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PREFACE

This work is the outgrowth of an interest in French Diplomatic History and 1848 which I experienced under the questioning encouragement of Professor Brison D. Gooch. I have especially appreciated the helpful suggestions of Professor William Savage. I am indebted to Professors William H. Maehl and Kenneth I. Dailey for their demanding insistence on detail and fact which balanced an earlier training in broad generalization by Professors H. Stuart Hughes, John Gaus and Herbert Spiro. For the idea of the French missionary feeling to export liberty, which characterized Lamartine and Bastide, the two French Foreign Ministers of 1848, I must thank the stimulating seminar at the University of Munich with Dr. Hubert Rumpel. To all of these men I owe a deep gratitude in helping me to understand history and the men that have guided politics.

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All translations from German and French appearing in the text are my own. All italics reproduced in the quotes were in the original unless otherwise noted.

ABBREVIATIONS

AEB	Affaires Etrangères Beligues, Brussels Archive.
AEF	Affaires Etrangères Françaises, Paris Archive.
AHG	Archives Historique de la Guerre, Paris Army Archive.
All	Allemagne, Germany.
ASI	Archivo Storico Italiano.
cc	commercial correspondence.
DDF	Documents Diplomatiques Françaises.
GSA	Geheim-Staatsarchiv, Berlin Archive.
HHSA	Haus- Hof- und Staatsarchiv, Vienna Archive.
JMH	Journal of Modern History
MD	Mémoires et Documents, series in Paris Archive (AEF).
Mey Corr	Peter von Meyendorff, Correspondence.
Saxony	Document collection from Dresden.

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INTRODUCTION

French foreign policy toward Germany in 1848 chose between two major alternatives: a larger, Grossdeutsch, or a smaller, Kleindeutsch, German state.¹ The possibilities in Central Europe reflected the division in France between the liberal and traditional views of foreign policy. French Liberal-Romantics upheld the notion of the mission of France and the Republic to spread liberty, equality and fraternity. This Girondin credo predominated in the opposition group to the July Monarchy, among men like Lamartine, Ledru-Rollin and Victor Hugo. They opposed the restrained foreign policy of Louis-Philippe that was "boring" France, favoring instead an active support for national movements in Italy, Poland and Germany. In Germany they favored a strong unitary state under the liberal leadership of Prussia a Kleindeutsch policy.

The traditional policy feared German unification, preferring to divide and rule, wishing to protect the "liberties of the German princes." The traditionalists mistrusted gallophobic sentiment in the German nationalist movement, which might claim Alsace and Lorraine. This group coveted the Rhine frontier for France, and they were exponents of reason of state, not idealistic nationalism. Important

¹In this study Grossdeutsch will be the position of Frenchmen favoring divided leadership and a federal structure and weakness of individual German states. The Kleindeutsch principle meant a smaller unified state under Prussian domination, similar to the borders of 1871-without Alsace and Lorraine.

leaders of the traditionalists were Thiers, Guizot, Edgar Quinet, and the Duc de Broglie. Their ideas were expressed in the newspapers and periodicals of Paris, particularly the Revue des deux mondes, and they propounded a Grossdeutsch policy of federalism and weakness in Germany.²

Historians of the diplomacy of 1848 have not differed widely on the policy attributed to the French Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Lamartine and Bastide toward Germany. Friedrich Ley, Wiśława Knapowska, A. J. P. Taylor, Eberhard Meyer and Alexander Scharff all believed that the French Ministers of Foreign Affairs were national Realpolitikers, unemotional traditionalists seeking a Grossdeutsch, weak Germany.³ Alois Mertes and Pierre Quentin-Bauchart differ slightly from these historians in that they saw a contradiction in French policy under Lamartine, who was unable to choose between the traditional and

²Rudolph von Albertine, "Frankreichs Stellungnahme zur deutschen Einigung während des zweiten Kaiserreiches," Schweizerische Zeitschrift für Geschichte, V, (1955), 305-10.

³Friedrich Ley, Frankreich und die deutsche Revolution 1848-49, (Kiel University, unpublished doctoral dissertation, 1923); Wiśława Knapowska, "La Prusse, la France et la question polonaise in 1848," in La Pologne au VI^e Congrès International des Sciences historiques à Oslo, (Warsaw: Société polonaise d'histoire, 1930), p. 150; A. J. P. Taylor, The Italian Problem in European Diplomacy: 1848-1849, ("Publication of the University of Manchester, Historical Series," LXVII; Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1934) p. 6; Eberhard Meyer, Die aussenpolitischen Ideen der Achtundvierziger, ("Historische Studien," vol. 337; Berlin: Ebering, 1938), pp. 78-81; Alexander Scharff, Die Europäischen Grossmächte und die deutsche Revolution: 1848-1851, (Leipzig: Koehler and Amelang, 1942), passim.

romantic viewpoints.⁴ Mertes and Otto Pfisterer thought that under Bastide, Foreign Minister after May 10, 1848, all inconsistencies were removed from French policy, which was purely realistic and supported the particularism of the various German states.⁵

This study will re-examine the contention of the vast majority of historians that Bastide and Lamartine were Grossdeutsch opponents of German unification. A major consideration will be the degree French policy was "prudent," as most historians have claimed,⁶ and to what degree it was shaped by a genuine sympathy for nationalism in central Europe.

The failure of previous writers on 1848 to use all major sources of information raises serious questions about their conclusions. The basic studies on the attitude of the French in 1848 toward Germany have been Otto Pfisterer's unpublished dissertation written at the University of Tübingen and Friedrich Ley's typed dissertation for the University of Kiel.

⁴Alois Mertes, Frankreichs Stellungnahme zur deutschen Revolution im Jahre 1848, (Bonn, unpublished doctoral dissertation, 1951), pp. 29-30; Pierre Quentin-Bauchart, Lamartine et la politique étrangère de la révolution de février: 24 février à 24 juin 1848, (Paris: F. Juven, 1908), pp. 41-52; cf. Alexander Scharff, "König Friedrich Wilhelm IV., Deutschland und Europa im Frühjahr 1849," in Geschichtliche Kraft und Entscheidungen: Festschrift zum 75. Geburtstag von Otto Becker, (Weisbaden: F. Steiner, 1954), pp. 165-99.

⁵Mertes, pp. 30, 51, 54-56; Otto Pfisterer, Preussen und Frankreich im Jahre 1848, (Tübingen, unpublished doctoral dissertation, 1921), pp. 99-102.

⁶Knapowska, p. 151; Taylor, Italian Question, pp. 6-7; Emile Bourgeois, Manuel historique de la politique étrangère, (11th ed.; Paris: E. Berlin, 1948), III, 311.

Both were published soon after World War I in a spirit of hatred toward France. They were based on the newly-opened Prussian Secret Archives, and neither writer visited the Vienna or Paris archives. For information on French opinion they supplemented the Berlin archive with French and German newspapers. Pfisterer especially was most indiscriminate in failing to distinguish between newspaper opinion and official policy. Ernst Birke's excellent study of the French press and foreign policy warned that the newspapers in 1848 reflected the traditional anti-German foreign policy ideas of Guizot and Thiers. The dissertations of Ley and Pfisterer suffered from the limits and biases of their sources.⁷

The most important published work on French foreign policy in 1848 has been done by Alexander Scharff, Professor of Modern History at the University of Kiel. Unfortunately he wrote his great work of synthesis in 1942, when travel to Vienna and Paris was difficult because of the war. When he was able to visit the Paris archives after World War II, Scharff somewhat altered his view of the extent of French hostility to German unification. However, his interests have shifted to the history of Schleswig-Holstein, and he has not written a study of the entirety of French policy in 1848. Scharff's earlier work suffered most from its reliance on Ley and Pfisterer and lack of archival materials; his later study focuses on only the Schleswig Question, a very minor segment of French Policy toward Germany.⁸

⁷Ernst Birke, Frankreich und Ostmitteleuropa im 19. Jahrhundert: Beiträge zur Politik und Geistesgeschichte, (Köln: Bohlau, 1960) passim; Ley, Frankreich; Pfisterer, Preussen.

⁸Alexander Scharff, Die Grossmächte; "Schleswig Holstein Erhebung im Spiegel französischer Akten" in Festschrift für Volquart Pauls, (Neumünster: Wachholtz, 1950), pp. 172-94.

The most complete work on French-German relations in 1848 is the unpublished University of Bonn doctoral dissertation of Alois Mertes written in 1951. Because circumstances did not permit him to travel to Berlin or Vienna, his work is based on one archive. In Paris, he was able to see only documents in the Quai d'Orsay archive up to June 30, 1848 because of a lengthy strike of French civil servants, including archivists. The failure to use more new material gravely limits the value of his work. The result was that, like previous writers, he was able to gain only a partial view of French policy.⁹

The present dissertation is based upon the political and consular files of the archives of the French Foreign Ministry and the reports of irregular diplomats and secret agents, a new major source of information.¹⁰ The consular reports have never before been quoted on this subject; thus the economic motivation of French policy is treated here for the first time.¹¹ The Prussian Secret Archives, the Austrian Haus- Hof- und Staatsarchiv and Belgian Foreign Ministry Archives were all extremely helpful as well as the published documents from the archive at Dresden.¹²

⁹Mertes, Frankreichs, see Introduction for explanation.

¹⁰see Chapter VI.

¹¹see Chapter XI.

¹²Helmut Kretschmar & Horst Schlechte (ed.) Französische und Sächsischen Gesandtschaftsberichte aus Dresden und Paris: 1848-1849, (Berlin: Rutten & Loening, 1956), (hereafter, Saxony).

CHAPTER I

THE REVOLUTION IN FRANCE

Louis-Philippe's abdication on February 24, 1848, led to the proclamation of the Second French Republic. Foreign policy during the Provisional Government, until the formation of the Commission of the Executive Power on May 10, 1848, was formed principally by Alphonse de Lamartine. He was replaced by Jules Bastide who directed affairs until the election of Louis Napoleon as President in December.

During 1848, the personality of these men had a profound influence on the direction of policy. The romantic predisposition of the poet Lamartine affected his outlook causing him to reject what was disagreeable. "Illusion was his native element" since he was a "sworn foe of reality."¹ His own account of 1848 must be read with caution, because he was an unreliable witness. He altered and distorted the most basic elements of the narrative. He used poetic license when he wrote of his own life. He changed his date and place of birth according to its relationship to the story; the data of his life was changed according to his whims. William F. GRIESE wrote, he "treats the facts of his life as a novelist treats the ingredients of fiction, solely in

¹William F. GRIESE, "Lamartine: A Portrait," (University of Wisconsin Studies in Language and Literature," XX; Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1924), 182-83.

accordance with aesthetic laws. Facts change from day to day. He was born in 1790, 1792, 1793 and 1794 at Maçon, at Milly and at St. Point."²

Alexis de Toqueville wrote similarly of Lamartine. He had "never known a mind less sincere, nor one that had a more sincere though contempt for the truth. . . . When speaking or writing, he spoke the truth or lied without caring which he did, occupied only with the effect he wished to produce at the moment."³

This Government policy in early 1848 was directed by a man with a "thorough contempt for the truth,"⁴ and it could easily suffer from a lack of consistent logic behind policy. He was surrounded by a world of chimeras, conceptions of his own fancy. Lamartine was more than a naive dreamer; he lived in a dream world in his daily concepts, unaware of what was really happening.

Such an unbalanced optimism in forming policy is extremely dangerous. Lamartine was capable of seeing his most extreme and irrational goals on the verge of total victory. It is not in the least surprising that these goals themselves were changing and even conflicting from time to time; nevertheless, the ideal of the moment was "inevitable," "predestined" with little or no action on his part.⁵

²Ibid., p. 193.

³Alexis de Tocqueville, The Recollections of Alexis de Tocqueville, translated by Alexander Tiexeira de Mattos, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1946), p. 118. Peter Amann called Lamartine's History of 1848 "a completely unreliable apologia." "Writings on the Second French Republic," JMH, XXXIV (1962), 409.

⁴Griese, "Lamartine," p. 209.

⁵Ibid.

It is a mistake to confuse inactivity with "prudence" as so many historians have done.

He was a very fervent if somewhat quixotic lover of liberty and an advocate of undefined and perhaps undefinable ideals. . . . His life was thus a continuous tribute to chimeras and false gods because Lamartine refused even for the briefest interval to live on terms of understanding with the realities of life. . . . Truth is the thing he least cared for.⁶

This study will explore whether it is possible to call Lamartine or Bastide "realists." Was the policy based on more than romantic notions of Germany and Europe? Was Bastide really less a dreamer than Lamartine? What was the real cause for French inactivity in 1848? Defeatism or overconfidence?

There were five important characteristics of French policy in 1848: order, peace, nationalism, republicanism and French self-interest. The last was felt to be the culmination of the first four. When the world was peaceably reorganized into national republics, all of the sources of tension and conflict would be removed from international relations. The new state of things would eliminate wars, which had been caused by dynastic rivalries. Serving the true interests of France meant serving the real interests of civilization, furthering the progress of man. If any single proposition had priority, it was peace. War was felt to be a barbaric vestige of another age when men were less enlightened. Moreover, the first republic had been destroyed by a foreign coalition which had prevented civil disorder by a crusade against France with the promise of reforms to Germans and others as a reward for their fighting. After the war, little if anything was done in

⁶Ibid

carrying out these promises, but they had been used to thwart the real thrust of the revolution.

France's national interest would also have been served by changing radically the diplomatic complex of Europe. The center of the new order would be Paris as much as the old order had been St. Petersburg, Vienna, and Berlin, the "Three Northern Courts." Future conflicts would be settled by congresses, by conciliation, by diplomacy. Lamartine saw for himself a role similar to Metternich's in earlier years. France as the oldest and most experienced republic would naturally have a special prestige in the new world. The errors of treaties of 1814-15 would be redressed, and the world would enter a new age of peace on the basis of national self-determinism and democracy. The French saw their motives as unselfish in bringing liberty, equality and fraternity to the world. After 1848, Europe had to wait for Woodrow Wilson to champion many of the same ideas at Versailles.

Since other European countries had a very different view of French intentions, there was a fear of invasion by France's neighbors after the February Revolution.⁷ Lamartine, in his letter to the diplomatic corps of Paris, shortly after assuming power, promised that the republican form of the new government had not changed the place of France in Europe, not its loyal and sincere disposition to maintain good relations with the powers who, like France wished the independence of nations and the peace of the world. He expressed his wish to cooperate

⁷For the best discussion of the fears of French invasion among the neighbors of France after the February Revolution, see Brison D. Gooch, Belgium and the February Revolution. (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1963).

with all means in his power for the concord of peoples with reciprocal dignity, claiming that both the principle of peace and the principle of liberty had been created in the French Revolution.⁸

Lamartine simultaneously posited national liberation of "oppressed peoples" and peace. He implied that the freedom of peoples could be arranged without war, that is by mutual respect, in a general congress of Europe. A few days later, he told French diplomatic agents to stress the themes of liberty for nations and the French desire for peace in a circular addressed to French diplomats abroad. The historian of the Girondists dwelt on the differences between 1792 and 1848, the changes since then and difference between the two republics. Failing to see a conflict of principles, he thought that the differing forms of governments could peacefully live together.⁹

Lamartine immediately impressed the members of the diplomatic community in Paris as the most capable member of the Provisional Government. He was labeled as a man of peace and order from the beginning. Arnim praised, 29 February, all the measures taken by the Provisional Government as most "energetic" and as "most appropriate to the circumstances." The new government seemed to him to be showing intelligence as well as force.

The greatest part of this praise returns to M. de Lamartine. During the first days when the government had no material force at its disposal, he, by his moral force alone and the prestige of his word on the masses, contained the popular

⁸Lamartine to the Members of the Diplomatic Corps in Paris, February 27, 1848, Charles Pouthas (ed.), Documents diplomatiques du gouvernement provisoire de la Commission du pouvoir exécutif, (Paris: Imprimerie Nationale, 1953), I, 1. (hereafter DDF)

⁹Lamartine to Diplomatic Agents, Paris, March 2, 1848, DDF, I, 7.

wave which menaced overflowing. One can say that he saved Paris from pillage and conflagration at the peril of his life. It is he who is again the soul of the government and the man of the people.¹⁰

Arnim indicated the precarious character of the revolutionary regime. "He exercises for the moment the sovereignty of genius. But this little cannot suffice for long; all governments need material force to maintain themselves." The government of Paris was also increasing the strength of the National Guard with workers and young men from the schools. No one knew if there might be a future competition between the revolutionary government and the army.¹¹

The Austrian Ambassador wrote the same day of a conversation that Normanby, the English Ambassador, had had the day before with Lamartine. Normanby, like Arnim, was impressed with the moderation and good sense of the new director of French foreign policy. Lamartine made the most categorical assurances of moderation and peaceful intentions.¹²

In Arnim's first interview with Lamartine, "as a private party," Lamartine gave assurances that not only he, but all of his colleagues, sincerely desired to maintain peace. Lamartine said, "The manifesto which will appear tomorrow or the next day will demonstrate this."¹³

¹⁰ Arnim to Berlin, Paris, February 29, 1848, Germany Geheimes Staatsarchiv, Berlin, III. Hauptabteilung, vol. 855, p. 54 (hereafter GSA).

¹¹ Ibid.

¹² Apponyi to Metternich, Paris, March 1, 1848, Austria, Haus- Hof- und Staatsarchiv, Vienna, Politisches Archiv, IX Frankreich, Kart. 29, vol. III, p. 212. (hereafter HHSA).

¹³ Arnim to Berlin, Paris, March 1, 1848, GSA, vol. 855, p. 57.

