

AFRICA AND THE TWO CHINAS

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AFRICA AND THE TWO CHINAS

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DEDICATED TO

Dr. Homer L. Knight (1907-1977)

in memory of

his inspiration, encouragement, and help

for more than a decade

## PREFACE

This study is the result of extensive research at four universities and a research institution. The collection of the Daily Report of the U. S. Foreign Broadcast Information Service held at Edmon Low Library, Oklahoma State University, was of great value in providing first-hand information on African countries and the PRC. The Center for Chinese Studies, at the University of California at Berkeley (UCB), provided most of the Chinese-language primary sources on the PRC used in this study. Its collection of Peking Review was also valuable. The Institute of International Studies, also at UCB, provided some general materials on Africa while the collection of microfilms of the U. S. Joint Publications Research Service's Translations on Africa held by UCB's main library gave an immense amount of the information used in this study.

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## TABLE OF CONTENTS

Chapter	Page
I. INTRODUCTION . . . . .	1
II. PRC POLICY IN AFRICA . . . . .	16
Stages in PRC Foreign Policy . . . . .	16
1949-1955 . . . . .	16
1955-1960 . . . . .	17
1960-1969 . . . . .	19
Since 1969 . . . . .	20
"The First Intermediate Zone" . . . . .	20
Establishing Diplomatic Relations . . . . .	23
Multi-National Conferences . . . . .	30
Bilateral Agreements . . . . .	38
Friendship Treaties . . . . .	38
Cultural Agreements . . . . .	39
Trade Agreements . . . . .	40
Economic and Technical Agreements . . . . .	41
Propaganda . . . . .	49
New China News Agency (NCNA) . . . . .	50
Radio Broadcasts . . . . .	51
Printed Material . . . . .	55
Motion Pictures . . . . .	56
Visits To and From China . . . . .	56
Student Scholarships . . . . .	60
Covert Activities . . . . .	62
III. EXTERNAL ISSUES AFFECTING PRC-AFRICAN RELATIONS . . . . .	76
The Sino-Soviet Dispute . . . . .	76
The PRC-India Border War . . . . .	79
The Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty . . . . .	81
The French Connection . . . . .	83
The PRC's "Cultural Revolution" . . . . .	84
The Ordeal of the PRC Foreign Ministry . . . . .	89
Disarray in Foreign Relations . . . . .	91
African Reaction to China's Upheaval . . . . .	94
Unfavorable Reaction in Africa . . . . .	98
Ending the Cultural Revolution . . . . .	101

Chapter	Page
IV. THE PRC AND WEST AFRICA . . . . .	112
The North African Prelude . . . . .	112
West Africa: An Overview . . . . .	115
Guinea . . . . .	119
Ghana . . . . .	124
Mali . . . . .	127
Congo . . . . .	131
Benin . . . . .	134
Mauritania . . . . .	136
Equatorial Guinea . . . . .	137
Nigeria . . . . .	138
Cameroon . . . . .	141
Sierra Leone . . . . .	144
Senegal . . . . .	145
Togo . . . . .	146
Upper Volta . . . . .	146
Guinea-Bissau . . . . .	148
Gabon . . . . .	149
Gambia . . . . .	150
Ivory Coast . . . . .	150
V. THE PRC AND CENTRAL AFRICA . . . . .	166
Central Africa: An Overview . . . . .	166
Zaire . . . . .	169
The Lumumba Phase, 1958-1960 . . . . .	170
The Gizenga Phase, 1969-1969 . . . . .	172
The Mulele-Gbenye Phase, 1962-1965 . . . . .	174
Zaire Under Mobutu . . . . .	178
Burundi and Rwanda . . . . .	180
Central African Republic (CAR) . . . . .	190
Chad . . . . .	193
Niger . . . . .	195
VI. THE PRC AND EAST AFRICA . . . . .	207
Sudan . . . . .	208
Somalia . . . . .	213
Tanzania . . . . .	218
Tanganyika . . . . .	218
Zanzibar . . . . .	219
Tanzania . . . . .	220
Uganda . . . . .	228
Kenya . . . . .	232
Ethiopia . . . . .	239

Chapter	Page
VII. THE PRC AND SOUTHERN AFRICA . . . . .	261
Southern Africa: An Overview . . . . .	261
Zambia . . . . .	263
The Zamtan or Tanzan Railway . . . . .	267
Madagascar . . . . .	272
Malawi . . . . .	275
PRC Relations with Portugal . . . . .	277
Angola . . . . .	279
Mozambique . . . . .	282
Rhodesia/Zimbabwe . . . . .	286
South Africa/Azania . . . . .	290
Southwest Africa/Namibia . . . . .	294
Botswana . . . . .	296
The Enclave Nations . . . . .	298
Lesotho . . . . .	298
Swaziland . . . . .	300
Transkei . . . . .	300
Bophuthatswana . . . . .	301
Comoros . . . . .	301
VIII. ROC POLICY IN AFRICA . . . . .	317
Goals . . . . .	318
Advantages and Disadvantages . . . . .	319
Tactics . . . . .	321
Establishing Diplomatic Relations . . . . .	322
Bilateral Agreements . . . . .	322
Visits To and From Taiwan . . . . .	325
Propaganda . . . . .	329
Agricultural and Technical Assistance:	
Overview . . . . .	330
"Operation Vanguard" . . . . .	331
Origin and Administration . . . . .	331
Technical Cooperation: Main Stages . . . . .	332
Propaganda Aspects . . . . .	332
Project Selection Criteria . . . . .	333
Agricultural Demonstration Teams . . . . .	333
Financing of "Operation Vanguard" . . . . .	338
Achievements of the Demonstration Team . . . . .	338
The African Response . . . . .	341
The Human Cost to ROC Personnel . . . . .	342
African Seminars in Taiwan . . . . .	343
Trade With Africa . . . . .	351

Chapter	Page
IX. THE ROC AND WEST, CENTRAL AND SOUTHERN AFRICA . . . . .	362
West Africa . . . . .	365
Liberia . . . . .	365
Cameroon . . . . .	368
Togo . . . . .	369
Congo . . . . .	370
Senegal . . . . .	371
Mauritania . . . . .	373
Gabon . . . . .	374
Upper Volta . . . . .	375
Benin . . . . .	376
Ivory Coast . . . . .	377
Sierra Leone . . . . .	380
Gambia . . . . .	381
Central Africa . . . . .	383
Zaire . . . . .	383
Chad . . . . .	385
Central African Republic . . . . .	387
Rwanda . . . . .	388
Niger . . . . .	390
East Africa . . . . .	391
Southern Africa . . . . .	392
Republic of South Africa . . . . .	393
Madagascar . . . . .	395
Malawi . . . . .	396
Lesotho . . . . .	398
Botswana . . . . .	399
Swaziland . . . . .	400
X. AFRICA AND "CHINA" IN THE UNITED NATIONS . . . . .	415
The "China Issue" . . . . .	415
Representation, Not Admission . . . . .	415
PRC Aggression Against UN Forces in Korea . . . . .	417
The "Moratorium" Resolutions 1951-1960 . . . . .	418
The "Important Question" Resolutions . . . . .	419
Decision in 1971 . . . . .	420
The Role of Africa, 1950-1971 . . . . .	423
Conclusions About African Voting . . . . .	431
After 1971 . . . . .	435

Chapter	Page
XI. CONCLUSIONS . . . . .	440
Origins of the Competition . . . . .	440
Objectives in the Competition . . . . .	441
Advantages and Disadvantages . . . . .	442
Tactics and Scale of Effort . . . . .	443
Effects of the PRC Cultural Revolution . . . . .	444
The African Response . . . . .	446
Peking's Focus: on Taipei or Moscow . . . . .	447
Since the United Nations Decision . . . . .	447
BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . .	451

# LIST OF TABLES

Table	Page
I. Alphabetic List of African Nations by Present Names . . .	8
II. Alphabetic Index of African Nations by Final Colonial Name . . . . .	9
III. Alphabetic Index of African Name Changes Since Independence . . . . .	10
IV. Chronological List of African Nations in Order of Independence . . . . .	11
V. Geographic List of African Nations by Regions . . . . .	12
VI. African Diplomatic Relations with the Two Chinas: List of Dates . . . . .	27
VII. African Diplomatic Relations with the Two Chinas: Statistics . . . . .	28
VIII. PRC-African Trade, 1960-1975 . . . . .	42
IX. PRC Agreements with African Nations . . . . .	43
X. PRC Aid Commitments to Sub-Saharan African Nations . . .	46
XI. Radio Peking Broadcasts to Africa . . . . .	53
XII. African State Visits to the PRC . . . . .	58
XIII. Exchange of Visiting Delegations by African Nations and the PRC . . . . .	61
XIV. African Impact of the Cultural Revolution, 1966-1969 . . . . .	93
XV. West Africa and the Two Chinas . . . . .	117
XVI. Central Africa and the Two Chinas . . . . .	168
XVII. East Africa and the Two Chinas . . . . .	210
XVIII. Southern Africa and the Two Chinas . . . . .	264

Table	Page
XIX. Southern African Nations in Order of Independence . . . . .	265
XX. The Two Chinas: Area and Population . . . . .	320
XXI. African Diplomatic Relations with the ROC . . . . .	323
XXII. ROC Agreements with African Nations . . . . .	324
XXIII. African State Visits to the ROC . . . . .	327
XXIV. ROC Agricultural Demonstration Teams in Africa . . . . .	334
XXV. ROC Land Reclamation and Farm Extension in Africa . . . . .	336
XXVI. Rice Varieties Used by the ROC in Africa . . . . .	337
XXVII. Irrigation Facilities Set Up by the ROC in Africa . . . . .	339
XXVIII. ROC Agricultural Training in Africa . . . . .	340
XXIX. ROC Non-Agricultural Technical Missions to Africa . . . . .	344
XXX. Training Program of the ROC Fifteenth Seminar . . . . .	347
XXXI. ROC Seminars for African Agriculturalists . . . . .	348
XXXII. African Participants in ROC Agricultural Seminars . . . . .	349
XXXIII. ROC-African Trade, 1960-1973 . . . . .	352
XXXIV. Statistical Summary of African Nations Which Recognized the ROC . . . . .	363
XXXV. The ROC and West Africa . . . . .	366
XXXVI. China Policy Changes in Benin . . . . .	378
XXXVII. The ROC and Central Africa . . . . .	383
XXXVIII. The ROC and Southern Africa . . . . .	393
XXXIX. General Assembly Voting on the China Issue . . . . .	421
XL. Importance of African Votes on Chinese Representation . . . . .	424

Table	Page
XLI. African Voting on the China Issue . . . . .	426
XLII. African Voting on the China Issue: Summary of Votes . . . . .	428
XLIII. African Voting on the China Issue by Type of Vote . . . . .	429
XLIV. African Voting on the China Issue by Diplomatic Status . . . . .	430
XLV. African Nations Recognizing the PRC but Not Voting for the PRC . . . . .	432
XLVI. African Nations Recognizing the ROC but Not Voting for the ROC . . . . .	433

## LIST OF FIGURES

Figure	Page
1. Map of African Regions . . . . .	13
2. Diplomatic Relations with the Two Chinas . . . . .	29
3. Map of West Africa . . . . .	116
4. Map of Central Africa . . . . .	167
5. Map of East Africa . . . . .	209
6. Map of Southern Africa . . . . .	262
7. Nations Never Having Diplomatic Relations with the ROC . . . . .	364
8. African Votes on China in the United Nations . . . . .	427

## LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AAPSO	Afro-Asian Peoples' Solidarity Organization
ANC	African National Congress, South Africa
BCP	Basutoland Congress Party
BNP	Basutoland National Party
BPP	Bechuanaland People's Party
CAR	Central Africa Republic, now Central African Empire
CFA	francs (Communaute Francaise de l'Atlantique, francs)
CNA	Central News Agency, Republic of China
CPL	Communist Party of Lesotho
COREMO	Revolutionary Committee of Mozambique
ELF	Eritrean Liberation Front
FNLA	National Front for the Liberation of Angola
FRELIMO	Front for the Liberation of Mozambique
FRROLIZI	Front for the Liberation of Zimbabwe
<u>JMJP</u>	<u>Jen-min jih-pao</u> , People's Daily of the PRC
KANU	Kenya Africa National Union
MANU	Mozambique African National Union
MPLA	People's Movement for the Liberation of Angola
NCNA	New China News Agency, PRC
OAU	Organization of African Unity
PAC	Pan-Africanist Congress, South Africa
PRC	People's Republic of China

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS (Continued)

ROC	Republic of China
SACP	South African Communist Party
SWANU	Southwest Africa National Union
SWAPO	Southwest African People's Organization
UAM	Afro-Malagasy Union
UDENAMO	Democratic National Union of Mozambique
UNIMI	African Union of Independent Mozambique
UNIP	United National Independence Party, Zambia
UNITA	National Union for Total Independence of Angola
ZANU	Zimbabwe African National Union, Rhodesia
ZAPU	Zimbabwe African People's Union, Rhodesia

## CHAPTER I

### INTRODUCTION

Throughout history, China has had a strong influence on other countries in Central, East, and Southeast Asia. For the past hundred years, China has also been deeply involved in relations with the United States and most of the European powers. But until very recently, the Chinese have had almost no interest in or connections with Africa, either officially or privately. In the fifteenth century, both the Chinese and the Portuguese made voyages to Africa, but for complex reasons the Portuguese's interest in Africa continued and the Chinese did not.<sup>1</sup> By the nineteenth century, when China was drawn involuntarily into a new world order designed and created by Europeans, Africa was being partitioned into European colonies. Preoccupied with efforts to escape a similar fate, China had neither opportunity nor incentive for involvement in Africa.

That has changed dramatically in the last quarter-century. An opportunity for Chinese involvement was created by events in Africa: the gradual conversion of European colonies into independent countries urgently needing technical and financial aid. Incentives for Chinese involvement were created by events outside Africa: the struggle between Chinese Nationalists and Chinese Communists, and the struggle between the Chinese Communists and their former Soviet allies.

A long civil war ending in 1949 left China divided between the

People's Republic of China (PRC) with its capital at Peking, and the Republic of China (ROC) with its provisional capital at Taipei, Taiwan.<sup>2</sup> The PRC controlled the vast territory and population of mainland China, while the ROC held only Taiwan and a few smaller islands but until 1971 retained China's seat in the United Nations. In two decades (1949-1971) of controversy over Chinese representation in the United Nations, the number of African states in the United Nations grew from four to forty-one. Competition for African votes in the United Nations General Assembly therefore became a major incentive for both the PRC and the ROC to take an active interest in African affairs.

Similarly, a bitter ideological dispute between the PRC and the Soviet Union, beginning in 1956 and escalating rapidly from 1960 on, led to rivalry between these two largest Communist nations that involved Africa as well as many other regions of the world. The PRC quest for African votes in the United Nations was intensified by suspicion that the Soviet Union was not trying very hard to win United Nations' acceptance of the PRC. But Sino-Soviet disagreement went far beyond this issue, and produced growing competition between the PRC and the Soviet Union for influence and ideological leadership throughout the world. Both countries saw Africa as an important area for this competition.

Chinese (especially PRC) relations with African countries have been discussed in numerous articles and books by Western, African, and Chinese writers.<sup>3</sup> Since 1965, five general works on PRC activities in Africa have appeared. The first, by John K. Cooley, a Christian Science Monitor correspondent in North Africa, was entitled East Wind Over Africa; Red China's African Offensive (New York, 1965). It covers

the first decade of the PRC's diplomatic penetration into Africa, beginning with the Bandung Conference in 1955. The account as a whole is well balanced and wide-ranging. It is one of the most readable books on the subject yet published, and includes useful appendixes. Except for two pages dealing with ROC activities in Africa, Cooley concentrated on Peking's attempts to replace both Washington and Moscow in Africa. He made the unique suggestion that prior to the 1960 Sino-Soviet rift, Moscow and Peking had agreed to divide Africa into spheres of influence with the former concentrating on East Africa while the latter worked mainly in West Africa. The book is a factual report instead of a scholarly study, and lacks footnotes and other documentation.

A second book appeared soon after Cooley's: Emmanuel John Hevi's The Dragon's Embrace: the Chinese Communists and Africa (New York, 1966). Hevi, a Ghanaian, went to China in late 1960 to study medicine under a scholarship granted by the PRC. While in China, Hevi became so disillusioned with Communism, particularly the Chinese variety, that he left China in April, 1962, without finishing his training. Shortly afterwards, he wrote An African Student in China (New York, 1963), an account of his stay in China. Three years later, in The Dragon's Embrace, he discussed with unusual insight the theoretical basis of the Chinese Communist revolution and its applicability to Africa. The Dragon's Embrace is an African's bitter yet revealing book about PRC ambitions and subversive activities in Africa. The author warned that in order for Africa to advance progressively, Africans must reject Peking's call for indiscriminate revolution. Covering the years from the Bandung Conference to the early part of the Cultural Revolution

(mid-1966), the book is generally well written but, like Cooley's, weak in documentation.

A third study appeared in 1968 as a monograph of the East Asian Research Center at Harvard University. Charles Neuhauser's Third World Politics: China and the Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Organization (Cambridge, Mass., 1968), dealt with the origin and development of the Afro-Asian "people's solidarity movement," Peking's role in the movement, and the Sino-Soviet rift which was largely responsible for the decline of the movement. The book began with the Asian Nations Conference at New Delhi in April, 1955, from which the idea of "solidarity" emerged, and ended with the anti-Peking meeting of the executive committee of the Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Organization in Cyprus in February, 1967, which marked the end of Peking's relations with the AAPS0. According to Neuhauser, Peking's failure in Africa during the late 1960s can be attributed to PRC leaders' ignorance of regional antagonisms and cultural and historical differences between various countries while trying to apply a general model of revolution to all African "liberation" movements. Though much shorter than the two earlier books, Neuhauser's work has more detailed notes and is more suitable for research purposes.

Early in the 1970s, two scholarly studies on Sino-African relations appeared. Bruce D. Larkin's China and Africa, 1949-1970; the Foreign Policy of the People's Republic of China (Berkeley, 1971) was the first scholarly work to cover Peking's foreign policy in Africa during the second half of the 1960s. Larkin suggested that Peking's African policy had both short-term and long-term goals. The book was heavily loaded with theoretical discussion of Peking's revolutionary model and

its application to "liberation" movements in Africa. The arrangement of the book, mixing topical and chronological chapters, made it sometimes difficult to follow. However, with its useful appendixes and lengthy bibliography, Larkin's book was the best and most detailed study on the subject thus far.

Three years later, another account of China's Policy in Africa, 1958-71 (London, 1974) was published by a Nigerian scholar, Alaba Ogunsanwo. This was the first account published after the admission of the PRC to the United Nations in late 1971, and provided another African perspective of Sino-African relations. However, Ogunsanwo's knowledge of China and of Peking's foreign policy was so superficial that his explanation of the PRC diplomatic activities in Africa is often unconvincing and sometimes self-contradictory. Nevertheless, the book had some value because it analyzed the issue from an African point of view, and contained some useful appendixes.

All five books mentioned above dealt almost exclusively with the PRC. None really considered the Peking-Taipei competition in Africa.<sup>4</sup> Without an adequate understanding of this competition since 1960, one cannot comprehend the reasons why some African countries responded to Peking's overtures as they did. The purpose of the present study is to add that dimension, and to consider the following aspects of the Chinese presence in Africa:

1. What were the origins of the Peking-Taipei competition in Africa?
2. What were the long-range and short-range goals of Peking and of Taipei in Africa?

3. What advantages and disadvantages were felt by Peking and Taipei respectively in their competition in Africa? How did these affect the struggle?
4. What tactics were used by Peking and Taipei respectively in their competition in Africa? How substantial an effort did they make in Africa?
5. How and to what extent did the "Great Proleterian Cultural Revolution" in China affect Peking's maneuvers in Africa?
6. How did African nations respond to the Peking-Taipei competition?
7. In its African policies and undertakings, has Peking regarded Taipei or Moscow as its principal competitor?
8. How has the resolution of the long dispute over China's UN seat affected the policies and activities of Peking and Taipei in Africa?

Serious Chinese interest in Africa, by either the PRC or ROC, can be dated from the 1955 Afro-Asian conference at Bandung, Indonesia, in which the PRC participated and the ROC did not. Major Chinese activity in Africa, however, dates largely from 1960, when the number of independent African nations suddenly jumped from ten to twenty-seven and the simmering dispute between Peking and Moscow became clear-cut with the recall of Soviet technicians from China and of Chinese students from the Soviet Union. The latter development made three governments--Soviet, PRC, and ROC--much more aware of the importance of Africa as an arena for their respective rivalries. The present study therefore discusses the 1955 conference and other early developments, but concentrates on events of 1960 and later.

Chapters II and III provide an overview of PRC policies and activities in Africa. Chapters IV, V, VI, and VII look in more detail at PRC activities in four parts of Africa: western, central, eastern, and southern. Chapters VIII and IX discuss ROC policies and activities in Africa. Chapter X reviews African aspects of the PRC-ROC competition for United Nations membership, and Chapter XI summarizes the conclusions of the study.

"Africa" is here defined as including the continent and the nearly independent insular states of the Cape Verde Islands, Sao Tome e Principe, Madagascar, and the Comoros, but excluding the independent islands in the Indian Ocean (Seychelles, Mauritius, and the Maldives) and the dependent Canary (Spanish) and Madeira (Portuguese) islands off the Atlantic coast of Africa. The emphasis is on sub-Saharan Africa. Only brief attention is given to the Mediterranean littoral states, since they are racially and geopolitically linked to the Arab Middle East rather than to black Africa.

To avoid confusion, all African states are referred to by the names they bear today, regardless of dates of adoption.<sup>5</sup> On the following pages are alphabetic lists of the present names, the last colonial names, and names abandoned subsequent to independence; a chronological list in order of independence; and a geographic list and a map showing the regional groupings used in later chapters (Tables I through V, Figure 1).

TABLE I  
ALPHABETIC LIST OF AFRICAN NATIONS  
BY PRESENT NAMES

Present Name	Former Names (if different)
1. Algeria	
2. Angola	
3. Benin	Dahomey
4. Bophuthatswana	[part of South Africa]
5. Botswana	Bechuanaland
6. Burundi	Urundi
7. Cameroon	
8. Cape Verde Islands	
9. Central African Empire	Ubangi-Shari, Central African Republic
10. Chad	
11. Comoros	
12. Congo	French Congo, Congo (Brazzaville)
13. Djibouti	French Somaliland, Afars and Issas
14. Egypt	United Arab Republic
15. Equatorial Guinea	Spanish Guinea
16. Ethiopia	
17. Gabon	
18. Gambia	
19. Ghana	Gold Coast
20. Guinea	French Guinea
21. Guinea-Bissau	Portuguese Guinea
22. Ivory Coast	
23. Kenya	
24. Lesotho	Basutoland
25. Liberia	
26. Libya	
27. Madagascar	Malagasy Republic
28. Malawi	Nyasaland
29. Mali	French Sudan
30. Mauritania	
31. Morocco	
32. Mozambique	
33. Niger	
34. Nigeria	
35. Rhodesia	Southern Rhodesia
36. Rwanda	Ruanda
37. Sao Tome & Principe	
38. Senegal	[part of Mali Federation]
39. Sierra Leone	
40. Somalia	British & Italian Somaliland
41. South Africa	Union of South Africa
42. Sudan	Anglo-Egyptian Sudan
43. Swaziland	
44. Tanzania	Tanganyika and Zanzibar
45. Togo	
46. Transkei	[part of South Africa]
47. Tunisia	
48. Uganda	
49. Upper Volta	
50. Zaire	Belgian Congo, Congo (Leopoldville), Congo (Kinshasa)
51. Zambia	Northern Rhodesia

TABLE II  
ALPHABETIC INDEX OF AFRICAN NATIONS  
BY FINAL COLONIAL NAME

Final Colonial Name	Present Name
Afars and Issas	Djibouti
Basutoland	Lesotho
Bechuanaland	Botswana
Congo, Belgian	Zaire
Congo, French	Congo
Dahomey	Benin
Gold Coast	Ghana
Guinea, French	Guinea
Guinea, Portuguese	Guinea-Bissau
Guinea, Spanish	Equatorial Guinea
Northern Rhodesia	Zambia
Nyasaland	Malawi
Oubangui-Chari	CAR
Ruanda	Rwanda
Somaliland, British	Somalia (part of)
Somaliland, French	Djibouti
Somaliland, Italian	Somalia (part of)
Sudan, Anglo-Egyptian	Sudan
Sudan, French	Mali
Tanganyika	Tanzania (part of)
Ubangi-Shari	CAR
Urundi	Burundi
Zanzibar	Tanzania (part of)

TABLE III  
ALPHABETIC INDEX OF AFRICAN NAME CHANGES  
SINCE INDEPENDENCE

Former Independent Name	Present Name
Central African Republic (C.A.R.)	Central African Empire
Congo (Leopoldville)	Zaire
Congo (Kinshasa)	Zaire
Dahomey	Benin
Malagasy	Madagascar
Mali Federation	Mali, Senegal
United Arab Republic	Egypt
Tanganyika	Tanzania
Zanzibar	Tanzania

TABLE IV  
CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF AFRICAN NATIONS  
IN ORDER OF INDEPENDENCE

Name	Date	Name	Date
Liberia	1847. 7.26	Mauritania	1960.11.28
South Africa	1910. 5.31	Sierra Leone	1961. 4.27
Egypt	1922. 2.28	Tanzania	1961.12. 9
Ethiopia	1941. 5. 5	Burundi	1962. 7. 1
Libya	1951.12.24	Rwanda	1962. 7. 1
Sudan	1956. 1. 1	Algeria	1962. 7. 5
Morocco	1956. 3. 2	Uganda	1962.10. 9
Tunisia	1956. 3.20	Kenya	1963.12.12
Ghana	1957. 3. 6	Malawi	1964. 7. 6
Guinea	1958.10. 2	Zambia	1964.10.24
Cameroon	1960. 1. 1	Gambia	1965. 2.18
Togo	1960. 4.27	Rhodesia	1965.11.11
Madagascar	1960. 6.26	Botswana	1966. 9.30
Zaire	1960. 6.30	Lesotho	1966.10. 4
Somalia	1960. 7. 1	Swaziland	1968. 9. 6
Benin	1960. 8. 1	Equatorial Guinea	1968.10.12
Niger	1960. 8. 3	Guinea-Bissau	1974. 9.10
Upper Volta	1960. 8. 5	Mozambique	1975. 6.25
Ivory Coast	1960. 8. 7	Cape Verde	1975. 7. 5
Chad	1960. 8.11	Comoros	1975. 7. 6
Central Afr. R.	1960. 8.13	Sao Tome e Principe	1975. 7.12
Congo	1960. 8.15	Angola	1975.11.11
Gabon	1960. 8.17	Transkei	1976.10.26
Senegal	1960. 8.20	Djibouti	1977. 6.27
Mali	1960. 9.22	Bophuthatswana	1977.12. 6
Nigeria	1960.10. 1		

TABLE V

## GEOGRAPHIC LIST OF AFRICAN NATIONS BY REGIONS

Country	Square miles	1976 population	Country	Square miles	1976 population
<u>NORTH AFRICA</u>			<u>EAST AFRICA</u>		
Algeria	919,595	17,333,265	Djibouti	8,404	108,839
Egypt	386,662	38,036,973	Ethiopia	471,778	26,617,974
Libya	679,362	2,547,567	Kenya	224,961	13,901,846
Morocco	242,414	17,135,000	Somalia	246,201	3,252,769
Tunisia	63,170	6,101,306	Sudan	967,500	15,353,387
Total	2,291,203	81,154,111	Tanzania	364,900	15,570,964
<u>WEST AFRICA</u>			Uganda	91,134	11,944,503
Benin	43,484	3,219,709	Total	2,374,878	88,750,282
Cameroon	183,569	6,522,984	<u>CENTRAL AFRICA</u>		
Cape Verde	1,557	308,200	Burundi	10,747	3,591,158
Congo	132,047	1,398,739	CAR	240,535	2,200,000
Equatorial Guinea	10,831	315,458	Chad	495,755	4,116,599
Gabon	103,347	530,452	Niger	489,191	4,720,967
Gambia	4,361	533,872	Rwanda	10,169	4,365,601
Ghana	92,100	10,132,847	Zaire	905,568	25,597,422
Guinea	94,926	4,521,460	Total	2,151,965	44,591,747
Guinea-Bissau	13,948	529,371	<u>SOUTHERN AFRICA</u>		
Ivory Coast	124,504	5,006,228	Angola	481,354	6,189,792
Liberia	43,000	1,746,657	Bophuthatswana	15,571	2,500,000
Mali	478,767	5,842,525	Botswana	231,805	713,444
Mauritania	430,660	1,399,700	Comoros	694	286,947
Nigeria	356,669	64,623,245	Lesotho	11,720	1,061,196
Sao Tome & Principe	372	81,784	Madagascar	226,657	7,782,220
Senegal	75,750	4,525,000	Malawi	45,747	5,148,062
Sierra Leone	27,699	2,984,467	Mozambique	302,330	9,339,978
Togo	21,622	2,285,312	Rhodesia	150,804	6,534,472
Upper Volta	105,869	6,171,381	South Africa	423,993	18,680,273
Total	2,345,082	122,679,391	Swaziland	6,704	508,095
			Transkei	17,000	1,900,000
			Zambia	290,586	5,065,028
			Total	1,914,379	60,644,479



Figure 1. Map of African Regions

## FOOTNOTES

<sup>1</sup>Chinese records indicate a few commercial contacts between China and Africa as early as the third century, continuing intermittently until the Ming dynasty. The Ming admiral Cheng Ho and his fleet visited East Africa four times (1413-1415, 1417-1419, 1421-1422, 1431-1433). However, China's official contact with Africa ended with Cheng Ho's last voyage, and by the end of the fifteenth century Chinese ships were seldom seen in the Indian Ocean. Chang Tieh-sheng gave a concise description of early Sino-African relations in Chung-fei chiao-tung-shih tsu-tang [A study of early Sino-African relations] (Peking, 1973).

<sup>2</sup>Since it will be necessary to mention one or both of the Chinese governments on almost every page of this study, they will be referred to by their official English acronyms, PRC and ROC, or by the names of their capitals, Peking and Taipei, used symbolically, for the sake of brevity.

<sup>3</sup>The most important articles are listed in the Bibliography. In addition to the books discussed here, there are two early works: Peter S.H. Tang, Communist China as a Development Model for Underdeveloped Countries (Washington, 1960), and Ming Chen-hua, Fei-chou hsien-shih yu Chung-kung ti shen-t'ou [The current situation in Africa and Chinese Communist penetration] (Taipei, 1961). A few case studies have appeared recently: George T. Yu, China and Tanzania: A Study in Cooperative Interaction (Berkeley, 1970); the same author's China's African Policy: A Study of Tanzania (New York, 1975); Richard Hall and Hugh Peyman, The Great Uhuru Railway, China's Showpiece in Africa (London, 1976); and Martin Bailey, Freedom Railway (London, 1976).

<sup>4</sup>Among the few articles dealing with the Peking-Taipei competition in Africa are Ann P. Munro, "Taiwan's Objectives in Africa," Africa Report, 8, 7 (July, 1963), 7-11; George T. Yu, "Peking Versus Taipei in the World Arena: Chinese Competition in Africa," Asian Survey, 3 (1963), 439-453; and "Two Chinas in Africa," Bulletin of the Africa Institute of South Africa, 8 (1970), 382-396. The first two of these are outdated; the third is too generalized. In addition there are two short works on ROC agricultural aid in Africa: a pamphlet by David Nelson Rowe, The New Diplomacy: International Technical Cooperation Projects of the Republic of China in African Countries (Washington, 1969) and an article by Yang Feng-t'ai, "Fei-chou nung-yeh chi-shu jen-yuan Chiang-hsi-pan chih yen-chiu" [A study of the "seminar of African agricultural technicians"], Tung-ya chi-kan, 4 (1972), 100-122.

<sup>5</sup>This means the distinctive portion of the official English name, not the generic portions. Thus the Kingdom of Libya (1951), the Libyan

Arab Republic (1969), and the People's Socialist Libyan Arab Public [sic] (1977) are all here called simply "Libya." However, the Central African Republic (1960) and Central African Empire (1976) are here called "CAR," because omission of the generic term would be misleading and the country is much better known by its former acronym. The Republic of South Africa (RSA), however, is best known simply as "South Africa," and is so referred to here.

## CHAPTER II

### PRC POLICY IN AFRICA

#### Stages in PRC Foreign Policy

##### 1949-1955

Before the 1955 Bandung Conference, Peking appeared on the world stage infrequently, and as one of Moscow's proteges. During the first six years of its existence, the PRC showed little interest in the outside world. Its main goals were domestic: to tighten control over the Chinese people, to strengthen the new regime, and finally to conquer Taiwan, the last refuge of the rival ROC government. PRC involvement in external affairs was confined largely to its closest neighbors, including large-scale participation in the Korean war and much more limited involvement in the Vietnamese wars.

As the PRC consolidated its domestic position and acquired more self-confidence at home, there were signs that its passive attitude in foreign policy would change. Doubts about the suitability of Soviet economic policies as models for China's economic development were paralleled by incipient doubts about the congruity of Soviet and Chinese national interests in foreign policy. Peking's prestige abroad was increased significantly by participation in the Korean armistice negotiations at Panmunjom in 1951-1953 and in the Geneva Conference that ended French colonial rule in Indo-China in 1954. This

soon led to a new era in which Peking became actively involved in events in various parts of the world. More significant, this new era was also characterized by a marked increase in PRC interest in Africa.

#### 1955-1960

Unlike the conferences on Korea and Indo-China, the 1955 conference at Bandung, Indonesia, gave clear indications that the PRC's interest in more distant countries was expanding and might eventually conflict with Soviet interests. The Bandung Conference of twenty-nine Asian and African nations, meeting from April 18 to April 24, 1955, was organized by Indonesia, Burma, Ceylon, India, and Pakistan to oppose colonialism in Asia and Africa.

Since all five sponsoring governments had recognized the PRC, almost from the date of its establishment, as the only legitimate government of China, they invited the PRC but not the ROC to the conference, even though many other participants did not recognize the PRC. Although there were only five independent countries in Africa at the time, people from nine African states took part in the conference: delegates from Egypt, Ethiopia, Liberia, Libya, Ghana, and Sudan, and observers from Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia. None of these then had diplomatic relations with the PRC, and the last five had not even achieved independence yet. One independent African country (South Africa) and the Soviet Union (by far the largest Asian country) were not invited.<sup>1</sup>

The PRC made the most of the Bandung opportunity, sending a delegation headed by its second highest official, Premier Chou En-lai, whose moderate and conciliatory attitude enabled him not only to eclipse India's Jawaharlal Nehru as a leader of the conference, but

also to allay apprehensions of non-Communist delegations about PRC ambitions in other countries. Chou presented the PRC as a reasonable and peace-loving nation, and later reported to his colleagues in Peking that "China and many Asian and African countries have established preliminary mutual understandings as a result of direct contacts during the Asian-African Conference."<sup>2</sup> Although Egypt then actually had diplomatic relations with the ROC, Egypt's President Gamal Abdel Nasser was among the African leaders most favorably impressed by Chou's performance at Bandung, and in 1956 Egypt became the first African state to establish diplomatic relations with the PRC.

In retrospect, Bandung can be seen as an early hint of a PRC attitude not clearly developed until much later: that the "developing" nations of Africa and other continents had a greater community of interests with the PRC (the largest and most populous of the developing nations) than with the industrially advanced Soviet Union (or the United States). But during the first five years after Bandung, the PRC continued to be more concerned with its own development than with activities in Africa or elsewhere. These were years in which deep-seated conflicts gradually emerged between two factions of senior PRC officials and between the PRC and the Soviet Union.

The internal dispute was basically between ideologues (led by Mao Tse-tung) and pragmatists over the methods and rapidity of collectivization in agriculture, and over the relative importance of ideological purity ("redress") and pragmatic competence ("expertness") in economic planning, training, and development. The ideologically motivated Second Five Year Plan, inaugurated by Mao in 1958 under the grandiloquent slogan of a "Great Leap Forward" to surpass the Soviet Union, was

a disastrous failure. Soviet criticism of Mao's economic blunders and pretensions to ideological leadership of the Communist world was matched by Chinese criticism of the Soviet repudiation of Stalinist policies and Soviet advocacy of "peaceful coexistence" with the West. This disagreement had been building since 1956, and though it was not publicized in open polemics until 1961, events of 1960 symbolized the rift. Soviet technical advisers were withdrawn from China, Soviet economic assistance to the PRC was almost entirely ended, and Chinese students were recalled from the Soviet Union.<sup>3</sup>

#### 1960-1969

Soviet unwillingness to share with the PRC the role of leading the Communist world and guiding the developing nations propelled the PRC toward a much more assertive and independent foreign policy. Opportunities for such a policy in Africa were greatly increased by the "rush to independence" which began in Africa in 1960 just as the Sino-Soviet dispute was hardening into an open split. Between the end of World War II and 1959, only six African countries had achieved independence, and only three of these were in sub-Saharan Africa: Sudan (1956), Ghana (1957), and Guinea (1958).<sup>4</sup> Suddenly in 1960 independence was granted to seventeen states in sub-Saharan Africa (see Chapter I, Table IV).

As will be shown later, Peking was quick to explore the possibilities of this radical alteration of the African political situation, and Premier Chou En-lai's two-month tour of ten African nations in 1963-1964 was only the most conspicuous sign of a new PRC policy of active involvement in African affairs, in competition both with the ROC and with the Soviet Union. However, from 1966 to 1969, PRC activities

throughout the world were decelerated and complicated by an unprecedented political convulsion within China, the so-called Cultural Revolution discussed in Chapter III.

#### Since 1969

Termination of the Cultural Revolution in 1969 left the political situation within China very murky, with no clear resolution of the dispute within the top leadership, but did enable the PRC to reinvigorate its African policies (with some changes in geographic emphasis), as well as its activities in other parts of the world. By the end of 1971, it had achieved one major objective that had been very elusive: recognition by the United Nations as the only government representing China. African votes contributed significantly to the PRC victory in the United Nations, as will be shown in Chapter X. Subsequent PRC activities would shed light on whether Peking's interest in Africa had been tactical or strategic, temporary or permanent.

#### "The First Intermediate Zone"

The remainder of this chapter deals with PRC strategy and tactics in Africa as a whole, beginning in the second of the four stages outlined above but developing chiefly in the third stage, and continuing in the fourth after the interlude of the Cultural Revolution. A basic component of PRC foreign policy has been the concept of the "intermediate zone," first mentioned by Mao Tse-tung in August, 1946, in an interview with American correspondent Anna Louise Strong, a Communist herself. In answer to Strong's question about the possibility that the United States might start a war against the Soviet Union, Mao said:

The United States and the Soviet Union are separated by a vast zone which includes many capitalist, colonial, and semi-colonial countries in Europe, Asia, and Africa. Before the U.S. reactionaries have subjugated these countries, an attack on the Soviet Union is out of the question . . . I believe it won't be long before these countries come to realize who is really oppressing them, the Soviet Union or the United States. The day will come when the U.S. reactionaries find themselves opposed by the people of the whole world.<sup>5</sup>

The exclusively anti-American interpretation of the concept was maintained by the PRC (in the Bandung Conference, for example) until the Sino-Soviet split developed. The "intermediate zone" was then re-defined in an important editorial in the Jen-min jih-pao [People's Daily], official newspaper of the Chinese Communist Party, on January 21, 1964:

This vast intermediate zone is composed of two parts. One part consists of the independent countries and those striving for independence in Asia, Africa, and Latin America, and may be called the first intermediate zone. The second part consists of the whole of Western Europe, Australia, Canada, and other capitalist countries, and may be called the second intermediate zone.<sup>6</sup>

According to the reinterpretation, countries in the "second intermediate zone" were said to have a dual character, exploiting and oppressing colonial peoples but being themselves exploited and bullied by the United States, and wanting, like the colonial states, to free themselves from U.S. control. This became the theme of a new Peking policy towards countries in the "intermediate zone."

But the more striking part of the 1964 reinterpretation was the portrayal of the Soviet Union not as head of the socialist camp and protector of "intermediate zone" countries but as a sinister co-conspirator with the United States in the crime of oppressing and exploiting all countries in the two "intermediate zones." As the JMJP

expressed it:

The Soviet leaders' hopes for U.S.-Soviet cooperation to dominant the world are but idle dreams. By undermining the unity of the socialist camp, the Soviet leaders violate the interests of the people of the Soviet Union and all other socialist countries and cater to the needs of U.S. imperialism.<sup>7</sup>

In other words, the "intermediate zone" is no longer a buffer between the Soviet Union and the United States but an area where a united front could be formed between various socialist countries and countries in the two intermediate zones, led by Peking in a struggle against both "U.S. imperialism" and "Soviet revisionism." Nevertheless, in Peking's strategic plan for revolution in the two intermediate zones, priority was given to Africa, a part of the first intermediate zone, since it was "both the center of the anticolonial struggle and the center for East and West to fight for control" of the Third World.<sup>8</sup>

Peking's African policy in the 1960s had three goals:

- (1) to gain recognition from African countries as the sole legitimate government of China and take over the ROC seat in the United Nations;
- (2) to break through the isolation imposed upon the PRC by the U.S. "containment" policy, by linking the two intermediate zones into a united front led by Peking; and
- (3) to replace Moscow as leader of and spokesman for the socialist countries.<sup>9</sup>

Since these goals reflected the national interests of China rather than those of African states, there was always the danger that Africans might feel they were being asked merely to accept Chinese domination in

lieu of Soviet or American domination. Peking's defense against this reasoning was constant reiteration of the "Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence," first expounded in a 1954 treaty with India and repeated at the 1955 Bandung Conference and incessantly thereafter. The formula for relations between China and African countries was to be (1) mutual respect for each other's territorial integrity and sovereignty, (2) mutual non-aggression, (3) mutual non-interference in each other's internal affairs, (4) equality and mutual benefit, and (5) peaceful co-existence.<sup>10</sup>

Behind these bland and soothing slogans, Peking used a variety of formal and informal means to achieve its own goals in Africa. These may be classified into seven categories: (1) negotiations for diplomatic recognition and establishment of diplomatic relations, (2) participation in multi-national conferences, (3) negotiation of bilateral treaties and agreements, (4) information and propaganda, (5) exchanges of visits, (6) student scholarships, and (7) covert activities.

#### Establishing Diplomatic Relations

Communist victory in the civil war ending in 1949 left little doubt that the PRC was in effective control of mainland China, and in view of China's immense size and population, this fact would in normal circumstances have been enough to persuade most other governments to extend diplomatic recognition regardless of ideological differences with Peking. But the question was complicated by the survival of the ROC government, despite loss of all its territory except Taiwan and a few minor islands, and complicated even more by the adamant insistence of both the PRC and the ROC that no other government could maintain

relations simultaneously with both Chinese governments. The existence of "two Chinas" was a manifest reality, but it was steadfastly denied by both Chinese governments, each insisting that it was the only legitimate government for all the territory of China, and that foreign governments must choose between the PRC and the ROC. The argument over which government should represent China in the United Nations was a specific variation of the basic argument over legitimacy, but a variation which made PRC-ROC competition in Africa more important to both than it would otherwise have been.

When the PRC was established on October 1, 1949, there were only four independent nations in Africa: Egypt, Ethiopia, Liberia, and South Africa. South Africa and Egypt had established diplomatic relations with the ROC in 1931 and 1942, respectively. Liberia signed an amity treaty with the ROC in 1937, but neither Liberia nor Ethiopia had established diplomatic relations with the ROC. In the early years after 1949, the PRC had numerous contacts of various types with various African leaders, but no diplomatic relations with any African state until after, and as a direct consequence of, the 1955 Bandung Conference. On May 16, 1956, Egypt abandoned its ties with the ROC and became the first African nation to recognize the PRC; diplomatic relations between the two were established two weeks later (May 30, 1956).<sup>11</sup> Liberia established relations with the ROC in 1957, and did not transfer recognition to Peking until twenty years later. Ethiopia, for reasons that remain unclear, ignored both the ROC and the PRC until 1970, when it established relations with Peking. South Africa continued to recognize the ROC, even in 1978.

All other African countries gained their independence subsequent

to creation of the PRC, and therefore had to seek diplomatic recognition at the same time they were bestowing recognition on other nations. This sometimes added a comic dimension to PRC-ROC rivalry. Both Peking and Taipei often tried the gambit of quickly recognizing a newly independent African state in hope that it would reciprocate. Sometimes one would succeed, sometimes the other, occasionally neither. Conversely, on several occasions a new African state invited both Peking and Taipei to send representatives to its independence ceremonies. One always declined the invitation after learning that the other would be represented in the African ceremony; there was no instance when both sent representatives to the same independence ceremony. But whether such tactics were initiated by a Chinese or an African government, they were less effective than quiet negotiations by the PRC or ROC to win recognition by promising economic or technical assistance to an African nation.

As long as Chinese representation in the United Nations remained in dispute, an African government's recognition of the PRC or ROC was more valuable than either PRC or ROC recognition of the African state, and this was clear to all parties. No matter how small or impoverished the African country might be, the PRC-ROC rivalry tended to cast the Chinese and not the Africans in the role of supplicants. As will be shown in Chapter X, having diplomatic relations with African states did not mean that either Chinese government could always count on their votes in the United Nations, since many abstained or were conveniently absent when the issue of Chinese representation was debated. But until 1971, the search for votes in the United Nations was an inescapable

dimension of PRC-ROC competition for diplomatic relations with African states.

The course of this competition is shown in Tables VI and VII and Figure 1. In independent Africa as a whole, the PRC and ROC were fairly evenly matched in diplomatic recognition from 1956 through 1965. From 1966 through 1969, the PRC withdrew into self-imposed isolation (because of the domestic upheaval called the Cultural Revolution), recalling all its ambassadors except the one in Egypt. During this three-year interlude, the number of African countries recognizing the ROC reached its all-time high, and the number recognizing the PRC declined. From 1970 on, following the end of the Cultural Revolution, the tide was reversed. By 1978, forty of the forty-six African states recognizing a Chinese government had chosen the one in Peking.

In addition to this chronological pattern of three phases, there is a striking regional pattern. From the beginning, Peking was much more successful than Taipei in establishing diplomatic relations with countries in North and East Africa. But until 1970, it was much less successful than Taipei in Central, West, and South Africa. The large gains by the PRC after 1970 were achieved chiefly in Central and West Africa. Of the six African countries still having diplomatic relations with Taipei in 1978, four are in South Africa, one each in North and West Africa. Among these is Libya, a very peculiar case. The royal government of Libya established diplomatic relations with Taipei in 1959. The socialist government ruling Libya since 1969 has maintained relations with Taipei, but in 1971 extended diplomatic recognition to Peking without establishing diplomatic relations (see Chapter X).

TABLE VI  
AFRICAN DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH THE TWO  
CHINAS: LIST OF DATES

Country	Diplomatic Relations with China	
	PRC	ROC
NORTH AFRICA		
1 Algeria	1962-	
2 Egypt	1956-	1942-56
3 Libya		1959-
4 Morocco	1958-	
5 Tunisia	1964-67; 1971-	
WEST AFRICA		
6 Benin	1964-66; 1973-	1962-64; 1966-73
7 Cameroon	1971-	1969-71
8 Cape Verde Islands	1976-	
9 Congo	1964-	1960-64
10 Equatorial Guinea	1970-	
11 Gabon	1974-	1960-74
12 Gambia	1974-	1968-74
13 Ghana	1960-66; 1972-	
14 Guinea	1959-	
15 Guinea-Bissau	1974-	
16 Ivory Coast		1963-
17 Liberia	1977-	1957-77
18 Mali	1960-	
19 Mauritania	1965-	1960-65
20 Nigeria	1971-	
21 Sao Tome & Principe	1975-	
22 Senegal	1971-	1960-64; 1969-71
23 Sierra Leone	1971-	1963-71
24 Togo	1972-	1960-72
25 Upper Volta	1973-	1961-73
CENTRAL AFRICA		
26 Burundi	1963-65; 1971-	
27 Central Afr. R.	1964-66; 1976-	1962-64; 1968-76
28 Chad	1972-	1962-72
29 Niger	1974-	1963-74
30 Rwanda	1971-	1962-71
31 Zaire	1972-	1960-72
EAST AFRICA		
32 Djibouti		
33 Ethiopia	1970-	
34 Kenya	1963-	
35 Somalia	1960-	
36 Sudan	1958-	
37 Tanzania	1961-	
38 Uganda	1962-	
SOUTH AFRICA		
39 Angola		
40 Bophuthatswana		
41 Botswana	1974-	1966-74
42 Comoro Islands	1975-	
43 Lesotho		1966-
44 Madagascar	1972-	1960-72
45 Malawi		1966-
46 Mozambique	1975-	
47 Rhodesia		1931-
48 South Africa		1968-
49 Swaziland		1968-
50 Transkei		
51 Zambia	1964-	

Sources: I-nan-piao (ROC); ARB, PSC Series; Keessing's Contemporary Archives.

TABLE VII  
AFRICAN DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH THE  
TWO CHINAS: STATISTICS

Year	Number of Nations	Diplomatic Relations			Number Recognizing PRC/ROC*				
		Neither	PRC	ROC	North	East	South	West	Central
1949	4	2	0	2	0/1	0/0	0/1	0/0	0/0
1956	8	6	1	1	1/0	0/0	0/1	0/0	0/0
1957	9	6	1	2	1/0	0/0	0/1	0/1	0/0
1958	10	5	3	2	2/0	1/0	0/1	0/1	0/0
1959	10	3	4	3	2/1	1/0	0/1	1/1	0/0
1960	27	9	7	11	2/1	2/0	0/2	3/7	0/1
1961	29	9	8	12	2/1	3/0	0/2	3/8	0/1
1962	33	7	10	16	3/1	4/0	0/2	3/9	0/4
1963	35	3	13	19	3/1	6/0	0/2	3/11	1/5
1964	36	4	17	15	4/1	5/0	1/2	5/8	2/4
1965	38	7	17	14	4/1	5/0	1/2	6/7	1/4
1966	40	8	14	18	4/1	5/0	1/5	4/8	0/4
1967	40	9	13	18	3/1	5/0	1/5	4/8	0/4
1968	42	8	13	21	3/1	5/0	1/6	4/9	0/5
1969	42	7	13	22	3/1	5/0	1/6	4/10	0/5
1970	42	5	15	22	3/1	6/0	1/6	5/10	0/5
1971	42	2	22	18	4/1	6/0	1/6	9/7	2/4
1972	42	1	27	14	4/1	6/0	2/5	11/6	4/2
1973	42	1	29	12	4/1	6/0	2/5	13/4	4/2
1974	43	1	34	8	4/1	6/0	3/4	16/2	5/1
1975	48	3	37	8	4/1	6/0	5/4	17/2	5/1
1976	49	3	39	7	4/1	6/0	5/4	18/2	6/0
1977	50	4	40	6	4/1	6/0	5/4	19/1	6/0
1978	51	5	40	6	4/1	6/0	5/4	19/1	6/0

\*The number of nations having diplomatic relations with the PRC are shown to the left of the virgule /, those having relations with the ROC to the right.




Figure 2. Diplomatic Relations With the Two Chinas

In the period 1965-1967, five African nations broke diplomatic relations with Peking for several years: Benin from 1966 to 1973, Burundi from 1965 to 1971, the Central African Republic (CAR) from 1966 to 1976, Ghana from 1966 to 1972, and Tunisia from 1967 to 1971. Two of these, Benin and the CAR, had previously had diplomatic relations with Taipei, and resumed these relations during their break with Peking. The circumstances of these actions are described individually in the regional chapters of this study, along with other changes in diplomatic relations not related to the general patterns discussed above.

#### Multi-National Conferences

As noted above, Peking's first important contacts with African leaders came at a multi-national conference attended by delegations from nine African states, none of which then had diplomatic relations with Peking, and five of which were not even independent countries. Mutual willingness to ignore these technicalities illustrated the importance which both the Africans and the Chinese attached to such gatherings, and their indifference to distinctions between "governmental" and "non-governmental" meetings. Peking made considerable effort to perpetuate the "Bandung spirit" in a later series of conferences with "first intermediate zone" countries under the slogan of "Afro-Asian peoples' solidarity." Four were held, all in Africa: in Egypt (1957), Guinea (1960), Tanzania (1963), and Ghana (1965). From 1960 on, the meetings were dominated by rivalry between Moscow and Peking for influence in Africa.<sup>12</sup>

The April 11-15, 1960, conference in Conakry, capital of Guinea, was attended by about 500 people, including delegates from 49 countries

and territories, observers, journalists, and guests.<sup>13</sup> This was the first international meeting of such size held in a sub-Saharan country, a fact which encouraged black Africans to feel pride and a sense of identity with Asians.

The importance which the Chinese attached to the Conakry conference was obvious. Peking sent the largest delegation, 25 members led by Liao Cheng-chi and Liu Ning-i.<sup>14</sup> On April 9, Premier Chou En-lai sent a message of greetings to the conference.<sup>15</sup> On April 11, the Chinese Communist Party's official newspaper published a long editorial concluding that:

The Asian and African peoples have common interests in fighting for and preserving independence, in defending peace, and in developing their national economy. We shall live in unity and friendship . . . It is our conviction that the grand manifestation of solidarity among Asian and African peoples now underway in Conakry will still more brightly light the path of the advancing Asian and African peoples who are certain to win ever greater victories in their fight for independence, freedom, and peace.<sup>16</sup>

In a speech to the conference on April 13, the head of the Chinese delegation paid special homage to the Algerians for their struggle against France for independence, and emphasized the relevance of the Chinese revolutionary model to national "liberation" movements in Africa:

The experience of long years of struggle of the Chinese people has proved that millet plus rifles can defeat airplanes plus tanks. The decisive factor in the struggle against imperialism is the people, and so long as the people are determined and persist in their heroic fight they are invincible.<sup>17</sup>

These words paraphrased a statement by Mao Tse-tung on "protracted war" more than two decades earlier, and they became the keynote of a PRC theory of violent revolution in Africa.<sup>18</sup>

The 1960 Conakry conference established a permanent "Afro-Asian Peoples' Solidarity Organization" (AAPS0), and witnessed an open Sino-Soviet conflict over the direction in which the AAPS0 should move. The Soviet delegation proposed a resolution saying that economic development of the new Afro-Asian countries could progress more speedily "the sooner the cold war is ended and international tension is reduced." The PRC delegates objected that this would "create illusions among Afro-Asian countries that the imperialists want our economic development and seriously believe in disarmament and world peace."<sup>19</sup> Finally, the conference adopted a compromise resolution saying that "elimination of imperialist exploitation is the prerequisite of peaceful coexistence and disarmament."<sup>20</sup>

Sino-Soviet competition was intensified at the Third Afro-Asian Solidarity Conference, held February 4-11, 1963, in Moshi, Tanzania.<sup>21</sup> As in the 1960 conference, PRC delegates took a much harsher line toward the United States than did the Soviet delegates. In a speech on February 4, Liu Ning-i, the Chinese chief delegate, reiterated Mao's theory that "the decisive factor in the development of history is always the people. What is really powerful is the strength of the masses of the people, and not that of the decadent imperialists and reactionaries, nor any kind of modern weapons." Liu also introduced a six-point proposal to accelerate the national "liberation" movements in Asia, Africa and Latin America.<sup>22</sup> In sharp contrast, the head of the Soviet delegation, Mirzo Tursun-Zade, emphasized that only peaceful coexistence and full disarmament could bring about successful "economic development of the countries of Asia, Africa, and Latin America."<sup>23</sup>

With many parts of Africa still under colonial rule and the bitterness of anti-colonial conflicts still fresh in the minds of leaders of many newly independent African states, the delegates at Moshi in 1963 liked the militant language of the PRC better than the more cautious Soviet line.<sup>24</sup> Moreover, they now openly supported Peking not only against Moscow but also against Taipei. In a general report to the conference, Yusuf as-Sabai, the Egyptian general secretary of the AAPSO permanent secretariat, condemned U.S. "imperialists" because:

They continue to occupy the Chinese territory of Taiwan. After failing in its scheme to instigate the Chiang Kai-shek gang to invade the mainland of China, the U.S. imperialists are now actively supporting the Chiang Kai-shek gang to carry out harassment and sabotage along China's southeastern coastal region.<sup>25</sup>

On February 11, the full conference adopted a resolution backing the PRC even more explicitly:

The Third Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Conference strongly condemns the occupation of Chinese territory of Taiwan by the U.S. imperialists, who actively support the Chiang Kai-shek clique in carrying out harassment and sabotage in China's southeastern coastal region.

The Chinese people have full right to liberate Taiwan, the sacred soil of the People's Republic of China, any time, by whatever means the Chinese people may choose.

The Conference demands the restoration of the legitimate right of the People's Republic of China in the United Nations.<sup>26</sup>

This 1963 conference constituted the high point of Chinese influence within the AAPSO. Already there were signs that Africans, though willing to exploit the Sino-Soviet dispute to their own advantage, were becoming weary with the dispute itself. The Nairobi Sunday Nation in Kenya commented caustically on February 17, 1963, that "if the conference at Moshi has achieved anything apart from the usual resolutions, it is in revealing that even brothers can cut each other's throats."<sup>27</sup>

But at the fourth AAPSO conference, held May 9-16, 1965, in Winneba, Ghana (about thirty miles from Accra), the rhetoric was changed very little. In his routine report to the conference on May 11, AAPSO general secretary Yusuf as-Sabai reaffirmed the AAPSO position on the Peking-Taipei issue as initiated in Moshi two years earlier.<sup>28</sup> In a long speech on the same day, PRC chief delegate Liao Cheng-chi condemned "U.S. imperialism" as "the arch-enemy of the national liberation movement in Africa."<sup>29</sup> In extremely vitriolic language, Liao also attacked the United Nations as "a tool of U.S. imperialism for undermining and suppressing the national liberation movements in Asia, Africa, and Latin America." The UN flag, he said, was "dripping with the blood of the peoples of Asia and Africa." Liao added a threat:

The United Nations should forthwith correct its mistakes, be thoroughly reorganized, and free itself from U.S. imperialist control. Otherwise it may be necessary to consider the establishment of a revolutionary United Nations as a rival drama in competition with the United Nations which is now controlled by U.S. imperialism and does nothing but evil deeds.<sup>30</sup>

On the other hand, the torrent of Sino-Soviet conflict was also running unchecked. On the eve of the conference, the Soviet delegation had staged an exhibition of anti-Peking propaganda at the entrance of the African Hall of the Nkrumah Ideological Institute, where the conference was to meet. One pamphlet accused PRC leaders of attempting "to detach the national liberation movement from the peoples of the socialist countries, to undermine the solidarity with the world revolutionary movement."<sup>31</sup> The Chinese countered this Soviet activity by offering African and Arab delegates "cash presents" and invitations to visit China.<sup>32</sup> The reason for this relative restraint appears to have been a desire to have the next AAPSO conference held in Peking. The

AAPSO council, meeting in Algiers in March, 1964, had unanimously recommended that a fifth conference be held in Peking in 1967, and this decision was approved by the delegates at Winneba in 1965.<sup>33</sup>

The May, 1965, AAPSO conference in Ghana was supposed to have been followed in late June by another meeting to which the PRC attached even greater importance. Officially known as the Second Asian-African Conference but usually referred to as "second Bandung," this had been proposed as early as 1960 at the Second AAPSO Conference in Conakry.<sup>34</sup> Premier Chou En-lai's trip to thirteen African and Asian countries between late 1963 and early 1964 was undertaken partially for recruiting participants for a second Bandung conference.<sup>35</sup>

PRC Foreign Minister Chen I led a Chinese delegation to a preparatory meeting in Jakarta, Indonesia, from April 10 to 15, 1964, where it was unanimously agreed that a "second Bandung" should be held on March 10, 1965, at a place in Africa to be chosen by the participating African countries.<sup>36</sup> But almost immediately, a dispute arose over Soviet participation. Having been excluded from the first Bandung conference in 1955, the Soviet Union was determined to attend the proposed second Bandung. The PRC objected on the peculiar ground that the Soviet Union was not an Afro-Asian country (despite its role in the AAPSO Afro-Asian conferences). Indonesia, Pakistan, and Guinea supported the Chinese view; India and Ceylon supported the Soviet.<sup>37</sup>

Meanwhile, at the urging of the moderate and anti-Communist President of the Ivory Coast, Felix Houphouet-Boigny, most of the former French colonies which had formed the Afro-Malagasy Union (UAM) decided not to participate in the second Bandung. By then, Algiers had been chosen as the site, but the conference was formally postponed to June

29, 1965, with the issue of Soviet participation still unresolved.

Ten days before the conference was to convene in Algiers, Algerian President Ahmad Ben-Bella was overthrown by his Defense Minister Houari Boumedienne. To avoid another postponement, Peking immediately expressed its support for the new regime, thus angering many pro-Ben-Bella African leaders.<sup>38</sup> A mysterious bomb explosion on June 26 inside the hall where the second Bandung was to meet gave reluctant African participants an excuse to have the conference postponed to November 4.<sup>39</sup>

By October, steady Soviet pressure had persuaded most delegates to agree that Moscow should attend the conference.<sup>40</sup> This caused Peking, long the most steadfast proponent of a second Bandung, to call for cancellation of the conference rather than permit Soviet participation. PRC Premier Chou En-lai sent a letter to governments of the Afro-African countries on October 22 asserting that:

To convene the conference at present will inevitably embroil Afro-Asian countries in serious disputes . . . and . . . do harm to Afro-Asian solidarity and the friendly relations among Afro-Asian countries and lead to a split among them. After repeated and careful consideration, the Chinese Government has come to the conclusion that . . . it would be better to refrain from holding the conference for the time being . . . If the conference should be forcibly convened as scheduled . . . in spite of the opposition of China, the Kingdom of Cambodia and other countries, the Chinese Government will be compelled to absent itself from such a conference which will lead to a split.<sup>41</sup>

Despite this statement, the new Algerian government announced on October 25 that the conference would be held as scheduled. This caused Peking to reiterate a day later that "China will not take part in such an Afro-Asian conference."<sup>42</sup> On November 2, a conference of Afro-Asian foreign ministers, unwilling to antagonize Peking, agreed to postpone

the second Bandung conference indefinitely. It was in fact never held.<sup>43</sup>

The same fate awaited the fifth AAPSO conference which had been scheduled for Peking in 1967. Despite preoccupation with internal problems during the Cultural Revolution and unilateral recall of Chinese ambassadors from around the world, the PRC apparently intended the AAPSO conference to be held as planned. But the Soviet Union brought strong pressure to have the meeting moved to Algiers, and this change was approved by an AAPSO executive committee meeting in February, 1967, in Nicosia, Cyprus. The PRC refused either to attend the Nicosia meeting or to accept the Algiers site, and the fifth conference was eventually cancelled altogether. After this, Peking lost interest in the AAPSO and turned to other activities in Africa.

In retrospect, the strengths and weaknesses of Peking's position in the multi-national Afro-Asian conferences are worth noting because they relate also to Sino-Soviet competition in other areas. In the 1960s, Peking's exclusion from the United Nations and its lack of diplomatic relations with a majority of the nations of Africa made it somewhat easier for Peking than for Moscow to support dissident movements against unfriendly African governments or against the surviving colonial regimes. The PRC could (and did) also appeal to Africans on racial and historical grounds: that the Chinese, being non-white and having themselves suffered from imperialist oppression and exploitation in the past, have deep compassion towards Africans which the Soviets, being white, do not have. The PRC then argued that this common experience shared by Chinese and Africans made Peking's revolutionary model relevant in Africa, and that Africans would find the Chinese

example of economic development more suitable to their needs than the Soviet model.

Offsetting these Chinese advantages were some undeniable weaknesses. Still an underdeveloped country itself, China could ill afford to spend on foreign aid what it urgently needed to spend on its own development. Despite the ability and willingness of a totalitarian government to conduct a foreign aid program regardless of the cost at home, China could not hope to match the Soviet bloc or the Western powers in either financial or technological aid to Africa, except in very limited areas. Moreover, despite having the world's largest army and achieving some industrial growth, China was clearly weaker than either the Soviet Union or the West in military and industrial power. African leaders looking not only for aid but also for security and the reflected prestige of association with the powerful were likely to find the PRC less attractive as an ally than Moscow or the West, except in special circumstances.

### Bilateral Agreements

#### Friendship Treaties

Between 1960 and 1965, the PRC signed treaties of friendship with five sub-Saharan African nations: Guinea (September 13, 1960), Ghana (August 18, 1961), Congo (October 2, 1964), Mali (November 3, 1964), and Tanzania (February 20, 1965).<sup>44</sup> Each was signed during a visit to Peking by the head of state of the African country and all incorporated the "five principles of peaceful coexistence," mentioned previously.

Peking apparently regarded the signing of a friendship treaty as a "privilege" granted only to countries that had the closest relations with Peking. The treaty was usually devoid of substance and evidently much less important than agreements on cultural, trade, economic, and technical cooperation. Information about such agreements is sketchy and inadequate, because of Peking's obsession with secrecy even about innocuous matters. So few official documents on PRC-African relations have been published that it is impossible to be certain even of the number of agreements signed, much less their content. The following account is based on the limited materials presently available.

#### Cultural Agreements

During the 1960s, Peking signed "cultural cooperation" agreements with at least seven sub-Saharan African countries: Guinea (1959 and 1965), Ghana (1961), Tanzania (1962), Somalia (1963), Mali (1963), CAR (1964), and Mauritania (1967). Most of these cited either the "five principles of peaceful coexistence" or the "spirit of Afro-Asian solidarity" as the basis of the agreement. The agreements covered a variety of subjects, including education (exchange of students, scholars, and educational delegations), literature and the arts (exchange of publications, films, slides, news broadcasts), science and medicine (exchange of experience and cooperation), and athletics (exchange of visiting teams and athletes).

The cultural cooperation agreements usually had a fixed term of three to five years but could be renewed. Their chief importance to Peking appears to have been as a cover for the propaganda operations described below, which were sometimes ruthless and unscrupulous.

### Trade Agreements

The PRC openly admits that it regards foreign trade as "a weapon for international political struggle."<sup>45</sup> Trade with Africa has been used both to support an aid program to various African countries and to get strategic commodities from Africa. Although the potential market of several hundred million consumers in China has long been written off by some Western experts as a myth (because of severe restrictions on imports), many African countries were attracted to the possibilities of trade with China.

The PRC had trade relations with several African countries, notably Egypt, Morocco, Algeria, and the Sudan, as early as 1950. However, trade relations with most sub-Saharan countries were not established until a decade later and the total amount was small. Among Peking's trading partners, Africa occupied only an unimportant place, chiefly because both China and Africa were less developed areas, and both had an economy that was basically agricultural; thus their products were competitive rather than complementary in the world market.<sup>46</sup>

Nevertheless, PRC-African trade has increased slowly but continuously since 1960, and the balance of PRC-African trade has been consistently in favor of China (see Table VIII). Peking signed a trade agreement with Egypt in 1955, its first with an African government, and by 1974 had signed trade agreements with twenty-four African countries, including twenty in sub-Saharan Africa.<sup>47</sup> However, a trade agreement was not essential to trade relations. For example, Kenya, Uganda, and Zambia had no trade agreements with Peking, but played more important roles in PRC-African trade than Burundi and Rwanda, both of which did

have trade agreements with Peking. The PRC has traded with more than thirty African countries. Its major trading partners in Africa have been Egypt, Tanzania, Morocco, the Sudan, Mali, Zambia, Kenya, Nigeria, Ghana, and Uganda. The bulk of Chinese imports from Africa came from the first four of these countries.<sup>48</sup>

In Table VIII, several facts stand out: (1) Trade with Africa has never exceeded 8.2 percent of total PRC trade. (2) Although Peking's total foreign trade has increased significantly since 1970, the percentage with Africa has declined consistently since 1971. (3) In the 1970s, the PRC suffered serious foreign trade deficits, which were partially offset by a surplus from its trade with Africa. Thus, although it is generally agreed that Peking maintained a double standard in foreign trade, stressing political motives in trade with underdeveloped countries and profit in trade with industrialized states, it achieved both in Africa.

#### Economic and Technical

##### Agreements

In its two-front diplomatic war against both the Soviet Union and the Western bloc (of which the ROC was a component), the PRC often made effective use of economic and technical cooperation agreements. Between 1960 and 1975 Peking signed such agreements with at least thirty-three African countries, including thirty in sub-Saharan Africa.<sup>49</sup> See Table IX for a recapitulation of the lists of known agreements of the types mentioned thus far.

"Eight Principles Governing China's Economic and Technical Aid to Other Countries" were set forth by PRC Premier Chou En-lai in an

TABLE VIII

PRC-AFRICAN TRADE, 1960-1975  
(in millions of U.S. dollars)

Year	PRC Exports to Africa*	PRC Imports from Africa*	Balance of PRC- African Trade**	Turnover of PRC Foreign Trade**	Balance of PRC Foreign Trade**	African Trade as % of Total PRC Foreign Trade***
1960	44.8	78.9	-34.1	3990	-70	3.1
1961	54.6	38.6	16	3025	35	3.1
1962	54.1	36.9	17.2	2675	375	3.4
1963	58.2	57	1.2	2770	370	4.2
1964	72.5	63.7	8.8	3220	280	4.2
1965	130.2	120.5	9.7	3880	190	6.5
1966	169	79.8	89.2	4245	175	5.9
1967	161.4	68.5	92.9	3895	- 5	5.9
1968	137.1	52.4	84.7	3765	125	5.0
1969	106	88	18	3860	200	5.0
1970	138	91	47	4290	-190	5.3
1971	200	186	14	4720	110	8.2
1972	221	200	21	5920	250	7.1
1973	310	200	110	9870	-80	5.2
1974	420	190	230	13975	-855	4.4
1975				14090	-400	

\*1960-1968 figures are from Alexander Eckstein, ed., China Trade Prospects and United States Policy, table B-2 (pp. 21-22). These figures were adjusted by including Egypt and the Sudan. 1969-1970 figures are from Joint Economic Committee of U.S. Congress, People's Republic of China: An Economic Assessment, table 10, adjusted to include Egypt. 1971-1973 figures are from U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, People's Republic of China: International Trade Handbook (Washington, DC, 1974), table 2 (p. 10). These figures were adjusted by including Egypt. 1974 figures are from Joint Economic Committee of the U.S. Congress, China: A Reassessment of the Economy (Washington, DC, 1975), table A-5 (p. 650).

\*\*1960-1973 figures are from People's Republic of China: International Trade Handbook, table 1 (p. 9). 1974 and 1975 figures are from "China's Foreign Trade in 1975, Pt. I," Current Scene, XIV, 9 (September, 1976), table I (p. 3).

\*\*\*Computed by dividing the annual total volume of PRC-African trade by the annual turnover of PRC foreign trade.

TABLE IX  
PRC AGREEMENTS WITH AFRICAN NATIONS

	Friendship Treaty	Cultural Agreement	Trade Agreement	Economic & Technical Agreement
<u>NORTH</u>				
Algeria				1963
Egypt			1955	
Libya				
Morocco			1957	
Tunisia			1960	
<u>WEST</u>				
Benin			1972	1972
Cameroon			1972	1972
Cape Verde				
Congo	1964	1964		1964
Equatorial Guinea			1971	1971
Gabon			1974	1974
Gambia				
Ghana	1961	1961	1961	1961
Guinea	1960	1959-1965	1960	1960
Guinea-Bissau				
Liberia				1977
Mali	1964	1963	1961	1961
Mauritania		1967	1967	1967
Nigeria			1972	1972
Sao Tome & Principe				
Senegal			1973	1973
Sierra Leone			1971	1971
Togo				1972
Upper Volta			1973	1972
<u>CENTRAL</u>				
Burundi			1972	1972
Central Afr. R.		1964	1964	1964
Chad			1973	1973
Niger				1974
Rwanda			1972	1972
Zaire			1973	1973
<u>EAST</u>				
Djibouti			1971	1971
Ethiopia			1970	
Kenya		1963	1963	1963
Somalia			1962	1970
Tanzania	1965	1962	1965	1964
<u>SOUTHERN</u>				
Angola				
Botswana				
Comoro Islands				
Madagascar			1974	1974
Mozambique				
Zambia		1966		1967

interview with the Ghana News Agency on January 15, 1964:

- (1) The Chinese Government always bases itself on the principle of equality and mutual benefit in providing aid to other countries. It never regards such aid as a kind of unilateral alms but as something mutual.
- (2) In providing aid to other countries, the Chinese Government strictly respects the sovereignty of the recipient countries, and never asks for any privileges or attaches any conditions.
- (3) The Chinese Government provides economic aid in the form of interest-free or low-interest loans and extends the time limit for the repayment so as to lighten the burden of the recipient countries as far as possible.
- (4) In providing aid to other countries, the purpose of the Chinese Government is not to make the recipient countries dependent on China but to help them embark on the road of self-reliance step by step.
- (5) The Chinese Government tries its best to help the recipient countries build projects which require less investment while yielding quicker results, so that the recipient governments may increase their income and accumulate capital.
- (6) The Chinese Government provides the best-quality equipment and material of its own manufacture at international market prices. If the equipment and material provided by the Chinese Government are not up to the agreed specifications and quality, the Chinese Government undertakes to replace them.
- (7) In giving any particular technical assistance, the Chinese Government will see to it that the personnel of the recipient country fully master such techniques.
- (8) The experts dispatched by the Chinese Government to help in construction in the recipient countries will have the same standard of living as the experts of the recipient country. The Chinese experts are not allowed to make any special demands or enjoy any special amenities.<sup>50</sup>

The carefully pragmatic, non-political, non-ideological language of Chou's "eight principles" is in striking contrast with the militant Marxist jargon that is required in all PRC statements about its own economic development (even when the speaker is more pragmatist than ideologue). This, of course, was partly because the PRC hoped to conclude aid agreements with non-Marxist as well as Marxist government in Africa. The second principle, professing that Peking wanted no privileges and attached no conditions to its aid, can hardly have been

taken seriously by the recipient governments. The eighth principle was undoubtedly meant to invite favorable comparison with Soviet and Western foreign aid officials and advisors.

Another PRC spokesman summarized the eight principles by saying that "the aim of China's economic and technical aid for foreign countries is to help them gradually build and develop their independent national economies by relying on their own efforts."<sup>51</sup> This emphasis on self-reliance was based as much on necessity as on idealism: the PRC simply lacked the resources and the technicians to undertake more than this.

Peking's African aid program consisted chiefly of financial credits and technical assistance. Though in the early years outright grants were given to some African countries for disaster relief or budget subsidies, PRC financial aid to Africa generally took the form of interest-free or low-interest loans, usually repayable in goods over a period of ten to thirty years, beginning five to ten years after the aid was given. These conditions were so lenient that it was said in Africa that "a Chinese loan is a gift loan."<sup>52</sup>

Between 1959 and 1974 Peking loaned a total of U.S. \$1206.4 million to twenty-five sub-Saharan African countries. This constituted 41.1 percent of total PRC aid to less developed countries during this period (see Table X). If the cost of the monumental Tanzam Railway, estimated at U.S. \$529.2 million, is added, the total percentage is 50.1. In other words, during these fifteen years, more than half of Peking's foreign aid went to sub-Saharan Africa. This "checkbook diplomacy," as the ROC called it, showed that one advantage of Peking over Taipei in Africa was its greater supply of money.<sup>53</sup>

TABLE X  
PRC AID COMMITMENTS TO SUB-SAHARAN  
AFRICAN NATIONS  
(in millions of U.S. dollars)

Year*	Amount	Recipient Countries	Total PRC Aid to Less Developed Countries	African Aid as % of Total
1959	0.5	Guinea	1.2	41.7
1960	26	Guinea	73.5	35.4
1961	39.2	Ghana (19.2), Mali (19.2)	163	24
1962	----	----	----	----
1963	21.6	Somalia	88.1	24.5
1964	115.1	CAR (4), Congo (25.2), Ghana (22.4), Kenya (18), Tanzania (45.5)	337.8	34.1
1965	15	Uganda	59	25.4
1966	41	Guinea (30), Mali (3), Tanzania (8)	119	34.5
1967	22	Zambia (17), Mauritania (5)	50	44
1968	----	----	56	----
1969	----	----	----	----
1970	52	Guinea (10), Sudan (42)	307	16.9
1971	285	Ethiopia (84), Mauritania (20), Sierra Leone (30), Somalia (110), Sudan (40), Tanzania (1)	505	56.4
1972	82	Burundi (20), Benin (44), Madagascar (11), Rwanda (22), Togo (45)	553	21.2
1973	335	Cameroon (71), Chad (50), Mali (2), Mauritania (2), Niger (1), Senegal (49), Upper Volta (50), Zambia (10), Zaire (100)	428	78.3
1974	172	Guinea (1), Mauritania (37), Niger (5), Somalia (1), Tanzania (75), Upper Volta (2), Zambia (51)	197	87.3
Total** (1959- 1974)	1206.4	25 Countries	2937.6	41.1

\*1959-1964 figures are from Alexander Eckstein, Communist China's Economic Growth and Foreign Trade, p. 307. 1965 figures are from U.S. Department of State, Communist Governments and Developing Nations: Aid and Trade in 1965, Research Memorandum, RSB-50, June 17, 1966, p. 2. 1966-1969 figures are from "China's Foreign Trade in 1972," Current Scene, XI, 12 (December, 1973), 5. 1970-1974 figures are from Joint Economic Committee of the U.S. Congress, China: A Reassessment of Economy, table 2 (p. 732). The 1970 figures were adjusted by excluding the Tanzam Railway aid to Tanzania and Zambia.

\*\*The 1959-1974 total excludes the Tanzam Railway aid. The total cost of the Tanzam Railway, completed in early June, 1975, amounted to U.S. \$529.2 million. See ARB, EFT Series, Vol. 12, no. 10, p. 3673. Including the Tanzam Railway, the total aid committed to sub-Saharan Africa by Peking between 1959-1974 was \$1735.6 million, or 50.1% of all PRC aid, to less developed countries during this period (\$3,466.8 million).

In the field of technical assistance, the capacities of the two Chinese governments were more evenly matched. PRC aid focused on enterprises producing daily necessities and requiring little investment or construction but yielding quick results, such as projects in textiles, food, machinery, metallurgy, chemicals, electric power, and building materials, as well as highway and transportation facilities.<sup>54</sup> Later, the PRC emulated their ROC competitors by undertaking agricultural aid projects in rice production, sugar refineries, tea plantations and factories, and edible seed-oil plants. Here too the PRC gradually outmaneuvered the ROC in most of the sub-Saharan African countries.

In the technical aid program in Africa, the PRC spared no efforts to overcome the limitations of its resources and underdeveloped technology in order to win African confidence. Although living in self-imposed isolation from people of the host countries, PRC technicians and experts were generally commended for their willingness to work under less favorable conditions and for lower salaries than their Soviet or Western counterparts.<sup>55</sup>

Before 1960 there were fewer than 1,000 Chinese technicians abroad and most were stationed in Asian countries. The number increased significantly after that, reaching 8,110 in 1970, and 18,700 in 1971.<sup>56</sup> Of these, 17,200 were in Africa, including 14,000 working on the Tanzam Railway.<sup>57</sup> In 1972 there were 22,165 PRC technicians abroad and more than 91 percent (20,275) were in Africa.<sup>58</sup> Though no later statistics are available, the figure should have increased between 1972 and 1975 as construction of the Tanzam Railway accelerated. Some reports estimated that in Tanzania alone there were about 20,000 Chinese,

including 13,000 technicians working on the Tanzam.<sup>59</sup> One more recent estimate is that about 30,000 Chinese and 20,000 Africans worked on this project; the number of Chinese should have decreased substantially after completion of the railroad in June, 1975.<sup>60</sup>

The PRC did extremely well in the aid competition with the Soviet Union in Africa through hard work and a more discreet manner. Even the handicap of limited resources and technology became in some ways an asset, as suggested by two African comments which mention visits to China but apply also to Chinese work in Africa. The first is by a Somali in the early 1960s:

When we [Somalis] visit China we feel at home. When we go to Moscow we see many splendid things, but they are far removed from African realities. They are the same sort of things we see in London or New York. We are simply overawed. In China we can see conditions almost similar to what we have at home, and we can see the progress which we, too, can make by following China's example.<sup>61</sup>

The second is by President Julius Nyerere of Tanzania during the construction of the Tanzam Railway:

Perhaps the Western countries (and the Soviet Union) are too sophisticated in every way for us to draw much inspiration from their techniques. They went through all our present troubles too long ago. When my young men go over and see an advanced production technique in the West, they are not really impressed or stirred. It is too far beyond their needs. But when they see more easily applicable experiments in China . . . then these young people come back with glowing eyes and hearts.<sup>62</sup>

Generally speaking, PRC technicians were well received and admired in most of the African countries where they were stationed, particularly in the more militant countries such as Mali, Guinea, Ghana, Somalia, and Tanzania. The Malian foreign minister spoke for many Africans when he said:

China is advancing at a dizzy pace. Her experience in economic construction is the most remarkable test of the capacity for development of under-developed countries.<sup>63</sup>

PRC technicians won the friendship of Guinean workers by shrewd use of psychology. Unlike Soviet and Czech technicians concerned with supervising the Guineans, the Chinese liked to stage a "socialist competition" with Guineans on a project and make sure that the Guineans always won. An American reporter commented that this was "rather like playing golf with the boss."<sup>64</sup> Another comparison between the Chinese and the Russians came from Ghana:

When the Chinese say they will give you glass, they will not change their word. The Russians are not like that, they can change their minds. By the way they behaved, you would think they were building the whole of Ghana.<sup>65</sup>

#### Propaganda

The PRC's ambitious program of diplomacy and foreign aid was supported also by informal tactics, and among these, the most important was the massive use of propaganda media. This was also the field in which the rival ROC was least able and least willing to challenge the PRC. Referring to the Chinese Communist propaganda machine, Mao Tse-tung once said:

What is a propagandist? Not only is the teacher a propagandist, the newspaper reporter a propagandist, the literary writer a propagandist, but all our cadres in all kinds of work are also propagandists . . . Anyone engaged in talking with another person is engaged in propaganda work.<sup>66</sup>

Despite Mao's theory that every Communist Chinese ought to regard himself as a propagandist, most Chinese propaganda, especially abroad, is carried out by specialists, but many agencies are involved.

As in any Communist country, all propaganda is a governmental function, and like all governmental functions is carried out under the strict control of the Chinese Communist Party. In addition to the official news agency and official broadcasting service, and such governmental units as the Foreign Ministry's African Affairs Department, PRC propaganda in Africa was conducted by such agencies as the Commission on Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries, the Commission on Economic Relations with Foreign Countries, and "semi-official" groups such as the Chinese Committee for Afro-Asian Solidarity, Liaison Committee with Permanent Bureau of the Afro-Asian Writers' Conference, China-Asia-Africa Society, and China-Africa People's Friendship Association.<sup>67</sup> Only the most extensive of these propaganda operations can be discussed here.

#### New China News Agency (NCNA)

The New China News Agency opened its first African branch office in Egypt (Cairo) in 1958. Shortly after this, offices were opened in Morocco (Rabat), Guinea (Conakry), and Ghana (Accra). From 1960 on, NCNA correspondents were usually sent to African countries even before diplomatic relations were established, a clear sign of the NCNA's importance to Peking. By 1966, NCNA had branch offices in twenty African countries: Algeria, Egypt, Morocco, and Tunisia in North Africa; Benin, Congo, Ghana, Guinea, Mali, Mauritania, and Senegal in West Africa; Burundi and CAR in Central Africa; Ethiopia, Kenya, Somali, Sudan, Tanzania, and Uganda in East Africa; and Zambia in Southern Africa. Those in Benin, Burundi, and the CAR went underground when those countries severed diplomatic relations with Peking. NCNA reportedly also

had a correspondent in Madagascar while that country still maintained diplomatic relations with Taipei (1960-1972).<sup>68</sup>

NCNA dispatches were always highly political in tone, filled with stock phrases endlessly repeating PRC epithets about "U.S. imperialism," "Soviet revisionism," and the like. One Western observer commented that the NCNA "news" service was so repetitive and monotonous that it would "make a normal Western reader all but scream with boredom."<sup>69</sup> Whether Africans felt that way is much harder to determine.

Evidence indicates that in Africa NCNA bureaus were also intelligence and agitation centers whose agents were assigned to collect political, military and economic information vital to Peking's diplomacy in Africa. These agents, disguised as journalists, also worked as intermediaries through whom Peking distributed cash, propaganda materials and even weapons to corrupt politicians, dissident elements, and guerrillas for subversion in various African countries.<sup>70</sup> Among the NCNA agents in Africa, two were notorious for subversive activities --Kao Liang in Central and East Africa, and Wang Teh-ming in Kenya. Despite their seemingly prestigious position in Africa, these NCNA agents were under constant and strict control by supervisors in Peking. NCNA headquarters conducted annual inspections of its bureaus abroad, and any agent who failed the screening would be recalled to China to face an uncertain and usually miserable future.<sup>71</sup>

#### Radio Broadcasts

The extremely high rate of illiteracy in Africa makes radio broadcasting an important medium for reaching mass audiences, though limited by a shortage of receiving sets in many poor countries. The PRC was

the first Communist country to broadcast to Africa. Radio Peking began beaming broadcasts to the continent in September, 1956, followed by Radio Moscow in April, 1958.<sup>72</sup> Over the years, Radio Peking substantially increased its broadcasting hours to Africa, though as shown in Table XI, published statistics disagree widely on the total time. At first, English was the only language used, but later Portuguese, French, Italian, and Arabic were added, along with two major African languages, Swahili (important in East Africa) and Hausa (important in West Africa). Transmissions in Chinese (Mandarin and Cantonese), also added in 1960, are intended for permanent Chinese residents as well as temporary visitors.

Radio Peking also strengthened its beaming power. A Chinese student of African affairs, George T. Yu, reported that in 1962 "Radio Peking could be heard more clearly in Africa south of the Sahara than the 'Voice of America'."<sup>73</sup> British African expert Pieter Lessing testified in the same year that "no other radio programmes can be heard as clearly in all parts of Africa as those of Peking Radio."<sup>74</sup> By 1971, Radio Peking reportedly had the most powerful of all the transmitters then broadcasting to Africa from outside.<sup>75</sup>

The effectiveness of this radio propaganda is uncertain. Qualitative evaluations range from "irrelevant to African interests" and "of doubtful efficacy" to "excellent, entertaining, instructive, and interesting, well worth any listener's attention."<sup>76</sup> An unusual observation in 1965 from John K. Cooley, Christian Science Monitor correspondent in Casablanca, was that Radio Peking was playing Somali battle hymns in a Somali language program but so softly that "a listener would never suspect that they were battle hymns if he did not know Somali."<sup>77</sup> Steve

TABLE XI  
RADIO PEKING BROADCASTS TO AFRICA

Year	Languages Used (Weekly Hours)	Total
<u>A*</u>		
1956	English	7
1960	English (49), Portuguese (7), Mandarin (7), Cantonese (7)	70
1965	English (28), French (14), Portuguese (7), Italian (3½), Mandarin (7), Cantonese (7), Swahili (10½), Hausa (7)	84
1970	English (28), French (14), Portuguese (14), Italian (3½), Mandarin (7), Cantonese (7), Swahili (10½), Hausa (7)	91
1975	English (28), French (14), Arabic (14), Portuguese (14), Italian (3½), Mandarin (14), Cantonese (7), Swahili (10½), Hausa (7)	112
-----		
<u>B**</u>		
1961(1)	English, Arabic, French, Portuguese (105 total), Mandarin (15), Cantonese (7)	127
1964(2)	English, French, Portuguese, Cantonese, Mandarin, Swahili, Hausa	108.5
1965(3)		206
1966(4)	English (28), French (14), Hausa (7), Italian 3½, Portuguese (7), Swahili (10½), Arabic (14), Mandarin (21), Cantonese (7)	112

\*Sources (A): The 1956 figure is from "Communist China Increases International Broadcasts," in *Current Scene* (October, 1959-April, 1961), p. 47. 1960, 1965, and 1970 figures are from the BBC monitoring service, cited in Brent Hutton-Williams, "Communism in Africa: Words as Weapons," *Bulletin of the Africa Institute of South Africa*, IX, no. 5 (June, 1971), p. 221. The 1971 figures are from "Communist Broadcasting to Africa," *ibid.*, X, no. 4 (May, 1972), p. 138. The figures were originally in daily minutes.

\*\*Sources (B): (1) Yu, "Peking Versus Taipei in World Arena," p. 443. (2) Yu, "Sino-African Relations: A Survey," p. 329. (3) See "Note on French Study of Communist Chinese Policies in Africa," a translation of an unsigned article, originally entitled "Political Life--Black Africa," in the French-language periodical *Bulletin de L'Afrique Noire* [Bulletin of Black Africa], Paris, no. 467 (June 14, 1967), p. 9423, in JPRS, *Translations on Africa*, no. 68 (41785), no. 598, p. 2. (4) Christian Roll, "Communist China's Program in Africa," a translation from the German-language biweekly *Afrika Heute*, Bonn, no. 8 (April 15, 1966), pp. 112-116, in JPRS, *Translations on Africa*, no. 44 (35759), no. 376, p. 3.

de Villiers, Director of Programs of the South African Broadcasting Corporation, commented in 1966 that "Radio Peking has penetrated Africa to such an extent that it has a representative music library containing indigenous music from even the most primitive outposts of Africa."<sup>78</sup>

A second factor, in addition to quality, is competition. In Africa, Radio Peking faced strong challenges from Radio Moscow and "Radio Peace and Progress" of the Soviet Union, "Voice of America" of the United States, and the BBC of Great Britain, the latter being particularly popular in East Africa. For example, surveys conducted in three East African capitals in 1964 and 1966 showed that among those interviewed who were over seventeen years of age and had at least six years of education, 51 percent to 70 percent preferred the BBC and only one percent to eight percent listened to Radio Peking.<sup>79</sup>

A third factor is the availability of radio receivers. Most Africans are still too poor to own radios. One writer commented in 1968 that "radio ownership continues to be a relative luxury; given the fact that the average daily wage of a nonskilled worker in East Africa currently is the equivalent of U.S. \$1.00, the purchase of a radio must be seen as a major investment. Indeed radio ownership and listening have been limited to urban dwellers with some schooling."<sup>80</sup> Statistics reported to the United Nations suggest that only 19 of every 1,000 Africans owned a radio in 1960, 25 per 1,000 in 1965, 41 per 1,000 in 1970, and 71 per 1,000 in 1974.<sup>81</sup> Even the last figure is extremely low, especially since short-wave receivers probably constitute only a small percentage of the total, and a disproportionate share of all receivers is undoubtedly concentrated in the more developed urban areas of North and South Africa rather than among black Africans. On the other hand,

those Africans who do own receivers are likely to be in some sense members of an elite whose influence is much greater than its numerical strength.

In addition to its own broadcasts, the PRC took an active interest in building radio broadcasting stations at strategic locations in friendly African countries, including Guinea, Mali, Congo, Zambia, and Tanzania, making a broad band across Africa. In most instances, Peking donated the transmitter and all other necessary equipment.<sup>82</sup> Peking is known to have signed "broadcast cooperation" agreements with two of its closest African supporters, Guinea and Mali. The official text provides for an "exchange" of broadcasting materials "on history, political affairs, economy, literature, drama, arts, programs, and recorded tapes that reflect the life of the people."<sup>83</sup> It is not clear whether "exchange" includes action by Guinea and Mali to rebroadcast transmissions received from Radio Peking by short wave.<sup>84</sup>

#### Printed Material

Books, periodicals, and pamphlets also constituted an important instrument of PRC propaganda among educated Africans. Mao's Selected Works, Selected Military Writings of Mao Tse-tung, and Quotations from Chairman Mao Tse-tung in English, French, Spanish, and some African languages were offered for sale at very low prices in many African countries. Translations of some more general works such as Chinese poems for children and Lu Hsun's novels were also available.<sup>85</sup>

Peking published numerous periodicals in several non-Chinese languages and distributed them among African readers at only a fraction of the normal price. These include Revolution, a Peking-supported monthly

edited by Africans and published in Paris; Peking Review, the authoritative biweekly magazine of the Chinese Communist Party; and Evergreen, a biweekly directed at African students.<sup>86</sup> Periodicals with excellent pictures such as China Pictorial (monthly, in English and French), China Reconstructs (monthly, in English and French), and Women of China (bi-monthly in English) were well received by Africans.<sup>87</sup>

### Motion Pictures

Motion pictures played an even more important role than printed materials in Peking's propaganda because of illiteracy in Africa. Under the various cultural cooperation agreements with African countries, the PRC exported to the continent African dialect-dubbed films of drama, science education, newsreels, and art appreciation. A "Chinese film week" was also frequently held in African capitals. Militant African countries like Guinea, Ghana, and Mali were the main targets of this "film propaganda."<sup>88</sup>

Sometimes Peking also sent Chinese cameramen to Africa to shoot documentary films on African subjects, always heavily revolutionary in tone. After being processed in China, these films were shipped back to Africa and shown to African audiences. Some were highly acclaimed.<sup>89</sup>

### Visits To and From China

The PRC also sought out and invited numerous African politicians, labor leaders, journalists, youth leaders, and athletes to visit China. The importance of this "personal diplomacy" exceeds statistical measures because it involved the political elite of actual and potential leaders in various African countries. Usually the PRC embassy in an

African country would select the guest, whether an individual or a group; a formal invitation was sent out by the Chinese counterpart of the African guest.

Highest on the lists of desirable guests were of course the African heads of state. Between 1960 and 1978, there were forty-one state visits to the PRC by heads of African nations (see Table XII), an average of two a year--even during the isolationist period of the Cultural Revolution. These involved thirty heads of state, from a total of twenty-seven countries: Algeria in North Africa; Zaire, CAR, Niger, and Rwanda in Central Africa; Mozambique and Zambia in Southern Africa; Ethiopia, Somalia, Sudan, Tanzania, and Uganda in East Africa; and Benin, Cameroon, Congo, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Mali, Mauritania, Nigeria, Sao Tome e Principe, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Togo, and Equatorial Guinea in West Africa. While in China, African heads of state were treated royally, welcomed by massed thousands of cheering Chinese, honored at lavish banquets, taken on sight-seeing tours, and until June, 1976, usually accorded the supreme privilege of an audience with Mao Tse-tung.

