

GOVERNMENTAL STABILITY: A COMPARISON BETWEEN  
THE FOURTH AND FIFTH REPUBLICS IN FRANCE

By

James E. Buck

Bachelor of Arts

Oklahoma State University

1964

Submitted to the faculty of the Graduate College  
of the Oklahoma State University  
in partial fulfillment of the requirements  
for the Degree of  
MASTER OF ARTS  
May, 1969

SEP 29 1969

GOVERNMENTAL STABILITY: A COMPARISON BETWEEN  
THE FOURTH AND FIFTH REPUBLICS IN FRANCE

Thesis Approved:

*Philip A. T. Ride*

Thesis Adviser

*Harold V. Lane*

*Ray A. Haddy*

*D. D. Durhan*

Dean of the Graduate College

724768

## ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I should like to express my deepest appreciation to Professor Clifford Rich, my longtime friend and adviser, for his assistance in the preparation of this study. I should also like to thank Professor Harold Sare for his scholarly criticisms and Professor Raymond Habiby for his many thoughtful suggestions. Thanks are also due Anne Schneider for diligent and competent typing and editing.

## TABLE OF CONTENTS

| Chapter   | Page |
|---|------|
| I. INTRODUCTION . . . . .                             | 1    |
| General Introduction . . . . .                        | 1    |
| Governmental Stability . . . . .                      | 6    |
| II. THE POLITICAL BASE . . . . .                      | 16   |
| Political Culture . . . . .                           | 16   |
| Political Stresses . . . . .                          | 28   |
| III. THE CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE . . . . .           | 30   |
| Constitutional Structure and Governmental Stability . | 30   |
| Fourth Republic . . . . .                             | 31   |
| Fifth Republic . . . . .                              | 36   |
| IV. THE ECONOMIC SYSTEM . . . . .                     | 41   |
| Economic Production . . . . .                         | 41   |
| Levels of Consumption . . . . .                       | 43   |
| V. SOCIAL MOBILITY . . . . .                          | 53   |
| VI. CONCLUSIONS . . . . .                             | 60   |
| A SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . .                     | 64   |
| APPENDIX A — FRENCH POLITICAL PARTIES . . . . .       | 70   |

# LIST OF TABLES

| Table   | Page |
|---|------|
| I. Premiers During the Fourth Republic . . . . .  | 9    |
| II. Cabinet Composition by Party at Beginning of Each Year<br>During Fourth Republic . . . . .            | 10   |
| III. National Assembly Composition by Party at Beginning of<br>Each Year During Fourth Republic . . . . . | 11   |
| IV. Cabinet Composition by Party at Beginning of Each Year<br>During Fifth Republic . . . . .             | 12   |
| V. National Assembly Composition by Party at Beginning of<br>Each Year During Fifth Republic . . . . .    | 13   |
| VI. Personnel Changes in Cabinet Composition . . . . .  | 14   |
| VII. Changes in National Assembly Composition . . . . .   | 15   |
| VIII. Class Ideologies . . . . .  | 24   |
| IX. Class Dissatisfaction . . . . .   | 27   |
| X. Population During Years of Fourth Republic . . . . .   | 46   |
| XI. Population During Years of Fifth Republic . . . . .   | 47   |
| XII. Percentage Change in GNP During Years of Fourth Republic   | 48   |
| XIII. Percentage Change in GNP During Years of Fifth Republic .   | 49   |
| XIV. Percentage Increase in GNP Minus Percentage Increase in<br>Population . . . . .                      | 50   |
| XV. Percentage Change in Real Wages During Years of Fourth<br>Republic . . . . .                          | 51   |
| XVI. Percentage Change in Real Wages During Years of Fifth<br>Republic . . . . .                          | 52   |
| XVII. Number of Students During Years of Fourth Republic . . .  | 57   |

| Table  | Page |
|--|------|
| XVIII. Number of Students During Years of Fifth Republic . . . .                                   | 58   |
| XIX. Annual Average Percentage Change in Students (Adjusted<br>for Change in Population) . . . . . | 59   |

## CHAPTER I

### INTRODUCTION

#### General Introduction

##### The Terms of Reference of the Problem

The question why certain governments are stable and others are unstable has long been an object of political analysis. Aristotle discussed governmental stability at some length in Book Two of his Politics<sup>1</sup> and much of Machiavelli's advice, if taken literally, was directed towards the maintenance of governments.<sup>2</sup> There are many other examples of this problem in ancient, medieval and modern political thought.

As political science evolved into a twentieth century academic discipline, the study of functional problems, governmental stability for example, was partially obscured by the dominance of formalized structural study.<sup>3</sup> Recently, however, there have been several works which have made significant contributions of both a methodological and of a

---

<sup>1</sup>Aristotle, Politics, tr. F. Jowett (New York, 1942) pp. 270-286.

<sup>2</sup>Niccolo Machavelli, The Prince, tr. Luigi Ricco (New York, 1940).

<sup>3</sup>One statement of this criticism: Gabriel Almond, Taylor Cole, and Roy Macridis, "A Suggested Research Strategy in Western European Government and Politics," American Political Science Review, XLIX (1955), pp. 1042-1049.

substantive nature to the study of governmental stability.<sup>4</sup> In general, these recent studies have dealt with the broad question of political development and have concentrated on the new states, but their scope can be narrowed to help the student focus on stability, and their findings can be useful in a study of the older states.

### The Problem

The purpose of this thesis is to compare the conditions of instability of the parliamentary-cabinet system of the Fourth French Republic<sup>5</sup> (1946-1958) with the conditions of stability that have characterized the Fifth Republic (1958-1968). After the two regimes have been compared according to their relative degree of stability, the variables which explain instability and stability will be analyzed.

The most common explanation of governmental instability in France stems from the nature of the individuals who make up the French nation.

---

<sup>4</sup>The most prominent examples: Seymour Lipset, Political Man (Garden City, 1960); Gabriel Almond and James Coleman, The Politics of Developing Areas (Princeton, 1960); Karl W. Deutsch, "Social Mobilization and Political Development," American Political Science Review, LV (1961), pp. 493-514; Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba, The Civic Culture (Princeton, 1963); Edward A. Shils, Political Development in the New States (s'Gravenhage, 1962); David Apter, Politics of Modernization (Chicago, 1965); Samuel P. Huntington, "Political Development and Political Decay," World Politics, XXII (1965), pp. 386-430; Lucian Pye and Sidney Verba, eds., Political Culture and Political Development (Princeton, 1965); Lucian Pye, Aspects of Political Development (Boston, 1966); Gabriel Almond and G. Bingham Powell, Comparative Politics (Boston, 1966).

<sup>5</sup>See: Lowell G. Noonan, "Politics and Government of France," European Politics and Government, Clifford Rich, et al. (New York, 1962), p. 113; Nicholas Wahl, "The French Political System," Patterns of Government, Samuel Beer, et al. (New York, 1965), pp. 282-300; Herman Finer, Governments of Greater European Powers (New York, 1956), pp. 271-297; D. W. Brogan and Douglas Vernay, Political Patterns in Today's World (New York, 1963), pp. 220-223.



The hypothesis has generally been advanced that the French are highly individualistic and unwilling to compromise. This is thought to be the result of an abnormally high degree of social, economic and cultural fractionalization that has resulted in a large number of ideologically inclined political groups. This, in turn, has resulted in a complex multi-party system with subsequent instability in the Parliament and Cabinet.

The relative stability during the Fifth Republic has frequently been attributed to the personal charisma of Charles de Gaulle.<sup>6</sup> If this proves to be the case, the possibility for prolonged stability would seem slight. However, this does not seem to be an adequate explanation, and one must search for more substantive explanations.

Several political scientists<sup>7</sup> have suggested that stability in the Fifth Republic is the result of the constitutional changes that have been made. They contend that the Constitution of the Fifth Republic provides for a political structure of much greater stability than did the Constitution of the Fourth Republic. Attention is usually focused on the changes made in the area of executive powers, although modifications of the legislative process and the electoral system are also pertinent influences. These changes, and their impact on stability, will be investigated and evaluated.

Another possible explanation for the increased stability during the Fifth Republic might be the increase in economic production and

---

<sup>6</sup>For examples see: Alexander Werth, De Gaulle (New York, 1965); Alan Hatch, The De Gaulle Nobody Knows (New York, 1960).

<sup>7</sup>A good example is Roy Macridis and Bernard E. Brown, The De Gaulle Republic (Homewood, 1960).

the increase of consumption. The influence of a rising level of affluence will be investigated to see whether it might be related to governmental stability.

Still another possible explanation for the increased level of stability of the Fifth Republic might be the increased rate of social mobility in French society; this variable also will be examined.

After the investigation is completed, the findings will be evaluated to provide an explanation for the greater stability found in the present regime. Perhaps this will be of some value in predicting the future pattern of governmental stability in France.

### The Hypotheses

The first hypothesis is that the individuals and groups that make up the French political system<sup>8</sup> adhere to basic patterns of beliefs which are likely to result in governmental instability.

The second hypothesis is that the varying degrees of governmental stability in the Fourth and Fifth Republics can be partially explained by changes incorporated in the Constitution of the Fifth Republic.

The third hypothesis is that the greater degree of governmental stability in the Fifth Republic is directly related to an increase in economic production and consumption levels.

The fourth hypothesis is that the greater degree of governmental stability in the Fifth Republic is directly related to an increase in social mobility.

---

<sup>8</sup>For a discussion of the term "system" see David Easton, The Political System (New York, 1964), pp. 96-100.

## Methodology and Organization

Chapter II, "The Political Base," discusses the first hypothesis. This chapter is a study of French political culture,<sup>9</sup> and examines the impact of that culture on governmental stability. The methodology used might be called descriptive-analytical and the chapter rests quite heavily on previous studies. Chapter II also contains a discussion of the political stresses (war, for example) during the Fourth and Fifth Republics.

Chapter III is devoted to the second hypothesis, which focuses on the constitutional structures of the Fourth and Fifth Republics. The changes in election laws, the executive powers, and the legislative process are among the areas of discussion. The impact of these changes on the relative degree of governmental stability is evaluated.

Chapter IV takes up the third hypothesis which is concerned with the relationship between economic production and consumption levels and the degree of governmental stability. Economic production is measured by per capita gross national product and variation in per capita gross national product. This variable is measured in each of the two periods and related to the degree of governmental stability. The levels of consumption are measured by comparing per capita gross national product to real wages and percentage variations in per capita gross national product to percentage variations in real wages. The level of consumption in each of the two periods is then related to the degree of governmental stability.

---

<sup>9</sup>For a discussion of the term "political culture" see Chapter II.

Chapter V is devoted to the fourth hypothesis, which examines the relationship between social mobility and the degree of governmental stability in each of the two periods. Social mobility is measured in terms of the percentage attending secondary school and college, and similar variables.

The methodology used in Chapters III, IV, and V is functional-analytical.

Chapter VI is a synthesis of the variables discussed in the body of the thesis, and evaluates the relative significance of each of the hypotheses, their interrelationship and the implications of the findings on the future stability of the Fifth Republic.

