

" 'SEEING AS...' IS NOT PART OF PERCEPTION."

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

A central theme in the first half of the eleventh chapter in Part II of Ludwig Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations is " 'Seeing as...' is not part of perception."¹ The purpose of this paper is to understand and appreciate the significance of this claim. In order to understand this theme I shall first introduce the concept 'seeing as' by presenting several illustrations regarded as paradigm cases of 'seeing as'. After this familiarization with the legitimate uses of 'seeing as', I shall illustrate several ways in which the concept has become a part of theories of perception. I will conclude this chapter with reasons for saying, " 'Seeing as...' is not part of perception."

Paradigm Uses of 'Seeing As'




Figure 1. The Duck-rabbit²

Figure 1 is an ambiguous figure that can be seen as a picture of a duck or as a picture of a rabbit. Wittgenstein calls this experience of seeing the same drawing in different ways "noticing an aspect."³ A

person seeing this figure may simply see it as a duck. If asked, "What do you see?" -- he would simply answer, "A picture of a duck," or "I see a duck." Later when he understands that it is an ambiguous figure that can also be seen as a rabbit, he would reply, "I see it as a duck." Some people see the aspect change, that is, see it first as a rabbit, then as a duck. They might respond to the question, "What do you see?" with "Now I'm seeing it as a rabbit." To learn how another person sees the drawing, we can show him the figure and ask him what he now sees it as. His response might be "A picture of a duck" or he could point to real ducks or draw us a picture of a duck. If however he drew an exact copy of the figure that he sees or described in detail the color and shapes he saw, it would not tell us what he saw it as.

'Seeing as' can also be used in connection with Figure 2.



Figure 2. Triangle Figure

Wittgenstein says⁴ we can see this figure as a geometrical drawing, as a hole, as a mountain, as a wedge, as an object that has fallen over, as hanging from the apex and as numerous other things. In both the duck-rabbit figure and this triangle figure in order to see the various aspects, one has to be familiar with certain objects. We can't see the duck-rabbit as a duck unless we are familiar with the shape of ducks. We can't see the triangle as a wedge or a mountain unless we are familiar with wedges and mountains. A difference in the case of seeing the triangle as various things and seeing the duck-rabbit as a rabbit or as a duck is that seeing the triangle as something fallen over takes imagination, whereas seeing the duck-rabbit as a duck or rabbit does not.

With the duck-rabbit we might mistakenly believe that it was a picture of only a rabbit. We might simply not be aware that it was an ambiguous figure. We cannot simply see the bare triangle as something fallen.⁵

Another of Wittgenstein's examples of 'seeing as' involving imagination is a game in which the children take crates or boxes to be a house. Here we could say the children see the crates as a house.⁶

Figure 3 can be seen as a white cross on a black background or as a black cross on a white background.




Figure 3. The Double Cross

This illustration differs from both the previous ones in that here one could show someone the two ways the figure can be seen simply by pointing to a part of the drawing. He would simply point to the color of triangle that forms the cross in order to have that cross stand out. A second difference between the double cross and the earlier illustrations is that in the earlier ones it would be necessary to have a familiarity with certain objects in order to see the various aspects. With the double cross

One could quite well imagine this as a primitive reaction in a child even before he could talk.⁸

A final figure that will illustrate the use of 'seeing as' is

Figure 4.




Figure 4. The Staircase Figure

This figure can either be seen as a staircase or as an overhanging cornice. This figure is important to us because here, as in one of the previous drawings, we are involved with the possibility of illusion.⁹

A more common use than with these illustrations found in introductory psychology textbooks is the use of 'seeing as' in aesthetics. We are sometimes told in order to fully appreciate a painting we must see the ball in the painting as actually floating. Or we must see an object as solid or as extending into viewer space. With music we are told to hear a bar as an introduction. There are also some uses of 'seeing as' that do not become involved in theories of perception. For example, in discussions of symbolism it is common to hear, "I saw that as meaning...." Also there are sentences such as, "A graduate student might see his thesis as an insurmountable task." In these two examples there is no temptation to regard 'seeing as' as part of perception.

Two Ways 'Seeing As' Becomes Involved in Theories of Perception

The previous figures illustrate the paradigm use of 'seeing as'. In these cases we don't say we see the same thing and describe it differently but rather that we see the same thing differently. In the history of philosophy there is not a continuous argument with different schools on how we discuss ambiguous figures. So how does the 'seeing as' locution enter into philosophical discussion?

One way 'seeing as' becomes a part of philosophical theories of perception is in the discussion of illusions. Illusions are of central importance in theories of perception. R.J.Hirst in discussing the role of illusions as one of the facts that must be taken into account in any fully adequate view of perception makes the following statement:

But even if perceiving a round table as round or in perspective as elliptical is taken as immediate confrontation needing no further analysis, seeing a stick as a dagger (or a piece of wax as a tomato or a bush in a fog as a man) can hardly be equally simple and immediate. In such cases and in hallucinations one has to admit that one seems to see an object quite different from that present to the senses. This can fairly be described as perceptual consciousness of the (ostensible) object (dagger, wax or man) and distinguished in analysis from actually perceiving an object (dagger, wax or man). And in view of the subjective similarity it is but a short step to suppose that perceptual consciousness of X' also occurs in perceiving X as X; the difference is between illusory and veridical perception of an X lying not in the common consciousness but in whether X is present and acting on the same organs. Any philosophy of perception should analyze this perceptual consciousness and explain how it may occur without the presence of the corresponding object.¹⁰

So the 'seeing as' locution is used to express illusions. Illusions are important in theories of perception because, as in the above case, these illusions seem to indicate the need to analyze seeing into a step that goes unnoticed in veridical perception. That is, explanation is necessary whenever what we describe as seeing does not correspond to what is there to see. Even though, when we say we see a bent stick in the water, we are corrected and told it is a straight stick that we see, we find it essential to distinguish this mistake from a lie or not knowing what bent sticks are. After all, we didn't just say 'bent stick', but we really saw it as bent. We seem to have the same reason or cause to say bent stick in the case of illusions as we do when there is actually a bent stick. So our analysis of seeing seems to require an element called perceptual consciousness, visual experience or something of which we are immediately aware.

Ambiguous figures also seem to indicate the need for a perceptual consciousness or visual experience. With an ambiguous figure we sometimes see it first as a rabbit, then as a duck. So it seems as if something must be changing and since the figure does not change, it must be something mental that changes. To indicate that 'sensa' are to some degree mind-dependent, Charles D. Broad says:

When I look at the 'staircase figure', which is given in most psychology text-books as an instance of ambiguous figures, it seems to me that it actually looks sensibly different from time to time. Its sensible appearance changes 'with a click', as I look at it, from that of a staircase to that of an overhanging cornice.¹¹

So in thinking about perception, it has seemed essential to note that people sometimes see things differently than they are, i.e., cases of illusions. Also ambiguous figures give us cases in which one person sees the same thing differently at different times or sees it differently than another person sees it. Wittgenstein states:

We said that one reason for introducing the idea of sense-datum was that people, as we say, sometimes see different things, colors, e.g., looking at the same object.¹²

What Wittgenstein says here of sense-data is similar to what I have said about perceptual consciousness and sensa. We have seen then that one way the expression 'seeing as' enters into theories of perception is that it is used to express illusions and to state the way we see ambiguous figures. Illusions and ambiguous figures are thought to illustrate that seeing involves sense-data or perceptual consciousness. Theories of perception must explain the connection between sense-data or perceptual consciousness and the objects that we perceive.

A second way 'seeing as' becomes involved in philosophical discussion is with the question, "What do you really see?" We are familiar

with a similar question in a context such as a husband admonishing his easily frightened wife with "Did you really see the burglar?" and her subsequential more accurate description, "Well, no, but I saw something move." However, "Do you really see a house or do you just see the surface of the front of the house and reason that it is a house."— is a different type question and one with which we are not familiar. When the husband asks his wife if she really saw a burglar, he implies that he doubts there actually was a burglar. However, the unfamiliar question does not imply that there was not actually a house. It is rather a question about how we know there is a house. At first we are inclined to answer that we just see the house. But if someone persists in asking what we really saw, indicating that we could not have seen the complete house from any one position, we don't feel capable of providing the accurate description of what we saw that he demands. No description seems possible. I can't name things like houses, buildings, trees because all that I really see must be the surface of these objects and at a particular angle. All the things I name have more than a purely visual reference. Perhaps I should make a wax model to show what I see. But the wax model would also have more than just a surface. A shell model of the objects would have a back side and a cardboard model would have to have supports. Perhaps the correct way to represent what I see is with a painting.¹³ But a painting is only two dimensional.

'Tis commonly allow'd by philosophers that all bodies, which discover themselves to the eye, appear as if painted on a plain surface, and that their different degrees of remoteness from ourselves are discovered more by reason than by the senses.¹⁴

So perhaps what I really see is a painted canvas and I only reason that

the objects are in a three dimensional space. But then what about the edges of objects in the painting; should they be blurred or sharp and clear? To show what you really saw does one paint each strand of hair separately or simply paint a colored patch?¹⁵

This inclination to ask, "What do you really see?" seems to come from both epistemology and science. In much of epistemology there is a search for fundamental statements that we can use as our basic building blocks of knowledge. We do not want to make an error in these fundamental statements by inferring from such information as the surface to the claim that what we see is an object. We want to make the smallest possible commitment in these fundamental statements. Statements reporting the colors and shapes seem to involve the least amount of inference and so the least chance of error, and so are the most accurate description of what we see. So it seems as if the answer to "What do you really see?", so far as it could be answered, should be in terms of colors and shapes.

The same temptation to give the ideal description of what we see comes from the sciences. Science tells us there is a pattern of excitation on the retina. Excitations on the retina would then seem to be at least a component of seeing. The process of seeing seems to have to get us from these excitations to houses and things we normally claim to see.

We normally see much more than the color patches or the excitations that we seem reduced to in order to answer the question, "What do you really see?" We see the building across the street, the car passing in front of it and the tree bending in the breeze. We have to get from the exact description of what we see that we were tempted into giving to the things we see. Given excitations or patches of color, how is it

that we see objects? A possibility seems to be that we see the patches of colors as objects.

Thus when I look at a house, my sense-datum is in actual fact a constituent of the front wall at most (not of the back or inside walls or roof) and only of the front surface of that. But is it only this front surface that I am perceptually conscious of? Not at all. What is before my mind is a house with four outside walls and many inside ones: all this and nothing less is what I take to exist. And not only so: what I take to exist is often not just a house but a particular house, with such and such a particular sort of back (though it is only the front part that is present to my senses) and such and such a set of rooms, thus and thus situated. Of course it may not in fact be that particular house, say Mr. Jones's; it may not be a house at all—I may be having an hallucination. Still I do see it as Mr. Jones's house.¹⁶

So part of seeing the building across the street is seeing it as a building across the street.

This involvement of 'seeing as' in theories of perception might be illustrated by a person looking at the duck-rabbit and not being able to see it as either the duck or the rabbit and then finally seeing it as say the duck. We might want to insist that seeing the figure as a duck was more than just seeing the lines in the drawing without any organization. Here we get the idea that something is added to the simple seeing of the lines when they are seen as something. It is as if seeing the lines as a duck had two elements: a simple seeing and something more. The simple seeing is like the seeing of color patches or the excitations. The request for an accurate description of seeing is to understand what we simply see with nothing added. The second element is that we notice that what we see in the pure way compares with my mental image of a duck. If it matches favorably, we report the information the comparison gives by saying, "I see the lines as a duck." So to explain

seeing, we analyze 'seeing as' into a sensory soaking up of the visual impression and the cognitive comparing of this to our mental images.

In this way theories of perception take 'seeing as' to be the link between sensations and information about the world. Or said in different terms, 'seeing as' is thought to provide us with the link between the immediate experience involved in seeing and what we believe about what we see. Don Locke in trying to figure out how ideas are 'blended' with immediate experience in perceiving that something is such and such says:

It seems to be a necessary truth that whenever I perceive anything I perceive it as something--as a piece of chalk, or as a cigarette, or as a white cylindrical object, or as a white blur on the edge of my visual field--so perhaps to take it to be a piece of chalk is to see it as a piece of chalk, while to take it to be a cigarette is to see it as a cigarette? For, as Wittgenstein points out, the concept of 'seeing as' is one where the concepts of seeing and thinking overlap.¹⁷

In contrast to these ways 'seeing as' is said to be involved in perception we have Wittgenstein's remark, " 'Seeing as...' is not part of perception." This is not the conclusion from years of work in a laboratory. It is a statement about concepts. The concept 'seeing as' is not part of the concept 'perception' as 'seeing' and 'hearing' often are. In other words, the concept of 'seeing as' is a distinct concept from 'seeing' used to make perception reports. This will mean that 'seeing' and 'seeing as' have a different function, different criteria, and are taught differently.

It should be seen from the previous material that 'seeing as' has often formed a part of a theory of perception either by the theory finding it important to account for ambiguous figures and illusions stated in the 'seeing as' locution, or as a way to explain the difference be-

tween the ideal description of what we see and the way we normally describe what we see. Wittgenstein's statement is then a rather radical departure from much of the work previously done in attempting to give an adequate account of perception. What previous theories of perception were attempting to account for Wittgenstein claims is not a part of perception.

Differences between the Concepts 'Seeing' and 'Seeing As'

It is important in establishing that 'seeing' and 'seeing as' are different concepts to note that the object of sight in 'seeing' is different from the 'object' of sight in 'seeing as'.¹⁸ Consider the case of two men hunting for ducks. One man calls, "I see one--over there on the far side of the reeds!" This would be a perception report and the object of sight is obviously a duck. Compare this to staring at an ambiguous figure and exclaiming, "Now I see it as a duck." Here we might say the 'object' of sight is the duck aspect. The hunter can draw an exact copy of what he saw to show his companion that he saw a duck. The hunter can point to the duck. The duck aspect can be pointed out or taught but not pointed to.

Remember that with the ambiguous figure no one sees a duck or a picture of a duck. There is no duck to see. If someone actually sees a duck, then there would have to be a duck. With the duck-rabbit there is not a duck nor is there a picture of a duck. There is an ambiguous figure that can be seen as a duck, but no duck. Most people can see the ambiguous figure as a duck but no one by looking at it can see a duck. This is not an empirical generalization but a simple fact about the concepts 'seeing' and 'seeing as'. If someone thought the figure was sim-

ply a picture of a duck, we could understand why he made such a mistake.

A second point in noting the difference in the concepts 'seeing' and 'seeing as' is to be aware of the difference in circumstances and functions of the two concepts. A paradigm situation of a perception report is one in which one person has a better view than others. The report then serves to inform the others what is there. The question, "What is there?" is synonymous with "What can you see?" in these situations. With the ambiguous figure both people have the same view and "What do you see?" could not be replaced by "What is there?"

Another difference is that we can command someone to see the ambiguous figure as a duck, but we cannot command someone to see a duck. There is a command such as "Now see the staircase figure as a staircase and draw a figure climbing the stairs." -- but not a context or function for a sentence like, "Now see this staircase." Also there is no teaching someone to see ducks. Of course we do have to teach a person to recognize ducks. A person that can't recognize a duck still sees ducks. But a person that can't recognize ducks can't see the figure as a duck. Even a person that can recognize ducks won't necessarily be able to see the figure as a duck. Sometimes we have to hold the drawing at different angles to help a person see the aspect. This is more obvious in examples such as the face-vase puzzle or the wife-mother-in-law puzzle in which there is sometimes real difficulty in seeing one aspect.

It is not that it is an empirical generalization that it takes a certain know-how to be able to 'see as'. It is that one of the criteria for 'seeing as' is the way one behaves towards the object. We only say that a person 'sees it as' if he can unhesitatingly make certain

applications of the figure. For example, a person that can be said to see it as a rabbit would be able to draw teeth for the rabbit and the person seeing it as a staircase could draw a person climbing up the stairs. In order for us to say a person can 'see it as', that person has to be capable of performing these sorts of tasks. It is not that one has to learn something before it clicks for him, but rather that we would correct our claim that he 'sees as' if he were not able to perform these tasks. On the other hand, given that the person is not blind there is no task or technique he has to be able to master before we say he sees a duck.

