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Perhaps the question of greatest concern to mankind today is that of how to prevent war. Those who think deeply on the subject, and a great many do, feel that the time has come when war must not merely be prevented from crisis to crisis, but that it must be eliminated as a social institution if civilization is to survive. Because of this urgent need to abolish war, the search for a permanent solution to man's big problem is becoming increasingly intensified. Among the efforts which he has made in recent times in his search for the answer to the problem of war is the North Atlantic Treaty which was signed in 1949 by 12 nations of the North Atlantic Area and joined later by 3 others.

Since its inception the organization of NATO has been the object of much and wide speculation and the question of its utility and/or success and even its functions is to date unresolved. To be sure almost everyone has an opinion about what NATO is or is not and about what it should or should not
become. The disparity of opinions on NATO runs from the idea that it interferes too much with the political independence of its members to the view that it is a framework for a greater Atlantic union or community and as such is considered too narrow in its outlook; from the idea of its being an organization primarily concerned with the security of the area which the Treaty encompasses to one which extends the Alliance to deal in affairs of the entire world.

It is understandable that there is widespread confusion about the purposes, functions, capacities, and limitations of NATO; for to date there has been no intensive study of the organization in terms of the possibilities of its becoming more than defense Alliance. There has been no plan, official or otherwise, whereby NATO would be politically or even economically united.

Most arguments advanced have been based on the dubious foundations of historical analogy, popular belief, and personal preference. There seems to be a sufficient amount of descriptive and analytical literature concerning NATO as a community as well as NATO as a defense pact, but no study has been made in which a criterion for analyzing mutual defense alliances in regard to their evolving into unified political alignments or for that matter the probability of their remaining valid as defense arrangements was used.

The present study is an attempt to establish a framework for an analysis of the political and strategic validity
of mutual defense alliances with the intention of using the North Atlantic Treaty Organization as a case study. It is hoped that the framework can be established from a study of the general problems of mutual defense alliances and of the essential conditions for establishing "security communities."

Common Problems of Mutual Defense Alliances

Throughout recorded history mutual defense alliances have come and gone, some lasting over long periods whereas others have been short lived. All mutual defense pacts from the Ancient Greeks to the present time have been plagued with certain recurring difficulties which as basic problems may be grouped under three broad headings: 1 The problem of establishment, the problem of cohesion, and the problem of effectiveness. It should be pointed out here that the fundamental problem, and one that can be included under all the broad headings, stems from the very definition of mutual defense alliances. By definition such alliances are agreements among sovereign states with each state bringing to the compact divergent national aims and policies. The members only bind themselves to exercise their sovereign power in prescribed

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ways when any other member may suffer an attack. Mutual defense alliances concluded among free nations are not only freely joined but are also freely withdrawn from by their members.

Defense alliances are not born; they are established, and therefore, must serve a given purpose. That is, a defense alliance is created for the purpose of defending the participating members against external physical force. Though the members may have divergent interests and reasons for committing themselves to an alliance (most members of most alliances do), they all have one thing in common: fear of an external threat. Once that fear disappears, the only thing that can hold the alliance together is the appearance of a new or greater menace. Thus the primary purpose of a defense alliance is to maintain security for its members. The alliance offers an alternative to being singled out and taken over by an adversary.

To create an alliance against hegemonic powers it is essential that the key state or core power make the first commitment. Smaller powers may lack the capabilities as well as the readiness to develop their strength, or they may not want to recognize that a threat exists. In any case, the larger power will then try to involve them despite their reluctance to become involved. Once the alliance is contracted it is expected that it will remain intact until its purpose is fulfilled. In fact, however, defense pacts are
highly vulnerable to break-up which brings up the major difficulty concerning mutual alliances—how to maintain cohesion.

The first and foremost problem concerning cohesion revolves around agreement by the participating parties on how much cohesion: that is, the question of how much unity does the pact want? and how much particularism can the pact stand? Too much unity can destroy the sense of responsibility of the allies. On the other hand, pluralism tends to fragmentation of common efforts.

One kind of break-up in alliances is when separate agreements are concluded between a participating ally and the adversary. This is similar to making a separate peace during wartime and the dislodging of allies by this means is an important goal of alliances and counter alliances. Although the ramifications of a separate peace in war-time may be greater, separate agreements that concern the cohesion of a peacetime alliance may be just as important, especially if the alliance is to deter war. In any case, an alliance is only as strong as its weakest link; hence pressure by the enemy can be expected to be applied at this point. However, this weakness is only a relative matter which increases and decreases in respect to the ambitions and goals of the member subject to pressure and the support of the other allies. It also must be noted that the major power is also susceptible to a separate agreement if to do so would consolidate gains.
in its own national interest. Some of the techniques that a would-be defector uses to break away from the alliance are to: (1) propose a course for the alliance necessitating sacrifices too great for the other allies, (2) apply for relief from some of his military burdens knowing that compliance cannot or will not be forthcoming, and (3) make demands for greater privileges and influence within the alliance than is commensurate with his contributions. The would-be defector is then freed from his loyalty to the pact when the other members do not cooperate.

Moreover, a partial-defection can be distinguished in peacetime alliances. For example, a limited interpretation of an ally's commitment to the pact, or when a member places restrictions on the use of the facilities it makes available to other members. The latter is a crucial point in the era of highly mobile strategic forces.

If alliances are to remain intact in spite of unexpected reverses, the bases for them must be rationalized. This calls into creation an ideology, which is the most important factor for institutionalizing alliances. A typical mutual defense agreement will distinguish the basis and usually, by implication, the limits of unity; it will be so constructed as to incite collective action while at the same time it will gloss over or hide inter-allied differences, interests, and strains. It will characterize the identity, intentions and capabilities of the adversary definitively
yet the statement of its own ulterior objective will be couched in tentative and general terms. All stages of an alliance—formation, implementation, and perpetuity—require special ideological support.

During the formative stages, the ideology must place emphasis on the collective interest of members and prospective members in combining their efforts and resources. Thus it must stress the common interests and at the same time ignore or at least minimize diversities among the members. During implementation the ideology must stress the seriousness of the opponents capabilities and intentions. And finally, to insure perpetuity, the ideology must stress the immutability as well as the immorality of the enemy; bestowing upon him magical powers of resurgence and incurable addiction to evil. However, this is not really enough since conflicts among allies tend to come to the fore. Thus to ensure cohesion the alliance will try to create a positive program to override disintegrative tendencies. But it must be said that creating a positive program is a formidable task, especially when the ideology comes to be differentiated more and more along nationalist lines.

Another important factor in regard to cohesion is the question of consultation within the alliance: whom to consult, what issues to consult on, and toward what objective? Consultation may, as cohesion, become an end goal; and may, as ideology, temporarily cover up basic discrepancies in alliances.
Consultation can be either an asset or a liability. It can be an asset if it affirms the unity and equality among the members; on the other hand it becomes a liability if too great an emphasis is placed on consultation—to the extent that it impedes the overall effectiveness of the alliance.

As a general rule lesser powers in a coalition take a realistic view on consultation. Their main concern is to be consulted in such a manner as to give reality to their standing within the pact. Usually it is on matters where they are directly involved that they will demand and exercise their right of veto. It is the major ally, or allies, that demands consultation. This demand stems from his desire to remain flexible: i.e., to have the opportunity to approve or veto certain actions, or to dissociate himself from the consequences of the smaller allies' actions. The real problem arises when the policy initiated becomes potentially fatal to all members. In this case the leading ally not only has the right to be consulted; he has the duty to consult the other allies when he shares the major responsibility. Probably a good rule of thumb for claiming the right to consultation could be based on capability, contribution to collective effort, and responsibility for allied action.

Nevertheless, the scope of consultation in any alliance will reflect the immediate needs and conveniences which also reflects the tendency of the coalition to be "limited" or "total" in respect to the degree of responsibility the allies
assume for each other's actions. To be total, an alliance must meet two conditions: It must practice complete solidarity, that is, the principle of "all for one and one for all", and it must do so all over the universe. On the other hand, a limited alliance will specify the commitment in regard to action and area. Consultation in a total alliance will, therefore, conform with the unlimited liability, whereas in the limited coalition, the limited commitment will also limit consultation. In any event, the degree of cohesion in a typical defense pact will be judged by separate actions taken and by the failure to consult.

No coalition, and especially no defense alliance, can long endure unless it can provide for the security needs of the participating members. To provide their security above all other interests, the alliance must be able to resist the pressures of the enemy. Any coalition constructed around a major power must depend on the capability of the strongest power which will in turn determine the degree of cohesion. This is especially true in a heterogeneous pact composed of nations of divergent interests. However the difficulty arises when national capabilities rise or decline. For example, the rising capabilities of the major power may give rise to cohesion and efficacy. On the other hand, coalitions of sovereign nations tend to seek some kind of balance within the alliance. It is never in lesser states' interest to replace the hegemonic tendencies of an enemy with those of a
predominate state, at least if they can avoid it. Unequal gains in capabilities among allies never favor cohesion, even when the coalition is created to cope with only one major conflict. An alliance's cohesion is in less danger of disintegration when it is on the defensive and needs all of its capability no matter how it is distributed. However, this is only one side of the coin. When there is an absence of a single conflict, the members' concern over each other's capabilities rises to the extent that unequal gains raises the fear that the successful ally will abandon the pact over issues less vital to his national interest.

With the advent of nuclear weapons the rule of capability as an agent of cohesion has taken on a new importance. The core-power of the coalition has gained in importance especially if he controls the nuclear forces. In this case, cohesion is loosened if the major power loses the trust of the other allies in regard to his use of the nuclear force in their behalf; if the alliance leader loses his immunity to direct attack; and if no other means of defense are available to the lesser powers. The alternative, of course, is diffusion of nuclear devices which in turn could lead to disintegration of an alliance.

Another important factor concerning alliance cohesion is the problem of national domestic stability produced by a change in the governing elites in member nations. It is always possible that the new government may reject the
alliance. Generally the new governing body will, in order to gain the confidence and respectability of continuity, retain membership in the coalition. On the other hand, rejection of the alliance is an important means of distinguishing the new group from the old regime. This can be especially important if the former governing elite was closely identified with, or used the alliance to keep itself in power. There is always the suspicion that an alliance serves to maintain the status quo within the member countries which in turn tends toward creating adverse reactions by the new government. There are recent examples where hard-pressed and shaky governments have sought concessions from alliances to avoid being deposed by the opposition.

Two factors that determine the cohesion of a defense pact are prestige and influence. Actually they are so similar in their use here that they can be incorporated in the common term status. Status is an especially divisive factor in heterogeneous coalitions. Ideally, higher status should derive from the amount of stability and security that a state contributes to the collectivity. In practice, there is the tendency to claim high status for past performance as well as for poor contributions in the areas of security and stability.

The importance of status is relatively new to alliances. It has reached the importance of territory with which classical alliances were concerned. Before contemporary alliances, members could evaluate their gains and liabilities
in concrete terms: expansion in territory for the price paid in men and money. Modern coalitions are more likely to be concerned with savings provided by security as opposed to an increase in territory. In any case, status is intangible and cannot be measured, but in modern alliances it has become tangible and stated in such indices as number of committee memberships, number of times a member is consulted on major policy, and number of high military commands held by each country. This leads to an intensified inter-allied struggle over status especially in terms of the relative standing of the lesser allies to the major power.

The status struggle within an alliance is not produced by external forces; it stems from the fact that the roles and the offices are determined by the members themselves as well as the fact that status is relative in character and cannot, like security, be increased for all members at the same time—if it is increased for one it is decreased for another.

Effectiveness of an alliance denotes the capacity of the members to reconcile their various needs and interests with an effective strategy for all. Cohesion and efficacy may have the same requirement, but not necessarily in all cases. For example, an alliance that emphasizes consultation or unanimity voting in order to hold the coalition together could destroy the efficacy by so doing. Defense strategy is simply plans for using force with the intent to prevail against
an enemy in the eventuality of having to fight him. Therefore, the essence of the defense alliance lies in its having an effective strategy.

Several difficulties surround the establishment of an effective strategy. The problem stems from the inability to know whether a strategy will succeed in operation unless and until it has failed of its basic purpose. Thus, accordingly, a planned strategy will be based on speculation and abstractions which, in a heterogeneous coalition, subjects strategy planning to the divergent views of each member; moreover, the most divisive factor in strategic planning evolves from each member's view of the threat. In all mutual defense alliances the perception and interpretation of the threat will determine the commitment; the commitment will set the purpose of strategy; and the strategy will distinguish the means for carrying out the commitment. One example should suffice to show the problem of establishing an effective strategy: The geographic location of each ally in relation to the prescribed enemy—the danger of the threat will be viewed as being greater with the closeness of the enemy.

Other difficulties develop over the employment of capability, both individual and collective. Employment of capability is equally as important as distribution of capability among members. One problem rises from the deployment of the coalition resources in different regions and theaters of operation. In fact, strategy as well as alliance
relationships themselves can be seriously strained when different members cannot agree on the importance of various areas, targets, and conflicts.

A major source of trouble in planning strategy is the enemy himself. The different ways in which the opposition applies pressure will affect the alliance's cohesion and strategy differently. For example, a sudden political demand or a military movement can and probably will cause a closing of ranks in the alliance. On the other hand, it can also expose inter-alliance conflicts or naked deficiency of strategy. The defense coalition is handicapped by the simple fact that it is a response to an external threat. Therefore, it does not have much leeway in planning strategy. Since alliances must respond to each new and different application of pressure they must remain flexible. This is especially true when a certain strategy has been successful or when a change in strategy might cause an increase in burdens and liabilities.

Still another difficulty common to defense alliances is the tendency to become dogmatic, i.e., the tendency to become and end in itself. When the alliance's preservation becomes the overriding factor in all situations, the particular interests which it is to serve will become obscure and thereby create a gap between the outer appearance and the inner-reality. This is highly likely to destroy predictability and stability which the alliance is supposed to create in relations among states.
A final difficulty that plagues mutual defense alliances is the fear by the members of loss of sovereignty. This fear is directed toward the allies as well as toward the potential enemy and is a condition which stems from the fact that each member has its own identity, prestige and interests which it is determined to preserve. Ideally, the members would prefer to make their own defense, but this being impossible the next preference is the defense of their own specific interests within a climate of alliance political agreement, i.e., each to have the support of its allies for its own position. Fear of losing sovereignty also directs members to avoid agreements that would limit their freedom of action. Thus allies will generally shun binding decisions on individual or collective activities outside the area covered by the treaty. A related fear in this regard revolves around the possibility that an ally's outside activity could involve the entire coalition in an unwanted confrontation.

This difficulty has become amplified with the development of nuclear weapons. Nuclear capability has to many states become the symbol of power and, therefore, the symbol of independence. Thus the allies in contemporary pacts tend to desire to retain an independent military posture for all eventualities. To do so it is necessary to develop a substantial nationally controlled nuclear capability. The stronger the capability, the stronger becomes the nation in
the realm of negotiations. A nuclear state must be taken into consideration in diplomacy and military strategy by both allies and adversaries alike. In other words, national control over nuclear weapons enhances a country's position in cold-war diplomacy by increasing the likelihood of the country's inclusion and strengthening its voice in serious negotiations.

In sum it is possible to say that almost every defense pact voluntarily entered into from earliest history has been based upon self-interest of the contracting nations. Not only does history show that alliances are based on temporary self-interests of their members, it also shows another simple fact—almost all coalitions have broken up the moment they cease to serve the members' interests. It is, therefore, possible to say that the real test of all alliances revolves around one central question: Do the terms of the agreement still offer mutual advantages? If the conditions are such that the interests of the alliance members no longer converge and the changing trend cannot be reversed, the coalition will be held together only by the inertia created by institutionalization which may keep an organization going after interests cease to be served.

Characteristics of "Security-Communities"

The topics of "political integration," "political-communities," and "security-communities," concerning
integration in the political, social, and economic spheres of such communities, have been the subject of extensive research by various authors in recent years. These studies made extensive analyses of several cases in which political order-building had attained the level of "security-communities," a level at which war among the members is practically out of the question. These authors distinguished two types of "security-communities:" "Amalgamated," i.e., one resulting from a formal federation of two or more independent entities into a single larger unit (e.g. the United States, or Switzerland); and the second, "pluralistic," made up of legal independent separate governments (e.g. the United States, Britain and Canada).

Though little enough is still known about the necessary requirements for successful integration, or in what

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order they need occur, these authors have identified several conditions as important and perhaps crucial. Among others they include: a degree of cultural similarity or at least agreement on the major politically relevant values, economic interdependence, and the existence of formal institutions with substantial consensus-building effects. In other words, the researchers found a compatibility of values among the participating states. These common values were most helpful when they were united in similar types of political institutions, thus creating a common "way of life."

Another characteristic is an increase in the political and administrative capabilities of the participating entities, along with the superior economic growth within the region. Other characteristics of the "security-community" appear to be the presence of a multiplicity of unbroken links of social communications and considerable social mobility of people among the states concerned. And finally, a degree of mutual predictability of behavior is considered a prerequisite for any "security-community."

No one of these is a sufficient condition for successful integration and research has not yet established with certainty whether any are necessary conditions. Yet it seems likely that they are essential for any successful federation of previously political entities (amalgamated security-community); and they are probably of major importance, though to a lesser extent for long-term peaceful cooperation.
among legally separate sovereign states (pluralistic security-community).

Despite the fact that there were several positive findings, it should also be noted that there were some negative findings regarding the integrative process. For example, the authors destroyed or at least subjected to serious doubt the basic myths for those who argue that the nation state is on the way to extinction, and that there is a trend toward political universality. In fact, it was found that it is hard to find the successful formation of a security-community in the twentieth century. Also the belief that the success of one security-community leads to the establishment of others (the bandwagon effect), was found to be invalid. And finally, the popular notion that fear of war or of anarchy among themselves led states to regional integration is unfounded. On the other hand, it is discovered that external threats usually lead to mutual defense pacts, but mutual defense alliances are generally transitory and do not turn out to be a good road toward establishing a "security-community."

In summary, and especially for the frame of reference, the concern is in the realm of political union. Here political union means any arrangement under which autonomous policy formulation is given up by existing states in regard to an important area of policy. Political Union covers a wide spectrum or range of situations--from the confederal
agreement between two or more entities with shared political interests and goals to the federal unified state. However, a confederation among states may or may not meet the requirements of a political union. The mark of union is whether or not there is actually a delegation of political power to a central governmental institution. Any arrangement that merely sets up an institutionalized council composed of states instructed delegates without the power to finalize decision making is not a political union in the real sense of the term. On the other hand, the successful or true political union is reached when the governing elites of the compacting states cease to identify themselves and their loyalty solely with their national state, and when power is delegated to the larger unit and lodged in a centralized organ for final decision-making.

Scope

In order to apply the North Atlantic Treaty Organization to the above criterion in the form of a case study, this work will concern itself with some of the Organization's major problem areas. However, to set the groundwork for a fuller understanding of the problems confronting the alliance, the study will begin with a descriptive analysis of NATO respecting the reason for, the purpose of, and the growth of the Organization. In addition, a description of the political and military organizational structure that has evolved out of the treaty will be given.
The first, and major, part of the study will be a thorough examination of the problem area of the development of the Alliance's strategy and the role of nuclear weapons within that strategy. In this area particular emphasis will be placed on the problems arising out of the United States' domination of the Organization's strategic planning and United States control of nuclear weapons. Included in the examination will be an investigation of Washington's efforts to establish an acceptable NATO nuclear force. An examination will also be made of what is possibly NATO's foremost problem—the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Though adverse ramifications from the spread of nuclear weapons could be almost unlimited, four seem of major importance to this study: the increased possibility of accidental wars, the possible effects of a nuclear-armed West Germany, the possible effects on disarmament, and the possible effects on NATO strategy.

Further, an analysis will be made of some nuclear strategies from which the Alliance may choose in face of nuclear diffusion. These alternatives will include the rejection of nuclear weapons, the establishment of independent nuclear forces, the establishment of a NATO nuclear force, and the complete control of all of the Alliance's nuclear weapons by the United States.

The remaining part of the study will look into the problem area arising out of changing world conditions, the
changing nature of the Alliance, and the changing views of the nature of the Soviet threat. Here the opinions of the leaders of NATO member nations will be examined in regard to how they view NATO's role within these changed conditions. An inquiry will be made into Soviet policy statements, ideology, and action in foreign relations in order to determine the nature of the Soviet threat. And finally, the views of some of the leaders of NATO nations will be examined in an effort to determine the present need for and purposes of the Organization.

Since this study is primarily concerned with the political and strategic problems of mutual defense alliances in general, and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in particular, and not in community-building, the emphasis will concern the political sphere. No attempt will be made to discuss the social and economic spheres. Not that the economic and social spheres are less important, but that they in themselves constitute the subject of a broader and more thorough treatment than can be here undertaken.

Another limitation to the scope of this study revolves around the amount of coverage given each problem in relation to the number of different possible views on each problem. For example, the organization is made up of fifteen signatory powers which means it is safe to say there are at least fifteen divergent views on every action--yet there can be, and is, agreement on the great majority of actions taken.
However, this study is going to emphasize, in the main, the problems as they affect the four leading members of the Alliance—Britain, France, West Germany, and the United States. Here again this limitation is not due to lack of importance of the lesser states but more to the lack of time and space in this undertaking. The smaller states are important to the organization, not only in respect to their geographical location and population, but also as a part of the glue or unifying factor of the Alliance. It is possible to make the statement that although the lesser nations are not completely pleased with the organization they seem to more or less accept the United States’ domination in return for their security and still feel that they are making a contribution. The position and attitude of the smaller members is probably stated best by Paul-Henri Spaak one of Europe’s truly great statesmen:

What would become of the smaller countries if NATO were destroyed? They would have to take refuge in unilateral disarmament and political neutrality. Who believes that a small country like Belgium, which an aeroplane can cross from North to South in two minutes and from East to West in three-and-a-half minutes, can maintain a completely independent army and air force and still have access to the weapons that would be effective in a possible war? Thrown back upon our own resources, we could not hope to create nuclear forces and as a result our military effort would become pointless. We can only reasonably ask of our peoples a sacrifice and expenditures of these dimensions if we integrate our military effort into an overall system.³

and again by a former Prime Minister of Greece, Panayotis Pipinelis, when he said:

In the matter of Atlantic, or indeed of any other kind of defense, the problem of the smaller countries is essentially not one of dimension or quantity; it is incontestably qualitative. The acquisition of one or the other weapons system . . . might be denied the smaller if only for economic reasons. A country whose diminutive area renders it at first sight insignificant can, because of its geographical position, be of prime importance to the Alliance's strategy.

. . . . . . . . . .

. . . furthermore participation with the right of veto in all levels of an integrated alliance offers the smaller countries a share in influencing common decisions that they could not hope for otherwise. It seems to me difficult to deny that, far from being diminished by this form of integration, the small countries are in fact elevated by it, in a limited way perhaps but in one which in certain cases of disagreement might become decisive.4

CHAPTER II

ORIGINS OF NATO

Background To The Treaty

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was established on April 4, 1949, when representatives from Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, the United Kingdom, and the United States met in Washington and signed the North Atlantic Treaty. Greece and Turkey joined the Alliance in 1952, while West Germany, the last member to join, was included in 1955.¹

NATO began essentially as a military alliance. The decision of the member nations to unite for their collective defense was brought about by the demonstrated intention of the Soviet Union to expand its systems by force, threat of force, and subversion. The Soviet Union had held intact a combined military force of some 175 wartime divisions and 20,000 planes and had sought to create a climate in which

Western Europe could be taken over piecemeal by any method short of war.\textsuperscript{2}

Thus, NATO was created in response to a long series of moves by Russia in which she used aggression and conquest, principally through subversion either in the direct pressure of or in the shadow of the Red Army. In 1947, Poland, Hungary, Bulgaria, and Rumania had been taken over by internal Communist parties even though these parties were in the minority.

As early as 1945, the USSR was active in giving aid to Communist rebels in Greece. It also brought pressure to bear on Iran in order to keep Soviet troops in North Iran, and at the same time, the USSR was pressuring Turkey for territory and bases in the Straits.

In February 1948, when Czechoslovakia fell to a Communist form of government, the West was shocked into full awareness that the period of peace and security they had hoped would follow World War II was not going to be realized. The West had reduced its armed forces below the security level and had placed their faith in the new United Nations and United States monopoly of atomic power for the maintenance of peace and the settlement of international disputes. But Russia had rendered the UN powerless for maintaining peace and security by abusing its power of veto in the Security

\textsuperscript{2}Ibid., p. 7.
Council. The Soviet had used the veto no less than thirty times by 1949.³

The Western Nations had begun to realize that the USSR was a growing menace and that, in order to thwart this menace, they must unite. For example, in March 1947, Britain and France had met in the historic town of Dunkirk and signed the first of the post war alliances. Although the Dunkirk pact was directed against aggression of Germany, rather than Russia, it had a clause that suggested defense against Russian aggression through the usage of East German forces since it provided defense against a threat arising from "action by Germany designed to facilitate . . . a policy" of aggression.⁴ The real importance of the Dunkirk pact lay in the fact that it showed a trend toward European collaboration, and that it was a forerunner of the Brussels Treaty.

Exactly one year later, March 1948, Britain and France met with Belgium, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands at Brussels and signed a 50-year Treaty of Economic, Social and Cultural Collaboration, and Collective Self-Defense, The signatory members pledged that if any one should be "the object of an armed attack in Europe," the others would


provide "all military aid and other assistance in their power."\(^5\)

The Brussels Treaty was also aimed directly at protection against German aggression. The "preamble" binds the signatory nations "to take such steps as may be held to be necessary in the event of a renewal by Germany of a policy of aggression."\(^6\) But by this time, the United States, which had shouldered the responsibility of aid to Greece and Turkey to resist Communism under the "Truman Doctrine," was interested in defense against Russian aggression. Britain had also become more interested in Russian aggression and the "real pre-occupation of the . . . British government was the eventuality of a Soviet attack on Western Europe."\(^7\)

Although the United States was not a signatory of the Brussels Treaty, President Truman welcomed its signing and stated that it was the intention of the United States to match the determination of the free countries of Europe to protect themselves "by an equal determination on our part to help them."\(^8\)


\(^6\)Ibid., p. 53.

\(^7\)Royal Institute of International Affairs, \textit{Britain in Western Europe} (London: Oxford University Press, 1956), p. 8.

In June 1948, the USSR, by means of a blockade, attempted to force the West out of Berlin. Since the status of Berlin was uncertain and rights of passage to and from the city were nowhere guaranteed in Allied agreement, the USSR hoped by this movement to shove the Allies out of that city and thus consolidate their hold on East Germany. (An Allied Airlift was to eventually break the blockade in 1949.)

The Brussels Treaty had set up a joint military organization for common military defense under the direction of British Field Marshal Montgomery, but in view of the massive strength of the Soviet Union the five signatory nations clearly did not have at their disposal the means to create a sufficient defense. "Only the strength of America, founded on an immense industrial potential and possession of the atomic arm, could redress the overwhelming imbalance of power." However the Brussels Treaty was another step toward a collective defense system for the Western World.

In 1948, the Canadian Prime Minister Louis St. Laurent proposed a single all-embracing Atlantic Defense System to incorporate the Brussels Alliance. An Atlantic Alliance met with immediate approval in Britain, and there was a general mood for acceptance of such an alliance in America.

It is not surprising that the atmosphere in regard to an Atlantic Alliance was becoming favorable in America.

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although such an alliance in peacetime would be a complete change in America's traditional foreign policy based on fear of "entangling alliances" which dated back to George Washington's Farewell Address. The change in thinking started when the United States assumed responsibility for aid to Greece and Turkey after Britain declared herself unable to carry out her responsibilities in that area. The Marshall Plan, instituted in 1947, for the economic recovery of Europe was another step toward this changing atmosphere. Gradually Americans began to realize that piecemeal takeovers of territory and extension of power by the USSR was a great threat to American security; to meet this threat the United States would have to participate in European and world affairs. This realization culminated in the so-called Vandenberg Resolution.

The Resolution, proposed by Senator Vandenberg, affirmed the right of the Government to exercise individual or collective defense under Article 51 of the United Nations Charter. It authorized the Government to associate itself with regional defense arrangements when they were based on "continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid" and when they contribute to the security of the United States.\(^\text{10}\) The Resolution was adopted in the U.S. Senate by a decisive

majority (64-4) on June 11, 1948, and thus paved the way for a comprehensive Atlantic Defense System.

Meanwhile, other steps toward the new union were being taken. The United States began to participate as observers in the meetings of the Defense Committee of the Brussels Pact. This participation grew from observer to advisor stage. In October 1948, the Consultative Committee of the Brussels Treaty announced "complete agreement in principle for a North Atlantic Defense Pact," and on December 10, the actual drafting of the treaty began in Washington, D.C.  

During the initial drafting period discussions took place between the five Brussels Pact countries and the United States. Canada, Denmark, Iceland, Italy, Norway, and Portugal were invited to take part in the negotiations. These countries accepted and, after two months of negotiations, the North Atlantic Treaty was signed by the twelve original nations on April 4, 1949.

The North Atlantic Treaty and the Brussels Treaty were much alike in purpose and goals:

---the peaceful settlement of disputes and abstinence from force or the threat of force. (Article 1)  
---economic collaboration among the signatory countries. (Article 2)

--the strengthening of the means for resisting aggression. (Article 3)
--consultation in the event of any signatory being threatened. (Article 4)
--mutual assistance in case of aggression. (Article 5)\textsuperscript{12}

But there were major differences in the two treaties. The Brussels Treaty was specifically aimed at German aggression, whereas the North Atlantic Treaty, though covering attack against any aggressor, was primarily aimed at the Communist World. Article 4 of the Brussels Treaty guaranteed military support in case of an attack on one of the signatory nations, while the North Atlantic Treaty was vague on the military commitment. Article 6 states that should an attack on any signatory country occur, each country will take "such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force," which did not bind any country to the use of force.\textsuperscript{13}

One other major difference was the length of effectiveness of the treaties. Whereas the Brussels Treaty was to continue for a period of fifty years, the North Atlantic Treaty could be reviewed after ten years upon request by any member, and after twenty years a member could secede upon a year's notice.

Growth Of The Organization

Although NATO was not to be the all-embracing Atlantic defense system that Prime Minister St. Laurent of

\begin{footnotesize}
\textsuperscript{12}See Appendix for full text of the Treaty.
\textsuperscript{13}Ibid.
\end{footnotesize}
Canada had proposed, it was not to become an exclusive organi-
ization. Article 10 assures that it can be extended if it
is required but it also limits extension to those European
countries that would strengthen the Alliance. Article 10
stipulates that "The Parties may, by unanimous agreement,
invite any other European State in a position to further the
principles of this Treaty and contribute to the security of
the North Atlantic area to accede to this treaty." The
NATO founders were of the opinion that to invite non-Euro-
peans could complicate the Alliance's task of self defense.
The founders were also of the opinion that not every European
country would be welcome; only those that were prepared to
promote the NATO principles both at home and abroad, that is,
to work for the preservation of peace and the extension of
freedom. Had the founders not incorporated these limitations
into the treaty it would have been possible for the Soviet
Union or any one of the satellites to join NATO and thereby
disrupt the cohesion and spirit which are basic to the strength
of any alliance. With the Soviets as members, NATO could be
paralyzed, as was the U.N. Security Council, by a veto.
Russian Foreign Minister Molotov probably had such a move in
mind in March, 1954, when he suggested that the Soviet Union
might be prepared to join NATO.  

\[14 \text{Ibid.}\]
\[15 \text{For the text of the Soviet note in regard to its}
The unanimity clause in Article 10 is also a limitation on membership. Spain which is considered of importance to the defense strategy of Western Europe has not been invited to join. Such suggestions were blocked by strong opposition from the Scandinavian countries. They were strongly opposed to the Spanish government headed by General Franco. Nevertheless Spain is an indirect part of the defense system and has been since 1953, when a bilateral agreement was concluded between Spain and the United States whereby the United States leased bases for the Strategic Air Command (SAC) bombers and naval bases for United States ships assigned to the Mediterranean fleet.

