

BEYOND THE STREETS: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF  
THE ENCOUNTERS OF TWO COMMUNITIES  
WITH URBAN RENEWAL

By

CONRAD EUGENE GUBERA

Bachelor of Science in Education  
Pittsburg State University  
Pittsburg, Kansas  
1962

Master of Science  
Pittsburg State University  
Pittsburg, Kansas  
1967

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Thesis Approved:

*George E. Leggett, Jr.*  
\_\_\_\_\_  
Thesis Adviser

*Juan Chapman*  
\_\_\_\_\_

*Harjit S. Sandhu*  
\_\_\_\_\_

*George L. Carney*  
\_\_\_\_\_

*Larry M. Berlin*  
\_\_\_\_\_

*Norman D. Duckham*  
\_\_\_\_\_  
Dean of the Graduate College

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## CHAPTER I

### INTRODUCTION

The efforts to accomplish purposeful social and physical changes in community settings through some vehicle of social organization has provided data for much sociological research in America. The inconsistency and arbitrariness which document such efforts are often analyzed in the conclusions of community research surveys and monographs. The intrigues, which occur within communities and surround the planning and implementation by organizations of their programs, have often provided a plethora of social data for the inquiring sociologist. Therein lies a full measure of human emotions, resplendent with schemes for power, idealizations for a better future, stratagems to increase personal or group wealth, and conflicting ideologies involving social values and collective behavior. A wide array of reactions to the motives which generate such organizations and programs can thus be delineated among those who propose and those who oppose their instigation. The result of such confrontations yields forms of social interactions on local community levels which create a reservoir of decisions, opinions, actions, and feelings, the expression of which involves contents and forms sociological in their nature. Such expression has frequently been expressed in conflict and cooperation on the community level. These two major social processes always provide a basis for problematic social behaviors which generate data for research and analysis.

One of the many organizations and programs oriented toward change on the local community level has been the federal program of urban renewal. Developed by an Act of Congress in 1949 and largely (75%) funded by federal money, the intent and philosophy of urban renewal was to refurbish local housing and/or slum conditions, and eradicate blighted structures or neighborhoods which were located upon land that could be better utilized within the community. To accomplish the feasibility of such a program, a large, bureaucratically-structured organization was developed along specific federal guidelines which emphasized career specialists functioning within a distinct line of command and authority. Therefore, when a local community attempted to initiate renewal by utilizing the ongoing resources which urban renewal controlled, it had to contend with another outside bureaucracy which functioned within a limited set of prescribed rules and regulations that dictated how it, as an organization, would respond to local needs.

Hence, one of the most basic criticisms of the urban renewal process has been that it was ignorant (or blind) in meeting the needs of people who lived in the local community. Although this ignorance may have included a lack of genuine consideration for how the whole community responded to the urban renewal process, specifically urban renewal has been criticized and opposed for how it has treated the local residents who lived within the selected project areas. The bulk of this criticism generally centered upon the program's inadequate knowledge about, and consideration for, the current and future needs of these people. The needs in question concerned such basics as family finances, employment, educational background, health, housing, transportation, recreation, and future goals. The critics of urban renewal could



point-out housing projects where large populations had been relocated before any information concerning these needs had been ascertained or considered. Tacitly implied in such criticisms was the almost total ignorance by urban renewal officials of how these basic needs may have been altered or completely changed once relocation had been accomplished. Therefore, it was argued, the same problems which had plagued these people before renewal continued or, as was often the circumstance, escalated with their forced relocation. To many Americans, the urban renewal process represented an association with buildings and physical structures rather than humanitarian aid to people.

With a latent effort to curtail such an image, in 1965 the federal bureaucracy issued a directive with a new set of guidelines pertaining to all future urban renewal projects which involved the removal and relocation of local citizens or the refurbishing of their housing. This directive was simply that henceforth all such projects would require, in their initial planning stage, a socio-economic diagnostic study or survey which would provide detailed demographic and social information relative to the basic human needs of the populace involved. Also required was an objective assessment of these residents' opinions and knowledge of the neighborhood and community in which they resided and how well they comprehended the process of urban renewal. The underlying rationale for this innovation was to secure data on human needs which would expedite urban renewal projects and, theoretically, facilitate personal-social change and/or amelioration commensurate with the change in the physical-structure environment. To accomplish the latter, the guidelines required that all such information accumulated through an independent socio-economic diagnostic survey be made available to

the local social-services agencies, welfare and educational institutions, and civic groups which would render available help to the residents during and after their residential transitions. The assumption made by urban renewal was that this type of data and action would "humanize" the urban renewal process.

Within such a context, this writer first became involved with urban renewal. A colleague and he were employed as "professional consultants" by the federal government for four separate, local urban renewal agencies located in four different communities spread over a three state area. The consultants' particular obligations were to fully conduct the socio-economic diagnostic surveys among the residents of the proposed projects in the communities. Each survey would be one of the resources (in conjunction with site appraisals; land use surveys, etc.) used by the local urban renewal agency to document the feasibility of the project for the local community and the federal government. These surveys were conducted during a period from 1968 through 1971. Briefly, the consulting duties required the submitting of an acceptable proposal for each project; the development of a special questionnaire and interview methodology for each survey; the "fieldwork" in each area; and an analysis and recommendation for each project based upon the collected data. Preliminary and final documented reports were submitted to the local agencies and federal offices of the Department of Housing and Urban Development (H. U. D.) upon completion of the surveys.

It is possible to construe such requirements as an obvious effort by the federal government to further solicit the response and support of the local community in the urban renewal process. These surveys

were further used to develop local citizen committees within the project areas so that they (these committee members) could aid in the explanation of the project to the other residents. Likewise, these committee members were called upon to help coordinate an effort in bringing together those residents who had particular or special needs with those cooperating social services, institutions, and civic groups which had indicated a willingness to help the people who would be relocated. As stated earlier, the objective was to better the human condition as well as the physical environment. Whether or not this overture by the federal urban renewal bureaucracy was successful in furthering its own advancement in local communities remains a research question. Whether or not urban renewal achieved some measure of durable influence in the communities in which this author worked will be a part of the research into community life presented in this paper.

## CHAPTER II

### THE PROBLEM AND METHODS OF RESEARCH

In American sociology, perhaps the most profusely researched topics have been various phases of community life. Community studies date from the 1920's commencing with the impressionistic study Middletown, U. S. A. and the numerous community studies conducted by the Department of Sociology at the University of Chicago. These early studies helped conceptualize the community as a living laboratory for sociological investigations whether they were exploratory or hypothesis/model testing. Regardless of the methodology, any research in deviancy, organization, stratification, demography, or ecology must consider the community setting and acknowledge that it provides a milieu which investigates and nurtures the data observed. Vidich, Bensman, and Stein (1964:VII-IX) emphasize that the community in America has been researched more in depth than in any other society. Those research efforts, Bell and Newby claim (1972:250):

. . . are at one and the same time some of the most appealing and infuriating products of modern sociology. They are appealing because they present in an easily accessible and readable way descriptions and analyses of the very stuff of sociology, the social organization of human beings; and infuriating because they are so idiosyncratic and diverse as to steadfastly resist most generalizations.

Urban renewal, as a particularized instrument of change, can be studied within the community research framework. Since the program, in essence, depended upon community decision and organization for its

implementation, "the how" and "the why" these were or were not accomplished in the respective urban renewal projects within the communities cited in this research is the basic problem studied. Two communities will be compared regarding their experiences with urban renewal. One community rejected urban renewal, with controversy, during the planning stage of its initial project. The other community accepted the first urban renewal proposal, and subsequently completed two more projects of major proportions. Both communities have similarities in their overall existence, population, and life styles. So the problem emerges regarding why urban renewal should be accepted in one while forcefully rejected in the other.

Response to the problem resulted in exploratory research of how each community approached the utilization of urban renewal and what factors indigenous to each had direct influence upon how the program was treated. To accentuate the individuality of each community and its own relation to the urban renewal process, a particular model for interpreting community action, as developed and elaborated by community sociologist Roland Warren (1972), will be employed. In utilizing this general model, the data derived from this exploratory study can be compared along various stages, thus indicating where basic changes, deviations, and decisions occurred. The philosophy, structure, and organization of the federal urban renewal program are of secondary consideration in this study. Nevertheless, they must be reviewed for a thorough understanding of the program and how it operated.

The study is organized into the following eight parts. Traditional for such research presentations will be the review of literature which will tersely recognize the bulk of publications which have addressed

various aspects of the urban renewal program and its effects upon local communities. The chapter which deals with a brief history of urban renewal is abbreviated to include the origin, philosophy, purpose, and organizational structure of the program from the federal level through the local community agency. To facilitate a general understanding regarding the logistics of how the program was operationalized in communities, the chapter on developing a local urban renewal agency and project reviews the basic stipulations required for the local level of participation. The axis for this research project lies in the chapter reviewing the particular model for community action whereby the general process of decision making is presented as a foundation upon which the separate communities decisions to engage, or not to engage, in urban renewal can be evaluated. The two chapters which follow present descriptions of each community. The chapters present descriptive narratives of traits, chronological developments, and principal changes which provide background knowledge pertinent to each. A comparison of Warren's model with each community's experience constitutes the chapter following the narrations. Consideration of how realistic the model is and how it related to each community case is reviewed. The final chapter is an analysis of this case study of the two communities regarding certain comparable variables with conclusions regarding why one community rejected and the other community accepted urban renewal. These conclusions are conceptually firm but not statistically proven; perhaps they would provide hypotheses for future testing. Finally the appendices and working bibliography appear at the conclusion of this paper.

The methodology used in this study has been somewhat eclectic, if not traditional, to community sociology research. Although a profusion

of research techniques have been/are used in community studies, Arensberg and Kimball (1965:29-31) point out that one approach appears more consistently than others:

Community study is that method by which a problem (or problems) having interconnections and dynamics of behavior and attitudes is explored against or within the environment of other behavior and attitudes of the individuals making up the life of a particular community; it is a naturalistic, comparative method. This method is aimed at studying behavior and attitudes as live objects through observation rather than as remote occurrences through variable isolation and abstraction or in an exercise of experimental models. Observation rather than a statistical or experimental method means that control, verification, and reliability are quite different from those associated with attitude survey or small-group experiments. A social scientist conducting community research must utilize many techniques of observation and data collection. To date, interviewing, participant-observation, sociometrics, genealogies, case-studies, content analysis of records and documents, etc., have been used widely. It is the material and data, not the research problem, that requires a manifold and flexible use of techniques.

Community sociologists Vidich, Bensman, and Stein (1964:XI) complement the preceding quote by emphasizing that:

In spite of the grandiose elaboration of much research methodology and abstract theory in sociology, it appears that the ear and the eye are still important instruments for gathering data, and that the brain is not always an inefficient mechanism for analyzing them.

Thus, in relation to the research problem posed for this study, a basic exploratory design (case-study) predominated. Within this design, several techniques were employed to gather the data. Content analysis of newspaper stories, editorials, and letters to the editors were used extensively. In one community, the back issues of the daily newspaper were reviewed over a three year period. In the other community, the back issues of its daily were reviewed over a period of fifteen years. Further content analyses of urban renewal agency documents, files, and administrative records were utilized through the

generous cooperation of officials at the local and regional levels. Especially useful was the complete personal file (i.e., letters, speeches, memoranda, etc.) of two former community agency directors. Content analysis in community studies has been justified by Hauser (1965:80-84) as:

. . . a research technique for the objective, systematic, and quantitative description of the manifest content of communications which have been verbalized through the mass media, published in books or periodicals, or written in record or document forms.

Personal interviews with certain "key informants" were used also. Thirty-six interviews occurred in which urban renewal officials (regional and local), agency board members from each community, city government officials, newspaper editors, community businessmen, school officials, and residents affected directly by the projects, shared their views and information. Most of the interviews were extensive (exceeding forty-five minutes in length) being conducted on a conversational level by this writer (who had considerable experience in interviewing in prior research fieldwork) who used a basic format of "open-end" questions. Upon completion of each interview, the researcher would, in privacy, document the interview information utilizing a tape recorder. This procedure proved effective in capturing details, impressions, and other general observations which are often difficult to note on a written interview form. Later, careful scrutiny of this taped information produced much data. The interview technique was successful in that each informant who was approached (usually by prior contact by telephone or letter requesting the interview) graciously and courteously cooperated.



Finally, this writer spent considerable time traveling to, and remaining in, each community. This afforded the opportunities to visually observe each community; to walk its streets; see its buildings; browse through each library; drive through the parks; frequent each city hall; study in each local museum; and visit in each residential section. These experiences all blend into distinct conceptions of each community regarding activity, impression, and atmosphere, and consequently help in understanding and appreciating the data which evolved.

## CHAPTER III

### REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE

There exists, in the scholarly and professional literature, an extensive array of publications related to community behavior and urban renewal as separate topics. Although this study is concerned with both, the basic quest is to understand urban renewal's relationship to the community. This does not preclude the need to investigate the nature, dynamics, and theories of community behavior; but to do so here would shift attention from the main points under investigation. Therefore, this review of the literature will necessarily concentrate upon urban renewal and how it has wrought varied effects upon community behavior.

When urban renewal is considered singularly, there remains a volume of materials to review most of which were published in the 1960's. It seems pertinent, almost mandatory, that some type of classification of this material be presented which would expedite this review. Thus the following areas are used to arrange the publications which depict various aspects of urban renewal and its relationship to local communities: the history and legislation of urban renewal; the organization and administration of urban renewal; the politics and economics of urban renewal; poverty and the urban renewal process; citizen participation and urban renewal; and the critiques

and criticisms of urban renewal. These areas will be presented as a terse overview of the materials reviewed in this research effort.

#### The History and Legislation of Urban Renewal

There appears to be no particular text which provides a definitive history of the urban renewal program. When researching this topic, this writer, through personal correspondence, was informed by a federal official in Washington, D. C. that a retired, high-ranking urban renewal official was preparing such a manuscript. However, this work has apparently not been published yet, at least commercially. There are various texts which contain generalized accounts of the historical and legal developments. Such accounts appear in Bellush and Hausknecht's book, Urban Renewal: People, Politics, and Planning (1967); Wilson's large text, Urban Renewal: The Record and the Controversy (1966); and Scott Greer's, Urban Renewal and American Cities (1965). A more direct and comprehensive treatment of the history and legality of the program is presented in two consecutive issues of the journal, Law and Contemporary Problems (Autumn, 1960; Winter, 1961). Both issues are completely and totally devoted to these aspects. A highly specialized inquiry into the legality of the program is presented in a full issue of Contemporary Law Review (Summer, 1969) while Duggar (1961) and Foard (1960) also review the legalities of the program by analyzing specific court rulings and cases. With regard to the legal evaluations, the majority of these publications are objectively critical rather than documentary.

## The Organization and Administration of Urban Renewal

Numerous articles and texts have reviewed, outlined, and discussed the various levels of the organization and administration of the urban renewal program. The foremost authority appears to be Lindebloom (1965) who evaluates the entire apparatus of the program's bureaucracy completely from the top echelon in the federal government's hierarchy descending to the agency structure which operates in the local community. The works by Osgood and Zwerner (1960), Brounfield (1960; 1961), Millspaugh (1961), Hauser and Wirth (1965), and Short (1967) review the various categories of planning, directing, relocating, and participating, through the local board of directors, as viable parts of the urban renewal process. The various duties, responsibilities, guidelines, and policies are commented upon in these publications in which, quite often, some critique is also developed. However, these publications are, for the most part, more evaluative and narrative than critical.

A special professional journal is published monthly by the professional organization of urban renewal directors and officials (the National Association of Relocation and Housing Officials). The Journal of Housing basically contains articles regarding the status of local projects, revised federal guidelines with commentary, and descriptions of successful projects and role performances by agency directors and local boards. This publication contains abundant information, but it is specialized and oriented toward the career employee who is engaged in administrative work.

## The Politics and Economics of Urban Renewal

The political involvement which urban renewal generated has been studied or alluded to in a number of publications. Frequently these works have been directed toward other salient features in the program and the political side of urban renewal was included only as an indirect observation. There are, however, two significant books which developed complete and detailed analyses of the political overtones and involvements which surrounded much of the program. Kaplan's, Urban Renewal Politics (1963) was developed from a case-study methodology of a housing and relocation project in Newark, New Jersey. The author succinctly documented how this particular project served obvious political purposes and vested interests which disregarded the enacted philosophy and purpose of the program. A similar case-study of another housing project in Chicago was presented in Rossi and Dentler's, The Politics of Urban Renewal (1961). These authors reached the same conclusions as Kaplan, except their study involved a project in which the local residents were of minority group status. Their removal from a tract of land that had potential redevelopment value instigated a community confrontation with racial overtones which became somewhat familiar with successive projects in the metropolitan areas during the 1960's.

The economics of the urban renewal program have also been evaluated in various articles. Often the focal point of discussion has been how a better utilization of urban land has resulted from such efforts. Under renewal guidelines, the federal government absorbed the costs of original real estate purchase, relocation of residencies and businesses, destruction of deteriorated buildings, and partial redevelopment of the property (i.e., land fill, grading, water and sewage lines, etc.).

Then the local agency would resell this land to private developers either for housing units or businesses. Obviously, there were economics of great proportions involved in many of the multi-million dollar projects. The most penetrating evaluation of this entire operation through an economic case-study analysis of a large project was presented by Davis and Whinston (1961). The entrepreneurial role of the federally employed local urban renewal director was analyzed by Bellush and Hausknecht (1967) while Dahl (1961) in his book, Who Governs, devotes some portions to the observations that a possible form of collusion may have existed among local officials, real estate developers, and the federal bureaucrats who directed local projects.

In the more contemporary literature, Schall (1976) has put forth a highly mathematical-theoretical model which postulates the efficiency of urban renewal projects that attain maximum timing, long-range planning, and permanent shifts in a community's physical deterioration. Recently, Stone (1976) has written an excellent book which presents a case-study of the urban renewal program in Atlanta, Georgia; it probes urban renewal over a twenty year period with particular references to the political and economic contexts. It was quite clear that business groups had much greater influence in shaping the redevelopment of the city than did low-income groups as new hotels, civic facilities, educational institutions, and sports facilities were constructed while one-seventh of the city's population (mostly low-income minorities) were forced to move. Stone clearly demonstrates that the urban renewal program also served as a vehicle for exercising community power. Cord (1974) finally asked if the entire urban renewal experience has been a "boon or boondoggle" based upon his review of the total costs of the

program which he claims has a history of haphazard benefits to the poor and subsidization to the rich through land redevelopment.

#### Poverty and the Urban Renewal Process

Philosophically, urban renewal was conceived as an emancipator of blighted and slum conditions. The idealistic posture of the original congressional act of 1949 indicated that every person was entitled to a decent home. The intent of this act was to aid in the relocation and/or rehabilitation of housing conditions for those citizens who lived in the poverty areas of the city. How effective the program has been in its direct involvement with the poverty issue is reviewed by a number of investigators including Dunham (1962), Northwood (1963), Gosser (1965), Loshbough (1965), Schorr (1965), and Weaver (1965). Several of these writers are basically objective in their works tending to review the philosophical merits of the program without delving into details regarding application. But a greater number of these researchers are more specific in that factual evidence of particular projects are presented which document that poor people are actually made more poor by the escalated and unanticipated personal costs involved in housing relocation or home improvements so that the direct consequences of urban renewal to them has been further economic hardships. Several of these publications were antagonistic as they critically appraised the program.

#### Citizen Participation and Urban Renewal

The literature regarding neighborhood involvement with urban renewal is copious and varied. This aspect of the urban renewal

process has seemingly stimulated more commentary, research, and publication than any of the other areas reviewed in this chapter. Basically, these publications have been addressed to the process of how local project area residents were to participate meaningfully in urban renewal. The bulk of this literature documents incidents and case histories of projects where the citizen involvement process did not work well. The inquiry and confusion this portion of the urban renewal program raised has been examined in a special issue of The Public Administration Review (September, 1962) in which various perspectives, theoretical and actual, of citizen participation are either commented upon or researched. Much of the same format is duplicated in a full issue of The Columbia Law Review (March, 1966) except greater emphasis is placed upon the theoretical mechanics of neighborhood participation and relocation in this journal.

