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EXCLUSIVE AND NONEXCLUSIVE SOURCES OF SELF-

ESTEEM AS RELATED TO SEX IDENTITY

IN CHILDREN

By

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Thesis Approved: Thesis ser Advi Sen 10 7 Dean of the Graduate College

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CHAPTER I

THE RESEARCH PROBLEM

Purpose

One of the most pressing problems of our time is the development of high self-esteem in people. It is central to effective functioning and internal comfort in both adults and children. The purpose of this study was to investigate some of the factors related to the development of selfesteem in children, factors dealing with the relationship between selfconceptualization and self-esteem. One important self-conceptualization is sex-role identity. The specific purpose of the study was to investigate the concept of exclusion-defined identity in its specific relationship to self-esteem and sex-role identity in children. To explain the concept of exclusion-defined identity, a foundation of basic building block concepts was necessary as a basis for communicating. These concepts are presented below.

Definitions and Introduction of the Concept

"Identity" as conceived by Erikson (1968) is partially concerned with the specific contents of identity, the self-definitions. These self-definitions, or identity elements, are discrete units of a wide variety. For example, they can be self-defining qualities, "I am a tall person (warm, athletic, professional)." They can also be self-defining attitudes or beliefs, "I am the sort of person who feels very positively about . . ."

The first basic concept for understanding exclusion-defined identity is that individuals tend to define themselves with discrete identity elements.

The second basic concept is that each self-defining identity element has attached to it an attitude. An attitude is a positive or negative affective-evaluative stance towards a target object. It is the "set of feelings" along the continuum of good, attraction--bad, repulsion (Bogardus, 1933; Osgood, Suci, Tannenbaum, 1957; Katz and Stotland, 1959; Shaw and Wright, 1967; Ehrlich, 1973). For example, an individual may have the identity element, "I am a male," and he may also have the attitude, "It is good to be a male." Attitudes directed towards the self are a part of the total identity picture -- "I". Such attitudes become part of the selfconceptualization and are a source of self-esteem (Rogers, 1951; Erikson, 1968; Sherif and Sherif, 1969).

The third basic concept for understanding exclusion-defined identity is that the total self-esteem of the person is not the sum of the attitudes attached to each self-defining identity element but the differentially weighted sum with each self-defining element being weighted with what Sherif and Sherif (1969) call ego-involvement. Ego-involvement with an identity element means very simply that the particular self-defining element is relatively more important in its contribution to total self-esteem. For example, an individual may not only have the identity element and attitude that, "I am a male and being a male is good", but he may also feel that being a male is very important to who he is. In this case, his maleness would contribute highly to his total self-esteem.

An exclusion-defined identity element is simply one that has the possibility of being defined by exclusion. Some definitions of who a person is can be described in terms of who he is not. For example, "I am a

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boy" also clearly means, "I am not a girl." For this study, a person who is highly ego-involved with an exclusion-defined identity element, has an exclusion-defined identity.

To summarize, a person has an "I" which is his identity. This identity is consistent across changing situations and is made up of discrete selfdefining identity elements, each of which has an evaluative-affective attitude valence attached to it. Each of these identity elements also has a degree of relative importance for the individual's self-esteem with some elements being very important, or very ego-involving, and others being less so (Rogers, 1951; Erikson, 1964, 1968; Sherif and Sherif, 1969). An individual may have an exclusion-defined identity if he is ego-involved with an identity element that can be defined by exclusion.

Implications of Exclusion-Defined

Identity for Sex Roles

In the opening paragraphs of this presentation, it was suggested that the concept of exclusion-defined identity is related to self-esteem and sex-role identity. This concept is related because ego-involvement with a sex-role is one of the clearest examples of an exclusion-defined identity. If it is very important for an individual with an exclusiondefined identity that he <u>not</u> be a certain way, then he may have a negative attitude toward people he perceives as being that way. For example, in the context of sex roles, if it is very important for the self-esteem of an individual that he be "a boy" i.e. "not a girl", then he may have a negative attitude toward those he perceives to be girls.

While sex-role identity can be an example of an exclusion-defined identity with the attendant negative attitudes toward the opposite sex,

it is possible for an individual to have positive feelings about his sexual identity without the negative attitudes. For example, if a person has positive feelings strongly associated with the non-exclusionary identity element "myself", the positive feelings may generalize to other identity elements like sex role. A child with such an identity structure may feel, "I am good, therefore my head is good, my hand is good, and my sex is good." A child with an exclusionary sex-role identity on the other hand may feel, "I am good because I am a boy, therefore I must keep being like a boy and avoid being like a girl."

The Present Study

To restate the general theoretical hypothesis for this study, when a person's identity is based on ego-involvement with an exclusion-defined identity element, he may have a negative attitude valence towards people who are perceived as being defined by the inverse of that trait. The corollary to this hypothesis is that if a person's self-esteem is based on an identity element that is not defined by exclusion, he may not have a negative attitude toward others. As applied to sex-roles, an individual with an exclusionary sex-role (i.e., self-esteem based on sex identity) may have a negative attitude toward the opposite sex. A person with selfesteem based on a non-exclusionary "myself" will probably not have a negative attitude towards the opposite sex. The purpose of this study is to temporarily create the above two conditions in an attempt to determine if attitudes toward the opposite sex are differentially influenced.

In the present experiment, a slide show was presented to a group of pre-selected, low self-esteem, third and fourth grade children in an attempt to develop a temporary exclusion-defined identity based on sex-role

identity. This classical conditioning procedure was designed to influence girls and boys to feel more positive toward cheir own sex group. It was anticipated that this exclusionary condition would produce a negative attitude toward the opposite sex.

Another classical conditioning slide show was presented to another group of children from the same population in an attempt to develop a temporary non-exclusionary identity based on the identity element "myself". This slide show was designed to influence girls and boys to feel more positive toward themselves. It was anticipated that the non-exclusionary condition would not produce a negative attitude toward the opposite sex.

Two other groups were also included in this experiment. A placebo group to control for the effects of attention and a no treatment control group.

Hypotheses

- Children who are exposed to the exclusionary treatment when compared to the placebo and control groups will have a more positive self-esteem.
- 2. Children who are exposed to the exclusionary treatment when compared to the placebo and control groups will have a more positive attitude toward their own sex group.
- 3. Children who are exposed to the exclusionary treatment when compared to the placebo and control groups will have a less positive attitude toward the opposite sex.
- 4. Children who are exposed to the non-exclusionary treatment when compared to the placebo and control groups will have a more positive self-esteem.
- 5. Children who are exposed to the non-exclusionary treatment when compared to the placebo and control groups will have a more positive attitude toward their own sex group.
- 6. Children who are exposed to the non-exclusionary treatment when compared to the placebo and control groups will <u>not</u> have a less positive attitude toward the opposite sex.

CHAPTER II

THEORETICAL AND EXPERIMENTAL REVIEW OF LITERATURE

This review will examine those theorists and researchers who have in some way related to the concept of exclusion-defined identity and its implications of negative attitudes toward the inverse. Included are Erikson, Adler, Sullivan, Perls, the Sherifs, Byrne, Hyman, and Osipow. The review will also include sections on the literature base for the technology and instruments used in the study.

Personality Theories

The parent concept for exclusion-defined identity was Erik Erikson's (1963, 1974) slightly broader concept of negative identity. He provided a developmental framework, a case for the value of the concept, and a solution to the problem of negative attitudes toward the inverse. Negative identity has a wider meaning than exclusion-defined identity for it includes delimuent and criminal identities. For Erikson, negative identity also implies that an individual has chosen the inverse of a socially acceptable positive identity, otherwise the concepts are identical.

. . . the negative identity, that necessary component of any positive one. It is as if . . . any new identity harbored a line-up of deviancies which define the boundaries . . . of the officially sanctioned character (Erikson, 1974, p. 58).

More specifically and developmentally,

Every person's psychosocial identity, . . . contains positive and negative elements, the latter resulting from the fact that

throughout his childhood the growing human being is presented with evil prototypes as well as with ideal ones . . The human being is warned not to become what he often has no intention of becoming so that he can learn to anticipate what he must avoid. Thus the positive identity, far from being a static constellation of traites and roles, is always in conflict with a past that has to be lived down and with that potential future which is to be prevented (Erikson, 1968, p. 303).

Thomas Jefferson admonished his daughter to study hard because laziness bred physical illness (Erikson, 1974). In other words, she should develop the identity of "hard worker" to avoid laziness and illness.

Erikson (1974) sees the source of exclusions (the negative attitude toward the inverse of the identity) as rooted in the growth process. "To grow means to outgrow others and in fact oneself; and in the process much that I once was and that others still are will now be beneath me" (Erikson, 1974 p. 90). Children are whole and are

at one with what they are doing and where they are doing it, until approximately ages 3-4-5 when the world becomes broken into polar opposites. The first being adult-child and the second being male-female (Erikson, 1968 p. 85).

The learned avoidance of what one must not be reaches its peak during adolescence which is the time for identity development.

At such times "exclusions" have intense meanings with deep felt commitments to groups with a limited membership, cliches.

The search for a new and yet reliable identity can perhaps best be seen in the persistent adolescent endeavor to define, overdefine, and redefine themselves and each other /emphasis added/ often in ruthless comparison . . . (Erikson, 1968, p. 87).

An adolescent girl known to this writer divided the world into "straights, cowboys, and freaks." She was proud that she was neither a "straight" nor a "cowboy".

Erikson reaches the same conclusions as have been developed as implications of having an exclusion-defined identity, namely, "What I am not is

bad, and must be avoided." His emphasis is clearly intrapsychic resulting in an emphasis which is slightly different from the suggestion in this presentation that the negative attitudes are reflected socially.

. . . the unconscious evil identity, that which the person is most afraid to resemble, is often composed of images of the violated (castrated) body, the ethnic outgroup, and the exploited minority . . . For the ego, . . . attempts to subsume the most powerful ideal and evil prototypes (the final contestants as it were), and with them the whole existing imagery of superior and inferior, good and bad, masculine and feminine, free and slave, potent and impotent, beautiful and ugly, black and white, tall and small, in one simple altercation in order to make one battle and one strategy out of a bewildering number of skirmishes (Erikson, 1968, p. 58).

Another central theoretical difference between Erikson's concept of negative identity and the present concept of exclusion-defined identity is the type of developmental mechanism. He says that negative identities, the exclusions, are directly learned while this writer is suggesting that it is very possible for them to develop without being specifically learned. A positive exclusionary identity that has been attained and is considered important directly implies that the person is not something else.

A somewhat minor theoretical difference is that Erikson makes no attempt to incorporate a concept of ego-involvement. He seems to assume that a person's identity, almost by definition, is very important.

