

EVOLUTION AND INSTITUTIONALIZATION
OF NIGERIAN POLITICAL PARTIES

By

RONALD L. HAXTON

Bachelor of Arts

Kansas State Teachers College

Emporia, Kansas

1962

Submitted to the faculty of the Graduate College
of the Oklahoma State University
in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the Degree of
MASTER OF ARTS
May, 1971

OKLAHOMA
STATE UNIVERSITY
LIBRARY
AUG 17 1971

EVOLUTION AND INSTITUTIONALIZATION
OF NIGERIAN POLITICAL PARTIES

Thesis Approved:

L. V. Love

Thesis Adviser

Stephen G. Dick

B. J. H. G. G.

D. D. Durham

Dean of the Graduate College

788311

DEDICATION

This thesis is dedicated to all my former students and colleagues in Ethiopia who have worked and died in the quest for change.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Chapter	Page
I. INTRODUCTION	1
II. MODERNIZATION AND POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT: A THEORETICAL BACKGROUND	9
Political Development as Institutionalization . . .	20
Institutionalization in the African Setting	23
III. THE POLITICS OF INDIRECT RULE.	30
The North--Fulani-Hausa Culture and the Coming of Indirect Rule.	37
Indirect Rule and the Yoruba Kingdoms	50
The East--Indirect Rule and Ibo Segmented Culture .	57
IV. THE EVOLUTION OF POLITICAL ORGANIZATIONS IN THE INTER-WAR PERIOD	65
The Nigerian Council and the Politics of Lagos. . .	67
The Clifford Constitution and the Birth of Party Activity.	73
Nationalism and Tribalism in an Urban Setting . . .	<u>76</u>
The Richards Constitution and the Politics of Nationalism	<u>83</u>
V. REGIONAL PARTIES AND THE QUEST FOR INSTITUTIONALI- ZATION	90
The Origin of Nigerian Parties.	90
The National Council for Nigeria and the Cameroons.	94
The Action Group	96
Northern People's Congress	100
Autonomy, Adaptability, and Coherence as Factors in Nigerian Party Institutionalization.	105
The Northern People's Congress--Party Autonomy, Adaptability and Coherence in a Closed Society. .	112
The Action Group--Institutional Decay with a Split Personality	126
National Council for Nigerian Citizens--Party Development and Sub-Ethnic Identities	140

Chapter	Page
VI. CONCLUSIONS	157
Autonomy	163
Adaptability	164
Coherence.	165
A SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY.	168

LIST OF TABLES

Table	Page
I. Coups and Coup Attempts in Modernizing Countries Since World War II.	26
II. Successful Coups in Modernizing Countries---1945 or Date of Independence Through 1966	26
III. Number of Administrators on Duty in a Sample Selection of Colonies by Years.	43
IV. Three Elections in the Far North, 1959-1964	125
V. Ethnic Distribution of Major Party Leaders.	127
VI. Occupational Distribution of Major Party Leaders.	128
VII. Three Elections in Western Nigeria, 1957-1961	134
VIII. Three Elections in the Midwest, 1956-1960	136
IX. Three Elections in the Eastern Region, 1957-1961.	147

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure	Page
1. Pre-1966 Nigeria.	viii

Source: American Universities Field Staff Reports Service,
 Vol. IV, No. 3, 1961.




Figure 1: Pre-1966 Nigeria

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

In January, 1966, the civilian government of Nigeria fell to military force. The following July, after barely six months in power, this military government was ousted in a second army-sponsored coup d'etat. The First Nigerian Republic had collapsed after less than two years of existence.

These coups d'etat are significant for the Nigerian and African political scene for a number of reasons. First, Nigeria's geo-political base is immense. This state contains nearly one-fourth of the combined populations of the nearly forty states of Sub-Saharan Africa. Prior to the military overthrows Nigeria was considered one of the most stable and promising members of the British Commonwealth in Africa. Second, a small segment of Nigeria's 8,000 man army, minute in proportion to the national population of 55 million, was able to take over the powers of the central government with relative ease, assassinating several top civilian leaders in the process. Third, in the context of events following the second coup d'etat in July, 1966, the role and composition of the armed forces further exposed the deep ethnic cleavages which underlay the Nigerian social and political order. Steadily escalating tribal conflict provided the setting for the disintegration of the First Republic and the eventual outbreak of civil war in 1967. Finally, following independence in 1960, Nigeria had been hailed as the model of a

workable, competitive multi-party system.¹ In retrospect, this seems to be a classic case of political overestimation. The three tribal based political parties which had so overwhelmingly dominated the politics of the First Republic were bitterly condemned by both military regimes.

The Nigerian civil war followed many years of sporadic political tension, intertribal party struggle, and political violence. Periodic disorder and bloodshed, which reached peaks during election periods, became a distinguishing characteristic of post-independence Nigerian politics. The political forces at work in Nigerian party evolution make the military overthrows of 1966 particularly significant and may well provide indication of the future role of both parties and armies in Nigeria and other Sub-Saharan political systems.

Like many other states of Africa the international boundaries imposed by the colonial power consolidated a great number of disparate ethnic groups within the confines of the Nigerian federal state. The large number of tribal groupings in Nigeria exhibited extraordinary diversity in their traditional social order, political organization, and religious affiliations. These deep contrasts to a large degree conditioned the varying degrees of success of British colonial practices and policies. During the last two decades of the colonial period there emerged modern institutions--political parties--whose formative activities and later electoral struggles further enunciated Nigerian ethnic diversity. Party growth took place in a political milieu which was

¹For the purposes of this study these three parties include the Eastern based NCNC (National Council of Nigerian Citizens), the Northern based NPC (Northern People's Congress), and the Western based AG (Action Group).

characterized by dysrhythmic economic and political development between the Northern and Southern areas and by the deep rooted strength of traditional elites and attachments in all regions. These factors were to be of critical importance to the efforts being made to institutionalize national organizations--parties in particular--with support spanning all major tribal groupings. It was very obvious very early in Nigerian party development that whatever the potential viability of the Nigerian federation, traditional elites and tribal orientations would be formidable obstacles to national integration and party institutionalization.

This study focuses on some of the factors which prevented the institutionalization of Nigerian political parties at a regional or national level. Although there have been significant differences among scholars on the definition and nature of political development there has been consensus on the vital aggregative role of the political party. The party has been the predominant modern political form to have evolved in the developing states and, as in the case of Nigeria, is fundamental to any analysis of political development.² It is an assumption of this study that the failure of Nigeria to institutionalize a strong national party system has contributed significantly to the difficulty of maintaining a viable national political order.

There has been a great deal of attention by observers of African politics devoted to the three largest tribes which were included in the

²For this study the author found Samuel Huntington's work, "Political Development and Political Decay," (World Politics, March, 1965) very useful for the purposes of definition and methodology used in this study. The author accepts Huntington's definition of political development as the "institutionalization of organizations and procedures." Institutionalization is defined as ". . . the process by which organizations and procedures acquire value and stability."

colony of Nigeria. These tribes were the Fulani-Hausa of the North, the Ibo of the East, and the Yoruba of the West. Though Nigeria is a composite of nearly 200 tribal groupings, these three tribes are central to any analysis of Nigerian political evolution and party development.

An extremely critical stage in Nigerian political evolution occurred during the time of British indirect rule in areas of the Fulani-Hausa, Yoruba, and Ibo. Early in the century Nigeria was divided into three regions administered by the traditional tribal elites (or ones which were appointed) and supervised by a small cadre of British officials. This was indirect rule. It was not surprising that during the nationalist period political parties which were formed largely reflected these same regional-tribal divisions. Traditional forces and attachments underlay the administrative infrastructure of indirect rule. These same forces and attachments were mobilized in party development at the outset by the emerging regional political classes. These classes struggled to build bases of political support within their home regions and in some cases in other regions. This study is an analysis of these efforts and their consequences to the Nigerian First Republic.

The basic hypothesis of this study is that tribal orientations and the traditional political order have not decayed sufficiently to permit the development of national political parties oriented toward the development of modern political forms. Other hypotheses which flow from this include:

- (1) The British policy of indirect rule contributed substantially to the dominant role of traditional forces in the Nigerian political system;
- (2) The strength of regional political organizations based on tribal forces and loyalties prevented the development of national political parties.

- (3) The aspiring nationalist leadership was never able to develop either the ideological appeal or the political organization necessary to overcome the strength of traditional forces and loyalties.

This study utilizes Huntington's criteria for assessing institutionalization which he sets forth in "Political Development and Political Decay" and which have been refined and expanded in his latest work, Political Order in Changing Societies. These criteria are very useful in analyzing institutional development in general and Nigerian political party development in particular. In his initial work Huntington argued:

The level of institutionalization of any political system can be defined by the adaptability, complexity, autonomy, and coherence of its organizations and procedures. So also, the level of institutionalization of any particular organization or procedure can be measured by its adaptability, complexity, autonomy, and coherence. If these criteria can be identified and measured, political systems can be compared in terms of the levels of institutionalization. Furthermore, it will be possible to measure increases and decreases in the institutionalization of particular organizations and procedures within a political system.³

The definition and applicability of each of these criteria for African and Nigerian politics are examined in more detail in Chapter II.

In analyzing the autonomy of the Nigerian political parties the spectrum of ethnic and elite group support for each of the three parties have been examined. In the case of Nigeria, analyses of electoral bloc group support provide some yardsticks for gauging the autonomy of each of the parties. An overview of the composition and social backgrounds of the party hierarchies and government employees provides a further index of autonomy of the parties and indicates the deliberate

³Ibid., p. 394.

infusion of traditional attachments into all levels of Nigerian politics.

In comparing the parties in terms of the other criteria of adaptability and coherence, subjective analysis has been used. The justification for this has as much to do with the age of the parties as with the lack of in-depth field studies in the specific area of party development. It must be noted that the study of political development in terms of institutionalization is a good deal more difficult than in terms of mobilization and participation. Statistics for urbanization, literacy, and mass media exposure are readily available but there is no neatly compiled statistical yearbook for political institutionalization. However, by the use of available statistical data and the systematic analysis of available materials on political leadership, elections, ethnic groups, and party histories, meaningful comparisons of party institutionalization can be made. Thus, the remaining criteria which will be utilized in assessing the level of party institutionalization will include:

Adaptability. Adaptability is an acquired characteristic of chronological age (how old is the organization?), generational age (has there been a succession of leaders?), and functional transition (has the organization adapted itself to changes in functions?). The transition from primarily colonial groupings to electoral competitors attempting to appeal to regional and national constituencies pointed up the contrasts in orientation and leadership between the parties of the North and South.

Coherence. The more unified or coherent an organization is the more highly institutionalized it is. The internal cohesion and unity of these three Nigerian parties was continually being threatened even before independence. There was constant party jockeying for the allegiance of the minority tribal groupings, persistent turmoil within the Southern parties, and inevitable interparty and inter-ethnic violence and bloodshed at election periods.

To avoid repetition the criterion of complexity has not been dealt with

specifically but its basic tenets have been incorporated in the analyses of party coherence.

The second chapter of this study is devoted to a detailed analysis of Huntington's criteria on institutionalization, the usefulness of these criteria for the Nigerian political environment, and the manner in which Huntington's work compares with others in the field of political development.

The study of party institutionalization in Nigeria would be incomplete without an analysis of the general role of British indirect rule on the evolution of Nigerian political institutions. In chapter three the focus will be on the legacy and differential impact of British colonial policy on each main tribal grouping. The impetus given to traditional forces and the non-integrative unity imposed on Nigeria by colonial policies were determinative influences on the regionalization of political parties. Again, stress will be placed on the critical importance of ethnicity, the diversity of tribal political culture, and the peculiar manner in which the British adapted indirect rule to each tribal culture.

The period following World War I was an important incubation period for nationalism and political organization in Nigeria. In the fourth chapter the evolution of political forces in the interwar years will be examined. This period was crucial for future party activity in that constitutional changes, rapid urbanization, and expanded political participation were all occurring simultaneously. During this critical period tribalism became an increasingly serious obstacle in the growth of national political forms.

In the fifth chapter attention will be given to the development of

the three political parties during the nationalist period following the Second World War. This was the climactic phase of party evolution and the greatest bulk of my study will emphasize this period. Huntington's criteria will be used to show how the varying levels of party autonomy, coherence, and adaptability resulted from a complex set of factors which were rooted in the resilience of traditional elites and loyalties and the manner in which the political classes in the various regions attempted to build party apparatus to secure political power.

In the concluding chapter to this study the factors which prevented the institutionalization of these parties on a national scale will be analyzed.

CHAPTER II

MODERNIZATION AND POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT:

A THEORETICAL BACKGROUND

Few political phenomena in this century concern social scientists as much as the rapid expansion of the nation state system. Since World War II the emergence of over seventy new states in Africa, Asia, and Latin America has dramatically altered the former numerical superiority held by the Western states. Old societies and new states have been thrust into the international community, many with artificial boundaries demarcated a century or more earlier over European conference tables. Telescoped into barely more than two decades, this dramatic expansion has found both statesmen and social scientists with inadequate empirical knowledge about customs, traditions and institutions of the societies which comprise the new states.

Descriptive terminology, typologies, and models abound with attempts to describe the new states and their politics; such terms as "emergent", "backward", "underdeveloped", or "transitional" are often used. The complexity in arriving at workable definitions, much less analytic schemes, was posed in one author's concern that:

The dilemmas of political scientists who focus on what once were the exotic areas of the world are doubly compounded. They encounter nominally political structures that do not perform the functions they are supposed to and sense rather than see processes that pursue devious and untraceable paths of their own. As if the problems in

trying to locate and depict the political system in action were not sufficient they are called upon to observe and map changes in it.¹

Out of this definitional debate perhaps the most often used terms which have emerged to describe the social and political consequences of the nation state proliferation have been "modernization" or "development". Writers generally accepted sine qua non that all these new states would strive to become "modern" (generally with the Western industrial states used as prototypes) or to "develop" (to achieve some semblance of economic growth and political "maturity"). The precise meanings of all these terms and the requisite conditions which must be present in the process of "development" or "modernization", however, have been areas of intense debate.

"Modernization" is the most inclusive and frequently used of the two concepts. A broad definition considers "modernization" as a process based upon the rational utilization of resources, characterized by a core belief in the application of technology and scientific control, and aimed at the establishment of a "modern" society, i.e., a society which is noted for its urbanization, literacy, social mobility and interdependence and a host of other factors.² This belief in scientific control and adaptability is fundamental in modernization studies of both old and new states. Robert Ward views modernization as a move toward a modern society which is "a massive and new type of social development characterized by its ability to control or influence the

¹Ann Ruth Willner, "The Underdeveloped Study of Political Development," World Politics, XVI (1964), p. 469.

²Claude E. Welch, Jr., ed., Political Modernization (Belmont, California, 1967), p. 2.

physical and social circumstances of its environment and by a value system which fundamentally is optimistic about the desirability and consequences of this ability."³ In this same behavioral vein David Apter has stressed that "modernization" as a non-economic process originates where a culture embodies an attitude of inquiry and questioning about how men make choices--moral (or normative), social (or structural), and personal (or behavioral). To be modern means to see life as alternatives, preferences, and choices.⁴

Lucian Pye looks on modernization as a "process of profound social change in which tradition-bound villages or tribal based societies are compelled to react to the pressures and demands of the modern, industrialized and urban-centered world."⁵ This process of change to Pye is largely determined by the diffusion of "world culture"--a culture based on advanced technology and the spirit of science, a secular approach to social relations, a feeling for justice in public affairs, and above all else, on the acceptance in the political realm of the belief that the prime unit of the polity should be the nation. Pye stresses not only the inexorability of societies being forced to react but that they will react to a "world culture" which apparently closely parallels the standards and fashions of the West. The all pervasive nature of modernization and the priority on change implicit in its definitions has prompted Manfred Halpern to describe modernization as a "revolution"

³Robert E. Ward, "Political Modernization and Political Culture in Modern Japan," World Politics, XV (1963), p. 570.

⁴David Apter, The Politics of Modernization (Chicago, 1965), pp. 9-10.

⁵Lucian Pye, Aspects of Political Developments (Boston, 1965), p. 8.

which involves "the transformation of all systems by which man organizes his society--the political, social, economic, intellectual, religious, and psychological systems."⁶ This "revolution" Halpern claims is the first revolution in history to set a new price upon stability in any system of society, namely an intrinsic capacity to absorb continuing transformation in a world of unintended, incoherent change.⁷

The sweeping scope of the modernization process and the conceptual schemes which attempt to systematically analyze it have caused concern among many theorists about potential loss of focus. Dankwart Rustow notes that this wide interdisciplinary approach has often tended to relegate politics to the position of an ever dependent variable. This denial of the primacy of politics to Rustow is tantamount to "throwing the political baby out with the institutional bathwater."⁸ For purposes of modernization Rustow emphasizes political factors such as the growth of authority, formation of national identity, a quest for political equality and participation, and political leadership.⁹ Sharing this view of the centrality of politics Halpern argues that:

Of all systems drawn into the revolution of modernization none has more potential capacity than the political for rapidly and decisively mustering coercive and material resources, mobilizing masses and developing an ideology. The political system tends to retain its primacy because it

⁶Manfred Halpern, "The Revolution of Modernization," Comparative Politics, eds. Roy Macridis and Bernard E. Brown (Homewood, Illinois, 1968), p. 512; Manfred Halpern, "Toward Further Modernization of the Study of New Nations," World Politics, XVII (1964), p. 173.

⁷Manfred Halpern, "A Redefinition of the Revolutionary Situation," (Unpublished paper, Princeton University, 1968), pp. 2-6.

⁸Dankwart Rustow, "Modernization and Comparative Politics," Comparative Politics, 1 (1968), pp. 38-39.

⁹Ibid., p. 40.

possesses greater and more immediate power than any system for maintaining or altering society's capacity to generate and absorb transformation.¹⁰

Most authors show their primary concern with the political aspects of the modernization process by using the term "political modernization" interchangeably with "political development". However, just as there is disagreement on what constitutes the broader processes of modernization, so too is there a diversity of definitions and semantic debate as to what constitutes political development.¹¹ Following the lead of economists, political development theorists have devised lists of indices or prerequisites to define and measure political development. For example, Karl Deutsch links political development with social mobilization or ". . . the process in which major clusters of old social, psychological, economic commitments are eroded and broken and people become available for new patterns of socialization and behavior."¹² This weakening of old traditions and norms is also basic to S. N. Eisenstadt's contention that:

The central problem of political modernization is the ability of any system to adapt itself to changing demands, to absorb them in terms of policy making, and to assure its continuity in the face of continuous demands and new forms of political organization. In other words political

¹⁰Halpern, "The Revolution," p. 516. Halpern defines transformation as "that kind of alteration of a system which results in the exclusion of some existing elements and linkages and the entrance of some new elements and linkages sufficient to be recognized at a given level of abstraction as a new system."

¹¹Lucian Pye, "The Concept of Political Development," Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Sciences, 358 (1965), pp. 1-13.

¹²Karl Deutsch, "Social Mobilization and Political Development," American Political Science Review, LXV (September, 1961), p. 494.

development and modernization creates in its wake problems of sustained political growth which becomes its central concern.¹³

In Eisenstadt's analysis the capacity of any system to absorb continuous growth and change varies greatly from one society to another. To contain and channel this change, however, creates need for structures and institutions which can permeate all spheres and regions of society.¹⁴

Four conceptual approaches which occur repeatedly in the analyses of political development have been noted by Samuel Huntington to be those of rationalization, national integration, democratization, and mobilization or participation.¹⁵ The following brief overview of some representative works which deal with political development gives ample evidence of both the differences in frameworks of reference and the often pronounced Western bias and ideological predilections in many writings.

For purposes of political development the concept of rationalization emphasizes movement from ascription to achievement, particularism to universality and functional differentiation. On the latter point, Fred Riggs in examining the role of public bureaucracies in political development noted that: "The phenomenon of development involves a gradual separation of institutionally distinct spheres, the differentiation of separate structures for the wide variety of functions that

¹³S. N. Eisenstadt, "Modernization and Conditions of Sustained Growth," World Politics, 16 (1964), p. 578.

¹⁴Ibid., p. 577.

¹⁵Samuel Huntington, "Political Development and Political Decay," World Politics, 17 (1965), p. 387 ff.

must be performed in any society."¹⁶ The manner in which public bureaucracies interact with other political and social institutions, particularly the political party, will be referred to later in this study.

National integration and nationalism has been a second popular area of emphasis for many developmental theorists. This concept embraces a vast range of human relationships and attitudes but is basically concerned with what holds a society and political system together.¹⁷ In focusing on concepts of integration, however, most writers have given greatest attention to national integration ("nation building") or the subordination of diverse cultural loyalties to a common sense of nationality.¹⁸ Coleman and Rosberg in their studies on political parties in Africa divide national integration between political integration (bridging vertical elite-mass gaps) on the one hand and horizontal integration (alleviating cultural and regional tensions in creating a homogeneous territorial community).¹⁹ Contemporary world history is replete with unpleasant but cogent facts; few states have successfully separated political loyalties from cultural loyalties and national disintegration has been far more frequent than successful

¹⁶Fred W. Riggs, "Bureaucrats and Political Development," Bureaucracy and Political Development, ed. Joseph LaPalombara (Princeton, 1963), pp. 122-123.

¹⁷Myron Weiner, "Political Integration and Political Development," Political Modernization, ed. Claude E. Welch, Jr. (Belmont, California, 1967), p. 152.

¹⁸Ibid., pp. 150-151.

¹⁹James Coleman and Carl Rosberg, Jr., eds., Political Parties and National Integration in Tropical Africa (Berkeley, 1964), pp. 8-9.

integration. In surveying the possibilities for achieving political unity, taking into account the cultural diversities of the new states, Myron Weiner noted India and Nigeria as promising prospects to overcome integrative problems.²⁰ In the four year period since Weiner made his study Nigeria has experienced a prolonged civil war and India has had increasingly disruptive regional-ethnic discord and violence.

A third conceptual approach focuses on democratization, pluralism, competitiveness, equalization of power and similar qualities.²¹ Most authors who subscribe to this approach stress the values and normative standards traditionally associated with Western democracies. Edward Shils makes "democratic" practices such as civilian rule, representative institutions and public liberties a precondition for a state to be classified as developed. Shils insists that in spite of the almost universal lack of these preconditions (or "gaps") in most new states, democracy still has the best chance for survival as a developmental model.²² More unequivocally, Millikan and Blackmer in studying the implications of the developing areas for United States foreign policy claimed:

Clearly the problem of political development is not to realize replicas of Western institutions, . . . it is rather to realize the functional equivalents of the essence of democratic government and politics. The central test is the degree of competitiveness of the overlapping interests of free groups composed of free men (which) in

²⁰Myron Weiner, "Political Integration," p. 162.

²¹Huntington, Political Order, p. 388.

²²Edward Shils, Political Development in the New States (s'Gravenhage, 1962), pp. 48 and 90.

the process of modernization sets the stage for a struggle between the alternatives of freedom and totalitarianism.²³

Other authors, too, stress prerequisites for democracy which they find largely absent. This propensity to stress deviations from "ideal" patterns of Europe and American democratic practice are arguments which American author Willner finds both tautological and ethnocentric.²⁴

One of the most popular concepts used to analyze political development is social mobilization. Karl Deutsch noted that mobilization is not identical with the process of modernization as a whole but deals with a recurrent cluster among its consequences.²⁵ These "recurrent clusters" or constituent processes of social mobilization are purportedly associated, tend to reinforce one another, and most importantly may be quantitatively analyzed. To Deutsch such indices or processes which all bring exposure to aspects of modern life, e. g. access to mass media, changes in per capita income, and trends towards urbanization may be correlated with one another to give a reasonably accurate picture of political development.²⁶ The cumulative effect of many of the facets of social mobilization would be greatly expanded political participation and a notable shift of emphasis away from parochialism. However, Deutsch allows that the abrupt inclusion of new groups into active political participation might bring a variety of unforeseen consequences. Rapid removal of colonial authority in many states would

²³Max F. Millikan and Donald L.M. Blackmer, The Emerging Nations and United States Policy (Boston, 1961), pp. 88-90.

²⁴Willner, "The Underdeveloped Study," pp. 471 and 480.

²⁵Deutsch, "Social Mobilization," p. 582.

²⁶Ibid., p. 586.

throw disparate societies into political confrontation and competition with one another. This competition would put enormous strains on both the political stability and institutions of that state. Deutsch infers that during such a period:

Other things assumed equal, the stage of rapid mobilization may be expected . . . to promote the consolidation of states whose peoples already share the same language, culture, and major social institutions; while the same process may tend to destroy the unity of states whose population is already divided into several groups with different languages or cultures basic to life.²⁷

The events of the past decade in many states of Africa leads one to the almost inescapable conclusion that very few if any states are in fact characterized by shared languages, culture, or social institutions. Extreme cultural pluralism is in most new states the rule and not the exception. Moreover, even in states where these shared traits occur experience has shown they are no guarantee of either stability or unity. On the contrary, in rapidly mobilizing states more often than not there is:

. . . development of continuous warfare and conflict between different groups within society, extreme antagonism and cleavages without possibility of finding any viable modus vivendi between them There is a lack of any strong leadership which can enforce legitimate authority and regulate these conflicts and problems, accompanied by growing corruption and inefficiency. Thus, unresolved, unregulated conflict spirals in continuous vicious circles.²⁸

Empirical research and slowly growing numbers of micropolitical field studies, many in the African area, have caused significant re-evaluation of theories and models concerning political development.

²⁷ Ibid., p. 586.

²⁸ Eisenstadt, "Breakdowns," pp. 349-351.

These studies have shown that breakdowns in modernization--whatever the definition used--have been recurrent and will undoubtedly become more frequent. Retrogression in the area of African political development--whichever series of indices or prerequisites are favored--has been brought into sharper focus by the recent series of military interventions, incidents of institutional collapse, economic stagnation, and civil war. Indicative of the new mood of writers in the current stage of political upheaval, Aristide Zolberg claims that the most salient characteristic of political life in Africa is that it constitutes an almost institutionless arena with conflict and disorder as its most prominent features.²⁹

After a decade of very rapid expansion of the nation-state system, it would appear there are numerous shortcomings with many approaches used to analyze political development. Willner has pointed out the latent normative ethnocentric bias which pictures political development as a latter-day episode of Euro-American development.³⁰ Normative bias is often reinforced by the near empirical vacuum in which sweeping generalizations concerning political development are often made. This vacuum, created in large part by the critical shortage of political microstudies of the new states, puts added force to David Easton's contention:

Typical demands that will find their way into the political process will concern matters in conflict that are labeled important by the (specific) culture. For

²⁹Aristide Zolberg, "The Structure of Political Conflict in the New States of Africa," American Political Science Review, LXII (1968), p. 70.

³⁰Willner, "The Underdeveloped Study," p. 480.

this reason we cannot hope to understand the nature of the demands presenting themselves for political settlement unless we are ready to explore systematically and intensively their connection with the culture. . . .³¹

In emphasizing the critical need to examine societies and political systems from different perspectives as a means to arrive at fresh conceptual approaches Rustow has metaphorically suggested that what the study of political modernization needs is a set of intermediate concepts that will bring the stratospheric omnipresence down to the tree-top level of middle range theory.³²

Political Development as Institutionalization

In this study the author proposes to utilize an intermediate concept--defining political development in terms of institutionalization--in analyzing Nigerian political party evolution and development. The concept of institutionalization was explored by Samuel Huntington in his article "Political Development and Political Decay." Huntington is critical of many approaches to political development theory in contending:

- (1) The close identification of political development with modernization drastically limits the applicability of the concept in both time and place to the parochial and immediate needs of the modern nation state;
- (2) Obversely, political development is broadened to include all politically relevant aspects of the modernization process, acquiring comprehensiveness at the cost of precision;
- (3) Definitions fail to distinguish clearly the empirical relevance of the components going into the definition,

³¹David Easton, "An Approach to the Analysis of Political Systems," World Politics, IX (1957), p. 388.

³²Rustow, "Modernization," p. 480.

causing things which are in fact occurring in the 'developing' areas to become hopelessly intertwined with things which the theorist thinks should be there;

- (4) Little provision is made for the reversibility of political development. Instead of structural differentiation and national integration occurring structural homogenization and national disintegration may actually be taking place. A theory of political development needs to be mated to a theory of political decay.³³

In defining political development in terms of institutionalization, Huntington has attempted to liberate the concept of development from modernization. Institutions are considered stable, valued recurring patterns of behavior, while institutionalization is defined as the process by which organizations and procedures acquire value and stability.³⁴ Stability is a factor which Huntington finds conspicuously absent among the new states. During the two decades after World War II the political evolution of new states was characterized by increasing ethnic and class conflict, recurring rioting and mob violence, frequent military coups d'etat, widespread corruption among civil servants, declining standards of bureaucratic efficiency, and at times complete disintegration of broadly based political parties.³⁵ This persistent upheaval is due in large part to the rapid increases in social mobilization and political participation coupled with the slow development of political institutions. In spite of the broad-based analytic schemes of many theorists, it is apparent that in the complex and heterogeneous

³³Huntington, "Political Development," pp. 389-393.

³⁴Ibid., p. 394.

³⁵Samuel Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven, 1968), p. 411.

societies of the new states viable communities will be produced by political action but maintained only viable political institutions.³⁶

Huntington is by no means the only theorist emphasizing institutional needs of the new states. S. N. Eisenstadt, a sociologist, criticizes the focus of contemporary analyses of development in arguing that the crucial problem of these societies has not been the relatively small amount of modernization but the lack of institutional settings, regulative mechanisms, and normative injunctions.³⁷ There are numerous examples of governmental incapacity to develop integrative institutions and inadequacy of older traditional organizations to cope with the problems posed by modernization. Thus, Eisenstadt like Huntington underscores the basic dilemma of the "developing" states in contending that not only is there a low level of development and shortage of capital and skills but there is also a discrepancy between a push towards modernization and the institutional ability for sustained growth, between continuous disruption of traditional frameworks and the impossibility of finding adequate outlets in new frameworks.³⁸

In the works of both Eisenstadt and Huntington there is agreement then that it is not the inevitability or scope of social mobilization and political participation which has caused widespread violence and instability in the new states. Rather, the implicit argument is that even if the new states were to hypothetically experience economic boom, increase literacy to optimum levels, or maximize the exposure of the

³⁶ Ibid., pp. 10-11.


³⁷ Eisenstadt, "Breakdowns," p. 357.

³⁸ Ibid., pp. 352-353.

masses to the media, there would be no assurance that violence and instability would not still be endemic. In the absence of viable institutional forms to aggregate and control the new demands unleashed during modernization, any state faces recurring violence, civil disorder, and political decay.

Institutionalization in the African Setting

With over forty independent states, Africa is a continent which defies political stereotyping and generalization. Most of the new states in this area, however, have been beset by the same problems which Huntington and Eisenstadt examine in their writings--rapid social mobilization, expanded political participation, and accompanying violence and political instability. The high degree of ethnic pluralism and heterogeneity characteristic of nearly all these states provide the societal backdrop for the concurrent problems of political institutionalization, national integration, and economic growth.

