

Richard Fenno, in Power of the Purse, contends that the budget process responds to interest group pressures. This study examines that hypothesis for 20 bureaus in the Department of Agriculture for the fiscal years 1971-1976. Cultivating clientele support both among interest groups and members of Congress appears to aid a bureau's budget position. Bureaus with strong support not only avoid budget cuts but grow rapidly from year to year.

BUREAUS, CLIENTS, AND CONGRESS

The Impact of Interest Group Support on Budgeting

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Since Truman's (1951) seminal work, *The Governmental Process*, interest groups have been central to the study of the American policy-making process. Almost every study of public policy ranging from studies of regulation to studies of health care refers to interest groups and their role in shaping public policy (Marmor, 1973; Kohlmeier, 1969; Thomas, 1975). Despite the emphasis on interest groups, there has been little comparative and empirical study of the relative impact that interest groups have in determining policy outputs.

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The inattention can be explained by two methodological problems. First, the events that concern policy analysts—the passage of medicare, cigarette health warnings, technological innovation in rail transportation, and the like—occur rarely; they are usually major struggles that are open to public scrutiny. Second, in these studies the goals of the interest groups are usually not comparable. One group may be attempting to prevent an issue from being placed on the agenda, another might try to force passage of a law, a third to restrict the scope of political conflict. When objectives differ greatly, assessing the impact of interest groups becomes extremely difficult.

One policy area with regular, reoccurring events and comparable goals is the budgetary process. Since budgets are an annual event and since the mechanisms of the budget reduce all goals into monetary terms, budgeting is an ideal area to assess the influence of interest groups. Also, the literature on budgeting offers some specific hypotheses concerning the impact of interest groups. Rourke (1976) notes that bureaus placed (as most are) in an uncertain political environment must attract interest group support to ensure their own survival. Fenno (1966) relates this need for political support directly to the budget process. Support among interest groups, according to Fenno, is directly translatable into positive action on bureau budgets. Members of Congress, to retain their position of influence in the budgetary process, must respond to interest groups because interest groups have political resources and information members of Congress need to perform adequately and remain in office.

Since Fenno's classic study of the appropriations process, two factors have changed suggesting that his findings should be reexamined. First, the amount of uncontrollable spending in the budget has grown substantially in the past decade (Derthick, 1975). Uncontrollable expenditures are expenditures that the government is committed to spend as a result of past obligations and contracts; such spending cannot

be controlled by the appropriations process in the short run. Uncontrollables have increased because substantive committees of Congress have committed funds through the authorization/legislation process. For example, by increasing social security payments Congress has committed resources far into the future—such spending is uncontrollable in the sense that the appropriations process cannot affect it. The increase in uncontrollable expenditures means that much of the discretionary power in the budgetary process has shifted from the appropriations committees to the substantive committees.

Second, the pattern of incremental decision-making has broken down as a result of increased inflation and a shortage of resources caused by the growth in uncontrollables. According to Gist (1976), the increase in federal revenues in the past ten years has not been able to cover the normally expected program growth. Funding all programs at the previous year's level with allowances for inflation totals a sum greater than the estimated federal revenue for most years. As a result, congressional scrutiny of agency budgets is increasingly concerned with both an agency's base as well as its requested increment. Funding disputes, therefore, have become more political and policy oriented. The presidential-congressional disputes over the B-1 bomber, the bombing of Cambodia, the Rural Environmental Assistance Program, pollution control grants, and the like have all been fought within the budget process.

In light of the changing circumstances, this paper will reassess the impact that interest groups have on the budget process at the federal level. First, a brief survey of the literature will reveal several important hypotheses about interest groups and their role in the budget process. Second, a series of new methods will be discussed for analyzing the impact that interest groups have on the budget. Third, using data from the 1971-1976 federal budgets, this paper will examine whether bureaus that are successful in attracting interest group support will also be successful in the budget process.

THE LITERATURE ON BUDGETING AND INTEREST GROUPS

In the literature on budgeting, the theoretical and empirical work has been separated to a surprising extent.¹ The two major works providing theoretical statements about the budgeting process do not provide more than intermittent empirical support for their arguments. Conversely, most empirical work on budgeting is limited in the nature of the variables employed, especially as far as inclusion of outside variables of a theoretically significant nature is concerned. These studies concentrate on variables that describe the process of budgeting itself and only consider influences from the political world in an ad hoc manner. The impact of interest groups has been completely ignored by this literature.

