

THE PENTAGON AND THE AMERICAN
GENERAL STAFF

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Colorado Springs, Colorado

1981

Submitted to the Faculty of the
Graduate College of the
Oklahoma State University
in partial fulfillment of
the requirements for
the Degree of
MASTER OF ARTS
December, 1986

Thesis
1986
058p
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PREFACE

A proposal for the reorganization of the Pentagon is submitted with the full knowledge that similar findings by individuals far more experienced have been disregarded. My efforts were aimed at not only what is wrong with the present system, but what has worked in the past.

Two major obstacles made my work more complicated than anticipated. Due to the ongoing debate concerning the Joint Chiefs of Staff, new information became available over the past few months, some of which had direct bearing on my studies. Also, as an insider looking out, I found it hard to accept many of the criticisms aimed at my profession.

I am indebted to Professor Harold V. Sare for his help not only on my thesis but my entire graduate studies program. Had it not been for his guidance, patience, and understanding, I would not have succeeded.

I also wish to thank my wonderful wife, Barbara, for her support during the often trying times of my absence, and encouragement toward achieving my goals.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

The military services' inability or unwillingness to work together has led this nation to military disaster or near-disaster. This has happened not once, or twice, but repeatedly since our services were first required to coordinate their efforts. And the sad fact is that these problems persist. There will be those who say the system "ain't broke, so don't fix it." However, it is broke, and we need to fix it. If we don't, our effectiveness will be seriously impaired.¹

Senator Barry Goldwater
2 October 1985

In one statement, Senator Barry Goldwater, himself a retired Air Force Major General, sent a jolt through the entrenched bureaucracy of the Pentagon and signalled the beginning of one of the most widespread and controversial studies of the American military establishment to date. Goldwater is not alone in his efforts; numerous commissions and interest groups have launched their own individual investigations. And while there are many such studies, they all seem to focus on the same issue: the current way America prepares for and fights wars is outmoded.

It is widely held that the last significant successful military operation the United States' has conducted was the Inchon invasion in 1950. Since that time, even the most optimistic observer cannot overlook the plethora of failed operations we have suffered: the thirteen year debacle of Vietnam culminating in the clumsy Mayaguez raid of 1975 in which forty-one died to save forty; the Iran rescue raid of 1980 where eight died and no one was rescued; the tragedy of Beirut which claimed the lives of 241 Marines; the invasion of Grenada in 1983 in which "the high heroism of the troops had to redeem gross failures of planning and command";² and the Lebanon bombing raid of December 4, 1983, when the U.S. Navy lost two aircraft in a region where others bombed day after day with no losses at all. To a nation which believes that, in the words of Douglas MacArthur, "there is no substitute for victory", our military performance is less than spectacular. As Edward N. Luttwak, Senior Fellow at Georgetown University's Center for Strategic and International Studies, indicates, "shaped by laws, regulations, and military priorities that date back to 1945-1948, the very structures of the armed forces and of the Department of Defense are now badly outmoded; and we now know that the system is quite incapable of self-reform."³

The United States' failure in Vietnam is a complex discussion still not totally answered; the fault lies with many. Among them, the failure of the military structure and command system, not only leaders but institutions, is

especially dismal. Writing under the alias Cincinnatus, the author of Self Destruction comments, "the old refrain that the army failed because of political softness and social unrest at home is still the theme song of the upper ranks. The fact is that the military disaster in Vietnam grew out of ineptitude at the top."⁴

Once troops were committed to Vietnam, the Joint Chiefs of Staff deemed it necessary to conform to the unified command system, that is, all services on equal footing. Notwithstanding, the war was primarily fought on the ground, the guerrilla nature alone would seem to dictate heavy emphasis on the Army. This would not be the case. The result was that petty rivalries and competition among all branches of the armed forces caused confusion in policy, enormous staffs, and more emphasis placed on corporate harmony than on prosecution of the war.

Each service took a "role enhancing" slice of the war, and the subsequent overlapping effort and chain of command created an extremely top heavy rank structure. By 1968, Saigon staff officers and their aides numbered 6,407 for the Army element alone.⁵ Even though the number of troops in the field declined dramatically over the next three years, the Saigon staff grew to 13,905.⁶ The Air Force and Navy were also represented in similar fashion. By 1968, there were 110 generals and admirals stationed in Vietnam.⁷

Even with the high number of senior officers in Vietnam, the key decisions affecting almost every aspect of

the war were made in Washington. Targets for airstrikes were drawn up by the Secretary of Defense. A whole series of restrictions were placed on aircrews to avoid inflicting civilian casualties including putting many surface to air missile sights off limits, limiting the opportunities to engage enemy aircraft, even dictating the routes and altitudes aircraft could fly to the targets. The result was that scores of American airmen lost their lives, and many more were captured. But the overcontrol continued with little interference throughout the war, and defied the very essence of military theory.

The maze of bureaucratic offices and intrigues resulting from this top heavy command structure caused a veritable dearth of strategic thinking as individual interests competed for a "piece of the pie." On a given operation, such as retaking an enemy held village, the infantry would propose a normal seize and clear attack, the air cavalry would argue an airborne assault was in order, artillery officers maintained that a pulverizing barrage would make assault unnecessary, if the target was close to the sea the Navy wanted to use its surface combatants with their larger guns to do the job, the Air Force felt fighter bombers could be more accurate and deadly, and Strategic Air Command (SAC), an entity of its own, felt fighter bombers were but toys in comparison to the B-52s available. Special Forces would claim all of the other methods were improper and utterly clumsy, and proposed its own campaign of winning

the confidence of the populace through economic and medical aid while also killing the enemy. At the same time, the American advisers to South Vietnam stated repeatedly that all this could be done without risk to Americans if sufficient aid and training was given to the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) forces.

Under ideal conditions, such a wide array of weapons and tactics would seem valuable to a commander in war, but with the unified system each element of the overall American force was given equitable consideration. The result was that targets were divided accordingly, operations assigned, and each element allowed to carry out its own standard operation, regardless of merit or utility.

With such a nebulous strategy, or lack of strategy, the American military tradition of obtainable goals was in danger. The answer came in the form of production; quantifying the quantifiable. "Thus the three air forces achieved great efficiencies in generating the highest possible number of daily bombing sorties; the Artillery worked hard to fire as many shells as possible; the Infantry and Air Cavalry tried to obtain the most "contracts" to score the highest body counts in assaults, patrols, and sweeps; and all the other forces and service units did their best to produce the most, each in its own way according to its own measure."⁸

More than anything else, the body count exemplifies America's involvement in Vietnam. In a war with no front

lines and few visible means of determining success or failure, the number of enemy killed served as a convenient substitute. The result was body counts became an end in themselves; passes were granted to soldiers for killing the enemy, senior officers inflated figures to enhance their own prestige, and a whole new system for dealing with this new form of "taking the high ground" was devised.⁹ The reported totals of enemy casualties were subsequently vastly exaggerated. As one observer noted, "I know one unit that lost 18 men in an ambush and reported 131 enemy body count. I was on the ground at the tail end of the battle and I saw five enemy bodies. I doubt if there were any more."¹⁰

By 1968, the American effort in Vietnam ran amok. At the end of that year, 536,000 troops were on hand. This number was a source of criticism from all quarters, but the true number of U.S. combatants was even more interesting. Fewer than 80,000 men served in infantry battalions. Even when allowing generously for the rest of the units directly facing the enemy, the "teeth to tail" ratio of combatants to support personnel was exceedingly small. As Luttwak puts it, "the country gave its men to be soldiers, but the system turned them into clerks and valets, mechanics and storekeepers, in huge and disproportionate numbers."¹¹

The institutional nature of the different services not only forced a high degree of competition, but of self indulgence. While only four generals were killed in Vietnam from 1961 to 1972, half of the hundreds of generals that

served there were decorated for bravery.¹² In 1968, over 14,000 servicemen lost their lives in Southeast Asia and over 400,000 decorations were handed out.¹³ In 1970, although the U.S. presence was decidedly smaller and the number of dead fell below 4,000, the number of decorations soared to 522,000.¹⁴

The longest war in American history ended in 1975 as the last Americans left South Vietnam, which was overrun by North Vietnamese armored divisions and conquered in a lightning offensive. Off Cambodia, the U.S. ship Mayaguez and its crew were captured by enemy forces. Caught completely off guard and unprepared, naval and air forces were rushed to the area. The situation was unclear, and various reports placed the American prisoners on the Mayaguez, in Cambodia and on a small island off the Cambodian coast.

President Ford, unsure of the actual position of the American crew and well aware of anti war sentiment in the United States, hesitated to take swift action. When he did, it was disastrous. A contingent of Marines was landed on Ko Tang Island, where they met defenses in depth and took heavy casualties. The Mayaguez was boarded and found abandoned. A helicopter, carrying Marine replacements, crashed after losing power with total loss of life. Several others were shot down on Ko Tang Island.

