

THE JAPANESE IMPERIAL INSTITUTION AND THE  
ALLIED OCCUPATION OF JAPAN

By

~~GLEN ROMAINE ROBERSON,~~

Bachelor of Arts

Northwestern State College

Alva, Oklahoma

1968

Submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate College  
of the Oklahoma State University  
in partial fulfillment of the requirements  
for the Degree of  
MASTER OF ARTS  
May, 1972

SEP 1 1972

THE JAPANESE IMPERIAL INSTITUTION AND THE  
ALLIED OCCUPATION OF JAPAN

Thesis Approved:

Sidney D. Brown  
Thesis Adviser

Harner L. Knight

D. D. Durhan  
Dean of the Graduate College

824828

## PREFACE

Historians have written many volumes studying the Allied Occupation of Japan. In-depth studies of political, educational, and agrarian reforms have greatly contributed to the search for a better understanding of post-war Japan.

However, there has been no substantial study of the role played by the Imperial Institution during the occupation. Many American officials of the day maintain that no policy was more successful than that concerning the Emperor. The purpose of this thesis will be to determine the reasons the Emperor institution was not abolished, and what purpose the institution served under the occupation. Another purpose of this study will be to examine the changes in the Imperial Institution in post-war Japan.

I wish to express my appreciation to Dr. Sidney D. Brown who served as my adviser and channeled my interests in East Asian Studies. Dr. Odie B. Faulk as a reader and critic of this thesis made numerous suggestions which improved my literary style. Finally, to my parents, Mr. and Mrs. Forrest Roberson, I wish to make a special dedication of gratitude for all the love they have given to me.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Chapter	Page
I. THE AMERICAN DECISION TO PERMIT THE RETENTION OF THE EMPEROR SYSTEM AFTER THE SECOND WORLD WAR . . . . .	1
II. THE RELATION OF THE JAPANESE EMPEROR TO SCAP POLICY . . . . .	23
III. CHANGES IN THE IMPERIAL INSTITUTION . . . . .	39
IV. THE EFFECTIVENESS OF OCCUPATION POLICY TOWARD THE EMPEROR AND HIS ROLE IN POST-WAR JAPAN . . . . .	63
BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . .	70

## CHAPTER I

### THE AMERICAN DECISION TO PERMIT THE RETENTION OF THE JAPANESE EMPEROR SYSTEM AFTER THE SECOND WORLD WAR

On July 14, 1945, the United States and its allies in the Pacific War accepted the Japanese peace offer with conditions attached.<sup>1</sup> The Japanese Government stated it was ready to surrender on the basis of the terms enumerated by the Potsdam Declaration of July 26, 1945, with the understanding that "the said declaration does not comprise any demand which prejudices the prerogatives of His Majesty as a Sovereign Ruler."<sup>2</sup> When the United States accepted this stipulation it deviated substantially from the announced principle of unconditional surrender.

But in fact, American policy had not been firmly established, the events leading up to and during the Potsdam Conference facilitated slight policy modifications. The Allied policy formulators, especially those of the United States, had argued several months before Potsdam to "soften" the terms of surrender and the future role of the Japanese Emperor. Although the latter was never included within the Potsdam

---

<sup>1</sup>"Instrument of Surrender," Department of State, Executive Agreement Series (Washington D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, October, 1929-November, 1945), V. 2.

<sup>2</sup>Letter from the Swiss Charge' d' Affairs ad interim to the Secretary of State, August 10, 1945. The Department of State Bulletin (Washington D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, July, 1939-April, 1971), XIX, 205.

Declaration, the United States officials had decided they could accept Japanese surrender with the proviso of retaining the Japanese Imperial Institution.

The general public of the Allied nations favored the abolition of the institution. Mass rallies were held across the U. S. Many mobs burned Hitler, Mussolini, and Hirohito in effigy. Before Potsdam, American policy was to demand publicly that the future of the Imperial Institution be placed in the hands of the victorious allies. But officials within the government had such widely divergent opinions that no definite policy could be fixed. As early as 1943, the future role of the Japanese Emperor occupied the mind of the Secretary of State Cordell Hull. Advisors in favor of abolishing the institution argued that the Emperor as an institution was undemocratic. On the other hand, those who favored a more moderate policy constantly brought forth points centering around the idea of retaining the institution and using it to legitimize occupation policy. The allies could use Shintoism and the Imperial Institution for peace in the same manner the militarists used them for War.<sup>3</sup> The problem was that no one could speculate intelligently on the effects any remark made concerning the Emperor might have.<sup>4</sup>

The most ardent proponent of this moderate policy was Joseph Grew, former American Ambassador to Japan. Grew's position, although he often claimed to be misunderstood both inside of and outside of

---

<sup>3</sup>Joseph C. Grew, Turbulent Era, a Diplomatic Record of Forty Years, ed. Walter Johnson (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1952), 1413.

<sup>4</sup>Cordell Hull, The Memoirs of Cordell Hull (2 vols., New York: MacMillan Company, 1948), II, 1591.

government circles, was that the allies should at least keep an open mind toward the question of the Emperor's future role.<sup>5</sup> He expressed his reasoning in a paper written to Cordell Hull in April 1944, entitled "Post-War Planning Committee." The military government, he said, would need the help of trained Japanese civil leaders in order to occupy Japan successfully and in order to avoid chaos. Grew believed the Emperor to be liberal in the ideological sense, and felt that the Imperial Institution could be utilized for this purpose.<sup>6</sup>

Secretary of State Hull, while not completely convinced the Emperor would assent to occupation objectives, was somewhat swayed by Grew's arguments. In communications during the spring of 1944 between the State, War, and Navy departments and President Roosevelt, Hull recommended the Emperor be retained provided he lost most of his political power. But all three departments agreed there should not be any public statement either for retention or abolition of the institution.<sup>7</sup>

There apparently were two main reasons why they recommended silence. By the end of 1944, the allies believed they were assured of victory. They had won in North Africa and had driven the Axis out of France. The Russians were pushing through the East European countries. Italy had surrendered. Germany doubtless would soon fall. Stalin was giving assurances that the Soviet Union would enter the Pacific War soon after German surrender, whereupon all the military

---

<sup>5</sup>U. S. Department of State, Nominations, Hearings, Committee on Foreign Relations, 78th Congress, 2nd. session, 1944, 17-19.

<sup>6</sup>Grew, Turbulent Era, 1411.

<sup>7</sup>Hull, The Memoirs of Cordell Hull, 1593.

powers of the Allies could be turned against a badly crippled Japan. The Pacific War was going well for the United States. The battles of Midway, Guadalcanal, Guam, and Saipan had been victories for the Americans. Japan's defeat was virtually assured.

Second, the United States policy makers could not be certain how the Japanese would react to any remark about the Emperor. Any attack upon the Imperial Institution would be playing into the hands of Japanese military leaders. The military could use the attack to strengthen the Japanese peoples' fighting spirit, thereby stifling the actions of the Japanese peace party. This could not be allowed to happen because it was known through an intelligence report submitted to Dr. Ladislav Farago, who was doing research on and planning the use of psychological weapons against Japan, that the Emperor himself was sympathetic to a group of influential people desirous of obtaining peace under the best possible terms.<sup>8</sup> If a statement favorable toward the Emperor was issued, the Japanese military would only tighten its controls on the government and possibly purge the peace advocates from the government. Therefore American officials believed the United States should not nor could not compromise the surrender terms.

But while the United States was publicly standing on the policy of unconditional surrender, privately there were signs the administration was considering a more conciliatory plan. In December 1944, there was a significant gain for the moderate group when Grew was appointed Under Secretary of State. In such a powerful position, Grew would have a stronger voice in decision making. Also, Secretary of the

---

<sup>8</sup> Ellis Zacharias, Secret Missions: The Story of an Intelligence Officer (New York: G. P. Putman Son, 1946), 335.



Navy James Forrestal had been having apprehensions about Russo-American postwar relations. As early as May of 1944 he had been envisioning Japan as the counterweight to Russia in the Far East.<sup>9</sup> On May 1, 1945, at a meeting of the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee, Grew, Forrestal, and the Secretary of War, Henry Stimson, proposed to President Truman that he explain that unconditional surrender did not mean the total destruction of Japan. Grew argued that in no better way could the President accomplish this purpose than to assure the Japanese that the Japanese Imperial Institution was not being threatened.<sup>10</sup> President Truman agreed such a statement was desirable, but he felt it would be better to stress that Japan's surrender would be military. He was not yet convinced any promises pertaining to the Emperor were desirable or necessary.<sup>11</sup> All agreed the ideal time to deliver the message would be soon after Germany's surrender.

The surrender message given by Truman on May 8, did stress that the Allies were demanding an unconditional surrender of all Japanese military forces. A Japanese surrender meant neither the destruction of Japan, nor the enslavement of the people. But it is significant that there was no notice of any conditions as to the Emperor. Truman had followed through with his rejection of Grew's idea.

---

<sup>9</sup>Walter Millis, ed., The Forrestal Diaries (New York: The Viking Press, 1951), 53.

<sup>10</sup>Herbert Feis, Japan Subdued: The Atomic Bomb and the End of the War in the Pacific (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1961), 16.

<sup>11</sup>Truman's statement of May eighth stressed the idea of military surrender because he hoped the Japanese would see the difference between defeating the Japanese military and defeating the Japanese nation.

It is apparent the policy had been somewhat revised. There was an important difference between the unconditional surrender of Japan's military and Japan's surrender as a nation. The military of Japan would try to continue to fight, but perhaps the civil leaders would be able to judge the significance of the statement.

But while the Emperor statement was not forthcoming, the administration continued to treat the Emperor issue as being important. Evidence of this is the implementation of Operation Plan 1-45 in May, 1945. It was a psychological phase of the war included in the paper written by Ellis Zacharias, a naval intelligence officer, entitled, "A Strategic Plan to Effect the Occupation of Japan." Zacharias believed that history proved that the Japanese could easily be psychologically defeated. He proposed to broadcast to the Japanese people attacks upon the Japanese military leaders in hopes of swaying the public opinion and thus getting the Japanese peace party into power.<sup>12</sup> The paper was submitted to and approved by Forrestal.<sup>13</sup> Zacharias first broadcast on May 8, emphasized that "I am speaking only of Japan's military defeat." Though his broadcasts lasted until the end of the war, he never made any reference to the Emperor. This was the plan Zacharias had recommended and the policy the administration had decided to follow.<sup>14</sup>

Following the German surrender the United States began "feeling

---

<sup>12</sup>Zacharias, Secret Missions, 336.

<sup>13</sup>Ibid., 335.

<sup>14</sup>The government did not publicly recognize Zacharias as its spokesman. But he did receive orders from the Navy Department. How much influence the broadcasts had on the Japanese is hard to determine. In the sources used in this paper, only Kase's Journey to the Missouri contains any mention of Zacharias.

out" the other allies. The administration was interested in their opinions about the future of the Japanese Imperial Institution. During the month of May, Harry Hopkins had been meeting with Stalin to discuss the future relations between the United States and the Soviet Union. At the third of such meetings, Hopkins asked Stalin his feelings toward the Imperial Institution. Stalin said he had no real animosity toward Hirohito, but he felt the institution should be abolished. He feared Hirohito might someday be succeeded by an "energetic and vigorous figure who could cause trouble."<sup>15</sup> Ideology also entered into Stalin's answer. Communists are opposed to a class society where certain people have special privileges and perogatives. Certainly any society with a nobility would be a class society for the justification for imperial institutions rests upon the principle of one individual ranking above another because of his inherited position within society. Thus an imperial institution would be a symbol of a class society.

The advocates of the moderate line knew that they would still have to push onward if their ideas were to be accepted as policy. Such men as Grew believed their recommendations could bring a speedy end to the Pacific war.

On the same day Hopkins posed the Emperor question to Stalin, Grew met with President Truman. He still hoped the President might make a statement allowing constitutional monarchy in post-war Japan. The President told him he was thinking along the same lines but he

---

<sup>15</sup>U. S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, Diplomatic Papers, The Conference of Berlin (The Potsdam Conference), (Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1960), I, 44. Hereafter referred to as FRUS, Potsdam, I.

asked Grew to consult first with the military.<sup>16</sup>

Stimson, Forrestal, General Marshall, who was head of the Army Chiefs of Staff, and Elmer Davis, head of the Office of War Information, met in Grew's office the following day. Grew read the statement he was going to submit to the President. Only Davis raised an objection to the statement. But the nub of the matter was when should the President make the declaration. Grew favored immediate announcement. If it was issued at once, it would coincide with the air raids on Japan and would tend to strengthen the hands of the peace minded officials.<sup>17</sup> General Marshall failed to see any need for immediate action. He felt the present was a bit premature. The battle of Okinawa was still continuing and any such statement might be construed as a sign of allied weakness.<sup>18</sup> The group voted to wait a while longer before announcing any new policy.

This decision was supported in a memorandum written by Secretary of State Edward Stettinius who was attending the United Nations Conference in San Francisco. Stettinius had been kept up to date on the proceedings by Grew. He advised the President to wait until after he had talked with Prime Minister Churchill and Premier Stalin at Potsdam. Stettinius went on to propose that the statement could be turned into a three or four power demand.<sup>19</sup>

---

<sup>16</sup>Grew, Turbulent Era, 1423; Harry S. Truman, Memoirs, Vol. I, Year of Decisions (Garden City, New York: Doubleday and Company, 1955), 416.

<sup>17</sup>Grew, Turbulent Era, 1421.

<sup>18</sup>Ibid., 1424.

<sup>19</sup>Feis, Japan Subdued, 21.