Greece And Turkey Accede To NATO

The organization, however has grown since 1949. In February, 1952, Greece and Turkey gained membership in the organization as a result of the heightened tension of the Korean War. Both countries desired entry to get a formal guarantee against invasion from the North. Turkey feared being left out of the defense perimeter, and being made subject to another incident such as Korea. Greece had fought internal conspirators for several years, and thought that a

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guarantee from NATO could prevent a recurrence of such turmoil. Turkey, however, was not qualified to join, that is, geographically, since she was in Asia Minor. Politically and strategically though Turkey was on the European frontier. Furthermore, both Greece and Turkey were receiving unilateral support, in their struggle against Communist subversion, from the United States under the "Truman Doctrine," and therefore, the United States pressed hard for their entry. After overcoming some objections from the Allies, especially the Scandinavians who "were deeply worried by what they regarded as a watering-down of the Atlantic and democratic character of NATO and an extension of their obligations to an area remote from them," they finally acceded to the treaty by the "Greece-Turkey Protocol."\(^{18}\)

West Germany Accedes To NATO

West Germany, the last member to join the Alliance, was able to accede only after a bitter struggle, of crisis magnitude, within the Alliance. The struggle was not over the extension of obligation or commitment of the treaty to defend West Germany, but over the delicate subject of German rearmament. The security of West Germany was already guaranteed, at least indirectly, by Article 6 of the treaty. Article 6,\(^{17}\)


\(^{18}\)Moore, *op. cit.*, p. 28.
which defines the North Atlantic Treaty Area, stipulates that "an armed attack on one or more of the Parties is deemed to include an armed attack . . . on the occupation forces of any party in Europe. . . ." Therefore, an attack on West Germany would have been an attack on Britain, France and the United States since all had occupation forces in West Germany. In fact, this clause of the treaty still commits NATO to the defense of Berlin so long as Britain, France, and the United States retain occupational forces in that city.

West German participation in the defense of the West was first considered and declared a necessity at the fifth session of the North Atlantic Council, meeting in New York on September 15, 1950. The Council, meeting for the first time since the outbreak of the Korean War, concentrated its efforts on a single problem: how to defend West Europe against a similar attack. The Council realized that the Alliance was far from ready to repel such an attack, but it was also in unanimous agreement that to repel a Korean type attack it must adopt a strategy to defend as far East as possible. But this in turn meant that the Allies would have to furnish far greater resources and manpower than were available at that time in Europe. 

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19 See Appendix for full text of the treaty.

20 NATO: Facts About The North Atlantic Treaty Organization, op. cit., p. 22. NATO countries could boast approximately fourteen armed divisions on the continent as opposed to some 210 Soviet armed divisions.
The United States took the lead in this crisis and proposed that NATO should seek to build "an integrated force under centralized command, which shall be adequate to deter aggression and insure the defense of Western Europe." Under this plan the United States would furnish an outstanding officer (General Eisenhower) and an increased number of American troops under his command in Europe. This proposal also called for an increase in aid for the enlargement of European forces. And, since the "forward strategy" called for defending Europe as far as possible, including the defense of West Germany, the integrated NATO forces must also include "the participation of German units and the use of German productive resources for its supplies."

The proposal of an integrated force with German participation had a resounding impact in two different quarters. First, in the United States, it set off a bitter debate in Congress on sending troops to Europe. Second, in Europe, it set off a bitter debate on the rearmament of Germany. The first, that is the Congressional debate, is of no moment for this inquiry so suffice it to say that the United States in the end "faced the problem which it had avoided when it ratified the North Atlantic Treaty, and sent

\[21\] Moore, op. cit., p. 44.

troops to Europe.” On the other hand, the impact on Europe of the rearming of Germany is important since it is directly related to the major political and strategic problems; it is directly related to the desires for a share in the control of nuclear weapons within the Alliance and the fears of some of the Allies over the possibility of Germany becoming a nuclear power or even sharing in a nuclear weapons system.

When France saw that the United States was determined to bring Germany into the defense of Europe, she reacted immediately with a plan of her own. It had been no more than five years since Germany's defeat in World War II, and opposition to the idea of German rearmament remained strong in Europe, particularly in France. French Premier Rene Pleven proposed a plan for a unified European force which would incorporate German troops. The Pleven Plan (later to be called the European Defense Community, EDC) was not only for the purpose of bringing Germany in as a participant in her own and European defense, but more as a means of keeping a check on a strong and revitalized Germany.

In any case the Pleven Plan was a unique and bold move toward a European union. It provided for an army composed

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23 Moore, op. cit., p. 44.

24 Bruce M. Russet, International Regions And The International System: A Study Of Political Ecology (Chicago: Rand McNally and Company, 1967), p. 204. According to Russet, some observers feel that the French desire for an independent nuclear force is due as much to fear of Germany as of the Soviets. However, he sees little evidence of this.
of mixed divisions and integrated staffs and support units. The army would be under the orders of a Supreme Command appointed by a Parliament of member countries. The army was to be financed by a common European defense budget, equipped with standardized arms, uniformly clothed and uniformly trained. This was "a bold step toward European military union."\(^{25}\)

Britain announced its inability to join a defense community one month after the Pleven proposal. Britain had always rejected any proposal which in any respect would limit her national sovereignty. Furthermore, as a Chatham House Report stressed in 1953, "Britain is a world power with vital interests outside Europe which preclude a complete merger with European neighbors and restrict what it can do for Western Europe."\(^{26}\) (Although Britain temporarily set aside this policy in later joining the Western European Union, it was basically this same attitude that kept her out of the Common Market.)

The United States had been pressing the Europeans to form a unified Europe since instituting the Marshall Plan, but American reaction to the French plan was far from enthusiastic. The United States viewed the Pleven Plan as no more than a means of delaying the building of European defenses.

\(^{25}\)Moore, op. cit., p. 46.

\(^{26}\)Atlantic Alliance, op. cit., p. 2.
The federalist elements in the plan were certain to lead to prolonged controversy, complicated negotiations, and postponement of the rearmament of Germany. Therefore, the United States argued for the direct integration of German troops into NATO rather than by way of a European army. As a compromise it was agreed, at the NATO Council meeting in Brussels on December 18, 1950, "in principle" to a German contribution to defense. Meanwhile the Council invited Britain, France, and the United States to explore, in cooperation with Germany, a means for effecting this decision. 27

As it turned out the United States viewed the Pleven Plan correctly. Due to delay in negotiation the idea of a European Defense Community (EDC) was not agreed to by France, Germany, Italy, and the Benelux countries until May, 1952. A year later the six governments had forged and signed a treaty to create the EDC and it was waiting for ratification. The EDC Treaty was basically the Pleven Plan—except France had negotiated several alterations, such as, the right to retain national forces for overseas interests and the right to withdraw forces, if necessary, for overseas interests. It was still another year, the Spring of 1954, before four countries had ratified the treaty. Neither France nor Italy had yet ratified it although it was expected that Italy would ratify the treaty soon after France.

In June, 1954, a new French government under Pierre Mendis-France took office. The new French government immediately asked for concessions in the treaty which would reduce the degree of army integration and supranational control. The other five nations balked at this point, and France was left to decide the fate of its own proposal.

On August 30, 1954, the French Assembly rejected the EDC Treaty by a vote of 319-264. The reasons for the French rejection are many and varied, but it is generally agreed that the major reasons were the reduction of tension brought on by the Korean Truce, the failure of Britain to join as a counter-weight to a strong Germany, and the distrust of supranational institutions as a check on Germany. Ben T. Moore aptly summed up the reasons for the rejection when he said, "The decision turned on national pride, particularly sensitive because of the recent withdrawal from Indo-China, and the pervasive fear of Germany." 28

The failure of the EDC left Europe in a state of confusion. A decided anti-French bias immediately developed in the United States, Britain, and Germany, and NATO was at a breaking point. NATO had adopted a strategy at the 1952 NATO Council meeting in Lisbon which called for incorporation of German troops into a central NATO army. The rejection automatically invalidated this strategy and left NATO with two

28 Moore, op. cit., p. 53.
alternatives: (1) they could go ahead and rearm Germany without the consent of the French; (2) they could set up air bases and rely on retaliatory strength to deter aggression, and give up the idea of maintaining ground troops for that purpose. Either choice would possibly have destroyed NATO.

Britain, however, under the Eden government, suggested a third alternative: the establishment of a new organization. The British invited representatives from Canada, the United States, Germany, Italy and the five Brussels Treaty countries to London for discussions. The discussions resulted in several decisions which were agreed to later in Paris. The "Paris Agreements" were signed by all representatives on October 23, 1954, and ratified by France in December, 1954.\footnote{The NATO Handbook, op. cit., p. 61.}

The agreements embodied the following decisions:

--Germany and Italy became members of a revised Brussels Treaty with a revised title of Western European Union (WEU).

--The end of the occupation of Germany, but the West German government agreed to the maintainence of the allied troops already stationed there.

--Agreement on forces to be maintained by each member, and a system of control over armaments and force level.

--Britain would undertake to maintain substantial troops on the continent for an indefinite period.
Germany became a direct member of NATO (May 5, 1955).

Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) would have control of all forces except member countries stationed within the areas of his command. 30

The modified Brussels Treaty had finally removed the barb against German aggression. But it was replaced by a restriction on rearmament that has become almost as painful to Germany as the declaration against German aggression. Under the WEU Protocol III, West Germany undertook not to manufacture any atomic, biological, or chemical (ABC) weapons. Germany can manufacture missiles, warships, and strategic bombers with approval of two-thirds of the WEU Council. Protocol IV sets up an agency for control of armaments whose job is to make sure provisions of Protocol III are carried out. 31 Thus, Germany is the only NATO member that is barred from developing nuclear weapons.

The price that the United States had to pay in order to achieve the participation of Germany in the defense of Europe was a promise to keep U.S. forces in Europe as long as was necessary.

Basically there were similarities in the new WEU and the abortive EDC. The main function of WEU would be to


31Ibid., p. 380.
administer control over the military strength of its continental members; and to exercise a more rigid control over Germany than the other members as was planned under the EDC Treaty. The integration of German units within the NATO army was but a watered-down version of the arrangements precluded by a European army. On the other hand, the WEU discarded the common defense budget, common production, and the common uniform ideas as were contemplated by EDC. This was a setback to those who were advocating a European union. (The EDC had been a bold attempt toward a federal Europe, but it ended in utter failure.)

The question might be asked: Why was France willing to accept the rearmament of Germany in less than four months after rejecting her own proposal? There has been considerable speculation on the answers to this question, but it is probably safe to state that there were five major reasons for France's change: First, Britain had broken from her centuries-long tradition, and had committed forces to the WEU, thereby easing France's fear of a revitalized German army.

Second, France realized that to reject the WEU might possibly lead to the dismantling of NATO. France realized as much as any other member that NATO was her basic security.

Third, the United States' promise that it would keep forces in Europe allayed much of France's fear of Germany becoming the predominant power of the new union. This was coupled with the fact that the United States would off-set
German predominance in the broader Alliance.

Fourth, the economic integration of France and Germany by the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) was beginning to show positive results. Many Frenchmen believed that the ECSC did give France some measure of control over a resurgent Germany.

Finally, the WEU was not as obnoxious to the French nationalist faction as had been the defunct EDC. Under WEU, France would retain her army as a national force, and France would not disappear as a nation. The disappearance of France as a great power and even as a nation had been the major nationalists' argument over the EDC Treaty in the French Assembly.32

The Present Structure Of NATO

Article 9 of the treaty provided for a Council to be "so organized as to be able to meet promptly at anytime," and the Council was given discretion to create subsidiary agencies with emphasis on defense.33 The first major action of the Council was, therefore, the establishment of a defense committee, and by the end of 1949, NATO had a loose "strategic concept" planned for the defense of the treaty area.34

32 Moore, op. cit., pp. 50-51.
33 See Appendix for full text of the treaty.
Since 1949, the organizational structure has grown considerably and today the structure includes the North Atlantic Council and its committees, the International Secretariat, and the Military Structure.

The Civil Structure

The North Atlantic Council is the highest authority of NATO, with a permanent headquarters in Brussels, Belgium. It is composed of representatives of the fifteen sovereign and equal member states. Since the member states are sovereign and equal in status, the Council's decisions are taken unanimously.

The Council generally meets at the ministerial level twice a year. At the Ministerial Meetings, the agenda determines who will represent the members. It can be one or several of the nation's ministers, such as Finance, Foreign Affairs, Defense, or even Heads of Government. The Council met at the level of Heads of Government in December 1957. However, in order to ensure the continuous functioning of the Council, Permanent Representatives, who hold Ambassadorial

35 North Atlantic Treaty Organization, The NATO Handbook (Brussels, Belgium: NATO Information Service, 1968), p. 11. In June of 1966, after French President De Gaulle announced that France intended to withdraw from the military organization of NATO, the Council decided on Brussels as the new permanent political headquarters. The Brussels headquarters for the Council, the Military Committee, and the International Secretariat was inaugurated on October 16, 1967. All of NATO's organizations have been transferred from French territory.
rank, meet between Ministerial Sessions. The permanent Representatives meet once or more a week, and can also be called together on short notice any time. The president of the Council is a Foreign Minister of a member state. This office rotates annually among the member states, according to alphabetical order in English.

The Committees are charged with assisting the Council in carrying out its role. There are numerous Committees; some of a permanent nature; others temporary. Each committee membership is composed of representatives from each member state. Each committee is charged with responsibility in areas according to subject matter. For example, the Political Committee, established in 1957, is responsible for preparing the political agenda for the Council. Mainly the Committees study questions and make recommendations on important matters submitted to them by the Council.

Some of the most important Committees would include (after the political committee); The Defense Planning Committee which was established in 1963. This Committee deals with all matters connected with integration of the common defense; it is the coordinating body for planning the defense of the "fourteen" members. The Nuclear Defense Affairs Committee, open to all NATO countries, and a Nuclear Planning Group of seven members, were established in December of 1966. Other important Committees are: the Science Committee; the Infrastructure Committee; the Committee for Pipelines; the
The International Secretariat is composed of a staff selected from all member nations and headed by a Secretary General. The Secretary General is Chairman of the Council, and exercises that capacity whatever the level at which the Council meets: that is, Permanent Representatives or Heads of Government. He is responsible for the direction of the International Staff and Secretariat. In his absence he is replaced by a deputy Secretary General. The Deputy Secretary General also assists him in the exercise of his role.

The Secretariat is divided into numerous Divisions according to the Principle activities of NATO. Some of the several divisions of the Secretariat are: the Division of Political affairs; the Division of Defense Planning and Policy; the Division of Defense Support; the Division of Scientific Affairs; and others.  

The Military Structure

The Military Committee is composed of a Chief-of-Staff from each member country except Iceland and France.  

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NATO's Civil Structure was taken from The NATO Handbook (1968), op. cit., pp. 9-14; See chart on p. 54 for general view of NATO's civil structure.

Iceland may be represented in the Committee by a civilian since it has no military forces. France's withdrawal from NATO commands also involved withdrawal from military affairs concerning NATO. Thus France does not associate herself with military decisions.
This Committee is the Supreme Military Authority of NATO and is responsible to the Council for the defense of the whole treaty area. It is also charged with the direction of NATO's military agencies and commands. Until October 1967, the Military Committee met in Washington, D.C., since that date it is headquartered in Brussels, Belgium.

The Military Committee meets regularly, and whenever necessary on short notice. In order to enable the Committee to continue in permanent session, however, each Chief-of-Staff selects a Permanent Military Representative. The Permanent Military Representatives exercise effective powers of decision on questions which come within the area of the Military Committee. Nevertheless, some questions by nature and scope require Chief-of-Staff approval. The major responsibility of the Military Committee calls for making recommendations for defense of the treaty area and supplying direction on military matters to subordinate commands.

The International Military Staff is a new group which was established by the Council, meeting in Ministerial Session, on June 8, 1966. This new integrated Staff replaced the Standing Group which was abolished at the same meeting. Each member nation, except France, is represented in this new group, whereas the Washington Standing Group was composed of representatives only from France, Great Britain, and the United States.

The International Military Staff acts as the executive agent of the Military Committee, and in that capacity ensures
that policies and decisions are implemented as directed. In addition, the Staff prepares plans, initiates studies, and makes recommendations on matters of military nature.

The North Atlantic Treaty Area is divided, so as to account for geographical as well as political factors, into three Commands and a Regional Planning Group. These Commands exercise authority in varying forms conditioned by peacetime or wartime. For example, the armed forces of member nations remain under national control and command in peacetime. However, some of them may be earmarked or actually assigned to NATO Commands.

The NATO Commanders are charged with the development of defense planning for their respective areas, for determining number of forces needed, and for the deployment of forces under their authority.

The European Command covers the allied countries in Europe, from North Cape to the Mediterranean and from the Atlantic to the eastern border of Turkey. Both the United Kingdom and Portugal are excluded from the European Command's responsibility: Portugal is covered by the Atlantic Command, while the United Kingdom is not covered by any of the major commands.

This area is under the authority of the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR), first headed by General Eisenhower and later by Generals Ridgway, Gruenther, Norstad and at the present by General Lemnitzer—all United States
Generals. SACEUR's headquarters, commonly known as SHAPE (Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe), are located near Mons in Belgium (Inaugurated March 31, 1967). To implement the defense of this area SACEUR has four subordinate divisions: the Northern European Command; the Central European Command; the Southern European Command; and the United Kingdom Air Defense Region.

The Atlantic Ocean Commands extend from the tropic of Cancer to the North Pole and from the shores of North America to the shores of Europe and Africa. This area includes Portugal and islands such as Iceland and the Azores, but excludes Britain and the Channel.

The area is under the responsibility of the Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic (SACLANT), whose headquarters are located at Norfolk, Virginia. Just as SACEUR has been headed only by Americans so has SACLANT.

SACLANT does not have a permanent force of assigned navies of ships, but it is in charge of those forces that are assigned at different times for training purposes.

To ensure effective defense of this broad area, the Atlantic Ocean Command is further divided into the Western Atlantic, the Eastern Atlantic, the Striking Fleet, the Submarine, and the Iberian Atlantic Commands.

The Channel Command (CHANCOM), is composed of Naval Chiefs-of-Staff from Belgium, the Netherlands, and Britain, which form the Channel Committee. This Command,
headed by a British Admiral, is responsible for defense of the Channel and the southern North Sea.

The Canada-United States Regional Planning Group (CUSHPG), composed of representatives from Canada and the United States, meets alternately in Washington and Ottawa. This group is responsible for developing and recommending to the Military Committee defense plans for the Canada-United States region.\(^3^8\)

This expansive and intricate organization gives the impression that the North Atlantic Alliance is more than an ordinary mutual defense pact. In the historical sense it is more than a classical alliance. For example, before NATO there had not been an alliance with a central political body to coordinate the goals and strategy of its members. Nor had there been a central integrated military command or a planned strategic defense in case of an attack. However, the organization should be viewed in the light of some important facts; First, NATO is not a political union. It is a typical intergovernmental compact among fifteen sovereign nations which must reach all decisions by unanimous vote, in order to remove any semblance of inequality. Even decisions reached in the military area require the unanimous agreement of each member's representative on the military committee before they are sent to the council for approval.

\(^{38}\)NATO's military structure was taken from The NATO Handbook (1968), op. cit., pp. 15-22; See chart on p. 54 for general view of NATO's military structure.
Secondly, with the exception of certain defense units—those on alert—SACEUR commands no national forces. National forces are commanded by their own authorities. In fact, NATO's integrated military command's primary mission is to unify the Alliance's defense strategy in peacetime and to use the Allies' forces to the best advantage in wartime.

And finally, the only integration that can be found is in the Staffs of the Alliance's commands. This fact dispels the notion that NATO has an integrated centralized army. Nor can any national forces, in case of war and even in the treaty area, be placed under NATO command without its government's decision to do so. Therefore, the effectiveness of NATO, in the final analysis, depends on the loyalty of its member governments.
The main committees of the Council deal with the following subjects: Political Affairs; Defence Planning; Nuclear Defence Affairs; Nuclear Planning; Economic Affairs; Defence Review; Science; Infrastructure; Senior Civil Emergency Planning; Information and Cultural Relations; Civilian Market; Military Budget; European Arms Co-ordination, NATO Organization, etc.

The main specialized NATO agencies are: NATO Defence College; Advisory Group for Aerospace Research and Development; Military Agency for Standardization; Anti-Submarine Warfare Research Centre; Supply Technical Centre; Allied Communications Agencies; Central Europe Operating Agency for Pipelines; NATO Air Defence Ground Environment Organization Project; NATO Maintenance and Supply Agency; etc.
CHAPTER III

NATO'S STRATEGY AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS

Although NATO does not qualify as a political community, by almost any set of standards it has been a successful coalition. It provided Western European Nations with the sense of security and confidence needed to let them carry out the task at hand: rebuilding their war-shattered countries and economies. NATO stimulated a desire for cooperation and interdependence that was to lead to several integrated economic structures of which the European Economic Community (EEC), or more commonly known Common Market, is probably most important. It erected a barrier to the Westward expansion of the Soviet Union by making a reality of the "Containment" policy. Although there is no empirical evidence from which conclusive proof may be drawn, and despite the Kremlin's eagerness to discount the effectiveness of NATO regarding peaceful settlement, it is generally agreed that NATO established the groundwork for the present movement toward detente between the East and the West. Therefore, the claim can be made that NATO was instrumental in keeping the West united during the toughest years of the Cold War and, at the same time, off-set the power of the Soviet bloc until the
Kremlin saw the need to moderate its policies.¹

While NATO has been the most powerful of Western mutual defense alliances, it has not been without problems and disputes which, on occasions, have seriously threatened to dissolve the coalition. The organization's major problems tend to fall into two broad categories: one political and the other military. The political disputes have arisen from the diversity of national policies and goals pursued by the major countries of the Alliance. The military strains have derived primarily over strategy and, above all, over the dilemmas created by the evolution of nuclear arms. In fact, it is possible to see NATO's current and greatest military problem as not being a military problem at all. Rather it is a purely political one. For example, the problem of nuclear weapons is only indirectly concerned with defense of the Alliance. On the whole, NATO has perhaps too much nuclear capacity—at least it has enough. The problem stems from the fact that at least 95 percent of the nuclear striking force is concentrated in the hands of just one of the members—the United States. Regardless of how it is defined, the American force is just as much a national force as the

British Bomber Command and the French force de frappe. The overriding need is not to keep the responsibility of the launching of nuclear weapons in the hands of competent political leaders, but devising a means to give all members a political voice in the decisions concerning the use of nuclear weapons. Former Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara pointed up the problem of nuclear weapons as political when he said:

As I suggest . . . there is need for and an interest in greater participation not only in what you might call the decision-making process itself but in the plans against which that decision would apply.

I think we must provide a formal mechanism within the Alliance to insure the active and effective and continuous participation by our allies in those two stages, the planning and the decision making.

I think it is a necessary action regardless of whether we have a collective force or not. The so-called multilateral force or allied nuclear force or any number of a number of 'hardware' proposals could be considered but only as supplementary to, not a substitute for, the organizational structure and procedures necessary to assure greater participation in planning and consultation.  

Or the problem was stated more clearly in a study made by the Senate Subcommittee on National Security and International Operations when it declared that:

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... since the United States has 95 percent or more of total Western nuclear capabilities, it necessarily and unavoidably has the decisive power, positive and negative, with respect to the use of these nuclear weapons. And that power is and will be located in Washington; no president can delegate it to anyone else.

However it may be accomplished, therefore, Canada and the European allies need greater access to the policy counsels of the United States—and vice versa—not just regarding the more remote contingencies of nuclear war, but also the ambiguous challenges that a flexible communist strategy makes probable. What the allies, including West Germany, need is confidence that they are, in fact, involved in major issues of strategic and political planning in such ways as to influence the actions of the United States government in a crisis. And again vice versa.3

NATO's strategy has developed from the Allies' view of the complex situation existing within itself coupled with the ever present Soviet threat. The refusal of the United States to relax its monopoly grip on determining alliance strategy plus its ownership of nuclear weapons interacts with the desire of the European governments—particularly Britain, France and West Germany—to share in the monopoly or to develop their own independent nuclear forces. (There is no proof that West Germany desires to develop its own nuclear forces but the Germans do desire a voice in the use of the Alliance's nuclear weapons.) The continuing debate over the nuclear arms dilemma is reflected in NATO's strategy, and from this strategy it is possible to identify three distinguishable policy stages developed around the issue of nuclear weapons control.

3The Atlantic Alliance: Basic Issues, op. cit., p. 12.
Stage One: "The Shield And The Sword"

From the inception of NATO into a period extending through the Korean War, the United States had an unchallengeable world-wide nuclear preponderance. The United States nuclear monopoly had ended soon after the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty in 1949, when Russia exploded her first atomic device, and Britain became the third nuclear power in 1952. However a nation does not go from its first atomic explosion to a capable nuclear power in one short step, therefore, the United States' nuclear monopoly had ended only symbolically.

In any event, Europe was in no condition to demand that the United States share its nuclear weapons and thereby its control of strategy, as a price for alliance. Furthermore, having lost most of its strength from the devastation of the second World War, Europe was too dependent on the United States for its (Europe's) recovery and defense to contest America's dominance over the Alliance. For this reason, Washington's first policy commitment concerning nuclear weapons, up to 1954, remained simply to control and improve the American nuclear monopoly, and after 1949 the

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alleged American superiority. It was around this commitment that the Alliance built its first strategy.

NATO's first strategic thoughts were simple. The political commitment stated in article 5 of the treaty—"an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all"—combined with the fact that only the United States possessed atomic weapons would be enough to deter a Soviet attack against the West. This was thought to be clear enough, as well as strong enough, to remove any danger of miscalculation by any would-be aggressor who might conceive the idea that the European allies could be taken over one by one. In both congressional hearings and in public statements, American officials described the treaty as being designed to prevent the Soviet Union from making Hitler's mistake of assuming that he could carry out piecemeal aggression without interference from Washington as well as to give Europe strength and confidence.

After some second thoughts, doubt was raised about the logic of this conclusion. Would it be wise to use nuclear weapons on allied territory should the Soviet forces overrun the token resistance offered by the small conventional forces

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of Western Europe? This doubt was changed to action with the onset of the Korean War in 1950. Fearing that the Communist attack on South Korea was a prelude to a similar attack in Europe, NATO set up a unified command in Europe, under the direction of General Eisenhower, with a plan of strategy: the "Shield and the Sword."?

NATO's first strategic plan was based on the assumption that Soviet aggression in Europe would be the start of a third World War and a third world war would be, more or less, a continuation of World War II in regard to type of battle plans, weapons, and number of troops. However, there was a slight modification—limited numbers of U.S. atomic bombs. The strategic concept called for a strong conventional force: a large number of troops to protect the main avenues leading into the West; a lesser number to cover the gaps in between; and a large number to remain in the reserve capacity. It was expected that the NATO conventional forces could execute, at least, a holding action until the United States Strategic Air Command (SAC) could deliver a telling, if not a fatal, blow to the Russian homeland with atomic weapons. To initiate the forces for the new strategy, the NATO Council meeting at Lisbon in 1952, set a goal of ninety-six divisions (forty-six active and fifty reserve) over the next four years for a strong "shield" for NATO.8

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8 Ibid.
However the United States, though willing to break with its tradition in regard to "entangling alliances," and willing to commit its nuclear power to the protection of its allies, wanted to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons. In 1946, Congress had passed the Atomic Energy Act (McMahon Act) which basically forbade the diffusion of atomic information or control of American made nuclear weapons to any foreign country. The McMahon Act also provides for a Congressional Joint Committee on Atomic Energy as a watchdog over atomic energy legislation, and to maintain civilian control over atomic weapons. There was, and still is, an overriding fear in Washington that the spread of nuclear weapons would increase the possibility of an accidental war through recklessness or carelessness. Furthermore Washington viewed the diffusion of nuclear weapons as a detriment to arms control agreements. With the addition of each new state to the "nuclear club," it would become exceedingly more difficult to achieve, enforce, or even motivate confidence in the effectiveness of arms control agreements.

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Coupled with fear of proliferation was the national­istic tendencies of the United States. It was only natural that the United States, as would any nation, should wish to maintain control over the weapons that gave it a basic choice of peace or war. Therefore, the United States regarded the knowledge of atomic weapons as national secrets not to be distributed to any national government. It preferred to maintain this monopoly even to the exclusion of its allies.

Meanwhile, Britain was bringing pressure to effect a United States policy change concerning nuclear weapons. The British desired to return to the close relations exercised during the Second World War. This was understandable since the bomb project had begun in England, and had been transferred to America, for security reasons, through an agreement between President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill at Quebec in 1943. According to the late Prime Minister,

The original arrangements made in the war were . . . on the basis of strict reciprocity. Those results were superseded by other arrangements after the war. We have conducted this operation ourselves and I do not doubt that it will lead to a much closer American interchange of information than has hitherto taken place—than has taken place in the last two years. . . .

By 1949, the British had persuaded President Truman that complete nuclear sharing would be highly desirable. The administration told a conference at Blair House that Britain should share fully in the "know how on weapons making" for at

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11Parliamentary Debates, op. cit., Col. 1270.
least three reasons: (1) Anglo-American relations required such action; (2) the British were ahead of America in some scientific fields and could aid the United States; and (3) Britain would develop the bomb in a matter of time regardless of whether they were aided or not.12

Senator Arthur Vandenberg, then chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, who was at the conference, disagreed with the administration's position for two major reasons: (1) he felt that the concept of the Alliance called for a division of labor without costly duplications, and (2) the McMahon Act restricted any such partnership in atomic information. The Senator's views were shared by others at the conference. Not wanting to jeopardize bipartisan support for European recovery, President Truman quietly dropped the matter.13 This left Britain completely responsible for the first bomb that she exploded in 1952.

Stage Two: The "New Look" Strategy

No sooner had the decision on strategy been taken in Lisbon than several changes took place that affected the concept of the "Shield and the Sword." When President Eisenhower took office in 1953, changes were taking place in the international sphere and in the nuclear weapons field: First, the

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13 Ibid., pp. 364-365.
world was entering a period of "nuclear-plenty," i.e., the United States, and the Soviet Union, was developing a wide range of "tactical" atomic weapons and adding them to the already growing stockpile. Second, Britain was well on the way toward a nuclear strike force. Third, both the United States and Russia had, in 1952, developed and successfully tested hydrogen devices signifying new horror in the nuclear age. And finally, the European NATO members were not meeting their requirements for the forty-six active divisions of conventional forces.

