ARTEMAS WARD AND THE POLITICS OF THE NEW NATION

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PREFACE

The politics of the young republic were marked by the fear of an all powerful government on the one hand, and by anxieties that government might have insufficient power on the other. This ambivalence not only divided Congress but created inner tensions within the members themselves as to how to achieve a proper balance. The national political career of Artemas Ward provides a particularly illuminating example of that tension.

After a long career in provincial politics, Ward moved into the national political circle at a time when greater powers for the Congress were deemed by many as essential to the further prosecution of the Revolution. An ardent patriot, Ward was also fiercely devoted to the preservation of a social order in Massachusetts which he believed would be destroyed by either over-centralization or public licentiousness. The resolution of the conflict between these two extremes in the political career of Artemas Ward elucidates one important facet of the politics of the new nation.

I owe a special debt of gratitude to my advisor, Professor H. James Henderson, who generously gave of his time and knowledge to help me in every stage of research and writing of this thesis. His patience, encouragement, and criticism, helped me through many difficult portions of the work. Professor Theodore Agnew also offered valuable criticism of the chapters and helped me to articulate my thoughts. Professors

Henderson and Agnew necessarily share in whatever value this thesis may have but the responsibility for factual error or misinterpretation is my own.

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INTRODUCTION

"I knew General Ward well," wrote Timothy Dwight and "had a very fair opportunity to learn his character." He then went on to describe Ward as one "possessed of an excellent understanding, directed chiefly to the practical aspects of mankind, as being, frank...undisguised... of few words...inflexible integrity...unwarping public spirit and a fixed adherence to what he thought right. His reverence for the Christian religion was entire, and his life adorned its precepts."[1] This was an accurate assessment of the General's character, for he was never one to "shift about like a weathercock with every breath of wind,"[2] and though he encouraged his sons to better their positions in the world it was never to be at the expense of their "politics and religion."[3] Indeed Ward's deep religious conviction and determination to do what was right were the crucial ingredients of his political philosophy. Just six months before the death of General Ward his good

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[1]Timothy Dwight, Travels in New England and New York, eds., Barbara M. Solomon and Patricia M. King (Cambridge, 1969), I, 269.

[2]Ward to Henry Dana Ward, March 3, 1795. Frederick L. Allis Jr. and Bruce R. Pruitt, eds., The Artemas Ward Papers (6 vols. microfilm; Boston, 1967). Reel 5, Unbound correspondence, frame 126. Hereinafter cited as Papers. The Papers of Artemas Ward are sometimes undated or unaddressed, and therefore, my citations will include the number of the reel, the volume number and the frame number of the papers used. The designation will be R _, V _, f.(s) _.

[3]Ward to Henry Dana Ward, February 25, 1795, ibid., f. 123.

friend Enoch Huntington, of Middlesex, while lamenting the passing of their generation, referred to Ward as "one of the most experienced, aged and wise, faithful and long tried friends of our religion and country."[4] The assessments of Dwight and Huntington are generally accepted. For while historians have criticized Ward's generalship, none have found reason to attack his character.[5] The few biographies that deal with Ward are weak. The reasons for these weaknesses are three-fold. Foremost, the papers of Artemas Ward were very widely dispersed until they were collected and published in a microfilm edition by the Massachusetts Historical Society in 1967. In addition, biographers have chosen to pose Ward essentially as a military figure to the neglect of his congressional career, and, finally, they have been preoccupied with rescuing Ward's military reputation. This preoccupation, however, is quite understandable because descriptions of Ward's military career have been sometimes vindictive and often inaccurate. One historian described Ward as a "mild village deacon sort of man... too fat to mount a horse,"[6] while another erroneously claimed that "Ward had never had any battle experience whatever."[7] Richard Alden in The American Revolution, 1775-1783 states that it was clearly

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[4]Enoch Huntington to Ward, April 4, 1800, Papers R 3, V 6, fs. 398-399.

[5]William V. Wells, Life and Public Services of Samuel Adams, (Boston, 1888), p. 307: "The Army of New England, however, was suffering for want of a competent leader. Ward, who was commander-in-chief was manifestly unfitted for the position, and yet the removal of a man whose blameless character was universally admitted was a matter of no little delicacy."

[6]William E. Woodward, George Washington: The Image and the Man, (New York, 1926), p. 259.

[7]Francis R. Bellamy, The Private Life of George Washington, (New York, 1951), p. 191.

"evident, however, that Ward's abilities were hardly equal to the duties of that [commander-in-chief] office."[8]

Charles Martyn's The Life of Artemas Ward: First Commander-in-Chief of the American Revolution is the one full-length biography of Artemas Ward. This book, though better than anything written about Ward before or since its appearance in 1921, suffers from oversimplification. Martyn's attention to features of Ward's career other than military is the greatest strength of his work. Percy H. Epler's Masterminds at the Commonwealth's Heart traces Ward's chief military activities with special attention directed toward his command at Cambridge, the siege of Boston, and the Dorchester Heights campaign. Epler's effort also suffers from its narrow scope and a preoccupation with rescuing Ward's military reputation.

Andrew H. Ward treats Ward mainly as a military figure in The History of the Town of Shrewsbury from its settlement in 1717 to 1829, but the book is nonetheless extremely useful to those interested in the Ward family history and the General's involvement in the affairs of Shrewsbury and Worcester. Ward had a distinguished judicial career in Massachusetts. William T. Davis's compendium History of the Judiciary of Massachusetts Including the Plymouth and Massachusetts Colonies, the Province of the Massachusetts Bay and the Commonwealth is valuable as a source for early Massachusetts court structure and procedure.

Artemas Ward, an important military commander of the American Revolution, also deserves attention as a political figure. The sim-

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[8]Richard Alden, The American Revolution, 1775-1783 (New York, 1954), p. 30.

plicity of his political philosophy applied to sometimes complex political situations is useful in illuminating the ways abstract political thought was applied in practice. Chapter II of this thesis, titled "Artemas Ward 1727-1777," is a brief biographical sketch of Ward's early life and military career up through November 1777, when Ward retired from active military life. The chapter is included to explain the General's somewhat parochial views, his attachment to things New England, and his incessant striving to preserve the Massachusetts puritan-republican social order. Every attempt has been made to avoid unnecessary repetition, though I have drawn rather heavily on the first chapters of Martyn's book. The rest of the paper is then concerned with Ward's political career in the Continental and Federal Congresses.

CHAPTER II

ARTEMAS WARD 1727-1777

Rising from a sick bed on a brisk April morning in 1775, the portly Colonel Artemas Ward traveled on horseback from Shrewsbury to Cambridge to assume command of forces raised by the Second Massachusetts Provincial Congress. Ward left Shrewsbury at dawn on April 20 and by hard riding reached Cambridge the same day, took charge of assembled forces, and became first commander-in-chief of the American Revolution. On May 19 Colonel Ward was officially commissioned by the Massachusetts Congress as a major general "for the defence of this and the other Colonies."[1] That Ward should have obtained this position was not surprising, for his family was prominent in Massachusetts, and Artemas Ward had played an important role in both civil and military affairs of the province for many years. His great-grandfather was a prominent member of the group that settled both Sudbury and Marl-

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[1]Andrew H. Ward, History of the Town of Shrewsbury, Massachusetts, from its settlement in 1717 to 1829 (Boston, 1847), p. 496. Dumas Malone, ed., Dictionary of American Biography (New York, 1936), XIX, pp. 415-416.

borough.[2] And more recently his father, Nahum Ward, had participated in the establishment of Shrewsbury. As an original settler in Shrewsbury Nahum received an initial grant of 58-1/2 acres which he constantly worked to enlarge.[3] He served as Shrewsbury's first moderator and selectman, attained the rank of colonel in the militia, was the first representative of the town to the General Court, and one of the founders of the church in Shrewsbury.

Shrewsbury, Massachusetts, the birthplace and life-long residence of General Ward, lay east of and adjacent to Worcester. It was a relatively new town, founded in the second decade of the eighteenth century when a group of thirty men led by John Brigham petitioned the General Court of Massachusetts for a charter. The settlement of Shrewsbury generally followed the pattern used in the establishment of

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[2] Sumner C. Powell, Puritan Village: The Formation of a New England Town (Middletown, 1963), pp. 84, 98, 108, 110-111, 123, 134 and 170. Ward, History of the Town of Shrewsbury, p. 457. William Ward, the great grandfather of Artemas Ward, was one of the founders of Sudbury in 1639. He was tenth in the economic hierarchy of the town which was set by the General Court and regarded as final. It is not known how much land William Ward possessed in England, but he received 45 acres in Sudbury and 130 acres in West Sudbury in 1658. He served a total of twenty-one years in public office. He was also a founder of Marlborough and though the amount of his land in that town is also unknown it is known that he was one of the largest land owners. Little is known about Artemas's grandfather, also named William, except that he was born in Marlborough and died there in 1697.

[3] Ward, History of the Town of Shrewsbury, pp. 12-15. On October 23, 1717 the Laying Out Committee of the General Court authorized a grant for the town initially divided into forty-two lots with an average size of approximately 65 acres. The largest lot was 70 acres and the smallest 51-1/2 acres. House Lot Number Eight was granted to Nehum Ward on December 30, 1718.

earlier towns such as Sudbury, Marlborough, or Dedham.[4] It was there, in Shrewsbury, that Artemas Ward was born on November 27, 1727, the fifth of six children of Nahum and Martha Ward.[5]

Nahum Ward became one of the wealthiest and politically most influential men in Worcester County.[6] (See Table I) Thus Artemas spent his childhood among the comfortable surroundings of a prosperous New England farm. Little beyond conjecture may be said about Ward's early childhood, but several things suggest that he was a serious boy by both inclination and training. His parents were faithful members of the church in Shrewsbury, and his education was supplemented by Job Cushing, the town's minister.[7]

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[4]Ward, History of the Town of Shrewsbury, p. 10. The conditions set for the settlement of Shrewsbury were much like those for Sudbury, Marlborough, or Dedham. The establishment of civil government in Shrewsbury was left to selectmen chosen by the people, while new citizens were subject to the approval of the Laying Out Committee. The Shrewsbury grant stipulated that every person who received a lot was to pay £3,12,0 before June 1, 1725 and that every person distinguished as a farmer "settle at least one family upon each of their farms respectively, lying within said town, distinct from the settlement on the new lot granted them, or else shall forfeit to the Country the lots granted them." From this it appears that Nahum Ward was already farming land in the vicinity of Shrewsbury before the town was founded. However, how much land he had cannot be determined.

[5]Martyn, Life of Artemas Ward, p. 3.

[6]Jackson Turner Main, The Social Structure of Revolutionary America (Princeton, 1965), pp. 22-23. Main indicated that a small group of large property owners dominated society in Worcester County. This elite constituted about ten per cent of the population who possessed estates worth over £1000.

[7]Ward, History of the Town of Shrewsbury, pp. 458-459. Nahum Ward was a founder of the church in Shrewsbury to which his wife was added in 1727. Papers, R 1, V 1, fs. 12, 42. At a town meeting in June 1729 fifteen pounds were set aside for building a school house. This money was set at a rate and collected. In November an additional twenty pounds was levied to pay a school master. By April 1732 five pounds nineteen shillings were set aside to pay Elias Keys to "conclude his pay for building of the school house in Shrewsbury."

TABLE I*

LAND OWNED BY WARD FAMILY

	DATE	ACRES PURCHASED	PRICE[a]	INCREMENT	ACREAGE-INCREMENT
	1718	58.25[b]	£ 3,		58.25
	1721	18.75		———,[c]	77.00
	1723	14.00		———,[d]	93.00
	1728	50.00		———,[d]	143.00
	1730	23.00	21,	24 [d]	166.00
	1731	300.00	18,	30 [d]	466.00
	?	5.00		———,[d]	471.00[e]
	1737	11.00[f]	20,	50	482.00
Feb	1740	23.25[g]	14,	64	505.25
Feb	1740	———	51,	115	505.25[g]
Jun	1740	350.00[h]	100,	215	855.25
Mar	1741	78.00	800,	1015	933.25
	?	12.00[i]	22,	1037	945.25[i]
Apr	1741	2.00	51,	1088	947.25
Jul	1741	152.00	625,	1713	1099.25
Jan	1742	37.00	200,	1913	1136.25
Mar	1742	50.00	——[j]	———	1186.25

*This tabulation is not exhaustive because some receipts are unreadable and no assurance exists that all receipts survived.

[a]Price is to the nearest Pound.

[b]This represents the initial tract of land owned by Ward when he came to Shrewsbury.