Evidently the President supported his Secretary of State. When Grew submitted his report to President Truman, the President told him that he liked the idea but he had decided to hold it up until he had discussed the matter at the Big Three Conference. He asked Grew to have the subject entered on the agenda for the meeting.<sup>20</sup>

Entering Grew's statement on the Potsdam agenda did not settle the issue. During the latter part of June the Emperor statement discussions continued. The basic question of when the President should issue the declaration remained. When Grew, Stimson, and the Under Secretary of the Navy, Artemus L. Gates met in a State-War-Navy Committee meeting on June 20, the Secretary of War read a memorandum he had prepared for President Truman. Stimson believed the Allies had to use the Emperor to obtain surrender, and the atomic bomb would be the instrument the Emperor could use to bring about peace.<sup>21</sup> All those present agreed any clarifying statement of unconditional surrender should be made prior to the invasion of Japan, perhaps after the Potsdam Conference would be a good time. By then, President Truman would know when the Soviet Union intended to enter the war against Japan. Also the atomic bomb tests in New Mexico would be going on. Any significant reports about the tests would alter the situation.<sup>22</sup>

On the second of July, Stimson carried to the White House a proclamation composed by the State-War-Navy subcommittee. Stimson

---

<sup>20</sup> Truman, Year of Decisions, 417; Grew, Turbulent Era, 1437.

<sup>21</sup> Henry L. Stimson and McGeorge Bundy, On Active Service In Peace and War (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1947), 631.

<sup>22</sup> Millis, ed., The Forrestal Diaries, 71; Truman, Year of Decisions, 417.

added to it his own memorandum. These were to be included in the President's Briefing Book for use at Potsdam. The subcommittee recommended that the Emperor's powers should be immediately suspended and he should be placed in protective custody.<sup>23</sup> As an instrument of surrender, the Emperor could proclaim unconditional surrender and command a cessation of hostilities. He should sign and seal the unconditional surrender; he should command all civil and military officials to remain at their posts and to carry out all orders of the designated commander of Japan until the designated commander relieved them of their offices.<sup>24</sup> The State Department went on to recommend that the Allied authorities refrain from any action which might imply to the Japanese that the Emperor was any higher than any other temporal ruler, or that he was divine.<sup>25</sup> Also included within the memorandum was an "Enclosure 2" which suggested that a constitutional monarchy could be acceptable if the Japanese could assure the Allies that no future policies would include militarism.<sup>26</sup> Thus, the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee had gone on record advising President Truman of the distinct possibility that the Emperor could be needed to obtain both Japanese surrender and to enforce Allied occupation.

But Grew continued to try to convince more governmental office holders. The Secretary of State's Staff Committee meeting on the seventh of July erupted into a heated debate over the Emperor question.

---

<sup>23</sup>FRUS, Potsdam, I, 895-897.

<sup>24</sup>Ibid., 886.

<sup>25</sup>Ibid., 887.

<sup>26</sup>Ibid., 893.

The Under Secretary of State repeated his now well known arguments. He concluded by saying he only wished the Allies to wait until after the Japanese surrender before passing any judgment concerning the worth of the Imperial Institution. To abolish the Emperor, he argued, meant facing a guerrilla war with the Japanese and such a situation could not be handled in a manner that would foster the completion of Allied policies. Grew went on to say it was his belief that the Emperor statement would not modify but would clarify unconditional surrender.<sup>27</sup>

Dean Acheson and Archibald MacLeish argued in opposition to Grew. MacLeish said German institutions had been abolished and the Allies were in control of the situation there.<sup>28</sup> Acheson backed MacLeish by arguing that the Emperor was a weak leader who continually yielded to military pressure and could not be relied upon.<sup>29</sup> The meeting adjourned without any decision being reached.

The military, on the other hand, managed to reach an agreement. On the sixteenth of July at the Joint Chiefs of Staff meeting, General George Marshall and Admiral William Leahy submitted a resolution adopting the SWNCC memorandum that had been taken to Potsdam. Their only stipulation was the third paragraph be changed from acceptance of a Japanese constitutional monarchy to allowing of the Japanese people to choose their own government. The other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff adopted the resolution. Admiral Leahy sent the resolution in memorandum form to President Truman, who was already at Potsdam.

---

<sup>27</sup>Ibid., 901.

<sup>28</sup>Ibid.

<sup>29</sup>Dean Acheson, Present at the Creation; My Years in the State Department (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1969), 112.

In addition to the resolution, Leahy expressed his own opinion that nothing should be said or done that would hamper the utilization of the Emperor for the future.<sup>30</sup>

If many of the policy formulators were under the impression that either President Truman alone, or the Big Three as a group would decide to announce a statement favorable to the Emperor, they must have been both surprised and disappointed to learn there was no reference to the Emperor during the formal Big Three meetings. Nor was there any mention of him in the ensuing declaration.

Upon close examination of the events centering around Potsdam, one can ascertain why discussion about the Emperor was absent.

At the time he became Secretary of State, James F. Byrnes had not been convinced the Emperor system should be retained. The Assistant Secretary of State Archibald MacLeish, knowing Byrnes was undecided on the matter, wrote a memorandum to him saying that in his opinion a statement as yet, a decision in fact, was too premature. MacLeish went on to express grave doubts about keeping the Emperor.<sup>31</sup>

Byrnes was also receiving advice from former Secretary of State Hull. On the fifteenth of July Byrnes telephoned the former Secretary of State inquiring his opinion on the matter. Hull told him he favored the keeping of the Emperor but only if he and the members of "the ruling class were stripped of all extraordinary privileges."

The following day Hull sent a cable to Byrnes explicating his views. Paragraph three in allowing the Imperial System to stand might

---

<sup>30</sup>FRUS, Potsdam, II, 1269.

<sup>31</sup>"Archibald MacLeish to Secretary of State James Byrnes," Ibid., 895-897.



create serious differences if issued now.<sup>32</sup> Would it not be better to await the climax of allied bombing and Russia's entry into the war? If the statement was made before then, perhaps the Japanese leaders might see it as a sign of allied weakness.<sup>33</sup>

These two communications either had a deciding effect upon Byrnes or at least fortified his own prior view. On July seventeenth, two days after hearing from MacLeish and one day after receiving Hull's cable, Byrnes telegraphed Hull that the declaration should not contain any promise of Imperial retention; and also that issuance of the declaration should be postponed.<sup>34</sup>

There was a second reason why the statement was never incorporated within the Potsdam Declaration. The United States realized that the Allies could bring to bear a tremendous amount of pressure upon Japan. Several events occurred during Potsdam which the United States interpreted to mean that Japan was ready to surrender.

On the 15th of July, the same day Byrnes received MacLeish's letter, the American delegation to Potsdam received word of the Japanese peace feelers which had begun in earnest on July 11.<sup>35</sup> The Japanese were trying to get the Soviet Union to act as a mediator for discussions which hopefully would lead to a negotiated peace. The Emperor himself wanted to send an envoy to the Kremlin to talk about

---

<sup>32</sup>The word "now" was underlined in Hull's cable.

<sup>33</sup>Hull, Memoirs, 1594.

<sup>34</sup>Ibid.

<sup>35</sup>James K. Byrnes, All In One Lifetime (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1958), 286.

the issues of peace.<sup>36</sup>

Knowing this, plus the fact that Russia would not act as a mediator but instead intended to declare war on Japan, the Americans estimated that the Japanese leadership would be hard pressed to carry on with the war and should be anxious to surrender.

Then, on July 16, the same day Byrnes received Hull's cable, President Truman and the Secretary of State received the news of the successful atomic bomb explosion in New Mexico. From the information given in both cables, the Americans, through induction, saw Japan as a beaten nation soon unwilling to continue the war; while the United States was ready to finish the war and was capable of using the most powerful weapon man had yet devised. Japan was already absorbing tremendous punishment from the B-29 fire bomb raids. The President and Byrnes agreed that once the Japanese were made aware of the destructive potential of the atomic bomb, they surely would be willing to lay down their arms.<sup>37</sup>

With the combination of all these factors, Americans took the attitude that there was no reason to make any conciliatory statement. Besides, no one could be sure just how the Japanese might react to a statement about the Emperor. If the concession was made, the military might purge the peace seeking advisors of the Emperor, and no one wanted to place the Emperor's advisors in such a precarious position. But if the statement denounced the Emperor, the allies would be playing into the hands of the military. So from the American point of view,

---

<sup>36</sup>The Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs to the Japanese Ambassador in the Soviet Union. FRUS, Potsdam, I, 876.

<sup>37</sup>Byrnes, All in One Lifetime, 286.

while there were more complications involved, the basic situation which existed in December 1944, had not changed.

On July 17, when Stimson asked Byrnes about the statement, Byrnes told him about the decision and talked to a "schedule." The schedule possibly related to the announcement of the Potsdam Declaration to be followed by the Russian entry into the war and the dropping of the atomic bomb.<sup>38</sup> Stimson gathered that the plan had been approved by Truman so he did not press the matter further.

But one should not assume that the question of the Emperor's future status did not arise during Potsdam. In Berlin the discussion continued in the meetings of the lower echelons. The American and British military staffs at Potsdam began reaching a certain understanding on Emperor policy. Field Marshal Sir Alan Brooke asked the Americans if any consideration had been given to explaining unconditional surrender to the Japanese. He was told that certain ideas, such as allowing retention of the Emperor had been discussed on a political level. Brooke agreed a statement retaining the Emperor was a good idea, especially if it were announced after the Russians entered the war. Brooke promised to take it up with Churchill. The American military advisors answered that they would be glad to have the Prime Minister talk over the matter with the President.<sup>39</sup>

But the subject was discussed between Churchill and Truman only in private talks, and even then, only in a round-about fashion. Churchill felt the Japanese should be given some assurance that their

---

<sup>38</sup> Feis, Japan Subdued, 64.

<sup>39</sup> FRUS, Potsdam, II, 36-37.

national existence was not in danger. But he wanted it understood that "I was only advising." The United States had been virtually alone in her fight with Japan, so he was willing to leave the final decision up to Truman.<sup>40</sup>

The final decision of course was the Potsdam Declaration. It followed the general lines of Stimson's July second memorandum except for any reference to the Emperor.<sup>41</sup> There are only three sections which could possibly be construed to pertain to the Emperor, two of which could be inferred as "anti-retention." Section Six explains that all those who led Japan into war would be punished.<sup>42</sup> Section Ten tells the Japanese they must eliminate all obstacles to the reviving of democracy.<sup>43</sup> The Japanese could have felt that these two sections could mean the end of the Imperial Institution.

However, the declaration went on to demand the unconditional surrender of the Japanese military. The significance of the differentiation between military and national surrender has already been discussed. But when viewed in this light one can also see within this statement a guarantee that Japan would be allowed to maintain her national existence. By including this final statement in the declaration instead of taking a stand one way or the other on the Emperor

---

<sup>40</sup>Winston Churchill, The Second World War: Triumph and Tragedy (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1953), 642.

<sup>41</sup>James Byrnes, Speaking Frankly (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1947), 206.

<sup>42</sup>Raymond Dennett and Robert Turner, eds., Documents of American Foreign Relations (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1962), VIII, 105.

<sup>43</sup>Ibid., 106.

question, the Allies left latitude enough for accepting the "condition" if need be. But certainly they hoped the July 26th declaration would suffice to clear the way for peace. But they were wrong; the declaration was not enough.

The Japanese received the Potsdam Declaration with apprehension. Togo Shigenori, the Japanese Foreign Minister did see that the Potsdam Declaration was a modification<sup>44</sup> and the Foreign Office expressed the belief that the declaration was a statement of conditions Japan should accept. It was hoped that the Government would release the full text to the people.<sup>45</sup>

The military was opposed to any consideration of the Potsdam Declaration as a surrender instrument. The omission of the Emperor from the declaration was looked upon as a threat to the institution. They wanted to seek further the prospects of a negotiated peace. The military's peace conditions included not only retention of the Emperor but also the assurance that the Allies would not invade the mainland, that the withdrawal of Japanese armed forces from the surrounding countries would be gradual and at Japan's own initiative, and that Japan would punish her own war criminals.<sup>46</sup> Probably it was the military's hold on the Japanese Government that influenced Premier Kantaro Suzuki into announcing that the government was ignoring the

---

<sup>44</sup>Togo Shigenori, The Cause of Japan, trans. and ed. Togo Fumihiko and Ben Bruce Blakeney (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1956), 311.

<sup>45</sup>Ibid., 308 and Robert Butow, Japan's Decision to Surrender (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1954), 142.

<sup>46</sup>Mamoru Shigemitsu, Japan and Her Destiny; My Struggle for Peace, trans. Oswald White, ed. Major General F.S.G. Piggott (New York: E. P. Dutton & Company, Inc., 1958), 361.

declaration. While much has been made of the "Mokusatsu Incident,"<sup>47</sup> the fact remains that the absence of any mention of the Emperor in the Declaration posed a serious problem for the peace advocates, as retention of the Emperor was one of their requirements for peace, and forced the Japanese Government to appease the military or be branded a traitor.<sup>48</sup>

But if the Potsdam Declaration alone could not bring peace, the Allied Forces still had Byrnes' "schedule" conceived at Potsdam. On the sixth of August, the atomic bomb was dropped on Hiroshima and on the seventh of August Molotov read to Sato the Russian declaration of war. Nagasaki was hit by the bomb on the ninth of August, the same day Russian troops marched into Manchuria.<sup>49</sup>

That afternoon the Japanese Supreme Council met to discuss the possibility of surrender. The military remained staunchly opposed to surrender and the only point the council could unanimously agree upon was the necessity of a condition that would assure the preservation of the national polity, the Imperial Institution.<sup>50</sup> Joining the military in opposition was Baron Kiichiro Hiranuma, President of the

---

<sup>47</sup>Kazuo Kawai, "Mokusatsu, Japan's Answer to the Potsdam Declaration," The Pacific Historical Review, XIX (November, 1950), 409-414.

<sup>48</sup>Robert J. C. Butow, Japan's Decision to Surrender (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1954), 140.

<sup>49</sup>The Japanese Government was still waiting for the Soviet reply to the proposed peace talks when the Soviet Union invaded Manchuria. *Ibid.*, 149.

<sup>50</sup>Shigemitsu, Japan and Her Destiny, 362; and Kato Masuo, The Lost War: A Japanese Reporter's Inside Story (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1946), 235. Both say Navy Minister Admiral Mitsumasa Yonai actually was willing to surrender.