Although these visits by African heads of state were obviously considered highly desirable, they were never reciprocated by the PRC. But neither were visits to China by heads of state from other parts of the world.<sup>90</sup> For Africa, the PRC provided at least a high-level substitute for a state visit on one occasion: PRC Premier Chou En-lai's fifty-four day tour of ten African countries in 1963-1964. Accompanied by an impressive entourage of more than fifty, including Foreign Minister Chen I and ten other high-ranking officials, Chou visited Egypt

TABLE XII  
AFRICAN STATE VISITS TO THE PRC

Year	Nation	Heads of State Visiting the PRC
1960	Guinea	Sekou Toure
1961	Ghana	Kwame Nkrumah
1964	Mali	Modibo Keita
1964	Congo	Alphonse Massamba-Debat
1964	Sudan	Ibrahim Abboud
1965	Tanzania	Julius K. Nyerere
1965	Uganda	Milton Obote
1965	Somalia	Aden Abdulla Osman
1966	Ghana	*Kwame Nkrumah
1967	Mauritania	Ould Daddah
1967	Zambia	Kenneth Kaunda
1968	Tanzania	*Julius K. Nyerere
1970	Sudan	Gaafar Mohammed Nimeiry
1971	Ethiopia	Haile Selassie
1972	Somalia	Mohammed Siad Barre
1973	Congo	Marien Ngouabi
1973	Cameroon	Ahmadou Ahidjo
1973	Mali	Moussa Traore
1973	Sierra Leone	Siaka Stevens
1974	Mauritania	*Ould Daddah
1974	Zambia	*Kenneth Kaunda
1974	Algeria	Houari Boumedienne
1974	Nigeria	Yakubu Gowon
1974	Gabon	Omar Bongo
1974	Zaire	*Mobutu Sese Seko
1974	Senegal	Leopold Sedar Senghor
1974	Togo	Gnassingbe Eyadema
1974	Tanzania	*Julius K. Nyerere
1975	Gabon	*Omar Bongo
1975	Gambia	Dawda Kairaba Jawara
1975	Mozambique	Samora Moises Machel
1975	Sao Tome e Principe	Manuel Pinto da Costa
1976	Benin	Mathieu Kere Kou
1976	CAR	Salah Addis Ahmed Bokassa
1977	Sudan	*Gaafar Mohammed Nimeiry
1977	Gabon	*Omar Bongo
1977	Cameroon	*Ahmadou Ahidjo
1977	Mauritania	*Ould Daddah
1977	Equatorial Guinea	Macias Nguema
1977	Niger	Seyni Kountche
1978	Rwanda	Juvenal Habyarimana

\*Repeat visit

(December 14-21, 1963), Algeria (December 21-27), Morocco (December 27-30), Tunisia (January 9-10, 1964, after a side trip to Albania), Ghana (January 11-16), Mali (January 16-21), Guinea (January 21-26), Sudan (January 27-30), Ethiopia (January 30-February 1), and Somalia (February 1-4).

Chou's trip has been dealt with extensively by other writers.<sup>91</sup> Here it is sufficient to note that the trip came at a time when PRC invective against the United States, the United Nations, and the Soviet Union was approaching its worst extreme, and it was not a courtesy trip but one with important political objectives: (1) to solicit African support for a second Bandung conference, (2) to improve the tarnished image of the PRC presented to Africans by Soviet and Western propaganda, (3) to remind Africans that China was a major power which it would be dangerous and unwise to ignore, and (4) to discredit and weaken the ROC position in Africa and thus in the United Nations.<sup>92</sup> More progress in reaching these objectives was achieved in black Africa than in North Africa, as will be discussed in subsequent chapters.

Although Chou En-lai was the only senior PRC official to visit Africa, the PRC showed somewhat greater willingness to reciprocate lower-level goodwill visits. Two early examples were tours of several African countries in 1961 by the chairman of the China-Africa People's Friendship Association, Liu Chang-sheng, and in 1965 by the Vice Chairman of the PRC National People's Congress Standing Committee, Liu Ning-i. The former spent four months (March to July, 1961) in Guinea, Mali, Ghana, Niger, Togo, Benin, Upper Volta, Ethiopia, and Somalia.<sup>93</sup> The latter spent two months (March and April, 1965) in Guinea, Mali, the CAR, Congo, and Ghana.<sup>94</sup>

Among lower-ranking personnel, visits by African delegations to China and Chinese delegations to Africa were so numerous that reliable figures are unobtainable. Those in Table XIII were assembled from several sources and appear to be conservative. A French African expert, Philippe Schneyder, reported 270 African delegations visiting China in 1959, while Ogunsanwo listed only 50 for that year.<sup>95</sup> Ogunsanwo disputed his own figure for 1960, citing 105 African delegations in one place (page 84), but only 98 in another (page 270). For 1962-1964, another French source counted a total of 318 African delegations visiting China and 156 PRC delegations visiting Africa.<sup>96</sup> Ogunsanwo's figures for these three years total 253 and 189, respectively.

#### Student Scholarships

The PRC also hoped to attract African youth leaders by granting scholarships to study in China. This may have started as early as the 1950s, since the Prague-based International Union of Students is reported to have established a "sanatorium" near Peking in January, 1958, for African and Asian students.<sup>97</sup> However, most of Africa was then still under colonial rule, and a systematic PRC scholarship program for African students does not seem to have started until 1960, directed mainly towards students from newly independent countries such as Zaire and Somalia.<sup>98</sup> Few statistics are available, but one account states that in 1962, when the Soviet bloc granted nearly 1,200 scholarships to twenty-six African countries, the PRC offered only about 400.<sup>99</sup> According to Emmanuel John Hevi, a Ghanaian who studied in Peking from 1960 to 1962, there were only 118 African students in China in April, 1962.<sup>100</sup>

TABLE XIII  
EXCHANGE OF VISITING DELEGATIONS BY AFRICAN  
NATIONS AND THE PRC

Year	From Africa to PRC	From PRC to Africa
1959	50	10
1960	98	25
1961	58	39
1962	37	52
1963	113	50
1964	103	87
1965	114	69
1966	114	47
1967	57	17
1968	12	14
1969	12	19
1970	15	33
1971	15	9
1972	51	14
1973	65	25
1974	15	9
1975	19	8
Total	948	527

Sources: The 1959-1970 figures are from Alaba Ogunsanwo, China's Policy in Africa, 1958-1971, Appendix I, tables 1 and 2 (pp. 269-270). The 1971-1975 figures are based on information in African Research Bulletin (1971-1975); Daily Report (1971-1974) of FBIS; Chin-chi tao-pao, nos. 1301-1302 (1973) and 1351-1352 (1974); and the BBC Summary of World Broadcasts (1971-1975). These figures are probably incomplete.

As mentioned in Chapter I, Hevi became very disillusioned with Chinese Communism, and wrote two books criticizing PRC ambitions in Africa, academic standards in China, and what he regarded as a PRC racist attitude towards African students. The latter charge was disputed by another Ghanaian student, Kojo Amoo-Gottfried, who studied in London but paid several visits to China.<sup>101</sup> Hevi's books criticizing the PRC were translated into Chinese by Nationalist Chinese. Both the PRC and the Soviet Union appear to have had difficulty in attracting and satisfying African students, for both academic and ideological reasons. Some African students went home from both Communist countries alienated rather than indoctrinated, and charged their Communist hosts with the same racist attitude the hosts had imputed to Western countries. Although it would be unwise to assume that these reactions were typical, or to discount the influence in their home countries of Africans who studied in China, it is curious that after the Cultural Revolution caused the PRC to suspend the scholarship program and to order all foreign students to leave China in 1966, student exchanges did not resume until 1973.<sup>102</sup>

#### Covert Activities

Although it was mentioned above that PRC "journalists" with the NCNA were often involved in covert activities unrelated to their supposed function, the PRC tactics described thus far were essentially overt and most were publicized lavishly if not always accurately. Even so, the information available about them is often fragmentary. It is therefore understandable that verifiable information about Peking's truly clandestine or semi-clandestine operations in Africa will always

be very scarce except perhaps in the secret films of other countries. It may well be that the PRC's covert operations in Africa were more important than any of its overt activities, but this is impossible either to prove or disprove.

Aside from bribing influential politicians and officials in various African countries, and collecting intelligence, the PRC's covert operations appear to have consisted chiefly of financing and sometimes giving military training to African rebels of various types. On the basis of his experience in the Chinese civil war, Mao Tse-tung was considered (by himself and others) the world's foremost innovator of guerrilla tactics and strategy, and African guerrillas were trained near Nanking and elsewhere in China during the early 1960s and perhaps before that. Later, such training was conducted in Africa at secret camps financed and operated by Chinese. Such camps are known in at least five countries--Burundi, Congo, Ghana, Tanzania, and Zambia--and Chinese arms for African rebels were shipped not only through Burundi and Tanzania but also through Uganda.<sup>103</sup>

Some guerrilla forces were trained for attacks on areas that were then either still colonial, such as Portuguese Angola and Mozambique, or still under white rule, such as South Africa, Southwest Africa (Namibia), and Rhodesia (Zimbabwe). But others were aided or trained by the PRC for the purpose of overthrowing independent black governments in Africa. Peking is said to have given support of one kind or another (more than propaganda support) to dissident or rebellious elements in at least thirteen African countries. Available information about these covert operations is discussed in the regional chapters which follow.

At this point, it need only be noted that Peking's constant militant rhetoric about "revolution" disquieted many African leaders because of evidence that Peking was interested in overthrowing not only colonial regimes but some independent black governments as well.

## FOOTNOTES

<sup>1</sup>In 1955, the only independent countries in Africa were Egypt, Ethiopia, Liberia, Libya, and South Africa. South Africa was not invited to the Bandung Conference, whose twenty-nine "official" participants included Afghanistan, Cambodia, PRC, Egypt, Ethiopia, Ghana, Iran, Iraq, Japan, Jordan, Laos, Lebanon, Liberia, Libya, Nepal, Philippine Islands, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Syria, Thailand, Turkey, Vietnam (North), Vietnam (South), and Yeman in addition to the five sponsoring nations. See Keesing's Contemporary Archives, 10 (1955), 14181; Cooley, pp. 8-9; and Bruce D. Larkin, China and Africa, 1949-1970; the Foreign Policy of the People's Republic of China (Berkeley, 1971), p. 16. Colin Legum, "Africa and China: Symbolism and Substance," Policies Toward China: Views from Six Continents, A. M. Halpern (Ed.) (New York, 1965), p. 391, is mistaken in saying that only five African delegations--Egypt, Ethiopia, Ghana, Morocco, and Tunisia--were present.

<sup>2</sup>Chou En-lai, "Report on the Asian-African Conference," China and the Asian-African Conference (Peking, 1955), pp. 50, 52-53. This was his report to the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress on May 13, 1955.

<sup>3</sup>Much has been published about the Sino-Soviet split; a convenient summary is The Sino-Soviet Dispute: Keesing's Research Report 3 (New York, 1969).

<sup>4</sup>The others were Libya (1951), Morocco (1956), and Tunisia (1956). Egypt, Ethiopia, Liberia, and South Africa achieved independence before 1945.

<sup>5</sup>See Mao Tse-tung, Selected Works (in five volumes, New York, 1954), Vol. 5, pp. 99-100.

<sup>6</sup>Yin Ching-yao, Chung-kung wai-chiao yu tui-wai kuan-hsi [Chinese Communist foreign policy and foreign relations] (Taipei, 1973), pp. 33-34. For the full text of the JMJP editorial, see Peking NCNA International Service in English, 0524 GMT, January 21, 1964, U.S. Foreign Broadcasting Information Service, Daily Report (hereafter referred to as Daily Report), no. 14 (January 21, 1964), pp. BBB 5-10.

<sup>7</sup>Daily Report, p. BBB 9, and Yin, p. 34.

<sup>8</sup>Jen-min chieh-fang-chun, Chung-hua jen-min kung-ho-kuo [People's Liberation Army, People's Republic of China], Kung-tso tung-hsun [Bulletin of activities], issues of early 1961, translated as The Politics of the Chinese Red Army, J. Chester Cheng (Ed.) (Stanford,

1966), pp. 22, 484. The origin of the term "Third World" is uncertain. According to a PRC source, the term was first used by Charles De Gaulle to designate the countries outside Europe and beyond the Anglo-Saxon sphere (the U.S., Great Britain, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, etc.). Another source indicated that the term was coined by French scholar George Balandier and referred to those countries located in the southern portion of the globe that did not take sides in the Cold War. See Hung Liu, "Kuan yu ti-shan shih-chieh tsung-tsung" [Facts about the third world], Hsueh shih-shih [Study on current affairs], no. 234 (May 28, 1972), pp. 1-3. See also "The Algiers Afro-Asian Conference--the Changing Profile of the Third World," translation of an article by Giorgio Signorini in the weekly theoretical journal of the Italian Communist Party Rinascita [Rebirth], Rome, no. 44 (November 6, 1965), 12, in U.S. Joint Publications Research Service, Translations on Africa (hereafter referred to as JPRS, Translations on Africa), no. 34 (33052), no. 291, p. 8.

<sup>9</sup> See George T. Yu, "Sino-African Relations: A Survey," Asian Survey, 5 (July, 1965), pp. 321-322, and "China's Failure in Africa," ibid., 6 (August, 1966), p. 462. See also "Chinese Communist Penetration in Africa," a translation of an article by Come Manckasa in La Semaine, Brazzaville, XIV, 682 (September 26, 1965), 1, 8, in JPRS, Translations on Africa, no. 32 (32647), no. 279, pp. 4-6; and Alan Hutchison, "China in Africa, A Record of Pragmatism and Conservatism," Round Table, 65 (1975), pp. 264-265.

<sup>10</sup> These principles appeared in the preamble to the "Agreement between the People's Republic of China and the Republic of India on Trade and Intercourse between the Tibet Region of China and India," signed on April 29, 1954. They were repeated in the new PRC constitution in September, 1954, as the general principles of PRC foreign policy, and have been repeated in most of the friendship treaties and trade agreements signed between Peking and African countries. See Yin Ching-yao, Chung-kung wai-chiao yu tui-wai kuan-hsi, pp. 18, 28; Chao Ch'un-shan, "Chung-kung Fei-chou cheng-tse ti li-lun yu shih-chi" [The theory and practice of the Peking regime's policy toward Africa], Tung-ya chi-kan, 3, 1 (July 1, 1971), p. 148; Emmanuel John Hevi, The Dragon's Embrace: The Chinese Communists and Africa (New York, 1966), p. 6; and David Kimche, The Afro-Asian Movement, Ideology and Foreign Policy of the Third World (Jerusalem, 1973), p. 48. At the 1955 Bandung Conference the "Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence" were expanded into "Ten Bandung Principles," but the former have wider currency. For the "Ten Bandung Principles," see W. A. C. Adie, "China and the Bandung Genie," Current Scene, III, 19 (May 15, 1965), pp. 12-13.

<sup>11</sup> Egypt's recognition of the PRC was also closely connected with its dispute with the United States over aid in building the Aswan high dam. See Malcolm H. Kerr, "The Middle East and China: the Scope and Limits of Convergent Interests," in Halpern, p. 438. During the isolationist first stage (1949-1955) of PRC foreign policy, there was one peculiarity in relations with several European countries that was not repeated in Africa: a long hiatus between the unilateral act of

establishing diplomatic relations (exchanging diplomats). Communist but anti-Soviet Yugoslavia recognized the PRC only four days after the creation of the PRC, and non-Communist Great Britain, Norway, and the Netherlands recognized the PRC a few months later (January and March, 1950). Peking welcomed the recognition, but for political reasons made all four countries wait four or five years before establishment of diplomatic relations was permitted. In Africa, however, diplomatic relations have been established either simultaneously with recognition of the PRC or no more than two weeks later.

<sup>12</sup>For a detailed background of the Afro-Asian movement and the Sino-Soviet clash at the various Afro-Asian conferences, see Charles Neuhauser, Third World Politics: China and the Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Organization (Cambridge, MA, 1968), Kimche, and Yin Ching-yao, chapter 3.

<sup>13</sup>According to Ogunsanwo, the Soviet Union and Communist China paid the travel expenses of many of the delegates. See Alaba Ogunsanwo, China's Policy in Africa, 1958-1971 (London, 1974), p. 94. The following were invited but sent no delegations: Afghanistan, Bahrain, Benin, Cambodia, Hadramawt (South Yemen), Kuwait, Laos, Malaya, Nepal, Nigeria, Philippines, Saudi Arabia, Thailand, Togo, and Upper Volta. See Kimche, p. 168.

<sup>14</sup>NCNA, April 5, 1960, in SCMP, no. 2235, p. 37. See also Peking, NCNA, English, 1354 GMT, April 5, 1960, Daily Report, no. 67 (April 6, 1960), p. AAA 16.

<sup>15</sup>Peking, NCNA, in English Hellschreiber to Asia, 0606 GMT, April 10, 1960, Daily Report, no. 71 (April 12, 1960), p. AAA 5.

<sup>16</sup>Peking, NCNA, Radioteletype in English to Europe and Asia, 0121 GMT, April 11, 1960, p. AAA 7.

<sup>17</sup>Peking, NCNA, Radioteletype in English to Europe and Asia, 1845 GMT, April 14, 1960, *ibid.*, no. 74 (April 15, 1960), p. AAA 13.

<sup>18</sup>In a series of lectures delivered from May 26 to June 3, 1958, at the Association for the Study of the Anti-Japanese War in Yenan, Mao said: "Weapons are an important factor in war but not the decisive one; it is man and not material that counts. The contest of forces is not only a contest of military and economic power, but also one of the power and morale of man. Military and economic power must be controlled by man." See Mao's Selected Works, II, 192.

<sup>19</sup>Donald S. Zagoria, The Sino-Soviet Conflict, 1956-1961 (Princeton, NJ, 1962), p. 263. See also Ogunsanwo, p. 94; Richard Lowenthal, "China," in Zbigniew K. Brzezinski (Ed.), Africa and the Communist World (Stanford, 1963), p. 176; and Yang Feng-tai, "Chung-kung tui Fei-chou ti kung-shih (I)" [Chinese Communist offensive in Africa (I)], Tung-ya chi-kan [East Asian quarterly], 3, 2 (October 1, 1971), p. 36.

<sup>20</sup>Yang, "Chung-kung tui Fei-chou ti kung-shih (I)," p. 36.

<sup>21</sup>The conference was originally scheduled to be held in the Tanzanian capital, Dar es Salaam. It was moved at the last moment to Moshi. See Hutchison, p. 267.

<sup>22</sup>For the full text of Liu's speech, see Peking, NCNA, in English to Asia and Europe, 1325 GMT, February 6, 1963, Daily Report, no. 27 (February 7, 1963), pp. I 6-13. A strongly racial charge by the Chinese at this time was that the Soviets would never support the anti-imperialist struggle because they were white. See William Griffith, The Sino-Soviet Dispute (Cambridge, MA, 1964), p. 125.

<sup>23</sup>Moscow TASS in English to Europe, 0629 GMT, February 6, 1963, Daily Report, no. 26, p. I 20.

<sup>24</sup>Manfred Halpern, "Afro-Asians at Moshi," Africa Report, 8, 3 (March, 1963), pp. 21-22. See also Lowenthal, p. 197.

<sup>25</sup>Peking, NCNA, in English to Asia and Europe, 1432 GMT, February 5, 1963, Daily Report, no. 26 (February 6, 1963), p. I 16.

<sup>26</sup>Peking, NCNA, in English to Asia and Europe, 1235 GMT, February 11, 1963, Daily Report (Supplement), no. 10 (February 19, 1963), p. 8.

<sup>27</sup>Cited by Kimche, p. 167.

<sup>28</sup>Peking, NCNA, International Service in English, 0542 GMT, May 12, 1965, Daily Report, no. 91 (May 12, 1963), p. I 16.

<sup>29</sup>Ibid., no. 93 (May 14, 1965), p. I 12. See also Peking Review, no. 21 (May 21, 1965), p. 15.

<sup>30</sup>Daily Report, ibid., pp. I 14-15; Peking Review, ibid., pp. 15-16.

<sup>31</sup>Peking, NCNA, International Service in English, 2200 GMT, May 18, 1965, Daily Report, no. 96 (May 19, 1965), p. 3. See also Ogunsanwo, p. 168.

<sup>32</sup>Kimche, p. 192.

<sup>33</sup>Kimche, p. 193; Larkin, p. 85; and Chao Ch'un-shan, "Chung-kung Fei-chou cheng-tse ti li-lun yu shih-chi," p. 145.

<sup>34</sup>Larkin p. 48; Kimche, p. 98.

<sup>35</sup>Larkin, p. 68; Ogunsanwo, p. 123, and Robert A. Scalapino, On the Trail of Chou En-lai in Africa (Santa Monica, CA, 1964), p. 1.

<sup>36</sup>See "Growing Afro-Asian Solidarity Against Imperialism," Peking Review, no. 16 (April 17, 1964), p. 6, and Peking, NCNA, International Service in English, 0224 GMT, April 18, 1964, Daily Report, no. 77 (April 20, 1964), p. BBB 16. See also Kimche, p. 104; Franklin B.

Weinstein, "The Second Asian-African Conference," Asian Survey, V (1965), p. 364; and Guy J. Pauker, "The Rise and Fall of Afro-Asian Solidarity," Asian Survey, V (1965), pp. 425-426.

<sup>37</sup> Moscow sent deputy Foreign Minister A. E. Kuznetsov to visit Asia and Africa to muster support for its admission to the conference. See Kimche, p. 119.

<sup>38</sup> Tseng Tao, the PRC ambassador to Algeria, conveyed Peking's support to Boumedienne, chairman of the Algeria Council of the Revolution, on June 20. See Peking, NCNA, International Service in English, 0500 GMT, June 21, 1965, Daily Report, no. 118 (June 21, 1965), p. BBB 2. See also Cooley, p. 154, and Pauker, p. 429.

<sup>39</sup> The Algerians suspected that Egypt engineered the explosion in order to have the conference moved to Cairo or at least postponed. See Pauker, pp. 429-430; Kimche, p. 120; New York Times, June 28, 1965.

<sup>40</sup> Pauker, p. 428.

<sup>41</sup> For the texts of Chou's letter and the joint proposal of China and Cambodia to postpone the conference, see Peking, NCNA, International Service in English, 2057 GMT, October 26, 1965, Daily Report, no. 208 (October 27, 1965), pp. BBB 3-5. They can also be found in Peking Review, no. 44 (October 29, 1965), pp. 6-7.

<sup>42</sup> For the text of the statement, see Peking, NCNA, International Service in English, 2032 GMT, *ibid.*, pp. BBB 5-7; and Peking Review, *ibid.*, pp. 5-6.

<sup>43</sup> For more detailed treatment of the Afro-Asian solidarity movement and the second Bandung conference, see books by Kimche, Neuhauser, Cooley, and Ogunsanwo; and "The Algiers Afro-Asian Conference: the End of a Myth," translation of an article in Le Monde (Paris), in JPRS, Translations on Africa, no. 34 (33052), no. 294, pp. 26-28.

<sup>44</sup> Texts of all five treaties in Chinese, French, English, and other languages can be found in Wai-chiao-pu, Chung-hua jen-min kung-ho-kuo [Foreign ministry, People's Republic of China], comp., Chung-hua jen-min kung-ho-kuo yu-hao tiao-yueh hui-pien [Collection of the friendship treaties of the People's Republic of China] (Peking, 1965).

<sup>45</sup> Kuo Chung-yen, Hsin Chung-kuo ti kung-yeh ping chu-k'ou mao-i [The export trade of new China's industrial products] (Shanghai, 1956), p. 34. For a detailed description of the function, institutional setting, and trends of PRC foreign trade, see Feng-hwa Mah, The Foreign Trade of Mainland China (Chicago and New York, 1971); Alexander Eckstein, Communist China's Economic Growth and Foreign Trade, Implication for U.S. Policy (New York, 1966); and Chin-chi-pu, Chung-hua min-kuo [Ministry of economic affairs, ROC] trans. and comp., Kung-fei tui-wai mao-i chin-kuang [The present situation of Communist Chinese foreign trade] (Taipei, 1971).

<sup>46</sup>"China in World Trade, Pt. II," Current Scene, IV, 4 (February 15, 1966), p. 4; and Alex Blake, "Peking's African Adventures," *ibid.*, V, 15 (September 15, 1967), pp. 5-6.

<sup>47</sup>The list in Table IX is based on reports in Africa Research Bulletin (1964-1976), BBB Summary of World Broadcasts (1969-1976); Daniel Wolfstone, "Sino-African Economics," Far Eastern Economic Review, XLIII, 7 (February 13, 1964), p. 350; Dick Wilson, "China's Economic Relations with Africa," Race, V, 4 (April, 1964), pp. 65-71; Wolfgang Bartke, Agreements of the People's Republic of China with Other Countries, 1969-1972 (Hamburg, 1973); and Ching-chi tao-pao [Economic reporter], nos. 1251-1252, pp. 33-34; 1301-1302, pp. 16-17; 1351-1352, pp. 12-13; 1401-1402, pp. 20-21. In most cases, the initial agreements were either renewed or replaced by new ones after expiration. However, the list is probably incomplete because of the lack of systematic compilation of Sino-African trade agreements.

<sup>48</sup>"Economic Relations of Taipei, Peking, Africa," excerpts from an unsigned article, "The 'Two Chinas' and Africa," in Le Moniteur Africain (Dakar), June 3, 1971, pp. 7-8, in JPRS, Translations on Africa, no. 163 (53556), no. 1050, p. 12. See also "African Economies--Communist Influence," Bulletin of Africa Institute of South Africa, X, 2 (March, 1972), p. 50; and "China's Foreign Trade in 1972," Current Scene, XI, 10 (October, 1973), pp. 12-14.

<sup>49</sup>In most cases, the initial agreements were either renewed or replaced by new ones after expiration. The list in Table IX is based on the same sources as mentioned in note no. 47 and thus is probably incomplete.

<sup>50</sup>Afro-Asian Solidarity Against Imperialism (Peking, 1964), pp. 149-150; Peking Review, no. 34 (August 21, 1964), p. 16.

<sup>51</sup>Ai Ching-chu, "China's Economic and Technical Aid to Other Countries," Peking Review, no. 34 (August 21, 1964), p. 15.

<sup>52</sup>"Chinese Said Making Progress in African Aid Programs," translation of an article by Raymond Tournoux in the French-language Paris Match, November 25, 1972, pp. 46-47, in JPRS, Translations on Africa, no. 204 (57804), no. 1245, p. 1.

<sup>53</sup>See Dick Wilson, "Chinese in Africa," Far Eastern Economic Review, XLVI, 10 (December 3, 1964), pp. 489-490. For ROC Vice Foreign Minister Yang Hsi-kun's comments on Peking's "checkbook diplomacy" in Africa, see Free China Weekly, IV, 20 (January 9, 1966), 2, and XIV, 30 (August 5, 1973), p. 1.

<sup>54</sup>Ai, pp. 15, 17.

<sup>55</sup>Peking usually paid transportation and wages for Chinese technicians working abroad. One advantage of Peking's economic aid over that of Moscow was that the Chinese often provided long-term financing

to cover the local costs of their projects, while the Soviets would not allow African recipients to use Soviet credits to finance local costs. Furthermore, Chinese technicians, required by Peking to accept local living standards received extremely low wages compared with their counterparts from the West and the Soviet bloc. For example, PRC experts working in Mali in 1964 received less than \$80 a month while those from Eastern bloc countries were paid three times this amount. See Cooley, p. 148. For more detailed description and comparison of the Sino-Soviet aid competition in Africa, see Warren Weinstein, ed., Chinese and Soviet Aid to Africa (New York, 1975); Charles B. McLane, Soviet-African Relations (London, 1974); Udo Weiss, "China's Aid to and Trade with the Developing Countries of the Third World," in Centre d'Etude du Sud-Est Asiatique et de l'Extreme-Orient, ed., China and the Current Era of Detente (no publisher, 1974), pp. 91-157; Dick Wilson, "China's Economic Relations with Africa," pp. 61-71; Leo Tansky, "Chinese Foreign Aid," in U.S. Congress, Joint Economic Committee, People's Republic of China: An Economic Assessment (Washington, 1972), pp. 371-381; and Liu Wei-peng, "Kung-fei tui Fei-chou wai-chiao ti ying-mou chi ts'o-pai" [Communist Chinese intrigues in Africa and their failure], Wen-ti yu yen-chiu, 9, 9 (June, 1970), pp. 59-60.

<sup>56</sup>Tansky, table 2.

<sup>57</sup>Tansky, p. 377.

<sup>58</sup>Udo Weiss, p. 98.

<sup>59</sup>"Red Onslaught on Southern Africa," Bulletin of the Africa Institute of South Africa, X, 9 (October, 1972), p. 358.

<sup>60</sup>Peter Seidlitz, "Along the Tanzam Railway," Swiss Review of World Affairs, XXVI, 1 (April, 1976), p. 20.

<sup>61</sup>Pieter Lessing, Africa's Red Harvest (New York, 1962), p. 42.

<sup>62</sup>Cas de Villiers, "China's Decade in Africa," Bulletin of the Africa Institute of South Africa, XI, 8 (September, 1973), p. 302.

<sup>63</sup>Lessing, p. 42.

<sup>64</sup>Jan Randall, West Africa correspondent for Time magazine, quoted in Lessing, p. 143.

<sup>65</sup>This remark was made by a certain figure, presumably Ghanaian, to Ogunsanwo in an interview. Ogunsanwo referred to him simply as "Z." However, the comparison was confirmed by Ogunsanwo's interview with Michael Dei Arang, former Secretary General of Ghana's Ministry of Foreign Affairs. See Ogunsanwo, p. 145.

<sup>66</sup>Brent Hutton-Williams, "Communism in Africa: Words as Weapons," Bulletin of the Africa Institute of South Africa, IX, 5 (June, 1971), p. 219. Hutton-Williams was the former Rhodesian Director of Information. The term "cadre" is used in the PRC to mean any person whose

responsibilities include training or leading others. See also Yang Feng-tai, "Tsung Mao-kung tui Fei-chou ti hsuan-chuan kan chi cheng-chih tung-hsiang" [Peking's political trends as viewed from its propaganda toward Africa], Wen-ti yu yen-chiu, XIII, 1 (October, 1973), p. 54.

<sup>67</sup>For fuller treatment of PRC propaganda organs and personnel, see Larkin, pp. 214-244.

<sup>68</sup>Hsin-wen-chu, hsing-cheng-yuan [Government Information Office, Executive Yuan, ROC], comp., Kung-fei tui Fei-chou hsuan-chuan ti fen-hsi [Analysis of Communist Chinese propaganda toward Africa] (Taipei, 1966), pp. 13-14.

<sup>69</sup>Elsbeth Huxley, "The Dragon in Africa," Optima (September, 1962), cited in George T. Yu, "Peking Versus Taipei in the World Arena," p. 444. See also Kung-fei tui Fei-chou hsuan-chuan ti fen-hsi, p. 3.

<sup>70</sup>"The Chinese 'Journalists' in Black Africa," translation of an article by Nicolas Lang in Est et Ouest, 17, 349 (October 16-31, 1965), 32, in JPRS, Translations on Africa, no. 34 (32902), no. 286, pp. 11-13. See also "The New China News Agency: Mao's Messengers Around the World," Current Scene, IV, 7 (April 1, 1966), pp. 7-8.

<sup>71</sup>For an inside personal account, see Chiang Kuei-lin, Hsin-hua she shih-erh nien [Twelve years with NCNA] (Taipei, 1962). Chiang, a CCP member, worked as an editor at the NCNA bureau in Cairo. He defected in December, 1959, in Cairo after being recalled to China. Later he went to Taiwan.

<sup>72</sup>In 1956 Radio Peking started broadcasting with seven hours per week in English to the Middle East, South Asia, and Africa. See special reports on PRC propaganda in Current Scene (October, 1959-April, 1961), "Statistical Sketch of Radio and TV Development in Mainland China in 1959" (p. 47); "Broadcasting Hours Per Week Directed to Africa by Communist Countries," comp. by BBC Monitoring Service and cited in Hutton-Williams, pp. 220-221, and Yu, p. 443. "Communist Broadcasting to Africa," Bulletin of the Africa Institute of South Africa, X, 4 (May, 1972), p. 141, indicates that Radio Peking "began beaming broadcasts to Africa in August, 1959." This misconception was probably based on the fact that Radio Peking's African broadcasts were terminated in 1958 but resumed and expanded a year later with programs for West, South and East Africa. See Yu, "Peking Versus Taipei in the World Arena," p. 443, and Lessing, p. 124.

<sup>73</sup>Yu, *ibid.*

<sup>74</sup>Lessing, p. 125.

<sup>75</sup>"Communist Propaganda to Africa," p. 141.

<sup>76</sup>Alex Blake, "Peking's African Adventures," p. 4; Yu, "Dragon in the Bush," Asian Survey, 8 (December, 1968), pp. 1023-1024; and "Communist Broadcasting to Africa," p. 141.

<sup>77</sup>Cooley, p. 29.

<sup>78</sup>"Communist Broadcasting to Africa," p. 143; see also Lowenthal, p. 158.

<sup>79</sup>Yu, "Dragon in the Bush," pp. 1023-1024.

<sup>80</sup>Ibid.

<sup>81</sup>These ratios were obtained by comparing the total African population with the total radio sets in Africa in 1960, 1965, 1970, and 1974, as reported in the U.N. Statistical Yearbook, 1968, table 216 (p. 782); 1972, table 213 (pp. 836-837); 1976, table 2 (p. 8), and table 216 (pp. 893-894).

<sup>82</sup>"Chinese Tactics in Africa Reviewed and Criticized," a translation of an article by Edouard Pellissier in the French-language periodical Lumiere [Light], Fianarantsoa, no. 1556 (February 6, 1966), p. 3, in JPRS, Translations on Africa, no. 38 (34342), no. 334, p. 3; "Peking Donates Radio Equipment to Guinea," a translation of an unsigned article entitled "Sino-Guinean Cooperation Emphasized at Donation of Radio Equipment by Peking to Guinea," in the French-language newspaper Horoya, Conakry, October 20, 1966, p. 4, in ibid., no. 57 (39134), no. 470, pp. 16-17; and "Africa's Relations with East Bloc Described," article by F. Pelerin, in the German-language Afrika Heute, Bonn, November 1, 1968, pp. 301-304, in ibid., no. 98 (46950), no. 750, pp. 4-5.

<sup>83</sup>Official Chinese-language texts of the two agreements appear in Wai-chiao-pu, Chung-hua jen-min kung-ho-kuo [Foreign ministry, PRC], Chung-hua jen-min kung-ho-kuo tiao-yueh-chi [Collection of treaties of the People's Republic of China] Hereafter referred to as Tiao-yueh-chi (PRC), 12 (1963), pp. 206-207, and 13 (1964), pp. 322-323.

<sup>84</sup>Hsuan-chuan ti fen-hsi, p. 39.

<sup>85</sup>Yu, "Dragon in the Bush," p. 1024; and Largin, p. 151.

<sup>86</sup>Revolution was published in English, French, German, and Spanish. Peking Review has editions in English, French, German, Spanish, and Japanese. Those circulated in Africa were mostly in English and French. See Hsuan-chuan ti fen-hsi, pp. 43-45; and Cooley, pp. 196-198.

<sup>87</sup>Hsuan-chuan ti fen-hsi, pp. 46, 52. See also special reports on ROC propaganda in Current Scene (October, 1959-April, 1961), p. 185; and Cooley, pp. 196-198.

<sup>88</sup>Hsuan-chuan ti fen-hsi, p. 41; Cooley, p. 200.

<sup>89</sup>Documentary films produced by Chinese cameramen in Africa include "Resolute Algeria," "Cities of Morocco," "An Ode to the Nile," "Chinese People Condemn the Murder of Patrice Lumumba," "Independent

Mali," and "The Horn of Africa." The last one, on Somalia's struggle for independence and development, won first prize in the Fourth International African Film Festival held in Mogadiscio in September, 1961. See Cooley, p. 200; and Yu, "Peking Versus Taipei in World Arena," p. 445.

<sup>90</sup>From 1949 to 1970, the position of Chairman of the People's Republic of China was the PRC equivalent of head of state. Until 1959, it was held by Mao Tse-tung concurrently with the paramount position of Chairman of the Chinese Communist Party, but Mao never left China except for visits to Moscow in 1950 and 1957. In 1959 he relinquished the PRC chairmanship to Liu Shao-ch'i. After Liu was purged in 1970, the PRC chairmanship was abolished, and the figurehead Chairman of the National People's Congress came to be regarded as the PRC equivalent of head of state for the ceremonial purpose of greeting foreign visitors.

<sup>91</sup>See especially Scalapino, On the Trail; John K. Cooley, East Wind Over Africa: Red China's African Offensive (New York, 1965); and W.A.C. Adie, "Chou En-lai on Safari," China Quarterly, 18 (April, 1964), pp. 174-194. For documents, speeches, and press interviews pertaining to Chou's visit, see Afro-Asian Solidarity Against Imperialism.

<sup>92</sup>See Scalapino, On the Trail, pp. 1-4; and his "Sino-Soviet Competition in Africa," Foreign Affairs, 42, 4 (July, 1964), pp. 641-644; "R.B." [sic], "China's Impact on Africa--A Summing Up," Race, V, 4 (April, 1964), pp. 79-80; "Communist China and Africa in 1965," translation of an article by Philippe Schneyder in the French-language monthly France Eurafrigue, Paris, XVII, 161 (April, 1965), pp. 15-20, in JPRS, Translations on Africa, no. 25 (30040), no. 198, p. 3; and "Two Chinas in Africa," Bulletin of the Africa Institute of South Africa, VIII, 10 (November-December, 1970), pp. 384-385.

<sup>93</sup>Lessing, p. 55. Adie, "China and Africa Today," Race, V, 4 (April, 1964), pp. 18-19, omits Ethiopia and Somalia but adds Senegal.

<sup>94</sup>Peking Review, no. 21 (May 21, 1965), p. 20. The ROC source Hsuan-chuan ti fen-hsi, p. 10, mistakenly lists UAR (Egypt) instead of CAR.

<sup>95</sup>See "Dimensions of the Chinese Involvement in Africa," translation of Philippe Schneyder's report entitled "Chinese Policy in Africa from 1955 to 1967," in Comptes Rendus Mensuels des Seances de l'Academie des Sciences d'Outre-Mer (Paris), March, 1968, pp. 131-151, in JPRS, Translations on Africa, no. 92 (46156), no. 726, p. 20.

<sup>96</sup>"Note on French Study of Communist Chinese Policies in Africa," a translation of an unsigned article entitled "Political Life--Black Africa," in the French-language periodical Bulletin de L'Afrique Noire, Paris, no. 467 (June 14, 1967), p. 9423, in *ibid.*, no. 68 (41785), no. 598, p. 2.

<sup>97</sup> See Lowenthal, "China," p. 160, and Cooley, p. 201.

<sup>98</sup> Gordon Brook-Shepherd, "Red Rivalry in the Black Continent," Reporter, 26, 2 (January 18, 1962), p. 23.

<sup>99</sup> Ibid.

<sup>100</sup> Hevi, An African Student in China, p. 116.

<sup>101</sup> See Kojo Amoo-Gottfried, "A Review of 'An African Student in China,'" Race, V, 4 (April, 1964), pp. 72-74.

<sup>102</sup> "Economic Relations of Taipei, Peking, Africa," in JPRS, Translations on Africa, p. 11; Tareq Y. Ismael, "The People's Republic of China and Africa," Journal of Modern African Study, 9, 4 (December, 1971), p. 522; Current Scene, XII, 7 (July, 1974), pp. 16-21.

<sup>103</sup> Documentation for this section on covert operations will be presented with more detailed discussions in the regional chapters which follow. It is worth mentioning at this point that some of the most revealing evidence of PRC involvement in training guerrillas in Africa was made public as a result of the overthrow of African rulers who had cooperated most closely with Peking, such as Ghana's Nkrumah.

### CHAPTER III

#### EXTERNAL ISSUES AFFECTING PRC-

#### AFRICAN RELATIONS

The policy framework described in Chapter II was affected by a number of issues external to Africa. From 1949 to 1971, the most pervasive of these was the non-African controversy over Chinese representation in the United Nations, as will be described in Chapter X. Several other external issues need to be examined here, before attention is turned to a regional survey of Peking's relations with individual countries in Africa.

#### The Sino-Soviet Dispute

As early as January 25, 1960, the idea that Africa might profit from big power disputes was openly stated by Tunisian President Habib Bourguiba in his opening address to the second All-African Peoples Conference of African Nations:

The fact that Africa today excites the appetites of certain great powers, that it is the focus of international intrigues and covetous desires, is not a matter for concern. It is even a good thing, because it emphasizes the interest felt towards Africa and shows the advantage which we must derive therefrom . . . The most important thing [for Africans] is to have a feel for events and know how to exploit them.<sup>1</sup>

Bourguiba was evidently referring to the cold war between the Soviet Union and the United States. In January, 1960, few people outside the inner circles of Soviet and PRC leadership realized that the

two largest Communist states were on the verge of a vitriolic public feud. Moreover, Tunisia did not then have diplomatic relations with either the PRC or ROC, and perhaps did not yet think of the PRC as a "great power." Four years later, Bourguiba received Chou En-lai and agreed to recognize Peking, but reportedly spoke very bluntly to Chou about the PRC's militance:

You come to Africa as the enemy of the capitalist states, of the West, of the neutralists and the non-aligned, of India, of Tito, of Khrushchev, of everybody. You have not chosen an easy policy. I'll say that. Don't expect to score much in Africa. Others won't tell you straight; I will--you won't get far in this continent.<sup>2</sup>

In the four years between these two statements by Bourguiba, the number of independent African nations had grown from eleven to thirty-five.<sup>3</sup> The outside powers vying for African favor could no longer be simply divided into two camps, East and West, because the Soviet Union and the PRC had become open enemies. Peking's influence in Africa was tested on three interrelated external issues: the Sino-Soviet rift itself, the 1962 Sino-Indian border war, and the 1963 Moscow nuclear test-ban treaty. The background and development of these issues have been treated extensively and need not be reviewed here. The study intends only to analyze African reaction to the Chinese stand on these issues.

Despite the fact that most African leaders tried to keep the Sino-Soviet conflict away from their continent, their efforts failed because African governments were already politically and ideologically diverse, and since both Peking and Moscow were determined to gain African support for 'their own point of view on such important issues as the test-ban treaty, disarmament, and peaceful coexistence. As the Sino-

Soviet dispute became intensified, African leaders, irritated and worried, asked Moscow and Peking to patch up their differences. On September 30, 1963, in a message to an AAPSO conference in Nicosia, Ghana's Nkrumah argued that:

Our goal should be to seek the unity of the socialist countries, for it is only through this unity that they can support us in our struggle against imperialism and colonialism . . . [We should] appeal most strongly to China and the Soviet Union to eliminate their difference and to come together again without delay.<sup>4</sup>

However, by then, the dispute had already reached the point where not even fraternal parties within the Communist camp could repair the breach. As the Sino-Soviet conflict dragged on, many Africans became impatient and disgusted with both. Commenting on the confusion caused by the mutual slandering of the Soviet and Chinese delegations at an AAPSO conference in Algiers in March, 1964, a Kenyan delegate expressed his resentment:

We are not Marxist-Leninists. Most of us have not read a line of Das Kapital, so what interest do you expect us to show in your doctrinal quarrels? I am tired of being asked what I think of the Soviet position when I am eating a sandwich, and what I think of the Chinese arguments when I am drinking my tea.<sup>5</sup>

In May, 1967, after a heated confrontation between the Chinese Embassy in Lusaka and a visiting Soviet delegation, the Zambia News commented critically:

Who do those Russians and Chinese think they are to fight their wordy ideological battles in Zambia? . . . This recent show of arrogance by the Russians and Chinese in Lusaka is an example of boorishness, particularly since President Kaunda had just asked, courteously but firmly, that Zambia not be drawn into the Sino-Soviet East-West conflict.<sup>6</sup>

Though the Sino-Soviet dispute stirred up African resentment against both Peking and Moscow, most African leaders seemed to find

Peking more blameworthy. They attributed the deterioration of Sino-Soviet relations to Peking's bellicose attitude toward Moscow and its extreme and uncompromising position on the nuclear test-ban treaty, disarmament, and the United Nations. The conflict between Peking and Moscow has been a handicap to both the Chinese and the Russians in winning influence in Africa and the rest of the Third World.

#### The PRC-India Border War

PRC influence in Africa faced another test when a long-standing Sino-Indian border dispute erupted into a full-fledged border war in October, 1962.<sup>7</sup> The war went badly for India and complicated both the Sino-Soviet dispute and Western relations with India, but caused surprisingly little reaction in Africa. Even though all twelve member states of the Union Africaine et Malgache (UAM), then the most anti-Peking international political organization in Africa, sent messages of sympathy to India, only Niger openly condemned "Chinese aggression."<sup>8</sup> There was no active support for India. In the rest of Africa, the most explicit denunciation of Peking came from Ethiopia, Nigeria, and to a lesser degree, Tunisia.<sup>9</sup> From the Indian viewpoint, the most disappointing reaction came from Ghana, a fellow Commonwealth member; President Nkrumah sent strong notes to Prime Minister Harold Macmillan, protesting Britain's decision to provide India with military aid.<sup>10</sup>

The UAM and Ghana then occupied opposite ends of the political spectrum in Africa. Other African governments, regardless of political coloration, seemed little concerned by the war. One reason was that Peking argued its case more cogently in Africa than India did. For example, when the Tanzanian government asked the Chinese and Indian

embassies to present information on the dispute, the Chinese submitted well-documented evidence, including maps, photostatic copies of treaties, illustrations showing the territory disputed, etc., while the Indians were unable to do likewise.<sup>11</sup> Even in New Delhi, the Indian government's embarrassing lack of information about the disputed territory made the Chinese claim to ownership more plausible. (For example, India was unaware that the Chinese had built a military road in the area several years earlier.)

Beyond uncertainty as to who was at fault in the Sino-Indian war, some Africans were prepared to give the PRC the benefit of the doubt because they disliked India. This was partly because of African jealousy of relatively prosperous Indian communities in East Africa, but among more militant Africans there was also dissatisfaction with Indian Prime Minister Nehru's moderate attitude on Third World issues. India and the PRC had been rivals for Third World leadership since the 1955 Bandung conference. Among Third World leaders, Nehru was the most realistic and his pragmatism became more apparent in the 1960s. He was more concerned with world peace than with armed revolution against colonialism, and he believed that only cooperation between the United States and the Soviet Union could solve world problems, viewpoints unacceptable to the PRC and such militant African leaders as Nkrumah of Ghana, Toure of Guinea, and Keita of Mali.

The Sino-Indian crisis therefore had consequences beyond its immediate context. It not only intensified the already deteriorating Sino-Soviet relations by making Moscow openly pro-India, but also ended the myth of "Afro-Asian solidarity." By 1964, Egypt, Yugoslavia, and India were promoting a "second Belgrade conference" of "non-aligned"

nations, which was held in Cairo without PRC participation, while the PRC was trying unsuccessfully to organize a rival "second Bandung conference" of Afro-Asian nations, to be held in Algiers, as noted in Chapter II. Some African nations friendly to Peking supported both types of conferences, but clearly the Sino-Indian war had created a new line of cleavage among the Third World countries.

### The Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty

Another issue over which the PRC fared less well in Africa was the nuclear test-ban treaty signed in Moscow in 1963. Since the founding of the PRC in 1949, China had been protected by the Soviet nuclear umbrella. Before the Sino-Soviet rift came into the open in 1960, Moscow had promised to help develop PRC atomic technology. An agreement on new technology for national defense was reportedly signed between China and the Soviet Union on October 15, 1957. Under this agreement, Moscow was to provide Peking "with a sample of an atomic bomb and technical data concerning its manufacture."<sup>12</sup>

However, as Sino-Soviet relations deteriorated, the Soviets unilaterally repudiated the agreement on June 20, 1959. The PRC later charged that this was done by Khrushchev "as a presentation gift at the time the Soviet leader went to the United States for talks with Eisenhower" in September, 1959, creating what the United States called the "spirit of Camp David."<sup>13</sup> Four years later, when the Soviet Union, the United States, and Great Britain signed a nuclear test-ban treaty in Moscow on July 25, 1963, Peking bitterly denounced it as "a big fraud to fool the people of the world," in which the three nuclear powers were attempting "to consolidate their nuclear monopoly and bind the

hands of all the peace-loving countries subjected to the nuclear threat."<sup>14</sup> Behind this bitter denunciation lay Peking's fear of Soviet-American encirclement of China with nuclear weapons or even a "pre-emptive" attack upon China by the Soviets. The PRC response was an intense drive to develop its own nuclear technology rapidly; this led to the first PRC atomic explosion on October 16, 1964.<sup>15</sup>

In Africa, the PRC spared no effort in attacking the Moscow treaty in propaganda and through diplomatic channels. Nevertheless, most African countries, with the notable exception of the PRC's close friend Guinea, became signatories of the treaty, as did Nationalist China.<sup>16</sup> ROC accession to the treaty added fuel to PRC attacks both on the treaty and on the Soviet Union, which had not immediately objected to the ROC as a signatory. On August 30, 1963, one week after the ROC signing, the Chinese Communist Party newspaper Jen-min jih-pao, in a long editorial entitled "Further Exposure of the Soviet Leaders' Act of Betrayal," called Soviet silence:

. . . another iron-clad proof that in order to meet the needs of the 'two Chinas' scheme engineered by U.S. imperialism, the Soviet leaders do not hesitate to betray their ally, and the interests of the socialist camp and of the world's people.<sup>17</sup>

Two days later, Peking issued an official statement charging that the Soviet Union had conspired with the United States in creating "a situation of two Chinas."<sup>18</sup> Only then did the Soviet government deliver a note to the U.S. Department of State (September 6), declaring that it "does not recognize" the signature of Nationalist China on the treaty. The Soviet objection was rejected by Washington and the issue remained unresolved.

Generally speaking, the test-ban treaty was well received in

Africa. Peking's denunciation of it irritated African leaders and convinced them that the PRC would carry its militant revolutionary ideology and opposition to peaceful coexistence to the extreme. During his 1963-1964 African tour, Chou En-lai was asked in several African capitals to explain Peking's stubborn attitude. For example, PRC opposition to the test-ban treaty was criticized both by Bourguiba of Tunisia, and by Ethiopia's Haile Selassie at a banquet in Chou's honor.<sup>19</sup>

### The French Connection

In the same month, however, another external development brought Peking new prestige in a part of Africa--the West--where it had previously not enjoyed much influence except in Ghana, Guinea, and Mali. This was France's decision, after fourteen years' delay, to recognize the PRC. On January 27, 1964, France and the PRC established diplomatic relations and agreed "to appoint their ambassadors within three months."<sup>20</sup> Two days later, a Jen-min jih-pao editorial acclaimed this as "another major achievement of China's foreign policy" proving that "the scheme of U.S. imperialism and its followers to isolate China is doomed to complete failure."<sup>21</sup> As expected, the French action was bitterly denounced by the ROC, which broke off diplomatic relations with Paris on February 10.<sup>22</sup>

The complex reasons for France's decision are extraneous to this study, and have already been examined by other writers.<sup>23</sup> For the PRC, French recognition was important not only because France was a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council but also because France under Charles De Gaulle was trying to establish its credentials as a "non-aligned" power and because France still had close relations with

numerous French-speaking nations in Africa which had not recognized Peking. The PRC concluded that French recognition would increase Peking's prestige in the countries of the Third World in general and in former French Africa in particular. The results were favorable but much more limited than Peking expected.

The Paris-Peking rapprochement produced mixed reactions in black Africa. Generally speaking, De Gaulle's decision was less well received in former French Africa than in the rest of the continent. There were then fifteen former French colonies in black Africa. Two of these, Guinea and Mali, had been unfriendly to France since independence, and had recognized Peking since 1959 and 1960, respectively. As expected, they openly praised De Gaulle's action in 1964. The other thirteen Francophone African countries all had diplomatic relations with Taipei, and only three followed France's example in switching to recognize Peking: Congo, the CAR, and Benin. Mauritania did so a year later, bringing to seventeen the total of African states recognizing the PRC. But the other nine countries rejected the French example and maintained relations with the ROC, partly because of apprehension over PRC's covert support of dissident groups in various African countries. Three of these--Madagascar, Ivory Coast, and Upper Volta--sharply criticized France's action.<sup>24</sup>

#### The PRC's "Cultural Revolution"

Except for the Sino-Soviet split, none of the external issues discussed above had such a profound effect on PRC relations with Africa as the domestic upheaval in China from 1966 to 1969, known euphemistically in the PRC as the "Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution." The scars

of this peculiar and traumatic chapter of Chinese history will be felt for years to come, and there is a large body of literature attempting to describe and explain the Cultural Revolution.<sup>25</sup> This is relevant to the present study insofar as relations with Africa were affected, but such external consequences cannot be understood without some explanation of the astonishing events inside China in those years.

The problem of describing the Cultural Revolution calls to mind the parable of six blind men who felt an elephant's tusk, trunk, ears, body, legs, and tail, and reached six very different conclusions as to what an elephant looked like. Although the Cultural Revolution had little connection with "culture" in any normal sense, it did begin with a November 10, 1965, newspaper article denouncing an historical play containing veiled criticism of Mao Tse-tung.<sup>26</sup> It ended with the April 1-24, 1969, congress of the Chinese Communist Party (the first held since 1958), and publication of a 24,000 word report by Marshal Lin Biao on the Cultural Revolution.

By far the most visible part of the violent Cultural Revolution was the two-year rampage of ten million teenage students called "Red Guards," first mobilized by Mao himself on August 18, 1966, given railway passes, and told to fan out over China and "make revolution," which they proceeded to do with a vengeance until gradually sent home or to manual labor on farms in the fall of 1968.<sup>27</sup> During this two-year period, the Red Guards spread over the whole country like a prairie fire, invading private homes (often going door-to-door from one end of the street to the other) to destroy or confiscate anything they considered "old" or "Western" (clothing, books, works of art), and invading public buildings to single out teachers, Communist Party

officials, PRC government officials, and even military officials for verbal and physical abuse, humiliating them without mercy in public criticism, forced "confessions" and self-criticism, and "trials."

Accompanying all this was a "cult of personality" apotheosizing Mao to an extent far exceeding anything in the earlier Soviet adulation of Lenin after death or Stalin before death. A sonorous anthem proclaimed that "red is the east, rises the sun: China has brought forth a Mao Tse-tung." Portraits of Mao were hung in every home and apartment; thousands of life-size statues of him were erected throughout the country, even in hotels. Mao was officially declared "the greatest Marxist-Leninist of our time," and Marxism-Leninism itself was renamed "Marxism-Leninism-Mao-tse-tung-thought." A pocket-sized summary of "Mao thought" was published as Quotations from Chairman Mao Tse-tung, carefully selected, lifted out of context, and arranged topically between red plastic covers. Millions of copies of this "little red book" were published in Chinese (and numerous other languages), to be carried in public at all times by everyone from kindergarten children to the highest officials and the oldest citizens, and consulted religiously for solutions to every conceivable problem.

As a wholesale verbal and physical attack promoted by a nation's highest leader against his own party and government, the Cultural Revolution is unique in world history, and therefore tends to elude rational explanation. In calling it a "revolution," Mao did not imply either of the usual Marxist or non-Marxist definitions of "revolution;" he did not seek either to overthrow a ruling social class or to change the PRC's political or social system. Since China had already had its "socialist revolution" in 1949, the Cultural Revolution was supposed

to be part of what Mao called the "continuing" or "permanent" revolution that would propel China from socialism to the utopia of communism.<sup>28</sup> An important aspect of this was Mao's belief that many members of the immense parallel bureaucracies of the Communist Party and the PRC government, from highest to lowest levels, had become comfortable, complacent, and "bureaucratic-minded," that is, "unrevolutionary" or even "counterrevolutionary," and must be "re-educated" to reinvigorate their "revolutionary spirit."

Given Mao's obsession with the ability of "revolutionary spirit" to overcome material problems, there is no reason to doubt that ideological renewal was one objective of the Cultural Revolution. But it is equally clear that real or imagined opposition to Mao's views was the sole criterion for judging whether an individual needed ideological renewal. Thus the Cultural Revolution was also an old-fashioned power struggle, thinly camouflaged with Marxist rhetoric. Anyone accused of being more "pragmatic" than "ideological," of stressing results rather than methods, was now classified as an opponent of Mao. The teenage Red Guards were permitted to carry out a wholesale purge of such people at every level within the party and the government, including Mao's hand-picked heir apparent, Liu Shao-ch'i, Chairman of the PRC, and Communist Party Secretary-General Teng Hsiao-p'ing (both close associates of Mao for more than forty years), as well as hundreds of thousands of lesser officials throughout China.

The resulting state of near anarchy encouraged widespread abuses. Many people were falsely accused, hounded out of office, and often physically abused or even killed simply because of personal grudges, jealousy, or the removal of all restraints (including the police,

which were quickly demoralized and under attack themselves). Some of these excesses met with Mao's approval, some did not. A major obstacle to understanding the Cultural Revolution has been a tendency to assume that it proceeded according to a master plan, that everything had been ordered or anticipated by an infallible Mao.

Though the Red Guards were under the overall supervision of a 17-member "Central Cultural Revolution Group" headed by Ch'en Po-ta and Mao's fourth wife Chiang Ch'ing, as the movement grew, different Red Guard factions emerged and fought each other for official endorsement by the Communist Party.<sup>29</sup> Between late 1966 and mid-1968, violence spread over China as competing Red Guard factions intensified their struggle. Besides fighting among themselves, the Red Guards locked horns with almost every other group, including educators, government officials, party leaders, foreign service personnel, industrial workers, and even the army.

As the Red Guard movement gradually got out of control, even the radicals within the CCP Central Committee, such as the Central Cultural Revolution Group, found it necessary to suppress the most radical elements within the movement in order to save the already partially destroyed political system. In the end, it took the intervention of the army to quell the rampaging Red Guards.<sup>30</sup> Tens of thousands of Red Guards died in their own intrafaction fighting or in confrontations with soldiers.

The chaotic Cultural Revolution affected every aspect of life in the PRC: the educational and political systems were paralyzed, economic development interrupted, foreign policy hindered, and relations with many countries deteriorated.<sup>31</sup> Peking's foreign policy during the

Cultural Revolution was affected by a wave of strong xenophobia, nationalism, and ethnocentrism reminiscent of the short-lived Boxer Rebellion in 1900. Normal and appropriate functions of the foreign affairs system were disrupted and paralyzed by Red Guards as they attempted to seize the decision-making power of the Foreign Ministry.

### The Ordeal of the PRC Foreign Ministry

One of the first high-ranking targets of the Red Guards was Ch'en I, a sixty-five year old field marshal who had been foreign minister since 1958. The first attacks on Ch'en I were verbal, and appeared in "big-character posters" (ta tze pao) in Peking in October, 1966. Ch'en was accused of numerous "crimes," including suppressing the Cultural Revolution in the Foreign Ministry and nurturing a "special privileged stratum of high ranking foreign service officers, . . . a stratum which consists of agents of Liu Shao-ch'i and Teng Hsiao-p'ing in the Foreign Ministry."<sup>32</sup> At first, Ch'en I seemed able to stand firm but his position gradually became more vulnerable.

Early in 1967, Red Guards gained a foothold inside the Foreign Ministry through the establishment of a "Ministry of Foreign Affairs Revolutionary Rebel Liaison Station" (wai-chiao-pu ke-ming tsao-fan lien-lo-chan) on January 18, to "lead revolution and to inspect work" in the ministry.<sup>33</sup> Six days later, at a mass rally of 10,000, reportedly presided over by his friend Premier Chou En-lai, Ch'en I was forced to make a public "confession." Between late March and early April, as extremist Red Guard factions criticized the Overseas Chinese Affairs Commission, Ch'en was again under fire. On April 4 the General Command of the Red Guards sponsored a mass rally against Ch'en.<sup>34</sup> Four

days later, a "Criticize Ch'en I Liaison Station" (p'i-p'an Ch'en I lien-lo-chan) was set up within the Foreign Ministry to attack the foreign minister himself.

By early May, the attack upon Ch'en I was broadened to include two of his vice-ministers, Chi P'eng-fei and Ch'iao Kuan-hua.<sup>35</sup> On May 13, the first of a series of violent incidents occurred in the Foreign Ministry building as hundreds of rampaging Red Guards occupied the building for six hours. The Red Guards completely paralyzed the regular operations of the ministry by beating up guards, breaking open files, and ransacking documents.<sup>36</sup>

After this incident, Premier Chou En-lai held a four-hour meeting with the young rebels. Chou agreed that he would attend criticize-Ch'en meetings organized by the Red Guards but he refused to submit to their other demand that Ch'en I, Chi P'eng-fei, and Ch'iao Kuan-hua be removed from office. Unsatisfied with Chou's answers, the young rebels again raided the Foreign Ministry on May 29 and stole classified materials.<sup>37</sup> In August, two more rallies were organized in Peking by Red Guards to criticize Ch'en I; Premier Chou attended both. During the ordeal, Ch'en was so roughly handled by the Red Guards that it took soldiers to protect him. However, leading members of the CCP Central Committee were still against the ouster of Ch'en.

In the early stages of his long ordeal, Ch'en fought back with dry wit and a sharp tongue. One story, repeated even by writers sympathetic to Mao, is that on one occasion when Red Guards invaded his office and forced him to wear a dunce cap while they harangued him for an hour, Ch'en finally "looked at his watch and said, 'Please excuse me. I have to go to the airport to welcome the President of

Guinea."<sup>38</sup> (The last detail must be garbled, since there is no record of a visit by Toure of Guinea during the Cultural Revolution.) Eventually, however, Ch'en was physically broken by the harassment, lost twenty-seven pounds, and had to be hospitalized. Mao is said to have complained that "I cannot show him to foreign guests in this condition."<sup>39</sup>

#### Disarray in Foreign Relations

There were not very many foreign guests to see. Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana arrived for a state visit on February 24, 1966, at the very beginning of the Cultural Revolution--and was overthrown by a military coup in Ghana during his flight to Peking. That may have discouraged some African leaders from leaving home; the isolationist and xenophobic attitude of China during the Cultural Revolution discouraged others. Only three other African heads of state visited China during the Cultural Revolution: in October, 1967, Ould Daddah of Mauritania (the latest African state to recognize Peking), and in June, 1967, and June, 1968, respectively, the leaders of Zambia and Tanzania, where the PRC was financing construction of a Zamtan or Tanzam railway.

On September 20, 1966, the PRC ordered all foreign students in China, numbering approximately 1,000 and mostly from Afro-Asian countries and Albania, to leave the country.<sup>40</sup> In December, Peking began calling its ambassadors home to be "re-educated" and to answer charges levied against them by Red Guards. Some senior diplomats were accused of living a capitalistic and rotten life and being seduced by Western luxuries. One Red Guard article charges that PRC "ambassadors, counselors and their wives were [sic] nothing but stuff made in the United

States, Britain, Germany, France, and Japan."<sup>41</sup> By late 1967, forty-five of the forty-six PRC ambassadors had returned home. Only Huang Hua, ambassador to Cairo, remained at his post. All other PRC embassies around the world were headed by charges d'affaires.<sup>42</sup>

The Cultural Revolution and its aftermath had very negative effects on PRC relations with many countries of the Third World. Peking's relations with Afghanistan, Cambodia, Ceylon, Indonesia, Burma, Nepal, Sweden, Switzerland, Algeria, Kenya, and Tunisia deteriorated rapidly. By September, 1967, Peking had been involved in incidents of various degrees with thirty-two nations.<sup>43</sup>

Despite this, the PRC maintained cordial relations during the Cultural Revolution with a few African countries, notably Congo, Mali, Mauritania, Tanzania, and Zambia. Relations with others deteriorated, sometimes because of events in Africa unrelated to the Cultural Revolution, sometimes because of Peking's domestic preoccupation, and sometimes because of attempts to "export" Cultural Revolution ideology and fanaticism, as noted below. Whatever the circumstances in individual cases, the pattern is one of general decline in PRC relations with Africa during the Cultural Revolution years, as summarized in Table XIV.

On January 3 and 6, 1966, new governments in Benin and the CAR broke diplomatic relations with Peking, and on October 30, 1966, the PRC broke relations with the new government of Ghana. In 1967 there were protracted disputes between the PRC and two other African countries, Kenya and Tunisia, leading to mutual expulsion of diplomats. Tunisia suspended diplomatic relations with Peking on September 24. Kenya did not, even though its embassy in Peking was attacked by Red

TABLE XIV  
AFRICAN IMPACT OF THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION,  
1966-1969

	1965	1966	1967	1968	1969
African countries having diplomatic relations with the PRC	17	14	13	13	13
African delegations visiting PRC	114	114	57	12	12
PRC delegations visiting Africa	69	47	17	14	19
PRC exports to Africa (in million \$)	130	169	161	137	106
PRC imports from Africa (in million \$)	120	80	68	52	88
PRC loans to Africa (in million \$)	15	41	22	0	0

Guards in August, 1967. This was the only major attack on African embassies in Peking, but Red Guards invaded and plundered both the Soviet and British embassies, and beat up a Soviet diplomat and the British charge d'affaires (August 14 and 22, 1967). By the end of the Cultural Revolution in 1969, the number of independent African countries had increased to forty-one but the number maintaining diplomatic relations with Peking fell to thirteen, compared to seventeen in 1965 when PRC activities in Africa reached a peak.<sup>44</sup>

As Red Guards intensified their attack on Foreign Minister Ch'en I and leaders of various organizations, such as Liao Cheng-chih and Liu Ning-i, who were in charge of semi-official and informal relations with Africans, the number of African delegations invited to China drastically declined, and did not increase significantly until 1972.<sup>45</sup>

In Sino-African trade, the Cultural Revolution also had negative effects. PRC exports to and imports from Africa suffered a continuous decline between 1966 and 1969. In 1969 Peking somewhat increased its imports from Africa, but even in 1969 the favorable balance of trade was only \$18 million, the lowest in the period 1966-1969.

PRC aid to black Africa, though not stopped, was definitely slowed down by the Cultural Revolution. In 1966, loans totaling \$41 million were granted to Guinea, Mali, and Tanzania. In 1967, Peking granted only \$22 million to two sub-Saharan African countries, Zambia and Mauritania.<sup>46</sup> In the next two years, no new loans were made to black Africa, although projects undertaken earlier were continued by Chinese technicians in countries such as Guinea, Mali, Congo, Tanzania, and Zambia.<sup>47</sup>

A noteworthy effect was a much narrower concentration of PRC aid in selected areas. The most conspicuous example was the Zamtan or Tanzam Railway to link landlocked Zambia with the sea, via Tanzania. Since Peking made the first bid on this project in 1965, negotiations continued with enthusiasm throughout the Cultural Revolution, with Chinese technicians undertaking surveying work, and state visits by the Presidents of Zambia and Tanzania, as mentioned above. Actual construction of the railroad began in 1970 just after the Cultural Revolution ended.

#### African Reaction to China's Upheaval

Despite numerous NCNA correspondents' reports of warm and enthusiastic African reaction to China's Cultural Revolution, many African leaders were understandably mystified by the extraordinary events in

China, and disturbed by the internal turmoil and particularly by the extremely violent xenophobia shown by the Red Guards. These cast doubt on Peking's repeated claims of stability and unity in China, brotherly love toward foreigners.

During Zambian President Kaunda's visit in June, 1967, Mao is said to have remarked to him that Africa was a continent "overflowing with energy" and destined to be "a principal zone of world revolutionary storms," a militant echo of Mao's earlier concept of the "intermediate zone" (discussed in Chapter II).<sup>48</sup> Kaunda's reaction is not recorded. Some of Africa's more militant leaders no doubt liked what they heard about the PRC in these years. The unpredictable Qaddhafi of Libya, though maintaining diplomatic relations with Taipei rather than Peking, adopted the Maoist term "cultural revolution" for his own use, and it has since been a part of the political vocabulary of several African countries.<sup>49</sup>

But uncertainty about the meaning of the Cultural Revolution even in China gave an incendiary implication to talk about "exporting" it to other countries. Soviet spokesmen in Moscow asserted in April, 1967, that Premier Chou En-lai and Chiang Ch'ing, Mao's wife and first deputy-chairman of the group directing the Cultural Revolution, had given orders to send Red Guards to Chinese embassies in Africa.<sup>50</sup> The PRC denounced these reports as Soviet attempts to sabotage China's friendship with African countries by implying an intent to interfere in their internal affairs.

The Soviet reports were echoed by at least one African source. Afrique Nouvelle [New Africa], published in Dakar, Senegal, reported in November, 1969, that in a late February, 1967, Peking meeting of the

recalled Chinese diplomats accredited to Africa, Chou En-lai and Chiang Ch'ing advocated creating in Africa a "broad united front . . . under the glorious banner of the revolutionary principles of Mao Tse-tung," to carry out a "cultural revolution in Africa."<sup>51</sup> Chiang Ch'ing reportedly told the diplomats that they "should do everything within their power to help the African organizations to achieve this objective."<sup>52</sup>

Afrique Nouvelle also asserted that from the outset of the Cultural Revolution, young Chinese in Peking had distributed among Africans in China pamphlets calling for organization of an international Red Guard movement. The Chinese Red Guards set forth five conditions for membership in this "world movement of Red Guards:" (1) to recognize Mao as the leader of the world revolution; (2) to recognize Mao's revolutionary doctrine as the only guide to Marxism-Leninism; (3) to become ardent propagandists of Mao's precepts in their own countries; (4) to organize a group of faithful partisans; and (5) to fight for the victory of the revolution "without fear of death."<sup>53</sup>

To demonstrate African receptivity to such overtures, a special New Year Day's bulletin from the official PRC news agency NCNA in 1967 reported a fantastic story of four African girls who came to China to pay homage to Mao:

Overwhelmed by their admiration and affection for the great Mao Tse-tung, four young girls from Southwest Africa crossed, over a period of several months, thousands of miles of territory, passing over deserts and forests, and finally arrived in China to reach the side of Mao Tse-tung. During their long trip they were not afraid of lions or police searches. They were thrown in jail and lost their way. But they did not give up in the face of unbelievable difficulties because the name of Mao Tse-tung filled them with the courage and strength which they needed.<sup>54</sup>

Such heavy-handed propaganda was surprisingly well received in the more militant African countries, and some even initiated their own "cultural revolution" on a limited scale. In Guinea, President Toure reorganized the Guinean party and government apparatus in 1967 to achieve what he called an "economic and cultural revolution" characterized by de-Westernization.<sup>55</sup> In Mali, there were youth demonstrations against government officials accused of living in a "capitalist and new-class style." In Tanzania, there was a de-Westernization movement focusing on education, self-reliance, rural development, and socialism, directed against the life-style of people who drove Western cars. All of these African de-Westernization movements reflected some influence from the PRC Cultural Revolution.

Among all the African politicians in favor of the Cultural Revolution, Mali's Information Minister Mamadou Gologo was undoubtedly its staunchest supporter. During the Cultural Revolution, he led a Malian delegation to Peking to attend the fifth plenary session of the Secretariat of the Association of Afro-Asian Journalists. On returning to Mali, Gologo said:

There is nothing to condemn [about the Cultural Revolution]. Democracy rules everywhere . . . I would say that the Proletarian Cultural Revolution is essentially democratic and popular, that on the whole it reflects the increased awareness of the whole Chinese people in support of the correct line of the Chinese Communist Party, in the political and ideological areas as well as in the cultural. It is a very lively revolution . . . and in my opinion and also that of all objective observers it will be crowned with great success that will strengthen the Chinese Communist Party, as well as the very ideas of democracy and freedom advocated and defended by that party.<sup>56</sup>

With Gologo in charge of the information ministry in Mali, it is not difficult to believe reports that during the Cultural Revolution, four

million copies of the "little red book" of Quotations from Chairman Mao Tse-tung were distributed in Mali, which has a population of only four million, 75 percent illiterate.<sup>57</sup>

#### Unfavorable Reaction in Africa

Cultural Revolution propaganda was not always so well received even in countries friendliest to Peking. Congo President Massemba-Debat is said to have emphatically rejected the PRC embassy's offer to show to members of his National Movement of the Revolution and its youth organization a film describing the Cultural Revolution in China.<sup>58</sup> In countries more moderate than Congo, PRC propaganda produced very adverse reactions. Kenya, Nigeria, and Tunisia were notable examples.

PRC relations with Kenya, never warm, were worsened by Peking's support of Oginga Odinga, President Jomo Kenyatta's political enemy. During the Cultural Revolution, Kenyan newspapers irritated Peking by publishing many reports of disruption and chaos in China. In March, 1967, a pamphlet entitled "New Diplomats Will Bring the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution to Africa," allegedly issued in Hong Kong by the NCNA, turned up in Kenya. According to the March 14, 1967, issue of the Kenya East African Standard, this pamphlet declared that 1967 would be "a year of great success" during which "the revolutionary peoples, especially in Africa and in Asia, would achieve resounding victory." The pamphlet also reportedly praised Odinga's opposition party as "dedicated to the just demands of all the people of Kenya."<sup>59</sup>

Some Kenyan newspapers also reported that a Chinese ship docked at Mombasa with a huge picture of Mao on its smokestack, while its crew distributed thousands of copies of his picture to Kenyans. Shortly

before the Red Guard attack on the Kenyan embassy in Peking in August, 1967, Kenya's Vice President Daniel Moi accused personnel of the PRC embassy in Nairobi of interfering in Kenya's internal affairs by going into a Kenyan school and trying to distribute Mao badges and copies of the "little red book" of Mao quotations.

Nigeria had diplomatic relations with neither Peking nor Taipei but traded with both. After the Nigerian civil war broke out in July, 1967, Peking received a delegation from the new secessionist "Biafra" government. Thereafter, federal Nigerian radio broadcasts and news media spoke of PRC involvement in the civil war and accused Peking of aiding the rebels. Although the government never openly criticized the Cultural Revolution, the Nigerian press did. The Morning Star, on February 11, 1967, compared Red Guard destruction and vandalism against works of art to the barbaric methods used by the Nazis in Europe.<sup>60</sup> Another Nigerian newspaper, Morning Post, commented on the same day that:

Mao Tse-tung's vainglorious ambition is to see his rule established in the developing world . . . rather than to underwrite, in that world, the victory of freedom and prosperity. It is hard to imagine anything more contrary to the interests of the developing nations than the famous 'cultural revolution' based on the Mao Tse-tung formula.<sup>61</sup>

PRC relations with Tunisia also deteriorated during the Cultural Revolution. Though diplomatic relations between Peking and Tunis were established in January, 1964, during Chou En-lai's visit, the two countries were never on cordial terms. In July, 1965, in an interview on West German television, Tunisian President Bourguiba described PRC policies in Asia and Africa as "colonialism camouflaged as ideology."<sup>62</sup>

During the Cultural Revolution, Sino-Tunisian relations were

pushed toward the brink of rupture. In September, 1967, a member of the PRC embassy staff and a Chinese ping-pong instructor in Tunis were put under detention by the Tunisian government on a charge of attempting to recruit University of Tunis students for subversive activities against the Bourguiba government.<sup>63</sup> On September 15, Peking delivered an extremely harsh official note protesting the detention of the two Chinese:

Standing on the side of U.S. imperialism, the Tunisian Government has been trying to split and disintegrate the Arab people's anti-imperialist front. This has greatly enraged the Tunisian and other Arab people and encountered their firm opposition. The Tunisian Government is finding itself in an increasingly bad fix. In trying to use its opposition to China to divert the attention of its people and cover up its own crime of entering further into the service of U.S. imperialism and Soviet revisionism and selling out the interests of the Tunisian and other Arab people, the Tunisian Government will certainly come to no good end.<sup>64</sup>

The Tunisian government demanded an apology and threatened to expel all Chinese embassy personnel if one was not forthcoming. Refusing to apologize, Peking withdrew its embassy staff, formally suspending relations with Tunisia; they were not resumed until 1971.

The deterioration in Peking's relations with Kenya and Tunisia cannot be attributed solely to the Cultural Revolution. Both Kenya and Tunisia had long been skeptical of Peking's intentions in Africa, and these were intensified by PRC rhetoric in the Cultural Revolution. But under normal conditions, the problems and differences existing between Peking and these African governments could have been solved through diplomatic channels. The Cultural Revolution prevented this, by making it impossible for the PRC's Foreign Ministry to conduct normal diplomacy or to make decisions in a rational way. The PRC recognized this fact,

and took steps to repair the damage and to improve relations with African countries as soon as the Cultural Revolution ended in 1969.<sup>65</sup>

### Ending the Cultural Revolution

On August 18, 1968, the second anniversary of the Red Guards, an editorial in the official Jen-min jih-pao said that "the Red Guards can have a sound future and carry the current great proletarian cultural revolution through to the end only by integrating themselves with the main force, the workers, peasants, and soldiers, armed with Mao Tse-tung's thought." What this opaque language meant was that the Red Guards were actually to be disbanded and sent to do manual labor on farms (the schools were still closed), because even Mao now agreed that they had gone too far. Two days later, the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia gave PRC leaders a new and urgent reason to terminate the disorders of the Cultural Revolution. Like the Western powers, the PRC denounced the Soviet action, but not for the same reasons.<sup>66</sup>

Peking's strong condemnation of the Soviet invasion reflected its fear of a similar invasion. On March 2, 1969, Chinese and Russian forces clashed on tiny Chenpao (Damansky) island in the Ussuri River between Khabarovsk and Vladivostok, with considerable loss of life. On April 1, the Ninth National Congress of the CCP opened in Peking in conditions of strict secrecy.<sup>67</sup> It was at this congress that Lin Piao was officially designated as Mao's "close comrade-in-arms and successor," and delivered a long report acclaiming the Cultural Revolution as a great success. He also reaffirmed PRC support for "revolutionary struggles" in Asia, Africa, and Latin America, as well as the "masses of the black people of the United States in their just struggle against

the U.S. ruling clique."<sup>68</sup>

Despite this militant rhetoric, the CCP Ninth National Congress in fact symbolized the end of the chaotic Cultural Revolution, the end to its isolationism, to most of its xenophobia, and to some of its more vitriolic language. Peking resumed its "diplomatic offensive" around the world, with Africa as a major target, using what the Nationalist Chinese sardonically called "smile diplomacy."<sup>69</sup>

the PRC not only resumed but expanded its African aid program. More countries became recipients, though most of the aid went to a few countries of strategic importance, such as Ethiopia, Somalia, Tanzania, and Zambia. Beginning in June, 1969, the Chinese ambassadorships vacated by the Cultural Revolution were refilled. By September, 1970, Peking had sent new ambassadors to ten African countries.<sup>70</sup> Prior to its admission to the United Nations in October, 1971, Peking not only resumed relations with Burundi and Tunisia but also succeeded in establishing diplomatic relations with Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, and Cameroon.

The Cultural Revolution was the most violent confrontation to date between the rival factions of the Chinese Communist Party, those stressing ideology above all else, and those taking a more pragmatic interest in results than in methods or ideological purity. The same competing lines had been visible in PRC foreign policy--radical "revolutionism" and moderate "pragmatism." Since the end of the Cultural Revolution, there has been an effort to reconcile these or combine them in what one African writer has called "revolutionary pragmatism."<sup>71</sup> It might also be appropriately called "revolutionary opportunism."

Nowhere did this "revolutionary opportunism" become more apparent than in Africa during the 1970s. In order to recapture the influence lost during the Cultural Revolution, Peking returned to Africa with a new "conservative" face in the 1970s. In those countries where it has embassies, the PRC has been much more circumspect than in the past, dealing with established regimes through appropriate channels, and avoiding contact with dissidents or guerrillas--except those planning to attack white governments in southern Africa.

#### FOOTNOTES

<sup>1</sup>Tunis, Tunisian Home Service in French, 0940 GMT, January 25, 1960, Daily Report, no. 17 (January 26, 1960), pp. 4-5.

<sup>2</sup>Chou visited Tunisia on January 9 and 10, 1964. Bourguiba's remarks were first reported by Russell Warren Howe in Jewish Observer and Middle East Review (London) on April 3, 1964, quoted by Legum in "Africa and China," p. 420.

<sup>3</sup>The number was temporarily reduced to thirty-four in April, 1964, by the merger of Tanganyika and Zanzibar to form Tanzania.

<sup>4</sup>Radio Ghana in English to Africa, 1445 GMT, September 30, 1963, in Daily Report, no. 191 (October 1, 1963), p. I 5.

<sup>5</sup>Quoted in Hevi, The Dragon's Embrace, pp. 76-77.

<sup>6</sup>See "China and Russia Clash in Africa," translation of an article by Henrik Bischofi in Afrika Heute, Bonn, October 1, 1970, pp. 285-288, in JPRS, Translations on Africa, no. 145 (51387), no. 967, p. 3.

<sup>7</sup>For the background leading to the war and the course of events, see J. P. Dalvi, Himalayan Blunder: the Curtain-raiser to the Sino-Indian War of 1962 (Bombay, 1969), and D. R. Mankekar, The Guilty Men of 1962 (Bombay, 1968). However, these two books deal with the conflict from an Indian point of view and thus are anti-Chinese. Probably the most objective work on the subject was Neville Maxwell's India's China War (London, 1970). Maxwell, a former London Times correspondent who covered the Sino-Indian border conflict of 1962, based his book on interviews with authorities and soldiers, unpublished files and government reports as well as on-the-spot observations.

<sup>8</sup>The UAM was a short-lived (1961-1964) association of French-speaking African states, including Benin, Cameroon, the CAR, Chad, Congo, Ivory Coast, Mauritania, Niger, Senegal, and Upper Volta in West and Central Africa, and Madagascar (then called the Malagasy Republic) off the southeast coast of Africa. All of these were former French colonies. None then had diplomatic relations with Peking. After Togo joined the UAM in 1963, it included all the former French colonies in black Africa except the two farthest to the left politically, Guinea and Mali. Rwanda, a former Belgian colony, also joined in 1963.

<sup>9</sup>For fuller description of African reaction toward the Sino-Indian conflict, see G. H. Jansen, Nonalignment and the Afro-Asian States (New York, 1966), Chapter XV, and Ogunsanwo, pp. 107-111.

<sup>10</sup>Ogunsanwo, pp. 108-109; Legum, "Africa and China," p. 431. For further comments by Nkrumah and the Ghanaian press, see Accra, Ghana, Domestic Service in English, 0700, 1300 and 1800 GMT, November 1, 1962, Daily Report, no. 215 (November 2, 1962), pp. I 3-6; and William Anti-Taylor, "China Through African Eyes," Race, V, 4 (April, 1964), pp. 50-51.

<sup>11</sup>Ogunsanwo, pp. 108-110.

<sup>12</sup>See statement issued by the PRC government on August 15, 1963, in Daily Report, no. 159 (August 15, 1963), p. BBB 14. See also Ying Ch'ing-yao, Chung-kung wai-chiao yu tui-wai kuan-hsi, p. 31.

<sup>13</sup>Daily Report, no. 159, *ibid.*

<sup>14</sup>See statement of the PRC on July 31, 1963, in Daily Report, no. 148 (July 31, 1963), p. BBB 1. For the full text of the Treaty, see Moscow TASS in English to Europe, 1908 GMT, July 25, 1963, in *ibid.*, no. 145 (July 26, 1963), pp. BBB 2-4.

<sup>15</sup>For fuller treatment of this subject, see Morton H. Halperin, ed., Sino-Soviet Relations and Arms Control (Cambridge, MA, 1967), especially chapters by Oran R. Young, "Chinese Views on the Spread of Nuclear Weapons" (pp. 31-70); Jeremy J. Stone, "Arms Control: Can China Be Ignored" (pp. 73-93); Helmut Sonnenfeldt, "The Chinese Factor in Soviet Nuclear Relations, 1957-1960" (pp. 117-143); and Walter C. Clemens, Jr., "The Nuclear Test Ban and Sino-Soviet Relations" (pp. 145-167). See also Halperin, "China and the Bomb-Chinese Nuclear Strategy," in Roderic MacFarquhar, ed., China Under Mao (Cambridge, MA, 1966), pp. 449-461; Walter C. Clemens, Jr., The Arms Race and Sino-Soviet Relations (Stanford, CA, 1968), chapters I, IV, VIII-X; and Alice Langley Hsieh, "The Sino-Soviet Nuclear Dialogue, 1963," in Raymond L. Garthoff, ed., Sino-Soviet Military Relations (New York, 1966), pp. 150-170.

<sup>16</sup>See Clemens, The Arms Race, p. 78. For comments by various African countries on the treaty, see Daily Report, nos. 141, 146-147, 149, 153-157, 160, 171, 173, 175-177, 182, 191 of 1963.

<sup>17</sup>Peking, NCNA, in English to Asia and Europe, 0245 GMT, August 30, 1963, Daily Report, no. 170 (August 30, 1963), p. BBB 8.

<sup>18</sup>For full text of the statement, see Peking, NCNA, in English to Asia and Europe, 2131 GMT, August 31, 1963, in *ibid.*, no. 171 (September 3, 1963), pp. BBB 1-21.

<sup>19</sup>Adie, "Chou En-lai on Safari," pp. 474-475, 480.

<sup>20</sup>For the text of the joint communique, see Peking, NCNA, International Service in English, 1100 GMT, January 27, 1964, in Daily Report, no. 18 (January 27, 1964), p. BBB 1.

<sup>21</sup>See editorial of January 29, 1964, entitled "Greeting the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations Between China and France," Peking, NCNA, International Service in English, 1235 GMT, January 28, 1964, in *ibid.*, no. 19 (January 28, 1964), p. BBB 14.

<sup>22</sup>For statement by the ROC Foreign Ministry, editorial criticism by Nationalist Chinese newspapers and world-wide comments, see Tai-kao-le cheng-jen fei-kung wo hsuan pu yu Fa chueh-chiao [De Gaulle recognizes Communist China and ROC severs diplomatic relations with France] (Taipei, 1964), a special pamphlet issued by the Government Information Office of the Executive Yuan, ROC.

<sup>23</sup>See Ernst Kux, "Paris and Peking," Swiss Review of World Affairs, XIII, 12 (March, 1963), pp. 7-8. Hans E. Tutsch, "DeGaulle's Policy Toward the Communist East," *ibid.*, XV, 10 (January, 1966), pp. 3-5; Stephen Erasmus, "General de Gaulle's Recognition of Peking," China Quarterly, 18 (April-June, 1964), pp. 195-200; and Francois Fejto, "France and China: the Intersection of Two Grand Designs," in A. M. Halpern, ed., Policies Toward China, pp. 42-76.

<sup>24</sup>See East African Standard, January 30, 1964, cited in ARB, PSC Series, 1, 1 (1964), p. 13.

<sup>25</sup>For fuller treatment of the background and development of the Cultural Revolution, see Asia Research Centre, comp. and ed., The Great Cultural Revolution in China (Rutland, VT and Tokyo, 1968); Richard Baum and Louise B. Bennett, ed., China in Ferment; Perspectives on the Cultural Revolution (Englewood Cliffs, NJ, 1971); Robert S. Elegant, Mao's Great Revolution (New York and Cleveland, 1971); Kuang-huan Fan, ed., The Chinese Cultural Revolution; Selected Documents (New York, 1968); Hans Granqvist, The Red Guard; a Report on Mao's Revolution, tr. Erik J. Friis (New York, 1967); Jack Gray and Patrick Cavendish, Chinese Communism in Crisis: Maoism and the Cultural Revolution (London, 1968); Robert J. Lifton, Revolutionary Immortality; Mao Tse-tung and the Chinese Cultural Revolution (New York, 1968); and Thomas W. Robinson, ed., The Cultural Revolution in China (Berkeley, 1971).

<sup>26</sup>On July 14, 1959, Marshal P'eng Teh-huai, minister of defense and long-time close associate of Mao, sent Mao a letter criticizing Mao's markedly unsuccessful economic policies in the 1958 "Great Leap Forward" and questioning Mao's theories of party control of the army, "people's wars," and Chinese nuclear strategy. Mao's response was to accuse P'eng of collaborating with the Soviet Union, and to purge him from all offices. Two years later, the deputy mayor of Peking, Wu Han, a former professor of Ming history, wrote a play purporting to eulogize a sixteenth-century official named Hai Jui (1514-1587) who had been dismissed in 1566 for daring to criticize the twelfth Ming emperor, Chia-ching (1521-1566). Mao interpreted this as a veiled analogy to his own dismissal of P'eng Teh-huai, but for reasons still being debated, he took no action until November, 1965, when a newspaper attack on Wu Han and his play signaled the start of the Cultural Revolution.

<sup>27</sup> Winberg Chai, The New Politics of Communist China (Pacific Palisades, CA, 1972), p. 80. For fuller treatment of the Red Guard movement, see Granqvist; James R. Townsend, The Revolutionization of Chinese Youth (Berkeley, 1967); John Israel, "The Red Guards in Historical Perspective," China Quarterly, 30 (April-June, 1967), pp. 1-32; Richard W. and Amy A. Wilson, "The Red Guards and the World Student Movement," *ibid.*, 42 (April-June, 1970), pp. 88-104; and Chai, pp. 76-86.

<sup>28</sup> This was originally a Trotskyite term implying the spread of revolution from the Soviet Union to the rest of the world. Mao re-interpreted it to refer to changes within a country ruled by a Communist Party. See Arthur A. Cohen, The Communism of Mao Tse-tung (Chicago, 1964), pp. 178-183.

<sup>29</sup> See Stephen Pan and Raymond J. de Jaegher, Peking's Red Guards (New York, 1968), pp. 134-135.

<sup>30</sup> For the role played by the army in the Cultural Revolution, see Jurgen Domes, "The Cultural Revolution and the Army," Asian Survey, VIII, 5 (May, 1968), pp. 349-363, and "The Role of the Military in the Formation of Revolutionary Committees 1967-68," China Quarterly, 44 (October-December, 1970), pp. 112-145; Harvey Nelson, "Military Forces in the Cultural Revolution," *ibid.*, 51 (July-September, 1972), pp. 444-474; and Ellis Joffe, "The Chinese Army after the Cultural Revolution: the Effects of Intervention," *ibid.*, 55 (July-September, 1973), pp. 450-477.

<sup>31</sup> For effects of the Cultural Revolution on Chinese political and economic development, see Willy Linder, "China: the 'Cultural Revolution' and the Economy," Swiss Review of World Affairs, XVI, 8 (November, 1966), pp. 6-8; Yuan-li Wu, "Economics, Ideology and the Cultural Revolution," Asian Survey, VIII, 3 (March, 1968), pp. 223-235; Charles Neuhauser, "The Impact of the Cultural Revolution on the Chinese Communist Party Machine," *ibid.*, VIII, 6 (June, 1968), pp. 465-488; Winberg Chai, "The Reorganization of the Chinese Communist Party, 1966-1968," *ibid.*, VIII, 11 (November, 1968), pp. 901-910; Tang Tsou, "The Cultural Revolution and the Chinese Political System," China Quarterly, 38 (April-June, 1969), pp. 63-91; Richard K. Diao, "The Impact of the Cultural Revolution on China's Economic Elite," *ibid.*, 42 (April-June, 1970), pp. 65-87; Audrey Donnithorne, "China's Cellular Economy: Some Economic Trends Since the Cultural Revolution," *ibid.*, 52 (October-December, 1972), pp. 605-619; and Byung-joon Ahn, "The Cultural Revolution and China's Search for Political Order," *ibid.*, 58 (April-May, 1974), pp. 249-285.

<sup>32</sup> See Robert A. Scalapino, "The Cultural Revolution and Chinese Foreign Policy," in Michigan Papers in Chinese Studies, 2 (1968), p. 85. An abridgement of this article can be found in Current Scene, VI, 13 (August 1, 1968), pp. 1-15. See also translations of Hung wei chan pao [Red Guard Combat Bulletin], April 13, 1967, and Ke ming ch'iao pao [Revolutionary Overseas Chinese Affairs Bulletin], April 9, 1967, quoted by Michael B. Yahuda, "Chinese Foreign Policy after 1963: the Maoist Phases," China Quarterly, 36 (October-December, 1968), p. 104.

<sup>33</sup> See Chu Pu, "An Analysis of Ch'en I's Confession, 'I am the Foreign Minister'" Fei-ch'ing yen-chiu [Studies on Chinese Communists] (Taipei), II, 2 (February 29, 1968), p. 36, cited in Melvin Gurtov, "The Foreign Ministry and Foreign Affairs during the Cultural Revolution," China Quarterly, 40 (October-December, 1969), p. 73.

<sup>34</sup> See Ke ming ch'iao pao, in SCMP, no. 3939 (May 16, 1967), p. 7.

<sup>35</sup> I-yueh feng-pao [January storm], Canton, May, 1968, trans. and appended by the editors of Chinese Communist Affairs: Facts and Features (Taipei), I, 22 (August 21, 1968), p. 23, cited in Gurtov, "The Foreign Ministry," p. 77. Under Ch'en I there were ten vice-ministers. Among them only four seem not to have been affected by the Cultural Revolution. See Daniel Tretiak, "The Chinese Cultural Revolution and Foreign Policy," Current Scene, VIII, 7 (April 1, 1970), p. 16.

<sup>36</sup> See Gurtov, "The Foreign Ministry," p. 78. Gurtov's article is probably the most detailed account of the PRC Foreign Ministry during the Cultural Revolution. See also Scalapino, "The Cultural Revolution and Chinese Foreign Policy," and Tretiak, "The Chinese Cultural Revolution and Foreign Policy," pp. 1-26.

<sup>37</sup> Gurtov, "The Foreign Ministry," pp. 79-80.

<sup>38</sup> Joan Robinson, The Cultural Revolution in China (Baltimore, 1969), p. 25. It might be thought that "Guinea" was a mistake for "Ghana," except that the Red Guards were not formed until seven months after the state visit by Nkrumah of Ghana.

<sup>39</sup> Stanley Karnow, Mao and China: From Revolution to Revolution (New York, 1972), p. 487.

<sup>40</sup> Scalapino, "The Cultural Revolution and Chinese Foreign Policy," p. 82. See also Ismael, p. 522; and Moscow TASS International Service in English, 1334 GMT, September 22, 1966, Daily Report, no. 185 (September 23, 1966), p. BB 13.

<sup>41</sup> "Thoroughly Smash the Foreign Affairs Ministry's Privileged Stratum," in the June 14, 1967, issue of Wai-shih hung-chi [Foreign affairs red flag], published by a Red Guard organization within the Foreign Ministry, trans. in SCMP, no. 404 (August 18, 1967), pp. 10-14. For more detailed treatment of PRC diplomats during the Cultural Revolution, see Shun-chiu mei-jen yu ssu-hsiang tou-cheng: Chung-kung wai-chiao-kuan ti shen-huo ho ssu-hsiang [Fine wine, beautiful women and ideological struggle: the life and thought of Communist Chinese diplomats], comp. and pub. by Chih-shih Feng-chih Chu-pan-she (Hong Kong, 1968).

<sup>42</sup> Daniel Tretiak, "Disappearing Act," Far Eastern Economic Review, LIX, 6 (February 8, 1968), p. 216; and "China's Foreign Policy and International Position during a year of Cultural Revolution," Current Scene, V, 20 (November 1, 1967), p. 3. For the list of the recalled

diplomats, see Shun-chiu mei-jen yu ssu-hsiang tou-cheng, pp. 62-65. Huang Hua was recalled to Peking on July 14, 1969, when the Cultural Revolution was already over.

<sup>43</sup> Scalapino, "The Cultural Revolution and Chinese Foreign Policy," p. 83; Gurtov, "The Foreign Ministry," p. 85.

