

IMPRESSION MANAGEMENT AS A FUNCTION  
OF MACHIAVELLIANISM

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
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


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## PREFACE

This study is concerned with the strategies employed by Machiavellians in the psychodiagnostic testing milieu. The primary concern is to determine the situational contingencies under which Machiavellians will be candid and defensive in their responses to instruments like the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory. A model advanced by Milton Rosenberg, which conceptualizes the subject as seeking to win a positive evaluation from the examiner or at least avoid a negative one, is central to this analysis of Machiavellian behavior.

The author wishes to express his gratitude to his major adviser, Dr. Julia McHale, for her constant guidance, assistance and confidence throughout this study. The author is indebted to Dr. Bob Helm for his tireless contributions and inspiration. Appreciation is also expressed to the other committee members, Dr. Larry Brown and Dr. Kenneth Sandvold, for their assistance in the design of the research proposal and preparation of the final manuscript.

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## CHAPTER I

### INTRODUCTION AND REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE

The clinical milieu in which a psychodiagnostic instrument such as the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory (MMPI) is administered constitutes a social influence situation for both the client and clinician. The context of this situation is evaluative. The clinician overtly communicates to the client that his (the client's) task performance (test results) will be evaluated and judgments made concerning his psychological functioning. In such an evaluative context, what concerns are most important to the client and how do these concerns mediate task (test) performance?

Models designed to explain the role of artifacts in experimental situations may provide some answers to these questions. Four models proposed by Riecken (1962), Orne (1972), Rosenberg (1972) and Sigall, Aronson and Van Hoose (1972) will be reviewed. In each of these models, the subject attempts to define the norms of the ambiguous experimental situation; develops hypotheses regarding how he can secure a favorable impression from the experimenter; and subsequently attempts to manage the impression he makes on the experimenter. The essential difference among the four formulations lies in their choice of the impression dimensions considered salient to the subject. Riecken (1962) and Orne (1972) favor task and cooperation dimensions with somewhat different emphasis. Rosenberg (1972) discusses the subject's desire to acquire

positive evaluation from the experimenter or at least to avoid negative evaluation, on dimensions of maturity and adjustment. Finally, Sigall, Aronson and Van Hoose (1972) contend that "looking good" is a more salient dimension for the subject than cooperativeness. A more detailed examination of each of these models seems in order.

Riecken (1962) contends that subjects are concerned about securing a favorable evaluation from the experimenter on dimensions of task performance and cooperation. In impression management attempts aimed at the experimenter, the subject tries to discover "what is going on in the experiment." This is achieved through the client's "progressive definition of the experimental situation" based on the sum of perceived cues. This represents an implicit hypothesis development process.

Orne (1972) emphasizes the cooperation dimension, attributing less salience to task performance. Subjects are predisposed to be "good subjects" which results in cooperative behavior. In pursuit of winning a favorable evaluation on the cooperation dimension, subjects attempt to determine the experimenter's hypothesis from the totality of cues which constitute the "demand characteristics" of the experimental situation. Following "identification" of the experimental hypothesis, subjects act to confirm it to "assist" the experimenter: "At some level he (the subject) sees it as his task to ascertain the true purpose of the experiment and respond in a manner which will support the hypothesis being tested (Orne, 1972, p. 237)."

Rosenberg (1972) argues that subjects enter the experimental situation with expectations that their performance will be evaluated on dimensions of maturity and adjustment. Perceived confirmation of these



expectations by the subject results in concern that he win a positive evaluation from the experimenter or at least avoid a negative one:

In experiments the subject's initial suspicion that he may be exposing himself to evaluation will usually be confirmed or disconfirmed (as he perceives it) in the early stages of his encounter with the experimenter. Whenever it is confirmed, or to the extent that it is, the typical subject will be likely to experience evaluation apprehension; that is, an active, anxiety-toned concern that he win a positive evaluation from the experimenter, or at least that he provide no grounds for a negative one (Rosenberg, 1972, p. 248).

Rosenberg (1972) concludes that evaluation apprehension leads to the development of implicit hypotheses about how the subject may obtain positive evaluation and avoid negative judgment:

Subjects in groups experiencing comparatively high levels of evaluation apprehension will be more prone than subjects in other groups to interpret the experimenter's instructions, explanations, and measures for what they convey about the kinds of responses that will be considered healthy or unhealthy, mature or immature. In other words, they will develop hypotheses about how to win positive evaluation or how to avoid negative evaluation (Rosenberg, 1972, p. 248).

As in the other models, these hypotheses function as blueprints for subsequent impression management attempts aimed at the experimenter.

