DETERMINANTS OF VOTING BEHAVIOR OF AMERICAN AND FRENCH ELECTORATES IN PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS--A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS

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1964

Submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate College
of the Oklahoma State University
in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the Degree of
MASTER OF ARTS
May, 1970

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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I should like to express my appreciation to Dr. C. A. L. Rich for patiently and wisely guiding the preparation of this endeavor. I would also like to thank Drs. Sare and Donnell for reading this thesis and offering constructive criticism.

Much appreciation is owed to Miss Eloise Dreessen for the arduous work of typing this thesis.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Purpose of the Study

Voting is one of the ways in which the public participates in the political process. It is the final stage in the process of paying attention to politics -- reading, talking, thinking -- and a recurrent and periodic event in the life of individuals and social groups. Moreover, if democracy could be simply and realistically defined as a regime in which those who govern are chosen by those who are governed by means of free and open elections, then a collective vote decision is of great significance in any democratic political system. The importance of elections in a democratic government may be elaborated in terms of decision-making. Decisions of the electoral process have important effects on decisions taken elsewhere in the system. What the electorate decides may determine which actors will have the power of decision, and the outcome of past and future elections generate important influences to which these actors respond.[1]

The decision who shall control the executive power of the state is of great consequence in every political system. Certainly few decisions

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[1] Angus Campbell, Philip E. Converse, Warren E. Miller, and Donald E. Stokes, The American Voter (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1960), p. 5.

rival in importance the choice of a President when the power to make the decision is vested in a mass electorate. The American system has always followed this practice. In France, since the modification of the Constitution by the referendum of 1962, the President of the Republic is elected by direct popular vote. In casting their votes in a Presidential contest, individuals act toward a world of politics in which they perceive the parties, personalities, issues and other groupings. The voters' attitudes, like other human attitudes are not self-generating, but are formed by inter-actions between the voters' psycho-physical make-up and their physical and social environment.

Psychological, physical, sociological, political variables determine the attitudes of individuals in any presidential situation. Psychological variables intervene between the external events of the voter's world and his ultimate behavior: for instance, the personal experience the voter has concerning the relation of authority in his contacts with others, and his personal knowledge of the various issues of political life, of the values at stake in the government of men. The act of voting is not an end in itself. It is rather a choice of means toward other ends. These ends may concern facts of human life that are at core non-political, and these facts turn one's attention to the non-political sources of the voters' decision. Physical characteristics such as age, race and sex, also exercise an influence on the formation of political behavior which cannot be denied. Sociological experiences of individuals involving group behavior in the family, social class, and church, socio-economic interests, income, profession and residence; in short, the social organization of the environment have an impact on voters' decisions at the polls.

Statement of the Problem

The purpose of this thesis is to test the significance of a number of factors or variables which are assumed to influence the voting behavior of people in France and in the United States in their choice of presidential candidates. Because of the difficulty of gathering psychological indicators for such a study, a number of related political and sociological variables have been selected as follows:

1. Party and group articulation
2. Issues and personality of candidates
3. Ideologies
4. Sectionalism and legal-political institutions

Such questions will be investigated as the relationship between individual attachment to parties and membership in various groups and social aggregates, and voting in political elections; the relationship between socio-economic status, religio-ethnic background, age, occupational status and voting behavior; and the significance of specific issues and the personality of candidates on voters' choice of candidates. The significance of ideologies, including religion, as well as the influence of regional characteristics and traditions and the institutional arrangements, will also be tested to discover whether these have a measurable relationship to voting behavior.

Using the presidential elections of 1960 in the United States and 1965 in France as case studies, the relative significance of each of the variables will be examined to determine its relationship to the pattern of voting behavior. Similarities and dissimilarities between the American and French political systems may aid in formulating certain

generalizations concerning the relative importance of these variables in the process of political socialization and articulation of electorates in democratic political systems.

Review of Literature

Concerning the United States, any survey of the literature on voting behavior is difficult and cannot help but be superficial, since the subject of voting behavior has produced a prodigious number of studies.

Empirical social research has moved from a concern for the demographic aspects of social phenomena to the socio-psychological aspects and, finally, to concern with the systemic aspects of human behavior. American studies have made the fullest use of the techniques of descriptive statistics and have concentrated mainly upon ethnic, social, legal and economic factors as explanatory devices.

Analyses of voting statistics have tended to focus on the political meaning of voting behavior. The works of V. O. Key,[2] H. F. Gosnell,[3] and Stuart Rice[4] are illustrative. After public opinion polls and academic survey organizations became highly developed, it was possible to go more deeply into the socio-psychological aspects of voting behavior.

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[2]V. O. Key, Jr., Southern Politics (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1949).

[3]H. F. Gosnell, Getting out the Vote (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, (1927), and Machine Politics: Chicago Style, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1927).

[4]Stuart Rice, Farmers and Workers in American Politics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1924).

The pioneering works of Lazarsfeld[5] and the Bureau of Applied Social Research at Columbia, in their studies of voting behavior, followed by the output of the Survey Research Center, are primary examples.[6]

In The Voter Decides, the authors were concerned with an analysis of various attitudinal factors, with emphasis on psychology and the individual's basic make-up. Party identification and perception of issues and candidates were seen as highly important in motivating the individual's voting behavior.

The most comprehensive example of election research was reported in The American Voter, which attempted to explain why Americans have voted as they did in national elections since 1948. By the use of survey techniques, the authors of the study identified and measured various factors influencing voting. Although thoroughly socio-psychological and theoretical, the study took cognizance of the many social and regional variables surrounding the voting decision. Voting was regarded as an act following a sequence of events, using the "funnel of causality" as a metaphor. Personal subjective factors of which the person was aware and external objective conditions of which he was not aware were placed in the funnel and related to political and non-political conditions.

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[5]Paul E. Lazarsfeld, Bernard Berelson and Hazel Gaudet, The People's Choice (New York: Columbia University Press, 1948) Bernard Berelson, Paul F. Lazarsfeld, and William N. McPhee, Voting (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1954).

[6]Angus Campbell and Robert L. Kahn, The People Elect a President, (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan, Survey Research Center Series No. 1952). Angus Campbell, Gerald, Gurin, and Warren E. Miller, The Voter Decides (Evanston, Illinois: Row, Peterson and Co., 1954): and Angus Campbell, Philip E. Converse, Warren E. Miller, and Donald E. Stokes, The American Voter (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1960).

In recent years attempts have been made to view the electoral process from a systemic point of reference. This point of reference considers the electorate in relation to political parties and candidates as constituting a system of interrelated parts. One can cite Katz and Eldersveld[7] in their study of presidential campaigns in Detroit. The emphasis on the individual as a unit of political analysis has also stimulated empirical research on the relations between personality and political attitudes and behavior, as well as on the processes by which individuals are prepared for political roles.

In France, the pioneer book in the field of voting behavior was Andre Siegfried's Tableau Politique de la France de l'Ouest Sous la III Republique[8] published in 1913. Subsequent investigations have been carried out by Francois Goguel[9] and George Dupeux, [10] sponsored by the Foundation Nationale des Sciences Politiques. These studies used the electoral geography approach. The social composition of the electorates was correlated in each region with the expressed political attitudes of the voters.

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[7]Daniel Katz and Samuel J. Eldersveld, "The Impact of Local Party Activity Upon the Electorate," Public Opinion Quarterly, 25 (1961), pp. 1-24.

[8]Andre Siegfried, Tableau Politique de la France de l'Ouest Sous la III Republique (Paris: Armand Colin, 1913).

[9]Francois Goguel, "Nouvelles Etudes de Sociologie Electorale," Cahiers de la Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques, 60 (Paris: Armand Colin, 1954). "Geographie des Elections Francaises de 1870 a 1951," Cahiers de la Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques, 27 (Paris: Armand Colin, 1951).

[10]George Dupeux and Francois Goguel, "Sociologie Electorale; Esquisse d'un Bilan," Cahiers de la Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques, 26 (Paris: Armand Colin, 1951).

Siegfried distinguished in the apparent confusion of French political life the persistence of two profound ideological tendencies -- the Right and the Left. This division of the French public into two fundamental ideological orientations was further developed by F. Goguel, who substituted for the terms "Left and Right" the expression "Party of Movement" and "Party of Established Order." Subsequent research into French electoral sociology has been pursued in terms of this ideological division. The postulate that all political tendencies can be reduced to the antitheses of Right and Left or Movement and Order has rarely been questioned in France.

Method and Procedure

This thesis is concerned with the major variables which influence the voters in the United States and in France in their choice of presidential candidates. Several hypotheses have been formulated to guide the investigation.

It is hypothesised that in France the voters' preferences for President are not highly related to their sense of party attachment, while in the United States party identification is a most significant factor in the outcome of presidential elections.

With respect to interest groups, voting studies suggest that in the United States, where membership in interest groups is high and where pressure groups participate actively in the campaign, there is a high correlation between voting behavior and membership in one of the nationwide interest groupings. In France the influence of interest groups is far less significant on the outcome of elections. Significant correlations between such social categories as class, education, age, and

voting behavior are expected to be found in both countries.

Another hypothesis is that issues and proposed solutions by the candidates in the American and in the French environments do not have an important bearing upon the voters' preference as between the candidates.

Personal characteristics and achievements of the candidates are presumed to be a major factor in the presidential elections of both countries, despite the fact that in the United States the candidates are nominees of the parties and must support the party platform and espouse the partisan interests which support the party. In France a most significant appeal has been the charisma of the candidate, the man who stands above party and who most personifies the national heritage.

In most countries we expect that competition in terms of partisan ideologies will appear. In France, two principal ideological currents used to divide public opinion: the right-wing ideology of the authoritarian regime supported by a state religion and the maintenance of a class structured society based upon the unequal division of property values; and leftism, which would substitute a new society for the existing order, with emphasis upon socialism, equality, and anti-clericalism. Although these traditional cleavages dividing Right and Left have declined, it is hypothesized that ideologies have a strong bearing upon the French voters' choice in a presidential election. In the United States, where the ideology of democracy tends to unite Americans, since both parties agree on the fundamental values and rules of the society, the ideological impact is far less significant.

It is hypothesized that there is a significant relationship between electoral choice and religious affiliation in both countries. In the

United States the religious factor was important in the 1960 election, while in France attachment to Catholicism has generally corresponded to conservative attitudes and religious indifference has characterized the leftist vote.

In both countries presidential elections are expected to be influenced a great deal by regional characteristics and traditions. In France there exists a close link between the traditional Right- Left cleavage and regionalism, which causes a majority of voters in the geographic Center, the South-West and South-East to vote for leftist candidates, while the pattern of voting in the Northwest and the Northeast is conservative. In the United States politics has often been described as a conflict between different sections or regions in which strong party attachments constituted a stable force in American politics. After the Civil War the Republicans were the dominant party in the North and the Democrats the party of the South. Republicanism has continued to prevail in the great farm belt in the Midwest, while the Democrats have become the dominant party of the urban centers of America.

Election behavior must also be studied in the context of the institutional setting of the national state. France is a unitary state, while the United States is a federation of states. The United States has a presidential government, which draws a clear distinction between the executive and legislative branches of the political system. France has a presidential - parliamentary form of government, where the executive power is shared by the President of the Republic and the Prime Minister, and the government is responsible before the Parliament.

In the American two-party system, the voters are confronted with only two rival candidates for legislative offices, whereas France has a

complex multiparty system. The electoral systems are different as well as the campaigning processes. It is assumed that the different legal-political institutions will have a significant influence on the voters' attitudes.

Source Material

The presidential election of 1960 in the United States and of 1965 in France will serve as case studies for this thesis in order to evaluate the relative importance of the variables examined. Aggregate data, particularly election returns and census reports, which are useful in describing recurring patterns of voters' preferences and the characteristics of particular electorates will be analysed. Data secured from questionnaires and interviews by researchers in the United States and in France, public opinion surveys and articles, provided by newspapers and periodicals, will provide the bulk of the empirical evidence to test the hypotheses. A quantitative measurement of the data will be used as far as possible in evaluating the significance of each variable.

The second chapter will evaluate the impact of party identification and interest group membership in American and French presidential elections. The third chapter will consider the role of issues and personalities of the candidate on the outcome of these elections. The fourth chapter will examine the impact of ideologies and religion, while the fifth chapter will analyse the sectional and institutional variables. The sixth chapter will provide a set of conclusions to the hypotheses and a summation of the thesis in terms of the similarities and dissimilarities discovered in the measurement of the different variables in the two countries. Generalizations concerning the implications of

voting behavior in presidential elections on the party system of democratic societies will be made.

CHAPTER II

THE IMPACT OF PARTY IDENTIFICATION AND GROUP MEMBERSHIP ON VOTERS IN FRANCE AND THE UNITED STATES

Party Affiliation

In every modern democracy conflict among different groups is expressed through political parties. Parties are the only forces whose purpose is to exercise an influence upon political organs not only occasionally but permanently and to concentrate their efforts upon political elections and the espousal of programs of political actions. Unlike a labor union or a professional society parties are political groups concerned with winning power. The influence of parties as determinants of voting behavior in a presidential election might be expected to be prominent in any political system.

Party affiliation refers to the diffuse commitment to one or another party in political life. It is the base from which political parties mobilize electoral support. It is a measure which varies slowly and persists between elections. The identification does not necessarily denote a voting record.

