

THE UNITED STATES AND CHINESE REPRESENTATION
AT THE UNITED NATIONS: A STUDY OF
POLITICAL AND LEGAL CHANGE

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
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
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
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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Purpose of the Study

After twenty-two years of deliberation, the United Nations General Assembly in its twenty-sixth session finally resolved the dispute over Chinese representation. The Albanian resolution,¹ which paved the way for the seating of the representatives of the People's Republic of China and unseated the Nationalist Government of the Republic of China, by a simple majority defeated the United States resolution.² The General Assembly's action appeared to be, perhaps superficially more than realistically, a major defeat for American foreign policy in the United Nations, considering that the American-sponsored "important question resolution" was rejected.³

¹A 23-Power draft resolution was adopted. "Restore all the rights of the People's Republic of China and to recognize the representatives of China to the United Nations, and to expel forthwith the representatives of Chiang Kai-shek from the place which they unlawfully occupied at the United Nations and in all its organizations related to it." "China: General Assembly Decides to Restore Its Rights to the People's Republic of China," United Nations Monthly Chronicle (New York, 1971), VIII, No. 10.

²The representatives of the Nationalist Government withdrew and did not take part in further proceedings of the General Assembly before the Albanian resolution was adopted.

³22-Power draft resolution: "That any proposal which would result in depriving the Republic of China of representation in the United Nations was an important question under Article 18 of the

The issue over Chinese representation in the United Nations began with the fifth session of the General Assembly in 1950 when a Special Committee was established to consider Chinese representation and report to the Assembly. In its report, the Special Committee declared that it was unable to make any recommendations. On the closing day of the fifth session, November 5, 1951, the Assembly decided simply to take note of the report.⁴ A moratorium followed, and there was no substantial discussion of the question in the General Assembly until 1961.

The problem of representation stemmed from the fact that there are two de facto governments--the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China on the mainland and the Nationalist Government of the Republic of China in Taiwan. The Nationalist Government, which occupied the United Nations seat of the state of China, an original member of the United Nations, was expelled from the Asian mainland in 1949. The Soviet Union resolution of 1950 called for the restoration of the lawful rights of the People's Republic of China as the representative of China.⁵ From 1963 to 1971, the Albanian resolution was debated annually until finally the People's Republic of China was seated.

Charter requiring a two-thirds majority vote." A 19-Power proposal affirming the right of representation of the People's Republic of China and affirming the continued right of representation of the Republic of China was not pressed to a vote. Ibid., p. 35.

⁴"Question of the Representation of China in the General Assembly!" Decisions of the Fifth and Sixth Regular Sessions (New York, 1953), Supplement No. 3 to Background Paper No. 46 (February 25, 1952), p. 15.

⁵Two resolutions of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republic:

Statement of the Problem

The purpose of this thesis is to describe the politics and rationales behind the twenty-one years of exclusion from the United Nations of the People's Republic of China, to analyze the role of the United States in this policy, and to explain the reversal of policy by which the People's Republic of China displaced the Republic of China as a permanent member of the United Nations. The hypothesis of this study is that the United States used its enormous power and influence among the members of the United Nations to successfully block the representation of the People's Republic of China for twenty-one years as a sanction for Chinese hostility towards the United States, and that as China developed an independent foreign policy from Moscow and responded to American diplomatic initiatives for a bilateral modus vivendi in Asia, the United States deftly concurred in the seating of the Peking regime in the United Nations.

This thesis will deal with the political and legal methods used by the United States for over twenty years to bar the People's Republic of China from the United Nations. It will attempt to show that the primary reasons for the exclusion of the People's Republic of China were political. Although legal arguments were used during the dis-

A/1369 called for the General Assembly to decide that the representatives of the Kuomintang group cannot take part in the work of the General Assembly and its organs because they are not the representatives of China; A/1370 called for the General Assembly to invite the representatives of the People's Government to take part in the work of the General Assembly and its organs. United Nations Official Records of the General Assembly, Fifth Session, September 19-December 15, 1950 (New York, 1951), pp. 3 & 9. Hereafter cited as GAOR.

cussions, the political aspect of the problem tended to outweigh the legal aspects.

At the end of the Second World War, the United States decided on a global strategy of containment against the Soviet Union. In relation to Asia, the goal was to maintain and safeguard the security of Asian states from communist domination. Fearing Chinese hegemony over the small Asian states, the United States pursued its policy of containment in Asia by means of a number of bilateral and collective military defense pacts with the small non-communist governments, and a concerted effort to isolate the People's Republic of China by means of diplomatic non-recognition, trade and travel embargoes, and exclusion from the United Nations.

The United States played the major role in keeping the People's Republic of China out of the United Nations. It employed its power and influence among its allies in order to secure compliance from them, and the United Nations was used to further United States policy by securing support for United States actions. As United States Ambassador Ball to the United Nations said, "the United Nations is an instrument of United States foreign policy just as it is an instrument of every other state."⁶

American efforts to exclude the People's Republic of China from the United Nations began with the policy of a moratorium, progressed to the "important question" formula, and evolved into the two Chinas policy. Changes in United States policy were affected by changes in

⁶George Ball, "The United Nations and the Real World," U. S. The Department of State Bulletin (Washington D. C., 1962), XLVI, No. 1190 (April 16, 1962), p. 636. Hereafter cited as Bulletin.

the international system, the structural framework of the United Nations and by American domestic politics. The so-called "duopoly" arising from the power structure in the early 1950's had worked favorably for the United States during the period of the moratorium. But in 1961, the issue of Chinese representation was placed on the General Assembly agenda and was influenced by the entry of new states and changes in the international system. To counter this, the United States and her allies triggered a procedural maneuver by passing the "important question" resolution. Thus, the United States was able to delay for a number of years the seating of the People's Republic of China. Most recently, the United States coupled the "important question" resolution with the two Chinas doctrine, hoping that the Republic of China might retain a separate seat in the United Nations.

It will be necessary to look into the problem from the United States perspective. The change in United States policy may be studied from the differing opinions of its allies, a study of the sponsors of a number of draft resolutions introduced before the General Assembly, and the multi-faceted views of the different member states representatives regarding the issue. The study will also deal with the problems faced in securing acceptance of the two Chinas policy and how and why the United States insisted on the two Chinas policy?

Limited recognition of the People's Republic of China outside of the Communist bloc and the alleged violations of the United Nations Charter by the People's Republic of China during the Korean War were the primary legal arguments put forth by the United States. Although recognition is a unilateral act of a state, nevertheless, the

question of Chinese representation was closely related to the question of recognition of the People's Republic of China. A United Nations Secretariat Memorandum of 1950 had rejected recognition policy as a criterion for United Nations action on the question of Chinese representation.⁷ During the period of the moratorium, the United States often equated the legitimacy of the Nationalist Government with the fact that most of the member states in the United Nations recognized the Nationalist Government. But with the growing membership of the United Nations, the United States found it expedient to base its arguments on the question of Chinese representation in the United Nations, on the unlawful behavior of the People's Republic of China in the international community and her belligerent actions during the Korean War. And yet, the United States seemed to recognize the de facto situation of the People's Republic of China by the two Chinas doctrine.

Method and Procedure

Primary sources will be cited to a great extent in presenting a description of the policy pursued by the United States within the United Nations on the question of Chinese representation. These will include the official record of the proceedings of the United Nations General Assembly, as well as the publications of the Department of State. Such secondary studies as monographs and articles on the politics of Chinese representation in the United Nations will be consulted to provide diverse insights on the course of American policy

⁷Sheldon Appleton, The Eternal Triangle (East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 1961), p. 19.

and that of other delegations. The files of the New York Times will also be extensively consulted for factual reporting to analyze the actions of the participants.

Review of Literature

Studies concerning the Chinese representation question have touched lightly on the proceedings of the plenary sessions of the General Assembly. They have dealt more with the two Chinas concept, and particularly, with the status of Taiwan. A comprehensive study is the work of Lung Chu-Chen and Harold D. Laswell.⁸ They have examined the claims put forward by the United States, the Republic of China, and the People's Republic of China to influence the outcome in bloc politics in the United Nations. The authors have advocated an independent Taiwan as a solution. In other words, by focusing on Formosa in seeking a solution to China's participation in the United Nations, they offered a one-China and one-Formosa solution.

In an article concerning the two Chinas concept, Paul M. A. Linebarger has written that the two Chinas policy "begins and ends in Washington D. C. as long as the Washington-Taipei connection remains firm."⁹ The author has presented a view favoring the Nationalist Government. It is of interest to note that he considered Peking the loser since the role of the United States and the Soviet Union would be significant in the resolution of the problem.

⁸Lung Chu-Chen and Harold Laswell, Formosa, China, and the United Nations (New York, 1967).

⁹Paul M. A. Linebarger, "The Two Chinas," Current History, XLVII, No. 277 (September 1964), p. 163.

Sheldon Appleton's The Eternal Triangle presents a historical and analytical study of the United States policy on the question of Chinese representation. He examines the two claimants' status on the basis of a viable government, support from the people and the ability to meet international obligations.¹⁰

What comes closer to this research is the work done by F. B. Schick.¹¹ His study concerns the proceedings of the seventeenth session of the General Assembly. He points out how the debates have centered on the "admission" of the People's Republic of China while the whole matter concerns the "representation" of two claimant governments. Yet this article is now somehow outdated as it was written in 1963.

¹⁰ Appleton.

¹¹ F. B. Schick, "The Question of China in the United Nations," The International and Comparative Law Quarterly, XII, Part 4 (October 1963).

CHAPTER II

DEVELOPMENT OF UNITED STATES CHINA POLICY

Containment, Isolation, Non-Recognition and Moratorium

After the Communist Government took over the mainland from the Nationalist Government, the United States regarded the People's Republic of China as a short-lived government. A policy of non-commitment was enunciated by President Truman on January 5, 1950. He withheld recognition from the Government of the People's Republic of China, but did not support the Nationalist Government. According to President Truman,

The United States has no predatory designs on Formosa or on any other Chinese territory. The United States has no desire to obtain special rights or privileges or to establish military bases on Formosa at this time. Nor does it have any intention of utilizing its armed forces to interfere in the present situation. The United States Government will not pursue a course which will lead to involvement in the civil conflict in China.¹

The United States posture regarding the threat of communism in Asia after the Communist takeover in mainland China was expressed by Secretary of State Acheson in the same month.

We are interested in stopping the spread of communism because communism is a doctrine which we don't happen to like. Communism is the most subtle instrument of Soviet foreign policy. . .

¹Harry Truman, "United States Policy Towards Formosa," Bulletin XX, No. 550 (January 16, 1950), p. 79.

Our real interest is in those people as people. It is because communism is hostile to that interest that we want to stop it. But the best way of doing both things is to do just exactly what the peoples of Asia want to do and what we want to help them to do which is to develop a soundness of administration in their new governments and to develop their resources and their technical skills so that they are not subject to penetration either through ignorance, or because they believe these false promises, or because there is real distress in their areas.²

Congress was divided over the China policy of President Truman, and early in 1950, the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations investigated State Department officials who had been charged by Senator Joseph McCarthy of communist activity or of being communist sympathizers. Through these investigations and through the activities of a nation-wide China Lobby³ the United States public opinion had come to believe that China had been sold out to the Communists. Professor Spanier explained this mood of the United States public when he wrote:

. . .The public did not comprehend the frustrations of American foreign policy in the Far East as compared to its victory in Europe. The assumption that the United States was omnipotent suggested the reason for America's political and military failures: treason within our own government.⁴

²"The Basic Position of the United States: Review of the Position as of 1950," Address by the Secretary of State, January 12, 1950, Bulletin, XXII, No. 551 (January 23, 1950), pp. 111-118.

³"China Lobby" is usually applied rather loosely to that disparate collection of organizations and individuals which in the 1940's and 1950's attempted to influence the United States Government and the American public in favor of supporting the Chinese Nationalists and opposing compromise with the Chinese Communists. A. T. Steele, The American People and China (New York, 1966), p. 112.

⁴John W. Spanier, American Foreign Policy Since World War II (New York, 1968), pp. 104-105.

Professor A. T. Steele explained why such American interest in China was to be expected. He wrote,

. . .The long standing relationship between China and the United States when the latter made itself the "protector" of China from European powers by the Open Door Policy was viewed as though China was a ward of the United States.⁵

The domestic political situation and the Korean War caused a reversal of policy by President Truman. The new policy was one of containment coupled with continuing pressure on the Chinese Communist regime.⁶ President Truman stated on June 27, 1950 that in view of North Korea's action, the occupation of Formosa by Communist forces would be a direct threat to the security of the Pacific area and to the United States forces. He ordered the United States Seventh Fleet to prevent any Communist attack on Formosa and to see that all Nationalist air and sea operations against the mainland were halted.⁷

When the Chinese Communists entered the Korean War in November 1950, this was considered by the United States Government to represent a policy of expansion in Asia. To counter this, the United States added to the policy of containment the objective of isolating China from the rest of her Asian neighbors and the world. This was pursued in the United Nations to the fullest extent and in 1951 the United States pressured the General Assembly to declare the People's Republic of China the aggressor in Korea.