In addition to his theoretical contribution, Erikson (1974, 1968) presents reasons for the value of the concept. He sees it as nothing less than the survival of humanity. Negative identities create "Pseudo-speciation" which is the "God given superiority of their own kind" (Erikson, 1968, p. 42). The World Wars have shown that "glorification of the pseudospecies (i.e., tribe, group) can spell the end of the species . . . " (Erikson, 1968, p. 299). Hitler's genocide has robbed intense group

identity of its innocence.

. . . the oppressor has a vested interest in the negative identity of the oppressed because that negative identity is a projection of his own unconscious negative identity -- a projection which up to a point makes him feel superior but also in a little way, whole (Erikson, 1968, p. 304).

Erikson makes one more contribution to this area in addition to his theoretical and value clarifications. He provides a possible solution, a developmental solution. The rigid negative identities begin to become less rigid during the stage of intimacy which requires partial and "judicious" repudiations of those to whom the person is not committed. The final solution is reached with the stage of generativity.

We have learned through the study of lives that beyond childhood, which provides the moral basis of our identity, and beyond the ideology of youth, only adult ethics can guarantee to the next generation an equal chance to experience the full cycle of humanness. And this alone permits the individual to transcend his identity--to become truly individual as he ever will be and as truly beyond all individuality (Erikson, 1968, p. 42)

Alfred Adler (Ansbacher and Ansbacher, 1956) was also a forerunner of the concept of exclusion-defined identity. For Adler, all of life is based on the strivings from some negative identity towards a positive one though he used different terms. Most of his concepts are motivational and are characterised in terms of opposites, thus for Adler, positive experiences and healthy strivings are always defined in terms of the absence of the opposite. The basic motive is the absence of inferiority feelings. While in the neurotic, the absence of inferiority means power, in the healthy person, overcoming inferiority is based on overcoming goals that are commonly recognized as being based on social interest. They do not hurt anyone but are based on a sense of ideal community and social welfare (Ansbacher and Ansbacher, 1956). Ansbacher and Ansbacher (1956) present a schematic representation of Adler's neurotic character structure (Figure 1.). Notice that every quality that is positive is based on the avoidance of a quality that is negative.

In Adler's early writing, (1927, p. 4) striving for direct power was seen as the central motive, exclusion with a vengence, and a glorification of the interpersonal implications of negative attitudes, "The desire to make oneself felt, a desire whose goal is superiority over others, is the guiding force . . . " Later he decided that this central motive was based on neurotic processes. For Adler, striving for power was replaced with striving for perfection with healthy striving based on conquering reality so as to improve it while for the "abnormal," . . . a person seeks to concretize his goals by wanting to domineer over others. Such a goal of perfection seems unfitted to guide the individual or the mass of men" (Adler, 1929, p. 398).

Adler's contribution is primarily in the realm of focusing on the motivational aspects of developing an exclusion-defined identity as well as some focus on the negative aspects of an exclusion-defined identity albeit somewhat indirectly. Notably absent is the portion of the present concept dealing with ego-involvement.

Like Erikson and Adler, Harry Stack Sullivan (1964, p. 310) makes a contribution with his discussion of "good-me", "bad-me". "Good-me" is the part of the personality that becomes built around rewarded experiences and tender moments. It is usually referred to as "I" or in the terms being used here, it is the identity. "Bad-me" are those parts of experience that are organized around anxiety situations that are not so intense as to be pushed into the unconscious. For Sullivan, part of being the "good-



Ansbacher, 1956.

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me" is the avoidance of being the "bad-me". "The essential desirability of being "good-me" is just another way of commenting on the essential undesirability of being anxious," (Sullivan, 1953, p. 165). These concepts of "good-me" and "bad-me" are very close to Erikson's view that people are taught what they ought to avoid, but there is also a substantial addition. Sullivan adds an intervening hypothetical construct, "anxiety", which is used to explain the avoidance reaction to those personal qualities that are bad.

For Sullivan, (1953, p. 165) the negative effects of investing energy in a functioning pattern based on avoiding the "bad-me" leads to dysfunctional interpersonal patterns based on avoiding anxiety. While Sullivan does not see this process as based on identity elements, avoidances of negatives is a prominent feature.

Sullivan's lack of specific pairings of opposite positive and negative identity elements leads him to what is a unique conclusion among the theorists so far presented. He suggests (Sullivan, 1953, p. 165) the possibility of a nonexclusion defined identity in which the person's "I" or "good-me" is not just an avoidance of "nots." If a person has mostly tender rewarding "good-me" experiences with a very low number of "bad-me" experiences, then the pattern will not develop.

The Gestalt theory of ground is related to the present concepts by including non-self features external to the individual in the unconscious. All of the other theories that included some concept of the unconscious could not be connected theoretically to exclusion-defined identity and its effects because the unconscious involves blocked personality parts. A person who is said to be unconsciously hostile is hostile and is not realizing it. Also the sense of "unconscious conflicts" at this point

cannot be related to exclusion-defined identity theory. The psychoanalytic sense of the unconscious cannot include the present concept, but the Gestalt view of the unconscious can.

Ground for the Gestaltists, (Fagan and Shepherd, 1970, p. xi) means parts of reality, inner or outer, that are not figure. In this sense, potential identities, "id" wishes, body functions, and nonpotential identities (i.e., the exclusions) all can be subsumed under the understanding of ground. The figure is conscious, the ground or background is unconscious. The effect of the exclusion based identity is unconscious in the Gestalt sense which also implies that it can easily be made conscious since people are continuously making and destroying Gestalts. Gestalt theory is the only one that takes into account the possibility that something that in fact does not exist may have an effect. The effect is also specified--ground is that background that a figure stands out from. An individual may feel, "what I am is very prominent for me partially because of what I, in fact, am not."

Developmentally Perls, Hefferline, and Goodman (1951, p. 117) suggest that the unconscious comes about by the inhibition of muscular responses that were not rewarding. This suppression becomes repression (background no longer worthy of attention) when the conclusion is reached that attention is no longer necessary because the situation will never change. When a possible identity is no longer in attention, it is not figure but ground, hence unconscious. An example of this would be a little boy who attempts behaviorally to become a little girl, learns that he cannot, and that his parents do not even like him trying. Hence trying to be a girl becomes unconscious or ground because it is impossible. It remains as ground. Part of being a boy is not being a girl.

Reference Groups

Turning now from older, more global theories to more modern, data based theories, one of the easiest examples of an exclusion based identity is group membership. If a person is a member, then he is clearly not a nonmember. As a result of this clear relationship between the identity element and its exclusion, the research and theory on reference groups should be relevant. Unfortunately at this time the contribution from this area is rather limited. People place themselves in reference groups (Hyman and Wright, 1958) consistent with their values (i.e., identities) and evaluate themselves in terms of group norms. While there are also writers who talk about the influence of groups to which a person is not a member, these influencing factors are not based on the exclusionary concerns (Schmitt, 1972) but on direct experiences.

Most prejudice research has one group, that may be a reference group, rate a group that is defined as the opposite i.e., Black-White. The results are consistent across many situations for the existence of negative affects toward these out-groups (Kitano, 1974; Ehrlich, 1973; Grafton, 1964; Shaw and Wright, 1968). These findings are at least consistent with the possibility that part of the negative affect might have been created by exclusion-defined group membership. Other research of the same type that is at least consistent with the exclusion-defined identity theory includes the finding that certain higher social status people have negative attitudes toward people of lower social status (Parker and Kiener, 1964). In another study certain lower class people rated upper class people more negatively (Teahan and Podany, 1974). Upward mobile people devaluated the group they are leaving (Whyte, 1955). Fraternity and sorority members have negative attitudes toward nonmembers (Parish, Bryant and Shirazi, 1976).

One author in the reference group area, Sumner (1906), directly makes the statement that appears to be partially in line with the present thinking on exclusion-defined identities. He says that ingroup membership automatically creates outgroup hostility. Sherif and Sherif (1969) produced evidence that outgroup hostility is not automatic (also Harvey, 1956), but their study indicates an understanding of outgroup hostility that is very consistent with the present hypothesis.

Ego-Involvement and Self-Esteem

The Sherifs (1969, p. 230) and their colleagues arranged for a summer camp for grade school aged boys in Oklahoma. They were randomly assigned to two groups who played games against each other, etc. He and the staff reported no across groups hostility though there was the usual latency aged competition at softball, etc. The exclusionary group in this situation was clear, yet negative attitudes did not exist. The Sherifs understand intergroup hostility to be produced by limited goods that are sufficiently limited that someone will be left out. They arranged these conditions and the resulting hostility was enormous including property and occasional physical damage. Ingroup loyalty and cohesion increased, members who were on the fringes were pulled in and ingroup cooperation elevated and self-esteem associated with group membership was high. In terms of the exclusion-defined identity hypothesis, the Sherifs created ego-involved self-esteem associated with a group membership identity because the membership became very important. The result was a clear exclusionary phenomenon. All of the other group members came to be considered bad. Self-esteem based on group membership is the key to

outgroup hostility.

The Sherifs (1969, p. 294) and their colleagues also provided much of the bases for the discussion of exclusion-defined identity in the introduction. Attitudes are identity elements though the Sherifs do not clearly separate the identity element content from the self-attitude valence which this paper is doing. An individual with this separation may feel, "I am the sort of person who feels good toward . . ." And, "I have feelings about myself because of these attitudes."

The Sherifs (1969, p. 387) are the primary source of the conceptualization of ego-involvement as it has been presented in this paper. Egoinvolvement in an identity element means it is important to maintaining a good self-view. "Ego-involvement means the arousal of an ego-attitude and its ego-involving activity" (Sherif and Sherif, 1967, p. 296). This arousal "generates modes of behavior that are more consistent, more selective, and more characteristic of the person . . ." than less ego-involving attitudes and behaviors (Sherif and Sherif, 1969, p. 387). A person who is ego-involved is consistent; is less distracted by the stimulus properties of the situation; he is more critical about embracing attitudes that might be at variance with his view (i.e., inverse identities) and therefore is also consistent with reference group memberships (Sherif and Sherif, 1969, p. 425). Sherif and Sherif (1969) review the literature (p. 388-401) suggesting that narrowness of focus, consistency and intensity are the hallmarks of an ego-involvement with an ego-attitude.

Consistency may be another way of expressing the exclusion-defined hypothesis though with a somewhat different focus of emphasis. The present statement is that exclusions and negative attitudes can develop directly as a result of developing a positive identity element. The word

"consistencies" implies that there is some logical operation in order. It implies that people take the position that they will not be intensely involved with groups that oppose each other. In other places, the Sherifs make statements that do not imply some rational decision making and are more consistent with the present concepts as developing automatically.

In actuality, formation of a positive or negative stand toward an object typically implies differential attachment to others in the same domain. For example, a strong attraction to one person involved a comparison with other persons who are similar or <u>different</u> /emphasis added/ whether the person is conscious of the fact or not (Sherif and Sherif, 1969, p. 335).

Consistency may well imply for them that exclusion is unavoidable.

