APPLICATIONS OF THE SIZE PRINCIPLE TO PARTY COALITIONS IN CONTEMPORARY CHILEAN POLITICS

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This thesis is dedicated to my wife, Linda Westphal, whose indefatigable encouragement and assistance made it possible for me to complete this manuscript before the eleventh hour.

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CHAPTER I

DEFINITION OF PURPOSE AND PROBLEM

Introduction

The formation of coalitions in multiparty, competitive political systems is essential where such behavior is preferable to acting alone for purposes of agreed-upon allocation and distribution of resources and values. This study will attempt to explain the formation of coalitions, where such coalition situations are present, by applying two major theories: William Riker's "size principle" and Michael Leiserson's "bargaining theory." These two theories will be applied to the formation of coalitions in Chile, with a major focus on the Popular Unity coalition in 1970. The principal purpose of the application of these two theories is to find out which can best be applied to real situations. Despite the fact that we are dealing with a single nation, analysis will focus on several major coalitions in Chilean history, under different conditions, in an attempt to test the predictive potential of these two theories.

Chile presents an ideal case for studying coalitions, since major constitutional factors make it so.[1] The direct election of the

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[1]For an excellent study of coalition situations in Chile see Orville G. Cope, Coalition Formation, Christian Democracy and The 1970 Presidential Election in Chile (Inst. of Govt. Res., Univ. of Ariz. No. 11, Tucson, 1972).

President, where more than two candidates may seek office and where a majority is necessary to win, has led candidates to form coalitions to insure not only popular support but congressional support as well. Chile represents also the type of political system where power is activated through the election process and where constitutional guarantees have insured party activity as a means of acquiring such power.

The election of Salvador Allende as President of Chile in 1970, with the support of a Popular Unity coalition of Marxist and left-of-center political parties, drew worldwide attention because of the mere acceptance of such a coalition, notwithstanding the claim by Allende that "the people have succeeded in taking the helm of their destiny to embark on a democratic course towards Socialism."[2] Allende received only 36.2 per cent of the popular vote and had to be elected by the Congress after some political maneuvers and promises, and because of a tradition by the Congress of always choosing the candidate with the most popular votes. It is of vital significance to the study of political coalitions to understand the process of coalition formation applicable in this situation and probable in others.

It must be clear at the outset that this study is concerned with the period up to the election of Allende and not with the maintenance of his coalition. The events of October and November, 1973, may, in fact, be connected with the failure to maintain a strong and viable coalition and it may be speculated that the future of coalition situations, in light of recent statements concerning the promulgation of a new

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[2]Dale L. Johnson, The Chilean Road to Socialism (New York, 1973), p. 166.

constitution, is precarious at best. However, it is only now, after the recent coup d'etat, that coalition situations have, in terms of parties, ceased.

This chapter will review the existing literature on coalition behavior and will describe the two theories to be applied in Chapter IV. Chapter II describes the origins of the party system and provides insight into the traditional and historical developments that have affected coalition behavior. Chapter III applies the two theories to the historical factors and attempts to establish which theory can best predict coalition formation in Chile. The focus of this application will be on the 1970 election. The lack of rigid statistical applications throughout this study is due mainly to the fact that data needed for such analysis is not available, and the computations often tend to have abstract meanings not always applicable to real situations. The author feels that the two theories can be tested empirically without need for quantification.

Design of the Study

This study's principal concern is to evaluate the utility of "size" as a predictor in the formation of political coalitions. The method used in the investigation of this problem is one that avails itself of the existing literature on the origins and development of the Chilean party system and party coalition situations. It also draws from knowledge and use of the two major theories concerned with "size," that of William Riker and Michael Leiserson. To this end, a rather extensive account of party origins provides a comparative point of reference that reveals differences in coalition situations. The application of the

two theories will be done through the use of existing electoral data for purposes of substantiating the analysis and predictions contained herein.

The utility of the two theories will simply be analyzed in terms of how well each theory contributes to an understanding and to the prediction of Chilean coalition patterns. It is important to note, however, that this study also concerns itself with the conditions under which coalition situations in Chile operate, so that the method of analysis here comes primarily from the works of noted North American and Latin American scholars and students of Chilean politics, such as Federico Gil, Eduardo Cruz-Coke, Ben G. Burnett, Orville Cope, Peter Snow, and Arturo Valenzuela. From this cross-section of the literature on Chilean politics, a balanced deduction of factors that are important in explaining coalition behavior will be made by evaluating, sorting, and organizing this material in a logical fashion. This will entail inferences on the part of the author as to the importance of the information available.

Implicit in the foregoing observations is the idea that coalition formation is an important technique in the distribution of power. This study will focus on such questions as: What are coalition situations? What conditions or sets of factors in Chilean politics lend themselves to coalition situations? How is "size" an important concept with regard to the formation of coalitions? What are some of the major works in coalition behavior that are mainly concerned with size and why do they orient themselves to this concept? In what manner have the theories of Riker and Leiserson contributed to the prediction of real situations in coalition formation? Finally, which of the two theories

serves as a better predictor of coalition formation in the Chilean political setting? As a general framework for this study, it will be necessary only to define certain important concepts. However, they may be made operational in a different fashion by the models described hereafter.

A "coalition" will be defined as any

> group of individuals or groups of individuals who, (1) agree to pursue a common and articulated goal, (2) pool their relevant resources in pursuit of this goal, (3) engage in conscious communication concerning the goal and the means of obtaining it, and (4) agree on the distribution of the payoff (benefits), received when obtaining the goal.[3]

A "winning coalition" will, in turn, be defined as one that gains authority over others by virtue of size in relation to the power decision rule. A "coalition situation" is one in which coalition formation is preferable to acting alone for purposes of agreed-upon allocation and distribution of resources and values. "Payoffs" are the rewards resulting from joining a particular coalition and winning. Finally, a "decision rule" is the minimum number of resources needed to control decisions.

To the extent that this study offers explanations regarding coalition formation, particularly as they apply to Chile, the following hypotheses are proposed to encompass the general framework of the study.

Hypothesis A

In multiparty competitive systems, where elections represent the principal mobilizing process and where pluralities result, there is a tendency for coalition situations to occur.

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[3] E. W. Kelley, "Techniques of Studying Coalition Formation," Midwest Journal of Political Science, XII (1968), p. 63.

Hypothesis B

Under certain coalition situations, the primary goal of participants is winning and, therefore, "size" becomes a major concern with regard to coalition formation.

Hypothesis C

In coalition situations where size is a primary concern, participants will seek minimum winning coalitions to insure the greatest distribution of payoff per member of the winning coalition.

Review of the Literature

Studies of coalition behavior have evolved from the descriptive-analytical works of such authors as Maurice Duverger in his classic work, Political Parties, which deals essentially with party organization and alliances and provides an interesting, although limited, classificatory scheme for alliance formation in multiparty systems.[4] Many of the descriptive-analytical works have been oriented toward factual narrations of the workings of coalitions and alliances, with a traditional emphasis toward Western European countries. Duverger's work, published in 1951, provides a fundamental basis for understanding party origins, organizations, leadership and alignments, but has the major weakness of its European bias and its claim that political systems such as those found in Latin America are still in the "prehistoric era of parties."[5] This observation may not hold true in Chile

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[4]See Maurice Duverger, Political Parties (New York, 1951); also see Samuel J. Eldersveld, "Alliance of Subcoalitions," in his Political Parties: A Behavioral Analysis (Skokie, Ill., 1964).

[5]Duverger, p. 228.

where political parties have played a key role in the electoral process since the 1920's, due mainly to strong party organization.

Since Duverger, the descriptive school has taken a more analytical approach, well represented by case studies of particular systems and their coalition behavior.[6] Among them is the work of Dankwart Rustow on the Swedish political system.[7] Rustow analyzes the functions and activities of the Swedish government with respect to the tactics employed in the legislative process and the building of political coalitions. As he states, "Swedish politics...has consistently faced situations where positive decisions could result only from compromise.[8] This condition, which has been essential to the Swedish system, has been used effectively by the parties to ease conflict and promote a certain degree of stability. There are many similarities between Chile and Sweden, such as the high regard for law and constitutional guarantees, early periods of oligarchial domination, a strong sense of tradition and custom, multipartism, large numbers of coalitions throughout

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[6]For an excellent cross-section of descriptive case studies as well as theoretical and methodological studies, see Sven Groennings, E. W. Kelley and Michael Leiserson, eds., The Study of Coalition Behavior (New York, 1970); also see E. W. Kelley, "Techniques of Studying Coalition Formation," Midwest Journal of Political Science, XII (1968), pp. 62-84; H. P. Secher, "Coalition Government: The Case of the Second Austrian Republic," American Political Science Review, LII (1958), pp. 791-808; Duncan MacRae, "Intraparty Divisions and Cabinet Coalitions in the Fourth French Republic," Comparative Studies in Society and History, V (1963), pp. 163-211; Erik Damgaard, "The Parliamentary Basis of Danish Governments: The Patterns of Coalition Formation," Scandinavian Political Studies, IV (1969).

[7]See Dankwart Rustow, The Politics of Compromise (Princeton, 1955). For a somewhat opposite view with regard to French politics, see Nathan Leites, On the Game of Politics in France (Stanford, Calif., 1959).

[8]Rustow, p. 230.

their histories and many other governmental practices which would make a comparative study quite appropriate.

Another analytical case study of coalition politics is that of Peter Merkl on West Germany. Merkl describes the process of coalition politics as follows:

> Coalition politics in Western parliamentary democracies is the competition for majority control among several parliamentary groups which relate to one another in a peculiar way in the national legislature. Their peculiar relationship can be defined in terms of relative size and compatibility, which determine the patterns of likely alliances and their stability. In a broader sense, coalition politics is at the intersection of three streams of bargaining processes that tend to transcend the confines of parliament.[9]

These processes described by Merkl are party cohesion, bargaining with the voter and bargaining with other groups.[10] His analysis begins with a study of coalitions at the state level and eventually moves to study the emergence of coalitions at the federal level with a focus on bargaining. Merkl is particularly interested in showing how bargaining relates to internal dissent in coalitions for certain periods of time.

A work of similar magnitude is that of Michael Leiserson on coalitions in Japan. Here the focus is on factions making up coalitions, particularly the struggle for power by factions of the Liberal-Democratic Party or the LPD.[11]

Although these various works and case studies are rather limited

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[9]Peter H. Merkl, "Coalition Politics in West Germany," in Sven Groennings, E. W. Kelley and Michael Leiserson, eds., The Study of Coalition Behavior (New York, 1970), p. 14.

[10]Ibid., p. 15.

[11]Michael Leiserson, "Coalition Government in Japan," in Sven Groennings, E. W. Kelley and Michael Leiserson, eds., The Study of Coalition Behavior (New York, 1970), p. 94.

in their general scope (as this particular study will be), they offer the rudiments for developing further studies of more general or theoretical scheme.

Recent studies of coalition behavior oriented toward theory formulation have been largely derived from two modes of analysis: the mathematical or game theory approach, and the sociopsychological approach.[12] The former emerged largely from the work of John Von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern, Theory of Games and Economic Behavior, in which the authors applied mathematical theories to explain or understand economic behavior.[13] The essence of their work was the theory of games which explained decisions concerning situations of conflict. The essential precept consists in the maximization of goals and in the awareness of the choices or goals of others in what is called the "cross-purposes optimization problem."[14] With regard to the strategy in games, Von Neumann and Morgenstern's most important contribution was the theory of rationality in two-person, zero-sum games. This was the minimax theorem regarding rational action in choosing alternatives, that is, the best possible choice in order to maximize goals. A

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[12]Sociopsychological studies will not be discussed in this study since their applications are better adapted to small-group behavior and simulation models. Some of the more important works in this area are: Theodore Caplow, "A Theory of Coalitions in the Triad," American Sociological Review, XIX (1956), pp. 23-29, 489-493; Jerome Chertkoff, "A Revision of Caplow's Coalition Theory," Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, III (1967), pp. 172-177; and William A. Gamson, "A Theory Coalition Formation," American Sociological Review, XXVI (1961), pp. 373-382.

[13]See John Von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern, Theory of Games and Economic Behavior (Princeton, 1953).

[14]Martin Shubik, ed., Game Theory and Related Approaches to Social Behavior (New York, 1964), p. 9.

zero-sum condition would be one in which the gains of one actor would exactly equal the losses of the other in a two person game (1-[a+b+... x]=0). The application of the Von Neumann and Morgenstern solution has been, perhaps, best developed for the political setting by William Riker's Theory of Political Coalitions.[15] Riker's fundamental theory is based on the well known "size principle" which states: "In n-person, zero-sum games, where side payments are permitted, where players are rational, and where they have perfect information, only minimum winning coalitions occur."[16] The sociological law surrounding the theory is: "In social situations similar to n-person, zero-sum games with side payments, participants create coalitions just as large as they believe will insure winning and no larger."[17]

The contention, therefore, is that actors will not settle for less than the maximum payoff and that can only be achieved with a minimum winning size with a decision rule of: $m = \frac{n+1}{2}$. The assumption of rationality as defined by Riker is that, in choosing alternatives, an actor picks that "alternative leading to the more preferred outcome," despite the fact that certain outcomes may detract from the person's ultimate goal, since the decision is itself a rational act and irrationality is indecision.[18] As to the assumption of perfect information, "if one participant, a, knows what move or moves another, b, has made,

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[15]See William Riker, The Theory of Political Coalitions (New Haven, Conn., 1962).

