

BETWEEN HAMMER AND ANVIL: FINNISH FOREIGN
RELATIONS IN WORLD WAR II

By

GEORGE WALTER WILLSON

//

Bachelor of Arts

Oklahoma Christian College

Oklahoma City, Oklahoma

1968

Submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate College
of the Oklahoma State University
in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the Degree of
MASTER OF ARTS
July, 1972

FEB 7 1973

BETWEEN HAMMER AND ANVIL: FINNISH FOREIGN
RELATIONS IN WORLD WAR II

Thesis Approved:

Douglas Hale

Thesis Adviser

John A. Lybester

W. Durham

Dean of the Graduate College

PREFACE

This work is concerned with the role Finland played in the Second World War. The primary objective is to study the Finnish involvement in the war between Russia and Germany. The author faced a difficulty in that the amount of available primary source material in this area of study in the years from 1942 to 1945 is rather limited. Using what sources that were available and utilizing secondary material when necessary, the author hopes to present a balanced picture of Finnish intentions, aspirations, and motivations in World War II.

The author wishes to acknowledge his gratitude to his major adviser, Dr. Douglas Hale, for his assistance in developing this work. Further thanks are extended to Dr. Jack Sylvester and Dr. Bernard Eissenstatt for their aid.

Special thanks are extended to my mother for her encouragement, to my supervisors at my job, Dennis McDow and Clarence Buller, for their patience at the often below standard level of work while I was more occupied with this thesis than my job. Finally, a very special thanks is extended to my fiancée, Miss Terresa McCoy, for her work in typing and for her patience and encouragement.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Chapter	Page
I. RUSSIA AND FINLAND	1
II. THE WINTER WAR	27
III. GERMANY AND FINLAND: 1940-1944	49
IV. THE END OF THE WAR	79
SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY	89

CHAPTER I

RUSSIA AND FINLAND

During the Second World War, small nations were used by the major powers for whatever purpose either side deemed desirable. This fact was most clearly demonstrated in the war between Germany and the Soviet Union. Poland, Rumania, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia are all examples of the exploitation and victimization of the small powers by the large nations. Farther to the north, a struggle developed that is one of the clearest demonstrations of this process which the war produced. For nearly six years, Finland was subjected to pressure and war from both Germany and Russia. This paper will be concerned primarily with the dealings between Finland and Germany during World War II.

The significance of this study is that the relationship between Finland, Germany, and Russia provides the clearest picture of how the major powers endeavored to use a smaller nation to their advantage. Moreover, Finland is the only country which was able to withstand to any degree the pressures brought by both sides. Finally, Finland is one of the few nations bordering on Russia which were not brought under Communist control after the war and in which the process of great power influence on smaller countries may be freely investigated.

The purpose of this thesis is to study an aspect of World War II which is often neglected. The relationship of diplomacy to strategy was one of the most important factors in the war, and it is one which

has received the least attention by historians. This paper will examine what happened in the three-cornered relationship among Finland, Russia, and Germany. It will further attempt to show why events happened as they did. As much as possible, translated German and Russian documents, memoirs, and other primary sources will be used to interrelate the actions of the governments involved, the personalities of the important Finnish leaders, and the circumstances which influenced important decisions in the far northern theatre of the war. While the basic purpose of this study will be to examine German-Finnish relations in World War II, it is impossible to understand this subject without realizing the decisive influence of Russia throughout Finnish history. Because the Scandinavian peninsula has tended to be a neglected part of Europe, this paper will consider Finnish history from the nineteenth century to establish an introduction to the relationship between Finland and Russia.

The history of Finland from its annexation by Russia in 1808 to the outbreak of war in 1939 is largely the story of the Russian desire to protect its territory. The proximity of the Finnish border to St. Petersburg has always been a matter of concern for the Russian government, whether of the czars or the commissars. As one professor at the University of Turku noted at the beginning of the nineteenth century, "We must pray to God that Russia will succeed in situating its capital in Constantinople. Then it might leave Finland in peace under the scepter of Sweden. But, now that its capital city is located so near, I am afraid that Finland will sooner or later fall under the power

of Russia."¹ This fear had already been confirmed by a statement of Peter the Great: "The ladies of St. Petersburg could not sleep peacefully as long as the Finnish frontier ran so close to our capital."² The thought of an invasion of Russia through Finland dominated Russian military strategy. To remove this threat, Russia was determined to control Finland.

Under Czar Alexander I, Russia forced Sweden to give up Finland by the Treaty of Fredrickshamm on September 17, 1809. The new province was organized as an autonomous Grand Duchy along constitutional lines. While the constitution was not particularly liberal, it was a departure from the principles of Russian autocracy which recognized only the Czar as supreme. The Duchy was to be administered by a Diet, made up of four Estates and presided over by a Governor General appointed by the Czar. A Finnish Affairs Committee at St. Petersburg, headed by a Finnish Secretary of State, provided a direct line of communication between the Finns and the Czar.³

The action of the Czar in giving Finland a constitution, while seemingly contradictory to normal Russian political practices, was not as radical as might be believed. The Finnish Diet was in reality a carry-over from the days of Swedish rule; for the Czar to continue this practice was an effective way to pacify the Finns who had been loyal to

¹Quoted in Eino Jutikkala, A History of Finland (New York: Fredrick A. Praeger, 1962), p. 176.

²Quoted in Max Jakobson, The Diplomacy of the Winter War (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1961), p. 14.

³Hugh Shearman, Finland: The Adventures of a Small Power (London: Stevens and Sons Limited, 1950), pp. 15-19.

Sweden in the war of 1808-1809. Also, the ideas of constitutional monarchy were quite strong in Europe at this time, and the Czar and his chief advisor, Mikhail Speransky, decided to establish Finland as an experimental area for their application. At the same time, the Czar continued to exercise many important functions of the government; the Diet, moreover, could not be convened except by the Czar.⁴ The most important feature of this settlement was that Finland became an autonomous region within the Russian Empire. It has internal and domestic freedom of action; in short, it was Finnish rather than Russian.

For most of the nineteenth century, Finland was virtually a separate nation. Few Russian troops were ever stationed in Finland, even during the First World War. Taxation was levied for internal uses and not to enrich the Imperial treasury. While Finland did not have a separate army until 1878, Finns who wished to make a career in the military were free to serve in the Russian army.⁵ Under the Grand Duchy, the capital was moved from Turku, near the Swedish border, to Helsinki.

As an autonomous province, Finland was exposed to the ideals and thoughts of western Europe. Finland's system of education was among the finest in Europe. The spirit of nationalism spread to Finland through the university at Turku and became a basic tenet among Finnish intellectuals. The excellent education system further disseminated the ideas of national pride and independence which were to become fully

⁴John H. Wuorinen, A History of Finland (New York and London: Columbia University Press, 1965), pp. 128-131.

⁵W. R. Meade, Finland (London: Ernst Benn Limited, 1968), pp. 101-110.

developed in 1918.⁶ Finland was no longer part of Sweden; its citizens could not be made Russians. In the words of Johann Wilhelm Snellman, a Finnish intellectual, "Swedes we are no longer. Russians we cannot become; we must be Finns."⁷

Despite the rise of nationalism, relations between Finland and Russia remained friendly. Under Russian control, Finland underwent a period of industrialization during the last half of the nineteenth century. The coming of railroads, an efficient canal system, hydro-electric power, lumber mills, and textile factories brought great prosperity to the Finns.⁸ At the same time they established a monetary system independent of the Russian scheme; by 1878, the Finnish mark was approximately equal to the French franc instead of merely a fraction of the Russian ruble.⁹ During the Crimean War, attacks by the British navy strengthened a feeling of comradeship between the Finns and the Russians; a popular saying is still heard in parts of Finland: "to laugh like an Englishman who has set fire to the harbor."¹⁰ The Finnish Life Guard Light Battalions were part of the Imperial Guard after 1829 and served loyally, distinguishing themselves in the Polish campaign of 1831, the Hungarian campaign of 1849, the Crimean War, and the Russo-Turkish war of 1877-78.¹¹ Throughout the nineteenth century, Finland

⁶Shearman, pp. 31-32.

⁷Quoted in Jutikkala, p. 203.

⁸Shearman, pp. 25-26.

⁹Jutikkala, p. 217.

¹⁰Meade, p. 141.

¹¹Anatole Mazour, Finland Between East and West (Princeton, N.J.: D. Van Nostrand Company, Inc., 1965), p. 18.

was loyal to Russia, although the spirit of nationalism was gradually growing, particularly in the middle and upper classes.

The same industrial and technological development which brought prosperity to the middle and upper classes of Finland also meant the beginning of a class struggle which would eventually bring civil war to Finland in 1918. Rural laborers and tenant farmers in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries faced poor housing, low wages, high prices for their necessities, hunger, disease, and a sense of inferiority because of their treatment by the larger landowners and independent farmers. For industrial workers, pay and working conditions were among the worst in Europe. While trade unions made their appearance around 1880, they exerted little influence until the 1920's.¹²

The reign of Nicholas II saw the end of Russian tolerance for Finnish autonomy. Russian nationalism had been growing as fast as Finnish, and the idea that Finland should be used to advance Russian interests and fortune was beginning to influence the thinking of Russian ruling circles. As one Russian minister put it, "We have not subjugated alien races to give them pleasure, but because we need them."¹³ A further development of this Great Russian ethnocentrism, which gained considerable strength after the assassination of Czar Alexander II, was the suspicion that the patriotism of minority groups within the Empire was subversive, if not treasonable, and should be eliminated. The only national sentiment to be tolerated was that of the Great Russians. The

¹²Shearman, pp. 35-36.

¹³Quoted in Jutikkala, p. 228.

process of Russification began in Finland about 1891 when Russian was declared the sole official language in the higher branches of the government. Not long thereafter, Russian-born officials were appointed to positions in the Finnish civil service.¹⁴ These measures, along with the absorption of the Finnish postal service into the Russian in 1890, were forerunners of the more extensive attempts to eliminate Finnish autonomy which began in 1898.

In 1899, the Czar declared that the Finnish Diet was no longer empowered to enact new laws; its function henceforth was merely to draft opinions on measures submitted to it by the Russian government. In a manifesto issued on February 15, 1899, Nicholas II declared that while the Diet was allowed to pass laws concerning the internal affairs of Finland, the Czar reserved the right to decide which laws were strictly local and which came under authority of the Russian government. This action virtually eliminated the power of the Diet, since the Czar could decide that any piece of legislation involved more than internal Finnish affairs and therefore was outside the authority of the Diet. A petition signed by 522,931 Finns protesting the Czar's action was submitted to the Imperial Court at St. Petersburg and rejected. A similar protest, Pro Finlandia, signed by more than a thousand of Europe's leading citizens, was also brushed aside.¹⁵ In view of Nicholas' coronation pledge to respect Finland's privileged position, the Finns began to refer to him as the "Perjurer".

¹⁴Mazour, p. 17.

¹⁵Wuorinen, pp. 202-204.

The net result of the Czar's actions was to alienate the three million people who had been his most loyal subjects. A resistance movement, the Kagaali, came into existence; its doctrine urged mainly passive resistance, but resistance nevertheless. A new division developed in Finnish politics. The Constitutionalists, a party composed of Finns who advocated a return to the constitution and who stood ready to resist the Czar, now opposed the compliance party, a group who believed the new laws were to be obeyed even though unpopular. The Russians continued their repression, discontinued the sale of stamps bearing the Finnish coat of arms in 1901, instituted censorship of the press, and put pressure on Finnish schools to teach more Russian. The Finnish army was made to draft Finns to serve in the Russian army under Russian officers. The Finns responded by refusing to report for duty when called, by issuing underground publications, and refusing to learn Russian.¹⁶

The Russo-Japanese War and the subsequent domestic disorder in Russia caused a temporary pause in the process of Russification. Between 1905 and 1908, Finland resumed its autonomous status and came to a new understanding with Russia. A new law transformed the Diet into a single-chamber assembly of two hundred members elected by secret ballot, and suffrage was extended to all citizens of both sexes over twenty-four years of age. The conscription system was abandoned on the condition that Finland would contribute money in place of men.¹⁷ From 1905 to 1908, Finland was one of the most democratic and prosperous nations in

¹⁶Meade, pp. 143-144.

¹⁷Mazour, p. 25.

the world. Then reaction set in, and the Russification program was intensified.

Beginning in 1908, the Russian government again decided that Finland's Diet could no longer act on matters involving Russian interests. After 1910 native Russians were appointed to the Diet; in addition, Russian was again designated as the official language of the government. Public officials who attempted to uphold the Finnish constitution and laws were arrested and sent to prison or Siberian exile. Among those so exiled was Pehr Evind Svinhufvud, who was later to become the first president of Finland. By 1914, constitutional government in Finland had been abolished. As a result of the harsh new measures, the goal of independence from Russia became a national aspiration rather than the dream of a few individuals.¹⁸ Still there was no violence or outright opposition, but rather a subtle refusal on the part of the Finnish population to cooperate with the Russian government.

World War I brought a new period of prosperity to Finland, but it also brought new measures of repression from Russia. Martial law was hastily imposed, and Finnish citizens were frequently arrested and subjected to Russian law. Grounds of military necessity were used by the Czar as a pretext to further reduce Finland to a servile position. Although at first some Finns offered to serve in the Russian army, their enthusiasm soon died. By the time Russia left the war, as many Finns were serving in the German army as in the Russian army.¹⁹ One

¹⁸Wuorinen, pp. 206-207.

¹⁹Mazour, pp. 35-36.

such unit of Finnish volunteers, the Lockstedt Jaegers, would also play an important role in the Finnish Civil War.

The attitude of the Finns toward the war was generally more favorable to Germany than to Russia. There are two basic reasons for this. First of all, Finland had intellectual and commercial ties with Germany; hence it was easier to deal with Germany than other nations, with the exception of neutral Sweden. Secondly, the fact that Germany seemed to be winning the war was a strong stimulus to pro-German sentiment. It would be to Germany's advantage to detach Finland from Russia, although the German foreign service did not promise the Finns more than a guarantee of Finnish autonomy if a peace conference was held. On the other hand, Finnish negotiations with England and France would accomplish little, since, as allies of Russia, they would not be likely to force Russia to grant any concessions to Finland.²⁰ This did not mean that Finland condoned Germany's actions such as the invasion of Belgium. The basic rationale was simply that defeat of Russia would mean better conditions for Finland; the matter of who defeated Russia was irrelevant.

Until 1918, the main contribution of Germany to Finnish aspirations was the training of two thousands Finns. Despite the effort of the Russian government to thwart the scheme, the men were raised, sent to Sweden and then to Germany. They were trained at Lockstedt, Holstein, and were designated the 27th Battalion of the Royal Prussian Jaegers in May, 1916. They saw some action in Lithuania as a unit but were mainly used as scouts and spies by the Germans.²¹

²⁰Jutikkala, p. 249.

²¹Shearman, p. 53.