<sup>44</sup> The thirteen African countries which maintained diplomatic relations with Peking during the Cultural Revolution were: Egypt, Algeria, Morocco, the Sudan, Guinea, Mali, Somalia, Tanzania, Uganda, Kenya, Congo, Mauritania, and Zambia.

<sup>45</sup> According to Ogunsanwo, p. 195, the reason the number of African delegations visiting China in 1966 did not decline was that invitations had been issued and arrangements completed before the upsurge of the Cultural Revolution. However, there is a minor numerical inconsistency in his account. In appendix I, table 2 (p. 270) he gave 114 as the number of African delegations visiting China in 1966; on p. 195, the number is given as 116. Similarly he gave the 1967 figure as 57 on p. 270 but 53 on p. 195.

<sup>46</sup> According to Larkin, pp. 95-96, Peking granted Algeria a loan of \$2 million in hard currency in April, 1967, as well as a \$10 million hard currency loan and 150,000 tons of wheat to Egypt in June after it was defeated by Israel in the Six-Day War.

<sup>47</sup> Ogunsanwo, pp. 3, 239. For description of projects undertaken between 1966 and 1969 in Tanzania and Guinea, see Larkin, pp. 97-98.

<sup>48</sup> See "Communist Chinese Propaganda and Africa," translation of an unsigned article in the French-language Afrique Nouvelle (supplement), Dakar, November 6-12, 1969, pp. 1-38, in JPRS, Translations on Africa, no. 123 (46369), no. 840, p. 2.

<sup>49</sup> Oskar Splett, "Cultural Revolutions in Black Africa," Swiss Review of World Affairs, XXV, 3 (June, 1975), p. 17.

<sup>50</sup> Ogunsanwo, p. 194.

<sup>51</sup> See "Communist Chinese Propaganda and Africa," p. 4.

<sup>52</sup> Ibid.

<sup>53</sup> Ibid.

<sup>54</sup> See "Implications of the Chinese Cultural Revolution for Africa," a translation of part II of an article by Simon Kiba appearing under the general title of "The Cultural Revolution" with part I being subtitled "China Repudiates Her Past" and part II, "Alert in Africa," in the French-language publication Afrique Nouvelle [New Africa], Dakar, no. 1031, May 11-17, 1967, p. 9, in JPRS, Translations on Africa, no. 66 (41362), no. 582, p. 1.

<sup>55</sup>W.A.C. Adie, "China Returns to Africa," Current Scene, X, 8 (August, 1972), p. 6.

<sup>56</sup>See "Malian Information Minister Reports Impression on Return from Journalists' Conference in Peking," a translation of an unsigned article in the French-language daily organ of the Sudanese Union--RDA, L'Essor [Ascent], Bamako, June 24, 1967, pp. 1, 3, in JPRS, Translations on Africa, no. 68 (41821), no. 600, p. 38.

<sup>57</sup>See "Ganda," "Reports on Maoist Subversion in Africa," in JPRS, Translations on Africa, no. 176 (54615), no. 1088, p. 24.

<sup>58</sup>See "Communist Chinese Propaganda and Africa," pp. 5-6. Other than this, however, Sino-Congolese relations remained very close during the Cultural Revolution.

<sup>59</sup>East African Standard, March 14, 1967, cited by Larkin, p. 137. See also "Communist Chinese Propaganda and Africa," p. 5.

<sup>60</sup>See "Communist Chinese Propaganda and Africa," p. 6.

<sup>61</sup>Ibid., p. 7.

<sup>62</sup>Africa Report, 10, 9 (October, 1965), p. 56.

<sup>63</sup>"Communist Chinese Propaganda and Africa," p. 12. See also Wu Chao-hsiung, "Kung-fei tsai Fei-chou ti hou-tung (II)" [Communist Chinese activities in Africa (II)], Fei-ch'ing yueh-pao, XV, 4 (June, 1972), p. 39.

<sup>64</sup>See Peking Review, 39 (September 22, 1967), p. 29. A variant translation of the document can be found in Communist China Digest, 192 (November 24, 1967), pp. 39-41.

<sup>65</sup>According to Yin Ching-yao, Chung-kung wai-chiao yu tui-wai kuan-hsi, p. 44, since August, 1967, Peking has forbidden its embassies abroad to carry on Cultural Revolution activities in the host countries.

<sup>66</sup>On August 23, three days after the invasion, Premier Chou En-lai, speaking in Peking at a Romanian Embassy reception on the occasion of Romania's national day, denounced the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia as "the most barefaced and typical specimen of Fascist power-politics played by the Soviet revisionist clique of renegades and scabs against its so-called allies." Chou declared that "the Chinese Government and people strongly condemn the Soviet revisionist leading clique and its followers for their crime of aggression--the armed occupation of Czechoslovakia--and firmly support the Czechoslovak people in their heroic struggle of resistance to Soviet military occupation." The Soviet ambassador walked out of the reception. For the full text of Chou's speech, see Peking, NCNA, International Service in English, 1515 GMT, August 23, 1968, Daily Report, no. 167 (August 26, 1968), pp. A 1-3. For criticism by NCNA and Jen-min jih-pao, see no. 166 (August 23, 1968), pp. A 1-8.

<sup>67</sup>No journalists or foreign observers were admitted to the meetings. The only information on the proceedings was contained in three communiques issued on April 1, 14, and 24. See Keesing's Contemporary Archives, XVII (1969-1970), p. 23377.

<sup>68</sup>For the full text of Lin Piao's report, see Daily Report, supplement, no. 8 (April 29, 1969), pp. 1-30; and Chai, appendix 3 (pp. 209-242).

<sup>69</sup>Chang Ching-wen, "Chung-kung ti 'hsiao-lien wai-chiao' yu 'ping-pong wai-chiao'" [Peking's diplomacy--smile and ping-pong], Chung-kuo ta-lu yen-chiu [Mainland China studies], 4 (April 25, 1971), p. 1.

<sup>70</sup>Tanzania, Guinea, Zambia, Congo, Mauritania, Algeria, Mali, Sudan, Egypt, and Somalia. See Yin Ching-yao, "Mao-kung tsui-chin tsei-wai tung-hsiang chih yen-chiu" [Recent Maoist foreign activities], Wen-ti yu yen-chiu, X, 1 (October, 1970), p. 13. See also "China and Russia Clash in Africa," p. 1.

<sup>71</sup>Ogunsanwo, p. 267.

## CHAPTER IV

### THE PRC AND WEST AFRICA

#### The North African Prelude

When the PRC was created in 1949, most of Africa was still under colonial rule. Even if Peking had not been so preoccupied with domestic affairs, there would have been few opportunities for involvement in Africa. Only four independent countries existed in Africa in 1949, and only five in 1955, when Peking's appearance at Bandung signaled a new and more aggressive foreign policy. Except for South Africa, all of the independent African states were represented at Bandung, but Ethiopia, Liberia, and Libya were then on good terms with the United States, and showed no interest in establishing formal relations with the PRC.

Egypt was the exception.<sup>1</sup> PRC-Egyptian talks on cultural cooperation were held in May, 1955, a month after Bandung, and on August 10, a PRC contract to buy Egyptian cotton was signed in Cairo, followed twelve days later by an agreement in Peking for Egyptian purchase of Chinese steel. On October 14, the two countries signed a three-year trade agreement including a most-favored-nation clause and provision for opening a PRC trade office in Cairo and an Egyptian trade office in Peking. A formal agreement on cultural cooperation was signed on April 15, 1956. After all this, there was little surprise when Cairo announced on May 16, 1956, that Egypt had withdrawn recognition from

Nationalist China and formally recognized Peking, the first African country to do so. Full diplomatic relations were established two weeks later (May 30).

On November 1, 1956, two days after British, French, and Israeli forces occupied the Suez Canal, Peking issued a statement strongly condemning the action. Nine days later, in a telegram to Egyptian President Nasser, Premier Chou En-lai offered 20 million Swiss francs in cash as a gift to Egypt. Thus began the first Chinese aid to an African nation. Peking even suggested sending 280,000 Chinese "volunteer" soldiers to fight for Egypt.<sup>2</sup> Whether the PRC then had the capability of fulfilling this seemingly impressive offer is doubtful, but it was never tested. The British, French, and Israeli forces withdrew from Suez under United States and Soviet pressure.

After gaining an operational base in Cairo, Peking became deeply involved in the Algerian guerrilla war against France, and seemed more interested in supporting Algerians than in cultivating good relations with Egypt. When an Algerian provisional government was created on September 19, 1958, Peking quickly granted recognition (September 22), the first Communist country to do so. Algerian soldiers were trained in China, and between 1959 and 1962 (when France agreed to grant independence to Algeria), arms worth about \$10 million were supplied to the Algerians by the PRC.<sup>3</sup>

In 1959, relations between Cairo and the Communist countries deteriorated because the latter supported Iraq and Syria against Nasser's pan-Africanism. On October 1 Syrian Communist leader Khalid Bakdash attacked Nasser in a speech at Peking's national day ceremony. This further strained the relations between Cairo and Peking, and made it

more difficult for China to support Algerians and contact other African "liberation" movements through Cairo.<sup>4</sup>

Anxious to find another base, Peking looked westward, but neither Libya nor Tunisia would have anything to do with the PRC. The only alternative was Morocco, independent since 1956. Trade agreements between the PRC and Morocco were signed on October 13, 1957, and October 27, 1958, and full diplomatic relations were established on November 1, 1958. Thereafter, Morocco became one of Peking's major trading partners in Africa. The PRC set up a consulate at Ouida, a Moroccan town bordering Algeria, and used it as a base to support Algerians in fighting France.<sup>5</sup>

Although PRC sympathy for the Algerians had not been diminished by the setback in Egypt, Peking realized by early 1960 that its hopes for revolution in the Middle East had faded. In East Africa, the Sudan had recognized the PRC on November 30, 1958, but its dominant ethnic group was Arab and it remained under the strong influence of Egypt. Prospects for a new outlet for PRC revolutionary energy looked better in sub-Saharan West Africa, where diplomatic relations were established with Guinea in late 1959, Ghana and Mali in 1960, just as other West African colonies began a "rush to independence." Since Peking's subsequent relations with North African countries were largely concerned with Arab-Israeli disputes, rather than with black Africa, the focus of this study will hereafter be on sub-Saharan Africa, as mentioned in Chapter I.

The importance that Peking attached to ousting the colonial powers from the remainder of Africa was indicated in a confidential document published by the General Political Department of the Chinese People's

Liberation Army on April 25, 1961:

Africa is now both the center of the anticolonialist struggle and the center for East and West to fight for the control of an intermediary zone, so that it has become the key point of world interest. The general situation is the forced withdrawal of the old colonialism from Asia or at least a large part of Asia and the changing of the last battlefield to Africa. The entry of America's new colonialism into Africa has resulted in the crowding out of old colonialism. The present struggle will go on even for one inch of territory. We must also develop our relationship with the movement for national independence in various parts of Africa.<sup>6</sup>

#### West Africa: An Overview

In West Africa, nineteen independent countries emerged between 1957 and 1975; Liberia had been independent since its founding in 1847. Among these twenty countries, twelve maintained diplomatic relations with the ROC during the 1960s and early 1970s, but by 1977 all West African countries except the Ivory Coast, which still maintains an embassy in Taipei, had established diplomatic relations with Peking.

No significant contacts with Peking have yet been reported for the three countries which established relations with the PRC most recently--Sao Tome e Principe (1975), Cape Verde (1976), and Liberia (1977). This chapter therefore discusses the other sixteen countries in the order in which diplomatic relations were established. This is the order in which they appear in Table XV, which also shows the very different order in which they achieved independence. The horizontal lines of dashes divide the table into three chronological stages in opening PRC relations with West African countries: before



TABLE XV  
WEST AFRICA AND THE TWO CHINAS

Independence		Diplomatic Relations with PRC			Diplomatic Relations	Broke Relations
Date	Order	Order	Date	Country	With ROC	With PRC
1958.10.2	3	1	59.10.4	Guinea	never	
1957.3.6	2	2	60.7.5	Ghana	never	1966-1972
1960.9.22	12	3	60.10.27	Mali	never	
1960.8.15	9	4	64.2.22	Congo	1960-1964	
1960.8.1	6	5	64.11.12	Benin	1962-64, 66-72	1966-1972
1960.11.28	14	6	65.7.22	Mauritania	1960-65	
<hr/>						
1968.10.12	17	7	70.10.15	Equatorial Guinea	never	
1960.10.1	13	8	71.2.10	Nigeria	never	
1960.1.1	4	9	71.3.26	Cameroon	1960-1971	
1961.4.27	15	10	71.7.29	Sierra Leone	1963-1971	
<hr/>						
1960.8.20	11	11	71.12.7	Senegal	1960-64, 69-71	
1960.4.27	5	12	72.9.19	Togo	1960-1972	
1960.8.5	7	13	73.9.15	Upper Volta	1961-1973	
1974.9.10	18	14	74.3.15	Guinea-Bissau	never	
1960.8.17	10	15	74.4.20	Gabon	1960-1974	
1965.2.18	16	16	74.12.14	Gambia	1968-1974	
1975.7.12	19	17	75.7.12	Sao Tome e P.	never	
1975.7.5	20	18	76.4.25	Cape Verde	never	
1847.7.26	1	19	77.2.22	Liberia	1957-1977	
1960.8.7	8	20	not yet	Ivory Coast	1963-	

and after the 1966-1969 Cultural Revolution in China, and after the October 26, 1971, entry of the PRC into the United Nations in place of the ROC.

When the Cultural Revolution was launched at the end of 1965, there were sixteen independent countries in West Africa. Peking had diplomatic relations with six--Guinea, Ghana, Mali, Congo, Benin, and Mauritania. Taipei had diplomatic relations with seven--Liberia, Cameroon, Togo, Gabon, Upper Volta, Ivory Coast, and Sierra Leone. Neither Chinese government had diplomatic relations with Nigeria, Senegal, or newly independent Gambia (Senegal had broken relations with Taipei in November, 1964).

Despite these statistics, Peking's influence in West Africa at the end of 1965 was actually much greater than Taipei's. Three countries with no official relations with the PRC--Nigeria, Senegal, and Sierra Leone--were nevertheless in favor of its admission into the United Nations. Moreover, Peking even overshadowed Moscow in this portion of Africa because since 1963 the Soviet Union had virtually disassociated itself from once-active military involvement in Ghana, Guinea, and Mali, making it easier for Peking to influence the "liberation" and socialist movements in West Africa.

However, during the Cultural Revolution, Benin and Ghana broke relations with the PRC, Benin resumed its earlier recognition of Taipei, and Gambia established relations with Taipei. Between the end of the Cultural Revolution in 1969 and the UN recognition of the PRC in 1971, the trend was reversed: Nigeria, Cameroon, Sierra Leone, and newly independent Equatorial Guinea opened relations with Peking. Since the 1971 UN vote, all other West African countries except Ivory

Coast have recognized the PRC, some more slowly than others.

### Guinea

For a dozen years after 1946, France had tried to hold its colonies by creating a "French Union," linking them to France in an integrated political unit controlled by France. In September, 1958, Charles de Gaulle proposed replacing the "union" with a "French Community," in which the colonies (except Algeria) could become autonomous member states or leave. Among the African colonies, only Guinea, under the leadership of Ahmed Sekou Toure, rejected membership in the French Community. As a result, French Guinea became the independent Republic of Guinea on October 2, 1958, but not without paying a heavy price. France cut off economic aid and withdrew almost everything French from Guinea--civil service personnel, office equipment, including telephones, typewriters, desks, chairs, and even light bulbs.<sup>7</sup>

However, Guinea's loss was not without compensation. By challenging France, Sekou Toure won admiration and support among militant and radical nationalists in Africa. At the First Conference on the All-African People's Organization, December 5-13, 1958, in Accra, Ghana, Guinean delegate Abdoulaye Diallo was elected secretary-general of the organization. Guinea and Ghana became centers for supporting nationalist movements in sub-Saharan colonial Africa.<sup>8</sup>

Guinea's growing prestige caught the watchful eye of PRC leaders. In April, 1959, Peking's first ambassador to Morocco, Pai Jen, visited Conakry, capital of Guinea, bringing 5,000 tons of rice as a "gift from the Chinese people to the Guinean people." On October 4, 1959, the PRC

and Guinea granted mutual recognition and decided to establish diplomatic relations at the ambassadorial level.<sup>9</sup> Guinea was the first country in West Africa to recognize Communist China. Three days later, a "Cultural Cooperation Agreement" between the two countries was signed at Peking, providing for cooperation in education, culture and arts, news and broadcast, science and medicine, and sports.<sup>10</sup>

The newly established PRC-Guinea relations ran smoothly and at the invitation of Liu Shao-ch'i, then Chairman of the PRC, Guinean President Sekou Toure visited China from September 10 to 15, 1960, the first African head of state to visit Peking. A treaty of friendship, an agreement on economic and technical cooperation, and a trade and payments agreement between the two countries were signed on September 13, 1960.<sup>11</sup> The PRC agreed to grant Guinea a non-interest-bearing loan of 100 million rubles (about \$25 million) without conditions or privileges.

Within this amount, the PRC would supply Guinea with (1) technical assistance by dispatching experts, technicians and skilled workers to Guinea, (2) complete sets of equipment, machinery, materials, and other goods, and (3) assistance in training of Guinean technicians and skilled workers. The standard of living of Chinese experts and technicians working in Guinea was not to "exceed that of personnel of the same rank in the Republic of Guinea."<sup>12</sup>

The conditions of this Chinese loan were undoubtedly more favorable than those attached to a 140 million ruble (\$35 million) loan offered by the Soviet Union in 1959.<sup>13</sup> It was in Guinea that both Russia and China had their first contacts with black Africa and started their competition for black African friendship.<sup>14</sup> In April, 1960, when

the second AAPSO conference met in Conakry, Peking sent a 25-member delegation (the largest at the meeting) and a 47-member Chinese acrobatic troupe.

The Chinese were more cautious and discreet than the Soviets in dealing with the Guineans. In late 1961 when Guinea accused Russia of interfering in its internal affairs by stirring up unrest among Guinean students and expelled Soviet Ambassador Daniel Solod, Sino-Guinean relations became closer. Between 1959 and 1965, Guinea received \$26.5 million in aid from the PRC, about 9.8 percent of the total Chinese aid commitments to black Africa. After Tanzania (\$45.5 million, or 16.9 percent of the total) and Ghana (\$42 million, or 15.6 percent of the total), Guinea was the third largest recipient of Chinese aid in black Africa in the period 1959-1965.<sup>15</sup>

This implied that by 1965 Peking was shifting its attention to East Africa and looking more to Ghana's Nkrumah in West Africa than to Guinea's Toure. Before the 1961 dispute, both Moscow and Peking seemed to think more highly of Toure than of Nkrumah. Having studied the Marxist classics and made a commitment to "socialism," Toure seemed to both Communist powers a man of principle, while Nkrumah was regarded as an unreliable opportunist.<sup>16</sup> This was a miscalculation. Nkrumah soon became more radical, and more willing to provide bases for subversion in other countries, while Toure, after the 1961 deterioration of Soviet-Guinean relations, showed increasing interest in receiving aid from the Western bloc, particularly from the U.S. He was even negotiating to resume economic links with France.<sup>17</sup>

Though disappointed by Toure's new attitude toward the Western powers, Peking did not criticize him and relations between Conakry and

Peking generally remained warm. On November 16, 1966, during a visit to Peking by Ismael Toure, half-brother of Sekou Toure and Guinea's minister of economic development, the PRC signed four agreements with Guinea, including an interest-free trade loan of 1.5 million pounds.<sup>18</sup> Peking also promised support if Guinea, whose relations with the United States were then deteriorating, broke with the United States.<sup>19</sup>

On January 28, 1967, inaugurating the Chinese-built Tinkisso dam and hydro-electric power station at Kinkon, President Toure praised Peking's aid to Guinea:

Bombs may destroy the power station as well as the dam. But what remains indestructible and imperishable and what the Chinese workers have brought to us is the example of their great moral qualities, which have enriched the spirit and awareness of responsibility of the Guinean people.<sup>20</sup>

By February, 1967, several other projects were in progress in Guinea with Chinese aid: match and cigarette factories, a tea-grading plant, a groundnut-crushing plant, a sugar refinery and a steel plant.<sup>21</sup>

During the Cultural Revolution, although Peking's ambassador was recalled from Guinea as from every other country (except Egypt), the flow of visiting delegations between the PRC and Guinea continued. On May 18, 1968, a Joint Guinean-Malian Friendship Delegation led by foreign ministers of the two countries arrived in Peking for a week's visit, and warmly praised "the great proletarian cultural revolution initiated and led by Chairman Mao Tse-tung."<sup>22</sup> The PRC agreed to help build a railroad linking Guinea and Mali.<sup>23</sup>

Early in June, 1968, a Guinean trade delegation arrived in Peking, followed a week later by departure of a PRC medical team to Guinea. On July 23 a Guinean military delegation arrived in Peking for a two-

week visit; two months later another PRC delegation left for Guinea.<sup>24</sup> In late February, 1969, another Guinean government delegation visited Peking and signed a trade protocol and an agreement for a PRC loan in commodities to Guinea.<sup>25</sup> Thus, it was apparent that relations between Peking and Conakry were not affected by the Cultural Revolution. When Peking began reappointing ambassadors on June 12, 1969, the first three for Africa were those accredited to Guinea, Tanzania, and Zambia, another indication of Guinea's high standing in Peking.

In late September, 1969, Conakry sent a government delegation to attend the PRC's twentieth anniversary celebration. Before leaving China, the Guinea delegation signed another economic and technical cooperation agreement with the PRC.<sup>27</sup> On November 22, 1970, when Guinea was invaded by forces allegedly from Portuguese Guinea, the PRC charged that the invasion was a "new monstrous crime committed by U.S. imperialism and the Portuguese colonialists against the Guinean people and the other African people."<sup>28</sup> Mao Tse-tung, his new heir Lin Piao, and Premier Chou En-lai sent Guinea a message of solidarity, and the PRC sent U.S. \$10 million and four doctors to treat wounded Guineans.<sup>29</sup>

Between early 1969 and late 1972, the PRC signed ten protocols and agreements with Guinea, more than with any other African country.<sup>30</sup> However, as far as the PRC's African aid is concerned, Guinea has never become a major recipient. The last aid of any significance received by Conakry from Peking was U.S. \$1 million granted in 1974. During the fifteen years, from 1959 through 1974, Guinea received a total of U.S. \$77 million from the PRC, only 4.1 percent of the total (U.S. \$1,878 million) committed by Peking to Africa during this period.<sup>31</sup> However,

since it established diplomatic relations with the PRC almost two decades ago, Guinea has been one of Peking's closest allies in West Africa, and consistently voted for Peking's admission to the United Nations.

#### Ghana

The British Gold Coast colony and British Togoland (then a UN trust territory) were unified as the independent Kingdom of Ghana on March 6, 1957, renamed the Republic of Ghana on July 1, 1960, with Kwame Nkrumah, then prime minister, becoming president. Despite Nkrumah's sympathetic attitude toward Peking, diplomatic relations were not established until July 5, 1960.<sup>32</sup> A year later, at the invitation of Liu Shao-ch'i and Chou En-lai, Nkrumah visited China (August 14-19, 1961), and was more explicit than Guinea's Toure in pledging support for PRC admission to the United Nations.<sup>33</sup> In return, he was given a treaty of friendship, an economic and technical cooperation agreement, and a trade and payments agreement. Peking was to grant Ghana a no-interest loan of 7 million pounds (\$19.6 million), without conditions or privileges.<sup>34</sup>

After Nkrumah's Peking visit, Sino-Ghanaian relations grew stronger; in July, 1964, the PRC made another interest-free loan of \$22.4 million.<sup>35</sup> Nkrumah, who had adopted some of Mao Tse-tung's revolutionary tactics in the early years of his political career, apparently believed that cooperation with the PRC, a potential superpower, would help him realize his own ambition of become sole ruler of a unified black Africa.

According to an official document issued by the Ghanaian military

government which overthrew him in 1966, Nkrumah had been building secret camps in Ghana since 1961 to train recruits from various African nations for the purpose of overthrowing governments unwilling to submit to his grandiose plan for a united "Socialist Africa." The first of these training camps was opened at Mankrong in November, 1961, and two Russian instructors were sent from Moscow in early 1962. Apparently the Russians did not get along with the Ghanaian personnel at the camp. The head of the camp accused the Russians of "wasting food and drink, of being arrogant and of bad behavior," and was glad to see them leave in June, 1962.<sup>37</sup>

This camp was moved in late 1962 to Half-Assini, a small village close to the Ghana-Ivory Coast border, and in October, 1964, the first group of five Chinese guerrilla warfare experts, led by Colonel Yen Leng, arrived there. Peking also sent the trainees arms and ammunition, falsely labelled "medical supplies."<sup>38</sup> A secret military protocol that formalized the stay of the Chinese military experts was signed on August 5, 1965, retroactive to September 30, 1964, when Peking dispatched the first military team to Ghana.<sup>39</sup>

The Chinese instructors complained that the camp was too close to the Ivory Coast border to carry out explosives training secretly. It was also too far from Accra, and with a bad road the transport cost was too high. Camp Half-Assini was closed down in mid-December, 1964, and replaced by a new camp at Obenemasi, the site of an abandoned gold-mine. On December 30, eight more Chinese instructors arrived.<sup>40</sup>

By January, 1965, Camp Obenemasi had 210 students and seventeen Chinese instructors. The Chinese conducted a three-and-a-half-month

training course and did "all the actions in exercises such as rolling, creeping, bounding, and fighting together with the students" in order to make them master the military skills. When the course ended in April, 206 students graduated.<sup>41</sup>

The subversion training program in Ghana attracted Africans from colonies such as Portuguese Angola, and many independent African countries, such as Niger, Zaire, Nigeria, Gabon, Upper Volta, Cameroon, Rwanda, Zambia, Malawi, and Tanzania.<sup>42</sup> In early May, 1965, a new course started with fifty students from Niger. However, Nkrumah had to suspend the program because the Organization of African Unity (OAU) Summit meeting was scheduled to meet in Accra in October. Several West African governments, aware of the subversion training program, threatened to boycott the meeting if the program continued. Therefore, it was decided to suspend training until the OAU conference was over.<sup>43</sup> In August, four Chinese instructors returned to China and nine others were on leave in Accra.

Nkrumah never intended to abandon the subversion training program. On February 10, 1966, Camp Obenemasi was made ready for a new session of training; the Chinese instructors in Accra returned to prepare the camp. Just two weeks later, while Nkrumah was flying to Peking, his government was ousted by a military coup d'etat.<sup>44</sup> Ousted with the Nkrumah regime were 430 Chinese experts and technicians, including the guerrilla warfare experts at Camp Obenemasi, who were immediately expelled by the new Ghanaian government. Along with the Chinese, 1,100 Russian experts and technicians were also expelled. The Ghanaian military government accused the PRC of clandestine efforts to restore Nkrumah to power.<sup>45</sup> After a series of acrimonious notes, the two governments broke off diplomatic relations and withdrew all their

embassy staffs on November 5, 1966.<sup>46</sup> Thus ended the first phase of Sino-Ghanaian relations.

Nkrumah's downfall was one of the most serious setbacks suffered by the PRC in Africa, since he had been one of Peking's staunchest and most outspoken supporters. An ROC agricultural demonstration team was sent to aid the new Ghanaian government in November, 1968, and remained in Ghana until May, 1972. During this period, Ghana also sent agricultural trainees to Taiwan to attend the ROC "Seminar for African Agriculturalists." But Ghana continued to vote for Peking's admission to the United Nations, and did not establish diplomatic relations with Taipei. Instead, diplomatic relations with Peking were resumed on February 29, 1972.<sup>47</sup>

The PRC immediately renewed two aid projects in Ghana (a pencil factory and a tannery) which had been cancelled in 1966 after the severance of relations between the two countries.<sup>48</sup> In late March, 1973, Peking also renewed an interest-free loan made during Nkrumah's reign for construction of irrigation facilities, chemical complexes, a cotton complex, and a textile factory.<sup>49</sup> Peking also helped in construction of a cement factory (1973), and donated some agricultural machines and sports equipment (1974).<sup>50</sup> But the volume of aid since restoration of relations has been small, reducing the fifteen-year total from 1959 through 1974 to only \$42 million, a mere 2.2 percent of Peking's total African aid.<sup>51</sup> The cordial relations of the Nkrumah era have not been revived.

#### Mali

Unlike Guinea, the other French African colonies accepted autonomy

within the French Community in 1958, but by 1960 they too were asking for independence, and this time, France was agreeable. Fourteen former French colonies (all except Algeria and Djibouti) achieved independence during 1960. The Mali Federation, formed by French Sudan and Senegal on January 17, 1959, became independent on June 20, 1960. Both Chinese governments granted recognition immediately, but President Modibo Keita at first favored Taipei, whose representatives attended the independence ceremony and established diplomatic relations the same day (June 20).<sup>52</sup>

Two months later, Senegal withdrew from the Federation (August 20), the remaining territory (the former French Sudan) became the Republic of Mali on September 22, and Keita changed his Chinese policy. After meeting with Peking's ambassador to Guinea, Ko Hua, in Bamako, the Malian capital, on October 25, Keita established relations with the PRC on October 27, the only one of the fourteen new Francophone nations to do so during 1960. From then until he was overthrown by a military coup in November, 1968, Keita was as staunch a supporter of Peking as Toure and Nkrumah. This was consistent with the close relations Keita had with French Communists in the early years of his political career, when he was an active member of the Confederation Generale du Travail. His initial cordiality to Taipei was intended to reassure France and the moderate Senegalese leader Leopold Senghor; when this failed to preserve the union with Senegal, Keita turned to Peking.<sup>53</sup>

In early September, 1961, a Mali economic mission led by Maderia Keita, Minister of the Interior and Information, visited the PRC, and on September 22 signed an agreement on economic and technical cooperation, similar to the PRC agreement with Ghana a month earlier. Peking

was to provide Mali a 7 million-pound (\$19.6 million) loan, without interest, condition, or privilege, and send Chinese experts and technicians to help in Mali's economic development.<sup>54</sup>

Sino-Malian relations reached a peak in 1964, when President Keita and his wife visited Peking to attend celebrations of the fifteenth anniversary of the PRC, then flew to Cairo for the second Conference of Non-aligned States, and returned to Peking on November 1 to continue his visit. Two days later, Keita and Liu Shao-ch'i issued a joint communique noting "with pleasure that the situation is most favorable for revolution throughout the continent of Africa." Mali "reaffirmed its support for the restoration of the legitimate rights of the People's Republic of China in the United Nations and for the just struggle of the Chinese Government and people to liberate their own territory, Taiwan," and Keita warmly congratulated the Chinese on "their tremendous scientific, political, and moral success in exploding their first atom bomb [on October 16, 1964]."<sup>55</sup>

This was the most outspoken communique yet signed by an African ruler, and Mali was rewarded on the same day with a treaty of friendship and an agreement to supply industrial equipment.<sup>56</sup> But no new loan was granted. In 1965 the PRC built two sugar refineries and a cigarette and match factory in Mali, but total PRC aid to this point was less than half of the Soviet aid to Mali.<sup>57</sup>

Nevertheless, Mali remained the most outspoken African supporter of Peking. One reason was Keita's desire to use the Chinese to counterbalance Russian policies. Another reason was that the Malian cabinet included some ministers even more pro-Peking than Keita--notably the Minister of Information and Tourism, Mamadou Gologo, who

accompanied Keita to Peking in 1961. Gologo was in Peking again as head of a Malian delegation during the Cultural Revolution, when the PRC exploded its first hydrogen bomb (June 17, 1967). He praised both the weapon and the Cultural Revolution more ardently than any other cabinet-level African leader.<sup>58</sup>

When Keita was overthrown on November 19, 1968, by a military coup led by Moussa Traore, a 32-year-old army lieutenant, the PRC tried hard to avoid the disruption in relations that had followed the ouster of Ghana's Nkrumah two years earlier.<sup>59</sup> To demonstrate friendship for the new regime in Mali, Peking completed two aid projects, an entirely Chinese-equipped tanneries unit and a new transmission centre with four 50 kw short-wave transmitters, within two years after Keita's ouster.<sup>60</sup> A Mali delegation visited Peking, and signed an economic and technical cooperation agreement on December 21, 1970.<sup>61</sup> In May, 1972, Peking and Bamako even renewed negotiations for construction of the Guinea-Mali railway mentioned earlier.<sup>62</sup> The project of the railroad has yet to be realized.

Under an April 4, 1973, medical cooperation agreement, Peking sent 45 medical personnel to serve in Mali for two years.<sup>63</sup> On June 20, 1973, President Traore arrived in Peking for a week's visit, and praised PRC successes in science and technology as "a source of encouragement, assurance, and hope for the peoples of the third world."<sup>64</sup> He thanked Peking for its support to Mali since independence, and signed a new economic and technical cooperation agreement (June 24).<sup>65</sup>

Since Traore's visit, Peking has financed a small tea farm and factory at Farako, Mali (inaugurated in August, 1973), 40 percent of the cost of a U.S. \$500,000 agricultural machinery repair-shop (1974),

and a rice mill and sugar refinery (1976).<sup>66</sup> Nevertheless, the total amount of PRC aid to Mali has not been impressive. From 1959 through 1974, Mali received \$57 million from Peking, only 3 percent of the total PRC commitment to Africa.<sup>67</sup>

### Congo

For four years after Mali recognized the PRC in 1960, no other West African country did so. The first to change was the former French Congo, which had become the independent Republic of Congo on August 15, 1960. Congo's first president, Fulbert Youlou, was strongly anti-Communist, and though both Peking and Taipei granted recognition, Youlou chose to establish diplomatic relations with Taipei (September 10, 1960).<sup>68</sup> This policy changed soon after his ouster three years later in a coup by trade union leaders (August, 1963). Public reference to establishing relations with Peking was made by the new Prime Minister, Pascal Lissouba, on January 1, 1964, almost four weeks before France recognized Peking, but apparently with advance knowledge of what France was about to do.<sup>69</sup>

On February 22, the new president, Alphonse Massamba-Debat, formally established diplomatic relations with the PRC, making Congo the first of four French-speaking countries to follow France's example. The Congolese foreign minister, Charles Ganao, was quoted later as saying, "If we can keep diplomatic relations with Taipei at the same time as we make links with Peking, and thus bring the two sides to co-exist in the Congo, we shall have pulled off an exploit here that no one up to now has managed."<sup>70</sup> However, Nationalist China severed relations with Brazzaville on April 17, maintaining the view (shared by

Peking) that no country could recognize "two Chinas."<sup>71</sup>

Relations between Peking and Brazzaville developed quite rapidly. In July, 1964, the PRC granted an interest-free loan of \$25.2 million, and in August donated five million CFA francs to Congo for refugees expelled from Zaire just across the Congo River.<sup>72</sup> A seven-member military delegation led by Major Felix Mouzabakani, chief of staff of the Congo armed forces, visited Peking in mid-September, and Massamba-Debat himself attended the October 1 PRC national day celebrations in Peking. In the communique issued on October 3, the PRC expressed "firm support for the people of the Congo in their heroic struggle against the imperialists' threats, interference, and subversion against the Congo" from Zaire, while the Congo expressed "support for the restoration of China's legitimate rights in the United Nations and the just struggle of the Chinese Government and people for the liberation of their own territory, Taiwan, as well as its opposition to the imperialist plot of creating two Chinas."<sup>73</sup> Four agreements were signed: a treaty of friendship, an agreement on economic and technical cooperation, an agreement on navigation, and one on cultural cooperation.<sup>74</sup>

However, Congo continued to depend heavily on French aid for economic development, using its relations with Peking for leverage in dealing with France. Congolese ties with Peking were less economic than ideological, and they proved very useful to Peking. From Brazzaville, the PRC gave aid to Pierre Mulele's guerrillas in Zaire and to rebels in Portuguese Angola. To the north and west, Peking's embassy at Brazzaville maintained contacts with Cameroonian insurgents, applied pressure on the then pro-Taipei government of Gabon, and made overtures to the Central African Republic.<sup>75</sup>

The Chinese set up at least three secret training camps in Congo, at Bouanga, Dambona, and Impfonda, under the supervision of Kan Mai. Nominally first counselor of the PRC embassy in Brazzaville, Kan Mai was actually a colonel in the PRC army and head of a Chinese military mission in Brazzaville.<sup>76</sup> By early 1965, Congo had become, to the dismay of its neighbors, one of Peking's most important bases for subversion in black Africa. Nevertheless, the Congolese government included both pro-Moscow and pro-Peking factions, with President Massamba-Debat leaning toward Moscow.<sup>77</sup> His ouster in July, 1968, by a military coup led by a self-styled Marxist, Marien Ngouabi, made Congo more pro-Peking than ever. Between September 21 and October 14, 1968, the new Congolese prime minister, Alfred Raoul, visited China, and signed an economic and technical cooperation agreement.

In 1969, Ngouabi changed the country's name from Republic of Congo to People's Republic of the Congo. Thereafter, Congo drew even closer to Peking ideologically. In June, 1970, a PRC military delegation led by Su Yu, vice-minister of national defense, visited Brazzaville. Prime Minister Raoul paid a second visit to Peking in July to discuss "military cooperation."<sup>78</sup> At the Lusaka non-aligned summit conference on October 9, 1970, President Ngouabi reaffirmed Brazzaville's support for Peking's admission to the United Nations.<sup>79</sup>

In January, 1971, a Chinese medical mission completed plans for a 200-bed hospital to be built in Congo with Chinese aid.<sup>80</sup> In March, Peking agreed to finance construction of a hydroelectric complex on the Bouenza River in southern Congo to produce 130 million kw per year.<sup>81</sup> In September, 1971, and February, 1972, two military

agreements were signed, by which the PRC was to train the Congolese army and provide heavy military equipment.<sup>82</sup>

In January, 1973, Radio Brazzaville reported a PRC loan of 100 million CFA francs (\$30 million) to finance several projects.<sup>83</sup>

President Ngouabi visited the PRC in July, 1973, and met with Mao.<sup>84</sup>

Another Congolese delegation led by Prime Minister Henri Lopes arrived in Peking on February 27, 1975. But while Congo remained on the PRC aid list in 1976, it has never been a major recipient of aid from Peking. Its close relations with the PRC continue to be based on ideological attraction rather than economic assistance, although this attraction may have diminished since Ngouabi's assassination on March 18, 1977.<sup>85</sup> Accusing former President Massamba-Debat of responsibility for the assassination, a new military government executed him on March 25, and in June agreed to resume diplomatic relations with the United States, broken since 1965.

#### Benin

Another French colony, Benin, became independent on August 1, 1960, under the name of Dahomey (changed on November 30, 1975). Undergoing six coups in ten years, Benin was one of the most unstable countries in a continent filled with instability. Its first president, Hubert Maga, established diplomatic relations with the ROC in January, 1962, and was overthrown in October, 1963, while visiting Taiwan. A new leftist government headed by Sourou-Migan Apithy established diplomatic relations with the PRC on November 12, 1964, although the ROC did not sever relations with Benin until April 8, 1965.<sup>86</sup>

After a second coup in November, 1965, and a third in December, a new military government under Christophe Soglo broke off relations with Peking on January 3, 1966, and reinstated relations with Taipei on April 21, thus ending the PRC's first brief period of official contact with Benin.<sup>87</sup> However, after three more coups in December, 1967, December, 1969, and October, 1972, Benin again reversed its China policy and resumed diplomatic relations with the PRC on December 29, 1972.<sup>88</sup> On the same day the PRC signed with Benin an economic and technical cooperation agreement and a trade and payments agreement, and granted an interest-free loan of \$44 million.<sup>89</sup> Although Benin is one of the poorest and most densely populated countries in Africa, subsequent PRC aid was dominated by non-essential projects: a Chinese-built sports stadium with capacity of 30,000, a sports palace with 5,000 seats, a 100-bed hotel for athletes, a large parking lot, and two tons of sports equipment.<sup>90</sup>

The 1972 coup brought to power Major (now Colonel) Mathieu Kerekou, who said in late 1974 that Benin's "revolution" would follow a Marxist-Leninist line. In July, 1976, he paid a six-day official visit to Peking, and signed a protocol for economic and technical cooperation. Commenting that China's aid to Benin was "still limited," the new PRC premier Hua Kuo-feng said: "We are against regarding aid as unilateral alms, or using aid as a pretext for exercising control." Kerekou praised the PRC as "a good example . . . in its liberation fight against the dark forces, such as imperialism, colonialism, racism, and apartheid."<sup>91</sup> During 1976, Benin was on China's aid list for agricultural assistance.<sup>92</sup>

## Mauritania

The sixth and last West African country to recognize Peking before the Cultural Revolution was Mauritania, a French colony which achieved independence on November 28, 1960, and established relations with Taipei on the same day. Unlike chaotic Benin, Mauritania has remained under the control of the same leader continuously since independence, Moktar Ould Daddah. Despite having recognized Taipei, Daddah accepted an agricultural mission from Peking in June, 1965, and established diplomatic relations with Peking on July 22, 1965.<sup>93</sup> The PRC mission studied the possibility of growing rice in Mauritania, and it was reported in late August, 1966, that the PRC would help Mauritania develop rice cultivation in the valley of the Senegal River.<sup>94</sup>

In February, 1967, a Mauritanian delegation led by Foreign Minister Briane Mamadou Wane visited Peking and signed a trade agreement, an economic and technical cooperation agreement and a cultural cooperation agreement.<sup>95</sup> President Daddah paid a state visit to Peking from October 20 to 24, 1967, the first African ruler to come there since Ghana's unlucky Nkrumah at the beginning of the Cultural Revolution. Daddah proclaimed Mauritania's "firm stand for the restoration of China's legitimate rights in the United Nations and the expulsion of the Chiang Kai-shek clique from that organization, and against all maneuvers to create 'two Chinas'."<sup>96</sup> Immediately after his visit, Peking granted an interest-free loan of 1 billion CFA francs (\$5 million).<sup>97</sup>

In February, 1968, the PRC delivered to Mauritania 200 tons of agricultural machinery, including trucks, tractors, and bulldozers,

for use on an experimental farm in the Rosso region, the first section of a 4000-hectare Chinese-aid project for stock-breeding and rice-cultivation.<sup>98</sup> By late 1970 there were 200 PRC medical, agricultural, and cultural advisors in Mauritania.<sup>99</sup> Mauritanian Foreign Minister Hamdi Ould Mouknass signed an economic and technical cooperation agreement in Peking on April 1, by which Peking granted an interest-free loan of \$20 million to finance construction of a deep-water port in Nouakchott and other projects.<sup>100</sup>

An additional Chinese medical team of twenty-six doctors was sent to Mauritania in November, 1972, and Mauritania received another \$2 million loan from the PRC in 1973.<sup>101</sup> Daddah paid a second visit to Peking in September, 1974, signing an economic and technical cooperation agreement for a \$37 million loan for constructing the deep-water harbor in Nouakchott, completing a 1000-km highway started with Arab aid, and building a 10,000-seat sports stadium, and several agricultural projects.<sup>102</sup> The Chinese also began building a clothing plant in Nouakchott and sent additional medical personnel to serve in Mauritania during 1976.<sup>103</sup>

#### Equatorial Guinea

Equatorial Guinea, a former Spanish colony, achieved its independence on October 12, 1968, one of the smallest countries on the continent, with a population of only 300,000. Under the influence of the strongly pro-Peking government of Congo, Equatorial Guinea established diplomatic relations with the PRC on October 15, 1970.<sup>104</sup> A delegation led by Jesus Alfonso Oyono Alogo, minister of public works, housing, and transport, visited Peking and signed agreements on

trade and an economic and technical cooperation on January 22, 1961.<sup>105</sup> In June, Peking sent economic and technological specialists to Equatorial Guinea to conduct a three-month study of the country.<sup>106</sup>

By August, 1973, a Chinese technical road group was reported building a road from Mongomo to Neue in the mainland section of Equatorial Guinea (Rio Muni province). No other aid projects have been announced, but in May, 1976, there was discussion of possible PRC assistance in building a hydroelectric plant and transmission line.<sup>107</sup>

#### Nigeria

The former British colony of Nigeria achieved independence on October 1, 1960, but unlike other African countries (except Ethiopia), it refrained from establishing relations with either Chinese government until 1971, when it recognized Peking. As in the case of Ethiopia, the reasons for this are complex. One factor was certainly that Nigeria, the most populous country in Africa, is also one of the richest, both in petroleum and in the number of educated citizens, and therefore had less need of Chinese assistance than poorer and more backward countries. Also, in the first years after independence, Nigeria seemed to preserve the heritage of British parliamentary democracy.

Nevertheless, when France recognized the PRC in January, 1964, Nigeria's official Radio Lagos endorsed the French action and commented that "we in Nigeria do stand for the admission of the Peking Government into membership in the United Nations General Assembly,

and perhaps in the Security Council."<sup>108</sup> Since this implied that the ROC might remain a member of the United Nations and perhaps even keep the Security Council seat, it was not quite what Peking was demanding, but it did suggest a change in Nigerian policy.

The change was made much more explicit six months later, when Nigerian Foreign Minister Dr. Jaja Wachuku announced on July 2, 1964, that Nigeria would establish diplomatic relations with Peking as soon as funds for personnel were available.<sup>109</sup> Since Nigeria was much wealthier than other countries which had opened embassies in Peking, this was a rather implausible reason for delay. However, later in July, Nigerian Prime Minister Alhaji Abubakar Tafawa Balewa called for the admission of the PRC to the United Nations, and Radio Lagos made a sharper commentary. Blaming the United States for keeping Peking out of the United Nations, Radio Lagos removed the ambiguity from its earlier commentary by declaring that "the fallacy of the 'two Chinas' policy is that two different governments, one in effective control of the territory of China and the other not, are representing that country." It concluded:

The only path of honor open to Nigeria is thus to recognize the government of China, exchange ambassadors with that state, and fight relentlessly for the admission of Peking to the United Nations and for the automatic expulsion of Chiang Kai-shek from the Security Council. Only by such a policy can Nigeria help to maintain justice and show that international peace must override the selfish interests of the United States, and the time to effect that policy is now.<sup>110</sup>

Encouraged by such remarks, Peking sent a PRC goodwill mission headed by Lu Hsu-chang, deputy minister of foreign trade, to visit Nigeria in September, 1964, and was told by the new Nigerian Foreign Minister, Alhaji Nuhu Bamalli, that Nigeria was seriously considering

establishing diplomatic relations with Peking.<sup>111</sup> An official source indicated that talks on the matter had already been held.<sup>112</sup> Despite all these indications of imminent recognition, nothing happened for another seven years.

The initial reason for this appears to have been Nigerian mistrust of Peking, based on reports of PRC subversive activities against various African governments, and Nigerian sympathy with India in the 1962 Sino-Indian border war. Later, the domestic upheaval of the Cultural Revolution in China coincided with domestic upheavals in Nigeria: two military coups in 1966, and a disastrous civil war from 1967 to 1971 over the attempted secession of the Biafran province. The Nigerian government repeatedly accused Peking of sending aid to the Biafran rebels through Tanzania.<sup>113</sup> Nevertheless, within a month after the end of the civil war, Nigeria finally established diplomatic relations with Peking on February 10, 1971, and voted for the PRC in the General Assembly in October.<sup>114</sup>

In August, 1972, a five-man Nigerian trade delegation led by Dr. Adebayo Adedeji, Federal Commissioner for Economic Development and Reconstruction, visited Peking to discuss trade and economic and technical cooperation. A PRC economic delegation led by Fang I, chairman of the Commission for Economic Relations with Foreign Countries, paid a reciprocal visit to Lagos and on November 3 signed a five-year economic and technical cooperation agreement and a trade agreement with the Nigerian government.<sup>115</sup> Under these agreements, Peking sent 21 agricultural experts to Nigeria in February, 1973, to study possible sites for large-scale cultivation of rice, wheat, and cotton.<sup>116</sup>

Little has been heard of this kind of cooperation since that time. A possible reason is suggested by a 1973 editorial in a Nigerian publication saying that the presence of a Chinese agricultural mission implied that Nigerian agricultural officials were incompetent.<sup>117</sup>

Between 1973 and 1975, Peking tried something less sensitive: sending table tennis coaches to work in Nigeria, and training Nigerian table tennis players in China.<sup>118</sup> The head of the Nigerian military government, General Yakubu Gowon, visited Peking in September, 1974, and in a joint communique both countries pledged their "material and moral support" for "liberation" movements in Africa.<sup>118</sup> In October, 1975, a twenty-two member PRC industrial mission, comprising experts in metal work, woodwork, leather goods, and automobile engineering, arrived in Nigeria to help develop small-scale industries.<sup>119</sup> No financial aid has been given to Nigeria by the PRC, and in view of the country's petroleum revenue, PRC aid is unlikely.

#### Cameroon

The French trust territory of Cameroon became independent on January 1, 1960, the first of seventeen colonial territories to achieve independence during that memorable year. On October 1, 1961, after a United Nations plebiscite, the country was expanded to include the southern half of the former British Cameroon (the northern half joined Nigeria). Prior to independence, there had been two major political parties in Cameroon, and the more radical party resorted to acts of terrorism which did not cease with independence. This insurgent UPC (Union des Populations du Cameroun) is said to have been the first revolutionary movement supported by Peking in sub-Saharan Africa.<sup>120</sup>

Before 1960, the UPC also received support from Ghana, Guinea, Egypt, and the Soviet Union. When the Russians changed their attitude and recognized the Cameroon government under President Ahmadou Ahidjo in 1960, UPC leader Dr. Roland-Felix Moumie turned even more to Peking for guidance and aid. After he was poisoned in Geneva in November, 1960, Peking continued to work with his widow and other UPC leaders.<sup>121</sup>

In these circumstances the government of Cameroon naturally refused to recognize Peking, and instead established diplomatic relations with Taipei on February 9, 1960. In July, 1961, Cameroon complained to the United Nations that "many young Cameroonians [are] inveigled and led into China on false pretences receive there psychological and military preparations [for] being sent back . . . to engage in subversive activities and serve as instructors and personnel in an eventual effective general revolution."<sup>122</sup> In July, 1963, President Ahidjo accused the PRC of being "one of the Communist countries supporting terrorism in Cameroon," and said that his government had proof that Cameroonian terrorists were being trained in China.<sup>123</sup>

In February, 1964, when asked whether Cameroon would follow France in recognizing Peking, President Ahidjo replied:

On several occasions I have said, and I recently repeated it, that if we do not recognize People's China it is not because it is communist. It is because we have observed that it interfered in our internal affairs . . . If we have proof that China will no longer interfere in our internal affairs, we will not find it inconvenient to recognize Communist China and vote for its admission to the United Nations.<sup>124</sup>

Referring to Chou En-lai's statement that "revolution is not for

export," Ahidjo added that "if the Peking government acts in accordance with what Chou En-lai said, we shall recognize it at once."<sup>125</sup>

Whether Peking's preoccupation with its own Cultural Revolution during the late 1960s reduced its support to Cameroonian insurgents is unclear, but terrorism in Cameroon was gradually reduced to isolated acts of banditry, and the last important rebel leader was captured in 1970.<sup>126</sup> By the following year, Cameroon's attitude toward Peking had begun to soften, apparently through the mediation of Mauritania at the opposite end of West Africa. A PRC goodwill delegation led by the PRC ambassador to Mauritania, Feng Yu-chiu, visited the Cameroonian capital of Yaounde from March 22 to 26, 1971, and a joint communique was issued establishing diplomatic relations between the two countries.<sup>127</sup>

On August 17, 1971, Cameroon signed trade and economic and technical cooperation agreements with the PRC.<sup>128</sup> Between March 25 and April 2, 1973, President Ahidjo paid an official visit to Peking. In a joint communique, the two governments reaffirmed their "resolute support to the just struggle of the people of Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique, Angola, Zimbabwe [Rhodesia], Namibia [Southwest Africa], Azania [South Africa]" and other regions of Africa.<sup>129</sup> During Ahidjo's visit, Peking granted Cameroon an interest-free loan of 18 billion CFA francs (\$75 million) to construct a hydroelectric dam at Lagdo and a Palace of Congress at Yaounde. The loan is repayable over twenty years, beginning in 1983.<sup>130</sup> Commenting on the Chinese loan, Ahidjo told the Cameroonian national assembly on June 20, 1973:

We appreciate this gesture of the Chinese people not only because of the conditions in which it was made but also and particularly because it was made by a people who are themselves engaged in a gigantic development effort.<sup>131</sup>

As of late 1976, Cameroon was still on the PRC's aid list, but detailed categories of aid were not announced.

### Sierra Leone

The British colony of Sierra Leone became independent on April 27, 1961, and established diplomatic relations with the ROC in late September, 1963, but proved to be one of Taipei's most unreliable friends in Africa. As early as December, 1964, Sierra Leone's Foreign Minister C. B. Rogers-Wright told the United Nations General Assembly that his country would "strongly support" seating the PRC in the United Nations.<sup>132</sup> Yet in 1965, while still maintaining diplomatic relations with Taipei, Sierra Leone voted for Peking's admission.

A Sierra Leone delegation led by Finance Minister C. A. Kamara-Taylor visited Peking on July 29, 1971, and established diplomatic relations.<sup>133</sup> An economic and technical cooperation agreement and a trade and payments agreement were signed on the same day, and Peking granted an interest-free loan of \$30 million to Sierra Leone later in 1971.<sup>134</sup>

In February, 1972, twelve PRC agricultural experts arrived in Sierra Leone, and in March, Peking donated two patrol boats and trained fifty-two Sierra Leoneans (in China) to operate them.<sup>135</sup> In April, 1973, a fifteen-member PRC medical team arrived in Sierra Leone to work for two years.<sup>136</sup>

Sierra Leone President Siaka Stevens visited the PRC between November 6 and 15, 1973, and signed a supplementary protocol to the 1971 economic and technical cooperation agreement.<sup>137</sup> Late in 1974,

Sierra Leone signed a contract for PRC aid in constructing a small-scale hydroelectric power station at Kikina in the Kenema district, and by 1975, the Chinese were also helping build a bridge and a stadium.<sup>138</sup>

### Senegal

The French colony of Senegal became part of the Mali Federation (autonomous in 1959, independent in 1960), but left it to become a separate republic on August 20, 1960, as noted above in the section on Mali. Leopold Senghor has been president of Senegal continuously since independence. His government recognized Taipei in 1960, but suspended relations with the ROC late in 1964. During the next five years, Senegal advocated admitting Peking to the United Nations, but did not establish relations with the PRC, and instead resumed relations with the ROC in July, 1969.

Two years later, Senegal's Foreign Minister Dr. Amadou Karim Gaye again spoke in favor of admitting Peking, and voted for it in October, 1971.<sup>139</sup> However, Senegal did not establish diplomatic relations with the PRC until December 7, 1971, after the final United Nations vote on Chinese representation.<sup>140</sup>

The first result of this late recognition of Peking was an exchange of visits more than a year later: a PRC agricultural mission visited Dakar in April, 1973, and in November a Senegalese delegation led by Ousmane Seck, minister for cooperation and planning, concluded trade and economic and technical cooperation agreements in Peking. The PRC made an interest-free loan of 11,268 million CFA francs (about \$50 million) to Senegal, repayable over twenty-five

years, beginning in 1983, to finance irrigation and agricultural development projects. Shortly afterwards, seventy Chinese agricultural experts were sent to Senegal.<sup>141</sup> In May, 1974, President Senghor made a month-long trip to four Asian countries: the PRC, North Korea, India, and Bangladesh.

#### Togo

The French trust territory of Togo became independent on April 27, 1960, and established diplomatic relations with the ROC on the same day.<sup>142</sup> Togo maintained these relations until nearly a year after Peking was admitted to the United Nations. Finally, Togolese Foreign Minister Joachim Hunlede led a goodwill delegation to Peking, and signed a joint communique on September 19, 1972, establishing diplomatic relations.<sup>143</sup> By an economic and technical cooperation agreement signed on the same day, Peking granted Togo an interest-free loan of 11.5 billion CFA francs (\$45.6 million) for rural development.<sup>144</sup>

Togolese President Gnassingbe Eyadema visited Peking two years later (September, 1974), and obtained a PRC promise to build a sugar refinery in Togo and to send thirty Chinese doctors to Togo with drugs and medical equipment.<sup>145</sup> In April, 1975, Peking donated agricultural equipment worth 110 million CFA francs to Togo.<sup>146</sup> During 1976 Togo was still on PRC's aid list and received additional medical aid.<sup>147</sup>

#### Upper Volta

The French colony of Upper Volta became independent on August

5, 1960, established diplomatic relations with the ROC on December 14, 1961, and did not switch recognition to the PRC until September 15, 1973, two years after the admission of Peking to the United Nations. During the decade 1961-1971, Upper Volta was one of the ROC's strongest supporters in the United Nations, and its first president, Maurice Yameogo, was outspoken about PRC subversion in Africa.

In March, 1965, referring to Peking's collaboration with Ghana's Nkrumah against other African governments, Yameogo said: "If we do not inform the masses about the dangers of the Chinese invasion, no matter what we do, we will always have the Chinese on our hands."<sup>148</sup> On September 21, 1965, campaigning for re-election in Leo, Yameogo told Upper Voltans:

If you vote for me I will insure that communism never penetrates our country . . . you also know that where communism thrives there is always chaos. I am referring to certain countries which have hoped to [divide?] Africa. I refer principally to the PRC. We have nothing against the Chinese; they are people we respect, but the moment they enter a country they introduce subversion, revolution, suicide, and assassination. We do not want to see them come here. We like them better in their own home.<sup>149</sup>

Six days later, in Bobodioulasso, Yameogo added a new theme to his criticism of Peking:

You are aware that Communist China is overpopulated, and consequently the Peking regime is now looking for places to send its surplus people to live. If we allow Communist Chinese people to enter our country, Upper Volta will no longer be Upper Volta but an extension of Peking and its regime and we would disappear within a few years.<sup>150</sup>

This rather implausible apprehension was echoed in other African countries.<sup>151</sup> Upper Volta's anti-Communist policy continued after a 1966 military coup ousted President Yameogo. By 1973,

however, Peking had diplomatic relations with four of the six countries bordering on landlocked Upper Volta--Mali, Benin, Togo, and Ghana. When a measles epidemic erupted in Upper Volta in April, 1973, PRC Premier Chou En-lai sent President Sangoule Lamizana a message of sympathy and, through the PRC Red Cross, 300,000 doses of vaccine and \$50,000 worth of antibiotics.<sup>152</sup>

Five months later, an Upper Volta goodwill delegation visited Peking and signed an economic and technical cooperation agreement with the PRC government on September 8, 1973.<sup>153</sup> Official diplomatic relations were established a week later. On December 3, by an agreement signed in Ouagadougou, capital of Upper Volta, the PRC loaned Upper Volta 11.286 billion CFA francs (\$50 million), repayable over twenty-five years, beginning in 1983. This was to be used for rural development, irrigation, and construction of the Tambao railway.<sup>154</sup>

Six months later, Peking donated 5,000 tons of rice, 300,000 doses of cholera vaccine, and 500,000 doses of measles vaccine.<sup>155</sup> There is one report, not confirmed by other sources, of another \$2 million loan in 1974.<sup>156</sup> As of 1976, Upper Volta was still receiving medical aid from the PRC.<sup>157</sup>

#### Guinea-Bissau

Portuguese Guinea was the last of mainland states of West Africa to achieve independence. During the 1960s, as noted in earlier sections, Peking supported guerrilla forces against the Portuguese in the large colony of Angola, but apparently had little influence with rebels in Portuguese Guinea, who were obtaining arms from Moscow. When rebel leader Amilcar Cabral was assassinated in neighboring

Guinea in January, 1973, there were reports that Peking was implicated in the killing.<sup>158</sup> Cabral's brother Luiz took over the leadership, and on September 24, 1973, proclaimed the colony an independent state under the name Guinea-Bissau. This was quickly recognized by many Communist and Third World states, including Peking, which granted recognition on September 30. Formal diplomatic relations between the PRC and Guinea-Bissau were inaugurated on March 15, 1974.<sup>159</sup> Portugal accepted the independence of the new state on September 10, 1974, making possible its admission to the United Nations a week later.

A Guinea-Bissau delegation led by Victor Saude Maria, Commissioner of State for Foreign Affairs, visited Peking and signed an economic and technical cooperation agreement with the PRC on July 9, 1975.<sup>160</sup> Guinea-Bissau received some medical assistance from Peking in 1976, but relations between the two countries have thus far remained rather formal.

#### Gabon

The French colony of Gabon, which achieved independence on August 17, 1960, had diplomatic relations with Taipei for the next thirteen and a half years but finally switched to Peking on April 20, 1974. Five months later, its President Omar Bongo visited Peking and negotiated the usual trade, economic and technical cooperation agreements on October 6, 1974.<sup>161</sup> Two weeks later, Peking granted Gabon an interest-free loan of 5.5 billion CFA francs (\$25.7 million), repayable in twenty years with a ten-year moratorium, to be used for rural development and construction of a textile factory.<sup>162</sup> As of late 1976, Gabon was receiving agricultural aid from Peking.<sup>163</sup>

## Gambia

The small British colony of the Gambia became independent on February 18, 1965, but did not establish relations with either Chinese government until 1968, when it recognized the ROC. This policy was maintained until December 14, 1974, when Gambia transferred recognition to the PRC. Gambian President Dawda Kairaba Jawara visited Peking from June 11 to 14, 1975, and during 1976 the PRC gave medical assistance and 500 tons of rice to Gambia for disaster relief.<sup>164</sup>

## Ivory Coast

The only West African nation still refusing to establish relations with Peking is the relatively prosperous and economically self-sufficient Ivory Coast, a former French colony which became independent on August 7, 1960, and has maintained diplomatic relations with Taipei since July 20, 1963. Since independence, Ivory Coast has remained under the leadership of President Felix Houphouet-Boigny, a moderate with considerable prestige in other African countries.

As early as 1959, before the Sino-Soviet split became evident, Houphouet-Boigny made the astute prediction that "the Soviet Union will one day regret having taught Communism to the PRC."<sup>165</sup> In March, 1960, he warned leaders of Upper Volta, Niger, and Benin, at a four-power meeting in Bodo-Dioulasso, Upper Volta, that "for the first time in its history, Africa is open to the Communist world, with its ideological and economic threat. The presence of the Chinese on Africa's flank is a source of great anxiety to us."<sup>166</sup> When France

recognized Peking in 1964, Houphouet-Boigny was one of the few French-speaking African leaders to criticize de Gaulle's decision. By then, his previous antipathy to Communism had been greatly reinforced by PRC involvement in Nkrumah's subversive activities against other African countries, including (as previously mentioned) the building of a training base at Half-Assini, close to the Ghana-Ivory Coast border. In attacking Nkrumah's activities, Houphouet-Boigny never forgot to mention that it was Peking who stood behind Nkrumah.

In August, 1965, on the fifth anniversary of Ivory Coast independence, Houphouet-Boigny accused the Chinese Communists of being intransigent and inhuman, with "absolute scorn for the individual and human dignity."<sup>167</sup> In September, he told the congress of the ruling Ivory Coast Democratic Party (PDCI), that Ivory Coast might revise its attitude toward certain East European countries, but would not establish diplomatic relations with the PRC, "whose policy is to maintain permanent revolution in other countries through subversion and assassination of those leaders who refuse to adopt its ideology in the conduct of state affairs."<sup>168</sup> A year later, he affirmed that no matter what happened, "we will be the last to recognize China."<sup>169</sup> He has kept his word.

#### FOOTNOTES

<sup>1</sup>As mentioned in Chapter I (note 11) Egyptian recognition of the PRC appears to have been intended partly to display independence in negotiating with the U.S. for aid to build the Aswan dam, and partly to secure an alternate source of arms in case of Soviet-U.S. agreement to ban arms sales in the Middle East.

<sup>2</sup>Chung-hua jen-min kung-ho-kuo tui-wai kuan-hsi wen-chien-chi [Collection of documents of foreign relations of the People's Republic of China] (hereafter referred to as wen-chien-chi (PRC)), 4 (1956-1957), pp. 154-155, 162; Zartman, "Tiger in the Jungle," p. 2.

<sup>3</sup>Zartman, "Tiger in the Jungle"; Ismael, p. 509; and "Chinese Penetration of Africa," translation of an unsigned article in Afrique Nouvelle, Dakar, no. 931, pp. 10-16, June, 1965, pp. 8-9, in JPRS, Translations on Africa, no. 29 (31368), no. 230, p. 34. Unlike the Soviet Union, Peking then had no diplomatic relations with France, so it was easier for the PRC to grant Algeria recognition immediately.

<sup>4</sup>Neuhauser, Third World Politics, p. 21.

<sup>5</sup>Lowenthal, pp. 162-163; Ogunsanwo, p. 30.

<sup>6</sup>Kung-t'so tung-hsun [Bulletin of activities], no. 17, pp. 22-23; quoted from an English translation of the document, The Politics of the Chinese Red Army: A Translation of the Bulletin of Activities of the People's Liberation Army, ed. by J. Chester Cheng, published by the Hoover Institute on War, Revolution, and Peace (Stanford, 1966).

<sup>7</sup>Ogunsanwo, p. 30; Chung-fei kuan-hsi chan-wang, p. 91. Robert Legvold wrote that before leaving Guinea, French personnel destroyed--partially in haste, partially in bitterness--virtually all records and all transportable capital equipment. What could not be burned was dumped into the ocean. See his Soviet Policy in West Africa (Cambridge, 1970), p. 60.

<sup>8</sup>Adie, "China and the Bandung Genie," p. 8; Ismael, p. 508.

<sup>9</sup>U.S. Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Daily Report, 1960, no. 67 (April 6), p. AAA 14, no. 72 (April 13), p. AAA 6. See also Larkin, pp. 66-67, table I. Larkin was mistaken in saying that after Guinea attained independence, "China promptly recognized Guinea and was, in turn, granted recognition . . ." (p. 39). The mutual recognition was not granted until more than a year after Guinea became independent.

<sup>10</sup>For the full text of the agreement, see Tiao-yueh-chi (PRC), 8 (1959), pp. 127-130.

<sup>11</sup>For the full texts of the documents, see *ibid.*, 9 (1960), pp. 80-84, 10 (1961), pp. 1-2. English translations of the documents were published in Peking Review, 37 (September 14, 1960), pp. 10-13.

<sup>12</sup>Peking Review, 37, p. 11.

<sup>13</sup>"Two Chinas in Africa," p. 387. Soviet credits to less developed countries usually were for twelve years at 2.5 percent interest. See An Economic Assessment, p. 376; and Udo Weiss, "China's Aid to and Trade with the Developing Countries of the Third World," pp. 97-98.

<sup>14</sup>For detailed description of the Sino-Soviet competition in West Africa, see Legvold, Soviet Policy in West Africa.

<sup>15</sup>U.S. Congress, Joint Economic Committee, An Economic Profile of Mainland China (New York, 1970), p. 612, table 1.

<sup>16</sup>Legvold, p. 61; Ismael, p. 508.

<sup>17</sup>Dick Wilson, "Peking's African Image," Far Eastern Economic Review, 49, 6 (August 5, 1965), p. 249.

<sup>18</sup>NCNA, November 16, 1966, in ARB, EFT Series, 3 (1966), p. 623. For Chinese text of the trade loan agreement, see Tiao-yueh-chi (PRC), 15 (1966-1967), pp. 15-16.

<sup>19</sup>ARB, PSC Series, 3 (1966), p. 687.

<sup>20</sup>"Peking Aid Lauded in Extending Power Facilities," translation of an article by Lamine Bah entitled "Inauguration of the Labe, Pita, Dalaba, and Mamou Electric Power Networks and of the High-Tension Line," in the French-language Horoya-Hebdo, Conakry, June 6-12, 1970, pp. 15-21; in JPRS, Translations on Africa, no. 137 (50938), no. 918, pp. 34, 41.

<sup>21</sup>ARB, EFT Series, 4 (1967), p. 704.

<sup>22</sup>Peking Review, 23 (June 7, 1968), p. 24.

<sup>23</sup>Peking Domestic Service in Mandarin, 1700 GMT, May 24, 1968, Daily Report, 104 (May 27, 1968), p. I A 3. The railroad project was dropped after Malian President Keita was overthrown in 1968. West Africa reported on May 26, 1972, that negotiations for construction of the 210-mile railroad were renewed between Mali and the PRC, but nothing later has been reported.

<sup>24</sup>Daily Report, nos. 144 (p. I A 1), 145 (pp. I A 4-5), 146 (pp. I A 2-3), 152 (pp. I A 5-6), and 153 (pp. I A 2-4).

<sup>25</sup>Peking, NCNA, International Service in English, 1902 GMT, February 28, 1969, and 1724 GMT, March 1, 1969, in *ibid.*, no. 41 (March 3, 1969), p. I A 9.

<sup>26</sup>Yin Ching-yao, "Mao-kung tsui-chin tui-wai ho-tung chih yen-chiu," p. 13.

<sup>27</sup>Under the agreement, PRC was to repair the road between Conakry and Kankan; to repair the port at Conakry; to help Guinea in its agricultural development; and to build a cement factory. See Radio Conakry, October 31, 1969, in *ARB*, EFT Series, 6 (1969), p. 1521; and Peking, NCNA, International Service in English, 1918 GMT, October 9, 1969, in *Daily Report*, no. 197 (October 10, 1969), p. I A 6.

<sup>28</sup>For the text of the statement, see *Peking Review*, 48 (November 27, 1970), p. 3.

<sup>29</sup>Conakry Home Service in French, 1101 GMT, November 24, 1970, in BBC, *SWB*, ME/3544/B/9 and ME/3555/B/3.

<sup>30</sup>Wolfgang Bartke, Agreements of the People's Republic of China with Other Countries.

<sup>31</sup>Carol H. Fogarty, "China's Economic Relations with the Third World," in *China: A Reassessment of the Economy*, table 2 (p. 732). Since 1974, Guinea has received two trawlers from the PRC on credit (July, 1976). See John Franklin Copper, "China's Foreign Aid in 1976," *Current Scene*, XV, 6 and 7 (June-July, 1977), table I (p. 13), and p. 16.

<sup>32</sup>As early as 1957, Nkrumah indicated that besides close relations with the three great powers of the Western bloc (Great Britain, France, the U.S.) Ghana must also have normal relations with the two great powers of the Eastern bloc (Soviet Union, PRC). See his "Ghana's Policy at Home and Abroad," a speech given in the Ghanaian parliament, in Ghana Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, *Miscellaneous Addresses of Kwame Nkrumah* (Accra, Ghana: Ministry of Information and Broadcasting), 3 (1457-1965), p. 13. Nationalist Chinese official sources list Ghana as granting Peking recognition in 1957; see *Chung-fei kuan-hsi ti chan-wang*, p. 90. However, this is not substantiated by other sources; see Ogunsanwo, p. 72; Ismael, p. 507.

<sup>33</sup>For Chinese text see *Tiao-yueh-chi* (PRC), 10 (1961), pp. 18-22. An English translation of the communique was published in *Peking Review*, 34 (August 25, 1961).

<sup>34</sup>For Chinese text of the documents see *Tiao-yueh-chi* (PRC), 10 (1961), pp. 17-18, 250-251, 252-258; English texts were published in *Peking Review*, 34 (August 15, 1961). Both Chinese and English texts of the treaty of friendship can also be found in *Tiao-yueh hui-pien* (PRC), pp. 61-64.

<sup>35</sup> According to NCNA, the supplementary agreement was signed on July 15 in Accra but NCNA did not give the account. See Daily Report, no. 138 (July 16, 1964), p. BBB 6. For the amount, see Eckstein, appendix E; An Economic Profile, p. 590, table 5; Ogunsanwo, p. 276, appendix I, table 9. Larkin, p. 94, also mentioned the grant, but gave the date as February, 1964.

<sup>36</sup> In his Africa Must Unite (New York, 1970), pp. 54-55, Nkrumah wrote: "In the early years of the C.P.R. (Convention People's Party), and frequently since, I urged members to follow the advice of the Chinese: go to the people; live among them; learn from them; love them; serve them; plan with them; start with what they know; build on what they have."

<sup>37</sup> See Ministry of Information, Republic of Ghana, Nkrumah's Subversion in Africa (Accra, 1966), p. 7.

<sup>38</sup> The arrival of the Chinese guerrilla warfare experts in Ghana was kept secret at the request of the Chinese Embassy for the safety of the experts and to avoid allegations that China was encouraging subversion in Africa. See *ibid.*, p. 7 and p. 60, appendix E; Hevi, p. 115.

<sup>39</sup> For Chinese and English texts of the protocol, see Nkrumah's Subversion in Africa, pp. 56-59, appendix B.

<sup>40</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 18. There were four secret training camps opened in Ghana at Mankrong, Half-Assini, Damongo, and Obenemasi, in chronological order. However, the one at Damongo was either very inactive or abandoned during the planning phase, since no activity there is mentioned. The Chinese participated in the training program at the camps of Half-Assini and Obenemasi and were in sole charge of the latter.

<sup>41</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 18-20, 60 (appendix E).

<sup>42</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 19; see also Larkin, p. 133; and New York Times, June 10, 1966. According to the International Press Service of West Berlin, a large number of African youths were also trained in mainland China at three secret training centers--Harbin in Manchuria, Nanking on the Yangtze River and an unidentified place in Shantung province on the North China coast. The Africans were from Nigeria, Benin, Ivory Coast, Algeria, Zanzibar, South Africa, Kenya, Madagascar, Angola, Mozambique, Guinea, Cameroon, Congo, and Zaire. See Free China Weekly, I, 19 (July 5, 1964), p. 3.

<sup>43</sup> The Accra Conference (October 21-26) was attended by heads of nineteen African countries; nine countries sent delegates of lower rank. Eight were absent--Chad, Benin, Gabon, Ivory Coast, Madagascar, Niger, Togo, and Upper Volta. See Keesing's Contemporary Archives, 15 (1965-1966), p. 21051 A.

<sup>44</sup> Nkrumah was allegedly visiting Peking on a Vietnam peace mission. See Legvold, p. 263. After the coup, Nkrumah went to Guinea and Sekou Toure proclaimed him co-President of Guinea. He never regained power in Ghana, but published a Handbook of Revolutionary Warfare (1968) and a Marxist tract called Class Struggle in Africa (1970); he died in 1972.

<sup>45</sup> According to J.W.K. Harlley, Inspector-General of Police and deputy chairman of the National Liberation Council, a few weeks after the coup, the PRC Ambassador to Guinea gave Nkrumah 500,000 pounds in Bank of England notes while the Soviet Ambassador gave him \$200,000, for use in trying to regain power in Ghana. See Information Department of the Ministry of External Affairs, Ghana, Ghana Today, 11, 1 (March 8, 1967), p. 10.

<sup>46</sup> Keesing's Contemporary Archives, 15 (1965-1966), p. 21687 D; Radio Accra Domestic Service, November 3, 1966, in Daily Report, no. 215 (November 4, 1966), p. I 6.

<sup>47</sup> Accra in English for Abroad, 1400 GMT, February 29, 1972, BBC, SWB, ME/3929/B2; and Peking Review, no. 9 (March 3, 1972), p. 3.

<sup>48</sup> Ghana News Agency in English, 1136 GMT, September 14, 1972; BBC, SWB, ME/4098/B/3.

<sup>49</sup> West Africa, March 26, 1973, in ARB, EFT Series, 10 (1973), p. 2701.

<sup>50</sup> Ghana News Agency in English, 1145 GMT, April 3, 1973, BBC, SWB, ME/4264/B/4; 1629 GMT, October 16, 1973, ME/4427/B/6; Accra in English, 0600 GMT, March 6, 1974, and Ghana News Agency in English, 1630 GMT, July 10, 1974, ME/4546/B/2 and ME/4649/B/11.

<sup>51</sup> Fogarty, p. 732.

<sup>52</sup> On June 17, the ROC representative, Chen Hsiung-fei, had a friendly talk with Keita and gave him reproductions of 300 Chinese paintings from the National Imperial Palace Museum. Keita sent letters to ROC President Chiang Kai-shek and Foreign Minister Shen Chang-huan expressing appreciation for the ROC's recognition and friendship. See Chung-fei kuan-hsi ti chan-wang, pp. 43, 44.

<sup>53</sup> For the background of the rupture of the Mali Federation, see Thomas Hodgkin and Ruth Schachter Morgenthau, "Mali," in James S. Coleman and Carl G. Rosberg, Jr., ed., Political Parties and National Integration in Tropical Africa (Berkeley, 1964); Legvold, pp. 89-92; and "Nationalist China and Africa," translation of an article by Franz Ansprenger in the German-language bi-weekly magazine Afrika Heute [Africa today], 1-2, Bonn, January 15, 1966, pp. 3-7, in JPRS, Translations on Africa, no. 40 (34740), no. 347, p. 12.

<sup>54</sup>For Chinese text of the agreement, see Tiao-yueh-chi (PRC), 10 (1961), pp. 333-334.

<sup>55</sup>*Ibid.*, 13 (1964), pp. 15-20. An English translation of the communique is in Peking Review, 46 (November 13, 1964), pp. 17-19.

<sup>56</sup>For Chinese text of the treaty of friendship, see Tiao-yueh-chi (PRC), 13 (1964), pp. 381-382. An English version is in Peking Review, 18 (April 30, 1965), p. 25. Tiao-yueh hui-pien (PRC), pp. 69-72, has both Chinese and French texts of the treaty. The contents of the agreement on the supply of equipment for an industrial project were not given. However, the agreement and the textile project were mentioned in Chin-chi tao-pao [Economic reporter], general nos. 938-939 (October 1, 1965), pp. 56-57; quoted in ARB, EFT Series, 2 (1965), pp. 275-276.

<sup>57</sup>An Economic Profile, p. 590, table 5; see also Colin Legum, "Africa and China," in Halpern, p. 421.

<sup>58</sup>For Gologo's opinion on the Cultural Revolution and the H-bomb explosion, see "Malian Information Minister Reports Impressions on Return from Journalists' Conference in Peking," pp. 37-39. According to Tung Chi-ping, a young Chinese staff member at the PRC Embassy in Burundi who defected on May 26, 1964, Gologo was given \$600 by the PRC for writing an anti-Soviet article. See Tung's testimony at a U.S. Senate sub-committee hearing on August 20, 1964, 88th Congress, 2nd Session.

<sup>59</sup>According to Le Monde, Keita's opponents in Mali thought he was planning a rapprochement with France; they preferred close ties with the eastern bloc, particularly the PRC; see Le Monde, November 21, 1968, in ARB, PSC Series, 5 (1968), p. 1235. If this was true, Peking may not have been displeased by Keita's downfall.

<sup>60</sup>Marches Tropicaux et Mediterraneens, September 26, 1970, in ARB, EFT Series, 7 (1970), p. 1826.

<sup>61</sup>For related reports, see Daily Report, nos. 243 (p. I A 3), 244 (p. I A 6-10), 247 (p. I A 10).

<sup>62</sup>See footnote 23.

<sup>63</sup>Bamako in French, 1300 GMT, April 4, 1973, in BBC, SWB, ME/4267/B/7.

<sup>64</sup>Peking Review, 26 (June 29, 1973), p. 8.

<sup>65</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 9.

<sup>66</sup>China and the Current Era of Detente, p. 143; L'Essor, Bamako, August 18, 19, 1973, in ARB, EFT Series, 10 (1973), p. 2854; MTM, March 1, 1973, *ibid.*, 11 (1974), p. 3051; Cameroon Times, February 17, 1976, and news agencies report on May 20, 1976, in *ibid.*, 13 (1976), pp. 3816, 3941; and Copper, p. 17.

<sup>67</sup>Fogarty, p. 732.

<sup>68</sup>On July 15, 1960, a month before Congo became independent, Youlou reviewed the situation in the former Belgian Congo at a press conference in Paris, and warned of the grave danger represented by the ascendancy of the Communist powers on the African continent. See Radio Paris, French to Africa, July 16, 1960, in Daily Report, no. 138 (July 18, 1960), p. I 6.

<sup>69</sup>Congo Brazzaville Domestic Service in French, 1830 GMT, January 21, 1964, in Daily Report, no. 21 (January 30, 1964), p. I 2.

<sup>70</sup>Quoted by Cooley, p. 115.

<sup>71</sup>See Wai-chiao-pu, Chung-hua min-kuo [Foreign ministry, Republic of China], comp. Wo yu Fei-chou ke-kuo kuan-hsi chien-chieh [A brief introduction to relations between our country and African countries], hereafter referred to as Kuan-hsi chien-chieh (ROC), Taipei, 1975, p. 10; Free China Weekly, NN-LXIV-16 (April 21, 1964), pp. 3-4 (some early issues were published as press releases, and volume numbers were not consistent with those of later issues).

<sup>72</sup>The loan agreement was signed in Brazzaville on July 10: see NCNA, International Service in English, 1425 GMT, July 15, 1964, in Daily Report, no. 139 (July 17, 1964), p. I 2; George T. Yu, "Peking's African Diplomacy," Problems of Communism, 21 (March, 1972), p. 21; Ismael, p. 519. In some sources the amount is given as \$25 million; see An Economic Profile, p. 590, table 5; An Economic Assessment, p. 381, table 5. The donation was made in the name of the Red Cross Society. Chou Chiu-ye, Peking's Ambassador to Brazzaville, also donated 300,000 CFA francs. See Daily Report, no. 170 (August 31, 1964), p. I 2; no. 173 (September 3, 1964), p. I 1.

<sup>73</sup>For the Chinese text of the communique, see Tiao-yueh chi (PRC), 13 (1964), pp. 28-30. An English translation is in Peking Review, 41 (October 9, 1964), pp. 14-15.

<sup>74</sup>The Chinese texts of the treaty of friendship and the agreement on navigation can be found in Tiao-yueh-chi (PRC), 13 (1964), pp. 27-28, 366-367, with English translation in Peking Review, 3 (January 15, 1965). Chinese and French versions of the treaty are also in Tiao-yueh hui-pien (PRC), pp. 65-68. The contents of the other two agreements were not given by the above sources.

<sup>75</sup>It was through PRC Ambassador to Brazzaville Chou Chiu-yeh's efforts that the Central African Republic decided to recognize Peking in September, 1964.

<sup>76</sup>"The Subversive Activity of World Communism in Africa," translation of an article in Neue Zurcher Zeitung [New Zurich journal], Zurich, August 27, 1965, in JPRS, Translations on Africa, no. 30 (32193), no. 263, p. 8; and "The Role of the Chinese Communists in the Congo(B) and Central Africa," translation of an article by Special

Correspondent "F. L.," in the daily La Libre Belgique [Free Belgium], Brussels, October 15, 1954, pp. 1-2, and October 15, 1964, p. 3, in JPRS, Translations on Africa, no. 17 (27507), no. 130, p. 20.

<sup>77</sup> See "Decline in Sino-Soviet Rivalry and Cuban Influence Noted in Congo(B)," translation of an unsigned article entitled "Sino-Soviet Rivalry Necessarily Indicated in Brazzaville," in Le Journal APAN [APAN journal], Abidjan, no. 135, June 22, 1967, p. 3, in JPRS, Translations on Africa, no. 68 (41821), no. 600, pp. 27, 29. Adie, "China Returns to Africa," p. 5.

<sup>78</sup> NCNA in English, 1235 GMT, June 18, 1970, and Brazzaville in French, 1845 GMT, July 12, 1970, in BBC, SWB, ME/3411/B/7 and ME/3429/B/5; Etumbo, Brazzaville, July 25, 1970, in ARB, PSC Series, 7 (1970), p. 1820.

<sup>79</sup> Tanyug in English, 1104 GMT, October 9, 1970, in BBC, SWB, ME/3480/E/1.

<sup>80</sup> Brazzaville in French, 1245 GMT, January 27, 1971, *ibid.*, ME/3596/B/7.

<sup>81</sup> Le Monde, March 13, 1971, in ARB, PSC Series, 8 (1971), p. 1971.

<sup>82</sup> Brazzaville in French, 1245 GMT, September 14, 1971, and Brazzaville Home Service in French, February 15, 1972, in BBC, SWB, ME/3788/B/6.

<sup>83</sup> *Ibid.*, ME/4188/ii.

<sup>84</sup> MTM, August 3, 1973, in ARB, PSC Series, 10 (1973), p. 2969.

<sup>85</sup> Ngouabi reportedly often appeared on television dressed in the Maoist style. See Ganda, "Report on Maoist Subversion in Africa," p. 17.

<sup>86</sup> Kuan-hsi chien-chieh (ROC), p. 10.

<sup>87</sup> Chin Shen-pao, "Da-ho-mey cheng-tsao chih fen-hsi" [Analysis of Dahomey's political problems], Wen-ti yu yen-chiu, IX, 9 (June, 1970), pp. 54-57; Kuan-hsi chien-chieh (ROC), p. 10.

<sup>88</sup> NCNA, December 29, 1972, in ARB, PSC Series, 9 (1972), p. 2705; Peking Review, 1 (January 5, 1973), p. 8. However, according to the ROC official source, Kuan-hsi chien-chieh, p. 10, Benin resumed diplomatic relations with Peking on January 10, 1973, and Taipei severed relations with Benin on January 19.

<sup>89</sup> Peking Review, 1 (January 5, 1973), p. 8; Fogarty, table 2 (p. 732); Current Scene, XI, 12 (December, 1973), p. 2. Bartke, quoting a Reuter report of January 15, 1973, indicated that the loan was \$35 million. See Bartke, Agreements of the PRC, p. 25.

- <sup>90</sup>West Africa, May 20, 1974, in ARB, PSC Series, 11 (1974), p. 2350.
- <sup>91</sup>News agency report, July 21, 1976, in ARB, PSC Series, 13 (1976), p. 4101.
- <sup>92</sup>Copper, p. 17.
- <sup>93</sup>Agence Tchadienne de Presse report on June 3, 1965, in ARB, EFT Series, 2 (1965), p. 327. Taipei severed relations with Mauritania on September 11, 1965.
- <sup>94</sup>MAC, August 31, 1966, *ibid.*, 3 (1966), p. 587.
- <sup>95</sup>Peking Review, no. 9 (February 24, 1967), p. 14. For joint communique of the visit, see pp. 14-15. For Chinese text of the joint communique, trade agreement and cultural agreement, see Tiao-yueh-chi (PRC), 15, pp. 1-3, 18-19, 153-154.
- <sup>96</sup>For text of the joint communique, see Peking Review, no. 45 (October 24, 1967), pp. 8-9.
- <sup>97</sup>"China's Foreign Aid in 1972," Current Scene, XI, 12 (December, 1973), table II, p. 5.
- <sup>98</sup>"Chinese Agricultural Material," translation of Mauritania news briefs in Le Moniteur Africain, Dakar, no. 336, March 7, 1968, p. 3; in JPRS, Translations on Africa, no. 86 (44908), no. 705, p. 56. See also Afrique Nouvelle, Dakar, March 13, 1968, in ARB, EFT Series, 5 (1968), p. 962.
- <sup>99</sup>Le Monde, November 3, 1970, in ARB, *ibid.*, 7 (1970), p. 1844.
- <sup>100</sup>Peking Review, 15 (April 9, 1971), pp. 3, 22; Bartke, Agreements of the PRC, p. 34; "China's Foreign Aid in 1972," p. 5; Afrique Nouvelle, April 28, 1971, in ARB, EFT Series, 8 (1971), p. 203.
- <sup>101</sup>Bartke, Agreements of the PRC, p. 34; "PRC Delegation," translation of an article in Le Moniteur Africain, Dakar, November 2, 1972, p. 3, in JPRS, Translations on Africa, no. 202 (57592), no. 1238, p. 35; Fogarty, p. 732.
- <sup>102</sup>See West Africa, October 14, 1974, in ARB, EFT Series, 11 (1974), pp. 3276-3277. According to OCDE (Cooperation and Economic Development Organization) report in 1976, the 1974 loan was \$53.1 million. See "Increase in Chinese Aid to Black Africa Noted," in JPRS, Translations on Sub-Saharan Africa, p. 3.
- <sup>103</sup>Cooper, p. 17; MTM, June 11, 1976, in ARB, EFT Series, 13 (1976), p. 3921.

<sup>104</sup>Peking Review, 43 (October 23, 1970), p. 10; Tiao-yueh-chi (PRC), 17 (1970), pp. 1-2.

<sup>105</sup>Peking Review, 5 (January 29, 1971), p. 5.

<sup>106</sup>NCNA, September 8, 1971, in ARB, EFT Series, 8 (1971), p. 2139.

<sup>107</sup>NCNA, August 17, 1973, in BBC, SWB, ME/4378/B/8; Copper, p. 17.

<sup>108</sup>Lagos Nigeria Domestic Service in English, 1800 GMT, January 29, 1964, in Daily Report, no. 22 (January 31, 1964), p. I 7.

<sup>109</sup>Enugu Nigeria ENBS in English, 1700 GMT, July 2, 1964, in Daily Report, no. 130 (July 6, 1964), p. I 5.

<sup>110</sup>Lagos Nigeria Domestic Service in English, 1800 GMT, July 27, 1964, in Daily Report, no. 140 (July 30, 1964), p. I 8.

<sup>111</sup>Lagos Nigeria Domestic Service in English, 1800 GMT, September 3, 1964, *ibid.*, no. 174 (September 4, 1964), p. I 8.

<sup>112</sup>Enugu Nigeria ENBS in English, 1700 GMT, August 26, 1964, *ibid.*, no. 173 (September 3, 1964), p. I 13.

<sup>113</sup>For accusations against the PRC by Nigeria, see Radio Lagos, June 21, 1968, in ARB, PSC Series, 5 (1968), p. 1097; Radio Nigeria, April 7, 1969; Radio Kaduna, August 16, 1969, in *ibid.*, 6 (1969), p. 1382 and 1500. See also Lagos in English for Abroad, 1530 GMT, February 10, 1969; BCNN (Kaduna) in English, 1400 GMT, August 15, 1969, in BBC, SWB, ME/2998/B/3-4 and ME/3154/B/4.

<sup>114</sup>For PRC-Nigeria joint communique on the establishment of diplomatic relations, see Peking Review, no. 8 (February 19, 1971), p. 5; and Tiao-yueh-chi (PRC), 18 (1971), p. 1.

<sup>115</sup>Lagos in English for Abroad, 0600 and 0700 GMT, November 6, 1972, BBC, SWB, ME/4138/B/1-2. See also Chin-chi tao-pao, nos. 1301-1302 (January 1, 1973), p. 17.

<sup>116</sup>"Agricultural Commissioner Praises Chinese Agricultural Achievements," report of an article in New Nigerian, Kaduna, February 15, 1973, p. 9, in JPRS, Translations on Africa, no. 209 (58336), no. 1271, p. 41.

<sup>117</sup>"PRC Agricultural Team's Presence Questioned," reprint of the editorial of New Nigerian, February 14, 1973, *ibid.*, pp. 39-40.

<sup>118</sup>Lagos Home Service in English, 0700 GMT, December 8, 1973, in BBC, SWB, ME/4456/B/6 and ME/4473/B/3; Lagos in English, 0600 GMT, October, 1975, *ibid.*, ME/5031/B/7.

<sup>119</sup>Lagos in English for Abroad, 0700 GMT, October 20, 1975, in BBC, SWB, ME/5038/B/2.

<sup>120</sup>Walter Z. Laqueur, "Communism and Nationalism in Tropical Africa," Foreign Affairs, 39, 4 (July, 1961), p. 615.

<sup>121</sup>Cooley, p. 101; Legum, "Africa and China," pp. 405-406.

<sup>122</sup>Sunday Telegram, July 3, 1961, quoted by Adie in "China and the Bandung Genie," pp. 8-9.

<sup>123</sup>Yaounde Cameroon Domestic Service in French, 1815 GMT, July 3, 1963, in Daily Report, no. 130 (July 5, 1963), p. I 3. According to Sun Pi-chi, spokesman of the ROC Foreign Ministry, 375 Cameroonians were being trained in mainland China for subversion in October, 1964; see Free China Weekly, II, 9 (October 25, 1964), p. 4.

<sup>124</sup>Yaounde Cameroon Domestic Service in French, 1815 GMT, February 8, 1964, in Daily Report, no. 29 (February 11, 1964), p. I 3.

<sup>125</sup>Ibid.

<sup>126</sup>U.S., Department of State, Background Notes: Cameroon (Washington, D.C., 1976), p. 5.

<sup>127</sup>For the text of the joint communique, see Peking Review, 15 (April 9, 1971), p. 9; the Chinese text is in Tiao-yueh-chi (PRC), 18, pp. 2-3.

<sup>128</sup>Bartke, Agreements of the PRC, p. 22.

<sup>129</sup>Peking Review, 14 (April 6, 1973), p. 7.

<sup>130</sup>La Presse de Cameroun, April 10, 1973, in ARB, EFT Series, 10 (1973), p. 2701; "Increase in Chinese Aid to Black Africa Noted," p. 2. However, in Fogarty, p. 732, gives the amount as \$71 million.

<sup>131</sup>Yaounde Home Service in French, 1100 GMT, June 20, 1973, in BBC, SWB, ME/4330/B/4.

<sup>132</sup>Peking, NCNA International Service in English, 1934 GMT, December 17, 1964, Daily Report, no. 247 (December 21, 1964), p. BBB 10.

<sup>133</sup>For the text of the joint communique, see Peking Review, 32 (August 6, 1971), p. 22. For official Chinese text, see Tiao-yueh-chi (PRC), 18 (1971), p. 5.

<sup>134</sup>Chin-chi tao-pao, nos. 1251-1252 (January 1, 1972), p. 3; Fogarty, p. 732.

<sup>135</sup> See Freetown Home Service in English, 2000 GMT, March 7, 1972, in BBC, SWB, ME/3936/B/3; and Freetown in English, 2000 GMT, December 7, 1972, *ibid.*, ME/4168/B/3.

<sup>136</sup> Chin-chi tao-pao, nos. 1301-1302 (January 1, 1973), p. 17; Freetown in English, 2000 GMT, April 6, 1973, in BBC, SWB, ME/4267/B/8.

<sup>137</sup> Chin-chi tao-pao, nos. 1351-1352 (January 1, 1973), p. 13. See also NCNA, November 12, 1973, in ARB, PSC Series, 10 (1973), p. 3064.

<sup>138</sup> Freetown in English, 2100 GMT, November 7, 1974, in BBC, SWB, ME/4753/B/3; Freetown in English, 2100 GMT, February 20, 1975, *ibid.*, ME/4838/B/9.

<sup>139</sup> "Foreign Minister Outlines Government's Policy," translation of an article in Le Soleil, Dakar, September 1-8, 1971, p. 3, in JPRS, Translations on Africa, no. 171 (54179), no. 1070, p. 30.

<sup>140</sup> For the text of the joint communique on establishment of diplomatic relations, see Peking Review, 51 (December 17, 1971), p. 4; for official Chinese text, see Tiao-yueh-chi (PRC), 18 (1971), pp. 26-27.