[c]Sold by William Ward to Nahum Ward, purchase price unknown.

[d]This represents Common Lands granted from time to time by the Proprietors of Shrewsbury. On December 14, 1730 Nahum Ward paid the Proprietors twenty-one Pounds for the lands granted to him.

[e]Prior to this increment Nahum Ward purchased the farm of Robert Allen; however, the acreage is unknown.

[f]This is an estimation based on the size of the original Lot #2, Shrewsbury, which was 70 acres.

[g]The acres purchased here unknown.

[h]This acreage included a house and barn.

[i]In this purchase thirty-eight Pounds was spent for a purchase of unknown size.

[j]Price of this acreage unknown.

Daily Bible reading and prayer were almost certainly an integral part of the daily routine of the Ward family, for "domestic instruction and worship was considered indispensable to the success of the weekly services in church, for religion was too important...to be left to weekly lessons."[8] While at college Ward was among the president's volunteers to discourage cursing, an offense he later never failed to punish as justice of the peace, and his name never appeared on the school's disciplinary list. Moreover, his religious exercise book and the numerous biblical references throughout his correspondence imply an early acquaintance with the scriptures.

At sixteen he entered the freshman class at Harvard, where he was placed seventh in rank of his class, another indication of the prominence of his family in the economic and social hierarchy of the province. At a time when it was not unusual for young men to grow weary of study and long separations from home, Artemas remained dedicated to his studies. He continued at Harvard until he took both the A.B. and M.A. degrees and left with a distinguished academic record. After graduation he was a schoolmaster at Groton, where he met and married Sarah Trowbridge. Preceding their marriage he returned to Shrewsbury and opened a general store in the back of a house his father had purchased in 1750. His business flourished because he handled a wide variety of merchandise and sold on terms of cash or barter.[9]

The following year Ward received his first civic appointment as tax assessor. Additional appointments as justice of the peace, town

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[8]Edmund S. Morgan. The Puritan Family: Religion and Domestic Relations in Seventeenth-Century New England (New York, 1944), p. 139.

[9]Martyn, Life of Artemas Ward, pp. 7-11.

clerk, and selectman followed in quick succession. The business of managing and operating his store, his many civic duties, and the development of his Shrewsbury farm made Artemas Ward an exceedingly busy man. The death of his father in 1754 brought an additional thirty-two acres to his estate which he continually developed throughout his life.[10] Before he reached the age of thirty Artemas Ward had become one of the most respected men in Shrewsbury.

Nor were his abilities unrecognized by provincial authorities, for less than a year after the death of his father Artemas Ward was commissioned major of the Third Regiment of Militia in Middlesex and Worcester and captain of a company in his home town. Five months before his thirtieth birthday he was elected to his first term as representative to the General Court from Shrewsbury. During his first term as representative his assignments were confined to committees to consider petitions of soldiers who were fighting in the French and Indian War, but this was helpful experience for one destined to play many important military roles.

As the conflict of the Seven Years War grew in intensity Ward became a recruiter of troops to be raised for Colonel William Williams's regiment which was scheduled to join General Abercrombie's forces at Fort Edwards for an attack on Ticonderoga. Ward was not only an active recruiter but a willing soldier, and he joined Colonel Williams's regiment as a major. It was in Abercrombie's assault against

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[10]Will of Nahum Ward, Papers, Rl, Vl, fs. 211-212. Artemas Ward received a small share of his father's estate compared to his brothers and sisters. This was probably because Nahum Ward had given Artemas a house and lot in 1753 and because Artemas had become a man of considerable means before the death of his father.

Ticonderoga that Ward distinguished himself as a brave resourceful, and competent commander. On July 5, 1758, after weeks of difficult, sometimes forced marching, Colonel Williams's Regiment converged with General Howe's forces ready to engage the enemy. Three days later, after frantic work on breastworks just three quarters of a mile from the French encampment, the battle began. Fighting from early in the morning and into the night, 2,000 British regulars fell, and Abercrombie ordered a retreat.[11] Ward's diary entry for that day states that after an attempt to build a forward breastwork we "shamefully retreated."[12]

The Ticonderoga campaign was full of deprivation, disease, and scalping (Ward recorded in his diary for August 9 that two men were brought in scalped but alive).[13] His outstanding military performance during the campaign brought him a promotion from major to lieutenant colonel and prepared him for an important military position in the American Revolution.

Ward returned a hero and was shortly promoted to full colonel. He returned quietly to his legislative duties and the work of his farm, little disturbed about the revenue acts passed by Parliament after the end of the war.[14] Indeed Ward, who became Samuel Adams's warmest rural supporter, was little bothered by the Sugar Act. Not until the

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[11]Percy H. Epler, Masterminds at the Commonwealth's Heart (Worcester, 1909), pp. 12-14. Ward, History of the Town of Shrewsbury, pp. 490-491. Martyn, Life of Artemas Ward, pp. 13-15.

[12]Ward's Ticonderoga Diary, Papers, R1, V2, f. 6.

[13]Ibid., f. 7.

[14]John C. Miller, Sam Adams Pioneer in Propaganda (Boston, 1936), p. 46. Martyn, Life of Artemas Ward, p. 33.

following year with the passage of the Stamp Act, did Ward become Adams's spokesman in rural areas of Massachusetts, where his voice carried more weight than Adams's. He became so obnoxious to Governor Francis Bernard that the Governor finally revoked his commission in the militia and twice vetoed his election to the General Court. Tradition has it that when the courier delivered the Governor's letter that Colonel Ward retorted:

> Give my compliments to the Governor and say to him that I consider myself twice honored, but more in being superseded than in being commissioned, and that I thank him for this, since the motive that dictated it is evidence that I am what he is not, a friend to my country.[15]

Never verbose, Ward was not a pamphleteer but gave Adams his full support in the General Assembly and was among the ninety-two who refused to vote to rescind Adams' Circular Letter in 1768. Ward was an important figure in shaping opinion in rural Massachusetts. He was so effective that Shrewsbury was one of the few towns to accept the Boston Circular verbatim.[16]

British officials attempted to enforce royal policies while men like Samuel Adams and John Hancock took advantage of every real and imagined grievance to increase the resistance. The lid blew when British regulars were sent to Concord on April 19, 1775 to destroy a munitions store and to arrest Adams and Hancock. The overwhelming resistance at Concord made the British beat a rapid retreat to Boston. If the British were hurried the Americans were frantic. War had come

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[15] Epler, Masterminds at the Commonwealth's Heart, p. 12. Ward, History of the Town of Shrewsbury, p. 493.

[16] Richard D. Brown, "Massachusetts Towns Reply to the Boston Committee of Correspondence, 1773," William and Mary Quarterly, XXV (1968), pp. 22-39.

but there was no army. The Massachusetts legislature, meeting extra-legally as the Second Provincial Congress, appointed Artemas Ward as commander-in-chief of its forces. The following day Ward was at his headquarters in Cambridge.[17]

Until Washington arrived on July 2nd, it was Ward who directed the organization, build-up, and movement of American forces against the British. The great mass of raw recruits that hurried to Boston after events at Lexington must have shocked General Ward. No stranger to military matters, General Ward accepted this gigantic task with some reluctance.[18] Organization of the Cambridge forces would have been a formidable task under the most favorable conditions, but Ward's unhappy position was to effect organization under duress of desertion, disease, and utter lack of discipline.[19]

Much of the political Artemas Ward was evident as he tried to give order and direction to the forces at Cambridge. Like Samuel Adams, the Revolution and republicanism meant more to Ward than simply the "elimination of a king." It involved a "moral dimension, a utopian depth," that "involved the very character of their society."[20] To Ward, no less than to Adams, the Revolution was to create a "Christian

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[17]General Ward's Order Book, Papers, R. 4, P II, f. 1. General Ward arrived at Cambridge on April 20 and called the first council of war. Don Higginbotham, The War of American Independence Military Attitudes, Policies, and Practice, 1763-1789 (New York, 1971), p. 47.

[18]Bruce Lancaster, From Lexington to Liberty (New York, 1955), p. 119.

[19]General Ward's Order Book, Papers, R. 4, P. II, f. 60-75. Ward's Order Book indicates that his major problems at Cambridge were smallpox and lack of discipline.

[20]Wood, The Creation of the American Republic 1776-1783 (Chapel Hill, 1969), p. 51.

Sparta."[21] This view of the Revolution and the society to be created by it greatly affected Ward's political thought. In some degree it accounted for the harshness of his orders at Cambridge, partly it disclosed his parochialism and it neatly fitted his conception of the perfect puritan republic. In great measure it explained his preoccupation with things "New England," for they were Spartan attributes. Corrupt morals, money-getting and public licentiousness had no place.[22]

Many of Ward's daily orders at Cambridge were the result of the unusual exigencies of the situation. Many were, however, anomalous and clearly elucidated the effect his religion and morals had on his thought. In fact, Ward's initial predilection for leniency may have been due more to the nature of his authority than his personal inclination, for he was given appreciably less power than Washington was later given. The Massachusetts committee of safety, responsible to the Provincial Congress, sat continuously at Cambridge. And it was not unknown for the Congress to revoke his orders.[23] Little by little a system of organization was implemented so that just twenty-three days after his arrival it was possible for General Ward to obtain complete

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[21] Ibid., p. 421.

[22] Undated, unsigned letter by Ward, Papers, R 4, P III, f. 329; Ward to Thomas Walter Ward, April 30, 1781, R 3, V 5, fs. 53, 54; unfinished draft letter December 14, 1780, R 4, P III, fs. 327,328.

[23] Higginbotham, The War of American Independence, p. 65. John Avery to Artemas Ward, July 4, 1776, Papers, Reel 4, Part II, 305; "The Board was this day informed that you had given Liberty to a number of Continental Troops now stationed at Winter Hill to receive the small pox by inoculation--The Board are unwilling to credit such a report--as there is an act of this colony prohibiting inoculation except in the town of Boston--they therefore request if you have given out any such orders that you would immediately recall them."

and detailed personnel rosters from his regimental commanders.[24] Simultaneously Ward directed his attention to desertion. Men who initially responded with enthusiasm quickly became disgruntled with the drab fare of military life. This problem reached such magnitude that he devised a plan in which passes were virtually eliminated.[25]

The chaotic conditions that existed during the first days after General Ward's arrival at Cambridge created a serious danger to the health of the troops. The frequent use of fatigue details greatly improved conditions but were too late to prevent the outbreak of small pox. This was a problem that threatened not only the immediate well-being of thousands of soldiers but one that could undermine the entire war effort. Confronted by such an appalling threat, Ward quickly isolated the infected group and moved to secure means of inoculation should it become necessary. To further insure that the camp remain clean he ordered rigid daily inspections and provided stiff penalties for those officers inclined toward leniency in inspections.[26]

Yet many of his orders were perhaps too severe, some were without precedent, and others stemmed more from his personal moral code than from the exigencies of the war. On June 3 Ward ordered that each regimental commander insure that his men attend their prayers morning and night and attend church services on Sunday. Later that same month, he

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[24]General Order of June 3, 1775, Papers, R 4, P II, f. 71.

[25]General Order of May 3, 1775, ibid., f. 67; "That no field officer presume to give a pass to any person to go out of camp before that person shall have presented to that field officer a person not belonging to the camp and out of the same town, to which the person who makes the application belongs, who is to tarry in camp, till the person that has leave returns."

[26]General Order of May 31, 1775, Papers, R 4, P II, f. 70.

announced that no swearing, or cursing, nor any indecent language or behavior, would be tolerated. He further admonished all persons to help keep lewd women from the camp.[27] These orders were not absolutely essential to the successful prosecution of the war, but Ward felt that they were. A "general corruption of morals" would bring certain "destruction," that "as long as the people...are in pursuit of vanity, we have no reason to expect anything" but that "the hand of the Lord will be stretched out against us."[28]

Nevertheless, the work achieved by General Ward before the arrival of Washington in organization of the army was vital to any effective combat effort. The effectiveness of his work at Cambridge was reflected at Bunker's Hill on June 17, 1775. At eleven in the morning in answer to Colonel Prescott's request Ward had sent Colonels Stark's and Reed's regiments as reinforcements and at one o'clock ordered the remainder of his forces to Bunker's Hill. The battle began at three o'clock and was finished before five but was savagely fought and constituted a moral victory for American forces. Ward had done so much with what he had that on June 20 Connecticut was encouraged to place its forces under his command and urged the other colonies to do likewise. However, on June 15, 1775 the Continental Congress appointed George Washington commander-in-chief of continental forces, and on July 22 Ward was appointed first major general and second in command. Washington arrived to take charge of the nearly 17,000 troops assembled at Cambridge on July 3. An army chaplain present in the camp when Washington arrived

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[27]General Orders of June 3 and June 30, 1775, ibid.; fs. 70, 71, 74.