More exciting is a lengthy monograph in which the author documents a residential project in New York City which was directed, incidentally, by his father. In Neighborhood Groups and Urban Renewal, Davies (1966) reconstructed how residents who opposed the project organized, acted, and defeated the implementation of the proposed plans. This descriptive analysis portrayed community action adamantly responding to a perceived threat from outside forces. Millspaugh and Breckenfeld (1960), Piven (1966), Wilson (1966), Wolf (1967), Lindbloom and Farrah (1968), Aiken and Alford (1970), Dubey (1970), Kovak (1972), Riedel (1972), Hallman (1972), Black (1974), and Mithun (1976) explored neighborhood reactions and controversies regarding urban renewal projects which resulted either in partially curtailing the proposed plans or successfully abolishing the project. From the opposite perspective, Cagle (1970), Hallman



(1970), Lewenstein (1971), Kolman (1972), Strange (1972), Stenberg (1972), Zimmerman (1972), and Benz (1975) investigated the cooperation of neighborhood groups within completed projects and what ensuing effects urban renewal had brought into their lives. Meanwhile, Rhyne (1960) and Warren (1967) discussed how neighborhood activity and involvement stimulated by urban renewal projects indirectly created a resurgence of community sentiment and identity.

All the publications which deal with actual cases of neighborhood response have utilized data from metropolitan centers. Many of the project residents were either of minority group status, elderly, poor, or considered "culturally deprived" in some way. Of noticeable importance to this study is the fact that the settings for these observations invariably are located in major cities and involve residents who had urban backgrounds. It appears that no research has been published regarding neighborhood groups and citizen participation in urban renewal projects which have been planned and completed in medium sized or small cities. Interpolation of responses to the residents in these areas seems, therefore, tacitly implied.

#### Critiques and Criticisms of Urban Renewal

Of all the literature oriented toward urban renewal, the works which critically explore the program seems to have garnered the most acclaim. The most obviously critical and accusatory are Anderson's, The Federal Bulldozer (1964); Greer's, Urban Renewal and American Cities (1965); and Jacobs', The Life and Death of Great American Cities (1961). While Anderson and Greer cite the hardships forced upon residents, businesses, and taxpayers regarding the entire program, Jacobs

argues against the forced destruction of a sociological milieu in neighborhood areas which had evolved over generations of people and time. Others such as Leach (1960), Everett (1961), Gans (1968, 1965), Carpenter (1962), Anderson (1965), Groberg (1965), and Taylor and Williams (1967) have described the economic and social wastes and general ineffectiveness of the program. Of particular concern is how urban renewal related to minorities. Accusations were made which indict urban renewal as helping to perpetuate racial conflicts by appearing racist in the selection of many project sites which were predominately black residential (thus urban renewal was jargonistically paraphrased "Negro removal" in several of these works). Obvious disgust was apparent in some of the literature which resembled an exercise in polemics rather than academics.

Thus a considerable body of literature relevant to urban renewal does exist. The program has been widely discussed, often misunderstood, and always controversial. There is abundant documentation that urban renewal projects have had positive effects in some communities while negative reactions have resulted in others. The program has been viewed as an economic and political ploy by some writers while others hailed it as humanitarian reform. Due to ideological stance and individual perception, urban renewal has been represented in many varied and contrasting ways.

## CHAPTER IV

### AN OVERVIEW OF THE HISTORY AND ORGANIZATION OF URBAN RENEWAL

The physical blight of the inner city has been well documented. Slums, decay, and deterioration are recognizable parts of any urban community. These are problems which are not relegated to large cities alone, for many towns and smaller cities are caught in the complex web of deterioration. The houses and commercial structures that served well for so many decades have now become obsolete. Often the owners of these structures reside in distant places, or the original owners have died and the property has passed into estates or multiple ownership. Ultimately, the community developed a concern regarding declining real estate tax revenues at a time when the need for public services had increased. Competition with the area in the form of new suburban developments replete with shopping centers and industrial parks emerged. This combination of problems, abetted by the migration of the undereducated, the poor, minority groups, and the aged into the depleted area in a quest for cheap housing provided the basic rationale for the creation of the federal urban renewal program in the United States.

The concept of urban renewal was not new. From time to time throughout history there have occurred significant city rebuilding efforts. For example, the ancient city of Troy was "renewed" nine times prior to the birth of Christ while in the mid-1800's Paris,

through a series of monumental public improvements, changed from a medieval town into a modern city (Lindbloom, 1968:10). During the latter part of the 19th century, British cities individually attempted renewal. A basic example of this effort was Glasgow which in 1886:

. . . renewed a tract of eighty-eight acres of slums which had, in some of the more dense areas, as many as one thousand persons per acre; this tract of deteriorated buildings was razed, new streets and tenements were constructed with improved sanitation facilities, and open space for court-yards, all at a cost borne by parliament and private finances. (Abrams, 1965:77-78).

This description could have applied to the modern renewal efforts in some American cities.

In some respects, the concept of urban renewal could be an example of cultural diffusion. However, no other society, as of yet, has undertaken as broad and extensive approach, originating from its national government, in seeking to make renewal applicable to each community's individual needs. Federal urban renewal was a "systems" approach to a problem organized through a bureaucratically structured personnel who, with the aid of some degree of demographic knowledge and change technology, sought to correct inevitable urban deterioration. On a higher philosophical level it can be regarded as an attempt by rational man to control material conditions, and thus with some degree of assurance, predict and prepare the future.

Urban renewal was created in the United States as the result of the Federal Housing Act of 1949. The basic objectives of this congressional act were to eliminate sub-standard and other inadequate housing through clearance of slums and to "realize the goal of a decent home and a suitable living environment for every American family" (Glazer, 1965:194). The original 1949 act was amended by the 1954

Federal Housing Act which actually created the term "urban renewal" and a specific organization to administer the program called the Urban Renewal Administration. This act also established the Urban Planning Assistance Program (sometimes referred to as the "701 Program" due to the number of the legislative bill). This legislation required long-range, comprehensive planning by each community which established an urban renewal project. The 1954 act recognized the need for non-residential renewal projects to correct blight in business and industrial areas. It was stipulated that ten percent of all funds should be designated for such non-residential projects. A decade later, this figure had risen to forty percent, thus indicating the trend of the program toward interests other than housing (Lindbloom, 1968:180). Urban renewal was empowered with the "right of eminent domain" regarding the acquisition of private properties. Ultimately the question of constitutional legality concerning this authority arose and in the case of *Berman versus Parker*, the U. S. Supreme Court upheld the right of the Urban Renewal Administration to utilize this procedure. This court decision was, in historical retrospect, overshadowed by the publicity which surrounded the court's ruling on integration in public schools, both of which were handed down in 1954 (Bullish and Hausknech, 1967:52).

Although the program started in 1949, it was not until 1956 that the first urban renewal project was completed; by the end of 1960, 41 projects were classified as completed (Anderson, 1964:40). Housing needs were still the primary concern, but the new guidelines had become more oriented toward restoration of commercially used buildings, acquisition of land sites on which vacant, deteriorated buildings stood, and the redevelopment of this land for resale to private investors,

municipalities, or institutions for the creation of new businesses, parking areas, public facilities, or beautification projects (Glazer, 1965:158). There was indication that this type of urban renewal activity was more expedient and profitable than its counterparts, residential housing, especially to local businessmen who either liquidated their old downtown real estate holdings, or purchased prime parcels of land for prices commonly 30 percent of what it had cost urban renewal (Anderson, 1965; Glazer, 1965).

The 1954 act had shifted the concerns from housing conditions to the broader concept of total community revitalization. Subsequently, the Federal Housing Acts of 1959 and 1961 added new provisions and stipulations to urban renewal which granted communities more tools to utilize in their total revitalization efforts. Then, in 1964, a remarkable variety of new programs for urban improvement was enacted together with the formation of a Presidential Cabinet-Level Department (Housing and Urban Development) to administer all renewal efforts (Lindbloom, 1968:13).

It was obvious that urban renewal attempted to restore communities by the infusion of large subsidies of federal money and control into the ongoing operations of the private real estate markets and the local municipal governments. Briefly, this is how urban renewal, in theory, operated. After a proposed urban renewal site was designated by the local government and a particular type of project proposed, a referendum was held in the community on whether or not to proceed in the establishment of a local urban renewal authority. Upon a successful mandate from the citizens, which would also indicate their approval for the proposed project, a local urban renewal board would be appointed by the mayor or

city council. This board had the authority to establish a local urban renewal agency (i.e., secure office space, hire a director, staff, etc.) and act as the community "watchdog" over the entire renewal effort for the duration of the project.

Once the agency was established and functioning, the proposed plan for the project was further developed and submitted to the federal authorities in the regional office. After having received tentative approval of the plan from this level, a series of public hearings would be scheduled at which times local renewal officials presented the entire plans for the project to the community. At these times, the public had the opportunity to speak for or against the planned project and to ask questions relative to any phase of the project or urban renewal. Depending upon the response from the public, the final approval (or disapproval) of the project was then given by the city council, or as some state statues permitted, by another special community election. Once the project had been officially approved, it moved from the planning into the implementation stage. During this stage, the plans would be translated into action. The project was considered complete when all changes called for in the plans had been accomplished and all money transactions accounted for and closed.

Thus, urban renewal had the advantage of involving a standard procedure to which all participating communities had to submit. Many of the program's guidelines were flexible, but all projects had to pass through the planning, implementation, and completion stages. Arrival at the completion stage was unquestionably the best measure of success in any project (Hawley, 1963:424).

The proponents of urban renewal commonly justified its existence through economic reasons. Better land utilization, new businesses, new jobs, and a higher property tax base were the usual justification. The social reasons used to promote renewal centered on its ability to clear bad housing while providing help in refurbishing existing dwellings in need of repairs. The not too subtle hint lingered that if the physical environment was improved the kinds of people who lived in that environment would change their lifestyles, consequently upgrading the social environment of the community.

Another line of reasoning used in perpetuating urban renewal was for the aesthetic improvement of the area. This rationale indicated that a well developed renewal plan, with sound controls, offered a unique opportunity to change the city pattern and appearance. This could be done in conjunction with the expansion of some public facility such as a local hospital, college campus, civic center, or creation of a needed trafficway. Those who favored urban renewal pointed out that such improvements could take decades to accomplish if the initiative was left entirely to the local community or private enterprise. Such considerations for long range community changes underscored and reinforced the 1964 amended Urban Renewal Act which established, as a prerequisite for any future urban renewal project, a community-wide master plan which would provide a comprehensive estimate of the community's future needs and possible revitalization.

Under Democratic administrations in the 1960's, federal domestic policies and programs were accelerated (i.e., "The Great Society"). Thus, a noticeable increase in urban renewal activity occurred. Due to the new requests for urban renewal projects throughout the nation, a



sophisticated bureaucratic structure was developed in which new areas of specialization in administration, technical supervision, and community planning predominated. Work roles were created to fulfill special needs which the system had generated.

By the late 1960's, the bureaucracy of the Urban Renewal Administration had evolved into four levels of organization. These included the Central Office in Washington, D. C., the Regional Offices, the Area Offices, and the local urban renewal agencies. The basic structuring of each of these levels was depicted in the Journal of Housing (April, 1970:178-187). Federal authority began with the Secretary of Housing and Urban Development and was dispersed through various Assistant Secretaries who were located in the Central Office. The Central Office directed all program administration and was primarily responsible for creating and interpreting policy guidelines, establishing priorities, and for developing standards, procedures, and criteria for the field operations (Bryan, 1970:182). Urban renewal projects were consolidated through the special office of the Assistant Secretary for the Urban Renewal Administration whose responsibility was primarily housing projects. Urban renewal projects other than housing (i.e., beautification or business-area projects, etc.) were administered through the office of the Assistant Secretary for Planning and Development. All funds received from the national budget were allocated from the Central Office to the Regional Offices, with each regional administrator responsible for their transference to the local community agencies that had projects in their various stages of existence.

The second level of administrative authority was the Regional Office. Ten Regional Offices were located in the following cities:

Boston (Region I), New York (Region II), Philadelphia (Region III), Atlanta (Region IV), Chicago (Region V), Fort Worth (Region VI), Kansas City (Region VII), Denver (Region VIII), San Francisco (Region IX), and Seattle (Region X). The internal structure of each Regional Office was somewhat a facsimile of the Central Office in Washington. The Regional Administrator had a complement of Assistant Administrators corresponding to most of the Assistant Secretaries in the Central Office. Each related directly to his counterpart in the Washington office, but their overall coordination within the Regional Office was part of the responsibility of the Regional Administrator. This Administrator also had a basic staff, plus retained consultants, for legal counsel, project planning and technology, public affairs, and labor relations. Through this structure, the regional officials exercised authority delegated to them by the Secretary of Housing and the various Assistant Secretaries (Bryan, 1970:182).

The specific duties of the Regional Offices included giving overall direction to the Area Offices and the local agencies; allocation of funds; evaluation of each project's progress and activity; interpretation of guidelines; and the standardization of project operations throughout the nation. They were also responsible for handling relations with state governors, state legislatures, and various national organizations which represented minority groups, business groups, etc. The office reviewed and processed all applications, plans, reports, and completions of renewal projects throughout the region. Sometimes the office served as a "buffer" between particular "problem" projects and the Central Office, arbitrating or ameliorating disputes which arose

between the local community agency and the Central Office regarding project guidelines, etc.

There were 26 Area Offices (geographically dispersed throughout the ten regions) which constituted the third level in the organization. Their internal structures differed somewhat from the Regional and Central Offices. They were compact and simple, specializing in direct relationships with the local agency's operations. There was an Area Director who had the authority to give partial approval to most plans and actions that were involved while keeping potential costs calculated and relevant to ongoing costs that were customary to the area (land prices, relocation costs, consultant fees, demolition work, etc.). The Area Offices operated through two divisions, a "production" division and a "housing services and property management" division. The production division covered the entire range of standard renewal projects. Personnel in this division were assigned to work with local applicants, assist in technical reviews, and make recommendations for changes or approval regarding the particular phases of the projects they had studied. Division personnel represented an array of full time specialists in areas of public housing, planning, relocation, rehabilitation, loans and grants, engineering, architecture, mortgage credit, and building codes (Journal of Housing, April, 1970:183). The "housing services and property management" division provided counselors and consultants who gave assistance in social services, housing choices, home management and home mortgage loans.

The final level of this complex organization was the local urban renewal agency. Its structure was extremely pliable due to the nature and demands of the type of local project attempted and the population

of the urban area it served. In this respect, a metropolitan project with a large scope would command a large agency staff with varied role specializations all under the supervision of the agency director. Meanwhile, a small community project would require a director, his immediate assistant, and a secretary. The agency director was responsible for the coordination of all local activity, keeping it within the guidelines and limits superimposed by the program and monitored by the hierarchy of the Area, Regional, and Central Offices. When specialization was required, often it was provided for the local agency through the Area Office or through private consultants retained by contract. Every decision, plan, and phase endeavored in the project was negotiated with the approval of the higher offices.

The unique feature of the local urban renewal agency was the citizen Board of Commissioners. This board represented the input and control from the local community. Its members, who were appointed community residents, were involved from the start of the local agency being responsible for its organization. The Board supervised the agency director (it could dismiss him), the major agency decisions, and all plans or innovations which the agency initiated. The Board was also committed to soliciting community support for the project. This was the "grass roots" involvement upon which the philosophy of local community control of urban renewal was formulated. In 1970, there were 986 local urban renewal agencies engaged in approximately 1600 separate projects (Journal of Housing, March, 1970:90). The entire Urban Renewal Administration operated with a federal allocation of \$2.1 billion in 1970 and submitted a \$2.3 billion budget in 1971 (Journal of Housing, October, 1970:468). In 1971, after 22 years of existence, the

approximate full time personnel (excluding secretarial staff) within the various levels of the Urban Renewal Administration totaled 7000 employees (Journal of Housing, March, 1970:90).

The amount of physical change which urban renewal has accomplished reflects the magnitude of its impact. Although data on the completed totality of all projects has apparently not been published, a review of urban renewal during its twentieth year of existence indicated that on June 30, 1969, there were 1608 projects either in the planning or execution stage, and the following physical changes had been the result of urban renewal activity: 19,300 acres had been converted either to new or rehabilitated housing (new housing constructed through public or private financing in renewal projects totaled 183,213 units of which 91,235 or 50% were classified as low income units); 29,300 acres had been converted to commercial, industrial, or institutional usage and 8,700 acres converted to public facilities such as new or improved streets, parks, city malls, and beautification projects. Some of these projects had taken as long as three years to plan and 12 years to execute (Journal of Housing, October, 1970:468).

During the same 20 year period, urban renewal statistics indicated displacement of 259,270 families; of this number 212,084 families had been relocated into standard housing units with local agency help. However, 13,996 families had relocated on their own initiative and resources without agency help while 33,190 families "whereabouts" were unknown. Relocation expenses during the 20 year period had amounted to \$34 million. There was no indication of the total amount of federal money expended for all urban renewal costs during that same time period,

(Journal of Housing, October, 1970:469), although Cord (1974:184) indicated the total costs of all urban renewal activity was in excess of ten billion dollars.

The last part of the decade of the 1960's was, perhaps, the zenith for the federal urban renewal program. When a new political administration assumed responsibility for the federal government in 1960, it commenced a reorganization of the Department of Housing and Urban Development which partially dismantled the program and desolved it into a more direct channeling of money from the federal government to local communities under the auspices of the Community Development Act of 1971. This new legislation allowed communities to spend their federal monies on whatever kinds of projects each desired. Only the unfinished but funded projects remained as viable indicators of the Federal Urban Renewal Administration in those communities which had utilized the program.

## CHAPTER V

### THE LOCAL URBAN RENEWAL AGENCY :

#### A COMMUNITY COMMITMENT

Once the superstructure of the federal Urban Renewal Administration had been operationalized, the whole program depended upon the creation of local community agencies which materialized the urban renewal philosophy. In all respects, the local agency concept was the most important aspect of the entire program. It was through the agency that the communications, directions, and funding were channeled into the community. Without the sustained development of local agencies, the organizational complexity of urban renewal would not continue to have been justified to the Department of Housing and Urban Development. But there were always competitive applications for federal urban renewal funds by numerous communities which wanted to establish an urban renewal project. Therefore, the basic procedures and requirements regarding the creation of the local agency should be reviewed.

In determining eligibility and qualification for the establishment of a local agency, two fundamental requirements of the community were made explicit; first, there had to be a generally recognizable degree of deterioration in the area where the renewal project was to occur; and second, the municipality had to have the resources to carry out its share of the project (25% of the total costs except for the initial planning stage) (Lindbloom, 1968:28). The formal requirements for the

physical conditions in a project area, as stated in the Urban Renewal Handbook as quoted in Lindbloom (1968:23) were:

. . . that an urban renewal area, other than an open land area, must contain deficiencies to a degree and extent that public action is necessary to eliminate and prevent the development or spread of deterioration and blight. At least twenty percent of the buildings in the area must contain one or more structural deficiencies, and the area must contain at least two environmental deficiencies such as drainage problems, sewage problems, unsafe streets, excessive noise, air pollution, or general run down conditions.