Wildavsky (1964), a leading authority on the politics of budgeting, argues that interest group support is a crucial factor for the success of a bureau in budgeting. Bureaus mobilize their clientele to testify before congressional committees so that they can provide feedback on bureau performance over the year. "When feedback is absent or limited, Congressmen tend to assume no one cares, and they need not bother with the appropriation" (Wildavsky, 1964: 68). An agency desiring positive treatment by Congress, therefore, attempts to persuade its clientele to actively support the bureau in the budget process.

Fenno's *The Power of the Purse* (1966), the other major work emphasizing the political aspects of budgeting, also stresses the impact of interest groups. Studying some 36 federal domestic bureaus over a time span of 16 years, Fenno found that bureaus with strong environmental support (which includes interest groups) were also the bureaus that had rapidly growing budgets. Bureaus with strong support among appropriations committee members, on the other hand, were able to avoid budget cuts and get a larger portion of the funds that they requested. Some agencies able to build both

clientele support and congressional support grew rapidly and avoided cuts in their request for funds. Fenno's findings are limited only by his failure to operationalize either environmental or congressional support; his hypotheses were validated by citing examples.

Empirical studies of budgeting, in general, are more narrow in range than Fenno's and Wildavsky's studies. They concentrate on variables internal to the budgeting process. Davis et al. (1966) basically demonstrated the incremental nature of budgeting using appropriations data. In a similar fashion Wanat (1974) extended their work by explicitly taking the agency's base and increment into account as separate variables. He showed that an agency's requested increment is separable into a mandatory increase necessary to maintain existing programs at their current level and a programmatic increase necessary to fund the expansion in an agency's programs. A number of other studies were direct applications of Fenno's work to agencies not treated by him (Fox, 1971; Knight, 1968; Thomas and Handberg, 1974) and of Davis et al.'s (1971) models to different agencies or different types of institutions (Hoole et al., 1976). None of these studies take variables other than those directly reflecting the process of budgeting into account.

Recently some empirical studies of budgeting have considered these so-called external variables. Davis et al. (1974) demonstrated the effects of partisan control of the presidency and Congress by including them into their model as dummy variables. Sharkansky (1968), in a study of budgeting in the states, related economic factors and gubernatorial power to the making of state budgets. Gist (1976) attempted to show that inflation and the increase in uncontrollable spending had changed the incremental nature of the budgetary process, necessitating agencies to defend their base rather than merely their requested increment.

This brief review of the literature reveals two things. First, environmental influences, especially interest group support,

are assumed to have a great deal of impact on budget outputs. Most descriptions of the budget process refer to the need to develop clientele support for a bureau. Second, no rigorous study, with replicable measures of interest group support, relating interest group support to budget outputs, has been undertaken. This paper hopes to remedy that shortcoming by providing both a measure of interest group support and relating that interest group support to budget outputs.

METHODS

1. *Dependent Variables.* The two dependent variables in this study, commonly used in all studies of budgeting, were developed by Fenno (1966). First, the *congressional growth rate* of a bureau is the percentage increase in an agency's budget over a number of years. By dividing this year's congressional appropriation by last year's congressional appropriation, the growth rate for one year is found. This study uses the average growth rate for the bureaus between FY 1971 and FY 1976.

The *congressional success rate* of a bureau relates the bureau's request for funds from Congress to the amount that Congress actually grants. The success rate is the agency's request of Congress (as approved by the Office of Management and Budget) divided into the actual congressional appropriation for that year. This study uses the average success rate for the bureaus between FY 1971 and FY 1976.

Fenno demonstrated that for his 36 bureaus, growth rates and success rate are independent of each other. In the bureaus used for this study (see below) high congressional growth rates are positively correlated with high congressional success rates.