Finally, Sigall, Aronson and Van Hoose (1972) contest Riecken's stress on cooperativeness as well as Orne's concern over the utility of performance (the extent to which a subject's performance supports the experimental hypothesis). From their perspective, subjects are concerned about how they appear on an "ability dimension:"

Clear evidence demonstrating the cooperative nature of subjects does not seem to exist. Our own hypothesis is that subjects would rather look good than cooperate with the experimenter. Underlying our hypothesis in the present experiment is the notion that the subject's concern about "looking good" is centered around how he will appear on an ability dimension. His concern about being evaluated as a cooperative subject is secondary, if present at all. Thus, we predict that if a subject knows the experimenter's hypothesis, he will not try to

be consistent with those expectations if his cooperation will fail to put him in a good light (Sigall, Aronson, & Van Hoose, 1972, p. 271).

Thus, Sigall, Aronson and Van Hoose (1972) contend that subjects attend to cues which demonstrate their ability in order to impress the experimenter.

The four models represented in the work of Riecken, Orne, Rosenberg and Sigall, Aronson and Van Hoose contain several elements in common. Each recognizes that the experimenter-subject interaction may produce artifacts which confound the experimental outcome. These artifacts develop when the subject attempts to define the nature of the ambiguous experimental situation through heightened attention to available cues which leads him to construct implicit hypotheses and to utilize these hypotheses to guide impression management attempts aimed at the experimenter. The models differ with respect to cue dimensions the theorists deem most salient to the subject. Riecken (1962) and Orne (1972) champion the task and cooperation dimensions with different emphasis; Rosenberg (1972), the maturity and adjustment dimensions; and Sigall, Aronson and Van Hoose (1972), the ability dimension.

While these models were designed to explain the development of artifacts in experimental situations, there is a sufficient correspondence between the clinical testing and experimental milieus to warrant their application to the problems posed in the beginning of this chapter. In the evaluative social influence situation inherent in psychodiagnostic testing, what are the client's concerns and how do these concerns mediate task (psychodiagnostic test) performance? Since experimental evidence does not decisively favor a specific model, any one of the four models may be chosen to deal with these problems. In

the present study, the Rosenberg paradigm was chosen because of its emphasis on the mental adjustment dimension which is the central issue underlying the psychodiagnostic testing situation.

The Rosenberg model provides a productive treatment of client behavior in the evaluative psychodiagnostic milieu. The client's salient concern is acquisition of a favorable evaluation of his mental adjustment or at least avoidance of a negative diagnosis. This concern, which Rosenberg terms "evaluation apprehension," exists to the extent that the client believes himself subject to the clinician's judgment. This predisposition mediates test performance through the mechanism of attempted impression management. The client constructs implicit hypotheses about how he may best influence the clinician's impressions from the totality of available cues. The subject, following these cues, attempts to influence the clinician through selective self-disclosure during the administration of the psychiatric instrument.

Clients may vary in the degree to which they will attempt to manipulate the clinician's evaluation of their mental adjustment. The present study is concerned with the investigation of such manipulative behavior, which Christie (1970a) designates as the Machiavellian dimension. In the remainder of this chapter, the Machiavellian model will be considered, the instrument used to measure degree of Machiavellianism will be examined, the contingencies in which the High Machiavellian (High Mach) will dissimulate or attempt favorable impression management will be reviewed and an hypothesis concerning the relationship between self-disclosure and Machiavellianism will be constructed.

There are four initial assumptions underlying the model proposed by Christie (1970a):

(1) The High Mach is unconcerned with conventional morality. His world view is utilitarian rather than moral.

(2) He is emotionally detached in his interpersonal relationships. Affective involvement impedes manipulation because it transforms others into individual human beings instead of manipulable objects.

(3) He is more concerned with the means than the ends of manipulation. For this reason, High Machs inhabit the entire ideological realm.

(4) He lacks gross psychopathology. Successful manipulation requires an undistorted image of the social environment.

Niccolo Machiavelli's The Prince and Discourses provided material which enabled Christie and Geis to construct an instrument that would measure a subject's standing on the Machiavellian dimension--the degree to which others are seen as manipulable. Successive revision reduced the original set of 71 statements to the present Mach IV scale which contains 20 statements placed in Likert format. Half of the items were phrased in the direction of agreement with Machiavelli, while the remaining half were constructed in the opposite direction to counter-balance for acquiescence set. Subsequent to the development of the Mach IV scale, a forced choice version employing the same items--designated Mach V--was introduced to control social desirability set.