I shall mention a similarity between 'seeing' and 'seeing as', for there are similarities, and the mistake is in thinking there are no differences. One reason we use the expression 'seeing as' rather than 'interpret' or 'know' is that with 'seeing as' like 'seeing' we do not treat the object as if it was one of several possibilities. That is, the way we react to the object of sight is not one of considering alternatives. This is connected with the fact that we verify 'seeing as' and 'seeing' claims much the same.

In order to more completely understand and appreciate Wittgenstein's claim that " 'Seeing as...' is not part of perception," I shall show the importance of failing to recognize the conceptual differences between 'seeing' and 'seeing as' in three theories of perception. I will first consider the theory of perception found in Clarence Irving Lewis' Mind and the World Order. My primary reason for considering this work is to point out the problems to which the assimilation of 'seeing as' to 'seeing' can lead. It is important to see that this assimilation would lead to problems in order to realize the importance of emphasiz-

ing the differences in these concepts. Next I shall discuss the claim of Godfrey N.A. Vesey that "All seeing is seeing as." Understanding why this claim was made and why it is wrong will lead to clearer understanding of the difference in 'seeing' and 'seeing as' and related concepts such as 'looks like' and 'recognize'. The third theory that I will consider is that of Russell Norwood Hanson. He argues that an analysis of 'seeing' not involving 'seeing as' is absurd. He insists that the concept 'seeing as' illuminates 'seeing' by showing that perception involves conceptual organization.

NOTES

¹Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations (New York, 1958), p.194. The relevant pages in this chapter are pp. 192-214. I shall note the passage to which reference is made by giving the page number followed by a number indicating which passage on the page is referred to with the first beginning paragraph that is a separate passage being number one.

²ibid., p. 194-1

³ibid., p. 193-3

⁴ibid., p. 200-3

⁵ibid., p. 207-8

⁶ibid., p. 206-5

⁷ibid., p. 207-3

⁸ibid., p. 207-6

⁹ibid., p. 208-1

¹⁰R.J.Hirst, "Perception", The Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed P. Edwards (New York, 1967), p. 80. I believe the sentence "This can fairly be described as perceptual consciousness of the (ostensible) object (dagger, wax or man) and distinguished in analysis from actually perceiving an object (dagger, wax or man)" should actually read, "This can fairly be described as perceptual consciousness of the (ostensible meaning 'apparent') object (dagger, tomato or man) and distinguished in analysis from actually perceiving an object (stick, wax or bush)."

¹¹C.D.Broad, "The Theory of Sense", Perceiving, Sensing and Knowing, ed. R.J.Swartz (New York, 1965), p. 108.

¹²Wittgenstein, "Notes for Lectures on 'Private Experience' and 'Sense Data' ", ed. Rush Rhees, Philosophical Review, LXXVII (1968), p. 316.

¹³Cf. Wittgenstein, "Notes on 'Philosophical Psychology' ", in private circulation, p. 90.

¹⁴David Hume, A Treatise of Human Value, ed. L.A. Selby-Bigge (Oxford, 1888).

¹⁵I believe I am indebted to Wittgenstein for this question.

¹⁶H.H. Price, Perception (London, 1932), p. 152. His italics.

¹⁷Don Locke, "Perceiving and Thinking", Aristotelian Society for the Systematic Study of Philosophy, Supplementary Volume XLIII (1968), p. 175.

¹⁸Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations. Cf. p. 193-1.

¹⁹*ibid.*, p. 213-5.

CHAPTER II

INTERPRETING PRESENTATIONS

C. I. Lewis' theory of perception in Mind and the World Order involves an assimilation of the concepts 'seeing' and 'seeing as'. An examination of this theory will show that overlooking the differences in these concepts was an important factor in Lewis' theory and responsible for some of the theory's inadequacies. I shall first give a general account of Lewis' theory of perception and then examine in greater detail the two elements in his analysis of 'perception'.

Lewis' Theory

One of Lewis' "principal theses" in Mind and the World Order is that there are two elements in knowledge that must be distinguished: a cognitive element and a sensory element.¹ Lewis believes this to be such a fundamental fact that every adequate theory of knowledge accepts it as true. Theories such as idealism and realism often seem to omit one of these elements in their analysis of the nature of knowledge, but actually they simply overstress one element. If a theory of knowledge did not contain a cognitive element, then knowledge would just be what was sensory, and there would be no account of the distinction between illusory and veridical perception. On the other hand, every theory, even idealism, must admit that there is something sensory in experience that cannot be altered by mind. Every experience so far as it has more

than just an aesthetic quality, according to Lewis, contains a cognitive and a sensory element.

There are in our cognitive experience two elements: the immediate data, such as those of sense, which are presented or given to the mind, and a form, construction, or interpretation, which represents the activity of thought.²

Of course, perception has more than just an aesthetic quality, for it is by perceiving that we gain information about our world. According to Lewis, seeing is a form of knowledge or a cognitive experience and so we must distinguish a given and an interpretive element in seeing. Empirical knowledge and perception both contain these same two elements.

It is important in understanding Lewis' theory of perception to see that it is not only empirical knowledge that contains a sensory element and an interpretive element, but that seeing also contains both these elements. If Lewis was claiming only that empirical knowledge contained a given and an interpretation of that given, then this would perhaps simply mean that upon seeing the same object, e.g., a tree, due to a difference of interest, we might classify it differently. If this was what Lewis meant, we would not see the tree differently, but simply because of our interest, use a different classification scheme for identifying it.

Lewis is maintaining more than this. For Lewis to give an account of the nature of knowledge, it is necessary for him to analyze basic facts such as seeing a tree. According to Lewis, it is only when we have no philosophical problems that we can afford to let such things as 'seeing a tree' go unanalyzed. In his theory of knowledge every cognitive experience, including the experience of seeing a tree, is analyzed into the two elements. An adequate theory of perception must, of

course, account for the fact that we do see trees rather than just lines and color patches. If Lewis simply meant that we interpret what we see differently and this shows the activity of the mind in knowledge, then he would claim that what we interpret is what we see, e.g., houses, people, trees, etc. But it is not the case that we simply interpret these objects that we see, but rather, in seeing we interpret the elements of the given. So it is not just that we interpret what we see but that in seeing there is interpreting.

I have mentioned that according to Lewis an adequate theory of perception will be able to account for the fact that we see such things as trees, houses, etc., and also provide grounds for the distinction between veridical and illusory perception. Another fact that theories of perception are required to account for is that we sometimes see the same thing differently. However the fact that people sometimes see things differently plays a mere important role in Lewis' theory than this. Situations in which we would employ 'seeing as' are used to illustrate both the elements in seeing.

The example Lewis considers to facilitate our understanding of the interpretive in seeing is an adult seeing an object as a fountain pen, while a child sees it as a plaything. It is not simply that the child and the adult interpret what they see differently, but that they see the object differently. The fact that people see the fountain pen differently reveals that the mind plays a role in seeing, and Lewis has called this role "interpreting."

To make it clear that an analysis of seeing involves an element other than this interpretive element, Lewis points out that people cannot see the fountain pen as just anything. For example, one cannot see

a fountain pen as soft, or as paper, or as a cubical.³ So there is an element involved in seeing which the mind cannot alter: this unalterable element is the sensory element in seeing and called the 'given.' Hence from the fact that people with different backgrounds would give different answers to the question, "What do you see when you see this?"⁴— it is concluded that seeing an object is interpreting the given.

In order to illustrate some of the philosophical problems which develop in this theory of perception, we need a more complete account of Lewis' analysis of 'seeing'. This can be provided by further characterizing what Lewis means by the 'given' and the 'interpretive elements' in 'seeing'.

According to Lewis, the child and the oyster open their eyes to a buzzing, blooming world of chaos. This buzzing, blooming world is a "stream of consciousness"⁵ and as such is the absolute given because this is unalterable by mind. This stream of consciousness is differentiated, and so the human mind can break up the stream into elements. These elements which are unique occurrences are called "presentations." Each presentation is a unique occurrence, but it is qualitatively identical to other presentations.

Lewis believes it is essential that presentations are distinguished from the properties of objects. A difference between presentations and properties is that types of presentations or quale have no names. We on occasion do refer to the presentations with a sentence such as, "This looks red." However, Lewis is careful to note that when "this" refers to a type of presentation, this sentence has a different meaning than the common times when 'this' refers to the property of an object.

When 'this' refers to the presentations, there is not any actual predication, because the subject and predicate coincide. "This looks red" would mean the same as the ejaculation "red look!"⁶ On the other hand, we say an object looks red, when on looking at it, we have presentations that are qualitatively identical to the ones we have when we look at a really red object under the proper conditions. So to say an object is red means, among other things, that if I see it under proper illumination, I will see it as red.

Another way of noting this difference between the presentations and properties of objects is that the properties of objects may be seen in different ways. The roundness of a penny may be seen as elliptical or a red object may be seen as a different color under different illumination.

According to Lewis, any time we apply a name, we are making a prediction about our future experience. In the example above, by calling the object red, we predicted that we would see it as red under the proper conditions. These predictions can be put in the form of hypotheticals; and there would be a great many of them meant by each word. "This is red" means, "If one sees it under standard illumination, one will see it as red," "If one sees it in blue light, it will look purple," etc. The application of a name which is the prediction of future experience is the interpretive element. To apply a name, which is to make an identification, is to interpret. If the hypotheticals are true, then the application of the name was correct. To sum up, we receive presentations and using these presentations as a clue to our future experience, we interpret what the object is. Our interpretation is correct if the list of hypotheticals meant by this interpretation is

verified. An example will make this clear.

For an example, I shall analyze seeing a fountain pen according to Lewis' theory of perception. With the normal background and desires of a graduate student wanting to write, I search the top of my desk. Suddenly I have a quite particular visual presentation -- it is the kind I roughly refer to as a gray, cylindrical presentation - gray, cylindrical look! I might interpret the presentation as the object looking gray and cylindrical. This would mean, "If I look at that object again under these conditions, it will look gray and cylindrical"; "If I change the illumination in certain ways, it will not look gray"; "If I change the angle from which I view the object, it will not look cylindrical," etc. However, because I do need to get my thesis written, I might interpret the 'gray, cylindrical' presentations as a fountain pen. If I make this interpretation of the presentations, then I see a fountain pen. Interpreting the presentations as a fountain pen means, "If I hold it in the correct position, it will mark on the paper"; "If I hand it to someone wanting a fountain pen, it will satisfy him"; "If I hold it, it will not melt in my hands." This list goes on and on, but Lewis tells us that we need not be embarrassed at not being able to think of this complete list even though it is simply what we mean when we call an object a fountain pen, because we usually are ignorant of the complete concept. If all these hypothetical statements are verified, then I do see a fountain pen. But since they cannot be completely tested, it is more accurate to say, "I see it as a fountain pen" rather than "I see a fountain pen."

I have thus far provided an account of Lewis' analysis of seeing. This analysis resulted from looking at a case in which it was suggested

that two persons with different backgrounds would see something differently. The example from which Lewis develops his analysis of 'seeing' is a case in which we would use the 'seeing as' locution rather than 'seeing'. His example of a child seeing the fountain pen as a plaything is similar to Wittgenstein's example of children seeing the chest as a playhouse.

This point is essential in understanding the connection between Wittgenstein's comments dealing with 'seeing as' and Lewis' position which does not seem on the surface to be concerned with the logic of 'seeing as' expressions. In Lewis' analysis of 'seeing', he thinks of cases in which people looking at the same object see it differently, and these are instances in which we ordinarily use the 'seeing as' locution. Using these instances as illustrations, he says 'seeing' is composed of an interpretive and a given element.

We have seen that Lewis' analysis of 'perception' into presentations and interpretation results from his attempt to account for not only veridical perception but also illusions and situations in which people see things differently. We can now turn our attention to an examination of 'presentation' and then, 'interpretation' in order to see if these make sense in an account of veridical perception, illusions, and 'seeing as' instances.

Recognizing Presentations

An interesting characteristic of presentations, according to Lewis, is that we can never know if another person has presentations qualitatively similar to our own when we both say we see the same object.

As between different minds, the assumption that a concept which is common is correlated with sen-

sory contents which are qualitatively identical, is to an extent verifiably false, is implausible to a further extent, and in the nature of the case can never be verified as holding even when it may reasonably be presumed.⁷

This leads to a philosophical puzzle that might be stated in the following question: how do I know that when I see a red triangle, I am seeing it like what you see when you see a red triangle? Or how do I know I have the qualitatively identical visual presentations when I see a red triangle as you have when you see a red triangle? As the above quote would indicate, Lewis' answer is that we could never know. It is like if I could see the red triangle the way you see it or 'through your eyes', perhaps I would call it a purple hexagon. Of course, we all call the object a red triangle because we were taught a common language, but each person's presentation of a red triangle might be different.

Suppose it should be a fact that I get the sensation you signalize by saying 'red' whenever I look at what you call 'green' and vice versa. ...We could never discover then so long as they did not impair the power to discriminate and relate as others do.⁸

Of course this problem cannot be resolved by each person drawing an exact representation of his visual impression. If upon looking at a red triangle, your visual impression was actually the same kind as the one I have when seeing a purple hexagon, you would simply draw the picture that resulted in your having a purple hexagon presentation which would be a red triangle.⁹ According to Lewis, every word has both a social meaning and a private meaning, and the private meaning is the presentation imagery. The private meaning or the denotation of a concept to an individual mind is the presentations that serve as clues for the application of the concept. It doesn't matter what the private

meaning is as long as we can consistently communicate with other people. Indeed Lewis' chapter on "The Pure Concept" is simply about this idea of a common meaning that transcends each of our own imageries. It seems as if much of the work Lewis does in Mind and the World Order is an attempt to explain how there can be so much agreement despite the possibility of complete discrepancies in basic visual presentations.

...that this 'common reality' is precisely one of the things which needs to be accounted for, in the face of the fact that we cannot reasonably suppose that presented or immediate experience is actually common to the degree that reality is.¹⁰

So our presentations never make any difference to our knowledge or communication. As long as we both call the same thing red, then it makes no difference whether I have qualitatively similar presentations. Hence the fact that we can never know whether others have similar or different presentations than we do when we see the same object is not important.

However, it is essential to Lewis' position that we are able to recognize the presentations. In order to make interpretations we must recognize the current presentations as qualitatively similar to former ones that I interpreted. For example, in order to see the fountain pen, I must recognize that I have the presentations that I have previously had in cases in which I interpreted what I saw as a fountain pen.

Lewis states that we cannot have knowledge of the presentations because there is no possibility of making an error with the presentations. Knowledge is the opposite of error and mistake, so where these are not possible, it would not be possible to have knowledge. Knowledge implies verification, and presentations do not have the temporal span necessary for verification that properties of objects have. So

verification also makes no sense in connection with presentation. That there can be no knowledge of presentation is a result of Lewis' fundamental doctrine that all knowledge has the two elements -- the interpretive and the given. However, it should be pointed out that for the same reason Lewis understood that we should not say "we have knowledge of the presentations," we also cannot say "we recognize them."

Lewis' problem of different people having different presentations even though they see the same object is more serious than Lewis reveals. It is not just that one does not know if others have qualitatively similar presentations when they see the same object, for how does one know others have any presentations at all? If there is no reason to believe they have qualitatively similar presentations, is there any reason to believe they have any presentations at all? We do say others see, and 'see' means 'interpreting presentations' so, if they see, they have presentations. But if this is what 'seeing' means, then how do we know others can see. We know they react to objects as we do by saying things such as "I see a fountain pen," but seeing is more than this, since it is interpreting presentations. It is obvious that, according to Lewis, if we say of someone that he sees, then we cannot claim he doesn't have any presentations, but how do we know to say he sees. Remembering that each person identifies what 'given' refers to in his experience, what if someone could not find anything in his visual experience to call the 'given'. Should he quit saying he can see or can he just assume that 'given' is there?