Discouraged over the shortage of conventional forces in Europe yet encouraged by the emergence of the new tactical nuclear weapons and motivated by an avid desire to cut the budget, President Eisenhower took a "new look" at the defense posture of Western security and the American defense budget. He had pointed out in the 1952 Presidential campaign that too much was being spent on defense, and had declared, "The most important victory the Soviets could win would be an economic collapse of our country." Later at a news conference on February 17, 1953, the President gave an indication of the direction the defense budget would take when he defended his reliance on Business for his cabinet members: "Now we have a Defense Department that spends two-thirds of all the money we appropriate. . . . If we are going to make a big savings

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In that place, we have got to get some business like practice there. I deliberately went out to find the men that I thought made the biggest record for efficiency in business, to get into that department."\(^{15}\) And again in a radio address to the nation, May 19, 1953, Eisenhower showed his desire to cut defense spending when he declared:

> It has been coldly calculated by the Soviet leaders . . . by their military threat they have hoped to force upon America and the free world an unbearable security burden leading to economic disaster. . . . Communist guns, in this sense, have been aiming at an economic target no less than a military target.\(^{16}\)

and he later added that "there must be . . . a speeding, a sharpening, a concentration that will extract the last cent of value from every dollar spent."\(^ {17}\) And finally he declared that "what we are trying to do today is find a program of security that costs the least. . . ."\(^ {18}\) This concept was later referred to as more "bang for the buck."

By the end of 1953, the "new look" defense policy had been adopted by the administration. The new policy placed emphasis on procurement of nuclear weapons and entailed changing the basis of the security of the West: that is, from dependence upon conventional forces to dependence upon nuclear

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\(^{16}\)Ibid., p. 307.

\(^{17}\)Ibid., p. 309.

\(^{18}\)Ibid., p. 317.
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weapons. In fact, by instilling the greater firepower of atomic weapons within the Alliance forces, it was thought that conventional forces could actually be reduced, a thought that pleased some of the European members.19

The increasing reliance upon nuclear weapons raised several questions of which two were very important: First, how was NATO to deal with a local attack by massive Soviet troops? And second, how was NATO to deal with limited aggressive movements by limited Soviet troops? Secretary of State John Foster Dulles answered these questions with the concept of a nuclear strategy. According to Secretary Dulles' new concept:

Local defense will always be important. But there is no local defense which alone will contain the mighty landpower of the Communist world. Local defense must be reinforced by further deterrent of massive retaliatory power. A potential aggressor must know that he cannot always prescribe battle conditions that suit him. . . . The way to deter aggression is for the free community to

be willing and able to respond vigorously at places and with means of its own choosing.\textsuperscript{20}

The Secretary later spelled out what he meant by the "further deterrent of massive retaliatory power." This was that the possession of nuclear weapons gave the capacity to punish aggression. Not in the sense of ultimate destruction of the aggressor but in the sense that the aggressor would lose more than he could possibly win. In other words, it must be assumed that the Soviet Union expected to gain more than the price of attaining it. Therefore, she must be convinced that no matter what the value of the objective might be, atomic weapons would make the cost greater than the value.\textsuperscript{21} This would deter any aggressor from any kind of attack.

The new concept meant that whatever the form of attack against the NATO area, there would be reprisal, and that reprisal would be a \textit{nuclear one}. The nuclear strategy, known as "massive retaliation," was accepted by the NATO Council in its December 1954 meeting. With the Council's acceptance, NATO was now dependent upon nuclear weapons not only for deterrence against aggression but also in planning for defense.


Actually neither Eisenhower nor Dulles should have to shoulder all the blame for the acceptance of the new strategy. There were other factors that contributed to readiness of its acceptance: First, the fabulous cost of maintaining conventional forces coupled with the price of nuclear weapons. Second, both Americans and Europeans could not be reconciled to any more limited (Korean type) wars. Third, aggression in Europe had not followed on the heals of Korea and there were many who believed that this was due to the nuclear deterrent. And finally, the destructive power of the new weapons made them seem a good substitute for conventional forces—that is, firepower for troop forces.

In any event, acceptance of the new strategy by NATO resulted in some unforeseen ramifications, especially in regard to the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy and the United States Congress. The Joint Committee faced the problems of preparing the allies for strategic nuclear concepts; making it possible to store tactical weapons and warheads outside of the United States territory and "dispersing their control down through the ranks of the American military . . . "22 The U.S. Congress faced the essential problem of altering the McMahon Act.

In order to influence Congress to amend the Atomic Energy Act, and to reduce some of the fears that had been

22 Nieburg, op. cit., p. 121.
raised over too much reliance on nuclear weapons, the State
Department began a drive to make tactical weapons sound con-
ventional. For example, Secretary Dulles argued that the
change from gunpowder to nuclear weapons was no more revolu-
tionary than the change from the cross-bow to the musket. President Eisenhower added to this argument when he sent his
"atoms-for-peace" message to Congress in February, 1954, in
which he pointed out that "a wide variety of atomic weapons--
considered in 1946 to be mere possibilities of a distant
future--have today achieved conventional status in our armed
forces." (Italics mine) In his message the President asked:

. . . that authority be provided to exchange with
nations participating in defense arrangements with the
United States such tactical information as is essential
to the development of defense plans and to the training
of personnel for atomic warfare. Amendments to the
definition of 'restricted data'. . . will also contribute
to needed administrative flexibility in the exchange of
information with such nations concerning the use of
atomic weapons.25

The President did not get the "administrative flex-
ibility in the exchange of information" that he desired, for
Congress discarded his message and enacted its own views on
the exchange of atomic information. The new legislation

23North Atlantic Council Meets At Paris," U.S. Depart-
ment of State Bulletin, Vol. XXXII, No. 810 (Washington:

24U.S. President, Public Papers of The Presidents,

25Ibid., p. 263.
allowed the transmittal of such information as was necessary for planning defense strategy, for training troops in the use of nuclear weapons, and for evaluating the potential enemy's capabilities. 26

Four Historic events occurred between 1954 and 1957, which profoundly influenced public attitudes—especially in Europe—concerning the risks of nuclear war and the validity of the United States commitment to use nuclear weapons in the interest of the NATO allies. The first event occurred in March of 1954, when a United States thermonuclear test in the Marshall Islands contaminated an area of approximately 7,000 square miles with radioactive fallout. This event received wide publicity due to radiation sickness suffered by the islanders, and particularly, to the contamination of the crews of the Fukuryu Maru (Lady Dragon) and some 23 other Japanese fishing boats in the near waters. 27 (Actually the fishing boats were outside the danger zone set for the test.) This event shocked the world into the realization of the peril of radioactivity in a nuclear war; it also brought the Europeans face-to-face with the dangers inherent in a NATO defense based on nuclear weapons.


The second event occurred on May Day, 1955, when Russia unveiled thirteen long-range jet bombers in a flight over Moscow. This display convinced the United States that the Soviet Union was building a nuclear bomber force with range and capacity to strike the North American continent. Moreover it exposed to the world, and particularly to the NATO allies, American vulnerability and the decline in value of the American nuclear deterrent. With the exposure of America's vulnerability, doubts became evident in Europe—doubts that the United States would use its nuclear power in the event of an attack on one of the allies that did not directly involve an attack on America itself.

The "Suez Crisis" in 1956, constituted the third historic event. During this crisis, the three leading members of the Alliance were at odds on what action should be taken in regard to Egypt's nationalizing the Suez Canal. Britain and France, without consulting any of the NATO members, decided that armed force was the best solution to protect their vital interests threatened by Nassar's seizure of the Canal. Washington disagreed with this measure and President Eisenhower let it be known to the American people, and Europe, in a radio and television address on October 31, 1956, when he declared:

On Monday, their armed forces penetrated deeply into Egypt. . . . And on Tuesday, the British and French Governments delivered a 12-hour ultimatum to Israel and Egypt—now followed by armed attack against Egypt.

The United States was not consulted in any way about
any phase of these actions. Nor were we informed of them in advance.

As it is the manifest right of any of these nations to take such decisions and actions, it is likewise our right to dissent. We believe these actions to have been taken in error. For we do not accept the use of force as a wise or proper instrument for the settlement of international disputes.

The action taken can scarcely be reconciled with the principles and purposes of the United Nations to which we have all subscribed.28

Determined that this was the proper stand to take, the United States found itself joined with the Soviet Union, in the United Nations Security Council, on a movement to censure its two senior partners for their punitive invasion of the Canal Zone.

NATO solidarity had been seriously damaged by this crisis—a crisis arising outside the treaty area. The brutal suppression of the Hungarian Revolution by Russia at the same time as the Suez Crisis is generally given credit for saving NATO from breaking up. Yet one may add another factor that was probably just as important in holding the Alliance together: The realization by Britain and France that they were not independent world powers; that their security was based on the Alliance; that there was no place to go if they left the Alliance. In any case, this crisis did have some enlightening effects upon the allies: (1) The Europeans

learned that the United States would openly oppose certain acts of member nations although those nations considered such acts vital to their own interests; (2) that NATO's defense was based completely on the nuclear deterrent, and therefore, completely on the United States; (3) that the Soviet Union was still a threat to the security of the West, and (4) that the lack of consultation on matters that concern the Alliance could have disastrous consequences.  

It was purely a coincidence that the NATO Council meeting which was held in Paris in December, 1956, was scheduled to hear a report by the Committee of Three (The Three Wise Men) on cooperation among the Allies in non-military matters. This report emphasized the need for political consultation within the Alliance. It warned that "there is a pressing requirement for all members to make consultation in NATO an integral part of the making of national policy. Without this the very existence of the North Atlantic Community may be in jeopardy." Included in the report were the following recommendations:

29 In order to clarify (2), Britain, at this time, was considered a nuclear power, but this seems to have had no effect on Khruskohev's nuclear threats. This should have convinced those who advocated the theory that a small nuclear force gives a nation more power, security, and flexibility in international relations that there is no basis for their argument.

(a) Members should inform the Council of any development which significantly affects the Alliance.

(b) both individual member governments and the Secretary-General should have the right to raise for discussion in the Council any subject which is of common NATO interest and not of purely domestic character;

(c) a member government should not, without adequate advance consultation, adopt firm policies or make major political pronouncements on matters which significantly affects the Alliance or any of its members, unless circumstances make such prior consultation obviously and demonstrably impossible;

(d) in developing their national policies, members should take into consideration the interest and views of other governments, particularly those most directly concerned, as expressed in NATO consultation, even where no community of view or consensus has been reached by the Council;

(e) where a consensus has been reached, it should be reflected in the formation of national policy. When for national reasons the consensus is not followed, the government concerned should offer an explanation to the Council.

The Council accepted in principle the recommendations of the Three Wise Men at the December meeting. However, there were some reservations. For example, Secretary Dulles reminded the Alliance members that the United States had obligations with countries outside NATO and could not, therefore, bind itself rigidly with a promise to consult the Alliance partners in formulation of policy outside the treaty area. In essence Mr. Dulles was notifying the Allies that the United States considered that NATO's concern was limited to the treaty area.

31 Ibid., p. 7.

The fourth and most significant event occurred in 1957, when Russia launched its first earth satellite (Sputnik). The Sputnik meant more than a Russian scientific research gain; it meant the arrival of the age of the intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM). But most important to the NATO allies, it removed all doubt about America's vulnerability to nuclear attack. Fears and doubts raised earlier were now being brought into the open, and several questions were being asked: Can the United States be trusted to use its nuclear weapons now that American cities are targets for Russian ICBM's? What can Europe do for defense if the nuclear deterrent fails to deter? This last question gained impetus because the Europeans, following the lead of America, had also economized in their defense budget to the extent that the forty-six active divisions agreed to at Lisbon had deteriorated to approximately fifteen divisions.\(^{33}\) To make matters worse, the Europeans began to understand the possible result if the United States did use its nuclear weapons in the Allies' behalf. Estimated personnel casualties from a nuclear confrontation in Europe were placed in the hundreds of millions. For example, Lieutenant General Gavin told a Senate Subcommittee that:

Current planning estimates run on the order of several hundred million deaths that would be either way depending upon which way the wind blew. If the wind blew to the southeast they would be mostly U.S.S.R., although they would extend into the Japanese and perhaps down into the Philippine area. If the wind blew the other way they would extend well back up into Western Europe.34

In order to answer these questions and reassure the Allies that the United States would meet its commitments, President Eisenhower attended the December, 1957, NATO Council meeting in Paris. Mr. Eisenhower offered the NATO members increased economic aid, nuclear weapons, and declared, "This is our resolve: Speaking for my own country, I assure you in the most solemn terms that the United States would come at once and with all appropriate force, to the assistance of any NATO nation subjected to armed attack."35 At the same meeting Secretary Dulles spelled out what the President's offer of nuclear weapons meant. The offer meant, specifically, that Washington was prepared to make IRBM's available for use as directed by the Supreme Allied Commander Europe. (American control) Warheads for these missiles would become a part of the atomic stockpile system of the Alliance. (American ownership) Deployment of such weapons would be by


agreement of the country concerned and the United States. Britain, Italy, and Turkey agreed to the offer of IRBM's under the "double veto" system—that is, each country and the United States were required to authorize the joining of the warhead to the missile. On the other hand, Denmark, Norway, and France refused the offer. France, who had demanded ballistic missiles to modernize her contribution to the Alliance, blamed the "double veto" system for her refusal. Later in 1959, France went further and forbade any allied nuclear weapons on her national territory unless the United States consulted France in regard to the use of nuclear weapons anywhere in the world. According to French President de Gaulle, "France feels that if atomic weapons are to be stockpiled on her territory, these weapons should be in her own hands." The Alliance members also agreed at the December, 1957, meeting to raise the conventional forces to thirty active divisions.

This new method of nuclear "sharing" meant another attack on the McMahon Act. The attack was not long in coming. In his annual message to Congress, January, 1958, President

36"Statement By Secretary Dulles December 16," ibid., p. 9.

Eisenhower urged Congress to enact such legislation as was necessary for sharing scientific and technical information—at least with friendly countries. The President declared that it was "wasteful in the extreme for friendly allies to consume talent and money in solving problems that their friends have already solved—all because of artificial barriers to sharing." And he added, "The task will be hard enough without handcuffs of our own making." Mr. Eisenhower did not mean sharing in the sense that the United States would assist other nations to become nuclear powers or produce nuclear weapons. In any event, Congress did change the Atomic Energy Act. The amendments to the Act in 1958, did remove some barriers to sharing information and some materials. For example, the President could authorize the Defense Department to sell, lease, or loan the following provided certain conditions were met:

(1) nonnuclear parts of atomic weapons provided that such nation has made substantial progress in the development of atomic weapons, and other nonnuclear parts of atomic weapons systems involved in Restricted Data provided that such transfer will not contribute significantly to that nation's atomic weapons design, development, or fabrication capability; for the purpose of improving that nation's state of training and operational readiness;

(2) utilization facilities for military application; and

(3) source, byproduct, or special nuclear materials

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for research on, development of, production of or use in utilization facilities for military applications; and

(4) source, byproduct, or special nuclear materials for research on, development of, or use in atomic weapons: Provided, however, That the transfer of such materials . . . is necessary to improve its atomic weapons design, development, or fabrication capability; and provided further, That such nation has made substantial progress in the development of atomic weapons. 39

Needless to say that only allies who were established nuclear powers (Britain) benefited from the change.

France, meanwhile, was striving to develop her own nuclear strike force. France had decided to develop nuclear weapons in 1956, under the Mollet government, and had used the same justifications for so doing as had Britain—national pride, fear of the decreasing values of the American deterrent, and for increased influence within NATO vis-à-vis the United States. It was only a coincidence that General de Gaulle, who personifies France's nationalism, came to power at about the same time the McMahon Act was being changed to benefit Britain, and to exclude France. Since that time, the possibility of dissuading de Gaulle from proceeding with the development of nuclear weapons has been virtually nil. 40


40 President de Gaulle has emphasized on several occasions that the condition for France to cease the development of her own nuclear force was and is complete nuclear disarmament by the other nuclear powers. For representative statements to this effect see General de Gaulle, Major Addresses, op. cit., pp. 27-28, 61, 96, 121, 124, 142, 159-160, 180-182, 219, 225.
After a huge economic outlay and much technical trouble, France exploded her first nuclear device over the Sahara on February 13, 1960.

With the French explosion, Washington realized it was not going to stop the diffusion of nuclear weapons with the system of "sharing" that had been established in 1957. The explosion also created two new fears in Washington: that other NATO members might be quick to follow France's example—particularly West Germany, and that West Germany might be tempted to join France in the creation of a "third nuclear force" as mediator between the two super powers. These fears supplied the impetus in Washington for the search for a system of sharing nuclear weapons that would stop the spread of atomic weapons and at the same time isolate France.

At the NATO Council Meeting in December, 1960, Secretary of State Herter proposed a new concept of sharing: The United States was prepared to give NATO five Polaris submarines by 1963, provided the members could agree on a multi-lateral means of control. Included in the proposal was the agreement to sell NATO one hundred medium-range ballistic Missiles (MRBM) for deployment at sea. However the NATO Council was not eager to accept the Secretary's proposal for two reasons: First, the European members were not certain that this was a new concept—to give them a voice in directing nuclear policy. Second, a new administration was taking office in Washington the following month. The Council acted
with caution, and in its final communique stated that it "took note of the United States' suggestion with great interest and instructed the permanent representatives to study the suggestion and relate matters in detail." \(^{41}\)

**Stage Three: The "Flexible Response"**

As did Eisenhower before him, and as can be expected with a change in the administration, President Kennedy made a complete reexamination of the United States foreign policy. He found NATO's lack of conventional forces and the strategy based on "massive retaliation" not to his liking. After examining American policy, the President decided that the best defense for America and the West was a strategy of "flexible response," that is, a defense flexible enough to respond to any level of aggression, from border incursions to all-out nuclear war. To have a strategy, of flexible response, the first requisite was a build up of conventional forces in Western Europe. Therefore, Mr. Kennedy called on the allies to build up their conventional forces at least to the agreed level of thirty active divisions. At the same time the administration was downgrading the value of tactical nuclear weapons, and was installing technical devices to assure political control over the nuclear weapons in Europe. If the Europeans did not wish to become embroiled in an atomic

confrontation without their consent, neither did Washington. In an address to the NATO Military Committee, April 11, 1961, the President declared that "we propose to see . . . that our military forces operate at all times under continuous, responsible command and control from the highest authorities all the way downward—and we mean to see that this control is exercised before, during, and after an initiation of hostilities against our forces, and at any level of escalation."\textsuperscript{42}

However, since the Atlantic Alliance's main purpose is the mutual defense of the NATO members, and the United States' nuclear forces is its backbone, and Europe's security is heavily dependent on the American deterrent forces, it is only natural that the European members not only have an interest but also a high stake in the continuity of American foreign and military policy. Even if the allies doubt its correctness, they believe it to be an American guarantee of reliability. It was, therefore, no surprise that the caution over nuclear weapons and the demand for upgrading the conventional forces, raised two important questions from Europe: Questions on the reliability of the weapons and the reliability of the American guarantee.\textsuperscript{43} Washington quickly


rejected both questions, but did not quell the doubts, fears, or desires for a voice in nuclear weapons decision making.  

On May 17, 1961, while addressing the Canadian Parliament in Ottawa, President Kennedy made a new proposal for sharing atomic weapons. It was hoped that the new proposal would satisfy the desires of the European Allies. The President said that "the United States will commit to the NATO command five—and subsequently still more—Polaris atomic—missile submarines . . . subject to any agreed NATO guidelines on their control and use responsive to the needs of all members. . . ." And he stated further that "beyond this we look to the possibility of eventually establishing a NATO seaborne force, which would be truly multilateral in ownership and control, if it should be found feasible to our allies . . .."  

At the NATO Council Meeting in Athens in May, 1962, Secretary of Defense McNamara committed five polars . . .

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submarines to the Alliance under the command of the Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic (SACLANT, American Officer). The NATO Council accepted the commitment without strong opposition. However, France's Foreign Minister Maurice Couve de Murville called the American policy "intellectually dishonest." That is, the United States was pretending that it was proposing a new policy when it was actually offering nothing new in regard to guidelines on when and how nuclear weapons would be used. On the other hand, the Secretary's commitment seemed to satisfy the German desire to have IRBM's under the "double veto" system.

In 1962, President Kennedy cancelled the Skybolt missile program. The Skybolt (an air to surface missile) had been promised to Britain. Its use would modify and extend the life of Britain's Bomber Command. Therefore, Britain had a great stake in the program which when cancelled left her nuclear delivery system in doubt. This resulted in a Kennedy-Macmillan meeting at Nassau in December, 1962, where it was agreed that Britain would develop her nuclear deterrent around the Polaris which she would buy from the United States. According to the Nassau agreement

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46Drew Middleton, "U.S. To Give NATO Five Submarines Carrying Polaris," New York Times, May 6, 1962, p. 1; Actually the submarines were shifted from the command of the U.S. Atlantic Fleet to SACLANT who was one and the same U.S. Naval Officer.

Britain would develop her own submarines and nuclear warheads. The British deterrent with a similar force from the United States would form the basis of a NATO nuclear force. This same offer was later made to the other Alliance members with the provision that they would also furnish the submarines and warheads. They too would contribute their Polaris forces as national components to the NATO forces.\(^48\) This agreement laid the groundwork for the much debated multilateral nuclear force (MLF) that the United States proposed to the NATO Council Meeting at Ottawa in 1963.\(^49\)

The MLF concept called for a fleet of twenty-five multi-owned mixed manned Polaris surface ships under command of participating members. Both Britain and France would surrender their nuclear forces to NATO but could withdraw them if their national interest required it. According to Mr. Buchan, Prime Minister Macmillan in the House of Commons "laid such stress on the continuing national command of British nuclear weapons as to rob their assignment to NATO

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\(^{49}\) For an excellent historical sketch of the multilateral force see Buchan, ibid.
of much of its significance, at least in European eyes."\(^{50}\) As for the actual control of the nuclear warheads, the point has never reached the negotiation stage.

European reaction to the United States proposal was less than enthusiastic to say the least. The smaller members (Norway, Denmark, Portugal and Canada) were particularly worried about the added cost of such a force considering the huge outlays to meet their conventional forces requirements. President de Gaulle made France's position on the MLP clear in 1963, when he stated that "France has taken note of the Anglo-American Nassau Agreement; as it was conceived, undoubtedly no one will be surprised that we cannot subscribe to it. . . . To turn over our weapons to a multinational force . . . would be to act contrary to that principle of our defense and our policy."\(^{51}\)

Britain being a part to the Nassau Agreement, at first supported the NATO nuclear force proposal. Mr. Peter Thornycroft, in the House of Commons, March 4, 1963, declared that the British would do its best, "with the United States and Europe to bring a NATO nuclear force into being. . . ." and "support, too, the efforts which the Americans are engaged upon to bring about a mixed-manned force as well."\(^{52}\)

\(^{50}\)Ibid., p. 7.


\(^{52}\)Cited in Buchan, op. cit., p. 8.
However, by October 1963, the British government had cooled considerably. She was willing at this time to join in the discussions on MLF with the U.S., Germany, Italy, Greece, and Turkey, the only members that were interested at the time, but not to commit herself. By July, 1964, Britain was not interested in the U.S. proposal and had submitted her own plan for a mixed-manned, joint financed and controlled force consisting of aircraft and missiles in Europe. When the Labor Party came to power there was no question about what the government's stand would be on the MLF. Mr. Harold Wilson, Labor candidate for the post of Prime Minister, had declared at a press conference in Washington in March, 1964, that he was strongly opposed to the MLF concept and that if he were elected would "renegotiate the Nassau Agreement." Mr. Wilson later added that his government "would accept the multilateral force if it were the only way to stop Germany from becoming a nuclear power."

On the other hand, West Germany was particularly attracted by the MLF concept. Germany desired some "nuclear status," and she was barred from developing her own nuclear weapons by the modified Brussels Treaty which admitted her to NATO. Nuclear weapons had become, and still are, such

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53 Ibid., pp. 10-11.
55 See footnote 30, page 43.
overexaggerated status symbols that Germany could only see herself relegated to a second or third rate power behind Britain and France. Therefore the MLF for Germany would raise her prestige in policy discussion in the Alliance to that of Britain and France. Another factor that gave impetus to Bonn's desire for the MLF was the strategy of "flexible response." It is not hard to understand Germany's consternation over a new policy, about which she was not consulted, considering she is the most exposed country to the Soviet threat. This coupled with talk of limited withdrawal of American troops, the carrying out of operation "Big Lift" by the United States, and the continual propaganda from de Gaulle and France that the United States would pull out of Europe, made the Bonn government extremely nervous. The MLF would be a means of tying the United States permanently to the defense of Europe plus giving Bonn a stronger voice in Washington. The desire for sharing nuclear weapons became so intense at one time, during Chancellor Erhard's administration, that Germany would have joined the MLF with the

56 General Lauris Norstad, U.S.A.F. (Ret), former SAC-EUR of NATO, aptly points out the overexaggeration of nuclear weapons when he said, "We should appreciate at the outset that, because these weapons have become a symbol of power and, thus, of sovereignty, they have assumed an importance in policy discussions far beyond that to which they are entitled on a purely military basis." U.S. Senate, Hearings, The Atlantic Alliance, op. cit., p. 69.

57 Buchan, op. cit., p. 9.
Germany has used only one argument for the adoption of the MLF whereas Britain and France used several to support the development of their nuclear forces. Bonn's argument for acceptance revolves around the theory that a NATO nuclear force would increase the deterrent force of the organization. For example, Chancellor Adenauer in a statement on Germany's foreign policy before the Bundestag on February 6, 1963, declared that his administration regarded the "Nassau Agreement as a big step forward along the road to creating an effective multilateral nuclear deterrent for NATO. We have decided to cooperate in the realization of the plans to the best of our ability." And again Chancellor Adenauer agreed with President Kennedy in their talks in Bonn in June, 1963, that the MLF would be a good "instrument for the defense of NATO."

The new German Chancellor, Ludwig Erhard, sounded this same desire and argument in his first policy statement to the German Parliament after his election October 16, 1963. The Chancellor declared that the "Federal Government . . . energetically supports all endeavors suited to intensify

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political cooperation between the parties of NATO and to strengthen the integration of NATO's means of defense. A multilateral nuclear force would render a substantial contribution towards attaining this objective."61 As late as 1966, after de Gaulle had withdrawn France from the organization, Chancellor Erhard felt that a NATO nuclear force was necessary and declared Germany's readiness to participate:

We are convinced that a joint nuclear solution within NATO would increase the deterrent power of the Alliance, and thus serve the cause of peace. We therefore continue to be ready to cooperate on a joint atomic force. The discussions of the defense ministers in the nuclear committee of NATO concern another aspect of the cooperation of the nuclear powers, but they are no substitute for a nuclear solution of joint nature within NATO.62

From all indications, the NLF has become a dead letter. President Johnson did vigorously press for its acceptance in 1964, but since that time has let it fade. However, there is a possibility that it could revive if there was some demand from the Allies. Both Secretary of Defense McNamara and Secretary of State Rusk have made this point clear. According to McNamara, if the "European Allies should decide upon a collective force of some kind, the U.S. would be ready to participate."63 Secretary Rusk, when asked in a

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Senate hearing if the MLF proposal was considered dead, replied that "no proposal which has been made over a period of time . . . has been declared dead. All of the alternatives remain open." 

By early 1966, President de Gaulle who had not accepted the new strategy of flexible response, removed France from participation in NATO and caused the organization's facilities to be removed from French soil. Not only had France refused to integrate her nuclear forces into a NATO force but refused any kind of integration or token integration of conventional forces. Although surprised by the French move, the other fourteen members did make the transition complete in 1967. And at the December meeting of the NATO Council the "flexible response" strategy was adopted, however, it remains to be seen the actual ramifications of the French decision as well as whether the Allies will fulfill their conventional commitments.

\[64\textit{Ibid.}, p. 161.\]
CHAPTER IV

THE PROBLEMS OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS PROLIFERATION

Why, one might ask, should nuclear weapons, the very basis of NATO's security, the very basis of NATO's strategy, be its greatest divisive factor? As has been pointed out NATO's security during most of its history has been based on the concept of massive nuclear retaliation. And even though the NATO Council adopted the flexible response strategy, some of the Europeans still feel that nuclear weapons will be brought into play at the outset of an act of aggression. Thus they have not really given up the massive retaliation concept.

One important factor that leads to the divisiveness of nuclear weapons is their tremendous destructive qualities. It is the unparalleled destructiveness of nuclear weapons that gives the Allies' dispute over strategy and control of such weapons its unprecedented urgency. The speed with which these warheads can be delivered adds complications to effective command and control of such weapons. Since disputes occur within each government in regard to strategy and technology, it should not be surprising that the debate extends on into the Alliance as well.

Another factor which adds to the debate is the lack
of a precedent for a nuclear war strategy. The world as yet has not witnessed a nuclear confrontation. The only occasion on which atomic weapons have been put to use in war time was when the bombs were dropped on Japan, to which she could not retaliate in kind. This has led to speculation on whether President Truman would have used the atom bomb if Japan could have retaliated. There is no ready answer to this speculation because there is no one who can say for sure how a nation or a nation's troops would react under a nuclear attack where there is a possibility of retaliation. Never before has so much depended on hypothesis and speculation based on unique weapons and unprecedented situations. This factor has been well pointed up by Britain's Permanent Representative to the NATO Council in 1966:

It is very difficult for NATO nowadays . . . to decide what forces and what weapons our countries must maintain as science advances and the international situation evolves. This is not because of any disagreement about the need to deter aggression. And it is not wholly due to economic and financial burdens which defense places on our countries, although that has a lot to do with it. The main cause is the extreme novelty and unfamiliarity of a situation in which weapons are for deterrence . . . and in which the more effective and terrible they become the less possible it is to use them. . . . In many respects our armed forces are still being prepared and trained to fight wars which never can and never will be fought.1

In addition to this the weapons systems themselves have not been thoroughly tested. Both the United States and

the Soviet Union have enormous stockpiles of nuclear warheads
of which a small number have been tested. More factors of
uncertainty are added with the delivery system for the war-
head. In fact, the "hard sites" that are supposed to protect
the American missiles have not been tested, but are based
entirely on theoretical studies.

Coupled with this fact is the added complications
caused by the fact that nuclear weapons are primarily for the
purpose of deterring war. This problem is well stated by
NATO's Military Committee Chairman in 1966:

We are asked as soldiers, to prepare for a war which
must be avoided at all costs, to arm and train ourselves
in order not to fight the enemy but to deter him from
fighting us. Our only victory consists in never having
to resort to war; our weapons and training must be fault-
less but must never see service. If the worst comes, and
we go into action it will be a war we cannot hope to
win, for there can be no victory in mutual destruction.
Our aim is to show the enemy that he cannot win either
and our intentions are not to destroy him but to contain
him.2

The basis of deterrence is credibility, that is, "to be
deterred the potential aggressor must credit the opponent with
the means and the resolve to employ military forces in order
to make aggression unprofitable."3

At the very heart of the dispute within the Alliance
is the problem concerning the spread of nuclear weapons. This

2Cited in ibid., p. 4.

3William R. Kintner and Stafan T. Passony, "NATO's
problem is affecting NATO in several areas, but there are four areas that are of major importance to the Alliance. The first of these is the possible dangers of accidental nuclear wars created through diffusion of nuclear weapons. The second is the possible effect that a nuclear West Germany would have on NATO and world stability. Third, is the effects that diffusion of nuclear weapons can have on a unified NATO nuclear strategy. And finally, what effects proliferation of nuclear weapons will have on disarmament. Each of these areas must be examined in order to get a comprehensive view of the basic problem of nuclear proliferation.