[16]Ibid., p. 32.

[17]Ibid., pp. 32-33.

[18]Ibid., p. 19.

then we shall say that, a, has perfect information about, b."[19] This assumption is difficult to meet in real situations, since the activities of one actor may be secretive enough to prevent another from having perfect information; however, inferences from past actions and relevant variables affecting actor b, may help a, in an intuitive guess of what b may do. As to the concept of side payments this simply refers to payments used to induce other actors to join a specified coalition. The manner in which Riker's theory may predict outcomes can be demonstrated through a simple example. Table I shows the strength of three parties (C, L, and S).

TABLE I

DISTRIBUTION OF SEATS OF PARTIES C, L, AND S

Party	Seats in Congress
C	43
L	34
S	23
Total	100

The prediction of possible outcomes (Table II below) shows the possible winning coalitions through a calculation of the division of payoffs to each partner:

[19] Ibid., p. 78.

$$\% \text{ of payoffs} = \frac{\#\text{ of seats of a particular party}}{\#\text{ of seats (i)} + \#\text{ of seats (x)}}$$

According to these calculations, C would choose S over L since its distribution clearly maximizes its payoffs. S would choose L for similar reasons and L would also choose S. Since L and S choose each other, this according to Riker, would be a "uniquely preferable coalition." With regard to the actual size, LS is closest to the decision points since it comprises 57 seats as opposed to 73 for CL, 70 for CS, and 100 for C, L, S.

TABLE II

POSSIBLE WINNING COALITIONS FOR PARTIES C, L, AND S

Possible Winning Coalitions	% Of Payoffs		
	C	L	S
CL	56	44	0
CS	61	0	39
LS	0	53	47
CLS	43	34	23

The limitations of Riker's theory (i.e., meeting all assumptions), have been serious enough for some to state that its utility in real world situations is limited. However, Riker himself admits this problem and, in some rather rigorous discussions of proto-coalitions and larger than minimum winning size coalitions, Riker has attempted to make his model more useful. Barbara Hinckley's work on coalitions in

the United States Congress assumes that games are continuous rather than discrete and, therefore, the decision to form coalitions is largely based on information costs, so that some larger than minimum winning coalitions occur.[20] This is not a refutation of Riker's model, but simply an expansion of the discussion on perfect information. As a result, this study will apply Riker's model with the assumption that political games are continuous, but that minimum winning coalitions will continue to be sought.

The second model to be applied in this study is that proposed by Michael Leiserson, which, like Riker's, is largely derived from Von Neumann and Morgenstern.[21] Leiserson posits five basic assumptions: (1) actors will attempt to form winning coalitions, (2) payoffs will go only to those actors in the actual winning coalition, (3) actors are aware of possible alignments that produce winning coalitions, (4) actors know the size of their payoffs in all possible combinations, and finally (5) coalition situations are constant-sum and simple.[22] This last assumption is perhaps the most important in differentiating between Leiserson's theory and the Von Neumann-Morgenstern solution. The constant-sum situation is one where total payoffs to the winning coalition are the same regardless of its composition, and, by a simple coalition situation, Leiserson refers to a situation where each possible

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[20]Barbara Hinckley, "Coalitions in Congress: Size and Ideological Distance," Midwest Journal of Political Science, XVI (1972), pp. 197-207.

[21]Michael Leiserson, "Coalitions in Politics: A Theoretical and Empirical Study" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Yale University, 1966).

[22]Leiserson, "Coalition Government in Japan," pp. 80-102.

combination is either winning or losing.[23] Again, the decision rule is $m = \frac{n+1}{2}$, and the predictable outcome would be a minimal winning coalition (a winning coalition which, if an actor left it, would become a losing coalition). The fundamental difference between Riker's prediction and Leiserson's prediction is that to Riker a minimal winning coalition is one which is closest to the decision point and where each player will maximize his payoffs, while to Leiserson, it is the one which would contain no unnecessary partners.

The rigid assumptions underlying Riker's principle produce outcomes where actors are simply concerned with maximization. Therefore, they seek the smallest possible coalitions in order to have fewer members among whom to distribute payoffs and thereby increase their own respective payoffs. If this is true, then coalitions of ideologically diverse members would occur. Leiserson's principle, on the other hand, makes allowances for such factors as ideological position and, with less rigidity in his assumptions, maintains that actors will seek minimum winning coalitions that will often include more members than absolutely necessary to win, but will contain no unnecessary members. To Riker, political parties would have to be dissoluble so that certain members could be excluded from coalitions. To Leiserson this is not necessary. Table III shows the flexibility of Leiserson's principle by allowing minimum winning coalitions with more than just two parties. Riker would say that all coalitions in Table III with more than two, as in the case of DA, would not occur under his assumptions.

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[23] Eric C. Browne, "Testing the Theories of Coalition Formation in the European Context," Comparative Political Studies, III (1971), pp. 391-413.

TABLE III

PREDICTIONS BASED ON LEISERSON'S MODEL

Party	Size	Possible W^m
A	15	ABCE = 51
B	17	ABEF = 54
C	10	ABCF = 55
D	36	DA = 51
E	9	DB = 53
F	13	DCE = 55
		DEF = 58
	100	DCF = 59

The significance of this difference is that Leiserson actors may settle for less than the optimal but would not share with more players than necessary to win. In this hypothetical multiparty setting there are 57 possible coalitions of which only eight are minimal winning (W^m). Leiserson would predict all eight, Riker would predict only one, DA.

However, Leiserson has modified the application of his model by introducing a "bargaining proposition" which states that as the "number of actors increases, there is a tendency to form a W^m with as few actors as possible."[24] Therefore, in Table III, Leiserson's predictions would be narrowed to DA and DB.

If we return to Table I on page 11, we see that Riker predicts LS as the minimum winning coalition; however, Leiserson would predict not

[24]Leiserson, "Coalition Government in Japan," p. 90.

only LS, but CL and CS. As a result, Leiserson predicts all the possible outcomes predicted by Riker.

There are two important models for coalition formation that are concerned with size as a primary variable in prediction and, therefore, they seem appropriate for application to this study. There are, however, other studies that point to different variables and use different conceptual techniques. One of these is the concept of "conflict of interest" as a strategic interaction to predict coalition behavior. This concept is found in the work of Robert Axelrod and it is based on the spatial model of Anthony Downs in An Economic Theory of Democracy.[25] Another technique proposed for explanation of coalition formation is one which looks at decision costs. This technique is treated thoroughly by Charled Adrian and Charles Press. They argue that:

> ... the precise membership in the winning coalition in any group must be determined by an algebraic summation of at least eight decision costs and that these costs are determined by various economic and psychological factors existing in the political setting.[26]

Another technique is to look at the ranking of possible criteria for coalition formation concerning both "size" and "ideologic diversity." Michael Taylor argues that an actor's preferences will determine the relative importance of such criteria and that its ranking will affect size and diversity.[27] There are, of course, many other possibilities,

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[25]See Robert Axelrod, Conflict of Interest (Chicago, 1970).

[26]Charles R. Adrian and Charles Press, "Decision Costs in Coalition Formation," American Political Science Review, LXII (1968), pp. 562-563.

[27]Michael Taylor, "Notes and Comments on the Theory of Government Coalition Formation," British Journal of Political Science, II (1972), pp. 361-386.

but size continues to be the single most important criterion, and, in this respect, the theories of Riker and Leiserson have made significant inroads.

CHAPTER II

PARTY ORIGINS AND CHILEAN POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT (1818 - 1925)

Introduction

The development of political life in Chile is dependent on and could not have been conceived without strong political parties. Among all Latin American nations, Chile is unique in that its political parties are solidly based on programs and ideological positions which have deep roots in the nineteenth century. Chile has not had any real experience with "personalismo," or movements organized around the personal philosophy of one man, as has often been the case in other Latin American states, rather, the parties have constituted, from time to time, real national movements with wide support.

This chapter will concern itself with the origins of political parties in Chile, since Chilean politics have been greatly influenced by tradition. It was in the nineteenth century that Chile began to move from a two-party system into a multiparty system, eventually establishing the 1925 Constitution, which greatly enhanced the mobility of parties by the introduction of such legal returns as the extension of the suffrage. From this period, three basic characteristics about the Chilean system have emerged: (1) the fractionalization of parties, which enabled small parties to survive by joining into coalitions;

(2) the competitive nature of the electoral process; and (3) the coalition nature of Chilean party behavior and the consolidation process in the system itself, which has encouraged the parties to form permanent alliances.[1]

1818 - 1925

Chile achieved its independence from Spain in 1818, but the social, economic, and political structures that existed prior to independence remained strong and viable.

> The war against Spain had been a social revolution only in the very limited sense of being a class conflict between the creoles (Chileans of Indian blood) and Spaniards. There had been no rising of the masses, no fundamental alteration in the class structure.[2]

As a result, Chile like many other Latin American countries, was not capable of sustaining a truly representative government. From 1818 to 1823, Chile was ruled by its revolutionary hero and "Supreme Dictator," Bernardo O'Higgins. His government made some serious attempts at reforms, from the development of new towns and the establishment of a police force, to the organization of an educational system. But his somewhat anticlerical stand and his attempts at social reforms did not reflect the wishes of the aristocracy, and contributed to his downfall in 1823. His successor, Ramón Freire, continued the reforms with more

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[1] Orville G. Cope, in "The 1965 Congressional Election in Chile: an Analysis," Journal of Inter-American Studies, X (1968), p. 257, has written: "Unlike other methods of mobilizing political power in some Latin American nations, elections in Chile have provided peaceful changes in the personnel of the Executive and Legislative branches of government and have contributed to the elucidation of political, economic, and international issues facing a developing urban society."

[2] John R. Stevenson, The Chilean Popular Front (Westport, 1970), p. 8.

success by toning down his anticlericalism, and in 1826 a new constitution was drawn up which established a federal government.

During the period from 1824 to 1829, political ideas began to form around two different factions. These two factions, which were later to develop into the Liberal and Conservative Parties, were not coherent or organized, since they overlapped and their respective supporters often made alliances by occasionally shifting positions. As in other Latin American countries, the factions "were drawn from the ranks of the top few per cent who were the custodians of the political power structure. No grass roots existed or were even dreamed of."[3] The divisions in almost all Latin American countries were basically along two main political tendencies: liberalism and conservatism. The conservatives were known as the "pelucones" or bigwigs. (This is in reference to the traditional wigs used by the aristocracy).[4] The pelucón conservatives were complemented (and in the end, controlled) by a less doctrinaire but more inflexible faction known as the "estanqueros," or more simply as the Estanco. "The estanqueros believed in tough centralized government and an end to political debate."[5] It was not until 1829 that a coalition of conservative forces led by Diego Portales was able to gain power. The other faction, the liberals, was often referred to as the "pipiolos", or beginners. They favored federalism, the liberation of social institutions and individual freedoms. "The tendency particularly

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[3]Russell H. Fitzgibbon, "The Party Potpourri in Latin America," Western Political Quarterly, X (1957).

[4]Simon Collier, Ideas and Politics of Chilean Independence 1818-1833 (Cambridge, 1967), p. 295.

[5]Ibid., p. 296.

noticeable among liberals of all descriptions was the desire to limit the power of the executive."[6]

These divisions were inherent in most of Latin America during the early republican years. Chile experienced short periods of liberalism and federalism which, by the end of the 1820's, had led to general disorder and turmoil. Again, as in other Latin American countries, Chile's federal-unitary struggle was eventually resolved by the emergence of strong central authority in the hands of the executive.[7] It is important to note, however, that this division of liberals and conservatives was an "intra-ruling class struggle," and that the reforms advocated by the liberals were not aimed at attracting the support of those outside the landholding elite.[8] The liberals, like the conservatives, were not apt to jeopardize their position as members of the elite.

In 1829, civil war broke out due mainly to the reformist policies of the liberals who had in that year won a majority in Congress. In fact, it has been speculated that their victory in Congress was attributable to the conservative rebellion. The conservatives were successful in defeating liberal forces and in ending a period of liberalism and constitutional experimentation. General Joaquín Prieto, the leader of the revolt, became president, although real power was in the hands of Diego Portales, who was to become one of the most influential and

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[6] Ibid., p. 300.

[7] Peter Ranis, "A Two-Dimensional Typology of Latin American Political Parties," Journal of Politics, XXX (1968).