 It is obvious that most Sub-Saharan political systems have a very limited capacity to institutionally absorb the new social forces and simultaneously maintain political stability. These polities lack large scale political institutions which have the aggregative capacity to cope with the rapid inclusion of various social groups into the political system. In a state with few if any institutional mechanisms to deal with such groups and assimilate them into the political system, there is a very high potential for political instability and violence. This is precisely the situation which confronts the majority of the states of Africa.

Many writers have claimed that the only modern political

institution which can become a source of authority and which can effectively be institutionalized is the political party. The role of the political party in Africa is so basic that Coleman and Rosberg assert that at this stage of Africa's development, political parties not only illuminate most clearly the nature of African politics but also are prime determinants of the unfolding African political scene.³⁹ In the absence of modern political institutions some societies have highly developed traditional institutions and might conceivably adapt these institutions to the demands of higher levels of political participation. Many Afro-Asian states in this category such as Ethiopia, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait have either no parties or as in the case of Jordan, Iran, and Thailand parties are now either illegal or severely restricted.⁴⁰ The enigmatic surface quiescence of many such systems often blurs the day to day struggle by traditional forces to contain political pressures created by modernization. These systems in some cases display all signs of contemporary stability, but the efforts of their governments to prevent the development of political parties makes them presumptively unstable; the longer the organizational vacuum is maintained, the more explosive it becomes.⁴¹

On another extreme is the state which is characterized by the

³⁹Coleman and Rosberg, Political Parties, pp. 1-2. Further, Coleman and Rosberg define political party as associations formally organized with the explicit and declared purpose of acquiring and/or maintaining legal control, either singly or in coalition or in electoral competition with other similar associations over the personnel and policy of the government of an actual or prospective sovereign state.

⁴⁰Huntington, Political Order, p. 398.

⁴¹Ibid., p. 406.

the strong one-party regime. In the past decade many political scientists were caught up with comparing the origins and advantages of the one-party versus multi-party systems in Africa.⁴² It was generally agreed that the single most striking trend of the political structures of the new African states prior to the rash of military interventions was the establishment of one-party or one-party dominant systems. For instance, Coleman and Rosberg differentiated between two varieties of African one-party rule--the pragmatic-pluralistic pattern typified by Senegal, Ivory Coast, Sierre Leone and Cameroun and the revolutionary-centralizing variety typical of Ghana, Mali, and Guinea.⁴³ Although there were differences in ideology, popular participation and organizational patterns of these two dominant types of one-party rule, most analysts were very optimistic that it was only through such a strongly centralized dominant party that modernization or political development could take place.

The one-party devotees argued that the existence of a single strong party inevitably led to more stability than either no party or multi-party systems. This is noted in the study by von der Mehden:⁴⁴

⁴²Martin Kilson, "Authoritarian and Single Party Tendencies in Africa Politics," World Politics, XV (1963), pp. 262-294; Ruth Schacter, "Single Party Systems in West Africa," American Political Science Review, LV (1961), pp. 294-307; Thomas Hodgkin, African Political Parties, (London, 1961).

⁴³Coleman and Rosberg, Political Parties, pp. 4-7.

⁴⁴Fred R. von der Mehden, Politics of the Developing Nations (Englewood, N.J., 1964), p. 65.

TABLE I
COUPS AND COUP ATTEMPTS IN MODERNIZING
COUNTRIES SINCE WORLD WAR II

Party System	Number of Countries	Countries with Coups
No effective parties	17	14 (83%)
Proletariat	3	0 (0%)
One-Party	18	2 (11%)
One-Party dominant	12	4 (33%)
Two-Party dictatorial	4	2 (50%)
Two-Party democratic	7	3 (43%)
Multiparty	22	15 (68%)

Following von der Mehden's statistical survey noted in the above table, there occurred the series of military takeovers in the period 1965-1968. Huntington attempted to update this table by focusing on only the successful coups as a manifestation of political instability and disunity:⁴⁵

TABLE II
SUCCESSFUL COUPS IN MODERNIZING COUNTRIES-----
1945 OR DATE OF INDEPENDENCE THROUGH 1966

Party System	Number of Countries	Countries with Coups	
		Number	Per Cent
One-party systems	26	6	25%
Dominant one-party systems	18	6	33%
Two-party systems	16	7	44%
Multiparty systems	20	17	85%

Both von der Mehden and Huntington's studies attempt to illuminate the close correlation between state-party stability and party number. There was significant change in the interim between von der Mehden's study where only 11% of the one-party systems experienced coups or attempted coups and Huntington's later study in which 25% of the one-party systems had been toppled by military forces. Concurrently, there

⁴⁵Huntington, Political Order, pp. 422-423.

was also a quantitative jump in the number of coups in states with multiparty systems. It is interesting to note that in spite of the emphasis placed on the greater control which a single party may exert over social mobilization and political participation, many military interventions in Africa have come at the expense of the more noted one-party or one-party dominant regimes.

Using the one-party typology set forth by von der Mehden in 1964, nearly half of the eighteen one-party African states have experienced military overthrow.⁴⁶ In addition states with exclusive or dominant single-party systems such as Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda have barely survived revolts which could have easily upset the civilian political order. At this juncture one-party systems--at least statistically in the African case--seem little more insulted than any other type of party system in surviving political instability or military coup d'etat.

The numerous multiparty systems in Latin America have been the most chronically unstable with their histories of recurrent military intervention. In the case of Africa the two most noted multiparty regimes, Nigeria and Sierra Leone, both experienced multiple military coups d'etat in 1966 and 1967.⁴⁷ Subsequent events in both these multi-

⁴⁶ von der Mehden, Politics, pp. 56-61. These states included Algeria, Central African Republic, Republic of the Congo, Dahomey, Ghana, Mali, Togo, Upper Volta, and Burundi; S. E. Finer, "The One-Party Regimes in Africa: Reconsiderations," Government and Opposition, II (1967), pp. 506-507. Further, Finer argues persuasively that ". . . the first great line of argument in defence of the single party state is that it provides. . . for economic advance, for national representation, for nation building, for stability. No one of these claims is true for every African state; all four are untrue for one African state; and most of them are untrue for most African states."

⁴⁷ Helen Kitchen, "The Forty-two Independent States of Africa," Africa Report, 14 (1969), pp. 48-51.

party states, particularly Nigeria, point up a very crucial issue peculiar to such party systems in the new states. In a competitive party system, as in pre-1966 Nigeria, strong incentives existed for each party to appeal to a particular group, ethnic and religious animosities were fanned by the mobilization of the masses, and the competition of the parties deepened and reinforced preexisting social cleavages.⁴⁸ Thus, in spite of rapid mobilization and increased participation in the new states--both fundamental rubrics of democratization--party breakdown and political upheaval have now become commonplace.

Parties in most African states, their number or ideological leaning, vary less and less in their respective capacity to effectively deal with social mobilization and political participation. It might be easily argued that after the events of the past decade the no-party regimes are certainly more vulnerable and perhaps equally unstable. In short, the number of parties or their ideological orientation are very uncertain guides to the level of political development of a particular state; it is critical that the party's origins and levels of institutionalization be examined in the context of the political culture of that state. In terms of political development what is critical is not the number of parties but rather the institutionalization of the party system.⁴⁹

The regional party groupings of Nigeria, once considered the arch-example of a democratic-competitive party system in Africa, must be analyzed in the general political environment of Nigeria to understand

⁴⁸Huntington, Political Order, pp. 425-426.

⁴⁹Ibid., p. 420.

the integral role which the parties played in the breakdown of the First Republic. In retrospect, it seems obvious that the three major parties were not the organizational democratic juggernauts pictured by many Western analysts. Instead, the parties' origin, organization, and operations were reflective of the artificiality of the original amalgam of ethnic groups into the state of Nigeria. The interaction of the Nigerian parties, the tribes on which they depended, and a grossly unbalanced federal political structure distinguished by extreme levels of ethnic pluralism made it difficult if not impossible for these parties to ever escape their regional confines to become institutionalized national entities. In this regard, Huntington's contention is particularly applicable to Nigeria:

In a multiparty system party competition tends to be less prevalent. In a weak multiparty system in which parties are just emerging from factions, the large number of groupings precludes any effective mobilizing appeal. In multiparty systems where the parties are solidly rooted in social forces, each party normally has its own constituency and makes intensive efforts to mobilize that constituency, but party competition for the support of the same groups is less than in the two party or dominant party system. Each party tends to have fixed blocks who support it regularly, are firmly identified with the party, and are generally impervious to the appeals of other parties The party system mirrors society only too well and its component parties possess little autonomy from the social forces with which they are affiliated.

In few new states did a multiparty system mirror a society so well as in the Federal Republic of Nigeria. In viewing the integral role of the three large tribal-based parties it is not surprising that the Nigerian First Republic disintegrated but that it was able to survive as long as it did.

⁵⁰Ibid., pp. 428-429.

CHAPTER III

THE POLITICS OF INDIRECT RULE

British colonial authorities in Nigeria created one of the most heterogeneous states in Africa. Piecemeal colonial acquisition accounts in part for the extreme unevenness in the degree of social change and modernization among the various regions and ethnic groups of Nigeria. However, the chronology of British conquest would be incomplete unless placed in the context of pre-colonial diversity of the tribal institutions. An analysis of the contrasting traditional political organization and institutions of the three major regional ethnic groups encountered by British authority point out the importance of sequential colonial acquisition to future Nigerian political development.

In this chapter the operation of British indirect rule in the socio-political settings of the three major Nigerian ethnic groups--the Fulani-Hausa of the North, the Yoruba of the West, and the Ibo of the East--will be examined. It is argued that this era of Nigerian political development is integral to any analysis of modern Nigerian political institutions--particularly political parties. Colonial policies in each of the regions and nationalist political associations examined in the next chapter had formative influence on later efforts by the political parties to become institutionalized as national political forms. The major political parties, each largely dependent on one of the three major ethnic groups, evolved out of earlier extra-

parliamentary social and cultural organizations. These predecessor organizations were deeply influenced by the parent tribal group and concurrently reflected the impact of British colonial policy on tribal political institutions. The interplay between British colonial authorities, traditional elites, and Western-educated nationalist groups during the period of indirect rule provided a framework within which modern political forms evolved.

Contrary to many general studies on the influence of modernization on traditional institutions, traditional authority and tribal orientations in Nigeria did not become extinct under the impact of nationalism or British rule.¹ On the contrary, traditional orientations and elites not only survived but were often reinforced by British colonial authorities and nationalist leadership. Thus, the formative influence and composite effects of the slave trade, European economic penetration, and indirect rule left a deep imprint on the development of political parties.

The image of slavery and the sparseness of accurate historic records which extend beyond the past century has tended to distort the fact that great African kingdoms evolved complex systems of government long before the rise of European nation-states. For instance, within the frontiers of the present state of Nigeria there existed the kingdom of Bornu, with a history of more than a thousand years; the Fulani empire which for a hundred years before its conquest by Britain had ruled

¹See for example Marion J. Levy, "Patterns of Modernization and Political Development," Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 358 (1965); Fred W. Riggs, Administration in Developing Countries: The Theory of Prismatic Society (Boston, 1964); Amitai and Eva Etzioni, Social Change (New York, 1964).

the savannah of the North; the kingdoms of Ife and Benin which had produced art recognized as amongst the most accomplished in the world; the Yoruba Empire of Oyo, which had once been the most powerful of the states of the Guinea Coast; as well as the loosely organized Ibo peoples of the Eastern region.² It is known remnants of these political empires and ethnic groupings confronted the Europeans during the period of the slave trade. However, extensive study of the scope and influence of these pre-colonial political developments in West Africa on modern political forms has only begun.

Nigeria, known as the "Slave Coast" until the mid-nineteenth century bore the brunt of demands for slaves from the West Indies and America. The total effect of the slave trade upon Nigerian society, institutions, and peoples will perhaps never be known. The general effects, however, included the disorganization of the tribal institutions and the devastating internecine warfare which prevailed in southern Nigeria during the decades of the trade. The disruption of institutions and breakdown of tribal groupings pales in comparison, however, to the sheer loss of manpower resulting from the withdrawal of many of the strongest members of those societies along the West Coast. Basil Davidson has claimed that even by conservative estimates the Atlantic slave trade, in one way or another, before and after embarkation cost Africa at least fifty million souls, or about one-fourth of Black Africa's approximate population today.³ The abolition of British

²Michael Crowder, A Short History of Nigeria (New York, 1962), p. 13.

³Basil Davidson, Black Mother--The Years of the African Slave Trade (Boston, 1961), pp. 80-81; J. D. Fage, An Introduction to the History of West Africa (Cambridge, 1962), pp. 82-84. Fage would doubt

participation in the slave trade by Parliament in 1807 ironically liquidated the first Nigerian middle class which had developed a vested interest in this operation.⁴

Following British abolition of external slave trade, the demand for Nigerian products by private European traders and companies grew at a rapid rate. At this stage British commercial interests far outweighed aims of territorial aggrandizement. Commerce centered on palm oil, and British presence--and interference--in local affairs grew accordingly.⁵ By 1851, a British consul John Beechcroft was instrumental in deposing Kosoko, ruler of Lagos, and during the next decade the British consulate became the center of power as "protector" of this important port area.⁶ If the period 1850-1865 proved nothing else it showed that if the Nigerian interior were to be opened up to legitimate trade with Britain, the British authority would have to be paramount.⁷

Until the 1870's trade in the interior and the Niger Delta had been dominated by British merchants. In this period, though, Yoruba internecine warfare and expansion by French and German commercial interests threatened British paramouncy. A palm oil entrepreneur who

the propriety of a figure as high as fifty million, putting the figure somewhere between eighteen and twenty-four million. His analysis does not account, however, for the high pre-shipment mortality which accompanied the slave raiding among the tribal groups.

⁴Onwuka Dike, Trade and Politics in the Niger Delta, 1830-1850 (Oxford, 1956), p. 11 ff.

⁵Robert Rotberg, A Political History of Tropical Africa (New York, 1965), p. 223 ff.; G. I. Jones, The Trading States of the Oil Rivers (Oxford, 1963), pp. 74-78.

⁶Dike, Trade and Politics, pp. 88-92.

⁷Crowder, A Short History, pp. 169-170.

recognized and dealt with both these threats was George Dashwood Goldie Taubman. During a visit to the Niger area in 1877, Goldie made contact with many of the larger British trading interests operating in the delta and river region. By November, 1879, Goldie (who was knighted in 1889 as Sir George Taubman Goldie) had welded all the major companies trading on the Niger into the United Africa Company after persuading their directors that the only cure for overcompetition was monopoly.⁹ Within five years Goldie was locked in a full fledged trade war with the French.¹⁰

The scramble for territory in Africa and the potential for power confrontations in this area spurred fourteen European nations and the United States to convene the Berlin Conference in 1884. Over conference tables in Berlin attempts were made to demarcate African lands for European acquisition. On the seeming inconclusiveness but enormous consequences of this international conference D..K. Fieldhouse noted:

There was no attempt to solve the . . . controversial West African question, for there only two major powers were involved. Germany's protectorates were taken for granted, but British and French claims to predominance were recognized and they were left to thrash out their differences, provided that freedom of navigation on the river Niger was preserved. . . . Conventions such as 'effective occupation', responsibility, and freedom of trade were to be preserved but these principles had little practical importance. 'Effective occupation' was required for full colonies, not for protectorates or spheres of influence and it related only to coasts--most of which were

⁸Ibid., pp. 152-154.

⁹Ibid., p. 166. Subsequently the United Africa Company was re-named the National Africa Company and finally the Royal Niger Company.

¹⁰C. W. Newbury, The Western Slave Coast and Its Rulers (Oxford, 1961), pp. 108-110.

claimed. The conference settled nothing but was an immense stimulus to colonial expansion. By drawing up rules it declared the game in progress. During the next five years there was feverish colonizing activity throughout the non-European world.¹¹

The Berlin Conference marked a turning point for African partition by European powers. The conference failed in precisely demarcating territorial divisions or spheres of influence and consequently the race to claim territories resulted in a maze of colonial "crazy quilt" territorial boundaries. These boundaries were normally demarcated across buffer zones where a great power "stand-off" had occurred. The arbitrary nature of the boundaries left a dual legacy of tribal units divided between territories and other instances where sharply disparate groupings were thrown together within the confines of one territory. Nigeria is a classic example of the latter. Thus, the Berlin Conference marked the advent of the partition of tropical Africa, that in time, divided tribes indiscriminately, disrupted traditional patterns of migratory drift, and resulted in fragmenting tropical Africa into arbitrary, untidy, colonial aggregates of heterogeneous peoples.¹²

In the years following the Berlin Conference the British concentrated on exploiting the economic potential of the Niger basin.¹³ The National Africa Company on July 10, 1886, received the Great Seal of the Privy Council to exercise the Queen's jurisdiction over a large area of

¹¹D. K. Fieldhouse, The Colonial Empires (New York, 1967), pp. 212-213.

¹²Rotberg, A Political History, p. 246.

¹³W. B. Hamilton, "The Evolution of British Policy toward Nigeria," The Nigerian Political Scene, eds. Robert O. Tilman and Taylor Cole (Durham, 1962), pp. 27 ff.

southern Nigeria.¹⁴ The chartering of Goldie's company was by proxy, the easiest expedient to avoid governmental responsibility and expense. His empire was the river and behind its banks his influence diminished rapidly. As early as 1886 Goldie began laying the groundwork for later colonial administrative dogma--indirect rule.

From the outset Goldie's efforts on the middle Niger were threatened by the French.¹⁵ The manner in which British and French imperial interests collided created both an international furor and a British national hero. Frederick Dealtry Lugard emerged as victor in the land acquisition race with the French and he became Colonial High Commissioner and in time prime architect of British indirect rule in Nigeria.

Under Lugard's leadership the British soon asserted military force to maintain their economic footholds. Without armed hostilities boundaries were gradually demarcated between French and British protectorates. By the terms of the Niger Convention of 1899 the approximate borders of western and northern Nigeria were determined.¹⁶ With boundaries settled, Parliament revoked the charter of the Royal Niger Company which was rapidly losing control of an area that had become a focal point for confrontation between colonizing powers.¹⁷ Northern Nigeria now became a protectorate of the Crown.

Thus, at the turn of the century Britain had three Nigerian

¹⁴John E. Flint, Sir Goldie and the Making of Nigeria (London, 1965), pp. 84-87.

¹⁵Margery Perham, Lugard--The Years of Adventure (London, 1956), pp. 495-500.

¹⁶Ibid., pp. 8-9.

¹⁷Flint, Sir George Goldie, pp. 307-308.

possessions; the new Protectorate of Northern Nigeria placed under Lugard as High Commissioner, the Protectorate of Southern Nigeria, and the Colony of Lagos. The latter two were combined in 1906 under the title of Colony and Protectorate of Southern Nigeria. Finally, in 1914, the Northern and Southern Protectorates were amalgamated to form the Colony and Protectorate of Nigeria. Of this territorial consolidation, Elias argued that modern Nigeria like most of the British colonial dependencies, was acquired by the British almost in a fit of absent mindedness as there had never been from the beginning any conscious administrative policy to establish British rule over the whole territory; rather acquisition was piecemeal, hesitant, and planless.¹⁸

With the flag following trade, the British acquired political control over an area containing some of the most sharply contrasting tribal cultures in Africa. It fell to the British colonial authorities to adopt a system of administration to cheaply but effectively control Nigeria. This system was indirect rule through pre-existing traditional institutions and the pattern was established in the Fulani-Hausa area of the North.

The North--Fulani-Hausa Culture and the Coming of Indirect Rule

In northern Nigeria the Fulani-Hausa culture and remnants of the old Bornu Empire near Lake Chad were initially unaffected by the arrival of the Europeans on the coast. For over a millinium Hausa city states such as Kano and Katsina had been primarily involved with the

¹⁸T. O. Elias, Nigeria, The Development of Its Laws and Constitution (London, 1967), p. 4.

trans-Saharan trade routes to the north. Not until the latter half of the fifteenth century did the Fulani peoples, a lighter-skinned, essentially pastoral group begin immigrating into the Hausa area in large numbers. Fulani diaspora over West Africa took them to the Hausa cities where they gained a reputation as the principal inheritors of the Islamic tradition.¹⁹ In the courts of the Muslim Hausas, the Fulani played important roles as administrators much as the clerics did in the courts of kings of medieval Europe.

By the eighteenth century the Fulani minority had achieved a notoriety for their growing economic power and political influence but also for their open criticism of the religious laxity and decadent standards of learning among Hausa royalty and citizenry. The general unrest among the Fulani in the city states was led by a famous Muslim scholar, Usuman dan Fodio, who preached radical reform and openly attacked what he considered the reversion to paganism among the leading Hausa monarchs. In lectures, books, and papers Usuman distinguished himself as a reformist zealot.²⁰ In 1804, Usuman rallied the countryside in rebellion, taking the title Sarkin Musulmi which in Hausa translation means "Commander of the Faithful."²¹ The Fulani jihad had

¹⁹Mervyn Hiskett, "Aspects of Islam: Northern Nigeria," Islam in Africa, eds. James Kritzeck and William H. Lewis (New York, 1969), p. 291.

²⁰H.A.S. Johnson, The Fulani Empire at Sokoto (London, 1967), pp. 30-34. Johnson notes that Usuman dan Fodio, his brother Abdullahi, and son Muhammedu Bello were all prolific writers producing over 250 works among them. This era is one of the best documented periods in Nigerian history to this date.

²¹Ibid., p. 42.

begun.²²

Within a few years the Fulani Jihad swept most Hausa kings off their thrones and established Fulani hegemony throughout most of northern Nigeria. Typical of the evangelical religious zeal which pervaded the Jihad was Usuman's insistence on Islamic traditions of close ties between the faith and government. This practice was retained in northern Nigeria and later institutionalized by the British during the colonial period. British policy reinforced Islam as a potent source of socio-political cohesion which successive northern theocratic leaders exploited. As dan Fodio ordered:

The government of a country is the governments of its King without question. If the King is a Muslim, his land is Muslim; if he is an unbeliever his land is a land of unbelievers. In these circumstances it is lawful for anyone to leave it for another country. . . . There is no dispute that the Hausa kings worshipped many places of idols and trees, and such was the condition of the Hausa peoples as we found them before the Jihad. Since then we have fought them and put them to flight and killed some and driven them from this land by the power of God (Exalted he be)

We have appointed Muslim Governors over the land and it has become a land of Islam, without doubt. Praise be to God. . . .²³

For the first time in two hundred years all the major Hausa kingdoms were united under one rule. The old kingdoms were transformed into emirates with their rulers owing both political and religious allegiance to the Commander of the Faithful at Sokoto. The unity of the empire did not depend so much on force as on religious obedience to Sokoto. This deference to Sokoto was to become a prime unifying factor in

²²A Jihad is a holy war in the Islamic sense.

²³Usuman dan Fodio, "The Origins of the Fulani Jihad," Nigerian Perspectives, ed. Thomas Hodgkin (London, 1960), p. 192.

Northern politics in the twentieth century.

The first large scale contact between the British and the Fulani-Hausa came through the Royal Niger Company. With the company's administrative organization based in the lower Niger and Benue, contact was made with the southern-most emirates of Nupe, Ilorin, and Adamawa.²⁴ Agents of the company concluded treaties with several of the emirs. Of the binding nature of these treaties to both signatories, Johnson noted that whatever Goldie and later Lugard chose to read into the agreements neither the Sultan of Sokoto nor the Emir of Gwandu supposed for a moment that they had bargained away any of their own sovereignty or their inherited authority over their vassals,²⁵

During the period 1901-1909 Lugard with his West African Frontier Force extended British control from the Niger northwards by forcing the installation of new, more amenable emirs. In choosing to exert influence through the existing native institutions, leaving them intact, Lugard was following British imperial practice already used in Fiji and India and propounded by his old friend Goldie as suitable for Nigeria. In Lugard's first annual report he noted:

The Fulani rule has been maintained as an experiment, for I am anxious to prove to these people that we have no hostility to them, and only insist on good government and justice, and I am anxious to utilize, if possible, their wonderful intelligence for they are born rulers, and incomparably above the Negroid tribes in ability.²⁶

Sokoto made little effort to counter the British expansion and the far

²⁴Sidney Hogben, Muhammedan Emirates of Nigeria (London, 1930), p. 211.

²⁵Ibid., p. 213.

²⁶Perham, Years of Authority, p. 47.

northern emirates maintained control of the major trade routes to the south. Thus, in his second report Lugard complained that trade could not be established on a satisfactory basis until the northern Hausa states were included in the "Provinces" of the Protectorate.²⁷

When the Sultan of Sokoto finally acknowledged British presence Lugard considered the Sultan's actions as tantamount to a declaration of war. In March, 1908, local troops and European officers under Lugard attacked and defeated the army of Kano, the main trading city in the North. In all fallen Fulani emirate capitals Lugard declared as a fait accompli the end of the conquest empire of Usman dan Fodio. In a candid statement outlining indirect rule Lugard's terms for the new political order were set forth:

Now these are the words which I, the High Commissioner have to say for the future. The Fulani in old times under dan Fodio conquered this country. They took the right to rule over it, to levy taxes, to depose kings and to create kings. They in turn have by defeat lost their rule to the British. All these things which I have said the Fulani by conquest took the right to do now pass to the British. Every Sultan and Emir and the principal officers of the State will be appointed by the High Commissioner throughout all this country. The High Commissioner will be guided by the usual laws of the succession and the wishes of the people as of old time and take such taxes as are appointed by the High Commissioner, but they will obey the laws of the Governor and will act in accordance with the advice of the Resident. . . . You need have no fear regarding British rule as it is our wish to learn your customs and fashions, just as you must learn ours. . . .²⁸

The quest for mutual admiration between the British administrators and the Fulani elite developed far beyond Lugard's expectations. Lugard

²⁷Crowder, A Short History, pp. 223-224.

²⁸Edward Lugard, "1903: The Speech at Sokoto," The Principles of Native Administration in Nigeria--Select Documents, ed. A.H.M. Kirk-Greene (London, 1965), pp. 43-44.

stressed imperial munificence but legitimized British sovereignty by right of conquest. To placate the theocratic Fulani elite, Lugard made a promise in return not to interfere with the Mohammedan religion. This promise was later used by the emirs as a rationale to exclude Christian missionary activity (and education) from the Muslim areas and to block the more secular Westernized elites who attempted to build political institutions overarching all regions.

The emphasis on reciprocity in Anglo-Nigerian indirect rule relationships permeates all of Lugard's writings. Indeed, the benefits and practicality of these reciprocal relationships formed the very core of both the idea and structure of Lugard's adaptation of indirect rule to the Nigerian setting. In his magnum opus on indirect rule, The Dual Mandate in British Africa published in 1922, he asserted:

Let it be admitted at the outset that European brains, capital, and energy have not been, and never will be, expended in developing the resources of Africa from motives of pure philanthropy; that Europe is in Africa for the mutual benefit of her own industrial classes, and of the native races in their progress to a higher plane, that the benefit can be reciprocal, and that it is the aim and desire of civilized nations to fulfill this dual mandate.²⁹

This statement encompasses all the complex motives and methods behind the British presence and policy--humanitarian altruism, economic imperialism, and administrative practicality. To Lugard, indirect rule through native authorities was both philosophically preferable and, in terms of the budget limitations imposed by the colonial office, the only feasible means to achieve the dual mandate without societal disruption. Perham noted the dual British aims of retention and adaptation

²⁹ Edward Lugard, The Dual Mandate in Tropical Africa (Hamden, Connecticut, 1965), p. 617.

of native institutions in claiming:

In northern Nigeria, British sovereignty having been uncompromisingly declared was fitted gradually and selectively over native institutions, here weakening or destroying, there retaining and reforming. Allowance had also to be made for differences and in the personalities, black and white, in each province, and also for a continuous process of change, planned and involuntary.³⁰

Of vast importance during the first formative years of indirect rule in northern Nigeria was the quality and quantity of colonial administrators (residents) Lugard recruited to supervise the Fulani governing elite. The number of political officers employed by Lugard was amazingly small given the large size of the region and the sprawling nature of the emirates. A comparison of staff in various British colonies in selected years is pointed out in the following table:³¹

TABLE III
NUMBER OF ADMINISTRATORS ON DUTY IN A SAMPLE
SELECTION OF COLONIES BY YEARS

	1909	1919	1929	1939	1949
Nigeria	261	297	488	411	486
Gold Coast (Ghana)	47	86	142	144	219
Tanganyika		109	177	179	260
Kenya	82	118	125	121	170
Northern Rhodesia			102	109	163
Malaya	125	242	270	223	226

The caliber of men Lugard demanded to fill staff positions in his

³⁰Perham, Years of Authority, p. 151.

³¹Robert Heussler, Yesterday's Rulers--The Making of the British Colonial Service (Syracuse, 1963), p. 13.

colonial administration is another point of interest. In Northern Nigeria the typical political officer was most often an educated and wealthy member of the British gentry whose interest was to lay not in innovative social engineering but only in discovering, accepting, and improving the decentralized native governments which existed.³² In securing an amenable efficient parochialism, the status quo needed only minor adjustment; otherwise, the political officer was to assiduously maintain the traditional structure. Lugard summed up his ideal colonial administrative officer as an English gentleman with an almost passionate conception of fair play, of the weak and of "playing the game."³³ Though Lugard never defined the somewhat cryptic "playing the game," it became apparent later that whatever the "rules" were for the northern emirates, these "rules" did not fit the "game" elsewhere in Nigeria.

The political consequences of the empathetic relationship which developed between the Fulani elite and aristocratic elements in the colonial service has recently come under closer scrutiny. It is

³²Prosser Gifford, "Indirect Rule: Touchstone or Tombstone for Colonial Policy?," Britain and Germany in Africa, eds. Prosser Gifford and Alison Smith (New Haven, 1967), p. 356. In one African colony Gifford noted that of eighty-three members of the Colonial Service recruited from 1899 to 1914, thirty-six were graduates of Oxford, twenty from Cambridge, nine from Sandhurst and six from Trinity College, Dublin.

³³Lugard, Dual Mandate, p. 132. During a personal visit by the author to all the regions of Nigeria in 1965 it was obvious that there was widespread antagonism between the retired members of the British Colonial Service of the North and the South. The regional bureaucratic divisiveness bore striking similarity to the suspicion and contempt which the regional ethnic leadership held for each other. An often heard joke among Nigerians held that if all Nigerians would have been evacuated from their home regions the colonial bureaucracies of the North and South would have gone to war with each other.

apparent the decades of colonial administration provided the Fulani elite insulation from modernizing forces and the political power base to eventually dominate the politics of the entire federation following independence. Gifford noted the mutuality of Anglo-Nigerian social backgrounds which underlay indirect rule:

It would be difficult to find better political officers than these heirs of the English gentry with their country-seat notions of liberty curbed by character-training. They were often intelligent, seldom intellectual. They accepted the naturalness of rule and understood the position of indigenous elites by analogy with their own. . . . It is hardly surprising that Lugard's administrative cadre in Northern Nigeria which numbered seventy-five in 1906 took to the decentralizing tendencies of Indirect Rule with enthusiasm.³⁴

Thus, throughout the colonial period the British Colonial Service in the North resisted attempts by more radical political forces to dilute the power of the traditional elites. This policy was especially obvious in the British toleration of the emirs' obduracy towards Western education and missionary activity. This policy retarded for decades the growth of an education system in the North to parallel advances being made in the South.