Lamartine told Normanby that the Provisional Government was trying to support the ideas of order and moderation and would combat anarchy with all its powers. He declared at the same time that the government desired ardently to maintain peace and good relations with all Powers, that it would never be an aggressor, and it would not intervene except on the request of the sovereigns or the governments. Though it was impossible in the present situation in Paris to speak openly of the maintenance of the treaties of 1815; nevertheless, the republican form of the new government had not changed the place of France in Europe. He promised that France sincerely desired to conserve the peace and would not attack anyone. His only hostile reservation was that France would repel the attack of an army of intervention directed against the peoples who wished to defend their independence and their liberty.¹⁴

The immediate effect of the February Revolution in the German Diet was fear. Another invasion across the Rhine was expected, and the forces there were reinforced. The French chargé was told by a member of the Diet that their declaration had been purely defensive, and the military precautions were not aggressive. It was with more apprehension in Frankfurt than anger that they followed the events in France. Billing, the French chargé, warned that "the cause of political progress . . . in Germany would be compromised, if the apprehension . . .

of France concentrated the energy of the German nation in the thought of repulsing a new invasion of her territory by force."¹⁵

¹⁴Ibid.

¹⁵Billing to Lamartine, Frankfurt, March 2, 1848, DDF, I, 13.

The most singular reaction was in Munich, where the King of Bavaria came to the home of the French Minister, something which the Minister thought had never happened before. The King told Bourgoing:

He desired to maintain peaceful and friendly relations with France; that if they did not attack Germany, she need not fear attack. . . . It would be a dangerous mistake to believe closer relations with France would cause Bavaria to leave the German Confederation. The King of Bavaria, like all German sovereigns is animated by the most sincere and exalted sentiment of German nationality.¹⁶

After the Paris Revolution, General Radowitz was sent by Prussia to Vienna to explain her policy. He was instructed to tell the Austrians that the King of Prussia desired to maintain peace and wished to contribute as much as he could to its conservation. He would not consider mixing into the affairs of France or adopting a system of aggression against her, but he could not tolerate the slightest aggression against her, by the French or infraction of the treaties in Germany or in the Italian provinces of Austria. Only defensive action was contemplated by the Prussians.¹⁷

The championing of nationalism by France threatened Prussia less than Russia or Austria, because Prussia had a smaller proportion of non-nationals in her population than Russia or Austria. Prussia was the most popular state in Germany among liberal circles and seemed likely to gain by the national reorganization of boundaries. The few Polish subjects the King of Prussia might lose would be more than off-set by the possibility of becoming the leader of Germans.

¹⁶Bourgoing to Lamartine, Munich, March 4, 1848, DDF, I, 31.

¹⁷Trautmansdorff to Metternich, Berlin, February 28, 1848, HHSA, III, Preussen, Kart. 31.

The Prussian cabinet was unenthusiastic about forming a coalition against France.¹⁸

The difficulties caused Austria by Italy would place Prussia "providentially" between the constitutional states and the absolute states of Germany. "Prussia would not be merely a power to mediate, but her attitude could be recognized as a compromise."¹⁹ The diplomats of the July Monarchy noted the opportunity for Prussia in Germany with Austrian preoccupation in Italy. The natural alliance of any French government would have been with Prussia against Austria, since a weakening of Austrian influence in Italy would necessarily mean an increase for France.

The Belgian Ambassador in Berlin wrote that the Prussian Minister of Foreign Affairs had assured him on March 2, Prussia would leave France to constitute her government as she wished.

Prussia had no wish to repeat the mistake of 1792. Prussia refuses all aggression against France, understanding that she, on her side, abstains from all aggression against not only the German states, but all states constituted by existing treaties.²⁰

Arnim in Paris aided the French by assurances to the Belgian Ambassador, Firmin Rogier, of the good intentions of both the Provisional Government and public opinion. "Until now, the ideas of propaganda and of conquest have not appeared here."²¹

¹⁸Nothomb to Hoffschmidt, Berlin, March, 1848, Belgium, Archives des Affaires Etrangères, correspondance politique: Légations, Prusse IX, 35. (hereafter AEB).

¹⁹Billing to Guizot, Frankfurt, February 12, 1848, France, Archives des Affaires Etrangères, correspondance politique, vol. 805, p. 14. (hereafter AEF).

²⁰Nothomb to Hoffschmidt, Berlin, March 2, 1848, AEB, Prusse IX, 35.

²¹Arnim to Berlin, Paris, March 3, 1848, GSA, vol. 855, p. 62.

Lamartine told Arnim of the Manifesto the day before its appearance. Lamartine said that he had submitted it to his colleagues, who had found the language too diplomatic and had added a few "gros mots." Lamartine told Arnim of the most important parts, especially the passage concerning the treaties of 1815; "France does not recognize in right the of 1815; but she admits them as facts, as a base of territorial circumscription and as a point of departure to arrive peacefully and with common accord at modifications."²²

Austria and Prussia's ambassadors had different views of the danger to Germany of Lamartine's peaceful assurances. While Arnim immediately reassured the King of Prussia that they had nothing to fear in Germany from France, the Austrian Ambassador, Apponyi, warned that the goals of French policy meant the destruction of the Austrian Empire. Arnim tried to convince Berlin that Prussia should do nothing to give the French cause for concern. The main territorial goal of France was Italy, not Germany, and even an invasion on the Rhine would be launched at Vienna, and not necessarily against any of the other German states.

On February 28, the Prussian Ambassador, Baron von Arnim, reported to Berlin in a cipher message that the republican government of France must seize the first pretext to expell Parisian radicals. There was a need to discharge them abroad. Shortly the government could be forced to final expedients to keep the unruly population busy. To avoid social reform, the malcontents might be encouraged to make conquests among the neighbors of France. He warned that if Frederick William IV replied to the proclamation of the republic in France by a

²²Ibid. pp. 62-63. Underlined in Berlin.

hostile alliance or by a reinforcement of troops along the frontier,
"C'est la guerre sur le Rhin."

Arnim wrote his government about the most pressing interest of French policy, the key to the understanding of French actions in 1848. The first thought of the republicans was not toward the Rhine, nor against Prussia, but in Italy,²³ and against Austria. France would send armies readily to the Rhine, because it is easier to reach than the Adige, and because they wish to make a conquest and destroy the treaties of 1815.

The German Question was closely allied in French policy with the Italian Question. One of the stronger members of the German Confederation was Austria and her Foreign Minister, Metternich, was a symbol for reactionary policy in the peninsula protecting her important possessions.

Apponyi believed that the assurances of Lamartine, far from offering some guarantee for the conservation of peace, seemed to announce, on the contrary, that the "irrestible force of things" would force France into a general war. In reflecting on conditions in Italy, Switzerland, and Germany, Apponyi thought it hardly possible that peace would be maintained. In late February, he thought that the movements for "independence and liberty" among these peoples would lead to a resistance to Austrian authority. The Austrian Ambassador saw the national movement as an inevitable enemy of the multi-national Austria. He feared war would be necessary to insure the maintenance the empire of Metternich, but in the immediate future, he noted a peaceful attitude in Paris.²⁴

²³ Arnim to Berlin, Paris, February 28, 1848, GSA, vol. 855, p. 51.

²⁴ Apponyi to Metternich, Paris, March 5, 1848, HHSA, III, 230-31.

On February 29, the Russian Ambassador in Berlin, Meyendorff, returned from Schwerin, and he met with the Austrian Ambassador, Trautmansdorff, at the home of the Prussian Foreign Minister, Canitz. The Russian recalled 1830, and, fearing a precipitous recognition of the French Republic, he spoke firmly. He declared that the Emperor would never recognize the republic, and that if Prussia decided to, she could count on no Russian ever again coming to the aid of the King. There also existed, he added, an engagement taken between the three courts allied in 1830, by which they excluded forever the recognition of a republican regime in France. "Recall what I tell you today," he said, "you will have in two years from now a war on the Rhine, and be certain that 200,000 Russians will be more useful to you than the English fleet."²⁵ He thought that the danger of French aggression necessitated an entente.

General Canitz tried to calm the Russian envoy, and observed that the present condition of France was highly provisional. There would soon be another government, "the republic being, in the long run, impossible in that country."²⁶

Trauttmansdorff, on March 9, wrote to Metternich of his reactions to the Manifesto of Lamartine. He found the language half diplomatic, half poetic, and he was most disturbed by its ambiguity on the maintenance of peace. The total effect that it produced was not reassuring for the future. The real policy would not be seen until the government was definitely constituted by an election.²⁷

²⁵Trauttmansdorff to Metternich, Berlin, February 29, 1848, HHSA, II.

²⁶Ibid.

²⁷Trauttmansdorff to Metternich, Berlin, March 9, 1848, HHSA, III.

Apponyi wrote that the Great Powers should wait on events. For the moment, they should not mix themselves in the internal affairs of France, in any way. They must abstain from all hostile overtures against her, but prepare themselves to repulse vigorously any attack. He found that the "sympathy and support for the oppressed" was more a manifesto of war than a guarantee of peace. He thought that France might resort to war to draw attention from internal conflicts, particularly the social question. He concluded that if war came it would be in Italy.²⁸

Normanby, however, was satisfied with the dispositions of the Provisional Government, and had no fear of aggression in Belgium. He thought that it was only in Lombardy that a war might break-out with France. He told the Prussian Ambassador that public opinion in England was unfavorable to Austria. Berlin underlined heavily in the margin of Hatzfeldt's dispatch the statement that Palmerston was opposed to a conference of the powers, because it would be mistrusted in Paris. The English thought it was necessary to avoid any hint of a coalition against France, and they must at all costs fortify the party of peace which Lamartine headed.²⁹

The attitude of Apponyi to the Manifesto contrasted sharply with Arnim. The Austrian did not find the passage about the treaties of 1815 significant. Guizot had often said that he regarded the treaties as violated by the incorporation of Cracow, but that France would continue to maintain the treaties and that she did not desire them to be

²⁸Apponyi to Metternich, Paris, March 10, 1848, HHSA, III, 255-56.

²⁹Hatzfeldt to Canitz, Paris, March 12, 1848, GSA, vol. 855, pp. 91-92.

broken. Apponyi did not find Guizot's declaration different in essence from Lamartine's; however, the passage which guaranteed Switzerland and Italy French support reversed completely all peaceful meaning.

I understand perfectly that Mr. Lamartine, although he desires ardently the conservation of peace, could not speak differently, but I see equally only one interpretation . . . to the cited paragraph-the avowed impossibility by the French Republic to avoid war.³⁰

Lamartine told Normanby that if Austria confined herself to defending her own territory, and if she did not cross the borders of her Empire to invade the other states of Italy, she would be left alone; but in the case where her army entered the adjacent states, France would be forced by the state of opinion to come to the aid of the attacked to oppose her intervention.³¹

A conflict between Austria and France seemed inevitable in March.

³⁰Apponyi to Metternich, Paris, March 5, 1848, HHSA, III, 230.

³¹Apponyi to Metternich, Paris, March 1, 1848, HHSA, III, 212.

CHAPTER II

THE FRENCH REPUBLIC AND WORLD REVOLUTION

While Lamartine wanted peace, because war could destroy liberty and lead to a dictatorship, he created tension by openly offering protection for the "reconstruction of oppressed nationalities of Europe," and specifically mentioned Switzerland and Italy. Is this a key to understanding the policy of France in 1848? Lamartine tended to see things in extremes; for every thesis, such as peace, there was an antithesis, like war. The contradiction itself between these ideals, has never been recognized as a policy. There was never an attempt by Lamartine to resolve this crude dialectic, and this tended to perpetuate instability, the terror in foreign capitals which is the essence of a revolutionary foreign policy. The consistency of French policy is that it was always contradictory; it never failed to have a polarity of concepts. A policy could be unclear, because its main goal was obscurity, fear of France's true aims, conflict. The creation of some conflict and clash was necessary for the maintenance and progress of the revolution. Lamartine's style, intentionally or not, created the maximum of stress and instability abroad. His relationship to Ledru-Rollin and the radical clubs in Paris suggests such a conclusion. While Lamartine posed as the opponent of disorder and anarchy, he always had Ledru-Rollin, as well as Louis Blanc and Albert in the Cabinet to warn of the alternative of more extreme revolution if he fell. When the

National Assembly met in May, Lamartine demanded that the new "Commission of Executive Power" include Ledru-Rollin. Did Lamartine believe that revolution was dependent on the tension created by conflict? Without conflict there was no place for Lamartine the "mediator." He did use the contrast to show the value of "prudence" and "caution," and without a colleague like Ledru-Rollin there was no need for Lamartine. As important as the policy of peace was the policy of nationalism and liberation which threatened Europe and created the climate necessary for the triumph of the revolutionary foreign policy. While Lamartine promised peace he always warned that war was inevitable anyway. When he spoke of order there had to be a danger of anarchy to make the statement meaningful. Without the antithesis there could be no dialectic and tension.

Lamartine's special agent in Berlin, Circourt, failed to understand the essence of his chief's policy. He looked for consistency, stability and clear direction from Paris. He felt that his position had been undermined because of the absence of any "direction" in policy. He suffered in anxiety because of the "morose silence" from Paris. Circourt thought that Lamartine had a "correct conscience," but had been deceived by his cabinet and especially, Ledru-Rollin.¹

Lamartine was "perfectly unintelligible"² in instructions to his agents, because he had nothing to tell them. Uncertainty itself was

¹Adolphe de Circourt, Souvenirs d'une Mission à Berlin en 1848, Georges Bourgin (ed.) (Paris: A Picard, 1908), I, 247-48.

²Ibid., I, 401.

central to his program. His immediate goals changed with events, and his view of the world was one without stability, shifting sands, on which nothing so stable as a formal entente could be contemplated without the risk of ending the revolutionary process. French declarations should be vague, leaving room for maneuver.

It is difficult to explain satisfactorily the actions of Lamartine in the fiasco of the violation of territory of Savoy, Belgium and Germany by freebooters in March and April, unless we accept him at his word (highly suspect in the case of Lamartine) or believe that he was delighted with uncertainty and tension for its own sake. He allowed the radicals to enter Germany, knowing that they would be crushed. Perhaps, he had more than one motive; nevertheless, the result was certainly confusion.

If one accepts the innocence of Lamartine, the incident of the circular of Ledru-Rollin, that Hatzfeldt learned of March 14, is important. Ledru-Rollin, who was Minister of Interior and responsible for public order, purged the Prefects by sending commissars to the departments to "protect public safety." When the British Ambassador learned of the new order, he went to Lamartine and asked for an explanation. Normanby claimed to fail to understand how this did not contradict the Provisional Government's promise for complete liberty in elections. Lamartine replied that he knew nothing of the circular and did not hide his personal disapproval of it to Normanby. Hatzfeldt concluded that there was no unity among the members of the government, and that each "followed the way of natural tendencies as they inspired him."³

³Hatzfeldt to Canitz, Paris, March 14, 1848, GSA, vol. 855, p. 101.

The Belgian Ambassador, de Ligne, wrote two days later that the circulars of Ledru-Rollin had displeased the National Guard. The rumor of conflict in the cabinet was wide-spread. Ligne feared that there were two opposed parties in the Provisional Government, that of Lamartine supported by the National Guard, the other of Ledru-Rollin, speaking for the progressive and extremist elements, marching with the aid of the clubs and the people of the streets. Ligne feared a civil war.⁴

If this was true, if Lamartine was really in danger of a movement to unseat him by the clubs, then the "invasion" of Belgium and southern Germany could have been unavoidable.

March 17, Schweitzer, the diplomatic representative of Baden saw Lamartine and Bastide, the first Under-secretary. They gave the German the confidential information that a German democratic club in Paris had resolved that a band of 5-6,000 workers would leave Paris to invade the Grand Duchy of Baden, and that this column had made preparations to depart the 22 or 23.

Schweitzer wished to send this information to his government by the telegraph, but Lamartine told him that the telegraph depended on the minister of Interior, Ledru-Rollin, who could pose obstacles to such a message. Schweitzer, therefore had to send the information by courier to Baden.⁵

Apponyi, the Austrian Ambassador, doubted that the expedition would ever depart. He noted that such ridiculous and emphatic

⁴Ligne to Hoffschmidt, Paris, March 16, 1848, AEB, XIII, 87.

⁵Apponyi to Metternich, Paris, March 17, 1848, HHSA, III, 280.

announcements were frequently reproduced without ever being carried out. But he thought Lamartine's confidential information about Ledru-Rollin outlined the situation of the moment in the Provisional Government.

Apponyi hoped that there would be a small violation of territory. "I wish that the adventurous expedition take place; it would produce a very salutary impression of fear in Germany, and let them know the real charm and advantage of having a republic as neighbor."⁶

Since the alarm was given so long in advance, could Lamartine have thought or wished that the expedition would be successful? The fiasco of the German Republican expedition was increased by the timely warning of the French government. Lamartine worked against the clubs and their plans to "export" republicans.

The villain, Ledru-Rollin, was possibly less guilty than usually believed. Hatzfeldt characterized him as an ex-deputy, lawyer, positivist, pushed into the extreme party rather by a desire to be a leader than by conviction, possessing more firmness of spirit than of character. After having been the most violent in the first days of the revolution, he seemed by March 9, to Hatzfeldt, to be more moderate. He was capable of doing much evil, but this would be more because of his tendency to let things go and by his rudeness than by design.⁷ Ledru-Rollin hardly impressed the Prussian observer as a plotter or even much of a leader. He was more likely to be moved by events than to be their mover.

⁶Ibid., 281.

⁷Hatzfeldt to Canitz, Paris, March 1, 1848, GSA, vol. 855, p. 81; Toqueville, Recollections, p. 121.

Two days after the French warning, Apponyi was more concerned about the German clubs, sending for the first time a description of them to Vienna. He wrote that the two main clubs in Paris, Herwegh and Bornstedt's and the less violent club of Veneday had 6,000 members together. After a large meeting of the German clubs in the Place de Madeleine, Lamartine told Schweitzer that the Provisional Government had enjoined the Minister of the Interior to take the most energetic measures to prevent all violation of German territory.⁸

The official promise of the inviolability of German soil given by the French who charged Ledru-Rollin to carry out the act makes unclear the government implication before the invasion. The government was relieved that some of the worst trouble-makers, the Germans, had left Paris. They also seemed to have feared the power of the clubs especially in the first weeks after the revolution.

