

MOTIVES AND THE UNCONSCIOUS

By

Paul Arthur Kosted,

Bachelor of Arts

Oklahoma State University

Stillwater, Oklahoma

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Thesis Approved:

Robert L Radford

Thesis Adviser

John E. Susky

D. Hurban

Dean of the Graduate College

830826

PREFACE

Many recent developments in philosophy of mind have made possible new ways of looking at the concepts found in psychological theories. The works of Ludwig Wittgenstein, Gilbert Ryle, J. L. Austin, and Alan R. White have pointed a new direction in the examination of ideas which could benefit those working in the field of psychology in their examination of human action. Perhaps the value of the endeavours of these men will be in showing psychologists that an important aspect of their investigation into human behavior is conceptual, i.e., that the scientific findings must ultimately relate to the concepts we have for explaining behavior, and it is how they relate that is at least half of the problem in psychology. As Ludwig Wittgenstein says in Part II of his Philosophical Investigations (p. 232).

The confusion and barrenness of psychology is not to be explained by calling it a 'young science'; its state is not comparable with that of physics, for instance, in its beginnings. . . . For in psychology there are experimental methods and conceptual confusions. . . .

The existence of the experimental method makes us think we have the means of solving the problems which trouble us; though problems and method pass one another by.

I have found in Freudian theory many valuable ideas about human behavior that are marred by what Wittgenstein calls "conceptual confusions". The value of psychoanalysis is something that I do not dispute. Nevertheless psychoanalytic explanations are couched in terms that in many cases need examination; these terms tend not only to

distort its findings, but also to contribute to an unacceptable view of human action.

The unconscious mind as conceived by Sigmund Freud presents some interesting problems for the Twentieth Century analytic philosophers. The purpose of this thesis is to draw out some of these problems, and deal with them as problems in the philosophy of mind.

Moreover, I hope to show that an appeal to the unconscious when dealing with motives confuses the issue. The unconscious forces that Freud saw at work on his patients (forces that the patient himself was unaware of), I believe can be seen in a more natural light as the ordinary sorts of things we call motives, but motives that the agent will not admit to.

I hope to show that the model of mind Freud works with is itself open to severe criticism via Wittgenstein's comments on the problem of other minds. Freud did not ask himself when introducing his theoretical model, "What does this model do to explain how we successfully operate with mental terms." It seems clear after investigating the Freudian model, that Freud can make no sense of common third person predicative sentences such as, "John love Mary", or, "Fred is a patriot", i.e., his model does not allow us to use these sentences with any degree of assurance. Operating on his model of mind any remark about another person's knowledge, likes, dislikes, motives, and aspirations, is a remark about an interior mental state, process, or event that may not be justified by observation of what the person does or says. For, according to Freud, the agent may act in a definite pattern that we would, for example, identify as patriotism, but be motivated by something completely different, i.e., by something that he

himself is completely unaware of. This may or may not be a common occurrence, but it certainly throws doubt on motive ascriptions and breaks down any assurance we may have that a person is motivated by anything we might postulate from watching him or talking to him. This is what is meant by saying that Freud casts doubt on our successful operation with the concept of motive.

My claim is not that Freud makes some sort of verbal slips in doing psychology. Rather he is confused about what we do with certain psychological concepts, particularly the concepts of desire and motive. This confusion leads him to postulate hidden mental realms that somehow control our behavior.

In the last part of my thesis I will show the surroundings of some of the more common cases where a person gives his own motives, and where a person talks about another person's motives. There is a two-fold purpose in doing this; first I hope to show an alternative to Freud's ideas about motives, and secondly I will briefly try to show how motive can be seen according to a modified teleological account as explanations we offer for human action.

In writing a thesis a great deal of advice is necessary. I wish to express my gratitude for the time and patience of Dr. Robert T. Radford, without whose help this thesis could not have been written. I am also indebted to Dr. Thomas C. Mayberry and Gerald Clements, who along with Dr. Radford, aroused my interest in the philosophy of mind, and served as fine examples of what a philosopher is. I wish to express a debt of gratitude to Dr. Walter Scott and Dr. Neil Luebke who have also provided help and encouragement in my academic career at Oklahoma State University and who showed me the value of scholarly work

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CHAPTER I

FREUD'S THEORY OF THE UNCONSCIOUS

In order to understand Freud's concept of the unconscious mind we must get a clear understanding of what Freud intended the concept to explain, and how he viewed the development of unconscious motives, desires, and wishes.

It is clear that Freud was working with a particular model of the mind. In order to understand the unconscious mind and its workings, we must first see the model as a whole, and thus see the unconscious as a part of this whole.

Let us begin with a condensation of Freud's model as found in An Outline of Psychoanalysis.¹ Here he sets out to explain the "psychical apparatus" by studying its development in individuals through the various stages of life. His model of the mind is one of various "mental provinces" which interact with one another and are developed, with one exception, at temporal periods in an individual's life. The exception to this developmental model of the provinces of the mind is the id. "The oldest mental province is the id, it contains everything that is inherited, that is present at birth . . . above all the instincts."²

The mind, according to Freud, is not a tabula rosa, but rather has in it a collection of reactions to stimuli that we as members of the animal kingdom have in common with the rest of the phylum. The id, at a very early stage of development, undergoes a special development, the

outgrowth of which is the ego.³ The ego serves as a mediator between our animal nature (our instinct for survival, propagation, etc.) and the environment. The memory, for instance, is one aspect of the ego that overrides the blind function of our instincts to remind us of past occurrences in which such a stimuli was present and such a result was obtained by such an action. The ego in no way modifies the drives of the id, but rather postpones fulfilling these drives to appropriate times and/or places, that will bring a maximum reward. As such, its development is the earliest real mental development; for here we find a reasoning process directing the activity of the id.⁴ With the ego comes consciousness of the external world. For Freud, the ego includes consciousness and controls, and shapes our reaction to the external world. In Freud's paper "The Ego and the Id", he says;

We have formulated the idea that in every individual there is a coherent organization of mental processes, which we call his ego. This ego includes consciousness, and it controls approaches to motility, . . . it is this institution in the mind which regulates all its own constituent processes, and which goes to sleep at night, though even then it continues to exercise a censorship upon dreams.

The next stage of development of the "mental apparatus" brings rules, norms, and standards into consideration in our decisions about action. The repository for the behavioral norms Freud calls the "superego". The superego is acquired primarily from one's parents and other authority figures, and represents the sum of their norms, rules, and standards. One supposedly feels a need for adopting these standards because of a need for acceptance and love from the parent (and later "parent substitutes"), and a fear of disapproval or rejection if these rules are broken. These two components (love and fear), Freud sees as strong, almost primary, drives. The superego, after its

development, can be seen as conscience, or "moral sense", and as such is a check on the ego and id.⁶

Before acquisition of the superego, the child operates totally on a pleasure-pain principle, with the ego being a device for weighing the pleasure and/or pains that are the consequences of particular actions, and making decisions on only this consideration. The superego works along the same lines, but pleasure and pain take on a new dimension, i.e., one is no longer solely concerned with pure sensory gratification or mere acquisition of status, but one, so to speak, has to "live with his conscience". The pain and pleasure takes on an "internal aspect" and mental anguish over the breach of adopted standards now has to be taken into account in the total picture.

The working of the superego, therefore, goes beyond gross hedonism and makes the pursuit of happiness a subtle activity. Given that one has certain drives for sense gratification and desires for status and elevation over the common run of mankind (the influence of the id and ego), one also has certain standards that cannot be broken in the pursuit of these primary goals. The superego gives one the rules for acting, and if one breaks these rules one pays the price of authority figure rejection and the consequent mental anguish.⁷

From the above skeleton outline of the Freudian analysis of the working of the "psychic apparatus", let us progress to the subtleties of the system. The first point that must be made clear is that the agent is rarely aware of the minor clashes and major battles that take place inside him when decisions must be made, i.e., the agent does not feel the pressures exerted by the id, ego, and superego when they make their demands.

The id, with its animal lusts and blind fears, is seldom felt as a real motivating force because the ego realizes that there are other pleasures besides mere survival or mere copulation and reproduction. The ego suppresses the gross action of the id for the sake of long range, subtle pleasure. The ego is devious and cunning about pleasure, it knows that the pleasure of power, of wealth, and of social standing are longer lasting, and in the end will serve to provide much greater pleasure, than the momentary impulses of the id.

The workings of the ego, however, are just as unprincipled as the workings of the id. What Freud is telling us is that there is perhaps only one thing in man that is innate; the id manifested in gross self interest. Just as the ego and id, the superego also works on the principle of self interest. In the case of the superego, we have self interest re-defined, i.e., the concept of "self interest" now becomes to some extent "self expectation" as defined by the values instilled by one's peers or the expectations of the community in which one is raised.

The ego is the inner process whereby one gets one's "self image", i.e., one's conscious self estimation. In order that one gets a self image that does not conflict with the rules of the superego and the desires of the ego (the desire to see oneself as being in an elevated or superior position), there is instinctual material from the id, past experiences (memories) and desires arising from various stages of fixation of the sexual impulse that must be dealt with.⁸ For one idea that could damage one's self estimation is the idea of the anamalistic nature of the individual as represented by the id.

Freud suggests that in many, if not in most, cases the ego cannot effectively rationalize the phenomenon to be dealt with when it is

presented on a conscious level. The conscious realization of, for instance, sexual feelings toward one's own parents can only cause pain to the man who wishes to see himself as a paragon of virtue (this being the working of the ego). What happens in this case, and cases like this, is that one denies entry of the material to the conscious level. One, so to speak, pushes the material away from conscious consideration. This protective function of the ego Freud calls "repression".⁹

But the damaging urges, memories, and fixations cannot be cancelled out, for there is no such thing for Freud as absolute forgetfulness. What happens to the material, according to Freud, is that it gets buried at a level of the mind that is rarely accessible to consciousness. Putting something out of conscious consideration means hiding it, not losing it. This hidden material is relegated to a region of the mind Freud calls "The Unconscious."¹⁰ Thus the urges of the id are now "contained" at this level of the mind and are not constantly pushing toward the surface as they did when we were infants.

Thus, the unconscious serves as a repository for deep seated desires, urges, and feelings that the ego cannot admit to, i.e., that the ego cannot rationalize with the rest of its picture of itself. However, this material still exerts an influence on the ego in a way that the ego is unaware of, i.e., not by presenting itself for conscious consideration, but rather exerting what Freud calls "psychic pressure."