In March, 1917, the Czar was forced to abdicate in favor of the revolutionary Provisional Government led by Prince Lvov. This action created confusion among the Finns. On March 20, Finland was granted a return to its status as an autonomous region of Russia. Political amnesty was declared, allowing men who had been deported for political reasons to return. The problem was that the new Provisional Government opposed total independence for Finland. The Finnish leaders were divided on the best course of action: to go for full independence, or to accept autonomy with Finnish control of domestic affairs and Russian control of military and foreign affairs. The latter view was held by the Social Democrats, who, in their desire to raise the position of the common worker, believed that a totally separate Finland would mean worse exploitation of the workers by the bourgeoisie while close ties with the new democratic Russian state would have a beneficial impact on Finnish social conditions.²²

On July 18, 1917, by a vote of 155 to 36, the Diet enacted legislation which provided that since the Russian monarchy was no longer in existence, the Finnish Diet alone would henceforth perform the functions of the Czar with regard to Finland. The Diet assumed the power to enact all laws concerning internal Finnish affairs, such as taxation, customs, etc. Foreign affairs were left under the jurisdiction of the Russian government. In effect, the Diet would constitute the government of Finland, and, except for foreign and military policy, the Russian government would have no authority over Finnish affairs. For all practical purposes, the implementation of this law would have meant

²²Ibid., p. 54.

independence for Finland. The Russian government, realizing the significance of the new law, held that the Diet had exceeded its authority and, on July 31, ordered it dissolved. New elections, held on October 1-2, cost the Social Democrats the majority they had held in the Diet and returned an even more nationalistic government to power. The new Diet convened on November 1; the Bolshevik revolution took place on the seventh, and this changed the picture altogether.²³

The disorder accompanying the November revolution in Russia caused the Finnish Diet to decide in favor of complete independence. The Progressive Party was in control, and the president, Pehr Svinhufvud, submitted a declaration of independence. On December 6, 1917, Finland announced its independence by a vote in the Diet of 100 to 88. The proclamation, in addition to declaring Finland an independent nation, empowered the government to take whatever measures necessary to win diplomatic recognition of Finland from foreign powers.²⁴

Independence was achieved, but there were problems. The Social Democrats were somewhat confused and divided. Some wanted to follow the Russian example and proclaim a Finnish Soviet Republic, but the majority was uncertain about the wisdom of such an action. As a result of this division, there was no immediate revolution, despite appeals from Russia. There were riots, various disorders, and strikes throughout Finland, but no general revolt. Interestingly enough, the Soviet Union became the first nation to recognize Finland; formal recognition

²³Wuorinen, pp. 213-214.

²⁴Ibid., pp. 215-216.

came in an official dispatch to Helsinki signed by Lenin, Stalin, and Trotsky on January 4, 1918.²⁵

Why did the new Bolshevik Government agree to Finland's independence? The main reason was that the Bolsheviks were too weak and too occupied with other problems to do anything else. The Soviet government was on a shaky foundation, and civil war seemed likely. Aside from that sad fact, there were other considerations. The Bolsheviks had declared that small nations had the right to determine their own destiny; this was a convenient chance to prove their sincerity. Finally, if a revolution later began in Finland, Russia could easily move in to aid in establishing a Communist regime. At the time, the Bolsheviks still clung to the belief in a world revolution which would destroy all bourgeois states; the present government of Finland, therefore, would be no more than a temporary nuisance.²⁶

The threat of a Marxist revolt was more than a dream of the rulers of the Soviet Union. The position of the working class had been unfavorable before the war, and by the end of 1917, conditions were much worse. The Civil Guards, often called the White Guards, had been organized throughout Finland to drive out the Russian soldiers; their membership was drawn mainly from the middle and upper class. The Socialists, seeing a threat in this action, organized the Red Guards to defend the rights of the working class and to achieve the aims of the

²⁵Report by Stalin to the All-Russian Central Executive Committee on the Independence of Finland, January 4, 1918, Soviet Documents on Foreign Policy, Jane Degras, ed., (London: Oxford University Press, 1953), Vol. I, pp. 29-31.

²⁶Mazour, p. 46.

labor movement.²⁷ In addition, there were about 40,000 Russian troops in Finland, and there was no sign that they would be quickly recalled. On November 12, the radical wing of the Social Democratic Party formed the Central Revolutionary Council and proclaimed a general strike. The strike, which lasted until November 20, was accompanied by considerable fighting between Red and White Guards, bloodshed, and destruction of property. It also ended any hope of compromise between the Socialists and the bourgeoisie.²⁸ Finland was an armed camp, without adequate police or military forces and totally occupied by foreign troops. Furthermore, Russian leaders exhorted the Finnish Socialists to revolt and promised aid. Civil war became a certainty.

By January 23, 1918, France, Germany, Sweden, Greece, Norway, Denmark, Austria-Hungary, Switzerland, and the Netherlands had joined the Soviet Union in extending recognition to Finland. Great Britain and the United States hesitated because of Finnish ties with Germany. By May, recognition had come from Spain, the Vatican, Bulgaria, Turkey, and Argentina.²⁹ In the meantime, the Finnish civil war had broken out.

In an effort to restore law and order to the country, the Diet authorized Svinhufvud to organize a police force to control the mounting disorders on January 12. On the twenty-fifth, the Civil Guards were recognized as the legal armed force of Finland. The army was to be grouped and trained at the town of Vaasa in the province of Ostrobothnia

²⁷Shearman, pp. 58-59.

²⁸Wuorinen, pp. 216-217.

²⁹Tancred Borenius, Field Marshal Mannerheim (London and Melbourne: Hutchinson & Co. Limited, 1940), pp. 85-89.

on the west coast of Finland. On January 27, Svinhufvud and some of his cabinet left Helsinki for Vaasa. The next day, the Red Guards seized Helsinki and proclaimed a revolutionary government.³⁰

The Socialists seem to have planned on a quick and relatively peaceful coup d' etat. The capital and the organs of government were seized; the majority of the government leaders were arrested or forced underground. As yet the government had no effective armed forces, and no foreign power was likely to be able to intervene on short notice. On the other hand, the Red Guards consisted of 30,000 men who, though poorly trained, were united and ready to act. About 40,000 Russian troops were also ready to help, and Lenin had agreed to supply arms to the revolutionaries. It seemed to the Socialists that the seizure of power in Finland could be accomplished quickly and without a great deal of fighting. Kullervo Manner was named chairman of the new government, while Eero Haapalainen, a former journalist with no military experience, was named Commander-in-Chief of the Red Guards. His Chief of Staff was Ali Aaltonen, a Finn who had been an officer in the Russian army during the Russo-Japanese War.³¹ Their belief that the legal government would go down without offering any serious resistance made the lack of training and proper leadership seem inconsequential to the revolutionary government.

The legal government, however, was not quite as helpless as the Socialists believed. Around Vaasa was a concentration of men who would serve as the nucleus of a Finnish army. Also in Vaasa were Svinhufvud,

³⁰Wuorinen, p. 219.

³¹Shearman, p. 61.

several members of his cabinet, and a man who was capable of leading the White Guards to victory. His name was Gustaf Mannerheim.

Mannerheim was formerly a high-ranking officer in the Russian army. He had seen action in the Russo-Japanese War and, though a Finn, was a member of aristocratic Russian society. He also spoke six languages and had gained considerable stature as the leader of a research expedition into Siberia and Mongolia in 1906. In 1914, he had been in command of the Cavalry Brigade of Guards in Warsaw, and, in August, had earned the Russian Sabre of St. George for stopping the Austrian advance against Lublin where the Fourth Russian Army was being concentrated. In early October, 1914, he managed, on his own initiative, to secure the only possible retreat route for the army of General Delsal and was responsible for saving this army. For this feat, he was awarded Russia's highest military award, the Fourth Class of the Order of St. George. In February, 1915, he was in command of the Twentieth Cavalry Division on the Polish front, Galicia and Bukowina. At the end of 1916, he held a command in the Carpathians of Rumania; in mid-1917, he was promoted to lieutenant general and was given command of the Sixth Cavalry Army Corps of the Rumanian front.³² As the Russian army disintegrated in mutiny and disease, Mannerheim returned to Finland. In January, 1918, Svinhufvud asked him to take over the command of the Finnish army, organize and train it.

On January 27, Mannerheim had the Russian troops in Ostrobothnia arrested and disarmed. A few days prior to this, the Russians in northern and central Karelia had been captured. Mannerheim had about

³²Borenus, pp. 36-37

40,000 poorly trained and ill-equipped men at his disposal. At this point, he was taking a gamble; resolute resistance by the Russians combined with an attack by the Red Guards would have scattered his forces and brought a Communist victory. But by February, northern Finland had been secured, and preparations were made to move into southern Finland. Conscription was used to secure men; arms and equipment were purchased from Sweden. Leadership and a highly trained cadre were provided when Germany returned the Lockstedt Jaegers to Finland.³³

The Socialist forces had the advantage of numbers but little else. The Russians were poorly disciplined and lacked effective leadership, while the Finnish rebel forces included criminals and other disreputable elements which were hard to control. Because of the close association of the revolutionaries with Moscow as well as the violence committed by units and individuals of the Red army, the Finnish population tended to be more loyal to the legal government. By February, 1918, the Reds held only about ten percent of the nation's area; that ten percent contained fifty percent of the population and virtually all Finnish industry, however.³⁴ A Red offensive which lasted from February twentieth to the twenty-fifth failed, mainly because of a shipment of German munitions to the Whites.

While Mannerheim had been pushing the Russians and Red Guards out of Finland, Svinhufvud had asked Germany to send an expedition to aid the Finns. While at first reluctant because of the concurrent peace negotiations between Russia and Germany, the German Imperial

³³Shearman, pp. 63-65.

³⁴Jutikkala, pp. 256-257.

Headquarters agreed on February 21 to send a division. Mannerheim protested, believing that the Finns should fight alone, but agreed when assurances were given that the Germans would not meddle in Finnish internal politics.³⁵

The Russians signed a treaty of friendship with the Finnish Socialists on March 1; at the same time, large amounts of Russian munitions were distributed to the Red Guards.³⁶ On March 7, the Red Guards launched a second offensive against White-occupied Finland. While the operation was ostensibly directed by Eero Haapalainen, it was in reality, engineered by a Russian officer, Colonel Svetshnikoff. Besides sending a large quantity of war material, the Russians supplied the technical experts who were also involved in the battle. The offensive was halted, however, and the initiative now shifted to Mannerheim. On March 15, the White offensive began against Tampere, Finland's second most important city. After battles at Laenkipohja, Orivesi, Lembois, and Vehmais, Tampere was cut off. On March 28, the orders were given to attack Tampere, which fell on April 6 after a savage and determined resistance by the Reds.³⁷

On April 3, a German force of 9,500 men under Major General Ruediger von der Goltz landed at Hangoe; on April 7, a second force of 2,500 men under Colonel von Brandenstein disembarked at Loviisa. They advanced on Helsinki, which had been abandoned by the Russians after

³⁵ Wuorinen, p. 221.

³⁶ Treaty of Friendship with the Finnish Socialist Workers' Republic, Soviet Documents on Foreign Policy, Vol. I, pp. 47-48.

³⁷ Borenus, pp. 137-148.

the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, and entered the city on April 13. The capital of Red Finland was moved to Vyborg. After cutting a Russian raiding expedition to shreds at Rautus, the Whites and Germans closed in on Vyborg and the last pockets of Red resistance. Vyborg was surrounded on April 26 and finally surrendered on May 1,³⁸

The war had left its mark. After about 20,000 Finns had died, four hundred industrial firms had suffered partial or complete destruction, and Finland was facing famine. Of the Red forces, some individuals, such as Kullervo Manner and Otto Kuusinen, escaped to Russia, some were shot, some joined the British Expeditionary Force in Murmansk and later returned to Finland, and some went to Sweden, Canada, or the United States. About ten thousand died from starvation and disease in prison camps.³⁹

The new Finnish state was faced by formidable problems. The exact form of government had not been decided. For a time, a scheme to name a German prince to the Finnish throne was considered, but the victory of Germany's enemies caused this idea to be abandoned. In July, 1919, a new constitution was adopted establishing Finland as the first Scandinavian republic. By that time the government had also secured diplomatic recognition from Britain and the United States, mainly due to Mannerheim's efforts.⁴⁰ With these measures, Finland was finally established as an independent nation.

³⁸Shearman, pp. 65-67.

³⁹Meade, pp. 150-151.

⁴⁰Wuorinen, pp. 261-266.

The most perplexing problem facing Finland from 1918 to 1939 was its relationship to Russia. The problem was initially aggravated by the Finnish desire to expand east into Karelia. The Karelians were closely related ethnically and culturally to the Finns; this expansion would also make Finland's borders shorter and easier to defend. During the Russian Civil War, Mannerheim proposed that Finland would help the anti-Communist forces take Petrograd in exchange for a guarantee of independence from the White Russians and Finnish expansion into eastern Karelia. The Whites unwisely declined this bargain at a time when Finnish aid would have meant the fall of Petrograd and possibly the collapse of the Bolshevik state.⁴¹

By 1920, when the Soviet government had clearly defeated the Whites, the Finns decided to come to terms with it. Questions over boundaries, debts, commercial activities, etc. remained, despite the recognition of Finland in 1918. The Treaty of Tartu was signed on October 14, 1920. It defined the boundary of Finland, transferred the provinces of Repola and Porajärvi from Finland to Russia, and defined some commercial, financial, and industrial interests common to both Finland and Russia.⁴²

Finnish foreign relations from 1920 to 1939 were dominated by the necessity to co-exist with its gigantic eastern neighbor. This problem overshadowed all other aspects of Finland's diplomatic policy. Generally, Finland managed to maintain peaceful, if not friendly,

⁴¹Shearman, pp. 71-72.

⁴²Wuorinen, pp. 485-491.

relations with the Soviet Union. A series of treaties and agreements between the two countries regulated various commercial and industrial enterprises in which both nations participated, such as fishing, fur trapping, lumber, and setting up commissions to arbitrate disputes.⁴³ However, several issues did arise between the Finns and Russians which poisoned relations and at times brought them to the brink of war.

A minor source of irritation to the Finns was the activities of Finnish Communists who had fled to Russia after the civil war. Men like Otto Kuusinen, who had been the revolutionary Commissar for Public Education, slipped back and forth across the border on missions of revolutionary espionage, often pursued by the Central Criminal Department of Finland.⁴⁴ This problem, however, was only minor and ceased to exist within a few years after the war as the Finnish government gained stability.

During the early 1920's, the major sources of friction between Finland and the Soviet Union were the Aaland Islands and eastern Karelia. In both cases the situation was aggravated by Finnish appeals to the League of Nations. Finland belonged to the League, but the Soviet Union consistently held that the League had no authority.

The question over the Aaland Islands arose when the League of Nations undertook, at Swedish request, to guarantee the neutrality of the islands. Despite the distance of the islands from Russia, the Soviet government apparently saw some threat in the action of the League,

⁴³ Robert M. Slusser and Jan F. Triska, A Calendar of Soviet Treaties: 1917-1957 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1959), pp. 476-480.

⁴⁴ Meade, p. 152.

possibly stemming from the fact that many of the League countries had been those who had intervened in the Russian civil war on the side of the Whites. At the beginning of the discussions, the Soviet Union announced that no decision concerning the islands would be valid if the Russians did not take part.⁴⁵ Along the same lines, Soviet leaders warned that while they would not intervene as long as the islands belong to Finland, Russia must be consulted if their status was to be changed.⁴⁶ When the League of Nations formulated its decision to neutralize the Aaland Islands but leave them under Finnish administration, the Soviet Union denounced the League for conspiring against Russia, rejected the authority of the world body to draft such an agreement, and refused to recognize the validity of the convention.⁴⁷ Fortunately, the Soviet Union chose not to go to the extreme of annexing the islands; the entire protest seems to have been largely a matter of fear that the League of Nations was planning new operations against Russia. Having lodged its protest, the Russian government was content to wait for further developments; the fact that it had been waging a de facto war against several League members was a contributing factor to the Russian fears.

