

RESPONSES TO THE EISENHOWER DOCTRINE IN THE
MIDDLE EAST: AN ANALYSIS OF A
STATUS QUO POLICY

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PREFACE

At the time of this writing, the two major tension areas in the world are Southeast Asia and the Middle East. Particularly in the Middle East, there is a possibility that one rash move by either the United States or the Soviet Union will result in a nuclear holocaust. It was thought that valuable insights into the present-day United States policy in the Middle East could be gained by exploring a major United States policy in the Middle East--the Eisenhower Doctrine.

I should like to express my gratitude to Professor Harold V. Sare for his inspiration of this study and guidance in the preparation of the thesis. I should also like to thank Dr. Raymond Habiby for his helpful comments and criticisms. Finally, I wish to express my gratitude and sincere appreciation to Dr. Clifford A.L. Rich, without whom, I would never have been able to pursue a graduate degree at Oklahoma State University.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Whenever a government formulates a foreign policy, it is assumed that the policy is based on the government's concept of national interest. Also, the implementation of the policy is dependent upon whatever is considered to be in the national interest as implementation proceeds. Therefore, whenever national interests are endangered by a particular policy, it must be assumed that the government will withdraw or change the policy. The determination of the objectives related to national interest is a constant process and changes can be expected to take place in reference to new circumstances that might develop over a period of time. When new circumstances develop and a policy does not change, the policy becomes rigid and of dubious value to the nation which promulgates it. These premises establish criteria for examining any particular policy formulated by a nation. In this study, these criteria will be used to examine the Eisenhower Doctrine.

In 1957, the Middle Eastern policy of the United States was designed to realize a number of objectives which were thought to contribute to national security and well being. Among these were the maintenance of military primacy in the region, the uninterrupted flow of oil, the preservation of the independence of the established states, and the promotion of foreign policies favorable to the Western bloc by the governments of the Middle Eastern states. One policy devised by

the United States to further these interests in the Middle East is found in the Eisenhower Doctrine. The announced objective of the Eisenhower Doctrine was to protect the political independence and territorial integrity of the states of the Middle East against international communist armed aggression. To meet this objective, the President was authorized by Congress to undertake economic and military assistance programs with any government in the general area. He was also given greater discretion in the disposition of \$200 million which previously had been appropriated by the Congress. The Congressional Resolution containing the Doctrine stated that:

...the United States regards as vital to the national interest and world peace the preservation of the independence and integrity of the nations of the Middle East. To this end, if the President determines the necessity thereof, the United States is prepared to use armed forces to assist any nation or groups of such nations requesting assistance against armed aggression from any country controlled by international communism...¹

By December, 1958, the Eisenhower Doctrine was, for all practical purposes, dead. It did not prevent further Soviet penetration of the Middle East, but rather, increased it, thus threatening the military primacy of the United States in the region. The Doctrine particularly estranged the United Arab Republic (Egypt and Syria) who, because of its control of the Suez Canal and the oil pipelines to the Mediterranean Sea, was in a position to interrupt the flow of oil from the Middle East. Finally, it impeded attempts to promote among Arab governments foreign policies favorable to the Western bloc.

¹Paul E. Zinner, ed., Documents on American Foreign Relations-1957 (New York, 1958), p. 206.

* This study will investigate the reasons why the Eisenhower Doctrine by 1958 had ceased to contribute to the realization of objectives which would protect the national interest. An attempt will be made to answer the questions: What were the actual objectives of the Doctrine? What were the reactions of the states in Middle East to the Doctrine? Did the Eisenhower Doctrine fail because of unanticipated reactions to its implementation by some key Arab states?

In an effort to provide tentative answers to these questions, this study will assert that the major objective of the Eisenhower Doctrine was to isolate Egypt, under President Gamal Abdel Nasser, from the other Arab governments. The United States believed that the policies of Nasser constituted a threat to the independence of certain Arab governments, and thereby, to the United States. This proposition is based on the Doctrine's military and economic aid provisions which made it unlikely that it would be used directly against the Soviet Union, but suggested that it was probable that it would be used against Egypt. In addition, Nasser's opposition to the recognition of Israel, his leadership of the Arab nationalist movement, which posed a threat to Western oil interests through expropriation, and his opposition to Western-oriented defensive alliances against the Soviet Union in the Middle East, suggested that he was antagonistic to the interests of the United States. Also, Nasser was the first Arab leader to turn to the Soviet Union for military assistance and his actions encouraged other Arab governments to do the same. This permitted the Soviet Union to militarily penetrate the Middle East, which threatened the military primacy of the United States in the area.

The Arab governments became alienated from the United States

because they believed that the United States was continuing the imperialist policies of Great Britain and France. It was immediately clear to the Arabs that the United States was using the Doctrine primarily against the Arab nationalists and not the communists. This was substantiated in their minds when the United States attempted to isolate Egypt, bribe friendly Arab states to oppose other Arab states, and used the Sixth Fleet to intimidate Arab governments.

The Eisenhower Doctrine ceased to be a viable foreign policy in the Middle East after 1958 because it failed to isolate Egypt, and instead, created overwhelming Arab hostility against the United States. By December, 1958, there was not one Arab government which could be called pro-Western. On the other hand, all of the Arab governments could be classified as nonaligned. This indicated a victory for President Nasser's position; he thereby gained prestige among the Arabs. Nasser's increased prestige, the demise of pro-Western governments, and Arab hostility toward the United States seriously undermined the national interests of the United States in 1958. This increased threat to the national interests in the Middle East can be related to the Eisenhower Doctrine; in these terms, the policy was not productive. This suggests the hypothesis: The major intent of the Eisenhower Doctrine was to isolate Egypt and preserve the status quo in the Middle East. Its failure to do either jeopardized the national interests of the United States.

In order to test this hypothesis, it will be necessary to verify several premises implied in the major hypothesis. First, this study will attempt to show that there was little threat of direct Soviet aggression in the Middle East and that Soviet subversion was not a major

threat in 1957. Also, this study will attempt to show that Egypt was an immediate threat to the national interests of the United States in the Middle East because Arab governments were under intense pressure to support a policy of Pan-Arab nationalism advocated by President Nasser, which was antagonistic to the United States and its Western allies. Arab governments identified the status quo policy of the United States with earlier Anglo-French imperialist policies, and this intensified Arab hostility.

The term "Middle East" has several definitions. Some authorities define the Middle East to include those Arab states located between the Mediterranean Sea and Asia. Others believe the entire Eastern Mediterranean area, including Turkey and Iran, to be the Middle East. The statement of the Eisenhower Doctrine reflects no specific delimitation of area, but Secretary of State John Foster Dulles included Greece and Turkey to the north, Morocco to the west, Pakistan to the east, and Sudan to the south, within the scope of the Eisenhower Doctrine. This study will focus upon the Arab states of the Eastern Mediterranean area. The scope will be restricted to the period from January 1, 1957, to December 30, 1958. This covers the period during which the Eisenhower Doctrine was formulated, implementation attempted, and Arab reactions to it materialized.

✧ Much of the literature on the Eisenhower Doctrine, including this study, view the Doctrine as a part of the status quo policy of the United States in the Middle East. This study differs by arguing that the Eisenhower Doctrine was primarily directed against Egypt and not the Soviet Union. For example, Paul Hanna viewed the purpose of the Doctrine to be that of deterring the aggressive aims of the Soviet

Union and reassuring the Baghdad Pact members. In this sense, it is viewed as a restatement of the Truman Doctrine. Hanna viewed the Arab reaction to the Eisenhower Doctrine as a side effect rather than as a direct result of the policy.² Thomas Finletter argued that the doctrine attempted to split the Arab world between pro-Western regimes and regimes that looked to Cairo for leadership and Moscow for support.³ Finletter's emphasis, however, was on the Soviet threat which he believed existed in the Middle East. John C. Campbell, in his book Defense of the Middle East, implied that the Eisenhower Doctrine may have been primarily oriented against Egypt, but concluded that the Doctrine extended the West's diplomatic warning system to the Middle East.⁴ In effect, Campbell also resorted to the argument that the Middle East was in grave danger of Soviet aggression or subversion.

~~The methodology of this study will be analytical and descriptive.~~

The Eisenhower Doctrine and the Arab response to it will be analyzed within the framework of what was perceived to be the national interests of the United States in 1957. Chapter II will present background on the national interests of the United States in the Middle East, the political environment of the region in 1957, United States policies prior to 1957, and the reasons for the United States' initiative in 1957. In the course of this chapter, it will be shown that the United States consistently favored status quo policies for the Middle East.

²Paul L. Hanna, "America in the Middle East", Middle Eastern Affairs, Vol. X, No. 5 (May, 1959), p. 184.

³Thomas K. Finletter, Foreign Policy: The Next Phase - The 1960s (New York, 1960), p. 160.

⁴John C. Campbell, Defense of the Middle East (New York, 1960), p. 169.

While the announced purpose of the Eisenhower Doctrine was to contain the communist "threat" to the Middle East, Chapter III will attempt to show that this threat was not a serious one, but that Egypt did pose an immediate threat to the interest of the United States in the Middle East. This chapter will try to verify that the major purpose of the Eisenhower Doctrine was to isolate Egypt.

Chapter IV will attempt to show that the Arab governments became antagonized toward the United States over the Eisenhower Doctrine because it clearly pursued the status quo by directing the policy against the Arab nationalists. This will be done by a careful analysis of the reasons why some of the Arab governments accepted the aid extended under the Doctrine, and others did not. In addition, this chapter will explore the reasons for Arab hostility toward the Eisenhower Doctrine which resulted from attempts by the United States to implement it. The last chapter will present conclusions concerning the utility of the Doctrine in realizing objectives of the United States.

This study will depend upon such primary sources as the New York Times, the Department of State Bulletin, the Congressional Record, and the Hearings by the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations and Armed Services Committees. In combination with the above primary sources, secondary sources will be utilized for indications of Arab reaction and ramification of the Eisenhower Doctrine. Various professional journals will also be used to obtain interpretations - Political Science Quarterly, Middle Eastern Affairs, the Middle East Journal, International Journal, The Western Political Science Quarterly, Survey of International Affairs, and Foreign Affairs.

In the East-West conflict, neither side has been willing to

concede the Middle East to the other, which indicates that both find the region vitally important to their national interests. The United States' objectives in 1957 in the Middle East continue to be pursued. The fundamental problems of the Middle East in 1957 still exist today. However, the influence and involvement of the Soviet Union have increased substantially and the influence of the United States has become more precarious. This study is significant because it will reveal the unsound basis of past policies of the United States and thereby should contribute to the development of more viable policies in the future.

CHAPTER II

THE UNITED STATES NATIONAL INTEREST IN THE MIDDLE EAST

Immediately following World War II, the United States did not assume a major role in the Middle East because Great Britain, a wartime ally, was dominant there. Great Britain had urged the United States to share her burden in the Middle East, but the United States was reluctant to do so.¹ However, it was not long until events occurred which compelled the United States to become involved.

These events centered around the post-World War II aims of the Soviet Union. In 1945 and 1946, the Soviet Union demanded that Turkey cede two of the latter's eastern provinces, Kars and Ardahan, to the Soviet Union. In addition, the Soviet Union demanded special privileges from Turkey in the administration of the Dardanelles, a narrow channel joining the Sea of Marmora to the Aegean Sea, and the Straits of Bosphorus, a channel joining the Sea of Marmora to the Black Sea. Great Britain, who historically had sought to deny Russia control over the Dardanelles and the Straits, supported Turkey in resisting the Soviet demands. During the same period of time, the Soviet Union had refused to participate in the supervision of elections in Greece, but aided the Greek Communist Party in its attempt to overthrow the Greek government. Great Britain, again, took the lead in supporting the Greek government.

¹William R. Polk, The United States and the Arab World (Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1965), p. 263.

A crisis was also developing in Iran. In a 1942 agreement among Great Britain, Iran, and the Soviet Union, Soviet troops were authorized to be stationed in Azerbaijan, a northern province of Iran, until six months after the War was concluded. In 1946, the United States Department of State reported to President Truman that the Soviet Union appeared to have no intention of leaving Azerbaijan but, instead, was reinforcing its garrison there.² The United States joined Great Britain in presenting a united front against this Russian threat.

In Iran, the United States, through diplomatic channels and in the United Nations Security Council, applied pressure upon the Soviet Union to withdraw its troops. Although the attempt to work through the United Nations failed because of the Soviet veto, it did call the world's attention to the situation and by December, 1946, the Iranian Government regained control over Azerbaijan.³ Meanwhile, unforeseen circumstances forced the United States to become more involved not only in Greece and Turkey, but also in the entire Middle East. Great Britain was economically devastated as a result of World War II and, in 1946, it became obvious it could no longer maintain a large military commitment around the world and particularly in the Middle East. The United States was informed in February, 1947, by the British Government that Great Britain would no longer take primary responsibility for the defense of Greece and Turkey. The United States was requested to assume the burden. This prompted the formulation of the Truman Doctrine, which served to warn the Soviet Union that the United States would not

²Harry S. Truman, Memoirs: Years of Trial and Hope, Vol. II (Garden City, New York, 1956), p. 93.