⁵Steele, p. 15.

⁶A. Doak Barnett in Robert Blum, ed., The United States and China in World Affairs (New York, 1966), p. 136.

⁷Henrietta Poynter, ed., China and United States Far East Policy 1945-1966 (Washington D. C., 1967), p. 8.

. . .American diplomats were reportedly instructed to tell the governments to which they were accredited that American public opinion might shift sharply if the United Nations ignored the Chinese aggression and that the fate of the United Nations might hinge upon the action taken by the General Assembly.⁸

The United States, in addition, guaranteed the security of Asian states by means of bilateral and military treaties and the Senate of the United States, on March 20, 1952, approved the four treaties which provided a foundation for security in the Pacific.⁹

The Eisenhower administration continued this policy of containment and isolation. Secretary of State Dulles gave priority to the policy of isolating China and protecting the Far East over the policy of protecting Europe against the threat of the Communists. He explained his policy in the following statement:

We negotiated with the Governments of Britain, France, and other maritime powers for tightening of the blockade of Communist China. They are taking important and practical measures to restrict the voyages of their own ships to China and to withhold fuel from ships of other nations which are carrying strategic goods to China.

You can see as others have seen that a new order of priority and urgency has been given to the Far East. Further, it has been made clear that we consider that our Eastern friends from Japan, Korea, and Formosa to Indochina and Malaya face a single hostile front, to be met with a common purpose and growing cooperation as between the component parts of freedom.

This means that the Communists in the Far East can no longer count on winning by shifting their strength and by focusing attack on one or another free-world position.

⁸ Donald G. Bishop, The Administration of United States Foreign Policy through the United Nations (Dobbs Ferry, New York, 1967), p. 65.

⁹ These four treaties are: Treaty of Peace with Japan, Security Treaty between the United States and Japan, Mutual Defense Treaty between the United States and the Philippines, and Security Treaty between Australia, New Zealand, and the United States (ANZUS).

that is isolated from the others. The Communist strategy based on a contiguous land mass, is now confronted by a growing free world unity based upon the peninsular positions and offshore island chain now controlled by the free peoples of Asia.¹⁰

To further guarantee the security of Asian states, a defense chain was built around the periphery of the Asian mainland. The mutual security defense pact, signed by eight countries in September 1954, formed the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO), and in December of the same year, a mutual defense pact was signed by the United States Government and the Nationalist Chinese Government.

The policy of isolation was also carried out a step further through trade and travel embargoes and diplomatic non-recognition. Arguments were advanced against the recognition of China by such leading statesmen as President Eisenhower, former President Hoover, Secretary of State John F. Dulles, former Ambassador Philip Jessup, officials of the Department of State, fifty-six senators in a petition to the President, and spokesmen of the China Lobby.

The reasons given why the United States should withhold recognition were: 1) non-recognition was part of a broader policy that included support for the Nationalist Government in Taiwan while anticipating the collapse of the Communist regime;¹¹ 2) the Communist government had failed to fulfill its international obligations, such as the maltreatment of American consular officials and American

¹⁰John F. Dulles, "The First 90 Days," Bulletin, XXVIII, No. 722 (April 27, 1953), p. 605.

¹¹Joseph G. Whelan, "The United States and Diplomatic Recognition: The Contrasting Cases of Russia and Communist China," The China Quarterly, No. 5 (January-March 1961), p. 219.

prisoners of the Korean War; 3) Communist China's international behavior was deemed to be hostile to the United Nations and aggressive in that it was supporting violent revolutions to establish communism in other countries; and 4) recognition and acceptance of the Peking regime would have weakened the will of the Asian states to resist Communist expansion.¹²

In applying the objective tests of international law,¹³ we find there was no doubt that the Central People's Government exercised actual control and authority over its territory and commanded the support of its people. T. C. Chen points out that non-fulfilment of the international obligations requirement has often been used as a pretext for withholding recognition whenever the wish of the recognizing state is not fully complied with.¹⁴ President Eisenhower on this point stated:

We must remember that different nations have different interpretations on what recognition of a nation means. Ever since Wilson's time, we in this country have more or less gone on the theory that recognition also means tacit approval. At one time, recognition meant just recognition of the fact that there was a de facto ruler of an important segment of the world. In certain countries, that viewpoint still holds. With us, because there has been a different meaning developed in this country on this word "recognition," we have to view the case differently.¹⁵

¹²Vladimir Petrov, What China Policy? (Hamden, Connecticut, 1961), p. 11.

¹³For a comparative study of the affirmative and negative evidences concerning the recognition of the Government of the People's Republic of China see: J. Weston Walch, Complete Handbook on Recognition of Communist China (Portland, Maine, 1954).

¹⁴Petrov, p. 8.

¹⁵"The March of News," U. S. News, No. 34 (May 22, 1953), p. 4.

The United States felt that recognition of the Government of the People's Republic of China would weaken American leadership and would jeopardize American commitments to Taiwan and the non-communist states. McConaughy says that recognition assumed a political and psychological significance which meant in the eyes of millions, especially in Asia, not necessarily approval but acceptance, accommodation and reconciliation.¹⁶

The United States position on recognition is important because it explained in part the United States policy regarding the question of Chinese representation in the United Nations. The period from 1949 to 1960 has been described as the period of the moratorium on the Chinese question at the United Nations.

The Period of the Moratorium

The issue of Chinese representation came about when the Government of the People's Republic of China protested in 1949 that it was the rightful representative of China. The memorandum addressed to the Secretary-General called for the expulsion of the representatives of the Nationalist Government of the Republic of China in the United Nations.

On March 8, 1950, United Nations Secretary-General Trygve Lie implied in a memorandum to all the delegations that the Communist

¹⁶Richard McConaughy, Director of the Office of Chinese Affairs, "China in the Shadow of Communism," U. S. The Department of State Publication (Washington D. C., 1954), Far Eastern Series 63, p. 6.

Government should be permitted to take China's seat at the United Nations,¹⁷ but Lie did not have his way.

In the fifth session of the General Assembly, the discussion was primarily over which government was the legal representative of China, therefore, which delegation's credentials should be accepted? India stated that the Government of the People's Republic of China was the legitimate representative, while the United States argued that only sixteen member states out of fifty-nine had granted recognition to the People's Republic of China. Three draft resolutions were submitted to the General Assembly. The Indian and USSR draft resolutions to seat the representatives of the People's Republic of China were defeated; the Canadian resolution to establish a Special Committee to deal with the question won.¹⁸ The President of the General Assembly thereupon selected the members of the Special Committee and asked them to report to the Assembly. The Soviet Union objected on the ground that out of seven members, only two recognized the Government of the People's Republic of China. The President replied that the basis for his selection was the proportion of member states in the United Nations which had recognized the People's Republic of China, namely one-third, and so in a committee of seven members, one-third corresponded to two members.

The fifth session was also the scene of another debate on China.

¹⁷Poynter, p. 51.

¹⁸"Question of the Representation of China in the United Nations: Membership of the Special Committee," GAOR, Fifth Session, (305th Plenary Meeting), p. 391.

Cuba¹⁹ had placed on the agenda a draft resolution to establish an ad hoc political committee to deal with the "Recognition by the United Nations of the Representation of a Member State." The representatives of the Soviet Union cited this as another example by the United States to obstruct the admission of the People's Republic of China.²⁰ Members of the Communist bloc interpreted the Cuban action as an attempt to block the admission of the People's Republic of China, so the Polish delegate stated that while discussion in the committee purportedly considered the problem in the abstract, it was clear throughout the debates that China was the real issue.

The Ad Hoc Political Committee report which was adopted as Resolution 396 (V) by the General Assembly on December 14, 1950, recommended that,

Whenever more than one authority claims to be the Government entitled to represent a Member State in the United Nations and this question becomes the subject of controversy in the Organization, the question should be considered in the light of the Purposes and Principles of the Charter and the circumstances of each case. The Assembly recommends that, when any such question arises, it should be considered by the General Assembly or by the Interim Committee if the Assembly is not in session.²¹

¹⁹Cuba at that time did not have a Communist government.

²⁰"Recognition by the United Nations of the Representation of a Member State: Report of the Ad Hoc Political Committee (A/1578 and Add1)," GAOR Fifth Session, pp. 675-676.

²¹"Recognition by the United Nations of the Representation of a Member State," United Nations Decisions of the Fifth and Sixth Sessions (New York, February 25, 1952), Supplement No. 3 to Background Paper No. 46, p. 15. A Sub-Committee of the Ad Hoc Political Committee which prepared the report was composed of the representatives of Australia, Belgium, China, Cuba, Denmark, the Dominican Republic, Egypt, France, India, Turkey, the United Kingdom, the United States, Uruguay and Venezuela.

The year 1950 did not produce any United Nations action to seat the People's Republic of China.

From 1951 to 1960, the Chinese representation question was not placed on the agenda of the General Assembly. The issue was discussed in the General Committee, while it was considering the agenda of the General Assembly, and also in the Credentials Committee.²² The General Committee kept recommending to the General Assembly the United States draft resolution to postpone the discussion of the issue for the duration of each session. The Soviet Union and India kept countering this by submitting other draft resolutions and even tried to introduce amendments to the draft resolution of the General Committee but without success.

For example, on November 13, 1951 the General Committee submitted to the General Assembly a draft resolution to postpone discussion of the issue during the sixth session. The Soviet Union blamed the Anglo-American bloc for preventing consideration of the issue, and those who supported the Soviet Union's draft resolution argued that a precedent had been set by General Assembly Resolution 396 (V) recommending that the question of representation should be considered by the General Assembly or by the Interim Committee if the Assembly was not in session.²³ The United States argued that since the Soviet Union had continuously proposed the issue in fully ninety organs :

²²The General Committee of the General Assembly is composed of the President, seven Vice-Presidents, and the Chairmen of the eight committees. The General Committee is responsible for making the draft proposal for the agenda of the General Assembly sessions.

²³"Adoption of the Agenda," GAOR Sixth Session, November 6, 1951-February 5, 1952 (342nd Meeting, November 13, 1951), pp. 100-101.

of the United Nations, no useful purpose would be served by continuing the debate. The General Committee's recommendation was adopted by thirty-seven votes to eleven with four abstentions. The USSR draft resolution was not voted upon as the Committee's resolution was contrary to it. Naturally, this meant that the Chinese question was not placed on the agenda.

Interpretations of the rules and procedures of the General Assembly have often been the source of conflict on how to vote on the draft China resolutions. In the eight session of the General Assembly, President Lester Pearson made a ruling based on Rule 91 which states that if two or more proposals relate to the same question, the General Assembly shall, unless it decides otherwise, vote on the proposals in the order in which they have been submitted.²⁴ Since both the United States and USSR draft resolutions dealt with the question of Chinese representation, the United States draft resolution was given priority, being submitted first and voted first. It was adopted by forty votes to eight with eight abstentions. When the President placed the USSR draft resolution to a vote, the United States delegate appealed the ruling of the President. The United States appeal was voted on and was rejected. The USSR proposal was then ready to be voted on. Great Britain, thereupon, asked for a recount of the votes on the United States appeal and the Soviet Union delegate stated that the British action was a political move and a lack of confidence in the President. Turkey joined in to ask

²⁴"Question of Representation of China," GAOR Eight Session, September 15- December 9, 1953 (432nd Plenary Meeting, September 15, 1953), p. 10.

why a vote was needed on the Russian proposal when the United States proposal already had been carried. The President replied that such an illogical step had been established in the first session of the General Assembly which established the habit of voting on proposals after a contrary proposal had been adopted. Finally, the President accepted Thailand's proposal that voting be on the basis of the second sentence of rule 91, stating that the General Assembly may after each vote on a proposal decide whether to vote on the next proposal.²⁵ The President asked the Assembly whether to vote or not to vote on the Russian proposal, and the Assembly voted not to vote on the Russian proposal. In all succeeding sessions of the General Assembly, the United States proposal always had priority in voting since it was part of the General Committee's recommendation which was submitted first.

Several countries criticized the General Committee's recommendation on the floor of the General Assembly. India and Nepal said that the Committee had acted ultra vires its own power, and pointed out that its recommendation cannot be final, and that it was the General Assembly which should make the decision.²⁶ They pointed out that the Committee's action was in fact contrary to the Charter and the previous decisions of the General Assembly, namely Resolution 396

²⁵Ibid., p. 12.

²⁶Functions of the General Committee are basically those of making recommendations concerning the inclusion of items in the agenda, the rejection of requests for inclusion or the inclusion of item in the provisional agenda of future session. GAOR Eleventh Session, November 12, 1956-March 8, 1957 (578th Plenary Meeting, November 15, 1956), p. 59.

(V), which was adopted in 1950. The United States countered by saying that there was no need to discuss further the procedural matter, and that "The General Committee's report should be upheld, as a substantial majority of the General Committee approved it by a substantial vote."²⁷ Others have pointed out that the General Committee was precipitating action that would affect the work of the Credentials Committee.²⁸ This is because the report of the Credentials Committee was usually considered by the General Assembly on the closing date or, in any case, on one of the last days of the session, that is, after consideration of the General Committee's recommendation;²⁹ which meant that action on the General Committee's report would have affected the decision of the General Assembly whenever it examined the report of the Credentials Committee.