From their position on the nature of ego-involvement, the Sherifs went on to develop their now famous concepts of "latitude of acceptance", "latitude of rejection," and "latitude of noncommitment" as measurements of ego-involvement (Sherif and Sherif, 1969, p. 357). The more intense or ego-involved the attitude, the smaller the latitude of acceptance, the larger the latitude of rejection, and the latitude of noncommitment approached zero (Sherif and Hovland, 1961; Sherif, Sherif, and Nebergall, 1965; Hovland, Harvey, and Sherif, 1957; Whittaker, 1965; Diab, 1967). The relevance for this view to the present concerns is important. The findings and patterns suggest when an individual has his self-esteem based on being committed to being a certain way, his behavior and attitudes reflect that way very narrowly, and what he rejects is not only the inverse of his attitude but many other "negatives" that may be only slightly different from his position. Sherif's suggestion is that exclusions become generalized.

Attraction-Repulsion

Another researcher whose theories are data based is Byrne (1971) and his attraction research. He has focused on those features that make people attractive to each other while in a sense this paper is examining one of the features that may make for interpersonal repulsion. Of course, the most robust finding of his is that attitude similarity is the central feature in attraction (Byrne, 1971, p. 108). The implication is that attitude dissimilarity produces repulsion, a view predicted by exclusiondefined identity theory. Unfortunately most of the studies sighted in Byrne's book say things like "significantly more attracted to" which is just not the same as "more repulsed by." If an individual is attracted to people with similar attitudes more than dissimilar people but still is attracted to them somewhat, then the present position is not supported.

There have been several areas of empirical support for the effect of exclusion-defined identities from this body of research. Besides the general finding of the effect of attitude similarity, there is experimental support for Newcomb's (1956, p. 580) assertion relative to ego-involvement,

The discovery of agreement between oneself and a new acquaintance regarding some matter of only casual interest will probably be less rewarding than the discovery of agreement concerning our own pet prejudices.

Byrne, London, and Griffitt (1968) found that the importance of the topic to the individual as well as attitude similarity contributed to attraction. In our terms, ego-involvement with an exclusion-defined element contributed to (possibly) more repulsion for the other person who was perceived as being defined by the inverse of that trait.

Another area within the same body of research which produces some support is the basis of the attitude. Batchelor and Tessler (in Byrne, 1971, p. 113) studied the effect of bases for an attitude: 1. Value expression. This type of attitude is internalized by the person as an end not as a means to achieving some environmental reward (i.e., is an identity element). 2. Need for cognition: By holding the attitude, the world is made more organized and predictable (i.e., the identity element of organization). 3. Utilitarian: The attitude is held to achieve some end (i.e., the identity element of pragmatism). 4. Ego-defense: Defending self against unacceptable parts of himself. The result was that both similarity of attitudes and bases for the attitudes were important for attraction.

One study in the attraction research area includes all of the features of the present theory, and the results are completely consistent with it. Olczak and Goldman (1975) studied the possibility that self-actualization may be a moderator of attraction. Fifty-six college students filled out a self-actualization questionnaire, and the top and bottom third were selected for the study. They filled out an attitude scale and a measure of the importance of topic for the subject. They were given bogus questionnaires that three other people were supposed to have filled out. These people were rated on intelligence, knowledge of current events, adjustment, morality, degree to which the subject liked the bogus strangers, and the degree to which the subject would be willing to work with them in an experiment. The result was that the more self-actualized subjects (higher self-regard, p < .01) were more affected by dissimilarity than were the less self-actualized subjects. They had significantly lower attraction (p.<.05). This finding flies in the face of the usual understanding of the effect of high self-esteem. It is assumed that those who have high self regard will be healthier, more adventuresome, more comfortable

in diverse social relationships, more flexible in their relationships with people. They are the ones who should be able to look for and enjoy the differences between people because they are not threatened by the differences. They know who they are and value what they are and then can love easily and freely without a sense of danger (Rogers, 1951).

The find is completely consistent with exclusion-defined identity theory. If a person values himself because of certain properties that he has, and if those properties have a way to have an opposite expression, he will not like those people who are perceived to define themselves by that opposite expression. The study showed exactly that finding. The one weakness of interpreting this study as a complete support was previously mentioned. "Lower attraction" does not mean the same thing as "repulsion." Hendrick and Page (1970), Johnson, Gormly and Gormly (1973), and Leonard (1975) found similar results.

One other area of some importance is the finding by Byrne and Rhamey (1965) that negative evaluations by a bogus subject of the subject reduces attraction. It could well be that when an individual perceives a person to be opposite him, he feels that this person automatically has a negative attitude and evaluation of him.

Classical Conditioning

Another experimental area that may contribute something to an understanding of exclusion-defined identity and its impact comes from the area of classical conditioning, specifically the concept of mediated generalization (Eisman, 1955; DiVesta, 1962; Osipow, 1960; DiVesta and Stover, 1962; Das and Nanda, 1963). For example, if a color word was paired in an experimental situation with a positive or negative evaluative word, a

positive or negative affective state is created in the subject (CS, UCS, and UCR, respectively). After sufficient conditioning trials, an attitude of positive or negative evaluation is established toward the color. The subjects are then put into a new experimental situation whereby the color name is associated with a nonsense figure. DiVesta (1962) showed that on such an occasion the attitude that was previously conditioned to the color name becomes transferred to the nonsense figure.

The suggestion from the principle of mediated generalization is that if a person has a history of being conditioned to have a positive view of a particular identity element, then features associated with that element will also illicit a positive affect. For example, if a girl has been conditioned that being a feminine female is good and sees that feminine females wear dresses, then dresses will come to be seen as good.

For mediated generalization to speak of exclusion-defined identity, it must be assumed that some cognitive action takes place. Exclusionidentity theory predicts that if a female is conditioned to achieve and accept for herself an identity of "feminine female", then she will have a negative attitude to the identity of "masculine female." To develop this mediated generalization to the inverse requires that the concept of "opposite" be understood which is a direct example of reversibility (Piaget, 1968). Once the concept of "opposite" is developed in an individual, then that concept will mediate the generalization of the opposite attitude toward the exclusion-defined target. Thus repeated pairings of "feminine female -- good" with the mediating concept of reversibility will automatically generalize to "masculine females -- bad." This writer has found no authors willing to integrate conditioning and cognitive theory in this manner. In fact the prediction from laboratory learning theory is that gen-

eralization will occur to stimuli that are most similar (Hilgard and Bower, 1966; Underwood, 1966). The theory presented in this paper is suggesting that when such learning occurs, learning opposite attitudes also occurs.

Semantic Conditioning

Classical conditioning was selected as the technical vehicle for investigating the exclusion-defined identity hypothesis. Classical conditioning can both be clearly operationalized and be designed to influence involuntary evaluative-affective attitudes (Staats and Staats, 1958; Kiesler, Collins, and Miller, 1969). Semantic conditioning, the type of conditioning selected for this study, uses positive or negative emotionally ladened words (good, beautiful, bad, ugle) as unconditioned stimuli to influence attitudes toward previously neutral stimuli. Emotionally evaluative words both positive and negative were paired with nonsense syllables which then came to be evaluated more positively or negatively depending on the UCS (Staats and Staats, 1967; Staats, Staats, Heard, and Nims, 1959; Blandford and Sampson, 1964; Abell, 1969, and Miller, 1967). Color names were also conditioned to have negative evaluations (Staats, Staats, and Biggs, 1958). Colors and colored animals were positively conditioned by Parish (1972). This technique has also been used to influence attitudes toward targets that probably were not previously neutral. Staats and Staats (1958) influenced attitudes toward European nationalities and toward male names by pairing them with evaluative words. Parish, Fleetwood and Lentz (1975) and Parish and Fleetwood (1975) used semantic conditioning with slides, as did the present experiment, to condition children to have more positive attitudes toward racial groups. The same type of slide show has also been used to reduce test anxiety in children

(Parish, Buntman, and Buntman, 1976) and to reduce aggression in children (Parish, Maly, and Shirazi, 1975). Parish, Bryant, and Prawat (1978) used the technique to influence grade school girls to have a more positive attitude toward females.

CHAPTER III

METHOD

Subjects

Subjects were third and fourth graders in three rural Oklahoma towns, Henryetta, Beggs, and Morris. A total of 60 males and 27 females were selected on the following basis. They all:

- 1. Had medium to low self-esteems,
- 2. Did not have extremely positive attitudes toward their own sex group, and
- 3. Did not have extremely negative attitudes toward the opposite sex.

More specifically, 373 students from 19 classrooms rated "Self", "Boys", and "Girls" on an evaluative Semantic Differential (Osgood, Suci, and Tannenbaum, 1957). They also filled out the Coopersmith Self-Esteem Inventory (Coopersmith 1957). Teachers filled out the Coopersmith Behavior Rating Form on each student (Coopersmith, 1967). Students were selected as subjects if they met all of the following criteria:

- 1. Were at the median or below on two of the three measures of self-esteem.
- 2. Had a scores at or below one standard deviation below the top score on the "Self" Semantic Differential rating.
- 3. Had a score at or below one standard deviation from the top score on the Semantic Differential rating of the subject's sex group.
- 4. Had a score at or above one standard deviation from the lowest score on the Semantic Differential rating of the opposite sex.
For example, for a boy to become a subject, he must be at or below the median on two out of three "Self" ratings (Semantic Differential "Self", Self-Esteem Inventory, Behavior Rating Form), be one standard deviation from the top on his rating of "Boys", and be one standard deviation from the bottom on his rating of "Girls". This selection procedure identified a pool of subjects with medium to low self-esteems who also did not have an extremely positive attitude toward their own sex group and did not have an extremely negative attitude toward the opposite sex. Instrument ceiling effects were also controlled with this procedure.

Instruments

Semantic Differential

The Semantic Differential that was used both as a selection instrument and as a dependent variable has eight bi-polar adjectives selected from the original evaluative lists by Osgood, Suci, and Tannenbaum (1957). (See Appendix A.) The direction of the polaritywas randomized to prevent response set. This particular instrument had previously been used with third and fourth graders to measure attitudes toward racial groups (Bryant and Parish, 1977; Parish, Bryant, and Prawat, 1978). It had a test-retest reliability of .84 with a one day interval with grade school girls (K-6) rating "girls" and a .80 reliability when they are rating "boys" (Parish, Bryant, and Prawat, 1978).

In a recent pilot study with third and fourth grade students, this Semantic Differential was found to correlate .296 (\underline{p} . <.05) (critical level $_{45}r$ =.237) with the Coopersmith Self-Esteem Inventory (1967) for both third and fourth graders and to correlate .45 (\underline{p} . <.05) for fourth graders only. Theoretically the Semantic Differential measures immediate,

good-bad affective evaluations, while the Self-Esteem Inventory measures enduring patterns of self-esteem. In two previous studies, this form of the Semantic Differential has been responsive to influence by the semantic conditioning techniques that were used in this study (Parish, Shirazi, and Lambert, 1976; Parish, Bryant, and Prawat, 1978).