<sup>141</sup> MTM, November 30, 1973, in ARB, EFT Series, 10 (1973), p. 2957; and West Africa, May 6, 1974, *ibid.*, 11 (1974), p. 3118; Chin-chi tao-pao, nos. 1351-1352 (January 1, 1974), p. 13. See also "Increase in Chinese Aid to Black Africa Noted," p. 3.

<sup>142</sup> The British trust territory of Togoland became part of Ghana in 1957.

<sup>143</sup> For the text of the joint communique, see Peking Review, 39 (September 29, 1972), p. 4.

<sup>144</sup> Chin-chi tao-pao, nos. 1301-1302 (January, 1973), p. 17; Togo Presse, September 27, 1972, in ARB, EFT Series, 9 (1972), p. 2511; and "Increase in Chinese Aid to Black Africa Noted," p. 3.

<sup>145</sup> Lome Home Service, 0615 GMT, September 18, 1974, in BBC, SWB, ME/4708/B/3.

<sup>146</sup> Fraternite, Abidjan, April 18, 1975, in ARB, EFT Series, p. 3506.

<sup>147</sup> Copper, p. 17.

<sup>148</sup> Ouagadougou Upper Volta Domestic Service in French, 2000 GMT, March 4, 1965, Daily Report, no. 44 (March 8, 1965), p. I 10.

<sup>149</sup> Ouagadougou Upper Volta Domestic Service in French, 2000 GMT, September 21, 1965, *ibid.*, no. 184 (September 23, 1965), p. I 5.

<sup>150</sup> Ouagadougou Upper Volta Domestic Service in French, 2000 GMT, September 27, 1965, *ibid.*, no. 188 (September 29, 1965), p. I 17.

<sup>151</sup> Where the over-population or "colonize Africa" theme originated is unclear, but it was mentioned also by President Houphouët-Boigny of Ivory Coast, and the press of the Central African Republic and Zaire in 1966. See Blake, p. 4; "Possibilities for Chinese Communist Expansion in Africa, with Particular Emphasis on Congo (Leopoldville)," a translation of an article by A. Cocles in the daily newspaper, Le Progres, Leopoldville, January 22-23, 1966, pp. 6, 8, in JPRS, Translations on Africa, no. 40 (34504), no. 340, pp. 7-10; "Discussion of Reasons for Chinese Communists Expulsion from the Central African Republic," a translation of an article by Henri Donra from Bulletin Bihebdomadaire de l'ARCAP [Bi-weekly bulletin of the Central African Republic press agency], Bangui, no. 129, February 8, 1966, pp. 19-24, in JPRS, Translations on Africa, no. 38 (34365), no. 335, pp. 52-53.

<sup>152</sup> "Chinese Aid," translation of Upper Volta news briefs, in Le Moniteur Africain, April 19, 1973, p. 6, in JPRS, Translations on Africa, no. 215 (59204), no. 1310, p. 39.

<sup>153</sup> Chin-chi tao-pao, nos. 1351-1352 (January 1, 1974), pp. 13, 18.

<sup>154</sup> Radio Ouagadougou, December 4, 1973, in ARB, EFT Series, 10 (1973), p. 2957; and "Increase in Chinese Aid to Black Africa Noted," p. 3.

<sup>155</sup> Ouagadougou in French, 0630 GMT, June 8, 1974, in BBC, SWB, ME/4628/B/8.

<sup>156</sup> Fogarty, p. 732.

<sup>157</sup> Copper, p. 17.

<sup>158</sup> D. S. Prinsloo, "China and the Liberation of Portuguese Africa," Foreign Affairs Association, Study Report, 2 (May, 1976), p. 4.

<sup>159</sup> See Current Scene, XII, 4 (April, 1974), p. 31.

<sup>160</sup> Current Scene, XIII, 7-8 (July-August, 1975), p. 27.

<sup>161</sup> Chin-chi tao-pao, nos. 1401-1402 (January 1, 1975), p. 21.

<sup>162</sup> MTM, October 31, 1975, in ARB, EFT Series, 12 (1975), p. 3698; and "Increase in Chinese Aid to Black Africa Noted," p. 3.

<sup>163</sup> Copper, p. 17.

<sup>164</sup> *Ibid.*; on August 10, 1976, a protocol was signed between the

PRC and Gambian government in Banjul, capital of the Gambia. According to the pact, Peking was to send a medical team to Gambia. See Current Scene, XIV, 9 (September, 1976), p. 23.

<sup>165</sup> In a 1965 speech, as PRC and Soviet invective against each other became steadily more virulent, Houphouet-Boigny recalled, with evident satisfaction, his 1959 prediction. See Abidjan Ivory Coast Domestic Service in French, 0940 GMT, September 24, 1965, in Daily Report, no. 187 (September 28, 1965), p. I 4.

<sup>166</sup> Brazzaville, 1820 GMT, March 11, 1960, in Daily Report, no. 50 (March 14, 1960), p. I 4.

<sup>167</sup> Free China Weekly, III, 25 (August 15, 1965), p. 2. For comments by President Houphouet-Boigny on other occasions, see *Ibid.*, II, 23 (January 31, 1965), p. 4; Abidjan Ivory Coast Domestic Service in French, 1600 GMT, November 25, 1965, in Daily Report, no. 229 (November 29, 1965), p. I 13.

<sup>168</sup> Abidjan Ivory Coast Domestic Service in French, 0940 GMT, September 24, 1965, in Daily Report, no. 187 (September 28, 1965), p. I 4.

<sup>169</sup> "The Overestimated 'Yellow Peril'--Sino-Soviet Competition for Africa," a translation of an article by Werner Holzer entitled "The Overestimated 'Yellow Peril'" in the Afrika Heaute, 22 (Bonn), November 15, 1966, pp. 325-327, in JPRS, Translations on Africa, no. 57 (39123), no. 469, p. 10.

## CHAPTER V

### THE PRC AND CENTRAL AFRICA

#### Central Africa: An Overview

In the six nations of Central Africa—three former French and three former Belgian colonies—the pattern of PRC involvement was different in several ways from the pattern in West Africa described in Chapter IV. First, Peking was much more involved in internal disputes within the Central African countries, both before and after they achieved independence. As a direct consequence of this fact, four of the six countries refused to recognize Peking in the 1960s, and the other two withdrew recognition only two years after granting it. Peking's change to "smile diplomacy" after the Cultural Revolution produced few results in Central Africa. One country which had broken relations with the PRC resumed them only twelve days before the final 1971 United Nations vote on China; the other five did not have diplomatic relations with the PRC until after that vote. The second chronological stage shown in Table XV (West Africa and the Two Chinas), is therefore missing from Table XVI, which lists the Central African nations in order of establishing diplomatic relations with Peking, and compares this with the order in which they gained independence. The horizontal line of dashes separates the



Figure 4. Map of Central Africa

TABLE XVI  
CENTRAL AFRICA AND THE TWO CHINAS

<u>Independence</u> Date	<u>Order</u>	<u>Diplomatic Relations with PRC</u> Order	<u>Date</u>	<u>Country</u>	<u>Diplomatic Relations</u> With ROC	<u>Broke Diplomatic</u> <u>Relations With PRC</u>
1962.7.1	5	1	1963.12.21	Burundi	never	1965-1971
1960.8.13	4	2	1964.9.29	CAR	1962-1964, 1968-1978	1966-1976
1962.7.1	5	3	1971.11.12	Rwanda	1962-1971	
1960.6.30	1	4	1972.11.24	Zaire	1960-1972	
1960.8.11	3	5	1972.11.28	Chad	1962-1972	
1960.8.3	2	6	1974.7.20	Niger	1963-1974	

period before the 1966-1969 Cultural Revolution from the one after the 1971 United Nations vote.

Because of these differences from the West African pattern, PRC involvement in Central Africa will be examined here not in the order in which diplomatic relations were established, but geographically, from south to north. The design which emerges appears to substantiate a 1964 description of PRC strategy by a defecting PRC diplomat, Tung Chi-p'ing, who told a New York press conference that Peking "does not care about Burundi. What they really care about is the Congo (Leopoldville) [Zaire]. Mao Tse-tung has said that if 'we can conquer the Congo, we will be in a position to conquer the whole of Africa.'" <sup>1</sup> Though the statement attributed to Mao is unverifiable and the word "conquer" may exaggerate whatever he may have said in Chinese, the credibility of Tung's charge is enhanced by abundant evidence that Peking took a very early and intense interest in Zaire, and exploited Burundi in pursuing that interest.

#### Zaire

At the time of independence, few parts of Africa were as rich in resources or as unprepared for self-government as the Belgian Congo, renamed Zaire in 1971 after being called "Congo (Leopoldville)" in 1960-1966 and "Congo (Kinshasa)" in 1966-1971 to distinguish it from adjacent "Congo (Brazzaville)." In black Africa, Zaire is the second largest (after the Sudan) and third most populous nation (after Nigeria and Ethiopia), and it was the only one of the seventeen black

African countries gaining independence in 1960 that collapsed immediately into bloody civil war among its own people, accompanied by massacres of Europeans.

#### The Lumumba Phase, 1958-1960

Peking's involvement in Zaire's problems began in December, 1958, at the All-African People's Conference in Accra, Ghana. Yang Shuo, the PRC representative at the AAPSO in Cairo, attended the Accra meeting as an observer, and established contact with some key figures in various African nationalist movements, including Patrice Lumumba, founder of the Mouvement National Congolais in Zaire.<sup>2</sup> PRC ties with Lumumba were strengthened at the Second Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Conference, April 11-15, 1960, in Conakry, Guinea, which elected an AAPSO executive committee including PRC delegate Liao Cheng-chi, Lumumba, and Kenya's Oginga Odinga.<sup>3</sup> Both Lumumba and Odinga later played significant roles in relations between their countries and Peking.

On June 30, 1960, Zaire became independent, with Lumumba as prime minister and Joseph Kasavubu as president. Both Peking and Taipei granted recognition to this government but only Taipei was invited to the independence ceremony, and Zaire established relations with Taipei on August 10.<sup>4</sup> By that time, Zaire was already falling apart. Lumumba, advocating a strongly centralized government, was soon in disagreement with Kasavubu, who favored a federal system with some autonomy for the provinces. An even looser confederation was

advocated by Moise Tshombe, prime minister of the rich copper province of Katanga (now Shaba). On July 5, Zairean troops mutinied, and Belgian forces began efforts to re-establish control. On July 11, Lumumba appealed to the United Nations for assistance, and on the same day Tshombe announced the secession of Katanga, accusing the Lumumba government of leaning toward the Communists. The UN Security Council on July 14 authorized the immediate dispatch of a UN military force and called on Belgium to withdraw its troops. The first UN soldiers arrived in Leopoldville on July 15, but Lumumba had already appealed to the Soviet Union for direct shipments of arms, military technicians, and advisors.

Despite growing PRC hostility toward the Soviet Union, Lumumba's successful appeal for direct Soviet aid, and his government's ties with Taipei, Peking continued to support him in official statements.<sup>5</sup> On September 5, President Kasavubu dismissed Lumumba and five of his cabinet ministers, charging that under Lumumba's premiership "the country has been slipping slowly but surely toward dictatorship and international Communism."<sup>6</sup> Two days later, in a two hour speech, Lumumba denied being a Communist.<sup>7</sup>

On September 8, Antoine Gizenga, Lumumba's vice premier, asked Peking for aid "to permit the Government of the Republic of the Congo to assure the dangerously menaced integrity of its territory." Gizenga reportedly asked for Chinese troops, munitions, helicopters, food, and money. Within four days, Peking placed 1 million pounds "at the disposal" of the Lumumba-Gizenga government, but declined to send troops.<sup>8</sup> On September 14, the Zairean army chief of staff,

Colonel Joseph Mobutu, seized control of the government, and ordered Soviet and Czech diplomats and technicians out of the country. When Lumumba tried to flee to Stanleyville (now Kisangani) in northeastern Zaire in November, 1960, he was arrested by Zairean troops but Gizenga and other Lumumbists reached Stanleyville and set up a pro-Lumumba government there on November 30, 1960.<sup>9</sup>

#### The Gizenga Phase, 1960-1961

This made a total of three governments in the chaos-stricken country--the central government under Kasavubu and Mobutu in Leopoldville, a Katangan government under Tshombe in Elisabethville (now Lubumbashi), and the Lumumbist government under Gizenga in Stanleyville. The Kasavubu-Mobutu regime was recognized by the United Nations as the sole legal government of the Congo, despite sharp disagreement among African nations, while Tshombe was supported by Belgium, and Gizenga by the Communist states, including the PRC. When Lumumba's death was announced on February 13, 1961, Peking denounced his murder as a "sanguinary, towering crime committed by the imperialist bloc headed by the United States of America and its agents."<sup>10</sup>

Four days later, the official Chinese Communist Party newspaper Jen-min jih-pao called on "the world's people" to:

. . . close ranks, resolutely oppose imperialist aggression in the Congo, actively support the just struggle of the legitimate Gizenga government in the Congo and the Congolese people for upholding national independence and the unification of their country.<sup>11</sup>

On February 19, 1961, PRC Foreign Minister Chen I sent a cable to

Gizenga, premier of the Stanleyville government, declaring that "the Chinese Government has decided to reaffirm its position of recognizing the Government led by your Excellency as the sole legal Government of the Republic of the Congo and is ready to establish diplomatic relations with your country and exchange diplomatic representatives of the rank of ambassador."<sup>12</sup>

By using the word "reaffirm," Peking said in effect that Gizenga's government in Stanleyville was the legitimate continuation of the Leopoldville government the PRC had unilaterally recognized in 1960. This time, Peking's overtures were reciprocated. A joint communique by the PRC and Gizenga governments was signed on February 20, 1961, and Gizenga's regime opened an embassy in Peking on April 12. Chang T'ung, a senior colonel of the Chinese army, was appointed PRC charge d'affaires, and arrived in Stanleyville on July 31, 1961.<sup>13</sup> For a while, Peking hoped that Gizenga could win his fight against the central government. However, at the end of August, Moscow officially switched its recognition to the central government, followed by all the East European countries that had relations with the Stanleyville government.

Having lost most of his diplomatic support and being threatened with military defeat, Gizenga was forced to reconcile with the central government, announcing on August 5, 1961, that the Lumumbist regime in Stanleyville was "dissolved." The PRC Foreign Ministry issued a statement on September 18, reluctantly conceding that:

. . . in view of the fact that the lawful Congolese government led by acting Premier Gizenga has announced its own termination, while the Leopoldville government maintains so-called diplomatic relations

with the Chiang Kai-shek clique in Taiwan, which absolutely has no right to represent China, the Chinese Government has decided to withdraw the Chinese Embassy in the Congo and declares with much regret that diplomatic relations between China and the Congo have to be temporarily suspended.<sup>14</sup>

Thus, Peking ended its diplomatic relations with the Gizenga government less than two months after opening its embassy in Stanleyville.

#### The Mulele-Gbenye Phase, 1962-1965

However, neither the Lumumbists nor Peking had abandoned hope. Gizenga returned to Leopoldville in January, 1962, and was jailed for two and a half years, but other former Lumumba supporters remained at large, and began organizing new rebellions. Pierre Mulele, minister of education in the original Lumumba government of 1960, had helped Gizenga establish the Stanleyville government, and shortly afterwards was sent to Cairo as Gizenga's representative. From Cairo he went to China in 1962 to receive military training, and became one of the most prominent Chinese-trained African revolutionaries.<sup>15</sup>

Meanwhile, Christophe Gbenye, former minister of interior in the Lumumba government, and his lieutenant, Gaston Soumialot, had taken refuge across the Congo River from Leopoldville in Brazzaville, capital of the "other Congo." There Gbenye established a Zairean "National Liberation Committee." Mulele returned to Zaire from China late in 1963, and began a new Lumumbist rebellion in his home area, Kwilu province in southwestern Zaire, east of Leopoldville.<sup>16</sup> Mulele's forces were supposedly under the "general guidance" of Gbenye's Brazzaville committee. On January 28, 1964, Peking's official Jen-min jih-pao praised the Kwilu rebellion in words that linked a theme of vengeance with the famous "spark" image used by both Lenin and Mao:

his ten-country African tour, gave the Somali government a gift of \$3 million as a budget subsidy.<sup>28</sup>

After attending the Tokyo World Bank Conference and visiting Peking, Somali Finance Minister Awil Haji Abdullahi told reporters in an interview in October, 1964, that the PRC had agreed to help Somalia complete the Gelib-Sahlambut road, to build a textile factory "producing fifteen kinds of goods," and to start a state rice farm.<sup>29</sup> In early 1965, when drought struck Somalia, Peking donated 1,200 tons of rice and 438 cases of drugs and medical equipment for relief of famine victims.<sup>30</sup> Somali President Osman visited the PRC in July, 1965, and was welcomed by hundreds of thousands of people "with the beating of drums and cymbals, folk dances, and thunderous applause and ovations." At a banquet given for Osman, PRC chairman Liu Shao-ch'i illustrated the Marxist use of history by asserting that "the friendship between the Chinese and Somali peoples can be traced back a thousand years."<sup>31</sup> Osman, for his part, claimed superhuman powers of telepathy, declaring that "the PRC government truly reflects the will of 700 million Chinese people."<sup>32</sup> Osman was received by Mao and signed a joint communique pledging "firm support for the national liberation movements of peoples of Asia, Africa and Latin America."<sup>33</sup>

Despite these displays of amity, there were some strains on Sino-Somali relations. Besides the formal relations with the Somali government, Peking also had close contacts with some opposition leaders, such as Haji Mohammed Hussein, leader of the Greater Somalia League, who had been expelled from the ruling League of Somali Youth, and Abdulaziz Nur Hersi, former Secretary-General of the Somali Democratic Union but

expelled from that party. With Peking's financial support, Hersi organized the Socialist and Revolutionary Workers' Party and the pro-Chinese Association of Journalists and Men of Letters, which had ties with the Chinese Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee in Peking, and started a pro-Chinese magazine, Pensee Nouvelle, under the supervision of an attache of the PRC embassy. Peking even donated \$250,000 worth of printing equipment.<sup>34</sup>

The Somali government was, of course, not unaware of the relationship between the PRC and Somali dissidents, and in March, 1963, the PRC embassy complained that the Somali government newsletter had refused to print materials supplied by the PRC news agency NCNA.<sup>35</sup> Somali reserve was suggested also by Prime Minister Shermanke's statement in February, 1964 (shortly after Chou En-lai's promise of a \$3 million budget subsidy) that "Communism has no part" in Somalia and "is against the principles of the Somali people."<sup>36</sup> There were also reports of competition from the Russians, who provided \$60 million in aid to Somalia and offered to train an expanded Somali army of 20,000 men.<sup>37</sup> After 1965, PRC aid to Somalia declined. Of a total of \$1,073 million committed by the PRC to Africa between 1956 and 1969, Somalia received only about 2.1 percent.<sup>38</sup>

In June, 1970, a year after the PRC's Cultural Revolution ended, a Somali economic delegation led by Brigadier-General Mohamed Ainarshe, vice-president of the Somali Supreme Revolutionary Council, visited Peking and signed an economic and technical cooperation protocol by which Peking agreed to expand the experimental rice and tobacco farm in Johar, built with the Chinese aid in early 1967, and to build cigarette and match factories in Somalia.<sup>39</sup> In November,

four PRC technicians arrived in Mogadishu to survey the 2000-km Balat Wen-Bosaso-Hargeisa road.<sup>40</sup>

In January, 1971, the PRC government and Chinese Red Cross Society donated 1 million yuan (3 million Somali shillings) worth of medical and food supplies for drought victims in Somalia.<sup>41</sup> Peking granted Somalia an interest-free loan of \$110 million to support the country's new three-year development plan. Projects covered by this loan included a 1045-mile highway linking Belet Wein, Garowa, and Burao.<sup>42</sup> This project appears to be second only to the Tanzam railway in magnitude among PRC undertakings in Africa. By 1973 about 550 Chinese technicians had participated in the survey, and about 60 percent of the construction equipment had arrived in Somalia.<sup>43</sup>

A contract for construction of a new hospital with 300 beds was also signed between Somalia and the PRC on May 8, 1972.<sup>44</sup> The construction of the cigarette and match factory began in late May.<sup>45</sup> In late August an agreement under which the PRC was to build in Somalia a stadium with capacity of 30,000 was also signed in Mogadishu.<sup>46</sup> Construction of the Belet Wein-Garowa-Burao highway began in July, 1973.<sup>47</sup> In February, 1974, an irrigation project near Hargeisa, undertaken by the PRC in 1969 at a cost of 85 million Somali shillings, was completed.<sup>48</sup> The Chinese-aided cigarette and match factory went into operation on October 20, the eve of the fifth anniversary of the Somali revolution.<sup>49</sup> Between 1959 and 1974, Somali has received loans of \$133 million from the PRC, or 7.1 percent of Peking's total commitment to Africa during this period. As of 1974, Somalia was the third largest recipient of Chinese aid in Africa, second only to Tanzania and Zambia.<sup>50</sup>

In February, 1975, a shipload of 4,038 tons of sorghum and seven tons of medicine donated by the PRC Red Cross Society arrived in Mogadishu for drought-stricken Somalia. In March, twenty-five more boxes of Chinese medicine donated by the PRC government arrived by air.<sup>51</sup> During 1976, Somalia remained one of the major recipients of Peking's aid.<sup>52</sup> On its part, Somalia continuously voted for the PRC in the General Assembly since 1961. The PRC-Sudan relations became closer after 1977 when the Somali-Ethiopian border war erupted. While Moscow supported Ethiopia, Peking was on the side of Somalia.

#### Tanzania

##### Tanganyika

The former British trust territory of Tanganyika became independent on December 10, 1961. Huang Hua, then PRC ambassador to Ghana, attended the independence ceremony in Dar es Salaam, capital of Tanganyika, and met Prime Minister Julius Nyerere, who agreed to establish diplomatic relations, partly to conciliate radicals such as Zuberi Mtemvu, leader of the extremist Tanganyika African National Congress, who had contacts with both Moscow and Peking.<sup>53</sup> Peking appointed Ho Ying, then Director of the PRC Foreign Ministry's West Asian and African Affairs Department as its first ambassador to Tanganyika. Ho arrived in Dar es Salaam on March 31, launching a relationship which proved to be most advantageous to Peking.

On November 30, 1962, a six-member Chinese cultural and goodwill delegation led by Chu Kuang, vice chairman of the PRC Commission for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries, arrived in Dar es Salaam,

stayed two weeks, and signed an agreement for exchange of students, artists, publications, and other cultural materials.<sup>54</sup>

### Zanzibar

The former British protectorate of Zanzibar, known as the island of cloves, became independent on December 10, 1963, despite growing discord between the ruling Arab minority and the 80 percent majority of Africans. Peking granted immediate recognition, and Ho Ying, PRC Ambassador to Tanganyika and Uganda, was among the guests at the independence ceremonies. On December 11, he and Zanzibar's External Affairs Minister Ali Muhsin signed a joint communique establishing diplomatic relations. Later, Ho Ying also became the first Chinese ambassador to Zanzibar. A euphoric editorial in Peking's JMJP concluded that "the friendship between the two peoples will become closer than ever and be eternally as fragrant as the clove."<sup>55</sup>

On January 12, 1964, only a month after independence, a bloody coup overthrew the Zanzibar government and drove the Arab Sultan Seyyid Jamshid bin Abdulla from the island.<sup>56</sup> It was widely held that the coup was engineered by Abdul Rahman Mohamed, known as "Babu," the half-Arab leader of the leftist Umma party, although he was in Dar es Salaam when the coup occurred.

The coup brought a leftist regime to power in Zanzibar. Abeid Karume, an almost illiterate former boatman and leader of the Afro-Shirazi party, became president of the new government, with Babu as foreign minister.<sup>57</sup> Peking granted recognition to the new Zanzibar government on January 17, the first country to do so, followed by Moscow a day later.<sup>58</sup> African correspondents quoted some young

Zanzibaris who participated in the coup as speaking openly about having been trained in China and Cuba. It was widely believed, though not proven, that Peking was behind the coup.<sup>59</sup>

At any rate, the PRC welcomed the new situation in Zanzibar because of the power now held by the Peking-trained Babu, which considerably enhanced Peking's opportunities for penetrating East Africa. Babu had worked as a NCNA correspondent in Zanzibar and had visited Peking on several occasions. On January 19, a week after the coup, Babu, now foreign minister, said in an interview with the NCNA that "the victory of the Zanzibar revolution is only a step in the revolution in Africa, Asia, and Latin America . . . the Zanzibar people must send greetings to Chairman Mao Tse-tung because they learned a lot from his words."<sup>60</sup> On February 20, Peking gave Zanzibar \$500,000 to ease its post-coup economic situation.<sup>61</sup>

### Tanzania

On April 26, 1964, Tanganyika and Zanzibar were joined as the United Republic of Tanganyika and Zanzibar, renamed the United Republic of Tanzania on October 29.<sup>62</sup> Tanganyikan President Nyerere became the president of the united republic and Zanzibar President Karume the first vice-president, while the original vice-president of Tanganyika, Rashidi Mfaume Kawawa, became second vice-president. The union between tiny Zanzibar and Tanganyika was a loose one with Zanzibar and Tanganyika still controlled separately by Karume and Nyerere. There were sharp contrasts between the two: Nyerere was intellectual, honest, and moderate; Karume, illiterate, unscrupulous, and tyrannical.

Babu soon fell out with Karume but subsequently became Tanzania's Minister for Commerce and Cooperatives and moved to the mainland.<sup>63</sup> With Babu away from the island, Peking's influence there was temporarily surpassed by that of the Soviet Union and East Germany, but its warm relations with the Karume regime continued and Peking kept sending aid and technicians to Zanzibar. In June, the PRC granted Zanzibar an interest-free loan of 5 million pounds (\$14 million) in the form of equipment and technical assistance.<sup>64</sup>

While Peking kept good relations with Zanzibar, its relations with Tanganyika progressed even more rapidly. Second vice-president Kawawa led a seven-member government delegation, including "Peking's man" Babu, to visit China, June 10 to 19, 1964.<sup>65</sup> Though not publicized by the Chinese, an agreement on economic and technical cooperation signed during Kawa's visit provided an interest-free loan of 10 million pounds (\$28 million) and a gift of one million pounds.<sup>66</sup> During 1964, Peking provided aid of \$45.5 million to the United Republic of Tanzania (both Tanganyika and Zanzibar), 40 percent of the total of \$115.1 million committed by Peking to Africa in 1964.<sup>67</sup>

On July 11, 1964, Ho Ying, Peking's Ambassador in Dar es Salaam, was formally appointed ambassador to Tanzania, while the Chinese embassy in Zanzibar was downgraded to consulate. Though the change was a mere diplomatic formality, it did symbolize Peking's decision to use Dar es Salaam as a major base for intensified diplomatic operations in East Africa. A new aspect of this was revealed when President Nyerere announced on August 31 that Tanzania had accepted a PRC offer of military aid, including weapons and military instructors to give six months' training to the Tanzanian army.<sup>68</sup> Thus, in 1964, Tanzania

became the first African country to have an official Chinese military mission to train its army (as distinguished from the clandestine training of guerrilla forces discussed in numerous sections in earlier chapters.)

Ho Ying was considered one of Peking's three top diplomats in Africa in the 1960s (the others being Chen Chia-kang in Cairo, Huang Hua in Ghana).<sup>69</sup> While ambassador to Tanganyika, Ho negotiated the establishment of diplomatic relations with Uganda and Zanzibar and was later concurrently accredited to both countries. Speaking no English, Ho relied heavily on Kao Liang, a NCNA correspondent who had been expelled from several countries in both Asia and Africa, in making contacts with East African politicians. His energy soon made Ho one of the most active heads of mission in Dar es Salaam, frequently publicized in local newspapers. A British reporter once described him as "China's most valuable agent" in East Africa, "whose American limousine is probably the largest and flashiest car anywhere in East Africa."<sup>70</sup>

By a January, 1965, agreement Peking was to provide 3.6 million pounds to finance three projects in Tanzania, including a 2.5 million-pound textile mill to be named after Mao.<sup>71</sup> In February, Babu led a Tanzanian trade delegation to Peking. China agreed to buy from Tanzania 80,000 bags of cotton, about a quarter of her total cotton production, as well as sisal, tobacco, cloves, and copra; while Tanzania would import Chinese textiles, building materials, hardware, bicycles, sewing machines, and stationary.<sup>72</sup>

Sino-Tanzanian relations reached a new peak when President and Mrs. Nyerere, with a sixteen-member retinue, visited China from

February 16 to 23, 1965. On February 20, a Sino-Tanzanian Treaty of Friendship was signed by Nyerere and Liu Shao-ch'i. A PRC-Tanzania joint communique expressed support for all the "national liberation" movements in Africa, Asia, and Latin America as well as support for the second Afro-Asian conference.<sup>73</sup> The communique made no reference to the 1963 nuclear test-ban treaty, which the PRC was then vigorously attacking—but which Nyerere had lavishly praised in a 1963 message to U.S. President Kennedy, Soviet Chairman Khrushchev, and British Prime Minister Macmillan.<sup>74</sup>

Nyerere's attitude toward the PRC appears to have been a mixture of admiration and suspicion. In February, 1963, speaking at the Third Conference of the AAPSO, held in Moshi, Tanzania, Nyerere had declared: "I wish I could honestly say that the second scramble for Africa is going to be a scramble only between the capitalist powers." He accused the socialist countries, in their quest for power and influence in the undeveloped world, of committing the same crimes as the old capitalist powers.<sup>75</sup> Chou En-lai had been scheduled to visit Tanganyika, Kenya, and Uganda during his 1963-1964 African tour, but cancelled these stops because of army mutinies just after the bloody Zanzibar revolution in January, 1964. Chou paid a delayed visit to Tanzania from June 4 to 8, 1965. Speaking at a mass rally in Dar es Salaam on June 5, Chou repeated remarks he made during his first African tour:

An exceedingly favorable situation for revolution prevails today not only in Africa but also in Asia and Latin America. The national liberation movement in Africa, converging with that in Asia and Latin America, has become a mighty torrent pounding with great momentum at the foundation of the rule of imperialism, colonialism, and

neocolonialism. The revolutionary storms of these areas are vividly described in Chairman Mao Tse-tung's famous verses, 'The four seas are seething, clouds lowering, and waters raging; the five continents are rocked by storm and thunder.'<sup>76</sup>

While admiring the frugality of the Chinese people and the courage and endurance shown by Chinese Communists during the "Long March" in 1934-1935 and admitting that there were many things the Tanzanian people should learn from the Chinese, President Nyerere nevertheless reminded the PRC premier:

While we use every possible weapon against our poverty, we have at the same time to guard the sovereignty and the integrity of our united republic against any who wish to take advantage of our current need in order to get control over us. Happily we shall enter into agreements and contracts for trade and economic assistance with friendly peoples and nations from all parts of the globe. But, from no quarter shall we accept direction or neocolonialism, and at no time shall we lower our guard against the subversion of our government or our people. Neither our principles, our country, nor our freedom to determine our own future are for sale.<sup>77</sup>

Near the height of the Cultural Revolution, Nyerere paid a second visit to the PRC, June 18 to 22, 1968. PRC objections to the 1963 nuclear test-ban treaty, not mentioned in the communique from Nyerere's 1965 visit, became a major topic in his 1968 visit--evidently because Nyerere had changed his position on the treaty. At a banquet in honor of Nyerere, Chou En-lai attacked the United States and the Soviet Union for pushing the treaty, calling this "another big conspiracy and swindle they have engineered against the people of all countries." Chou praised Tanzania because it "has emphatically exposed the neocolonialist nature of this treaty and resolutely opposed it."<sup>78</sup> At this point, the ambassadors from the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia,

Hungary, Mongolia, East Germany, Poland, and Bulgaria walked out of the reception.<sup>79</sup>

In response to Chou's reference to Tanzania's opposition to the treaty, Nyerere then commented:

We have opposed this treaty not because we want to reserve our right to make, or receive, nuclear weapons. We have neither the ability nor the wish to do so. We have opposed it because it is an unequal treaty, which cannot even contribute to the cause of peace . . . For the time being we [Tanzania and the PRC] happen to hold similar views on this particular matter. Of course this does not mean that China and Tanzania will always adopt the same policies, and will always have the same priorities of action. China is an Asian power; we are a part of Africa . . . My colleagues and I have not come to China to ask China to place a protective nuclear umbrella over Tanzania. [If] I had come to ask China to declare Tanzania to be her nuclear protectorate, the people of Tanzania would have every right to denounce me as a lackey of nuclear neo-colonialism.<sup>80</sup>

Similarly, in a May, 1969, interview with Agence France Presse, Nyerere said, "Tanzanians are obstinate people, and if People's China plans to take us in hand, it must realize that it will come to regret it."<sup>81</sup>

Such remarks obviously implied lingering doubts about Peking's intentions; Nyerere's prestige in Africa enabled him to speak more frankly than others. Convinced that retaining Nyerere's friendship was essential to long-term PRC influence in East Africa, Peking was alert to opportunities to aid his government. When Tanzania broke diplomatic relations with Great Britain in December, 1965, blaming the British for Rhodesia's unilateral declaration of independence, the British suspended a \$21 million development loan to Tanzania. Peking came to the rescue in June, 1966, offering an interest-free loan of two million pounds (\$5.6 million) and a grant of 1 million

pounds (\$2.8 million).<sup>82</sup> Barely a month later, Tanzania and the PRC agreed to form a new shipping line with an initial capital of 1.5 million pounds and two 10,000-ton vessels. The initial capital would be supplied entirely by the PRC, half as an outright grant, half as an interest-free loan representing Tanzania's share.<sup>83</sup>

During 1965, on the eve of the Cultural Revolution, the PRC was offering aid to ten African countries which also received Soviet aid. Chinese aid was greater than Soviet aid in four countries--Tanzania, Congo, Kenya, and Zambia--and larger than American aid in Tanzania and Congo.<sup>84</sup> Not surprisingly, public opinion polls showed the percentage of Tanzanians having a favorable impression of the PRC rose from 28 percent in 1964 to 79 percent in 1966.<sup>85</sup>

When PRC ambassadors were again sent out after the Cultural Revolution ended, Tanzania was one of the first three posts in Africa to receive one (Chung Hsi-tung, appointed on June 12, 1969). In December, 1969, new military barracks built with the PRC aid in Nachingwea were handed over to the Tanzanian government.<sup>86</sup> More important, PRC military experts took over the training of the Tanzanian armed forces in January, 1970, after Nyerere decided not to renew an earlier agreement with Canada for such training.<sup>87</sup> A new national stadium built by the Chinese in Zanzibar was also completed in early January.<sup>88</sup> Construction of a naval base with PRC aid began in May, and a Chinese-aided farm implements factory opened in June at Ubungu in Dar es Salaam.<sup>89</sup>

In July, 1970, a hospital built by the Chinese in Mkoani on Pemba (Zanzibar's smaller island) was put into operation, and a vaccine plant to manufacture vaccines against smallpox and tuberculosis) built

with the Chinese aid at Mabibo near Dar es Salaam, was completed.<sup>90</sup>

In September, forty-six Chinese doctors and assistants arrived in Dar es Salaam to serve in fourteen medical stations over the country;

Nyerere sent a message of gratitude to Mao Tse-tung.<sup>91</sup> The most costly project of all, construction of the Zambia-Tanzania railway, began in late October, 1970; details of this will be discussed in Chapter VII under Zambia.

The Chinese-built naval base was completed and handed over to the Tanzanian government in December, 1971.<sup>92</sup> Between May 5 and 20, 1972, a Tanzanian military delegation visited the PRC, but no details of the mission were made public.<sup>93</sup> On December 10, 1973, eighteen Chinese medical experts arrived in Zanzibar to work there for two years.<sup>94</sup> In January, 1974, a new sugar factory built with Chinese aid in Zanzibar was inaugurated. At the opening ceremony, Tanzania's First Vice-President Aboud Jumbe, who succeeded Karume as the real ruler of Zanzibar after the latter's assassination in early April, 1972, expressed his "heartly thanks" to the PRC government.<sup>95</sup>

On March 24, 1974, President Nyerere arrived in Peking for his third visit to the PRC in ten years. At a banquet given in his honor by Chou En-lai, Nyerere praised the devotion and hard-working spirit of the Chinese, and said that PRC financial and technical assistance in constructing the Tanzam railway showed "the world what friendship and revolutionary solidarity really meant."<sup>96</sup> During Nyerere's visit, Peking granted Dar es Salaam a new interest-free loan of 525 million shillings (\$75 million) to be disbursed in five years, for completing existing projects, exploiting the coal mine in Tukuyu and iron ore in Chunya, and building a 250-km railway to link the two points.<sup>97</sup>

Between 1959 and 1974, Tanzania received more aid from Peking than any other African country--loans of \$331 million, constituting 17.6 percent of the total PRC commitment to Africa.<sup>98</sup> Aid continued in 1975 and 1976, with a new sugar refinery and cigarette factory, and fourteen students from Zanzibar (ten men, four women) sent to the PRC for two years of medical training.<sup>99</sup> However, completion of the costly Tanzam railway will probably cause a decline in Tanzania's share of future PRC aid to Africa. Between October, 1975, and September, 1976, Peking financed construction of a military and political academy at Munduli in Arusha, enabling Tanzania to train all its military officers and party cadres there instead of sending them abroad.<sup>100</sup> However, Tanzania denied reports in May, 1974, that it had offered Peking the privilege of building military bases and stationing PRC naval forces in Tanzania.<sup>101</sup>

#### Uganda

The former British protectorate of Uganda became independent on October 9, 1962. The PRC granted immediate recognition.<sup>102</sup> Ho Ying, then Peking's ambassador to Tanganyika, visited Kampala, capital of Uganda, talked with Prime Minister Milton Obote, and signed a joint communique on October 18, establishing diplomatic relations.<sup>103</sup> Two months later, Peking opened an embassy in Kampala, under a chargé d'affaires, but in April, 1963, made Ho Ying concurrently ambassador to Uganda. Ho was replaced by a resident ambassador, Chen Chih-fang, a year later.

However, PRC trade with Uganda had started in 1957. PRC imports

of Ugandan cotton rose to \$5 million in 1960, and \$11 million in 1963, making China Uganda's largest customer (more than a quarter of total cotton production).<sup>104</sup> Since production was rising in the 1960s, increased Chinese purchases undoubtedly benefited the Ugandan economy and influenced relations with the PRC. Peking also had pre-independence contacts with Ugandan nationalists, beginning early in 1958 through the AAPSO secretariat in Cairo. Peking's initial preference was for Joseph William Kiwanuka, chairman of the Uganda National Congress party (UNC), who visited China and was supported by Peking for membership on the executive board of the All-African People's Solidarity Council.<sup>105</sup>

However, Kiwanuka never committed himself clearly to either Peking or Moscow, and his UNC declined after defection of several leaders, including Milton Obote, who formed the Uganda People's Congress (UPC) and became the first prime minister of independent Uganda. Kiwanuka, as a political figure, simply faded away in the re-grouping.<sup>106</sup>

Peking's connection with Kiwanuka may have been one reason why relations with the Obote government were slow to develop. For more than two years after the establishment of diplomatic relations in 1962, Peking's contacts with Uganda were correct but not conspicuously cordial. On October 18, 1964, two days after the PRC's first atomic test, Prime Minister Obote commented:

This is a fact that I cannot welcome. It means that China has now joined what is called the Atomic Club, and this is a dangerous club to work with. It is a club whose members are not united and whose only intention is to show one another and to the rest of the world that they have this dangerous weapon to hold one another to ransom, and force their influence on such other countries that possess no atomic weapons.<sup>107</sup>

Sino-Ugandan relations improved after Uganda sent a goodwill mission headed by William Kalema, Minister for Works and Communications, to visit Yugoslavia, the Soviet Union, India, China, and Japan in April, 1965. While in Peking, Kalema obtained for Uganda an interest-free loan of 4.3 million pounds (\$12.04 million) and a gift of 1.07 million pounds (\$2.99 million) to help the country's five-year development plan.<sup>108</sup>

Obote himself visited the PRC from July 11 to 16, 1965, and signed a joint communique with Chou En-lai in Canton on July 16, condemning "the armed aggression in . . . the Congo Leopoldville," and pledging support for "the national independence struggle of the peoples of Mozambique, Angola, the so-called 'Portuguese Guinea, Basutoland, Bechuanaland, Swaziland, southwest Africa, French Somaliland, Equatorial Guinea, and the other African countries still under colonial rule."<sup>109</sup>

PRC relations with Uganda suffered a setback when Obote was overthrown by the unpredictable Idi Amin, Ugandan army commander, on January 25, 1971, while Obote was in Singapore. Obote found refuge in Tanzania, a fact which strained Uganda relations not only with Tanzania but also with the PRC because of its close ties with Tanzania. In August, 1971, Amin accused Peking of aiding an invasion of Uganda from Tanzania, and claimed that a Chinese colonel had been killed in the border fighting.<sup>110</sup> Yet only three months later, Amin's search for international respectability led him to invite Mao Tse-tung to attend a January, 1972, celebration of the first anniversary of Amin's coup.<sup>111</sup> Mao had left China only twice in his life (both times, to visit Moscow) and of course had no intention of coming to Uganda.

But Amin persisted, reportedly sending messages to both Mao and Nixon congratulating them on their "historic and successful conversations" in February, 1972.<sup>112</sup> In November, 1972, he sent telegrams to Mobutu of Zaire and Tombalbaye of Chad, congratulating them on establishing diplomatic relations with Peking.<sup>113</sup> During a meeting with PRC ambassador Ku Pu-hai on December 27, Amin formally invited Peking to send a "high-powered Chinese delegation, made up of military and economic experts" to Uganda to acquire a better understanding of the country.<sup>114</sup>

Although Peking has sent no delegation fitting Amin's specifications, it did help Uganda in 1973 and 1974 with several projects in agriculture and small-scale industry.<sup>115</sup> The cost of these projects was apparently covered by the \$15 million interest-free loan granted by Peking to Obote in 1965. No subsequent PRC loan to Uganda has been announced, and Uganda was not on the PRC African aid list during 1976.

Amin's subsequent public references to Peking have been as contradictory and unpredictable as his statements on other matters. Although he himself had on several occasions accused Peking of arming Tanzanian forces to attack Uganda, he referred to such charges in August, 1974, as "rumors" and "hopeless propaganda," and told Ugandan provincial and district leaders that Peking was "the best friend of the people of Uganda."<sup>116</sup> Four months later, in an interview with Mrs. Naamin Falaschi, wife of the Italian ambassador to Uganda, Amin charged that Tanzania, Zambia, and Sudan planned to invade Uganda "with the help of Chinese fighter planes," though perhaps

he meant "Chinese-made planes" instead of "planes flown by Chinese pilots."<sup>117</sup>

As chairman of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) at the OAU summit meeting in Kampala in July, 1975, Amin said he was worried by the mutual antagonism between Moscow and Peking, and would "ask the UN organization to do their best to unite the Soviet Union and China."<sup>118</sup> When fighting between opposing Angolan liberation forces intensified in 1975 and Soviet involvement became evident, Amin, as OAU chairman, threatened to break off relations with Moscow if it did not stop meddling in the Angolan internal conflict.<sup>119</sup> On November 12, he sent messages to the heads of state of the United States, the PRC, and Great Britain protesting Moscow's interference in Angola.<sup>120</sup> Five days later, the PRC ambassador delivered a special message from Mao to Amin, in which Mao said that "the Chinese Government resolutely supports and highly appreciates" Amin's stand in "opposing the interference of the Soviet Union in Angolan and African issues."<sup>121</sup> Although the Kampala radio asserted in November, 1975, that Mao had invited Amin to visit China, there has been no such visit.<sup>122</sup>

#### Kenya

The former British colony and protectorate of Kenya became independent on December 12, 1963, after an unusually long and bitter war with the British. The dominant leaders in Kenya then were Jomo Kenyatta and Oginga Odinga. Peking's closest ties were with Odinga, since Kenyatta was imprisoned by the British from 1953 to 1961, but PRC propaganda repeatedly demanded Kenyatta's release.<sup>123</sup> Odinga visited Peking in August, 1960, and Chou En-lai sent Odinga a message in February,

1961, reaffirming Chinese support of demands for the release of Kenyatta.<sup>124</sup> Kenyatta had already been elected president of the Kenya African National Union (KANU) party, and after his release from detention in August, 1961, became the inevitable choice as independent Kenya's first prime minister. Peking recognized the Kenyatta government on December 8, 1963, four days before independence, and sent PRC Foreign Minister Chen I to the December 12 independence ceremony in Nairobi.<sup>125</sup> Chen conferred with both Kenyatta and Odinga, now Kenya's Minister for Home Affairs. On December 14, Chou En-lai and Kenyatta exchanges messages formally establishing diplomatic relations between the two countries.<sup>126</sup> In February, 1964, Liu Shao-ch'i appointed Wang Yu-tien as Peking's ambassador to Kenya; Wang arrived in Nairobi on April 18.

As already mentioned, Chou En-lai's scheduled visits to Tanzania, Uganda, and Kenya during his 1963-1964 African trip, were cancelled when army mutinies occurred simultaneously in all three countries. In May, 1964, Odinga led a Kenyan government delegation to China, and obtained an interest-free loan of nearly 5.5 pounds (\$15.4 million) for development of Kenya's economy, and a grant of one million pounds (\$2.8 million). Speaking in Kisumu, his hometown, in late May after his visit to China, Odinga advised Kenyans to follow the Chinese example, and asserted that "ten years ago, China was poor, but because the people accepted villagization and worked hard in groups, China is now one of the richest countries in the world."<sup>128</sup>

From 1964 on, Odinga's political ideology became more radical and his Communist leanings more apparent.<sup>129</sup> The result was a growing estrangement between Odinga and Kenyatta, and a concomitant deterioration

in Kenyatta's relations with Peking. In December, 1964, in a reshuffling of his government, Kenyatta appointed Odinga vice-president but reduced his power, and used another politician from Odinga's Luo tribe, the young but energetic Tom Mboya, to offset Odinga's influence in the government and the KANU.<sup>130</sup> Like most African countries, Kenya had relations with both Eastern and Western blocs, but President Kenyatta was one of the African leaders most suspicious of Communist intentions in Africa. He became disaffected with the Communists, particularly the Chinese, because of their interference in Kenya's internal politics.

In March, 1965, a mysterious quarterly magazine, Revolution in Africa, circulated in some African countries. The magazine, believed to have been published in Tirana, Albania, applied the label "imperialist stooges" to Kenyatta, President Nyerere of Tanzania, President Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia, Prime Minister Obote of Uganda, and Prime Minister Hastings Banda of Malawi. Albania was then Peking's only European ally, and rumors circulated that the magazine article was inspired by Colonel Kan Mai, the PRC charge d'affaires in Congo (Brazzaville), although Peking was then on good terms with at least some of those named, notably Nyerere and Obote (both of whom visited Peking in 1965).<sup>131</sup> PRC embassies in Kenya, Tanzania, and Zambia issued statements denouncing the article as an "imperialist forgery" designed to undermine PRC-African relations.<sup>132</sup> The Kenyan Ministry of Internal Security and Defense banned circulation of the publication in Kenya on April 7, 1965.<sup>133</sup>

Whether Kenyatta believed the rumors about a Chinese connection

with the Revolution in Africa affair is not known, but he was certainly troubled when Kenyan security forces in mid-May, 1965, intercepted and seized eleven truckloads (some accounts say forty) of Chinese-made weapons being smuggled from Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, through Kenya to Uganda without the permission of the Kenyan government. In a speech on June 1, Kenyatta said that although it was natural for Kenyans to detest Western imperialism and to associate the word "imperialism" with the West:

It is naive to think that there is no danger of imperialism from the East. In world power politics, the East has as much design upon us as the West, and it would like us to serve their own interests. This is why we reject Communism. It is in fact the reason why we have chosen for ourselves the policy of nonalignment and African socialism. To us, Communism is as bad as imperialism . . . It is a sad mistake to think that you can get more food, more hospitals, or schools by crying 'Communism.'<sup>134</sup>

Four days later, Chou En-lai stated at a mass rally in Dar es Salaam that "an exceedingly favorable situation for revolution prevails today in Africa." Commenting on Chou's remarks, a spokesman for the Kenyan government said in Nairobi on June 6:

It is not clear to the Kenya Government what type or what form of revolution he had in mind. But the Kenya Government wishes it to be known that Kenya intends to avert all revolutions irrespective of their origin or whether they come from inside or are influenced from outside.<sup>135</sup>

Kenyan Finance Minister James Gichuru, speaking to the parliament on June 11, condemned Chou's statement even more explicitly:

The other day Chou En-lai said the whole of Africa is ready for revolution, but against whom, I must ask? The only thing China knows is to send arms under disguise through our country . . . There are Chinese agencies in this country, and the time has come for us to challenge them.<sup>136</sup>

On July 22 Kenya Government expelled Wang Teh-ming, a NCNA correspondent stationed in Nairobi, on the grounds that "his presence in Kenya is contrary to the interests of national security." Wang was ordered to leave the country in twenty-four hours. Despite a protest by the PRC embassy in Nairobi that the charge against him was "groundless," the Kenya Government probably had very valid reasons to expel Wang Teh-ming. A Korean War veteran with the rank of major, Wang arrived in Nairobi as a NCNA correspondent in early 1964, traveled all over the country, and made close contacts with leftist members of the KANU. As reported by the Nairobi Daily Nation, Wang "had been moving around the country sometimes in suspicious circumstances." He was also reportedly involved in an abortive attempt by twenty-seven leftist KANU members to take over the KANU headquarters in Nairobi in early July.<sup>137</sup>

Sino-Kenyan relations worsened further when the Kenyan parliament, on March 1, 1966, unanimously adopted a resolution calling for severance of diplomatic relations with Peking because "a number of coups d'etat, crises, and assassinations have already taken place in some African states" since "the destructive statement made by Chinese Prime Minister Chou En-lai in Cairo [sic] last year that Africa is ripe for revolution."<sup>138</sup> Between March 10 and 16, eleven journalists and diplomats from Communist countries, including two Chinese Embassy personnel, were expelled from Kenya. The Chinese Embassy handed a note to the Kenyan government on March 17, attacking the parliament's resolution as "a premeditated scheme to poison the normal relations between the two countries."<sup>139</sup> On March 31, Peking's JMJP published an article entitled

"Where do Kenyan Authorities Want to Lead Sino-Kenyan Relations?" The article criticized the Kenyan resolution for linking Chou's remarks with military coups in some African countries:

It is common knowledge that U.S.-led imperialism is launching frantic counterattacks against independent African states. Imperialism, colonialism, and neo-colonialism have been responsible to a greater or lesser extent for the recent reactionary military coups south of the Sahara. It is preposterous and ridiculous for the Kenyan authorities to attempt to blame China for what the imperialists have done.<sup>140</sup>

By April, 1966, while relations between Peking and Nairobi were deteriorating, rivalry between the right-wing led by President Kenyatta and left-wing led by Vice-President Odinga within the ruling KANU also intensified. Odinga resigned the vice-presidency of Kenya on April 14, and thus Peking lost its most important Kenyan spokesman at a time when it needed one most. Odinga issued a bitter statement accusing conservative leaders in the KANU of becoming the tools of former colonialists and leading the country in the wrong direction.<sup>141</sup>

On May 26, 1967, speaking during debate in the Kenyan parliament on activities on the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, Tom Mboya, Minister of Economic Development and Planning, and heir apparent to Kenyatta, declared that since the developing countries were constantly exposed to danger and intrigue from the great powers, "not only the Americans but also the Russians, British, Chinese, and French have to be watched."<sup>142</sup> This rather minor criticism drew from Li Chieh, the PRC charge d'affaires in Nairobi, a very unwise overreaction. In a letter to a Nairobi newspaper, Li violently attacked Mboya, calling him a "lackey of the imperialists." Infuriated by this Chinese insult to his protege, Kenyatta on June 29 ordered Li Chieh to leave the country

within forty-eight hours. Kenya also recalled its ambassador in Peking, and in retaliation, Peking expelled the Kenyan charge d'affaires, S.M. Maetha, from Peking.<sup>143</sup>

During the second half of the 1960s, the PRC's relations with Kenya considerably deteriorated because of Peking's support of Odinga. Relations between the two countries further worsened during the Cultural Revolution. Mao's works were banned in Kenya.<sup>144</sup> The PRC apparently reopened its embassy in Nairobi in late 1969 or early 1970, but as late as August, 1975, Kenya would say only that it was "seriously considering reopening its embassy in Peking."<sup>145</sup>

Trade, however, continued. The PRC signed a contract in March, 1970, to buy 500,000 sterling pounds worth of cotton from Kenya.<sup>146</sup> This purchase reportedly alleviated Kenya's cotton surplus, and therefore improved relations between the two countries.<sup>147</sup> At the non-aligned summit conference in Lusaka, Zambia, in September, 1970, Kenya's Vice President Daniel Arap Moi advocated the admission of Peking to the United Nations.<sup>148</sup> On November 17, three days before the issue of "China's representation" was to be voted on in the General Assembly, Kenya's Foreign Minister Dr. Njoroge Mungai spoke at a luncheon in honor of Peking's delegation to the Tanzam railway inauguration ceremonies, and said that "Kenya would like to strengthen further its already existing relationship with People's China and . . . fully supports China's admission into the U.N."<sup>149</sup>

In March, 1971, the PRC Red Cross Society donated 576,000 shillings for Kenya's drought-stricken areas, and promised to give food and medical supplies worth 2,300,000 shillings for relief.<sup>150</sup> Relations with Peking have further improved since 1972, as the PRC increased its

import of cotton, sisal, pyrethrum and other raw materials from Kenya.<sup>151</sup> However, Kenya has received no PRC loans since the one granted to Odinga in 1964.

### Ethiopia

Among the six East African countries, this ancient empire was the last to establish diplomatic relations with Peking. During the Korean War, Ethiopia sent 5,000 troops to fight the Communist Chinese and North Koreans under the UN flag. Although both Ethiopia and the PRC attended the Bandung Conference in 1955, Ethiopia recognized neither the PRC nor the ROC until November 24, 1970, when it at last established diplomatic relations with Peking. In addition to his mistrust of revolutionary Communism, Emperor Haile Selassie had obvious objections to PRC aid to Somalia, with which Ethiopia had a border dispute, and to Eritrean secessionists fighting a protracted guerrilla war inside Ethiopia.

During the 1950s, Ethiopia received agricultural assistance from the ROC, despite the lack of diplomatic relations, and supported the ROC in the United Nations until 1959, when it abstained on the China issue. A Nationalist Chinese source states that Peking sent 150 technicians to Ethiopia in September, 1959, and granted a loan, but this cannot be confirmed from other sources.<sup>152</sup>

The verified early contacts between Ethiopia and the PRC include a three-week visit to China in September, 1961, by an Ethiopian cultural delegation, at the invitation of the PRC Commission on Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries, and a February, 1962, PRC-Ethiopian agreement to exchange journalists. Under this agreement, NCNA sent a

husband and wife team to Ethiopia as correspondents (Li I-chen and Chen Chung-ying). Curiously, the ROC's official Central News Agency (CNA), also opened an office in Addis Ababa in March, 1965. Thus, for a time, there were both Communist and Nationalist Chinese news agency offices in Ethiopia, despite that country's lack of diplomatic relations with either China.<sup>153</sup> The two initial NCNA correspondents were expelled from Ethiopia in March, 1968, for unknown reasons, but were replaced. Beyond this, nothing constructive was achieved by Peking, and relations with Ethiopia were strained in the next several years as Peking involved itself in the Ethiopian-Somali border dispute and the Eritrean secessionist movement.

Somalia was then the most radical country in East Africa, ruled by a strongly socialist-oriented regime which claimed French Somaliland (Djibouti), northern Kenya, and three sections of Ethiopia--Ogaden, Hodh, and Eritrea. In fighting between Somalia and Ethiopia in the Ogaden and Hodh regions in 1963 and 1964, Peking gave limited support to 50,000 Somali guerrilla tribesmen who were making raids into Ethiopia.<sup>154</sup>

Peking intervened more explicitly in the Eritrean secessionist movement. Eritrea, a former Italian colony, became an autonomous region within the Ethiopian Empire in December, 1950, in accordance with a UN recommendation. However, the Ethiopian government annulled Eritrea's autonomy in 1962 and made it a province. The Eritreans, ethnically and religiously closer to the Islamic Somalis and Sudanese than to the Christian Ethiopians, started a guerrilla war against the Ethiopian government, and formed a separatist movement calling itself the Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF), based in Sudan. The ELF demanded

independence for Eritrea. Ethiopia would not concede this since it would have deprived Ethiopia of its only access to the sea (except through French Djibouti), including ports on the Red Sea which handled 70 percent of Ethiopia's foreign trade.<sup>155</sup>

The ELF received support from both Arab and African countries, including Syria, Libya, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Somalia, and Sudan, as well as from the PRC and Cuba. According to Wolday Kahisay, a former ELF division commander who surrendered to Ethiopian authorities in November, 1967, Peking supplied uniforms to the Eritrean guerrillas and trained ELF military leaders in China.<sup>156</sup> Since early 1970, Peking has reportedly provided the ELF with military supplies, sent via southern Yemen.<sup>157</sup>

Despite its aid to enemies of Ethiopia, the PRC evidently would have liked to establish diplomatic relations with Ethiopia. Emperor Haile Selassie was one of the few senior African statesmen respected by most African countries, and his prestige increased significantly after the Organization of African Unity (OAU) was established in a summit meeting at the Ethiopian capital, Addis Ababa, which has since become the OAU's permanent headquarters. Regardless of its limitations, the OAU has been the most important inter-African organization yet created, and Chou En-lai was careful to include Ethiopia on the itinerary of his 1963-1964 African tour. He visited Ethiopia from January 30 to February 1, 1964.<sup>158</sup>

At a banquet given for Chou, Haile Selassie told the Chinese premier that Ethiopia strongly supported the nuclear test-ban treaty and he felt disappointed that the PRC had refused to sign the accord.<sup>159</sup> However, he agreed to a joint communique saying that "the legitimate

rights of the People's Republic of China in the United Nations must be reinstated," and that measures should be taken to strengthen PRC-Ethiopian relations, "including the normalization of relations between the two Governments in the near future." Haile Selassie agreed to visit the PRC "after relations between the two countries have been normalized."<sup>160</sup> No mention of the Eritrean issue appeared in the emperor's speech or in the joint communique, though it was believed that the subject must have been discussed by Haile Selassie in his private talks with Chou.

In November, 1964, Peking held a month-long trade exhibition in Addis Ababa, and later the PRC Shenyang Acrobatic Troupe visited the Ethiopian capital, gave a royal performance, and performed in several Ethiopian cities, donating all proceeds to the Ethiopian government for charitable use.<sup>161</sup>

However, these initiatives did not lead to establishment of diplomatic relations with Ethiopia. A major reason for their failure was Chou En-lai's statement at Dar es Salaam in June, 1965, about "an exceedingly favorable situation for revolution in Africa." Kenya's displeasure over this remark has already been noted. In fact, there were reports that on hearing of Chou's statement, Kenyatta refused to allow his plane to stop at Nairobi for refueling. When Chou came to Addis Ababa, Ethiopian Prime Minister Tsahafe Taezas Aklilou habte-Wold refused to meet him, according to the Nationalist Chinese correspondent stationed there, who reported that after "waiting in the airport for forty minutes and drinking a cup of coffee," Chou left for Cairo and Peking.<sup>162</sup> By November of that year (1965), China was plunging into

its Cultural Revolution, and for the next five years, there was little effort by the PRC to establish relations with Ethiopia.

After the Cultural Revolution was terminated in 1969, the revolutionary radicalism exemplified by Chou En-lai's 1965 speech at Dar es Salaam was muted in PRC foreign policy, and though the rhetoric remained harsh, the policy took on a more pragmatic realism. More than a year later, Yang Shou-cheng, the PRC ambassador to Sudan, went to Addis Ababa for talks with Ethiopian Foreign Minister Ato Ketema Yifru. On November 24, 1970, the two signed a joint communique establishing diplomatic relations between the PRC and Ethiopia. Ethiopia affirmed that the PRC "is the sole legal Government representing the entire Chinese people."<sup>163</sup>

Though the PRC made no public commitment to end its involvement with the ELF, the joint communique did repeat the PRC's "five principles," including non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries. An ELF spokesman, Omar Jaber, said in Beirut a year later (November 2, 1971) that the PRC had previously "supposed us as a part of the international revolution," but no longer did so, and "this state of affairs is part of the policy carried out by China with a view to expanding its international relations."<sup>164</sup> Despite an ROC report that as of mid-1972 Peking continued aid to the ELF, there have been few other indications of direct PRC involvement in Eritrea after late 1971.

In corroboration of this situation is Emperor Haile Selassie's cordial statement during his state visit to Peking from October 5 to 11, 1971. Speaking at a banquet given by Tung Pi-wu, acting chairman of the PRC, and Chou En-lai on October 6, Haile Selassie said:

Never in modern history has a nation successfully made such a determined and massive effort as the new China to achieve progress for so many millions of people within such a short span of time. We, in Ethiopia, have been following this remarkable achievement with great interest.<sup>165</sup>

The Emperor also made the most flattering comment an African head of state is known to have made about Mao:

Chairman Mao's outstanding achievements in organizing and leading one-fourth of the human race have earned him an unassailable place not only in the history of your nation but also in world history. The depth and scope of Chairman Mao's thoughts have achieved for him a place of honour among the great thinkers. His examples shall live to inspire many generations to come.<sup>166</sup>

In such a warm atmosphere, Peking signed trade, economic, and technical cooperation agreements with Ethiopia on October 9, and granted Ethiopia an interest-free long-term loan of 230 million Ethiopian dollars (\$84 million) for economic development.<sup>167</sup> Later Peking sent several Chinese teams to Ethiopia to help implement several development projects. In February, 1973, another economic and technical cooperation agreement on rural development was signed, and air service between Addis Ababa and Shanghai (later extended to Peking) began at the same time.<sup>168</sup>

As in Burundi but much later and for less obvious reasons, Peking showed in its dealings with Haile Selassie how far it would go in making ideological concessions to an archaic and backward monarchy in order to achieve diplomatic goals. The PRC's new relationship with Ethiopia did not at first seem to be altered by the February, 1974, military revolt, or the subsequent deposition of the emperor (September 12, 1974) and his death in captivity (August 27, 1975).

In March, 1974, a forty-man engineering team from the PRC arrived in Addis Ababa to survey a proposed 300-km road linking Wereta, Debre Tabor and Weldia, to be financed and built by the Chinese under the 1971 economic and technical cooperation agreement.<sup>169</sup> In August, 1975, the PRC Red Cross Society donated five tons of powdered milk for famine relief in Ethiopia. The PRC government donated 100,000 quintals of Grain and promised to send a seven-member medical team to work in drought-affected areas.<sup>170</sup> During 1976, PRC technicians worked on well-digging and other water projects. Ethiopia also received military aid from Peking, though no details were announced.<sup>171</sup>

However, Peking's relations with the new military regime in Addis Ababa began to deteriorate in 1977 because of the Ethiopian-Somali border conflict. While the Soviet Union and Cuba actively supported Ethiopia with weapons and even forces, PRC statements appeared to support Somalia.

#### FOOTNOTES

<sup>1</sup>Adie, an expert on African affairs, divided PRC-African relations into five periods. It was not until his third period, roughly 1962 to 1965, that PRC influence was strongly felt in East Africa. See Adie, "China Returns to Africa."

<sup>2</sup>Lessing, chapter 3. See also Scalapino, On the Trail, pp. 18-19. Soviet policy in East Africa was hindered by a shortage of funds. About 50 percent of the total allocated for Africa by Moscow went to Egypt for the Aswan Dam and other projects favored by Khrushchev. According to some non-Soviet Communist diplomats, this enabled Peking to compete more effectively in East Africa. See Arslan Humbaraci, "Peking's African Limits," Far Eastern Economic Review, XLVI, 12 (December 17, 1964), p. 572.

<sup>3</sup>For message on recognition sent by Abboud to Mao and messages between the PRC and Sudanese foreign ministers, see Wen-chien-chi (PRC), 5 (1958), pp. 207-209. See also Chung-fei kuan-hsi ti chan-wang, pp. 87-88; Larkin, p. 40.

<sup>4</sup>Kao Hsiang-kao, Kung-fei tui-wai mao-i chih yen-chiu [A study of Communist China's foreign trade] (Taipei, 1966), pp. 131-132.

<sup>5</sup>See, for example, Omdurman Sudanese Home Service in Arabic, 0430 GMT, September 29, 1960, Daily Report, no. 190 (September 29, 1960), pp. I 6-7.

<sup>6</sup>For Chinese text of the communique, see Tiao-yueh chi (PRC), 13 (1964), pp. 38-41; an English translation is in Peking Review, 21 (May 22, 1964), pp. 6-7.

<sup>7</sup>David Morison, The U.S.S.R. and Africa (London, 1964), p. 34; Keesing's Contemporary Archives, 13 (1961-1962), p. 18642.

<sup>8</sup>Larkin, pp. 172-173, divided African countries into four categories based on Peking's four styles of diplomacy in the early 1960s: (1) the countries Peking spoke to with special warmth--Algeria, Congo, Nkrumah's Ghana, Guinea, Mali, Tanzania, and Egypt; (2) the countries Peking treated with proper formality but less warmth--Morocco, Mauritania, Somalia, the Sudan, Uganda, and Zambia; (3) the countries where Peking provoked a break in diplomatic relations--post-Nkrumah Ghana, Kenya, and Tunisia; and finally, (4) the countries where the PRC wished to stay but was nonetheless ousted--Burundi, the CAR, and Benin.

- <sup>9</sup>Radio Omdurman, May 22, 1970, in ARB, EFT Series, 7 (1970), p. 1704.
- <sup>10</sup>China and the Current Era of Detente, p. 134; Financial Times, London, August 25, 1970, and Middle East Economic Digest, September 4, 1971, in ARB, EFT Series, 7 (1971), p. 1803. See also Fogarty, p. 732.
- <sup>11</sup>Radio Omdurman, June 10, 1971, in ARB, EFT Series, 8 (1971), p. 2052.
- <sup>12</sup>Colin Legum, "Sudan's 'Three Day Revolution'," Africa Report, 16, no. 7 (October, 1971), p. 12.
- <sup>13</sup>News Agencies report, August 9, 1971, in ARB, PSC Series, 8 (1971), p. 2204.
- <sup>14</sup>Radio Omdurman, August 24, 1971, in ARB, EFT Series, 8 (1971), p. 2140. For a third agreement, see Chin-chi tao-pao, nos. 1251-1252 (January 1, 1972), p. 34; Bartke, Agreements of the PRC, p. 44; Radio Omdurman, 1100 GMT, December 18-1100 GMT, December 20, 1971, in BBC, SWB, ME/3970/i; and Radio Omdurman, December 24, 1971, in ARB, EFT Series, 8 (1971), pp. 2256-2257. Some reports on the third PRC-Sudan economic and technical cooperation agreement gave the impression that a third loan of \$40 million was granted by Peking. However, this was not the case. The third agreement only reaffirmed the loan granted by the second agreement signed on August 24.
- <sup>15</sup>Radio Omdurman, April 16, 1972, in BBC, SWB, ME/3966/i.
- <sup>16</sup>Radio Omdurman, 0455 GMT, May 25, 1972, in BBC, SWB, ME/3999/i.
- <sup>17</sup>China and the Current Era of Detente, p. 134.
- <sup>18</sup>Fogarty, p. 732.
- <sup>19</sup>Copper, pp. 15, 17.
- <sup>20</sup>Chung-fei kuan-hsi ti chan-wang (ROC), pp. 61, 65. For the PRC messages of June 30 to Somali Prime Minister Abdulahi Issa, see Daily Report, no. 128 (July 1, 1960), pp. AAA 13-14 and JMJP editorial of July 1, pp. AAA 14-15.
- <sup>21</sup>Chung-fei kuan-hsi ti chan-wang (ROC), pp. 61-62.
- <sup>22</sup>I-nan-piao (ROC); Halpern, Policies Toward China, table A-1 (p. 497); Larkin, p. 67.
- <sup>23</sup>Cooley, p. 25.
- <sup>24</sup>For text of the agreement, see Tiao-yueh-chi (RPC), 12 (1963),

pp. 211-213. See also Peking, NCNA, in English to Asia and Europe, 1600 GMT, January 14, 1963, Daily Report, no. 11 (January 16, 1963), pp. I 7-8.

<sup>25</sup>For text of the agreement, see Tiao-yueh-chi (PRC), *ibid.*, pp. 178-182. See also Peking, NCNA, in English to Asia and Europe, 1820 GMT, May 17, 1963, Daily Report, no. 98 (May 20, 1963), pp. BBB 12-13, and Kao, p. 129.

<sup>26</sup>Peking, NCNA, in English to Asia and Europe, 1249 GMT, August 4, 1963, Daily Report, no. 151 (August 5, 1963), p. BBB 16.

<sup>27</sup>Peking, NCNA, in English to Asia and Europe, 1319 GMT, August 9, 1963, *ibid.*, no. 156 (August 12, 1963), p. BBB 17; China: A Reassessment of the Economy, p. 732; An Economic Profile, p. 590; Melvin Gurtov, "Communist China's Foreign Aid Program," Current History, 49, 289 (September, 1965), p. 151; Gilbert Comte, "Peking Shows its New African Look," Africa Report, 16, 3 (March, 1971), p. 21. Other accounts give slightly different amounts for the loan; see Legum, "Peking's Strategic Priorities," Africa Report, 10, 1 (January, 1965), p. 19; Wilson, "The Chinese in Africa," p. 489; Chung-yang wei-yuan hui, Chung-kuo kuo-min-tang [Central Committee, Kuomintang], Comp. and pub., Kung-fei yu Ya-fei kuo-chia chin-chi kuan-hsi chih yen-pien [The development and change of the economic relations between Communist China and African countries] (Taipei, 1967). See also Wolfstone, p. 350, table III.

<sup>28</sup>See the Wolfstone, Wilson, and Gurtov articles cited in note 27. Wilson listed the budget subsidy as one million pounds. See also "Communist China's Program in Africa," a translation of an article by Christian Roll in the German-language biweekly Afrika Heute (Bonn), no. 8 (April 15, 1966), pp. 112-116, in JPRS, Translations on Africa, no. 44 (35759), no. 376, p. 6, which listed the subsidy as 12 million West German marks.

<sup>29</sup>Mogadiscio Somalia Domestic Service in Somali, 1400 GMT October 11, 1964, Daily Report, no. 200 (October 13, 1964), p. I 1.

<sup>30</sup>Mogadiscio Somalis Domestic Service in Somalia, 1700 GMT (January 8), 1400 GMT (January 10), and 0800 GMT (March 2), 1965, in *ibid.*, no. 7 (January 12), pp. I 1-2, and no. 42 (March 4), p. I 13. In early 1967, the PRC sent seventeen agronomists and technicians to Somalia to teach Somalis work on rice and tobacco. As of mid-August, 1969, they were still there. See Said Bacar and Abucar Hassan Ali, "Rice and Tobacco Flourish in Giohar Experimental Station," in the Italian Corriere della Somalia (Mogadiscio), August 23, 1963, p. 3, in JPRS, Translations on Africa, no. 119 (48944), no. 820, pp. 70-72.

<sup>31</sup>Liu was no doubt thinking of scattered references in Chinese histories to East Africans (more often in China than in Africa) during the Sung dynasty (960-1279), but imperial China regarded all foreigners as inferior barbarians, and Liu's assertion would have bewildered a tenth-century Chinese, whether scholar or peasant.

<sup>32</sup>Peking, NCNA, International Service in English, 1720 GMT, July 21, 1965, Daily Report, no. 140 (July 22, 1965), p. BBB 6.

<sup>33</sup>For the text of the communique, see Pekinga NCNA, International Service in English, 1612 GMT, July 28, 1965, *ibid.*, no. 145 (July 29, 1965), pp. BBB 7-8.

<sup>34</sup>"Communist Chinese Propaganda and Africa," p. 11. See also Zartman, "Tiger in the Jungle," p. 8.

<sup>35</sup>Legum, "Africa and China," p. 422.

<sup>36</sup>Reported by Nairobi Radio on February 7, 1964, cited by Cooley, p. 31.

<sup>37</sup>Legum, "Africa and China," p. 404.

<sup>38</sup>China: A Reassessment of the Economy, p. 732, table 2. The \$1,073 million listed in the table did not include the \$3 million budget subsidy; the 2.1 percent does include it.

<sup>39</sup>Mogadishu in Somali, 1645 GMT, June 24, 1970, BBC, SWB, ME/3414/B/7. See also "Seeds of Friendship," Peking Review, 48 (November 28, 1969), pp. 23-24.

<sup>40</sup>Mogadishu in English, 1730 GMT, November 22, 1970, BBC, SWB, ME/3543/B/8.

<sup>41</sup>Mogadishu in Somali, 1400 GMT, January 16, 1971, *ibid.*, ME/3587/B/2; and NCNA, January 18, 1971, in ARB, EFT Series, 8 (1971), p. 1943.

<sup>42</sup>Current Scene, IX, 7 (July 7, 1971), p. 21; Chin-chi tao-pao, nos. 1251-1252 (January 1, 1972), p. 33; Fogarty, p. 732; Financial Times, November 18, 1971, in ARB, EFT Series, 8 (1971), p. 2218.

<sup>43</sup>Mogadishu in Somali, 1410 GMT, December 2, 1971, in BBC, SWB, ME/3858/B/8; Radio Mogadishu, February 1, 1973, in ARB, EFT Series, 10 (1973), p. 2632.

<sup>44</sup>Radio Mogadishu, May 8, 1972, in ARB, PSC Series, 9 (1972), p. 2490.

<sup>45</sup>Mogadishu in Somali, 1130 GMT, May 25, 1972, in BBC, SWB, ME/4000/B/4.

<sup>46</sup>Mogadishu in Somali, 1130 GMT, August 26, 1972, in *ibid.*, ME/4079/B/5.

<sup>47</sup>Mogadishu in English, 1200 GMT, December 10, 1973, in *ibid.*, ME/4474/B/9.

<sup>48</sup>Times of Zambia, February 13, 1974, in ARB, EFT Series, 11 (1974), pp. 3015-3016.

<sup>49</sup>NCNA, October 21, 1974, in ARB, EFT Series, 11 (1974), p. 3299.

<sup>50</sup>Fogarty, p. 732.

<sup>51</sup>Mogadishu in English, 1200 GMT, February 16, 1975, BBC, SWB, ME/4833/B/5; and Mogadishu in Somali, 1700 GMT, March 11, 1975, ibid., MF/4854/B/10.

<sup>52</sup>Copper, pp. 15-17.

<sup>53</sup>For the PRC recognition message to Nyerere on December 8 and press communique issued on December 9 by Huang Hua and the Tanganyika government on establishment of diplomatic relations, see Wen-chien-chi (PRC), 8 (1961), pp. 309-310; and SCMP, no. 2641 (December 9, 1961), p. 36; Pieter Lessing, pp. 54, 131; Ogunsanwo, p. 75.

<sup>54</sup>For the text of the agreement, see Tiaho-yueh-chi (PRC), 11 (1962), pp. 123-125; and Daily Report, no. 245 (December 18, 1962), p. I 20.

<sup>55</sup>Peking, NCNA, International Service in English, 0232 GMT, December 13, 1963, Daily Report, no. 241 (December 31, 1963), pp. BBB 8-9. For Chen I's message of recognition to Muhsin and the joint communique on diplomatic relations, see Wen-chien-chi (PRC), 10 (1963), pp. 436-437. For English version of the communique and Chou's message to Zanzibar Prime Minister Sheikh Muhammed Shamte Hamadi, see Peking, NCNA, International Service in English, 0300 and 0326 GMT, December 12, 1963, Daily Report, no. 240 (December 12, 1963), pp. I 12-13.

<sup>56</sup>For background and immediate aftermath of the coup, see Keith Kyle, "Coup in Zanzibar," Africa Report, 4, 2 (February, 1964), pp. 18-20, and Chao Ch'un-shan, "Chung-kung yu i-chiu-liu-ssu-nien sang-chi-pa cheng-pien" [Chinese Communists and Zanzibar's coup d'etat in 1964], Tung-ya chi-kan, 4, 4 (April 1, 1973), pp. 80-87.

<sup>57</sup>"Peking Subversive Effort in Africa Evaluated," translation of an unsigned article from the French-language La Tribune Diplomatique, Kinshasa (September-October, 1970), p. 15, in JPRS, Translations on Africa, no. 145 (51709), no. 961, p. 3; Cooley, pp. 44-45.

<sup>58</sup>Peking Domestic Service in Mandarin, 1230 GMT, January 17, 1964, Daily Report, no. 12 (January 17, 1964), p. BBB 20; Cooley, p. 44.

<sup>59</sup>Alan Hutchison, "Exorcising the Ghost of Karume," Africa Report, 19, 2 (March-April, 1974), p. 50. During his 1964 African tour, at a press conference on February 4 in Mogadishu, Somalia, Chou En-lai, replying to the question of whether there was any truth in the widely held belief that Communist China was involved in the Zanzibar revolution, said: "It is an honor for us when it is said that a people who

are alive and able to rise to defeat colonialism have done so at the instigation of communists. This is an honor for us, but I must tell you that we had nothing to do with the events in Zanzibar. It was through the press that I heard a revolution had been staged in that country." See Mogadiscio Somali Domestic in Somali, 1420 GMT, February 4, 1964, Daily Report, no. 25 (February 5, 1964), p. I 16, and pp. 423-424. On training in China and Cuba, see Nairobi Kenya Domestic Service in English, 1800 GMT, January 16, 1964, *ibid.*, no. 12 (January 17, 1964), p. I 24.

<sup>60</sup>Peking, NCNA, International Service in English, 1630 GMT, January 20, 1964, Daily Report, no. 14 (January 21, 1964), p. I 20; Cooley, p. 41; and Hsuan-chuan ti fen -hsi, p. 34.

<sup>61</sup>Adal Insaaf, February 20, 1964, cited in ARB, EFT Series, 1, no. 2 (February, 1964), p. 28; South China Morning Post (Hong Kong), February 22, 1964; Kao, p. 129; Larkin, pp. 94, 97; and Gurtov, "Communist China's Foreign Aid Program," p. 151. Gurtov, however, mistakenly called the half million dollars a loan.

<sup>62</sup>The union was the result of a secret talk between Nyerere and Karume during the former's visit to Zanzibar on April 22. See Peking, NCNA, International Service in English, 1603 GMT, April 28, 1964, Daily Report, no. 84 (April 29, 1964), pp. BBB 13-14.

<sup>63</sup>Babu was allegedly involved in the assassination of Karume on April 7, 1972. A total of eighty-six people (eighteen of them, including Babu, in absentia) were accused of treason. Most of those tried in Zanzibar were found guilty and many were executed. Nyerere refused a Zanzibar request to return Babu to the island for trial. Babu was held in prison on the mainland until 1978.

<sup>64</sup>The grant was first announced by Karume at a public rally in Darajani on June 8. A formal agreement was signed by Chinese Ambassador Meng Ying (who was appointed on March 25 but withdrew from Zanzibar on July 11 when the Chinese embassy there was downgraded to consulate after Tanganyika-Zanzibar union) and Karume on June 16. See Zanzibar Domestic Service in Swahili, 1415 GMT, June 9, 1964, Daily Report, no. 113 (June 10, 1964), p. I 5, and 1100 GMT, June 16, 1964, *ibid.*, no. 118 (June 17, 1964), p. I 11. This loan of \$14 million to Zanzibar was one-third of the amount received by Tanganyika (\$42 million), but a lion's share comparing Zanzibar's 300,000 population with Tanganyika's 10 million.

<sup>65</sup>In the joint communique, it was stated that Kawawa visited China from June 10 to 19, but according to the NCNA report he did not arrive in Peking until June 11.

<sup>66</sup>The grant was half in currency and half in kind; the loan was to be given in installments in the form of equipment, ordinary commodities, and assistance by technical personnel, and repaid over a period of ten years with the first repayment due in 1975. Repayment could be in the form of export goods of Tanganyika and Zanzibar. See

Tanganyika Standard, June 22, 1964; and "The Chinese Offensive in Tanzania," a translation of an article by "Africanus" in the French-language review France Eurqfrigue[France Eurafrica], Paris, no. 164 (July-August, 1965), pp. 7-9, in JPRS, Translations on Africa, no. 30 (31893), no. 249, p. 7.

<sup>67</sup>Eckstein, p. 307, table E-2. For a more detailed description of Chinese aid to Tanzania, see George T. Yu, China and Tanzania; a Study in Cooperative Interaction (Berkeley, 1970), and China's African Policy, a Study of Tanzania (New York, 1975).

<sup>68</sup>Dar es Salaam Tanganyika Domestic Service in English, 1600 GMT, August 31, 1964, Daily Report, no. 171 (September 1, 1964), p. I 10. When Nyerere made the announcement, the first cargo of rifles had already arrived in Dar es Salaam. The second shipment of weapons was unloaded on September 2. By March, 1966, Peking had sent 11,000 tons of weapons to Tanzania; see New York Times, March 17, 1966. The Chinese military mission, consisting of seven military instructors and four interpreters, arrived sometime before September 9, to stay for six months. Peking also sent twenty-one instructors to train the Tanzanian Police Force. See Tanganyika Standard, September 3, 1964, and East African Standard, September 10, 1964. See also Legume, "Why Tanganyika Accepted a Chinese Military Mission," Africa Report, 9, 9 (October, 1964), p. 16, and "Two Chinas in Africa," p. 390. For official comment by the ROC Defense Ministry, see Free China Weekly, II, 2 (September 6, 1964), p. 4.

<sup>69</sup>Donald W. Klein, "Peking's Diplomats in Africa," Current Scene, II, 36 (July 1, 1964), pp. 5-6.

<sup>70</sup>The comment was made by Alastair Matheson, correspondent for London Observer Service, on the Tiger Standard (Hong Kong), September 3, 1963, quoted by Klein, *ibid.*, p. 6. See also Legum, "Peking's Strategic Priorities," p. 20; George T. Yu, "Peking's African Diplomacy," p. 18; and Yang Feng-tai, "Chung-kung tui Fei-chou ti kung-shih (I)," p. 33.

<sup>71</sup>Tanganyika Standard, January 6, 1965, and Radio Dar es Salaam, January 11, 1965, in ARB, EFT Series, 2, 4 (January-February, 1965), p. 243; and Chin-chi tao-pao, nos. 938-939 (October 1, 1965), p. 56.

<sup>72</sup>Nationalist (Tanzania), February 12, 1965, and Radio Dar es Salaam, February 25, 1965, and Tanganyika Standard, May 28, 1965, in ARB, *ibid.*, pp. 244, 261, and 305. See also Chin-chi tao-pao, *ibid.*

<sup>73</sup>For the Chinese, Swahili, and English texts of the Sino-Tanzanian Treaty of Friendship, see Tiao-yueh hui-pien (PRC), pp. 73-78. The English text can also be found in Peking, NCNA, International Service in English, 1721 GMT, February 20, 1965, Daily Report, no. 35 (February 23, 1965), p. BBB 17, and Peking Review, 9 (February 26, 1965), p. 9, and Ogunsanwo, pp. 282-283. The joint communique can be found in Peking Review, *ibid.*, pp. 8-10.

<sup>74</sup>Algiers Domestic Service in French, 1300 GMT, July 27, 1963, Daily Report, no. 146 (July 29, 1963), p. I 2, quotes a message which "President Julius Nyerere and Premier Ben Bella [of Algeria] have sent . . . to President Kennedy, Chairman Khrushchev, and Prime Minister Macmillan," saying: 'We have learned with great satisfaction about the agreement concerning the banning of nuclear tests. We are convinced that this agreement expressed legitimate aspirations of all the peoples and will greatly contribute to strengthening peace and world security. Our two governments . . . wholeheartedly support this step. We congratulate you sincerely'."

<sup>75</sup>Daily Report (supplement), no. 10 (February 19, 1963), p. 2; Ogunsanwo, p. 135; Hevi, p. 76; and Wilson, "The Chinese in Africa," p. 489.

<sup>76</sup>Peking, NCNA, International Service in English, 1259 GMT, June 6, 1965, Daily Report, no. 109 (June 8, 1965), p. I 14.

<sup>77</sup>Peking, NCNA, International Service in English, 1323 GMT, June 5, 1965, *ibid.*, no. 108 (June 7, 1965), p. I 12. Also quoted by Free China Weekly, without giving sources, in III, 17 (June 20, 1965), p. 3.

<sup>78</sup>Peking, NCNA, International Service in English, 2251 GMT, June 18, 1968, Daily Report, no. 120 (June 19, 1968), p. A 6, and Peking Review, 26 (June 28, 1968), pp. 5-6. See footnote 74 for Nyerere's 1963 praise of the test-ban treaty.

<sup>79</sup>Belgrade TANYUG International Service in English, 1902 GMT, June 18, 1968, Daily Report, no. 121 (June 20, 1968), p. A 2.

<sup>80</sup>Peking, NCNA, International Service in English, 2049 GMT, June 21, 1968, *ibid.*, no. 123 (June 24, 1968), pp. A 4-5; Peking Review, *ibid.*, pp. 7-8.

<sup>81</sup>"Communist Chinese Propaganda and Africa," p. 12.

<sup>82</sup>See Larkin, pp. 94, 97; Yu, "Peking's African Policy," p. 19. An economic cooperation agreement concerning the new loan and grant was signed in Peking on June 8 by Chinese Vice Premier Li Hsien-nien and Paul Bomani, Tanzanian Minister of Economic Affairs and Planning. See NCNA, June 8, 1966, cited in ARB, EFT Series, 3, no. 5 (May-June, 1966), p. 529. See also Tanganyika Standard, June 17, 1966.

<sup>83</sup>Tanganyika Standard, July 8, 1966; Keesing's Contemporary Archives, 15 (1965-1966), p. 21488; and Blake, p. 6.

<sup>84</sup>"African Economies--Communist Influences," Bulletin of the Africa Institute of South Africa, X, 2 (March, 1972), p. 50.

<sup>85</sup>See "Two Chinas in Africa," p. 390.

<sup>86</sup>Dar es Salaam in English, 1600 GMT, December 1, 1969, and 1800 GMT, December 2, 1969, in BBC, SWB, ME/3245/B/9, ME/3247/B/6.

<sup>87</sup>Montreal Radio's external service, January 1, 1970, in BBC, SWB, ME/3278/B/7. As mentioned previously (see footnote 68), PRC military personnel had trained Tanzanian troops for six months in 1964.

<sup>88</sup>Dar es Salaam Home Service in English, 1600 GMT, January 12, 1970, in BBC, SWB, ME/3278/B/7.

<sup>89</sup>The Standard (Tanzania), June 3, 1970, in ARB, EFT Series, 7 (1970), pp. 1712-1713.

<sup>90</sup>Zanzibar in Swahili, 1500 GMT, July 14, 1970, in BBC, SWB, ME/3431/B/3; and Nationalist (Tanzania), August 22, 1970, in ARB, PSC Series, 7 (1970), p. 1853.

<sup>91</sup>Dar es Salaam in English, 1600 GMT, September 24, and 1000 GMT, October 5, 1970, in BBC, SWB, ME/3492/B/4 and ME/3501/B/5.

<sup>92</sup>Dar es Salaam in English, 1000 GMT, December 6, 1971, *ibid.*, ME/3859/B/8.

<sup>93</sup>The mission appeared only on a list in Chin-chi tao-pao, nos. 1301-1302 (January 1, 1973), p. 21. It was not mentioned in either BBC's SWB or ARB.

<sup>94</sup>Zanzibar in Swahili, 1900 GMT, December 10, 1973, in BBC, SWB, ME/4475/B/7.

<sup>95</sup>Zanzibar in Swahili, 1900 GMT, January 12, 1974, *ibid.*, ME/4500/B/3.

<sup>96</sup>Daily Nation (Kenya), March 28, 1974, in ARB, PSC Series, 11 (1974), p. 3185.

<sup>97</sup>Current Scene, XII, 4 (April, 1974), p. 31; Chin-chi tao-pao, nos. 1401-1402 (January 1, 1975), p. 20; and Dar es Salaam radio on April 1, 1974, in BBC, SWB, ME/4566/ii. See also Daily Nation, October 8, 1974, in ARB, EFT Series, 11 (1974), p. 3270.

<sup>98</sup>Fogarty, p. 732.

<sup>99</sup>Daily Nation, January 28, 1975, in ARB, EFT Series, p. 3398; Zanzibar in Swahili, 1500 GMT, March 18, 1975, in BBC, SWB, ME/4859/B/4; Copper, p. 16.

<sup>100</sup>Dar es Salaam in Swahili, 1600 GMT, October 21, 1975, *ibid.*, ME/5040/B/8; News Agencies report on September 1, 1976, in ARB, PSC Series, 13 (1976), p. 4162.

<sup>101</sup>Dar es Salaam Home Service in Swahili, 1700 GMT, May 15, 1974, in BBC, SWB, ME/4602/B/1-2.

<sup>102</sup>Cooley, p. 186, states that Taipei was also invited to the Uganda independence ceremony but declined. No confirmation of this

has been found. For PRC Foreign Minister Chen I's recognition message to Ugandan Prime Minister Apollo Milton Obote on October 8, 1962, see Wen-chien-chi (PRC), 9 (1962), p. 367.

<sup>103</sup> SCMP, no. 2845, p. 32 (October 18, 1962); Kampala Uganda Domestic Service in English, 1700 GMT, October 18, 1962, Daily Report, no. 205 (October 19, 1962), p. I 17; New York Times, October 20, 1962. For Chinese text of the joint communique, see Wen-chien-chi (PRC), p. 368. Uganda established relations with Peking and Moscow on the same day. However, Obote explained that Uganda would not be able to open an embassy in either Peking or Moscow immediately.

<sup>104</sup> Uganda Argus, October 22, 1964; Wolfstone, p. 350; and Colina Macdougall, "Cotton Horoscope," Far Eastern Economic Review, XLIII, 9 (February 27, 1964), p. 450.

<sup>105</sup> Cooley, pp. 69-70.

<sup>106</sup> For a detailed description of pre-independence party politics in Uganda, see D.A. Low, Political Parties in Uganda, 1940-1962 (London, 1962).

<sup>107</sup> Uganda Argus, October 19, 1964; and Delhi Domestic Service in English, 1530 GMT, October 20, 1964, Daily Report, no. 206 (October 21, 1964), p. I 16.

<sup>108</sup> Chin-chi tao-pao, nos. 938-939 (October 1, 1965), p. 57; and Obote's announcement, Kampala Uganda Domestic Service in English, 1700 GMT, May 3, 1965, Daily Report, no. 86 (May 5, 1965), p. I 8. See also Larkin, p. 94.

<sup>109</sup> For the text of the communique, see Peking, NCNA, International Service in English, 1631 GMT, July 16, 1965, Daily Report, no. 137 (July 19, 1965), pp. BBB 11-13.

<sup>110</sup> Kampala Home Service in English, 1400 GMT, August 26, 1971, in BBC, SWB, ME/3773/B/1. See also Yang Feng-tai, "Wu-gan-da yu Tan-sang-ni-ya tui-k'ang ti pei-ching" [Background of the Uganda-Tanzania confrontation], Wen-ti yu yen-chiu, XII, 3 (December, 1972), pp. 52-58.

<sup>111</sup> Kampala in English, 1800 GMT, December 1, 1971, *ibid.*, ME/3855/5.

<sup>112</sup> Radio Kampala Report, March 1, 1972, in BBC, SWB, ME/3930/ ii.

<sup>113</sup> Radio Kampala in English, 1445 GMT, November 30, 1972, in *ibid.*, ME/4160/B/5.

<sup>114</sup> Kampala Home Service in English, 1700 and 1900 GMT, December 27, 1972, in BBC, SWB, ME/4180/B/3-4.

<sup>115</sup>These projects included a 16.7 million-shillings rice cultivation scheme and a brick factory at Kibimba, a national stadium, a tea-processing factory, a knitwear factory, and an ice plant. See Kampala in English, 1000 GMT, January 13, 1973, in BBC, SWB, ME/4195/B/6; 1000 GMT, April 13, 1973, *ibid.*, ME/4274/B/7; 1700 GMT, November 17, 1973, *ibid.*, ME/4457/B/4; and 1000 GMT, February 6, 1974, *ibid.*, ME/4521/B/5.

<sup>116</sup>Kampala Home Service in English, 1045 GMT, August, 1974, in BBC, SWB, ME/4670/B/1. For Peking's relations with the Uganda-Tanzania conflict in 1971-1972, see Yang Feng-tai, "Wu-gan-da yu Tan-sang-ni-ya tui-k'ang ti pei-ching."

<sup>117</sup>Kampala Home Service in English, 0700 GMT, December 20, 1974, in BBC, SWB, ME/4968/B/18.

<sup>118</sup>Kampala in English for Abroad, 1923 GMT, July 28, 1975, in BBC, SWB, ME/4968/B/5.

<sup>119</sup>For related reports, see Kampala Home Service in English, 1400 GMT, November 9, and 0400 GMT, November 10, 1975, in BBC, SWB, ME/5056/B/6-8; 1400, 1507 and 1900 GMT, November 11, 1975, *ibid.*, ME/5058/B/8-10.

<sup>120</sup>Kampala Home Service in English, 1000 GMT, November 12, 1975, in BBC, SWB, ME/5058/B/10-11.

<sup>121</sup>Kampala Home Service in English, 1400 GMT, November 17, 1975, in BBC, SWB, ME/5063/B/5.

<sup>122</sup>Kampala Radio, 1000 GMT, November 18, 1975, in BBC, SWB, ME/5063/B/4.

<sup>123</sup>See for example, Wen-chien-chi (PRC), 6 (1959), p. 570; Peking, NCNA in English, 1452 GMT, February 25, 1960, Daily Report, no. 39 (February 26, 1960), p. AAA 23.

<sup>124</sup>Wen-chien-chi (PRC), 8 (1961), pp. 137-138.

<sup>125</sup>For messages sent by Chou En-lai and Chen I to Kenyatta on December 8, see Peking, NCNA, International Service in English, 0800 and 0803 GMT, December 11, 1963, Daily Report, no. 241 (December 13, 1963), p. I 19.

<sup>126</sup>Peking, NCNA, International Service in English, 0132 GMT, December 15, 1963, *ibid.*, no. 243 (December 17, 1963), pp. BBB 4-5.

<sup>127</sup>For the statement issued by the Kenya government on May 20, see East African Standard, May 21, 1964. See also Nairobi Kenya Domestic Service in English, 1015 GMT, May 20, 1964, Daily Report, no. 100 (May 21, 1964), p. I 1.

<sup>128</sup> Nairobi Kenya Domestic Service in English, 1015 GMT, May 25, 1964, ibid., no. 103 (May 26, 1964), p. I 3. After his first visit to China in August, 1960, Odinga made the comment that "it was impossible not to be impressed with life in China. So many of the problems of poverty and illiteracy were those of our people, and these problems were being overcome at an impressive rate." See his Not Yet Uhuru: the Autobiography of Oginga Odinga (New York, 1967), p. 190.