[8] James Petras, Politics and Social Forces in Chilean Development (Berkeley, 1969), p. 78.

effective leaders in Chilean history. In 1833 a new constitution was drawn up:

> The legal framework for Portalesian philosophy of government was provided by the Constitution of 1833, destined to remain in force until 1925. This conservative document not only restricted the suffrage through literacy and property qualifications, but also provided for a very strong presidency by giving the Chief Executive the power to select and control directly all administrative officials, to name Supreme Court justices and to veto Congressional legislation. Further reflecting its aristocratic origin, it reestablished the right of primogeniture (which had been abolished under the liberal regime) and declared Roman Catholicism the state religion, at the same time prohibiting the "public exercise" of any other faith whatsoever.[9]

Although the restrictions on suffrage kept many elements of the population out of the election process, it eventually led to the formation of viable parties by promoting cohesion and organization on the part of the two major factions. By the 1840's, liberals were beginning to come out from hiding, European radicalism had influenced many young aristocrats, and a new Liberal Party was formed. During the administration of Manuel Montt, in 1856, a very significant set of events took place. Montt, an independent-minded President, had a minor dispute with the Church. This gave extreme liberal and conservative elements an opportunity to revolt. The ultramontane faction of Montt's conservative government broke away and formed the Conservative Party.[10] The Conservatives became the chief supporters of the Church and strong critics of presidential supremacy. The more extreme liberals, who had previously formed the Liberal Party, joined the conservatives in their opposition to Montt. This was countered by a coalition of moderate conservatives

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[9] Stevenson, p. 12.

[10] Ultramonttane refers to greater supremacy and authority by the Roman Catholic Church over national affairs.

and liberals who formed the National Party. The union of conservatives and liberals, although it lasted only a short while, marked the beginning of a unique trend in Chilean politics that eventually culminated in a permanent alliance in 1966. At this point it is difficult to explain just where on the political spectrum these parties appeared vis-a-vis the Right, Center, or Left. Maurice Duverger's rather limited explanation that the "dilution" of the doctrine of one party forms by its very nature a centrist party, cannot be shown to have occurred at this time.[11]

> The only significant issue dividing the ruling oligarchy was the relationship between church and state. Clerical bodies themselves were great landowners... Most liberals were hacendados, and their aim in supporting the move to separate church and state was to reduce the political influence of a small, ultraconservative group.[12]

In 1861, a fourth party evolved out of a split in the Liberal Party. This new group, which called itself the Radical Party, was composed of progressive liberals who wanted faster moves in the direction of political and social reform.[13] Between 1861 and 1873, several coalitions were formed, but the general trend was for a greater split between Liberals and Conservatives over the "theological questions." In 1873, the new "Liberal Alliance" was formed, made up of Liberals, Radicals, and the old Nationals.[14] This liberal current introduced certain new reforms, such as the extension of suffrage and greater representation of minorities. "With this growth of liberalism, public

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[11] Maurice Duverger, Political Parties (New York, 1954), p. 231.

[12] Petras, p. 87.

[13] For an excellent study of the Radical Party, its philosophy and development, see, Florencio Duran Bernales, El Partido Radical (Santiago; Editorial Nascimento, 1958).

[14] Stevenson, p. 16.

opinion strengthened and assumed a broader sweep."[15] This result was a civil uprising, which was supported by large sectors of the population and led by the Congress. Balmaceda reacted by proclaiming a dictatorship, but eight months later it fell and Balmaceda committed suicide.

> The success of the parliamentary party in this great constitutional struggle was held to have settled two points absolutely and forever. Hereafter there should be no executive interference with the liberty of election. That political function should be entirely disassociated from the activities of the central administration and the electorate should be allowed freely to express its choice. The other principle was that no president should attempt to govern without a cabinet which expressed the will of the majority in the chamber of deputies.[16]

From 1891 to 1925, presidential authority was to disappear almost entirely. Political parties multiplied rapidly and the Congress wielded unrestricted powers. By the end of the nineteenth century, political parties were identifiable, organized and cohesive. Perhaps it would be appropriate to conclude the discussion of this period by describing the party spectrum as Chile entered the modern period.

The Conservative Party remained the party of the Church. Its support came not only from the clergy but from those among the masses that the Church could influence. The Conservatives opposed public education under the control of secular institutions, favored proportional representation, and a laissez-faire economic policy. The Liberals, although experiencing some success in government, were seriously divided. Paul Reinsch has given an explanation for the problems of the Liberal cause:

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[15]Paul S. Reinsch, "Parliamentary Government in Chile," American Political Science Review, III (1909), p. 512.

[16]Ibid., p. 514.

> The Liberal Party of Chile has suffered the fate which has overcome the group bearing that name in many other countries. Its principles, indeed, are such as appeal to high-minded statesmanlike men, yet the party fails in some of the lesser arts of politics, and moreover, its principles are often not brought into a vital relation with the interests and energies of national life. It will always inspire respect but will not always command an irresistable following.[17]

The Liberals were moderately anticlerical, espousing individual freedom and the prerogatives of parliament. Their support came mainly from the industrial elites and some agricultural sectors. The National Party had not espoused very definite principles. Represented by the "upper bureaucracy and the banking, commercial and industrial groups," it often shifted on issues such as secularism or congressional supremacy.[18] The fourth party, the Radicals, had a popular base of support, "a strong belief in the democratic form of government, in public education and in freedom from ecclesiastical tutelage."[19] A fifth party organized during the late nineteenth century represented labor, but since Chile then had only a small labor class, its electoral appeal was limited. Its major role, however, seems to have been in the "political game of alliances and party combinations," but its failure to organize the labor movement lost that constituency later to the Marxists.[20] Finally, the sixth party, the Liberal Democratic, was weak and tenetless. Since most of its constituency was made up of social elites, it could not compete with the more traditional Liberals and Conservatives.

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[17] Ibid., p. 518.

[18] Petras, p. 97-98.

[19] Reinsch, p. 519.

[20] Federico G. Gil, The Political System of Chile (Boston, 1966), p. 56.

By the end of the nineteenth century, Chile had securely transformed itself from a two-party system into a multiparty system. Maurice Duverger's contention that two-party systems are natural but that there are tendencies towards "internal division" and "overlapping", thereby creating multipartism proved true in Chile.[21] Multipartism in Chile led to the formation of many coalitions of opposing parties and alliances of parties adhering to the same goals, thereby contributing to the stability of the political system. During the parliamentary period (1981-1925), there were numerous coalitions and alliances which allowed opposing factions a constitutional path for pronouncing their goals.

In the presidential election of 1920, Arturo Alessandri Palma, candidate of the modified "Liberal Alliance" became the champion of the common man with support from Radicals and Democrats. His opposition consisted of the old Liberals and Conservatives in a new coalition called the National Union.[22] This organization represented the ineffective and disorganized oligarchial structures of the period. Alessandri's victory "signified the initial political triumph of socio-economic liberalism."[23] But the reforms were difficult to enact due to opposition from the Senate and the National Union. By the end of 1924, Alessandri had to ask for help from the army to try to force Congress into allowing him the reforms he wanted. When he realized that the situation was out of his control, he fled the country, which then came under the leadership of a military junta headed by General Luis

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[21] Duverger, pp. 229-230.

[22] Stevenson, p. 36.

[23] Ibid., p. 34.

Altamirano. In January, 1925, a coup d etat led by an army officer, Carlos Ibáñez, brought back Alessandri and with him hopes for constitutional reforms and social change. These reforms were incorporated in the 1925 Constitution which established presidential supremacy. The success of Alessandri's reforms was largely due to popular support and to the military group that allowed him to return.[24] It was also a "response to the realization on the part of the country's political leaders that only a monistic structure would render the government operational."[25] The new Constitution was to provide the nation one of the fundamental bases for political stability: that is, the ability of parties and extra political groups (disorganized and decentralized) to organize and exist. Some of the major constitutional provisions that contributed to this stability were: the guarantee of civil liberties, the separation of church and state, the prohibition on Congress to dismiss the cabinet, a presidential term of six years and election by direct vote, extension of the suffrage, and presidential power over fiscal matters.[26] But perhaps the most relevant basis for political stability was "the new system of proportional representation, the selection of the President by Congress if any candidate failed to receive a majority of the vote and the separation of the dates of congressional and presidential elections.[27] The 1925 Constitution then

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[24]Gil, Political System, p. 58.

[25]Francisco José Moreno, Legitimacy and Stability in Latin America (New York, 1969), p. 153.

[26]Gil, Political System, p. 59.

[27]Ibid.

served to pave the way for a new era in Chilean politics, since it had the effect of facilitating and legitimizing the formation of coalitions.

CHAPTER III

THE MODERN PARTY SYSTEM (1925 - 1970)

Introduction

The emergence of distinct blocks through coalitions of the Right, Center, and Left, was brought about by swift changes in Chilean society. The industrial revolution, the building of major urban centers, and the emergence of a proletariat and an intellectual middle class, together with the decline of the traditional oligarchy that had ruled Chile since 1891, moved Chile into a social revolution. This revolution, although not quite in the tradition of Mexico, was led by the middle sectors with support from the proletariat; it was to lead Chile into a new era of presidential supremacy and more stable political institutions.[1]

This chapter will be concerned with the development of the three major blocks in Chile. At the beginning of the twentieth century the traditional elites continued to hold political power and to control the electoral process, since only about ten per cent of the population was registered to vote. However, about ninety per cent of those registered voted. By the 1950's the percentage of the population so registered had increased to eighteen and by 1963, to thirty-three per cent, showing a

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[1]For an excellent study on political change and the middle sectors in Latin America, see John J. Johnson, Political Change in Latin America (Stanford, 1958).

trend toward broader political participation.[2]

The Chilean Right will be examined first, because it has enjoyed the support of the traditional elites and of the two oldest and more conservative parties in Chile, the Liberal and Conservative Parties. An analysis of the Radical and Christian Democratic Parties will ensue, since they occupy the Centrist position, and, finally, the last section will deal with the Left and its development into the Popular Unity Coalition of 1970. Although a major portion of this section is descriptive, it will hopefully provide the reader with the necessary background on Chilean party development as a prelude to understanding the dynamics of coalition behavior in Chile.

The Chilean Right

The Chilean Right has been made up of two major parties with deep roots in the nineteenth century, parties whose base of support has been in the traditional elites. These two major parties are the Conservative and Liberal Parties.

The evolution of these two parties in Chile was similar to that of other Latin American countries. The Liberals became the representatives of the urban elite, while the Conservatives represented the landholding elite.[3] Chile was no exception to this fact but, as shall be seen later in this chapter, the Chilean Right was to pursue a somewhat different path from the rightist parties of most other Latin American countries: the two major parties would eventually form an alliance.

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[2]Gil, Political System, p. 211.

[3]Edward J. Williams, Latin American Christian Democratic Parties (Knoxville, 1967), p. 4.

Throughout the 1920's and 1930's, during the government of Arturo Alessandri, the conservative Right did not suffer, despite Alessandri's coalition of middle class, reform-minded followers. Alessandri was too busy maintaining himself in office and his socio-economic reforms were minimal.[4] When Alessandri returned to office in 1932 at the head of a coalition of Radicals and Democrats, he resorted to strong arm measures to maintain control and initiate reforms. The lack of cohesion in his coalition caused Alessandri to shift to the right, so that, by 1938, he left office with Liberal and Conservative support.

Despite this success by the Right, events began to take place that would contribute to keeping the Right out of the presidency until 1958. First, there was the appearance of a small industrial proletariat which combined with the middle class to form a substantial sector of the population.[5] A second factor was a gradual intellectual awakening of a large segment of the middle elites, who became familiar with European trends. Thirdly, the government bureaucracy was inefficient and often corrupt. The country experienced harsh, repressive measures for even minor disturbances. Finally, such social revolutions as the Mexican and Russian greatly influenced the thinking of these elites.[6]

These factors and the general economic crisis of the post-World War I period were to bring about two great changes in the Chilean political tradition. The first was the Constitution of 1925, already discussed in

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[4]Petras, p. 99.

[5]John J. Johnson uses the term "middle sectors" because of the economic implications of the term "class", however, I find the relationship of this term to economic, social, and cultural determinants very important in Latin America.

[6]Stevenson, p. 28.

the first section of this chapter. The second was the victory in 1938 of the Popular Front, a coalition of center-left political parties. The success of the Front in procuring the election did not completely eliminate the Right from political power. Both rightist parties had great influence in Congress since, in the parliamentary elections of 1937, the Right maintained its strength in Congress and a clear majority in the Senate (See Table IV).

TABLE IV

CONGRESSIONAL SEATS AFTER THE 1937 ELECTION

Coalition	Parties	Chamber Of Deputies	Senate
Right	Conservative	30	12
	Liberal	35	10
	Independent Liberal	2	1
		67	23
Center	Agrarians	3	0
	Nazis	2	0
	Falange	6	0
	Democrat	4	4
		15	4
Left	Radical	33	12
	Socialist	17	4
	Communist	7	1
	Democratico	6	1
	Radical-Soc.	2	0
		65	18
Total		147	46

Source: John R. Stevenson, The Chilean Popular Front (Westport, 1942), pp. 96-97.