The American crew was finally located aboard a boat bound for the mainland, and they were rescued. The Marine

force on Ko Tang Island, very nearly driven into the sea by counter attack earlier, was withdrawn late in the day. Forty one American servicemen lost their lives, a pyrrhic victory in saving forty.¹⁵

The Mayaquez incident was indeed Vietnam in a nutshell. The lack of planning for the possibility of having a ship captured, even though the same thing happened to the Pueblo off North Korea in 1968, left the military leadership in the blind. The response was predictable and clumsy. We coordinated tremendous firepower and numerical superiority, but failed to use them effectively. The entire operation was directed from Washington. In fact, President Ford at one point talked directly to Navy fighter pilots as they flew above the battle area.¹⁶

The same command structure which failed in Vietnam remains the backbone of the American military system. It's inherent faults would be the cause of military disaster in the desert of Iran in 1980 as a highly trained, top secret American force attempted to rescue the American foreign service workers taken hostages by radical students. Once again, the lessons of war went unheeded. The strike force was composed of Delta Force, an Army unit specifically designed for such an event, Air Force personnel for transportation, and a number of support troops. The number of people taken was pared to the absolute minimum for secrecy and mobility, but with all services wanting representation, Air Force helicopters and pilots, trained in

long, terrain following flights and equipped for the environment, were deleted in favor of the Navy. As Colonel Charlie Beckwith, commander of Delta Force, waited impatiently for the overdue helicopters, he saw the operation slipping away. In the end, several never made it because of sand storms and mechanical failure, and the raid had to be aborted. The final act came when Marine pilots, apparently afraid their Air Force tankers might take off without them, attempted to leave. A collision ensued in which eight died.

Not only did the raid suffer from poor coordination, the chain of command stretched from Col Beckwith to General David Jones, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. A communications link gave him control over the raid from the National Military Command Center in the Pentagon. The command system was a model of complexity. An Army colonel commanded the ground force, a Naval officer commanded the helicopters (his never reached the sight), and an Air Force commander was present, as well as one for the landing zone. Between Desert One and the Pentagon was a middle level command set up in Egypt with an Army major general and his Air Force aid.

The Iran raid was doomed by over control, over complexity, and lack of common training between all elements of the strike force. British, French, and Israeli commando experts were astonished by the lack of unification in the American force; specialists in small numbers might be

attached to units, but the sharing of responsibilities in such an undertaking did more than anything the enemy could have done to end any chance of success.

Despite the military failures and embarrassments of the past decade, the institutional problems remain. Three events in 1983 serve to illustrate the deep structural defects in the military: the terrorist bombing of Marine headquarters in Beirut on October 23, Operation "Urgent Fury" (the invasion of Grenada on October 25), and the Navy bombing strike in Lebanon on December 9.

A commission, headed by Admiral Robert L. J. Lang, was convened by the Secretary of Defense, to explain the loss of 241 Marines in Beirut. The commission was highly critical of the commanders involved. It sharply criticized the lack of elementary security measures, for concentrating 350 servicemen in a single building, and unmilitary instructions to the forces guarding the headquarters (they were ordered to keep their weapons unloaded). Even more important, the commission found the chain of command "did not initiate actions to ensure the security of the USMNF [the Marines] in light of the deteriorating political/military situation in Lebanon. The Commission found a lack of effective command supervision."¹⁷

Responsibility for the battalion in Lebanon was hopelessly diluted: orders came down from USCINCEUR, the unified headquarters for U.S. forces in Europe, to CINCUSNAVEUR, the headquarters for U.S. naval forces in

Europe, to COMSIXTHFLT, the fleet headquarters in charge of Navy and Marine activities in the Mediterranean, to CTF 61, the amphibious task force to which the Marines were attached, to the commander of the Marine amphibious unit, to the battalion commander.¹⁸ The commission reported that even after the October 23 bombing, security precautions were inadequate as the layered staffs moved requests through too slowly. Only after members of the commission visited the area were steps taken to improve security.

The invasion of Grenada began early on the morning of October 25, 1983, and succeeded. It should have, because a full Marine amphibious unit consisting of 1250 men and two Ranger battalions assaulted the island, and were supported by fighter bombers from a U.S. aircraft carrier and Air Force gunships. Their opposition was composed of less than 700 Cubans and a handful of Grenadans.

Of the 700 or so Cubans on Grenada, no more than 43 were professional soldiers, including 22 officers.¹⁹ Grenada was also unprotected by any sort of an air defense system, nor were there any tanks or artillery pieces available. Nevertheless, the initial invasion forces required reinforcements on the second day of the operation as General John Vessey, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff announced, "we got a lot more resistance than we expected."²⁰ Elements of the 82nd Airborne Division were ordered into the area, and more followed on the third day. The primary reason for Operation Urgent Fury, at least

publically, was the danger faced by hundreds of American medical students attending school in Grenada. A 24 hour shoot on sight curfew was imposed by Bernard Coard's new government, and the spectre of another Iran hostage system loomed large in the mind of President Reagan. Other key goals were political prisoners at the Richmond Hill prison and the residence of Governor-General Sir Paul Scoon, the Queen's representative and the only real alternative to the Coard regime.

Instead of swift, decisive action, the operation degenerated into a series of fire fights and mistakes. The students at St. Georges Medical College were almost forgotten and in fact called the American forces for help. The Cuban forces on the island might well have captured or killed them at will. The force sent to take Richmond Hill prison failed in its objective and was rescued by Marines after taking casualties. A team of Navy SEALS (their own elite troops), met armored cars enroute to the Governor-Generals house, and had only small arms to oppose them. Surrounded at Scoon's house, all but one was wounded. They were unable to call for help immediately, because Navy and Army radio equipment were incompatible; the SEALS eventually used the residence telephone to call in support.²¹

By the time the island was secured, 18 American servicemen died and 116 were wounded. Several helicopters were shot down and more were damaged. Accidents claimed the lives of several soldiers as a Navy boat overturned and two

Army helicopters collided, and 21 Grenadans died in a bombing accident.²²

In the immediate aftermath of the conflict, military leaders presented the outcome as a great triumph. The numerous problems were excused by poor intelligence and determined resistance of Cuban "professionals," both of which were shallow rationalizations. On the positive side, American troops, especially the Rangers, showed great courage and innovativeness. But in the end, the same problems from the past plagued the operation and caused unnecessary loss of life.

First, although Urgent Fury was a land battle, the operation was planned and commanded by the Navy because Grenada lay within the boundaries of the Atlantic Command in Norfolk, Virginia. Even though there was an Army deputy, there was no single commander for the ground forces. Apparently, the Navy and Army could not reach an agreement on the matter. So while there was no naval battle to speak of, the Navy ran the show.

The fact that the Navy planned the operation was very evident in the nature of the invasion. As Edward Luttwak explains, the natural Army tendency would have been to conduct a "coup de main," in which bodies of troops large enough to suppress any resistance are simultaneously placed on the target proper; there is no need for tactical movement as objectives are taken at once.²³ The Navy course of action, easily understood from a historical perspective, is

a bridgehead invasion plan. In much the same way American forces took Pacific islands, forces invaded, established bases, and moved inland. The inherent problem with this, especially on a small island, is that the enemy can use interior lines to regroup and establish resistance. It was inevitable that we met opposition continually as we advance inland.

The bureaucratic struggle also manifested itself in the forces used, specifically the Navy SEALs. Trained to infiltrate in twos and threes to gather intelligence, these Navy commandos were improperly employed as a strike team. Their normal armament, light automatic weapons, was overmatched by Soviet built armored cars and they were forced to fight in the open.

In the end, all the objectives of Operation Urgent Fury were met, but it is an understatement to say we were lucky. A 645 page Senate report on America's defense, sighting serious shortages of vital supplies and poor Army-Navy coordination, stated "in a more serious fight against a stronger and more sophisticated enemy, these organizational failures could prove disastrous."²⁴ But the failure would continue.

In punitive strikes against targets in the Chouf and Metn mountains east of Beirut on December 4, 1983, the Navy lost 2 aircraft out of a strike force of 28.²⁵ This would not normally be considered a high number, but closer examination reveals poor planning and lack of preparation by

the Navy. The Israeli Air Force shot down 88 aircraft and destroyed a large number of missile sights without the loss of a single plane in an environment much more dangerous than that faced by the Navy.²⁶ In fact, the Israelis had prevented any full scale development of an anti-aircraft missile defense in Lebanon. The Navy faced only small guns and heat seeking missiles, both of which could be defeated with minor countermeasures, but were not.

Heat seeking missiles can be thwarted by simple flares and hot balloons. Even though these are used by the Air Force and several foreign countries, the Navy did not have any. Planners refused to buy them in favor of more ships and aircraft, for institutional growth. Small arms fire can be easily defeated by either attacking at night (Navy planes are equipped with night-vision equipment), low level attack, or a surprise attack with hidden routing to the target. The planning officers on the carrier task force knew this, but were not allowed to plan out the airstrike. In a committee setting, the Joint Chiefs in Washington negotiated with the unified command headquarters in Europe, the Navy headquarters in Europe, and the Sixth Fleet (strangely reminiscent of the Beirut tragedy). The result, had it not involved the loss of lives and aircraft, was almost comic. The attack was launched at 3:00 A.M. with good visibility for gunners; the aircraft gathered at 20,000 feet over the task force ensuring early detection; and the attack was made from 3,000 feet, ideally within the range of small heat

seeking missiles. No competent officer would have prescribed such an attack, but as Rear Admiral Roger Box, commander of the aircraft carrier battle group stated, orders for the air strike were "dictated by a higher chain of command than the Navy."²⁷ He added, "the sun was highlighting our aircraft while the missile sights were in the shadows, and we lost two aircraft."²⁸

Measured against this list of failures and half victories, there have been limited successes. In 1981, Navy interceptors shot down two Libyan fighter aircraft in the Gulf of Sidra with relative ease. Four years later, in an attempt to demonstrate that "you may run, but you can't hide," an airliner carrying terrorists who hijacked an ocean liner and killed an American citizen was tracked, intercepted, and forced to land in Italy by four Navy F-14's. Most recently, and most daring, was a raid on Libya in retaliation for a Berlin disco bombing. A large strike force of Air Force aircraft from England flew a 2800 mile route to avoid European airspace and timed their attack to coincide with Navy planes from two carrier battle groups. While the effects of the attack are still being assessed, it was an impressive display of mobility, timing, and will.