**Accidental Nuclear War**

Since the explosion on Hiroshima and President Truman's warning about diffusion of nuclear weapons, there is no longer a secret about the bomb. Five nations now belong to what is known as the "nuclear club" and prospects are great for new members. A National Planning Special Projects Committee, in 1960, came to the conclusion that sixteen countries could achieve atomic bomb production within the next ten years. A National Planning Association, The Nth Country Problem and Arms Control, Planning Pamphlet No. 108 (Washington: National Planning Association, 1960), p. 37; At this writing, three of the nuclear nations (Britain, the USSR, and the U.S.) plus some 91 non-nuclear nations have reached an agreement on a non proliferation treaty. Though it is a step in the right direction, the treaty is not a foolproof guarantee against nuclear diffusion because two nuclear nations
Denmark, Italy, the Netherlands, and West Germany. The only remaining problem for the potential nuclear powers consists in (1) finding enough skilled scientists and engineers, and (2) providing the necessary economic and industrial base, as well as necessary strategic materials.5

The committee also concluded that the diffusion of nuclear weapons, continued unchecked, would obviously increase the possibility of a nuclear war, and listed some of the incalculable factors that the spread of atomic weapons adds to international politics: (a) Economic or other pressures may cause some countries to sell nuclear weapons. (b) Fanatics or dictators who head some governments may act rashly. (c) There will be an increase in unauthorized, or accidental, use of atomic weapons. (d) One small nuclear power, through irresponsible "mischief making" can act as a catalyst for a nuclear conflict between large powers.6

An examination of the last factor points up the danger of the spread of nuclear weapons. That is, the possibility of a nuclear conflict from the "mischief-making" of a small

(France and Red China) desired to remain outside the treaty, there are no guaranteed safeguards through inspections, and it is quite possible that the treaty could not survive ratification.

5Ibid.

nuclear power. It is agreed by many that a small nuclear
country allied with a large nuclear power may force the latter
into a nuclear conflict, not of its own choosing, by launch­
ing an attack on another large nuclear power. Since in the
nuclear missile age it is most difficult to know the direc­
tion from which a missile is launched; and since nuclear
strategies are planned for almost instantaneous response, it
is agreed by many that the attacked country, in all probabil­
ity, will retaliate with a major strike at its number one
enemy. The argument can be made that a small nuclear power
would not be able to come forth and collect the benefit for
which it launched the attack; that an attack is most likely
to be launched after or during an argument and, therefore,
the opponents would automatically be identified. Neverthe­
less the point is that even the possibility that a nuclear
conflict can be forced upon the super powers is sure to add
an element of instability to world peace each time the
"nuclear club" expands. It is this possibility that Wash­
ington fears most about proliferation.7 This alone causes
many headaches in Washington, and greatly increases the
potential power of a French or British nuclear force.
(Actually, few Americans fear irresponsibility by the British;
it is the French force de frappe and, particularly, the pos­
sibility of a potential German force that creates the most

worries in Washington.) The "hot line" from Washington to Moscow is a product of this fear.

Viewed in the light of some of the justifications for independent forces, Washington is not wrong in fearing the possibility of a catalytic nuclear war. Both Britain and France have justified their independent nuclear forces with arguments that nuclear weapons would give them greater influence over the United States' action. For example, the late Prime Minister Churchill, replying to an argument in the house of Commons, on March 1, 1955, that Britain need not build a hydrogen bomb, but should rather criticize unwise American nuclear policies, stated, "Personally I cannot feel that we should have much influence over their policy or actions, wise or unwise, while we are largely dependent... upon their protection." On the other hand, this influence was spelled out more bluntly by French General Pierre Gallois: "In France the notion that the small nuclear arsenal would lead to the use of the large one of the United States is one of the justifications for a modest nuclear arsenal for security."  

The striving for independent nuclear forces by

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8 Strausz-Hupé, Dougherty, and Kintner, op. cit., p. 110.
9 Parliamentary Debates (Commons) (5th series) Vol. 537 (1955), col. 1905.
10 Gallois, op. cit., p. 39.
Britain and France for a bargaining weapon to gain special position within NATO could in the long run be the most divisive factor of the Alliance. According to Albert Wohlstetter, "not all members of an alliance can be 'more equal' than the others." The allies that are slighted are bound to resent their inferior position and follow the course to a nuclear force or neutrality or both. Two cases in point are France and West Germany. For example, France has, from the first, resented Britain's close ties with the U.S. and has made it known on several occasions. French Foreign Minister Maurice Couve de Murville stated this resentment as justification for the force de frappe on January 24, 1963:

On the European level . . . nothing has been done with regard to nuclear matters. Germany is finding itself in a special position resulting from the commitments it made in 1954. As for Britain, it is linked to the U.S. through special relations that it has maintained for a long time, and which have just been reinforced following the recent Nassau Accords. That is to say, to this day, the only path open to us is to continue what has been started. . . .

French Ambassador Herve Alphand expressed this same resentment to unequal treatment in an address to the Economic Club of Detroit on February 24, 1964, stating that he could not see why Washington was so concerned about an independent French

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nuclear force which would in the majority of cases be joined with the U.S. force. He said, "Our position on this subject does not differ from that of Great Britain."  

Germany's awareness of inequality in the Alliance is stated by State Secretary von Hase: "A special status for the Federal Republic of Germany is unacceptable, since free Germans are called upon to shoulder equal risks and responsibilities with their partners."  

There are two other possible dangers that are not given much thought: (1) It is possible that a short sighted calculation on the part of a small nuclear power which would stand to gain if the United States and Russia annihilated each other could lead to a nuclear war. In this case each nation would move up two rungs in power. One observer asserted that "this prospect presents as great a danger as any real or imagined Soviet belligerency." (2) The proliferation of weapons might increase to a point where...

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"suitcase bombs may be attractive to lands lacking delivery systems, thus producing the danger of anonymous attacks which could 'trigger-off' a general war."^16

The reasoning which would motivate a small nuclear power to attack a large nuclear power with the intent of starting a nuclear holocaust, is beyond the boldest reach of the imagination. The argument against such an act is quite strong. First, the small power would have to avoid all means of being detected: the risk of detection might outweigh any possible gain— it could be suicide. Second, there is always the possibility that the nation that starts a nuclear attack could become its own victim; that is, a victim of radioactive fall-out. And finally, the "hope of inheriting the world after the major powers have destroyed each other seems vague."^17

Every possibility, in the era when the destruction of man himself rests on irrationality, vague concepts, and the foolhardiness of men, becomes compounded. If past history shows anything it is the fact that man has not always been rational, has not always had clear concepts, and has not always been prudent.


Germany And Nuclear Weapons

The Federal Republic of West Germany is commonly cited as the next likely nation to acquire its own nuclear forces. No potential factor arouses greater emotions throughout Europe than this prospect. Memories of two major wars in the first half of the twentieth century argue against a nuclear Germany. Moreover, there are well grounded apprehensions about the reactions of the Soviet Union to such a situation. The unresolved European problems could at any time start a chain reaction of violence whether intended by Russia or not—problems of Berlin, German reunification, boundaries, and the general unrest in East Berlin as well as the Eastern European countries. Since these conditions already exist, they could only be compounded with the advent of a nuclear-armed Federal Republic. In view of this it is easy to understand why many agree that diffusion of nuclear weapons to West Germany is one of the most explosive factors.

in the Alliance, and at the same time one of the most explosive factors in the international sphere.

An examination of some of the ramifications of a nuclear armed Germany points up why the United States pressed for the MLF program to head off a German national nuclear force, and at the same time head off collaboration between France and Germany on the French Force. It is true that under the Brussels Treaty Germany is barred from manufacturing atomic weapons, but there is nothing to prevent West Germany from collaborating with any of the Alliance members in the production of weapons systems. Of course implicit in de Gaulle's desire to involve West Germany in nuclear collaboration is the need to share the costs; not to share the control. 19

The situation, where de Gaulle can tempt German Nationalism, is much feared in Britain and the United States. One possible American reaction to a collaboration of Germany and France, is withdrawal from Europe. Withdrawal of the United States, according to most writers, strategists, and officials, is the worst blow that NATO could suffer and would be the greatest Russian "political and military success since 1945." 20 Even if the United States did not withdraw


from Europe, a Franco-German effort would replace America's control over the European end of the Alliance and thereby have the same effect as an American withdrawal. In any case, a West Germany with nuclear arms as viewed by the Soviet Union, could only lead to a sharp deterioration of international stability.

According to Anthony Hartley, the fear of what might happen if West Germany got control of nuclear weapons and Moscow should take fright was a motive force that gave rise to the "Ban-the-Bomb" faction in the British Labor Party. And this same motive force could cause Britain to join any nuclear arrangement between the United States and West Germany. Britain could not afford the isolation that staying out of such a project as the MLF would bring her. 21 Britain's fear is multiplied by the thought that there is a possibility of erosion of the American veto over nuclear weapons.

Another factor of instability that would be inserted into the Alliance should West Germany develop her own force, or for that matter, should come to share in the already existing atomic power with any of the NATO members, is the fact that she would become the decisive nuclear power among the continental Allies. Bonn already possesses the strongest

conventional forces in Western Europe. Germany has, as of 1965, "fulfilled its pledge to NATO by making available the last of 12 divisions of armed forces. . . ." On the other hand, Britain has fewer than two and one half divisions and Belgium has two divisions, assigned to the Central European NATO Command. France does not have any troops assigned to NATO, but does have approximately two divisions in Germany. And each of these nations, France, Britain, and Belgium, was planning further unilateral reductions of troop levels for 1968.

In light of the present potential strength of the Federal Republic, there are several possible views that Moscow might take of any further addition to German strength. Since the inception of NATO and German rearmament, the Soviets have charged that both NATO and rearmament would lead to a rebirth of German militarism. "A revival of German militarism would endanger Germany's neighbors" is one of the main themes Moscow uses against NATO. A good example of the propaganda campaign against the West German government by Moscow can be seen in a speech by Leonid


Brezhnev, April 24, 1967, at a Conference of Communists and Workers Parties of Europe, held in Karlovy Vary, Czechoslovakia:

Facts show that the military threat which today stems from German imperialism is an indisputable reality. In the past 10 years the German Federal Republic has created one of the largest armies in West Europe ... and a sufficient quantity of command cadres to enable numerous armed forces to be mobilized in a short period ... .

The West German imperialists ... do not have the power to achieve their revanchist aims. The Soviet Union and other socialist countries have a sufficient military might to strike a crushing blow at an aggressor who would dare start a war. But the revanchists could plunge the European countries, and eventually the whole world, into ... another war, and this danger must be recognized.

The military presence of the United States in Europe encourages West German militarism and increases the threat to peace in Europe.25

No one but the Soviets themselves know what course they would take in a situation of a nuclear armed West Germany, but considering their strong opposition to NATO and to the MLP proposal, and remembering their fear of a rearmed Germany, it is possible to anticipate some of the views that Russia might take toward West Germany. From these anticipated views it is possible to predict some of the possible reactions of the Soviet Union to such a move: First, Russia could take the view that West Germany was seeking the same weapons as the Soviet Union and was claiming parity. Second, the Soviet Union could get the impression that Bonn was actually becoming

revanchist (not just propaganda) and, therefore, an offensive nation, since a German nuclear force would have only "first-strike" capability. That is, these weapons would be vulnerable to destruction by a nuclear blow and thus be of little or no use for retaliation or defense. 26 Third, Moscow might view the situation as one in which West Germany was preparing for the reunification of all Germany by force, since securing self-determination for the entire German nation remains a vital objective of German policy. 27 Acquisition of atomic weapons would tend to support the Soviet propaganda of the rebirth of German imperialism even though German officials have denied this on numerous occasions beginning with the Land Declaration of 1954, in which West Germany declared "never to have recourse to force to achieve the reunification of Germany or the modification of the present boundaries" of West Germany. The Federal Republic also pledged to settle by peaceful methods all disputes "which might arise between the Federal Republic and other states." 28

26 Kissinger, Necessity For Choice, op. cit., p. 17.

27 West German officials always include reunification in their policy statements. Chancellor Kiesinger's statement is representative--"The right of self-determination which is invoked by the peoples of the earth . . . cannot in the long run be denied to the German people either." "Responsibility For The Future of The German Nation," NEWS, Vol. XII, No. 3 (Washington: The German Embassy, 1968), p. 1.

28 Karl-Gunther von Hase, "Bonn Consulting With NATO Allies On Future Of Defense," op. cit., p. 2; See particularly the German Declaration of March 25, 1966, on the use of
In considering these views that Moscow might take, there is a possibility of Russia implementing a preemptive nuclear attack on West Germany through fear.

This same possibility holds also in regard to the stationing of American missiles on German soil under the "double key" or "double veto" system. For to equip the German Federal Republic with nuclear weapons capable of destroying Moscow, or for that matter, any Russian city, could have the same effect on the Kremlin as the Russian missiles in Cuba had on Washington. It is unlikely that Moscow would be more inclined to accept a Germany armed with American missiles than was Washington a Cuba armed with Russian missiles. It might be added that this could be the basic reason that the United States has not favored a NATO nuclear force of land-based MRBM's as suggested by SACEUR. Another side to this unstable factor is the possibility that Russia could view American missiles on German soil as the erosion of American Deterrent capability. This could set off a Soviet attack through miscalculation.

There is also speculation that if the United States were to help West Germany, or any of the Alliance members, to develop a nuclear strike force, the Soviet Union would be
forced to give nuclear aid to East Germany and her other satel­
ites. However, it is generally agreed that Russia has
several reasons for not giving nuclear weapons to her satel­
lites. One observer dismisses this possibility in the follow­
ing manner: "This is nonsensical for two reasons. First of
all, there is scarcely a nexus between the two eventualities.
Second, it is doubtful, in any event, that the Russians will
donate the hard earned fruits of their military technology
to a potential dangerous neighbor."29 This view gains con­
siderable support when seen in the framework of the Hungar­
ian, Polish, and East German uprising plus the latest Russo-
Czechoslovak confrontation over Czech reforms. It is highly
unlikely that Russia would go so far as to arm her satellites
with weapons that could not only involve the Soviet Union in
a nuclear war but could also be used effectively against her.
On the other hand, John G. Stoessinger, while agreeing that
it would be a hard decision for Moscow to make, argues that
Moscow has been pressured by its Warsaw partners as much as
Washington has by its NATO Allies for a share in nuclear
strategy. Therefore, he implies that it is a strong possi­
bility that Russia could give atomic weapons to East Germany
should West Germany come to share them.30

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30On the Dilemma facing the Soviet Union should West Germany get a share in nuclear weapons, see John G. Stoessin­
In any case, each of these factors or any combination of them, is possible and could very well happen. The worst situation is unlikely to occur, but where the fate of NATO and the world hang in the balance, "even very small probabilities need to be taken seriously."

As for Bonn's goal of the reunification of Germany and any motion of her pursuing a policy for nuclear weapons, the two aims are incompatible. Alastair Buchan has pointed out that a Federal Republic Administration that participates in a European nuclear arrangement "must abandon all hope of reunification." Helmut Schmidt, member of the Bundtag Defense Committee, in arguing against nuclear weapons for the Federal Republic, summed up the incompatibility of reunification and nuclear arms when he said:

Since German reunification is only attainable by negotiation, the German people cannot interest itself in the establishment and cultivation of a state of enmity between themselves and the Soviet Union. . . . Negotiations of an agreed settlement of the German problem is quite inconceivable other than on the basis of partnership between East and West.

This seems to be the adopted position of the present West German administration. Chancellor Kiesinger placed emphasis on establishing a detente with Eastern European countries and omitted any mention of a desire for nuclear weapons sharing in

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his State of The Nation message in March, 1968. Bonn has, since the advent of the Kiesinger administration, tended toward establishing better relations with its neighbors.34

Klaus Knorr argues that the sharing control of nuclear weapons with West Germany would have further ramifications than an attack on Germany. He says that "the USSR would probably interpret the transfer of control . . . as a move so hostile that the host country would thereby assume the immediate risk of a preemptive Soviet strike."35

Effects On Nuclear Disarmament

Several strategic analysts within the Western nations believe that the diffusion of atomic weapons to other countries would magnify the problems of arms control and reduce further whatever possibilities there might be of reaching some kind of international arms agreement. The Soviet Union, for example, continued to hold out on the Nonproliferation Nuclear Treaty "so long as the United States continued to hold open the possibility of such nuclear sharing . . . as the multilateral force or Allied nuclear force. These schemes would

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34For the complete text of Chancellor Kiesinger's State of The Nation Message see NEWS, Vol. XII, No. 3 (Washington: The German Embassy, 1968).

constitute proliferation. . . ."\(^{36}\) Arms agreements will be complicated by the fact that each case of diffusion creates additional pressure and incentive for still other countries to strive to acquire their own nuclear force, "or to destroy the nuclear facilities of the acquiring state before the program reaches completion."\(^{37}\)

It has already been pointed out how nuclear weapons as a status symbol for more influence within NATO can only create inequality and further incentive to member countries. It is not likely that any new atomic power could develop "second-strike" capabilities for several years after it exploded its first atomic device. France, who exploded her first device in 1960, did not have her force de frappe fully developed until 1966, and does not expect to have her submarine missile fleet fully developed until 1972.\(^{38}\) Therefore until the nuclear launching submarines are completed the French force will remain no more than a "first-strike" force due to high vulnerability.

To overcome vulnerability there will be a tendency


toward automatic or "quick-trigger" systems for launching retaliatory strikes. Automatic systems could raise the risks of nuclear war by accident of third party or by war exercises, mismanaged tests, and strategic miscalculation: Automatic reaction systems are inflexible and could escalate into a full scale war out of border incidents or threats. In view of these factors it would be almost an impossibility to achieve, much less enforce, arms agreements that would stabilize world conditions. It is argued that nuclear arms control will be almost an impossibility where there is a history of suspicion and hostility. As a matter of fact, Secretary of State Rusk argues that "nuclear proliferation could add a new and dangerous dimension to historical ethnic and territorial disputes existing between nations." Another observer suggests that a "perfect or foolproof inspection and control system" cannot be "designed for most types of disarmament agreements between states that are hostile to and suspicious of each other." With this in view, the possibility of what will happen when the United Arab Republic and Israel acquire atomic weapons lends urgency to the matter.

39 The Nth Country Problem And Arms Control, op. cit., p. xi.
40 Rusk, "Non Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons," loc. cit.
Washington agrees with the analysts who argue that to gain any measure of arms control the spread of nuclear weapons must be halted. RAND analyst Malcolm W. Hoag writes that the broad objective of the United States has been, and remains, to halt the diffusion of national nuclear forces. Therefore, "the United States has persisted in one message to would be aspirants: 'If you go toward independent nuclear capabilities, you go it alone. The road promises to be long and costly; and for what?'" Washington was hoping that France's problem would be a prime example as a lesson to other potential atomic powers.

An argument that has been used extensively by both Britain and France is the positive effect that their own nuclear force has on world stability and disarmament. Each tends to view his own national force as beneficial. Both the late Prime Minister Winston Churchill and former Prime Minister Harold Macmillan justified Britain's nuclear weapons on the basis that they gave the British an exercise of influence on arms-control agreements between the United States and Russia. French President de Gaulle speaks not only of the increased effect that France as a nuclear power will have on nuclear disarmament but also of the peaceful effects of equilibrium, security, wisdom, and circumspection she will bring to a dangerous world. For example, in 1958, de Gaulle

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42 Hoag, op. cit., p. 286.
declared that "when we become an atomic power . . . we will have all the greater means at our disposal for making our action felt in fields that are precious and useful to all mankind: those of world security and disarmament." In 1960, when France exploded her first atomic device, General de Gaulle immediately proclaimed that the "French Republic is now in an even better position to further its actions toward the conclusion of agreements among the atomic powers with a view to achieving nuclear disarmament." At his Tenth Press Conference on July 3, 1964, the General stated that France's nuclear force "not only constitutes for her . . . the guarantee of her security, but also it introduces into a dangerous world a new and powerful element of wisdom and circumspection." Later in the same conference he added:

We will . . . continue our atomic effort over the short, medium and long term, convinced to be thereby helping the nation's scientific, technical and industrial development . . . and to be giving France the means for her security and her independence, consequently those for her action in behalf of equilibrium and peace in the world.

If these arguments were carried to their logical conclusion, it would mean that the unanimity for stability and nuclear disarmament through arms-control can be achieved only by

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43 De Gaulle, Major Addresses, op. cit., p. 28.
distributing nuclear weapons to all countries.

Neither Britain nor France, of course, has ever carried this argument to its conclusion. They have adhered closely to what Albert Wohlstetter, RAND analyst, has called the "N-Plus-1 Country Problem," that is, so far as world stability is concerned the Nth country tends to see the problem of proliferation as starting with the N-Plus-1. The Nth Power problem originally started when both Russia and the United States thought of the trouble as the "third-power problem"; Britain thought of it as the "fourth-power problem"; France as the fifth; and Red China as the sixth. "Each new or prospective nuclear power thinks of the problem as stopping the next country after itself." Secretary Rusk pointed out the Nth power problem when he declared that the United States believed that "even one nuclear power was too many, and immediately after World War II we sought to remove nuclear energy from the military field." Red China faithfully followed this procedure when she exploded her first nuclear device. She immediately called for a world conference to outlaw the bomb.

A study prepared at Stanford Research Institute, in California, suggests that the prevention of nuclear diffusion

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46 Wohlstetter, op. cit., p. 257.
47 Ibid., p. 258.
has not only been a failure in its intended purpose of creating world stability, but has rather increased instability by giving Russia an opportunity for various forms of blackmail. The study further asserts that since Russia's fears of a nuclear-armed Western Europe are sincere, Washington could use these fears to America's advantage by suggesting to Russia that Washington is seriously thinking about sharing control with the NATO Allies. "Over the long run it may give the United States bargaining leverage in any negotiation" over the areas of nuclear disarmament and European security.

The suggestion is refuted by an example of the complexities of proliferation of weapons and nuclear disarmament. For instance Washington proposed the MFL as an arms-control measure to head off Bonn's nuclear ambitions and at the same time tempt Britain and France to consolidate their forces within the NATO framework. Russia, on the other hand, regarded the proposal as proliferation, and declared the project would preclude any arms agreement, including agreement against nuclear proliferation. Though Washington maintained that the MFL arrangement did not constitute proliferation, it did let the matter become obscure. A nonproliferation treaty has been negotiated and is now in the ratification

50 Ibid., p. 280.
However, since neither France nor Germany has approved the treaty, West Germany could still be driven into collaboration with France. This would bring about the proliferation that the MLF was supposed to prevent.

Proliferation and nuclear disarmament are incompatible. Diffusion of nuclear weapons within NATO can only add to the problem of agreements on control of nuclear weapons. It seems that, until nuclear disarmament has been achieved, world stability in the nuclear age can best be maintained by the nuclear stalemate between the two super powers.

Effects On NATO's Strategy

An Alliance should be an exception to the problems of proliferation. An effective Alliance would not be plagued with the spread of nuclear weapons if it had a planned strategy in accord with objectives to be achieved. In the case of the North Atlantic Alliance, there are fifteen sovereign nations with common interests but not identical ones; and fifteen different views on the objectives to be achieved. It is true that so long as the Allies viewed Soviet foreign policy as a military threat to their security, they were agreed that the main purpose of NATO was to counter Communist force. But as armed aggression became less imminent and Western Europe grew more prosperous, the

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Alliance's leading members began to disagree on NATO's objectives and how they should be achieved.

For most of the Alliance members one purpose of NATO is to create a base of strength from which to negotiate successfully with the USSR. A base of strength is considered a prerequisite for successful negotiations in international diplomacy. Marshal Stalin emphasized this necessity for military force when he posed his famous question: "How many divisions has the Pope?"\(^5^2\)

The principle members of the Alliance are agreed that NATO falls far short of an effective strategy and that there is need for a change. Even though the "flexible response" was adopted in December, 1967, it did not solve the basic problem of strategy because the basic problem turns on the question of confidence within the Alliance and is brought about by the changing purposes of alliances. For example, pre-nuclear age alliances were formed for three basic purposes: First, to amass physical force—the more members the stronger the alliance. Second, to let it be known to all potential enemies what nations would support each other. There is some claim that had Germany known that the United States would join the Allies both world wars would have been

prevented. Third, "to provide an incentive for mutual assistance beyond that already supplied by an estimate of the national interest."\textsuperscript{53}

There was inconsistency among these purposes even before nuclear weapons were introduced. The larger the membership of an alliance the greater was the collective security; but at the same time, the wider the range of interests the harder it was to establish a common ground and get common action from the members. Larger membership not only made agreement on what constituted a threat next to impossible it also raised the threshold on how direct and intense a threat had to be to produce joint action. Those difficulties have multiplied with the atomic age. An alliance in the atomic age must have a strategy based on tight control and command of nuclear weapons because of the great risks involved in nuclear warfare. These risks have brought the pledge of mutual assistance into grave doubt. As a result of this doubt there are two opposing views on the effectiveness of the modern alliance such as NATO. (1) The Alliance can be effective if all its nuclear weapons are centralized under competent authority and direction. (2) The Alliance has lost its usefulness and each member must have its own nuclear strike force.

The United States subscribes to the first view.

Washington has consistently emphasized that European contributions to the overall nuclear strength of NATO is negligible, and has adopted a policy that firmly opposes proliferation of independent nuclear strategies. On June 16, 1962, Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara expressed clearly the United States' position in an address delivered at the University of Michigan. Mr. McNamara asserted that independent European nuclear strike forces would be too small to have any serious deterrent effect on the Soviet Union, and their use against Russia would be tantamount to committing suicide. "Limited nuclear capabilities operating independently, are dangerous, and prone to obsolescence and lacking in credibility as a deterrent."

Essential to American strategy, Mr. McNamara added, is the existence of a "controlled response" based on "unity of planning, concentration of executive authority, and central direction. There must not be competing and conflicting strategies to meet the contingency of nuclear war."

Fundamental to Secretary McNamara's new strategy was the determination to control the employment of force in order to rule out, insofar as humanly possible, the chance of an expansion of a small conflict into a nuclear war through


55 Ibid.
miscalculation, and to rule out a possible "counter-city" strike by Russia. The "controlled response" (flexible response) strategy called for the United States to retaliate, in case of a nuclear attack, against Soviet military forces. This strategy is impossible if independent strike forces with only "first-strike" capabilities are dispersed throughout NATO countries.

Every United States proposal for nuclear sharing reflects this strategy. Each proposal has had a built in veto system that would perpetuate American hegemony over nuclear weapons and nuclear strategy within the Alliance. In other words, Secretary McNamara's flexible response called for a division of labor within the Alliance with the Europeans supplying the conventional forces and the United States furnishing the nuclear deterrent. Since the only real deterrent force in the Alliance is nuclear, this could and would leave the security of Europeans completely at the mercy of the American commitment. In fact, Europeans would be reduced to mere satellites. (A fact which many of them already realize and resent.) In view of this it is not surprising that the Europeans have balked at raising conventional forces; that the Europeans are suspicious of Washington's efforts to get them to furnish the "men-at-arms for the American nuclear knight." 56

as Secretary McNamara pointed out in a statement before the Senate Armed Forces Committee:

The main subject of this debate over nuclear strategy has concerned the proper response to levels of aggression below an all out strategic nuclear attack on our home­
lands. For six years, the discussion has centered on the extent to which we should plan on the use of nuclear weapons as the main response to non-nuclear aggression. The U.S. has been firmly of the view that the threat of an incredible action is not an effective deterrent.57

The opposing view of the controversy, that Alliances have lost their usefulness, is based on the assumption that the risks of total destruction will prevent the United States from fulfilling its commitment to defend Europe with the American deterrent. It is also based on the assumption that a small national strike force will deter a large force. The leading exponent of this view is French President de Gaulle. President de Gaulle has used these arguments on several occasions in support of the French force de frappe. For example, in his second press conference in 1959, as President of the French Republic, de Gaulle cast doubt upon the American commitment when he declared:

Who can say whether . . . the two powers that would have a monopoly on nuclear weapons might not make a deal with each other to divide the world between them. Who can say whether, should the occasion arise—while each side might follow a policy of not hurling its devices at the principle adversary . . . the two rivals might not

crush others?
And who even can say whether the two rivals . . . will not come to the point of uniting? In truth, France, by equipping herself with nuclear armaments, is rendering a service to the equilibrium of the world. 58

By 1963, President de Gaulle was more direct in his doubts of the United States' commitment to use its nuclear weapons in defense of NATO:

With regard to defense, until recently the Americans . . . were in a position to assure the free world almost complete protection, but they lost this monopoly. . . . Owing to the fact that the Russians now have the wherewithall to destroy the world . . . it is only natural that America is seeing its own survival as the principle objective in a possible conflict and is not considering the time, degree, terms and conditions of its nuclear intervention for the defense of other regions . . . except in relation to this natural and primary necessity. This . . . is one of the reasons that France is equipping itself with its own atomic weapons. 59

In his Tenth Press Conference, in 1964, President de Gaulle again found the American commitment doubtful. He also took issue with those who had criticized national nuclear forces as insignificant. De Gaulle asserted that in six years (1970) France would have "a total instantaneous power of 2,000 Hiroshima bombs. This is what certain, obviously unthinking, opponents call France's 'little bomb.'" 60 The French President added that an attack on France would bring

58 De Gaulle, Major Addresses, op. cit., p. 61.
60 De Gaulle, Tenth Press Conference, loc. cit.
destruction to the attackers, and since a people can die but once, "the deterrent exists provided that one has the means to wound the possible aggressor."\(^{61}\) (Italics mine)

This argument was carried further in 1966, when French Premier Georges Pompidou, in a foreign policy statement before the French National Assembly, declared:

> Within NATO itself, we have seen the replacement, . . . and without our agreement, of the initial strategy that was based on deterrence and . . . the immediate use of atomic reprisals, by a strategy called 'flexible' which actually consists in enabling the U.S. to limit the field of the initial operation by sparing the territory of the main potential aggressor. Tactical nuclear weapons under American control could not ensure us from an attack from the East.\(^ {62}\)

If this argument were carried to its logical conclusion, NATO in the end would comprise fifteen separate nuclear weapons programs and strategies. All these programs would not only overlap from duplication, but would be of dubious military value, and would mark the end of the Alliance. In all probability, this would lead to world chaos. Each country, to assure its security, would have to, not only build a nuclear strike force, but would have to devise a method of protection against careless neighbors. This in turn could lead to surrender or non-involvement.

\(^{61}\)Ibid.

CHAPTER V

STRATEGIC ALTERNATIVES FOR NATO

The will to use or not to use nuclear weapons is formed by human attitudes coupled with political considerations. These in turn have been the subject of conflicting views that cover the entire spectrum from preventive strikes to unilateral disarmament of nuclear weapons. It is fortunate that, within the Alliance, those who hold either extreme view are not in responsible governmental positions. Yet it is unfortunate that those who are responsible officials cannot agree on what constitutes the best atomic strategy which in turn creates nonagreement on what constitutes nuclear proliferation and the dangers of proliferation.