The United States thus used the General Committee's report in a procedural maneuver to stop the General Assembly from considering the Chinese question. The use of the General Committee, which deals with procedural matters, to influence a political decision is explained by Patricia Ann Peyton who wrote:

The General Committee's importance paradoxically, is political. Procedural matters can become very important

²⁷"Adoption of the Agenda," GAOR Thirteenth Session, September 16-December 13, 1958 (753rd Plenary Meeting, September 22, 1958), p. 66.

²⁸The Credentials Committee's function is to examine the credentials of the representatives of member states of the United Nations.

²⁹S. E. Werners, The Presiding Officers in the United Nations (Haarlem, 1967), p. 69.

politically. Each country desires to protect its special interests which could be harmed through inclusion on the agenda; if a detrimental item is included, there is still opportunity for countries to protect their political interests by changing the wording of the item, or by grouping it with others to diminish its importance, or emphasizing the most favorable aspect of the question by allocating it to a Committee which will view it from a favorable angle.³⁰

In the Credentials Committee, India and the Soviet Union kept asking regularly for the invalidation of the credentials of the Government of the Republic of China. In 1952 the Credentials Committee discussed a USSR and Byelorussian SSR's draft resolution to declare invalid the credentials of the Nationalist Government delegation.³¹ The United States argued that Communist China could not be admitted because it was found guilty of aggression in Korea. The United States motion not to vote on the USSR draft resolution was sustained, and the report of the Credentials Committee was adopted.³² When the report went before the General Assembly, the Assembly blocked the discussion of the question despite the Soviet Union's repeated endeavors to raise it again, refusing to let the Soviet Union explain why it voted "yes" on the Byelorussian SSR's draft resolution before the Credentials Committee.

³⁰Patricia Ann Peyton, "The Evolution and Importance of the General Committee of the United Nations' General Assembly" (unpub. master's thesis, Purdue University, 1963), p. 156.

³¹"Report of the Credentials Committee," GAOR Sixth Session (351st Plenary Meeting, December 7, 1951), p. 212.

³²"Report of the Credentials Committee," GAOR Seventh Session, October 14, 1952-August 28, 1953 (389th Plenary Meeting, October 25, 1952), pp. 167-168.

The moratorium policy of the United States does not mean there were absolutely no discussions of the Chinese representation question in the General Assembly's plenary sessions. Actually, discussions of the problem of representation took place while the General Committee's report was being considered, that is, before the agenda was approved.

Arguments during the said General Assembly's plenary sessions linked the question of Chinese representation with de facto control, recognition, legality through democratic elections, the admission of states based on universality versus states working for peace and are peace-loving, and the realistic need to have the People's Republic of China in the United Nations. Due to the extensive arguments posited by different delegations, this paper will give the views on the basis of the arguments of the delegates of the pro group, those who favored the seating of the People's Republic of China, and the delegates of the anti group, those against the seating.

The problem of de facto control and whether a state is or is not peace-loving kept coming up as a basis for the discussion of the problem despite the Lie Memorandum of 1950. Walter Robertson, United States Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs, gave the following reasons in 1954 why the United States was opposed to the seating of Communist China.

The United Nations is not an organization of de facto governments. It is an organization of nations which under the United Nations Charter have renounced war as an instrument of national policy and have pledged themselves to take collective action to oppose aggression and preserve peace.

Red China has flagrantly violated the international obligations assumed by responsible governments.³³

³³Walter S. Robertson, "Communist Tactics in the Far East," Bulletin XXXVIII, No. 791 (August 23, 1954), p. 262.

The United States and her allies maintained that they recognized the Nationalist Government as the de jure government of China, and pointed out that they considered the Nationalist Government to be the representative of the Chinese people. Robertson had this to say about the United States position:

It is true that the Peiping regime does now exercise physical control over a larger area of Chinese territory than that under the control of the Republic of China. However, this situation represents a military rather than a political reality. The Republic of China has repeatedly stated its willingness to rest its claim to represent the Chinese people on the basis of free elections held throughout the country. The Communist military dictatorship of Peiping does not dare to submit its claim to such test.³⁴

The pro group criticized the United States for applying the criteria of de jure control, recognition, and legality through democratic elections, and claimed that the United States' bias against the political system of the People's Republic of China was the major reason for the United States opposition. According to the pro group, the People's Republic of China had been recognized by thirty-three states, was exercising authority over the entire mainland, was educating the people, and was fostering peaceful coexistence as declared in the Bandung Conference of 1954. Czechoslovakia said that the denial of China's legitimate right to recognition was a typical consequence of the appearance of a "cold war" in the organization.³⁵

³⁴Walter S. Robertson, "United States Position Before the United Nations General Assembly, September 21, 1959," American Foreign Policy Current Documents, 1959, p. 13.

³⁵"Adoption of the Agenda," GAOR Fourteenth Session, September 15 December 13, 1959 (800th Plenary Meeting, September 21, 1959), p. 64.

The pro group added that the criteria to be applied in the question of representation should be the principles of universality and political reality. To this the United States replied that the principle of universality in membership was not applicable and that the United Nations was not engaged in promoting realism. According to the United States delegate,

. . .This hall is not a mere cockpit in which the criminals and the law-abiding are indiscriminately scrambled. The United Nations Charter says that Member States should be "peace-loving."³⁶

The pro group replied that the People's Republic of China had made valuable contributions to the Korean War negotiations and the Geneva Conference on Indochina, and that these were signs of her adherence to peace. The USSR argued that the failure to seat the People's Republic of China was contrary to the Charter of the United Nations and did not serve to strengthen either international security or world peace. Ceylon stressed the need to seat the People's Republic of China, and said that with the Chinese in the United Nations, crucial matters such as the test ban treaty could be discussed. Ceylon further gave the example of the settlement of the 1956 Middle East Crisis which was worked out through negotiations made possible by the United Nations.³⁷

³⁶"Adoption of the Agenda," GAOR Twelfth Session, September 17-December 14, 1957 (684th Plenary Meeting, September 23, 1957), p. 128.

³⁷"Adoption of the Agenda," GAOR Thirteenth Session (754th Plenary Meeting, September 23, 1958), p. 85.

The world crises were used by the anti group as pretexts for blocking the placing of the issue on the agenda. In 1951 and 1956, the United States recommended the adoption of the General Committee's report "due to the prevailing crises in Korea and in the Middle East." In 1951 Burma replied that the most potent argument presented in support of the General Committee's recommendation was the situation in Korea, yet the crisis would not have occurred had the representative of the People's Republic of China been seated.³⁸ In 1956 India asked why the United Kingdom and France, who are members of the Security Council, were not denounced for aggression against Egypt, the way the People's Republic of China was denounced as an aggressor in the Korean War.

Other incidents, e.g., the Hungarian Crisis, the Quemoy and offshore islands crises and even the Congo Crisis were used to block any deliberation of the Chinese representation question. Ireland stated that the situation in Hungary did not warrant the deliberation of the issue, while others drew comparisons between events in Hungary and Communist China.³⁹ Canada declared that the Quemoy and offshore islands crises were manifestations of the aggressive nature of the People's Republic of China, and thus, the inclusion of the issue was untimely. Bulgaria ridiculed the claim that Chinese representation in the General Assembly would create an unpropitious

³⁸"Adoption of the Agenda: Report of the General Committee," GAOR Sixth Session (342nd Plenary Meeting, November 13, 1951), p. 101.

³⁹"Adoption of the Agenda, GAOR Eleventh Session (578th Plenary Meeting, November 15, 1956), p. 52.

atmosphere for the Warsaw talks between the United States and the People's Republic of China regarding Formosa and the offshore islands.⁴⁰

The United States in 1960 presented a new argument when it charged that the attitude of the Chinese Communists in African matters was "entirely" aggressive and warlike. It circulated as a United Nations document a statement made by the Mayor of Peking, Mr. Peng Chen, and argued that the statement clearly showed the hostility of the Peking regime and Peking's propaganda campaign against the United States. This was the part of the statement to which the United States took strong objection:

. . .The recent armed intervention of the United States imperialism in the Congo under the cover of the United Nations flag has disclosed most nakedly that the United States imperialism is the most vicious enemy of nationalist independence in Africa.⁴¹

Guinea replied that the People's Republic of China was not a threat to the African states and pointed out that the People's Republic of China had the backing of the African states. Guinea further noted that a resolution calling for the restoration of the rights of the People's Republic of China had been adopted by the Afro-Asian Conference in April 1960.⁴² Ghana stated that the African struggle for independence against colonialism was a nationalist

⁴⁰"Agenda Item 9," GAOR Thirteenth Session (749th Plenary Meeting, September 18, 1958), p. 71.

⁴¹"Adoption of the Agenda," GAOR Fifteenth Session, I, Part 1 (881st Plenary Meeting, October 1, 1960), p. 305.

⁴²Ibid.

movement; yet the West was claiming it was communist and that African leaders such as Lumumba were branded as communist agents.⁴³

On a number of occasions during the General Assembly's plenary sessions, the pro group pointed out that the moratorium policy would eventually lead to a two Chinas policy. In the debate of 1960, the pro group accused the anti group of propagating a two Chinas concept. The United States delegate denied this, stating that: "The issue is not two or one China [sic] but the behavior of the China which seeks admission."⁴⁴

The arguments by the pro and anti groups thus often dealt with the substantial aspects of the problem, with the pro group always insisting on placing the Chinese representation question on the agenda. Most of the speakers belonged to the pro group, and they felt that the General Committee recommendation was an act of injustice to the People's Republic of China. One way to gauge the strength of the positions of the pro and anti groups is to study the arguments used. Another way is to show the number of member states supporting the United States and how many were for the People's Republic of China. The pattern of voting in the General Assembly reveals this.

Patterns of Voting

By using the bloc system of voting, it can be seen which bloc supported the moratorium policy of the United States. It does not

⁴³Ibid., p. 362.

⁴⁴Ibid., (891st Plenary Meeting, October 6, 1960), p. 545.

mean that all of them voted the same way everytime; in fact, only the Soviet bloc is considered to be a true bloc in this sense.⁴⁵ The following table of votes for the years 1950-1960 shows which countries voted for or against the moratorium.⁴⁶

⁴⁵A bloc is a group of states which meet regularly in caucus, and the members of which are bound in their votes in the General Assembly caucus decision. Thomas Hovet Jr., Bloc Politics in the United Nations (Cambridge, 1960), pp. 30-31.

⁴⁶A. M. Halpern, ed., Policies Toward China (New York, 1965),

TABLE I
UNITED NATIONS VOTES RELATED TO THE CHINA QUESTION, 1950-60^a

	1950 seat	1951 aggr	1951 ^b mora	1952 mora	1953 ^b mora	1954 mora	1955 mora	1956 mora	1957 mora	1958 mora	1959 mora	1960 mora
Countries (by bloc)												
SOVIET BLOC												
1. USSR	x	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
2. Ukraine	x	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
3. Byelorussia	x	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
4. Czechoslovakia	x	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
5. Poland	x	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
6. Albania												
7. Bulgaria												
8. Hungary												
9. Rumania												
WESTERN EUROPE BLOC												
10. France	a	x		x		x	x	x	x	x	x	x
11. United Kingdom ^c	x	x		x		x	x	x	x	x	x	x
12. Denmark	x	x		x								
13. Netherlands	x	x		x		x	x	x	x	x	x	x
14. Norway	x	x		x								
15. Sweden	x	a										
16. Yugoslavia	x	a		a								
17. Finland												
18. Belgium	-	x		x		x	x	x	x	a	x	x
19. Greece	-	x		x		x	x	x	x	a	x	x
20. Iceland	-	x		x		x	x	x	x	a	a	a
21. Luxembourg	-	x		x		x	x	x	x	x	x	x
22. Austria								x	x	a	a	a
23. Ireland								x				
24. Italy								x	x	x	x	x
25. Spain								x	x	x	x	x
26. Portugal								a	a	a	a	a
LATIN AMERICAN BLOC												
27. Cuba	-	x		x		x	x	x	x	x	a	-
28. Argentina	a	x		x		x	x	x	x	x	x	x
29. Bolivia	-	x		a		x	x	x	x	x	x	x
30. Brazil	-	x		x		x	x	x	x	x	x	x
31. Chile	-	x		x		x	x	x	x	x	x	x
32. Colombia	-	x		x		x	x	x	x	x	x	x
33. Costa Rica	-	x		x		x	x	x	x	x	x	x
34. Dominican Republic	-	x		x		x	x	x	x	x	x	x
35. Ecuador	a	x		x		x	x	x	x	x	x	x
36. El Salvador	-	x		x		x	x	x	x	x	x	x
37. Guatemala	a	x		x		x	x	x	x	x	x	x
38. Haiti	-	x		x		x	x	x	x	x	x	x
39. Honduras	-	x		x		x	x	x	x	x	x	x
40. Mexico	-	x		x		x	x	x	x	x	x	x
41. Nicaragua	-	x		x		x	x	x	x	x	x	x
42. Panama	-	x		x		x	x	x	x	x	x	x
43. Paraguay	-	x		x		x	x	x	x	x	x	x
44. Peru	-	x		x		x	x	x	x	x	x	x
45. Uruguay	-	x		x		x	x	x	x	x	x	x
46. Venezuela	-	x		x		x	x	x	x	x	x	x
AFRO-ASIAN BLOC												
47. Philippines	-	x		x		x	x	x	x	x	x	x
48. Thailand	-	x		x		x	x	x	x	x	x	x
49. Japan									x	x	x	x
50. Afghanistan	x	a		a		a	a	-	-	-	-	-
51. Burma	x	-		-		-	-	-	-	-	-	-
52. Indonesia		a		a		a	-	-	-	-	-	-
53. Cambodia								a	a	-	-	-
54. Laos								a	a	a	x	-
55. Nepal								-	-	-	-	-

Key: x=for -=against a=abstained nv=not voting

^aThe General Assembly votes covered by this table are:

- (1) 1950 - a resolution to oust the representatives of the Republic of China and to seat the People's Republic of China.
- (2) 1951 - a resolution to condemn the People's Republic of China as an "aggressor" in Korea and a resolution to postpone discussion the representation question (a moratorium resolution).
- (3) 1952-1960 - moratorium resolutions similar to that of 1951.