In the United States millions of people may attach or tie themselves to the Republican or Democratic party without necessarily registering as such, voters are to some extent attached to a party. They

acquire their party identification very early in life.[1] Party identification is fairly constant in the American electorate.

The Survey Research Center, using a national sample of 1,139 to 1,772 persons from the period 1952 to 1962, found that there was a high degree of consistency in party identification over the period; that the respondents were willing to identify themselves to some degree as Democrats or Republicans; that Democrats (independent, weak and strong) outnumbered Republicans by a percentage averaging from 54 to 31.

TABLE I

DISTRIBUTION OF PARTY IDENTIFICATION, 1952-1962[2]

Identification	1952	1954	1956	1958	1960	1962
Strong Democrat	22%	22%	21%	23%	21%	23%
Weak Democrat	25	25	23	25	23	22
Independent Democrat	10	9	7	7	8	7
Independent	5	7	9	8	8	8
Independent Republican	7	6	8	4	7	6
Weak Republican	14	14	14	16	13	16
Strong Republican	13	13	15	13	14	12
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

Studies have also shown correlation between intense partisanship and strong interest in election campaigns and between party

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[1] Campbell, et al., p. 32.

[2] As cited in Bone Hugh, American Politics and the Party System (McGraw Hill Book Company, New York, 1965), p. 480.

identification and attitudes toward issues and candidates. The stronger the partisan the greater the tendency to accept the party's attitude toward domestic issues and its presidential candidate.

TABLE II

PARTY IDENTIFICATION AND INTEREST IN 1956 CAMPAIGN[3]

	Strong Party Identifiers	Weak Party Identifiers	Independent
Very much interested	42%	23%	25%
Somewhat interested	38	42	43
Not much interested	20	35	32
Much concerned over outcome	82	62	51

Traditional party identification is thus always important and operates as a determinant in voting, but will be less operative in elections where there are exciting candidates and where issues are particularly important.

In 1960 there was a basic Democratic majority in the nation. Throughout the campaign the Democratic presidential nominee referred to the theme of party loyalty. At a campaign strategy meeting it was decided that he should "make clear that the two parties were wholly different in goals and pin the Republican label on Nixon as highly as possible, hammering him as the spiritual descendant of McKinley,

[3]Campbell, et al., p. 144.

Harding, Hoover, Landon and Dewey."[4] Nixon, by contrast, took a different stand. As Stanley Kelley puts it: "Vice President Nixon tried to induce the voter to make a choice between men. Senator Kennedy strove to make his choice one between parties as well as candidates."[5]

An indication of how well Kennedy succeeded in rallying Democratic sympathizers to his cause appears in Table III.[6]

TABLE III

SWITCHING IN PRESIDENTIAL VOTING PREFERENCE 1956-1960
IN RELATION TO PARTY IDENTIFICATION

1960 Identification	% of 1956 D's	D-R	% of 1956 R's	R-D	% of new Voters	D
Republican	100	(20)	32	(280)	17	(176)
Democratic	4	(606)	78	(207)	86	(369)
Independent	14	(105)	32	(280)	57	(205)

[4]Theodore White, The Making of the President 1960 (New York: The New American Library 1941), p. 320.

[5]Stanky Kelley, Jr., "The Presidential Campaign", in The Presidential Election and Transition 1960-1961 (Washington: Brookings Institution, 1961), p. 65.

[6]As cited in V. O. Key, The Responsible Electorate (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1966), p. 122.

The form of the question was, "In politics of today do you consider yourself a Republican, Democrat or Independent?". The figures "14(105)" at the bottom of the first column mean that 105 people interviewed in October 1960 said they considered themselves Independent and recalled voting for Stevenson in 1956, and that 14 per cent of these people said they were going to vote vor Nixon in 1960.

New voters who considered themselves Democrats voted overwhelmingly for Kennedy, Republican new voters voted for Nixon. Kennedy pulled very few 1956 Republican voters who considered themselves Republican in 1960. But he lost few (4 per cent) of the 1960 Democratic identifiers who had voted Democratic in 1956. Since party identification is one of the most stable forces in American politics, by appealing to party loyalty Kennedy hoped to rally mainly Democrats who might be lost to him on the religious issue.

In France at the time of the presidential election six main parties were registered in the French National Assembly: the Communisy Party (PCF), the Socialists (SFIO), the Independent Socialists (PSU), the Radicals, the Popular Republicans (MRP), the Gaullists (UNR), and the Independents.

Electoral studies on France have revealed an astonishing permanence in political attitudes. In France the division of the electorate between Right and Left has for a long time dominated political life. Influenced by an electoral system which allowed regrouping on the second ballot, the French electorate has divided into an ideological cleavage between all the Right on one side and all the Left on the other. The Right-Left cleavage has been for 150 years one of the determinants of French political life.

Thus, when considering the results of legislative elections under the IV Republic, one finds that there was a high degree of consistency among the leftist electorate. See Table IV.

However, in 1958 the percentage of the leftist electorate fell below this level from 8,867,074 votes in 1958 with 22.9% abstentions to 8,146,334 votes in 1962 with 31.2% abstentions.

TABLE IV

DISTRIBUTION OF LEFTIST VOTES 1944-1956[7]

21 October 1944	
PC	5,024,174
SFIO	4,491,152
Radicals	2,018,665
	11,533,991
2 June 1946	
PC	5,145,325
SFIO	4,187,747
Radicals	2,299,963
	11,633,035
10 November 1946	
PC	5,430,593
SFIO	3,433,901
Radicals	2,136,152
	11,000,646
17 June 1951	
PC	5,056.605
SFIO	2,744,842
Radicals	1,887,583
	9,689,030
2 January 1956	
PC	5,514,403
SFIO	3,247,431
Radicals	2,389,163
	11,150,997

Thus, in 1965 about 3,000,000 voters who generally voted for the Left under the IV Republic approved the presidential mandate of De Gaulle. They did not vote for Lecanuet, since the geographical study

[7]Francois Goguel, "Combien y a t-il eu d'electeurs de gauche parmi ceux qui ont vote le 5 decembre 1965 pour le General De Gaulle?" Revue Francaise de Science Politique, 17 (1967), pp. 65-69.

shows that on a national level this candidate obtained his best results in traditionally conservative regions under the V Republic. The actual division of the Left and the homogeneity of the Right has been acknowledged in a sample survey. When asked to situate themselves on an imaginary Right/Left scale, 90 per cent of the people interviewed were able to do it. The question asked of ten thousand voters who represented the French electorate was the following: Generally the French are situated according to their political opinion on a continuum from the Left to Right. Where would you situate yourself on this continuum? The responses to this were extremely uniform during the years 1964, 1965, 1966 and were recorded as follows:[8]



According to this answer E. Deutsch divided the electorate into political families which could be distinguished by certain opinions toward the great political issues.

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[8]Emeric Deutsch, Denis Lindon and Pierre Weill, Les Familles Politiques Aujourd'hui en France, (Paris, Les Editions de Minuit, 1966), p. 14.



Comparing the responses of voters for the Extreme Right and Right, the author noted that their opinions were not very far apart and that the rightist electorate constituted a homogeneous bloc.

TABLE V

COMPARISON OF OPINIONS OF THE RIGHT AND EXTREME RIGHT

	Moderate Right	Extreme Right
Think one must fight against communism	60%	75%
Think one must limit the right to strike in public services	70	75
Think one must maintain help to private schools	82	82
Think that France must have a powerful army	54	66
Think one must accelerate the growth of the Common Market	70	64
Think one must maintain the authority of the State	54	62

Source: Deutsch, p. 33.

The Left on the contrary is more divided, voters of the Extreme Left being very different from those of the Moderate Left. On most problems the Extreme Left is unanimous. Its supporters think one must reduce the authority of the State 73%, suppress the nuclear striking force 78%, suppress public subsidies to private schools 63%, have a foreign policy independent of the United States 73%. The Moderate Left is profoundly divided, especially concerning the following issues:

TABLE VI

OPINION OF THE MODERATE LEFT

	Pro	Against	No Opinion
Fight against communism	33%	39%	28%
Limitation of the right to strike	40	51	9
Nationalizations	34	42	24

Source: Deutsch, p. 34.

After having asked the voters to situate the parties on the Right-Left continuum, the interviewers asked them if they had sympathy, antipathy or indifference toward them. An index of acceptability was calculated. The Extreme Left was attached to the Communist Party but accepted the Federation of the Left. The Moderate Left was divided: the party which came first was the Federation, but the Centre Democrate and UNR were also accepted. The Right was more homogeneous: 77 per cent favored the UNR. The Centre Democrate was also accepted. The Centre hesitated between the UNR and the Centre Democrate. 77 per cent

among the undecided were not attached to any party.

There is a modest proportion of expressed attachment to political parties in France, where the majority of voters follow a general ideological orientation. Shortly before 1962, Converse and Dupeux, in a survey made in France to study the partisan ties felt by citizens before the elections, found that less than 45 per cent of those who did not refuse to answer the question, "Which political party do you feel closest to?", were able to classify themselves in one of the parties or splinter groups, while others associated themselves with the Left or Right. Some confessed that they just had not been able to keep track of which party was which; others indicated that they found it too hard to choose between so many parties, or indicated preferences for a specific political leader while admitting that they did not know which party he belonged to or had no interest in the identity of his party. This low level of partisan identification is related to the large number of French party switchers. According to Converse and Dupeux this would not be a consequence of the multi-party system but of basic discontintinuities of political socialization.[9]

Through political socialization people acquire their political loyalties, beliefs and opinions. Political socialization is the gradual learning of the norms, attitudes, and behavior accepted and practiced by a political system. Its goal is to train or develop individuals so that they will become well functioning members of political

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[9]Philip Converse, and George Dupeux, "Politicization of the Electorate in France and in the United States," Public Opinion Quarterly 26 (Spring 1962), p. 11.

society.[10] Such learning begins very early in the person's life. "In many ways a child born into a system is like an immigrant into it. But where he differs is in the fact that he has never been socialized to any other kind of system. . . He learns to like the government before he really knows what it is."[11]

The family's vote in the process of political socialization is thus very important. The child tends to identify with his parents and to adopt their outlook toward the political system. The father is the prototypical authority figure and thereby initiates the child's view of political authority. In the United States, the degree to which partisan orientation appears to be passed hereditarily from generation to generation through families has been remarked by social scientists. In a national sample of college graduates, Havemann and West found that 58 per cent belonged to the same political party as their fathers. "If we disregard the independents," they wrote, "we find that 85 per cent follow the politics of their fathers and only 15 per cent have switched."[12] On the contrary, Converse and Dupeux found that a large number of the French who were willing to speak of their own party preference were unable to give the father's preference of a generation before.[13]

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[10] Roberta Sigel, "Assumptions About the Learning of Political Values," The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 361, September, (1965), p. 1.

[11] Easton, David, and J. Dennis, "The Child's Image of Government," The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 361, September, (1965), pp. 56-57.

[12] Havemann and West, They Went to College, Harcourt, Brace and World Inc., New York, (1952), p. 117, as cited in Bone, p. 25.

[13] Converse, p. 13.

TABLE VII

RESPONDENT'S CHARACTERIZATION OF FATHER'S POLITICAL BEHAVIOR, IN FRANCE AND IN THE UNITED STATES (in per cent)

	France	United States
Located father in party or broad tendence	25	76
Recalled father as "independent," "shifting aroung," or as apolitical, nonvoting	3	6
Total able to characterize father's political behavior	28	82
Unable to characterize father's political behavior	68	8
Father did not reside in country or was never a citizen	--	3
Did not know father; question not asked about father surrogate	4	6
Refused; other	--	1
	100	100
(N)	(1,166)	(1,795)

Source: Converse, p. 12

Of those Americans in 1958 having a known father who had resided in the United States as an American citizen, thereby participating in American political life, 86 per cent could characterize his partisanship, and another 5 per cent knew enough of his political behavior to describe him as partisan or independent. Among comparable French respondents only 26 per cent could link their fathers with any party and another 3 per cent could describe the father's disposition as variable or apolitical.

Dupeux and Converse observed that:

> Partisan attachments appear therefore to be weakly developed within the less politically involved half of the French

> electorate. While undoubtedly a large variety of factors, including the notoriety which the French parties had acquired in the later years of the IV Republic, have helped to inhibit their development, more basic discontinuities of political socialization in the French family appear to be making some persisting contribution as well.[14]

There is therefore a striking difference between France and the United States on the matter of party loyalty. This absence of party loyalty is associated with the political socialization process. It prevents any close articulation between opinions which voters may hold and an appropriate party instrument.

In the United States, the nature and strength of a person's party identification is the single most important factor governing his behavior in presidential elections. This factor has a stabilizing influence. It might therefore be expected that, due to this low level of party identification, the electorate in France will be more responsive to temporary influences, such as issues or the personality of candidates.

In considering this factor, one notes the extent to which the French parties were involved in the electoral contest for the Presidency. How did the parties act before the campaign? They played a reduced role. In the spring of 1965, Gaston Deferre announced that he would be a candidate and attempted to establish a new political organization, the Federation Democrate Socialiste, which would have included SFIO, Radicals, MRP, Conventions des Institutions Republicaines, but excluded the PC. In June 1965, MRP and SFIO bosses vetoed the idea of a joint Federation and Deferre withdrew from the presidential race. The Federation de la Gauche Democrate et Socialiste, including SFIO, Radicals, UDSR, and the Conventions des Institutions Republicaines, was formed in

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[14] Ibid., p. 14.