Critics of defense reform sight these military actions as proof that the system works, but with the exception of the most recent raid, forces from only one service were involved. There in lies the main problem. As separate organizations, the Army, Navy, Marines, and Air Force have

developed extensive doctrine and tactics suitable to prosecuting a war which they may fight. But there will be no war that will involve only one branch, they must all fight together. And while the unified command system espouses this, in reality the very organization and rules by which the Joint Chiefs of Staff operate make it virtually impossible. Not only is this a recognized fact now, but has been for some time.

Just one year after the formation of the JCS, it was reevaluated by the Hoover Commission. Four major criticisms were raised: (1) the aloofness on the JCS from the other parts of the national security organization; (2) their excessive concern with Service particularization and aggrandizement; (3) their inability, because of obligations within their Service Chief roles, to devote sufficient time to joint matters; and (4) an excessive burden of minor matters. The report was issued in 1948, and although reorganization steps were taken in 1953 and 1958, no substantive progress has resulted.²⁹

Nor has there been any lack of criticism from authoritative sources. In 1953, General of the Army Omar Bradley complained of "--compromise rather than integrated policy; --too great a focus on short run and superficial rather than long-range fundamental issues."³⁰ In 1982, General David C. Jones summarized "we need to spend more time on our warfighting capabilities and less on intramural squabbles for resources."³¹ As Alice Norris, a civilian

intelligence analyst, puts it, there are three characteristics of the JCS which provide a starting point for change and at the same time mark the binding limits for evolution: one, it is a committee system; two, it is a coordinating system; and three, it is an advisory, not a decision making, system. These characteristics have been incorporated into the JCS by legislation over the past four decades.³²

There are no easy solutions to the problem of military reform. Whether or not a form of JCS reorganization does succeed, and a more centralized, coherent establishment is realized, will depend on a number of factors. Is there a sense of urgency within the defense organization sufficient to overcome traditional practices and bureaucratic inertia? Does Congress fully understand the needs of the military, and can it force reform? Is there even a need for major overhauls in the system, or will evolutionary change remedy the perceived problems?

The most comprehensive work on defense reorganization is found in The Pentagon and the Art of War, by Edward Luttwak. In it, he describes the numerous failures of the military establishment and the reasons for them. He also suggests a variety of reforms, including the establishment of a general staff system. Alice Norris, working with the National Security Council and the Air Force, examined the role of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and possible reforms in 1984 with her paper "A General Staff for the United States?"

As a philosopher once noted, there are no simple answers, only logical alternatives. Therefore, to fully grasp the complexities of the defense establishment, its problems, and possible cures, a short history of the Joint Chiefs of Staff will lay the foundation for possible reform, and will be followed by criticisms of the JCS. An alternative, the formation of a general staff, will be presented by defining what a general staff is, reviewing several general staffs from the past and present, and discussing their relative strengths and weaknesses. Combining both discussions, a discussion on how a general staff could improve the American military establishment and allow the Pentagon to serve in the strategic role for which it was intended will be made. Going beyond the works of Luttwak and Norris, restructuring the Joint Chiefs of Staff and service chains of command to fully utilize a general staff is presented. Finally, the prospects for a general staff will be addressed. In light of opposition to real change within the military and the historical American mistrust of a centralized military control, the likelihood of such reform must be critically assessed.

ENDNOTES

¹Senator Barry Goldwater, Congressional Oversight of National Defense. 99th Congress, 1st Session, October 2, 1985, S12403-04.

²Senator Sam Nunn, Congressional Oversight of National Defense. 99th Congress, 1st Session, October 2 1985, S12406.

³Edward Luttwak, The Pentagon and the Art of War (New York, 1985), p. 18.

⁴Cincinnatus, Self Destruction (New York, 1981), p. 2.

⁵Luttwak, p. 28.

⁶Ibid.

⁷Ibid.

⁸Ibid, p.21.

⁹Cincinnatus, p. 75.

¹⁰Ibid. p. 81.

¹¹Luttwak, p. 32.

¹²Ibid, p. 33.

¹³Ibid.

¹⁴Ibid.

¹⁵Ibid, p.17.

¹⁶Ibid, p.86.

¹⁷Ibid, p. 17.

¹⁸Ibid, p. 51.

¹⁹Ibid.

²⁰Ibid, p. 53.

²¹Senator Nunn, Congressional Oversight of National Defense, S12405

²²Luttwak, p. 55.

²³Luttwak, p. 56.

²⁴"Defense Organization: The Need for Change," : Armed Forces Journal, October, 1985, p. 14.

²⁵Luttwak, p. 58.

²⁶Ibid.

²⁷Ibid, p. 59.

²⁸Ibid.

²⁹Leonard Wainstein, "The Problem of the Joint Chiefs of Staff." International Security Review (Fall, 1982), p. 234.

³⁰Alice L. Norris, "A General Staff for the United States?" Air War College, 1984, p. 32.

³¹Ibid, p. 33.

³²Ibid, p. 31.

CHAPTER II

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

Although the Joint Chiefs of Staff has, as an institution, served for over 40 years, there have been few substantive changes to it. This is not to say there has been no attempt to alter or restructure the JCS; dozens of proposals have been submitted to modernize and make it more efficient.

Until World War II the United States was reluctant to establish any form of a unified command system for its national defense. Insulated by the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans, isolationist in nature, and traditionally suspicious of the military, the U.S. was content with the 19th century makeup of its land and naval forces. There was little impetus to develop an organization to plan and direct the armed forces and opposition to centralize military control.

The U.S. entry into World War II was the direct reason for the creation of the JCS. The limited cooperation between the Army and Navy brought about by the Joint Army-Navy Board was inadequate for wartime operations. The rapidly developing relationship between the U.S. and Great Britain was enhanced by the Arcadia Conference in late 1941

which established the Combined Chiefs of Staff for directing the Anglo-American effort.¹ While the British were well prepared for staff operations (with one of their own for some 20 years), the Americans were not.

The original JCS was probably the most efficient one ever and certainly contained the most famous military leaders. The staff was made up of Army Chief of Staff General George Marshall; Admiral Ernest King, Commander-in-Chief, US Fleet; and General Henry "Hap" Arnold, Commanding General of the Army Air Forces.² Later, the position of Chief of Staff to the Commander in Chief was created and filled by Admiral William Leahy, and he became the senior member of the staff.³ These officers served for the remainder of the war and directed the largest armed force in the history of the United States.

Even with the newly formed organization, the Army and Navy chose not to cooperate fully. There were, for all purposes, two separate wars, with the Army directing the war against Germany and the Navy against Japan. The Air Force, still a part of the Army, was not invited to debate the issue. This system worked well enough during the war due to the vast resources commanded by both the Army and Navy and the geographic nature of the war, but problems emerged in the post-war period.

The legislative basis for the existence of the JCS was the National Security Act of 1947. The Army, planning for a general staff since before the war, naturally intended to

dominate the structure. At the same time, the Navy sought to thwart any attempts to redefine the traditional naval role and was highly critical of the Army's plans during Congressional hearings. This antipathy to unification continues today.

The actual makeup and evolution of the JCS was not the product of carefully weighed lessons of warfare, but a compromise based on political forces of the time. In a sense, it reflected the government in that it retained a system of checks and balances intended to maintain control of the military establishment.

The National Security Act established the Air Force as a separate and equal entity to the Army and Navy; a National Military Establishment (later the Department of Defense); a Secretary of Defense with general control over the service departments; the National Security Council; and the Central Intelligence Agency.⁴

The Joint Chiefs of Staff, comprised of the chiefs of staff of the respective services, were designated "principal military advisers to the President and the Secretary of Defense."⁵ The major functions of the JCS were (1) to prepare strategic direction of military forces; (2) to review major materiel and personnel requirements of the armed forces; (3) to formulate policies for joint training and education of members of the military forces; and (4) to establish unified commands in strategic areas.⁶ While impressive in scope, the role of the JCS was never as strong

following 1947.

The newly formed position of Secretary of Defense and the new National Security Council, both with direct access to the President, quickly gained prominence. Their expanding roles in the national defense came at the expense of the JCS. This, along with the requirement for the JCS to act like a committee, drastically reduced the capacity of the staff to influence military matters.

The next two years saw two slight changes to the JCS. In 1948, the Key West Agreement gave the staff responsibility for providing strategic direction to the armed forces as well as general direction to all combat operations. It also called for the formation of unified commands.⁷ The position of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff was created in 1949. Ostensibly to provide control of the service chiefs, the chairman had no command authority over the JCS or military services. His responsibilities included setting up the agenda and presiding over JCS meetings, and advising the Secretary of Defense on matters where no collective agreement could be reached.