The problem of proliferation derives urgency from the fact that the world is approaching a point where it will no longer be possible to control the diffusion of independent atomic forces. Once a nation has successfully completed a nuclear weapons program it will have atomic stockpiles which can be stored indefinitely; which can survive responsible

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1 See above footnote 4, p. 96 and footnote 51, p. 119 for the efforts being made to halt the proliferation of nuclear weapons.
governments; and which can be exchanged, sold, or given away. And just as important, "Every additional country having nuclear weapons, is an additional center of independent decision-making on the use of nuclear weapons. International relations are thereby made more complex and more dangerous."²

It is possible that the point of no return has already been reached. In the opinion of many there is no possible way to stop proliferation of nuclear weapons in NATO, therefore, the next best thing is to accept the inevitable and plan a NATO nuclear strategy accordingly. French Air Force Colonel F. O. Miksche, who is a noted military strategist, has written that the spread of independent atomic forces in NATO is inevitable unless the United States distributes some "300 Hiroshima bombs among the Western European countries," and thereby exercise some measure of control over diffusion by controlling the production of nuclear warheads.³ And if the United States procrastinates longer, it will control neither the use nor the production of the weapons. As Miksche succinctly put it, "The expansion of the nuclear club is inevitable. Those who stubbornly oppose this trend remind one of the doctor in Moliere's *Le Malade Imaginaire*, who hated everyone who preferred to cure himself in his own way

²Rusk, "Non Proliferation Of Nuclear Weapons," *loc. cit.*

³Miksche, *op. cit.*, p. 305.
rather than die according to the advice of the medical faculty."^4

Professor Robert Strousz-Hupé, director of the Foreign Policy Research Institute, University of Pennsylvania, and others have agreed with Miksche that nuclear proliferation is inevitable and added that the United States should give life to the policy of nuclear sharing to which it has formally committed itself. The United States cannot stop proliferation and to try to do so by a policy that stifles its Allies, "is almost as futile as Canute commanding the sea to stand still."^5

In any event, an examination of the possibilities of proliferation shows that Miksche and Strousz-Hupé et al are probably right. First Russia and Britain then France and now Red China have developed nuclear weapons. West Germans have discovered a process which is a short cut to the development of the weapons. It has been found by a research group that any country, "in traveling the road to an operational power reactor, is simultaneously traveling well over half-way toward an operational plutonium bomb."^6 By 1960, some forty-two countries were operating atomic powered reactors and were active in atomic research.

^4Ibid.


^6The Nth Country Problem And Arms Control, op. cit., p. 38.
It should be noted here that the United States, for all its fear of nuclear diffusion, has at times proceeded on the assumption that the spread of nuclear weapons is good. There has never really been much objection in Washington to the British nuclear strike force. In addition, some of the United States military policies tend toward the notion that the spread of nuclear weapons is good. For example, the United States has placed nuclear weapons in foreign countries under the "double veto" system; has given or sold significant parts of total systems; and has agreed to assist the Dutch and French in construction of nuclear submarines—at least the non-nuclear parts of the main propulsion machinery. Washington has gone even farther in regard to Britain: "Actually given not only submarine plans, but also designs and special materials for nuclear warheads." To justify this special treatment to Britain, the United States modified the Atomic Energy Act in 1958, in such a way that it can be interpreted, as was stated above by Hoag, or as an incentive to the "other Allies to demonstrate a nuclear capability of their own, and so become eligible for help."^7

It should be also noted that nuclear sharing, such as the United States is now doing, is in itself a movement toward an eventual independent nuclear force. The United States

^7 Wohlstetter, op. cit., p. 356.

Ibid.
will try to retain control over the shared nuclear weapons, but it is expected that these efforts will be resisted. France is a case in point. Furthermore, in the bilateral agreements with the Allied countries, involving nuclear weapons, Washington has found it expedient to vest in the recipient country a right to continue to receive both ancillary equipment and restricted information on the use of nuclear systems. This right can only be terminated by bilateral agreement or by the dissolution of NATO. The United States-Turkey agreement is representative of all the atomic energy agreements with NATO Allies. Article I states that "each Party will communicate to and exchange with the other Party information and transfer of non nuclear parts of atomic weapons systems involving restricted data to the other Party . . ."9 And Article XI makes note that the agreement "shall remain in force until terminated by agreement of both Parties except either Party may terminate its cooperation . . . upon the expiration of the North Atlantic Treaty."10

Since it is highly probable that proliferation of nuclear weapons is inevitable, the choices among alternative atomic policies confronting NATO members are likely to play an important role in proliferation of national strike forces,

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10Ibid., p. 1344.
and the problem of avoiding small or large nuclear conflicts. For this reason it is necessary to examine some of the alternatives open to the individual Alliance members, within the framework of what is best for the national interest of each country.

Albert Wohlstetter, Assistant President of the RAND corporation, lists four alternatives from which NATO nations can choose: (a) the repudiation of all nuclear weapons, of the American guarantee, and of association with any nuclear powers; (b) the development of an independent nuclear strike force; (c) the creation of a jointly controlled nuclear force; (d) the reliance upon the nuclear commitment of the United States, that is American control of all NATO nuclear forces.\(^\text{11}\) There are other choices perhaps, but for the study Wohlstetter's should be sufficient to make the point clear.

**Rejection Of Nuclear Weapons And U.S. Commitment**

The unilateral repudiation of nuclear weapons, even an Ally's, for protection against Russian aggression has, over the past decade, gained some prominence in Britain and a small following in the United States. This movement was able to split the British Labor Party on policy concerning Britain's nuclear strike force, yet it was not confined to the Labor Party alone. The movement boasts such notables as Bertrand Russell, Philip Toynbee, Stephen King-Hall and

\(^{11}\text{Wohlstetter, op. cit., p. 358.}\)
others. In any case, this policy receives support only from those who advocate returning to complete reliance upon conventional weapons; those who advocate passive resistance to Soviet aggression and occupation; and those who advocate complete surrender without resistance. The unilateral disarmingers see the possibility of war with Russia not as the consequence of Communist aims and ambitions but as a result of the arms race. This movement views the USSR as a satisfied status quo power that, if given a chance, is ready for a negotiated settlement of the East-West differences. On the other hand, the group views the United States as "one half of a power conflict which threatens to crush third countries." Moreover the nuclear disarmingers are in the forefront of those who spread doubt that America will come to the defense of NATO: but is more likely to involve the Allies in a nuclear war in which the NATO members have no interests.


13 Wohlstetter, op. cit., p. 359.

14 Russell, loc. cit.; It is quite interesting to note that France has used these same arguments to justify her development of nuclear weapons. See above pp. 124-126; See also French Premier Pompidou who, after criticizing the idea of U.S. control of weapons, asserts that U.S. control could also "involve us in a war that would not be ours . . . and for reasons alien to the interests of France and the Alliance." Statements On Foreign Policy, op. cit., p. 5.
Fortunately, unilateralism is the opinion of a small minority throughout NATO countries. Rejection of nuclear weapons does not in any sense assure a country of security against a nuclear power. Rejection of nuclear weapons, total disarmament, or submission would not necessarily diminish the Russian motive for attack. A non nuclear defense is not a wise substitute for reliance on nuclear weapons since it could have little chance of stopping a nuclear attack. To unilaterally disarm or partially disarm nuclear weapons, would be an invitation for Soviet aggression since at no time have the Soviet leaders disavowed the inevitability of Communist expansion. On the contrary, the Soviet leaders have made it very clear that peace is no more than an ordering of world affairs for the triumph of Communism. Their policy of peaceful coexistence has a twofold purpose: (1) the avoidance of a general war and (2) the creation of a situation where all obstacles to Communist expansion are removed. Nuclear disarmament is regarded as a most vital weapon in the struggle for the Communist triumph. Former Soviet Premier Khrushchev pointed this out in speeches in November, 1957, and January, 1961. According to Mr. Khrushchev the 20th CPSU Congress had advanced the theory and practice of the Communist movement, which was first of all the "recognition of the necessity of a revolutionary transformation of capitalist society into a socialist society as an axiom. . . . The path to socialism lies through
proletarian revolution and the establishment of the dictatorship of the proletariat." Khrushchev went on to recite some of the conclusions reached at the 20th CPSU Congress:

Marxism-Leninism proceeds from the view that the forms of transition to socialism can be a peaceful or nonpeaceful nature. Revolution by peaceful means is in keeping with the interests of the working class and the masses. But if the ruling classes counter revolution with force and are unwilling to bow to the will of the people, the proletariat must break their resistance and start a resolute civil war.  

In establishing peaceful coexistence as the Soviets' foreign policy, Khrushchev had this to say:

Our party considers the policy of peaceful coexistence, which has been handed down to us by Lenin, to be the general line of our foreign policy. . . . The consistent implementation of the policy of peaceful coexistence strengthens the position of the World Socialist system, promotes the growth of its economic might, its internal prestige and influence among the peoples' masses and creates for it favorable foreign-political possibilities in peaceful competition with capitalism.

Peaceful coexistence helps develop the forces of progress, the forces struggling for socialism, and in capitalist countries it facilitates the activities of the Communist Parties. . . . It facilitates the struggle the people wage against aggressive military blocs, against foreign military bases. It helps the national liberation movement to gain success.  

In regard to world peace, the former Soviet Premier pointed out that peace was synonymous with Communism. Or

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16Ibid., p. 66.
better still peace was subject to Communist world triumphs:

Consequently the slogan of the struggle for peace does not contradict the slogan of the struggle for Communism. Those two slogans harmonize with each other because . . . Communism acts as a force capable of saving mankind from the horrors of modern destructive rocket nuclear war. . . . Therefore, the slogan of the struggle for peace appears as a satellite of the slogan of the struggle for Communism.17

The new leaders in the Soviet Union have not rescinded the policies stated by Khrushchev in the Moscow conferences. As a matter of fact Party Chairman Leonid Brezhnev has made it quite clear that the "important conclusions" that were drawn at the 1957 and 1960 conferences had been confirmed to be the correct policies.18 In evaluating the correctness of the policies, Mr. Brezhnev declared, "We state with conviction that during the years since the Moscow conferences detach­ments of the revolutionary movement have taken up new posi­tions and continue their advance though not as rapidly as we would like."19 The Chairman went on to assert, "There has been continuous confirmation of one of the fundamental propositions of communist strategy: that the struggle for peace helps the struggle for communism."20 Mr. Brezhnev's evaluation concluded that:

17Ibid., p. 67; See also Charles B. Marshall, Two Communist Manifestos (Washington: Center of Foreign Policy Research, 1961).
19Ibid., p. 2.
One of the most important sociopolitical factors of the postwar period is that precisely in Europe... capitalism's positions have been weakened to a great degree. This is manifest in the collapse of capitalism and the victory of socialist revolutions in the eight states of East and Central Europe. This is also manifest in the fact that the bourgeoisie has been able to retain its domination over the remaining part of Europe to a considerable degree only by relying on the military, political, and economic help of the United States.\textsuperscript{21}

However, according to Brezhnev, now that the European members of NATO are gaining their independence from the United States it is splitting the "united front of world capital, which opens up new opportunities for the European and world workers movement for the development of the struggle for peace..."\textsuperscript{22}

In regard to the Soviet position on wars of liberation, Chairman Brezhnev made it clear that there would be a continuation of support from the Kremlin. Of much interest here is the insight Brezhnev gives into how the tensions and communist struggles in Europe aid the liberation movement throughout the world:

Even today the struggle for peace in Europe pins down the aggressive forces of the imperialists to a certain extent and prevents them from taking part in suppressing the liberation movement in other parts of the world... To tie down the forces of imperialism in Europe and thwart their aggressive plans is not to simply narrow the circle of action of imperialism's aggressive policy... but is also to deal it a defeat which would

\textsuperscript{21}Ibid., p. 4.
\textsuperscript{22}Ibid.
have effects everywhere. This would also be a real help to the liberation struggle of the peoples on all other continents.\textsuperscript{23}

It should also be noted that should both East and West agree to destroy all existing nuclear weapons, Russia would have the advantage of massive conventional troops. NATO has at no time reached the conventional force levels agreed to whereas the Soviet Union has continued to maintain her strong conventional troops in her satellite countries plus sophisticated conventional weapons.\textsuperscript{24} With the destruction of all nuclear weapons, Russia would probably have a greater advantage over the West than she had when NATO was founded, that is provided the West did not build up its conventional forces.

\textbf{Independent Nuclear Forces}

Although national nuclear strike forces have been justified for various reasons, the major justification is the belief that no alliance or commitment of allies can ever

\textsuperscript{23}\textit{Ibid.}, p. 5.

\textsuperscript{24}Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) gives the following statistics on Soviet conventional forces; Soviet Army: 26 tank and motorized divisions in East Germany, Poland, and Hungary; 50,000 combat-ready airborne troops; 115 Red Army divisions in Russia; Soviet Airforce: 12,000 planes with well trained Airmen; Soviet Navy: Four fleets—second in power only to the U.S. Navy. \textit{Highlights On A Briefing On SHAPE And Allied Command Europe (SHAPE (mimeographed) 1968)}, pp. 2-3. See also "Defining The True Purpose Of NATO," \textit{NATO Letter}, Vol. XVI, No. 4 (April, 1968), pp. 12-13, for the disparity of conventional forces between the NATO and Warsaw Pacts.
be strong enough to force any country to risk annihilation to aid another. As has been pointed out, advocates for the spread of national nuclear forces—particularly France—argue their position as follows: (1) nuclear forces can only deter an attack if the potential aggressor knows that the retaliation, causing more destruction than he is willing to bear, will actually be used to answer an aggression; (2) it is not credible that a nation will become involved in a nuclear war, if its own cities are exposed to devastation, solely to defend another country; (3) therefore, the only force that can deter an attack on France is a nuclear force in the hands of the French. Some French writers—not President de Gaulle—make two further points: (4) the other European nations can be protected only by having their own strike forces, therefore, each European nation should have nuclear weapons in its own control; and (5) since the Western Europeans have intermeshed interests, France will only be secure when every major European country has its own nuclear strike force.

In brief, the advocates of independent national atomic forces argue that not only must each country have its

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own nuclear weapons, but that any small nuclear force will be able to deter a major power such as Russia. Thus it is logical that diffusion of nuclear forces offers the best means for NATO members to protect their national interests.

This argument supporting the diffusion of small nuclear forces is based on the assumption that, in the atomic age, there is no longer a correlation between the purposes of war and the risks of war. An aggressor nation, though stronger, risks losing in a few hours the advantage of all its past efforts economic and political. Therefore, "when two nations have nuclear weapons, even if they are unequally armed, the status quo is unavoidable." This argument is also based on a theory held by some analysts immediately after the Second World War. The view held at that time was that nuclear arms would be the great equalizer of nations. That is, according to some, nuclear weapons would be the poor country's way to retaliate. Kenneth Younger succinctly places the bases for this argument as coming from those who struggle against universalism, those who tenaciously hold to the concept of the sovereign nation state as the only possible center of authority. According to Younger, the advent of nuclear weapons arrived in time to support this group,

\[ \ldots \] by making it possible to suggest that moderate sized nations may now be able after all to look the great powers in the eye, if they make national nuclear

\[ ^{27} \text{Gallois, op. cit., p. 7.} \]
deterrent forces the basis of continuing national independence.

This doctrine, clearly stated by de Gaulle, appeals to deep-seated emotions in many countries including Britain and is consequently capable of stimulating dangerously nationalistic ambitions at a time when every economic and military consideration underlines the need for greater international cooperation.\(^\text{28}\)

Nevertheless, the view that nuclear weapons would be the poor country's equalizer does not hold true today. Both the weapons and the delivery systems have become sophisticated and more costly. Today nuclear weapons deterrent power must be viewed in terms of a well protected second-strike capability. Which also means that command, control, and communication systems must be capable of withstanding a nuclear strike from a potential enemy.\(^\text{29}\)

Will small national nuclear strike forces be able to deter an attack against a country possessing them? First, it must be noted that national nuclear forces tend to produce an illusory feeling of security which in itself amplifies the dangers associated with nuclear forces. Most analysts agree that each European NATO member is limited in the resources needed to build a force capable of destroying Russia, even by a pre-emptive attack. Thus, for all

\(^{28}\text{Kenneth Younger, Changing Perspectives In British Foreign Policy} \text{ (London: Oxford University Press, For The Royal Institute Of International Affairs, 1964), p. 51; For the statement by de Gaulle that "government of nations alone can be capable of and responsible for making policy" see Tenth Press Conference, op. cit., p. 6.}\)

\(^{29}\text{Foster, "Unilateral Arms Control Measure And Disarmament Negotiations," op. cit., p. 266.}\)
practical purposes, the Soviet nuclear force is invulnerable to European NATO Allies. Since such an attack could not achieve victory, but rather guarantee the complete destruction of the NATO members concerned, it is only logical that no European Ally would retaliate to initiate its own annihilation—even in the face of extreme provocation.

National nuclear forces could on the other hand, create a more dangerous situation in that each new NATO nuclear power would be a subject of Russian provocation. In addition, it would be subjected to nuclear blackmail. The "Suez Crisis" of 1956 should have been a lesson to the advocates of small independent nuclear forces in that respect for two reasons: First, Britain, which was considered a nuclear power at the time, had to exercise caution in face of Soviet nuclear threats. Therefore, her nuclear forces were utterly useless. Second, Britain's nuclear weapons added nothing to her capability in dealing with a non-nuclear power such as Egypt. This refutes any notion by those, such as Colonel Miksche, who claim that "there is a clear nexus between the safeguard of interests in overseas areas and the expansion of the . . . atomic club." It would be interesting to see how Britain or France could have justified using nuclear weapons against Egypt. Or for that matter, how France could have benefited in Indo China or Algeria by

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30 Miksche, op. cit., p. 298.
having a nuclear strike force.

There are several other factors that decrease the effectiveness of European national forces as deterrents. Three of these factors must be taken into consideration before a nation strikes out for independent nuclear capability:

1. The short distance between Russian missile bases and targets in Western Europe. The short distance makes it possible for the Kremlin to use maximum payloads and still achieve a high degree of accuracy. This will make it harder for the West Europeans to build effective hard shelters for a deterrent.

2. The limitation of land area in Western Europe. An effective deterrent must have land area for proper dispersal. Proper dispersal becomes a vital factor if the deterrent consists of manual nuclear bombers which now comprise the French and British deterrents.

3. The dense population of Western Europe. The dense population of West Europe is vulnerable—especially to city-strike strategy. Therefore, a few well placed Soviet bombs could all but literally devastate European civilization. In light of these factors it is easy to see why Professor Kissinger asserts that for any one of the NATO "Allies to attempt independent retaliation is almost suicide."31 Or as the French scholar, Raymond Aron, in writing against independent nuclear forces, aptly puts it

"the elimination of Great Britain and France would not counter-balance the destruction of Lenningrad or Moscow by a few atomic bombs."\textsuperscript{32}

National nuclear strike forces are costly and of dubious military value. Their political value has also been over emphasized as was shown by the British deterrent during the Suez crisis.\textsuperscript{33} From the standpoint of world stability national nuclear forces can only hinder individual NATO members since it increases their possibility of becoming involved in extreme provocations, nuclear blackmail, and an accidental nuclear war. Moreover, an increase in national nuclear forces within NATO could diminish the American guarantee. One observer asserts that several independent nuclear forces within NATO could be advantageous to the Western deterrent power since Russia would be confronted with a "more complicated and less predictable situation."\textsuperscript{34} However, an increase in national nuclear forces within NATO is more likely to lead to a decrease in the American commitment. And if the Kremlin were reasonably sure that the United


\textsuperscript{33}On the other hand, one must accept the fact that France's atomic force, though insignificant in real military value against a possible adversary, nevertheless seems to give France some political influence over her station.

\textsuperscript{34}Klaus Knorr, "Perspective On Nuclear Policy," \textit{Alliance Policy In The Cold War} (ed.) Arnold Wolfers, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 157.
States would not intervene, an independent national force could be overwhelmed by a Russian attack.

**A NATO Nuclear Force**

Growing concern for the continued reliability of the American retaliatory force for deterring an attack on individual NATO countries has prompted many analysts, strategists, and officials to propose several different types of joint NATO nuclear forces. These proposals have been suggested as a means of insuring that the United States would fulfill its guarantee; of halting diffusion of nuclear weapons; and of strengthening the Alliance. For example, Alastair Buchan proposed the creation of "the least vulnerable" NATO strategic nuclear force. This force composed of an IRBM system would be developed along the entire periphery of the Alliance Area from "North Cape to Alexandretta," under the direct control of SACEUR or some other suitable command.\(^{35}\)

Frederick W. Mulley, British Labor M.P., who has been Vice President of the Western European Union (WEU) Assembly and Rapporteur of its Defense Committee, submitted a proposal at the WEU Assembly meeting in December, 1959, for a joint European Strategic Nuclear Force.\(^{36}\) Mr. Mulley's plan did not call for joint production, nor the sharing of

\(^{35}\) Buchan, *NATO In The 1960's*, op. cit., p. 71.

atomic secrets, nor the sharing of actual bombs and warheads. To put it in Mulley's own words, it would "simply have transferred the control of those that existed from national to joint WEU control and direction."37

Professors Strausz-Hupé, Dougherty, and Kintner agree that a joint European nuclear force under the WEU might be the best possible plan for a credible NATO deterrent. They suggest that the United States "offer to make the Western European Union an independent nuclear power, provided Britain and France will subject their nuclear capability to joint control within the WEU framework."38

French General Gallois also has proposed a joint nuclear force which is not a joint NATO, or European force, but rather joint nuclear forces between each NATO member and the United States.39 The General urged retention of the "double veto" system for control of nuclear weapons, and for protection of the vital interests of each member. But he proposed further that the system be supplemented by an agreement that in certain specified circumstances the United States would turn over the nuclear weapons to the national control of the Ally. For example, the United States would make arrangements with each of the NATO Allies or group of Allies with a

37Ibid., p. 87.
38Strausz-Hupé, Dougherty, and Kintner, op. cit., p. 222.
definition of the several danger criteria on which to base the agreements. Using a hypothesis of a bilateral agreement between the United States and France as a model, Gallois explains his plan. Experts would decide that aggressive acts, such as, a nuclear bomb exploding on France, enemy divisions crossing the Rhine in force, or bombardment of the French coast by an alien fleet would constitute enough danger to lift the American veto. The nuclear weapons would then become national and France would be responsible for their use. The double veto system would play its proper role because it would be understood that in grave danger the American check would be removed and France in turn could use the weapons as "instruments of a strictly national policy of dissuasion."\textsuperscript{40}

There are several other proposals such as the plan proposed by General Norstad while in command of NATO Forces. Another was proposed by General Andre Beaufre, former French representative to the Washington NATO Standing Group. It has not been for the lack of a plan that NATO does not have a joint nuclear force of some sort. The difficulty arises because all joint systems that have been proposed suffer the same major problem as does the official United States MLF proposal: the problem of who and how many would have the final say in the use of nuclear weapons. Or to use the overworked metaphor, the problem of "how many fingers on the trigger."

\textsuperscript{40}\textit{Ibid.}, p. 174.
The United States has been committed to the idea of a NATO-wide nuclear force since 1960, as the best means to strengthen the Alliance and halt diffusion of national nuclear forces. Rather than examine all the different joint systems that have been suggested this inquiry will concentrate on the NATO-wide force that the United States is committed to.

It should be noted first that a NATO strike force would in all probability not stop diffusion of independent nuclear forces. That is, if viewed in the light of some of the reasons for national forces. The purpose of a NATO strike force is to make NATO an organization responsible for the decision of launching a nuclear attack. Thus, theoretically it would be the result of an Alliance decision rather than a national decision. A NATO force, therefore, obviously could not be used in defense of special national interests, for example, conflicts with lesser powers, and especially overseas interests. It is doubtful that NATO members would consent to any one country using it for such interests. A NATO strike force also opposes the concept of sovereignty, and it would be useless as a means of gaining influence or a special position within the Alliance. (However, West German officials see a NATO force as a means of gaining equal influence within the Alliance for Germany.) Besides, France had made it clear all along that a NATO force could not, in the words of General Billotte, "respond even partially to the exigencies imposed for the security of France... it could
in no manner be a substitute for the French project."\(^{41}\) Since a joint NATO atomic force does not satisfy these motives for national nuclear forces, it is not likely that it can halt the diffusion of independent nuclear forces.

Another side of the NATO nuclear forces coin is its military value. It is generally conceded, except by some U.S. officials, that the military worth of a joint nuclear force adds nothing to the defense of NATO. The MLF of surface vessels as proposed by the United States can only be seen as possibly having some political value. A matter which was pointed out by Patrick Gordon Walker, the new British Foreign Minister, at the NATO Parliamentarian Conference in Paris, November, 1963. Mr. Walker questioned the Americans on the feasibility of a NATO multilateral force and asked why the United States had not adopted such a weapon for its own use since it was supposed to be so "magnificent." He then derided the concept as useless, costly, and an interference in the upgrading of NATO's conventional forces.\(^{42}\) Another who voiced considerable doubt as to the worth of the MLF was French Foreign Minister Couve de Murville. In a policy statement before the French National Assembly on November 3, 1964, the Foreign Minister said:

\(^{41}\)Cited in Wohlstetter, op. cit., p. 376; As has been shown France at no time even considered giving up her nuclear project for a NATO nuclear force.

Let us take ... the matter of the so-called multilateral force. No one has yet told us what its real goals are. Everyone agrees in thinking that its interest is far from being demonstrated from a military standpoint. Then what would be its utility from the political standpoint? It is understood that Germany would perhaps, psychologically, derive some satisfaction from it. It is seen that the Soviets would, rightly or wrongly, be disturbed by it. It is felt that it would result in a split within NATO, for which it would be difficult to blame France.\(^4^3\)

In view of the opinions of the two Foreign Ministers, the MLF would cause a reduction in conventional forces due to added expenditures as well as add a divisive factor to the organization.

The major difficulty in the effectiveness of a joint NATO strike force is the problem of control and command; that is, in the political sphere of NATO. The object of creating the joint forces by the European members would be to make it independent of Washington domination and dependent on Europe's ability to make decisions on its use. However, in place of the lone decision by Washington the Europeans would purchase a dependence upon fifteen governments and their decisions. (14 now that France has withdrawn from the organization.) The NATO-wide force presupposes that whereas a single country would not, a group of countries would, run the risk of exposing their cities to a nuclear counter-strike or pre-emptive nuclear strike. There is little difficulty in

predicting that a unanimous decision, if it could be reached at all, would be made in time. On the contrary, it is highly probable that many countries would try to control the elements of the strike force stationed in their own country so as to avoid provoking a retaliatory strike on their territory. This being the case, in an emergency the NATO joint force would probably be useless.

To understand the effectiveness of a NATO strike force, it must first be determined just what it is that the Europeans want. That is, do they want the power to veto the American use of nuclear weapons or the power to launch a nuclear attack? It has been pointed out that the European Allies fear both premature use or no use at all by Washington. If it is the power of veto that the Allies desire, the NATO joint force offers little in the way of European security. And the United States could still exercise its veto if a strike were not in America's national interest. But even if the American veto were removed, it is quite likely that at least one other member would find reason to exercise a negative vote due to national interest. Actually the power to veto a nuclear strike by a joint force in the final analysis would in no way affect the use of the American strategic

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It is highly improbable that the United States would forego its veto power over any kind of NATO joint force to which it was committed. According to Adrian S. Fisher, U.S. representative to the Geneva Disarmament Conference, "We would have to insist . . . that the United States be a necessary
forces which are, and in all probability will remain, outside of a joint NATO force.

If on the other hand, the Europeans want the power to launch a nuclear attack how will the decision be made? Would the decision to invoke the NATO deterrent be taken by unanimous consent of all members, by special majority, by a simple majority, or by a special majority composed of leading powers? There have been several suggestions of which two can be ruled out without further discussion: (1) a unanimous decision by all members, and (2) delegating the decision to the NATO SACEUR. In the former case, any small country would thwart the use of the nuclear forces. As for the latter it is unthinkable that the decision to launch a nuclear attack should be in the hands of the military.\(^{45}\)

The suggestion of drafting a prior set of guidelines for reaction to an attack on NATO also has its drawbacks. First, it would presuppose a renunciation of national sovereignty, which not only would not be accepted by the European Allies, since it would infringe on their nationalistic party to a decision to use nuclear weapons. Because the vast arsenals of the United States are so heavily involved in that decision, we must be present for that decision and must ourselves agree to the decision taken." "U.S. Presents Amendments To Draft Treaty On Nonproliferation," U.S. Department of State Bulletin, Vol. LIV, No. 1400 (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1966), p. 676.

\(^{45}\)No documentation is necessary to recall that delegation of decision making, respecting nuclear weapons, to the military played an important role in the U.S. Presidential Campaign of 1964.
tendencies, but the United States Congress would also probably refuse such a move since it would usurp its power to declare war. As a matter of fact, one of President de Gaulle's major criticisms of NATO and a basic reason for his withdrawal from the organization was the token integration within the NATO military command structure. To de Gaulle this represented a loss of sovereignty for France. As for Congress' power to declare war, for all practical purposes that power has already been usurped with the stationing of troops and missiles on foreign soil.

Second, it would be inexpedient for NATO to list in advance how it would react to all eventualities. Should the list become known to the enemy, it might be regarded as an invitation for him to choose the smallest risk specified in it for an attack.

On the other hand, decision to launch the NATO strike force by a committee of five or three fares no better than by unanimity. What five or three countries would compose the committee? Would the decision, in the committee, be unanimous, three out of five, two out of three or what? The American position in this respect was made clear by President Eisenhower in a letter to President de Gaulle on October 20,

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46 For de Gaulle's criticism and claims of loss of sovereignty see his Major Addresses, op. cit., pp. 235-236; Also see de Gaulle, Tenth Press Conference, op. cit., pp. 8-10.
1958. General de Gaulle had written President Eisenhower suggesting that, since NATO did not meet France's need as a world power, a tripartite organization be established between Britain, France, and the United States for the purpose of strategic planning and employment of nuclear weapons. In his answer President Eisenhower said:

As for the means dealing with the problem which you propose, our present procedure for organizing the defense of the free world clearly requires the willing cooperation of many other nations, both within and outside NATO. We cannot afford to adopt any system which would give to our other Allies . . . the impression that basic decisions affecting their own vital interests are being made without their participation.47

Bernard Brodie asserts that even though the smaller NATO powers "seem content to go along with the American views, . . . and feel that what they can contribute is not going to make much difference in the defense of NATO," they definitely want a proper voice in a NATO decision to launch a nuclear attack.48

From the foregoing it seems that if the NATO allies could merely prevent the United States from using a small NATO force, which only supplemented the much larger nationally controlled American force, and could not force the United

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47 For the text of President Eisenhower's letter to General de Gaulle, and a statement by the State Department of the events surrounding General de Gaulle's letter to President Eisenhower, see U.S. Senate, Subcommittee On National Security and International Operations, Hearings, The Atlantic Alliance, op. cit., pp. 228-231.

48 Brodie, op. cit., p. 27.
States to authorize its use, a NATO joint nuclear force
would not have changed the situation from its original posi-
tion. In any case, practically every proposal put forth on a
NATO strike force, and on the command and control of such a
force, would seem to render the deterrent more cumbersome and
less credible than the American nuclear guarantee.

**American Control Of NATO's Nuclear Weapons**

The growing Soviet capability to threaten the United
States has magnified the doubts which began to appear during
the Suez Crisis: Whether America can be relied upon to ful-
fill its commitment to challenges which the NATO Allies con-
sider vital to their national interests. On the other hand,
Europeans equally fear the opposite hypothesis, that is, that
Washington might use nuclear weapons prematurely, especially
since NATO's conventional troops are not, and have not been,
up to agreed levels.\(^{49}\) Or, as some have put it, the Ameri-
cans might be "trigger happy."

