

POLITICAL INTEGRATION: AN ANALYSIS
OF THE BRITISH WHITE PAPER
ON NORTHERN IRELAND

By

JAMES V. CALVI

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
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Thesis Adviser







Dean of the Graduate College

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DEDICATION

This thesis is dedicated to my
mother, Mrs. Evelyn Calvi.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

In March of 1972, the British Government announced the enactment of the Northern Ireland (Temporary Provisions) Act of 1972 which suspended the operation of Stormont, the Parliament of Northern Ireland. The Act instituted direct rule by the British Government and ended over fifty years of devolution under the Government of Ireland Act of 1920. The imposition of direct rule dramatized the failure of Prime Minister Brian Faulkner's Government to end the terrorism and violence in Northern Ireland. The violence was accompanied by the breakdown of the political system which illustrated the failure of successive Governments of Northern Ireland to effectively integrate the sizable Catholic minority into the political system. As a result, the problem of political integration has become a primary concern to all of the parties affected, whether they favor or oppose the increased participation of Catholics in the politics of Northern Ireland.

The study of the problem of political integration in Northern Ireland must focus on two fundamental questions: first, why did the political system of Northern Ireland fail to integrate the Catholic minority? What role did religion play in the political malintegration of Northern Ireland? What role did Catholic nationalism play? The second fundamental question is: what can be done to promote political integration in Northern Ireland? Once the factors that led to the

breakdown of the political system are identified, what solutions are available? What are the elements of a political solution and what are the prospects for peace in the future of Northern Ireland? The answers to these questions are essential to an understanding of the viability of Northern Ireland as a political entity. Before the presentation of hypotheses that will attempt to shed some light on these questions, it is necessary to have a clear understanding of the problem of political integration as it relates to Northern Ireland.

Definition of the Problem

Purpose

Northern Ireland is torn by political violence and terrorism. Indeed, Northern Ireland was created when intense conflict in Ireland between Protestants and Catholics led to its partition into two separate political entities. Northern Ireland is composed of six of the nine historic counties of Ulster and is separated from the other twenty-six counties that comprise the Republic of Ireland by an international boundary. In the fifty years of its existence as a separate political entity, Northern Ireland has struggled with the problem of integrating a sizable Catholic minority into the political system. By almost any standard it has failed in that effort. That it failed is not as surprising as the fact that Northern Ireland has been able to exist for fifty years in an atmosphere of hatred, fear, and distrust. On March 20, 1973, the British Government published its long awaited White Paper entitled, "Northern Ireland Constitutional Proposals" in which it outlined a new constitution for Northern Ireland. The purpose of this thesis is to examine the factors involved in Northern Ireland's failure

to achieve political integration and to analyze and evaluate the British White Paper as a means of promoting political integration.

Definition of Political Integration

In his book entitled, A Theory of Political Integration, Claude Ake has written that "In essence, the problem of political integration is one of developing a political culture and inducing commitment to it."¹

Ake has also written that:

A political system is integrated to the extent that the minimal units (individual political actors) develop in the course of political interaction a pool of commonly accepted norms regarding political behavior and a commitment to the political behavior patterns legitimized by these norms.²

Besides defining the extent to which a political system is integrated, Ake also defines a malintegrated political system. He has written that "In malintegrated political systems, the emphasis is on effective rather than on legitimate means of pursuing political goals."³ Jacob and Teune have written that the people in an integrated community are held together by mutual ties and feelings of identity and self-awareness.⁴ According to Myron Weiner, political integration is "the process of bringing together culturally and socially discrete groups into a single

¹Claude Ake, A Theory of Political Integration (Homewood, Illinois, 1967), p. 1.

²Ibid., p. 3.

³Ibid., p. 4.

⁴Philip E. Jacob and Henry Teune, "The Integrative Process: Guidelines for Analysis of the Bases of Political Communities," The Integration of Political Communities, eds. Philip E. Jacob and James V. Toscano (Philadelphia, 1964), p. 4.

territorial unit and the establishment of a national identity."⁵

Finally, Karl Deutsch sees political integration as

a condition achieved by political communities in which violence is excluded and there are stable expectations of peace among the participating units of groups, whether or not there has been a merger of their political institutions.

In this thesis political integration will be defined as a process whereby a disaffected segment of a political system is disposed to accept the legitimacy and political authority of the legal regime, and that closely linked to the concept of political integration are the concepts of legitimacy⁷ and political authority.⁸ The concepts of legitimacy and political authority are important to an explanation of political integration; their significance to the problem of political integration in Northern Ireland will be discussed in greater detail later.

Problems for Discussion

The question whether or not Northern Ireland has a malintegrated political system seems almost absurd to anyone even remotely aware of

⁵Myron Weiner, "Political Integration and Political Development," Political Development and Social Change, eds. Jason L. Finkle and Richard W. Gable (New York, 1966), p. 551.

⁶Robert J. Jackson and Michael B. Stein, "The Issue of Political Integration," Issues in Comparative Politics, eds. Robert J. Jackson and Michael B. Stein (New York, 1971), p. 117.

⁷Legitimacy involves the principle or principles on which a regime bases its right to govern. See Carl J. Friedrich, Man and His Government, pp. 232-246.

⁸Political authority is the influence a regime derives from a willing acceptance by the subjects of its claim to rule. See Jack C. Plano and Robert E. Riggs, Dictionary of Political Analysis, p. 6, and Carl J. Friedrich, Man and His Government, pp. 216-231.

the current political situation in that country. While it is undesirable for the purposes of this thesis to go into great detail to establish that Northern Ireland has a malintegrated political system, it is equally undesirable to assume the obvious and assert that the system is malintegrated. Therefore, attention to this problem, however brief, is needed to establish this basic premise. This analysis will focus upon the intervention by British troops, the imposition of direct rule by the British Government, and the level of political violence as indicators of malintegration.

If it is shown that Northern Ireland is malintegrated politically, it is necessary to consider the causes of the malintegration. Here it will be hypothesized that the malintegration of Northern Ireland is a direct result of political, social, and economic discrimination against Catholics by the Protestant majority. This study of political discrimination will focus upon electoral practices, disenfranchisement of Catholics in local elections, the treatment of Catholics while under arrest by the authorities, and the administration of justice in Northern Ireland. Discrimination in social relations will be examined in terms of the amount of interaction between the two communities in areas such as intermarriage, education, and housing patterns. The attitudes of Catholics and Protestants toward each other will also be examined to determine their effect on political integration. Finally, the examination of economic integration will focus upon discrimination in the hiring of Catholics in both the public and private sectors. Discrimination generally has caused many Catholics to question the legitimacy of the legal regime and to reject its authority. If the hypothesis is verified, a corollary to it is that the removal of discriminatory

practices, especially on the part of the Government, is necessary for the future political integration in Northern Ireland.

The existence of discrimination, if verified, does not completely explain the problem of political integration in Northern Ireland. Discrimination against Catholics may provide answers as to why that group is discontented with the political system, but it does not explain why there is discrimination in the first place and why the situation in Northern Ireland was allowed to deteriorate to such a point that the collapse of the political system became inevitable. First, it is necessary to examine the cleavages that divide Northern Ireland. The most important cleavage is based on religious affiliation. Religious cleavage has resulted in the emergence of a Catholic subculture within a Protestant dominated political system, and in the rejection of the values of this system by the minority. So pervasive is the religious cleavage that other cleavages in Northern Ireland, such as class, racial, and economic differences, are articulated in terms of religious affiliation. Nationalism is another cleavage that is important in understanding the conflict in Northern Ireland. The question of Irish nationalism also divides the people of Northern Ireland along religious lines.

Besides examining the cleavages in Northern Ireland we must study other factors involved in political malintegration. One must ask why the existing government in Northern Ireland was unable or unwilling to cope with the demands and discontent of the Catholic minority. Here it hypothesized that the failure of the constitutional system established by the Government of Ireland Act of 1920 resulted from: (1) the implementation of an inadequate solution to the "Irish Question" at the time of the partition of Ireland; (2) the domination of Northern Ireland

by a single political party throughout its existence; and (3) the failure of the British Government to assume full responsibility for the governing of Northern Ireland.

A study of the problem of political integration in Northern Ireland of necessity should tackle the question of a possible solution to the conflict. Any solution will have to take into account the interests of the Catholics and Protestants in Northern Ireland, the Republic of Ireland, and Great Britain. These four parties have a major interest in the future of Northern Ireland. The proposals contained in the White Paper will be analyzed in terms of the interests of the four parties mentioned above. The analysis will focus upon the factors that have been identified as being crucial in the breakdown of the previous constitutional order. Specifically, this will involve: (1) proposals that deal with ending discrimination against Catholics; (2) efforts to increase the participation of Catholics in the new government; (3) efforts to end the domination of one political party in the new government; (4) proposals that involve the maintenance of law and order; (5) the safeguarding of individual human rights; and (6) the future relationships of Northern Ireland, Great Britain, and the Republic of Ireland. The analysis will of necessity involve some description of the powers and structure of the new government of Northern Ireland. In addition, some of the experiences of other nations that have confronted the problem of political integration will be examined to provide insights concerning a workable solution for Northern Ireland.

Finally, it should be noted that the problem of political integration is one that could take several generations to solve. A constitutional solution by itself is not enough. Three hundred years of living

together on the same island has not brought Catholics and Protestants together and certainly the proposals in the British White Paper will not do it overnight. Major economic and social problems as well as political difficulties confront Northern Ireland. These problems will not be solved easily. The final hypothesis to be posed is that the changes in the political institutions of Northern Ireland suggested by Great Britain in its White Paper provide the basis for a workable solution to the problem of political integration in Northern Ireland. The verification of this hypothesis is beyond the scope of this thesis, since it may be years before it is known whether or not the proposals will work. The thrust of the hypothesis is that while the necessary elements for a political solution are contained in the White Paper, it is for the people of Northern Ireland to make them work.

Literature Review

For the past three and a half years, the political situation in Northern Ireland has been one of such intensity that the word "explosive" is somehow inadequate to describe it. It is a problem that is fascinating as well as frustrating for the researcher. It is quite possible that after gaining some familiarity with the political situation in Northern Ireland, the reader will agree with observation that "Anyone who isn't confused here doesn't really understand what is going on."⁹

What goes on in Northern Ireland has been approached in a number of ways. Journalist have provided vivid accounts of the civil rights

⁹Quoted in Richard Rose, Governing Without Consensus: An Irish Perspective (Boston, 1971), p. 113.

marches and the rioting that have occurred since the late 1960's. Unfortunately, there has been a tendency to distort the situation, usually in favor of the Catholics. Also, journalists tend to focus on the discrimination against Catholics and deal only superficially with other factors involved in the political malintegration of Northern Ireland.¹⁰ However, the works of these authors have provided valuable sources of factual information on Northern Ireland.

Many authors on Northern Ireland have focused upon socio-economic explanations of the conflict. For example, authors such as Peter Gibbon and Bernadette Devlin view the conflict in terms of class struggle. Gibbon has maintained that the political parties in Northern Ireland have effectively eliminated the class struggle from politics by focusing on religion¹¹ which precludes the usual class distinctions from acting as a unifying element of political alignment. Instead of a conflict between the working class and the upper and middle classes, Protestant workers align with the upper and middle class Protestants against Catholics. The Unionist Party has been able to maintain its position of power because of this alignment. Bernadette Devlin concurs with Gibbon's view, writing, "Polarized by this ploy into their religious sects, and set against each other the ordinary people have not been able to combine and fight for their real interests."¹² According to this

¹⁰ See Max Hastings, Barricades in Belfast: The Fight for Civil Rights in Northern Ireland (New York, 1970) and The London Sunday Times Insight Team, Northern Ireland: A Report on the Conflict (New York, 1972).

¹¹ Peter Gibbon, "The Dialectic of Religion and Class in Ulster," New Left Review, No. 55 (May-June, 1969), p. 25.

¹² Bernadette Devlin, The Price of My Soul (New York, 1969), pp. 54-55.

this view, the solution to the problem in Northern Ireland is to realign society on the basis of class rather than on religious affiliation. Cornelius O'Leary points out that this hypothesis ignores the fact that trade unions have been strong in Ulster except when constitutional issues appear.¹³ In other words, working class Protestants and Catholics can work for their own interests except when politics are involved.

One of the most comprehensive works on politics in Northern Ireland is Governing Without Consensus by Richard Rose. Professor Rose based his book on a survey called the Northern Ireland Loyalty Survey that he conducted in 1968. The survey was taken before the start of the major violence in Northern Ireland, but it is still a valuable source of information. Rose measured the attitudes of Catholics and Protestants toward each other, the regime, Great Britain, the Republic of Ireland, and religion among other things.¹⁴ Rose's survey provides an in depth analysis of the complicated motive variables involved in Northern Ireland politics and has been a major source used in this study of political integration.

One author, Derek Birrell, has studied Northern Ireland in terms of relative deprivation. Birrell has stated that even though the Catholics in Northern Ireland realize that they are better off than their counterparts in the Republic of Ireland, they feel alienated and discriminated

¹³ Cornelius O'Leary, "The Northern Ireland Crisis and Its Observers," Political Quarterly, Vol. 42, No. 3 (July-Sept., 1971), p. 265.

¹⁴ Richard Rose, Governing Without Consensus: An Irish Perspective (Boston, 1971).

against relative to the Protestant majority. Birrell points out that relative deprivation may take forms other than just economic deprivation, such as social and political deprivation.¹⁵ He says that Catholics are made to feel that they are second-class citizens and that they do not receive the same benefits that other British citizens receive in other parts of the United Kingdom. It should be noted that Professor Rose has taken an opposite point of view regarding relative deprivation, writing, "Contrary to the economic determinist theory, economic dissatisfaction does not cause Protestants or Catholics to disapprove of the Constitution."¹⁶ He has stated that just as many satisfied Catholics support the Constitution as those who do not.¹⁷

Still another approach to the Northern Ireland problem is manifested in the Irish nationalism hypothesis,¹⁸ which states that the real issue involved is neither discrimination nor relative deprivation, but a desire of Catholics to unite with Ireland. Liam de Paor¹⁹ is one of the chief proponents of this hypothesis. The survey conducted by Richard Rose does not confirm the nationalism hypothesis. Although 76 per cent of the Catholics in the sample said that they thought of themselves as being Irish rather than British, only 14 per cent advocated

¹⁵Derek Birrell, "Relative Deprivation as a Factor in Conflict in Northern Ireland," Sociological Review, Vol. 20, No. 3 (Aug., 1972), pp. 317-343.

¹⁶Rose, p. 290.

¹⁷Ibid.

¹⁸O'Leary, p. 264.

¹⁹Liam de Paor, Divided Ulster (Baltimore, 1971).

abolishing the Border and uniting with the Republic.²⁰

Other general works that provided valuable information included The Northern Ireland Problem: A Study in Group Relations (1972) by Denis P. Barritt and Charles F. Carter; Ireland Since The Rising (1966) by Timothy Patrick Coogan; Ireland's English Question (1971) by Patrick O'Farrell; and A Short History of Ireland (1966) by Roger Chauvire. This brief survey of the literature on Northern Ireland is not a repudiation of any of the approaches. It is meant only to acquaint the reader with them and to point out some of the important criticism that has been aimed at them.

Methodology and Procedure

The case study method allows the researcher to focus upon one particular political system and to analyze in depth the variables and factors involved in concepts such as political integration. Each case study increases our general knowledge and understanding of fundamental concepts. Case studies allow the political scientist to make comparisons between political systems and to note their uniqueness as well as their similarities. These comparisons help in the formulation of generalizations about political integration and its relation to other political concepts. Eventually, it is hoped that a more sophisticated general theory of political integration will be formulated. Case studies can contribute to the development of such general theories.