The dates refer to the year in which the vote occurred, not necessarily to the year in which the Assembly was convened.

^bThe 1951 and 1953 moratorium votes were not roll-call votes, so only totals are available for these two years.

^cPermanent members of the Security Council.

TABLE I (Continued)

	1950 seat	1951 aggr	1951 ^b mora	1952 mora	1953 ^b mora	1954 mora	1955 mora	1956 mora	1957 mora	1958 mora	1959 mora	1960 mora
56. Iran	-	x		x		x	x	x	x	x	x	x
57. Iraq	-	x		x		x	x	x	x	-	-	-
58. Turkey	-	x		x		x	x	x	x	x	x	x
59. Lebanon	a	x		x		x	x	x	x	x	x	x
60. Saudi Arabia	a	a		a		a	a	a	a	a	a	a
61. Syria ^d	a	a		a		a	a	-	-	-	-	-
62. UAR (Egypt) ^d	a	a		x		a	a	-	-	-	-	-
63. Yemen	a	a		a		a	a	-	-	-	-	-
64. Jordan								a	x	x	x	x
65. Libya								a	x	a	a	a
66. Tunisia								a	a	a	a	a
67. Morocco								x	-	-	-	-
68. Ethiopia	-	x		x		x	x	x	x	x	a	-
69. Liberia	-	x		x		x	x	x	x	x	x	x
70. Sudan								-	-	-	-	-
71. Guinea												-
72. Cameroun												a
73. Central African Republic												a
74. Chad												a
75. Congo (Brazzaville) ^a												a
76. Congo (Leopoldville)												nv
77. Dahomey												a
78. Gabon												a
79. Ivory Coast												a
80. Malagasy												a
81. Mali												-
82. Niger												a
83. Senegal												-
84. Somalia												a
85. Togo												a
86. Upper Volta												a
COMMONWEALTH BLOC												
87. Canada	a	x		x		x	x	x	x	x	x	x
88. Australia	-	x		x		x	x	x	x	x	x	x
89. New Zealand	-	x		x		x	x	x	x	x	x	x
90. Federation of Malaya									x	x	x	a
91. India	x	-		a		-	-	-	-	-	-	-
92. Pakistan	x	a		a		x	x	x	x	x	x	x
93. Ceylon								-	-	-	-	-
94. Cyprus												a
95. Ghana												-
96. Nigeria												-
97. South Africa	-	x		x		x	x	x	nv	x	x	x
NON BLOC STATES ^c												
98. United States ^c	-	x		x		x	x	x	x	x	x	x
99. Republic of China	-	x		x		x	x	x	x	x	x	x
100. Israel	x	x		a		x	a	a	a	a	a	a

TABLE TOTALS

	1950 seat	1951 aggr	1951 ^b mora	1952 mora	1953 ^b mora	1954 mora	1955 mora	1956 mora	1957 mora	1958 mora	1959 mora	1960 mora
For	16	44	37	42	44	43	42	47	48	44	44	42
Against	33	7	11	7	10	11	12	24	27	28	29	34
Abstain	10	9	4	11	2	6	6	8	6	9	9	22
Not Voting	0	0	8	0	4	0	0	0	1	0	0	1
TOTAL MEMBERSHIP	59	60	60	60	60	60	60	79	82	81	82	99

^dIn 1958 Egypt and Syria formed the United Arab Republic, and Syria gave up her seat in the General Assembly. That union was dissolved in 1961. Syria then returned to the Assembly as an independent country, but Egypt retained the name "United Arab Republic" for itself.

We can see that the Soviet bloc continuously voted against the moratorium resolution. The Latin-American bloc regularly voted with the United States, except for Cuba, which underwent a change of government in 1959, and abstained from voting in 1959 and 1960.

The Western European bloc was divided. States voting consistently with the United States were the United Kingdom, France, the Netherlands, Belgium, Greece, Luxembourg, Italy, and Spain. Sweden started to vote against the moratorium in 1952, while Denmark and Norway voted against it in 1954. Ireland voted for the moratorium until 1956 but changed in 1957. Austria voted in favor of the moratorium in 1956 and 1957 but abstained thereafter while Portugal continuously abstained from voting. Yugoslavia and Finland continuously voted against the moratorium resolution.

The Afro-Asian bloc countries belonging to the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization, those which had bilateral treaties with the United States like Japan, the Philippines, and Thailand, and some countries in the Middle East like Turkey, Iran, and Lebanon, as well as Liberia and South Africa, all voted consistently with the United States.

Of the Commonwealth bloc states, the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Malaya, and South Africa voted consistently for the United States resolution. Pakistan supported the United States except for one abstention in 1952, while India and Ceylon voted against the moratorium.

Non-bloc states such as the Republic of China and the United States voted consistently for the moratorium resolution. Israel's voting record shows support for the moratorium and a number of

abstentions.

The table totals show that from 1956 the votes against the moratorium began to increase while there was little change in favor of the moratorium. This was due to the growing United Nations membership from seventy-nine in 1956 to ninety-nine in 1960. The voting in 1960 on the report of the General Committee showed that while the report was accepted, it failed to win a majority for the first time. More countries voted against it, abstained or did not vote. This was a signal for the United States to use a new strategy in the United Nations. The new African countries seem to have been responsible for this:

. . . There was a significant development with respect to the attitudes of the new United Nations members, mostly African countries. Thirteen abstained while three voted against the moratorium resolution.⁴⁷

⁴⁷ "Chinese Representation in the United Nations," United States Participation in the United Nations: Report by the President to the Congress for the Year 1960 (Washington D. C., 1961), Department of State Publication 7341, International Organization and Conference Series 27, p. 100.

CHAPTER III

A REAPPRAISAL OF UNITED STATES POLICY

From a Policy of Containment and Isolation to Rapprochement

The policy to exclude the People's Republic of China from the United Nations was pursued by the United States from 1961 to 1970 in a new form. The General Assembly voting turn-out in 1960 as reported in the previous chapter, and the differences in opinion between the United States and her allies led the United States to abandon the moratorium policy and adopt the "important question" policy in the United Nations.

The growing membership of third world countries in the United Nations necessitated the application, by the end of the fifties, of more pressure on member states by the United States in order to maintain its position in the sixties. Other signs of the growing influence of the third world bloc were the ideological split in the Sino-Soviet camp, the United Nations' crises resulting from peace-keeping operations in different parts of the world, particularly its handling of the problems of colonialism and disarmament, and finally, the appointment of U Thant, who came from a neutral third world country, to succeed Dag Hammarskjold as Secretary-General of the United Nations.

In this United Nations atmosphere, the United States launched its "important question" policy and maintained it for a decade within the

councils of the United Nations, while outside the United Nations, in Warsaw, the United States was negotiating with the People's Republic of China. Trade and travel restrictions were relaxed, and American antipathy toward the People's Republic of China became more restrained compared to the previous decade; yet, the United States posture against the seating of the People's Republic of China did not change. This policy of exclusion of China continued during the Kennedy, Johnson and the first part of the Nixon administrations.

In 1961, the United States for the first time succeeded in mustering support at the United Nations for a resolution that declared the representation of China to be an "important question" requiring a two-thirds majority vote of the General Assembly. The United States did not submit similar resolutions in 1962 and 1963, and the voting was confined to resolutions to seat the People's Republic of China, one submitted by the USSR in 1962 and the other by Albania in 1963, and both were defeated.

Fears of an expansionist China and of its extremist form of communism continued in those years to influence United States policy toward the People's Republic of China. Two United States Department of State officers explained this position. In a speech in 1963 before the Commonwealth Club, Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs Roger Hilsman stated:

. . . Faced with the realities of the nuclear age, the Soviet Union appears to recognize that certain interests--notably survival--are shared by all mankind. Peiping, however, remains wedded to a fundamentalist form of communism, even if it threatens the physical ruin of the civilized world. It refuses to admit that there are common interests which cross ideological lines.

United States policy is influenced by Chinese obsessive suspicion of the outside world, far exceeding that

of the Soviet Union.¹

Deputy Assistant Secretary of Far Eastern Affairs Marshall Green, who addressed a Princeton University Conference on February 26, 1965, said,

We avoid those actions which would tend to strengthen Communist China's position or contribute to the realization of its expansionist goals. Thus, we refuse to establish diplomatic relations with China or to promote its seating in the United Nations.²

There was no discussion of the Chinese representation question in 1964 due to a financial crisis in the United Nations. In 1965 the United States submitted a draft resolution reaffirming the validity of the 1961 "important question" resolution. Albania responded by submitting a draft resolution to seat the People's Republic of China. The "important question" resolution got fifty-six votes to forty-nine with eleven abstentions, while the Albanian resolution received forty-seven votes to forty-seven with twenty abstentions.

The vote on the Albanian resolution might have prompted Congress to review the United States stand on the Chinese representation question. In 1966 two congressional subcommittees were formed, one was chaired by Senator Fulbright of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the other by Representative Zablocki of the Subcommittee on the Far East and the Pacific of the House Foreign Affairs Committee.³ It was clear from the hearings that the possibility of the

¹Roger Hilsman, "Clarification. . .of the Policies which We are Adopting Toward the Soviet Union and Toward Communist China," American Foreign Policy Current Documents (December 13, 1963), p. 759.

²Marshall Green, "Communist China as a Problem in United States Policy-Making," Bulletin, LII, No. 1344 (March 29, 1965), p. 451.

³Ruth B. Russell, The United Nations and United States Security Policy (Washington D. C., 1968), p. 377.

United Nations admitting the People's Republic of China was becoming real, and leading Sinologists who spoke at these congressional hearings were practically unanimous on the need to adopt a two Chinas policy in the United Nations, allowing for the representation of both the Nationalist and the Communist governments. Professor A. Doak Barnett advocated the seating of the People's Republic of China on condition that the United States should also obtain representation for the Taipei regime; Professor John A. Fairbanks agreed that Communist China be seated in the United Nations despite its disruptive nature; Professor John M. H. Lindbeck suggested that normal relations be established with mainland China; and Professor Donald Zagoria, while expressing himself against United States support for the entry of Communist China, called upon the United States to stop opposing China because a majority of the countries in the United Nations wanted to seat both governments.⁴ However, ex-Congressman Walter Judd and Professor Donald N. Rowe were of the opinion that the isolation of Red China was a realistic policy and that the policy of accommodation should require the People's Republic of China to change its policy.⁵

These hearings seem to have had a minimal effect on United States policy in the United Nations because the United States continued to press the "important question" policy. The only noticeable change was the greater emphasis given to maintaining Taiwan's rights and preventing its expulsion from the United Nations.

⁴Akira Iriye, ed., United States Policy Toward China (Boston, 1968), pp. 170-176.

⁵Ibid., pp. 181-184.

Although the United States posture on the China question did not change, signs of rapprochement with the People's Republic of China were noticeable. President Johnson had this to say in the 1967 "State of the Union" message,

We shall continue to hope for a reconciliation between the people of mainland China and the world community-- including working together in all the tasks of arms control, security and program on which the fate of the Chinese people, like their fellow men elsewhere, depends.

We would be the first to welcome a China which decided to respect her neighbors' right. We would be the first to applaud her were she to apply her great energies and intelligence to improving the welfare of her people and we have no intention to deny her legitimate needs for security and friendly relations with her neighboring countries.

The People's Republic of China was negative in its response to the American diplomatic initiatives. Its numerous postponements of the Warsaw talks were interpreted to mean that China was isolating itself from the world. Undersecretary Katzenbach had this to say about China's response:

. . .Once again it is not the attitude of the United States but that of the People's Republic of China which isolates. The United States, influential though it may be, does not control and govern the organs of the United Nations or of other international bodies.