September 1965, but did not play an important role during the campaign. Each of the three major candidates who opposed De Gaulle -- Tixier-Vignancour, Mitterand and Lecanuet -- obtained the support of one or more political parties. Each of them wanted to appeal to a sector of opinion much wider than the electorate of a single party.

The SFIO, UDSR and PCF gave their formal support to Mitterand, but some Radicals did not support him. The Socialist party campaigned for Mitterand as "the sole candidate of the Left," but the full party apparatus was not mobilized. There were no posters and only a few leaflets and tracts. Only the PCF gave strong organizational support to Mitterand. The MRP supported Lecanuet, who had resigned as President of MRP to become a candidate. The anti-Gaullist conservatives and the Radicals who refused their support to Mitterand supported Lecanuet. The Independent Republicans supported De Gaulle.

The political preferences of the French voters were surveyed by two sample polls taken prior to each of the two ballotings. More than seven leftist voters out of few indicated a preference for Mitterand on the first ballot. The remaining 30 per cent of the leftist voters indicated a fairly even preference distribution for De Gaulle, Lecanuet and Tixier-Vignancour. On the preference poll taken prior to the second balloting 85 per cent of the leftist voters indicated a preference for Mitterand.

Voters who indicated a preference for the two Gaullist parties (UNR and UDT) preferred De Gaulle by 90 per cent, while Independent Republicans expressed 91 per cent support for De Gaulle. Among MRP voters, about one half supported Lecanuet on the first consultation, with the remainder divided among De Gaulle, Tixier-Vignancour and

Marcilhacy. On the second ballot 70 per cent of the MRP voters expressed a preference for De Gaulle and only 30 per cent went for Mitterand.

TABLE VIII

FRENCH PRESIDENTIAL VOTING INTENTIONS AND PARTY PREFERENCE DECEMBER 1-2, AND DECEMBER 14-16, 1965

	December 1-2				December 14-16	
	De Gaulle %	Mitte-rand %	Leca-nuet %	Others %	De Gaulle %	Mitte-rand %
Party Preference:						
PCF, SFIO, Radicals	13	73	9	4	14	86
MRP, Conservatives	27	5	49.5	18.5	71	29
UNR, Gaullist Cons.	89.5	2.5	4	4	93	7
No Preference	43	19.5	21.5	16	60	40

Source: Sondages, 1965, no. 4, pp. 21-38.

Interest Group Articulation

Interest groups are important agents of political socialization. They are a reference for the formation of attitudes and decisions. They provide their members and followers with values and explanations for their voting. A striking feature of American politics is the extent to which political parties are supplemented by associations formed to influence public policy. In France, by contrast, the paucity of voluntary associations to mediate between the mass of citizens and centralized authority in France has been cited by Duverger as a crucial

difference in the quality of the political process between the two countries.

During a presidential election in the United States, pressure groups campaign for party candidates and become allied to one or the other of the political parties, even if federal laws prohibit corporations and labor unions from making contributions from their treasuries. The Chamber of Commerce, the National Association of Manufacturers and the American Farm Bureau Federation support the Republicans, while the AFI-CIO and the Farmers' Union support the Democrats. Labor Unions raise and expend funds through specially created political committees such as The Committee on Political Education (AFI-CIO). Although organized labor in the United States long professed to be independent, the Survey Center's sample of labor union financial contributors in 1960 showed that 73 per cent favored Kennedy's election.

In France there is much less citizen participation in associational groups. Thus the three main labor unions have about two millions adherents, who represent 17 to 20 per cent of the workers. Only 1/6 or 1/7 of the young people belong to a youth organization. In 1963 only 47.6 per cent of French farmers belonged to the FNSA. Political clubs and associations have only a few thousand members (500 for the Club Jean Moulin). It is difficult to evaluate the role of French pressure groups during a presidential election. The GGT is closely bound up with the PCF, even though there is an active non-Communist minority within the union. Force Ouvriere is closely linked with the Socialist party, while the CFTC exercises some influence on the left wing of the MRP, which it tends to reinforce. The most important teacher associations voted for Mitterand, but the labor unions did not participate

actively in the campaign. The Clubs de la Convention Republicaine supported him. The FNSA was strongly against De Gaulle and supported Lecanuet.

The survey sample showed that in American elections the proportion voting Democratic increases sharply as one moves down the occupational or income ladder. Lower paid and less skilled workers generally regard themselves as Democrats. The Democrats are in the minority among the non-manual strata and, except among the intellectuals, the Democratic proportion of non-manually employed voters declines with rising income and occupational status. Business, professional and managerial groups tend to vote for the Republican presidential nominee. In 1952, 58 per cent of a Gallup poll sample, which included doctors, lawyers and teachers as well as business and professional men, saw the Republican party as best serving the interest of business and professional people.

TABLE IX

VOTE FOR DEMOCRATIC CANDIDATE FOR PRESIDENT, 1948, 1952, 1956, AND 1960

Occupational Group	1948	1952	1956	1960
Professional and Executive	19%	30%	32%	45%
White-collar workers	47	35	37	48
Skilled workers	73	53	44	60
Unskilled workers	67	67	54	59
Union members	76	56	52	65
Farm operators	59	36	45	33

Source: Survey Research Center National Sample, as cited in Bone, p. 504.

TABLE X

PARTY PREFERENCE OF MIDDLE AND WORKING CLASSES
1944, 1952, 1960

Party Choice	Middle Class			Working Class		
	1944	1952	1960	1944	1952	1960
Democratic	49	30	35.9	71	54	52.2
Republican	49	69	60.4	29	43	43.1
Other, refusal	2	1	3	0	3	4.7

Source: Ibid., p. 506.

De Gaulle received a majority of the sample vote from all occupational groups, except the blue collar workers, who preferred Mitterand by 55 per cent to 45 per cent, on the survey taken prior to the run-off election. On the first sampling of French voters by occupational status, De Gaulle ran ahead of all his competitors among all the status groups. Lecanuet who ran third, had more support than Mitterand from farmers, businessmen and the upper management professional groups.

The relationship of socio-economic position to political behavior is reinforced by religious and ethnic factors. Religious affiliation plays an important role in determining political affiliation. Surveys indicate that among the Christian denominations, the higher the average income of the membership of a church group, the more likely the members are to vote Republican. According to the average socio-economic status of their membership, Christian religious groups in the United States are Congregational, Presbyterian, Episcopal, Methodist, Lutheran, Baptist

TABLE XI

FRENCH PRESIDENTIAL VOTING INTENTIONS BY OCCUPATIONAL STATUS
DECEMBER 1-2, AND DECEMBER 14-16, 1965

	December 1-2					December 14-16		
	Per cent of Sample	De Gaulle	Mitte-rand	Leca-nuet	Others	Per cent of Sample	De Gaulle	Mitte-rand
Occupation of head of family:								
Farmers	15	38	22	28	42	17	59	41
Industialists and businessmen	11	44	14	24	18	10	67	33
Upper management and free professionals	5	32	23	26.5	18.5	5	63	37
Middle management, technicians and white collar	18	38.5	31.5	21	9	15	55	45
Workers	30	42.5	34	16	7.5	33	45	55
Retires and non-working	21	52	24.5	14	9.5	20	60	40

Source: Sondages 1965, no. 4, pp. 21-23.

and Catholic,[15] and this rank order is the same when the denominations are ranked by propensity to vote Republican. However religious beliefs or loyalties have independent effect on voting behavior. Working class protestants belonging to the Congregational or Presbyterian Churches are more likely to be Republicans than workers who are Baptist or Catholic. Wealthy Baptists or Catholics are more apt to be Democrats than equally rich Congregationalists or Episcopalians.

Differences also appear between ethnic groups: Anglo-Saxons are more likely to be Republican than other Americans in the same position who have a more recent immigrant background. Ethnic and racial politics are found in every part of the United States. Big city subnational groups tend to associate with the Democratic party but, like others in the electorate, their party attachment can be shaken by events and candidates. Ethnic background, however, is unlikely to be a determinative factor in an election, because it is very often modified or reinforced by such factors as socio-economic status and religion.

In 1960, the cleavage between White America and Negro America acquired a particular importance. In a Gallup poll in 1960, 49 per cent of white respondents identified as Democrats, while 60 per cent of the Negroes so designated themselves.[16] The Center found that 70 per cent of the Negro voters voted for Kennedy in 1960. The distinctiveness of the Negro vote and its Democratic preference is said to be due to the fact that Negroes have been in a lower socio-economic status and

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[15]Seymour M. Lipset, Political Man, Doubleday and Company, Inc., (1963), p. 306.

[16]Hazel Erskine, "The Polls: Race Relations," Public Opinion Quarterly, 26 (1961), pp. 137-148.

have a strong identity with their group, but this vote, like that of other groups, varies by region. Southern Negroes are less Democratic than in the North.

Among other minority groups the Jewish minority comprises one of the most Democratic groups to be found in the electorate. The AIPO poll noted that 80 per cent of Jewish voters voted for Kennedy in 1960. Evidence of the constancy of Jewish support for Democratic candidate is also shown by the fact that upper income and age levels within the Jewish community fail to vote Republican, in contrast to the behavior of most other ethnic groups.

In France the majority of Frenchmen are Catholics, at least nominally; Jews, and protestants, although they occupy some key positions, are negligible in the vote. Religious or practicing Catholics tend to vote for conservative parties. Catholics whose church membership is only nominal and freethinkers tend to support Communist, Socialist or Radical parties.

Unassimilated ethnic groups such as Algerian Muslims, Italian immigrants in the South, and postwar refugees from Eastern Europe do not have an important bearing upon the vote.

There is also a high correlation between a person's voting and his education, sex and age. Thus, in the United States, there is widespread support among the middle class intellectual groups -- artists, professors, scientists -- for the Democratic party. Political scientists are among the most Democratic of the academic groupings. To explain the sources of American intellectual' leftism, Bertrand de Jouvenel has pointed out that there is a conflict between the values of the business classes and creative artists. Business is committed to

giving its clientele what it wants; the creative artist evaluates his product independently of its immediate market value.[17] Seymour Lipset has explained the liberalism of American intellectuals by factors specific to this country and its history. The historic ideology of the United States has contained the equalitarian dogmas of the Declaration of Independence, which are the values of the democratic Left everywhere. Thus, concern with equality has fostered the objectives of equality of opportunity of achievement for all, while the European leftist parties have concentrated on protecting the underprivileged from unsecurity through social security, government ownership and cultural activities. However, the major explanation of the political behavior of American intellectuals is said to be due to the fact that they are an underprivileged group -- low on income and power compared with business men and professionals.[18]

In the United States the electorate is evenly divided between the sexes. The Gallup figures for 1960 show no difference in voting behavior between men and women. Party attachment shows differences between younger voters, who are more Democratic, and persons over fifty, who are more Republican. The Center's panel also found that young people are less tied to the party system and more attracted to candidates than to parties.

French women are generally more conservative than the men. They were not permitted to vote until after the Liberation in 1944, and have

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[17]Bertrand de Jouvenel, "The Treatment of Capitalism by Continental Historians" in F. A. Hayek, Capitalism and the Historians (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1954), pp. 118-120.

[18]Lipset, p. 346.

always been more sensitive to the prestige of De Gaulle. In the October 1962 referendum, according to a survey of the French Institute for Public Opinion, 42 per cent of the men voted "no" compared to 25 per cent of the women. In the presidential election of 1965 women expressed more support for De Gaulle than men and less for Mitterand. The vote for the other candidates was about the same for men and for women.

TABLE XII

FRENCH PRESIDENTIAL VOTING INTENTIONS BY SEX
DECEMBER 1-2, AND DECEMBER 14-16, 1965

	December 1-2					December 14-16		
	Per cent of Sample	De Gaulle	Mitte-rand	Leca-nuet	Others	Per cent of Sample	De Gaulle	Mitte-rand
Sex:								
Men	47	38.5	32.5	20	9	50	49	51
Women	53	47	23.5	20	9.5	50	61	39

Source: Sondages 1965, no. 4, pp. 21-23.

The political difference between sexes is related to differences in the religious attitudes of the two sexes (Table XIII). In view of the relationship between religious feeling and political opinion, it is normal that women who, compared to men, are more religious and more sympathetic to the recommendations of the Church, tend to vote for the parties which directly or indirectly are backed by the Church. The

TABLE XIII

DIFFERENCE IN RELIGIOUS BEHAVIOR OF MEN AND WOMEN, PARTICULARLY AMONG THE WORKING CLASS (in percentage)[19]

	Catholics		Without	Other
	Active	Nonactive	Religion	Religions
Industrial workers				
men	16	61	20	3
women	40	47	10	3
Agricultural workers				
men	26	59	13	2
women	50	42	6	2
Small clerks, civil servants				
men	31	52	15	2
women	36	47	14	3
Shopkeepers, craftsmen				
men	27	53	14	6
women	44	44	6	6
Industrialists, professionals, upper civil servants, managers				
men	39	39	17	5
women	42	36	17	5
Farmers				
men	52	39	5	4
women	64	29	3	4
Retired people				
men	30	55	12	3
women	56	34	7	3
Total				
men	32	51	14	3
women	47	42	8	3

[19] Seymour Lipset and Stein Rokkan: Party Systems and Voter Alignments (New York: The Free Press 1967) p. 230.

difference between masculine and feminine suffrage is greatest among industrial workers, tenant farmers, agricultural workers, and small farmers, than in the bourgeoisie and middle classes. Women belonging to the bourgeoisie or to the upper strata of the middle bourgeoisie have sufficient socio-economic reasons not to vote Communist or Socialist. It is difficult to determine which of the two variables, religious feeling or socio-economic status, most influences their vote, because men in the same social condition also vote conservative. No important discrepancy between feminine and masculine voting patterns appears in this prestigious social class.