The procedure involved in this thesis has been to review the literature on Northern Ireland to acquire an understanding of the nature

²⁰Rose, p. 213.

of the political conflict and to identify the major elements of a political solution. This led to the formulation of a number of hypotheses concerning the causes of the conflict and how they related to legitimacy and political integration. In Chapter II, the problem of discrimination and its effects on political integration will be examined. The principal cleavages that exist will also be studied, especially the roles of religious affiliation and Irish nationalism. The hypothesis on discrimination has been tested here using the available empirical data. Sources included aggregate data concerning employment figures, election results, and religious affiliation. Other sources of information included the Northern Ireland Loyalty Survey conducted by Richard Rose, the findings of various scholars on Northern Ireland politics, parliamentary debates, publications of the British Government, newspaper and magazine accounts, reports of Royal Commissions, and the report of Amnesty International on the ill-treatment of political prisoners in Northern Ireland. The hypothesis concerning non-discriminatory factors has been tested by conducting a survey of the literature on the partition of Ireland and its effects on Northern Ireland.

Chapter III will entail a description of the British White Paper in terms of its attempt to deal with the factors that have resulted in political malintegration in Northern Ireland. It will also evaluate the White Paper in terms of the adequacy of its proposals to bring about the desired goal of political integration. The evaluation will draw upon the writings of political scientists such as David Easton, Carl Friedrich, Robert Dahl, and others. The hypothesis which predicted the success of the White Paper was based upon a technical evaluation of the proposals contained in it. Eugene J. Meehan has written:

The most important contribution of political science to normative discussion relates to the process we call technical evaluation, the selection of ways and means of achieving goals. Such problems are not, strictly speaking, normative; they are empirical questions that call for²¹ explanations and predictions rather than normative judgments.

Finally, Chapter IV will summarize the author's conclusions on the conflict in Northern Ireland and the prospects for peace in the future.

Significance of the Study

The politics of Northern Ireland have been studied by numerous authors. Why then undertake still another study? Historians claim that each new generation rewrites history and this justifies the replications of earlier studies. However, the study of contemporary problems allows the political scientist to take into account new developments concerning unresolved conflicts. In the present study, the publication of the British White Paper is such a development. The success or failure of the proposals contained in the White Paper will have lasting effects on the future of Northern Ireland and its relationships with Great Britain and the Republic of Ireland. It is for this reason that the analysis of the White Paper is very important. Therefore, it is hoped that this thesis may contribute in some way to an increased understanding of the conflict in Northern Ireland.

²¹ Eugene J. Meehan, Contemporary Political Thought: A Critical Study (Homewood, Illinois, 1967), p. 354.

CHAPTER II

THE FACTORS OF MALINTEGRATION IN NORTHERN IRELAND

In the first chapter, several questions were raised concerning the problem of political integration in Northern Ireland, one of which concerned the need to verify the existence of a malintegrated political system in that country. While it is not necessary to present an elaborate case verifying this seemingly well-acknowledged fact, neither is it desirable to assume that the malintegration of Northern Ireland's political system is a truism needing no elaboration. Thus, evidence will be presented to establish this point. Emphasis will be given to the intervention of British troops, the level of political violence, and the imposition of direct rule.

After the presentation of evidence concerning the existence of political malintegration in Northern Ireland, the background to the conflict will be discussed. This will involve an examination of the political culture and the major cleavages. Next, the issues of legitimacy and political authority in Northern Ireland will be examined. The remainder of the chapter will focus on discrimination against Catholics, the inadequate solution of the 1920's, the issue of one party dominance, and the failure of Great Britain to assume its share of the responsibility for the governing of Northern Ireland.

Malintegration in Northern Ireland

In August of 1969, British Prime Minister Harold Wilson sent 6,000 British troops to Northern Ireland to maintain law and order, and as a result, "A 'peace line' of corrugated iron and barbed wire was later stretched for three-quarters of a mile between Protestants and Catholics in West Belfast."¹ Wilson's action was deemed necessary because of rioting in connection with a series of civil rights marches and counter-marches in the Belfast area. The issue of civil rights had divided the community into two warring camps. British soldiers were placed between them to insure peace and order. What Liam de Paor has termed a kind of "Berlin wall"² was erected to separate the Catholic Falls Road area from the Protestant Shankill Road section of Belfast. Since 1969, law and order have been maintained primarily by the British soldiers. The direct intervention by the British army into the internal affairs of Northern Ireland is one indication that the province is unable to settle its political and social disputes in an orderly and constitutional manner.

The intervention of British troops is not the only indication that Northern Ireland has a malintegrated political system. Claude Ake has written that in a malintegrated political system the emphasis is on "effective" rather than on "legitimate" means of achieving political goals. He has stated that the level of political violence is one indication that a political system is malintegrated. Richard Rose concurs,

¹Rose, p. 107.

²de Paor, p. 199.

writing that:

Statistics of violence are the most frequently cited evidence of a regime's failure to ensure the compliance with basic political laws. This is understandable, because violence is a visible, dramatic and threatening form of behavior.³

The high level of political violence in Northern Ireland supports the malintegration hypothesis. Between the time of the British Army's intervention in August 1969 and July 1973, 839 persons were killed in Northern Ireland,⁴ most of them victims of Catholic and Protestant extremists who employed terrorist tactics to further their political goals. The victims of political violence have included British soldiers and innocent bystanders as well as persons chosen by the terrorists as targets for revenge. The pattern of violence is the murder of a Protestant or a British soldier by the militant Provisional wing of the Irish Republican Army (IRA) followed by the retaliatory murder of a random Catholic or a suspected IRA member by the militant Ulster Defense Association (UDA). However, political assassinations have not been limited to Catholics killing Protestants or vice versa. The IRA has been known to execute Catholics who have collaborated with the Protestants or the British, even though "collaboration" may have simply been to join the Ulster Defence Regiment, which is Northern Ireland's police force. Also, British soldiers, once considered to be "liberators" by both of the warring communities, are now just as likely to be fired upon by Protestant extremists as by members of the IRA. Tables 1 and 1-A in the appendix provide statistical evidence of the

³Rose, p. 29.

⁴"Chance for Compromise," Time, Vol. 102 (July 9, 1973), p. 27.

high level of political violence.

The imposition of direct rule by the British Government is further evidence that Northern Ireland is politically malintegrated. The constitution of Northern Ireland was written into the Government of Ireland Act of 1920. This Act established a regional Parliament called Stormont and devolved upon it most of the ordinary legislative powers such as the maintenance of law and order, health care, education, and social welfare. Functions such as national security and foreign policy were retained by the British Government, and Section 75 of the Act names the British Parliament at Westminster as the supreme parliament for Northern Ireland. On March 24, 1972, pursuant to Section 75 of the Act, the British Parliament enacted the Northern Ireland (Temporary Provisions) Act by which it assumed direct authority over the Government of Northern Ireland. All of the executive authority that had previously been exercised by the Government of Northern Ireland under Prime Minister Brian Faulkner was transferred to William Whitelaw, the British Secretary of State for Northern Ireland. Prime Minister Faulkner and his Cabinet promptly resigned and the Northern Ireland Parliament was dissolved.

The intervention of British troops, the high level of political violence, and the imposition of direct rule by the British Government are clear indications that Northern Ireland's political system is malintegrated. The following section will provide the background to the conflict by examining the political culture of Northern Ireland. Then, the cleavages that divide the people of Northern Ireland will be discussed.

The Political Culture of Northern Ireland

In order to understand any political system, it is essential to know its political culture. Political culture is a somewhat elusive concept that still perplexes political scientists because, like so many concepts in the discipline, it cannot be observed directly. This can be illustrated with the concept of power. Even though power per se cannot be seen, touched, or accurately measured, one can tell when power is being exercised. Similarly, political culture cannot be seen or touched, and yet it is difficult to deny that it exists. Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba have written that, "The political culture of a nation is the particular distribution of patterns of orientation toward political objects among the members of a nation."⁵ Almond and Verba have further explained that:

'Orientation' refers to the internalized aspects of objects and relationships. It includes (1) 'cognitive orientation' that is, knowledge of and belief about the political system, its roles, and incumbents of these roles, its inputs and its outputs; (2) 'affective orientation,' or feelings about the political system, its roles, personnel, and performance, and (3) 'evaluational orientation,' the judgments and opinions about objects that typically involve the combination of value standards and criteria with information and feelings.

Almond and Verba's definition of political culture assumes that a degree of consensus exists on the nature of and feelings toward the political objectives of the regime or polity. They also assert that the political culture of a nation consists of the patterns of orientation of

⁵Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba, The Civic Culture (Boston, 1965), p. 13.

⁶Ibid., p. 14.

the individual members who compose the polity.⁷ Knowledge of the degree of consensus within a political system can provide insight into the problem of political integration. One might hypothesize that a high level of consensus on basic values would indicate a well integrated political system. Similarly, a low level of consensus would indicate a poorly integrated system.

One of the most serious obstacles to political integration in Northern Ireland is the difference in perception of political values by Catholics and Protestants. Claude Ake has vividly illustrated this problem in reference to the political system of Ceylon. He has written:

Nor is it easier to find cultural symbols around which the country may be united. Wiggins points out that when Ceylon cast around for a cultural symbol from her past, it was discovered that the past had no common significance for all Ceylonese. Ceylonese recalled battles won and lost from each other. What some remembered as the hour of heroism was remembered by others as the hour of humiliation. It was clear that the quest could only underline the inferiority and superiority feelings among the various ethnic groups to the detriment of integration.

Like Ceylon, Northern Ireland lacks a common cultural symbol from her past that has common significance for Catholics and Protestants. When the Protestant King, William of Orange, defeated the Catholic King, James II, at the Battle of the Boyne in 1690, the domination of Ireland by the Protestants was established. Each year the Protestants celebrate the victory which is, of course, a source of humiliation to Catholics. Many times the Orange Lodges go out of their way to insure that their celebration parades pass by the Catholic areas of the cities. Similarly, Catholic holidays, such as Saint Patrick's Day, are a source of

⁷ Ibid, p. 13.

⁸ Ake, p. 33.

annoyance to many Protestants. When Richard Rose asked the respondents in his Northern Ireland Loyalty Survey to agree or disagree with reasons for supporting the regime in Northern Ireland, he found some interesting results. When asked to agree or disagree with the statement that "the regime is good because it is what the people voted for," only 37 per cent of the Catholics agreed, while 74 per cent of the Protestants agree. Support for the regime "because it gives us a Queen to rule over us" polled 82 per cent of the Protestants, but only 37 per cent of the Catholics. The belief that Northern Ireland is in the hands of men who are good leaders was held by 73 per cent of the Protestants and 47 per cent of the Catholics.⁹ Obviously the political socialization of the two communities is different, which is indicated by a statement of Bernadette Devlin. She has written that when she attended school,

We learned Irish history. People who went to Protestant schools learned British history. We were all learning the same things, the same events, the same period of time, but the interpretations we were given were different.¹⁰

More will be written later about the effects of education on the socialization process. First it is necessary to look at some of the cleavages that divide Northern Ireland.

Cleavages in Northern Ireland

Whenever a low level of political integration is present in a political system, the attention of any observer of that system, whether he is a journalist, historian, or political scientist, must focus upon

⁹Rose, p. 244.

¹⁰Devlin, p. 60.

the cleavages that divide the political community. Douglas W. Rae and Michael Taylor have written that "A cleavage is merely a division of a community into religious groups, opinion groups, or voting groups for example."¹¹ Rae and Taylor also distinguish between cross-cutting and reinforcing cleavages, writing,

Roughly, cross-cutting cleavages assure that those persons who are divided by one cleavage (say, race) will be brought together by another (say religion) and vice versa. Reinforcing cleavages, by way of contrast, assure that those who are divided by one cleavage (race) will also be divided by another (religion).¹²

Every study of the problem of Northern Ireland refers to it as being a division between Catholics and Protestants. But religion in terms of Christian theology is not the main cleavage. Other cleavages exist and they reinforce one another. Examination of cleavages in Northern Ireland is required to gain insight into the problem of political integration.

Without doubt the major cleavage in Northern Ireland centers on religion, but only in the sense of religious affiliation. Religious affiliation permeates almost every aspect of life. Richard Rose discovered that,

In reality, Northern Ireland is best considered a bi-confessional society. It is bi-confessional because nearly everyone identifies himself as either a Protestant or a Catholic. In the 1961 census, only 384 of the 1,457,000 persons enumerated described themselves as free thinkers, atheists or humanists.¹³

But Rose discovered something of more significance than the fact that

¹¹Douglas W. Rae and Michael Taylor, The Analysis of Political Cleavages (New Haven, 1970), p. 23.

¹²Ibid., p. 13.

¹³Rose, p. 248.

Northern Ireland is religiously divided between Catholics and Protestants. When Rose asked his respondents what they disliked about churches in general, only 26 per cent of the Protestant respondents named the doctrines and rituals of the Catholic Church; and only 5 per cent of the Catholics disliked the doctrines of Protestant churches. Also, 30 per cent of the Protestants could not think of anything they disliked about the Catholic Church and 61 per cent of the Catholics found nothing that they disliked about Protestant churches.¹⁴ One of the main fears that the Protestants have of a united Ireland is the position of the Roman Catholic Church in the Republic of Ireland. Fifty-eight per cent of Rose's Protestant respondents reported that they felt that the Catholic Church was either "powerful" or "too powerful" in the Republic. However, 62 per cent of the Catholics said the same thing, indicating that both groups are suspicious of the Catholic Church.¹⁵ Finally, Rose attempted to measure religious fundamentalism (belief in a literal interpretation of the Bible) among Catholics and Protestants and found virtually no difference in the religious conservatism of the two groups.¹⁶ Rose's data indicates that religious doctrine or teachings are not the focal point of the conflict, or the cause of the cleavage.

Even though the problem is not a controversy over religious dogma, religious affiliation is a basic factor in the conflict because Catholics and Protestants are pitted against one another. If religious dogma is not the underlying cause of the cleavage, what are the factors

¹⁴Ibid, p. 256.

¹⁵Ibid, p. 257.

¹⁶Ibid, p. 21.

contributing to political malintegration? Here, it is necessary to examine nationalism in Northern Ireland as the root of the religious cleavage.

Basil Chubb has asserted that Irish nationalism is manifested in three ways: (1) concern about the "border problem" (2) being anti-British and (3) searching for a cultural identity with emphasis on the increased use of the Irish language.¹⁷ It should be noted that Chubb's analysis of Irish nationalism is valid only in the sense that being Irish and being Catholic are considered to be synonymous. In Northern Ireland the majority of the people are British and Protestant, and they do not favor union with the Irish Republic. The Catholic minority generally identifies with the Irish Republic. Richard Rose found that Protestants in Northern Ireland generally think of themselves as being either British (39 per cent) or Ulstermen (32 per cent), while only 20 per cent think of themselves as being Irish. Conversely, 76 per cent of the Catholics in Northern Ireland think of themselves as being Irish and only 15 per cent of the Irish Catholics (that is, those Catholics who thought of themselves as being Irish) disapprove of the regime. Forty per cent of the Irish Protestants also disapprove of the regime, but they represent only 20 per cent of the Protestant population.¹⁸

The above cleavage then divides those citizens of Northern Ireland who are loyal to Great Britain and those who are not, and the religious cleavage constitutes a manifestation of it. In other words, Protestants tend to be loyal to Great Britain while Catholics do not; this is far

¹⁷Basil Chubb, The Government and Politics of Ireland (Stanford, California, 1970), pp. 47-50.