### Governmental Stability

#### Terminology

As explained earlier in this chapter, the degree of governmental stability during the Fourth and Fifth Republics is the central topic of this paper. The obvious first step is an explanation of the term "governmental stability." Most political writers who have discussed stability have used the term in a broad, general way which totally encompasses the system. A good example of this usage is found in Lipset's Political Man<sup>10</sup> and a brief discussion of the shortcomings of that usage is found in Almond and Verba's The Civic Culture.<sup>11</sup>

Governmental stability in this paper refers to the personnel composition of national political institutions over time periods, i.e., the

---

<sup>10</sup>Lipset, pp. 45-76.

<sup>11</sup>These weaknesses are discussed by Almond and Verba, pp. 10-11.

length of time during which the personnel remain constant. The institutions with which this paper works are the Premiership, the Cabinet, and the National Assembly. It is quite obvious that this concept of governmental stability is far short of a general stability theory. However, it is on this basis that political scientists have criticized the Fourth Republic, and it seems valid to assume that this criticism is of considerable importance. It must be pointed out that this thesis is not designed to be a general theory of stability or stable government. It is simply a discussion of the variables which relate to the frequent personnel changes in French government ("governmental instability").

#### Fourth Republic

During the Fourth Republic (1946-1958) there were 21 Premiers in France (Table I, page 9). During the same period there was a great deal of Cabinet instability, as is shown in Table II, page 10 (Cabinet composition by party at the beginning of each year during the period). The degree of Cabinet fluctuation is shown in Table VI, page 14 and one can see that there were an average of 14.0 Cabinet shifts each year during the Fourth Republic. Table III, page 11 shows the National Assembly composition by party and the same pattern of instability exists. There were an average of 158.2 changes in party composition each year (Table VII, page 15). Considering the fact that elections were held only in 1951 and 1956 this seems extremely high.

### Fifth Republic

In contrast to the 21 Premiers during the 12 years of the Fourth Republic, there have been only one President and three Premiers during the 10 years of the Fifth Republic. Almost as striking is the degree of Cabinet stability (Table IV, page 12 ) and the fact that there have been an average of 5.3 Cabinet changes each year during the Fifth Republic as opposed to 14.0 changes during the Fourth Republic (Table VI). There has also been a marked increase in the stability of the National Assembly during the Fifth Republic (Table V, page 13 ), and an average annual change of only 67.6 compared to 158.2 during the Fourth Republic (Table VII).

It is clear that there has been a good deal more stability in French national governmental institutions during the present government than existed during the former. It can be argued that the results are stable in the sense that they are static. However, when political scientists speak of instability in France they refer to these conditions.

TABLE I  
PREMIERS DURING FOURTH REPUBLIC

| Premier              | Party       | Term of Office |             |
|----------------------|-------------|----------------|-------------|
| Charles de Gaulle*   | None        | 11-21-45       | to 1-22-46  |
| Felix Gouin*         | SFIO        | 1-26-46        | to 6-11-46  |
| Georges Bidault*     | MRP         | 6-23-46        | to 11-28-46 |
| Leon Blum            | SFIO        | 12-16-46       | to 1-16-47  |
| Paul Ramadier        | SFIO        | 1-22-47        | to 11-19-47 |
| Robert Schuman       | MRP         | 11-24-47       | to 7-19-48  |
| Andre Marie          | PRRRS       | 7-26-48        | to 8-28-48  |
| Robert Schuman       | MRP         | 9-5-48         | to 9-7-48   |
| Henri Queuille       | PRRRS       | 9-9-48         | to 10-6-49  |
| Georges Bidault      | MRP         | 10-29-49       | to 6-24-50  |
| Rene Pleven          | UDSR        | 7-12-50        | to 2-28-51  |
| Henri Queuille       | PRRRS       | 3-10-51        | to 7-10-51  |
| Rene Pleven          | UDSR        | 8-10-51        | to 1-7-52   |
| Edgar Faure          | PRRRS       | 1-20-52        | to 2-29-52  |
| Antoine Pinay        | Independent | 3-8-52         | to 12-23-52 |
| Rene Mayer           | PRRRS       | 1-8-53         | to 5-21-53  |
| Joseph Laniel        | Independent | 6-27-53        | to 6-12-54  |
| Pierre Mendes-France | PRRRS       | 6-18-54        | to 2-6-55   |
| Edgar Faure          | PRRRS       | 2-25-55        | to 1-24-56  |
| Guy Mollet           | SFIO        | 1-31-56        | to 5-21-57  |
| M. Bourges-Maunoury  | PRRRS       | 6-12-57        | to 9-30-57  |
| Felix Gaillard       | PRRRS       | 11-5-57        | to 4-15-58  |
| Pierre Pflimlin      | MRP         | 5-14-58        | to 5-28-58  |
| Charles de Gaulle    | None        | 6-1-58         | to 1-8-59   |

SOURCE: Beer, p. 412.

\*  
Premiers during provisional period.

TABLE II

## CABINET COMPOSITION BY PARTY AT BEGINNING OF EACH YEAR DURING FOURTH REPUBLIC

| Year | PCF | SFIO | PRRRS | RGR | UDSR | ASR | MRP | CNIP | PRL | RPF | CNRS | UNR | UFF | Other | Total |
|------|-----|------|-------|-----|------|-----|-----|------|-----|-----|------|-----|-----|-------|-------|
| 1947 | 5   | 9    | -     | 5   | -    | -   | 5   | 5    | -   | -   | -    | --  | -   | -     | 29    |
| 1948 | -   | 8    | 4     | -   | 1    | -   | 10  | 1    | -   | -   | -    | -   | -   | -     | 24    |
| 1949 | -   | 5    | 3     | -   | 1    | -   | 5   | 1    | 1   | -   | -    | -   | -   | -     | 16    |
| 1950 | -   | 5    | 3     | -   | 2    | -   | 6   | -    | -   | -   | -    | -   | -   | 2     | 18    |
| 1951 | -   | 5    | 5     | -   | 3    | -   | 6   | -    | -   | -   | -    | -   | -   | 3     | 22    |
| 1952 | -   | -    | 11    | -   | 3    | -   | 11  | 3    | -   | -   | -    | -   | -   | 12    | 40    |
| 1953 | -   | -    | 10    | -   | 2    | 2   | 10  | 3    | -   | -   | -    | -   | -   | 10    | 37    |
| 1954 | -   | -    | 8     | -   | 2    | 3   | 8   | 4    | -   | -   | -    | -   | -   | 13    | 38    |
| 1955 | -   | -    | 8     | -   | 3    | 1   | 2   | 2    | -   | -   | 5    | -   | -   | 13    | 32    |
| 1956 | -   | 6    | 4     | -   | 2    | -   | -   | -    | -   | -   | -    | -   | -   | 1     | 13    |
| 1957 | -   | 7    | 3     | -   | 2    | -   | -   | -    | -   | -   | 1    | -   | -   | -     | 13    |
| 1958 | -   | 4    | 3     | 1   | 2    | -   | 3   | -    | -   | -   | 1    | -   | -   | 3     | 17    |

SOURCE: Political Handbook of the World, 1947-1958.



TABLE III

## NATIONAL ASSEMBLY COMPOSITION BY PARTY AT BEGINNING OF EACH YEAR DURING FOURTH REPUBLIC

| Year | PCF | SFIO | PRRRS | RGR* | UDSR | ASR | MRP | CNIP** | PRL | RPF | CNRS | UNR | UFF | Other | Total |
|------|-----|------|-------|------|------|-----|-----|--------|-----|-----|------|-----|-----|-------|-------|
| 1947 | 182 | 102  | -     | 71   | -    | -   | 166 | 29     | 38  | -   | -    | -   | -   | 35    | 618   |
| 1948 | 186 | 103  | -     | 70   | -    | -   | 166 | 29     | 38  | -   | -    | -   | -   | 36    | 618   |
| 1949 | 182 | 104  | -     | 70   | -    | 10  | 155 | 30     | 34  | -   | -    | -   | -   | 20    | 619   |
| 1950 | 181 | 99   | -     | 58   | 14   | -   | 151 | 24     | 30  | 22  | -    | -   | -   | 42    | 621   |
| 1951 | 167 | 99   | 46    | -    | 13   | -   | 145 | 24     | 29  | -   | -    | -   | -   | 98    | 621   |
| 1952 | 101 | 107  | -     | 91   | -    | -   | 97  | 98     | -   | 120 | -    | -   | -   | 13    | 627   |
| 1953 | 100 | 105  | -     | 98   | -    | -   | 88  | 134    | -   | 84  | -    | -   | -   | 18    | 627   |
| 1954 | 100 | 105  | -     | 101  | -    | -   | 88  | 136    | -   | -   | 78   | -   | -   | 19    | 627   |
| 1955 | 98  | 105  | -     | 100  | -    | 33  | 85  | 104    | -   | -   | 72   | -   | -   | 30    | 627   |
| 1956 | 150 | 94   | 57    | 14   | 19   | -   | 73  | 95     | -   | -   | 21   | -   | 52  | 52    | 627   |
| 1957 | 150 | 100  | 60    | 14   | 20   | -   | 74  | 99     | -   | -   | 22   | -   | 42  | 15    | 596   |
| 1958 | 148 | 101  | 57    | 35   | -    | -   | 82  | 99     | -   | -   | 21   | -   | 42  | 11    | 596   |

SOURCE: Ibid.

\*RGR was a loose coalition of PRRRS and UDSR.

\*CNIP was a loose coalition of several parties.

TABLE IV  
CABINET COMPOSITION BY PARTY AT BEGINNING OF EACH  
YEAR DURING FIFTH REPUBLIC

| Year | SFIO | MRP | UNR | Non-<br>Party | Other | Total |
|------|------|-----|-----|---------------|-------|-------|
| 1959 | -    | 4   | 7   | 12            | 3     | 26    |
| 1960 | -    | 3   | 6   | 16            | 1     | 26    |
| 1961 | -    | 4   | 7   | 13            | 1     | 25    |
| 1962 | 1    | 3   | 15  | 6             | -     | 25    |
| 1963 | 1    | 3   | 14  | 8             | -     | 26    |
| 1964 | 1    | 3   | 13  | 8             | -     | 25    |
| 1965 | 1    | 3   | 13  | 8             | -     | 25    |
| 1966 | 1    | 3   | 14  | 7             | -     | 25    |

SOURCE: Political Handbook of the World, 1959-1966.

TABLE V  
NATIONAL ASSEMBLY COMPOSITION BY PARTY AT BEGINNING OF EACH YEAR DURING FIFTH REPUBLIC

| Year | PCF | SFIO | PRRRS | RGR | MRP | CNIP | UNR | UFF | Non-Party | Other | Total |
|------|-----|------|-------|-----|-----|------|-----|-----|-----------|-------|-------|
| 1959 | 10  | 66   | 16    | 66  | 57  | 136  | 189 | -   | -         | 1     | 475*  |
| 1960 | 10  | 44   | 44    | -   | 57  | 119  | 210 | 45  | -         | 24    | 552   |
| 1961 | 10  | 58   | 37    | -   | 58  | 122  | 212 | 32  | -         | 36    | 552   |
| 1962 | 41  | 66   | 39    | -   | 55  | 36   | 223 | -   | -         | 22    | 482   |
| 1963 | 40  | 68   | 39    | -   | 55  | 35   | 234 | -   | -         | 13    | 484   |
| 1964 | 40  | 68   | 39    | -   | 55  | 35   | 234 | -   | -         | 13    | 484   |
| 1965 | 41  | 68   | 39    | -   | 55  | 35   | 231 | -   | -         | 13    | 482   |
| 1966 | 41  | 66   | 39    | -   | 55  | 35   | 231 | -   | -         | 15    | 482   |

SOURCE: Ibid.