As was pointed out above, President de Gaulle has in-
sisted that France have her own nuclear weapons because the
United States might make some arrangement with Russia; that
the United States and Russia might agree to divide the world;
and that the United States and Russia might decide to confine
violence to other parts of the world and thereby protect
themselves from devastation. Though there have been doubts

and fears raised in other member countries, France has taken the lead in criticizing the American commitment to the Alliance.\textsuperscript{50}

It should be noted here that even though de Gaulle is the leading critic in spreading doubt of the American commitment, he more than any one does not really doubt that the United States will honor its guarantee to NATO. Or as Professor Schelling has put it, de Gaulle is "enjoying the luxury of knowing that his security is so much guaranteed by the rest of us that he can insult us as he does."\textsuperscript{51} The late Secretary of State Herter voiced the same view on de Gaulle's belief in the American commitment when he said, "I can understand why France has not withdrawn from the treaty. She still has the umbrella of U.S. power hanging over her as long as she is a member of the Alliance."\textsuperscript{52} In any case, President de Gaulle's policies are based on the assumption that no matter how troublesome an ally is the United States cannot allow it to be defeated. Thus his policies are made possible by the protection of the American forces which he seems eager


\textsuperscript{51}Hearings, The Atlantic Alliance, op. cit., p. 120.

\textsuperscript{52}\textit{Ibid.}, p. 45.
to see withdrawn from Europe. Henry Kissinger described de Gaulle's belief in the American guarantee in the following manner: "Far from doubting America's military commitment to Europe, President de Gaulle is so certain of it that he does not consider political independence a risk. He thus adds American power to his own in pursuit of his policies."53

Nevertheless, the European allies do have some grounds for worry and their fears are real. The worries and fears were brought about by the fact that the Alliance's primary dependence was (and is) upon American nuclear weapons, and to a lesser extent, the British nuclear deterrent—both of which are outside NATO's control, and for that matter, whose deployment and targeting in case of war were unknown to the Allies. Therefore, the Allies had no effective voice in control of the weapons on which their security primarily rests. Former Secretary of Defense McNamara accurately defined these worries and their bases in a news conference on April 3, 1967:

The foundation of the security of the alliance is nuclear power. Thus it is only natural that the non-nuclear members . . . have always felt a need to be informed about nuclear matters and to participate in nuclear planning. They have been uncertain of their role. They believed, and rightly so, that they should have a greater voice in assessing the nuclear threat to the Alliance, in determining the nuclear forces required

to meet that threat, and in working out how and under what conditions these nuclear forces would be employed.\textsuperscript{54}

To alleviate this situation, the NATO Council established the NATO Nuclear Planning Group and the Nuclear Defense Affairs Committee as permanent bodies at the December, 1966, meeting. This Group met for the first time in April, 1967. It is yet too early to assess the success of this new body in removing the fears and worries of nuclear weapons.\textsuperscript{55}

Yet it is not only the nuclear control problem that has given rise to European worries and fears. It was pointed out earlier that the Suez crisis had effected some new realizations. There have been events other than the Suez crisis that have reinforced the Allies' doubts and fears: (1) Statements by high United States government officials have caused some uneasiness among the Europeans. For example, the statement by the late Secretary of State Christian A. Herter in April, 1959, in which he said that he could not "conceive of any President involving us in ... nuclear war unless the facts showed clearly that we are in danger of all-out devastation ourselves, or that actual moves have been made toward devastating ourselves."\textsuperscript{56} (2) The


\textsuperscript{55}For the text of the communique issued following the Nuclear Planning Group's first meeting see \textit{ibid.}, pp. 687-688.

\textsuperscript{56}\textit{U.S. Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Hearings, On The Nomination Of Christian A. Herter To Be
landing of the United States troops in Lebanon, about which NATO was not consulted, even though it increased the risk of Soviet pressure on NATO countries and involved the redeployment of some of the Alliance's divisions. (3) The unilateral reaction of Washington to the Cuban missile threat also added weight to European fears and bolstered, in European eyes, de Gaulle's reason for a national nuclear strike force.

President Kennedy's reaction in the Cuban Crisis in 1962, did, to some extent, dispel the fear of some Europeans that America would not run the risk of a nuclear war where American interests were at stake. For example, Chancellor Adenauer stated that "the crisis has proved that the American Administration is ready, in the face of a threat to the very existence of the United States and to freedom, to take even the gravest decisions." But it did not dispel the doubt of some Europeans that Washington would run the same risk in face of similar interests of the European Allies. On the other hand, many Europeans take an adverse view of the ramifications of the Cuban Crisis. First, President Kennedy's decision to take unilateral action, without advanced notice

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58 Mulley, "NATO's Nuclear Problems: Control Or Consultation," op. cit., p. 22.
to NATO, reenforced the argument that the United States might involve the Alliance in a nuclear war over a situation of little or no interest to the Allies.

Argument can be made that the Cuban crisis was more than of little interest to the Allies since the basis of their security was at stake. The Cuban crisis was a threat from NATO's common enemy—not just a Cuban threat to the United States. However it cannot be argued that the NATO countries would not be involved. American troops, missiles, and airbases are dispersed throughout NATO countries. It is not likely that the United States could engage in a confrontation with Russia and exclude some of its armed forces from the conflict. In addition it is not likely that the Soviet Union would exclude such forces and bases from its targets in the event of a hot war.

Second, some Europeans seem to see the Cuban crisis in the light of a settlement being made by the two super powers. The settlement was actually made without Cuba's participation, the country which was most concerned but which possessed only conventional weapons. This reenforced de Gaulle's argument for France's nuclear force as a means of protection against United States and Russian arrangements.

Finally, some Europeans see the importance of the small nuclear force as a result of the Cuban crisis. No Washington argument has been able to satisfy those critics who question why the United States could regard the French
force de frappe as insignificant and useless while at the same time regard some forty missiles in Cuba as a threat to the vital interests of the United States. An argument, though weak, can be made that the missiles were a threat because they were Russian made and were highly sophisticated as to range and capability, and, particularly, because they were backed by the full might of the USSR. However, it is more likely that the missiles would have had the same effect if they had been completely Cuban-made, Cuban-owned, and Cuban-controlled.

(4) A final event that seems to enforce European worries over the American guarantee to the NATO Allies is the United States involvement in Vietnam. Some Europeans view the Vietnam involvement as a sign of the lessening in importance of American Foreign and defense policies in Europe. In addition there is fear that a less than total victory or less than a completely satisfying solution will have a detrimental effect upon American prestige and thus degrade the credibility of American policy in Europe. German Chancellor Kiesinger, a supporter of the American position in Vietnam, discounted this possibility at a press conference on November 3, 1967. Kiesinger stated that he could not "envisage a solution of the Vietnam conflict by the United States which would weaken the credibility of the American protection

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In addition to European misgivings about United States commitment to NATO, some see in America's Vietnam policy the possibility of their becoming entangled in a war that is not of their own concern—a war outside the NATO area.

Are the European fears real or mythical? One has only to reverse the situation placing America's security on the guarantee of France or any of the NATO members to see that the fear exists. Besides history is filled with broken commitments and alliances; some NATO members have, within this generation, abandoned allies themselves.

But, there is strong argument favoring American support of the NATO Allies in the event of an attack on them. An examination of America's European interests can lead only to the conclusion that the United States' stake in the use of its nuclear deterrent is as great as that of Europe. A Europe under the control of Russia would isolate America to the extent that the United States could not survive as an island of freedom surrounded by a Communist world. Domination over Western Europe would also give Russia the rich and powerful industrial nations that she needs to become the world's leading power. George C. McGhee, U.S. Ambassador to Germany, makes a very strong argument concerning the importance

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60 Chancellor Kiesinger, "Current Problems In German International And Foreign Policy," loc. cit.
of free Europe to America's world leadership and freedom:

For to anyone examining the situation of the United States as a world power in the nuclear age, it must be clear that our fate is linked inseparably with that of free Europe. Our heavy investment of American men, materials, and technology in the Federal Republic—and Berlin—exist in order to defend not just Germany or Europe but the United States as well. I cannot take seriously the notion spread by some that the United States does not feel genuinely committed to the defense of Germany and Europe. 61

Another reason that America would honor its commitment is that an attack on Western Europe would be an attack on the American armed forces. Former Assistant Secretary of State George Ball pointed this out in 1964, when he said, "We have not stationed our troops in Europe to let them be overrun by a hostile power. We have not built our massive strategic force... with any thought that the force would not be used if Europe were attacked." 62 The American armed forces stationed in Europe are a substantial part of the United States defense system, even though Europeans view them as a "triggering" device for the ultimate use of the American deterrent. It is doubtful that Russia would if she could stage an attack on Western Europe without including American forces and bases. The risk would be too great to do so.

The most obvious reason why the United States would


honor its commitment to NATO is because it has identified its defense with that of Western Europe in the form of a treaty. Albert Wohlstetter in defending the idea that America's word can be trusted said that "it is not merely a figure of speech to say we will treat an attack on Europe as an attack on ourselves."\(^\text{63}\) The defense of the United States in respect to the treaty and the honoring of the commitment is probably argued best by Professor Thomas Schelling. Professor Schelling declares that it is not the treaty per se that commits America to the defense of Europe but the attitude surrounding the reasons for the treaty. The Professor's defense is better stated in his own words:

The North Atlantic Treaty did not so much create a commitment as it expressed one. On matters of war, especially nuclear war, President de Gaulle is quite right; nations can often not be relied on to risk nuclear destruction for each other merely because they are partners to a treaty. But in the United States most of us have never thought that we were bound up with the security of Turkey, Italy, Germany, or Norway, merely because the Senate ratified a treaty in 1949. Rather, the Senate ratified the treaty because it recognized that our security was indeed bound up with the security of those countries. Ratification did not create the obligation, the commitment, or the interest; it expressed it.\(^\text{64}\)

In any event, should the United States fail to honor its commitment even on lesser matters than a nuclear conflict it would mean for her a tremendous setback in political power. Or to put it in the words of Secretary of State Rusk, "If it

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\(^{63}\text{Wohlstetter, op. cit., p. 379.}\)

\(^{64}\text{Hearings, The Atlantic Alliance, op. cit., pp. 94-95.}\)
should be discovered that the pledge of the United States is meaningless, the structure of peace would crumble and we would be well on our way to a terrible catastrophe." More­over a massive attack on one or more of the NATO Allies could only be viewed in Washington as the first wave of an attack against America itself.

Whether the NATO Allies believe that America will respond or not, it seems that the Kremlin does not find it hard to believe, i.e., if the American deterrent can be given credit for the stoppage of the piecemeal take over of Europe. This fact seems to have been forgotten by many of the strategists and analysts on both sides of the Atlantic. According to Bernard Brodie the doubters could take a lesson from the late Winston Churchill who once wrote, in regard to planning an offensive: "However absorbed a commander may be in the elaboration of his own thoughts, it is necessary sometime to take the enemy into consideration." Brodie then went on to say that the USSR is so convinced that the Americans will honor this nuclear commitment; that it would take considerable persuasion on the part of the United States to rid the "Soviet leaders of their apparent conviction that in the event of a substantial attack by them the nuclear weapons available to


66 Cited in Brodie, op. cit., p. 28.
NATO forces in Europe would quickly be used.\footnote{67} As for the individual NATO countries, reliance upon the American guarantee seems to offer each of them the best security against Russian aggression. It is hard to see how the commitment can be made stronger or more real than it was made when President Johnson said, "Like the Constitution . . . the North Atlantic Treaty is more than just a legal document. It is the foundation of a living institution. The institution is NATO . . . created to give meaning and reality to the Alliance commitments."\footnote{68} There is also a fringe benefit that derives from acceptance of the American commitment: It offers more peace of mind to the individual NATO members in regard to the likelihood of accidental wars through nuclear proliferation.

\footnote{67}Ibid.; Another writer makes this point when he shows that no overt aggressive moves have been made by Communist forces in areas where U.S. troops are assigned. See Morton H. Halperin, Limited War in the Nuclear Age (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1963), p. 123.

CHAPTER VI

CHANGING NATURE OF THE ALLIANCE

As the North Atlantic Alliance moves toward its twentieth anniversary, it is moving toward a clearly uncertain future. The eleven nations in 1949, plus the three others in the early 1950's, that desperately sought to rebuild their economies and military security in the face of a strong adversary on their borders, are completely different in 1968. These nations are again prosperous; they are also very much aware of their proud national traditions; and they are raising questions concerning the validity of the assumptions and commitments made in 1949. Many see the Soviet threat, NATO's raison-d'être, receding and being replaced by a policy of coexistence which, if encouraged, can lead to a true entente. Some argue that, though a threat is possible, the Soviet Union of Brezhnev and Kosygin is not the Soviet Union of Stalin.

It has been shown that the true force behind NATO lies in the United States' nuclear power which places this force in the hands of Washington's policy-makers. This has raised the question regarding involvement of NATO members due to
unwise maneuvers or policies of the United States. It has also raised the question of whether too much dependence on American nuclear weapons relegates Western Europe to a second-rate military position from which it will not be able to extricate itself. A secondary military position is not only intolerable to most Europeans in terms of national pride, it is also seen as suicidal in terms of national defense.

These fundamental questions underlie the discontent and uneasiness on the part of certain NATO Allies. Although the most divisive elements in the NATO structure are France and West Germany, Britain and the United States also add to the divisiveness. Much of the division within NATO stems from the differences among the four leading members on the Alliance's purposes. For example, France has looked on NATO as if it were established particularly for the security of France, with as little participation by France as possible. France insisted from the beginning that the French Algerian Departments be included in the treaty, and later insisted that North Africa was NATO's southern flank; and argued that Washington should overtly take France's side on the Algerian problem.¹

West Germany has looked at NATO as a base of strength to ensure negotiations on reunification; she has insisted

that the NATO defense line be the Federal Republic's eastern frontier, so that West Germany would not become a battleground in a war with the Soviet Union. According to Helmut Schmidt, West Germany "cannot be interested in a Western defense structure predicated on the eventual liberation of a Germany devastated after a final battle."  

Britain views NATO as a means of retaining great power status through a close, and, at times, special relationship with the United States. Moreover, NATO is a means of security to Britain, but mostly in terms of a deterrent, not as a means of winning a war. This can be seen in Britain's severe reduction of conventional forces since the 1957 Defense White Paper, which placed Britain's defense on her nuclear strike force. This meant that she was admitting that she could not survive devastation should a global war come.  

The United States has looked upon NATO as the basis of United States' policy for all of Europe. With its European policy anchored in the Alliance, Washington has viewed NATO as the basis of America's general overall policy of "containment." Washington has, therefore, dominated NATO policies and strategy in effecting the containment policy.

Whether the United States has intended, or as for that matter, has had any desire to dominate the Alliance,

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there is little doubt that it has been the dominating partner of the Organization. Arnold Wolfers sees this dominating relationship of America to its Allies as being analagous to a wheel. According to Wolfers, the United States represents the hub of the wheel while its friends and partners are located at intervals around the rim. Each spoke in the wheel represents the line of communication or tie between the Ally or friend and the United States. Though the Allies make up the outer rim, they are not necessarily tied together. Thus, a disturbance in any Allied nation such as Portugal or Denmark would be communicated automatically to the hub (the U.S.) but not necessarily to other nations along the rim. Yet a disturbance at the center would have repercussions on the entire wheel. An excellent example of Wolfer's analogy in action was the Korean War. The Allies did send token forces as a supporting gesture, but did not agree wholeheartedly with the United States' policies. Neither did the Allies feel that the Korean conflict was as much a threat to Europe as did the United States. The United States involvement in Vietnam is a similar example. Here again only a few of the Allies seem to be opposed to the United States' policy. Particularly is this true of France who has been very critical

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4 Arnold Wolfers, "Stresses And Strains In 'Going It With Others,'" Alliance Policy In The Cold War, (ed.) Arnold Wolfers, op. cit., p. 7.
of the United States. In addition to de Gaulle's general opinions of the United States' policy, France's former ties in Southeast Asia have much bearing on French attitudes concerning this area.

In any case, the United States' domination of the Alliance is breaking down. It is no longer possible for Washington to get its NATO policies accepted without argument. Added to the break-down of American domination, is the tendency to see the organization as an anachronism which is also coming apart because its reason to be is disappearing. Many see the organization as being destroyed by the efforts of one man: President Charles de Gaulle.

It is easy enough to blame the ills of NATO on de Gaulle for he has not been subtle or diplomatic in regard to his opinion of the Organization. As a matter of fact, many of de Gaulle's actions and utterances can, rightly, be seen as direct attempts to break up the Organization. However, if the Organization does fall apart it is doubtful that it will be a result of de Gaulle's actions but more as a result of the changing nature of the Alliance. In the first place, the Organization is stronger than one man; it is the implementation of the self identified interest of several nations for a base of security. And in the second place, though de Gaulle

has strong appeal to nationalistic tendencies, it is hard to visualize any NATO member giving up the security of NATO to follow France. A brief look at the changing nature of the Alliance and the changing relationship within the Alliance will point this out.

France And The Alliance

On March 7, 1966, French President de Gaulle notified President Lyndon Johnson of his intention to remove France from the Organization of the Alliance. The French President’s rationale for this move was based on his views of the changed world conditions. As stated by de Gaulle:

France considers the changes that have occurred, or are in the process of occurring, since 1949 in Europe, Asia and elsewhere, as well as the evolution of her own situation and of her own forces, no longer justify, insofar as she is concerned, the provisions of a military nature taken after the conclusion of the Alliance, either in common in the form of multilateral agreements, or by special agreements between the French Government and the American Government.

That is why France proposes to reassume on her territory the full exercise of her sovereignty, which is at present impaired by the permanent presence of Allied elements or by the regular use made of her air space, to terminate her participation in the 'integrated' commands and no longer to place forces at the disposal of NATO.  

On March 10 and 11, 1966, France’s withdrawal from the Organization was made official when each of the remaining fourteen member nations were handed a memorandum to that effect. The memorandum not only affirmed de Gaulle’s

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6 For the full text of President de Gaulle’s letters see *ibid.*, pp. 24-25.
withdrawal of French troops from NATO's integrated command but also expelled the command structure and alien troops from French soil. The withdrawal from the Organization did in no way mean renunciation of the North Atlantic Treaty since France regards the Organization implementing the treaty and the treaty as two separate entities.

France's withdrawal from NATO and the removal of the Organization's commands and foreign troops from French soil did not create any extreme changes in the structure of NATO but rather brought to light conflicting attitudes within the Alliance. Other than the time factor, France's withdrawal should not have come as a great surprise to the other Allies. Any one who had kept up with de Gaulle's speeches and press conferences knew that he was against the integration of the French military even within NATO commands. He had made this clear even before he came to power in France in 1958. After coming to power de Gaulle made his displeasure with the Organization known in the letter to President Eisenhower in which he suggested the three-powered directorate of Britain, France and the United States.

By 1959, France had forbidden the United States to

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7 For the full text of the Memorandum see ibid., pp. 25-27, 36.
8 Ibid., p. 48.
10 The late Secretary of State Herter, Secretary of State Rusk, and the former Secretary of Defense McNamara were in
store atomic weapons on French soil and later had removed the
French navy from participation in NATO. By 1966, there was
every indication that France was determined to leave the Organ-
ization: De Gaulle had stopped planning new physical facili-
ties for SHAPE and refused to let French forces take part in
an important NATO exercise—"Fallex 66."

Former French Foreign Minister Couve de Murville, in
a speech before the French National Assembly, April 14, 1966,
declared that no one inside or outside of France should have
been surprised at de Gaulle's decision to withdraw. To put
it in the French Minister's words:

Since June 1, 1958, that is, for nearly eight years,
everyone in the world has known what, in this major affair,
the French Government's position is. Everyone knows the
steps it has taken over the years... concerning either
our naval forces, our ground forces when they were brought
back from Algeria, ... or our refusal to accept Ameri-
can atomic missiles on our soil. Everyone was well in-
formed that we had set ourselves as the final deadline for
the changes that we found indispensable for France the
expiration of the second ten-year period of the treaty of
April 4, 1949. We have frequently set forth our views to
our principle partners, and first of all to our American
partners. And twice even, and the last time in October,
I pointed out to Washington that, barring unforeseen
events... France would make known her position in the
spring of 1966, and more exactly, probably during March.
Now, our first step was taken on March 10th.11

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In regard to the changes that were "indispensable for France," United States officials have categorically denied that there has been any suggested plan for changing the Organization's structure. Secretary of State Rusk's statement on May 2, 1966, is representative of these denials:

France has made no proposals to reform NATO. From time to time over the past three years, the French Government has indicated that it intended to put forward proposals, and her Allies in NATO have made it clear that they looked forward to those proposals and would give them most careful consideration. But instead of offering proposals for reform of NATO, the French Government has chosen to announce its decision without consulting its Allies in any serious way.12

Although President de Gaulle did not insist that the NATO Council leave French territory, it too has left France. Thereby France is completely divorced from the Organization except for membership on the Council and a military mission at SHAPE.13

No one but de Gaulle himself knows what his aim really is. It appears, however, that he wants to establish a Western Europe removed from United States influence leaving France free to negotiate bilateral defense agreements unhindered by the Organization's integrated commands. Or as John McCloy has stated it: "France contends, while adhering to a 'come hostilities' form of alliance, that her sovereignty is being

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impaired and her flexibility limited by continued membership in NATO. . . ." Moreover, in such a situation, and since Germany, without nuclear weapons, would be unable to counter French power, de Gaulle could dominate the continent. Since de Gaulle does not feel that the United States would allow France to be absorbed by the Soviet Union, he seems willing to surrender the many years of planning and preparation that went into the development of a common defense for the sake of French hegemony in Europe.

Although de Gaulle's design for Europe may sound fanciful and unrealistic, it has been in the General's thoughts for quite some time. De Gaulle envisages French hegemony over a Europe that extends from the "Atlantic to the Urals" and he has spoken of this possibility on numerous occasions. For example, in a speech before the United States Congress on April 25, 1960, the French President stated:

Through the Organization of a Western Europe ensemble, facing the bloc built by the Soviets, it will be possible to establish, from the Atlantic to the Urals, some equilibrium between those two zones which are comparable, in both populations and in resources. Alone such a balance may . . . one day, enable the old continent to bring a reconciliation between its two parts, to find peace within itself, to give a fresh start to its civilization and lastly . . . to help in an atmosphere of serenity, the development of the unfavored masses of Asia and of the awakening populations of Africa.15

14Hearings, The Atlantic Alliance, op. cit., p. 128.

One of President de Gaulle's fellow Frenchmen, Jean Lecanuet, has aptly summarized the premises underlying France’s new foreign policy which is worthy of quoting in full:

"... In 1949, the Atlantic Alliance responded to a need because it corresponded to a threat; that threat has now disappeared and the danger of hegemony has been reversed, coming now not from the East but from the West; to this new danger we must reply with a new policy, one affirming our national independence and seeking to build a Europe productive of détente and understanding from the Atlantic to the Urals; this Europe will be more European if she is deprived of the presence of Great Britain; détente will lead to understanding with the Soviet Union and bring about the conditions for the settlement of the German problem; the disappearance of the Western bloc carries with it the certainty of the dislocation of the Eastern bloc. There, in abbreviated but I believe accurate form, are the formulas best able to explain France's present policy."

Mr. Lecanuet went on to argue that the French policy is based upon false premises. For example, in the question of American hegemony, if there had been signs of it being true, France would not have tolerated it—particularly France during the years of the Fifth Republic. Lecanuet then added his view of the real danger of France’s policy:

Under the pretext of combatting American hegemony this policy is leading to the withdrawal of American troops from Europe, although to my knowledge no official statement has ever been made on this question. But if it is by chance the political intention to achieve this result, we would then... exchange what we call American hegemony for the danger... of Soviet hegemony. What would then become of what we are accustomed to hear referred to as Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals? I would be inclined to call it Europe from the Urals to the Atlantic, in order to make known and understood by public opinion...

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where would be the real weight of hegemony in Europe so cut off from Anglo-Saxon Allies.\footnote{Ibid., pp. 11-12.}

It is doubtful that France will be able to degrade the effectiveness of NATO strategy in Europe to the extent that France will be placed in the position to arbitrate with the Kremlin on such issues as Germany's future. This seems neither plausible nor acceptable to the other Allies, especially Germany. Such acceptance would mean a Federal Republic pliable to French designs. Although the plausibility of such a situation can be more or less discounted, its nuisance value cannot.

\textbf{West Germany And The Alliance}

West Germany stands today (1968) as probably the strongest power in Western Europe. And it is fully aware of its importance in Europe. Yet, by most standards, West Germany is a second rate force. Its troops, integrated into the much larger framework of the NATO defense structure, are denied nuclear weapons since Germany itself is denied production and ownership of nuclear weapons. Germany is still a divided country some twenty three years after the cessation of hostilities of the Second World War. The Soviet Union has not seen fit to restore to freedom the part of Germany it has occupied for this same length of time. If anything, the USSR is more solidly entrenched in East Germany than ever before.
Since joining WEU, and as a result NATO, West Germany has viewed the latter as the best means to influence the balance of forces in Europe and bring about a European peace settlement, and particularly the reunification of Germany. It was the general belief in Germany that participation in NATO would not adversely affect a peaceful settlement and reunification. On the contrary, membership in NATO would facilitate the problem of security for the whole of Europe. Therefore, to West German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer, the Federal Republic's membership in the Alliance was to serve two purposes: as an incentive to keep the United States committed to the defense of West Germany; and to establish a situation of stability that could provide for the unification of all Germany.18

Due to its position as the most exposed NATO Ally to the Soviet threat, the West German Government tends to overreact to each crisis or act of crisis nature. Even though most members of the Alliance seem to be in agreement that the Soviet bloc is not contemplating an overt aggressive act against a member of NATO, the Federal Republic does not view the situation in the same manner. The physical threat to Germany has not receded as far as many West Germans are concerned. Probably one of the major reasons the Soviet threat

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has not disappeared in the eyes of the West Germans is that "it is difficult for the Federal Republic to close her eyes to the continued presence in the other part of Germany of the strongest concentration of military force within the Soviet bloc--forces whose arms and equipment are constantly being improved in line with the latest technical development." 19

The late Chancellor Adenauer's first objective has been a success--ensurance of American participation in Germany's defense. It is the second objective that has been less than successful. Though a more or less stable condition has been established, a peaceful settlement of Europe and German reunification has not; and, for that matter, cannot be seen even in the distant future. Nevertheless the Federal Republic holds that it will never accept the idea of a permanent division of Germany, that is, two German states. Former Chancellor Erhard pointed this out in a speech to the Christian Democratic Union on March 22, 1966:

If, on all sides, a measure of good sense of justice governs without which a peaceful world cannot exist, the questions which now still appear burning and insoluble can also be settled, because the German people are ready, now as before, to make the sacrifices for their unity. However, one thing must be excluded from their deliberations by our discussion partners--the thought . . . that the Germans will ever become used to their division, and that they will in the long run, be ready to accept the existence of two German states. 20

19 Ibid., p. 2.

West Germany recognizes and accepts the fact that her future lies with the Atlantic Agreements and she is anxious to strengthen her ties through NATO with the United States. At the same time, however, the Federal Republic is fully cognizant of the strategic importance she plays in Western defense and therefore, desires the status of a full participant in the decision-making process of the organization. This is seen in a statement of basic principles concerning the Alliance and German defense, by State Secretary Karl Guenther von Hase, March 15, 1966:

(1) NATO is indispensable to keep the peace in Europe.
(2) An integrated defense is necessary, for integration ensures the degree of effectiveness required to deter aggressors.
(3) The free nations of Europe should plan the common defense in close contact with the United States and Canada.
(4) North American presence in Europe is an essential part of Atlantic teamwork to avoid war.
(5) A special status for the Federal Republic of Germany is unacceptable. . . .

Although Bonn officials maintain that an integrated NATO is the best guarantee of German and Western European security, there are signs of doubt and distrust that NATO can achieve reunification in West Germany's foreign policy. When the utter lack of achievement is displayed, it is not hard to understand a reaction of doubt and distrust on the part of the Germans. It should also be noted that there is a tendency

among the Western nations to accept the division of Germany as a natural dividing line between East and West. At least the senior NATO members have never placed the German problem in a position of high priority in East-West negotiations.

In any case, since 1966, the Federal Republic has made some changes in its approach to the German and therefore European problem. On March 25, 1966, the West German Government declared that the "Federal Government is determined in accord with its Allies to defend itself against any attack on its freedom. However, it is not equipped for a war of aggression. Nor would it be capable of waging such a war since it has assigned all its combat units to NATO."

This declaration was to alert the world and especially the Eastern European satellites that West Germany was not following a "revanchist" policy. It was hoped that the declaration would cause a let up in the constant Soviet propaganda aimed at West Germany. It was also hoped that such a declaration could establish a peaceful framework for a relaxation of tension between West Germany and Eastern Europe.

As a further effort to establish a relaxation of tension, the Federal Republic, though not recognizing East Germany as an independent state, has made overtures toward the government in East Berlin to negotiate some of the

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problems concerning all Germans. This effort is best stated in Chancellor Kiesinger's State of the Nation Message in March 1968:

I repeat once again the offer that I made in the Government Declaration of December 13, 1966 and April 12, 1967, as well as in my two letters to Herr Stoph. The Federal Government adheres to the intention of easing the lot of the people in divided Germany. It is prepared to negotiate with the Government in East Berlin about all practical questions concerning the living together of Germans.23

In this message the German Chancellor first aptly shows the greatest obstacle to the German settlement through NATO, and then outlines his policy in this regard:

Since the Soviet Union has caught up with the United States in nuclear armaments, the powers and their blocs have been facing each other strongly armed. They are endeavoring to avoid any conflict which might develop into a nuclear war annihilating them both. The dreadful danger, while preserving a precarious peace, solidifies the status quo. The powers' political and ideological differences continue to exist, but the fronts have frozen in the middle of our country.

Whoever wants to change this intolerable and dangerous state of affairs . . . can only do so by peaceful means. This is why the Federal Government has initiated its policy of detente vis-a-vis Eastern Europe. . . . If we want to create a lasting peace, we must find solutions which are recognized as right and just also by future generations. We are therefore trying to develop better relations with our Eastern neighbors. We have therefore established diplomatic relations with Rumania and Yugoslavia and have exchanged trade missions with Prague.

We are prepared to enter into diplomatic relations with the Czechoslovak Republic and with all other East

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European States and, together with them, to endeavor to build a better future for Europe.  

Whether Bonn's policy of detente will hasten negotiations on a peace settlement in Europe is unknown, but it is a known fact that a peaceful approach is a necessary condition for a final peaceful settlement. It is impossible to know if and when the Soviet Union will be ready or willing to settle the question of German division. However, the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact's intervention in the internal affairs of Czechoslovakia in August, 1968, is suggestive. This is an indication that the Kremlin will go to extreme lengths to retain control over the satellites. And that East Germany will remain in the Soviet orbit for quite some time.

Fear is being voiced by some sections that the Federal Republic, disenchanted with the slow progress on reunification in the framework of NATO, will follow President de Gaulle out of the organization. One German writer asserts that the French President speaks to a strong German following when he says, "If you remain in NATO, that is, if you remain dependent upon the United States, you will remain divided! The German question can only be resolved in a framework of a European Europe." This of course is a possibility, but it

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24 Ibid., pp. 1-2.