Age accounts for significant differences in voting behavior in France, the attitudes of young people concurring with those of men, and the attitude of older persons with that of women. In both samplings young people expressed support more often for Mitterand and for Lecanuet than for De Gaulle. The vote for De Gaulle increased with age, the President receiving the consensus of an absolute majority among voters more than 64 years old.

TABLE XIV

FRENCH PRESIDENTIAL VOTING PREFERENCES BY AGE
DECEMBER 1-2, AND DECEMBER 14-16, 1965

	December 1-2					December 14-16		
	Per cent of Sample	De Gaulle	Mitte-rand	Leca-nuet	Others	Per cent of Sample	De Gaulle	Mitte-rand
Age:								
20-34	30	35	32.5	21	11.5	29	49	51
35-49	28	37	29	24.5	9.5	30	55	45
50-64	26	47	27	19	7.0	25	55	45
65 & over	16	58.5	19	11	11.5	16	65	35

Source: Sondages 1965.

CHAPTER III

THE IMPACT OF ISSUES AND THE PERSONALITIES OF CANDIDATES ON VOTERS IN FRANCE AND IN THE UNITED STATES

The United States

Issues refer to a person's attitude toward current questions of what government should do regardless of which party or individual holds office. However, in order for an issue to affect partisan choice at the polls, a person must not only be aware of it but identify it with a party or a candidate. How much do American voters know or care about issues in a presidential election? The Survey Research Center found in 1956 that a typical voter is not very concerned about most of the issues that agitate political leaders and fill the news columns; that voters are more concerned about and have more information on general issues than on specific ones; that the voter's picture of the parties and candidates' stand on many issues is often unclear and inaccurate.[1]

In order to analyse the role of issues in presidential elections, it is first necessary to note what the voters saw and heard in the election of 1960; then what they themselves perceived as the major problems before the country and how their feelings about issues coincided with and deviated from party preferences.

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[1] Campbell, p. 174.

Among domestic questions in the last years of the Eisenhower Administration, the state of the economy elicited most attention: the decrease of industrial production and the increase of the number of unemployed workers, which presented the issue of government mis-management of the economy; the problems of an important increase of the population; the problems of federal aid to education, the raising of the statutory minimum wage, civil rights, medical care, and farm policy were other long-standing issues which precipitated proposals for actions and disputes about action.

In foreign policy, where presidential predominance is unquestionable, the situation was disturbing, though peace of a sort prevailed. Relations with the Soviet Union were at a standstill. The loss of the U-2 reconnaissance plane over Russia had given Kruschchev a pretext for wrecking a summit meeting with Eisenhower. The explanation of the U-2 affair provided criticism of the administration. International detente became an issue of the electoral campaign. The Congo, Laos, Cuba, and Berlin were subjects of preoccupation as was the issue of whether the United States should defend Quemoy and Matsu.

The favorite themes of the campaign among Democrats were the decrease of the international prestige of the United States, the lack of leadership and initative of the Republican administration, and the domestic recession. Criticism of the inadequacy of the defense capability of the country was also raised by Democrats. Candidates expressed agreement on many basic propositions. No single over-riding issue of public policy came to the fore. In the first presidential debate Vice President Nixon said, "I agree with Senator Kennedy completely on that score. Where we disagree is in the means that we would

use to get the most out of our economy."[2]

What did the voters themselves perceive as the major problems before the country? One question asked by Dr. Gallup's interviewers was the following: "What do you think is the most important problem facing this country today?" The responses by those who, at the time of interview, had expressed a choice between the presidential candidates were recorded as follows:[3]

TABLE XV

FOREIGN POLICY AND DEFENSE POLICY

Threat of war	18%
Foreign relations, communicating understanding, getting along with other people and nations	18
Relations with Russia (no mention of war threat)	9
Threat of Communism, threat of communistic countries other than Russia	8
Cuba, Castro, etc.	7
Threat of war with Russia	5
Problems of Defense, atomic warfare, U. S. military strength lag, preparedness	5
DOMESTIC POLICY	
Domestic economic problems, inflation, higher prices, ect.	12%
Unemployment	7
Racial problems, segregation, integration, discrimination	6
Education problems, crowded buildings, fewer teachers, and low pay	2

[2] White, p. 403.

[3] As cited in Key, pp. 130-131.

Although a generalized concern over foreign policy problems and the maintenance of peace was widespread in 1960, it was not so strong a factor pushing voters toward one party as foreign policy concerns had been in 1952. The campaign of 1960 was not devoid of foreign policy issues. They just never became decisive, though at times it looked as though they might.

The state of American prestige abroad was cited by less than one per cent of the voting population. Farm policy was mentioned by one per cent of those interviewed and social security and medical care by less than one half of one per cent. Domestic economic policy and unemployment received more emphasis; close to one American in every five put these issues above even war and peace and relations with the communist world. Public policy issues did not appear to have had an important bearing upon the voters' choice of presidential candidates, since poll results indicated that the voters who cited the threat of war and problems of getting along with other nations as major problems favored Nixon. The voters who were most preoccupied with domestic issues were for Kennedy. Those who cited domestic economic policy or racial problems reported by two to one their intention to vote for Kennedy; among those who cited education, three to one were for Kennedy and among those who expressed concern with unemployment Kennedy led Nixon by five to one.

After getting voters to list what they regarded as the most important problems before the country, the Gallup poll's interviewers then asked them which party would be better to handle the problem. The responses were recorded as follows:

TABLE XVI

PATTERNS OF PRESIDENTIAL PREFERENCE 1956-1960

Response	D-D	R-D	O-D[a]	O-R[a]	D-R	R-R
Republican	1%	5%	7%	26%	52%	81%
Democratic	79	63	65	8	12	1
No difference	13	17	10	16	20	10
No opinion	5	12	14	17	3	7
No answer	2	3	4	3	13	1
	100	100	100	100	100	100
	(678)	(348)	(469)	(298)	(61)	(850)

This was in response to the question: "Which political party do you think can do a better job of handling the problem (the most important problem facing this country) you have just mentioned -- the Republican party or the Democratic Party?"

Source: Key, p. 134.

[a]Non-voters in 1956.

There was a strong correlation between the voters' response to this question and their vote intention in the Kennedy-Nixon presidential contest. Voters who thought that the party they had voted for in 1956 was best able to handle the most important problem before the country in 1960 remained with the party they had supported in 1956. The more strongly the person felt his Republicanism or Democraticism, the more strongly he supported the Republican or Democratic attitude toward public issues both foreign and domestic. According to Dr. Gallup's samples few respondents shifted from Democratic to Republican between 1956-1960, while some Republicans switched to the Democratic party.

Since the candidates agreed on many basic propositions and no basic issue of public policy came to the fore, the influence of party identification seemed to have had a more important bearing upon the outcome of the election than issues.

American politics is sometimes spoken as a "politics of personality". This would mean that in a presidential election year voters pay little attention to party labels or issue positions and vote for the candidate whom they believe to be "the better man". The charisma of the man would supervene over party tradition. Max Weber distinguished three types of power: legal authority which rests upon the function that a person exercises, traditional authority which rests upon custom, and charismatic authority which rests on the affectual and personal devotion of the follower. Obedience is given exclusively to the leader as a person for the sake of his non-routine qualities. Charisma, meaning literally "gift of grace", was used to characterize self-appointed leaders who are followed by those who are in distress and who need to follow the leader because they believe him to be extraordinarily qualified. Pure charismatic leaders and followers are ideal types unlikely to bound in an actual situation. But there are undoubtedly some charismatic tendencies in all candidates for popularly elected office.

Kennedy was the second Catholic to be a presidential candidate of a major party -- the other having been the Democrat Smith in 1928. He was also only the second United States senator to be the presidential candidate of a major party, the other being the Republican Harding in 1920. He was also the youngest presidential candidate ever nominated by a major party -- only 43 years old.

Nixon was 47 and was the first Vice President to be designated as a candidate for the presidency for more than a century. Both were experienced politicians, party men, orators quick to improvise. Both were moderates, at equal distance from the extreme right and left of their parties.

Studies have shown that the four great debates had an immense impact on the fortunes of the two candidates. Those debates might have been an opportunity for a discussion of issues. White acknowledges that:

> The television debates did little to advance the reasonable discussion of issues...What they did was to give the voters of a great democracy a living portrait of two men under stress and let the voters decide by instinct and emotion, which style and pattern of behavior under stress they preferred in their leader...The television debates generalized the tribal sense of participation, the emotional judgment of the leader from the few to the multitude...Rarely in American history has there been a political campaign that discussed issues less or clarified them less.[4]

For Nixon, the television debates were a disaster. The personality of a candidate is a factor which has an important bearing upon the voter's decision. However another question arises, how did this variable interrelate with party identification? In 1952 many voters who were not Republicans were drawn to Eisenhower because of his symbolic qualities and personal attributes. If one contrasts the structure of the vote for the presidency with that for the two parties as expressed in congressional and local races, one notices that in 1960 the American people chose the most conservative Congress in six years. The Democratic majority of 262 Representatives in the House included 101 Democrats who were permanent allies of the Republicans on most domestic matters. White states that:

> If the Democratic Party at best in 1960 held even with the Republicans and at worst suffered a defeat only one lasting conclusion can be drawn therefrom; that the election of 1960 was a personal victory of J. Kennedy not for his party. When one stops off the Old South where American politics are distorted by the race problem Kennedy in the states of his most important victories ran ahead of his party-not behind.[5]

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[4] White, p. 332.

[5] Ibid., p. 408.

In France, the Journal Officiel of November 19, published the list of candidates certified by the Constitutional Council, which functions as the Election Board for presidential elections: J. L. Tixier-Vignancour a fifty-eight year old lawyer and militant of the Extreme-Right; Pierre Marcilhacy, a fifty-five year old journalist, lawyer and senator, unsupported by any party; Francois Mitterand, a 51 year old deputy of the moderate leftist UDSR and former Minister under the Fourth Republic, supported by the entire Left; Charles De Gaulle, the seventy-five year old incumbent President and candidate of the UNR and moderate Right; J. Lecanuet a forty-five year old philosophy professor, deputy and leader of the MRP; M. Barbu, a fifty-eight year old worker, artisan and organizer of the community Boimondeau, unsupported by any political organization.

The main issues in the 1945 presidential election campaign involved the De Gaulle constitution and the economic, social military and foreign policies of the De Gaulle government. The candidates developed the issues in the following manner. On September 23, 1965, Mitterand, in his press conference, announced his program in seven "Options" and twenty-eight propositions, which were concerned with institutions, liberties, foreign policy, striking force, economic policy, social justice, and national education. He proposed that Parliament should abrogate Articles 11 and 16 of the Constitution. Article 16 and Article 11 modify the articles concerning the Constitutional Council, the Superior Council of Magistrature and the Economic Council as well as the procedures for amending the Constitution. Concerning civil liberties, Mitterand advocated the suppression of all exceptional legislation, enactment of a statute on radio and television, the abrogation of the

1964 laws restraining the right to strike, and the creation of a national fund for local communities. As far as foreign policy was concerned, Mitterand asked for the strengthening of the Common Market, the creation of a European political authority based upon universal suffrage, the maintenance of the Atlantic Alliance with modification of NATO, participation by France in the disarmament conference, approval of the treaty on non-dissemination of nuclear arms, signature of the Moscow pact, aid to developing nations through the organization of a world market for raw materials, support for the Geneva agreements on Vietnam, and admission of China to the United Nations. Mitterand proposed to abolish the independent French nuclear striking force, elaborate a new economic plan, and create a ministry for economic planning. He also advocated a fiscal policy to help the most disadvantaged groups and measures to improve working conditions for women and housing.

Preceding the first ballot, the opponents of the De Gaulle devoted much time to challenging his record of having restored social peace to France. Mitterand and Lecanuet stressed their youth, questioned De Gaulle's fitness and accused him of flouting his own constitution. All of the opposition candidates dissociated themselves from the existing splinter party system. Tixier-Vignancour, Mitterand and Lecanuet each declared his intention to build a new and vigorous political party better adapted to the new world than the old machines. Lecanuet made this need for a re-vitalization of the parties the central note of his final television broadcast. All the opponents of De Gaulle called for an expanding instead of a stagnant economy and compained that France was lagging behind other Common Market countries. They all denounced the shortage of schools and housing and appealed for the support of the

women. They accused the President of sabatoging European unity and condemned France's nuclear deterrent.

There was little difference between the candidates of the opposition; from Tixier-Vignancour to Mitterand, each was for democracy, the increase of public welfare, an integrated Europe, the Atlantic Alliance, and against the nuclear striking force and high taxes. Mitterand stressed the fact that he was the candidate of the Left; Lecanuet appealed to disgruntled Gaullist voters and to the Socialists as well as his own MRP group; Tixier exploited public reaction to the Algerian events.