If the Soviet reaction to the Aaland Islands question was in protest to the League of Nations rather than Finland, the dispute over

⁴⁵Note from Chicherin to the Allied, Swedish, and Finnish governments on the Aaland Islands, June 28, 1921, Soviet Documents on Foreign Policy, Vol. I, p. 190.

⁴⁶Note from Chicherin to Sweden and Finland on the Aaland Islands, July 22, 1921, *ibid.*, p. 251.

⁴⁷Narkomindel statement on the convention on the neutrality of the Aaland Islands, November 16, 1921, *ibid.*, pp. 278-280.

eastern Karelia was much different. An uprising in Karelia in 1921 caused a large number of Finns to cross the border and fight against the Soviet Union. The rebellion was put down, but relations between Finland and Russia were worsened. The Russian protest against Finnish bands of volunteers helping the insurgents also demanded that the border between Finland and Karelia be closed until the uprising was crushed. The Finnish plea for a League of Nations investigation was rejected by the Soviets, and their note also contained an implied threat against Finland if further aid was sent to the rebels.⁴⁸ When the Finnish government managed to place the Karelian issue before the League of Nations, the Soviets replied that the League had no authority to act.⁴⁹ The Finns regarded themselves as the protectors of the Karelians; the Soviet Union regarded Finland as an imperialistic state eager to expand at Russia's expense. A later attempt by the Finns to again involve the League of Nations brought a Russian accusation that the Finns were in violation of the Treaty of Tartu by so acting.⁵⁰ The Soviet Union also rejected Finnish attempts to bring the matter before the Permanent Court of International Justice, again saying that only Russia had any authority in the matter.⁵¹ The issue was never

⁴⁸Note from Chicherin to the Finnish Charge' d' Affairs in Moscow on eastern Karelia, December 5, 1921, *ibid.*, pp. 280-282.

⁴⁹Narkomindel statement on the League of Nations resolution on the Karelian question, January 18, 1922, *ibid.*, p. 288.

⁵⁰Note from Chicherin to the Finnish envoy in Moscow on eastern Karelia, February 17, 1923, *ibid.*, p. 374.

⁵¹Reply from Chicherin to the Secretary of the Permanent Court of International Justice, June 2, 1923, *ibid.*, pp. 398-399.

successfully resolved and remained a point of disagreement between the two countries until the Second World War.

While other problems arose between the two nations, they were generally of a minor nature and were settled without trouble. Yet, there persisted one consideration which remained a source of anxiety for the Russians. The position of Finland, along with Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, constituted a threat to the Soviet Union. This concern may well have prompted the Moscow Disarmament Conference between Russia, Estonia, Latvia, Poland, and Finland in 1922. Fear of Russia prevented any agreement from taking place, however.⁵² A thaw between Russia and Finland occurred in 1926 when representatives of both nations met to discuss the Aaland Islands and settlement of disputes. Little was decided at this time, but the door was left open for further discussion.⁵³ A dangerous lack of understanding between the two nations persisted into the early 1930's, however, as evidenced by the Soviet belief that the Finnish government was responsible for the anti-Russian election posters and newspaper items which frequently appeared.⁵⁴ The Finns, for their part, generally exhibited disinterest in Russia and often contempt for Russians.

⁵²Litvinov's statement in reply to the collective statement of Polish, Finnish, Estonian, and Latvian delegation to the Moscow Disarmament Conference, December 12, 1927, *ibid.*, pp. 351-353.

⁵³Note from the Soviet Envoy in Helsinki to the Finnish Foreign Minister on the proposed guarantee pact, July 12, 1926, *ibid.*, Vol. II, pp. 123-124.

⁵⁴Tass statement on settlement of questions in dispute with Finland, January 28, 1931, *ibid.*, pp. 469-470.

Despite the nervousness of the Russians about Finland, relations between the two countries were not uncordial from 1926 to 1938. As Germany began to rearm, Russia began to have new worries. Stalin remembered only too well that German troops had landed at Hangoe in 1918 and had been in a position to strike at Petrograd or cut the railroad linking Murmansk with the rest of Russia. Nor had Stalin forgotten the British naval raids on Russian ports during the Civil War. Consequently, in order to safeguard their northwestern flank, the Russians began to pressure Finland into a mutual assistance pact in 1939 in addition to the non-aggression agreements in 1932 and 1938. The Finns rejected the proposal as an attempt to put Finland under Soviet control.⁵⁵ This refusal caused the Russians to grow more suspicious of Finland.

The approach of war in Europe caused the Soviet Union to become even more wary of Finland. As Germany became more belligerent, the close economic ties between German and Finnish industries prompted Russian concern over a possible alliance between the two countries. The proximity of the Karelian Isthmus to Leningrad was a major anxiety for the Soviet Union. The possibility of a German thrust through Finland into Russia seems to have been considered more seriously than an attack through Poland and eastern Europe. The fact that diplomatic relations between Germany and Finland had been rather cold since the coming of Hitler and that Finnish press was sharply critical of the Third Reich does not seem to have made an impression on the Kremlin.

⁵⁵ Shearman, p. 87.

Russia saw a threat in Finland and determined to eliminate that threat as soon as possible.

CHAPTER II

THE WINTER WAR

After Germany annexed the remnant of Czechoslovakia in March, 1939, war in Europe became even more likely. As France and Great Britain began to stiffen their resistance to further German expansion, a situation developed which was to involve Finland in an almost fatal struggle with Russia. The Finns wished to avoid an alliance with any of the major powers but were being pressured by the Russians to accept a mutual assistance treaty in the event of an attack by a third power. The Finnish government refused the Russian offer, choosing to issue a proclamation of neutrality instead.

Unfortunately, an event occurred which would ultimately force Finland into war. On August 23, 1939, Germany and the Soviet Union signed an agreement not to attack each other. Germany's aim was to avoid interference by Russia when Hitler's armies attacked Poland. If war did start, the Soviet Union wished to see it waged between Germany, France, and the United Kingdom rather than between Russia and Germany. In this way, all three of the aforementioned nations would be weakened and the position of the Soviet Union strengthened.¹ Appended to this treaty was a secret protocol which meant trouble for Finland and the Baltic states. The agreement divided Poland and defined German and

¹Wuorinen, A History of Finland, p. 88.

Soviet spheres of influence. The dividing line was originally the northern border of Lithuania; Germany declared that it had no interest in Estonia, Latvia, and Finland since they were recognized as being in the Soviet sphere of influence.² Lithuania was later assigned to the Russian zone in exchange for Polish territory to Germany.

With the assurance of a free hand, the Soviet Union turned its attention to the Baltic states--Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia. Shortly after the German invasion of Poland, the Russians set forth demands to these nations for the use of certain ports, airfields, and military installations for the duration of the war, while their governments were to supply the Soviet ground, naval, and air forces occupying these areas. While the Baltic nations were reluctant to accept these conditions, Soviet duress, which amounted to threat of invasion if the terms were not met, forced them to agree. Estonia signed an agreement on September 25, 1939, followed by Latvia on October 5, and Lithuania on October 11.³ The Soviet Union, for its part, pledged not to infringe on the economic or political affairs of the nations involved; the sincerity of this promise was subsequently demonstrated in 1940 when all three nations were annexed by the Soviet Union. The concession forced from the Baltic states in September and October of 1939 insured that Russia could take them whenever such action seemed desirable.

²Treaty of Non-Aggression between Germany and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, August 23, 1939, U. S. Department of State, Documents on German Foreign Policy (Ser. D, Washington: Government Printing Office, 1956-57), Vol. VII, pp. 245-247.

³The Times (London, October 14, 1939), p. 9.

The meaning of what was happening was not lost on Finland. The Finns were suspicious from the start that there might be some kind of secret agreement which would be harmful to Finland. Already in August, Eljas Erkko, the Finnish Foreign Minister, had voiced his fears that Germany might have divided the Baltic area with Russia. Erkko was also keenly aware that without Germany to be concerned about, the Soviet Union would feel free to take action against Finland. When confronted by these Finnish suspicions, the Germans responded in an evasive and noncommittal manner.⁴

When these Baltic states were forced to accept the Russian agreement, the Finns realized that Russia would probably make similar proposals to them. Despite Soviet promises to honor the political sovereignty of these countries, the Finns believed that all three would soon be swallowed by Russia. On October 9, 1939, a Finnish representative, Juko Paasikivi, was sent to Moscow at Soviet request to discuss a number of unspecified items of importance to both Finland and Russia.

Negotiations began in Moscow on October 12. The Finns were represented by Paasikivi, A. S. Yrjo-Koskinen, Johan Nykopp, and Aladar Paasonen; on the Soviet side, the delegation consisted of Stalin, Molotov, V. P. Potemkin, and Vladimir Derevuanski.⁵ The Soviet proposals were far reaching. They demanded the lease of the port of Hangoe for a Soviet naval base, the right to use anchorages in Lappohja Bay, the destruction of all fortifications on both sides of the Finnish-Soviet

⁴Bluecher to Grundherr, August 26, 1939, Documents on German Foreign Policy, Ser. D, Vol. VII, pp. 343-345.

⁵Vasinoe Tanner, The Winter War (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1957), p. 25.

border, the relocation of the Karelian Isthmus border to a point seventy kilometers from Leningrad, and a non-aggression treaty between Finland and the Soviet Union.⁶ In return, the Soviet Union agreed to cede the provinces of Repola and Porajärvi from Soviet Karelia to Finland. The Russians were thus willing to exchange 5,529 square kilometers of land for 2,761 square kilometers of Finnish territory, which was also to include the islands of Suursaari, Tytärsari, and Koivisto in the Gulf of Finland.⁷ The Russian demands were clearly designed to achieve greater security for Leningrad and Murmansk. At this point in the negotiations, Stalin and Molotov maintained a rather benevolent demeanor toward the Finns and, unlike their treatment of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, made no threats, direct or indirect, against Finland if it refused. The Finnish delegates returned to Helsinki on October 16 to present the Soviet demands to the Finnish government.

A select committee of the Finnish Council of State met on October 16 to consider the Russian proposals. Present were Prime Minister A. K. Cajander, Foreign Minister Erkko, Defense Minister Juko Niukkanen, Väinö Tanner (a member of the Cabinet foreign affairs committee and later Foreign Minister), Field Marshal Mannerheim, Lieutenant General Hugo Oestermann, Lieutenant General Lenhart Oesch, Paasikivi, and the other members of the delegation to Moscow. The consensus of those

⁶Hellmuth Guenther Dahms, Geschichte des Zweiten Weltkriegs (Tuebingen: Rainier Wunderlich Verlag Herman Leins, 1965), p. 94.

⁷Memorandum of the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics handed in Moscow on October 14, 1939, by M. M. Stalin and Molotov to M. Paasikivi, Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland, The Finnish Blue Book (New York: J. B. Lippincott Company, 1940), pp. 49-51.

present was that the Russian demands should be rejected. The cession of Hangoe was deemed impossible, since this strategic port could be used as a base for an assault of Helsinki from the west at the same time a general attack on Finland came from the east. Some minor adjustments of the Karelian border might be open to discussion, they agreed, but the frontier could not safely be changed to the extent desired by the Soviet Union. The cession of the islands asked by Russia constituted no threat to Finland and should be discussed further.⁸ No mention was made of the Soviet offer of Repola and Porajaervi to balance the loss of Finnish territory. These provinces were of little value compared to what Finland would be giving up in terms of military, industrial, and commercial potential. Also, in the years from 1920 to 1939, Repola and Porajaervi had been colonized with Russians who might possibly constitute a threat to Finland's safety.⁹ With this reply and counter-offer to Russia, Paasikivi and Tanner returned to Moscow on October 23.

In this first stage of negotiations the limits had been set; neither side deviated far from its original position. Stalin wanted Hangoe, part of the Karelian Isthmus, and some islands in the Gulf of Finland in order to increase the security of Leningrad. He was willing to give up two provinces of little value and make a few other minor concessions. The Finns regarded Hangoe in foreign hands as a permanent threat to Helsinki. To give up a large part of the Karelian Isthmus would be to give up territory containing an important part of Finnish

⁸Tanner, pp. 31-35.

⁹Borenus, p. 256.

industry; it would also mean that the border in that area would be twice as long and much harder to defend. The islands, except for Koivisto, were of little importance to Finland and could be given to Russia.

The journey of Paasikivi and Tanner to Moscow was futile. The Soviet Union refused to change its original proposals in anything save a few unimportant details; the proposed Russian garrison in Hangoe was reduced to four thousand instead of five thousand troops, for example. The adjustment of the Karelian Isthmus boundary was altered slightly but not enough to be a genuine compromise. The Soviet Union rejected the Finnish terms as unacceptable, and the Finnish delegates announced that Finland could not accede to the Russian demands. Paasikivi and Tanner left Moscow on October 24 and arrived in Helsinki on the twenty-sixth.¹⁰

On November 3, Tanner and Paasikivi returned to Moscow for the last time to present their final proposals: Hangoe and the Lappohja Bay anchorage must remain under Finnish control; the government of Finland was willing to give the Soviet Union several islands in the Gulf of Finland in exchange for territorial compensation in Soviet Karelia; the border on the Karelian Isthmus might be relocated out of artillery range of Leningrad.¹¹ The Soviet government declared these terms to be unsatisfactory. Hangoe had become an integral part of the Russian defense plans, and the Russians refused to consider any plan which did not cede the city to them.

¹⁰Tanner, pp. 39-45.

¹¹Memorandum of the Finnish Government handed in Moscow on November 3, 1939, by M. M. Paasikivi and Tanner to M. Molotov, Commissar for Foreign Affairs, The Finnish Blue Book, pp. 61-66.

The Finnish delegates remained in Moscow until November 13, accomplishing nothing. As they departed, the Soviet press and radio launched a campaign of abuse against the Finnish government, labelling it an organ of warmongers and capitalists. There were hints that Russia would impose its will on Finland by force if necessary. Before they departed, the Finns sent a letter to Molotov expressing the hope that it would be possible to hold further negotiations, but this effort proved no more than an idle gesture.¹²

The Finns had not been idle at home during the negotiations in Moscow. On October 5, the very day upon which the Russians had requested that a delegation be sent to Moscow, frontier elements of the Finnish army were mobilized.¹³ Mobilization continued at a rapid pace and was completed by October 19. Troops were sent to various positions along the Soviet-Finnish border.¹⁴ The Council of State agreed to raise 500 million marks from the Finnish people for defense purposes, and the population subscribed a loan of 700 million marks. In addition, private industries and individuals began to contribute to the common defense. Some people were content to collect winter clothing for the army; some businesses continued to pay employees who were absent because of duty with the reserves. When Tanner and Paasikivi left Helsinki for Moscow on October 21, their train was delayed a number of times by troops moving into defense positions.¹⁵ The Finns had 300,000 men under arms,

¹²Tanner, pp. 79-80.

¹³Bluecher to Weizsaecher, October 6, 1939, Documents on German Foreign Policy, Ser. D, Vol. VIII, p. 231.

¹⁴Bluecher to Weizsaecher, October 19, 1939, *ibid.*, p. 319.

¹⁵Tanner, pp. 35-36.

including both regular army and reserves, by the time mobilization was completed, and the Finnish fortifications on the Karelian Isthmus were hastily finished. As much war material as possible was purchased from foreign sources, mainly Sweden and England,¹⁶ and air raid shelters were dug in the cities.¹⁷ In addition to the men under arms, Finland also mobilized its women's auxiliary, the Lotta Svaerd organization. This group of women raised Finland's total number of defense personnel to 375,000.