Rightist causes also had support in the conservative wing of the Radical Party (a leading member of the Front). Through legislative vetoes, the Right was able to prevent substantial social and economic reforms that would have uprooted its power. Although the traditional oligarchy did not "rule" Chile between 1938 and 1958 (through the presidency), it did limit the scope of action of the left-of-center coalitions that elected the President.[7] A partial explanation for the success of the Right in 1937 and its failure in 1938 has been given by Gil, who states that "the rightist parties managed to preserve their majority in Congress, but thanks only to systematic bribery and wholesale vote buying."[8] Another explanation is the fatal mistake made by the Rightist in nominating a man who was "widely hated and even more widely feared," as was their presidential candidate.[9] This man was Gustav Ros, a man of strong fascist tendencies who alienated the more progressive elements of the Right and forced their defection to the Front. In 1942, the Conservatives and Liberals united with the Nazis to support the former dictator, Carlos Ibáñez, for the presidency. Although this was a close race, the victory went to Juan Antonio Ríos, the candidate of the Democratic Alliance (the new "Popular Front"), a coalition of center-left parties. Despite the loss, the Right was to see a steady increase in support until 1953, when division and general revolt against the traditional parties was to cut their percentages almost in half.[10] Tables V and VI indicate the steady increase of voter

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[7] Petras, p. 100.

[8] Gil, Political System, p. 68.

[9] Stevenson, p. 78.

[10] Ibid.

TABLE V

CONSERVATIVE PER CENT OF VOTE 1941-1963



Key: Congressional Elections Municipal Elections

Source: Federico Gil, Chile: Election Factbook (Washington, D.C., 1963), p. 23.

TABLE VI

LIBERAL PER CENT OF VOTE 1941-1963



Key: Congressional Elections Municipal Elections

Source: Federico Gil, Chile: Election Factbook (Washington, D.C., 1963), p. 24.

support for the Conservatives and Liberals up to 1953 and then a decrease in support up to 1963. The Conservatives had their largest margin in 1950, with 25.8 per cent of the vote, which was the highest percentage polled that year by any party.[11]

The rise and fall of the Right occurred because of the various shifts and alliances that took place in the 1940's and 1950's. For example, in the 1946 presidential election, the Liberals and Conservatives aligned together to support Fernando Alessandri, son of the former President. A progressive faction of the Conservative Party (the Social Christian wing), splintered and joined the Falange Nacional in support of Eduardo Cruz-Coke, a popular leader of the splintered group.[12] The coalition of center-left parties nominated Gabriel González Videla, a leader in the Radical Party. When neither candidate polled fifty per cent of the vote needed to win the election outright, the election had to be decided by the Congress. González Videla had the largest percentage of popular votes, but his election in Congress depended on the Liberal Party, since the Conservatives and the supporters of Cruz-Coke refused to give him support. After some bargaining, the Liberals decided to throw their support to González Videla. They justified their action to the other members of the Right, arguing that by joining in the government with the Communists, they would exercise a vigilance over the Left and serve to balance the extremism of the Soviet ideology.[13] This shift by the Liberals lost them some support among the more conservative

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[11]Federico Gil, Chile: Election Factbook (Washington, D.C., 1963), p. 24.

[12]Gil, Political System, p. 72.

[13]Duran Bernales, p. 426. (Translation is mine.)

members of the party, but an internal struggle persisted in the government and the Liberals soon withdrew from the coalition. By 1952, Conservatives and Liberals had joined forces once again, this time in support of the Liberal candidate, Arturo Matte Larrain. This election, however, saw the return of Carlos Ibáñez to the Presidency, who won considerable support from the Left. This was due mainly to his strong stand against the existing government and to his pledge to legalize the Communist Party. This leftist support, along with some conservative support resulting from his image as a Peronista type leader, gave the election to Ibanez.[14]

Between 1952 and 1958, two major events occurred that were to have a profound effect on Chilean politics in the future. One was the formation of a coalition of leftist parties called the Popular Action Front (Frente de Acción Popular or FRAP). The other was the alliance of the Falange Nacional and the Christian Socialist wing of the Conservative Party into a new party called the Christian Democratic Party.[15] By 1958, the three major blocks were in close contention. The traditional Conservative Party, now calling itself the United Conservatives, formed a coalition with the Liberals to support Jorge Alessandri. The leftists supported Salvador Allende, a Socialist and the Christian Democrats nominated Eduardo Frei, "a figure of great appeal to intellectuals, technicians, non-Marxist leftists, as well as Catholics."[16] In a hard fought campaign, Alessandri barely defeated Allende by only 33,500

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[14]Gil, Chile: Election Factbook, p. 33.

[15]Gil, Political System, p. 80.

[16]Ibid.

votes, thereby bringing the rightist parties back to the presidency after nearly twenty-five years of center and left domination of the office. However, it was to last only the six years of the presidential term, since reforms were difficult to undertake. Gil describes this period as follows:

> During the Alessandri administration, Chile's economy showed little improvement, while popular demands became more pressing. The administration relied on import restrictions, wage ceilings, and currency controls, all unpopular measures which were only partially successful. In spite of Alessandri's great personal popularity the period was characterized by governmental irresolution. The rightist forces in control of the administration, even if they conceded the need for social reform, remained generally committed to the past and proved unable to carry out the radical alterations demanded by Chilean society.[17]

In 1961, the Radical party joined the Conservative-Liberal coalition and formed the Frente Democratico, or the Democratic Front. By 1964, the three blocks were formed and ready for the election. The Right was made up of the Democratic Front, a center-right coalition. The Center was made up of the Christian Democrats, and the Left was composed of the FRAP coalition. But, in the congressional elections preceding the presidential elections, in the conservative agricultural Curico Province, the candidate of the Left won a surprising victory, which caused the break of the rightist coalition as the Radicals withdrew.[18] Julio Duran, the candidate of the Democratic Front, also withdrew from the race, which left the Christian Democrats and FRAP by themselves in the election. Fearing a leftist victory, the Conservatives and Liberals gave their support to the Christian Democrat, Eduardo

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[17] Ibid., p. 81.

[18] Ibid., p. 82.

Frei, who won the election.[19] Despite this support in the election, Frei did not return the favor. He

> refused to name Conservatives and Liberals to cabinet posts, and determinedly pushed programs, such as tax reform and the organization of slumdwellers, that are the anathema of the Right.[20]

As a result, Frei not only received sharp attacks from the Left, but also from the traditional Right. In 1966, Conservatives and Liberals united in a permanent alliance and called themselves the National Party.[21] The two parties realized that the road to victory could not be reached by going their separate ways or by loose and temporary coalitions. Table VII shows the percentage received by the Right, first as separate parties in 1963 and 1965, and then as the National Party in 1967 and 1969. By combining their strength, they came second only to the Christian Democrats in 1969 and, in the 1970 presidential election, the National Party polled 34.9 per cent of the vote, only slightly behind the victorious Allende Popular Unity coalition.

A combination of factors, such as the prominence of their candidate, Jorge Alessandri and his lead in the early polls before the election, gave the National Party the confidence and vitality that might lead it to victory in the future.[22]

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[19] Ibid.

[20] George W. Grayson, Jr., "The Frei Administration and the 1969 Parliamentary Elections," Inter-American Economic Affairs, XXIII (1969), p. 51.

[21] H. E. Bicheno, "Anti-Parliamentary Themes in Chilean History: 1920-1970," Government and Opposition, VII (1972), p. 386.

[22] Ibid.

TABLE VII

PERCENTAGES OF VOTES RECEIVED BY MAJOR CHILEAN PARTIES IN RECENT MUNICIPAL AND CONGRESSIONAL ELECTIONS

Parties	Elections			
	1963 Municipal	1965 Congressional	1967 Municipal	1969 Congressional
	%	%	%	%
Communist.....	12.4	12.4	14.8	15.9
Socialist.....	11.1	10.3	13.9	12.3
Radical.....	20.8	13.3	16.1	13.0
Christian Dem....	22.0	42.3	35.6	29.6
Conservative.....	11.0	5.2		
Liberal.....	12.6	7.3		
National.....			14.3	20.0
Other.....	6.7	6.2	3.1	5.2
Null and Blank...	3.4	3.0	2.2	4.2
Total.....	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

Source: Arturo Valenzuela, "The Scope of the Chilean Party System," Comparative Politics, IV (1972), p. 186.

The Chilean Center

The Chilean Center is composed of two extremely versatile and enterprising political parties, the old Radicals and the new and dynamic Christian Democrats. Their relative strength throughout the twentieth century, their mobility within the system, and their strong middle class support has kept these two parties in the mainstream of Chilean politics for over thirty years. Unlike the Right, the Chilean Center has had greater input in the modern period with respect to coalition formation and has played a key role in the balancing of extremes by being what Gil

calls, "the center of gravity of Chilean politics."[23] For this reason and the factors stated above, the discussion of the Center will be divided to show the distinct role each party has played in this modern period.

The Radical Party

Prior to 1920, there were two basic coalitions to which most parties aligned. One was the conservative coalition of which the Conservative Party was the major force; the other was the "Liberal Alliance" headed by the Radical Party. The Liberal Party, although aligning with the Conservatives most of the time, did play a centrist role at times, shifting from one coalition to the other. When the Liberal-Conservative alliance became stronger, the Radical Party began to draw greater support from the middle class and developed ideological strategies ranging from moderate socialism to communism.[24]

In the preceding discussion of the Right, it was noted that in Arturo Alessandri's 1932 election as President, he obtained some support from the middle sectors. But, by 1938, he had shifted and was heading a government of Conservatives and Liberals. During his administration, Alessandri felt that he needed the support of the Rightists due to their strength in Congress. He therefore appointed many of their leaders to high government posts. The Radicals, angered by this and by restrictions of personal freedoms, withdrew from his administration, leaving the cabinet in the hands of the Conservatives and Liberals. Despite

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[23] Gil, Political System, p. 75.

[24] Ibid., p. 63.

strong disagreement between the Radicals and the extreme Left, economic problems were to thrust the Radicals into a coalition with the Left against Alessandri and the Right. This coalition, known as the Popular Front, began to take shape in 1936. In that year, several major strikes, accompanied by direct presidential intervention through the use of the army, resulted in an appeal by the Socialists to the Radicals and Communists to unite in a "Block of the Left."[25]

Although many Radical leaders opposed the Front, the coalition was formed, representing, as Stevenson states, "a symbol of union in the minds of the masses, union against oppression, union for the achievement of all those things they had always deserved strongly, yet always somehow been denied."[26] This new Front consisted of the Radicals, Communists, Democrats, Socialists, and other smaller left-of-center parties. Of these parties, the Radical Party, with the most experience and largest support, took over the leadership of the Front. After some heated debate and what appeared to be a serious deadlock in the nomination of a presidential candidate for the 1938 election, the nominee of the Socialist Party, Marmaduke Grove, withdrew and gave the nomination to a moderate leader of the Radical Party, Pedro Aguirre Cerda.[27] The opposition consisted of Gustav Ross, an extreme-rightist, representing the Conservative-Liberal coalition, and Carlos Ibáñez of the "Popular Liberating Alliance," a coalition of the Union Socialist Party and the Chilean Nazi Party.[28]

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[25]Stevenson, p. 65.

[26]Ibid., p. 72.

[27]Ibid., p. 77.

[28]Gil, Political System, p. 68.

The strength and popularity of the Front indicated that, for the first time in Chilean history, the middle and lower sectors of society were in serious contention for political power with the traditional elites. The election was won by the Front, but only by a few thousand votes.[29] However, the victory in the election was not destined to bring permanent unity to the Front. By 1941, the Popular Front had broken up, largely because of internal divisions. Such factors as the Communists' decision to stay out of the government, their conflicts with the Socialists, the conflicts between the Radicals and the Socialists, and the strong opposition of the Right in Congress all contributed to the eventual disintegration of the Front. However, by means of several other coalitions, the Radicals were able to stay in the presidency until 1952, with the election of Carlos Ibáñez. In 1942, a coalition of Radicals, Agrarians, Socialists, Democrats, and Communists supported the candidacy of Juan Antonio Ríos. His opponent, Ibáñez, was supported by the Conservatives and Liberals.[30] The victory of Ríos maintained the left-of-center coalition in power, but internal struggles ensued, due largely to the leadership role claimed by the Radicals. The Radicals won the presidency in 1946, with the election of Gabriel González Videla. The election was decided in the Congress where the Liberals bargained and threw their support to González Videla. But, as noted earlier, the Liberals soon withdrew from the coalition. By 1948, the Communists had also withdrawn. Because of his strong stand against communism, González-Videla obtained from Congress "The Law for the

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[29] Aguirre received 222,700 votes and Ross 218,609.

[30] Gil, Political System, p. 71.

Permanent Defence of Democracy," which outlawed the Communist Party. It was this type of division, together with the lack of control and the "inability to perform the function of moderator by elevating themselves above everyday partisan politics," that brought about the demise of the Front.[31]

By 1952, the Chilean electorate was ready for a candidate that would be "above politics," as Carlos Ibáñez claimed to be and won. By the end of his administration, Ibáñez had become a rather unpopular figure among the masses. He sought support from the Right and angered the progressives in those parties that had helped his election. The Radicals improved their position but, by 1958, they were

> no longer able to make a strong appeal to independent elements of the Left and, unwilling to make the necessary concessions to permit this rapprochment, they found themselves isolated for the first time, and fought a hopeless battle for their candidate, Louis Bossay.[32]

Alessandri's victory in 1958, and the good showing of the Liberals and Conservatives in the 1960 municipal elections, prompted the Radicals to form a coalition with the rightist parties, called the Democratic Front. In the 1961 congressional elections, the Radicals represented the only party in the new Front able to "maintain its voting strength."[33] However, by the 1964 election, the coalition had broken, with the Conservatives and Liberals giving their support to Frei, as the Radicals went their own way with Julio Durán. Since 1964, the Radical Party has remained "a center party, highly political, willing to negotiate with

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[31]Moreno, p. 164.