The rejection from consciousness of certain "psychic material" does not mean that the material does not still make its influence felt. What happens is that the desires, urges, etc., come to consciousness in a disguised form that does not directly affront the ego. They are

disguised to a greater or lesser degree as the material offends the ego. It is in this disguised form that dreams come to us, and it is in many cases how motives for action originate, i.e., as disguised forms of ego damaging, repressed, facts about oneself.¹¹

Since the primary focus of this thesis is on motives, let us look at how, according to Freud, the unconscious affects our motives. To do this, let us look at a case Freud takes up in his sixteenth lecture, "Psychoanalysis and Psychiatry".¹² The case involves a fifty-three year old woman who was married for thirty years. She was brought to Freud by her son-in-law because she was by her unhappiness, making the living situation of her family uncomfortable. The cause of her unhappiness, and the bad feelings between her and her family, Freud discovered, was an anonymous letter she had received informing her that her husband was having an affair with another woman. The patient knew enough about the household situation to be sure that the letter was written by a jealous housemaid and the purported events never occurred. Nevertheless, she acted as if the affair actually took place, i.e., she reproached her husband for having an affair, was suspicious, and showed all signs of doubting his love.

This case is complicated, obviously enough, because the woman is seemingly operating under the delusion that her husband was having an affair, but at the same time she is aware that it is false that her husband is, or was, having an affair, i.e., she acts as if something happened when, in fact, she knows it didn't. Freud's question is, "What motivates this woman's behavior?"

His explanation comes in the form of a series of observations about behavior. Freud comes to see the woman's behavior as the product

of an unconscious motive, i.e., a repressed motive. He first notices that the woman almost invited the servant to write the letter concerning the alleged affair, i.e., the woman introduced into a conversation with the servant the fear she had of her husband being unfaithful with another servant, of whom the servant to whom she was speaking was very jealous. About this event (the conversation) Freud says,

So the delusion acquires a certain independence of the letter; it existed beforehand as a fear--or as a wish?--in her mind. Besides this, the further small indications revealed in the bare two hours of analysis are noteworthy. The patient responded very coldly, it is true, to the request to tell her further thoughts, ideas, and recollections, after she had finished her story. She declared that nothing came to her mind, she had told me everything; after two hours the attempt had to be given up, because she announced that she felt quite well already and was certain that the morbid idea would not return. Her saying this was naturally due to resistance and to the fear of further analysis. In these two hours she had let fall some remarks, nevertheless, which made a certain interpretation not only possible but inevitable, and this interpretation threw a sharp light on the origin of the delusion of jealousy. There actually existed in her an infatuation for a young man, the very son-in-law who had urged her to seek my assistance. Of this infatuation she herself knew nothing or only perhaps very little; in the circumstances of their relationship it was easily possible for it to disguise itself as harmless tenderness on her part.¹³

Freud's analysis of this case, briefly, is that the infatuation the mother-in-law felt for the son-in-law could not come into her conscious mind, i.e., her "self-image". The ego, could not allow for this kind of feeling since it would not match her expectations or the socially instilled norms of behavior between her and her son-in-law. Thus, the infatuation was buried at a very deep level of her mind and exerted a psychic pressure which found release in a modified form. Freud tells us how the "displacement" of the infatuation came into her conscious mind.

If not merely she, old woman that she was, were in love with a young man, but if only her old husband too were in love with a young mistress, then her torturing conscience would be absolved from the infidelity. The phantasy of her husband's infidelity was thus a cooling balm on her burning wound.¹⁴

In this case the question was "What motivated the woman to act toward her husband in this manner?" According to Freud, the answer would be that her repressed desire for her son-in-law exerted a psychic pressure in her unconscious. This caused modification and a distortion of the desire; the distorted desire then manifests itself in her actions. In Freud's analysis, the motive was the infatuation, and can be properly called "an unconscious motive". Freud makes this very clear in the passage following the above cited one.

Of her own love she never became conscious; but its reflection in the delusion, which brought such advantages, thus became compulsive, delusional, and conscious. All arguments against it could naturally avail nothing; for they were directed only against the reflection, and not against the original to which its strength was due and which lay buried out of reach in the unconscious.¹⁵

This example shows the direct workings of the unconscious in the life of one of Freud's patients. The workings of the unconscious in this example, however, do not give us the full picture of the way Freud saw the unconscious mind in operation.

To fully explain Freud's concept let us look at the distinction between three concepts Freud employs; conscious, preconscious, and unconscious. Let us start with that which is conscious. Freud sees that which is conscious as that which we have in mind at any given time, i.e., if one is thinking about one's mother at t_1 then at t_1 , one is conscious of the thought of one's mother. If at time t_2 one is thinking of one's wife then one is conscious of the thought of one's wife,

but not conscious of the thought of one's mother. What happened to the thought of one's mother one had at time t_1 ? According to Freud, the "thought of one's mother" is stored in the mind at the level of the pre-conscious. The preconscious level is one which is neither conscious, for by Freud's schema one has to be thinking the thought for it to be conscious, nor is it unconscious, for this is reserved for that which is repressed as damaging material. But rather this thought is stored at a level where it can be recalled, perhaps easily, perhaps with difficulty; but this material will not be censored by the ego.

The greatest amount of "stored material" according to Freud as unconscious. In the unconscious region of the mind is all that we have repressed, and the bulk of the mental processes which make up our daily "mental life". What he means by this, as explained in An Outline of Psychoanalysis, is that we are not consciously aware of the thought processes that are involved in thinking; all we are aware of is the result of the thought processes. Furthermore, unlike repressed material, the processes of the mind can never be brought to the level of consciousness. The only way we can understand these "processes" is to make plausible inferences about their nature based on what is given in consciousness. These processes, Freud contends, are locked in the "unconscious proper" and can never be brought to the level of the pre-conscious, and thus to the level of consciousness, i.e., this is information that we can never give as first hand experience.

A question which must be asked at this point is, "Does the unconscious exert pressure on the motives of 'normal' people, or is the role of the unconscious in motivation only operative in neurotics?" In Freud's essay, "The Unconscious," he brings up this point.

. . . we may say that as long as the cs conscious controls activity and motility, the mental condition of the person in question may be called normal. Nevertheless, there is an unmistakable difference in the relation of the controlling system to the two allied process of discharge. Whereas the control of the system Cs over voluntary motility is firmly rooted, regularly withstanding the onslaught of neuroses, and only breaks down in psychosis, the control of the Cs over affective development is less firmly established. Even in normal life we can recognize that a constant struggle for primacy over affectivity goes on between the two systems Cs and Pcs preconscious, that certain spheres of influence are marked off one from another, and the forces at work tend to mingle.¹⁶

In referring to the "system Pcs" as a system Pcs" whose sphere of influence is partially involved in controlling the affective (emotional) growth of a normal person, Freud draws a borderline between normal behavior and what he later goes on to describe as abnormal behavior. The abnormal person is one whose emotional life (which includes one's motives) is totally under the control of the unconscious, i.e., he is not conscious of the motives he has at the times he acts. The normal person, on the other hand, is aware of the struggle between forces acting on him (the forces originating in the Pcs) and to some extent can become aware of some of the forces, that is, to know what the motivational forces are.

This, however, still leaves an element of "unknown forces at work" even on a normal person, for the system "cs" is not that of which we are aware, but only that of which we can become aware (and this is usually only through psychoanalysis). Moreover, Freud later goes on to talk about many cases in which the man on the street is caused to do something by unconscious pressure, e.g., girls with beautiful hair oft-times "manage their combs and hairpins in such a way that their hair comes down in the middle of a conversation", or Freud himself forgets

to keep professional appointments that are not lucrative and forgets to catch a train to his brother's in order to see a painting he has wanted to see.

Now the above cases do not involve neuroses; they are the ordinary actions of ordinary people. Furthermore, Freud sees all actions as caused by some mental agency and those acts which we, as agents, may see as uncaused (such as verbal slips and convenient omissions) are really caused by that of which we are not aware; the contents of the unconscious. Freud states this quite candidly in Beyond The Pleasure Principle.

Psycho-analytic speculation starts from the impression gained on investigating unconscious processes that consciousness cannot be the most general characteristic of psychic processes, but merely a special function of them.¹⁷

Thus, unconscious motivation is not a sign of sickness, nor useful only in relation to exceptional cases and unusual circumstances, but rather is an element in our ordinary "mental life". The reason for pointing this out is to bring the unconscious into the realm of that about which we can talk. For in cases of obsession, for instance, we do not know what to say without appealing to some psychological theory. However, contrary to Freud's claims, we do have successful ways of explaining ordinary actions, via motives, that employ non-technical language.

We can see from this outline of Freudian theory that this construct seemingly has great explanatory power. Freud attempts to explain how the past influences the present and he attempts to show the place of instinct in our lives. He also tries to show why we sometimes encounter actions that seem to be at variance with an actor's stated

motives. Moreover, Freud has tried to show us that the motives we do profess (are conscious of) are, in many cases, only a part, or a distortion of, the real reasons we have for acting. Though this theory seems to have explanatory power, I believe that it embodies some confusions about important mental concepts. I shall argue that Freud is particularly confused about the concepts of "motive" and "desire."

FOOTNOTES

¹Sigmund Freud, An Outline of Psychoanalysis, (first published in German in 1914), tr. James Strachey, (New York, 1949).

²Ibid., p. 14.

³Ibid., p. 15.

⁴Ibid., p. 16.

⁵Sigmund Freud, "The Ego and The Id", (1923), tr. Joan Riviere, Great Books of the Western World, ed. R. M. Hutchins, (Chicago, 1952), p. 699.

⁶Op. Cit., pp. 17-18.

⁷Ibid., p. 17.

⁸Ibid., p. 43.

⁹Ibid., p. 43.

¹⁰Ibid., p. 43.

¹¹Ibid., p. 48.

¹²Sigmund Freud, The Complete Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis, (1917) tr. James Strachey, (New York, 1966), p. 243.

¹³Ibid., p. 252.

¹⁴Ibid., p. 252.

¹⁵Ibid., p. 252.

¹⁶Sigmund Freud, "The Unconscious", (1915), tr. Cecil M. Baines, Great Books of the Western World, ed. R. M. Hutchins, (Chicago, 1952), p. 433.

¹⁷Sigmund Freud, "Beyond The Pleasure Principle," (1920), tr. C.J.M. Hubback, Great Books of the Western World, ed. R. M. Hutchins, (Chicago, 1952), p. 646.

CHAPTER II

A CRITICISM OF THE FREUDIAN THEORY OF MIND

I have briefly discussed what Freud says about unconscious motives in the first part of this thesis. I will now critically examine that way of talking about motives.