³Ibid., pp. 93-95.

condone any further Soviet expansion in Europe and the Mediterranean.

With its increased involvement in world affairs, the United States found that one major problem was to contain the Soviet Union's penetration of the Middle East.⁴ The Truman Doctrine was the first enunciation of the containment policy. Its rationale was provided by George Kennan. He pointed out that the Russians, always fearful of foreign contact, had learned to seek security by destroying their rivals. But they had demonstrated caution in doing so, and if barriers were placed in their path, they would adjust to them. Kennan argued that "...the main element of any United States policy toward the Soviet Union must be that of a long-term, patient but firm and vigilant containment of Russian expansive tendencies."⁵ To achieve this end, the United States began to promote bilateral security treaties and alliance systems.

In 1946, a problem of a different sort confronted the United States. Great Britain held Palestine as a mandate under the League of Nations. In 1917, the British Government under the Balfour Declaration had supported the idea of establishing a national home for the Jewish people in Palestine, but the 1946 political situation in the Middle East was not conducive to honoring this pledge. President Truman, who personally directed the Palestine policy of the United States,⁶ believed that his government could not stand by while the European Jewish

⁴Ibid., p. 102.

⁵George F. Kennan, American Diplomacy 1900-1950 (New York, 1951), pp. 98-99.

⁶Dean Acheson, Present at the Creation (New York, 1969), p. 169.

refugees were being denied opportunities to resettle.⁷ He believed that the human misery of the Jewish refugees must be relieved and that Great Britain's promise to the Jews must be kept.⁸

With Truman's pressure on Great Britain to keep its commitment, the situation in Palestine deteriorated rapidly, and the British were caught in a crossfire between the Jews and Arabs. Finding itself unable to cope with a problem that was becoming increasingly more difficult, Great Britain, in February, 1947, informed the United Nations that it would surrender its mandate by August 1, 1948. The British left the solution of the Palestine conflict to the United Nations. The United Nations solution was to divide Palestine and give a portion of it to the Jews for the establishment of the State of Israel. The United States voted for the partition of Palestine and the creation of the State of Israel. United States support for Israel was indicated by the immediate extension of de facto recognition when the Provisional Government of Israel was established on May 14, 1948. President Truman extended recognition of the Provisional Government within eleven minutes after Israel had been proclaimed a state.⁹

The policy of the United States in support of the creation of Israel antagonized the Arabs. The Governments of Egypt, Syria, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia believed that Truman's policies toward Palestine constituted a reversal of oral and verbal commitments which previously had

⁷Truman, p. 140.

⁸Ibid., p. 157.

⁹Ibid., p. 164.

Dean Z. Chertov

been made to them by President Roosevelt.¹⁰ Even within the Truman Administration, there was dissent over the Palestine policy.¹¹ In his memoirs, however, Truman states that he was primarily motivated by humanitarian considerations rather than possible future security considerations.¹²

After the establishment of Israel, one of the lasting problems in the Arab-Israeli conflict concerned boundaries. The Arabs rejected the 1947 United Nations partition plan¹³ and soon after the establishment of the State of Israel, Arab and Israeli armies clashed. During the war, Israel was able to conquer large portions of Arab Palestine. The Egyptian-Israeli Armistice which ended the 1948 war left Israel in control of most of the territory which it had conquered.¹⁴ The war had humiliated the Arabs and some of them desired revenge. In an attempt to maintain peace and stability in the area, the United States joined with Great Britain and France in 1950 in issuing the Tripartite Declaration which declared that they would refuse to sell arms to any Middle

¹⁰ Acheson, p. 171.

Truman, p. 148.

New York Times, October 19, 1945, p. 4.

United States Department of State Bulletin, Vol. XV, No. 384 (November 10, 1946), pp. 848-849.

¹¹ Walter Millis, ed., The Forrestal Diaries (New York, 1951), pp. 344, 363.

Truman, p. 149.

Acheson, p. 169.

¹² Truman, pp. 140, 157.

¹³ John C. Campbell, Defense of the Middle East (New York, 1960), p. 323.

¹⁴

U.S. Congress, Senate, A Select Chronology and Background Documents Relating to the Middle East (Washington, D.C., 1969), p. 125.

East nation planning aggression. Furthermore, the Declaration stated that they were opposed to the use of force or the threat of force by any of the states in the area.¹⁵ This placed the United States in opposition to any military solution of the Arab-Israeli conflict.

Beginning in the early 1950's, the United States was seeking an alliance system in the Middle East. As a result of the Truman Doctrine, the North Atlantic Pact, the ANZUS Pact, the Japanese Security Treaty with the United States, and the Korean conflict, the United States by 1951 had either military bases or alliances surrounding the Soviet Union except in the Middle East. In an attempt to remedy this gap, the United States in 1951 proposed a Middle East Defense Command which would combine all the Middle Eastern nations in an alliance against outside aggression.¹⁶ The primary responsibility for regional defense would rest with Great Britain, but Egypt would furnish facilities for the organization.¹⁷ The Egyptian army would be trained and armed by Great Britain and the British base at Suez would be turned over to Egypt with the understanding that it would simultaneously become an Allied base.¹⁸ Unfortunately for the United States, the proposal was made at a time when the Egyptian Government was denouncing Great Britain's control of the Suez Canal. The Egyptian leadership immediately rejected the plan, believing it a subtle attempt to retain British influence in Egypt.¹⁹ Although the United States persisted in its

¹⁵ Ibid., p. 182.

¹⁶ Acheson, p. 563.

¹⁷ Ibid., pp. 563-565.

¹⁸ Campbell, pp. 41-42.

¹⁹ Ibid., p. 43.

efforts until the end of the Truman Administration, it failed to secure any alliance.

When the Eisenhower Administration took office in 1953, the Middle East situation remained the same; there continued to be a gap in the ring of bases surrounding the Soviet Union. In the spring of 1953, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles headed a fact-finding mission to the Middle East and reported that most Middle Eastern governments were unwilling to associate with the West in a defensive alliance but that the states of the "northern tier" were more aware of the Soviet menace and probably would participate in a defensive pact.²⁰ The United States thus persuaded Turkey and Iraq to negotiate a mutual defense treaty which became known as the Baghdad Pact. The Pact was later joined by Great Britain, Pakistan, and Iran. The Baghdad Pact was immediately denounced by President Nasser and the leadership of the Arab League because Iraq, the only Arab member, had broken its agreement with the Arab League that required Arab states not to enter an alliance with non-Arab states.²¹ From that period until July, 1958, the Iraqi Government was subjected to torrents of verbal abuse by Radio Cairo and President Nasser for allying itself with Great Britain.²²

In 1956, in response to the refusal of the United States and Great Britain to provide financial assistance for construction of the Aswan

²⁰United States Department of State Bulletin, Vol. XXVIII (June 15, 1953), pp. 831-835.

²¹Ann Williams, Britain and France in the Middle East and North Africa (New York, 1968), p. 116.

²²F.R.C. Bagley, "Iraq To-Day", International Journal, Vol. XII, No. 3 (Summer, 1957), p. 207.

Dam, Egypt nationalized the Suez Canal. Great Britain and France, major stockholders in the Canal, were concerned that Nasser would exact concessions from them and they concluded that Nasser's government must be overthrown.²³ Israel, smarting from Arab guerrilla attacks and realizing that the withdrawal of British troops gave Egypt a freer hand for action in Palestine, found its interests complementing those of Great Britain and France. France, in September and October, sent considerable military equipment to Israel and by late October, Israel had agreed to cooperate with Great Britain and France in overthrowing Nasser's government.²⁴ On October 29, Israel attacked the Sinai Peninsula, claiming that it had taken necessary measures to destroy Egyptian commando bases. The next day, an Anglo-French ultimatum was issued to the Israelis and the Egyptians to withdraw their forces at least ten miles from the canal, and permit British and French troops to enter the Canal Zone to insure free passage.²⁵ This ultimatum was ignored and France and Great Britain took military action.

The United States refused to condone the attacks of Great Britain, France, and Israel, but instead, condemned them as aggressors. Faced with the united opposition of the United States and the Soviet Union, a growing uneasiness in Great Britain over the venture, and unlikelihood of toppling the Nasser regime, the British and French accepted a

²³Williams, p. 125.

²⁴Anthony Moncrieff, ed., Suez Ten Years After (New York, 1968), p. 95.
Williams, p. 127.

²⁵U.S. Congress, Senate, A Select Chronology and Background Documents Relating to the Middle East, p. 6.

a ceasefire on November 7 and withdrew all of their forces by December 22, 1956. The United States was instrumental in persuading Israel to withdraw from the territory it had seized during the war.²⁶

As a result of its actions, Great Britain's influence and leadership in the Middle East were severely damaged. The crisis also nullified the Tripartite Declaration, as Great Britain and France informed the United States that they were no longer obligated by its terms.²⁷ By December, 1956, the only powerful Western nation having influence in the Middle East was the United States who had gained prestige by condemning the aggression. At the same time, the Soviet Union also gained prestige not only by condemning the aggression, but also because it had suggested that troops be sent to aid the Egyptians. Finally, the crisis served to enhance the image of President Nasser, who became recognized by Arab nationalists as a leader in the fight against imperialism.

President Eisenhower believed that the Suez crisis and the British withdrawal created a vacuum in the Middle East, a vacuum which the United States had to fill.²⁸ In order to fill that vacuum, the Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, began to formulate the Eisenhower Doctrine. Since any nation's policies are based on its government's concept of national interest, the national interest of the United States in 1957 must be examined.

²⁶ Ibid., pp. 155-159.

²⁷ U.S. Congress, Senate, President's Proposal on the Middle East, Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Relations and Committee on Armed Services, 85th Congress, 1st Session (Washington, D.C., 1957), p. 100.

²⁸ Dwight D. Eisenhower, Waging Peace 1956-1961 (New York, 1965), p. 179.

As with all countries, the primary national interest of the United States was its national security. Defined in terms of long-range goals for the Middle East, the leadership of the United States believed that the national security could best be promoted by stabilizing conditions in the Middle East. For example, the Suez crisis created conditions which made the Middle East highly unstable. The concept of Middle Eastern stability colored much of the post-World War II policy of the United States. Dean Acheson, Secretary of State in the Truman Administration, expressed it as a goal;²⁹ it is found in the Tripartite Declaration;³⁰ and it is also found in the title of the Joint Resolution upon which the Eisenhower Doctrine is based.³¹ President Eisenhower, in a letter to the Prime Minister of Israel in 1957, wrote:

It has always been the view of this Government that... there should be a united effort by all of the nations to bring about conditions in the area more stable, more tranquil, and more conducive to the general welfare than those which existed heretofore.³²

At the same time, Henry Cabot Lodge, the United States Ambassador to the United Nations, stated that it was the policy of the United States "...to bring order and stability to this troubled area."³³ Assistant Secretary of State Robert C. Hill argued that the Eisenhower Doctrine

²⁹Acheson, p. 501.

³⁰U.S. Congress, Senate, A Select Chronology and Background Documents Relating to the Middle East, p. 132.

³¹Ibid., p. 151.

³²Ibid., p. 169.

³³Ibid., p. 168.

was "...an essential step toward the cherished goal of stability."³⁴

To the United States government, stability was synonymous with the status quo. Although not antagonistic to all change, the United States government was fearful that any major changes in the Middle East would impair its national interests. The Suez crisis, for example, was viewed as creating unstable conditions in the Middle East because British influence was severely damaged and the influence of Egypt and the Soviet Union had increased. Traditionally, the policy of the status quo aims at the maintenance of the distribution of power which exists at a particular moment in history.³⁵ The United States, in 1957, did not want either Egypt or the Soviet Union to gain further influence in the Middle East but wished to maintain the political environment which was then present in the region. This can be more clearly shown by inspecting the immediate objectives of the United States in the Middle East which were thought to contribute to the national interest. All of these immediate aims dictated a status quo policy.

Perhaps the foremost objective of the United States was to maintain its military superiority in the Middle East. It had acquired military bases in Libya, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Iraq, and Iran. In addition, the United States had its Sixth Fleet patrolling the Mediterranean Sea. Although not a member of the Baghdad Pact, it had close associations with the members and was allied with Great Britain and Turkey through NATO. Its military primacy placed the United States in

³⁴United States Department of State Bulletin, "A Step Toward Stability in the Middle East", Address by Robert C. Hill, Vol. XXXVI, No. 918 (January 28, 1957), p. 134.

³⁵Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations (3rd ed., New York, 1966), p. 40.

a position where it could act as a bulwark against any possible Soviet aggression and, at the same time, realistically work toward stabilizing the Middle Eastern political environment.