26 Roth, op. cit., p. 7.
is not highly likely. At least it appears that Bonn is not anxious to exchange American hegemony for French hegemony. This was implied by former Chancellor Erhard at a press conference on February 25, 1966. When asked if the Federal Republic recognized de Gaulle as the spokesman of Europe, after the French President had stated that he would represent the European viewpoint in Moscow, Erhard said, "In Moscow, the French President will illumine the European standpoint from the French view. It is clear that not all the European Nations will share this view to the final comma."²⁷

Another fear, voiced by NATO's Secretary General, is that the tendency of Alliance members toward unilateral detente with the Soviet Union is confusing and blurring the purposes and aims of NATO; that these unilateral efforts could "become a sanction for the status quo, and at that moment the temptation for Germany to try a direct approach to the Soviets may become too strong."²⁸ Mr. Brosio warned that:

... the present situation is not clear enough to rule out either the possibility of an agonizing

²⁷"Chancellor Takes Stock At Press Conference," op. cit., p. 4; Although the Germans recognize American domination over NATO, they do not feel that the United States seeks hegemony over Europe. See Foreign Minister Gerhard Schroeder, "Points of Main Emphasis In German Foreign Policy," The Bulletin, Special Supplement (Bonn: German Federal Government, Press and Information Service, July 9, 1963), p. 5.

reappraisal by Germany in an unforeseeable future, or
the reversal of the Soviet attitude towards Germany, from
implacable hostility to the offer of a deal at the ex-
 pense of the West.29

Here again it is unlikely that the Federal Republic would act
rashly, that is, exchange its freedom for Soviet hegemony.
However, it must be noted that the German division is a high-
ly explosive factor and any eventuality is possible.

Britain And The Alliance

The annual statement on the British Estimates, as
announced in the House of Commons on January 16, 1968, sig-
naled the end of the myth that Great Britain was a world
power. For all practical purposes Britain had ceased to be a
world power by the end of the Second World War, although
she did have many overseas commitments. The 1968 White Paper
on Defense also signaled the withdrawal of British forces
from all areas except Europe. The British Government's
important decisions can be summarized as follows: (1) Europe
and the treaty area will constitute Britain's major efforts
of defense; (2) an accelerated withdrawal of troops to be
completed by 1971, from such areas as Maylaysia, Singapore,
and the Persian Gulf; (3) the reduction of new naval con-
struction and the complete phase out of carrier forces upon
completion of the troop withdrawal from the above mentioned
areas; (4) Britain will maintain no forces for use outside of

29Ibid.
Europe after the troop withdrawal. This was a concession that Britain's role as a great power and her overseas commitments had come to an end. The White Paper stated further that Britain's future was with Europe and that she was depending upon the Alliance for her freedom and security:

The foundation of Britain's security now . . . lies in the maintenance of peace in Europe. Our first priority, therefore, must still be to give the fullest possible support to the North Atlantic Alliance. Our contribution will be formidable. The size and striking power of the Royal Navy is, after that of the United States Navy, greater than that possessed by any other member of the Alliance. Our army is well-trained and superbly equipped, and has more recent and varied fighting experience than any other European army. The Royal Air Force . . . will be second to none in Europe. We shall thus be able to contribute to the security of NATO on a scale corresponding with our efforts to forge closer political and economic links with Europe.31

Although it was implied in the White Paper that Britain was determined to become a part of the European community both politically and economically, this was later spelled out by William Rodgers, British Parliamentary Under Secretary of States, Foreign Office. In stating Britain's policy Mr. Rodgers said:

Britain has made her commitment to Europe, which I should like to emphasize is unequivocal, and to the Europe of the Rome Treaty. Not everyone yet understands the very profound change which has taken place in my country. We have come to recognize that from now on our major interests and the major field of operations for our policies must be in and with Europe. We have said quite plainly that we want to work out in Europe and with

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31 Ibid.
other Europeans our own common destiny. This then is the point we have reached.  

To say that the British policy was a change would be an understatement. Particularly, considering that Mr. Harold Wilson, as late as March 1964, was making such statements as: "We have always been a world power." and "We should not be corralled in Europe." At the same time the Party in power was implying the same attitude in regard to Britain's need to maintain its own nuclear deterrent. For example, Prime Minister Douglas-Hume warned should Britain give up its nuclear arms, "France and China would take our place in the highest international councils." Mr. R. A. Butler, Foreign Secretary, asserted that it would make it "impossible to conduct the foreign policy of the country unless it were quite certain we had our nuclear deterrent."  

Britain's policy change does not come as a surprise since her colonial holdings had started their decline shortly after World War II. The surprise is generated by the

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determination displayed in her effort to become involved on the European Continent. Why is Britain so eager to tie her destiny to Europe at this date when leadership of Europe could have been hers with little effort on her part two decades ago? What prevented Great Britain from taking the opportunity to lead Western Europe twenty years ago when today she would settle for equal membership in the Common Market? As a matter of fact the British have tried twice—and have been refused twice by France—since 1961, to become a participating member of the Treaty of Rome (Common Market).

It is impossible to point to any single factor as a cause for the British refusal to seize the opportunity to lead Europe. However, it is possible to point to some factors that probably influenced the course Britain took. First, a brief review of British Foreign Policy shows that it was always in her interest to deal with a fragmented Europe. The continental states were viewed as the greatest threat to Britain's security. Therefore, the policy generally followed by the British was to prevent the rise of a strong European state, or for that matter a coalition of European states strong enough to threaten her security. Thus promotion of a United Europe would have been in complete opposition to the British tradition. Britain was not in the decade following World War II, ready to break with this tradition.  

36Younger, op. cit., p. 88.
A second probable influence on her decision away from European leadership was the fact that she retained the view that Britain was still a world power. This was only natural since she still headed the Commonwealth; she had just made a gallant stand in the War when the European nations had given up leaving her to fight alone; and the War-time alliance with the United States had resulted in a "special relationship"—at least for the British. In regard to the latter, President de Gaulle sees it as something formal, though it has not really been defined. Actually, any British-American relationship would bear some "special" qualities considering they share a common language and culture which could only encourage informal ties. These ties would probably exist regardless of the close alliance during the War.37

In any case, British policy throughout most of the post-war period seemed to lack any definite purpose. For at least a decade following World War II, she seemed more or less concerned with keeping as many channels open as possible. Though she was concerned with British security in the framework of the Alliance, she was not concerned with building a strong Europe or limiting her flexibility in foreign affairs by binding herself to the Continent. (It was only when the European Defense Community failed and there was the possibility that NATO would follow suit that Britain broke with

tradition and stationed troops on the Continent.) However, in 1955, the late Sir Winston Churchill set the tone for a definite British policy which, though eroded badly, lasted until 1968. In a debate in the House of Commons Mr. Churchill stated that Britain must become a strong nuclear power in order to have influence throughout the globe. Yet, she must at all times direct her policy toward a close relationship with the United States. The British policy is best stated in Churchill's own words:

... We must never allow, above all, ... the growing sense of unity and brotherhood between the United Kingdom and the United States and throughout the English-speaking world to be injured or retarded. Its maintenance, its stimulation and its fortifying is one of the first duties of every person who wishes to see peace and wishes to see survival of this country.

Our moral and military support of the United States and our possession of nuclear weapons of the highest quality and on an appreciable scale, together with their means of delivery, will greatly reinforce the deterrent power of the free world, and will strengthen our influence within the free world. That, at any rate, is the policy we have decided to pursue.38

Needless to say this policy did not bear fruit. Britain was unable to develop the nuclear capabilities that would give her a strong influence within the free world. In regard to the special relationship with the United States, it was shattered, or at least it was exposed as being not so special, when London found Washington in complete opposition to the

British policy in the 1956 Suez Crisis. Although the United States did help meet the British fuel shortage caused by the closing of the canal, and amend the Atomic Energy law which in the long run favored Britain over the other Allies, the relationship did remain strained.

Another blow to the British-American relationship occurred when President Kennedy cancelled the Skybolt missile project in 1962. The cancellation not only put Britain's nuclear strike force in jeopardy it also put the relationship in jeopardy. That is, the manner in which it was cancelled: without prior consultation. The cancellation of Skybolt also pointed out that the two facets of the policy set by the late Prime Minister, were both dependent on the United States: the "unity and brotherhood" relationship and Britain's nuclear deterrent. The Nassau Agreement, which resulted from the Skybolt affair, was able to smooth some of the British-American relations. However, this agreement came in time to adversely affect a new British policy toward Europe.

At the time of the Nassau Agreement, Britain was negotiating with members of the Common Market concerning her application for membership in the EEC. It is doubtful that Britain's membership would have been accepted by France had there been no British-American Agreement at Nassau, but at

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39 Kissinger, The Troubled Partnership, op. cit., p. 79.
any rate, it came at the most opportune time when President de Gaulle was preparing to exercise his veto over Britain's membership. Though de Gaulle did not use the Nassau Agreement as a reason when he vetoed the British entry, it later came out in one of his press conferences when he stated the reasons for the Franco-German Treaty:

The French plan for European organization not being adopted by the Benelux countries; moreover, integration not being able to lead to anything other than an American protectorate; finally, Great Britain having shown through the ... Brussels negotiation that it was not in a position to accept the common economic rules and, by the Nassau Agreement, that its defense force, particularly in the nuclear domain, would not be European for lack of being autonomous in relation to the United States—it seemed to the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany and to the Government of the French Republic that their bilateral cooperation could have some value.\(^\text{40}\)

There is not much doubt that de Gaulle had viewed the Nassau Agreement as another example of the British-American special relationship. And the argument can be made that his reasoning concerning Britain's defense forces is not logical. For example, the British forces are as much European as the French forces including the force de frappe. However, the point is Britain missed an opportunity to use her nuclear force as a lever for influencing European attitudes when she failed to consult any of the European Allies before coming to an agreement with Washington.\(^\text{41}\)

\(^{40}\) De Gaulle, Tenth Press Conference, op. cit., p. 6.

\(^{41}\) Younger, op. cit., p. 44.
How long Britain will remain out of the Common Market is unknown. She recently applied again for membership, but was blocked a second time by a French veto. One interesting aspect of this situation is the fact that all members of the Common Market have their defenses bound together in NATO, except France. On the other hand, three countries (Britain, Denmark and Norway) which have applied for membership in the EEC also have their defenses bound in NATO, but are being excluded by the one member that does not wish to have its defense bound in NATO. Professor Ernest H. van der Beugel, Leyden University, former Deputy Foreign Minister, The Netherlands, pointed out Britain's greatest obstacles to membership in EEC when he said that he was "very pessimistic about the possibility that the French Government having already lost so much of its absurd illusion of hegemony of ... Europe, will permit Britain to come in."^43

The United States And The Alliance

Just as the other NATO members see different advantages and disadvantages through membership in the organization so does the United States. Just as the other members


hold different views regarding the role they intend to play in the common effort so does the United States. Washington has viewed the United States as a full member of the organization with all of its benefits and obligations, but she has not viewed her role as being just one of fifteen members. Washington has at different times viewed the United States as having several distinctive roles for achieving NATO's objectives. William T. R. Fox and Annette Baker Fox distinguish seven roles that American policy-makers have envisaged for the U.S. from time to time. For this study, however, a brief look at three of these roles and how they are changing should be sufficient: (1) Washington has viewed itself as the best guide for the Alliance's strategic planning; (2) as the best authority on NATO's overall policies; and (3) as best equipped to handle NATO's nuclear deterrent.

The view in Washington that the United States was more capable of guiding the Alliance's strategic planning was a natural growth out of the economic and military situation of the Allies when NATO was founded. First, the United States was the only member that could pay its full share of the financial burden of rearming. Since America was already underwriting the economic recovery of Europe, it would necessarily have to assume the major financial burden for rearming.

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45 Ibid., pp. 63, 64, 69.
the Alliance. It goes without saying that in general the one who pays the larger share has the stronger voice in most any endeavor. Thus, the United States was the dominant voice in the Alliance's planning.

Second, aside from Britain, the United States had perhaps the best qualified and established military organization capable of planning a strategy for the whole Alliance area. In addition, the technological gap between the United States and the Allies increased, particularly after tactical nuclear weapons were introduced into the Alliance's defense, to the extent that Americans felt they were more capable of strategic planning; Bernard Brodie adds to this the tendency of Americans to think of themselves as almost exclusively gifted in knowledge of appropriate strategy planning because America was out front in some technological phases. In any event, the introduction of atomic weapons into NATO placed the United States in the dominating position, especially in the nuclear area.

When the Kennedy administration announced the flexible response strategy, the Allies balked. Not only was the new strategy completely American inspired without prior Allied consultation, but it advocated the build up of conventional forces which had lost much of their importance under the "new look" strategy. In addition, the European Allies had regained

\[46\] Brodie, op. cit., p. 27.
enough economic security that they could not be persuaded financially to accept a strategy change in which they had little faith.

When the Allies resisted the strategy change, Washington began to realize it was losing its dominance of NATO's strategic planning; that the day of automatic acceptance by the Allies of American inspired policies was over. Washington also began to realize the more it pressed for acceptance of the new NATO strategy the more it caused doubt to be raised concerning the American nuclear commitment. The latter realization in turn led to the search for an acceptable NATO nuclear force.

The view by Washington that it was the best guide for making overall policy for the organization is best seen in America's readiness to effect an increase in the membership of the Alliance. The United States had taken the initiative in bringing in Greece, Turkey, and particularly, West Germany. Although West German admittance to NATO was executed through a maneuver by Great Britain, from 1950 on the United States policy was aimed at rearming Germany.

Again such a view is apparent in the way in which the United States tied Spain to the defense of the Alliance over the protests of some members. Another example is the part

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47 Buchan, NATO In The 1960's, op. cit., p. 17.
48 U.S. Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Hearings, Mutual Security Act of 1954, 83rd Cong., 2nd Sess
played by the United States in setting up the principle commands such as SACEUR and SACLANT.\footnote{See above, p. 37.} However, Washington's suggestions that NATO members coordinate their policies outside the Alliance area have met with non acceptance by most of the Allies. American officials have on several occasions urged the NATO members to support the Washington policies in areas such as Vietnam and Africa—as if American policies were in the common interest of the Alliance. For example, Ambassador George McGee asserted in 1964, that a full partnership in the Alliance entailed "increasing contributions in formerly remote areas like Vietnam and Central Africa from countries which, like Germany, have only recently acquired the ability to contribute."\footnote{George C. McGee, "Some American Thoughts On Current Issues," U.S. Department of State Bulletin, Vol. LI, No. 1310 (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1964), p. 138.}

Speaking to the Overseas Press Club on April 7, 1964, Secretary of State Rusk also urged support of American policies outside the NATO area:

The North Atlantic Nations should also deal cooperatively and effectively with communist aggression and subversive threats—in Asia, Latin America, and Africa ... especially such countries as Laos and South Vietnam which are targets of aggression by Hanoi, with the support of the Chinese Communists.\footnote{"Documentation: Mr. Dean Rusk And The Atlantic Alliance," \emph{op. cit.}, p. 20.}
Under Secretary of State George Ball has argued that the Europeans are neglecting world responsibilities by not coordinating their policies with the United States’ global responsibilities. 52

Nevertheless, the European members did not, and do not accept the American interpretation of the communist threat in Southeast Asia as a threat to their security. Rather, as has been shown, some feel that the real threat to their security is a general war caused by the United States policy in that area.

It has already been pointed out how Washington has viewed itself as best equipped to control NATO’s nuclear weapons; Washington has also dominated nuclear strategic planning for the Alliance. This, too, was only a natural reaction since the United States was for some time the sole possessor of atomic weapons. Moreover, the Allies accepted the United States’ view of its role in the nuclear area even after the Soviet Union and Britain had broken the American monopoly. With the advent of the Missile delivery system for nuclear weapons, the United States experienced non-acceptance of its dominating role over NATO’s nuclear weapons and nuclear weapons strategy. With non-acceptance of American domination came the demand from the Allies that they share in

their nuclear defense—particularly the strategic planning based on the United States nuclear deterrent.

This was purely a political problem. Yet between 1960 and 1965, the United States tried to solve it by technical methods—the NATO nuclear force. In 1965, Washington, though leaving the door open for a possible NATO nuclear force, suggested a political method for solving the political problem. Secretary McNamara suggested to the NATO defense ministers in June, 1965, that a small group of the ministers consult about the nuclear planning problems. This led to the establishment of an ad hoc group: the Nuclear Planning Working Group composed of five Alliance Defense Ministers. As a result of four meetings of this group in 1966, the NATO Council established two permanent organizations at its meeting in December, 1966—Nuclear Defense Affairs Committee, open to all NATO members, and the Nuclear Planning Group, composed of the defense ministers of seven NATO countries: Canada, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the United States.

It is not known at this time whether these two new NATO organizations will satisfy the nuclear desires or the

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54 Ibid., p. 687.
defense planning desires of the Allies in the long run.\textsuperscript{55} It is known that the several proposals for a NATO nuclear force was not the answer the Allies wanted. Probably the main reason it was not the answer is aptly stated by General Norstad before the U.S. Senate Subcommittee:

\ldots most of them feel that, regardless of the level of nuclear effort which, may be appropriate for the Alliance or the form in which that effort may be organized, they should have a voice in the political process by which decisions will be taken governing the use of weapons of this type—an influence, an appropriate measure of control.\textsuperscript{56}

Finally, it should be noted that there has been considerable change in another area in which the United States has been dominant; an area in which the United States has brought about uneasy strains on the Alliance: in the area of consultation with the Allies. This too was caused by the disparity between the United States and the Allies at the founding of NATO. In addition, the United States had been the senior Western spokesman at Potsdam and Yalta, therefore, it was normal that she felt she should continue in this role, particularly in negotiating with the Kremlin.

Further, the United States has never discounted the desire and hope of somehow reaching an accommodation with the Soviet Union. This hope and desire is underscored by a number

\textsuperscript{55}The first meeting of the NATO Nuclear Planning Group that was held in Washington on April 6, 7, 1967, seemed to have positive and satisfactory results. See the "Text of Communique," \textit{ibid.}, pp. 687-688.

\textsuperscript{56}\textit{Hearings, The Atlantic Alliance, op. cit.}, p. 69.
of efforts in United States Foreign Policy, including the present effort respecting the non-proliferation treaty. This has raised some fears of Washington and Moscow again arbitrating Europe's future. If the USSR is ready to come to terms concerning Europe's future, then the European states—especially and emphatically France—naturally wish to do their own bargaining. This point is emphasized by French President de Gaulle in his Eighth Press Conference, July 29, 1963:

... the United States which, since Yalta and Potsdam, has nothing ... to ask from the Soviets, the United States sees tempting prospects opening up before it. Hence, for instance, all the separate negotiations between the Anglo-Saxons and the Soviets, which started with the limited agreement on nuclear testing, seems likely to be extended to other questions, notably European ones, ... which clearly goes against the views of France. 57

Although the United States has on occasions initiated bilateral negotiations with the Soviet Union, without prior consultations with the Allies, she has realized since the 1956 Suez Crisis that consultation is an important key to the unity of NATO. 58 This realization can be seen again in a statement by Mr. McNamara before a U.S. Senate Subcommittee:

We are committed to discuss with other members of NATO any actions that we propose to take with respect to the Soviet Union or the Warsaw Pact. It is only in

57 De Gaulle, Major Addresses, op. cit., p. 235.
that fashion that we believe we can maintain the unity that is the foundation of our strength. 59

By 1966, Washington recognized that in order to keep NATO together the Alliance must be changed to adapt to changing world conditions; and especially, to changing European conditions. The permanent nuclear planning committee was evidence of Washington's recognition. Other indications of that recognition and the changing United States dominant role can be seen in a speech by President Johnson on October 7, 1966, in which he said, "We are committed and shall remain firm. But the Atlantic Alliance is a living Organism. It must adapt to changing conditions." 60 The Alliance must not only modernize and streamline its physical structures, it must do more. "The Alliance must become a forum for increasingly close consultations. These should cover the full range of joint concerns—from East-West relations to crisis management."

It should also be noted that the attitude of change extends to the smaller members of the Organization. Whereas the lesser members once viewed the major, perhaps the only, purpose of the Alliance to be a defense against external


61 Ibid.
aggression, there is now a general tendency for them to emphasize a new important role for the Organization in world affairs. Though maintaining that NATO still serves a valid purpose for their security, the smaller members tend to emphasize NATO’s validity as an instrument for solving East-West differences and a necessary instrument for achieving arms control and general disarmament. Though one person or country does not speak for all the small members, a statement by former Foreign Minister Halvard Lang, Norway, 1946-1965, reflects the general feeling of the lesser states concerning the changing nature of NATO. Mr. Lang first asserted that the Organization was essential to the smaller countries if they were to conduct "fearless" policies vis-a-vis the Communist bloc nations. "Certainly in the case of my own country, Norway, the only solution to our security problem is an international, or Allied, one." He then emphasized a new purpose for the Alliance:

... The Alliance should be better able to deal with critical international situations. More positively, it should contribute to solving the problems which create tension between ourselves and Warsaw Pact countries. It should also constantly seek practical ways to achieve arms control and disarmament. Such thoughts have been in the minds of many of those who call for NATO’s adaption to changing conditions. ... To alter the "machinery" is far less important than to develop a set of policy priorities and attitudes which are in accord with new conditions.62

CHAPTER VII

NATURE OF THE THREAT

The Threat—Myth Or Reality

When Nikita Khrushchev was removed from power in the Soviet Union there was fear in some quarters that the Kremlin might reverse its policies and return to the hard line of Stalin. However, the new leadership in the Soviet Union has done little to diminish the world's hope for an East-West detente. Recently, and for the first time since the end of World War II, there was a widespread tendency toward accepting the Communists' affirmations of peaceful coexistence and good will as more than mere manipulation aimed at weakening the West's defense. There was even expectation that through peaceful coexistence the Communist bloc and the Western bloc could be moving toward a genuine accommodation. At the same time there was much debate on Capital Hill in Washington whether United States NATO forces could and should be reduced. ¹

However, in August 1968, the Soviet Union and five

¹See Senator Henry M. Jackson, Hearings, The Atlantic Alliance, op. cit., p. 79.
other Warsaw Pact nations invaded Czechoslovakia with military force for the purpose of deposing the new reform Czechoslovak government. Although it is too soon to see the outcome of this new Soviet move, and it is too soon to know the final effects it will have on the movement toward an East-West detente, it goes without saying that the movement will be affected adversely. As a matter of fact, in the annual meeting of finance, defense, and foreign ministers of NATO, the occupation of Czechoslovakia took top priority. The Western leaders joined in criticizing the Soviet intervention and several made new contributions to the Organization. The purpose here is not to analyze the effects of the Soviet move into her satellite, but to show that the widespread hopes of an early detente and a genuine accommodation are based partially, perhaps mostly, on emotions and wishful thinking.

If a man is to retain his sanity in today's nuclear age, he must have at least some degree of hope. Yet, in order to measure the progress toward accommodation and the settlement of the East-West conflict, a more reliable criterion must be adopted. Thus it is necessary to transcend the realm of emotions and wishful thinking to the hard, cold

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2It is interesting to note that the Czechoslovak invasion came only sixteen months after a Conference of Communist and Workers Parties of Europe had declared at Karlovy Vary, Czechoslovakia, that there must be a "conclusion by all European States of a treaty renouncing the use of force or threat of force in their relations and interference in internal affairs. . . ." The Soviet View Of NATO, op. cit., p. 19. (Italics mine)
facts of national foreign policies which are the basis of action and reaction in the international arena.

One of the major issues in dispute among the Alliance members hinges on the question of whether the Kremlin's ambitions have actually changed. That is, whether the Soviets are really willing to practice—and not merely proclaim—peaceful coexistence. This issue derives urgency from the fact that in the past few years voices have been raised in all NATO countries implying that the organization has lost its validity because it was formed as a defensive arrangement against Communist aggression. Now that the Soviet Union is peacefully inclined NATO has become an anachronism. These same voices imply that the most important task of NATO is a resolution of the differences with the members of the Warsaw Pact because the real threat is a nuclear armed China.3

The differences over the Soviet threat range from the belief that overt aggression is possible to the belief that the threat is a myth or non-existent. As regards the former, it is generally accepted by most that Soviet physical aggression against a NATO Ally is highly unlikely. As to the latter, a former U.S. State Department Consultant on Russian Affairs has argued that a Soviet threat has been a

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myth or non-existent from the beginning. To look back over a period of relative European stability and proclaim that since there has been no Russian invasion there has been no threat is as Aesopian as "a logic which concludes that because deterrence has been successful, it is no longer necessary. . . ." But, in any event, the post-war Soviet threat to the Western nations must be viewed in terms other than just overt military aggression. Granted the military threat was fresh in Western statesmen's minds since they had just witnessed the use of the Red Army in regard to Czechoslovakia in 1948. But there were other dangers which were feared by the West: political pressures, internal subversion, and the possibility of Western Europe falling within the Soviet sphere of influence. In this sense the threat was real enough, and was no doubt seen as such by both Europe and America. NATO itself is the best evidence that the threat existed. The fact that fifteen separate national entities, after years of disagreement and conflict, were able to

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4Fred Warner Neal, "The Political Unity of Western Europe--Myth or Reality," The Unity of Western Europe, (ed.) Jack D. Dowell (Pullman, Washington: Washington State University Press, 1964), p. 5. Professor Neal bases his argument on George F. Kennon, Russia, The Atom and The West (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1958), and the fact that there has been no Russian invasion of the West even though NATO has never reached minimum force strength.

discard past traditions and create an alliance which holds no parallel in their history shows that, whether mythical or actual, the Soviet Union threatened their interests. It should also be pointed out that military power does not always take the shape of physical force against one's neighbors. As a matter of fact, political issues of military power is still viewed as a fundamental aspect of international diplomacy.

Has the Soviet Union modified its long range aims? Is the Kremlin in reality willing to practice coexistence to the extent that it no longer constitutes a threat to Western interests? It has already been pointed out that one of the NATO members, France, has demonstrated (in 1966) that the threat has disappeared, or at least a lack of concern over possible Soviet aggression, by withdrawing from the Organization. As a matter of fact, French officials have gone further and accused NATO of being an instrument for prolonging the Cold War. On the other hand, the remaining fourteen

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7 Former French Premier Georges Pompidou asserts that the Organization "is the daughter of the cold war and helps to perpetuate it." *Full Texts Of Statements On Foreign Policy*, op. cit., p. 5.
members took an opposite view of the threat and the purpose of the Organization in their joint declaration, March 18, 1966:

The North Atlantic Treaty and the Organization established under it are both alike essential to the security of our countries.

The Atlantic Alliance has ensured its efficacy as an instrument of defense and deterrence by maintenance in peacetime of an integrated and interdependent military organization in which . . . the efforts and resources of each are combined for the common security of all. We are convinced that this organization is essential and will continue. No system of bilateral arrangements can be a substitute.8

The Soviet Union seems, in the 1960's, to have changed its views in regard to at least one specific problem area: prevention of a general war by communication failures, accident, or miscalculation. This is reflected in the "Hot line" of 1963, the Nuclear Test-ban Treaty of 1963, the United States-Soviet Consular Agreement of 1968, and in the agreement of the Soviet and the United States to discuss reductions in ballistic and anti-ballistic missiles systems in June 1968. However, the Kremlin has not presented any evidence that it has given up its effort to bring Europe under Soviet hegemony; that it has abandoned its aim to spread Communism throughout the world; or that it is ready to negotiate seriously the basic political conflicts with the West.9 Nor has

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9The Atlantic Alliance: Basic Issues, op. cit., p. 4.
the Soviet Union changed its policy regarding the destruction of the Alliance so that Moscow can deal separately with a fragmented Europe. These are the basic issues that have constituted the Soviet threat since the second World War.

On the contrary, the Kremlin presents hard, cold evidence that the contest for Europe is still one of its basic aims. For example, the Soviet Union continues to invest heavily in arms and research for "major advances in critical new weapons."\(^{10}\) In addition, the USSR continues to maintain the most powerful military force in Central Europe: 20 divisions in East Germany alone.

It has already been pointed out that the Soviet policy of peaceful coexistence is a method of advancing communism by any means short of a general war; that peaceful coexistence meant no more than a sensible agreement not to attempt to settle the ideological battle by use of modern nuclear weapons.\(^{11}\) This aim has not changed. In fact, Soviet Party Chairman Brezhnev reaffirmed the goals, set by Krushchev's peaceful coexistence policy, before the Conference of Communist and Workers Parties of Europe at Karlovy Vary, Czechoslovakia, April 24, 1967. Brezhnev said, "at their 1957 and 1960 conferences, communists drew important conclusions about the basic tendencies of modern world development. The intervening period has affirmed the correctness

\(^{10}\)Ibid.

\(^{11}\)See above pp. 134-138.
of these conclusions." He later added, "As for the Soviet Union, our policy in the future will aim, as before, at the development of mutually advantageous relations with capitalist countries of Europe on the basis of the principles of peaceful coexistence. . . ." Chairman Brezhnev then went on to state:

The historic aim of our movement is socialism and communism. We are convinced that the working class and people of West Europe will sooner or later set out on the road to socialism. The communist parties selflessly struggle for this very thing, for the only correct road guaranteeing the triumph of democracy, peace, and the full development of the creative forces of each people. . . . This is why the communist parties tirelessly strive to insure that their policies strengthen the socialist, Marxist-Leninist orientation of the working class and that they actively and purposefully create favorable conditions for the victory of socialism.

In his speech before the 1967 Conference, Mr. Brezhnev also issued a clear call to all communist and progressive forces to make every effort to destroy the North Atlantic Pact; an endeavor the Soviets have aimed at since the founding of NATO. According to Brezhnev,

. . . we cannot ignore the fact that in two years the governments of the NATO countries will have to decide whether NATO is to be extended or not. In our opinion, it is quite correct that communist and all progressive forces should try to use this circumstance to develop still more widely the struggle against the preservation of this aggressive bloc.

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14 Ibid., p. 9.
The destruction of the Organization was again emphasized as a high priority in the final statement issued by the 1967 Conference:

The 20 year period of the validity of the Atlantic pact expires in 1969, and this makes possible a clear alternative: a Europe without military blocs. This alternative must be put on the agenda with all earnestness.

No effort should be spared in order to develop a broad movement of peace-loving forces of our continent against the extension of or any modification of the Atlantic Pact.\textsuperscript{15}

The lack of the Soviet Union's readiness to seriously negotiate the basic political conflicts between the East and West is shown in the conditions established by the 1967 Conference in Czechoslovakia. A brief look at some of these requirements points out that these demands preclude any peaceful East-West negotiations. First, in order to set the basis for a peaceful settlement based on the principles of peaceful coexistence, all states must recognize and accept European conditions as they now exist:

This means: Recognition of the inviolability of existing frontiers in Europe, particularly on the Oder and the Neisse, and also of the borders between both German states; recognition of the existence of two sovereign and equal German states, the GDR and the German Federal Republic, which requires of the latter the renunciation of its claim to represent all Germany; preclusion of any opportunity for the German Federal Republic to gain access to nuclear arms in any form...; and recognition of the Munich treaty as invalid from the moment of its conclusion.

\textsuperscript{15}\textit{Ibid.}, p. 20.
It is interesting to note that the only disarmament proposals that were of any interest to the conference were those concerning the "withdrawal of foreign troops from the territory of European states, liquidation of foreign war bases, establishment of denuclearized zones in central Europe, in the Balkans, the territory of Danubian countries, in the Mediterranean, and in Northern Europe. . . ." There is no doubt about West Germany, and very little doubt about the rest of the NATO Allies, not accepting the Soviets' conditions for European settlement. Nor do the disarmament proposals mentioned above, which would in the final analysis destroy NATO and remove the United States from Europe, appeal to the Western Bloc nations.