A basic distinction that Freud does not observe is the distinction between motive and desire. For Freud, all motives are species of desire.¹ Thus, in the example given in the first chapter, (the older woman with the unconscious desire for the younger man), we find the jealousy as a by-product of a repressed affect or emotion which becomes an unconscious desire. That this is a typical example of the workings of the unconscious mind, as Freud sees it, can be seen from examining Freud's work, "The Unconscious," (particularly the chapter on "Unconscious Emotions"). This preference of Freud for explanations in terms of desire leads Paul Ricouer to call Freudian discourse the "semantics of desire".²

If I read Freud correctly, what he says is that the unconscious desire produces a mode of action which is a disguised form of the action that the desire would cause if it were conscious. Thus, one has (in the sense of "possesses"), a desire which one is not consciously aware of. This way of talking raises two questions. First, in what sense can one be said to "have" a desire, and second, what sense can be made of talking about desires as being something that one is unaware of.

In answering the first question let us look at how Freud arrived at the idea that so and so "has" a desire. Let us take, for example, Jones' desire for candy. When Jones is at his office, and is working intently, thinking of nothing but the task at hand, does he then desire candy? Since Jones is thinking only about his work, we must say that he does not want candy at this moment. (A minimal condition for his wanting candy, at a particular moment would be his thinking of candy at that moment.) So what then happens to Jones' desire for candy? It seems that we must say that Jones has a latent desire for candy at any given moment, and his latent desire is something that he "has".

According to Freud, this is the same sense in which Jones "has" all of his desires, both conscious and unconscious. The way Freud approaches "desire: and "have" is in the sense of, "Jones has a nickel". This is what led Freud to posit the Unconscious and Preconscious as regions of the mind; for just as Jones has a nickel that he carries about in his pocket, so must he have a place for carrying around his desires that he is not at that time manifesting. So the phrase, "Jones' desire for candy", is the name of something Jones (when he is at work) carries about in his preconscious.

That Freud indeed thinks this way is obvious on examining a passage for "The Unconscious".

Our mental topography has for the present nothing to do with anatomy; it is concerned not with anatomical locations, but with regions in the mental apparatus, irrespective of their possible situations in the body.³

Here Freud posits a non-spatial realm or region in which our ideas, desires, etc., are located. That he needs this region for the processes of desires and ideas is evident from his claim that ideas and

desires are somehow located in different parts of the mental apparatus, and his insistence that ideas and desires are never lost, but rather are stored. This is evident upon reading the following passage.

With the first, or topographical, is bound up that of a topographical separation of the systems Cs and Ucs and also the possibility that an idea may exist simultaneously in two parts of the mental apparatus-- indeed that if it is not inhibited by the censorship, it regularly advances from one position to the other, possibly without its first location or record being abandoned.⁴

To posit a psychic storehouse in which a person carries about his permanent desire, (or his knowledge, memories, and abilities) is on the one hand unnecessary, and on the other hand misrepresentative of the way we talk about desire. So, as a mode of explanation for Jones having a desire which he is not at this time exhibiting, the adoption of the idea of the pre-conscious is both superfluous and confusing. To see this, let us look at why we say, "Jones likes candy", and notice that the "pre-conscious" is unnecessary in explaining why or what we say when we say this.

If we are familiar with Jones, and have seen that on any occasion when candy is present, he eats all he can get, we can say with justification, "Jones likes candy", without reference to any mental event or object. But one may ask, "What is Jones' justification for his saying that he likes candy?". This presupposes that he needs a justification for this first person statement about himself. But he can remember how well he likes the taste of candy, and he can remember that he oft-times gets cravings for candy. He is not, however, locating a psychic entity when he remembers these things, nor is his liking the taste of candy anything he carries about in any region (spatial or non-spatial); if he carries this liking about anywhere, it is in his tongue.

It could be said that the above is an unfair analysis of Freud's view of desire, i.e., that Freud referred to emotions and desires as processes rather than entities. It is true that he does use the idea of "process" in his later work more predominately than he does "entity", but he does at various points use both. Furthermore, it seems that he is oftentimes using "desire" as if it is a sensation word. I will examine the possibility of desire as an ambiguous internal process, and as an internal feeling or sensation and see if one can make sense of this.

It will now be only fair to see if we can make sense of Freud's idea of "x's desire for y" in terms of the desire being a process, the "process of desire" (of which we are conscious) works like this; at a certain time while Jones is at work or at home he experiences "in himself" a certain feeling (sensation) that makes him want to go out and get candy, or go to the cabinet and get some candy. It is this internal causal feeling (desire) which Jones has that is his desire for candy.

My objection to this is that no one could ever know or even, usually, infer that the cause of Jones' candy eating was the occurrence in him of a feeling, and thus we could never say of Jones with any certainty that he had a desire for candy. Even if Jones reported that he had a feeling (desire) just before he went for the candy this would be very weak evidence that the desire caused the action, since (for all he knows) the cause was some other inner happening simultaneous to the feeling he reported. The main objection to this is that no reasonable person could put any trust in the sort of induction that Freud's view makes necessary when an observer says of Jones, "He must have had a desire for candy at noon today, because he walked six blocks to the

candy store." Moreover, the process view of desire, wanting, knowing, remembering, and all our mental concepts makes nonsense of the ways we, in fact, operate with them.⁵

Let us take another example of this. According to Freud all our mental concepts name processes in the mind. Now, when a mathematics professor gives a test to a student, what is he testing? Is he testing the student's ability to demonstrate what he knows, or is he testing the student's knowledge of the material? If we say that the professor wants a demonstration of knowledge then we can also say that if there is no demonstration then there is no knowledge. Why then is it necessary to think of knowledge as something other than what is demonstrated? To the professor, and to us in our ordinary affairs, what the person says and writes is what he knows; if he can't do it, then we say that he doesn't know it. If the reverse were true we would have to have grade reports that read, "Ability to demonstrate--'C', Knowledge of the subject--undetermined". Isn't it often the case that we think we know something--say a poem--but when asked to recite it we are unable to do so. Shouldn't we say here, "I thought I knew it but in fact I didn't." The place to look for someone's knowledge is in what he says and what he does (this is, in fact, what we do); we do not look at any mental process, for how would this be done? And if this is how we operate with mental concepts, then a reference to "Inner events" is both unnecessary and confusing.

The above is a description of how we use words like "know", "desire", etc. It is not a theoretical structure or recommendation, it is a reminder. The point is this; talking of a mental process in connection with these concepts does not help us, but rather it throws

doubt on the successful way we have of operating with these concepts.

Freud's way of talking about desire in the conscious state makes desire something that is internal, and that which is external is only the manifestation of that internal state, process, or event which is the desire. But our most important use of desire is that of explanation by desire. In explanations by desire we are not concerned with the internal workings of the agent's mind alone, but also with the circumstances of the action.⁶ These circumstances are public and usually involve conventions. For instance, if Jones takes off in the middle of the working day and walks down to the candy store, and a superior asks a colleague, "Why did Jones take off in the middle of the day?", the colleague will explain Jones' action in terms of his desire for candy. The public circumstances on which his analysis rests is his seeing Jones walk in the direction of the candy store, as he has done before in the middle of the day. The conventions that are involved in this explanation by desire are that taking off in the middle of the day is a fairly serious offense for just a walk. So Jones' colleague infers that Jones must have wanted something badly to take time off.

What one does in thinking of desire as an internal event is to lift the concept out of its context of action.⁷ This can be seen if we look at how we use "desire". For instance, we say of a person, if he goes out of his way to obtain candy, that he desires candy. Whereas, if another person is passed a tray of candy at a party and takes only one piece all evening, and doesn't normally buy candy, then we can say, if asked, "X doesn't like (desire) candy". It is contexts like these in which we learn to use "desire" and in which it makes sense, for in circumstances like this we have considerations on which we

decide if so-and-so likes (desire) anything. Here we can answer questions like, "What makes you think Jones likes candy?" If we take words out of their surroundings (make them stand for mental events), then they lose their meaning, for words have meaning just in so far as we can use them and they are always used in some situation or in relation to some situation.

The positing of an inner state, process, or event, which the word "desire" points to or names, in effect, isolates that mental concept from the outer world of human action. If we do this then it makes no sense to say of another person, "He was right when he said Jones has a desire for candy". If we can't say this, then we can't say, "He was wrong when he said Jones has a desire for candy", for right and wrong make sense only insofar as they are opposites.

We cannot say that any characterization of Jones is right or wrong at all if we follow Freud's model to its logical conclusion, and it furthermore raises the irresolvable question, "Is what Jones calls desire the same as what I call desire?", thus making the concept of desire useless. For if we approach "desire" and other mental concepts from Freud's point of view all we have in answer to this question is, "He acts the same as I act when I desire something, therefore he must analogously have the same thing I call desire." But this sentence makes it look as if I identify my desire. If this is true, then by what criteria do I identify my "inner experiences", and how am I to teach others (particularly children) to use "desire"?

In considering the first question, let us look at passage #288 in Ludwig Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations. In this passage, he is showing how we might teach someone about a sensation word (in

this case, "pain").

If he now said, for example: 'Oh, I know what 'pain' means; what I don't know is whether this, that I have now, is pain--we would merely shake our heads and be forced to regard his words as a queer reaction which we have no idea what to do with. (It would be rather as if we heard someone say seriously: "I distinctly remember that sometime before I was born, I believed. . . .').

That expression of doubt has no place in the language game; but if we cut out human behavior, which is the expression of the sensation, it looks as if I might legitimately begin to doubt afresh. My temptation to say that one might take a sensation for something other than what it is arises from this: If I assume the abrogation of the normal language-game with the expression of sensation, I need a criterion of identity for the sensation; and then the possibility of error also exists.⁸

One might ask, "What would a criterion for desire be like?" It looks as if what we would have to do is to remember what the feeling of desire is like and ask ourselves, "Is this similar to the feeling I call 'desire'?". But what check could one run on one's memory of a particular feeling? And how then can we say we remembered rightly? Wittgenstein makes this point very clear in passage #265 of his Philosophical Investigations.

Let us imagine a table (something like a dictionary) that exists only in our imagination. A dictionary can be used to justify the translation of a word X by a word Y. But are we also to call it a justification if such a table is to be looked up only in the imagination?--'Well, yes; then it is a subjective justification.'--But justification consists in appealing to something independent--'But surely I can appeal from one memory to another. For example, I don't know if I have remembered the time of departure of a train right and to check it I call to mind how a page of the time table looked. Isn't it the same here?'--No; for this process has got to produce a memory which is actually correct. If the mental image of the time table could not itself be tested for correctness, how could I confirm the correctness of the first memory? (As if someone

were to buy several copies of the morning paper to assure himself that what it said was true).

Looking up a table in the imagination is no more looking up a table than the image of the result of an imagined experiment is the result of an experiment.⁹

The point is that if desire is an internal process (and that means that the word "desire" refers to an internal process), then no reasonable person could say that he desires anything with any degree of certainty. He could hate the thing which he says he desires; for all he knows, because it is quite possible for him to be mistaken in his identification of that inner feeling.