To accommodate these requirements, a typology of projects had been established by the federal bureaucracy. Each project had to qualify under one of the typology's headings to be eligible for federal assistance. The classification of various projects were: (1) "Built-Up Area Projects" where at least 50% of the designated area contained deteriorated structures or other deteriorating improvements such as streets, utilities, etc.; (2) "Predominately Open Land Projects" where an area had less than 50% in structures but did have obsolete buildings and improvements which occupied more than 10% of the area and impeded or arrested further community growth and sound land use of the unused portion which, in all likelihood, would not be developed by private capital; (3) "Open Land Projects" where there was less than 10% in buildings and improvements, but the land use was deemed essential to the future development of the community while arresting slums and undesirable development; (4) "Special Projects" which included the acquisition of land and removal of structures for the development or expansion of existing college, university, hospital, or other public facilities (Lindbloom, 1968:36-37). One other condition was necessary for the creation of an urban renewal agency. This was that the community must have developed (or engage in the process of developing) an



overall, comprehensive plan with details pertaining to all future community growth, redevelopment, and possible deterioration problems. This "master plan" was the responsibility of the local government but it could use the urban renewal agency and federal funds in this effort.

Basically, the comprehensive plan was an illustrated and written document of the long term objectives of the community for its physical condition. Under the 1964 act, it had to be completed and adopted by the community before its urban renewal project entered the implementation phase (the second of three phases that every project passed through). The comprehensive plan consisted of six core elements or sub-plans:

- (1) 'The Land Use Plan' created for the most effective use of all land within the community.
- (2) 'The Street Plan' which indicated improved and new street construction.
- (3) 'The Community Facilities Plan' which indicated where public utilities, institutions, parks, etc., were to be located in relation to future needs.
- (4) 'The Public Improvement Program' which established priorities and methods of meeting future community needs.
- (5) 'The Zoning Ordinances and Zoning Map' with regulations and procedures for zoning, rezoning, and housing codes.
- (6) 'The Subdivision Regulations' which provided standards for new housing or industrial developments (Lindbloom, 1968:42-44).

This degree of rational planning reflected the belief held by federal authorities that the funded project of any community should serve as a catalyst for sustained improvement and establish a local concern for community revitalization.

Aside from these imposing regulations, urban renewal was actually a local program from beginning to end. Indeed the federal government did provide money, policy guidelines, and professional assistance, but the community had to plan, approve, and complete the project. Thus the community was responsible for having made the most basic decisions. The Board of Commissioners of the local urban renewal agency was held accountable for the operation of the agency and the activities in which it engaged. Board members were appointed by the local government from within the community and served terms of three years without salary compensations (they could repeat their tenure on the board, if they so desired, for successive terms). The board evolved from the local government's recognition of a potential project within the community and its decision to apply for urban renewal funds to ameliorate the condition. The board, in turn, would proceed to develop an urban renewal agency based on models provided by the federal government. The board assumed responsibility for hiring the agency's director, supervising money expenditures, detailing the project's plans, and pledging that the community would meet its share of the project's expenses. A great amount of time and commitment was usually involved in these efforts. In this respect, certain personal qualities were considered desirable in those local citizens who would serve on the board. Bodine (1966:43-44) indicated these qualities as:

Having possessed 'leadership in' and 'knowledge of' the community; 'salesmanship' which promoted a belief in the project; 'relationships' which carried a number of connections or influences in the community; and a 'statesmanship' which could comprehend and compromise the overall federal policy for local needs.

Possibly the desire for community prestige or a sense of power may have motivated some members of the local boards also.

Not all of the local responsibility for the agency lay with the Board of Commissioners. It has been observed that the success or failure of proposed urban renewal projects was, to a significant degree, attributable to the agency director:

Of all the persons or groups participating in urban renewal the director bears the brunt of the responsibility for getting the job done. When confronted with a project that is in trouble in a community, the director's ability is immediately evaluated. Often this person is the sole cause of the problem (Lindbloom, 1968:47).

As a professional employed by the federal government, there were certain duties and roles that an agency director had to be capable of adequately fulfilling. Lindbloom (1968:47-48) observed that:

Aside from the many talents needed for administrative ability, the director had to function as a 'policymaker' by giving a sense of direction and timing to the project; as an 'educator,' he had to explain technical procedures, policies, and general red-tape; as a 'publicist,' he had to keep the public informed through media releases and speeches; as a 'local representative of the federal government,' he sought to gain respect from the community by articulating their interests and needs to the federal bureaucracy; and as a 'dispenser of public funds,' he had to be recognized for his integrity and honesty.

The director was usually expected to have gained some job experience in urban renewal work but this was not a prerequisite for his being hired. A college degree was not a necessity. The director's salary was paid by the federal government, but the amount was negotiated by the Board of Commissioners. Applications for the directorship had to be formally made, generally in response to solicitation by the board via professional publications within the Urban Renewal Administration or by personal contact.

With the creation of a Board of Commissioners and the employment of a director, a local urban renewal agency would be functional. The director assumed responsibility for securing office space, hiring additional staff, purchasing supplies, and supervising the detailed plans for the project. Because the federal government was interested in the tenure of the local agency, the director could proceed with caution and a flexible schedule in completing the plans for the proposed project. Although the agency had been established in the community, the first phase of any project (planning) was still a proposition in which need for the project was confirmed, specific plans for the project finalized, total costs through completion estimated, and a probable timetable for the remaining phases of the project calculated. The initial planning phase could involve a year before all details became known to the community and subjected to a final vote of approval. During this period of preparation, appraisals of property were made, socio-economic diagnostic surveys were conducted, and construction costs were evaluated. This emphasis on careful preparation and planning was underwritten by the federal government because the Urban Renewal Administration paid 100% of all costs associated with the planning phase of the project before its final approval by the community.

To understand any urban renewal project was to understand the use of planning and time. A project was divided into phases and as such represented a process rather than an event. As previously mentioned, the initial phase was the planning phase. If/when the plan for the project was accepted by the community, the next general phase was the "implementation" phase which included the buying of parcels of property

by the agency and conducting all the necessary legal details regarding the purchases. The right of eminent domain, legal condemnation, and court litigation frequently were involved in this phase which, in theory, was to adhere to a certain time period. The final phase of the project was the "completion" or "execution" stage. It, too, was supposed to be concluded within a certain time frame. This last phase involved the relocation of businesses and/or households from within the project area, the renovation of the remaining structures, the razing of the structures designated for removal, the improvement of the streets, utilities, and land, and the resale of the improved land to private developers, institutions, or the municipality. All projects were collapsed into these three phases which resulted in a standardized process. Due to the many details, most projects took years to complete.

Thus, in the two communities studied in this paper, it will be obvious that one stopped the urban renewal process immediately after the planning phase of its proposed project. The other community completed its project, and its urban renewal agency endured for a period of 15 years during which three separate and different types of projects were concluded that involved large amounts of federal funds and significant community changes.

## CHAPTER VI

### A REVIEW OF COMMUNITY PROCESSES AND VARIOUS MODELS WHICH ALLOW FOR THEIR ANALYTICAL STUDY

Urban renewal was a federally conceived and funded program which originated in Washington, D. C., but was designed to be effective only if adopted by local communities. In theory and practice, the local community had the ultimate and final choice whether or not to proceed with the program. Such a choice always incorporated the basic dynamics of community life, namely community decision, community planning, community action, and community change. The interrelations of these dynamics could be observed relative to each local urban renewal project.

A degree of tension and conflict seemed apparent in the federal-local relationship on which urban renewal was predicated. The nature of this tension producing situation has been observed by community sociologist Roland Warren (1956:9):

It is the problem of the relation between deliberately induced community change, on the one hand, and democratic values on the other. Anyone who knows something that is 'good' for a community is faced with the dilemma of forcing this good, however subtly, on the community, or of running the risk that the community will not accept it, and that his efforts will be unsuccessful.

Thus if a basic decision was made to undertake a local urban renewal project, the elements Warren indicated had to be understood and placed in certain perspective.

Community decisions involve power. This is clearly demonstrated in Floyd Hunter's (1953) work, Community Power Structure: A Study of Decision Makers, in which the author pointed out that basic decisions which affected the entire community were often nurtured in the informal meetings of those community members who represented the "inner power" structure. If a community had voted to establish a local urban renewal agency, such a decision could have exemplified what Hunter had documented. This was attested to by Reiss (1959) who urged further research oriented toward determining the nature of the process of decision making in a community and suggested a design for such research. The concern for analyzing decision making in a community setting was also evaluated by Miller (1952) who carefully delineated a process through which one could dissect the influences and factors which affected decisions. Thus, observations of community decision-making processes were relevant to the instigation of urban renewal and, in essence, such decisions reflected the conditions under which power and influence could often be "sensed" at work within the community. Such power often took a "low profile" in the preliminary plans but emerged to lead the community in the important decision regarding the final approval of the local urban renewal project and agency.

Community planning was also thoroughly involved in urban renewal efforts. As indicated earlier, the federal guidelines requested detailed plans specifically indicating how the project would improve local land use and property values, correct existing deterioration,

and remove or relocate residencies or businesses within the proposed project area. Such planning procedures had political overtones and intrigues. In a penetrating essay, Schottland (1963:113-120) recognized the impact on local community autonomy that had occurred from more than 100 separate federal programs which required formulation of local plans prior to their being funded. Meanwhile, Wilson (1963:242-249) in his article, "Planning and Politics: Citizen Participation in Urban Renewal," directly assessed how and with whom the federal bureaucracy planned the urban renewal projects. He asserted that such planning inevitably involved those community influentials who made the decisions to initiate urban renewal and not the people whose property or homes would be directly affected. Morris and Rein (1963:169-176) reviewed tactics for community planning and observed that most plans were derived from non local rather than local sources, were concerned with political skills more than with consensus-forming skills, and were deliberately oriented toward change, rather than community cooperation, as the primary goal. Consequently when Warren (1971:102) scrutinized the "great changes" which had taken place in the American community, he concentrated upon the forms of control which had been brought into the ongoing community life through external and bureaucratic influences. These tended to affect the overall culture and ethos which had lent distinction to each community. Herein was the potential for observing community response to external influences such as urban renewal.

Planning denotes change or, at least, forthcoming change. Warren (1971:276) asked if change can be channeled and then presented a response to his own inquiry. He postulated that a dichotomy existed



between purposive and nonpurposive change. The latter occurred indirectly, without intent, and was unplanned. The former was planned change which resulted from deliberate responses to problems which arose from an aggregate of individual decisions made by persons, families, and organizations of one type or another as they pursued their interests and objectives in the community. The innuendo derived from this statement is that planned change may occur by default, not because it is the more logical, rational, and pragmatic alternative. Warren also noted that the relation between community change and national change must be considered. If the community was a microcosm of society, then change and action were intricacies of a social process which extended beyond the local boundaries. Again urban renewal exemplified these observations. As a workable program, its very reason for being was to facilitate planned change (purposive change) in the community. Its relation to community change was direct and somewhat exclusive once the local project had been granted approval.

While decision, planning, and change were implicit in the urban renewal--local community relationship, community action was the result. In either response, favorable or unfavorable, to the urban renewal proposal, community action had to have occurred. Many of the local citizens had to respond because they were directly involved through socio-economic or other vested interests. The urban renewal agency itself was an action oriented entity as necessitated by its very purpose and structure. The process of urban renewal and its particular relation to each community was indicative of social action processes capable of being reviewed and evaluated through cross-community comparative techniques.

In the evaluation of community response to the urban renewal program, the scope of the proposed project and the population size of the community were significant factors. Research indicated that the projects which progressed the fastest were the smaller ones because they had required less planning and less time to execute (Anderson, 1964:41). Also the larger communities (cities) responded to the urban renewal program overwhelmingly more than the smaller communities. Anderson's research (1964:42-44) indicated that 79% of the communities in excess of 100,000 population had federal urban renewal projects whereas only 11% of the communities with less than 100,000 population had them. The larger the community, the greater the probability was of its having an urban renewal agency. This was distinctly indicated by the following data (1964): of the 3115 communities in the United State with populations ranging between 2,500 to 10,000, 127 or 4%, had federal urban renewal projects. Of the 1,146 communities with populations ranging between 10,000 to 25,000, 170 or 15%, had urban renewal projects. When compared to the five largest cities in the U. S., all which had several projects operating concurrently, a bias against urban renewal seemed tentatively apparent in the smaller communities.

Community sociology literature has often depicted the small town as being somewhat ambivalent toward "extracommunity" influence. The foremost example of such literature was Small Town in Mass Society, in which Bensman and Vidich (1958) maintained that such communities were opposed to federal programs becoming incorporated into their lives because such an extension of the federal government represented a loss of "grass roots democracy" and community identity. Nevertheless, the authors noted, such communities made some effort to participate so

that they could gain federal money and cultivate regional prestige. Such federally funded programs, in turn, affected the local economy and social organization of the community. Relating to this observation, Hawley (1963) theorized that in each urban community, a ratio existed between managers, proprietors, and local government officials (as an aggregate) to the rest of the labor force. The lower the ratio, the greater the concentration of power and, subsequently, the greater the chances of success for such programs as urban renewal because power was less dispersed.

Such theoretical formulations imply that a substantial amount of change can be directed from outside the community, especially through the modern bureaucratic service agencies which directly relate to the basic social institutions found in each community (i.e., family, school, religion, government, and the economy). Much of the literature in social change, social organization, and community sociology reinforce this theoretical construct and provide analytical models capable of illustrating how this occurs within community processes. Utilizing this level of reflection, the community, large or small, can be observed in its relation to external influences which produce change. How individual communities respond and react can be analyzed by comparative community research efforts. Decision making process is interwoven with theories of action process, and both are generally observed to progress through various stages until adoption and finally assimilation by the community results. How this process transpires and the forms it may take are areas for research endemic to community sociology. Such research has produced certain models of community behaviors which have applicability to further studies.

Considerable reflection and discussion has occurred regarding the use of models in sociology. Debates have persistently questioned whether models are theoretical constructs or heuristic, analytical tools to be used in explaining the various types and natures of social data. In many respects, the latter has been highly relevant to certain types of community research. There has often been a need for pragmatic assessment of process in the activity produced by human interaction. This was definitely relevant to community studies which researched decision, planning, action, and change. The heuristic capacity of models which delineated process had a practical and workable relationship with a research methodology which incorporated observation, comparison, and verification with all having been grounded in the basic dimensions of time, place, and situation. With these considerations in perspective, the following comments by Arensberg and Kimball (1965:34-35) seemed pertinent:

In community study, the three main problems in executing a research design are 'sui generis.' They are not much like those of other social science methods. First is the construction of a model of the whole from data gathered in the widest possible net. Second comes comparison, at least implicit comparison, with other similar wholes. Third is the fitting of any particular problem or other object of study into the proper spaces within the model.

These writers were quick to add that "a great deal depends upon the theoretical and comparative insight of the model user and a great deal depends, too, upon the accuracy of the data-gathering techniques that were used."

The application of analytical models in social research has been acknowledged. However, Warren (1971:256-257) lamented the minimum usage of models in contemporary community studies. He viewed models

as guides for recognizing phases of a process. Once the phases had been recognized, further examination could deduce inherent strengths or weaknesses of the process. Warren also observed (1971:246-247) that models for community development could be deduced from historical as well as comparative observations. The historical perspective referred to such utopias as Plato's planned and regimented state in The Republic. Other historical examples included past social experiments in deliberately formed "avant garde" communities or communes (i.e., obvious examples have resulted from certain intellectual and/or artistic endeavors in group living, such as Nathaniel Hawthorne's "Brook Farm," experiment in New York State in the 1830's--this writer's italics). The contemporary models included the "new towns" which epitomized rational planning. Warren also has written about "prescriptive models" which indicated the movement of community action as a process capable of being viewed as stages within a developmental framework. The synopsis of Warren's concern was that various model related to various needs. Hence, some models for community study rendered ideal constructs, some provided insight into rational, pragmatic planning, and some were utilitarian in that they facilitate observation, analysis, and explanation of sequential events that resulted in community decision and action.

The use of analytical models and what variables they have included must be reviewed. Arensberg and Kimball (1965:100-101) do this with cognizance and equity:

Nowadays it is clear that a model rather than a definition serves to represent the complex variables of a complex situation, thing, or process. A model serves better to put together empirical descriptions economically and surely and to handle summarily things of many dimensions, little known organization, diverse functions and processes, and intricate connections with other things.

Thus, the models we shall need for American communities must rest on the common terms of description which serve for all others. The variables we use must be terms of universal application. The following are the comparative variables which apply to human communities, out of which models can be constructed:

- (1) Individuals (persons)
- (2) Spaces (territory, position, movement)
- (3) Times (schedules, calendars, time series)
- (4) Functions (for individuals and group life)
- (5) Structure and Process

With cogency these writers have brought together the basic variables which are required for action and process. Without recognition of these, any discussion of the various analytical models which have been used to research community dynamics would be somewhat academic. Definite perspectives which involve people, place, time, interaction, and meaning are crucial to the comprehension and implication of community processes. Otherwise, model construction for purposive analysis would be an erudite but sterile exercise.

Numerous models have been conceived and applied to the analysis of community action. Some of the more publicized include the following examples. Rogers (1962:81-86) posits an adoption process model which included (1) awareness, (2) interest, (3) evaluation, (4) trial, and (5) adoption as separate stages through which an individual or a community passes enroute to completing change. Ross (1955:39) pointedly referred to and defined community organization in his work and in so doing provided the outline for a model depicting community action when he stated:

Community organization is a process by which a community identifies its needs or objectives; orders (ranks) them; develops the confidence and will to work at them; finds the resources (internal and external) to deal with them; takes action in respect to them; and in so doing extends and develops cooperative and collaborative attitudes and practices in the community.

It must be inserted that these are proposed models for analyzing various kinds of community actions. They are not concerned with influencing the process of the actions but rather with analyzing them. Warren (1972:308-310) has indicated that the most sophisticated and useful model available at his writing had been developed over a period of years at Michigan State University and used in Paul Miller's (1952) study of community action regarding the adoption of a long range health program by a local community. It analyzed the action process in terms of the following stages: convergence of interest; establishment of an initiating set; legitimation and sponsorship; establishment of an execution set; mobilization of community resources; and fulfillment of "charter," meaning that the process of attaining the goal is complete.

A simpler model has been presented by Green and Mayo (1953:323-324) which analyzed community action via four phases: (1) the initiation of action or idea; (2) goal definition and planning; (3) implementation of plans; and (4) goal achievement and consequences. Meanwhile, Kaufman (1959:13-14) proposed a five step model which included: (1) rise of interest; (2) organization and maintenance of sponsorship; (3) goal setting and the determination of specific means of their realization; (4) gaining and maintaining participation; (5) carrying out the activities which represent goal achievement. Bruyn (1963:25-31) presented a more complex model complete with sub topical headings arranged under the following organization: (1) philosophy; (2) objectives; (3) functions; (4) initiation-organization; (5) execution; (6) maintenance. Although it was somewhat cumbersome in design, the scope of this model was more pervasive and thorough than many

others. Hage and Aiken (1970:92-106) created a time sequence model for analyzing organizational change which was divided into four periods or stages that included (1) evaluation: a period of study and assessment of the need for a new program; (2) initiation: locating the human and financial resources which specialize in coping with the deduced need; (3) implementation: developing the program into a functioning reality; (4) routinization: continuation and standardization of the new program. Lowery and Mitchell (1967:42-61) conceded that a model for community action passes through progressive stages which tend to overlap rather than occur in a well defined sequence. They separated these stages into a very general model which included: (1) convergence of interest; (2) initiation of action; (3) legitimation and sponsorship; (4) development of an overall action plan; (5) implementation of the action plan; (6) assessment or evaluation of action. This particular model was indicated as possessing high applicability for detailing procedures of community action. It must be reaffirmed that these models were not blueprints for community action and change. They did, however, provide heuristic methods for conceptualizing what can become immensely complex research.