\*Not counting temporary Algerian delegates.

TABLE VI  
PERSONNEL CHANGES IN CABINET COMPOSITION

| Fourth Republic |           | Fifth Republic |          |
|-----------------|-----------|----------------|----------|
| Year            | Change    | Year           | Change   |
| 1947            |           |                |          |
| 1948            | 25        | 1959           |          |
| 1949            | 10        | 1960           | 8        |
| 1950            | 6         | 1961           | 5        |
| 1951            | 4         | 1962           | 17       |
| 1952            | 28        | 1963           | 4        |
| 1953            | 7         | 1964           | 1        |
| 1954            | 9         | 1965           | 0        |
| 1955            | 20        | 1966           | <u>2</u> |
| 1956            | 31        |                |          |
| 1957            | 4         |                |          |
| 1958            | <u>10</u> |                |          |
| Total           | 154       | Total          | 37       |
| Average         | 14.0      | Average        | 5.3      |

TABLE VII  
CHANGES IN NATIONAL ASSEMBLY COMPOSITION

| Fourth Republic |           | Fifth Republic |          |
|-----------------|-----------|----------------|----------|
| Year            | Change    | Year           | Change   |
| 1947            |           |                |          |
| 1948            | 7         | 1959           |          |
| 1949            | 47        | 1960           | 222      |
| 1950            | 106       | 1961           | 52       |
| 1951            | 204       | 1962           | 177      |
| 1952            | 581       | 1963           | 14       |
| 1953            | 96        | 1964           | 0        |
| 1954            | 84        | 1965           | 4        |
| 1955            | 88        | 1966           | <u>4</u> |
| 1956            | 404       |                |          |
| 1957            | 63        |                |          |
| 1958            | <u>60</u> |                |          |
| Total           | 1740      | Total          | 473      |
| Average         | 158.2     | Average        | 67.6     |

## CHAPTER II

### THE POLITICAL BASE

#### Political Culture

#### Political Culture and Governmental Stability

The first hypothesis of this paper is that the individuals and groups that make up the French political system adhere to basic patterns of beliefs which are likely to result in governmental instability. In simpler, and broader terms, this hypothesis could be restated in the following way: French political culture lends itself to instability. The first task that needs to be accomplished in this chapter is the definition and exploration of "basic patterns of beliefs" or "political culture" and their relationship to governmental stability. It is difficult to say just where the study of political culture started: some would point to the ancient philosophers, others to Max Weber,<sup>1</sup> still others to the work of Talcott Parsons and Edward Shils.<sup>2</sup> However, the first use of the term "political culture" seemed to be by Gabriel Almond in 1956. At that time he used the term to describe the notion

---

<sup>1</sup>Max Weber, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, tr. Talcott Parsons (New York, 1958) and Max Weber, The Theory of Social and Economic Organization, tr. Talcott Parsons (New York, 1947).

<sup>2</sup>See for example Talcott Parsons and Edward A. Shils, eds., Toward a General Theory of Action (Cambridge, 1951).

that, "...every political system is embedded in a particular pattern of orientation to political action."<sup>3</sup> To explain the importance and utility of the concept Professor Almond stated:

Political culture is not the same thing as general culture, although it is related to it. Because political orientation involves cognition, intellection, and adaptation to external situations, as well as the standards and values of the general culture, it is a differentiated part of the culture and has a certain autonomy.<sup>4</sup>

Almond then went on to briefly outline some of the differences in the political cultures of several political systems and to discuss the importance of this type of study.<sup>5</sup>

In 1958 Samuel Beer discussed political culture in the following words:

In political science, as in any social science, we begin with individuals--actual men and women going about the business of politics....But for all their individuality, people also have much in common. They share a common human nature--certain emotional drives, intellectual capacities, and moral tendencies. As we find it in any particular society, however, this common human nature expresses itself in certain values, beliefs and emotional attitudes, which, with greater or lesser modification, are passed on by instruction or imitation from one generation to the next. These we call the culture of a society.

Certain aspects of the general culture of a society are especially concerned with how government ought to be conducted and what it should do. This sector of culture we call political culture.<sup>6</sup>

These statements explained the term political culture, a term that has gained wide usage among political scientists. The term, in

---

<sup>3</sup>Gabriel A. Almond, "Comparative Political Systems," Journal of Politics, XVIII (1956), p. 396.

<sup>4</sup>Ibid.

<sup>5</sup>Ibid., p. 397.

<sup>6</sup>Beer, p. 12.

conceptual form, has been used in several studies, most notably in The Civic Culture<sup>7</sup> and Political Culture and Political Development.<sup>8</sup>

The next section of this paper is an analysis of the political culture of France, and a testing of the paper's first hypothesis.

### Political Culture in France

Reformers and organisers, from within and without, neighbours and treaty negotiators, have again and again discovered, often with impatience, the existence of a French personality which clings with the greatest cunning and tenacity to its habits, including its bad habits--and those who study the country more closely, whatever their angle or approach, find themselves continually confronted with this personality.<sup>9</sup>

The previous statement, by Herbert Luthy, was a typical statement of one studying the French political system. After reading such a passage the normal reaction is either tacit acceptance or hostile rejection on the grounds that it is an indefensible generalization. Yet, in a thoughtful paper, neither of these two reactions is acceptable. The contention cannot be rejected, because it is too widely held, yet it cannot be accepted without further investigation. The first step is to pin down this "French personality," or at least pin down what people say about it. The second step is to investigate the reasons for the common acceptance of the concept "French personality," and the third is to measure the effects of that "personality," or the reasons for its acceptance, on the political system.

---

<sup>7</sup> Almond and Verba.

<sup>8</sup> Lucian Pye and Sidney Verba, eds., Political Culture and Political Development (Princeton, 1965).

<sup>9</sup> Herbert Luthy, France Against Herself (New York, 1955), p. 1.



Perhaps the most widely discussed element of the "French personality" is the high degree of individualism. P. E. Charvet described this individualism in the following way:

If the idea of individualism and its attendant quality of independence has been emphasized it is because this trait, more than any other, would appear to be fundamental, a thread running through the varied pattern of French life and character. The corollary is that Frenchmen seem to have little social sense.<sup>10</sup>

An extremely widely read French political commentator, Jacques Fauvet, carried this same thought a step farther.

To the Frenchman individual liberty means so much, his resistance to authority goes to such lengths, that he is undisciplined. He shows this failing in everything that he does and, since political activity is more exposed to the public gaze, he shows it in this field more than any other. This individualism puts him ceaselessly in conflict with the government as with other authorities.<sup>11</sup>

Both of these writers claimed that the "average Frenchman" has such a high degree of devotion to the ideal of individualism that he is unable to accept authority. There is much evidence to back up their claims: French resistance to taxes; resistance to military service; disregard for police directives; the historical tendency for violent revolt; and others. Andre Siegfried made the following comment on this individualistic tendency in politics:

It must be remembered that the Frenchman, the man on the street as well as the intellectual, is above all an individualist.... This quality of mind, admirable in itself, becomes a serious liability in politics, since it prevents ready adjustment by compromise. Every argument becomes a matter of principle; the practical results are relegated to second place.<sup>12</sup>

---

<sup>10</sup>P. E. Charvet, France (New York, 1955), p. 15.

<sup>11</sup>Jacques Fauvet, The Cockpit of France (London, 1960), p. 17.

<sup>12</sup>Andre Siegfried, "Stable Instability in France," Foreign Affairs, XXXIV (1956), p. 394.

This intense individualism and unwillingness to compromise which seems to exist in France would be of the greatest importance in a discussion of political stability.

Why do the French seem to be so individualistic and uncompromising? The answer to this question, if indeed there is a satisfactory answer, is very complex. One French political scientist, Maurice Duverger, said this:

The variety of races among the French will not astonish Americans; they are themselves familiar with great racial diversity. Compared with other European countries, however, France is somewhat exceptional in this respect. A comparison of France with Italy, Spain, the Scandinavian countries, Germany and Great Britain reveals a notable difference.<sup>13</sup>

Duverger went on to explain the historical reasons for the lack of racial unity in France and the fact that racial differences follow regional lines.<sup>14</sup> This regionalism is reinforced by the strength, or weakness, of the Catholic Church, which varies greatly from one part of France to another.<sup>15</sup> Differences in language, between North and South, East and West, Paris and the provinces, adds still more fuel to the intense differences between the different regions in France.<sup>16</sup> Each of these differences (racial, religious, and linguistic) presents difficulties of its own. For example, the religious debate prevents the cooperation of the Radicals and Socialists with the Christian

---

<sup>13</sup>Maurice Duverger, The French Political System, tr. Robert Ward (Chicago, 1958), pp. 3-4.

<sup>14</sup>Ibid., p. 4.

<sup>15</sup>See Roy C. Macridis and Robert Ward, eds., Modern Political Systems: Europe (Englewood Cliffs, 1968), pp. 186-188.

<sup>16</sup>See P. E. Charvet, p. 24.

Democrats.<sup>17</sup> Thus, we see many small groups which prevent consensus.

Even stronger reasons for the "French personality" can be found in French history. In that country's history, for several centuries, there have been two strong political traditions that are extreme opposites. Nicholas Wahl called them the "state-minded administrative pattern and the individual-oriented representative pattern,"<sup>18</sup> and said that they are, "unintegrated and unreformed...competitive and hostile."<sup>19</sup> Many other writers have discussed this rivalry, which seems more bitter in France than in other European countries. Most of these writers have referred to the two traditions as "revolutionism and traditionalism,"<sup>20</sup> and discussed the results in terms of political instability. It should be pointed out that French political scientists have tended to agree with this analysis,<sup>21</sup> and the split seems just as serious in this decade as ever before. Perhaps this split remains serious partly because of the country's basic value system, which seems to be reflected in education and literature. Edwin Godfrey discussed the education system, and its stress on theoretical political writers, in his book on French government,<sup>22</sup> and Raymond Aron further discussed

---

<sup>17</sup>David Schoenbrun, As France Goes (New York, 1957), p. 76.

<sup>18</sup>Wahl, p. 279.

<sup>19</sup>Ibid.

<sup>20</sup>See for example: Saul K. Padover, French Institutions: Values and Politics (Stanford, 1954), pp. 5-9.

<sup>21</sup>See for example: Jean Chatelain, La Nouvelle Constitution De La France (Paris, 1959), pp. 17-32.