Yet, what were the chances for Finland's survival if war actually broke out? To those best informed, the prospects seemed dim indeed. Field Marshal Mannerheim, whose requests for a higher arms budget had been denied several times in the past, held that Finland would exhaust its supply of ammunition in two weeks; it followed that the war could last no more than a month. Though Defense Minister Niukkanen was comparatively optimistic, he conceded that Finland could last but six months at the most.¹⁸ The Finns were willing to fight Russia to preserve their freedom; the question was whether the Finnish army, with 375,000 men and women and ninety-six airplanes, could withstand the onslaught of the millions of men and thousands of airplanes that the Soviet Union could throw against them. Given these hopeless odds, the military leaders of Finland advised the government to come to terms with Russia.

¹⁶Some material was also purchased from Italy but was halted in transit through German territory.

¹⁷Geoffrey Cox, The Red Army Moves (London: Victor Gollancy Limited, 1941), p. 28.

¹⁸Tanner, p. 51.

Finland attempted to obtain aid from other nations. Sweden and the other Scandinavia countries were the first choices. Norway felt that it was far enough away from the Soviet Union that there was no need to become involved; Denmark was afraid of Germany. Sweden seems to have favored the idea of helping the Finns but turned against the idea when Germany failed the guarantee that it would not interfere if Sweden cooperated with Finland against Russia. Finnish attempts to obtain German mediation were rejected by Berlin as being contrary to the German-Soviet agreement.¹⁹ Attempts by the various Scandinavian governments and the United States to act as arbitrators were rejected by the Soviet Union. Russia, having failed to obtain her demands of diplomacy, was ready to turn to other methods.

On November 26, 1939, Molotov accused the Finnish forces in the Karelian Isthmus of attacking Soviet troops. His statement alleged that the Finns had fired seven artillery rounds at Soviet forces stationed near the village of Mainila, killing four and wounding nine. Molotov further declared that the concentration of Finnish forces in the Isthmus constituted a threat to Leningrad and demanded that the Finnish government withdraw its troops twenty-five kilometers from the border.²⁰

On November 27, Finland denied that they had fired on any Russian troops on the grounds that there was no Finnish artillery in the vicinity of Mainila of the type that had been supposedly fired. The

¹⁹Weizsaecher to Bluecher, October 12, 1939, Documents on German Foreign Policy, Ser D, Vol. VIII, p. 267.

²⁰Note from Molotov to the Finnish Minister in Moscow, November 26, 1939, Soviet Documents on Foreign Policy, Vol. III, p. 401.

Finnish reply further stated that the only cannon fired on the twenty-sixth had been on the Soviet side of the border. The Finns rejected as unnecessary the demand that their troops be withdrawn from the frontier and asked that a joint inquiry be made into the incident to clear it up.²¹

On the twenty-eighth, Molotov declared that the denial of the attack on Soviet troops near Mainila, along with the continued concentration of Finnish troops in the Karelian Isthmus, constituted a breach of the Finno-Soviet Non-Aggression Treaty of 1932, and that consequently the Soviet Union considered itself released from that treaty. On November 29, the Soviet Union accused Finland of further attacks on Russian troops, denounced the Finnish government as imperialistic, and broke off diplomatic relations.²²

The accusations made by the Russians against the Finns on the occasion of the Mainila incident seem far-fetched. The Finnish government knew it could not win a war against the Soviet Union without foreign assistance. It also realized there would be no such foreign assistance. Therefore, the last thing that the Finnish government would do would be to order such a provocation. There were no substantial troop concentrations near Mainila. To withdraw from the Isthmus fortifications in the face of the Soviet troops which had been marshalled in the area since September would have been suicidal for the

²¹Expose of M. Holsti, Delegate of Finland to the League of Nations, presented at the Session of the Assembly of the League of Nations on December 11, 1939, The Finnish Blue Book, pp. 89-94.

²²Note from Molotov to the Finnish Minister in Moscow, November 29, 1939, Soviet Documents on Foreign Policy, Vol. III, pp. 402-403.

Finns. Finally, the Finns were still hoping that the dispute between Finland and the Soviet Union could be settled through diplomatic channels; to engage in a series of planned attacks would destroy this hope.

On November 30, the Soviet Union launched air, sea, and land assaults on Finland. Helsinki, Lahti, Kotka, Enso, Kittilae, and the Petsamo area were bombed, with considerable civilian losses. The Soviet battleships Oktoboskaja Rovuluzja and Marat, along with the heavy cruiser Kirov and several destroyers, attacked Hangoe and Vyborg. Soviet strength on the ground has been estimated at 500,000 men and 1,000 tanks, supported by 2,500 planes.²³

On December 2, 1939, the Soviet Union created a puppet government in exile with the intention of discrediting the legitimate Finnish regime. Russia's leaders selected Otto Kuusinen, a member of the Finnish Revolutionary Cabinet of 1918, to head the Democratic Republic of Finland to replace the Finnish government which had refused to cooperate with Russia. In addition, it pledged military aid to Kuusinen and resolved to eliminate the "former plutocratic government in Finland". The Democratic Republic agreed to all the demands which the Soviet Union had originally presented to Tanner and Paasikivi; in return, Russia promised to transfer about 70,000 square kilometers of Soviet Karelia to Finland and maintain a posture of noninterference in future Finnish affairs.²⁴

²³Dahms, pp. 95-98.

²⁴Treaty of Mutual Assistance and Friendship between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Democratic Republic of Finland, December 2, 1939, Soviet Documents on Foreign Policy, Vol. III, pp. 407-409.

The motives behind the Soviet decision to go to war and to form the Kuusinen government are fairly simple. Finland had refused to agree to the Soviet demands; thus, Leningrad was still in jeopardy. After the failure of Stalin and Molotov to reach an agreement with Paasikivi and Tanner, the Soviet Union had decided that force would be necessary. The propaganda barrage by the Soviet news service and the border incidents had been designed to pave the way by making it appear that Finland was guilty of wanting war. At the same time, roads were constructed through formerly impassible terrain in Soviet Karelia and troops were brought up.²⁵ The process of creating the Kuusinen government had begun in mid-November when Stalin became convinced that the negotiations would fail to achieve the results he desired, making the use of the Red army necessary.²⁶ The role of the Kuusinen regime was to give legitimacy to the Soviet invasion on the grounds that the Russians had been invited into Finland by a friendly government. Also, Stalin believed that he could draw Finnish workers to his side by this device. Kuusinen seems to have shared this illusion, remembering only the events of 1918 and never thinking that conditions could have changed.²⁷

In Finland, however, conditions in 1939, were considerably different from those in 1918. Great programs of social reforms and labor legislation had been inaugurated, and the causes of the 1918

²⁵ John H. Wuorinen, Finland and World War II: 1939-1944 (New York: The Roland Press Company, 1948), p. 64.

²⁶ Tanner, pp. 104-105.

²⁷ Borenus, p. 261.

civil war had largely been eliminated.²⁸ To the Finns, therefore, the creation of the Democratic Republic of Finland seemed nothing more than a cynical maneuver to bring Finland under complete Soviet control. When the news of the Kuusinen government became known in Finland, the Finnish Social Democratic Party and the Finnish Confederation of Trade Unions jointly declared that although the working classes of the country wanted peace, they would fight to the death to preserve Finnish independence. In the words of Karl-August Fagerholm of the Finnish newspaper Arbetarbladet, "O. W. Kuusinen's government is a complete failure; its propaganda value is nil."²⁹ The apparent intent of Russia in setting up the Kuusinen government, combined with the impact from the civilian losses resulting from the Russian bombing of Helsinki, united all Finns and fired them with a determination never to surrender. The Cajander cabinet resigned, but although the new cabinet under Risto Ryti was more willing to negotiate even on points like Hangoe, it refused to give up the freedom of Finland.

The Russian attack was three pronged: a drive against Petsamo, an attempt to drive across the center of Finland to the Gulf of Bothnia and cut the country in half, and finally an attack through the Karelian Isthmus toward Vyborg. The Russian military leaders planned on a short war. The morale of the Finns would break before the onslaught of the Red army, they believed; within a week all of Finland would be under the control of Kuusinen. The weather was not considered an important

²⁸Wuorinen, A History of Finland, pp. 329-336.

²⁹Quoted in Tanner, p. 106.

factor because of the short time that the conquest would take.³⁰ The first day of the war seemed to confirm Soviet expectations, as Soviet divisions drove forward, opposed by handfuls of Finnish troops. In one place, a single Finnish battalian fought a delaying action against an entire division in a series of fighting withdrawals. Petsamo was completely overrun in the first few days of the war and held by the Russians until its end.

Within a few days, however, the Soviet advance had been halted. The Finnish government asked for a renewal of negotiations on December 4, but the Soviet Union rejected the request, replying that they did not recognize the Ryti government as the legal government of Finland. By December 5, the Red army, although slowed by increasing Finnish resistance, was still advancing, and Stalin still expected an early victory.³¹ By December 17, however, the Soviet attacks had been stalled. Russian armor was stopped in the Karelian Isthmus at the forward Finnish positions. In the center of Finland, the Russian advance was halted by Finnish victories at Tolvajaervi on December 11 and Suomussalmi on December 15. Another Soviet drive was held at Aeglaejaervi. On December 24, Finnish raiding parties crossed into Russian Karelia. The Russian air force, on the other hand, continued to hammer at Finnish troop positions and the civilian population.³²

³⁰David J. Dallin, Soviet Russia's Foreign Policy: 1939-1942, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1942), pp. 141-142.

³¹Weizsaecker to Legations in Sweden and Finland, December 5, 1939, Documents on German Foreign Policy, Ser. D, Vol. VIII, pp. 486-488.

³²Borenus, pp. 264-265.

Russian reverses continued until February, when Soviet troops broke through Finnish defenses in the Karelian Isthmus. By the end of 1939, the Finns had shot down 150 Russian planes and destroyed four hundred tanks. At Suomussalmi, the Russian 163rd Division was destroyed after a three-week battle. By January 8, 1940, the 44th Division had also been shattered at Suomussalmi. The climax of Finnish victories north of Lake Ladoga came in February when they annihilated the 18th Division at Syskyjaervi; by February 18, this division had lost 18,000 men. After a battle that lasted a month, the 34th Moscow Tank Brigade was destroyed on March 1.³³ The destruction of these two units was no more than a sideshow, however, because of the Russian breakthrough in the Karelian Isthmus.³⁴

How was it possible for Finland to win such spectacular victories during this part of the war? Part of the reason lies in the inept handling of the war by Moscow. First of all, most of the troops used were of inferior quality, sent to Finland in the expectation of occupying a nation that would receive them gladly. A second important reason is that the Red army was not prepared for a war in Finland. The Russians had not prepared for a war in Finland. The Russians had developed a splendid force for operations on the plains of central and eastern Europe, but it was not an army which could be used effectively in the terrain found in Finland. The Soviet troops were not properly equipped or clothed for a war in which temperatures dropped to thirty

³³Ibid., pp. 266-269.

³⁴In addition, the 54th Division was encircled and escaped destruction only because the war ended.

below zero. The dark colored uniforms worn by the Russian soldiers were suited for weather in the Ukraine and Poland, not for the Finnish winter. Tanks were of little value in the forests of Finland, where there was no room to maneuver and the roads and clearings were mined. Also tanks were often disabled by mechanical problems caused by the intense cold. The Russians had no effective reconnaissance, since planes were often grounded by weather or were unable to spot movements of Finnish troops because of low clouds or thick forests. Within the forests, visibility was frequently limited to fifty meters or less. Another major failing of the Russian army was its command system. In every regimental or divisional unit, besides the commanding officer, a political commissar kept watch over the loyalty of the officers and the morale of the men; in many cases, the commissar could overrule the commander. This system was not conducive to an effective strategy, since it inhibited initiative and could cause an officer to have second thoughts about any action he took. Finally, because of the purges in the Red army during the 1930's, many commanders hesitated to act without asking higher headquarters for instructions.³⁵

On the other hand, the Finnish army proved itself to be a superb fighting machine. Finnish terrain constituted a great obstacle to any enemy advance, and the Finns made maximum use of this fact in fighting the Russians. They were expert in the use of land mines. The so-called Mannerheim Line, a collection of pillboxes, mine fields, machine gun emplacements, and trenches, held up the Russian advance on the Karelian Isthmus for three months. North of Lake Ladoga, the Finns utilized

³⁵Cox, pp. 236-242.

another form of attack--ski troops--which brought disaster to the Russians at Suomussalmi, Tolvajaervi, and Syskyjaervi. While the Finns had little equipment in the way of artillery, aircraft, or anti-tank guns, their ski-borne infantry, clothed in white and armed with sub-machine guns and rifles, destroyed thousands of Russian troops and captured tons of Russian material. The Finnish army was a well organized, disciplined, and highly motivated group of men. They were dedicated to Finnish independence and had a courage which came from a belief that they were in the right.³⁶

Despite the Finnish victories and the Soviet losses in personnel and equipment, Finland could not hope to win the war. While the Soviet Union had lost several times more men than Finland had, the Finns lost a far greater percentage of their available manpower. Despite purchases of anti-aircraft and anti-tank guns, machine guns, airplanes, and other war material from England, Sweden, and France, the Finnish army could not compete with the Red army as far as quantity of arms was concerned. The losses sustained by the Finnish army could not be replaced. The 8,000 Swedes and 3,500 Norwegians, Danes, Dutch, Irish, Canadians, and Americans who volunteered to serve with the Finns were not sufficient to alter the balance.³⁷ Consequently, when the Russians resumed their offensive in the Karelian Isthmus in February, 1940, the Finns did not have the manpower to hold them.

³⁶Ibid., pp. 253-255.

³⁷Dahms, pp. 98-101.

Still, by January, 1940, Russia was in a difficult position. Her troops had been defeated, and the Finns had overwhelmingly rejected Kuusinen. The Finns were ready to negotiate a settlement and were even willing to discuss Hangoe, but because of Soviet defeats and the consequent damage to Soviet prestige, Stalin could not consider negotiations.³⁸ Instead, better troops were sent to Finland, and the army was reorganized. Among other changes, the system of political commissars was abolished. General Semjon Timoschenko, in command of Soviet forces on the Karelian Isthmus, was given more troops and ordered to break through the Finnish lines.

On February 4, after a tremendous artillery barrage, the battle of Summa began. Thousands of Russian troops, supported by tanks, aircraft, and artillery, attacked this small coastal village at the west end of the Mannerheim Line. The terrain in this area was less of a barrier than north of Lake Ladoga or further east on the Isthmus. The first attacks were repulsed as the Russians lost hundreds of men and about fifty tanks. Timoschenko then attacked with three division on an eight-kilometer front,³⁹ By February 12, 1940, the Soviet troops had forced the Finns back about fifteen kilometers to their second-line positions. The Finnish island of Koivisto, with its 305 mm coast defense guns, was able to hold out for nearly two weeks, but by the end of the battle for Summa, Finland had been forced to commit the last of its reserves.⁴⁰

³⁸Frohwein to Weizsaecker, January 19, 1940, Documents on German Foreign Policy, Ser. D, Vol. VIII, pp. 685-688.

³⁹One division generally attacks on a front of five to ten kilometers.

⁴⁰The Times (London; February 15, 1940), p. 9.