Privy Council, and War Minister Korechika Anami.<sup>51</sup>

After the stalemate within the Supreme Council, Marquis Koichi Kido, Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal and Premier Suzuki realized the only chance for peace was to get an audience with the Emperor so he could express his wish for peace. Kido and Suzuki met with the Emperor that afternoon and told him of the failure of the Supreme Council to reach a decision and that it would be necessary to meet in an Imperial Council in order to reach a decision. The Emperor informed them that he was ready to issue an Imperial Order to surrender.<sup>52</sup> The meeting of the Imperial Council was called for that night. It was at this meeting that the Emperor expressed his desire to terminate the war.<sup>53</sup> It was decided that only the 'Imperial Prerogative' stipulation would be asked.<sup>54</sup> If the United States would accept the condition then the Emperor's position as the head of the Japanese state would not be placed in danger by surrender. The Emperor's wish was considered a command the Japanese leaders could not ignore. The result was the Japanese offer to surrender. It was sent through the Swiss Government on the tenth of August. The Japanese were ready to surrender under the terms of the Potsdam Declaration if their provision was acceptable.<sup>55</sup>

President Truman, upon receiving the message, called Byrnes,

---

<sup>51</sup>Butow, Japan's Decision to Surrender, 161.

<sup>52</sup>Shigemitsu, Japan and Her Destiny, 360.

<sup>53</sup>Butow, Japan's Decision to Surrender, 176.

<sup>54</sup>Shigemitsu, Japan and Her Destiny, 361.

<sup>55</sup>Letter from the Swiss Charge' d' Affairs ad interim to the Secretary of State, August 10, 1945. The Department of State Bulletin, XIX, 205.

Stimson, and Admiral Leahy to meet with him and to discuss the offer. Byrnes did not want to accept the surrender. He felt that Japan was surrendering to the terms of unconditional surrender. To accept this proposal was to accept a condition which Japan had no right to request. Besides Great Britain and Russia might balk at allowing the Emperor to remain.<sup>56</sup>

Stimson of course was willing to accept the peace offer. He had been disappointed that there had been no statement at Potsdam. He was later told that unfortunately during the war high American officials had made some fairly blunt statements about the Emperor. President Truman and Secretary of State Byrnes had not thought it wise at that time for the government to reverse its field too sharply.<sup>57</sup> But he had continued to believe that the Allies would need the Emperor to bring peace and to enforce occupation.<sup>58</sup>

Admiral Leahy had been persuaded in the Combined Staff meetings, held during the last few months of the war, to accept the retention of the Emperor.<sup>59</sup> He said at the meeting that he had no feeling concerning "little Hirohito" but he did believe the Emperor as an institution would be needed to effect the surrender.<sup>60</sup>

---

<sup>56</sup>Byrnes, All in One Lifetime, 305; and Truman, Year of Decisions, 428.

<sup>57</sup>Stimson and Bundy, On Active Service in Peace and War, 626. Research of newspapers and journals does not bare this out.

<sup>58</sup>Byrnes, All in One Lifetime, 305; and Truman, Year of Decisions, 428.

<sup>59</sup>Admiral William Leahy, I Was There: The Personal Story of the Chief of Staff to Presidents Roosevelt and Truman Based on His Notes and Diaries Made at the Time (New York: Whittlesey House, 1950), 418.

<sup>60</sup>Ibid., 434; and Truman, Year of Decisions, 428.



President Truman ordered Byrnes to write the reply to the Japanese offer. It was approved by all at the meeting. The condition was accepted on the basis that the Emperor would be subject to the Supreme Commander for the Allied Forces. The Emperor and the Japanese High Command were required to sign the surrender document and to carry out the terms of the Potsdam Declaration. The Emperor was to order all military forces to cease fighting and to accept the surrender terms.

The ultimate form of Japan's government had to be in accordance with the Potsdam Declaration and founded upon the freely expressed will of the Japanese people.<sup>61</sup> Copies were sent to the other Allied Powers to get their consent. All of them approved the answer, so Byrnes sent the Allied reply.

The Second World War ended with the Allies accepting the Emperor proposal. Grew and his colleagues had forced the American administrators to keep their options open. They were able to persuade the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee and the Joint Chief of Staff to issue advice to the President in favor of keeping the Emperor. Retention of the Emperor was not a decision reached prior to the morning of August 10, 1945. The moderate line was adopted as an alternate policy if the public policy of the United States which was not enough to force a Japanese surrender. Three times a clarifying statement was almost announced; before May 29, 1945, before Potsdam, and after Potsdam. But President Truman felt he should not announce any conciliatory remark toward the Emperor because of public opinion and because he felt

---

<sup>61</sup>Letter from the Secretary of State to the Charge' d' Affairs ad interim of Switzerland, August 11, 1945. The Department of State Bulletin, XIII, 205; and "The Instrument of Surrender" Department of State Executive Agreement Series 493, 2.

obligated to President Roosevelt's policy. Also Byrnes' 'schedule' seemed to be enough to bring peace. The atomic bomb and the Soviet Union's entry into the war was enough to force Japan to surrender.<sup>62</sup>

As to the question that the war could have been ended sooner if the Allies had issued the Emperor statement, one cannot easily discount Grew's opinion that the pro-Emperor statement would aid the Japanese peace advocates. However, one must note the military control of the Japanese Government. Certainly, the military was not ready to surrender until ordered by the Emperor. Even when the Emperor finally ordered surrender, military elements in Tokyo rebelled and tried to head-off the surrender by an attempted kidnapping of the Emperor. As the well-informed Japanese diplomat Kase observed, these military revolts indicated that, "if we had attempted it (surrender) sooner, I am certain it would have ended in a fiasco."<sup>63</sup> From this evidence, the author does not feel a conciliatory statement toward the Emperor would have hastened the end of the war.

---

<sup>62</sup>Togo stresses the fear of the atomic bomb as the reason for surrender. Togo, The Cause of Japan, 315.

<sup>63</sup>Toshikazu Kase, Journey to the Missouri (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1950), 264.

## CHAPTER II

### THE RELATION OF THE JAPANESE EMPEROR TO SCAP POLICY

Japan's history took a radical turn under the Allied Occupation. The reforms of Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers found acceptance because of the decision to use the existing Japanese governmental institutions and historical practices. For SCAP might be viewed as the twentieth century shogunate, with General MacArthur as the Shogun governing through a military organization which worked outside of but in coordination with the existing Japanese governmental machinery to implement policy. This is how the Imperial Institution was used so effectively. Thus, retention of the Emperor was in part agreed upon as an occupational expediency. Historically, the Emperor had played the role of the sacred legitimizer and the Allied Powers followed the Japanese custom to the letter by using the Emperor to obtain acceptance for the innovative programs and to purge the Emperor's advisors who had "misled" the Emperor.<sup>1</sup>

The question of how to use the Emperor during the occupation was being studied in the spring of 1944. In May of that year, the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee sent a memorandum to President Roosevelt stating that if Japan was allowed to retain the Emperor, the occupation forces should: 1) permit the Emperor only such functions as related to administrative

---

<sup>1</sup>Marquis Kido, Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal, was indicted and convicted of being a war criminal.

assignments by the military governor; 2) not act so as to give the impression of imperial divinity or superiority; 3) not encourage nor discourage public revolt against the Emperor.<sup>2</sup> These recommendations were incorporated into the surrender terms by explaining that "the authority of the Emperor and the Japanese Government to rule the state shall be subject to the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers who will take such steps as he deems proper to effectuate these terms of surrender."<sup>3</sup> Thus, the military of the conquering Allies was to be the true government of Japan. SCAP could voice approval or disapproval of the actions of the Japanese leaders. Policies of the Japanese government could be vetoed by the occupation government and new policies originating at SCAP could be substituted.

Allied Policy was formulated around the guide lines outlined in three basic documents, "The United States Initial Post-Surrender Policy for Japan," "The Basic Initial Post-Surrender Directive to the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers for the Occupation and Control of Japan," and "The Basic Post-Surrender Policy for Japan." Only the first two were of any real importance because the last of these documents was written by the Far Eastern Commission in June 1947 after most of the outlined policies had already been implemented. The only difference between "The United States Initial Post-Surrender Policy for Japan" and "The Basic Post-Surrender Policy for Japan" was the wording and even this was the same in ninety per cent of the documents. The

---

<sup>2</sup>Cordell Hull, The Memoirs of Cordell Hull (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1948), 1591-1593.

<sup>3</sup>U. S. Department of State, Executive Agreement Series, "Instrument of Surrender," V (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1945), 2..

first of the two main documents was prepared jointly by States, Navy, and War Coordinating Committee and sent to General MacArthur by radio on August twenty-ninth. It was approved by President Truman on the sixth of September and sent by messenger to SCAP the same day. It was basically a statement of general initial policy relating to Japan after surrender. "The Basic Initial Post-Surrender Directive" was written by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and approved by the State, War, Navy Coordinating Committee. It was sent to General MacArthur on the third of November and it defined the powers of SCAP and his prospective policies.<sup>4</sup> The relations with Japan, it said, did not rest on a contractual basis, but on unconditional surrender. The authority of SCAP was supreme, and it was his duty to see that the terms of the Potsdam Declaration and the Instrument of Surrender were carried out in good faith.<sup>5</sup>

The relation of the Emperor to SCAP was also prescribed on this basis. His authority was at all times to be subject to the Supreme Commander. The General was to work through the Imperial Institution, but he could act separately if the Emperor proved not to be in support of the United States objectives.<sup>6</sup> The Supreme Commander was to require

---

<sup>4</sup>Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, Political Reorientation of Japan, (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1950), II, 429.

<sup>5</sup>"Authority of General MacArthur as Supreme Commander for The Allied Powers," Political Reorientation of Japan, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1945), II, 427.

<sup>6</sup>"U.S. Initial Post-Surrender Policy for Japan," *Ibid.*, II, 423; and Raymond Dennett and Robert Turner, eds. Documents in American Foreign Policy, VIII, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1962), 2687; and "Basic Post-Surrender Policy for Japan," U.S. Department of State Bulletin, XVII, (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1947), 217.

the Emperor to take all necessary steps to assure that all SCAP directives were complied with by all Japanese and to see to it that all laws, decrees, and regulations which might conflict with the terms of the Potsdam Declaration and the Instrument of Surrender were abrogated.<sup>7</sup> This relationship was explained to Messrs. Katsuo Okazaki, Morio Yukawa, and General Torashiro Kawabe at the Manila Surrender Conference where the Japanese delegates received a copy of the Instrument of Surrender and General Order Number One, which directed the Emperor to order the cessation of all Japanese armed resistance.<sup>8</sup>

When Higashi-Kuni reported to the Emperor on August the thirty-first, "the Emperor was quite relieved"<sup>9</sup> over the lack of real severity of the terms. The Tenno had already done more than the general order required, Amaterasu's direct descendant was in the process of assuring Japanese surrender by his dignified acceptance of that surrender. He certainly had been the most instrumental figure in bringing complete surrender.

Dr. Hiroshi Shimomura, President of the Board of Information, Kido, and the Emperor met on the fifteenth of August and decided that the quickest way to convince the people that Japan was surrendering was by an imperial broadcast. That morning in the Household Ministry, the Emperor recorded his surrender speech. The record was to be played

---

<sup>7</sup>"U.S. Basic Initial Post-Surrender Directive to SCAP," Political Reorientation of Japan, (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1950), II, 430.

<sup>8</sup>"General Order No. 1, Military and Naval," *Ibid.*, 442; and Mamoru Shigemitsu, Japan and Her Destiny, My Struggle for Peace (New York: E.P. Dutton & Company, Inc., 1958), 370.

<sup>9</sup>General Staff, Reports of General MacArthur, (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office), I, 23.

over N H K, the Japan Broadcasting Corporation.<sup>10</sup>

The broadcasting of the record was essential. Even after the Emperor ordered surrender before the Imperial Council, the radical elements of the military reveled in hope of preventing the people from hearing the decision. Major Hatanaka led a group of soldiers to the palace to prevent the broadcast of the surrender record. War Minister Anami appeared to be ready to launch a coup d' etat and to place the Emperor under "the protection" of the army. However, it was learned that he had tried to get his subordinates to carry out the Emperor's wishes but they had refused.<sup>11</sup> The last flyers of the "Divine Wind Squadrons" flew over the Capital "making threatening gestures" and showering Tokyo with leaflets proclaiming this to be Armageddon and telling the people not to believe the Imperial Rescript.<sup>12</sup> But all these sabotage attempts were in vain. The Imperial Rescript ordering the cessation of hostilities and requesting the Japanese Imperial Government and the Japanese Imperial General Headquarters to sign the Instrument of Surrender on behalf of the Emperor was broadcast on the second of September.<sup>13</sup>

The Emperor utilized the Imperial Family as agents for surrender to insure the people that it was his wish that the war come to an end. He sent members of the family to visit military posts to convince the

---

<sup>10</sup>Lester Brooks, Behind Japan's Surrender: The Secret Struggle That Ended in Empire (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1968), 301.

<sup>11</sup>Shigemitsu, Japan and Her Destiny, 365.

<sup>12</sup>Ibid., 368; and Kato Masuo, The Lost War: A Japanese Reporter's Inside Story (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1946), 248.

<sup>13</sup>SCAP, Political Reorientation of Japan, II, 416.

military. He appointed Prince Higashi-Kuni to the Prime Ministry and Prince Konoye to the post of Deputy Prime Minister. It was their duty to form the cabinet that would surrender. Shigemitsu, at this time Foreign Minister, and Chief of the General Staff Umezu were appointed to the demeaning task of leading the surrender delegation. The Emperor himself went before the Diet to inform his people that preserving the national polity meant carrying out to the letter the Allied demands.