The Nixon administration embarked upon unilateral steps to improve United States relations with the People's Republic of China and to draw it into more consultations and negotiations. In 1969, Secretary of State William Rogers stated,

⁶Lyndon B. Johnson, "The State of the Union," (Excerpts), Bulletin, LVI, No. 1440 (January 30, 1967), p. 162.

⁷"A Realistic View of Communist China," by Undersecretary Katzenbach, Bulletin, LVIII, No. 1511 (June 10, 1968), p. 739.

. . .We shall take initiatives to reestablish more normal relations with Communist China and we shall remain responsive to new indications of less hostile attitudes from their side.

At a news conference with Secretary Rogers, someone asked whether the relaxation of trade restrictions would lead to a change in American views toward Peking's membership in the United Nations. The Secretary answered in the negative and said that such action would depend on future events. He also added,

The steps that we have taken are quite consistent with the policy that we have announced; and that is, that we would like to improve our relations with Communist China. We think the way to do it is by small steps, and we have taken now two unilateral steps which we think are good. We are encouraged by the fact that--although we haven't had any affirmative response from Peking, there is a possibility that these⁹[Warsaw] talks in the ambassadorial level may resume.

The Warsaw talks did not break the deadlock and the United States stand on the Chinese representation question did not change until 1971. The following discussion of the "important question" policy is intended to show what delaying tactics the United States used to keep the People's Republic of China out of the United Nations.

The "Important Question" Policy

The issue of Chinese representation was finally placed on the General Assembly agenda in 1961, and lengthy and heated debates became the yearly rule in the plenary sessions, except for the year 1964 when no discussions took place because the United Nations was in the grip

⁸William Rogers, "Vietnam in the Perspective of East Asia," Bulletin, LX, No. 1559 (May 12, 1969), p. 399.

⁹"Secretary Rogers' News Conference of December 23, 1969," Bulletin, LXII, No. 1594 (January 12, 1970), p. 722.

of a financial crisis.

In the yearly plenary sessions, the arguments ranged from the discussion of the "important question" resolution, the two Chinas concept, the principle of universality, and finally, how realism dictated the seating of the representatives of the People's Republic of China.

The draft resolutions presented during this period were the United States' "important question," a draft resolution to seat the People's Republic of China (in 1963, it became the Albanian resolution), and a draft resolution to establish a study committee on the problems of Chinese representation. This last draft resolution was intended as a compromise solution, somewhere between the "important question" and Albanian resolutions, and was abandoned in 1969 due to the lack of support from the member states.

The relative strength of each group can be judged from the arguments used, the voting turn-out, and the number of co-sponsors of each draft resolution. This is why this thesis will now deal with the arguments, followed by voting and sponsorship tables.

In the sixteenth session of the General Assembly (1961), the New Zealand¹⁰ and the USSR delegations¹¹ submitted separate proposals to the General Committee requesting that the issue of Chinese representation be placed on the General Assembly's agenda. On

¹⁰New Zealand's request entitled, "Question of the Representation of China in the United Nations," (A/4874).

¹¹USSR's request entitled, "Restoration of the Lawful Rights of the People's Republic of China in the United Nations," (A/4874).

September 25, 1961, the General Committee's recommendation to consider both proposals was approved by the General Assembly; thereupon, two draft resolutions were submitted: the USSR draft resolution¹² together with a three power amendment¹³ submitted by Cambodia, Ceylon, and Indonesia, and the Five Power draft resolution¹⁴ sponsored by the United States and her allies seeking to apply the "important question" procedure.

In his speech before the General Assembly, United States representative Stevenson underlined what he called four principal reasons of overriding importance which were to be considered by the General Assembly,

First, the step [seat the People's Republic of China] advocated, once taken, is irreversible.

Second, there are ample grounds to suspect that. . . the Peking regime. . . would be encouraged by its success in gaining admission to exert. . . a most disruptive and demoralizing influence on the Organization at this critical moment in its history.

Thirdly, its admission. . . could seriously shake public confidence in the United Nations—I can assure you it would do so among the people of the United States—and this alone would significantly weaken the Organization.

¹²That the General Assembly would resolve to remove from all United Nations organs, the representatives of Chiang Kai-shek clique and invite the representatives of the People's Republic of China to send its representatives. For text of resolution, see Appendix A.

¹³Amendment that the representatives of the People's Republic of China be seated in the United Nations and all its organs. For text of amendment, see Appendix A.

¹⁴That the Assembly would decide in accordance with Article 18 of the Charter that any proposal to change the representation of China was an important question (i. e., requiring a two-thirds majority vote for adoption). For text of resolution, see Appendix B.

Fourth, . . .the explicit conditions which the Chinese Communists themselves demand to be fulfilled before they will deign to accept a seat in the United Nations, . . .the expulsion of the Republic of China, and restoration of her legitimate rights are impossible.¹⁵

The United States statement was a warning to member states of disaster if and when the representatives of the People's Republic of China were allowed to take China's seat. This also made the United States sponsor the "important question" resolution because the United States considered the expulsion of the representatives of the Republic of China to be unrealistic.

The 1961 debate seems to have centered on the two-thirds majority requirement. Australia pointed out that the problem was of such magnitude that it could not be solved by a simple majority. Senegal pointed out that the problem had to be linked to Article 18 (2) of the Charter requiring a two-thirds majority vote. Great Britain stated that a two-thirds majority was needed in order to reach a solution acceptable to a wide majority of the member states and fair to the countries concerned. The French and Cameroun delegates argued that the question was important because it involved changing the representation of China, and because the question had been raised for twelve years.¹⁶

The USSR insisted that the problem was nothing more than a question of credentials and Poland added that there was no require-

¹⁵"Question of the Representation of China in the United Nations. Restoration of the Lawful Rights of the People's Republic of China in the United Nations," GAOR Sixteenth Session, October 19-December 15, 1961, II (1069th Plenary Meeting, December 1, 1961), p. 905.

¹⁶Yearbook of the United Nations (New York, 1961), pp. 126-127.

ment of a two-thirds majority to recognize the credentials of a delegation.¹⁷ Ceylon stated that the two-thirds majority was another procedural obstruction to the General Assembly's action in considering the credentials of the People's Republic of China. To the Soviet bloc, the two-thirds majority requirement was actually a plan to impose the two Chinas concept.¹⁸

When the votes were taken, the Five-Power resolution won over the USSR resolution and it became the "important question" (Resolution 1668 (XVI)) which was re-adopted continuously by the General Assembly from 1961 to 1970 except for the years 1962, 1963, and 1964, as was explained earlier.

When the "important question" resolution was re-introduced in 1965, the Philippine delegate supported the "important question" claim and reiterated the 1961 arguments of the French and Cameroun delegates.¹⁹ The Romanian delegate argued,

. . . To claim that this question must be resolved by a two-thirds majority, when the situation has been created and maintained as a result of a decision adopted by a simple majority, suffices to violate the United Nations Charter.²⁰

The United States and her allies were not content with the United Nations regular voting on the "important question" resolution. They

¹⁷GAOR Sixteenth Session (1079th Plenary Meeting, December 4, 1961), p. 914.

¹⁸Yearbook of the United Nations, 1961, p. 127.

¹⁹GAOR Twentieth Session, October 7–November 29, 1965 (1373rd Plenary Meeting, November 10, 1965), p. 6.

²⁰Ibid., (1374th Plenary Meeting, November 11, 1965), p. 5.

manuevered with some success to have this resolution voted on by the General Assembly ahead of the Albanian draft resolution.

In this continuing fight over what was procedural and what was important, the supporters of the "important question" resolution in 1968 argued that in the Security Council the question of changing the representation of a member state was procedural, but in the General Assembly because of Article 18 (2), a procedural question may be treated as an important question.²¹ The United States delegate argued that what was at stake was the integrity of the United Nations Charter and the protection of the sovereign rights of states provided for in the two-thirds majority rule, particularly when it dealt with membership and representation.²² In 1970, the United States delegate argued further that the two-thirds majority rule in Article 18 (2) was a "safeguard clause for members of the United Nations against arbitrary expulsion."²³

The supporters of the Albanian resolution refused to accept this argument, and insisted that the approval of the credentials of the representatives of the People's Republic of China was a procedural matter, and contended that for those governments who underwent change, a simple majority vote in accordance with the rules of procedure of

²¹Yearbook of the United Nations, 1968, p. 134.

²²Ibid., p. 163.

²³"Representation of China: Assembly Decision," United Nations Monthly Chronicle (New York, 1970), VII, No. 11, p. 36.

the General Assembly would suffice to approve the credentials of their delegates.²⁴

Another point raised in the discussion of the "important question question" resolution was that it would pave the way for two Chinas in the United Nations. The USSR in 1962 warned the members against the plan for two Chinas because it conflicted with common sense and the United Nations Charter. The USSR delegate said,

. . .Taiwan is not a state but an integral part of China, one of China's provinces, over which the sovereignty of the Chinese people will sooner or later be restored. . .

Nor does the United Nations Charter permit of two interpretations in this matter. Under the Charter (Article 18), each country—including China—has only one seat and one vote in the Organization, and consequently, the Charter excludes simultaneous representation of the People's Republic of China and the supporters of Chiang Kai-shek.²⁵

Albania in 1965 pointed out the absurdity of the two Chinas theory.

By striving to keep the Chiang Kai-shek clique in the Assembly by every possible manuever and subterfuge, the United States is trying to insure its continued occupation of Taiwan. But because of the growing opposition to this abnormal state of affairs, it has long been trying to gain acceptance here for its fallacious theory or, rather its plot of "two Chinas" or "China and Taiwan."²⁶

It is true that the United States did not come out openly in support of the two Chinas theory, but the "important question" resolution seemed to contain a latent purpose, that of having both Chinese governments represented in the United Nations. In 1966, the

²⁴Yearbook of the United Nations, 1966, p. 134.

²⁵GAOR Seventeenth Session, October 5–November 20, 1962 (1156th Plenary Meeting, October 22, 1962), p. 549.

²⁶GAOR Twentieth Session (1369th Plenary Meeting, November 8, 1965), p. 17.

United States supported a draft resolution to form a committee to study the issue, and in 1968 the United States delegate expressed support for this draft resolution as the proposal would not prejudice the outcome of the study.²⁷ The wording of the operative paragraph of this draft resolution closely followed the two Chinas theory as it proposed "to work out an equitable and practical solution to the Chinese representation question in accordance with the principles and purposes of the United Nations Charter."²⁸

While the draft resolution offered a means to clarify and possibly end the existing stalemate, many members doubted its usefulness and felt that the proposal was not in a position to produce results. Others argued that the purpose of the resolution was to bypass the General Assembly, as the normal procedure would have been to resolve questions of representation in the Assembly. To those who supported the seating of the People's Republic of China, the study committee proposal was a way for the two Chinas to be in the United Nations, while the Republic of China opposed the proposal on the grounds that it would pave the way for the entry of the People's Republic of China.²⁹

This study committee draft resolution was presented in 1966, 1967 and 1968, and dropped in 1969. According to Italy, one of its original sponsors, "The proposal had not been understood in its true

²⁷Yearbook of the United Nations, 1968, p. 163.

²⁸Yearbook of the United Nations, 1966, p. 134. For text of resolution, see Appendix C.

²⁹Yearbook of the United Nations, 1968, p. 134.

significance nor had it won sufficient support,"³⁰ so it was dropped.

The argument that realism required the seating of the People's Republic of China was denounced by those member states who judged the Communist Chinese Government on the basis of its adherence to peace, its political system and its legality in international law. In 1962 those countries which supported the "important question" resolution denounced the People's Republic of China for committing aggression against India and presented this as another act in a long record of aggressive behavior. The Philippine delegate, while supporting the United States arguments, noted that the act in question was a breach of a bilateral agreement (Pancha Shila) between the People's Republic of China and India. The delegate of the Republic of China argued that the act in question clearly negated the theory of realism being used as an argument for bringing the People's Republic of China to the United Nations. India reasserted her commitment to support the seating of the People's Republic of China despite the outbreak of hostilities on their border. The Indian delegate reiterated the need to bring the representatives of the People's Republic of China into the United Nations in order to check China's activities and to make it accept its responsibilities as a member.³¹

The People's Republic of China as a reality in the world and its adherence to peace were continuously stressed by its supporters. In 1963 Albania blamed the United States for waging a "fierce campaign

³⁰Yearbook of the United Nations, 1969, p. 156.

³¹GAOR Seventeenth Session (1156th Plenary Meeting, October 22, 1962), p. 597.

of false charges and slander" against the People's Republic of China and its peaceful foreign policy.³² The USSR pointed out the need for China to participate in the settlement of international problems, and Czechoslovakia referred to a statement by President Kennedy on October 16, 1963 about the inevitability of the participation of the People's Republic of China in disarmament negotiations.³³ In answer to the charge of aggressive behavior on the part of the People's Republic of China, the Ceylonese delegate declared that it was impossible to treat a country as an outlaw and then expect it to behave like a member of society. The delegate insisted that, from the legal point of view, there was no other solution except to have the People's Republic of China in the United Nations.³⁴

In 1968 the Albanian delegate, defending China against charges of aggression, not only denounced the United States but also the USSR for committing aggression in Vietnam and Czechoslovakia respectively. He claimed that the collusion of these two powers was responsible for the exclusion of the People's Republic of China. He stated,

. . .The aggressive policy of the United States imperialists towards China—which was the main cause of its continued exclusion from the United Nations—was now being carried out with the active cooperation of the Soviet revisionists because the People's Republic of China constituted the most powerful obstacle to the attainment of a joint goal of world hegemony by the United States and the USSR.³⁵

³²Yearbook of the United Nations, 1963, p. 31.