Christie (1970b) found a mean split-half reliability of .79 for the Mach IV scale. Research supporting content and criterion-validity of the Mach IV scale has been reported by Christie and several colleagues. Partial evidence of content validity was established by Christie and Lehmann (1970). Factor analysis of 1782 college student protocols,

including items from the Anomia, Mach IV and V, and counterbalanced F scales, delineated four main factors. These factors included: (1) duplicity or interpersonal candor, (2) affirmative negativism, involving negative references to man and society, (3) distrust in people, and (4) traditional moralism, which involves rejection of anti-authoritarian statements. Significantly, the duplicity factor, which primarily taps interpersonal tactics, was derived from the Mach IV and V items. The contribution of Anomia and F scale items to the remaining three factor loadings precluded the use of these factors as evidence of Mach IV scale content validity.

Persuasive evidence of criterion validity was provided by Christie and Geis (1970a) through their Ten Dollar experiment. Three subjects, representing high, medium and low levels of Machiavellianism, were seated around a table and instructed that any two might divide the provided ten dollars between themselves. The game terminated when the funds were divided. Consistent with the assumptions underlying the Machiavellian model, Highs were found to be members of the winning coalitions in each of the seven triads. Highs controlled the interaction and distribution structures, playing, in contrast to Lows, "impersonally and opportunistically."

Further evidence of criterion validity was provided by Exline et al. (1970) in a situation where confederates were employed to induce subjects to cheat on a test while participating in an experiment. During the post-experimental interview, the experimenter accused the subjects of misconduct. Highs maintained longer eye contact with the experimenter than Lows while denying complicity and confessed less frequently than Lows. These findings are completely consistent with the

Machiavellian assumptions of lack of concern with conventional morality and emotional detachment.

The Christie and Lehmann factor analytical study, coupled with evidence derived from the Christie and Geis, and Exline experiments, are supportive of both content and criterion validity for the Mach IV scale. These studies suggest that the Mach IV scale taps attitudes regarding the manipulability of others and is positively related to manipulative behavior in experimental paradigms.

What are the conditions under which High Machs will attempt to manage the impressions of the experimenter? The literature suggests that High and Low Machs attempt impression management for different reasons. Christie and Geis's (1970b) review of 38 experimental studies of Machiavellianism concluded that Highs manipulated only to gain desired outcomes, while Lows manipulated to gain both desired outcomes and obtain a favorable impression. Moreover, the literature suggests that when both Highs and Lows participate in a situation where each has inducement to manipulate, Highs will attempt manipulation and experience success in these attempts to a significantly greater extent than Lows. Geis (1970a) explained these differences between Highs and Lows as a function of their respective approaches to the game situation:

High Machs approached the game situation cognitively, while low Machs had an emotion or value-oriented approach. High Machs played by what they knew - the specific game rules and the definition of the situation as a game. Low Machs knew the game rules equally well, but played what they felt. They responded to the personal, emotional, and value implications that the interpersonal relations in the game would have had outside the game (Geis, 1970a, p. 154).

Do High and Low Machs differ significantly in attempted manipulation when given a psychodiagnostic instrument like the MMPI? The literature provides no definitive answer. Wrightsman and Cook (1970, data

reported in Christie, 1970c, p. 45) administered the Mach IV scale and the L and K validity scales of the MMPI (without the clinical scales) to a psychiatrically screened sample of female Peace Corps trainees. The correlations between the Mach IV scale and the two validity scales were  $-.40$  and  $-.27$ , respectively. These findings suggest that High Machs within their sample were "relatively uninhibited" in their response to the validity scales, but must be judged to be tentative due to the unrepresentativeness of the sample (Peace Corps volunteers) and the absence of replication studies.

The Wrightsman and Cook (1970, in Christie, 1970c, p. 45) findings appear inconsistent with Christie and Geis's (1970b) previously cited review of the literature which concluded that where both High and Low Machs find inducement to manipulate, Highs will attempt manipulation to a significantly greater extent than Lows. Although both High and Low Mach female Peace Corps Trainees in the Wrightsman and Cook (1970, in Christie, 1970c, p. 45) study should have found the assessment of their personality salient, Highs appeared to respond more candidly than Lows (based on correlation data), instead of more defensively, as might be predicted from the reviewed literature.