Another immediate aim of the United States was to maintain the uninterrupted flow of oil from the Middle Eastern oil fields to Western markets. In 1956 the Middle East accounted for seventy per cent of the world's proven oil reserves.³⁶ While Middle East oil constituted less than four per cent of the American crude oil demand,³⁷ American companies had profitable investments in Middle Eastern oil production.³⁸ The United States Government, responsive to the wishes of its citizens and aware of the value of these investments to its balance of payments, sought to protect these interests. There is another, and perhaps more important, reason for seeking to protect the flow of Middle Eastern oil. If the United States did not depend upon Middle Eastern oil, its European allies did. Seventy-five per cent of Western Europe's oil imports were supplied by the Middle East.³⁹ If the flow of Middle Eastern oil were halted, Western Europe would have to rely on either the United States or the Soviet Union for its oil. Both possibilities would be damaging to the national security of the United States because it could not meet Western Europe's needs for an extended period of time without creating shortages for itself and because Western Europe's dependence

³⁶U.S. Congress, Senate, President's Proposal on the Middle East, p. 32.

³⁷Ibid., p. 35.

³⁸Ibid.

³⁹"Committee Analysis of the Problem", Congressional Digest, Vol. XXXVI (1957), p. 68.

on Soviet oil would impair its effectiveness as an ally. The interest of the United States in the uninterrupted flow of Middle Eastern oil to Western Europe was expressed by the State Department in response to a series of questions sent to it by Senator Fulbright: "It is correct to say that a principal security interest in the Middle East is to assure petroleum resources are available to the allies in time of war."⁴⁰

The United States had two other immediate objectives in the Middle East. One was the preservation of the independence of the established states in the region, and the other was the promotion of foreign policies favorable to the United States. The United States did not want any centralized control over the Middle East because such control would impair its interests. In this sense, the Pan-Arab movement of President Nasser and the Soviet Union were possible threats to the independence of the governments of the Middle East. The United States also believed that by insuring the independence of the various Middle Eastern governments, it could convince these governments that it was to their advantage to ally themselves with the United States. By late 1956, the United States was successful in securing an informal alliance of interests between itself and Lebanon, Saudi Arabi, and Iraq. Thus, by promoting foreign policies that were favorable to the United States, it could protect its interests in the Middle East.

If these objectives of the United States dictated pursuit of the status quo, there were two threats to the status quo in the Middle East. One of these threats came from the Soviet Union. In 1957, the Soviet Union increased its prestige in the area following its

⁴⁰ U.S. Congress, Senate, President's Proposal on the Middle East, p. 31.

denunciation of the tripartite invasion of 1956 and its sale of arms to Egypt and Syria. The Soviets also began to propagandize against Israel and this increased their standing among the Arabs. These events reflected the increased Soviet penetration of the area and challenged the containment policy of the United States. This increased Soviet attention to Egypt and Syria had a strong rationale. Egypt controlled the Suez Canal; Syria controlled all the pipelines to the Mediterranean Sea.⁴¹ If Egypt and Syria became communist-dominated, the flow of Middle Eastern oil to Europe could be interrupted.

Another threat to the aims of the United States was President Nasser of Egypt. In 1956, the Arab nationalist movement "...seems to have been captured by Gamal Abdel Nasser."⁴² As the leader of the Arab nationalist movement, President Nasser, in the view of the United States, posed a potential threat to the stability of the Middle East. He had allowed the Soviet Union to penetrate the region by buying arms in 1955, and he began playing the United States off against the Soviet Union in order to realize his own ambitions. If Nasser gave the Soviet Union a naval base or air base in Egypt, the military primacy of the United States in the Middle East would be challenged and the containment policy in the Middle East would be threatened. Nasser was also in a position, because of his control of the Suez Canal, to impede the flow of oil through the Canal. Furthermore, he was a nationalist and some nationalist groups had advocated expropriating Western oil

⁴¹Campbell, pp. 254-255.

⁴²John C. Campbell, "From Doctrine to Policy in the Middle East", Foreign Affairs, Vol. XXXV (July, 1957), p. 446.

concessions in the Middle East.⁴³ Nasser, in his book Egypt's Liberation, had suggested that Arab oil should be used as the economic power behind the Arab Nation rather than letting the "imperialists" control it.⁴⁴ Although Nasser had not attempted to expropriate any oil concessions, oil producers in the United States planned to curb their expansion in January, 1957, because they feared Nasser's ability to create trouble in the area and because they were worried by Arab nationalist rumors that oil properties would be expropriated.⁴⁵ There was also the threat posed by both the Soviet Union and Egypt to subvert the governments of other Middle East states. Nasser, through his denunciation of Iraq when it joined the Baghdad Pact, had already indicated that the Arab states must remain nonaligned, and that he was prepared to unleash his propaganda upon any Arab government that followed pro-Western policies. The Soviet Union, for its part, was attempting to prolong any unstable situation which might occur in the Middle East because such instability would allow it to gain supporters.

In order to further its interests in the Middle East, and in light of the two threats to those interests which existed, the United States formulated the Eisenhower Doctrine. It remains to be determined which of the two threats the United States considered to be most serious in 1957.

⁴³Sylvia G. Haim, ed., Arab Nationalism: An Anthology (Berkeley, California, 1964), pp. 237-241.

⁴⁴Gamal Abdel Nasser, Egypt's Liberation (Washington, 1955), pp. 108-109.

⁴⁵New York Times, January 2, 1957, p. 16.

CHAPTER III

SHAPING OF THE EISENHOWER DOCTRINE

President Eisenhower called Congressional leaders to the White House on January 1, 1957, to brief them on his Middle East proposal. The President told the Congressional leaders that the United States needed to make its intentions clear in the Middle East and that the United States was determined to sustain Western "rights" in the region. Eisenhower argued that the existing vacuum in the Middle East must be filled by the United States before it was filled by the Soviet Union. After nearly four hours of discussion, the Congressional leaders departed, assuring the President of their support.¹

Four days later, in a gesture designed to emphasize the urgency of the Middle East situation, President Eisenhower spoke to a special joint session of Congress where he noted the increasing Soviet danger throughout the world and the importance of the Middle East to the United States. The President implied that the Soviet Union presented an immediate threat to the region and he requested Congressional passage of a Joint Resolution which would give him support in dealing with this threat.²

¹Dwight D. Eisenhower, Waging Peace 1956-1961 (New York, 1965), p. 179.

²Paul E. Zinner, ed., Documents on American Foreign Relations - 1957 (New York, 1958), pp. 200-204.

After amendment by Congress, the final version of the Resolution which President Eisenhower signed into law had three major provisions: (1) the President was authorized to undertake economic and military assistance programs with any nation in the Middle East desiring such assistance; (2) the President, at his discretion, would use armed forces to assist any Middle East nation requesting assistance against armed aggression from any country controlled by international communism; (3) the President was given greater discretion in the use of \$200 million which had been previously appropriated by the Congress.

In the House of Representatives, the Resolution passed easily; the only difficulty encountered was the substitute resolution offered by the Speaker of the House, Sam Rayburn, which read: "The United States regards as vital to her interests the preservation of the independence and integrity of the states of the Middle East and, if necessary, will use her armed forces to that end."³ President Eisenhower and Secretary of State Dulles rejected this substitute resolution, partially because it seemed an attempt to establish a United States protectorate in the Middle East, and partially because it contained no provisions for economic or military assistance.⁴

In the United States Senate, the Joint Resolution met strong opposition before passage. Some Senators commented that their mail was running eight to one against the Resolution and that many of the individuals who wrote questioned the candidness of the President in regard to

³Eisenhower, p. 180.

⁴Ibid., p. 181.

the Soviet threat to the Middle East.⁵ Senator Fulbright was suspicious of the proposal, saying that he believed it "...improvident and unwise to make a grant of authority to disburse large sums of public money without restrictions of any kind, for objectives which are vague and unspecified."⁶ Senator Jackson of Washington had serious doubts about the definition of "international communism" and Secretary of State Dulles was unable to dispel his doubts.⁷ Dean Acheson, when asked to comment about the Doctrine, made this statement: "To fight an enemy that's not going to attack with forces that don't exist, to carry out a policy you haven't decided upon yet."⁸ Even former President Truman, after initially approving the Doctrine, joined the dissenters and criticized it as being "too little, too late."⁹

Much of the skepticism surrounding the Doctrine began in the Hearings on the proposed Resolution. The major premise of the Doctrine was that the Soviet Union was an immediate threat to the Middle East and that this threat was two-fold: overt military aggression and/or covert subversion. In order to meet this threat, the United States declared that it would use its troops to protect the independence of the Middle Eastern states and that it was prepared to extend economic and military

⁵New York Times, February 1, 1957, p. 3.

⁶Tristram Coffin, Senator Fulbright: Portrait of a Public Philosopher (New York, 1966), p. 126.

⁷U.S. Congress, Senate, President's Proposal on the Middle East, Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Relations and Committee on Armed Services, 85th Congress, 1st Session (Washington, D.C., 1957), p. 176.

⁸New York Times, January 7, 1957, p. 16.

⁹Ibid., February 17, 1957, p. 1.

assistance to those Middle East states which accepted the Doctrine in order that they might become economically stable and, therefore, better able to fight Soviet subversion. The testimony provided in the Hearings was never able to substantiate this premise of an immediate Soviet threat.

On the contrary, there was considerable evidence that the Soviet Union was unlikely to commit an act of overt aggression in the Middle East. The troubled political situation in Poland and the revolt in Hungary in 1956 forced the Soviet Union to nervously watch the European situation and to keep its troops available for use there. Furthermore, in 1957, the Soviet Union did not have any allies in the area that it could depend on. To move troops from the Soviet Union to any non-aligned Arab nation in a short period of time, it would have been necessary for the Soviet Union to violate the air space of one or more of the following states: Turkey, Iran, Iraq, or Pakistan. All of these nations were allied with either the United States or the United Kingdom. Any move of this nature would have immediately involved the Soviet Union in a confrontation with the United States that could have led to nuclear war. It is doubtful that the leadership of the Soviet Union felt powerful enough to be successful in such a confrontation.¹⁰

The Administration also tried to argue that communist subversion was an immediate threat to the Middle East. The closest that it came to confirming this assertion was through Admiral Radford's testimony that if Egypt and Syria continued to receive Soviet weapons, they would

¹⁰An argument against Soviet military action in the Middle East similar to the one presented here was given to Eisenhower by Admiral Radford during the Suez crisis of 1956. See Eisenhower, p. 91.

become communist-dominated.¹¹ Secretary of State Dulles implied that Egypt and Syria, while not at that time under the control of international communist leadership, they were in danger of becoming so.¹² Dulles, however, offered no tangible evidence to verify his assertion. There were implications that President Nasser and Colonel Serraj of Syria might be communist sympathizers,¹³ but these were demolished when Hanson W. Baldwin, the respected military editor of the New York Times, wrote a series of articles on the Middle East in one of which he stated that President Nasser had outlawed the Communist Party in Egypt and that: "Neither Nasser nor Colonel Serraj is a Communist. They are fervent nationalists who probably have two pre-eminent passions; the exalting of Arab nationalism and the defeat of Israel."¹⁴

For the purpose of argument, suppose communist subversion was a real and immediate danger in the Middle East. The only course of action then available to the United States was the \$200 million mentioned in the Joint Resolution which could be used to bolster the economies of the threatened nations.¹⁵ The effectiveness of this \$200 million to stop communist subversion can be doubted. First, since the Joint Resolution was applicable to approximately twenty countries, it is conceivable that many of them were threatened by communist subversion and this

¹¹U.S. Congress, Senate, President's Proposal on the Middle East, p. 410.

¹²Ibid., p. 249.

¹³Ibid., p. 650.

¹⁴New York Times, January 3, 1957, p. 3.

¹⁵U.S. Congress, Senate, President's Proposal on the Middle East, p. 252.

would spread the aid rather thinly. Second, even if it was determine that a nation was being subverted, it can be questioned whether even \$200 million to strengthen that nation's economy is effective to meet the challenge of subversion.

Several Senators had doubts about the communist threat to the Middle East. On the floor of the Senate, Senators Ervin of North Carolina and Johnson of South Carolina denounced the Administration's claim of a communist threat to the Middle East. Senator Ervin attacked the Doctrine's military emphasis as unwarranted:

When we got into the hearings we made some discoveries that were totally inconsistent with the releases which had been given to the press. We found, for example, that the Middle East resolution announcing the new doctrine was not, in fact, directed toward the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. We found that out because the Secretary of State himself testified that there was nothing to indicate that Soviet Russia was preparing to make any armed attack upon any of the nations of the Middle East.¹⁶

Senator Johnson, in a less well-reasoned argument but still indicative of what many Arabs believed, was more concerned about the "threat" of Soviet subversion in the Middle East:

The myth of communistic infiltration of the Middle East as the reason for the President's resolution disappeared before the rising sun when King Saud in one of his latest press releases said he did not feel that the Middle East was in danger of subversion from communism. The Arab World looks to Mecca. Russia would not dare to break the ties of the Arabs to prevent their facint Mecca. The leaders of the other Arabian countries seconded the note of King Saud, namely, that the Arabian countries had no fear of the growth of communism among them. Thus, in one fell swoop, falls the scarecrow of communism. The window dressing afforded by this reason - growth of communism - has to be pulled aside.¹⁷

¹⁶U.S. Congress, Congressional Record, 85th Congress, 1st Session, February 20, 1957, Vol. 103, Part 2, p. 2312.