The second question--about teaching the word "desire"--shows another difficulty with Freud's view. In teaching a sensation word to a child, or a person who does not speak the language, what is required is what David Pears¹⁰ calls a "teaching link". This link is something that the person learning the language can connect with the word, and what is necessary for this is some observable phenomena. This is necessary because if the sensation word were linked to some inner experience, then the teacher would be unable to make the connection for the learner between the word and the situation in which the learner could use the word. That the language of sensation is taught in connection with outward behavior is important because it shows us the way we learn the language and therefore, how we use words like "desire". Freud's thesis about desire then, misrepresents the way language is used.

I would like to suggest that it is this way of looking at "desire" (as a word that refers to internal states, processes, or sensations), that makes the concept of unconscious desire plausible. If one were

clear about how one learns, and operates with, the word "desire", then one would not be inclined to look for hidden (internal) desires, and thus, one would not be inclined to look for hidden desires of which he or another person was unaware.¹¹ For the idea of a hidden (in the sense of that of which one is not aware) desire depends, for its sense, on an idea about desire in general being a mental phenomena (hidden in the sense of being out of reach of an observer), for the idea of an "unconscious desire" entails two things: (1) a desire which is internal, and (2), the person being unaware of this internal desire. "Inner events" are both unnecessary and confusing.

An argument for unconscious desire (and thus, unconscious motives) can be reasonably advanced. When Freud looks for unconscious motivation he does the same sort of thing that we do when we look for conscious motives, but with an important difference that distorts these similarities. The action he looks for is a displacement of the action the desire would elicit if it were conscious. Thus, when Freud analyzes a person's unconscious motives, among other things, he looks at the person's past, at his present circumstances, and at his attitudes. This is a sort of standard thing one does when one wants to get at another person's motives, when that person is unavailable for comment. However we do not look for something that the agent is unaware of, and here the similarities begin to fade.

However reasonable this sounds, I still believe Freud makes some mistakes with this approach.

To understand Freud's use of "motive" and "desire", let us look at the context where Freud uses these terms. The patient that Freud treats either comes to Freud or is brought to him. The patient seeks help from

Freud in solving some emotional difficulty that either he is aware of, or his family or friends notice. In short, the patient needs help from a psychologist. From a person who is mentally or emotionally disturbed, and in the process of gaining help, we find the person asking someone else about his motives for exhibiting behavior that is judged to be strange. This marks an extreme change in the context of motive giving, and it is not unusual that a different way of talking about motives would emerge here.

In the psycho-analytic setting it looks as if the agent is unaware of his own attitudes in connection with the actions he performs.¹² It is then the psycho-analyst's job to supply the missing motives for the patient. But on what grounds does one decide that a person is unaware of his motives? Obviously Freud decides, because he has an agent performing an action for which the agent can give no reasonable explanation, or for which the explanation he gives is highly doubtful.

One may ask appropriately; "What makes Freud think that the patients he treats are not lying to him when they give unacceptable motives and perhaps when they can give no motive at all they are covering something up?" This is a question that a Freudian would not be able to answer; or at best his answer would be very tenuous. For, as I argued earlier, if a desire (motive) could be internal, then only one person could know what that desire is, and everyone else would have to be in the dark unless he tells them truly what his motive is.

One might ask in connection with this, "What sense does it make to say, 'He will never admit that to himself'?" We might say this when we see certain motives behind a person's actions, but we also know the actor well enough to know that the motive we see in his action would

not be one that he would accept. This is particularly true of ego-tists.

Some proponents of the privileged access theory believe that if a person does not eventually acknowledge a motive, then it cannot be said to be his. This is one quite natural outcome of the view that motives and desires are "private", "internal" happenings. For if they are, then there is only one person who can comment on my motives and he has the final word.

However, if one examines court cases where it is the motive of the defendant that is in question, this idea reveals itself as a bit of nonsense. For if we accept only the defendant's word for his motive in shooting Jones, then we would never have any premeditated murders, only cases involving supposed mistaken identity or self defense. Even if the court were trying a mass murderer it would never find him guilty of murder, for he could always say that he was target practicing and several passers by got in the way.

What makes Freud think that there are unconscious motives is that the motives his patients give do not rationalize their actions. This idea, however, relies on another idea, namely, that we are experts on the motives that we avow. But if we do not buy the idea that we are experts on our own motives, then motives we do not acknowledge are not necessarily unconscious (for what made Freud think they were was that his patients disavowed them or would not mention them). Rather, we find people having motives that are not compatible with their "self-image"; and because of this they will not admit to having them. Let us take up a specific case to illustrate how this might work.

In Chapter I of this thesis, I mentioned a case that Freud used

as an example in his lecture "Psycho-analysis and Psychiatry". In this case we find a fifty-three year old woman who chooses to believe that her husband is having an affair with a housemaid, although the evidence clearly indicates otherwise. In response to this belief, the woman becomes extremely jealous of her husband, and reproaches him about many imagined offenses not connected to his imagined unfaithfulness. In other words, she acted as if he had had an affair while being intelligent and well informed enough to know that he did not. The real problem, according to Freud, was that the woman had an unconscious desire for the young man who brought her to Freud (the young man was also her son-in-law). The desire was repressed because of the damage that a conscious recognition of it would do to her self-image. In short, she felt guilty about her infatuation for a younger man who was her son-in-law. The only thing that could help salve her unconscious wounds was if she could discover that her husband was in a similar situation, and in a sense this would be an absolution.

It is interesting to note what Freud says about the process of psycho-analysis in this situation.

The patient responded very coldly, it is true, to the request to tell her further thoughts, ideas, and recollections, after she had finished her story. She declared that nothing came to her mind, she had told everything; after two hours the attempt had to be given up, because she announced that she felt quite well already and was certain that the morbid idea would not return. Her saying this was naturally due to resistance and to the fear of further analysis. In these two hours she had let fall some remarks, nevertheless, which made a certain interpretation not only possible, but inevitable, and this interpretation threw a sharp light on the origin of the delusion of jealousy.¹³

This example, I believe, gives us an important insight into how Freud uses the terms "unconscious desire" and "unconscious motive".

For here it seems obvious that the ordinary use of the sentence, "She will not admit this to herself", plays the same role as "unconscious desire". When Freud encounters the resistance on the patient's part, what could be happening is that the patient suddenly comes to see a pattern in her behavior which she finds repulsive (this is by Freud's own admission). Because the patient has something to hide, this does not mean that that thing is completely hidden from her. Perhaps Freud started to tie together the verbal slips and pointed out to her the fact that she displayed unduly affectionate behavior to her son-in-law. The woman sees that perhaps she did at one time or the other wish she were in her daughter's position and she had noticed how sexually attractive her son-in-law was. But when confronted with this evidence, she refuses to recognize (admit) that she was sexually attracted to her son-in-law. Perhaps she rationalizes her actions toward her son-in-law as a normal display of affection to a relative, and her feeling toward him as a natural feeling one has to the person who married her daughter.

The fact that people do rationalize their motives and in many cases not those of other people tends to make one believe that one is not in a particularly favorable position in always giving an unbiased assessment of one's own motives. It can be argued that when a person gives his own motives to another person, what he does is to tell that person what his considerations were when he acted as he did.¹⁴ I don't think I will be claiming too much when I say that we oftentimes try to see what we do and what we feel in the best possible light, whereas when we judge the actions of others with whom we have no emotional ties, we tend to be fair, or critical.

It appears then, that what Freud would call an unconscious

motive is one to which the agent who has it will not admit. What Freud goes on to do in psycho-analysis, is to give his assessment of the patient's motive, which is a more honest evaluation of the patient's actions. The success of the psycho-analysis depends on the patient's acceptance of his motive as the analyst sees them. This forces the patient to recognize the attitudes that he has for what they are, and thus to take the positive action toward changing them, or accepting this part of his or her character as described by the analyst.

In the previous example, it may be the case that the woman did, to some extent, recognize her infatuation with her son-in-law. This may have produced an "internal struggle" in which she alternated between blaming herself for feeling as she does, and rationalizing her feelings. Freud may have been right in attributing the cause of her actions toward her husband to her infatuation with her son-in-law, and her feeling that if her husband was in a similar situation she would be somewhat absolved. However, he does not need the idea of an unconscious motive to bring this off, for what makes this explanation plausible is that this is, in fact, the way people sometimes operate when they have a conscious motive, i.e., we are familiar with non-mysterious cases of self-absolution proceeding along similar lines.

To put what I have been saying in another way, there is no practical difference between what Freud calls a "repressed or unconscious motive or desire", and a more familiar case of a person not being honest with himself or with others about his considerations in acting. Moreover, psycho-analysis could proceed with less doubtful assumptions if it did change its concept of unconscious desire.

To carry this point a bit further, let us look at an idea

introduced by Jean-Paul Sartre in his book Being and Nothingness.¹⁵ In his chapters on "Bad Faith" and "The Unconscious", he presents a devastating attack on Freud's model of man. "Bad faith", in Sartre's terminology, is lying to oneself. Sartre sets out to distinguish lying in general from lying to oneself. Truth is transcendent (outside of oneself) and this sort of truth is what the ordinary liar is hiding. By this he means that when a person intends to deceive, he does it as a conscious act. People, in this way, lie to others, i.e., the lie is a hiding of truth from the "Other" (a person or thing other than the liar).

In "bad faith" there is no separate deceiver and deceived; they are one. What does this do to the person practicing "bad faith"? The person can not at one and the same time lie to himself and be deceived. To lie is a conscious act, and the "unity of consciousness" requires that one know of the lie. Now, if one knows of the lie, how is one perpetually deceived? The answer Sartre poses is that this is a very unstable state which never the less achieves a durable form in a way of life, i.e., one, so to speak, "lives out the lie".

Sartre expands on how bad faith works in Freudian theory in his chapter on "The Unconscious". The psycho-analysis of Freud, he says, splits the unity of consciousness into ego and id, thus making a lie without a liar. The id, according to Freud, is not a part of me, i.e., I have no available contact with it, and I cannot discover it without help (and then only to a limited extent). The ego is me, but is influenced by the id. Here, the id can be the liar, but is not me (therefore, it is "the Other") and can influence behavior, i.e., I can be lied to by myself without holding myself responsible for the lie, because part of my "self" (the id) is the "Other" (not me, therefore

like another person). The id serves as a censor, blocking the contents of the "unconscious complexes" from view, but yet letting these "complexes" influence my behavior.