[32]Gil, Political System, p. 81.

[33]Federico Gil, The Chilean Presidential Election of November 4, 1964 (Washington, D.C., 1965), p. 21.

anyone near power for short-run gains."[34] In 1970, this proved to be true, as the Radicals joined the Left in a coalition called the Popular Unity Front under Salvador Allende.[35]

The ideological tenets of radicalism in Chile are very similar to the doctrinal situation in France and Italy; that is, opposition to oligarchal authority and the defense of individual freedoms. The radical philosophy included a strong belief in secularism, i.e., anti-clericalism, progress in education and a return to parliamentary government.[36] The former senator and leader of the old Radical Party, Florencio Durán Bernales, observed that the Radical Party had found that it was wiser and easier to accomodate a political doctrine that would meet the mentality of the country, rather than to disturb the country by attempting to modify it towards certain doctrines.[37] This mentality had a tendency to keep the Radical Party in the center, acting as the equilibrium between more extreme factions. In general, the heterogeneous nature of the party allowed it to shift from one coalition to another. At the same time, this flexibility contributed to an eventual erosion of popular support. In most elections between 1938 and 1963, the Radicals received the largest percentage of the vote (see Table VIII) but, since 1963, their support has been eroded by the stronger Left.

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[34]Ronald H. McDonald, Party Systems and Elections in Latin America (Chicago, 1971), p. 124.

[35]Greater discussion of the formation of this coalition will be found in Chapter Four.

[36]Snow, p. 479.

[37]Durán Bernales, p. 26. (Translation is mine.)

TABLE VIII

PERCENTAGES OF VOTES RECEIVED BY MAJOR CHILEAN PARTIES IN MUNICIPAL AND CONGRESSIONAL ELECTIONS 1937-1969 (1)

Parties	Elections															
	1937 C	1941 C	1944 M	1945 C	1947 M	1949 C	1950 M	1953 C	1956 M	1957 C	1960 M	1961 C	1963 M	1965 C	1967 M	1969 C
Conservative	21.3	17.1	22	23.6	21	22.7	26	10.1	18	13.8	14	14.3	11.4	5.4	14.6	20.0
Liberal (4)	20.7	14.0	14	17.9	14	18.0	16	10.9	12	15.3	16	16.1	13.2	10.1		
Radical	18.7	21.7	24	20.0	21	21.7	24	13.3	23	21.5	21	21.4	21.6	12.8	16.5	13.8
Christian Democrat (2)	----	3.4	3	2.6	4	3.9	4	2.9	7	9.4	14	15.4	22.0	41.1	35.6	29.6
Socialist	11.2	16.7	7	12.8	8	9.3	10	14.1	11	10.7	9	10.8	11.5	10.5	14.2	12.3
Communist (3)	4.2	11.8	8	10.3	16	----	--	----	--	----	9	11.4	12.7	11.2	15.0	15.9
Other (5)	23.9	15.3	22	22.8	16	24.4	20	48.7	29	29.3	17	10.6	7.6	8.9	4.1	9.2
Total.....	100.0		100		100		100		100		100		100.0		100.0	
.....		100.0		100.0		100.0		100.0		100.0		100.0		100.0		100.0

Sources: Federico Gil, The Political System of Chile (Boston, 1966), p. 215; Fransisco Jose Moreno, Legitimacy and Stability in Latin America (New York, 1969), pp. 196-197; Arturo Valenzuela, "The Scope of the Chilean Party System," Comparative Politics, IV (1972), p. 186.

Notes: (1) There are some small discrepancies in the data offered by Gil, Moreno, and Valenzuela. However, this is probably due to rounding and the approximations will suffice for this study.
(2) The Christian Democratic Party was known as the Falange Nacional up to 1957.
(3) The Communist Party was outlawed between 1948 and 1958.
(4) The Conservative and Liberal Parties formed a permanent alliance in 1966 and call themselves the National Party.
(5) "Other" inclues: minor political parties, null and blank votes and temporary associations.

Key: C - Congressional; M - Municipal

The Christian Democratic Party

The origins of the Christian Democratic Party go back to 1935 and the National Conservative Youth Movement which, together with the Social Christian wing of the old Conservative Party, broke away in 1938 to form the Falange Nacional.[38] By 1939, the party had built some support among workers, students, and young professionals and made an impressive penetration into the Northern provinces, which are made up of predominantly proletarian population. This proletariat was thought to be in the ranks of the Communists but the more moderate views of the Christian Democratic Party had made their effect. The Christian Democrats also acquired further strength in some middle class areas which, in general, gave them a broad base of support.[39] The basic philosophy of the party, and the reason for its break from the Conservative Party, was the same as in other Latin American countries. Edward Williams gives three basic reasons for the split: first, the development of progressive student movements, i.e., the National Conservative Youth Movement. Second, these youth movements were strongly influenced by Social Christian ideas and, third, growing opposition to authoritanism.[40] It should be noted that the Conservative Party, the party of the Church, gave only lip service to the encyclicals that tended to be progressive but, in fact, detested this liberalism and never intended to put these encyclicals to use. As a result, the youth and student factions of the Conservative

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[38] George W. Grayson, "Chile's Christian Democratic Party: Power, Factions, and Ideology," Review of Politics, XXXI (1969), p. 149.

[39] Ricardo Cruz Coke, Geografía Electoral de Chile, (Santiago, 1952), p. 47. (Translation is mine.)

[40] Williams, p. 17.

Party broke away.[41]

Between 1938 and 1950, the Falange had slight support in elections, ranging from 3.5 per cent in 1941 to 4.7 per cent in 1950.[42] These were the years of the Popular Front and, although some leaders of the Falange served in the cabinets of Presidents Ríos and González Videla, they generally did not ally with the Democratic Front. There was some division within the party over its participation in the alliance with the Front, but the party remained fairly strong and united throughout the 1940's and 1950's. As is shown in Tables VIII and IX, it was not until 1956 that the party began to gather electoral strength. In 1957, support for Ibanez was very low, which gave the Falange greater electoral support. In that year, the Falange united with the Partido Conservador Social Cristiano in an alliance that was to register impressive gains.[43] This upward trend can be seen in Table IX; in 1953, the Falange received 2.9 per cent of the vote in the congressional election but, by 1963, it had become the largest single party, having gained 22 per cent of the vote. In the 1964 presidential election, the candidate of the Christian Democratic Party, Eduardo Frei, gained an impressive 56.1 per cent of the vote.[44]

The greatest support for the Christian Democrats has come from the Catholic middle class. It has been more or less a radical Christian party that has cut away at the base support of the Radical Party. In

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[41]Ben G. Burnett, Political Groups in Chile, (Austin, 1970), p. 177.

[42]Cruz Coke, p. 124.

[43]Burnett, p. 178.

[44]Grayson, The Frei Administration, p. 57.

TABLE IX

CHRISTIAN DEMOCRAT PER CENT OF VOTE 1941-1963



Key: Congressional Elections Municipal Elections

Source: Federico Gil, Chile: Election Factbook (Washington, D.C., 1963), p. 26.

its efforts to be a truly Christian party, the Christian Democrats have attempted to attract members of other confessions in order "to transmute the party into a genuine non-confessional movement."[45] In 1964, the Christian Democratic Party "promised to transcend the staid categories of 'left' and 'right' while reshuffling the nation's pyramidal socio-economic structures in favor of the disadvantaged," thereby acquiring a substantial part of the middle and lower class support.[46] But, during his administration, Frei made some very serious mistakes, such as his unwillingness to organize a coalition government, thereby creating sharp conflict between his government and both the Left and Right. His position as a "moderate" strained his efforts to carry out badly needed reforms to improve the hard hit economy.

The failures of the Frei administration made it difficult for Radomiro Tomic, the Christian Democratic candidate in 1970, to win election, and the discontented electorate chose the candidate who promised the fastest short term solutions, Salvador Allende of the Left.[47] The 1970 election, which saw Allende defeat Alessandri by only 40,180 votes, was decided by Congress, since neither candidate had received the fifty per cent popular vote majority needed to win. It was in the Congress that the Christian Democrats did some bargaining and received assurances from Allende that he would respect the Constitution and its guarantees. In return, he was promised support by the Christian Democrats. Allende agreed, and defeated Alessandri with support from

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[45] Gil, Political System, p. 274.

[46] Grayson, The Frei Administration, p. 49.

[47] Constitutional law precludes the president from serving two consecutive terms.

the Christian Democrats and other smaller left-of-center parties.

Actually, Allende's victory had been assured during the Frei administration, largely because of Frei's inability to curb inflation. In 1964, Frei inherited a 38 per cent inflation rate from the previous administration of Jorge Alessandri, which was brought down to 17 per cent by 1966. By 1969, inflation had again risen to 30 per cent and, by 1970, to 35 per cent.[48]

> Breaking the Chilean tradition, Frei refused to make a formal coalition with other parties and could get his programs passed only with the alternating support of the right or the left, depending on the program. For example, the agrarian reform was supported by the parties of the left, while the partial nationalization of the copper companies and anti-inflationary laws passed with rightist votes.[49]

Despite the 1970 loss to Allende, the Christian Democrats promise to be a force to contend with in the future. Their centrist position during the Allende administration and the failures of that administration should help the Christian Democrats, who have a resourceful and intelligent leader.

The Chilean Left

Like the Center, the Chilean Left has consisted of two major political parties and some smaller parties and movements. The two major parties, the Communists and the Socialists, have occupied the key positions in all coalitions of the left, especially in the formation of those coalitions. This key position refers to their base of support and reception by the Chilean electorate. The support of the leftist parties

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[48] M. J. Francis and H. Verra Godoy, "Chile: Christian Democracy to Marxism," Review of Politics, XXXIII (1971), p. 327.

[49] Ibid., p. 325.

was in large part due to the political guarantees of the 1925 Constitution, which encouraged the rise of parties with middle and lower class support.

Since 1925, there have been three major coalitions of the Left and Center. The first was the Popular Front of 1938 which, as mentioned previously, consisted of the Radical, Communist, Socialist, and Democratic Parties. The second major coalition was the Frente de Accion Popular, or FRAP, formed in 1956. It consisted of the Socialist Party, the Democratic Party of the People, the Democratic Party of Chile, the Labor Party, and the outlawed Communist Party. The third coalition was the present Popular Unity Front made up of the Socialist, Communist, Radical, and Social Democratic parties, together with a left wing faction of the Christian Democratic Party called the Movimiento de Acción Popular Unitaria, or MAPU, and a small group called Acción Popular Independiente, or API. These parties had a long tradition of responsible participation in the Chilean political process.

> In Chile, a full generation before the Soviet revolution and many years before the Mexican revolution, a number of political parties and other groupings with a distinct socialist outlook were already freely functioning. The present Radical Party was founded over a century ago; the Social Democratic Party--another member of the present Allende government--can trace its origins to the Democratic Party founded in 1887, while the Socialist Workers Party was founded in 1898. These developments were not paralleled elsewhere in the continent.[50]

The Communist Party, the first viable leftist party in Chile, formally joined the Third International in 1921. The Stalin-Trotsky conflict appeared soon after and the party split into two factions representing each group. In 1937, the Stalinist faction emerged as the

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[50]Claudio Veliz, "The Chilean Experiment," Foreign Affairs, XLIX (1971), p. 445.

official party and supported the first left-of-center coalition, the Popular Front. The relative strength of the Communist Party is best exemplified by its early struggles to stay alive in the political system. During the 1920's, the Communists fought with Alessandri and Ibanez for control of the trade unions and, in the 1927 election, they ran the only candidate against the dictator, Ibáñez. This move, however, brought harsh repressive measures against the Communists by Ibáñez and his regime. This, along with the internal division in the party, placed its future as a viable party of the Left in jeopardy. However, once civil liberties were restored in 1931, the Communist Party was able to function effectively, largely because of its internal discipline and perseverance.[51]

The Socialist Party was not formed until 1933, when several small socialist groups united. Prior to 1933, there had been a coup, led by military and civilian elements under Colonel Marmaduke Grove. This coup proclaimed a "socialist republic" which lasted only ten months before a rightist military coup took over the country. After this coup, the leftist groups were exposed to coercive and repressive measures from the government and, by 1933, had to unite to gain strength.[52]

In 1938, the Popular Front coalition was formed on a proposal by the Socialists for a block of the Left. Although the Radicals were the major contributors to the Front, the Communists and the Socialists received strong support from the Chilean working class, which was generally dissatisfied with the traditional parties. Once the Front was

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[51]Cruz Coke, p. 49. (Translation is mine.)

[52]Burnett, pp. 173-174.

in power, the Communists stayed out of the government and capitalized on the failures of the Front. The socialists and Radicals were constantly in conflict over the leadership of the Front and, when the Radicals began to appease some of the more traditional forces, the Socialists withdrew from the Front.[53] By 1941, the Popular Front was dissolved. Throughout the 1940's and 1950's the Socialists experienced serious disintegration, due mainly to the cohesive and disciplined opposition of the Communists and the ideological differences within the Socialist Party itself. The numerous splits of the Socialists contributed greatly to the strength of the Communists who, in 1946, joined a center-left coalition under González Videla. Under this coalition, the Communists participated openly in the government for the first time, but it was only to last five months.