¹⁷Ibid., February 26, 1957, p. 2610.

What then was the immediate threat to the Middle East? It does not appear to be "international communism." The Soviet Union had not introduced any new policies in the Middle East since 1955 which would warrant immediate response on the part of the United States. The Soviet Union had threatened to use "volunteers" to help Egypt during the Suez crisis but this was clearly a bluff. The Soviets had threatened action before but, in reality, they had never committed troops outside of Eastern Europe since World War II. It is true that communist subversion was a threat to the governments of the Middle East, but this was a threat of long standing going back to 1940, when Hitler offered the Middle East as a zone of Soviet influence.¹⁸ The Eisenhower Administration could not present any evidence that Soviet subversion had increased to such an extent that it was an immediate danger to the governments in the Middle East. For that matter, most of the Middle East governments did not sense a Soviet threat.¹⁹

If the communists did not pose an immediate threat to the Middle East, why would President Eisenhower call a special joint session of Congress, even before he gave his State of the Union address, to discuss an urgent threat to the Middle East? Why did Secretary of State Dulles warn the Congress that delay in passage of the Resolution would have serious consequences in the Middle East?²⁰ If the communists constituted a threat of long standing, the only remaining danger, from the

¹⁸John C. Campbell, Defense of the Middle East (New York, 1960), pp. 22-23.

¹⁹Campbell, p. 217.
Eisenhower, p. 119.

²⁰U.S. Congress, Senate, President's Proposal on the Middle East, p. 60.

point of view of the United States, must have been the threat posed by Egypt under President Nasser. When Nasser first came to power in 1952, the United States hoped to work with him²¹ but, by 1956, President Eisenhower was characterizing him as a dictator.²² It was Nasser who first invited Soviet penetration in the Middle East with his arms deal in 1955; it was Nasser who was the symbol of Arab nationalism which was challenging Western influence in the Middle East;²³ and it was Nasser who caused a serious deterioration in relations between the United States and Great Britain because he nationalized the Suez Canal. It was Nasser who was consciously working to change the status quo in the Middle East by urging other Arab governments to buy arms from the Soviet Union, by urging the overthrow of those governments which supported pro-Western policies, and by threatening Israel with retribution for its 1956 attack. In other words, Nasser wanted to change the very conditions which the United States was attempting to maintain.²⁴ The Eisenhower Administration hoped that Nasser would survive the Suez crisis in a mood to negotiate major Middle Eastern issues but, instead, he returned to playing off the United States against the Soviet Union.²⁵ Thus, it was Nasser who was a threat to the interests of the United States. His actions were contributing to an unstable situation in the Middle East, partially because of the greater threat of military action and partially because of the increased prestige lent to the Soviet

²¹Eisenhower, p. 23.

²²Ibid., p. 43.

²³Ibid., p. 27.

²⁴Ibid., p. 25.

²⁵New York Times, January 19, 1957, p. 1.

Union. The United States did not want the Soviet Union to further penetrate the Middle East because it would threaten the interests of the United States, yet Nasser continued to allow Soviet penetration to occur. If the United States could isolate Nasser from the other Arab governments, or possibly lead to his overthrow, it would limit Soviet penetration and secure its national interests in the Middle East.

The goals of the Eisenhower Doctrine appear more understandable if it is viewed as an instrument designed to oppose President Nasser rather than the communists. The economic aid in this context was to be used to "bribe" those Arab leaders who feared Nasser. The United States was going to make it worthwhile for the Arab governments to be with it rather than against it. In return for not supporting Nasser, the other Arab governments would receive economic and military assistance from the United States. This would make the usage of the \$200 million more practical than if it were used against Soviet subversion. Whereas overt Soviet aggression was difficult to contemplate, overt Egyptian aggression under the banner of nationalism was a distinct possibility.²⁶ Certainly there was evidence that the United States was not favorably disposed to help President Nasser. President Eisenhower, in a letter to Winston Churchill in 1956 wrote: "...we would have to concert our actions in making certain that he (Nasser) did not grow to be a danger to our welfare."²⁷ It is true that the United States condemned the actions of Great Britain, France, and Israel during the Suez crisis, but it also froze Egyptian assets in the United States and refused to release

²⁶Eisenhower, pp. 23-24.

²⁷Ibid., p. 680.

any of those funds for the purchase of food or medicine which were urgently needed in Egypt. Furthermore, the CARE program in Egypt was halted and the United States refused to sell oil or surplus wheat to the Egyptians.²⁸ The economic measures of the United States were actually punitive to Egypt.²⁹

The theory that the Eisenhower Doctrine was directed against President Nasser is supported by the statements of various United States Government officials, including the President. President Eisenhower attributed the decline of Western influence in the Middle East to Pan-Arabism with Nasser as its unifying symbol.³⁰ Secretary of State Dulles said that the United States sympathized with the Arab unity movement as long as it was responsive to the desires of the people concerned and consistent with the peace and welfare of the area as a whole.³¹ Presumably, the United States would provide the criteria for this judgment. Under the circumstances, it would be difficult to contemplate support by the United States for Nasser's type of Arab nationalism. Dulles later charged the nationalist movement under Nasser's leadership with indirect aggression.³² President Eisenhower, in a letter to Chairman Khrushchev of the Soviet Union, implied that

²⁸ Georgiana Stevens, ed., The United States and the Middle East (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, 1964), p. 164.

²⁹ Ibid., p. 24.

³⁰ Eisenhower, p. 27.

³¹ United States Department of State Bulletin, "Secretary Dulles' Press Conference of February 11, 1958", Vol. XXXVIII, No. 975 (March 3, 1958), p. 332.

³² Ibid., "Secretary Dulles' Press Conference of June 10, 1958", Vol. XXXVIII, No. 992 (June 30, 1958), p. 1089.

Nasser was attempting to achieve unity by indirect aggression.³³

William Rountree, who in 1957 was Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs, wrote:

The sovereignty and territorial integrity of the nations of the Middle East are threatened by several factors. One of these is nationalism. This is, in itself, a good thing. But the banner of nationalism can be picked up by emotional, xenophobic, and unconstructive elements. In certain disturbed countries, nationalistic slogans are used to arouse street mobs and to terrorize many who work in the true interests of their nations.³⁴

In the New York Times, Hanson W. Baldwin wrote: "The prestige of Gamal Abdel Nasser is probably at a new high with Arab street mobs, by which Arab governments are so often made or broken."³⁵ Baldwin further commented: "The Egyptian President's hold upon 'the street' in Iraq is strong and seems to be increasing, and even some Iraqi Army officers are influenced by his views."³⁶ The key phrase in both Rountree's and Baldwin's articles was "street mobs". Rountree's use of the phrase seems too coincidental to suggest anything other than the fact that he was referring to President Nasser as a danger to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the nations of the Middle East.

To sum up, it is clear that the United States considered Nasser to be an extremely ambitious individual. The United States publicly supported Arab nationalism but only if it did not create unstable

³³United States, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower - 1957 (Washington, D. C., 1958), pp. 561-562.

³⁴United States Department of State Bulletin, "The Middle Eastern Policy of the United States", Vol. XXXVI, No. 933, May 13, 1957, p. 756.

³⁵New York Times, January 2, 1957, p. 1.

³⁶Ibid., p. 14.

conditions in the Middle East. Nasser's behavior in buying Soviet arms and urging the overthrow of those Arab governments which favored the United States did not meet the test. Furthermore, his actions made him a threat to the interests of the United States in the region.

There were other evidences that the doctrine was primarily oriented against President Nasser. On January 1, 1957, four days before President Eisenhower gave his special message to the Congress, the New York Times published an article concerning the consultation which had occurred among the United States, Great Britain, and France over the Middle East Resolution:

The British and French Governments have been informed that the proposed United States policy for the Middle East is not directed primarily against the creation of Soviet satellite states. The new United States policy, it is understood, would seek to prevent aggression by any state in the Middle East. Under the circumstances as the British see them, the question is not one of military aggression, either by the Soviet Union or a new Soviet satellite in the Middle East, but of the continued infiltration of the governments of Arab states by nationalists sustained by Soviet financial aid and supported by troops armed with Soviet weapons.³⁷

It should be noted that only Syria and Egypt were receiving Soviet weapons as of 1957. This means that Great Britain and France believed that the United States' policy was directed against Egypt and Syria.

In the Senate Hearings on the Joint Resolution, Secretary of State Dulles commented that the doctrine would stabilize those governments then in control in the Middle East.³⁸ This supports the assumption that the United States intended to pursue the status quo in the Middle East, but also, since some Arab governments presumed that Nasser was a

³⁷Ibid., January 1, 1957, p. 2.

³⁸U.S. Congress, Senate, President's Proposal on the Middle East, p. 416.

threat to their continued existence,³⁹ it indicates that the United States was going to oppose attempts by Nasser to expand his influence.

When one Senator questioned Dulles on the need for unilateral action by the United States rather than the United Nations in event of overt aggression in the Middle East, Dulles replied: "...the United Nations does not freeze the political status quo."⁴⁰ It appears that Dulles meant that the United Nations could not guarantee existing governments in the Middle East but that the United States might. Secretary Dulles testified that President Nasser had not gained in prestige among the Arabs as a result of the Suez crisis.⁴¹ On this point, Mr. Dulles was contradicted by newspaper reports,⁴² respected journalists such as Hanson W. Baldwin,⁴³ and even a former Ambassador to Egypt, Jefferson Caffery.⁴⁴ As a former State Department official commented: "Nasser has become in the eyes of most Arabs a modern Saladin. More than any other man, he has restored Arab independence and dignity."⁴⁵

³⁹Campbell, pp. 77-78.

Ann Williams, Britain and France in the Middle East and North Africa (New York, 1968), p. 122.

William R. Polk, The United States and the Arab World (Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1965), p. 210.

⁴⁰U.S. Congress, Senate, President's Proposal on the Middle East, p. 57.

⁴¹Ibid., p. 350.

⁴²New York Times, January 4, 1957, p. 5.

⁴³Ibid., January 2, 1957, p. 1.

⁴⁴U.S. Congress, Senate, President's Proposal on the Middle East, pp. 776-777.

⁴⁵Richard Nolte and William R. Polk, "Toward a Policy for the Middle East", Foreign Affairs, Vol. XXXVI, No. 4 (July, 1958), p. 652.

Yet, Dulles said that this "modern Saladin" had little influence in the Middle East, a statement which Dulles himself contradicted by mentioning that the Eisenhower Doctrine was formulated in December, 1956, the time when Nasser was at the height of his prestige and influence among the Arabs as a result of the Suez crisis.⁴⁶

The inclusion of economic aid under the Doctrine and its projected uses presents another indication that the Eisenhower Doctrine was oriented against President Nasser. As previously mentioned, the Rayburn substitute resolution was rejected by the President and Secretary Dulles because it included no economic or military assistance programs. President Eisenhower, in a press conference, was asked whether the economic portion of the Resolution was essential to the document as a whole. The President said that the economic aid was a vital part of the Resolution; the United States could not "wage the peace" by force of arms alone.⁴⁷ In the Senate Hearings, Secretary Dulles testified that Egypt and Syria would not be allowed to participate in the aid program⁴⁸ and it was possible that the economic portion of the document could be used as a penalty against them.⁴⁹ Dulles' statement, at least in regard to Egypt, concurs with a similar statement by Eisenhower in his book, Waging Peace.⁵⁰ When questioned about the specific uses of

⁴⁶U.S. Congress, Senate, President's Proposal on the Middle East, p. 107.

⁴⁷United States, Public Paper of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower - 1957, p. 78.

⁴⁸U.S. Congress, Senate, President's Proposal on the Middle East, p. 24.

⁴⁹Ibid., p. 145.

⁵⁰Eisenhower, p. 30.

the aid, Dulles was unable to give any inclination concerning the position of the funds. Senator Fulbright was particularly concerned about the prospect of spending foreign aid money with no specific purpose in mind and he suggested that the Resolution be tabled until the Department of State gave a full accounting of its Middle Eastern activities during the period 1947-1956.⁵¹ Another witness, Joseph C. Green, the former Ambassador to Jordan, was quite frank concerning the spending of the \$200 million:

As far as spending \$200 million between now and June out there is concerned, the Administration may have some specific projects that I have never heard of, but I know of no way that that could be done in that space of time except by simply handing it out.⁵²

What is evident at this point is that the President wanted complete discretion to spend \$200 million in the Middle East for projects which were not formulated. It was obvious that neither Egypt nor Syria would receive any of this aid and that, in all likelihood, it would be used to support the opposition of these countries. The United States was not likely to give away money without receiving something in return from the recipient state. In this case, it is reasonable to assume that the economic aid of the Eisenhower Doctrine was designed to be used as a "bribe" to secure a pledge from specific political leaders in the Middle East to resist President Nasser.