The extent to which the campaign over issues was a factor of significance in persuading voters cannot be precisely evaluated. No special issue of public policy came to the fore, and it is difficult to say that the results constituted a defeat or victory of issues such as the De Gaulle regime, the economic plan, the Atlantic alliance or Europe are integration. The electorate was not called upon to support structured programs or particular issues, but the candidates as personalities. Issues do not seem to have been a major factor in motivating voters in their choice of candidates.

Thus, foreign policy was stressed by 10 per cent of the voters who supported Mitterand, and 25 per cent of those who voted for Lecanuet. The issue of personal power was considered significant by 10 per cent of the voters of the opposition. As far as social and economic policy was concerned, dissatisfaction by farmers with agricultural policy undermined De Gaulle on the first ballot and provoked a second ballot by giving to Lecanuet votes which would otherwise have gone to De Gaulle.

On the first ballot, the voters of the Extreme Left supported Mitterand because he was the candidate of the Left. The support which the Communist Party gave to Mitterand influenced most of the Communist voters. The television appearances of Mitterand built up his image among the voters of the Extreme Left. Because Mitterand was the candidate of the Left and appeared the most able to direct a policy of social and economic progress, two-thirds of the Moderate Left voted for him on the first ballot. Those who did not (mostly Radicals) were fearful that a change of leadership might result in instability of the regime.

To the question, "which candidate seems to you more apt to insure a government of stability?" moderate leftists responded as follows:

61% De Gaulle

7% Mitterand

3% Lecanuet

29% Without opinion

Those leftist voters who did not vote for Mitterand gave the following reasons:

Stability would be threatened	- 60%
The Communists were supporting him	- 30
Personal preference for somebody else than Mitterand	- 25%
Europe or Common Market	- 10%

At the beginning of the electoral campaign the Right and Center intended to support De Gaulle, who satisfied the need for order and stability which those voters felt, and had the prestige and authority which they highly valued in a leader. The main reasons given by people who voted for Lecanuet were his youth and personal attractiveness and

the fact that he was "for Europe".[6]

VOTERS PREFERRED MITTERAND:

Because he was the candidate of the Left	42%
Because De Gaulle was not concerned with welfare	26
Because Mitterand would modernize the country	24%

VOTERS PREFERRED LECANUET:

Because he was young	40%
Because he was attractive	40%
Because he was the candidate of the Center	21%
Because De Gaulle was not concerned with welfare	20%

VOTERS PREFERRED DE GAULLE:

Because he best represented France	44%
To insure stable government	40%
Because he has shown ability to govern	34%

In a survey[7] taken in 1966 by the Foundaton Nationale des Sciences Politiques on the population of Bologne-Billancourt concerning the motivations of the voters on the first and second ballots, the answers given corroborated the preceding results. Thirty-four per cent of these voters on the first ballot were inclined to vote for General De Gaulle because they desired stability, 27% because he was a great man, 17% out

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[6] Deutsch, p. 23.

[7] Guy Michelat, and Janine Mossuz, "Les Elections Presidentielles dans une localite de la Region Parisienne", Revue Francaise des Sciences Politiques, 16 (April, 1966), p. 566.

The analysis of the motivations of the votes in the two ballots was on the question: "What are the main reasons which make you choose this candidate?" Which was following the question: "Can you tell me for whom did you vote?" The survey was made upon 1427 persons, and realized in January, 1966.

of gratitude. On the second ballot, stability was less significant, and only 25 per cent voted for this reason.

On the first ballot five reasons influenced the voters who supported Mitterand. The first four concerned the ideology and program of the Left; the last concerned their opposition to General De Gaulle (18 per cent). On the second ballot the opposition to De Gaulle increased to 29 per cent of the voters. Only 13 per cent of the voters cast their ballot for Mitterand because he was the candidate of the Left and 12 per cent because he was nearer the workers.

The most important elements in the vote for Lecanuet were his program, 29 per cent, Europe 29 per cent, and opposition to General De Gaulle, 28 per cent. The youth of the candidate was mentioned by 24 per cent of his voters. 40 per cent of those who voted for Tixier-Vignancour did so because of Algeria; 28 per cent because he was anti-Gaullist, and 28 per cent because of his program.

Thus, through the reasons given by the electors, it appears that voters did not vote so much on programs or on issues but on personalities. The need for security and stability was the most important factor favoring De Gaulle. Traditional attachment to a party favored Mitterand.

TABLE XVII

REASONS FOR VOTERS' PREFERENCES

	1st. Ballot	2nd. Ballot
For De Gaulle		
Stability Security	34	25
De Gaulle is a Great Man	27	18
Against Mitterand	--	19
Foreign Policy	14	9
Gratitude	17	10
Nationalism, Patriotism	12	9
Economic Policy	5	4
Against IV Republic	3	4
Diverse	9	9
Without Opinion	3	10
	(516)	(627)
For Mitterand		
He is nearer Workers	21	12
Economic and Social Policy	21	20
Nearer my Ideas	20	18
Candidate of the Left	19	13
Against De Gaulle	18	29
Against Striking Force	9	5
He is Young	7	4
He is a Democrat	4	5
Because De Gaulle is Personal Power	4	4
Diverse	17	14
No Opinion	2	8
	(300)	(376)
For Lecanuet		
Program	29	--
Europe	29	
Against De Gaulle	28	
He is Young	24	
Personal Qualities	10	
Domestic Policy	8	
One Must Give New Blood to Politics	3	
Diverse	18	
	(179)	

TABLE XVII (Continued)

	1st. Ballot	2nd. Ballot
For Tixier-Vignancour		
Because of Algeria	40	
He is the Most Anti-Gaullist	28	
His Program	28	
Personal Qualities	16	
For France	5	
Against Aid to Underdeveloped Countries	5	
Diverse	14	
No Opinion	2	
	(43)	

All results given in this table are in percentage; the figure between parenthesis indicates the effective on which the percentage is calculated.

CHAPTER IV

IDEOLOGIES AS A DETERMINANT OF VOTING

Ideology and Voting in the United States

The phenomenon of ideology is certainly one of the most important dynamic influences in politics. Ideologies such as Christianity, nationalism or communism can create or destroy civilization, topple governments or change the face of the world and have.

By origin and usage ideologies are primarily political, although we expect an ideology to encompass content outside the political order, such as social and economic relationships and religion. Daniel Bell regards ideologies as:

> Systems of belief that are elaborate, integrated, and coherent, that justify the exercise of power, explain and judge historical events, identify political right and wrong, set forth, the interconnections (casual and moral) between politics and other spheres of activity and furnish guide for action.[1]

The elements of American democratic ideology are considered to be such concepts as consensus, accountability, limited or constitutional government, equal representation, majority rule, minority rights, freedom of political opposition, freedom of thought, speech, press, and assembly, equality of opportunity, religious toleration, equality before the law, right of judicial due process.

There is substantial agreement in American society regarding the

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[1] Daniel Bell, The End of Ideology (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1960), p. 25.

legitimacy of the ruling authority. According to Robert Dahl,[2] it is nearly impossible to find an American who says that he is opposed to democracy or favors some alternative. Most Americans display complacency about their economic institutions. The great corporations have gained acceptance. The trade-unions are unpopular, among some, but few would like to see trade-unions done away with altogether. There is consensus about the fundamental values or the rules of the games in the society, even if there are differences of philosophy between the two great American parties. The Democratic party, for instance, emphasizes the fact that the government must be used as an instrument of social reform. This philosophy has gathered citizen groups who wish to use government for new social programs, minority groups who want from government protection and advancement, labor groups and farmers who want to extend the economic role of government. The Republican philosophy, in contrast, asserts that each citizen bears a responsibility in private and community life greater than the responsibility of government to shape that life and community. However all the candidates and elected officials of the two major parties accept the legitimacy of the basic social, economic and political structures.

Previous studies have shown that in the United States a majority of the electorate also accepts the political system as legitimate and rejects radical and extreme movements which want to alter or overthrow the constitutional foundations of the system. V.O. Key found that the political class is more united than the electorate on fundamental

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[2]Robert Dahl, A Pluralist Democracy in the United States, Rand McNally Company, (Chicago, 1967), p. 330.

political values, but divides more sharply on the issues which separate the two parties. Thus the ideology of democracy tends to unite Americans.

Nonetheless, Americans have often disagreed how far democracy and equality should be extended, how widely the advantages enjoyed by elite groups should be distributed throughout the general population, how much equality of opportunity and of power is desirable. Originally the controversy among the Founders between those who wanted an aristocratic republic and those who wanted a democratic republic was just an ideological cleavage. These two ideological viewpoints have reappeared since the Constitutional Convention. The one which stresses equality and democracy is liberalism, the other conservatism. Voters of higher status tend to be conservative in ideology and are likely to vote Republican, while voters of lower status tend to be more liberal in ideology and are more likely to vote Democratic. According to Dahl a line of cleavage separates people according to status, ideology and party.[3]

	Camp I	Camp II
Status	Upper	Lower
Ideology	Conservative	Liberal
Party	Pro. Republican	Pro. Democratic

Each tendency is important, yet none is strong enough to exert a dominant influence on American political life. The connection between status and party is imperfect. In every occupational or status group a minority holds opinions diverse from the prevalent views. For

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[3]Robert Dahl, Pluralist Democracy in the United States. Chicago: Rand McNally and Company, 1967, p. 358

instance, many manual workers are as conservative as non-manual workers, and many non-manual workers are liberal. The link between party and ideology is not overwhelmingly powerful. Both parties have been supported by conservatives and liberals. Low-status Republicans might be highly liberal on domestic issues, while high status Democrats, like high status Republicans, are likely to be conservative.

According to Dahl, the ideologies of conservatism and liberalism are made up of different dimensions -- economic reform, political and civil liberties, foreign policy, attitudes toward social change. Consequently people who are close together along one dimension of liberalism-conservatism may be apart along another dimension. Thus, the dimensions of liberalism and conservatism divide Americans one way on one kind of issue and another way on another kind of issue. This ideological cleavage does not assume an important role in the nation. Surveys[4] in 1960 even showed that many people have only weak traces of liberal or conservative ideological framework within which to judge political issues, candidates and parties. The people were asked: "Would you say that either one of the parties is more conservative or more liberal than the other?" Respondents who said yes were asked which party seemed the more conservative and, then "What do you have in mind when you say that the Republicans (Democrats) are more conservative than the Democrats (Republicans)?" Thirty seven per cent of the respondents "could supply no meaning for the liberal-conservative distinction." Slightly more than fifty per cent of the respondents furnished evidence that they could identify the meaning

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[4]Campbell et al., p. 249.

of these twins correctly, more or less. To a majority, liberalism was equated with government spending and conservatism with economy.

The slight ideological framework within which most Americans view political problems was examplified by a national sampling of American voters in 1956.[5] The respondents were asked whether there was "anything in particular that you like about the Democratic Party," or anything "that you don't like?" The same questions were asked about the Republican Party. The answers people gave indicated that some thought in terms of a liberal-conservative scale of some sort; others cited possible benefits or dangers to this or that group -- to farmers, workers, doctors, big business. A third group commented about the goodness or badness of the times -- peace or war, prosperity or recession. A fourth group made no comments at all on the political issues under debate. (See Table XVIII)

H. McClosky found that in the United States the influences which prevent ideological cleavages from assuming an important role in the nation's political life would be, for example, political institutions such as federalism, checks and balances, separation of powers, bicameralism, the congressional committee system, and a system of elections more often fought around local issues and personalities than around national questions. The two party system disguises disagreements that exist between active Democrats and active Republicans.

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[5] Philip E. Converse, "The Nature of Belief Systems in Mass Politics," in Ideology and Discontent, David E. Apter, ed., (New York: The Free Press, 1964), pp. 206-261.

TABLE XVIII

IDEOLOGUES AND NON-IDEOLOGUES AMONG AMERICAN VOTERS

	Total Sample	Voters
I Ideologues	2½%	3½%
II Near Ideologues	9	12
III Group Interest	42	45
IV Nature of the Times	24	22
V No Issue Content	22½	17½
	100%	100%

> The Americans social system contributes to the same end, for it is a model of the pluralistic society, a profuse collection of diverse groups, interests and organizations spread over a vast and variegated territory...The complexities of a highly pluralistic social and political order to tend to diminish the impact of intellectual differences to compel compromise, and to discourage the holders of divergent views from crystallizing into intransigent doctrinal camps.[6]

Religion and Voting in the United States

Religious affiliation plays an important role in determining political affiliation in the United States. America as a civilization began with religion. The first immigrants from England and Europe came scarred by religious wars of that era fought between Protestant sects. Not until the 1850's did the Protestant civilization of America begin to include a proportion of Catholics, and then it was

[6] Herbert, McClosky, "Consensus and Ideology in American Politics," American Political Science Review, Vol. 58 (1964), p. 214.

a Catholicism confined to cities of the Eastern borders and the New Orleans community.