It would seem that we have no more reason to believe that others have any presentations than we do to say they have similar ones, and if 'seeing' means 'interpreting presentations', then we would not know if

others actually could 'see' and hence be in the rather awkward position of solipsism. Lewis has the possibility of avoiding solipsism with an analogical argument, but he does not use this for qualitatively similar presentations. Since all knowledge of objects is probable, perhaps it would not bother Lewis that the probability that others see is compounded another time.

Let us re-examine the way Lewis introduced presentations and interpretation in cases of 'seeing as' and how this accounts for illusion. The given was illustrated as explaining why we could see a fountain pen as a cylinder or as a good buy but not as soft. The fact that we could not see a fountain pen as a soft object indicated that there was something in our visual experience that was not alterable by the mind. The fact that we could see the fountain pen differently and different from the infant was explained as indicating the interpretive element in seeing. If we cannot know if others have qualitatively similar presentations, then we do not have a reason for introducing the idea of an interpretive element. Of course the locution 'seeing it as' does indicate that there is an 'it' that is in common when Lewis sees 'it' as a fountain pen and the infant sees 'it' as a plaything. But of course this 'it' is not a presentation; 'it' is the fountain pen. And if someone argued that 'it' isn't a fountain pen to the infant or that 'fountain pen' was just Lewis' interpretation of 'it', we could at least pick 'it' up and throw 'it' at them, and you can't throw presentations around the room. Unless we can assume that the presentations are similar, then there seems no reason to consider these illustrations of interpretations. Lewis says that we can presume that in a "broad sense" the presentations are 'qualitatively no different.'¹¹ But not being

told what this "broad sense" is, this is not of any help.

The same that has been said here about cases of 'seeing as' can be said about illusions. Lewis' explanation of illusions is that we get the same presentations as others that make a correct interpretation and so have veridical perception, but we make a different interpretation and this interpretation is wrong, since it results in predictions that are probably false. But now we find out that we can't know and that it doesn't matter if we have similar presentations as others have. So illusions cannot be accounted for by our having the same presentations, yet a different interpretation than others have, since it can never be known what presentations we have. All that can be known is what 'interpretation' a person makes. It is beginning to seem that the presentations don't really matter and that all that really matters is that I make a correct or incorrect interpretation.

Perhaps the presentations play a role we have not noted yet, and this might be revealed by looking at the case that illustrated the given. If we can never know if others have similar presentations, does the fact that we can't see the fountain pen as soft illustrate the given? Lewis could simply mean that you cannot apprehend the presentations you normally interpret as soft while seeing the fountain pen. It is not that you cannot apprehend the presentations I interpret as soft, but that you can't apprehend the ones you interpret as soft. But is this true? This would mean that seeing a fountain pen could not be analyzed into the elements apprehending the presentations you normally interpret as soft and interpreting this as a fountain pen. But although it may be the case that we usually do not apprehend the presentations we normally interpret as soft while seeing the fountain pen,

there is no reason why this is impossible, and as long as we interpret these as a fountain pen, then we are seeing a fountain pen.

It would seem that Lewis' point in illustrating the given by an instance such as not being able to see a fountain pen as soft means no matter what presentations you have, don't interpret it as soft. This is of course true for the analysis of seeing a fountain pen, because whatever presentations you have, if you interpret them as soft, then you are having an illusion. It would seem that Lewis' point here has to be that whatever presentations you have, don't call them soft. But then this is just to say whatever happens you will be wrong if you say you can see this fountain pen as soft and this tells us nothing about any unalterable abstraction of seeing. If anything turns out to be unalterable here, it is the language.

So whatever presentations we have, if we make the correct interpretation, then we do see that object; if we make an incorrect interpretation, then we are having an illusion. So having presentations seems to be an unnecessary element to seeing. And of course if presentations play no role in seeing, then there is nothing to interpret and so there could not be an interpretive element in seeing.

The fact that presentations are simply an assertion and can account for none of the above cases is also seen by looking at the way we are to recognize these presentations. I shall examine what Lewis says about the recognition of the presentations. "It may be said that the recognition of the quale is a judgment of the type, 'This is the same ineffable 'yellow' that I saw yesterday'."¹² One of Lewis' points is that this use of 'judgment' in this sentence would be a different sense of 'judgment' than normal for reasons similar to those he gave for not

using 'knowledge' in connection with presentations. The quoted sentence contains not only a different sense of 'judgment', but we need to overlook his use of 'see' here because of course he would not want to say we 'see' the presentations. He cannot of course say we 'see' the presentations because as indicated earlier, the criterion of an adequate theory of perception is that it accounts for the fact that we see objects such as trees. Also as I have indicated elsewhere, seeing is a form of knowledge, and there can be no knowledge of the presentations. Knowledge always goes beyond the presentations with an interpretation. So it is wrong to say that we 'see' the presentations. Also note that Lewis has to put 'yellow' in quotes to indicate that this word is normally used to refer to a property of objects and not as it here does to the presentations one interprets as yellow. So we could rephrase the sentence as, "These presentations are qualitatively similar to presentations I apprehended yesterday and interpreted as yellow."

However the importance of Lewis' discussion here is to point out that there is an immediate comparison of the given with a memory image, but this comparison "is immediate and indubitable; verification would have no meaning with respect to it."¹³ This direct comparison is not a normal use of memory because normally when we remember, one of the objects of comparison is "in objective reality." In this case, both the memory image and the quale are subjective.

Remember we are considering Lewis' recognition or identification of presentations by comparing them to the memory image of former presentations. But if the current presentations do compare with the memory image, then in the same circumstances we will interpret these presentations as we did the former. But since the interpretation and the

presentations are abstract elements in our seeing experience, the result will be that I will see the same thing this time as I did the time I apprehended the presentations I am remembering. Or without going too far from Lewis, we could say the result of this recognition by comparison will be that I will see the object as the same thing I saw before. One might remember that according to Lewis, at the point at which we are interpreting the presentation, since we have not checked any of the hypothetical statements that will confirm this interpretation, we have no reason to think that this is an illusion rather than perception. So, saying 'I see it as', which does not imply what the object actually is the way 'see' does, would seem desirable.

Lewis realizes that this is not the sense of 'comparison' that we might use in an instance such as identifying a criminal by comparing his face to the one in the photograph of a wanted poster. But if it is not this sense of 'comparison', what sense is it? Lewis acts as if there is another sense but does not tell us what it is. Wittgenstein makes us aware of the way 'seeing as' can lead us to think of a 'comparison' -- "...it is as if an image came into contact, and for a time remained in contact, with the visual impression."¹⁴ Or we might say the comparison is something like the presentation coinciding with the memory image. It is almost that we look through our memory image onto the presentation and if things align, then we see the object as a fountain pen. This perhaps gives us a picture of the idea of a comparison between presentations and memory images, but it does not give a sense for this use of 'comparison'. As Wittgenstein says, although 'seeing as' is not a comparison, it "strongly suggests" that it is.

And in this way 'seeing dashes as a face' does

not involve a comparison between a group of dashes and a real human face; and, on the other hand, this form of expression most strongly suggests that we are alluding to a comparison. 15

A comparison which makes no sense to verify could amount to no more than just saying these seem to me to be similar, and what seems to be, would then be the case. Lewis would be saying if your present presentations seem to you to be similar to your memory image of former presentations, then they are. This is very contrary to Lewis' former definition of presentations as the unalterable. It is not that when it is meaningless to talk of verification, then one cannot be mistaken, but rather that here it makes no sense to talk of making mistakes or of getting it right.

Since Lewis was using 'seeing as' instances to illustrate the elements in seeing, we can understand why he might think that 'seeing' was the result of a comparison. Although 'seeing it as a fountain pen while someone else sees it as a plaything' does suggest there is an 'it' in common in these two cases and the difference is in one case 'it' matches with the memory image of a fountain pen and another time with the memory image of a plaything, this matching or comparing makes no sense. It does not make sense because verification has no meaning in connection with it. It is not that there is no verification, but that 'verification' has no meaning in connection with this 'comparison'. And if 'verification' has no meaning, then "correct comparison" has no meaning. And if it doesn't make sense to talk about a "correct comparison", then how could it make sense to talk about a 'comparison'?

We can understand how pointless the ideal of 'recognition' or 'comparison' is here by noticing that it simply doesn't matter what we compare or how the comparison comes out or that we compare, just as

long as we say "I see a fountain pen" at the appropriate time. Wittgenstein helps us to see how senseless this notion of a 'comparison' here is. He states:

Always get rid of the private object in this way: assume that it constantly changes, but that you do not notice the change because your memory constantly deceives you.¹⁶

To apply this to Lewis' situation of comparing his present presentation with the memory image of former ones in order to give an interpretation of it and so see it as a fountain pen, we might get the memory image of presentations interpreted as fountain pens changing to say memory images of presentations interpreted as sticks, but we forget that this is the memory image of a stick and so still say, "I see it as a fountain pen." Here we see that this comparison is just empty theory, for it is surely senseless to talk of comparison where it does not matter what we compare. According to Lewis' analysis, such a situation as I have described above would have to involve this comparison, since according to Lewis' analysis it would be a case of 'seeing a fountain pen'. But if a similar situation happened with our identification of the criminal by comparing his face to the one in the photograph, we would laugh at the idea of a comparison here. That is, if instead of the photograph on the poster, we looked at the portrait of Lincoln on the five dollar bill and then pointed to a wanted criminal and said, "That is the wanted criminal," we could not explain this by saying we compared him to the portrait on the dollar bill. Whatever we did, it certainly wasn't a case of comparison.

Interpreting

Another problem Lewis' analysis of 'seeing' creates is that we can

never know any empirical fact with more than a high degree of probability. Lewis is of course fully aware that according to his theory of knowledge, we can never have more than probability in our knowledge of objects. He believes this is not a defect in his theory, but rather it is simply the case that we can never obtain certainty in regard to objects. We should feel the absurdity in Lewis' claim which would, for example, mean that he knows with a high degree of probability, or it is highly probable, that the object he has been writing his book with and occasionally staring at is a fountain pen. According to Lewis, 'fountain pen' means a list of hypothetical statements so long I could never completely verify them. We cannot completely verify this list, so we are barred from certainty. We are limited to reaching higher and higher degrees of probability as we verify more and more of the statements on our list.

What we mean by 'fountain pen' is "If I hold it in a certain position, it will write"; "If I smash it in my pocket, it will stain my clothes"; "If I use it for a long period of time, it will run out of ink," etc. So in order to know if we actually saw a fountain pen or simply experienced an illusion of one, we must verify this complete list. The list is impossible to completely verify, so we have to realize that we can only have probable knowledge of physical objects. We are banned from having certainty because the list of hypothetical statements is too long and if one of the untested statements would prove false, then we would be wrong that we saw a fountain pen -- we only had the illusion of one.

If this is what fountain pen means, then with Lewis' theory of perception, we cannot even have probable knowledge that we see a foun-

tain pen. Probable knowledge would be the result of verifying some of the statements but not all of them. As we verified more and more of the statements, we would gain higher and higher degrees of probability. But for the same reason we cannot verify that we see a fountain pen, we cannot verify any statement on this list. For example, if one member of the list of hypothetical statements for the meaning of fountain pen is "If I hold this object in such-and-such a position, it will write on the paper," I could never actually see the writing on the paper but only interpret my presentations as writing. Interpreting my presentations as writing would mean that I predict a list of hypotheticals could be verified. So in trying to verify one of the hypotheticals predicted of the presentations I interpreted as a fountain pen, I would simply get another list of hypotheticals needing verification and for each one on this list, another list. Since I could not verify any statement on this list, it is not that I can't have certainty about this object, but I can't even have any probability. If I could verify one of the hypotheticals, then I would have probability, but I can't verify any one hypothetical.

This is more serious than compounding probabilities because in order for probability to make any sense, we would need something like the number of true cases compared to the total number of cases, and here we would simply not know any true cases. As Wittgenstein says, it is as if we toss a coin to settle a toss. For Lewis, it could always look like rain, but never rain.

According to Lewis, seeing a fountain pen as a plaything is the result of an interpretation. Wittgenstein reminds us of some important differences between 'seeing as', 'seeing' and 'interpreting'.¹⁷ An in-

terpretation is like an hypothesis in that with either we seek evidence to support our claim. There are circumstances in which we might interpret something to be a fountain pen, but Lewis is not considering such circumstances. Perhaps when looking in a museum at common objects from another century, one might interpret an object as a fountain pen. However this is a very different circumstance than when Lewis is talking about the pen with which he is writing his book. In an actual interpreting case we would expect the person to say, "This is supposed to be a fountain pen," or perhaps he just goes on after a bit of hesitation. In such cases we could ask him why he interpreted it as a fountain pen. He might mention clues that led him to that interpretation rather than another such as ink stains on the tip. He might try to prove to himself that he had correctly interpreted it as a fountain pen by holding it in such and such a position and seeing if it would write on paper.

This is all rather foreign to cases of 'seeing' and 'seeing as'. If the child picks up the fountain pen and places it in his mouth and puffs on it in imitation of his father, could we ask why he sees it as a cigar? If there is such a question, it certainly is not one asking about evidence to support that way of seeing, but rather a question about the child's background. "Why did you see a fountain pen?" is obvious nonsense. The times in which someone would say of you, "He sees the fountain pen" or "He sees it as a fountain pen" are the cases in which you do not go on to test the object. It cannot be the case that all we are ever able to have is an interpretation. Interpretations function in contrast to cases in which "it might be this way" or "it might be that way," "I need more evidence but I think...", "it must be

like this because..." are out of place. That is, interpretation functions in contrast to cases in which we just react — where we don't proceed with caution.

So seeing a fountain pen is nothing like interpreting something as a fountain pen. We interpret something this way rather than another way. One of the differences between 'seeing as' and 'seeing' is that with 'seeing as' whoever says of himself or of another that they see something as something else must be aware of the possibility that there are other ways that the object can be seen. Perhaps the person cannot see the duck-rabbit as a duck, but if he uses the expression, "I see it as a rabbit" rather than, "I see a rabbit," then he at least knows that it can be seen in a different way. So a characteristic of 'seeing as' is that there are alternatives, as with interpretations, there are other alternatives. So perhaps Lewis' assimilation of the concept 'seeing as' and the concept 'seeing' allowed him to think of 'seeing' as the result of an interpretation. There is a difference in 'seeing as' and 'interpreting' in that interpreting involves gathering information to show that one interpretation is superior to another. Interpretations, like hypotheses, are situations in which we verify our interpretation. With 'seeing as' there is no verification.

Although 'seeing as' and 'interpretation' are different, the similarity in that they both involve alternatives and the fact that Lewis confuses 'seeing as' with 'seeing', help us to understand why Lewis might think of 'seeing' as an interpretation. Perhaps slipping from 'seeing' into 'seeing as' and then slipping from 'seeing as' to 'interpretation', allowed Lewis to think 'seeing' is an interpretation.

As a final comment on Lewis' analysis of 'seeing' into a presenta-

tion and an interpretive element, I would like to discuss the following passage:

Here perhaps we should like to reply: the description of what is got immediately, i.e., of the visual experience, by means of an interpretation—is an indirect description. 'I see the figure as a box' means: I have a particular visual experience which I have found that I always have when I interpret the figure as a box or when I look at a box. But if it meant this I ought to know it. I ought to be able to refer to the experience directly, and not only indirectly (as I can speak of red without calling it the colour of blood).¹⁸

I shall paraphrase a sentence from this passage in using Lewis' example and terms. According to Lewis "I see the object as a fountain pen" means "I have the particular presentations I have found I always have when I probably correctly interpret the presentations as a fountain pen." A criticism Wittgenstein makes that is relevant to our discussion is if it makes sense to talk about interpreting our presentations, it ought to make sense to talk about them without an interpretation, i.e., we ought to be able to refer as directly to a presentation as we can to red. With a color I can call a color the color of blood or refer to it as 'red'. So it seems with presentations I should be able to interpret one as the presentation of a fountain pen or refer to it with a name. But Lewis explicitly states that the presentations cannot be meaningfully named.¹⁹ If it doesn't make sense to give presentations a name, does it make sense to say, "This is a presentation of a fountain pen"? The demonstrative 'this' serves to remind us of criteria we have already adopted, not to give us a new criterion.