[28]Undated, unsigned letter, ibid., P III, f. 329.

commented:

> There is great overturning in the camp, as to order and regularity. New lords, new laws. The Generals Washington and Lee are upon the lines every day. New orders from his Excellency are read to the respective regiments every morning after prayers.[29]

The worsening condition of General Ward's gallstones had prohibited his daily trooping the line, but he had shown the same energy in the organization of the forces that Washington was displaying in their reorganization. Indeed the careers of the two Generals up to their arrival in Cambridge were remarkably similar. Neither were brilliant but both possessed solid powers of reason, both were rather reserved but apt to win and hold respect, each ardently devoted to duty yet resentful of criticism. Both served as moderates in their respective provincial legislatures, both gained their first military commissions largely as a result of political connections, both served with distinction in the French and Indian war--Washington under Braddock and Ward under Abercrombie--and finally, both had faced the lonely problems of a commander-in-chief.[30] It is ironic that two men with so much in common and so alike in temperament should have allowed their

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[29] Jared Sparks, ed., The Writings of George Washington Being His Correspondence, Addresses, Messages and Other Papers Official and Private (Boston, 1839) III, 491.

[30] John C. Miller, Triumph of Freedom 1775-1783 (Boston, 1948), p. 63. Washington's commission in 1754 came largely as a result of having "the backing of the right people."

personal esteem for each other to deteriorate. And yet, they did.[31]

After the arrival of Washington, Ward took charge of the right wing at Dorchester Heights. It was in driving the British from Boston that Ward's generalship was most apparent, for it was his forces and his battle plan that forced the regulars from that city in March 1776. It was at this point that the relations between Ward and Washington began to worsen. Late in April Washington expressed concern that "I learn from every hand, that your works for the defense of Boston go exceeding slow," and ordered that "no time...be lost in putting the town in the best posture of defense."[32] Ward replied that he had "given all attention in my power to the works," reported the progress that was being made, and ended his report by stating that he had only half as many teams as the work required.[33] Even prior to this letter Ward had asked to be relieved because gallstones made it impossible for

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[31]John R. Alden, The American Revolution 1775-1783 (New York, 1954), p. 32. Epler, Masterminds at the Commonwealth's Heart, p. 46. Christopher Gore to Thomas Walter Ward, January 22, 1819, Papers, R 3. V 6, fs. 304-305. The jealousy of General Charles Lee supposedly was the main contributing factor to the break between Washington and Ward. Lee described Ward as "more fit to be a churchwarden than a general" and termed him a "chimney-side hero." Christopher Gore stated that General Ward always attended President Washington's Levees but never accepted his dinner invitations. Gore attributed the dispute to a letter written by Washington in the "early part of the Revolutionary War" which contained remarks "injurious to the reputation of General Ward." After Washington retired from public life he wrote Ward expressing "the highest regard for the character of General Ward in all the departments of public duty in which he had acted." However, Ward seems to have never gotten over what he felt was a betrayal. As late as 1792 Ward claimed that his illness should excuse him from participation in the President's birthday celebration.

[32]George Washington to Artemas Ward, April 29, 1776, Papers, R 4, P III, f. 295.

[33]Ward to Washington, undated, ibid., f. 296.

him to execute his duties to his own satisfaction. At the specific request of Washington he retained his command until November, when he was finally relieved.[34]

Ward's experience from boyhood through 1777 formed the major lines of his political thought. His long experience in parochial politics and the ethnocentric attitude he developed for Massachusetts society colored his political thought for the rest of his life. His national political career which began in November 1779 with his appointment to the Continental Congress further illuminated the effect parochial politics had on the direction of the new republic.

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[34]Joseph Priestly to Artemas Ward, April 24, 1776, Edmund C. Burnett, ed., Letters of the Members of the Continental Congress, I, (Washington, 1931), p. 430.

CHAPTER III

THE CONFEDERATION PERIOD

The distaste Artemas Ward developed for life as a congressional delegate was understandable. He did not enjoy life in Philadelphia; the business of Congress, he felt, proceeded too slowly, and finally, he was among a group of early patriots who believed that the Revolution was being undermined by nationalists in Congress.[1] Elected by the Massachusetts General Court on November 18, 1779, he began his congressional career in one of the most critical periods of the war. The continental army was on the verge of collapse for want of adequate supplies, General Washington needed additional enlistments, the inflated economy seemed ready to burst, and even to supply the immediate needs of the government was a perplexing problem.[2] Many in Congress stood ready to subordinate congressional authority to France to relieve the economy

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[1]Ward to Thomas Walter Ward, March 1, 1792, Papers, R 3, V 6, f. 307. Wood, The Creation of the American Republic 1776-1787 (Chapel Hill, 1969), p. 420: "By the late seventies the old patriots, embodied in the Adams-Lee junto saw a 'Design' afoot 'a joynt combination of political and commercial men' centering in New York and the South, which aimed to exclude from power all 'those who took an active part and continued consistent in support of the Liberties of America' in order to 'get the trade, the wealth, the power and the Government of America into their own hands.'"

[2]Martyn, Life of Artemas Ward, p. 253. Edmund C. Burnett, The Continental Congress: A definitive history of the Continental Congress from its inception in 1774 to March, 1789 (New York, 1941), pp. 472-477.

and to supply the army.[3] However, others like Ward and Samuel Adams, were whole-heartedly against any such scheme as this, and viewed it as an alarming betrayal of the Revolution.[4] Yet no one denied the dire state of affairs.

On December 1, 1780 Quartermaster General Timothy Pickering observed to his assistant Charles Pettit that all moneys raised by the states were exhausted to obtain "very partial supplies," and that the continental treasury "has remained empty." The army was unpaid for the year, "promises of continental officers were "held in no esteem," states would not furnish supplies, and finally Pickering raised the question, "Is it imagined that the war can be continued with such insufficient means."[5]

For this sad condition of affairs Pickering blamed Congress in part:

> I can neither act nor cease to act without wounding my feelings and subjecting myself to the charge of neglect of duty or of arbitrary, unreasonable, or illegal conduct. And am I indeed never to expect relief? Is it unlawful for Congress

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[3]Gaillard Hunt, ed., Journals of the Continental Congress 1774-1789, (Washington, 1912), XX, 614. Hereinafter cited as Journals of the Continental Congress. Congress was considering whether to instruct the United States Minister to France to undertake no peace negotiations without the concurrence of the French.

[4]Samuel Adams to James Warren, February 1, 1781, Harry A. Cushing, ed., The Writings of Samuel Adams, (New York, 1968), IV, 242-244: "I have been assured that the court of France would be highly disgusted with any of its ministers if they should improperly interfere in our Councils; and indeed when I consider the jealousy of a Rising Republick, I think nothing would equal the impolicy of their attempting it, but the imprudence of Congress in submitting to it."

[5]Timothy Pickering to Charles Pettit, December 1, 1780, "Letters from the Board of War and Ordnance 1780-1781," Micro-film edition of "Papers of the Continental Congresses 1774-1789," Item #148, Roll 161, (Washington D.C.: 1958), frames 258-260. Hereinafter cited as Letters from the Board of War.

> to point out to the several states the very steps they must take to furnish supplies? Congress have directed me to apply to states for forage but what will it avail? I have already complied in part and shall now fully comply with the direction but only to obey the order of Congress and not in expectation of its producing any good effect.[6]

The frustration Pickering felt was not without justification. In September 1781 the Board of War, in response to a congressional order for the securing of public stores in Pennsylvania and New Jersey, reported only that, "we have it not in our power to move our own paper," and that "when furnished with means," they would be "very ready to obey the directions of Congress."[7] In June 1780 the Board of the Treasury "knew not which way to turn themselves to afford any relief to the daily pressing demands made on them from many quarters."[8]

The multiple difficulties of Congress did not relieve it from responsibility for defense of the southern states, and for building an army for the south. General Horatio Gates was sent to take command of the southern army, and Congress resolved that for his immediate needs he should be authorized to call on the states of Virginia, North and South Carolina and Georgia for supplies.[9] Shortly thereafter, Congress recommended that North Carolina order 4,000 militia to join the army, that Gates be allowed to keep his troop strength at a minimum of 10,000, and that Virginia and North Carolina keep 3,000 troops on

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[6] Timothy Pickering to Charles Pettit, December 1, 1780, Letters from the Board of War, fs. 258-260.

[7] Board of War to President of Congress, September 20, 1781, ibid., f. 255.

[8] Journals of the Continental Congress, XVII, 564.

[9] Martyn, Life of Artemas Ward, p. 255. Journals of the Continental Congress, XVII, 509.

alert "for the shortest possible notice."[10]

At the same time Congress was faced with building an army, it was at a loss as to how to get another army in the position to move. The Board of the Treasury informed Congress on June 26 that it was "utterly out of the power" of the Board to make any provision for Washington's army, "the treasury of the United States at this time being totally exhausted."[11]

The agency of Congress most responsible for prosecution of the war was the Board of War. The task of supplying the army with adequate provisions was assigned to the Board, and many times this involved finding a means of paying for the supplies. Added to this primary function were other major assignments such as paying the army, hearing and judging the merits of sundry kinds of soldiers' petitions, and to some extent even campaign planning.

On June 24, 1780 Ward replaced John Mathews of South Carolina as a member of the Board of War. Ward was particularly suited to the assignment. He knew from first hand experience that inadequate provision could cripple the effectiveness of combat operations, and judging the merits of soldiers' petitions had been his primary task as a member of the General Court of Massachusetts.[12]

Two days later Ward was assigned to a committee of five to collect taxes from the states, which were $45,523,460.72 in arrears.[13] The

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[10] Journals of the Continental Congress, XVII, 533.

[11] Ibid., 563.

[12] Ward to Washington, undated letter, Papers, R 4, P III, f. 296.

[13] Journals of the Continental Congress, XVII, 555, 564.

report of this committee was delivered in Congress two days later, and Congress ordered that warrants be drawn in favor of the United States from New Hampshire to Maryland for their proportions of the "ten millions specially called for by the resolution of May 19 last."[14] The expresses sent with these warrants conveyed great urgency since the funds were "essential to the very existence of the army."[15] This was about all that Congress could do, but it was hardly enough to meet the immediate needs of the war. Two quartermasters believed that the states could easily supply the needs of the army if they would. Nathanael Greene contended that the states were more able to furnish supplies than they had been for three years.[16] Timothy Pickering pointed out that "the states will not themselves furnish necessaries for the army and hold up the terror of their laws to every continental agent who dares to attempt to procure them." However, he felt that the states could, "I say the states will not; for they certainly can if they will procure supplies."[17] The general feeling among many members of Congress was that private gain motivated more people than did concern for the public good.[18]

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[14] Ibid., 437, 438, 575. On May 19, 1780 Congress resolved that the states of Virginia, Maryland, Delaware, Pennsylvania, New York, Connecticut, Rhode Island, Massachusetts Bay and New Hampshire pay $10 million for the express purpose of bringing an army into the field.

[15] Ibid., 576.

[16] Burnett, The Continental Congress, p. 403.

[17] Timothy Pickering to Board of War, December 9, 1780, Letters from the Board of War, f. 249.

[18] Burnett, The Continental Congress, p. 403. Samuel Adams to Benjamin Austin, March 9, 1779, Cushing ed., The Writings of Samuel Adams, IV, 132-137.

To Ward, those who sought private gain did so at the public expense, betrayed republican principles, and represented a real threat to the perfect republic. The foundation of a republic was virtue, with laws that would serve as the "authoritative guardians of virtue."[19] Ward's republican ideology, like Adams's, had no room for those he believed to be aristocratic, pretentious, or dishonest.[20] Ideally, "religion and republicanism would work hand in hand to create frugality, honesty, self-denial, and benevolence among the people.[21] The Revolution was moral as well as political,[22] and Ward continually reiterated the idea that private virtue was necessary for public success.[23]

Because of the depreciation of the currency, because taxes were neither uniformly or punctually paid, and because contracts often allowed exorbitant profits, the Congress devised a plan for requisitioning supplies from the states. This scheme was practical and feasible. Though great bickering broke out among the delegations with regard to the proper amount furnished by each state, it was generally recognized that certain inequities would necessarily occur. The delegations from

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[19]Wood, The Creation of the American Republic, p. 120.