This idea is strengthened by the visit of King Saud of Saudi Arabia to the United States in January, 1957. King Saud, although ruler of an extremely rich nation, was a relatively insignificant

⁵¹U.S. Congress, Senate, President's Proposal on the Middle East, p. 219.

⁵²Ibid., pp. 674-675.

political force in the Middle East,⁵³ and his regime was probably the most reactionary in the entire region. King Saud had refused to allow any Jew to enter Saudi Arabia and this ban was applicable even to Jewish personnel of the United States Air Force which operated the Dhahran air base. This Saudi Arabian policy antagonized many citizens in the United States,⁵⁴ yet the Eisenhower Administration rolled out the red carpet and welcomed Saud as a "conquering hero" when he visited the United States. King Saud told President Eisenhower that for the Doctrine to be successful, it must be as advantageous to the Arabs as Nasser's policy.⁵⁵ This report increases the suspicion that the economic portion of the Doctrine was in reality a "bribe". More importantly, the treatment that Saud received while in the United States indicated that the United States planned to use him as its political instrument in the Middle East. This point was later substantiated by President Eisenhower in his memoirs.⁵⁶ King Saud did not make any formal commitment to the Doctrine but he did agree to explain it to other Arab leaders and, in return, the King received additional military aid from the United States.⁵⁷

The belief that the Doctrine's primary purpose was to isolate President Nasser from the rest of the Arab world was held by some

⁵³H. B. Sharabi, Governments and Politics of the Middle East in the Twentieth Century (New York, 1962), p. 241.

⁵⁴Eisenhower, p. 114.

⁵⁵Gerald De Gaury, Faisal: King of Saudi Arabia (New York, 1967), p. 78.

⁵⁶Eisenhower, p. 116.

⁵⁷De Gaury, p. 83.

Senators in 1957. Senator Ervin indicated what he believed to be the real purpose of the Eisenhower Doctrine:

The truth is, Mr. President, that the testimony offered in support of the resolution makes it so plain that he who runs may read and not err in so doing, that this is a resolution advocated by the Secretary of State for the purpose of making the United States a policeman for the countries of the Middle East.⁵⁸

During the Hearings, Secretary of State Dulles defended the refusal of the United States to join the Baghdad Pact by arguing that it would involve the United States in Arab politics.⁵⁹ Senator Ervin noted a possible result of the Resolution:

Mr. President, I submit that if the United States is going to attempt to maintain the status quo in the countries of the Middle East insofar as their present governments are concerned, Uncle Sam will be sticking his nose into Arab politics with a vengeance.⁶⁰

Senator Ellender of Louisiana also criticized the Doctrine and mentioned what he believed the Resolution would do:

There is only one thing the resolution would do. It would permit the President to use American troops to defend a Middle East country from attack by another Middle East country...⁶¹

During the latter stages of debate in the Senate and almost immediately after the Resolution was signed by the President, a number of incidents occurred which were significant in identifying the policy which the United States would pursue in regard to President Nasser of

⁵⁸U.S. Congress, Congressional Record, 85th Congress, 1st Session, February 20, 1957, p. 2313.

⁵⁹U.S. Congress, Senate, President's Proposal on the Middle East, p. 344.

⁶⁰U.S. Congress, Congressional Record, 85th Congress, 1st Session, February 20, 1957, p. 2314.

⁶¹Ibid., February 27, 1957, p. 2690.

Egypt. The first incident concerned a Vice-Presidential fact-finding mission to Africa and the Middle East. While Vice-President Nixon visited many of Egypt's neighboring states and, more specifically, three nations at odds with Nasser (Sudan, Libya, and Ethiopia), he did not visit Egypt. Furthermore, Nixon had not requested a visit to Egypt.⁶² It seems incredible that an individual would go on a fact-finding trip in the Middle East so soon after the Suez crisis and not visit Egypt. The only possible explanation was that the United States was attempting to ignore Nasser.

The second incident or, more precisely, series of incidents occurred less than a month after the Joint Resolution was adopted by the Congress and signed by President Eisenhower. Throughout March, King Saud received visits from various Middle Eastern leaders. Curiously, all of these individuals had a pro-Western bent in their foreign policies. First to visit Saud was President Chamoun of Lebanon, who was followed by King Faisal of Iraq, and then the Shah of Iran. It was reported that informed circles in Arab countries were reportedly talking about a major realignment in the process of being formed which would result in a better understanding with the United States. These informed individuals also stated that a closer understanding between former rivals King Saud and King Faisal could mean a vital change in the position of Saudi Arabia in the Middle East and this would, in turn, weaken President Nasser.⁶³ These visits to King Saud indicate that there was some realignment being considered in the Middle East. The

⁶²New York Times, March 5, 1957, p. 5.

⁶³Ibid., March 28, 1957, p. 4.

visit of Faisal was of particular interest in this regard because Saud and Faisal had previously been involved in territorial disputes. The visit of Saud to the United States and then, less than two months later, the visits of three important Middle East leaders to Saudi Arabia, one immediately following the other, were too coincidental to have occurred without some preparation. Perhaps more importantly, President Nasser was not involved in any of these meetings.

Finally, another incident concerns the efforts of the United States to distribute the economic aid allocated under the Doctrine. President Eisenhower had appointed James P. Richards as a Special Ambassador whose purpose was to explain the Doctrine to the Middle East nations and parcel out grants or loans to those nations which accepted the Doctrine. Richards toured fifteen nations but did not visit Egypt, Syria, or Jordan. When he returned, Richards gave an address in which he explained his reasons for not visiting the three nations. Richards said that Egypt had offered no firm invitation for him to visit; Syria had presented a scrap of paper which implied that he would be welcome but that the Government had clearly shown that there was no real desire for frank and sincere discussions; and internal developments in Jordan made it preferable to extend United States aid through other means.⁶⁴ Richards made it clear that only in Jordan would the United States make renewed attempts to provide economic assistance; Egypt and Syria were to be excluded. But then, Dulles had stated in the Hearings that the United States did not plan to permit either Egypt or Syria to

⁶⁴United States Department of State Bulletin, "Radio and Television Address by Ambassador Richards", Vol. XXXVI, No. 935 (May 27, 1957), p. 841.

participate in the program, so Richards needed some pretext for not visiting those countries. The Richards Mission succeeded only where he was preaching to the converted and Mr. Richards seems to have wanted to ensure that there would be no new converts.

At this point, it is necessary to summarize the position advanced in this chapter. Although the Doctrine was rationalized as a defense against communist ambitions in the Middle East, evidence has been presented which indicates that the communist threat was not particularly serious in the Middle East. On the other hand, President Nasser and the Pan-Arab movement did constitute a threat to the interests of the United States in the Middle East. This view is supported by the statements of Secretary of State Dulles, President Eisenhower, and Assistant Secretary of State William Rountree in which all three considered Nasser's nationalism to be dangerous. Dulles' testimony in the Senate Hearings shows that the United States was not going to allow Egypt or Syria to participate in the aid program. Furthermore, the amount of aid appropriated by the Congress was not large enough to combat communist subversion generally, but it was adequate to serve as a "bribe" to those Arab leaders who would promise not to support Nasser. Finally, a number of incidents occurring soon after the Doctrine was signed by the President shows that the United States was using King Saud as its political instrument in the Middle East while it ignored Nasser. Thus, the position of this study is that the Eisenhower Doctrine was primarily oriented against President Gamal Abdel Nasser of Egypt.

CHAPTER IV

IMPACT OF THE EISENHOWER DOCTRINE ON THE MIDDLE EAST

Thus far it has been shown that Egypt, under President Nasser, was viewed as constituting the most immediate and major threat to the interests of the United States in the Middle East. In January, 1957, there were three Arab governments which were pursuing policies more or less compatible with the interests of the United States and thereby could be characterized as being at variance with President Nasser's position. Iraq was a member of the Baghdad Pact; Lebanon, under the leadership of President Camille Chamoun, was following a pro-Western policy; and Saudi Arabia also was friendly toward the United States. Furthermore, the response of the United States to the Suez crisis had improved its prestige in the region, if only slightly. Less than two years later, however, Iraq, Lebanon, and Saudi Arabia were all nonaligned and the prestige of the United States was at its lowest in the Middle East. Some explanation must exist for this rapid turn of events, and since the only major Middle Eastern policy declaration of the United States was the Eisenhower Doctrine, a question can be raised concerning the relationship between the implementation of the Doctrine and the negative response toward the United States by several Arab states.

In attempting to gauge the Arab reaction to the Eisenhower Doctrine, it should be noted that the Arabs had never forgotten the Suez

experience.¹ The West, in Arab minds, had proved that it had the will to use force to achieve its ends and many Arabs believed that the United States was committed to Western interests and was pursuing policies which the Arabs identified with past Anglo-French imperialist control.² It was clear that the Arabs were going to compare any action on the part of the United States with the acts committed by Great Britain and France. The United States, therefore, was forced to attempt to promote Western interests and yet disassociate itself from Great Britain and France. The fact that Great Britain and France welcomed the Eisenhower Doctrine and the initiative of the United States in the Middle East³ made the Doctrine immediately suspect by the Arab nationalists.⁴

Initial reaction to the Eisenhower Doctrine was mixed; Syria was adamantly opposed from the first hint of its coming,⁵ while Lebanon and Iraq welcomed a more active involvement by the United States in the Middle East.⁶ The Baghdad Pact endorsed the Eisenhower Doctrine, but this was to be expected.⁷ In Jordan, the Foreign Minister rejected the

¹John S. Badeau, The American Approach to the Arab World (New York, 1968), p. 6.

²Ibid., p. 10.

³New York Times, January 1, 1957, p. 2.

⁴Ibid., p. 1.

⁵Ibid.

⁶Ibid., p. 3.

⁷"Baghdad Pact Statement on the Eisenhower Doctrine", Middle Eastern Affairs, Vol. VIII, No. 3 (March, 1957), pp. 109-110.

Eisenhower assertion⁸ that a vacuum existed in the Middle East and insisted that even if a vacuum had existed, it was filled by the Arabs themselves.⁹ President Nasser did not immediately comment on the Doctrine. Observers noted that he seemed to be waiting until the Congressional consideration had been completed.¹⁰ Some early reactions from Arab countries were misleading because of the manner in which the Doctrine had been announced. Alfred Lilienthal testified at the Senate Hearings that the earliest cabled reports from Arab correspondents in New York spoke of a "United States mandate" over the Middle East.¹¹ As a generalization, it appeared that the anti-Western Arabs would oppose the Doctrine as an attempt to buy off the Arab nationalists.¹²

While the Doctrine was primarily aimed at Egypt, President Nasser was a watchword of restraint. While not outwardly antagonized by the Doctrine, he seemed to be seriously worried about its possible impact upon his position in the Arab world. In January, 1957, he convened a conference in Cairo including King Hussein of Jordan, King Saud of Saudi Arabia, and Premier Assali of Syria reportedly for the purpose of discussing means to prevent his possible isolation from the rest of the

⁸Dwight D. Eisenhower, Waging Peace 1956-1961 (New York, 1965), p. 178.

⁹New York Times, January 3, 1957, p. 3.

¹⁰Ibid., January 5, 1957, p. 6.

¹¹U.S. Congress, Senate, President's Proposal on the Middle East, Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Relations and Committee on Armed Services. 85th Congress, 1st Session (Washington, D.C., 1957), pp. 572-573.

¹²New York Times, January 5, 1957, p. 1.

Arab world.¹³ In addition, Nasser wished to keep the Arab Bloc united in its relationship with the West.¹⁴ The participants agreed upon a subsidy plan for Jordan and then adjourned without making a joint statement about the Doctrine.

King Saud left this meeting to officially visit the United States. In Washington, he agreed to explain the Doctrine to the other Arab leaders in the Middle East. By doing this, Saud indicated support for the Doctrine, if not explicitly, at least implicitly.¹⁵ After his visit to the United States, he traveled to Morocco, Libya, and Tunisia; in each country he explained the purpose of the Eisenhower Doctrine. He met with President Nasser, President Kuwatly of Syria, and King Hussein in late February, 1957. King Saud told the other Arab leaders that the United States recognized that there were two sides to the Israeli question¹⁶ and that it was not antagonistic toward nationalism as long as it was not oriented toward the interests of the Soviet Union.¹⁷ Saud was immediately challenged by Nasser and Kuwatly, both of whom refused to abandon their policies of nonalignment or to denounce the Soviet Union.¹⁸ The conference adjourned without the issuance of a

¹³Ibid., January 19, 1957, p. 1.

Georgiana G. Stevens, ed., The United States and the Middle East (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, 1964), p. 165.

¹⁴New York Times, January 19, 1957, p. 3.

¹⁵United States Department of State Bulletin, "Joint Communique on Visit to Washington of King Saud", Vol. XXXVI, No. 992 (February 25, 1957), pp. 42-44.

¹⁶New York Times, February 26, 1957, p. 1.

¹⁷Ibid., p. 8.