In general most Catholics voted Democratic for reasons quite apart from faith; as a group, American Catholics are ordinarily lower in economic status than Protestants and one has seen that wealthier people and people with business interests usually voted Republican. Samplings in Elmira, New York, and Philadelphia stated that upper-strata Catholics tended to vote Republican, although less than upper-strata Protestants. Events brought the religious question to the surface in the 1960 campaign. For some people it reinforced the pull of partisanship; for others it ran counter to the tugs of party loyalty. Concern over the religious issue was wide spread throughout the American electorate. The Survey Research Center of the University of Michigan found in a pre-election interview that nearly 40 per cent of the sample voluntarily introduced the subject of religion before any direct probing was initiated by the interviewer, which testifies to the importance of religion among the voters during the campaign. On September 7, 1960, a group of Protestant churchmen issued a public statement questioning the wisdom of choosing any man of the Roman Catholic faith for President.[7] Kennedy appeared before the Greater Houston Ministerial Association in Houston, Texas, to discuss his religion and his fitness to serve as President. Protestants were subjected to conflicting pushes by the campaign. Their religion tended to prompt Protestant Democratic defectors of 1956 to remain in Republican ranks; their partisanship

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[7] Philip Converse, "Stability and Change in 1960; A Reinstating Election," The American Political Science Review, LV (June 1961), p. 276.

tended to draw them to Kennedy. Converse shows that the defection to Nixon among Protestants who were identified in 1960 with the Democratic party is correlated with regularity of attendance at a Protestant church, and that the impact of the religious factor was not the same in the North and South.[8]

Polls taken after the elections showed that only three per cent of Protestant-Republicans voted for Kennedy, while 23 per cent of Protestant-Democrats voted for Nixon. Forty-three per cent of all independent voters voted for Kennedy, while only 28 per cent among Protestant independents voted for him.[9]

County data suggests that there were variations from place to place in the voting behavior of Protestants and Catholics. Kennedy's losses were especially heavy in the Midwest and in the South, where he generally ran behind the rest of the Democratic party. Key observed that religion and voting shifts were less pronounced on the Pacific coast than might be expected and that some predominantly Protestant areas did not vote uniformly against the Democrats. The detailed election data[10] suggested the existence of some sectional differentials. Northwestern Catholics behaved differently from those of the Far West and western non-Catholics responded differently from northeastern counterparts. These variations show that aggregate data may not present an

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[8] Ibid, p. 276.

[9] As cited in Austin Ranney, "Les Elections Americaines de 1960," Revue francaise de Science Politique, p. 855.

[10] V. O. Key, "Interpreting the Election Results," in P. T. David, The Presidential Election and Transition, 1960-1961, The Brockings Institution, (1961), p. 5.

accurate picture of the importance of a single variable. Racial, ethnic, religious and nationalistic groups are not homogeneous voting categories. The effect of local conditions on the outcome of an election may have been overlooked. However the religious factor in the motivation of the electorate in 1960 may have overpassed other partisan social, or regional considerations.

Ideology, Religion and Voting in France

Differences in political and religious ideologies are striking in France. They stem from the Revolution of 1789 and from the 16th and 17th century religious wars. Although these wars ended in the triumph of the Catholics and the partial elimination of the Protestants, the latter still play an important part in politics. Moreover within the ranks of French Catholics there are traditional divergences. To some extent the present day opposition between liberal Catholics and those who support a rigid doctrine of Church supremacy reproduces the divisions of previous centuries.

The differences in political ideologies are even more striking. In France no regime has enjoyed unchallenged legitimacy. Each has been threatened by reactionaries or radicals or both. Political regimes haved followed one another since 1789: monarchy by divine right, revolutionary republic, charismatic empire, constitutional monarchy, liberal monarchy, presidential republic, plebiscitarian empire, parliamentary republic, military occupation, multi-party republic, charismatic republic. The roots of political cleavage sometimes go deep into the past. As Francois Goguel remarked: "In order to explain certain differences having consistently reoccurred in the electoral

behavior of some cantons or communes, one has to go back to history."[11]

In contrast to the United States, where parties agree on the essentials and especially on the system itself, in France it is the system which is questioned by some groups, whose members think that the interest of the class which they represent cannot be satisfied by those institutions and want other rules and other institutions. The extreme right and, the PCF do not accept the notion of a pluralist democracy.

The roots of ideological cleavages go deep into the past. The revolution of 1789 is the starting point for all present day French parties because it brought about patterns of conflict between conservatives and liberals. This conflict was social as well as political. The 18th century conservatives represented the aristocracy and supported the monarchical "ancien regime," a society founded on "natural difference", in which the nobility had a right to special powers and political authority belonged to a hereditary monarch. They regarded political power from a paternalist angle. Religion was also an important factor; authority was in accordance with divine law.

The eighteenth century liberals thought the social order ought to be founded on reason: the traditional order should be altered and replaced by a rational order. All men should enjoy equal rights; none had a natural prerogative to rule over others. The liberals were defender of individual liberty, and in particular, of liberty of thought, and were suspicious of religion and of the Catholic Church, though there were occasional alliances between liberals and Catholics. There

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[11]Francois Goguel, La politique des partis sous la III Republique, (Paris: Seuil, 1946), p. 27.

were no socialists at the time of the Revolution of 1789. The birth of the socialist movements followed the coming of large scale industry and the growth of a proletariat in the nineteenth century. After the Socialist party had gained a mass following, some Catholics turned their attention to social problems and started a Christian Democratic movement. However, not until 1944 was a major Christian-Democratic party born, the MRP. After the Russian Revolution of 1917, one wing of the Socialists came out in favor of the Bolsheviks. This produced a split in the party and gave birth to the Communist Party in 1920. Thus today one can identify several major ideologies: Communism, Democratic Socialism, Economic Liberalism, Political Liberalism, Anti-clericalism, Christian Democracy, Conservatism.

French communism resembles the Russian as far as ideology goes. It has adopted Marx's interpretation of history and the classless society. Socialism has in common with communism a deterministic conception of history and an ideal of equality among men. It states that the existing democratic system has to be extended; that the government cannot, in its present form, provide greater freedom and equality, and that consequently the government should increase its sphere of action. The economy of the nation should be regulated by the government in such a way that the distribution of goods is on a more equal basis and that private property is not a means of oppression. An economy controlled by the state, itself controlled by the people, can sum up French socialism.

Economic liberalism posits that the government should refrain from interfering with the economic process except to maintain or strengthen competition. While entrusting the state with maintaining

the rules of the games, economic liberals think that economic decisions should be left to the individuals. Political liberalism calls for restraint by the state in dealings with the citizens and restricts the state to intervention only when public order is menaced. Anticlericalism was linked at first to political liberalism. It is a philosophy denying the Church any role in secular matters. Christian democracy meant to reconcile the principles of liberalism and those of socialism which were consistent with Christian ethics. According to this ideology, the state is subordinate to the individual and man's freedom of choice should be preserved as much as possible. From socialism, Christian democracy took the concept of the state's responsibility for the welfare of society as a whole and the obligation of the government to intervene in order to create a society from which man could benefit more equally. It added that the major objective of the state was to create a society in which men could live according to Christian morals, while refusing the state the right to enforce such morals. There are various shades of conservatism in France, of which authoritarian conservatism and libertarian conservatism may be considered as the boundaries. Conservatism accepts the values of economic liberalism, but rejects its equalitarian implications. A government controlled by the multitude is a potential danger to the established order and its natural hierarchies. The conservative thinks that there is a natural social order. When this social order is not menaced, authoritarian and libertarian conservatives are undistinguishable. When this order is menaced an authoritarian system of government is offered as alternative.

In France, ideologies and organizations do not regularly coincide.

Some of the major ideologies find their incarnation in a single party, others in more than one. The communist ideology finds its embodiment in the PCF; the social democratic in the Socialist Party, the Christian democratic in the MRP; economic liberalism is represented by the Independents, the Radicals and the UNR; political liberalism by the Radicals; anticlericalism, by the Socialists, Communists, and Radicals; conservatism by the UNR and the Independents. On the Right today one finds conservatism and economic liberalism, on the Left, communism, democratic socialism, political liberalism and anti-clericalism.

The link between party and ideology is thus powerful. Under the Fifth Republic De Gaulle and the UNR fall directly in the tradition of the conservatist Right, although Gaullism presents itself as an ideology promoting unity and challenges traditional divisions and, above all, Right- Left distinctions. De Gaulle maintains that these are obsolete and claims to take merit wherever he finds it and to borrow indifferently from Left and Right. However, he has kept the essence of the right wing tradition, the alliance of democracy and nationalism. Gaullism incarnates a certain idea of direct democracy as expressed by means of the referendum and achieves that mixture of authority and democracy, of appeals to the masses and antiparliamentarism, which is characteristic of the authoritarian Right. Political institutions have been changed in order to conserve traditional values. In advocating a strong executive Gaullism follows in a tradition which in France has been identified with Bonapartism.

Lecanuet and the Centre Democrate fall under the Christian Democrat in tradition. Mitterand, with the support of the Socialists, Radicals, and Communists, represents the left wing current.

Tixier- Vignancour speaks for the Extreme Right current. During the 1965 presidential election voters who generally voted Communist, Socialist or Radical voted for the "candidate of the Left". More than seven out of 10 leftist voters indicated a preference for Mitterand on the first ballot. The remaining 30 per cent of the leftist voters indicated a fairly even preference distribution for De Gaulle, Lecanuet, and Tixier- Vignancour. On the preference poll taken prior to the second balloting, 85 per cent of the leftist voters indicated a preference for Mitterand. Voters who indicated a preference for the two Gaullist parties (UNR-UDT) preferred De Gaulle by 90 per cent, while Independent Republicans expressed 95 per cent support for De Gaulle. Among MRP voters about one half supported Lecanuet on the first consultation, with the remainder divided among De Gaulle, Tixier- Vignancour and Marcilhacy. On the second ballot, 70 per cent of MRP voters preferred De Gaulle and only 30 per cent went for Mitterand.

There has always been a deep involvement of the Catholic Church in French politics. The Right has, since the middle of the 19th century, supported the development of Catholic schools which would produce future conservative voters, while the Left has supported public secular schools to give a republican and liberal education. Correlation between the voters' choice of candidates and religious affiliation was significant, proving that in France religion is a powerful political influence. M. Brule found religion to have had greater influence on French voters than such variables as sex, age, or occupational grouping. "In a society where people take pleasure in emphasing everything which makes it different from its own past, it is worth

calling attention to the persistence on the political plane of such a deep and traditional cleavage."[12]

TABLE XIX

DISTRIBUTION OF THE VOTE IN THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION OF DECEMBER 5, 1965

Claimed to Have voted on December 5, 1965, for:	Regularly Practicing Catholics (23)	Occasionally Practicing Catholics (36)	Nonpracticing Catholics (27)	No Religion (10)
General de Gaulle	55	37	28	14
Mitterand	7	23	37	56
Lecanuet	17	11	6	4
Tixier-Vignancour	4	3	2	4
Marcilhacy	1	1	2	1
Barbu	-	-	1	1
No reply	16	25	24	23
	100	100	100	100

Source: Sondages, 1966, no. 2, pp. 15-17.

In France attachment to Catholicism corresponds to conservative attitudes, while detachment from religious practices accompanies leftist voting. In 1965, for example, 68 per cent of the practicing Catholics supported either the MRP or the Independent party, both conservative parties. Fifty-six per cent of the nonpracticing and 63

[12] Michel Brule, "L'appartenance Religieuse et le vote de decembre 1965", Sondages, (1966), p. 15-17.

per cent of the "indifferent" Catholics supported either the Socialists or the Communists. Among members of minority religions, 39 per cent supported either the Socialists or the Communists. Among members of minority religions, 39 per cent supported the leftist parties and 34 per cent backed the Radical Party. Among those with no religion 79 per cent supported the Marxist parties. Conservative secularists, anticlericalists or Protestants in France will not vote for a clerical conservative party, while religious or practicing Catholics will not vote for an anti-religious party.

CHAPTER V

GEOGRAPHIC AND INSTITUTIONAL INFLUENCES

Geographic Influences on Voting in the United States

Regional particularism refers to geographic areas whose voters appear to hold certain views or aspirations that are at variance with or absent from the views of the nation as a whole. It includes a feeling that people of a geographic region possess separate interests, ideals, mannerisms, dialects, social traditions, attitudes and values from the rest of the nation.

In the United States during the nineteenth century, the North, the South and the Middle West exhibited marked regional characteristics in politics. Later, the Far West provided a new regional subculture. The particularism of the South has historic roots originating in the colonial era. After the Civil War, race relations and states' rights remained strong political values in the South.

Originally sectionalism was based on agricultural, commercial, and manufacturing interests. The agricultural interests espoused a policy of low tariffs; the commercial interests long supported a policy of neutrality and the "open door" in the world; the manufacturing interests urged a policy of national protectionism. As various geographic regions of the United States developed increasingly diverse interests, a pattern of geographic sectionalism developed in politics. After the Civil War, the Republican party was the party of the North and the Democrats the

party of the South. Today, by dividing America into major regions, it is possible to distinguish a recurring pattern of voting behavior. In 1960, Kennedy received 34,221,463 votes and Nixon 34,108,582 out of the 68,832,818 votes cast. Kennedy was elected President by 303 electoral votes drawn from 23 states, to 219 votes for Nixon, drawn from 26 states. Theodore White, analyzing the results of the election, clustered the individual states into eight regional groupings and found that the confusion which arises when looking at the results of individual states (Table XIX), dissolves into a rough pattern. Of these eight distinct geographical communities, Nixon and the Republican party carried five and Kennedy, but three of them.