In order to maintain a proper perspective regarding these models and the empirical utility they should possess, the variables to which these models have been related should be stressed again. Arensberg and Kimball indicated that individuals, spaces, times, functions, and structure interact as the basis for analytical modeling. Each community contains its fundamental personnel (residents) who, in their activities and relationships, engage with others in events in which it is possible to discern the order of action, and hence the structure,



of the social relationships present. Also it is possible to ascertain the functions that activities and relationships possess and the extent in which they contribute to the community and modify the ongoing social processes of the community life. Space and time are socially structured and utilized through the activity and distribution of the community personnel (residents) in their events. Arensberg and Kimball (1965:101) maintain that these variables, in their relationships with each other, constitute the "internal conditions" that give each community its particular "ethos." These writers caution, however, that each community is susceptible to "external conditions" that flow from other communities and from the larger society of which it is a part. External and internal influences have input and some measure of power in altering community process and ultimately must be recognized in the analytical models relevant to the study of those processes.

With regard for the various models encountered in the literature, the one proposed by community sociologist Roland Warren seems the most theoretically succinct. It incorporates the various external and internal forces which provoke change in a community setting. Much of Warren's (1972) community sociology text, The Community in America, stressed the "great change" which has occurred in contemporary community life, a change which resulted from internal and external dynamics. Essentially the model Warren developed will serve as a heuristic device in this study against which the research objectives relative to both communities can be compared through a sequence involving time, organization, decision, and action.

Briefly, Warren (1966:69-88; 1972:237-340) theorized that community organization and change can be viewed from two basic

perspectives; a vertical axis (pattern) and a horizontal axis (pattern). The relationships through which the community is oriented to the larger society beyond the local setting constitute the vertical pattern. Meanwhile, the degree of interactive relationships which local people or groups share with each other on a reciprocal level within the community create the horizontal pattern. Each community typically has both vertical and horizontal aspects present within its domain although some communities have a stronger vertical component while others have a stronger horizontal component. The important characteristic of the vertical pattern is the rational, planned, bureaucratically structured nature of the extracommunity ties. They are clearly structured along systemic lines, and the relations of the local community unit to the extracommunity system is usually clearly prescribed in terms of the rational, overall objectives and operating procedures of that system. Hence, the local community is not an isolated entity but "tied" to the extracommunity system, even to the extent that in many modern communities, these vertical ties are stronger than the local (horizontal) ties especially among businesses, management, professionals, and workers to some "outside the community" organization. Examples of the vertical ties have included chain stores, branch banks, branch factories, denominational churches, labor unions, state supported schools and colleges, the local unit of a hospital chain, voluntary associations, communication and transportation systems, and the local agencies representing state and federal government units such as the Post Office, Department of Justice, Department of Agriculture, Health, Education and Welfare, and Housing and Urban Development. The influence of these external forces through

the vertical pattern have extended a "gesellschaft" atmosphere into the daily routines of community life which, as Warren has asserted, denotes a historical change in the sociology of contemporary community life.

Warren (1972) also observed that the interrelationships between persons or units within the community formulate the basic ingredient of the horizontal pattern. This pattern is characterized not so much by "administered" decisions resulting from an organized hierarchy but rather by "exchange" decisions generated by individuals operating on an informal basis using whatever means of charisma, influence, power, or leverage available to them. Warren contends that they (the decisions) are clearly local in original and scope, and can be characterized by "sentiment, informality, tentative planning, and diffuse, informal and ad hoc structuring of an essentially nonbureaucratic nature" (270). Special interest groups, local government, local merchants, real estate interests, self-employed professionals, and owners of local natural resources exemplify these horizontal patterns of interaction. Here the different levels of authority and prestige are not so clearly delineated as in the vertical pattern but exist as a result of social dynamics. Herein lies the potential for a community power coalition representing vested interests relative to local decisions, changes, and actions. Warren points out that tension or conflict can exist between the demands of the horizontal pattern (i.e., provincialism) and the vertical pattern which directs actions through rules and procedures instigated outside the community (283).

Effects of these two patterns can be observed in the interactions of the people within the community. Both of these patterns influence

the community decision which is made through a process. Grounded in this interpretation, Warren's "five stage" model outlines a continued flow of social action in relation to a task of program undertaken by the community. The stages of this model may be tersely indicated as:

- (1) 'initial systemic environment' which means awareness, by the total community or a special group, of a problem or goal relevant to local residents;
- (2) 'inception of the action system' refers to the gathering of data and facts pertinent to the observed problem;
- (3) 'expansion of the action system' in which possible solutions to the factually-documented problem are sought;
- (4) 'operation of the expanded action system' denotes that a course for action is chosen;
- (5) 'transformation of the action system' is the last stage of this process model in which implementation and eventually assimilation of a change occurs (Warren, 1972: 253-254).

It is curious to note the way this model is analogous to the stages of the widely quoted "scientific method" which, when paraphrased, indicates that theory is derived by stating the problem, developing a hypothesis, experimentation, evaluation of the results, and conclusion. However, the scientific method is used to produce hard facts whereas this process model was proposed for analyzing action and change.

Warren (1972) acknowledged that this model could not account for subtleties and "subphases" which in themselves constituted miniature cycles similar to the stages of the larger process. With this recognized limitation, the model obviously cannot include all actions which may take place in the community in relation to the vertical and/or horizontal influences upon the various stages and the consequences each entails.

Thus utilizing Warren's theory and model as a pivot, exploratory, comparative research in the two communities related to this study was undertaken. After observing the separate and opposite outcomes of the two urban renewal projects, was there evidence that one community had developed a stronger vertical pattern than the other? Did the horizontal pattern predominate over the vertical pattern in one community? Specifically, in the community where the project failed, was the horizontal pattern dormant or latent up to a certain phase or stage in the model and then transformed into action? What was the relationship between the vertical pattern and the horizontal pattern within the community with the successful project? At what stages in the model were the influences from the two patterns obvious? At what stage in the model was the greatest strain exerted upon the proposed projects? At what stage in the model did the one community ultimately reject the proposed project? Did the community which maximized urban renewal pass through the stages of the model in the sequence Warren postulated? The very nature of these inquiries evoke certain parameters within which theory, model, and field research interrelate. Before comparative analysis can be made, a descriptive narrative of each community and its individual experience with urban renewal seems appropriate and pragmatic.

## CHAPTER VII

### A NEGATIVE RESPONSE TO URBAN RENEWAL--

#### ONE COMMUNITY'S EXPERIENCE

The community lies in the southwestern part of Butler County Kansas where the gentle roll of the eastern Kansas hills began to yield to the flat prairie terrain conspicuous throughout the middle and western parts of the state. There is a certain nostalgic and small town charm which seems to prevail. The large billboard at the edge of town proclaims, "Home of 6999 Friendly People." The tacit provincialism in this greeting is repudiated by one occasion, at least, when the community was besieged by tension and conflict regarding a local issue. Perhaps the mayor of the town summarized it well by saying that the people of his community are usually very open and friendly and cooperative but definitely not toward Urban Renewal.

In overall appearance, Augusta, Kansas, is a physically attractive small town. Although the main street business area displays some ready evidence of age (i.e., inlaid brick streets in lieu of asphalt pavement, archaic architectural styles of building designs, and an abundance of fading red brick facades on many commercial properties), the greater part of the residential area, particularly that section which lies north of the downtown business area, is neat, well maintained, and very clean. The town is platted on a north-south axis which incorporates about three square miles of land area. The "Main Street" of the town

is bisected by Kansas Highway No. 54 which, as a major east-west state highway, connects with Wichita approximately 15 miles to the west. North of this intersection is the improved residential part of the community. A large majority of the residential properties in this area are maintained with pride. Sidewalks, spacious yards, an abundance of shade trees, and smooth asphalt streets predominate. A large number of the houses in this area represent new development and construction which have been planned and erected within the last generation. The 1970 Census of Housing (Vol. 1, Part 18, Kansas) indicated that Augusta had a total of 2252 single family housing units of which 293 had been built between 1960-1970 and 692 during the decade of the 1950's. The census further documented the median value of housing property at \$12,900 (1970 dollar value) with 1562 of the housing units being owner occupied. Architectural styles of residencies vary with many of the newer houses bordering the scenic city lake and attractively landscaped city park. A sense of orderliness, quietness, and general serenity prevails along the wide, curved streets and cul-de-sacs with such names as "Meadowlake Drive," "Westwide Avenue," and "Sunflower Avenue." Within this same area of the town, an elementary and secondary school are located as are five sectarian and denominational churches plus a community hospital-nursing home complex. All of these institutional facilities were constructed during the decade of the 1960's and are apparent indicators of community improvement.

Public documents in the city museum indicate that Augusta was founded in 1868. Chamber of Commerce literature specifies that the town was organized "as an agricultural community and has remained so, basically, although the refining of oil and light manufacturing has had

a part in the city's development in recent years." With its setting in a predominately agricultural county, the town remains a contemporary farm-service type community. The business sector of the town contains a half dozen major farm implement franchises and service dealerships, impressively massive grain elevators, and a large number of seed, feed, and fertilizer supply stores. Mechanic and general repair service shops, hardware stores, and several dry goods stores specializing in farm and/or western clothing accentuate the rural orientation. There are two major but locally owned banks. The automobile dealerships represent major American model names. The three large supermarkets are associated with major chain names and they compete with seven smaller, independent, locally owned neighborhood grocery stores. A large post office serves the town and rural routes. There are two construction and ready-mix concrete firms, two lumber yards, and a large variety of service-oriented smaller businesses with varying degrees of specialization most of which are locally owned and operated. The city manager indicated that in 1968-1970 there were approximately 250 retail businesses in the town and that over 80% of these were owned and operated by local residents.

At the same time, the professional aggregate of the community included six lawyers, three dentists, three veterinarians, three accounting firms, two chiropractors, two osteopaths, and four medical doctors. The city manager indicated that a large portion of the professionals' clientele was composed of residents from throughout the county as well as in the town. Augusta is the largest urban area in the county although it is not the county seat. This evokes caustic remarks by some residents who resent this fact. Yet it is obvious to



most residents that the community's population is due in part to its geographical proximity to Wichita. This metropolitan area is very close and accessible via the four lane State highway. Approximately 40% of the residential households have members who commute to the city to work and the influence of this metropolis is great enough to classify Augusta with the status of a "satellite town."

The local government follows the form of City Manager-Council. The present city manager has occupied his position for the past 11 years. There is an attractive city hall and a full-time police department and fire department. The community retains its water supply from the city owned lake which also provides a source of local recreation. The Augusta Daily Gazette is the locally owned daily newspaper with a circulation of 4500. The local school system is called the Unified School District No. 402 and is composed of an impressive senior high school, a junior high school, three elementary schools, and a kindergarten. Total enrollment exceeds 2000 students with a large portion of this figure representing rural farm youth who are bussed into this unified system.

Within the community are the typical civic and service clubs and a large number (66) of other clubs and voluntary organizations. Some of these are affiliated with the 16 different Protestant churches. There is one large Catholic church with an accompanying parochial school (elementary). There is an active Little Theatre which stages four productions each season. There is a local country club with membership facilities. There are no local nightclubs, and few bars or taverns; although, there are seven package liquor stores located in various parts of the community.

There are two principle industries in the community. They are located in the southern part of the town where a zoned industrial park has been created near the Walnut River. The larger of the two is the Mobile Oil Corporation refinery which has been in Augusta since 1927 (having assumed production from a local operator which existed prior to this time). The refinery operation encompasses 300 acres of land, employs 450 personnel, and is equipped to process 50,000 barrels of crude oil per day. The other major industry is Loadcraft. This industry manufactures special heavy duty truck-trailers for long distance transports. Loadcraft also contracts with the United States Armed Services for production of special transport vehicles. It has been in the community since the 1940's and by 1970 it employed 125 personnel. There are a number of other industrial concerns throughout the community but they are mostly light industry and employ a dozen people or less. Unlike the major industries, most of these are locally owned.

The history of the community dates from its origin in 1868. The name, Augusta, was the given name of the wife of one C. N. James who owned most of the original town site. The location of the town was at the confluence of the Walnut and Whitewater Rivers across from the ruins of an old Indian tribal settlement. The abundance of Indian artifacts in the Augusta area suggested that the terrain had been heavily used by the natives. In fact, the land on which the town was platted had been open to white settlement only within two years prior. There was a movement of white population into Butler County Kansas at this time (after the Civil War), and the Federal government had "negotiated a new treaty with the Osage tribe whereby they relinquished a parcel of their reservation. By January, 1869, a post office was

established which gave the town status. In 1870, the Federal government located a Federal Land Office in Augusta which brought new trade and people into the community. The same year the town's first newspaper began publications. However, in 1872 a county election was held to determine whether El Dorado, a neighboring town about 20 miles north and east, or Augusta would be the county seat. Both communities claimed victory. The contest moved into the circuit court and the decision was rendered in favor of El Dorado. For generations, a bitterness lingered between the two communities. During the same year (1872) the Federal government relocated its land office in Wichita. This had a definite impact which caused many of the residents to leave the community and created a period of financial crisis. The bitterness of the county election was enhanced by the added bitterness oriented toward the Federal government. The community rebounded, however, when in 1880 and 1881 the Frisco and Sante Fe railroads came into the town. Within a year the population reportedly doubled and new businesses were on the increase. Farming had greatly increased in the southern part of the county and during the more prosperous times of the late 1880's, the local businesses were oriented toward the farm-service relationship. Primarily, this was how the town managed to survive.

By 1880, the community had established a school system which expanded into the creation of a separate high school facility in 1900. In 1906, the town installed a gas distribution system followed by a water system in 1908, a municipal electric system in 1913, and a sanitary sewer system in 1916. These modern conveniences, added by the impetus of the local oil "boom," caused Augusta to grow. In one year, 1914-1916, the population increased from 1400 to 3750. The discovery

of a local oil field instigated a number of refineries. During the 1920's, three were in operation, but as the production limitation of the oil field became apparent, only one refinery survived, and it was acquired by the Mobile Oil Company during the following decade.

It was also during this period that a natural disaster threatened the community. A severe tornado destroyed a number of businesses, churches, the high school (partially) and approximately 40 homes while extensively damaging other properties. The financial loss was, for the size of this community, quite significant. This occurred at a particularly inopportune time because the nation was involved in a vast economic depression. As the community managed to rebuild, it did so slowly and painfully and without the assistance of any state or federal aid to alleviate the disaster. Again this was a somewhat demoralizing experience. Augusta was not a "boom town" in the tradition of many such mining or drilling communities (quick growth and quick dispersion of people once the natural resource had been depleted) because it still maintained a strong relationship with the surrounding farming area. However, it was also clearly apparent by 1940-1950 that the greatest growth occurring in central Kansas was in Wichita. With the advent of modern highways, transportation, and communication systems and the rapid growth of Wichita in the direction of Augusta, the community settled into a certain status quo.

Such is the general description and history of the August community. It is similar to hundreds of other small towns regarding its reason for being and its general atmosphere. There is a favorable impression created by the overall physical appearance and general life style. And like other communities, it contains a section with

recognizable deterioration, a part of town which displays evidence of neglect, poverty, and deprivation. At the south end of town, several blocks west of main street, the residential deterioration is obvious. This part of town is lower in elevation than the northern part and lies in close proximity to the oil refinery and the Walnut River. In this area are ten blocks of older, smaller houses (some abandoned and decaying), vacant commercial buildings, unpaved streets, and empty lots overgrown with weeds and fouled with a profusion of unidentifiable debris. When the river flooded, as it had twice before, this area and south main street suffered most; on both previous occasions local financial resources were used to restore south main street and parts of this mixed residential-business area. Although huge earthen levies had been constructed, this entire ten block area was again inundated by a summer flood in 1966. Most of the structures were damaged and further eroded. Some damage was also sustained by the refinery. The industry was quick to restore its property but the residential area was very slow in its cleaning and restoration efforts.

Thus in the spring of 1967, the Augusta city government decided to instigate urban renewal efforts to rehabilitate the worst portion of this area. Kansas Statutes provide that a municipality, acting on its own, may exercise urban renewal powers through local bonds or taxes or it may, at the discretion of the local governing body, elect to have such powers exercised by an urban renewal agency under the guidelines and funds provided by the United States Department of Housing and Urban Development (Kansas Statutes 17-4756). Utilizing this law, the Augusta city council filed an application with the Urban Renewal Region V Office (Ft. Worth, Texas) for the necessary survey and planning phase

leading to the development and execution of an urban renewal project. The essentials of this application outlined and described the 10 block, 45 acre tract which was to be rehabilitated; however, these original plans were modified when the Mobile Oil Refinery indicated an interest in expanding its facility by utilizing the land in this project area. Therefore, in the summer of 1967, a revised application was submitted to the Regional Office which proposed a better land-use plan whereby all structures in the 10 block area would be razed, the land resold to the refinery as an industrial park, and the residents and businesses in this area relocated to other available properties in the community or new structures built for them. In October, funding for the Survey and Planning Phase of the proposed project was granted and the city council moved toward the creation of a local Urban Renewal Agency. This was done by the appointment of an Urban Renewal Board of Commissioners composed of local residents who assumed responsibility for administering the federal funds in the project and employing an agency director. Five local men were appointed to this board in November. None of the men were professional and all but one were self-employed (one owned a small grocery store which was located in the project area; one owned the major lumberyard; another owned a construction firm; the fourth owned a machinery repair shop; the last member was employed as a foreman at the refinery). Two of the members were college educated while four of the five were life-long residents of the Augusta area. All had served on other local boards or had previous experience with some type of commission work. One had served two terms in the state legislature. All were married, had children, and when calculated, their mean (average) age was 51. None had had any previous experience with an

urban renewal project nor involvement in a community-action type program. None of the members had been friends, but all were acquainted with one another.

The initial duty of the board was to hire an agency director. This proved a minor conflict between board members at the outset due to the selection. Several members of the board wanted to hire an older, more experienced man for the position, but his salary would have been \$1500 more per year than asked by the man they selected. Their selection was a young man (28 years old), an assistant director in another agency in Kansas (a position which he had held for two years), from out-of-state origin, and a career professional within the H. U. D. bureaucracy. Certain reservations regarding his personality, youth, and ability were held by two board members who voted in the minority not to hire him.

With his February, 1978, appointment, the new director began the typical duties required of his position. He rented an office in one of the newest buildings in town (a decision which was more expensive than most of the board members approved), completed the agency staff, established time schedules for the project, set meetings, supervised survey work, contracted consultants, acted as a liaison with the Regional Office, and provided press releases concerning details of the project. The planning phase, which included the diagnostic study conducted by this writer, was completed by the end of July, 1968. An overview of the separate parts of the planning phase had been continually communicated to the community through the director's press releases. In speeches, he frequently stressed the need for the community to bind itself to the Wichita metropolitan area by providing an

increased residential atmosphere (conducive to potential residents who would commute to the city to work). In other public communications he occasionally shared research findings relative to the people and conditions which existed in the "Southwest Project" as it had subsequently been named by the local agency.

As the final planning draft of the proposed project was being prepared for the city council's approval before its forward to the Regional Office, a major shift in funding emphasis occurred on the federal level which directly affected the community. This was the creation of the Neighborhood Development Program (referred to as N. D. P.). This program had been introduced into the urban renewal bureaucracy as part of the Housing and Urban Development Act of 1968 (Title V; Section 501) which had gained congressional passage in August, 1968; the wording in the new program called for:

. . . more flexibility in planning to meet new needs as they become apparent in long range plans; to allow the acceptance of urban renewal project plans on a year by year basis by the local community; for authorization to close out a renewal project when only small parcels of land remain; to aid in alleviating harmful conditions not only in the blighted areas where renewal action is already planned but also immediate action where needed to correct deteriorating conditions throughout the entire community to prevent future decay.

The Neighborhood Development Program provided a responsive vehicle for taking immediate action to correct local physical deterioration wherever it would be found and when it conformed to the federal guidelines which structured the program. In order to document this type of action, a new, comprehensive, Neighborhood Development Plan of an entire community would have to be developed which would specify all types of deteriorating conditions in all areas. This effort would also contain a master plan which could incorporate any existing urban



renewal project within the design for correcting all such local problems. Such deterioration (as dead trees, breaks in sidewalks, curbs, paving, junk and debris on lots, decaying wooden fences, obsolete outbuildings, erosion, and noxious weeds on vacant lots) were included and would have to be indicated in the comprehensive plan.