But it has been found in certain stages of psycho-analysis that the subject offers resistance to the probings of the analyst. This, the analyst says, is the action of the id breaking through the psychic make up. But we have two things at work here, the id (censor) and the complex (what is to be revealed via psycho-analysis). The id then must know what is being held back because it is censoring that complex from the analyst. The id, therefore, must choose this complex to hold back, and be aware that it is doing so in order to function. It functions to elude the analyst, having a goal in mind, and therefore must in some sense be aware of the direction toward which the analyst is aiming, as well as the complex it is hiding. The censor in doing this exhibits an awareness of itself as repressing a truth and this brings Sartre's circle round--the censor is in "bad faith".

All the verbage and special terms the psychoanalysts have thrown up is to no avail. For in this phenomenon (resistance in the last stage of psychoanalysis), we see a self-aware "thing" which can no longer be seen as the other-than-myself because it makes conscious choices in influencing my behavior and choices that I am aware of. All they have shown is a dual activity within a unity which is me (my awareness, my thoughts, my actions).

Sartre also accuses Freud of not fully explaining the connection between the "repressive drive" and our actions. We can not and do not apprehend the "drive" that affects us; it is at a distance, but yet it interacts with the ego, or our everyday reactions, actions, and

awareness. There is a mystical link that Freud has not supplied (as Sartre has shown, this cannot be the censoring device, because of its self-awareness).

Sartre gives an example of what psychoanalysts would refer to as an example of the censoring device that actually is an example of bad faith; the frigid wife. The wife consciously avoids the pleasure of sexual intercourse by distracting herself consciously during the act. Where the Freudians want to say that what is the cause of her frigidity is some "deeply rooted" and hidden phenomenon. Sartre wants to say in effect "It is all in plain view, she distracts herself, appealing to anything more is unwarranted and unjustified".

There is, I believe, another possible interpretation for what Freud calls an unconscious motive that does not require as harsh an indictment against the person involved as Sartre's view. It seems to be the case that our actions are not always transparent to us, i.e., they proceed from a minimum of thought and reflection. If at a later date we do reflect on the promptings for our action, we oftentimes do, at that time, construe what we did in light of the way we would like to see ourselves, i.e., we posit the kinds of attitudes that we approve of because we like to see ourselves as having certain praiseworthy character traits and motives.

These revisions of Freud's view would not mean that we completely abandon psychoanalysis, but the psycho-analyst would have to look at his patients, not as persons on whom mysterious forces were at work, but rather as people who need to be taught to be more self-aware and less guilt ridden about natural inclinations. In many cases (e.g., psychopathy) the analyst might serve as a moral adviser, making

patients more responsible for their actions and perhaps showing them what is in their best interest. There are, in fact, tendencies in psychology that point in this direction.

FOOTNOTES

¹He ofttimes uses "wish", but these uses are synonymous with "desire".

²Paul Ricoeur, Freud and Philosophy, tr. Denis Savage, (New Haven and London, 1970) p. 363.

³Sigmund Freud, "The Unconscious", (1915), tr. Cecil M. Baines, Great Books of the Western World, ed. R. M. Hutchins, (Chicago, 1970) p. 431.

⁴Ibid., p. 432.

⁵See footnote number 17 in Chapter II.

⁶There are other uses of "desire", but for Freud there are no transitory desires since all of our wishes, desires, memories, etc. are stored in the preconscious. Therefore we are concerned here with only those desires which are relatively permanent features of a person.

⁷This is an idea borrowed from an unpublished paper by Konstantin Kolenda entitled "The Recovery of the Human" which he delivered at the Mountain-Plains Philosophical Confernece at the University of Colorado, October 14, 1971.

⁸Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, 2nd edition, tr. G.E.M. Anscombe, (Oxford, 1958) pp. 98-99.

⁹Ibid., p. 93.

¹⁰David Pears, Ludwig Wittgenstein, (New York, 1969-70), pp. 158-166.

¹¹Here we are not concerned with the "secret desires" that one tries to hide from another person. Rather we are concerned with Freud's view of desire as necessarily hidden, private, and internal process, state, or event. Neither are we concerned with the inarticulated desires, for these show themselves in an agent's actions and are therefore not the most likely candidates for the privileged access interpretation that Freud is working with, since the agent can come to articulate these desires with the aid of an observer.

¹²The importance of attitudes in connection with motives will be discussed in Chapter III.

¹³Sigmund Freud "Psychoanalysis and Psychiatry", (1915), tr. James

Strachey, Great Books of the Western World, ed. R. M. Hutchins (Chicago, 1970), p. 243.

¹⁴I will argue for this position in Chapter III.

¹⁵Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness, tr. Hazel E. Barner, (new York, 1966).

CHAPTER III

A POSITIVE ANALYSIS OF THE CONCEPT OF MOTIVE

In this, the last chapter of my thesis, I will give an elucidation of the concept of motive. In this account there will be no theoretical structure employed; nothing more than a simple description will be used to explain how the concept is employed in our language. I will show how the giving of motives is the giving of an explanation; and I will show how motives are related to wants, desires, attitudes, and character traits. These matters are all tied together in a teleological account of motives. This elucidation shows how we use the term "motive" in a successful and non-mysterious way, and thus shows the Freudian analysis to be an unnecessary alternative.

The Role "Motive" Plays In Our Language

The first consideration involved in this examination should be the question, "What rôle does the concept of motive play in our language?" To deal with this question, let us look at some typical sorts of cases where motive giving is practiced. The following are four such types of cases that suggest themselves:

- (1) Cases where a person other than the agent is answering questions about an agent, such as,
"What made him do that?"
"What caused him to do that?"

"What prompted him to do that?"

"What persuaded him to do that?"

"What led him to do that?"

"What was his purpose in doing that?" or

"What was his motive for doing that?"

- (2) Cases where the agent is answering questions like the above about himself:
- (3) Cases where an agent spontaneously avows his motives;
- (4) Cases where one person, without being asked, volunteers what he believes to be another person's motive (or motives) for doing certain acts.

In the first type of case, what is being asked by these questions? How do people arrive at answers to such questions about other people's motives? One might be asking, in the above questions, what is "behind" the actions that the agent performed, i.e., what the agent saw in his own actions. The answer would enable one to find out more about the agent or more about the action. When we find out about the motive for which the agent performed an action, that action takes on new significance, or a new dimension, in light of the agent's attitude.

When we try to determine the motives of another person (when we answer questions of the sort mentioned in number one), what we do is show how the actions of the agent fit in with the intentions, goals, or personality of the agent. The ways we do this are various. For some actions it takes a familiarity with the agent to posit motives; but for other actions the agent does not have to be known at all. An instance of the latter sort would be a detective determining the motive for the murder of a rich man who is found on some back street with an empty

wallet. An instance of the former would be, for example, a person who is trying to determine his friend's motive for leaving his wife.

In the murder case the detective would use as evidence in determining the motive of the murderer the fact that the rich victim usually carried large sums of money, and the fact that he was found in a rough part of town where robberies are often committed. These considerations would lead him to believe that the motive for murder was robbery, i.e., that the person who murdered him wanted money and expected that the victim would have money.

In the case of the man leaving his wife, his motive is less transparent. If the person's motive was being discussed by a number of his friends, it is likely that there will be some contention over why he left her. Character traits might be mentioned, e.g., that Mr. X was an irresponsible person. Certain facts will be brought to bear, e.g., Mr. X was known to be seeing his secretary. His friends might infer from this that he left his wife in order to be with his secretary.

In the first case we have a detective explaining what he saw as the cause of the murder, or the intention of the murderer, by examining the circumstances of the murder. In the second case we have friends of Mr. X explaining why he left his wife by citing certain things they know to be true of Mr. X or his situation. It is clear in both cases that the question is about the various considerations the actor has in deciding to do what he did, and the evidence one accepts in positing the motives of another person are of a factual nature, rather than just a matter of opinion. For instance, in the case of the detective, it is a fact that the victim was found in an area where the crime rate is high, and it is a fact that he ordinarily carries large sums of

money, etc. In the case of the man who left his wife we might cite the fact that he behaved in an irresponsible manner in many instances, or the fact that on the night before his disappearance he was dancing with his secretary, and was known to desire her company.

In the second category of motive giving, where the agent gives his own motive, the explanation of the action in question is of a different nature, and the agent may be doing one of several different things. For instance, he might be attempting to "get off the hook" for something he did. Perhaps the agent is seen shooting his neighbor's dog, and the neighbor asks the agent for his motive, implying perhaps that the agent shot the dog out of spite. The agent tells his neighbor that the dog was exhibiting signs of hydrophobia and that he shot the dog in order to protect himself and his neighbors from a rabid dog, thus exculpating himself from implied charges that he did something cruel or unwarranted.

People sometimes carry on another activity with first person motive givings which we may call "information giving". For instance, two people meet at a social gathering; let us say one is a young man and the other a young woman. They talk for awhile and become interested in each other. The young man tells the young woman about himself; that he was in school and during his senior year he quit going to classes and took a trip to California. The girl questions him as to why he went to California, rather than staying in school and graduating. In answering the question, the boy tells the girl something about what kind of a person he is; he tells her about how he sees college as meaningless and the value he finds in first hand experience,

and that he is a natural romantic and is attracted by the bright lights of Hollywood.

In telling the girl these things he is not trying to exculpate himself from any charge, because none was made. He perhaps wants to impress the girl by showing how adventurous he is, and tells her about his senior year just so she will ask him about his motives for leaving school. In effect he is giving her information about his wants, desires and expectations.

In the above case, the boy might not have even waited for the girl to ask him why he left school, but proceeded to tell her straightaway why he did it. (This would be a case of the third type; spontaneous motive giving.) Here, though, the purpose of his telling her his motive for leaving school would still be to give information about himself.

An instance of the fourth type (spontaneous third person motive assessment) would be a spontaneous character assessment. The speaker, Mr. Jones, is telling his friend, Mr. Smith, about another person, Mr. Johnson. Jones gives, as a basis for his claim that Johnson is a good fellow, a situation where Johnson donated a large sum of money to the United Fund. Not only did Johnson give the money to the United Fund, Jones claims, but he did it from an altruistic motive, i.e., he did not give the money for the purpose of a tax deduction.

In this instance, Mr. Smith is receiving information about Johnson, (that he gave money) and he is also receiving information as to why Jones thinks that this was altruistic; his desire was for the well being of others and not for selfish purposes.

Let us consider these ordinary functions of motive giving, and

see if there is a common factor among them that would define the concept of motive.

In the examples of third person motive givings, the predominant purpose for the motive giving is for showing why something was done. We give motives to explain the action via the wants, goals, or the intention of the actor. This can be seen by noticing, first of all, that the motive giving is in answer to a question about the actor's motive, and by noticing that in the examples of this sort that were given the facts about the action from an observer's viewpoint are known and what is problematic is the "inspiration" for the action. Giving the inspiration for the action via motive givings redescibes the action in terms of how the agent saw it, for it is assumed by the questions asked that this is what is wanted, i.e., not more facts about the action, but a redescription in terms of the agent's interest. So in the first example, what is asked for in the third person motive giving is a redescription, i.e., an explanatory description in terms of the interests of the agent. As in all explanations, there is evidence for the acceptance of one explanation by motive, rather than another (this is pointed out in the detective example and the example of friends of the delinquent husband offering a motive for his behavior).