Self-Esteem Inventory

The Self-Esteem Inventory (SEI) measures the personality variable of self-esteem that is persistent across time and does so inferentially from self-reported behavioral statements. This instrument, developed by Coopersmith (1967), requires that the subject indicate that a statement is "like me" or "unlike me". It has fifty scoreable statements with an even number of favorably and unfavorably worded items in random order (Appendix B.). It was originally developed to read by children 7-10 years and to measure the "enduring subjective experience of self-esteem" with such statements as "I daydream a lot," and "I often get discouraged at school," Coopersmith found test-retest reliabilities of .88 for 30 fifth grade children with a five week interval and .70 for 56 children after a three year interval. Ziekel and Moses (1971) used the SEI to demonstrate a difference between the self-esteem of Caucasians and Puerto Ricans. Simon (1972) found it to differentiate high vs. low popularity in a sociometric study. Wood and Johnson (1972) used it to identify behavior disordered boys. Spatz and Johnston (1973) found a high level of internal consistency (.86). Smith, Tedeschi, Brown, and Lindskold (1973) found SEI self-esteem to correlate with measures of self-trust and popularity. Dorr, Rummer, and Green (1976) found a significant correlation between the SEI and a measure of "emotional adjustment" on the California Test of Personality for Children. Cunningham and Berbecian (1976) and Burback and Bridgeman (1976) both related SEI self-esteem to internal locus of control. Prawat, Parish, Grissom, Childress, and Grissom (1977) found the Self-Esteem Inventory to correlate - .66 (p. <.01) with external locus of control (Nowicki and Strickland, 1973) for elementary school males (grades 3-6) and -.58 (p. <.01) for elementary school females. They also found a relationship of .49 and .42 for males and females respectively, (both p. <.01) between the Self-Esteem Inventory and Achievement Motivation (Herman, 1970). In a recent pilot study, a significant correlation was found between the Self-Esteem Inventory and the Coopersmith Behavior Rating Form (r=.523, p.<01) for fourth graders.

Behavior Rating Form

The Behavior Rating Form was developed by Coopersmith (1967) to tap self-esteem as it is reflected by classroom behavior. The Behavior Rating Form consists of items thought to be related to self-esteem and is filled out by teachers (Appendix C.). For example, "Does this child hesitate to express his opinions, as evidenced by extreme caution, failure to contribute, or a subdued manner in speaking situations?" Teachers respond with "never", "seldom", "sometimes", "usually", and "always" with directionality randomized to control for response set. Coopersmith's reliability studies found a .73 relationship between two raters who were rating the behavior of 26 children and found a test-retest of .96 when one teacher rated 21 students with an 8-week interval. His validity study found a moderate but statistically significant relationship between the Behavior Rating Form and the Self-Esteem Inventory for fifth grade children, .43, which was somewhat lower than the relationship found for fourth grade children

in the recent pilot study, .52.

The three instruments measure self-esteem with increasingly distant degrees of inference. The Semantic Differential operates at an affective level that is presumably relatively more subject to transient influences, hence may be more responsive to a time limited experimental intervention. The Self-Esteem Inventory measures personality in terms of characteristic behavior statements and characteristic attitudes that inferentially reflect a stable pattern of self-esteem. The Behavior Rating Form is the most inferential deriving self-esteem from third party judgments of adaptive self-confident behaviors. Together they provided a more reliable method of subject selection than would any of the instruments alone.

Apparatus

The mechanical apparatus used in the procedures below consisted of 1. a 35 mm Kodak Ectographic AF2 carousel projector that automatically showed each slide for 5 seconds with 1/2 second between slides coordinated with 2. a Wollensak brand cassett player (Model:2551) that pronounced any words that were projected. The 35mm slides were shown on a standard white movie screen in a room that was darkened sufficiently for the pictures and words to be clear. The size of the projected image was identical for all subjects, 20" x 20" (\pm 3") even though three different sized rooms were utilized. The distance from the screen for the best perception was empirically determined for each group. The slides of the words were created by photographically copying typed words, a single word appeared in the center of the screen in black letters on a white background. The slides of pictures were of three types. Type I were photographic reproductions of colored magazine pictures with the color accurately reproduced. Type II were actual photographs of students from Stillwater schools participating in standard school activities. Type III were photographs of the experimental subjects using a Pentax 35 mm single lens reflex camera with Kodak FR135-20 film (ASA 64) in an outdoor setting near their school with all subjects clearly visible as individuals. All slides were high quality color reproductions in clear focus. All slides contained only one sex.

Procedures - Phase I

The Semantic Differential and Coopersmith Self-Esteem Inventory were administered by the author in the regular classroom to all the students present in the third and fourth grades. Half of the classes of each grade filled out the Semantic Differential first and the other half filled out the Self-Esteem Inventorv first. All possible target orders on the Semantic Differential were previously randomized. Teachers were also provided with the Coopersmith Behavior Rating Form to be filled out on each child during the pretesting period. They were also instructed to put the child's name, sex, and their initials on each form.

More specifically, at the beginning of the pretest, the following was said to each class.

Hi! My name is Bill, and I'm going around to different schools as part of a project to find out what kids really think about certain things. Are you willing to help me find out what kids really think? Good. Clear your desks except for a pencil. Here are some cards. Don't make any marks until I tell you.

All students were given a numbered 3 x 5 card on which they printed their name, sex, school, grade, and teacher. The number on the card was the identifying number for each child. On each instrument filled out, students recorded their individual numbers.

After passing out either the Semantic Differential or the Self-Esteem Inventory the following general instructions were given.

Write the number that is on your card in the upper left hand corner, here (demonstrating). Be sure that it is exactly the same number that is on the card. Do not write your name. We are using these numbers instead of names so that you will know that you can say what you really think without the teachers or principals or parents knowing.

The specific instructions for each instrument were given (Semantic Differential, Appendix D. and Self-Esteem Inventory, Appendix E.).

Procedures - Phase II.

The subjects were then selected according to the previously described selection procedures and randomly assigned across school, grade, sex, and race to four experimental groups. These were : an exclusionary selfesteem increasing group (Exclusionary Group), a nonexclusionary selfesteem increasing group (Whole-Self Group), a placebo control (Placebo Group), and a no treatment control group (Control Group). All subjects in treatment groups were presented with a form of semantic conditioning.

Semantic conditioning, a well established version of Pavlovian classical conditioning (Pavlov, 1927), uses words as unconditioned stimuli to generate in subjects, mostly children, a certain feeling that the experimenter wishes to have transferred to some previously neutral stimuli (Staats, Staats, Heard, and Hims, 1959; Blandford and Sampson, 1964: Abell, 1969; Parish, Bryant, and Prawat, 1978). In the present study, subjects saw a slide of a picture (CS), followed by a positive word (UCS) which presumably produced a positive affect (UCR), followed by a neutral word to prevent backward conditioning. Each treatment group saw different pictures but had the same set of positive and neutral words. For example, one of the groups might have seen a picture of boys studying, followed by a positive word, "candy", followed by a neutral word, "it". A picture and two words constituted a conditioning trial. Each slide was presented for five seconds. The subjects received thirty-six trials on each of four successive days. On the fifth day, the instruments used for the pretest were readministered.

The positive and neutral words to be used in this study were operationalized in the following manner. Twenty randomly selected kindergarten children from the Danville Illinois School system were individually presented with 171 words from children's readers. They identified which words "made them feel good", "made them feel bad", or "made them feel neither good nor bad". If 17 of the 20 children agreed that the word was positive, it was included on the positive word list. If 17 children agreed that a word was neutral, it was included on the neutral list. The positive words were: kind, laugh, lovely, sweet, excitement, father, funny, family, friend, good, great, gentle, gift, happy, holiday, baby, beautiful, beauty, cake, charming, Christmas, candy, circus, delicious, delightful, love, nice, polite, proud, party, pretty, sunshine, smile, and wonderful. The neutral words were: and, button, brick, block, cool, circle, coal, cord, dot, door, floor, far, ink, into, inside, it, little, leaf, line, mop, of, on, the, trunk, thing, pot, pipe, paint, road, round, rock, sign, square, something, sit and this (Parish, 1972). Parish, Bryant, and Prawat (1978) successfully used these words to condition attitudes in children in grades K - 6.

Subjects in each experimental group were presented the semantic conditioning procedure in same sex groups of between four and six students. If fewer than four were available, then extra students were included, (picked by the principals from the third and fourth grade) to bring the

group size to the specified level. These extra students were treated identically in all respects to the experimental subjects except their data was not included in the final analysis. Subjects in the Exclusionary Group saw pictures of their own sex group with the positive and neutral words arranged to produce semantic conditioning. This procedure was designed to increase the positive attitudes toward the subject's sex group. The Whole-Self Group saw pictures of themselves in their respective treatment group with semantic conditioning procedures. This procedure was designed to increase the positive attitude of the individual subject toward himself. The Placebo Group was exposed to exactly the same slides as their Exclusionary counterparts (i.e. own sex group only) except the order was randomized so conditioning would not occur. The Placebo Group was to control for effects of attention. The Control Group saw no slides.

With regard to specific procedures, a treatment group from the Exclusionary Group (i.e. six boys or six girls) was brought to the experimental room from their various classes where they saw the slide projector, tape recorder, screen, and chairs. After they were seated, they were given the following instructions:

Hi! My name is Bill, and I would like your help today. I am studying how kids learn, and I would like to show you some slides of pictures and words. Do you think you would like to do that? Good. Now the first thing I want to do is make sure that you can see the pictures and words clearly. Turn out the lights /the shades would already be down/ and take a look at this picture. Can everyone see over everyone else's head? Are the chairs too close or too far from the screen? Is there anyone here who is supposed to wear glasses and doesn't have them with him? Have any of you been told that you are going to need glasses? Is anyone color-blind? Now that everybody can see the picture let's take a look at a word. Can everybody see it clearly and read it? Now lets try the tape. Can everyone hear and understand the words? All right, we are ready to begin. When the words come on the screen, you will hear the tape recorder pronounce it. At the same time you say the word,

and I'll be saying it too. Are there any questions? Let's begin.

The experimenter then showed the classical conditioning based slide show. At the end of the slides the subjects were told:

We will be doing something like this everyday this week so I will be seeing you tomorrow.