With the loss of Summa and the continued attacks against Finnish positions, the Finnish government was faced with a different decision: to continue fighting, or to make peace on the best terms they could secure. While Foreign Minister Tanner had been in touch with Moscow through the mediation of Stockholm since January 29, the Russian demands had not changed except that they no longer offered any guarantee of compensation.⁴¹ The Finnish government had three choices. They could continue to fight on alone, although there was no hope of victory; the end result would be the destruction of the Finnish nation and virtual extermination of the Finnish people. Secondly, Finland could appeal for foreign intervention. While Norway and Sweden had refused to become directly involved in the war, France and Great Britain offered to send an expeditionary force of 50,000 men to be followed by a larger force later. There were two drawbacks to the plan. First of all, only about 15,000 could reach Finland before April, and this number would be of little value in the present crisis. Secondly, such an action by France and England would bring Germany into the war and turn Scandinavia into a battleground for the major powers. Hitler had clearly stated that the German army would invade Sweden if she allowed Allied troops to pass through Swedish territory. Consequently, the Finns rejected the idea of getting help from France and Great Britain.⁴² Finally, the Finns could capitulate. The terms would be harsh, but the Finnish state would be preserved.

⁴¹Tanner, pp. 125-126.

⁴²Georg Achates Gripenberg, Finland and the Great Powers (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1965), pp. 115-138.

The decision was a hard one to make. Most Finns did not want to give up, as the considerable debate in the Diet revealed. The continued advance of the Red army was the deciding factor. Koivisto fell on February 23; by March 8, the Soviet 29th and 33rd Divisions were attacking Vyborg. In addition, ski troops had been brought from Siberia and were making raids into the northern and central sections of Finland. As these events materialized, Mannerheim advised Ryti and Tanner to secure peace on the best possible terms available.⁴³

On March 6, a Finnish delegation, consisting of Prime Minister Ryti, Paasikivi, Major General Rudoff Walden, and Vaeinoe Voionmaa arrived in Moscow to consider the Russian demands which had been stiffened since the negotiations of October and November. The border adjustments on the Karelian Isthmus included Vyborg; in addition, large tracts of territory in the center of Finland were to be ceded to Russia. These new concessions included some of the most important industrial centers of Finland. However, the impending collapse of the Finnish army near Vyborg left the delegation with no choice. On March 12, 1940, a peace treaty between Finland and the Soviet Union was signed.⁴⁴ O. V. Kuusinen and the Democratic Republic of Finland were quietly dropped from the scenario and played no part in the treaty negotiations. In the words of W. P. Coates, a pro-Soviet author, "after consultation between the Soviet and Terijoki (Kuusinen) Governments the later agreed to dissolve itself."⁴⁵

⁴³Dahms, pp. 100-101.

⁴⁴Tanner, pp. 217-248.

⁴⁵Quoted in *ibid.*, p. 141.

The treaty gave the entire Karelian Isthmus, including Vyborg and the islands in Vyborg Bay, to Russia. In addition, the western and southern shores of Lake Ladoga and sections of central and northern Finland were also ceded to the Soviet Union. The two nations agreed not to attack each other. The Hangoe peninsula was leased to Russia for eight million Finnish marks a year, and the Soviet Union was given the right to establish a naval base there. Finland granted transit rights to Sweden. Some restrictions were placed on the Finnish use of Petsamo; these provisions were designed to keep Finland from using its Arctic coast for military purposes.⁴⁶ The treaty was ratified in the Diet on March 15 by a vote of 145 to three.

The terms of peace were harsh indeed. Finland had been forced to give up 35,201 square kilometers of its territory, including the ports of Hangoe, Vyborg, Uuras, and Koivisto. The Saima Canal was rendered useless, since its mouth was in Russian hands. The Karelian Isthmus contained most of the Finnish lumber, chemical, textile, and metal industries, and Finland further lost about one hundred power stations. About 450,000 Finns in the ceded areas chose to migrate west rather than to live under Soviet rule, and these refugees required aid from the government to start a new life.⁴⁷ Finland had been defeated and stripped of some of its most valuable territory. This was a fact that the Finns would not forget, and they would be quick to seize a chance for revenge.

⁴⁶Treaty of Peace between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and Finland, Soviet Documents on Foreign Policy, Vol. III, pp. 421-423.

⁴⁷Mazour, pp. 130-131.

Though defeated, the Finns were justifiably proud of their performance. While they had not been expected to last more than a few weeks, they had held out for three and a half months against the most massive army in the world. Finnish losses had been heavy--24,923 dead and 43,557 wounded--but Russian casualties were three times as high--48,745 dead and 158,863 wounded.⁴⁸ The Finns viewed the war as a small country standing alone against an overpowering colossus and took pride in the stand they had made.

The Winter War had several important consequences. First of all, it damaged Russian prestige. As the Red army suffered defeat after defeat, many observers began to dismiss it as a rather inefficient and impotent instrument--a conclusion which subsequent events were to belie. Secondly, it would contribute to a reorientation of German strategy. The German military men had been worried about the Red army; this concern was one of the reasons for the German-Soviet Non-Aggression pact. During the Winter War, the Germans supported the Russians and were rather hostile to the Finns. The war caused the Germans to have second thoughts about their alliance with Stalin. Finally, the Finns, in their mixed pride and bitterness, seem to have reached the conclusion that if they could gain an ally against the Soviet Union, they could retake the territory that had been taken from Finland. While this attitude was not openly expressed, it existed and would have a considerable influence on Finnish actions when Germany invaded Russia in 1941.

⁴⁸Dahms, p. 103. These figures are based on official records of both sides. Russian casualties are believed to have been considerably higher.

CHAPTER III

GERMANY AND FINLAND: 1940-1944

The treaty which ended the Winter War did not insure peace between Finland and Russia. The terms of the treaty had been too harsh for the Finns to accept willingly. The attitude of the Finns was grounded on the hope that after Germany was defeated, France and Great Britain would take action to force the Soviet Union to return what it had taken. There was little doubt at this time that Germany would be defeated, and the statements of British and French leaders with regard to Finland encouraged Finnish hopes. Prime Minister Chamberlain's speech to Parliament on March 19, 1940, praised the valor of the Finns and expressed hope for a more just peace after the war.¹

On March 18, 1940, Finland, Sweden, and Norway began negotiations on a mutual defense alliance. The idea was not new, for the first attempt at such an action had been in the mid-1930's. Basically, the proposed treaty would have meant that an invasion of any of the three nations would be met by united military action by all three. The intention seems to have been to prevent a recurrence of the Winter War. Such an alliance might have been sufficient to defeat the Russian invasion of Finland in 1939. This thought was probably uppermost in the minds of the delegates at the negotiations. Therefore, a mutual assistance

¹The Times (London, March 20, 1940), p. 4.

treaty could possibly prevent a new invasion of any of these Scandinavian countries by Russia, Germany, or any other potential invader.² On March 29, Molotov declared that the proposal alliance was directed against the Soviet Union and, therefore, was a violation of the Finno-Soviet treaty of 1940. To the Finns, this action demonstrated that the Russians were trying to restrict Finland's freedom of action. Even Finns like Mannerheim and Paasikivi who understood the necessity of good relations with Russia deplored the Soviet move, stating that it would further promote Finnish distrust of the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, Soviet opposition to this defense plan caused it to be dropped.³

In the treaty of 1940, Finland had leased Hangoe to the Soviet Union as a naval base. The Russians subsequently forced Finland to allow the base to be supplied over Finnish railroads rather than by sea. A transit treaty was signed on September 6, 1940, authorizing Russian supply trains to use Finnish railroads. The Soviet Union also demanded the return of private property taken from the Karelian Isthmus and Hangoe prior to the Soviet occupation; in some cases, property removed before the war had to be returned. Of particular interest to the Russians were factory machinery and railroad rolling stock. These exactions were not part of the peace treaty but were added by Russia after its ratification.⁴

²The Times (London, March 21, 1940), p. 7.

³Anthony F. Upton, Finland in Crisis: 1940-1941 (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1964), pp. 51-53.

⁴Wuorinen, Finland and World War II: 1939-1944, pp. 83-84.

Another action taken by the Soviet Union which appeared to reduce Finnish independence was the proposal for a joint Finno-Russian company to operate the nickel mines in the Petsamo area.⁵ After the German conquest of Norway in April, 1940, Petsamo provided Finland's only access to the Arctic. The Soviet demand seemed to be an attempt to further control Finnish use of the area. Negotiations between the two nations continued, but the matter had not been settled when war was resumed.⁶

In the summer of 1940, the Soviet Union annexed Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia, charging that the three nations were conspiring against Russia. This action worried the Finns, especially since the original treaties had provided only for the establishment of bases in the Baltic countries similar to that at Hangoe. The Russians seemed to be interfering with Finnish domestic affairs in the same way that they had tampered with the Baltic nations before their annexation by the Soviet Union. When Molotov stated that the retention of Vaeinoe Tanner as Foreign Minister would hinder good relations between Finland and Russia, Tanner resigned. President Kyoesti Kallio resigned the presidency in November, 1940, and the Finns held an election for a new president. The Soviet Union announced that Tanner, Mannerheim, Svinhufvud and T. M. Kivimaeki, who had been active in suppressing the Communists in the 1920's and 30's, would be unacceptable to the Soviet Union.⁷ While

⁵The mines had been operated by an Anglo-Canadian firm.

⁶Wuorinen, Finland and World War II: 1939-1944, pp. 83-84.

⁷Statement by Molotov to the Finnish Ambassador in Moscow on the proposal for a Swedish-Finnish agreement and on the Forthcoming Presidential elections, December 6, 1940, Soviet Documents on Foreign Policy, Vol. III, p. 479.

none of these men had been considered, this type of interference strengthened the Finnish belief that the Soviet Union intended to reduce Finland to the position of a vassal state.

From a military standpoint, Finland had been placed in a difficult position. Her new borders were not only longer than the prewar boundaries but were also more difficult to defend. In the Karelian Isthmus, besides the regular border forces, the Soviet Union had an entire army corps which could be employed at any point along the southeast border of Finland; in addition, there was a force of five thousand Russians in Hangoe, equipped with tanks, armored cars, railroad artillery, and other weapons which were more appropriate to ground attack than coast defense.⁸

Encouraged by increasing Soviet influence in Finland, the Finnish Communists began to emerge from hiding. While Communism had been outlawed in Finland since 1918, defeat in the Winter War caused the government to be cautious about suppressing Communist activities because of the danger of offending Russia. On May 22, 1940, the Suomen-Neuvostoluetetan Rauhan ja Ystaevyyden Seura (Finnish-Soviet Peace and Friendship Society) was founded. The SNS, directed by Communists and leftwing Socialists, was ostensibly intended to improve relations between Finland and Russia and promote a campaign to eliminate hostile feelings toward the Soviet Union. In reality, it was a front for the revival of the Communist Party in Finland. The Finnish government regarded the organization as a potential fifth column, endeavored, upon Tanner's recommendation, to keep its articles out of general circulation,

⁸ Wuorinen, Finland and World War II: 1939-1944, pp. 85-86.

and applied other harassments intended to discourage the SNS membership and keep it under control.⁹ However, the Soviet Union officially condoned the activities of the SNS and gave it moral and financial backing.¹⁰ Because of this Soviet action, the Finnish government did not take the final step of ordering the movement dissolved. Whether the SNS was under the domination of Moscow, as Tanner and other leading Finns believed, is uncertain. In any case, the Russian recognition of the organization was another example of interference in Finnish affairs which many Finns regarded with suspicion.

On the other hand, the Finns were allowed to rebuild their border defenses without active Soviet opposition. The 1940 treaty had not restricted Finnish military activities except along the Arctic coast, where sea traffic to Murmansk could be affected. Under the direction of Field Marshal Mannerheim, the Finns began to build a larger and better equipped army. A larger army was required because the new borders of Finland were not as easy to defend as the old. The Finnish army had been deficient in antitank guns and ammunition for all types of artillery; Mannerheim resolved that this situation would not recur and was given full authority by the Diet to proceed with his plans. New fortifications were constructed, partly with Swedish aid. While these defenses were never used, they provided employment for many

⁹Upton, pp. 98-100.

¹⁰Speech by Molotov to the Seventh Session of the Supreme Soviet on the incorporation of Bessarabia and the Baltic States, and Soviet foreign relations, August 1, 1940, Soviet Documents on Foreign Policy, Vol. III, pp. 461-469.

refugees from the Karelian Isthmus and thus eased the unemployment situation to some extent.¹¹

While the work on the fortifications was proceeding, Mannerheim sought for a practical way of organizing a larger army. The army of 1939 had consisted of nine infantry division; the new army was to consist of sixteen infantry divisions, two elite Jaeger brigades, and a motorized cavalry brigade. Equipping the new army was the major problem. Remembering that they had not heeded Mannerheim's warnings that the Finnish military budget was too small prior to the Winter War, the government agreed to find the money for new equipment, and Finnish industry began to manufacture anti-aircraft artillery, anti-tank guns, a new 120mm mortar, and 105mm howitzers. Production of the nine millimeter Suomi machine pistol, which was very useful in forest fighting, was also stepped up. Finally, the ammunition supply of the Finnish army was vastly improved; the situation in the Winter War where Finnish artillery had been silenced by lack of shells more often than Russian activity would not be repeated. In addition, two hundred 75mm guns and thirty-two other pieces of heavy field artillery arrived from the United States via Petsamo.¹²

Despite the improvements in Finnish equipment, the arms embargo applied to Finland by Germany held back many shipments of weapons and hampered Finnish military reconstruction to a great extent. The effect of this embargo was particularly severe after the fall of France in June, 1940. Hitler's conquest of western Europe caused the Finns to

¹¹Upton, pp. 78-81.

¹²Ibid., pp. 84-85.

consider attempting to reach an agreement with Germany; at the same time, the apparent elimination of any threat from the West seems to have caused Hitler to reconsider his treaty with the Soviet Union. Russia was continuing to improve its military forces and had gained several key bases which could be used for offensive as well as defensive purposes.¹³ Therefore, Hitler decided to move against Russia in hopes of removing any possible threat there to Germany; because of his decision, Germany's relationship to Finland was also to change.

During the Winter War, though officially neutral, Germany had pursued a rather hostile policy toward Finland. Ribbentrop ordered embassy officials in Finland, Russia, and other nations to stress the justice of the Russian claims and blame Finland for the war.¹⁴ The German news service was also instructed to play up Finnish guilt and blame England for the refusal of Finland to grant the territorial changes desired by the Soviet Union. In January, 1940, Tanner had asked the German Minister to Finland if Germany would attempt to mediate a settlement to the war. The answer was a polite negative coupled with an implication that if Finland accepted aid from France and Great Britain, Germany might enter the war on the side of the Soviet Union.¹⁵

Germany had also contributed in a more material way to defeat of Finland. War materials from Italy were denied passage through Germany. In one case, fifty Italian fighter planes being shipped to Finland

¹³Speech by Molotov to the Supreme Soviet on the war with Finland and Soviet Foreign Policy, Soviet Documents on Foreign Policy, Vol. III, pp. 436-449.

¹⁴Ribbentrop, Foreign Ministry Circular, December 12, 1939, Documents on German Foreign Policy, Ser. D, Vol. III, p. 501.

¹⁵Bluecher to Weizsaecker, January 4, 1940, *ibid.*, p. 613.

through Germany were held up.¹⁶ When the Russian Navy decided on a submarine blockade of the Gulf of Bothnia, they requested German supply ships to provision and fuel their vessels at sea.¹⁷ The Germans agreed, hoping for similar aid in the Far East. After the Winter War ended, Germany continued to block any arms shipments to Finland through Germany or German-occupied territory.