¹⁸Gerald De Gaury, Faisal: King of Saudi Arabia (New York, 1967), p. 84.

statement on the Eisenhower Doctrine, a fact which particularly annoyed President Kuwatly.¹⁹ Nasser, also, was becoming suspicious of King Saud. Saud's appearance as an emissary of the United States, coupled with the military aid which he had recently received from the United States and his position in the conference, seemed to have convinced Nasser that the United States was attempting to isolate him.²⁰

Before the Richards Mission left for the Middle East, an article in The Economist warned: "There is no evidence that the Arab states will join the western camp to get aid. There is much to indicate that they will resist the West more strongly if excluded for political reasons from getting aid offered to others."²¹ This warning was to become a prophecy. In his tour of fifteen nations, Richards received commitments of support against communist aggression from thirteen nations, although only Lebanon publicly and specifically supported the Eisenhower Doctrine. Richards negotiated aid programs in nine countries: Lebanon, Libya, Afghanistan, Saudi Arabia, Ethiopia, Pakistan, Iraq, Iran, and Turkey.²² With the possible exception of Afghanistan, every one of the recipients had a pro-Western government. Of the \$200 million appropriated by the Congress, Richards parceled out \$174

¹⁹New York Times, February 26, 1957, p. 8.

²⁰Ibid., March 5, 1957, p. 1.

²¹The Economist, "Wrong Bait for Neutrals", Vol. CLXXXII, No. 5917 (January 19, 1957), p. 194.

²²U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, "First Report to the Congress Covering Activities Through June 30, 1957, in Furtherance of the Purposes of the Joint Resolution to Promote Peace and Stability in the Middle East", House Miscellaneous Documents, 85th Congress, 1st Session (Washington, 1957), p. 1.

million, most of which was in the form of grants rather than loans.²³ Iraq, Lebanon, and Saudi Arabia are of particular importance to this study. Iraq's acceptance can be explained by its membership in the Baghdad Pact, an alliance which the United States had helped to establish. Saudi Arabia's acceptance can be explained by King Saud's fear of communist penetration and his vision of becoming a leader of the Arab world.²⁴ Lebanon, under the government of President Chamoun, had actively pursued pro-Western policies and the President was a personal friend of Eisenhower.²⁵

There were three Arab nations which did not receive any of the economic aid offered under the Eisenhower Doctrine: Egypt, Syria, and Jordan. Other than the fact that it was doubtful that Secretary of State Dulles would ever have permitted Egypt and Syria to receive aid under the Doctrine, the governments of these nations believed that the United States was attempting to establish itself as the protector of the Middle East in much the same way as the British had done.²⁶ Furthermore, the Doctrine implicitly demanded a public condemnation of the communist "menace" by the recipient state. To the Arab nationalists, this was anathema because the Soviet Union was aiding them in their conflict with Israel. When Israel accepted the Eisenhower Doctrine and Richards visited there, this further strengthened the suspicions of the

²³The Economist, "Doctrine At Work", Vol. CLXXXIV, No. 5951 (September 14, 1957), p. 829.

²⁴H.B. Sharabi, Governments and Politics of the Middle East in the Twentieth Century (New York, 1962), pp. 240-241.

²⁵Eisenhower, p. 265.

²⁶New York Times, January 1, 1957, p. 1.

Arab nationalists. In his role as "male Cleopatra" (as former Secretary of State Dean Acheson characterized him), Nasser tried to pull the Middle East off against the West in order to prevent either from becoming dominant in the Middle East and, thereby, facilitate his own objectives. In 1957, the Soviet Union was the lesser evil because the United States had assumed Great Britain's former role of "protecting" the Middle East. This meant that the United States would be promoting those Middle Eastern governments which had pro-Western policies and this would frustrate Nasser's objectives. To pursue his own policies, Nasser was forced to denounce the Eisenhower Doctrine. The situation in Jordan was quite different. King Hussein acted in a manner which implied that he would accept the Doctrine, but his pro-Nasser government prevented him from doing so. The United States recognized this and, for that reason, Ambassador Richards declared that it was preferable that United States aid be extended through other means.²⁷

It was evident that the United States was using its aid programs to reward its political supporters in the Middle East. The United States was making it economically more desirable for the Arab governments to be with it than against it. The fact that this was obvious, and that Egypt and Syria were being deliberately excluded for political reasons, created hostility among Arab nationalists. The Syrian Foreign Minister reported that Richards' statements about Syria's invitation had been considered an insult and proved that Syria could not deal with

²⁷United States Department of State Bulletin, "Radio and Television Address by Ambassador Richards", Vol. XXXVI, No. 935 (May 27, 1957), p. 841.

the United States.²⁸

While King Saud's visit to the United States and the Richards Mission might be considered the first steps in implementing the Doctrine, they were not the first attempts by the United States Government to implement the Doctrine during a crisis situation. Between March, 1957, and July, 1958, the United States was faced with three crises in the Middle East: Jordan, in the spring of 1957; Syria, in the fall of 1957; and Lebanon, in the summer of 1958. In each of these crises, the United States took some form of action, although only in the Lebanese crisis did the United States resort to using its military forces. The Arab responses to these acts were to have significant repercussions on the prestige of the United States and the effectiveness of the Eisenhower Doctrine.

The political situation in Jordan was characterized by internal dissension between the Palestinians, who comprised two-thirds of Jordan's population and to whom Nasser represented the only Arab leader capable of retrieving their homeland, and the Bedouins, who were loyal to King Hussein.²⁹ In the elections of 1956, the pro-Nasser nationalists became the majority in Parliament and Sulaiman al-Nabulsi became Prime Minister. Nabulsi was a member of the pro-Nasser National Socialist Party and believed that Jordan, because it was a non-viable state, should unite with Egypt.³⁰ The Government formulated a pro-Nasser, anti-Western policy which was successful in bringing about

²⁸ New York Times, August 27, 1957, p. 3.

²⁹ Sharabi, pp. 185-186.

³⁰ Ibid., p. 187.

closer ties with Nasser. The Nabulsi regime conducted itself as though a parliamentary regime had in fact been established and it was reduced to only a constitutional monarch.³¹ This situation would inevitably have caused friction, but the Jordanian crisis actually began over a foreign policy issue. Nabulsi favored the diplomatic recognition of the Soviet Union in order to procure economic aid.³² In this matter, Nabulsi was attempting to follow the precedent established by the Egyptian Government in 1955 and the Syrian Government in 1956. King Hussein opposed diplomatic recognition or aid programs with the Soviet Union and, instead, wanted aid from the West, if there were not any strings attached, or aid from his fellow Arab governments.³³ In February, 1957, Hussein called Nabulsi's attention to the danger of communist penetration in Jordan and urged Nabulsi to mitigate communist influence.³⁴ With Nabulsi's views about the Soviet Union paralleling those of Nasser, it was evident that the King and his Prime Minister were close to estrangement.

The gap between the views of the King and the Prime Minister continued to widen after the Eisenhower Doctrine was signed by the President in March. Jordan had not accepted the Doctrine because it was politically not feasible to do so with the large pro-Nasser Palestinian population and with a pro-Nasser government. At the first indication that Jordan might seek closer ties with the United States, riots broke out in Amman and other cities throughout Jordan. Hussein believed that

³¹J.C. Hurewitz, Middle East Politics: The Military Dimension (New York, 1969), p. 319.

³²Ibid., p. 320.

³³Ibid.

³⁴New York Times, February 3, 1957, pp. 1, 22.

these riots had been instigated by President Nasser.³⁵ The straw that broke the camel's back was a speech by Nabulsi in which he contended that the Eisenhower Doctrine was an interference in Jordanian internal affairs and that regardless of the economic aid promises made by the United States Government, Jordan would continue to refuse to denounce the Soviet Union.³⁶ Four days after this speech, Prime Minister Nabulsi was dismissed and the nationalist Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces, General Abu Nuwar, was arrested for plotting against the King.

After the dismissal of Nabulsi, King Hussein appointed a pro-Western Cabinet which antagonized the Arab nationalists who believed that the King had gone too far to the right.³⁷ They unleashed a propaganda campaign against him and, with Egyptian support, threatened street demonstrations and a general strike unless the new Prime Minister resigned.³⁸ King Hussein blamed Nasser and Kuwatly for provoking the riots and warned them to moderate the inflammatory radio broadcasts about the Jordanian Government which were inciting the people to rebel.³⁹ Faced with the street mobs, the propaganda from Egypt, and the presence of a Syrian army regiment on Jordanian soil,⁴⁰ Hussein acted to ensure the loyalty of his armed forces and sought assistance from King Saud, who placed at King Hussein's disposal all the Saudi troops

³⁵Stevens, p. 96.

³⁶New York Times, April 7, 1957, p. 2.

³⁷Ibid., April 26, 1957, p. 4.

³⁸Ibid., April 24, 1957, p. 1.

³⁹Ibid., April 23, 1957, p. 1.

⁴⁰Ibid., April 4, 1957, p. 1.

which were then in Jordan as a result of the Suez crisis.⁴¹ King Saud also began to extend financial assistance to Hussein.⁴² With this support and another change in the Cabinet, the crisis subsided.

It was evident that the Jordanian crisis was not caused by the communists although communist elements were probably a factor in increasing an already tense situation.⁴³ The major impetus came from the Arab nationalists encouraged by Nasser. The disputes between Nabulsi and Hussein were issues in which Hussein was in disagreement with Nasser. The fact that an obviously pro-Nasser government was dismissed for a pro-Western government confirms that view. The radio propaganda against Hussein's pro-Western government came from Cairo rather than Moscow. It is true that Hussein had stated that Jordan was threatened by international communism,⁴⁴ but his statement did not fit the actual situation and it must be viewed as a means of obtaining aid from the United States rather than accurately describing the political situation in Jordan. This is substantiated by Hussein's statement of April 25, 1957, in which he charged that the conspiracy to overthrow him was getting its support from Egypt.⁴⁵ Another indication that Hussein was attempting to catch the attention of the United States were the reports that Hussein was looking for a formula similar to that of King Saud for

⁴¹De Gaury, p. 85.

⁴²New York Times, April 12, 1957, p. 6.

⁴³George Lenczowski, The Middle East in World Affairs (Ithaca, New York, 1962), p. 678.

⁴⁴New York Times, February 3, 1957, p. 22.
Ibid., April 25, 1957, p. 1.

⁴⁵Ibid., April 26, 1957, p. 2.

obtaining financial aid from the West without tying his country to any pact.⁴⁶

The fact that the origin of Jordan's conflict stemmed from internal dissension and inter-Arab rivalry rather than from international communism posed a problem for the United States. The Eisenhower Doctrine could not be specifically used because it did not fit the situation; there was no overt communist aggression and Jordan had not accepted the Doctrine. On the other hand, the United States could not allow Jordan to fall into the hands of the Arab nationalists. Such an event would either prompt an Israeli attack to protect its borders or an inter-Arab war over the division of the spoils; both possibilities would create an uneasy situation in the Middle East and, therefore, would endanger the interests of the United States.⁴⁷ At one point, the United States Government announced that it was not under any commitment to defend Jordan,⁴⁸ but six days later, President Eisenhower authorized Presidential Press Secretary James Hagerty to say that the United States regarded the independence and integrity of Jordan as vital.⁴⁹ Eisenhower purposely used language similar to that of the Doctrine.⁵⁰ The next day, President Eisenhower ordered the Sixth Fleet to sail into the Eastern Mediterranean Sea. The State Department press release announcing the President's action read, in part: "Jordan is menaced by the

⁴⁶Ibid., April 19, 1957, p. 4.

⁴⁷Eisenhower, p. 194.

⁴⁸New York Times, April 19, 1957, p. 1.

⁴⁹Ibid., April 25, 1957, p. 1.

⁵⁰Eisenhower, p. 195.

forces of international communism."⁵¹ In addition, the United States extended a \$10 million grant to Jordan which, although not specifically attached to the Eisenhower Doctrine, was given, "...in recognition of the steps taken by His Majesty King Hussein and the Government and people of Jordan to maintain the integrity and independence of their nation."⁵² Again, the language was such as to suggest that the Eisenhower Doctrine was being used in fact, if not in name. It appears that Hussein was successful in obtaining aid from the United States without committing himself to any anti-communist pledge or to joining the Baghdad Pact.

The crisis subsided rapidly after the action taken by the United States. Jordan was detached from the ranks of the Arab nationalists but it was done by abolishing political parties and suspending the Parliament. The Arab nationalists did not miss Eisenhower's choice of words in announcing that the United States would support Hussein. They realized that the Doctrine had been used and Nasser and Kuwatly characterized United States aid to Jordan as an attempt to buy the country.⁵³ The United States lost prestige as a result of its actions during the crisis. The Arab nationalists could not see any distinction between a British show of force and a United States show of force.⁵⁴ The presence of the Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean Sea was interpreted by the Arab nationalists as a provocative move to shore up King Hussein

⁵¹New York Times, April 26, 1957, p. 1.

⁵²Ibid., April 30, 1957, p. 1.

⁵³Ibid., May 1, 1957, p. 3.