The next reorganization step came in 1953. In a step intended to widen civilian control of the military, the JCS were removed from corporate command responsibilities. Also, military departments, not individual JCS members, were placed as heads of the unified and specified commands. The responsibilities of the chairman were expanded to include

managing the work of the staff and approving appointments of staff officers.⁸ The decade of the fifties saw tremendous advances in military technology, particularly nuclear weaponry. With technology came soaring defense costs and violent arguments concerning resource allocation. The complexities of both technology and economics compelled President Eisenhower to propose a true unified command structure. Advancing his call for the system, Eisenhower said, "separate ground, sea, and air warfare is gone forever...Peacetime preparatory and organizational activity must conform to this fact. Strategic and tactical planning must be completely unified, combat forces organized into unified command, each equipped with the most efficient weapons systems that science can develop, singly led and prepared to fight as one, regardless of service."⁹ With that statement, the Defense Reorganization Act of 1958 was initiated.

After 1958, all operating forces, with very few exceptions, were assigned to unified or specified commands. The line of authority established by the Defense Reorganization Act extended from the President to the Secretary of Defense to the operational commands. Orders were issued through the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The staff was directed to "assist" the Secretary of Defense in directing the unified and specified commands, and the size of the Joint Staff was doubled to 400, the same it is today.

The function has changed little as well. The basic planning role of the JCS is related to operational command responsibilities by the 1958 directive from the Secretary of Defense: "To prepare strategic plans and provide for the strategic direction of the armed forces, including the direction of operations conducted by commanders of unified and specified commands and the discharge of any other functions of command for such commands directed by the Secretary of Defense."¹⁰

Following the Vietnam War, more moves were made to streamline the JCS organization. By 1978, the Secretary of Defense had taken the Defense Communications Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency and the Defense Mapping Agency out of the JCS chain of command and into his own. One additional agency, the Command, Control and Communications (C3) System Directorate was established and placed under JCS control to oversee the development of command and control systems and attempt to develop inter-operability among allies.¹¹

The evolution of the JCS from World War II through the major changes of 1958 and beyond has been a process of compromise. The newest changes will be discussed later. Numerous problems in system, from the structure to authority and responsibility, abound, and criticism of the staff is frequent. There have been, in fact, far more studies of the JCS than successful attempts to reform it.

ENDNOTES

¹Norris, p. 20.

²James Watson, "The Joint Chiefs at 40." Defense 82
(January, 1982), p. 17.

³Ibid.

⁴Norris, p. 23.

⁵Ibid.

⁶Ibid.

⁷Joint Chiefs of Staff: Historical Division, Joint Chiefs of Staff: Special Historical Study. Washington, 1979, p. 37.

⁸Watson, p. 21.

⁹Ibid, p. 20.

¹⁰Ibid, p. 22.

¹¹Ibid, p. 24.

CHAPTER III

CRITICISM OF THE JCS

While there has been a lack of real reform in the Joint Chiefs of Staff organization, there has been a plethora of criticism, beginning shortly after its inception. The Army and Air Force have long favored a more centralized staff as a better organization, while the Navy and Marines oppose any additional centralization of military authority, and in fact would prefer less centralization than in the present form. This competition in ideology is likely to endure.

Writing in the International Security Review, Leonard Wainstein points out three characteristics of the JCS which both are the baseline for its evolution and the limits within which it may evolve: first and foremost, it is a committee system; within that committee system it is also a coordinating system; and three, it is an advisory, not a decision-making system.¹ The present makeup of the JCS is a product of legislative acts in 1947, 1949, 1953, and 1958, and it will take another act of Congress to effectively reform it in the future.

It has been said that a camel is a horse designed by committee. Not only is this an apt description of the type

of organization the JCS is, but it also gives insight into the complexities of the Pentagon. The JCS is composed of service members, supported by the Joint Staff, which reaches decision by compromise. Formal position papers submitted by the JCS to the Department of State, Department of Defense and National Security Council are accepted with a very large grain of salt and generally held in low regard.² At even the lowest levels of importance, a staff summary might transit seven or eight offices, a more pressing matter could pass through dozens. Recommendations in such papers have thus been reviewed by so many agencies that they reflect the absolute lowest common denominator of agreement.

A critical report on the shortcomings of the JCS was highlighted by the comments of former Secretary of Defense Harold Brown who said that the advice of the JCS was "worse than nothing." Further, "Robert Komer, once the No. 3 man in the Pentagon, calls it a laughing stock, and former JCS Chairman Maxwell Taylor argues that it should be abolished. The reason: the JCS decisionmaking process is ponderous and flawed, elevating parochial concerns above the national interest and possible disaster in war."³

In similar fashion, in the aftermath of President Carter's public pledge to defend the Persian Gulf against attack the JCS met to discuss how this might be carried out. Komer relates, "What do the Chiefs do during this entire period? They spend a lot of time arguing about command arrangements, more than they do thinking of strategy." As a

result the basic document for U.S. strategy for defending Persian Gulf oil--a mission essential to the survival of the industrial democracies--was written in the Spring of 1980 by Komer, a civilian. The JCS Chairman, David Jones, would attend meetings of the National Security Council to discuss strategy, Komer recalls, "but he would not express the JCS position because there is no JCS position."⁴ Dean Acheson was once quoted as saying that the result of interservice rivalries on the JCS and its inadequate staff is that the system produces oracular utterances instead of real military advice.⁵

This is not to say that coordination is without strengths; it does allow for the maintenance of a great deal of corporate knowledge and expertise. Yet the weaknesses seem to override the benefits. In one incident during the Kennedy administration, the JCS were unanimous in their advice that the U.S. should not commit itself to a ground war in Asia (a wise position following what amounted to a lecture discussing the futility of ground warfare in Asia by General Douglas MacArthur). However, each Chief had a different idea on what exactly should be done. President Kennedy, seeking a definite course of action, turned to his Secretary of Defense, Robert Strange McNamara, for strategic advice. There was, and is, no legal requirement for the advice of the JCS to be followed, and the situation was exacerbated by a growing reluctance on McNamara's part to seek or accept military advice. The result was a major

growth and increase in influence of the Department of Defense, and a concurrent decline in the influence of the military.⁶ The lasting impression has been the erosion of the JCS; decisions from the level of expenditures to structure of forces are made by civilians outside the military. During the Dominican Republic crisis that began on April 25, 1965, President Johnson met almost continuously in the White House with his closest personal advisors and the Secretaries of State and Defense, but with the conspicuous absence of General Wheeler, the Chairman of the JCS, who was not invited until April 29 after numerous important demands had already been made.⁷

A special working group from the Center for Strategic and International Studies at Georgetown University reported to Congress in March, 1985 that "The JCS remains incapable of providing meaningful advice on issues involving important service interests or prerogatives...in short, none of the three components of the joint military establishment is able to perform its role effectively."⁸ Headed by Edward C. Meyer, and with an impressive list of participants including Samuel Huntington, David Jones, and Edward Luttwak, the group adamantly supports the overhaul of an organization which "continues to act as a executive secretariat to coordinate service views rather than as an independent, unified military staff."⁹

If there is a single focal point for the committee system, it is the relationship between the individual

services to the JCS. The service chiefs of the Army, Navy, Marines, and Air Force must not only advocate the interests of their respective branches but also try to cut through parochial squabbles to prepare the national defense. In the best of times, this balancing act is extremely difficult; normally it is impossible. More often than not, loyalty to the service is an overriding consideration. It has been hinted in closed circles that the use of F-111s in the Libya raid was not so much a tactical decision as it was an economic one: the Air Force wanted to demonstrate the utility of its aircraft for the upcoming budget battle between the services. Such emphasis on service priorities is a definite obstacle toward centralization and true unity of operations, and the problem extends throughout the ranks.

As a junior officer in the Pentagon, leaning too far in the direction of the other services is considered definitely unhealthy for his or her career. While such problems as duplication of effort and economy of force might lead one to support the allocation of resources in favor of the Army or Navy, the Officer Effectiveness Report (OER), the source document which decides promotions and assignments, is written and controlled within one's own service. There is no "balancing act" to worry about; with feverish competition for funds, leaders place a high premium on allegiance. Risk taking and realistic planning, two vital ingredients in the preparation of the military for war, take a back seat to the day by day worries of managing a career.

ENDNOTES

¹Wainstein, p. 233.

²Richard C. Steadman, Report to the Secretary of Defense on the National Military Command Structure. (Washington, July, 1978), p. 52.

³Anthony Porcaro, "Military Strategy and the National Security Council." Air War College, 1985, p. 21.

⁴Ibid.

⁵Ibid.

⁶Wainstein, p. 235.

⁷Bruce Palmer, "The Case For Limited Reform of the JCS." Parameters, (Winter, 1985), p. 7.

⁸U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Armed Services. Reorganization Proposals For the Joint Chiefs of Staff-1985. 99th Congress, 1st Session, June 13, 19, and 26th 1985, p. 138.

⁹Ibid.

CHAPTER IV

GENERAL STAFFS

The idea of a general staff has its roots deep in history, with the first recorded staff being that of Gustavus Adolphus.¹ The thrust behind creating a general staff is to cultivate a group of highly professional, deeply motivated officers who would serve as the backbone for planning and executing warfare. The screening process starts early to remove promising young prospects from their existing chain of command and indoctrinate them to staff life. Once appointed, they would form an elite cadre, one with continuity and corporate knowledge, to guide the nations military.

One of the key points of the general staff is that it is an entity in its own; a general staff officer might be reassigned to an operational unit at any given time, yet he would always be a member of the staff, and thus his allegiance remains at that level. This practice allows a staff officer to avoid the scrutiny of local commanders, ensuring he carries out his prime duty of executing the directives of the general staff.