By July, 1940, the German attitude began to change. Germany had occupied northern France and had driven the British off the Continent. Italy and most of the Balkan nations were allied with Hitler; Germany seemed to have won the war. The need to keep the Soviet Union neutral was no longer as pressing as had been the case the previous March. A second reason for the change in German thinking was the need to supply its troops in Norway. The British navy made sea transport through the Atlantic difficult; a shorter and safer route lay across the Baltic sea and then overland through Sweden and Finland. In September, 1940, Germany sent an anti-aircraft battalion to Norway via Finland; at the same time, the Soviet Union was advised of the action and the reason for it--protection from British bombers.¹⁸ Russia made no protest about the incident.

On September 22, 1940, Germany and Finland reached an agreement on the transit of German troops through Finland to Norway. The terms were

¹⁶Wiehl to Embassy in Italy, December 12, 1939, *ibid.*, p. 507.

¹⁷Scherpenberg to Weizsaecker, December 12, 1939, *ibid.*, p. 507.

¹⁸Ribbentrop to Embassy in Soviet Union, September 16, 1940, Documents on German Foreign Policy, Ser. D, Vol. XI, pp. 92-93.

similar to the treaty allowing Russia to supply its troops in Hangoe by rail and the Swedish-German agreement of July 5, 1940. The agreement provided that: (1) Germany could ship troops and equipment to Finnish ports on the Gulf of Bothnia (mainly Vaasa, Oulu, and Kemi) and then along the Arctic Highway by way of the Rovaniemi to the Norwegian town of Kirkennes; (2) Germany would inform Finland of the time of departure of troop transports from Germany and their time of arrival in Finland at least one day in advance; and (3) troops and equipment would be shipped in separate railroad cars.¹⁹ When the Soviet Union was informed of the agreement it showed signs of surprise and possibly alarm at the idea of having German troops in Finland. Molotov asked if Finland had been forced to grant the concession under threat of German invasion. The negative Finnish reply, combined with German assurances that the troops were being sent to Norway, may have quieted any Soviet fears; at any rate there was no further Russian protest.²⁰

Another reason for the change in German attitudes was that the occupation of Norway had changed the German military situation. Since the easiest way to supply troops in northern Norway was through the Gulf of Bothnia and then through Finland, Germany began to show an interest in events which could threaten this supply line. The negotiations between Finland and the Soviet Union on the Aaland Islands were therefore of interest to Germany. While Germany never took any direct part in these negotiations, it instructed its legation in Helsinki to keep

¹⁹Weizsaecker to Bluecher, September 22, 1940, *ibid.*, pp. 148-149.

²⁰Bluecher to Weizsaecker, September 22, 1940, *ibid.*, p. 160.

informed on their progress and to advise the Finns of the German interest in the islands.²¹ For similar reasons, Germany was concerned about possible Soviet occupation of the Petsamo region. Petsamo in Russian hands would have meant that German use of the Arctic Highway to supply Norway would have been subject to Soviet regulation.²²

Germany had interests in Petsamo besides a safe supply route to Norway. Nickel had been discovered in the area in 1924; the Finnish government had signed a contract with a subsidiary company of the International Nickel Company of Canada to mine the deposits. The company was to begin mining operations by 1941. Germany had concluded an agreement with the Finnish government in April, 1940, to receive sixty percent of the metal mined.²³ But two months later Molotov proposed that the nickel mining concession be transferred to the Soviet Union or that a Russian-Finnish company be formed to extract the ore in place of the Anglo-Canadian trust. The net result of this demand would have been Soviet control of Petsamo, probably in order to provide greater security from a possible threat to Murmansk from German troops in Norway. Also, control of the nickel mines would give the Soviet Union greater bargaining power in the event of a dispute with Germany.²⁴ In the negotiations which followed in the next twelve months, Germany reversed its previous policy, advising the Finns to resist the Soviet proposal but not to

²¹Ribbentrop to Legation in Finland, September 23, 1940, *ibid.*, p. 191.

²²Bluecher to Weizsaecker, January 26, 1941, *ibid.*, pp. 1199-1200.

²³Nickel was vital to the German armanent industries.

²⁴H. Peter Krosby, Finland, Germany, and the Soviet Union: 1940-1941 (Marrison: Univ. of Wisconsin Press, 1968), pp. 4-5, 27-34.

give Russia an excuse for military action.²⁵ The Finns, feeling themselves bound by the contract with the International Nickel Company, did not give in to the Soviet request. The Soviet Union used different sorts of pressure. At one time Soviet exports of various foodstuffs to Finland were cut off in an attempt to force the Finns to agree to the Russian demands. At the same time, the Soviet Minister to Finland was recalled. The Finns, receiving reports of Soviet troop concentration on the Karelian Isthmus, interpreted this move to mean that war was imminent and mobilized part of their army.²⁶ The Soviet Union apparently was merely bluffing or did not wish to risk a repetition of the Winter War, for the crisis temporarily eased soon after the Finnish mobilization. Germany stated that the agreement of April 23, 1940, guaranteed it sixty percent of the ore mined and that its armament industries needed the material. The Soviet Union replied that if Finland would agree to a Finnish-Russian company to work the mines, Germany would receive sixty percent of the mines' output until December 1, when the German contract expired.²⁷ The negotiations continued until the outbreak of war between Germany and Russia, and the issue was not definitely settled until the Soviet Union took possession of Petsamo at the close of World War II.

Having changed its thinking toward Finland, Germany prepared to offer more than mere moral support. On October 1, 1940, Lieutenant

²⁵ Wiehl to Embassy in Soviet Union, November 27, 1940, Documents on German Foreign Policy, Ser. D, Vol. XI, pp. 722-723.

²⁶ Bluecher to Weizsaecker, January 10, 1941, *ibid.*, p. 1139.

²⁷ Schulenberg to Weizsaecker, February 11, 1941, Documents on German Foreign Policy, Ser. D, Vol. XII, pp. 196-197.

Colonel Joseph Veltjens, of the J. Veltjens Arms and Munitions firm of Germany, concluded a contract with the Finnish government to supply equipment that the Finnish army needed. Finland was to pay for the new arms in a number of ways. Money and certain goods such as nickel and lumber products were the basic forms of payment, while the right of transit to Norway for German troops constituted part of the bargain also. Equipment being shipped to Finland but seized by Germany in Norway was to be released immediately; if German troops had used such material, the German firm was to replace it.²⁸ Veltjens was also responsible for the German-Finnish transit agreement. Finland's most important purchases from Germany were of artillery, which the Finnish army was very short of. The Finnish Minister of Defense, Rudolf Walden, ultimately bought twenty-three light and forty heavy batteries of field artillery, twenty-eight anti-aircraft batteries, and 150,000 land mines.²⁹ The Finns also bought modern aircraft, mostly fighter planes, and communication and transportation equipment. These purchases from Germany, combined with the Finnish domestic arms production, were to make the Finnish army a formidable force when war with Russia was resumed in June, 1941.³⁰

Why did the Finns turn to Germany? Hitler was often attacked by the Finnish press, and the Finnish people were not fond of the Nazi regime in Germany, although there were close ties between German and Finnish citizens dating from the civil war. Germany had been rather

²⁸Bluecher to Weizsaecker, October 1, 1940, *ibid.*, Vol. XI, pp. 232-233.

²⁹An artillery battery usually consists of four to eight guns.

³⁰Upton, p. 85.

hostile to Finland in the Winter War, refusing even to attempt to mediate a settlement between the Finns and the Russians. On the other hand, the army had to be re-equipped, and after the German conquest of Norway, the Netherlands, Belgium, and France, Germany was the only nation capable of giving Finland the aid it needed. Accepting German arms did not mean that Finland was simultaneously adopting German ideology. Finnish foreign policy had never followed a set pattern but constantly adapted itself to circumstances. The Finns could not defeat Russia alone; Finland was faced, therefore, with a situation in which Russia had to be either satisfied or balanced against another power. At the same time, the interests of Great Britain and the North American countries had to be considered, since they were the source of much of Finland's food supply.³¹ Still, Germany was the only nation that was capable of acting as a check on Russian demands. Therefore, Finland found it expedient to turn to Germany for aid.

By August, 1940, Hitler had apparently decided to attack Russia before the Soviet armed forces became too strong to defeat. The value of having Finland as an ally for operations in the northern areas of Russia seems to have occurred to the German High Command before the end of 1940. In February, 1941, Lieutenant General Hans von Seidel and Colonel Erich Buschenhagen visited Finland ostensibly on an inspection tour of the Luftwaffe supply organization in Finland. However, in a visit to Mannerheim's headquarters, the subject of Finnish participation in the event of a German-Russian war was brought up. At this point,

³¹Bluecher to Weizsaecker, April 2, 1941, Documents on German Foreign Policy, Ser. D. Vol. XII, pp. 433-435.

only Finnish war aims were discussed; no attempt was made to coordinate strategy or tactics. The German officers were not allowed to speak of the actual plans for a German invasion of Russia. The Finns stated that they wished to regain the 1939 boundaries at the very least; the maximum advance would be to a line extending from the Baltic Sea along the 1939 boundary of the Karelian Isthmus to Lake Ladoga, then northeast to Lake Onega and further north to the White Sea.³² The Germans remained evasive and non-committal about the probability of war actually taking place, but the stage was set for further talks.

The Finnish government apparently did not hear of the conversation between Mannerheim and Seidel, or they did not consider it worthwhile to act at that point. The Diet had given Mannerheim complete authority as far as military matters were concerned. The government of Finland put complete trust in his judgment and decisions. He took whatever action that would be best for Finland. Mannerheim seems to have been apolitical; the relative merits of Communism, Nazism, or democracy seem to have been irrelevant to him. His only concern was his love for Finland and its welfare. He supported the Finnish government but remained politically aloof unless his opinion was asked for. Possibly Mannerheim would have preferred British or American aid if it had been available in sufficient quantities to fit Finnish needs. However, Britain was forced to divert most of her energy to rearming its forces after Dunkirk, and the United States was busy arming its recently expanded army. German aid was the only alternative.

³²Roessing to Matzyky, February 21, 1941, *ibid.*, pp. 122-126.

On May 25, 1941, a conference between German and Finnish military representatives took place in Salzburg. The Finns were told of a possible impending German attack on Russia. Concerning Finland, the Frontier was divided into German and Finnish sectors. The Germans would operate in northern and central Finland; the Finns would be concerned with the area near Lake Ladoga. The plan of operations was for the German troops to move toward Murmansk and occupy the Kola Peninsula; two Finnish divisions were to cover the German flank. In southeast Finland, the Finns would mobilize their army to freeze Soviet troops in the vicinity of Leningrad but would not be required to attack. The Soviet base in Hangoe was to be sealed off; again no assault would be required until German air support was available. The Finns would also provide anti-aircraft protection for unloading operations on the Gulf of Bothnia and for German troops in the vicinity of Rovaniemi and Kemijaervi.³³

The head of the Finnish delegation, Lieutenant General Erik Heinrichs of the Finnish General Staff raised a few minor objections to the plan from the Finnish standpoint and commented that Finnish troops near Lake Ladoga would attack if Finland accepted the plan. However, the Finns did not definitely promise anything. The Germans maintained that an attack would not be launched unless a series of important negotiations proved fruitless. In reality, there were no such negotiations in progress.

Subsequent talks between General Heinrichs and General Franz Halder, Chief of Staff of the German Army, during the next three days at Berlin

³³Memorandum of the German High Command, May 25, 1941, *ibid.*, pp. 879-885.

were designed to further clarify the military situation in Finland. Halder was interested particularly in the possibility of Finnish troops launching an offensive to support the German drive on Leningrad. Heinrichs again was non-committal but seems to have hinted that such action might be possible. Again, war between Germany and Russia was treated as a possibility rather than a certainty.³⁴ The information gained from the Salzburg conference was subsequently transmitted to Mannerheim and Ryti. Ryti ultimately made the decision which meant a new war with Russia.

At this point, Ryti performed a few acts which were a departure from the usual Finnish procedure. The Diet was not informed of what had been discussed at Salzburg. There is no definite information on why Ryti and his cabinet acted as they did. However, there are several possibilities. Ryti shared the bitterness of all Finns in their defeat by Russia in the Winter War; this feeling may have been more intense, since he was Prime Minister of Finland when the treaty of 1940 was signed. Tanner was Minister of Finance; his feelings were definitely anti-Russian. Other members of the cabinet were similarly overly influenced by their bitterness toward Russia. Instead of a man like the astute and experienced Paasikivi, a former professor of foreign relations at the University of Helsinki, Rolf Witting, was Foreign Minister. The Finns, comparing the German exploits in Poland and western Europe with the Russian experiences in the Winter War, seem to have reached the conclusion that the Soviet Union would be no match for Germany and that the war would be over within a few months. Hence, Finland with German

³⁴Upton, pp. 250-260.

aid could regain the territory which the Finns regarded as rightfully theirs. Finally, the decision to go to war does not seem to have been weighed with sufficient care. No consideration seems to have been given to what a long war would mean to Finland or how nations such as Great Britain and the United States would view German-Finnish co-operation.

President Ryti began to prepare the government for war on May 30 when he warned that German transits through Finland might increase in volume because of the tension between Germany and the Soviet Union. He further stated that either side might try to use Finnish territory to their advantage; Petsamo, the Aaland Islands, and Hangoe were especially threatened. Mannerheim was preparing to guard against any dangers in these areas.³⁵ Conferences were held in Helsinki between the second and sixth of June to conclude preparations for Finnish-German co-operation against Russia. The final plan was the one proposed by the Germans at Salzburg, with the exception that the Finnish divisions in southeast Finland would attack as soon as possible. Mobilization would commence on June 10 and would be completed by the twentieth.³⁶ The Finnish government insisted on one thing: that Finland not appear as an aggressor. Ryti, Foreign Minister Witting, and Mannerheim all wanted it to appear that Finland had been attacked by Russia. Therefore, the opening attacks were not to be launched from Finnish territory. Once the war began farther south, however, the concentration of German troops and aircraft in Finland, the blockade of Hangoe, and the mobilization

³⁵Ibid., pp. 261-262.

³⁶Buschenhagen to Jodl, June 4, 1941, Documents on German Foreign Policy, Ser. D, Vol. XII, p. 963.

of the Finnish army would probably be enough to provoke Russian ground or air attacks. This action would suffice to bring Finland into the war.³⁷

Despite the close co-operation envisioned between the German and Finnish armies, the Finns insisted that Finland was going to war as an independent nation rather than as a German satellite or puppet state. Some pro-German elements had arranged in 1940 for a battalion of Finns to be sent to Germany for training in the same way that the Lockstedt Jaegers had been trained in World War I. Mannerheim opposed the move, however, fearing that Germany might decide that Finland could be converted into a Nazi state from the willingness by the Finns to take such action. In the Helsinki conference of June, 1941, he specifically warned that any German attempt to set up a puppet government in Finland similar to that in Norway would destroy all chances of Finnish-German co-operation.³⁸ Mannerheim also reserved almost complete freedom in determining how the Finnish and German troops under his command in southeast Finland would be used.³⁹ The Finnish government, unaware that the reported negotiations between Germany and Russia were not taking place, also took steps to make sure it could explain away its mobilization if war did not take place. Foreign Minister Witting stated that millions of German and Russian troops were facing each other "from the Black Sea to the White Sea"; because of the danger that Russia might

³⁷Upton, pp. 266-267.

³⁸Ibid., p. 267.

³⁹Two German infantry divisions were sent to Mannerheim to replace the two Finnish divisions serving with the German army in northern Finland.

attack the German troops in Finland, the Finnish army was being mobilized. The action was represented as a precautionary measure to keep the country out of the war, but if Russia attacked Finland, German aid could be expected.⁴⁰

The Finnish reasons for going to war in 1941 seem to have been a desire to regain what had been taken from them and a hope to eliminate the Soviet Union as a threat to Finnish independence. Finland believed that Germany would defeat Russia; as a co-belligerent of Germany, the Finns would be able to reclaim what had been taken from them in 1940. After this goal had been accomplished, Finland would disassociate itself from Germany. This policy was basically the goal of Finnish diplomacy throughout the war; to regain what Finland had lost and then withdraw from the war.