> It was clear that in the government coalition the only winners were the Communists. It also seemed clear that many who had formerly voted Radical were now becoming supporters of the Communists, while at the same time, because of the latter's high-handed tactics, many workers were returning to the Socialist fold. Furthermore, righist voters who were normally adherents of the Liberal Party were strongly reacting against the alliance of this party with the Communists and, in disgust, had now turned towards the Conservatives.[54]

Soon thereafter, González Videla outlawed the Communists, and it was not until 1958 that they were allowed to return. This should have helped the Socialists, who were violently anti-Communist; instead, they split even more on the question of the suppression of the Communists.

In 1956, the second major coalition of the Left began to take shape. It was called the Frente de Acción Popular and it included a

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[53]Gil, Political System, p. 80.

[54]Ibid., p. 73.

united Socialist Party, the Communists, the Labor Party, and some factions of the Democratic Party. This time the Center Radical Party did not join the coalition and the Left placed its hopes on the Socialist leader, Salvador Allende. In the 1958 presidential election, Allende ran against a very powerful leader of the Right, Jorge Alessandri. Although Alessandri won, he did so by only 33,500 votes over Allende.[55] The failures of the Alessandri government gave strength to the rapidly growing Christian Democrats who, in 1964, won a strong victory over FRAP, who again had nominated Allende. However, as Gil states, the leftist parties were not thoroughly defeated.

> The most significant development of the early 1960's were the impressive gains made by the left FRAP coalition and by the Christian Democrats. A strong shift of the electorate towards the moderate and extreme left became clearly detectable in the congressional and municipal elections of 1961 and 1963, respectively. The leftist coalition continued to make inroads among the agricultural workers of central Chile.[56]

Like Alessandri, Frei suffered from economic problems and his refusal to coalesce with other parties made the prospects for major reforms difficult. By 1970, the centrist Radical Party had shifted to the leftist coalition which now called itself Popular Unity. Together with the Communists and the Socialists, plus some smaller parties and movements, they nominated Allende for the fourth consecutive time and, this time, the electorate was willing to accept a leftist regime under Allende. Since this coalition will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter I it is sufficient to show at present its ascendancy to the presidency.

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[55] Ibid., p. 81.

[56] Ibid., p. 82.

To summarize, the Left incrased its popular support after the 1950's in a rather impressive fashion. In the 1967 municipal elections, the Communists and the Socialists received their largest percentage of votes with a combined total of 29.2 per cent of the vote (See Table VIII), compared to 1961 when they polled 22.2 per cent. In the 1961 election, the FRAP received 31 per cent and, in 1971, it received 50.9 per cent.[57] Despite the difficulties of the Allende government, the coalition was able to win a majority of the vote. In the 1952 election, Allende polled 5.5 per cent of the vote as the candidate of the Socialist Party. In 1958, as the candidate of FRAP, he received 28.9 per cent and in 1964, again as the candidate of FRAP, he received 38.9 per cent. In the 1970 election Allende finally won the presidency with only 36.2 per cent of the popular vote and the votes of the Christian Democrats in Congress.

TABLE X

RECENT PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS IN CHILE
1938 - 1970

Year	Candidate	Vote & or %	Backing
1938	Pedro Aguirre Cerda	212,000	Radicals, Socialists Communists (PF)
	Gustav Ross	199,000	Conservatives-Liberals

[57] Ibid., pp. 82-83.

TABLE X (Continued)

Year	Candidate	Vote & or %	Backing
1942	Juan Antonio Ríos	260,000	Radicals, Socialists Communists
	Carlos Ibáñez	204,635	Conservatives, Nazis Liberals
1946	Gabriel González Videla	192,207	Radicals, Communists
	Eduardo Cruz Coke	142,441	Falange, Socialists, Christ. Socialists
	Fernando Alessandri	131,023	Conservatives, Liberals
	Bernardo Ibáñez (1)	12,114	Socialists
1952	Carlos Ibáñez	46.8%	non-political
	Arturo Matte	27.8	Conservative, Liberal
	Pedro Alfonso	19.9	Radicals
	Salvador Allende	5.5	Socialists
1958	Jorge Alessandri	31.6	Conservative, Liberal
	Salvador Allende	28.9	Socialist, Communist, (FRAP)
	Eduardo Frei	20.7	Christian Democrat
	Luis Bossay	15.6	Radical
	Antonio Zamorano	3.3	Leftists
1964	Eduardo Frei (2)	56.1	Christian Democrat Conservative, Liberal
	Salvador Allende	38.9	Socialist, Communist (FRAP)
	Julio Durán	5.0	Radical
1970	Salvador Allende	36.3	Socialist, Radical, Communist, (PU)
	Jorge Alessandri	34.9	Conservative, Liberal
	Radomiro Tomic	27.8	Christian Democrat

Source: Francisco José Moreno, Legitimacy and Stability in Latin America (New York, 1969), p. 195; J. Biehl del Río and Gonzalo Fernández, "The Political Pre-Requisites for a Chilean Way," Government and Opposition, VII (1972), p. 214.

Notes: (1) Bernardo Ibáñez is not related to the former dictator, Carlos.
(2) The only President to be automatically elected by winning 50% of the vote. Election did not go to Congress.

CHAPTER IV

APPLICATION OF COALITION THEORIES TO CHILEAN GOVERNMENT COALITIONS

Introduction

As noted in the previous chapter, certain key factors have played a distinct role in Chilean coalition politics. Among them is the competitive nature of the party system with respect to presidential coalition situations and congressional coalition situations.

> Historically, a number of presidential candidates, attempting to achieve a majority of the popular vote or merely to obtain voter support in more than two-candidate contests, have had to rely on the organized support of and identification with two or more political parties capable of mobilizing voter support in varying geographic areas where traditional voter alliances to certain political parties have been apparent.[1]

Another factor that has played and continues to play an important role is the 1925 Constitution, which states that a candidate must obtain a majority of the popular vote and, if not, he must then be selected by the Congress. This provision offers an additional coalition situation in Congress aside from the continuous efforts to form winning coalitions for purposes of policy deliberations. At the presidential level, there is the formation of cabinets, usually representative of the electoral coalitions that elected the chief executive. The formation of cabinets certainly plays a key role in the maintenance of government coalitions

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[1]Cope, Coalition Formation, p. 4.

and the stability of the system.

A third factor to be identified in the previous chapter was the development of three major blocks, making the formation of coalitions on ideological lines much clearer. The Right, composed of the Conservatives and the Liberals, joined together in 1966 to form the National Party and it continues to form coalitions of the Right in an attempt to offset the Left. The leftist parties have themselves continually formed coalitions, despite bitter past disagreements between the Socialists and Communists. They have now joined in a coalition of the Left roughly equalling that of the Right. The balance between them lies in two major Chilean parties, the Radicals and the Christian Democrats. The Radical Party was at one point (in the 1930's and 1940's), the party with the widest base of support. It has been and continues to be an opportunistic party, or what Sven Groennings calls a "pivot party, which is a party having coalition options," and, therefore, does not by itself seek to form coalitions; because of its diverse membership, the party awaits offers to join coalitions.[2] The Christian Democratic Party gained steady support from the 1940's onward because it was alienated from the traditional Chilean parties; but the unwillingness of the Christian Democrats to join or form coalitions has caused their popular support to diminish.

These and other variables have made Chilean politics ideal for coalition situations. However, several questions must be answered regarding the general features of coalition formation in an attempt to

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[2]Sven Groennings, "Notes Towards Theories of Coalition Behavior in Multiparty Systems: Formation and Maintenance," from Sven Groennings, E. W. Kelley, and Michael Leiserson, The Study of Coalition Behavior, p. 451.

find patterns based on the foundations described in Chapter II. For example, what major factors prompted the formation of coalitions? Were only minimum winning coalitions established? If not, why were there no minimum winning coalitions? Is the bargaining proposition more effective in predicting possible outcomes than the size principle? Are actors merely seeking to maximize payoffs?

In order to answer these questions, it is necessary to look back at some of the events leading to the formation of certain important coalitions so as to discern patterns that may subsequently be used to test the two theories. There are, however, certain problems that arise concerning applications to data. One of these problems is that of limited, unreliable and sketchy data. Much of the analysis in this paper is based on the piecing of data much in the manner one would work on a jigsaw puzzle: piece by piece from many different sources. These sources often differed in their presentation of facts, and thus it became a difficult task to distinguish the most accurate from the least accurate. The method employed in this study was one of looking at third and fourth sources and decide in favor of the fact which was reported most often. Another problem is that, although this study is not concerned with the maintenance of coalitions, that aspect of their behavior is related to their formation and in Chilean politics this relationship has been difficult to examine. Since the formation of a particular coalition may be related to the formation of a future one, many things may be said regarding the expected duration of the coalition to be formed. It will suffice to say here that we will deal with one coalition at a time and that factors such as future costs may be a subsequent object of study.

Applications to Chilean Congressional Elections

Coalition situations in Chile have existed throughout its history and, ever since the 1925 Constitution, not a single party has been able to receive a majority of the popular vote in congressional elections, and only twice has any party received more than thirty per cent of the vote.[3] As a result, parties have, since 1925, made strong attempts to build coalitions to gain control of the power structures. Table X (page 56) indicates that in all but the 1952 election, winning candidates were backed by coalitions of established parties or the traditional parties in Chile. Ibáñez did receive support from a coalition of splinter parties and won the election due to resentment toward the more traditional parties on the part of the electorate.

In the 1937 congressional elections, the Right, a coalition of the Conservatives, Liberals and Independent Liberals, gained a majority in the Senate (composed of 45 members) and considerable strength in the Chamber of Deputies. Together with other sympathetic rightist parties, they controlled 109 seats in the Congress, as opposed to 83 for the Center and the Left.[4] With other major political events of the times, this may have prompted the Center and Left to join a coalition which some have described as "nothing more than an alliance formed in order to enable the Radicals to seize the presidency and thus obtain control of government patronage."[5]

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[3] Valenzuela, p. 185.

[4] Stevenson, p. 96-97.

[5] Ernst Halperin, Nationalism and Communism in Chile (Cambridge, 1965), p. 49.

In the 1941 elections, said to be one of the most orderly ever, a new coalition of the center-left gained just enough seats to have a majority, and, although many expected internal dissension, certain international events drew the parties together and the coalition survived.[6] After the death of the Radical President Aguirre, a new coalition was formed, named the Democratic Alliance. This time the coalition consisted not only of the Radicals and major leftist parties, but of some centrist parties as well, such as the Falange, Democrats, and Doctrinary Liberals.[7] However, this coalition was not to last very long. By 1944, serious problems caused factions to split, and by the 1945 congressional elections, the coalition was too weak. Despite this, a major surge by the Radicals and leftist parties gave the coalition a minimal majority in the Congress. By the 1947 municipal elections, the only party that was gaining was the Communist Party, which caused a serious break with Radical President González Videla, who fired the Communist ministers and formed an all Radical cabinet.[8] Two years later, in the 1949 congressional elections, factionalism created an enormous number of parties, so that after the election there were fourteen parties represented. The dominant coalition, however, was that of the Right, which counted 108 seats of the 192 seat Congress. The most significant gain of that election was by the Agrarian Labor Party (see Table XI), which received seventeen seats in the Congress. It was a pro-Ibanez party which set the stage for his presidential bid in 1952.

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[6] Stevenson, p. 114.

[7] Gil, Political Systems, p. 71.

[8] Ibid., p. 73.

TABLE XI

1949 CONGRESSIONAL ELECTIONS

Party	Deputies	Senators
Radical	34	5
Conservative	31	3
Liberal	33	6
Agrarian Labor	14	3
Radical Democratic	8	1
Popular Socialist	6	1
Democratic	6	-
Falange Nacional	3	1
Socialist of Chile	5	-
People's Democratic	1	-
Traditional Conservative	2	-
Progressive Liberal	2	-
Authentic Socialist	1	-
Renovating Action	1	-

Source: Gil, Political System, p. 74.

Ibáñez, without the support of any of the traditional political parties, won the presidential election of 1952. That marked the end of the dominance of the Radical Party. A coalition of small parties and ad-hoc groups was formed specifically to get Ibáñez elected and to play up some obvious discontent of the masses with the traditional parties.[9] This fragmentation of the political system continued in 1953, when Ibáñez was able to win 88 of 192 seats in Congress. However, this was not a majority, and many of the small parties in the Ibanez coalition made demands which made the coalition inoperative. The failure of Ibáñez to keep campaign promises produced a complete turn-around in the elections of 1957, which resulted in a Right-Center coalition made up of

[9] Ibid., p. 74.

the Conservative, Liberal, and Radical parties. They gained control of the Congress, winning 98 of the 192 seats.

By 1958, the FRAP coalition of the left had formed, but it was unable to command majorities in Congress. In the 1961 election, the Right-Center coalition retained control of the Congress, commanding 110 of the seats but, in 1965 and 1969, the elections produced no winning majority coalitions, although the Left had its minority coalition. It was the Christian Democrats who held the closest thing to a majority with 95 seats in 1965 and 78 in 1969.