<sup>22</sup>Edwin D. Godfrey, The Government of France (New York, 1963), pp. 11-15.

the importance of literature.<sup>23</sup> The effect of this education, and this related set of values, which stem from history, seems to be that "the Frenchman thinks of himself as a humanist and this tends to affect his political thought. He is likely to be uncompromising and rather ineffective."<sup>24</sup> It does indeed seem that cultural sensitivity "dominates their political actors...and they do not accept the responsibilities of democracy"<sup>25</sup> as a result.

One of the most important explanations of the "French personality" is to be found in the country's socio-economic class system. Basically, France has many of the characteristics of an underdeveloped country and some of the characteristics of a developed industrial state. As Francois Goguel has explained:

In French political life the past has as great an influence, if not more influence, than the present....The France of earlier days, the France of small farms, small workshops, small businesses, the France of individualism, the France where...politics is a matter of taste...this France still survives today in many areas....France has not been uniformly stagnant economically, and some areas experienced an economic development similar to that which other countries were undergoing.<sup>26</sup>

This uneven development, which was called a combination of feudal and industrial by Stanley Hoffmann,<sup>27</sup> has resulted in a population that is

---

<sup>23</sup>Raymond Aron, France: Steadfast and Changing (Cambridge, 1960), pp. 7-16.

<sup>24</sup>Pierre Barriere, La Vie Intellectuelle En France (Paris, 1961), pp. 1-39.

<sup>25</sup>Jean Revel, The French, tr. Paula Sparlin (New York, 1966), pp. 1-30.

<sup>26</sup>Francois Goguel, France Under the Fourth Republic (Ithaca, 1952), pp. 140-142.

<sup>27</sup>Stanley Hoffmann, In Search of France (Cambridge, 1963), pp. 3-8.

severely split along socio-economic lines.

France has two working classes: one is property owning and 'integrated,' the other is propertyless and 'alienated.' France has two farming classes: one owns its land, the other is composed of workers, tenants, and sharecroppers. France has two middle classes: one is modern, relatively prosperous, and 'on the make,' the other is archaic, poor and on the decline.<sup>28</sup>

These socio-economic groups are well-defined, rigid and hostile towards each other. As David Thompson said, the "peasants fear the political power of the workers,"<sup>29</sup> the "industrial workers resent the historical power of the peasants,"<sup>30</sup> the "middle classes are split according to degree of conservatism,"<sup>31</sup> and the upper class is split into ultra "conservative gentry"<sup>32</sup> and a less conservative "oligarchy"<sup>33</sup> that resents the gentry.

These economic divisions are illustrated in Table VIII which indicates the predominate ideological leanings of each major socio-economic class. The peasants, who own extremely small family farms, are quite conservative because they look back to a time when the small land owner was self-supporting and more important politically. The non-landowning agricultural workers, who have much in common with the peasants, tend to be radical or communistic because they want ownership. Industrial workers tend to be communistic or socialistic, although

---

<sup>28</sup>Noonan, p. 113.

<sup>29</sup>David Thompson, Democracy in France (London, 1964), p. 45.

<sup>30</sup>Ibid., pp. 50-52.

<sup>31</sup>Ibid., p. 64.

<sup>32</sup>Ibid., pp. 65-66.

<sup>33</sup>Ibid., pp. 66-68.

TABLE VIII

## CLASS IDEOLOGIES

| Class                  | Communist | Socialist | Radical | Catholic<br>Moderate | Conservative | Reactionary |
|------------------------|-----------|-----------|---------|----------------------|--------------|-------------|
| Peasants               |           |           |         | x                    | x            | x           |
| Agriculture<br>Workers | x         |           | x       | x                    |              |             |
| Workers                | x         | x         |         |                      |              |             |
| Old Middle<br>Class    |           |           |         | x                    | x            | x           |
| New Middle<br>Class    |           | x         | x       |                      | x            |             |
| Upper Class            |           |           |         |                      | x            | x           |

there are some Catholic-moderates, and are generally quite violent. They cannot work with the peasants because of the historical conflict, and cannot work with the moderates because of religious differences. The old middle class, shop owners and master artisans, are generally conservative because they oppose social reform, economic reform, taxation and seek to preserve their historical importance as the middle class. The new middle class, "white collar" salaried people, are much more progressive than the old middle class and a great deal of friction has developed between the two. The new middle class is much less susceptible to the Church and this is another serious difference between the two. The upper class, which is marked by inherited wealth and whose members either live off rents or enter military or government service, is very conservative. There is some inter-class disagreement on how to prevent social change and economic redistribution but the ends are commonly agreed on. Needless to say, there is a great deal of animosity between the upper class and the new middle class, the working class and the agricultural working class.

So, we find in France, a population that is severely split along racial, religious, regional, socio-economic, and philosophical lines.

In France there are two basic temperaments--Left and Right; there are three main tendencies, if the centre is included; six schools of thought; ten parties, large and small with numerous cross-currents; fourteen highly undisciplined parliamentary groups and forty million different opinions.<sup>34</sup>

This evaluation of the political base in France, a base that is highly fragmented and composed of alienated groups, seems to be supported by both analysis and data research. In 1957 Edgar Furniss ran a poll

---

<sup>34</sup>Fauvet, p. 26.

sampling French economic groups to see if they felt "better off" than previously. Table IX shows the percentage responses. These figures suggest that French society, which is highly fragmented, is also quite dissatisfied. Much of this dissatisfaction appears to stem from the belief of each group that other groups are relatively better off than they should be and that the political system is not working properly. It is because of these antagonisms, and the fact that France remains a "less integrated" country than other European states,<sup>35</sup> that the "French personality" persists.

In practical political terms, "such a kaleidic economic and social pattern produced a number of irreconcilable forces that, unable and unwilling to compromise, continued to prevent movement toward fewer and larger political groupings."<sup>36</sup>

No institutions have developed to bridge the gap between the individual and the state and make the first a full-fledged participant and the second an instrument for the realization of the demands and interests of the citizens. Voluntary associations, political parties, trade unions, and, in general, intermediary associations that allow for participation and provide for compromise, have been weak.<sup>37</sup>

So we seem to have an answer to the questions raised by the paper's first hypothesis and that hypothesis seems valid. The individuals and groups that make up the French political system adhere to basic patterns of beliefs which are likely to result in government instability because of the lack of consensus. It is clear that the basic conditions for instability exist in France, and have existed for some time. The

---

<sup>35</sup>Philip Williams, Politics in Post-War France (London, 1955), pp. 4-5.

<sup>36</sup>Wahl, p. 355.

<sup>37</sup>Macridis and Ward, p. 159.



TABLE IX  
CLASS DISSATISFACTION

| Group                   | Worse Off | Same | Better Off |
|-------------------------|-----------|------|------------|
| Peasants                | 34        | 37   | 26         |
| Agricultural<br>Workers | 30        | 40   | 19         |
| Industrial Workers      | 36        | 33   | 22         |
| Artisans                | 45        | 28   | 20         |
| Middle Class            | 36        | 25   | 29         |
| Professionals           | 38        | 28   | 25         |
| Retired                 | 41        | 27   | 27         |

SOURCE: Edgar S. Furniss, France—Troubled Ally, (New York, 1960)  
p. 147.

question now becomes, why has the government of the Fifth Republic showed greater stability than that of the Fourth Republic?

### Political Stresses

#### General Remarks

Perhaps a partial answer to this last question can be found in the events of the two time periods. Without question this is the most simplistic and least analytical part of the answer, but it cannot be overlooked.

#### Fourth Republic

In 1946 France had the political and economic scars of German occupation. Still, France was considered, formally at least, as a great power and was called upon to act as one. The strains placed upon the French system of both an external and internal nature seem to have contributed to instability. A much greater burden was that of decolonialization. In the Middle-East, in Indo-China and in North Africa the French withdrawal was costly and painful. The wars in Indo-China and Algeria not only placed huge demands upon the economy, but also caused deep political divisions. It seems reasonable to assume that these events, and their results, contributed to instability in the 1946-1958 period.

#### Fifth Republic

The years since 1958 have been comparatively free from this type of severe political stress. The wars were over, or were ended, and

decolonialization was virtually completed. This one fact, that France was not engaged in war or decolonialization, must be remembered, although it is extremely difficult to weigh in terms of stability.

## CHAPTER III

### THE CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE

#### Constitutional Structure and Governmental Stability

The question why constitutional structure is important is often discussed in basic political science texts.<sup>1</sup> These discussions usually center around the different forms that constitutions take and their functional role in the political system. Form, which seems to reflect the social system<sup>2</sup> and the power structure within the system, is of less importance in this paper than function. This chapter deals with the second general hypothesis which suggests that the different degrees of governmental stability during the Fourth and Fifth Republics can be partially explained by changes that were made in the constitutional structure. The analysis focuses on the constitutional definition of government organs<sup>3</sup> and their powers, and relates this definition to

---

<sup>1</sup>For two examples see: Robert Rienow, Introduction to Government (New York, 1964), pp. 5-7; 38-45; 164-182; J. Roland Pennock and David G. Smith, Political Science (New York, 1964), pp. 239-261.

<sup>2</sup>This belief is explained by many political scientists. One of them is Arnold J. Zurcher, Constitutions and Constitutional Trends Since World War II (New York, 1955), pp. 1-12.

<sup>3</sup>The importance of constitutional definition of structures is discussed by: Carl J. Friedrich, Constitutional Government and Democracy (Boston, 1950), pp. 173-236; Karl Loewenstein, "Reflections on the Value of Constitutions in Our Revolutionary Age," Constitutions and Constitutional Trends Since World War II, ed. Arnold J. Zurcher, pp. 206-220.

stability.

"The main objective of the framer of the Constitution of the Fifth Republic was to correct the institutional defects of the past and to create a strong and stable executive."<sup>4</sup> The above statement was made in 1960 by Macridis and Brown and was a fairly typical descriptive analysis of the de Gaulle Constitution. This chapter will therefore examine the Constitutions of the Fourth and Fifth Republics to see whether that statement can be borne out. The Constitutions are compared at critical points to see whether changes were made that might help explain the different degrees of governmental stability during the two periods.<sup>5</sup>

#### Fourth Republic

On October 21, 1945 the Provisional Government held parliamentary elections and submitted to the electorate the question of whether the Constitution of 1871 should be replaced. The results were 18,500,000 in favor of a new Constitution and 700,000 opposed (the results were remarkable for a French election). Those elected in the parliamentary elections formed the first national Constituent Assembly and started working on a document. On April 19, 1946 the Assembly adopted a Constitution, but it was rejected in the national referendum of May 5, 1946. On June 2, 1946 new parliamentary elections were held and the

---

<sup>4</sup>Macridis and Brown, p. 174.

<sup>5</sup>For a discussion of the structure of the Fourth Republic Constitution I recommend Maurice Duverger, Constitutions Et Documents Politiques (Paris, 1957). For a discussion of the Constitution of the Fifth Republic see Jean Chatelain, La Nouvelle Constitution et le Regime Politique de La France (Paris, 1959).

second national Constituent Assembly convened. It was obvious that the French wanted a new Constitution, but it was just as obvious that there was no agreement as to what it should contain. The second Assembly adopted a new draft Constitution on September 28, 1946, and on October 27, 1946 the voters approved it by the narrow margin of 9,200,000 to 8,200,000. This document was to serve as the legal foundation of the French Government for 12 years.