The vast difference in the timing and scope of Western education among the regions of Nigeria had far reaching political consequences. The Muslim areas of northern Nigeria provided the British colonial authorities with a unique opportunity for controlling the rate and direction of acculturation. The promises Lugard made at the turn of the century expressly forbade any outside interference in the religious area and from 1900 to 1909 the basic theme of Lugard's reports stressed the inappropriateness of Western mission education in the North and

³⁴Gifford, "Indirect Rule," p. 358.

sufficiency of the 20,000 Koranic schools then in existence.³⁵ In addition, the inescapable colonial budget limitations meant that for several decades the resources did not permit any general scheme of public education.³⁶ Allocation for education ranked very low in the colonial budget until the 1950's.

Lugard discovered the Christian missions' virtual monopoly of schooling in southern Nigeria provided an education inseparable from evangelization. In many areas of the South the mission education preceded formal colonial acquisition and had given tremendous impetus to the growth of a new semi-educated Westernized class. To Lugard there was administrative inconsistency in exerting British suzerainty over local institutions and permitting mission autonomy over an educational process which stressed egalitarian concepts at variance with the philosophy of indirect rule. Lugard's conception of education emphasized its role in creating support for the "natural rulers." As Lugard argued, education's function should be to fit the ordinary individual to fill a useful part in his environment and to insure that the exceptional individual would use his abilities for the advancement of the

³⁵ Coleman, Nigeria, p. 133. Coleman noted that at the time of the imposition of British control over the North, various areas of the South had already been under the influence of Christianity and Western education for fifty years. British officials lamented the products of these schools but needed them in the administration. In contrast, the North by 1937 had only one secondary school, barely one-percent literacy in the Muslim areas, and was extremely underrepresented in the colonial bureaucracy as a result. By 1951, the North could point to only one college graduate out of a total population of approximately 16 million.

³⁶ Ibid., p. 137.

community and not to the subversion of constituted authority.³⁷

Lugard repeatedly argued that the indiscriminate diffusion of European education and civilization had a tendency to undermine and disrupt the respect for authority which was the crux of social order. No group better epitomized the results of such exposure than the mission-educated (and evangelized) non-Muslim Southerners. Because of their education, this group was heavily represented as Native Court clerks or scribes in the North. Instead of religion being used solely as an auxiliary to the British directed formation of high "moral character", mission education in the South instead produced a pool of transient clerical subordinates for colonial offices. Moreover, these educated Southerners (particularly Ibos) were migrating to the North in growing numbers.

Western education spawned a mobile, potentially nettlesome class which was neither attracted nor particularly acquiescent to the British legitimized "natural institutions and rulers." In turn, Lugard and the emirs considered the typical semi-educated Southern clerk as the very antithesis of deferential propriety expected of a subject in such a traditional-administrative structure. The Southerner was considered at best a necessary administrative evil and a foreign agent of social change incapable of understanding the "natural institutions." The contempt and suspicion held for this new class was symptomatic of the British administrator's aversion for the "southern, semi-Anglicized, ill-educated, and denationalized bureaucrat prone to condemn old native

³⁷Perham, Years of Authority, p. 491.

power and customs."³⁸ This attitude was tempered only by the nearly total dependence on the Southern educated class to staff the subaltern ranks of the colonial administration.

The rapid spread of education and the systematic exclusion of the growing educated class from positions of political authority provided the environment for nationalist agitation. The struggle was basically polarized between the native authorities and the British colonial superstructure on the one hand and the nationalist Western-educated class on the other. The impact of education was fundamental to Coleman's assertion that:

Western education did not merely facilitate the emergence of a separate class; it endowed individuals in that class with knowledge and skills, the ambitions and aspirations that enabled them to challenge the Nigerian colonial government, . . . wrest control over central political power and by so doing place themselves above the traditional African authorities in the new Nigerian political system. Within a short span of two generations, Western education made possible a nearly complete reversal in the status of political leaders. The rapidity of upward mobility and status reversal in this revolutionary transformation is possibly unparalleled in history.³⁹

Status reversal between the classes was never fully complete and the British support of traditional authorities in the North and other areas made the devolution of political power extraordinarily complex. Indirect rule, aimed at cultivating "love of tribe" and deference to

³⁸Gifford, "Indirect Rule," p. 359. As the author observed, these Southerners working in the North normally lived in ghettos or sabon garis (outsiders quarters) in the larger cities. Southerners were prohibited from owning land in the North. These sabon garis became the focus for both intense political activity during the nationalist period and growing antagonism on the part of the Fulani for these outsiders living in their midst.

³⁹Coleman, Nigeria, pp. 115-116.

traditional authority became near dogma at the same time a growing cadre of young educated Southerners began to consider the maintenance and extension of such authority an anachronism. When transplanted outside the North, indirect rule was much less capable of meeting the needs of dissimilar tribal institutions or the aspirations of new political groupings. In effect, however, the preservation of an efficient parochialism insured the political dominance of Northern traditional elites not only within the geographically dominant North but in time over the entire colony. As Feit argued, the complementary relationships peculiar to Northern indirect rule reinforced one of Nigeria's most conservative elites:

Colonial officers and tribal rulers alike wanted to preserve for different reasons a mutually beneficial status quo. . .each providing something the other could not. . .always an ideal basis for cooperation. . . . The administrators protected traditional systems from change and made their preservation acceptable to the governments at home. The traditional rulers in turn, helped to make colonial practices institutional among their followers. . . . They served to legitimize each other and thus, we term it administrative-traditional rule.⁴⁰

The extension of indirect rule to the South presented infinitely greater problems as the British encountered tribal institutions which were in sharp contrast to the hierarchical, autocratic emirates of the North. Lugard's successors' attempts to impose the Northern administrative traditional mold on the Yoruba and Ibo political cultures were to have serious repercussions for future Nigerian political development. In the North, indirect rule achieved its greatest success. In the South, it suffered its most portentous failure.

⁴⁰Edward Feit, "Military Coups and Political Development," World Politics, XX (1968), pp. 180-181.

Indirect Rule and the Yoruba Kingdoms

The Yoruba peoples of southwestern Nigeria might rightly claim to be the largest cultural aggregation in West Africa with a history of political unity and a common historical tradition.⁴¹ In addition to this common historic matrix a notable characteristic of the Yoruba has been their level of urbanization. Out of the eleven largest cities in Nigeria in 1931, nine were almost entirely Yoruba and Lagos which was two-thirds Yoruba was fairly ranked as the tenth.⁴² By the 1952 census thirty-six per cent of the Yoruba lived in twenty-five homogeneous, densely populated cities of over 25,000.⁴³ In terms of general levels of urbanization the Yoruba pattern is analogous to that of Western Europe or the United States. Yoruba cities, however, were based on agriculture rather than on industrialization with the urban pattern being traditional rather than an outgrowth of acculturation.⁴⁴

Despite the absence of industrialization, ethnic heterogeneity and the continued importance of kinship units, the Yoruba had cities long before European penetration.⁴⁵ The historic permanency of Yoruba cities is confirmed from at least two sources. As early as the eighteenth century Portuguese explorers reported that both Benin and

⁴¹Coleman, Nigeria, p. 25.

⁴²Margery Perham, Native Administration in Nigeria (Oxford, 1937), p. 162.

⁴³William Bascom, "Some Aspects of Yoruba Urbanism," American Anthropologist, LXIV (1962), p. 699.

⁴⁴G. J. Afolabi Ojo, Yoruba Culture (London, 1966), pp. 118-120.

⁴⁵William Bascom, "Urbanization Among the Yorubas," American Journal of Sociology, LX (1955), p. 453.

Dahomey were subject to control by Yoruba cities and the British noted Oyo as the most powerful city state along the West African coast.⁴⁶ With extensive British exploration efforts in the nineteenth century several large Yoruba cities were identified but during this period Yoruba internecine warfare was depopulating large areas.

A second feature of the Yoruba social system is the patrilineage, an exogamous descent group whose members venerate a founding ancestor and tend to cluster into politically unified towns.⁴⁷ Tribal legend attributes origin of the Yoruba to a deity, Oduduwa who reigned at Ife. Royal dynasties and lineages are purported to have been founded by the grandsons of Oduduwa with the result that numerous obas (kings) reign throughout Yorubaland, many taking kingship titles distinctive to their kingdoms.⁴⁸

Just as the Oni of Ife historically exercised spiritual influence in the Yoruba kingdoms, the Alafin of Oyo was noted for his secular political power. A century before the Fulani conquests of the Hausa kingdoms, Oyo suzerainty extended from the middle Niger to Benin and included parts of Dahomey.⁴⁹ Fragmentation of the empire later occurred and was continuing at the time of the British rise to power in Lagos.⁵⁰ A comparatively strong Yoruba-consciousness persisted in

⁴⁶Ibid., p. 448.

⁴⁷Richard L. Sklar and C. S. Whitaker Jr., "The Federation of Nigeria," National Unity and Regionalism in Eight African States, ed. Gwendolyn Carter (Ithaca, 1966), p. 13.

⁴⁸Perham, Native Administration, pp. 163-165; Samuel Johnson, The History of the Yorubas (London, 1921), p. 143.

⁴⁹Fage, History of West Africa, pp. 88-91.

⁵⁰Coleman, Nigeria, p. 25.

spite of this disintegration. Too, this consciousness was vastly reinforced through the more intensive Westernization of Yoruba areas during the colonial period.

A third distinguishing feature of the Yoruba culture is the comparatively large scale of pre-colonial political organization and tradition of constitutional monarchy.⁵¹ As Lloyd noted in his study of Yoruba political culture, sacred kingship among the Yoruba was an ancient institution; each town had its own royal or non-royal descent groups but the Yoruba had no ruling clan or aristocratic group, such as the Fulani of the emirates of northern Nigeria.⁵²

The ancient Oyo kingdom was a good example of Yoruba monarchical political organization. The Alafin of Oyo, king of this city state, by all appearances was an absolute monarch wielding unrestricted power. In fact, the selection of the Alafin and his exercise of power was based on an intricate interplay between overlapping lineage and clan units.⁵³ In contrast to the pyramidal structure of the Fulani North where the contest for power lay between segments of a narrow royal lineage, in Oyo non-royal lineage town chiefs held ultimate power over the selection of the Alafin. Candidates for the throne were nominated by elders from particular royal descent groups, but senior chiefs performed a power balancing function on the final choice and policy of the otherwise semi-divine king. Lloyd noted the political importance of

⁵¹Ezera, Constitutional Developments, p. 6.

⁵²P. C. Lloyd, "Sacred Kingship and Government Among the Yorubas," Africa, XXX (1960), p. 222.

⁵³Frederick A.O. Schwartz, Nigeria--The Tribes, The Nation or the Race (Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1965), p. 31.

the balance of power and the level of sophistication of the Yoruba political system:

There is a clear distinction between the royal lineage and the non-royal descent groups of the town. But while the candidates for the throne are proposed by the elders of royal lineage groups, it is the chiefs, representing the non-royal lineages who make the final selection. Although the oba is at the head of the government of his town and kingdom he may act only on the advice of his chiefs. The balance of power between oba and chiefs depends ultimately on personalities.⁵⁴

A council of Oyo senior chiefs acted as "kingmakers." The Alafin was considered semi-divine and enjoyed enormous prestige, but a delicate balance of power was maintained between these chiefs (who received a popular mandate) and the king.⁵⁵ An interesting aspect of the effectively applied de jure limitations on the exercise of power were the sanctions taken against a despotic Yoruba king who acted contrary to accepted norms. Though rare, deposition of a king by the chiefs was their constitutional prerogative. This deposition had an element of finality in that:

Ultimately the chiefs might ask their oba to die. . . . Deposition could only be affected by death and never by exile or abdication, for only by the death of one oba could his successor perform the consecration rituals necessary to validate his own rule. The demands of the chiefs were usually conveyed symbolically; in Oyo the Alafin was sent a gift of parrot eggs. The Alafin was then expected to take poison and commit suicide.⁵⁶

⁵⁴Lloyd, "Sacred Kingship," p. 236.

⁵⁵Elias, Nigeria, Development of Its Laws, p. 11. Elias noted that in Yorubaland the political views of the mass of people were often expressed in their lineage meetings; these views were carried by the chiefs sitting in these meetings as ordinary members of their own assemblies.

⁵⁶Lloyd, "Sacred Kingship," pp. 232-233; Johnson, The History of the Yorubas, pp. 168-177.

One of the significant consequences of the amalgamation of the Protectorates of Northern and Southern Nigeria in 1914 was the deliberate extension of indirect rule to the South. The Royal Niger Company had in the 1890's suppressed the slave trade through the more important Yoruba chiefs, thus recognizing them as the indigenous authority. At this stage there was little attempt by the British to find a place for them within its organization of rule.⁵⁷ This was accomplished in the Native Authority Ordinance of 1916, which extended indirect rule to Yoruba areas.⁵⁸

Governor-General Lugard was confronted with a number of independent Yoruba monarchical states. As Perham noted in her biography, Lugard's background in the North and the enigmatic character of the Yoruba kingship led to a number of misconceptions on the part of the British. Oyo, Ife, Abeokuta, and Lagos seemed to Lugard to be closely comparable to a cross section of the larger and smaller Northern emirates. As Lugard had declared that indirect rule was applicable to the smallest pagan groups, it was natural that he should regard the Yoruba states, especially Oyo, as promising areas in which to impose a proven administrative system.⁵⁹

All the political characteristics of the North--centralized authority, administrative machinery, a judiciary, and a system of revenue based on direct taxation--were often lacking in the South. Not dissuaded by these sharp contrasts, Lugard insisted that if Southern

⁵⁷ Lord Hailey, An African Survey (London, 1956), p. 460.

⁵⁸ Ibid., p. 454.

⁵⁹ Perham, Years of Authority, pp. 439-440.

political institutions were not as explicit as in the North then the British should create them. The first step was to find a man of influence as chief, group under him as many villages or districts as possible and then teach him to delegate powers and to take an interest in his Native Treasury. The British would support his authority and instill in him "a sense of responsibility."⁶⁰ In retrospect, "finding" leadership to fit the administrative scheme was not only simplistic but, as a solution for exerting imperial control, caused tremendous disarray among traditional political systems in the South.

In universalizing indirect rule to the point of creating tribal leadership, Lugard failed to discern the sharp distinction between Fulani emir and Yoruba oba. Nevertheless, in 1916 Lugard introduced his system of native administration with taxation to Oyo which by all outward appearances resembled the political organization of an emirate. Two costly miscalculations stemmed from overestimating the powers of the Alafin:

1. The highly ritualized and semi-sacred behavior of the Alafin was considered by Lugard to be reflective of the amount of power wielded by paramount emirs of the north. In this case Lugard misinterpreted pomp as power.

2. In terms of control over his dominions, the Alafin was not an emir. For instance, the Alafin exerted only the most tenuous spiritual influence over the independent city of Ibadan which had long had poor relations with Oyo. These relations were certainly not as a vassal state.⁶¹

Lugard failed to recognize the power nuances and limitations

⁶⁰Edward Lugard, "1914: The Amalgamation Report," Principles of Native Administration, ed. A.H.M. Kirk-Greene (London, 1965), p. 46.

⁶¹Perham, Years of Authority, pp. 443-446.

inherent in the office of the Alafin or the practical political primacy of Oyo's main Yoruba rival, Ibadan.⁶² The British colonial authorities were consequently faced with the ignominy of contributing to the political-commercial ascendancy of Ibadan over Oyo in the 1880's and within a few decades reversing the process by placing Ibadan under the auspices of the Alafin of Oyo. Thus, Oyo had become a facsimile of Sokoto in the South. Ibadan's inclusion in the native authority of the Alafin marked the beginning of years of acute political tension between these two Yoruba cities. This tension was only partly eased in 1934 when Ibadan was made independent of Oyo.

In Abeokuta, another large Yoruba city, the imposition of native authority provoked violence. A disturbance in 1914 requiring British troops gave Lugard pretext to abrogate a treaty guaranteeing Abeokuta's authority over its internal affairs. Tension finally came to a head in early 1918 when Lugard felt secure enough to introduce taxation.⁶³ Again, Lugard assumed the Alake of Abeokuta enjoyed sufficient sovereignty to impose such an innovation as central taxation. In fact, the Alake was merely primus inter pares among the chiefs of Abeokuta and any such arbitrary move was considered a gross misuse of traditional authority. Perham noted British bureaucratic naivete and dogmatism in extending emirate-style indirect rule to Abeokuta:

As with Oyo it was clear that the simple pattern of a single dominant ruler with District Heads under the king to conduct the administration and to collect the new tax simply did not fit the Abeokuta system which was

⁶²Bolanle Awe, "Ibadan, Its Early Beginnings," The City of Ibadan, eds. P. C. Lloyd and A. L. Mabogunje (Cambridge, 1967), p. 24.

⁶³Crowder, A Short History, p. 249.

at once looser and more complex. The Alake himself, was not, by origin, comparable to an emir, but was the chief among the four heads of the four component groups of the city.⁶⁴

Thus, as the Western oba was no prototype of the emir the traditional power locus among the Ibo proved even more difficult to locate. Imposition of indirect rule on the dispersed Ibo political system was to be an even greater failure than in the West.

The East--Indirect Rule and Ibo Segmented Culture

For many centuries before the arrival of the Europeans the Ibo peoples had been settled in their present home in eastern Nigeria. Their early origins are unknown but it appears that when they moved into this area their pressure pushed other groups such as the Ijaw and Ekoi to the less hospitable delta and swamp regions.⁶⁵ With few outside invasions or mass migrations into this region of heavy rain forest to cause large scale ethnic intermixing, the Ibo never developed highly centralized pyramidal political structures as did the Fulani-Hausa in the North. Although the present Ibo population is estimated to be nearly eight million, it is divided into 30 subtribes, 69 clans, and some 500 autonomous villages and village groups.⁶⁶ There is overlapping among all these groups.

The political system of the Ibo is unique in Nigeria in its strong emphasis on the independence of the village. Hailey claims:

⁶⁴Perham, Years of Authority, p. 453.

⁶⁵J. C. Anene, Southern Nigeria in Transition (Cambridge, 1966), p. 12.

⁶⁶Coleman, Nigeria, p. 30.

Nowhere is there to be found any close analogy to the centralized organizations of the Northern Emirates, nor indeed to the less highly centralized but nevertheless authoritative organizations of the Yoruba and the Egba. . . . The large Ibo community presents perhaps the most outstanding example in the British African colonies of an indigenous structure in which it is difficult to find any definite seat of executive authority.⁶⁷

The village group was not subject to any outside authority and had little basis for cooperation with other villages. The closest approximation to any external integrating element were the Arochukwu, a sub-tribe of the Ibo peoples.⁶⁸ The Arochukwu dominated a shrine area of the supreme god of the Ibo, Chuku, and exerted influence from the Cross River westwards to the Niger. The mystical-political influence of this group was noted by Mabogunje:

In the hands of the Arochukwu, this system, built around the Chuku oracle provided a means of exerting considerable political influence over most of Iboland. The Aros, in fact, divided the whole of Iboland up into spheres of influence, each place under the management of a certain 'quarter' in Arochukwu. Representatives from these 'quarters' formed colonies in all the principle places in their area of influence and by having all cases of importance referred through them to the oracle, managed to attract to themselves considerable power and prestige.⁶⁹

Thus, the Aro oracles not only filled a judicial role as a court of appeals in the segmented Ibo society but more importantly forged links through the communities in Iboland. Unfortunately, the British were hardly able to discern much less exploit the influence of this group

⁶⁷L. Gray Cowan, Local Government in West Africa (New York, 1958), p. 9.

⁶⁸Victor C. Uchendu, The Ibo of Southeast Nigeria (New York, 1965), pp. 101-102.

⁶⁹Akin L. Mabogunje, "Land, People, and Tradition in Nigeria," The Politics and Administration in Nigerian Government, ed. Franklin Blitz (New York, 1965), p. 68.

for purposes of indirect rule.

In all Ibo communities the principal legislative or rule-making power was the council of elders. This body included all the heads of the lineage groups, rich influential men, certain title holders, and priests of important cults.⁷⁰ Ottenberg, in studying the Afikpo Ibo, noted that the main factor in determining political leadership in a village was age but that younger men of ability were sometimes found in high positions and quite often participated actively in village meetings.⁷¹ The subtle underlying factors responsible for cohesion and order within Ibo society, in spite of the lack of strong, centralized political institutions, were emphasized by an Ibo anthropologist:

The picture of the Igbo (Ibo) political community which emerges from these settings is one that is territorially small enough to make direct democracy possible at the village level; a government in which the principle of equality is respected; and in which there are leaders rather than rulers and political cohesion is achieved by rulers rather than by laws and by consensus rather than by dictation. In general, the Igbo have not achieved any political structure which can be called a federation, a confederacy, or a state.⁷²

In the religious sphere, just as in the judicial and legislative areas, there were also integrative mechanisms indicating a basic cohesion which compensated for the political fragmentation of the Ibo. Among the Ibo, mythical values and common sacred places combined with trade and intermarriage to provide some modicum of unity. As Anene has claimed:

⁷⁰Kenneth S. Carlston, Social Theory and Tribal Organization (Urbana, Illinois, 1968), p. 18.

⁷¹Simon Ottenberg, "Improvement Associations Among the Afikpo Ibo," Africa, XXV (January, 1955), pp. 2-4.

⁷²Uchendu, The Ibo, p. 112.

The pervasive factor of religion among the Ibo. . . provided a basis for the important role of priests who mediated between god and man. Religion had another significance in the sphere of inter-group relations. . . . The ritual power exercised by the (theocratic) king of Nri (in the Awka district) was an integrative force uniting perhaps loosely a large part of Iboland.⁷³

In general, government was the business of the whole Ibo community. The fragmentation and dispersal of Ibo political authority baffled the British colonial authorities, who, for several decades after the amalgamation of the North and South, attempted to institute native authority patterned on the emirate system of the North. These efforts proved to be an administrative exercise in frustration. If Lugard had difficulties in applying indirect rule to the Yoruba he found it almost impossible to introduce to the Ibo. An administrative system which depended ultimately on a fulcrum of authority had little application in so loosely an organized society. As one of his more dispassionate biographers concluded, "Lugard had a strong, though not quite constant, awareness of African sociology."⁷⁴ With inadequate staffing and little information on the political organization of the Ibo, nowhere did the practice of indirect rule fail so utterly as in the East. Perhaps, as N. U. Akpan has contended, the commonest mistake committed by the early apostles of the indirect rule system was their frequent over-hasty assumption that hardly any indiginous authorities worthy of reckoning with existed, where they failed to see such institutions as the

⁷³Anene, Southern Nigeria, p. 15; Dike, Trade and Politics, pp. 43-45.

⁷⁴Perham, Years of Authority, p. 462.

emirates of Northern Nigeria.⁷⁵

Following the Native Courts Proclamation of 1900, Iboland was arbitrarily carved into Native Court areas formed by grouping together a number of contiguous village groups which were traditionally sovereign units.⁷⁶ The court areas bore little relation to the natural social units and were supervised by British District Officers having little knowledge about Ibo traditional institutions they ostensibly were trying to preserve. In the absence of accurate information identifying indigenous leaders, "chiefs" were appointed by the court. These "warrant chiefs" as they were to be known, were not representative of the village groups they were appointed to serve and quite often these artificial "chiefs" proved to be notoriously corrupt.⁷⁷ The warrant chief owed his position to the external authority and was generally free to disregard tradition and custom, factors which often antagonized both illiterate and educated classes. Sir Donald Cameron, Governor of Nigeria in 1931, described the ludicrous attempt through the warrant chief to ". . . make, as it were, a crown or king at the top and then try to find something underneath on which it might--perhaps--approximately be placed."⁷⁸ Less than two decades after this remark the

⁷⁵Ntieyong U. Akpan, Epitaph to Indirect Rule (London, 1967), p. 33.

⁷⁶Uchendu, The Ibo, pp. 46-47.

⁷⁷Dilim Okafar-Omali, The Nigerian Villager in Two Worlds (London, 1965), p. 76. Okafar-Omali gives an interesting account of how the village council was often usurped by the warrant chiefs literally short-circuiting the traditional dispersed system of authority and in the process creating intense resentment at all levels of Ibo society.

⁷⁸Akpan, Epitaph, p. 34.

British had become so discouraged that a modified form of English local government supplanted indirect rule in the East.⁷⁹

One of the incidents which pointed up the cohesiveness and solidarity of the Ibo peoples were the Aba riots of 1929. In this period of violence the surprisingly rapid mobilization of Ibo women across two provinces was matched by the incapacity of British political officers to fathom the impact of their use of warrant chiefs on Ibo social organization. During the 1920's despite repeated criticism of the native courts and the warrant chief system, few reform measures had been taken by the British. In 1927 the belated decision to take up Lugard's rejected policy was made to extend taxation to adult males in the Eastern region. Because it lacked a traditional base, the assessment procedure used for the new tax was misunderstood by many people. Disturbances erupted in the Warri and Kwale areas but were quickly quelled.⁸⁰ This was but the beginning.

In late 1929 in Ibo Owerri province a warrant chief, under instructions of the District Officer instituted a reassessment of taxable property--this time to include women, children and domestic animals. Anger at this assessment of themselves quickly spread among the women of two of the most populous provinces of Iboland. What followed exhibited an amazing capacity for organization and united action which cut across clan and tribal boundaries. Perham noted the general targets for this anger:

⁷⁹ Hugh H. Smythe and Mabel M. Smythe, The New Nigerian Elite (Stanford, 1960), p. 21.

⁸⁰ Crowder, A Short History, p. 259.

The trouble spread in the second week in December to Aba, an important trading centre on the railway. . . . Here converged some ten thousand women. Singing songs against the chiefs and court messengers, the women attacked European trading stores and the Barclays Bank. . . but were more interested in destroying Native Courts and mobbing the Warrant Chiefs than in looting. . . . The movement spread from Owerri and Aba to Ukan, Opobo, and finally beyond the Ibo area to heavily populated Ibibio Calabar. . . . The disturbed area covered six thousand square miles and contained two million people. Native Courts and sixteen Native Administration centres were attacked and burned. Fifty women were killed.⁸¹

An important result of the Aba riots were the Commissions of Inquiry which urged administrative reform in the East. One of these commissions called upon trained anthropologists to conduct investigations to discover the real seat of traditional authority. By 1935 nearly 200 reports had been written outlining both the variety of political units and the existence of village councils.⁸² In spite of these valuable reports administrative reorganization of the East was never fully achieved before the beginning of World War II.

By the late 1950's it had become very apparent that Native Authorities in the South could not become effective local government agencies. The growth of a new educated class following the war made their deficiencies even more obvious. Normally this class was denied effective voice in Native Authority affairs and often openly criticized tribal authority. Thus, a class which could have aided in adapting traditional institutions to modern needs was restrained by an administrative theory which sought to preserve and reinforce the traditional elites. In the South agitation by the educated class was always more

⁸¹Perham, Native Administration, pp. 206-211.

⁸²Hailey, An African Survey, p. 466; Crowder, A Short History, pp. 260-261.

pronounced because of the larger size of this group and the existence of a native authority structure which lacked legitimacy and often any sense of popular responsibility.

In the authoritative North the generation-class cleavage was muted and the insulation and isolation from the forces sweeping the South lasted well into the post-World War II period. Northern traditional elites were to be finally galvanized into response mainly through the formation and agitation across Nigeria by nationalist Southern-based political organizations. Organizational efforts among the tribal groups paralleled in reverse chronological order the three sharply contrasting tribal societies which have been examined in this chapter. Growing interaction among these three main tribal groups was an important result of the activities of these early organizations. Most critically, the pace and scope of organizational effort reflected the extreme disparity of regional development during the period of indirect rule. The legacies of the colonial period had, thus, a formative direct influence on the later development of Nigerian nationalist organizations and political parties.

CHAPTER IV

THE EVOLUTION OF POLITICAL ORGANIZATIONS

IN THE INTER-WAR PERIOD

The intimate working relationship which developed between the small British colonial service and the Fulani traditional elite proved to be extremely difficult to transfer to the South. Conceivably, by longer reinforcement of traditional structures ("natural institutions") and leaders ("natural rulers"), the political environment Lugard envisioned might have evolved whereby these traditional institutions and elites would have been capable of exerting control over the whole of Nigeria. However, Nigeria did not exist in a historic vacuum and new forces were interjecting themselves into the Nigerian political setting. A new Western educated class began to question not only the inadequacies of indirect rule but the injustices and even the legitimacy of colonial rule. In this new political environment Hamilton noted the adaptive potential of indirect rule:

He [Lugard] turned a necessity of cheap and practical governing into a theory of indirect rule as a positive good, which grew into a dogma slavishly followed by his successors and held out as a pattern for the slow development of all the 'backward' empire. Before it could be installed on thorough lines, indirect rule was out of date. The British were of course too slow in occupying, too slow in governing, too slow in welfare and developmental activity, too slow in training for independence; but, when they faced up to this last, they were perhaps superb in their timing.¹

¹Hamilton, "The Evolution of British Policy," p. 40.

The spread of Western education in mission schools stimulated new political activity and contact among the ethnic groups. The emergence of new political activism challenged the existing order legitimized by the British.² In Nigeria the initial activity was heavily concentrated in the South with political organizing most widespread among Yoruba and Ibo educated elements. In time these efforts not only challenged the efficiency of indirect rule but demanded for Nigeria self-determination as an independent state.

The nationalist struggle, the rise of Nigerian political organizations and the attempts made by these organizations to permeate all levels of Nigerian society will be the general focus of this chapter. It is my contention that the interwar efforts to organize nationalist groups into a cohesive political force were crucial in determining the future structure, activities, and difficulties of the major political parties. As was true of all other efforts at territorial organization, these political parties were strongly influenced by the contrasting tempo of regional development during the period of indirect rule. In the interaction between the British colonial administration, traditional elites, and nationalist forces in the emerging federal framework of Nigeria a power struggle developed. This struggle had wide ramifications for later efforts by political parties to become institutionalized on a national scale. Thus, the formative attempts by nationalist forces to build and sustain viable political organizations against a backdrop of indirect rule provides insight into problems which later plagued the

²Martin L. Kilson, "Social Forces in West African Political Development," Twentieth Century Africa, ed. P.J.M. McEwan (London, 1968), p. 9.

Southern parties in their efforts to escape the basic regional-tribal orientation and become truly national political institutions. In this chapter the early efforts to build indigenous nationalist political organizations will be examined. The evolution of these early political forms in the context of colonial disrhythmic development among the regions had a fundamental influence on the development of the Nigerian multiparty political system.