The most decisive expression of support for Nixon came from the block of five predominantly farm states (Iowa, North Dakota, Kansas, South Dakota, Nebraska), characterized by the culture of the small town and Protestant homesteads of traditional Republican allegiance. Nixon led by a margin of 598,362 votes out of a total of 3,395,088. Nixon also scored in the eight states of the Rocky Mountains (Montana, Idaho, Colorado, Utah, Wyoming, Nevada, Arizona, New Mexico), receiving 53.6 per cent of the vote and leading by 192,313 votes out of 2,641,593 cast.

The Border States (Kentucky, Missouri, Oklahoma, Tennessee, West Virginia), provided Nixon with a margin of 263,033 votes out of 5,837,965 cast, because in these traditionally Democratic, yet fundamentalist Protestant regions, religion plays a heavy role. In the industrial Midwestern States that ring the Great Lakes (Illinois, Michigan, Indiana, Minnesota, Wisconsin, Ohio), Nixon led by 462,778 out of 17,607,696 votes cast. This, the industrial heartland of the country, remains the greatest single base of Republican strength. The five

TABLE XX

Final Presidential Vote

STATE	TOTAL VOTE	REPUB.	%	DEMO.	%	OTHER	%
ALA.	564,242	237,981	42.2	318,303	56.4	7,958	1.4
ALASKA	60,762	30,953	50.9	29,809	49.1	——	—
ARIZ.	398,491	221,241	55.5	176,781	44.4	469	0.1
ARK.	428,509	184,508	43.1	215,049	50.2	28,952	6.7
CALIF.	6,507,082	3,259,722	50.1	3,224,099	49.5	23,261	0.4
COLO.	736,246	402,242	54.6	330,629	44.9	3,375	0.5
CONN.	1,222,883	565,813	46.3	657,055	53.7	15	—
DEL.	196,683	96,373	49.0	99,590	50.6	720	0.4
FLA.	1,544,180	795,476	51.5	748,700	48.5	4	—
GA.	733,349	274,472	37.4	458,638	62.6	239	—
HAWAII	184,745	92,403	50.0	92,342	50.0	——	—
IDAHO	300,451	161,597	53.8	138,853	46.2	1	—
ILL.	4,757,394	2,368,988	49.8	2,377,846	50.0	10,560	0.2
IND.	2,135,360	1,175,120	55.0	952,358	44.6	7,882	0.4
IOWA	1,273,820	722,381	56.7	550,565	43.2	874	0.1
KAN.	928,825	561,474	60.4	363,213	39.1	4,138	0.5
KY.	1,124,462	602,607	53.6	521,855	46.4	——	—
LA.	807,891	230,980	28.6	407,339	50.4	169,572	21.0
ME.	421,767	240,608	57.0	181,159	43.0	——	—
MD.	1,055,349	489,538	46.4	565,808	53.6	3	—
MASS.	2,469,480	976,750	39.6	1,487,174	60.2	5,556	0.2
MICH.	3,318,097	1,620,428	48.8	1,687,269	50.9	10,400	0.3
MINN.	1,541,887	757,915	49.1	779,933	50.6	4,039	0.3
MISS.	298,171	73,561	24.7	108,362	36.3	116,248	39.0
MO.	1,934,422	962,221	49.7	972,201	50.3	——	—
MONT.	277,579	141,841	51.1	134,891	48.6	847	0.3
NEB.	613,095	380,553	62.1	232,542	37.9	——	—
NEV.	107,267	52,387	48.8	54,880	51.2	——	—
N.H.	295,761	157,989	53.4	137,772	46.6	——	—
N.J.	2,773,111	1,353,324	49.2	1,385,415	49.9	24,372	0.9
N.M.	311,118	153,733	49.4	156,027	50.2	1,358	0.4
N.Y.	7,291,079	3,446,419	47.3	3,830,085	52.5	14,575	0.2
N.C.	1,368,966	655,648	47.9	713,318	52.1	——	—
N.D.	278,431	154,310	55.4	123,963	44.5	158	0.1
OHIO	4,161,859	2,217,611	53.3	1,944,248	46.7	——	—
OKLA.	903,150	533,039	59.0	370,111	41.0	——	—
ORE.	775,462	408,060	52.6	367,402	47.4	——	—
PA.	5,006,541	2,439,956	48.7	2,556,282	51.1	10,303	0.2
R.I.	405,534	147,502	36.4	258,032	63.6	——	—
S.C.	386,687	188,558	48.8	198,129	51.2	——	—
S.D.	306,087	178,017	58.3	128,070	41.7	——	—
TENN.	1,051,792	556,577	52.9	481,453	45.8	13,762	1.3
TEXAS	2,311,670	1,121,699	48.5	1,167,932	50.5	22,039	1.0
UTAH	374,981	205,733	54.8	169,248	45.2	100	—
VT.	167,324	98,131	58.7	69,186	41.3	7	—
VA.	771,449	404,521	52.4	362,327	47.0	4,601	0.6
WASH.	1,241,572	629,273	50.7	599,298	48.3	13,001	1.0
W.VA.	837,781	395,995	47.3	441,786	52.7	——	—
WIS.	1,729,082	895,175	51.8	830,805	48.0	3,102	0.2
WYO.	140,892	77,551	55.0	63,331	45.0	10	—
TOTAL	68,832,818	34,108,582	49.6	34,221,463	49.7	502,773	0.7

Source: White, p. 431.

Pacific States (California, Oregon, Washington, Hawaii, Alaska), provided Nixon with 50.6 per cent of the votes, or a majority of 107,461 votes out of 8,733,361. These five geographic regions of the land gave Nixon in 1960 a majority of 1,623,967 votes.

In New England (Maine, New Hampshire, Vermont, Massachusetts, Rhode Island), the most heavily Catholic section of the country, the Democratic party got more support. Kennedy ran up a majority of 603,587 votes out of 4,977,169 cast of 56.0 per cent. The Old South is the prototype of political sectionalism, where race relations and state's rights are deep seated political values. Traditionally Democratic, in 1960 the Old South registered the greatest and most significant Republican gains in a national election. However, the ten states of the Old South (Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, Texas and Virginia), yielded a majority of 530,693 votes out of 8,865,501 cast, or 52.9 per cent for the Democratic party. In the Middle Atlantic States (New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Maryland, Delaware), Kennedy had 51.5 per cent of the votes, or a majority of 601,570 votes out of 16,372,790 cast.

Kennedy's strategy took into account regional subcultures. He campaigned in the North-Eastern industrial states, Johnson in the Old South. Kennedy-Johnson carried the popular vote in only three regions--New England, the South, and the Middle Atlantic States. Some of the old sectional presidential preferences were eroded.

Political attitudes show considerable variation in terms of residential area. Rural area, central cities, and suburbs contribute differently to the voters' political socialization. Suburbs used to be Republican and central cities Democratic. However, the 1960 elections

jolted this tradition, because Kennedy did well in many suburbs.[1]

There is evidence that persons change their party affiliation when they leave the city. As whites move from the central city to the suburbs, their places are taken by Negroes and lower-income whites who are Democratic in party preference, which has strengthened the Democratic party in the cities.

Although cities differ, the influences of urbanization on American politics is more definite than that of suburban living; industrialism has brought about class politics and its leading issues -- housing, civil rights, collective bargaining, wage and hour laws, unemployment, welfare measures, consumer production. Beginning with Franklin Roosevelt, Democratic candidates for President, with the exception of Stevenson, have carried the largest cities of the United States; majorities in the biggest cities are oriented toward the Democratic party. Industrialization and urbanization have fostered a more national outlook, while sectionalism, as a force for political cleavage and socialization, has receded into the background.

Geographic Influences on Voting in France

In France, political cleavages must be considered within a traditional region context. Voting is still significantly influenced by local traditions. Three regions have remained faithful to their historic orientations. Western France has remained the stronghold of the Right, while southern and central France have remained faithful to the Left.

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[1]William M. Dobrina, Class in Suburbia, New Jersey Prentice Hall, Inc., (Englewood Cliffs, 1963), Chapter 2.

In the presidential election of 1965, Lecanuet received his heaviest support from voters in the North-West, while Tixier-Vignancour received his concentrated votes from the South-West and South-East, where there were many North African repatriates. The plurality of votes from the South, however, went to Mitterand, while in the North-West and North-East it went to De Gaulle.

On the second ballot, the geographical distribution of the votes was similar to that of the first ballot. De Gaulle's greatest strength was in the North and Mitterand's in the South and Center, which are traditionally the strongholds of the Left and Extreme Left, although De Gaulle polled well in some southern areas and Mitterand well in northern urban areas, such as the Paris suburbs and Le Havre.

Siegried observed in 1913 that globally and geographically French election results were unchanged. Goguel in 1965 concluded from a geographical analysis of French elections that the support which French voters gave to Mitterand came less from economic and social factors than from the persistence of historic traditions, which impels the majority of voters in the central, southwestern, and southern regions to vote for the Left.[2] Historic tradition has remained stronger in the rural areas and less populated "departments" than in the urban centers. The voters who favored Mitterand were faithful to a political style and allegiance formed by the end of the nineteenth century. The Left today is defined much more in terms of religious values than social economic interests and does not imply adherence to a common program.

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[2]Francois Goguel, "L'election Presidentielle Francaise de Decembre 1965" Review Francaise de Science Politique (18 April 1966), pp. 221-254.

TABLE XXI

PRESIDENTIAL VOTING INTENTIONS DECEMBER 1-2, AND DECEMBER 14-16, 1965

	December 1-2					December 14-16		
	Per Cent of Sample	De Gaulle	Mitte-rand	Leca-nuet	Others	Per Cent of Sample	De Gaulle	Mitte-rand
Region:								
Paris Region	19	46	29	15.5	9.5	17	51	49
North-West	19	42	25	27	6.0	20	61	39
North-East	25	51	24	19	6.0	26	58.5	41.5
South-West	15	39	25	23	13.0	14	47.5	52.5
South-East	22	31.5	33.5	16	19.0	23	52	48
Size of Community:								
Rural	35.5	43.5	25	21	10.5	35	57	43
Less than 20,000	12	43	26	21	10	14	53	47
20,000-100,000	14.5	40	32	15.5	12.5	14	47.5	52.5
Over 100,000	24.5	40.5	30	20.5	9.0	21	57.5	42.5
Paris Area	13.5	48.5	23.5	17	11	16	52	48

Source: Sondage 1965



Figure 1. Distribution of the Candidates' Strength at the First Ballot. Source: Le Monde, December 7, 1965.

19 Decembre 1965
Votes for De Gaulle

1. 28.2% of the registered voters
2. 20 to 35.9%
3. 36 to 41.9%
4. 42 to 47.9%
5. 48 to 53.9%
6. 54 to 59.9%
7. more than 60%



19 December 1965
Votes for Mitterrand

1. De 12 to 17.9% of the registered voters
2. De 18 to 23.9%
3. De 24 to 29.9%
4. 30 to 35.9%
5. De 36 to 41.9%
6. De 42 to 47.9%
7. De 48 to 53.9%
8. 55.4% or more



Figure 2. Distribution of the Candidates' Strength at the Second Ballot. Source: Le Monde, December.

Geographically, De Gaulle was strongest in the regions of the West, East and Massif Central; Lecanuet in Normandy, the far West and the Massif Central, which were historic strongholds of the old reactionnary and clerical right.

Political and Legal Influences on American Voting Behavior

Political and legal institutions also affect electoral behavior. In the United States the Constitution distributes the powers of government between the national government and the state governments. Originally the American system of government left to the states the regulation of suffrage. But the decentralization of political power contributed to the development of multiple interest groups, which provided an alternative method of political participation by the citizenry.

For parties, interest groups, and governmental institutions mean to attract popular participation. Parties are reference groups for the voters, whose leaders try to enlist the electorate to their cause and mobilize it for the election. The American presidential election is a massive phenomenon. It takes place in three stages. First the delegates of each party in the States meet in convention to designate the presidential candidate of the party. The national committees fix the time and place of the conventions and allot the number of delegates to each state in accordance with the rules established by the preceding conventions. In twelve states, there are "presidential primaries" to designate the delegates and indicate which candidate for the presidency they will support at the convention of the party. It has been said that the primary system of nominations represents an effort to enlarge the responsibilities of the electorate; yet it may weaken party

organizations. In other states the party committees secure the designation of delegates according to different systems -- generally by district committees and state conventions. The delegates who have been thus designated gather later in the national convention of the party.

Although it takes second place to the excitement over nominations, the drafting of the platform is a major function of the convention, a widely publicized statement of party faith. Drafting the platform is assigned to a committee which convenes a week before the convention to hold hearings. Thus, persons from pressure groups are brought into contact with the committee and with the party officials. The same interest groups appear before both parties. The third function performed by the convention is the nomination of the Vice President.

In the second stage of presidential elections the American people vote by party list in the states for the presidential electors. The third phase of the election takes place on the second Monday of December, when the presidential electors vote for the President and the Vice President. This system has been established progressively. The Constitution provides only that each state shall choose a certain number of presidential electors equal to the number of senators and representatives that it sends to the Congress. Originally the legislatures of the states designated the presidential electors. The Constitution is silent concerning the nomination of presidential candidates by party convention; neither the states nor the federal government have attempted to control it. The organization and control of a national convention are the responsibility of the party. The means by which the choice of voters is narrowed to two candidates is almost completely controlled by the parties. However, the influence of public opinion polls and the

presidential primaries operate in the convention to bring about the nomination of a candidate who has strong backing among rank and file party members. For instance, in 1960, the candidates for the Democratic nomination were closely affected by the results of certain state primaries. Kennedy's strong showing in Wisconsin and West Virginia made him the first runner and ended Senator Humphrey's campaign.