We can see this point clearly with an example like looking at a flower on a nature walk and the guide begins by saying, "This species is found in the damp undergrowth..." and we interrupt with the question

"What species did you say the flower was?" Normally he would give us a name and tell us how to recognize it. But what if his reply was that 'this species' had no name and there is no way to recognize it. We would be very puzzled and might wonder why he started his talk at this point on the walk. In this case the use of 'this' would be senseless as it is in connection with presentations which it makes no sense to recognize and so to name.

If it made sense to recognize something, then it would make sense to give this a name and it would make sense to refer to it with the demonstrative 'this'. But none of these make sense in connection with presentations. If it makes no sense to talk about 'recognizing presentations', what point is there in analyzing 'seeing' into 'presentations' and 'interpretations'?

NOTES

- ¹C.I.Lewis, Mind and the World Order (New York, 1965), p. 37.
- ²ibid., p. 38.
- ³ibid., p. 52.
- ⁴Cf. Ludwig Wittgenstein, "Philosophical Psychology", in private circulation, p. 89.
- ⁵Lewis, p. 58. Lewis gives the oyster as an example of a passive consciousness, p. 30.
- ⁶Cf. p. 278, whatever this ejaculation might mean.
- ⁷Lewis, p. 115.
- ⁸ibid., p. 75, Cf. p. 161.
- ⁹Norwood Russell Hanson, "On Having the Same Visual Experiences", Mind, LXIX (1960), p. 345. Hanson mentions the fact that the elongated figures of El Greco's painting could not be explained by suggesting that El Greco had an astigmatism.
- ¹⁰Lewis, p. 109.
- ¹¹ibid., p. 50.
- ¹²ibid., p. 125.
- ¹³ibid., p. 125.
- ¹⁴Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, p. 207-3.
- ¹⁵Wittgenstein, The Blue and Brown Books (New York, 1965), p.164.
- ¹⁶Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, p. 197-5.
- ¹⁷ibid., p. 212-5.
- ¹⁸ibid., p. 193-4.
- ¹⁹Lewis, pp. 5, 118, esp. 131.

CHAPTER III

"ALL SEEING IS SEEING AS"

In his article "Seeing and Seeing As" Vesey states, "All seeing is seeing as."¹ This is a very unusual statement. This statement plays a very important role in Vesey's theory of perception, and he restates it several times. Do we understand what this sentence means? We are familiar with the expression 'seeing as'. That is, we understand its use in such expressions as "Now I am seeing the reversible figure as a staircase." We also are familiar with the use in "He is seeing the ink blot as an organ player." We can think of numerous examples of 'seeing as', but do we understand Vesey's statement?

If we do understand Vesey's statement, then we would know why "No seeing is seeing as" and "Some seeing is seeing as" are false. That is, if we knew what Vesey's statement meant and thought it was true, then we would know why these were false. I am wondering if we even understand the statement.

If "all seeing is seeing as," then seeing a fork is seeing a fork as a fork.² Do I know what this means? That is, when would I use this expression? If someone at the dinner table asks me if I saw a fork as a fork, would I know how to answer? Would I know what to do to find the answer? I would know how to answer, if he asked me if I saw a reversible figure as a staircase.

We cannot think we understand what Vesey is saying in this context

simply because he uses words with which we are familiar. Vesey must explain to us what this statement means. Since people do not normally give a statement extra meanings, we might wonder why he gives this particular statement some special meaning. Vesey provides three different explanations of what the statement means. This chapter will be devoted to a discussion of these three proposed meanings of "All seeing is seeing as."

Used to Mark a Self-Contradiction

The first time he says, "I will mark my non-acceptance of these meanings for 'not see it as anything' by saying 'All seeing is seeing as'."³ By his non-acceptance of the meanings he accepts "I saw it, but I didn't see it as anything" as self-contradictory. So since "All seeing is seeing as" is to mark a statement as self-contradictory, the sentence cannot be an empirical generalization. Although the sentence appears to be a generalization, it is obvious from his arguments that it is a different kind of sentence than "All politicians are dishonest." So it would perhaps be less misleading to rephrase the statement "All seeing is seeing as" as "'Seeing' means 'seeing as'."

The discussion in the introduction on the difference between the concepts of 'seeing' and 'seeing as' makes it clear that 'seeing' does not mean 'seeing as'. That discussion reminded us of the fact that we can describe what we see by making an exact copy, but an exact copy will not be an adequate description of what we see a thing as. Another fact which convinced us of the difference in these concepts was that the report "I see a duck" is false, if there is not a duck present, but I can see an ambiguous figure as a duck.

Another point in realizing that all 'seeing' could not be 'seeing as' is made by Charles E. Burlingame.⁴ If "All seeing is seeing as," then when I see the duck-rabbit as a rabbit, it is true that I see the duck-rabbit. I could not see the duck-rabbit as a duck without seeing the duck-rabbit. But if "All seeing is seeing as," then I must have seen something else as a duck-rabbit, and seen something else as that something that I saw as a duck-rabbit that I saw as a duck. What could all these somethings be? You might try to say I saw the figure as a duck-rabbit and the lines as a figure. But then what is the something you saw as the lines? If "All seeing is seeing as," we would be involved in this regress. If Vesey meant by his statement, "All seeing is seeing as" that "'Seeing' means 'seeing as'," then it is false. But perhaps we have been too hasty in thinking we understood Vesey's claim, for he is not the only philosopher⁵ to have explicitly claimed this.

True and False Perception

Vesey states: "Another way of expressing the point that all seeing is seeing as is to say that perceptions, like judgments, are either true or false."⁶ The claim that there are true and false perceptions may not seem to be very helpful in understanding "All seeing is seeing as." It is not obvious what would be meant by a true or false perception or why "All seeing is seeing as" expresses this. In hopes of understanding what Vesey means by "All seeing is seeing as," I shall develop his reasons for saying perceptions are true or false.

It is an objective of Vesey's to show that perception does not involve judgment. Previous theories in their attempts to explain cases

in which things look different than they are have considered these mistakes. Never questioning the dogma that mistakes are the result of judgments, the theories result in the analysis of perception as involving judgment. Earlier theories of perception are committed to the following line of argument.

Things sometimes look different than they are.
 These cases could be called mistaken perceptions.
 A mistake is the drawing of a false conclusion
 from evidence.
 This drawing of a false conclusion is a judgment.
 Therefore perception involves judgment.

Vesey understands previous theories of perception as agreeing that perception involves judgments but disagreeing on what they think the judgment is about. There seem to be two possibilities here. Either the judgment is about material things or the judgment in perception is about non-material things. Vesey will show how either choice has led to an inadequate theory of perception. This will then give us reason for doubting that perception involves judgment.

One of the alternatives is that the judgment involved in perception is about material things. This apparently would mean that one judges things to be what they look like, i.e., if a thing looks like a torpedo, then I judge it to be a torpedo. Vesey shows that this is obviously false, because it makes good sense to say, "It looks like a torpedo, but it isn't one." In other words, we do not always judge things to be what they look like. So we realize this theory is inadequate. If judgment is involved in perception, it cannot be judgment about a material thing.

The other alternative agrees that perception involves judgment, because only judgment can be true or false, but disagrees that these judgments are about material things. According to this alternative,

judgment involved in perception is about non-material things. Vesey thinks the reasoning of those holding this alternative, called the sense-datum account, is that a material thing can look like something it is not. For example, we see something as a snake but since it is a stick, we are mistaken. To make a mistake means to infer from evidence to a false conclusion. So any situation that has the possibility of a mistake involves an inference. Unless there is to be an infinite regression of these mistakes, there must be something I am aware of that involves no inference. Since being aware of this something must involve no possibility of a mistake and so no inference, it must be that we are directly aware of this thing. This non-material thing is called a sense-datum. The sense-datum is then a thing, but not a material thing.

Since the sense-datum is a thing, it must have fully determinate qualities. A sense-datum cannot be just colored but rather must be a particular color, for example green, -must not be just any shade of green but a particular shade, peacock green. This is the basis of why this theory is inadequate. Since the sense-data must have fully determinate qualities, the theory cannot explain why we would make different judgments given the same data. To make this criticism clear, we can consider the following cases:

- Case 1 - We see something as green
 Sense-datum theory analyzes this into:
- a) We are directly aware of a peacock green colored sense-datum.
 - b) We think or judge green.
- Case 2 - We see something as peacock green
 Sense-datum theory analyzes this into:
- a) We are directly aware of a peacock green colored sense-datum.
 - b) We think or judge peacock green.

Case 3 - We see something as colored

Sense-datum theory analyzes this into:

- a) We are directly aware of peacock green colored sense-datum.
- b) We think or judge colored.

According to this theory there is no explanation as to why we would make these different judgments from the same data. We usually account for these different judgments by degrees of attention. But if we were immediately aware of sense-data and sense-data are things, there could be no explanation for cases we normally explain by degrees of attention.⁷ But attention is part of seeing and necessary to perception.

There are then two things wrong with the sense-datum account. It mistakenly assumes that illusions are the result of mistaken judgments. So it maintains that what an object is seen as is the result of a judgment. The second mistake is that what we apparently are immediately aware of is a thing.

Since perception has not been analyzed adequately into a judgment about a material thing or a judgment about a non-material thing, we have reason to believe that there is no judgment involved in perception. Moreover, the reason philosophers have thought there was judgment in perceptions was because illusions or non-veridical perception was understood as mistakes, and mistakes were thought to be the results of incorrect inference.

Vesey has discovered another way to explain illusions. Illusions are mistaken perceptions, but mistakes do not have to be considered as always the result of a judgment. Judgment doesn't have to be the only thing we consider true or false. We will simply call perceptions true or false, a false perception being roughly a perception in which a material object looks like something other than what it is. So if we

agree that perceptions can be true or false, by denying the old dogma that only judgments can be true or false, then we need not involve judgment in perception.

It is difficult to understand how Vesey thinks declaring that perceptions are now to be called true and false is going to solve a philosophical problem concerning perception. This difficulty shows in the fact that we are a bit lost as to what calling a perception true or false would mean. It is not a perception report that is now called true or false because these always have been, but the perception itself is true or false. A false perception seems to be what we normally would call an illusion. In having an illusion you have something false like a box with a false bottom or false teeth.

In attempting to understand "All seeing is seeing as," we have seen that the reason for saying perceptions are true and false is that it will allow us to give a theory of perception that does not involve judgment. Hopefully we can have a theory that does not involve judgment because both the possible alternatives of analyzing 'perception' as involving judgment have been shown to be inadequate.

To further understand Vesey's own theory we need to be aware of the major problem he thinks a theory of perception must solve. The problem is that the facts discovered by psychologists and physiologists must be reconciled with the common sense assumption that different people are very often aware of the same thing. Reconciling these factors was the problem the sense-datum theory was also attempting to solve. The fact that some people see a duck-rabbit as a duck while others see it as a rabbit informs us that when we see something, what we see it as is determined by our psychological background and make up. The ambi-

guous figures of psychology textbooks are thought to reveal facts about all seeing. With this scientific information we are apparently made aware that perception is a function of both stimulus and receiver. If what we see is a function of our psychological background, it seems we have reason to say that no two people could ever see exactly the same thing, yet it is a common assumption that we can see the same things other people see.

The way Vesey reconciles these factors is to first deny that only judgments may be true or false. So now we do not need to analyze 'seeing' as involving data we directly apprehend, which are the result of perceiving a material object under conditions. In order to completely reconcile the scientific information that we 'see under conditions' and the common sense assumption that we can see the same material object, Vesey not only denies that judgment is involved in perception but also asserts that we should refuse to use the possession of physiological apparatus as a criterion for not seeing the same, any more than we now use viewing from different angles as a reason for saying we do not see the same thing. Although the sense-datum account would reconcile the two factors, it does not provide an adequate theory of perception, because it cannot account for attention in perception.

Vesey's theory is that we normally see a stick as a stick. When we see a stick as a snake, this mistaken perception is not due to an incorrect judgment but rather due to a false perception - it is just not what it seems to be. Vesey asserts there is no judgment in seeing an object as 'X'. Rather if the object is not "X", it is simply a false perception. What we are immediately aware of is an object - what the material object looks like or what we see it as.

An indication of the difference of the sense-datum theory Vesey rejects and his own theory can be shown by noting how both theories would account for a case of veridical perception, a case of 'mistaken' perception and a case in which we say 'looks like' rather than 'it is'.

Veridical perception: I see a stick.

sense-datum account:

- a) I am aware of a stick shaped sense-datum.
- b) I judge it to be a stick.

Vesey's own theory:

I am aware of the look of a stick and have no reason to think the material object is not what it looks like.

'Mistaken' perception: I see a snake.

sense-datum account:

- a) I am aware of a stick shaped sense-datum.
- b) I judge it to be a snake.

Vesey's own theory:

I am aware of the look of a snake and have no reason to think the material object is not what it looks like. Nevertheless the material object is not what it looks like and it is a false perception.

A case in which I say 'looks like' rather than 'I see':
it looks like a snake.

sense-datum account:

- a) I am aware of a stick shaped sense-datum.
- b) something about the content (sense-datum leads me to say 'looks like' rather than 'I see'.

Vesey's own theory:

I am aware of the look of a snake but something in the context gives me reason to think that this is not the material object it looks like.

A false perception is defined by Vesey as occurring when the object does not look like what it is. 'Looks like' is defined as what I would take or judge a material thing to be if I saw it and had no reason to think it was not that. For example, if I look at my coffee cup on the table, I suppose Vesey would say, I would take it to be a coffee cup because here I have no reason to think it is not a coffee cup, so in this case my coffee cup looks like a coffee cup and since it is a

coffee cup and looks like what it is, then this is a case of a true perception.

Vesey thinks there is a content to perception, and this content is the same when we say, "It is a torpedo" and "It looks like a torpedo." Whatever we see, we see as something. This simply means that in any case of seeing, I have something or am aware of something. I may misidentify the material thing, but nevertheless I am aware of something, and this something is what the thing looks like to me or what I see it as.

We have the same content in 'looks like' and 'it is', but when we say 'looks like', we have the look plus something in the context that makes us think it is not what it looks like. I say it 'looks like' only when I think it is not what it looks like. There is no judgment in perception, because all perception does is give us evidence for a thing being what it looks like. 'Looks like' is the report of what we believe to be a false perception. Looks are the evidence for judgments but do not involve a judgment, or to say it again, what we 'see it as' provides evidence for our judging it to be that. When we use the phrase 'looks like', we state what the object would be if we had a true perception, but we have reason to believe this is a false perception.

Seeing What It Looks Like

By looking at the two previous indications of Vesey's meaning for "All seeing is seeing as," we have learned what Vesey's theory of perception is, but we have not gained much of an understanding of his statement "All seeing is seeing as." Vesey gives us a third indication of his meaning for this statement in the following passage:

"All seeing is seeing as." In other words if a person sees something at all it must look like something to him, even if it only looks like 'somebody doing something'.⁸

The importance of this point is again emphasized in the conclusion, "Whenever we see an object, it looks like something..."⁹ So, according to Vesey, whenever I see my fountain pen, it looks like something. However, according to Vesey, since I have no reason to think that what I see is not a fountain pen, it would be misleading for me to say it looks like a fountain pen. This is because we say 'looks like' only when we have a reason to believe the object is not what it looks like. When we don't have such a reason, we say 'it is' rather than 'it looks like'. This is a fundamental point in Vesey's theory because the difference in saying 'it is' and 'it looks like' is not in the content of the visual experience but in the context of it. The difference in the context is that when I say 'looks like', the circumstances give me reason to doubt that it is what it looks like. Vesey states, "We say 'It looks like a torpedo' when we have reason to believe that the object may not really be what it looks like."¹⁰

Now we are in a very strange situation. I see my fountain pen but if I do, then it looks like something to me and yet I can't say it looks like a fountain pen. Oddly enough Vesey's position would have to be that it does look like a fountain pen but it would be 'misleading' to say it. Vesey knows this object looks like a fountain pen because "what an object looks like to a person is what he would judge that object to be, if he had no reason to judge otherwise."¹¹ In my situation I have no other reasons, so I would judge this to be a fountain pen. Hence it looks like a fountain pen, but I cannot correctly say, "It looks like a fountain pen."