Since the Wrightsman and Cook (1970, in Christie, 1970c, p. 45) findings are inconclusive due to the unrepresentative sample employed and absence of replication studies, and because of the consistency noted in the Christie and Geis (1970b) review of 38 studies, an hypothesis based on the Christie and Geis review seems appropriate. In the present study, therefore, the hypothesis that High Machs will attempt impression management to a significantly greater degree than Lows in a situation of high evaluation salience will be investigated. The high

evaluation salience condition is believed to contain inducement to attempt management of the experimenter's impressions for both High and Low Machs. It is assumed that Highs should find the personal consequences of being adjudged "mentally ill" salient, whereas Lows should be concerned both with these consequences and the experimenter's opinion of them (aside from its consequences). As suggested by Christie and Geis (1970b), in this experimental situation where both High and Low Machs should find inducement to manage the experimenter's impressions, Highs should attempt impression management to a significantly greater extent than Lows. The following chapter will examine the methodology required to test the validity of this hypothesis.



## CHAPTER II

### METHOD

The testing of the experimental hypothesis, that High Machs will attempt impression management to a significantly greater degree than Lows when placed in a situation of high evaluation salience (where the subject believes himself to be under evaluation on a personally salient dimension), required identification of High and Low Machs, and their random assignment to conditions believed to possess high or low evaluation salience. This section reviews the subjects, materials and procedures employed to investigate the experimental hypothesis.

#### A. Subjects

Forty-three undergraduate males (25 Highs and 18 Lows), drawn from Introductory, Comparative and Personality Psychology courses and obtaining Mach IV scores at least one standard deviation (6.59) above or below the sample median (88) were assigned to the low and high evaluation salience conditions (see Table I). The 43 males were selected from an initial pool of 250 male and 250 female undergraduate students.

#### B. Materials

The main experimental instruments were the Machiavellian IV scale, the L and K scales of the MMPI and three sets of task instructions (which will be discussed in Procedure).

TABLE I  
SUBJECT DISTRIBUTION MATRIX

	Low Evaluation Saliense	High Evaluation Saliense
Low Mach	9	9
High Mach	12	13

The Mach IV scale was employed to identify High and Low Machs (see Appendix A). This scale consists of 20 items derived from Machiavelli's The Prince and Discourses, placed in Likert format. Half the items are constructed such that endorsement means agreement, while the remaining half are keyed to disagreement with Machiavelli. Christie (1970b) contends that it provides an index of the degree to which respondents believe that people in general are manipulable. This interpretation is supported by a substantial body of research which has established that subjects who score in the upper third of the scale tend to engage in more persistent, detached and successful interpersonal manipulation than subjects falling in the lower third.

The L and K scales of the MMPI were administered to assess the magnitude of favorable dissimulation in the subject's self-disclosure (see Appendix B). Dahlstrom (1972) contends that the 15 item L or Lie scale appears to measure naive defensiveness. The scale content deals with minor failings characteristic of most individuals in this society. The specific content includes denial of aggression, bad thoughts, weakness of character or resolve, poor self-control, prejudices and minor dishonesties. Rosen (1972) found a test-retest reliability of .62 for this scale. The companion K scale contains 30 items dealing with subjects' description of mental health, stability and control, feelings and expectations of others, and family relationships. This scale appears to measure favorable dissimulation in self-disclosure in a more subtle manner than the L scale. Rosen (1972) established a .65 test-retest reliability for the K scale.

### C. Procedure

Male and female undergraduate students in Introductory, Comparative and Personality Psychology courses were presented the Mach IV scale by their respective instructors during class. Although only male subjects were used in the experiments, females were included in the classroom administration of Mach IV for convenience and also to prevent the development of a sex related response set. The instructors were individually coached on procedure, provided materials and supplied with the explanation that they were simply distributing a Psychology Department student philosophy survey. Each instructor read the following instructions after the Mach IV scale, IBM answer cards and pencils were distributed:

These items sample college student philosophies about the nature of man and society. Select the answer that best

reflects your own position and mark it on the computer answer card. Remember to record your full name in the appropriate space. Your response will be completely confidential.

The instructors collected the test materials and returned them to the experimenter the same afternoon in privacy. The experimenter was anonymous throughout this procedure so that students would not associate the Mach IV scale administration with the subsequent treatment conditions.

Forty-eight male subjects (28 Highs and 20 Lows) obtained Mach IV scores which exceeded one standard deviation above or below the sample median. These subjects were listed in a roster purporting to be a randomly selected list of candidates for participation in research and were approached by the experimenter in class to elicit their cooperation.

Forty-three subjects who agreed to participate (25 Highs and 18 Lows) were randomly assigned to high and low evaluation salience conditions (see Table I), given the choice of any one of three scheduled testing periods located in a dormitory, and were promised academic credit for their 20-minute participation.