The Whole-Self Group also had semantic conditioning procedures. Prior to running any of the groups in a school, Whole-Self subjects were photographed. On the day the pictures were taken, distinctive hats, Christmas bows, and ribbons were available so that each subject looked as distinctive as possible. Forty photographs of each treatment group (i.e. six boys or six girls) were taken. Some pictures were full length, and others were head and shoulders. In every photograph, every subject was clearly visible. For the photographs, the six subjects were arranged in two rows, three in the front and three in the back. After every third picture, subjects were told to rotate positions in a clock-wise fashion. All subjects had equal back-row and front-row exposure. The subjects were also told to make different faces, "Let's see a big smile, a sad face, a silly face, a mad look, a hungry look, a look like you have just eaten something that tastes bad". They were also told to make their bodies into funny statues. All of the instructions were given unsystematically throughout a photography session. Instructions for the Whole-Self Group were identical to those given the Exclusionary Group except for this addition:

Now that everybody can see the picture clearly you have probably noticed that these pictures are of you. Can everybody see themselves? Good. Anytime a picture is on the screen be sure to find yourself. Now lets take a look at a word . . .

And before the procedures began:

. . . and I'll be saying it too. Are there any questions?

Remember, look for yourself and say the words. Lets begin. The Placebo Group received the same instructions as the Exclusionary Group. Order of treatment groups was randomized within schools.

Procedures - Phase III.

Treatment sessions took place on four successive days Monday through Thursday. On Friday, the Coopersmith Self-Esteem Inventory and the Semantic Differential were readministered to each group, including the Control Group, by this experimenter using the same instructions and coding system as on the previous administrations in the room used for conditioning. A subject's data was included in the final analysis if he was in three of the four conditioning sessions and was present for the administration of the instruments. The teachers were asked to fill out the Coopersmith Behavior Rating Form (1967) paying particular attention to the behavior on the day the dependent variables were collected.

Due to the conflicting evidence with regard to whether or not conditioning occurs with or without awareness (Staats and Staats, 1967; Miller, 1967; Miller and Barness, 1969; vs. Cohen, 1964; Hare, 1964; Insko and Oakes, 1966; Page, 1969), this study was done "without awareness". For this study "without awareness" was created by not explaining conditioning to the subjects. After the final data was collected from each group on the fifth day, subjects were asked to turn the Semantic Differential over on the back. They were asked to write any guesses they might have with regard to the purpose of the study. If any felt that they were not able to write what they thought about the purpose, they were given an opportunity before they returned to class to tell into a tape recorder any ideas they had about the experiment. No child was able to hear another talking into the tape. Two Master's level psychologists read the responses and listened to the tapes. If any subject seemed to understand that they were being conditioned, their data was excluded from the final analysis.

Procedures - Phase IV.

Following the study, all subjects at each school were brought together for a partial debriefing. They were shown a slide show that had samples of pictures seen by all of the groups as well as some of the words. Some pictures were also included of both males and females in one picture. They were thanked for their help and given the opportunity to ask questions and make observations.

CHAPTER IV

RESULTS

The data were analyzed with a One-Way Analysis of Variance (Dayton, 1970). If an \underline{F} was found to be significant, a Duncan's Multiple Range Test (Dayton, 1970) was completed to identify differences between specific groups. The primary confidence level was .05, but the .10 level was also noted on certain statistics. The results will be presented separately for each instrument, Semantic Differential, Self-Esteem Inventory, and Behavior Rating Form.

Semantic Differential

The Means and Standard Deviations on the Pretest for all experimental subjects can be found in Table I. Using the One-Way ANOVA, comparisons were made between the experimental groups (Whole-Self, Exclusionary, Placebo, and Control) on the Semantic Differential, ratings of "Self", ratings of Same Sex, and ratings of Opposite Sex. Change scores (Post-test minus Pretest) were also computed for each subject on each attitude target. An Analysis of Variance was also computed on these scores.

The ANOVA for the raw scores for all subjects on "Self" ratings was not significant ($F_{3,70}$ = .975, p. >.05). The ANOVA for Change Scores on the "Self" ratings was also not significant ($F_{3,70}$ = 1.987, p. >.05). The descriptive data on "Self" ratings is in Table II, and the attendant F - tables are Tables III and IV.

TABLE I

POPULATION CHARACTERISTICS OF ALL SUBJECTS WHO COMPLETED THE STUDY: PRETEST SCORES ON SEMANTIC DIFFERENTIAL RATINGS OF "SELF", OF THE SUBJECTS SEX GROUP, AND OF THE OPPOSITE SEX.

		Self	Opposite Sex	Same Sex	
Henryetta &				07.44	
Beggs	Mean	28.27	28.34	27.14	
(N=44)	Standard Deviation	4.15	6.52	3.52	
Morris	Mean	30.47	27.03	27.03	
(N=30)	Standard Deviation	3.64	6.26	3.85	
Total Group	Mean	29.16	28.81	27.09	
(N=74)	Standard Deviation	4.09	6.45	3.66	

TABLE II

MEANS AND STANDARD DEVIATIONS FOR PRE-TEST, POST-TEST, AND CHANGE SCORES FOR ALL SUBJECTS IN ALL EXPERIMENTAL GROUPS ON THEIR SEMANTIC DIFFERENTIAL RATINGS OF "SELF"

		11 1 0 1	c		7 1 1		
		Whole-Sel	I	1	Exclusiona	ry	
	${\tt Pre}$	Post	Ch.	Pre	Post	Ch.	
Means	27.94	32	4.06	29,78	29	78	
N	17	17	17	18	18	18	
<u>S. D.</u>	4.77	5.80	7. 45 .	3.99	6.18	6.64	
		Placebo			Control		
	Pre	Post	Ch.	Pre	Post	<u>Ch</u> .	
Means	29.72	30.61	.89	29.14	29.71	.57	
N	18	18	18	21	21	21	
<u>S. D.</u>	3.44	4.90	5.43	3.87	4.52	5.14	
<u>Means</u> <u>N</u> S. D.	<u>Pre</u> 29.72 18 3.44	Placebo Post 30.61 18 4.90	<u>Ch.</u> .89 18 5.43	<u>Pre</u> 29.14 21 3.87	Control <u>Post</u> 29.71 21 4.52	<u>Ch.</u> .57 21 5.14	-

TABLE III

F - TABLE FOR THE ONE-WAY ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE OF POST-TEST SCORES (RAW SCORES) FROM THE SEMANTIC DIFFERENTIAL RATINGS OF "SELF"

Source	Sum of Squares	df.	Mean Square	F	.05F	
Treatments	88.477	3	29.492	.975	2.74 n.s.	
Error	2120.564	70	30.294			

TABLE IV

F - TABLE FOR THE ONE-WAY ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE OF CHANGE SCORES FROM THE SEMANTIC DIFFERENTIAL RATINGS OF "SELF"

Sum of Squares	df.	Mean Squai	re F	.05F	
236.963	3	78.988	1.987	2.74 n.s.	
2783.091	70	39.758			
	Sum of Squares 236.963 2783.091	Sum of Squares df. 236.963 3 2783.091 70	Sum of Squares df. Mean Squares 236.963 3 78.988 2783.091 70 39.758	Sum of Squares df. Mean Square F 236.963 3 78.988 1.987 2783.091 70 39.758	Sum of Squares df. Mean Square F .05F 236.963 3 78.988 1.987 2.74 n.s. 2783.091 70 39.758 39.758

A One-Way Analysis of Variance was computed on the ratings of the Subject's Own Sex Group. It was not significant ($F_{3,70}$ = 2.06, p. >.05). A One-Way Analysis of Variance on the Change Scores was not significant at the .05 level ($F_{3,70}$ = 2.57, p. >.05), but was significant at the .10 level ($_{.10}F_{3.70}$ =2.18). A Duncan's Multiple Range test (Dayton, 1970) was computed for the Post Hoc analysis. The subjects from the Whole-Self Group had significantly greater positive change than did the Placebo Group (p.<.05). The descriptive data for the Own Sex Group ratings is in Table V. The F - Tables are in Tables VI and VII.

A One-Way Analysis of Variance was computed on the Opposite Sex ratings. It was not significant ($F_{3,70}$ = .250, <u>p</u>. > .05) nor was the One-Way ANOVA for the Change Scores ($F_{3,70}$ = .422, <u>p</u>. > .05). The descriptive statistics for Opposite Sex ratings are in Table VIII. The F - Tables for the Post-Test and Change Scores are in Tables IX and X, respectively.

The dependent variable data could not be collected in Morris on the scheduled Friday because of a snowstorm that cancelled school. It was collected on the following Monday. Inspection of the raw data seemed to indicate that the delay may have produced a very different distribution. As a result, a series of analyses were performed separately on the data from Henryetta and Beggs without Morris. The following paragraphs and Tables XI - XXII deal only with the data from Henryetta and Beggs.

A One-Way Analysis of Variance was computed on the raw scores of the Semantic Differential "Self" ratings for subjects from Henryetta and Beggs. It was not significant at the .05 level ($F_{3,40}=2.58$, p. >.05), but was significant at the .10 level ($_{.10}F_{3,40}=2.23$).

A Duncan's Multiple Range Test (Dayton, 1970) was computed for a Post Hoc analysis. The subjects in the Whole-Self Group had significantly

TABLE V

MEANS AND STANDARD DEVIATIONS FOR PRE-T.EST, POST-TEST, AND CHANGE SCORES FOR ALL SUBJECTS IN ALL EXPERIMENTAL GROUPS ON THEIR SEMANTIC DIFFERENTIAL. RATINGS OF THEIR OWN SEX GROUP

		Whole-Self	-	Exclusionary
Means	Pre 26.76	Post 31.24	<u>Chg.</u> 4.47	Pre Post Ch. 27.39 29.06 1.67
N	17	17	17	18 18 18
<u>S. D.</u>	4.35	6.85	7.06	3.51 6.42 5.50
		Placebo		Control
Means	<u>Pre</u> 26.94	Post 26.22	<u>Chg.</u> 72	Pre Post Ch. 27.24 28.57 1.33
N	18	18	18	21 21 21
<u>S.</u> D.	4.22	6.79	5.63	2.41 2.63 3.11

TABLE VI

F - TABLE FOR THE ONE-WAY ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE OF POST-TEST SCORES (RAW SCORES) FOR THE SEMANTIC DIFFERENTIAL RATINGS OF OWN SEX GROUP

Source	Sum of Squares	df.	Mean Square	F	.05
Treatments	222.338	3	74.113 2	2.06	2.74 n.s.
Error	2512.257	70	35.889		

TABLE VII

F - TABLE AND DUNCAN'S MULTIPLE RANGE SUMMARY FOR THE ONE-WAY ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE OF CHANGE SCORES FOR THE SEMANTIC DIFFERENTIAL RATINGS OF OWN SEX GROUP

Source	Sum of Squ	ares df	. Mean	Square	F	(.05)F	(.10)F
Treatments	238.636	3	79	9.545	2.57	2.74	2.18p.<10
Error Whole-Self	2164.513 > Placebo	70 p.<.05	30	0.922			

TABLE VIII

MEANS AND STANDARD DEVIATIONS FOR PRE-TEST, POST-TEST, AND CHANGE SCORES FOR ALL SUBJECTS IN ALL EXPERIMENTAL GROUPS ON THEIR SEMANTIC DIFFERENTIAL RATINGS OF THE OPPOSITE SEX

.