¹⁸Rose, p. 208.

more significant than religious affiliation because the real issue in Northern Ireland is its continued existence as a political entity, not whether the Pope will take over the government. The Catholic nationalists in Northern Ireland seek independence from Great Britain and union with the Irish Republic and have resorted to violence to achieve their goal. The so-called Provisional wing of the Irish Republic Army is the chief organization representing the Catholic nationalist position; the Protestant extremists are represented by the Ulster Defense Association and are generally called "ultras". Richard Rose has written:

The individual who favours the regime but refuses compliance is less familiar but very formidable. This person is an Ultra, an individual who supports a particular definition of the existing regime so strongly that he is willing to break laws, or even take up arms to recall it to its 'true' way.¹⁹

It is clear that these two groups of extremists are the major source of the violence that has occurred in Northern Ireland during the last four years. All attempts at reconciliation have been opposed by the ultras and the nationalists alike. For example, many ultras in the dominant Unionist Party were responsible for the downfall of Prime Minister Terence O'Neill's Government. They opposed him because he favored a moderate approach to the issue of civil rights. The nationalists have refused to cooperate with the British in most efforts to find a political solution and consistently have been just as adamant as their forefathers had been during "The Troubles" of the early 1920's. This seemingly irreconcilable cleavage has been the greatest threat to the political stability and political integration of Northern Ireland. No compromise has been possible as far as these two groups are concerned

¹⁹ Ibid., p. 33.

because both have been determined to achieve their goal; and victory for one has meant defeat for the other; no middle ground has been found.

Other cleavages exist in Northern Ireland and one of them is the cleavage between the working class and the employer class. This cleavage also seems to run along the lines of religious affiliation as the bulk of the Catholics in Northern Ireland are in the working class while most of the employer class are Protestants. As a result, Protestant workers do not unite with Catholic workers in the political structure. The Protestant working class has been fully integrated into the Unionist Party because of the Party's insistence on remaining part of the United Kingdom, while the Catholic working class divides its support among the opposition parties, chiefly the Nationalist Party and the Northern Ireland Labour Party.²⁰ Workers, in their approach to unionism, also disagree along nationalist-loyalist lines. Liam de Paor has written:

A number of different traditions failed to come together in the [labor] movement: for example, that of trade unionism, which in theory should favour the solidarity of workers, irrespective of creed, but which has been divided on a number of issues--whether, for instance, unions in Northern Ireland should be branches of all-Ireland unions or branches of British unions.²¹

Another cleavage in Northern Ireland has been the urban-rural cleavage which exists in many societies that are becoming industrialized, but its significance insofar as political integration is concerned has been almost negligible. Also, there is a slight generation gap which has been reflected in political activities. It can be clearly

²⁰Ibid., p. 235.

²¹de Paor, p. 141.

seen in the fact that the fight for civil rights in Northern Ireland has been led by relatively young people, such as Michael Farrell, Bernadette Devlin, and Austin Currie. This is supported by the fact that younger people, both Protestant and Catholic, are more likely than older people to believe that Catholics are treated unfairly in Northern Ireland.²²

So far there has been no attempt to explain the linkage of the cleavages in Northern Ireland. One might wonder what causes this relationship between religious affiliation and loyalty to the political regime. Not all of the Catholics in Northern Ireland are nationalists and not all of the Protestants are ultras. However, there must be some relationship between these two variables, since it is highly improbable that the fact that most of the ultras are Protestants and most of the nationalists are Catholics simply occurred by chance. Therefore, the linkage of the third variable that must be considered is the legitimacy of the political system. The question now is whether being a Catholic is related to whether a person questions and then later rejects the legitimacy of the existing regime. First, it is necessary to clarify what constitutes legitimacy and its relationship to political authority. Later the factors that have caused the Catholics in Northern Ireland to reject the legitimacy of the regime will be examined in greater detail.

Legitimacy and Political Authority in Northern Ireland

Fundamental to the study of political integration is the concept of the legitimacy of the government. Seymour Lipset has written that,

²²Rose, p. 364.

Legitimacy involves the capacity of a political system to engender and maintain the belief that existing political institutions are the most appropriate for the society.²³

Carl Friedrich has written that legitimacy "is a very particular form of consensus, which revolves around the question of the right or title to rule."²⁴ The right or title to rule, according to Friedrich, has been founded upon a variety of beliefs, one of which is ". . . the fact that those who are being ruled have expressed a preference for a person through voting for him in an election . . ."²⁵ He classifies four types of legitimacy, one of which he calls "procedural or pragmatic". This type of legitimacy is based upon the performance of the political regime.²⁶ Friedrich has written that:

Democratic legitimacy in modern states is similarly subject to performance tests, especially in the economic realm, and the legitimacy based upon a majority's preference in an election may be broadened or narrowed by performance.²⁷

Finally, Friedrich has written that:

The issue of legitimacy shows, however, that there ought to be a measure of agreement on one fundamental, and that is the kind of rule that is right and sort of ruler who is entitled to rule. In a democracy, this question will be settled in a constitution (written or unwritten), and the acceptance of the 'rules of the game' laid down in the constitution will be the one basic agreement required.²⁸

²³ Seymour Lipset, "Some Social Requisites of Democracy," Comparative Politics: Notes and Readings, eds. Roy C. Macridis and Bernard E. Brown (Homewood, Illinois, 1972), p. 129.

²⁴ Carl J. Friedrich, Man and His Government: An Empirical Theory of Politics (New York, 1963), p. 233.

²⁵ Ibid.

²⁶ Ibid., p. 236.

²⁷ Ibid.

²⁸ Ibid., p. 238.

Closely related to legitimacy is the political authority of a regime. John Day, a British scholar, has explained political authority in terms of compliance that must be freely given by the subjects of the regime. Day distinguished between compliance based upon the acceptance of the regime's authority and compliance based upon its power:

Men may obey through fear of being punished for disobedience and such action may be called involuntary. But in so far as men obey government through fear of punishment, they are not acting because they accept the authority of the government. He who keeps within the law solely to avoid imprisonment (or flogging) is not acknowledging the authority of the government, but its power.²⁹

Day asserts further that authority also involves the use of coercive power and that "A person is allowed coercive power because he can be trusted to use coercive power for the benefit of those who authorize it."³⁰ He states that a government that receives obedience from most of its citizens can use its coercive power to force obedience from the "stubbornly disobedient".³¹

Carl Friedrich describes political authority in terms of the power-handler's capacity to provide reasons for his actions based upon the values, beliefs, and interests of the group within which the power is exercised.³² Finally, Richard Rose has noted that,

The less individuals are inclined to accept the authority of their regime or the more they are committed to specific courses of political action, then the greater is the likelihood

²⁹ John Day, "Authority," Political Studies, Vol. 11, No. 3 (Oct., 1963), p. 259.

³⁰ Ibid., p. 260.

³¹ Ibid., p. 261.

³² Friedrich, p. 223.

that discord will result in a refusal to comply with basic political laws.³³

In summary, according to Day, Friedrich, and Rose, political authority: (1) involves compliance that is freely given by the subjects; (2) includes coercive power that is required to be used only in limited situations; (3) is the belief that those having coercive power can be trusted; (4) includes the beliefs, values, and interests of the subjects; and (5) involves noncompliance by those who reject it.

For the purposes of this study, legitimacy involves the right to rule; the political regime that existed in Northern Ireland prior to the imposition of direct rule by Great Britain was certainly legitimate if democratic norms, such as free elections and majority rule, are the criteria. However, for the Catholics in Northern Ireland, the legitimacy of the government was not seen in terms of legal or democratic norms, but in moral terms. The Catholics have continued to reject the legitimacy of the government of Northern Ireland which limited the political authority of the regime and its capacity to rule. Compliance by a majority of Catholics was effected by the power of the government and not by its legitimacy.

Earlier it was hypothesized that political, social, and economic discrimination on the part of the Protestant majority was at the root of the failure to successfully integrate the Catholic minority and, as a result, the government of Northern Ireland failed to attain legitimacy in the eyes of that minority. Each of these three areas of discrimination will now be examined to test the hypothesis, with special emphasis on political discrimination.

³³Rose, pp. 30-31.

Political Discrimination

Perhaps the greatest criticism that the Catholics had against the political system was the practice of political discrimination against them. However, discrimination against Catholics has been a way of life in Ireland since the British firmly established control in 1690, marking the beginning of the Protestant ascendancy. For example, penal laws that were in effect until the early 1800's prescribed, according to one source, that, "No Catholic could serve in the army, or navy, nor were they allowed to possess arms, to vote, to be members of Parliament or citizens of incorporated towns . . ." ³⁴ The following passage summarizes the position of Catholics in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries:

The Williamite settlement ended for a long time to come the possibility that a Catholic property-owning class would dominate Ireland. It established instead a Protestant ascendancy which proceeded to consolidate its position by enacting a penal code against Roman Catholics designed essentially not to punish Catholics for their beliefs nor to convert them to any form of Protestantism, but to prevent them from obtaining as a group, property, position, influence or power. . . . The laws on the statute books directed against Roman Catholicism were sufficient, had they been fully applied, to stamp it out, but their application was erratic and selective, designed to convert or ruin landowners, to restrict the numbers of the clergy, and to fix the association of Roman Catholicism with poverty, humiliation, and servitude. ³⁵

The struggle for political rights in Northern Ireland has focused on three areas: the problem of gerrymandering and voting rights in general; internment and the enforcement of the Special Powers Act; and the treatment of civil rights activists and others by the police and the

³⁴Roger Chauvire, A Short History of Ireland (New York, 1966), p. 77.

³⁵de Paor, p. 17.

administration of justice.

To understand the allegations of political discrimination in Northern Ireland, it is essential to know something about the political alignment of Catholics and Protestants. When Ireland was partitioned after the passage of the Government of Ireland Act of 1920, Northern Ireland was left with a population of approximately 1.5 million people with two-thirds of them being Protestants and the remaining one-third being Catholics. The Protestants in Northern Ireland belonged almost exclusively to the Unionist Party which favors the union with Great Britain, and the Catholics generally supported the Nationalist Party which opposes the union with Great Britain. This alignment provided the Unionists with a perpetual and comfortable 2-1 majority--a majority that had very little respect for the political rights of the minority, even one as large as the Catholic minority. Basic to majority rule is the hope entertained by the minority that it will someday become the majority, but in Northern Ireland this was almost an impossibility because the society was divided along religious, not political lines. Unless mass conversions take place, the Catholics are not likely to become the majority in the near future.

Gerrymandering, the practice of drawing the electoral districts so as to enhance the power of the majority party, is one example of the political discrimination which was practiced against the Catholics. Gerrymandering created electoral districts that concentrated the strength of the minority into the smallest possible number of districts or dispersed the minority among several districts where they were continually outvoted by the majority. The most blatant cases of gerrymandering in Northern Ireland appeared at the local level, since

elections to the British Parliament were based on proportional representation. For example, in the city of Londonderry in 1971, Catholics made up approximately 69 per cent of the population yet, on the local council, there were twelve Unionist members and only eight Nationalist members. While it is true that not all of the Catholics belonged to the Nationalist Party, Richard Rose found that only five per cent of the Catholics identified with the Unionist Party;³⁶ this means, of course, that one-third of the population was represented by two-thirds of the council's membership. John Kane has written about another gerrymandered area where 4,564 of 7,544 voters elected eight Unionists and 13,718 of 15,287 voters elected eight Nationalists.³⁷ The Cameron Commission, which investigated the causes of disturbances in Northern Ireland, found that:

In Londonderry County Borough, Armagh Urban District, Omagh Urban District and County Fermanagh a Catholic majority in the population was converted into a large Unionist majority on the Councils. In the two Dungannon councils a very small Protestant majority held two-thirds or over of the seats on the councils.³⁸

In addition to gerrymandering, other practices have been used such as the so-called business vote which, until it was abolished in the late 1960's, gave additional votes to businessmen who were mostly Protestants. Also, the franchise was restricted to house dwellers (as opposed to apartment or tenement dwellers) and, as a result, about one-fourth of those who could vote in the Stormont elections, in which universal adult

³⁶Rose, p. 235.

³⁷John Kane, "Civil Rights in Northern Ireland," Review of Politics, Vol. 33 (Jan., 1971), p. 60.

³⁸Cameron Commission, "Disturbances in Northern Ireland," Report of the Commission appointed by the Governor of Northern Ireland (Belfast, 1969), p. 59.

suffrage operated, were disenfranchised in local elections.³⁹ Just before he was forced from office in April 1969, Prime Minister Terence O'Neill attempted to reform the electoral system and was successful in having universal adult franchise adopted for all elections; however, the civil rights movement⁴⁰ charged that this and other reforms were mere "paper reforms" which were grudgingly given. In fact, no elections have taken place in Northern Ireland since the universal adult franchise was adopted.

The second area of political discrimination in Northern Ireland relates to the issue of internment and the enforcement of the Special Powers Act in particular. This Act was passed in 1922 when the IRA was conducting an intense campaign against the partition of Ireland. It was meant to be a temporary measure, but since then it has become a permanent statute. Commenting on the Act, Bernadette Devlin has written:

Among its many provisions is one blanket one, providing for the arrest of people who do anything 'calculated to be prejudicial to the preservation of peace or maintenance of order in Northern Ireland and not specifically provided for in the regulations'.⁴¹

Some of the other articles that have been especially obnoxious to the Catholics included provisions for:

- 1) arrest without a warrant
- 2) detention without a charge or trial
- 3) no recourse to habeas corpus
- 4) denial of any claim to a jury trial

³⁹ Cameron Commission Report, p. 62.

⁴⁰ The Civil Rights movement basically consists of two organizations: The Civil Rights Association and the People's Democracy. Their goals include the repeal of the Special Powers Act, reapportionment of electoral districts, and a new system of housing allocations.

⁴¹ Devlin, p. 118.

- 5) entrance and search of homes without warrants and the use of force, any time, day or night
- 6) prohibition of the circulation of any newspaper
- 7) forced self-incrimination⁴²

The fact that many of those interned were Catholics did not escape the attention of members of the civil rights movement and Catholics in general.

Beyond the obvious restrictions on civil liberties that the Special Powers Act entailed, the treatment of those arrested has also angered many Catholics. Charges of police and army brutality have been very common. Allegations by suspected IRA terrorists of having been hooded, kicked, and beaten by the police has bred a feeling of contempt for the political authority that the police represent. Amnesty International, an independent organization which investigates alleged violations of Articles 5, 9, 18, and 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, reported that:

On the basis of evidence presented to it the Commission concluded that persons arrested under the Special Powers Act had been subject to brutal treatment by the security forces during arrest and transport. It also concluded that there were cases where suffering had been inflicted on those arrested to obtain from them confessions or information.⁴³

Another reason why the Catholics in Northern Ireland distrust the police has been illustrated by the events that occurred during a civil rights march in January of 1969. On a march to Londonderry, Catholic civil rights demonstrators were attacked by a mob of Protestants and they were beaten, stoned, and kicked. But, as Max Hastings reported,

⁴²Kane, pp. 62-63.

⁴³Amnesty International, "Report of an Enquiry into Allegations of Ill-Treatment Made Against the Security Forces in Northern Ireland," (London; 1971), p. 27.

Most incredible of all, the police appeared utterly indifferent to everything that passed. Many of the police chatted with the Protestants as they watched the marchers come up. Others stood by and watched while marchers were clubbed and kicked. No attempt was made to arrest the attackers or even to impede them.⁴⁴

What is more, many of those attacking the marchers were out of uniform members of the "B Specials",⁴⁵ which is an auxiliary police force in Northern Ireland.⁴⁶ The Cameron Commission contradicted this as it made clear that there was no official use made of the "B Specials".⁴⁷

In addition to their contentions that the police mistreated Catholic prisoners and refused to protect Catholics while they exercised their civil rights, the critics have also condemned the administration of justice. Rose has written that:

Father Denis Faul, a Dungannon priest, has summed up the problem succinctly. 'Our people are afraid of the courts. They believe the judicial system as it operates in the blatantly sectarian conditions of life here is loaded against them.'⁴⁸

Many Protestants on the other hand did not trust the courts because they claimed that the courts were allowing Catholic terrorists to go free.

⁴⁴Max Hastings, Barricades in Belfast: The Fight for Civil Rights in Northern Ireland (New York, 1970), pp. 86-87.