The Nigerian Council and the Politics of Lagos

A major result of the amalgamation of Northern and Southern Nigeria in 1914 was the establishment of the Nigerian Council by Sir Frederick Lugard, the Governor-General. This body which nominally represented the whole of Nigeria--Colony and Protectorate--had been preceded by a small nominated Legislative Council which advised and assisted the Governor.³ The purview of the original council was confined to the colony and it served as a valuable politicizing instrument in Lagos. The Nigerian Council was composed of thirty-six members: the Governor, the members of the Executive Council, six unofficial European members representing the chambers of commerce, shipping, banking and mining and six African unofficals (chiefs) nominated to represent as "far as may be" both the coastal districts and the interior.⁴ The purely advisory role of the Nigerian Council was explicitly stated in section 17 of the Order in Council: "No resolution shall have any legislative or executive authority, and the Governor shall not be required to give effect to any

³Sir Alan Burns, History of Nigeria (London, 1963), p. 138.

⁴Elias, Nigeria, The Development of Its Laws, p. 24.

such resolution unless he thinks fit and is authorized to do so."⁵

The chiefs rarely attended the annual Council meetings and in effect this body's main business was largely confined to a desultory discussion of the Governor-General's annual address. The meetings of this first territory-wide Anglo-Nigerian political body were later described by the Governor, Sir Hugh Clifford:

Some of you will recollect the dreary and apathetic meetings of the so-called Nigerian Council which always seemed to me to be a debating society in which nobody would enter into a debate. And those of you who can remember the proceedings of that Council. . . will agree with me what an extraordinary contrast it is between the interest of the debate to which we have listened today and the work you have done during the past week and those feeble, faint, colourless meetings that used to weary us all so intensely in the past.⁶

The lethargy of the Council Clifford found so disappointing and tedious should hardly have been surprising. A diverse membership which included a Northern emir, a Yoruba chief, and the local representative of Barclay's Bank was hardly equipped for debating (in English) questions of colonial policy which, in any event, were clearly beyond its control. The powerlessness of the Council was reflected in a 1919 motion to the effect that the Council be either reconstructed so as to make it a serious factor in the governing of the Colony, or else be abolished.⁷

⁵Ibid., pp. 24-25; Crowder, A Short History, pp. 215-216. Crowder noted the unwieldy nature of the Council and the fact that Lugard only centralized departments that he felt necessary for control of overall policy. At every turn Lugard avoided the acquisition of a large administration, so that the administration was effectively regionalized under the Lieutenant-Governors, a process which only exacerbated the growing differences between the two regions.

⁶Joan Wheare, The Nigerian Legislature Council (London, 1949), pp. 30-31.

⁷Elias, Nigeria, The Development of Its Laws, p. 25.

Though the motion failed, the point was well taken and three years later the Council was reconstituted.

Frustration with the Nigerian Council was part of a growing demand in all West Africa for basic reform in colonial rule. During World War I the idea for concerted action in this area among West African intellectuals lay dormant. With the end of hostilities in Europe, this dormancy ended with the first Congress of British West Africa held in Accra in 1920. Caseley Hayford, Gold Coast Barrister and early nationalist leader, headed this conference which included representatives from Nigeria, the Gold Coast (later renamed Ghana), Sierre Leone and Gambia.⁸ The outlines and aims of this conference were explicit but:

Leading all the rest was the demand for basic reform . . . which would give Africans effective parity in the Legislative Council, create new houses of assembly with elected majorities and power over taxation and the colonial budgets, and establish self-government at the municipal level. The tone of the conference was clear--it was high time that such reforms were effected. West Africans had long-lived traditions of self-government and they now had a growing number of educated leaders, so that Wilsonian self-determination had relevance for West Africa at least as much as for other parts of the world.⁹

The idea of united political action was very compelling on paper

⁸ Thomas Hodgkin, Nationalism in Colonial Africa (New York, 1957), pp. 139-141. Hodgkin noted that any discussion of African political parties must involve predecessor organizations from which they sprung, i.e., the Aborigines' Rights Protection Society of the Gold Coast (1897), the National Congress of British West Africa (1920), and the Nigerian National Democratic Party (1923). Hodgkin further noted these political associations had common characteristics: (1) control was exerted by a professional elite, generally lawyers; (2) influence of these associations was effectively limited to a few main towns--Lagos, Freetown, and Accra, etc.; and (3) these groups tended to be exclusive clubs for the professional and prosperous business classes which were emerging.

⁹ Robert W. July, The Origins of Modern African Thought (London, 1968), pp. 444-445.

and it received a good deal of popular support throughout West Africa; yet, it had two practical limitations. First, the internal struggles among the African intelligentsia, especially in Nigeria and the Gold Coast, crippled the Congress movement at the outset.¹⁰ Infighting among factions in Lagos had already become a dominant theme of Nigerian politics and Nigerian support for any concerted interterritorial initiatives was badly splintered. Secondly, the British authorities were from the outset suspicious and contemptuous of the aims of the Congress. Lord Milner, British Secretary of State for Colonial Affairs, rejected the demands of the Congress outright. Sir Hugh Clifford, Governor of Nigeria, expressed open hostility to the demands of the Congress for the elective representation of Africans. In one of the most scathing and denunciatory addresses in Nigerian colonial history Clifford attacked the largely southern Nigerian delegation to the Congress:

There had during the last few months been a great deal of loose and gaseous talk on the subject of popular election --talk which has for the most part emanated from a self-selected and self-appointed congregation of educated African gentlemen who collectively style themselves the 'West African National Conference'. . . . For it can only be described as farcical to suppose that. . .continental Nigeria can be represented by a handful of gentlemen drawn from a half-dozen coast towns, men born and bred in British-administered towns situated on the seashore who, in the safety of British protection have peacefully pursued their studies under British teachers, in British schools, in order to enable them to become ministers of the Christian religion or learned in the laws of England, whose eyes are fixed, not upon African native history or tradition or policy, nor upon their own tribal obligations and duties to their Natural Rulers which immemorable custom should bestow on political theories

¹⁰Ibid., p. 446.

evolved by Europeans to fit a wholly different environment, for the government of peoples who have arrived at a wholly different stage of civilization.¹¹

Governor Clifford dismissed as an absurdity the idea of a West African "nation" or a "nationality" in the Nigerian context. The most far reaching attack was reserved for the idea--anathema to the rubrics of indirect rule--that there could ever be a Nigerian nation per se. As Clifford noted, Nigeria had been and would continue to be governed in accordance with the diversity of its ethnic fragments:

Assuming the impossible were feasible. . .that this collection of self-contained and mutually independent Native States separated from one another. . .by great distances, by differences of history and tradition and ethnological, racial, tribal, political, social, and religious barriers were indeed capable of being welded into a single homogeneous nation. . .a deadly blow would thereby be struck at the root of national self-development in Nigeria, which secures to each separate people the right to maintain its identity, its individuality and its nationality, its own chosen form of government, and the peculiar political and social institutions which have been evolved for it by the wisdom and accumulated experience of generations of its forebears.¹²

Clifford revealed the dogmatic side of indirect rule and the colonial government's antipathy toward the most basic resolutions of the Congress on the concepts of nation, nationality, and self-government. It is ironic that the author of this attack on early African demands for greater self-determination authored the next constitution. The 1922 Clifford Constitution provided for elected African members of a Legislative Council for the first time in British West Africa.¹³ Thus, an official outlet was provided for the very class Clifford had just

¹¹Ezera, Constitutional Development, pp. 24-25.

¹²Ibid., p. 26.

¹³Crowder, A Short History, p. 228.

repudiated.

The West African Congress must be recognized as a milestone in the gradual but impressive awareness of the intellectual elite for legislative and administrative reforms in their respective colonial territories.¹⁴ A consistent theme of British criticism of Nigerian Congress participants was their alleged unrepresentativeness to either speak for the masses or to conceivably replace the "natural rulers." This allegation was used ten years later to deride nationalist activities of Herbert Macaulay and Nnamdi Azikiwe in Nigeria. Such agitation for reform confronted the British with the quandary of whether to continue dealing exclusively with the traditional elite of Lugard's era or whether to respond to the grievances posed by the new vocal nationalist minority. July posited the importance of this basic turmoil in power relationships in a series of questions:

Who indeed were the peoples representatives? Was it the chiefs whose rule was sanctioned by tradition but whose ability to rule was increasingly called into question by the exigencies of a modern world? Was it self-appointed parvenus who had no authority in the community based on custom, but whose knowledge of the West and of contemporary legal or technical questions qualified them to advise their people? The issue was whether the old Africa or the new was going to act as a liason between the administration and the people, and in the long view whether the traditional authorities or the new leadership¹⁵ would eventually become the government of emergent Africa.

It became increasingly apparent that the traditional authorities and the nationalist elites were engaged in a power struggle with far reaching consequences for Nigerian political development. The initial

¹⁴Eyo B. Ndem, "Changing Political Structure Due to Changing Force in Nigeria," International Journal of Sociology, VII (1966), pp. 160-1961.

¹⁵July, Origins of Thought, p. 451.

incredulity of the British towards the "educated African gentlemen" soon gave way to a recognition that the nationalist elites were indeed a force to be reckoned with. Nationalist agitation and British response greatly influenced the evolution and contour of future political institutions and the constitutional structure of the Nigerian state.

The Clifford Constitution and the Birth of Party Activity

In the 1922 Clifford Constitution there was provision for a Legislative Council of 46 members of which 27 were officials and 19 were un-officials. In the unofficial minority fifteen were to be nominated by the governor and for the first time four were to be elected.¹⁶ Two critical features of this Constitution were the near exemption of the North from the competence of the Legislative Council and the inclusion of the elective principle which was unique for British West Africa at the time. Out of the four elected African members three were to come from Lagos and one from Calabar.¹⁷

The elective principle imbedded in the Clifford Constitution created an immediate upsurge in political activity in Lagos. The Nigerian National Democratic Party¹⁸ led by Herbert Macauley emerged as one of the most powerful political organizations of the period. The NNDP won all three Lagos seats in the Legislative Council in the

¹⁶Ezera, Constitutional Development, p. 27.

¹⁷Wheare, Nigerian Legislative Council, p. 33; Crowder, A Short History, p. 228. Crowder noted that electoral requirements enfranchised only adult males in Lagos with a residence of 12 months and gross income of £100 per annum.

¹⁸Hereafter referred to as the NNDP.

consecutive elections of 1923, 1928, and 1933.¹⁹ Macauley's forty year career as the gadfly of the British administration is ironic in view of his aristocratic background. The grandson of the revered Bishop Crowther and the product of a Victorian mission education, Macauley was a typical example of the breed of assimilated nationalists who dominated this early period of party development. His bitter harangues against British colonial authorities, however, seem mild and circumspect compared to nationalist and tribal oriented publications of two decades later. July analyzed the role of Macauley in the evolution of nationalist thought thus:

A deep sense of outrage never seemed to leave Macauley throughout his long life and it constantly characterized his tireless efforts to check, to circumscribe, to erode, and to replace the power of British colonial administration in Lagos. Yet he was in no sense a revolutionary. He has been described as a typical nineteenth century liberal of moderate old-fashioned views, and not once did the slightest hint of Nigerian separatism from Britain ever intrude itself into his writing. If his creed was liberalism, however, it included as well the idea of a democratic local self-government, a concept which fitted not at all with contemporary European doctrines of colonial government and white supremacy.²⁰

Macauley's NNNDP did not fulfill its early promise as a vehicle of militant nationalism. Though the party's name and platform indicated a national orientation, its leadership and actual policies were often neither Nigerian nor national. Led by a cosmopolitan elite (many non-Nigerian), the NNNDP interests stressed vague inter-territorial programs of nationalist action but reflected more a parochial preoccupation with

¹⁹Ezera, Constitutional Development, pp. 30-31.

²⁰July, Origins of Thought, p. 379.

Lagos internal politics.²¹ Branches were established in other cities but these quickly withered as most activity focused on Lagos. During the period 1923-1951, Lagos and Calabar alone in Nigeria could directly elect legislative representatives. In short, the system of indirect rule and the effects of indiginous parochial politics resulted in the suffocation of a territorial political party orientation.²²

Another phase of organizational activity began with the founding of the West African Student Union (WASU). Founded in London in 1925 by a Yoruba law student, Ladipo Solanke, WASU became the principal center for the growing number of Nigerian students in the United Kingdom and a hotbed of student politics.²³ A primary objective of this student-led organization was to foster a spirit of national consciousness and racial pride among its members. Between 1929 and 1932 Solanke established branches throughout West Africa and Nigeria. With these local branches Solanke and WASU influenced a critical segment of the generation from which many of Nigeria's most militant post-war leaders emerged. However, WASU was mainly oriented towards the awakening of racial not territorial consciousness.²⁴ Solanke, though a Nigerian, tended to think in terms of either his home Yoruba area or "West Africa" and avoided any particularization of thought or organization along Nigerian territorial lines. In short, tribe and race were the transcendent

²¹Oluwole Idowu Odomosu, The Nigerian Constitution: History and Development (London, 1963), p. 28.

²²Coleman, Nigeria, p. 206.

²³Eme O. Awa, Federal Government in Nigeria (Berkeley, 1964), pp. 86-87.

²⁴Ibid.

criteria of nationality. In spite of the preoccupation by WASU with racial consciousness and pride, the awakening of a Nigerian national consciousness was not long to remain out of sight and out of mind.

Nationalism and Tribalism in an Urban Setting

During the 1930's there was a high degree of correlation between the migration to the cities in Nigeria and the concurrent development of the mass media, educational facilities, and ethnic-group associations. Migration had far reaching effects on the development of political organizations.²⁵ During the colonial era migration to the cities made possible the contacts through which horizons were broadened and administrations were subverted. Migration led to new economic possibilities and exposure to a new multi-tribal environment. These factors in turn caused traditional systems of authority to be called into question. Migration was, thus, a phenomenon congruent with both modernization and nationalism.²⁶

One of the political consequences of rapid urbanization in Nigeria was the founding of interest and ethnic group associations in many of the larger cities. A proliferation of labor unions, professional groups and tribal unions occurred in the late 1920's and early 1930's. In this period ethnicity persisted and permutated in urban settings. Most importantly, however, these new associations were of crucial

²⁵Coleman, Nigeria, pp. 210-211.

²⁶Inmanuel Wallerstein, "Migration in West Africa--The Political Perspective," Urbanization and Migration in West Africa, ed. Helda Kuper (Berkeley, 1965), p. 157; Kenneth Little, West African Urbanization--A Study of Voluntary Associations in Social Change (Cambridge, 1966), p. 109.

importance to the nationalist movement because they enabled nationalist leaders to more easily mobilize and manipulate important segments of the population.

The tribal associations were particularly important for (1) serving as communications links to the countryside, (2) establishing lower schools and funding over-seas university education for fellow tribesmen, and (3) influencing the operation of political parties.²⁷ The earliest all-tribal federation, the Ibibio Welfare Union was organized in 1928. However, the Ibo State Union formed in 1944 and the Egbe Omo Oduduwa (Yoruba) established in 1945 were to become the most influential unions.²⁸ Later these cultural associations were to be closely tied as auxiliary units of the Ibo and Yoruba dominated political parties. The agitation by the educated minority among the Yoruba was noted by Garigue:

A new stage was reached in the late 1920's with the formation in practically every large Yoruba town of associations led by European-educated Yoruba. Each town developed its own pattern with different attitudes to the Native Authority. . . . Abeokuta acquired a reputation of having more radical literate leaders than towns like Oyo and Ife where being a progressive meant nothing more than wanting a voice in the framing of local policies. Administrators. . . frequently brought pressure to bear on the local councils to co-opt literate members as councillors. . . . The earlier cleavages between European educated Yoruba and illiterate chiefs was gradually broken down, and an increasing number of new appointments as chiefs went to European-educated persons.²⁹

A new group to emerge in Lagos, critical of the parochial,

²⁷Awa, Federal Government, p. 91.

²⁸Ibid., p. 93.

²⁹P. Garigue, "Changing Patterns of Leadership," Twentieth Century Africa, ed. McEwan, pp. 17-18.

conservative bent of the NNDP was the Nigerian Youth Movement (NYM). The founding members of this embryonic party were Dr. J. C. Vaughn, Ernest Ikoli, H. O. Davies and Samuel Akinsanya.³⁰ With the exception of Ikoli, who belonged to the Ijaw tribe, the majority of this group were educated Yorubas. The NYM's structure and membership were important for several reasons: (1) the NYM was the first genuine nationalist organization; (2) like the NNDP all but two of the early founders were educated Yoruba Christians or non-Nigerian men of substance engaged in business, law, journalism or medicine; (3) multi-tribalism was stressed in the branches which were set up in all regions of Nigeria; and (4) the NYM was the first effort in the political history of Nigeria to organize a party on modern lines.³¹

By 1938 Youth Movement membership of 10,000 was organized in twenty branches. In the Lagos Legislative Council election of 1938 the NYM captured all three seats from the NNDP which had dominated Lagos politics for fifteen years. Macauley's "Lagos Dynasty" was badly shaken by the NYM's effective mobilization of the non-indigenous Yoruba and Ibo urban working classes.³² The support of the urbanized Ibo was largely due to the charisma and dynamism of Nnamdi Azikiwe.

The Nigerian Youth Movement had little patience with the restrained moderation of the NNDP. By contrast, in its charter of 1938 the NYM demanded complete autonomy for Nigeria within the British Commonwealth

³⁰Sklar, Nigerian Political Parties, p. 49.

³¹Odumosu, Nigerian Constitution, pp. 30-31.

³²Richard L. Sklar and C. S. Whitaker, Jr., "Nigeria," Political Parties and National Integration, eds. James S. Coleman and Carl G. Rosberg, Jr. (Berkeley, 1964), pp. 598-599.

and Empire.³³ By 1940 the NYM had begun agitating for the abolition or reform of indirect rule, higher appointments to the civil service, representation of the North in the Legislative Council, and improvement in the working conditions of African employees in mercantile firms.³⁴ Thus, the universalism of the Congress of West Africa and the non-separatist, parochial focus of the NNDP had evolved into the militant nationalism of the Nigerian Youth Movement.

Internal dissention in 1941 shattered the facade of tribal co-operation in the NYM and crippled this organization as a national political force. This crucial period, the "Akinsanya crisis," originated in the rivalry between two of the leading journalists within the movement, Nnamdi Azikiwe (Ibo), editor of the West African Pilot, and Ernest Ikoli (Ijaw), editor of the newly launched organ of the NYM, The Daily Service. Shortly after the founding of the Service in 1938, Azikiwe resigned from the executive committee of the Movement, a decision which his critics allege was made in a fit of pique over the business competition extended to his Pilot. Later Ikoli described Azikiwe in an editorial as a megalomaniac.³⁵ At this point a breach was opened in the organization which had far reaching consequences for Nigerian political party development.

The much publicized rift in the NYM was opened wider in February, 1941, when a Legislative Council seat fell open due to the resignation of Dr. K. A. Abayomi, past head of the Youth Movement. Ernest Ikoli

³³Awa, Federal Government, p. 95.

³⁴Coleman, Nigeria, p. 226.

³⁵Ibid., p. 227.

and Samuel Akinsanya (Ijebu Yoruba), officers and symbols of the pan-tribalism of the NYM, both sought the vacant post. Azikiwe and the Ibos supported Akinsanya who, even though he was an Ijebu Yoruba, lost the contest to Ikoli in spite of the board's domination by Yorubas.³⁶ Azikiwe and Akinsanya interpreted this loss as a manifestation of tribal prejudice against Ibos and Ijebu Yorubas who together constituted the backbone of NYM electoral support in Lagos.

A press war replete with name calling, tribal slurs, and shrill sensationalism ensued between the West African Pilot and the Daily Service. As these were two of the most widely circulated newspapers in Nigeria, the animosities within the Movement reached the reading public via the all too convenient scapegoat of tribal prejudice.³⁷ The Akinsanya episode wrecked the broad based character of the Nigerian Youth Movement and exhibited the latent tribal tension within this nominally pan-tribal, national movement. The willingness of leaders to exploit this latent animosity in the press for their own political ends influenced all future efforts to mobilize a viable pan-tribal working

³⁶ Sklar, Nigerian Political Parties, pp. 51-53; Coleman, Nigeria, p. 228. Coleman noted that the Ijebu Yoruba had acquired the reputation as the Jews of Yorubaland. The Ijebus, located mainly on the shores of the Lagos Lagoon, had controlled the trade routes to the interior and had become widely known as middlemen in the slave trade. Yorubas from Oyo, Ibadan, Lagos and Abeokuta tended to look down on this subtribe in spite of the Ijebus reputation as enterprisers.

³⁷ Ezera, Constitutional Development, p. 49. Ezera noted that the tendency to exploit tribal suspicion by party leaders found an ever wider reading public in the diffusion of newspapers:

YEAR	LAGOS	WESTERN REGION	EASTERN REGION	NORTHERN REGION
1890	1	0	0	0
1910	4	0	0	0
1930	12	1	3	0
1950	15	10	10	5

relationship in any national political organization.

Appeals to tribal prejudice by NYM factions as well as in other organizations was often a convenient face-saving device during periods of competition among the tribes for leadership positions. Latent ethnic suspicion and animosity were always much easier to exploit than to sublimate. For instance, no leader utilized the mass media to condemn the evils of tribal prejudice more than Azikiwe. Yet, Azikiwe at the same time constantly extolled the Ibo to become more assertive--and by inference dominant. In his classic and widely publicized "chosen people" speech in 1949 Azikiwe asserted:

It would appear that God has specially created the Ibo people to suffer persecution and be victimized because of their resolute will to live. Since suffering is the label of our tribe we can afford to be sacrificed for the ultimate redemption of the children of Africa. Is it not historically significant that throughout the glorious history of Africa, the Ibo is one of the select few to have escaped the humiliation of a conqueror's sword? . . . Search through the records of African history and you will fail to find an occasion when, in any pitched battle, any African nation has either marched across Ibo territory or subjected the Ibo to a humiliating conquest. Instead, there is record to show that the martial prowess of the Ibo, at all stages of human history, has enabled them not only to survive persecution but also to adapt themselves to the role thrust upon them by history, of preserving all that is best and most noble in African culture and tradition. Placed in this high estate, the Ibo cannot shirk the responsibility conferred on it by its manifest destiny.³⁸

Nigerian newspapers and journals were filled with strident appeals to tribal destiny side by side with warnings that unfettered tribal prejudice was debilitating to Nigerian unity and played into the hands of the British. Wide coverage was given to increasingly frequent and

³⁸Nnamdi Azikiwe, Zik--A Selection of Speeches of Nnamdi Azikiwe (Cambridge, 1961), pp. 242-243.

often demagogic attempts by party leaders to use ethnic insult to build up their political power base. In explaining Yoruba dominance of the NYM Executive Committee and Azikiwe's alleged responsibility for the Akinsanya crisis, an Ijebu Yoruba leader, Obafemi Awolowo later wrote:

The fact that in the leadership of the Nigerian Youth Movement there were more Yorubas than those belonging to other ethnic groups was an accident; and it was not noticed as a strange or undesirable phenomenon until 1941. . . . On polling day, I was extremely depressed. . . by the unabashed demonstrations of tribalism I witnessed. All the Easterners, particularly the Ibos, and all the Ijebus in Lagos, teamed up with Dr. Azikiwe and Oba Samuel Akinsanya; and all those who dared to disagree with them were openly abused, jeered at, and condemned as traitors. For the first time in my life I was called a traitor and 'Uncle Tom' all because. . . I supported an Easterner against my own tribesman. But of course Ikoli is an Easterner with a difference--he has never stooped to worship at the shrine of Dr. Azikiwe.³⁹

For sheer quantity of inflammatory diatribe and bombast Nigerian newspapers of this period cannot be underestimated in the contribution which they made to tribal nationalism--and political violence. On the question of press responsibility Azikiwe asserted that the character of any country could be observed by a study of its newspapers and Nigerians should insure that standards achieved and maintained in their country be as high as possible.⁴⁰ In retrospect it is probable that publicly extolling the "manifest destiny" of the Ibos or the "accidental leadership" of the Yorubas contributed to growing tribal chauvinism. The practical political effect of these exchanges by the leadership was to help transform hitherto latent tribal suspicion into open

³⁹Obafemi Awolowo, Awo--The Autobiography of Chief Obafemi Awolowo (Cambridge, 1960), p. 132.

⁴⁰Awikiwe, Zik, p. 240.

violent confrontation--often spurred on by the parties in the cities. Tribal nationalism was, thus, alternately condemned and exploited in the evolution of the regional political parties.

The Richards Constitution and the Politics of Nationalism

By the end of the Second World War agitationist political activity was discernible in all parts of Nigeria, particularly in the South.

The period after the Clifford Constitution of 1922 saw a steady growth of organizations of all types. Labor unions, ex-service men's organizations, and professional groups emerged during the period of the war effort. These new socio-economic groups demanded constitutional and political reforms. The far reaching and controversial Richards Constitution of 1946 attempted to deal with these emergent political forces.

In planning Nigeria's postwar constitutional structure British officials wrestled with two interrelated problems:

1. How would native authority systems be reconciled as the primary units of self-government with a parliamentary system of government at the central territorial level?
2. How were the centrally minded nationalists to be given a larger role in the government without relinquishing ultimate imperial authority?⁴¹

The situation which confronted the British was how best to bring about systemic change and still preserve traditional structures and "national rulers" which they had legitimized through indirect rule. The balancing act of reconciling traditional leadership and nationalist demands was a central theme in all constitutional negotiations during this period. Governor Richards gave the three objectives of his

⁴¹Coleman, Nigeria, pp. 271-272.

constitutional proposals as: (1) to promote the unity of Nigeria, (2) to provide adequately within that unity for the diverse elements which make up the country, and (3) to secure greater participation by Nigerians in their own affairs.⁴² In short, the Richards Constitution aimed at creating Nigerian unity by perserving its diversity. This approach attempted to protect traditional authorities and placate the nationalists. In the latter respect the attempt was a failure. This constitution, the first in twenty-five years, was immediately attacked by nationalists for both its content and the abrupt manner in which it was approved.

Richard's "unity" was to be provided by a reconstituted Legislative Council composed of the Governor, sixteen official members and twenty-eight unofficial members of which four continued to be elected.⁴³ The competence and composition of this Council covered the whole of Nigeria, a change from the previous Council which represented the Eastern and Western regions. Until this change the Northern elite had been largely isolated from political contact with the more radical nationalist leadership in the South.

The second and unique feature of this constitution was the relation of the Central Legislative Council to the Regional Councils of the Eastern, Western, and Northern regions each of which was to be derived from the local native authorities.⁴⁴ The new advisory Regional Council for the North had two chambers in the House of Chiefs and a House of

⁴²Elias, Nigeria, The Development of Its Laws, p. 35.

⁴³Wheare, Nigerian Legislative Council, p. 170.

⁴⁴Ibid., p. 171.

Assembly (both dominated by native authority traditional elites) while the Eastern and Western Regions were to have only Houses of Assembly.⁴⁵ Ezera noted the advisory nature of these Regional Councils in that none possessed any legislative powers or capacity to appropriate revenue.⁴⁶ They were only deliberative and advisory bodies with the right to make recommendations regarding draft legislation. The Regional Houses of Assembly were to forge a link between the native authorities and the Central Legislative Council. Twenty of the twenty-four unofficial members on this central body were to be chosen from the Houses of Assembly in the following pattern:

- 9 from the Northern provinces
- 4 from the House of Chiefs
- 5 from the unofficial members of the Northern House of Assembly
- 6 from the Western House of Assembly
- 4 other unofficials from the Western House
- 5 from the Eastern House of Assembly.⁴⁷

The main group of unofficial members in each House of Assembly was selected by and from the native authorities of the region concerned, thus, giving weighted representation to the traditional elites. To the British, fitting the Native Administration system into the constitutional structure was expedient in acknowledging the regional-ethnic diversity and the traditional elites legitimized by indirect rule. Membership allocation gave traditional authorities an inordinately strong voice (especially in the North) in the new quasi-federal regional political bodies. Utilizing the native authority structure was far more

⁴⁵Ibid.

⁴⁶Ezera, Constitutional Development, p. 70.

⁴⁷Odomosu, Nigerian Constitution, p. 45.

acceptable to British authorities than any direct election through constituency units by which radical nationalist leaders might capture all available seats. By using indiginous local authorities as a prime source of representation the principles underlying Richard's Constitution were derived not from Rousseau, Bentham, and Mill but from Lugard, Hailey, and Bourdillon.⁴⁸

The Nigerian nationalist leadership--moderate and radical--bitterly condemned most aspects of the proposed constitution. The emphasis on Nigerians "endlessly discussing" their own affairs prompted a strong reply by H.O. Davies:

The word discussion seems the crux of the principle as there is neither intention nor the pretension to secure greater participation by the Africans in the direction, management, or control of their affairs. No attempt is made to democratise that bureaucratic rule or make it sensitive to public opinion. . . . The head of department formulates policy, he legislates it, and afterwards administers it;. . .as an executive, he is irresponsibly backed by the law and all its sanctions.⁴⁹

Though the nationalist leaders all endorsed in substance the quasi-federal regional structure set forth they vehemently condemned the unofficial majority in the regions and at the center as a deception of power and not truly unofficial.⁵⁰ To such leaders as Davies and Azikiwe the inclusion in the Councils of emirs and chiefs who owed their position to the government was clearly a conflict of roles. Wheare summarized somewhat pessimistically the progress made towards responsible self-government in this Constitution:

⁴⁸Ezera, Constitutional Development, p. 84.

⁴⁹Odumosu, Nigerian Constitution, p. 50.

⁵⁰Coleman, Nigeria, pp. 278-279.

The Council is no nearer than its predecessor to being an elective assembly. . . . The Executive Council was not altered (Africanized). . . . The Governor still governs. . . in a delicate and difficult relationship with the unofficials Nigeria is thus no nearer to responsible government than what it was.⁵¹

Added to the multiplicity of grievances of the nationalists was another more subtle factor which conceivably had immense repercussions at this very crucial stage in Nigerian political development. Coleman noted this factor which had so much bearing in the interrelationships between the British and nationalists:

It is unfortunate in many respects that Sir Arthur Richards was governor of Nigeria during the delicate period 1943-1947. He came to Nigeria from Jamaica where his record reflected unfavorably on his capacity to deal effectively with colonial nationalists. His handling of constitutional reform and nationalism in Nigeria followed a similar pattern. He seemed to have a special knack for antagonizing the educated elements; in Nigeria, at least, his name is at the bottom of their popularity list.⁵²

In March, 1945, the Legislative Council hastily approved both Richard's constitutional proposals and a series of four ordinances. These ordinances, soon denounced by the nationalists as the "obnoxious ordinances," were not new but variously had been on the statute books of Nigeria.⁵³ However, the semantic and psychological impact of these ordinances at this particular juncture was enormous. Though the aim of three of the ordinances was protective and perfunctory in the vesting of mineral rights and public lands as Crown domain, the use of the term "Crown" triggered a storm of protest from the nationalists. The

⁵¹ Wheare, Nigerian Legislative Council, p. 180.

⁵² Coleman, Nigeria, p. 275.

⁵³ Ezera, Constitutional Developments, p. 78.

fourth ordinance extended and systemized the Governor's power over the appointment and deposition of chiefs. For the two years following their passage these ordinances provided the pretext for intense agitation by Nigerian nationalist groups. Leaders such as Azikiwe made strong public attacks on the alleged Crown "seizure" of Nigerian lands and minerals and the mockery of categorizing traditional leaders as "unofficials." For the moment cleavages within the nationalist movement and tribal animosities were shelved for a wide scale assault on the Richards Constitution.