		Whole-Sel	f	E	Exclusionary			
Means	$\frac{\text{Pre}}{27}$	<u>Post</u> 27.18	<u>Ch.</u> .18	<u>Pre</u> 28.94	Post 25.33	<u>Ch.</u> -3.61		
<u>N</u>	17	17	17	18	18	18		
S. D.	6.82	9.62	12.37	7.18	9.30	9.09		
<u></u>		Placebo			Control			
Means	<u>Pre</u> 26,78	<u>Post</u> 25.89	<u>Ch.</u> 89	<u>Pre</u> 28.38	Post 27.62	<u>Ch.</u> 76		
<u>N</u>	18	18	18	21	21	21		
<u>S. D.</u>	6.82	9.62	11.42	5.11	7.54	7.14		

TABLE IX

F - TABLE FOR THE ONE-WAY ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE OF POST-TEST SCORES (RAW SCORES) FOR THE SEMANTIC DIFFERENTIAL RATINGS OF THE OPPOSITE SEX

Source	Sum of Squares	df.	Mean Square	F	.05F
Treatments	65.177	3	21.726	.250	2.74 n.s.
Error	6083.201	70	86.903		

TABLE X

F - TABLE FOR THE ONE-WAY ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE OF CHANGE SCORES FROM THE SEMANTIC DIFFERENTIAL RATINGS OF OPPOSITE SEX

Source	Sum of Squares	df.	Mean Square	F	.05F
Treatments	142.259	3	47.42	.442	2.74 n.s.
Error	7504.336	70	107.20		

more positive scores than did the Placebo Group (\underline{p} . <.05), the Control Group (\underline{p} . <.05), and the Exclusionary Group (\underline{p} .<.10). The descriptive statistics, F - Table, and Duncan's Multiple Range Summary can be found in Tables XI, XII, and XIII, respectively. The ANOVA for the Change Scores on "Self" ratings was also significant ($F_{3,40}$ = 4.20, \underline{p} . <.01). The Post Hoc Duncan's Multiple Range Test was computed. The subjects in the Whole-Self Group had significantly more positive change than the Placebo Group (\underline{p} . <.01), the Control Group (\underline{p} . <.01) and the Exclusionary Group (\underline{p} . <.01). The descriptive statistics, F - Table, and Duncan's Multiple Range Summary can be found in Tables XI, XIV, and XV.

A One-Way Analysis of Variance was computed on the Semantic Differential Ratings of the Subjects Own Sex Group for Henryetta and Beggs. It was significant ($F_{3,40}$ =4.62, p. <.01). The Duncan's Multiple Range Test indicates that the Whole-Self Group had a significantly more positive rating of their Own Sex Group than did the Placebo Group (p. <.001), the Exclusionary Group (p. <.10), and the Control Group (p. <.10). The Control Group had significantly more positive ratings than the Placebo Group (p.<10). The Exclusionary Group had significantly more positive ratings than the Placebo Group (p. <.10). The One Way ANOVA for the Change Scores was not significant at the .05 level ($F_{3,40}$ =2.69, p.>.05), but was significant at the .10 level ($_{.10}F_{3,40}$ =2.23). The Whole-Self Group was significantly more positive than the Placebo Group (p. <.05). The above findings are summarized on Tables XVI, XVIII, XVIII, and XIX.

A One-Way Analysis of Variance was computed on the data from Henryetta and Beggs on the Semantic Differential ratings of the Opposite Sex. It was not significant ($F_{3,40}^{=}$.132, <u>p</u>. > .05). The ANOVA on the Change Scores was also not significant ($F_{3,40}^{=}$ =1.32, <u>p</u>. > .05). These findings

TABLE XI

MEANS AND STANDARD DEVIATIONS FOR THE PRE-TEST, POST-TEST AND CHANGE SCORES BY HENRYETTA AND BEGGS SUBJECTS ON THEIR SEMANTIC DIFFERENTIAL RATINGS OF "SELF"

		Whole-Self	E	I	Exclusiona	ary		
Means	$\frac{\text{Pre}}{26.50}$	<u>Post</u> 35.20	<u>Ch.</u> 8.70	Pre 29.00	Post 30.50	<u>Ch.</u> 1.50		
N	10	10	10	10	10	10		
<u>S.</u> D.	4.76	5.21	6.07	3.58	6.17	6.61		
		Placebo			Control			
Means	Pre 28.82	Post 28.91	<u>Ch.</u> .091	Pre 28.62	<u>Post</u> 29.85	<u>Ch.</u> 1.23		
N	11	11	11	13	13	13		
<u>S. D.</u>	3.54	5.38	6.23	4.14	4.72	4.66		

TABLE XII

F - TABLE FOR THE ONE-WAY ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE OF POST-TEST SCORES (RAW SCORES) FROM HENRYETTA AND BEGGS ON SEMANTIC DIFFERENTIAL "SELF" RATINGS

Source	Sum of Squares	df.	Mean Square	F	.05F	.10F
Treatment	244.276	3	81.425	2.58	2.84	2.23 p. 10
Error	1260.701	40	31.518			

TABLE XIII

POST HOC ANALYSIS OF THE SIGNIFICANT F OF SEMANTIC DIFFERENTIAL "SELF" RATINGS FROM HENRYETTA AND BEGGS: DUNCAN'S MULTIPLE RANGE TEST

Whole-Self	>	Placebo	p. <.05
Whole-Self	>	Control	p. <.05
Whole-Self	>	Exclusionary	p. <.10
		•	

TABLE XIV

F - TABLE FOR THE ONE-WAY ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE OF CHANGE SCORES FROM HENRYETTA AND BEGGS ON THE SEMANTIC DIFFERENTIAL "SELF" RATINGS

	1						
Source	Sum of Squares	df.	Mean Square	F	.01F		
Treatment	477.342	3	159.114	4.20	2.84	p. <.01	
Èrror	1513.817	40	37.845				

TABLE XV

POST HOC ANALYSIS OF THE SIGNIFICANT F FOR CHANGE SCORES ON SEMANTIC DIFFERENTIAL "SELF" RATINGS FROM HENRYETTA AND BEGGS: DUNCAN'S MULTIPLE RANGE TEST

\geq	Placebo	p. <.01
>	Control	p. <.01
>	Exclusionary	p. <.01
	<u>/</u> / /	<pre>> Placebo > Control > Exclusionary</pre>

TABLE XVI

MEANS AND STANDARD DEVIATIONS FOR THE PRE-TEST, POST-TEST AND CHANGE SCORES BY HENRYETTA AND BEGGS SUBJECTS ON THEIR SEMANTIC DIFFERENTIAL RATINGS OF THEIR OWN SEX GROUP

	Whole-Self			E	Exclusionary				
Means	Pre 28.0	Post 33.9	<u>Ch.</u> 5.9	Pre 27.1	$\frac{\text{Post}}{28.5}$	$\frac{Ch.}{1.5}$			
N	10	10	10	10	10	10			
<u>S. D.</u>	3.41	6.44	8.02	3.21	6.99	5.92			
		Placebo			Contro1				
Means	Pre 25.91	$\frac{\text{Post}}{24.09}$	<u>Ch.</u> -1.82	<u>Pre</u> 27.54	Post 28.92	<u>Ch.</u> 1.38			
N	11	11	11	13	13	13			
<u>S. D.</u>	4.42	6.54	6.28	2.56	2.53	3.15			

TABLE XVII

F - TABLE FOR THE ONE-WAY ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE OF THE POST-TEST (RAW SCORES) FROM THE SEMANTIC DIFFERENTIAL RATINGS OF OWN SEX GROUP BY SUBJECTS FROM HENRYETTA AND BEGGS

Source	Sum of Squares	df.	Mean Square	F	.01F	
Treatment	505.018	3	168.339	4.62	3.83	p. <.01
Error	1457.230	40	36.431			

TABLE XVIII

POST HOC ANALYSIS OF THE SIGNIFICANT F OF SEMANTIC DIFFERENTIAL "SELF" RATINGS FROM HENRYETTA AND BEGGS: DUNCAN'S MULTIPLE RANGE TEST

>	Placebo	p .	<.001
\geq	Exclusionary	p.	<.10
\geq	Control	p.	<.10
\geq	Placebo	p.	<.10
\geq	Placebo	p.	<.10
	VVVV	 > Placebo > Exclusionary > Control > Placebo > Placebo 	 > Placebo > Exclusionary > Control > Placebo > Placebo p. > Placebo p.

TABLE XIX

F - TABLE FOR THE ONE-WAY ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE OF CHANGE SCORES AND DUNCAN'S MULTIPLE RANGE TEST FROM THE OWN SEX GROUP SEMANTIC DIFFERENTIAL RATINGS FROM HENRYETTA AND BEGGS

Source	Sum of Squares	df.	Mean Square	F	.05F	.10F
Treatment	314.069	3	104.690	2.69	2.84	2.23 p.<.10
Error	1556.113	40	38.903			
Whole-Self>	Placebo p.<.05		•			

TABLE XX

MEANS AND STANDARD DEVIATIONS FOR THE PRE-TEST, POST-TEST AND CHANGE SCORES BY HENRYETTA AND BEGGS SUBJECTS ON THEIR SEMANTIC DIFFERENTIAL RATINGS OF THE OPPOSITE SEX

		Whole-Sel	f	I	Exclusiona	ry
	Pre	Post	<u>Ch.</u>	Pre	Post	<u>Ch.</u>
Means	27.80	25.50	-2.3	30.90	25.80	-5.1
N	10	10	10	10	10	10
<u>S.</u> D.	6.97	11.56	14.11	7.15	6.31	9.45
	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	Placebo	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·		Control	
	Pre	Post	Ch.	Pre	Post	Ch.
Means	26.82	26.91	.10	28.08	27.62	46
N	11	11	11	13	13	13
<u>S.</u> D.	6.15	9.01	11.64	5.29	7.30	8.39

are summarized on Tables XX, XXI, and XXII. It should be noted that though the Standard Deviations for Opposite Sex ratings are slightly higher on the Pretest than are other ratings (see Tables II, V, VIII, XI, XVI), the Post-Test and Change Score Standard Deviations are much larger. This observation suggests that the treatment produced a wider dispersion of scores.