It might seem that Vesey has in mind two senses of 'looks like'. In a sentence like "We say 'looks like' only when we have doubts that it is what it looks like," there seems to be represented one 'looks like' which we say and another which an object has. Or one 'looks like' that we say and one that we see. But rather than two senses, Vesey says in talking about perceptions in which people see things as they judge them to be, "These are the cases which provide no occasion for talking of what things look like, or what people see things as."¹² Equating 'see things as' with 'looks like', as he does throughout the paper, we understand that it is not that there are two senses of 'seeing as' or 'looks like', but that objects are always seen as something when they are seen, but it is only mentioned in cases of doubt as to what the object is.

So, according to Vesey, we always see what things look like, but we only mention it when we wish to show that we are not sure what the object is. So if someone looking at my fountain pen in normal circumstances asks, "What is that?" it would be confusing for me to say, "It looks like a fountain pen," or "I see it as a fountain pen," but nevertheless true. So likewise Wittgenstein's remark at a dinner table, "I see this fork as a fork," would be misleading but true.¹³

In order to understand why according to Vesey, it would be misleading to say "looks like" even when the object we see does look like something, we need to understand what Vesey means by "looks like." Vesey begins his article by asking the question what is the difference in the circumstance when we say "looks like" from the circumstance in which we say "it is." The difference, as I mentioned above, is that in the 'looks like' case, one has a reason to doubt that the object seen is

what it looks like. There is not only a difference but a similarity in these two cases. The similarity between a time in which I say "It is . . .," and a time in which I say "It looks like...," is that what I see looks the same. The difference is the circumstance in which the visual experience occurred, and the similarity is the content of the visual experience.

It should be obvious that according to Vesey the content of a visual experience is the look of a material object, and that it is the same in these cases. If the content wasn't the same in these cases, I would say, "It looks different," rather than, "It looks like...." This also shows that even in the case in which we say, "It is...," there is a look because we compare the look in the 'look like' case to this one. If the 'it is' case didn't have a look, then what would the look in the 'looks like' case be like. Indeed what else can we see other than the way an object looks? So the reasons Vesey would have us say 'looks like' rather than 'it is' are first because the content of this visual experience is the same as in the 'it is', and second, because I doubt the object to be what it looks like.

The fact that according to Vesey the content of a visual experience is what the object looks like helps us to understand Vesey's sentence, "...if a person sees something at all, it must look like something to him,...." If we see an object, we are aware of its look. To say we saw something that didn't look like anything would be to say we had a visual experience without a content. My lack of understanding the sentence "...if a person sees something at all it must look like something to him..." must be as silly to Vesey as not understanding, "If a person has a toothache, he must be aware of some pain."

Since, according to Vesey, when we understand that what we are aware of is the look, we no longer actually have an 'I see' case or 'it is' case. The "I see" case is analyzed as being aware of a look plus judging the object to be what it looks like. What an object looks like is evidence for what it is. So if we have no counter evidence, we accept this as conclusive and say "I see ..." or "It is"

This does not seem as distinct from Lewis' position as one might have thought upon noticing that Vesey's stated purpose is showing that perception does not involve judgment. According to Lewis, we are aware of the presentation (recognize it as qualitatively similar to previous presentations), and we interpret this presentation (predict that the same will follow this as did those previous presentations) and so can report our perception by saying, "I see" According to Vesey, we are aware of the look, and if there is no counter evidence, we say "I see"

There seems to be a difference in these two theories because Vesey says judgment is not involved in perception, while Lewis says perception is judgmental.¹⁴ However, this is only a verbal disagreement because by "perception" Vesey means "the way the object we see looks." A perception is a look and there is no judgment in the look of an object. For Lewis a presentation is the look and there is no judgment in the apprehension of a presentation. However to say "It looks like," "It is" or "I see" is the result of a judgment based on the evidence. So for both Vesey and Lewis saying "I see" is a conclusion based on evidence that we obtained by immediate awareness. Because seeing something is based on evidence, we can expect the same consequences that we saw in Lewis. With Vesey's theory we again seemed doomed in a world of probability and

so of skepticism. Vesey's "It is" or "I see" are based on evidence like Lewis', so it is difficult to understand how he could say more than "I have a great deal of evidence and no reason to doubt that I see a snake." For Vesey it is not only that sticks look like snakes but that snakes look like snakes. Can we strictly speaking say a snake looks like a snake or should we actually say looks like what a snake looks like? Instead of introducing his wife in the usual "And this is my wife" way, Vesey could more accurately say, "This looks exactly like my wife and in all probability it is she; at least I have no reason to doubt it."

Such results lead us to see that Vesey's theory of perception is not a correct analysis of perception. But we knew Vesey was essentially wrong since our introductory discussion of the difference between the concepts 'seeing' and 'seeing as'. However to understand that Vesey is mistaken is not to understand why he made these mistakes.

One basic mistake Vesey makes that lead him to such statements as "All seeing is seeing as" is assimilating 'recognizing' (or 'identifying') and 'seeing'. First I shall point out that Vesey does make this assimilation and then that it is a mistake to do so.

The fact that Vesey does assimilate these concepts is revealed in the conclusion of the article in which he has argued that 'all seeing is seeing as'. He states:

My aim in this paper has been to combat the idea that in seeing an object as something, in recognizing an object, there is involved a judgment...¹⁵

Another consideration of Vesey's assimilation of 'seeing' and 'recognizing' is the fact that he begins the article with the contrast between 'it is' and 'looks like'. "It is a snake" is a standard reply to

questions such as "What is it?" or "What did you identify it as?," not "What is there?" It would be more common to make a perception report with "There's a snake" or "A snake!"

It seems obvious that Vesey is not thinking of a case in which one person has a better view than another and so is asked what he can see. Such a situation would seem to be the more natural setting for perception reports. Vesey has in mind two people looking at a stick gathering evidence for its being a stick or a snake.

The fact that Vesey assimilates 'seeing' and 'recognizing' is important to us because now we can understand why he says, "All seeing is seeing as" or "If you see an object it must look like something." The circumstances in which it makes sense to talk about recognizing are the circumstances in which it makes sense to talk about what a thing looks like. So by assimilating 'seeing' and 'recognizing', he overlooks cases of 'seeing' in which 'looks like' are not involved.

So in order to understand that all 'seeing' does not involve 'looks like' or 'seeing as', we need to be reminded of cases of 'seeing' which do not involve the acts of 'recognizing'. There may be no act of recognition involved in seeing two oncoming cars and a pedestrian while driving to work. Perhaps I can bring this out by contrasting a case of seeing a snake and recognizing it with seeing a snake where there was no act of recognition. A snake in the backyard can look like a stick. When it moves, you suddenly recognize that it is a snake. In such a case there is an act of recognition and it makes sense to talk about what it looked like. When you see the snakes in a zoo, there is no act of recognizing them as snakes. If someone asks if you saw the snakes, there would not be a problem in answering him. If you were asked if you

recognized them as snakes, you might feel your second grade education was being challenged. It is not that ever since the second grade you have been able to recognize the snakes in the zoo when you see them. It is rather that since the second grade you have not had to recognize the snakes at the zoo.

To point out the difference between the concepts of 'seeing' and 'recognizing', I should also remind the reader of cases such as "I saw her when she first came in, but I didn't recognize her until she smiled." So there are at least two kinds of cases that point out the difference in these concepts. There are cases like the last in which I see without recognizing, as I can see my sister whom I have not seen for 14 years without recognizing her. There are also cases like the first kind discussed in which what I see does not require an act of recognition, as I can see my wife without an act of recognition. 'Recognizing' is a different concept than 'seeing' and obviously distinct from 'seeing as'. One cannot say I recognized that it was a snake but it was a stick. In order to recognize or identify, one has to get it right. One can say, "I saw it as a snake but it was a stick."

I have mentioned that Vesey treats 'seeing as' and 'looks like' as synonyms. There are differences relevant to these terms that I have regarded as relatively unimportant to this paper. Perhaps they should be mentioned. 'See as' does apparently have a use in describing illusions as does 'looks like'. However as 'looks like' implies doubt about the object being what it is, 'seeing as' does not imply the speaker has doubt but rather that he knows an alternative way it can be seen. The reason Vesey seems to find no trouble in interchanging these is that for Vesey there is always an alternative. We either see things as they are

(true perceptions) or see things as they are not (false perceptions). But to see things as they aren't, isn't just another way of seeing something. Also we generalized from the reversible figures illustrated in the psychology textbooks to all perception. The result of this generalization is that perception is a matter of both stimulus and receptor. Each of us sees under the conditions of his own central nervous system and so there is supposed to be some literal sense to saying we see different objects yet the same material object. I see things under the conditions of my nervous system but others under theirs, so there are many alternative ways to see the one material object. Every receptor is an alternative way of seeing.

In order to highlight some of the tangled relationships between 'seeing as', 'seeing', 'looks like' and 'recognize' that have been mentioned in this chapter, I shall consider a possible objection to each of my cases that separate 'recognizing' from 'seeing'. These are objections someone in Vesey's position might make.

In commenting on my case of seeing my sister but not recognizing her, one might reply with, "You didn't recognize her as your sister, but still if you saw her, you at least recognized she was a woman, a human being or at least something." Since it has been mentioned that to recognize something, I must get it right, one can explain that in seeing my sister, I need not recognize my sister. This can be clearly seen in a third person use of see: "He sees his sister but he does not recognize her." So he simply does not recognize what he sees. But now what if someone like Vesey was to agree and say, "We don't necessarily recognize it if we see it, because this would imply we never made mistakes, but it does look like something to us. That is, if we see it, then we see it

as something but not necessarily as what it is."

So again we have the statement: "If you see it, you must see it as something." So we ask someone who claims to see it, "What do you see it as?" or "What does it look like to you?" Perhaps we get no answer because the person can think of nothing that looks like the thing he is looking at, i.e., he can think of nothing to compare it to. Then we ask that he at least describe what it looks like. And surely if he sees it, he can describe what it looks like.

A criterion for 'seeing' is what our description of what we see is. The question about him seeing an object is not always a question about perception. We could be asking about his ability to identify an object or perhaps asking to learn about his visual acuity. But this is not Vesey's point. Perhaps rather than say, "Surely if he sees it, he can describe what it looks like," we should say, "If he sees it and should recognize it but is unable to, then he will be able to describe what it looks like."

Where we see without recognizing what we see, we can talk about 'looks like'. But in case of seeing my wife in the kitchen, I don't have to recognize her and here it ~~doesn't~~ make sense to talk about 'looks like'. She doesn't look like my wife; she is my wife. If someone asks me who the woman in the kitchen looked like, I could not answer "My wife." This means if when you see your wife in the kitchen and someone asks, "Does she look like your wife?" you would not know how to answer. But this is not because one doesn't know what she looks like but because we don't know what 'looks like' means here.

A person arguing from Vesey's theory might think that I had overlooked something important in claiming that seeing my wife does not nor-

mally involve an act of recognition. He might want to say that perhaps one does not go through an act of recognition but still one does recognize his wife. After all what kind of man couldn't even recognize his own wife? It is true that I am not startled as I would be if I came home to a strange woman, i.e., a woman of which it would be true to say I didn't recognize her, such as my sister. I might not recognize my sister until sometime after I had been told who she was. I might recognize her as soon as she smiled. I might recognize her as soon as I saw her. Perhaps I recognize her by her smile or perhaps I say, "Of course, I recognize you; you haven't changed a bit in 14 years. I just couldn't believe it was you."

Do I recognize my wife because she hasn't changed a bit? With my sister you might say I found out who the woman was. I learned who she was as soon as I saw her or when she smiled. I don't learn who my wife is when I see her. When I see my wife, I may not learn anything. Upon seeing my sister I might have asked myself or someone else, "Who can that be?" and not gotten an answer or been able to answer, and then all of a sudden realized that it was my sister. But with my wife in the kitchen, I do not ask even myself who that could be. So it seems strange to talk about an act of recognition here.

If you say you recognize your wife to contrast this with the case of being with someone you don't know, then you should realize that in seeing your wife, there was not an act of recognition, as there is in recognizing your sister. You recognize your wife but not by seeing her, as you recognize your sister by seeing her. You recognize your wife but there is no act of recognition.¹⁶

Above all, don't think that in seeing your wife you recognize her,

and this means that you compare the way she now looks with what you remember her looking like and since the two looks are alike, then you see her as your wife. If one was inclined to think of seeing as comparing the way the object looks now to a look or image brought forth by memory, then we could expect to hear the person saying, "Whenever you see, it looks like something to you," or "What an object looks like is evidence that the object is that," or maybe even, "All seeing is seeing as." Then "All seeing is seeing as" would mean that in every case of seeing I compare the object in the kitchen with the one in my mind. I see the one in the kitchen as or like the one in my mind. So it is like saying if I see it as anything, then I match it with something in my mind.

If you think saying, "I see my wife in the kitchen" involves comparing the way things look now with a memory image of my wife, then you might feel inclined to think that "I see my wife" means "I see my wife as my wife." Thinking that 'seeing' involves comparing what something looks like with a memory image is exactly the same problem Lewis has. Remember Lewis had to recognize a presentation in order to give it an interpretation and so see it by matching it with former presentations. Also remember Lewis says the only way to refer to the ineffable presentations was with the circumlocution, 'looks'. In the discussion of Lewis it was brought out that the idea of a comparison or matching makes no sense here because nothing counts as a correct or incorrect comparison. We noticed that if a memory image changed and we forgot this change and yet made the correct verbal response, there was simply no difference. And if it makes no difference if you get the comparison right or wrong, then it makes no sense to talk about a comparison.

In other words, in our example your memory image changes - first it

is your sister, then it is your mother-in-law, then your neighbor, but you forget that it changes and just say, "I see my wife in the kitchen." If you were correct in saying that the first time, you will be correct in saying that when all these hypothesized inner workings of matching and comparing go astray.

NOTES

¹G.N.A. Vesey, "Seeing and Seeing As", Perceiving, Sensing and Knowing, ed. Robert J. Swartz (New York, 1965), pp. 109-124.

²Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations (New York, 1958), p. 195-1.

³Vesey, p. 72.

⁴Charles E. Burlingame, "On the Logic of 'Seeing As' Locution", (unpub. Ph. D. dissertation, University of Virginia, 1965).

⁵Don Locke, "Perceiving and Thinking", Aristotelian Society for the Systematic Study of Philosophy, Supplementary Volume, XLIII (1968) and Noel Fleming, "Recognizing and Seeing As", The Philosophical Review, LXVI (1967) both claim that all seeing is seeing as.

⁶Vesey, p. 73.

⁷C.D. Broad, "The theory of Sense", Perceiving, Sensing and Knowing, ed. Robert J. Swartz (New York, 1965), pp. 84-129. C.D. Broad's account concerns explaining how we could not make a mistake about but could overlook detail in sense data (sensa). This stops infinite regress and allows attention, but then it is hard to see what 'directly aware' would mean. But 'directly aware' was introduced to mean there was no inference involved so why couldn't there be no inference to either looks green or looks peacock green and yet the latter involve greater attention?

⁸Vesey, p. 73.