Three general staffs, one from the past and two from

the present, serve as examples of functional military establishments. Each has its own peculiarities, yet all focus on the overriding principles of centralized military control and the effective prosecution of warfare. The British General Staff, while limited in scope, illustrates the evolution of a staff system in a democracy. The Soviet General Staff is the best example of a current centralized military system, and it owes many of its practices to the most well known of all military systems, the German General Staff.

The formulation of the British Defense Staff is indicative of western democracies; during times of imminent danger or outright warfare, the scope and importance of the staff grew. Extended periods of peace brought a stagnation of military thought and less efforts toward staffing. The British did attempt to learn from their mistakes, as witnessed by events after the Crimean and Boer Wars. The serious problems encountered during the Crimean War led to the establishment of the Council of Military Education under the Duke of Cambridge, the commander-in-chief.² The most important impact of this action was the establishment of a college to train staff officers, yet little actual work was accomplished toward developing effective staffs. After the lengthy Boer War, a second study was ordered which concluded that British staff organization had not kept pace with world military evolution. A general staff was commissioned, and grew into the Committee of Imperial Defense in 1907, with

the responsibility of reviewing the military needs of the British Empire.³ The foundations of a war office which, for the most part, lasts to today were laid.

In 1924, the Chiefs of Staff Committee was formed as an agency of the Committee of Imperial Defense. It served as the point of contact with the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff during World War II. The Minister of Defense position was created in 1936, and strengthened appreciably in 1947 as the individual Service Ministers lost their cabinet posts. The Department of Defense evolved in 1948, and the Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff in 1955.⁴

The centralization of the British armed forces has come in a period of declining overseas responsibilities and more reliance on deterrence. As a result, the size of the British military has declined and allowed more centralized control. In the Falkland Islands War, there was a high degree of unity of command and interservice cooperation, a necessity in successful prosecution of a conflict such a great distance from home bases.

In speaking of the Soviet General Staff, John Erickson relates, "At the heart of <Soviet Military> professionalization lies the General Staff, the apotheosis of professionalism and the institutionalization of expertise par excellence, at once an institution and a professional elite in its own right, a planning agency, and a command instrument which has ... assumed managerial functions".⁵

The Soviet General Staff is a true general staff, the best example of one today. It is charged with the fundamental planning for the Soviet Armed Forces and decides how each service will be employed in a conflict. Staff officers are drawn from the individual services, but ties are severed once an officer is marked, and from then on promotions are determined by the General Staff.

Not only do the Soviets maintain a vigorous staff system, they place high emphasis on military education throughout an officer's career. There are some 170 military schools, academies, and institutions, headed by the General Staff Academy which dictates doctrine and training objectives for all other military educational institutions.⁶

A key element of importance is that the Soviet General Staff, responsible to the Ministry of National Defense, maintains command authority over individual services. The scope of general staff functions is vast; a comparable list in the United States is accomplished by the Department of Defense, the JCS, the National Security Council, and even parts of individual services. The Soviet General Staff is also charged with analyzing the changing aspects of warfare and political and military ramifications, developing theory, and transforming theory into practice.

The Soviet General Staff is all-encompassing, an instrument to coordinate the military effort from theory to application, from training to prosecution. It is designed to take the most promising military minds in the nation,

educate them, train them, and utilize them within the framework of the Communist Party to manage one of the most powerful military systems in history. It is a commonly held philosophy that the Soviets prepare to fight the same type of combat they encountered in World War II, only on a far wider scale. This is perhaps an apt statement, as they observed and copied many ideas from their enemy at that time, Germany.

The need for a strong military is prevalent theme in German history. Located in central Europe with poorly defensible frontiers, invasion has long since necessitated the formulation of a capable military and popular support for military expenditures. Indeed, the excellent German staff system was paramount in numerous military successes.

The year 1821 was the turning point in the authority held by the staff; until then the Prussian General Staff reported to the war ministry. This was changed by a royal act which appointed a single staff chief and placed the staff directly below the king. This was enhanced by the powerful influence of General Moltke. During the wars of unification he employed superior staff organization to win an impressive set of victories, demonstrating the need for a strong staff in modern warfare.⁷

During World War I, General Staff officers held major posts and had tremendous influence; in many cases far exceeding their rank. In many situations, General Staff officers held discretionary authority over superior

officers, and exercised this right earnestly.⁸ Such was the respect and fear of the German General Staff, its continued existence was forbade under the Treaty of Versailles.⁹ Staff organizations were allowed at division level, however, and were promptly used by the Reichswher in their traditional form. Most of the General Staff officers of the German high command in World War II served on the General Staff in World War I.

It was during World War II that the German General Staff gained both admiration and fear in American eyes. Despite an overwhelming inferiority in numbers of men and equipment, German field armies continually outmaneuvered and outfought the Allies on both the western and eastern front. In several instances, only days after suffering bloody setbacks to Russian forces, the Germans unleashed brilliant counter-attacks, driving them back and inflicting horrendous casualties. In the opinion of many historians, had Hitler taken the strategic advice of the General Staff and forced a climactic battle for Moscow instead of attempting to capture Stalingrad, Germany may well have defeated the Soviet Union.

The German General Staff was a "socialized," rather than bureaucratic, organization, centered on three characteristics.¹⁰ The first was careful selection and education of officers; so careful in fact that only about one percent of those who applied for general staff duty were accepted.¹¹ Even at the height of World War II, there were less than 1000 general staff officers.¹²

A second characteristic was that once an officer was accepted by the general staff, he remained a general staff officer for the rest of his career. Promotions, opportunities, and assignments were controlled by the general staff, not field units.

The third major characteristic of the German General Staff was the atmosphere of innovativeness it fostered. Original thinking and risk taking were encouraged; complacency and dogma frowned upon. In exercises, officers were often presented with situations in which the only effective solutions called for the disobedience of superior orders. Early in general staff history, Von Moltke actively recruited admitted eccentrics because he felt they often came up with excellent ideas.

The three General Staffs; the British, Soviet, and German, were formed on the basis of historical experience and military necessity. The respective powers of each have grown and ebbed with war and peace, but the central theme they share is continuous: centralized military control. This concept allows the development of theory; the organization, training, and equipping of combat forces; and prosecution of warfare. And while the American historical experience has been remarkably different from all three, the general principles of warfare are universal. The need to develop an organization capable of harnessing the American military potential to its fullest is present and growing with the developing complexities of armed conflict.

ENDNOTES

- ¹Norris, p. 7.
- ²Ibid, p. 13.
- ³Correll Barnett, Britain and Her Army. (New York, 1970), p. 356.
- ⁴Neville Trotter, "A British View on the Incentives for JCS Reform." Armed Forces Journal International, (May, 1982), p. 70.
- ⁵John Erickson, The Russian Imperial/Soviet General Staff. (College Station, 1981), p. 2.
- ⁶Jack Cross, The Soviet Higher Military Education System. (College Station, 1982), p. xi-xiii.
- ⁷Brig Gen J. D. Hittle (USMC, Ret), The Military Staff: Its History and Development. (Harrisburg, 1961), p. 81)
- ⁸Col Trevor N. Dupuy (USA, Ret), "Civilian Control and Military Professionalism: A Systemic Problem." Strategic Review (Winter, 1980), p. 90.
- ⁹Norris, p. 9.
- ¹⁰William S. Lind, "JCS Reform: Can Congress Take On a Tough One?" Air University Review (Sep-Oct, 1985), p. 49.
- ¹¹Ibid.
- ¹²Ibid.

CHAPTER V

THE AMERICAN GENERAL STAFF:

PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE

The United States once maintained a vigorous general staff. In the chaos surrounding the War of 1812, Congress moved to create a general staff made up of autonomous bureau chiefs, such as the quartermaster general, who reported directly to the Secretary of War.¹ While doing little to alleviate the tremendous problems American forces faced during the war, two postwar Secretaries of War, William H. Crawford and especially John C. Calhoun, acknowledged the necessity of maintaining a peacetime staff organization.²

During the war, no single officer commanded the entire army; the War Department divided the army into districts and departments with individual commanders who acted on their own with little coordination save that which could be arranged through the Secretary of War's office. In 1821, when Congress reduced the nation's high command to one major general and two brigadiers, Calhoun seized the opportunity, ordered Major General Jacob Brown to Washington and designated him the commanding general of the army. For a short

time, America truly had centralized military control. And while the semblance of a General Staff persisted, it was not as developed or refined as those in Europe.

Between 1813 and 1903, the United States military experienced a roller coaster history. Unprepared for the Mexican-American War in 1848, the Civil War in 1861, and Spanish-American War in 1898, armies were formed hurriedly, employed in battle with varying stages of effectiveness, and disbanded once hostilities ended.

The exceedingly poor performance of the army in the Spanish-American War caught the public's attention and stimulated a reform led by the Secretary of War, Elihu Root. Upon taking office, he expressed the key concept of professionalism: "the real object of having an army is to provide for war."³ He understood that until the War Department had a "single brain", as a British writer characterized the general staff, planning for war would be plagued by poor coordination, parochialism, and inertia.⁴

Careful to avoid the brute force of several high-ranking army opponents, Root nourished his ideas through the establishment of the Army War College in 1900. He assigned faculty duties similar to those in a general staff and encouraged its officers to develop and advocate the general staff concept. He then gathered support from a number of influential government and military leaders and persuaded Congress to accept an Americanized version of the German General Staff.