The Allies' terms for the surrender were somewhat vague because they wanted flexibility in their programs. But this obscurity caused misunderstanding. The news that Japan would be occupied by a military government shocked the Japanese officials who had interpreted surrender in a different manner. But at Yokohama on the third of September, Shigemitsu said he persuaded MacArthur to use the existing Japanese government.<sup>14</sup> But there is little evidence that he deserved too much credit. The occupation policy formulators had already made that decision before Shigemitsu was capable of advising MacArthur. The Supreme Commander knew that neither would it suffice to ~~order~~ a change of life for the Japanese, nor force revision through military pressure. The adaption of Japan to democracy had to come through the existing Japanese institutions if the Allied policies were to endure. However, he was determined that SCAP was always to remain above these institutions. Almost immediately upon arrival in Japan, General MacArthur was advised to summon the Emperor. The Supreme Commander refused, feeling such a move would make a martyr of the Emperor and would infuriate the

---

<sup>14</sup>Shigemitsu, Japan and Her Destiny, 376.



people. He knew that in due time the Emperor would have to come to him of his own accord.<sup>15</sup> The Japanese mountain would have to go to the American Mohammed.

But if MacArthur wanted to bring the "god" down from the clouds, many of the Allies and people in the United States wished to drag him in the dirt. The Allies had used the Emperor to carry out the surrender terms and now that he had served this purpose, such countries as Russia, China, and Australia wished to see him degraded further by being indicted as a war criminal. The United States had realized this and had encouraged it, though perhaps unintentionally, by its policy. The Potsdam Declaration and the Instrument of Surrender left the door open for internal changes in Japan and Allied policy continued to guarantee freedom of choice by telling the Japanese people that they could do away with the Imperial Institution by popular referendum. This promise was not retracted following the peace settlement.

Both the "United States Initial Post-Surrender Policy for Japan" and the "Basic Post-Surrender Policy for Japan" stated emphatically that "the policy is to use the existing form of Government in Japan, not to support it. Changes in the form of Government initiated by the Japanese people or government in the direction of modifying its feudal and authoritarian tendencies are to be permitted and favored."<sup>16</sup>

---

<sup>15</sup>U.S. Adjutant-General Office, A Brief Progress Report on the Political Reorientation of Japan, October 10-December 31, 1949 (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1949), 36; and Courtney Whitney, MacArthur: His Rendezvous With History (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1956), 285.

<sup>16</sup>"U.S. Initial Post-Surrender Policy for Japan," Political Reorientation of Japan, II, (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1950), 423; and "The Basic Post-Surrender Policy for Japan, Part II, Allied Authority," U.S. Department of State Bulletin, XVII, (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1947), 217.

General MacArthur had no authority to interfere with internal political problems unless occupation safety was imperiled, and even then, he could not act without consultation with the Joint Chiefs of Staff.<sup>17</sup>

In the United States much sentiment toward doing away with the Imperial Institution existed. "Victory rallies" during the war had depicted Hitler, Mussolini, and Hirohito as common enemies of the Allied Powers.<sup>18</sup> A private citizen, Ralph P. Boas of Norton, Massachusetts, wrote to the New York Times demanding that the Emperor not only be deposed but banished from Asia.<sup>19</sup> This was a typical private citizen's opinion.

Many public figures were expressing the same sentiment. Admiral William F. Halsey, Commander of the United States Navy's Third Fleet, commented that "there should be no Mikado when this thing (the war) is over."<sup>20</sup> Rear Admiral Thomas L. Gotch, Judge Advocate General of the Navy, predicted a bloody Japanese Revolution against the Emperor.<sup>21</sup> Senator Richard B. Russell of Georgia sent a telegram to President Truman protesting that the Potsdam Declaration had been too lenient on the Japanese and was a compromise on unconditional terms.<sup>22</sup> The Senator later demanded that Hirohito be tried, and introduced a

---

<sup>17</sup>Theodore McNelly, "Political Reform in Japan: A SCAP Report," Far Eastern Survey, XXI, (September 13, 1950), 162.

<sup>18</sup>At one such rally in Union City, New Jersey, Hirohito was burned in effigy. New York Times November 2, 1942, 2.

<sup>19</sup>Ibid., August 16, 1944, 16.

<sup>20</sup>Ibid., February 20, 1945, 2.

<sup>21</sup>Ibid., July 26, 1945, 2.

<sup>22</sup>Ibid., September 19, 1945, 2.

resolution to that effect to the Senate.<sup>23</sup> The National Lawyers Guild asked President Truman to reverse war crimes policy and to indict Hirohito;<sup>24</sup> and an organization called Americans United for World Organization, Incorporated, sent a telegram to Secretary of State Byrnes demanding the same fate.<sup>25</sup> Even Joseph Grew had admitted that if the invasion of Japan had been necessary perhaps the Emperor should have been charged.<sup>26</sup>

The allies of the United States were no less adamant in demanding the trial of the Emperor and the abolition of the Imperial Institution. A Chinese newspaper, The World Daily News, asked for the death of the Emperor as the number one war criminal.<sup>27</sup> C. H. Fan, spokesman for China at the World Trade Union Conference asked that Hirohito be tried.<sup>28</sup>

The Russians, because of their ideology and their aggravation at not having more power in the occupation, were especially demanding in their cry to bring the Mikado to trial. Early in February of 1949, the Soviet Union proposed that the Emperor and five of Japan's top generals be tried on charges of biological warfare.<sup>29</sup> Later, articles

---

<sup>23</sup>Ibid.

<sup>24</sup>Ibid., October 2, 1945, 8.

<sup>25</sup>Ibid., August 16, 1945, 4.

<sup>26</sup>Joseph Grew, Turbulent Era: A Diplomatic Record of Forty Years, 1904-1945 (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1952), 1438.

<sup>27</sup>New York Times, May 7, 1945, 3.

<sup>28</sup>Ibid., February 13, 1945, 2.

<sup>29</sup>Robert Fearey, The Occupation of Japan, Second Phase: 1948-1950 (New York: Macmillan Company, 1950), 195.

appeared in such newspapers as the Cominform Journal in Bucharest in January of 1950 and in Pravda just two days later depicting the Emperor as a diabolical murderer.<sup>30</sup> In February of 1950, Panyushkin, the Soviet ambassador in Washington, proposed that the Emperor be tried on charges of "crimes against humanity."<sup>31</sup>

The Soviet Union was trying to cripple Japan to such an extent that she could not rival Soviet aims in the Far East which included the control of Manchuria and the Sakhalin Islands. The Russians were also demanding vast sums of reparations which would almost totally destroy Japan's industrial capacity. These demands also involved the growing rivalry between the Soviet Union and the United States. The Russians soon learned after the war that the United States was going to control the occupation of Japan. That America might become "soft" on occupation terms and even help rebuild Japan in order to curb Russian influence in the Far East was a constant fear of the Soviet Union. She thus felt the need to take the lead against the questionable American occupation policies.

The countries of Southeast Asia were not far behind the Russians in supporting trial of the Emperor. They too had learned to fear the Japanese. They wanted to insure that Japan would be rid of all elements of military aggression. Thus, Australia and New Zealand submitted a joint list of those they felt should be tried as war criminals and the Emperor was at the top of the list.<sup>32</sup> The Australian

---

<sup>30</sup> Ibid., 204.

<sup>31</sup> New York Times, February 2, 1950.

<sup>32</sup> Japan Times, January 21, 1946, 1.

spokesman to the United Nations War Crimes Commission asked for the indictment of Hirohito on the grounds that he was head of the Japanese state.<sup>33</sup> The other Southeast Asian countries backed Australia. Brigadier General Carlos P. Romulo, Resident Commissioner to the Philippine Islands from the United States, called for congressional action against war criminals, including the Japanese Emperor.<sup>34</sup>

Such public outcries placed SCAP in a very precarious position. MacArthur and most of his advisors feared the indictment of Hirohito would incite the Japanese to revolt against SCAP supervision. But to allow the Emperor to remain upon the throne, would bring only stronger public reprisals. Possibly Hirohito could have been removed by abdication in favor of the Crown Prince Akihito. As Grew had told Cordell Hull in 1944, "it is the institution that is important, rather than the individual."<sup>35</sup> So strong was the call to try the Emperor that Col. Alva C. Carpenter, Chief of the Legal Section for General MacArthur, was quoted at a press conference that the Emperor was not immune from prosecution.<sup>36</sup>

Certainly the occupation officials could have found enough evidence to charge Hirohito with war crimes. He could have been charged with initiation of the war under article five of the "Charter for the Establishment of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East." The article emphasized that official position was not enough to free

---

<sup>33</sup>New York Times, May 25, 1945, 8.

<sup>34</sup>Ibid., March 23, 1945, 8.

<sup>35</sup>Grew, Turbulent Era, 1414.

<sup>36</sup>New York Times, October 21, 1945, 2.

the accused from responsibility.<sup>37</sup> No one was safe from indictment. These points were also included within "The Basic Initial Post-Surrender Directive to SCAP."

The Japanese Constitutional Laws would have been used as evidence against the Emperor. Under the Meiji Constitution, the Emperor declared war. The Emperor was commander-in-chief of the imperial forces. Certainly he was aware of the war clique which anticipated hostilities with the western powers. Thus the responsibility for war could easily have been placed in his lap.

Hirohito understood how vulnerable his position was following the war. He was acutely aware that the Allies could easily place him on the list of war criminals. He had noticed that even some Japanese newspapers felt he should abdicate and stand trial.<sup>38</sup>

But this does not appear to have been his main object of concern. Throughout history, Japanese in leadership positions had taken partial blame for the mistakes of their underlings. The Tenno did not like standing by untouched while those around him were being accused of being criminals against the world. It was for such a reason that the Emperor told Marquis Koichi Kido, Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal, that he was ready to abdicate in favor of the Crown Prince.<sup>39</sup>

Many of the members of the royal family believed the Emperor should resign. The traditionalists, die-hards, and the totalitarians

---

<sup>37</sup>Dennett and Turner, Documents in American Foreign Relations, VIII, 355.

<sup>38</sup>The Minpo and the Daigaku Shimbun ran such articles. New York Times, December 10, 1945, 6; and John La Cerda, The Conqueror Comes to Tea (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1946), 74.

<sup>39</sup>Wildes, Typhoon in Tokyo, 74.

approved of his stepping down. Their chief spokesman was Prince Naruhiko Higashikuni, the Emperor's cousin. He had favored the Emperor signing the documents of surrender and then abdicating to show his remorse for Japan's downfall. To Higashikuni, the Emperor was the captain who must go down with his ship.<sup>40</sup>

While the die-hard traditionalist of old Japan acclaimed the idea of Hirohito resigning, parliamentarians such as Ichiro Hatoyama, Yukio Ozaki, Takao Saito, and Dr. Hitoshi Ashida opposed the distasteful thought. Ashida, who became Prime Minister under the occupation, tried to express his fears to SCAP and to inform MacArthur that pressure was building for Hirohito to abdicate so as to share responsibility for the war with his subordinates.<sup>41</sup>

The Emperor was soon convinced he should step down, such was his desire to stand along with the so called war criminals. But the Japanese "liberals" pointed out to him that such a move could sabotage the occupation. Hirohito decided to ask MacArthur when and if he should resign.

At the first meeting between Hirohito and General MacArthur on September the twentieth, the Emperor said he was ready to place himself in the hands of the Allies for judgment. The Emperor claimed sole responsibility for every military and political decision made in

---

<sup>40</sup>Ibid., 74; and Leonard Mosley, Hirohito, Emperor of Japan (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1966), 335.

<sup>41</sup>William J. Sebald, With MacArthur in Japan: A Personal History of the Occupation (London: Cresset, 1967), 161; and Wildes, Typhoon in Tokyo, 74.

bringing war between Japan and the United States.<sup>42</sup> He then asked the General his opinion of abdication but MacArthur dodged the issue as he had no authority to interfere in what was viewed as an internal Japanese problem.<sup>43</sup>

Ironically the general was the one who settled the question.<sup>44</sup> MacArthur reasoned that while he had no real authority to intervene in the affair, perhaps he could ease the tensions upon the Emperor. The general had changed his opinion of the Emperor. He had been impressed when Hirohito had been willing to accept all blame for the war. He now viewed the Emperor as a very strong but peace loving man who was more interested in nature than in autocracy and war.<sup>45</sup>

On more practical grounds, SCAP feared that if he were convicted, and/or hanged, civil war would be inevitable. General MacArthur advised Washington that if this resulted, he would probably need a million reinforcements in order to keep the peace.<sup>46</sup>

That was all that was necessary to be said. The American populus would have been overwhelmingly opposed to sending such a large number of men to Japan. The United States was tired of war and wanted peace. So on October the sixth of 1945, the Joint Chiefs of Staff

---

<sup>42</sup>Douglas MacArthur, Reminiscences (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1964), 288.

<sup>43</sup>Wildes, Typhoon in Tokyo, 76.

<sup>44</sup>Whitney, MacArthur: His Rendezvous with History, 283; and La Cerea, The Conqueror Comes to Tea, 70; and McNelly, "Political Reform in Japan: A SCAP Report," Far Eastern Survey, IXX, 162.

<sup>45</sup>LaCerea, The Conqueror Comes to Tea, 70.

<sup>46</sup>MacArthur, Reminiscences, 288; and Whitney, MacArthur: His Rendezvous with History, 284.



forwarded a top-secret directive renewing the order to start the war crimes trials, but forbidding any action against the Emperor.<sup>47</sup> The Emperor's name was quickly stricken from the several lists of indictments that had been submitted by Australia and China. Soon everyone but the Russians and the Japanese communists had ceased to demand the Emperor's trial. The Far East Commission adopted a resolution to discontinue the trial policy. On April the third of 1950, a FEC Directive to SCAP emphasized the Emperor should be exempt from indictment as a war criminal unless a decision to the contrary was authorized by the FEC.<sup>48</sup>

Whether there was any truth to the rumors, or in reports that SCAP had personally requested the Emperor to stay on the throne was not known. Perhaps the Emperor was unofficially informed of the secret directive. At any rate, it was made public on the eighth of October that the Emperor would not abdicate.<sup>49</sup> From that time forward, the Allies, except for the Soviet Union, did not make attacks upon the Tenno.<sup>50</sup>

The decision not to place the Emperor on trial had settled a very ticklish problem. Certainly there was American apprehension at the outset of the occupation that the Emperor was too "hot." The removal of Hirohito would have only thrown Japan into turmoil. The trial would

---

<sup>47</sup> Wildes, Typhoon in Tokyo, 77.