The L and K scales of the MMPI were administered on two successive nights. At the start of each period, the experimenter identified the subjects on a roster, distributed the L and K scales and one IBM answer card, and then played the pre-recorded instructions appropriate for the treatment condition. Subjects in the high evaluation salience condition were instructed:

The questions presented here come from the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory and measure emotional disturbance. Your responses will help us measure the amount of emotional disturbance found in Midwestern college students. Please answer true if the statement is generally true of you, and false, if generally false. Record your answers on the accompanying IBM score card. Your answers will be held in the strictest confidence.

Low evaluation salience condition subjects were told:

This study is designed to restandardize a 1971 attitude survey. Please answer true if the statement is generally true of you, and false, if generally false. Record your answers on the accompanying IBM score card. Your responses will be strictly confidential.

At the conclusion of the instructions, the subjects were directed to individual tables where they took the L and K scales. When subjects finished the items, a check was made for overlooked questions and each subject left individually. Thirty minutes separated each testing period to reduce interaction among subjects.

All subjects were debriefed through a newsletter distributed in their classes one week following completion of the administration of the two experimental conditions. The hypothesis, design and tentative findings were explained, emphasizing the anonymity of all subjects. Participants were encouraged to share their experiences and comments with the experimenter, and appointments were made available (no subjects chose to meet with the experimenter).

## CHAPTER III

### RESULTS

The data derived from both the L and K scales were subjected to a two-way fixed analysis of variance with correction for unequal cell sizes, correlation and Scheffé' post hoc procedures as described by Hays (1963). The means for the L and K scales obtained by subjects in the two evaluation salience conditions are plotted in Figures 1 and 2 and listed in Table II. The grand means contributed by all subjects on the L and K scales were 3.37 and 14.8, respectively. In what follows, we shall examine the results scale by scale with respect to their implications for the experimental hypothesis.

Findings on the L scale failed to confirm the experimental hypothesis. Highs earned scores of 2.54 compared to the Lows' mean of 4.88 in the high evaluation salience condition (see Table II). Two-way fixed analysis of variance disclosed no main effects attributable to the Machiavellian, evaluation salience or interaction variables (see Table III). Correlation data similarly failed to support the hypothesis. Instead of the predicted positive correlation between scores obtained on the Mach IV and L scales, the finding was a nonsignificant negative correlation ( $r = -.22, p < .30$ ).

K scale findings were in the opposite direction from the experimental prediction. Highs earned a mean of 12.46 compared with 17.2 for Lows under the high evaluation salience condition (see Table II). The




Figure 1. L Scale Means as a Function of Machiavellianism and Evaluation Salience Variables




Figure 2. K Scale Means as a Function of Machiavellianism and Evaluation Salience Variables

TABLE II  
MACH IV, L AND K SCALE MEASURES

	Low Evaluation Salience			High Evaluation Salience		
	Mean	S.D.	Range	Mean	S.D.	Range
Low Mach						
L	3.22	1.56	5-1=5	4.88	3.55	11-1=11
K	15.00	5.87	25-4=22	17.22	4.02	23-11=13
Mach IV	71.20	3.38	77-67=11	73.67	3.42	80-65=16
High Mach						
L	3.25	2.12	9-1=9	2.54	1.61	5-0=6
K	13.16	4.15	21-8=14	12.46	1.63	20-4=17
Mach IV	107.82	9.84	127-96=32	106.92	9.20	123-95=29

TABLE III  
ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE SUMMARY FOR L SCALE

	Degrees of Freedom	Sum of Squares	Mean Square	F Ratio	P>F
Evaluation Salience	1	.737	.737	$\frac{.737}{5.126} = .144$	.708
Mach	1	14.462	14.462	$\frac{14.462}{5.126} = 2.821$	.097
Interaction	1	14.922	14.922	$\frac{14.922}{5.126} = 2.911$	.092
Error*	39	199.925	5.126		
Corrected Total*	42	230.047	5.477		

\*A weighted analysis with correction for unequal cell sizes has been computed where  $n = 10.75$



two-way fixed analysis of variance revealed a main effect attributable to the Machiavellian variable ( $F = 5.21$ ,  $df = 1/39$ ,  $p < .026$ , see Table IV). Correlation analysis also contradicted the experimental hypothesis with a moderately negative relationship between scores obtained from the Mach IV and K scales ( $r = -.34$ ,  $p < .05$ ). The Scheffé post hoc procedure failed to uncover statistically significant differences between mean pairs at the .05 level for the critical interval,  $\hat{\Psi}_g - 7.74 < \underline{\Psi}_g < \hat{\Psi}_g + 7.74$ .