Once established, the General Staff was successful in bringing about several improvements. Among them were better officer education, field maneuvers, contingency planning, intelligence collection and analysis, tactical organization, and theoretical mobilization planning.⁵ On paper and in practice, competence in the American military was on the rise. However, the lack of visible threats and traditional public antipathy towards the military caused it to lag behind those of Europe as World War I approached. While American involvement greatly improved managerial expertise within the army, the end of the war disrupted development in two distinct ways.

First, as is traditionally American, the armistice brought a call to "bring the boys home." The United States military, which swelled to millions during the conflict, quickly withered. Second, a new sense of isolationism abounded. Vowing never again to fight the European's war, America settled down behind the distances of the Atlantic and Pacific. We had, after all, made the world "safe for democracy."

An offshoot of our distrust of the Europeans was an outright fear of militarism, particularly German militarism. American history glorifies the role of the citizen-soldier: the Minuteman at Lexington and the militia at Cowpens ensure us that when the time comes we can pick up arms and defeat even the most properly trained standing army. Americans came to understand that German militarism itself caused the

war; with the inescapable corollary that if there is no centralized military control there will be less likelihood of conflict. That attitude, with short intermissions, prevails today.

Establishment of an American General Staff to overcome the problems with the present system is not a novel idea. The Senate Armed Services committee reported in October 1985 the "log-rolling" and watered-down compromises are inevitable when individual services control promotions and assignments of officers on the Joint Chiefs of Staff or other multi-service roles.⁶ In The Pentagon and the Art of War, Edward Luttwak states, "to select the best military officers, to liberate them from the one-service prisons which they must now operate and to let them get on with the job of running the show, while carefully initiating more detailed reform is the only remedy that can really work."⁷

Simply put, the purpose of an American General Staff would be to bring out the best of the American officer corps; to provide the most effective medium through which military leaders, both current and future, would execute what Samuel Huntington describes as "the management of violence."

To create such an organization, significant reforms must be accomplished and changes made, many which go far beyond the Pentagon. The basic military system of the United States fosters the "intramural squabbles" which General David Jones found so distasteful, despite the emphasis

placed on unified command structures.

An excellent example is professional military education. To foster intellectual growth and corporate expertise, each service has a military school system which members either attend or take in correspondence at various stages of their career. Air Force officers, for example, go through Squadron Officer School (SOS) as a lieutenant or captain, Air Command and Staff College (ACSC) as a major, and the Air War College (AWC) as a lieutenant colonel or colonel. The Army and Navy have similar programs. While each school devotes part of its curriculum to joint operations, the vast majority of instruction is service-oriented, especially at SOS. The knowledge required about the Army, Navy and Marines deals mainly with an overview of force structure and mission.

A small number of officers are allowed to attend another services' school, and there are in fact schools for all services, such as the Armed Forces Command and Staff College, but requesting enrollment at such an institution is not seen as a "good career move." A common joke is that, given an order, an officer must consider all aspects of its utility, particularly how the order will enhance his career. While a bit exaggerated, such humor illustrates a basic fault with our present system.

The military officer corps during peacetime is an uncomfortable beast. Promotion is based on what is quantifiable: job performance, effectiveness reports,

military education, advanced civilian degrees, and additional duties. Competition is keen; it is not enough just to do your best, you must do it that much better than the next man. Most of all, you must accomplish those items deemed as prerequisites for moving up the corporate ladder, the "square fillers," to succeed.

While on joint duty, regardless of the chain of command, an officer's allegiance remains with his parent service, where the power of promotion is maintained. Disagreement with the position of your own service, particularly if it involves the allocation of resources, is unwise for an ambitious young officer. Brought up under such circumstances, officers adopt this practice as acceptable and become part of the promotion machine.

The very sight where joint doctrine is most important, the Pentagon, is where the need to change the promotion system (for a small number of officers, at least) is most important. The Joint Chiefs of Staff protect their own interests because they have been trained for over 30 years to do so. In many ways it is not so much a conscious decision on their part to fight over weapons systems as it is a way of life; "the way we've done it in the past."

The creation of an American General Staff would therefore involve a significant decision to remove a number of promising officers from each branch of the armed forces and make them general staff officers. It is but one of several changes which would help build a true unified command

structure, and it's effect would not be felt for some time, but it is the cornerstone of a truly workable military establishment.

Built on the German model, only a limited number of officers would be accepted as recruits for such a staff. Robert L. Goldich, a defense specialist for the Congressional Research Service, notes that in 1927 only 270 German lieutenants and captains passed a screening program to even take the admission test for general staff training; 37 were selected, and only 13 remained at the end of the 3 to 5 year training program.⁸ Based on manpower, a similar ratio for the American military would show about 5,000 applicants, 600 selections, and only 240 successful tours.

An officer would initially spend four to five years in his commissioned service before applying for general staff duty, ample time to demonstrate the potential for leadership and at the same time early enough in his career to allow flexibility. Once established as a general staff officer, he would be removed from the service promotion and reporting system and placed under the General Staff.

Ironically, the services have individual programs which mark young officers for higher responsibilities. The Air Force, for example, has ASTRA, the Air Staff Training Program. Captains with four years of federal service may apply for this one year tour at the Pentagon, and if selected serve in posts at the highest decision-making levels of the Air Force. Only a few officers are encouraged

to apply, and of those less than one in ten are accepted. And while ASTRA officers are not officially "tagged," their selection to the program and time spent at the Pentagon are duly recorded and mark them for accelerated promotion.

The House Armed Services Committee recommended in 1984 that the services make special efforts to send their best officers to the Joint Staff. Another provision enacted made the Secretary of Defense responsible for ensuring military departments gave appropriate consideration to the performance of an officer as a member of the Joint Staff.⁹ Neither recommendation has been carried out by the services; the problem of keeping the best officers for purely service responsibilities bars such actions. Only a system which encourages crossing service boundaries will consistently draw the most outstanding officers available.

Once an officer serves three to five years on the General Staff, he would return to the field with his knowledge and indoctrination. With the distinction of not belonging to a particular service, he would be available for a wide assortment of duties in which he developed his expertise. Devoid of "filling squares," his abilities would then be harnessed to promote joint operations and unified command. Occasional tours at higher headquarters and the Pentagon would continue the officer's general staff training.

In time, the role of the general staff would be to ensure that the preparation of the national military force

is carried out by the most effective means. Duplication of effort would be reduced and thus the actual size of planning staffs, such as the Pentagon, would be reduced. Information on force structure and recommendations on implementation would be made available to senior commanders on a timely basis with minimal parochial influence and "intramural squabbles."

Two other changes, one which has already partially taken place, would serve to reinforce the role of the American General Staff and greatly increase the effectiveness of the Joint Chiefs of Staff - the deletion of the office of service secretary and elevation of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Both would be conspicuous statements regarding the importance of war planning and allow the JCS and General Staff do its job better.

Civilian control of the military is mandated by the Constitution and never has been seriously questioned in our history, even during World War II. But the individual service secretaries are an unnecessary and often burdensome link in the national military establishment. Their prime function is to promote their services position, primarily on acquisition questions, a job better suited to the ranking military officer in that service. In fact, in their efforts to enhance the position of their respective services, it has been said that they have done great damage to any hopes for effective joint operations. This complicated and exceedingly slow chain is further exacerbated by the committee

role of the JCS, and while improvements have been made recently, more can be done yet.

General David C. Jones, retired Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, has repeatedly called for the strengthening of his former position. During his tenure, if even one of the joint chiefs disagreed with the recommendations of the Chairman, he could take his argument directly to the Secretary of Defense or, on some subjects, even the President.¹⁰ Jones proposed that the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs would, by law, be named the senior military officer, responsible to both supervising the JCS and providing advice to the President, the Secretary of Defense, and the National Security Council (NSC).¹¹ The final Congressional report of the Center For Strategic and International Studies supports General Jones, stating "As the only member of the JCS without a service portfolio, the chairman is uniquely situated to provide independent military advice and planning that cuts across service boundaries. Accordingly, the National Security Act should be amended to make the chairman the principal military advisor...the current single-service veto over joint positions would be abolished and responsibility for formulating joint positions would rest with the chairman supported by the Joint Staff and the unified and specified commanders."¹² A Deputy Chairman of the JCS would act as his deputy and in his absence. Both of these steps were indorsed by the President's Blue Ribbon Committee on Defense Management and will shortly come into

being.

General Bruce Palmer, a former Army Vice Chief of Staff, carries the argument one step further. The Chairman should be made "a statutory member of the National Security Council, not just an adviser."¹³ A logical step to ensure the preeminance of the Chairman would be to revive the five star rank, previously held by a select few generals and admirals during and just after World War II.

Restructured, the new American General Staff and Joint Chiefs of Staff would be a streamlined, much more effective and efficient, military establishment. A five star Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, with command authority and direct access to the National Security Council, Secretary of Defense and President would be supported by a General Staff made up of the finest military officers from all four services. Committed to the General Staff for their entire careers, such officers would provide the most accurate and timely advice available. The actual size of the staff, small in nature, would ensure better communications and information flow.

Presently, unified operations are a way for each service to make sure they have "a piece of the pie." Advice and operations are carried out at the lowest level of agreement, and subsequently the lowest level of success. In time, the proposed American General Staff and reformed Joint Chiefs of Staff would be the basis for a true unified system. This would not cure the military of all its

problems, certainly, but it would be a giant step in the direction of establishing a much more effective national defense. And while arguments abound against such an undertaking, the creation of an American General Staff is "the best chance remaining for creating a rational command structure for the United States."¹⁴

ENDNOTES

¹Allan R. Millett and Peter Maslowski, For the Common Defense: A Military History of the United States of America. (New York, 1984), p. 120.