⁹ibid., conclusions, p. 83.

¹⁰ibid., p. 68.

¹¹ibid., p. 83.

¹²ibid., p. 75.

¹³Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, p. 195-1.

¹⁴C.I. Lewis, Mind and the World Order (New York, 1956), p. 164.

¹⁵Vesey, p. 83.

¹⁶Wittgenstein, Zettel, passage 202.

CHAPTER IV

PERCEPTION INVOLVES CONCEPTUAL ORGANIZATION

Norwood Russell Hanson's concern in his chapter on observation in Patterns of Discovery is to find out which sense of 'seeing' is most enlightening in the understanding of modern observational physics. He argues that 'seeing' must be analyzed into 'seeing as' and 'seeing that' in order to explain the relationship of our visual sensations to our knowledge of the world. In analyzing 'seeing' he states:

I do not mean to identify seeing with seeing as. Seeing an X-ray tube is not seeing a glass-and-metal object as an X-ray tube. However, seeing an antelope and seeing an object as an antelope have much in common. Something of the concept of seeing can be discerned from tracing uses of 'seeing...as...'. Wittgenstein is reluctant to concede this, but his reasons are not clear to me. On the contrary, the logic of 'seeing as' seems to illuminate the general perceptual case.

I have claimed that Wittgenstein is not only "reluctant to concede this" but that it is a central theme of chapter xi of Philosophical Investigations to remind the reader of the differences between 'seeing' and 'seeing as' in order to avoid conceptual puzzles. It would then seem that Wittgenstein finds the differences in these concepts important in resolving certain puzzles, while Hanson finds the similarities illuminating to a theory of perception. We have seen the difference between these concepts. It will be interesting to understand what Hanson believes to be the common element in 'seeing' and 'seeing as' that 'illuminates' the

perceptual sense of 'see'.

According to Hanson, 'seeing as' illuminates 'seeing' by providing us with clear examples of conceptual organization which is a logical feature of perception. Hanson's idea of conceptual organization can be partially explained by looking at the following illustration.

Figure 5. A Picture Puzzle.

If you stare at this drawing in bewilderment and then you are informed that it is a picture of a soldier and his dog passing behind the corner of a building, the elements in the drawing should 'pull together' or become organized. This organization is then not a detail in the picture as the lines are but is rather the way the "details are appreciated." The organization gives the lines a pattern. Hanson compares the organization of our visual impressions to the plot of a story.

With the duck-rabbit figure one sees it as first a duck, then as a rabbit, and one wants to ask what is it that changes. Nothing in the object one sees changes. Hanson introduces the notion of organization by asking about seeing the different aspects of an ambiguous figure.

... does one's visual picture change? How?
 What is it that changes? What could change?
 Nothing optical or sensational is modified.
 Yet one sees different things. The organiza-
 tion of what one sees changes. ²

The above drawing was helpful in understanding organization because the picture was not at first organized, and we could contrast this with its later organization. And in the cases of the ambiguous figures the dif-

ferent ways the figures are organized results in our actually seeing the figures differently, and so the organizational feature of 'seeing' is again made obvious. The organizational feature is obvious in these cases as it is not in most of our 'seeing' because we are normally provided with a context that psychologically 'sets' us to take the elements of our visual experience in a particular way. Thus Hanson believes that we need cases of 'seeing as' to illustrate this logical element involved in all of our 'seeing'.

Hanson thus maintains that conceptual organization is involved in perception. Wittgenstein has shown us that there are a number of differences in our use of 'seeing as' and 'seeing', so we could not accept an argument that simply generalized from cases of 'seeing as' involving organization to the conclusion that all seeing involved organization. However, we have seen that there are similarities between 'seeing' and 'seeing as', so it is certainly possible that all seeing does involve conceptual organization. Thus in this chapter we shall be considering the question, "Does perception involve conceptual organization?" We will want to consider how Hanson supports his affirmative answer to this question.

Hanson has two basic arguments to show that perception involves conceptual organization. First, a theory of perception must account for the fact that we see different things when we look at the same object. This can be explained if perception involves organization. Second, a theory of perception must explain the relation between seeing and our knowledge, and this can only be done by a theory that maintains that perception involves conceptual organization. Before we can consider these arguments, we need to be more fully aware of what Hanson means by

'conceptual organization'. I shall first explain Hanson's two senses of 'see' in order to understand his notion of "conceptual organization." I will then show how each of his arguments fail and then attempt to indicate why I think Hanson was misled.

Two Senses of 'See' and the Meaning of 'Conceptual Organization'

In order to understand Hanson's theory or analysis of perception, we must understand Hanson's two senses of 'see'. He begins his conceptual investigation of 'seeing' by considering answers to the question, "Do Kepler and Tycho see the same thing in the east at dawn?" There is, he says, a sense of 'see' in which we would answer this question affirmatively and a sense in which we would answer it in the negative. These two senses of 'see' are illustrated in the situation of two men looking at the duck-rabbit. In this situation in which one sees it as a rabbit and the other sees it as a duck, in one sense of 'see' we can say the two men see the same object, while in the other sense we would, according to Hanson say they see different things.

The more basic sense of 'see', Hanson claims, is the sense in which we would say of two men looking at an ambiguous figure, they 'see' the same object. In this sense of 'see', when we say they see different things, it means they are actually looking at different objects. This sense of 'see' means that the person that sees is visually aware of the object. It is the logically prior sense of 'see'. There would be nothing philosophically perplexing about Tycho and Kepler or ambiguous figures if there was not a sense in which we say they see the same.

This logically prior sense of 'see' is the philosophically less interesting sense of 'see', according to Hanson. The more interesting

sense is the one in which we see something different when you see it as a rabbit and I see it as a duck. This second sense of 'see' is the sense illuminated by 'seeing as'. As I have indicated, 'seeing as' reveals that this sense of 'see' involves organization. The logically prior sense of 'see' does not involve organization. Thus we understand the central importance of organization in Hanson's theory, because this is what distinguishes the two senses of 'see'. The difference in seeing the duck-rabbit as a duck and seeing it as a rabbit is the organization of your visual impression.

The following example will help to further our understanding of what Hanson means by our visual experience having a particular organization. The example is a collection of data such as Tycho's list of the position of Mars at different times. This collection of data just looks like a long list of numbers to most men. They can find no particular pattern to the numbers or no reason for a particular number occurring in one place in the list rather than in another. Kepler was able to find an organization to the numbers. He realized that the data showed that Mars had an elliptical orbit about the sun. He could see a pattern in the numbers that others could not see. For him the numbers had an organization, while for others there was no organization until Kepler showed it to them. It took Kepler to see the meaning of this series of numbers and on the basis of this he was able to make predictions about the future position of Mars.

In this example, you are given the numbers and then you look for the organization, while our visual experience is not, according to Hanson, first had and then organized, but rather we just have an organized visual experience. However this illustration of finding the organiza-

tion of a series of numbers does indicate that by 'organization' Hanson means something like understanding what the significance or meaning of this particular arrangement of numbers is. The example indicates that knowledge is involved in the organization. If Kepler had not known the formula for an ellipse, he could not have seen the organization of Tycho's collection of data.

An organized visual experience is then one in which we understand the pattern of elements as meaningful. It is one in which our visual experience makes sense to us. A visual experience that makes sense is one that we can describe with meaningful sentences.

Now that we have been introduced to Hanson's two senses of 'see' and to his meaning of 'organization', we can further discuss the sense of 'see' in which we see the same when we see an ambiguous figure. I have mentioned that this is considered by Hanson the logically prior, more basic and philosophically less interesting sense of 'see' and that this sense of 'see' does not involve the logical factor of organization. This sense of 'see' means that we are visually aware of the object. The logically prior sense of 'see' means visually aware in the sense of 'see' which we use to say an infant sees something because the infant has no knowledge necessary to organize his visual experience. This lack of organization is the distinguishing factor of the two senses of 'see'.

What does 'visually aware' mean and of what are we visually aware? According to Hanson, we are visually aware of a sense-datum picture. In light of the fact that Hanson spent a considerable portion of this chapter on observation criticizing what he labels the sense-datum account of perception, my claim that what Hanson thinks we are visually aware of is a sense-datum picture may seem surprising.

The sense-datum account is introduced as one of the possible meanings for two men seeing the same when looking at an ambiguous figure or the sense of 'see' in which we answer Hanson's question, "Do Kepler and Tycho see the same in the east at dawn?" affirmatively. Another possible but also rejected meaning for Tycho and Kepler 'seeing the same' is that the same chemo-physical process would occur in both of their brains and eyes. "They see the same" would then mean that they see the same retinal pictures. This explanation of this sense of 'see', Hanson says, is simply the result of careless talk. We do not see retinal pictures. The pictures on the retina would be small, upside-down and two in number. Besides drunks and drugged people might have the same retinal pictures but not be said to see the same. And finally, according to his argument, this is a chemical physical state and seeing is not a state but an experience.³

Rejecting this explanation of 'seeing the same' when looking at an ambiguous figure, Hanson considers the sense-datum account. In this account what we mean when we say that we see the same object when we look at the ambiguous figure or that Kepler and Tycho see the same is that they both have identical sense-datum pictures. A sense-datum picture avoids the criticism of the retinal picture because it is a single picture and it is not inverted. To have a sense-datum picture is to be aware of it. We can find out that two people do have identical sense-datum pictures and do see the same in the logically prior sense of 'see' by having them draw an exact copy of what they see. As previously discussed, people seeing the duck-rabbit as a duck would draw a figure that was congruent with someone that saw it as a rabbit. Because their drawings of what they see would be identical, we would know that their

sense-datum pictures are identical, and we have a reason for saying they see the same thing.' According to this account, the logically prior sense of 'see' means that we are aware of a sense-datum picture.

Another way we can find out that they have the same sense-datum picture is to ask them to describe what they see. However, Kepler and Tycho might both say they see the sun. This would disguise the real sense in which they see the same, because 'sun' would have ambiguous visual referent. By 'sun' Kepler refers to a static body while Tycho means a satellite of the earth. So to get to the true sense in which they see the same, we would need to have them describe what they see in terms that did not have ambiguous visual referent, such as lines, shapes and colors. They would describe what they saw as a yellow-white disc between a patch of green and a patch of blue. Since they both would describe what they see identically, we have a plausible meaning for 'they see the same'.

However, as I mentioned at the beginning of this explanation of Hanson's meaning of 'visually aware', when I claimed that Hanson thought we were aware of sense-datum pictures, he is critical of the sense-datum account. In fact he remarks of the way we see ambiguous figures, "Could anything be more opposed to a sense-datum account of seeing?"⁴ He rejects the sense-datum account as a fully adequate account of 'seeing' because it does not explain how it is that we see the same object differently. And this is the sense of 'see' that is philosophically interesting and the sense of 'see' in observational physics. According to Hanson the sense-datum account explains seeing ambiguous figures differently as being aware of the same picture but giving it a different interpretation. Thus the sense-datum formula for perception is perception

= sense-datum picture + interpretation.

Hanson rejects this formula because seeing is not a composite. Seeing is an experience and this experience is not a composite. There are not two things we do when we see. There is not a soaking up of sensations and the clamping on of an interpretation. The interpretation is there in the seeing and not a second operation. In other words, in the formula perception = sense-datum picture + interpretation, it is the plus that Hanson is arguing against.

This agrees with Lewis' account. Lewis made it clear as Hanson does that we are not concerned about giving a description of what happens when we see but rather an analysis of 'seeing'. Also both Hanson and Lewis agree that in an analysis of 'seeing' there are two logical features that need to be made clear. Lewis calls these two logical components the 'given' and 'interpretation' which are made obvious in the seeing an object differently. Hanson's analysis also depends upon seeing an object differently. For Hanson the two locutions 'seeing as' and 'seeing that' point out the logical features of seeing that are necessary to understand the role seeing plays in observational physics. It is important to both Hanson and Lewis that these are logical features and not parts of the seeing experience. These are logical features of 'seeing' and not psychological facts about seeing. So these two factors can be talked about separately but not actually separated any more than the weight and shape of an object can be separated from the object.

So Hanson's fundamental reason for rejecting the sense-datum formula of perception is that interpretation is not a psychological component of seeing. We could say for Hanson there is interpreting in seeing but seeing is not interpreting plus something interpreted. This is an

important point because it is necessary in order to understand why Hanson rejects the sense-datum account and so to understand the possibility that he does maintain that what we are visually aware of is a sense-datum picture. In addition, if we do not understand this, it will seem that Hanson merely substitutes his own notion of 'organization' for the notion of 'interpretation' in the sense-datum account. What Hanson sees himself as doing is substituting the logical analysis of 'seeing' for what has before been discussed as the components of the seeing experience.

So whether we discuss organization or interpretation, it is essential in Hanson's analysis not to think that we receive some element in seeing and then interpret it or that we get the elements and then organize them into a pattern. The interpretation is in the seeing or the elements come with an organization. This organization is different with different knowledge, but it is not that we use this knowledge to organize the elements (lines, shapes, colors) but that this knowledge 'sets' us for a particular organization.

Hanson's argument that seeing is not something plus interpretation is based on seeing the ambiguous figures. According to Hanson, when I see an ambiguous figure as a duck, it is not that I first get sensations from the duck-rabbit and then interpret these as a duck. This would be the sense-datum account of seeing an ambiguous figure differently, but it is ambiguous figures that point out how wrong the sense-datum account is. If in these ambiguous figures, such as the duck-rabbit, there was an interpretation, it would have to be a spontaneous interpretation. Hanson's main criticism against this view is that the word 'interpretation' functions in contrast to such spontaneous situations as these am-

biguous figures. The idea of spontaneous interpretation makes no sense in ordinary language nor is it explained in philosophical language. So Hanson rejects the sense-datum analysis of seeing.

It is important that Hanson rejects the perception = sense-datum picture + interpretation formula as an account of seeing only in the sense of seeing differently. He rejects the analysis of this sense because, as is shown by seeing the duck-rabbit differently, this sense of 'see' is not a composite and so there is not an interpretation tacked on to something else in this sense of 'seeing'. So Hanson does not reject the idea that in the sense of 'see' in which we say of two men seeing different things in an ambiguous figure "they see the same object," 'they see' means 'they are aware of a sense-datum picture'. Also he does not reject the idea that a sense-datum picture is involved in seeing the ambiguous figure differently.

So Hanson's arguments against the sense-datum account do not eliminate the possibility that we are aware of sense-datum pictures. The following quotes show that Hanson does think we are aware of sense-datum pictures. Remembering that the sense in which the infant sees something is the sense meaning he is visually aware of it, the following quote indicates that this sense of 'see' means no more than being visually aware of a sense-datum picture. "...react to his visual environment with purely sense-datum responses as does the infant or the idiot..."⁵ The fact that sense-datum pictures are involved in Hanson's other sense of 'see' that contains the logical feature of organization is shown by Hanson's comment "...for while seeing is at least a 'visual copying' of objects, it is also more than that."⁶

The primary reason I had for showing that according to Hanson

sense-datum pictures are involved in both senses of 'see' was to further our understanding of his concept of conceptual organization in order that we might more adequately consider his arguments that 'seeing as' illuminates 'seeing'. It is now possible to state what Hanson means by his two senses of 'see' and by 'conceptual organization' in terms of sense-datum pictures. The sense of 'seeing' in which an infant sees simply involves being aware of a visual copy or sense-datum picture of the object one looks at. Because the infant has no knowledge, the elements of the picture have no organization and thus what the infant sees means nothing to him. Of course the lines, shapes and colors that are the elements of his sense-datum picture have a particular arrangement, but this arrangement means nothing to the infant seer as Tycho's collection of data meant nothing to men before Kepler. In contrast if we were to say an adult with knowledge saw the object, this would mean that the adult would be aware of the same elements but in addition, the picture would be meaningful. For example, saying that two men see (infant's sense) the same duck-rabbit means they both are aware of a visual copy of the duck-rabbit but implies nothing about their organization of this copy. Saying of the two men that they see (adult sense) the ambiguous figure differently means they have a visual copy with the same elements in them but these pictures have a different meaning for the men. An infant cannot see it as a duck or as a rabbit because he does not have the knowledge to organize his visual experience, which means his visual experience has no meaning to him. Thus according to Hanson, the visual world of an infant is a "rhapsodic, kaleidoscopic, senseless barrage of sense signals."⁷

Two Arguments for Perception Involving Conceptual Organization

The previous discussion has given us an understanding of what Hanson means by the two senses of 'see' and 'conceptual organization'; we can now consider his arguments to show that perception involves conceptual organization. These arguments are that his theory of perception, which maintains this, is more adequate than other theories of perception because it can account first for the seeing of ambiguous figures differently and secondly, for the connection of knowledge and seeing which other theories fail to do.