When Apponyi saw Lamartine on the afternoon of March 22, they spoke of the situation in France. Lamartine was very despondent, and said that he could not count on 100 men among the National Guard who would defend the government. "We have nothing but our naked breasts to oppose to our adversaries." He thought that it was not only possible but probable that in a few days the government would pass under the influence of the leaders of the National Guard, who were for the most part the leaders of the clubs. He believed that they would still re-elect him as premier, as a hostage. He did not think that the

⁸Apponyi to Metternich, Paris, March 19, 1848, HHSA, III, vol. 337, 282; Hatzfeldt to Canitz, Paris, March 19, 1848, GSA, vol. 855, p. 128.

National Guard would protect the government, and he feared being overthrown by 100 to 150,000 workers, led by the chiefs of the clubs.

Lamartine thought that the danger existed for 20 more days. He told Apponyi that he regarded Ledru-Rollin, not as the leader, but solely as the "instrument" of his party, and except for a few nuances of opinion among the members of the Provisional Government, there was accord between them at this time.⁹

The feeling of relief was predominant in the conversation of Hatzfeldt and Lamartine a few days later. Lamartine was most content with the change since his last conversation with Apponyi. He said that the most perfect accord existed among the members of the Provisional Government. He thought that the great majority of the working class was now animated by good sentiments toward the government and he felt the cabinet that had been menaced by the clubs was no longer in great danger. According to him, even in the clubs the most extreme opinion was losing ground. The bands of Belgians and Germans which had left had caused havoc in the outskirts of Paris. After these excesses they had been very badly treated by the French people.¹⁰

The expedition of the German workers did not come without a protest from the German diplomats in Paris. Apponyi was sent to Lamartine as a representative of the Germans to object to the expedition. He and Hatzfeldt were met by the Foreign Minister, who told them that he had just seen Herwegh and Bornstedt at the Hôtel de Ville. He had replied to their requests for aid by saying that the government not only would give them no arms, but would oppose the departure from Paris of armed

⁹Apponyi to Chancellery, Paris, March 23, 1848, HHSA, III, 286-87.

¹⁰Hatzfeldt to Berlin, Paris, March 26, 1848, GSA, vol. 855, p. 133.

columns of republican voluntaries. The government would not allow the declarations of peace made in the Manifesto changed into a lie, nor could they make France a base of operations against Germany. If the Germans living in Paris wished to return, individually, the government would furnish them with assistance and would be happy to get rid of them. Lamartine had said that the Provisional Government was firmly resolved not to furnish voluntarily to the German democrats a single rifle nor any other aid. He said that he could not prevent their leaving Paris, but hoped in three weeks to deal with the matter with more energy.¹¹

Not only the Belgians and Germans, but the Poles also embarrassed the French Provisional Government March 25 and 26. Lamartine told these delegations of his warm sympathies for the reestablishment of Poland, but that France was hardly at war, openly or secretly, with any existing governments, and that she could not voluntarily permit any act of aggression or violence against the German nation.¹²

The Austrian, Apponyi, sympathetically explained to Vienna the problems of the French Government. He wrote that Belgians, Germans, and Poles were daily departing from Paris. Their passage had been paid by the French government who could hardly find work for the French workers. The internal problem of mass unemployment, which had led to the institution of the national workshops and the Luxembourg Commission now affected foreign policy.

On March 25, Lamartine politely refused the Polish deputation's

¹¹Bose to Dresden, Paris, March 26, 1848, Saxony, p. 64.

¹²Hatzfeldt to Berlin, Paris, March 27, 1848, GSA, Vol. 855, p. 134.

request for arms, munitions and clothing. This resulted in a violent scene, the Polish deputation becoming extremely insolent and making increasingly menacing suggestions. A few hours later, the Poles came in a large body to the Hôtel de Ville, where a certain Godebske talked to the Minister of Foreign Affairs in their name. Lamartine was able to make a reply that calmed them, and they resolved to leave March 28 without arms. "The Provisional Government showed a great satisfaction to see all the foreigners leave Paris."¹³

In Lamartine's conversation with Apponyi, he said that Germany was in turmoil, and that there would be revolutions all over the country. The Minister was self-confident and even smug about the improvements in the internal situation of France during the past week. He felt much stronger, since the "spirit of the people is excellent and all members of the government are in excellent accord."¹⁴ Was Lamartine so confident after the March Revolutions in Germany that he thought the Republican rising in Baden might succeed? He told Apponyi that he foresaw a "completely democratic reorganization of all governments in Germany."

Lamartine felt himself prepared for any eventuality; but he still denied wishing to interfere in the internal affairs of other lands, because the republican form of governments was suited only for the most advanced nations.¹⁵

¹³Apponyi to Chancellery St. K. Fr. K., Paris, March 27, 1848, HHSA, IV, 297-98.

¹⁴Ibid.

¹⁵Apponyi to Vienna, Paris, March 25, 1848, HHSA, III, 296.

While Lamartine was confident that Germany was on the eve of democratic revolution to culminate the earlier March Revolutions in Vienna, Berlin and other capitals, he failed to warn his diplomats of the approaching storm in Franco-German relations. Although Lamartine told the German diplomats that the German Democrats were leaving Paris, his own agents had to learn by hearsay, and his chargé in Frankfurt stated that, though he had no instructions, he doubted that the Provisional Government would permit such an attack.¹⁶

Circourt, on special mission in Berlin, felt that he had been betrayed by Lamartine by his actions. The special envoy thought that the "capitol point" for the Germans was that France must oppose by administrative measures or by force, if necessary, the formation and the departure of the Freischaren and other armed adventurers menacing Baden and the Bavarian Palatinate. Lamartine was clearly to be blamed for these demonstrations. Lamartine told Hatzfeldt that he:

promised to give to Straßburg formal orders by which the danger would quickly disappear. . . . The King of Prussia and his ministers thanked me that M. Lamartine by that act of loyalty which rendered them an eminent service! . . . But, in reality, nothing was done.¹⁷

Circourt accused, without evidence, Ledru-Rollin of having given secret orders opposed to Lamartine's. The extent of French aid to the few hundred German Idealists will remain a mystery, but there is no doubt that the name of France Republic was not aided by the reaction in German public opinion which tended to blame France.

The result of the action or inaction in Paris was a distrust of France along the Rhine. Bernays, accompanying Lefebvre, from

¹⁶Salignac-Fénelon to Lamartine, Frankfurt, March 27, 1848 DDF, I, 439.

¹⁷Circourt, Souvenirs, I, 249-50; II, 49.

Strasbourg to Karlsruhe, wrote, April 29, that his superior, the French Minister in Baden, and he decided that he should travel around for a few days to observe conditions after the "First Baden Revolution." Bernays saw troops everywhere, all the trains were armed concentrations ready for action. Southwestern Germany was an armed camp. No one thought of a war with Russia. Everyone he heard, in contrast, awaited a great attack from France. In the first 24 hours he spent in Baden he wrote that he heard over a hundred times that this invasion was possible if Lamartine were unable to dominate Ledru-Rollin. "It seemed to me that this is the password, because I found the same phrase on all lips."¹⁸

The Prussian Foreign Minister told Trauttmansdorff, the Austrian Ambassador in Berlin, that there was no reason for large concentrations of Prussian troops in the Rhine provinces, because Germany had "nothing to fear from that direction." He seemed entirely reassured in this regard, and thought that the security reposed in the "honest character of M. de Lamartine, of whom he made to me the most positive praises, as well as in the circumstance that the republican system would consolidate itself by the decisions of the coming National Assembly."¹⁹

When the Austrian remarked that some people thought that France would sooner or later have to seek her preservation (salut) in spreading into the neighboring lands, Arnim disagreed. Arnim said that the attention of French government was directed elsewhere, because the

¹⁸Bernays to Lamartine, Karlsruhe, April 29, 1848, AEF, Mémoires et documents, Allemagne, vol. 170, p. 24. (hereafter MD and A11).

¹⁹Trauttmansdorff to Ficquelmont, Berlin, April 16, 1848, HHSA, IV, No. 77 A-B.

republic was worried about the Duc de Montpensier in Spain.²⁰ While Lamartine's projected "Army of the Rhine" and "Army of the Alps" have received attention by historians the "Army of the Pyrennes" and the specific reference to Spain and the Spanish Marriages by the family of Louis Philippe in the Manifesto of March 2 are usually ignored. Arnim was most likely correct that France feared most a royalist plot in southern France supported by an army from Spain, led by the brother-in-law of the Queen of Spain and son of the former King of France.

The claim of Circourt that his position in Berlin was made impossible because of the "rejection" of the alliance offer by Lamartine seems unfounded. Arnim is almost overly effusive in his praise of the French Foreign Minister, and the issue of the Freischaren that Circourt called "the capital point for Germany" apparently hardly worried the Prussian Foreign Minister. He was confident that Germany had nothing to fear along the Rhine, and that the present troops were more than enough to deal with any eventualities.²¹

The next day, the Prussian Foreign Minister spoke with the Belgian diplomatic representative in Berlin and expanded on what he meant when he told the Austrian that the republican system would "consolidate itself" with the meeting of the National Assembly. Arnim thought that the treaties of 1815 existed between powers as facts fixing the territorial state of nations. Changes could come in the ruling houses of a few states; Austria, for example, might lose Lombardy and Venetia, but the

²⁰Ibid.

²¹Circourt, Souvenirs, I, 249.

two countries would remain in Italy, without the King of Sardinia's necessarily becoming the ruler. He drew a distinction between what he called the "territorial" or "national" parts in the 1815 treaties. The same reasoning could also justify Prussia's "absorption" into Germany, a favorite idea of Arnim. He assured Nothomb that Prussia would protect Belgian neutrality in case of French attack, and maintain the treaties of 1831 and 1839, but Belgium would not be in danger when the French National Assembly met. "The Assembly will be pacific." The Belgian concluded, "Baron d'Arnim does not believe that a general war will come."²²

In another conversation with Trauttmansdorff, April 28, Arnim reiterated that France was not as warlike as generally believed. He added that they had passed in the past two months, the "most dangerous epoch, and the pacific disposition of the nation would be even more apparent when the Constituent Assembly met in Paris." When asked by the Austrian if he feared war, Arnim replied in the negative, then qualified it, "At least not with France."²³

In all of these conversations there is not the slightest indication that the Prussians associated the risings in Baden with the French government or that the "rejection" of the alliance offer had put a shadow on French-Prussian relations. Arnim seems to be anything

²²Nothomb to Hoffschmidt, Berlin, April 17, 1848, AEB, IX, 152.

²³Trauttmansdorff to Ficquelmont, Berlin, April 29, 1848, BHSA, IV, No. 87B.

but dejected about the conduct and policy of the French.²⁴

With the German radicals gone, the French government restored confidence quickly and the party of order completed elections for officers of the National Guard. The Prince de Ligne reported that the National Guard was prepared to maintain order. By April 26 and 27 it was clear that the National Assembly elections would be an immense victory for Lamartine and the moderate party of the Provisional Government.²⁵

At the same time, the Moniteur published a decree, dated April 19 dissolving the bands of German workers. Lamartine told Normanby that he had only obtained the assent of his colleagues with a great deal of trouble and at the cost of concessions on his part for certain internal political and administrative measures.²⁶

When Apponyi saw Lamartine, the Foreign Minister told him that the delay in publishing the decree had been caused by the elections and the wish of the Provisional Government not to lose popularity.²⁷

²⁴Nearly all general accounts assert that April 15, 1848 the French "rejected" the Prussian alliance offer; see, for example, Alexander Scharff, "Revolution und Reichsgründungsversuche," in Peter Rassow (ed.), Deutsche Geschichte: Im Überblick: Ein Handbuch Stuttgart: Europäischer Buchklub, n. d.), p. 433. I find it highly unlikely that Arnim thought the reply of Circourt was negative. If Russia had attacked, the French were committed to defend Germany.

²⁵Hatzfeldt to Berlin, Paris, April 25 & 28, 1848, GSA, vol. 855, p. 195 ff. Ligne to Hoffschmidt, Paris, April 26, 1848 AEB, p. 147.

²⁶Thom to Ficquelmont, Paris, April 27, 1848, HHSA, IV, 83.

²⁷Thom to Ficquelmont, Paris, May 1, 1848, HHSA, IV, 85.

Lamartine himself never understood the alarm in Germany. He saw only a few hundred unemployed workers who wished to return home. He steadfastly refused to admit that the men were more than a group of tourists that had spent some time in Paris and had privately and individually decided to return home. He denied that the republic was ever capable of ulterior motives, because it was guided in its policy by the "Declaration of the Rights of Men." He was indignant when the German Diet insinuated that the French were allowing armed bands to cross their frontier. The French were incapable of such action which was below the dignity of the republican honor.

The communication that you have received from Colleredo, relative to the military measures adopted by the Diet in view of an invasion of Germany by German and Polish workers coming from our territory to revolutionize there, arms in hand, show all the exaggeration of the rumors that have been circulated on this subject. It has transformed into an army a few hundred Germans that lack of work has forced to return to their country. The Government of the Republic did not in the least oppose their depart; but, in any case, her sincere respect for the rights of men was a sufficient guarantee that no action leaving France would be tolerated and still less favored from her side against Germany. The workers were sent without arms: I did not give them more than the Belgians and Savoians, that circumstances equally forced to return to their homes. . . . Finally, Monsieur, I have proclaimed loud enough and often enough the principles of loyalty which form the basis of our foreign policy. My language in that regard has been, I think, resounding enough that no doubt can exist of the spirit of the government towards peoples. These principles exclude on our part all ideas and ulterior motive of propaganda which would be hostile to them. The French Republic, you cannot repeat too often, will always regard such means as unworthy of her, and does not have the taste or the need for recourse to them.²⁸

It is possible that Lamartine was telling the truth. He claimed that the Government was far too weak in relation to the radical clubs

²⁸ Lamartine to Salignac-Fénelon, Paris, April 4, 1848, DDF, I, 610.

and refugee groups to make a public stand. There was probably an element of truth in his claim that he feared for his own life in the situation, and he was probably relieved to have the worst "anarchists" leave Paris. This changed an internal problem of order into an international incident. Lamartine may have thought that he could afford an international incident more than a rising in Paris.

April 12, Schweitzer, the Minister from Baden, went to see Lamartine about the expedition of corps francs. Lamartine told him that the government found itself in a difficult and dangerous position.

In Paris the most menacing argument of the violent men against the government is that it had little sympathy for foreign enterprises for liberty and gave them little aid. He himself and several of his colleagues lived under the continual menaces of assassination.²⁹

Apparently his claims of "violent and menacing" language have some substance. The Military Commander of the Lower Rhine sent a telegraphic despatch to the Minister of Interior, April 18, that in Strasbourg and other large cities petitions had been received with an "immense number of signatures" asking the government to give 50,000 rifles to the Polish refugees. "The refusal would bring serious manifestations."³⁰

Lamartine claimed that he must first gain control of the elections of officers to the National Guard and use them to help him in the elections to the Constituent Assembly. This met with varying degrees of credence by the diplomatic corps. At least one person who believed Lamartine's protestations of innocence was Arnim, the Prussian Foreign Minister.

²⁹Bose to Dresden, Paris, April 13, 1848, Saxony, pp. 81.

³⁰dated "Strasbourg, April 18," marked "received 10: 30 April 18," in, AEF, MD, France No. 2125, p. 127.

CHAPTER III

POLAND AND THE PRUSSIAN ALLIANCE

A major cause of French inaction and lack of effectiveness under Lamartine was a fatalism inherent in the thinking of the Foreign Minister. He tended to "forsee" that certain events were "inevitable" and would "necessarily" come about. In his conversation with Apponyi he showed this fatalistic characteristic and seemed less a pacifist than usually assumed.

Lamartine told Apponyi, March 25, that the internal situation had improved over the last week. The spirit of the people was excellent and all members of the government were in perfect accord. He felt that he was stronger than the clubs. He believed that after the events of the past week, the fall of Metternich in Vienna, the Berlin Revolution, and risings over Germany, that there would be a "general upheaval" in Germany. This would not be a social, but a governmental revolution, that is, a "completely democratic" organization of all the governments. The principal danger he saw for Germany was the emancipation of Poland, which would be "the object of all wishes."

That ought, according to him, "inevitably and necessarily" lead to a war with Russia, "a power so unpopular and so detested in Germany." France would be forceably called to take part in this war. He foresaw, without going into the reasons, that this war would not be very bloody,

and it would be of short duration. Lamartine thought that the danger of an invasion of Lombardy by the Sardinian troops was immediate, and he feared that Austria would be unable to defend Lombardy-Venetia, and it would be reduced to retreat to an occupation of a few strongholds.¹

Lamartine's lethargy in sending instructions, complained of by Circourt,² could have been caused less by a "lack of clear policy," as Circourt believed, than Lamartine's feeling that his enemy-"reaction"-was on the verge of total defeat. His explanation of policy to his agents was "perfectly unintelligible," because Lamartine was totally "expectant."³

The French confidence worried the Belgian chargé, the Prince de Ligne.

The proclamation of the King of Prussia was felt to be the first application of the idea of German unity and the rearrangement of Germany. Just as encouraging for the French was the rising in Vienna, which Paris saw as meaning that the principle of the dissolution of the Austrian Monarchy had triumphed and that each state would separate itself by the power of facts. France would be triumphant, because all possibility of coalition against her would be impossible.⁴

In Germany, Lamartine awaited the many democratic revolutions which would demand the liberation of Poland, consequent Russian intervention, and the call by Germany for French aid. All of this seemed

¹Apponyi to Vienna, Paris, March 25, 1848, HHSA, III, 292-96.

²Circourt, Souvenirs, I, LXVIII.

³Ibid., I, 401; Gustav Ölsner-Mommerqué, Drei Missionen: Politische Skizzen aus Paris. (Bremen: Schlodtmann, 1850), pp. 3-6.

⁴Ligne to Höffschmidt, Paris, March 22, 1848, AEB, XIII, 96.