[20]Undated, unsigned draft letter, December 14, 1780, Papers, R 4, PIII, fs. 327-328. In this letter Ward made obvious reference to John Hancock, who was entered in the gubernatorial contest of 1780. To Ward the term "aristocratic" fitted such prominent commercial men as John Hancock and Robert Morris, who did not hesitate to mix public with private business, loved luxury, and whom he suspected of realizing a personal profit at public expense. However, much depended on who was speaking. Two of Ward's closest political associates, Samuel Adams and Benjamin Lincoln, were accused respectively of being an "embezzler and autocrat" and an "aristocrat and leader of monarchy." Van Beck Hall, Politics without Parties Massachusetts, 1780-1791 (Pittsburgh, 1972), p. 84.

[21]Wood, The Creation of the American Republic, pp. 118, 220.

[22]Ibid., pp. 117-118.

[23]Ward to Thomas W. Ward, April 6, 1781, R 3, V 5, fs. 53, 54.

North and South Carolina felt that their quotas were far beyond their states' proportion but also recognized that unless the states cooperated to the fullest extent the war might be lost.[24] Others were not so ready to cooperate. Benjamin Lincoln wrote Ward that, "a zeal for the common cause and an unalterable determination to support it, at every hazard and expense," have led Massachusetts into many advances to the United States "over and above what has been advanced by other states."[25] He suggested that when the "war have ceased and the particular distresses forgotten," it would be the greedy who profited most.[26] Finally, he felt that the state should "not make advances--but on the most explicit regulations of Congress."[27] The design was agreed to on December 14, 1779.[28]

The system was practical but the results were dubious. The states were as reluctant to fill their quotas as they were to pay taxes. A letter to the War Office from a field commander reflected the situation:

> ...we are clearly convinced that unless this [Pennsylvania] and the state of Jersey fully supply their quota of flour much distress will ensue and if no more supplies of this article are sent for the ensuing campaign than those which appear to have been furnished for the last the army cannot possibly be kept together.[29]

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[24]Burnett, The Continental Congress, p. 404.

[25]Benjamin Lincoln to Ward, September 13, 1782, Papers, R 3, V 5, fs. 99-106.

[26]Ibid.

[27]Ibid.

[28]Burnett, The Continental Congress, p. 402.

[29]Board of War to President of Congress, March 31, 1781, Letters from the Board of War, f. 339.

The Board of War was constantly flooded with pleas for money and provisions. The shortage of both was always extreme. In March 1781 a group of officers from a Pennsylvania detachment informed the Board of War that they would not march without at least partial pay. The situation was aggravated when it was discovered that the state had no money to pay them. The Board reported that "$116,328 in the old emission or $28,781 in the new" would enable the detachment to march.[30] Almost simultaneously the commander at Fort Pitt reported that, unless reinforced with provisions, he would be unable to pursue the enemy and be forced to abandon "posts of the first consequence."[31] Against the outcry for specific requisitions from the states Ward retorted, "I am no more fond of calling on the states for specific supplies than you are," since the resolution "took place from necessity and not from choice."[32] He added that although this method was twice as costly it would be practiced until money was furnished.[33]

The efforts of Congress and the Board of War were not without results. On April 6, 1781 Ward wrote his son concerning progress in the war. Generals Sumpter and Pigeon had taken 300 prisoners at a point in Carolina called ninety-sixlocated sixty miles from Camden about 120 miles northwest of Charleston. Nevertheless, he was somewhat apprehensive and believed that the enemy would carry on the war with as much vigor as it had in any summer since the War had begun, "if we can

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[30]Board of War to President of Congress, March 1781, Letters from the Board of War, f. 349.

[31]Daniel Brodhrad to Richard Peters, June 22, 1781, ibid., f. 301.

[32]Unsigned letter, February 8, 1781, Papers, R 3, V 5, fs. 39-40.

[33]Ibid.

judge from present appearances."[34] His attitude toward the war was one of cautious optimism. He hoped that, "the good Lord will prepare this people for what is before them," and felt that if "there was a more general execution to the southward of the Delaware River," and a "more true fear of God," that "we should have more reason to expect the blessing of heaven." However, he did not despair of deliverance," but felt that "we may probably be made to suffer many grievances, hardships and trials to prepare us for such a matter as peace."[35]

Ward's attitude toward the war was a good example of how his religious beliefs affected his political thought. God's blessing was essential to both the successful prosecution of the war and the conclusion of a desirable peace. He compared the Revolution to the wanderings of the Israelites under Moses and believed that only an acknowledgement of God would, in the final analysis, bring a successful conclusion to the conflict.[36] Almost the entire war had gone to the south in 1780-1781, and it was not going well. Samuel Adams admonished his friend Richard Henry Lee to "make every possible effort" to defeat the British, who had arrived in Virginia and were burning "all before them."[37]

Ward believed that the war went badly in the south because of the character of the southern population. He repeatedly cautioned his son

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[34]Ward to Thomas W. Ward, April 6, 1781, ibid., R 3, V 5, fs. 53-54.

[35]Ibid.

[36]Ward to Thomas W. Ward, April 6, 1781, Papers, R 3, V 5, Fs.53-54.

[37]Samuel Adams to Richard Henry Lee, October 31, 1780 and Adams to Samuel Cooper, November 7, 1780. Cushing, The Writings of Samuel Adams, IV, 215-216, 217-218.

Henry Dana Ward not to imbibe the traits of South Carolinians.[38] It was typical of him to view the efforts of Massachusetts as paramount and the exertions of the southern states as meagre by comparison. On August 23, 1780 his second cousin and one-time aide-de-camp Joseph Ward wrote:

> I am sorry to learn the southern states have not exerted themselves in raising their quota of men for the campaign agreeable to the requisition of Congress....If all the states tax as severely as this [Massachusetts] has done, the money must rise soon; but should they be as dilatory as they have been in other matters, the consequence might be fatal to our finances.[39]

This was illustrative of General Ward's own views. The South was despicable because somehow they could never make a contribution equal to that of Massachusetts. They were not, in a word, filled with the spirit of New England politics or religion, and that was their undoing.

The failure of the states to carry out their responsibilities perhaps accounted for Ward's support of a five per cent tax on imports to be levied by Congress.[40] Indeed, this was one of the few issues on which Ward disagreed with the New England bloc in Congress. Always apprehensive of an over-concentration of power, he was only too aware of the great need for a dependable and regular source of revenue. However, he was not ready to go the whole length by granting Congress the power to regulate interstate commerce or by investing extensive powers in a superintendent of finance. On the latter issue Ward proved particularly stubborn. On the motion that Congress not require

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[38] Ward's son practiced law in Orange County, South Carolina.

[39] Joseph Ward to Artemas Ward, August 23, 1780, "Joseph Ward Collection," (Chicago: Chicago Historical Society), folder no. 12.

[40] Journals of the Continental Congress, XIX, 111.

Morris to dissolve commercial ties made prior to his acceptance of the superintendency Ward was opposed; on the resolution empowering the superintendent to hire and dismiss assistants, he was also opposed.[41] Finally, when Congress voted unanimously for Morris, Ward and his colleague, Samuel Adams, abstained from voting.[42]

Though Ward and Adams were the only members of Congress not to agree to the appointment of Morris, they were not alone in holding reservations about his appointment. In July 1780 Thomas McKean of Delaware wrote Adams that:

> There are some amongst us, who are so fond of having a great and powerful man to look up to, that tho' they may not like the name of king, seem anxious to confer kingly powers, under the titles of Dictator, Superintendent of Finance, or some such, but the majority do not yet appear to be so disposed.[43]

The Whig opposition to Morris's appointment stemmed in large part from a general fear of "aspiring men," and a reluctance to see those men gain from the public distress. It was upon these principles that Ward opposed Morris. Then, too, the schemes of Morris promised a closer union of the several states in "one general money connection,"[44] which was in direct opposition to Ward's republicanism. The Revolution was to effect a confederation of sovereign states, in most respects, and not a union governed by a commercial aristocracy. Ward was among those New Englanders who by the early 1780's saw themselves "as the last

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[41]Ibid., 289, 338.

[42]Joseph Jones to George Washington, February 21, 1781, Burnett, ed., Letters of the Members of the Continental Congress, V, 577-580.

[43]Quoted in Burnett, The Continental Congress, p. 514.

[44]Merrill Jensen, The New Nation A History of the United States During the Confederation 1781-1789 (New York, 1950), p. 62.

bastion of devout republicanism."[45] Samuel Adams boasted to his wife that "I have not raised a fortune in the service of my country," while Ward rejected a third appointment to Congress because ill health and family circumstances prevented his full attention to the work of Congress.[46]

The office of superintendent of finance was one that promised to concentrate power, and Ward believed the appointment of a commercial man such as Morris would assure it. Those who opposed Morris saw in him the "spearhead of a movement to overthrow the federal government and to establish a dictatorship."[47] Whatever good Morris might do for the finances of the country were overshadowed, the opposition felt, because it did not stem from "disinterested patriotism."[48] Ward proved adamant in opposition to every measure to increase the powers of the superintendent of finance. He was opposed to a motion of Congress to make bills of credit emitted by Congress legal tender and stood ardently against Morris's bank.[49] What was needed, according to Ward, was a greater coordination of the common cause--local and private interests

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[45]Wood, The Creation of the American Republic 1776-1787, p. 421. Commercial men such as John Hancock and Robert Morris were suspected of making profits from the war while the people suffered deprivation. Hence it was easy for Ward to view himself as a champion of the common people.

[46]Samuel Adams to Mrs. Adams, November 24, 1780, Cushing, ed., The Writings of Samuel Adams, IV, 225-227. Ward to Samuel Adams, November 5, 1781, Papers, R 3, V 5, f. 74.

[47]Jensen, The New Nation, p. 57.

[48]Ibid., E. James Ferguson, The Power of the Purse A History of American Public Finance, 1776-1790, (Durham, 1961), p. 139.

[49]Journals of the Continental Congress, XIX, 332 and XX, 547.

should submerge themselves by common consent based upon an informed citizenry and not upon enlarged powers for Congress.[50]

The "Christian Sparta," to use Samuel Adams's revealing phrase which Ward endorsed, and for which good Whigs aspired, depended upon "the virtue of the people; virtue grows on knowledge, and knowledge on education."[51] In fact, education was the crucial ingredient for the survival of republicanism. Republican governments would, in time, "beget republican opinions and manners."[52] Ward declared, "people many times run into excesses for want of consideration," and that there was "no more effectual way to bring them to a sense of their duty" than to address them in a "serious and solemn manner." It was important that this should be in "due season," or the people would become "habituated" and "there will be a general corruption of morals."[53] Education spawned virtue and virtue was vital for God's support of the Revolution. Ward explained that he was aware of the "interposition of Divine Providence in the detection of Arnold's traitorous conspiracy," and that he wished "we may all be truly thankful therefore not only in word but in deed," not only for that one intervention but for the "many unobserved interpositions of Divine Providence in our behalf."[54] Samuel Adams commented to James Warren that a general "Dissolution of Principles & Manners will more surely overthrow the Liberties of America than the

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[50]Unsigned letter, February 8, 1781, Papers, R 3, V 5, fs. 39-40.

[51]Wood, The Creation of the American Republic, 1776-1787, p. 120.

[52]Ibid., p. 426.

[53]Unsigned, undated letter, Papers, R 4, P III, f. 329.

[54]Unsigned draft letter, December 14, 1780, ibid., R 4, P III, fs. 327-328.

whole Force of the Common Enemy," and impressed upon him the necessity of supporting the "Education of our country."[55]

Ideologically the two men were very close, and their votes in the Continental Congress were the same on every issue.[56] Samuel Adams clearly stood a leader in the New England bloc in Congress. The bloc was generally characterized by extreme jealousy of their state powers, a suspicion of centralization, and support of a sound fiscal policy based upon individual state responsibility rather than the coercive power of Congress. This bloc stood in contrast to the middle and southern states led by more nationalistic men like Robert Morris of Pennsylvania, Alexander Hamilton of New York, and John Mathews of South Carolina. Ward voted with the New England bloc fully sixty-five per cent of the time.[57] In 1780-1781 Ward believed that the New England states, and particularly Massachusetts, were the guardians of the Spirit of '76, which meant that New Englanders were not only foremost in war but, that they would guard against the encroachments of Congress on the states.