The present variables differ slightly from those used by Fenno; since he was concerned with the actions of the appropriations committee, he used the figures of the appropriations

committee report rather than the final congressional budget figures. Using only the figures from the appropriations committee can be misleading. As Ferejohn (1974: 157), a perceptive student of budgetary politics, states:

For some agencies the [appropriations] committee's decisions are effectively final for both the House and the Senate. For other agencies the House goes along with committee recommendations but the Senate makes large changes. In the case of still other agencies, the House makes substantial changes through floor amendments after the appropriations committee has submitted its recommendations.

Ferejohn's study indicates that some bureaus (and some interest groups, for that matter) have influence in the appropriations committees, others on the floor of the House, others in Senate and House substantive committees, and others still on the Senate floor. If bureaus have support in various portions of Congress, then only the budget figures as they are finally passed by Congress can assure one that the figures reflect all possible influences of interest groups.

2. *Independent Variables.* Assessing the extent of clientele support for a bureau is a difficult task. Even in a process as well defined as the appropriations process, a bureau's clientele has a variety of points of access: the president, the OMB, the department budget office, appropriations subcommittees, and finally the floor of Congress. Unfortunately, the operations of clientele groups in most of these arenas are obscured from view. The only place where group support or opposition is visible in the process is during the nondepartmental testimony in the House and Senate appropriations subcommittees. Whether or not the groups appearing at the subcommittee hearings are representative of the bureau's clientele support is an empirical question. We believe, based on our knowledge of the process and the studies of others, that it is for two reasons. First, whether or not an agency has friends on sub-

committees or elsewhere in the process, the subcommittee hearings are perceived as an opportunity to demonstrate that the bureau has public support (Wildavsky, 1964: 67). Only an irrational bureau chief would rely on sub rosa contacts that were not supplemented by an impressive public record of group support. Second, an examination of the groups testifying for and against the Agricultural Research Service shows few major forces in agriculture missing—the large farm associations, commodity organizations, elements of agribusiness, state organizations, and local farmers are all present.²

The first variable gathered from subcommittee testimony is the *number of interest groups* testifying for a bureau. Using both the House and Senate appropriations subcommittees on agriculture, the number of interest groups was counted for the 1971 through 1976 fiscal years. The number of groups testifying ranged from a low of zero for the National Agricultural Library to 216 for the Agricultural Research Service.

According to Rourke (1976), mere quantity of clientele support is only partly relevant. The best type of clientele group for an agency to have is one that is intensely committed to the bureau. Strong supporters are more likely to go to greater lengths to support a bureau than lukewarm supporters. The *intensity of interest group support* measure was derived from a content analysis of the six years of appropriations hearings by reading all the testimony for all agricultural bureaus and coding the intensity of the support. Since this is the first attempt to determine the intensity of interest group support, the measure will be crude at best. Only as additional research is focused on this problem can this measure be adequately refined.

The coding of intensity of support is based on the assumption that support for a bureau in general is evidence of a stronger commitment by a group than support for a specific program. The transitory nature of many agricultural programs means that programmatic support for a bureau lasts only as

long as the program—anywhere from a few years to decades. General support for the bureau, although in all likelihood based on programmatic support, indicates a stronger commitment to the bureau. In line with this assumption, if a witness testified for the bureau only, the testimony was coded as a +3. Program support only was coded as +2. Both program and bureau support was coded as +5. If the witness favored the agency in general but opposed a single program, the testimony was coded as +1. Support for a program coupled with criticism of the agency was coded -1. Similar scores were created for opposition to the bureau/programs with negative scores assigned to such testimony.

The intensity of support variable is divided into two variables: first, a relatively simple variable, the percentage of witnesses that testified favorably. In most cases groups appear to compliment bureaus, not to criticize them. The average agency received positive support from 81% of the groups mentioning it. The second variable is the mean support score of all clientele testifying on the bureau, based on the above coding system. The average support score for the agriculture bureaus was 1.98.

Since Fenno's original study concerned the impact of congressional support as well as the impact of interest group support, a special variable was constructed out of congressional testimony similar to the interest group testimony. Measures were gathered for *number of congressional testifiers* (range 0 to 249, with mean 31) and the mean *congressional support score* (mean for all agencies was 1.63) for all the bureaus in this study.