We have seen how Hanson accounts for seeing an ambiguous figure differently and how the sense-datum account fails at this point. The sense-datum account fails because it accounts for seeing the duck-rabbit as a duck and as a rabbit by claiming that the same sense-datum picture is involved, but the reason it is seen differently is that there is a different interpretation of this picture. However, if interpretation is to make sense, it takes time and so it does not make sense in the duck-rabbit situation. Hanson can adequately account for these cases. When we say one person sees it as a duck while the other sees it as a rabbit, we simply mean 'see' in the sense that involves organization. And in this sense of 'see' we say they see different things, because we mean their sense-datum pictures are organized differently.

In condensed form Hanson's argument looks like this. Other theories cannot explain our looking at the same object yet seeing different things such as happens with ambiguous figures. A theory maintaining that perception involves conceptual organization can adequately explain seeing ambiguous figures differently and is therefore a more adequate

theory of perception. Hence perception involves conceptual organization.

This argument implies that a theory that can explain cases of 'seeing as' such as the seeing ambiguous figures differently is a more adequate theory of perception. So in order for this argument to be sound, 'seeing as' must be a part of perception. In the introduction, by noting the differences in the concept of 'seeing as' and 'seeing', we saw that 'seeing as' is not a part of perception. So because 'seeing as' is not a part of perception, this argument of Hanson's to show that perception involves conceptual organization fails.

The fact that, since 'seeing as' is not a part of perception, theories of perception do not have to account for the fact that people can see ambiguous figures differently is important. Both Vesey and Hanson argue against the sense-datum picture theory of perception by showing that if to perceive something was to have a sense-datum picture, then this would not account for seeing an ambiguous figure differently. The argument is that if a person seeing the duck-rabbit as a duck and the person seeing it as a rabbit both represent their sense-datum picture with a drawing, then the drawing may be the same and thus not account for the fact that they see different things. This cannot be used as an argument against sense-datum pictures as a theory of perception, because the cases they are trying to criticize the theory for not explaining are actually not cases of perception. Here we can see the fundamental nature of Wittgenstein's comment, " 'Seeing as...' is not part of perception." While Lewis, Vesey and Hanson are refuting theories of perception because of the theory's inability to account for seeing objects differently and then offering their own theories, Wittgenstein is re-

jecting the need to offer an explanation by showing the difference in the concepts.⁸

The second argument which Hanson offers to show that the correct theory of perception maintains that perception involves conceptual organization is that this is the only theory that explains the relevance of 'seeing' to what we know. Without the logical features that the concepts 'seeing that' and 'seeing as' bring out, the way seeing functions in science could never be understood. As Hanson presents the problem, visual consciousness is essentially pictorial, while knowledge is essentially linguistical, and 'seeing' must bridge this gap. By discussing the logical features of 'seeing that', we can understand how conceptual organization helps us explain the connection between seeing and our knowledge. After this discussion of 'seeing that', I will show that Hanson's argument that perception involving conceptual organization is the only way to explain the relationship of our knowledge to seeing is weaker than we would suppose. And finally with a discussion of 'seeing as' cases, we can understand that this argument fails.

By the claim that the logical factor of 'seeing that' is involved in seeing, Hanson means that we would not say a person could see other than in the sense in which the infant sees - as visually aware - if the person did not have knowledge of the object of sight. This knowledge that we must have in order to have it said that we can see in the sense that we say scientists or adults with knowledge 'see' can be expressed by the locution 'see that'. For example, to see a duck in the adult sense is to see that it will fly south for the winter; that the feathers on its breast will make a good sleeping bag; that it is a member of a certain species, perhaps one on the verge of extinction; that it will

not dissolve in water; etc. To see an object in the adult sense of 'see' is to 'see that' or know what observation we could make on the object. We will have a list of things that we know are possible in regard to the object and a list of things that we know are impossible, and to 'see' the object in the adult sense is to 'see that' all these are true.

Hanson, by using the locution 'see that' rather than 'know', stresses his point that 'seeing' is not a composite. 'See that' stresses that the knowledge is there in the seeing and not something added on to it. If he had stated that 'seeing' in the adult sense required that we know this list to be true, we might have been misled into thinking there were two parts to this 'seeing'. By saying to 'see' is just to 'see that' the list is true, he emphasizes that 'seeing' is not a composite.

The relation of knowing to seeing is discussed in several ways. Often it is thought that an essential feature of seeing is gaining knowledge. We have to tell blind people such things as, "There's a chair just to the right," "Careful now, there are three steps here," while our eyes give us all this information. Saying, "I see a duck" seems to imply that the speaker knows or believes there to be a duck, and so seeing seems to be gaining information. Generalizing from these sentences to the conclusion that seeing is knowing seems to be simply a mistake of overemphasizing first person present tense perception reports. To show that seeing does not always involve gaining knowledge, we simply need to be reminded of common sentences like, "He saw a duck but thought it was a rabbit."⁹ From sensible sentences like this, we can understand that knowledge is not necessarily gained by seeing.

However, although Hanson is concerned about the relevancy of seeing

to knowledge, he does not claim that seeing is knowing or that we must know what the object we see is. Hanson is not claiming that we need to know what it is to see, but rather that we must have knowledge about those things that we can be said to 'see' in the adult sense. Using an example of Hanson's, it is not that a person needs to know that what he saw was a meson shower, but in order for others to correctly say of him that he sees it in an adult sense, he has to know what meson showers are. So Hanson is not arguing that we have to correctly identify what we see in order to see it as an adult, but rather that we have to have the concept before we can be said to 'see' it. This helps to make it clear why Hanson uses the term 'conceptual organization'. In the sense of 'see' which involves the logical feature of organization, we can only say of people that have the concept of meson shower that they see a meson shower.

As the sentence, "He saw a duck but thought it was a rabbit" reminds us that we do not have to 'know what we see', it might seem that a common sentence like, "He does not know what a duck is, but he sees one" would indicate that having knowledge of the concept of what we see is not a logical feature of 'see'. Hanson would agree that this was a sensible sentence, but he would add this is the sense of 'see' in which an infant sees. Hanson would claim that the sentence was not a counter-example because we have just changed the sense of 'see'. He would still maintain that there was a sense of 'see' that implies we have knowledge about the object we are said to see.

It seems as though Hanson's analysis is immune to counter-examples. Each time we would say of another person that he saw although he did not have the concept, Hanson can simply agree that the sentence makes sense

and add that it is a different sense of 'see' than the one requiring that the seer have knowledge. So far Hanson has simply claimed that there are two senses of 'see', only one of which has the logical element of knowledge. So if we find occasions to say of someone, "He sees a duck although he does not know what a duck is," we are using 'see' in the sense not involving the logical feature of knowledge.

Is there a sense of 'see' in which if the person is known not to know anything about the object of sight, then we withdraw our claim that he saw it? According to Hanson, this is the case with the sense of 'see' that involves the logical feature of conceptual organization. But it seems that we do not ever withdraw our claim that a person sees when we are told he does not have any knowledge. Hanson's answer is that when we find out the person does not have any knowledge of the object, we still say that he sees but in a different sense. So it is not that we ever deny that he sees, but simply that we change the sense of 'see'.

If one keeps using the word 'see' even when the knowledge requirement is denied, how does Hanson know there are two senses of 'see'? That is, in order for Hanson to show that this is a logical requirement of 'see', he needs to demonstrate that when this requirement of 'see' is not met, then the claim to 'see' is withdrawn. If this never happens, Hanson can't explain this by claiming there are two senses of 'see', because we have no reason to believe that there are his two senses of 'see'. First he has to establish that there are two senses.

Hanson's argument would be circular if he said there must be two senses of 'see', because we don't deny our claim to see when we don't have knowledge of the object, but if knowledge is not one of the logical requirements of some sense of 'see', then we can't explain how 'seeing'

is relevant to knowledge. In other words, Hanson cannot simply insist that there must be two senses of 'see' in order to explain the connection between knowledge and seeing. This would be like asking the question, what is the connection between knowledge and seeing and being given the answer, knowledge is a logical feature of seeing. Then asking, how do you know, and being told, this must be so in order for us to explain the connection between knowledge and seeing. Hanson must come up with a case that demonstrates the logical requirement of knowledge by showing that when the knowledge requirement is not met, then we deny that that person could have seen it. Hanson might not have offered us such a case because he thought such cases were obvious. I hope to weaken the force of his argument that perception involves conceptual organization by showing that cases that Hanson might have had in mind as meeting the logical requirements of the adult sense of 'see' do not obviously meet these requirements.

It seems probable that Hanson was thinking about cases in which we use the 'see that' locution to meet both the logical requirements of knowledge and of sensation. A reason Hanson would have for so thinking is that 'see that' claims are denied of the person not having knowledge. For example, "He could not see that it was four o'clock if he does not even know what four o'clock means." The following quote gives an indication that Hanson was thinking of the 'seeing that' situations as meeting both requirements: "The infant doesn't see that the element in the X-ray tube will heat up and this is precisely what the scientist does see."¹⁰

In order for 'see that' to be the sense of 'see' which has the logical element of knowledge and visual awareness that Hanson's analysis

demands for one of the uses of 'see', it must be the case that 'seeing that' would be denied not only if the person did not have knowledge about the object, but also if the person was not visually aware of the object. It is not the case that all uses of 'see that' have both these logical requirements. It seems to be the case that if one does not know anything about X, we would then think it improper to say that he sees that X is the case. We have examples of 'seeing that X is the case' which do not imply that one is visually aware of X. "I see that Biafra surrendered" does not imply that one is visually aware of Biafra surrendering. In many cases 'see that' can be replaced with 'understand' without loss of meaning. However, there seem to be cases of 'see that' which not only imply that you have certain knowledge about an object but that you are also visually aware of it. For example, "I see that Edna wore her most expensive dress tonight." Here one might think that not only must the speaker know Edna and that she is wearing her most expensive dress, but also the speaker must have been visually aware of Edna and her dress. But after Edna left her room for the evening her roommate might look in her closet and not seeing Edna's most expensive dress also say, "I see that Edna wore her most expensive dress tonight." Hence for this 'see that' case one need not be visually aware of either Edna or her dress. And what if Edna's roommate was blind, would she not be able to use this sentence?

Consider Hanson's example, "Today in science lab, we saw that ice cubes can melt."¹¹ A student that did not see this would be thought not to be paying attention or mentally retarded rather than needing glasses. In the case of seeing objects we may ask, "Can you see our house from here?" and so talk about vision, visually aware and glasses. With the

case of seeing that certain facts are true, we cannot ask, "Can you see that ice cubes can melt from here?" Would it be wrong or funny for a blind student to use the sentence, "I see that ice can melt." as it would for him to say "I see the ice melting?" For example in the science lab, a blind student might ask, "I can see that ice can melt, but I can't see how you got the temperature to increase."

This argument is made difficult by the fact that if 'visually aware' means 'having a sense-datum picture' as it does to Hanson, it is difficult to understand what we need to be visually aware of in order to properly say, "I see that ice cubes can melt." I know what a picture of ice melting might look like, but I do not know what a picture of 'ice can melt' would be.

My point here that situations in which we use 'see that' are not situations in which it is appropriate to talk about visual sensations, and so visual sensation not being a logical requirement of this use of 'see', seems strengthened by an argument of Arthur W. Collins.¹² Collins in arguing a similar point notices the ambiguity in the perception verb 'feel'. 'Feel' can be used to mean 'my opinion' or 'a tactical sensation'. When 'feel' is used in the locution 'feel that', it means my opinion and there is no reference to tactical sensations. The difference is seen in the contrast between "I feel 10 oranges in the bag" and "I feel that there are 10 oranges in the bag."

I have been investigating the locution 'see that' in order to see if it involved both the logical features of being visually aware of an object and having knowledge about that object. I investigated 'seeing that' because Hanson spends some of his chapter talking about how 'see that' closes the gap between pictures and language or between sensations

and knowledge and because this locution does have the logical feature of knowledge that our previous uses of 'see' lacked. Hanson does not claim that 'seeing that' involves the logical requirement of being visually aware. This locution was simply a possible use of 'see' in the sense that 'seeing' has both knowledge and visually logical features. I was searching for the use of 'see' which would be denied if we did not know about what we were visually aware. Hanson claims that there is such a sense of 'see' but gives no examples. We investigated the locution of 'seeing that', thinking that it might be such an example; it was not. Hence it is not obvious that there is such a sense of 'see' requiring knowledge of the object seen. These were the logical requirements of the sense of 'see' that involved conceptual organization.

Another candidate that might be a sense of 'see' involving both logical features is 'seeing as'. Not only might this be a sense of 'see' that involves both logical features but for Hanson's argument to be sound, it must be. Since according to Hanson's analysis, 'see as' involves organization and organization involves knowledge, then cases of 'seeing something as something' must be cases involving this logical feature. The sense of 'see' opposing the sense in which an infant sees is the sense involving knowledge, because it takes organization of elements to 'see' in this sense. So the sense of 'see' opposing the sense in which an infant sees is 'seeing as'. Hence faced with a case of 'seeing as' that does not involve knowledge, Hanson could not claim this to be the infant's sense of 'see'. Infants and idiots or people without knowledge cannot 'see as'. Hanson's argument that an adequate theory of perception involves conceptual organization could be destroyed if one could demonstrate that there are cases of 'seeing as' that do not

involve any knowledge. I have two considerations in this respect: 1) the double cross and 2) the knowledge involved in the duck-rabbit.

Considering the case of seeing a duck-rabbit as a duck, Wittgenstein says that we would not say this of a person who was not familiar with the shape of a duck. But being familiar with the shape of a duck is a far cry from the knowledge Hanson would consider essential. Hanson talks about knowing a list of possible and impossible observations to make of the object of sight, a list, such as if you see it as a duck, then you see that it will fly south for the winter, you see that it will not dissolve in water, etc. We can imagine a child not knowing anything on Hanson's list and yet coloring the duck-rabbit yellow as he had been taught to color pictures of ducks, and we might say of him, "He sees it as a duck." Therefore, if there is a logical requirement of knowledge involved in 'seeing' the duck-rabbit as a duck, it is certainly not the knowledge of the list of possible and impossible observations Hanson is concerned with in this sense of 'see' involving conceptual organization.

Concerning the double cross that may be seen as either a black cross on a white background or a white cross on a black background, Wittgenstein remarks:

Those two aspects of the double cross (I shall call them the aspects A) might be reported simply by pointing alternately to an isolated white and an isolated black cross.

One could quite well imagine this as a primitive reaction in a child even before it could talk.

(Thus in reporting the aspects A we point to a part of the double cross.—The duck and rabbit aspects could not be described in an analogous way.)

You only 'see the duck and rabbit aspects' if you are already conversant with the shapes of those two animals. There is no analogous condition for seeing the aspects A. ¹³

Wittgenstein also remarks as I mentioned in the introduction:

'Now he's seeing it like this', 'now like that'
would only be said of someone capable of mak-
ing certain applications of the figure quite
freely.¹⁴

In other words we might say that there is a logical connection between 'seeing as' and know how or knowing one's way about, but Hanson explicitly denies that he is interested in 'knowing how' and makes it clear that his interest is in the connection between theoretical knowledge and seeing.¹⁵ The example of a child coloring the duck-rabbit yellow as he does pictures of ducks, giving us reason to say, "He sees it as a duck" indicates that what gives 'seeing as' a use is 'know how' rather than knowledge.