The campaign is a most elaborate affair. It lasts at least nine months and motivates millions of Americans into action to support the candidates. Among the sixty million voters in 1960, some 4,000,000 actively participated in the campaign, contributing money, ringing doorbells, posting stanps, and organizing rallies. Lazarsfeld found that the chain of events arising from such campaigning is as follows: campaigning increases exposure; exposure then arouses latent predispositions composed of group or ideological referents; predispositions arouse partisan sentiments, and so the emotional basis is laid for participation.[3]

Political campaigns "are waged to make marginal changes in political alignments."[4] The campaigner has very limited ability to change popular attitudes toward parties, candidates, and public policies or to alter the scope and efficiency of political organizations. He must take as given some of the most important determinants of an election outcome and lay his plans accordingly. He must determine whether there will be primary dependence upon the party machine or whether the

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[3]Theodore H. White, The Making of the President 1960 (New York: Athenum Publishers, 1961), p. 296.

[4]"The Presidential Campaign," in Paul T. David, The Presidential Election and Transition 1960-1961 (Washington, D. C.: The Brookings Institution, 1961), p. 57.

formation of "independent committees" will be encouraged; whether the candidate will depend upon a mass appeal for votes using radio, television, and rallies or whether he will bring his campaign to a personal level by trying to reach as many voters as possible on a hand-shaking basis. In 1960 the television debates between Nixon and Kennedy provided an innovation in the political use of this medium of mass communication. The number of people who watched the first debate was close to 75 million and it has been estimated that 120 million people saw one or more of the debates.

However some writers have found that campaigning has a limited value, since most voters have made up their minds before the campaign starts. In the study of the 1940 presidential race within a single county, it was found that half the voters of Erie County, Ohio, knew in May how they would vote in November and never changed their minds; 25 per cent made up their minds following the national party conventions in 1940. Thus only one voter in four had much sensitivity to the appeals of the two candidates during the campaign. But this undecided minority would hold the balance of power in any presidential election and is important to justify intensive campaigning by both parties.[5]

A similar study of the 1948 presidential election in Elmira, New York, found that most voters remained constant during the campaign, while 29 per cent wavered between parties or from their normal party affiliation. Sixty-four per cent had decided by June; another 15

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[5]P. Lazarsfeld, Berelson and M. Gaudet, The People's Choice: How the Voter Makes up His Mind in a Presidential Campaign (New York: Duell Sloan & Pearce, Inc., 1944).

per cent came to a final conclusion in August; only 11 per cent in October.[6]

The American Voter concludes that 65 to 75 per cent of those who vote make up their minds by the end of the national convention and before the campaign starts; another 10 to 20 per cent between the start of the campaign and two weeks before the election. One out of ten remains undecided until the last two weeks before the election.[7] Thus it can be concluded that the institution of campaigning has only limited significance in influencing voters' behavior in American presidential elections.

TABLE XXII

TIME OF VOTING IN PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS
(VOTERS ONLY)

Question: How long before the election did you decide that you were going to vote the way you did?

	1948	1952	1956	1960
Knew all along	37	30	44	24
Before the Conventions, when knew candidates would run	37	4	14	6
At the time of the Conventions	28	20	18	30
During the Campaign	14	10	12	25
In the last two weeks	12	--	8	11
Don't remember, not ascertained	9	4	4	4
	100	100	100	100

Source: University of Michigan Survey Research Center

[6]B. Berelson, P. Lazarsfeld, and W. McPhee, Voting (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1964).

[7]Angus Campbell, et al., The American Voter (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1960), Chapter 4.

Political and Legal Influences on French Voting Behavior

In France, the President is elected for a term of seven years; there is no limitation on successive re-election. Qualifications and procedures are regulated by statutes, and the conduct of the election is administered by the Constitutional Council, which serves as the presidential election board. Nomination is by petition: each candidate is required to have 100 signatures of persons who must be either members of Parliament, the national Social and Economic Council, general councillors of the Departments, or mayors, and these must be residents of not less than ten different Departments of France. An absolute majority of votes is required to win on the first ballot. If there is not majority candidate on the first ballot, a second election must take place between the two leading candidates, and a plurality is sufficient to win. Should either of the two leading candidates choose to withdraw from the second ballot, the candidate or candidates next in line would be placed on that ballot.

Since election of the President must take place not less than 20 days and not more than 35 days prior to the expiration of the term of the incumbent, or in the event of the death or removal of the incumbent, not less than 20 days nore more than 35 days afterwards, the period of the campaign is limited by law to a maximum of three weeks. Although in 1965 the political parties did endorse a candidate, party leaders took little active part in the campaigning. Party organizations did contribute assistance to the candidates by arranging local meetings and preparing and mailing out election circulars. The most significant medium for the candidates was the national television which the government made available to each of the candidates; two hours were provided

for use as the candidate preferred. Private television also made its facilities available, and a number of "debates" took place between prominent backers of several of the candidates. A sampling of voters who had viewed the candidates on television found that some 20 per cent changed their minds as the result of the television exposure by the candidates; most of those who indicated a change of voting intention switched to Lecanuet on the first ballot and to Mitterand on the second ballot. De Gaulle may be presumed to have suffered some loss of support in favor of the younger candidates as a result of the television showing. There is no evidence that the personal tours of the candidates, the many local meetings and rallies held by the candidates' supporters, the showing of porpaganda films, and the widespread display of campaign posters and circulation of printed publicity had a significant influence on the voters' decision to support a particular candidate.

In this first election of the French President by popular vote, it was generally expected that De Gaulle would win a majority on the first ballot. Only two of the opposition candidates had strong party backing -- Mitterand, who had the support of the entire Left, and Lecanuet, who could expect the support of the moderate Catholic voters. A fourth candidate, Tixier-Vignancour, was supported by the anti-Gaullist Extreme Right. Although De Gaulle ran well ahead of his closest rival, Mitterand, his total vote fell far short of the required majority, thus necessitating a run-off election. Despite the fact that Lecanuet announced his personal preference for Mitterand, and Tixier-Vignancour called upon his supporters to defeat De Gaulle, the incumbent President was able to attract almost as many of these opposition votes as Mitterand in the run-off election. De Gaulle's percentage of vote increased

from 44,645 per cent on the first ballot to 55,20 per cent on the second, while that of Mitterand went from 31,722 per cent to 44,80 per cent. Although De Gaulle forfeited most of the Extreme Right vote, he attracted nearly two-thirds of the moderate vote of the Catholic Center group.

TABLE XXIII

RESULTS OF 1965 FRENCH PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION

December 5		
Registered Voters	28,914,581	
Voting	24,502,916 (84,743%)	
Abstentions	4,411,665 (15,257%)	
Invalid Ballots	248,360 (1,013%)	
De Gaulle	10,828,521 (44,645%)	of expressed votes
Mitterand	7,694,005 (31,722%)	
Lecanuet	3,777,120 (15,572%)	
Tixier-Vignancour	1,260,208 (5,196%)	
Marcilhacy	415,017 (1,711%)	
Barbu	279,685 (1,153%)	
December 19		
Registered Voters	28,920,909	
Voting	24,378,401	
Abstentions	4,542,508 (15,70%)	
Invalid Ballots	669,747 (2,31%)	
De Gaulle	13,085,407 (55,20%)	
Mitterand	10,623,247 (44,80%)	

Source: Année Politique 1965, pp, 106-114.

CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSIONS

The purpose of this thesis was to evaluate the relative significance of a number of variables in order to discover what motivated voters in the United States and France in the American presidential election of 1960 and the French presidential election of 1965. A number of hypotheses were formulated respecting the significance of the selected variables. These conclusions will sum up the major findings of the research and provide a commentary on the variations between the voting behavior of American and French voters. Certain broad generalizations will be made concerning the implications of voting behavior in presidential elections on the party systems of democratic societies.

The data and evidences of this research generally supported the hypothesis that in the United States most voters support the candidate of the party with which they identify. It may also be stated that the importance of the presidential election, which is reflected in the extremely high incidence of popular participation, has been a strong influence on the development and persistence of the two-party system in the United States.

In France, the voters participated for the first time in the election of a President in 1965; the upgrading of that office by the Constitution of the Fifth Republic resulted in a record participation of voters, which exceeded by more than 10 per cent voting in

parliamentary elections. Despite the traditional division of the French electorate into a multi-party system, the voters divided their votes on the second run-off ballot in accordance with the basic ideological division of Left and Right attitudes and values. On the first ballot the parties of the Left concentrated their support for only one candidate, as was true of the principal parties of the Right; the only other candidate of any importance was the leader of the moderate Center, whose showing necessitated a run-off election between the candidates of the Left and Right. Although there is no evidence yet to support the hypothesis that the bipolarization of voters in French presidential elections will significantly re-shape the multiparty system into a two-party system, the results of recent parliamentary elections do show an increasing bipolarization of the parties and their elected representatives into Left and Right blocs. The data did show that in France the voters deviated from straight party voting patterns to support presidential candidates who corresponded to their basic ideological attitudes and values.

The research on American and French voting behavior also revealed a significant relationship between the political attitudes and values of voters and such factors as socio-economic status, ethnic groupings, religion, and sectional or geographic traditions. In both the United States and France social status, as determined by occupation and income, divides the voters rather sharply: those of lower status tend to be Democrats in the United States and to support the candidate of the Left in France. As one ascends the ladder of social status in both countries, the ratio of support for the conservative candidate increases--to favor the Republican candidate in the United States and the candidate

of the Right in France. In the United States, Catholics and members of the more fundamentalist protestant churches are predominantely Democrats, whereas in France, it is the non-religious or non-practicing Catholics who identify with the Left. Americans who are high-church Protestants are generally Republicans, while devout Catholics in France prefer the candidate of the Right to that of the Left. A closely related variable is the higher incidence of support by French women for the political Right, which corresponds to the higher degree of devoutness among French women. Although sectional interests and geographic traditions are still evident in the patterns of voting of Americans and French, these variables were not decisive in the presidential elections of the United States (1960) or France (1965).

The research indicated that in both the United States and France the voters were not significantly influenced by the issues which the candidates raised in the campaign. Most of the voters had already decided in favor of a particular candidate on the basis of other factors before the campaign took place. The manner in which the candidates chose to raise and deal with issues had only marginal effect on the voters. Those who had not already formulated a preference for other reasons tended to be voters who do not participate regularly in legislative elections, who have a low incidence of party identification, and who are more likely to be influenced by charismatic appeals than issues. In both the United States and France the number of voters who participate in presidential elections exceeds that of participants in strictly legislative elections.

In both the United States and France candidate appeal to the voters was significant. Much of this personal appeal of the candidates

was due to their general ideological orientation: Kenndey addressed himself to the masses, who had provided such high popular majorities for Roosevelt, as the candidate who would continue the social policies of the New Deal and Fair Deal. In France, De Gaulle promised to pursue the politics of conservatism -- public order, stability of the regime, tight fiscal and monetary policy, and international power and prestige. The general ideology which the candidates espoused acquired appeal also from the personal qualities and style of the candidates. Both Kennedy and De Gaulle generated a certain amount of charisma among the voters by their attractive personalities, which, in turn, helped to spread the appeal of the respective ideologies that they had endorsed.

The variable which seems to have had major significance in both the United States and France in presidential and legislative elections has been the institutional nature of the presidency and the method of election of the chief executive. Because of the singular importance of the American presidency, the diverse interest groups of American society were, at an early historic date, forced to coalesce into broad coalitions, which became the basis of the American two-party system. Group interests in the United States have compelled, because of the extraordinary powers of leadership of the President and the patronage and administrative favors which he disposed, to involve themselves in the politics of electing a President. The norms (statutory and customary) by which the American President is elected required, therefore, the merging into two broad party coalitions of the disparate interest groups and the voting public.

In France, multipartism flourished under the parliamentary regime because the executive was made up of shifting combinations of party

leaders within the legislature who provided representation for various interest groups within the collective known as the Cabinet. The leader of the Cabinet was the person who could best manage or arbitrate between the disparate party groupings who agreed to collaborate in return for their fair share of the spoils of power. In this system, the French voters delegated their authority to party representatives and leaders to act in their interest; the voters did not make decisions through elections, nor did the parties make any commitments to their electorates other than vague testimonials to ideological tenets. Multipartism satisfied the politicians and some interest-groups in France, but not the voters.

The introduction of a strong presidential office elected directly by the people in France has required the candidates to establish a direct bond of consensus with the electorate. The candidates have sought, through various parties and interest groups acting as reference groups, to establish a rapport with the electorate. In doing so, however, the candidates have contributed to the process of re-combining heterogeneous and even disparate elements of the public into more effective voting blocs. A Gaullist bloc of three parties has been welded into a compact coalition which has presented a united front against the parties of the Center and Left in parliamentary elections. The severe defeat of the parties of the Left and Center in recent parliamentary elections was due more to their failure to present a united front than to their loss of electoral support. Unless they are willing to accept a permanent loss of influence, which is unlikely, the parties of the Left and Center might be expected to match the Right.

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