⁴⁵The "B Specials" or Special Constabulary is an auxiliary police force that is called into service during civil disorders and to help police the Border. This organization is almost exclusively Protestant and is accused of being the military arm of the Unionist Party. Its disbandment has been one of the aims of the civil rights movement.

⁴⁶de Paor, p. 182.

⁴⁷Cameron Commission Report, p. 63.

⁴⁸Rose, p. 127.

Rose has written:

Scepticism about the law's absence of bias in discretionary legal decisions is not confined to Catholics. Protestants such as the Rev. Ian Paisley also voice suspicion of the courts and other agents of the law. Put crudely, an Ultra is inclined to believe that any Catholic brought to court (and many who are not) are guilty of rebellion, whatever the charge, evidence, or verdict, and a rebel will be inclined to believe the same in reverse about an Ultra.⁴⁹

The belief by both segments of the community that the courts did not administer justice fairly has been unhealthy for the political system and has naturally undermined its political authority.

Social Discrimination

Besides the above examples of political discrimination, widespread belief in the existence of other forms of discrimination undermined the legitimacy of the political system. One of these was social discrimination. This is a difficult area to examine because a certain amount of segregation is self-imposed. In other words, the cliché that there is safety in numbers operates in a society such as Northern Ireland where co-religionists are expected to stick together in the event of trouble. Richard Rose has discovered some very interesting aspects of social relationships in Northern Ireland which provide some insight into the claims of social discrimination and which could help in finding a political solution. The remainder of this section of the chapter will draw heavily from Rose's Northern Ireland Loyalty Survey in which he measured social relationships. We shall be concerned with three broad areas: mixed marriages, education, and housing.

⁴⁹ Ibid.

The institution of marriage is an important step in the process of political integration if it serves to bring diverse elements of a community together so that an exchange of ideas and opinions can freely take place. In Northern Ireland, after three centuries of living together, there is very little intermarriage between Catholics and Protestants. The main reason for this situation has generally been attributed to the Catholic Church and its views on marriage. For example, until recent years, a non-catholic who married a Catholic had to promise to raise his or her children as Catholics, and also, the couple had to be married in a Catholic church. Of course, the Church forbade divorces, abortions, and means of artificial birth control.⁵⁰ In a country such as the United States, one of the partners might simply adopt the religion of his or her future spouse, but in Northern Ireland this is not an acceptable form of behavior. Rose sought to determine what effect a change of religion might have on the individual's relations with his family and friends. He found that 45 per cent of those interviewed said that changing religion would make a big difference, while another 36 per cent said it would make a difference to some of their family and friends. Only 6 per cent said that it would make no difference at all.⁵¹ These findings are substantiated by Barritt and Carter, who have written that nearly every church in Northern Ireland discourages mixed marriages because of the stress that religious differences puts on a marriage.⁵² These church restrictions, in addition to

⁵⁰ de Paor, pp. 144-145.

⁵¹ Rose, p. 269.

⁵² Denis Barritt and Charles F. Carter, The Northern Ireland Problem: A Study in Group Relations (London, 1972), p. 27.

the other reasons that the two communities have for segregating themselves, serve to deter young people from meeting other young people of the opposite religion. Consequently, intermarriage is not likely to happen and thus cannot serve as a means of promoting either or other types of integration.

Education is another area in which there has been very little interaction between Catholics and Protestants. Catholics in Northern Ireland have insisted, as have Catholics in other countries, that religious instruction, which the state schools do not provide, is vital to the education of a child. As a result, approximately 98 per cent of primary school Catholic children attend Catholic schools,⁵³ while most Protestant children attend the state schools. The insistence upon a dual school system has led to several problems and has increased tension. First, many Protestants have rejected the charges of discrimination and segregation and have pointed out that the Catholics have segregated themselves in the area of education. Second, many Protestants believe that Catholic schools are centers of treason where hatred for Protestants has been taught. While it is unlikely that hatred for Protestants has been advocated, there is no question that history has been taught from a different perspective in the Catholic schools. Catholic schools have stressed Irish nationalism, culture, and language. Bernadette Devlin has reported that the Mother Superior of her parochial school was a fanatical Republican who hated everything British.⁵⁴ Children in Catholic schools generally have not played rugby football or cricket, "which are referred to by those of Nationalist opinion as

⁵³Ibid, p. 77.

⁵⁴Devlin, pp. 59-60.

'foreign', 'Protestant', or 'British' games,"⁵⁵ Consequently, the dual school system has resulted in a dual process of political socialization where Protestant children have learned to respect the Queen and the Union Jack while Catholic children have learned about Ireland, Irish heroes, and have saluted the flag of the Irish Republic.

One might posit that desegregation of the school system in Northern Ireland would promote social integration, which in turn would enhance political integration. Richard Rose found that 64 per cent of the adult population of Northern Ireland favored mixed education. Surprisingly, he found that mixed education made very little difference in the extent to which Catholics and Protestants supported the Constitution. For example, Catholics who attended mixed schools were no more inclined to support the Constitution than were Catholics who attended Catholic schools. However, Catholics and Protestants who attended mixed schools were more likely to favor compliance with basic political laws than were those who attended segregated schools.⁵⁶ Another more serious problem with Catholic schools has been that even though they were partially subsidized by the State, they were overcrowded and the quality of education was below that of secular schools. Timothy Patrick Coogan argued that the poorer education that they have received caused Catholics to continue to be the "have nots" in Northern Ireland.⁵⁷ Finally, opposition to a single school system has been opposed by Catholics because

⁵⁵ Barritt and Carter, p. 148.

⁵⁶ Rose, pp. 336-337.

⁵⁷ Timothy Patrick Coogan, Ireland Since the Rising (New York, 1966), p. 301.

many Catholic teachers have been afraid that in a single system they would not be hired even if discrimination in hiring teachers and other state employees were forbidden by the Government of Ireland Act of 1920.

Housing is another area in which the leaders of the Catholic civil rights movement charged blatant discrimination. Complaints about housing have been two-fold: first, housing allocations have not been equitable and, second, housing has been assigned in a manner that maintained segregation. Evidence concerning the first charge is contradictory because, while on the one hand there seems to be enough evidence to support allegations of discrimination, on the other hand there is evidence that Catholics actually have been favored in the allocation of housing. For example, in June 1968, Austin Currie, a Stormont MP, helped set off the civil rights movement by staging a sit-in in a public housing apartment that had been assigned to a single Protestant girl who was the secretary of a Unionist Party politician. Currie maintained that there were Catholics with families who needed the apartment more than a single Protestant girl even if she was due to be married.⁵⁸

Timothy Patrick Coogan has written:

Of the total number of houses built in Londonderry since the end of the war, Catholics have received 2,212 and Protestants 924. This is not so equitable as may appear because while the proportion of unhoused Protestants was insignificant, there were in 1965 over 2,000 Catholic families awaiting houses on the city's list.⁵⁹

Richard Rose was not able to either accept or reject charges of systematic discrimination in housing allocations. If discrimination was

⁵⁸Rose, p. 102.

⁵⁹Coogan, pp. 323-324.

present, one would expect the number of Protestants in public housing to be greater than the number of Catholics. According to Rose's data, among Catholics and Protestants in each income bracket, in only one bracket was the proportion of Protestants higher than the proportion of Catholics. Rose found that among the six county and two county borough housing authorities, all of which were controlled by the Unionists, the proportion of Catholic tenants was larger than the proportion of Protestants, even though the proportion of Protestants in the population was much larger in some cases.⁶⁰ Rose concluded that since housing in Northern Ireland generally has been poor, many Catholics and Protestants have been living in slums.⁶¹ Another possible explanation is that isolated cases of discrimination in housing might have resulted in accusations of widespread discrimination on the part of the government.

The second charge against local housing authorities was that the building of houses and assignments to them followed a design calculated to maintain segregated neighborhoods, and this was done for political reasons. The Cameron Commission concluded that there was enough proof to substantiate this allegation. The Commission found that:

Council housing policy has also been distorted for political ends in the Unionist controlled areas to which we specially refer. In each, houses have been built and allocated in such a way that they will not disturb the political balance.⁶²

However, it should be remembered that in a turbulent country such as Northern Ireland, many people have felt more comfortable in

⁶⁰Rose, pp. 292-294.

⁶¹Ibid., p. 294.

⁶²Cameron Commission Report, p. 61.

neighborhoods where they have been in the majority. As a result, a type of self-imposed segregation has hampered efforts to increase interaction between the two communities.

Finally, social discrimination involves the attitudes of Catholics and Protestants toward each other. Protestants have considered Catholics to be lazy, dirty, and to produce large families which require increased welfare benefits at the expense of the Protestant taxpayers. They have considered Catholics to be subversive and not deserving of the political and economic benefits of living in Northern Ireland. The Protestants have seen themselves as hard working, industrious, and loyal to Great Britain. Catholics have seen themselves as the exploited victims of a bigoted majority. Liam de Paor has written:

To Catholics in Northern Ireland, on the other hand, too many of their Protestant fellows appeared as canting bigots--hypocrites too, for the very liberties they feared to lose for themselves they deprived others of, and the very features of government they deprecated in a Catholic state they maintained in a Protestant one.⁶³

The above constitutes a sampling of attitudes one encounters in almost every study of Northern Ireland. However, Rose's survey showed that 73 per cent of his sample said that Ulstermen of the opposite religion were "about the same" as themselves. In other words, most Ulstermen felt that persons of the opposite religion were the same as themselves. From this Rose concluded that Catholics and Protestants could live together "as long as politics is not involved."⁶⁴

⁶³ de Paor, p. 144.

⁶⁴ Rose, pp. 214-215.

Economic Discrimination

Catholics have charged economic discrimination in both the public and private sectors. Protestants have responded to this by saying that the reasons for not hiring a person of the opposite religion is the belief that an employer should be able to hire whosoever he pleases, that each group should take care of its own, and finally, the Protestant belief that Catholics are "shifty, idle, and unreliable."⁶⁵ It should be made clear that unemployment generally has been high in Northern Ireland compared to Great Britain. In 1966, Northern Ireland's unemployment rate was 6.1 per cent compared to only 1.5 per cent in the rest of the United Kingdom.⁶⁶ Rose found that four per cent of the Protestants in his sample were jobless while 11 per cent of the Catholics were.⁶⁷ The reason for this could well be the fact that Catholics have constituted the majority of the unskilled labor force and that they have been the last to be hired and the first to be fired. Catholics have been understandably resentful of the high unemployment among their co-religionists and blame it on discrimination in hiring practice. We will now examine the charges as they relate to both the public and private sectors.

Charges of discrimination in the hiring of government employees have some basis in fact. For example, in 1969, Fermanagh County had a Catholic population of approximately 53.2 per cent, yet only about nine

⁶⁵ Barritt and Carter, p. 94.

⁶⁶ de Paor, p. 127.

⁶⁷ Rose, p. 298.

per cent of the 360 county employees were Catholics.⁶⁸ It seems safe to say that this probably was not a matter of chance. In 1959, according to Barritt and Carter, 94 per cent of the top grades of Northern Ireland's civil service were Protestants, but these authors maintain that this was not unreasonable since Protestants had a 2-1 majority in the population, were generally better educated, and had not rejected the legitimacy of the regime, and therefore were more likely to be hired than Catholics.⁶⁹ At the local level, as in the County Fermanagh example given above, the spoils system operates with the winners (many times as a result of gerrymandering) dispensing patronage positions. The Cameron Commission came to the same conclusion when it wrote that, "We are satisfied that all these Unionist controlled councils have used and use their power to make appointments in a way which benefitted Protestants."⁷⁰ So the question of discrimination in government hiring really comes down to which arguments one wants to believe.

There is good reason to believe that discrimination in hiring also existed in the private sector in Northern Ireland. In a country as divided as Northern Ireland, it is reasonable to expect a small businessman to hire someone of the same religion. What is more, a Protestant employer who hires Catholics risks losing his business if the other Protestants believe that he is favoring the Catholics. Beyond that, in the interest of harmony, employers have found that it is better not to mix workers of different politics and religion in order to avoid

⁶⁸ de Paor, p. 147.

⁶⁹ Barritt and Carter, p. 100.

⁷⁰ Cameron Commission Report, p. 60.

trouble.⁷¹ Examples of open discrimination can be seen in signs that read "Catholics need not apply" or "Catholics Only". Discrimination can also be practiced very discreetly, too. Many times an employer can discern the prospective employee's religion by whether he has an Irish, Scotch, or English surname. If that does not work, he can tell by asking the name of the school the prospect attended and, if the name is that of a saint, he must be a Catholic.⁷² Such treatment of Catholics makes them bitter, especially when they are accused of being lazy and unreliable by the very people who refuse to give them jobs.

Thus far, we have seen evidence of alleged political, social, and economic discrimination against Catholics in Northern Ireland. Much of the evidence is either contradictory or weak. This being the case, how can one hold that these forms of discrimination have led to the decline of legitimacy of government in the eyes of the Catholic minority? The answer lies in that:

Feelings of relative deprivation are important in influencing people's attitudes and behavior independently of whether the perceived degree of inequality actually exists.⁷³

The fact that Catholics in Northern Ireland perceive themselves as victims of discrimination is far more important than the reality of the situation in so far as political integration is concerned. Rose found that 74 per cent of the Catholics in Northern Ireland believed that

⁷¹Barritt and Carter, p. 100.

⁷²Devlin, pp. 54-55.

⁷³Derek Birrell, "Relative Deprivation as a Factor in Conflict in Northern Ireland," Sociological Review, Vol. 20, No. 3 (Aug., 1972), p. 322.

discrimination existed in their country.⁷⁴ If the Catholic minority feels that its parks and recreational facilities are inferior to those of Protestant neighborhoods, and if it perceives that its voice is not being heard by an oppressive political system, then there is little doubt that sooner or later it will no longer see the existing institutions as appropriate for society. This in turn causes it to resort to what Ake termed "effective" rather than "legitimate" means of achieving political goals, which of course means violence.

Non-Discriminatory Factors of Malintegration

The existence of discrimination against Catholics in Northern Ireland is not the only factor that has led to political malintegration. Similarly, the existence of reinforcing cleavages does not sufficiently explain political malintegration. There are other relevant factors involved in the breakdown of the previous constitutional order. First, the solution to the Irish Question that was implemented in the 1920's merely postponed the problem of a country united by geography and divided by culture. Second, throughout its fifty years of existence, Northern Ireland has been dominated by a single political party--the Unionist Party. The Unionist Party has been overwhelmingly Protestant and for all practical purposes the Unionist Party and the Government of Northern Ireland have been synonymous, and this fusion of party and government has created a situation in which the opposition parties, mainly composed of Catholics, were constantly frustrated and defeated.

⁷⁴Rose, p. 272.

Third, the British Government failed to assume its share of the responsibility for the governing of Northern Ireland. Instead, Britain allowed Northern Ireland to govern itself without proper care to insure that it conformed to standards in the rest of the United Kingdom. As a result, Britain helped to create an atmosphere that eventually led to political violence and malintegration.

The Solution of the 1920's

The solution to the Irish question that emerged in the 1920's must be viewed in its historical context. The issue of Home Rule for Ireland had been a precarious one for British Prime Ministers because the Protestant minority, concentrated in northeast Ireland, was violently opposed to any type of Home Rule which would subordinate it to the Catholic majority and the Catholics were equally determined to end British control of their homeland. The compromise that resulted came in the form of the Government of Ireland Act of 1920 which divided Ireland into two political entities with each having a regional parliament subordinate to the British Parliament. When this arrangement proved to be unacceptable to the Catholic Nationalists, the Irish Free State was created by the Anglo-Irish Treaty of 1921. This Treaty gave what is now Northern Ireland the option to opt out of the Irish Free State which it promptly did. Eventually Southern Ireland declared itself to be a republic and Northern Ireland remained as part of the United Kingdom.