⁵⁴"The Middle East Since Suez", The World Today, Vol. XIII, No. 12 (December, 1957), p. 514.

regardless of the wishes of the people of Jordan.⁵⁵ Furthermore, the use of the Sixth Fleet held the United States open to the charge of "gunboat diplomacy"⁵⁶ reminiscent of its past and British colonialism.⁵⁷ The suspicions of the Arab nationalists that the approach of the United States to the Middle East was anti-Nasser and anti-nationalist seemed to be confirmed.⁵⁸

The United States had won the first round, but Nasser was not defeated. In June, 1957, King Saud and King Hussein met in Amman, ostensibly for the purpose of reaffirming their belief in neutralism. The communique issued from that meeting was denounced by the Syrian Defense Minister, Khaled al-Azm, who described the two monarchs as "tools of America".⁵⁹ This attack upon Saud and Hussein indicated that a split was occurring in the Arab world and that Egypt and Syria were becoming isolated. This was further evidenced in the closer working relationships among Kings Saud, Hussein, and Faisal,⁶⁰ the withdrawal of the Saudi ambassador from Damascus, and the refusal of Egypt and Syria to financially assist Jordan after they pledged that they would do so.⁶¹

⁵⁵ Ibid., p. 513.

⁵⁶ John C. Campbell, Defense of the Middle East (New York, 1960), pp. 130-131.

⁵⁷ Thomas K. Finletter, Foreign Policy: the Next Phase - The 1960s (New York, 1960), p. 161.

⁵⁸ Stevens, p. 167.

⁵⁹ G. Barraclough, ed., Survey of International Affairs 1956-1958 (London, 1962), p. 176.

⁶⁰ New York Times, June 20, 1957, p. 1.

⁶¹ Barraclough, p. 177.

The United States did not have to wait too long for the second round to begin--this time in Syria. In this crisis, it was the response of the United States to the situation which precipitated the crisis. Syria had an extremely nationalist government controlled by the Ba'athist Party. After President Nasser's arms agreement with the Soviet Union in 1955, Syria negotiated one in 1956. When the Eisenhower Doctrine was announced in 1957, Syria virulently denounced it and began to characterize the United States as an imperialist power. In July, 1957, it secured a loan for approximately \$100 million from the Soviet Union and in addition negotiated a marketing agreement with the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia for the sale of Syrian grain and cotton.⁶² In August, the Syrian Government alleged that three United States Embassy officers were plotting against the government and expelled them. The State Department was quick to report that the manner in which the three officers were expelled indicated that Syria was moving closer to the Communist Bloc.⁶³ The United States did not send its ambassador back to Damascus and the Syrian ambassador to the United States was declared to be persona non grata.⁶⁴

This incident was the start of the Syrian crisis. While the United States was concerned about the arms build up in Syria, some countries in the region were highly distressed about the turn of events in Syria.⁶⁵ Turkey was particularly worried about the

⁶²Ibid., p. 179.

⁶³New York Times, August 15, 1957, p. 4.

⁶⁴Barraclough, p. 179.

⁶⁵Eisenhower, p. 197.

possibility of a communist (or a communist sympathizing) government in Syria because it would then have a communist government on two of its borders.⁶⁶ Lebanon asked the United States for formal assurances of support in the event that Lebanon was attacked by Syria.⁶⁷ Other nations in the area also expressed their concern to the United States.

The first public response of the United States was to send Loy W. Henderson, a Department of State Middle Eastern expert, to the area to confer with United States ambassadors and the leaders of those nations concerned about the leftist tendencies of the Syrian Government and more importantly, the large arms shipments being sent to Syria from the Communist Bloc. Henderson met with leaders of Turkey, Jordan, and Iraq in Ankara, Turkey and then made a short trip to Lebanon where he conferred with government officials there. These meetings were held in secret and for seven days the response of the United States to the recent events was unknown. Significantly, Henderson made no effort to contact either Egyptian or Syrian officials and did not visit either country.⁶⁸ The Arab nationalists were suspicious of Henderson's real intentions and were therefore not too surprised when Henderson, upon his arrival in the United States, asserted that Syria's behavior jeopardized the "free world".⁶⁹ In the wake of Henderson's report, the United States sent arms to Turkey and Iraq and rapidly accelerated its arms

⁶⁶New York Times, August 24, 1957, p. 4.

⁶⁷Eisenhower, p. 197.

⁶⁸New York Times, September 2, 1957, p. 1.

⁶⁹Ibid., September 5, 1957, p. 1.

deliveries to Jordan and Lebanon.⁷⁰ In addition, the Sixth Fleet was again ordered to the Eastern Mediterranean Sea and State Department officials hinted that the Eisenhower Doctrine might be invoked.⁷¹ During this period of time, the number of Turkish troops stationed on the Syrian border increased from thirty-two thousand to fifty thousand.⁷² A short time after it was suggested that the Eisenhower Doctrine might be invoked, the Syrian Government charged that Turkey, with the collaboration of the United States, was planning to invade Syria. On October 15, 1957, Syria brought its complaint to the United Nations. This turn of events placed the United States on the defensive and even pro-Western Arab governments hesitated in their support of the United States.⁷³

The United States Government denied the allegation of the Syrian Government but Eisenhower's memoirs suggest that the United States was not as totally innocent as it led the world to believe in the United Nations debates. Eisenhower wrote that Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, and Turkey had concluded that the Syrian regime had been subverted by the communists and were prepared to take action that would overthrow the Syrian Government. These countries asked President Eisenhower what the United States would do to help them. Eisenhower replied that if Syria's Moslem neighbors felt it necessary to take action, the United States

⁷⁰Eisenhower, p. 202.

⁷¹New York Times, September 6, 1957, p. 1.

⁷²Eisenhower, p. 203.

⁷³H. Paul Castleberry, "Arab View of Postwar American Foreign Policy", The Western Political Science Quarterly, Vol. XII, No. 1 (March, 1959), p. 17.

would expedite shipments of arms already committed to the Middle Eastern countries and, further, would replace losses as quickly as possible. In addition, the United States would ensure that no outside countries - for example, Israel and the Soviet Union - would interfere with the measures taken by these Moslem nations to protect themselves from Syria. In the meantime, the President informed key Congressmen of the seriousness of the situation and alerted the "ready" forces of the armed forces, particularly the Strategic Air Command. Something went wrong, however, and first, Iraq withdrew from the plan, then King Hussein left unexpectedly for a vacation in Italy, and King Saud, although never informed of the plan, became preoccupied with the Israeli dispute rather than addressing himself to the problems of Syria. This left Turkey and Lebanon; the latter nation was unable to initiate any military action.⁷⁴ On September 19, 1957, Secretary of State Dulles delivered a speech before the United Nations General Assembly in which he declared that Turkey faced a growing military danger resulting from the major build up of Soviet arms in Syria.⁷⁵ This danger cited by Dulles was of doubtful validity. The Syrian army was about 50,000 strong, newly equipped, lacking in battle experience, and largely tied down along the Israel frontier whereas Turkey had one of the largest armies in NATO with 500,000 troops, many of whom had fought in Korea, and it was the best equipped military force in the Middle East.⁷⁶ Although it probably would be going too far to conclude from this information that

⁷⁴Eisenhower, pp. 197-203.

⁷⁵New York Times, September 20, 1957, p. 1.

⁷⁶Richard Nolte and William R. Polk, "Toward a Policy for the Middle East", Foreign Affairs, Vol. XXXVI, No. 4 (July, 1958), p. 646.

the United States was prepared to support aggression against Syria, the behavior of the United States Government suggests that it would not have been displeased had the Syrian Government been overthrown.

The Syrian crisis was probably the turning point for the Eisenhower Doctrine. Throughout the crisis, the United States based its actions on the premise that Syria was becoming communist-oriented. Yet, it was unable to prove that premise and the withdrawal of Arab support from the invasion plan indicates that the Syrian Government was actually ultra-nationalist. On the other hand, the Soviet Union and Egypt gained the opportunity to pin the label of aggression once again on the Western powers.⁷⁷ In the General Assembly debates, Syria charged that the United States was intimidating the Syrian Government and that the Eisenhower Doctrine was a policy for "American intervention in the Middle East."⁷⁸ One by one, the other Arab governments began to line up in support of Syria. The attempt of the United States to ostracize the Syrian Government in the name of anti-communism contributed to a renewed sense of Arab unity which three months earlier was not evident.⁷⁹ The crisis proved that even if a weak Arab state wrapped itself in the mantle of nationalism and Arab solidarity, there was little that the United States could do.⁸⁰

The responses of the United States during the Syrian crisis did

⁷⁷Malcolm Kerr, The Arab Cold War 1958-1964 (London, 1965), p. 6.

⁷⁸"Assembly Debates Syrian Complaint Against Turkey", United Nations Review, Vol. IV, No. 6 (December, 1957), p. 29.

⁷⁹Barraclough, p. 182.

⁸⁰Campbell, p. 135.

not produce the desired results. In its quest for stability in the Middle East, the United States actually contributed to the instability. Although it still held military superiority, the Soviet Union was able to gain influence which threatened that superiority. The military position of the United States and the threat to invoke the Eisenhower Doctrine were associated by the Arabs. This stimulated hostility among the Arabs toward the Doctrine. The Arabs became increasingly doubtful about the good intentions of the United States and feared a move to install leaders who would be nominally independent but who, in fact, would be dependent upon and dominated by Washington.⁸¹ To the Arabs, the United States manifested its imperialistic policies by sending the Sixth Fleet to the area, urging Arab to fight Arab, and attempting to "bribe" those nations not firmly committed to Nasser. The United States, like Great Britain before it, had proved that it had the will to use force to achieve its ends. When the coup in Syria failed to materialize, the popular conclusion among the Arabs was not that it had not been planned but that the United States had been forced to back down.⁸² It was in this atmosphere that the Eisenhower Doctrine became a subject for general scorn throughout the Middle East. Its association, in Arab minds, with gunboat diplomacy, bribes, and puppet regimes made it a liability in the Middle East. The United States, however, did not recognize the liability of the Doctrine until after it had been used in one more crisis.

⁸¹William Appleman Williams, America and the Middle East: Open Door Imperialism or Enlightened Leadership? (New York, 1958), p. 58.

⁸²Stevens, p. 168.

For a time, Middle East tensions eased. In early 1958, Egypt and Syria united and formed the United Arab Republic, to which the United States, after an acceptable period of time, extended diplomatic recognition. Yemen later associated itself with this union to form the weak confederation of the United Arab States. President Eisenhower claimed that while the Arab populations as a whole seemed to view the event as a first step toward the long-sought goal of Arab unity, Arab governments were fearful of this obvious elevation of Nasser's influence and prestige.⁸³ At the encouragement of the State Department and as an obvious response to the formation of the U.A.R., Iraq and Jordan formed a federation called the Arab Union which essentially was a weak confederation in which both states retained their sovereignty.⁸⁴

New tensions arose in Lebanon during the spring and summer of 1958. In 1943, Lebanon received its independence from France which controlled the area under a League mandate. Lebanon faced the problem of reconciling the great religious differences within the country by adopting the National Pact, an unwritten gentlemen's agreement. The Pact reserves the office of President to the Maronite Christians, that of the Prime Minister to the Sunni Moslems, and that of the Speaker of the House to the Moslem Shi'is. The National Pact further implied that in foreign relations, Lebanon was to remain neutral except in regional matters.⁸⁵ An example of this point was the Lebanese participation in

⁸³Eisenhower, p. 263.

⁸⁴Ibid.

⁸⁵Sharabi, p. 145.

the Arab League and its aid in prosecuting the war with Israel in 1948.

The Lebanese crisis began to develop as early as 1956 when President Camille Chamoun failed to give active support to Egypt during the Suez crisis and had offended the Arab nationalists even more by not severing diplomatic or trade relations with Great Britain and France. In 1957, Lebanon was the only Middle Eastern government which publicly accepted the Eisenhower Doctrine, an act which many Lebanese considered as a departure from the National Pact.⁸⁶ The pro-Western stance of Chamoun's government antagonized many Moslems who wished to have closer ties with Nasser and the U.A.R.⁸⁷ The dominant Sunni Moslem community in Syria, who envisaged Lebanon as part of Greater Syria, was also disturbed at the pro-Western policies.⁸⁸ Syrian-Lebanese relations had been strained for over a year with minor incidents and disruption of trade between the two nations which occurred intermittently.⁸⁹ In April, 1958, all of these irritations surfaced when President Chamoun attempted to be re-elected. According to the Lebanese Constitution, the President is ineligible for re-election and Chamoun's predecessor had been forced to resign because he had attempted to perpetuate himself in office. Yet, Chamoun indicated that he would seek another term. This became the issue which provoked violence in Lebanon and which, in turn, involved the United States under the Eisenhower Doctrine.

⁸⁶Stevens, p. 169.

⁸⁷New York Times, April 2, 1958, p. 5.

⁸⁸Hurewitz, p. 389.

⁸⁹New York Times, January 28, 1957, p. 6.