With regard to the hypotheses, the Whole-Self Group had the highest self-esteem, an elevation in positive attitudes toward their Own Sex, and no deterioration in attitudes toward the Opposite Sex as predicted. The prediction of deterioration in Opposite Sex attitudes in response to Same Sex conditioning (Exclusionary Group) is unclear because conditioning of increased positive attitude toward one's own sex group did not occur except as a trend (\underline{p} . <.10). Even with this trend in Same Sex conditioning, the F's for Opposite Sex ratings were very low inspite of the Means for Opposite Sex ratings being in the predicted direction. As was mentioned in the above paragraph, the within variance for Opposite Sex ratings was very high (Table XX). One unanticipated finding was the trend (\underline{p} .<.10) in the Placebo Group to deteriorate in "Self" ratings,

Self-Esteem Inventory

Another dependent variable was collected, the Self-Esteem Inventory (Coopersmith, 1967). A One-Way Analysis of Variance was computed on the raw scores. It was not significant ($F_{3,70}=1.42$, $\underline{p}.>.15$). Descriptive data can be found in Table XXIII, and the F - Table can be found in Table XXIV. Change Scores (Post-test minus Pretest) also were computed for each subject. The ANOVA for Change Scores was not significant ($F_{3,69}=1.44$ $\underline{p}.>.05$). The F = Table is Table XXV.

TABLE XXI

F - TABLE FOR THE ONE-WAY ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE OF THE POST-TEST (RAW SCORES) ON THE SEMANTIC DIFFERENTIAL OPPOSITE SEX RATINGS FROM HENRYETTA AND BEGGS

Source	Sum of Squares	df.	Mean Square	F	.05F
Treatment	32.823	3	10.941	.132	2.84 n.s.
Error	3320.086	40	83.002		

TABLE XXII

F - TABLE FOR THE ONE-WAY ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE OF THE CHANGE SCORES FROM THE SEMANTIC DIFFERENTIAL OPPOSITE SEX RATINGS FROM HENRYETTA AND BEGGS

·····				
Source	Sum of Squares	df.	Mean Square F	.05F
Treatment	174.019	3	58.006 1.32	2.84 n.s.
Error	5289,140	40	132.229	

TABLE XXIII

		Whole-Sel	f	Exclusionary			
Means	Pre 28.88	Post 27.06	$-\frac{\text{Ch.}}{1.82}$	Pre 27.89	Post 26.94	<u>Ch.</u> 94	
N	17	17	17	18	18	18	
<u>S.</u> D.	4.20	7.74	7.52	5.99	6.36	5.45	
Means	Pre 26.06	Post 27.61	$\frac{Ch.}{1.56}$	Pre 29.30	Post 31.33	$\frac{Ch}{2.3}$	
N	18	18	18	20	21	20	
<u>S.</u> D.	6.82	7.10	5.18	6.66	8.77	8.33	

MEANS AND STANDARD DEVIATIONS FOR PRE-TEST, POST-TEST AND CHANGE SCORES FOR ALL SUBJECTS ON THE SELF-ESTEEM INVENTORY

TABLE XXIV

F - TABLE FOR THE ONE-WAY ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE OF THE POST-TEST SCORES (RAW SCORES) FOR THE SELF-ESTEEM INVENTORY

Source	Sum of Squares	df.	Mean Square	F	.05F
Treatment	260.575	3	86,858	1.42	2,74 n.s.
Error	4270.830	70	61.012		

TABLE	XXV
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F - TABLE FOR THE ONE-WAY ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE FOR CHANGE SCORES ON THE SELF-ESTEEM INVENTORY

Source	Sum of Squares	df.	Mean Square	F	.05F
Treatment	212.680	3	70.893 1	44	2.76 n.s.
Error	3398.060	69	49.247		,

TABLE XXVI

MEANS AND STANDARD DEVIATIONS FOR PRE-TEST, POST-TEST, AND CHANGE SCORES FOR SUBJECTS FROM HENRYETTA AND BEGGS ON THE SELF-ESTEEM INVENTORY

		Whole-Sel	f	Exclusionary
Means	<u>Pre</u> 27.9	Post 25	<u>Ch.</u> -2.9	Pre Post Ch. 29.1 27.3 -1.8
N	10	10	10	10 10 10
<u>S. D.</u>	3.56	5.42	7.26	5.28 4.50 5.64
		Placebo		Control
Means	<u>Pre</u> 27.45	Post 28.82	<u>Ch.</u> 1.36	Pre Post Ch. 26.46 30.85 4.38
<u>N</u>	11	11	11	13 13 13
<u>S.</u> D.	7.40	7.86	5.19	5.00 8.64 7.89

Due to the snowstorm that cancelled school in Morris, the same secondary analyses were computed for the Self-Esteem Inventory as were computed for the Semantic Differential. An ANOVA was computed on the Post-test (raw scores) for subjects from Henryetta and Beggs only. It was not significant ($F_{3,40}$ = 1.44, p. >.05). Means and Standard Deviations are in Table XXVI, and the corresponding F - Table is Table XXVII. The ANOVA for the Change Scores for subjects from Henryetta and Beggs was not significant at the .05 level ($F_{3,40}$ = 2.55, p. >.05) but was significant at the .10 level, ($_{.10}F_{3,40}$ =2.23). A Duncan's Multiple Range Test was computed for a Post Hoc analysis with results in exactly the reverse direction of the predictions. The Control Group had a significantly higher Change Score than did the Whole-Self Group (p. <.05) and the Exclusionary Group (p. <.10). Change Scores are in Table XXVI. The F - Table is in Table XXVIII as is the Duncan''s Multiple Range Summary.

Behavior Rating Form

Another dependent variable was also collected, the Coopersmith Behavior Rating Form (Coopersmith, 1967). Teachers were asked to observe the students the last day of the study as well as the following Monday and rate the behavior observed. When the forms were collected a week later, one teacher was absent and had not filled out the forms due to illness, one left due to delivering a baby without having filled out the forms, two "forgot" and filled them out a week later, one threw them away, and three wrote "no change" on most of their forms. Eleven filled them out as instructed. All data was pooled because the N for those who followed instructions was too low for meaningful statistical analysis.

The descriptive data can be found in Table XXIX. A One-Way Analysis

TABLE XXVII

F - TABLE FOR THE ONE-WAY ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE OF POST-TEST SCORES (RAW SCORES) ON THE SELF-ESTEEM IN-VENTORY FOR SUBJECTS FROM HENRYETTA AND BEGGS

Source	Sum of Squares	df.	Mean Square	F	.05F
Treatment	212.680	3	70.893	1.44	2.76 n.s.
Error	3398.060	69	49.247		

TABLE XXVIII

F - TABLE FOR THE ONE-WAY ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE FOR CHANGE SCORES FOR THE SELF-ESTEEM INVENTORY FOR SUBJECTS FROM HENRYETTA AND BEGGS AND DUNCAN'S MULTIPLE RANGE SUMMARY

Source	Sum of Squares	df.	Mean Square	F	.05F	.10F
Treatment	372.673	3	124.224	2.55	2.84	2.23 p.<10
Error	1950.122	40	48.753			
	Duncan's Multip	le Range	e: Control >	Whole-	Self p	.<.05
			Control>E	xclusi	onary	p.<.10

TABLE XXIX

<u></u>		Whole-Sel	f	Ex	Exclusionary			
Means	$\frac{\text{Pre}}{50.18}$	Post 49.09	<u>Ch.</u> -1.09	<u>Pre</u> 49.77	<u>Post</u> 49,85	.077		
N	11	11	11	13	13	13		
<u>S. D.</u>	7.46	6.23	4.42	8.25	5,11	5.55		
		Placebo			Control	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·		
Means	<u>Pre</u> 46.0	$\frac{Post}{46.0}$	$\frac{Ch.}{0}$	Pre 46.25	Post 47.62	<u>Ch.</u> 1.38		
<u>N</u>	14	14	14	16	16	16		
<u>S.</u> D.	5.68	3.46	4.04	5.80	4.77	4.04		

MEANS AND STANDARD DEVIATIONS FOR PRE-TEST, POST-TEST AND CHANGE SCORES ON THE BEHAVIOR RATING FORM

TABLE XXX

F - TABLE FOR THE ONE-WAY ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE FOR POST-TEST (RAW SCORES) ON THE BEHAVIOR RATING FORM

Source	Sum of Squares	df.	Mean Square	F	.05F
Treatment	115.580	3	38.527	1.48	2.79 n.s.
Error	1298.350	50	25.967		

of Variance was computed on the Post-Test (raw) scores and was not significant ($F_{3,50}$ = 1.48, p. >.05). The F - Table is Table XXX. A One-Way Analysis of Variance was also computed on the Change Scores. It was not significant. ($F_{3,50}$ = .62, p. >.05). The F - Table for Change Scores is Table XXXI.

TABLE XXXI

Source	Sum of Squares	df.	Mean Square	F	.05F
Treatment	41.177	3	13.726	.62	2,79 n.s.
Error	1105.579	50	22.112		

F - TABLE FOR THE ONE-WAY ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE FOR CHANGE SCORES ON THE BEHAVIOR RATING FORM

CHAPTER V

DISCUSSION

The hypothesis that the Whole-Self Group (nonexclusionary) would have an elevated self-esteem was not supported for the entire subject sample but was supported for the sub-sample from Henryetta and Beggs on both raw score (p. <.10) and change score analyses (p. <.01). The hypothesis that the Exclusionary Group would have an elevated self-esteem was not supported.

The hypothesis that the Whole-Self Group would have an elevation in their positive attitudes toward their Own Sex Group was supported by the change scores (\underline{p} . <.10) for the entire sample. It was also supported by the Henryetta and Beggs sub-sample for raw scores (\underline{p} .<.01) and change scores (\underline{p} .<.10). The hypothesis that the Exclusionary Group would have a more positive attitude toward their Own Sex Group was supported only by the raw scores from the sub-sample from Henryetta and Beggs (\underline{p} .<.10).

The hypothesis that there would be no deterioration in attitude toward the Opposite Sex in the Whole-Self Group was supported by the raw score and change score analyses of the total sample as well as the subsample from Henryetta and Beggs. The hypothesis that there would be a deterioration in attitude toward the Opposite Sex in the Exclusionary Group was not supported.

Within the limitations of generalizability, it appears that in the context of sex-roles, influencing children to feel good about themselves

does not produce the side effect of negative attitudes toward the opposite sex. This finding is particularly clear because both positive feelings toward oneself and towards one's sex group increased simultaneously for the Whole-Self subjects.

The exclusion-defined identity hypothesis is neither clearly rejected nor supported by this study. For the hypothesis to be adequately tested, the subjects in the Exclusionary Group would have had to 1. increased in their positive attitudes toward their same sex; 2. increased their selfesteem (ego-involvement with a sex-role identity) and then 3. show either a positive or negative change in opposite sex attitudes. Since step one above occurred at a very low level and since step two did not occur, the viability of the exclusionary hypothesis was not adequately tested.

The Exclusionary portion in the present study is a partial replication of one done by Parish, Bryant, and Prawat, 1978. Since they successfully conditioned an increased positive attitude toward the same sex, a comparison of differences between the two studies might prove helpful for future researchers. The studies were alike in that they used subjects from rural Oklahoma schools, the same conditioning procedures, and the same dependent variable. They differed in that the Parish, Bryant, and Prawat (1978) study used a random sample of girls in grades K-6 while the present study used boys and girls in third and fourth grades selected for low self-esteem. The results indicate that girls may be more responsive than boys to these procedures or that low self-esteem subjects are more rigid and less responsive generally to environmental impact.