Frank Gallagher, an Irish scholar, has maintained that the partition of Ireland was unnecessary because there were a number of safeguards which would have protected the rights of Protestants in a united Ireland. For example, 40 per cent of the seats in the Irish House of

Commons would have been Unionist which was more than their electoral strength of about 25 per cent would have given them. The Unionists were actually given a majority of the seats in the Irish Senate and issues affecting the status of the minority would have been decided by both Houses sitting together, giving the Protestants a virtual veto power.⁷⁵ However, the Protestant Unionist could not be swayed and partition was imposed.

It is difficult to assess the success of the partition plan that was implemented in the 1920's. On the one hand, it gave the Catholic Nationalists the Home Rule they had sought which eventually led to independence. It almost certainly prevented an insurrection by the Unionists who were willing to rebel against Britain if Ulster was abandoned to the South. If, on the other hand, partition was really unnecessary, then the partition plan that resulted merely postponed a solution to the Irish question. By dividing Ireland, the Protestant minority in Northern Ireland was able to impose its will on the Catholic majority. In light of the fact that Protestants who live in the Republic of Ireland have not suffered religious or political persecution at the hands of the Catholic majority, the Unionist fears were unfounded. Instead, the Protestants in Northern Ireland who feared persecution have been oppressing the Catholics in their own country. This revived the Irish question which was left unresolved in the 1920's.

⁷⁵ Frank Gallagher, The Indivisible Island: The History of the Partition of Ireland (London, 1957), pp. 303-304.

One Party Government in Northern Ireland

Robert Dahl has written that the process of democratization has "at least two dimensions: public contestation and the right to participate."⁷⁶ Dahl has devised a method of classifying political systems in terms of the relationship between the level of public contestation and the level of participation. According to Dahl, public contestation refers to the resolution of conflicts between groups or coalitions of groups over public policies. The alignment of the groups or coalitions will change according to the issue involved. The level of participation (more accurately called the level of inclusiveness), is defined by Dahl in terms of the proportion of the adult population allowed to vote. What Dahl has termed a "polyarchy" is a political system with a high level of public contestation and a high proportion of enfranchised adults. A political system that has a low level of public contestation and a high level of participation is termed an "inclusive hegemony."⁷⁷ Dahl cites the Soviet Union as an example of an inclusive hegemony since it has universal adult suffrage and "almost no system of public contestation."⁷⁸ Northern Ireland may also be classified as an inclusive hegemony because it has a high level of participation as far as the voting privilege is concerned, especially at the parliamentary level. However, the domination of politics in Northern Ireland by a single

⁷⁶Robert A. Dahl, Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition (New Haven, 1971), p. 5.

⁷⁷For additional classifications, see Robert A. Dahl, Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition (New Haven, 1971), pp. 5-9.

⁷⁸Ibid., p. 5.

political party--the Unionist Party--has virtually eliminated public contestation. Decisions over public policies have been confined to deliberations within the Unionist Party itself: that is, Unionist Party policy has been the Government's policy and if one did not share the political philosophy and interests of that party, one did not participate in decision-making in Northern Ireland. This point is clearly supported by the extent to which the Unionist Party dominated politics in Northern Ireland.

Table 2 in the appendix illustrated the strength of the Unionist Party in the parliament of Northern Ireland. Not once since the partition of Ireland in 1920 has the Unionist Party failed to form a Government after an election. Except for the election of 1962, the Unionists have always commanded at least a 2-1 majority at Stormont. By now it should be clear that Northern Ireland possessed what Rajni Kothari has termed a system of one party dominance. In an analysis of the Congress Party of India, Kothari has written:

The fact is that we have neither a one-party system which assumes not only the absence but the illegality of other parties nor a multi-party system which assumes that no party is sufficiently powerful to form the government by itself.⁷⁹

As in India, one party has consistently been given a substantial percentage of the vote in Northern Ireland. However, the Congress Party has functioned as an integrating force in the Indian political system while the Unionist Party has not. India is a country that is divided along religious, linguistic, and caste lines. The Congress Party has

⁷⁹ Rajni Kothari, "Party System," Asian Political Systems, eds. Betty B. Burch and Allan B. Cole (Princeton, N. J., 1968), p. 290.

served as a "big tent" within which all of the diverse elements of Indian society have found shelter and has promoted political integration in India by bringing them together under one party banner and platform. In Northern Ireland, the Unionist Party has derived its support almost exclusively from the Protestant majority. Richard Rose found that 70 per cent of the Protestants in his sample had identified with the Unionist Party and 95 per cent of the supporters of the Unionist Party were Protestants.⁸⁰

One might ask why a system of one party dominance has promoted integration in India and has contributed to malintegration in Northern Ireland. First, Northern Ireland is a much smaller country with fewer divisions in its population. James Madison has written:

The smaller the society, the fewer probably will be the distinct parties and interests composing it; the fewer the distinct parties and interests the more frequently will a majority be found of the same party; and the smaller the number of individuals composing a majority, and the smaller the compass within which they are placed, the more easily will they concert and execute their plans of oppression.⁸¹

Second, the Congress Party was able to bring together many diverse elements under its organization during the quest for independence. But in Northern Ireland the primary objective of the Unionist Party has been to avoid independence, an issue that divides the country. In other words, there has not been any issue that brings Catholics and Protestants together. Finally, the British Green Paper entitled, "The Future of Northern Ireland: A Paper for Discussion," has pointed out that:

⁸⁰Rose, p. 235.

⁸¹James Madison, "Federalist No. 10," The Federalist Papers, ed. Clinton Rossiter (New York, 1961), p. 83.

The alternation of governing Parties which has for so long been a characteristic of the British political system, and which has undoubtedly contributed in a marked degree to the stability of Parliamentary Government in Great Britain, accordingly did not exist in Northern Ireland. It is true that there are other democracies, whether sovereign States or self-governing areas within them, of which this can also be said. The special feature of the Northern Ireland situation was that the great divide in political life was not between different viewpoints on such matters as the allocation of resources and the determination of priorities, but between two whole communities.⁸²

Brett has written that "The dangerous effects of one-party government cannot be over-emphasised."⁸³ Brett has suggested that the dominance of politics in Northern Ireland by the Unionist Party has created an opposition that has been bitter and frustrated. James Gallagher, a member of the British Parliament, accurately summed up this problem when he said:

I understand what all hon. Members mean when they talk of democracy and the need to preserve democratic ways. But it is the essence of a democracy that one should be able to change one's Government, and one of the difficulties about Northern Ireland is that, although theoretically one can change one's Government, because of the frozen nature of the situation, there has not been anything but one Government for the last fifty years.⁸⁴

Another dangerous consequence of one party government is that the majority party begins to be convinced that it alone is right. Brett has

⁸²"The Future of Northern Ireland: A Paper for Discussion," (London, 1972), pp. 4-5. The Green Paper is a publication of the British Government that resulted from the Darlington Conference held September 25-27, 1972. Representatives from the Unionist, Alliance, and Northern Ireland Labour Parties presented proposals on the future of Northern Ireland. Later, the proposals of the Social Democratic and Labour Party, the Ulster Liberal Party, and the New Ulster Movement were also included. Hereafter called simply the Green Paper.

⁸³G.E.B. Brett, "The Lessons of Devolution in Northern Ireland," Political Quarterly, XLI, No. 3 (1970), p. 272.

⁸⁴Parliamentary Debates, Commons (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, Vol. 811, Feb. 8 to Feb. 19, 1971), p. 1283.

written that "The ideas, opinions and feelings of members of other parties come to seem ridiculous, fit only to be dismissed out of hand!"⁸⁵ Also, a government that is assured of victory becomes less sensitive to public opinion and "the channels of communication with the public at large become clogged."⁸⁶ Finally, the civil service loses its independence and becomes a tool of the majority party.⁸⁷ In conclusion, the complete domination of politics in Northern Ireland by the Unionist Party created a frustrated Catholic minority that has seen violence as an alternative to the present situation. This frustration has been a critical factor in the political malintegration of Northern Ireland.

The Failure of Great Britain

The final factor in the breakdown of the constitutional order in Northern Ireland is the failure of Great Britain to assume full responsibility for the governing of Ulster. Section 75 of the Government of Ireland Act of 1920 clearly reads that: . . . the supreme authority of the Parliament of the United Kingdom shall remain unaffected and undiminished over all persons, matters, and things in Ireland and every part thereof.⁸⁸ Section 8(b) of the Act prohibits the making of any law that interfered with religious equality.⁸⁹ The first provision was made to dispel the fears of the Protestants that they might be dominated by the Catholics after partition, even though Northern Ireland had its own

⁸⁵Brett, p. 272.

⁸⁶Ibid.

⁸⁷Ibid., p. 273.

⁸⁸Quoted in de Paor, p. 108.

⁸⁹Green Paper, p. 6.

regional parliament. The second provision was to assure the Protestant minority in the South and the Catholic minority in the North that they would be protected from religious discrimination. Thus, Great Britain assumed responsibility under law for the governing of Northern Ireland.

In practice, Great Britain failed to exercise its power as the supreme authority in Northern Ireland because:

In general, the view prevailed that, having established responsible if subordinate institutions in Northern Ireland with certain powers, the United Kingdom Parliament and Government should not lightly supersede or override those powers.⁹⁰

In debate on Northern Ireland in the British Parliament, Michael McGuire admonished that body that it was shirking its duty in the governing of Ulster, saying:

A lot of damage was done in the past because we were not able to discuss matters which we can now discuss. I recall how, when I was on the benches opposite, some of my hon. Friends tried to raise these issues, but were unable to do so. Indeed, a convention was established whereby one did not speak about the affairs of Northern Ireland. Mr. Speaker would rule out of order. Had that convention not grown up, many of the⁹¹ problems which we are now facing might have been resolved.

The Green Paper makes it clear that the negligence of Great Britain has involved the failure to insure that Ulster conform to changes made in the rest of the United Kingdom. For example, the business vote was abolished in Great Britain, but allowed to remain in Northern Ireland. Also, Northern Ireland maintained a ratepayers' franchise in local elections after Britain had adopted the universal adult franchise and removed such restrictions.⁹²

The reluctance of Great Britain to become involved in the affairs

⁹⁰ Ibid., p. 4.

⁹¹ Parliamentary Debates, Commons, pp. 1286-1287.

⁹² Green Paper, pp. 4-5

of Northern Ireland is understandable from the British point of view. The Irish question had brought the downfall of several Governments prior to the 1920's and succeeding Governments have avoided the issue whenever possible. Britain's main interest has been to influence the external affairs of Ireland because she has always considered the domination of Ireland by a foreign power to be a potential threat to her own security. For example, there was much concern among the Allies during the Second World War when the Republic of Ireland chose to remain neutral and refused to allow Britain to establish naval bases in Ireland. For this reason, Britain has always tried to maintain a foothold in Ireland and has been unwilling to antagonize Northern Ireland by interfering in its internal affairs. Now the situation has deteriorated to the point where Britain has been forced to abandon its policy of benign neglect and to intervene in the affairs of the beleaguered province.

The identification of the factors that have led to political malintegration in Northern Ireland should provide an understanding of the conditions necessary for a political solution. In other words, if discrimination has been identified as a factor involved in political malintegration, the removal of discrimination is a requisite to a political solution. The British Government's White Paper entitled "Northern Ireland Constitutional Proposals" has outlined a series of proposals for a solution to the problem of Northern Ireland. The next chapter will focus upon those proposals in light of the factors presented in this chapter.

CHAPTER III

AN ANALYSIS OF THE BRITISH WHITE PAPER

In the introduction to the White Paper entitled, "Northern Ireland Constitutional Proposals,"¹ the British Government has given two reasons for the establishment of new political institutions in Northern Ireland. First, Britain hopes that the new institutions will produce wider consensus among the people of Northern Ireland than had previously existed and second, that they will provide a basis for good government and a restoration of peace and order.² In order to achieve these two goals, the proposals contained in the White Paper will have to rectify those conditions that led to political malintegration in Northern Ireland. But even if the proposals prove to be unworkable, it is significant that the British Government has attempted a solution. Robert Dahl has written that:

In some cases, even though the government's actions are misdirected, they may reduce further demands simply because these actions symbolized to the disadvantaged group that the government is concerned. Indeed, it seems as least theoretically possible that sometimes a government's wrong-headed but seemingly well-intentioned policies may completely fail to reduce

¹U.S. Congress, Senate, Senator Edward Kennedy introduced into the record the British White Paper entitled, "Northern Ireland Constitutional Proposals," 93rd Cong., 1st sess., March 22, 1973, Congressional Record, Daily Digest, S5493-S5502. Additional citations will simply list the appropriate paragraph of the White Paper.

²White Paper, paragraph 2(d).

inequalities, yet the very fact that the government demonstrates its concern may be enough to hold, perhaps even to win over, the allegiance of the deprived group.³

Britain's response to the demands of the Catholic minority is what David Easton has termed a "structural regulation of support" type of response. He has written that:

A regulative response with regard to support may include efforts to change the structure and processes that characterize a particular type of political system. This is perhaps the most radical strategy. It requires the system to transform its goals and structures as a means of maintaining at least some kind of system for making authoritative allocations.⁴

The purpose of the White Paper is to outline the proposals that will bring about a transformation of Northern Ireland's goals and structures and establish a new system for making authoritative allocations.

In the last chapter a number of factors were identified as contributing to political malintegration in Northern Ireland. The removal of those factors may be described as the necessary conditions⁵ needed for a political solution to the conflict. This type of approach has been termed empirical functionalism and according to Lawrence Mayer:

This approach, exemplified by Robert K. Merton, envisions function as the fulfillment of a specific set of demands in a particular political or social system. The question therefore is What set of institutions fulfill a particular set of functions or satisfy a specific set of demands in a particular

³ Dahl, p. 90.

⁴ David Easton, A Framework for Political Analysis (Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1965), p. 124.

⁵ "Conditions are said to be necessary when their presence is essential to the occurrence of the phenomenon in question--when their absence would preclude its occurrence." See Vernon Van Dyke, Political Science: A Philosophical Analysis (Stanford, 1960), p. 39.

time and place?⁶

In other words, once the specific set of demands are identified, what must be done to satisfy those demands? Specifically, how does the British Government plan to deal with the problem of discrimination? How does the White Paper propose to increase the participation of Catholics in the government of Northern Ireland? What will be done about the dominance of the Unionist Party in the political system? What will be the responsibilities of Great Britain under the proposals? How will the question of Irish unity be handled? And finally, what will be done to satisfy the demands of Protestants who wish to keep Northern Ireland in the United Kingdom?

The questions that were asked in the above paragraph could easily be answered by merely examining the proposals contained in the White Paper. Even though the description of the proposals is important to an understanding of the solution, it does not tell us whether Great Britain will achieve its goals of wider consensus and good government. In fact it would be impossible to completely guarantee the success or failure of the White Paper's proposals. Similarly, James Madison, John Jay, and Alexander Hamilton were unable to guarantee the successful implementation of the American Constitution, and in the Federalist Papers, they were predicting that the American Constitution would produce the results they deemed desirable. Based upon their knowledge of political theory, practical politics, and human nature, the authors of the Federalist Papers were evaluating and justifying the provisions in the Constitution.

⁶Lawrence C. Mayer, Comparative Political Inquiry (Homewood, Illinois, 1972), p. 151. Empahsis mine.