<sup>129</sup> Odinga reportedly said in a speech in early 1965 that Communism is like food to him. See Area Handbook for Kenya (Washington, DC, 1976), p. 45.

<sup>130</sup> For detailed but biased description of the rivalry within the KANU, see Odinga, Not Yet Uhuru. See also recollections by William Attwood (U.S. Ambassador to Kenya during the Johnson administration), The Reds and the Blacks (New York, 1967).

<sup>131</sup> "Ganda," "Report on Maoist Subversion in Africa," p. 28.

<sup>132</sup> Peking, NCNA, International Service in English, 1453 GMT, April 5, 1965, Daily Report, no. 65 (April 6, 1965), p. I 7, and 0925 GMT, April 20, 1965, ibid., no. 77 (April 22, 1965), pp. BBB 15-16. See also Lusaka Zambia Domestic Service in English, 1800 GMT, April 23, 1965, ibid., no. 79 (April 26, 1965), pp. I 6-7. For statement issued by NCNA, see Peking, NCNA, International Service in English, 1757 GMT, May 5, 1965, ibid., no. 87 (May 6, 1965), pp. BBB 11-12.

<sup>133</sup> Nairobi Kenya Domestic Service in English, 1015 and 1600 GMT, April 7, 1965, Daily Report, no. 67 (April 8, 1965), p. I 2.

<sup>134</sup> For the full text of Kenyatta's speech on June 1, 1965, see Nairobi Kenya Domestic Service in English, 1700 GMT, June 1, 1965, ibid., no. 107 (June 4, 1965), pp. I 5-8. It can also be found in his book, Suffering Without Bitterness (Nairobi, Kenya, 1968), pp. 274-277.

<sup>135</sup> East African Standard, June 7, 1965.

<sup>136</sup> Free China Weekly, III, 17 (June 20, 1965), p. 3; and Wilson, "Peking's African Image," p. 250.

<sup>137</sup> "The New China News Agency," p. 9, and Chung-kung hsin-hua she nei-mu [The inside story of the NCNA], a collection of press excerpts between 1961 and 1969 (no date or publisher), p. 5. See also Free China Weekly, III, 22 (July 25, 1965), p. 1. Wang reportedly helped raise money for the defense of twenty-seven left-wing KANU members arrested after the coup.

<sup>138</sup> Nairobi Kenya Domestic Service in English, 1830 GMT, March 1, 1966, Daily Report, no. 41 (March 2, 1966), pp. I 7-8.

<sup>139</sup>"Communist Chinese Subversion in Kenya," a translation of an unsigned article in the French-language daily newspaper, L'Etoile du Congo [Congo star], Leopoldville, May 10 (pp. 1-2), May 11 (p. 2), May 12 (p. 2), 1966, in JPRS, Translations on Africa, no. 46 (35988), no. 384, pp. 21-23. See also Radio Peking, March 30, 1966, cited in ARB, PSC Series, 3, no. 3 (March, 1966), p. 498.

<sup>140</sup>Peking, NCNA, International Service in English, 0327 GMT, March 31, 1966, Daily Report, no. 62 (March 31, 1966), p. BBB 2, and Peking Review, 15 (April 8, 1966), p. 16.

<sup>141</sup>For Odinga's resignation statement on April 14, see Africa Report, 11, 5 (May, 1966), pp. 8-9. For the Kenya Government's reply on the same day, see *ibid.*, pp. 10-11; it can also be found in Nairobi Kenya Domestic Service in English, 1615 GMT, April 14, 1966, Daily Report, no. 73 (April 15, 1966), pp. I 6-8.

<sup>142</sup>Keessing's Contemporary Archives, 16 (1967-1968), p. 22280. Alex Blake wrote in "Peking's African Adventures" that Mboya made the statement in a speech in the UN General Assembly.

<sup>143</sup>See "Kenya and the Chinese Red Guards," a translation of an unsigned article in the French-language bimonthly Afrique-Express (Paris), 7, no. 144 (September 10, 1967), pp. 2-3, in JPRS, Translations on Africa, no. 74 (43196), no. 653, pp. 42-43, and Nationalist (Tanzania), June 30, 1967. See also Liu Wei-peng, "Kung-fei tui Fei-chou wai-chiao ti yin-mou chi ts'o-pai," p. 61.

<sup>144</sup>Nairobi in English, 1300 GMT, February 10, 1969, in BBC, SWB, ME/2998/B/2. See also East African Standard (Kenya), April 2, 1971, in ARB, PSC Series, 8 (1971), p. 2081.

<sup>145</sup>Nairobi in English, 1600 GMT, April 11, 1975, in BBC, SWB, ME/4877/B/6; ME/4818/ii; and Nairobi in English, 1400 GMT, August 8, 1975, *ibid.*, ME/4978/B/6.

<sup>146</sup>See Daily Nation, Nairobi, April 1, 1970, in ARB, EFT Series, 7 (1970), p. 1661.

<sup>147</sup>Wu Chao-hsiung, "Kung-fei tsai Fei-chou ti huo-tung (I)," p. 29.

<sup>148</sup>Tanyug in English, 1102, 1400 and 1600 GMT, September 9, 1970, in BBC, SWB, ME/3479/E/11.

<sup>149</sup>See Radio Nairobi, 1100 GMT, November 17, and 1100 GMT, November 18, 1970, in BBC, SWB, ME/3538/ii.

<sup>150</sup>Nairobi in English, 1600 GMT, March 10, 1971, in BBC, SWB, ME/3632/B/3.

<sup>151</sup>Nairobi in English, 1600 GMT, February 15, 1972, in BBC, SWB, ME/3917/B/9.

- <sup>152</sup>Chung-fei kuan-hsi ti chang-wang, p. 94.
- <sup>153</sup>Tiao-yueh-chi (PRC), 10 (1961), pp. 399-401; Hsuan-chuan ti fen-hsi, p. 14; Lang, "The Chinese 'Journalists' in Black Africa," p. 12; Chung-kung hsin-hua-she nu-mu, p. 15; and Yang Yun-ta, "I-so-pi-ya yu kung-fei chien chioa ti lai-nung chu-mai" [Diplomatic relations established between Ethiopia and Peking], Wen-ti yu yen-chiu, X, 5 (February 10, 1971), p. 62. Yang was the CNA correspondent in Addis Ababa.
- <sup>154</sup>Cooley, p. 28.
- <sup>155</sup>John Franklin Campbell, "Background to the Eritrean Conflict," African Report, 16, 5 (May, 1971), p. 19.
- <sup>156</sup>Ethiopian Herald, November 7, 1967, and Radio Addis Ababa report on November 9, 1967, both cited in ARB, PSC Series, 4, (1967), p. 910.
- <sup>157</sup>Liu Wei-peng, "Fei-chou ti chung-chu chan-cheng" [Racial war in Africa], Wen-ti yu yen-chiu, 10, 3 (December, 1970), p. 72.
- <sup>158</sup>Ethiopia was apparently added to Chou's schedule while he was visiting the Sudan. It was announced on January 27 (after Chen Chia-kang, then PRC ambassador to Egypt, visited Addis Ababa and met Haile Selassie) that Chou would visit Ethiopia. See SCMP, no. 3150, p. 15.
- <sup>159</sup>For the full text of Haile Selassie's speech, see Afro-Asian Solidarity Against Imperialism, pp. 253-256, and Peking, NCNA International Service in English, 1723 GMT, February 1, 1964, Daily Report, no. 24 (February 4, 1964), pp. I 2-3.
- <sup>160</sup>For the full text of the PRC-Ethiopia joint communique, see Daily Report, no. 24, pp. 257-260, and Peking, NCNA, International Service in English, 1707 GMT, February 1, 1964, *ibid.*, no. 23 (February 3, 1964, pp. I 4-6.
- <sup>161</sup>Yang Yun-ta, p. 62. See also Addis Ababa Ethiopia Domestic Service in Amharic, 1700 GMT, November 6, 1964, Daily Report, no. 220 (November 10, 1964), pp. I 7-8.
- <sup>162</sup>Yang Yun-ta, p. 62.
- <sup>163</sup>For the Chinese text of the joint communique, see Tiao-yueh chi (PRC), 17 (1970), p. 3. For the English text, see Peking, NCNA, International Service in English, 1100 GMT, December 1, 1970, Daily Report, no. 232 (December 1, 1970), pp. I A 16-17, and Peking Review, 50 (December 11, 1970), p. 7. See also Addis Ababa Home Service in Amharic, 1100 GMT, December 1, 1970, in BBC, SWB, ME/3550/B/1.
- <sup>164</sup>Jean de la Gueriviere, "Sharp Increase Recorded in Chinese Economic Aid to Africa," Le Monde (Paris), March 18-19, 1973, in JPRS, Translations on Africa, no. 213 (58625), no. 1289, p. 10; Adie,

"China Returns to Africa," p. 2. For the more recent Eritrean nationalist movement, see unsigned article, "Eritrea's Silent War of Secession," in Swiss Review of World Affairs, XXV, 12 (March, 1976), pp. 22-24.

<sup>165</sup> Peking, NCNA, International Service in English, 2340 GMT, October 6, 1971, Daily Report, no. 195 (October 7, 1971), p. I A 7.

<sup>166</sup> Ibid.

<sup>167</sup> See Addis Ababa in Amharic, 1700 GMT, January 31, 1972, in BBC, SWB, ME/3904/B/8. See also Ethiopia News Briefs, in JPRS, Translations on Africa, no. 180 (55166), no. 1115, p. 33. For the Chinese text of the PRC-Ethiopia trade agreement, see Tiao-yueh-chi (PRC), 18 (1971), pp. 68-69.

<sup>168</sup> China and the Current Era of Detente, p. 133, and ARB, EFT Series, 10, no. 2 (February-March, 1973), p. 2669. See also Ethiopia News Briefs, in JPRS, Translations on Africa, no. 209 (58199), no. 1262, p. 9.

<sup>169</sup> Addis Ababa in Amharic, 1800 GMT, April 3, 1974, in BBC, SWB, ME/4572/B/5. See also Radio Addis Ababa on August 15, 1974, in ARB, EFT Series, 11 (1974), p. 3244.

<sup>170</sup> Addis Ababa in Amharic, 1700 GMT, August 1, 1975, in BBC, SWB, ME/4974/B/2. According to report, a five-member Chinese medical team had already been in Ethiopia since mid-June. See Addis Ababa in Amharic, 1800 GMT, August 8, 1975, *ibid.*, ME/4980/B/11.

<sup>171</sup> Copper, pp. 15, 17.

## CHAPTER VII

### THE PRC AND SOUTHERN AFRICA

#### Southern Africa: An Overview

Peking's diplomatic offensive in Africa began (after the 1955 Bandung conference), and the Sino-Soviet split emerged, before any of the countries of southern Africa, except the Union (later Republic) of South Africa, achieved independence.<sup>1</sup> Moreover, southern Africa was the region where large-scale colonialism survived longest, and where white-black controversies became most bitter. For these reasons, the pattern of PRC involvement in southern African affairs was quite unlike the patterns in other regions of Africa.

Zambia was the only southern African nation to establish diplomatic relations with Peking before the start of the PRC Cultural Revolution, and it was in Zambia and neighboring Tanzania that Peking undertook its largest aid project in Africa, the Zamtan or Tanzam railway. With this exception, Peking's policy in southern Africa concentrated on support for rebel movements against black governments unfriendly to the PRC (Madagascar and Malawi), colonial governments (Angola and Mozambique), or white governments (Rhodesia and South Africa). The sequence of discussion in this chapter is therefore: Zambia, Madagascar, Malawi, the Portuguese colonies, Rhodesia, South Africa, and the smaller countries.



Figure 6. Map of Southern Africa

Table XVIII lists the thirteen independent nations of southern Africa in order of establishing diplomatic relations with the PRC; the horizontal lines of dashes separate four categories: those recognizing the PRC before and since the Cultural Revolution, those still recognizing the ROC today, and those having relations with neither China. Since the last two categories include more than half the countries involved, the entire list is rearranged in Table XIX in order of independence; the horizontal lines of dashes here separate the periods before, during, and after the Cultural Revolution.

#### Zambia: General

The British colony of Northern Rhodesia became the independent Republic of Zambia on October 24, 1964. On October 21 both PRC Chairman Liu Shao-ch'i and Premier Chou En-lai sent messages of greeting to Kenneth Kaunda, first president of Zambia, and Foreign Minister Chen I informed Zambia of Peking's decision to recognize the new republic.<sup>2</sup> Ho Ying, the PRC ambassador to Tanzania, had visited Zambia in June, and returned for the independence celebrations. On October 25, President Kaunda announced recognition of Peking; diplomatic relations were established on October 29.<sup>3</sup> The PRC embassy in Lusaka was opened in late November. Ch'in Li-chen was named first PRC ambassador on February 12, 1965, and arrived in Lusaka in mid-March, to begin an extremely warm diplomatic connection.<sup>4</sup>

The new Sino-Zambian relations developed rapidly. In August, 1965, a Zambian government delegation led by Agriculture Minister E.H.K. Mudenda visited China, followed a year later by Justin Chimba, Zambian minister of commerce and industry, on a goodwill mission to Peking.

TABLE XVIII

## SOUTHERN AFRICA AND THE TWO CHINAS

<u>Independence</u>		<u>Diplomatic Relations with PRC</u>		<u>Diplomatic Relations</u>	<u>Broken Relations</u>	
Date	Order	Order	Date	Country	with ROC	with PRC
1964.10.24	4	1	1964.10.29	Zambia	never	
1960.6.26	2	2	1972.11.6	Madagascar	1960-1972	
1966.9.30	6	3	1974.3.25	Botswana	1966-1974	
1975.6.25	9	4	1975.6.25	Mozambique	never	
1975.7.6	10	5	1975.11.13	Comoro Islands	never	
1910.5.31	1			South Africa	1931-	
1964.7.6	3			Malawi	1966-	
1966.10.4	7			Lesotho	1966-	
1968.9.6	8			Swaziland	1966-	
1965.11.11	5			Rhodesia	never	
1975.11.11	11			Angola	never	
1976.10.26	12			Transkei	never	
1977.12.6	13			Bophuthatswana	never	

TABLE XIX

## SOUTHERN AFRICAN NATIONS IN ORDER OF INDEPENDENCE

Independence			Diplomatic Relations with PRC		Diplomatic Relations with ROC
Date	Order	Country	Order	Date	
1910.5.31	1	South Africa			1931-
1960.6.26	2	Madagascar	2	1972.11.6	1960-1972
1964.7.6	3	Malawi			1966-
1964.10.24	4	Zambia	1	1964.10.29	never
1965.11.11	5	Rhodesia			never
1966.9.30	6	Botswana	3	1974.3.25	1966-1974
1966.10.4	7	Lesotho			1966-
1968.9.6	8	Swaziland			1968-
1975.6.25	9	Mozambique	4	1975.6.25	never
1975.7.6	10	Comoro Islands	5	1975.11.18	never
1975.11.11	11	Angola			never
1976.10.26	12	Transkei			never
1977.12.6	13	Bophuthatswana			never

Chimba was received by both Liu Shao-ch'i and Chou En-lai. Two weeks later, Zambian Vice President Reuben Chitandika Kamanga led another delegation to Peking for a four-day visit, was received by Mao, and signed an agreement on cultural cooperation with Peking.<sup>5</sup>

Kaunda himself visited Peking in June, 1967, despite intensification of the Cultural Revolution. Arriving in Peking on June 21, Kaunda and his entourage were given "a rousing welcome" by "hundreds of thousands of people from all walks of life." At a welcome ceremony at the airport, Chinese Red Guards presented the Zambian president with a copy of the little red book, Quotations from Chairman Mao Tse-tung.<sup>6</sup> At a banquet given by Chou En-lai in his honor, Kaunda congratulated Chinese leaders on their successful explosion of a hydrogen bomb on June 17, calling this "a great achievement for a great nation," bound to usher in a completely new era in which China would play a great role.<sup>7</sup> On June 22 China signed an economic and technical cooperation agreement to provide a 6 million pounds (U.S. \$16.8 million) interest-free loan for Zambia's four-year National Development Plan.<sup>8</sup>

Because of its strategic location, bordering eight African countries and territories (Angola, Zaire, Tanzania, Mozambique, Malawi, Rhodesia, Botswana, and South-West Africa), Zambia occupied an extremely important position in Peking's political, military, and propaganda strategy in Africa. To compete with South African broadcasts, the PRC promised to give Zambia three powerful radio transmitters in November, 1970, though they did not arrive until early 1972.<sup>9</sup>

Beginning in late 1968, Peking is reported to have helped set up at least seven permanent bases within Zambia for training guerrillas from Angola, Mozambique, Rhodesia, South-West Africa, and South

Africa.<sup>10</sup> By the end of the 1960s, Zambia had become one of Peking's strongest supporters in Africa. Kaunda continuously supported PRC membership in the United Nations, and in September, 1972, Zambian Vice President M. M. Chona led another goodwill mission to China. When Rhodesia closed the Rhodesian-Zambian border in May, 1973, in retaliation against Lusaka's support of black guerrillas attacking Rhodesia from Zambia, Peking offered a grant of U.S. \$10 million and fifty-seven trucks to help Zambia re-route its trade.<sup>11</sup>

Kaunda paid a second visit to Peking in February, 1974, and expressed his gratitude to PRC leaders for building the Tanzam Railway and for aid during the Rhodesian-Zambian border crisis, declaring that the Chinese were among Zambia's best friends.<sup>12</sup> During Kaunda's second visit, Peking agreed to provide an interest-free loan of U.S. \$33 million, repayable over thirty years with a ten-year grace period, to help Zambia improve the Serenje-Samfya road and undertake other technical and agricultural projects.<sup>13</sup> On June 8, 1975, Zambia and the PRC signed a 3 million kwacha (U.S. \$21.5 million) loan agreement for the Kaoma-Lusaka road, built by the Chinese under the 1967 agreement.<sup>14</sup> During 1976, Zambia also received technical assistance from Peking in mining and other projects.<sup>15</sup> Far surpassing all of these, however, was the railway from Zambia to Tanzania, built with Chinese aid from 1970 to 1976.

#### The Zamtan or Tanzam Railway

Before 1900, Cecil Rhodes, the British colonist and empire builder in southern Africa, conceived the idea of a Cape-to-Cairo railway to strengthen British dominance on the continent. This dream

was never realized, partly because of German acquisition of Tanganyika, midway along the proposed route. Discovery of rich copper deposits in both Zaire (then the Belgian Congo) and Zambia (then British Northern Rhodesia) resulted in development of Zambia's trading routes to the west and south, rather than to the east.<sup>16</sup> The pattern of decolonization in Africa created a new situation, with political and racial disagreements between Zambia and its southern and western neighbors in the 1960s and beyond. As a landlocked country, Zambia needed alternate routes for its trade.

Even before independence, Kaunda and his United National Independence Party (UNIP) were committed to the idea of building a railway between Zambia and Tanzania. As a pan-Africanist, Kaunda wanted to end Zambia's economic dependence on the white regimes of Rhodesia and South Africa and also to have closer relations with militant East African countries, such as Tanzania and Uganda. Kaunda's enthusiasm was shared equally by Tanzanian President Nyerere.

A Tanzam railway would reduce Zambia's dependence on Rhodesia and South Africa and therefore enable Zambia to join the boycott against both without fearing retaliation. It would also create jobs in Zambia, promote industrial and business sites along the railway, attract more Zambians to previously backward areas, and increase trade as well as political contacts with Tanzania, Kenya, and Uganda.

As far as Tanzania was concerned, the railroad could stimulate economic development in southern Tanzania, by attracting more Tanzanians to the southern part of the country to exploit the agricultural potentiality of the area. It would also increase Dar es Salaam's sea port profits, and could be used to transport weapons and other aid to

various African "liberation" organizations based in Tanzania and Zambia.<sup>17</sup>

In October, 1964, following an African summit meeting in Dar es Salaam, Kaunda and Nyerere jointly announced their intention to build the railway. Shortly afterwards, appeals for loans were made to the World Bank, the United States, Britain, West Germany, Japan, Russia, and the African Development Bank, but none was willing to finance the project.<sup>18</sup> The Western powers were reluctant to aid the railway because of the unfavorable report issued by the World Bank in 1964, judging the project economically unfeasible. The World Bank report estimated that the railway would cost 75 to 150 million pounds and, considering the economic conditions in Tanzania and Zambia, the railway would operate at a loss until 1999. Instead the World Bank recommended construction of a tarred truck road.<sup>19</sup> The Western powers may also have opposed the Tanzam railway because they did not want to contribute to cutting South Africa off from central and eastern Africa.<sup>20</sup>

Peking, on the other hand, began to show interest in the project. In early 1965, the PRC announced that it was willing to provide 60 million pounds to build the railway. During his visit to Peking in February, 1965, Nyerere of Tanzania formally asked for Chinese help on the project. Chinese leaders responded favorably by increasing their offer to 100 million pounds, without going into details of the plan.<sup>21</sup> When Chou En-lai visited Dar es Salaam in June, 1965, the Tanzam railway was on the agenda for discussion with Nyerere, and thereafter Peking's involvement in the project became more clear and open.<sup>22</sup> However, Zambia's Kaunda appeared reluctant to accept Peking's offer

and was still looking for Western help. When this did not come, Kaunda visited Peking in June, 1967, changed his attitude, and was ready to accept the Chinese offer.

An initial agreement on construction of the Tanzam Railway was signed between China, Tanzania, and Zambia in Peking on September 5, 1967, with the amount of the loan and all other technical details to be discussed later.<sup>23</sup> By mid-1968, Zambia's Finance Minister E.H.K. Mudenda indicated that "Africa is no longer prepared to consider Western proposals."<sup>24</sup> In June, 1968, one hundred and ninety Chinese technicians arrived in Tanzania and immediately started surveying the route. Another 170 arrived in Zambia in late October.<sup>25</sup>

Final agreement on the Tanzam Railway was reached in Peking on July 12, 1970, when representatives of the three countries signed three protocols and minutes.<sup>26</sup> According to the loan agreement, Peking was to grant Tanzania and Zambia an interest-free loan of 2886 million kwacha (U.S. \$402 million), repayable over thirty years starting in 1983. Thus Peking formally committed itself, financially and technically, to construction of the 1860 km (more than 1115 miles) Tanzam Railway, the largest single PRC aid project ever undertaken in Africa. Western reaction was a mixture of surprise and misgivings. Considering Peking's limited financial and technical resources, and urgent domestic requirements, many Western observers doubted Peking's ability to complete the project.

Groundbreaking ceremonies for the railway were officially held at Dar es Salaam and at Kapiri Mposhi, Zambia, the two ends of the projected railroad, on October 26 and 28, 1970, respectively. Nyerere and Kaunda attended both ceremonies, as did a PRC delegation led by

Fang Yi, minister of the Commission for Economic Relations with Foreign Countries, and Kuo Lu, vice-minister of Communications.<sup>27</sup> Thus formally began the construction of the railway, whose 1860 km length would be divided about equally between the two countries (about 976 km in Tanzania, 884 km in Zambia).

Why would Peking undertake such a difficult and costly project, diverting resources from its own development? Peking evidently saw major advantages outweighing the cost: an excellent opportunity to penetrate East Africa and thus spread the Maoist form of Communism, a chance to exploit the mineral resources of both Tanzania and Zambia, closer contacts with various "liberation" movements in southern Africa and a market for Chinese goods in Tanzania and Zambia. (Both countries were obligated to import Chinese goods in order to repay the loans.) It was not surprising that the Tanzam Railway was described by Western powers and South Africa as "China's Trojan horse in Africa."<sup>28</sup>

About 30,000 Chinese and 20,000 Africans participated in construction of the railway. Stories of mutual assistance between Chinese and African workers were regularly publicized by PRC news media.<sup>29</sup> A Chinese Communist newspaper in Shanghai, Ta kung pao, even used the railway to claim supernatural powers for Mao's "little red book," asserting that when Chinese surveyors on the railway route were attacked by wild animals or surrounded by lions, they would read Mao's quotations and by "applying his principles" they could usually drive the animals away with their bare hands.<sup>30</sup>

Construction was completed in late 1975, at a total cost well over U.S. \$500 million, with 147 stations, 300 bridges, and 23 tunnels, and was described by a United Nations expert as "first-rate hardware."<sup>31</sup>

The railway was officially opened on October 23, 1975, the eve of the eleventh anniversary of Zambia's independence, at a grand ceremony at the Kapiri Mposhi station in Zambia, by Kaunda and Tanzanian Prime Minister Rashidi Kawawa.<sup>32</sup> The PRC officially handed over the railway to Tanzania and Zambia on July 14, 1976.<sup>33</sup>

### Madagascar

Madagascar, the world's fourth largest island and a former French colony, became autonomous as the Republic of Malagasy in 1958, achieved independence on June 26, 1960, and was renamed the Democratic Republic of Madagascar on December 30, 1975. Initially the most pro-French of the Francophone African countries, Madagascar also had the largest Chinese community in Africa, about 10,000 in 1961 (approximately one-fifth of the Chinese living in Africa) and an equal number of inhabitants of mixed Sino-Madagascan origin.<sup>34</sup> Most of these Chinese were immigrant laborers who went to Madagascar in 1869 and later to build the Tananarive-East Coast railroad. Because of its strategic location just off the African coast and its large Chinese community, independent Madagascar immediately became an object of competition between Peking and Taipei.

On the eve of independence, Chou En-lai sent a message to President Philibert Tsiranana on June 25, 1960, saying that Peking "has decided to recognize the Malagasy Republic" and Chou hoped that the recognition "will lead to the development of friendly relations between China and Malagasy."<sup>35</sup> Being a loyal follower of Charles De Gaulle, who was then still a strong supporter of Nationalist China, Tsiranana instead invited the ROC to the independence celebrations.

Taipei appointed Chou Shu-Kai, chairman of the Overseas Chinese Affairs Commission, as special envoy for the occasion. Taipei's consulate-general at Tananarive, capital of Madagascar, was raised to the rank of embassy and Chiang Un-k'ai, the former consul-general, was appointed the first ROC ambassador. Tsiranana became one of Taipei's staunchest supporters in Africa; his visit to Taiwan in April, 1962, was the first by an African head of state. Madagascar became one of the most important African recipients of agricultural aid from the ROC.

Because of his early close relations with the then anti-Communist French Socialist Party, Tsiranana was one of the very few African statesmen who foresaw the dangers presented by Communists, especially those from Peking, in Africa.<sup>36</sup> His fear of Peking was strengthened by the presence of a sizable Chinese community in Madagascar. Tsiranana's suspicion of the Chinese Communists was so deep-rooted that even when Paris recognized Peking in 1964 he refused to follow. It was mainly because of his influence that the inter-Francophone African organization, Union Africaine et Malgache (UAM), and its successor, the Organization Commune Africaine et Malgache (OCAM), took a more or less pro-Taipei stand during the 1960s. Madagascar was among the African UN members which voted against Peking's admission even in 1971. Until his ouster from power in May, 1972, President Tsiranana was one of Peking's bitterest enemies in Africa, never hesitant to speak out against the PRC.<sup>37</sup>

On May 18, 1972, after five days of rioting by students, Tsiranana was forced to transfer power to the army chief of staff, Major General Gabriel Ramanantsoa, ending Madagascar's pro-Taipei era.<sup>38</sup> In late September, on his way to Moscow, Madagascar's new foreign minister,

Lieutenant Commander Didier Ratsiraka, stopped at Dar es Salaam and met with PRC Ambassador Li Yao-wen. In late October and early November, Ratsiraka paid a two-week official visit to China and North Korea, signing a joint communique in Peking on November 6, 1972, to establish diplomatic relations with the PRC.<sup>39</sup> After publication of two insulting "open letters" addressed to the ROC ambassador by La Basy Vava, a left-wing newspaper, Nationalist China severed relations with Madagascar on November 15.<sup>40</sup> Anti-Chinese riots erupted in Tamatave. Some Chinese, burned out of home and business, were compelled to leave. About 2,000 Chinese reportedly left Madagascar after the departure of the Nationalist Chinese ambassador.<sup>41</sup>

In January, 1973, Peking granted Madagascar an interest-free loan of 2,000 million CFA francs, to buy out South African interests in Madagascar hotel projects. The PRC also supplied Malagasy with 50,000 tons of rice (10,000 tons as a gift, the rest at a low price).<sup>42</sup> On January 18, 1974, trade, economic, and technical cooperation agreements were signed in Peking. Peking agreed to aid Madagascar's economic development with material, technical assistance as well as special interest-free loans.<sup>43</sup> In mid-1975, according to the agreement, Peking provided an interest-free loan of 250 million francs (over U.S. \$60 million), repayable from 1990, to build a sugar factory, improve a national match factory, create an experimental station for rice and vegetables, and buy necessary goods and equipment.<sup>44</sup>

In mid-1976, Ratsiraka, now president of the new "Democratic Republic of Madagascar," arrived in Peking for an official visit and was welcomed at the airport by the new Chinese Premier Hua Kuo-feng and Foreign Minister Chiao Kuan-hua.<sup>45</sup> Immediately after Ratsiraka's

visit, Peking sent a survey team to begin studies for the projected 150 km road linking the Madagascar capital with Tamatave port on the east coast, and, at the same time, started implementing other projects provided in the economic and technical cooperation agreement.<sup>46</sup> Thus, within four years after the ouster of Tsiranana, the former strongly anti-Peking Madagascar became one of Peking's friends in Africa.

#### Malawi

Nyasaland, a former British protectorate, became independent on July 6, 1964, and changed its name to Malawi (meaning "flaming water," after the sunrise on Lake Nyasa).<sup>47</sup> In the late 1950s when Nyasaland was still a British protectorate, Peking expressed support for the Nyasaland independence movement led by Dr. Hastings Kamuzu Banda, father of Nyasaland nationalism and president of the Nyasaland African Congress. When Banda was imprisoned in Southern Rhodesia for thirteen months by British authorities, the Chinese Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee (CAASC) issued a statement on March 24, 1959, demanding his immediate release.<sup>48</sup>

When Nyasaland achieved internal self-government in early 1963, Peking's Jen-min jen-pao published an article heartily congratulating "the people of Nyasaland on this preliminary victory won in their struggle for national independence."<sup>49</sup> Three weeks before independence in July, 1964, Dr. Banda received Ho Ying, Peking's ambassador to Tanzania, and had a "friendly talk with him."<sup>50</sup> Though he had no intention of recognizing either Peking or Taipei, Banda invited both to the independence ceremonies on July 6. Peking declined the invitation,

but sent messages to Banda saying that the PRC "has decided to recognize Malawi."<sup>51</sup>

However, on July 6, Peking's official Jen-min jih-pao published an editorial deploring the Malawian government's "two-Chinas" attitude: "It is obviously due to the influence exercised by U.S. and British imperialism that the Malawi Government should propose to recognize two Chinas and try to create a two Chinas situation at the independence celebrations."<sup>52</sup> On the other hand, Taipei accepted the invitation and appointed Yang Hsi-k'un, vice foreign minister, as special envoy.<sup>53</sup>

After a 1964 Ugandan report that Banda might recognize Peking, the PRC attempted to encourage him by offering Malawi an interest-free loan of U.S. \$50 million.<sup>54</sup> However, Banda declined the offer, much to the displeasure of some members in his cabinet. Six minister, including Foreign Minister Kanyama Chiume and Education Minister Henry Chipembere, either were dismissed or resigned; some fled to neighboring Tanzania to form an anti-Banda force with PRC support.<sup>55</sup>

Having failed to entice Banda, Peking turned to supporting Malawian dissidents in Tanzania, and trained Malawian guerrillas, hoping to overthrow Banda's government through subversion. Enraged by this, Banda became one of Peking's bitterest critics in Africa. In 1965 and 1966 Banda and Malawian news media openly attacked the PRC on many occasions. On July 2, 1965, after returning from the Commonwealth Conference in London, Banda expressed his suspicion of Peking's intentions in Africa, saying: "She just uses you, and when you are no longer useful she ditches you."<sup>56</sup> In early January, 1966, Dr. Banda told American journalists in an interview that assassins trained by Peking attempted to kill him and loyal members of his government.<sup>57</sup>

On December 16, 1966, commenting on the Vietnam problem in the Malawian parliament, Banda declared that "it is not the Americans but the North Vietnamese and Chinese who stand in the way of peace."<sup>58</sup>

To counter Peking's hostility, Banda took measures to establish relations with Nationalist China. Taipei signed a technical cooperation agreement with Malawi on December 3, 1965, to help Malawi's agricultural development.<sup>59</sup> Malawi accorded de jure recognition to the ROC on July 12, 1966. On August 4, 1967, Banda arrived in Taipei for an eight-day state visit at the invitation of President Chiang Kai-shek. In a joint communique, both leaders agreed that Chinese Communism was a source of "subversion and unrest in Asia, Africa, and other parts of the world."<sup>60</sup> Malawi's policy did not change after the 1971 United Nations recognition of Peking. Seven years later, Banda was still president of Malawi, and Malawi continued to recognize Taipei and to receive agricultural aid from the ROC, though surrounded by militant Tanzania, Zambia, and Mozambique, all having close relations with Peking.

#### PRC Relations with Portugal

In dealing with the black governments of Madagascar and Malawi, Peking had always to consider possible repercussions in its relations with other independent black governments in Africa. Entirely different considerations were involved in its policy towards colonial and white governments in southern Africa. Before turning to the Portuguese colonies of Mozambique and Angola, it is useful to consider Peking's relations with Portugal itself. These were complicated by the fact that one of Portugal's oldest and smallest colonies is located in

China: Macao, consisting of a peninsula near Canton, and two small islands, with a total area of only six square miles (sixteen sq. km).

The opportunism of Peking's foreign policy was never more openly displayed than in regard to Macao. Despite Portuguese refusal to recognize the PRC until a quarter century after its creation, despite Peking's constant denunciation of Portuguese colonialism in Africa, and despite the utter indefensibility of Macao, this small territory and its 95 percent Chinese population (276,000) have remained under Portuguese administration—even after Portugal tried to return it to the PRC. The principal reason is that Peking has profited greatly (and in hard currencies) from international trade through Macao.<sup>61</sup> Since the Sino-Soviet split, the Soviet Union has enjoyed taunting Peking about its Macao policy. When the PRC accused Khrushchev of cowardice in the 1962 Cuban missile crisis with the United States, Khrushchev sarcastically reminded Peking of its continued toleration of Portuguese and British colonies (Macao and Hong Kong) within its own territory.<sup>62</sup> In 1966, during the Cultural Revolution, Moscow charged the PRC with using Macao and Hong Kong not only for financial profit but also for "political contacts with imperialist countries."<sup>63</sup>

Peking's complacency about Portuguese Macao did not apply to Portuguese colonies in Africa, as will be discussed below. The April 25, 1974, military coup in Portugal soon changed Portuguese policy not only towards its African colonies but also toward Peking. Dr. Antonio de Almeida Santos, the Portuguese Minister for Inter-Territorial Coordination, declared in a speech in Macao on October 14, 1974, that, although the Portuguese enclave of Macao could not exist without

China's consent, Peking had until then expressed no desire to change Macao's status.<sup>64</sup> On January 6, 1975, the Portuguese government recognized Peking as "the only legitimate representative of the Chinese people" and stated that it considered Taiwan "an integral part of China." A month later, Lisbon severed diplomatic relations with Taipei and expelled all pro-Taipei Chinese from Macao.<sup>65</sup> Between 1975 and 1977 there were several Western reports that the Portuguese military government had on several occasions offered to return Macao to China, but the proposals were always turned down by the PRC.<sup>66</sup>

The first of the Portuguese African colonies to achieve independence was Guinea-Bissau, on September 10, 1974. All the rest achieved independence within a few months after Portugal's January 6, 1975, recognition of Peking: Mozambique on June 25, 1975, the Cape Verde Islands on July 5, Sao Tome e Principe on July 12, and Angola on November 11.

#### Angola

Since Portugal and the PRC did not have diplomatic relations until a few months before the Portuguese colonies in southern Africa became independent, Peking had for years vehemently denounced Portuguese rule in Africa, and supported African rebel movements against Portugal. The PRC became the first Communist power to broadcast to Portuguese Africa when Radio Peking began beaming a Portuguese program to Angola in September, 1960, four months before the Angolan uprising began (February, 1961). By mid-1961 Radio Peking broadcast seven hours a week in Portuguese to Angola and was joined by Radio Moscow in August of the same year.<sup>67</sup>

However, between 1960 and 1963, the formative years of the Angolan liberation movement, Peking did not commit itself seriously to either of the principal rebel groups, the Moscow-backed People's Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA), led by Agostinho Neto, and the newer National Front for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA) led by Holden Roberto.<sup>68</sup> Both were active in Leopoldville, Zaire, in 1962, but Peking was then aiding Zairean rebels against the Leopoldville government and thus not in a position to make contacts with Angolan leaders in the Zairean capital. An opportunity for the FNLA's Roberto to make contacts with the PRC embassy in Algiers came in early 1963 when Algeria's Ben Bella allowed both MPLA and FNLA to open offices in Algiers. In December, 1963, Roberto met PRC Foreign Minister Chen I in Nairobi at Kenya's independence ceremony. Chen I reportedly offered to supply FNLA "all the aid that it needs."<sup>69</sup> Roberto accepted the offer and shortly afterwards FNLA guerrillas were sent to China for training; some were later trained in Ghana by Chinese instructors.<sup>70</sup>

The FNLA's influence declined after early 1964 because of leadership disputes and friction with rapidly changing governments in Zaire. When a third major Angolan rebel group, the National Union for Total Independence of Angola (UNITA), was formed in March, 1966, by former FNLA leader Jonas Savimbi, Peking switched its support from FNLA to UNITA.<sup>71</sup> PRC aid to UNITA, never large, soon declined because of China's preoccupation with its own Cultural Revolution, although token shipments of weapons and medical supplies continued to be sent to Peking to Savimbi's forces through African countries friendly to the PRC. During the years of China's inactivity (1966-1969), the three Angolan

groups became bitter rivals; one report said the MPLA forces had probably killed more UNITA guerrillas than Portuguese.<sup>72</sup>

In the 1970s, after the Cultural Revolution, the PRC re-entered the Angolan competition. Realizing that it could not change MPLA's strong pro-Moscow position despite the fact that Neto visited the PRC in July, 1971, Peking gradually resumed support of Roberto's FNLA while decreasing its support for UNITA, which became a lesser partner of the FNLA. China's pro-FNLA position became more apparent in 1973 after a visit to Peking by President Mobutu of Zaire, a strong supporter of Roberto. In December, 1973, Roberto himself visited Peking and signed a military aid agreement, by which Peking sent twenty military experts to Zaire to train FNLA guerrillas. By August, 1974, 105 more Chinese instructors and 450 tons of Chinese-made arms also arrived.<sup>73</sup> Meanwhile, Soviet aid poured into Angola for the MPLA.

The April 25, 1974, military coup in Lisbon brought to power in Portugal a military government which promptly announced that it would allow all five Portuguese colonies in Africa to become independent before the end of 1975. In January, 1975, the Portuguese agreed that Angola would officially become independent on November 11, 1975, and before then, a transitional coalition government would be formed including the MPLA, FNLA and UNITA.

Unfortunately the war in Angola was far from over. It entered a final and more bloody phase, changing from a liberation war to a civil war between MPLA's "People's Republic of Angola" supported by the Soviet Union and its satellite Cuba, and an FNLA-UNITA coalition rather weakly supported by the PRC and Western powers.<sup>74</sup> With full military support from Moscow and 14,000 Cuban soliders, Neto's MPLA gained the

upper hand over the FNLA-UNITA coalition by the end of February, 1976.

The victory of the Moscow-backed MPLA in Angola was undoubtedly a serious blow not only to the United States but also to the PRC. To Peking, one of Moscow's major competitors in Africa, the collapse of the FNLA-UNITA coalition caused both short-range and long-range disadvantages. It not only temporarily curtailed Peking's influence in southern Africa, but in the long run could also prevent the PRC from playing a decisive role in a future conflict between black Africa and white South Africa, which Peking has advocated, planned, and invested in since the early 1960s. Peking's bitter reaction to Soviet dominance in Angola was amply revealed in PRC statements, editorials, and commentaries published by Jen-min jih-pao and NCNA in late 1975 and early 1976.<sup>75</sup>

Although one report lists Angola among the African nations receiving aid from Peking during 1976, no details were given, and no announcement has been made of establishment of diplomatic relations between the Neto government and the PRC.<sup>76</sup>

#### Mozambique

The independence movement in Portugal's second largest African colony, Mozambique, began later than that in Angola but encountered fewer difficulties and achieved its goal five months before Angola. When the Angolan rebellion began in February, 1961, conditions in Mozambique were still calm. A major reason was that Mozambique was then much less accessible than Angola to outside intervention. All the countries bordering on Mozambique (Tanzania, Malawi, Zambia, Rhodesia, and South Africa) were then under European or white African rule. Tanzania achieved independence in December, 1961, but did not become

radical until 1965.

In 1961, three Mozambican nationalist organizations emerged in exile: the Democratic National Union of Mozambique (UDENAMO), the Mozambique African Nationalist Union (MANU), and the African Union of Independent Mozambique (UNIMI). All had their headquarters in Dar es Salaam, capital of Tanzania. Pressed by Tanzanian President Nyerere to unite, the three organizations merged in June, 1962, to form the Front for the Liberation of Mozambique (FRELIMO), electing Dr. Eduardo Chivambo Mondlane, who was favored by Nyerere, as president in September. However, from the outset, FRELIMO was plagued by factional rivalry, assassinations, and defections.

FRELIMO launched its armed liberation struggle inside Mozambique in late September, 1964, with a very small force (250 men).<sup>77</sup> Between late 1962 and early 1965, a series of expulsions and reorganizations took place within FRELIMO. Some prominent leaders broke away from the party, and in mid-1965 organized the Revolutionary Committee of Mozambique (COREMO) in Lusaka, Zambia.<sup>78</sup>

Although FRELIMO president Mondlane was American-educated, married a white American woman, and received financial support from some American churches and humanitarian organizations, most of the military equipment used by his forces came from Moscow, and he was generally considered pro-Soviet. His two right-hand men--Marcelino dos Santos, a well-known leftist poet and FRELIMO's secretary for external relations, and Samora Machel, commander-in-chief of FRELIMO's guerrilla forces--were both devoted Marxists with pro-Moscow inclinations.

Thus, when the rival COREMO appeared in mid-1965, Peking immediately favored it, without ever totally refraining from supporting

FRELIMO as well. From the outset, COREMO took an openly pro-Peking and anti-Moscow stand. One COREMO leader was quoted as saying that "the Russian methods are wrong--they were partly afraid of the peasants, and crushed and collectivized them. The Chinese had to build a National Liberation Army of solid peasant support [in China]; they taught us we had to utilize thirty million Africans in southern Africa."<sup>79</sup> Another COREMO leader, Manuel Mahluza, was quoted by Peking's NCNA in 1966 as having mastered some of the PRC's favorite jargon: "By arming ourselves with Chairman Mao's great thesis on people's war, we can defeat the Portuguese colonialists who are nothing but paper tigers."<sup>80</sup>

China was said to be the only country supplying arms and equipment to COREMO. The Organization for African Unity (OAU) did not recognize COREMO, and forbade it to open a headquarters in Dar es Salaam. By the early 1970s, COREMO had lost momentum and gradually withered away. At that point, Peking appeared to be in the same difficulty as in Angola, having backed a weaker faction, but by 1973 the PRC had successfully shifted its allegiance and became FRELIMO's leading supporter.<sup>81</sup>

Despite FRELIMO's often-exaggerated battle success claims, the Mozambican war was not as ferocious as the one then going on in Angola, and attracted much less attention world-wide. FRELIMO's war efforts were considerably weakened by factional struggles between pro-Moscow and pro-Peking elements within the party, accompanied with mysterious assassinations of several of its top-ranking leaders. On February 3, 1969, Mondlane himself was killed in Dar es Salaam when he opened a package delivered to him that contained a bomb. It was widely believed that the Portuguese secret police were responsible, but the Portuguese denied the charge and instead blamed the Communist Chinese for the

assassination.<sup>82</sup>

The death of Mondlane brought the intense power struggle within FRELIMO into the open. Supported by Mondlane's widow, Samora Machel emerged as the new leader. Under Machel, FRELIMO maintained close relations with the PRC. Since 1971 Peking had increased its military support to FRELIMO and had stepped up its training of Mozambican guerrilla fighters in Tanzania.<sup>83</sup>

Machel led FRELIMO delegations on visits to China in August, 1971, and again in February, 1975, a few months before independence.<sup>84</sup> Especially on the second visit, he received a royal welcome from PRC leaders. Speaking at a banquet in his honor, Machel praised Peking more explicitly than ever:

Ever since the beginning of our struggle, the People's Republic of China has stood in the vanguard of the magnificent movement supporting us. Educated by Chairman Mao Tse-tung and carrying forward the internationalist tradition of the Communist Party of China, the Chinese Government and people have always been and constitute now a great and reliable strategic rear area for our fight and an invincible base supporting the struggle of the oppressed peoples . . . We have come here to study and learn from your revolutionary experience of building the people's power and reconstructing a country ruined by feudal pillage and the wars of aggression launched by the reactionaries and imperialists.<sup>85</sup>

After the April, 1974, military coup in Lisbon, the new Portuguese government and FRELIMO negotiated a September 7, 1974, agreement promising independence to Mozambique in 1975. A transitional government of Portuguese and Mozambicans was set up on September 20. Despite several bloody incidents in September and October, the transfer of power in Mozambique was smoother than in Angola, and Mozambique achieved full independence on June 25, 1975.<sup>86</sup>

Peking sent a delegation to the independence celebrations, and donated 30,000 tons of wheat to the Mozambique people.<sup>87</sup> Shortly afterwards, China granted Mozambique an interest-free loan of U.S. \$56 million, to be repaid only after 1990. In September, Peking sent a medical mission to Mozambique to survey Mozambique's health service, and in November agreed to send about thirty medical experts to work in Mozambique's health services.<sup>88</sup>

Mozambique's position in the Sino-Soviet rivalry was not clear following independence. Both Moscow and Peking found Machel more neutral than they wished, despite his avowed devotion to Marxism.<sup>89</sup> Chinese Nationalist sources reported that about 5,000 of the 6,000 Chinese living in Mozambique at the time of independence had left by mid-1976, mostly for Portugal or Brazil.<sup>90</sup> Since Peking is not known to have objected, it may be assumed that these were anti-Communists. Whatever the degree of Peking's success in Mozambique, it appeared substantially greater than in Angola. Machel's government established diplomatic relations with the PRC on the day of independence, and additional PRC medical aid was sent to Mozambique during 1976.<sup>91</sup> Although a 1962 report described Mozambique's arable but untilled land (nearly a third of the country) as perhaps the best in Africa for rice cultivation, no PRC agricultural aid has yet been announced.<sup>92</sup>

#### Rhodesia/Zimbabwe

On November 11, 1965, Rhodesia--known to Africans as Zimbabwe and to others as Southern Rhodesia until Northern Rhodesia changed its name to Zambia--became the only British colony in Africa to declare its independence unilaterally, without British consent. There are, of course,

numerous colonial territories which have proclaimed their independence unilaterally and been recognized by other nations without awaiting the consent of the colonial power. Examples include Vietnam from China in 1939, the United States from England in 1776, and several black African states in recent years. The international outcry over Rhodesia's "UDI" (unilateral declaration of independence) did not in fact have much to do with its unilateral character; the real issue was racial, a white government over a predominantly black population.

The PRC's first comment, on November 14, 1965, was couched in typical Peking invective: the Rhodesian UDI was "a wild attack on the Zimbabwe people and a grave threat to all the African peoples."<sup>93</sup> On the same day, Peking's Jen-min jih-pao published an editorial entitled "The Just Struggle of the Zimbabwe People Will Surely Win," declaring that the real intention behind the UDI by the white settlers in Southern Rhodesia was:

. . . to cloak their bloodthirsty rule with sham independence, thus giving a legal figleaf to this barbarous rule, so that they may maintain Southern Rhodesia as their 'paradise' where they can continue to rule supreme . . . The independence of southern Rhodesia can only be won by the unrelenting struggle of the Zimbabwe people. Africa belongs to the Africans. The minority rule of the white settlers must be overthrown. All imperialist, colonialist, and neocolonialist forces must be liquidated. No force on earth can prevent the Africans from taking their destinies into their own hands. Final victory certainly belongs to the Zimbabwe people so long as they strengthen their unity and persist in their struggle.<sup>94</sup>

During the 1960s there were two major nationalist organizations in Rhodesia: the Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU) and the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU). ZAPU was founded in December, 1961, by Joshua Nkomo. After the Rhodesian government banned ZAPU

in September, 1962, Nkomo traveled extensively in Africa and opened ZAPU offices in the capitals of Tanzania, Zambia, Ghana, Algeria, Egypt, and Britain.<sup>95</sup> Dissatisfied with Nkomo's indecisiveness and fondness for foreign travel, a group of high-ranking ZAPU leaders led by Reverend Ndabaningi Sithole rebelled against Nkomo's leadership. On August 8, 1963, the dissidents formed the rival ZANU in Dar es Salaam.<sup>96</sup> Though ZANU was more militant than ZAPU, their political goals were initially the same. Both were banned by Rhodesian authorities, and Sithole was jailed.

In their international orientation, ZAPU followed the Moscow line; ZANU was regarded as pro-Peking, and was among the five southern African nationalist organizations supported by Peking during the 1960s.<sup>97</sup> In April, 1966, five months after Ian Smith's UDI, ZANU launched full-scale guerrilla war from its Zambian bases. This displeased the ZAPU leaders, who denounced the attack as an "irresponsible" action provoked by "pro-Chinese extremists" within ZANU.<sup>98</sup> However, unwilling to be left behind, ZAPU started its own guerrilla war in Rhodesia in August, 1967.

After Zambian President Kaunda warned ZAPU and ZANU that they must "choose between coming together or forfeiting Zambia's readiness to accommodate them," the two were merged in 1971 as the Front for the Liberation of Zimbabwe (FROLIZI), but this proved ineffectual and some leaders of both parties refused to join.<sup>99</sup> In the Peking-Moscow competition within the Zimbabwe liberation movement, China seemed tentatively to occupy the better position since it had played a primary role in training guerrillas for ZANU, which is militarily stronger than the Moscow-backed ZAPU. However, the long-term advantage may lie with

the Soviet Union, because it can supply Cuban troops and more sophisticated weapons, and can be expected to press the Zimbabwe leaders to reduce Peking's influence.<sup>100</sup>

Peking has also had to cope with widespread charges that the PRC has continued to trade with Rhodesia while vehemently denouncing the Rhodesian white government as "racist" and avowing its firm support of the Zimbabwe liberation movement. PRC denials of any trade relations whatsoever with either South Africa or Rhodesia were disproved by confirmed Western reports. During the PRC food shortage in the early 1960s, Peking bought large quantities of maize from both South Africa and Rhodesia.<sup>101</sup> The British Sunday Times reported on October 1, 1967, that Peking had bought 60,000 tons of chrome ore from the Smith regime in mid-August, one-fifth of Rhodesia's chrome production.<sup>102</sup>

In November, 1968, both the British Sunday Telegraph and South Africa's Rand Daily Mail reported that the PRC was continuously buying Rhodesian chrome through the Mozambican port of Beira, having it shipped in Portuguese vessels to conceal PRC involvement. Similar reports were substantiated by the Observer in 1970.<sup>103</sup> In November, 1974, another British publication reported that the PRC was buying Rhodesian chrome and lithium needed in the manufacture of rockets. The minerals were transported in oil drums from the Mozambican ports of Lourenco Marques and Beira to Macao and Hong Kong, then taken by road into China.<sup>104</sup>

As expected, the Soviets repeatedly used these Western reports in their propaganda to discredit Mao's regime in Africa as well as in China. The Soviets accused Peking of hypocrisy and double-dealing by claiming to give firm support to African liberation movements while

at the same time maintaining secret trade relations with the "African people's most vicious enemies, the racist authorities of South Africa and Rhodesia."<sup>105</sup>

Stung by such accusations, a PRC External Trade Ministry spokesman issued a statement on September 1, 1970, denying any PRC links with South Africa or Rhodesia, and denouncing all the reports as "imperialist machinations mounted to sow dissension and sabotage friendship between China and Africa states." Noting that the PRC had never had diplomatic relations with either Pretoria or Salisbury, he insisted that Peking had long since cut off all direct or indirect economic and trading relations with them.<sup>106</sup>

After Peking became a UN member, PRC Foreign Minister Chi Peng-fei solemnly declared in a letter addressed to the secretary-general of the United Nations on January 27, 1972:

In order to support the just struggle of the people of Zimbabwe, the Chinese Government has always refrained from having any diplomatic contacts with the Rhodesia white racist regime and long ago severed all economic and trade relations with it, direct or indirect.<sup>107</sup>

On March 3, 1972, Peking's official Jen-min jih-pao published an article entitled "Curious Rumour, Vile Slander," accusing the Soviets of fabricating rumors of Sino-Rhodesian trade deals in order "to misrepresent China's consistent stand on the Rhodesia question, poison the friendly relations between China and African countries and undermine the friendship between the Chinese and African people."<sup>108</sup>

#### South Africa/Azania

The Union of South Africa, independent since 1910, established diplomatic relations with the ROC in 1931 and has maintained them ever

since. The balance of political power within the ruling white minority began to shift from those of British descent to those of Dutch (Boer or Afrikaner) descent around 1914, and the Afrikaner Nationalist Party has dominated South African politics since 1948, a year before the PRC was established. The Union was converted into the Republic South Africa on May 31, 1961, the fifty-first anniversary of independence. African nationalists call it Azania.

Preferring the name "Afrikaner" to the older "Boer" because it specified that whites born in Africa were as African as the black Africans, the Afrikaner government adopted a policy of stringent racial segregation called "apartheid" (apartness) which became a major target of internal and external attack when black nationalism emerged in the 1960s.

The two major African nationalist organizations in South Africa were both formed before 1960. The African National Congress (ANC), Africa's oldest nationalist organization, was founded in 1912.<sup>109</sup> The Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC) was organized in 1959 by a group of ANC dissidents led by Mangaliso Robert Sobukwe, who accused the ANC of collaboration with the whites. Beginning on March 21, 1960, the PAC challenged the "pass laws" requiring all black Southern Africans to carry identity cards at all times. Unwilling to be left behind, the ANC started a similar campaign on March 31.<sup>110</sup> The result was the terrible "Sharpeville Massacre" in which white police killed sixty-nine unarmed Africans and injured 180 more.<sup>111</sup> Sobukwe and many of his aides were arrested; both ANC and PAC were outlawed by South African authorities in early April. Some leaders of the two organizations escaped abroad or went underground.

Like all other liberation movements in southern Africa, the one in South Africa soon became involved in the Sino-Soviet conflict. Both Moscow and Peking regarded South Africa as a major battleground between Eastern communism and Western capitalism. While the Soviets saw the confrontation as based on ideological and economic conflicts, Peking saw it as a racial war with Moscow in the "white racist" camp with Peking leading the "colored people." At first, Peking tried to maintain friendly relations with both ANC and PAC. However, the ANC, strongly influenced by the Moscow-oriented South African Communist Party (SACP), gradually took a pro-Moscow stand, while the PAC, which originally opposed cooperation with Communists, fell into the pro-Peking group.<sup>112</sup>

Despite general acknowledgment that Peking was behind the PAC, there were few data to show the extent of Chinese support. PAC's own reports stated that two PAC missions had visited Peking, each receiving \$20,000 from the PRC.<sup>113</sup> Various reports confirmed that PAC guerrillas had been trained in China, Tanzania, and Zambia by Chinese instructors.<sup>114</sup> But South Africa was much stronger and less vulnerable to such subversion than the Portuguese colonies or Rhodesia, and both Peking and Moscow appeared to put higher priority on activities elsewhere in Africa. Nevertheless, the South African government took Peking's involvement very seriously. Prime Minister Vorster said in a May, 1971, interview:

The greatest single threat to Africa is that the Communist Chinese have established a bridgehead in Tanzania and the possibility that they might, through the construction of the Tanzam Railway, infiltrate farther into the heart of Africa and establish themselves in a permanent basis in Tanzania and Zambia.<sup>115</sup>

Speaking at Graaff Reinet in the Cape Province on November 27, 1971, South Africa's Defense Minister P. W. Botha declared that "Communist forces, mainly the Communist Chinese, are behind the terrorist activities on the northern borders of South Africa."<sup>116</sup> Botha's statement was reaffirmed in April, 1974, by the chief of the South African Army: "The terrorist threat to the country's borders is intimately related to Chinese activities in some black African states."<sup>117</sup> Appearing on a U.S. nationwide television program, "Firing Line," on April 21, 1974, Prime Minister Vorster again emphasized that "the scourge of terrorism in South Africa will continue as long as Communist China and Russia train and arm the terrorists."<sup>118</sup>

Although Moscow appears to have given more and better aid to southern African liberation organizations than Peking, the government of South Africa has regarded Peking as the more dangerous of the two, and expressed grave concern over Peking's expansion in southern Africa in general and its increasing influence in Tanzania and Zambia in particular.<sup>119</sup> This anxiety probably was a factor in South Africa's decision to strengthen relations with Taipei, which resulted in raising South Africa's consulate-general in Taipei to the rank of embassy in late April, 1976.<sup>120</sup>

Accusations that Peking, while vilifying the South African government, continued to trade with it parallel those described earlier under Rhodesia. Despite an official statement by the New China News Agency in July, 1960, that the PRC had cut "all economic and trade ties with African colonial authorities," sufficient evidence proved the contrary. Both Western and African reports, some issued by Pretoria, indicated that Peking continued trade with South Africa during the 1960s

and into the 1970s. Official South African figures showed that Peking bought U.S. \$15.75 million worth of maize and wool from South Africa during 1962, and the figure tripled in 1963.<sup>121</sup> The Peking-Pretoria trade was given wide publicity by Western and African newspapers, as well as by Soviet propaganda, which used it to discredit Peking in Africa.

To repair its tarnished image in Africa, the PRC issued an official statement through NCNA on July 15, 1963, reiterating that "the PRC Government will in the future continue to have no economic and trade ties, direct or indirect, with the South African authorities."<sup>122</sup> The essence of this statement was repeated in December, 1963, through the PRC embassy in Guinea, and through the PRC Ministry of Foreign Trade in 1970.<sup>123</sup>

#### Southwest Africa/Namibia

Peking's interest in South Africa extends also to the large territory administered by South Africa under the name of Southwest Africa, called Namibia by Africans and (since 1968) by the United Nations General Assembly. The juridical status of this territory is less clear than that of any other part of Africa except the former Spanish Sahara, but it is in some sense still a colony.<sup>124</sup> The 434 square mile enclave of Walvis Bay has been legally part of South Africa since 1910, but the rest of the territory was assigned to South Africa in 1921 by the League of Nations as a mandated territory. After the demise of the League, South Africa proposed in 1946 that Southwest Africa be incorporated into South Africa. The United Nations wanted it converted into a trust territory, eventually to be independent. The two have been in

disagreement ever since, though South Africa remains in control.<sup>125</sup>

The black nationalist movement in Southwest Africa included two principal organizations. The Southwest Africa National Union (SWANU) was founded in May, 1959, and under Jariretundu Kozonguizi established close ties with Communist countries, especially the PRC. The rival Southwest African People's Organization (SWAPO) was formed in 1960.<sup>126</sup>

Because of its reluctance to cooperate with the African Liberation Committee of the Organization for Africans Unity (OAU), SWANU gradually lost OAU support; this considerably reduced its momentum and strength. At the Havana Tricontinental Conference in January, 1966, Kozonguizi joined with other pro-Peking delegates in denouncing "Soviet-American collusion under the guise of peaceful coexistence."<sup>127</sup> Kozonguizi's fiery words brought him into conflict with the majority of SWANU's External Council, and in July he resigned the presidency of SWANU. At the APPSO council meeting at Nicosia, Cyprus, in February, 1967, SWANU was expelled through maneuvers by pro-Moscow African delegations.

Since the early 1970s, SWANU, suffering from internal discord, international rejection, and suppression by South African authorities, has ceased to be a major organization. SWAPO is now recognized by both the United Nations and the OAU as the only representative movement of black Southwest Africans. Some authors do not even mention SWANU in describing the Southwest African situation.<sup>128</sup>

Peking, finding that it had (as in Angola and Mozambique) backed the wrong faction, tried hard to improve its relations with SWAPO. SWAPO leaders reacted rather favorably, needing to broaden their sources of support. The independence of Angola in late 1975 provided SWAPO with a base from which it could carry guerrilla war into

Southwest Africa. But Angola's pro-Soviet government and lack of diplomatic relations with Peking put the USSR in a better position than the PRC to exert influence over SWAPO. South Africa agreed in 1975 to negotiate the granting of independence in 1978, but continued to disagree with the United Nations over SWAPO participation.

### Botswana

The former British protectorate of Bechuanaland achieved its independence on September 30, 1966, as the Republic of Botswana. The PRC had shown interest in Bechuanaland as early as July 28, 1963, when Radio Peking broadcast a statement attributed to Bechuanaland leaders, saying that "the struggle between the colonialists and the colonial people is a life and death struggle. Only through a revolutionary struggle by the mass of the people can we achieve our aim--the independence and the liberation of Bechuanaland."<sup>129</sup> However, independence was achieved by peaceful means, rather than by violent revolution as envisioned by Peking.<sup>130</sup>

In Botswana, Peking supported the small but violently revolutionary Bechuanaland People's Party (BPP), also known as the Bechuanaland Popular Party, led by K. T. Motsete. Another Bechuanaland People's Party, led by Philip G. Matante, also had contacts with the PRC; Matante visited Peking in November, 1966.<sup>131</sup> But the preindependence general election of March, 1965, was won by the Democratic Party of Seretse Khama, a moderate tribal chief, who became the first president of Botswana.

Surrounded by Rhodesia, South Africa, and Southwest Africa, Botswana was politically and economically dependent on Rhodesia and South

Africa, particularly the latter. It therefore could not afford to follow the militant African countries on issues such as sanctions against Rhodesia and South Africa or the China-issue vote in the United Nations.

Botswana established diplomatic relations with Taipei on December 30, 1966, and a ROC embassy was soon opened at Gaborone, capital of Botswana. Shortly afterwards Taipei sent a twelve-member agricultural team to Botswana to help the country's agricultural development.<sup>132</sup>

In mid-July, 1968, Botswana's Vice President Q.K.J. Masire visited Taiwan and assured ROC leaders that Botswana would remain "firm in its policy of supporting the Republic of China's rightful position in the United Nations."<sup>133</sup>

On September 10, an agricultural technical co-operation agreement between the two countries was signed at Gaborone, under which Taipei was to send another agricultural demonstration team to Botswana.<sup>134</sup> In September, 1969, during his tour of twenty-five African countries, Yang Hsi-K'un visited Botswana and awarded President Khama the "Special Cordon of the Order of Propitious Clouds" in appreciation of Khama's contribution to friendship between the two countries.<sup>135</sup>

After 1970, however, the increasing attacks of African nationalists on Rhodesia and South Africa led Botswana to try to reduce its economic and political dependence on these countries, and seek alternative connections with Zambia, which was strongly pro-Peking.<sup>136</sup> Thus when the China issue was voted on in the General Assembly in October, 1971, Botswana followed the African majority in voting for Peking's admission. The beginning of construction of the U.S.-aided Botswana-Zambia highway in late 1972 pulled Botswana further away from South Africa's influence and drew it into that of Zambia.<sup>137</sup>

On March 25, 1974, Botswana recognized the PRC as "the only legitimate government of China," and asked ROC representatives to leave the country.<sup>138</sup> Taipei severed diplomatic ties with Gaberones on April 5 and withdrew its agricultural demonstration teams from Botswana.<sup>139</sup> Peking and Gaberones signed a joint communique on January 6, 1975, raising diplomatic relations between the two countries to the ambassadorial level.<sup>140</sup> Botswana President Seretse Khama arrived in Peking on July 26, 1976, for a state visit, and an economic and technical cooperation agreement was signed between the two countries.<sup>141</sup> However, as of late 1976, there were no announcements of PRC aid to Botswana.

#### The Enclave Nations

In view of the hostility between South Africa and the PRC, it is not surprising that none of the four nations which are enclaves within South Africa has diplomatic relations with Peking. All are in varying degrees economically and politically dependent on South Africa, and this is unlikely to change without a revolution in South Africa itself.

#### Lesotho

Basutoland, a former British protectorate, gained its independence on October 4, 1966, and became the kingdom of Lesotho. The real political power rests in the hands of its prime minister, Chief Leabua Jonathan, founder of the ruling Basutoland National Party (BNP), and a cousin of Paramount Chief (King) Moshoeshoe II. Because of its landlocked location and natural poverty, Lesotho's economic and political survival depend completely on South Africa.<sup>142</sup> Thus, Lesotho has followed a pro-Western foreign policy and shunned any contact with

Communist countries. This anti-Communist inclination is strengthened by the fact that about 70 percent of Lesotho's population is Christian, and the churches play a political role second only to that of the central government.<sup>143</sup>

When Lesotho achieved its independence, Taipei appointed Yang Hsi-k'un as special envoy to the independence celebrations. While in Lesotho, Yang signed a joint communique with Prime Minister Jonathan to establish diplomatic relations between Taipei and Maseru, the capital of Lesotho. Lesotho became an important recipient of ROC agricultural aid in Africa, while Peking began supporting political dissidents.

In Lesotho Peking financially supported the opposition Basutoland Congress Party (BCP) led by Ntsu Mokhehle, who has been praised by Peking as a "great leader."<sup>144</sup> Peking tried to promote a "united front" between the BCP and the Communist Party of Lesotho (CPL), formed by exiled members of the South African Communist Party (SACP). This effort was unsuccessful because of Soviet dominance of the SACP, which in turn controlled the CPL. In 1964, the Central Committee of the CPL issued a statement denouncing the "deviation" created by Peking within the international Communist movement.<sup>145</sup> Neither the BCP nor the CPL has much chance of gaining political power in the foreseeable future.

After Lesotho's Foreign Minister J.R.L. Kotsokoane visited Peking in May, 1975, at the invitation of PRC Foreign Minister Chiao Kuan-hua, there was speculation that Lesotho might seek diplomatic ties with Peking.<sup>146</sup> However, as of 1978 this has not happened.

### Swaziland

Swaziland, another former British protectorate, became an independent kingdom on September 6, 1968, and established diplomatic relations with Taipei on the same day. Swaziland had sent agricultural trainees to attend the "Seminar for African Agriculturalists" in Taiwan as early as 1965.<sup>147</sup> Like Lesotho, Swaziland also has close political relations with and depends economically on South Africa.<sup>148</sup>

### Transkei

The other enclave nations in South Africa have not established relations with either China, or with any other government except that of South Africa, which created them under its "Bantustan" policy. This involves granting independence to the nine major Bantu tribes within South Africa, as a means of reducing the black-white imbalance in the population of South Africa itself. Tribesmen who work outside the tribal territories (many have never lived there at all) are to lose South African citizenship and acquire citizenship in their respective Bantustan. The presumption is that they will continue to work (and often reside) in South Africa, but will no longer be citizens of South Africa. The policy has been denounced by most other nations as a subterfuge in which independence is no more than a legal fiction.

Transkei was the first Bantustan. South Africa granted independence on October 26, 1976, under Chief K. Matanzima, to this homeland of 3.4 million Xhosas, second largest of South Africa's nine major tribes.<sup>149</sup> To lend credibility to Transkei's independence, South African Prime Minister Vorster announced that the independent Bantu states were free

to establish diplomatic relations with any government in the world, including Peking and Moscow.<sup>150</sup>

This statement was widely criticized by South African whites, as inviting Communist penetration of southern Africa, but the PRC denounced Transkei's independence as a South African fraud against the world. NCNA declared that "Transkei will . . . be nothing but a supplier of cheap labour for the South African white racists, and the Transkei authorities, their recruiting agents."<sup>151</sup> There has been no indication that Transkei will seek diplomatic relations with either China, although the ROC foreign ministry congratulated the Transkei people and said that Taipei was willing to "cooperate" with Transkei.<sup>152</sup>

#### Bophuthatswana

South Africa granted independence on December 6, 1977, to a second Bantustan, called Bophuthatswana, with a population dominated (68 percent) by Bantus of the Tswana tribe.<sup>153</sup> The response by other countries has been the same as towards Transkei, and there are no indications that Bophuthatswana has sought diplomatic relations with either China.

#### Comoros

Three of the four Comoro Islands (between Africa and Madagascar) unilaterally declared their independence from France on July 6, 1975.<sup>154</sup> The first government was overthrown by a coup on August 3. The Republic of the Comoros was admitted to the United Nations on November 12, and established diplomatic relations with the PRC on November 13,

1975.<sup>155</sup> On May 31, 1976, a Comoro government delegation led by Salim Himidi, minister of internal affairs, arrived in Peking for a visit, and signed an economic and technical cooperation agreement on June

10.<sup>156</sup> A Comoro trade delegation visited Peking in late September,

1976.<sup>157</sup> No details of PRC aid to the Comoros have been announced.<sup>158</sup>

#### FOOTNOTES

<sup>1</sup>Though not precisely parallel to the terms West, Central, and East Africa used in other chapters, "Southern Africa" is used here to reduce confusion with the Republic (formerly Union) of South Africa. Except for using the initials CAR, there appears to be no way of eliminating confusion between the regional name "Central Africa" and the Central African Republic (now Empire).

<sup>2</sup>For texts of the messages, see Peking, NCNA, International Service in English, 0830 and 0833 GMT, October 23, 1964, Daily Report, no. 208 (October 23, 1964), pp. BBB 7-8.

<sup>3</sup>Ibid., 0225 GMT, October 26, 1964, no. 209 (October 26, 1964), p. BBB 3.

<sup>4</sup>According to a South African source, there was Communist influence in Zambia even before independence, with Communists in control of major trade unions, and displays of pro-Moscow and pro-Peking sentiment in the parliament. Simon Kapwepwe, who became Zambia's foreign minister, had expressed his admiration for Peking. See "Two Chinas in Africa," p. 390.

<sup>5</sup>Kamanga's visit might have something to do with Communist China's aid to Zambia. Two months after Kamanga's visit to China, President Kaunda announced that Peking had offered aid to Zambia, though he gave no details. See Uganda Argus, October 22, 1966, cited in ARB, EFT Series, 3 (1966), p. 624.

<sup>6</sup>Peking, NCNA, International Service in English, 1608 GMT, June 21, 1967, Daily Report, no. 121 (June 22, 1967), pp. BBB 1-2.

<sup>7</sup>Ibid., p. BBB 5.

<sup>8</sup>Times of Zambia, June 24 and 29, 1967, cited in ARB, EFT Series, 4 (1967), p. 791. See also An Economic Assessment, p. 381. The first portion of this loan, 12 million kwacha, was appropriated in January, 1969, to be used for building the 394-mile Lusaka-Mankyoa-Mwumba road. See Radio Lusaka in English, 1115 GMT, January 24, 1969, BBC, SWB, ME/2948/B/1 and its broadcast on October 1, 1969, in ARB, EFT Series, 6 (1969), p. 1474.

<sup>9</sup>The gift of the transmitters (two 60-kw short wave and one 200-kw medium) was the result of a visit to Peking by Skota Wina, Zambian minister of information, broadcasting and tourism in late August and

early September, 1969. However, the transmitters did not arrive in Lusaka until early 1972. Peking also sent thirteen engineers and technicians to install the equipment. The installation took several months and was completed in early October, 1972. The radio station was officially inaugurated by Kaunda in May, 1973. For related reports, see BBC, SWB, ME/3168/B/4, ME/3543/B/9, ME/3586/B/5, ME/3741/B/6, ME/3743/B/6-7, ME/4035/B/3, ME/4114/B/15, ME/4306/B/1-3, and ME/4307/B/3.

<sup>10</sup> Wu Chao-hsiung, "Kung-fei tsai Fei-chou ti ho-tung (I)," pp. 27-28. According to Yang Feng-tai, by 1973 there were about eighty permanent guerrilla training bases in Zambia, the largest having a capacity of 5,000 people. See "'Yu-chi ke ming' wei-hsieh hsia ti nan-pu Fei-chou" [Southern Africa under the threat of guerrilla revolution], Wen-ti yu yen-chiu, 12, 10 (July, 1973), p. 47.

<sup>11</sup> Radio Lusaka in English, 0700 GMT, May 27, 1973, BBC, SWB, ME/4307/B/3; Times of Zambia, May 28, 1973, cited in ARB, EFT Series, 10 (1973), p. 2745.

<sup>12</sup> Peking, NCNA, in English, 1558 GMT, February 21, 1974, Daily Report, no. 37 (February 22, 1974), pp. I A 7-8. For treatment of Kaunda's 1974 China visit from a Nationalist Chinese point of view, see Shen Ping-wen, "Ka-un-da chi Pao-mi-ti ti Fei-chu chih-hsin" [The visits of Kaunda and Boumedienne to Communist China], Fei-ch'ing yueh-pao, XVII, 2 (April, 1974), pp. 43-45.

<sup>13</sup> Radio Lusaka in English, 1115 GMT, February 27, 1974, BBC, SWB, ME/4539/B/3-4.

<sup>14</sup> Lusaka in English, 1800 GMT, June 18, 1975, in BBC, SWB, ME/4935/B/13.

<sup>15</sup> Copper, p. 17.

<sup>16</sup> Aaron Segal, "The Tanganyika-Zambia Railway Project," Africa Report, 9, 10 (November, 1964), p. 9; Kasuka Simvinji Mutukwa, "Tanzania-Zambia Railway: Imperial Dream Becomes Pan-African Reality," *ibid.*, 17, 1 (January, 1972), p. 10; and "Tanzam-Railway: Breakthrough for Red China," Bulletin of the Africa Institute of South Africa, X, 6 (July, 1972), p. 237.

<sup>17</sup> For more detailed description of the significance of Tanzam Railway to Tanzania and Zambia, see articles by Segal and Mutukwa. See also Chiu Chen-teh, "Chung-kung yuan-chu hsin-chien Tan-sang tieh-lu" [The PRC's assistance of the construction of the Tanzan railway], Chung-kuo ta-lu yen-chiu, 8 (June 25, 1971), pp. 36-42; Chao Chun-shan, "Chung-kung shen-t'ou Fei-chou ti ta-tung-moi--Tan-sang tieh-lu ti hsiu-chien" [The artery of Chinese Communist infiltration in Africa--the Tanzania-Zambia railway], Tung-ya chi-kan, IV, 1 (July 1, 1972), pp. 102-121; and Wu Chao-hsiung, "Kung-fei ch'eng-chien Tan-sang la

tieh-lu chih fen-hsi" [Analysis of Communist China's construction of the Tazara line], Fei-ch'ing yueh-pao, XIV, 10 (November 30, 1972), pp. 70-73. The last three articles reflect a Nationalist Chinese point of view.

<sup>18</sup>David Martin, "Africans Realizing Cecil Rhodes's Dream," The Guardian, September 12, 1970, cited in Chao Chun-shan, "Tan-sang tieh lu ti hsiu-chien," p. 103. See also Mutukwa, p. 10; Chao Ch'un-shan, "Tan-sang Tieh-lu ti hsiu-chien," p. 103; and George T. Yu, "Working on the Railroad: China and the Tanzania-Zambia Railway," Asian Survey, XI, 11 (November, 1971), p. 1104. See also, "China's Gold-tipped Wand Hovers over Eastern Africa," Economist, 224, 6468 (August 12, 1967), p. 565

<sup>19</sup>Keesing's Contemporary Archives, 15 (1965-1966), p. 20849; "Tanzam-Railway; Breakthrough for Red China," pp. 237-238; Mutukwa, p. 10; Daniel Wolfstone, "Zam-Tan Rails," Far Eastern Economic Review, XLIX, 4 (July 22, 1965), p. 171; and "Chinese Activities Gaining in Africa," a translation of an article by "Strategicus" in the Les Opinions Africaines [African opinions], 4, 208 (October 1, 1967), p. 1, in JPRS, Translations on Africa, no. 74 (43125), no. 650, pp. 1-2.

<sup>20</sup>"New Chinese Policy in Africa Analyzed," a translation of an article by Jacques van Broekhuizen, "New Aspects of Chinese Policy in Africa," Est & Ouest, Paris (December 16-31, 1969, pp. 1-4, in JPRS, Translations on Africa, no. 127 (49877), no. 866, p. 10.

<sup>21</sup>Martin, cited in Chao chun-shan, "Tan-sang tieh-lu ti hsiu-chien," p. 104.

<sup>22</sup>"A Slow Train from China," The Guardian, August 16, 1970, cited in Chiu, pp. 37, 41.

<sup>23</sup>Peking, NCNA, International Service in English, 1515 GMT, September 5, 1967, Daily Report, no. 173 (September 6, 1967), pp. BBB 8-9; and Jen-min jih-pao, September 6, 1967. The agreement was signed by Li Hsien-nien, Chinese vice premier, Amir H. Jamal, Tanzanian minister of finance, and A. J. Soko, Zambian minister of state. For Chinese text of the statement, see Tiao-yueh-chi (PRC), 15 (1966-1967), 199-201.

<sup>24</sup>Thomas Land, "China's African Railway," Contemporary Review, 213, 1230 (July, 1968), p. 24.

<sup>25</sup>Ta-kung-pao (Shanghai), June 21 and October 30, 1968, and Jen-min jih-pao, September 29, 1968; Chao Chun-shan, "Tan-sang tieh-lu ti hsiu-chien," pp. 113-115. For detailed description, see Hall and Peyman, The Great Uhuru Railway.

<sup>26</sup>Jen-min jih-pao, July 13, 1970; and Dar es Salaam Home Service in English, 1600 GMT, July 12, 1970, BBC, SWB, ME/3429/B/1-2.

<sup>27</sup>Radio Dar es Salaam broadcasts at 0100, 0745, and 1000 GMT, October 26, 1970, 0900 and 1000 GMT, October 28, 1970, BBC, SWB, ME/3519/B/7; ME/3521/B/9-10; Daily Report, no. 209 (October 27, 1970), pp. U 1-6; Jen-min jih-pao, October 28 and October 31, 1970; and Peking Review, 45 (November 6, 1970), pp. 17-19.

<sup>28</sup>See "Tanzam-Railway: Breakthrough for Red China," p. 241; and Cas de Villiers, "China's Decade in Africa," p. 295. See also Mutukwa; Chao Ch'un-shan, "Tan-sang tieh-lu ti hsiu-chien," pp. 112-113; David Omazo Edeani, "South Africa: What Lies Behind the 'Red Scare'?" Africa Report, 17, 8 (September-October, 1972), pp. 23-24; Ruth Weiss, "Letter from Africa," Far Eastern Economic Review, 83, 2 (January 14, 1974), p. 62; "China and the Tazara Railroad Project," Current Scene, XIII, 5-6 (May-June, 1975), pp. 14-21; and Gerd Meurer, "A Hopeful Future for the Tanzam Railway" Swiss Review of World Affairs, XXV, 7 (October, 1975), pp. 19-20.

<sup>29</sup>For stories of Chinese and African workers who risked their own lives in order to save the lives of their co-workers, see report by NCNA correspondent published in Jen-min jih-pao, July 18, 1972. The report can also be found in Wo-men ti peng-yu pien tien-hsia [We have friends over the world] (Peking, 1972), pp. 129-132.

<sup>30</sup>Ta-kung-pao, January 21, 1970.

<sup>31</sup>See "China and the Tazara Railroad Project," p. 18. According to Peter Seilitz, the train takes forty-nine hours to make a trip from Dar es Salaam to Kapiri Mposhi. Seilitz once took such a trip from Dar es Salaam and arrived at Kapiri Mposhi precisely forty-nine hours later. See his article, "Along the Tanzam Railway," pp. 20-21.

<sup>32</sup>Lusaka Home Service in English, 0525 GMT; and Dar es Salaam in Swahili and English, 1258 GMT, October 23, 1975, BBC, SWB, ME/5042/B/1-3. See also, ARB, EFT Series, 12 (1975), pp. 3673-3674; and Henry S. Hayward's report from Nairobi, Christian Science Monitor, October 1, 1975.

<sup>33</sup>Times of Zambia, July 15, 1976, in ARB, EFT Series, 13 (1976), p. 3962.

<sup>34</sup>China Yearbook 1961-1962 (Taipei, 1962), p. 262. According to Nationalist China statistics, there were 41,665 overseas Chinese residing in Africa in 1961 while the total number of overseas Chinese at the same time was 15,487,907 (ibid., p. 288). See also Population de Madagascar au 1 Janvier 1967 [Population of Madagascar as of January 1, 1967], National Institute of Statistics and Economic Research, (Tananarive, 1968), pp. 8, 15, 18, 20, quoted in "Evolution of Madagascar's Chinese Community," a translation of an article by Leon M.S. Slaweki, "The Origin and Growth of the Chinese Community in Madagascar," Tananarive, Bulletin de Madagascar, French, May, 1969, pp. 484-498, in JPRS, Translations on Africa, no. 113 (48409), no. 798, p. 66.

<sup>35</sup>Peking, NCNA, Radioteletype in English to Europe and Asia, 1240 GMT, June 25, 1960, Daily Report, no. 124 (June 27, 1960), pp. AAA 29-30. According to Cooley, p. 77, when Radio Peking began its broadcasts to Africa in 1956, one of its daily programs was in Cantonese beamed directly to Madagascar.

<sup>36</sup>As early as 1958 while campaigning for approval of the constitution of the French Fifth Republic, official publicists of the Social Democratic Party (PSD), Tsiranana's ruling party, reportedly told Madagascan peasants: "If you vote 'no' the French troops will leave and then the Chinese will come and seize your land." See "Foreign Policy Analyzed, Prospects Evaluated," a translation of an article by Anne-Marie Goguel, "Malagasy Diplomacy," Revue Francaise d'Etudes Politiques Africaines, Paris, June, 1972, pp. 78-103, in JPRS, Translations on Africa, no. 193 (56639), no. 1193, p. 24.

<sup>37</sup>For criticism of Chinese Communists by Tsiranana on various occasions, see "Peking Making Little Headway in Africa," in JPRS, Translations on Africa, no. 36 (33577), no. 310, p. 2. See also "Survey of Madagascar's Foreign Relations," article by Antoine Delcourt, in *ibid.*, no. 113 (48378), no. 797, p. 43; Goguel, p. 25; "Former President Tsiranana Interviewed," *ibid.*, no. 206 (58052), no. 1255, p. 11; BBC, SWB, ME/3843/B/10, 1970, ME/3656/B/6, 1971; and ARB, PSC Series, 8 (1971), p. 2265.

<sup>38</sup>Yang Feng-tai, "Ma-la-chia-hsi chuan-pien yu In-tu-yang ti an-chuan" [The change in Malagasy and the security of the Indian Ocean], Wen-ti yu yen-chiu, XII, 6 (March, 1973), p. 64.

<sup>39</sup>For full text of the communique, see Peking Review, 45 (November 10, 1972), p. 4. For Jen-min jih-pao's editorial on November 8, see Daily Report, no. 217 (November 8, 1972), pp. A 5-6.

<sup>40</sup>For the text of the open letters, see JPRS, Translations on Africa, no. 204 (57774), no. 1243, p. 27; and no. 206 (57873), no. 1247, pp. 33-34.

<sup>41</sup>"Clarification on Reported Exodus of 2,000 Chinese," excerpts of an unsigned article, in Madagascar Matin, French, Tananarive, March 5, 1973, p. 2, in *ibid.*, no. 211 (58594), no. 1287, p. 7.

<sup>42</sup>See Hendrik J. A. Reitsma, "South Africa and the Red Dragon: A Study in Perception," Africa Today, XXIII, 1 (January-March, 1976), p. 52; "China's Foreign Aid in 1972," p. 2; Rhodesia Herald, January 20, 1973; and Newsweek, December 3, 1973, p. 38. See also China and the Current Era of Detente, p. 138.

<sup>43</sup>ARB, EFT Series, 11 (1974), p. 3022.

<sup>44</sup>*Ibid.*, 12 (1975), p. 3600.

<sup>45</sup>The "Republic of Malagasy" was renamed the "Democratic Republic of Madagascar" on December 30, 1975, and Ratsiraka, who had become head of state in June, became the new republic's first president; see Keesing's Contemporary Archives, XXII (1976), pp. 27558, 37970. For the visit, see Reuters' report from Peking, June 11, 1976, in Chung-yang jih-pao, June 12, 1976, p. 1.

<sup>46</sup>ARB, EFT Series, 13 (1976), pp. 3984, 4010 and 4050.

<sup>47</sup>Cooley, p. 96.

<sup>48</sup>For Chinese text of the statement, see Wen-chien-chi (PRC), 6 (1959), pp. 519-520.

<sup>49</sup>Peking, NCNA, in English to Asia and Europe, 0149 GMT, February 6, 1963, Daily Report, no. 26 (February 6, 1963), p. BBB 11.

<sup>50</sup>Ibid., 0516 GMT, June 14, 1964, no. 119 (June 18, 1964), p. I 5.

<sup>51</sup>For messages sent to Banda by Chou En-lai and Chen I on July 4, see ibid., no. 130 (July 6, 1964), p. BBB 15.

<sup>52</sup>Peking, NCNA, International Service in English, 0848 GMT, July 6, 1964, ibid., p. BBB 16.

<sup>53</sup>Free China Weekly, NN-LXIV, 24 (June 16, 1964), p. 4.

<sup>54</sup>Uganda Argus reported on December 8, 1964, that Banda had said in London the day before that his country "had no choice but to recognize the People's Republic of China." See ARB, PSC Series, 1 (1964), p. 210.

<sup>55</sup>East African Standard (Nairobi), September 9, 1964; and Rhodesia Herald, September 12, 1964, both cited in ARB, ibid., pp. 148, 155. See also Cooley, pp. 97-98; and "Two Chinas in Africa," p. 391.

<sup>56</sup>Wilson, "Peking's African Image," p. 249. See also the 1965 controversy over an Albanian or possibly PRC-sponsored publication denouncing various African leaders, as discussed in Chapter VI under Kenya.

<sup>57</sup>"Attack on China," This is Malawi (a monthly published by Malawi's Department of Information), 2, 1 (January, 1966), p. 4.

<sup>58</sup>Blantyre Malawi Domestic Service in English, 1600 GMT, December 16, 1966, Daily Report, no. 244 (December 19, 1966), p. I 4. For criticism of Peking by Banda and Radio Blantyre on many other occasions, see Daily Report, nos. 178 (p. I 5), 180 (p. I 20), 181 (p. I 16), 184 (pp. I 5-7), 188 (p. I 11), 197 (pp. I 2-3), 198 (pp. I 6-7), 204 (p. I 13), 219 (p. I 5) in 1965; and nos. 38 (p. I 16), 48 (p. I 3), 149 (p. I 2) in 1966.

<sup>59</sup> Blantyre Malawi Domestic Service in English, 1600 GMT, December 3, 1965, ibid., no. 235 (December 7, 1965), pp. 1 3-4. See also ARB, EFT Series, 2 (1965), p. 412.

<sup>60</sup> See Rhodesia Herald, August 7, 1967; and Radio Blantyre, August 14, 1967, both cited in ARB, PSC Series, 4 (1967), p. 847.

<sup>61</sup> Sidney Klein, "The Cultural Revolution and China's Foreign Trade: A First Approximation," Current Scene, V, 19 (November 17, 1967), p. 9. See also Cooley, p. 123.

<sup>62</sup> Moscow Domestic Service in Russian, 1405 GMT, December 12, 1962, Daily Report, no. 242 (December 13, 1962), p. CC 21.

<sup>63</sup> Commentary entitled "When a Worm is Called a Dragon," in Moscow Domestic Service in Russian, 1630 GMT, December 24, 1966, ibid., no. 250 (December 28, 1966), pp. BB 1-2. See also no. 19 and 33 of 1967.

<sup>64</sup> Sing-tao jih-pao (Hong Kong), October 15, 1974, p. 6.

<sup>65</sup> Christian Roll, Macao's Uncertain Outlook," Swiss Review of World Affairs, XXV, 6 (September, 1975), p. 24.

<sup>66</sup> For a Nationalist Chinese View of this issue, see Chao Ting-chun, "Ts'ung chu-chueh shou-huei Ao-men k'an Chung-kung" [Communist China viewed from its refusal to retrieve Macao], Chung-yang jih-pao, March 22, 1977, p. 2.

<sup>67</sup> Lessing, p. 13; and Cooley, p. 126.

<sup>68</sup> For background and early development of the Angolan rebellion, see Thomas Okuma, Angola in Ferment: the Background and Prospects of Angola in Flames (New York, 1962); and Anders Ehnmark and Per Wastberg, Paul Britten-Austin, tr., Angola and Mozambique, the Case Against Portugal (New York, 1963); Prinsloo; Richard Gibson, African Liberation Movements: Contemporary Struggles Against White Minority Rule (New York and London, 1972); Chin Shen-pao, "Nan-pu Fei-chou ti tung-luan: Pu-shu An-go-la ti min-tsu chu-i yun-tung" [Turbulence in southern Africa: the nationalist movement in Portuguese Angola], Wen-ti yu yen-chiu, XI, 1 (October, 1971), pp. 63-64; John Marcum, "The Angola Rebellion: Status Report," Africa Report, 9, 2 (February, 1964), pp. 3-4, 6-7.

<sup>69</sup> Nigerian Morning Post, January 10, 1964, quoted in ARB, PSC Series, 1, no. 1 (1964), p. 12. See New York Times, February 5, 1964.

<sup>70</sup> Ogunsanwo, pp. 170-171.

<sup>71</sup> Prinsloo, p. 8; Chin Shen-pao, "Nan-pu Fei-chou ti tung-luan," p. 63; and Yang Feng-tai, "'Yu-chi ke-ming' wei-hsieh hsia ti nan-pu Fei-chou," p. 49 and "pu-shu Fei-chou wang ho-ch'u ch'u?" [Portuguese Africa--where is it going?], Wen-ti yu yen-chiu, XIII, 8 (May, 1974),

p. 67. Savimbi broke away from the FNLA because during his absence from Leopoldville in April Roberto admitted a dissident wing of the MPLA, led by Viriato da Cruz, into the FNLA. Savimbi had opposed admission of this group. See John A. Marcum, "Three Revolutions," Africa Report, 12, 8 (November, 1967), p. 10.

<sup>72</sup>Gibson, p. 233.

<sup>73</sup>Africa Contemporary Record (1974-1975), p. B530; cited by Prinsloo, p. 9.

<sup>74</sup>See Yu Ssu-chou, "An-go-la ti ch'ih-hua" [The communization of Angola], Chung-yang jih-pao, February 27, 1976, p. 1; Time, January 19, 1976, p. 23. According to Time, since early November, 1975, the Soviet Union supported MPLA with about three hundred Czechoslovak-made Tatra armored troop carriers, some seventy T-34 battle tanks, fifty PT-76 amphibious tanks and large quantities of SA-7 missiles, 122-mm. multiple-rocket launchers, wheel-mounted antitank recoilless guns, 3-in. mortars, heavy machine guns and AK-47 assault rifles, the largest export of Soviet military equipment in recent years to a foreign area outside the Middle East. It was reported that when the Angolan civil war ended in late February, 1976, Moscow had spent \$200 million on military equipment for MPLA, while U.S. support to the FNLA-UNITA amounted to only \$32 million, mostly channeled through Zaire.

<sup>75</sup>For PRC statements, JMJP and NCNA criticism of the Soviet intervention in Angola, see Hsin-hua-she (NCNA), Statements and Articles on Angola from "Hsinhua News" (West Berlin, 1975), items nos. 110437, 110613, 111033, 111249, 111343, 111530, 11227, 120721, 120833 and 121129. See also NCNA commentary on January 17, 1976, and JMJP editorial on January 21, 1976, cited in ARB, PSC Series, 13 (1976), pp. 3886, 3897. For PRC Foreign Ministry statement of November 15, 1975, on the Angolan situation, see Peking Review, 47 (November 21, 1975), p. 9.

<sup>76</sup>Copper, pp. 15, 17.

<sup>77</sup>See Mondlane's interview with Helen Kitchen, editor of African Report, "Conversation with Eduardo Mondlane," African Report, 12, 8 (November, 1967), p. 32.

<sup>78</sup>Prinsloo, p. 5. For detailed description of intra-faction rivalry and reorganization within the various Mozambican nationalist organizations, see Gibson, pp. 276-290; and Marcum, "Three Revolutions," pp. 18-20. See also Chin Shen-pao, "Mo-zam-bi-que ti min-tsu chu-i yun-tung" [The nationalist movement in Mozambique], Wen-ti yu yen-chiu, XI, 3 (December, 1971), pp. 58-60.

<sup>79</sup>Alan Hutchison, China's African Revolution, p. 230, quoted by Prinsloo, p. 5.

<sup>80</sup>See NCNA, September 29, 1966, quoted by Prinsloo, p. 5.

<sup>81</sup>See "Defector Murupa Discusses FRELIMO Problems," an interview with Murupa by Fernando Farinha of the Portuguese Noticia, Luanda, September 18, 1971, pp. 52-56, in JPRS, Translations on Africa, no. 171 (54311), no. 1075, p. 61. See also Prinsloo, p. 6.

<sup>82</sup>Gibson, pp. 282-283. The Portuguese accusation was also shared by some political observers in Africa. See "Communist Chinese Propaganda and Africa," p. 15. See also Wu Chao-hsiung, "Kung-fei tsai Fei-chou ti huo-tung (II)," p. 41.

<sup>83</sup>Prinsloo, p. 6. It was reported that the Chinese had set up at least seventeen camps in Tanzania for training Southern African guerrillas. See Wu Chao-hsiung, "Kung-fei tsai Fei-chou ti huo-tung (I)," p. 27.

<sup>84</sup>Peking, NCNA, International Service in English, 1736 GMT, September 10, 1971, Daily Report, no. 179 (September 15, 1971), p. A 12; Peking Review, 41 (October 8, 1971).

<sup>85</sup>Peking Review, 9 (February 28, 1975), p. 14.

<sup>86</sup>Peter Hess, "Mozambique en Route to Independence," Swiss Review of World Affairs, XXIV, 12 (March, 1975), pp. 20-21.

<sup>87</sup>BBC, SWB, June 13, 1975, ME/4928/ii. For congratulation message sent by Chou En-lai to Machel, see NCNA, June 26, 1975, cited in ARB, PSC Series, 12 (1975), pp. 3655-3656.

<sup>88</sup>ARB, EFT Series, 12 (1975), p. 3545; BBC, SWB, October 3, 1975, ME/5023/B/6 and November 19, 1975, ME/5065/B/8.

<sup>89</sup>Prinsloo, pp. 6-7.

<sup>90</sup>Central News Agency report, July 10, 1976, from Lisbon, quoted by Chung-yang jih-pao, July 18, 1976, p. 1; and Yang Feng-tai, "Peiping Mos-cow tsai nan-pu Fei-chou ti chueh-chu" [Contention between Peking and Moscow in Southern Africa], Wen-ti yu yen-chiu, XV, 12 (September, 1976), pp. 36-37.