TABLE IV  
ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE SUMMARY FOR K SCALE

	Degrees of Freedom	Sum of Squares	Mean Square	F Ratio	P>F
Evaluation Salience	1	2.241	2.241	$\frac{2.241}{22.012} = .102$	.750
Mach	1	114.734	114.734	$\frac{114.734}{22.012} = 5.212$	.026
Interaction	1	23.084	23.084	$\frac{23.084}{22.012} = 1.049$	.313
Error*	39	858.453	22.012		
Corrected Total*	42	998.512	23.774		

\*A weighted analysis with correction for unequal cell sizes has been computed where  $n = 10.75$ .

## CHAPTER IV

### DISCUSSION

The analysis of the data failed to support the experimental hypothesis that High Machs will attempt impression management to a significantly greater extent than Lows in the high evaluation salience condition. In fact, Low Machs attempted impression management to a significantly greater extent than Highs in the high evaluation salience condition on the K scale. These findings appear to be in direct opposition to the conclusions of Christie and Geis (1970b) on which the present study was based, but may be supported by the work of Wrightsman and Cook (1970, in Christie, 1970c, p. 45).

These negative findings may be explained by reexamination of the high evaluation salience condition and the criterion scores by which High and Low Machs were selected. One possible explanation of these negative results may be that the experimental hypothesis was never properly tested because the treatment condition labeled high evaluation salience was not considered to be such by both Highs and Lows. The rationally oriented High Mach may have been determined that his individual performance would be anonymous and therefore concluded that there were no targets for attempted influence nor any personally important outcomes to be won. If the High Mach perceived the treatment condition in this manner, he would not have found the situation to possess high evaluation salience.

The Low Mach's affective orientation may have caused him to find the treatment condition highly salient. Lows may have attended more closely to internal cues like anxiety than situational cues, resulting in the perception that he would be evaluated by the experimenter on his mental adjustment. Concern that he secure a favorable evaluation from the experimenter (apart from the personal consequences of such an evaluation) might have been sufficiently salient to induce the Low Mach to attempt to manage the experimenter's impression. Thus, difference in orientation between High and Low Machs may have resulted in attention to different cues and radically opposed perceptions of the treatment condition. Where High Machs may have found anonymity and low evaluation salience, Lows may have found high evaluation salience due to the experimenter's presumed evaluation of individual mental adjustment.

A second possible explanation of these negative findings may be that the criterion scores used in the present study to define High and Low Machs were not equivalent to those employed in the 38 experimental studies reviewed by Christie and Geis (1970b). Examination of the criterion scores used in one-fifth of these studies revealed the absence of agreement between experimenters as to how High and Low Machs should be defined. For example, Geis (1970a) defined Highs and Lows on the basis of scores lying in the fourth and first quartile distributions of the sample (108-147 and 61-88), respectively. Exline et al. (1970), in contrast, defined Highs and Lows on the basis of whether the scores lay above or below the sample median of 93.56. The apparent lack of consensus among investigators as to standard criterion scores to define High and Low Machs leaves unresolved the question of whether the criterion scores used in the present study defined "true" Highs and

Lows, since the criteria used in the experimental literature varies so greatly. This lack of consensus makes it impossible to equate the present findings with the literature findings and may be responsible for failure to support the experimental hypothesis since it was based on these 38 studies.

The unexpected finding that Low Machs scored significantly higher on the K scale than Highs in the high evaluation salience condition (but scored comparably to Highs on the L scale in that same condition), may be due to differences in scale item content. Low Machs may have obtained significantly higher K scale scores because denial of these items which deal with personal feelings and loss of control may have been more important to the Low Mach's conventional self-image than to that of the comparatively unconventional High Mach. However, Low Machs may have responded like Highs on the L scale because endorsement of some of its items which deal with minor faults may have been judged to be consistent with a conventional self-image.

The generality of the experimental paradigm for High Mach impression management attempts in the psychodiagnostic milieu is a question of crucial importance, since the present study was designed to predict High Mach behavior in the clinical milieu. The findings suggest that the high evaluation salience condition employed in the present study is not a valid model of the psychodiagnostic milieu. In the experimental condition of (presumed) high evaluation salience, Highs possibly perceived that their answers would be anonymous and reasoned that their performance on the L and K scales would not result in personally meaningful consequences. There was no basis for Highs to anticipate significant future interaction with the experimenter. In the psychodiagnostic

milieu, however, the High Mach's mental adjustment would be evaluated by the clinician and the High Mach could plausibly expect that this assessment might significantly affect later client-therapist interactions in therapy sessions. To the extent that Highs believe that self-disclosure will have personally important consequences, they will find inducement to attempt to manage the clinician's impression of their mental adjustment. Thus, High Machs who did not attempt impression management in the high evaluation salience condition might find sufficient inducement to attempt impression management in the psychodiagnostic milieu due to its property of greater evaluation salience.