During the 1945-1946 period the leftist parties, especially the Communists and Socialists, opposed the creation of an executive head of state. They were strongly in favor of assembly government and professed both ideological and practical fear of a President. Finally, after bitter debate, a President was included in the Constitution. Although the President was to be head of state, he was virtually powerless in real terms. A quick reading of the 1946 Constitution might give the impression that the President held a considerable measure of power: Article 30 contained the power of appointment; Article 31 gave the power to ratify treaties; Article 32 made him presiding officer of the Cabinet; Article 33 named him Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces; and Articles 34-35 contained certain judicial powers. A closer reading of the document, however, reveals that these powers (and the office of President) were designed to be symbolic and ceremonial. The President was elected by Parliament (Article 29) rather than the electorate and was thus prevented from taking his case to the people.<sup>6</sup> Of even greater importance was the fact that the President had no veto

---

<sup>6</sup>Article 41 said that Parliament could, by a vote, determine that a President was incapable of performing his duties and remove him. Although this did not constitute an impeachment process, it was used twice during the Third Republic to remove Presidents.

power. He was required by Article 36 to sign legislation within ten days (five days if so decreed by the National Assembly). He could send legislation back to the Parliament for "reconsideration," but the Premier could sign legislation into law if the President did not. It must also be noted that the President did not have the power of dissolution.

These articles were a reflection of the desire to have a weak head of state (possibly because of the events in 1848 which had led to the establishment of a monarchy). They were also a reflection of the highly fragmented party system and the lack of a majority in the Parliament. Both of the Presidents during the Fourth Republic were compromise selections (Vincent Auriol was a minority socialist and Rene Coty was an independent) who did not have a power base with the electorate, with a strong political party, or with a coalition in the National Assembly. As a result each of them operated within the constitutional framework, and according to the wishes of the Assembly, as a figurehead.

The real executive during the Fourth Republic, if there was an effective executive, was the Premier. Articles 45-55 of the 1946 Constitution discussed the Premier and those articles were more of a negative nature than a positive one. They were more an attempt to limit the power of the Premier than to make him an effective executive. Article 45 insured that the Premier could not be appointed until he and his entire Cabinet had been approved by an absolute majority of the deputies in the National Assembly. As the result, Premiers were forced to name Cabinets which reflected this support at the time and a great deal of Cabinet immobility was the result. (Before 1954 the process of double investiture was followed: the Premier was approved and then the

Premier and his Cabinet were approved. This was changed in 1954 but did not attack the basic problems of multi-party instability and executive impotence).

Article 49 discussed the confidence vote<sup>7</sup> and although an absolute majority was required for a vote of no confidence, government legislation could be defeated by a voting majority. In actual practice minorities were able to defeat legislation and compel Cabinet resignation. It was also quite clear that the Premier had to resign after loss of confidence and that interim power rested with the National Assembly.

Article 51 described dissolution which was possible only if two previous governments had been toppled within an 18 month period.<sup>8</sup> This limited power of dissolution was in keeping with traditional French fear concerning anti-republican government. At the Constituent Assembly there were many who favored the British system of dissolution and argued that it would be an effective means of insuring stability. However, they were overruled, and this rather weak dissolution power was given the Premier.

It is obvious in reading the Articles (5-24) of the Constitution dealing with Parliament that the framers were not dedicated to the principle of separation of power but to that of legislative supremacy. As pointed out in Chapter I of this thesis, the National Assembly was severely fractionalized along party lines. This fractionalization made the legislative process extremely cumbersome and difficult. It was

---

<sup>7</sup>A censure motion required only a majority of deputies voting. In 1957 Premier Felix Gaillard proposed that this be changed to an absolute majority but he was ignored.

<sup>8</sup>Again, in 1957 Gaillard attempted to give the Premier the power to dissolve Parliament at any time but was defeated.



difficult to pass legislation of any kind, and there were times when only the rather conservative, but solid, bureaucracy kept the country going. This inability to act was obvious many times, but at no time was immobility more critical than in the Algerian Generals' Revolt in May, 1958, when the end finally came.

Election laws present another important item in the constitutional structure that should not be overlooked. The election law of 1946 operated under the principle of proportional representation with party list voting. This system might have helped governmental stability had there been a nation-wide party of fair strength. However, there was not a party strong enough to benefit from the system and as a result an alliance system of leftist parties supported the Cabinets of the period and kept them in office. In 1950-1951 it became obvious that these coalitions were in trouble and the left-center and center parties collaborated to pass a new election law in 1951. That new law made it possible for a party to gain all of the seats in a district if it received a majority of the votes cast. The law also made it possible for several parties to combine their totals to achieve the majority and to thus exclude the opposition parties (this particularly hit the Communist party and Rassemblement du Peuple Francais). This law helped to a degree, but did not solve the basic problem of a multi-party system.

In summation, the Constitution of 1946 provided for a President who was little more than a figure head; a severely limited Premier; an undisciplined Parliament, and election laws that promoted parliamentary fractionalization.

## Fifth Republic

May 1958 saw France on the verge of civil war. The army in Algeria<sup>9</sup> set up a Committee of Public Safety on May 13, 1958, and threatened to seize Paris if the National Assembly did not hand the Premiership to General Charles de Gaulle.<sup>10</sup> On May 15, 1958 de Gaulle stated privately that he would accept the Premiership and on May 19 he made the same statement before a formal news conference. On May 28, 1958 the Pflimlin Cabinet resigned and on June 1, 1958 the National Assembly accorded de Gaulle confidence as Premier and gave him exceptional powers for six months. The next day the Assembly voted to amend<sup>11</sup> the Constitution, and a committee started work on a draft. The final draft was accepted by de Gaulle in early September and, on September 28, 1958, passed in a national referendum by an 80 percent vote.

During the months following de Gaulle's installation as Premier there was wide acceptance of the need to vastly strengthen the executive. This was reflected in the draft Constitution. General de Gaulle and his advisers thought that the problem of the chronic instability of the Cabinet and the impotence of the National Assembly could be cured by the creation of a strong executive. The office of President, which had been largely ceremonial during the Fourth Republic, was made extremely powerful. The President during the Fourth Republic was

---

<sup>9</sup>Under the active leadership of a group of paratroop Colonels and the nominal leadership of General Salan.

<sup>10</sup>These officers thought that a strong executive was necessary and that de Gaulle would support their position on "Algerie Francaise."

<sup>11</sup>It is not clear who worked out the draft Constitution, but it is generally accepted that de Gaulle played a dominant role.

elected by Parliament but, according to Article 6 of the new Constitution was to be elected by an electoral college (in 1962 de Gaulle submitted to referendum a constitutional amendment to provide for direct election of the President and it passed). In this way the President is no longer dependent upon the Parliament. Article 11 gives the President the power to submit legislation to the electorate in referendum and either bypass or overrule the Parliament. This seems to be a very powerful tool in the hands of a national executive, especially one as forceful as Charles de Gaulle. Perhaps the threat of referendum is even more useful than the referendum itself. During the Fourth Republic the power of dissolution rested with the Premier and was seriously limited. Article 12 of the 1958 Constitution gives the President power to dissolve Parliament at any time "after consultation with the Premier and the Presidents of the Assemblies." Needless to say, "consultation" does not constitute a check or an effective legal restraint. Perhaps the most striking article of the new Constitution is Article 16:

When the institutions of the Republic, the independence of the nation, the integrity of its territory or the fulfillment of its international commitments are threatened in a grave and immediate manner and when the regular functioning of the constitutional authorities is interrupted, the President of the Republic shall take such measures commanded by these circumstances, after official consultation with the Premier, the Presidents of the Assemblies and the Constitutional Council.

Although this type of power was not new in France in an informal sense, it is significant to see that it was specifically included in the Constitution. This shows that de Gaulle considered it important enough in the scheme of executive powers to insist on it and that the electorate was willing to accept it. It should be obvious that the President himself defines a "grave and immediate threat" and that

there is no constitutional check on his decision at that time. From a constitutional standpoint the President of the French Republic is probably one of the western world's strongest executives.

The Constitution of the Fifth Republic does not contain a section dealing with the Premier, as did that of the Fourth Republic. Title III, which contains Articles 20-23, deals with the "Government" and Article 21 gives a bare outline of the Premier and says simply that he shall direct operations of the Government, be responsible for national defense, insure the execution of the laws and have powers of an appointive and administrative nature.

In absolute terms the Premier seems to have the same degree of power which he held during the Fourth Republic. The difference is in the relative sense--the powers of the President have been greatly expanded and the Premier under de Gaulle has been an administrative figure.

Title V concerns relations between the Parliament and the Government and insures Government supremacy. Article 38, for example, gives the Cabinet the power to pass binding ordinances. This power is limited by the fact that the ordinance must be submitted in the form of proposed legislation but it is binding in the interim. Conceivably, in times of parliamentary division, the Cabinet could govern by ordinance because of control of the legislative agenda and the threat of referendum or dissolution. Article 41 gives the Government the power to veto legislation. If the Legislature objects, the Government can sustain the veto with the consent of the Constitutional Council (another innovation of de Gaulle and whose membership favors the

Government).<sup>12</sup> Article 44 gives the Government the power to prevent amendments from the floor and a great deal of power in controlling the legislative routine. It is obvious that the relationship between the Government and the Parliament has changed drastically from the Fourth Republic to the Fifth and that the executive is no longer totally dependent on the National Assembly.

The Election Law of 1958 divided France into single-member election districts with a second ballot necessary if no candidate receives a majority on the first ballot. This law obviously favors a nation-wide party headed by a popular candidate and probably has done much to provide France with the parliamentary majority which was lacking during the Fourth Republic.

During the Fourth Republic the President was a ceremonial figure chosen by the Parliament. He had no power base and was a compromise candidate who was relatively inoffensive. This was a reflection of old French fears of strong executives and of the belief in parliamentary supremacy. The Premier was also dominated by the National Assembly and was made ineffective by the severe fragmentation of political parties and representation in the Assembly. The Premier's impotence was made worse by constitutional limitations on his power of dissolution and his relationship with the Assembly.

The President during the Fifth Republic is universally elected and is thus freed from the Parliament. His wide constitutional powers include a quasi-veto power, the referendum, the power of dissolution,

---

<sup>12</sup>The Council consists of nine members plus all former Presidents. Three each are appointed by the President of the Republic, the President of the National Assembly and the President of the Senate. Most observers assume that de Gaulle has a safe majority on the Council.

and the power to rule by ordinance in "time of emergency." The Government (under the President's direction) now controls the parliamentary agenda, can pass binding ordinances and can lose confidence only by an absolute majority vote. It is quite obvious that the Government now holds the balance of governmental power in France.

If any one change has been the most important in bringing stability it is the change in election laws. The adoption of the single-member district system has forced parties to choose between the two strongest candidates. In most cases the choice has been between a Gaullist and a far left candidate and the Gaullist party has been able to enjoy a working majority in the National Assembly.

These constitutional changes seem to have done a great deal in correcting the defects of multi-party parliamentary instability.