<sup>48</sup> Dennett and Turner, eds., Documents of American Foreign Relations, XIII, (1950), 480.

<sup>49</sup> Robert A. Fearey, The Occupation of Japan, Second Phase: 1948-1950, 18; and Wildes, Typhoon in Tokyo, 77.

<sup>50</sup> Mark J. Gayn, Japan Diary (New York: W. Sloane Associates, 1948), 475.

have smoothed international fever, or perhaps, just kept the record straight. Neither of these reasons seem enough justification for such action.

The Emperor had always claimed to be too sacred to become involved in politics. A person familiar with the workings of Japanese politics would have built an excellent case showing that the Emperor had little voice in the decision for war. The cult of militarism had been artificially developed with the establishment of the Shogunate and later the Meiji Restoration. The Emperor had been quite simply used as a convenient facade. Throughout much of its history, Japan's people had been virtually unaware that there was such a thing as an Imperial Institution. In other words, the Japanese did not need their Tenno to be militarily aggressive, nor did the existence of the Imperial Institution make them militaristic. This essential neutralism of the Imperial Institution promoted the decision to retain Hirohito upon the throne. The door was then open for the occupation officials to continue the historical position of the Emperor for the facilitating of SCAP policy which would hopefully bring democracy back to Japan.

## CHAPTER III

### CHANGES IN THE IMPERIAL INSTITUTION

So deeply embedded was the Imperial Institution into every facet of Japanese life that it was impossible to attempt any reform in Japan unless the institution was reconstructed along more democratic lines. Occupation officials thus deemed it necessary to place the Emperor under the same laws that governed the people of Japan. State Shintoism was to be abolished, and the laws governing the Imperial family revamped. The Japanese Education Ministers were to be encouraged to change the emphasis of the entire education system. Also, it was decided that the Emperor should conduct public tours throughout Japan in order to lend prestige to the occupation policies. Hopefully, these trips would tend to "humanize" the Emperor, and to divorce him from the religious cult of State Shintoism that had surrounded him in pre-war Japan.

The most important of all these endeavors was the revision of the existing Japanese Constitution. Only by re-evaluating the Emperor's constitutional powers could real democracy grow in post-war Japan.

Under the Meiji Constitution, the Emperor had supreme control over the army and navy, but what this actually meant was that the military was not responsible to the Government. The old constitution had been so narrowly interpreted that the Emperor was not an organ of the State

but the State itself.<sup>1</sup> If democracy was to progress in post-war Japan, a new constitution had to be drafted that would design the Imperial Institution as an organ of the State with checks upon its power. What was needed was an organic law that would assure the rights of the individual and still keep the essence of national unity under the Emperor, for the Japanese people could not conceive of a Japan without their Emperor.

The policy began when "The Basic Principles for a New Japanese Constitution" was sent from the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Far East Commission stating plainly that, "the Emperor shall be deprived of all military authority such as that provided in....the Constitution of 1889."<sup>2</sup>

The basic problem was how to persuade the Japanese to accept the idea that Japan needed a new constitution, and it would have to be implemented so that there would be no doubt as to the legitimacy of the document. The occupation officials had to prevail upon the existing Japanese government, including the Emperor, to undertake its own reforms. But in theory the Emperor could not introduce nor fundamentally change the Constitution of 1889 as it was considered a part of the National Polity.<sup>3</sup> It was decided that the best method to implement the new constitution would be to attach it to the Meiji Constitution as an

---

<sup>1</sup>Hugh Borton, "The Administration and Structure of Japanese Governments," The Department of State, Far Eastern Series (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1944), 817.

<sup>2</sup>Government Section, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, Political Reorientation of Japan, September, 1945 to September, 1948 (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1950), II, 661.

<sup>3</sup>Ibid., II, 662.

amendment.<sup>4</sup>

After these SCAP decisions, it was necessary to educate the Japanese officials to the fundamental changes SCAP wanted. Soon after occupation began, Prince Fuminaro Konoye, Minister without Portfolio, met with George Atcheson, Jr., U. S. Political adviser to the Supreme Commander.<sup>5</sup> Atcheson outlined the major points SCAP considered basic for constitutional revision. Several of these points were specifically for the curtailment of the Emperor's authority to legislate by means of rescript and ordinance. General MacArthur wanted to be sure that the Emperor was made the symbol of state. Imperial succession had to be dynastic, and the duties of the Emperor had to be in accordance with a constitution that would be responsible to the people.<sup>6</sup>

As soon as it was learned that a revision of the constitution was in order, many of the several political parties began submitting their own versions of what should be done. These proposals ranged from total abolition of the Imperial Institution to initially no change in the Emperor's status and prerogatives.

The most conservative of all the proposals was the so-called Progressive Party's. The Emperor was to remain as the head of state

---

<sup>4</sup>Ibid., II, 663.

<sup>5</sup>Prince Konoye was related to the Imperial Family by marriage. He had been Premier three times, the last in 1940 just before Tojo's takeover. He later committed suicide upon learning that he was to be indicted as a war criminal.

<sup>6</sup>SCAP, Political Reorientation of Japan, I, 102; and T. McNelly, "Political Reform in Japan: A SCAP Report," Far Eastern Survey, LXX, (September, 1950), 161-164.

with fundamentally the same powers as under the Constitution of 1889.<sup>7</sup> The proposal of the Liberal Party was not very different. Sovereignty still resided with the Emperor. His prerogatives were curtailed in that he could act only with "the assistance of his Ministers of State" and he would have neither legal nor political responsibility. However, neither would he be answerable through legal or political process.<sup>8</sup>

The Social Democrats were able to arrive at a proposal that was progressive in parts and more in line with what SCAP had in mind. Sovereignty was to reside with the state, which included the Emperor. The Diet became the supreme organ of the state by divorcing the Imperial Institution from politics. The Emperor, though his duties were purely ceremonial, appointed the Prime Minister after consultation with the presidents of both houses of the legislature.<sup>9</sup>

The Communist proposal was by far the most radical. Sovereignty was placed in the hands of the people. The Imperial Institution was to be completely abolished. The communists were convinced that the institution represented the feudal remains of all that was hated in military Japan when the Japanese leaders continually exploited the masses for the "good" of Japan. The Emperor was the antithesis of all the communist endeavors for a classless society. Thus to the communist, only the elimination of the Emperor would assure the total democratization of Japan.<sup>10</sup>

---

<sup>7</sup> SCAP, Political Reorientation of Japan, I, 95. The Emperor exercised legislative powers with the consent of the Diet through Imperial Ordinances. He remained in control of the Army and Navy.

<sup>8</sup> Ibid., I, 96.

<sup>9</sup> Ibid., I, 96-97.

<sup>10</sup> Ibid., I, 96.

To study the situation, a Constitutional Problem Investigation Committee under Dr. Joji Matsumoto was established by the Japanese Cabinet in October, 1945. But the Matsumoto Committee, as it was called, found it difficult to formulate a constitution that would please General MacArthur. The draft of the committee did not substantially change the powers of the Emperor but only reworded the Meiji Constitution.<sup>11</sup> The Emperor was to be supreme and inviolable rather than sacred and inviolable. Articles four, five, six, nine, ten, fourteen, sixteen, seventeen, of the old constitution remained unchanged.<sup>12</sup> Article fifteen which dealt with conferring titles of nobility was reworded to "conferring marks of honor only."<sup>13</sup> In other words, the constitutional status of the Emperor under the Matsumoto Draft remained the same as under the Meiji Constitution except that his divinity was left out. The decision of the constitutional committee was reported to SCAP under reports entitled, "Gist of the Revision of the Constitution,"<sup>14</sup> and "A General Explanation of the Constitutional Revision by the Government."<sup>15</sup>

SCAP refused to approve the reports. Three times the committee submitted constitutional drafts to General MacArthur and three times SCAP rejected the proposals. Finally in answer to the Matsumoto Drafts, the Government Section of SCAP issued its own constitutional

---

<sup>11</sup>For a copy of the Meiji Constitution, see Ibid., II, 586.

<sup>12</sup>Ibid., II, 617.

<sup>13</sup>Ibid., I, 99.

<sup>14</sup>Ibid., II, 617.

<sup>15</sup>Ibid., II, 619.

"outline, in order to give the Japanese an idea of what SCAP wanted in the new constitution."<sup>16</sup>

Under Article One the Emperor was the symbol of the state. Acts of state had to have the approval of the Diet and the Cabinet. The Emperor could appoint the Chief Judge of the Supreme Court and the Prime Minister, but only with the designation of the cabinet. The Emperor could convene the Diet, dissolve the House of Representatives, proclaim general elections, receive foreign ambassadors and ministers, and perform ceremonial functions. The Imperial Throne was to be dynastic and succession was to be in accordance with the Imperial House Law passed by the Diet. There was no mention of the Emperor being sacred. In fact, Article I left the door open for the abolition of the Imperial system if the sovereign will of the Japanese people asked for a constitutional amendment.<sup>17</sup>

The "MacArthur Constitution" struck many Japanese liberals with consternation because it not only proclaimed the alien idea of popular sovereignty, but it cast doubt upon the national polity which the liberals had always argued would be strengthened by liberalization of the organic law.<sup>18</sup> Thus, democracy in Japan had always been founded upon the Imperial System and liberalization of the Constitution would indicate the benevolence of the Japanese Emperors. The people would

---

<sup>16</sup>Ibid., I, 111.

<sup>17</sup>Ryusuke Suda, "Role of the Emperor in Post-War Japan," Social and Economic Aspects of Japan, 1917-1967 Naosaku Uchida and Kotaro Ikeda, eds. (Tokyo: Economic Institute of Seijo University, 1967), 223.

<sup>18</sup>Shigeru Yoshida, The Yoshida Memoirs; The Story of Japan in Crisis, Trans. Kenichi Yoshida (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1962) 139; and Kazuo Kawai, "Sovereignty and Democracy in the Japanese Constitution," American Political Science Review, XLIX, (September, 1955), 671.



love their Emperor more than ever. Democracy, they argued was a part of the history of Japan originating in the promises of the Emperor Meiji. Also it was imposed by a military government and the liberals had always fought rule by the military. There was no difference in pressure exerted by the allied military authorities and that by the old Japanese military officials.

The committee loitered to such an extent that SCAP was forced to inform them that there was no compulsion upon them to draft any more constitutions as General MacArthur was prepared to lay the SCAP draft before the people.<sup>19</sup> In desperation, Prime Minister Shidehara, accompanied by Yoshida and Narahashi visited the Emperor on February 22, 1946, and advised him of the changes of his powers under the "MacArthur Draft." Hirohito told the delegation that he fully supported the most thorough revision of the old constitution, even to the point of completely depriving the Emperor of all political authority.<sup>20</sup>

There appear to have been two reasons why the Emperor was in favor of the reforms. He was basically a liberal in political philosophy. He had been so since his tour of Europe during the 1920's when constitutional democracy was in vogue in his country. The smooth functioning workings of the European democracies had impressed him, and he had looked on in favor at his own people's attempts at democracy. He had looked on with trepidation as the power of the military

---

<sup>19</sup>G. B. Sansom, "The Political Orientation of Japan," Pacific Affairs, XXIV, (September, 1951), 308.

<sup>20</sup>SCAP, Political Reorientation of Japan, I, 106; and Douglas MacArthur, Reminiscences (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1964), 300; and McNelly, "Political Reform of Japan: A SCAP Report," Far Eastern Survey, IXX, 163.

grew in the thirties thwarting the attempts at parliamentary government.

The second reason gives an insight to his personality. Hirohito was not a politically minded person. His main field of interest was biology. He did not want to be burdened with the heavy reins of power but was content to serve as the symbol of the state and not the State itself.

The drafted constitution was publicly announced at the "command of the Emperor" and with the "full approval" of General MacArthur on March 6, 1946.<sup>21</sup> This, however, did not mean that the constitution was automatically accepted. Strong debates were held in the legislature during the spring, summer, and on into the fall. These arguments centered around the preservation of the national polity and the prerogatives of the Imperial Institution. But it is important to note that the questions related to the nature and intent of the document, not to specific articles. Opponents of the constitution said that the Emperor was procedurally vulnerable because the constitution was inconsistent with the claim that the national polity had been preserved. The new constitution placed sovereignty with the people. This, the opponents charged, was alien to Japan. What was needed was the corporate state with the philosophy of the "organ theory" where the Emperor as a separate branch of the government held a certain governmental power in order to check the other branches of government.<sup>22</sup> At a House Constitutional Committee hearing, Tokujiro

---

<sup>21</sup>SCAP, Political Reorientation of Japan, II, 657.

<sup>22</sup>Ibid., I, 111; and Kazuo Kawai, "Sovereignty and Democracy in the Japanese Constitution," Political Science Review, XLIX, 670.

Kanamori testified that the word "people" in the preamble and in Articles I and CII seemed to exclude the Emperor from authority.<sup>23</sup>

The government ministers supported the constitution by asserting that the constitution did not change the national polity, but in fact, preserved it. Such men as Reijiro Wakatskue, former Prime Minister, Admiral Keisuke Okada, also a former Prime Minister, argued that they still believed in kokutai and that they would not be in favor of any document that would not insure its continuance.<sup>24</sup> Prime Minister Shidehara was in favor of a constitutional monarchy.<sup>25</sup>

Influential political scholars such as Dr. Tatsukichi Minobe, the constitutional scholar and author of the "Emperor-Organ" theory, stated his belief in the Tenno system and his certainty that the institution was compatible with the new constitution draft.<sup>26</sup> Dr. Ruchiro Hoashi later pointed out in an article that the Imperial system would serve as a foundation for Japanese democracy.<sup>27</sup>

These testimonials plus the influence and pressure of SCAP persuaded the Japanese officials to approve the constitution. The House endorsed the revisions on October 29, and submitted them to the Privy Council. With the Emperor attending the meeting, the Privy

---

<sup>23</sup>Japan Times, July 4, 1946, 1.