"inevitable" to the Frenchman. In the resulting war, the principal fighting would be done by the "nation in arms," not the professional armies. The nations quickly would triumph over the dynasties, because the reactionaries were fighting a losing battle with historical forces. This is why Lamartine saw every rising after late February as a triumph of French policy. The eventual break-up of Austrian Monarchy on national lines and the rearrangement of Germany were basic to Lamartine's concept of the new order in Europe.

The optimistic French policy toward the Great Powers was outlined in a circular despatch of the Minister of Foreign Affairs to the diplomatic agents attached to the Governments of the North, March 11. It dealt with the Polish question, and it stated that the cause of the reestablishment of a Polish nationality was a cause of France herself, one of the causes that she would not desert, nor ever forget. Poland would be offered the assistance of French diplomacy, and later her active help when time and circumstances were favorable. France waited for a "sensible combination," of "natural auxiliaries" to intervene with her in the cause of the independence of Poland. The French desired peace with Prussia, Austria and Russia; they even wished an alliance on terms equitable to all, beneficent for the intermediary nations. "But the first condition for the solidarity of that peace, the intimacy of the alliances, is that usurped Poland, oppressed without a proper nationality, without civil and religious freedom not rise up between you and us." The Northern Courts must reconstitute, emancipate, organize in concert with Poland herself, in concert with all the interested Powers, guarantors of the treaties of 1815.

France stated that the new order in Poland would be the price for friendship and peace between the French Republic and the Northern Powers. The alternative would be a precarious, false, hostile source of embarrassment, wars and snares. "The durable repose of the world is the price."⁵

Under such terms, it is hardly possible to understand why a French alliance with Russia necessarily worked against German unity, as Mommsen believed. Lamartine's conversation with Apponyi of March 25 demonstrates that German unity was essential to his view of the future. The democratic revolutions in the states of Germany would prepare the essential condition for the liberation of Poland, the demand of the Germans for Polish liberties. The French expected the Germans to fire the first shot against the Russians; France would then be called to help fight Russia.

The instructions to the new French Minister attached to the Diet of the German Confederation at Frankfurt, Salignac-Fénelon announced the policy toward Germany. Lamartine referred him to the Manifesto, which he thought left no doubt concerning French policy.

Germany, like all of Europe, knows the character and tendencies of the foreign policy of the French Republic. Peace and fraternity, these two words are the sincere expression. The Republic only aspired to form with the other states fraternal bonds, . . . which would unite all the members of the great family of peoples. The Republic of France was pacific and moderate, pure of all ambition and all spirit of conquest. France gave . . . to Germany her moral support and example and the power for necessary expansion to claim the liberties which could no longer be

⁵The Minister of Foreign Affairs to Diplomatic Agents attached to the Governments of the North, Circular, March, 1848, DDF, I, 145.

denied her. France could meet in the great German nation only a friendly people, sympathetic to her institutions and her destinies, confident in elevated liberalism.⁶

Future relations with Germany were seen in terms of states united into a "great family of peoples." Germany should obtain her liberties and build a liberal state as friendly to France as the old Confederation had been friendly to Russia and legitimacy.

The instructions for Lefebvre, French Minister at Karlsruhe, expressed the wish that fears of a French invasion would dissipate as France showed to the world her moral, pacific and disinterested nature, the great principles of moderation, of liberty, and of international fraternity which ruled her foreign policy. He wrote that the French Republic was the ally and friend of all the States, who, like she, wished the independence of nations, the maintenance of peace, the respect for all laws, the free and legitimate development of the ideas of national progress and of civilization.⁷

Similar instructions were given to the chargé in Vienna, Lacour, but they also expanded on the Circular to the Three Northern Courts of the day before. Lacour was told to prepare the way for the establishment of good relations between the two states. The French Republic was the friend and ally of all states which, like she, wished the maintenance of peace, independence of peoples, the respect for all the laws and all the forms of government, the harmony and the fraternal union of nations. She admitted, in fact the treaties of 1815 were

⁶Lamartine to Salignac-Fénelon, Paris, March 15, 1848, DDF, I, 214-15.

⁷Lamartine to Lefebvre, Paris, March 13, 1848, DDF, I, 173-74.

established and she would take loyal account of them in international relations. France would be pacific, but not neglect her major interests. He specifically mentioned Italy, but not Germany or Poland, in the instructions, a good indication of the relative importance of the three questions to France.⁸

Lamartine felt that the efforts toward German unity would lead to liberalism and a favorable climate in Germany for Polish liberation. France would only benefit by the "political and social transformation" of Germany.

I read with great interest the details that you gave on the deliberations of the notables at Frankfurt. They open for Germany an era of political and social transformation which will belong to the future German parliament, their Estates General of the Confederation, to prepare and to accomplish the work, if the great task is not above its power.⁹

The thinking of Lamartine is clear from his language: "futur parlement germanique, ces Etats généraux de la Confédération"; he expected the Great Revolution to repeat itself in Germany. Now that an "assemblée des notables" was meeting at Frankfurt, the next step could only be their Estates General. The iron law of history, in his mind, was merely working itself out. It was impossible to try to fight the forces of history, the liberal trend in Germany. He expected sooner or later, that the Powers would realize this and capitulate on his main point of policy, the nationalities.

Salignac-Fénelon wrote that public opinion favorable to a

⁸Lamartine to Lefebvre, Paris, March 13, 1848, DDF, I, 173-74.

⁹Lamartine to Salignac-Fénelon, Paris, April 4, 1848, DDF, I, 610.

republic existed among many of the inhabitants of the German provinces bordering on the French Republic.¹⁰ Nearly all of the Diet had been "renovated," or would be. All of the "retrograde" envoys had been dismissed. While the opinion at the Diet was still for constitutional monarchy, liberal and republican opinions were expressed every day in newspapers. "The workers, and peasants adopt them with avidity." This could only have pleased the French, as well as the news of the interest of the Diet in foreign policy.

During the last two days, [the Diet] changed a committee to examine if it would not be in the interest of the Confederation to bind all of the cabinets which compose it to proceed against Vienna to renounce Lombardy. Several ministers of the Diet think that Germany will be much stronger if it separates itself from annexed territory which belongs to other nationalities. Germany, according to them, ought to be composed of a country purely German. . . . On the other side, the partisans of Austria in the military commission and others, maintain that it is suicide for a great country to permit one of its provinces to be detached, that the conduct of Sardinia merits a punishment . . . if Austria must sacrifice one of her most beautiful provinces to avoid a general war, the peace seems to them too expensive at that price, and she will draw the sword with the hope of having a powerful coalition come to her aid.¹¹

The interest of France in Italy was to strengthen the "German" party, the nationalists, and weaken Austria in Italy. The long-run, primary goal of France, driving Austria out of Italy, demanded a strong nationalist unification movement in Germany, and her best, most obvious potential ally was Prussia. A Prussian, national movement in Germany "solved" not only the Italian Question, but also the Polish, or so it seemed in early April.

¹⁰Salignac to Lamartine, Frankfurt, April 6, 1848, DDF, I, 652.

¹¹Ibid., I, 653-54.

The question of the liberation of Poland has not ceased for an instant to preoccupy the spirits. I have been assured that most of the ministers of the Diet, excited by the advice of the Permanent Committee of 50 will declare themselves frankly in this sense. They see a satisfaction governed, not to the ephemeral passions of the multitude, but the real and permanent interests of Europe . . . without a doubt, it is hard for Prussia to render freedom to the Grand Duchy of Poznan . . . but she can buy at that price the driving back of Russia to the Orient; if Courland, Livonia, German provinces, were to be incorporated in Prussia, that country would gain by the change. At the same time, if Austria renounced Galicia, she could in the near future, find a compensation in the beautiful principalities of the Danube, whose possession would be worth for her that of Lombardy and Galicia together. Those are, . . . the general views of the majority of the ministers of the Diet. . . . The universal wish . . . is to remain a friend of France, to conserve with her the relations of national confidence.¹²

Germany was the key to the Polish Question; Austria and Prussia could be compensated at the expense of Russia. A neutral Poland as a buffer state between Germany and Russia would lessen the influence of the reactionary power in central Europe, and proportionately increase the influence of revolutionary and republican France. Compensation for Prussia in the Baltic would decrease the power of the Russian Empire, removing the Baltic Germans that constituted such an important part of the Russian military and bureaucratic personnel.

Austria, pushed into the Danubian Principalities, would have poor relations with Russia and the Ottoman Empire, and she would be dependent on France for military support. This was an important aim of French policy in 1848, to get Austria into Moldavia and Wallachia. If Austria were no longer in Germany, and gave up her interests in Italy, this would leave Italy open for France and would open a new

¹²Ibid., I, 654.

era for French influence in Europe. If Austria concentrated her attention of the Danube, embroiling herself with Turkey and Russia, she would be forced into dependence on France and Prussia, the "liberal" powers, and Austria would have to be internally more liberal.

Prussia's new policy of alliance with France for the aid of Poland was proclaimed by her Foreign Minister, Alexander von Arnim, who had been the Prussian Ambassador in Paris during the February Revolution, in a significantly entitled pamphlet, "The political Memorandum of 17 March 1848 concerning the French February Revolution and its consequences for Germany," which was published in Berlin, March 20. He gave two important acts that Prussia should carry out as soon as possible: increase the German military potential and declare German neutrality.

This should be in the name of United Germany through Prussia, and it should be sent in a circular despatch to the four great courts. It must say that Germany in the present situation rejects any alliance with one or more of the four Great Powers. . . . Also Prussia can declare that she, in the name of united Germany or in her own, neither directly nor indirectly will take part in the battle of Austria which might develop through her non-German provinces. The same rejection is awaited from the other Great Powers. Lastly, Prussia for herself might send at once a secret explanation concerning Poland to the courts of London and Paris. The present condition of Poland is irreconcilable with the public opinion and with the peace in Europe, so with the European balance of power and a healthy policy. The King will endanger Prussia and Germany in the near future, if he does not begin today to take the reconstruction of Poland into the calculations of his policy. It is better to surrender here with freedom and with the usual intelligence. This means, in this case, to protect from fire in one's own house, to prevent the conflict with France and the armed revolution, with the principle of sanctity of nationalities, with the general opinion of the times. The sacrifice, which Prussia makes from carefulness, cannot be compared with what she had to gain: . . . the peace alliance (Friedensband) with England and France and a fortress (Vormauer) against Russia. . . . In the interest of peace and the balance

of power in Europe, Prussia should declare that it is ready, on her side, for the restoration of the independence and autonomy of old Poland, under the condition of eternal neutrality.¹³

The Foreign Minister of Prussia proposed nothing less than a diplomatic revolution. In place of the reactionary alliance of the Three Northern Courts, he proposed a liberal league of Great Britain, Prussia, and France, a "peaceful Band," a Cordon, a ring around Russia, the last reactionary power untouched by the revolution in 1848. Most important, Prussia refused attempting any longer to oppose the "spirit of the age" (allgemeinen Meinung des Zeitalters); in Arnim, France saw a new spirit in Prussian diplomacy.

Prussia promised not only to reject help for Austria in Italy, but "expected" Russia not to help Austria either. If Frederick William IV's statement, "Preussen geht fortan in Deutschland auf," is ambiguous, his Foreign Minister's is most explicit: Prussia should force "neutrality" on Germany. This liberalism meant that Austria would no longer be able to use the German Confederation to aid her against France in Italy.

The new principle of Prussian foreign policy was no longer in conflict with the principle of the sanctity of nationalities. They would no longer infringe on the rights of other nations; imperialism was rejected as a goal of foreign policy. The "principle" of nationalities had reached the level of international law in the vocabulary of Arnim, and countries had "violated" the rights of man by ruling over

¹³ Alexander von Arnim, Die politische Denkschrift über die französische Februar Revolution und ihre Folgen für Deutschland, (Berlin: Wilhelm Herz, 1848), 20-22.

subject nations. Nationalism (German nationalism especially) was at the center of Prussian policy as much as that of the French. Interestingly, Prussia justified this by the principle of "balance of power," which Metternich had used to support legitimacy. France was also linked with the "armed revolution"; but to save Prussia from this danger of a "fire in their own house," Arnim felt a change in policy was necessary.

The policy was put into effect soon after the memorandum was written when King Frederick William IV received a Polish delegation of Posen and announced the concessions toward autonomy. "The King promised to proceed, with the briefest delay, to the national reorganization of the Grand Duchy of Posen."¹⁴

The special envoy of France in Berlin reported, March 29, that the King had told the Polish committees and a deputation of Posen he had done everything for the reestablishment of their nationality that depended on him.

I implored the Emperor of Russia in the most pressing manner, to follow my example, but I foresee that he will refuse. . . . Take infinite care that you do not commit yourselves too far. I will not aid you to operate by the force of a revolution on the territories that the treaties have assigned to the authority of the Emperor of Russia.¹⁵

In a private conversation, later, the Prussian Foreign Minister told Circourt that their official relations with Russia would become precarious because of the Poles that had gathered as an army in Prussian territory to deliver Poland. While Prussia "was not prepared to offer German troops to the Poles to attack Russia, they would not impede

¹⁴Circourt, Souvenirs, I, 272.

¹⁵Ibid., I, 307.

voluntaries, German or others, coming from France or elsewhere, from joining in Poznan the banner of national Poland."¹⁶ The only condition that Arnim made was that the "auxiliaries" while crossing Prussian provinces not be in obviously armed and organized units. "For the rest, when they fight for the principle of the construction of independent nationalities, that will be for a just principle, that will be for our present principle that they fight!"¹⁷

The Frenchman concluded that if the Poles penetrated in arms on Russian territory and were repulsed, Russia would go to war.

The Prussian nation will impetuously ask for a declaration of war; if the Russians, following their advantage, penetrate in turn on Prussian territory, that declaration of war will positively be required, and the King of Prussia will have to fight his brother-in-law, . . . his former ally, unfurl the banner of Germany in a crusade for the Poles.¹⁸

Two days later, Circourt reported that the Polish organization of the Grand Duchy of Poznan was a preparation for the reconstruction of the independent nationality of Poland.

The Prussian cabinet has conceded that organization on good faith . . . it is morally impossible, with these facts and with the manifestations which will follow, that the Russian government does not see an indirect aggression, an hostility against her principle, an immediate danger for her interests.¹⁹

He outlined what Prussia wished from France if they were attacked by Russia.

¹⁶Ibid., Circourt to Lamartine, Berlin, March 29, 1848, I, 307.

¹⁷Ibid., Circourt's italics.

¹⁸Ibid., 307-08.

¹⁹Ibid., Circourt to Lamartine, Berlin, March 31, 1848, I, 325-26.

First, a solemn declaration of alliance and of political solidarity with that which concerns the reconstruction of the Polish nationality; that would give her [Prussia] a moral support of considerable value. Second, if they asked us, to send a squadron into the Baltic to operate as a diversion; two ships with our flag would suffice to increase notably the force and confidence of the Polish national party and their German auxiliaries.²⁰

Circourt also mentioned that the governmental situation in Berlin was strong enough, but, with the fall of the present cabinet, the monarchical government might collapse with it, and this could only logically lead to a "political dissolution" of Prussia. The Grand Duchy of Poznan was already in full anarchy; Circourt thought that the aid of France's prestige might bolster the present cabinet, especially in the eyes of the Polish radicals. He concluded that the reply of the French to the Prussian alliance offer was awaited with anxiety.²¹

The Prussian military alliance proposal must have caused an extensive debate in Paris, one stage of which perhaps was the announcement of General Chagarnier, April 10, as "extraordinary envoy and plenipotentiary in Prussia."²²

The Paris reply, dated April 4, arrived in Berlin on April 15, and it was not new official instructions asked for by Circourt but a personal letter signed by Champeaux, the personal secretary of Lamar-tine. He emphasized the transitory character of the present situation and the difficulty of planning. Most important, he stressed the present weakness of the Provisional Government.

²⁰Ibid.

²¹Ibid., I, 326-28.

²²Ibid., I, 331, footnote.

Our affairs take each day a better turn . . . except for the financial situation. . . . Each day gained is in itself an improvement. We are on the eve of the elections for the National Guard, and the National Guard so organized will aid us in elections for the Assembly. . . . You will probably not receive the new instructions that you desire and have asked for in all of your letters. It would be imprudent to build on shifting sands. Also your mission is mainly to watch, to estimate and to observe. If Russia attacks Prussia and invades her territory seizing Poznan, France will support Prussia by force. You can use that phrase confidentially and in conversation but without going further; in a time where every eventuality can be realized from one day to another, it is necessary to work with great reserve and to avoid anything precise not to entangle the future.²³

With the information that Circourt had supplied on the precarious situation in Prussia, with the exaggerated hopes of the French Foreign Minister for a republican triumph in Germany, this was a very positive answer to the proposed alliance of Berlin. It can hardly be used as "evidence" of French hostility toward Germany or German unification. It is rather a reflection of the basic thought in French diplomacy of 1848, "a time where every eventuality could be realized from one day to another." Everything was possible. Even a revolution in Russia, after that in Vienna, did not seem out of the range of the probable. Under such conditions, it was not a time for "entangling alliances." However, a Russian invasion would have meant the support of French arms, but the specific proposal of a French squadron in the Baltic depended, not the least of all, on England and on French commitments in Italy. Circourt never understood that Germany was only part of the total French policy. It was impossible that France make this her sole interest. Under such conditions, it is hardly surprising that no more specific instructions were given to Berlin. France had her own policy with Russia.

²³Ibid., I, 329-30, footnote.

CHAPTER IV

RUSSIA AND FRANCE

Immediately after the February Revolution, the Russian Ambassador in Berlin, Peter von Meyendorff, thought that a war was inevitable, but the Prussian cabinet was hardly ready to accept his offer of 200,000 Russian troops to be sent to the Rhine.