²Ibid, p. 121.

³Ibid, p. 310.

⁴Ibid.

⁵Ibid, p. 311.

⁶P. J. Budahn, "Division Over General Staff Plan tied to History." Air Force Times (January 6, 1986), p. 6.

⁷Ibid.

⁸Ibid.

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¹⁰Arthur T. Hadley, The Straw Giant: Triumph and Failure of America's Armed Forces. (New York, 1986), p. 288.

¹¹Norris, p. 41.

¹²U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Armed Services. Reorganization Proposals For the Joint Chiefs of Staff-1985. p. 84.

¹³Palmer, p.7.

¹⁴Budahn, "Division Over General Staff Plan Tied to History." p. 6.

CHAPTER VI

OBJECTIONS TO THE AMERICAN

GENERAL STAFF

Any attempt to drastically change an institution will be met with resistance; the Pentagon is no exception. Opposition to the idea of a general staff and reform of the Joint Chiefs of Staff comes from a number of sources and in varying degrees of ambivalence.

Throughout American history, there has been a feeling that informal military units could be trained to meet observed threats. This "militia mentality" was formed with the Minutemen at Concord and Lexington as they bloodied the British regulars, and glorified at Bunker Hill. The militia's greatest moment came at Cowpens when, after initially retreating, they overcame an aggressive British charge and won the day.

Such incidents were the exception, however, as the militia was markedly undisciplined with a tendency to break ranks and run when confronted with superior forces. Nevertheless, the legend of the of the militia overcame historical fact and imbedded itself in what Russell Weigley terms "The American Way of War."

George Washington recognized the necessity of an efficient staff system, but was in perpetual battle with Congress to maintain even the barest dimensions of one. Six months after the end of the Revolutionary War, only 600 men remained in the American Army. Not only did Congress oppose Washington's staff requests, but standing armies in peacetime were observed to be "dangerous to the liberties of a free people."¹

Belief in the militia was coupled in the 19th century with popularism, the conviction that the frontier spirit of American citizens made them capable of military leadership, regardless of formal training or education. Together, they provided the nation with the comforting illusion that, given ample warning, natural American tendencies would sally forth to defeat any potential enemy.

It is small wonder that the building of a military academy at West Point, New York met with violent protests. Not only did the public resist the need for a trained military cadre, outright fear of a European-style system pervaded a nation more concerned with expanding its western frontier. The Civil War confirmed the antagonist's fears: West Point provided the majority of military leaders for the South and was all but blamed for starting the war by developing an "elitist" attitude. Serious moves were made to close it down.

World War I added to the traditional American fear of a military elite for two reasons: isolationism and fear of

centralization. Having made the world "safe for democracy," American vowed never to send it's forces to Europe again. As late as the 1940 presidential campaign, both Wendel Wilkie and Franklin Roosevelt affirmed their commitment never to "send our boys to fight over there." With the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans on our east and west coasts, and friendly neighbors to the north and south, America settled into a pacifistic euphoria; carefully ignorant of outside events. The state of the nation's armed forces reflected this mentality.

The love affair with a nebulous American back-woods ability to win against all odds is best illustrated by the movies we as a society claim represent the true way we fight wars. The overly done reluctance of Gary Cooper to fight in "Sergeant York" typified our perceived pacifistic beliefs; yet at the same time the skills he learned down on the farm enabled him to kill a number of German soldiers single-handedly and win the Medal of Honor. "The Dirty Dozen" related a story in which twelve American soldiers, all on death row for committing one or several murders, successfully assaulted a German fortress prior to D-Day. German professionalism, it seems, is no match for Yankee guile. The image of the American outcast is further portrayed in such movies as "The Devil's Brigade" and "Blacksheep Squadron," both of which show normal American boys thrown into abnormal situations and succeeding against all odds.

This is not to say there is no substance for such portrayals; many of the movies are based on fact. Yet the overall impression on the American public since the beginning of motion pictures is to reinforce the poorly understood and misconstrued notion that we need not worry, if worse comes to worse some force inside of us will turn us all into fighting men and we will save the world for democracy and free enterprise once again. This "John Wayne" mentality is a panacea, and an entirely too comfortable one at that.

Abhorrence of the European militarism which initiated World War I confirmed America's fear of a large standing army; a cursory look at the war led many to believe that such a force was itself a cause of hostilities. Carried one step further, centralized control of the military was a dangerous and provocative step toward war. Ironically, the same general staff which many sight as the basis for our future development was the driving force behind stopping efforts to build an American organization of the same kind. Immediately after World War I, and especially after World War II, the spectre of German militarism and its possible transplantation to American shores wrought heated debate in Congress. Concern over the idea of a general staff was addressed in nearly every piece of legislation on the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In 1947, when the current JCS was created, the only true point of agreement about the JCS was that "Congress did not want a Prussian General Staff or German

General Staff which would, presumably, shun all efforts at civilian direction, gain too much influence in government and constantly be planning for and promoting wars."² A 1949 ammendment to the 1947 Act specifically addresses this concern and states the legislation is to provide for the future security of the United States, "... but not to establish a single Chief of Staff over the armed forces nor an armed forces general staff..."³ It may be summized then that Congress created a military establishment in its own image, one with a system of checks and balances aimed not so much at the efficient planning and prosecution of warfare but one which could be controlled.

As Vincent Davis remarks, "In Congress and the Office of the Secretary of Defense, there is a bureaucratic version of ancient divide-and-conquer tactics that strives to keep the military under control by keeping the services apart."⁴ But this philosophy does not stop at the civilian authorities, the military services themselves have mixed emotions when considering a general staff system.

Each service develops its own elite, its "fair haired boys," and selects them for service staffs and command assignments. Rarely does this include the Joint Staffs (by regulation, general officers must have served at least one tour on a Joint Staff, but this is currently disregarded and a great number of the flag-rank selectees are given waivers).⁵ There is a perceived threat that an elite "fifth service" of general staff officers will dominate the

military establishment. The Army, Navy, and Air Force all fear that the loss of control over key individuals will degenerate their positions.

The newest of the services, the Air Force, still retains the memory of a time when promotions and assignments were decided by Army generals. On more than one occasion, a ranking Air Force officer was demoted and sent into "exile" at one of several remote posts for being too exuberant in his work.

The Army, still healing from the turmoil of Vietnam, also retains a corporate memory of the post-Korean War era which witnessed the almost complete reduction of American ground forces in favor of airpower and reliance on bombers. At one point, the only mission demanded of the Army was to gain and defend air bases (one it jealously guards today).

Nevertheless, the Army and Air Force have attempted a number of joint programs. The Navy, however, was and is the driving force in the Department of Defense against attempts at unification. As early as the 1920s, when General Billy Mitchell proposed that the battleship was being rendered obsolete by air power, the Navy was staunchly opposing any form of centralization. In 1938, when Air Corps bombers brought headlines by the extraordinary interception of an Italian luxury liner 700 miles out to sea, the Navy sponsored a new War Department regulation restricting Air Corps planes to within 100 miles of shore.⁶ This move was designed to prevent interference with the role

of the Navy and allow the growth of naval aviation.

The Navy enjoyed a great deal of autonomy during World War II, but saw its role as the "first line of defense" degenerate after the Korean War, an episode which guides Navy thinking to this date. With a dwindling defense budget and the advent of nuclear weapons, the United States turned to the doctrine of Massive Retaliation, which theoretically allowed us to respond to an act of aggression at a time and place of our choosing. The implicit threat was that we would launch a nuclear attack on the Soviet Union to prevent a prolonged ground war such as we had suffered through from 1950 to 1953. The Navy, trying to gain a piece of the atomic pie, planned the construction of super carrier capable of carrying aircraft with nuclear weapons. In the budgetary battle that followed, the construction was halted in favor of buying more B-36s for the Strategic Air Command. Shocked, several admirals openly rejected the decision and even "leaked" information to the press that the B-36 fleet had serious construction problems and could not carry out its mission. The "Revolt of the Admirals" was one of the bloodiest inter-service skirmishes on record. The effects are still being felt.

The Navy remembers the treatment it received and has repeatedly screamed foul at any and all attempts to unify the armed forces and centralize control. "A Joint Staff composed of officers whose staff duties had kept them out of the field for successive years would necessarily rely on

outdated information about service capabilities" stated the Secretary of the Navy, John Lehman, Jr.⁷ He raised the ghost of the German General Staff during testimony before Congress and argued, "for all its influence-and renowned tactical expertise-it was unable to formulate a successful national strategy and brought its country to defeat."⁸ General Paul X. Kelley, Commandant of the Marine Corps, warned the Armed Services Committee against creating a cadre consisting of the "professional bureaucrat and compromiser, one who is skilled in perfect syntax in the preparation of neuter position papers and staff reports."⁹ Kelley later wrote that he knew only one Chairman who supported drastic reform, adding "and his views must be carefully weighed against his performance while in office."¹⁰ This is a biting criticism of General Jones.