It was obvious that those local agencies which would be the first to utilize this new concept would secure the most financial aid before the program became limited by the number of requests for it. The Augusta Urban Renewal Agency realized that their project was in such a position and that the timing was excellent to capitalize on the increased funds available under N. D. P. In a series of speeches and press releases in early September, the agency director outlined the new program and stressed its availability and practical applications for the community. During the same month, the agency announced that it was conferring with the Regional Office on the possibility of changing the urban renewal project applications so that it could be collapsed into the N. D. P. Upon confirmation from the Regional Office, the board of commissioners unanimously agreed that the alterations should be made in a new application to incorporate the Southwest Project plan into a Neighborhood Development Program proposal. In November, the city council was advised of the change and the particular benefits the community could expect to derive. The council extended their approval, a courtesy which was formal but unnecessary under N. D. P. guidelines. However, the agency was determined to have council sanction as it initiated the new approach. In late December, 1968, the Augusta Urban Renewal Agency announced that it had received approval from the Regional Office to change the Southwest Project into a N. D. P.

It is somewhat uncertain how much attention the general community was giving to these changes. There had been numerous office inquiries regarding the new proposal, and the director and individual board members had been solicited regarding special questions, but the tone of these exchanges were not considered antagonistic nor hostile toward the redirection of the project.

During the first months of 1969 the new plan was organized. Surveys and site evaluations of real estate property were conducted throughout the entire community. This work was hastily conducted, for the most part, from the streets and sidewalks. There were few direct interviews with residents. Having secured the essential details called for in the N. D. P. proposal, the new community-wide master plan was completed by the end of February. An extensive newspaper article announced its completion and stressed that it contained all plans that were originally made for the urban renewal project. The article generally reviewed the new comprehensive plan noting that it identified all deteriorating conditions in the community, and where they were located be it public domain or private property. The article concluded with the announcement that the plan would be submitted to a public hearing tantamount to final approval by the city council. The public hearing was scheduled for late April, 1969.

While the survey work was being conducted for the plan, public reaction had started to occur. Many of the residents, shopowners, and landlords had become curious and slightly alarmed about the fieldwork that was occurring throughout the whole community. Some of these citizens contacted the Urban Renewal Agency seeking explanation but many others relied on hearsay, rumors, and innuendos. Many of those who had

contacted the agency did not fully comprehend the meaning and scope of the new plan. In their misunderstandings, they frequently interpreted the plan as a community wide urban renewal project. Such an interpretation could be negatively construed as a direct threat to personal real estate and private ownership. With an almost tacit acknowledge of this developing attitude, the first full page, paid advertisement outlining and supporting the need, the proposal, and the benefits of the Neighborhood Development Plan appeared in a mid-March newspaper edition. This commercial advertisement was paid for by the board of commissioners and "friends of urban renewal" (it is curious, in retrospect, to note this reference to urban renewal when the issue had become the N. D. P.; perhaps it would have been strategic at that time to have signed the advertisement as "friends of N. D. P.," thus displaying support for the plan). This type of advertisement continued for the next six weeks (until the public hearing regarding the plan) on an everyday basis. The principal theme these advertisements stressed was that under the N. D. P. concept, the community had the option, each year, through the city council to continue or reject urban renewal, and that no long term, binding contract would be forced onto the entire community by the federal government.

At the same time the affirmative advertisements were being placed in the newspaper, "anti" or negative ones began to appear. These were likewise as large and attention-getting, and were paid for and sponsored by the "Augusta Community Action Committee," an informal association of residents led by the principal antagonists of the project and plan (these were five lifelong, self-employed businessmen and a middle-management employee of the refinery). The content of these ads were

very simple. They usually stressed the deceit which had occurred through urban renewal, the authoritarianism and negative view the proposed plan had taken toward the community as a whole, and the encroaching power and control which a federal bureaucracy would exert over the local citizens. The advertisements were calculated to appeal to local pride and local fears, and appeared with almost the same frequency as those supporting the project.

Interestingly, during this entire period, the newspaper took no position, printed no "letters to the editor" which referred to this local issue, nor editorialized. However, it obviously capitalized upon the amount of advertising the issue generated. The editor indicated (to this writer) that it was his deep belief that neither the paper nor himself should become involved in supporting any position in a local issue but rather objectively and honestly report the facts as they happened. The majority of the Urban Renewal Board of Commissioners indicated, to this writer, a mild disgust for this type of journalism. They maintained that the editor and the paper should have taken a positive position of leadership in this community issue.

As the advertisements continued to appear, a new and more intense interest developed regarding the upcoming city council election in early April. Additional advertisements were placed by the incumbent councilmen and their slate of opponents. Both sides indicated that the basic issue which surrounded the election was the council approval, yet to be given, on urban renewal and the N. D. P. The four council members (one half of the council) who were vying for reelection campaigned from the vested interest of having initiated and supported the local urban renewal project. Their opponents, who were members of the

organized group which had declared its opposition to the project, vigorously campaigned against it. At stake was the power, under Kansas law, of the council to accept or reject the urban renewal project and the N. D. P. The decision was scheduled to be made after the city council election, and after the public hearing on the proposed N. D. P. All candidates addressed this impending decision and there was little doubt regarding who stood where on the issue.

The city council election was held in early April. The incumbent councilmen were soundly defeated by the opposition candidates. The timing of this election and its consequences were an unfortunate occurrence for the proponents of the project. Most of the board and the agency director privately conceded that the fate of the proposed project was definitely in jeopardy.

The tempo of the newspaper advertising was vigorous throughout the remainder of the month. In combination with a heavy circulation of handbills and posters, all media materials were oriented toward the showdown which would come at the public hearing. These activities dramatized the widespread community attention and interest in the final decision regarding the project. The proponents of the project published full page advertisements stressing the need for urban renewal endorsed with lengthy listings of names of community supporters. They also alluded to the propaganda devices being circulated by the Augusta Community Action Committee, particularly the copy of a bogus N. D. P. map of the town, which had no descriptive legend attached to it, plus a circular which contained a photograph and fabricated story about a new home which was supposed to have been condemned by the urban renewal agency. The map was a particularly controversial ploy. The opponents

had managed to secure a copy of the actual N. D. P. map from the agency director who, in assumed good faith, had given it to them as a source of explanation and knowledge regarding the N. D. P. plan. They, in turn, had it depict the entire community as being considered deteriorated by the agency. Within each block were at least five or six dots with no explanation relative to what each dot represented. The opposition boldly asserted that the map was a copy of the official N. D. P. plan and that each dot represented decaying parcels of property. The caption on this publication read, "Which Home Is Yours?" Since these dots occurred in all portions of the community, conceivably a non-informed or confused resident could have obtained the wrong impression that his maintained home (if it corresponded numerically with any of the dots present in his block) had been labeled deteriorated. Obviously, the shock technique could be devastating to the unwary homeowner. To counter this allegation the agency published their official map with the same markings and an accompanying legend which explained each dot as indicating a dead tree, rundown outbuilding, a potential traffic hazard, bad areas of pavement, erosion, sidewalk repair, etc., which were located somewhere within the designated block but not necessarily in the individual lots or property parcels which corresponded with the numbers of markings. It was further explained that this information was all that was required in the N. D. P. plan that was to be submitted to the Regional Office, thereby demonstrating that the local agency had surveyed the physical needs of the community and were cognizant of where certain kinds of improvement would be needed in the future. The agency distinctly pointed out that federal funds could be used to correct some of these

conditions but that the right of eminent domain which was applicable to the urban renewal project area did not extend into the remainder of the N. D. P. plan.

In response to the agency's explanation, the Augusta Community Action Committee continued to berate the flexibility of the proposed plans. This effort impugned the integrity of urban renewal by such simple questions in bold print as, "When and Where Will the Next Change Be?" and "Old Maps--New Maps--Who Knows the Best Plan for Augusta? Federal Bureaucrats or Our Local Citizens?" In its final attempt to persuade the community, the urban renewal agency disclosed that if the city council would accept the project, Augusta would receive \$1.5 million for the project, and in future years this could mean "credits" for the community with the federal government relative to other local projects that would qualify for federal cost-sharing, such as sewage improvements, highway and bridge construction, flood control, school construction, hospital expansion, etc. The concept of credits was carefully explained as being that consideration by the Federal government on a future loan or grant where the matching funds the community would be responsible for could be defrayed over a longer period of time, thereby allowing for only a very slight increase of local tax levies to meet the city's obligation. The credits resulted from the fact that there would already be other federal projects, in this case urban renewal, in which the community would be engaged on a cost-share basis. Hence, involvement with the urban renewal project would facilitate a more expedient access to federal funds in the future as other major community needs occurred.

The public hearing regarding the proposed project took place as scheduled during the last week in April. Newspaper coverage of it was headlined on the front page the following morning. About 600 people had attended the meeting which had been conducted by the urban renewal director, the board of commissioners, and the mayor. The history of the project had been reviewed, the decision to engage the Neighborhood Development Program had been discussed, and the scope, meaning, and action regarding the urban renewal project and the N. D. P. plan had been explained. Although the meeting had been very long (in excess of four hours), the newspaper typically presented only the facts with no color or value judgments. The board members and the mayor had different accounts however. Each commented upon the expressed bitterness and hostility which accompanied questions and/or statements from the floor. Some personal attacks were verbalized toward the agency director and individual board members, particularly in reference to what financial or monetary gains they would secure from the project. Board members were chastised as traitors by a few speakers. Shouts of "socialism," "dictator," "communist," "welfare," and "bureaucrats," emanated indiscriminately from the crowd. There was a litany regarding the corrupting influence of big government upon society and especially small communities. Several of the residents disclosed plans to retain attorneys to legally contest the project while another group of citizens indicated that they were organizing a "work week" during which they, and voluntary help solicited from the community, would refurbish and clean-up the project area and then establish a permanent citizens committee to eradicate the deteriorating conditions throughout the community. In all, the level of activity had been intense enough to have the



meeting attended by a number of off duty policemen in uniform, an unlikely event associated with such a public gathering. Although various citizens individually spoke out in support of the project, the impact of the opposition forces appeared to have dominated the night.

After the public hearing, the next step in the procedure was the city council vote on whether to accept or reject the proposed project and the N. D. P. plan. On the day of the council meeting, the urban renewal agency sponsored a full page newspaper advertisement which listed over 300 names of local residents who supported the proposal. There were no newspaper advertisements by the opposition, but they had organized an active telephone campaign directed toward bringing pressure upon those council members who supported the project. The council met in its usual chambers, but due to the overflow crowd at the meeting, the council recessed to the National Guard Armory. During the meeting, spokesmen for both sides presented, in detail, their respective points of view. Some of the opponents had indeed retained counsel from Wichita who raised specific legal questions pertaining to the project and the establishment of the local urban renewal agency. After extended review, the council voted on the issue. As expected, a four to four deadlock resulted. The mayor, as chairman of the council meeting, decided to postpone casting the tie breaking vote until the next regular council meeting so that the issue could "cool down" while it was further studied. He stressed that he would not cast his vote under the present adverse pressures and conditions. Boos and angry shouts of disapproval greeted the mayor's decision. The council agreed not to call a special meeting for the vote and that the vote could not be cast unless all the members of the council were present.

During the next two weeks, the pressure shifted to the council and the mayor. Those council members opposed to the project publically announced their own "plan" to rehabilitate the community; it was euphemistically called the Community Self-Help Rehabilitation Plan and it simply proposed that during an appointed time in the following summer, all able bodied, community minded citizens should voluntarily contribute time, money, and labor in reshaping the project area and then continue to remedy the worst conditions of decay throughout the community. If this failed, the new council members promised to introduce local legislation of some type to make local tax funds available for rehabilitation. The mayor indicated (to this writer) that there was considerable fervor for this local self help approach and that he believed a considerable degree of sincerity was involved. The mayor also indicated that it was common knowledge throughout the town, even before the vote had been called, that there would be a stalemate in the decision. Each side in the council had taken polar positions on the issue and would not compromise. Those council members who had favored the acceptance of the project had publically declared that they received threats pertaining to loss of business and some form of boycott if they persisted in their vote. The mayor had stalled for time in an effort to attempt a reconciliation between the two factions. He was criticized for this action by both sides. During the interim between the council meetings, the mayor indicated that he received letters, visits, and phone calls from throughout the community, the majority of them urging him to cast a deciding negative vote. After a Wichita newspaper and television station had carried details about the community conflict, and had interviewed the mayor, he had received many negative calls from anti-urban

renewal factions in Wichita and from other parts of the country (Wichita had sustained a race riot resulting from a proposed urban renewal project in the summer of 1968--the movie actor, Burt Lancaster, on location in Kansas for a film, had gone into the riot area in a dramatic effort to help quell the Mexican-American rioters). Many of the calls were abrasive and crude; some implied physical threats. The mayor indicated that no one from outside the community or from the federal bureaucracy called to offer their support. There were a number of business threats from clients of the bank (where the mayor was president), and a few of the threats relative to withdrawal were actually carried out. The mayor observed that those who favored the project were not as adamant or insistent as those who opposed it. Thus based upon what he had been exposed to and what he had seen develop, the mayor felt that to continue the project in such a swelter of opposition would erode any potential for its acceptance while depending the present community conflict. At this point, several members of the agency's board of commissioners reluctantly agreed with him. With this reasoning as a basis, the mayor, on June 3, 1969, cast the final and deciding negative vote which broke the council deadlock. This was the ultimate decision regarding the fate of urban renewal in Augusta, Kansas, and, to paraphrase the mayor, "You might say I'm the guy who killed urban renewal in this community."

Several members of the board of commissioners vigorously disagreed with the mayor and expressed, in personal interviews, that he didn't have the "guts" to make the right decisions because he was overly concerned about how his vote would endanger his bank and business relations in the community. The mayor, like most of the council and commission

members, was a native of the community having lived there all his life. He was fully aware of his position and the responsibilities that were involved regarding his official vote. After the critical council meeting, the mayor sent an official letter to the Regional Office requesting that H. U. D. terminate its local urban renewal agency in the community. The board of commissioners disbanded, and the agency director closed the office, dismissed his staff, completed the bookkeeping entries, and then relocated his family to the east coast (Maryland) where he had accepted a position as an assistant director in a large, metropolitan agency. One of the commissioners sold his local business and moved to Colorado, stating that although he had lived all his life in the community, he had become disgusted with it and the actions of its residents. A general attitude resembling alienation seemed to characterize those commission members who remained, as evidenced by their general comments regarding their personal refusal to serve on any other community projects or boards due to the negative experience with urban renewal.

Administrative personnel at the Regional Office terminated the Augusta Urban Renewal account and placed the records in their "dead files" of rejected projects. In a personal interview, the regional director stated that no official effort was ever made (by the Regional Office) to "follow-up" on the projects rejected by local communities or to find out why the rejection occurred. All proposed plans and communications were eventually destroyed (after two years from termination), and the only materials kept regarding such rejections were the official bookkeeping records of the proposed project's planning costs, and the letter from the community requesting termination of the project.

According to the dead file on the proposed Southwest Project for Augusta, Kansas, the cost absorbed by the Federal government for its planning phase totaled \$98,832.88.

In accordance with federal urban renewal statutes, the local community was under no obligation to repay any of these planning costs. However, if the community would ever have wanted to reinstate Urban Renewal, Model Cities, or any related program which was administered under the jurisdiction of the federal Urban Renewal Authority, the amount spent for the rejected project must first be repaid before any action under the auspices of the new program could have started. The Regional Office Director concluded the interview with the observation that the federal bureaucracy was not concerned with the internal disputes which arose within a community regarding its acceptance or rejection of a proposed project, because for every one rejected, there were probably three applications seeking to develop an initial or second project, and always the applications far surpassed the federal funds available.

## CHAPTER VIII

### A POSITIVE RESPONSE TO URBAN RENEWAL--

#### ONE COMMUNITY'S EXPERIENCE

Few towns in the United States can trace their creation to a special act of the United States Congress. Such was the origin of Miami, Oklahoma. This unique relationship with the Federal government would be enhanced in many ways throughout the community's history. One particular way resulted in a multi-staged, multi-faceted urban renewal program which lasted for 12 years, and was engaged to the fullest extent possible under federal guidelines.

During the late 1800's, the present site of Miami was a trading post called "Jimtown" (so named for the four men whose given names were all Jim and shared the operation). It was during 1890 and 1891 that Col. W. C. Lykins, a retired U. S. Army officer, sought to create a town in the vicinity around the trading post. The setting was logical due to the close proximity of the Missouri and Kansas borders (both were within 12 miles), and the availability of a natural landing on a bend in the Neosho River. This river contoured through the extreme northeast part of Indian Territory (land which eventually would become the state of Oklahoma).

However, the land was owned by the Ottawa Indians (the county in which Miami is now the political, industrial, and economic center is named after this tribe, "Ottawa" county). The Ottawas, as well as the

Peoria, Seneca, Shawnee, Wyandot, Quapaw, Modoc, Cherokee, and Miami were then local area tribes. In his efforts to secure the land for his town, Col. Lykins, who was considered a friend to these tribes, appealed for assistance from the chief of the Miami Indians, Thomas P. Richardville, a well-educated, English-speaking tribesman who represented the Miami and Peoria tribes in Washington, D. C.

With the chief's aid, a special act of Congress, adopted on March 2, 1891, authorized the Secretary of the Interior to sell to the newly formed Miami town company 558 acres of land "for and in behalf" of the Ottawa Indians, and gave the company 90 days to submit a plat of the proposed town. The price of the land was fixed at not less than 10 dollars per acre with the proceeds to go to the Ottawa tribe.

The Ottawa County Historical Society has documented that the Miami chief, Col. Lykins, and a Kansan named O. J. Nichols (whose descendants still live in the community) selected the site for the new town and proceeded with its development under the auspices of the Miami Town Company. Due to the special federal legislation which created it, Miami was the first town in the Indian Territory where purchasers could immediately secure quick claim deeds to their land as issued by the town company. The first lot was sold to a medical doctor on June 26, 1891. During the first year, over 300 lots were sold to incoming residents and businesses. By 1895, the population had increased to 800 and according to a 1902 publication, "Col. Lykins had developed a band of faithful, pushing citizens with but one objective, and that was the upbuilding of their town." Within two years after its founding, Miami had established a local post office, and by 1895 the town had been granted the location for a federal court by another special act of the

U. S. Congress. That same year the community also incorporated and elected its first mayor. A third special act of Congress in 1896 allowed the creation of a recorder's office in Miami where legal instruments pertaining to real estate within the Indian Territory could be filed. In the spring of 1896, what eventually would become the Frisco railroad was initiated with a gift of \$30,000 worth of property by Col. Lykins to build a spur line extending into the town. This transportation facility naturally added to the population and business growth. In 1898, Miami developed the first, free public school system in the Indian Territory (Oklahoma). Due to the territorial status, white settlers had previously sent their children to private schools, or to the public schools, in the adjoining states. The local public schools resulted from the sales of municipal bonds. Since the community had incorporated, these bonds were allowed to be issued although they were not supervised or protected by statehood. Money raised from their sales was also used to finance an opera house and a town hall. At this time, Miami boasted of being the first town in the territory (Oklahoma) to have concrete sidewalks.

Most of the material cited here comes from the Ottawa County Historical Society's archives. Particularly interesting and relevant to the early era is the reprint of a 1902 booklet entitled Miami's Resources and Tributary Lands. This booklet (analogous to a modern Chamber-of-Commerce brochure) indicated that at its original printing, there were over 200 businesses, 11 churches, 3 newspapers, 2 banks (which remain), and over 2000 residents in the community. The publication was extravagant in its description and praise of the "Beautiful Indian City" where "the miraculous work of 11 years shows the interests



of the community are a public concern and every individual has lent his might toward this work." Although this quotation may appear somewhat ethnocentric, it is important to remember, at this point, for it may characterize an ethos in this community, as does the brief synopsis of its first decade, which has remained essentially unchanged as it evolved through the following seven decades of the twentieth century.