It is idle to ask if France will recognize existing treaties. They will recognize all, only to agitate for the chance of success, they will reorganize their army, establish order in the interior, send emissaries everywhere, make propaganda for the revolution and will only make an eruption of the German soil when it is mined on all parts. Against the danger there, only one means is available, to arm and pronounce military judgment on the makers of plots and risings.¹

He found Europe on the eve of a long war of principles and of propaganda with the republic opposing the monarchy, the nations against nations, each fighting for its existence. "For us, it seems to me essential not to arrive too late as in 1805 and 1806."²

The letters of the Russian Ambassador show a mirror image of Lamartine, both feeling that the progress of the revolution was "inevitable." In all of Meyendorff's conversation and letters, there is a fixation on the wars of the first revolution. In the letter

¹Meyendorff to Nesselrode, Berlin, March 8, 1848, March 2, 1848, in Peter von Meyendorff, Ein russischer Diplomat an den Höfen von Berlin und Wien, O. Hötzsch (ed.) (Berlin: W. de Gruyther, 1923), II, 38-42. (hereafter, Mey Corr.).

²Ibid., II, 39.

above, 1805 and 1806 are mentioned; later, the "lesson" of history would concentrate on 1812 and the defensive power of Russia. No less than in France, Russians feared fatalistically that all of Europe would turn against Russia.

Before the March Revolutions in Vienna and Berlin, the Russians had hoped that Berlin would meet and turn back "the revolution." On March 12, the Tsar and the Tsarina wrote Frederick William IV in friendly trust that he would "save Europe," and they were painfully disappointed, March 26, when the news came to St. Petersburg of the Berlin Revolution. Nesselrode wrote that they would be on the defense, concentrate as many troops as possible in Poland. With time, the warmth for the Poles in Berlin would cool, he thought.³

Meyendorff also wrote from Berlin, "In general, our role is that of an expectant observer. When positions are more clearly taken, we will see the situation better."⁴ His prediction, a week later, was that the first act of the social revolution in Berlin with the triumph of the bourgeoisie united with the worker would lead to a second act: "The bourgeoisie will defend their property, the tranquility of the city and public order personified in the royalty." This would cause a break with the workers which would result in civil war. The army would then enter Berlin to support the bourgeoisie.⁵

³Willy Andreas (ed.), "Der Briefwechsel König Friedrich Wilhelm IV. und des Zaren Nikolaus I. von Russland in den Jahren 1848 bis 1850," in Forschung zur brandenburgischen und preussischen Geschichte, XLIII, (1930), 131.

⁴Meyendorff to Nesselrode, Berlin, March 17, 1848, Mey Corr., II, 48.

⁵Meyendorff to Paskevich, Berlin, March 25, 1848, Mey Corr., II, 53-54.

The greatest danger to Russia was the republican party's coming to power in Germany. This would have meant an immediate war with Russia for the Polish cause.⁶ "The role of Russia ought to be to impede the junction of Germany with revolutionary Poland."⁷ A few days later, he thought the situation had improved for Russia in Berlin, and, by gaining time, they had the double chance of a change in public opinion and a consolidation of government in Prussia.⁸

Kiselev wrote from Paris that Russia should avoid an open split with France, because of the exposed position of Russia following the events in Vienna and Berlin, which basically "destroyed the political system of Europe. Austria has fallen apart and vanishes for us. Prussia no longer exists as a conservative power, as an ally of Russia."⁹

This loss of support for Russia in Germany made it most important to avoid an open break with France at all costs. The immediate danger to Russia was a Polish-German alliance. If France were alienated, then almost the entire continent would be supporting Poland.¹⁰

Circourt wrote to Lamartine of the Weakness of the Russians:

Their means of resistance in Poland consist only of their army on the Vistula and their fleet in the Sund. Henceforth, they will have no more allies; . . . Army in the

⁶Ibid., II, 52.

⁷Meyendorff to Nesselrode, Berlin, March 29, 1848, Mey Corr., II, 57.

⁸Meyendorff to Paskevich, Berlin, April 1, 1848, Mey Corr., II, 59.

⁹Kiselev to Nesselrode, Paris, March 29, 1848, quoted in M. N. Pokrovsky, "Lamartine, Cavaignac und Nikolaus I.," in Historische Aufsätze, (Vienna: Verlag für Literatur und Politik, 1928), p. 104.

¹⁰Ibid.

Kingdom of Poland today is two corps, each of 50,000 on paper, 35,000 in reality. In seven of eight weeks, there will be four corps, a real force of 140,000 combatants.¹¹

The latest study of Russia in 1848 concurs in the estimation of Russia's weakness in the spring of 1848.

Because Tsarism was militarily poorly prepared, and the troops must have been left behind for the practical purpose of police functions in colossal territories, (for example, the Baltic, Kingdom of Poland, Lithuania, a part of White Russia and the Ukraine), Nicholas I not only had to give up all plans of aggression for immediately fighting the European revolution, but he was also forced, for a few months, to wait in a defensive position. . . . In the spring, 1848, because of conditions in Russia itself Nicholas Pavlovich really feared an invasion of Prussia, Austria, and even France.¹²

The plan for invasion of Prussia made by Nicholas I in 1848 that Schiemann thought written in March expressed the hope that "We march in not as an enemy, but as former friends." At the end of the first period of fighting the Russians would have paused at the Vistula, to see if all of Germany joined Prussia.¹³

Against the background of the isolation and weakness of Russia, which Lamartine believed, the interview with Kiselev in April is comprehensible. Kiselev saw the Foreign Minister to inform him of a letter from Nicholas of April 7. He read only the lines which assured the French government of the impossibility of Russian intervention in the inner affairs of France.

Lamartine was pleased and added his own peaceful views to those

¹¹Circourt to Lamartine, Berlin, March, 1848, Souvenirs, I, 308.

¹²A. S. Nifontov, Russland im Jahre 1848, quoted in Ernst Birke, pp. 278-79.

¹³Nicholas I., "Russian Angriffe und Anschläge auf Deutschland vor Nikolaus II.", "Theodor Schiemann (ed.), Süddeutsche Monatshefte February, 1915, p. 611.

of the Tsar. He spoke of the public opinion of France and their sympathy for the Poles, and he attempted to pose as the "man of order" in the midst of the chaos, preventing by his own genius a hasty march to Warsaw. He told the Russian chargé that while no one had hindered the Poles' leaving France, one had to get rid of these disorderly people somehow. This led Lamartine to make the famous offer of the "natural alliance" of France and Russia.

During my diplomatic career. . . . I often thought about the mutual hostility of France and Russia and came to the conclusion that the most natural alliance for France is an alliance with Russia. When the Polish Question had not produced a certain sympathy in France, this alliance would have long ago existed to aid both peoples, whose spirits are much more closely related than any other two peoples. All of this is only a question of time and good circumstances.¹⁴

Lamartine had a "great trust in the wisdom and the power of his majesty the Tsar." He conceded that France, at the time, was in a position where a government had been toppled and the new one was not yet secure. He thought, however, in a country like France with so much "healthy good sense," such a respect for family and property, the day was near when order in Paris would be achieved. He thought that France has passed through the worst already. In eight or ten days, the National Guard of 200,000 men would be organized. Already, he had at his disposal 15,000 mobiles and 20,000 dependable troops of the line surrounding Paris. They could be marched into the city to put down the "criminal element" and the club fanatics.¹⁵

This was not Lamartine's only attempt for an alliance, nor were

¹⁴Pokrovsky, pp. 106-09.

¹⁵Ibid.

his overtures summarily rejected by Russia. Nesselrode wrote to Meyendorff, May 20, "Lamartine is making us enthusiastic advances, that one here by all means does not take negatively."¹⁶ The principal Russian diplomatic offensive for a French alliance was in late summer. Pokrovsky's article is invaluable for our understanding of Lamartine, because it substantiates the Russian side of his policy. The French policy had not changed from the earlier Circular to the Three Northern Courts and the Manifesto. As before, Russia, Prussia and Austria had only one great factor preventing good relations: Poland. "All was only a question of time and good circumstances" to Lamartine. As soon as Poland was reconstituted, good relations would result with no difficulties. Lamartine took pains to present his positions as precarious, having to please French public opinion which wished a Polish state immediately. He, however, felt that time was on the side of France, and if France could wait things would take care of themselves.

Lamartine made a crude appeal to the intelligence of the Tsar. He felt that there was a possibility that Nicholas would realize there was no hope for resistance against all of Europe. To hold out against history was futile. An alliance with France to give up Poland when Prussia was already making plans for the war and when Austria was writing constitutions for the parts of the realm seemingly in full dissolution - of what value could this alliance have been to Russia? If Russia gave up at the cost of war, she could also lose the Baltic provinces to Prussia and the Danubian Principalities to Austria, and gain no compensation! Under the right circumstances, an alliance of France

¹⁶Ibid., p. 98.

and Russia might have been advantageous to Russia, and the Russians came to this conclusion during the summer of 1848.

Meanwhile, in St. Petersburg during the last of March, Nicholas I had an interview with a special envoy of Austria, Count Thun. The Tsar was most friendly saying "Austria was always my most loyal ally" and that he would "never abandon Austria." He saw a great difference in the revolutions in Vienna and in other states, especially Prussia. The ministry in Vienna still had "honest men" as opposed to Berlin where they had "hunted in the streets" for ministers. Nicholas also showed a flexibility in thinking that is seldom granted him by historians. "Changes had become indispensable, one had unfortunately delayed them too long in Austria. . . . You have still elements of strength and stability."

Nicholas was concerned with the constitution for the Austrian Empire, and particularly if it would be unitary or separate for the different provinces. Count Thun replied that in such a large empire it would be difficult to make one constitution that would meet the needs of all the regions. After Thun stated that he did not know if Cracow would be reestablished as a free state, Nicholas again stated his friendship for Austria under all circumstances. He began in a most unreactionary vein.

I know well that the world suspects from me very unconstitutional intentions; however, I understand perfectly the power of circumstances of situations that one cannot oppose. It would not be I who distanced himself from Austria, not I who hindered her development. I cannot even comprehend that the policy of Austria and Russia could separate and follow different lines, but that is a vital question for us. Never and in no manner would I allow a source of insurrection at my door and in contact with my Polish friends. If one thought of such a change

if a revolution broke out in Galicia. . . . I would be forced, in spite of myself, to intervene . . . and I would not hesitate for a single instant to cross the frontier of Austria to reestablish order in the name of Emperor Ferdinand.¹⁷

When he spoke of events in Berlin, Nicholas clearly showed great indignation about the King, whom he referred to several times as the "Pflasterkönig." He seemed to have been deeply insulted by the perfidy of Frederick William IV.

I confess . . . that in the time when he was still King, I, myself, counseled him, seeing that all was going badly in Germany, that a center of power was absolutely necessary and that Austria could not occupy the place which she ought by right. . . . I said, 'put yourself at the head of Germany, not as a usurper, but as an administrator until Austria could or would take her natural place.' But now that he has made himself king of the street, that he has put himself under the protection of the rabble, this is absolutely ridiculous.¹⁸

The Tsar advised the Prussian King to unify Germany in the interval between the French February Revolution and the Berlin March Days. Nicholas was not opposed to German unification, per se, and he was outraged by Prussia when the crown mixed with the rabble in the March Days.

The German Liberal unificationists, especially in Frankfurt and Berlin, were violently anti-Russian, and a war with Russia was universally regarded as the only means to unify Germany. The lack of Russian hostility to German nationalism in itself is shown in the correspondence of Meyendorff, March 19. He favored measures that would fortify the unity of Germany.

¹⁷Vicomte Eugene de Guichen, Les grandes Questions européennes et la diplomatie des puissances sous la seconde république française, (Paris: Victor Attinger, 1925), I, 76-77.

¹⁸Ibid., I, 79. Italics in original.

In spite of the admitted hatred which would be unleashed against us, I do not cease to favor that which can impede ~~that~~ Germany not break into pieces, not divide herself into two great divisions,.....If there is still a means of saving the unity of Germany, it is here [in Berlin] that ought to come the impulse. God help that it succeed! The more that Germany is weak and divided, the greater she will be open to influences of the republic, the closer the danger approaches our frontiers. Let the Germans, enlightened in their true interests, understand that Russia can only desire her strong, united, not having propaganda to exercise and desiring only that the France of 1848 not exercise it to our detriment!¹⁹

The myth that Russia wanted Germany weak and divided seems open to question in early March, 1848. After the March Days, the indignation was against the King of Prussia personally; moreover, an Austrian domination of Germany "reconstituted solidly and with sufficient guarantees of stability" was favored by the cabinet of St. Petersburg in Late March.²⁰

The hostility of Russia to German unification was no more "inevitable" in 1848, than it was in 1871. Nicholas' interest was more in the method by which Germany was unified. Some of the violence of his language in late March originated from Frederick William's not taking his advice to unify Germany, but instead turning towards the liberals. The Prussian King refused to declare himself the "administrator" of Germany in early March.

Nicholas was more interested in Russia than in preventing change in Germany or of actively opposing the revolution by fire and sword. He was disturbed by the russophobia which manifested itself in Europe; He told Thun, the Austrian chargé:

¹⁹Meyendorff to Nesselrode, Berlin, March 19, 1848, Mey Corr, II, 49.

²⁰Guichen, I, 79-80.

I think that we have proved enough that we do not search for a war, not for aggrandizements; that which I desire with all my heart is the power to build a true Chinese wall against the rest of Europe and to cut completely all communication with her; also not to allow any more foreigners to enter this side of the earth, then I would be happy. Unfortunately, we have here a sea port where it is almost impossible to watch the entrance.²¹

On April 10 Nicholas was enraged about Prussia, about Germany, and the German press in general. He blamed the conduct of the King of Prussia whom he called "bête" and "lâche." The Emperor told the Comte de Bray, the Bavarian agent, that he had already conquered Poland once, and that if it was necessary, he would reconquer it. He said that he did not search for war and certainly would not pass his frontiers until he was attacked.²²

Russia became more defensively minded, as even Austrians talked of a war of Germany against Russia as a "happy diversion" in early April.²³ There was no power that Russia could depend upon, and an alliance with France had the advantage of the distance. France was far from Poland; after the German War was over it could not be certain what Russia would actually have to do for Poland.

Later, Nicholas had another rationalization. While the republican party was very small in Russia, the constitutional monarchy party

²¹Ibid., I, 80.

²²Bloomfield to Palmerston, St. Petersburg, April 10, 1848, Ibid., I, 95.

²³Vitzthum to his Mother, Vienna, April 7, 1848, in Karl F. Vitzthum von Eckstadt, Berlin und Wien in den Jahren 1845-52: Politische Privatbriefe des damaligen K. Sächs. Legationssekretärs Carl Friedrich. . . (Stuttgart: J. G. Cotta'schen, 1886), p. 89.

was a constant threat to his internal position. He could afford to have an alliance with a republic like France, while proximity to a constitutional monarchy would endanger his place in Russia.²⁴

Lamartine was willing to have an alliance with Russia "under the right conditions." The terms were given in the Circular to the Three Northern Courts; Poland must first be reconstituted, then good relations would automatically follow. He thought that the war with Russia was "inevitable", but he also wished to give Nicholas the chance to save his throne by compromise before it was too late. Lamartine wished to offer Nicholas a Tilsit without Friedland. He thought the choice of war was Nicholas' to make.

²⁴Edmond Bapst, Les origines de la guerre de Crimée: La France et la Russie de 1848-1854, (Paris: Charles Delagave, 1912), p. 7.

CHAPTER V

AUSTRIA AND FRANCE

Austria was alternatively the greatest danger for French policy and the finest opportunity for negotiation. She was the stumbling block opposing German, Italian and Polish national movements. If Austria could be gained for the French program; all was within reach; Europe would necessarily be reconstituted on national lines. With Austria the French alternately used threats and allegations of friendship. The goal was always the same. The role of Austria under the Metternich system in Italy and Germany was to be reversed and a new direction must be given to the Austrian "mission."

The most pressing danger was an Austrian war in northern Italy in which France herself could be involved. Lamartine spoke with the Austrian charge in dialectical terms, saying he wished only peace, but he was unable to see how war could be avoided. He declared that France wished to have good relations with the Austrians, but public opinion in France and Austrian policy would "inevitably" involve the two in war. Lamartine even alleged that he thought the Austrians would be fighting for a just cause, but the French were fatalistically trapped in a position opposing Austria in spite of themselves.

When he saw the Austrian charge on March 1, he spoke to him bluntly.

It is above all with you, Austria, and relatively to the Italian affairs, that we fear collisions. . . . We respect your rights of legitimate possession of the states of Lombardy and Venetia, and recognize your right to maintain them against foreign attacks.¹

If the Sardinians attacked Lombardy, the French situation would be "delicate and embarrassing." If such a war resulted in an invasion of Piedmont by Austria, it would be difficult for France to stay out of the conflict. Apponyi protested in vain that such a situation would only be the result of an invasion of their territory which Lamartine had recognized as just.

Lamartine affirmed the full justice of his statement, but pleaded that the Provisional Government could not resist the demands of public opinion which demanded help for the oppressed peoples. He said that the French regarded the commitment to Italy of long duration. "This conflict alone worries us seriously. We will search by all possible means to prevent it."²

Lamartine said that the Italian Question was the only conflict that really preoccupied him. He found Belgium tranquil, and even if the Belgians wished a republic-which he doubted- he denied that he would like to have it attached to the French Republic. He characterized the Republic as essentially contrary to all spirit of conquest. He did not fear the agitation on the Rhine provinces, and denied that France wanted anything at all in that area.³

¹Apponyi to Metternich, Paris, March 8, 1848, HHSA, No. 21 Letter A-B, III, 242-44.

²Ibid.

³Ibid.

Lamartine also told Apponyi that he had great confidence in the reestablishment of order in the country. He said that the Provisional Government was very strong and that everyone felt the need to rally to and support it. The National Guard of Paris, which had been only 80,000 at the time of the revolution, had been raised in two weeks to 220,000 and there were 20,000 troops of the line around Paris. He was most worried about the financial crisis, but, in general, he was very confident.

Apponyi told Hatzfeldt that Lamartine said, "If, unfortunately, war should come, I know, at least, that it will be a small limited war which will be over quickly."⁴

As Austria and Sardinia neared war, France also had poor relations with the government of Charles Albert. During April, there was an invasion of Italians and French into Savoy, similar to the Baden conflict, which hardly improved the French image in Sardinia.