The Navy, with its traditionally high degree of independence, does little to promote joint operations at any level of operations. Its position on the subject is manifest in the treatment of naval officers on the Joint Staff. In 1982 and 1983, the Army and Air Force promoted from one to four officers on the Joint Staff "below the zone" in recognition of accelerated abilities. The Navy and Marine Corps did not promote a single staff officer below the zone. Even "within the zone" promotions for Naval officers on the Joint Staff lagged behind that of the naval staff and the fleet, sending a clear signal that the Navy was not sending even average officers to joint positions,

but mediocre ones.¹¹

Naval leaders consistently argue that the present system is not only adequate, but change would threaten carefully developed command lines. Admiral James Holloway III, former Chief of Naval Operations, states: "We must be extraordinarily cautious in approaching any decision to make significant changes. The present system works...it has served us well in its same configuration through two conflicts and years of cold war with the Soviet Union."¹²

Possibly the greatest barrier to change in the Department of Defense is the concept of change itself. Any highly institutionalized bureaucracy is resistant to change, particularly from outside. With change comes the prospects of job loss and relegation to lesser status. A visit to the Pentagon is less than inspiring; one is left with the distinct impression that a large percentage of the positions there could be eliminated with little detrimental effect. Indeed, many proposed changes call for the reduction of staffs throughout the nation's military headquarters. Yet plans have been formulated to renovate the Pentagon for more office space and an annex is under construction.

The services appear to be playing a game of chicken, waiting for the first one to make a move in the direction of meaningful reform. A number of joint programs have been launched, such as the Army-Air Force Airland Battle Doctrine and the conversion of a number of B-52s to carry Harpoon anti-ship missiles, but the steps are tentative and there

continues to be a strong resistance to additional moves toward centralization. And while there is little disagreement that the present system could be made better, the consensus among senior military leaders is that it is not, as Senator Goldwater contends, broke, and there should be no drastic measures taken to fix it.

ENDNOTES

¹Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations. (Cambridge, 1957), p. 144.

²John G. Kester, "Designing a U.S. Defense General Staff." Strategic Review (Summer, 1981), p. 40.

³John G. Kester, "The Future of the Joint Chiefs of Staff." AEI Foreign Policy and Defense Review (Vol 2, Nr 1, 1982), p. 32.

⁴Budahn, "Division Ovier General Staff Plan Tied to History." p. 6.

⁵P. J. Budahn, "Joint Duty Necessary For Star-Rank Duty." Air Force Times (September 1, 1986), p. 3.

⁶DeWitt S. Copp, A Few Great Captains. (Garden City, 1980), p. 424.

⁷U.S. Congress. House. Armed Services Committee Reorganization Proposals For the Joint Chiefs of Staff-1985. p. 205.

⁸Ibid.

⁹Ibid.

¹⁰Charles W. Corddry, "Defense Reorganization Bill Introduced." Baltimore Sun (February 26, 1986), p. 3.

¹¹Hadley, p. 287.

¹²Ibid, p. 288.

CHAPTER VII

CONCLUSION

When the Air Force initially procured the F-16 and F-15 fighters, there was considerable trouble in keeping more than a few of them flying at any given time. Highly complex, with literally thousands of intricate parts which had to all work at the same time to be successful, these planes, the most sophisticated and deadly weapons of their kind in the world, sat unused for weeks on end awaiting spare parts. When asked about the abilities of the F-16 and F-15, an only half joking response was that "when they work, boy are they beautiful."

Much the same can be said of our entire Department of Defense. There have been some moments of glory over the past decades, many that go unnoticed by modern historians: Westmoreland's direction of the Battle of the Ia Drang Valley in 1965 that saved South Vietnam from being cut in two by communist forces, the Battle of Khe Sanh that witnessed some of the best coordination between land and air forces in contemporary history, the capture of Palestinian terrorists who seized the Achille Lauro, and the more recent bombing of Lybia all can make us justifiably proud.

Yet the mistakes of our past and the reasons for them cannot be dismissed, and we have made some tremendous blunders. Needless lives have been lost, the prestige of the most powerful nation on earth has ebbed, and the military's ability to carry out its mission is in question. The consequences of this are inescapable and dangerous: our enemies' perception of our lack of strength invites aggression and seriously undermines attempts at maintaining world stability.

Three questions must be addressed when examining our defense inadequacies: one, who is at fault? two, what should be done? and three, can it be done? Within the framework of these questions the topic of defense reform and reorganization is discussed.

First, who is at fault? The answer is nobody. While a great deal of criticism has been aimed our military leaders, there is no doubt but that they are acting in what they feel is the best interests of the United States. An interview with a general or an admiral, regardless of his position is on defense reform, would reveal a reasonable, well educated, professional soldier. It must be remembered that by the time an officer reaches the decision-making level of the Pentagon, he has probably spent close to 30 years in uniform. The indoctrination, explicit or implicit, in that period of time is impossible to ignore and almost as impossible to change. Our senior leaders act and think the way they do because that is how they were trained. The

problem, therefore, is in the system that we have created to control the military and prepare it for war. From the review of the development of the Joint Chiefs of Staff presented, it should be apparent that significant changes have resulted only when extraordinary circumstances dictated them. The growth of the JCS has been an evolutionary, not a revolutionary, process.

The history of an aircraft, the T-33, might characterize such a process. First flown in 1945, the P-80 (as it was called then) was outmoded as a fighter by the Korean War. We nonetheless kept it, and it has been used to train pilots in both fundamentals and air interception. As the T-33 aged, new flight instruments were introduced which, although aiding the pilot, could not be fitted into the aircraft efficiently. They were put in anyway. The result is that we have a very old airframe, and though many of its components are relatively modern and beneficial, they are so strewn around the cockpit that the pilot has difficulty using them.

The Pentagon, in the same fashion, has grown with the complexity of warfare. But its "airframe," too, is very old and in bad need of renovation. While there are a number of very badly needed components present in the nations military establishment, they cannot properly be employed unless the body that utilizes them modernizes with them.

Oddly, in modernizing the JCS, we seek answers from the past. This is a tribute in many ways to Clausewitz and the

dictum that certain principles of warfare are timeless, and that "there is only one thing that counts: final victory." The German General Staff, which is unfailingly referred to when speaking of reorganization, remains the best example of a highly efficient and professional national war-planning staff. The oft-cited fact that this general staff did not prevent the loss of two wars is a hollow argument against implementing its principles. The remarkable accomplishments of the German General Staff against insurmountable odds transcend such criticism.

It must be understood, however, that an American General Staff (with the necessary collateral changes associated with it) will be far more complex than its German predecessor. While the German General Staff was concerned with land forces, the United States must plan for war on land, at sea, and in the air. Warfare in space looms as a possibility in the near future. Again, no matter how great the intricacy of the effort, historical experience dictates that a highly trained cadre of officers schooled in the practice of warfare and given the opportunity to devote a career at the higher levels of planning will provide the backbone for a truly effective national military establishment. This is the answer to the second question.

While, on paper, the idea of a general staff is appealing it can only be successful if several prerequisites are met. First, only officers of the highest caliber and motivation should be considered for such duty. The screen-

ing process must be able to differentiate between those who are capable and those who simply want to advance their careers. Second, the staff must be kept small. The term strength in numbers is not applicable to staff work. Further, large number of general staff officers would tend to "water down" their identity and degrade their intended purpose. Third, and most important, once accepted on the general staff, an officer would remain on it for the rest of his career. Tying promotion and responsibility to the general staff is the cornerstone in giving the individual the latitude to disagree with established procedures and take risks in his decisions. The current system will continue to draw criticism for promoting a stifling atmosphere, one that does not allow for rapid innovation.

And finally, will a general staff system be adopted by the United States? Historical analysis provides a gloomy outlook. The American experience is vastly different from that of Germany, Russia, and even Great Britain. While each example of a general staff has parallels from which to draw lessons, any attempt to reorganize the Pentagon in such a manner would be a complex undertaking. And while few people actually understand what a general staff is, many seem to know enough to link it to Prussian militarism. There is a genuine fear of a centralized military in the United States, one that belies any attempt to demonstrate the merits of such a system.

The status quo is always more comfortable than an uncertain future. Many will point out that, with the exception of Vietnam, the present system has sufficiently defended the United States and its western allies since 1945. But satisficing is an insufficient decision level from which to defend a nation; what has worked well enough in the past does not guarantee success in the future.

The United States has never faced the destruction that England, Russia, and Germany experienced during both World Wars I and II. Our recent military debacles are relatively insignificant when compared with the battles of Britain, Kiev, and Stalingrad, but they have occurred during limited conflict. War, it is said, is its own multiplier. Transfer mishaps such as an army officer having to telephone from Grenada because he did not know the Navy's code, or Air Force helicopters carrying wounded being waved off a Navy carrier because the pilot did not have the proper qualifications to land, to a major conflict, and the potential for military disaster is real.

Incompetence in the military comes nearer to immorality than in any profession; the lives of millions, the very existence of a nation may depend on the quality of its fighting forces. In a country that values freedom above all else this is poorly understood. Unfortunately, one of two things will bring this realization about. Either a prolonged effort by leaders in positions powerful enough to force the change, or a military disaster. In the first

case, efforts have been made to improve and increase joint operations by the military in such areas as the Airland battle, anti-ship warfare and even space. Over a period of time, these moves will provide the opportunity to practice true unified operations. This will not, however, solve the problems of parochial interests and inter-service sompetition. The second possibility, a military disaster, is a frightening thought but one that must be considered. The United States does not have an impressive history of progressive reforms in peacetime.

In the end, rapid change in the Pentagon is impossible. Substantive change on the scale needed to bring about a general staff and reorganize the Joint Chiefs of Staff is unlikely from within, and only increased pressure from Congress over an extended period of time will bring it about.

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