<sup>91</sup>Copper, p. 17.

<sup>92</sup>K. Madhu Panikkar, Angola in Flames (New York, 1962), p. 100.

<sup>93</sup>For the full text of the PRC statement, see Peking, NCNA, International Service in English, 1333 GMT, November 14, 1965, Daily Report, no. 220 (November 15, 1965), pp. BBB 5-7. It was also published in Peking Review, 47 (November 19, 1965), pp. 10-11.

<sup>94</sup>Peking NCNA, International Service in English, 0220 GMT, November 14, 1965, Daily Report, no. 220, p. 8.

<sup>95</sup>Africa Report, 10, 4 (April, 1965), Fact Sheet, p. 48.

<sup>96</sup>Gibson, p. 174.

<sup>97</sup>Larkin, p. 188. See also Alan Rake, "Black Guerrillas in Rhodesia," Africa Report, 13, 9 (December, 1968), p. 25.

<sup>98</sup>Gibson, p. 164.

<sup>99</sup>See press communique of the Zambian High Commission in London, no. 49/1971, quoted by Gibson, p. 183.

<sup>100</sup>For a more detailed analysis, see Colin Legum, "The Soviet Union, China and the West in Southern Africa," Foreign Affairs, 54, 4 (July, 1976), pp. 745-762.

<sup>101</sup>Pauline Lewin, The Foreign Trade of Communist China: Its Impact on the Free World (New York, 1964), p. 70.

<sup>102</sup>Sunday Times, October 1, 1967, quoted in "Communist Chinese Propaganda and Africa," p. 26. See also Moscow in Mandarin to China, 1130 GMT, March 5, 1968, Daily Report, no. 47 (March 7, 1968), p. AA 15.

<sup>103</sup>See "Communist Chinese Propaganda and Africa," p. 26; and "Peking's Trade with Africa Politically Significant," translation of an article, "Communist China's Trade with Africa, Though Limited, Reflects China's Desire for a Political Presence," in Le Moniteur Africain, Dakar, May 21, 1970, p. 7, in JPRS, Translations on Africa, no. 137 (50919), no. 917, p. 3. See also Wu Chao-hsiung, "Kung-fei tsai Fei-chou ti huo-tung (II)," p. 40.

<sup>104</sup>"China and Africa," Africa Confidential (London), 15, 22 (November 8, 1974), p. 3.

<sup>105</sup>Moscow Radio Peace and Progress in Mandarin to China, 1430 GMT, February 7, 1970, Daily Report, no. 27 (February 9, 1970), p. A 7. According to Radio Peace and Progress, Peking bought Rhodesian chrome with gold, and that so long as Rhodesia had such trade partners as Peking she need not fear any economic sanctions. See *ibid.*, no. 68 (April 9, 1969), p. A 11.

<sup>106</sup>ARB, EFT Series, 7 (1970), p. 1787; and BBC, SWB, ME/3473/ii.

<sup>107</sup>For the Chinese text of Chi's letter, see Li-shih tsao-liu pu-k'o k'ang-chu (II) [Irresistible historical trend (II)], a collection of documents on the PRC delegation to the 26th session of the UN General Assembly (Peking, 1972), pp. 145-148.

<sup>108</sup>Peking, NCNA, International Service in English, 0030 GMT, March 3, 1972, Daily Report, no. 44 (March 3, 1972), p. I A 1. The article was also published in Peking Review, 10 (March 10, 1972), pp. 17-18.

<sup>109</sup>For the development of the ANC between 1912 and 1960, see Gibson, pp. 38-55.

<sup>110</sup>*Ibid.*, pp. 55-56.

<sup>111</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 56.

<sup>112</sup>Larkin, p. 187. According to Scalapino, a radical faction of ANC was reportedly under strong Peking influence. See his "Sino-Soviet Competition in Africa," Foreign Affairs, 42, 4 (July, 1964), p. 647. See also Legum, "Africa and China," p. 411. For detailed description of interrelations between the ANC-PAC power struggle and the Moscow-Peking conflict in South Africa, see Gibson, pp. 55-76, 84-105.

<sup>113</sup>Larkin, pp. 190-191, note 53.

<sup>114</sup>Gibson, pp. 97, 102; Wu Chao-hsiung, "Kung-fei tsai Fei-chou ti huo-tung (I)," pp. 27-28.

<sup>115</sup>The interview was published in Johannesburg Star, May 15, 1971, cited in ARB, PSC Series, 8 (1971), p. 2098. Vorster repeated the same remarks in Cape Town on May 31, 1971, in BBC, SWB, ME/3698/B/2. Vorster's statement was also quoted by a Nationalist Chinese newspaper, Chungkuo shih-pao [China times], June 2, 1971.

<sup>116</sup>Johannesburg Radio in English for Abroad, 0930 GMT, November 27, 1971, BBC, SWB, ME/3825/B/9.

<sup>117</sup>*Ibid.*, 0515 GMT, April 19, 1974, ME/4579/B/6.

<sup>118</sup>*Ibid.*, 1030 GMT, April 22, 1974, ME/4582/B/3. For a more recent accusation by Pretoria against Peking's involvement in terrorism in South Africa, see the ROC Central News Agency report from Johannesburg on July 20, 1977, in Chung-yang jih-pao, July 22, 1977, p. 1.

<sup>119</sup>"China and Africa," in Africa Confidential, p. 4. See also Reitsma, p. 66.

<sup>120</sup>Dr. H. Muller, South Africa's foreign minister, has reportedly said: "Viewed from the Angolan issue, Nationalist China's efforts in Africa in the past ten years and so has delayed Communist Chinese penetration into the continent for at least a decade." See Yu Ssu-chou, "Fei-chou kuo-chia yu wo chia-ch'iang kuan-hsi" [African countries strengthen their relations with the Republic of China], Chung-yang jih-pao, June 3, 1976, p. 1.

<sup>121</sup>See Sunday Times (Johannesburg), November 3, 1962; the New York Times, January 14, 1964; and Johannesburg Domestic Service in English, 1600 GMT, July 14, 1964, Daily Report, no. 137 (July 15, 1964), p. I 11. For the increasing trade volume between Peking and Pretoria during 1958-1963, see Jan S. Prybyla, "Pragmatic Marxism--Peking Style," Challenge, 15, 2 (November-December, 1966), p. 14.

<sup>122</sup> See Peking, NCNA, in English to Asia and Europe, 1250 GMT, July 15, 1963, Daily Report, no. 137 (July 16, 1963), p. BBB 10. For Chinese text of the statement, see Wen-chien chi (PRC), 10 (1963), p. 175.

<sup>123</sup> For statement made by the PRC embassy spokesman at Conakry, see Daily Report, no. 1 (January 2, 1964), p. BBB 19. For the statement by spokesman of the PRC ministry of foreign trade, see Peking Review, 36 (September 4, 1970), p. 31. The exact date of this statement was not stated.

<sup>124</sup> Except for five small enclaves ("plazas") on the Atlantic coast of Morocco, Spanish Sahara was the last Spanish colony in Africa. It was claimed by both Morocco and Mauritania, although the International Court of Justice ruled in 1975 (at the request of the United Nations General Assembly) that neither Morocco nor Mauritania had any historical claim to the territory. After an unarmed invasion by 350,000 Moroccans, Spain agreed on November 14, 1975, to abandon the Spanish Sahara to Morocco and Mauritania, who divided it between them on February 26, 1976. Algeria, however, supported an independence movement called the Polisario Front, whose Saharan Arab Democratic Republic was recognized by Algeria on March 6, causing Morocco and Mauritania to break relations with Algeria on March 7. Several Communist states and some leftist African states also recognized the Polisario government, but the OAU refused to recognize either the Polisario or its government. There was no indication that Peking recognized the new African country. See Keesing's Contemporary Archives, 22 (1976), p. 27747.

<sup>125</sup> Gibson, p. 116; Christoph Muhlemann, "Southwest Africa: A Race Against Time," Swiss Review of World Affairs, XXVI, 11 (February, 1977), p. 7.

<sup>126</sup> For the development of SWANU and SWAPU, see Gibson, pp. 120-140.

<sup>127</sup> Ibid., p. 126.

<sup>128</sup> Barbara L. Rogers, "Namibia: Freedom Demand is Spreading," Africa Report, 17, 2 (February, 1972), pp. 30-32; Legum, "The Soviet Union, China and the West in Southern Africa;" and Muhlemann, "Southwest Africa: A Race Against Time." All these authors cite SWAPU as the major Namibian liberation organization; none mention SWANU at all.

<sup>129</sup> Cooley, p. 90.

<sup>130</sup> For background on Bechuanaland's independence, see Richard P. Stevens, "The New Republic of Botswana," Africa Report, 11, 7 (October, 1966), pp. 15-19.

<sup>131</sup> Peking, NCNA, International Service in English, 1744 GMT, November 30, 1966, Daily Report, no. 232 (December 1, 1966), p. BBB 12.

- <sup>132</sup> Free China Weekly, VIII, 22 (July 21, 1968), p. 4.
- <sup>133</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>134</sup> Ibid., XI, 5 (September 22, 1968), p. 1.
- <sup>135</sup> Ibid., X, 7 (October 5, 1969), p. 1.
- <sup>136</sup> For detailed treatment, see "Botswana Between Black and White Africa," Swiss Review of World Affairs, XXII, 5 (August, 1972), pp. 20-22.
- <sup>137</sup> Ibid., p. 21; and Reitsma, p. 58.
- <sup>138</sup> Johannesburg in English for Abroad, 1600 GMT, March 25, 1974, BBC, SWB, ME/4561/B/7; see also ARB, PSC Series, 11 (1974), p. 3183.
- <sup>139</sup> See Wo yu Fei-chou ke-kuo kuan-hsi chien-chieh (ROC), p. 11.
- <sup>140</sup> See NCNA report of January 9, 1975, in ARB, PSC Series, 12 (1975), p. 3512.
- <sup>141</sup> Current Scene, XIV, 8 (August, 1976), p. 27; and 9 (September, 1976), p. 23.
- <sup>142</sup> For more detailed treatment, see Richard Weisfelder, "Power Struggle in Lesotho," Africa Report, 12, 1 (January, 1967), pp. 5-13.
- <sup>143</sup> Ibid., p. 10.
- <sup>144</sup> "Two Chinas in Africa," p. 391; Legum, "Africa and China," p. 412.
- <sup>145</sup> For the text of the statement, see Moscow Domestic Service in Russian, 2300 GMT, June 25, 1964, Daily Report, no. 127 (June 30, 1964), pp. 23-27. See also Legum, "Peking's Strategic Priorities," p. 21.
- <sup>146</sup> See Africa Report's interview of Lesotho Prime Minister Jonathan, in 20, 4 (July-August, 1975), p. 17.
- <sup>147</sup> Wo yu Fei-chou ke-kuo kuan-hsi chien-chieh (ROC), p. 5.
- <sup>148</sup> For more detailed description, see Christian Potholm, "Swaziland in Transition to Independence," Africa Report, 12, 6 (June, 1967), pp. 49-54.
- <sup>149</sup> For more detailed treatment of Transkei independence, see "Black-White Dialogue in South Africa?," Swiss Review of World Affairs, XX, 6 (September, 1970), pp. 12-14; and "Transkei," Africa Report, 21, 3 (May-June, 1976), pp. 2-10.
- <sup>150</sup> Reitsma, p. 60.

<sup>151</sup>Quoted by Tanzanian Daily News, on October 27 and 29, 1976, cited in ARB, PSC Series, 13 (1976), p. 4191.

<sup>152</sup>Chung-yang jih-pao, October 28, 1976, p. 1.

<sup>153</sup>See Keesing's Contemporary Archives, 24 (1978), pp. 28850-28851.

<sup>154</sup>The fourth Island, Mayotte, voteed overwhelmingly (99 percent) to remain French.

<sup>155</sup>See Facts on File Yearbook, XXXV (1975), p. 983 E 3.

<sup>156</sup>Current Scene, XIV, 6 (June, 1976), p. 27; and 7 (July, 1976), p. 23.

<sup>157</sup>Ibid., 10 (October, 1976), p. 31.

<sup>158</sup>Copper, pp. 15, 17.

## CHAPTER VIII

### ROC POLICY IN AFRICA

Like their cousins on the mainland, the people of Nationalist China had little contact with Africa before the 1960s. The ROC developed an African policy in response to two related phenomena--the mushrooming of independent African countries in 1960 and the PRC's intensified diplomatic offensive in Africa.

An invitation to attend Cameroon's independence ceremony on January, 1960, gave Taipei the opportunity to send its first official goodwill mission to Africa, led by Yang Chi-tseng, then ROC minister of economic affairs. Among the members of this delegation was Yang Hsi-k'un, later to become the chief architect of Taipei's African policy. After participating in the Cameroon independence ceremony, the delegation went on to visit Nigeria, Togo, Gabon, Guinea, Ivory Coast, Mali, Tunisia, Somalia, and Ethiopia.<sup>1</sup> Of the ten African countries visited by the ROC delegation, all but the last three were in West Africa, where Peking began its diplomatic offensive.

The ROC goodwill mission was sharply attacked by PRC propaganda. On February 8 Jen-min jih-pao published a lengthy observer's commentary denouncing the visit in the intemperate language and stock epithets that were to become familiar to Africans:

Recently, a so-called 'Chinese delegation' led by Yang Chi-tserg, a Chiang Kai-shek element, made a stealthy visit to a number of countries in West Africa, including Guinea, with which China [the PRC] has just formed diplomatic relations. The Chiang Kai-shek clique and its master, the United States, had a clear purpose in this. They know that, in the face of the growing friendship between the peoples of China and Africa, it would not be easy for them to achieve their purpose by taking open disruptive measures. That is the reason that they are trying to take advantage of the desire of the newly independent African countries for friendship with all countries and the fact that the Chiang Kai-shek clique still illegally occupies China's seat in the United Nations, to make the newly independent African countries form relations with the Chiang Kai-shek clique. By so doing, the Chiang Kai-shek clique and its master, the United States, want to create a situation of 'two Chinas' or prevent these newly independent African countries from establishing and maintaining normal relations with China and block the contacts and cooperation between the 650 million Chinese people and the 200 million African people.<sup>2</sup>

#### Goals

This article not only disclosed Peking's apprehensions about ROC diplomacy in Africa, but also showed that both Peking and Taipei realized that African votes would play a vital role in the "Chinese representation" controversy in the United Nations. In other words, one goal of the African policies of both Taipei and Peking was control of the Chinese seat in the United Nations: Taipei hoping to retain it, Peking hoping to acquire it.

Both governments also had economic goals in Africa. The newly independent countries of Africa, rather suddenly left on their own, were all underdeveloped and in urgent need of both aid and trade. Their rapidly growing population, estimated at about 273 million in Africa as a whole in 1960, about 352 million in 1970, appeared to offer a rich

market for outsiders, including both Chinas. Many also possessed resources that might supply import needs of the ROC and PRC.

Beyond these parallel interests in the United Nations and in trade, Taipei and Peking had very different goals in Africa, Taipei was concerned with acquainting Africans with the nature of Communism, especially in China. While this could help win African votes for Taipei in the United Nations, it was a goal not to be discarded even if the United Nations seat were lost. Unlike Peking, Taipei had no wish to lead the Africans to a particular ideology or political system, but only to warn them away from Communism, for reasons that were essentially altruistic. This basic, permanent goal and some of the ROC ideas for achieving it, were succinctly expressed on August 13, 1960, by Yang Hsi-k'un, then Director of the West Asian Department of the ROC Foreign Ministry:<sup>3</sup>

Politically, while nationalism is roaring over Africa and it [Africa] is very vulnerable to the penetration of Communists, we offer our most painful experience from the aggression of international Communists and our most valuable experience in fighting them. We want to tell [Africans] about our experience so that our African friends can escape what we have suffered. Economically, Taiwan in the past decade has advanced from a backward agricultural economy to an industrial society. Our achievements and experience provide a good example for the new African nations in their economic development. We would like to share this experience sincerely with African friends.<sup>4</sup>

#### Advantages and Disadvantages

Some considerations affecting the Peking-Taipei competition in Africa are implicit in comparisons of their size, as shown in Table XX. The PRC is about 266 times as large as the ROC (Taiwan), with fifty to sixty times as many people. The difference in natural resources is of

TABLE XX  
THE TWO CHINAS: AREA AND POPULATION

	Square Miles	Population	
		1960	1970
People's Republic of China	3,705,387	650,000,000	759,600,000
Republic of China (Taiwan Province)	13,893	10,947,000	14,753,911

similar magnitude. The PRC, ranking first in the world in population and second only to the Soviet Union in area, is of course much larger than any African nation, and has a population more than double that of the entire African continent. The ROC has a smaller area than all but ten African nations: Burundi, Cape Verde, Comoros, Djibouti, Equatorial Guinea, Gambia, Lesotho, Rwanda, Sao Tome e Principe, and Swaziland. ROC population is larger than that of every sub-Saharan African nation except Nigeria, Ethiopia, South Africa, and Zaire, but much smaller than that of any former colonial power (except Portugal), and extremely small by comparison with the PRC, the United States, or the Soviet Union.

Taipei's advantages in the African competition, included, first, its smallness. The ROC did not frighten Africans, or arouse suspicion or anxiety.<sup>5</sup> Second, by refraining from subversive activity, Taipei could claim that it had no imperialistic or expansionist intentions in Africa. Third, though both Peking and Taipei claimed great achievements in agrarian reform, Taipei was far ahead in modernizing

agriculture, thanks to financial and technical support given by the United States. Moreover, the ROC "land to the tiller" slogan was certainly more appealing to Africans than the PRC's collectivized state farms. Fourth, despite its basic principle of anti-Communism, Taipei never emphasized, as Peking did, any cold war ideological preference in its dealings with African countries. It was therefore possible for Taipei to base its African aid program totally on local needs and the economic condition of the recipients.<sup>6</sup>

Unfortunately, as later events proved, these four advantages were often offset by handicaps. First, smallness had adverse as well as favorable implications. It was difficult for the ROC to impress Africans, who were awed by the PRC's huge area and population.<sup>7</sup> Second, because of its limited manpower and resources, the ROC was unable to offer as much aid as the PRC could. Shortage of aid funds was one of the main reasons why many African countries which received aid from Taipei during the 1960s turned to Peking in the 1970s. Third, as a UN member, the ROC felt obliged to carry out its diplomatic activities through conventional methods, while the PRC was never hesitant to use unscrupulous and clandestine means whenever necessary.

#### Tactics

Seven major categories of PRC undertakings in Africa were listed in Chapter II: (1) negotiations for diplomatic recognition and establishment of diplomatic relations, (2) participation in multinational conferences, (3) negotiation of bilateral treaties and agreements, (4) information and propaganda, (5) exchange of visits, (6) student scholarships, and (7) covert activities. The ROC made

little or no use of covert methods in Africa, and only minimal use of propaganda. Nor did it participate in Afro-Asian conferences. Since these were dominated by countries hostile to Taipei, invitations went always to Peking. The other four tactics listed for Peking were used also by Taipei, but will be discussed here in somewhat different sequence.

### Establishing Diplomatic Relations

Although countries recognizing the ROC did not always vote for it in the United Nations, Taipei did of course make a substantial effort to win recognition from African countries, and was relatively successful in the 1960s in West, Central, and Southern Africa, as shown in Table XXI (see also Tables VI and VII, and Figure 2, in Chapter II). The peak came in 1969, when there were forty-two independent nations in Africa, of which twenty-two had diplomatic relations with Taipei, thirteen with Peking, and seven with neither. But after Gambia established relations with Taipei in November, 1968, and Senegal resumed relations in July, 1969, there were to be no more additions to the ROC list, only losses, as country after country in the 1970s turned to Peking instead. Details of these developments are presented in Chapter IX.

### Bilateral Agreements

Like Peking, Taipei also effectively used bilateral agreements in winning friends in Africa. Between 1957 and 1975, the ROC signed bilateral agreements with twenty-six African countries (see Table XXII). As in the case of the PRC, most of the agreements signed between the

TABLE XXI  
AFRICAN DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH THE ROC

Independent	Established Diplomatic Relations	West Africa	Central Africa	Southern Africa	North Africa	Dip. Rel. Ended
1910. 5.31	1931.	Liberia		South Africa		1977
1922. 2.28	1942. 5.19			Egypt		1956
1847. 7.26	1957. 8.19	Liberia				1977
1951.12.24	1959. 5.10				Libya	
1960. 1. 1	1960. 2.19	Cameroon				1971
1960. 4.27	1960. 4.27	Togo				1972
1960. 6.26	1960. 6.26			Madagascar		1972
1960. 6.30	1960. 8.10		Zaire			1972
1960. 8.15	1960. 9.10	Congo				1964
1960. 8.20	1960. 9.23	*Senegal				1971
1960.11.28	1960.11.28	Mauritania				1965
1960. 8.17	1960.12. 9	Gabon				1974
1960. 8. 5	1961.12.14	Upper Volta				1973
1960. 8.11	1962. 1.13		Chad			1972
1960. 8. 1	1962. 1.18	*Benin				1973
1960. 8.13	1962. 4.13		*CAR			1976
1962. 7. 1	1962. 7. 1		Rwanda			1971
1960. 8. 7	1963. 7.20	Ivory Coast				1971
1960. 8. 3	1963. 7.22		Niger			1974
1961. 4.27	1963. 9.28	Sierra Leone				1971
1964. 7. 6	1966. 7.11			Malawi		
1966.10. 4	1966.10.31			Lesotho		
1966. 9.30	1966.12.30			Botswana		1974
1968. 9. 6	1968. 9. 6			Swaziland		
1965. 2.18	1968.11.12	Gambia				1974

\*Senegal, Benin, and the CAR broke relations with the ROC during 1965-1968, 1964-1966, and 1964-1967, respectively, then resumed relations.

NOTE: No nation in East Africa ever established diplomatic relations with ROC.

Source: I-nan-piao (ROC).

TABLE XXII  
ROC AGREEMENTS WITH AFRICAN NATIONS

	Friendship Treaty	Cultural Agreement	Trade Agreement	Economic & Technical Agreements
<u>NORTH</u>				
Libya				1962
Morocco			1957	
Tunisia				1967
<u>WEST</u>				
Benin				1963
Cameroon		1962	1962	1962
Gabon				1963
Gambia				1966
Ghana				1968
Ivory Coast			1971	1962
Liberia	1937	1963		1965
Senegal				1963
Sierra Leone				1964
Togo				1964
Upper Volta			1971	1964
<u>CENTRAL</u>				
Central African Republic			1970	1964
Chad				1964
Niger			1970	1962
Rwanda				1963
Zaire				1964
<u>EAST</u>				
Ethiopia				1963
<u>SOUTHERN</u>				
Botswana				1968
Lesotho	1969			1968
Madagascar	1962		1963	1967
Malawi				1965
South Africa			1975*	
Swaziland				1969

\*Two agreements, one on maize, one on general trade.

Source: Tiao-yueh chi-pien (ROC), vols. 1-5.

ROC and African nations were economic and technical cooperation agreements (with twenty-four countries, including two [Ghana and Tunisia] which had no diplomatic relations with Taipei). Next came trade agreements (with eight countries, including Morocco, which then had relations with neither China but later recognized Peking).

A friendship treaty with Liberia had been signed much earlier (1937), but in the period of this study, the ROC signed friendship treaties with only two African countries--Lesotho and Madagascar, and cultural agreements with Cameroon and Liberia. Most of these ROC-African agreements were signed during a visit to Taiwan by the head of the African country or a government delegation. A few were signed by ROC ambassadors with the host African governments.

#### Visits To and From Taiwan

The architect of Taipei's "personal diplomacy" in Africa was Yang Hsi-k'un, later called "Mr. Africa" because of his wide knowledge of African affairs. Born in Kiangsu province in 1912, Yang studied at Chinese and American universities, including Columbia University. From 1948 to 1959 he represented the ROC in the UN Trusteeship Council, and visited Africa in 1952 and 1955 as a member of the UN Visiting Mission to West Africa Trust Territories. He was recalled at the end of 1959 to become director of West Asian Department of the ROC Foreign Ministry, which was then also in charge of African affairs. Before he returned home, Taipei appointed Yang a member of the 1960 goodwill mission to Cameroon's independence ceremonies. This was his first direct contact with African leaders. In 1964 Yang became Administrative Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs and concurrently Director of the Department of

African Affairs. In 1968 he was promoted to vice-minister in charge of political affairs (first vice-minister).

Taipei's "personal diplomacy" toward Africa concentrated on sending ROC government leaders and official delegations to African countries and inviting African leaders and delegations to visit Taiwan. From the first goodwill mission to Africa in early 1960, until mid-1971, eighty-seven ROC delegations consisting of 325 members visited Africa, approximately eight a year, and 881 invited Africans visited Taiwan.<sup>8</sup> Between 1962 and 1976 ten African heads of state or governments visited Taiwan, some more than once, as listed in Table XXIII. There were also visits to the ROC by the vice presidents of Togo, Liberia, and Botswana, and the queen of Lesotho. Sometimes Taipei also received visiting government officials or delegations from African countries which maintained diplomatic ties with Peking, such as Kenya.

Like Peking, Taipei attracted more delegations from Africa than it sent to Africa, and it did not reciprocate state visits. Neither President Chiang Kai-shek nor the successive prime ministers of the ROC ever visited Africa. There were, however, some ROC delegations at the Cabinet level. In July, 1963, five months before PRC Premier Chou En-lai's fifty-four day tour of ten African nations, ROC Foreign Minister Shen Chang-huan and four other officials made a six-week trip to sixteen African countries: Mauritania, Senegal, Upper Volta, Ivory Coast, Niger, Togo, Liberia, Benin, Chad, CAR, Cameroon, Gabon, Congo, Zaire, Rwanda, and Madagascar.<sup>9</sup> Of these, all except Ivory Coast and Niger had already established relations with Taipei, and during his visit, Shen signed joint communiques establishing relations with Ivory Coast and Niger.<sup>10</sup> With the addition of Sierra Leone later in the

After U.S. imperialism and its followers murdered Lumumba, smothered the Congolese independence, and swallowed the Congo, they clinked their glasses in 'congratulation' . . . How could they know that their 'throne' is built upon the volcano of the Congolese people's indignation? Blood debts must be paid back in blood. Now a people's armed struggle has broken out in the Congo. The unyielding people have arisen again . . . Although these patriots in the Kwilu Region, east of Leopoldville, are armed with nothing better than bows and arrows, spears, and machetes, yet they have dared to fight the puppet troops equipped and commanded by the U.S. imperialists and have expanded their area of operations. The colonialists can hardly conceal their fears. If a spark is kindled, who can tell that it will not start a prairie fire?<sup>17</sup>

Especially after the Congo (Brazzaville) government recognized Peking on February 22, 1964, Chinese weapons were smuggled through the Congo, presumably by Gbenye's committee, for use by Mulele's guerrillas in Kwilu. Although the Soviet Union still recognized the Leopoldville government and had not supported Mulele's revolt, there appears to have been some feeling in Brazzaville that the Russians might change their policy if not alienated by a rebel involvement with China. A Mulele document captured by Zairean central government forces attempted to explain to Gbenye's Brazzaville committee Mulele's reason for accepting PRC aid:

We have done everything to get our Russian comrades to help us, but they have never comprehended our difficulties. That is the reason Comrade Mulele left for China. China gave him a course to enter a military school. After having pursued the course, the Chinese friends gave him some material (arms and munitions and certain materials to make plastic bombs). We do not wish to offend our Russian friends, but we judge it best to address ourselves to China. It is because we do not have confidence in the Russians; China has aided Mulele.<sup>18</sup>

An Indian newspaper reported that Mulele had received 200 round-trip airplane tickets from the PRC for sending his cadres to China to

be trained.<sup>19</sup> In March, Zaire government released a document captured from Mulele's guerrillas, showing that Mulele not only received aid from Peking but based his "Jeunesse Movement" on the guerrilla ideology and tactics of Mao Tse-tung.<sup>20</sup> However, the revolt in the Kwilu region lasted only a few months and was crushed by forces of the central government. Mulele himself escaped to sanctuary in Brazzaville.

By early 1964, Gbenye and Soumialot had left Brazzaville to re-enter Zaire, launching attacks on government forces in northern Katanga and in Kivu province along the Burundi border. In May, the premier of Kivu province accused the PRC of leading the rebellion. Tshombe, who not only had made peace with the central government but became its prime minister in July, 1964, claimed that he had "absolute proof of Communist China's interference in the rebellion affecting the eastern Congo."<sup>21</sup>

On August 1, Tshombe displayed to all ambassadors accredited to Leopoldville captured documents and arms as proof of PRC support of the rebels. He said that he also had evidence that Peking had paid \$80,000 into the rebels' bank account in Brazzaville through the PRC embassy there.<sup>22</sup> In a note to UN Secretary-General U Thant on August 20, Tshombe complained that Peking was exploiting the situation to "maintain a permanent centre of subversion on Congolese soil." Accusing Peking of coordinating subversive activities in Zaire by sending supplies and men, Tshombe asked U Thant to assist in curbing the infiltration of Zaire by agents and rebels from Burundi and Congo (Brazzaville). However, U Thant took no action.<sup>23</sup>

Other rebels calling themselves "Simbas" (lions) captured

Stanleyville on August 5, 1964, and a month later Gbenye arrived in Stanleyville to proclaim creation of a "People's Republic of the Congo" with himself as prime minister, Soumialot as defense minister. This new Stanleyville government published its own newspaper, The Martyr, and the Gbenye regime was said to be "very favorably accepted by a large part of the population," and regarded in many African capitals as the "first purely African government to be installed in the Congo since the fall of Lumumba."<sup>24</sup>

Peking was encouraged by these developments, and though denying all the charges of Chinese aid to the rebels, appears to have supported Gbenye more actively than ever before.<sup>25</sup> On November 28, Mao himself made his first public statement about a specific African country.

Congolese people, you are not alone in your just struggle. All the Chinese people are with you. All people throughout the world who oppose imperialism are with you. U.S. imperialism and the reactionaries of all countries are paper tigers. The struggle of the Chinese people has proved this. The struggle of the Vietnamese people is proving it. The struggle of the Congolese people will surely prove this too. By strengthening national unity and persevering in protracted struggle, the Congolese people will certainly be victorious, and U.S. imperialism will certainly be defeated.<sup>26</sup>

However, PRC plans for helping Gbenye suffered a severe setback only two months later, when Burundi (for reasons discussed below) broke diplomatic relations with the PRC and expelled all Chinese on forty-eight hours' notice. Moreover, Gbenye's holding of 1,200 European and American hostages enabled the Zaire government to obtain outside help. Tshombe authorized Belgium and the United States to rescue the hostages. USAF planes airlifted Belgian paratroopers to Stanleyville on November 24. Aided by the Zaire national army, the

Belgians took Stanleyville on the same day and Gbenye's rebel government fell.<sup>27</sup> However, most of the rebel leaders--Gbenye, Soumialot, and General Nicolas Olenga--escaped to Sudan. Sporadic fighting between the rebels and government forces went on until May, 1965, when mercenaries captured the last rebel base of Buta, thus formally ending the revolt in eastern Zaire.<sup>28</sup>

#### Zaire Under Mobutu

This also effectively ended PRC hopes for a pro-Peking government in Zaire. President Kasavubu dismissed Prime Minister Tshombe in October, 1965, and was himself ousted on November 24 by the Zairean army commander, Joseph Mobutu (who renamed himself Mobutu Sese Seko in 1972). Peking made no attempt at reconciliation with the Leopoldville government, and instead charged that Mobutu was "one of the murderers of the Congolese national hero Patrice Lumumba, and . . . is a notorious running dog of the imperialists."<sup>29</sup> Remembering Peking's long support of Lumumba, Gizenga, Mulele, and Gbenye, the Mobutu government indeed proved to be strongly hostile to the PRC.<sup>30</sup> Even after U.S. President Nixon visited Peking in February, 1972, Zaire Radio Kinshasa declared:

The Zairean people cannot easily forget the flagrant interference by People's China in their internal affairs during the dark and tragic period of rebellion in their country. As long as the Chinese authorities fail to give every proof of a radical and absolute change of their attitude towards us, there will never be any question of our recognizing the People's Republic of China.<sup>31</sup>

Nine months later, the Zairean attitude changed. On November 19, 1972, Chiao Kuan-hua, the PRC's vice-foreign minister, and Inonga Loklngol'ome, the Zairean deputy commissioner of state for foreign

affairs, signed a joint communique in Paris, agreeing to "realize the normalization of relations between the two countries as from November 24, 1972, and to exchange diplomatic representatives at the ambassadorial level."<sup>32</sup>

Between January 10 and 20, 1973, Mobutu visited Peking at the PRC's invitation. He talked with Mao, and later said that Mao had admitted "with brutal frankness" that he had spent a lot of money and arms trying to overthrow the Zairean government.<sup>33</sup> During Mobutu's visit, the PRC and Zaire signed an economic and technical cooperation agreement and a trade agreement (January 14), under which Peking granted Kinshasa an interest-free loan of 5 billion Belgian francs (\$100 million) with an "unprecedented" moratorium period.<sup>34</sup> This was one of the largest loans received by any African country from Peking.

After Mobutu's visit, nineteen PRC experts in agriculture, horticulture, and agricultural mechanization arrived in Kinshasa in early April to establish experimental stations. By August, more than one hundred PRC agricultural experts were working in Zaire.<sup>35</sup> In early November, a delegation from the Chinese Mechanical Industry and Electrical Institute toured Zaire to study sites for an agricultural equipment assembly plant.<sup>36</sup> In late November, 1973, ten Chinese doctors, including two women, arrived to work in the hospital at Kibambu.<sup>37</sup> In April, 1974, agreements on cooperation in agriculture, maritime navigation, medicine, and banking were signed between Peking and Kinshasa, but no details of the agreements were announced.<sup>38</sup> An air transport agreement was signed in Peking on May 31.<sup>39</sup> Also in May, a second team of thirteen Chinese doctors arrived to work in Zaire.<sup>40</sup>

Kinshasa Radio reported in November, 1974, that the PRC would build a stadium with a capacity of more than 80,000 in Kinshasa.<sup>41</sup> In mid-December, Mobutu led a sixty-five member delegation to pay his visit to the PRC. It was announced in September, 1975, that the PRC would build a machine-tool factory and a sugar refinery in Zaire. Construction of the Chinese-aided People's Palace in Kinshasa began in November, 1975.<sup>42</sup> During 1976, Zaire received more medical aid from Peking.<sup>43</sup> Thus, within a short period of four years, Zaire, Peking's bitterest enemy in Central Africa, became a major recipient of PRC aid. Soviet support for renewed rebellions in the rich Shaba province (formerly Katanga) in 1977, and again in early 1978 (involving incursions by Zairean exiles from Soviet-dominated Angola) can be expected to strengthen Zaire's new ties with Peking.

#### Burundi and Rwanda

The small Belgian trust territory of Ruanda-Urundi on the eastern edge of Zaire had a unified Belgian administration but two hereditary African kings (mwami), one in the north, one in the south. Both areas had for centuries had a similar tribal division with an aristocratic ruling minority of Tutsis (also called Tussis, Batusis, Watusis, or Watutsis) of 10 percent to 15 percent, and a subservient peasant majority of Hutus (also called Bahutus) of 85 percent to 90 percent. The northern king, Mwami Kigeri V, was overthrown by a bloody Hutu revolt in 1959, and about half the Tutsi population fled into exile. A United Nations referendum on September 18, 1961, confirmed the abolition of the monarchy in the north, which became the independent Republic of Rwanda on July 1, 1962.

The southern king, Mwami Mwambutsa IV, was more popular and tribal relations were somewhat better in the south, which became the independent Kingdom of Burundi on July 1, 1962.<sup>44</sup> Since independence, the domestic politics of both Rwanda and Burundi have been dominated by tribal conflicts, and their foreign policies have been deeply affected by the same factor. The Hutu peasant republic of Rwanda banned Communism, recognized the ROC, and followed a pro-Western foreign policy. The autocratic Tutsi kingdom of Burundi accused Belgium of supporting the 1959 Hutu rebellion in Rwanda and encouraging Hutu rebellion in Burundi; it developed friendly relations with the PRC and other Communist countries. Both Rwanda and Burundi have been plagued since independence by continuing Hutu-Tutsi conflicts involving refugees or exiles, and approaching genocide.

Rwandan Tutsi refugees in Burundi became the sore spot in Rwanda-Burundi relations. Centered around their deposed king, the exiles organized guerrilla raiding forces called Inyenzi ("cockroaches," because they work at night) to invade Rwanda and attempt to restore the Tutsi monarchy there. As early as 1962, Rwanda accused Burundi of permitting and aiding Tutsi attacks across the border; Burundi Prime Minister Pierre Ngendandumwe strongly denied the charges.<sup>45</sup>

This turbulent situation in Rwanda and Burundi coincided with the various Lumumbist rebellions in Zaire, and attracted Peking's attention in its search for access to Zaire. Though professing to oppose aristocratic leisure classes such as the Tutsis and to favor the liberation of oppressed working classes such as the Hutus, Peking opportunistically elected to establish close relations not with the peasant

republic of Rwanda but with the autocratic kingdom of Burundi. The reason was simply that Peking had little interest in either country for itself, but needed one of them as an avenue for aid to rebels in Zaire. Both countries border on Zaire's Kivu province, from which men or supplies could be moved north to Stanleyville or south to Katanga, the main areas of rebellion in Zaire's long civil war. But Rwanda was anti-Communist, Burundi anti-Western, and it did not require much effort on the part of the Chinese to turn Burundi into Peking's base to support Zairean guerrillas.

In Burundi, as in Zaire, the United States and Belgium were the two major targets of Peking's propaganda. On July 10, 1962, nine days after Rwanda and Burundi became independent, Kao Liang, a NCNA correspondent and the leading figure in Peking's infiltration of central and east Africa, sent a dispatch from Dar-es-Salaam, Tanzania, accusing both the United States and Belgium of "again inciting the two peoples, Bahutu and Batutsi, and the two newly independent countries to fight each other."<sup>46</sup>

Although Burundi Prime Minister Andre Muhirwa said in July, 1962, that Burundi intended "to have relations with only one China, that is, the People's Republic of China," formal diplomatic relations were not established until the end of 1963.<sup>47</sup> The Burundi government actually invited both Peking and Taipei to its delayed independence ceremonies in late September, 1962. Ho Ying, then Peking's ambassador to Tanzania, journeyed to Bujumbura, capital of Burundi, for the ceremony but left on finding that an ROC representative was also there. Ho issued a statement charging a U.S. plot to create "two Chinas," but portraying the Burundi government as merely an innocent victim.<sup>48</sup>

In March, 1963, Burundi's Queen Therese Kanyonga visited Peking at the invitation of the PRC National Women's Federation and the Chinese People's Institute of Foreign Affairs. Flattered by the grandiose reception accorded her, the Queen said she would henceforward regard the Chinese as her own "cousins."<sup>49</sup> Immediately after the Queen's visit, NCNA sent Kao Liang from Dar-es-Salaam to Bujumbura to establish the first contacts with Burundi leaders. Through bribery and other unscrupulous methods, Kao Liang soon controlled some members of the Burundi government and of the Mwami's court.<sup>50</sup> Kao's efficient work led Burundi to establish diplomatic relations with Peking on December 21, 1963.

Peking's first ambassador, Liu Yu-feng, arrived in Bujumbura on June 1. With vast resources at his disposal, and an able and unscrupulous charge d'affaires, Chiang Yen, who as consul in Djarkarta had been once arrested by Indonesian authorities for subversive activities, Liu was able to find willing accomplices within Burundi. Within a few months, Burundi became one of the most important bases of Chinese infiltration in Africa. Despite Burundi's smallness and lack of Chinese residents, the PRC embassy staff quickly became extraordinarily large; the ambassador admitted expansion from eight to twenty, and the actual figure was reported to be forty-five. In Bujumbura, the Chinese also made close contacts with Gaston Soumialot, defense minister of the Gbenye rebel government in Zaire, whom they put up at PRC expense at a Bujumbura hotel, as well as with the deposed Tutsi king of Rwanda, Kigeri V.

In Burundi, the Chinese Communists were pursuing a two-fold objective: to support the Zaire guerrillas and to overthrow the

anti-Peking republican government in Rwanda by using thousands of Tutsi [Inyenzi] guerrillas living as refugees in Burundi. In order to facilitate the revolt in eastern Zaire, four training camps were set up in Burundi, at Rwigi, Musinga, Kirundo, and Murore, where Chinese instructors trained Zairean rebels, and provided them generously with money, arms and food supplies. PRC Charge d'Affaires Chiang Yen became in effect quartermaster general of the Gbenye forces.<sup>52</sup>

To train the Inyenzi guerrillas for action in Rwanda, the Chinese set up a training camp for 10,000 Tutsi refugees at Murore in Burundi. Chinese-trained Tutsis worked as instructors. Arms were shipped by Chinese ships to Dar-es-Salaam and transferred overland through Tanzania, Uganda, and Burundi for division between the Zairean and Inyenzi guerrillas.<sup>53</sup>

Everything went smoothly for the Chinese in Burundi until May, 1964, when a young Chinese embassy staff member in Bujumbura defected to the West. On May 26, Tung Chi-p'ing, a 24-year old assistant cultural attache who had arrived in Bujumbura the day before, took refuge in the U.S. Embassy, bringing with him a 72-page document on PRC activities in Africa. Tung's defection and his subsequent revelations created a considerable stir in black Africa, especially in Burundi. He presented concrete evidence of PRC bribery of corrupt African politicians, such as Malian Minister of Information Gologo, and PRC exploitation of African news media and propaganda agencies through bribery.<sup>54</sup>

Extremely embarrassed by Tung's defection, Peking avoided discussing his charges and simply claimed that he had been kidnapped by the U.S. Embassy.<sup>55</sup> Despite Tung's revelations, Chinese influence

continued to grow in Burundi, at the expense of both Belgians and Americans. In early January, 1965, a large quantity of buried Chinese arms and ammunitions were discovered in Bujumbura and Kitega.<sup>56</sup> These weapons were presumably to be distributed to Tutsi refugees from Rwanda and to followers of Burundi's pro-Peking Prime Minister Albin Nyamoya, a Tutsi. Fearing that militant Tutsis might provoke a Hutu uprising that could destroy the Burundi monarchy as the Rwandan monarchy had been overthrown in 1959, the Burundi king dismissed Nyamoya on January 11, and replaced him with the former conservative Prime Minister Pierre Ngendandumwe, a Hutu considered to be anti-Chinese. However, four days later, Ngendandumwe was assassinated by a Rwanda refugee, Gonzalve Muyenzi, who was an accountant at the American Embassy in Bujumbura but later admitted receiving money from PRC agents.

The Mwami immediately had most of the pro-Chinese leaders arrested, including former Prime Minister Nyamoya, and dissolved the pro-Peking "Workers' Federation" and the "Rwagasore National Youth."<sup>57</sup> On January 25 the Mwami appointed Joseph Bamina, a prominent Hutu leader, as prime minister. Four days later, the Burundi government suspended relations with Peking, encircled the PRC embassy with troops, and ordered all Chinese Embassy personnel to leave the country within two days.<sup>58</sup>

In a public address, Prime Minister Bamina explained his action:

[Chinese] interference in the internal politics of Burundi obliged the Government of Burundi to suspend diplomatic relations with the Chinese People's Republic. In fact, their support and their encouragement were always made in one direction only and risked compromising not only our feelings of unity

and esprit de corps between the Burundi [sic] themselves but also the relations between Burundi and neighboring countries.<sup>59</sup>

On January 30, the PRC Embassy delivered a note to Burundi Foreign Minister Marc Manirakiza protesting the unilateral suspension of diplomatic relations. Peking acceded to the Burundi demand that the entire staff of the Chinese Embassy be withdrawn from Burundi, but expressed hope that relations could be resumed in the future.<sup>60</sup> Next day, the PRC Foreign Ministry formally issued a statement criticizing the action of the Burundi government:

China has never interfered in the internal affairs of the Kingdom of Burundi . . . Evidently, the Burundi authorities have taken this action as a result of submission to the pressure of the U.S. and Belgian imperialists who have always been hostile to China-Burundi friendship and who have from the outset tried to undermine it by every conceivable means . . . The Chinese Government has every reason to ask the Burundi authorities to revoke their demand for the withdrawal of the Chinese Embassy in Burundi, because this demand is utterly groundless and unjustifiable, because it goes against the aspirations of the broad sections of the patriotic people in Burundi and against the elementary principles governing international relations. However, we have refrained from doing so, but followed a different course, that is, we have acceded to the demand of the Burundi authorities and will soon withdraw our Embassy . . . We believe that when we have followed this course, the Royal Government and people of Burundi will be able to discern more clearly who are their friends and who their foes. At any time when the Royal Government of Burundi wishes to have the relations between our two countries resumed, the Chinese Government will give it sympathetic consideration.<sup>61</sup>

On February 2, Jen-min jih-pao published an editorial charging that the United States and Belgium had sabotaged Sino-Burundi relations:

This is an extremely grave case of the Royal Government of Burundi unilaterally undermining the relations between the two countries . . . The activities of the

Chinese Embassy have always been correct, open and above board, and irreproachable . . . An AFP dispatch said on 30 January that the assassin had confessed that he was an 'accounting clerk' of the U.S. embassy and that he received a considerable sum after he had carried out the assassination . . . In engineering this political murder, U.S. imperialism evidently wants to sow discord among the nationalities in Burundi and to whip up an anti-China campaign. It is now clear enough for the whole world to see what sinister, malicious and despicable means U.S. imperialism is capable of employing . . . We firmly believe that the interests of China and Burundi are one, that the relations of friendship and cooperation between the two countries must eventually be restored and grow, and that the friendship between our two peoples decidedly cannot be undermined by any forces in the world. The conspiracy of the U.S. and Belgian imperialists is destined to go bankrupt.<sup>62</sup>

Chinese Ambassador Liu Yu-feng and his staff left Bujumbura by special plane on February 2, 1965, thus ending the first phase of Peking's active infiltration in this tiny central African country. For a while Taipei tried to fill the vacuum left by Peking. In late August, Yang Hsi-k'un, the ROC deputy Foreign Minister, visited Bujumbura during his routine annual African trip. Yang was received by the Mwami and gave him a message from ROC President Chiang Kai-shek. The Mwami and Yang agreed that closer and more regular contacts should be established between Bujumbura and Taipei.<sup>63</sup> However, these plans were soon aborted by another drastic change of the political situation in Burundi.

On the night of October 18-19, 1965, a group of Hutu gendarmes staged an unsuccessful coup against the Mwami. This led to a mass execution of Hutu army officers and political leaders, including former Prime Minister Bamina, who had resigned under pressure from the Mwami in September. A new tribal conflict was touched off, and Burundi plunged into political instability.

On July 8, 1966, the Burundi king was deposed by his nineteen-year old son, who was crowned Mwami Ntari V on September 1 but was himself deposed on November 29 by his Tutsi prime minister, Michel Micombero.<sup>64</sup> Meanwhile, a reconciliation between Burundi, Rwanda, and Zaire had been achieved at a conference in Kinshasa in late August. Burundi's Foreign Minister Pie Masumbuku announced at Kinshasa that Burundi would resume diplomatic relations with the Peking government and support its admission to the United Nations.<sup>65</sup> Since young Mwami Ntari V was said to oppose Micombero's policy of rapprochement with Peking, the king's ouster seemed to remove the only obstacle. But in fact, the new Republic of Burundi under Micombero did not restore diplomatic relations with Peking until five years after the 1966 announcement. The most likely reason is that early restoration of relations would have antagonized Mobutu of Zaire, and jeopardized the reconciliation between Zaire and Burundi.

By late 1971, however, majority support for Peking in the United Nations was emerging. Burundi had continued voting for Peking despite the 1965 rupture, and resumed diplomatic relations less than two weeks before the final United Nations vote. On October 13, 1971, the PRC and Burundi ambassadors to Tanzania, Chung Hsi-tung and Protais Mangona, signed a joint communique in Dar es Salaam restoring diplomatic relations between the two countries.<sup>66</sup>

In January, 1972, a Burundi delegation led by Artemon Simbanaiye, minister of foreign affairs, cooperation and planning, visited Peking and signed trade and economic and technical cooperation agreements.<sup>67</sup> Peking granted Burundi an interest-free loan of \$20 million to be disbursed between 1972 and 1976, repayable over ten years with a ten-year

moratorium period.<sup>68</sup> A Burundi trade delegation visited the PRC in October, 1973, but as of late 1976, there were no reports of projects undertaken under the PRC loan.<sup>69</sup>

Rwanda, which had been a major target of Peking's subversion in Burundi, was also ready to recognize the PRC by late 1971. Belgium established diplomatic relations with Peking on October 26, 1971, the day of the final United Nations vote on "China's representation." Rwanda had remained on good terms with Belgium, and the change in Belgian policy appears to have been the principal reason for a change in Rwanda's policy. The PRC ambassador to Tanzania Chung Hsi-tung, came to Kigali, capital of Rwanda, on November 4, 1971, and after eight days of negotiation, signed a joint communique with D. Gashonga, Rwanda's minister of coordination of economic, technical and financial affairs of the presidency, establishing diplomatic relations between Rwanda and the PRC.<sup>70</sup>

Under an economic and technical cooperation agreement signed on May 13, 1972, in Kigali, the PRC granted Rwanda an interest-free loan of \$22 million.<sup>71</sup> Between June 21 and 24, 1972, a Rwanda trade delegation visited Peking and signed a trade agreement with the PRC.<sup>72</sup> Chinese aid in rice cultivation and in constructing both a sugar refinery and a road linking Rwanda and Tanzania was promised on June 6, 1973; PRC technicians and road equipment arrived in Rwanda in December.<sup>73</sup>

Meanwhile, both Burundi and Rwanda were experiencing serious domestic disturbances. Micombero's execution of the former Burundi king on April 1, 1972, touched off a complex tribal war that proved to be even bloodier than the 1963 war in Rwanda. Hutu exiles returned to

Burundi from Rwanda and other nearby countries, and during 1972 and 1973 there were mass killings on both sides: more than 100,000 Hutus and "tens of thousands" of Tutsis in Burundi were slaughtered, in something approaching mutual genocide. Although Peking's earlier exploitation of Tutsi-Hutu animosities in both Burundi and Rwanda was at least partly responsible for the later carnage, the PRC has not been charged with direct involvement in the 1972-1973 fighting.<sup>74</sup> Military coups overthrew the Rwanda government on July 5, 1973, and the Burundi government on November 1, 1976, but both countries have maintained relations with Peking.

#### Central African Republic (CAR)

Like former Belgian Zaire and Rwanda, the three former French colonies in Central Africa--the CAR, Chad, and Niger--all recognized Taipei soon after they achieved independence, and only the CAR broke with Taipei before 1972. The French colony of Oubangui-Chari (Ubangi-Shari) became the independent Central African Republic on August 13, 1960. Both Peking and Taipei quickly granted recognition to the CAR, but only the ROC was invited to the independence ceremony.<sup>75</sup> However, formal diplomatic relations with Taipei were not established until April 13, 1962.

Landlocked and with few natural resources, the CAR did not offer much attraction for foreign capital investment. Except for French aid and a small amount from the United States, the poor country could not find much outside help. The deteriorating economic situation made the CAR receptive to Peking's diplomatic advances. On hearing from the PRC ambassador in Congo (Brazzaville), Chou

Chiu-yeh, that Peking might be willing to mitigate the CAR's transport and communication problems, CAR President David Dacko sent a three-man friendship mission, led by Ferdinand Bassamoungou, president of the Economic and Social Council, to Peking in August, 1964.

Bassamoungou and Tseng Yung-chuan, PRC Vice Foreign Minister, agreed on August 27 to establish diplomatic relations between the two countries, but withheld formal announcement until a PRC good will mission led by Vice Minister of Foreign Trade Lu Hsu-chang visited Bangui, the CAR capital, in September.<sup>76</sup> There Lu and President Dacko also signed agreements on trade, cultural cooperation, and economic and technical cooperation.<sup>77</sup>

On October 3, 1964, the Chinese Communist Party newspaper Jen-min jih-pao's editorial on these events seemed less interested in the CAR itself than in the impending ouster of ROC diplomats from the CAR.<sup>78</sup> The CAR Foreign Ministry officially notified the ROC charge d'affaires in Bangui on October 7 that as of September 29, the CAR had recognized the PRC as the sole legal government representing all the Chinese people.<sup>79</sup> The ROC government announced on November 5 that it had severed diplomatic relations with the CAR and withdrawn its embassy and a handicraft demonstration team.<sup>80</sup>

In mid-1965, Meng Ying, the first PRC ambassador to Bangui, signed an agreement under which the PRC made a small long-term interest-free loan of 1,000 million francs CFA (\$4 million) to the CAR, half in cash and half in industrial equipment.<sup>81</sup> President Dacko evidently had misgivings about Peking's intentions. He told a visiting PRC parliamentary mission in April, 1965, that it would be as impossible to transport CAR ideology to China as it would be

to try to apply Chinese politics in the CAR.<sup>82</sup>

This remark had a strange parallel in Chinese Communist Party history, which can hardly have been forgotten by Dacko's 1965 audience. Forty-two years before, Soviet representative Adolf Joffe had signed a joint manifesto with China's Sun Yat-sen, agreeing that conditions in China made it impossible to extend Communism or the Soviet system to China.<sup>83</sup> This Soviet effort to allay Chinese apprehensions in 1923 was not echoed by the Chinese Communists dealing with the CAR in 1965. Instead, PRC Vice Foreign Minister Chi Peng-fei visited Bangui in June, and attempted to persuade CAR leaders to join with Peking in opposing the participation of the USSR and Zaire in the Peking-sponsored second Bandung Conference scheduled to meet in Algiers. Such action would have involved the CAR in the bitter Sino-Soviet dispute, and the CAR rejected Peking's request.<sup>84</sup>

In the early morning of New Year's Day, 1966, President Dacko was overthrown by a military coup led by his cousin, Colonel Jean-Bedel Bokassa, chief of staff of the CAR Army. Five days later, Bokassa announced that diplomatic relations with Peking had been severed following discovery on January 5 of a cache of Chinese weapons and documents indicating that pro-Chinese elements in the CAR had intended, with Peking's aid, to overthrow the Dacko government. Bokassa asserted that his own coup had saved Dacko's life because "sooner or later he would have been eliminated by the pro-Chinese extremists."<sup>85</sup> Bokassa ordered the Chinese Embassy staff to leave the CAR within forty-eight hours; by January 8, thirty-one Chinese, including diplomats, technical experts, and NCNA correspondents had left Bangui.<sup>86</sup>

A PRC government statement charged the Bokassa government with an "unreasonable act . . . [that] runs counter to the desire of the entire people of its country."<sup>87</sup> As expected, the ROC government welcomed this move taken by Bokassa. Chung-yang jih-pao [Central daily news], the organ of the ROC ruling Kuomintang party, in a January 8 editorial, interpreted the recent moves by Benin and the CAR to break relations with the Peking regime as signs of an anti-Communist trend in Africa because "far-sighted African statesmen have gradually realized the the objective of what Chou [En-lai] called 'unconditional aid' is to seize their countries."<sup>88</sup>

Although ROC Vice Foreign Minister Yang Hsi-k'un paid a goodwill visit to the CAR in August, 1966, diplomatic relations between the ROC and CAR were not formally restored until May, 1968. President Bokassa visited Taipei in October, 1970, and the CAR received ROC agricultural aid. Bangui's relations with Taipei were rather unstable, but continued until August 20, 1976, when the CAR again established relations with Peking, the last country in Central Africa to do so.

#### Chad

Even the short-lived success of PRC overtures to the CAR in 1964-1965 was not repeated in the other former French colonies of Central Africa, Chad and Niger. Both these countries were quickly recognized by both Peking and Taipei, but both chose to establish relations with Taipei. Chad became independent on August 11, 1960, one week after Niger, and established diplomatic relations with the ROC on January 13, 1962.<sup>89</sup> Taipei's aid program in Africa was necessarily

smaller than Peking's, but Chad received technical and agricultural aid, and a \$3 million loan, from the ROC.<sup>90</sup> Despite reports that Peking once supported the Chad National Union, a violent revolutionary group opposed to N'Garta Tombalbaye's pro-French government, Chad was too isolated to be reached from the main centers of PRC subversive activities in west and central Africa. Peking made little effort to compete in Chad until after the Cultural Revolution.

When a cholera epidemic broke out in Chad in June, 1971, the PRC donated 200,000 doses of vaccine.<sup>91</sup> Like a similar 1973 donation of measles vaccine to Upper Volta (mentioned in Chapter IV), this humanitarian gesture helped to soften Chad's policy toward Peking. Later the same month, when the eighth conference of African heads of state met in Addis Ababa, the PRC Ambassador to Ethiopia, Yu Pei-wen, had a long talk with Chad's President Tombalbaye. Nevertheless, in the final 1971 United Nations vote on the China issue, Chad still voted against Peking's admission, and did not recognize Peking until November 28, 1972. President Tombalbaye said his government had decided to establish diplomatic relations with Peking "because we could not ignore a people [sic] with more than 800 million inhabitants."<sup>92</sup>

A Chad delegation led by Abdoulaye Djonouma, minister of territorial development and housing, visited Peking and signed trade and economic and technical cooperation agreements on September 20, 1973; the PRC granted Chad a loan of \$50 million for rural development.<sup>93</sup> In May, 1974, a group of PRC experts completed a preliminary study on construction of a bridge over the Chari River for the Chadian government.<sup>94</sup> In late July, the PRC Red Cross donated pharmaceutical

supplies to Chad, including another 200,000 doses of anti-cholera vaccine.<sup>95</sup> As of late 1976, Chad was still on Peking's aid list.

### Niger

The former French colony of Niger had reasons of its own for hostility to Peking. In 1959, the autonomous government of Niger under President Hamani Diori had outlawed the antigovernment Sawaba party led by Diori's arch-rival Djibo Bakary. Bakary fled the country, and tried to organize support in nearby Ghana (which established relations with Peking in July, 1960) and in Mali (which opened relations with Peking in October, 1960). At the April, 1960, second AAPSO conference in Guinea (which had recognized Peking in 1959), PRC representatives made contact with Bakary of Niger, and reportedly gave him more than \$1 million for use in overthrowing the Diori government.<sup>96</sup>

When Niger became independent on August 3, 1960, both Peking and Taipei quickly recognized the new nation, but Niger invited only Taipei to send representatives to the independence ceremony.<sup>97</sup> Diplomatic relations with Taipei were not established until July 22, 1963, but Peking's ties with Bakary made it certain that Diori would not recognize Peking. PRC support of Bakary was intensified in 1961 and 1962, when a small group of his adherents received military training at Nanking, China, according to the testimony of one of its commanders when captured in 1964.<sup>98</sup> Later PRC training of Niger rebels was carried out in the camps in Ghana mentioned in Chapter IV. Although Bakary's force was estimated at only 150, he ordered a series of unsuccessful attacks in Niger in September, 1964. Early in 1965, there

was an unsuccessful attempt to assassinate President Diori, and testimony given by captured rebels and the failed assassin indicate substantial PRC involvement in both the revolt and the assassination attempt.<sup>99</sup>

Diori told a press conference in Abidjan, Ivory Coast, on February 3, 1965, that "the attack by commandos of the opposition Sawaba party was organized, financed, and led by Communist China and the weapons used were bought with Chinese money deposited in banks at Brussels, Geneva, and Accra."<sup>100</sup> It was therefore not surprising that France's recognition of Peking in 1964 did not impress Niger. Diori told a Niamey newspaper in August, 1965, that Peking was infiltrating Africa through economic penetration and subversion, including nine subversive attacks on Niger:

You will easily understand that after being so attacked we are not prepared to establish relations with the PRC. We have expressed to the French Government how embarrassing and distressing its recognition of the PRC Government is for countries like ours, which are exposed to Chinese Government subversion.<sup>101</sup>

In an address to the nation on October 11, 1965, following his re-election, President Diori reaffirmed that while Niger would improve its relations with certain countries of the Eastern bloc, it could not establish relations with the PRC, "which gives ideological and military training to nationals of other countries, and assists them financially to create subversion in their countries."<sup>102</sup> This was almost as adamant as a similar statement a month earlier by Ivory Coast President Houphouet-Boigny (see Chapter IV).

Niger became one of the principal recipients of ROC agricultural aid in Africa. Diori visited Taipei in 1969 to attend the October 10

national day celebrations, and ROC Vice Foreign Ministry Yang Hsi-k'un visited Niger several times during his annual African tours. Good relations with Taipei continued until Diori was overthrown by a military coup on April 15, 1974, two and a half years after Peking was admitted to the United Nations.

A delegation led by Major Sani Sound Sido, vice-president of Niger's supreme military council, visited the PRC and, in a joint communique on July 20, the two countries agreed to establish diplomatic relations.<sup>103</sup> An economic and technical cooperation agreement, signed the same day, granted Niger an interest-free loan of 12 billion CFA francs (about \$52.6 million), to finance cement works, a sugar agro-industrial complex, a fruit plant, and a farm implement factory.<sup>104</sup> In 1975, the PRC agreed to send a medical team to work in Niger.<sup>105</sup> During 1976, Niger was still receiving aid from Peking.

# FOOTNOTES

<sup>1</sup>Quoted in Free China Weekly, I, 24 (August 9, 1964), p. 3. Tung Chi-p'ing arrived in the capital of Burundi on May 25, 1964, as PRC assistant cultural attache, and sought asylum in the U.S. embassy there one day later. The statement quoted here (from an August, 1964, press conference in New York) was amplified in an article by Tung Chi-p'ing as told to Quentin Reynolds, "Red China," Look, 28, 24 (December 1, 1964), p. 21: "Before I was sent to Burundi, I had been thoroughly briefed on the progress being made there and the plans for the future. Again and again, my superiors repeated Mao Tse-tung's statement: 'When we capture the Congo, we can proceed to capture the whole of Africa. Burundi is the stepping-stone for reaching the Congo.'" Tung later published an autobiography, The Thought Revolution (New York, 1966).

<sup>2</sup>Larkin, p. 47.

<sup>3</sup>Ibid., p. 48.

<sup>4</sup>ROC Foreign Ministry, African Department, comp. Fei-chou, tu-li kuo-chia i-nan-piao [Table of independent African countries], hereafter referred to as I-nan-piao (ROC) (Taipei, 1974); also Kuan-hsi chien-chieh, p. 11. Both of these official sources state that Taipei established diplomatic relations with Leopoldville on August 10, 1960. Larkin, p. 180, citing "Africa and the two Chinas: A Summary of Known Facts," Africa Report, 10, 1 (January, 1965), back cover, says that "the Congo did not set up relations with the Republic of China until December, 1960." Shen Chin-ting, Kang-ho pao-feng-yu hui-i [A recollection of the tempest over the Congo River] (Taipei, 1969), provides detailed background of the establishment of relations between Leopoldville and Taipei.

<sup>5</sup>Peking, NCNA in Chinese Hellschreiber to the press, July 12, 1960, 1140 GMT, in Daily Report, no. 135 (July 13, 1960), pp. AAA 20-21; Peking Review, no. 30 (July 26, 1960), p. 10.

<sup>6</sup>Paris radio, French Home Service, September 6, 1960, 2252 GMT, and Brazzaville radio, September 7, 1960, 0645 GMT, in Daily Report, no. 174 (September 7, 1960), pp. I 2-3.

<sup>7</sup>Brussels radio, Belgian Home Service in French, September 7th, 1960, 1830 GMT, in ibid., no. 175 (September 8, 1960), pp. I 2-3.

<sup>8</sup>Larkin, p. 181.

<sup>9</sup>Wen-chien-chi (PRC), 8 (1961), p. 139; Peking Review, 7 (February 19, 1961), p. 10. Lumumba was kept in custody by central government forces until January 17, 1961, when he was put on a plane and sent to Tshombe's headquarters in Elisabethville. There he was killed on February 12, in circumstances that remain mysterious. One version is that he was killed by a Belgian mercenary in Tshombe's presence.

<sup>10</sup>For the text of the statement, see Peking Review, 7 (February 19, 1961), p. 10; the official Chinese text is in Wen-chien-chi (PRC), 8 (1961), p. 139.

<sup>11</sup>Peking Review, 7 (February 19, 1961), pp. 11-13.

<sup>12</sup>Wen-chien-chi (PRC), 8 (1961), pp. 141-142.

<sup>13</sup>Survey of China Mainland Press (hereafter referred to as SCMP), no. 2478, p. 29, no. 2554, p. 25.

<sup>14</sup>"China and the World," Peking Review, 38 (September 22, 1961), p. 22.

<sup>15</sup>According to Hevi, p. 98, Mulele's presence in China was "announced" by the PRC ambassador in Egypt, Chen Chia-kang. Hevi was in China himself at this time, and meeting Gizenga's ambassador to Peking in 1961.

<sup>16</sup>Keessing's Contemporary Archives, 14 (1963-1964), p. 20218; Cooley, p. 108.

<sup>17</sup>Jen min jih pao (hereafter cited as JMJP) commentary, "Flames Can Never be Put Out," January 28, 1964.

<sup>18</sup>The African Mail (Lusaka), January 10, 1964, cited by Legum, "Africa and China," p. 407.

<sup>19</sup>Hindustan Times (New Delhi) report of December 29, 1963, cited by Cooley, p. 108.

<sup>20</sup>The document was in French. For English translation, see Cooley, appendix F, "The Congo in Arms: An Order of the Day of Pierre Mulele." See also Legum, "Africa and China," p. 407.

<sup>21</sup>Bukavu Congo Domestic Service in French, 1745 GMT, May 18th, 1964, in Daily Report, no. 98 (May 19, 1964), p. I 3, and Brazzaville French Controlled Overseas Service in French, 2030 GMT, July 27, 1964, in *ibid.*, no. 147 (July 29, 1964), pp. I 3-4.

<sup>22</sup>Free China Weekly, I, 24 (August 9, 1964), p. 3.

<sup>23</sup>Keessing's Contemporary Archives, 14 (1963-1964), p. 20423A.

<sup>24</sup>Max Clos, "The Chinese Role in the Congo: Fact or Fiction?," African Report, 10, 1 (January, 1965), p. 18.

<sup>25</sup>Peking Review, 36 (September 4, 1964), pp. 10, 31.

<sup>26</sup>In Support of the People of the Congo (Leopoldville) Against U.S. Aggression (Peking, 1965), pp. 2-3.

<sup>27</sup>Leopoldville Domestic Service in French at 1130 and 1630 GMT, November 24, 1964, in Daily Report, no. 230 (November 25, 1964), pp. I 102.

<sup>28</sup>See "Africa: 1960-1970," Bulletin of the Africa Institute of South Africa, VIII, 1 (January-February, 1970), p. 24.

<sup>29</sup>Peking, NCNA, International Service in English, 2027 GMT, November 25, 1965, Daily Report, 230, (November 25, 1964), p. BBB 1.

<sup>30</sup>Gizenga had been in prison in Leopoldville since 1962, as noted previously. Two days after Mobutu seized power in 1965, he released Gizenga, who left Zaire and reportedly went to Moscow in March, 1966. Mulele returned to Zaire in October, 1968, apparently expecting amnesty, but Mobutu ordered his arrest and trial; he was executed by a firing squad on October 9. See Nationalist (Tanzania), October 10, 1968; and Radio Kinshasa, October 10, 1968, in ARB, PSC Series, 5 (1968), p. 1211.

<sup>31</sup>Kinshasa Home Service in French, 1130 GMT, February 23, 1972, BBC, SWB, ME/3924/B/1.

<sup>32</sup>Peking Review, no. 48 (December 1, 1972), p. 4; and Le Monde, November 28, 1972, in ARB, PSC Series, 9 (1972), p. 2677.

<sup>33</sup>West Africa, February 5, 1973, in ARB, EFT Series, 10 (1973), p. 2636.

<sup>34</sup>Chin-chi tao-pao, nos. 1351-1352 (January 1, 1974), p. 12; West Africa, February 5, 1973, in ARB, EFT Series, 10 (1973), p. 2636; and "Effects of Mobutu's China Trip Discussed," translated excerpts from an unsigned article in the French-language Special, Brussels, February 7, 1973, p. 32, in JPRS, Translations on Africa, no. 211 (58438), no. 1277, p. 35. See also Fogarty, p. 732.

<sup>35</sup>Kinshasa in French, 1830 GMT, April 6, 1973, BBC, SWB, ME/4267/B/8; MTM, August 10, 1973, in ARB, EFT Series, 10 (1973), p. 2829.

<sup>36</sup>Kinshasa in French, 1130 GMT, November 5, 1973, BBC, SWB, ME/4446/B/6.

<sup>37</sup>Kinshasa Home Service in French, 1130 GMT, September 22, 1973, BBC, SWB, ME/4407/B/5.

- <sup>38</sup>MTM, April 19, 1974, in ARB, EFT Series, 11 (1974), p. 3118.
- <sup>39</sup>Kinshasa in French, 1130 GMT, June 1, 1974, BBC, SWB, ME/4616/B/8; and Chin-chi tao-pao, nos. 1401-1402 (January 1, 1975), p. 20.
- <sup>40</sup>Kinshasa in French, 1130 GMT, May 28, 1974, BBC, SWB, ME/4613/B/8.
- <sup>41</sup>Kinshasa in French, 1180 GMT, November 12, 1974, BBC, SWB, ME/4756/B/5.
- <sup>42</sup>See MTM, October 3, 1975, and News Agencies report on January 8, 1976, in ARB, EFT Series, 12 (1975), pp. 3666, 3755. See also AZAP in French, 1225 GMT, November 21, 1975, BBC, SWB, ME/5067/B/6.
- <sup>43</sup>Copper, p. 17.
- <sup>44</sup>For more detailed description, see Aaron Segal, "Rwanda: the Underlying Causes," Africa Report, 9, 4 (April, 1964), pp. 3-6; "Burundi at Close Range," by "Special Correspondent," *ibid.*, 10, 3 (March, 1965), pp. 19-22, 24.
- <sup>45</sup>Nairobi Kenya Domestic Service in English, 1600 GMT, February 5, 1964, in Daily Report, no. 26 (February 6, 1964), p. I 1.
- <sup>46</sup>NCNA in English to Europe and Asia, 1802 GMT, July 10, 1962, *ibid.*, no. 134 (July 11, 1962), pp. BBB 10-11.
- <sup>47</sup>See Peking, NCNA in English to Europe and Asia, 0527 GMT, July 14, 1962, in Daily Report, no. 138 (July 17, 1962), p. I 5.
- <sup>48</sup>Peking, NCNA in English to Asia and Europe, 1810 GMT, October 2, 1962, Daily Report, no. 194 (October 4th, 1962), pp. BBB 14-15.
- <sup>49</sup>Peking, NCNA, in English to Asia and Europe, 1240 GMT, March 20, 1963, *ibid.*, no. 56 (March 21, 1963), p. BBB 5; "Peking Checked in Burundi," translation of the article by Nicholas Lang in France-Eurafrigue, XVII, 161, Paris (April, 1965), pp. 11-14, in JPRS, Translations on Africa, no. 25 (30040), no. 198, p. 30.
- <sup>50</sup>Lang, "Peking Checked in Burundi," p. 30; Cooley, p. 111.
- <sup>51</sup>Lang, "Peking Checked in Burundi," p. 30.
- <sup>52</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 31; Keesing's Contemporary Archives, 15 (1965-1966), p. 20576B. For Radio Leopoldville commentary, see Leopoldville Congo Domestic Service in French, 1830 GMT, August 5, 1964, in Daily Report, no. 153 (August 6, 1964), pp. I 1-2. Burundi Prime Minister Albin Nyamoya denied charges that Burundi helped the Soumialot troops. See Bujumbura Burundi Domestic Service in French, 1800 GMT, August 13, 1964, in Daily Report, no. 159 (August 14, 1964), p. I 9.

<sup>53</sup>Cooley, p. 111.

<sup>54</sup>See Tung's testimony before a U.S. Senate subcommittee on August 20, 1964, 88th Congress, 2nd Session; also statement made by him to the press in New York on August 4, Free China Weekly, I, 24 (August 9, 1965), p. 3. See also footnote 1 above.

<sup>55</sup>Peking, NCNA, International Service in English, 0516 GMT, June 11, 1964, in Daily Report, no. 114 (June 11, 1964), p. BBB 13; JMJP editorial, "Strongly Protest Against U.S. Gansterism of Kidnapping Chinese Embassy Official," Peking, NCNA, Domestic Service in Chinese, 0248 GMT, August 2, 1964, in *ibid.*, no. 150 (August 3, 1964), p. BBB 10.

<sup>56</sup>Lang, "Peking Checked in Burundi," p. 33. According to a report by Bulletin of the Africa Institute of South Africa, "thirty tons of Chinese weapons were found buried in Bujumbura and several hundred tons of weapons were uncovered in Kileg (Kitega?), a former capital;" see "Two Chinas in Africa," p. 388.

<sup>57</sup>Kampala Uganda Domestic Service in English, 1700 GMT, January 20, 1965, in Daily Report, no. 13 (January 21, 1965), p. I 1; Lang, "Peking Checked in Burundi," p. 34; and Ismael, p. 517.

<sup>58</sup>Peking, NCNA International Service in English, 1924 GMT, January 30, 1965, in Daily Report, no. 20 (February 1, 1965), p. BBB 1; Keesing's Contemporary Archives, 15 (1965-1966), p. 20576B.

<sup>59</sup>Bujumbura Burundi Domestic Service in French, 1800 GMT, February 12, 1965, in Daily Report, no. 30 (February 15, 1965), p. I 1.

<sup>60</sup>Peking, NCNA International Service in English, 2248 GMT, January 30, 1965, in Daily Report, *ibid.*

<sup>61</sup>For the full text of the note, see Peking, NCNA International Service in English, 1230 GMT, January 31, 1965, in *ibid.*, pp. BBB 2-3; Peking Review, no. 6 (February 5, 1965), p. 10.

<sup>62</sup>JMJP editorial of February 2, 1965, "U.S. and Belgian Imperialist Scheme is Doomed to Bankruptcy," Peking, NCNA International Service in English, 0212 GMT, February 2, 1965, in Daily Report, no. 21 (February 2, 1965), pp. BBB 1-3.

<sup>63</sup>Bujumbura Burundi Domestic Service in French, 1800 GMT, August 27, 1965, in Daily Report, no. 167 (August 30, 1965), p. I 1.

<sup>64</sup>Keesing's Contemporary Archives, 15 (1965-1966), p. 21622A.

<sup>65</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 21786A; see also Brussels Domestic Service in French, 0800 GMT, November 29, 1966, in Daily Report, no. 230 (November 29, 1966), p. I 1.

<sup>66</sup> Peking, NCNA, International Service in English, 1203 GMT, October 14, 1971, Daily Report, no. 200 (October, 1971), p. I A 1. For text of the joint communique, see Peking Review, 43 (October 22, 1971), p. 4; for official Chinese text, see Jen-min jih-pao, October 15, 1971, reprinted in Shih-shih hsueh-hsi [Study on current affairs], 4 (October, 1971), p. 29.

<sup>67</sup> Peking, NCNA, International Service in English, 1500 GMT, January 6, 1972, Daily Report, no. 5 (January 7, 1972), pp. I A 10-11. See also Chin-chi tao-pao, nos. 1301-1302 (January 1, 1973), pp. 16, 20.

<sup>68</sup> See News Agencies report on March 10, 1972, in ARB, EFT Series 9 (1972), p. 2313; "China's Foreign Aid in 1972," p. 2; and Bartke, Agreements of the PRC, p. 21.

<sup>69</sup> Chin-chi tao-pao, nos. 1351-1352 (January 1, 1974), p. 19.

<sup>70</sup> Wu Chao-hsiung, "Kung-fei tsai Fei-chou ti huo-tung--Part (I)" [Communist Chinese activities in Africa (I)], Fei-ch'ing yueh-pao, XV, 3 (May, 1972), p. 29. For English text of the joint communique, see Peking Review, 47 (November 19, 1971), p. 4; for official Chinese text, see Tiao-yueh-chi (PRC), 18 (1971), pp. 15-16.

<sup>71</sup> See Chin-chi tao-pao, nos. 1301-1302 (January 1, 1973), p. 16; "China's Foreign Aid in 1972," p. 2.

<sup>72</sup> Chin-chi tao-pao, nos. 1301-1302 (January 1, 1973), pp. 7, 16, 21.

<sup>73</sup> See NCNA in English, 1652 GMT, June 8, 1973, in BBC, SWB, ME/4318/B/5; Kigali in Swahili, 1445 GMT, December 18, 1973, in BBC, SWB, ME/4481/B/7.

<sup>74</sup> For related reports, see Keesing's Contemporary Archives, 18 (1971-1972), pp. 25323-25324; 19 (1973), pp. 25814, 25910, 26003, 26059-26060; 20 (1974), p. 26644. See also Africa Report, 17, no. 5 (May, 1972), p. 9; no. 6 (June, 1972), pp. 8-9; 18, no. 3 (May-June, 1973), pp. 10-11; and "Burundi's Tutsi Fall Out," *ibid.*, 19, no. 3 (May-June, 1974), pp. 4-5.

<sup>75</sup> For messages sent by PRC premier Chou En-lai and Foreign Minister Chen I to Central African Prime Minister David Dacko, see Peking, NCNA Radioteletype in English to Europe and Asia, 1200 and 1203 GMT, August 12, 1960, in Daily Report, no. 159 (August 16, 1960), p. AAA 21. For messages sent by ROC President Chiang Kai-shek and Foreign Minister Shen Chang-huan, see Chung-fei kuan-shi ti chan-wang (ROC), p. 75.

<sup>76</sup> Peking, NCNA International Service in English, 1503 GMT, October 2, 1964, in Daily Report, no. 194 (October 5, 1964), pp. BBB 8-9.

<sup>77</sup>For the Chinese text of the agreements, see Tiao-yueh-chi (PRC), 13 (1964), pp. 260-267, 383-385.

<sup>78</sup>Peking, NCNA, International Service in English, 1812 GMT, October 3, 1964, in Daily Report, no. 194 (October 5, 1964), p. BBB 10.

<sup>79</sup>Peking, NCNA, International Service in English, 1503 GMT, October 9, 1964, in Daily Report, no. 200 (October 13, 1964), p. BBB 12; Radio Bangui, October 8, cited in ARB, PSC Series, 1 (1964), no. 10, p. 175.

<sup>80</sup>See I-nan-piao (ROC), Free China Weekly, II, 11 (November 8, 1964), p. 4.

<sup>81</sup>See Bangui La So, January 16, 1965, cited in ARB, EFT Series, II (1965), no. 1, p. 241; also Africa Report, 10, 3 (March, 1965), p. 34; and Cooley, p. 183.

<sup>82</sup>Africa Report, 10, 5 (May, 1965), p. 30.

<sup>83</sup>Sun-Joffe joint manifesto of January 26, 1923, complete text in Conrad Brandt, Benjamin I. Schwartz, and John K. Fairbank, ed., A Documentary History of Chinese Communism (London, 1952), pp. 70-71.

<sup>84</sup>Africa Report, 8 (August, 1965), p. 24.

<sup>85</sup>See Togo Presse, January 7, 1966, cited in ARB, PSC Series, 3 (1966), no. 1, p. 454; Dakar Domestic Service in French, 2355 GMT, January 21, 1966, in Daily Report, no. 16 (January 24, 1966), p. I 1. See also Henri Donra, pp. 54-55.

<sup>86</sup>Cotonou Dahomey Domestic Service in French, 1900 GMT, January 8, 1966, in Daily Report, no. 6 (January 10, 1966), p. I 3; Free China Weekly, IV, 21 (January 16, 1966), p. 1.

<sup>87</sup>NCNA, January 7, 1966, cited in ARB, PSC Series, 3 (1966), no. 1, p. 454.

<sup>88</sup>Chung-yang jih-pao, January 8, 1966, cited in Free China Weekly, IV, 21 (January 16, 1966), p. 3.

<sup>89</sup>For messages from ROC President Chiang and Foreign Minister Shen to Chad's Prime Minister Francois Tombalbaye, see Chung-fei kuan-hsi ti chan-wang (ROC), p. 74. For messages sent by the PRC's Chou En-lai and Chen I to Tombalbaye, see Peking, NCNA, Radioteletype in English to Europe and Asia, 1227 and 1229 GMT, August 10, 1960, in Daily Report, no. 156 (August 11, 1960), pp. AAA 12-13.

<sup>90</sup>Free China Weekly, III, 19 (July 4, 1965), p. 1; Chung-fei kuan-hsi ti chan-wang (ROC), p. 57.

<sup>91</sup>Wu Chao-hsiung, "Kung-fei tsai fei-chou ti huo-tung (II)," p. 42.

<sup>92</sup>Peking Review, 49 (December 8, 1972), p. 3. See also Radio Fort Lamy, November 28, in ARB, PSC Series, 9 (1972), p. 2676; and "Tombalbaye Discusses Chad's Economy and Foreign Policy with Press," translation of the summary of a Radio Fort Lamy report in French, 1430 GMT, December 5, 1972, in JPRS, Translations on Africa, no. 204 (57830), no. 1246, pp. 5-6.

<sup>93</sup>Chin-chi tao-pao, nos. 1351-1352 (January 1, 1974), p. 13; Fogarty, p. 732; "Increase in Chinese Aid to Black Africa Noted," p. 3. However, another source indicated the amount of the loan was 13 billion CFA francs (about \$64 million); see News Agencies report, on November 8, 1973, in ARB, EFT Series, 10 (1973), p. 2909.

<sup>94</sup>Njamena in French 1230 GMT, May 11, 1974, in BBC, SWB, ME/4600/B/5.

<sup>95</sup>See BBC, SWB, ME/4661/ii.

<sup>96</sup>Pellissier, p. 2.

<sup>97</sup>For messages sent by the PRC's Chou En-lai and Chen I, see Peking, NCNA, Radioteletype in English to Europe and Asia, 1210 and 1213 GMT, August 2, 1960, in Daily Report, no. 150 (August 3, 1960), p. AAA 21. For messages between Diiori and ROC President Chiang Kai-shek, see Chung-fei kuan-hsi ti chan-wang, pp. 67-68.

<sup>98</sup>According to captured guerrilla commander Abubakr Dandouna's testimony in October, 1964, his thirty-man force had been trained in Nanking between 1961 and 1962. See Cooley, p. 180; and Niamey Niger Domestic Service in French, 1845 GMT, October 20, 1964, in Daily Report, no. 207 (October 20, 1964), p. I 7.

<sup>99</sup>"Communist Chinese Propaganda and Africa," p. 9; Africa Report, 9, 11 (December, 1964), pp. 23-24; Free China Weekly, III, 9 (April 25, 1965), p. 4.

<sup>100</sup>Africa Report, 10, 3 (March, 1965), p. 38; see also Free China Weekly, II, 24 (February 7, 1965), p. 2.

<sup>101</sup>Niamey Niger Domestic Service in French, 1845 GMT, August 4, 1965, in Daily Report, no. 150 (August 5, 1965), p. I 12.

<sup>102</sup>Radio Niamey, October 11, 1965, cited in ARB, PSC Series, 2 (1965), no. 10, p. 388.

<sup>103</sup>Peking Review, 30 (July 26, 1974), pp. 3-4. The Niger government had decided on July 16 to recognize Peking; see Niamey in French, 0600 GMT, July 17, 1974, BBC, SWB, ME/4655/B/12.

<sup>104</sup> Chin-chi tao-pao, nos. 1401-1402 (January 1, 1975), p. 20; Niamey in French, 0600 GMT, November 26, 1974, in BBC, SWB, ME/4767/B/8; and "Increase in Chinese Aid to Black Africa Noted," p. 3.

<sup>105</sup> See MTM, September 12, 1975, in ARB, EFT Series, 12 (1975), p. 3633.

## CHAPTER VI

### THE PRC AND EAST AFRICA

Though Peking began its African diplomatic offensive from the west coast, it was in East Africa, comprising Sudan, Somalia, Tanzania, Uganda, Kenya, and Ethiopia, that Peking achieved the most remarkable results. This Chinese success can be explained in several ways. First, the PRC was attractive to East African elites as a developmental model. The transformation of China under Communist rule from a poor and backward country to a self-sufficient one, potentially a superpower, within a short span of time had been generally admired by such West African leaders as Guinea's Toure, Ghana's Nkrumah, and Mali's Keita. But it was in East Africa that the Chinese model was taken most seriously as one worth imitating.

Second, Peking's early experience in West Africa and lessons learned in Central Africa made the PRC more adroit and discreet in dealing with East African leaders.<sup>1</sup> Third, the British colonies in East Africa gained independence later than those in West Africa, and later than the French colonies in West and Central Africa. This fact, together with a Soviet decision to give most of its aid to Egypt, gave Peking more opportunity to establish pre-independence contacts with East African leaders and to claim that it was helping them more than the USSR, although Peking's involvement in the actual drive for independence was minimal.<sup>2</sup>

A striking measure of Peking's success in East Africa is that this is the only African region where no country ever recognized Taipei. Five of its six principal countries recognized Peking soon after achieving independence. Only Ethiopia, whose independence pre-dated the existence of the PRC, delayed establishing relations with Peking until after the Cultural Revolution. The newest and smallest country of East Africa, Djibouti, did not gain independence until 1977; since no report of official contact with Peking has yet appeared, Djibouti is not discussed here. PRC relations with the other East African countries are discussed in order of their establishing diplomatic relations with Peking, as shown in Table XVII. The horizontal line of dashes separates the periods before and after the Cultural Revolution. Since no East African country broke relations with the PRC, the final column in Tables XV and XVI has no counterpart here.

#### Sudan

After half a century under joint British-Egyptian rule, Sudan attained independence on New Year's Day, 1956. Although ruled by Arabs and therefore more closely tied to the Middle East than to black Africa, Sudan is included here because its blacks (comprising 35 percent of the total Sudanese population) are the majority in southern Sudan, and racial discord between southern blacks and northern Arabs has been a major factor in Sudan's internal politics.

Peking recognized the Sudan promptly in early 1956, but the Sudan did not reciprocate until three years later, after a military coup brought General Ibrahim Abboud to power. The Sudan granted



Figure 5. Map of East Africa

TABLE XVII  
EAST AFRICA AND THE TWO CHINAS

<u>Independence</u>		<u>Diplomatic Relations with PRC</u>			<u>Diplomatic Relations With ROC</u>
<u>Date</u>	<u>Order</u>	<u>Order</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Country</u>	
1956.1.1	2	1	1958.12.1	Sudan	never
1960.7.1	3	2	1960.12.16	Somalia	never
1961.12.14	4	3	1961.12.9	Tanzania	never
1962.10.9	5	4	1962.10.18	Uganda	never
1963.12.12	6	5	1963.12.14	Kenya	never
*1941.5.5	1	6	1970.11.24	Ethiopia	never
1977.6.27	7	?		Djibouti	never

\*Date of the return of Emperor Haile Selassie to the Ethiopian capital, on the fifth anniversary of its fall to Italian forces who were ousted by the British in 1941.

recognition to Peking on November 30, 1958, two weeks after the coup, and diplomatic relations were formally established on December 1, 1958.<sup>3</sup> Trade relations between the PRC and the Sudan had existed since 1956, and the volume increased significantly after 1959. By 1964 Peking was the sixth largest purchaser of Sudanese cotton, after West Germany, India, Great Britain, Italy and Japan.<sup>4</sup>

After establishment of relations, the Sudan consistently advocated the PRC's admission into the United Nations.<sup>5</sup> Chou En-lai visited Khartoum on his 1963-1964 tour of ten African countries and the Sudanese President Abboud paid a reciprocal visit to the PRC from May 16 to 20, 1964. But no friendship treaty or aid agreement was signed, and the joint communique by Abboud and Liu Shao-ch'i, chairman of the PRC, contained nothing but platitudes.<sup>6</sup> The reason for this is that the Sudan had economic ties with the Western powers and growing ties with the Soviet Union. Abboud had visited Moscow in July, 1961, and received an "open credit" of 20 million roubles (8 million pounds), to be repaid in twelve years at 2½ percent interest.<sup>7</sup> Leonid I. Brezhnev, then President of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, paid a return visit to the Sudan in November, and signed an agreement for Soviet economic and technical assistance to the Sudan on numerous industrial projects, as well as a three-year trade agreement. On several important international issues, such as peaceful coexistence and disarmament, the Sudan regarded Moscow's attitude as more reasonable than Peking's hard-line position.<sup>8</sup>

The PRC's position with Sudan improved after General Gaafar Nimeri came to power through a military coup in May, 1969. A Sudan-

PRC trade protocol was signed in Khartoum on May 21, 1970.<sup>9</sup> A Sudanese Friendship Delegation led by Nimeri arrived in Peking in early August, signed economic, technical, educational, and cultural cooperation agreements, and Peking granted Khartoum an interest-free loan of \$42 million to finance a fertilizer plant, textile, sugar, and paper factories, road projects, and a radio station.<sup>10</sup> In June, 1971, the PRC also agreed to finance and build a 1000-km road from Mendi to Gedarif.<sup>11</sup>

Between July 19 and 22, 1971, an anti-Nimeri coup backed by Moscow failed and many of those involved, including Abdel Khalik Mahgoub, secretary-general of the Sudan Communist Party, and several other members of the party's central committee, were executed by Nimeri's military government. The abortive coup led to an open break between the Sudan and the Soviet Union and further strengthened Sudan-PRC relations.<sup>12</sup> In early August, the Sudanese vice-president and defense minister Major-General Khalid Hassan Abbas and two other ministers visited Peking "to strengthen relations between Sudan and the PRC," though no details were announced.<sup>13</sup> Another economic and technical cooperation agreement signed on August 24, 1971, provided Sudan a \$40 million loan for constructing bridges, roads, a textile factory, and an international conference hall.<sup>14</sup>

In December, 1971, Abbas led another delegation to the PRC, and it was reported in mid-April that a military agreement was signed under which the Sudanese armed forces would "benefit from the expertise of the Chinese People's Liberation Army in various fields of training."<sup>15</sup> On May 25, Chinese-made weapons, including fighter-bombers and tanks, appeared for the first time in the military parade

held in Khartoum to mark the anniversary of the 1969 coup.<sup>16</sup> Meanwhile, in March, 1972, PRC engineers and technicians arrived in Sudan and began work on the Medni-Gedarif road.

On March 6, 1973, President Nimeri himself laid the foundation stone for a 507-meter bridge over the Blue Nile which was to be built by 400 Chinese technicians. It was also reported that three more bridges were planned.<sup>17</sup> Between 1970 and 1974 Sudan received loans of \$82 million from Peking, constituting 4.4 percent of Peking's total commitment to Africa between 1959 and 1974.<sup>18</sup> During 1976, Sudan remained one of the major recipients of PRC aid in Africa.<sup>19</sup>

#### Somalia

The Democratic Republic of Somalia came into being on July 1, 1960, by merger of the former British Somaliland and former Italian Somalia. Both Peking and Taipei recognized the new republic upon its independence.<sup>20</sup>

Taipei had contacts with Italian Somalia before its independence. In mid-February, 1960, a ROC goodwill mission led by Yang Hsi-k'un visited Mogadishu, the capital of Italian Somalia. In May, Haji Farah Omar, the Somali Minister of Industry and Commerce, led a four-man delegation which paid a return visit to Taipei and attended the inauguration of President Chiang Kai-shek.<sup>21</sup> Taipei sent a special delegation led by Yu Chun-chi, ROC Ambassador to Italy, to Mogadishu to attend the Somali independence celebrations on July 1. President Chiang also cabled a congratulatory message to the new Somalian President Aden Abdullah Osman. All signs indicated that Mogadishu would establish diplomatic relations with Taipei.

However, for unknown reasons, diplomatic relations with Taipei never materialized. Instead, Mogadishu established relations with Peking on December 16, 1960.<sup>22</sup> In June, 1961, Peking appointed Chang Yueh, one of its top Arabic and Islamic experts, as first PRC ambassador to Somalia.

With the largest and most ornate embassy in Mogadishu and a staff of nearly forty, Chang Yueh began his business in Somalia efficiently. The embassy staff toured the country and established close relations with Somali politicians (including opposition leaders) through cash payments, sometimes into secret accounts in Swiss banks.<sup>23</sup> Of the 400 scholarships given by Communist China to Africans in 1962, half went to Somalia. In January, 1963, during a visit to Somalia by a Chinese cultural and goodwill delegation, a cultural cooperation agreement was signed.<sup>24</sup>

In May, 1963, a Somalian delegation led by Minister of Information Ali Mohamed Hirave arrived in Peking and negotiated economic, technical, trade, and payments agreements. The PRC was to export to Somalia textiles, metal products, machinery, tea, and other items, in exchange for oil seeds, cereals, frankincense, myrrh, skins, and minerals from Somalia.<sup>25</sup>

When Somali Prime Minister Shermarke visited the PRC in August, 1963, according to a NCNA report, "more than 400,000 Peking people, braving heavy rain, lined the main thoroughfare to give [him] a tremendous welcome."<sup>26</sup> Shermarke met with Mao and Liu Shao-ch'i, and obtained an interest-free loan of \$22 million.<sup>27</sup> In February, 1964, Premier Chou En-lai, during his visit to Somalia, the last stop on

TABLE XXIII  
AFRICAN STATE VISITS TO THE ROC

Year	Nation	Head of State or Government Visiting ROC	
		Presidents	Prime Ministers
1962	Madagascar	Philibert Tsiranana	
1963	Benin	Hubert Maga	
1965	Madagascar	*Philibert Tsiranana	
1966	Lesotho		Leabua Jonathan
1967	Malawi	Hastings Banda	
1968	Gambia		Dawda Kairaba Jawara
1969	Niger	Hamani Diori	
1969	Sierra Leone		Siaka Stevens
1969	Lesotho		*Leabua Jonathan
1970	CAR	Jean-Bedel Bokassa	
1971	Zaire	Mobutu Sese	
1972	Gambia	*Dawda Kairaba Jawara	
1976	Lesotho		*Leabua Jonathan
1976	Swaziland		Maphevu Diamini

Sources: Daily Report (1962-1972); Free China Weekly (1964-1972); Africa Research Bulletin, PSC Series (1964-1976).

\*Repeat visit

year, nineteen of the thirty-three independent nations of Africa had diplomatic relations with Taipei, only ten with Peking; four (Burundi, Ethiopia, Nigeria, Tunisia) recognized neither China.