One feature of the Opposite Sex ratings is worth noting - the high standard deviations. The higher variabilities for Opposite Sex on the pretest, when compared to the ratings of Self and Same-Sex, is in line with

Sherif's and Sherif's (1969) finding that consistency is a feature of ego-involvement. Inspection of the tables of Means and Standard Deviations gives the appearance that scores became more dispersed with treatment. A series of F_{max} tests (Dayton, 1970) was done to test this possibility, and none were significant. In the same context, the F's for Opposite Sex ratings were less than 1.0, suggesting some systematic errors. A search of possible sources; sex, grade, high vs. low pretest scores, and school found no specific source of systematic error. It may have been that certain subjects, for some reason unknown at present, developed negative attitudes toward the opposite sex in response to the conditioning while others did not. If this occurred it may partially explain the variability.

The Coopersmith Self-Esteem Inventory ratings from Henryetta and Beggs subjects were in a reverse direction from the predictions. The Whole-Self Group dropped somewhat from the pre-test; the Exclusionary Group dropped slightly; the Placebo Group increased slightly; and the Control Group increased somewhat more than the Placebo Group. No clear explanation is readily available for this score pattern. One might speculate that the instrument may be inadequate for the purposes of this study or that the subjects in the Whole-Self Group may have: responded less defensively after conditioning. Further research is needed to more carefully delineate what the Self-Esteem Inventory measures and how it relates to the present findings.

The study points to several directions for future applied research in semantic conditioning. One of the results of the study indicates that self-esteem in children was increased using a nine minute treatment for four consecutive days. Furthermore these treatments did not result in the development of negative Opposite Sex attitudes. It should be possible
to refine and evaluate both short and long term effects of this treatment by varying the number of slides, number of children in each picture, age of children, and possible effects of coordinated experiences (i.e. growth groups). Such further research would help to define a possibly new treatment tool for teachers and counselors. Such a treatment tool might be most valuable in dealing with shy children with feelings of inadequacy and possibly prevent the sufferings of some depressed adults in our society who cannot cope with life situations because of feelings of worthlessness. To find out whether such a tool is possible, rigorous research will be necessary. A large part of such evaluative research needs to be focused on the instrumentation used to measure results. The three instruments used here show promise, but none of them are totally satisfactory.

Further research along theoretical lines could essentially deal with the same issues as this study. The question of whether or not an exclusiondefined identity produces a negative attitude toward the inverse identity remains viable and important, but remains for future research to answer.

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APPENDIX A

SEMANTIC DIFFERENTIAL

Grade

State your own opinion.

Are you a boy? (Circle One) girl?

Self good___:__:__:__bad ugly___:__:__:__beautiful sweet___:__:__:__sour clean___:__:__:__dirty cruel__:__:__:__kind awful__:__:__:__inice honest__:__:__:__dishonest unfair___:__:__:__fair

Girls

good__:__:__:__bad ugly__:__:__:__beautiful sweet__:__:__:__sour clean__:__:__:__dirty cruel__:__:__:__dirty awful__:__:__:__:__hind awful__:__:__:__:__hind awful__:__:__:__:__fair

Boys

good__:__:__:__bad ugly__:__:__:__beautiful sweet__:_:_:_:__sour clean__:__:__:__dirty cruel__:__:__:__kind awful__:__:__:__nice honest__:__:__:__dishonest unfair__:__:__:__fair

APPENDIX B

SELF-ESTEEM INVENTORY

Υ.

SELF-ESTEEM INVENTORY (SEI)

Please mark each statement in the following way: If the statement describes how you usually feel, put a check () in the column, "Like Me." If the statement does not describe how you usually feel, put a check () in the column "Unlike Me." "There are an indicated an analysis of the statement." There are no right or wrong answers. Unlike Me Like Me

1.	I spend a lot of time daydreaming.		
2.	I'm pretty sure of myself.		
3.	I often wish I were someone else.		
4.	I'm easy to like.		
5.	My parents and I have a lot of fun together.		
6.	I never worry about anything.		
7.	I find it very hard to talk in front of the class.		
8.	I wish I were younger.	·	
9.	There are lots of things about myself I'd change if I could.	 	
10.	I can make up my mind without too much trouble.		
11.	I'm a lot of fun to be with.		
12.	I get upset easily at home.		
13.	I always do the right thing.	•	<u></u>
14.	I'm proud of my school work.		
15.	Someone always has to tell me what to do.		 • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •
16.	It takes me a long time to get used to anything new.		
17.	I'm often sorry for the things I do.		
18.	I'm popular with kids my own age.		
19.	My parents usually consider my feelings.		
20.	I'm never unhappy.	<u></u>	
21.	I'm doing the best work that I can.		
22.	I give in very easily.		
23.	I can usually take care of myself.		
24.	I'm pretty happy.		
25.	I would rather play with children younger than me.		
26.	My parents expect too much of me.		
27.	I like everyone I know.		
28.	I like to be called on in class.		
29.	I understand myself.		
30.	It's pretty tough to be me.		

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SELF-ESTEEM INVENTORY (SEI)

		Like Me	Unlike Me
31.	Things are all mixed up in my life.		
32.	Kids usually follow my ideas.		
33.	No one pays much attention to me at home		
34.	I never get scolded.		
35.	I'm not doing as well in school as I'd like to.		
36.	I can make up my mind and stick to it.		
37.	I really don't like being a boy girl.		
38.	I have a low opinion of myself.		
39.	I don't like to be with other people.		
40.	There are many times when I'd like to leave home.		Statistic statistics of the states
41.	I'm never shy.		
42.	I often feel upset in school.		
43.	I often feel ashamed of myself.		
44.	I'm not as nice looking as most people.	-	
45.	If I have something to say, I usually say it.	-	
46.	Kids pick on me very often.		
47.	My parents understand me.		
48.	I always tell the truth.		
49.	My teacher makes me feel I'm not good enough.		
50.	I don't care what happens to me.	-	
51.	I'm a failure.		
52.	I get upset easily when I'm scolded.		
53.	Most people are better liked than I am.		
54.	I usually feel as if my parents are pushing me.		
55.	I always know what to say to people.		
56.	I often get discouraged in school.		
57.	Things usually don't bother me.	-	••••••••••
58.	I can't be depended on.		

APPENDIX C

BEHAVIOR RATING FORM

BEHAVIOR RATING FORM (BRF)

1.	Does this child adapt easily to new situations, feel comfortable in new settings, enter easily into new activities?
	alwaysusuallysometimesseldomnever
2.	Does this child hesitate to express his opinions, as evidenced by extreme caution, failure to contribute, or a subdued manner in speaking situations?
	alwaysusuallysometimesseldomnever
3.	Does this child become upset by failures or other strong stresses as evidenced by such behaviors as pouting, whining, or withdrawing?
	alwaysusuallysometimesseldomnever
4.	How often is this child chosen for activities by his classmates? Is his companionship sought for and valued?
	alwaysusuallysometimesseldomnever
5.	Does this child become alarmed or frightened easily? Does he become very restless or jittery when procedures are changed, exams are scheduled or strange individuals are in the room?
	alwaysusuallysometimesseldomnever
6.	Does this child seek much support and reassurance from his peers or the teacher, as evidenced by seeking their nearness or frequent inquiries as to whether he is doing well?
	alwaysusuallysometimesseldomnever
7.	When this child is scalded or criticized, does he become either very aggressive or very sullen and withdrawn?
	alwaysusuallysometimesseldomnever
8.	Does this child deprecate his school work, grades, activities, and work products? Does he indicate he is not doing as well as expected?
	alwaysusuallysometimesseldomnever
9.	Does this child show confidence and assurance in his actions toward his teachers and classmates?
	alwaysusuallysometimesseldomnever
10.	To what extent does this child show a sense of self-esteem, self-respect, and appreciation of his own worthiness?
	very strong strong medium mild weak
11.	Does this child publicly brag or boast about his exploits?
	alwaysusuallysometimesseldomnever
12.	Does this child attempt to dominate or bully other children?
	alwaysusuallysometimesseldomnever
13.	Does this child continually seek attention, as evidenced by such behaviors as speaking out of turn and making unnecessary noises?
	always usually sometimes seldom never

APPENDIX D

SEMANTIC DIFFERENTIAL INSTRUCTIONS

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- 1. "Write the number for your grade on the line where it says 'Grade' and circle whether you are a boy or girl."
- 2. "Now you will notice that there are three groups of words and lines (pointing). Now look at the scales (pointing) and you will see that on each end of these blank spaces the words are opposites. For example, good and bad are opposites and beautiful and ugly are opposites. Now, the idea is for you to tell me what you think in the following (Printed on the board, 'Babies' and underneath was printed, wav. 'Wet : : : : Dry'.) If you were working on a section that says, 'Babies' and you think that babies are mostly wet, you put an x here. If you think they are mostly dry, you put and x here. If you think they are mostly wet and a little bit day, put an x here. If you think they are half way between wet and dry, you put an x here in the middle. Are there any questions? When you begin start at the top and go straight down. Some of you have girls first, some have boys first, and some have self first. Start at the top and go down. Do not skip any, Go ahead and begin, If you have any questions about what you are to do, or you don't know the words, raise your hand and I'll help you. Turn your papers over when you have finished.

APPENDIX E

SELF-ESTEEM INVENTORY INSTRUCTIONS

For fourth graders:

- 1. "You see on your paper a series of statements. If the statement describes how you usually feel, put a check in the column under, 'Like Me. If the statement does not describe how you usually feel put a check in the column under 'Unlike Me'. (Hold up paper and point to each column.) There are no right or wrong answers, so be sure to put what you really think."
- 2. "Let's do the first one together. (Number 1. was read.) If that is like you, put a check under 'Like Me'. If that is not like you, put a check under 'Unlike Me'.
- 3. The above was repeated with item 2.
- 4. "Continue doing the rest of the statements. Let me know if you have trouble reading or understanding anything. Turn your papers over when you have finished."
- 5. "Double check your code number and check to make sure you have not skipped any items."

For third graders:

- 1. Steps 1.--3. were identical except that item 3. was also included.
- 2. "I will be reading the items aloud while you read silently with me. If you have trouble following or don't understand something be sure to raise your hand to let me know."
- 3. Each item was read twice with a pause following the second reading. Caution was maintained to not speed up. Students were given a chance to stand and stretch after the first page.
- 4. Step 5. above.

VITA

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Candidate for the Degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

Thesis: EXCLUSIVE AND NONEXCLUSIVE SOURCES OF SELF-ESTEEM AS RELATED TO SEX IDENTITY IN CHILDREN

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