The colonial authorities had unwittingly chosen the two most litigious issues in Nigeria--land and chieftancy--on which to pass the ordinances and at a time which could not have been more ill-chosen. In addition, the wording and legalistic jargon of the ordinances seemed to have come straight from the manuals of Lugard. Recently formed radical political groups, thus, had ready-made issues in the Constitution and ordinances to launch a nation-wide campaign to politicize the masses and discredit the British moves. This campaign and the general labor strike of 1945 brought international attention to a nationalist leader, Nnamdi Azikiwe, and a recently formed political party, the National Council for Nigeria and the Cameroons.

The interwar years were a critically important period of incubation in the evolution of Nigerian political organizations. During this period, indirect rule, first applied in the North, was superimposed with little success on Southern ethnic groups. Under British tutelage the vastly larger Northern region was insulated from modernizing forces and never participated in an all-Nigerian political forum until 1947. Moreover, from the 1920 West African Congress until the nationalist

agitation surrounding the Richards Constitution of 1946, organizational activity was overwhelmingly dominated by educated Yoruba and Ibo elites.

The dramatic shift from the non-separatism of Macauley's NNDP to the militant activism of the NYM was evidence that, although the tempo of constitutional change was largely determined by Southern nationalist agitation the actual substance of these changes continued to assure the domination of Northern traditional elements. More critically, the maintenance of three territorial divisions after 1914 and British quest for "unity through diversity" resulted in a devolution of power to the regions. For purposes of party development there was a parallel gravitation towards regional tribal emphasis. Thus, the parties were forced to make simultaneous efforts to insure their survival by controlling at least one region as a means to control the institutions at the center.

The collapse of the NYM due to factionalism served as an important precedent for future party efforts to establish viable pan-regional support. The unwillingness or the incapacity of the parties to become institutionalized on a national scale meant that party competition in effect became regional-ethnic group confrontation. This power struggle among the three major parties occurred in a territorially unbalanced federal structure devised by British colonial authority. In the next chapter party origin and efforts at institutionalization will be examined.

CHAPTER V

REGIONAL PARTIES AND THE QUEST FOR INSTITUTIONALIZATION

The Origin of Nigerian Parties

Under what conditions did African political parties emerge?¹

Thomas Hodgkin posed this question in his work African Political Parties to point out the critical importance of party evolution in determining party leadership and policy in African political systems. In the previous chapter the organizational predecessors of Nigerian political parties were examined. In this chapter the origins and efforts towards institutionalization of the three major regional political parties shall be analyzed. These parties were each heavily dependent on the major tribal cultural organizations which provided the ethnic base and leadership in the formative period of party activity. Each of these cultural organizations reflected a composite of influences noted previously--the evolution of British indirect rule in each of the regions, the differential rates of exposure to Western institutions, and the interaction between traditional and more radical nationalist elements in each of the dominant ethnic groups.

From diverse regional political settings emerged three tribal

¹Hodgkin, African Political Parties, p. 45. Hodgkin defines a political party similarly to James Coleman as an organization which competes with other similar organizations in periodic elections in order to participate in formal institutions and thereby influence and control the personnel and policy of government.

based parties dominated by political classes which attempted to control both regional politics and later the government institutions at the center. It is contended that both the party origin and the abortive attempts of the Southern parties to become institutionalized political forms on a national scale must be analyzed in a historic context to understand the critical role of parties in recent Nigerian political development. The dominance of the conservative Northern People's Congress (NPC) during the short-lived period of civilian rule was not an accident of political evolution. Rather, this party's regional cohesion and adaptability in achieving national power gives ample evidence of the continued vitality of traditional elites and attachments in a contemporary political setting. The capacity of the Northern theocratic elite to respond to various competitive threats to its hegemony through a political party was a reflection of its coherence and adaptability as well as the impact of the British policy of indirect rule which reinforced this elite's control. The failure of the more radical Southern parties to break the NPC grip on the North polarized the Nigerian political system into essentially three one-party regions, thus allowing the conservative and more populous North to dominate the government at the center. This unique situation eventually created tensions so acute that violence and civil disorder became common in party competition throughout Nigeria.

In examining the evolution of modern Nigerian political forms, James Coleman has pointed out:

The really decisive factor--the precipitant--in the formation of political parties has been the constitutional reform providing for (1) the devolution by the imperial government of a sufficiently meaningful and attractive measure of power to induce or to provoke nationalist

leaders to convert their movements into political parties, and (2) the introduction or refinement of institutions and procedures such as an electoral system, which would make it technically possible for parties to seek power constitutionally.²

In addition, the pace of constitutional change and political participation after the Second World War was paralleled by two other developments which had determinative influences on the origin and activities of the parties. The first of these developments involved the preference, eventually supported by all party leadership, for a federal structure of government with a rather weak center and powerful regional governments. Regional boundaries inherited from the British era, mostly on Northern insistence, were retained intact. The second development was the increasingly virulent character of tribal nationalism provoked mostly by party leaders from the three major ethnic groups--the Ibo of the East, the Yoruba of the West, and the Fulani-Hausa of the North.

Appeals to nationalism took two somewhat contradictory directions--one unifying, the other disunifying. On the one hand, nationalist agitation was directed at gaining full political self-determination for Nigeria within the British Commonwealth. Simultaneously, party leaders appealed to tribal-regional nationalism to build secure partisan political bases in one or more regions in the three-region structure. The British presence for the most part held these two forces in balance. As the Crown's authority was slowly withdrawn, the main thrust of independence orienting nationalist appeal was deprived of

²James Coleman, "The Emergence of African Political Parties," Africa Today, ed. C. Grove Haines (Baltimore, 1955), pp. 230-231.

the unifying presence of an alien power. Once independence was gained, anti-colonial agitation lost much of its vitality and appeals to tribal nationalism became the primary pretext for political mobilization.

The fragile nature of tribal political coexistence was best observed in political party activity. The party struggle for regional and national power exposed the centrifugal forces present in the Nigerian political system. In the case of Nigeria, ethnic based party struggle proved inimical to national integration and political stability. The Nigerian colonial period was characterized by extreme unevenness in social, political, and economic development among its core regional ethnic groups. As Ezera has claimed, an ideal setting for intertribal rivalry and disharmony existed because of the social and economic imbalance of the various tribes.³ Thus, the consequences of such contrast and imbalance was manifest in the origins, leadership, and activities of the three regional political parties.

As Hodgkin noted, African parties had an extra-parliamentary origin; they were constituted out of preexisting associations and groups as instruments to achieve power.⁴ This is particularly true, though in varying degrees, of the three major Nigerian parties. An analysis of party origins indicates the peculiarities of the tribal bases and the difficulties which the Southern parties in particular faced in becoming institutionalized on a national scale.

³Ezera, Constitutional Development, p. 90.

⁴Hodgkin, African Political Parties, p. 46.

The National Council for Nigeria and the Cameroons

Between 1944 and 1957 the National Council for Nigeria and the Cameroons (NCNC) was the best known all-Nigerian nationalist organization. During its early years Hodgkin categorized the NCNC as a "congress" embracing most--though not in fact all--of the politically conscious elements of Nigeria.⁵ In contrast to its predecessors, the Nigerian Youth Movement (NYM) and the National Nigerian Democratic Party (NNDP), however, the NCNC had supporters throughout Nigeria. Heaviest support continued to be based in Lagos and the Eastern region, but the NCNC described itself--with some justification--as the only truly national political party in Nigeria.

Nnamdi Azikiwe broke with the NYM in 1941 carrying with him the support of many non-indigenous Yoruba and Ibo settlers of Lagos. In early 1942 Azikiwe organized the National Reconstruction Group (NRG), a small personalized political study group which met periodically in Azikiwe's home.⁶ This group, mainly non-Yoruba, deduced that the time had come for the formation of a national front to pursue nationalist objectives more vigorously. Upon invitation the NYM refused to take the initiative in heading up this front. However, in a series of student rallies organized in 1943 by the new militantly nationalist Nigerian Union of Students (NUS), Azikiwe found both a platform to propose his new Front and a youthful ally equally interested in coordinating the political endeavors of existing political parties, trade

⁵Ibid.

⁶Sklar, Nigerian Political Parties, p. 56.

unions, professional organizations, and tribal unions.⁷

In June, 1944, the NUS with the strong support of Azikiwe's press issued "a call from the youth" for all patriotic groups to meet in Lagos.⁸ On August 26, 1944, the inaugural meetings of the conference were held and it was resolved:

Believing our country is rightfully entitled to liberty and prosperous life. . .and determined to work in unity for the realization of our ultimate goal of self-government within the British Empire we hereby bind ourselves together forming the Nigeria National Council.⁹

The party began at this conference as an agglomeration of social groupings; membership was not open to individuals. By 1945 groups which joined included trade unions, small political parties, literary and social clubs, professional organizations, athletic groups and 101 tribal unions.¹⁰ An example of the latter was the new Ibo Federal Union which became the foremost supporter of the NCNC. Because of the lack of grassroots organization, party policy in the period between 1945 and 1951 was determined by a small political class of influential members of the affiliated organizations.¹¹ These local party "barons" were constantly at odds with younger, more militant followers and internal jockeying for power threatened party unity from the beginning. Manifestations and consequences of this incoherence will be referred to

⁷Ibid., p. 57.

⁸Ibid.

⁹Coleman, Nigeria, p. 264. The name of the party was to be changed when several Cameroonian groups affiliated with the NCNC.

¹⁰Ibid.

¹¹Awa, Federal Government, p. 103.

later in this chapter.

The NCNC enjoyed early success in its monopoly of national politics. However, it was never able to effectively organize as a national political organization. As Mackintosh maintained:

Certainly ~~only~~ the NCNC had ever seemed likely to take its position firmly at the centre of Nigerian political life, as the Congress People's Party did in the Gold Coast in 1949-51. By 1957 however, it had become apparent that the NCNC had failed to develop a mass party capable of mobilizing country-wide support in sufficient strength to mark it as the obvious inheritor of power from the British when they handed over political control. The contrast with the CPP's position in the Gold Coast by that date is marked. There, the party had succeeded by early 1956 in beating off the challenge to its supremacy. . . .¹²

By 1951, the NCNC was embroiled in electoral competition with two other major parties. The original broad based appeal of the party and its monopoly of the nationalist movement was eroded by its persistent internal rivalries and eventual competition from other parties for regional and national dominance. The main Southern challenger to NCNC hegemony was the Yoruba based Action Group led by Obafemi Awolowo.

The Action Group

The Yoruba of Western Nigeria comprised a number of tribal sections that had a long history of conflict particularly acute during the pre-colonial slave trade examined earlier in this study. As a consequence, associational activity during the nationalist period among the Yoruba, though widespread, tended to emphasize the formation of local sub-tribal unions. By the end of World War II efforts by educated Yoruba elites to merge these local groups met with success. A pan-

¹²John F. Mackintosh, Nigerian Government and Politics (Evanston, 1966), p. 407.

tribal cultural organization, established by overseas Nigerians in London, was called Egbe Omo Oduduwa (Society of the Descendants of Oduduwa--the Yoruba cultural hero).¹³ Awolowo was among the student founders of the Egbe and many other members played key roles in later nationalist agitation and Action Group party activity.

In Western Nigeria, Yoruba circles were becoming alarmed by the meteoric rise of Azikiwe and the political awakening of the Ibo through tribal unions and the NCNC. Azikiwe had become the bête noir of many conservative Yoruba leaders most of whom considered his towering political stature in the West a barrier to their own political ambitions.¹⁴ In June, 1948, a conference of Yoruba notables met in Ife, "the cradle of all the Yorubas," to inaugurate the founding of Egbe Omo Oduduwa on Nigerian soil. At the beginning, the Egbe's stated objectives, ostensibly cultural, emphasized dual nationalisms. Some of the objectives were to: (1) foster the study of Yoruba language, culture, and history, (2) protect the monarchical institutions of Yorubaland, and (3) accelerate the emergence of a virile, modernized and efficient Yoruba state within the Federal State of Nigeria.¹⁵ Sir Adeyemo Alakija, president-elect of the Egbe, declared it was a "big tomorrow for all Western children," and that "Yorubas will not be relegated to the background in the future."¹⁶ Azikiwe's Pilot attacked this organization almost immediately and the Pilot and Daily Service once again waged a

¹³Sklar, Nigerian Political Parties, pp. 67-68.

¹⁴Ezera, Constitutional Developments, p. 92.

¹⁵Ibid.

¹⁶Ibid., p. 93.

war of bombast in the press. In Lagos both Ibo and Yoruba residents declared at mass meetings that attacks or tribal slurs against their group by the other would cause bloodshed. A strident, unrestrained tone was typical of Azikiwe's widely read Pilot:

Henceforth the cry must be one of battle against Egbe Omo Oduduwa, its leaders at home and abroad, up hill and down dale, in the streets of Nigeria and in the residence of its advocates. . . . It is the enemy of Nigeria; it must be crushed to the earth. . . . There is no going back, until the Fascist organization of Sir Adeyemo has been dismembered.¹⁷

The tribal "cold war" immediately politicized the Egbe if it had not already been from the beginning. Awolowo, general secretary of the Egbe and a barrister in Ibadan, initiated discussions among Yoruba groups to counter the growing political strength of the NCNC in the West.¹⁸ He knew that for overt political action he had to unite the Yoruba traditional rulers with the monied commercial class and that he could best mobilize such a coalition within the Egbe. A passage from Awolowo's autobiography candidly outlined the strength of traditional elements and the practical problems in party formation:

When the idea of starting a new party occurred to me in 1949, and I began to make contacts, I had frequent contact. . .with leaders of the Egbe. . . . Many of them were tired of politics. . .as a 'dirty game'. . . . I persisted in lobbying them. If the new party was to make any showing at all during the regional elections it must make use of the organization and branches of the Egbe Omo Oduduwa throughout the Western Region. Besides, party organization does cost money; and the people to whom I looked for financial support were at the head of the Egbe. I was under no illusion. . .that if these leaders frowned

¹⁷Coleman, Nigeria, p. 346.

¹⁸Sklar and Whitaker, "The Federal Republic of Nigeria," p. 39.

on the new political project I would either have to abandon it, or to think again. It was when they gave their blessing that I convened the first meeting at which the Action Group was founded.¹⁹

Communal partisanship based on psychological commitments to traditional values of tribal groups was openly exploited by Awolowo to mobilize mass support in rural areas and old towns. These appeals were as blatant by the other parties in the other regions. After 1951, the Action Group and the Egbe became virtually inseparable in rural areas, where traditional chiefs blessed them both in the name of the people.²⁰ The strong patronage of the Egbe by Yoruba traditional elites enabled the chiefs to influence party policy while extending legitimacy to party functions in the rural areas. Hodgkin noted the political relationships between ethnicity and party:

There was certainly a parental relationship between the cultural association, Egbe Omo Oduduwa. . .and the Action Group publicly inaugurated in 1951. Indeed, the Action Group seems to have had a period of embryonic, pre-natal existence as the Action Committee of the Egbe. From the first its founders took pains to prevent it from appearing to be a purely Yoruba ethnic party. None the less there was a strong family resemblance, as regards leadership, basis of support, and political philosophy between the Egbe and the Action Group in its initial phase.²¹

The dominant theory of the AG leaders was that the only avenue to national power was a regional political party. Under this assumption, the party had to meet the NCNC head-on in the Western areas where the NCNC had established footholds while simultaneously expanding Action Group power into other regions. The NCNC retaliated by appealing to

¹⁹Awolowo, Awo, p. 220.

²⁰Sklar, "Contributions of Tribalism," p. 376.

²¹Hodgkin, African Political Parties, p. 49.

the non-Yoruba peoples of the Western Region and their fear of Yoruba domination. Simultaneously, the AG used the same tactic in the East among the non-Ibo minority tribes. Thus, at a very early stage in party development, tribalism and regional nationalism became the most legitimate and effective means for party leaders to mobilize support.²² The results of the regional elections in 1951 under the new Macpherson Constitution was the triumph of this regional nationalism. After this point national political survival for each of the parties depended on political control of a region.

Political developments in the South and the anticipated changes in the new constitution stirred reaction in the North. When faced with political encroachments of militant Southern parties and a small articulate radical minority in their own midst, a coalition of Western-educated Northern conservatives and emirs undertook organizational activity to counter the "Southern" threat. This coalition's response was the formation of the Northern People's Congress (NPC).

Northern People's Congress

Political societies in Northern Nigeria were first organized by educated youth in the public service (governmental and native administration). Many of these were born into privileged families and nearly all of them were exposed to nationalist thought from the South and abroad. As noted previously, the late introduction of Western education caused the North to lag far behind the South in the development of a literate class. This disparity was especially acute in that the

²²Coleman, Nigeria, pp. 350-351.

North had over twice the combined population of the other two regions but, by 1947, had only 2.5% of the total secondary enrollment of Nigeria.²³

Among the small educated elite of the North, teachers were prominent and teacher education was considered the most respectable kind of educational preparation. Just as the Onitsha schools in the East were the breeding ground for the Ibo political elite, the Katsina Teacher Training College had the same function in the North. This school produced so many of the first small group of Northern political leaders that Mackintosh noted that the NPC, far from being a political party, more resembled a reunion platform for old boys of the Katsina College.²⁴

In 1943 the Bauchi Improvement Union was founded by three Northern school teachers each of whom was to play a prominent role in the political history of the region. Of these, Mallam Abubakar Tafewa Balewa, headmaster of the Bauchi Middle School, later became the first Prime Minister of the Nigerian First Republic and deputy-leader of the NPC.²⁵ Malle Amenu Kano, founded the Northern Teachers Association and, after his disaffection from the conservative elements within the NPC, later formed the radical-reformist Northern Elements Progressive Union (NEPU).²⁶ Mallam Sa'ad Zunger, the third of the founders of the Bauchi Union, was the first Northern student to attend Yaba Higher College in the South, and later became a dedicated follower of Azikiwe

²³ Sklar, Nigerian Political Parties, p. 88.

²⁴ Mackintosh, Nigerian Government, p. 358.

²⁵ Ibid.

²⁶ Sklar, Nigerian Political Parties, p. 372.

and General Secretary of the NCNC.²⁷ The Bauchi Union soon became defunct because of the hostility of the emirs. The patronage of traditional authorities was indispensable for the survival of any Northern organization, especially where it involved the reformist-minded educated elements.

By 1949, following a pattern similar to the political evolution in the South, a pan-Northern Nigerian cultural association known as Jam 'iyyar Mutanen Arewa (Northern People's Congress) was formed under the leadership of Kano and Balewa. This organization sought to avoid the stigma of offending the emirs by declaring its close support of the ruling oligarchy. As Balewa asserted:

Jam 'iyyar does not intend to usurp the authority of our natural rulers; on the contrary it is our ardent desire to enhance such authority whenever and wherever possible. We want to help our natural rulers in the proper discharge of their duties. . . . We want to help them in the enlightening of the Talakawa.²⁸

With these social and cultural objectives, the Congress won the conditional support of many important emirs and the Sultan of Sokoto. Most of the early moderate leadership favored reforms in certain archaic aspects of native authorities as well as efforts to insure that future self-government in the North would be led by moderate Northerners rather than radical Southerners. However, radical elements within the NPC, led mainly by Kano and Zunger, soon split with the more conservative factions and founded the Northern Elements Progressive Union (NEPU), the first publicly announced political party in the North.

²⁷Ibid.

²⁸Ezera, Constitutional Developments, p. 96. Talakawa refers to the ordinary masses of the North.

The threat from the Southern parties and the early success of NEPU during the first stages of parliamentary elections in 1951 compelled the NPC to assert itself actively in the electoral struggle. The Northern emirs were motivated to organize by a growing fear of encroachment by Southern "radical" elements who avowedly would destroy the emirate structure. In the midst of the 1951 nationwide elections, the Northern People's Congress with 65 branches and 6,000 members was converted into a political party.²⁹ The future President of the Congress, Alhaji Ahmadu Bello, the Sardauna of Sokoto, later noted the vast differences in party outlook and political orientation between leaders of the North and South:

The Northern People's Congress grew out of a purely cultural society of that name. After the 1951 elections--the electoral college ones--Balewa asked me to join this cultural party, later to become our own political party. . . . We called it Northern because we wanted to unite the Northern people and at that time were not looking beyond our own border. . . .

Our aims are very simple, to develop the country to the fullest extent in the shortest time; to preserve the peace, good order, and friendly relations between all our different peoples; to conduct an efficient and impartial administration;. . .to do good to all men. You will see that we were never 'militant nationalists' as some were. We were sure that in God's good time we would get the power. The British had promised this frequently and we were content to rest on our promises; there was plenty of work ready at our hands for us to do.³⁰

Ahmadu Bello, the most powerful traditional ruler in Nigeria, was not engaging in political overstatement in his assurance that "we would get the power." With British acquiescence, Bello's leadership of the powerful coalition of forces reinforcing traditional rule in the North

²⁹Sklar, Nigerian Parties, p. 96.

³⁰Alhaji Ahmadu Bello, My Life (Cambridge, 1962), pp. 85-86.

insured that the NPC would be solidly welded into the social structure of that region. Most critically, the Federal Constitutional revisions after 1951 retained the three region arrangement. The North in population and area became the overwhelmingly dominant partner in the federation. Thus, the NPC had only to capitalize on the potential electoral advantages within its own home region to extend its power to the center.

The NPC was dominated by one of the most insulated political elites in British West Africa. The aristocratic Fulani, who, under the Jihad of Usuman dan Fodio conquered the North and had continued to administer it under British tutelage, emerged in 1951 in a far different political role. Through the modern electoral process and political party competition, basically alien to Fulani-Hausa political custom, Usuman's great-grandson, Alhaji Admadu Bello, led his Northern People's Congress to political power over the entire Federation of Nigeria.

Prior to independence the NPC clashed with the other two large regional parties in several elections. During this period powers devolved increasingly to regional governments at the expense of strong central authority. Thus, it became essential for each of the parties to dominate the politics in its home region as a springboard for dominance of the central government in Lagos. The legacy of British indirect rule, the differential rates of regional development and the structural features of a federal constitution presented immense initial problems for any single party to gain outright control over the central government. Moreover, for the two Southern parties, operating from smaller regional-demographic bases, it was expedient to attain significant electoral support in one or both of the other regions if there was to be any hope to build a majority in the Federal House. The efforts

to develop such a broad electoral base--i.e. becoming institutionalized national parties--exposed the NCNC and AG to intense internal and external pressures. The incapacity of either of these parties to make sustained electoral inroads into the other regions and the frequent appeals to tribal nationalism by party spokesmen and candidates caused periodic outbursts of tribal violence and bloodshed in the urban areas. The consequences of such confrontation on party institutionalization can be analyzed by utilizing three criteria set forth by Huntington-- autonomy, adaptability, and coherence.

Autonomy, Adaptability, and Coherence as Factors
in Nigerian Party Institutionalization

The first criterion of party institutionalization, autonomy, focuses on the extent to which each of these parties existed independently of other social groups and methods of behavior. Huntington has argued:

How well is the political sphere differentiated from other spheres? At its most concrete level autonomy involves the relations between social forces, on the one hand, and political organizations on the other. Political institutionalization, in the sense of autonomy means the development of political organizations and procedures that are not simply expressions of the interests of particular social groups. A political organization that is the instrument of a social group--family, clan, class--lacks autonomy and institutionalization. A political party, for instance, that expresses the interests of only one group in society. . .is less autonomous than one that articulates and aggregates the interests of several social groups.³¹

Analyses of party autonomy are useful in comparing and contrasting the social bases of support for the three major Nigerian parties.

³¹Huntington, Political Order, p. 20.

Contrasting traditional forms among the three major ethnic groups as they evolved in the era of differential colonial policy deeply affected party structure, leadership, and policy. Not surprisingly, significant contrast between the North and South existed in the role the different tribal elites played in the political process and party leadership. For instance, focusing only on the role of the so-called modernist elements is to overlook the critical importance of the chiefs and emirs in Nigerian parties. As Ward and Rustow argue:

No society is wholly modern; all represent a mixture of modern and traditional elements. It has often been thought these elements stood in basic opposition to each other, and that there was implicit in the social process some force which would ultimately lead to the purgation of traditional 'survivals,' leaving as a residue the purely modern society. The preceding chapters amply document the falsity of such a thesis, at least where Japan is concerned, showing that the role of traditional attitudes and institutions in the modernization process has often been symbiotic rather than antagonistic. . . . We can, therefore, identify a quality of 'reinforcing dualism' within at least some modernizing experiences.³²

An analysis of Nigerian political party autonomy similarly points out the fallacies in assumptions predicated on what Whitaker criticizes as "conceptualizing the encounter of modernity and traditionality in terms of mutually exclusive social qualities."³³

Traditional forces and the basic tribal orientations among Nigerian ethnic groups were not eclipsed by the impact of modernization or the introduction of modern political forms evolving out of constitutional changes. On the contrary, far from being destroyed, traditional influence and tribal orientations were in many cases enhanced through

³²Ward and Rustow, "Political Modernization in Japan," pp. 94-95.

³³C. S. Whitaker, "A Dysrhythmic Process of Political Change," World Politics, XIX (1967), p. 192.

the policies and activities of party politics. On this point Norman Miller has observed:

Whatever the basis, the political survival of traditional leaders is significant because they provide the vital linkage between the government and the people. They influence the success of specific modernization schemes by serving as translators, interpreters, and mediators of government goals. This form of leadership is basically syncretistic, a leadership pattern among chiefs and headmen which is a synthesis and conciliation of the opposing forces of traditionalism and modernism. The result is a form of leadership which is neither modern nor traditional but an incorporation of both. The process is one of accommodation and compromise. It is a reconciliation of demands from (a) the traditional custom bound elements of rural society, and (b) the modernising bureaucratic groups made up of local administrators and political party leaders.³⁴

The reconciliation and accommodation process between traditional and modernizing groups was often performed by the Nigerian regional parties. Each of these groups had something to gain from the other in spite of obvious contrasts which existed in educational levels and ideologies. However, each of these elites' political power was dependent on the support of a core tribal group--the Ibo, Yoruba, and Fulani-Hausa. The influences of communal attachments were inescapable. Thus, a basic characteristic of Nigerian political evolution during the decade prior to independence was the growing tribal nationalism which was internalized and exploited by the party leadership.

³⁴ Norman M. Miller, "The Political Survival of Traditional Leadership," Journal of Modern African Studies, LXII (1968), pp. 183-184; Hodgkin, Nationalism in Colonial Africa, p. 171. Hodgkin further notes many nationalists' efforts to reconcile theories underlying traditional African institutions and the new imported democratic ideas. The latter were by no means antithetical to the former as essentially democratic forms were found in many parts of pre-European Africa; Zolberg, "Structure of Political Conflict," p. 72. Zolberg argues that ". . . it is generally evident that the most 'modern' institutions in Africa are governed by values and norms that stem from both the 'new' and the 'residual' sets."

In spite of the emphasis by all parties on communal values, there was a variation in party roles of traditional forces which points up the interdependence of the criteria for gauging party institutionalization. At best any one of these criteria provides an incomplete picture of party efforts to achieve preeminence in the Nigerian political scene. Only when party autonomy is analyzed alongside party coherence and adaptability does a more complete picture of the level of Nigerian party institutionalization begin to emerge. Thus, just as any society is neither wholly modern or traditional the criteria for measuring the institutionalization of any political organization are also not mutually exclusive. For instance, the interrelationship between two of these criteria was noted by Huntington:

In theory an organization can be autonomous without being coherent and coherent without being autonomous. In actuality, however, the two are often closely linked together. Autonomy becomes a means to coherence enabling the organization to develop an esprit and style that become distinctive marks of its behavior. Autonomy also prevents the intrusion of disruptive external forces, although of course autonomy does not protect against disruption from internal sources.³⁵

Nigerian parties lacked autonomy in the sense that they were ultimately dependent on support from one of the three key ethnic groups. All three parties became inextricably linked to the electoral support which the Ibo, Yoruba, or Fulani-Hausa offered. Further, in a more restricted but perhaps equally important sense all parties were also dominated in varying degrees by political classes or power elites. The vigorous initial efforts made by the two Southern parties' leadership to escape the confines of their regional-tribal base vividly exposed

³⁵Huntington, Political Order, p. 22.

both internal incoherence and lack of adaptability. Neither of these parties ever attracted sustained electoral support from other tribal groupings to substantially alter the power balance in the regions or at the center. During election periods the frequently violent and nearly always abrasive party appeals to tribal nationalism further exacerbated tribal animosities and cleavages. Thus, Nigerian parties more than any other political organization were in the pivotal position to provide accommodation or provoke confrontation among the major ethnic groups. In the struggle for regional and national political power party activity provided little opportunity for accommodation.

Political confrontation placed the Southern parties under particularly intense cross pressures to solidify control over their home power base while building an electoral coalition with minority groups in all other regions. Southern party success in building and sustaining such coalitions influenced each party's adaptability. As Huntington argued:

The more adaptable an organization or procedure is, the more highly institutionalized it is, the less adaptable and more rigid it is, the lower its level of institutionalization. Adaptability is an acquired organizational characteristic. It is in a rough sense a function of environmental challenge and age.³⁶

The functional adaptability of the major Nigerian parties could be seen in the efforts of each party to shift its representation from one regional or tribal constituency to another and to shift from opposition to control of government. Both transitions presupposed a capacity to gain electoral support in other regions which was an absolute necessity for the Southern parties to gain control of the central government.

³⁶Ibid., pp. 13-15.

For the NCNC and AG such attempts proved increasingly futile and these parties were thus deprived of nearly all coalition electoral support.

Just as the degree of party autonomy is closely linked with party adaptability, so too is party coherence. As Huntington has contended:

The more unified and coherent an organization is, the more highly institutionalized it is; the greater the disunity of the organization, the less it is institutionalized An effective organization requires at a minimum, substantial consensus on the functional boundaries of the group and on the procedures for resolving disputes which come up within those boundaries. . . . Discipline and development go hand in hand.³⁷

The interdependence among the criteria for gauging institutionalization --autonomy, adaptability, and coherence--is best seen in the contrasting manner the NPC and the Southern parties pursued regional and federal political power. For example, the NCNC and AG were forced to compete on three sharply contrasting regional fronts with party apparatus ill-equipped to organize campaigns outside their home regions much less attract sustained support and exert control over other tribal blocs. In contrast, the emir-dominated NPC made no attempt to extend direct party campaigning beyond the North and was primarily interested in consolidating its hold on the Northern minority tribal groups in which the AG and local parties had made early inroads. Considering the North's size, dispersion of the native authorities, and the capacity of the emirs to mobilize support, the NPC exhibited far greater adaptability and coherence in their home region than the Southern parties. Most critically, with the 1963 census any party which controlled the northern bloc of seats in effect commanded a clear majority in the Federal House. Thus, it became electorally irrelevant for the NPC to

³⁷Ibid., pp. 22-24.

extend activity beyond the North.