Between March and July, 1964, Minister of Economic Affairs Yang Chi-tseng, who had visited Cameroon in January, 1960, led another delegation to fourteen African nations: Cameroon, Zaire, Gabon, Togo, Libya, Benin, Ivory Coast, Niger, Upper Volta, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Senegal, Rwanda, and Madagascar.<sup>11</sup> After meeting with eleven presidents or heads of government and three vice-presidents, Yang returned home to report that seven ROC agricultural missions then working in Africa were "winning an immense number of friends for free China in the emerging [African] nations."<sup>12</sup>

The most recent tour to Africa to high-ranking ROC political leaders was made in October, 1976, by Vice-Premier Hsu Ching-chung, who visited Lesotho, Swaziland, and South Africa.<sup>13</sup> But of all the ROC officials who visited Africa, no one spent more time there or covered more of the continent than "Mr. Africa," Yang Hsi-k'un. After he became director of the ROC West Asian Department in 1959, he made an annual tour to Africa part of his routine duty. Sometimes he made two trips to Africa in one year. Since his first contact with the continent in 1952 as a member of the UN Trusteeship Council, by 1977 he had visited Africa more than thirty times, most recently in August, 1977.<sup>14</sup>

Yang spent most of his diplomatic career of over three decades in dealing with African affairs. No other Chinese diplomat, from Taipei or Peking, had greater influence on various African political leaders than he once did because of his personal friendships with them. Referring to his friendship with Yang, a president of Togo once said:

"when I met him, I was fairly unknown."<sup>15</sup> Under Yang's guidance, "personal diplomacy" strengthened by agricultural and technical aid helped the ROC achieve considerable success in its counter-offensive against PRC penetration of Africa during the 1960s. However, Taipei's effort in exchanging cultural missions with Africa was negligible. During the 1960s, the ROC sent to Africa only one cultural mission of any consequence. A forty-member Chinese Goodwill and Cultural Mission made a hundred-day tour of fifteen African countries in 1964: Chad, CAR, Libya, Cameroon, Benin, Togo, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Upper Volta, Nigeria, Niger, Gabon, Ivory Coast, Madagascar, and Mauritania.<sup>16</sup> Traveling 70,000 miles, this mission gave fifty-five Chinese opera and dance performances, and presented seventy-eight cultural exhibits, seen by three million Africans.<sup>17</sup>

### Propaganda

The ROC made a serious mistake by overlooking propaganda toward Africa. Though the ROC government set up a branch office of the Government Information Office in its embassy in the Congo in 1961 "to strengthen Taipei's public relations with African countries and improve their understanding of Nationalist China," this was hardly a major undertaking, and even it ended three years later when Congo recognized Peking.<sup>18</sup>

In 1965 Peking's propaganda offensive in Africa was supported by NCNA branch offices in at least twenty African countries, though it had diplomatic relations with only seventeen of them.<sup>19</sup> On the other hand, Taipei, which then had relations with fourteen African nations, chose to open the first African office of its Central News Agency (CNA) in

Ethiopia, which recognized neither China.

Compared with Peking's massive and often exaggerated propaganda in Africa, Taipei's efforts were so meager that even African visitors to Taiwan remarked to ROC officials that the Nationalist Chinese "put out too little propaganda about their success."<sup>20</sup> ROC African policymakers, such as Yang Hsi-k'un, were no doubt well aware of this shortcoming; a lack of funds is the most likely explanation for it.

### Agricultural and Technical

#### Assistance: Overview

Conversely, the ROC's most effective instrument in Africa during the 1960s was its agricultural and technical assistance program in various countries. A major stimulus to this program was the abrupt shift, unfavorable to Taipei, in voting on the "China issue" in the United Nations in 1960, as discussed in Chapter X. Among sixteen new African members of the United Nations in that year, Taipei was unable to win a single vote even though it had already established diplomatic relations with six of them, including Senegal, which actually voted against Taipei. This made ROC leaders realize that establishing diplomatic relations with an African country did not guarantee its support in the United Nations. More was needed to win African support. The United States, also worried by Taipei's weakening position in the United Nations, also urged the ROC government to take new steps to win African support.<sup>21</sup>

Considering the similarities in climate between Taiwan and most African countries, the ROC felt that the valuable experience gained by Nationalist China from the rapid and successful agricultural

development in Taiwan since 1949 could be of great help to Africans. This belief was confirmed by Chinese agricultural specialists sent to Africa on survey missions and by African leaders and experts visiting Taiwan. Thus, it was decided that ROC technical assistance to Africa would concentrate on agriculture.<sup>22</sup> This was enthusiastically endorsed by the United States, which later was to play an important role in financing the program.<sup>23</sup>

### "Operation Vanguard"

#### Origin and Administration

Between late 1960 and early 1961 there was a series of meetings involving officials of the ROC Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Economic Affairs, Council for United States Aid, Sino-American Joint Commission on Rural Reconstruction (JCRR), and the Taiwan Provincial Government's Department of Agriculture and Forestry. The ROC delegation to the United Nations suggested calling the project "Operation Safari," but in January, 1961, it was given the name "Hsien-feng-an" or "Operation Vanguard," an English name proposed by Yang Hsi-k'un, the major architect of the aid project.<sup>24</sup> At the same time an Executive Committee for "Operation Vanguard" was jointly formed by the above-mentioned government organs. The Committee, with Yang as its coordinator, was made responsible for implementing "Operation Vanguard" in Africa. Thus, in October, 1961, when Taipei sent its first agricultural mission to Liberia, an important new phase of the ROC diplomatic offensive against the PRC in Africa formally began.

"Operation Vanguard" proceeded rather rapidly and soon grew

beyond the administrative capacity of its initial executive committee. To cope with the rapid development and to facilitate the cooperation between its components, the Executive Committee was expanded and renamed the Sino-African Technical Cooperation Committee on April 18, 1962.<sup>25</sup>

#### Technical Cooperation:

##### Main Stages

In "Operation Vanguard," the ROC government took the following steps: (1) sending agricultural specialists to various African countries on fact-finding missions to determine the most effective way to assist each country; (2) dispatching agricultural and other technical teams to various African countries to help their agricultural development in the field they needed most; (3) inviting responsible officials and agricultural personnel of African countries to Taiwan to observe ROC economic activity, particularly in agriculture; (4) offering scholarships to friendly African countries for sending agricultural technicians to seminars in Taiwan for practical training.<sup>26</sup>

##### Propaganda Aspects

"Operation Vanguard" was also supposed to strengthen friendship and improve mutual understanding between Nationalist China and various African countries by (1) establishing news agencies or branch offices of the ROC Government Information Office at strategic locations in Africa; (2) increasing book, magazine and audi-visual propaganda toward Africa; (3) sending acrobatic and other art delegations to visit Africa; and (4) inviting leaders from African countries to visit Taiwan.<sup>27</sup>

However, only the last method was appropriately utilized; the first three were more or less neglected. Propaganda was the weakest link of the whole "Operation Vanguard" project.

#### Project Selection Criteria

In its agricultural and technical aid program to African countries, the Nationalist Chinese government used the following criteria in project selection: (1) feasibility: whether the project was within ROC means and capacity; (2) urgency: whether the project was urgently needed by the recipient country; (3) interest: whether both the government and people of the recipient country were interested in the project and ready to work closely with Chinese experts for the project.<sup>28</sup>

#### Agricultural Demonstration

##### Teams

Though including several categories, Taipei's technical aid to Africa was dominated by agricultural demonstration teams. The idea of sending such teams to African countries was conceived by Yang Hsi-k'un under a slogan which suggested they might be more effective than conventional diplomats: "Let the diplomats go to the countryside; let the agricultural experts go abroad" [wai-chiao hsia-hsiang, nung-yeh tsu-yang].<sup>29</sup> Between 1961 and 1970, Nationalist China sent agricultural demonstration teams to twenty-two African countries (see Table XXIV). Each team usually started with between ten and twenty members, depending on the size of the project undertaken in each country. In most cases, the team was later enlarged.<sup>30</sup> The largest team was the one sent to the Ivory Coast, which at one time included 160 people. Since

TABLE XXIV  
ROC AGRICULTURAL DEMONSTRATION  
TEAMS IN AFRICA

Country	Date of Establishment <sup>1</sup>	Date of Withdrawal <sup>2</sup>
1. Liberia	November 28, 1961	February 23, 1977
2. Libya	March 4, 1962	April 12, 1969 <sup>3</sup>
3. Benin	March 10, 1963	January 19, 1973
4. Ivory Coast	March 15, 1963	Still remains
5. Gabon	October 23, 1963	March 30, 1974
6. Rwanda	January 30, 1964	May 13, 1972
7. Senegal	April 29, 1964	May, 1973 <sup>4</sup>
8. Sierra Leone	June 15, 1964	August 20, 1971
9. Niger	July 27, 1964	July 29, 1974
10. Cameroon	November 7, 1964	April 3, 1971
11. Upper Volta	April 15, 1965	October 23, 1973
12. Chad	April 17, 1965	December 27, 1972
13. Togo	August 6, 1965	October 4, 1972
14. Malawi	December 24, 1965	Still remains
15. Gambia	June 11, 1966	December 28, 1974
16. Zaire	August 12, 1966	December, 1972 <sup>5</sup>
17. Madagascar	December 20, 1966	December 15, 1972
18. Botswana	February 1, 1968	April 5, 1974
19. Ghana	November 1, 1968	May, 1972 <sup>6</sup>
20. CAR	November 13, 1968	August 23, 1976
21. Lesotho	January 24, 1969	Still remains
22. Swaziland	September 23, 1969	Still remains

Sources: Hsien-feng-an, Table I; Sino-African Technical Cooperation, Attachment IV, Table A-1 (p. 71).

<sup>1</sup>The date of establishment refers to the date in which the mission arrived in the host country.

<sup>2</sup>The date of withdrawal refers to the date in which diplomatic relations between Nationalist China and the host country were severed, except in cases of Libya, Senegal, Zaire, and Ghana.

<sup>3</sup>The agricultural mission to Libya was withdrawn because the project was completed.

<sup>4</sup>Taipei broke relations with Senegal on April 12, 1972, but did not withdraw its mission until May, 1973.

<sup>5</sup>Though Taipei did not break relations with Zaire until January 30, 1973, the team was recalled in December, 1972, after Kinshasa established diplomatic relations with Peking in late November.

<sup>6</sup>Nationalist China sent an agricultural team to Ghana after the latter broke relations with Peking. Taipei withdrew the team after Ghana resumed relations with Peking.

the size of each team fluctuated, the exact number of Chinese technicians who served in Africa between 1961 and 1977 is hard to determine. A conservative estimate would put it around nine hundred. If ROC technicians serving in other related fields are added the total could reach at least a thousand.<sup>31</sup>

Each ROC agricultural demonstration team was charged to achieve the following objectives in the host country: (1) to demonstrate to farmers improved techniques in the cultivation of rice and other crops; (2) to help them establish farmers' organizations to consolidate farm management and stimulate dissemination of agricultural knowledge; and (3) to pave the way for development of the rural economy through farm extension projects and set a general pattern to guide the host country in carrying on the development alone.<sup>32</sup>

Generally speaking, the task of each demonstration team was executed in five stages: (1) Land reclamation: areas selected for development, whether jungles, mounds, swamps, or wasteland, were turned into arable farms. Most preparation at this stage was done by hand to minimize the dependence on machinery (see Table XXV). (2) Experimentation: crop varieties, time of planting, and farming methods most suitable to the local environment were selected empirically. (3) Demonstration: local farmers were shown by Chinese technicians how to cultivate the selected crops with Chinese techniques and tools. (4) Training: local farmers were encouraged to work in the field with the Chinese team members to learn the farming techniques and to gain self-confidence. (5) Extension: the Chinese team expanded the demonstration farm and set up sub-demonstration farms or stations in various districts, and added new crop varieties (see Table XXVI). Irrigation

TABLE XXV  
ROC LAND RECLAMATION AND FARM EXTENSION  
IN AFRICA

Country	Land Reclaimed (ha)	Extension Acreage (ha)	No. of Extension Families
Benin	416.20	434.60	886
Botswana	17.51	15.45	15
CAR	49.73	40.55	84
Chad	395.32	516.70	812
Gabon	189.37	253.73	518
Gambia	5.63	977.70	2,993
Ghana	68.66	70.84	31
Ivory Coast	13.47	8,280.04	18,225
Liberia	186.57	799.15	440
Madagascar	336.60	336.07	642
Malawi	822.77	1,786.55	2,482
Niger	766.50	759.00	1,762
Rwanda	1,024.60	770.00	3,483
Senegal	50.40	975.61	4,043
Swaziland	28.50	---	---
Togo	547.35	529.59	1,353
Upper Volta	323.50	316.00	312
Zaire	775.19	1,760.01	2,055
Total	6,249.33	18,629.77	41,189

Source: Sino-African Technical Cooperation, p. 28 (data to June, 1971).

TABLE XXVI  
RICE VARIETIES USED BY THE ROC IN AFRICA

Country	Good Rice Varieties	Average yield under extension in 1970 (kg/ha)
Benin	IR--8	4,000
Cameroon	Taichung Native 1	4,561
	IR4--2	5,000
	Tainan 1	4,500
CAR	Tainan 3	4,500
	Taichung Native 1	4,000
Chad	Tainan 3	4,600
	Tainan 5	4,500
	Hsinchu 56	4,100
Gabon	Chianan 8	4,105
	Tainan 1	3,301
Gambia	Taichung Native 1	4,500
	Taichung Hsien 2	4,600
Ghana	Taichung Native 1	4,833
	IR--8	5,425
	C4--63	4,720
Ivory Coast	Chianan 8	5,630
	Kaohsiung 10.	4,048
	IR--8	3,663
	Taichung Native 1	4,000
Liberia	Taichung Native 1	4,250
	IR--5	4,350
	IR--8	4,210
Madagascar	Chianung 242	4,700
	Chianan 8	4,500
Malawi	Chianan 8	4,200
	Blue Bonnet	5,000
	IR--8	4,500
Niger	D52--37	3,600
	IR--8	4,500
Rwanda	Sifara	3,500
	Hsinchu 61	1,200
	Malagasy Variety	2,500
Senegal	I Kung Pao	4,430
	Taichung Native 1	4,725
Sierra Leone	Tainan 5	4,464
	Chianung 242	4,182
	Taichung Native 1	4,364
Togo	Tainan 3	4,450
	IR--8	4,600
Upper Volta	Kaohsiung 10	4,733
	IR--8	5,709
Zaire	Tainan 1	2,255
	Chianan 8	5,175
	Tainan 3	4,335

Source: Sino-African Technical Cooperation, p. 15 (data to June, 1971).

and drainage systems were constructed where necessary (see Table XXVII). Special attention was given to pest and disease control. The Chinese teams also helped African farmers to organize cooperatives in order to improve credit and marketing facilities.<sup>33</sup>

#### Financing of "Operation Vanguard"

Initially most of the aid projects were financed solely by the ROC government. As the program expanded, the cost also increased considerably. By the late 1960s, it cost Taipei U.S. \$7 million a year, and in 1969 alone, African missions and training programs cost Taipei U.S. \$10 million dollars. However, beginning in 1968, the United States, impressed by the Nationalist Chinese accomplishments in Africa, provided most of the necessary money through sale of U.S. agricultural surplus in Taiwan under the PL 480 program.<sup>34</sup>

#### Achievements of the Demonstration Teams

With this relatively small budget, it is fair to say that ROC agricultural and technical missions did a great job in Africa. Between 1961 and 1974, ROC agricultural missions working in Africa reclaimed 10,842.82 hectares with 71,881 farm families. The Chinese missions also trained 42,182 farmers and extension cadres (see Table XXVIII) and constructed 3,434,800 meters of irrigation canals and drainage ditches.<sup>35</sup>

Most of the ROC agricultural demonstration teams achieved their scheduled objectives in the host countries and set impressive records.

TABLE XXVII  
IRRIGATION FACILITIES SET UP BY THE ROC  
IN AFRICA

Country	Irrigation Canal (m)	Drainage Ditch (m)	Pumping Station (unit)	Irrigated Area (ha)
Benin	47,306	79,700	3	624.50
Botswana	1,614	430	4	6.19
Chad	54,247	22,220	6	341.32
Gabon	6,350	12,080	16	70.99
Gambia	95,713	15,368	74	719.70
Ghana	10,557	7,346	4	58.36
Ivory Coast	439,552	246,582	--	3,381.30
Lesotho	2,466	1,318	--	8.86
Liberia	28,645	21,905	3	202.63
Madagascar	10,324	12,995	1	189.97
Malawi	52,703	35,184	3	1,036.20
Niger	102,884	23,234	20	757.60
Rwanda	152,010	103,516	--	779.31
Senegal	21,124	15,613	15	682.25
Swaziland	4,296	4,046	--	23.70
Togo	48,200	32,207	8	284.34
Upper Volta	13,900	8,500	--	303.50
Zaire	28,885	34,494	10	208.64
Total	1,124,952	676,867	172	9,776.94

Source: Sino-African Technical Cooperation, p. 18 (data to June, 1971).

TABLE XXVIII  
ROC AGRICULTURAL TRAINING IN AFRICA

Country	Number of Trainees		Total
	Ordinary Farmers	Extension Cadres	
Benin	900	38	938
Botswana	185	27	212
CAR	104	80	184
Chad	343	102	445
Gabon	84	53	137
Gambia	5,392	141	5,533
Ghana	43	26	69
Ivory Coast	18,287	1,050	19,337
Lesotho	10	2	12
Liberia	731	23	754
Madagascar	---	--	---
Malawi	478	404	882
Niger	1,723	85	1,808
Rwanda	3,483	182	3,665
Senegal	2,861	325	3,186
Swaziland	20	--	20
Togo	1,200	153	1,353
Upper Volta	2,160	9	2,169
Zaire	1,292	186	1,478
Total	39,296	2,886	42,182

Source: Sino-African Technical Cooperation, p. 22 (data to June, 1971).

In almost every African country with a ROC agricultural mission, the average rice yield was increased several times. In Togo, the increase reportedly reached nearly 2,000 percent.<sup>35</sup> In Zaire, where only a few varieties of vegetables were grown before the arrival of ROC agricultural technicians, by 1969 fifty-three different vegetables were produced, while the rice yield had tripled.<sup>37</sup> In Botswana, the Chinese farm experts introduced canteloupes, which the people of Botswana called "Chinese apples." It was reported that "Chinese apples" were prescribed as the first course in all Botswana state banquets thereafter.<sup>38</sup>

#### The African Response

Patient and hard-working, the Nationalist Chinese agricultural technicians won friendship and admiration in almost every African host country, from presidents down to ordinary people. President Houphouet-Boigny of the Ivory Coast praised the ROC contribution to Africa: "People used to think that the quality of Africa's soil is very poor and infertile. However, with the assistance of Republic of China's agricultural team, three crops of rice can be harvested annually. Then, we realized that we were but sleeping on a treasure mountain."<sup>39</sup> President Banda of Malawi said: "The work of the Chinese agricultural team is laid in front of everybody's eyes. I only hope that farmers from all over Africa will strive to learn from them the new farming methods and techniques."<sup>40</sup> Prime Minister Makhosini of Swaziland put it even more lyrically, telling ROC Ambassador Lo Ming-yuan: "There was a magic blanket in Thousand and One Nights. Now, the agricultural

team from the Republic of China also gave us a green blanket which will bring us abundant wealth."<sup>41</sup>

ROC agricultural technicians were so trusted by local Africans in the host country that they often found themselves requested to perform duties beyond their capacity. In Liberia, some Africans would go to Chinese farm technicians instead of medical doctors when they became ill.<sup>42</sup> In Niger, two cabinet ministers, competing for legal rights to a certain field and water sources, both asked the chief of the Chinese team to be their arbitrator.<sup>43</sup>

Touching and heart-warming stories about the friendship between Chinese team members and local Africans could be found in almost every African country where an agricultural team was stationed.<sup>44</sup> These farm experts from Taiwan enjoyed almost unprecedented prestige in the host countries, and the accomplishments of this small group of Chinese played a major role in winning African votes for the ROC each year in the United Nations during the 1960s.

#### The Human Cost to ROC

##### Personnel

In making these contributions to Africa and to their own country, Chinese agricultural experts paid a heavy and sometimes tragic price. They had to leave their families behind and live for usually more than two years in a remote, unfamiliar land where the living standard was much lower than in Taiwan. Working in uncomfortable conditions, some mission members fell victims of malaria and other diseases, treatment of which was often delayed because of lack of medicine and equipment.

The reckless driving of an African driver killed two of the top ROC agricultural specialists in an accident in Togo in December, 1963, and permanently paralyzed a third.<sup>45</sup>

In Chad, Lu Cheng-wu, deputy chief of the ROC agricultural mission, died of acute hepatitis in late July, 1969, after being away from his wife and children for two years.<sup>46</sup> Lee Ta, who led the first Chinese agricultural mission to the Gambia in April, 1966, died of illness, probably induced by exhaustion, in the Gambia in November, 1969. After his death, a bronze statue was erected in his memory at Bathurst, capital of the Gambia. During his visit to Taiwan in October, 1972, the Gambian President Jawara awarded Lee the posthumous Order of Officer of the Republic of the Gambia, and praised the contributions Lee and his fellow team members had made to the Gambia: "Lee died because he worked too hard."<sup>47</sup> Never before had so many Chinese owed so much of their diplomatic victory to so small a group of their fellow countrymen. In addition to the twenty-two agricultural demonstration teams, the ROC also sent sixteen other technical missions between 1963 and 1973 to ten African countries. These covered veterinary medicine, fishing, handicrafts, distilling, sugar refinery, edible-oil plants, farm machinery-making, and highway engineering (see Table XXIX).

#### African Seminars in Taiwan

Besides agricultural and technical missions, another important arm of "Operation Vanguard" was a series of fifteen "Seminars for African Agriculturalists" held in Taiwan between 1962 and 1974. Since Africa was handicapped most by an acute shortage of experienced and well-trained technicians in all fields, the ROC in 1962 established

TABLE XXIX  
ROC NON-AGRICULTURAL TECHNICAL MISSIONS  
TO AFRICA

Name of Team & Country	Date Established	Date Withdrawn
1. Veterinary Mission to Ethiopia	August 21, 1963	December, 1970 (Ethiopia recognized Peking)
2. Fishery Mission to Cameroon	December 9, 1963	November, 1965 (Mission completed)
3. Handicraft Mission to Central African Republic	August 14, 1964	November, 1964 (Relations severed)
4. Handicraft Mission to Rwanda	January 1, 1965	January, 1967 (Mission completed)
5. Distillery Mission to Rwanda	April 30, 1965	December, 1966 (Mission completed)
6. Veterinary Mission to Chad	June 19, 1967	Incorporated into the Agri- mission in September, 1969
7. Seed Multiplication & Supply Center to Ivory Coast	April 2, 1968	Still remains
8. Sugar Refinery Mission to Rwanda	August, 1968	May, 1972 (Relations severed)
9. Peanut oil Plant Mission to Chad	August, 1968	June, 1971 (Mission completed)
10. Bamboo Handicraft Mission to Madagascar	April 14, 1969	December, 1972 (Relations severed)
11. Highway Engineering Mission to Central African Republic	December 13, 1970	August, 1976 (Relations severed)
12. Veterinary Mission to Liberia	December 15, 1972	February, 1977 (Relations severed)
13. Handicraft Mission to Swaziland	March 10, 1973	Still remains
14. Handicraft Mission to Ivory Coast	October 2, 1973	Still remains
15. Farm Machinery Factory Mission to Niger	October 15, 1973	July, 1974 (Relations severed)
16. Sugar Production Mission to Liberia	December 18, 1973	February, 1977 (Relations severed)

Sources: Hsien-feng-an and Sino-African Technical Cooperation, pp. 59-70.

these seminars to train agricultural technicians for friendly African countries. All expenses were paid by the ROC. Trainees from various African countries attended a four to eight month agricultural seminar in Taiwan to learn cultivation techniques and get on-the-job training.

The first such seminar was held from March 31 to October 15, 1962, with twenty-five participants from eleven African countries. Since trainees came from both English-speaking and French-speaking countries, they were divided into English and French classes, each with its own resident translator-counselor.<sup>48</sup> During the first three seminars the trainees and their counselors stayed in hotels, but in 1964 a Training Center of the Sino-African Technical Cooperation Committee was constructed in Tainan. In the fourth seminar, all classes were given at this center, where trainees also lived and had their meals. In 1965 a new Sino-African Technical Cooperation Building was built in Taipei, and the headquarters of the fifth and all subsequent seminars was in Taipei, closer to the Sino-African Technical Cooperation Committee, overseer of the whole training project.<sup>49</sup>

The fact that the participants came from many countries with different and sometimes antagonistic religious and political backgrounds caused some problems, such as in assigning room and preparing meals.<sup>50</sup> Sometimes, unexpected personal problems arose which emotionally upset the trainees and in turned affected the training.<sup>51</sup> Generally speaking the African trainees were well-treated during their stay in Taiwan. The accommodations in the newly constructed Sino-African Technical Cooperation Building in Taipei occupied by the African trainees were much more comfortable than the living quarters

of the Chinese agricultural demonstration team members who were under training simultaneously. Each African trainee had a private room; the Chinese slept four to six in one room.<sup>52</sup>

The training program of each seminar had three main phases: (1) Orientation: to help trainees acquire a general understanding of Nationalist China's political organizations, economy, culture, and customs. (2) Training courses, the longest and most important phase of the project: Trainees were taught in classrooms and trained in the field in all rice and upland crop cultivation techniques; the curriculum included the selection of seeds, land preparation, rotational irrigation, pest control, cultivation of upland rice, vegetables, and sugar cane, use and maintenance of power tillers, water and soil conservation, seed grading and improvement, irrigation installation, farm demonstration and extension.<sup>53</sup> (3) Observation tours: when the major training courses were over, participants were given an opportunity to make "study tours to various rural districts to observe farm operations and the work of peasant organizations."<sup>54</sup>

At the end of each seminar, general discussions were held to evaluate the training program. Hours allocated to each phase of the training are indicated for the fifteenth (last) seminar in Table XXX. Each seminar officially ended with a graduation ceremony, at which each participant who had completed the training received a certificate from the ROC government.

Between March, 1962, and July, 1974, fifteen of these seminars were held in Taiwan (see Table XXXI). During this period, 714 African trainees from thirty countries attended the seminars (see Table XXXII). Among these 714 participants, sixty-four were from seven African

TABLE XXX  
TRAINING PROGRAM OF THE ROC  
FIFTEENTH SEMINAR

<u>1/ Orientation (4 days):</u> Orientation on general situation of Sino-African technical cooperation, various re-construction establishments and people's living and custom in the Republic of China.						
<hr/>						
<u>2/ Training courses (17 weeks):</u>						
Courses	Classroom Lectures	Field Practice	Dis- cussion	Obser- vation Tours	Total	Percent- age
1. Orientation	12				12	2.4
2. Paddy Rice	49	19			68	13.4
3. Upland Rice	6	4			10	2.0
4. Corn	8	4			12	2.4
5. Soybean	9	4			13	2.6
6. Sweet Potatoes	9	4			13	2.6
7. Sorghum	6	4			10	2.0
8. Sugar Cane	9	4			13	2.6
9. Fruit Cultures	8	6			14	2.7
10. Vegetables	34	14			48	9.5
11. Varietal Improvement	29				29	5.7
12. Plant Protection	20	4			24	4.7
13. Soil & Fertilizers	20	10			30	5.9
14. Irrigation & Drainage	18	7			25	4.9
15. Farm Machinery		26			26	5.1
16. Farmers' Organization	12	6			18	3.5
17. Agricultural Extension	8	2			10	2.0
18. Marketing of Agricultural Products	11	4			15	2.9
19. Agricultural Credit	3	2			5	1.0
20. Farm Management	10				10	2.0
21. Report on Agricultural Status in Africa			6		6	1.2
22. Observation tours				94	94	18.5
23. General Discussions			2		2	0.4
Total	281	124	8	94	507	
Percentage	55.4	24.5	1.6	18.5		100.0
<hr/>						
<u>3/ Observation tours:</u> (a) Visiting economic establishments. (b) Visiting rural communities. (c) Touring scenic spots in the Republic of China.						
<hr/>						
<u>4/ Final evaluation &amp; general discussion:</u> (a) On training program of this seminar. (b) On agricultural establishment in the Republic of China. (c) On Sino-African Technical Cooperation.						

Source: Secretariat, Committee of International Technical Cooperation, Republic of China, International Technical Cooperation (Taipei, 1974), pp. 6-7.

TABLE XXXI  
ROC SEMINARS FOR AFRICAN  
AGRICULTURALISTS

Sessions	Period	Main Subject(s)	Number of Participants			Number of Countries
			French-speaking	English-speaking	Total	
I	Mar. 31-Oct. 15, 1962	Rice culture Upland crops	23	2	25	11
II	Feb. 15-July 15, 1963	Rice culture	31	18	49	19
III	Aug. 15, 1963- Jan. 11, 1964	Upland crops	25	19	44	21
IV	Mar. 16-Nov. 14, 1964	Rice culture Upland crops	31	19	50	17
V	Feb. 20-July 15, 1965	Rice culture Upland crops	18	29	47	17
VI	Aug. 21, 1965- Jan. 5, 1966	Rice culture Upland crops	26	18	44	16
VII	Feb. 5-June 24, 1966	Rice culture Upland crops	26	20	46	15
VIII	Feb. 20-July 7, 1967	Rice culture Upland crops	31	17	48	17
IX	Feb. 10-July 30, 1968	Rice culture Upland crops	32	21	53	17
X	Feb. 24-Aug. 21, 1969	Rice culture Upland crops	32	23	55	20
XI	Feb. 23-July 29, 1970	Rice culture Upland crops	41	22	63	21
XII	Feb. 10-July 14, 1971	Rice culture Upland crops	38	20	58	19
XIII	Mar. 10-July 26, 1972	Rice culture Upland crops	39	19	58	19
XIV	Mar. 7-July 18, 1973	Rice culture Upland crops	21	19	40	12
XV	Mar. 6-July 4, 1974	Rice culture Upland crops	12	22	34	8
Total			426	288	714	

Source: International Technical Cooperation, Table III-A (p. 4).

TABLE XXXII

## AFRICAN PARTICIPANTS IN ROC AGRICULTURAL SEMINARS

Country	S e s s i o n s															Total
	1st	2nd	3rd	4th	5th	6th	7th	8th	9th	10th	11th	12th	13th	14th	15th	
1. Benin	4	2	2	3	-	-	-	3	3	3	3	3	3	-	-	29
2. Botswana	-	-	-	-	-	2	-	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	-	23
4. CAR	2	2	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	3	-	2	2	5	19
5. Chad	-	3	1	2	2	2	4	3	-	2	4	4	4	-	-	31
6. Congo	2	2	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	6
7. Ethiopia	-	-	1	-	2	-	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	7
8. Gabon	-	2	2	4	2	3	3	2	3	2	2	3	2	2	-	32
9. Gambia	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	-	2	3	2	3	2	4	18
10. Ghana	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	2	2	3	-	-	9
11. Ivory Coast	2	2	-	-	2	3	3	3	4	3	3	5	4	3	4	41
12. Kenya	-	9	9	4	4	4	4	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	34
13. Lesotho	-	-	-	-	-	2	3	2	3	3	2	2	1	3	4	25
14. Liberia	-	3	2	5	4	3	3	-	4	3	3	2	3	3	4	42
15. Libya	2	4	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	7
16. Madagascar	2	2	2	4	2	2	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	-	-	35
17. Malawi	-	-	2	3	10	-	4	4	3	3	2	3	3	4	6	48
18. Mauritania	1	1	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	3
19. Niger	2	2	2	2	2	3	3	4	3	3	4	4	4	4	4	46
20. Rhodesia	-	-	2	2	2	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	8
21. Rwanda	-	2	2	1	2	1	1	1	1	2	2	2	2	-	-	19
22. Senegal	2	3	2	2	-	-	-	-	2	2	3	3	3	3	-	25
23. Sierra Leone	-	-	-	2	2	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	-	-	-	32
24. Somalia	-	-	-	-	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2
25. Swaziland	-	-	-	-	3	-	-	-	3	3	3	2	2	3	3	22
26. Tanzania	-	1	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2
27. Togo	3	2	3	4	-	4	3	2	3	3	3	3	3	-	-	36
28. Upper Volta	-	2	2	3	2	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	5	8	-	43
29. Zaire	3	2	2	2	2	3	3	4	5	4	5	5	5	-	-	45
30. Zambia	-	-	-	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2
Total:	25	49	44	50	47	44	46	48	53	55	63	58	58	40	34	714

Source: International Technical Cooperation, p. 5.

countries which had no diplomatic relations with Taipei: Ethiopia (7), Ghana (9), Kenya (34), Rhodesia (8), Somalia (2), Tanzania (2), and Zambia (2). Five of these seven countries (Ghana, Kenya, Somalia, Tanzania, and Zambia) actually had diplomatic relations with Peking.

Although the ROC did not restrict participation to citizens of countries recognizing Taipei, recognition was a factor in African acceptance. For instance, Zambia immediately stopped sending participants after it established diplomatic relations with Peking in late 1964. Ghana started sending participants in 1969 after breaking relations with Peking (1966), but stopped participation after resuming relations with Peking in 1972.<sup>55</sup> Kenya, Somalia, and Tanzania all discontinued participation at the seminars when they developed closer relations with Peking.

Though the program of training African agricultural technicians in Taiwan was terminated in 1974 after the fifteenth seminar, the project was successful. The seminars not only gave African participants an opportunity to learn agricultural techniques from the Nationalist Chinese, but also enabled them to study together, to know and appreciate each other. This contributed in a small way to African unity, which has been so often preached by the Africans themselves.

The chief deficiency in the seminar program was in the selection of participants. Although the ROC government asked that all participants be graduates from an agricultural school "with at least two years of actual farming experience" and in good health, these criteria were not always met. African governments often sent officials from their department of agriculture or personnel with political connections rather than genuine farmers, as if the trip were for pleasure on a beautiful

island rather than for serious practical training. Some participants were in poor health or not within the optimum age range (the oldest participant was 55, the youngest 17).<sup>56</sup>

By the 1970s most African countries recognized Peking rather than Taipei. The ROC seminar program for African agricultural technicians was terminated in 1974 after the fifteenth session, ending one of Nationalist China's most impressive and successful aid projects. Thereafter Taipei still carried out some training programs for Africans, but only on an individual basis and on a limited scale. As of late 1977, there were still four ROC agricultural missions in Africa (Ivory Coast, Malawi, Lesotho, and Swaziland) and three technical missions (a seed multiplication and supply center mission and a handicraft mission in the Ivory Coast, a handicraft mission in Swaziland).

#### Trade With Africa

As can be seen from comparison of Table XXXIII with Table VIII in Chapter II, ROC trade with Africa has always been much smaller than PRC trade with Africa, both absolutely and in proportion to total ROC or PRC foreign trade. On the other hand, it has been less affected by recent political changes that might be expected. In the 1950s, the ROC had trade relations with Morocco, South Africa, Egypt, and British East Africa (Kenya, Uganda, Tanganyika), the first two being the major trading partners of the ROC in Africa. Taiwan generally neglected Africa as a market in the 1950s, because of the weak purchasing power of the few independent countries there, the dominance of the market by colonial powers, and high tariff and transport costs.<sup>57</sup>

TABLE XXXIII

## ROC-AFRICAN TRADE, 1960-1973

Year	ROC Exports to Africa		ROC Imports from Africa		Balance of ROC- Africa Trade	Total Value	Total Value of ROC's Foreign Trade	African Trade as % of ROC Total Foreign Trade
	Value	Percent	Value	Percent				
1960	4.0	2.3	1.3	0.5	+2.7	5.3	426.4	1.2
1961	6.1	2.8	1.2	0.4	+4.9	7.3	542.4	1.3
1962	3.8	1.6	1.4	0.4	+2.4	5.2	571.9	0.9
1963	5.0	1.4	2.9	0.9	+2.1	7.9	700.3	1.1
1964	15.6	3.3	8.6	2.1	+7.0	24.2	879.9	2.7
1965	15.5	3.1	6.4	1.1	+9.1	21.9	1051.1	2.1
1966	19.8	3.4	5.1	0.8	+14.7	24.9	1185.3	2.1
1967	21.5	3.2	8.0	0.9	+13.5	29.5	1522.6	1.9
1968	21.3	2.5	9.9	1.0	+11.4	31.2	1867.7	1.7
1969	34.7	3.1	8.7	0.7	+26.0	43.4	2315.4	1.9
1970	60.2	3.9	11.2	0.7	+49.0	71.4	3090.0	2.3
1971	65.0	3.0	20.7	1.0	+44.3	85.7	4126.0	2.1
1972	69.5	2.4	48.6	1.9	+20.9	118.1	5429.7	2.2
1973	103.9	2.4	55.1	1.5	+48.8	159.0	8164.7	1.9

Sources: 1960-1969 figures were taken from Kuo-chi mao-i-chu, ching-chipu [Bureau of International Trade, Ministry of Economic Affairs, ROC], comp., Shih-nien lai tui-wai mao-i fa-chan kai-kuang [The general survey of the development of foreign trade in the past decade], Taipei, 1970, pp. 39-42. The 1970-1971 figures are from Tai-wan sheng chin-ch'u-k'ou shang-yeh tung-yeh kung-hui lien-ho-hui [The united association of Taiwan imports and exports associations], comp., Fei-chou shih-chang kai-kuan [A general survey of the African market], Taipei, 1972, p. 130; China Yearbook (1971-1972), pp. 249-250; China Yearbook (1972-1973), p. 262. The 1972-1973 figures are from China Yearbook (1974), p. 205.

As Taipei intensified its diplomatic offensive in Africa after 1960, attention was also given to trade. While the two-way trade between the ROC and Africa developed rather unevenly between 1960 and 1963, it tripled in 1964, reaching a total of U.S. \$24.2 million, in comparison with only U.S. \$7.9 million dollars in 1963. It dropped to U.S. \$21.9 million dollars in 1965 but picked up again in 1966 and the increasing trend continued through 1973.<sup>58</sup>

Between 1966 and 1969 the total value of Taiwan-Africa trade increased continuously but slowly (U.S. \$24.9 million in 1966, \$29.5 million in 1967, \$31.2 million in 1968, and \$43.4 million in 1969), but rose much faster in the 1970s. Six of the nine trade agreements signed between Nationalist China and African countries since 1957, were signed between 1970 and 1975 (see Table XXII). The total value of Taiwan-Africa trade reached U.S. \$71.4 million in 1970, \$85.7 million in 1971, \$118.1 million in 1972, and \$159 million in 1973. This consistent increase indicated that Taipei's withdrawal from the United Nations in late 1971 and the subsequent severance of diplomatic relations with most African countries did not affect its trade relations with Africa. Both Peking and Taipei have been willing to trade with African countries regardless of political ties or lack of them.

Between 1960 and 1973 the balance of ROC-Africa trade was consistently in favor of Taipei. In 1960 the ROC reaped a profit of U.S. \$2.7 million dollars from trading with Africa; a decade later the profit reached U.S. \$49 million (see Table XXXIII). Despite the increasing volume, however, African trade has never comprised more than 2.7 percent of the ROC's total foreign trade. During the 1970s, Taipei did lose some former trading partners in Africa, or at least some of the

trade volume, because of the rupture of diplomatic relations. These losses were offset by the rapid increase of trade with South Africa. Like Peking, Taipei has traded with South Africa since the 1950s, but unlike Peking, has not denied this trade or that with Portuguese Africa and Rhodesia.<sup>59</sup> In 1970 about 40 percent of the ROC's African trade was with Southern Africa, with South Africa being the leading partner, and the Taiwan-South Africa trade increased even more in the mid-1970s. While this partially compensated for the loss of business by the ROC in other parts of the continent, Taipei's profit from African trade probably declined since its imports from South Africa exceeded its exports.

ROC government and private enterprises agreed that Africa was one of the few markets (along with the Middle East, Australia, and Southeast Asia) with developing potential for the ROC.<sup>60</sup> Unfortunately, ROC efforts to explore and develop new overseas markets were often offset by inadequate control over the quality of exported products. Unscrupulous merchants often exploited loopholes in the trade codes to export goods of poor quality, thus damaging Taiwan's trade reputation. The ROC government's lax inspection system was mainly responsible for this problem.

#### FOOTNOTES

<sup>1</sup>As a result of the mission, diplomatic relations were established with Cameroon in March, 1960. Of the other places visited, only Guinea, Tunisia, and Ethiopia were then independent, and Guinea had already established diplomatic relations with Peking in 1959. The other six areas became independent later in 1960, but only Togo and Gabon (both in 1960) and Ivory Coast (in 1963) established relations with Taipei.

<sup>2</sup>Jen-min jih-pao, February 8, 1960. English translation in Peking, NCNA, Radio-teletype in English to Europe and Asia, 0155 GMT, February 9, 1960, Daily Report, no. 27 (February 9, 1960), pp. AAA 10 and 12, also in SCMP, no. 2195 (February 12, 1960).

<sup>3</sup>The West Asian Department then was in charge of all African affairs; an African Affairs Department was established in 1963.

<sup>4</sup>See Yang Hsi-k'un, "Wo kuo tui Fei-chou wai-chiao cheng-tse" [Our country's foreign policy toward Africa], Chung-yang jih-pao (August 14, 1960). The translation is mine. See also Chung-Fei kuan-hsi ti chan-wang (ROC), p. 83; and Munro, p. 7. For an African view of this, see "Nationalist China's Aid Helps African Development," a translation of an article entitled "Nationalist China's Cooperation with Africa is Basically in the Agricultural Field but its Importance and its Moral Aspect Deserve to be Emphasized," in Le Moniteur Africain (French), Dakar, September 18, 1969, p. 8, in JPRS, Translations on Africa, no. 119 (49110), no. 828, p. 4.

<sup>5</sup>Francois Charbonnier, "Slowdown in Africa," Far Eastern Economic Review, XXXVII, 13 (September 27, 1962), p. 585; Ansprenger, p. 10; and "Two Chinas in Africa," p. 393.

<sup>6</sup>There was only one condition for an African country to receive Taipei's aid: it must not recognize Peking. Generally this principle has been strictly followed. One notable exception was Libya, which recognized Peking in 1971 but still received agricultural aid from Taipei. However, Taipei made this exception apparently because Libya so far has not established official diplomatic relations with Peking and there is still an ROC embassy in Libya.

<sup>7</sup>Legum, "Africa and China," p. 390, reported a private conversation with the president of an African country exceptionally well disposed to Peking, who said, "If Mao Tse-tung told all the Chinese to pee at the same time over Africa we would all be drowned."

<sup>8</sup> However, some delegations to and from Africa consisted of only one individual. See lists given by the ROC government, in Wai-chiao-pu chin-pao-ssu [Intelligence department, ministry of foreign affairs, ROC], comp., Shen-pu-chang chang-huan yen-lun-hsuan-chi [Collection of selected speeches and reports of foreign minister Shen Chang-huan] (hereafter referred to as Yen-lun hsuan-chi (Taipei, 1966), appendix 10 (pp. 335-340) and 11 (pp. 341-378). See also Secretariat, Sino-African Technical Cooperation Committee, Republic of China, Sino-African Technical Cooperation (Taipei, 1971), attachments 1 and 2.

<sup>9</sup> Yen-lun hsuan-chi, *ibid.*, appendix 1 (pp. 190-191). For details of Shen's visit to each African country, see Hsing-cheng-yuan hsin-wen-chu [Government information office, executive yuan, ROC], comp., Shen-wai-chang fang-Fei chi-yao [A concise record of foreign minister Shen's African visit], (hereafter referred to as Fang-Fei chi-yao), (Taipei, 1963).

<sup>10</sup> For Chinese text of the communique, see Yen-lun hsuan-chi, pp. 235-236.

<sup>11</sup> Yen-lun hsuan-chi, appendix 10 (p. 338). Free China Weekly, I, 20 (July 12, 1964), p. 2, listed Burundi instead of Madagascar. However, this was impossible since Burundi had already established diplomatic relations with Peking in December, 1963.

<sup>12</sup> Free China Weekly, *ibid.*

<sup>13</sup> See Chung-yang jih-pao, October 2, 1976, p. 1.

<sup>14</sup> Yang did not tour Africa in 1974 or 1975. Though the reason for not going in 1974 is unknown, the reason in 1975 was the death of President Chiang Kai-shek; ROC officials deemed it inappropriate to travel abroad during the period of "Kuo-sang" [national mourning] for him.

<sup>15</sup> Shang yueh-heng, Fei-chou hsin-mien-mao [The new face of Africa] (Taipei, 1970), p. 257. The Togolese president was not identified, but was probably Etienne Eyadema.

<sup>16</sup> Yen-lun hsuan-chi, appendix 10; and Free China Weekly, II, 15 (December 6, 1964), p. 4.

<sup>17</sup> Free China Weekly, *ibid.*

<sup>18</sup> Yen-lun hsuan-chi, p. 48.

<sup>19</sup> See Chapter II, note 68.

<sup>20</sup> Ansprenger, p. 10.

<sup>21</sup> Munro, pp. 7, 11; Chung-Fei chi-shu ho-tso (hsien-feng-an) ti yuan-chi yu fa-chan [Sino-African technical cooperation--"operation vanguard"--its origin and development] (hereafter referred to as

Hsien-feng-an) (Taipei, 1975), p. 2. This is a document issued by the ROC government, presumably by the Sino-African Technical Cooperation Committee which was in charge of agricultural and technical aid to Africa. The date of publication is unknown, probably in late 1975 since the document contains information on events that occurred in September, 1975.

<sup>22</sup>See Sino-African Technical Cooperation, p. 4. For more specific treatment of the factors behind Taipei's decision to emphasize agricultural aid to Africa, see Yang Hsi-k'un, "Activities and Achievements of the Chinese Agricultural Missions to Africa," Industry of Free China, XXX, 3 (September, 1968), p. 16.

<sup>23</sup>Ray S. Cline, Secrets, Spies and Scholars; Blueprint of the Essential CIA (Washington, DC, 1976), p. 180. Cline, former CIA deputy director who had been chief of the CIA station in Taiwan in 1957-1962, asserts that the idea of using Taiwan's agricultural experience to help Africans was conceived by Washington. However, most sources, including Nationalist Chinese, American and British, say that the idea was of Chinese origin. Nevertheless, as Cline says, the CIA played a role in the program by using "its contacts in the prospective [African] countries that would receive Chinese economic aid to explain the mutual benefits and get the enterprise going." Generally the United States played a behind-the-scene role and its importance was purposely minimized because it was feared, to use Cline's words, that "acknowledged U.S. sponsorship would have caused some governments to shy away from it, and might have embarrassed the Republic of China by making it appear it was forced to do the job by the United States."

<sup>24</sup>Hsien-feng-an, pp. 2-3.

<sup>25</sup>Ibid., p. 4. See also Fei-chou-ssu, comp., Chung-Fei chi-shu ho-tso [Sino-African Technical Cooperation], Taipei, 1975, p. 1.

<sup>26</sup>Hsien-feng-an, p. 3. See also Yang Hsi-k'un, p. 14; and Sino-African Technical Cooperation, pp. 8-9; "Chinese Communists Post Threat to Africa," a translation of an article by Madan M. Sauldie, "The Communist Chinese Presence in Africa," in the German-language Afrika Heute, Bonn, November 1, 1968, pp. 297-300, in Translations on Africa, no. 98 (46950), no. 750, p. 13. See also Li Kuo-ting "Republic of China's Aid in Developing Nations," Pacific Community, X, 4 (July, 1970), p. 667. Li was former Minister of Finance and vice chairman of the Council for International Economic Cooperation and Development of the Republic of China. His article also appeared under the title "Exchange of Experiences Between Developing Countries-- Republic of China's Approach and Accomplishments," Industry of Free China, XXXIV, 3 (September, 1970), pp. 2-8.

<sup>27</sup>Hsien-feng-an, p. 3.

<sup>28</sup>See Yang Hsi-k'un, p. 16.

<sup>29</sup>Shang, p. 257. At the beginning, many people, including some agricultural experts, remained skeptical about the idea and predicted that the project would eventually fail. See "Nationalist China Provides Africa with Farm Aid," a translation of an article by Nicolas Lang in the French-language periodical France Eurafrigue, Paris, October, 1968, pp. 5-6, in JPRS, Translations on Africa, no. 103 (47356), no. 763, p. 5.

<sup>30</sup>For description of qualifications and training required to serve as a member of a ROC agricultural mission, see Ansprenger, p. 14. See also Rowe, pp. 23-24.

<sup>31</sup>See Hsien-feng-an, table I; Secretariat, Comité pour la Coopération Technique Sino-Africaine, République de Chine [Secretariat, Sino-African technical cooperation committee, Republic of China], Coopération Technique Sino-Africaine [Sino-African technical cooperation] (Taipei, 1972), table III (pp. 19-20). See also "Nationalist China's Aid Helps African Development," p. 2. Another African source indicated in mid-1970 that since 1951 [sic] Nationalist China has sent 1,254 agricultural specialists to various African countries. See "Nationalist China's Assistance Programs to Africa," excerpts from an article in Le Moniteur Africain, Dakar, July 30, 1970, p. 8; in JPRS, Translations on Africa, no. 141 (51448), no. 946, p. 2.

<sup>32</sup>Sino-African Technical Cooperation, p. 11.

<sup>33</sup>For more detailed description of the tasks of the Chinese agricultural teams, see *ibid.*, pp. 10-21, 27, 54-55. For achievements of individual teams in various countries, see pp. 29-41.

<sup>34</sup>See "Two Chinas in Africa," p. 394; O. K. Armstrong, "Free China Gives Africa a Helping Hand," Reader's Digest, 95, 571 (November, 1969), p. 187; Yawsoon Sim, "Taiwan and Africa," Africa Today, 18, 3 (July, 1971), p. 21; and William Glenn, "Taipei: Friends on the Farm," Far Eastern Economic Review, LXIII, 28 (July 10, 1971), p. 30.

<sup>35</sup>The figures quoted here are the latest figures listed in Hsien-feng-an, table I.

<sup>36</sup>Glenn, p. 31.

<sup>37</sup>Armstrong, p. 188.

<sup>38</sup>Shang, p. 249. Some of the vegetables and fruits recommended to Africa by Chinese agricultural missions were previously unknown there. When watermelons were first introduced by the Chinese, many Africans asked how to cook them. See Row, p. 48.

<sup>39</sup>Chen Teh-yi, "R.O.C. Agricultural Team Earns Great Fame in Africa," Asian Outlook, VIII, 1 (January, 1973), p. 31.

<sup>40</sup> Ibid.

<sup>41</sup> Shang, p. 245.

<sup>42</sup> Ibid., p. 189.

<sup>43</sup> Ibid., p. 203.

<sup>44</sup> For more detailed reports on the accomplishments of ROC agricultural teams in each African country, see Shang Yueh-heng, Fei-chou hsin-mien-mao, II (pp. 177-258). Shang was a correspondent of the Ta-Hua wan-pao [Great China evening news], a private evening newspaper in Taipei. In mid-April, 1970, Shang took a two-and-a-half month trip over Africa and wrote eighteen reports dealing with Taiwan's agricultural teams in Africa. These eighteen reports were later published as part two of his book.

<sup>45</sup> According to Rowe, who has visited Africa five times, "the greatest danger to which these Chinese workers in African countries are exposed is from the local automobile drivers . . . whose reckless driving habits really have to be experienced to be believed." See The New Diplomacy, p. 25. See also Shang, pp. 73-74, 185.

<sup>46</sup> Shang, *ibid.*, pp. 231-233.

<sup>47</sup> Free China Weekly, XIII, 43 (October 29, 1972), p. 1. See also Shang, pp. 183-184. President Jawara's words can be well applied to other Chinese technicians serving in Africa. A Benin farmer who had worked with Chinese agricultural experts told a Western author that he realized later that the work was very hard but he did not have the courage to quit because "our Chinese supervisors are not afraid to work and do not stand on ceremonies." Another Western source also reported that wherever they served the Chinese farm experts have harvested the praise of the African governments; only the local African farm owners occasionally murmur, "The Chinese are working too hard." See "Chinese Nationalist Agriculture Assistance in Dahomey," a translation of an article by Louis Zekpa, in the French-language periodical, L'Aube Nouvelle [The new dawn], 7, 18-19, Porto-Novo, May 14, 1967, pp. 3-10, in JPRS, Translations on Africa, no. 68 (41806), no. 599, p. 30; and "Survey of Nationalist China's Rising Influence over that of Red Chinese in Africa," a translation of an unsigned article entitled "Rice and Revolutionaries" in the African section of the German-language periodical Der Spiegel [The mirror], Hamburg, no. 17, 1967, pp. 126-134, in *ibid.*, no. 62 (40818), no. 552, p. 12.

<sup>48</sup> Yang Feng-tai, "'Fei-chou nung-yeh chi-shu jen-yuan chiang-hsi-pan' chih yen-chiu" [A study of the "seminar of African agricultural technicians"], hereafter referred to as "Nung-chi-pan yen-chiu," Tung-ya chi-kan, IV, 2 (October 1, 1972), p. 110. Yang's article was probably the most detailed one dealing with the agricultural seminars.

<sup>49</sup> Ibid., p. 116.

<sup>50</sup> Ibid., pp. 111, 114.

<sup>51</sup> For instance, a participant in the fourth seminar was upset because his wife back home had a miscarriage. In another case, a trainee from Ethiopia criticized Ethiopia's land-owning system at a discussion on land reform; then fearing that he might face punishment when he returned home, he became very depressed. See *ibid.*, p. 115.

<sup>52</sup> Ansprenger, p. 16.

<sup>53</sup> Sino-African Technical Cooperation, p. 43. See also Yang, "Nung-chi-pan yen-chiu," p. 113.

<sup>54</sup> Ibid. The observation tours for each session usually totaled 3,000 Kilometers. See Yang, "Nung-chi-pan yen-chiu," pp. 113, 114.

<sup>55</sup> Ghana resumed diplomatic relations with the PRC on February 29, 1972. However, it still sent three participants to attend the thirteenth seminar in Taiwan, held March 10-July 26, 1972.

<sup>56</sup> Some of the trainees were from prominent families with strong political influence in their home countries. The brother of Gambia's President Jawara was a participant in the fifth seminar, H. Dlamini, a cousin of the king of Swaziland (and later foreign minister), attended the fifth seminar, during which his son was born in Taiwan and named "Taiwan." Dlamini said, "The training in Taiwan has increased my knowledge and skill. Besides, the beauty of Taiwan and the diligence of the people especially impressed me during my stay. I named my son 'Taiwan' to express my gratitude and appreciation." See Yang Feng-tai, "Nung-chi-pan yen-chiu," pp. 111, 120; Chen Teh-yi, p. 31; Ansprenger, p. 15; Sino-African Technical Cooperation, pp. 42-43.

<sup>57</sup> Munro, p. 11.

<sup>58</sup> Official statistics of Taiwan-Africa trade after 1973 were unavailable to this author. However, ROC trade with South Africa alone reached a total of more than U.S. \$50 million dollars in 1974. In 1975 it climbed to U.S. \$140 million. The figure in 1976 was estimated at U.S. \$200 million. See Industry of Free China, XXXV, 1 (January, 1976), tables 36 and 38 (pp. 147, 158).

<sup>59</sup> See "Economic Relations of Taipei, Peking, Africa," p. 2.

<sup>60</sup> See Wu Yun-chung, "K'ai-t'uo Fei-chou hsin-shih-ch'ang" [To open new African market], part five of a series on how to expand overseas markets, in Chung-yang jih-pao, May 23, 1975, p. 2; and Sun Yun-suan [ROC minister of economic affairs], "Wo-kuo mao-i chien-tu

chan-wang" [The prospect of the Republic of China's foreign trade], *ibid.*, February 15, 1976, p. 3. For a detailed and country-by-country study of potential markets for Taiwan's goods in Africa, see *Tai-wan sheng chin-ch'u k'ou shang-yeh tung-yeh kung-hui lien-ho-hui* [The united association of Taiwan imports and exports associations], comp. *Fei-chou shih-ch'ang kai-kuan* [General survey of the African market], Taipei, 1972. This is probably the best and most detailed study of the African market yet published in Nationalist China. After a general survey of the market situation in each African country, the book indicated the potential market for certain goods made in Taiwan. In most cases, a list of names and addresses of trade agencies in each country was also provided.

## CHAPTER IX

### THE ROC AND WEST, CENTRAL, AND SOUTHERN AFRICA

Although, as noted in Chapter VIII, the ROC has had trade and other contacts with some African countries that did not recognize Taipei, diplomatic relations are generally prerequisite to systematic contacts, and set limits for a government's foreign undertakings. By that criterion, it is clear that ROC opportunity for influence in Africa has always been limited. Only twenty-five of Africa's present fifty-one independent nations have ever had diplomatic relations with the ROC, and they account for a little over one-third of Africa's total population. The lack of diplomatic relations closed large sections of Africa to most ROC activities. These included all of East Africa, most of North Africa (after 1955), and large parts of West and Southern Africa (see Figure 7 and Table XXXIV). The six nations that still recognize the ROC in 1978 account for nine percent of the continent's population, twelve percent of its area.

This chapter surveys relations between the ROC and individual countries in Africa, grouped regionally as in the previous surveys of PRC relations, and in the same sequence: West Africa, Central Africa, East Africa, and Southern Africa. There is little to report for East Africa since none of the countries there ever recognized Taipei.

TABLE XXXIV  
STATISTICAL SUMMARY OF AFRICAN NATIONS  
WHICH RECOGNIZED THE ROC

Region	Number of Nations	Population*		Area	
		Population	Percentage of Total	Square Miles	Percentage of Total
North Africa	2 of 5	40,584,540	49.4	1,066,224	46.5
West Africa	12 of 20	36,324,501	29.6	1,296,912	55.3
Central Africa	5 of 6	41,000,589	91.9	2,141,218	90.2
East Africa	0 of 7	0	0.0	0	0.0
Southern Africa	6 of 13	38,293,290	63.1	979,197	51.1
Total	25 of 51	156,202,920	39.3	5,482,551	49.5

\*Based on 1976 estimates. Percentages for earlier dates do not vary significantly.




Figure 7. Nations Never Having Diplomatic Relations With the ROC (shaded)

## West Africa

during the 1960s West Africa was the area where Taipei made its greatest efforts to compete with Peking. Though the PRC and ROC began their diplomatic offensives in West Africa in the early 1960s almost simultaneously, it was the smaller China that was welcomed by most of the newly emerging countries in this part of the continent. Of West Africa's present twenty countries, three achieved independence before 1960, eleven during 1960, two others in 1961 and 1965, respectively, and the last four in the 1970s. Of the sixteen that were independent in 1969, twelve had recognized Taipei, three had recognized Peking (Guinea, Ghana, Mali) and Nigeria, the largest, recognized neither (see Table XXXV). Taipei's impressive record in West Africa in the 1960s can be attributed in considerable part to the fact that nine of the twelve countries recognizing Taipei were former French colonies (Cameroon, Togo, Congo, Senegal, Mauritania, Gabon, Upper Volta, Benin, and Ivory Coast), still under the influence of France, which then recognized the ROC.

### Liberia

A treaty of amity between the ROC and Liberia was signed in Paris on December 11, 1937, by Dr. V. K. Wellington Koo, then Chinese ambassador to France, and Baron de Bogaerde, Liberian minister to France.<sup>1</sup> This was China's first treaty with an African country, but diplomatic relations were not established until nearly twenty years later. An official ROC publication dates formal relations with Liberia from August 19, 1957.<sup>2</sup> Relations were raised from ministerial to

TABLE XXXV  
THE ROC AND WEST AFRICA

Independent	Diplomatic Relations with the ROC			First Opened Relations With PRC
	Established	Country	Suspended	
1847. 7.26	1957. 8.19	Liberia		1977. 2.22
1960. 1. 1	1960. 2.19	Cameroon		1971. 3.26
1960. 4.27	1960. 4.27	Togo		1972. 9.19
1960. 8.15	1960. 9.10	Congo		1964. 2.22
1960. 8.20	1960. 9.23	Senegal	1964-1968	1971.12. 7
1960.11.28	1960.11.28	Mauritania		1965. 7.22
1960. 8.17	1960.12. 9	Gabon		1974. 4.20
1960. 8. 5	1961.12.14	Upper Volta		1973. 9.15
1960. 8. 1	1962. 1.18	Benin	1964-1966	1964.11.12
1960. 8. 7	1963. 7.20	Ivory Coast		never
1961. 4.27	1963. 9.28	Sierra Leone		1971. 7.29
1965. 2.18	1968.11.12	Gambia		1974.12.14

ambassadorial level on February 25, 1960. In August, 1960, an ROC trade delegation visited Liberia during a tour of seven African countries and Lebanon, and was followed by an agricultural delegation from Taipei in November. In March, 1961, a Liberian goodwill delegation led by S. A. Tolbert, Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce, visited Taiwan to request help in Liberia's agricultural development. A two-year technical cooperation agreement was signed between the ROC and Liberia in Monrovia on October 13, 1961. In November, 1961, the ROC began its African aid program by sending a fourteen-member team (led by Tsou Mei) to help Liberia improve the cultivation of rice and vegetables.

This first ROC agricultural demonstration chose Gbedin, in eastern Liberia about 190 miles from the capital, as the area for experimentation. Originally swamp land, Gbedin was once opened up by an American experiment group for raising rice, but the plan failed because Liberian farmers refused to use large farm machinery.<sup>3</sup> The Chinese team set up an experimental farm in Gbedin to teach Chinese methods of growing rice and vegetables, as well as use of fertilizers, irrigation, and techniques of insect and disease control. The work done by the Chinese team proved to be very successful. While the average Liberian farm produced only 500 kilograms of rice per hectare, the first harvest of rice at the Chinese demonstration farm reached an average of 4,500 kilograms per hectare.<sup>4</sup> When the initial agreement expired in late 1963, Liberia asked Taipei to renew it and expand the categories of assistance. The agreement was renewed in 1963, 1965, and 1967, and in June, 1970, extended to four years.<sup>5</sup> The impressive results achieved by the ROC agricultural team led other African countries to ask Taipei for aid.

Additional ROC teams were sent to Libya in 1962, to Benin and the Ivory Coast in 1963, and later to many other African countries.

The number of ROC agricultural technicians in Liberia increased from fifteen in 1961 to twenty-two in 1965, to forty-six in 1967, and to sixty-eight in early 1975.<sup>6</sup> Between 1963 and 1974 a total of forty-two Liberian trainees graduated from the various "Seminars for the African Agriculturalists" held in Taiwan. On February 14, 1973, Taipei signed another technical cooperation agreement with Liberia, and sent a three-member veterinary team to work in Liberia for two years. This agreement was renewed in 1976 for two more years, and the team was enlarged to five members.<sup>7</sup> In late 1973 Nationalist China helped Liberia to build a sugar plant and arranged one year of training in Taiwan for twenty-five Liberian sugar technicians.<sup>8</sup>

Officials of the two nations exchanged frequent visits. Between 1954 and 1971 Liberia continuously supported Taipei in the United Nations, but established diplomatic relations with Peking on February 22, 1977, after an exchange of goodwill visits. Taipei broke relations with Monrovia the next day, ending a cordial relationship for two decades.

#### Cameroon

When Cameroon became independent on January 1, 1960, Taipei sent a government delegation led by Yang Chi-tseng, minister of economic affairs, to attend the independence ceremony at Yaounde, capital of Cameroon, and the two countries officially established diplomatic relations on February 19.<sup>9</sup> A general agreement on economic and technical cooperation was signed in Taipei on September 29, 1962, under which the ROC was to help Cameroon's economic development.<sup>10</sup>

A year later a protocol on fishing cooperation was signed, and Taipei sent sixty-seven fishermen and two 550-ton fishing vessels to train Cameroonian fishermen.<sup>11</sup> Implementing the 1962 agreement, the ROC sent a twelve-man agricultural demonstration team in late October, 1964, to work for two years in Cameroon.<sup>12</sup> Satisfied with the work of the team, Cameroon asked Taipei to extend the stay of the team and to expand its service. By 1967 there were thirty-four ROC agricultural technicians working in Cameroon.

Despite receiving agricultural aid from Taipei continuously since 1964, Cameroon only half-heartedly supported the ROC in the United Nations. Though never voting against Taipei, Cameroon abstained in many votes on the China issue. Following the visit of a PRC good-will mission, Cameroon announced on April 2, 1971, that it had decided to recognize Peking. Taipei severed relations the next day and withdrew its agricultural teams from Cameroon.<sup>13</sup> Cameroon was one of the twenty-six African countries that voted for Peking's admission to the United Nations in October, 1971.

### Togo

When Togo became independent on April 27, 1960, the ROC was invited to the independence celebrations, and diplomatic relations were established on the same day. In December, 1963, the ROC sent four specialists to study the potential for rice cultivation in Togo: Prof. Chin Cheng, Dr. Tseng Chun-fu, Tsou Mei, and Yu Yin-piao. Tsou and Yu were then the heads of the ROC agricultural teams in Liberia and Benin, respectively. On December 7 a car accident claimed the lives of Prof. Chin and Dr. Tseng, and permanently paralyzed

Tsou Mei. Yu Yin-piao suffered only minor injuries.<sup>14</sup> This was the most tragic cost of the ROC's African aid program.

On August 12, 1964, the ROC and Togo signed a technical cooperation agreement in agriculture at Lome, capital of Togo. Taipei was to send nine experts to help Togo's rice cultivation.<sup>15</sup> The Chinese team arrived in Togo in August, 1965, began work immediately, and in early January, 1966, held a ceremony to celebrate Togo's first good harvest. Among the five hundred guests attending the ceremony were the Togolese president, cabinet ministers, the chief of general staff, and members of the diplomatic corps.<sup>16</sup>

The Sino-Togolese agricultural cooperation agreement was renewed twice (1968, 1970). By late 1969 there were thirty-eight Chinese agricultural experts working in Togo.<sup>17</sup> However, Togo established diplomatic relations with Peking on September 26, 1972. Taipei closed its embassy on October 4 and withdrew its agricultural mission.<sup>18</sup>

### Congo

Though Taipei established diplomatic relations with this former French colony on September 10, 1960, less than a month after it achieved independence, relations between the two countries lasted only four years. Conservative and anti-Peking Congolese President Youlou was forced to resign on August 15, 1963, the third independence anniversary of the country, after a bloody demonstration instigated by left-wing trade unions. When France recognized Peking on January 27, 1964, the new Congo regime under Alphonse Massamba-Debat followed

suit by establishing diplomatic relations with Peking on February 22. Taipei severed relations with Brazzaville on April 17.<sup>19</sup> Congo under Massamba-Debat and subsequently Marien Ngouabi grew more radical during the next decade and became one of Peking's closest allies in Africa.

### Senegal

Originally Senegal and former French Sudan formed the Mali Federation on June 20, 1960. Due to personal rivalry and incompatibility between Senegal's Leopold Senghor and French Sudan's Modibo Keita, Senegal seceded from the federation two months later and became the Republic of Senegal; French Sudan became the Republic of Mali. Taipei had established diplomatic relations with the Mali Federation on June 20, but the new Republic of Mali switched its ties to Peking on October 27, while Senegal established relations with Taipei on September 23, 1960.

Senegal provided an early test of the one policy on which Taipei and Peking agreed: that no nation could have diplomatic relations with both Chinas. Senegal granted recognition to the PRC on March 14, 1961, without breaking relations with the ROC.<sup>20</sup> Peking refused to establish diplomatic relations on that basis. Taipei, though displeased with Senegal's action, did not break relations. Instead, the ROC signed a technical cooperation agreement with Senegal on September 13, 1963, and sent a twelve-man agricultural demonstration team from Taiwan in April, 1964.<sup>21</sup>

During 1964, relations between Taipei and Dakar were broken off in circumstances that remain cloudy. The ROC charge d'affaires in

Dakar, Chen Hou-jou, was declared persona non grata on September 5, reportedly for inviting a Senegalese Foreign Ministry press officer, Babacar Dias, to make a private visit to Taiwan despite objections by Senegal's Foreign Minister Doudou Thiam. Thiam told the press that "to say that this is a question of personality is to put the interpretation on it given by Formosa [the ROC]; for us there is more to it than that." Other sources indicated that Chen was accused of "corrupting Senegalese officials" and interfering in Senegal's internal affairs. President Senghor was reportedly out of the country during these developments. On November 8, the ROC severed relations with Senegal, and closed its embassy in Dakar.<sup>22</sup>

But Senghor was reported to be very anxious for the ROC agricultural team to remain in Senegal. Rather surprisingly, the ROC not only permitted this, but enlarged the team to sixteen members and renewed its stay every two years after 1965.<sup>23</sup> Chinese agricultural experts achieved spectacular success in raising Senegal's rice yield. The previous record had been 500 kilograms per hectare; the Chinese boosted this to 6,000 kilograms in August, 1965.<sup>24</sup> However, diplomatic relations between the ROC and Senegal were not resumed until July, 1969, and lasted only two and a half years after that.

Senegal voted for Peking's admission in the United Nations in October, 1971, and established diplomatic relations with the PRC on December 7. Taipei did not close its embassy at Dakar until April 12, 1972, and then only at Senegal's request. Even then, Taipei's forty-three agricultural technicians remained in Senegal another full

year, to May, 1973.<sup>25</sup> Senegal evidently appreciated ROC aid, but increasing pressure from its pro-Peking neighbors (Mali, Mauritania, Guinea) forced it to change sides.

#### Mauritania

Mauritania became independent on November 28, 1960, and established diplomatic relations with the ROC on the same day. Mauritania soon became involved in a political battle between the ROC and the Soviet Union. Most new African nations were admitted to the United Nations quickly and without controversy, soon after achieving independence, but Mauritania had to wait almost a year. Before 1961, Taipei had persistently blocked admission of the Soviet satellite Outer Mongolia to the United Nations. At the 16th UN General Assembly meeting in 1961, the Soviet Union again sponsored Outer Mongolia's membership and indicated that it would veto the admission of Mauritania if Taipei again blocked Outer Mongolia.

Eleven UAM states which sponsored Mauritania's membership (Benin, Cameroon, CAR, Chad, Congo, Gabon, Ivory Coast, Madagascar, Niger, Senegal, and Upper Volta) told the ROC that if it provoked a Soviet veto of Mauritania by blocking Outer Mongolia, they would vote for Peking on the "Chinese representation" issue.<sup>26</sup> Taipei was forced to compromise; both Mauritania and Outer Mongolia joined the United Nations in 1961.

Despite this sacrifice made by the ROC, no ROC ambassador was sent to Mauritania, and relations between the two countries were never close. However, Mauritania was the first country visited by

ROC Foreign Minister Shen Chang-huan during his 1963 trip to sixteen African countries, and in February, 1965, Mauritania accepted an offer of assistance made by ROC Vice-Foreign Minister Yang Hsi-k'un on a visit to Nouakchott. In June, Taipei sent a technical cooperation mission to Mauritania and at last appointed an ambassador.<sup>27</sup> However, less than a month later, Mauritania suddenly changed its attitude. Peking's ambassador to Tunisia, Yao Nien, visited Nouakchott from July 16 to 19, and Mauritania established diplomatic relations with Peking on July 22.<sup>28</sup> Taipei broke diplomatic ties with Nouakchott on September 11, 1965.

#### Gabon

Gabon became independent on August 17, 1960, and established diplomatic ties with Taipei on December 9. Relations were raised to ambassadorial level in May, 1965. During February and March, 1962, a ROC agricultural mission toured Gabon to study the potential for rice cultivation.<sup>29</sup> An agricultural cooperation agreement between the two countries was signed in Taipei on January 19, 1963, under which the ROC sent a twelve-man agricultural demonstration team in October to teach Gabonese farmers Chinese methods of cultivating rice under irrigation.<sup>30</sup> The agreement was renewed in 1966, 1969, and 1972, and the team was also expanded.<sup>31</sup> By mid-1969 there were thirty-nine agricultural experts from Taiwan working in Gabon. The number increased to forty-two by early 1972, working in nine agricultural technical stations. The achievements of the Chinese team were "close to miraculous," to use the words of Jean Engone, Gabon's finance minister, who visited Taiwan in September, 1964, with rice harvests averaging 6,000 kilograms per hectare. Vegetables produced by the

Chinese were also valued by the Gabonese, who had usually imported vegetables from France by air.<sup>32</sup>

Besides cultivating rice and vegetables, the Chinese team also helped the Gabonese to improve their fishing catch. Jean Remy Ayoune, Gabonese minister for external affairs, who visited Taiwan in April, 1969, praised the Chinese team for its training of Gabonese fishermen.<sup>33</sup> On November 8, 1973, Taiwan also signed an agreement to help Gabon build a sugar plant and train Gabonese technicians to manage it.<sup>34</sup> However, the agreement was never implemented, since diplomatic relations between the two countries were soon terminated; Libreville granted Peking de jure recognition on March 5, 1974. Taipei closed its embassy on March 30 and withdrew its agricultural team.<sup>35</sup> Peking officially established diplomatic relations with Gabon on April 20.

#### Upper Volta

Upper Volta achieved its independence on August 5, 1960, but did not establish diplomatic relations with the ROC until December 14, 1961. From July 17 to 20, 1963, ROC Foreign Minister Shen Chang-huan visited Ouagadougou, capital of Upper Volta, to confer ROC decorations on President Maurice Yameogo and Foreign Minister Lompolo Kone, and to receive Upper Volta's second highest decoration from President Yameogo.<sup>36</sup> A joint communique on July 20 indicated plans for cooperation, particularly in agriculture.<sup>37</sup>

On May 25, 1964, during his second visit to Africa, Yang Chitseng, ROC minister of economic affairs, signed an agricultural technical cooperation pact with Upper Volta, under which Taipei sent

a twelve-member agricultural team in April, 1965.<sup>38</sup> This was subsequently renewed and expanded several times. As in many other African countries, the Chinese team achieved great success in Upper Volta, with an average yield of 6600 kilograms of rice per hectare. An Upper Volta official described the Chinese achievement as "fantastic and admirable," and President Sangoule Lamizala, who replaced Yameogo after a coup, was also "very much satisfied" with the work of the Chinese technicians.<sup>39</sup>

On September 13, 1971, during Yang Hsi-kun's visit to Upper Volta, Taipei signed a most favored nation trade agreement with Ouagadougou to increase commerce between the two countries.<sup>40</sup> In November, 1972, by another agreement the ROC granted Upper Volta 50 million CFA francs for construction of a rice mill.<sup>41</sup> However, just before the project was to begin, Upper Volta established diplomatic relations with Peking on September 15, 1973. Taipei broke off relations with Ouagadougou on October 23 and withdrew its forty-two agricultural technicians from Upper Volta.<sup>42</sup>

### Benin

When Benin became independent on August 1, 1960, under the name of Dahomey, Taipei appointed Chen Hsiung-fei, its charge d'affaires at Paris, as special envoy to the independence celebrations. Benin established diplomatic relations with the ROC on January 18, 1962. A technical cooperation agreement was signed between the two governments at Porto Novo on February 4, 1963, resulting in the dispatch of a twelve-man agricultural mission from Taiwan in March.<sup>43</sup> From October 7 to 12, 1963, President and Madam Maga paid a state visit

to Taiwan and received a warm welcome from President and Madam Chiang Kai-shek. A joint communique promised further cooperation between the two countries.<sup>44</sup> However, relations were very unsteady because of Benin's extreme political instability (see Table XXXVI).<sup>45</sup>

Benin had six coups d'etat in nine years. On November 12, 1964, a year after the first coup, the new government allowed Peking to establish an embassy in Cotonou (opened in December), while Taipei still had one there. This curious situation continued until April 6, 1965, when Taipei broke relations with Benin and withdrew its embassy.<sup>46</sup> Seven months later, two coups in quick succession brought a pro-Taipei government back to power in Benin, and the China policy was again reversed. Benin terminated its ties with Peking on January 3, 1966, and resumed relations with Taipei on April 21. Nine days earlier, on April 12, Taipei had renewed its agricultural cooperation agreement, and a new ROC agricultural team arrived in Cotonou in early May.<sup>47</sup>

The Chinese, who at first lived on "dry bread, sardines, and water," set a good example through self-discipline and hard work which won the respect of Benin's farmers.<sup>48</sup> By mid-1969 there were forty-one ROC agricultural technicians working in Benin.<sup>49</sup> But after three more coups, a Marxist government reverted to the 1964 pro-Peking policy, reviving diplomatic relations with Peking on December 29, 1972. Taipei apparently was not immediately informed, since an ROC official source dates the change from January 10, 1973. Taipei severed relations with Benin on January 14, and withdrew its agricultural team.<sup>50</sup>

#### Ivory Coast

When the Ivory Coast achieved independence on August 7, 1960, the

TABLE XXXVI  
CHINA POLICY CHANGES IN BENIN

Date	Event	Diplomatic Relations with the ROC		Diplomatic Relations with the PRC	
		Established	Severed	Established	Severed
1960. 8. 1	Independence				
1962. 1.18	Pro-Taipei policy	1962. 1. 18			
1963.10.28	First coup d'etat				
1964.11.12	Pro-Peking policy		1964. 4. 8	1964.11.12	
1965.11.29	Second coup d'etat				
1965.12.22	Third coup d'etat				
1966. 4.21	Pro-Taipei policy	1966. 4.21			1966.1.3
1967.12.17	Fourth coup d'etat				
1969.12.10	Fifth coup d'etat				
1972.10.26	Sixth coup d'etat				
1972.12.29	Pro-Peking policy		1973. 1.19	1972.12.29	

ROC sent Chen Hsiung-fei, its minister to Paris, as special envoy to the independence ceremonies at Abidjan, capital of the new republic. Though Taipei granted immediate recognition to the Ivory Coast, official diplomatic relations were not established until July 20, 1963, during ROC Foreign Minister Shen Chang-huan's visit to Abidjan.<sup>51</sup> Taipei's relations with Abidjan were to be among the most long-lasting and most fruitful with any African country. Ten months earlier, on September 22, 1962, Taipei had signed a technical cooperation agreement with Abidjan, and sent a fourteen-man agricultural demonstration team to the Ivory Coast in March, 1963.<sup>52</sup> This agreement was renewed August, 1967, expanding the ROC agricultural demonstration and cadre-training mission to the Ivory Coast to a total of 160 people, the largest ever sent by Taipei to an African country. The agreement was renewed in 1969, 1971, and 1974. In addition, Taipei established a "Seed Multiplication and Supply Center" in the Ivory Coast in April, 1968.<sup>53</sup>

Besides agriculture, Taipei's cooperation with Abidjan also included trade and handicrafts. On August 31, 1971, during his annual visit to Africa, Yang Hsi-k'un signed a trade agreement at Abidjan providing for reciprocal and preferential treatment between the two countries.<sup>54</sup> The Ivory Coast also requested ROC aid in tapping its forest and bamboo resources. An ROC team of handicraft experts arrived in Ivory Coast in October, 1973, and on April 10, 1974, the two countries signed a technical cooperation agreement at Abidjan, for ROC assistance to the Ivory Coast in developing a handicraft industry.<sup>55</sup> When a French official offered similar aid, President Houphouet-Boigny asked him to visit the Chinese team; after seeing its work, the French official withdrew his offer as unnecessary.<sup>56</sup>

Ivory Coast became one of Taipei's closest allies in Africa. President Houphouet-Boigny, acclaimed by the ROC as the "leader of leaders" in Africa, is one of the very few senior African statesmen who has persistently warned Africans of the danger presented to Africa by Communism, especially the Peking variety. Under his leadership, the Ivory Coast continuously supported Taipei in the United Nations between 1961-1971. As of 1978, the Ivory Coast was the only West African country that still recognized Taipei instead of Peking.

### Sierra Leone

Sierra Leone became independent on April 27, 1961, but did not establish diplomatic relations with the ROC until September 28, 1963. Taipei signed a technical cooperation agreement with Sierra Leone on March 30, 1964, under which an eleven-man farm team was sent in June to help Sierra Leone's agricultural development.<sup>57</sup> Working in a swampy area south of Freetown, capital of Sierra Leone, the Chinese team reaped its first rice harvest in late October, three months after sowing; local rice had required a growing period of six months. Furthermore, the Chinese were able to double Sierra Leone's rice output from 2,000 to 4,000 pounds per acre.<sup>58</sup> According to the Nationalist Chinese themselves, Freetown's attitude toward Taipei was at first skeptical; because of the hard work of the Chinese team, Sierra Leone's attitude gradually changed.<sup>59</sup>

A new technical cooperation agreement between the ROC and Sierra Leone was signed in Taipei on July 26, 1965, providing for U.S. \$2 million in agricultural aid from Taipei in the next five years.<sup>60</sup>

Banja Tejan-sie, speaker of the Sierra Leone parliament, said on October 18, 1965, during his visit to Taiwan, that Sierra Leone "will give 100 per cent support to the Republic of China when the so-called Chinese presentation problem comes up on the floor of the United Nations for debate."<sup>61</sup> But less than a month later, when the UN General Assembly again voted on the "China issue" Sierra Leone voted for Peking, not Taipei.<sup>62</sup>

It was only after the visit to Taipei by Prime Minister Siaka Stevens in May, 1969, that Sierra Leone began to take a definite pro-Taipei stand in the United Nations. It voted in favor of Taipei on the "representation issue" in both 1969 and 1970.<sup>63</sup> However, this was soon to change. In March, 1971, Stevens, by then president of Sierra Leone, received Guinean military help in suppressing a military revolt in Sierra Leone. Influenced by Guinea, one of Peking's closest allies in West Africa, and attracted by Peking's promise of economic and technical aid, Sierra Leone established diplomatic relations with the PRC on July 29, 1971. The ROC broke relations with Sierra Leone on August 20 and withdrew its agricultural mission.<sup>64</sup>

#### Gambia

The Republic of the Gambia, the smallest country in continental Africa, became independent on February 18, 1965, but did not establish relations with either China until late 1968. However, a sixteen-member agricultural team from the ROC was sent to Gambia in June, 1966, and a technical cooperation agreement between Gambia and the ROC was signed at Bathurst, capital of Gambia, on August 12, 1966, by the ROC ambassador to Upper Volta, Joei Tcheng-kao, and

Gambian Agriculture Minister A. S. Kanyi.<sup>65</sup> Because the Chinese team made "great contributions to the increase of rice production" in Gambia, Yaya Lang Cessay, the new Gambian minister of agriculture and natural resources, went to Taipei in May, 1968, to seek extension of the team's service.<sup>66</sup> On May 14 the Sino-Gambian technical cooperation agreement was extended for two years and the team was expanded to twenty-four men.<sup>67</sup>

On September 27, Yang Hsi-k'un signed a joint communique with Gambian Prime Minister Jawara at Bathurst, in which both sides indicated willingness to establish diplomatic relations, with the detailed procedures to be discussed by Jawara on a state visit to the ROC from November 8 to 12.<sup>68</sup> A joint communique at the end of this visit announced the establishment of diplomatic relations between the two countries on November 12, 1968.<sup>69</sup> After this long-delayed action, the ROC stepped up agricultural aid to Gambia, renewing the agreement in 1970, 1972, and 1974, and expanding the agricultural team to thirty-five members. Many new farm machines were also shipped to Gambia.<sup>70</sup>

On October 16, 1972, Jawara, now president of Gambia, and Lady Jawara arrived in Taipei for an eight-day state visit, and received a gold key to the city of Taipei as a token of respect.<sup>71</sup> Nevertheless, pressed by the pro-Peking trend prevailing in Africa, Gambia established diplomatic relations with the PRC on December 14, 1974, only three months after Taipei extended its technical cooperation agreement with Bathurst. The ROC broke relations with Gambia on December 28 and withdrew its farm technicians.

By the end of February, 1977, among the twelve West African countries which had at one time or another maintained diplomatic

relations with Taipei and received agricultural assistance from Taiwan, only the Ivory Coast remained a friend of Taipei.

### Central Africa

Central Africa was another area where Taipei was more successful than Peking during the 1960s and early 1970s. There were six independent countries in this part of Africa: Zaire, Chad, the Central African Republic, Rwanda, Niger, and Burundi. All except Burundi maintained diplomatic relations with the ROC during the 1960s, as shown in Table XXXVII.

TABLE XXXVII

#### THE ROC AND CENTRAL AFRICA

Independent	Diplomatic Relations with ROC		First Opened Relations with PRC
	Established	Country      Suspended	
1960. 6.30	1960. 8.10	Zaire	1972.11.24
1960. 8.11	1962. 1.13	Chad	1972.11.28
1960. 8.13	1962. 4.13	CAR      1964-1967	1974. 9.29
1962. 7. 1	1962. 7. 1	Rwanda	1971.11.12
1960. 8. 3	1963. 7.22	Niger	1974. 7.20

#### Zaire

The former Belgian Congo achieved its independence on June 30, 1960, and became the independent Republic of Congo, later renamed Zaire. Due to the influence of Belgium, which then had diplomatic relations

with the ROC, Taipei instead of Peking was invited to the independence ceremonies at Leopoldville, and diplomatic relations with Taipei were established on August 10, 1960. However, during the long series of civil wars that followed, Zaire was involved not with the ROC but with the PRC, which actively supported such rebels as Gizenga, Mulele, Gbenye, and Soumaliot in the first half of the 1960s (see Chapter V). Peking came to be regarded by Zaire's central government as one of its bitterest enemies. This hostility survived frequent changes of leadership within Zaire in the 1960s.

On October 13, 1964, during a visit to Taipei by Zaire's Minister of Agriculture, Albert Kalonji-Ditunga, a technical cooperation agreement was signed with the ROC.<sup>72</sup> Taipei sent an eleven-member agricultural team to Zaire in August, 1966, to work for two years helping to develop rice cultivation. The Chinese agricultural experts succeeded in producing rice and vegetables in Zaire and even transplanted Taiwanese pineapples into the "white sands" of the Congo. General Joseph Mobutu, Zaire's president since November, 1965, praised the Chinese contributions, saying: "The Dutch reclaim land from the sea; the Chinese produce rice and vegetables in sandy soil. The Chinese agricultural team is made up of people who know only hard work instead of filing reports."<sup>73</sup> The agricultural pact was renewed on September 3, 1969, and the Chinese team increased to thirty-nine by June, 1969.<sup>74</sup>

At the invitation of the ROC President Chiang, President and Madam Mobutu made a state visit to Taiwan from April 15 to 21, 1971. In a joint communique, the two leaders agreed "to strengthen cooperation with special emphasis on the cultivation of rice, maize, cotton,

sugarcane, and the establishment of sugar mills" in Zaire, and "to establish a joint committee that will meet once a year in Taipei and Kinshasa alternatively to discuss cooperation between the two countries."<sup>75</sup> After Mobutu's visit, the ROC actively helped Zaire develop the Ruzizi valley in Kivu, the most fertile province, hoping to raise cotton, sugar cane, rice, and cattle.<sup>76</sup>

Zaire supported the ROC in the United Nations from 1961 on, and its pro-Taipei stand became more definite in 1967 after Taipei began its agricultural aid. Zaire was one of the fifteen African countries voting against Peking's admission to the United Nations in October, 1971. After that, however, Mobutu's pro-Taipei attitude changed. Zaire established diplomatic relations with Peking on November 24, 1972, and withdrew its embassy from Taipei on December 30. Taipei broke off relations with Zaire on January 30, 1973, ninety-two agricultural technicians having already been withdrawn in December, 1972.<sup>77</sup> Zaire was the first Central African country to establish relations with Peking. The loss of Zaire was the most serious setback suffered by the ROC in Africa in the early 1970s.

### Chad

Chad achieved independence on August 11, 1960, but did not establish diplomatic relations with the ROC until January 13, 1962. From August 4 to 7, 1963, ROC Foreign Minister Shen Chang-huan visited Fort Lamy, capital of Chad. Under an agricultural cooperation agreement signed in Taipei on April 7, 1964, the ROC sent a

seventeen-man agricultural team to Chad in April, 1965, to help with cultivation of rice and sugar cane.<sup>78</sup> On June 19, 1969, a three-member economic mission from Chad led by Minister of Economic Affairs Abdoulaye Lamana arrived in Taipei for a week's visit to seek more assistance. In a joint communique on June 26, Taipei promised U.S. \$3 million in aid to Chad over the next five years, the first credit assistance granted by the ROC to a foreign country.<sup>79</sup> A new technical cooperation agreement was signed in Fort Lamy on January 15, 1966, providing for expansion of ROC agricultural assistance, scholarships for training young Chadian farmers in Taiwan, and construction of an oil refinery and a factory to produce 150,000 tons of soup a year.<sup>80</sup> In June, 1967, Taipei sent a four-member veterinary mission to Chad to help its animal husbandry.<sup>81</sup>

In 1972 the 1964 agricultural pact and the 1966 technical cooperation agreement were incorporated into a new Sino-Chadian economic and technical cooperation agreement signed on July 10 in Taipei, further increasing ROC agricultural and technical assistance to Chad. Despite the considerable aid it had received, Chad deserted Taipei a year after the latter lost its U.N. seat to Peking in late 1971. In May, 1971, Peking had donated U.S. \$2.5 million and 200,000 doses of vaccine to help Chad combat a cholera epidemic.<sup>82</sup> Chad voted against the expulsion of Taipei from the United Nations, but established diplomatic relations with Peking on November 28, 1972, four days after Zaire. Zaire's switch to Peking evidently influenced Chad's decision. Taipei severed diplomatic ties with Chad on December 27 and withdrew its agricultural mission.<sup>83</sup>

### Central African Republic

The Central African Republic achieved independence on August 13, 1960, but did not establish diplomatic relations with Taipei until April 13, 1962. During his 1963 tour of Africa, ROC Foreign Minister Shen Chang-huan visited Bangui, capital of the CAR, and met with President Dacko. On May 19, 1964, a CAR-ROC technical cooperation agreement on handicrafts was signed in Bangui.<sup>84</sup> Taipei sent a four-man handicraft demonstration team to the CAR in August. However, the CAR established diplomatic relations with Peking on September 29, 1964, causing Taipei to close its embassy on November 5 and withdraw the team.<sup>85</sup>

On New Year's Day, 1966, Dacko was overthrown by a military coup led by his cousin, Colonel Jean-Bedel Bokassa, then chief of staff of the CAR Army. The new regime under Bokassa broke off relations with Peking on January 6 and expelled the PRC embassy staff. Nevertheless, diplomatic relations between Bangui and Taipei were not restored until more than two years later, May 6, 1968. A technical cooperation agreement between the ROC and the CAR was signed on June 16, 1968, during CAR Foreign Minister Jean-Arthur Bandio's visit to Taipei, and a sixteen-man ROC agricultural mission was sent to the CAR in November.<sup>86</sup>

At the invitation of President Chiang, Bokassa paid a state visit to Taiwan from October 8 to 17, 1970, and the 1968 agreement was renewed.<sup>87</sup> A trade agreement was also signed to increase the trade between the two countries.<sup>88</sup> Immediately after Bokassa's visit, another team of four ROC agricultural experts arrived in Bangui in

early November to serve on four state farms, followed a month later by a Highway Engineering Team of eight members.<sup>89</sup> By the end of 1970 there were more than forty ROC technicians working in the CAR.<sup>90</sup>

Though the CAR had received considerable aid from the ROC and Bokassa had pledged support during his visit to Taiwan just a month earlier, when the "Chinese representation" issue was voted on in the United Nations in November, 1970, the CAR abstained, much to the dismay of the ROC government.<sup>91</sup> Nevertheless, diplomatic relations between Taipei and Bangui lingered on, and the 1970 technical cooperation agreement was renewed in March, 1973, during CAR Foreign Minister Joseph Potolot's visit to Taipei. In a joint communique Taipei and Bangui even agreed to form a joint committee to meet in Taipei and Bangui alternately once a year, to review the progress of technical cooperation between the two countries.<sup>92</sup> But under the influence of French President Valery Giscard d'Estaing and Zaire's Mobutu, and a PRC promise to build a railroad for the CAR, Bokassa decided to establish diplomatic ties with the PRC on August 20, 1976.<sup>93</sup> The CAR was the last country in Central Africa to switch to Peking. Taipei broke relations with Bangui on August 23, and withdrew all its technicians from the CAR.<sup>94</sup>

### Rwanda

Rwanda became independent on July 1, 1962, and established diplomatic relations with the ROC on the same day. A four-member Rwandan government delegation led by Minister of Agriculture and Economic Affairs P. D. Nkezabera visited Taipei from October 9 to 16, 1963, and signed an agricultural technical cooperation agreement which resulted

in the dispatch of a ten-man ROC agricultural team in late January, 1964, to work for two years in Rwanda.<sup>95</sup> On July 1, 1964, the second anniversary of Rwanda's independence, the Chinese team was able to present sheaves of rice to President Gregoire Kayabanda as evidence of the best harvest in Rwanda's history.<sup>96</sup> A handicraft technical cooperation pact was signed between the two countries at Kigali, capital of Rwanda, on May 26, 1965.<sup>97</sup>

The 1963 agreement was renewed in a new pact signed at Taipei on May 28, 1966, by Li Kuo-ting, ROC minister of economic affairs, and Thaddee Bagaragaza, Rwanda's minister of international cooperation. By the new agreement, Taipei was to provide U.S. \$1.5 million in technical aid over a five year period to help Rwanda develop 1,000 hectares of land into rice and sugar cane fields, and build three small sugar refineries, a soybean-oil plant, a pottery plant, and an agricultural training center.<sup>98</sup> At a press conference, shortly after the signing of the pact, Bagaragaza pledged Rwanda's support to Taipei in the United Nations.<sup>99</sup> Rwanda had abstained on the "Chinese representation" issue in November, 1965, but in the next five years, kept the promise made by Bagaragaza.

However, pressed by its strongly pro-Peking neighbor Tanzania and lured by a PRC promise of aid, Rwanda began to change its policy in early 1971, and for the first time voted for Peking's admission in the United Nations on October 26, 1971. On November 12 Rwanda officially established diplomatic relations with Peking. Taipei closed its embassy on May 13, 1972, and withdrew its forty-seven agricultural technicians. Five months after the closing of the ROC embassy, Peking

signed an economic and technical cooperation agreement with Rwanda, to finance the building of a road linking Rwanda with Tanzania, and the building of a cement plant.<sup>100</sup>

### Niger

This former French colony became the independent Republic of Niger on August 3, 1960. However, diplomatic relations with the ROC were not established until three years later. A Niger delegation led by Minister of Rural Economy Yacoube Djibo visited Taipei from November 6 to 10, 1962, and signed an economic and technical cooperation agreement, but Taipei did not begin agricultural assistance to Niger until July, 1964.<sup>101</sup> A year before that, ROC Foreign Minister Shen Changhuan visited Niamey, capital of Niger, and a joint communique was issued on July 22, 1963, announcing establishment of diplomatic relations between Taipei and Niamey.<sup>102</sup>

In July, 1964, Taipei sent five farm technicians to help Niger grow sugar cane; five more left for Niger in late August to help grow rice and dry land crops.<sup>103</sup> After two failures, the Chinese team reaped its first rice harvest in March, 1965, exceeding 5,000 kilograms per hectare.<sup>104</sup> In 1966, Taipei promised Niger U.S. \$3 million in technical and material assistance over the next five years.<sup>105</sup> By mid-1969, ROC farm technicians were able to help the farmers of Niger grow vegetables "not only for their own consumption but also for export" to France.<sup>106</sup>

Niger President and Madame Hamani Diori arrived in Taipei on October 23, 1969, for a five-day state visit. Speaking at a banquet

given in his honor by President Chiang, Diori thanked Chinese leaders for their assistance in agricultural development.<sup>107</sup>

During his annual trip to Africa in the summer of 1970, Yang Hsi-k'un signed a trade agreement with Niger at Niamey on August 15. The pact provided that the two governments shall grant each other favorable treatment in regard to export and import licensing and customs duties in order to stimulate trade between the two countries.<sup>108</sup> A second protocol to the economic and technical cooperation agreement was signed in Taipei on May 22, 1972, by Niger's Minister of Rural Economy Moma Kaka; the ROC agreed to continue technical assistance for Niger's agricultural development.<sup>109</sup>

During the 1960s, Niger was one of Taipei's strongest supporters in Africa, consistently voted for Taipei in the United Nations, and was among the fifteen African countries which voted against Peking's admission in 1971. However, by late 1973, Niger's stand began to change after all its neighbors had either established relations with or at least granted recognition to Peking: Algeria, Mali, Nigeria, Dahomey, Chad, and Upper Volta had diplomatic ties with Peking, while Libya had recognized Peking without establishing official diplomatic relations. Niger established diplomatic relations with the PRC on July 20, 1974. Taipei closed its embassy at Niamey nine days later and withdrew its fifty-three agricultural technicians from Niger.