<sup>24</sup>Nobutaka Ike, Japanese Politics (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1957), 47. Kokutai is the word used to depict the concept of the Emperor as a father who oversees the Japanese Family State. This also had a religious connotation during the existence of State Shintoism.

<sup>25</sup>Japan Times, January 25, 1946, 3.

<sup>26</sup>Ibid., January 30, 1946, 1.

<sup>27</sup>Ibid., March 7, 1946, 4.

Council approved the new constitution.<sup>28</sup> November third was the promulgation date highlighted by an Imperial Rescript before the Diet.<sup>29</sup> The Constitution went into effect six months later on May 3, 1947.

The Constitution of 1947 did not change the political position of the Emperor because the Japanese Emperor had not actually ruled in a thousand years. What change there was had been theoretical. The Japanese must have realized this because an editorial in the Japan Times on the birthday of the Emperor lauded the fact that while other Japanese institutions were being disgarded or revised, the Imperial Institution remained to lead the people into the post-war era.<sup>30</sup> The Prime Minister still tendered resignations to the throne so that the Emperor could call for a new election.<sup>31</sup> The new constitution was an attempted compromise. It was written largely in SCAP headquarters, with the idea of perpetuating the stabilizing influence of the throne.<sup>32</sup> The Emperor's power to dissolve the Diet came under protest but in 1953, the Supreme Court dismissed the case.<sup>33</sup>

Constitutional revision opened the door for more democratic reforms. SCAP could then turn its attention to restructuring or

---

<sup>28</sup>SCAP, Political Reorientation of Japan, I, 111.

<sup>29</sup>Ibid., II, 670. It is significant that the Emperor wore morning clothes instead of his traditional military uniform when he went before the Diet with the Constitution.

<sup>30</sup>Japan Times, April 29, 1946, 4.

<sup>31</sup>Russell Brimes, MacArthur's Japan (Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott Co., 1948), 85.

<sup>32</sup>Ibid.

<sup>33</sup>John M. Maki, Court and Constitution in Japan: Selected Supreme Court Decisions, 1948-1960 (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1964), 366.

abolishing certain laws that placed the Imperial Institution above the normal legal processes and thus put the Emperor on the same legal footing as the common Japanese man.

One of those laws which needed re-examination was the old criminal code of 1907. It was considered undemocratic because of the *lèse majesté*, defined as any criminal act against the Imperial family. Any act of violence against the Mikado or any dissenting voice against the Imperial Institution was treated as an overt act of treason against the state as the Emperor was the foundation for the national polity.

While the legal section of SCAP was determined to abolish this law and to replace it with a code that was more compatible with the new constitution, the Japanese officials under the occupation were determined to keep the statute on the books. In a letter to General MacArthur, Prime Minister Yoshida pointed out that the Emperor held too important a position to be placed under the same laws that govern the people of Japan.<sup>34</sup> In answer to Yoshida's letter, General MacArthur wrote, "as the symbol of state and of unity of the people, the Emperor is entitled to no more legal protection nor no less than that accorded to all other citizens...."<sup>35</sup>

Resigned to carrying out the terms of the occupation policies, the Diet passed into law the Partial Amendment to the Criminal Code of 1907. Known as the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1948, it struck out articles seventy-three and seventy-six of the old code which regulated

---

<sup>34</sup>SCAP, Political Reorientation of Japan, II, 679.

<sup>35</sup>Ibid., II, 680.

the offenses against the Imperial Household, thus abolishing *lése majesté*.<sup>36</sup>

The Japanese immediately put the new law to use. Five men were released in Tokyo from charges of publicly criticizing the Emperor.<sup>37</sup> The precedent was set when the Supreme Court overruled a decision of a lower court which had sentenced a young man to eight months in prison for writing a placard depicting an Imperial Rescript which was derogatory toward the Emperor. The defense won the case on grounds that the defendant could not be tried for *lése majesté*, nor could he be held for libel as the injured party, which was of course the Emperor, had not complained.<sup>38</sup>

Having erased the constitutional powers of the Emperor and abolishing the special laws that had placed the Emperor above the law, the occupation officials turned to another revision of the Imperial system, the transfer of the vast wealth of the Emperor to the State. It was one of the top priorities of the occupation. The "U.S. Initial Post-Surrender Policy for Japan" stipulated that the Imperial Household property must not stand in the way of occupation objectives.<sup>39</sup> SCAP was to stop any revenue of the Imperial family.<sup>40</sup> A complete

---

<sup>36</sup>Arthur Taylor Von Mehren, ed., Law in Japan: The Legal Order in a Changing Society (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1963), 17.

<sup>37</sup>MacArthur, Reminiscences, 317.

<sup>38</sup>Japan Times, November 4, 1946, 1.

<sup>39</sup>SCAP, Political Reorientation of Japan, II, 426; and Raymond Dennett and Robert Turner, eds., Documents of American Foreign Relation, VIII (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1962), 273.

<sup>40</sup>SCAP, Political Reorientation of Japan, II, 438.

inventory of all Imperial Household assets was made and submitted to SCAP valuing the Imperial property holdings at 1,700,000,000 yen<sup>41</sup> which was somewhere between \$500,000,000 and \$1,000,000,000. The fortune was nourished by an annual salary of \$1,600,000 tax free. Imperial landholdings covered six thousand square miles. The Emperor held thousands of blue-chip stocks, especially in banking equities and he was the largest investor in N.Y.K. shipping, run by Mitsubishi, and in O.S.K. ship lines N.Y.K.'s biggest competitor.<sup>42</sup>

Diverting these holdings and revenue from the Emperor to the State required the revision of the old constitution and the Imperial House Economy Law. Under the first chapter of the new Japanese Constitution of 1947, the Emperor was prohibited from either giving or receiving property and gifts without the authorization of the Diet.<sup>43</sup> During the occupation, SCAP authorization was also needed. Article eighty eight under chapter seven transferred all property of the Imperial Household to the State. Any salary received by the Emperor was determined by the Diet.<sup>44</sup>

The Imperial House Economy Law was designed to carry out the constitutional changes. The law established an Imperial House Economic Council to advise the Emperor of the provisions of the new law and to see that they were complied with. Imperial expenses were to be

---

<sup>41</sup>Mark J. Gayn, Japan Diary (New York: W. Sloane Association, 1948), 146.

<sup>42</sup>Ibid., 147; and Lester Brooks, Behind Japan's Surrender: The Secret Struggle That Ended an Empire (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1968), 91.

<sup>43</sup>SCAP, Political Reorientation of Japan, II, 671.

<sup>44</sup>Ibid., II, 676; and Russell Brimes, MacArthur's Japan (Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott Co., 1948), 86.

paid out of the annual national budget. An Office of the Imperial Household was created to manage the property of the family.<sup>45</sup> Under the Imperial Household Law, property of the household was limited to the Emperor's own hereditary estates.

In 1947, a Property Tax based upon a graduated basis was passed by the Diet. This law was not specifically for the Emperor but under the new governing principles, he was not exempt as he might have once been. As a result, he had to pay a ninety per cent levy tax which totaled almost 3,000,000,000 yen as the entire family holdings were assessed at over 3,000,000,000 yen. He still retained over 300,000,000 yen bringing his personal fortune to more than twice that of the wealthiest zaibatsu.<sup>46</sup> As an "economy move" the Emperor dismissed over seventy-five per cent of the 8,000 Palace employees, the Palace guards being the first to go.<sup>47</sup>

Laws to reform the Imperial family next commanded the attention of the occupation. To insure SCAP's wishes, the court officials took the initiative by abolishing the influential office of Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal.<sup>48</sup> The Diet in 1947 inaugurated the new Imperial

---

<sup>45</sup>SCAP, Political Reorientation of Japan, II, 850; and Edwin M. Martin, The Allied Occupation of Japan (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1948), 68.

<sup>46</sup>Japan Times, February 19, 1947, 3; and Brimes, MacArthur's Japan, 86.

<sup>47</sup>Japan Times, January 5, 1947, 1; and Harry Wildes, Typhoon in Tokyo: The Occupation and Its Aftermath (New York: Macmillan Co., 1954), 83.

<sup>48</sup>Marquis Kido, the last Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal was later sentenced to life imprisonment by the International Military Tribunal for the Far East and Admiral Kanitoro Hisamori, Grand Chamberlin was forced to resign under the pressure of the SCAP purge directives.



House Agency Law which established the Imperial House Agency that assumed the functions of the abolished Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal and the Imperial Household Ministry. The agency was composed of the Grand Steward, the Vice-Grand Steward, the Private Secretary of the Grand Steward, the Grand Chamberlain, Chamberlains, the Master of Ceremonies, and the Secretary of the Imperial House Agency. The agency was in charge of all state affairs and the Emperor's acts were provided for by government ordinance.<sup>49</sup> The law also reduced the Imperial Family to the Empress, the Grand Empress, Imperial Princes, the consorts of the Imperial Princes, the Imperial Princesses, and the grandchildren of the Emperor. SCAP further reduced the ranks of the nobility through the Imperial Household Law and the Imperial Ordinance No. I, which purged "undesirables from public service."<sup>50</sup> By spring of 1946, fifteen Princes had resigned from the House of Peers under the purge directive,<sup>51</sup> and by Christmas, 1946, the ranks of the nobility were reduced by fifty-one per cent. Those reduced in rank received compensation ranging from one hundred million yen to eight hundred million yen, but after paying the ninety per cent capital levy tax, the compensation was negligible.

The second of the laws governing the Imperial Family was the Imperial House Law which covered all matters concerning succession, membership of the Imperial Family, establishment of the regency,

---

<sup>49</sup>Theodore McNelly, Contemporary Government of Japan (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1963), 62.

<sup>50</sup>SCAP, Political Reorientation of Japan, II, 501-504; and Japan Times, May 28, 1946, 2.

<sup>51</sup>Wildes, Typhoon in Tokyo, 81-82.

ceremonial functions, funerals, records of Imperial lineage, and the Imperial House Council which took the place of the Imperial Family Council.<sup>52</sup> The Council was composed of ten members, two from the Imperial Family, the President and Vice-President of the House of Representatives and the House of Councilors, the Prime Minister, who served as the presiding officer, the head of the Imperial House Agency, the Chief Judge, and one other judge of the Supreme Court.<sup>53</sup>

Succession to the throne was set by the Imperial House Law. The primary heir to the throne was the Crown Prince, followed in order of succession by the Emperor's eldest grandson, other descendants of the eldest son of the Emperor, the second son of the Emperor and his descendants, other descendants of the Emperor, brothers of the Emperor, descendants of the brothers of the Emperor, uncles of the Emperor and their descendants. There was no provision for abdication. In case of necessity, a Regent would serve until the Emperor became of age at eighteen.<sup>54</sup>

The occupation officials knew that it would take more than the changing of laws to remove the Emperor from the center of Japanese power. That is why in late 1945 the Allies began a policy to "humanize" Hirohito. The basic idea was to get statutes on the books that would annihilate Shintoism as a state religion. The best method to destroy Shintoism was by revamping the educational system and by employing a

---

<sup>52</sup>U. S. Department of the Army. Civil Affairs Division, Summation of Non-Military Activities in Japan, September, 1947 to August, 1948 (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1948), 20.

<sup>53</sup>McNelly, Contemporary Government of Japan, 61.

<sup>54</sup>SCAP, Political Reorientation of Japan, II, 846-848; and McNelly, Contemporary Government of Japan, 61.

program that would hopefully remove the aura surrounding the Emperor. Also the decision was made to induce the Emperor to appear before the public as often as possible. It was hoped that public exposure would wash away much of the mysticism that had grown around the Emperor during the late eighteen hundreds.

As the direct descendant of the Sun Goddess, Amaterasu, the Emperor was the High Priest of Japan and thus considered a god, but in a different way than the West could comprehend. In Japan all men were potential deities. The famous suicide pilots of the Second World War were called "Kamikaze" because a Kamikaze was a type of god, and if these pilots would happen to die for their Emperor, the Japanese believed they would become gods. The greater the man, the better his chances of being a god. The Emperor was considered the greatest man in Japan, thus the greater potential to become a great god.<sup>55</sup> As Admiral Okada once said, "he (Emperor) is a god whom the people worship without question."<sup>56</sup>

If the Japanese people believed this to be true, evidently the Emperor did not. On New Years day in 1946, SCAP policy received an accommodation when the Emperor proclaimed his non-divinity rescript. "The ties between us and our people have always stood upon mutual trust and affection. They do not depend upon mere legends and myths. They are not predicated on the false conception that the Emperor is

---

<sup>55</sup>Alexander H. Leighton, Human Relations in a Changing World: Observations on the Use of the Social Sciences (New York: E. P. Dutton and Co., Inc., 1949), 92.

<sup>56</sup>Ike, Japanese Politics, 48.

divine."<sup>57</sup>

Some sources claim that it was SCAP pressure that brought the rescript and that it could have been written at SCAP headquarters.<sup>58</sup> Occupation officials claim the rescript resulted from Hirohito's initiative, not from SCAP.<sup>59</sup> Whether the Emperor decided to announce the rescript out of personal belief or because of SCAP insistence is not known. But neither is it particularly important. What is important is that the declaration psychologically prepared the Japanese people for the religious and educational reforms to come. Some months later, the Japan Times printed an historical explanation of the reason for the rescript. The word "kami" had originally referred to a leader of ancient tribes or families, not the name for a god. Thus, in ancient Japan the Emperor was not a god but a powerful leader.<sup>60</sup>

While the Imperial Rescript helped clear the way for freedom of religion, the Allied authorities intended not only to establish religious freedom but freedom from religion—State Shintoism. This goal took root in the "U.S. Initial Post-Surrender Policy for Japan" and in Education in the New Japan, written by the U.S. Department of the Army.