We have understood Hanson's two senses of 'see', both involving sense-datum pictures and having the distinguishing feature of conceptual organization; we have examined his arguments that a theory of perception involving this organization is necessary to explain 'seeing' the same object differently and the connection between knowledge and 'seeing'. We have seen there is not a reason for a theory of perception to explain 'seeing' ambiguous figures differently. We have also seen that Hanson does not establish that there is a sense of 'see' with the logical requirements of both having sensations and knowledge, and that it is not obvious that there is such a use of 'see'. Finally I have shown that Hanson's sense of 'see' does not square with the fact that we do use 'seeing as' when the person has no knowledge. Thus I conclude that Hanson does not succeed in giving us reason to believe that 'seeing as' illuminates 'seeing' by showing that perception involves conceptual organization.

Conceptual Problems in Hanson's Argument

I will now turn to attempting to indicate why it was not clear to Hanson that his arguments were not successful. I have previously mentioned several reasons that were responsible for Hanson's reasoning. I have noted that Hanson's belief that a theory of perception must account for seeing ambiguous figures is due to Hanson's not realizing that there are important differences between the concepts of 'seeing as' and 'seeing'. Also if Hanson was thinking that 'seeing that' obviously involves visual sensations, this seems to result from not carefully noticing the way this locution is actually used.

A partial explanation for Hanson insisting that there are two senses of 'see' is because the infant and the scientist describe what they see differently. The layman might describe what he sees as a funny shaped light bulb while the scientist might describe it as an X-ray tube. According to Hanson, both men are visually aware of a glass and metal object, but we need another sense of see to account for the different descriptions we would get if we ask these men what they saw. It is not that the scientist sees the glass and metal object as an X-ray tube. If we were to say he saw it as an X-ray tube, we would have to be able to say what else it could be seen as. Although it is obvious that it can be described in various other ways, is there something it can be seen as. With the duck-rabbit we might say, "What you see as a duck can also be seen as a rabbit" or perhaps we say, "What in this context is a picture of a rabbit could in another context be a picture of a duck." We would not say, "What in this context is a funny shaped bulb is in another context an X-ray tube." Rather if someone describes what he sees as a funny shaped light bulb, you might say, "That funny shaped light

bulb is an X-ray tube." You would not say that a rabbit is a duck. "Glass and metal object" and "funny shaped bulb" are descriptions of the X-ray tube. The glass and metal object is a funny shaped bulb that is an X-ray tube. "Duck" and "rabbit" are not descriptions of the ambiguous figures although they are descriptions of how we see it. We can't say, "The duck is a rabbit that is an ambiguous figure."

So "glass and metal object," "funny shaped bulb" and "X-ray tube" are just different descriptions of the same object. But the fact that different people give these different descriptions of an X-ray tube seems a reason Hanson thinks we have a second sense of 'see'. However, we don't need another sense of 'see' to account for the fact that they describe or identify what they see correctly but differently. It simply needs to be noted that it is a common fact to have different ways to describe or identify objects.¹⁶ For example, we might ask different people returning from a convention, "Whom did you see at the convention?" Different people might respond with "Marilyn's father," "Edna's husband," "A fellow Rotarian," "A tall dark man," etc. These descriptions might all be of the same man. The fact that different people describe this same man differently does not give us a reason for saying there are different senses of 'see'. It is simply the fact that we describe the same object in many different ways. We can describe an object as an X-ray tube, as a funny shaped light bulb or as a glass and metal object, and this is not a reason to think that there is a different sense of 'see'. And if we don't describe it as a glass and metal object but simply draw a picture of it, we have no reason to think there is a different sense of 'see'.

One factor that may have played a part in Hanson's thinking that

perception involves organization is the fact that all of his examples of 'seeing as' are of the type that involve what could be called "aspects of organization."¹⁷

In several of the illustrations of paradigm uses of 'seeing as' in the introduction we might say that when the aspect changes, some of the parts pull together that before did not go together. We might say this of the staircase figure and the duck-rabbit. Instances such as these are the type Hanson uses to illustrate 'seeing as'. However, in cases such as the triangle - i.e., cases that involve imagination, there is nothing to describe as 'organization'. Organization may play a role in some instances of 'seeing as', but it does not in all cases. Thinking all cases of 'seeing as' are the same, results in thinking that all cases of 'seeing as' involve organizational aspects. This might result in the further generalization that all perception involves organizational aspects.

I would now like to consider a question that is fundamental in Hanson's analysis of 'seeing'. I will consider the question that introduced 'organization'. 'Organization' was introduced by Hanson as the answer to the question, "What changes when we first see one aspect and then another?" For example, we stare at the duck-rabbit figure, seeing it first as a duck and then as a rabbit. Nothing about the object changes. As Hanson says, nothing optical or none of my sensations change. So we wonder what changes and we answer, "The organization."

Let us examine the question, "What changes?" as it occurs in this situation. Wittgenstein indicates that we normally have one of the following criteria for something changing.¹⁸ Usually when we say that something changes, there is some part of the changing thing that remains

the same. For example, when we change a tire on a car, the rest of the car remains the same. However, with a change of aspects as in an ambiguous figure, we have no part that remains the same, but rather the whole figure remains the same. Another criterion for something changing is that I can paint a 'before' and 'after' picture that indicates the change. As mentioned previously, the exact copy of what I saw when I saw it as a rabbit would be the same as when I saw it as a duck. So with a change of aspect, I cannot draw the change.

So although there seems to be a legitimate use of 'changing aspects', this perhaps is a different sense than the sense of change about which we ask, "What changes?" At least this question has a different function in the cases of changing aspect than when it is asked in a situation such as a person asking a friend if he noticed anything different and he is to discover what has been changed - her hair style or her shade of lip stick, etc. In this situation the question, "What has changed?" seems to find a more natural role to play.

Wittgenstein asked about a change of aspect, "But what is different: my impression? my point of view? - Can I say?"¹⁹ This suggests the question, "What changes?" does not have a sense here. When the object of sight changes, we can report this change. Imagine someone changing the arrangement of the furniture in a room and my description of the change to a blind friend, "Now she has got the piano where your old easy chair was." My description tells him something about the room. My description has a use because it helps him to find his way in this new arrangement. It can be checked on, corrected, said to be accurate or inaccurate, true or false. Now with an aspect change in the same tone of voice as before I might say, "Now it's a duck," but this sentence

could not serve to describe or report an arrangement. Its function might rather be to show how I will go on to treat the figure. If I don't describe the changed arrangement of furniture to a friend, he may find out about the change by feeling his way around the room. If I don't say, "Now it's a duck," people might discover the changed aspect by my behavior toward the object.

So although a change of aspect and a change in the object of perception are described much the same, the function of these sentences is rather different. The question, "What has been changed?" seemed to fit in naturally with changing the furniture and with different criteria in the change of aspect case. If we are tempted to answer the question, "What changes?" in a change of aspect with "Organization," we should remember the criterion here is simply our description of the object or the way we go on to behave.

Hanson also mentions organization in connection with a picture puzzle, a drawing that only seems like lines on the page until we are told, "It's a soldier and a dog." Wittgenstein seems to be leading us away from the question, "What changes?" in this situation by connecting the question, "What makes the difference between the look of the picture before and after the solution?" with the question, "What is the general mark of the solution having been found?"²⁰ And then he dispels the attempt to answer this question by giving us 16 different reasons we might have for calling what we have found, a solution. There is not one thing called a solution to such puzzles, so there is no general mark of the solution having been found, and hence we are not tempted to think there is a single answer to "What makes the difference between the look of the picture before and after the solution?" or "What changes?"

To note the difference in the question, "What changes?" when it occurs in a case of changing aspects and when it occurs in the situation where the object of sight has been changed, let us compare the duck aspect changing to the rabbit and the arrangement of the furniture changed in a room. If 'organization' is the answer to the question when it occurs in connection with the ambiguous figure, then we should note that 'organization' does not serve to explain what changed the way the answer "The arrangement of the furniture" might. If organization was an explanation like the arrangement, it would be an empirical claim. One could be wrong that what changed in the room was the arrangement of furniture. I might have to look again to see if it was the arrangement that was different. The arrangement of furniture could be changed and I not even notice it. Can the organization of the duck-rabbit be changed and I not notice it? Is it possible but not true that I have the duck organization and yet see it as a rabbit?

How does the answer, 'organization' help? Is it that when we see different things, there are two possible explanations: the organization of what we see is different or the object itself is different. So the answer, 'organization', distinguishes between these two possibilities. There is only one way to see different things and that is if the object is different. There is no seeing the same object but seeing different things, although there is seeing the same object as different things. Thinking that there is some other way to see different things besides seeing different things is simply assimilating the concept of 'seeing as' to 'seeing'.

The answer to "What has changed?" in connection with the furniture can explain why the room looks different. The answer to "What has

changed?" in the case of ambiguous figures cannot explain the fact that we now see it as something different. However, 'organization' might mark the contrast in seeing the duck-rabbit differently and in seeing the triangle as a mountain. If Hanson ignored the differences in the questions of what changed, he might think he had noted something that could be involved in an explanation of what we something as.

NOTES

¹Norwood Russell Hanson, Patterns of Discovery (Cambridge, 1958), p. 19. Hanson quote both Vesey and Wittgenstein in this section.

²ibid., p. 12.

³ibid., p. 6.

⁴ibid., p. 13.

⁵ibid., p. 22.

⁶ibid., p. 29

⁷Hanson, "Observation and Interpretation", Philosophy of Science Today, ed S. Morgenbesser (New York, 1967), p. 96.

⁸On seeing that a theory of perception does not need to account for cases of 'seeing as' and so ambiguous figures and at least some cases of illusions that can be stated in terms of 'seeing', one may wonder exactly what a theory of perception is explaining. "If your head is haunted by explanations here, you are neglecting to remind yourself of the most important facts." Ludwig Wittgenstein, Zettel, ed. G.E.M. Anscombe and G.H. von Wright, translated G.E.M. Anscombe (Berkeley, 1970), passage 220.

⁹G.J. Warnock, "Seeing", Perceiving, Sensing and Knowing (New York, 1965), pp. 49-67.

¹⁰Hanson, Patterns of Discovery, p. 25.

¹¹ibid., p. 25.

¹²Arthur W. Collins, "The Epistemological Status of the Concept of Perception", The Philosophical Review, LXXVI (1967).

¹³Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations (New York, 1958) p. 207-6,-7.

¹⁴ibid., 208-5. Also "For we might never have seen a cube and still have this experience of seeing it as a cube." Brown Book, p. 164.

¹⁵Hanson, Patterns of Discovery, p. 26. "We are concerned with sa-voir, not savoir faire."

¹⁶John L. Austin, Sense and Sensibilia (Oxford, 1962), p. 98.

¹⁷Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, p. 208-4.

¹⁸Wittgenstein, "Notes on Philosophical Psychology", in private circulation, pp. 85-6.

¹⁹Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, p. 195-8. Also Cf. p. 201-7.

²⁰Wittgenstein, Zettel, passage 195.

SUMMARY

The objective of this thesis has been to clarify the differences between the concepts 'seeing as' and 'seeing' and to understand the significance of these differences.

In order to understand the differences between the concepts 'seeing as' and 'seeing', it was shown how Wittgenstein would support his claim that " 'Seeing as...' is not part of perception." Wittgenstein has pointed out such differences as the fact that we can draw an exact copy to show what we see, whereas an exact copy will not show what we see it as. Wittgenstein has reminded us that the paradigm uses of 'seeing as' are in connection with ambiguous figures such as the duck-rabbit rather than as perception reports used to answer the question. "What is there?" When we say, "I see a duck," it implies there is a duck; on the other hand, when we say, "I see it as a duck," the 'it' cannot be a normal-looking duck in plain sight. When we say, "I see it as a duck" or "He sees it as a duck," we imply that there is another way that the figure can be seen. We have also noticed that there are differences in the different figures used as paradigms of 'seeing as'; some of these involve imagination, some involve having a familiarity with different shapes, some involve the possibility of illusions.

In order to show that 'seeing as' was involved in theories of perception, two ways were mentioned that this concept becomes involved in theories of perception. The first way is as a locution to state illusions and the seeing of ambiguous figures; theories of perception at-

tempt to explain both of these. The second way is in theories that involve basic elements of perception such as color patches and lines. These theories must explain the fact that we see houses, trees and people rather than just lines and colors. This is sometimes done by saying we see the lines and colors as a house.

This discussion showed 'seeing as' was involved in these theories, but in order to demonstrate the significance of 'seeing as' in the analysis of perception, three theories were examined which either explicitly or implicitly in their arguments claimed that 'seeing as' was a part of perception. It was then shown how each of these theories was inadequate because of the failure to consider the conceptual differences between 'seeing' and 'seeing as'.

In the discussion of each of the three theories of perception we saw how the theory involved the assimilation of 'seeing as' to 'seeing'. In each case the author rejected previous theories of perception on the basis of their inability to account for situations in which it is appropriate to use the 'seeing as' locution, and then attempted to offer an analysis of 'seeing' that would adequately account for these instances of 'seeing as'. Thus Wittgenstein's reminders of the difference between these concepts had the effect of denying the validity of these cases as a criterion for an adequate theory of perception.

In the discussion of each of the three theories of perception we saw not only how the assimilation of 'seeing as' and 'seeing' led to attempts to offer adequate explanations of seeing the same thing differently, but how this confusion involves the theory in other confusions.

With Lewis we saw that overlooking the difference in 'seeing' and 'seeing as' resulted in 'seeing' meaning 'interpreting presentations'.

It was pointed out that 'seeing as' and 'interpreting' both involved alternatives and so although 'interpreting' implies the need of more information and so is very different from both 'seeing' and 'seeing as', the similarity of 'seeing as' and 'interpreting' and the assimilation of 'seeing' and 'seeing as' was partly responsible for Lewis' claim that 'seeing' was 'interpreting'. Also the fact that 'seeing as' suggests a comparison led Lewis to think that all 'seeing' involves a comparison between presentations and memory images of former presentations. We saw that although 'seeing as' may have tempted us to think there was a comparison involved in seeing, this comparison made no sense, because there was no sense to verifying it.

In understanding Vesey's theory of perception we found him to have a view surprisingly close to Lewis'. Although he argued against there being judgment in perception, this was only a verbal disagreement with Lewis. Vesey made the claim that "All seeing is seeing as." Remembering our previous discussion of the differences in the concepts 'seeing' and 'seeing as', we realized the statement was false. It was understood that Vesey meant by this statement that whenever we see, what we see looks like something or is seen as something. We saw that this was due in part to Vesey confusing the concepts 'seeing' and 'recognizing'. In situations in which it is proper to use 'recognize', it is appropriate to talk about 'looks like', but this is not always appropriate in cases of 'seeing'.

In the discussion of Hanson's theory of perception, the idea was examined that perception involves conceptual organization. Here it was argued that since 'seeing as' is not a part of perception, a theory of perception does not need to account for seeing ambiguous figures differ-

ently, and that Hanson did not provide us with a sense of 'see' which would be withdrawn if the person was proven not to have the concept of what he was supposed to see. This showed that Hanson had not given us reason to believe that perception involves conceptual organization. In this discussion it was suggested that 'seeing that' does not involve being visually aware of something. It was argued that asking, "What changed?" in connection with the ambiguous figure led Hanson to believe that he had found a factor that helped explain perception.

Thus we have seen the significance of noting the differences between the concepts 'seeing' and 'seeing as'. Noting the differences between these concepts helps us not only to appreciate the significance of Wittgenstein's claim but promotes a better understanding of the passages in chapter xi of Philosophical Investigations. Emphasizing his claim of the differences in these concepts facilitates the organization of much of the material in this chapter.

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