When Brignole, the Sardinian Ambassador, sent a note complaining to Lamartine about the lack of official action by the French in preventing the "corps francs" and from passing the frontier, Lamartine replied by letter, inclosing the letters sent by the government commissars of Lyon, Grenoble and Bourg. These functionaries asserted that they had done all that was possible to oppose the march of these bands. They also wrote that they had given no arms to the corps francs and exhorted them to disperse and renounce the execution of their project. Brignole told Hatzfeldt that he did not think that the French had done

⁴Hatzfeldt to Canitz, Paris, March 9, 1848, GSA, vol. 855, p. 76

much to prevent the violation of Sardinian soil.⁵

Perhaps Lamartine was not lying? The Prussian chargé wrote the next day that the defeat of the corps francs in Savoy was causing unrest in Lyon.⁶ By the ninth, he wrote that "a large part of the population" had resolved to invade Savoy because of the mishandling of the French citizens among the invaders. Normanby asked Lamartine why he had not used the army to prevent the crossing of the frontier. Lamartine replied that he dared not try, because he feared that the troops themselves would be dragged into the invasion.⁷

The French concentration of troops in the Lyon and Grenoble region under the title of the "Army of the Alps" caused a great worry to Sardinia and to Austria. When Thom asked Lamartine about these soldiers, he said that in case of a conflict in Lombardy, the French wished to "prepare themselves for the eventualities of war." The troops would not participate in any revolutionary action in Italy. He assured the Austrian chargé that no one in the Provisional Government was hostile to the court in Vienna in this matter. He admitted that a proposition had been made to send an observer to the headquarters of Charles-Albert to follow the events of the war more closely, but this had been rejected. Lamartine thought that the presence of a French officer there would be "falsely interpreted." The second reason for the Army of the Alps was the agitation in Lyon and southern France.

⁵Hatzfeldt to Canitz, Paris, April 7, 1848, GSA, vol. 855, p.157.

⁶Hatzfeldt to Berlin, Paris, April 8, 1848, GSA, vol. 855, p. 160.

⁷Hatzfeldt to Berlin, Paris, April 9, 1848, GSA, vol. 855, p. 166.

Lamartine said, "The Provisional Government not only abstained from all interference in the interior affairs of other countries, but also will prevent and reprimand all extra-governmental action in this sense."⁸

This conversation is typical of all those of Thom and Lamartine. Lamartine denied all motivation hostile to Austria and actively sought better relations. While the attempts in early May to obtain an alliance with Russia are well known, the direct offer of alliance to Austria is published here for the first time. The territorial offer to Austria was renewed by his successor, Bastide, twice and is the basis of French policy toward Austria in 1848. Far from an "undeclared philosophical war" with Austria that he claimed in his History of 1848, Lamartine made every effort to trade territory with Vienna, and, as the margin indications denote, these French overtures were taken seriously by Vienna.

Apponyi had visited Lamartine for the last time before taking a summer vacation, and Lamartine took the occasion to explain French policy. He repeated that Italian affairs were the most dangerous for the maintenance of peace in Europe. "He hoped that the court of Vienna would succeed in resolving peaceably the questions pending to-day in the peninsula." Lamartine attempted to show his friendship for Austria by casting doubt on their support for Sardinia. He was mistrustful of King Charles Albert and of his conduct marked by "weakness and extreme versatility," and he would not have been astonished if the sovereign were mixed-up in secret negotiations with Austria, only making a "comedy of resistance." Lamartine then changed the subject to possible compensations for Austria's losses in Italy.

⁸Thom to Ficquelmont, Paris, April 9, 1848, HHSA, IV, 32-36. *italics in Vienna.*

The court of Vienna could find in the Danubian Principalities a compensation for the loss of her states in Italy; The French government desires that Austria should be strong on this side and if it is necessary, it would be prepared to arrive at an understanding for that end.⁹

Lamartine again repeated that the primary interest of France was Italy, ignored entirely the Danish war of the German Confederation, where Austria is a member. He ignored Poland and the Austrian possession of Galicia. Instead of talking of old frictions between France and Austria, he shifted the discussion to the east, a favorite object of Romantic dreaming among poets. How much real reflection stimulated this policy decision?¹⁰

On Moldavia and Wallachia the ambitions of the Ottoman Empire, Russia, Austria and even the Hungarians-not an unimportant consideration in May of 1848 for Austria-came together. The declaration that Austria should be "forte de ce côté" could mean a conflict with Russia and Turkey, but open new opportunities for the Austrians now plagued by the unruly Hungarians and other internal troubles. The control of the mouth of the Danube could also involve her in conflict with grain-importing England. Is it possible that the entire plan of a Dual Alliance of Bismark had been thought-out over a quarter of a century before by the

⁹Thom to Ficquelmont, Paris, May 1, 1848, HHSA, IV, 86-87, italics in Vienna.

¹⁰In a year of French statesmen so selfconsciously trying to imitate the "Great Revolution," it is possible that the Foreign Ministry could have been inspired by an old memorandum submitted to Napoleon after Austerlitz, recommending similar compensations for Austria along the Danube. See the documents in Pierre Bertrand, "M. de Talleyrand, l'Autriche et la question d'orient en 1805," Revue historique, XXXIX (1889), 63-75.

foreign policy planners in Paris? The myth of Pokrovsky that a French alliance with Russia must have been at the expense of Germany should be rejected. Paris was quite willing to divide the Empire of the Ottoman Turks. On such terms as these, even Nicholas I might have been interested. Nothing was sacred to Lamartine, and everything seemed possible by negotiation. The criticism of the Duke de Broglie of Lamartine's faith in diplomacy seems to have had a solid basis.

CHAPTER VI

THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE PROBLEM OF INFORMATION

In writing of the French policy in 1848 most authors have assumed that most of the information used by the Foreign Minister came from regular diplomats. Under Lamartine and Bastide, irregular agents and their role in shaping the picture of German conditions has been seldom assessed. Most of the travelers were radical republicans, and their reports reflected a political bias; they tended to be far too optimistic about the success of the progress of the revolution in Germany, and they consistently predicted greater and more violent uprisings. The agents also tended to present Germany as overwhelmingly pro-French and seldom wrote of the francophobia among the lower classes.

The finest analysis of Germany at mid-century in the French archives of the Quai d'Orsay is an unsigned, undated memorandum that cannot have been written later than July, 1848. It warned of a hostility toward France of the German people who dwelt on the past invasions of the Rhine valley by the French. The Germans on the Rhine hated the Prussians, but they hated the French more. In fact, the central Germans were much less hostile toward France than the Rhine Germans who refused to rebuild the ruins of Louvois. They feared, like the Belgians and Swiss, being absorbed by France and did not wish to be detached from the "German family." The national sentiment had grown at a

great rate for the past three years, increasing their hostility toward France. Not only was the rejection of France growing but it was a direct result of German national movement. Most interestingly, he thought that the francophobia was a movement of the people, more than governments. The governments in the wars with Austria had been more moderate than the populations. The memorandum contained the warning that the German national movement, while not so barbaric as Spain had been to Napoleon, was distinctly hostile to France along the Rhine.¹

Bourgoing, the French Minister in Munich, thought that Germany could do more in a few weeks than temporizing and care had accomplished in ten years, if a war did not break out. He thought Germany was on the verge of turmoil, and the new governments would be closer to the people and friendlier to France.²

The first letter of Salignac-Fénelon as chargé in Frankfurt assumed that the old cabinets of Germany which had infringed on the treaties of 1815 as they had infringed on the constitutions, had been reversed. Their successors had been elected by public opinion more than by princes and understood that the treaties, violated so often, no longer had an obligatory force for France. The princes were pleased that France intended to respect territorial limits of Germany, a pledge

¹MD, A1, vol. 171, pp. 4-8. This document mentions that men over age sixty could speak in French in the Rhine area, because of their service in the French army. It also talked of the trains that connected the Rhine with France, Switzerland and the countries to the north. The extreme German nationalist party was called the "Gotha Party," so it definitely antedated the Frankfurt Assembly. It seems reasonable to conclude that it dates from early 1848, since an average age of 24 for soldiers in the Grand Napoleonic Army of 1812 is rational, but it cannot be dated later than July, when there were new names for the "Gotha Party."

²Bourgoing to Lamartine, Munich, March 10, 1848, DDF, I, 124-27.

of the pacific intentions of France. Germany wished fraternity toward France, liberty for all, themselves and the other unfortunate nations, especially Poland.³

A curious source on public opinion in Germany toward France is preserved in the Paris Army Archives, a series of "Notes for the military operations section," by one Roly Nautier. They are taken from morning reports of garrisons and commissars along the German border, and record dissatisfaction in Belgium, Luxemburg, and German frontier regions and friendly attitudes toward France.⁴ Their principle importance is that they show the bond that the French thought existed between the people of Germany and the idea of democracy in a time of flux, March, 1848.

The chaotic nature of March, which so radically transformed Germans that their history, 1815-1848 is always referred to as "Vormärz", is conveyed in the personal letters of another traveler-informant of Lamartine, "Liénard." He recorded the rising in Aachen accompanied with violence and disorder, when news came of the great risings in Berlin. There were inevitable murmurs for autonomy for the Rhine provinces from Prussian domination.⁵

He thought that the Rhine provinces would only declare

³Salignac-Fénelon to Lamartine, Frankfurt, March 21, 1848, DDF, I, 321.

⁴Archives Historiques de la Guerre, Paris, Mémoires et Reconnaissances 1514 Confederation germanique, 1842-1853, (hereafter AHG & MRQ).

⁵For the discontent in the Rhine under Prussian rule, see, Oscar J. Hammen, Separatist Tendencies in the Rhine Provinces: 1815-1850, (University of Wisconsin, doctoral dissertation, 1941).

themselves independent as a last extremity, but, if they did, they would ask for the protection of France.⁶

The greatest fear in Aachen was that the King of Prussia would ally himself to the Czar and that they would crush the Poles together. By March 25, Liénard thought that, within two weeks, the cities of the Rhine would ask for French aid, because the King would never give them what they asked. He thought that it was necessary for France to decide what they would do if the Rhine provinces sought French protection and support, in a week or two.⁷

Another agent writing about affairs in Germany in mid-March was a M. Wersaint, who wrote to Dupont de l'Eure, a member of the Provisional Government, and he in turn sent it to Lamartine. His report gave details on the inhabitants of Germany. He contradicted Liénard in thinking that the Germans across the Rhine loved their nationality and were proud of it to the point of giving their last drop of blood for the integrity of their territory. Nevertheless, the German people on the French side of the Rhine were French to the heart, and would be loyal under all circumstances.

The group to fear were the nobles across the Rhine who were in danger of losing their privileges and prerogatives. They wished to prevent their ruin, and might have recourse to falsehood and suspicion to discredit a republic. Under the mask of liberalism they recalled to the peasants and artisans scenes of 1793, the invasions of the Republic, the conquests of Napoleon, his ambition, and his despotism.

⁶Liénard to [Lamartine], Aix, March 21, 1848, DDF, I, 331-32.

⁷Liénard to Lamartine, Aix, March 25, 1848, DDF, I, 423-24; March 26, 1848, I, 424-25.

To keep peace, France needed to repeat unceasingly to officials and in the papers that France respected the nationality of all peoples and the integrity of their territory, that she would not declare war on any people, but that if a sovereign dared to deny a nation the right to reconquer their liberties or develop more advanced institutions, the French Republic, continuing to respect all the national integrity of all the territory, would regard the sovereign as guilty of lèse-humanité and lèse-nation. He thought that proclaiming such a manifesto would reassure the people well disposed toward a republic and terrify the despots.⁸

While Liénard thought an active military intervention should be prepared, Wersaint opposed any hint of military intervention, and he thought a manifesto would encourage those friendly to France, but an invasion would be met by all the forces of Germany uniting around the princes. Wersaint thought nothing could be more dangerous to the interests of France than a show of military strength in Germany.

A third observer was one "de Scey" who also wrote at the same time to Lamartine advising on "state of spirits" in Germany and what the effect would be if Germany were to proclaim republican institutions. He, as most other visitors, found a state of flux there, with the people undecided on the government to adopt. The people of Germany did not know whether they wished to preserve the princes with constitutional government or to establish a federal republic. In the state of indecision, he thought that they would voluntarily follow the inspirations of France. "In this state of things, the government of the Republic could

⁸Wersaint to Dupont de l'Eure, marked "Sent to Minister of Foreign Affairs," AEF, MD, All, vol. 171, p. 173.

be master of the political situation in Germany, if that entered in its views."⁹

There is little doubt that it was difficult in late March for Lamartine to be sure of the true situation in Germany. He sent a Mr. Klein and Alexander Rey on special missions to Germany during the month. The instructions for Rey show the items of doubt in the Foreign Ministers' mind. Rey was sent to Frankfurt as a simple tourist:

to observe from the important vantage of Germany the whole of the new situation and an important one for the future. . . . He should notice the movement of spirits and of things, the tendencies, more or less democratic, of opinion, the disposition, more or less pronounced, to connect the destinies of liberal Germany with those of the French Republic by a union founded on the common interests of liberty, independence and civilization. . . . He should apply himself to the degree convenient, to explain (faire ressortir) the principles of morality, of order and of fraternity and human dignity that bind the French Republic to the sympathies of these peoples.¹⁰

He should work to further relations useful to French policy, and inform Lamartine by an exact and frequent correspondence of everything that he learned. In addition to the secret agents, Lamartine got reports of the growth of the liberal movement from the French diplomatic corps in late March. Salignac-Fénelon in Frankfurt thought the general spirit of Germany was democratic and liberal, but inclined to constitutional monarchy, rather than a republic. He was told by discerning men that the preference for the constitutional monarchy was because of a defiance of Russia and France.¹¹

⁹Scey to Lamartine, Waldshut, March 21, 1848, AEF, MD, All, vol. 171, p. 174.

¹⁰Lamartine to Alexander Rey, Paris, March 27, 1848, Instructions, AEF, MD, All, vol. 171, p. 175.

¹¹Salignac-Fénelon to Lamartine, Frankfurt, March 26, 1848, DDF, I, 415.

Salignac doubted any sympathy for France from the liberal movement in Germany, noting that it could be estranged from France as well as Russia. He took necessarily strong exception to the prevailing passion for nationalism, and doubted that this was in France's true interests.

France can only watch with pleasure all that will give more liberty, more equality, more happiness in Germany; but she ought, I think, to devote serious attention to all that, under the pretext of establishing unity of the Confederation, tends to confiscate the independence of the secondary states at the profit of a single cabinet. That would be a real alteration of the territorial delimitations that France has recognized, an alteration which will touch the equilibrium of Europe.¹²

The same worry about the change the balance of power was manifest in his prediction of the coming increase of power with unification of Germany. He reported that all the members of the Diet in Frankfurt had been changed, by April 2, except the minister for Austria, Collaredo. Nationalists would replace the old delegates, and "Everything makes one believe that if Germany is able to cross without too much disorder the period of transition where it is at the moment, her unity, consequently her power will make giant steps."¹³

While Salignac-Fénelon worried about a future change in the power structure of Europe, Brunet-Denon in Berlin was less sure of the future of Germany. He thought that "the diversity of character, of religion, of language itself makes it difficult to decide." It was by no means clear to him that the small states of Germany would dissolve into the larger and stronger.¹⁴

¹²Salignac-Fénelon to Lamartine, Frankfurt, March 21, 1848, DDF, I, 323.

¹³Salignac-Fénelon to Lamartine, Frankfurt, April 2, 1848, DDF, I, 581.

¹⁴Brunet-Denon to Lamartine, Berlin, March 23, 1848, DDF, I, 366.

The charge d' affairs in Munich, Bourgoing, summarized the dominant points of an address of the bourgeoisie of Munich to King Maximilian of Bavaria. The document had a "propensity to regard France as a faithful friend of free Germany reconstituted on a new basis, and a invincible opposition to all alliance with Russia."¹⁵ Two days later, he commented more extensively on the German attitude toward France. He thought that in the past six weeks the dispositions in regard to France had completely changed.

In the first weeks after our February Revolution, aggression on our part was awaited, and the long traditional habit of detesting us, because we were feared, was revealed in all the German newspapers. Today, they are assured by our declarations of liberty, and they desire our friendship.¹⁶

The examples given are sufficient to show that there was contradictory information on Germany reported to Paris, and the policymakers had to choose according to their own experience and their evaluations of the reliability of the information from the various sources. Nearly all agreed on the basic friendliness of the German people toward the republican form in France, but they were less sure that this government was the best for Germans. The more cautious professional diplomats recalled past hostile manifestations towards the French, and Salignac-Fénelon raised the question of the balance of power if Germany were unified in a manner unfriendly toward France.

Lamartine read "with interest" the dispatches of Salignac-Fénelon and he answered, March 31. He was very confident, optimistic about

¹⁵Bourgoing to Lamartine, Munich, March 28, 1848, DDF, I, 463; March 31, 1848, DDF, I, 532.

¹⁶Bourgoing to Lamartine, Munich, March 30, 1848, DDF, I, 518.

public opinion, doubting that any hostile feelings existed toward France.