An analysis of the dual level of party struggle exhibited the capacity of the NPC to grasp control of Northern and central institutions by achieving nearly the total measure of its institutionalization within the Northern region. These levels included: (1) intra-party factional-leadership struggles which in varying degrees plagued all the parties and (2) interparty electoral struggles conducted to win sufficient support to insure political control of the respective regional governments. These struggles invariably had much greater disunifying effect on the Southern AG and NCNC than on the Northern NPC. These two dimensions of party struggle were most pronounced and bitter during regional and federal election periods.

Southern parties were repeatedly thwarted in their attempts to build sustained electoral support outside their own regions. The decision of the 1958 Constitutional Conference to base representation in the Federal House on total regional population tipped the balance of power at the center inexorably to the North and the NPC. By 1959 the three parties had largely consolidated control over the core ethnic groups. The outlying minority groups clustered around each of these blocs thus became focal areas of regional party competition. Tribal nationalism and the particular manner each party elite manipulated tribal symbols and orientations greatly affected the success of each party in vying for the critical support of minority tribal constituencies. A brief examination of the dual level of power struggle within and among the Nigerian parties emphasizes the interrelationship of autonomy, coherence, and adaptability in the contrasting levels of Nigerian party institutionalization.

The Northern People's Congress--Party Autonomy, Adaptability,
and Coherence in a Closed Society

The Northern People's Congress was welded into the social structure and traditional political system of the North. A traditional social structure which had existed with amazing continuity in the Hausa areas since the fifteenth century retained its basic character despite Fulani conquest and British colonial policy. The Fulani emirs and the British colonial rulers helped assure continuity by adapting the administrative techniques and political characteristics before them. During constitutional revision British authorities attempted to launch Nigeria as a democratically governed national entity while preventing abrupt discontinuity with British policy toward the autocratic emirate system. Thus, for a half century the British preserved the Fulani autocracies as instruments of law and order and as vehicles of controlled innovation along modern British lines.³⁸

The Northern political system proved to be surprisingly adaptable to the growth of party politics during the latter stages of colonial rule. The emir, designated as the sole native authority, remained an autocrat subject only to British overrule. Modern bureaucratic services, staffed for the most part by expatriate Southerners, were introduced into the native authority system to make it more effective and efficient. In this manner, the dynastic continuity in the emirates remained unchanged and the North continued to be a quiescent but politically static showpiece of British imperial policy. Lloyd outlined the sweeping powers of the Northern emirs which was typical at the time of

³⁸Whitaker, "Dysrhythmic Political Change," p. 206.

the founding of the NPC:

The native authorities, controlled by the emirs, were large and powerful bodies. Their scale is suggested by the fact that the largest one, in Kano, today spends ₦2 million annually. Services that are provided by the regional governments in the Eastern and Western regions, with their small fragmentary units, are, in the North, controlled by the native authorities; they run hospitals, secondary schools, waterworks, prisons, and police forces. When the British administrators dreamed of a self-governing Nigeria as a federation of native authorities they were thinking of the emirates; the impossibility of creating them in Ibo country frustrated their hopes.³⁹

Scholars who have studied Fulani rule have been most impressed by both its continuity and adaptability to modern political processes. The relationships which developed between the NPC and the traditional, social, and political structure of the North were so close that the NPC never bothered to develop party organizational structure until 1958. Until then it was virtually unnecessary. The traditional elite who so thoroughly dominated the native authority structure also dominated the NPC. Thus, the NPC was provided a dispersed powerful bureaucratic structure which the Southern parties never possessed. The utilitarian motive of the traditional elite in grafting party structure to the pre-existing native authorities was noted by Post:

The men who took control of the Jam 'iyyar Multanen Arewa in 1951 and turned it into a political party did not regard the Northern People's Congress as a new means by which influence and power could be gained. To the ruling groups in the emirates it was a means by which to protect their already existing authority from a possible source of encroachment--the new Regional House of Assembly and the Council of Ministers. . . . The traditional interests

³⁹ Peter G. Lloyd, "Traditional Rulers," p. 399.

vested in the various Native Administrations gradually moulded the character of the party to suit themselves during the first two years of the party's existence.⁴⁰

Above all, the NPC was founded to defend the ruling groups in the North from a perceived threat to their interests. Despite its non-traditional functions (i.e., contesting elections and operation of a parliamentary system of government) the party was so fused with those interests that it was difficult to distinguish its functioning as a political party. This fusion of traditional political class interests and ethnic support made the NPC the least autonomous of all the major parties. The "party in power" was nearly synonymous with the traditional oligarchy which dominated the native authorities and to remain in regional power was considered basic to the survival of the existing order. It was not until 1959 that the NPC felt compelled to establish more than rudimentary party organization to muster mass support. By this juncture the NPC was well entrenched in the North and, unlike the Southern parties, exhibited little interest in extending its efforts into other regions.

Two indices for assessing party autonomy were the close correlation between the native authority bureaucracy, the composition of the National Executive Committee of the party, and the NPC slates fielded in federal or regional elections. For instance, in analyzing the composition of the NPC's Executive Committee Sklar noted that fully 60 per cent of the NEC was a present or past employee of the native administration; likewise, the NEC was heavily dominated by

⁴⁰Post, Nigerian Federal Election, pp. 50-51.

Parliamentarians from the regional or Federal House.⁴¹

Most analyses of NPC leadership verify the rigid control of the party by the traditional elite. Since education was acquired mainly by the sons of Northern aristocrats and their retainers, the transition from feudal government to colonial administration did not entail any considerable transfer of power and prestige from the traditional or ruling class. As one British governor noted: "If indirect rule is to be truly tribal (in Northern Nigeria) we must educate from the top down, and not as in Southern Nigeria from the bottom upwards."⁴² Thus, the typical NPC Executive Committee member was most likely a Fulani or Hausa Muslim, educated to the middle school level, a Parliamentarian, and a functionary of the native administration.

Control of the NPC passed to persons loyal to and dependent on the emirate bureaucracies. It took the emirs no time to realize that they either had to control the party or be controlled by it.⁴³ Party nominating procedure became crucial and further reflected the lack of party autonomy. As Mackintosh argued:

Possibly no single fact brings out the general character of a party more than its procedure for nomination of candidates to contest elections, and an analysis of the process adopted in the NPC reveals only too clearly how closely interrelated the party is to social structure.⁴⁴

Theoretically NPC parliamentary candidates were nominated by divisional

⁴¹Sklar, Nigerian Political Parties, p. 324.

⁴²Whitaker, "Dysrhythmic Political Change," p. 25.

⁴³B. J. Dudley, "The Nomination of Parliamentary Candidates in Northern Nigeria," Journal of Commonwealth Political Studies, II (1963-64), p. 51.

⁴⁴Mackintosh, Nigerian Government, p. 394.

or provincial executive committees subject to the approval of the National Executive Committee. However, the major emirs, in practice, dominated the nominating process in their jurisdiction. Inevitably candidates were chosen mainly from the higher echelon positions in the native authority, i.e., Councillor, Alkadi (Judge), District or Village Head. In the Federal Parliament of 1959, 106 out of 111 Northern members or 96 per cent of the total nominated were from native authority positions.⁴⁵ Less than 4 per cent came from such occupations as business and the independent professions. The effect of this nomination process on party autonomy was noted by Dudley:

The control over the recruitment process placed those recruited in the status as appointees or agents of the emirs. . . . Moreover, this traditional leadership hierarchy was dominated in practice by the Premier, Sir Ahmadu Bello, the Sardauna of Sokoto. Put negatively, one can best describe his control by saying that nothing can be done or carried out in the North of which he does not approve.⁴⁶

After 1951 the informal coalition between traditionalists such as Ahmadu Bello, and low born, educated modernists such as Abubakar Tafewa Balewa, fused native authority and parliamentary leadership into an exclusive and well-disciplined party machine. Though the party developed a formal structure, it tended to become self-perpetuating with native authority officials occupying dual roles as local administrative subalterns in a traditional bureaucracy and politicians in modern

⁴⁵Ibid., pp. 90 and 342.

⁴⁶Dudley, "Nomination of Parliamentary Candidates," pp. 54-55. Dudley claimed that Ahmadu Bello as the Premier of the North, President of the NPC and the preeminent leader of the traditional elite, wielded immense political power. As the single most powerful political leader and "kingmaker" in the federation, Bello's behavior and speeches bear striking parallels to his great-grandfather Usuman dan Fodio, the founder of the Fulani empire.

elective legislative bodies. Both positions were bestowed by the emirs and the NPC legislator's political survival depended on absolute obedience in party manners. Party structure, nomination process and parliamentary representation became the almost exclusive political preserve of the entrenched Fulani ruling class.

Power struggles within the NPC were insignificant compared to the divisive factionalism endemic with the Southern parties. In the North the cohesive influence of Islam and the towering influence of the Sardauna made the NPC an easily controlled instrumentality of the native authorities. Discipline cases and open discord among NPC leaders were comparatively rare. As Sklar noted of the NPC, after the election of the Sardauna of Sokoto as General President in 1954, there were no rebellions against the leadership and only one discipline case involving a national officer.⁴⁷

Social and political cohesion in the far North was due in no small part to the feudal aristocracy reinforced by British supervised native administrations. In this period of party growth the symbiosis and congeniality of Northern traditional and modern political forces was seen in the position of Ahmadu Bello, Sardauna of Sokoto. In the predominately Islamic North the Sardauna exploited at every opportunity the historical continuity of the emirate system and the religious symbolism and sentiment inherent in his position. The secular promotion of Islam was a potent tool in the political arena as Whitaker has argued:

⁴⁷ Sklar, Nigerian Political Parties, p. 388.

A persistent and highly inflammatory NPC campaign theme has been the duty of true Muslims to follow Muslim political leadership or to reject, in other words, that of non-Muslim or 'nonorthodox' southern Nigerians. In the cause of this NPC doctrine of religious obligation to follow its lead as the great protector of traditional authority the conservative mallami, or religious teachers, have been most effective.⁴⁸

Religious sanctions and discipline applied to the elite as well as the masses, were utilized in legitimizing native authorities and mobilizing support for the NPC. Socially habituated and psychologically conditioned to thinking in terms of the native authority as represented by the emirs, the district and village heads, the councillors, and al-kadis, it was normal to expect that the majority of the populace would support the party identified with the native authority.⁴⁹ For non-Moslem elements of the North, the party leaders emphasized regionalism (as opposed to tribalism), an essentially pragmatic attitude stressing Northern unity while allowing for ethnic diversity. The motto of the NPC was indicative of this stance: "One North, One People, Irrespective of Religion, Rank, or Tribe."⁵⁰

A result of NPC's emphasis on regionalism was the northernization scheme undertaken after 1958 to replace public employees from the South with persons of northern origin. The NPC extended this preferential treatment from the civil service into the economic sphere under intense lobbying pressure from merchants, contractors, and transport

⁴⁸Whitaker, "Dysrhythmic Political Change," p. 212.

⁴⁹Mackintosh, Nigerian Government, p. 289.

⁵⁰Sklar, Nigerian Political Parties, pp. 327-328.

firms to contractually favor only Northern interests.⁵¹ Favorable NPC response to these elements won the party the monetary support of the monied commercial interests while permitting this group only a marginal representation in the party hierarchy and legislative delegations.

The NPC's ideology emphasized regional unity and the party's role as mediator between various northern forces and the emirate bureaucracies. In this process, the maintenance of party coherence largely reflected the coherence exhibited in the intramural competition among the hereditary lineages and royal dynasties for central and regional bureaucratic offices. The balance, adjudication, maintenance, and pursuit of these rival corporate claims to office at all levels of the bureaucracy was the overwhelming political preoccupation of members of the ruling stratum.⁵² The cohesiveness and adaptability of the NPC reflected the extraordinary degree of emirate control prevalent in spite of the competitive process for hereditary office. In similar manner, the northern traditional elite proved to be most sensitive to pressure from modernist forces for participation and privilege in exchange for their support. As Whitaker asserted, with constant intramural jockeying for position among elements of the Fulani aristocracy this system was at once theocratic but still cognizant of wealth and/or merit in

⁵¹Kenneth Younger, The Public Service in the New States (London, 1960), p. 5. Younger notes that the exclusion of southern Nigerians is indicated by the regional and national origins of 221 members of the Northern administrative class in 1959: 161 were expatriate officers, 59 were Northern Nigerians, and one was a non-Northern Nigerian. Thus, a classic example of the nearly pathological fear of Southern administrators was exemplified in the clear preference for British expatriates whatever their cost.

⁵²Henry L. Bretton, Power and Stability in Nigeria (New York, 1962), p. 123.

choosing party leadership:

Political offense, defined by the system as attachment to the king's political rival was the principal ground for dismissal; and political solidarity with the king and opposition to his rivals was the principal ground for appointment. Apart from solidarity with superiors, the essential criterion of and precondition for success in this institutionalized system of competition, which in Hausa is called neman sarautau--the quest for offices and the prestigious formal titles that go along with them--was and is wealth and influence largely purchased.

Neman sarautau is very greatly responsible for two ostensibly contrasting sets of qualities in the system as a whole; on the one hand, political and administrative insecurity, uncertainty, instability, arbitrariness, domination, dogmatism, coercion, and restrictiveness; on the other hand competitiveness, flexibility, mobility, calculation, inventiveness, and secular devotion to whatever the requirements and rewards of power might be.⁵³

The political attributes that rendered traditional elites in the native authorities insecure and potentially disunified at the same time motivated the emirs to extend official patronage to educated commoners or the nouveau riche who were powerless to threaten the traditional position of the emir but could help legitimize him in the area of party politics. In the South this situation was reversed with modernist elements patronizing the chiefs and elders for the same purpose but with far less electoral impact in determining ultimate control of the central

⁵³Whitaker, "Dysrhythmic Political Change," p. 204; See also Anthony H.M. Kirk-Greene, "The Merit Principle in African Bureaucracy: Northern Nigeria," Nations by Design, ed., Arnold Rivkin (Garden City, N.Y., 1968). Kirk-Greene notes the confrontation of two groups within the bureaucracy and political parties of the North. These were the "meritocrats" or the new generation of "achievementalist" university-trained civil servants who insisted that higher education should be a sine qua non qualification for appointment and promotion. The "hierocrats", on the other hand, were those who carried over into local government service and party politics unquestioning acceptance of the creed of ascriptive criteria and hereditary authority of traditional Fulani-Hausa society should confer equal rank and status in modern society, pp. 257-258.

government. The inclusion of Northern commoner elements was often based on clientage, i.e., patronage, economic security, and protection in exchange for personal loyalty and obedience. The successful transfer of this relationship to party politics largely accounted for the adaptability and cohesiveness of the NPC in the North. The non-traditionalist promotion of traditional forces in such a coalition arrangement was noted by Whitaker:

While the composition of the central executive councils was generally liberalized to include representatives of non-traditional ruling elements, in the great emirates (especially Sokoto, Kano, Bornu, and Zaria) such reforms went no further than a shift from autocracy to oligarchy. Thus, measures strengthening 'local government' in the North were in effect bolstering hereditary rule.⁵⁴

The unique blend of hereditary and commoner elements in the NPC exhibited the capacity of the Fulani autocracy to build strategic coalitions allowing for vertical mobility while maintaining tight control over both religious and political institutions. Thus, the unique, absorptive political syncretism in the NPC was an extension of the pervasive control of the emirate bureaucracies over nearly every aspect of Northern political, economic, and social life.

In the absence of a large aggrieved educated class or claimant nationalist minded commercial class in the North, these forces were accommodationist rather than revolutionary. Too, far from being antagonistic or dichotomous these groups combined with the traditional elites to form a highly cohesive and adaptable regional party machine which was used to counter all electoral challenges by radical Northern splinter groups or the Southern parties. The coalition of forces was

⁵⁴ Whitaker, "Dysrhythmic Political Change," pp. 212-213.

epitomized in the leadership of Bello and Balewa. As Whitaker argued:

During the whole period of Northern Nigeria's advancement to self-government (1959) the Sardauna and Tafewa Balewa operated independently of direct mass political support, and of any real popular accountability. In fact they were modern politicians only in the quite limited sense they were parliamentarians. As such they were free to formulate their own political roles--within the limits set by virtual dependence on the political sponsorship of traditionally composed native authorities.⁵⁵

It was in the electoral arena of interparty struggle in which this coalition perhaps best exhibited the adaptability and cohesiveness of the NPC in Northern and Federation politics.

The NPC after 1951 rejected any suggestion that it should extend direct activity and competitive efforts south. As long as it solidly controlled the North it was assured a majority at the center and there were no socio-political reasons to believe that NPC domination of the North would be undermined. As Dudley argued, all this meant in effect that, with political power shifting to the center, the real levers of power were actually to be found in the North; Federal superordination, to put it differently, in practice turned out to be Northern dominance.⁵⁶ Within the North the rigid control by emirs over regional police, courts, administration, and patronage were critical powers which assisted the NPC in extending its control into minority tribal buffer areas around the periphery of the region. These levers of control made it virtually impossible for any party to gain a foothold much less survive and sustain an electoral base anywhere in the North.

⁵⁵G. S. Whitaker, "Three Perspectives on Hierarchy," Journal of Commonwealth Political Studies, 3 (1965), p. 8.

⁵⁶B. J. Dudley, "Federalism and the Balance of Political Power in Nigeria," Journal of Commonwealth Political Studies, 4 (1966), p. 21.

In most of the North the social structure was monolithic and there was no stable base in class, occupational, religious, or other source of differentiation for a viable alternative party.⁵⁷ However, efforts to break the electoral hold of the deeply entrenched NPC were made by at least three different party groupings: (1) the radical, commoner-oriented opposition parties within the emirates (e.g., the Northern Elements Progress Union or NEPU), (2) opposition based parties in the minority areas or the northern "middle belt," (e.g., The United Middle Belt Congress (UMBC), and (3) radical Southern parties which attempted to make inroads in both majority and minority areas.⁵⁸ Few minority parties in the North behaved like groups which had the remotest chance of forming an alternative government through the workings of the parliamentary system. To the political elite of the NPC, in Northern politics the NEPU adherents were held to be apostates while the NCNC and AG were interlopers. In this context, as Post cogently observed: "On the eve of independence in 1959 nowhere in Nigeria, particularly in the North, could a classical two-party system with the possibility of a change of government by a true 'swing of the pendulum' be found."⁵⁹

The Northern Elements Progressive Union was the oldest and most active of the local opposition parties in the North. NEPU was founded in Kano by young radical Northerners bitterly opposed to the conservative, traditional elites. The urban based NEPU derived its hard core

⁵⁷ J. P. Mackintosh, "Electoral Trends and the Tendency to a One Party System in Nigeria," Journal of Commonwealth Political Studies, 1 (1961-63), p. 205.

⁵⁸ Whitaker, "Dysrhythmic Political Change," p. 210.

⁵⁹ Post, The Nigerian Federal Election, p. 70.

membership from such groups as petty traders and small businessmen (Northerners who had adopted some non-traditional source of livelihood) and a small group of dissident traditional elements who saw NEPU as an alternative opportunity to gain political status.⁶⁰ This combination, after initial success in Kano city elections in 1951, was swamped in successive elections by the conservative rural vote which overwhelmingly opted for the NPC. For example, the NPC rural vote in the 1959 Federal elections swept 105 of the 110 upper North constituencies.⁶¹ After 1959 the NPC faced little meaningful opposition in the North.

During the first Federal election by secret ballot in 1959, many Southern party leaders expected Northern voters to repudiate emirate rule. Awolowo was thoroughly confident the AG would make deep inroads into NPC strength in all areas, particularly in the non-Moslem and Yoruba areas of the Middle Belt region. The AG and the NCNG-NEPU coalition garnered 33.4 percent of the votes but barely 19 per cent of the Federal seats.⁶² Furthermore, by the 1961 elections most of these opposition members had crossed the floor to the NPC, and in the regional balloting that year the NPC gained 94.1 per cent of regional seats, eliminating virtually all opposition from the minority areas

⁶⁰ Sklar, Nigerian Political Parties, pp. 335-337.

⁶¹ Ibid., p. 338; Huntington, Political Order, p. 444. Huntington noted that the extension of suffrage to the rural masses in a society which remains highly traditional strengthens and legitimizes the authority of the traditional elite. This seems to have been true in Northern Nigeria during the 1959 Federal Elections. The possibility of significant Northern support swinging to the AG or any other opposition party after this date was very slight.

⁶² Mackintosh, "Electoral Trends," p. 205.

outside of the far North:⁶³

TABLE IV

	December 1959 89.2% polling		May 1961 66% polling		December 1964 57% polling	
	% votes	% seats	% votes	% seats	% vote	% seats
NPC	60.8	77	69.2	94	82	97
AG	17.3	14.3	14.6	5.3	11	2.5
NEPU-NCNC	16.1	4.6	14.2	.6		
Others	5.7	4	1.8	---	7	.5

In the 1964 Federal election in the North the NPC-dominated National Nigerian Alliance (NNA) won 162 of the 167 allotted seats for the North in the Federal House.⁶⁴ As the Federal House of Representatives contained only 312 seats, the NPC held an absolute majority based on its near monopoly of the Northern regional bloc. This second and last Federal Election exposed the polarization of Nigerian regional parties into two powerful alliances--the NNA which was dominated by the conservative NPC and the United Progressive Grand Alliance (UPGA) dominated by more secular and radical coalition elements from the NCNC and AG. This stark North-South confrontation pointed up the awesome leverage of the NPC in a federal system dominated by one region and one party. Southern party disarray and extreme political instability

⁶³Ibid.; Mackintosh, Nigerian Government, p. 589.

⁶⁴Richard Harris, "Nigeria: Crises and Compromise," Africa Report, 10 (1965), p. 30.

resulted from the turbulent 1964 election.

The party tension in the drastically unbalanced Nigerian federal system was continuously escalated by appeals to tribal nationalism. The persistent exploitation by party leaders of tribal attachments made violence between ethnic groups in urban centers nearly inevitable, particularly during election periods. The temporary party beneficiary of this party-instigated violence was the regionally entrenched and institutionalized NPC and the primary party victim was the Action Group.

The Action Group--Institutional Decay with a Split Personality

Just as the Fulani-Hausa provided primary ethnic group support and leadership for the Northern People's Congress, the Action Group was heavily dependent on the communal support of the Yoruba. The following table provides information on core group domination of the National Executive Committees of the two largest parties in the North and South.⁶⁵ Statistically, the AG in the context of party leadership composition was the least autonomous of the three major parties. As in the North, elite occupational groups were instrumental in the founding and leadership of the AG. There were, however, vast dissimilarities between the Northern and Southern parties in the exact type of occupational groups which were represented on the National Executive Committees as the chart on page 128 shows.⁶⁶

⁶⁵Coleman and Rosberg, Political Parties and National Integration, p. 612. Discrepancies in percentage totals reflects the presence of minority elements not listed in the ethnic categories.

⁶⁶Ibid., p. 614.

TABLE V
 ETHNIC DISTRIBUTION OF MAJOR PARTY LEADERS
 (In percentages)

SOUTH							
Party	Ibo	Other Eastern Groups	Yoruba	Other Western Groups	Other Northern Groups	Cameroonians, non-Nigerians and Unknown	
NCNC	49.3	9.9	26.7	5.6	2.8	5.6	
Action Group	4.5	5.2	68.2	7.6	3.0	1.5	
NORTH							
Party	Fulani	Hausa	Nupe	Kanuri	Other Northern Groups	Yoruba	Unknown
NPC	32.4	18.9	9.4	6.8	16.2	6.8	9.4
NEPU	14.0	67.1	4.6	3.1	---	7.1	3.2

TABLE VI
 OCCUPATIONAL DISTRIBUTION OF MAJOR PARTY LEADERS
 (In percentages)

Party	Professionals (Law, medicine, & the learned professions)	Educators	Businessmen (finance & Investors)	Business managers, re- tired senior civil servants, & administra- tors of the Northern native authorities
NCNC	26.8	19.7	28.2	5.6
AG	33.3	18.2	21.2	1.5
NPC	1.4	6.7	25.7	63.5
NEPU	3.1	3.1	17.2	20.3

Although the native authority functionaries enjoyed an overwhelming majority of party and parliamentary posts in the NPC, this group had infinitesimal representation in the hierarchy of the Southern parties. There was in the South no single entrenched hereditary clique such as the emirs who enjoyed an obvious monopoly of power. Instead, a coalition of professionals, businessmen, and educators provided the primary source of leadership for the Southern parties, indicative of the relevance of ascribed and achieved status in the contrasting patterns of party leadership. Socially achieved leadership status was the rule in the Action Group and the NCNC while socially ascribed leadership status was the dominant pattern in the NPC.

The contrasting roles played by business-professional elements in the ranks of the NPC, the Action Group and the NCNC reflected in microcosm the differential development patterns among the regions and the role of traditional elites in each society. The "new men" of the South, wealthy business elements and a highly educated professional class, controlled the NCNC and Action Group after 1951. The parties

were used as instruments to mould the new economic, social, and political developments in these regions to their own advantage and these groups asserted this was to the advantage of all.⁶⁷ In contrast, the leaders of the Northern People's Congress derived their influence from the traditional forms of government which their class had managed to accommodate to British rule with as little modification as possible and no change in the real balance of power.

Business and banking interests lent crucial financial support to the Southern parties. Sklar noted:

In 1958 there were three African banks in close association with the Action Group. The most important was the National Bank of Nigeria Limited, the oldest existing African bank with the greatest volume of business. . . . Both the Chairman of the Board and General Manager of the bank were Vice-Presidents of the Lagos branch of the Action Group and influential members of the party hierarchy. Most directors and leading shareholders of the National Bank were persons of Yoruba descent who supported the Action Group morally and materially.⁶⁸

After 1959 the main channel of funds to the AG was the Yoruba dominated National Investment and Properties Company Limited whose board of directors consisted entirely of national officers of the Action Group. Massive injections of public funds from such public institutions to finance party campaigns were tolerated as the parties considered the potential loss of dominance in the region disastrous to the very survival of the party--and their own economic interests.⁶⁹ Very few tactics were circumscribed in assuring political control by the parties over their respective regions. In the game of zero-sum politics the

⁶⁷Post, Nigerian Federal Election, p. 65.

⁶⁸Sklar, Nigerian Political Parties, pp. 455-456.

⁶⁹Ibid., pp. 457-458.

exploitation of tribal attachments like the transfer of public funds to party coffers was considered not only legitimate but crucial.

The second major social group which gave important support to the AG were the traditional authorities. It was the chief aim of the Action Group founders to overcome the ingrained particularism of the Yoruba tribes and mobilize them behind the political party. In the rural areas and traditional towns of the West, chiefs were among the most influential leaders of opinion. No party in Nigeria conducted so systematic an effort as the AG to organize the peasantry or exert party control over the institution of chieftaincy. Party leaders accomplished this in several ways: (1) Egbe and AG leaders acquired honorary chieftaincy titles (Mr. Awolowo was retitled Chief Awolowo after becoming Premier of the Western Region in 1954), (2) Action Group ideals were propagated at all regional chiefs meetings and (3) Action Group control was assured by its ultimate legal sanction of appointment and deposition of chiefs.⁷⁰

Most Yoruba chiefs resigned themselves to an era of democratic government and hoped that in return for their support the dignity of the chieftaincy would be preserved in the new order. The alignment of the chiefs with the Yoruba-speaking intelligentsia at the local level endowed the AG with the aura of traditional legitimacy. This traditional support along with the financing by commercial interests permitted the AG to mobilize mass support necessary to dominate Western

⁷⁰Ibid., pp. 234 and 444. Sklar further noted that by 1957 "recognized" or "honorary" chiefs numbering 1,500 had been appointed by the regional government and formed a very important pressure group in the region. This prompted the Oni of Ife to claim that, "In any gathering of party faithful every third or fourth man is a chief."

regional politics. For example, Chief C. D. Akram did not equivocate in 1958 about the necessity for Yoruba chiefs to be partisan supporters of the government party:

Is it not our bounden duty to guard and guide our people? Have they made us chiefs in order that we may show complete indifference to the problems which confront them and us? . . . Chiefs vote in their different councils and can they escape being called politicians? . . . Chiefs in particular must make it known to their people what political party they know can rule this country in the best interests of the people. . . . It is our clear duty if we love this great country and wish our people well to strain every nerve to see that the Action Group is voted into power in the Central Government.⁷¹

In contradistinction to the AG, Northern theocratic traditionalists dominated the upper echelons of party leadership. Clearly, however, the NPC could not have remained dominant if its support had remained exclusively with the traditional elite in a coalition of minority interests. Thus, appeals of a communal and associational nature were made by the emirs to the new educated elements and business interests to stress the basic integrative forces of the Northern community. In the North, Islam was such a force, and the NPC relentlessly portrayed party, faith, and community as one. Fidelity with Islam became synonymous with fidelity to the Northern People's Congress.⁷²

In the South the AG could also not have achieved hegemony over the Western region without appealing to communal partisanship involving the cooperation of the chiefs. In the regional election of 1951, for instance, political activity in Yorubaland was confined largely to the obas who bargained with each other to insure success of the candidates

⁷¹Sklar, Nigerian Political Parties, p. 242.

⁷²Ibid., p. 623.

from their town.⁷³ The South, however, lacked an overarching integrative mechanism similar to Islam in the North and a traditional leadership which dominated both religious and secular institutions. Thus, in the AG an "alliance" of convenience developed in which communications between the traditional leader and modernizing agent (party official) was established with the chief translating the desires of the official to the people. In analyzing the requisite conditions for effective participation of chiefs in party affairs Miller noted that: (1) the traditional leaders' authority was bent to serve the ends of the modernizing agent, probably by persuasion, (2) articulation to the people was favorable and activating, and (3) the task, program, or campaign was undertaken.⁷⁴ Ironically, this alliance was analogous in many respects to the relationship of chiefs and the colonial administration under indirect rule.

In terms of the dominance exerted by the Yoruba over every facet of its operation the Action Group was not an autonomous political party. Judged in a different light, however, the AG's initial inroads into other regions indicated a higher degree of party autonomy than was true of the NPC. Though most AG party leaders came mainly from a relatively small elite of Yoruba business and professional elements, this was a broader based and more diversified group than the traditional autocracy which dominated the NPC. However, Southern "modernist" party leadership was by no means monolithic or unified in ideology or tactics. NCNC and AG leaderships' degree of "modernity" was as double edged as

⁷³Peter S. Lloyd, "The Development of Political Parties in Western Nigeria," American Political Science Review, XLIX (1955), p. 700.

⁷⁴Miller, "Political Survival," p. 185.

it was deceptive; factors of "modernity" contributed as much to basic cleavages and disunity within the elite leaderships as often the "modernizing" sector was hopelessly splintered. Too, the level of autonomy of all regional parties tended to be static in the sense that the initial dependence on both a core ethnic group for electoral support and on a particular party elite for leadership did not significantly change. This was not true, however, in assessing party adaptability and cohesiveness for there was a more marked and growing contrast in these areas among the parties during the course of electoral struggles.