In first person motive givings as an answer to a question, the function of the motive giving is essentially the same as third person motive givings. The example of exculpation by motive giving lets the person who shot the dog off the hook by his saying, in effect, "I did not see myself as performing a vicious or unwarranted action", by saying, "The dog exhibited all the signs of hydrophobia". Thus, the agent explains the action in terms of what he saw in it; i.e., he redescibes

it as having a praiseworthy goal. When someone exculpates himself by way of giving a motive (as in the example of the man shooting his neighbor's dog), he can be seen as saying, "This may be what you saw in this action, however, I saw something else." Again, there are considerations of a factual nature that could serve as evidence for the motive explanation of the action.

In the other example of motive givings of this type (the "information giving" example) the elements of explanation and grounds for its acceptance are present. The young man in this example can be seen as explaining what kind of person he is by citing something he did and telling why he did it. The citing of the action alone does not give this kind of information about a person unless the motive is transparent. If the young lady finds out later that her young man does not do the sorts of things one expects an adventurous person to do, then she will have cause to doubt his explanation of why he quit school.

In the last example, what Jones is doing is giving Smith reasons for believing that Johnson is an altruistic person. He does this by way of telling Smith about Johnson's action, and explaining how this action can be seen as altruistic. He does this by pointing out Johnson's motive, e.g., by showing that Johnson did not give the money to the United Fund as a tax write off, and no other motives are apparent. He redescribes the simple act of giving money in terms of ideals, i.e., in reference to what Johnson saw as a desirable humanistic end. In doing this, Smith gives information about Johnson by pointing out what Johnson saw as the ends of his action, i.e., that for the sake of which Johnson did the action.

It is clear from the exposition of the examples that common to

all these cases of motive given is the explanatory role of the motive given. A. R. White, in his The Philosophy of Mind, recognizes this phenomenon. He writes, "The word 'motive' signifies a kind of explanation, not a factor that can occur in explanation."²

Let us examine this claim and see why White holds it. First of all, White sees a "factor in explanation" as the kinds of things one mentions when explaining why the person did whatever he did. For example, we may explain an action by citing an inclination or desire that the agent had, and by doing this we supply the motive. This idea seems quite odd until one notices that when one asks for a motive, one is asking for a redescription of the action in terms of the further ends for the sake of which the action was done. (This can be seen in the examples given above.)

We can ask about John's motive by asking, "Why did John do that?", or "What made John do that?", or "What was John's reason for doing that?"; these general questions can be used in asking, "What was John's motive for doing that?". In each case we get an explanation, and in a motive explanation certain of the agent's desires, etc., are mentioned as factors. By mentioning these factors, the motive for the action is given, i.e., a certain sort of explanation (a motive explanation) is given by giving the agent's wants, desires, goals, etc.. For instance, I may desire a pack of cigarettes and thus walk to the store to get them. If someone wants to know my motive for going to the store I will tell them about my desire for cigarettes. Both a desire and a motive must be for something, but a desire for some object furnishes a motive for doing what one must do to obtain that object. The motive is not

for the object, the desire is, i.e., the motive is for an action (going to the store), the desire is for the cigarettes.

To ask for a motive is to ask for a particular type of explanation. We give a motive type explanation in terms of wants and desires.

Here we can see another important distinction. White points out that the source of much confusion in philosophy of mind has been caused by an identification of motive with desire. The above explanations of what asking for a motive entails shows this important distinction. To make a more solid case for the distinction, White goes on to show that there are things that can be said of desires that cannot be said of motives. Motives cannot be lifelong, or momentary, fierce or gnawing, satisfied or unsatisfied, nothing arouses or thwarts them, they cannot be cultivated, produced or suppressed, nor can they occupy one's mind. (These are the kinds of things one can say about desires.)³ Motives are always for the sake of something; desires are always for some specific thing, which we call its object). Thus, we see that the older woman in Freud's example (the case of the misplaced jealousy) has a motive for acting jealously, not a desire for being jealous (the grammatical oddity of this phrase is enough to show the point). All of the above points can be easily seen if one keeps in mind the uses we have for the concept of motive--asking for explanations, and giving explanations.

One might object to this last statement by way of saying that not enough evidence has been marshalled for this conclusion. Evidence for a grammatical claim such as this can be produced by showing the circumstances in which the concept is employed.

Writers such as P. H. Nowell-Smith and Gilbert Ryle believe that

the concept of motive is employed only when the action in question is disreputable or strange.⁴ Although this analysis is not correct, as I believe my examples indicate, I do believe that they have struck on something that is fairly common in the background of the use of the concept. It seems true that if the motives for which a person does something are transparent (motives such as generosity and politeness often being of this sort), we do not question them about why they did the action in question. It is when we are puzzled as to the considerations of the actor for doing what he did that we are most often inclined to ask about motives. For instance, when someone acts out of character, we might wonder about new considerations upon which he is acting. But we never wonder what consideration a person is acting on if he acts in character, if we know the person's character to begin with.

What this points out is simply that in many cases we ask about motives for strange and disreputable acts simply because we want an explanation of unusual behavior. We generally do not need to ask about common-place behavior. But what if the person in question is a disreputable person, motivated by the most base of motives; then we ask about his motives if it looks as if he was motivated by honesty. With cases such as this, I suggest, Ryle's and Nowell-Smith's ideas about motives break down.

Motive and Attitudes

In the analysis of motive I have given, I have from time to time employed the idea that what motives tell us about is an agent's considerations in doing what he did. Let us now look further at what these considerations may be.

Let us consider the case of a man, Mr. Jones, who is invited to a formal dinner where his associates and his boss are present. When it is time for dessert to be served, a large plate containing chocolate cake is passed from guest to guest. When it comes to Jones, instead of taking a piece and passing it on, he sits it down in front of him and starts grabbing cake with both hands. He takes about eight pieces and passes the plate on, depriving his employer of his piece. After dinner a friend of Jones says to him, "You certainly like chocolate cake". Jones replies, "What makes you think I like cake, I didn't eat a bite, and as a matter of fact, I hate chocolate".

Now assuming we know that Jones likes his boss, and doesn't want to offend him, what makes his reply so surprising? Well, first of all, he exhibited all the signs of liking chocolate cake, while denying that he did. What Jones did not do was to supply us with a motive for his behavior.

P. H. Nowell-Smith, in his book, Ethics, claims that behind every motive explanation is a "for the sake of" clause which tells us for what consideration the action was done.⁵ In the above case we would expect Jones to tell us the end for the sake of which he embarrassed himself in front of his employer and friends, for we expect that he had a value that he held above the opinions of the other guests.

This consideration, or value, Nowell-Smith says, can be expressed in terms of a pro or con attitude. This is why Jones' answer to our question is so odd; we expect him to have a pro-attitude toward chocolate cake and he says he doesn't. To illustrate Nowell-Smith's ideas of "for the sake of" clauses and pro and con-attitudes in motive

explanation, let us see if we can interpret the examples given at the first of this chapter in these terms.

The examples for the third person motive use are, (1) a detective investigating a murder, and (2) friends attributing a motive to a man who ran away from his wife. In the first case the detective concludes that the man was murdered for his money. Here we could say that he was murdered for the sake of his money, and in this context, this is just another way of saying "for". It is redundant to also say that the murderer has a pro-attitude toward money, as we have said as much when we say, "The victim was murdered for his money". We might say that the murderer wanted the money and in saying this we mention the murderer's wants, and this is to cite a pro-attitude of the murderer.

In the second example, the friends of the man who left his wife decide that he had been seeing his secretary and left his wife for his secretary. Now, we don't want to say that he left his wife for the sake of his secretary, but rather that he left his wife out of love for his secretary. However, this is another way of saying, "He left his wife because of his desire to be with his secretary", or, "He left his wife for the sake of his secretary's feelings". Here, we mention the agent's desires in the first quoted sentence, but not in the second quoted sentence. In the second sentence it is obvious that the agent has a pro-attitude toward his secretary's feelings, though the pro-attitude words ("want", "desire", "interested in", "like", etc.) are not mentioned. But it can be said that he wanted to please his secretary. This last sentence mentions "want", which is, according to Nowell-Smith, a pro-attitude word.

A. R. White in The Philosophy of Mind also sees the concept of desire as being related to motive in this way. He writes, "Whenever that it can be said that someone acted from such and such a motive, it can also be said that he wanted so and so. Greedy men want possessions, ambitious men want power, vindictive men want to get their own back, vain men want to show off and patriotic men want to serve their country."⁵

This is not to say that if a person does something, just because he wanted to do it, he had a motive for doing that thing. Ofttimes wants go no further than just wants, i.e., the idea of a want (as in, "I want a piece of candy") is in many cases the most simple or basic explanation for an action. For example, it would be very odd to ask a man why he wanted a piece of candy if we already know that he likes candy. All he could say here is, "I just want it".

We can see from this that wanting a thing is not the same as having a motive for doing some action to obtain that things, i.e., wants do not always produce motives. Wanting X is not always a motive for X. But wanting Y is a motive for doing X, if X is likely to lead to Y. Wants are not as closely related to the concept of motive as some have thought, but are a factor in a motive explanation.

A Teleological Account of Motives

From what has already been said in this chapter, it follows that when we ask for a motive (i.e., a certain sort of explanation) we are asking about what a person wanted from his action. This is another way of saying that we want to find out the considerations upon which the agent acted. P. H. Nowell-Smith had the same thing in mind and

called wants "pro-attitudes" or "con-attitudes". He also recognized that this analysis necessitated a teleological approach to motives; the "for the sake of" clause that is necessary in motive explanation is just another way of saying, "for this end". He also claims that pro-attitudes and/or con-attitudes will be mentioned in the "for the sake of" clause. Another way of putting this is that when I give a motive explanation I will tell you my wants, or my aspirations, or my desires, my feelings, or dispositions. These are all factors in a motive explanation and they involve attitudes (either pro or con). Pro- and con- attitudes, however, are used in other ways than just to give motive explanations, and where they appear they will not always be used for this job.

In presenting a teleological approach to motives, I am relying on an article by N. S. Sutherland entitled "Motives as Explanations".⁷ According to Sutherland, there are several classes of actions for which motive explanations are not appropriate. Such acts as habitual acts, reflex acts, acts which were performed merely for the sake of performing them, acts which are direct expressions of a mood or an emotion, and unintentional acts, are not the sort of actions for which people have motives. People who throw ashtrays out of anger, or yawn out of boredom, or whistle as they walk are not said to be performing acts with something else in mind, i.e., they would not be able to give a motive explanation for these actions in terms of something outside the act itself.