During the first decade of the 1900's community growth resulted from increased explorations of the rich deposits of lead and zinc that surrounded the town. Mining had begun as early as 1891, but had been considered a somewhat precarious enterprise since the nearest smelter mill was located at Joplin, Missouri. Because this large mining town was located nearly 40 miles away, and there was no rail transportation at that time, the initial extraction effort was unprofitable. However, with the construction of the railroad, the first, successful mining operation developed in 1905. The rich vein of ore into which the first shaft was sunk developed into the locally famous and profitable "Old Chief" mine.

The town became a "boomtown" by 1906 when the mining activity greatly accelerated. Local records indicated that the peak period for the mining industry in Miami was from 1912 until 1940. During this period approximately 14 million tons of zinc and lead were extracted. The Dobson Memorial Museum, located in the center of town, contains a vast and vivid collection of mining artifacts and records. The mining legacy which developed during this period provided documentation that the town's wealthiest families represented mining and banking interests and these families were often noted for their active participation in community development and local philanthropy. The town was publicized

as being located in the "heart of the country's largest lead and zinc mining field." Over 10,000 miners and operators labored at dozens of mine sites that included such innovative names as the "Anna Beaver," "Lucky Bill," "Jay Bird," "Blue Goose," "Sweet Pete," "See Sah," "Bird Dog," "Lucky Jack," and "Black Eagle." World War I, which had occurred during this era, plus the technology of new products (i.e., sheet metals, lead batteries, alloy metals, pipes, paints, etc.) created a heavy demand for the local natural resource.

When the Indian Territory became the state of Oklahoma in 1907, Miami was the natural choice for the county seat of what became known as Ottawa County. Tantamount to its mining era, the town had become indispensable to the surrounding trade area due to the legal offices, records, and county courts system. After World War I, when the tempo of the mining activity leveled to a steady pace, the town developed a central water system, a city sanitation system, and a number of miles of paved or bricked streets. Local capital and taxes were responsible for all the developments at this time.

The spin-off from the mining industry brought greater cultural and educational advantages to the town. In 1919, the Oklahoma State Legislature established the Miami School of Mines, a type of vocational-technical school available to local residents. The town already had one large high school and five grade schools at that time (currently it still has one large high school, constructed in 1971, a junior high school, and seven elementary schools in the local public school system). The School of Mines became a state owned junior college in 1925 and was later (1943) renamed Northeastern Oklahoma A. & M. College. It is still known by this name and has remained a two-year institution.

By the 1930's the local business and financial leadership of the community had become aware that ultimately their natural resource would be depleted. Recognizing that extraction activities had a limited future, they created an industrial development committee, funded by local contributions, whose principal effort was to attract diversified industry to the town. Their activity was somewhat overshadowed, however, by the development of a huge lake construction which commenced, a few miles south of the community, in 1938. This created a second "boom" era for Miami. The large, federal project had been actively sought by the state and local political and business leaders. A giant concrete dam (Pensacola Dam) was constructed which received credit at that time as "the longest multiple-arch dam in the world." It impounded the waters of the Neosho and Spring Rivers south of Miami. The waters were contained in a reservoir which inundated 59,000 acres of land and established 1300 miles of shoreline. This body of water became known as the Grand Lake of the Cherokees. The immense project generated a tremendous amount of local activity and a new status for the town, that being recognition as the "gateway" to Oklahoma's "Green Country," a regional identification for what would become a contemporary tourist and vacation attraction. Of more immediate consequence to the community was the creation of the Grand River Dam Authority which eventually secured ownership of the dam, with its electric power generating facilities, via transfer from the Federal government. The ownership was a cooperative venture by several communities (comparable to the Tennessee Valley Authority but in a smaller way) which provided the distribution of uncommonly cheap electric power then and now. Once more the Federal government had been closely involved with the community.

The creation of this public utility was indeed fortuitous. Cheap energy was a premium in the solicitation of new industry to the community. Recognizing this potential, by 1943 the local banks and several businessmen had contributed over 50,000 dollars for the development of Miami's first "industrial park." This local effort secured undeveloped land adjacent to the town and developed it by grading the terrain and adding sewage, water, transportation, and electric power facilities and, since it was near the Neosho River, certain flood control measures were also provided. The first major industry to relocate in Miami was the B. F. Goodrich Tire and Tube Company. Goodrich moved its major U. S. plant from Akron, Ohio, in 1945 and was deeded a portion of the industrial park. The company constructed its new plant and initially employed 500 workers (currently its physical plant is mammoth with a floor space of 26 acres, an employment of 2600, and a three million dollar monthly payroll). The relocation of this major industry at that time was viewed as an indication that the community and its local economy could sustain the transition from mining to industrial development.

After the initial success of the Goodrich relocation, the Miami Industrial Development Corporation was formed in the early 1950's. This foundation was a non-profit organization that functioned as sales representative, coordinator, and landlord to any new industry locating in the community. During its organizational period, the Miami News Herald indicated that over 90% of the local businesses invested money in it. By the mid 1960's, it had over 200 stockholders, and as a corporation, it owned or had under long term lease, more than one million dollars in land holdings which had been developed into industrial park sites.

When the mines finally closed in 1957, there had been sufficient planning to compensate for the demise of this major industry, the reduction in local payroll wages, and the loss in population which should have followed. The final closing of the mines had an impact on the whole county. Diversified industry and retail sales were considered the answers to the economic woes, and these were developed carefully and patiently by the civic and business leaders. To this extent, Miami currently has 46 different industries which employ over 6000 workers. These industries are primarily situated on 400 acres of industrial parks developed by the community. There are approximately 460 different businesses involved in various facets of retail trade. The town is served by 27 doctors (and dentists), 32 attorneys, four veterinarians, and three architects. There is an intermediate airport which accommodates private craft and some air freight. The town is adjacent to a major transcontinental interstate highway system (I-44) on an east-west axis, and is strategically located between the metropolitan areas of Tulsa, Oklahoma, and Joplin, Missouri. One large hospital, one a m./f.m. radio station, and one daily newspaper also serve the 15,000 inhabitants of this community.

Since it has remained a permanent county seat, a high degree of legal activity and area leadership seems incidental to Miami. It has retained a mayor-council form of government for decades. The man who had been mayor of the town for 15 years (during the entire period of the community's urban renewal experience) indicated that this type of local government had worked very well, especially in recruiting participation from the citizens, even to the extent that at one time during the late 1960's, 220 of the local townspeople were voluntarily serving

on various community boards, associations, and advisory groups, all making input into the community decision-making process. The mayor indicated that a very active Chamber of Commerce operated in the town which included a healthy mixture of second and third generation business owners and newer managers and owners who had relocated in the community. The municipal offices are housed in a large, modernistic, civic center which was constructed by local revenue bonds during the early 1960's. This large facility encompasses recreational areas, convention halls, eating facilities, small meeting rooms, plus the various municipal departments. The building seems a unique structure for a community this size.

Miami's population was 14,560 according to the last decennial (1970) census. This population resides within an eight square mile boundary. The town is platted on a north-south axis with the concept of Main Street being the center of the town's traffic activity. The downtown area is clean and rather bright with some new buildings and new facades on most of the older ones. The revitalization of the downtown area was due, all informants conceded, to the urban renewal project which had been directed toward this goal. Where the former high school building was located now stands a nine story structure which is a specialized housing complex for the elderly. Known as the "Nine Tribes Tower," (each floor named after one of the Indian tribes mentioned earlier in this chapter), this structure was partially secured with urban renewal funds and was opened in 1973. It contains 270 apartment units in which only those persons 60 years of age or older may reside. This structure also has the office facilities for the Urban Renewal director and his staff. The two banks have established new

downtown drive-in facilities, and the Federal building has been remodeled. Of the 34 church structures within the town, 27 have been constructed within the last 15 years. Although the local hospital is an older structure, plans are being completed for a new hospital complex to be built. Evidence of the community's retail business expansion lies at the northern boundary of the town. A shopping center complex was constructed here in the mid 1960's.

One of the major attractions of the community's physical appearance is the state owned two year community college. It has a 200 acre campus with 26 buildings, most of them recently constructed and the visible results of Miami's first urban renewal project. The campus is located in the northeastern quadrant of the community. Farther north and east of the campus is an area of expensive homes. Beyond this residential area lies the country club, golf course, and other private recreational facilities. Many of the exclusive homes of the community are located in this area. Just as new but less expensive homes lie in the northwest quadrant, surrounding the civic center, while the modest, somewhat older homes are located primarily in the southwest quadrant which surrounds the hospital and museum. In the southeast quadrant, between the grain elevators and the city park, is the poorer section of the community with the older, smaller, and obviously more dilapidated residencies. This was the area that became the third and final urban renewal project for the community - a residential project which resulted in upgrading the streets, water drainage, sewage facility, and home or apartment construction in this erstwhile slum area. This project was the largest, and most costly, for the Federal government and the community.

The 1970 Census of Housing (Vol. 1, Part 28) indicated that Miami had 5,105 "all season, single family occupied" permanent residencies which averaged 5.6 rooms. This housing data further indicated the mean average value per residency was \$14,300. Less than one half of these residential structures had been constructed prior to 1940, while 774 (over 15% of the total) had been constructed in the decade between 1960 and 1970. The Housing Census projected that approximately 83% of the community's total population lived in these residencies which averaged 2.8 persons per dwelling, while 4,799 were owner occupied and 306 were rentals.

In conjunction with the various industries and retail businesses which composes the basic economic sector of the community, Miami is also a farm service center for the county. The surrounding area is composed of cattle ranches and diversified farm operations generally oriented toward small grains, row crops, and livestock or dairy productions. Various farm stores, machinery dealerships, livestock auctions, and grain elevators are obvious in the community. The junior college offers a popular Associate's Degree in Agriculture and during the spring season an annual farm show of considerable magnitude is held in the town's civic center. With the town being the county seat, a number of federal Department of Agriculture offices are located in the county courthouse. A considerable trade with the surrounding rural area is noticeable.

Thus, into this progressive community, the concept of urban renewal was introduced. It occurred after the 1960 session of the Oklahoma State Legislature had created the state's Urban Development Law. This statute authorized communities, in excess of 10,000 population, to



participate in urban renewal under the guidelines formulated by the Federal Housing Act of 1949. Miami was the first Oklahoma community to establish a local urban renewal authority. It became the first community to implement and complete a federal urban renewal project in the state.

The presence of the state two year college and its dynamic, aggressive president were primarily responsible for this event. This college president was politically active, keeping in close contact with state legislators and thoroughly informed about federal and state programs. He was quick to envision the way a local urban renewal project would allow the college to expand its facilities and develop its enrollment. Being knowledgeable about the various kinds of projects then being funded through the federal urban renewal bureaucracy, he, and a local attorney who had just completed a term in the state legislature, educated the mayor, city council, and various business leaders of the community about the feasibility of a local project. The mayor, who had recently been elected to his post, publically proposed a city referendum on the urban renewal concept. This proposal was unanimously supported by the city council. A special election date was set for May 23, 1961. Principal to the balloting was the decision whether or not to authorize the city government to create a local urban renewal authority and proceed to utilize the federal program.

Throughout the days preceding the election, this initial project was explained, discussed and advertised, all costs for these activities being absorbed by the supporters of the proposal. Basically, the project involved the acquisition of approximately 30 acres (108 parcels) of land south of the college campus. The owners would be paid, those who

wished would be relocated, the structures razed, the land filled and then sold to the college. The number of college buildings would double, as would student enrollment and staff positions. Since most of the housing in this area was modest or substandard (the majority of these units were low cost rentals), and the streets, curbs and guttering, pavement, and general appearance were all in poor condition, a case was made for better land utilization. Important to this project was the awareness that the community had the unique opportunity to be the first in the state to develop a federal urban renewal project, and at no local expense since the Federal government would pay for 75% of the project (cities less than 50,000 were obligated for one-fourth of the costs whereas larger cities had to assume one-third), while the state would pay the remaining share because it owned the college which would acquire the redeveloped land. This was, essentially, the promotion of the first urban renewal project in Miami. Occasionally a casual reference was made to possible future projects in the community but these were never specifically emphasized.

A vigorous campaign was pursued, especially using full-page newspaper advertising and various news releases which encouraged a "yes" vote in the election. Occasionally there would be a letter to the newspaper opposing the creation of the urban renewal authority, and branding urban renewal as a socialist plot which destroyed free enterprise and individual ownership. Within a two-week period prior to the election date, there was a development of unified opposition by some of the homeowners who lived within the area of the proposed project. However, their efforts at advertising were marginal, obviously reflecting their financial status. The letters and statements of their

position lacked the sophistication and articulation that the proponents of the project had. However, they were abundantly sincere and profoundly upset about the prospect of losing their neighborhood. Most of the letters of opposition were written by elderly persons who identified themselves as such. Their efforts to resist the project took on the appearance of negativism toward future growth and community change. There were no editorials or editorial comments either supporting or opposing the proposal. This was significant in that reviews of the local newspaper regarding other elections at other times disclosed abundant editorial comment and position. It seemed that in taking no position on the proposal, the daily newspaper had assumed one in favor of the project.

The proponents of the proposal had used not only an extended advertising and news release campaign, but also had utilized many opportunities to address local civic, service, and church groups. Numerous accounts described speeches which documented the local need for the urban renewal authority. The college president, the new mayor, and the city council members were the most active advocates. Aside from repeating the dimensions of the proposal, they accentuated the future of the community, its growth, and its positive changes. However, they did not discuss what other possible urban renewal projects could or would take place in the future.

On election day the proposal was overwhelmingly passed by a vote of six to one (979 for; 154 against). The mayor was authorized to appoint a director, supervise the local urban renewal agency, and further negotiate with the Federal government for funds to plan, implement, and execute the project. The project had a proposed cost of \$975,000 and

was tentatively set for completion by 1964. The clear mandate given the project by the local referendum secured a favorable relationship with the regional office of the federal bureaucracy. The new board appointed by the mayor included the college president, a lawyer, two senior bank officers, and a general manager of a local industry. All but one had completed a college education. Although the majority of the members had not been raised in the community, they had lived in the town at least a decade prior to their appointment. All had accumulated considerable experience in board membership roles for all had served on a number of other local boards, etc., previously.

The first agency director, hired by a unanimous vote of the board, was in his fifties and had a local background in private business and railroad administration (there were four different directors throughout the duration of the agency and all were men who had been raised in the community). He was not college educated. Since he was not a career professional in urban renewal, he had to spend considerable time in training and workshops conducted by the regional level office. Throughout the remainder of 1961 and during the first half of 1962, the planning phase of the project was conducted. It was financed by a federal grant of \$56,000 which paid for the costs of land survey, residential appraisals, and legal aid. The project was also officially named "Oklahoma R-6, the Artesian Project." The letter-number combination in the name represented a federal designation, but the verbal part was local input, symbolic of the project area being located in a lower terrain prone to occasional water hazards. After the planning grant was received, the college president resigned his board position citing

a possible "conflict of interest." He was replaced with the appointment of a local merchant.

During the summer and autumn of 1962, the director and the board held a series of public meetings with the residents of the project area. They explained the project in detail and answered questions regarding property acquisitions, payments, and relocation. By late 1963, the authority had acquired, through negotiations with the owners, approximately 85 of the 108 parcels of land. Throughout the winter and early spring of 1963-64, the urban renewal authority entered into "condemnation suits" against the remaining owners, eventually invoking the "right of eminent domain" to secure final property rights and titles.

During 1964 and 1965, the physical aspects of the project were completed. The structures were razed, the land cleared and filled, and the surveying work completed. Approximately 80 households were relocated within the community, or adjacent to the community in the rural area, through the relocation efforts of the Urban Renewal Authority. The remaining households either moved on their own or had given up private housekeeping and moved in with someone else.

When the "Artesian Project" was completed and closed-out in January, 1966, it had cost less than its estimated cost and this amount of unspent funds was returned to the Federal government. The title to this improved 30.6 acres of land was transferred to Northeastern Oklahoma Community College which had paid \$272,000 for its purchase. Within the next five years, the college built six major buildings on this land, including a large athletic fieldhouse and a spacious performing arts center, both which have had direct community orientation and high facility usage. During the same time period, the college

enrollment more than doubled to approximately 2600 students while its total capital investment value rose to \$10.8 million. These impressive and positive statistics were extolled in publications locally and throughout the state, particularly emphasizing the beneficial aspects to the community derived from Oklahoma's first completed federal urban renewal effort.

During the spring, 1963, there were two events which indicated the direction that future urban renewal projects would take in the community. One was the announcement of a survey, undertaken by the Urban Renewal Authority with permission from the city council, of the downtown parking needs and the general state of decay of the downtown streets, alleyways, sidewalks, buildings, etc. The survey was introduced to the community and underwritten by the Merchants Division of the Chamber of Commerce. The other significant event was the passage by the state legislature of a 50-page bill into public law (known as the Oklahoma Housing Authority Act) which allowed Public Housing Authorities to be established in communities which so desired "to undertake slum clearance and provide better quality dwellings for low income and elderly households."

By mid-summer of 1963, the Urban Renewal Authority had secured a federal grant of \$45,000 for planning and survey work which would eventually lead to the creation of the second community project, officially designated as the "R-21 Downtown Project." Priorities in the project included an expansion of offstreet parking; acquisition and demolition of deteriorated structures for better land use (redevelopment for resale, etc.); and rehabilitation of existing properties, alleyways, sidewalks, etc., in the downtown area. The project was designed to

cover 47 acres and 14 blocks in the center of this area. When the survey work was completed, it was estimated that this project would cost \$1.5 million. The most interesting and controversial part of this project was the proposal to eliminate parking on each side of Main Street and create two lane traffic along a serpentine effect drive. A mall effect would be developed in the space generated by this unusual design within which trees, various landscaping scenery, public rest areas, kiosks (large wooden, rectangular benches with roofs), public phones, and children's play areas would predominate. One of the principal motives for rejuvenating this area was to maintain competition with a new shopping center which was being developed at the northern edge of town.

Local reaction to the proposed plan was intense and varied. Throughout the spring and summer of 1964, groups of merchants and city officials visited various communities in other states which had completed similar downtown projects. These visits and the reactions to what had been seen were carefully noted by the local newspaper, which had taken a somewhat negative posture toward the plan. In stating its case, the Urban Renewal Authority cited increased accessibility to downtown through the creation of a number of new, offstreet, parking lots (in lieu of the deteriorated structures that occupied the land); potential for greater business and retail volume; downtown beautification; and the need for an improved Main Street area to complement the newly constructed Civic Center and potential growth of the college campus.

The planning (and discussing) stage for the downtown project extended throughout a two-year period from June, 1963 to August, 1965.

On August 17, 1965, a public hearing on the proposed plan was attended by 160 persons during which the city council unanimously gave final approval and adopted resolutions for implementation. The cost of the project had been revised upward to \$1,675,000. The portion for which the community was responsible was assessed at \$250,000 to be paid over a 54-month period. The community's share had actually been \$410,000, but certain credits were allowed by the Federal government because the community was completing one urban renewal project and had already completed a number of other types of federally subsidized projects. The project involved the purchase of 68 parcels of land (and the demolition of all structures on these parcels). Sixty percent of this land would be used for public facilities and parking while the remainder would be sold for the development of new businesses. It was contended that the plan was oriented toward long range growth of the community through 1980, when the population was projected to be 20,000 or more. The date for the completion of this project was set for 1970.