Until the Western Regional Election of 1956 it was difficult to gauge either the adaptability or coherence of the AG. In the 1951 election 45 out of 80 members in the regional House of Assembly called themselves AG with crossovers finally bringing the total to 60.⁷⁵ The AG dominated regional government launched a very ambitious and costly legislative program based on increased personal taxes. Western NCNC candidates played upon this policy in capturing 23 of the 40 allotted Western seats in the Federal Election in 1954.⁷⁶ After this setback a massive party reorganization in the constituencies conducted by Chief Anthony Enahoro allowed the AG to grasp firm control over the Western Region by 1956. This control was gradually extended as pointed out

⁷⁵Mackintosh, "Electoral Trends," pp. 194-195. Mackintosh noted that at this formative date there was no method of determining which party commanded the votes of the majority as the concept of parties and elections were not sufficiently well known to permit accurate party breakdowns.

⁷⁶Ibid.

in the following table.⁷⁷

TABLE VII
THREE ELECTIONS IN WESTERN NIGERIA 1956-1960

	May 1956		December 1959		August 1960	
	% votes	% seats	% votes	% seats	% votes	% seats
AG	48.3	60	49.6	53.2	53.6	62.9
NCNC	45.3	40	40.3	33.8	36.2	27.4
Others	6.4	--	10.0	12.9	10.1	9.7

The Action Group never achieved the intraparty regional coherence of the NPC. Lacking the integrative mechanisms of Islam or the native authorities, the political coalition of forces in the AG proved to be very brittle. The pockets of resistance to the AG within the West were more entrenched and the factional disputes much more rancorous and intractable than in the North. Intraparty regional disputes exposed the cleavages within the AG and its incapacity to achieve party harmony, much less a sustained electoral following in the other regions.

Bitter interparty struggle was focused in areas of historic turmoil, Ibadan and the minority areas of the West. Action Group electoral superiority in both these regions was not accomplished until 1961, a year before intraparty conflicts shattered the AG and triggered a national crisis. In Ibadan, ethnic competition and conflict had long been a source of tension. As the largest sub-Saharan black African city and capital of the West, Ibadan was a critical locus of party

⁷⁷Ibid.

struggle. In the center of this struggle was Adegoke Adelabu. A brilliant party tactician, Adelabu exerted firm control over Ibadan politics through his local party, the Mabolaje Grand Alliance (MGA). In electoral coalition with the NCNC, Adelabu was able to mold Ibadan pride (mainly directed at the Ijebu Yoruba of which Awolowo was the prominent member), dislike of reforms (bringing the detested taxes), and fervent anti-British nationalism into a single very effective local movement.⁷⁸ The death of Adelabu in 1958 crippled the coalition strength of the MGA-NCNC. However, in terms of interparty struggle it was not until 1961 that the AG was able to exert its regional dominance over local affairs in Ibadan.⁷⁹

Historical rivalries and ethnocentrism among many Yoruba cities, along with growing class cleavages, were exploited by the NCNC and the NPC in dividing and eventually destroying the original Action Group. The political "Achilles heel" of the AG in the West lay in the so-called Midwest, an area containing several minority groups bordering on the Eastern Region. The Action Group's electoral record in the Midwest was initially poor: it lost all ten Midwestern seats in the Federal Election of 1954, 16 out of 20 in the Regional Elections of 1956, and 14 out of 15 in the Federal Election of 1959.⁸⁰ As noted in the following table, it was not until the election of 1960 that AG regional power

⁷⁸ Mackintosh, Nigerian Government, p. 344.

⁷⁹ George Jenkins, "Government and Politics in Ibadan," The City of Ibadan, eds. P. C. Lloyd and A. Mabogunje, pp. 228-229.

⁸⁰ Sklar, Nigerian Political Parties, p. 245; Philip Whitaker, "The Western Region of Nigeria--May, 1957," Five Elections in Africa, eds. W. J. M. Mackenzie and Kenneth Robinson (Oxford, 1960), pp. 86-90.

succeeded in equalling the NCNC in these minority areas:⁸¹

TABLE VIII
THREE ELECTIONS IN THE MIDWEST 1956-1960

	May 1956		December 1959		August 1960	
	% votes	% seats	% votes	% seats	% votes	% seats
AG	31.1	20	39.1	20	46.6	50
NCNC	63.5	80	54.8	80	50.9	50
Others	5.3	--	6.1	--	2.5	--

Ethnic cleavages and ideological diversity within the AG caused severe strains on the adaptability and cohesion of the party. Closely related and more contemporary threats to party cohesion were the rising political class conflicts within the parties of the South. As noted, both the AG and NCNC leadership was dominated by members of an emergent business-professional group--a "political class"⁸²--whose members had strategic leadership positions in the dominant institutions of society. Within the AG and the NCNC, a growing rift developed between "haves" and "have nots." This polarization was revealed in regionalist and anti-regionalist factions developing within the party structure. These factors were spawned by what Sklar incisively described as a basic contradiction in the Nigerian political system: "The 'machinery of

⁸¹Mackintosh, "Electoral Trends," pp. 196-197.

⁸²Gaetano Mosca, The Ruling Class (New York, 1936). In terms of party autonomy Mosca's "political class" is an apt description of the core elite groups which developed vested interests in party leadership in all the regions, especially the South.

government'--the system of governmental power including the power of patronage--was largely regionalized, but the 'machinery of politics'--the party system, i.e., the organization of the masses--continued to exhibit a strong trans-regional and anti-regional tendency."⁸³

Cleavages between the regionalist and anti-regionalist wings of the AG crippled the efforts of this party to become institutionalized on a regional much less a national scale. By 1960, AG's control over patronage within the West created a class with vested regional interests which considered efforts to maintain a national image by campaigning in the East and North expensive and fruitless.⁸⁴ Party incoherence tended to focus on the political power to be exercised by Awolowo, President of the party and leader of the Federal opposition, and the AG Western Region Premier, Chief S. L. Akintola. As Sklar inferred, this divided power base had enormous political consequences for AG party coherence and adaptability:

The Action Group rapidly developed a flagrantly split personality. As the Federal Opposition, it tried to be the chief spokesman for opponents of the political class. As governing party in the Western Region, it was identified with indulgence toward the social and political status quo. The 'federal' faction led by Awolowo, wanted the Action Group to intensify its opposition to the regional power groups that controlled the Federal Government. The 'regional' faction, led by the Premier, S. L. Akintola favored a general settlement with the other regional power groups and the formation of a national government at the federal level that would include all the regionally dominant parties. This rupture was exposed at the Action Group

⁸³Richard L. Sklar, "Contradictions in the Nigerian Politican System," Journal of Modern African Studies, 3 (1965), p. 205.

⁸⁴Mackintosh, "Electoral Trends," p. 208.

Congress of February, 1962. In his Presidential address Awolowo admitted 'openly for once' the existence of 'real and dangerous' contradictions within the party.⁸⁵

Awolowo was forced to rely on a Western class-conscious regional power group headed by Samuel Akintola. Awo, on the other hand led the AG in opposition to the NCNC-NPC coalition at the center. Spreading its resources to cover multi-level activities led directly to the institutional decay and collapse of this political party. Akintola's regionalist faction was more interested in maintaining regional hegemony than striving for national dominance and in reconciling rather than dislodging political classes in other regions. To the AG regionalists party efforts outside the Western Region were both undesirable and futile. To Akintola party coherence and control involved a firm grip on the West even at the expense of abandoning AG opposition in the North and East. Awolowo's democratic socialism was palatable to this faction but his adamant anti-regionalist determination to provide 'virulent opposition' to the NPC-NCNC federal coalition split the AG from top to bottom.⁸⁶

At the Action Group National Congress in February, 1962, the Awolowo and Akintola factions of the AG struggled for ascendancy. Awolowo set the stage for Akintola's ouster from office by revising the party constitution permitting the removal of any parliamentary leaders who had lost the confidence of the party.⁸⁷ Akintola retaliated by

⁸⁵ Sklar, "Contradictions," pp. 205-206.

⁸⁶ Richard L. Sklar, "The Ordeal of Chief Awolowo," Politics in Africa, ed., Gwendolyn Carter (New York, 1966), pp. 130-133.

⁸⁷ Ibid., p. 131.

threatening the removal of Western patronage officeholders who opposed him. On May 19-20, 1962, the Western and Federal AG Executive Councils demanded Akintola's resignation as Regional Premier. Akintola refused and called for dissolution of the Western House.⁸⁸ In rapid order Akintola was removed and in the ensuing Assembly vote of confidence for a new AG Premier, Akintola's faction in collusion with NCNC members violently disrupted Assembly proceedings. On May 29, the Federal House operating under section 65 of the Federal Constitution and the Emergency Powers Act of 1961 took control of the Western Region ousting the entire AG hierarchy--Governor, Premier, Ministers, and Superintendent-General of the local Government Police.⁸⁹ Under the emergency administration imposed by the NPC-NCNC dominated Federal House, the AG was eclipsed as a viable majority political party in the West.

The intraparty split and Federal intervention in the Western Region exposed the deep ethnic-class cleavages in the AG and the Federal coalition's opportunism in taking advantage of them. This period of tension and violence upset the decade-old tenuous balance of party power at the Federal level. After 1962, the former AG leadership factions gravitated towards new coalition arrangements with either the NPC or the NCNC. The eventual collapse of the East-North coalition polarized and realigned party activity on a basically North-South axis. Thus, with the termination of the NPC-NCNC Federal coalition prior to the 1964 Federal Elections, the Awolowo faction joined in a new alliance with the NCNC, their former Southern antagonists. This new

⁸⁸Mackintosh, Nigerian Politics, pp. 446-447.

⁸⁹Ibid., p. 450.

coalition was the United Progressive Grand Alliance (UPGA). The UPGA was countered by the National Nigerian Alliance (NNA), made up of the Akintola faction of the AG, and the NPC.

Thus, the AG was unable to exhibit functional adaptability in either shifting from opposition to government at the Federal level or in shifting its representation from one regional consistency to another. The trend toward electoral isolation and encapsulation of each major party in its home region helped create incoherence in the bitter power struggle between the wings of AG party leadership. This struggle involved personalities, ideology, and more critically, the basic role of the party in Federation politics. In spite of the fact that the AG was more autonomous than the NPC, the lack of adaptability, and particularly, coherence within even its own region prevented the Action Group from becoming institutionalized on a national scale. Mounting pressures from competing on many fronts combined with the intense NPC-NCNC cross-pressures at the center to hopelessly split the Action Group. Firmly entrenched throughout the North, the organization and electoral base of the NPC enabled it to face the more institutionalized wing of the new Southern coalition--the NCNC.

National Council for Nigerian Citizens--Party Development
and Sub-Ethnic Identities

The evolution of the National Council of Nigerian Citizens (NCNC) closely paralleled the mobilization and modernization of the Ibo peoples within the heterogeneous Nigerian state. As noted previously, British imperial penetration of the Ibo areas came comparatively late and the application of indirect rule in the East was made with little

knowledge of the nature of Ibo authority patterns. The British found no monolithic kingdoms, no hierarchical administrative systems and no centralized political structures as in the Northern emirates or the Yoruba constitutional monarchies of the West. To many observers of Ibo culture, traditional Ibo society appeared to be acephalous, egalitarian, and individualistic, united more by culture than by power or authority.⁹⁰ Thus, the extreme political segmentation and absence of any dominant, overarching cultural mechanism within Ibo traditional culture are fundamental considerations in any analysis of Ibo modernization in the Nigerian state. It is contended that these same primordial factors also had deep influence on the modern conduits of Ibo political mobilization--the ethnic unions and the NCNC.

Most early descriptions contrasting the Ibo with other ethnic groups in Nigeria were based upon impressions rather than on systematic research.⁹¹ These descriptions of Ibo society created an image of a decentralized yet cohesive political culture which, despite its fragmentation, still exhibited a high degree of shared values. Since colonial contact the Ibos were widely noted for their mobility, receptivity to change and attraction to the nationalist cause. For instance, Ottenberg stated flatly that the Ibo were probably the most receptive to cultural change and the most willing to accept Western

⁹⁰Paul Anber, "Modernisation and Political Disintegration: Nigeria and the Ibos," The Journal of Modern African Studies, 5 (1967), p. 49.

⁹¹Note for example Daryll Forde and G. I. Jones, The Ibo and Ibibio Peoples of Southeastern Nigeria (London, 1950); M. Green, Ibo Village Affairs; and V. Uchendu, The Igbo of Southeastern Nigeria.

ways of any large group in Nigeria.⁹² Robert Levine in his study, Dreams and Deeds, compared Ibo, Yoruba, and Hausa schoolboys and confirmed the stereotype that the Ibo ranked highest in achievement motivation.⁹³ Although few anthropological studies dealt explicitly with Ibo party participation, the conclusion from these studies was that the transformation of traditional Ibo culture into a more secularized political culture was an accommodation favorable to political development.

Recent micropolitical studies in the former Eastern Region indicate that many early works tended to focus only on surface features of Ibo society while blurring the interstices and nuances of Ibo political organization or modernization. Many studies overlooked the high level of political competition prevalent among Ibo classes and sub-groups. In this regard, Barnard has claimed that students of political behavior in both "established" and "emergent" nations must realize that purely formal or legalistic conceptual frameworks are inadequate to provide meaningful answers to such problems as persistence and change, socialization, political cohesion and the complex bases of political authority and legitimacy.⁹⁴ The application of such conceptual frameworks to narrow sectors of Ibo society was noted recently in a study of Eastern Region ethnicity by Audrey and David Smock. In this study the Smocks

⁹² Simon Ottenberg, "Ibo Receptivity to Change," Continuity and Change in African Cultures, eds., William R. Bascom and Melville Herskovits (Chicago, 1959), p. 130.

⁹³ Robert A. Levine with the assistance of Eugene and Leonard Unterbarger, Dreams and Deeds: Achievement Motivation in Nigeria (Chicago, 1966), pp. 78-94.

⁹⁴ F. M. Barnard, "Culture and Political Development: Herder's Suggestive Insights," American Political Science Review, LXIII (1969), p. 379.

noted the irresistible urge of Africanists to generalize about the entire Ibo linguistic group on the basis of detailed research on one village or clan. As a consequence, writing on the Ibo more often stressed general (and unverified) Ibo cultural characteristics rather than systematically elucidating differences among sub-groups.⁹⁵ The dynamics of the segmental Ibo political culture noted in the Smock study more clearly points up the problems encountered by the NCNC in achieving institutionalization at a regional or at the federal level of party competition.

The level of autonomy achieved by the NCNC can be only superficially observed in the party's dependence on Ibo electoral support for its survival. More important than mere tribal-political block-party linkage are the origins, background, and tactics of the political class associated with the NCNC. As with the NPC and the AG, autonomy as a factor in assessing NCNC institutionalization is closely associated with party coherence and adaptability. Moreover, the combined influence of both ethnicity and class, so fundamental to considerations of autonomy also permeated all levels of party struggle, prime indices of NCNC coherence and adaptability. Thus, the dual level of struggle for NCNC institutionalization was a microcosm of the wider, national problem of "horizontal" integration of communal groups and the "vertical" assimilation of social and economic classes.⁹⁶

One of the most provocative features of the emergence of the Ibo

⁹⁵ Audrey C. Smock and David R. Smock, "Ethnicity and Attitudes Toward Development in Eastern Nigeria," The Journal of Developing Areas, 3 (July, 1969), p. 511.

⁹⁶ Huntington, Political Order, p. 397.

was their role in the nationalist movement and their domination of the leadership and mass membership of the NCNC. As noted previously, between 1945 and 1951 the NCNC justifiably claimed to be the only national political party. During this period Azikiwe tried to mobilize his party into a unified, cohesive, political force and at the same time assume the leadership of not only a pan-Nigerian but a pan-African movement as well. This mobilization effort was remarkable in that it was carried out with only the most rudimentary organization. Nigerian nationalism and Ibo advancement were for Zik not conflicting goals but dual sources of inspiration in the fight against colonialism.⁹⁷ With the strengthening of regional autonomy in the 1954 Lyttleton constitution and the emergence of the other regional parties NCNC's monopoly of Nigerian politics was terminated. The tri-polarization of Nigerian politics which resulted from these constitutional changes caused party government to evolve in the regions earlier than at the center. Thus, as political power devolved to the regions, increasing regional autonomy, both real and potential party autonomy decreased.⁹⁸ Whatever possibility the NCNC had of establishing a truly autonomous broadly based national party dissipated in the decade prior to independence.

The politics of the Ibo, after organized political activity commenced on a national scale in Nigeria, was characterized by a pattern of steady detachment from national goals, a detachment which has been

⁹⁷ Anber, "Modernisation and Political Disintegration," p. 173.

⁹⁸ Donald Rothchild, "The Limits of Federalism: An Examination of Political Institutional Transfer in Africa," Journal of Modern African Studies, 4 (1966), p. 284; Odumusu, Nigerian Constitution, pp. 218-219.

described as the "regionalization of nationalism."⁹⁹ Prior to independence the radical and militant pan-Nigerian Ibo political posture was paralleled by the new requirement to grasp and maintain power in the Eastern Region which the Ibo dominated. Thus, upon independence the NCNC seemed electorally entrenched to defend its tribal-regional base. The political class in Enugu--as in Kaduna and Ibadan--had now to defend its regional status quo and respond to the precarious Federal balance of power. Although the NCNC of all the three major parties apparently had wide appeal, it had not developed effective machinery for interest representation even in its own region. As with the AG, Federation-wide politics pursued by the NCNC exposed a further dimension of party autonomy than mere dependence on the familiar tribal electoral support. The NCNC leadership was in fact highly elitist and dominated by a relatively small political class. This domination is perhaps most crucial to any analysis of national party autonomy or co-hension as this elitism became more and more regionally oriented.

In Nigeria, elite interests--political, economic, educationa, bureaucratic, and military--were dominantly aggregated and articulated within the context of ethnic solidarities.¹⁰⁰ Hence, leadership elements in the NCNC, as in the NPC and AG, in actuality were in positions to tribalize Nigerian polics. The nature of these elites or classes was noted in Himmelstrand's contention that:

⁹⁹ Coleman, Nigeria, pp. 319-331; Anber, Nigeria and the Ibos, p. 173.

¹⁰⁰ James O'Connell, "Political Integration: The Nigerian Case," African Integration and Disintegration, ed., Arthur Hazlewood, (New York, 1967), p. 131.

One can safely assert that social classes in Weber's sense. . .are fast emerging in Nigeria. Perhaps the first visible product of such class-formation is the post-colonial 'political class'--visible not because of any outwardly manifested identification with well-defined class symbols but because of the accumulation of conspicuous power, wealth, and, sometimes, intellectual resources in the same hands.¹⁰¹

In short, the party system of Nigeria was the focus of class interests and these interests influenced the party autonomy, adaptability and coherence.

The political class within the NCNC was characterized by four objective criteria: high status occupation, superior education, high income, and the ownership or control of business enterprise.¹⁰² These criteria were manifest in the composition of the top executive bodies of the NCNC. Sklar noted that of the membership of National and Regional Executive Committees and members of ministerial rank, fully 80 per cent were in the professional, educational, entrepreneurial-managerial class.¹⁰³ The importance of class interests to the NCNC was similar to equivalent groups in the AG and NPC. What was most crucial, however, was that the major institutions of Nigerian society, especially those institutions which were fundamental to the pattern of social stratification, were closely related to and substantially controlled by the political parties. Southern parties in particular were part of rival business and financial structures which existed to make

¹⁰¹Ulf Himmelstand, "Tribalism, Nationalism, and Rank-Equilibration and Social Structure--A Theoretical Interpretation of Some Socio-Political Processes in Southern Nigeria," Journal of Peace Research, 2 (1969), pp. 82-83.

¹⁰²Sklar, Nigerian Political Parties, pp. 480-481.

¹⁰³Ibid., pp. 482-483.

money for the individuals concerned and provide financial backing for the parties. This party control was furthermore exerted by a class deeply dependent on core tribal support to maintain its position. This support is indicated in the following table:¹⁰⁴

TABLE IX
THREE ELECTIONS IN THE EASTERN REGION, 1957-1961

	March 1957 46.8% polling		December 1959 74.4% polling		November 1961 57% polling	
	% votes	% seats	% votes	% seats	% votes	% seats
NCNC	63.2	76.0	64.6	79.4	79.2 (57.8)*	86.2 (72.6)*
AG (+UNIP)	17.0	21.4	23.0	19.1	15.5	10.2
Others	19.6	2.3	12.3	1.4	5.0 (26.4)**	3.4 (17.0)**

*This is the figure if the Independents are subtracted from the NCNC total.

**This is the figure if the Independents are added to "Others."

For purposes of determining NCNC autonomy it is necessary to focus on the interrelationships between ethnicity and class in the mobilization of electoral support. As O'Connell has argued, tribalism can be defined in the contemporary setting as the competitive struggle for modernization between the elite members of different ethnic groups with dissent and conflict in society centered on the control of political authority which is seen as the main source of the allocation of rewards

¹⁰⁴ John Mackintosh, "Electoral Trends and the Tendency of a One Party System," Nigerian Government and Politics, ed., John Mackintosh (Evanston, 1966), p. 527.

in the forms of status, roles, and wealth.¹⁰⁵ Within the NCNC, party leadership was exercised largely by an Ibo class which had vested interests in seeing that the party exercised power in the East and other component parts of the Federation. Just as with the NPC and AG, elite group domination of the NCNC was a prime determinant of party autonomy. The dynamics of such class domination and its cultivation of tribal attachments for party purposes was noted by Himmelstrand:

The Nigerian tribalism in recent years is mainly a political tribalism stemming not from primordial ethnic loyalties as such but from politically exploited and reinforced reactions to strains in the emerging stratification system of Nigeria.¹⁰⁶

Certainly, the NCNC was used to promote class interests in the acquisition and retention of regional power in the East.

All three parties were obviously dependent for regional power on core group support and, hence, none were ethnically autonomous in grasping regional power. For purposes of determining institutional capacity, it seems expedient to delve below an analysis of simple electoral ethnic arithmetic. More fundamental are the contrasts in evolution, composition, ideology, and tactics which existed between and within Northern and Southern political classes. These factors, most observable in interparty and intraparty struggle, determined both the adaptability and coherence of the parties--perhaps cogent and more reliable indices in gauging party institutionalization. Only by such analyses can there be any explanation why the most traditional and least autonomous of the three parties--the NPC--had the greatest

¹⁰⁵James O'Connell, "Inevitability of Instability," Journal of Modern African Studies, V (1967), pp. 186-187.

¹⁰⁶Himmelstrand, "Tribalism, Nationalism, and Rank," p. 97.

capacity for achieving regional institutionalization.

Internal problems which plagued the coherence of the AG similarly affected the NCNC. In the period 1954-1955, the basic framework for future party disunity was exposed with the political developments rising from the Lyttleton Constitution. Under this Constitution fully responsible governments were established in the regions. In the Eastern and Western Regions all ministers were to be chosen from among the members of the regional legislatures; the leader of the majority party in each legislature was designated Premier, and each regional government remained in power on the condition that it retained confidence.¹⁰⁷ The regional governments were assured of full internal self-government within a few years and for the time being political powers would be primarily in the regions. The Federal Council of Ministers would include nine positions--three from among the Federal legislators elected in each region.

After the 1954 London Constitutional Conference the NCNC reversed its previous championing of a unitary government for Nigeria. Policy change came only after bitter disagreement between regionalist and unitarist wings of the party. The regionalists prevailed. This intra-party discord was only the beginning but reflected party organizational evolution from 1944 to 1953. During this period Azikiwe led the NCNC from his political-commercial base in Lagos as General Secretary, then as National President. Over the entire period he made little effort to create a disciplined and cohesive organization comparable to Nkrumah's

¹⁰⁷Sklar, Nigerian Political Parties, p. 143.

Convention People's Party.¹⁰⁸ Azikiwe periodically made speeches exploring unity, usually in times of crises, but he never fully subscribed to the party as an apparatus of organizational control. As Sklar noted:

. . . this writer ventures to suggest that few of his contemporaries will object to the characterization of Azikiwe as a persuasive teacher, an effective propagandist, an able formulator of principles, an astute political tactician, a rugged antagonist, an aspiring personality, but a less than inspired organizer.¹⁰⁹

When Azikiwe became Eastern Premier in 1954, the results both of the regionalism and the NCNC's malady of organizational particularism became endemic. As noted previously, Ibo political culture was unique among Nigerian nationalities for the numbers of tribal sections and subsections, each with its own customs and traditions which inspired local or sectional loyalties. For instance, the Nnewi, the Mbaise, the Ohafia, the Ngwa, the Ikwerrri, all exemplified the remarkable strength of Ibo clan feeling.¹¹⁰ Over the years Ibo communities had given overwhelming bloc support to the NCNC. However, this support overshadowed other intratribal developments. With the rapid Ibo modernization there was reinforcement of a general ethnic identity but there was also a parallel growth of sub-ethnic, particularist sentiments. This particularism became most apparent after 1954 and was often translated within party councils into competition for amenities and eventually persistent intraparty conflict. The NCNC developed few organizational

¹⁰⁸G. O. Olusanya, "The Zikist Movement--A Study in Political Radicalism, 1946-1950," Journal of Modern African Studies, IV, 3 (1966) pp. 323-328.

¹⁰⁹Sklar, Nigerian Political Parties, p. 149.

¹¹⁰Smock, "Ethnicity and Attitudes," p. 501.

mechanisms or techniques to impose discipline or cope with conflict resolution.

In attempting to compete on several different electoral fronts, the NCNC exhibited the inconsistency and disorganization of a unitary party attempting to operate in a federal state. Although party power was technically lodged in the National Executive Committee, party operations in other regions entailed regional command. In the absence of any coherent leadership or mechanisms to deal with the various levels of party operations, incoherence was implicit in Sklar's claim that by 1958:

It seemed as though the formation of an anti-Azikiwe political cartel embracing ethnic associations and local factions had become a distinct possibility. In the West, opposition to Azikiwe was centered. . .in Lagos; in the East increasingly vehement criticisms of Azikiwe by influential leaders of the Ibo State Union was indicative of discontents of several local factions that were not unified on a regional basis.¹¹¹

Internal conflict and factionalism within the NCNC grew despite the restructuring of the party to determine membership on a direct, individual basis. By 1959, the party had nearly 200 branches scattered throughout Nigeria with nearly half a million members. Membership recruitment, however, could not camouflage serious organizational weaknesses in securing effective party action. As Post pointed out:

It is. . .essential to ensure effective coordination of activity between the branches, which itself depends upon effective direction and supervision from the center. This again implies the existence of an effective apparatus of professional party organizers both at central headquarters

¹¹¹ Sklar, Nigerian Political Parties, p. 207.

and in the Regions. This was the first and great weakness of the NCNC as a political party; it never possessed such an apparatus.¹¹²

After 1951, when regional Working Committees were created, there was a tendency for the party to operate as a federation of three parties rather than as one unified body. As Post further noted, relations between NCNC National Headquarters and its regional leaders sometimes took on the appearance of foreign relations between sovereign entities, rather than the passing of messages between different levels of an established hierarchy.¹¹³ The organizational facade of the NCNC could not disguise the party's incoherence. Periodic disputes wracked the NCNC, undermining and eventually destroying its footholds in other regions.

Electoral challenges to the NCNC in its home region underscored the segmentation of the Ibo political culture and the party's own organizational deficiencies. The importance of the Ibo cultural matrix to party coherence was pointed up by Mackintosh:

The NCNC. . .has always been a gathering of clan and town unions. . .and it included virtually all persons and organizations which exercised local influence in Ibo territory. As a result the NCNC has continually faced internal disputes as to which section, person, or group was to control the party machine and nominate candidates in a given area. And if one clan or community succeeded in capturing a branch or gaining nomination for its candidate, this was seen as a local dispute rather than as a threat to the NCNC and the losers might stand as independents, expecting to rejoin the Party after they had

¹¹²K. W. Post, "National Council of Nigeria and the Cameroons--The Decision of 1959," Nigerian Government and Politics, ed., John Mackintosh (Evanston, 1966), pp. 411-412.

¹¹³Ibid., p. 413.

won the election. So the NCNC has had to face an opposition trying to exploit local feelings in non-Ibo areas and the constant danger of divisions and independent candidates from within its own ranks.¹¹⁴

Within the segmented Ibo political system "government" consisted of the collective rule of representatives of each segment and not in imposition of a central authority standing above the federated units. In this perspective it is not surprising that the Ibo political class was the main proponent of post-war radical, militant nationalism and a unitary state structure. However, as Wolpe has asserted no less noteworthy was the parallel development of a highly cohesive and organizationally sophisticated pan-Ibo movement, the very success of which ultimately undermined the pan-Nigerian aspirations of the Ibo-led NCNC and, subsequently, was one of several factors operating to impair the national legitimacy of an Ibo-led military regime.¹¹⁵ Further, as Wolpe contends, the stability of the Ibo political system lay in ad hoc ever shifting alignments at different levels of the society rather than in hierarchical, continuously functioning structures and institutions.¹¹⁶ In this perspective, in analyzing NCNC coherence and adaptability, such "shifting alignments" were also destabilizing as obviously the party was only nominally "hierarchical" and seldom "continuously functioning." In effect, NCNC party structure was a mirror image of the segmented political culture in which it was spawned.

Two recent studies exhibit the influence of micropolitical

¹¹⁴ Mackintosh, "Electoral Trends," p. 522.

¹¹⁵ Howard Wolpe, "Port Harcourt: Ibo Politics in Microcosm," Journal of Modern African Studies, VII, 3 (1969), p. 469

¹¹⁶ Ibid., p. 474.

ethnicity on NCNC coherence and adaptability. Audrey Smock, in studying Mbaise, the largest county-council area of the Eastern Region, explored the relationships between the party and the numerous ethnic unions in this area. As Smock argues:

Conflict between central party directives and local loyalties haunted the NCNC from its inauguration. . . . The resilience of the primary ethnic groups resulted in part from the organizational deficiencies of the NCNC and also reflected the strength of the ethnic unions. . . and the greater relevance for their members than the political party. As a more particular and smaller unit, the ethnic group could provide a better framework than the inclusive NCNC through which to compete for scarce economic resources and political rewards.¹¹⁷

The ironies involved in the resurgence of sub-ethnic loyalties and the consequences for party coherence emerge from such a micropolitical study. It would seem that any efforts to build a coherent, adaptable NCNC in the Eastern Region were victim of the very electoral success of the party among the Ibo. Too, concurrent with electoral successes in the 1950's came stepped up economic development and distribution of amenities in the region. In this environment Smock contends:

. . . while modernization diminished both the objective differences between the constituent ethnic units and their relevance, the exigencies of political participation reinforced more primary groups as units of identification. Political participation accenuated the significance of clans, since the clan was the most inclusive grouping. . . through which economic amenities and political nominations could be distributed.¹¹⁸

In the absence of adequate structural mechanisms for conflict resolution, NCNC electoral success at the regional level had actually a detrimental influence on party coherence. Paradoxically, a regional

¹¹⁷ Audrey G. Smock, "The NCNC and Ethnic Unions in Biafra," Journal of Modern African Studies, VII, 1 (1969), pp. 21-22.

¹¹⁸ Ibid., pp. 24-25.

electoral defeat for the NCNC would have been disastrous in the game of zero-sum politics but victory brought only increased dissention at the local level.