The following analysis of the proposals contained in the British White Paper on Northern Ireland is not purported to be of the same scope or magnitude as the Federalist Papers; but an attempt to analyze the White Paper should be made, especially if one agrees with Robert Dahl's observation that:

Depending on one's point of view, it may be a source of professional satisfaction or a cause for reproach that American political scientists have in recent years largely forsworn attempts to evaluate political systems in an explicit and systematic fashion.⁷

Proposals on Discrimination

Complaints of political discrimination against Catholics involved electoral laws, gerrymandering, the enforcement of the Special Powers Act, the treatment of Catholic prisoners by the authorities, and the administration of justice in Northern Ireland. It should be noted that the Government of Northern Ireland made efforts to alleviate the civil rights crisis by implementing a number of political reforms prior to the implementing a number of political reforms prior to the imposition of direct rule by Great Britain. In 1971, two new election laws that brought Northern Ireland's franchise in line with that in Great Britain were passed by Stormont. The Parliamentary Commissioner Act (Northern Ireland) established an ombudsman to investigate complaints by citizens against the central government and the Commissioner for Complaints Act (Northern Ireland) did the same at the local level. An act that was to

⁷Robert A. Dahl, "The Evaluation of Political Systems," Contemporary Political Science: Toward Empirical Theory, ed. Ithiel de Sola Pool (New York, 1967), p. 167.

establish an unarmed police force was also passed but was never implemented.⁸ But these reforms were "too little, too late" for Northern Ireland. With this in mind, we now examine the White Paper proposals to end discrimination in Northern Ireland.

Election Laws

The White Paper has proposed a new Assembly for Northern Ireland that will consist of 78 members elected from multi-member districts by the Single Transferable Vote (STV) method of proportional representation.⁹ According to the White Paper, the determination of the franchise will be an "excepted"¹⁰ matter that will be the responsibility of the United Kingdom Parliament. Since the new Assembly will not be permitted to legislate on the franchise, Britain will be able to reassure the Catholics of Northern Ireland that practices such as the business vote and the ratepayers' franchise shall never be reinstated in Northern Ireland. Laws concerning all phases of the electoral process have been classified as "excepted" matters (policy areas such as foreign policy and the administration of justice, for example) and this will prevent the Unionist Party from enhancing its power by the manipulation of the election laws and voting requirements.

⁸ London Sunday Times Insight Team, Northern Ireland: A Report on the Conflict (New York, 1972), pp. 233-234.

⁹ White Paper, paragraph 41.

¹⁰ White Paper, paragraph 57. "Excepted" matters are those on which the Northern Ireland Assembly may never legislate. "Reserved" matters are those on which either Westminster or the Assembly may legislate. "Transferred" matters are those not classified as excepted to reserved.

Gerrymandering

The White Paper maintained that the immediate redrawing of electoral districts would have eliminated any chance for an election in 1973. Since the British Government considered that it was necessary to have an election as soon as possible, the decision was made to have the members of the Assembly elected from the twelve electoral districts used in the election of Northern Ireland's representatives to the British Parliament. The White Paper also indicated that any future change in the electoral districts would be done by an impartial Boundary Commission.¹¹ Since the adoption of proportional representation, gerrymandering should no longer be a problem because, as Carl Friedrich has pointed out, "proportional representation possesses the merit of getting rid of the difficulties as the size and structure of constituencies."¹² However, it should be remembered that gerrymandered districts did not present a serious problem at the parliamentary level, but at the local level. The British Government will control the composition of electoral districts at all levels and will participate in the drawing of local constituency boundaries as well. The demand for "one person, one vote" was an important factor in the Catholic civil rights movement and the guarantee of equal voting power is necessary for the development of the legitimacy of the government in the eyes of the Catholics. British control of electoral districts should assure the Catholics that the Government of Northern Ireland will adhere to that principle.

¹¹White Paper, paragraph 39.

¹²Carl Friedrich, Constitutional Government and Democracy (Waltham, Mass., 1968), p. 282.

Law and Order

Another area in which the Catholics felt that they were the victims of political discrimination has been the treatment of Catholic prisoners by the authorities under the Special Powers Act. The delicate balance between the maintenance of law and order and the exercise of civil rights has made the enforcement of the Act an extremely sensitive issue. According to the White Paper, the new constitutional bill to be submitted to the British Parliament

. . . will propose the repeal of the Special Powers Act and the re-enactment into law only of strictly necessary provisions which, like those provisions implementing the Diplock Report will be operative only during an emergency and with the approval of Parliament.¹³

The important aspect of this provision is that the discretionary power of determining just when an emergency exists will be removed from the hands of the Unionist dominated government of Northern Ireland. In addition, the possibility of a future Special Powers Act being enacted will be limited because all emergency legislation in the field of law and order will be reserved to the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland.¹⁴ The Northern Ireland Executive may act only as an advisory committee to the Secretary of State on matters of law and order and other matters reserved to the United Kingdom Government. Finally, the Police Authority, a body that existed under the old system, will continue to manage the police service. Elected representatives selected

¹³White Paper, paragraph 60. The Diplock Report contains the findings of a Royal Commission concerning the administration of justice in Northern Ireland.

¹⁴White Paper, paragraph 67(d).

from the Assembly will also be members of the Authority and local District Councils will be established to improve community-police relations.¹⁵

The maintenance of law and order is of vital importance to future political integration in Northern Ireland. Equality in the treatment of Catholic prisoners is needed to help develop the legitimacy of the government in the eyes of the minority and, at the same time, it is extremely important that the Protestants are able to feel that the government is capable of maintaining law and order. The British Government must see to it that, in coping with the demands of the Catholics, it does not lose legitimacy in the eyes of the Protestants by seeming to lose effectiveness in maintaining law and order. Seymour Lipset has written:

By effectiveness is meant the actual performance of a political system, the extent to which it satisfies the basic functions of government as defined by the expectations of most members of a society, and the expectations of powerful groups within it which might threaten the system, such as the armed forces.¹⁶

The White Paper has made it clear that the British Government still intends to deal forcefully with violence and terrorism and that peaceful opposition to the Government will be tolerated and protected. The White Paper has stated that:

Any person in Northern Ireland, whatever his political beliefs, may advance them peacefully without fear. But no person or organisation can expect to be allowed to be acting politically

¹⁵ White Paper, paragraph 69.

¹⁶ Seymour M. Lipset, "Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy," Politics and Social Life: An Introduction to Political Behavior, eds Nelson W. Polsby, Robert A. Dentler, and Paul A. Smith (Boston, 1963), p. 554.

at one moment and then, given what appears a favourable opportunity, to turn to violence and subversion.¹⁷

In order to insure that human and political rights are respected, a Standing Advisor Commission on Human Rights will investigate charges of discrimination.¹⁸ The constitutional bill will also contain a provision forbidding Executive Departments of the Northern Ireland Government from acting in a discriminatory way. In addition,

This statutory bar to any form of discriminatory action will also apply to any authority, body or agency in Northern Ireland which is subject to investigation by the Parliamentary Commissioner for Administration, the Northern Ireland Parliamentary Commissioner for Administration, or the Northern Ireland Commissioner for Complaints, and to the Post Office.¹⁹

The constitutional bill will have a provision forbidding the new Assembly from making any law of a discriminatory nature,²⁰ and as a final safeguard, the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland will have the power to place any measure passed by the Assembly before the British Parliament. According to the White Paper:

If he is of the opinion that any measure either deals substantially with a "reserved" matter, or touches incidentally on an "excepted" matter, he will cause it to be laid before Parliament together with his recommendations relating to it, so that an opportunity will be offered for the will of Parliament to be made known. If, however, he is of the opinion that the measure relates solely to a "transferred" matter and does not run contrary to statutory restraints, e.g., on legislation of a discriminatory nature, he will cause it to be submitted directly to the Privy Council.²¹

¹⁷White Paper, paragraph 93.

¹⁸Ibid., paragraph 104.

¹⁹Ibid., paragraph 77.

²⁰Ibid., paragraph 63.

²¹Ibid., paragraph 57.

This provision virtually gives the Secretary of State a veto power over legislation passed by the Assembly and will allow the British Government to take positive action to prevent discriminatory practices by the Government of Northern Ireland. In his defense of the veto power of American presidents, Alexander Hamilton wrote that:

It establishes a salutary check upon the legislative body, calculated to guard the community against the effects of faction, precipitancy, or of any impulse unfriendly to the public good, which may happen to influence a majority of that body.²²

The protection of the minority against the "tyranny of the majority" is an essential element of a political solution in Northern Ireland. The provision contained in the White Paper would seem to provide the Catholics with adequate guarantees that they will be protected against arbitrary action on the part of the Protestants. However, the key element is the determination of the British Government to use the machinery provided to protect minority rights.

The Administration of Justice

The final area of political discrimination has been the administration of justice in Northern Ireland. As mentioned above, the Special Powers Act will be repealed and greater efforts will be made to protect human, legal, and political rights. Under the former constitutional system, county judges, magistrates, and coroners were appointed by Northern Ireland Ministers who, of course, were usually Unionists. Under the new constitutional bill, these officials will be appointed by

²²Alexander Hamilton, "Federalist No. 73," The Federalist Papers, ed. Clinton Rossiter (New York, 1961), p. 443.

the Lord Chancellor. The administration of justice will be an "excepted" matter and will be the responsibility of the Secretary of State. The responsibility for public prosecutions will belong to the Attorney-General.²³ These proposals are clearly attempts to remove the administration of justice from partisan and sectarian influences and to establish a more impartial judicial system. The importance of the removal of such influences in the administration of justice is that the judicial process must be thought to be legitimate before its actions are considered to be just. Carl Friedrich has written:

Thus an interaction is apparent between legitimacy and justice: a just act is required to produce the legitimate ruler, while the legitimacy of the ruler helps render his actions just by providing them with the legitimacy which bare or brute force does not possess.²⁴

If the men who hold positions as judges and other officers of the courts in Northern Ireland are to be considered legitimate, it is essential that they be considered to be impartial by both communities. The selection of individuals who are acceptable to both Catholics and Protestants will be an extremely difficult task since many of the values and beliefs of the two groups are incompatible. The position of Great Britain is a precarious one since, as noted in the last chapter, each community feels that the other is receiving preferential treatment in the administration of justice. The critical question is whether the British Government will be able to find individuals that will be acceptable to both communities. The extremists in both communities will never

²³White Paper, paragraph 67 (a-c)

²⁴Friedrich, p. 259.

accept judges who are appointed by the British, but the appointment of impartial individuals should be able to win the support of the moderates in Northern Ireland.

Proposals on Social Discrimination

The British Government has recognized the need to promote social reforms in Northern Ireland and has stated in the White Paper that, "In any part of the world an inadequate social environment breeds boredom, aimlessness, alienation from society, vandalism and even violence."²⁵ The White Paper reflects a special concern with education and housing as they relate to social relations between the two communities in Northern Ireland.

Education

Education has often been recognized as one means of promoting integration and in the White Paper the segregated school system was identified as a factor in the mutual distrust that exists between the two communities. But, it was also cautioned that: "To make the educational system itself the scapegoat for all the ills of Northern Ireland would obscure problems whose origin are of a much more complex character."²⁶ However, after recognizing the need to end the dual school system, there were no positive proposals in the White Paper to deal with the problem and the British Government was only vaguely committed to a

²⁵White Paper, paragraph 27.

²⁶Ibid., paragraph 20.

policy of encouraging desegregation of the school system.²⁷ The section of the White Paper on education ends with the observation that: "Unless in the future, a greater sense of community can be fostered amongst the young people of Northern Ireland, it is difficult to see how this distrust can be broken down."²⁸

It should be noted that a complete restructuring of the entire society of Northern Ireland was never the aim of the White Paper. However, the importance of the educational process in political socialization is such that more positive action by the British Government was warranted. David Easton has written:

As we might expect, where the agencies of socialization from which the child learns, such as family or school, are hostile to the existing authorities, it is probable that he will absorb disaffective rather than supportive attitudes.²⁹

Even if the educational system is not the primary source of political socialization, it is still an important long term force in the fostering of the legitimacy of the regime and compliance with its laws.

Housing

As noted in Chapter II, the allocation of housing in Northern Ireland has had political as well as social implications. The Government of Northern Ireland attempted to reform the housing allocation system by establishing a "points system" by which housing would be

²⁷ Ibid., paragraph 21.

²⁸ Ibid., paragraph 21.

²⁹ David Easton, A Systems Analysis of Political Life (New York, 1965), p. 307.

allocated to families on the basis of need. The reform met with stiff opposition from within the Unionist Party and, as a result, the criteria established to determine need were only guidelines and the local housing authorities were not obligated to comply with them.³⁰ Plans for a central housing authority that would have removed housing allocations from local control were also resisted by members of the Unionist Government.³¹

It was proposed in the White Paper that a central Housing Executive with a "broadly based membership"³² be created to allocate housing in the future. The centralized Housing Executive will take housing allocations out of the hands of Unionist politicians who have a vested interest in maintaining homogeneous electoral districts. Catholic representation on the Housing Executive will provide the minority with a voice in the allocation process and should help to dispel any unfair charges of discrimination. More importantly, the British Government has committed itself to replace inadequate housing in Northern Ireland³³ which has been a major problem for Catholics and Protestants alike.

The White Paper did not offer any proposals on discrimination concerning housing in the private sector. There is very little the British Government can do about individual attitudes concerning discrimination in housing. For example, Barritt and Carter have noted that

³⁰London Sunday Times Insight Team, pp. 233-234.

³¹Ibid., p. 161.

³²White Paper, paragraph 98.

³³Ibid., paragraph 26.

there is pressure on Protestants not to sell their homes to Catholics and mixed neighborhoods have been considered by Protestants to be "going downhill."³⁴ It should also be remembered that until the mutual distrust is broken down, neither Catholics nor Protestants are very likely to feel safe in a mixed neighborhood.

Proposals on Economic Discrimination

The White Paper has proposed vigorous action in the area of discrimination in hiring in both the public and private sectors. In the public sector, the White Paper has stated that:

Every public authority is required to operate under a fair employment code; an anti-discriminatory clause (policed on an extra-statutory basis by the Parliamentary Commissioner for Administration) is written into all Government contracts, and a breach of its requirements can involve removal for a period from the Government contract list³⁵

The British Government has also committed itself to a policy of physical reconstruction and rehabilitation of Northern Ireland's industries and has promised to provide additional aid in building a sounder economy for the province. This will include aid to boost industry and cash allotments for social services such as unemployment compensation.³⁶

The Private Sector

In the private sector, a Working Party³⁷ which consisted of

³⁴ Barritt and Carter, pp. 53-54.

³⁵ White Paper, paragraph 98.

³⁶ Ibid., paragraph 88.

³⁷ An ad hoc committee similar to a Presidential task force or commission in the United States.

representatives of government, business, and labor, submitted a list of recommendations to promote equal opportunity in hiring in Northern Ireland. Its recommendations include: (1) a rejection of a formal quote system in employment practices; (2) a declaration of principles and intent in hiring practices should be signed by representatives of business and labor; (3) a pamphlet entitled "Guide to Manpower Policy and Practices" should be distributed to businesses; and (4) an agency to investigate individual complaints of discrimination on religious or political grounds should be created. According to the Working Party, the Agency would also be given the power to initiate its own inquiries into patterns of discrimination in business and industry.³⁸ Finally,

Where it is satisfied on inquiry that an unlawful discriminatory practice existed, the Agency would seek, through conciliation and other administrative procedures, to secure voluntary compliance with the law; but it would be able, as a last resort, to apply to the courts for a range of civil remedies.³⁹

The provisions for positive action, including legal recourse, for seeking compliance with anti-discriminatory practices in employment should reassure Catholics of the British Government's good intentions in securing equality and fairness in hiring.

The White Paper's economic proposals should act as an impetus to the economy of Northern Ireland and, as Carl Friedrich has pointed out, the performance of the political system, especially in the economic realm, contributes to or detracts from the legitimacy of the system.⁴⁰

³⁸White Paper, paragraphs 100-103.

³⁹Ibid., paragraph 102(c). Emphasis added.

⁴⁰Friedrich, Man and His Government, p. 236.

But the loyalty of the Catholic minority will never be bought with economic benefits alone. As Robert Dahl has noted, the effort made is as important as the action taken. The fact that the British Government has committed itself to promoting economic prosperity in Northern Ireland will contribute more to the legitimacy of the regime than just pumping money into the country without regard to other Catholic demands.