Finally, the Soviet threat must be viewed in the framework of the Communist ideology though there is argument that communism as an ideology is dead. Zbigniew Brezezinski, Professor and member of the U.S. State Department Policy Planning Council, argues that "communism is dead as an ideology in the sense that it is no longer capable of mobilizing unified global support." Carrying his argument further Mr.

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16 Ibid., pp. 18-19.
17 Ibid., p. 19.
18 Zbigniew Brezezinski, "The Implications of Change For the United States Foreign Policy," U.S. Department of
Brezezinski states:

On the contrary, it is increasingly fragmented by conflicts among constituent units and parties. This has contributed to ideological disillusionment among its members. Communist states, Communist movements, and Communist subversion are still very important on the international scene, but Communist ideology as a vital force is no longer with us.\textsuperscript{19}

Actually argument could be made that communism has never been capable of unifying global support considering how the satellites became communist and considering how they have supported Russia more or less out of the necessity to survive. The invasion of Czecho-Slovakia in 1968 is a case in point.

Regardless of whether Communist ideology is a vital force in international relations, it is a vital force within the Soviet Union—the Communist Party still controls the USSR. The Marxist ideology provides the Kremlin with a conceptual framework for viewing the world. It looks on history as a continuous struggle in which forces of progress contend with forces of reaction and defeats them. In other words, the basis of the Communist faith is that the capitalistic system is doomed; that Communism is certain to take its place; and that this process must be aided at all levels. A Communist Party that completely discarded the Marxist ideology would not only lose its reason to be but would lose its

\textsuperscript{19} Ibid.

monopoly on control of government. Therefore the Kremlin's beliefs of its total claim to the future will continue to influence the outlook and purposes reflected in the Soviet policy.

Probably the best evidence that the Soviet Union is following the Marxist ideology can be seen in its intention to continue to inspire and support uprisings against any noncommunist governmental system. Mr. Khrushchev made this point quite clear in his speech before the 20th CPSU Conference, January 6, 1961:

Can such wars flare up in the future? They can. Can there be such uprisings? There can. But these are wars of national uprisings. What is the attitude of the Marxists toward uprisings? A most positive one. . . . These are uprisings against rotten reactionary regimes, against the colonizers. The Communists freely support such just wars and march in the front rank with the people waging liberation struggles.20

Mr. Brezhnev reaffirmed this as a major policy of the Soviet Union at the 1967 Conference in Czechoslovakia.21 From this it would seem that the Soviet Union or at least its long-range goals do constitute a threat to the Western nations.

On the other hand, it should be noted that Marxist theory does not set a time table for the inevitable triumph of communism. Nor does Marxist ideology contemplate such a thing as "nationalist communism"—that is, national interests

taking precedence over theory. Yet, national interests consistently have priority over theory in Russia as well as in Communist states which are not under Soviet Russia's control. That national interests will override theory in the Soviet Union has been evident since early in the history of Communist Russia: at least since Lenin instituted his "New Economic Policy" in 1921. In view of the fact that the Soviet Union will place national interests ahead of Marxist theory, it is possible to see the basis of the 1968 Czechoslovakian invasion not as an indication of Russian designs for global communism but as an indication of the Kremlin's concern over maintaining a specific sphere of influence and protection on her borderlands. In any case, in the final analysis, Russian national interests tend to dictate her foreign policy which in turn makes it impossible to say that a Soviet threat does or does not actually exist. Nor is it possible to predict whether an East-West detente can or cannot be established in the near future.

Is The Organization Still Needed?

The argument concerning the threat or degree of threat naturally leads to the ultimate question of whether or not the need for NATO has dissipated. And if so then should not the Organization itself be abolished. Here again differences span from one extreme to the other. It is not likely that the answer to this question can be found in the arguments that
have been put forth—both sides are convincing. It is necessary, therefore, to turn to the purpose, or purposes, of the Organization as seen by officials and others of some of the member nations. From this source it may not be possible to actually discover whether NATO is needed or not, but it will give an insight into the attitudes and beliefs that will determine whether NATO remains an active Organization.

Washington seems to view NATO as the best, if not the only, means of creating the conditions of stability which can lead to a solution of East-West differences and thereby the reunification of Germany. Though stressing that the security of the NATO area and European peace are the main objectives of the Organization, there has been a tendency in Washington to include the unification of Germany as an Alliance goal. There has also been a tendency in Washington to accept at face value the contention that a divided Germany constitutes the greatest threat to world peace and therefore German reunification is essential to European peace.

However, these assumptions must be seen in their proper perspective. Washington's emphasis on German reunification stems from the United States' role in getting West Germany involved in NATO and the defense of the West; the early acceptance of the West German thesis that a unified Germany is essential to the peace of Europe by Washington; and the adoption of German reunification as a policy goal by the United States. Emphasis on a unified Germany can also be
seen as reassuring gestures on the part of Washington toward the Federal Republic.

President John F. Kennedy spoke of German reunification as a United States Policy goal at a press conference in Germany on June 25, 1963.

Quite obviously, the German people wish to be reunited. If the people of the United States had lost a struggle and the Mississippi River divided us, we would wish to be reunited. I think the people of the Soviet Union, if they experienced a comparable fate, would wish to join together. So that is the object of our policies.\(^{22}\)

President Lyndon Johnson reaffirmed this goal when he made it clear in December 1964 that the division of Germany was not an acceptable condition for European peace. President Johnson then implied that German reunification should be an Alliance objective when he called on the Allies to assure the Federal Republic "that there shall be no acceptance of the lasting threat to peace which is the forced division of Germany."\(^{23}\) Mr. Johnson later added that "there can be no stable peace in Europe while one part of Germany is denied the basic right to choose freely its own destiny and to choose ... reunion with the Germans in the Federal Republic."\(^{24}\)


\(^{23}\)Quoted in The Atlantic Alliance: Basic Issues, op. cit., p. 5.

\(^{24}\)Ibid.
Again on October 7, 1966, President Johnson, in a speech to a Conference of Editorial Writers, brought up the task that faces the Alliance. Mr. Johnson noted that the greatest task before this generation was a reconciliation of Europe and a United Germany. The first requisite to accomplish this task is a modernized NATO along with other strong Atlantic institutions. To put it in the President’s own words:

In a restored Europe, Germany can and will be united. This remains a vital purpose of American Policy. It can only be accomplished through a growing reconciliation. There is no short cut.

We must move ahead on three fronts:
--First, to modernize NATO and strengthen other Atlantic institutions.
--Second, to further the integration of the Western European Community.
--Third, to quicken progress in East-West Relations.

Former President Harry S. Truman still feels that NATO is needed to preserve a stable European environment as well as to achieve a final settlement of the problems left from World War II. In a letter to Senator Henry M. Jackson, Chairman, Subcommittee on National Security and International Operations, on July 26, 1966, Mr. Truman stated his feelings on the need for the organization in the following manner:

It seems to me that there is continued need for NATO to guard against the use of force to resolve issues which remain 20 years after the War. The United States is as concerned in the just and peaceful settlement of these issues as are the nations of Europe, for the peace of all

of us is involved.

For almost two decades the nations have sought formulas to solve the problem left by the War. The hopeful road today is toward creation of an environment in which settlement is possible. To that end security, which excludes domination, is very necessary. I firmly believe that NATO offers the best hope of achieving it.26

Up to this point, the emphasis has been on the United States view regarding the need for NATO. This is only natural since the United States is the Alliance's core power. A reversal in United States attitude on NATO policy could spell the end of the Organization or the Alliance itself. Removal of United States forces from NATO could end the Organization or withdrawal of the United States from the Treaty could terminate the Alliance. This is, of course, not a predetermined fact. For example, the United States could withdraw its forces from NATO and still remain committed to the terms of the Treaty. It can also be argued that an American withdrawal from the Treaty would not necessarily destroy the Alliance. The Western European countries had agreed to ally for their common defense before the United States became involved: the Dunkirk and Brussels Treaties are cases in point. However, since the Soviet Union has become the second most powerful nation in the world, and, since the United States is the only Western nation that can deal with Russia

26 Full text of President Truman's letter is found in Hearings. The Atlantic Alliance, op. cit., p. 227.
on a level of parity, the Dunkirk Treaty, Brussels Treaty, or the North Atlantic Treaty without the United States would be more or less meaningless. The French scholar Raymond Aron aptly summed up the meaninglessness of a Western European defense without the United States in the following manner:

Let the U.S. withdraw from Europe before the real problems are solved, and the risk of Soviet domination will appear again, more dangerous than ever. He who imagines that Western Europe, grouped around France, is capable of balancing the Soviet Union is blind or a megalomaniac.27

In any case, the obverse side to this coin is the fact that the Alliance must serve the interests of all its members, not just the core power, if it is to survive. It must be granted that the withdrawal of one lesser power—even one of the larger ones—will not destroy NATO: France, for example. Yet, if several of the lesser states should follow France's lead or if there is disagreement among the members in regard to the main purpose of the organization, it could lose its reason to be.28 Therefore, other member's views concerning the necessity and purpose of NATO are relevant.

It has already been noted how West Germany has placed


her future and the settlement of German reunification with NATO: how Germany's defense is completely tied to NATO. Needless to say, the Organization is indispensable to Germany.\(^\text{29}\) It has also been shown that Britain now views NATO as the corner stone of her policy and defense; that NATO is necessary to create the conditions for a peaceful settlement in Europe.\(^\text{30}\) It is not necessary to discuss de Gaulle's refusal to believe that NATO is a necessary instrument for achieving a peaceful settlement of the East-West problems. However, it should be noted that France, distinguishing the Alliance from NATO, regards membership to the treaty as a necessary condition until the "fundamental elements of the relations between East and West" have changed.\(^\text{31}\)

Despite the fact that there is considerable diversity of viewpoints on matters concerning the commitments of members in regard to the basic purpose and need for the Organization, the smaller members agree that NATO is a requisite for the final negotiations of a peaceful settlement of East-West differences. They also agree that North America, particularly the United States, must have a part in a final settlement. The Canadian view of the necessity for NATO is representative of this general agreement.

\(^{29}\)See above pp. 178-186.

\(^{30}\)See above pp. 186-194.

Canada's attitude and policy concerning the future of NATO can be seen in a speech by the Canadian Secretary of State for External Affairs Paul Martin. Speaking at a National Newspaper Awards Dinner in Toronto, January 1967, Mr. Martin maintained that the Allies had formed an Alliance for the purpose of Western defense and to achieve "certain long-range objectives beneficial to the whole of Europe." The Secretary of State went ahead to say that,

"... The interests of Western Europe and North America in these ultimate questions of security and political settlement are inextricably mixed. It has been the greatest importance ... that the Atlantic States, through NATO and in other ways, should maintain unity and develop their common interests as a means of eventually achieving a broad European settlement with Eastern States.

If the final purpose of the NATO arrangements is to be seen in these terms, then any major military or political move affecting the Alliance must be considered, first and foremost, in terms of whether it will facilitate or hinder that ultimate European settlement. ..."  

Mr. Martin also made it clear that the threat which brought about NATO had not actually dissipated. Though the Soviet Union may have given up hope for an early establishment of Communism throughout Europe, she must be judged according to her basic policies. The Soviet Union has neither changed its European policy concerning a European settlement nor has she changed her military policy. As a matter of fact, evidence

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33 Ibid.
shows that "there has been no weakening or withdrawal in the Soviet position." ³⁴

Another representative view supporting the general agreement among the lesser members concerning the purpose and necessity for NATO is that of Norway. Norway's view regarding the future need for NATO is similar to that of the United States. In fact, John Lyng, Norwegian Parliament Foreign Minister, recently made a statement in the Norwegian Parliament in which he fully agreed with President Johnson regarding the objectives of the Alliance. Mr. Lyng viewed President Johnson's stated objectives (October 7, 1966) as the basis for "a gradual and balanced" reduction of armed forces by both sides. ³⁵ The Foreign Minister told Parliament that in his view the Organization had fulfilled its primary role by stopping Soviet expansion in Europe, however, NATO had now begun a new phase and had another role. In the words of Mr. Lyng,

It is natural to regard NATO's role as having entered into a second phase. Inside as well as outside the Organization it has been underlined that NATO has now entered into a period which should be used to bring about détente in Europe and the Atlantic Area... "We must expect that NATO will continue to be a necessary element

³⁴Ibid.

in European development and that there are important and essential tasks to be solved by NATO. This presupposes the continued opportunity for the individual member countries to remain standing on that foundation of security and strength which is provided for them by NATO.36

Other views that support the need for NATO in the future come from Belgium, Greece, and Denmark. For example, Paul-Henri Spaak, Belgian Statesman, argues that the Allies would indeed be stupid if they did not acknowledge the fact that the world situation has changed since the signing of the Treaty in 1949. However, and more important, the Allies must recognize that NATO was perhaps the most important factor leading to current changes. He further argues that it is most important that the Alliance and NATO adapt themselves to world changes:

What can NATO do to show that it is ready to adapt itself? Commit suicide? A radical measure, but hardly a wise one, and one that the international situation forbids, for, whatever the new trends in the Communist world, Russia is still powerfully armed and refuses . . . to follow the path of controlled disarmament. It would consequently be extremely dangerous if NATO were to disappear.

We have only saved ourselves from this disorder because fourteen countries refuse to follow the fifteenth, and the fifteenth can conduct its policy only because the fourteen others refuse to follow its example.37

The Greek attitude concerning the need for NATO can be seen in a statement by Panayotis Pipinelis, Former Prime Minister and Permanent Representative to the NATO Council from Greece, in November 1966:

36 "Documentation: Norway and NATO," loc. cit.

... the crucial and most dangerous stage in East-West relations, far from having been passed, as the improvement in the political climate would appear to indicate, is waiting for us at the end of the road up which we are at the present advancing towards real and lasting peace. ... Meanwhile, is it prudent—or, indeed, conceivable—that we abandon the policy of diplomatic and military cohesion that has served us so well, just when it is starting to pay dividends?

In January 1967, Denmark's Prime Minister Otto Krag declared the Danish view when he said, "The existence of NATO is essential as the basis of all our searching for a détente. It must exist as a viable Organization based on mutual trust between its member countries." The Prime Minister went on to say that "a Europe which is not in cooperation with the United States is unthinkable."

Though it is possible to document similar statements of agreement from the remaining NATO members supporting the general agreement that NATO is still a necessity for Western European security, for the solution to European problems, and for the eventual achievement of world peace, space does not permit it here. In lieu of such declarations probably the best statement on the need, purposes and future tasks of NATO can be found in a study which was prompted by a proposal from Belgian Foreign Minister Pierre Harmel in December

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1966. The "Harmel Report" which was made to and adopted unanimously by the NATO Council in December 1967, acknowledged the fact that the international situation had changed considerably since 1949 and that the political tasks of the Organization had taken on new dimensions; that the Soviet policy of peaceful coexistence had changed the nature of the confrontation with the NATO countries but not the major basic problems. In the words of the Report,

The Atlantic Alliance has two main functions. Its first . . . is to maintain adequate military strength and political solidarity to deter aggression and other forms of pressure and to defend the territory of member countries if aggression should occur. . . . The possibility of a crisis cannot be excluded as long as the central political issues in Europe, first and foremost the German question, remains unsolved. Moreover, the situation of instability and uncertainty still precludes a balanced reduction of military forces. Under these conditions, the Allies will maintain . . . a suitable military capability to assure the balance of forces, thereby creating a climate of stability, security and confidence.

In this climate the Alliance can carry out its second function, to pursue the search for progress toward a more stable relationship in which the underlying political issues can be solved. . . . Collective defense is a stabilizing factor in world politics. . . . The way to peace and stability in Europe rests in particular on the use of the Alliance constructively in the interest of detente.40

The report went on to point out that "the ultimate political purpose of the Alliance is to achieve a just and

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lasting peaceful order in Europe accompanied by appropriate security guarantees. Further, the report made it clear that "no final and stable settlement of Europe is possible without a solution of the German question which lies at the heart of present tensions in Europe." Thus there is general agreement among the Alliance members that so long as Germany remains divided, the split will insert an unstable factor into world as well as European affairs and that NATO will remain a necessary instrument for world stability.

It should be noted that France's acceptance of the Report and her withdrawal from the Organization are not necessarily incongruous. Since France views the Alliance and the Organization as two separate entities, she could easily interpret any reference to the Allies or Alliance in the Report as meaning the Allies as separate independent entities. The point is that even though France sees no future use for the Organization, she does see the Treaty or Alliance as a necessary condition for world stability and European security.

Though the above statements seem to imply that the smaller nations have agreed that German reunification should be a NATO policy, there is no clear evidence that any of the smaller NATO members, especially European ones, accept the

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41 NATO, The Future Tasks, op. cit., pp. 16-17.
42 Ibid., p. 16.
contention that a unified Germany is essential to European peace. There is a great difference in supporting a thesis that the German problem should be resolved, and supporting a thesis that Germany should be reunified. The above implications should be viewed more or less as the reflection of the dominating influence of the United States. Reunification of Germany, as this writer sees it, is not a proper goal for the Organization.
CHAPTER VIII

CONCLUSIONS

It now seems clear that NATO is first and foremost a mutual defense alliance. Its primary concern is the security of its member nations against external physical force: Soviet aggression. Being a mutual defense pact, the Alliance has been, and is, subjected to most of the problems that plague military alliances. The Alliance has suffered difficulties in all three of the broad categories: establishment, cohesion, and effectiveness.

The world situation and European economic and political conditions were such in 1949 that the Western Europeans felt they had no other choice than to subordinate their divergent views within the Alliance. There were, moreover, few disagreements among the Allies concerning the need to establish the Organization in 1951. However, the Allies faced an establishment difficulty of crisis nature in regard to the accession of West Germany to the treaty.

In the area of cohesion, the Alliance has not been excluded from major difficulties. The Allies have disagreed on most of the factors which determine cohesiveness. This has been so, especially, in regard to the problems of fear.
that the core power will exert hegemony over the lesser members, fear of separate agreements by individual members, particularly the core power, with the enemy, and the desire for greater status within the Alliance. In fact, disagreements regarding these factors form part of the basis for the rationale for France's withdrawal from the Organization.

Though NATO strategy to date has been effective--there has not been overt Soviet aggression against any member country--it has not been as a result of total agreement within the Alliance. Here again NATO members have been at odds. As a matter of fact, it is in the category of effectiveness over the matter of strategy that the Alliance has shown its greatest disunity. Disagreements over strategy have ranged over the complete spectrum from numbers and uses of conventional forces to numbers and uses of nuclear forces. However, it is the latter that has created NATO's greatest problem of developing a credible strategy: the ownership, control, and uses of nuclear weapons.

The North Atlantic Alliance can be classified as a "pluralistic security-community." It meets the basic fundamental requirements of such a community as established by Karl W. Deutsch et al: The Alliance consists of members representing legal independent governments and, for the past two decades, war among the members has been practically out of the question. However, the Alliance is not a "political

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1On two occasions, Greece and Turkey have come close to armed conflict over Cyprus. There have been implications
There has developed a considerable amount of confusion about the nature of the Alliance—confusion grounded in a great deal of wishful thinking about and references to an "Atlantic Partnership," "Atlantic Union," or "Atlantic Community." If, by the use of these terms, it is meant that the members of the Alliance share similar values that originated in a more or less common heritage; that the members hold similar outlooks derived from a high degree of industrial development; and that the members hold common interests regarding morals and problems of mankind, the term can then have some meaning. However, if it is meant by these terms, a Partnership, Community, or Union in which there is a central structure to which political decision-making has been delegated by the members, i.e., a structure in which some scheme for supranational decision-making has been set up, then an "Atlantic Partnership," "Atlantic Union," or "Atlantic Community" does not exist. In the case of the North Atlantic Alliance, there is no central governmental institution with delegated powers but rather there is an institutionalized council composed of state instructed delegates without power from different sources that France's determination to develop a nuclear force stems from her fears of a resurgent Germany rather than from a Soviet threat. See Dean Acheson's testimony before a Senate Subcommittee, *Hearings, The Atlantic Alliance*, op. cit., p. 12; See also Lord Gladwyn, "The New World of Maurice Schumann--Some Comments," *NATO Letter*, Vol. XV, No. 1 (January, 1967), p. 12.
to finalize decision making. Therefore, NATO is not a "political Union."

One factor is clearly evident from the foregoing study: The Alliance is going through a transitional period and the major concern with which the Allies are grappling is the adaptation of the Organization to the many changes that have occurred in the past and will continue to occur in the future. This in turn leaves NATO's future cloudy or at least without a clear definition. Therefore, it is not possible to definitely say that the Organization still serves a valid purpose.

One member (France) sees the Organization as being obsolete; an instrument for maintaining the status quo, and thus, the perpetuation of the East-West division and thereby world tensions. At the same time France views the treaty as being valid and necessary for the maintenance of world stability, at least until some of the basic East-West differences have been altered. Moreover, France has opted out of the Organization (military part), but remains a member of the Alliance.

However, without France, the Organization will continue, at least until one year after its 20th anniversary. The other 14 members resoundly affirm the Organization's continued necessity and its role in the defense of Western Europe. "We are convinced that the Organization is essential and will continue," declared the 14 in June 1966. Later
(1967) the NATO Council again affirmed the necessity of the Organization by adopting the Harmel Report which set out objectives for NATO's future: defend the members against external force and to search for solutions to reduce East-West tensions.

Thus it is evident that, though NATO is faced with many unsolved problems, the "fourteen" members view a collective defense system as the best method by which they can maintain their own security and world stability. They are not ready to accept de Gaulle's view that NATO has served its purpose. It is not difficult to see why the other Allies vetoed de Gaulle's alternative. If NATO is too obsolete to cope with changing world conditions, de Gaulle's alternative--a France dominated, nationalistic "Europe of the fatherlands"--belongs further in the past. His ideas of a revitalized Europe, based on a collection of strong and proud national forces, has the ring of past centuries. Or, as The Economist succinctly described it, "Selfsufficient defense is not just a delusion: It is the relapse of the addict into his delusion."²

Close examination reveals that the French distinction between the Alliance and Organization seems to be more or less a case of "hair-splitting". The Organization, in the

final analysis and applying even a loose interpretation of integration, can be seen as no more than a planning agency for recommending numbers of troops and types of equipment that each member should contribute in the event of an external attack. It has been, and still is, left to the discretion of the individual nation whether to follow the recommendations. The failure of the member countries to ever fulfill the recommended force levels in the past should be proof enough. This has led some observers to believe that France will leave the Alliance itself at the opportune time.3 Though France’s tenure as a signatory to the treaty is unpredictable, it is almost certain that she will remain in the Alliance as long as the advantages from being a member outweigh the disadvantages. At the present all the weight seems to favor the advantageous side of the scale.

Yet all the blame for NATO’s problems and unclear future cannot be heaped upon de Gaulle. Some of the other members must share that blame—particularly Washington and especially concerning nuclear weapons and strategic planning. The possession of nuclear weapons by certain of the Allies would pose far less danger, provided they were jointly controlled in accordance with a feasible and well understood strategy, than that danger inherent in fragmentation of

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policy and strategy. Washington has tended to disregard the latter by its obsession with nuclear diffusion.

The United States has changed its proposals concerning nuclear weapons so often the Allies cannot tell what Washington either wants or believes. In sum, Washington has assigned submarines to NATO only to have this gesture turn out to be the transferring of them from one American command to another. In May, 1962, Washington spoke of submarines with mixed crews; in December, 1962, the Nassau agreement seemed to favor and encourage National strike forces; in May, 1963, the United States proposed the MLF composed of surface vessels; and in 1965, Washington suggested committees designed specifically to give the Allies a voice in nuclear planning. The point is that it is no easy matter for other governments to base their military policies on the vacillating policies of an ally. In fact, de Gaulle could argue that a separate European force is needed to guard against Washington's changes of mind.

Only a coherent NATO strategy based on a viable system of command, control, and communication can make the Organization viable and thus valid for the future. A coherent NATO strategy can be brought about by resolving the political control and strategic doctrines.

From this inquiry it is possible to see that there are several factors that must be considered in resolving NATO's political and strategic problems, and for planning NATO's nuclear weapons policy and strategy for the future.
(1) The day of America's overwhelming economic and nuclear dominance is gone. Though the United States remains the most powerful individual member, the economic strength of Europe plus the establishment of the European Economic Community means that, both politically and militarily, Europe's bargaining power is now vastly stronger than in NATO's early years. Washington will, therefore, find it more and more difficult to exercise leadership and management of the Alliance.

(2) There has been a change within the European balance of power. Whereas France once sought British support as a safeguard against a resurgent West Germany, and one of the main reasons the EDC failed was British refusal to give such a guarantee, France now refuses Britain membership in the Common Market, and the Franco-German treaty for closer cooperation poses new problems for the Allies. Moreover, there has been a change in the relationship between the Soviet bloc and NATO. Though the Soviet Union has not changed its goal to expand communism, the wide consensus once held concerning the nature of the Soviet threat has dissipated with economic stability and reduced tensions created by the Russian policy of peaceful coexistence. Though the Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia in 1968, which signified a reassertion of Russian policy based not on the principle of economic or ideological competition, but rather on overt physical power, seems to have breathed new life into the Alliance, it has
not rejuvenated the general consensus— at least France has not returned to the Organization.

(3) Whether Americans like it or not, Europe is a "third force." That is, in the manner of being powerful, partly because the United States sought to make it so. This fact is now beyond the power of America to reverse. The United States should accept the recovery and self-assertiveness of the Allies with pride. It is, after all, a sign of success for the United States policies that came into being with the Marshall Plan and NATO.

(4) The nuclear deterrent cannot remain effective unless arrangements are made which make it certain that the deterrent, in fact, will be used against an attack on either Western Europe or North America. Though the Allies have a greater voice in NATO's nuclear strategy, problems in this area are likely to remain for two reasons: (a) a voice in planning nuclear strategy is not the same as having one's own nuclear weapons and (b) short of a supranational solution through a surrender of national sovereignty, it is inevitably difficult for a large group of countries to develop a common and efficient strategy as well as balanced military forces. And for the same reasons the spread of nuclear weapons, though possibly checked momentarily by the nonproliferation treaty, will continue to be a problem for the Allies.

(5) Finally, political union or integration within the Alliance is not a reality. In fact the trend seems to be
against political integration. French President de Gaulle refuses to accept even token integration in the military commands. In addition, Washington does not desire a genuine partnership. Two important factors point this up: (a) If the United States actually desired a political union, a proposal for discarding America's national sovereignty would have been forthcoming. To this date it has not been officially discussed. (b) Washington's demand for freedom outside the NATO area and unwillingness to bind itself in that respect.

It is conclusive that NATO is a defense alliance that rests upon the security interests common to all members. At the present NATO is an alliance of free and sovereign states that view the Organization in terms of their own national interests. Moreover, each member's government will continue to be influenced by its own domestic political problems and constraints when it develops its policies toward NATO. Therefore, NATO stands or falls by the added sense of security it gives its members. If the need for security no longer holds its members together, NATO's solidarity cannot be restored by pretending it is a more broadly based community or by trying to redefine its purposes.

With these considerations in view, the momentous question before the Allies is not whether the Organization is an end in itself or an anachronism, but rather how to solve the political and strategic differences so as to achieve as
much security as possible for the peoples of the Alliance area. Until such time as there is a reasonable and meaningful effort in arms reduction and a peaceful settlement of East-West differences, the NATO defenses should not be weakened. Nor, under any circumstances should the American commitment be weakened or withdrawn.

It is believed by the writer that the framework established in the "Introduction" of this inquiry can be a helpful guide for the study of mutual defense pacts. It is not possible through application of the framework to exact factual information for definite predictions concerning the breakup, the continuance, or the development of political integration within an alliance. It can, however, help one to understand better the possibilities concerning these factors, i.e., whether a defense pact will break up, continue, or evolve into a political community.
APPENDIX

NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY¹

April 4, 1949

The Parties to this Treaty reaffirm their faith in the purpose and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and their desire to live in peace with all peoples and all Governments.

They are determined to safeguard the freedom, common heritage and civilization of their peoples, founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law.

They seek to promote stability and well-being in the North Atlantic area.

They are resolved to unite their efforts for collective defense and for the preservation of peace and security.

They therefore agree to this North Atlantic Treaty:

Article 1

The Parties undertake, as set forth in the Charter of the United Nations, to settle any international disputes in which they may be involved by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security and justice are not endangered, and to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force in any manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations.

Article 2

The Parties will contribute toward the further development of peaceful and friendly international relations by strengthening their free institutions, by bringing about a

better understanding of the principles upon which these institutions are founded and by promoting conditions of stability and well-being. They seek to eliminate conflict in their international economic policies and will encourage economic collaboration between any or all of them.

**Article 3**

In order more effectively to achieve the objectives of this Treaty, the Parties, separately and jointly, by means of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid, will maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack.

**Article 4**

The Parties will consult together whenever, in the opinion of any of them, the territorial integrity, political independence or security of any of the Parties is threatened.

**Article 5**

The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all; and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defense recognized by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.

Any such attack and all measures taken as a result thereof shall immediately be reported to the Security Council. Such measures shall be terminated when the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to restore and maintain international peace and security.

**Article 6**

For the purpose of Article 5 an armed attack on one or more of the Parties is deemed to include an armed attack on the territory of any of the Parties in Europe or North America, on the Algerian Departments of France, on the occupation forces of any Party in Europe, on the islands under the jurisdiction of any Party in the North Atlantic area north of the Tropic of Cancer or on the vessels of aircraft in this area of any of the Parties.
Article 7

This Treaty does not affect, and shall not be interpreted as affecting, in any way the rights and obligations under the Charter of the Parties which are members of the United Nations, or the primary responsibility of the Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security.

Article 8

Each Party declares that none of the international engagements now in force between it and any other of the Parties or any third State is in conflict with the provisions of this Treaty, and undertakes not to enter into any international engagement in conflict with this Treaty.

Article 9

The Parties hereby establish a council, on which each of them shall be represented to consider matters concerning the implementation of this Treaty. The Council shall be so organized as to be able to meet promptly at any time. The Council shall set up such subsidiary bodies as may be necessary; in particular it shall establish immediately a defence committee which shall recommend measures for the implementation of Articles 3 and 5.

Article 10

The Parties may, by unanimous agreement, invite any other European State in a position to further the principles of this Treaty and to contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area to accede to this Treaty. Any state so invited may become a party to the Treaty by depositing its instrument of accession with the Government of the United States of America. The Government of the United States of America will inform each of the Parties of the deposit of each such instrument of accession.

Article 11

This Treaty shall be ratified and its provisions carried out by the Parties in accordance with their respective constitutional processes. The instruments of ratification shall be deposited as soon as possible with the Government of the United States of America, which will notify all the other signatories of each deposit. The Treaty shall enter into force between the States which have ratified it as soon as the ratifications of the majority of the signatories, including the ratifications of Belgium, Canada,
France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and the United States, have been deposited and shall come into effect with respect to other States on the deposit of their ratifications.

Article 12

After the Treaty has been in force for ten years or at any time thereafter, the Parties shall, if any of them so requests, consult together for the purpose of reviewing the Treaty, having regard for the factors then affecting peace and security in the North Atlantic area, including the development of universal as well as regional arrangements under the Charter of the United Nations for the maintenance of international peace and security.

Article 13

After the Treaty has been in force for twenty years, any Party may cease to be a party one year after its notice of denunciation has been given to the Government of the United States of America, which will inform the Governments of the other Parties of the deposit of each notice of denunciation.

Article 14

This Treaty, of which the English and French texts are equally authentic, shall be deposited in the archives of the Government of the United States of America. Duly certified copies thereof will be transmitted by that Government to the Governments of the other signatories.
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