Rourke indicates that some clientele characteristics make them more attractive as bureau supporters. Although this study cannot probe all the interesting hypotheses that Rourke presents about the effect of size, cohesion, prestige, and so on of a clientele, the effects of different types of witnesses were examined. Witnesses before congressional subcommittees on appropriations generally fall into four types:

members of Congress, mass membership associations, peak associations, and single petitioners. We can speculate that some of these witnesses are more important in the budget process than others. Members of Congress, because of the norms of reciprocity, are likely to be the most important for an agency (Rourke, 1976: 61). Next most influential should be the mass associations—support from mass membership associations demonstrates that the agency's outputs are used and appreciated by a large segment of the American population. Peak associations, i.e., associations of associations, are likely to be less influential because they represent fewer individuals. The Association of State Superintendents of Instruction represents some 50 individuals, and government institutions at that. We are not arguing that support from peak associations is qualitatively different from that of mass associations, only that mass associations can claim to represent a larger segment of the population than most peak associations can. Finally, single petitioners, the single individuals that request special congressional action on a project that affects them or their community, should be least influential. Single petitioners should be important only to the members of Congress representing the petitioner's district.

3. *The Unit of Analysis.* The unit of analysis for this study is 20 bureaus and agencies within the U.S. Department of Agriculture.³ These particular bureaus were selected because they met three characteristics. First, they comprise a limited set of bureaus making the task of gathering data on interest groups and appropriations manageable. The time necessary to gather data similar to the present data for all similar-sized bureaus in the federal government would be at least seven or eight times as long. Second, these agencies are involved primarily in distributive (Lowi, 1972) policy-making. Distributive policy is characterized by piecemeal, positive sum politics. The policy is easily divisible into small tasks, each of which can be granted without denying any of the others.

TABLE 1
Number of Interest Groups Testifying and Budget Outputs

<u>Number of Interest Groups</u>	<u>Congressional Growth Rate</u>	
	<u>Less than 8%</u>	<u>More than 8%</u>
0-30	6	3
31-216	4	7
	Phi .30	Gamma .56

<u>Number of Interest Groups</u>	<u>Congressional Success Rate</u>	
	<u>Less than 5.5%</u>	<u>More than 5.5%</u>
0-30	6	3
31-216	4	7
	Phi .30	Gamma .56

Ferejohn (1974: 193) argues that distributive policy is marked by extensive interest group involvement. The agricultural bureaus, therefore, are likely candidates for strong interest group support and the translation of that support into budget outputs. Third, all of the bureaus operate in the same functional area. This means that the requests the bureaus make on the subcommittees will be similar and, thus, comparable more than in just strict monetary terms. Operating in the same functional area means also that these bureaus will all seek

TABLE 2
Percent of Groups Testifying Positively and Budget Outputs

<u>Clientele Testimony</u>	<u>Congressional Growth Rate</u>	
	<u>Less than 8%</u>	<u>More than 8%</u>
All Positive	5	5
Some Negative	5	5
	Phi 0	Gamma 0

<u>Clientele Testimony</u>	<u>Congressional Success Rate</u>	
	<u>Less than 5.5%</u>	<u>More than 5.5%</u>
All Positive	4	6
Some Negative	6	4
	Phi .20	Gamma -.20

budget support within the same appropriations subsystem so that variation in the degree to which subsystems support the cultivation of interest group support will not affect the analysis.⁴ In addition, since all these agencies are in one department, the effects of differences in departmental budget procedures and the general policy orientation of the president and Congress toward the policy area are constant.

TABLE 3
Intensity of Group Support and Budget Outputs

<u>Intensity</u>	<u>Congressional Growth Rate</u>	
	<u>Less than 8%</u>	<u>More than 8%</u>
Less Intense (2.4 & less)	5	5
More Intense (greater than 2.4)	5	5
	Phi 0	Gamma 0

<u>Intensity</u>	<u>Congressional Success Rate</u>	
	<u>Less than 5.5%</u>	<u>More than 5.5%</u>
Less Intense	5	5
More Intense	5	5
	Phi 0	Gamma 0

GROUP SUPPORT AND BUDGET OUTPUTS

Fenno presented evidence that clientele support for a bureau could lead to high growth in that bureau's budget. Table 1 presents the relationships between the number of interest groups testifying for each of the bureaus and the two budget output measures.⁵ As suggested by Fenno, bureaus