³³GAOR Eighteenth Session, October 14–November 20, 1963 (1244th Plenary Meeting, October 17, 1963), p. 3.

³⁴Yearbook of the United Nations, 1963, p. 34.

³⁵Yearbook of the United Nations, 1968, p. 163.

The Republic of China delegate harped on the aggressive nature of the Communist Chinese regime and claimed that the inherent warlike nature of the Communist Government had caused the split in the Communist camp. He also pointed out that Communist China had in 1965 attacked and abused the United Nations and had called for the formation of a new "revolutionary United Nations."³⁶ The delegate also stated that the Chinese Communist regime revelled in war, as shown by Mao T'se Tung's doctrine, and that it was disintegrating as a result of the cultural revolution then in progress there. The cultural revolution became another object for attack against the existing political system of the People's Republic of China.

Mauritania, at the same meeting, stated that membership in the United Nations should not be based on the kind of government a state had or how it came into being.³⁷

The old argument of recognition was given a new interpretation by the delegate of Haiti:

. . .Restoration of the lawful rights of a state amounts to a subtle recognition of a situation in the past, because one can only restore what was in existence, previously, in the sense of bringing action for recovery.³⁸

This statement implied that the delegate considered membership in the United Nations to be tantamount to recognition of the state. The

³⁶ GAOR Twentieth Session (1369th Plenary Meeting, November 8, 1965), p. 8.

³⁷ Ibid., (1378th Plenary Meeting, November 16, 1965), p. 2.

³⁸ Ibid., (1377th Plenary Meeting, November 15, 1965), p. 1.

representative of Ghana used the law of succession argument to suggest membership for both governments.

. . .By all the tenets of state succession, the People's Republic of China was the legal state successor to that which had joined the Organization as a founding member. By application of the same law of succession, the effective ruling part of that former part of China, called Taiwan was the Government of Chiang Kai-shek which was entitled to continued membership.³⁹

Although legal arguments based on recognition and state succession were still being used, the political reality of the People's Republic of China was gradually gaining acceptance. In 1969 the United States reversed itself on its previous contention that to bring in the People's Republic of China would create a disaster in the United Nations. The United States now agreed that it was important for mainland China to return to the family of nations, but added that the obstacles which it raised to such a return could not be ignored,

. . .To allow Peking to come in the United Nations under her terms would encourage intransigence, debase the Charter and perpetuate a grave injustice against a Member of the United Nations.⁴⁰

In 1970 the United States delegate stated that the United States had actively sought to move from an era of confrontation to an era of negotiation and now agreed to the political reality of the People's Republic of China.⁴¹

³⁹Yearbook of the United Nations, 1968, p. 156.

⁴⁰United Nations Monthly Chronicle, VI, No. 10 (December 1969), p. 10.

⁴¹United Nations Monthly Chronicle, VII, No. 11 (December 1970), p. 37.

Those members who supported the Albanian resolution identified realism with the principle of universality. Although this principle does not appear in the United Nations Charter, those who favored the seating of the People's Republic of China kept arguing the principle of universality until their argument gained acceptance by the United States and its allies. They argued that the "important question" resolution was contrary to the principle of universality. In memoranda submitted by this group of states to the General Assembly "to restore the lawful rights of the People's Republic of China," the following clause was always included,

. . .The refusal to restore those rights, . . .was an extreme denial of justice and inconsistent with an essential principle of the United Nations, namely universality.⁴²

Mr. Yost, representative of the United States, replying in 1966 to the argument of universality, had this to say:

The argument for universality, moreover runs, counter to the Charter by depriving this Organization of the right to pass judgment required by the Charter, on whether a state is able and willing to carry out the obligations of the Charter. Carried to its logical conclusion, that argument would mean membership for every Government which exercises the attributes of sovereignty regardless of how it came to power and regardless of its international conduct. This was clearly not the view of the authors of the Charter, or they would not have included Article 4⁴³ which clearly lays down certain criteria for membership.

⁴²Memorandum to the General Assembly in August 1966 submitted by Algeria, Cambodia, the Congo (Brazzaville), Cuba, Guinea, Mali, Rumania, and Syria. Yearbook of the United Nations, 1966, p. 133.

⁴³GAOR Twentieth Session (1379th Plenary Meeting, November 16, 1965), p. 4.

Australia, Japan, and Thailand argued that the question of Chinese representation could not be solved merely by expelling one of the two parties directly concerned, for such action would inevitably increase tension in East Asia and have the effect of disturbing rather than stabilizing the world situation.⁴⁴ The delegate of the Philippines criticized the logic of those who advocated the principle of universality on grounds that while seeking the admission of the People's Republic of China, they would expel the Republic of China.⁴⁵ Similar views were expressed by Great Britain, Canada, Austria, Italy and Peru, all members who were in favor of the seating of the People's Republic of China. For them, universality was a desirable goal but not at the expense of the expulsion of the representatives of a member state. This point was clearly revealed in 1971 when the United States and its allies sponsored the draft resolutions for dual representation and the "important question."

The Proposal of Dual Representation

The United States had in 1970 not fully concurred with the seating of the People's Republic of China although Secretary Rogers stated that, as a general policy, the Nixon administration felt that it was impossible for the People's Republic of China to be isolated. Even after the United Nations gave the China seating resolution a

⁴⁴Yearbook of the United Nations, 1968, p. 163.

⁴⁵United Nations Monthly Chronicle, VII, No. 11 (December 1970), p. 35.

simple majority in 1970, President Nixon stated that there was no plan to change United States policy with regard to the admission of the People's Republic of China.⁴⁶

President Nixon's foreign policy report to Congress on February 25, 1971 expressed the need to establish more dialogue with Peking, but rejected the idea of its hegemony over Asia. Nixon cautiously added, "But neither do we impose on China an international position that denies her legitimate national interests."⁴⁷ He inferred that Peking could come into the United Nations when he said that China could play a "constructive role in the family of nations."⁴⁸

At President Nixon's press conference on June 21, 1971, the President declared that United States policy announcements concerning Chinese representation would soon be made following consultations with the Republic of China. Then came Kissinger's trip to Peking and the announcement of a forthcoming visit by President Nixon to China. On August 23 Secretary Rogers announced the new United States policy on Chinese representation.

. . .The United States accordingly will support action in the General Assembly this fall calling for the seating of the People's Republic of China. At the same time, the

⁴⁶"President Nixon's Conference of December 10, 1970," Bulletin, LXIII, No. 1644 (December 28, 1970), p. 772.

⁴⁷Richard M. Nixon, "United States Foreign Policy for the 1970's Building for Peace," (A Report to the Congress on February 25, 1971), Bulletin, LXIV, No. 1656 (March 22, 1971), p. 383.

⁴⁸Ibid.

United States will oppose any action to expel the Republic of China or otherwise deprive it of representation in the United Nations.⁴⁷

As to China's seat in the Security Council, the Secretary added that the United States would abide by the views of the majority of nations. According to him, the change in United States policy was the result of the favorable attitude of the People's Republic of China toward the United Nations, its interest in membership, its attitude toward other governments, and its improved relations with the United States.⁵⁰

The following discussion of the proceedings during the twenty-sixth plenary session of the General Assembly held in the fall of 1971 is an attempt to explain what happened and to try to find out whether the defeat of the United States resolution was a defeat for the United States and whether the United States had a hand in the seating of the People's Republic of China.

In the General Committee, which, as reported earlier, deals with the agenda of the General Assembly, the United States tried to have its two Chinas resolution and the Albanian resolution combined in order to insure their simultaneous discussion in the General Assembly. This was defeated. Albania then sought to exclude the United States resolution from the General Assembly agenda but its attempt was voted

⁴⁹"President Nixon's News Conference of June 1," (Excerpts from Transcripts), Bulletin, LXIV, No. 1669 (June 21, 1971), p. 790.

⁵⁰"Secretary Rogers Announces United States Policy on Chinese Representation in the United Nations," Bulletin, LXV, No. 1678 (August 23, 1971), p. 193.

down.⁵¹ Thereupon, the General Committee submitted the three draft resolutions to the General Assembly.⁵²

During the plenary meetings, after what seems to have been a good deal of lobbying and arm-twisting, the United States moved the acceptance of its draft resolution. The New York Times had this to say about the United States tactics:

. . .The United States experienced difficulty in obtaining co-sponsors from the outset like Japan. Australia and New Zealand agreed to put in a specific assertion that Peking would get the Security Council seat.⁵³

Secretary Rogers warned some delegates that Congress might cut off United States financial support to the United Nations.⁵⁴ New York Senator James Buckley warned that if Taiwan was ousted, he would call for a dramatic reduction of United States financial support of the United Nations.⁵⁵ On October 18 United States Ambassador George Bush told the General Assembly that the United States proposal for dual representation was not intended to have two Chinas but provided a system for the proper representation of China. In support of this,

⁵¹Time Magazine (October 14, 1971), p. 29.

⁵²The Albanian draft resolution to seat the representatives of the People's Republic of China; United States "important question" draft resolution and the proposal to seat both the People's Republic of China and the Republic of China in the United Nations. For text of the Albanian resolution, see Appendix D.

⁵³"Tactics Left United States on the Defensive," New York Times (October 26, 1971), p. 10.

⁵⁴"After Saigon, Peking Ahead," Time Magazine (October 18, 1971), p. 32.

⁵⁵Ibid., (October 25, 1971), p. 26.

he cited the flexibility of the Charter in allowing the representation of Byelorussia, Ukraine and the USSR. He said that the draft resolution,

. . . does not in any way purport to divide China into two separate states or to commit those who vote for it on how they may in the future regard the legal or the diplomatic situation of the parties involved. It does not take either a "two-Chinas" position or a "one-China, one-Taiwan" position or in any way seek to dismember China. It is simply founded on the reality of the present situation as we all know it to be, but it does not seek to freeze this situation for the future.⁵⁶

No lengthy debates took place compared to the previous sessions. On October 25 Albania maneuvered the early voting of the draft resolutions despite a Saudi Arabian motion to postpone the voting until the next day. The "important question" resolution was voted first, and was defeated by 55 in favor, 59 opposed, with 15 abstentions. Eight nations, Belgium, Cyprus, Laos, Qatar, Senegal, Togo, Trinidad-Tobago and Tunisia, who were thought to be either leaning to or supporting the United States, abstained.⁵⁷ The Nationalist Chinese delegates walked out before a vote was taken on the Albanian resolution to seat the People's Republic of China, which turned out to be 76 in favor, 35 opposed with 17 abstentions. The draft resolution for dual representation was not put to the vote.

There were mixed reactions in the United States over the vote. Conservatives were for the withdrawal of some United Nations funds,

⁵⁶"United Nations Votes to Seat People's Republic of China and Expel Representatives of Republic of China," (Statement by Ambassador George Bush and Text of Resolution), Bulletin, LXV, No. 1640, (November 15, 1971), p. 18.

⁵⁷"United Nations Votes 76-35 to Seat Peking and Expel Taipei" New York Times (October 26, 1971), p. 10.

moderates were reticent, and others warned against retaliation.⁵⁸

Secretary Rogers stated,

. . . Although we believe that a mistake of major proportion has been made in expelling the Republic of China from the United Nations, the United States recognized that the will of a majority of the members has been expressed. We, of course, accept that decision.⁵⁹

He stated further that relations with the Republic of China would not be affected by the vote in question. In answer to charges made that the United States did not exert enough effort to ensure the adoption of its resolution the State Department Bulletin had this to say:

. . . In New York, Secretary Rogers met formally with ninety-two foreign ministers and heads of delegations to seek support for the United States sponsored resolutions. In addition, the Secretary wrote to more than sixty foreign ministers and spoke to others by long distance telephone. The Department of State and its embassies around the world pressed the campaign. In the United Nations, Ambassador Bush and his staff explained the new approach and sought the support of some one hundred delegations.⁶⁰

Various delegations voiced the opinion that the United States had not acted strongly for the adoption of its proposal to seat both governments. First, they cited the main weakness in the American position, which many governments saw as a halfway house—a makeshift compromise—that was likely to be abandoned in one or two more years

⁵⁸"Steamroller Tactics of United States Are Blamed for Defeat," New York Times (October 27, 1971), p. 16.

⁵⁹"Secretary Rogers Discusses United Nations Decision on Chinese Representation," (Transcript of News Conference), Bulletin, LXV, No. 1690 (November 15, 1971), p. 541.