#### East Africa

East Africa was the only region of Africa in which the ROC's

diplomatic efforts to compete with Peking were totally unsuccessful. In the 1960s, there were six independent countries in East Africa: Ethiopia, the Sudan, Somalia, Tanzania, Uganda, and Kenya. All except Ethiopia established diplomatic relations with Peking before the end of 1963. Despite the close friendship between the United States and both Ethiopia and the ROC during and after World War II, there is no evidence that Ethiopia ever established diplomatic relations with the ROC. On the other hand, it waited nearly twenty-one years before establishing relations with the PRC (November 24, 1970). Prior to that, Ethiopia had permitted both Peking and Taipei to station news agency correspondents in Addis Ababa, but beyond this meager achievement, the ROC made no headway in East Africa.

#### Southern Africa

Both Nationalist and Communist Chinese arrived in Southern Africa rather late because most colonies in that part of the continent achieved their independence relatively late. Of the thirteen countries in Southern Africa (Republic of South Africa, Madagascar, Malawi, Lesotho, Botswana, Swaziland, Rhodesia, Zambia, Mozambique, Angola, Comoros, Transkei, and Bophuthatswana), the last five did not become independent until the 1970s. Generally speaking, the ROC was more successful than the PRC in Southern Africa during the 1960s. Among the eight then independent Southern African countries, Taipei maintained diplomatic relations with six (South Africa, Madagascar, Malawi, Lesotho, Botswana, and Swaziland) and Peking with only one (Zambia); Rhodesia had diplomatic relations with neither (see Table XXXVIII).

TABLE XXXVIII  
THE ROC AND SOUTHERN AFRICA

Independent	Diplomatic Relations with ROC		First Opened Relations with PRC
	Established	Country	
1910. 5.31	1931	South Africa	not yet
1960. 6.27	1960. 6.27	Madagascar	1972.11. 6
1964. 7. 6	1966. 7.11	Malawi	not yet
1966.10. 4	1966.10.31	Lesotho	not yet
1966. 9.30	1966.12.30	Botswana	1974. 3.25
1968. 9. 6	1968. 9. 6	Swaziland	not yet

#### Republic of South Africa

A Chinese consulate general was opened in Johannesburg as early as 1897, while China was still the Manchu empire and South Africa still a British colony. Diplomatic relations between the independent Union of South Africa and the Republic of China date from 1931. After the division of China in 1949, South Africa continued to recognize the ROC government in Taiwan, and consistently voted against Peking's admission to the United Nations. This policy was not so much pro-Taipei as anti-Peking, because of the PRC's harsh criticism of South Africa. In the 1960s, relations between Taipei and Pretoria, capital of South Africa, were formal rather than close.

The major reason for this was that as long as the ROC had any hope of winning and retaining influence in black Africa, it could not afford to display friendship for the apartheid white minority regime in Pretoria. Conversely, South Africa did not seek friendship with

the ROC because that might provoke Peking into more active support of South Africa dissident movements. After the 1971 ouster of the ROC from the United Nations, both governments had reason to reevaluate the earlier policies. Abandoned by most of its black African friends, Taipei felt isolated by the PRC in Africa and began to review its relations with South Africa, neglected for so many years. Pretoria, feeling intensified pressure from the Communist powers and militant Africans and realizing the impossibility of appeasing Peking, decided to improve its relations with Taipei. Out of mutual sympathy and practical necessity, the ROC and South Africa were simultaneously attracted to each other by having a common enemy, Communist China.

Though the ROC had continued to maintain a consulate general in Johannesburg, South Africa did not set up a consulate general in Taipei until 1967. An ROC consulate in Cape Town was opened in January, 1973, to aid ROC fishing ships and crews, and local Chinese residents.<sup>110</sup> South Africa has become the ROC's largest trading partner in Africa since the early 1970s, and the trade has increased significantly.

The total trade volume between Taipei and Pretoria was only U.S. \$8 million in 1960, and only \$12 million in 1971. By 1975 it had climbed to U.S. \$140 million, and the estimate for 1976 was U.S. \$200 million.<sup>111</sup> A trade agreement with South Africa was signed on February 26, 1975, in Taipei, and a maize trade agreement on October 7, 1975, providing for the ROC to buy 1.35 million tons of maize from South Africa between 1976 and 1979.<sup>112</sup> Generally Taipei imported minerals (iron, coal, and industrial diamonds) and maize from South Africa and exported to it fish, textiles, and chemicals.<sup>113</sup>

In early March, 1976, Yang Hsi-k'un visited Pretoria and met with both President H. Diederichs and Prime Minister Vorster. Diederichs and Vorster reaffirmed South Africa's friendship for Nationalist China.<sup>114</sup> With Pretoria's approval, Yang also visited South-West Africa for the first time, met with South-West African tribal delegations then attending a constitutional meeting at Windhoek, and told them that the ROC "always supports any nation to achieve their legitimate political goals through peaceful means."<sup>115</sup> Taipei and Pretoria announced (April 26, 1976) that diplomatic relations between the two countries would be raised to ambassadorial level.<sup>116</sup> Improvement in diplomatic relations is reported to have substantially improved the lot of 8,000 overseas Chinese in South Africa, who like other Asians had been discriminated against in many ways.<sup>117</sup> Yang Hsi-k'un visited Pretoria again in August, 1977.

#### Magadascar

When Magadascar became independent on June 26, 1960, there was an ROC consulate general at Tananarive, capital of Magadascar. Taipei established diplomatic relations with the new republic on the same day and raised its consulate general to embassy rank. Because of his earlier close relations with the French Socialist party, President Philibert Tsiranana became one of the most anti-Communist leaders in Africa. On April 3, 1962, he became the first African head of state to visit Taiwan. A Sino-Magadascar treaty of amity was signed on April 4.<sup>118</sup> President Tsiranana later called his visit to Taiwan "very rewarding" and indicated that his country had "much to learn from Nationalist China in economic development, land reform, and

modernization of armed forces."<sup>119</sup>

In 1963 ROC Foreign Minister Shen visited Tananarive from August 24 to 29. Two months later, a Madagascar government delegation led by Minister of National Economy Jacques Rabemananjara signed a trade agreement in Taipei on November 11, 1969, to increase trade between the two countries.<sup>120</sup> From November 12 to 15, 1965, President and Madame Tsiranana paid a second visit to Taiwan.

A Sino-Madagascar agricultural technical cooperation agreement was signed on January 9, 1967, at Tananarive, according to which Taipei was to send an agricultural demonstration team to work for two years to help Madagascar's agriculture.<sup>121</sup> Yang Hsi-k'un visited Tananarive and signed a technical cooperation agreement on bamboo handicrafts with the Madagascar government on August 30, 1968: a three-man bamboo handicraft demonstration was sent from Taiwan in April, 1969.<sup>122</sup> The agricultural pact was extended on September 22, 1969, and the bamboo handicraft agreement on April 10, 1972.<sup>123</sup>

Madagascar under the leadership of Tsiranana was one of the ROC's strongest African supporters in the United Nations between 1961 and 1971. After Tsiranana was forced to resign in mid-May, 1972, by left-wing labor unions and students, the new regime under Major General Gabriel Ramanantsoa established diplomatic relations with Peking on November 6, 1972. Taipei closed its embassy at Tananarive on December 15 and withdrew all its technicians.<sup>124</sup>

### Malawi

Malawi achieved its independence on July 6, 1964. The ROC appointed Vice Foreign Minister Yang Hsi-k'un as special envoy to the

independence celebrations, but official diplomatic relations were not established until two years later. A Sino-Malawian technical co-operation agreement was signed by Yang and Malawian Prime Minister Banda on August 20, 1965, at Zomba, capital of Malawi, with some revisions on December 3.<sup>125</sup> The ROC sent a twelve-man agricultural team to Malawi for two years to demonstrate paddy rice and vegetable cultivation.

In July, 1966, Malawi became a republic and Banda the first president. On July 1 Yang Hsi-k'un led a government delegation to Malawi for the second anniversary of independence of the country. President Banda received Yang on July 11 and informed him that Malawi had decided to establish official diplomatic relations with Taipei.<sup>126</sup> On the same day the first protocol to the Sino-Malawian technical co-operation agreement was signed by Banda and Yang, expanding Taipei's agricultural assistance by twenty additional agricultural technicians.<sup>127</sup> As in many other African countries, the Chinese team achieved great success in increasing Malawi's average rice yield from 500 pounds to 6,000 pounds per hectare.<sup>128</sup> A second protocol was signed on January 22, 1969, to step up aid to Malawi.<sup>129</sup> By June, 1969, there were thirty-eight agricultural technicians from Taiwan working in Malawi.<sup>130</sup>

Malawi under Banda consistently supported Taipei in the United Nations between 1965 and 1971. During these years, various Malawian leaders and government delegations visited Taiwan. President Banda arrived in Taipei on August 4, 1967, for an eight-day visit.<sup>131</sup> At the end of his visit, Banda signed a joint communique with President Chiang on August 11, in which both leaders agreed that the "Communist

Chinese regime is the major source of the subversion, turbulence, and unrest in Asia, Africa, and other parts of the world."<sup>132</sup> Banda assured Chiang that Malawi would fully support Nationalist China in the United Nations.

During his 1972 visit to Malawi, Yang Hsi-k'un signed a new technical cooperation agreement on May 2, according to which the Chinese agricultural mission in Malawi was to complete reclamation of a total area of 2,200 acres of land in Nsanje, Limpasa, and Domasi.<sup>134</sup> This agreement was renewed on November 8, 1973, when Yang was on another six-day visit to Malawi, and renewed again in 1975 and 1977.<sup>135</sup> With technical aid from the ROC for thirteen years, Malawi is now one of the largest rice producing countries in Africa, and one of the six African countries that still maintains diplomatic relations with Taipei.<sup>136</sup>

### Lesotho

Basutoland became the independent Kingdom of Lesotho on October 4, 1966, and established diplomatic relations with Nationalist China on October 31. Even in 1965, Lesotho had sent trainees to attend the "Seminar for the African Agriculturalists" in Taiwan, and in January, 1966, Basutoland's Minister of Agriculture, Cooperatives and Marketing S. R. Letsie paid a week's visit to Taiwan.<sup>137</sup> After establishment of diplomatic relations, Lesotho Prime Minister Chief Leabua Jonathan visited Taiwan from November 21 to 28, 1966. At the end of his visit, Jonathan signed a joint communique agreeing that "international Communism's attempt and ambition to conquer the world is the most serious threat to world peace."<sup>138</sup>

A technical cooperation agreement was signed between the ROC and Lesotho on November 13, 1968, at Maseru, capital of Lesotho, and Taipei sent a twelve-man agricultural mission to Lesotho in January, 1969.<sup>139</sup> In August, 1969, Prime Minister Jonathan paid a second visit to Taiwan, reporting that the Chinese farm team in his country "had done an excellent job and won the respect" of his people.<sup>140</sup> Before leaving Taiwan, Jonathan announced that a treaty of amity would be signed between Lesotho and the ROC. This was accomplished on December 21 at Maseru, the third such treaty between Taipei and African countries.<sup>141</sup> The 1968 technical cooperation agreement was subsequently renewed and expanded in 1972 and 1973. By late 1975 there were twenty-two agricultural experts from Taiwan working in Lesotho.

Since 1971 Yang Hsi-k'un has visited Lesotho every year except in 1974 and 1975 during which he did not make any trip to Africa. His most recent trip to Lesotho was in August, 1977. In May, 1976, Prime Minister Jonathan paid his third visit to the ROC, while the queen of Lesotho also made a six-day visit to Taiwan in September, 1977.<sup>142</sup>

#### Botswana

Bechuanaland, a former British protectorate, became the independent Republic of Botswana on September 30, 1966, and established diplomatic relations with the ROC on December 30 of the same year.<sup>143</sup> In February, 1968, Taipei sent a twelve-member agricultural demonstration team to Botswana. On July 15 Botswana Vice-President Q.K.J. Masire arrived in Taipei for a nine-day official visit, and said his country

was "grateful to the Chinese government for sending an agricultural team to Botswana . . . a significant demonstration of genuine friendship."<sup>144</sup> Two months later, Yang Hsi-k'un, during his twenty-second trip to Africa, signed a technical cooperation agreement with Botswana on September 10 at Gaberones, capital of Botswana. According to the pact, retroactive to January 1, Taipei was to dispatch another farm team of more than ten members to Botswana in the near future.<sup>145</sup> The rice cultivation carried out by the Chinese teams in Botswana achieved a tremendous success, with a yield of 7,000 pounds of rice per acre.<sup>146</sup> This impressive achievement prompted Botswana to request extension of the 1968 agreement, which was done on April 28, 1972, by Yang, during his twenty-eighth trip to Africa.<sup>147</sup>

However, relations between the ROC and Botswana gradually deteriorated after the 1970 UN vote on "Chinese representation," when Botswana joined Chad, Togo, Cameroon, the CAR, and Senegal--all then receiving ROC agricultural aid--in saying they would no longer try to block Peking from the United Nations.<sup>148</sup> In October, 1971, Botswana voted for the expulsion of Taipei in order to seat Peking in the United Nations; yet diplomatic relations between the ROC and Botswana lingered on for two and a half more years. Botswana granted recognition to Peking on March 25, 1974, and asked ROC diplomatic representatives to leave.<sup>149</sup> Taipei closed its embassy at Gaberones on April 5 and withdrew its agricultural mission and medical personnel from Botswana.<sup>150</sup>

#### Swaziland

Swaziland, a former British protectorate, became an independent

kindgom on September 6, 1968, and established diplomatic relations with the ROC on the same day. Yang Hsi-k'un attended the independence ceremonies at Mbabane, capital of Swaziland. Friendly contacts between the two countries had begun much earlier, when several royal dignitaries from Swaziland visited Taiwan in 1964 and 1965.<sup>151</sup> The ROC signed a technical cooperation agreement with Swaziland on August 19, 1969, at Mbabane, and dispatched a seventeen-member agricultural team to Swaziland in September, to work on rice and vegetable growing.<sup>152</sup> The Sino-Swaziland pact was renewed on May 10, 1972, while the agricultural team was increased to twenty-five men.<sup>153</sup> The Chinese technicians achieved very successful results in Swaziland, raising upland rice yield to between 1,800 and 4,000 pounds per acre, paddy rice yield to about 9,000 pounds per acre. In addition, the Chinese also helped Swaziland produce vegetables and fruits. In a little more than two years after first receiving ROC agricultural assistance, Swaziland, though one of the smallest countries in Africa, was able to export food to other parts of the continent.<sup>154</sup>

A handicraft technical cooperation agreement was signed between the two countries on February 12, 1973, resulting in the dispatch of a three-man ROC handicraft demonstration team from Taiwan to Swaziland in March to help train woodcarvers, stonecarvers, and potters.<sup>155</sup> Both the agricultural agreement and the handicraft pact were later renewed in 1975.<sup>156</sup> Yang Hsi-k'un has visited Swaziland during every trip he made to Africa since 1971, the latest in July, 1977. ROC Vice-Premier Hsu Ching-chung visited Mbabane in October, 1976, following a week's visit to Taipei by Prince Maphevu Dlamini, premier of Swaziland, in August, 1976.<sup>157</sup> Swaziland is one of the six African

countries that still maintain diplomatic ties with Taipei.

In Southern Africa, as in other parts of the continent, the ROC was forced to retreat, though not as totally as elsewhere. Of the six African countries still recognizing Taipei, four are in Southern Africa. In Africa as a whole, it appears from the analysis above that the ROC did as well as could have been expected in its competition with the PRC, given the enormous differences in resources. At the peak of its influence, Taipei had diplomatic relations with twenty-two African countries (in 1969 and 1970) while Peking was recognized by only thirteen African countries in 1969 and fifteen in 1970. But as soon as Nationalist China's prestige in Africa reached its peak, it began to decline. The setback suffered by the ROC after 1970 can be attributed to a drastic change in political atmosphere in Africa for reasons beyond Taipei's control. ROC agricultural aid to African nations achieved impressive results in increased crop yields, but these contributions could not outweigh the political considerations which made it increasingly difficult even for non-Marxist African governments to refuse to deal with Peking.

#### FOOTNOTES

<sup>1</sup>For Chinese and English texts of the treaty, see Wai-chiao pu, Chung-hua min-kuo [Foreign ministry, Republic of China] com., Chung-wai tiao-yueh chi-pien [Treaties between the Republic of China and foreign states], hereafter referred to as Tiao-yueh chi-pien (ROC), I (1927-1957), Taipei, 1958, pp. 309-310.

<sup>2</sup>I-nan-piao (ROC).

<sup>3</sup>Munro, p. 9.

<sup>4</sup>Yang Hsi-k'un, p. 23.

<sup>5</sup>For Chinese and English texts of the renewal agreements in 1965, 1967, and 1970, see Tiao-yueh chi-pien (ROC), IV, (1965-1972), pp. 364-378. The texts of the 1961 and 1963 agreements were not published in Tiao-yueh chi-pien.

<sup>6</sup>"Economic Relations of Taipei, Peking, Africa," p. 5; and Kuan-hsi chien-chieh (ROC), p. 2.

<sup>7</sup>For Chinese and English texts of the agreement, see Tiao-yueh chi-pien (ROC), V (1973-1976), Taipei, 1977, pp. 124-127. See also Chung-yang jih-pao, May 7, 1976, p. 1.

<sup>8</sup>See Hsien-feng-an, table IV. For special reports on ROC agricultural aid to Liberia, see two articles by Yang Chung-nan, correspondent for Chung-kuo shih-pao [China times] in Europe, "Wo nung-teng-tui chu Lai-kuo chin-hsing 'lu-se ke-ming'" [Nationalist Chinese agricultural team helped Liberia's "green revolution"], Chung-kuo shih-pao, September 7, 1974, and "Fang lai-kuo nung-hueh-yuan ch'ung-pan-jen Ma Pao-chih po-shih" [An interview with Dr. Ma Pao-chih, founder of Liberia's college of agriculture], *ibid.*, September 10, 1974.

<sup>9</sup>Press release of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of China, February 23, 1960.

<sup>10</sup>For Chinese and French texts of the agreement, see Tiao-yueh chi-pien (ROC), III (1962-1964), Taipei, 1965, pp. 14-16.

<sup>11</sup>For Chinese and French texts of the protocol, see *ibid.*, pp. 21-24. See also "Economic Relations of Taipei, Peking, Africa," p. 5, and Radio Yaounde, August 1, 1964, in ARB, EFT Series, 1 (1964), p. 139.

<sup>12</sup>Free China Weekly, II, 2 (September 9, 1964), p. 2, and no. 11 (November 8, 1964), p. 4. See also Le Moniteur Africain du Commerce et de l'Industrie, September 19, 1964, cited in ARB, EFT Series (1964), p. 157.

<sup>13</sup>For statement issued by ROC Foreign Ministry on April 3, 1971, see Wai-chiao-pu sheng-ming chi kung-pao hui-pien [Statements and communiques of the ministry of foreign affairs, ROC], hereafter referred to as Kung-pao hui-pien (ROC), (July, 1970-June, 1971), pp. 45-46. See also Free China Weekly, XII, 14 (April 11, 1971), p. 4.

<sup>14</sup>See Lome Togo Domestio Service in French, 0630 and 1230 GMT, December 9, 1963, Daily Report, no. 242 (December 16, 1963), p. I 16; and Shang yueh-heng, pp. 73-75. Tsou Mei is the son of Tsou Lu, a close friend and follower of Dr. Sun Yat-sen and a senior leader of the Kuomintang in the early republican era. Tsou Mei received serious brain damage in the accident, which impaired his ability to speak and permanently paralyzed him. Today, fifteen years after that tragic accident, still paralyzed and unable to speak, he lives as an invalid in the Nationalist Chinese General Veterans Hospital near Taipei. For the most recent report on his condition, see Shih-chieh jih-pao [World journal], a Nationalist Chinese newspaper published in New York City, March 2, 1978, p. 12.

<sup>15</sup>See Togo Press, August 13, 1964, in ARB, EFT Series, I (1964), p. 140. For Chinese and French texts of the agreement, see Tiao-yueh chi-pien (ROC), III, pp. 208-211.

<sup>16</sup>Free China Weekly, IV, 20 (January 6, 1966), p. 1.

<sup>17</sup>See "Nationalist China's Aid Helps African Development," p. 3.

<sup>18</sup>For press release of the ROC government on October 5, 1972, see Kung-pao hui-pien (ROC), (July, 1972-June, 1973), p. 13.

<sup>19</sup>Free China Weekly, NN-LXIV-16 (April 21, 1964), pp. 3-4.

<sup>20</sup>Ansprenger, p. 12.

<sup>21</sup>For the Chinese and French texts of the Sino-Senegalese agreement, see Tiao-yueh chi-pien (ROC), III, pp. 202-205.

<sup>22</sup>I-nan-piao (ROC); Afrique Nouvelle, September 11, 1964, in ARB, PSC Series, I (1964), p. 155; Cooley, p. 132.

<sup>23</sup>"Economic Relations of Taipei, Peking, Africa," p. 6; Yang Feng-tai, "Nung-chi-pan yen-chiu," p. 105.

<sup>24</sup>Afrique Nouvelle, Dakar, August 26, 1965, in ARB, EFT Series, 2 (1965), p. 352. See also Free China Weekly, VI, 6 (October 2, 1966), p. 4.

<sup>25</sup>I-nan-piao, and Hsien-feng-an, table I.

<sup>26</sup>Munro, p. 7.

<sup>27</sup>Free China Weekly, III, 17 (June 20, 1965), p. 1; China Yearbook (1965-1966), p. 243.

<sup>28</sup>Peking, NCNA, International Service in English, 1230 GMT, July 26, 1965, Daily Report, no. 143 (July 27, 1965), p. BBB 1.

<sup>29</sup>Yen-lun hsuan-chi, p. 336; Slaweki, "The Two Chinas in Africa," p. 408.

<sup>30</sup>For Chinese and French texts of the agreement, see Tiao-yueh chi-pien (ROC), II, pp. 111-114.

<sup>31</sup>For texts of the various new agreements, see *ibid.*, IV, pp. 180-196.

<sup>32</sup>Free China Weekly, II, 4 (September 20, 1965), p. 4; see also Shang, p. 224.

<sup>33</sup>Free China Weekly, IX, 3 (May 4, 1969), p. 1.

<sup>34</sup>For text of the agreement, see Tiao-yueh chi-pien (ROC), V, pp. 39-42.

<sup>35</sup>Kung-pao hui-pien (ROC), March 30, 1974 (July, 1973-June, 1974), p. 21.

<sup>36</sup>See Fang-Fei chi-yao, pp. 9-10.

<sup>37</sup>For the Chinese text of the joint communique, see Yen-lun hsuan-chi, p. 234. For the English text, see Ouagadougou Upper Volta Domestic Service in French, 2000 GMT, July 23, 1963, Daily Report, no. 145 (July 26, 1963), pp. I 8-9.

<sup>38</sup>Free China Weekly, NN-LXIV-24 (June 16, 1964), p. 4, and IV, 1 (August 29, 1965), p. 1. See also Le Moniteur Africain du Commerce et de l'Industrie, April 17, 1965, in ARB, EFT Series, 2 (1965), p. 294. For Chinese and French texts of the pact, see Tiao-yueh chi-pien, III, pp. 339-342.

<sup>39</sup>Free China Weekly, VI, 8 (October 16, 1966), p. 8, and VIII, 1 (February 25, 1968), p. 1.

<sup>40</sup>Under the trade pact, the ROC would sell textiles, machines, tools, equipment, glassware, and cement to Upper Volta, and buy from it cotton, sesame, groundnuts, almonds, meat, hides, and skins. For texts of the agreement, see Tiao-yueh chi-pien (ROC), IV, pp. 915-920.

<sup>41</sup>For the exchange of notes on the agreement, see *ibid.*, pp. 925-928. See also Radio Ouagadougou, November 24, 1972, in ARB, EFT Series, 9 (1972), p. 2572.

<sup>42</sup>For press release of the ROC Foreign Ministry on October 28, 1973, see Kung-pao hui-pien (July, 1973-June, 1974), pp. 20-21.

<sup>43</sup>See "Economic Relations of Taipei, Peking, Africa," p. 6. For texts of the agreement, see Tiao-yueh chi-pien (ROC), III, pp. 68-71.

<sup>44</sup>For Chinese text of the joint communique, see Yen-lun hsuan-chi, pp. 222-223. For ROC reports of Maga's visit, see Hsin-wen-chu, Da-ho-mey kung-ho-kuo Ma-chia tsung-tung k'ang-li fang-Hua [President and Madame Maga of the Republic of Dahomey visit Republic of China], Taipei, 1963.

<sup>45</sup>For a Chinese description of Dahomey's political instability, see Shang, pp. 67-71.

<sup>46</sup>Radio Cotonou, April 8, 1965, in ARB, PSC Series, 2 (1965), p. 283. See also Free China Weekly, III, 7 (April 11, 1965), p. 1.

<sup>47</sup>For texts of the new agreement, see Tiao-yueh chi-pien (ROC), IV, pp. 115-118.

<sup>48</sup>See Zekpa, pp. 28-32.

<sup>49</sup>China Handbook (1969-1970), p. 184.

<sup>50</sup>For press release of the ROC Foreign Ministry on January 27, 1973, see Kung-pao hui-pien (July, 1972-June, 1973), p. 16. For the discrepancy between PRC and ROC reports, see Chapter IV, note 88.

<sup>51</sup>Fang-Fei chi-yao, pp. 11-13; Abidjan Ivory Coast Domestic Service in French, 2000 GMT, July 21, 1963, Daily Report, no. 141 (July 22, 1963), pp. I 3-4. For the Chinese text of the joint communique of July 20, see Yen-lun hsuan-chi, p. 235.

<sup>52</sup>For texts of the agreement, see Tiao-yueh chi-pien (ROC), III, pp. 131-134.

<sup>53</sup>The seed center was the result of an agreement signed on April 26, 1967, at Abidjan. For texts see *ibid.*, IV, pp. 271-274; see also Free China Weekly, VI, 52 (August 20, 1967), p. 4.

<sup>54</sup>See Radio Taipei, September 6, 1971, in ARB, EFT Series, 8 (1971), p. 2141; Free China Weekly, XII, 36 (September 12, 1971), p. 4. For texts of the agreement, see Tiao-yueh chi-pien (ROC), *ibid.*, pp. 280-285.

<sup>55</sup>Free China Weekly, XV, 15 (April 21, 1974), p. 1. For texts of the handicraft pact, see Tiao-yueh chi-pien, V (1973-1976), pp. 75-77.

<sup>56</sup>Chung-yang jih-pao, April 28, 1976, p. 1.

<sup>57</sup>See Daily Mail (Freetown), March 21, 1964, in ARB, EFT Series,

1 (1964), p. 43; Free China Weekly, NN-LXIV-24 (June 16, 1964), p. 4. For the Chinese text of the pact, see Tiao-yueh chi-pien (ROC), III, pp. 206-207.

<sup>58</sup>Free China Weekly, II, 10 (November 1, 1964), p. 2, and 16 (December 13, 1964), p. 4.

<sup>59</sup>Kuan-hsi chien-chieh (ROC), p. 11.

<sup>60</sup>Free China Weekly, III, 23 (August 1, 1965), p. 1. For Chinese and English texts of the agreement, see Tiao-yueh chi-pien (ROC), IV, pp. 544-550.

<sup>61</sup>Free China Weekly, IV, 9 (October 24, 1965), p. 4.

<sup>62</sup>See Wai-chiao-pu Fei-chou-ssu, "Fei-chou kuo-chia tsai nien-ho-kuo li-chieh ta-hui chung tui so-wei Chung-kuo tai-piao-chuan wen-ti ti tou-piao chi-lu" [The voting record of the African countries on the so-called Chinese representation issue at each annual session of the UN General Assembly], hereafter referred to as Tou-piao chi-lu (Taipei, 1971).

<sup>63</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>64</sup>For the ROC Foreign Ministry's statement on August 20, see Kung-pao hui-pien (July, 1971-June, 1972), pp. 32-33; and Free China Weekly, XII, 34 (August 29, 1971), p. 1.

<sup>65</sup>Free China Weekly, V, 26 (August 21, 1966), p. 1. For Chinese and English texts of the agreement, see Tiao-yueh chi-pien (ROC), IV, pp. 197-199. As a matter of fact, a sixteen-member Nationalist Chinese farm team was already sent to Gambia in June before the signing of the agreement. See Free China Weekly, VI, 6 (October 2, 1966), p. 4.

<sup>66</sup>Free China Weekly, VIII, 12 (May 12, 1968), p. 1.

<sup>67</sup>*Ibid.*, 13 (May 19, 1968), p. 4, and 18 (June 23, 1968), p. 1. For texts of the agreement, see Tiao-yueh chi-pien (ROC), IV, pp. 202-205.

<sup>68</sup>Free China Weekly, IX, 7 (October 6, 1968), pp. 1, 4. For the Chinese text of the joint communique, see Kung-pao hui pien (July, 1968-June, 1969), p. 38.

<sup>69</sup>Free China Weekly, IX, 12 (November 10, 1968), p. 1, and 13 (November 17, 1968), p. 1.

<sup>70</sup>*Ibid.*, XI, 11 (March 15, 1970), p. 2.

<sup>71</sup>*Ibid.*, XIII, 32 (August 13, 1972), p. 1, and 42 (October 22, 1972), p. 1. For special pictorial reports on Jawara's visit, see "Special Supplement" section in 42.

<sup>72</sup>*Ibid.*, II, 8 (October 18, 1964), p. 4.

<sup>73</sup>Shang, p. 239. For a detailed study of the work done by the Nationalist Chinese team in Zaire, see Shang, Part II, chapter 14 (pp. 237-241) and "Nationalist Chinese--Congolese Cooperation Increase," a translation of an article in the French-language Zaire, Kinshasa, April 19, 1971, pp. 16-17, in JPRS, Translations on Africa, no. 161 (53358), no. 1043, pp. 23-26.

<sup>74</sup>China Handbook (1969-1970), table I (p. 184). For Chinese and French texts of the technical cooperation pact of 1969, see Tiao-yueh chi-pien (ROC), IV, pp. 103-107.

<sup>75</sup>Free China Weekly, XII, 16 (April 25, 1971), p. 1. For Chinese and French texts of the joint communique, see Kung-pao hui-pien (July, 1970-June, 1971), pp. 52-53.

<sup>76</sup>Le Moniteur Africain du Commerce et de l'Industrie, September 30, 1971, in ARB, EFT Series, 8 (1971), p. 2167.

<sup>77</sup>See press release of the ROC Foreign Ministry on February 2, 1973, Kung-pao hui-pien (July, 1972-June, 1973), p. 16.

<sup>78</sup>See Le Moniteur Africain du Commerce et de l'Industrie, May 1, 1965, in ARB, EFT Series, 2 (1965), p. 293. For Chinese and French texts of the agreement, see Tiao-yueh chi-pien (ROC), III, pp. 36-40.

<sup>79</sup>La Presse du Cameroon, June 25, 1965, in ARB, EFT Series, 2 (1965), p. 327. One-third of the grant was to finance construction projects in Fort Lamy and the rest for industrial and agricultural development and employment of Chinese technicians in Chad. See Free China Weekly, III, 19 (July 4, 1965), p. 1.

<sup>80</sup>Free China Weekly, IV, 22 (January 23, 1966), p. 1, and Le Moniteur Africain du Commerce et de l'Industrie, January 26, 1966, in ARB, EFT Series, 3 (1966), p. 452. For texts of the agreement, see Tiao-yueh chi-pien (ROC), IV, pp. 88-93.

<sup>81</sup>Hsien-feng-an, table II. See also "Nationalist China's Aid Helps African Development," p. 3; and "Economic Relations of Taipei, Peking, Africa," p. 6.

<sup>82</sup>Jonathan Unger, "Peking: On the Brink," Far Eastern Economic Review, LXXIII, 28 (July 10, 1971), p. 27.

<sup>83</sup>For press release of the ROC Foreign Ministry on December 27, 1972, see Kung-pao hui-pien (July, 1972-June, 1973), p. 15.

<sup>84</sup>For texts of the agreement, see Tiao-yueh chi-pien (ROC), III, pp. 32-35.

<sup>85</sup>Free China Weekly, II, 11 (November 8, 1964), p. 4.

<sup>86</sup>Marches Tropicaux et Mediterraneens, June 22, 1968, in ARB, EFT Series, 5 (1968), p. 1074; and Free China Weekly, VIII, 18 (June 23,

1968), p. 4. See also "Economic Relations of Taipei, Peking, Africa," p. 6. For texts of the agreement, see Tiao-yueh chi-pien (ROC), IV, pp. 74-77.

<sup>87</sup>For texts of the 1970 technical cooperation agreement between Taipei and Bangui, see Tiao-yueh chi-pien (ROC), *ibid.*, pp. 81-87.

<sup>88</sup>For texts of the ROC-CAR trade agreement, see *ibid.*, pp. 78-81.

<sup>89</sup>See Radio Banui in French, 1830 GMT, November 3, 1970, in BBC, SWB, ME/3527/B/5; China Yearbook (ROC), 1971-1972, pp. 384-385.

<sup>90</sup>China Yearbook, *ibid.*

<sup>91</sup>Glenn, p. 31. The abstention of the CAR in the UN voting followed by about ten days a statement by Bokassa (in an interview with the magazine Africasia) that he was ready to resume relations with Peking if it wished. See Afrique Nouvelle, November 11, 1970, in ARB, EFT Series, 7 (1970), p. 1842.

<sup>92</sup>Free China Weekly, XIV, 10 (March 18, 1973), p. 4.

<sup>93</sup>Yang Chung-nan, "Fei-chou hsin-wen-hsin" [Newsletter from Africa], Chung-yang jih-pao, November 5, 1976, p. 1. Just two weeks earlier, CAR Foreign Minister Antonio Franck visited Taipei and signed a joint communique with the ROC government on August 20 in which both sides indicated desire to strengthen relations and cooperation between the two countries. See Chung-yang jih-pao, August 5 (p. 1), August 6 (p. 1), and August 10 (p. 2).

<sup>94</sup>*Ibid.*, August 24, 1976, p. 1.

<sup>95</sup>For texts of the agreement, see Tiao-yueh chi-pien (ROC), III, pp. 194-197.

<sup>96</sup>Free China Weekly, I, 20 (July 12, 1964), p. 4.

<sup>97</sup>*Ibid.*, III, 15 (June 6, 1965), p. 1. For texts, see Tiao-yueh chi-pien (ROC), IV, pp. 507-510. A four-man handicraft demonstration team from Taiwan had been in Rwanda since February.

<sup>98</sup>Free China Weekly, V, 15 (June 5, 1966), p. 4, and "Economic Relations of Taipei, Peking, Africa," p. 6. See also "Taiwan Rice Experts Start Pilot Project in Rwanda," a translation of an article by "J.K." entitled "Do You Know 'Sinchu 61'?" in the French-language publication Trafipro [The cooperation member], Kabgayi, no. 26 (April 24, 1967), p. 6, in JPRS, Translations on Africa, no. 66 (41362), no. 582, pp. 64-65; and "Nationalist China's Aid Helps African Development," pp. 3-4; for texts of the pact, see Tiao-yueh chi-pien (ROC), IV, pp. 510-516.

<sup>99</sup>Free China Weekly, V, 15 (June 5, 1966), p. 4.

<sup>100</sup>Daily Nation (Nairobi), October 13, 1972, in ARB, EFT Series, 9 (1972), p. 2511.

<sup>101</sup>For texts of the agreement, see Tiao-yueh chi-pien (ROC), III, pp. 166-168.

<sup>102</sup>For the Chinese text of the joint communique, see Fang-fei chi-yao, p. 14.

<sup>103</sup>Free China Weekly, I, 21 (July 19, 1964), p. 4; 22 (July 26, 1964), p. 1; and II, 1 (August 30, 1964), p. 1.

<sup>104</sup>Ibid., II, 3 (March 14, 1965), p. 1, and 12 (May 16, 1965), p. 4. See also Shang, part II, chapter 7.

<sup>105</sup>For texts of the protocol, see Tiao-yueh chi-pien (ROC), IV, pp. 446-450. Before the signing of this protocol, Taipei had already dispatched ten technicians to Niger in early May to work out a land reclamation project, which was later incorporated into the protocol part of the new aid.

<sup>106</sup>Free China Weekly, IX, 42 (June 8, 1969), p. 2 and Shang, p. 204.

<sup>107</sup>Ibid., X, 10 (October 26, 1969), p. 1; and 11 (November 2, 1969), p. 1.

<sup>108</sup>Ibid., 34 (August 23, 1970), p. 1. For texts of the trade pact, see Tiao-yueh chi-pien (ROC), IV, pp. 450-452.

<sup>109</sup>Free China Weekly, XIII, 21 (May 28, 1972), p. 1. For texts of the protocol, see Tiao-yueh chi-pien (ROC), IV, pp. 453-457.

<sup>110</sup>Kuan-hsi chien-chieh (ROC), p. 8.

<sup>111</sup>Chung-yang jih-pao, March 12, 1976, p. 1, and April 30, 1976, p. 2.

<sup>112</sup>For Chinese and English texts of the trade pact, see Tiao-yueh chi-pien (ROC), V, pp. 235-238; for the English text of the maize trade agreement, see ibid., pp. 238-247.

<sup>113</sup>Yu ssu-chou, "Wo yu nan-Fei mao-i chi-tseng" [ROC-South African trade increased rapidly], Chung-yang jih-pao, April 27, 1976, p. 1.

<sup>114</sup>Chung-yang jih-pao, March 6, 1976, p. 2, and March 7, 1976, p. 1.

<sup>115</sup>Ibid., March 10, 1976, p. 1.

<sup>116</sup>See Chung-yang jih-pao, April 27, 1976, p. 1, and its editorial, "Wo yu nan-Fei tseng-chin wai-chiao kuan-hsi ti yi-i" [The significance

of the strengthening of diplomatic relations between the Republic of China and South Africa], on the same page, and April 28, 1976, p. 1. See also Radio Johannesburg, April 28, 1976, in ARB, PSC Series, 13 (1976), p. 4010.

<sup>117</sup>Chung-yang jih-pao, June 10, 1976, p. 3, and June 20, 1976, p. 2.

<sup>118</sup>For Chinese and French texts of the amity treaty, see Tiao-yueh chi-pien (ROC), III, pp. 151-154; for the Chinese text of a joint communique, see the special pamphlet on Tsiranana's visit compiled by Hsin-wen-chu, "Ma-la-chia-hsi kung-ho-kuo Chi-na-na tsung-tung k'ang-li fang-Hua" [The visit to the Republic of China by President and Madame Tsiranana of Malagasy Republic], (Taipei, 1962), pp. 41-42; and Yen-lun hsuan-chi, pp. 213-214.

<sup>119</sup>Slawewski, "The Two Chinas in Africa," p. 408.

<sup>120</sup>For Chinese and French texts of the trade pact, see Tiao-yueh chi-pien (ROC), III, pp. 154-157.

<sup>121</sup>For Chinese and French texts of the agricultural pact, see *ibid.*, IV, pp. 379-382. Apparently an agricultural team from Taiwan had already arrived in Madagascar in December, 1966. See Hsien-feng-an, table I, and China Handbook (1969-1970), table I (p. 184). The initial number of team members is unknown; however, by 1967 there were twenty-four ROC agricultural technicians working in Madagascar and by 1968 the number increased to twenty-seven. See "Economic Relations of Taipei, Peking, Africa," p. 7.

<sup>122</sup>Free China Weekly, IX, 9 (October 20, 1968), p. 4. For texts of the bamboo handicraft pact, see Tiao-yueh chi-pien (ROC), IV, pp. 382-385.

<sup>123</sup>For the exchange of the note on the extension of the agricultural pact, see Tiao-yueh chi-pien (ROC), IV, pp. 387-389. For the texts of the 1972 bamboo handicraft pact between the two countries, see pp. 393-396.

<sup>124</sup>See press release of the ROC Foreign Ministry on December 17, 1972, in Kung-pao hui-pien (July, 1972-June, 1973), p. 14.

<sup>125</sup>Free China Weekly, V, 1 (February 27, 1966), p. 3. For texts of the initial pact, see Tiao-yueh chi-pien (ROC), IV, pp. 397-401. For texts of the new agreement signed on December 3, see pp. 401-406.

<sup>126</sup>Radio Blantyre Domestic Service in English, 1600 GMT, July 12, 1966, Daily Report, no. 134 (July 13, 1966), pp. I 9-10. See also Free China Weekly, V, 21 (July 17, 1966), p. 1.

<sup>127</sup>For texts of the first protocol, see Tiao-yueh chi-pien (ROC), IV, pp. 406-408.

<sup>128</sup>Free China Weekly, VI, 5 (September 25, 1966), p. 2. For Malawian reports on the Chinese technicians' achievements, see "Chinese Agricultural Aid to Malawi," This is Malawi, 3, 10 (October, 1967), pp. 21-22; "Rice--the Crop with a Future, Chinese Boost Production in Malawi," *ibid.*, 12 (December, 1967), pp. 10-11; "Two Plots of Land (Njala, Kaporo)--Chinese Influence Malawi Farmers," *ibid.*, 4, 1 (January, 1968), pp. 18-19; "Chinese Agricultural Team in Malawi Reclaim Land to Extend Rice Cultivation," *ibid.*, 2 (February, 1968), p. 10; and "Agricultural Achievements on Show," *ibid.*, 9 (September, 1968), p. 4.

<sup>129</sup>For texts of the second protocol, see Tiao-yueh chi-pien (ROC), IV, pp. 409-412.

<sup>130</sup>China Handbook (1969-1970), table I (p. 184), and table III (p. 185).

<sup>131</sup>Free China Weekly, VI, 5 (August 6, 1967), p. 1.

<sup>132</sup>For Chinese text of Chiang-Banda joint communique, see Wai-chiao-pu, Wai-chiao-pu chou-pao [Weekly of the foreign ministry, ROC], no. 851 (August 15, 1967), p. 2. See also Radio Blantyre, August 14, in ARB, PSC Series, 4 (1967), p. 847.

<sup>133</sup>Rhodesia Herald, August 7, 1967, in ARB, PSC Series, *ibid.* See also "Malawai at the United Nations," excerpts from an address by Malawi Foreign Minister A. Nyasulu in the UN General Assembly in October, 1968, This is Malawi, 4, 11 (November, 1968), p. 21.

<sup>134</sup>Radio Blantyre in English, 1600 GMT, May 2, 1972, in BBC, SWB, ME/3980/B/4. For texts of the agreement, see Tiao-yueh chi-pien (ROC), IV, pp. 415-422.

<sup>135</sup>For texts of the 1973 agreement, see Tiao-yueh chi-pien (ROC), V, pp. 134-142.

<sup>136</sup>For more recent reports on the ROC agricultural mission in Malawi, see Chung-yang jih-pao, February 16 (p. 1), March 1 (p. 1), March 8 (p. 1), and December 2 (p. 3) of 1976; and January 27 (p. 1), May 5 (p. 1), July 12 (p. 3), and August 23 (p. 3), of 1977.

<sup>137</sup>Free China Weekly, IV, 20 (January 9, 1966), p. 1.

<sup>138</sup>For the Chinese text of the joint communique, see Kung-pao hui-pien (July, 1966-June, 1967), pp. 17-18.

<sup>139</sup>For Chinese and English texts of the pact, see Tiao-yueh chi-pien (ROC), IV, pp. 351-353.

<sup>140</sup>Free China Weekly, X, 2 (August 31, 1969), p. 1.

<sup>141</sup>For Chinese and English texts of the treaty, see Tiao-yueh chi-pien (ROC), IV, pp. 358-361.

<sup>142</sup>For ROC reports on Jonathan's third visit to Taiwan, see Chung-yang jih-pao, p. 1 of May 23, 27, 31, and June 1-6, and June 8, 1976. For reports on the queen's visit, see *ibid.*, September 28, 1977, pp. 1, 2.

<sup>143</sup>For the Chinese text of the joint communique on establishment of diplomatic relations, see statement issued by the ROC Foreign Ministry on December 30, 1966, in Kung-pao hui-pien (July, 1966-June, 1967), pp. 22-23.

<sup>144</sup>Free China Weekly, VIII, 22 (July 21, 1968), p. 4.

<sup>145</sup>*Ibid.*, IX, 5 (September 22, 1968), p. 1; and 11 (November 3, 1968), p. 1. For Chinese and English texts of the agreement, see Tiao-yueh chi-pien (ROC), IV, pp. 44-47.

<sup>146</sup>"Two Chinas in Africa," p. 395.

<sup>147</sup>For texts of the 1972 pact, see Tiao-yueh chi-pien (ROC), IV, pp. 47-52.

<sup>148</sup>Sin-chew jih-pao [Singapore daily news], December 2, 1970. However, in the UN voting of 1970, Botswana still voted for the US-resolution to treat the "Chinese representation" as an important issue, which required a two-thirds majority to pass. Botswana abstained on the Albanian resolution (to admit Peking and expel Taipei) which it had voted against since 1968. See Tou-piao chi-lu (ROC).

<sup>149</sup>Radio Johannesburg in English for abroad, 1600 GMT, March 25, 1974, BBC, SWB, ME/4561/B/7.

<sup>150</sup>For press release of the ROC Foreign Ministry on April 5, 1974, see Kung-pao hui-pien (July, 1973-June, 1974), pp. 21-22.

<sup>151</sup>In late October and early November, 1964, S. S. Nxumalo, a cousin of Swaziland's King Sobhuza II who later became Minister of Industry, Commerce and Tourism of Swaziland, visited Taiwan. Nxumalo subsequently visited Taiwan in 1969 and 1973. Before he became Swaziland's premier, Prince Makhosini Dlamini, then leader of the ruling Imbokodo National Movement of Swaziland, also visited Nationalist China in early 1965. See Kuan-hsi chien-chieh (ROC), p. 4, and Free China Weekly, II, 24 (February 7, 1965), p. 1.

<sup>152</sup>For texts of the pact, see Tiao-yueh chi-pien (ROC), IV, pp. 555-559.

<sup>153</sup>For texts of the new pact, see *ibid.*, pp. 559-562.

<sup>154</sup>Free China Weekly, XIII, 47 (November 26, 1972), p. 2.

<sup>155</sup>For texts of the handicraft pact, see Tiao-yueh chi-pien (ROC), V, pp. 248-250.

<sup>156</sup>For the exchange of notes between the two governments on the extension of the two pacts, see *ibid.*, pp. 250-255.

<sup>157</sup>For ROC reports on Maphevu's activities during his visit to Taiwan, see Chung-yangjih-pao, August 20 (p. 1), August 21 (p. 1), August 22 (p. 2), August 23 (p. 2), August 24 (p. 1), August 25 (p. 1), August 26 (p. 1), and August 27 (p. 1).

## CHAPTER X

### AFRICA AND "CHINA" IN THE UNITED NATIONS

#### The "China Issue"

Since its founding in October, 1945, the United Nations has discussed, and sometimes voted on, many difficult and complicated issues, but none proved more difficult to resolve than the so-called "China issue," on which the United Nations voted twenty-one times in twenty-two years.<sup>1</sup> The purpose of this chapter is to summarize the entire series of votes in the context of other events, and then to analyze the role of Africa in the long dispute.

#### Representation, Not Admission

The Republic of China was one of the founding members of the United Nations and one of the five permanent members of the Security Council. There probably would not have been a "China issue" in the United Nations if the ROC had either won the Chinese civil war or been totally defeated. Instead, the ROC lost most of China but retained the island of Taiwan and thus survived as a functioning government for millions of Chinese, not a powerless government in exile on foreign soil. Although this division of China between two governments had proximate parallels in Germany, Korea, and Vietnam, none of those countries had been United Nations members before the division. The

partition of China therefore created a unique dilemma: not whether "China" should be admitted to the United Nations, but which government was entitled to represent China in the United Nations.

This question was first raised by the PRC six weeks after that government was established. At that time, ROC armies were still in southern China, and the ROC government had moved back to the World War II capital at Chungking deep in the interior; it did not abandon the mainland and move to Taiwan until December 8, 1949. But on November 15, 1949, PRC Premier Chou En-lai cabled UN Secretary General Trygve Lie and Carlos Romulo, president of the UN General Assembly, declaring that "the remnant reactionary Kuomintang government is fundamentally doomed and is no longer qualified to represent the Chinese people."<sup>2</sup>

Ten days later, at a meeting of the First Committee of the fourth session of the General Assembly, representatives from the Soviet Union, Ukraine, Byelorussia, Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Yugoslavia challenged the right of the ROC to represent China. Thus began the first debate on "Chinese representation" in a UN organ.<sup>3</sup> In reply, ROC chief delegate Dr. Tsiang Tingfu accused the Soviet Union of supporting the Chinese Communists during the civil war in China, in violation of the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Alliance signed by Moscow with the ROC in 1945.<sup>4</sup>

On December 29, 1949, the Soviet delegate to the Security Council, Yakov Malik, demanded the expulsion of the ROC delegation. After a rebuttal by the ROC delegate, the president of the Security Council ruled the matter closed since it was not on the provisional agenda of the meeting.<sup>5</sup>

Peking then tried a more direct approach, appointing PRC delegations to the Security Council and the Economic and Social Council, and demanding that they be seated in place of the ROC delegations. Messages to this effect on January 19 and February 8 were followed in the first half of 1950 by similar approaches to other United Nations agencies, all without success.<sup>10</sup> On June 25, 1950, North Korea armed forces invaded South Korea, starting a war that was to complicate the "China issue" even more. When the Security Council condemned North Korean aggression and called on all member states to assist South Korea, the Soviet Union was unable to use its veto because it was still boycotting the Security Council over the China issue.

#### PRC Aggression Against UN

##### Forces in Korea

On September 14, 1950, just four days after the United Nations forces landed at Inchon to begin driving the North Koreans back, India asked the General Assembly to transfer the Chinese seat from Taipei to Peking. This resolution A/1365 was rejected by thirty-three votes to sixteen, with ten abstentions, the first General Assembly vote on the issue.<sup>11</sup> Peking's prospects declined even more after its armies entered Korea on October 19 and attacked United Nations and South Korean forces on all fronts. The Security Council initially tried to avoid a wider war by inviting the PRC to send a special representative to Security Council meetings. But on November 28, Peking's representative, Wu Hsiu-chuan, denounced the Council for depriving the PRC of its lawful seat as a permanent member. After making similar charges in several meetings of the General Assembly's First Committee, Wu and

the PRC delegation went home on December 19.<sup>12</sup> On February 1, 1951, the General Assembly adopted resolution 498(V) condemning PRC aggression in Korea.<sup>13</sup> Thus, Peking was officially branded an aggressor by the very organization it earnestly wanted to join. On May 18, the General Assembly adopted resolution 500(V) recommending an embargo on shipment of arms, ammunition, and other war materials of strategic value to areas controlled by the PRC and North Korea.<sup>14</sup> The Korean War dragged on to a stalemate, ending in a cease-fire agreement on July 27, 1953.

#### The "Moratorium" Resolutions

1951-1960

Despite UN condemnation of Peking as an aggressor against the UN itself, the Soviet Union proposed on November 10, 1951, that the issue of Chinese representation be included in the agenda of the sixth session of the General Assembly. Instead, at its 342nd plenary meeting on November 13, the General Assembly adopted, by thirty-seven to eleven votes with four abstentions, a Thai resolution to postpone consideration of the Chinese issue.<sup>15</sup> Similar "moratorium" resolutions (proposed by the United States from 1952 on) were adopted each year thereafter, at the beginning of each session through 1960.

From 1951 through 1955, the moratorium resolution was approved by at least a two-thirds majority in the General Assembly. In 1956 it gained only 59 percent of the votes; thereafter, the percentage dropped steadily to a low point of 42 percent in 1960, well below a simple majority of total UN membership.<sup>16</sup> The 1960 resolution was adopted only

because twenty-three countries abstained, leaving a margin of forty-two votes in favor, thirty-four opposed. Fourteen of the twenty-three abstentions were by new African members.

### The "Important Question" Resolution

1961-1971

African abstentions in the 1960 vote were a major reason for the launching of the ROC's "Operation Vanguard" to win African support by giving agricultural and technical aid. The 1960 vote also caused the United States and the ROC to change strategy in the 1961 session of the General Assembly in order to save the ROC seat. Instead of a moratorium resolution, the United States, Australia, Colombia, Italy, and Japan proposed that the General Assembly treat "Chinese representation" as an "important question"--that is, one which (under Article 18 of the UN Charter) required a two-thirds majority for approval. In effect, a simple majority could by this procedure require two-thirds approval for any transfer of the Chinese seat from Taipei to Peking. Conversely, Peking and its supporters were put in the curious position of having to argue that Peking's demand for the UN seat was not an "important question." The General Assembly approved the 1960 five-power resolution 1668(XVI) on December 15, 1961, by sixty-one votes to thirty-four, with seven abstentions.<sup>17</sup>

The moratorium resolutions of 1951-1960 postponed a direct vote on the question of replacing Taipei with Peking. The important question resolutions of 1961-1971 permitted a direct vote annually on this question, but required a two-thirds majority on it. The "important question" strategy saved Taipei's UN seat in 1961 and for the next

nine years, since votes in favor of seating Peking never reached the two-thirds level (not even in 1971). However, votes on the "important question" resolutions are less informative than votes on the direct question, which posed a simple choice between Taipei and Peking, not complicated by any procedural element. The statistics presented here are therefore based on the explicit pro-Peking resolutions from 1961 through 1971, rather than on the "important question" resolutions. Table XXXIX shows the total vote each year, in number and in percentage. Statistics on African votes are presented later in this chapter.

In the first three years of the "important question" strategy (1961-1963), the ROC actually gained ground in the voting on the pro-Peking resolution. There was no vote in 1964, but the 1965 vote alarmed the ROC: for the first time, Peking received as many votes as Taipei (see Table XXXIX). Thereafter the ROC intensified its diplomatic efforts, especially in Africa, which had given Peking nearly twice as many votes as Taipei in 1965. The tide of pro-Peking votes receded in 1966, 1967, and 1968, but this probably was due less to ROC efforts than to the PRC's preoccupation with its Cultural Revolution. As soon as Peking renewed its diplomatic efforts after the Cultural Revolution ended in mid-1969, the voting trend was again reversed in favor of the PRC. In 1970, for the first time, Peking received more votes than Taipei, though not a majority (because of twenty-seven abstentions).

#### Decision in 1971

In the 1971 voting, Peking at last received a majority of the votes (60 percent). Although not a two-thirds majority, this was

TABLE XXXIX  
GENERAL ASSEMBLY VOTING ON  
THE CHINA ISSUE

Year	All Nations: Percent of Votes			Total	All Nations: Number of Votes		
	For ROC	For PRC	Abstain*		For ROC	For PRC	Abstain*
1950	56	27	17	59	33	16	10
1951**	62	18	20	60	37	11	12
1952	70	12	18	60	42	7	11
1953**	73	17	10	60	44	10	6
1954	72	18	10	60	43	11	6
1955	70	20	10	60	42	12	6
1956	60	30	10	79	47	24	8
1957	59	33	8	82	48	27	7
1958	54	35	11	81	44	28	9
1959	54	35	11	82	44	29	9
1960	42	34	24	99	42	34	23
1961	46	36	18	104	48	37	19
1962	51	38	11	110	56	42	12
1963	51	37	12	111	57	41	13
1965	40	40	20	117	47	47	23
1966	47	38	15	121	57	46	18
1967	48	37	15	122	58	45	19
1968	46	35	19	126	58	44	24
1969	44	38	18	126	56	48	22
1970	39	40	21	127	49	51	27
1971	27	60	13	128	35	76	17

\*Including those registered as absent or not voting.

\*\*No roll-call vote in 1951 or 1953; only totals are available.

Sources: Yearbook of the United Nations, 1950-1971; and Tou-piao chi-lu (ROC). Figures from 1961 through 1971 refer to votes on the resolution "to seat the PRC and expel the ROC," rather than on the "important question" resolution, because the former reveals the true strength of the two Chinas in the voting.

sufficient to decide the issue, because the "important question" resolution was for the first time defeated, by fifty-nine votes to fifty-five, with fifteen abstentions.<sup>18</sup> After the rejection of this resolution, and before the vote on the pro-Peking resolution, ROC Foreign Minister Chou Shu-kai took the floor on a point of order and made the following statement:

The rejection of draft resolution A/L.632 and Add. 1 and 2 is a flagrant violation of the Charter, which governs the expulsion of Member States. In view of the frenzied and irrational manners that have been exhibited in this hall, the delegation of the Republic of China has now decided not to take part in any further proceedings of this General Assembly.<sup>19</sup>

On behalf of his government, Chou thanked the countries which had supported Taipei throughout the years. Then he and the other ROC delegates walked out of the General Assembly hall. Without the presence of the ROC delegation, the General Assembly then adopted the pro-Peking resolution by seventy-six votes to thirty-five, with seventeen abstentions.<sup>20</sup> After the vote, pro-Peking delegates, especially those from the African countries, "were in a frenzy of delight--their arms swooping above their heads and jumping up and down in their seats as wild applause engulfed the circular chamber."<sup>21</sup>

Shortly afterwards, Foreign Minister Chou issued an official statement declaring that the ROC "has now decided to withdraw from the organization which it helped establish" twenty-six years before. Chou accused those who supported Peking of sacrificing "the lofty principles of the Charter on the altar of expedience; . . . they will have to answer to the judgment of history and posterity."<sup>22</sup>

The seating of the PRC delegation on October 26, 1971, ended the ROC's relations with the United Nations. On the same day, ROC

President Chiang Kai-shek, in a lengthy message, told his people:

We declared that neither the Government of the Republic of China nor the Chinese people will ever recognize the validity of an illegal resolution adopted by the current United Nations session in flagrant violation of the provisions of its own Charter. The destiny of our nation is not in the hands of the United Nations. It is squarely in our own hands . . . The international situation now confronting us is marked by danger and pitfalls. Nevertheless, as long as we ourselves are strong, no force in all the world can shake us. As long as we ourselves are courageous and of undaunted spirit, no force in all the world can humiliate us. As long as we ourselves persevere in the struggle, the final success will be ours.<sup>23</sup>

#### The Role of Africa, 1950-1971

Africa played an important role in the General Assembly decision on the "Chinese representation" issue on October 26, 1971. A third (34 percent) of Peking's seventy-six votes came from Africa. Ironically, an even larger proportion (43 percent) of Taipei's thirty-five votes came from Africa, but the number was much smaller. Fifteen African nations voted for Taipei, twenty-six for Peking, including four which still had diplomatic relations with Taipei. without this African support, the PRC would not have won in 1971. Since every country has an equal voice in the General Assembly, regardless of size or population, the steady increase in the number of African nations made African votes steadily more important on this and other issues, as shown in Table XL. Since African votes were negligible in the period of the PRC's isolation before 1955, the fact that Peking received none of them made no difference. African votes were about one-tenth of the total in 1956-1969, about one-fourth in 1960-1961, and thereafter about one-third, and thus of major importance to both Chinas.

TABLE XL  
IMPORTANCE OF AFRICAN VOTES ON  
CHINESE REPRESENTATION

Year*	African Votes as % of Total Votes	African Votes as % of all ROC Votes	African Votes as % of all PRC Votes	African Abstentions as % of All Abstentions :
1950	7	9	0	10
1952	7	10	0	0
1954	7	7	0	17
1955	7	7	0	17
1956	10	9	8	25
1957	11	6	15	29
1958	11	7	14	22
1959	12	5	17	33
1960	25	5	25	61
1961	28	19	24	58
1962	30	30	33	17
1963	30	30	29	31
1965	32	21	38	39
1966	32	30	37	28
1967	32	33	36	21
1968	33	34	34	25
1969	33	38	38	9
1970	32	35	37	19
1971	32	43	34	0

Source: Based on Tou-piao chi-lu (ROC).

\*There was no vote in 1964, no roll-call vote in 1951 or 1953

Votes on the China issue by each African country over the entire period, 1950-1971, are recorded in Table XLI, which uses two sets of three symbols each to indicate whether a country abstained (A), voted for Taipei (T), or voted for Peking (P), and also whether it then had diplomatic relations with Taipei (t), with Peking (p), or with neither (n). The total number of African votes, and the number for Taipei (T) or for Peking (P), are shown graphically in Figure 8. The detailed voting record is then analyzed statistically in five other tables.

Table XLII is a statistical summary of "T", "P", and "A" entries in Table XLI--that is, the percentage and number of African countries voting for Taipei, voting for Peking, or abstaining. Table XLII shows that the ROC received a majority of African votes in 1950, 1952, 1954, 1955, 1956, 1962, 1963, and 1969, and a plurality in 1967 and 1968. The PRC received a majority of African votes in 1959 and 1971 only, but a plurality in 1957, 1958, 1960, 1965, and 1970.

Table XLIII distributes the African "T", "P", and "A" votes by type, subdividing the "T" votes into "Tt" and "Tn" categories, the "P" votes into "Pp," "Pn," and "Pt" categories, and the "A" votes (abstentions) into "At," "Ap," and "An" categories. From this table, it is clear that after 1958, both Taipei and Peking drew most of their votes from countries with which they had diplomatic relations. No African nation having diplomatic relations with Peking ever voted for Taipei, though the reverse was not true in 1960, 1965, 1969, 1970, or 1971 (see also Table XLVI below).

Table XLIV provides the opposite correlation, distributing the African "t," "p," and "n" categories of diplomatic relations by voting category, subdividing the "t" countries into "Tt," "At," and "Pt"

TABLE XLI  
AFRICAN VOTING ON THE CHINA ISSUE

Country	Year																		
	50	52	54	55	56	57	58	59	60	61	62	63	65	66	67	68	69	70	71
NORTH AFRICA																			
1. Egypt	At	Tt	At	At	Pp	Pp	Pp	Pp	Pp	Pp	Pp	Pp	Pp	Pp	Pp	Pp	Pp	Pp	Pp
2. Libya					An	Tn	An	At	At	Tt	Tt	Tt	At	Tt	At	At	Pt	Pt	Pt
3. Morocco					Tn	Pn	Pn	Pp	Pp	Pp	Pp	Pp	Pp	Ap	Ap	Ap	Pp	Pp	Pp
4. Tunisia					An	An	An	An	An	An	Pn	Pn	Ap	Ap	Ap	Ap	Ap	Ap	Ap
5. Algeria											Pp	Pp	Pp	Pp	Pp	Pp	Pp	Pp	Pp
WEST AFRICA																			
6. Liberia	Tn	Tn	Tn	Tn	Tn	Tt	Tt	Tt	Tt	Tt	Tt	Tt	Tt	Tt	Tt	Tt	Tt	Tt	Tt
7. Ghana						Pn	Pn	Pn	Pp	Pp	Pp	Pp	Pp	Pn	An	An	Pn	Pn	Pn
8. Guinea								Pn	Pp	Pp	Pp	Pp	Pp	Pp	Pp	Pp	Pp	Pp	Pp
9. Benin									An	An	Tt	Tt	Ap	Tt	Tt	Tt	Tt	Tt	Tt
10. Cameroon									At	Tt	Tt	Tt	At	At	Tt	Tt	Tt	At	Pp
11. Congo									At	At	Tt	Tt	Pp	Pp	Pp	Pp	Pp	Pp	Pp
12. Gabon									An	Tt	Tt	Tt	Tt	Tt	Tt	Tt	Tt	Tt	Tt
13. Ivory Coast									An	An	Tn	Tt	Tt	Tt	Tt	Tt	Tt	Tt	Tt
14. Togo									At	At	At	Tt	Tt	Tt	Tt	Tt	Tt	Tt	Pt
15. Upper Volta									An	At	Tt	Tt	Tt	Tt	Tt	Tt	Tt	Tt	Tt
16. Mali									Pp	Pp	Pp	Pp	Pp	Pp	Pp	Pp	Pp	Pp	Pp
17. Senegal									Pt	Tt	Tt	Tt	An	Pn	Pn	An	Tt	At	Pt
18. Nigeria									Pn	An	An	An	Pn	Pn	Pn	An	Pn	Pn	Pp
19. Sierra Leone										Pn	Pn	At	Pt	Tt	Tt	Tt	Tt	Tt	Pp
20. Mauritania										Tt	Tt	At	Pp	Pp	Pp	Pp	Pp	Pp	Pp
21. Gambia													Tt	Tt	Tt	Tt	Tt	Tt	Tt
22. Equatorial Guinea																An	An	Pp	Pp
CENTRAL AFRICA																			
23. CAR									An	An	Tt	Tt	Pp	Tn	Tn	Tt	Tt	At	Tt
24. Chad									An	An	Tt	Tt	At	At	Tt	Tt	Tt	Tt	Tt
25. Niger									An	An	Tn	Tt	Tt	Tt	Tt	Tt	Tt	Tt	Tt
26. Zaire										At	Tt	Tt	At	Tt	Tt	Tt	Tt	Tt	Tt
27. Burundi											Pn	Pn	An	Pn	Pn	Pn	Pn	Pn	Pp
28. Rwanda											Tt	Tt	At	Tt	Tt	Tt	Tt	Tt	Pn
EAST AFRICA																			
29. Ethiopia	Tn	Tn	Tn	Tn	Tn	Tn	Tn	An	Pn	Pn	Pn	An	Pn	Pn	Pn	Pn	Pn	Pn	Pn
30. Sudan						Pn	Pn	Pn	Pp	Pp	Pp	Pp	Pp	Pp	Pp	Pp	Pp	Pp	Pp
31. Somalia									An	Pp	Pp	Pp	Pp	Pp	Pp	Pp	Pp	Pp	Pp
32. Tanzania										Tn	Pp	Pp	Pp	Pp	Pp	Pp	Pp	Pp	Pp
33. Uganda											Pp	Pp	Pp	Pp	Pp	Pp	Pp	Pp	Pp
34. Kenya													Pp	Pp	Pp	Pp	Pp	Pp	Pp
SOUTHERN AFRICA																			
35. South Africa	Tt	Tt	Tt	Tt	Tt	At	Tt	Tt	Tt	Tt	Tt	Tt	Tt	Tt	Tt	Tt	Tt	Tt	Tt
36. Madagascar									At	Tt	Tt	Tt	Tt	Tt	Tt	Tt	Tt	Tt	Tt
37. Malawi													Tn	Tt	Tt	Tt	Tt	Tt	Tt
38. Zambia														Pp	Pp	Pp	Pp	Pp	Pp
39. Botswana														An	Tt	Tt	Tt	At	Pt
40. Lesotho															Tt	Tt	Tt	Tt	Tt
41. Swaziland																	Tt	Tt	Tt

Code:

A = abstained      n = recognized neither China  
 T = for Taipei      t = recognized Taipei  
 P = for Peking      p = recognized Peking




Figure 8. African Votes on China  
in the United Nations

TABLE XLII  
AFRICAN VOTING ON THE CHINA ISSUE:  
SUMMARY OF VOTES

Year*	% of African Votes			Number of African Votes			
	For ROC	For PRC	Abstain	Total	For ROC	For PRC	Abstain
1950	75	0	25	4	3	0	1
1952	100	0	0	4	4	0	0
1954	75	0	25	4	3	0	1
1955	75	0	25	4	3	0	1
1956	50	25	25	8	4	2	2
1957	33	45	22	9	3	4	2
1958	33	45	22	9	3	4	2
1959	20	50	30	10	2	5	3
1960	8	36	56	25	2	9	14
1961	31	31	38	29	9	9	11
1962	52	42	6	33	17	14	2
1963	52	36	12	33	17	12	4
1965	27	49	24	37	10	18	9
1966	44	44	12	39	17	17	5
1967	49	41	10	39	19	16	4
1968	49	37	14	41	20	15	6
1969	51	44	5	41	21	18	2
1970	42	46	12	41	17	19	5
1971	37	63	0	41	15	26	0

Source: Based on Tou-piao chi-lu (ROC).

\*There was no vote in 1964, no roll-call vote in 1951 or 1953.

TABLE XLIII  
AFRICAN VOTING ON THE CHINA ISSUE  
BY TYPE OF VOTE

Year	Number Voting for Taipei			Number Voting for Peking			Number Abstaining		
	Taipei- Recognizers	Neutrals		Peking- Recognizers	Neutrals	Taipei- Recognizers	Taipei- Recognizers	Peking- Recognizers	Neutrals
1950	1	2		0	0	0	1	0	0
1952	2	2		0	0	0	0	0	0
1954	1	2		0	0	0	1	0	0
1955	1	2		0	0	0	1	0	0
1956	1	3		1	1	0	0	0	2
1957	1	2		1	3	0	1	0	1
1958	2	1		1	3	0	0	0	2
1959	2	0		3	2	0	1	0	2
1960	2	0		6	2	1	5	0	9
1961	8	1		7	2	0	4	0	7
1962	15	2		10	4	0	1	0	1
1963	17	0		10	2	0	2	0	2
1965	9	1		15	2	1	5	2	2
1966	16	1		12	5	0	2	2	1
1967	18	1		12	4	0	1	2	1
1968	20	0		13	2	0	1	1	4
1969	21	0		13	4	1	0	1	1
1970	17	0		14	4	1	4	1	0
1971	15	0		19	3	4	0	0	0

Source: Based on Tou-piao chi-lu (ROC) and I-nan-piao (ROC).

TABLE XLIV  
AFRICAN VOTING ON THE CHINA ISSUE  
BY DIPLOMATIC STATUS

Year	Voting by Taipei Recognizers			Voting by Peking Recognizers		Voting by Neutrals		
	For ROC	No Vote	For PRC	For PRC	No Vote	For ROC	No Vote	For PRC
1950	1	1	0	0	0	2	0	0
1952	2	0	0	0	0	2	0	0
1954	1	1	0	0	0	2	0	0
1955	1	1	0	0	0	2	0	0
1956	1	0	0	1	0	3	2	1
1957	1	1	0	1	0	1	2	3
1958	2	0	0	1	0	1	2	3
1959	2	1	0	3	0	0	2	2
1960	2	5	1	6	0	0	9	2
1961	8	4	0	7	0	1	7	2
1962	15	1	0	10	0	2	1	4
1963	17	2	0	10	0	0	2	2
1965	9	5	1	15	2	1	2	2
1966	16	2	0	12	2	1	1	5
1967	18	1	0	12	2	1	1	4
1968	20	1	0	13	1	0	4	2
1969	21	0	1	13	1	0	1	4
1970	17	4	1	14	1	0	0	4
1971	15	0	4	19	0	0	0	3

Source: Based on Tou-piao chi-lu (ROC) and I-nan-piao (ROC).

categories, the "p" countries into "Pp" and "Ap" categories, and the "n" countries into "Tn," "An," and "Pn" categories. This table shows that defections--meaning either an abstention or a vote for the other side--were much rarer among countries recognizing Peking than among countries recognizing Taipei. The countries failing to vote for the China they recognized are identified by year in Tables XLV and XLVI.

### Conclusions About African Voting

From the last seven tables (XL through XLVI), the following conclusions can be drawn.

(1) Although African nations tend to vote in a bloc on some issues in the United Nations, they did not do so on the issue of Chinese representation. In other words, there was never a unified "African view" of the China issue, but a sharp though fluctuating division between pro-Peking and pro-Taipei votes from Africa (see Tables XLI and XLII, and Figure 8).

(2) Very high rates of abstention (see Table XLII ) before 1962, and occasionally thereafter, suggest that many African nations resented being asked to take sides in a dispute perceived as an internal Chinese dispute, or feared the consequences if they did take sides.

(3) Abstentions were nearly always more numerous among African countries not having diplomatic relations with either China, than among those which recognized either Taipei or Peking (see Table XLIV).

(4) As might be expected, leftist governments tended both to recognize Peking and to vote for Peking in the UN, while anti-Communist governments usually recognized Taipei and voted for Taipei in the UN. There is a high degree of correlation between diplomatic

TABLE XLV  
AFRICAN NATIONS RECOGNIZING THE PRC BUT  
NOT VOTING FOR THE PRC

Country	Abstained
North Africa:	
Morocco	1966, 1967
Tunisia	1965, 1966, 1967, 1968, 1969, 1970
West Africa:	
Benin	1965

Source: Based on Tou-piao chi-lu (ROC) and I-nan-piao (ROC).

TABLE XLVI  
AFRICAN NATIONS RECOGNIZING THE ROC BUT  
NOT VOTING FOR THE ROC

Country	Abstained	Voting for Peking
<u>North Africa</u>		
Egypt	1950, 1954, 1955	
Libya	1959, 1960, 1965, 1967, 1968	1969, 1970, 1971
<u>West Africa</u>		
Cameroon	1960, 1965, 1966, 1970	
Congo	1960, 1961	
Mauritania	1963	
Senegal	1970	1960, 1971
Sierra Leone	1963	1965
Togo	1960, 1961, 1962	1971
Upper Volta	1961	1971
<u>Central Africa</u>		
CAR	1970	
Chad	1965, 1966	
Rwanda	1965	
Zaire	1961, 1966	
<u>Southern Africa</u>		
Botswana	1970	1971
Madagascar	1960	
South Africa	1957	

Source: Based on Tou-piao chi-lu (ROC) and I-nan-piao (ROC).

recognition and UN vote, not only for these two kinds of governments but for all African governments.

(5) Countries that consistently voted for Peking since establishing diplomatic relations with the PRC included Egypt, Algeria, Guinea, Congo, Mali, Sudan, Somalia, Tanzania, Kenya, and Zambia. Most of these were in North and East Africa (where the ROC had little or no influence), and most were strongly pro-Peking. But it is noteworthy that Kenya continued to vote for Peking even when relations were badly strained (1965-1970).

(6) Some countries which regularly voted for Peking abstained when relations with the PRC deteriorated, but they never voted for Taipei. Within this category were Morocco, Tunisia, Ghana, and Burundi.

(7) Some countries having diplomatic relations with Taipei occasionally voted for Peking--Senegal, Libya, Sierra Leone, Togo, and Botswana (see Table XLVI).

(8) When an African nation which had recognized one China switched to recognition of the other, it nearly always changed its UN vote accordingly. Examples include Congo and CAR in 1964, Mauritania in 1965, Benin in 1966, CAR in 1968, and Cameroon and Sierra Leone in 1971 (compare Table XLI with the summary of diplomatic relations in Chapter II, Table VI).

(9) Some countries having no diplomatic relations with either China voted for Peking on many occasions after 1959--notably Nigeria and Ethiopia.

(10) African support for Peking in the General Assembly continuously increased from 1956 through 1961, but dropped in 1962 and 1963,

presumably because of the Sino-Indian border war and Peking's hardline attitude toward the nuclear test-ban treaty. This was particularly apparent in the case of Ethiopia, which began voting for Peking in 1960 but abstained in 1963. There was no vote in 1964, but the sharp rise in pro-Peking votes in 1965 can be attributed to intense diplomatic activities on the part of PRC in Africa (including Chou En-lai's fifty-four day tour of ten African countries in 1963-1964) and the establishment of diplomatic relations between Peking and Paris in 1964.

(11) African support for Peking declined steadily in 1966, 1967, 1968, during the Cultural Revolution but not always because of that. Tunisia's abstention, beginning in 1965, seems to have been prolonged through 1970 by a dispute related to the Cultural Revolution (see Chapter III). However, Ghana's abstentions in 1967 and 1968 were due to internal factors--the overthrow of Nkrumah's pro-Peking government. Nigeria voted for Peking in 1966 and 1967 but abstained in 1968, probably because of Peking's involvement in the Nigerian civil war.

#### After 1971

The General Assembly's decision in 1971 ended a twenty-two year controversy, and ushered in a new era of international politics which saw Peking playing the self-proclaimed role of leader of the Third World, and Taipei trying to break out of political and economic isolation. With its seating in the UN, Peking had achieved the two short-range goals of its African policy, but the two long-range goals remain. Thus, it can be predicted that Africa will remain an important target in PRC foreign policy plan. The conflict between the Peking and Moscow in Africa and elsewhere in the Third World will probably become more

acute in the future. The PRC can be expected to remain active in Africa though on a reduced scale.

One striking example of decline in PRC effort in Africa was Peking's minimal participation in international relief to the six Sahelian countries (Chad, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Senegal, Upper Volta) during the terrible drought of 1971-1975. Mali had been one of Peking's closest allies in Africa since 1960, but Mali's Defense Minister Kissima Doukara, in charge of famine relief, said in 1974 that the United States had provided more than sixty percent of the foreign aid and almost seventy percent of the food grains supplied to Mali.<sup>24</sup> A Senegalese official commented that the Communist powers had done "almost nothing" and assistance from the oil-rich "Arab countries was infinitesimal."<sup>25</sup> Numerous reports showed that aid to the drought-stricken countries came almost entirely from Western countries, either directly or through contributions to the UN Food and Agriculture Organization.<sup>26</sup> The only reports of PRC aid were small donations of cholera vaccine to Chad in 1971 and 1974, and measles vaccine to Upper Volta in 1973, as reported in Chapters IV and V.

Since ten of the fifteen countries voting for Taipei in 1971 broke diplomatic relations with the ROC and recognized Peking within the next few months or years, the 1971 decision tended also to terminate ROC activities in Africa outside the six nations which in 1978 still recognize Taipei. After 1971 the ROC gradually shifted its energy and attention to strengthening trade relations with the five countries still on friendly terms with Taipei. These do not include Libya, which technically still maintains diplomatic relations with

the ROC. Libya voted for Peking in 1969, 1970, and 1971, and actually granted diplomatic recognition to Peking on June 11, 1971--without establishing formal diplomatic relations with the PRC or severing relations with the ROC. This curious state of affairs still existed in 1978.

#### FOOTNOTES

<sup>1</sup>Technically, there were dozens of votes over the twenty-two years, since there were usually at least two opposing resolutions each year, and often other procedural resolutions. The reference here is to a group of related votes on the issue in twenty-one of the twenty-two years.

<sup>2</sup>Wen-chien-chi (PRC), I, pp. 85-87. See also Byron S. J. Weng, Peking's UN Policy, Continuity and Change (New York, 1972), p. 74.

<sup>3</sup>See United Nations, General Assembly Official Records, (hereafter referred to as GAOR), Fourth Session, First Committee, November 25, 1949, pp. 339-340.

<sup>4</sup>Ibid., pp. 340-347.

<sup>5</sup>United Nations, Security Council, Official Records (hereafter referred to as SCOR), no. 54, 458th meeting, December 29, 1949, pp. 1-3.

<sup>6</sup>Wen-chien-chi (PRC), I, p. 90.

<sup>7</sup>SCOR, no. 1, 459th meeting, January 10, 1950, p. 2.

<sup>8</sup>The voting result was: in favor, India, USSR, Yugoslavia; against, ROC, Cuba, Ecuador, Egypt, France, United States; abstaining, Norway, U.K. See *ibid.*, no. 3, 461st meeting, January 13, 1950, p. 9.

<sup>9</sup>Ibid., pp. 9-10.

<sup>10</sup>Wen-chien-chi (PRC), I, pp. 90-91, 96; Weng, pp. 74-75; Sheldon Appleton, The Eternal Triangle? Communist China, the United States and the United Nations (East Lansing, MI, 1961), p. 3. According to Weng, p. 78, between October 1, 1949, and June 30, 1950, Peking sent eighteen cables to UN organs and related international agencies, all concerning the representation issue.

<sup>11</sup>GAOR, Fifth Session, 227th Plenary Meeting, September 19, 1950, p. 15; and UN Yearbook (1950), p. 429.

<sup>12</sup>See China Accuses! Speeches of the Special Representative of the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China at the United Nations (Peking, 1951), pp. 44-45. See also UN Yearbook (1950), pp. 293-294.

<sup>13</sup>Resolution 498(V) was adopted by 44 votes to 7, with 9 abstentions. See GAOR, Fifth Session, 327th Plenary Meeting, February 1, 1951, p. 696; and UN Yearbook (1951), pp. 224-225.

<sup>14</sup>Resolution 500(V) was adopted by 47 votes to none, with 8 abstentions and 5 not participating in the voting. See GAOR, 330th Plenary Meeting, May 18, 1951, p. 742; and UN Yearbook (1951), p. 228.

<sup>15</sup>GAOR, Sixth Session, 342nd Plenary Meeting, November 13, 1951, pp. 99, 104; and UN Yearbook (1951), pp. 265-266.

<sup>16</sup>For a more detailed description of the votes on the "moratorium" resolutions 1951-1960, see Appleton, pp. 7-10.

<sup>17</sup>GAOR, Sixteenth Session, II, 1080th Plenary Meeting, December 15, 1961, pp. 1068-1969; and UN Yearbook (1961), pp. 128-129.

<sup>18</sup>GAOR, Twenty-sixth Session, 1976th Plenary Meeting, October 25, 1971, p. 18, 33-35.

<sup>19</sup>Ibid., p. 40.

<sup>20</sup>Ibid., p. 41. For more detailed treatment of the "Chinese representation" issue and the 26th Session of the General Assembly, see Chao Hui-mu, "Wo-kuo i-jan tui-ch'u lien-ho-kuo ching-wei" [The withdrawal of the Republic of China from the United Nations], Wen-ti yu yen-chiu, XI, 3 (December, 1971), pp. 61-70.

<sup>21</sup>The Christian Science Monitor, October 27, 1971.

<sup>22</sup>For full text of Chou's statement, see Asian Outlook, 6, 11 (November, 1971), pp. 9-11.

<sup>23</sup>Free China Weekly, XII, 43 (October 31, 1971), p. 2.

<sup>24</sup>New York Times, November 10, 1974, cited in Keesing's Contemporary Archives, 21 (1975), p. 26903.

<sup>25</sup>Ibid.

<sup>26</sup>Keesing's Contemporary Archives, 19 (1973), pp. 26192-26193; 20 (1974), pp. 26559-26561; 21 (1975), pp. 26903-26904, 27379-27380; and 22 (1976), p. 27778.

## CHAPTER XI

### CONCLUSIONS

The preceding nine chapters examined the general policies pursued by the PRC (Chapters II and III) and by the ROC (Chapter VIII) in Africa, and then the application of these policies, region by region, country by country (Chapters IV, V, VI, and VII for the PRC, Chapter IX for the ROC), followed by a review of the African aspects of the "China issue" in the United Nations (Chapter X). It is now time to summarize evidence concerning the eight questions posed in the Introduction (Chapter I).

#### Origins of the Competition

The Peking-Taipei diplomatic competition in Africa since 1960 is an extension of the general political, military, and economic competition between the two Chinese governments. It might be even called a second front of the still unfinished Chinese civil war, or a civil war fought on foreign soil. The beginning of this competition can be dated from the 1955 Bandung Conference, when Peking first showed signs of strong interest in Third World leadership, but at that time there were only five independent countries in all of Africa. Two developments in 1960 intensified the competition thereafter: marked deterioration of relations between Peking and Moscow, and a "rush to independence" in Africa, with seventeen colonies gaining their independence in 1960

alone. The first development spurred Peking to greater efforts in Africa and elsewhere, which in turn gave Taipei greater incentive to compete. The second development provided much more opportunity for both Chinas to become involved in African affairs.

### Objectives in the Competition

In their competition in Africa, both Peking and Taipei had long-range and short-range goals which they hoped to achieve with the support of friendly African countries. Peking's first long-range goal in Africa was to become principal leader of the Third World, of which Africa is a major part, and to replace Moscow as leader and spokesman for the socialist countries. A second long-range goal was to make Africa a market for PRC products as well as a source for raw and strategic materials the PRC must import for its own military and industrial development.

During the 1960s, Peking also had two short-range goals in Africa: first, to gain recognition from African countries as the sole legitimate government of China and take over the seat held by Taipei in the United Nations; and second, to break out of the isolation imposed upon the PRC by the United States "containment" policy and later by Soviet policy as well, and to link the two "intermediate zones" into a united front led by Peking.

Taipei also had two long-range goals in Africa. The first was to warn African countries against the dangers imposed by Communism, especially Chinese Communism. Second, Taipei (like Peking) also wanted trade with Africa. In its diplomatic war with Peking over the world in the past three decades and particularly in Africa since 1960, Taipei

had only one short-range goal: to protect its seat in the United Nations and thus promote the survival of the ROC as a political entity.

#### Advantages and Disadvantages

The PRC and ROC are opposites not only in ideology but also in size, resources, and United Nations status. These contrasts determined their inherent advantages and disadvantages in the African competition, and affected the response of African nations to Peking and Taipei. In Africa during the 1960s, Peking enjoyed three advantages over Taipei:

- (1) As the world's largest country in population and second largest in area, the PRC could more easily impress Africans as an important power.
- (2) The PRC's much greater resources (though smaller than those of the United States and the Soviet Union) enabled it to spend more in Africa.
- (3) Not being a member of the United Nations, Peking was subject to fewer international constraints and could better afford to go beyond conventional methods in order to achieve some specific results.

However, the PRC also had disadvantages in Africa: (1) While its size impressed all Africans, it also worried many of them, causing them to suspect that Peking might have imperialist or neo-colonialist ambitions equal to or greater than those of the other superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union. (2) In Africa, Peking faced not only the competition from Taipei, but also the much stronger challenge of both Moscow and Washington--not one rival but three.

Taipei had some advantages: (1) Although opposed to Communism, the ROC attached no importance to promoting any ideology in Africa, and was able to stay away from ideological controversies which often bored and antagonized Africans. (2) In Africa, Taipei had only one major

designated enemy--Peking; thus, Taipei could concentrate all its resources on achieving its single immediate political aim--thwarting Peking's efforts to take over the UN seat with the support of African countries. (3) The ROC was small enough to make plausible its assurances that it had no imperialist ambition in Africa.

On the other hand, Taipei's efforts in Africa were often handicapped by some adverse factors: (1) With much smaller resources than the PRC, the ROC's technical aid to Africa had to be limited both in cost and in geographic spread. A shortage of funds also prevented Taipei from fully matching or counteracting PRC activities in all fields, and especially in propaganda to Africa. (2) As with the PRC, size was both helpful and harmful: being small, the ROC stirred up no suspicion or fear among African countries, but neither did it command much respect. It is undeniable that most Africans have never considered the ROC an equal of the PRC. (3) Being a member of the United Nations (until 1971), Taipei had to be more cautious and discreet than Peking in its dealings with African countries, avoiding tactics and methods that might be considered improper and thus jeopardize the basic objective of protecting its seat in the United Nations with the support of African countries.

#### Tactics and Scale of Effort

To exploit their advantages and alleviate their disadvantages, both Peking and Taipei used a variety of methods and tactics in the effort to win friends in Africa at each other's expense. In practice, Peking used both overt and covert tactics. It made contacts with African countries through conventional methods: (1) establishing

diplomatic relations, (2) attending various Afro-Asian conferences, (3) increasing trade, (4) offering economic and technical assistance, (5) exchanging visits at high and lower levels, (6) offering educational opportunities to African students, and (7) propaganda (radio, broadcasts, printed materials, motion pictures).

Besides these conventional methods, Peking also sought to gain supporters and extend its influence in various African countries through covert tactics: (1) bribing influential politicians in Africa, (2) supporting pro-Peking members of government having diplomatic relations with the PRC, or supporting political dissidents and anti-government groups in countries not recognizing Peking, and (3) secretly training African guerrillas from anti-Peking countries, either in mainland China or in a friendly African country, to carry out subversion in their home countries. Though these covert activities sometimes had adverse repercussions, they were often useful.

On the other hand, Taipei's African policy relied on overt tactics. Like Peking, though usually on a more modest scale, Taipei used diplomacy, trade, economic and technical assistance, exchanges of visits, and opportunities for educating students in Taiwan. But Taipei's propaganda efforts in Africa were negligible in comparison with Peking's, and since the Afro-Asian conferences were usually sponsored by Third World countries which took a pro-Peking stand in the Peking-Taipei competition, the ROC was never invited.

#### Effects of the PRC Cultural Revolution

The PRC's activities and influence in Africa reached a peak in 1965, when the thirty-eight independent African countries included

seventeen recognizing Peking, fourteen recognizing Taipei, and seven recognizing neither. By 1969 the figures were dramatically reversed: there were forty-two independent African countries, but now only thirteen recognized Peking, twenty-two recognized Taipei, and seven recognized neither. The principal cause of this dramatic decline in Peking's standing in Africa was the chaos in China known as the Cultural Revolution, which affected almost all aspects of Peking's African policy.

Diplomacy was de-emphasized by the PRC's recall of all but one of its ambassadors, leaving its embassies in the hands of charges d'affaires. Peking turned away from the AAPS0 conferences, though continuing lesser Afro-Asian conferences under its own control, such as journalists' meetings. The volume of imports from and exports to Africa was sharply reduced. Foreign aid declined, and in 1968 and 1969 there were no PRC loans to African countries. The number of African delegations visiting China, and the number of Chinese delegations visiting Africa, declined sharply. All foreign students in China were sent home. Propaganda was not diminished but became much more shrill, self-centered, and heavy-handed, antagonizing some African governments. During the Cultural Revolution, diplomatic relations between the PRC and Benin, Burundi, the CAR, Ghana, and Tunisia were broken or suspended; those with Kenya were reduced to fiction by mutual withdrawal of all diplomatic personnel without formal severance of relations. Some of these breaks were precipitated by governmental changes in African countries, but the violence and political instability in China was at least a contributing factor in all.

On the other hand, Peking did not entirely forget Africa even during its domestic nightmare. Negotiations were started for the PRC's

largest single African aid project, the Zambia-Tanzania railway, and the presidents of those two countries did visit Peking during this essentially isolationist period (as did the president of Mauritania). Relations with a few other militant countries, such as Congo, Guinea, and Mali, remained good though somewhat subdued. Moreover, when Peking's African offensive resumed in the early 1970s, the rapid improvement in the PRC's position in Africa indicated that the external damage caused by the Cultural Revolution was more easily repaired than the damage inside China.

### The African Response

The PRC's domestic quarrels and the Sino-Soviet quarrel tended to puzzle and sometimes dismay African leaders, especially when efforts were made to involve them in these disputes. But to Africans, the Peking-Taipei competition on their continent was probably more welcome than annoying. Most African countries, especially those claiming to be non-aligned, were fully aware that the more intense the competition between East and West, or between Peking and Taipei, the better their chances were for exploiting and taking advantage of it. Most African political leaders, whether socialist or nationalist, shared the view expressed very early by Tunisian President Habib Bourguiba:

The fact that Africa today excites the appetites of certain great powers . . . is not a matter for concern. It is even a good thing, because it emphasizes the interest felt towards Africa and shows the advantage which we must derive therefrom . . . The most important thing [for Africans] is to have a feel for events and know how to exploit them.<sup>1</sup>

Almost all African countries used self-interest as the sole criterion

in choosing between pro-Peking and pro-Taipei policies. Even the smallest African countries discovered that they could control and profit from their choice.

#### Peking's Focus: on Taipei or Moscow

During the decade of most acute competition between Peking and Taipei, 1961 to 1971, the two never had a direct confrontation. The diplomatic war between the two opposing Chinese governments was fought intensely but rather silently (except in propaganda). Moreover, though Taipei designated Peking its sole enemy in the diplomatic war in Africa, Peking never regarded Taipei as its major target. Since 1960, Peking's principal competitors in Africa, as in the rest of the world, have been Moscow and Washington, which Peking accuses of being "revisionist" and "imperialists," respectively. However, Peking did not entirely ignore the intense activities undertaken by Taipei in Africa, especially in agricultural assistance to African countries. Such aid was initiated by the ROC in the early 1960s, and later imitated by the PRC.

#### Since the United Nations Decision

With twenty-six African nations supporting Peking in late 1971, the long dispute over China's seat in the United Nations ended with total victory for the PRC: Taipei lost not only China's permanent seat in the Security Council but even its membership in the General Assembly. This formally ended both the controversy in the United Nations and an era in the PRC-ROC competition in Africa. The historic vote in the General Assembly on October 26, 1971, changed the outlook and perspective of both Peking and Taipei, which in turn affected their respective

policies toward Africa thereafter.

With its admission to the United Nations, the two short-range goals of Peking's African policy--to gain recognition as the sole legitimate government of China and to break out of the isolation imposed upon it by the United States and the Soviet Union--were achieved. Yet its two long-range goals--to become the principal leader of the Third World and replace Moscow as leader and spokesman for the socialist countries, and to explore Africa as a major market, remain to be achieved. Thus, it was rather implausible to suppose, as some Western experts speculated, that the importance of Africa in Peking's foreign policy would gradually decline in the late 1970s. The PRC might reduce its loans, technical assistance, and exchange of visits in Africa because its short-range goals have been achieved. But Africa, and the rest of the Third World, still play an important role in Peking's long-range goals, which are more time-consuming and less visible. No major country can afford to overlook Africa.

As for Taipei, its involuntary withdrawal from the United Nations in 1971 was undeniably a serious blow. Since then the ROC has been forced to retreat not only in Africa but also in many other parts of the world. The ROC's long effort to preserve its seat in the UN was defeated in 1971. However, its two long-range goals--to warn African countries against the danger imposed by Communism and to explore Africa as a market--still remain. Since the ROC now has embassies in only six African countries (Libya in North Africa, Ivory Coast in West Africa, Lesotho, Malawi, Swaziland, and South Africa in Southern Africa), while Peking maintains diplomatic relations with forty African countries,

Taipei's chances of achieving its first long-range goal remain doubtful for lack of adequate contacts. By 1978, the ROC seemed to concentrate its efforts on exploring Africa as a market for its goods.

However, Taipei's intensive activities in Africa during the 1960s, particularly in agricultural aid, constituted one of the finest pages in Chinese diplomatic history. Though finally unsuccessful due to forces beyond its control, the ROC fought gallantly and took defeat with dignity. A major, perhaps decisive, turn in the African competition between Peking and Taipei was taken in 1971. But the issue of "Two Chinas" is far from ended.

FOOTNOTE

<sup>1</sup>See Chapter III, note 1 of this study.

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