The patterns of coalition formation since 1937 seem relatively clear despite their obvious failure at maintenance. First, rightist coalitions tended to have greater size (this will be explained in greater detail later in the chapter), and their basis of support often came from small fourth and fifth parties, and, of course, from the pivot Radical Party since the 1950's. Second, the coalitions of the Left were, if not more durable, more rigid in their ideological position. This, perhaps more than anything else, contributed to their downfall. The coalitions of the Right were more pragmatic in that they seemed to clearly perceive the need to form and maintain coalitions for purposes of keeping the Left out. Many of the coalitions of the Left, well founded on ideological grounds, eventually gave way to coalitions of the Right because the rightist factions of the leftist coalition were able to arouse violent opposition from moderate members towards the Communists, perhaps the best organized party and one that made great gains in the 1940's. It is interesting to note that the three major blocks have continued to compete and that a consolidation of parties has definitely taken place. The Conservatives are now united with the Liberals in the

National Party, the Christian Democrats occupy the Center, and the Popular Unity forms the Left.

In order to apply the theories of Riker and Leiserson to Chilean congressional data, several steps had to be taken and, with preceding account of the Chilean party system and history of coalitions, this application may be undertaken without much descriptive analysis.

The first step in the application is to note the basic assumptions of the two theories. How rigorous one wishes to be concerning these assumptions is of relative importance to their outcomes with respect to predictability. However, it is the opinion of the author that these assumptions may be used in the context of Chilean politics without much ado and that their conditions are readily met in the political setting. A second step in this application calls for noting the differences between actual minimum winning coalitions and the decision rule that was employed at that time. With regard to this decision rule, it must be noted again that in Chile the Congress consisted of 192 seats, 147 in the Chamber of Deputies and 45 in the Senate, but that in 1970 this was changed to 150 in the Chamber and 50 in the Senate. Therefore, a simple majority in the Congress up to 1970 would consist of 97 seats. The third step would consist of determining whether the coalitions were the smallest possible.

The first step will be outlined separately for Riker and Leiserson. The second step is largely contained in Table XII, and the third is deduced from Table XIII.

The "size principle" contains five basic assumptions with regard to the parameters of the coalition situation. First, is the assumption of "n-person," an assumption which obviously is met, since there are many

actors, often an indefinite amount. The second assumption concerns situations that are "zero-sum." Riker explains that this condition "assumes that gains and loss can be quantified and measured." This can be achieved but only in terms of aggregate votes or congressional seats. It is in this context that we can assume a zero-sum condition. The seats lost by one party will be gained by another. There is obviously a risk in dealing with such an illusive assumption; however, since this study will not use rigorous statistical applications and since we are dealing with situations of conflict, we can meet this assumption. The third assumption, that of side payments, can also be met here. Votes in the Congress can be traded and the inducement can be in the form of pay-offs such as possible appointments to cabinet positions. As to the fourth assumption, i.e., the assumption of rationality, the nature of political activity in Chile in so far as winning elections is concerned, has been highly competitive and the actors have been strong maximizers; that is, the failure to make decisions on the best alternatives to gaining particular outcomes rarely existed, since other variables could also play a distinctive role and provide for a high cost affecting coalition formation. Finally, regarding the fifth assumption of perfect information, we may conclude that members of Congress, for example, know which party each other member belongs to and also what some of the boundaries of those parties are. With this type of information, an actor can infer possible coalitions and thereby enhance his ability to act rationally. Now, these over simplifications of some rather complex assumptions can only be made if we decide that, if the coalitions observed conform to the prediction of W^m, then the size principle is relevant to our purpose. Therefore, it may be possible to say that if

the coalitions observed are larger than minimum winning, it may have been because of imperfect information.

Leiserson's bargaining proposition rests on three very basic assumptions which are all directly relevant to the Chilean situation. First, that "coalitions are worth forming," can certainly be said to be the case, as emphasized in Chapter II. Second, there is the assumption that only the actors in the winning coalition will receive payoffs. This is evident in that winning coalitions gain control of policy decision making institutions such as the Cabinet or Congress. Finally, according to Leiserson actors must know the range of possible coalitions and the payoffs of each. As already observed, parties in Chile have been reluctant at times to join a coalition. One need only recall, for example, the Radicals in 1970, who did not wish to commit themselves to any given direction until the promises concerning payoffs were especially attractive.

To review the two theories, Riker states:

> In n-person, zero-sum games, where side payments are permitted where players are rational, and where they have perfect information, only minimum winning coalitions occur.[10]

Leiserson states:

> As the number of actors increases, there is a tendency for each actor to prefer a winning coalition with as few members as possible.[11]

With the assumptions just considered, we may now see the actual results and verify which of the two theories has the better prediction potential. Table XII shows the difference between the size of the

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[10]Riker, p. 32.

[11]Leiserson, "Coalition Government in Japan," p. 90.

TABLE XII

COMPOSITION OF CHILEAN CONGRESS 1937-1969

Year of Election	Cons	L	R	S	Comm	CD	Others
1937	40	40	36	21	8	--	47
1941	44	32	57	20	18	2	19
1945	46	35	38	25	19	6	23
1949	44	35	42	17	-- (1)	8	46
1953	19	21	25	28	--	6	94 (2)
1957	27	29	42	21	--	17	56
1961	21	37	52	19	20	27	16
1965	5	11	29	22	23	95	7
1969	-39-(3)		33	19	28	78	3

Notes: (1) Communist Party was outlawed from 1949-1959.

(2) In 1953 there was strong feelings on the partof the Chilean electorate against traditional parties.

(3) In 1966 the Conservatives and the Liberals united to become the National Party.

Abbreviations: Cons - Conservatives

L - Liberals

R - Radicals

S - Socialists

Comm - Communists

CD - Christian Democrats

actual minimum winning coalition and the minimal majority need in the congressional elections since 1937. In only two cases, 1941 and 1945, were the actual coalitions minimum winning; otherwise the differences ranged from one to thirteen. Considering the size of Congress (a total of 192 members in both houses), those differences are not really great. However, if we rely strictly on Riker's assumptions, especially that of perfect information, only minimum winning coalitions should appear. One important point must be noted here, that is, that many parties in the Chilean system must be regarded as indissoluble. Thus, one could argue that those coalitions with the smallest possible combinations are in actuality minimum-winning. However, Riker's theory does not really allow for this, since the prediction concerns the actual maximization of payoffs, and actors would seek to exclude other actors not necessary for the coalition to meet the decision rule.[12]

Now, in order to see whether the winning coalitions in Table XII were the smallest possible, calculations were made on the data showing the number of seats captured by major parties in the elections from 1937 to 1969. These are illustrated in Table XIII.

Calculations (deduced from data on Table XII) show that in 1937, 1953, 1961, and 1969, minimum winning coalitions could have been formed; of course, it would have meant the union of ideologically diverse

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[12]For additional notes on the size principle, see Robert L. Butterworth, "A Research Note on the Size of Winning Coalitions," American Political Science Reivew, LXV (1971), pp. 741-745. Also see William Riker's reply, American Political Science Review, LXV (1971), pp. 745-747, and rejoinder by Butterworth in the same journal, pp. 747-748. Also, see Martin Southwold, "Riker's Theory and the Analysis of Coalitions in Precolonial Africa," and Phyllis Peterson, "Coalition Formation in Local Elections in the State of Sao Paulo, Brizil," in Sven Groennings, ed., The Study of Coalition Behavior (New York, 1970), pp. 336-350 and 141-159.

TABLE XIII

DIFFERENCE (D) BETWEEN SIZE OF ACTUAL WINNING COALITIONS AND MINIMAL MAJORITIES (M) IN CHILEAN CONGRESSIONAL ELECTIONS BETWEEN 1937 AND 1969

Year of Election	Actual Winning Coalition	S	M	D
1937	RIGHTIST COALITION: Conservative, Liberal, Independent Liberal, Agrarian, Nazi, Falange, Democratas	109	97	12
1941	POPULAR FRONT: Radical, Communist, Democrats, Independent Democrats, Radical Socialist, Workers Soc. Falange, Agrarian	97	97	0
1945	POPULAR FRONT: Radical, Socialist, Communist, Democrats	97	97	0
1949	RIGHTIST COALITION: Conservative, Liberal, Nationalists	108	97	11
1953	No Majority Winning Coalition	---	--	--
1957	RIGHT-CENTER COALITION: Radical, Conservative, Liberal	98	97	1
1961	RIGHT-CENTER COALITION: Radical, Conservative, Liberal	110	97	13
1965	No Majority Winning Coalition	---	--	--
1969	No Majority Winning Coalition	---	--	--

parties such as the Conservatives, Communists, Socialists, and Liberals in 1961. A coalition of these four parties would have yielded exactly 97 seats and would have satisfied Riker's prediction. The same type of combinations in 1937, 1953 and 1969 would have yielded similar results. The four coalitions would have had 97 members and zero difference with minimal majority. It must be noted that we are dealing with majorities of both houses and that there have been no considerations made concerning majority governments in command of both houses. The assumption has been made that a majority of seats in Congress commands a winning majority. Since Riker's theory failed to predict but two of nine outcomes, we may conclude that the application of the "size principle," in so far as the Chilean Congress is concerned, is not particularly relevant. This is not to say that the size principle itself is not relevant, but that in so far as Chilean coalition formation is concerned, Riker has not predicted well and, therefore, his principle may be a poor indicator of what may, in fact, occur in Chilean coalition situations.

It may be inferred that in those cases where no majority coalition was present (see Table XIII), where minority governments existed, there are strong indications that actors were not simply and totally concerned with maximization. This may seem to infer that Chilean political parties were not sufficiently pragmatic for effective use of Riker's theory. This is not the case, since the Liberals and Radicals have continually changed sides and formed new alliances with both the Left and the Right who, at the same time, sought coalitions with the centrist parties. It may suffice to say that the parties were ideologically pragmatic, which means that extreme parties would not seek coalitions with opposites because of obvious conflict, often deeply rooted in the

past.

Leiserson's "bargaining proposition" has higher predictive value, particularly because its actors are not absolute maximizers concerned only with payoffs. While not overly concerned with such variables as ideology, leadership, structures, etc., Leiserson does allow for such variables to influence formation by accepting coalitions which would not be the absolute minimum. At this point then, we can say that, in actuality, Leiserson and Riker differ in their definition of minimum winning. To Riker, in the case of the Chilean Congress, W^m, must be 97 seats. To Leiserson, it may be larger, so as to allow for parties of near or same ideology to form a coalition that would win but contain only the smallest possible combination.

Applying Leiserson to Chilean data (Table XII), we note that he predicts both the 1941 and 1945 outcomes predicted by Riker. The 1937 Popular Front coalition is larger than W^m for both Riker and Leiserson. It was made up of several small parties, some of which could have been excluded, and the coalition would have remained winning. In the 1949 elections each member of the rightist coalition was necessary, therefore, it conforms to Leiserson's prediction. The 1957 and 1961 coalitions are also predicted by Leiserson, since all members were necessary for the coalition to win. Therefore, with the exception of 1937, Leiserson's model predicts all outcomes, including Riker's.

It would be inappropriate to conclude here without certain reservations that Leiserson is a better predictor than Riker. The two theories have only been applied to nine congressional elections, of which six had actual winning coalitions in Congress. Leiserson correctly predicted 83 per cent of the outcomes to Riker's 33 per cent. However, these

percentages may be misleading considering the number of elections studied. Further application of these theories may reveal a more significant relationship between the size principle and the bargaining proposition. For example, one may consider coalitions formed for specific policy votes or one may compare coalition formation in various multiparty systems, thus subjecting both theories to a stricter test with a larger sample.

Application to Chilean Presidential Elections

As noted in the previous chapter, Arturo Alessandri came to power with the support of the powerful Radical Party, winning approximately 55 per cent of the popular vote.[13] However, he quickly came to odds with the Left, who had not supported his election; eventually, Alessandri's further moves to the Right drove the Radicals from his cabinet. By 1936, with the Democrats also defecting, Alessandri was left with only about 34 per cent support in Congress, approximately half of it coming from the Liberal Party.[14] In preparation for the 1937 congressional elections, the Radicals joined in a Popular Front with the Socialists and the Communists; however, it was not a complete move until 1938. The right wing of the Radical Party continued to give support to Alessandri and, in the 1937 elections, the Conservative block maintained control with approximately 43 per cent of the seats compared to about 34 per cent for the Popular Front. In the presidential election of 1938, the Popular Front, consisting of the Radicals, Communists, Socialists,

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[13] Stevenson, p. 57.

[14] Cruz-Coke, p. 53.

Democrats and other small left-of-center parties, captured the election by gaining 50.4 per cent of the popular vote, compared to 49.6 per cent for the Conservative coalition. Obviously, the coalition of Center and Left proved worthwhile. As Ernst Halperin states:

> That the Popular Front formula proved successful in Chile is to be attributed to a purely Chilean cause that had little to do with ideology and nothing whatsoever to do with the international situation. The real basis for the construction of the Popular Front in Chile was merely the slightly left-of-center Radical Party's desperate urge to obtain control of government patronage and the Communists' willingness to help them do so.[15]

The decision point for a minimal winning coalition would have been 220,655 votes, whereas the actual winning coalition polled 222,700 votes. In this presidential election both Riker and Leiserson would have predicted the outcome. The Popular Front coalition had just enough parties, with no unnecessary members, to make it a minimum winning coalition.