SCAP initiated its program by sending a memorandum to the Imperial

---

<sup>57</sup>SCAP, Political Reorientation of Japan, II, 470.

<sup>58</sup>John M. Maki, Government and Politics in Japan: The Road to Democracy (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1962), 66; and Leonard O. Mosley, Hirohito, Emperor of Japan (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1966), 347.

<sup>59</sup>MacArthur, Reminiscences, 311; and Courtney Whitney, MacArthur: His Rendezvous With History (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1956), 275.

<sup>60</sup>Japan Times, May 16, 1946, 4.

Japanese Government in December of 1945 ordering the end of Shintoism.<sup>61</sup> SCAP followed up its own order by disbanding the Jikosama religious cult which strongly preached Emperor worship.

A positive education reform mission was established under Dr. George D. Stoddard. Dr. Stoddard, after a careful study of the situation, recommended to the Japanese Ministry of Education that the textbooks teaching "morals" (Shushin) be disposed of and a plan for revision of education be submitted to SCAP for approval.<sup>62</sup> "Morals," the mission recommended, "which in Japanese education has fostered submissiveness....should be differently constructed."<sup>63</sup>

Eager to cooperate with SCAP, the Japanese government immediately began following Dr. Stoddard's recommendations. A new education law passed the Diet in 1947. The government prohibited the teaching of any type of religion in the public schools.<sup>64</sup>

The entire social sciences were almost totally revamped. Not only religious but also ultranationalistic, militaristic, and ethocentric materials were not to be used in the instruction of

---

<sup>61</sup>U. S. Department of the Army. Civil Affairs Division, Education in the New Japan (Tokyo: General Headquarters, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers Civil Information and Education Section, 1948), II, 26.

<sup>62</sup>U. S. War Department, General Headquarters, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, SCAP Directives to the Imperial Japanese Government, 1945-1946 (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1946), VI, 51.

<sup>63</sup>U. S. Department of the Army, Education in the New Japan, II, 51.

<sup>64</sup>Ibid., 178.

students.<sup>65</sup> The Ministry of Education issued numerous instructions to the Prefectural Governors and Directors of various schools ordering the school officials to refrain from considering the Imperial Rescripts as the sole source of educational philosophy. The Imperial portraits were not to be hung in the schools nor observed as sacred.

The program was very successful. Progress was so rapid that by the end of 1946, SCAP had approved the national education program and had delivered the new textbooks.<sup>66</sup> The new social studies texts emphasized such social principles as worth of the individual, equality before the law, and other democratic lessons. Thus school sponsored veneration of the Emperor was eliminated.<sup>67</sup>

In 1951, the Ministry of Education came under harsh public criticism when it published "An Outline of Ethical Practice for the Japanese People." The document emphasized the new "democratic" Emperor as no longer the center of power nor an object of worship, but the object of affection.<sup>68</sup> However the ministry stood by the document by declaring

---

<sup>65</sup> Ibid., II, 109; and General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers. Civil Information and Education Section. Education Division, Post-War Developments in Japanese Education, 1945-1952 (Tokyo: April, 1952), II, 128.

<sup>66</sup> Courses in geography were reopened in June, 1946, and history classes were opened in October, of the same year. U. S. Department of the Army, Education in the New Japan, II, 46-47.

<sup>67</sup> General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, Post-War Developments in Japanese Education, I, 27; and U. S. War Department, Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers, Two Years of Occupation; Social (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1948), 3; and General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, Civil Information and Education Section. Mission and Accomplishments of the Occupation in the Civil Information and Education Fields (Tokyo: 1950), 16.

<sup>68</sup> R. P. Dore, "The Ethics of New Japan," Pacific Affairs, vol. 25, (June, 1952), 27.

it in accordance with the political trends of the times.

The Japanese generally accepted the new education reforms. There was no outcry for the reinstatement of Shushin within the school curriculum nor against the abolition of State Shinto. The Emperor continued to visit such important Shrines as the Ise Shrine, though in theory the visits were now only as a private citizen not as a religious official. But his spiritual influence continued to be extensive.<sup>69</sup>

Perhaps SCAP looked with disdain upon the continuing influence of the Emperor, for early in 1946 the campaign began to change the public image of the Emperor. The Emperor was to begin making numerous trips throughout the nation. Supposedly the decision was made at the highest levels of the Japanese Government. Assuredly SCAP approved of the idea. The more familiar the people became with their Emperor, the less reverent they would be toward him. The trips were handled carefully and were closely planned. Often buildings were built or repaired so the Emperor would receive a better impression. The Emperor was cited as a man desiring to get out among his people.<sup>70</sup> The Emperor visited hospitals, planted rice in Takasaki Prefecture, and inspected schools and relief housing.

The Japan Times cooperated with the new program. The Japan Times Magazine ran three pictorial articles depicting the Emperor as a family man,<sup>71</sup> showed him working at his hobby of biological research,<sup>72</sup> and

---

<sup>69</sup>Gayn, Japan Diary, 27.

<sup>70</sup>Japan Times, March 7, 1946, 2.

<sup>71</sup>Ibid., January 1, 1946, 2.

<sup>72</sup>Ibid., September 28, 1946, 2.

as the concerned public official exhorting the Japanese people to bear the lack of food, which was very scarce during the first years of the occupation.<sup>73</sup> Later he gave an interview in which he expressed worry over the life of "vice" into which ex-servicemen had fallen.<sup>74</sup> Thus, he used his waning prestige to keep lawlessness to a minimum. Hirohito the man began to replace Hirohito the god.

Some of the Allies, especially the Russians, and even a few American observers, were disenchanted with the humanization policy, The Russians proclaimed it to be a capitalist plot to force Emperor rule upon the people.<sup>75</sup> A few American news correspondents such as Mark Gayn also voiced disapproval, believing that the idea was self-defeating. "Japan has been given free speech — with reservations. If originally we meant to suppress militarists propaganda alone, now we permit no word critical of the Emperor."<sup>76</sup>

The humanization program had both its good and bad results. The Emperor was almost "paraded" before his people to show his human ineptitudes——shyness and lack of articulation. Mark Gayn described a trip taken by the Emperor to the Takasaki Military Hospital:

As the Emperor walked into the first ward, someone barked a command, and the men bowed.... The voice barked another command, and the patients raised their heads, staring forward. At first, he shuffled past the men, stopping occasionally to read the charts. Then he apparently decided the moment called for a few words. He tried several questions, but they all seemed out of place.

---

<sup>73</sup>Ibid., May 25, 1946, 1.

<sup>74</sup>Ibid., January 1, 1946, 2.

<sup>75</sup>Wildes, Typhoon in Tokyo, 84.

<sup>76</sup>Gayn, Japan Diary, 475.



At last he settled on the simple 'Where are you from'. He now walked from man to man, asked his question, and when the patient answered, the Emperor said, "ah, so!"<sup>77</sup>

Because of his standard remark of "ah, so," many people began to call his "As-so San."<sup>78</sup> Once, while visiting a coal mine, a miner walked up and asked the Emperor to shake hands with him, something unheard of prior to the occupation.<sup>79</sup>

But these incidents were not the standard reception accorded the Emperor. The Japanese seem to feel that he had deliberately humiliated himself in order to save his people. During the trip to Takasaki, Mark Gayn reports, "..... pandemonium broke. The mob surged down from the rubble. I have seen mob hysteria before, but never so sudden or so marked."<sup>80</sup> A public opinion poll taken by the Japan Times during December, 1945, and January, 1946, indicated that ninety-two per cent of the people, out of over two thousand polled, backed the Emperor and what he was doing during the occupation.<sup>81</sup>

Conversely, the Communist Party which persistently attacked the Emperor declined in popularity. In the national elections of April, 1946, all political parties except the Communist strongly supported the Emperor. As a result the Communist won only five seats in the Diet.<sup>82</sup>

The changes in the Imperial Institution which divorced it from the dogmas of militarism, politics, and religion were great break-

---

<sup>77</sup>Ibid., 137-138.

<sup>78</sup>Kazuo Kawai, Japan's American Interlude (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1960), 85.

<sup>79</sup>Ibid., 86.

<sup>80</sup>Gayn, Japan Diary, 140.

<sup>81</sup>Japan Times, January 24, 1946, 1.

<sup>82</sup>Ibid., April 14, 1946, 1.

throughs for democracy in Japan. The Constitution assured that the Emperor would not be involved in post-war politics. No longer could he be used as a facade for dictatorial powers sought by an individual or a group. The strongest organ of the national government was the Diet which was answerable, not to the Emperor, but to the people. The humanization policy fostered the transition from a state religion to a separation of church and state. But the popularity of the Emperor was not diminished and he continued to be a useful vehicle for SCAP imposed democracy.

## CHAPTER IV

### THE EFFECTIVENESS OF OCCUPATION POLICY TOWARD THE EMPEROR AND HIS ROLE IN POST-WAR JAPAN

Policies of the Allied Occupation made democracy a reality in post-war Japan. Never had a country been so politically and socially changed as Japan was during its occupation. Certainly the parliamentary experiment by the Japanese during the 1920's was a good orientation experience for the Japanese, for it gave SCAP and the Japanese officials guide lines to follow. But the Allied decision to retain the Japanese Imperial Institution and to use it as a legitimizer for its policies was possibly the difference between success and failure.

Democracy, of course, could not become a reality unless the people had willed it, no matter how good the occupation policies had been nor how many laws were put in the statute books. While the Emperor had always remained above politics, his dignified acceptance of the surrender and his unfeigned friendliness toward the Americans and his obvious approval of many of the reforms had a profound influence upon the Japanese people. Stripped of his mystical aura, Hirohito appeared as a man determined to bring peace to the world and democracy to his country. While those around him were being tried and convicted as war criminals against the world, he retained his bearing and maintained the affection of his people and won the respect of the Allied officials.

The Emperor adjusted well to his new position as a powerless symbol of state nor did the people seem inclined to reinstate him to his former position.<sup>1</sup>

Many occupation officials asserted that there was no more successful aspect of the occupation than the Emperor policy, and Hirohito's personal views contributed to this success. General MacArthur was quoted as saying, "the Emperor has a more thorough grasp of the democratic concept than almost any Japanese with whom I have talked."<sup>2</sup> Even former Secretary of State, James F. Byrnes, who had voiced reservations toward keeping the Emperor, said, "some of it (the Allied success), I believe, comes from our decision to continue the institution of the Emperor."<sup>3</sup>

The decision to retain the Emperor was one of expediency rather than one based on ideology. One does not find Allied advisors proposing that Japan needed its Imperial Institution to survive. The basic point of contention was that he would be retained to effect a Japanese surrender.

Following surrender, SCAP policies deliberately kept the door open to abolition of the institution if the Japanese people wished it. All policy appeared to break down the social stratification of pre-war Japan, but only to a certain extent. Certainly if the Imperial Family

---

<sup>1</sup>William J. Sebald, With MacArthur in Japan: A Personal History of the Occupation (London: Cresset, 1967), 69; and Robert Fearey, The Occupation of Japan, Second Phase: 1948-1950 (New York: Macmillan Co., 1950), 49.

<sup>2</sup>Courtney Whitney, MacArthur: His Rendezvous With History (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1956), 286.

<sup>3</sup>James F. Byrnes, Speaking Frankly (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1947), 204.

had been eliminated, this would have destroyed the upper class. But the Allies did not wish to revolutionize Japan completely.

Nor was SCAP particularly interested in the well-being of the Tenno. The Emperor could have easily been tried as a war criminal. He was not because SCAP feared a national uprising if he were indicted. Instead, SCAP followed the age old practice of removing the "bad" advisors of the Emperor but kept him to legitimize assumed power.

To assure that this tactic was never used again, the occupation officials helped the Japanese write a new constitution that removed the Emperor from any seat of power and placed the power with the people. Japanese democracy was constructed in the form of a constitutional monarchy that would hopefully assure lasting peace in Japan. The Imperial House Law was changed so that members of the Diet would have control of the affairs of the Imperial Family. The Emperor's role in the religious affairs of Japan was changed so that he was no longer considered sacred. The end of Shintoism was the result of the revamping of the educational system by removing the role of the Imperial Rescript. These changes coupled with the public tours changed his image from a reverent symbol to a man with human strengths and weaknesses.

Certainly his physical appearance was not one of an all powerful god. He was a short man about five feet six inches tall with round shoulders and short legs. His head appeared slightly oversized in relation to his body. He had a pronounced facial tic, and his right shoulder twitched constantly. He appeared to be poorly coordinated for when he walked he threw his right leg a little sideways as if he had no control over it. His face was oval, covered with moles—a

Japanese good luck omen. He had weak eyes which the war had etched with lines and there were hints of gray in his wide mustache.<sup>4</sup>

Both he and the Empress were blatantly middle-class in their appearance, attitudes, and actions. Often the Emperor's clothes looked unkempt and often looked too large for his frame. They were a couple dedicated to tea parties, gardening, and watercolor painting. They dressed conservatively, devoid of any hint of grandeur. Both were so common in bearing that the foreign press corps in Tokyo during the thirties called them "Charlie and Emma."<sup>5</sup> One would never guess them to be one of the richest couples in the world.

Hirohito's great interest was marine biology. He had a small lab built on the palace ground and in the thirties, published a work, Opisthobranchia of the Sagami Bay Region which won respect for him inside the international scientific community.<sup>6</sup>

But if Hirohito did not appear to fit the role of a leader, he served as a useful stabilizer against possible radical change in Japan. Popular sovereignty was inconsistent with the traditions of Japan. Even during the 1920's parliamentary democracy was too unstable to last. Conservatives seem unanimous in agreement that the Emperor must not

---

<sup>4</sup>Mark J. Gayn, Japan Diary, 137; Lester Brooks, Behind Japan's Surrender: The Secret Struggle That Ended an Empire (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1968), 90; and Russell Brimes, MacArthur's Japan (Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott Co., 1948), 83.