The need for a dependable and regular source of revenue drove Congress to drastic action. In October 1780 Virginia submitted a resolution which provided that lands ceded to the United States should

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[55]Samuel Adams to James Warren, February 12, 1779, Cushing, ed., The Writings of Samuel Adams, IV, 123-124.

[56]Clifford L. Lord, ed., The Atlas of Congressional Roll Calls: The Continental Congresses and of the Confederation 1777-1789, (New York, 1943), I, C 0629-C 0717.

[57]This percentage was determined by adding the actual number of times Ward voted in agreement with the majority of New England states on all issues. One scholar has found a higher percentage by comparing Ward's vote with that of individual New England delegates.

be disposed of for the common benefit of the several states and formed into states under such regulations as were determined by Congress. There was the catch, however, that Virginia would agree to land cession only if Congress would void all land purchases in the Old Northwest, and guarantee her the region of Kentucky.[58] Ward, with a deep concern for New England's interests, voted against the resolution.[59] He may also have been motivated by the fact that the bill would have greatly increased the power of Congress. Early the next year a motion was raised to empower Congress to regulate interstate commerce. Ward was absent for that vote, but his alter-ego, Samuel Adams, voted against the measure; and it is more than likely that Ward too would have voted against it. Not even the distresses of the war induced him to advocate congressional powers that would subtract from the sovereignty of the states. In May, 1781, while Congress was desperately searching for means to furnish the immediate needs of the army, Ward opposed a bill which directed the states to accept bills drawn on them by the United States treasurer "as soon as presented."[60] He went even further by voting against a measure which would have given Congress regulatory powers for state currency issues.[61]

These votes were illustrative of the ends Ward felt the Revolution should achieve. A Christian Sparta would be endangered by a Congress powerful enough to regulate the individual states. Ward's

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[58] Jensen, The New Nation, pp. 350-351.

[59] Journals of the Continental Congress, XVII, 916.

[60] Ibid., XX, 524.

[61] Ibid., 593.

military experience in the early stages of the Revolution had convinced him of the need for collective unity, but never did it alter his basic assumptions about republicanism or significantly alter his political posture. Unlike some military men such as generals Varnum and Sullivan, his military experience did not impel him toward centralism.

As a member of the Board of War Ward was most sympathetic to the needs of the army, and the Board generally reported in favor of the military; however, for the most part the Board was restricted to simple recommendations to Congress. In Congress Ward voted about equally for and against the military.[62]

Ward's career in the Continental Congress was significant, for it deepend his commitment to republicanism, refined his political thought, and provided valuable experience for his career in the federal Congress. Reappointed to a third term, he declined to serve, "considering the circumstances of my family and my own state of health."[63]

Ward did not find the political scene in Massachusetts to his liking. He had opposed the gubernatorial candidacy of John Hancock in 1780 without success, and the Hancock coalition, he felt, enjoyed a particularly favorable position. His constituency was growing restless under duress of declining farm prices, and many of those imprisoned for debt were from the very towns he had represented in the Massachu-

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[62]Ibid., XVII, 610, 752; XVIII, 961, 1000.

[63]Ward to Samuel Adams, November 1781, Papers, R 3, V 5, f. 74.

setts General Court.[64] The policy adopted by the General Court invariably favored creditors against debtors, and the bill of January 13, 1780 for paying arrears to the Continental army was the initial step of Massachusetts toward a general devaluation of the currency, which further alienated the debtors of the state.[65] Finally, in September a bill devaluing the currency to a final ratio of 40/1 was passed.[66] The people of Worcester County, beset by such an array of problems, returned Ward to the state House of Representatives in May, 1782.

At the same time the United States was attempting to conclude a peace with Great Britain, a situation developed in Massachusetts which Joseph Hawley, a member of the Massachusetts supreme judicial court, described as of "greater magnitude" than any "affair since the Revolution."[67] In April 1782, a group of disgruntled debtors led by Samuel Ely, a former minister, disrupted the courts in Northampton County, Massachusetts. These men felt that the government, largely controlled by the Hancock coalition and seaboard interests, was discriminating against them. In July the General Court appointed Ward, Samuel Adams, and Nathaniel Gorham to deal with the problem. The

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[64]Unsigned letter, December 14, 1780, Papers, R 4, P III, fs. 327-328. Ward to Hancock, December 9, 1778, ibid., R 3, V 5, f. 19. Ward's dislike for Hancock arose over what he felt was a misuse by Hancock of funds while he was President of the Harvard Board of Overseers. Richard B. Morris, "Insurrection in Massachusetts," Daniel Aaron, ed., Crisis in America, (New York, 1952), pp. 21-49.

[65]Oscar and Mary Handlin, "Revolutionary Economic Policy in Massachusetts," William and Mary Quarterly, IV, (January, 1947), 3-26.

[66]Ibid., 24-25.

[67]Martyn, Life of Artemas Ward, p. 264.

committee explained the government's position during the early days of July at Hatfield, and by July 8 the insurgents declared their ill feeling was based largely on misinformation.[68] The violence of the mobs led by Ely attracted little attention but was important as a prelude to Shays's Rebellion of 1786-1787 because westerners were thereby convinced that violence could help them reach their political objectives.[69]

The grievances which gave birth to Shays's Rebellion existed before the critical period of 1786. The cost of the Revolution had put a severe strain on the Massachusetts economy, and the tax burden was increasingly oppressive. The rising costs of a free market that supplied provisions for the war was an added burden to soldiers and their families who had to live on fixed incomes, and the Revolution especially hurt farmers who had to live on fixed incomes, and the Revolution especially hurt farmers in the interior counties where land holdings were small and access to markets difficult. In these areas cash was in acute shortage and taxes were particularly burdensome.[70]

After the war the interior counties continued to suffer most while debtors received no relief from their government. In Ward's home county of Worcester persons jailed as debtors rose in number from seven in March 1786 to seventy-two in December, and numbered among them were some of the more renowned soldiers of the Revolution.[71]

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[68]Martyn, Life of Artemas Ward, pp. 261-267. Hall, Politics without Parties, pp. 188-189.

[69]Ibid.

[70]Oscar and Mary Handlin, "Revolutionary Economic Policy in Massachusetts," 3-26.

[71]Morris, "Insurrection in Massachusetts," 24.

Although seaboard counties enjoyed a disproportionate number of representatives in both the House and the Senate, the tax burden fell heaviest upon the interior counties. In 1781 no change took place in items taxable on the seaboard, but new itemizations were made on the holdings of interior farmers. With the adoption of the new state constitution in 1780 the proportion of taxes raised by assessments on real estate were lowered in favor of an increased poll tax. The result was that by 1784 Worcester County, hard pressed for circulating currency, actually paid a greater amount in poll taxes than the county that included Boston.[72]

Ward's posture during Shays's Rebellion clearly suggested his great concern for social stability. Not only were most of the insurgents from towns which made up his constituency, but some had served directly under his command in the earliest stages of the Revolution. These were not people he would lightly offend. Within the context of Shays's Rebellion, the meaning of republicanism and the nature of society as perceived by Ward was more clearly shown. For most of the Whigs "republicanism was not equated with democracy,"[73] and Ward was included among that number. To Ward, like most Whigs, although sovereignty ultimately resided in the people, nothing was so much feared as too much power handed to the people, for their licentiousness was well established.[74]

To Ward republicanism meant a mixed polity couched in a highly

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[72]Ibid., 27.

[73]Wood, The Creation of the American Republic 1776-1787, p. 221.

[74]Ibid., pp. 404-405, 432.

structured hierarchy which ran from a high echelon of governing officials to a lower rung that included the people. Government worked best when set beyond the direct control of the people. To Samuel Osgood he confided that "political justice" was not always that which was supported by the people. Only a people first "well informed" and therefore virtuous, were capable of participation in government.[75] And this participation extended only through election day.[76] This gave the people a fair and adequate voice in government and at the same time protected the government from the licentiousness of an all-powerful people.[77] As he understood republicanism Ward's posture during Shays's Rebellion was consistent with his political thought. The maintenance of social stability for which he was concerned was not a denunciation of democracy but rather a solid stance for republicanism. Nor was it a repudiation of the Revolution. For Ward, like other Whigs, "colonial independence was not a democratic movement which dissolved all ligaments of subordination in colonial society and 'liberated the people.'"[78] What independence did do, which was precisely what Ward intended that it should do, was to transfer "allegiance from one set of magistrates to a slightly different set who happened to be called

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[75]Ward to Samuel Osgood, March 31, 1781, quoted in Martyn, Life of Artemas Ward, p. 303.

[76]Ward to Benjamin Lincoln, April 23, 1783, ibid., Original letter in Fogg Collection, Maine Historical Society. "I am almost ready to say, that the choice of the first magistrate ought by no means, be committed to the people at Large. I apprehend the inattention of the people is so great that there is a danger of their being undone before they are aware of it."

[77]Wood, The Creation of the American Republic, pp. 404-405.

[78]Richard Buel, "Democracy in the American Revolution: A Frame of Reference," William and Mary Quarterly, (1964), XXI, 165-191.

representatives of the people."[79]

In August 1786 a host of conventions met throughout Massachusetts. These extralegal political gatherings had become common in the state after 1780 as the only way in which westerners in the state felt they could air their grievances against the government.[80] On August 15, 1786 a convention was called at Leicester, and delegates from thirty-seven towns in Worcester County drafted a petition of grievances. The convention had two major complaints: high court fees and the heavy taxes that had been levied to pay off the state's public securities.[81] Shrewsbury was not numbered among the towns that sent representatives for reasons which were penned by Ward. He believed that the conventions held by the insurgents were unlawful and that they arose from "licentiousness, disappointed ambition, and disaffection to the free government."[82] Although they were supported by many "honest but unthinking people," Ward believed that the conventions worked into the schemes of domestic and foreign foes who would destroy the commonwealth.[83] Finally, he felt that such meetings were in violation of the constitution of Massachusetts, and he admonished all who were assembled to separate and "study to be quiet and do his own business."[84]

Not until October 1786, when the rebellion had reached a fevered

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[79]Ibid., 180.

[80]Hall, Politics without Parties, pp. 179-184.

[81]Forrest McDonald, E Pluribus Unum: The Formation of the American Republic 1776-1790 (Boston, 1965), pp. 145-146.

[82]Unsigned, undated draft, Papers, R 3, V 5, fs. 182-183.

[83]Ibid.

[84]Unsigned, undated draft, Papers, R 3, V 5, fs. 182-183.

tempo, did the legislature make any meaningful attempt to inform the public concerning the measures it had adopted.[85] At the same time the Court made their report and admitted that the lack of information was partially responsible for the rebellion, the Confederation Congress was raising forces obstensibly to use against the Indians but actually to quell the insurrection. Congress asked for an immediate augmentation of 1,340 troops for the protection of the frontier and to aid in surveying western lands. These troops, raised principally from the New England states and consisting of infantry and artillery, were never used.[86]

On September 6, at the request of the Justices of the Court of Common Pleas, Ward sent Governor James Bowdoin a brief account of the violence that had taken place in Worcester County, and stated that the violence was not subsided.[87] By December the government settled on the necessity of crushing the rebellion, and Ward was repeatedly con-

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[85] J. R. Pole, "Shays's Rebellion: A Political Interpretation," The Reinterpretation of the American Revolution 1763-1789 ed. Jack P. Greene, (New York, 1968), p. 422.

[86] Undated letter, Papers, R 3, V 6, fs. 189-190. This letter was read and concurred to an October 27, 1786 in the House of Representatives.

[87] Ward to James Bowdoin, September 6, 1786, ibid., R 3, V 5, f. 187.

sulted as to the best means of accomplishing that objective.[88] No wonder then that the rebels selected Ward as a target for retaliation in the event that the government took any of their number.[89]

On December 3, 1786 Governor Bowdoin informed Ward and the other members of the Court of Common Pleas that the insurgents were going to prevent the sitting of the courts in Worcester but that information had not been received in time to send militia. He gave the justices permission not to sit because of the imminent danger.[90] The courts did not meet in January, but only because business could not be carried on as usual. Earlier in September Ward proved that he would not be intimidated. On Monday night of the first week of September, 1786 a group of rebels took control of the Worcester Court of Common Pleas. The following morning Ward met the challenge:

> I do not value your bayonets, you might plunge them into my heart; but while that heart beats I will do my duty; when opposed to it, my life is of little consequence; if you will take away your bayonets and give me some position where I can

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[88] James Bowdoin to Ward, December 14, 1786, Papers, R 3, V 5, f. 216. Ward to James Bowdoin, December 15, 1786, ibid., R 3, V 5, f. 193. The Governor's Executive Council met on December 20, 1786 to consider the most effective means of crushing the revolt; in a letter to Ward the Governor asked for the General's advice on the "best plan for that purpose." Ward's response was that the conflict would be shorter and less severe if the government mustered a "decided superior force." It would, he felt, be necessary that the lower counties have a force double to that of the insurgents. This would serve as a "stimulus to the militia in this County to turn out support of government: this plan will convince the insurgents that they are not the people as they affect to call themselves."