Again the Finnish cabinet does not seem to have carefully considered what its position would entail. First of all, trying to convince the rest of the world that Finland was not under German influence would be very difficult. Secondly, if Russia held out against Germany, the task of reaching an agreement with the Soviets would have to be faced. Thirdly, Finland could be in serious difficulty if Germany did not want Finland to withdraw from the war. None of these difficulties seem to have been considered by Ryti or his cabinet.

The German invasion of Russia began on June 22, 1941. The German troops in Finland temporarily remained in position despite Hitler's proclamation that Finnish forces were attacking the Soviet Union in league with German forces. However, the Russians reacted as Mannerheim

⁴⁰Bluecher to Weizsaecker, June 13, 1941, Documents on German Foreign Policy, Ser. D, Vol XII, p. 1023.

and Ryti had predicted. On the day the invasion began, Soviet bombers attacked Finnish positions on the island of Alskaer and bombed two Finnish warships in the Gulf of Finland. Since the Finnish troops were not yet in the positions from which Mannerheim wished to begin his offensive, Witting protested the incident to the Russian Minister to Finland.⁴¹ The Russian Minister denied that any attacks had taken place, but on June 25, 1941, the Finnish Diet declared war on the Soviet Union. The Finnish government, army, and population all seemed to have hoped and believed that Finland could at last be rid of its hereditary enemy--Russia.

The Finns were worried about one thing in particular, however. Much of Finland's food supply came from Great Britain and North America; if Britain joined the Soviet Union, Finnish grain supplies could be cut off. Great Britain hinted that this action might be taken but expressed its desire to maintain diplomatic relations with Finland; Finland was equally eager to maintain its relations with England. However, British newspapers began to adopt a critical and often hostile attitude toward Finnish participation in the war against Russia, and inevitably relations between Finland and Great Britain began to deteriorate.⁴²

In July, 1941, Finland began to consider seriously breaking off its relations with Great Britain and recalling its diplomatic staff. The main reason for the Finnish action was the view that the British alliance with Russia combined with the blockade of Petsamo, which had been instituted by the Royal Navy in June, made normal relations

⁴¹Bluecher to Weizsaecher, June 22, 1941, *ibid.*, p. 1079.

⁴²Gripenberg, pp. 185-190.

impossible. Therefore, nothing was to be gained by keeping the legations in both countries open. At the same time, the Finnish government declared that it had no interest in western Europe and would not be drawn into the war in that area.⁴³ On July 27, Witting gave the British Minister of Helsinki a document stating that because of the British alliance with Russia and its promise to aid the Soviet Union in every possible way, normal diplomatic relations could not be continued.⁴⁴ While this view may have been correct, the delay of the British government in recalling its staff made it appear that Finland had taken the action unilaterally and, by inference, as a result of German pressure. The British press played up this idea, ignoring the reasons given in the Finnish document. While Germany had been pressuring Finland to break off diplomatic relations with Great Britain since the German invasion of Russia, there is no evidence that this pressure was the reason for the rupture between Finland and England. The British government avoided formally ending diplomatic relations until August 1, although British planes attacking Kirkenes, Norway, bombed the Finnish village of Luenahamari possibly the accident, on July 30.⁴⁵ Great Britain did not declare war on Finland, however, until December 6, 1941. Fortunately, this British action resulted in no casualties to either nation.

⁴³Bluecher to Woerman, July 22, 1941, Documents on German Foreign Policy, Ser. D, Vol. XII, p. 202.

⁴⁴Gripenberg, pp. 196-198.

⁴⁵Ibid., pp. 199-203.

The Finns maintained from the start of the war that their struggle was to guarantee their independence rather than to gain more territory. While Finland was co-operating with Germany in military operations, the Finnish campaign was not connected to Germany in a political sense. In other words, Finland was waging its war as an independent nation rather than as a German puppet state. At the same time, elements existed which could make Finland more dependent on Germany. Sixteen percent of the Finnish population were under arms; the economy would break down if large segments of the army were not soon released. The Finnish population could only be fed if additional food supplies were brought in from abroad, and the only source of these food supplies was Germany.⁴⁶

Mannerheim envisioned the Finnish operations in three parts: first of all, an advance to the 1939 borders of western Karelia; secondly, reoccupation of the Karelian Isthmus; and thirdly, an offensive into eastern Karelia to achieve greater security for Finland. The first and second stages ran concurrently, since the Finns moved to their 1939 borders by August 31 and reoccupied the Karelian Isthmus by early September.⁴⁷ Some fighting continued on the Isthmus until the end of September as the Finns drove out the Soviet rearguard. The Germans began to pressure Mannerheim into joining in an attack on Leningrad when the city was cut off from the rest of Russia. Though the government of Finland forbade Mannerheim to advance further south on the Karelian

⁴⁶Bluecher to Woerman, September 1, 1941, Documents on German Foreign Policy, Ser. D, Vol. XIII, pp. 417-418.

⁴⁷The Times (London, September 5, 1941), p. 8.

Isthmus than the 1939 border, Ryti promised the Germans at the same time that Finland would not demobilize its forces.⁴⁸

Mannerheim's advance into eastern Karelia, though resisted stubbornly by the Red army, was successful. By December 5, 1941, Finnish troops had reached the Svir River, which connects Lake Onega with Lake Ladoga. At that point, Mannerheim decided that further advance would not be practical and ordered the drive halted.⁴⁹ Although Finland had lost more men than in the Winter War, the Finns felt they had gained greater security than at any time since their independence. For the next thirty months, the Finnish-Russian front was quiet. The Soviet Union could not spare the troops to attack the Finns, and the Finns had no wish to drive deeper into Soviet territory. The war between Finland and Russia, therefore, reached a stalemate which lasted until June, 1944. At the same time, Mannerheim began to make plans to reduce the army to about 150,000 men so that the Finnish economy could be returned to normal.

Britain's attitude toward the Finns was either naive or very cynical, especially considering that England had been at the verge of war with Russia over Finland about eighteen months previously. On September 22, 1941, Foreign Minister Anthony Eden sent a message to Witting warning Finland not to advance into eastern Karelia but to withdraw to the 1939 boundaries. Furthermore, it was pointed out that relations between Britain and Finland could not be very good as long as

⁴⁸Bluecher to Woerman, September 1, 1941, Documents on German Foreign Policy, Ser. D, Vol. XIII, pp. 421-422.

⁴⁹Jutikkala, p. 282.

German troops stood on Finnish soil. The essence of Eden's message was that if Finland would stop its part of the war, withdraw to its 1939 frontiers, and somehow expel the Germans, Great Britain and Finland would be good friends again.⁵⁰ The possibility that Russia might decide to continue the war was not considered, and the Finnish view that the extra territory in eastern Karelia was necessary for Finnish security was not mentioned. Finally Eden did not seem to have given consideration to what might happen if the Germans refused to leave Finland. On October 8, Witting sent a negative reply to the English proposal. Great Britain repeated its terms on November 28, but again offered no guarantee that the Soviet Union would be satisfied with the 1939 boundaries of Finland. Eden, however, went further than in his note of September 22; if Finnish troops were not withdrawn to the 1939 border, Great Britain would declare war on Finland. On December 4, 1941, Finland rejected the ultimatum.⁵¹ On December 6, 1941, Great Britain declared war on Finland even as the Finnish Diet announced the reincorporation of the territories lost in 1940.

Could Finland have accepted the British offers? At the end of 1941, the answer seems to have been no. First of all, the question of whether Russia would accept the 1939 borders was very disturbing to the Finnish government, especially since Britain gave no guarantee that those borders would be respected. Secondly, there was the matter of what Germany would do. There were German troops in Finland. Because of bad harvests in Finland, the Finnish population was faced with a serious

⁵⁰Bluecher to Woerman, September 24, 1941, Documents on German Foreign Policy, Ser. D, Vol. XIII, pp. 558-560.

⁵¹Bluecher to Woerman, December 4, 1941, *ibid.*, p. 949.

food shortage, and Germany had promised to send food to help the Finns.⁵² Any English grain supplies would have had to enter through Petsamo, and even if there had been no German troops in Petsamo, the nearness of a German air base at Kirkenes would have made it difficult to land sufficient supplies to ease the situation. It also seems doubtful that Russia could have helped Finland very much at this point in the war even if it had been willing to.

Part of the difficulty facing Finland was the nature of the war. Finland viewed its war with Russia as a local affair, waged separately from the German campaign. Although Finnish troops co-operated with German forces, the Finns held that the Finnish war was conducted to guarantee Finland's independence and security rather than for territorial expansion. When Finnish forces reached the positions that would mean maximum security for Finland, the advance was halted. Because of this view, the Finnish government refused to participate in drives against Leningrad or Murmansk.

Unfortunately, no nation was willing to accept the Finnish viewpoint except Germany. England and the United States condemned Finland for waging an aggressive war in accord with Germany. The presence of German troops and aircraft in Finland, combined with the Finnish dependence on Germany for food and munitions, were interpreted as proof that Finland was a full-fledged ally of Germany.⁵³ The Allied view was not correct, although Germany was pressuring the Finnish to agree to an alliance which would hold Finland in war as long as Germany was fighting.

⁵²Bluecher to Woerman, November 23, 1941, *ibid.*, p. 814.

⁵³The Times (London, September 24, 1941), p. 4.

In January, 1942, Mannerheim began to question German capabilities to defeat Russia and recommended that Finland somehow withdraw from the war. From January, 1942, to September, 1944, Finland was in a very awkward position. At the same time that it was seeking a way to disengage itself from the war, it had to stay in the good graces of Germany in the event that German aid would be needed. On June 4, 1942, Hitler visited Mannerheim in Helsinki to convey best wishes on the Field Marshal's seventy-fifth birthday and to obtain Finnish assistance in the north. The following month, Mannerheim and his chief of staff visited Germany in an effort to secure more aid.⁵⁴ The net result of these visits and the German aid to Finland was that Finland, although not formally allied with Germany, could not easily disassociate itself from German influence. When the Finnish Minister to Germany asked on November 30, 1942, if Germany would object if Finland began negotiations with the Soviet Union, the reply was that such action would be interpreted as a sign of weakness and should be avoided. However, the Finnish Minister of Sweden was ordered to keep in contact with Russia.⁵⁵

On February 2, 1943, the German Sixth Army surrendered at Stalingrad; the following day, President Ryti visited Mannerheim to obtain his views on the outcome of the war. The discussion established that Germany's military position was beginning to deteriorate and that Finland should get out of the war as quickly as possible. On February 9, Colonel Ali Paasonen of the Finnish intelligence department reported to the Diet that the Axis powers would probably lose the war. The

⁵⁴Mazour, p. 157.

⁵⁵Wuorinen, Finland in World War II: 1939-1944, p. 150.

Finnish government decided that it was imperative to find some way of reaching a peace settlement with the Soviet Union. On March 20, the United States offered to help negotiate an end to the war, and Foreign Minister Henrik Ramsay, who wanted peace for Finland, visited Berlin on March 26 to discuss the American proposal. Ramsay was told that acceptance of the American offer would weaken relations between Finland and Germany; Germany further demanded that the Finnish government sign a treaty guaranteeing that neither side would agree to a separate peace. When Ryti refused to agree to the proposal, Wipert von Bluecher, the German Minister, angrily left Helsinki. The Finnish government turned down the American offer to avoid further German displeasure.⁵⁶ The German government continued to pressure Finland into signing a treaty of alliance, and Finland continued to resist.

In June, 1943, Germany began to hold up shipments of food, gasoline, and oil to force the Finns to give in. When the government of Finland at last made it plain that no treaty such as the Germans proposed would be considered, the German government, faced with other difficulties, decided not to force the issue. Ribbentrop brought the matter of an alliance treaty up again in November but was informed by the Foreign Affairs Committee that such a pact would never be approved by the Diet and would only cause difficulties between Finland and Germany. Thus, by the end of January, 1944, Finland had avoided a formal alliance that would have made it impossible to withdraw from the war without German permission.⁵⁷

⁵⁶ Mazour, pp. 158-159.

⁵⁷ Wuorinen, Finland in World War II: 1939-1944, pp. 154-155.

On February 16, 1944, Paasikivi met with Alexandra Kollontay, the Russian Minister to Sweden, to discuss the possible terms of peace. The Russian requirements were (1) severance of Finnish relations with Germany and internment of German soldiers in Finland, (2) withdrawal of Finnish troops to the 1940 borders of Finland, (3) immediate return of Russian prisoners of war and interned citizens, and (4) discussions on reparations and Petsamo. On February 29, the Diet asked that the negotiations begin before acceptance or rejection of the Soviet terms. When the Soviet Union denied this request, the Diet rejected the demands completely although keeping in touch with Russia through Stockholm. In a move kept secret from Germany, Paasikivi and Carl Enckell were sent to Moscow on March 25, 1944.⁵⁸

On the first of April, they returned to Finland with Russian terms which were very severe and almost impossible to meet. In addition to Finnish internment of German troops, restoration of the 1940 boundaries, and return of Russian prisoners of war, Finland was to reduce its army to peacetime levels, pay six hundred million dollars in reparations over a five-year period, and cede Petsamo to the Soviet Union.⁵⁹ Finland was required to demobilize its army at the same time it was driving out the Germans; the Germans were to be interned or ousted from Finland within a month. The reparations demand was impossible to meet within five years. Based on these considerations, Finland rejected the Soviet terms on April 12. However, the Soviet government kept the way open to further negotiations.

⁵⁸Ibid., pp. 163-167.

⁵⁹Ibid., pp. 167-170.

On June 9, 1944, the Red army began an offensive against Finnish forces in the Karelian Isthmus. Supported by one of the heaviest artillery aircraft bombardments of the war, the Russians broke through the Finnish defenses, and, on June 20, took Vyborg. Finnish troops were brought from eastern Karelia but were delayed by Russian attacks in that area too long to affect the outcome of the struggle of Vyborg. The Finns were faced with two alternatives: make peace with Russia or seek greater aid from Germany. On June 23, Russia announced that peace could be concluded if Finland were willing to surrender before negotiations began. On the other hand, Germany promised to send aircraft and ground troops to aid the Finns, but Ribbentrop was also in Helsinki demanding a formal alliance as a condition of such aid.⁶⁰ Finland desperately needed the German help, but the Diet was opposed to binding the Finnish people to Germany in the way that Ribbentrop desired.

On June 26, President Ryti broke the impasse by sending a personal letter to Hitler declaring that Finland would not withdraw from the war as long as he was president. The Diet was not consulted; no official treaty of alliance was concluded.⁶¹ The Ryti proclamation was merely an assurance that the Ryti government would continue the war and in no way committed any future government to the same course. German aid increased; an infantry division and an assault gun brigade arrived in Finland and was helpful in stopping the Soviet drive. The main factor in holding the drive was Russian strategy, however. After driving the Finns back to the 1940 borders, the Russian leaders decided that the

⁶⁰The Times (London, June 30, 1944), p. 4.

⁶¹Ibid.

troops were needed elsewhere. Ryti's statement had been the wisest course for Finland under the circumstances. The pledge could be disregarded if Ryti resigned and a new government was formed. Therefore, Finland was provided with a way out of the "alliance" Ryti had made with Germany. At the same time, the pledge was enough to satisfy Germany and insure the supply of material vitally needed by Finland. The question was whether this aid would be enough.