Catholic Participation

Because of the close relationship between religious affiliation and party affiliation in Northern Ireland,⁴¹ the problem of how to increase Catholic participation in the decision making process and how to end the system of one party dominance is interconnected. The British Government must try to balance the need to assure the Catholics of an effective voice in government and the need to maintain some semblance of majority rule. Since the two needs have come into conflict in the past, the problem is especially perplexing. The constitutional proposals contained in the White Paper seek to remedy this problem by the introduction of proportional representation, the use of a strong Committee system in the Assembly, and the guarantee that the executive power of Northern Ireland will not be concentrated in the hands of representatives from only one community.

Proportional Representation

Stein Rokkan has written that:

⁴¹Rose, p. 235.

In linguistically and religiously divided societies majority elections could clearly threaten the existence of the political system. The introduction of some element of minority representation came to be seen as an essential step in a strategy of territorial consolidation.⁴²

The British Government recognized the need for "some element of minority representation" at the time of the partition of Ireland; thus the Government of Ireland Act of 1920 provided for a system of proportional representation in elections. The regional parliaments in Northern and Southern Ireland were to operate under the system but could abolish the system after three years, which the government of Prime Minister James Craig did in Northern Ireland in 1929.⁴³

While it is useless to speculate about what might have happened if proportional representation had not been abolished in Northern Ireland, it is significant that the re-introduction of the system was advocated by every political party that participated in the Darlington Conference on the future of Northern Ireland,⁴⁴ with the exception of the Unionist Party which naturally did not favor an electoral system that would reduce its political strength. The White Paper has proposed that the new Northern Ireland Assembly be elected by the Single Transferable Vote method of proportional representation.⁴⁵ In addition, the voters will choose their representative from multi-member districts instead of

⁴²Stein Rokkan, Citizens, Elections, Parties: Approaches to the Comparative Study of the Process of Development (New York, 1970), p. 157.

⁴³de Paor, p. 107.

⁴⁴Those parties were the Unionist, Alliance, Northern Ireland Labour, Social Democratic and Labour, Ulster Liberal and the New Ulster Movement.

⁴⁵White Paper, paragraph 39.

single-member districts. Stein Rokkan has written that:

The Single Transferable Vote made little sense in single-member constituencies but offered an alternative to party dominance in multi-member units. The voter was free to establish his own list of candidates and did not have to abide by any party nominations.⁴⁶

The Single Transferable Vote method allows the voter to cast only one vote, but allows him to rank the candidates in the order of his preference. In this way, if the voter's first choice is not elected, his second, third, or even fourth choice may eventually receive his vote. If the voter's first choice receives more votes than are needed to win, the surplus votes are divided among the remaining candidates according to the voter's second or third choices until all of the seats in the multi-member constituency are filled. This method reduces the number of wasted votes⁴⁷ (compared to plurality systems), and allows a minority representation roughly equivalent to its numerical strength in the electorate as a whole.

One serious problem with the Single Transferable Vote method is that those wishing to vote along straight party lines may still do so. Enid Lakeman and James D. Lambert have written that in the 1948 elections in the Republic of Ireland, 90 per cent of the non-transferable votes "became non-transferable when no candidate of the same party remained."⁴⁸ In other words, if the voter found that he could not vote

⁴⁶Rokkan, p. 164.

⁴⁷For an excellent example of how the Single Transferable Vote method works, see Enid Lakeman and James D. Lambert, Voting in Democracies (London, 1959), pp. 257-269.

⁴⁸Ibid, p. 111.

for another candidate of his particular party, he simply did not list a preference for any other party's candidates either and his vote became non-transferable. This obstacle has been avoided in Northern Ireland by requiring the voter to list his preferences for all of the candidates on the ballot.⁴⁹ Now, if the voter refuses to list a preference for candidates of the other parties, his vote will not count.

Another serious problem with the introduction of the Single Transferable Vote method is that even though the Catholics of Northern Ireland will be represented in proportion to their number in the population as a whole, they will continue to be hopelessly outnumbered in the Assembly as long as voting and party affiliation follow religious lines and the population ratio remains constant. In addition, the Protestants have solidly supported the Unionist Party whereas the Catholics have divided their votes among the Nationalist, the Social Democratic and Labour, and the Northern Ireland Labour Parties. Consequently, there is a great burden placed upon these minority parties to abandon sectarian causes and to begin to appeal to members of the Protestant majority thereby cutting into the strength of the Unionist Party. In the past the Unionists have tried to "out-British the British" and have been very successful at appealing to Protestant patriotism. Therefore, the minority parties must show that they are just as loyal to the new constitution as the Unionist Party. Once minority parties lose their image of being subversive, a wider range of appeals could be made on economic and social grounds dealing with issues of concern to both

⁴⁹"Oh, Jesus, Will It Work?" Time, Vol. 102, No. 1 (July 2, 1973), p. 27.

communities. Unless significant changes are made in this area, the new Assembly will resemble Stormont with the Unionists enjoying a commanding majority and with the Opposition being weak and ineffective.

The Committee System

The second change proposed in the White Paper was to increase Catholic participation in government by the use of a stronger committee system in the parliament of Northern Ireland. The Committees will be organized along functional lines according to specific areas of specialization such as Home Affairs, Public Accounts, and so forth. Each member of the Assembly will be assigned to a standing Committee whose membership will reflect "the balance of parties in the Assembly."⁵⁰ The chairman of each Committee will also be the head of an executive department in the same policy area and the department heads collectively will form the Executive. It is stated in the White Paper that it is not necessary for the Assembly to follow the procedures used either at Westminster or Stormont and it has been encouraged to adopt less formal procedures.⁵¹

The committee system will allow the members of the Assembly who do not hold positions in the Executive to take a more active part in policy formulation. The White Paper envisions a "pre-legislation" stage that will allow the appropriate committee to study proposed legislation before it is presented to the entire Assembly.⁵² This

⁵⁰White Paper, paragraph 44.

⁵¹Ibid., paragraph 45.

⁵²Ibid., paragraph 44.

procedure will allow opposition party members to express minority opinion on proposed legislation and to propose alternative measures acceptable to both communities. In addition, opposition members will have a greater voice in the committee's "watch-dog" function of monitoring the activities of the Executive because the committee as a whole will have more power in this area.⁵³

The use of a strong committee system in the Assembly should promote cooperation among its members and contribute to political integration.

Carl Friedrich has written that:

The political function of representative assemblies today is not so much the initiation of legislation as the carrying on of popular education and propaganda and the integration and coordination of conflicting interests and viewpoints. The representative must be a master in the art of compromise.⁵⁴

However, if the elected representative himself does not possess the capacity to promote the interests of his supporters in a legislative body, he no longer has any reason to support it or to recognize its legitimacy. In order to gain the support of a representative's constituents, the political regime must be considered to be legitimate by the representative himself. For many years the Nationalist Party members refused to act as the Official Opposition at Stormont because they did not recognize its legitimacy.⁵⁵ If the new Assembly is to gain legitimacy in the eyes of the Catholics, it must have the support of its members who will then have a vested interest in convincing their supporters of its legitimacy. This in turn will legitimate the actions

⁵³Ibid.

⁵⁴Friedrich, Constitutional Government and Democracy, p. 309.

⁵⁵Rose, p. 220.

of the Assmebly thereby increasing the capacity of the government to rule.

The use of legislative committees also points to the need for minority parties to abandon their strictly sectarian appeals and to broaden the base of their membership. If the committees of the Assembly are to reflect the party balance and if the parties are divided into Protestant and Catholic parties, then the Unionist Party will have a 2-1 majority on the committees. Unless a unanimous vote is required for new legislation, the Unionist members of the committees would have very little trouble passing legislation over the objections of the opposition parties. Depending on the ability of the Unionist Party to maintain its cohesion, the Catholic opposition parties may find themselves as ineffective as they were at Stormont.

Control of the Executive

One of the conditions that the British Government will require before the devolution of power to the Assembly is that:

. . . the Executive itself can no longer be solely based upon any single party, if that party draws its support and elected representation virtually entirely from only one section of a divided community.⁵⁶

Since the Executive will be formed by the heads of the committees of the Assembly, this condition guarantees that some positions of power will be held by members of the minority parties. It imposes a type of coalition government with the Catholic parties representing the junior partners. This requirement is not unlike an informal requirement of

⁵⁶ White Paper, paragraph 52.

of most executives that they reflect a balance of various factions within the party or geographical areas within the nation. For example, in Belgium, the Government must reflect a balance between the Flemings and the Walloons because of the cultural and linguistic differences in that country.⁵⁷ Once again, minority representation in the Executive of Northern Ireland is needed to instill in the minority parties' representatives a sense of legitimacy of the government and to recruit their help in establishing the legitimacy of the government among the minority elements in the political system.

In conclusion, the British Government has taken a number of steps to promote the participation of Catholics in the government of Northern Ireland. Under the new system there will be a type of coalition government which will serve to promote greater consensus among the minority on the legitimacy and existence of the political regime. In addition, there are safeguards that will guarantee the minority a voice in the decision making process. But it is worth noting that the details of many of the proposals are sketchy or will not be developed for some time. Consequently, the most that has been established is the foundation for a workable solution to the problem of Catholic participation.

The Role of Great Britain

One of the key factors cited as contributing to political malintegration in Northern Ireland was the failure of Great Britain to assume its share of the responsibility for governing it. It should be

⁵⁷Stephen Holt, Six European States (New York, 1970), pp. 270-271.

remembered that Britain always had the authority to intervene in the affairs of Northern Ireland but simply chose not to do so. The violence that erupted in the late 1960's forced Britain to intervene and restore order. In turn, Britain will be forced to play a larger role in the internal affairs of Northern Ireland; first, to reassure Protestants by its presence and second, to protect the rights of Catholics. This is a role that Britain does not relish but cannot avoid.

The White Paper contains several proposals that indicate that Great Britain will take a more active role in the governing of Northern Ireland. First of all, Britain has committed itself to a policy of economic development of Northern Ireland⁵⁸ and is also committed to raising social services to a level of parity with those in the rest of the United Kingdom.⁵⁹ The British Government will scrutinize legislation passed by the Assembly of Northern Ireland and will have the power to veto any deemed discriminatory by the Secretary of State.⁶⁰ Britain will also assume the responsibility for the maintenance of law and order.⁶¹ Finally, the constitutional bill will contain a list of "excepted" powers that are matters on which the Assembly will not be allowed to legislate.⁶² These proposals indicate that Britain, in contrast to its past record of performance, intends to be an active participant in the government of Northern Ireland.

⁵⁸White Paper, paragraph 25.

⁵⁹Ibid., paragraph 88.

⁶⁰Ibid., paragraph 95.

⁶¹Ibid., paragraph 2(h).

⁶²Ibid., paragraph 56(a).

The importance of Britain's role in Northern Ireland should not be underestimated because its presence has been one of the few stabilizing factors there. It is worth noting that the extremists of both communities would like to see the British withdraw. The IRA would favor a British withdrawal in the hope that Ireland would eventually be reunited. The Protestant "ultras" would also favor a British withdrawal because they think Britain "coddles" the Catholics and they would then be free to deal with the IRA in a different way. It is for this reason that Britain must remain in Northern Ireland until more moderate elements can gain control. Without the stabilizing presence of British troops, a civil war would be very likely. Britain must now try to repair the damage that fifty years of neglect has created.

The Irish Dimension

William Kingston has identified two key elements of a solution to the problem of Northern Ireland. First, any solution must seek to remove Unionist fears of being swallowed up by the Irish Republic and second, recognition must be made that eventual reunification is a desire of both Northern and Southern Catholics.⁶³ At first glance, these two elements would seem to be mutually exclusive, but the White Paper has attempted to accommodate both communities by the introduction of the so called "Irish Dimension." The Irish Dimension recognizes that Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland have common problems and must cooperate to solve them.

⁶³William Kingston, "Northern Ireland: The Elements of a Solution," Political Quarterly, XLIII, No. 2 (1972), p. 206.

Before any cooperation on common problems can begin, mutual trust must be developed between the two countries. But before that can happen, the Protestants in the North must be assured of the continued connection with the United Kingdom. The British Government has incorporated a number of guarantees that are designed to do just that. On March 8, 1973, the people of Northern Ireland went to the polls to vote on a referendum concerning the question of Irish unity. The results are listed in Table 3 in the appendix. Briefly, the referendum indicated an overwhelming (99 to 1) desire on the part of the people of Northern Ireland to remain in the United Kingdom. However, the outcome of the vote is somewhat misleading because a majority of the Catholic voters boycotted the election. The British Government was forced to accept the results and in the White Paper declared that:

In accordance with the specific pledges given by successive United Kingdom Governments, Northern Ireland must and will remain part of the United Kingdom for as long as that is the wish of a majority of the people; but that status does not preclude taking into account what has been described in this Paper as the "Irish Dimension."⁶⁴

In addition to the guarantee to keep Northern Ireland a part of the United Kingdom, the White Paper also contains others as well. First, Northern Ireland is to have the same number of representatives in the British Parliament as it had before direct rule was imposed.⁶⁵ Second, the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland will continue to have Cabinet rank in the British Government.⁶⁶ Third, the White Paper

⁶⁴ White Paper, paragraph 2(b). Paragraph 32 repeats the pledge.

⁶⁵ Ibid., paragraph 33.

⁶⁶ Ibid., paragraph 48.

contains a promise that there will not be a weakening of Northern Ireland's links with the Crown.⁶⁷ Fourth, the ministers that comprise the Executive of the Government of Northern Ireland will be required to take an oath of allegiance before assuming office.⁶⁸ And fifth, the British Government has promised to take strong action against political terrorists while attempting to respect civil liberties.⁶⁹ These proposals should assure Protestants that cooperation between Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland will not endanger the continued existence of Northern Ireland as a political entity within the United Kingdom.

As noted above, the guarantee of the status of Northern Ireland does not preclude the possibility of a change in that status.⁷⁰ In the White Paper the British Government goes on record as favoring a "Council of Ireland" through which cooperation between the Republic and Northern Ireland can be achieved.⁷¹ It has been stated in the White Paper that the provision for a Council of Ireland in the constitutional bill would have been unrealistic and inappropriate. Instead it has been proposed by the White Paper that a conference be held to discuss the possibility such an organization. Cooperation between the two communities would include matters such as control of terrorism, joint economic policies and development, the promotion of tourism, and the production of

⁶⁷ Ibid., paragraph 81.

⁶⁸ Ibid., paragraph 52.

⁶⁹ Ibid., paragraph 58-62.

⁷⁰ Ibid., paragraph 2(b).

⁷¹ Ibid., paragraph 110.

electricity. Cooperation between the two countries would also require the recognition of the status of Northern Ireland by the Irish Republic.⁷² If at some time in the future both sides desire a union, the organization would be there to discuss the details. What is more important is that the channels of communication will be opened.

The purpose of this chapter has been to describe and analyze the British solution to the problem of Northern Ireland as outlined in the White Paper entitled, "Northern Ireland Constitutional Proposals." The analysis was aimed at evaluating the proposals in the White Paper in light of the factors that have led to political malintegration. However, the creation of the proper set of institutions is only the beginning of the process of political integration. The final chapter will deal with the prospects for the future of political integration in Northern Ireland.

⁷²Ibid., paragraph 112(a).