[89] John Avery to Artemas Ward, December 2, 1786, ibid., R 3, V 5, f. 194. "I am directed by the Governor to inform you that it was agreed on by Shays & others in consultation this or last week, that in case government took up any of them, they would retaliate on the friends of government and that you and Judge Gile were agreed upon."

[90] James Bowdoin to Worcester Court of Common Pleas, December 3, 1786, Papers, R 3, V 6, f. 196.

> be heard by my fellow citizens and not by the leaders alone, who have deceived and deluded you, I will speak but not otherwise.[91]

Ward's duty, as he viewed it, was to the people-at-large. He did not believe that the leaders of the rebellion were the people to whom he had a duty, but he did choose to recognize a duty to those among the people who had been deceived. He knew that the people could often be misled "for want of consideration," and that when they were it was the duty of their representatives to "address them in a serious and solemn manner."[92] He did address them for more than two hours but was unable to disperse the gathering. The only recourse was force. On January 21, 1787 the state sent 4,400 men under Benjamin Lincoln, and the rebellion was crushed.[93]

The voting record of General Ward in the Continental Congress, and his stand for social stability during Shays's Rebellion clarified his political posture. He would not endanger the Massachusetts puritan-republican social order by subservience either to France or to a strong Congress. Yet neither was he ready to allow that social order to be destroyed by the anarchy.

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[91]Epler, Masterminds at the Commonwealth's Heart, p. 53. Ward, History of the Town of Shrewsbury, p. 96.

[92]Undated, unsigned letter, Papers, R 4, P II, f. 329.

[93]Epler, Masterminds at the Commonwealth's Heart, p. 53.

CHAPTER IV

THE FEDERAL PERIOD

The first congressional election under the new federal Constitution in 1788 indicated the extent to which Ward's popularity had waned as a result of his posture during Shays's Rebellion. Ordinarily popular among Worcester voters, he ran third in an election won by a personal enemy, Jonathan Grout, a lawyer from Petersham.[1] Though not elected to Congress, he was made moderator in Shrewsbury and this,

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[1] Jonathan Grout to Ward, October 26, 1786, Papers, R 3, V 6, fs. 234-237. Proceedings of the House on Colonel Grout's motion, ibid., R 3, V 6, f. 232. Ward to Thomas Ward, December 1, 1791, ibid., R 3, V 6, f. 296. In a written accusation Grout accused Ward of a general misuse of the Speaker's powers. "...as Speaker you did last June deprive me of my privilege as a member of the House when speaking with your leave in ordering me to set down which was contrary to the rules and orders of the House and in violation of the Constitution. And when a certain matter had been before the House...you did then without any just cause, in an angry manner cross the floor and come to me with words unbecoming a gentleman...your dignified station raised you so much above the powers of your mind, as to cause you to forget the rules of the House, the constitution and the gentleman...and did you not insinuate...that I said...that I would go home raise a party to prevent the Court's sitting." Two reports accepted by the House exonerated Ward. On March 7, 1787 the House concurred that, "the conduct of the Honorable Speaker on that as well as on every other occasion has been entirely consistent with the rules and orders of the House and the constitution." And that Grout's charges were "false and groundless." On June 6 a committee of nine declared that the order of March 7 was not an impeachment of the words "false and groundless," and that they should remain part of the Journal. The matter was always one of concern for Ward. On December 1, 1791 he wrote his son Thomas, "Grout's son is here and appears very sociable he came here last week he says he shall tarry here two or three weeks. I mean to treat him with propriety and decency that he may have no just cause to say I treated him ill."

together with his farm, more than consumed his time.[2] In the fall of 1790 Grout ran for reelection, and again Ward opposed him. The first ballot of October 4 was indecisive, but a second vote on November 26 gave the election to Ward.[3]

The Second Congress was important not only because it determined answers to vital questions regarding the national interest, but because it also witnessed the growth of party cleavages. Indeed, two distinct voting blocs developed in the First Congress, and by the end of the Third Congress, both governmental questions and popular events were viewed from a partisan perspective.[4] Although the sectional lines grew less clear in the Fourth Congress, the two voting blocs retained their original sectional character.[5] The staunch Massachusetts Federalist Fisher Ames grew alarmed at the diversity which grew up in the First House and observed that men with local sympathies sometimes joined Anti-federalists to defeat the purposes of government.[6] The issue that divided Ward and Ames was precisely how much power should be vested in the federal government. This difference was complicated by the fact that it was not a party difference but rather one of experience.

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[2]Ward to Henry Dana Ward, December 15, 1789, Papers, R 3, V 6, f. 278: "I have so many things to attend to at present that I stand in need of your assistance; if it was not indispensibly necessary I should not wish to call you from your studies."

[3]Worcester District Vote Tabulation, November 26, 1790, ibid., f. 287. Martyn, Life of Artemas Ward, p. 301.

[4]Mary P. Ryan, "Party Formation in the United States Congress, 1789 to 1796: A Quantitative Analysis," The William and Mary Quarterly, XXVIII, (1972), pp. 523-542.

[5]Ibid.

[6]Fisher Ames to George Minot, June 23, July 8, 9, 1789, Ames, ed., Works of Fisher Ames. I, 56, 61, 62, 64.

Both were avowed New England Federalists, both had an aversion for the South which was identified as the main opposition to the administration, and both held that government should not be left too much to the devices of the people. To Ames, Federalists were men determined to build a strong central government, men who could enlarge their strictly parochial views to encompass the good of the entire country. Nor did he view his national sympathies as a betrayal of New England, for he felt that what was best for the nation was best also for New England.[7] Ward believed in 1792, just as he had in 1776, that what was best for New England, particularly Massachusetts, was best for the general government.

The gulf that separated Ward and Ames was one that no amount of political debate or impassioned rhetoric could bridge. When Ward left his sick bed on that chilly April morning in 1775 it was to take command of a provincial army fighting for a provincial cause and not a continental army fighting a nationalist war. The original purpose of the war had been political separation from England and individual sovereignty for the several states. Ward had fought to preserve the Massachusetts-puritan-republican social order, and it remained as dear to him in 1800 as it had in 1776. Ward grew to political maturity during the Revolution, and the socio-political ideas of the period remained a life-long part of his thought. Then too, Ward's political experience to 1780 had been provincial. Ames, on the other hand, saw only brief service in the Revolution, most of which came after Massachusetts was no longer the main theater of the war, and he had virtually

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[7]Winford E. A. Bernhard, Fisher Ames: Federalist and Statesman 1758-1808. (Chapel Hill, 1965), pp. 93-101.

no political experience whatever, outside of his law practice, until he was named a delegate to the Massachusetts Ratifying Convention in 1787.[8]

Therefore it is not surprising that parochial politics and sectional interests swayed Ward more than they did Ames. Essentially both men wanted what was best for New England and the country as a whole; the difference came over how this could best be realized. Ames saw "how much power this government needs and how little is given it," but his was a vision Ward did not share with him.[9] The conflict between Ward and Ames came most often where questions of the military, government expense, or centralization were involved.[10] (See Table II.)

Ward's position as a Federalist in the Second and Third Congresses was not inconsistent with his political thought, nor was it indicative of a change in attitude from the earlier period of the Revolution and Confederation. Federalism was a sectional expression as well as a political one, and it was this sectional aspect plus his concern for social stability that endeared to him the principles that came to be called Federalism.[11] Ward could vote for centralist policies only when they were compatible with the interests of New England.[12]

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[8]Bernhard, Fisher Ames, pp. 3-56.

[9]Fisher Ames to Thomas Dwight, January 23, 1792, Ames, Works of Fisher Ames, I, 110.

[10]My analysis but based on the research and data of Professor H. James Henderson.

[11]James M. Banner, Jr., To the Hartford Convention, p. 22: "Federalism offered a social ideal which emphasized stability, tradition, dependence, and the common good...The party won the adherence of all sorts of men: the high and low, western farmer and eastern merchant, Boston deist and Connecticut Valley Calvinist, the learned and the ignorant."

[12]Martyn, Life of Artemas Ward, p. 30; "...but it was solely and specifically for the political liberty of his own province of Massachusetts, that, nineteen years before he had risked life and honor by heading a revolutionary army."

TABLE II

WARD'S DISAGREEMENT WITH FISHER AMES IN CONGRESS

DATE	ISSUE	WARD'S VOTE	AMES'S VOTE
Jan 25, 1792	Provision for new enumeration and reapportionment on Mar 1, 1797	No	Yes
Jan 30, 1792	Strike provision in bill for protection of the frontier that provided for 3 additional regiments of infantry	Yes	No
Jan 30, 1792	Shall Congress provide 3 additional regiments	No	Yes
Mar 6, 1792	Bill providing for a uniform milita	No	Yes
Mar 27, 1792	President of the United States requested to investigate the failure of General Arthur St. Clair's expedition	Yes	No
Mar 27, 1792	A committee to investigate General St. Clair's failure	Yes	No
Apr 4, 1792	Indemnify estate of late General Greene on the public behalf	No	Yes
Apr 10, 1792	Engrossed bill to indemnify General Greene	No	Yes
May 4, 1792	Bill for settling demands of Anthony W. White against the United States	Yes	No
Jan 8, 1793	Wording of motion reducing the military establishment of the United States	Yes	No
Jan 8, 1793	Shall the military be reduced?	Yes	No
Jan 15, 1793	Shall the petition of the merchants of Charleston be considered by Congress	No	Yes
Jan 15, 1793	Should the petition of the merchants be considered along with those of military officers?	No	Yes

TABLE II (Continued)

DATE	ISSUE	WARD'S VOTE	AMES'S VOTE
Jan 25, 1793	Shall the loan program to the states begin January 1, 1794?	No	Yes
Jan 21, 1794	Strike out provision that commissioned officers who stay in the army shall receive half pay	Yes	No
Jan 21, 1794	Pension for families of deceased officers up to half pay of a Lt. Col.	No	Yes
Feb 14, 1794	Unfair election (Delaware) Henry Latimer is to replace John Patton	No	Yes
Dec 4, 1794	Congression vote of thanks to Major General Anthony Wayne for his campaign against the Indians	No	Yes

Source: Annals of Congress, 2nd Congress, 1791-1793, 335, 354-355, 435, 493, 537, 550, 594, 802, 823, 824, 843-844. 3rd Congress, 1793-1795, 254, 454, 763, 965.

"There are matters before Congress of very great importance," Ward reported to his son Thomas, "such as the Indian war, representation in Congress, whether one for every thirty thousand, &c, militia law &c. I wish they may all be determined in such manner as will be most for the benefit of the people at large."[13] One of the first of these issues to concern the Second Congress was the ratio of representatives in the House. This issue promoted sectional polarization, reflected regional population expections, and proved potent in promoting partisan-

[13]Ward to Thomas W. Ward, January 23, 1792, Papers, R 3, V 6, f. 298.

ship.[14]

The Constitution had fixed the number of representatives at a total of sixty-five, a specified number from each state. A constitutional amendment to set the ratio of representatives at one for every 30,000 inhabitants had not been ratified by the states, and it became the task of the lower branch of the legislature to settle the issue. On Monday, October 31, 1791 John Laurance of New York proposed that the ratio for representatives be one for every 30,000.[15]

The South generally favored this ratio because those five states expected the population balance ultimately to shift drastically in their favor. William Findley of Pennsylvania believed that a large representation would better win the confidence of the people for the government, and that they would gladly bear the additional expense to safeguard their freedom.[16] The standard anti-Federalist argument was that the larger the representation the less likely that government would subvert the liberties of the people. Virginia's William Giles argued that only an increase in the number of the House would prevent the formation of legislative aristocracy in that body, and that only numerous representatives could balance the government against the strong executive branch that had been created.[17] John Page, also of Virginia, contended that the smaller ratio would give the people the fullest voice

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[14]Mary P. Ryan, "Party Formation in the United States Congress," p. 538.

[15]"Proceedings and Debates of the House of Representatives of the United States," Annals of the Congress of the United States, (Washington: 1849), 2nd Congress, 1791-1793, III, 147. Hereinafter cited as Annals of Congress.