⁶⁰"United States Policy and Chinese Representation," United States Foreign Policy 1971: A Report of the Secretary of State, Department of State Publication 863 (March 1972), p. 277.

as President Nixon drove for better relations with Peking,⁶¹ and consequently, those who had recently entered into diplomatic relations with Peking would suffer the consequences. Second, there were inherent contradictions in the United States strategy. Some said that the Nixon administration was determined to retain Taiwan, while others called it blackmail and predicted that it would backfire.⁶² They could not explain how Ambassador Bush would be campaigning for votes, while Kissinger was in Peking at the President's bidding. Others pointed out that the Nixon visit to Peking could not take place had the United Nations decided against Peking. Third, the "important question" resolution, a device used for so many years to keep Peking out of the United Nations, was now being used to retain Taiwan. Delegates were convinced that the People's Republic of China would not come to the United Nations unless the Republic of China was expelled, and the Albanians were busy telling other delegations that it was the opportune time to bring in Peking. Fourth, Bush and his staff were accused of either applying too much or too little pressure on the delegations.⁶³

United States pressure on its smaller allies was greater than on its bigger allies like the NATO countries. Great Britain, which had previously voted for both the "important question" and the

⁶¹New York Times (October 18, 1971), p. 8.

⁶²"United States Warning on Taiwan Ouster," New York Times (October 12, 1971), p. 11.

⁶³Newsweek Magazine (November 8, 1971), p. 23.

Albanian resolutions, managed this time to vote only for the Albanian resolution. The British delegate explained that before, the United States was categorically opposed to the seating of Peking, but now the United States was proposing to seat Peking.⁶⁴ He cited President Nixon's diplomacy with Peking and the result of the vote of the Albanian resolution in 1970 as reasons for the change in the British stand. It is said that Ghana was made to vote for the United States resolution despite voting for the Albanian resolution in 1970. Reports of United States pressure came mostly from third world states.

It is clear then that United States action made the seating of the People's Republic of China a foregone conclusion. How the United States was able to maintain the "important question" resolution in the General Assembly will be shown in the following tables giving the voting patterns in the General Assembly.⁶⁵ The same table will give the votes on the Russian and Albanian resolutions to seat the People's Republic of China, and the resolution to establish a study committee. Member states will be divided by blocs following the same system adopted in Chapter two. Due to the large number of Afro-Asian bloc members, the table will be further subdivided in terms of geographical areas: South and East Asia, the Middle East and North Africa, and Africa.

⁶⁵ Halpern, pp. 505-507, New York Times (October 26, 1971), p. 1, United Nations Monthly Chronicle (December 1970), and Yearbook of the United Nations (1961-1963, 1965-1969).

TABLE II (Continued)

	1961		1962		1963		1965		1966			1967			1968			1969		1970		1971	
	IQ	ST	ST	ST	IQ	ST	IQ	ST	IQ	ST	SC	IQ	ST	SC	IQ	ST	SC	IQ	ST	IQ	ST	IQ	ST
81. Congo (Brazzaville)	x	a	-	-	-	x	-	x	-	x	-	-	x	-	-	x	-	-	x	-	-	x	-
82. Congo (Kinshasa) ^e	x	a	-	-	x	nv	x	-	x	-	x	-	-	x	-	-	x	-	-	x	-	-	x
83. Dahomey	x	a	-	-	x	-	x	-	x	-	-	x	-	-	x	-	-	x	-	-	x	-	-
84. Ethiopia	-	x	x	nv	-	x	-	x	-	-	x	-	-	x	-	-	-	x	-	-	-	x	-
85. Equatorial Guinea	nv	-	-	-	x	-	x	-	a	-	x	-	-	a	-	-	x	-	a	nv	a	nv	nv
86. Gabon	nv	-	-	-	x	-	x	-	a	-	x	-	-	a	-	-	x	-	-	a	-	x	-
87. Guinea	-	x	x	-	x	-	x	-	-	-	x	-	-	-	-	-	-	x	-	-	-	x	-
88. Ivory Coast	x	a	-	-	x	-	x	-	-	-	x	-	-	-	-	-	-	x	-	-	-	x	-
89. Liberia	x	-	-	-	x	-	x	-	x	-	-	x	-	-	-	-	-	x	-	-	-	x	-
90. Madagascar ^d	x	-	-	-	x	-	x	-	-	-	x	-	-	-	-	-	-	x	-	-	-	x	-
91. Mali	-	x	x	-	x	-	x	-	-	-	x	-	-	-	-	-	-	x	-	-	-	x	-
92. Mauritania	x	-	-	-	x	-	x	-	-	-	x	-	-	-	-	-	-	x	-	-	-	x	-
93. Niger	x	a	-	-	x	-	x	-	-	-	x	-	-	-	-	-	-	x	-	-	-	x	-
94. Rwanda	x	-	-	-	a	-	x	-	-	-	x	-	-	-	-	-	-	x	-	-	-	x	-
95. Senegal	x	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
96. Somalia	a	x	x	x	-	x	-	-	-	-	x	nv	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
97. Sudan	-	x	x	x	-	x	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
98. Togo	nv	a	-	-	x	-	x	-	-	-	a	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
99. Upper Volta	x	a	-	-	x	-	x	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
COMMONWEALTH BLOC																							
100. Australia	x	-	-	-	x	-	x	-	-	-	x	-	-	-	x	-	-	-	x	-	-	x	-
101. Barbados	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	a	-	x	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	a	-
102. Botswana	-	-	-	-	-	-	x	a	-	-	-	x	-	-	x	-	-	-	x	-	-	x	a
103. Canada	x	-	-	-	x	-	x	a	x	-	x	a	x	-	x	a	a	-	x	a	-	x	a
104. Ceylon	-	x	x	x	-	x	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
105. Cyprus	a	a	a	-	a	a	a	a	a	a	a	x	a	x	x	a	x	-	x	a	-	x	a
106. Fiji	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
107. Gambia	-	-	-	-	x	-	x	-	-	-	x	-	-	x	-	-	-	-	x	-	-	x	-
108. Ghana	-	x	x	x	-	x	x	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
109. Guyana	-	-	-	-	x	-	x	-	a	-	x	-	-	a	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
110. India	-	x	x	x	-	x	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
111. Jamaica	-	-	-	-	a	a	x	a	x	-	x	a	x	-	x	a	x	-	x	a	-	x	a
112. Kenya	-	-	-	-	-	x	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
113. Lesotho	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
114. Malawi	-	-	-	-	x	-	x	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
115. Malaysia ^e	x	-	a	-	x	-	x	-	-	-	a	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
116. Malta	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
117. Mauritius	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
118. New Zealand	x	-	-	-	x	-	x	-	-	-	x	-	-	x	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
119. Nigeria	a	a	a	a	-	x	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
120. Pakistan	a	x	x	x	-	x	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
121. Sierra Leone	a	x	x	a	-	x	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
122. Singapore ^f	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
123. Swaziland	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
124. Tanzania ^g	a	-	x	x	-	x	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
125. Trinidad-Tobago	-	-	a	a	x	a	x	a	x	a	a	a	a	x	a	a	a	x	a	a	a	a	a
126. Uganda	-	-	x	x	-	x	-	nv	nv	nv	nv	nv	a	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
127. Zambia	-	-	-	-	-	x	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
NON-BLOC STATES																							
128. Israel	x	-	-	-	x	-	x	-	-	-	-	x	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
129. Republic of China ^h	x	-	-	-	x	-	x	-	-	-	-	x	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
130. South Africa	x	-	-	-	x	-	x	-	-	-	-	x	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
131. United States	x	-	-	-	x	-	x	-	-	-	-	x	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-

TABLE TOTALS

	1961		1962		1963		1965		1966			1967			1968			1969		1970		1971	
	IQ	ST	ST	ST	IQ	ST	IQ	ST	IQ	ST	SC	IQ	ST	SC	IQ	ST	SC	IQ	ST	IQ	ST	IQ	ST
For	61	36	42	41	56	47	66	46	34	69	45	32	73	44	30	71	56	66	51	55	76		
Against	34	43	56	57	49	47	48	57	62	48	58	57	47	58	67	48	48	52	49	59	35		
Abstain	7	20	12	12	11	20	7	17	25	4	17	30	5	23	27	4	21	7	25	15	17		
Not Voting	2	0	0	3	1	3	1	2	1	3	3	4	1	1	3	3	2	1	1	2	3		
TOTAL MEMBERSHIP	104		110		113		117			122			123			126		126		126		131	

^c Congo (Leopoldville) was the former name of Congo (Kinshasa), and recently the state's name was changed to Zaire.^d The Republic of Malagasy is the official name of Madagascar.^e Malaysia was formed in 1963 by the union of Malaya, Singapore, Sarawak, and Sabah (North Borneo), but Malaya had been a member of the United Nations since 1957. The votes listed for 1957-62 are those of Malaya, also see f.^f Singapore separated from the Federation of Malaysia and became an independent state. It became a member of the United Nations on September 21, 1965.^g The independent states of Tanganyika and Zanzibar united in April 1964, and the new state was renamed Tanzania in October of that year. At the time of the union, both Tanganyika and Zanzibar were members of the United Nations, but only Tanganyika had been a member long enough to vote on resolutions to seat the representatives of the People's Republic of China. The votes for 1962-63 are Tanganyika's.^h South Africa broke away from the Commonwealth when it became a republic on May 31, 1961.

Patterns of Voting

Cuba was treated as belonging to the Soviet bloc after its government turned communist in 1959. The Soviet bloc states voted consistently against the "important question" resolution for a study committee. The bloc voted consistently for the resolution to seat the People's Republic of China.

In the Western European bloc, Belgium, Greece, Iceland, Luxembourg, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, and the United Kingdom voted consistently for the "important question" resolution. France voted for it from 1961-63 but changed in 1965. Denmark, Finland, France, Norway, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and Yugoslavia voted consistently for the Albanian resolution. As can be seen, the United Kingdom voted in favor of both the "important question" and Albanian resolutions since 1961, but in 1971 it voted against the former and in favor of the latter. As to the study committee resolution, half of the Western bloc was in favor and half was against. Austria and Portugal abstained from all three resolutions until Austria began to vote for both the "important question" and Albanian resolutions in 1970 and Portugal did so in 1971. In the 1971 voting, only four members of this bloc voted in favor of the "important question," namely Greece, Luxembourg, Portugal, and Spain, and the rest voted for the Albanian resolution except for three who abstained, namely Greece, Luxembourg, and Spain.

The "important question" resolution had the continued support of the Latin-American bloc. Except for some abstentions by Bolivia, Ecuador and Peru, the Albanian resolution did not get any support

until 1970 when Chile voted in favor of it because of its Marxist oriented government. In 1971 this resolution had the support of Chile, Ecuador, Mexico, and Peru. The study committee resolution was favored by most of the Latin-American bloc states.

In the Afro-Asian bloc, the South and East Asian countries, namely Japan, the Philippines and Thailand voted consistently for the "important question" resolution and against the Albanian resolution. Afghanistan, Bhutan, Burma and Nepal voted consistently for the Albanian resolution and against the "important question" resolution. Cambodia supported the Albanian resolution from 1961-69, but changed in 1970-71 to support the "important question" resolution. Indonesia's vote was in favor of the Albanian resolution from 1961-63, but after withdrawing in 1965 and then returning to the United Nations, it voted in favor of the "important question" in 1966 and 1967, did not vote from 1968-70, and in 1971 voted in favor of both resolutions. Laos supported the "important question" in 1965-70, but opposed it to vote for the Albanian resolution in 1971. Maldives voted for the "important question" from 1966-69, but did not vote for both resolutions in 1970 and 1971. Most of the South and East Asian states were against the study committee resolution.

Of the Middle East and North African states, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Lebanon, and Turkey consistently voted in favor of the "important question" resolution, although Turkey voted against it in 1971. Algeria, Iraq, Southern Yemen, Syria, the United Arab Republic, and Yemen continuously voted for the Albanian resolution. Iran's record shows a number of abstentions. Kuwait and Libya first voted for the "important question," but later changed to vote for the

Albanian resolution. In 1971 most of these states voted for the Albanian resolution except for Jordan, Lebanon, and Saudi Arabia. The new states admitted to the United Nations in 1971, like Bahrain, Oman, and Qatar either abstained or did not vote. Most of the Middle East and North African states did not support the study committee resolution.

Among the African states, the Central African Republic, Chad, Congo (Kinshasa), Dahomey, Gabon, Ivory Coast, Liberia, Madagascar, Niger, Rwanda, Togo, and Upper Volta voted consistently for the "important question" resolution. Those who voted consistently for the Albanian resolution were Burundi, Congo (Brazzaville), Ethiopia, Guinea, Mali, Mauritania, Somalia, and Sudan. Cameroun, Equatorial Guinea and Senegal shifted in their voting from in favor to against on the "important question" resolution. In 1971, no change occurred as states maintained their record of either voting for the "important question" or the Albanian resolution. The study committee resolution did not have the support of the African states.