<sup>5</sup>Brooks, Behind Japan's Surrender, 89.

<sup>6</sup>Elizabeth Gray Vining, Windows for the Crown Prince (New York: J. B. Lippincott Co., 1952), 129; Sebald, With MacArthur in Japan, 28; and Brooks, Behind Japan's Surrender, 92.

be the symbol of state but its leader as head of state.<sup>7</sup> Leftest campaigned against the retention of the Emperor knowing full-well that if he remained they had little chance to gain power.<sup>8</sup> Though the Emperor had no particular party affiliation, he certainly wanted a party in power that would carry through the Allied reforms. Beyond that point, he seemed to care little for politics. He once expressed his hope to Shidehara that all thirty-six million Japanese would vote in the April, 1946 national elections; but he did not himself register to vote.

All the political parties stood in favor of the Emperor, except of course the Communist. As a result, communist candidates were attacked and beaten.<sup>9</sup> The communist cry to abolish the Emperor became less ardent in the years to come. Still, in 1950, a public opinion poll of the Tokyo metropolitan area found fifty-one per cent of some 790 people favored outlawing the Communist Party.<sup>10</sup>

The new position of the Imperial Family contributed to an acceptance of constitutional monarchy and yet retained their popularity, though significantly different from the pre-war mania. Wherever the

---

<sup>7</sup>John M. Maki, Government and Politics in Japan: The Road to Democracy (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1962), 204; and Theodore McNelly, Contemporary Government of Japan (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1963), 66.

<sup>8</sup>An interview with Kyuichi Takuda, Secretary-general of the Japanese Communist Party. Japan Times, January 1, 1946, 2.

<sup>9</sup>Ibid., March 15, 1946, 3.

<sup>10</sup>Allan B. Cole and Naomichi Nakanishi, eds., Japanese Opinion Polls With Socio-Political Significance, 1946-1957 (The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy Tufts University and the Roper Public Opinion Poll Research Center, Williams College, 1962), II, 288.

Emperor went, unrestrainable public demonstrations resulted. At Waka-yama, the people tore the fenders from his car. At a northern railroad station a rickety overpass collapsed under the weight of thousands who wanted to see him.<sup>11</sup> The strongest support for the Emperor tended to come from farmers, fishermen, the less educated portion of the population, and the older generation. The least enthusiastic support, and in some cases intense opposition, was found among the intellectuals, industrial workers, and the youth. But opposition tended to be based on political ideology rather than personal, that is, against the system but not Hirohito.<sup>12</sup>

Slowly changes in the institution became accepted, even expected. When the Emperor opened the Diet in 1948, it was significant that three once-important restrictions were broken: 1) commoners looked down on him from the gallery; 2) Komakichi Matsuoka, a labor leader, turned his back to the tenno and spoke first; 3) Juchiro Matsumoto, Vice President of the House of Councillors refused to attend the customary audience given the Diet officials after the inaugural ceremony.<sup>13</sup> When the Imperial Family was reduced in size, a survey of the people by the Japan Times found that the people sympathized with the members who had been cast out.<sup>14</sup> In March, 1947, the Japan

---

<sup>11</sup>Brimes, MacArthur's Japan, 91.

<sup>12</sup>Cole and Naomichi, eds., Japanese Opinion Polls, II, 442; and Nobutaka Ike, Japanese Politics (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1957), 48; and Huth H. Smythe and Watanobe Masahara, "Japanese Popular Attitudes Toward the Emperor," Pacific Affairs, XXVI, (December, 1953), 338.

<sup>13</sup>Brimes, MacArthur's Japan, 96.

<sup>14</sup>Japan Times, May 11, 1946, 3.



Times ran an article chastising the court officials for preventing Crown Prince Akihito from walking among the "common people."<sup>15</sup>

Thus, the Japanese people came to accept the new post-war role of the Imperial Institution. As the fraternal figure of the nation family, the Emperor helped Japan recover from the devastating defeat in World War II and the ordeal of the Allied occupation, into a new era of political maturity and economic prosperity.

---

<sup>15</sup>Ibid., March 28, 1947, 3.

## BIBLIOGRAPHY

### Documents

- U. S. Congress. Senate. "Nominations, Hearings, Committee on Foreign Relations. 78th Cong. 2nd. sess. 2 vols. Washington D.C.: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1944.
- U. S. Adjutant-General Office. A Brief Progress Report on the Political Re-orientation of Japan, October 10, 1949-December 31, 1949. Washington D.C.: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1949.
- U. S. Adjutant-General Office. Supreme Commander's for the Allied Powers Instructions to the Japanese Government From September 4, 1945 to March 8, 1952. Washington D.C.: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1952.
- U. S. Department of the Army. Civil Affairs Divison. Education in the New Japan. 2 vols. Tokyo: General Headquarters, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers Civil Information and Education Section, 1948.
- U. S. Department of Army. Civil Affairs Divison. Summation of Non-military Activities in Japan, September, 1947-August, 1948. Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1948.
- U. S. Department of State. The Department of State Bulletin, XIII (July, 1945-December, 1945) Washington D.C.: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1946.
- U. S. Department of State. Executive Agreement Series, 493. Washington D.C.: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1945.
- U. S. Department of State. Far Eastern Series. (December 24, 1944), Hugh Borton, "The Administration and Structure of Japanese Government," 817-833.
- U. S. Department of State. Foreign Relations of the United States, Diplomatic Papers. The Conference of Berlin (The Potsdam Conference), 2 vols. Washington, D.C.: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1960.
- U. S. Department of State. Occupation of Japan: Policy and Progress. Washington, D.C.: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1946.

- United States, Strategic Bombing Survey. Japan's Struggle to End the War. Washington, D.C.: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1946.
- U. S. War Department, Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers. Two Years of Occupation, Social. Washington D.C.: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1948.
- U. S. War Department. General Headquarters, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, SCAP Directives to the Imperial Japanese Government, 1945-1946. 7 vols. Washington D.C.: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1946.
- The Far East, Foreign Relations of the United States Diplomatic Papers, 1945, Vols. VII-IX, Washington D.C.: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1969.
- General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers. Civil Information and Education Section. Education Division. Post-War Developments in Japanese Education, 1945-1952. 2 vols. Tokyo (April, 1952), General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers.
- General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers. Civil Information and Education Section. Mission and Accomplishments of the Occupation in the Civil Information and Education Fields. Tokyo (January, 1950).
- General Staff. Reports of General MacArthur. 4 Vols. Washington D.C.: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1966.
- Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers. Government Section. Political Reorientation of Japan, September, 1945-September, 1948. Washington D.C.: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1950.

#### Books and Articles

- Acheson, Dean. Present At The Creation: My Years in the State Department. New York: W. W. Norton and Co., 1969.
- Bakke, E. Wight. Revolutionary Democracy: Challenge and Testing in Japan. Hamden, Conn.: Archon Books, 1968.
- Bowers, Faubion. "How Japan Won the War," The New York Times Magazine (August 30, 1970), 5-7; 35-39; 42-44.
- Brines, Russell. MacArthur's Japan. Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott Co., 1948.
- Brooks, Lester. Behind Japan's Surrender: The Secret Struggle that Ended an Empire. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1968.

- Burks, Ardath W. The Government of Japan. 2nd edition. New York: Crowell Comparative Government Series, 1961.
- Busch, Noel Fairchild. Fallen Sun, A Report on Japan. New York: D. Appleton Century Co., 1948.
- Butow, Robert J. C. Japan's Decision to Surrender. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1954.
- Byrnes, James F. All in One Lifetime. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1958.
- \_\_\_\_\_. Speaking Frankly. New York: Harper and Brothers, 1947.
- Churchill, Winston S. The Second World War: Triumph and Tragedy. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1953.
- Clifton, Allan Stephen. Time of Fallen Blossoms. New York: Knopf, 1951.
- Cole, Allan B. and Naomichi Nakanishi, eds., Japanese Opinion Polls With Socio-Political Significance, 1946-1957. 3 Vols. The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy: Tufts University and The Roper Public Opinion Poll Research Center, William College, 1962.
- Dennett, Raymond, and Robert Turner, eds. Documents of American Foreign Relations. 23 vols. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1962.
- Dore, R. P. "The Ethics of New Japan," Pacific Affairs, XXV, (June, 1952), 147-159.
- Fearey, Robert A. The Occupation of Japan, Second Phase: 1948-1950. New York: Macmillan Co., 1950.
- Feis, Herbert. Japan Subdued: The Atomic Bomb and the End of the War in the Pacific. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961.
- \_\_\_\_\_. Between War and Peace: The Potsdam Conference. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1960.
- Gayn, Mark J. Japan Diary. New York: W. Sloane Associates, 1948.
- Grew, Joseph C. Turbulent Era: A Diplomatic Record of Forty Years, 1904-1945. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1952.
- Hall, John. "A Monarch for Modern Japan," in R. E. Ward, ed., Political Development in Modern Japan. Princeton: (Princeton University Press, 1968), 11-64.
- Hall, Robert King. Shushin: The Ethics of a Defeated Nation. New York: Bureau of Publications, Teachers College Columbia University, 1949.

- Henderson, Dan Fenno, ed. The Constitution of Japan; Its First Twenty Years, 1947-1967. Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1968.
- Hull, Cordell. The Memoirs of Cordell Hull. 2 vols. New York: The Macmillan Co., 1948.
- Ike, Nobutaka. Japanese Politics. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1957.
- Kase, Toshikazu. Journey to the Missouri. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1950.
- Kato, Kasuo. The Lost War: A Japanese Reporter's Inside Story. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1946.
- Kawai, Kazuo. Japan's American Interlude. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1960.
- \_\_\_\_\_. "Sovereignty and Democracy in the Japanese Constitution," American Political Science Review, XLIX, (September, 1955), 663-672.
- \_\_\_\_\_. "Mokusatsu, Japan's Response to the Potsdam Declaration," The Pacific Historical Review, XIX, (November, 1950), 409-414.
- La Cerda, John. The Conqueror Comes to Tea. New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1946.
- Leahy, William D. I Was There: The Personal Story of the Chief of Staff to Presidents Roosevelt and Truman Based on His Notes and Diaries Made at the Time. New York: Whittlesey House, 1950.
- Leighton, Alexander H. Human Relations in a Changing World: Observations on the Use of the Social Sciences. New York: E. P. Dutton & Co., Inc., 1949.
- MacArthur, Douglas. Reminiscences. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1964.
- Maki, John M. Court and Constitution in Japan: Selected Supreme Court Decisions, 1948-1960. Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1964.
- \_\_\_\_\_. Government and Politics in Japan: The Road to Democracy. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1962.
- Martin, Edwin M. The Allied Occupation of Japan. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1948.
- McNelly, Theodore. Contemporary Government of Japan. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1963.
- \_\_\_\_\_. "Political Reform in Japan: A SCAP Report," Far Eastern Survey, XXI, (September 13, 1950), 161-164.

- Millis, Walter, ed. The Forrestal Diaries. New York: The Viking Press, 1951.
- Mosley, Leonard D. Hirohito, Emperor of Japan. Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1966.
- Sansom, G. B. "The Political Orientation of Japan," Pacific Affairs, XXIV (September, 1951), 306-312.
- Sebald, William J. With MacArthur in Japan: A Personal History of the Occupation. London: Cresset, 1967.
- Shigemitsu, Mamoru. Japan and Her Destiny, My Struggle for Peace. New York: E. P. Dutton & Co., Inc., 1958.
- Smythe, Hugh H. and Watanabe Masahara. "Japanese Popular Attitudes Toward the Emperor," Pacific Affairs, XXVI (December, 1953), 335-344.
- Stimson, Henry L. and McGeorge Bundy. On Active Service in Peace and War. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1948.
- Suda, Ryusuke. "Role of the Emperor in Post-War Japan," in Naosaku Uchida and Rotaro Ikeda, eds., Social and Economic Aspects of Japan, 1917-1967. Tokyo: Economics Institute of Seijo University, 1967.
- Togo, Shigenori.. The Cause of Japan. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1956.
- Truman, Harry S. Memoirs: Year of Decisions, Vol. I. Garden City: Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1955.
- \_\_\_\_\_. Memoirs: Years of Hope and Trial, Vol II. Garden City: Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1956.
- Vining, Elizabeth Gray. Windows for the Crown Prince. New York: J. B. Lippincott Co., 1952.
- Van Aduard, Lewe, and Evert Joost. Japan, From Surrender to Peace. New York: Praeger, 1954.
- Von Mehren, Arthur T., ed. Law in Japan: The Legal Order in A Changing Society. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1963.
- Ward, R. E. "Origins of the Present Japanese Constitution," American Political Science, (December, 1956), 980-1010.
- Whitney, Courtney. MacArthur: His Rendezvous with History. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1956.
- Wildes, Harry E. Typhoon in Tokyo: The Occupation and Its Aftermath. New York: Macmillan Co., 1954.

Yoshida, Shigeru. The Yoshida Memories: The Story of Japan in Crisis.  
Kenichi Yoshida, trans. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1962.

Zacharias, Ellis M. Secret Missions: The Story of an Intelligence Officer. New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1946.

#### Newspapers

Japan Times.

New York Times.

VITA

Glen Romaine Roberson

Candidate for the Degree of

Master of Arts

Thesis: THE JAPANESE IMPERIAL INSTITUTION AND THE ALLIED  
OCCUPATION OF JAPAN

Major Field: History

Biographical:

Personal Data: Born in Amarillo, Texas, August 28, 1946, the  
son of Mr. and Mrs. Forrest Roberson.

Education: Attended primary and secondary schools in Hartley  
and Dalhart, Texas; graduated from Dalhart High School  
in 1964; received a Bachelor of Arts degree from North-  
western State College in 1968 with a major in history  
and sociology.

Professional Experience: Graduate Assistant in the Department  
of History at Oklahoma State University; member of  
Phi Alpha Theta honor fraternity.