The downtown project went into execution in October, 1965. The ensuing five years were frequently involved with controversy, derision, cynicism, and bitterness. There were 15 condemnation suits brought to the court by the Urban Renewal Authority which forced the sale of certain parcels of land. In the "Letters to the Editor" section of the daily newspaper, local citizens by a three to one ratio, lamented the project and expressed that they had been misled by the concept of urban renewal. Throughout this period, the paper engaged in negative editorial comments on 16 occasions, often reminding readers of its opposition to the downtown project from the initial public announcement of the plan. The paper also published poems and limericks by "Miami Doc,"



a prominent and outgoing local physician, who debunked the project from various perspectives. A well known artist (specializing in western and frontier paintings), who had resided in the community all his life and had maintained his studio in one of the condemned buildings, wrote several passionate and eloquent letters of protest. During this period he indicated that he might move from the community and the state. Newspaper stories of the local controversy appeared in the Major Urban dailies in Oklahoma and were reprinted by out-of-state papers in Kansas, Missouri, and Arkansas. Exasperation at the tediousness of the project and the inconvenience to the downtown area was ventilated throughout 1967 and 1968, partially causing the resignation of the first urban renewal director. He was succeeded by another local man who had been his assistant, and he, during the course of this project, died. He was succeeded, in turn, by his assistant director in 1969 (again a local man who had already retired from an administrative position in private business). Throughout this interim, the downtown merchants, who originally supported the project, tenaciously continued to do so although glumly as sales dropped during the demolition and construction periods. However, no organized groups arose to contest the project by court injunction or other means. One minor form of ridicule occurred when someone planted onions and carrots in one of the small parks newly constructed along Main Street.

Finally at a cost of \$2 million, the downtown project was completed in October, 1970. Its park-like atmosphere with the serpentine drive, kolsks, islands with trees, grass, and shrubs, play equipment for children, public rest rooms, plus the creation of eight off-street parking lots (with a total of 2500 auto spaces), and the resurfacing of all

alleyways and sidewalks, was presented in publications and features in all of the state's metropolitan newspapers and several Sunday supplements. The project was also featured as a cover story in the periodical, American City (December, 1970). The Chamber of Commerce indicated that retail sales for 1970 were \$5.6 million more than in 1966 (before the project), and optimistically predicted continued increases throughout the 1970's. All of the redeveloped land not used for parking was sold to buyers who either created new business establishments or expanded existing ones, such as both banks who added new drive-in facilities. Also 41 businesses, which had been in the redeveloped area, relocated within the community with the aid of the Urban Renewal Authority.

Still, a number of local residents continued to condemn the project. In a display of solidarity, the downtown merchants voluntarily contributed \$10,000 to purchase new Christmas decorations for the 1970 yuletide season (these were given to the city). Even the local paper changed its position claiming that "there is probably no better downtown project in a city this size anywhere in the United States" (December 20, 1970). This belated enthusiasm may have resulted from awards the community received from several state and regional professional associations for its "innovative contributions to the central business district" (Oklahoma Good Roads and Streets Association and the Professional Architect's Association). Even the local police chief maintained that one of the latent effects of the project was that it did slow traffic on Main Street, especially the "drag racing" antics of some of the younger drivers.

The third, and final, project of the Miami Urban Renewal Authority was a neighborhood residential and public housing project. It was the project in which this writer became professionally involved as a consultant, retained by the Authority to diagnostically survey the needs of the project area residents and profile their socio-economic characteristics. This project was different from the others in that rehabilitation of a residential area, essentially the poorest section of the community, was the primary objective rather than land reclamation and redevelopment for commercial or institutional growth.

The planning phase of this third project occurred after the development of the local Public Housing Authority. This authority was, for administrative and expedient purposes, collapsed into the Urban Renewal Authority, a merger which was permitted by federal regulations. The first indication of the residential project was in December, 1965, when the mayor announced that the city council had voted to conduct a housing survey in the community under the auspices of urban renewal. This housing survey was to be used to determine the need and feasibility relative to a possible neighborhood rehabilitation project for the elderly and low income families. Funds (\$27,000) for this preliminary research were awarded from the Department of Housing and Urban Development in June, 1966.

The results of this survey indicated that local needs for rehabilitation and some form of public housing did exist in the community. Thus in January, 1967, the city council approved an urban renewal request that the city apply for a \$56,000 grant to survey and plan for a residential project which would encompass approximately 100 acres in the southeast portion of the community. This area contained 97

substandard houses (out of 214 within the boundaries of the proposed project) according to the preliminary survey. The Urban Renewal Authority indicated that should their proposed rehabilitation plan be accepted by the Federal government, it would cost \$1,211,000 to complete. The community's 25% obligation of this amount would be substantially reduced by credits already compiled with the Federal government.

The application for the planning stage of this project was delayed, however, for the following two years. The reasons for the delay were the various pressures and problems associated with the implementation and construction phases of the downtown project which had evolved during that same time. The planning request for the residential project was resubmitted to the city council in March, 1969, and again it was approved. However, the costs had been increased in this request which escalated the planning stage to \$65,000 and \$1,675,600 for the completion stage. The request specified plans for upgrading residential housing to meet local code standards as a minimum measure, construction of sidewalks (there were very few in the area), the improvement of sewers, and the paving and guttering of streets. The proposal had merit with the regional office for in July, 1969, the Miami Urban Renewal Authority was awarded a survey and planning grant for the full amount requested. The project was officially called "R-38, The Southeast Project."

Requirements for a residential project stipulated that public hearings defining the proposed plan and the organization of citizen participation take place. After the plans were tentatively concluded by the Urban Renewal Authority, a series of public hearings were held

within the project area during the early spring of 1970. These meetings, conducted by the urban renewal staff and the mayor, were well attended by the project area residents. The proposed project plans and the nature of the various survey efforts, which were yet to be conducted relative to diagnosing social and neighborhood needs that could alter some of the planning, were explained. These hearings also presented opportunities for citizens to form participating groups from within the area which would conduct liaison functions between the authority and individual homeowners. Regardless of these efforts, research later indicated most of the residents were confused about the plans and scope of the project. Despite this lack of understanding, there was no indication of unified opposition from the community or project neighborhood, and in the autumn, 1970, the project plan was accepted by the Federal government and fully funded. It was scheduled for completion in September, 1976.

During the following six years, this project became reality. All of the designated substandard houses were either demolished and replaced by modern, single family dwellings, or were structurally renovated through grants or low interest, long term loans, depending upon the individual household's financial situation. New sewers, gutters, sidewalks, and paving were completed while 50 new single story, three bedroom duplexes were constructed in the project area to be rented to low income families. There were several condemnation suits filed by the Urban Renewal Authority during this time but they were quickly and quietly resolved. Of the 97 households residing in substandard units, 36 of them sought the Authority's help in relocation in other parts of the community or outside the town. During the course of this project,

the Authority opened a "store front" office with a limited staff in the project area in an effort to be physically closer to the residents. This project was successfully completed and closed in the autumn of 1976 at a total cost of \$2.3 million, substantially more than originally planned for.

One other aspect of the Miami Urban Renewal and Public Housing Authority must be considered. During the same period as the Southeast Residential Area Project was under construction, the Authority purchased the land on which the former high school had been located and, acting under the auspices of the Public Housing Authority, secured another \$2.5 million from the Department of Housing and Urban Development for the erection of the high rise apartment complex for the elderly. This nine story complex was completed and dedicated in 1974 as the "Nine Tribes Tower" (mentioned earlier in this chapter). This complex contained 270 apartments each with full household facilities, plus various activity and recreational facilities for all the residents to share. The structure also furnished the office space for the Urban Renewal Agency.

Thus, Miami, Oklahoma, demonstrates the performance of the federal urban renewal effort in a local community. As the urban renewal concept was phased out in the mid 1970's, its results can be seen in the tangible and cultural changes in this community. For 15 years it had functioned as an agent of change and had spent a total of \$5.2 million in the direct completion of the three projects. When the Public Housing Authority's \$2.5 million apartment complex is included, the total expenditure by the federal Housing and Urban Development Department in this community was \$7.7 million. With the general aggressiveness this community has displayed in competing for federal funds, it is presently

utilizing such federal packages as the Community Development Act and Rent Subsidies Plan. The last urban renewal director is now the Public Housing and the Community Development Director. The former Urban Renewal Authority and agency staff remains the same under these new titles. With sagacious planning, forceful leadership, and internal cooperation, the community continues its legacy of direct relationship with the Federal government.

## CHAPTER IX

### A COMPARISON OF THE DIFFERENT URBAN RENEWAL EXPERIENCES TO A THEORETICAL MODEL OF COMMUNITY PROCESS

In Chapter VI, various analytical models from community studies, relevant to observing local process and change, were reviewed. It was indicated that their value resulted from their being practical and resourceful methodologies for organizing time, events, and decisions into sequential frameworks which allowed for comparisons between communities. The model developed by Roland Warren (1972) was particularly relevant to this study for the specific purposes of analyzing community process and developing comparisons. This model proposed that community activity is affected by inner communal (horizontal) dynamics as well as extra communal (vertical) dynamics, both having input into local decisions and actions. This model delineates five stages which may be used to assess community action. Briefly, these stages can be paraphrased as awareness of a local problem or concern; documentation and practical assessment of the local concern; development of possible solutions; choosing a course of action; and achieving results through change. By themselves, these stages and their patterns are not uncommon or unique among community process models. However, the influences upon these stages exerted by the inner and outer (horizontal and vertical) patterns of community relationships present a special attribute of the



model and provides a more complete analysis. In Chapter VI, the question was raised regarding how relevant this model is to the experiences with urban renewal that both communities in this study shared.

Unquestionably this model is relevant to both communities. Within each can be seen the operations of the vertical and horizontal influences and the particular stages each community moved through as the respective decisions toward urban renewal developed. Both communities had recognized local physical deterioration and land use problems in certain areas. This was stage one in the model. Both communities followed this model through stage two by gathering evidence and documenting the nature and scope of the local problem. In stage three of this model, both communities developed strategies for coping with the problem under the proposed urban renewal project plans. In comparison, the timing and funding for these plans were different as well as the separate state laws which allowed local communities to pursue federal urban renewal projects. A seven-year period separated the two proposed plans and this was a period in which federal guidelines had been altered by several congressional acts.

Stage four in the model was essential in each community. This was the public decision regarding what course of action would be taken. Again, the different state laws required different expressions in that one community, by public referendum, mandated urban renewal while the other community, by exerting public pressure, forced the local council, whose obligation under state law was to vote on the proposal, to cast a negative vote regarding the proposed project. Regardless of the separate outcomes, stage four of this model was critical in pursuance of community action toward realistically and methodically developing a

procedure for change. This is why the high degree of activity surrounded each decision (personal efforts, newspaper advertisements, etc.). The local residents who were most involved with the issue, both for and against, realized the importance of the decisions and how they would affect their communities and neighborhoods for some time into the future. Certainly the importance of the decision regarding future growth of the college and its direct benefits to the local residents could clearly be seen in one community. Although better land usage and the eradication of a slum area was of essence in the other community, at issue also was a local feeling of distrust, ineptness, and confusion regarding the federal program and its administration. In an effort to provide an alternative to the proposed urban renewal project, those citizens who adamantly opposed it discussed local self help plans (effects of the community horizontal relationships) which would attempt to meet some of the same objectives and goals of the federal program. In this community, all such activity was directly related to stage four of the model regarding the decision on what plan to initiate. Both communities had to encounter this stage, but only one urban renewal plan passed through it into stage five, implementation, which resulted from the other four stages. There is no doubt that this occurred in the community which selected urban renewal. The physical, tangible changes are there. They are the results of schedules, supervision, regulation, and cooperation. These procedures were basic in the operation of the Urban Renewal Authority which had, at its disposition, guaranteed funds and legal, contractual agreements. There was no stage five in the community which denied urban renewal. Regardless of local intentions evoked by the spirit of the proposed self help plan, nothing was done.

Once the urban renewal proposition was defeated, within a short period of time, the local plan was abandoned or forgotten. Ironically, exactly ten years after the devastating 1966 flood which had caused a major portion of the physical damage involved in the original need for the project, the same river again flooded the same area, and caused more local problems. If the local self help renewal plan had been viable, it would have passed through the identical stages of Warren's model relative to decision, action, and change which would have prevented this reoccurrence.

Thus it was possible to use the multi-stage model to analyze urban renewal in each community while comparing the differential results. As a community action program directed and funded by the Federal government, the very process which the guidelines of urban renewal demanded were somewhat analogous to the stages of the model itself. In requiring a definite local need, local assessment of the dimensions of that need, community related objectives and plans for change, and community acquiescence to those plans, it appears that the structuring of urban renewal by the federal bureaucracy anticipated the stages of Warren's model. Indeed, many of the models that have been proposed to analyze community process seem to have this same applicability. It may be that the federal bureaucracy actually considered the practical operations of some of these models when the official structuring of the urban renewal process was developed under the various federal housing acts of the 1950's and 1960's. This observation, however, lacks factual data to support it.

Warren (1972) postulated that in conjunction with the stages of his model, various vertical and horizontal relationships could be perceived. As

mentioned earlier, the vertical relationships were those which influenced community decision and action from outside the community, while the horizontal relationships were those local interactions which occurred within the community itself relative to the local situation. Again, the urban renewal program, as conceived and structured, seemingly anticipated both sets of relationships. Obviously the vertical perspective related to the structuring and funding of each project, but the recognition of local need, the development of a proposed plan, and the decision to engage federal aid under the auspices of urban renewal had to rely upon the dynamics of those horizontal relationships which occurred within the community. Likewise, the rejection of a proposed urban renewal project could be analyzed from the perspective that horizontal relationships within a community were forceful enough to repress the input or change of such federal efforts as they were vertically directed toward local areas. Warren was accurate when he stated that both sets of relationships occur in contemporary communities and, depending upon intervening variables, variate in relation to time, place, and local situation.

This did happen in the two communities in this study. Within the community which employed urban renewal, a definite vertical relationship with the Federal government could be traced, beginning with the creation of the town. The succession of various federal offices which were located in the community, its subsequent development as a county seat through which a number of federal programs were administered for the county, its mining activity which directly related to World War I, the federal lake and dam project, and the various other local projects (sewers, highways, airport development, and flood controls) which were

partially funded by federal subsidization during earlier periods, helped the community prepare for urban renewal. The vertical input into this community was also accentuated by relocation of major national industries and the presence of a progressive, state-owned community college. Both educational and industrial facets of the community life brought new people, new ideas, and permanent extra community relationships.

Although this strong vertical pattern existed, the community also contained progressive leadership expressed through certain horizontal patterns. The inner community decision to invest personal funds to develop new industrial parks and then seek major industrial relocation is an example of a horizontal pattern. The local abilities to construct a number of new churches and local public buildings, school facilities, and pass local tax levies and bond issues in pursuance of community development projects are the results of some form of the horizontal relationships at work (i.e., this community prided itself upon being the first municipality in the state to pass a 1971 ordinance requiring residents to use trash bags or synthetic liners in their garbage cans). When a community this size could have over 200 citizens involved in local government and supervisory boards, horizontal relationships must have been occurring. Thus while the vertical perspective appears to predominate in the major urban renewal efforts of this community, the recent history of the community strongly asserts that active and well led horizontal relationships functioned simultaneously. Perhaps this is the essence of a progressive, dynamic, modern community.

Meanwhile in the community which rejected the proposed urban renewal project, there was limited evidence of vertical input. Since it was not the county seat, it did not have any of the federal offices

which administer certain programs for H. E. W., Department of Agriculture, Department of Interior, etc., located within the community. Its rejection as the county seat and the relocation of certain federal offices to Wichita during the early part of its existence had, by local admission, somewhat limited its development. No federal aid had been available to the community during its major disaster, and aside from a sewer and water project, at the time of its experience with urban renewal it had had limited relationship with federal funds to help meet local needs. The population size of the community itself may have been a factor contributing to its stronger horizontal relationships. Since it was smaller than the other community with primarily a retail business and residential orientation, more of the residents probably had direct contacts with, and personal knowledge about, each other. Thus the probability of gossip, rumor, and innuendo was a part of the horizontal relationships which helped misconstrue the intent of the local urban renewal authority. The members of the urban renewal board (authority) by self-admission indicated a lack of practical experience and expertise in relation to this federal program and thus were somewhat inept in explaining and defending it to the community. Most of their community service, prior to their urban renewal appointment, had been on local boards and commissions. The change in the wording and conceptual framework of the project during the latter part of its planning stage was interpreted as too strong a control and direction from the federal bureaucracy which deigned to identify deterioration throughout all parts of the community. This was viewed as direct, vertical input into local affairs. As such, the reaction to it was characterized by a greater degree of horizontal involvements within the community. The

change in the project was the catalyst. Distrust of a federal program which could determine what was considered to be a local responsibility (especially in the middle and upper middle class neighborhoods), made the local gossip and rumors appear all the more accurate. The community did not have other significant contingents of vertical relationships which might have helped the urban renewal cause. Only one industry was owned by an outside corporation (but it had been locally owned before its corporate status), and most of the retail businesses were locally owned. With its farm-service and residential atmosphere, this community personified the *gemeinschaft* setting which always indicates a stronger set of horizontal rather than vertical relationships. With these considerations, the data seemed to indicate that in this community there was an imbalance between the vertical and horizontal relationships which provided a fundamental detriment to the implementation of the federal urban renewal project.

The different effects of the vertical and horizontal influences within the respective communities provide additional comprehension of, and appreciation for, Warren's model. Each stage in the model related to the developmental process of each project. Each project was, in turn, affected by the dynamics of the vertical and horizontal relationships which existed within each community. In the community where urban renewal was successful, the project, its various stages, and the vertical and horizontal relationships all achieved a certain equilibrium. In the community where urban renewal failed to materialize, the influence of horizontal relationships appeared disproportionate to the vertical input, and interrupted the process during the fourth stage of

the model. A closer analysis and discussion of certain comparable variables which existed in both cases will provide a conclusion to this paper.



## CHAPTER X

### COMPARATIVE OBSERVATIONS ON VARIABLES

#### RELEVANT TO BOTH COMMUNITIES:

#### A CLOSING REVIEW

In the preceding chapters, the different experiences each community underwent regarding their respective urban renewal efforts have been reviewed. Narrations of the events which occurred have been presented. An analysis of how each community's efforts related to the process of decision making and change has been undertaken in conjunction with a sociological model, one of many devised for such a purpose. However there remains certain key variables relative to both settings which, when compared, provide further observations and details. Some of these variables could be investigated more thoroughly, perhaps through a hypothesis testing methodology which would prove or disprove their legitimacy with finite measurement. This concluding chapter is an attempt to clarify these variables.

Although no order or ranking of variables is intended, some priority seems appropriate. For instance, the type of project each community selected for its urban renewal effort is very important. In the one community with a successful program, the initial project was definitely oriented toward the improvement of the whole community. In its attempts to expand the popular junior (two year) college, the projected results of this effort would directly benefit the whole town on several

different levels. The college was well recognized and supported in its athletics (national champions in several sports) and performing arts. The urban renewal project allowed expansion and development of physical plant facilities which enhanced these programs, as well as doubling student enrollment, faculty, and payrolls. Expanded programs, improved local educational opportunities, and more jobs were permanent features directly related to this project. It had been the president of the college, a forceful, respected, and experienced local leader who had introduced the urban renewal concept to the community. When the residents had been made aware that it would not cost them any money to start and complete the project (through local revenues), the overwhelming success of the urban renewal referendum was understandable.

In the community which rejected the urban renewal process, the land reclamation effort with its potential resale value to private industry created a different circumstance. Many members of the community believed that only certain interests, especially those of the urban renewal board and the industry that was interested in the property, would directly benefit. With a housing shortage existing in the community at that time, many residents wondered where the working class families from the proposed project area would be relocated. This was an annoying concern for the residents who lived in the newer development in the town. Moreover, the direct benefits from this project lacked an overall community orientation and thus could be viewed as having limited potential for the future good of the whole town. Very little concern was expressed regarding the flood hazard which the project would seek to correct. These factors, combined with the radical change which was proposed for the project midway through its

planning phase, furthered a distrust and credibility-gap which fueled the community's anti-urban renewal forces.