The violence began with a riot which destroyed the United States Information Service's Library in Tripoli. The Government of Lebanon blamed a "foreign Arab power" for the disturbances and reported that hundreds of Syrian nationalists were infiltrating Lebanon to subvert the government.⁹⁰ The United States charged that Nasserites and communists were responsible for the riots in Lebanon.⁹¹ As disturbances within Lebanon increased in number and violence, President Chamoun mobilized the Lebanese army and formally charged the United Arab Republic with attempting to subvert the government of Lebanon.⁹² President Nasser denied Chamoun's accusation and assured the United States that he was not responsible for the events occurring in Lebanon.⁹³ The United States Department of State officials were unimpressed by President Nasser's denial and said that no nation would claim agents operating in another nation.⁹⁴ This, of course, implied that Nasser was lying.

While General Chehab, Lebanese Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces, led attempts to mediate between members of the Government and the opposition, President Nasser threatened to unleash Arab "volunteers" to protect Lebanon if President Chamoun called on foreign troops to crush the Lebanese rebellion.⁹⁵ The United States, referring to

⁹⁰Ibid., May 12, 1958, p. 2.

⁹¹Ibid., May 13, 1958, p. 1.

⁹²Ibid., May 22, 1958, p. 5.

⁹³Ibid., May 21, 1958, p. 1.

⁹⁴Ibid., May 22, 1958, p. 6.

⁹⁵Ibid., June 8, 1958, p. 40.

Nasser's threat, charged that Nasser had admitted his guilt fomenting Lebanon's troubles and called for observers from the United Nations to be sent to Lebanon to determine whether infiltration of men and arms was occurring.⁹⁶

By the end of June and the early part of July, the situation began to cool. One reason for this was President Chamoun's public announcement in the early part of July that he was not seeking re-election.⁹⁷ This robbed the opposition of one of its major issues. The United States, at this point, was attempting to assure President Chamoun of its strong support without becoming actively involved. Unexpected help for the forces of non-intervention came from the Pentagon where military experts strongly opposed a unilateral military action by the United States in Lebanon because of the strong possibility of guerrilla warfare.⁹⁸ On the political front, Secretary of State Dulles was also indicating that the United States had no intention of intervening in Lebanon.⁹⁹ Even when the United Nations Observation Group reported that they could find no evidence of Syrian infiltration into Lebanon and that the disturbance in Lebanon was a civil war,¹⁰⁰ the United States questioned the report but took no overt action. In Lebanon, the number of incidents tapered off and it appeared that the situation was becoming stabilized.

⁹⁶Ibid.

⁹⁷Eisenhower, p. 269.

⁹⁸New York Times, June 26, 1958, p. 1.

⁹⁹Ibid., July 2, 1958, p. 1.

¹⁰⁰Ibid., July 5, 1958, p. 1.

Then two events occurred within three days of each other which changed the Middle East situation. On July 12, King Hussein uncovered a plot to assassinate him which was led by sixty army officers. Hussein believed that the plot had been financed and directed by the United Arab Republic.¹⁰¹ The second event was a coup d' etat in Iraq. The coup was engineered by pro-Nasser forces who acted when rumors spread that King Faisal intended to order the army to attack Syria in support of the Lebanese government.¹⁰² The United States knew that many Iraqi army officers were influenced by Nasser's views and the army coup led by pro-Nasser officers, the assassination plot in Jordan, and the events in Lebanon, did not appear to be isolated incidents but pointed to an attempt by Nasser to eliminate his opposition. The United States Government could not help but believe that the Middle East situation was deteriorating. If pro-Nasser forces were successful in Lebanon and Jordan, the influence of the United States in the Middle East would be greatly reduced. Even Saudi Arabia could no longer be counted on to give the United States support because in April, King Saud had been forced to abdicate much of his power to his brother, Crown Prince Faisal, who favored closer ties with President Nasser.¹⁰³ If Nasser was successful, the Soviet penetration of the Middle East would have increased and the military primacy of the United States would be threatened. Furthermore, the flow of Middle Eastern oil to Europe would be threatened if pro-Nasser governments were in control of the

¹⁰¹Ibid., July 13, 1958, p. 23.

¹⁰²F.R.C. Bagley, "Iraq's Revolution", International Journal, Vol. XIV, No. 4 (Autumn, 1959), p. 288.

¹⁰³William R. Polk, The United States and the Arab World (Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1965), p. 211.
See also, Eisenhower, p. 264.

Eastern Mediterranean region. The position of the United States in the region under these circumstances would be in serious difficulty.

Acting upon this reasoning, the President ordered elements of the United States Marines to land in Beirut "to protect American lives and by their presence there to encourage the Lebanese government in defense of Lebanese sovereignty and integrity."¹⁰⁴ In addition, President Eisenhower asked Robert Murphy, a distinguished ambassador, to attempt to resolve the crisis in Lebanon. Murphy recorded that Eisenhower cited the basis for sending troops as the Eisenhower Doctrine.¹⁰⁵ The next day, Great Britain sent troops to Jordan to protect King Hussein's government.

The crisis ended with the inauguration of the new President of Lebanon, General Chehab, and with the realization that the revolutionary leader of Iraq, General Kassim, was not as pro-Nasser as originally thought. It is interesting that the United States strongly supported the election of General Chehab¹⁰⁶ even though he had opposed the United States' intervention and once elected, he appointed a Cabinet recruited almost wholly among the former rebels.¹⁰⁷ The Chehab government reaffirmed Lebanon's traditional foreign policy of nonalignment except in regional affairs. This, then, was a setback for the policy of the United States in the Middle East.

¹⁰⁴United States Department of State Bulletin, Vol. XXXIX, No. 997 (August 4, 1957), p. 181.

¹⁰⁵Robert Murphy, Diplomat Among Warriors (New York, 1964), p. 398.

¹⁰⁶Eisenhower, p. 268.

¹⁰⁷Hurewitz, p. 390.

In assessing the part of the United States in the Lebanese crisis, it is significant that President Eisenhower told the Congress that "... the avowed purpose of the rebels was to overthrow the legally constituted Government of Lebanon and to install by violence a government which would subordinate the independence of Lebanon to the policies of the United Arab Republic."¹⁰⁸ Yet, in his memoirs, Eisenhower said: "Behind everything was our deep-seated conviction that the Communists were principally responsible for the trouble, and that President Chamoun was motivated only by a strong feeling of patriotism."¹⁰⁹ These statements can only be rationalized by assuming that President Nasser was either a communist or a communist-sympathizer. There were indications that this was exactly what President Eisenhower believed¹¹⁰ but this belief was never substantiated by him. The events in Lebanon, as in Jordan and Syria, were caused by Arab nationalists, not the communists. President Chamoun blamed Nasser and the United Arab Republic for the intervention in his country. The United Nations Observation Group reported that the violence in Lebanon was the result of a civil war among the Arabs in that country. Hanson Baldwin reported that Lebanon was unable to prove that the principal threat to its security came from beyond its borders, especially when the rebels were not well-equipped and the army was not using its full force against them. As a matter of fact, General Chehab had refused to act even after President Chamoun had

¹⁰⁸United States Department of State Bulletin, Vol. XXXIX, No. 997 (August 4, 1958), p. 182.

¹⁰⁹Eisenhower, p. 266.

¹¹⁰Ibid., pp. 193, 290.

ordered him to attack the rebels.¹¹¹ It must therefore be concluded that the United States acted against Arab nationalists rather than communists.

The general Arab response to the actions of the United States during the Lebanese crisis was unfavorable. The United States fulfilled the expectations of the Arabs when it supported a regime antagonistic to the cause of Arab nationalism. The presence of United States armed forces on Arab soil less than two years after the United States Government condemned Great Britain and France for sending their troops to Egypt resulted in hostility among the Arabs. The Suez and Lebanese crises developed under different circumstances but many Arabs were unable to see the distinction.¹¹² The United States, in 1958, found itself in much the same position that Great Britain did in 1956.

At the beginning of this chapter, it was noted that the United States had to find a way to protect its interests in the Middle East and yet disassociate itself in Arab minds from Great Britain and France. It was never able to accomplish this. Perhaps it was hopeless from the first in the sense that the Middle Eastern interests of the United States and Great Britain were similar. Instead of the British navy patrolling the Mediterranean, it was the Sixth Fleet of the United States. Instead of British subsidies, it was the United States that offered economic and military aid. However, this aid was extended only to those nations whose foreign policies were compatible with that of the United States. Instead of British paternalism and support of

¹¹¹New York Times, June 26, 1958, p. 8.

¹¹²Campbell, p. 144.

dependent colonial monarchies, the United States was extending support to governments in the region. Arab nationalists, however, viewed these governments as reactionary and dependent. The British had their Suez, the United States had Lebanon. In these circumstances, it is not difficult to see why the Arabs were unable to distinguish between British policies and the policies of the United States.

The United States in the 1957-1958 period attempted to maintain the status quo. In Jordan, in Syria, and in Lebanon, the United States opposed the forces of change. The stock solution for any disturbance in the Middle East was to blame the communists and then invoke the Eisenhower Doctrine. The result was that the Arabs and their governments became increasingly alienated and antagonistic toward the United States.

CHAPTER V

CONCLUSIONS

Less than a month after President Eisenhower ordered troops into Lebanon, Senator J. William Fulbright, in a Senate address, said: "The Administration might well review the validity of the concept of the Baghdad Pact and the Eisenhower Doctrine. If these are as worthless as I believe them to be, it is high time they were reconsidered and abandoned."¹ In December, 1969, Senators Mike Mansfield of Montana and Charles Mathias of Maryland introduced Senate Joint Resolution 166 which would repeal the Eisenhower Doctrine and three other foreign policy resolutions. The State Department, asked to comment on the Resolution, informed Senator Fulbright that much of the Eisenhower Doctrine was no longer relevant and that "...as a functional matter, these resolutions have no continuing significance in the foreign policy formulation process...."² On May 1, 1970, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee voted to terminate the Eisenhower Doctrine. The expected repeal of the Eisenhower Doctrine by the Congress indicates that it no longer promotes the interests of the United States.

¹Tristram Coffin, Senator Fulbright: Portrait of a Public Philosopher (New York, 1966), p. 127.

²United States Congress, Senate, Termination of Middle East and Southeast Asia Resolutions, Report of the Committee on Foreign Relations, 91st Congress, 2d Session (Washington, D.C., 1970), pp. 33-34.

This study attempted to determine the reasons for the failure of the Eisenhower Doctrine to promote the interests of the United States. It was found that a primary reason for its failure was its attempt to isolate Egypt under President Nasser from the other Arab states. The United States failed to realize that Nasser was a symbol of Arab aspirations. By attempting to isolate him, the United States sought to remove Egypt as a threat to its interests in the Middle East. Nasser was regarded as the leader of the Arab nationalists and the United States considered the nationalists to be a disruptive force in the Middle East. Nasser had permitted the Soviet Union to penetrate the Middle East, and had nationalized the Suez Canal, a major artery for transporting oil to Europe, and he had urged the overthrow of Arab governments which followed pro-Western policies. The United States Government believed that, by isolating Egypt from the other Arab states, it would increase its bargaining position and thereby force Nasser to come to terms.

The study further found that the attempts by the United States to implement the Doctrine caused the Arabs to become alienated from the United States. The United States underestimated the appeal of Arab nationalism and failed to fully assess the impact of Great Britain's "imperialistic" policies upon the Arab governments. It was not lost upon either the Arab nationalists or the Soviet Union that the United States, by attempting to build up the influence of King Saud, was supporting one of the most reactionary governments in the Middle East. Likewise, the United States was identified by the Arab nationalists with Western policies they did not like and this tended to increase their suspicions. The United States, by refusing to extend economic

aid to Egypt and Syria, had indicated that it was following a policy similar to that of Great Britain's "divide and rule" policy. When the Doctrine was invoked during the Jordanian and Syrian crises, it was clear that the United States was doing so to oppose the Arab nationalists. This is why after the Syrian crisis, many Arabs became increasingly doubtful about the good intentions of the United States in the region. They feared that the United States was attempting to establish puppet regimes. The Lebanese crisis appeared to confirm these fears. The Arabs believed that the United States intervened against the Arab nationalists in order to support a government which had lost its appeal among the people. The Arabs compared the United States intervention in Lebanon with the British invasion of Egypt in 1956. Because of the association of the Eisenhower Doctrine with the former British policies in the region, the Arabs became hostile toward the United States.

Finally, the study found that the Eisenhower Doctrine served to endanger the national interests of the United States in the Middle East. Rather than isolating Egypt from the other Arab states, it practically isolated the United States from the Middle East. It cut the lines of communication between the United States and the Arab nationalists and it seriously weakened the position of those governments which had been friendly to the United States. The Doctrine served to increase the Soviet penetration of the Middle East and, thereby, posed a threat to the future United States military primacy in the region. It left Nasser in stronger control of the major petroleum arteries to Europe, which placed him in a much more favorable bargaining position than he had before 1957. Finally, it impeded attempts to promote among Arab

governments foreign policies favorable to the Western bloc because of the increased hostility resulting from the Eisenhower Doctrine.

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