[16]Annals of Congress, III, 177-178.

[17]Ibid., 179.

in their government consistent with its nature. He explained that only a large representation in the National Assembly of France had made possible the Constitution of 1791.[18]

Argument for the smaller ratio was not confined to the southern representatives. Elbridge Gerry, a Massachusetts Federalist at the time, pointed out that the states had decreased the number of representatives in their state legislatures in the expectation of enlarging the number of representatives in the federal government. To those who pointed to the ineffectiveness of the large state assemblies, he replied that the weakness lay in the method of election rather than the mere number; to those who feared that a large House would impinge upon the Senate he maintained that the Constitution had thoroughly guaranteed the independence of that body. In his final remarks he compared the government to a pyramid and hoped that the House would give it a wide representative base and thereby provide stability.[19]

When the vote was taken on November 15, 1791 both Ward and Ames voted against the majority of Congress in establishing the smaller ratio.[20] The Senate returned the bill with an amended ratio of one representative for every 33,000 inhabitants, which reduced the number of representatives in some states, mainly southern, but because of fractions allowed for population over 16,500, some states, mainly northern, retained their original number.[21] Both Ward and Ames sup-

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[18] Ibid., 182.

[19] Annals of Congress, III, 191-192.

[20] Ibid., 121.

[21] Bernhard, Fisher Ames, p. 189.

ported the Senate amendment. Ames argued that the original ratio would give Virginia twenty-one representatives when that state was entitled to only nineteen. He indicated that according to the census 112 representatives would be called for at the ratio of one to thirty thousand. Ames reckoned that with a population of 630,000 Virginia would have twenty-one representatives, while the states of Vermont, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, Connecticut, New Jersey, and Delaware, with a total population of 766,000, would have a total representation only equal to that of Virginia.[22]

The debate then turned to residual population elements that would be left unrepresented by the proposed ratios. Ames took pains to convince the House that the ratio of one for every 33,000 would provide a more equitable distribution of the representatives chosen.[23] He was willing to accept the Senate amendment because as proposed Massachusetts would have sixteen of thirty-five New England representatives and Virginia would have only twenty-one of the House on March 23, 1792 by a margin of two votes.[24] The Senate amendment finally passed the House on March 23, 1792 by a margin of two votes.[25] On April 9, however, the bill was back in the House with a veto message attached. Washington's objections to the bill were twofold: the Constitution, he noted, provided that representatives would be apportioned among the states according to their respective numbers, and that no divisor gave

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[22] Annals of Congress, III, 257.

[23] Ibid., 259, 262.

[24] Bernhard, Fisher Ames, p. 191.

[25] Annals of Congress, III, 482, 483.

the number of representatives proposed by the bill. He further objected because the bill gave a smaller ratio than one to thirty thousand to eight states.[26]

New England representatives attempted unsuccessfully to pass the bill over the President's veto on April 6. Finally, three days later, the House passed an apportionment bill with the ratio of one representative for every 33,000 inhabitants without the enlarged representation for the eight states.[27] This left Massachusetts with fourteen representatives and gave Virginia nineteen.[28]

The sectional nature of the issue was shown by the fact that of the entire representation from New England only Elbridge Gerry of Massachuseets, and Amasa Learned and Jeremiah Wadsworth from Connecticut, consistently supported the smaller ratio, while in the South support for the smaller ratio was virtually unanimous.[29] Ward's objection to the smaller ratio was that it would increase the expense of government without making the efforts of Congress more effective. He surmised that a large number of representatives could not be easily watched by the people.[30] No doubt Ward believed that a smaller number of representatives would do the work of Congress more efficiently, but his well established aversion for the South, and the jealousy with which he guarded the interests of New England, also figured in his

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[26]Ibid., 119.

[27]Ibid., 541.

[28]Ibid., 548.

[29]Data of Professor Henderson.

[30]Ward to Henry Dana Ward, February 22, 1792, R 3, V 6, 304-305.

reasoning.

The disastrous defeat of General Arthur St. Clair by Indians in the Northwest in 1791 alarmed the country, and drew the attention of Congress away from the question of representation. Early in 1792 the House met as a committee of the whole and began consideration of a bill to provide adequate protection for the frontier. Debate on the bill centered around section two, which provided for an augmentation of 3,040 troops, consisting of three infantry regiments and one squadron of light dragoons. The additional force, many argued, was unnecessary because the Indians could easily be appeased by moderation and justice. It was pointed out that the Indians attacked only when grievously wronged by encroaching white settlers and never pursued their advantage into white territory. Some in Congress favored what they felt was a wiser and less costly policy of appeasement. They contended that the Indians could not be defeated so long as the British maintained posts in the Northwest and believed that if whites would stay off Indian lands the problem would solve itself.[31]

The bill for the protection of the frontier further illustrated the parochial leanings of Ward, and the nationalist sentiment of Ames. As a proponent of the bill Ames argued that the additional force was necessary not only to protect the lives of western settlers but to preserve respect for the national government.[32] Ever parochial in attitude, Ward was largely unconcerned about the Northwest. At any rate, if a real Indian problem existed it was the problem of western

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[31] Annals of Congress, III, 337-338.

[32] Bernhard, Fisher Ames, p. 194.

settlers, not the national government. Nevertheless, the bill passed Congress on February 1, substantially as proposed.[33] Ward commented that the additional force was unnecessary, and therefore constituted a needless expense.[34] The Indians of the Northwest continued to be a problem, but by November Ward believed that the prospects for a general treaty of peace with the Indians had greatly improved. The Indians, he explained, had spent too much time at war, this had disrupted their trade with the British, and hence both the Indians and the British were more prone toward peace.[35] In December Ward's hope for peace with the northwest Indians was even more optimistic, and he believed that a treaty was forthcoming.[36] By February of the following year he told Thomas that the reports of fighting between American forces and Indians were unsubstantiated, and that he was not even certain that an expedition had been sent out.[37] However, the Indian problem continued to bother Congress until the expedition of General Anthony Wayne in August 1794.

Also related to defense was the bill introduced by Jeremiah Wadsworth for the establishment of a uniform militia.[38] The debate again was heated. Jonathan Sturges of Connecticut believed that some

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[33] Annals of Congress, III, 355.

[34] Ward to Thomas W. Ward, March 1, 1792, Papers, R 3, V 6, f. 307.

[35] Ward to Thomas W. Ward, November 13, 1792, ibid., R 3, V 6, f. 320.

[36] Ward to Thomas W. Ward, December 28, 1792, ibid., R 3, V 6, f. 326.

[37] Ward to Thomas W. Ward, February 22, 1792, ibid., R 3, V 6, fs. 304-305.

[38] Annals of Congress, III, 200.

amendment was needed for the first section of the bill because as worded the militia became a federal force, which he conceived to be in violation of the principles of the Constitution. He reasoned that only the states were empowered to determine who should serve, and who should be exempt from militia service.[39] No explicit statement exists among Ward's correspondence to account for why he voted against this bill, but his parochial outlook, his fear of a strong military, and a distrust of centralism, were probably deciding considerations.

On March 27, 1792 William Giles of Virginia proposed that President Washington initiate an investigation to discover the reasons for the defeat of General St. Clair.[40] This proposal failing by a vote of 35 to 21, an alternative resolution was introduced by which a House committee should investigate the defeat of General St. Clair. The latter resolution passed by a large majority, with Fisher Ames being one of the representatives against it. Ward split with Ames on both votes. Ames viewed both resolutions as an affront to the administration, while Ward, with an ingrained distrust of the military, believed that it should be watched.

Ward again split with Ames on the issue of whether to indemnify the estate of the late General Nathaneal Greene. Major General Greene bound himself to pay £8,743 for supplies received from Charleston merchants in April 1783 to supply the southern army. He settled the debt in 1786 with £8,688 from his own funds. On February 22, 1792 the

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[39] Ibid., 418-419, and 1392. The bill as finally approved provided that every able-bodied white male of the states between the ages of 18 and 45 should serve in the militia, and that members of Congress and certain other government officials were exempt from duty.

[40] Annals of Congress, III, 490.

House began consideration of a resolution to indemnify the deceased general's estate.[41]

The debate in Congress centered around whether Greene's purchase had actually been made on behalf of the public interest or whether he was in partnership with the Charleston merchants at the time he bought the supplies. Abraham Baldwin of Georgia could not produce evidence to prove conclusively that Greene had not entered a partnership but pointed to the high character of the general as sufficient testimony for the validity of the claim. John Steele of North Carolina argued that only evidence admissable in a regular court of justice should establish the legitimacy of the claim.[42] Ames voted for the indemnification while the parsimonious and anti-militarist Ward opposed the indemnification of Greene's estate.

Consistently Ward voted against all congressional measures which provided federal benefits for soldiers. On January 21, 1794 he voted to strike a provision in a military bill which provided for half pay for commissioned officers who stayed in the army, and on the same day he rejected a bill which provided for pensions for families of deceased soldiers.[43]

As a provincial commander Ward had been paid by Massachusetts, and he viewed it as the responsibility of the states to pay their militia and thereby maintain adequate control over them. Parochialism alone did not account for Ward's position against federal provision for

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[41] Annals of Congress, III, 424.

[42] Ibid., 454.

[43] Ibid., IV, 253-255.

the army. He opposed the creation of a uniform militia largely because this would take the control of the militia out of the hands of the states. Perhaps the presence of British troops in Boston in the period just before the Revolution made Ward acutely sensitive to the dangers of a national military force. Certainly the dangers of such a force were apparent to him, for he twice voted for reduction of the military.[44]

Ward's high voting agreement with the Federalists in the Second and Third Congresses implies that he wanted a government with adequate power to enforce its policies, but his disagreements also make it clear that the dangers inherent in an all-powerful central government were equally apparent to him. Then too, there were simply some matters Ward felt naturally fell within the competence of the state, rather than the nation. On January 15, 1793 he voted against a resolution of Congress to consider a petition of Charleston merchants for losses sustained during the war.[45] The merchants complained that they were suffering under the terms of the fourth article of the Treaty of Paris, which required them to pay their British debts in sterling money with full interest. The merchants felt this unfair and begged relief from Congress.[46] These debts were contracted previous to the Revolution, and Ward believed that they should be paid. This attitude stemmed from no partiality toward Britain. His aversion for the South, his strict belief that debts should be paid, and the fact that these

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[44] Annals of Congress, III, 802.

[45] Ibid., 823.

[46] Ibid.

terms had been agreed to between the United States and Great Britain probably caused this feeling.

Ward's attitude toward the British, as manifested by the debate on Jay's Treaty, and toward the French as indicated by his view of the French Revolution, further identified his differences with high Federalists, and proved conclusively that he never wholly divested himself of the spirit of '76. Just after the close of the Third Congress Jay's Treaty was received in the United States. When the full text of the treaty, as ratified by the Senate, became public the outcry from the emerging Republican opposition was quick and vociferous.

Ward was among those who did not particularly like the treaty but believed that some kind of treaty with the British was desirable, and that no better one could be obtained. He confessed that "there are things in the treaty I could wish were otherwise," but also realized that it was not possible to have them otherwise."[47] He explained to his son Henry Dana Ward that the treaty would not last forever, that the commercial benefits of the treaty were as good as those obtained from the earlier treaty with France, and that those most ardently opposed to the treaty were simply alarmed at the prospect of having to pay their British debts.[48] He admonished his son to "endeavor to enlighten the dark minds of your legislators so far as you can with prudence."[49]

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[47]Ward to Henry Dana Ward, undated, Papers, R 5, Unbound correspondence, f. 130.

[48]Ibid.

[49]Ibid.

Ward's support of Jay's Treaty did not stem from anti-French sentiment. He celebrated every step the French took toward a republican form of government. He approved the French Constitution of 1791 though he did not believe that it was granted by the generosity of Louis XVI.[50] The vital aid the French had afforded the United States during the American Revolution perhaps made him reluctant to abandon them in their hour of upheaval and confusion. He noted to Thomas that the French, "not knowing how to use their rights turn their rage on their best friends,"[51] yet the next month he rejoiced at the success of the French against the combined armies of Austria and Prussia.[52]

Ward's actions toward both the English and French were motivated by a desire to ensure that the United States acted independently from Europe. The presidential election of 1796 prompted him to observe that "federal men" were needed in the executive branch and to hope that no one would be elected "so frenchified as some of the characters to the southward are. We are an independent nation," he told Henry Dana Ward," and we ought to act like one."[53] Earlier, while serving in the Continental Congress, Ward had been equally vehement in opposition to French control of American policy. There had been those in Congress who were ready to exchange American sovereignty in return

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[50] Annals of Congress, III, 458. Ward concurred with the House resolution that received the news of the French Constitution with high satisfaction but voted against the section that referred to the "magnanimity" of its acceptance by the French king.