## CHAPTER IV

### THE ECONOMIC SYSTEM

#### Economic Production

#### Economic Production and Governmental Stability

The hypothesis that governmental stability is directly related to economic production strength has been the object of considerable attention during the twentieth century. Max Weber believed that democracy and stable government could occur only under industrial capitalism.<sup>1</sup> Apparently, many economists and government leaders have accepted Weber's opinion. More recently, Seymour Lipset discussed the concept that stable democracies could exist only in economically advanced areas.<sup>2</sup> Although Lipset is somewhat inclined to ideology, his discussion of stability and national wealth is interesting.<sup>3</sup>

This chapter takes a closer look at this hypothesis to see whether it presents any help in explaining why there has been a greater degree of stability in France during the 1958-1968 period than in the 1946-1958 period. If we find a marked increase in the wealth (productive capacity) in France, then we can proceed to explore the relationship.

---

<sup>1</sup>Max Weber, "Zur Lage der Burgerlichen Demokratie in Russland," quoted in Lipset, p. 46.

<sup>2</sup>Lipset, pp. 45-75.

<sup>3</sup>Ibid., pp. 51-54.

Economic strength is based on the gross national product (GNP) and we shall measure the differences between the GNP's in the two periods. For better comparison, differences are adjusted for population increase. If any significant increase is found we will investigate the effects on governmental stability. (GNP figures are also adjusted for price changes).

#### Fourth Republic

During the years of the Fourth Republic the GNP grew by an annual average of 4.93 percent (Table XII, page 48). The population grew by an annual average of 0.8 percent (Table X, page 46 ) and the per capita GNP increased by 4.13 percent (Table XIV, page 50). It must be pointed out that the GNP in 1948 was fairly small, thus the base for growth was good. However, the growth rate continued at a uniformly high rate.

#### Fifth Republic

During the Fifth Republic the GNP has shown an annual average increase of 4.4 percent (Table XIII, page 49). The average annual population increase has been 1.2 percent (Table XI, page 47) and the per capita average annual increase in GNP has been 3.2 percent (Table XIV). Thus we find that there was a decrease in GNP per capita growth rate between the two periods and that there has been no significant change in the economic production of the country. The different degrees of governmental stability cannot be explained by an increase in economic production and we must turn elsewhere for the answer.



## Levels of Consumption

### Consumption and Governmental Stability

The problem of measuring consumption is one that has long interested, and plagued, economists.<sup>4</sup> Consumption is the question of factor allocation and the most common determinant is income.<sup>5</sup> Perhaps no other factor is receiving more widespread government attention at the present time than is income distribution,<sup>6</sup> and when national economies are compared, income distribution is always a prominent part of the comparison.<sup>7</sup> The reasons for the study of income distribution are many, but the one that concerns us here is the long supposed direct relationship between income equality and governmental stability. Robert Dahl and Charles Lindbloom discussed this relationship in Politics, Economics and Welfare in 1953 saying that "income inequality threatens political stability,"<sup>8</sup> and that "This is one of the most serious aspects of political instability in France and Italy."<sup>9</sup> The problem in

---

<sup>4</sup>For examples see: Joseph A. Schumpeter, History of Economic Analysis (New York, 1954), pp. 59-60, 108-122, 123-194, 266-275, 452-462, 588-687, 939-944, 1170-1184.

<sup>5</sup>For a brief discussion see: Paul A. Samuelson, Economics (New York, 1961), pp. 111-129.

<sup>6</sup>For a group of articles see: Wulfram D. Grampp and Emanuel T. Weiler, eds., Economic Policy (Homewood, 1961), pp. 175-258.

<sup>7</sup>For comparative examples see: George N. Halm, Economic Systems (New York, 1960), pp. 50-53, 124, 203-206; William N. Laucks, Comparative Economic Systems (New York, 1961), pp. 57-60; James R. Eliot, Economic Systems and Resource Allocation (Dubuque, 1963).

<sup>8</sup>Robert Dahl and Charles Lindbloom, Politics, Economics, and Welfare (New York, 1953), p. 139.

<sup>9</sup>*Ibid.*

Italy was discussed at some length by Clifford A. L. Rich in 1952 in the Journal of Politics,<sup>10</sup> and many writers, commenting on France, have discussed inequality of income distribution and governmental instability as a cause-effect relationship.<sup>11</sup>

This part of Chapter IV compares the increase in per capita GNP (increase in wealth) and compares it to the increase in real wages (income), to arrive at the rate of change in income distribution. This rate is computed for the Fourth and Fifth Republics and the two are compared. If there has been a significant increase in income distribution during the Fifth Republic the relationship between distribution and stability will be explored further.

#### Fourth Republic

As shown in Table XIV, the real per capita increase in GNP during the Fourth Republic was an annual average of 4.13 percent. During the same time the real wage increased by an annual average of 3.52 percent (Table XV, page 51). This means that the relationship between the two was (minus) -0.61 percent. In simple terms, the real wage lagged behind the GNP and income distribution grew slightly less equal.

---

<sup>10</sup> Clifford A. L. Rich, "The Permanent Crisis of Italian Democracy," Journal of Politics, XIV (1952), pp. 659-682.

<sup>11</sup> See: Dahl and Lindbloom p. 139; Schoenbrun, pp. 176-178, 180-183; Luthy, pp. 178-179, 299-300, 313-314; Warran C. Baum, The French Economy and the State (Princeton, 1958); Pierre Bauchet, Economic Planning--The French Experience (New York, 1964).

Fifth Republic

The real per capita increase in GNP during the Fifth Republic was an annual average of 3.2 percent (Table XIV). During the same period the real wage increased by an annual average of 2.03 percent (Table XVI, page 52 ) for a (minus) -0.99 percent relationship. This means that the relationship between GNP and wages was actually more favorable during the Fourth Republic. In other words, it seems that the degree of income equality did not increase during the Fifth Republic and that this variable as such presents no explanation to the increase in governmental stability.

In summary, the third hypothesis appears invalid. There may indeed be a direct relationship between economic production and consumption and governmental stability. However, in the case of the Fifth Republic, no increases in production or consumption were discovered and therefore we must rule it out as a factor in explaining the increase in governmental stability in France.

TABLE X  
POPULATION DURING YEARS OF FOURTH REPUBLIC

| Year | Population |
|------|------------|
| 1947 | 40,644,000 |
| 1948 | 41,044,000 |
| 1949 | 41,400,000 |
| 1950 | 41,736,000 |
| 1951 | 42,056,000 |
| 1952 | 42,360,000 |
| 1953 | 42,652,000 |
| 1954 | 43,057,000 |
| 1955 | 43,428,000 |
| 1956 | 43,843,000 |
| 1957 | 44,311,000 |
| 1958 | 44,789,000 |

Average Increase: 0.8%

SOURCE: United Nations Demographic Yearbook,  
1966, p. 128.

TABLE XI  
POPULATION DURING YEARS OF FIFTH REPUBLIC

| Year                   | Population |
|------------------------|------------|
| 1958                   | 44,789,000 |
| 1959                   | 45,240,000 |
| 1960                   | 45,684,000 |
| 1961                   | 46,163,000 |
| 1962                   | 46,998,000 |
| 1963                   | 47,854,000 |
| 1964                   | 48,411,000 |
| 1965                   | 48,919,000 |
| 1966                   | 49,440,000 |
| Average Increase: 1.2% |            |

SOURCE: Ibid.

TABLE XII  
PERCENTAGE CHANGE IN GNP DURING YEARS OF FOURTH REPUBLIC

| Year                  | % Change |
|-----------------------|----------|
| 1947                  | n.a.*    |
| 1948                  | n.a.     |
| 1949                  | 6        |
| 1950                  | 4        |
| 1951                  | 5        |
| 1952                  | 5        |
| 1953                  | 6        |
| 1954                  | 5        |
| 1955                  | 5.3      |
| 1956                  | 5.3      |
| 1957                  | 6.1      |
| 1958                  | 2.1      |
| Average Change: 4.93% |          |

SOURCE: United Nations World Economic Survey, 1949-1958.

\* Not available.

TABLE XIII  
PERCENTAGE CHANGE IN GNP DURING YEARS OF FIFTH REPUBLIC

| Year                 | % Change |
|----------------------|----------|
| 1958                 | 2.1      |
| 1959                 | 2        |
| 1960                 | 6        |
| 1961                 | 4        |
| 1962                 | 7        |
| 1963                 | 5        |
| 1964                 | 5        |
| 1965                 | 3        |
| 1966                 | 5.5      |
| Average Change: 4.4% |          |

SOURCE: United Nations World Economic Survey, 1958-1966.

TABLE XIV

PERCENTAGE INCREASE IN GNP MINUS PERCENTAGE INCREASE IN POPULATION

| Variable                               | Fourth Republic | Fifth Republic |
|--|-----------------|----------------|
| Percentage Increase<br>in GNP          | 4.93            | 4.4            |
| Percentage Increase<br>in Population   | .8              | 1.2            |
| Adjusted Percentage<br>Increase in GNP | 4.13            | 3.2            |



TABLE XV  
PERCENTAGE CHANGE IN REAL WAGES DURING YEARS OF FOURTH REPUBLIC

| Year           | % Change |
|----------------|----------|
| 1947           | n.a.*    |
| 1948           | n.a.     |
| 1949           | 0        |
| 1950           | -5       |
| 1951           | 9        |
| 1952           | n.a.     |
| 1953           | 3.5      |
| 1954           | 6.5      |
| 1955           | 7        |
| 1956           | 5.5      |
| 1957           | 5.7      |
| 1958           | -0.5     |
| Average: 3.52% |          |

SOURCE: United Nations World Economic Survey, 1949-1958.

\* Not available.

TABLE XVI  
PERCENTAGE CHANGE IN REAL WAGES DURING YEARS OF FIFTH REPUBLIC

| Year          | % Change |
|---------------|----------|
| 1958          | -0.5     |
| 1959          | 1        |
| 1960          | 3        |
| 1961          | -1       |
| 1962          | 3.3      |
| 1963          | 3.4      |
| 1964          | 3.3      |
| 1965          | 3.7      |
| 1966          | n.a.*    |
| Average: 2.03 |          |

SOURCE: United Nations World Economic Survey, 1958-1966.

\* Not available.

## CHAPTER V

### SOCIAL MOBILITY

Social mobility, or the relative lack of mobility, has been a burning issue in this century, and almost every political commentator since Marx has discussed the issues related to mobility. Perhaps there is a built-in conflict between the need for an elite and the need for mobility,<sup>1</sup> perhaps technology has increased the desire for mobility,<sup>2</sup> or mobility is a part of the modernization process.<sup>3</sup> Whatever the reasons, mobility has assumed a place of importance in the study of political systems and their functioning and cannot be overlooked.

This chapter takes up the fourth hypothesis concerning the relationship between social mobility and governmental stability. If the investigation of social mobility during the Fourth and Fifth Republics shows an increase in mobility, the relationship between that increase and the increase in governmental stability will be explored.

One way of analyzing social mobility in a particular political

---

<sup>1</sup> Seymour Lipset and Hans Zetterberg, "A Theory of Social Mobility," Class, Status and Power, Reinhard Bendix and Seymour Lipset, eds., (New York, 1966), p. 570.