Of the Commonwealth bloc states, the United Kingdom, Australia, Canada, Barbados, Botswana, Fiji, Gambia, Guyana, Jamaica, Lesotho, Malawi, Malta, Mauritius, New Zealand, Swaziland and Trinidad-Tobago voted consistently for the "important question" resolution. Ceylon, India, Kenya, Nigeria, Pakistan, Tanzania, Uganda and Zambia voted consistently for the Albanian resolution. Those states which shifted their votes were Cyprus, Ghana, Malaysia, Sierra Leone and Singapore. In 1971 most states changed to vote for the Albanian resolution. The study committee was opposed by most of these states.

The non-bloc states like Israel, the Republic of China, South Africa and the United States voted consistently in favor of the "important question" resolution and against the Albanian resolution. In 1971 Israel voted in favor of the Albanian resolution while the Republic of China withdrew before a vote on the Albanian resolution was taken. Israel and the United States supported the study committee, but the Republic of China and South Africa were against it.

From the table totals, in 1961 the "important question" resolution had more votes than the Albanian resolution. Voting in 1962-63 was confined to the Albanian resolution and there was a minimal increase in its favor. In 1965 support for the "important question" resolution decreased by five votes compared to that of 1961, while there was a tie between the for and against vote on the Albanian resolution. If we compare the votes cast in favor of the "important question" resolution and the Albanian resolution, the former had 21 votes more in 1966, 24 votes more in 1967, 29 votes more in 1968, 15 votes more in 1969, and 15 votes more in 1970. In the 1970 vote, the Albanian resolution had a simple majority for the first time. In 1971 it had 21 votes more than the "important question" resolution.

Beginning in 1969, the "important question" resolution showed a decrease of votes favoring it because some of those who had supported it began to support the Albanian resolution following the establishment of diplomatic relations by their governments with the People's Republic of China. In 1971 many states, particularly those of the Western European bloc and the Commonwealth bloc, voted in favor of the Albanian resolution because of the new United States

policy. The growth of membership in the United Nations seems to have increased for a while the number of votes cast for the "important question" resolution, but this seems to have changed in 1968. Some states changed their voting record following a change of government, with some leaning to the West and others to Communism, such as Cambodia, Cuba, Chile, Indonesia, and Laos.

While the record of voting in the General Assembly indicates the extent of support given to the three draft resolutions, another indicator of support is the list of member states that sponsored each draft resolution. The following tables show that the "important question" and Albanian resolutions had almost an equal number of sponsors, which was not true of the study committee resolution.

TABLE III
SPONSORS OF RESOLUTIONS ON THE CHINA QUESTION

	1961	1962	1963	1965	1966	1967	1968	1969	1970	1971
Albania			-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Algeria			-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Australia	x			x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Belgium					x*	x*	*			
Bolivia					x*	x	x			x
Brazil				x	x*	x	x	x	x	
Burundi				-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Cambodia			-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Ceylon										
Chile					*	*	*			
Colombia	x			x	x	x	x			x
Congo (Brazaville)				-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Costa Rica								x	x	x
Cuba				-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Dominican Republic										x
El Salvador										x
Equatorial Guinea										-
Fiji										x
Gabon				x	x	x	x	x	x	
Gambia									x	
Ghana				-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Guinea				-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Haiti								x	x	
Honduras										x
Iceland							*			
Iraq								-	-	-
Italy	x			x	x*	x*	x*			
Japan	x			x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Lesotho								x	x	x
Liberia										x
Luxembourg						*	*			
Madagascar				x	x	x	x	x	x	
Malawi								x	x	
Mali				-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Mauritania				-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Mauritius										x
Netherlands						*				
Nepal										-
New Zealand					x	x	x	x	x	x
Nicaragua				x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Pakistan					-	-	-	-	-	-
Paraguay								x	x	
Philippines				x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Rumania				-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Somalia										-
Southern Yemen								-	-	-
Spain								x	x	
Sudan								-	-	-
Swaziland								x	x	x
Syria				-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Tanzania								-	-	-
Thailand				x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Trinidad-Tobago					*					
United States	x			x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Uruguay										x
USSR	-	-								
Yemen								-	-	-
Yugoslavia								-	-	-
Zambia								-	-	-

Key: --resolution to seat the People's Republic of China
x-"important question" resolution
*-resolution to establish a study committee on the Chinese representation question
x*-member states that sponsored both the "important question" and the study committee resolutions

CHAPTER IV

CONCLUSIONS

The discussion of the actions and arguments in the United Nations General Assembly from 1950 to 1971 was intended to show how the United States maintained its position of excluding the People's Republic of China from the councils of the international organization. The United States used both political manuevers and legal arguments to substantiate its actions and secure enough votes to keep the Chinese Communists out. Finally, when the United States could no longer control a favorable vote, and because the United States had embarked on a new policy vis-a-vis the Chinese Communists dramatized by President Nixon's visit to Peking, it was inevitable that the People's Republic of China would be seated in the United Nations.

When the Communists took over mainland China, the United States seemed to have been taken by surprise and to have written off the Nationalist Chinese. Factors that contributed to the adoption of stringent policies toward the People's Republic of China in the fifties were congressional dislike of certain actions of the Truman administration, the work of the China Lobby in the United States, and the People's Republic of China's intervention in the Korean War, which made the United States come to the conclusion that China was an enemy with aggressive designs in Southeast Asia, and was in collusion with the USSR. This is why it became the announced policy of the United

States to contain communism within mainland China, and try to destroy it there by means of strict isolation. The United States wanted to use China as an example to other countries to deter them from accepting communism.

The United States decision to sanction the People's Republic of China and restrain it from further aggressive acts was manifested by continued action in the United Nations to prevent the recognition of the People's Republic of China as the legitimate representative of the state of China. The United States was pursuing this policy in furtherance of the national interest based on the assumption that China's action in Asia constituted a threat to that interest and could prevent the realization of United States goals in Asia.

The United States representatives in the United Nations adopted their tactics to accommodate to the changes of attitudes and membership within the United Nations. At the beginning, the United States maneuvered to have the General Committee of the United Nations, which handles the agenda of the General Assembly, to recommend that no action be taken to seat the representatives of the People's Republic of China. This was the period of the moratorium, during which the United States managed to keep the issue off the agenda of the General Assembly in spite of the pressures of the pro-China group. Some discussion took place in the General Assembly while the report of the General Committee was being considered. The United States and its supporters presented a number of legal arguments based on the concepts of de facto control, recognition, legality through democratic elections, peace-loving, and fulfillment of international obligations.

In 1960, as a result of the influx of new members which in part was responsible for the failure of the General Committee's report to win a simple majority for the first time, the United States abandoned its moratorium policy. The following year, the United States came up with a new procedural strategy to block the seating of Communist China. This started the second period which lasted from 1961 to 1970. The United States argued that the issue was an important question and presented a resolution to the General Assembly to treat it as such. The General Assembly, by adopting the "important question" resolution, bound itself to a procedural requirement that to change the representation of China would require a majority of two-thirds of the votes.

During the period of the "important question" policy which, one should point out, also coincided with United States-People's Republic of China talks in Warsaw, the United States resorted to numerous legal arguments in the General Assembly to induce the latter to vote against the seating of the People's Republic of China and the expulsion of the Republic of China. These arguments dealt mainly with the legal requirements of membership, such as the legality of the regime, recognition, peace-loving, fulfilment of international obligations, and how universality precludes the expulsion of a member.

The year 1970 marked the onset of change. With President Nixon's new policy toward China based on negotiation and not confrontation, more countries began to recognize the Communist regime in China, and the split between the USSR and the People's Republic of China was becoming clearly irreparable. In this atmosphere, the General Assembly again passed the "important question" resolution but,

this time, the Albanian resolution received a simple majority vote for the first time. The international scene was set for change.

Early in 1971, the United States, following secret contacts with Peking, announced that President Nixon would visit China. Soon one development followed another. The United States announced its intention not to object to the seating of the People's Republic of China but added that such action should not mean the expulsion of the Republic of China. In the United Nations, the United States fought a rearguard action to implement this new policy and went as far as threatening both the United Nations and member states. The United States, nevertheless, failed to force the General Assembly to accept its two Chinas policy, and the Assembly went ahead and seated the People's Republic of China. The issue which had plagued the United Nations for so many years was no longer an issue.

It is clear that the United States had ably utilized all the political and legal methods available to her to keep the People's Republic of China out of the United Nations. The political manuevers were evidently more effective than the legal arguments used. What appeared to many to be a defeat for the United States was actually a change in the foreign policy of the United States coincident with a change in mood in the United Nations. The United States policy of containment and isolation had become outmoded and there was a need to reappraise United States policy toward China in the light of the changing situation in the Far East and the reality of the split between the People's Republic of China and the Soviet Union. The rapprochement with the People's Republic of China might have been motivated by United States interest in having an understanding with

Communist China in the Vietnam negotiations, or a policy assumption that a detente with the two Communist powers would widen the split between the USSR and the People's Republic of China. This is why the commitment to support the Nationalist Government in the United Nations became secondary to the United States' interest to draw the People's Republic of China into closer diplomatic relations.

This thesis has relied mainly on an analysis of the proceedings of the General Assembly and the conclusions reached were derived from this analysis. It would be of interest that further in-depth study of the Chinese representation controversy be made focusing on the roles played by the Republic of China and the People's Republic of China. Due to the unavailability at present of United States documents, it is difficult to state exactly why the United States changed its position in the United Nations, and what has really taken place between the United States and the People's Republic of China, and between the United States and the Republic of China before the United States changed its policy and decided to let the People's Republic of China secure the United Nations seat after years of unending political and legal maneuvering to keep that Asian giant out of the councils of the world organization.

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APPENDIX A

DOCUMENT A/L.360

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:
Draft Resolution

[27 October 1961]

The General Assembly,

Bearing in mind that only representatives of the Government of People's Republic of China are competent to occupy China's place in the United Nations and all its organs,

Resolves to remove immediately from all United Nations organs the representatives of the Chiang Kai-shek clique who are unlawfully occupying the place of China in the United Nations,

Invites the Government of the People's Republic of China to send its representatives to participate in the work of the United Nations and of all its organs.

DOCUMENT A/L.375

Cambodia, Ceylon and Indonesia: Amendment
to Document A/L.360

[12 December 1961]

Delete operative paragraph and substitute the following:

Decides in accordance with the above declaration that the representatives of the Government of the People's Republic of China be seated in the United Nations and all its organs.

Source: GAOR Sixteenth Session Annexes (Agendas 90 and 91), III (1961), p. 2.

APPENDIX B

RESOLUTION ADOPTED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

1668 (XVI) Representation of China
in the United Nations

The General Assembly,

Noting that a serious divergence of views exists among Member States concerning the representation of a founder Member who is named in the Charter of the United Nations,

Recalling that this matter has been described repeatedly in the General Assembly by all segments of opinion as vital and crucial and that on numerous occasions its inclusion in the agenda has been requested under rule 15 of the Assembly's rules of procedure as an item of an important and urgent character,

Recalling further the recommendation contained in its resolution 396 (V) of 14 December 1950 that, whenever more than one authority claims to be the government entitled to represent a Member State in the United Nations and this question becomes the subject of controversy in the United Nations, the question should be considered in the light of the purposes and principles of the Charter and the circumstances of each case,

Decides, in accordance with Article 18 of the Charter of the United Nations, that any proposal to change the representation of China is an important question.

1080th plenary meeting

15 December 1961

APPENDIX C

DOCUMENT A/L.500

Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Italy and
Trinidad and Tobago: Draft Resolution

[21 November 1966]

The General Assembly,

Having considered the question of the representation of China,

Believing that a solution of the question of Chinese representation which accords with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations and the aim of universality, would further the purposes of the United Nations and strengthen its ability to maintain international peace and security,

Believing that the complexities of this question require the most searching consideration in order to pave the way to an appropriate solution, taking into account the existing situation and the political realities of the area,

1. Decides to establish a committee of . . . Member States, to be appointed by the General Assembly, with the mandate of exploring and studying the situation in all its aspects in order to make the appropriate recommendations to the General Assembly at its twenty-second session for an equitable and practical solution to the question of the representation of China in the United Nations, in keeping with the purposes and principles of the Charter;

2. Appeals to all Governments concerned to give assistance to the committee in search for a solution.

Source: GAOR Twenty-First Session Annexes (Agenda Item 90), III (1966), p. 3.

APPENDIX D

RESOLUTION ADOPTED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

2758 (XXVI) Assembly Decides to Restore Its
Rights to People's Republic of China

The General Assembly,

Recalling the principles of the Charter of the United Nations,

Considering that the restoration of the lawful rights of the People's Republic of China is essential both for the protection of the Charter of the United Nations and for the cause that the United Nations must serve under the Charter,

Recognizing that the representatives of the Government of the People's Republic of China are the only lawful representatives of China to the United Nations and that the People's Republic of China is one of the five permanent members of the Security Council,

Decides to restore all its rights to the People's Republic of China and to recognize the representatives of its Government as the only legitimate representatives of China to the United Nations, and to expel forthwith the representatives of Chiang Kai-shek from the place which they unlawfully occupy at the United Nations and in all the organization related to it.

26 October 1971

Source: United Nations Monthly Chronicle, VIII, No. 10 (November 1971), p. 61.

VITA

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