In summary, the negative findings may be due to procedural problems in constructing a treatment condition possessing high evaluation salience for High Machs and selecting criterion scores equivalent to those utilized in the 38 experimental studies reviewed by Christie and Geis (1970b). It is suggested that future investigations in this area employ a pilot study to operationally demonstrate that the treatment condition possesses high evaluation salience for High Machs and that the criterion scores be equivalent to those used in the studies upon which the investigations are based to allow greater comparability of findings. A valuable contribution in this regard would be the establishment of standardized norms for the Mach IV test.

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APPENDIX A

MACHIAVELLIAN IV SCALE



## College Philosophy Survey

Instructions

Participation in this survey is completely optional. These items sample student philosophies about the nature of man and society. Take two computer cards. Using pencil, write your name and sex in the upper left hand rectangle of both cards. Now, look at the computer cards. Answers for items 1-17 should be marked on the first card and 18-20 in columns 1, 2, and 3 of the second card. If my answer for item 1 was 1, I would locate column 1 on the first card and look for the bubble that contains (1) and blacken it. Your responses will be held in strict confidence. Results will be made available in several weeks.

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Each item can be marked with a number from 1-7. Make your choice and then mark the proper bubble on the computer card.

1. Never tell anyone the real reason you did something unless it is useful to do so. (7) strongly agree, (6) somewhat agree, (5) slightly agree, (4) no opinion, (3) slightly disagree, (2) somewhat disagree, (1) strongly disagree.
2. The best way to handle people is to tell them what they want to hear. (7) strongly agree, (6) somewhat agree, (5) slightly agree, (4) no opinion, (3) slightly disagree, (2) somewhat disagree, (1) strongly disagree.
3. One should take action only when sure it is morally right. (1) strongly agree, (2) somewhat agree, (3) slightly agree, (4) no opinion, (5) slightly disagree, (6) somewhat disagree, (7) strongly disagree.
4. Most people are basically good and kind. (1) strongly agree, (2) somewhat agree, (3) slightly agree, (4) no opinion, (5) slightly disagree, (6) somewhat disagree, (7) strongly disagree.
5. It is safest to assume that all people have a vicious streak and it will come out when they are given a chance. (7) strongly agree, (6) somewhat agree, (5) slightly agree, (4) no opinion, (3) slightly disagree, (2) somewhat disagree, (1) strongly disagree.
6. Honesty is the best policy in all cases. (1) strongly agree, (2) somewhat agree, (3) slightly agree, (4) no opinion, (5) slightly disagree, (6) somewhat disagree, (7) strongly disagree.
7. There is no excuse for lying to someone. (1) strongly agree, (2) somewhat agree, (3) slightly agree, (4) no opinion, (5) slightly disagree, (6) somewhat disagree, (7) strongly disagree.

8. Generally speaking, men won't work hard unless they're forced to do so. (7) strongly agree, (6) somewhat agree, (5) slightly agree, (4) no opinion, (3) slightly disagree, (2) somewhat disagree, (1) strongly disagree.
9. All in all, it is better to be humble and honest than important and dishonest. (1) strongly agree, (2) somewhat agree, (3) slightly agree, (4) no opinion, (5) slightly disagree, (6) somewhat disagree, (7) strongly disagree.
10. When you ask someone to do something for you, it is best to give the real reasons for wanting it rather than giving reasons which might carry more weight. (1) strongly agree, (2) somewhat agree, (3) slightly agree, (4) no opinion, (5) slightly disagree, (6) somewhat disagree, (7) strongly disagree.
11. Most people who get ahead in the world lead clean, moral lives. (1) strongly agree, (2) somewhat agree, (3) slightly agree, (4) no opinion, (5) slightly disagree, (6) somewhat disagree, (7) strongly disagree.
12. Anyone who completely trusts anyone else is asking for trouble. (7) strongly agree, (6) somewhat agree, (5) slightly agree, (4) no opinion, (3) slightly disagree, (2) somewhat disagree, (1) strongly disagree.
13. The biggest difference between most criminals and other people is that criminals are stupid enough to get caught. (7) strongly agree, (6) somewhat agree, (5) slightly agree, (4) no opinion, (3) slightly disagree, (2) somewhat disagree, (1) strongly disagree.
14. Most men are brave. (1) strongly agree, (2) somewhat agree, (3) slightly agree, (4) no opinion, (5) slightly disagree, (6) somewhat disagree, (7) strongly disagree.
15. It is wise to flatter important people. (7) strongly agree, (6) somewhat agree, (5) slightly agree, (4) no opinion, (3) slightly disagree, (2) somewhat disagree, (1) strongly disagree.
16. It is possible to be good in all respects. (1) strongly agree, (2) somewhat agree, (3) slightly agree, (4) no opinion, (5) slightly disagree, (6) somewhat disagree, (7) strongly disagree.
17. Barnum was very wrong when he said there's a sucker born every minute. (1) strongly agree, (2) somewhat agree, (3) slightly agree, (4) no opinion, (5) slightly disagree, (6) somewhat disagree, (7) strongly disagree.