The German Diet has not been able to remain apart from the liberal and national impulse which is sweeping through Germany. . . . Germany, in general is still only in the era of constitutional monarchies. That is evident and belongs to the nature of things. But, if, as you have said, and which I can hardly believe (peine à croire), the German nation, in the middle of the democratic spirit that animates it only rejects the republican form because of a residue of defiance towards France, that sentiment would be as unjust as blind. The French Republic does not nourish any hostile idea, no ulterior motives toward Germany. She proves it sufficiently by the manner in which she practices her policy of fraternity, of peace and of moderation. That policy, so clearly and so forcefully proclaimed by me, is not only in words; it is also in actions, and that is a fact that you ought to apply yourself to establish well. Also, France never aspired to impose on any country her principle nor her form. She respects all governments, all nationalities, all laws and will not hear of mixing herself into the interior regime of other peoples that she would not be disposed to permit to intervene in her own.¹⁷

Lamartine had sent Mr. Klein on a special mission to learn about conditions in Germany. Klein wished to communicate with Hecker and Struve, the far left of German politics. While the regular diplomats in the German capitals maintained a normal relationship with the sovereigns and cabinets, there also existed a network of men like Klein, and Kraetzer-Rassaerts with contacts to the underworld of German revolutionary politics. An editor, Heinrich Boernstein, a member of the German Democratic Society, presided over in Paris by Herwegh, and the basis of the German Legion in Baden was one of the many secret agents of the French Foreign Ministry, and his daily reports are in the archives of the Quai d'Orsay. The network of such agents must have been vast, because there also exists in the archives a volume whose index

¹⁷Lamartine to Salignac-Fénelon, Paris, March 31, 1848, DDF, I, 532-33.

of names of the members of the "German Secret Societies" covers both sides of nineteen folio pages and folio 7-261 is on 1848 alone, with seemingly complete lists of people present at important gatherings of radicals.

Klein reported, April 24, that Germany did not seem hostile to him, although there was now a "notable cooling" compared to the earlier enthusiasm for France.

That which seems to be truly inexplicable to the evil inclination which brings the Germans to preoccupy themselves without ceasing with the difficulties which could come from France, while they never have a word to say about the reactionary projects which menace them and which are plotted with the aid of Russia.¹⁸

When depending on his confidential sources alone it would be difficult for the agent to understand that the fear of France across the centuries was more than illogical, especially since the German radicals had been involved in the recent rising in Baden and wished future French aid for the republican cause. The problem was that Klein's confidants were hardly typical of Germany as a whole and gave a false picture of the country, as of late April; consequently, he was not complete in his analysis of German conditions.

The French policy in 1848 was imbued with a great optimism about the attitude of Germany toward France and of the possibilities of revolt in Germany. The victory of Schwarzenberg was totally unexpected by Bastide, and the reaction as a whole was ignored by the Minister of Foreign Affairs. This was a catastrophic blindness by the French when optimism reached the degree that it blurred their vision of events.

¹⁸Klein to Lamartine, Frankfurt, April 24, 1848, DDF, I, 1005.

The unclear image of the state of Germany was very important in shaping the policy of Bastide in the questions of Schleswig, Poznan, Italy, and the conflict of Prussia-Austria. The French were doomed to defeat in their foreign policy in 1848 because they let their hopes for the future obscure reality. But with such romantics as Bastide and Lamartine running affairs, this is hardly surprising; they were contemptuous of Realpolitik and reality.

Even when Lamartine had been told of German distrust and hatred of France, he rationalized this as "backward thinking," which time would change. In spite of warnings by some diplomats, carriers of the traditional divide-and-rule policy in Germany, of the danger to France in the unification of Germany, Lamartine was confident of the friendship of Germans for France in early May, when he wrote instructions for the mission of Dr. Kraetzer of the statistical bureau of the Ministry of War. The principal concern of the "statistical mission" was for him to collect military information on Germany. Kraetzer should go at once to Strasbourg and correspond directly with the Foreign Ministry. While there was concern for the "very considerable movement of troops on the borders of France," he should also comment on "political state of Germany."

Great changes are taking place in the institutions of the peoples of the Confederation; all aspire for a system of national unification which a German Parliament was called to conserve the principle and the form; a republican party declared itself, which, wishing to impose itself by force has already been given a bloody check; and their spirits seem inclined by preference towards the constitutional monarchy. As for German opinion, in general it is essentially liberal, hostile to Russia, favorable to the reestablishment of Poland [in margin "sans trop d'ardeur"]

sympathetic toward our revolution but not completely exempt in our regard from the mistrust which has its source in the prejudices of another epoch.¹⁹

Lamartine gave Kraetzer permission to travel extensively in Germany, of course, without title. Kraetzer's reports included detailed plans of German fortifications, and in Strasbourg Kraetzer was in immediate contact with the German republicans and radicals.

Lamartine made a distinction between the "good" and "bad" Germans, according to the "progressiveness" of their thinking. Those distrustful of France were "prejudiced by another epoch," their thought-patterns were backward, belonging to the pre-revolutionary era. They were also those who were less liberal and luke-warm to Polish reconstitution. But even the worst Germans were not all bad; the desire for national unity was universal.

Significantly, any mistrust of France had not been contributed to by the recent French conduct towards the invasions of Germany from French soil. Lamartine merely spoke of the "republican party" that had been bloodily suppressed, without the slightest hint of French collusion. He refused to accept an innate hatred of nations, but rather saw history in terms of "ages," and with time the antiquated ideas of hostility toward France would be overcome.

¹⁹Lamartine to Dr. Kraetzer-Rasserts, May 4, 1848, Instructions, MD, All, vol. 129, p. 4.

CHAPTER VII

WAR AND THE FRENCH REPUBLIC

Wilhelm Mommsen's is typical of the accounts of the weakness of France which prevented their carrying out an active policy in Europe. They usually point to the "rejection" of the alliance offer of Arnim as an "indication" of the pacifism in French policy, and many even maintain that France would have fought to oppose German unity.

France was then not capable of a bellicose policy; she also did not wish to carry out a revolutionary policy of principle that would aid and bring about German unity. Only a relatively weak French circle thought of cooperating with German radicals and supporting the refugees fighting in the uprisings in the west. The official French foreign policy from Lamartine to Napoleon III and the great majority of all political groups in France were opposed to the German political movement. They rejected Arnim's alliance offer and were ready to bind themselves to Russia against the German unity. . . . The will to fight against German unity, an old tradition of French power politics, was stronger than the common internal political principle.¹

Arnim most likely understood the French answer of help in the event of Russian invasion to be a positive and binding agreement, although it was given casually and orally. He told the Belgian and Austrian diplomatic representatives in late April that the French forces of order, Lamartine's party would be much stronger after the

¹William Mommsen, Grösse und Versagen des deutschen Bürgertums, (2nd ed., Munich: R. Oldenbourg, 1964), pp. 109-10.

meeting of the National Assembly. He also rejected the possibility of a league with Russia.²

The Polish policy of Arnim was not ruined by a French "rejection" of his alliance offer, but from the Russian refusal to carry out the part assigned to them by the Prussian cabinet. Nicholas failed to attack Prussia so that all of Germany and France would come to Prussia's "rescue" and establish national-states in Poland and Germany. "It is evident that from the end of March, the Prussian ministry had awaited a large insurrection in the interior of the Russian Empire. This expectation had been frustrated (trompée). Nothing had stirred."³

Namier's book suffers from his not having read the article of Knapowska who saw the original text of Willisen's instructions when he was sent to Poznan. It spoke openly of a war with Russia and seriously discussed the necessity of a Polish legion for the Russian war. He did not exceed his authority in signing the Convention of Jaroslawice and contemplated an army of 15-20,000 for Mieroslawski. Willisen was a "decided partisan of a Russian war" and wished to accelerate the beginning of such a conflict; he suggested to the Poles the idea of a diversion in Galicia or an attack on the small fortress of Czestochowa in the Kingdom of Poland to incite a Russian invasion of Germany.⁴

²Circourt, Mission, II, 47 for the view that Circourt had been "betrayed"; Ibid., II, 97-98; see also Nothomb to Hoffschmidt, Berlin May 8, 1848, AEB, Prusse, IX, 184.

³Circourt to Lamartine, Berlin, April 25, 1848, Mission, II, 57.

⁴Lewis Namier, 1848: The Revolution of the Intellectuals, (New York: Anchor Book, 1964), p. 94; Knapowska, pp. 158-59, 154.

All waited for the insurrection in the Kingdom of Poland which failed to materialize. "A mournful silence reigned here while all of Europe fixed their eyes there with impatience." The cause of the silence was the prompt action of Paskevich who had discovered the Polish plot in Russian Poland in the first days of April and had arrested the principal leaders. Many of the conspirators had escaped to Poznan. "The rest waited for the army of Mieroslawski and the coalition of French and German troops."⁵

The French and Germans were willing to give their lives for Polish liberty, but Nicholas I refused to accomodate them by invading Prussia and committing suicide. Arnim's Polish plans were upset by the failure of Russia to invade Poznan and give the Prussians the war they wished.

Instead of a war of the Poles and the Prussians against the Russians, an insurrection broke out in Poznan in late April between the Polish and German inhabitants of the Prussian province. This uprising and its repression by the Prussian army had no repercussions on French policy. They still expected the Prussian cabinet to carry out the promises to the Poles made in March.⁶

If the French still expected a Russian-Polish and Prussian war, then the French estimation of their own forces, those of the revolution, those of their allies and potential opponents, is important. The liberal doctrine emphasized the levée en masse, a Volksturm, a spontaneous uprising of the population of all nations

⁵Ibid., p. 159.

⁶Lamartine to Circourt, Paris, May 7, 1848, DDF, II, 94-95.

for their liberty. There was a mistrust of aristocratically structured professional armies and a preference for "citizen armies."

In the spring of 1848, the French statistical division of the Ministry of War made the following estimates of the military state of France and foreign powers.

	Population	Active Army	Militia Forces	Total Forces
France	33,540, 910	338,732	2500 Battallions of National Guards formed of 13-14,000 men (5,000 veterans)	1,740,000
Russia	62,517,000	520,000	"If one deducts as of no value the troops left in Poland and those employed in the provinces of Caucasasia and on the frontiers of the Empire, Russia could dispose only 200 to 250,000 men."	
Prussia	14,154,500	100,000	400,000 (Landwehr)	500,000
Austria	35,000,000	370,312	252,096	622,408
Bavaria	4,370,987	57,814	"Organization of Bavaria was perhaps carried at the total figure of 57,814, but she has effectively under the flag in peace only 20-25,000 men."	
German Confederation	39,717,621	292,377	Part of the forces of Austria, Prussia, and Bavaria. ⁷	

One estimate for Prussia was made by N. J. Franz, a lawyer and former Captain in the Second French Corps of the Moselle. His "political and statistical Prussia" lists the Prussian effectives by "peace" and "war," the latter category including the Landwehr.

	<u>Peace</u>	<u>War</u>
Troops	153,328	490,912
Royal Guard		63,544
Prussia would be able to put into campaign		544,456 ⁸

⁷All of these documents are in the AHG in Paris, in a box of loose, unnumbered papers for 1848, MR, 1634.

⁸Ibid.

A much less favorable view of Prussia was given by M. Bentaboles of the statistical bureau of the Ministry of War, March 3, 1848.

Austria with Landwehr was	470,305
Prussia " " "	224,425
English with "eventual army"	241,677
Russia " " "	781,859 ⁹

A Colonel Courtigis gave information on Prussian effectives, excluding officers.

In peace	97,200
Mobilized	207,700
In war with first band of Landwehr	356,500
With first and second bands	466,500 ¹⁰

If Lamartine thought that the war with Russia would be "of short duration," he hardly thought the Russian Empire would be capable of getting a substantial portion of her total forces into the field. He must have been calculating with the first figures, drawn on impressive, large sheets of paper by the statistical section of the Ministry of War, the French intelligence agency with an expert knowledge of military conditions in Germany.

The first circular of Bastide to the French diplomatic agents, dated May 12, showed the same romantic view of the world and arms as Lamartine. He wrote that in foreign affairs the republic had not limited itself to proclaiming merely the principles of a pacific and generous policy, but had sincerely offered unity to peoples by the "sacred bonds of fraternity, free of all ulterior motives of aggressive

⁹Ibid.

¹⁰Ibid.

propaganda and of conquest." He promised to respect all nationalities and the governments in their independence and their liberty. These principles which France had loyally respected would continue to be the guide of policy. French policy would be disinterested and peaceful. He did not ignore, as Lamartine had, the role of France in allowing free-booters to invade Baden, Belgium and Savoy. Believing that the best defense is a good offense, he refused to admit that France had acted improperly.

She [France] had protected the governments against civil war, in preventing, as much as she was permitted by her own internal embarrassment, the violent attempts against their security and in giving decisive measure to impede the renewing of attack, when the aggression had taken place against her will. . . . The Republic had maintained order and was combating anarchy, and by that itself she gave to the foreign governments another force to help them at home.¹¹

Bastide claimed that France had followed a "moderate policy," the old argument of Lamartine. If the wild men had been in power things would have been much worse, he alleged. But he made a new allegation that Lamartine had never stated; he had "protected" the foreign governments against civil war. He asserted that it was the inactivity of France, their unwillingness to see anarchy among their neighbors, which caused the uprisings to be crushed. This implied a threat that though France had refused to give aid and encouragement to the republicans, in the future France could as "easily" allow her neighbors to submerge into civil anarchy. France "of course" would not like this to happen, and she preferred peace. His warning was most explicit recording what could happen later if Europe refused to listen to reason.

¹¹Bastide to Foreign Agents, Paris, May 12, 1848, circular DDF, II, 185-86.

If, by the fault of Europe, the conversation of peace must become impossible, what an imposing force the government of the Republic would have at her disposition with the energy of that population of men accustomed to combat in the streets, dangerous today for them, the Republic fully prepared tomorrow to become the most useful auxiliary, if it is necessary, to fall on the frontiers; with a million soldiers animated with the same patriotism, whose maintenance cost an enormous sum and which the war would nourish; and last with the great number of friends that the Republic counts abroad, who can hold back the élan which would at the first signal rise to serve her cause?¹²

France had three lines of defense; first, an army of one million that was a great drain on the budget and which could be removed as a financial liability by sending it abroad, especially with subsidies from allies and the intimidated states. The historical parallel was Napoleon's first Italian campaign which solved the fiscal problems that plagued the Great Revolution. The forces available were, of course, grossly, inflated, and it included the highly questionable National Guard, but it is just as clear that Bastide believed the "patriotism" of these citizen soldiers was an important substitute for military training. All historians have accepted Lamartine's claim that he thought France was weak and his greatest contribution was to increase the French military forces. This claim that the Foreign Ministry under Bastide and Lamartine was aware of a weakness in France's armies is a later fabrication of Lamartine in his History.

Bastide significantly mentioned first the entire "population of men accustomed to combat in the streets." This was the basis of France's real strength, the mystique of the levée en masse, the revolutionary ideal would carry her over all obstacles and tyrants. The third line of armies was a "fifth column" of those "friends" of the Republic who will "rise at the first signal to serve her cause."

¹²Ibid.

Bastide was hardly a "realist" or a "pacifist!" His picture of France was of a monolithic legion united behind the idea of the republic. He hinted that as the solution to the financial embarrassment could be an ideological war, it would also get rid of the troublemakers that later caused the June Days by channelling their energies abroad. As with Lamartine, the choice of war or peace was "given" to Europe, but Bastide in mid-May saw definite domestic advantages in immediate war to relieve attention from France's two principal problems, social and financial difficulties. He also indicated little doubt of the outcome where France made war under the right conditions.

The contemporary picture of Paris in May is Olsner's book that described the new military groups everywhere. After the February Revolution the clubs had kept their private armies and individual leaders had their own forces. The regular army was needed to keep civil order in the major population centers and 60-100,000 of the best troops were needed for the administration of Algeria.¹³ The optimism of the Foreign Minister was based on a total misconception of France. The country was on the verge of the June Days, and the newly-elected National Assembly was luke-warm toward foreign adventures.¹⁴

The least explainable is the misconception of a powerful "fifth column" that would "rise at the first signal" to fight for France and the republic. Bastide, like Lamartine, felt that the "spirit of defiance" toward France sometimes displayed by their neighbors was a

¹³Oelsner-Monmerqué, p. 30.

¹⁴Hatzfeldt to Berlin, Paris, May 18, 1848, GSA, vol. 856, p. 58; Thom to Lebzeltern, Paris, May 20, 1848, HHSA, V, 30-33.

result of opinions from another "epoch", pre-republican ideas.

The same organic view of development as Lamartine's with the republic as the highest form of civilization was shown most clearly in Bastide's letter to the Minister at Berne, General Thirad.

We wish, without doubt for the triumph across the Alps [in Italy] of a democracy like ours; we desire that the republican party, the most numerous, most able, and the most sympathetic to the masses would make their principles prevail; we are far from hiding to ourselves the political consequences of such an aggrandizement of Sardinia. But the French Republic, after having proclaimed her respect and her good wishes for the nationalities which seek to reconstitute themselves, after having recognized the law of peoples to organize themselves as they judge right (convenable) with the capacity of their civilization, of their interests and of their needs, could she openly oppose that which northern Italy today asks for: an independent nation, welfare and security? We do not doubt that there will be undesired results before the hour of maturity; in Italy as in Germany, a monarchy founded on democratic institutions seems destined to serve as the transition to the pure republic.¹⁵

Bastide was an ideological republican before all else, like Lamartine, seeing the organic development of the liberal idea as the greatest goal toward which civilization was striving. Bastide certainly did not share the opinion of Mommsen, Droz et al. of the military weakness of France. He was sure that the "patriotism" of his armies would be matched by the same love of liberty across the borders in neighboring lands. "At the first signal" people were waiting for the French to come to help them throw off their bonds.

¹⁵Bastide to General Thirad, Paris, May 23, 1848, DDF, II, 427.

CHAPTER VIII

SCHLESWIG-HOLSTEIN

A major cause of friction between Germany and France, in 1848, was the conflict in Schleswig. This was never in French eyes more than a very minor matter, and it did not materially affect their attitudes toward Germany. It was in the attitude of Frankfurt toward Italy, Austria and the "principle" of nationality that the hostility of the French to the Parliament was based, not primarily in the Schleswig Question. Alexander Scharff's analysis of the topic is questionable in two respects. The French never changed their attitude of sympathy toward German unity, and the hostility that was maintained by Bastide toward the German National Assembly, was only secondarily caused by the Schleswig Question.¹ From the beginning of the conflict, France thought that the Germans were the aggressors and hoped that Denmark would win. Lamartine, however, told Hatzfeldt that it was not of "major and pressing importance for France," but warned him that "a certain treaty existed whereby France had made engagements vis-à-vis Denmark relative to Schleswig."² A few days later, Lamartine told

¹For opposed opinion see Alexander Scharff, "Schleswig-Holsteins Erhebung," p. 181.