In reviewing the differences between the two projects, one regional urban renewal official commented that in all proposed projects, the ones that had been the most successful and well accepted by local communities were those which expanded or improved public institutions. These projects held the greatest potential for serving the total population in the communities. Conceivably, if the community with the successful project had opted for one of its later projects as its initial effort, in lieu of the college expansion, urban renewal may have been rejected there also.

Not only was the type of project an important factor accounting for the differences between community responses, but the timing of the projects was also relative. The successful project was pioneered in its community when the federal urban renewal program was a comparatively new concept, especially to the midwestern part of the United States. Nationally, at this time (1961), the program was neither large nor had it been adversely reviewed. The unique distinction of being the first community throughout the whole state of Oklahoma to initiate an urban renewal project was likewise an added, and attractive, incentive. Seven years later when the other community sought its urban renewal project, many conditions had changed. Nationally, the urban renewal program had been widely criticized by independent researchers, journalists, and politicians. In some major cities it had been implicated as being directly responsible for race riots and other forms of social unrest which had occurred. Various reactionary conservative political and economic organizations had condemned it for its liberal spending

and socialistic philosophy, while various liberals had declared it a tool for local power structures in that it was a vehicle used to further private economic interests at the expense of the public good and impoverishment of minorities. No special or unique distinction characterized the proposed project in the second community except that it would have been the first urban renewal effort in this rural Kansas county. The negative experience which urban renewal had encountered in neighboring metropolitan Wichita was also a counter force of some degree. These factors plus the general fears and uncertainties associated with the latter part of the 1960's generated by an unpopular war, domestic riots, a pronounced lack of credibility in prominent national leaders, an emerging negativism toward bureaucracies, and a change in the political administration of the Federal government combined, with some degree of probability, to induce the failure of this project.

A comparison of the two local agency boards also indicates why community responses differed toward urban renewal. In the successful project, the initial board of directors was appointed after the project had been voted into the community (permissible by state law). These men were known leaders in the community and obviously a part of the local power structure. Among the board members, the college president was a dynamic, popular personality who had been urged, on several occasions, to declare his candidacy for the state's governorship. He was intelligent and shrewd, yet projected a "home spun" and provincial demeanor. He had been the president of the community college for over 20 years. The lawyer appointed to the board was also a local, second generation attorney who had just retired from several terms in the state

legislature. The presidents of both local banks were also on the board. Each were from families representing generations of banking interests in the community and each had a reputation for integrity, community betterment, and public service. Both had contributed personal funds to help the community change from a mining town to an industrial center. The remaining board member was an industrial executive known locally for his work in service clubs and various community projects. All of these members, except the latter, held college and/or graduate-professional degrees. They met and conferred in a spirit of cooperation and decisiveness which presented a formidable leadership in the project.

Conversely, in the community which denied urban renewal, there were no professionals appointed to that local board and only one member held a college degree. Under Kansas law, the local urban renewal board was appointed and the planning phase completed before final approval would be given to a project by the local government. Under such conditions, it is feasible to consider that an inexperienced local board might act hesitantly and with less sense of authority needed to secure final approval of a project. Only two members of this board, due to a heritage of successful family businesses, would possibly have been a part of the local power structure. All board members indicated that they felt a thorough knowledge about the urban renewal process. Occasionally they lacked unanimity in their decisions, and several of the board members indicated that minor personality conflicts did exist between some of the men. Since the majority of the board were local self-employed businessmen whose businesses were directly or indirectly related to construction, when the anti-urban renewal forces wanted to

embarrass the board, they would direct attention to this fact through innuendos about how each would financially profit from the project. This type of undermining caused several of the members to develop slightly alienated attitudes toward the community. However, the board had made a mutual pact with one another that together, without individual resignations, they would act as a unified group regarding the fate of the project. Previous to the city elections (prior to the final approval of the project), the city council members were in agreement with and in support of the board's efforts. Both the board and the council were committed to accomplishing the project and publically avowed their belief in the mechanics of the federal urban renewal process to accomplish this needed community improvement.

In comparison, each community's urban renewal board was evenly distributed in age and income level. However, the board in the successful project contained members who had resided longer in their community and were in a higher income level than the other group. Although the different types of projects and the timing of each were factors of importance, the successful project contained a board which was more knowledgeable about the urban renewal process, was more unanimous and forceful in their decisions, possessed a greater amount of internal community influence, and had gathered more experience in external community organizations and programs (as Warren asserted in his model, this association represented the vertical influence necessary for community change). The greater acceptance of and acquiescence to the board's role in the successful project as opposed to the confusion, criticism, and rumors concerning the board in the unsuccessful project, accounted for one of the greatest differences between the two cases in this study.

Equally dissimilar were the directors of the two local urban renewal agencies. Basic contrasts between these two men were obvious. Age, backgrounds, and community orientation specifically separated the two directors. In the community with the urban renewal project, the initial director was an older man who had lived in the community the majority of his life and had either been self-employed or in management. Being local and well known, he quickly established a sense of trust and local input and control over the urban renewal agency. He carefully consulted with the board regarding all phases of the project, was "low keyed" and restrained in his public communications, and tended to ignore or dismiss any of the negative comments or criticisms directed toward the project. He, like all the directors who would follow him, was not a career specialist in urban renewal and was not college educated. His technical knowledge of the urban renewal process had been gained by personal study and attendance at a number of workshops and training seminars provided by the regional office.

In the unsuccessful project, the director was a young man (under 30), had been raised in a distant eastern state, and was a career employee in the Department of Housing and Urban Development. Since the local urban renewal board had been somewhat uncertain on how to proceed regarding the creation of the urban renewal agency, they had decided an experienced person was necessary. Although the director's credentials appeared superior to other applicants, there was a split decision by the board regarding his hiring. Some of the board members felt throughout the duration of the urban renewal period that he was too young, brash, and outspoken. Particularly displeasing were certain public communication via speeches and press releases in which the

director discussed the future of the whole community, how it would change and how it should be improved. Also irritating to some board members was his candid exposure of the intricate, detailed plans of the proposed project to the whole community. When some of the board members themselves didn't fully comprehend these plans, they reasoned that many of the people in the community would probably misunderstand them and react with confusion. On occasion, the director reminded the board that he was a college graduate, had completed internships and associate directorships in other urban renewal agencies, and has been employed as a professional to supervise the operation of this project. His overt concern for candor, his naivety in allowing various parts of information or plans to be taken from the office (often out of context), and his urging the decision to change the nature of the project were regarded by certain board members (and other community members) as examples of poor judgement and a lack of "common sense." Somewhat urbane in appearance and general demeanor, some of the community residents regarded him as a stranger who did not have the best interests of the community foremost in his concerns. The element of distrust was no doubt present in this relationship and the observations from George Simmel's essay regarding local reactions to a stranger are noteworthy in this context.

The fate of this proposed urban renewal project might have been different had an older, local, well-known and respected resident been employed as the director and had the board been more knowledgeable and forceful about the urban renewal program. A comparison of Warren's model (regarding decision making and change in a community) to the events associated with the directorships in each project produces a



certain observation. In the successful project, the director represented the community "horizontal" influence by virtue of his local background. In the unsuccessful project, the director represented the vertical influence particularly since he was from outside the community and brought into the locality specifically because of his skills and expertise in relation to a federal bureaucracy. Interestingly, the successful project developed from this particular horizontal relationship while the project which had sought to utilize a more vertical relationship through a background of career management was the unsuccessful one.

As noted in previous chapters, the history of each community presented contrasting relationships with the federal government. Perhaps the differences in ages and locations were integral factors that influenced the relationships. The younger community had been created through direct legislation by the federal government in what was, for all practical purposes, the last frontier land in the continental United States. Its long association with Washington, D. C. can be traced throughout its history of federal courts, federal offices, and its governmental activity as a county seat. The success of the urban renewal project in this setting was, in some respects, simply another relationship with the federal government. However, in the older community, its history reflected an erstwhile, erratic relationship to Washington commencing with its early loss of the federal land office to Wichita followed by the loss of designation as the county seat and relocation of governmental activities. No new governmental offices or agencies replaced these and eventually the relationship with the

Federal government was distant and remote.\*

Hard data in the form of federal grants, loans, and other subsidies more clearly present the contrasts between these two communities. In the community which rejected urban renewal, no federal funds (or other sources of relief from outside the community) were utilized when it was beset with natural disasters such as the tornado and flood. The mayor and city manager checked past records and indicated that to the best of their knowledge, the community had received, previous to its urban renewal application, a total of approximately \$250,000 for separate sewer and water projects and hospital construction aids. With the myriad of federal funding agencies available to communities during the past generation, this dollar figure reflects a limited use of federal funds. Meanwhile in the community with urban renewal, the mayor provided a detailed list (including dates and amounts of money) of local projects which had been funded by the Federal government. Not only had the usual water and sewage projects been funded, but the Federal government had also made large grants after disasters and had underwritten flood control projects, airport improvement projects, street and highway construction, hospital improvement, school expansion, and the creation of a second industrial park plus the expansion of the first one. The total federal expenditures in these various projects had amounted to \$2.6 million previous to and during the time of the first urban renewal

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\*Interestingly, the historical sources and records provided obvious differences. The urban renewal community's history was easy to research. Books, monographs, and pamphlets had been written. The other community's history was more difficult to research although primary documents were displayed in its local museum which was heavily oriented toward agricultural artifacts and antiques.

project. At the conclusion of the final urban renewal project in this community (1976), the increase of federal expenditures had significantly changed. Although there had been other community projects funded through the Federal government during the 15-year period urban renewal had existed in this community, the urban renewal projects were the principal federal expenditures. When all federal monies were combined (with the urban renewal project), an excess of 10 million dollars had been spent in the community. Hence the difference between the two communities relative to capitalizing on federal funds was overwhelming. However, an interesting paradox remained. The government accounting office (federal) data indicated that for the period from 1968 through 1975, the total amount of federal expenditures in each county in which the two communities are located was within \$50,000 of each other for each year. An analysis of these data showed that much more money came into the Kansas county through the various Department of Agriculture programs beneficial to crop and livestock farm operations.

Other differences were apparent between the two communities. In the urban renewal community, there was a different level of activity due to the presence of government offices and mixed industry. Being a county seat always has special advantages for a town because it thus becomes a magnet to the population of the county. It is the place where local citizens interact with the various state and federal office personnel who are located there. When active industrial expansion determines thousands of jobs is also a part of this local setting, the community obviously achieves newer and greater dimensions. Population, economic expansion, residential development, and service institutions increase. In the urban renewal community these happened to such an

extent that the community became the largest urban center located, with respectable distance, between Joplin, Missouri and Tulsa, Oklahoma. In a sense, this community became a microcosm of a larger metropolitan area with similar features.

In the community which rejected urban renewal, the urbanism which characterized the other community has not occurred. Deprived of being the county seat, this community lacked state and federal contact regarding offices and personnel. With only one major industry, its industrial development was not diversified enough to create and expand the local labor force and thus elevate the local economy. Moreover, its close geographical proximity to Wichita, Kansas has had a major effect upon its own survival. As a satellite community it has a special sensitivity toward its own status. Data from 1968 and 1969 indicated that approximately 40% of the residents in this community had one or more household members who commuted to the city to work. The vitality of local employment sources had diminished as the nearby metropolitan area expanded. However, an unplanned byproduct of this expansion had been the enhancement of this small town as a residential or "bedroom" community. With its small town, rural atmosphere, it became a somewhat popular place for the commuter to live for it contained a more gemeinschaft environment than the quickly built, consumer "packaged" suburban developments, most of which were constructed on the other (western) side of Wichita. It is possible that this residential population feared the loss of local community identity. Therefore, any program or change which had the potential to reduce community atmosphere and identity posed a possible threat, especially to real estate values. This feeling may have escalated when the urban renewal program in Wichita received

bad publicity and intensified when the confusion and misunderstanding occurred regarding the publications of the Master Plan for the whole community which was a part of the planning phase in the urban renewal project.

It is evident that the one community which adopted urban renewal had greatly utilized planned change. It had instigated purposeful change at several stages in its history which had the deliberate effect of keeping the community in a highly competitive and growth oriented status. The major impact of this type of change is that it can make a community more oriented toward accepting the utility of federal programs and their assimilation into the local life. This is an important factor. When a community is not forced to change its economy or life style but remains essentially the service oriented type of community it has always been, then a definite provincialism occurs. It is, therefore, much more difficult to initiate and develop programs that are externally created, funded, and controlled from outside the community. Such was the condition in the community which rejected the urban renewal process. In many respects, the comparison of these two communities resembles much of the description which characterizes the *gemeinschaft* and *gesellschaft* types. The classification of each seems obvious in that the urban renewal community exemplifies the latter and the nonurban renewal community typifies the former.

Selected observations made by city managers, urban renewal agency directors, and regional urban renewal officials, all from outside the state of Kansas, relate to this observation. Unanimously they volunteered their professional opinion that it was difficult to accomplish very much in that state. Regional officials indicated that Kansas had

fewer projects than the other states in the region, that it was more difficult to start projects in the state, and likewise a greater percentage of rejections of proposed projects had occurred in the state more than any other in their region. Five urban renewal directors in neighboring states (Oklahoma and Missouri) maintained that Kansas was the most difficult state (in the region) in which to initiate new programs and also had the greatest amount of agency personnel turn-over. Several city managers commented about the conservatism and localism which was dominant in many of the small and middle-sized communities in the state. All such commentary tended to agree and reinforce the general reputation which the state has had as being conservative, independent, and rural or grassroots oriented. These often unsolicited remarks indicated the jeopardy to which the urban renewal project in the Kansas community was heir and accounted for another situation negative to its existence.

Finally, there were the people in the two communities. The difference in population size has previously been indicated. Recent research still asserts that in the small communities there is a deeper awareness of local issues which directly affect individuals, their beliefs and opinions, to a greater degree than what occurs in the larger communities (Black, 1974; Benz, 1975; and Mithun, 1975). Local issues generate a more acute interest, discussion, and response. The social dynamics of the smaller communities allow for direct confrontation of interests and personalities. Informal interactions more frequently expedite local decisions in lieu of procedural methodologies. Conflict regarding decisions is more likely to result in the smaller community because directness often prevails, especially where no clear control of the

community decision making process is attached to a prevailing vested interest group or local power structure. The conflict over the proposed project in the one community can be viewed within this framework. Rumor, innuendo, and direct confrontations instigated by local inhabitants generated the necessary force which ended urban renewal. Outside the community resources and influences were minimal but timely in the anti-project campaign. Informants agreed that the community was probably too small and too closely interwoven to allow for a widespread apathy toward such a local issue to exist. They believed that if the community had been two or three times larger, the acceptance of urban renewal could have been enhanced due simply to a greater lack of interest and less possible direct confrontation with the principal personalities involved.

Such factors, as mentioned in the preceding paragraph, could have been highly relevant to the community which accepted urban renewal. Its situation in a larger community, less maintained by informal social dynamics, followed the general pattern of most projects which had been completed in the larger urbanized areas. Formal discussions, formal controls, and professional planning had usually predominated among the projects in larger communities, processes which in themselves suggested the absence of direct citizen participation in such local affairs. Although the community with the successful urban renewal program was not a Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area (a community with 50,000 or more population, U. S. Census Bureau, 1960), its overtones of urbanism, industrialization, governmental bureaucracies, and a more formal and forceful appearance of local leaders helped develop the potential for its success.

One singular aspect of this study which could have been a special research topic was the role of community leadership. The combination of local projects, community leadership, and community power is a special area of investigation in which urban renewal could have been the vehicle for an analysis of such interrelationships. Both communities reviewed in this study had local power structures. Informants referred to these albeit indirectly and generally. Without specific documentation it appeared that in the community which rejected urban renewal, there was a division of interests and personalities among the local power group. Several informants in that community indicated that perhaps the urban renewal issue was the catalyst that brought into the open covert feelings which had apriori existence. Reference was made that in the past the community influentials had not always acted in a spirit of cooperation and unity regarding other issues. Regardless of this contention a lack of unity prevailed among this group which was obvious to many persons in the community and thus weakened the local support system upon which the project ultimately depended. Conversely, in the community which accepted urban renewal, the local power structure was unified and adamant in its endorsement. Vested social and economic interests notwithstanding, the influential group in this community had developed a history of acting decisively and cohesively regarding decisions on other issues which had involved programs and resources, some of which had been external to the community through large horizontal industries and the Federal government. Informants never suggested an indication of personality conflict or publicized differences of opinion within this group relative to urban renewal. However, the type of the initial project and its particular timing had to have been important



factors regarding their mutual cooperativeness. It appeared that throughout the remaining urban renewal projects this group kept its composition and composure.

Although tempting, a statement referencing one community as having more of a "sense of community" than the other cannot be made. The data would not support such an assertion, and it is not within the framework of this paper to arrive at such a conclusion. What has emerged is an awareness of two distinct, separate communities, each with a different history, ethos, and orientation toward change. Whereas one community had to implement direct changes for survival, the other community's changes were more gradual and less dramatic as they indirectly occurred from influences generated by a nearby metropolitan area. Each community has met the needs of the majority of their residents in different ways, and as individual persons differ, so do these communities. Therefore, this study underscores the different responses to similar encounters that followed the same process, in part, but resulted in separate outcomes. One may postulate that future decisions in each community could follow similar processes, perhaps resulting in similar outcomes regarding further encounters with outside the community forces and influences. Much would have to depend upon the nature of the encounter and how it might be handled. This study, however, has basically explored the question of why the different community responses to urban renewal occurred and the relevancy of a model for clarification of community decision making process. To exceed these general limitations by proposing conclusions relevant to other objectives and methods of inquiry would be obviously inappropriate.

A study of this nature may leave a feeling of incompleteness and inconclusiveness - of not being finished. The absence of hard data, of statistics and proven relationships, account for such a feeling. Having had extensive experiences in community research in their own backgrounds, Vidich, Bensman and Stein (1964) have observed that no one has yet been able to present a formal methodology for the optimum scientific study of the community and that anyone who has studied a community is as much changed by his effort as the community he has studied. During the course of his personal experience with the community, the investigator realizes other interests and problems that were initially outside the scope of his imagination and planned methodology so that only with the passage of time does the data inevitably become more clearly defined and focused. Mysticism notwithstanding, the observations in this study are distinct, and the reader can travel to either community and have a modicum of knowledge about each and a realization that beyond the streets there exists a background of encounters with urban renewal which affected each community in a separate way.

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VITA

Conrad Eugene Gubera

Candidate for the Degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

**Thesis:** BEYOND THE STREETS: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF THE ENCOUNTERS  
OF TWO COMMUNITIES WITH URBAN RENEWAL

**Major Field:** Sociology

**Biographical:**

**Personal Data:** Born in Joplin, Missouri, June 28, 1940, the son of  
Mr. and Mrs. Carl Gubera.

**Education:** Graduated Valedictorian, R-6 High School, Pierce City,  
Missouri, May, 1958; received Associate of Arts degree from  
Joplin Junior College in May, 1960; received Bachelor of  
Science in Education degree from Pittsburg State University in  
June, 1962; received Master of Science degree from Pittsburg  
State University in June, 1967; completed requirements for the  
Doctor of Philosophy degree at Oklahoma State University in  
December, 1979.

**Professional Experience:** Instructor at Mount Vernon High School,  
Mount Vernon, Missouri, 1962-1963; Instructor at Joplin Senior  
High School, Joplin, Missouri, 1963-1965; Instructor at  
Pittsburg State University, 1966-1967; Part-time Instructor at  
Crowder Junior College, Neosho, Missouri, 1966-1967; Instructor  
at Missouri Southern College, 1967-1971; Consultant for the  
Housing and Urban Development Department, 1967-1971; Consul-  
tant to the Ozarks Gateway Regional Planning Association,  
1968-1971; Teaching Associate, Department of Sociology,  
Oklahoma State University, 1971-1973; Assistant Professor,  
Missouri Southern State College, 1973-1979.