TABLE 4
Number of Members of Congress Testifying
and Budget Outputs

<u>Members of Congress</u>	<u>Congressional Growth Rate</u>	
	<u>Less than 8%</u>	<u>More than 8%</u>
0-11	6	3
12-249	4	7
	Phi .30	Gamma .56

<u>Members of Congress</u>	<u>Congressional Success Rate</u>	
	<u>Less than 5.5%</u>	<u>More than 5.5%</u>
0-11	7	2
12-249	3	8
	Phi .50	Gamma .81

with strong group support have larger growth rates in congressional appropriations. The bureau's group support, however, also has a positive impact on the ability of the bureau to avoid budget cuts (the success rates). The first table appears to confirm a portion of Fenno's predictions on interest groups and budgets.⁶

In the methodological sections of this paper, we argued that the more intense the support for a bureau among its

TABLE 5
Intensity of Congressional Support and Budget Outcomes

<u>Intensity</u>	<u>Congressional Growth Rate</u>	
	<u>Less than 8%</u>	<u>More than 8%</u>
Less Intense (1.99 & less)	7	3
More Intense (2.00 & more)	3	7
	Phi .40	Gamma .69

<u>Intensity</u>	<u>Congressional Success Rate</u>	
	<u>Less than 5.5%</u>	<u>More than 5.5%</u>
Less Intense	6	4
More Intense	4	6
	Phi .20	Gamma .20

clientele, the greater the impact the clientele would have on budget outputs. Table 2, which presents the relationship between the percentage of favorably testifying groups and budgets outputs, *and* Table 3, which relates the mean support scores of the bureau's clientele to the budget outputs, both indicate that intensity of support does not influence the budget process positively. None of the four relationships are positive and substantively significant.

In *Power of the Purse*, Fenno also presents evidence that indicates congressional support for an agency helps that agency avoid cuts in its budget (positive congressional success rates). Although the variable in this study is operationalized somewhat differently than in Fenno's original essay,⁷ the evidence in Table 4 indicates he was correct. First, congressional support has a moderate impact on the congressional growth rate of bureau budgets, a finding not anticipated by Fenno. More directly, however, a strong relationship (the strongest found in this paper) exists between congressional support and large congressional budget success rates.

Unlike the intensity of clientele support in general, the intensity of congressional support is related to budget outputs (see Table 5). The intensity of congressional support is moderately related to the congressional growth rate, and slightly related to the congressional success rate. In each case the intensity relationships merely reflect the same relationships between the number of members of Congress testifying and the budget outputs because the congressional intensity scores are highly correlated with the number of congressional witnesses ($r = .62$).

Given the nature of the budget process and the perspective of appropriations committee members, we speculated that certain types of clientele would be more helpful than others. Table 6 lists the phi coefficients for the relationships between budget outputs and the distribution of groups testifying for a bureau. The .10 relationship between members of Congress and the congressional growth rate, for example, indicates that bureaus with a larger portion of their support from members of Congress fare slightly better in maintaining a strong congressional growth rate. Table 6 indicates that with few exceptions the type of clientele support has little impact on budget outputs. In both cases bureaus that have a larger amount of support from peak associations fare worse in the budget process at all stages. Second, bureaus with a large

TABLE 6
Phi Coefficients for the Relationship Between Type
of Group and Budget Outputs^a

	<u>Mass</u> <u>Groups</u>	<u>Peak</u> <u>Associations</u>	<u>Members</u> <u>of Congress</u>	<u>Single</u> <u>Petitioners</u>
Congressional Growth Rate	.00	-.20	.10	-.10
Congressional Success Rate	-.20	-.40	.30	.30

a. Sign assigned to phi coefficient based on sign of gamma.

percentage of single petitioners tend to have slightly higher success rates. The first finding is in line with our hypotheses because peak associations do not have large memberships and are not perceived as potent political forces. The second relationship is spurious; agencies with a large percentage of single petitioners are also agencies with strong congressional support. The success rates are more likely a result of congressional support rather than the single petitioner support.

CONCLUSION

This paper has argued for more research on the impact of external factors on the budget process. In line with that emphasis, we reexamined some hypotheses first proposed by Fenno on the impact of interest group support on the budget success and failure of federal bureaus.