Similarly, in a study of ethnicity in Port Harcourt, Wolpe found that urbanization in the East often stimulated both intra-and inter-ethnic competition:

Communal identities comprised the most convenient categorisation in the new urban community, and the primary points of social and political reference for the newly urban citizens. From this perspective, Port Harcourt politics were from the outset 'ethnic politics'; and Port Harcourt's non-Ibo patricians, no less than their Onitsha Ibo and Owerri Ibo successors, were 'ethnic' political actors.¹¹⁹

In this largely Ibo city narrow ethnic loyalties (rural home administrative units) generally determined social relationships and political affiliations. However, differences in communities of origin, religion, class, and occupation meant that politically salient identities were in a state of constant flux.¹²⁰ Party coherence in such an environment would have been extremely difficult to achieve.

Urban Port Harcourt and rural Mbaise had no corps of active NCNC members and only a shoddy party structure which operated generally at election time. The resurgence of Ibo ethnic and sub-ethnic unions occurred simultaneously with NCNC electoral sweeps. The organizational weakness of the party derived from its lack of a role in the local political system as political affiliation could not provide the basis for demand articulation as virtually everyone belonged to the NCNC. Thus, party organization and coherence were secondary to and

¹¹⁹Wolpe, "Port Harcourt," p. 480.

¹²⁰Ibid., p. 485.

overshadowed by the particularistic ethnic unions. That this phenomenon took place in both rural and urban settings in the East lends credence to Wolpe's claim that his study:

. . . calls into question the widely held view that, as economic development accelerates, the creation of new, functionally specific social identities will eventually undermine the organizational bases upon which communalism rests. Viewed over time, communal structures and sentiments in Port Harcourt not only have persisted but appear to have been diversified and politicized.¹²¹

Thus, the weakness of NCNC party apparatus--endemic in other regions--was clearly exposed in the East by the dynamics of Ibo sub-ethnic loyalties. These loyalties were only a further dimension of the evolving ethnicity which fundamentally influenced party institutionalization in all regions.

¹²¹Ibid., p. 489.

CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSIONS

It is not surprising that Nigeria should have come to mirror the full range of problems of nation-building in Africa. There is nothing natural about most of Africa's multitribal states, and building a sense of community is one of the main challenges that confronts Africa's new leadership. The basic integrative problems faced by Nigeria, analyzed through the prism of party politics in this study, tend to make the original estimates of Nigerian stability grossly overstated.

During the first decade of independence Nigeria experienced five years of civilian rule characterized by steadily escalating political tension and violence. The seemingly entrenched multiparty political system was abruptly and violently overthrown in early 1966 by a small military force most analysts had considered politically unimportant if not impotent. A second military coup, preceded and followed by widespread inter-ethnic bloodshed, led to near disintegration of the Nigerian state with the secession of the Eastern Region as the independent Republic of Biafra. This secession precipitated a thirty month civil war. Nostalgic illusions of the stability and unity of the First Republic were shattered. In retrospect, rather than being the African exemplar of a stable democratic system, Nigeria was more realistically a model of political dissension, contradiction, and conflict. There is ample evidence to show that Nigeria bought social modernization at the

price of political degeneration and decay.

As the most populous state in Africa, Nigeria was characterized by its ethnic diversity and intense communal pluralism. The politics of Sub-Saharan Africa are typified by competition among ethnic blocs grouped within the confines of the numerous states. Nigeria forms a triple example of this phenomenon. For instance, contemporary Nigerian political evolution was dominated by the Fulani-Hausa, Ibo, and Yoruba groups. Although these three large ethnic clusters do not constitute a majority of the total Nigerian population, each singly is larger than many other nation states of Sub-Saharan Africa. In fact these three groups might qualify for what Geertz considered as "possible, self-standing maximal social units, as candidates for nationhood."¹ The jockeying for power among these three ethnic groups corresponds markedly to that of a power struggle between nation and nation. The peculiar colonial policies and constitutional formulas cast each of these three groups as a core majority in a three-region arrangement which remained basically unchanged until after independence. These regional ethnic blocs were characterized not only by fundamentally dissimilar traditional orders but also by dysrhythmic tempos of modernization during the colonial period.

Basic to this study is the assumption that political development in Africa must be viewed initially as the process of building an institutional framework within which the game of politics can be played. One of the primary institutions to have evolved in Africa has been the political party and the Nigerian political system to a large extent

¹Clifford Geertz, "The Integrative Revolution," Old Societies and New States, ed. Clifford Geertz (New York, 1963), p. 111.

reflects the evolution and operations of the three large parties. Fleming has claimed that the penultimate goal of political development is a self-sustaining accumulation and distribution of power and ultimately the values which power buys.² This process implies an institutional structure and, in the case of Nigeria, the prime institutional focus must necessarily include the political parties. This is not to say that these parties are important simply because they provide convenient and functional facsimilies of Western practice. Rather, an analysis of party evolution on the Nigerian scene provides some insight into the enormous diversity of Nigeria's ethnic groups, their traditional political orders, and the problems encountered by the tribal based parties in their quest for power and institutionalization. Thus, just as the Nigerian political order has been shaped by its parties, the parties have in turn reflected the cleavages within this order.

In studying Nigerian political evolution one is struck by both the complexities and contrasts inherent in the ethnic matrix of this nation of sub-nations and the continued resiliency of primordial attachments in modern politics. Far from disappearing, these widely embracing ethnic attachments, though often disclaimed or ignored, have exhibited an amazing durability despite appeals to supra-tribal nationalism and despite efforts to achieve measures of political integration on a national scale. A study of Nigerian party politics is very much a study of evolving ethnicity.

Nigerian interethnic politics involved questions of systemic change and culture far deeper than could be exhibited in formal

²William G. Fleming, "Political Science and African Politics," Journal of Modern African Studies, VII, 3 (1959), p. 501.

structures of government or written constitutions. As noted, Nigeria did not evolve as an organic political entity. In spite of this fact, the British left Nigeria with full formal structures of government and administration, a national anthem and flag, political parties and all the trappings of sovereignty. However, it is all too apparent that the institutional apparatus and ritual symbols of statehood preceded the achievement of nationhood. Underlying these surface legacies of modernity there existed contradictions, cleavages, and centrifugal forces which prevented the growth of truly national political institutions and resulted in the disintegration of the Nigerian polity into civil war.

It is asserted that tribal attachments and the traditional political order have not been eroded but have actually been reinforced by modernization and the advent of modern political processes. In Nigeria it is obvious the parties not only reflected the persistence of such attachments but actually manipulated ethnic particularism and sectional loyalties to grasp and maintain power. Such manipulation often resulted in stark interethnic confrontation which neither the parties nor the central or regional governments could control. The changes affected by dysrhythmic modernization and steadily escalating interethnic tension occurred simultaneously. The incapacity of the parties or the governments to channel such change and resolve such conflict was noted by Rothchild:

In theory governmental, party, and military authorities in third world countries exercise great control over political, social, and economic matters within the state; in practice, this institutional authority is somewhat more

apparent than real. By displaying the inability of these structural mechanisms to deal with the crises of political integration, interethnic conflict exposes the fragility and limited nature of the government's capacity for control.³

The colonial period was a critical era in the evolution of Nigerian constitutionalism, the growth of indigenous political organizations, and the reinforcement of regional insularity and ethnic attachments. As this study claims, British policies of indirect rule and "unity through diversity" contributed substantially to the dominant role of traditional forces in the Nigerian political system. Integration of the various heterogeneous segments of Nigeria was not the original intention of the architects of indirect rule. Imperial hegemony was maintained by superimposing a small cadre of British administrators onto a preexisting traditional political structure. The British preserved and reinforced the centralized emirate system making it a static but inexpensive showpiece of rule by proxy. British colonial policy was predicated on upholding the "natural rulers and institutions" and this was accomplished by drawing a curtain of isolation across the North effectively insulating this region from the educational, political, social, and economic changes generated in the South. Because of the fundamental differences in Northern and Southern traditional orders, indirect rule ideally suited to the centralized, authoritarian emirate system was abortively applied elsewhere.

The independence which the emirs lost in the colonial Pax Britannica was replaced by a far greater security in office. The British retained the emirs at the apex of the traditional political pyramid and

³ Donald Rothchild, "Ethnicity and Conflict Resolution," World Politics, XXII, 4 (1970), pp. 597-598.

utilized the same traditional elite to lead the new native authority system. This system largely paralleled the old emirate structure but placed the emirs and their retainers in charge of a vast web of patronage and administrative services. Far from atrophying under colonial overlordship, emirate theocratic rule, reactionary by some standards, proved adaptive and resilient in its demonstrable ability to accommodate its basic structure to modern realities without seriously shifting the nature or balance of power in its own ranks or the region. In their advisory role, the British acquiesced to an indigenous authoritarian system which allowed no basis for legitimate opposition and, on the face of it, was incompatible with the elective system of government. Further, in an insular and conservative Northern political system in which opposition was tantamount to treason, the British did not hesitate to collaborate with the emirate oligarchy in suppressing any opposition to a political structure which each sedulously sought to preserve. Thus, Anglo-Fulani accommodation in the mutually advantageous policies of indirect rule perpetuated the role of a traditional elite whose adaptive potential extended even to the grafting of political party activity onto the native authority structure.

The evolution of political parties occurred during a period of colonial reforms which attempted to reconcile regional values--accentuated by indirect rule--with the intention of laying the foundations of federalism. The reforms of 1922-1954 exhibited the enormous problems and contradictions inherent in building a national unity while allowing for regional diversity. In the twenty-five year period between the Clifford Constitution of 1922 and the Richards Constitution of 1947 nationalist activity was isolated to the South, and the North

remained insulated from agitational politics. The Richards Constitution laid the foundations of a federal system by providing regional deliberative bodies whose composition was derived mainly from local native authorities. By 1958 regional governments had become key centers of power and the composition of the Federal House of Representatives henceforth was to be based on total population which favored the North in a ratio of 54:46. Herein lay a crucial factor for party development: Nigeria was to become an independent federation of semi-autonomous regions in which one region--the North--was larger than the other regions combined. In a classically distorted and unbalanced federal arrangement the three ethnic-regional parties vied for power and institutionalization.

Primordial ethnic loyalties in Nigeria were politicized in the arena of competitive electoral democracy. Most critically, the ethnic based parties were prime catalytic agents in cultivating a new political tribalism. A corollary hypothesis of this study asserted that the strength of regional political organizations based on tribal forces and loyalties prevented the development of national political parties. A summary of the criteria used to analyze the party system point out the composite effects of evolving regional-tribal forces and attachments on the Nigerian polity.

Autonomy

None of the major parties examined in this study could be considered autonomous. Each depended on core ethnic group support while the bulk of party leadership came also from these same groups. In examining Nigerian party autonomy within the context of growing

regionalism and tribal nationalism, it seems more apropos to classify Nigeria as three one-party systems rather than one three-party system. Admittedly, the commercial-professional political class which dominated the parties of the South was much less clearly delineated than the narrow theocratic elite which dominated the North. Each class, however, deliberately manipulated tribal attachments and cleavages to grasp and maintain regional power. In this regard the concepts of traditionality and modernity were not dichotomous but mutually reinforcing for the so called traditionalists were "modernizing" while the modernists were "traditionalizing." Furthermore, it is obvious that traditional authoritarianism successfully permeated leadership and behavior patterns of party politics in Northern Nigeria. The NPC, though labeled a political party, was in essence more an aggregation of factional, emirate interests operating as an evolved electoral arm of the native authorities. Most Southern politicians grossly underestimated the adaptive potential of this monolithic structure in the arena of party politics. Thus, autonomy provides a basic though incomplete picture of party institutionalization.

Adaptability

Party adaptability points out the divergence of the party's aims in attempting to establish electoral footholds outside their respective regions. By 1960 it was apparent that de facto one-party rule had come into existence in the regions and that the parties would use any means at their disposal to maintain these regional power bases. The NCNC and AG each attempted to establish electoral footholds in the minority regions of the other--the Delta region of the East and the Midwestern

region of the West. Neither party succeeded. The two Southern parties also attempted to build sustained support in minority areas of the lower North. Again, both parties failed. Though neither Southern party ever successfully shifted or extended its electoral appeal, both achieved the dubious distinction of manipulating tribal nationalism in desperate and increasingly violent electoral clashes. NPC tactics were no exception. For all the parties, tribal chauvinism and paranoia made excellent politics. In contrast to the NCNC and AG, the NPC never attempted to become a national party in the sense of extending its electoral base beyond the minority areas of its own region. Through the vast local leverage of the native authority structure and outright intimidation the NPC consolidated power throughout the North. From its regional electoral base alone the emir dominated NPC swept to absolute power in Kaduna and Kaduna was the key to Lagos. Thus, none of the parties were adaptable on a national scale and the capacity of the NPC to monopolize the North made efforts to escape regional encapsulation by the NCNC and AG exercises in electoral futility.

Coherence

Interparty and intraparty struggle among the regionally based groups exposed varying degrees of incoherence. Disunity, which plagued early nationalist and NYM efforts, remained a constant divisive factor affecting particularly the Southern parties. For instance, the Western AG based in the most modernized region of the Federation, developed deep divisions in its multiple roles as opposition party at the center and North and government leader in Ibadan. The AG internal regionalist-unitarist power struggle, exploited by the NPC-NCNC

coalition at the center, split the AG and set the stage for party re-alignment and an even more violent confrontation on a North-South axis. The NCNC, as the oldest of the three parties, suffered from lack of organizational apparatus to be government leader in Enugu, coalition partner in Lagos, and opposition party in the West. In the East, ethnic politics and NCNC electoral victories stimulated latent sub-ethnic attachments. The number and strength of ethnic unions revealed both the structural weakness of the NCNC and also the fact that NCNC electoral domination actually contributed to the strength of Ibo sub-ethnic unions at the expense of a strong party organization. In the North, with the entrenched native authority structure, the overarching mechanism of Islam, a disproportionately larger demographic base, the NPC achieved a degree of coherence lacking in the South. These factors in part explain the seeming paradox of the insular, conservative Northern region being able to dominate the technologically advanced and modernized South. Thus, none of the parties were coherent national organizations and only the NPC with its narrow elite and exclusively Northern orientation could claim to have achieved substantial regional unity.

If there were any pervasive ideology in Nigerian party politics it was that of regionalism. In spite of attempted electoral thrusts by the NCNC and AG outside their home regions, regionalism which fed on tribal attachments became the modus operandi for party survival. The rival regional political classes in seizing power retribalized politics and condoned methods which erupted periodically into public violence. The peculiar effects of zero-sum party politics was that by often making legitimate opposition impossible violent confrontation became

inevitable. Rather than to moderate or prevent such ethnic based violence the parties more often manipulated and provoked it. In retrospect it would seem that both the constitutional and party systems in Nigeria were as much the victims of political and social fragmentation as its causes. It is the conclusion of this study that pre-1966 constitutional formulas and competitive party politics were dysfunctional for national integration in Nigeria. The failure of the Nigerian party system to be institutionalized on a national scale represents an African dimension to the study of political development and political decay.

A SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Akpan, Ntieyong U. Epitaph to Indirect Rule. London: Cass Press, 1967.
- Anber, Paul. "Modernisation and Political Disintegration: Nigeria and the Ibos," Journal of Modern African Studies, V, No. 2 (1967), pp. 163-179.
- Andreski, Stanislav. The African Predicament: The Pathology of Modernization. London: Michael Joseph Press, 1968.
- Anene, J. C. Southern Nigeria in Transition. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1966.
- Apter, David. The Politics of Modernization. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1965.
- Awa, Eme O. Federal Government in Nigeria. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1964.
- Awolowo, Obafemi. Awo: The Autobiography of Chief Obafemi Awolowo. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1960.
- Azikiwe, Nnamdi. Zik: A Selection of Speeches of Nnamdi Azikiwe. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1961.
- Barnard, F. M. "Culture and Political Development: Herder's Suggestive Insights," American Political Science Review, LXIII (February, 1969), pp. 379-397.
- Bascom, William R. and Melville Herskovits, eds. Continuity and Change in African Cultures. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1959.
- Bascom, William R. "Some Aspects of Yoruba Urbanism," American Anthropologist, LXIV, No. 2 (April, 1962), pp. 684-702.
- _____. "Urbanization Among the Yorubas," American Journal of Sociology, LX, No. 5 (March, 1955), pp. 446-454.
- Bello, Ahmadu. My Life. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1962.
- Blitz, Franklin, ed. The Politics and Administration of Nigerian Government. New York: Frederick Praeger, 1965.
- Bretton, Henry L. "Political Science Field Research in Africa," Comparative Politics, II, No. 3 (April, 1970), pp. 413-444.

- _____. Power and Stability in Nigeria. New York: Frederick Praeger, 1962.
- Burns, Sir Alan. History of Nigeria. London: Allen and Unwin, 1963.
- Carlston, Kenneth S. Social Theory and Tribal Organization. Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1968.
- Carter, Gwendolyn, ed. National Unity and Regionalism in Eight African States. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1966.
- _____. Politics in Africa: Seven Cases. New York: Harcourt Brace & World, 1966.
- Carter, Gwendolyn and William O. Brown, eds. Transition in Africa: Studies in Political Adaptation. Boston: Boston University Press,
- Coleman, James and Carl Rosberg, Jr., eds. Political Parties and National Integration in Tropical Africa. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1964.
- Cowan, L. Gray. Local Government in West Africa. New York: Columbia University Press, 1958.
- Crowder, Michael. A Short History of Nigeria. New York: Frederick Praeger, 1962.
- Davidson, Basil. Black Mother, The Years of the African Slave Trade. Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1961.
- Deutsch, Karl. "Social Mobilization and Political Development," American Political Science Review, LV, No. 3 (September, 1961), pp. 493-514.
- Diamond, Stanley. Nigeria--Model of a Colonial Failure. New York: American Committee on Africa, 1967.
- Dike, Onwuka. Trade and Politics in the Niger Delta, 1830-1850. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1956.
- Dudley, B. J. "Federalism and the Balance of Political Power in Nigeria," Journal of Commonwealth Political Studies, IV, No. 1 (March, 1966), pp. 16-30.
- _____. "The Nomination of Parliamentary Candidates in Northern Nigeria," Journal of Commonwealth Political Studies, II, No. 1 (1963-1964), pp. 45-58.
- _____. "Traditionalism and Politics: A Case Study of Northern Nigeria," Government and Opposition, II, No. 4 (July, 1967), pp. 509-524.
- Easton, David. "An Approach to the Analysis of Political Systems,"

- World Politics, IX, No. 3 (April, 1957), pp. 383-401.
- Eisenstadt, S. N. "Modernization and Conditions of Sustained Growth," World Politics, XVI, No. 4 (July, 1964), pp. 576-595.
- Elias, T. O. Nigeria, The Development of its Laws and Constitution. London: Routledge and Paul, 1967.
- English, M. C. An Outline of Nigerian History. London: Longmans, 1964.
- Etzioni, Amitai, ed. Social Change. New York: Basic Books, 1964.
- Ezera, Kalu. Constitutional Development in Nigeria. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1960.
- Fage, J. D. An Introduction to the History of West Africa. Cambridge: Oxford University Press, 1962.
- Feit, Edward. "Military Coups and Political Development," World Politics, XX, No. 2 (January, 1968), pp. 179-194.
- Fieldhouse, D. K. The Colonial Empires. New York: Delacorte Press, 1967.
- Finer, S. E. "The One-Party Regimes in Africa: Reconsiderations," Government and Opposition, II, 4 (1967), pp. 491-509.
- Fleming, William G. "American Political Science and African Politics," Journal of Modern African Studies, VII, No. 3 (1969), pp. 495-510.
- Fletcher-Cooke, John. "The Failure of the 'Westminster Model' in Africa," African Affairs, LXIII, No. 252 (July, 1964), pp. 197-204.
- Flint, John E. Sir George Goldie and the Making of Nigeria. London: Oxford University Press, 1965.
- Forde, Daryll and G. I. Jones. The Ibo and Ibibio Peoples of South-eastern Nigeria. London: Oxford University Press, 1950.
- Geertz, Clifford, ed. Old Societies and New States. New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1963.
- Gifford, Prosser and William Roger Louis, eds. Britain and Germany in Africa. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1967.
- Green, M. M. Ibo Village Affairs. London: Sedgewick and Jackson, 1947.
- Hailey, Lord. An African Survey. London: Oxford University Press, 1957.

- Haines, C. Grove, ed. Africa Today. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1955.
- Halpern, Manfred. "A Redefinition of the Revolutionary Situation," (Unpublished paper, Princeton University, 1968).
- _____. "Toward Further Modernization of the Study of the New Nations," World Politics, XVII, No. 1 (October, 1964), pp. 157-181.
- Harris, Richard. "Nigeria: Crises and Compromise," African Report, X, No. 3 (March, 1965), pp. 25-47.
- Hatch, John. A History of Postwar Africa. New York: Frederick Praeger, 1965.
- Hazlewood, Arthur, ed. African Integration and Disintegration. New York: Oxford University Press, 1967.
- Heussler, Robert. Yesterday's Rulers--The Making of the British Colonial Service. Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1963.
- Himmelstand, Ulf. "Tribalism, Nationalism, and Rank-Equilibration and Social Structure--A Theoretical Interpretation of Some Socio-Political Processes in Southern Nigeria," Journal of Peace Research, II (1969), pp. 81-103.
- Hodgkin, Thomas. African Political Parties. Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1961.
- _____. Nationalism in Colonial Africa. New York: New York University Press, 1956.
- _____, ed. Nigerian Perspectives. London: Oxford University Press, 1960.
- Hogben, Sidney John. Muhammedan Emirates of Nigeria. London: Oxford University Press, 1930.
- Huntington, Samuel. "Political Development and Political Decay," World Politics, XVII, No. 3 (April, 1965), pp. 386-430.
- _____. Political Order in Changing Societies. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968.
- Johnson, Samuel. The History of the Yoruba. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul Ltd., 1966.
- Johnston, H. A. S. The Fulani Empire at Sokoto. London: Oxford University Press, 1967.
- Jones, G. I. The Trading States of the Oil Rivers: A Study of the Political Development in Eastern Nigeria. London: Oxford University Press, 1963.

- Jordan, Robert S. Government and Power in West Africa. New York: Africana Publishing Corporation, 1969.
- July, Robert W. The Origins of Modern African Thought. New York: Frederick Praeger, 1968.
- Kilson, Martin. "Authoritarian and Single Party Tendencies in African Politics," World Politics, XV, No. 2 (January, 1963), pp. 262-295.
- Kitchen, Helen. "The Forty-two Independent States of Africa," Africa Report, XIV, No. 1 (January, 1969), pp. 48-51.
- Kirk-Green, A. H. M., ed. The Principles of Native Administration-- Select Documents. London: Oxford University Press, 1965.
- Kritzcek, James and William H. Lewis, eds. Islam in Africa. New York: Van Nostrand Reinhold Company, 1969.
- Kuper, Helda, ed. Urbanization and Migration in West Africa. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1965.
- Kuper, Leo and M. G. Smith, eds. Pluralism in Africa. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1969.
- La Palombara, Joseph, ed. Bureaucracy and Political Development. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963.
- La Palombara, Joseph and Myron Weiner, eds. Political Parties and Political Development. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966.
- LeVine, Robert. Dreams and Deeds: Achievement Motivation in Africa. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1966.
- Levy, Marion. "Patterns of Modernization and Political Development," Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 358 (1965), pp. 29-41.
- Little, Kenneth. West African Urbanization--A Study of Voluntary Associations in Social Change. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1966.
- Lloyd, P. C. Africa in Social Change. Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1967.
- _____. "Development of Political Parties in Western Nigeria," American Political Science Review, XL, No. 3 (September, 1955), pp. 693-707.
- _____. "Sacred Kingship and Government Among the Yorubas," Africa, XXX, No. 3 (July, 1960), pp. 221-237.
- Lloyd, P. C. and A. L. Mabogunje, eds. The City of Ibadan. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1967.

- Lugard, Edward. The Dual Mandate in Tropical Africa. Hamden, Connecticut: Archon Books, 1965.
- Mackintosh, J. P. "Electoral Trends and the Tendency to a One-Party System in Nigeria," Journal of Commonwealth Political Studies, I, No. 2 (1961-1963), pp. 194-211.
- _____, ed. Nigerian Government and Politics. Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1966.
- Mackenzie, W. J. M. and Kenneth Robinson, eds. Five Elections in Africa. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1960.
- Macridis, Roy and Bernard E. Brown, eds. Comparative Politics. Homewood, Illinois: The Dorsey Press, 1968.
- McEwan, P. J. M., ed. Twentieth Century Africa. London: Oxford University Press, 1968.
- Miller, Norman M. "The Political Survival of Traditional Leadership," Journal of Modern African Studies, VI, No. 2, pp. 183-201.
- Millikan, Max F. and Donald L. M. Blackmer. The Emerging Nations and United States Policy. Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1961.
- Mosca, Gaetano. The Ruling Class. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1939.
- Ndem, Eyo B. "Changing Political Structure due to Changing Force in Nigeria," International Journal of Sociology, VII, No. 1 (July, 1966), pp. 160-174.
- Newbury, C. W. The Western Slave Coast and Its Rulers. London: Oxford University Press, 1961.
- Niven, Sir Rex. Nigeria. New York: Frederick Praeger, 1967.
- O'Connell, James. "Inevitability of Instability," Journal of Modern African Studies, V, No. 2 (1967), pp. 181-191.
- Odomosu, Idowu O. Nigerian Constitution: History and Development. London: Sweet and Maxwell, 1963.
- Ojo, G. J. Afolabi. Yoruba Culture. London: University of London Press, 1966.
- Okafor-Omali, Dilim. A Nigerian Villager in Two Worlds. London: Faber and Faber, 1965.
- Olusanya, G. O. "The Zikist Movement--A Study in Political Radicalism, 1946-1950," Journal of Modern African Studies, IV, No. 3 (1966), pp. 323-333.

- Ottenberg, Simon. "Improvement Associations Among the Afikpo Ibo," Africa, XXV, No. 1 (January, 1955), pp. 1-26.
- Perham, Margery. Lugard--The Years of Adventure. London: Collins Press, 1956.
- _____. Lugard: The Years of Authority. London: Collins Press, 1956.
- _____. Native Administration in Nigeria. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1962.
- Post, K. W. J. Nigerian Federal Election of 1959. London: Oxford University Press, 1963.
- Pye, Lucian. Aspects of Political Development. Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1965.
- _____. "The Concept of Political Development," Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Sciences, 358 (March, 1965), pp. 1-13.
- Riggs, Fred W. Administration in Developing Countries: The Theory of Prismatic Society. Boston: Houghton-Mifflin, 1964.
- Rivkin, Arnold, ed. Nations by Design. Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday and Co., 1968.
- Rotberg, Robert. A Political History of Tropical Africa. New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1965.
- Rothchild, Donald. "Ethnicity and Conflict Resolution," World Politics, XXII, No. 4 (July, 1970), pp. 597-616.
- _____. "The Limits of Federalism: An Examination of Political Institutional Transfer in Africa," Journal of Modern African Studies, IV, No. 3 (1966), pp. 275-293.
- Rustow, Dankwart. "Modernization and Comparative Politics," Comparative Politics, I, No. 1 (October, 1968), pp. 37-52.
- Schacter, Ruth. "Single Party Systems in West Africa," American Political Science Review, LV, No. 2 (June, 1961), pp. 294-307.
- Schwartz, Frederick A. O. Nigeria--The Tribes, the Nation, or the Race. Cambridge: The M. I. T. Press, 1965.
- Shils, Edward. Political Development in the New States. The Netherlands: Moutan and Co., 1962.
- Sklar, Richard. "Contradictions in the Nigerian Political System," Journal of Modern African Studies, III, No. 2 (1965), pp. 201-213.

- _____. Nigerian Political Parties. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963.
- _____. "Nigerian Politics in Perspective," Government and Opposition, II, No. 4 (July, 1967), pp. 524-539.
- Smock, Audrey C. "NCNC and Ethnic Unions in Biafra," Journal of Modern African Studies, VII, No. 1 (April, 1969), pp. 21-35.
- Smock, Audrey C. and David R. Smock. "Ethnicity and Attitudes Toward Development in Eastern Nigeria," Journal of Developing Areas, III No. 4 (July, 1969), pp. 499-512.
- Smythe, Hugh H. New Nigerian Elite. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1960.
- Tansey, S. D. and D. G. Kermode. "The Westminster Model in Nigeria," Parliamentary Affairs, XXI, No. 1 (Winter, 1967-68), pp. 19-38.
- Tilman, Robert O. and Taylor Cole, eds. The Nigerian Political Scene. Durham: Duke University Press, 1962.
- Uchendu, Victor. The Ibo of Southeast Nigeria. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1965.
- Von der Mehden, Fred R. Politics of the Developing Nations. Englewood: New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1964.
- Ward, Robert. "Political Modernization and Political Culture in Modern Japan," World Politics, XV, No. 4 (July, 1963), pp. 564-597.
- Welch, Claude E., ed. Political Modernization. Belmont, California: Wadsworth Publishing Co., 1967.
- Wheare, Joan. The Nigerian Legislative Council. London: Faber and Faber, 1949.
- Whitaker, C. S. "Three Perspectives on Hierarchy: Political Thought and Leadership in Northern Nigeria," Journal of Commonwealth Political Studies, III, No. 1 (March, 1965), pp. 1-20.
- _____. "A Dysrhythmic Process of Political Change," World Politics, XIX, No. 2 (1967), pp. 190-217.
- Wiedner, Donald. A History of Africa South of the Sahara. New York: Random House, 1962.
- Willner, Ann Ruth. "The Underdeveloped Study of Political Development," World Politics, XVI, No. 2 (April, 1964), pp. 428-468.
- Wolpe, Howard E. "Port Harcourt: Ibo Politics in Microcosm," Journal of Modern African Studies, VII, No. 3 (October, 1969), pp. 469-494.

Younger, Kenneth. The Public Service in the New States. London: Oxford University Press, 1960.

Zolberg, Aristide. "The Structure of Political Conflict in the New States of Africa," American Political Science Review, LXII, No. 1 (March, 1968), pp. 70-88.

VITA

Ronald L. Haxton

Candidate for the Degree of
Master of Arts

Thesis: EVOLUTION AND INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF NIGERIAN POLITICAL
PARTIES

Major Field: Political Science

Biographical:

Personal Data: Born in Sabetha, Kansas, December 16, 1940, the son of Mr. and Mrs. Harry A. Haxton.

Education: Graduated from Wetmore High School, Wetmore, Kansas, in May, 1958; attended Kansas State Teachers College of Emporia from 1958 to 1962, receiving the Bachelor of Arts degree in the Social Sciences; attended Oklahoma State University from 1962 to 1964 and from 1967 to 1970, completing requirements for the Master of Arts degree with a major in Political Science in May, 1971.

Professional Experience: Graduate Teaching Assistant, Department of Political Science, Oklahoma State University, 1962-1964, and 1967-1968; Federal Intern, Washington, D. C., Department of the Treasury, Summer, 1963; Peace Corps Volunteer, Ras Gobena Dachew Secondary School, Wollisso (Ghion), Ethiopia, 1962-1964; university instructor (Prince Bede Mariam Laboratory School) in the Faculty of Education, Haile Sellassie I University, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, 1966-1967.

Professional Organizations: Member of Pi Gamma Mu and Pi Sigma Alpha.