<sup>2</sup> As popular acceptance of the "rising expectation" concept would suggest.

<sup>3</sup> As implied by Karl Deutsch, "Social Mobilization and Political Development," American Political Science Review, LV (September, 1961), pp. 493-514.

system is by studying its educational process.<sup>4</sup> The degree of education that an individual possesses is directly related to status,<sup>5</sup> and a system's pattern in providing education can be a useful tool in measuring mobility.<sup>6</sup> Needless to say, this is not a definitive study of the French system of education.<sup>7</sup> It is rather an attempt to draw information from the educational system that will be of some value in measuring the degree of change in social mobility between the 1946-1958 and 1958-1968 periods. Table XVII, page 57 shows the number of students enrolled at each level during the years of the Fourth Republic and Table XVIII, page 58 shows the same figures for the years of the Fifth Republic.

The two tables show that there was fairly even growth in the number of elementary school students, somewhat more rapid growth in secondary school students during the Fifth Republic, and a great deal higher growth rate of university students during the Fifth Republic. Table XIX, page 59 gives the annual average percentage change in students, adjusted for change in population, for each of the two periods. Universal elementary school attendance was achieved under the Third Republic, so the percentage increase during the Fifth Republic reflects

---

<sup>4</sup>For an interesting example see: Ralph H. Turner, "Modes of Social Ascent Through Education," Class, Status, and Power.

<sup>5</sup>Seymour Lipset and Reinhard Bendix, Social Mobility in Industrial Societies (Berkeley, 1959), pp. 35-36, 59-60.

<sup>6</sup>For a discussion see: Bernard Barber, Social Stratification (New York, 1957), pp. 390-421.

<sup>7</sup>For discussions of the French educational system see: Beatrice Hyslop, France: A Study of French Education (New York, 1964); Anthony Kerr, Schools of Europe (London, 1960), pp. 143-156; Encyclopedie Pratique de L'Education En France, Ministere de L'Education Nationale (Paris, 1960).

demographic increase. However, the annual average growth rate for secondary school students has more than doubled, while that for college students has increased by 1000 percent. These figures show that higher education has become possible for an ever increasing number of Frenchmen and that the increase seemed too large to be considered a result of increased enrollment among the upper classes. This indicates a somewhat higher rate of mobility, but is not conclusive evidence.

The data contained in part two of Chapter IV indicates a lack of increase in income distribution, which would seem to indicate a lack of social mobility. At this point we find that two important indicators of social mobility, change in income and education, seem to be in conflict. It is not possible to say that one is valid and the other is not, or that one is significant and the other is not.

There are of course other factors which can be used as indicators of social mobility. Class origin of government and party leaders is one of these factors. It is difficult to obtain data on this factor, but what is available suggests no significant changes.<sup>8</sup>

Perhaps another indication of this lack of increase in mobility is the apparent lack of change in the party platforms of the far left parties and their strength (this is especially true of the PCF).<sup>9</sup>

Other variables which seem to suggest a lack of mobility increase are the absence of change in persons per physician or inhabitants per

---

<sup>8</sup> Cabinet members and party leaders are listed in Political Handbook of the World and the backgrounds of the best known can be found in common reference books. This method is by no means satisfactory but proper information could probably be obtained only in Paris.

<sup>9</sup> Francois Fejto, The French Communist Party (Cambridge, 1967), p. 207.

dwelling room.<sup>10</sup> Other variables which seem to suggest a slight increase in mobility, but which are difficult to quantify because of data shortage, are a decrease in the number of persons employed in agriculture and the increase in the number of persons in "white collar" positions.<sup>11</sup>

The situation was perhaps summed up by Laurence Wylie, who wrote in 1963 that while there has been a blurring of class lines<sup>12</sup> the clear division still exists<sup>13</sup> and that these distinctions seem to be self-perpetuating.<sup>14</sup> One gains the impression from Mr. Wylie's analysis that social mobility apparently is increasing in France, yet in truth it is not. This seems to be the common opinion of students of French politics. This is, at best, confusing and academically frustrating.

However, it seems that the fourth hypothesis can be neither proved nor disproved and there is no apparent answer without lengthy and expensive field study. It seems unlikely, however, that there has been an increase in the social mobility rate.

---

<sup>10</sup> United Nations Statistical Yearbook, 1960-1966.

<sup>11</sup> Economic Survey of Europe: 1961, p. 111.

<sup>12</sup> Laurence Wylie, "Social Change at Grass Roots," In Search of France, ed., Stanley Hoffmann (Cambridge, 1963), p. 184.

<sup>13</sup> Ibid., pp. 184-189.

<sup>14</sup> Ibid., pp. 202-234.

TABLE XVII  
NUMBER OF STUDENTS DURING YEARS OF FOURTH REPUBLIC

| Year  | Elementary<br>(Thousands) | Secondary<br>(Thousands) | University<br>(Thousands) |
|-------|---------------------------|--------------------------|---------------------------|
| 1946* |                           |                          |                           |
| 1947* |                           |                          |                           |
| 1948  | 4,478                     | 891                      | 147                       |
| 1949* |                           |                          |                           |
| 1950  | 5,232                     | 794                      | 138                       |
| 1951  | 4,758                     | 857                      | 153                       |
| 1952* |                           |                          |                           |
| 1953  | 4,658                     | 948                      | 146                       |
| 1954  | 4,921                     | 1,001                    | 150                       |
| 1955* |                           |                          |                           |
| 1956  | 5,422                     | 1,157                    | 160                       |
| 1957  | 5,579                     | 1,266                    | 176                       |
| 1958  | 5,351                     | 1,335                    | 186                       |

SOURCE: United Nations Statistical Yearbook, 1948-1958.

\* Not available.

TABLE XVIII

## NUMBER OF STUDENTS DURING YEARS OF FIFTH REPUBLIC

| Year  | Elementary<br>(Thousands) | Secondary<br>(Thousands) | University<br>(Thousands) |
|-------|---------------------------|--------------------------|---------------------------|
| 1958  | 5,351                     | 1,335                    | 186                       |
| 1959  | 5,900                     | 1,493                    | 229                       |
| 1960* |                           |                          |                           |
| 1961  | 5,777                     | 1,881                    | 283                       |
| 1962  | 5,900                     | 2,200                    | 369                       |
| 1963  | 5,568                     | 2,318                    | 410                       |
| 1964  | 5,600                     | 2,300                    | 455                       |
| 1965* |                           |                          |                           |
| 1966* |                           |                          |                           |
| 1967* |                           |                          |                           |
| 1968* |                           |                          |                           |

SOURCE: United Nations Statistical Yearbook, 1958-1966.

\*

Not available.



TABLE XIX

ANNUAL AVERAGE PERCENTAGE CHANGE IN STUDENTS  
(ADJUSTED FOR CHANGE IN POPULATION)

| Educational Level | Fourth Republic | Fifth Republic |
|-------------------|-----------------|----------------|
| Elementary        | 1.53%           | -.55%          |
| Secondary         | 4.56%           | 10.72%         |
| University        | 2.43%           | 22.68%         |

## CHAPTER VI

### CONCLUSIONS

After reviewing the political life of the Fourth Republic it is quite obvious that a high degree of governmental instability existed. Between 1946 and 1958 there were 21 Premiers, an annual average of 14 Cabinet changes, and an annual average of 158 changes in the National Assembly. It is just as obvious that governmental instability has been much lower during the Fifth Republic. Between 1958 and 1968 there were only two Premiers, an annual average of five Cabinet changes, and an annual average of 67 changes in the National Assembly.

The most basic explanation of the pattern of instability is found in French political culture. The strong sense of individuality and the unwillingness to compromise found in the "average Frenchman" seem related to the cultural heritage, educational values, regional differences, religious differences and wide differences in socio-economic groupings. The many economic classes (peasants, agricultural workers, workers, old middle class, new middle class and upper class) are severely split and mutually antagonistic. These divisions have resulted in a multi-party system of great instability.

The different degrees of governmental stability during the two periods can be partially explained by changes in the constitutional structure. The election laws were changed to establish single-member districts with majority voting rather than proportional representation.

These changes have forced the voters in most districts to make a choice between the Gaullist candidate and his strongest opponent, often a Communist. In effect, the voters are falling back into one of the two main French ideological groupings: revolutionary or reactionary. This has helped bring about a bipolarization of delegates in the National Assembly and has created a working majority in that body. The fact that there is now a nationally elected executive also seems to promote the tendency towards political bipolarization and a stable parliamentary majority. Another area of change is that of Government-Parliament relations. The Cabinet now has a great deal of power in the legislative process: regulating the agenda; prohibiting amendment or debate, passing binding ordinances, and legislating through delegation. The Premier and his Cabinet are no longer pawns of the Assembly, but holders of governmental power. It should also be noted that a censure motion now requires an absolute majority and is much less likely than during the Fourth Republic (there has been only one censure motion adopted in the last ten years). Perhaps the most striking constitutional changes are related to the executive. The President is able to bypass the Parliament through referendum, ask the Constitutional Council to overrule Parliament, dissolve Parliament more freely and govern by ordinance in exceptional circumstances. These changes seem to have played a great part in Fifth Republic stability.

Another possible explanation of the increase in stability would be an increase in economic production and distribution. However, there has not been an increased rate of growth in GNP or in real wages, and this variable must be ruled out.

Still another possible explanation for the increase in stability would be an increase in social mobility, but the data available is not conclusive. The increase in university enrollment, the increase in "white collar" positions, and the decrease in agricultural employment seem to suggest such an increase in occupational mobility. However, the lack of increase in real wages and the lack of increase in consumption suggest otherwise. A lack of increase in social mobility is further indicated by the continued strength of the Communist party and the social unrest of 1966-1968. Although data cannot be obtained to either prove or disprove an increase in social mobility, such an increase seems doubtful.

The only substantive differences that can be found between the Fourth and Fifth Republic periods are those of a constitutional nature. It seems that these changes, added to the popularity of Charles de Gaulle and the relief from external problems, explain the level of stability of the Government of the Fifth Republic.

Those who contend that stability in France is the result of significant economic or social changes seem to be in error and those who cite de Gaulle's charisma seem to overlook the political effects of the far reaching constitutional changes. Here, quite naturally, the question of prediction arises. After de Gaulle it is probable that the two basic ideological groups into which the French nation has been divided for nearly two centuries, namely, a socially conservative bloc identified with authoritarian and paternalistic institutions and dedicated to the maximum retention of traditional values, and a reformist bloc espousing representative-parliamentary institutions and advocating goals of social equality, may spur the process of political bipolarization

into a two-party system.