CHAPTER IV

CONCLUSION

The purpose of this study has been to examine two fundamental questions concerning political integration in Northern Ireland. The first question asked why the political system of Northern Ireland failed to integrate the Catholic minority, and the second asked what can be done to promote political integration in the province. The first question led to an examination of some of the factors which have hampered political integration in Northern Ireland and to the testing of a number of hypotheses about the relationship between various forms of discrimination and the legitimacy of the Northern Ireland government. Factors labeled non-discriminatory were also examined in order to study their effects upon political integration. The second question led to a study of the proposals contained in the British White Paper entitled "Northern Ireland Constitutional Proposals." Its goal is the gradual political integration of the Irish nation. In other words, this study was concerned with the White Paper as a response to the conditions that had interfered with political integration in Northern Ireland. In this chapter conclusions regarding the prospects of political integration in Northern Ireland will be made on the basis of the analysis of the White Paper, and suggestions for further inquiry into the problem of political integration will be made.

Discrimination and Legitimacy

There is a preponderance of evidence to support the widespread belief of Catholics in Northern Ireland that they have been the victims of discrimination in their own country. A survey of the political literature on Northern Ireland reveals that discrimination against the Catholics has been one of the most important causes of social and political conflict. Examples of discrimination in both the public and private sectors have been well documented. Conceding the widespread discrimination against Catholics, did this, in fact, cause the alienation of Catholics from the former Protestant regime of Northern Ireland? On the basis of the operational definitions of legitimacy and political integration presented in Chapter I, it must be concluded that it did.

Alienation from a political regime is evident from such overt actions as political terrorism. Obviously the members of the IRA have never accepted the legitimacy of the government of Northern Ireland, but the refusal of the majority of the Catholics to support terrorism or massive civil disobedience against the government does not necessarily indicate their acceptance of its legitimacy. Not every man is willing to lay down his life to attain his political objectives. Similarly, compliance with the law on the part of most of the Catholics in Northern Ireland does not mean that they accept the legitimacy of the government. It should be recalled that the legitimacy of a government is based upon the belief that the political regime has the right to govern. The right to govern must be distinguished from the coercive power that a political regime may command; the fact that the majority of Catholics in Northern Ireland have remained law-abiding has been due

at least in part to the presence of British troops. But even if the British were to leave Northern Ireland, it does not necessarily follow that every Catholic would then take to the streets. The point is that a citizen may reject the legitimacy of the political regime without taking positive action to bring about its demise, and the lack of positive endorsement by Catholics has been detrimental to political integration in Northern Ireland.

If there is no overt action to indicate the rejection of the legitimacy of a political regime, how can it be concluded that discrimination has resulted in a loss of legitimacy of the Northern Ireland government? As Carl Friedrich has pointed out, the legitimacy of a political regime is related to its performance.¹ One can argue that a citizen who perceives that he is not being afforded "equal protection under the law" by his government will not be satisfied with its performance, which may cause him eventually to reject its legitimacy. The findings in Professor Rose's Northern Ireland Loyalty Survey indicate that a majority of the Catholics in the sample believed that they have been the object of discrimination and rated the performance of the Unionist Party government of Northern Ireland poorly compared to Protestants, who generally rated it favorably. It would seem to be reasonable to conclude that the existence of discrimination was a significant factor in the failure to gain legitimacy of the Northern Ireland government which, in turn, has hindered political integration.

The conclusion that discrimination has been a factor in the loss

¹Friedrich, Man and His Government, p. 236.

of legitimacy and therefore detrimental to political integration partially answers the first of the two fundamental questions. Now one must ask whether the proposals to end discrimination contained in the White Paper may be expected to alleviate the problem, that is, answer the second fundamental question.

Some of the proposals to end discrimination are vague, to say the least. For example, the proposal to desegregate the schools was, at best, only a weak commitment to end the dual system. But the proposals dealing with human and political rights are a strong assurance to the Catholics of the determination of the United Kingdom to insure justice in Northern Ireland. The proposals and promises concerning economic aid promise to help Catholics and Protestants alike, thereby promoting harmony as well as economic progress. However, the dire economic straits in which the United Kingdom finds itself at the present time could pose a serious threat to its ability to provide the economic aid that has been promised to Northern Ireland. The failure of Britain to live up to its economic promises could exacerbate tensions if economic conditions should become worse and severely hamper the prospects of political integration. Finally, the proposals in the White Paper are weakest in the area of social relations. Government cannot legislate the hearts and minds of men, but it can take the moral leadership in the job of creating an atmosphere of mutual tolerance and respect. Though weakest in concrete measures, the proposals dealing with social relations are nevertheless important in promoting political integration. The substance of the proposals to end discrimination have led the author to conclude that, taken as a whole, they will help to eliminate social tensions in Northern Ireland.

Non-Discriminatory Factors

The fact that a person is not pleased with the performance of a political regime does not necessarily mean that he will automatically reject its legitimacy. A reasonable man can be expected to advance his demands upon society by using the norms and means provided by society. In addition, if he perceives that the means provided by society to advance his demands are just, he will be more inclined to accept his failure to achieve his political goals. However, if a person perceives the means that have been provided as being unjust and ineffective, or that the "rules of the game" are being unjustly applied, he may be inclined to resort to "effective rather than legitimate means of pursuing political goals."² Again the question arises whether Protestant dominance of the political process has impeded the process of political integration. The findings of the present study lead the author to conclude that it has. The Unionist Party, unrestrained by the British Government, was not responsive to the demands of the Catholics. Since the Unionist Party and the Government of Northern Ireland were synonymous in the past, it means that the Government was unresponsive. An unresponsive government is one that is lacking an adequate performance in coping with demands, which undermines the support it receives from its subjects. Many Catholics in Northern Ireland were sorely aware that adherence to the democratic norm of majority rule left them at the

²Ake, p. 4.

mercy of the Protestants. Since the legal means³ of achieving political goals did not work, the minority turned to more effective means of protest which have included terrorism as well as peaceful demonstrations.

The proposals of the White Paper lead the author to conclude that the dominance enjoyed by the Unionist Party has ended in Northern Ireland. Franchise reforms satisfy the demands of civil rights leaders for equal voting power (one person, one vote) and a voice in the affairs of Northern Ireland. The legal guarantees regarding freedom of expression in political matters and the introduction of proportional representation will insure a fairer distribution of Catholic and Protestant seats in the New Assembly. Representation of minor parties on the committees of the Assembly will assure Catholics of a voice in their government to a degree not possible under the old regime. Finally, the occupation of positions of leadership by Catholics in the Executive of Northern Ireland will create a coalition government in which the Catholic leadership will have a vested interest. This moderating effect on the Catholic leadership should enhance the legitimacy of the government in the eyes of the Catholics.

The Role of Great Britain

One conclusion that seems inescapable is that the future of political integration in Northern Ireland will depend to a large extent on

³Legal is used here instead of legitimate since a terrorist may feel that his activities are legitimate if the government itself is illegitimate along with the procedures it provides for political action.

the determination of the United Kingdom to implement and enforce the proposals contained in the White Paper. The failure of Parliament to assume its responsibility in the past contributed to the conflict in Northern Ireland. In the future, Britain can expect to have its authority challenged by both Catholic and Protestant militants. Already militant Protestant representatives in the new Northern Ireland Assembly have attacked the legitimacy of that body. The group, led by the Rev. Ian Paisley, has claimed that the Assembly is illegal, since it was not sanctioned by the old parliament that was dissolved when the British imposed direct rule.⁴ Paisley and his followers have tried unsuccessfully to disrupt the meetings of the new Assembly.⁵ Militant Catholic members of the Irish Republican Army have launched a terrorist campaign in London, which has included the use of letter bombs. One such letter bomb was sent to Prime Minister Edward Heath at his official residence at No. 10 Downing Street.⁶ The strategy is obviously aimed at forcing Britain's withdrawal by moving the "front" from Northern Ireland to Britain itself.

The British Government has clearly indicated in the White Paper that it has no intention of withdrawing from Northern Ireland as long as a majority of the People there favor the British presence. Since terrorist activities are likely to continue in Northern Ireland during the transition between direct and home rule, it will be up to Britain

⁴The Daily Oklahoman (August 1, 1973), p. 16.

⁵Ibid.

⁶"The Bombs of Summer," Time, Vol. 102, No. 10 (Sept. 3, 1973), p. 37.

to insure that the new system has time to work. If Britain fails in this task the result will likely be another Irish civil war. So, while the proposals in the White Paper allow for future British withdrawal and union between Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland, the stabilizing influence of Britain should increase the chances for successful political integration in Northern Ireland. For this reason, it is the author's opinion that Britain's determination to make the new constitutional system work is the key element in the future of political integration in Northern Ireland.

The Role of the Republic of Ireland

The emphasis of the present study has been on the role of Great Britain in the future political integration of Northern Ireland. However, this does not mean that the Republic of Ireland also does not have a significant role. There are several positive policies that the Republic must follow to assure the Protestants in Northern Ireland that it will respect the latter as a part of the United Kingdom. First, the Republic must make a greater effort to stop the IRA from using it as a territorial base for terrorist raids on Northern Ireland. This is probably the single most important policy that will assure Protestants of the goodwill of the Republic. Second, the Republic must follow a cautious policy in reference to the Council of Ireland. Any attempt at cooperation between the North and South in handling their common problems must not give the appearance of moving too fast or of being dominated by the Republic. Third, the question of union between the North and South must not be allowed to become an issue in Irish politics. Rapprochement must not be allowed to suffer because of party

politics in the Republic. Though the present study has emphasized the need for Great Britain to assume its responsibility for the future of Northern Ireland, it is equally important that the Government of Ireland recognize its responsibilities toward the strifetorn province.

How This Study Compares With Similar Studies

Many of the studies on Northern Ireland have examined the problem of discrimination, usually with the intention of confirming or disconfirming its existence. With varying degrees of success the case for discrimination against Catholics has been well documented. In his book, Governing Without Consensus, Professor Richard Rose has linked the existence of discrimination to the concepts of legitimacy and authority. Robert Moore has studied the Northern Ireland problem in terms of race relations between the two communities.⁷ Moore sees the solution to the problem in the creation of a working class movement.⁸ He also maintains that Britain allowed the discrimination against Catholics to exist as the price it paid for Unionist support at Westminster. Moore also believes that the denial of legal, political, and social rights has caused the Catholic minority to reject the legitimacy of the social order.⁹ In the present study, the variables of discrimination have been linked to the concept of political integration. Although legitimacy is certainly not the only outcome of the process of political

⁷ Robert Moore, "Race Relations in the Six Counties: Colonialism, Industrialization, and Stratification in Ireland," Race, Vol. 14, No. 1 (July, 1972), pp. 21-41.

⁸ Ibid., p. 37.

⁹ Ibid., p. 39.

ration, integration... the process. the pro... of... the Brit... Paper on... political... tell whet... integrational... method is... the problem o the pro... studies is fr... of political... a theoretic... framework for th... According, 10... take into con... the influence o... the impact of... political... Stevenson, has... political... Stevenson, 11... that... the les... analysis the

¹⁰ James Coleman, "The Coleman, 10... in Emer... (March, 1955), pp. 44-55.

¹¹ Donald G. Morison, "Morrison, 11... and I... American Polit... pp. 902-927.

¹² Ibid., p. 33. Ibid., p. 33. Ibid., p. 33.

¹³ Ibid., p. 910. Ibid., p. 910. Ibid., p. 910.

authors have attempted to establish a causal relationship between forty-two socio-economic variables and political stability.¹⁴ They found that "higher levels of ethnic pluralism, religious fractionalization, and linguistic heterogeneity are related to higher probabilities of both elite and communal instability."¹⁵

Future Studies of Political Integration

As it often happens, the study of a particular problem raises more questions than it answers. The case study method has limited theoretical application and there is still much to be done before a general theory of political integration can be formulated. One of the difficulties encountered in the study of political integration is the question of when a political system is integrated. The absence of political violence is one way of determining whether a system is integrated and yet a seemingly well integrated system like the United States may suddenly (as did happen in many major American cities in the late 1960's) disrupt into violence. A theory of political integration must be able to identify latent indicators of malintegration as well as manifest indicators such as violence.

Another problem with the study of political integration is the force of irrationality. Government officials and political scientists may design institutions to promote political integration and yet they do not. Political scientists must recognize that what seems to be a

¹⁴Ibid., p. 907.

¹⁵Ibid., p. 925.

perfectly logical solution may fail because of the hostility between the groups involved. This element of irrationality is perhaps the most frustrating aspect of the study of political integration. Any general theory of political integration must somehow cope with the human variables of political relationships.

Finally, political integration is a time consuming process. There must be time for new institutions and procedures to become institutionalized. There must be time for communal hostilities to break down and be replaced with a sense of common identity. In a rapidly changing world, men are not susceptible to change and this must be recognized by those who exercise power and those who would restructure society.

Much can be done in the area of survey research to provide data for the study of political integration. For example, a survey conducted in Northern Ireland with the expressed intention of finding the extent of the relationship between discrimination and political legitimacy would be helpful in the understanding of political integration. Such a study would provide an empirical basis for the formulation of more explicit generalizations about the relationship between these variables. While a survey to measure the relationship between discrimination and legitimacy in Northern Ireland would not in itself be sufficient to support a generalization applicable to every political system, the results of such a survey could be a step in the right direction. Once the relationships between discrimination, legitimacy, and political integration are more clearly defined, new factors involved in the process of political integration could be explored. Perhaps the question of the legitimacy of government is not as crucial to political integration as had been expected. This is not posited as a refutation

of the hypotheses presented in the present study, but simply recognition that any hypothesis may be disconfirmed at some time in the future. Whatever the findings of future surveys, case studies can contribute to the development of general theory and can be useful in the task of defining more precisely concepts such as political integration.

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APPENDIX

TABLE I
POLITICAL VIOLENCE IN NORTHERN IRELAND¹

1971	Soldiers Killed (Including U.D.R.)	R.U.C. Killed	Civilians Killed (Not Including IRA)
Jan-March	6	2	11
April-July	4	4	4
Agusut	7	-	28
Sept-Dec	<u>31</u>	<u>9</u>	<u>71</u>
Total	48	11	114

TABLE I-A
POLITICAL VIOLENCE IN NORTHERN IRELAND¹

1971	No. Incidents	Bombs lb. Exploded	Bombs lb. Dismantled By Army
Jan-March	209	510	120
April-July	476	1650	670
August	270	960	270
Sept-Dec	<u>800</u>	<u>6477</u>	<u>1740</u>
Total	1692	9597	2800

¹Barritt and Carter, p. xxvii.

TABLE II
 UNIONIST PARTY STRENGTH IN THE PARLIAMENT
 OF NORTHERN IRELAND²

Year	Unionist and Independent Unionist	All Other Parties
1921	40	12
1925	36	16
1929	40	12
1933	38	14
1938	42	10
1945	35	17
1949	39	13
1953	39	13
1958	37	15
1962	34	18
1965	36	16

TABLE III
 NORTHERN IRELAND BORDER REFERENDUM³

Proposition	In Favor
1 "Do you want Northern Ireland to remain part of the United Kingdom?"	591,820
2 "Do you want Northern Ireland to be joined with the Republic of Ireland outside the United Kingdom?"	6,463

²Brett, p. 280.

³White Paper, paragraph 10.

VITA 2

James V. Calvi

Candidate for the Degree of

Master of Arts

Thesis: POLITICAL INTEGRATION: AN ANALYSIS OF THE BRITISH WHITE PAPER
ON NORTHERN IRELAND

Major Field: Political Science

Biographical:

Personal Data: Born in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, May 29, 1949,
the son of Mr. and Mrs. Tony Calvi.

Education: Graduated from Bishop McGuinness High School, Oklahoma
City, Oklahoma, in May, 1967; received Bachelor of Arts
degree in Political Science from Oklahoma State University in
1971; completed requirements for the Master of Arts degree at
Oklahoma State University in May, 1974; enrolled in doctoral
program at the University of Missouri, 1973-74.

Professional Experience: Graduate Teaching Assistant, Department
of Political Science, Oklahoma State University, 1971-1973;
Graduate Teaching Assistant, Department of Political Science,
University of Missouri, 1973-1974. Member Pi Sigma Alpha and
Phi Alpha Theta honor societies.