The relative success of the coalition is debatable since it remained unstable until the death of the President in 1941. The major problem was bitter disagreement between the Communists and the Socialists. In 1942, when Juan A. Ríos, another Radical, won the Presidency, again the coalition, this time under the name of "Democratic Alliance," was composed of Communists and Socialists. However, it also ended with the death of the President; in 1946, González Videla, a Radical candidate backed by Communists and Liberals, took office. After about six months of rule, González Videla outlawed the Communist Party; from then until just prior to the 1970 elections, the Marxist left refused to join with

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[15] Ernst Halperin, Nationalism and Communism in Chile (Cambridge, 1965), p. 47-48.

the Radicals in any coalition! However, as has been noted previously, the Radicals were an oportunistic party and the pragmatism of the Left in 1970 would draw the two groups together in a winning coalition.

In the 1958 presidential election, Allende polled 28.9 per cent of the popular vote, nearly defeating Jorge Alessandri, who polled 31.6 per cent. In 1964, Allende increased his support to 38.9 per cent, but lost to Frei, who won a clear majority with 56.1 per cent. In both of these elections, Allende was backed by the Communist and Socialist Parties under the Frente de Acción Popular (FRAP), coalition. By 1969, the mass support of the Christian Democrats under Frei was slowly deteriorating. Frei refused to compromise and join coalitions in Congress, and disagreement grew within the party over economic and social policies. This resulted in some rather severe factionalism within the party which eventually was to lead to its defeat at the polls.

> In addition to the problem of intra-party factionalism, the Christian Democrats were caught between their commitment to maintain some ideological purity, which articulated a particular kind of social and political change through centralized technical planning, and an unsuccessful strategy of controlling the entire political system which would have aided in pulling ideological goals into full operation.[16]

In 1969, a radical faction within the Christian Democratic Party defected and formed the Movimiento de Acción Popular Unitaria (MAPU), which helped to build the Popular Unity Coalition.[17] This factionalism of the Christian Democrats increased the prospects of the Left, which had come close to winning in 1958 against three candidates. The support

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[16] Cope, Coalition Formation, p. 10.

[17] J. Biehl del Rio and Gonzalo Fernández R. "The Political Prerequisites of the Chilean Way," Government and Opposition, VII, (1972), p. 311.

of the Radicals now seemed to bring victory within the grasp of the Left. In the 1970 election, the Popular Unity, consisting of the Socialists, Communists, Radicals, Independent Popular Action Movement, Popular Socialist Union, Social Democrats, and MAPU, polled 36.3 per cent of the popular vote, against 34.9 per cent for the National Party and 27.8 per cent for the Christian Democrats. The closeness of the vote, 40,180 votes between the two frontrunners, indicates that the coalition was probably minimum winning, although it is difficult to determine which coalition member was the unnecessary partner. This can probably be better explained in terms of Allende's election by the Congress. As stated previously, a candidate must have a majority of the popular vote or the election goes to the Congress, where a majority of two hundred members is needed to win. Table XIII shows the distribution of seats in the Chilean Congress in 1970. The total number of seats controlled by Popular Unity was eighty and they needed one hundred and one to win. A coalition with the Democratic Radical Party would have given a margin of six votes, not enough to win. However, a coalition with either the National Party or the Christian Democrats (who now played the role of a pivot party) would have produced a winning coalition. Neither combination would have conformed to Riker's prognosis, unless certain members within each of the parties were either denied or themselves refused to participate in the coalition. A coalition of the National Party and the Left would have been virtually impossible due to their strong ideological differences. Therefore, only the Christian Democrats could be sought by either side and, in both cases, would have produced winning coalitions. With the Left they would have produced winning coalitions. With the Left they would control 155

seats, whereas with the Right, 119.

However, after some lengthy bargaining, the Christian Democrats "exacted from Allende not only....Constitutional guarantees, but also a commitment that neither a Socialist nor a Communist would be appointed to the Defense Portfolio."[18] In return, they threw their support to his camp and Allende won with 153 votes, with 35 for Alessandri, seven blank ballots, and five absentees.[19]

Leiserson's bargaining proposition would have predicted this outcome since there were no unnecessary members and it was minimal winning. It may be noted at this point that one inadequacy of the Leiserson model is that, although his prediction is correct, a coalition of the Right and Center would have been preferable to the actual winning Left-Center coalition, since it would have contained fewer members and, ideologically speaking, would have been a more cohesive coalition.

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[18] Cope, p. 15.

[19] Ibid., p. 16.

TABLE XIV

DISTRIBUTION OF SEATS IN THE CHILEAN CONGRESS 1969-1970

Senate

Popular Unity		Opposition	
Party	Seats	Party	Seats
Socialists	6	Christian Democrats	20
Communists	5	National Party	5
Radicals	7	Democratic Radical Party	2
Independent Popular Action	1	TOTAL	27
Popular Socialist Union	1		
Social Democrats	1		
MAPU	2		
TOTAL	23		

Chamber of Deputies

Popular Unity		Opposition	
Party	Seats	Party	Seats
Socialists	15	Christian Democrats	55
Communists	21	National Party	24
Radicals	20	Democratic Radical Party	4
MAPU	1	TOTAL	93
TOTAL	57		

Source: J. Biehl del Río, p. 316.

CHAPTER V

CONCLUSION

This study has attempted to answer two basic questions regarding the formation of political coalitions in multiparty systems. The first question relates to the idea of coalition situations. This involved inquiring into constitutional and extra-political rules of the game in order to determine coalition building potential. It has been shown that in Chile, where coalition situations exist, the chances for political parties, and especially for pivot and captive parties (parties with no bargaining power), to be included or excluded in a potential coalition, is a crucial variable to examine. Chile has had a long history of coalition situations in which parties have played all the traditional roles, as captive, pivot, and coalition builders. It is also interesting to note that in Chile certain political parties have played different roles at different times. For example, the Radical Party was a coalition builder in the 1930's and 1940's. It had the largest base of support and was the leading partner in the Popular Front of 1938 as well as in the Democratic Front of 1941 and 1946. Once they broke with the Left, the Radicals began to lose support, so that, by the 1950's and 1960's, they played the part of a pivot party, as they lost their broad base of support and experienced a great deal of intraparty factionalism. Yet, in 1970, the Radical Party again played a key role in coalition situations by aligning with the Left in a winning coalition.

Another factor that has played a key role in the development of coalition situations in Chile has been the development of the three major blocks. This has resulted in coalitions of the Left, Center and Right and also Center-Left, Center-Right, Left-Center and Right-Center. All these possible coalitions have developed in Chile with no exceptions. The ability for these coalition situations to take place has come about largely as a result of the competitiveness of the Chilean system. This made Chile a politically stable nation where tradition commanded that power be sought through the electoral process. This, in turn, necessitated the formation of political coalitions. As noted previously, at least since 1925 not a single party has managed to obtain a majority of the popular vote in a congressional election and, with the two exceptions of Carlos Ibáñez in 1952 and Eduardo Frei in 1964, no presidential candidate has run without the support of a coalition of parties (see Table X). Furthermore, four of the nine elections since 1925 have gone into Congress where often new coalitions had to be built or new members had to be added. Therefore, it may be noted that in Chile elections do represent the principal means of mobilization and, since pluralities often occur, they bring about coalition situations.

The second question which this study addressed itself to concerned the conditions necessary for the actual formation of winning political coalitions in Chile. Under coalition situations, the primary goal of participants is winning and, therefore, "size" becomes a major concern with regard to coalition formation. This directly relates to the notion of pragmatism of Chilean parties. Noted previously was the callousness of the Radical Party in the 1938 and 1942 elections, wishing only to win and gain the presidency. In 1946, the Radicals again needed to form a

coalition with the Left to win the election; yet soon thereafter, Radical President González Videla outlawed the Communists. Other examples cited were the alliances of the leftist parties ever since 1925, often in bitter disagreement, but always attempting to win control. The same holds true of the Conservatives and Liberals, who managed to form several winning coalitions in Congress even though center-left candidates held the presidency. Therefore, the pragmatic character of Chilean parties led participants to seek winning coalitions and, in so doing, to consider size as a major factor in the formation process. This is not to say that size was the only concern, since the parties were obviously separated into the three ideological blocks and the two extremes never formally joined together to form coalitions. Thus, ideology was a factor that prevented certain possible coalitions. In 1953, 1965, and 1969, there were no majority winning coalitions in Congress, mainly as a result of ideological differences. However, size is a major factor when pivot parties play a significant role in the coalition situation, and this has been the case in every presidental election since 1925, with the exception of 1964. Pivot parties such as the Radicals or Christian Democrats, have tilted the balance both in outright majority victories as well as minority ones needing congressional approval. To this end, size becomes a major factor for coalition builders in seeking victory.

In the review of the literature, several of the most prominent works on the study of coalition behavior were discussed with the intention to show that the approaches to describing, hypothesizing, and testing the theories of political coalitions are quite diverse and that they, too, concern themselves with those conditions that determine

possible coalitions. Of all these works, two have stood out as perhaps the most rigorous and inventive. Their importance is that they attempt to predict outcomes on the basis of size, relying on certain assumptions. While one may intuitively think that ideology, more than anything else, would draw actors together to form coalitions, these two theories maintain that actors are maximizers and, therefore, seek only to win and will pursue coalitions that will win and maximize payoffs, regardless of ideology. The first of these works is that of William Riker, who developed the "size principle" as it relates to coalition formation. The size principle assumes that actors seek to maximize goals and payoffs and that this drives them to form the smallest possible coalitions where the division of payoffs will be the maximum for every member of the winning coalition. This concept is then strictly concerned with the size needed to win in a minimal fashion. Such variables as decision costs, ideological diversity, relative strength of actors in coalition, resources, leadership, social base and structures become secondary. Games are zero-sum, players are rational and they have perfect information about each other. These variables represent basic assumptions which then set the parameters of the size principle. The second work, that of Michael Leiserson, states that actors do seek to maximize by participating in winning coalitions, but not necessarily the smallest possible coalitions. That is, to Leiserson, a minimal winning coalition is one which has no unnecessary partners. Both theories basically assume that in coalition situations, where size is a primary concern, participants will seek minimum winning coalitions to insure the greatest distribution of payoff per member of the winning coalition. The key here is, of course, the term minimum.

It has been found in this study that in applying these theories to Chilean elections, participants have sought winning coalitions, but not necessarily the minimum, at least not in terms of Riker's size principle. Only twice since 1925 has Riker's prediction been actually relevant for Chile, in the 1941 and 1945 congressional elections. In all other outcomes, including presidential elections by Congress, coalitions have been larger than the minimum. Does this mean that participants are not concerned with maximizing payoffs? Not necessarily, since the outcomes conformed to Leiserson's theory, which assumes that participants seek to maximize payoffs. However, the participants do not seem to be always concerned with optimal maximization; that is, they will accept larger coalitions and share payoffs with larger numbers in order to win, but will not include unnecessary partners. In essence, this is Leiserson's definition of a minimum winning coalition, and it provides for the flexibility that allows for such factors as ideology, leadership, resources, etc., to affect the outcomes, although "size" remains its principal tenet. It must be clear that this study was ultimately concerned with the utility of size as a predictor, and the two theories were tested to determine just such an end. One can conclude that "size" is a major determinant, but that if it is used in and of itself without allowances for other variables, as mentioned above, its utility is seriously impaired.

From all this, two major conclusions are reached regarding the conditions necessary for coalition formation. One is that, while size is normally treated as an independent variable, this study regards it to be primarily a dependent variable. Perhaps, by gaining some insight into the conditions of size alone, it can become a more accurate

indicator for coalition formation. We have established that by using Leiserson's bargaining proposition, size does become a useful tool for prediction. The other conclusion stems from the first in that, while size is a necessary condition, it is not necessarily the only one. The description of the origins and development of the Chilean party system shows that such factors as decision costs and ideological diversity also played an important role in the formation of political coalitions. The flexibility of the bargaining proposition in not disallowing these variables results in a higher degree of accuracy in prediction.

The usefulness of these two models has been tested in a very limited sense here. The inadequacy of Riker's model for Chile may not hold true for other systems. Therefore, further research is needed to test his hypotheses. Other multiparty systems may also lend themselves to such analysis and perhaps, with a more effective use of hard data, different conclusions might be reached. The basis for refinement of these two models is a rigorous study of situational variables which this study has attempted to apply to Chile. That is, greater in-depth analysis of all factors and how they affect coalition formation may reveal other indicators that are more reliable for purposes of explanation and prediction. A concluding note regarding the objectives of this study is that it has not confined itself to the explanatory value of the two theories. It may be dangerous to assume that simply because one may encounter difficulties in prediction, they also cannot be used to explain. This is altogether too complex a point to discuss here, except to state that this assumption should be regarded with the utmost care.

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