CHAPTER IV

THE END OF THE WAR

With German aid, the Finns had managed to halt the Russian assault of June, 1944, but the Finnish military position was still most unfavorable. Mannerheim warned that future Soviet attacks would be difficult to fight off. Furthermore, the Germans were forced to withdraw their units in southern Finland to reinforce other areas. Luftwaffe forces were transferred from Finland in mid-July; ground units were withdrawn at the end of the month.¹ While a large German army remained in northern Finland, it could not be relied on to help repulse Russian drives in the south.

With the withdrawal of German forces, the Finnish government was forced to reconsider the possibility of concluding peace with the Soviet Union. Diplomatic contact had been maintained between the Russian Minister in Stockholm, Mme. Kollotay, and the Finnish Minister, Georg A. Gripenberg. The only obstacle to further negotiations was Ryti's pledge not to make peace without first consulting Germany. On July 28, leaders of the Finnish government met at Mannerheim's country house in Sairala. As a result of this meeting, the Ryti government decided to resign. On

¹ Wuorinen, Finland and World War II: 1939-1944, p. 175.

July 29, the Finnish legation in Sweden was informed that a new government was being formed.² Since the Ryti proclamation had only applied to the Ryti government, the new government felt free to conclude a peace treaty with the Soviet Union.

Ryti officially resigned as president on August 1, 1944, and the Diet elected Mannerheim as his successor on August 4. By the time Mannerheim came to power, the Finnish army had only enough ammunition and supplies to last two or three months. Mannerheim personally held the opinion that Finnish defenses could last but a few days in the event of a major Soviet offensive. Germany, anxious to keep Finland in the war against Russia, threatened military action against ports in the Gulf of Bothnia and in northern Finland if the Finnish government abandoned Germany. Field Marshal Keitel visited Mannerheim on August 17 to ascertain the significance of the change in governments. Because of these developments, Mannerheim delayed any action in seeking peace, other than informing Keitel that Finland was no longer bound by the Ryti agreement.³

On August 26, however, Foreign Minister Carl Enckell instructed Gripenberg to inform Kollontay that Finland would be willing to discuss peace on the basis of the Russian terms of March 25, 1944. Three days later, Russia sent the reply that negotiations could begin on the condition that Finland would sever relations with Germany and order German troops withdrawn from Finnish territory by September 15. This

²Earl F. Ziemcke, Stalingrad to Berlin: The German Defeat in the East (Washington: United States Army, 1968), p. 387.

³Gripenberg, Finland and the Great Powers, pp. 338-349.

condition was accepted on September 2. A cease-fire between the Soviet Union and Finland was arranged on September 5, and a Finnish delegation arrived in Moscow on September 7 to negotiate a new treaty.⁴

Negotiations lasted from September 7 to September 19. The Russian terms were harsh, involving further cessions of Finnish territory, a heavy reparations indemnity, and other terms which were difficult for the Finns to accept. Among other provisions was the demand that Ryti, Tanner, and other Finnish leaders be tried as war criminals and that all Fascist organizations be outlawed. There was little discussion; the Finns realized that further fighting would mean the destruction of their country. They felt that the only way to preserve Finnish independence and prevent Soviet occupation was to agree to the Russian terms. An armistice agreement was signed on September 19 and ratified by the Diet on the same day. Finland accepted the 1940 boundaries; the Finnish army had already been forced back to this frontier. The Hangoe area was returned to Finland in exchange for the Porkkala peninsula, much nearer to Helsinki. The entire Petsamo region was ceded to the Soviet Union, and the Aaland Islands were demilitarized. Finland was required to pay a three hundred million-dollar indemnity over a six-year period. Finally, Finland was to reduce its army to a peacetime level of about 35,000 men and give Russia the use of airfields and ports in southern Finland until Germany surrendered.⁵

The German troops in northern Finland presented a problem. The 200,000 men of the German Twentieth Alpine Army occupied all of Finland

⁴Ibid., pp. 349-362.

⁵Mazour, Finland Between East and West, pp. 168-170.

north of the Oulu River. By the terms of the armistice they were to be expelled or interned within two weeks. The Germans had been caught off guard by the Finnish armistice. Faced by Allied successes in France, Poland, Italy, and the Balkans, Germany could do little to keep Finland in the war. A half-hearted attempt was made to form a rival government to the Mannerheim cabinet in northern Finland, but the Finnish people, tired of war, were not interested. The Finnish army might have continued the fight had not Mannerheim staked his enormous prestige against continuing the struggle. On September 6, the Germans began to withdraw into Petsamo, which was now considered Russian territory.⁶

Despite the German withdrawal, relations between the retreating German troops and the Finns remained cordial for a time. On September 15, the port of Oulu was turned over to the Finns. The first outbreak of fighting between Finns and Germans occurred on September 15, 1944, when a German landing force tried to take the island of Suursaari in the Gulf of Finland before it changed from Finnish to Russian hands. The Finnish garrison opened fire on the first wave, and Soviet air attacks prevented the second wave from landing. About 700 Germans were killed and another 700 taken prisoner by the Finns.⁷

The Finnish government made an agreement with the Germans for a gradual withdrawal from Finland. The Germans retreated slowly and in an orderly fashion, followed by Finnish troops. On September 28, 1944, fighting broke out between Germans and Finns at Pudasjaervi. By October 1, the fighting had spread to the ports of Kemi and Tornio.

⁶Ziemcke, pp. 390-391.

⁷Ibid., p. 394.

General Siilasvuo, who had been under German command, was ordered to drive the Germans out. Actual fighting was over by October 8. The Germans continued their withdrawal, followed by Finnish patrols. Although the German withdrawal from Finland took until January 30, 1945, there was no further fighting.⁸

As the Germans retreated, they resorted to a "scorched earth" policy, destroying homes, businesses, schools, and churches in addition to roads and bridges. At least a third of Finland was devastated in a campaign which seems to have been motivated as much by a desire for revenge as by strategic considerations.⁹ As a part of their program of destruction, the town of Rovaniemi was totally destroyed, and the Petsamo nickel mines were wrecked beyond repair.

The armistice had provided that members of the Ryti government be tried as war criminals, and the Finnish Diet passed a law ordering that anyone who contributed decisively to Finnish participation with Germany against the Soviet Union would be punished. The law also provided that convicted prisoners could be released on probation after serving half of their sentences. The trials, which lasted from November 15, 1945, to February 21, 1946, convicted Ryti, former Prime Ministers Edwin Linkomies and J. W. Rangell, Ministers of Finance Vaeinoe Tanner and Tyko Reinikka, Minister of Foreign Affairs Henrik Ramsay, Minister of Education Antti Kukkonen, and Minister of Berlin, T. M. Kivimaeki. Ryti was sentenced to ten years of hard labor, Rangell to six years, Linkomies and Tanner to five and a half years, Kivimaeki to five years, Ramsay to two and a

⁸Ibid., pp. 395-396.

⁹Mazour, pp. 170-171.

half years, and Kukkonen and Reinikka to two years. All of these men were released on probation after serving half of their sentences.¹⁰

While the Communist news services in various parts of the world protested against their release, there was no legal challenge, since the terms of both the law and the armistice had been fulfilled.

On February 19, 1947, a peace treaty between Finland and the Soviet Union was signed in Paris. The treaty confirmed the territorial and reparations provisions of the original armistice agreement. Furthermore, Finnish military activities were permanently curtailed, and Finnish responsibilities in keeping future peace and paying its war reparations bill were specified. While Finland was not to be occupied as Germany, Austria, Japan, and certain other Axis powers had been, it was disarmed to the point that it could be considered harmless. While the treaty was a violation of some of the moral pronouncements of the Allies, such as the Atlantic Charter, it seems to have been justified on the grounds that, as a nation which had supported Germany, Finland was fortunate not to be dealt harsher treatment.

The position taken by the signatories of the treaty other than Finland and Russia--Great Britain, South Africa, Australia, Canada, and several others--was rather contradictory to their actions in other areas of the war. For instance, Italy changed sides under much the same circumstances as Finland, yet, Italy was given little more than a reprimand from the Allies. Finland was condemned for not breaking with Germany and pulling out of the war earlier. The United States and Great Britain largely ignored what happened to nations which had

¹⁰Ibid., pp. 171-173.

switched sides. Italy and Hungary deserted the German cause; both were occupied by Germany and devastated when the German troops were at last forced to retreat. That the same thing could have happened to Finland--and did occur to a large extent--was overlooked. According to the principles of the Atlantic Charter of 1941, Finland should have been restored to her 1939 boundaries; instead, even more Finnish land was taken.

The 1947 treaty largely ignores the reason for the Finnish resumption of war against the Soviet Union. Finland did not go to war in 1941 to gain more land; the Finns merely wanted what they felt belonged to them. When they did go beyond the 1939 borders, it was only to gain more security for Finland; greater security could best be attained through a shorter and more defensible frontier than that of 1940. That kind of security was needed because Finland had no guarantee that the Soviet Union would respect the 1939 boundaries if Finland stopped there. If Great Britain and the United States had been willing or able to guarantee absolutely that the Soviet Union would not demand boundaries other than those of 1939, Finland might have been willing to stop at those boundaries.

The results of the war were far-reaching and lasting. The Soviet Union eventually cancelled half of the Finnish debt and extended the deadline for the payment. Finland was able to retire its debt to Russia on September 19, 1952. The Porkkala district, which replaced Hangoe as the important Soviet naval base in Finland, was returned to the Finns in September, 1955. Finland had suffered the loss of about 75,000 men, about seven percent of its total population, in a series of

three wars against Russia and Germany. The northern part of Finland had been desolated in a campaign of revenge by the Germans.

Finland was still independent, however; except for the Porkkala garrison, no Russian troops occupied Finnish soil. While Finland's industrial potential was damaged by the loss of the Karelian Isthmus and the Petsamo region, the country was still able to produce enough goods to pay off the Russians within the eight-year period allowed them. Despite the virtual isolation forced on Finland by the signing of the Paris treaty of 1947, Finland remained independent and was eventually able to return to some measure of its former prosperity.

In concluding Finland's role in World War II, and in particular the co-operation between Finland and Germany from June 22, 1941, to September 19, 1944, the following generalizations can be made. Prior to the Winter War, Finland would have been willing to make boundary concessions in the Karelian Isthmus for the security of Leningrad. Possibly, the Finns could have adopted a more conciliatory attitude; however, the settlement imposed by the Russians in 1940 went far beyond their demands of the previous October, and gave the Finns no compensation in other areas. The final peace terms of the 1940 treaty stripped Finland of its finest industrial region. Furthermore, the interference of the Soviet Union in internal Finnish affairs seemed to be part of a Russian program to terminate the independence of Finland. In order to regain their lost territories and safeguard their independence, the Finns were willing to join Germany in a renewed war against Russia in 1941.

Finland's decision to co-operate with Germany against Russia was based on the fact that Finland had no hope of winning a war without aid

of other nations. After the fall of France and the apparent defeat of Great Britain, the Finns had no one to turn to except Germany. While the Finnish and German troops co-operated militarily, their war aims were different. Germany fought to gain more territory; Finland fought to guarantee Finnish independence and security. Finland fought a separate war, only taking such action as was necessary to regain Finnish territory and make it secure from Russian air and land attacks. Finnish and German co-operation was limited to areas in which German and Finnish interests coincided. Finland resisted German pressure to take action which could not be justified as increasing Finnish security, as in the cases of participation against Leningrad and Murmansk. The Ryti agreement came about only when military conditions were such that only German aid could halt the Russian drive and after Germany withheld its aid until Finland agreed not to make a separate peace. Finnish co-operation with Germany was caused by circumstances of the day and the need for an ally. Until June 26, 1944, Finland was not an ally of Germany in the sense that their war aims and policies were linked, as was the case between the United States, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union.

Finland stayed in the war because no practical way was ever provided to withdraw. If the United States and Great Britain had been willing or able to persuade the Soviet Union to guarantee Finland its 1939 boundaries and provide definite safeguards for Finnish independence, Finland would probably have been willing to withdraw from the war and possibly deny the use of northern Finland to German troops by early 1942. However, the American and British practice of demanding that Finland withdraw to its 1939 frontier without guarantees from the

Soviet Union that this border would be respected in the future could not be accepted by the Finns. The experiences of Finland in the Winter War made such action unacceptable.

The key to German-Finnish relations is expediency under existing circumstances. The Finns had to change their position constantly to meet changing military and political conditions. One set policy could not be followed without risking disaster. If the policy followed proved to be wrong, it was usually because the conditions had changed. Co-operation with Germany proved to be the wrong course of action because Germany lost the war. In June, 1941, this outcome could not be foreseen, especially since military experts all over the world were sure that Russia would collapse under the German attack. However, as a result of their leaders' mistake, the Finnish people and nation paid one of the highest prices, in proportion to size, of any nation in Europe during World War II.

SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY

Primary Sources

Government Documents

Degras, Jane, ed. Soviet Documents on Foreign Policy. London: Oxford University Press, 1953.

Finland Ministry for Foreign Affairs. The Finnish Bluebook. New York: J. B. Lippincott Company, 1940.

United States. Department of State. Documents on German Foreign Policy (Series D, Volumes VII-XIII), Washington: Government Printing Office, 1956-1957.

Memoirs

Gripenberg, Georg Achates. Finland and the Great Powers. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1965.

Tanner, Vaeinoe. The Winter War. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1957.

Newspaper

The Times. (London), 1940-1945.

Secondary Sources

Special Studies

Borenus, Tancred. Field Marshal Mannerheim. London and Melbourne: Hutchinson & Co. Limited, 1940.

Cox, Geoffrey. The Red Army Moves. London: Victor Gollancy Limited, 1941.

Jakobson, Max. The Diplomacy of the Winter War. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1961.

Krosby, H. Peter. Finland, Germany, and the Soviet Union: 1940-1941. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1968.

Upton, Anthony. Finland in Crisis. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1964.

Wuorinen, John H. Finland and World War II: 1939-1944. New York: The Ronald Press Company, 1948.

Ziemcke, Earl F. Stalingrad to Berlin: The German Defeat in the East. Washington: United States Army, 1968.

General Works

Dahms, Hellmuth Guenther. Geschichte des Zweiten Weltkriegs. Tuebingen: Rainier Wunderlich Verlag Herman Leins, 1965.

Dallin, David J. Soviet Russia's Foreign Policy: 1939-1942. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1942.

Jutikkala, Eino. A History of Finland. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1962.

Mazour, Antole. Finland Between East and West. Princeton, N. J.: D. Van Nostrand Company, Inc., 1965.

Shearman, Hugh. Finland: The Adventures of a Small Power. London: Stevens and Sons Limited, 1950.

Slusser, Robert M., and Jan F. Triska. A Calendar of Soviet Treaties: 1917-1957. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1959.

Wuorinen, John H. A History of Finland. New York and London: Columbia University Press, 1965.

VITA

George Walter Willson

Candidate for the Degree of

Master of Arts

Thesis: BETWEEN HAMMER AND ANVIL: FINNISH FOREIGN RELATIONS IN
WORLD WAR II

Major Field: History

Biographical:

Personal Data: Born in Guthrie, Oklahoma, October 8, 1947, the
son of Mr. and Mrs. George W. Willson.

Education: Graduated from Guthrie High School, Guthrie, Oklahoma,
in May, 1965; received Bachelor of Arts degree in History
from Oklahoma Christian College in 1968; completed require-
ments for the Master of Arts degree in History at Oklahoma
State University in July, 1972.