#### A SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Almond, Gabriel. "Comparative Political Systems." Journal of Politics, XVIII (August, 1956), 391-409.
- \_\_\_\_\_. "A Developmental Approach to Political Systems." World Politics, XVIII (1965), 183-214.
- \_\_\_\_\_ and James Coleman. The Politics of Developing Areas. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1960.
- \_\_\_\_\_, Taylor Cole and Roy Macridis. "A Suggested Research Strategy in Western European Government and Politics." American Political Science Review, XLIX (December, 1955), 1042-1049.
- \_\_\_\_\_ and G. Bingham Powell. Comparative Politics. Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1966.
- \_\_\_\_\_ and Sidney Verba. The Civic Culture. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963.
- Apter, David. "A Comparative Method for the Study of Politics." American Journal of Sociology, LXIV (November, 1958), 221-237.
- \_\_\_\_\_. Politics of Modernization. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1965.
- Aristotle. Politics. Tr. F. Jowett. New York: Walter J. Black, 1942.
- Aron, Raymond. France: Steadfast and Changing. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1960.
- Banks, Arthur and Robert Texter. A Cross-Polity Survey. Cambridge: MIT Press, 1963.
- Barber, Bernard. Social Stratification. New York: Harcourt-Brace, 1957.
- \_\_\_\_\_ and Elinor Barber. European Social Classes: Stability and Change. New York: Macmillan, 1965.
- Baron, Paul A. The Political Economy of Growth. New York: Monthly Review Press, 1957.
- Barriere, Pierre. La Vie Intellectuelle En France. Paris: Albin Michel, 1961.

- Barron, Richard William. Parties and Politics in Modern France. Washington: Public Affairs Press, 1959.
- Bauchet, Pierre. Economic Planning, The French Experience. New York: Praeger, 1964.
- Baum, Warren. The French Economy and the State. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1958.
- Beer, Samuel, et al. Patterns of Government, 2nd ed. New York: Random House, 1965.
- Bendix, Reinhart and Seymour Lipset, Eds. Class, Status and Power. New York: Free Press, 1966.
- Blanc, Emmanuel. Les Institutions Francaises. Paris: Editions de Minuit, 1959.
- Brogan, D. W. and Douglas Verney. Political Patterns in Today's World. New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1963.
- Chapsal, Jacques. La Vie Politique Et Les Partis En France. Paris: Cours de Droit, 1961.
- Charvet, Patrick. France. New York: Praeger, 1955.
- Chatelain, Jean. La Nouvelle Constitution De La France. Paris: Berger-Levrault, 1959.
- Cole, Taylor. European Political Systems, 2nd ed. New York: Knopf, 1959.
- Dahl, Robert and Charles Lindbloom. Politics, Economics and Welfare. New York: Harper, 1953.
- Davey, Elizabeth. France in Crisis. New York: Wilson, 1957.
- De Tarr, Francis. The French Radical Party. London: Oxford University Press, 1961.
- Deutsch, Karl. "Social Mobilization and Political Development." American Political Science Review, LV (September, 1961), 493-514.
- Dragnich, Alex. Major European Governments. Homewood: Dorsey Press, 1966.
- Duverger, Maurice. Constitutions Et Documents Politiques. Paris: Presses Universitaires De France, 1957.
- \_\_\_\_\_. The French Political System, Tr. Robert Ward. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1958.
- Easton, David. The Political System. New York: Knopf, 1953.

- Eckstein, Harry and David Apter, Eds. Comparative Politics. London: Free Press, 1963.
- Economic Survey of Europe. Geneva: United Nations.
- Einaudi, Mario and Francois Goguel. Christian Democracy in Italy and France. Notre Dame: Notre Dame University Press, 1952.
- Elliot, James. Economic Systems and Resource Allocation. Dubuque: William C. Brown, 1963.
- Encyclopedie Pratique de L'Education En France. Paris: Ministere de l'Education Nationale, 1960.
- Fauvet, Jacques. The Cockpit of France. London: Harvill, 1960.
- Fejto, Francois. The French Communist Party. Cambridge: MIT Press, 1967.
- Finer, Herman. Governments of Greater European Powers. New York: Henry Holt, 1956.
- Finkle, Jason and Richard Gable. Political Development and Social Change. New York: Henry Holt, 1966.
- Friedrich, Carl. Constitutional Government and Democracy. Boston: Ginn, 1950.
- Furniss, Edgar. France—Troubled Ally. New York: Harper, 1960.
- Galbraith, John. Economic Development. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1964.
- Godfrey, Edwin. The Government of France. New York: Crowell, 1963.
- Goguel, Francois. France Under the Fourth Republic. Ithica: Cornell University Press, 1952.
- Grampp, William and Emmanuel Water. Economic Policy. Homewood: Irwin, 1961.
- Hackett, John. Economic Planning in France. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1952.
- Halm, George. Economic Systems. New York: Holt, Rhinehart, Winston, 1960.
- Hatch, Alan. The De Gaulle Nobody Knows. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1965.
- Hermens, Ferdinand. The Fifth Republic. Notre Dame: Notre Dame University Press, 1960.



- Hoffmann, Stanley. "Succession and Stability in France." Journal of International Affairs, XVIII (November, 1964), 86-103.
- \_\_\_\_\_. "The French Constitution of 1958." American Political Science Review, LIII (June, 1959), 332-357.
- \_\_\_\_\_, et al. In Search of France. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1963.
- Huntington, Samuel. "Political Modernization: America vs. Europe." World Politics, XVIII (1966), 378-414.
- \_\_\_\_\_. "Political Development and Political Decay." World Politics, XVII (1965), 386-430.
- Hyslop, Beatrice. France: A Study of French Education. New York: World Education, 1964.
- Kerr, Anthony. Schools of Europe. London: Bowles and Bowles, 1960.
- Kindleberger, Charles. Economic Development. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1958.
- Laponce, J. A. The Government of the Fifth Republic. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1961.
- Leites, Nathan. On the Game of Politics in France. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1959.
- Lerner, Daniel. The Passing of Traditional Society. Glencoe: Free Press, 1958.
- Les Institutions Politiques En France. Paris: La Documentation Francaise, 1961.
- Lipset, Seymour. Political Man. Garden City: Doubleday, 1960.
- \_\_\_\_\_. Social Mobilization in Industrial Societies. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1959.
- Loucks, William. Comparative Economic Systems. New York: Harper and Row, 1961.
- Luthy, Herbert. France Against Herself. New York: Praeger, 1955.
- Machiavelli, Niccolo. The Prince. Tr. Luigi Ricco. Walter J. Black, 1940.
- Macrae, Duncan. Parliament, Parties and Society in France. New York: St. Martins Press, 1967.
- Macridis, Roy and Bernard Brown. The De Gaulle Republic. Homewood: Dorsey, 1960.

Macridis, Roy and Bernard Brown, Eds. Comparative Politics, Rev. ed. Homewood: Dorsey, 1964.

\_\_\_\_\_ and Richard Cox. "Research in Comparative Politics." American Political Science Review, XLXII (September, 1953), 641-675.

Merritt, Richard and Stein Rokkan. Comparing Nations. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966.

Moore, Richard. Modern Constitutions. Ames: Littlefield, Adams and Co., 1957.

Nordlinger, Eric. "Democratic Stability and Instability." World Politics, XVIII (October, 1965), 127-157.

Padover, Saul. French Institutions: Values and Politics. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1954.

Papandrea, A. G. The Political Element in Economic Development. Stockholm: Almquist and Wippsell, 1966.

Parsons, Talcott and Edward Shils, Eds. Toward a General Theory of Action. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1951.

Pennock, J. R. and David Smith. Political Science. New York: Macmillan, 1964.

Political Handbook of the World. New York: Harper.

Pye, Lucian. Aspects of Political Development. Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1966.

\_\_\_\_\_ and Sidney Verba. Political Culture and Political Development. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965.

Revel, Jean. The French, Tr. Paula Sparlin. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1958.

Rich, Clifford et al. European Politics and Government. New York: Ronald Press, 1962.

\_\_\_\_\_. "The Permanent Crisis of Italian Democracy." Journal of Politics, XIV (1952), pp. 659-682.

Rienow, Robert. Introduction to Government. New York: Knopf, 1964.

Russett, Bruce. World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1964.

Samuelson, Paul. Economics, 4th ed. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1958.

Schoenbrun, David. As France Goes. New York: Harper, 1957.

Schumpeter, Joseph. History of Economic Analysis. New York: Oxford University Press, 1954.

Shannon, Lyle. Underdeveloped Areas. New York: Harper and Row, 1957.

Shils, Edward. Political Development in New States. S'Gravenhage: Mouton, 1962.

Siegfried, Andre. "Stable Instability in France." Foreign Affairs, XXXIV (1956), 394-404.

Spiro, Herbert. Government by Constitution. New York: Random House, 1959.

Statesman's Yearbook. New York: Martin's Press.

Thompson, David. Democracy in France. London: Oxford University Press, 1964.

United Nations Demographic Yearbook. New York: United Nations.

United Nations Statistical Yearbook. New York: United Nations.

United Nations World Economic Survey. New York: United Nations.

Wahl, Nickolas. The Fifth Republic. New York: Random House, 1962.

Weber, Max. The Theory of Social and Economic Organization, Tr. Talcott Parsons. New York: Oxford University Press, 1947.

\_\_\_\_\_. The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, Tr. Talcott Parsons. New York: Scribner, 1958.

Werth, Alexander. De Gaulle. New York: Hawthorne, 1960.

Williams, Phillip. Politics in Post War France. London: Taggmans, 1955.

Zurcher, Arnold, Ed. Constitutions and Constitutional Trends Since World War II. New York: New York University Press, 1955.

## APPENDIX A

### FRENCH POLITICAL PARTIES

PCF -- Parti Communiste Francais  
PSA -- Parti Socialiste Autonome  
PSU -- Parti Socialiste Unifie  
SFIO -- Section Francaise de l'Internationale Ouvriere  
PRRRS -- Parti Republicain Radical et Radical Socialiste  
RGR -- Rassemblement des Gauches Republicaines  
UDSR -- Union Democratic et Socialiste de la Resistance  
ASR -- Action Socialiste Revolutionnaire  
UGS -- Union de la Gauche Socialiste  
MRP -- Mouvement Republicain Populaire  
CNIP -- Centre National des Independants et Paysans  
PRL -- Parti Republicain de la Liberte  
RPF -- Rassemblement du Peuple Francais  
CNRS -- Centre National des Republicains Sociaux  
UNR -- Union Pour la Nouvelle Republique  
UDCA -- Union des Commerçants et Artisans  
UFF -- Union et Fraternite Francaise

VITA

James Elmer Buck

Candidate for the Degree of  
Master of Arts

Thesis: GOVERNMENTAL STABILITY: A COMPARISON BETWEEN THE FOURTH AND  
FIFTH REPUBLICS IN FRANCE

Major Field: Political Science

Biographical:

Personal Data: Born in Beardstown, Illinois, September 20, 1940,  
the son of Mr. and Mrs. George A. Buck.

Education: Graduated from Bonham High School, Bonham, Texas, in  
June, 1958; received the Bachelor of Arts degree from Okla-  
homa State University in 1964, with a major in political  
science; attended University of Oklahoma in 1965-66; com-  
pleted requirements for the Master of Arts degree at Okla-  
homa State University in May, 1969.

Professional Experience: United States Army 1958-1961; graduate  
teaching assistant, University of Oklahoma, 1965-66;  
Management Intern, Department of Defense, 1966-67; Legisla-  
tive Aide to Senator George S. McGovern, 1967; graduate  
teaching assistant, Oklahoma State University, 1967-68.