We found that congressional budgeting behavior was responsive to interest group support for bureaus and their programs. Strong interest group support (strong in the sense that many groups supported the bureau) resulted in larger growth and success rates for the bureau's budget. Strong congressional support affected both the bureau's growth

rate and its ability to avoid budget cuts. Congressional support was very strongly related to a bureau's ability to avoid cuts in their budget requests to Congress.

The findings are encouraging but not definitive. Finding that interest group support has some impact on the budget process supports the contentions of Wildavsky, Fenno, Rourke, and other students of the political process. Although the study deals only with Department of Agriculture bureaus over a short time span, the methods used are easily transferable so that this study can be replicated in other policy subsystems and during other time periods. Only when such studies are completed can a definitive answer be given concerning the impact of interest groups on the federal budget process.

NOTES

1. This section does not pretend to examine all the literature on budgeting—that would be an impossible task in a few pages. Our concern is only with that portion of the literature concerning interest groups and a small portion of the empirical literature that we cite as illustrative.

2. A brief listing of some of the witnesses supporting the Agricultural Research Service will indicate the range of interests included. They include the National Woolgrowers, the Society of American Florists, Agway Inc., the North Dakota Stockmen, the National Wildlife Federation, the National Grange, the National Farmers Union, the American Farm Bureau Federation, and the Wild Rice Growers, to name just a few.

3. The bureaus are the Agricultural Research Service, the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service, the Statistical Reporting Service, the National Agricultural Library, the Extension Service, the Cooperative State Research Service, the Economic Research Service, the Packers and Stockyards Administration, the Farmers Cooperative Service, the Foreign Agricultural Service, the Foreign Assistance Program, the Agricultural Stabilization and Conservation Service, the Federal Crop Insurance Corporation, the Commodity Credit Corporation, the Rural Development Service, the Rural Electrification Administration, the Farm Home Administration, the Soil Conservation Service, the Agricultural Marketing Service, and the Food and Nutrition Service.

4. These criteria mean that the Forest Service, which is part of the Department of Agriculture but not subject to the Agriculture Appropriations Subcommittee, was excluded from the analysis. Also excluded from the analysis were the Environmental Protection Agency, the Federal Trade Commission, and the Consumer

Product Safety Commission that were under the jurisdiction of the Agriculture Subcommittee for part of the time period under consideration. These agencies were excluded because they performed fundamentally different functions, and because they were moved to the jurisdiction of a different appropriations subcommittee in 1975.

5. The data are presented in 2-by-2 tables to simplify the presentation and because the extreme values for a few cases make correlations unreliable. The cut points for the tables are the median values of the variables. The median growth rate for all agriculture bureaus was 8%; and the median success rate was 5.5% more than the initial request. Other division points also represent medians. Tables were divided on the medians to prevent all the bureaus from clustering in one or two cells.

6. Data were presented in aggregated form rather than in yearly figures because a single year's budget, especially in an area as rapidly changing as agricultural policy in the 1970s, is subject to a variety of outside influences totally unrelated to bureau support or bureau performance. The need to cut back funds for fiscal policy reasons in the 1970s was reflected in decreases for rural development programs. The Soviet grain purchases caused a major revamping of the Commodity Exchange Authority (now Commodity Futures Trading Commission) and its budget. These events plus the increase in grain prices and the enactment of the 1973 Agriculture and Consumer Protection Act caused major variations in appropriations from year to year. The correlations between group support in one year and budget growth in that year ranged from $-.07$ to $.22$; congressional support correlations ranged from $-.04$ to $.44$. Only in the long run do major environmental influences even out so that the impact of interest groups on budgeting is discernible. Interest group support may not have any impact in a single year, but with continued support over time (interest group support is fairly consistent from year to year, $r = .78$) budgets are affected.

7. Fenno argues that support for the bureau among subcommittee members helps the agency avoid cuts. The variable we used here is support from members of Congress in general rather than just subcommittee members. Table 4, therefore, is not a fair test of Fenno's hypothesis; but given the fact that the table supports the hypothesis, we feel the generalizability of the original hypothesis is increased.

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