\*\*\*\*\* Mark your answer to 18 in column one of the second card,  
19 goes in column two and 20 in column 3 \*\*\*\*\*

18. It is hard to get ahead without cutting corners here and there.  
(7) strongly agree, (6) somewhat agree, (5) slightly agree, (4) no opinion, (3) slightly disagree, (2) somewhat disagree, (1) strongly disagree.
19. People suffering from incurable diseases should have the choice of being put painlessly to death.  
(7) strongly agree, (6) somewhat agree, (5) slightly agree, (4) no opinion, (3) slightly disagree, (2) somewhat disagree, (1) strongly disagree.
20. Men forget more easily the death of their father than the loss of their property.  
(7) strongly agree, (6) somewhat agree, (5) slightly agree, (4) no opinion, (3) slightly disagree, (2) somewhat disagree, (1) strongly disagree.

Now, please check both cards to see that name and sex are marked, no blanks are left, and that you have used columns one, two and three on the second card for items 18-20. Thank you for your cooperation.

APPENDIX B

L AND K SCALES

Test Instruments One and Two

Place your name on the two IBM cards. Mark the first - test 1, and the second - test 2. Answers for instrument one should be marked on the first card and those for instrument two on the second. To answer the items, answer true (A) if you believe it to be mostly true, and false (B) if mostly false.

Instrument one

1. I do not always tell the truth.
2. I do not read every editorial in the newspaper every day.
3. Once in a while I put off until tomorrow that I ought to do today.
4. If I could get into a movie without paying and be sure I was not seen I would probably do it.
5. I would rather win than lose a game.
6. I like to know some important people because it makes me feel important.
7. I do not like everyone I know.
8. I gossip a little at times.
9. Sometimes at elections I vote for men about whom I know very little.
10. I get angry sometimes.
11. Once in a while I laugh at a dirty joke.
12. At times I feel like swearing.
13. My table manners are not quite as good at home as when I am out in company.
14. Once in a while I think of things too bad to talk about.
15. Sometimes when I am not feeling well I am cross.

Instrument two

1. At periods my mind seems to work more slowly than usual.
2. I have sometimes felt that difficulties were piling up so high that I could not overcome them.
3. I have often met people who were supposed to be experts who were no better than I.
4. I find it hard to set aside a task that I have undertaken, even for a short time.
5. I like to let people know where I stand on things.
6. At times I feel like swearing.
7. At times I am full of energy.
8. At times I feel like smashing things.
9. I have never felt better in my life than I do now.
10. It takes a lot of argument to convince most people of the truth.
11. I have periods in which I feel unusually cheerful without any special reason.
12. I certainly feel useless at times.
13. Criticism or scolding hurt me terribly.
14. I think a great many people exaggerate their misfortunes in order to gain the sympathy and help of others.
15. Often I can't understand why I have been so cross and grouchy.
16. I get mad easily and then get over it soon.

Instrument two continued

17. What others think of me does not bother me.
18. I have very few quarrels with members of my family.
19. I am against giving money to beggars.
20. At times my thoughts have raced ahead faster than I could speak them.
21. I frequently find myself worrying about something.
22. I worry over money and business.
23. It makes me impatient to have people ask my advice or otherwise interrupt me when I am working on something important.
24. People often dissappoint me.
25. I often think, "I wish I were a child again."
26. I find it hard to make talk when I meet new people.
27. When in a group of people I have trouble thinking of the right things to talk about.
28. Most people will use somewhat unfair means to gain profit or an advantage rather than to lose it.
29. It makes me uncomfortable to put on a stunt at a party even when others are doing the same sort of things.
30. I think nearly anyone would tell a lie to keep out of trouble.

Please check both cards to see that your name and test number are properly marked, and that you have left no blanks. Your cooperation has been appreciated. Full results will be reported shortly.

VITA

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