Sutherland suggests that these types of actions have one thing in common; they are not done in order to achieve some further end. "The great majority of motive explanations of actions do fit the paradigm

of explaining the action by assigning a further end towards the accomplishment of which the action was directed."⁸ His paradigm for motive explanations is, "He did X because he wanted Y", or "He did X in order to achieve Y". If, for example, we say that person's motive was ambition, that is to say that he did what he did in order to obtain a more important position, or something like this. If we say that a person was motivated by revenge, we could also say that he did what he did because he wanted to repay someone for an injustice.

Sutherland claims that an examination of character describing words shows that nouns formed from them can function as motive words only to the extent that they describe ends that a person could pursue. "Cowardice", for example, is a character-describing term that can be given as a motive for a person who seeks to avoid danger.

Sutherland also notices that when we ask for a motive we are asking for an explanation, and the explanation will be in terms of what the agent wanted from his action. Sutherland supports this thesis by showing that certain terms can function in motive explanations while others do not, just to the extent that they do explain behavior in terms of an agent's expectations (ends). He shows how "cowardice", "ambition", and "vindictive" (which are all character-describing words) can give an agent's goals and thus, function as motive explanations. While other character describing terms such as "conceit" and "timidity" do not perform this function and are not appropriate to motive explanations.

In support of his contention that motives are only used as explanations he says, "The question of a motive can only arise when there

is an action to be explained: there is no such thing as simply having a motive--we only have a motive for doing something."⁹

To argue further for this teleological approach, I will draw some conclusions about actions for which motives are given, and together with some of the other conclusions arrived at in this chapter, they will provide premisses for an argument for approaching motives teleologically.

(1) Motive explanations are given only for purposeful acts. This can be seen from looking at what someone might say when asked, "What made you do that?" or, "What prompted you to do that?" or, "How did you come to do that?" or, "What was the point in your doing that?" or "What made him do that?", etc. If the person in question says, "It was an accident", or, "I (he) didn't do it on purpose", or, "Someone made me (him) do it", these serve as question stopping statements, i.e., after this sort of answer we do not go on further to ask about motives, for we know there is none, or at best it was only done because of coercion. After the person has said, "It was an accident", what further could he say except to perhaps tell you how the accident happened, and this would not be a motive giving statement. Furthermore, accidents and coercions are not something a person does; they are things that happen to a person.

The question as to whether these purposeful acts can be described as being unconsciously purposeful was considered in the second chapter. Here it is the idea of purposefulness that is important, for even in unconsciously motivated behavior the purpose can be discovered, but it is not readily available to the agent. These explanations of actions also redescribe the action, as do motive explanations. The important

difference is that the explanation is not in terms of anything the agent wanted from his action.

(2) Motive explanations are only asked for in connection with actions that a person performs for which he has a reason for wanting to see the action done. As we have seen from the examples, the explanatory function of motive givings serves to let us see the action in terms of how the agent saw it. This is why we ask for a motive, simply to have the action re-explained in terms of the considerations of the agent. This presupposes that the agent had considerations, and these will be related to something in the action, or something the action accomplished. The agent may sometimes have to reflect in order to become clear about the considerations upon which he acted, i.e., what he saw in the action. Nonetheless, if a rational person performs an action for which he can be held accountable, we expect him to be able to tell us what he wanted from that action.

We have seen that the factors of a motive explanation are desires, wants, and other attitudes. The explanation of action by motive is often given by sentences such as "I did . . . because I wanted money", or, "My desire for ice cream made me act impolitely", or simply, "I like ice cream". But what if we asked a person why he did a certain thing, and he said, "I had no reason for doing it". We would not regard this utterance as giving a motive because this sentence betrays a compulsion or is one of the five kinds Sutherland mentions as not being amenable to motive explanations. The reason for this is that we expect a motive that a person gives us to explain the action; this sentence does not give us any information about the actor in relation to how he saw the action.

(3) All that is being claimed by this teleological account is that motive explanations are teleological explanations, i.e., explanations about the goals of action. When a pro-attitude is used in giving a motive explanation, it will tell us what the action was meant to bring about (a satisfaction of a want or desire, the promoting of a situation about which the actor has a pro-attitude, etc.)

The strongest objection against this interpretation is offered by Donald Davidson in "Actions, Reasons, and Causes".¹⁰ His thesis is that a primary reason for performing an action consists in a pro-attitude toward some property of the action and a belief that the action performed by the agent will bring about this property. Davidson claims that the primary reason a person has for doing an action is the cause of the action. Thus, motives tell us about causes of actions, and ends of action are themselves causes of action. "Central to the relation between a reason and an action it explains is the idea that the agent performed the action because he had the reason." (p. 72) One is tempted to say, "Of course he performed the action because he had a reason. Is that all you mean by 'the reason caused him to act?'" He has more than this in mind, of course, but it is very hard to determine just what he means by "cause." He does not want to take a determinist position, as he makes clear in the last part of the article, but he wants the force of the determinists' argument (if a person has a reason, then he acts). Charles Taylor, in his article, "Relations Between Causes and Actions", points out that Davidson is using the concept of "reason" in analogy with another concept, "craving"; . . . let us imagine a tribe in whose vocabulary there was a word, let us translate it 'craving', which designates a strong and irresistible desire,

such that if a man didn't do X (or try his damndest) it couldn't be said of him that he had a craving for X."¹¹ It is this very strange usage of pro-attitude or "reason" (as in the French concept "raison d'etre") that makes Davidson's whole thesis seem plausible, if we buy this usage, and implausible if we don't. For Davidson's thesis needs precisely this kind of use of "reason" to make reasons causal.

Taylor has another idea that is very much to the point; he rightly claims that by the very nature of the connection between wants, desires, attitudes, and the action itself, we can always give the motive for a person doing Y in terms of wanting X to be done or his pro-attitude towards the accomplishment of X, etc. As a causal explanation, this has the same force as explaining why opium puts one to sleep by saying that it possesses dormative powers.

What the proponents of a causal theory of motive explanation need to do to make their theory meaningful is to show a uniform contingent relationship between wants and actions, such that given a want, an appropriate action will be forthcoming. But it is obvious that we have many wants which we may tell our friends about, but never act on. A person may be working at a very boring job and want very much to quit, but keeps on working because he knows he is doing better financially at his present job than he would if he changed jobs. A poor woman may want very much to own a Paris designer original, but sees that there is no possible way of acquiring one. A slothful man may want very much to rise to the top of his field, but keeps falling back into his old way of acting. To point to conflicting causes in these examples would be to offer either an after the fact, non-explanatory hypothesis, or to qualify one's theory out of existence. This is what happens

when a causal theorist says, "His ambition will cause him to succeed, unless there are other intervening causes."

The proponent of the causal theory may say that given a strong enough want (one that overcomes other wants) the person will act. But doesn't this just say that wants that are strong enough to cause us to act will cause us to act. For as a matter of fact, this is how we judge whether one want is stronger than another, i.e., that a person does X though he also wants Y. This can be easily seen as a circular argument and is not an explanation of anything, and in particular it does not give the causal theorist what he wants, a tool for predicting and controlling human behavior.

(4) It may be asked, "Given that a causal interpretation of motives does not explain very much, how on a teleological interpretation do motives explain?" To see this, let us look at the concept of "attitude", for according to this teleological account of motive explanation, what one gives when one gives a motive is a pro or con attitude on which one acted.

To show what is involved in an attitude, I will refer to two unpublished papers by Robert Audi, "Attitudes and Their Role in Common-sense Explanations of Action", and "Toward a Cognitive-Motivational Theory of Character and Personality".¹²

In Audi's paper on attitudes, he spells out what an attitude toward some thing or situation entails.

An attitude toward something is a belief to the effect that it lies somewhere on the continuum from good to bad, excellent to poor, desirable to undesirable, admirable to execrable, appropriate to inappropriate, and the like.

Audi's contention is that these attitudes bring about wants, e.g., if I have an attitude toward negroes such that I believe they are undesirable persons, I will, among other things, want them kept away from my children. Here, as in all cases of attitude, we find actions which are the expression of the attitudes one has, and which are made clear once the agent gives his motive for the action. In Audi's analysis, which I believe in essence to be correct, we find that when a motive is given we find out about a person's wants and attitudes (beliefs), and thus we may find out about the person's character. He ties wants, attitudes, motives, and character traits together in such a way that an explanation by motives not only tells us about the action from the point of view of the actor, but also tells us something about a relatively permanent feature of the actor (his character).

It may not be the case that all motive explanations tell us about an agent's character, or that character traits can all be defined in terms of wants and beliefs. But it is important to note that many character traits can be seen in this way, e.g., patriotism can be seen as wanting to see the causes of one's country advance and believing that it is right to personally try to advance the causes of one's country.

This, I believe, is why a motive explanation, when approached from a teleological point of view, is very explanatory. For if it is correct to say that attitudes are the basis for one's wants, in the sense that we explain our wants in reference to attitude and the determinants for some important character traits, then what we want to find out about an action is the attitude that produced the want, toward the satisfaction of which the action is directed.

Audi's analysis of attitudes, wants, and motives seems to conflict with the analysis of motive given by P. H. Nowell-Smith, but the conflict is only apparent. Nowell-Smith groups "wants" under "pro-attitudes" but he uses "attitude" in a broad technical sense. Audi sees wants as arising from one's attitudes where "attitude" is used in its normal sense. We must notice that what Nowell-Smith is saying is something like this: Anytime a person is said to want X, he can be said to have a pro-attitude toward X. When put in this fashion, Nowell-Smith's idea can be seen as being consistent with Audi's; Audi in addition provides an explanation of the connection between wants and attitudes.

There is, I believe, a difficulty with this view which I would like to go into briefly. Let us take the case of a Catholic priest who seduces a young woman of his parish. To say that the priest has a pro-attitude toward unmarried couples having sexual relations, would be in this case mistaken. But it would also be mistaken to say that the priest did not want to have sexual relations with the woman, for we have already said that he seduced her. This is a seemingly clear cut case of a person's wants and attitudes conflicting. This presents problems for Audi's analysis, since he claims that it is our attitudes that bring about our wants.

The correct analysis of this case, I believe, would be that in this instance the priest, holding that fornication is wrong, has a want that he himself judges wrong (assuming he is honest with himself and sees what he is doing as fornication). This does not mean that at the time of the seduction the priest adopts a new attitude toward fornication. Here his pro-attitude would be toward his own gratification.

If he does not feel remorse after the fact (vow not to continue in this course of action), he must either be called a hypocrite, or he must change his avowed attitude toward fornication.