[51] Ward to Thomas W. Ward, November 13, 1792, Papers, R 3, V 6, f. 320.

[52] Ward to Thomas W. Ward, December 28, 1792, ibid., R 3, V 6, f.326.

[53] Ward to Henry Dana Ward, October 10, 1796, ibid., Unbound correspondence, fs. 133-134.

for financial and military aid, but Ward steadfastly opposed all such efforts. Neither the monarchical system of the British government nor the licentious anarchy of the French Republic fitted Ward's ideal of the perfect republic.

Ward's party affiliation was not strong until after the division of opinion caused by the French Revolution and the debate on Jay's Treaty. At the end of his first term in Congress he still believed that if there were "more independent men we should do much better."[54] The intense attacks launched in the press by both parties strengthened party cohesiveness and unity. By 1796 Ward not only believed it imperative to have John Adams and Thomas Pinckney in the two highest offices but regretted that the Federalists did not enjoy a House majority in the Fourth Congress.[55] When the information that Edmund Randolph had apparently solicited funds from the French for political purposes while Secretary of State became public, Ward happily rejoined that the "Jacobins who were forever declaiming against the Federalists, saying they were influenced by British Gold," were silenced, and that "now we may conjecture with a good deal of certainty who would receive foreign bribes."[56]

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[54]Ward to Thomas W. Ward, March 1, 1792, Papers, R 3, V 6, f. 307.

[55]Ward to Dwight Foster, March 1, 1796, quoted in Martyn, Life of Artemas Ward, p. 317.

[56]Letter quoted in Martyn, Life of Artemas Ward, pp. 317-318. The incident had to do with an intercepted letter from the French Minister in which Randolph had purportedly solicited a large sum of money from the French at the time of the Whiskey Rebellion to pay the debts of four influential men he believed were needed to prevent civil war in the United States but who could not act for fear of their British creditors.

The period of Ward's service in the Second and Third Federal Congresses proved the consistency of his thought, and brought about a slight change in his political posture. His attachment to the Massachusetts puritan-republican social order, his parochial views, garnered from long experience in provincial politics, his aversion to the South, and Congregationalist religious ideas continued to affect his political thought as they had throughout his public career. The Artemas Ward of 1796 was different only in that the public rancor over treatment of the French and Jay's Treaty had intensified his commitment to a party that promised order rather than chaos.

CHAPTER V

THE POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY OF ARTEMAS WARD

"I hope you will endeavor to get the good will of the people among whom you reside," Ward wrote his son Henry Dana Ward, "but in order to obtain that I hope you will not sacrifice your political principles, nor your religion."[1] He reflected that a "steady firmness to right principles is more likely to raise a man in the opinion of others than shifting about like a weathercock with every breath of wind."[2] This statement, which seems at first glance to be no more than the moral admonition of a loving father, is actually an accurate and complete statement of Ward's political philosophy, for the political principles to which he referred were in reality a rigid set of moral beliefs, lifted directly from scripture, interpreted literally, and applied to politics. This one simple and straightforward statement embodied the entire scenario of his political strategy from his earliest appointment to minor civic duties in Shrewsbury, to the end of his career in the Federal Congress.

The civil law of the province of Massachusetts was based upon

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[1]Ward to Henry Dana Ward, March 3, 1795, Papers, R 5, Unbound correspondence, f. 126 and ibid., February 25, 1795, f. 123: "I wish to have you obtain the esteem of the people among whom you dwell; but to obtain that I would not have you renounce the New England Politic or Religion...".

[2]Ward to Henry Dana Ward, March 3, 1795, ibid., R 5, Unbound correspondence, f. 126.

Biblical injunctions, and a breach of civil law therefore often involved an act that was in violation of scripture as well. During his long tenure as justice of the peace in Worcester County Ward was quick to punish swearing, and often levied the maximum fine permitted under law; he punished Sabbath breaking, adultery and any other violation of moral or Biblical law quickly and harshly.

Ward's daily orders at Cambridge proved that by 1775 his moral and political principles had become so enmeshed as to be one. Morality and politics had become synonymous. This remained the case throughout his life, for he never discussed politics apart from religion. It was characteristic that he believed the political ineptitude of the South to be based more upon a lack of virtue and religion than on inadequate political experience. In 1781, after the main thrust of the war had shifted to the South, Ward observed that "if there was a more general execution to the southward of the Delaware River," and a "more true fear of God," that "we should have more reason to expect the blessing of heaven."[3] He feared that his generation like the "stiff necked Israelites of old" might be "made to wander in the wilderness until the rebellious generation were gone" before the "spirit of liberty and righteousness will flourish on this continent in the manner wished for."[4] He believed that only if "there was that attention to Virtue and Religion there ought to be" would there be a hope for "Divine favor from the calamities we now feel."[5]

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[3]Ward to Thomas W. Ward, April 6, 1781, Papers, R 3, V 5, fs.53-54.

[4]Undated, unsigned letter, ibid., R 4, PIII, f. 329.

[5]Undated, unsigned letter, ibid., R 4, P III, f. 329.

Those who held political office, Ward felt, should be "sensible, religious men," and that man who "makes a mock of all religion" should be avoided as one's "greatest adversary."[6] The election of virtuous men was imperative, for the people often "run into excesses for want of consideration," and not to have men in government to "bring them to a sense of their duty" would result in a "general corruption of morals."[7] Shays's Rebellion was a perfect example of what could happen if the "honest but unthinking people" were led by men without religious principle.[8]

The principal ingredients of his political philosophy, which were the logical outgrowth of a convergence of puritanism, Whiggism, parochialism, and the ethnocentric nature of Massachusetts society, were instilled in Ward before he was thirty years old, and remained virtually unchanged throughout his long public career. His ancestry went back to the earliest days of the Commonwealth, and his family had long been prominent in the province. Well educated, he easily assumed many of his father's civic duties as judge, selectman and moderator. He thoroughly accepted the social and political nature of Massachusetts society and was never able to give up the idea that what was best for Massachusetts was best for the nation.

He reached his political majority during the Revolution and had a deep-rooted commitment to republicanism, but republicanism as he under-

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[6]Ward to Thomas W. Ward, December 14, 1780, Papers, R 4, P III, fs. 327-328.

[7]Unsigned, undated letter, ibid., R 5. Unbound correspondence, f. 130.

[8]Ward on extra-legal political conventions, August 9, 1786, R 3, V 5, fs. 182-183.

stood it involved a hierarchical political order in which the people figured as the lowest rung of the ladder. The post-Revolutionary political turmoil did not significantly alter his posture except where party affiliation was concerned. When he retired from national life in 1796 he remained committed to the same socio-political ideas he had learned during the Revolution, but the numerous outbreaks of violence had deepend his attachment to the one party that promised order.

Much of his concern for social stability was evident as early as April, 1775 when he took command of provincial forces at Cambridge. His daily orders seem unusual unless viewed from the vantage point of his belief in the Massachusetts puritan-republican social order, for the orders often went beyond the pure exigencies of the war. While acting as commander-in-chief he discouraged camp followers, meted out punishment for swearing, and made church attendance mandatory. The Revolution had for Ward a "utopian depth" that removed it from the realm of pure politics and added a "moral dimension" that involved the "very character of colonial society."[9]

The "Christian Sparta" in which Ward believed as strongly as Samuel Adams, was dependent on the virtue of the people, and the function of government was to develop virtue and safeguard it against monarchical corruption on the one hand, and from the licentiousness of the people on the other. The puritan social order of the province of Massachusetts had been as close to the Christian Sparta as British authority would allow, and Ward's participation in the Revolution had

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[9]Richard Buel, "Democracy in the American Revolution: A Frame of Reference," The William and Mary Quarterly, (1964), XXI, 165-191.

been to preserve rather than change that structure. Civil disturbances which came in the wake of the Revolution were as much feared by him as British tyranny, for the tyranny of licentiousness was no better than the tyranny of government.

This dual fear of an over-concentration of power and utter chaos goes far in explaining Ward's political posture. It explains, for instance, why he could take up arms against the British over what he conceived to be economic and political injustices, and at the same time resist changes in unfair economic practices in Massachusetts in 1786-1787. It explains why he saw no inconsistency between supporting the committees of correspondence during the colonial period and denying the legitimacy of the extra-legal political conventions held in Massachusetts in the early 1780's. And most of all it explains why he could vote with Samuel Adams one hundred per cent of the time in the Continental Congress, and agree with the high Federalist Ames more than eighty per cent of the time in the Federal Congress. Ward's concern for the preservation of the Massachusetts puritan-republican social order caused him to act in concert with Samuel Adams while the social order was threatened by British authority and in concert with Ames when he perceived the danger to be from too little government.

This fear further accounts for his disagreement with the Federalists on certain issues, for an overcentralization of power in the federal government was conceivably as great a danger as British authority had been. Neither fear of the people nor his military experience during the Revolution inclined Ward toward centralism, and in this respect he was different from ardent nationalists who viewed extensive central power as the only effective bridle against anarchy, and from

military commanders of the Revolution who had witnessed the ineffectiveness of a government without power. In both the Continental and Federal Congresses Ward consistently voted against measures that promised to enlarge the powers of the Congress and national control over the states. On the few occasions when he did vote for centralizing policies he did so because he saw direct benefits for Massachusetts.

One of the few instances in which Ward voted differently from the New England bloc in the Continental Congress was on the issue of a five per cent duty on imports to be levied by Congress. He believed that Massachusetts was carrying more than its weight in sponsoring the war effort and saw in the measure direct relief for his state. Under no circumstances, however, was he persuaded to support Robert Morris or the office he occupied, the Bank of North America, congressional control of interstate commerce, or land distribution to the states.

For two terms in the Federal Congress Ward maintained this strictly parochial position. He consistently voted against measures such as the uniform militia bill, and the bill for the protection of the frontier, because these kinds of policies promised to concentrate power in the hands of the federal government. Again, his high support of administration policy stemmed from his belief that the interests of Massachusetts were happily aligned with those of the nation. His support for the bill providing for federal loans to the states was prompted by his belief that such a bill held positive benefits for Massachusetts.

Ward's views on representation and the social order perhaps best indicated how his political philosophy worked when applied to a concrete situation, and illustrate what he conceived to be the nature of

the society in which he lived. Ward believed that the people might not, in every instance, be fit to elect their representatives. This attitude, though caused in part by the fact that John Hancock had won the state gubernatorial race, was a common tenet of eighteenth century Whiggish thought. The representative was not supposed to be "an average man who reflected the defects as well as the virtues of his constituents," but he was supposed to be the "best man, the wisest and most virtuous."[10] Therefore it was necessary that the people should sometimes adjust themselves to their representatives' views. Not to do so would be to surrender power to the least capable and deprive society of those most suited to govern. The power that was reserved to the people was not to be used to "express their will but to defend them from oppression."[11]

Given these generally accepted views of republicanism and the place of the people in the eighteenth century social order, Ward's political thought appears both consistent and typical. His alignment with Samuel Adams in the Continental Congress and with Fisher Ames in the Federal Congress merely illustrate the consistency of his political thought. His greatest concern throughout the Revolution, Confederation, and early Federal periods was to preserve the Massachusetts puritan-republican social order.

The numerous stands he took for social stability in the postwar years were no contradiction of republican principles as he understood them. His duty as he perceived it was to take the side of government

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[10] Buel, "Democracy in the American Revolution: A Frame of Reference," 177-178.

[11] Ibid., 189.

against anarchy. Republican government meant social stability, and the people had no more right to impede the function of government than government had to suppress the liberties of the people. The people had responsibilities as well as rights. A well informed and virtuous people had a right to express themselves at the polls, but at that point their rights ended and their responsibilities began. Their obligation was to support government--they might disagree, but the time and the place for disagreement were fixed by law.

Ward's political thought remained consistent throughout his life; it was circumstance that changed. What was needed to preserve the Massachusetts puritan-republican social order in 1775 was revolution, and Ward became a rebel. The Revolution, however, was fought to preserve, not change, the social order. The turbulence of the postwar years were a threat to that order, and Ward reacted by taking a solid stand for order and government. His voting record in the Continental and Federal Congresses as well as his alignment with Samuel Adams and Fisher Ames speaks to the consistency of his concern for the social order that meant so much to him and which he conceived to be the perfect republic.

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