The view that attitudes and wants are closely related does not entail that these attitudes and wants do not change from time to time, or that they might change momentarily under special circumstances. If a person's attitudes do change in a special circumstance, and then revert to the original, we may say of this person that he lacks the strength of his convictions. As an explanation for the seduction of the woman the priest may say, "The spirit was willing, but the flesh was weak". This, I believe, says, in effect, that in this case the priest's former attitude changed under stress, and having recognized this (perhaps even at the time of the act) his new attitude toward his own gratification proved too strong for his former attitude about fornication. Correspondingly, his newly recognized wants (for his own gratification) weighed more heavily in his subsequent action. It can be correctly said that in this case the priest's actions and his earlier avowed attitudes are inconsistent, and inconsistency between one set of attitudes and wants and another set of attitudes and wants, is no objection against Audi's thesis.

It seems strikingly obvious to say that if a person acted in a patriotic manner, he has a pro-attitude toward his country's well being. If it is used, however, in a motive explanation where the person who asks for the motive does not know why the other person acted the way he did, then saying that he acted out of patriotism may resolve the question of the person who asked about the motive. But does saying that a person acted from patriotism cite an attitude? To say that a

person has a pro-attitude toward the advancement of his country's cause does, of course, cite an attitude and, in fact, is a partial explication of the concept of "patriotism". We do say of persons who regularly exhibit pro-attitudes toward the advancement of their country's causes that they are patriotic, and given this character trait we know many things that a patriotic person would do, and many things he would abstain from doing. Given this pro-attitude in even one instance in special circumstances let one infer a good deal about the actor, if the pro-attitude is clearly spelled out. We can, and actually do, operate with motive explanations in this way because it seems that we expect people to be consistent in their actions; they are blamed if they aren't consistent, and are of good character. This is why attitudes are essential in motive explanations, for motive explanations would not explain anything further than the immediate action if they didn't carry implications about agent's attitudes.

FOOTNOTES

- ¹These considerations will be discussed later on in this chapter.
- ²Alan R. White, The Philosophy of Mind (New York, 1967), p. 136.
- ³Ibid., p. 137.
- ⁴See P. H. Nowell-Smith, Ethics (Harmondsworth, Middlesex, 1954), pp. 122-133. Gilbert Ryle, The Concept of Mind (New York, 1949), pp. 110-113.
- ⁵Nowell-Smith, op. cit.
- ⁶Alan R. White, The Philosophy of Mind (New York, 1967), p. 141.
- ⁷N. S. Sutherland, "Motives as Explanations", in Mind, Vol. LXVIII, No. 270, (April, 1959), pp. 145-158.
- ⁸Ibid., p. 148.
- ⁹Ibid., p. 154.
- ¹⁰Donald Davidson, "Actions, Reasons, and Causes", The Nature of Human Action, ed. Myles Brand (Glenview, 1970), pp. 67-79.
- ¹¹Charles Taylor, "Relations Between Causes and Actions", Proceedings of the Inter-American Congress on Philosophy, Vol. I, (Quebec, 1967), p. 116.
- ¹²These papers were presented in a seminar conducted by Dr. Robert Audi at the University of Texas at Austin in 1968.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

In the first chapter of this thesis, I gave a brief account of Freud's theory of mind, with emphasis on his ideas about the unconscious. I showed how Freud saw the mental development of man from early childhood (the stage of pure id), to maturity.

We arrive at a point in our development, according to Freud, where we become aware of ourselves in relation to our environment; this he calls the unfolding of the ego. With the unfolding of the ego comes the desire for power and personal advancement. These desires become modified by the acquisition of the superego, which Freud sees as a moral sense instilled in us by our parents, peers, and community. The super-ego is a check upon the ruthless, self-serving, action of the ego, in the same way that the law is a check upon the pursuit of unbridled self-interest on the part of the citizenry.

The development of the ego and super-ego, according to Freud, gives a person what we might call a "self-image", i.e., it gives us a particular model for looking at ourselves. This model, because of the demands of the ego and super-ego, is one that forces one to try to see oneself as a moral person who is in some way better than the average man.

After the acquisition of this "self-image, one rejects from consideration material about oneself that clashes with this model. Since Freud believes that no thoughts or memories are ever lost, he posits a "psychic storehouse" below the level of conscious consideration where

ego damaging material is stored, (in this storehouse we also find id material that must be rejected because is too is ego damaging). This storage place he calls "The Unconscious", and the process of rejection from conscious consideration he calls "repression".

These repressed desires and urges, Freud says, still exert an influence on one's behavior by exerting "psychic pressure" at an unconscious level. This pressure causes (in the sense of impels) one to act in a way such that one cannot give an acceptable explanation for the action, since the "real reason" for the action is buried on a level that one has no access to. This, then, is how one acquires what Freud calls "unconscious motives".

I noted that Freud sees desires, motives, wants, and all of our mental concepts as designating processes, states, or events in a multi-leveled mental apparatus.

In Chapter II I argued that Freud made several major mistakes in his theory of mind. Firstly, I have shown that Freud sees desires as something an agent "has" in the sense of "possesses". This sense of possession gets Freud into trouble because this forces him to use "desire" as a word that refers to an inner state, process, or event. The identification of desire with an inner state, process, or event, in effect, lifts "desire" out of the context of action where it functions and makes nonsense of the successful way we have of operating with the term.

This isolation of desire also gets Freud into the difficulties presented by the problem of other minds, i.e., he can in no way show how it is that we can predicate desires of other persons. He also cannot show how we come to learn to use the word "desire" if its referent

is hidden. Furthermore, he cannot even show how the agent can say of himself, "I desire . . .". This, I believe, is what Wittgenstein meant when he remarked on the barrenness of psychology being due to conceptual confusion.

I have also shown that it is this unacceptable way of using "desire" that leads Freud to posit unconscious desires; the positing of inner states that the agent is unaware of would only make sense given Freud's misunderstanding of the concept of desire.

In this same chapter I suggested that what Freud thought of as unconscious motives were in reality motives that an agent will not admit to. Human agents are not necessarily being acted upon by unknown internal forces. Rather the agent either refuses to see a pattern in his own actions, or fails to see a pattern because his actions proceed from a minimum of thought and reflection.

I summarized Jean Paul Sartre's critical analysis of Freud's concept of the unconscious. Sartre makes points similar to my own; in addition he points out some contradictions in Freud's theory.

I briefly presented an alternative to psycho-analytic theory and offered some suggestions concerning how best to restructure therapy, i.e., by having the analyst encourage the patient to be more self-aware and less guilt ridden about certain natural inclinations. The analyst would suggest to the patient that he be more responsible for his own actions, and he would not attribute to mysterious forces the inspiration for the patient's actions.

In the third chapter I gave a positive account of the concept of motive. I showed that asking for a motive, or giving a motive, was asking for, or giving, a particular sort of explanation. The

explanation given is in terms of the agent's attitudes (wants, desires, aversions, goals, etc.) and gives an insight into the action from the point of view of the agent.

A distinction was made between desire and motive, and an analysis of motive borrowed from Alan R. White was given. I summarized White's distinction between motives as a kind of explanation, and desires and attitudes as factors in explanation. This was done primarily to discredit Freud's identification of motive and desire.

I also argued that motive explanations can be best seen as teleological explanations. For what the agent gives as his motive is in terms of what he expects from the action he performed. Therefore, a "for the sake of" clause is essential in motive explanations, though it may not be specifically stated. In the "for the sake of" clause, the agent's attitudes will be brought out. I also offered several arguments against a causal interpretation of motives advanced by Donald Davidson. What makes Davidson's claim seem plausible is a misconstrual of the way we use "reason". I also argued that in many cases using motives as causal antecedents does not satisfy an essential need we have for motive explanations, i.e., they do not explain.

In the last part of this third chapter, I introduced Robert Audi's ideas on character traits and attitudes to show how some character traits are linked to motives. I did this by showing that some character-traits are also essentially linked to the agent's attitudes. This point was also made to support a teleological interpretation of motives by showing how motives, when approached teleologically, also tell us a great deal about a person's character, and thus are doubly explanatory.

Let us now see how these ideas fit into what Freud does with motives. First we must notice that a patient comes to Freud, usually because he is confused about his own motives, attitudes, or desires. He perhaps has found that the things he finds himself wanting are quite contrary to his professed motives. He may find himself displaying behavior that belies an attitude that he swears he does not have.

Many times it is the case that patients are sent to Freud by relatives. It is often the case that the relative finds the patient's actions at variance with what he believes to be the patient's character, i.e., the patient displays behavior that is not consistent with what his relative has come to expect from him.

What makes the patient decide to come to Freud, or the relative decide to send a patient to Freud, is the lack of similarity between the patient's attitudes (in the broad technical sense) and his professed motives or his normal mode of behavior. This lends credence to the analysis of motives that I have been arguing for in Chapter III, i.e., it shows that we do relate attitudes and motives in a way such that if there is a gap between them we suspect that something is wrong with the actor.

Freud also relates attitudes (in a broad technical sense) to motives as we all do, but with an important difference. Since the patient's professed motives do not match his demonstrated attitudes, Freud tries to connect the patient's attitudes to some "hidden" motive. As I have written in Chapter II, I believe Freud is misled in his search by his ideas about our mental concepts, however, he does use the same conceptual framework in analysis that has been argued for in Chapter III.

Freud's theory, resting on a framework of hidden causes (unconscious mental events) misleads an otherwise worthwhile endeavor into finding what is behind an agent's actions. The conceptual confusion behind Freudian theory misleads Freud into thinking that he has found a buried cause, when his therapy has discovered a motive that the agent will not admit to.

I have argued that Freudian therapy is acceptable, while Freudian theory is not. I have also shown how a therapist can retain the therapy while abandoning the theory.

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VITA

Paul Arthur Kosted

Candidate for the Degree of
Master of Arts

Thesis: MOTIVES AND THE UNCONSCIOUS

Major Field: Philosophy

Biographical:

Personal Data: Born in Colorado Springs, Colorado, March 22, 1944,
the son of Mr. and Mrs. A. H. Kosted.

Education: Graduated from Northwest Classen High School, Oklahoma
City, Oklahoma, in May 1962; attended Oklahoma State Univer-
sity from September 1962 to May 1964; received an Associate
Degree in Drafting and Design in May 1964; attended Oklahoma
State University from September 1964 to January 1968;
attended The University of Texas at Austin from January 1968
to January 1969; returned to Oklahoma State University in
1969 and in 1970 received the Bachelor of Arts Degree with a
major in Philosophy; completed requirements for the Master
of Arts degree at Oklahoma State University with a major in
Philosophy in May 1972.

Professional Experience: Employed by Oklahoma State University as
a graduate assistant from January 1970 until December 1971.