²Hatzfeldt to Berlin, Paris, April 24, 1848 GSA, vol. 855, pp. 192-93.

the Danish that France would not intervene because her "position" did not allow her to.³

Lamartine was so ignorant of the *précise* commitment of France under the treaty of 1720 that he referred to the wrong date when speaking of it. While in the *mystique* of the Great Revolution Denmark had been France's "most loyal ally," in 1848 Russia gave repeated assurances to Denmark, and seemed prepared to use the war in Schleswig as a pretext for invading Prussia. Whatever the feelings of France, she would not make a clear statement, because of the cipher of Nicholas I.⁴ To gain allies in the war of principle against Russia, France needed a clear conflict of nationalism *vs.* legitimacy, as she would have had in Poland or in northern Italy. France was so disgusted in the Schleswig War, because this was exactly what was missing. Both sides upheld the principle of nationality and liberalism! Liberals thought nations would never fight; wars were caused by dynasties.

France was also gravely misinformed about Schleswig. Bastide thought that "only 125,000 of 350,000 speak German" in Schleswig. Actually, the proportion of those living where German was spoken in church was 2:1 German over Danish. At best, the Danes could claim that in daily conversation almost as many of the peasants spoke Danish as spoke German.⁵ Like Lamartine, Bastide thought that Germany was the aggressor, and Denmark had to call on Russia to defend her territory.

³Hatzfeldt to Berlin, Paris, April 27, 1848, GSA, vol. 855, p.198.

⁴Lamartine to Dotezao, Paris, May 2, 1848, DDF, II, 24.

⁵Bastide to Arago, Paris, June 29, 1848, DDF, II, 1158; W. Carr, *Schleswig-Holstein: 1815-48: A Study in National Conflict*, (Manchester University Press, 1963), pp. 70-71, *cf.* The view of Bastide: "In allen geographischen Verhaelthisse ausserordentlich unwissend." *Wilsner-Monmerqué*, p. 3.

Why cannot [the Germans] understand that the intervention of Russia, in favor of Denmark must give the enemy of liberal and democratic Germany one means more to weigh on her and make war. It is a singular spectacle to see Germany, while democracy is being born there, to fight for the cause in Holstein and Schleswig of a tedious aristocracy and against a country . . . that just received the most democratic institution.⁶

Germany had violated equity and international law, endangered themselves in war with Russia for the wrong cause. France was very doubtful that Denmark was not more liberal than Prussia, under their new constitution.⁷

France refused to do anything for the time, because she did not wish to endanger her position with Germany. The violence of the June Days also weakened France at this time, making it impossible for her to have a very active foreign policy for the next few weeks. There seemed also little practical purpose in protest, since Great Britain, Sweden and Russia were actively trying to end the conflict.

Meanwhile, May 22, the Prussian government had accepted and taken into consideration the conditions of armistice which England had given them May 19. General Wrangel was sent an order from Berlin to pull his troops out of Jutland, one of the English conditions, and Prussia was humiliated in Germany.⁸ The provisional government of Kiel in revolutionary Schleswig refused to accept any terms which included provision for a division of the Duchies of Schleswig and

⁶Bastide to Arago, Paris, June 29, 1848, DDF, II, 1158.

⁷Ibid.

⁸Jacques Droz, Les Révolutions allemands de 1848, D'après un manuscrit et des notes de E. Tonnelat, (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1957), p. 258.

Holstein; General Wrangel, a Prussian in command of the federal army, refused to recognize the armistice because it had not been accepted by Frankfurt.⁹ Bastide thought that "The conduct of General Wrangel in disobeying the orders of his sovereign, the King of Prussia, to take note of those of the Vicar of the Empire proves well enough the false and humiliating position of the sovereigns of Germany."¹⁰

The Frankfurt Assembly took up the cause of Schleswig as all-important for the German unity. In retrospect, this was undoubtedly a mistake. W. E. Mosse feels that it is "certain that it was above all German intransigence in the question of the Duchies which provoked the hostility of the powers toward the National Assembly and its government."¹¹ To France the implications of Schleswig were more a cause of alienation from Frankfurt than just distaste with such barbaric degeneration of civilized nations as war. With a French intervention threatening in northern Italy against Austria, a member of the German Confederation, Bastide did not favor the combined armies of a Germany being under the control of the Frankfurt Assembly, whose judgment Paris hardly trusted.

The French hostility in Schleswig turned from Berlin to Frankfurt, because the latter seemed to be causing all the delay in bringing peace. Bastide wrote, September 7, that the Prussian Minister of

⁹Ibid., 304.

¹⁰Bastide to Arago, Paris, July 31, 1848, AEF, vol.302, p. 187.

¹¹W. E. Mosse, The European Powers and the German Question: 1848-1871: with Special Reference to England and Russia, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1958), p. 25.

Foreign Affairs, Auerswald, "was mistaken if he wished to say that France was animated in the Schleswig Affair by hostile sentiments towards Prussia. It is the contrary that is true." France was only hostile to the unitarians of Frankfurt and their Minister of War, who wished to accustom the Prussian army to taking orders from elsewhere than Berlin; they wished a common expedition to melt the armies of the different German states into a national German army. This army might then be ordered from Schleswig to Milan by Frankfurt without the consent of Berlin.¹²

France wanted peace in Schleswig, because the Prussian action there was as "deadly" for Prussia as for her adversary.¹³ Bastide observed in September that the Schleswig Question could be the cause of the death of the liberal movement in Germany. He wrote Arago that the vote in Frankfurt over the armistice of Malmö augured poorly for the force of the Central Power, and was a symptom of the "disunion which henceforth divides into two parties the Parliament that cannot be brought together." He thought that the disunion shown in the vote of September 5 in Frankfurt rejecting the armistice in the Schleswig War was a confirmation that it was "at least premature to recognize officially the envoy of Frankfurt."¹⁴

Bastide told Hatzfeldt "Men like Heckscher and Dahlmann at Frankfurt can only envenom all the questions that are put in their hands."¹⁵

¹²Bastide to Arago, Paris, September 7, 1848, AEF, vol. 302, p. 251.

¹³Ibid.

¹⁴Bastide to Arago, Paris, September 9, 1848, AEF, vol. 302, p. 261.

¹⁵Hatzfeldt to Berlin, Paris, September 13, 1848, GSA, vol. 863, p. 28.

Arago was just as short with the Assembly. "The Parliament is the cause of the disorder and the instrument of Anarchy which reigns today in Schleswig and Holstein."¹⁶

France remained true to the policy of Völkerverständigung, but in Schleswig the Parliament had shown a "spirit of ambition and absorption which, taking unity of race and of language for the base of German unity," added to their territory a portion of Poznan, at least part of Schleswig and of Limburg, and menaced France itself in the possession of Alsace. Bastide found "little sympathetic reciprocity . . . in presence of the declarations of our National Assembly's proclamation of a fraternal pact with Germany."

He instructed the new French chargé in Frankfurt, "Our role ought to be to observe, to see what comes, and above all to avoid forming an opinion (prendre couleur) before this situation clears itself up" by a manifestation of the wishes of Germany herself. Bastide found the situation in Germany highly provisional, and France should at all costs avoid taking sides.

M. you ought to present yourself at Frankfurt as the organ of a power friendly to Germany, loyally disposed to contract with her the bonds of fraternal friendship, having the sincere wish for the happiness of the German Confederation, for a reconstruction of Germany in the most favorable sense to the development of her welfare, of her civilization and of her international relations.¹⁷

Above all, in September fully as much as March, Germany was the key to the reorganization of all of Europe. The myth of French opposition to

¹⁶Arago to Bastide, Berlin, September 27, 1848, AEF, vol. 302, p. 301.

¹⁷Bastide to Tallenay, Paris, September 5, 1848, AEF, For the best account of the complexities of the negotiations leading to the Armistice of Malmö, see Volker Weimar, Der Malmöer Waffenstillstand von 1848, (Neumunster: Wachholtz, 1959).

German unification cannot be maintained for September any more than for March. The French before August had seen little need to protest in the Schleswig affair, because the opposition of Sweden and Russia had been more than enough opposition to Prussia. France saw no need nor did they find it convenient to add her protest in Prussia.¹⁸

France though favoring the Danes did little to aid their cause, wishing as much as any other power a negotiated compromise.¹⁹

Arago wrote, July 15, that France should work diligently to end the Schleswig Question as soon as possible. The French should use all of their influence on Prussia to end the war because it could embarrass the German unity movement. "The centralization of the German power is certain, which is indispensable for the continual progress of democracy."²⁰

The news from Frankfurt was anything but reassuring for France in July. Savoye reported that the decision on a offensive and defensive alliance with France had been put off until the Central Power had been installed.²¹

The head of the new Central Power was a "vicar," a Reichsverweser, Prince Johann of the House of Hapsburg, whose cabinet had three members. Schmerling was an Austrian, with little to recommend him to Bastide.

¹⁸Bastide to Tallenay, Paris, June 6, 1848, AEF, vol. 670, p. 106.

¹⁹Bastide to Arago, Paris, July 11, 1848, AEF, vol. 302, p. 152; Bastide to Tallenay, Paris, July 10, 1848, AEF, vol. 670, p. 224.

²⁰Arago to Paris, Berlin, July 15, 1848, AEF, vol. 302, pp. 157-58.

²¹Savoye to Bastide, Frankfurt, July 2, 1848, AEF, vol. 805, p. 210.

The Foreign Minister, Heckscher, was a lawyer named by the rich merchants of his native Hamburg. Savoye thought he loved dispute more to show his own brilliance than to clarify the situation. He was also not thought to be friendly to French views. The last cabinet member was General Peucker, not one of the Liberals of Prussia, but rather with a reputation of belonging to the old militarist party. Savoye warned against awaiting any sincere sympathy for France from him. The entire first cabinet was a great disappointment to the French.

Savoye gave little hope for the Parliament, or hope that a new more liberal cabinet would be formed soon. "The sentiments of the people in regard to France will never be represented by that majority of civil servants, of servants and of partisans of the old monarchical system, which doubt and hate France." The army had been increased by a vote of 303 to 149. "It is clear that the reason for the increase is less fear of Russia than a mistrust in regard to France." The main speakers for the bill had been old Prussian militarists: Auerswald, "a man without capacity imbued with the old Prussian ideas against France," Lichonowski, "he glories to be the sworn advisory of the French Republic," and most importantly, General Radowicz, who "detests the system of the government of France."²²

Savoye was discouraged with the composition of the Parliament because of the "absence of representatives from the heart of the people," and because of the "prodigious agglomeration out of all proportion" of salaried functionaries, of titled men and of professors.

²²Savoye to Bastide, Frankfurt, July 15, 1848, AEF, vol. 805, 217-18; July 7, vol. 805, 211-12. The myth that Savoye was more friendly to the Frankfurt Assembly than Bastide is hardly supported here.

All of these showed a "certain disdain" of the people. As Bernäys had said, "this is not the last word in Germany." It is hardly surprising that the French were not greatly pleased by the membership of the body or of the new-formed Central Power.²³

July 24, Normanby told Hatzfeldt that the French government was "not in the least concerned by the affair of Schleswig and of the strife which exists in regard to Germany and Denmark."²⁴ French attention radically changed when the Sardinian army seemed in danger and France feared the Frankfurt Assembly had become frankly pro-Austrian. With the danger of a French confrontation with Germany in Italy, France took greater notice of the war in Schleswig. Bastide told the Austrian chargé that, "If Archduke Johann is not able to make the Frankfurt Parliament reasonable, that affair in [Schleswig] could have incalculable results."²⁵

The same day, Bastide vented his disgust with developments in Frankfurt to Arago in Berlin. "This National Assembly of Frankfurt is a very sorry spectacle of political morality in the questions of Schleswig and of the Grand Duchy of Poznan." Bastide thought that "such a state of affairs assured the resistance of discords and divisions dangerous for the unitary system of Germany and deadly for peace in that country." The conduct of the parliamentarians was leading Germany into civil war which would destroy the national and liberal movement. Under the present leadership at Frankfurt, he did not see

²³Savoye to Bastide, Frankfurt, July 7, 1848, vol. 805, p. 211

²⁴Hatzfeldt to Berlin, Paris, July 24, 1848, GSA, vol. 861, p. 83.

²⁵Thom to Wessenberg, Paris, July 31, HHSA, VII 80.

it in the interest of France to support such a unity led by forces hostile to France. This was not the time for France to centralize her diplomacy in Frankfurt to support that body.²⁶

The men in Frankfurt were not bringing Germany to democracy, but were creating a situation conducive to "democratic anarchy and perhaps civil war," speculated Bastide.²⁷ Arago was less fatalistic and advised against "considering en bloc" the National Parliament. "Opinions there are very divided, and the democratic party is sympathetic to France." He also thought that public opinion in Germany was "much more" for the democratic party than any other.²⁸ He assured the Foreign Minister that the Prussian minister was using his influence to avoid a rupture and mitigate the "fatal policy of extreme germanism which reigns at the Parliament." The Berlin cabinet had just addressed to the Vicar of the Empire an energetic invitation to put an end soon to the war in Italy, according to a good source. France should look to aid in Berlin and "support Prussia against Frankfurt."²⁹

Arago again assured Bastide that public opinion was not in accord with the "ideologues of Frankfurt, these germanisers," France instead should accept help from Prussia, who could rally to her the sympathies of those alienated by Frankfurt and peacefully become head of a union of Germans which would give France serious guarantees of peace.³⁰

²⁶Bastide to Arago, Paris, July 31, 1848, AEF, vol. 302, p. 187.

²⁷Ibid.

²⁸Arago to Bastide, Berlin, August 1, 1848, AEF, vol. 302, pp. 189-90.

²⁹Arago to Bastide, Berlin, August 2, 1848, AEF, vol. 302, p. 192.

³⁰Arago to Bastide, Berlin, August 4, 1848, AEF, vol. 302, pp. 194-95.

As late as August 2, Bastide was still very poorly informed on the complexity of the Schleswig Question. Hatzfeldt asked for instructions on the Schleswig War, indicating that France had never before seriously discussed the question. Bastide admitted to Hatzfeldt that he had never read the Treaty of 1720, which is hardly an indication that the French were as interested in the matter as Scharff would have us believe.³¹ Berlin sent Hatzfeldt the circular despatches of March 30, April 7 and 10 on August 4 which apparently had not been sent to Paris before because of the lack of interest of the French in discussing Schleswig.³² The next day, they sent a cipher despatch that illuminates the Schleswig Question and the French role.

The government can only see with pleasure that the French government addresses her protestations against the entry of German troops in Jutland at Frankfurt and not at Berlin. It sees it as a [in original draft "the best"] means of mitigating the bellicose ardor of the Ministry and the National Assembly of Frankfurt; it engages you accordingly to seek to influence in this sense.³³

The "protest" of France was encouraged by Prussia! How can this protest be called "anti-German"?

Berlin disassociated herself in Paris totally with the Frankfurt Parliament, their Minister of War, and continuation of war.

The Minister of War in Frankfurt announced in the fifty-first meeting of the Parliament at Frankfurt that troops would be increased to bring as speedy an end to the war as possible. That announcement being in direct contradiction with the pacific and conciliatory views that we have always professed and that we still profess, it

³¹Hatzfeldt to Berlin, Paris, August 2, 1848, GSA, vol. 861, p. 103.

³²Berlin to Hatzfeldt, Berlin, August 4, 1848, GSA, vol. 856, p. 234.

³³Berlin to Hatzfeldt, Berlin, August 5, 1848, GSA, vol. 861, p. 105.

cannot fail to produce a great sensation, and one could easily believe, that General Peucker being a Prussian General, Prussia approved in secret of the measures and shared in that manner of opinion, although the government of the King holds to opposed language. To dispel the suspicion of duplicity, I think you ought to declare that since General Peucker has become a Minister of the Empire . . . we can no longer exert influence on him.³⁴

While Frankfurt was as unreasonable and bellicose in Schleswig as in Italy, Prussia was peaceful and supported the French. While Frankfurt was increasingly representing the party of reaction, Prussia was more liberal. Obviously, a Germany united by Prussia would be more reasonable in the Schleswig Question, the Italian Question, and would be more sanely nationalistic. Another important consideration was that Prussia's army made up most of the available forces used in Schleswig and the available forces that could be used to aid Austria in Italy.³⁵

The official position perhaps influenced an article in Moniteur, August, 12. It expressed the hope that the German Parliament would unite its efforts to those of France to conclude an accord in Schleswig-Holstein.

The struggle that has gone on in the Duchies for relatively secondary interests ought to be halted. The German Parliament wishes, we do not doubt, that her first act will be an act of conciliation, and it will unite itself to our efforts to conclude an accord already long over-due. It ought not to forget that the efficacy of its action depends on its wisdom.³⁶

³⁴Berlin to Hatzfeldt; Berlin, August 4, 1848, GSA, vol. 861, pp. 101-02.

³⁵Arago to Bastide, Berlin, August 4, 1848, AEF, vol. 302, p. 194.

³⁶Moniteur, August 12, 1848, quoted by Hatzfeldt to Berlin, Paris, August 12, 1848, GSA, vol. 857, p. 3.

Bastide wished to conciliate and compromise the pretensions of Germany and Denmark.³⁷ Hatzfeldt concluded, August 12, that France was much less interested in territorial matters and the treaty guarantees to Denmark than to the "intentions manifested in Germany for recognition of certain rights on her frontiers."³⁸ The French were more worried about Italy than Denmark when they talked of Schleswig. The talk of Alsace was more a fear for Venetia.

As the tension grew more serious, the Prussians continued to blame Frankfurt for delay. Bülow, the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, told Arago that, if Frankfurt had not intervened the armistice would have been signed long ago and peace concluded.³⁹ Meyendorff, the Russian Ambassador, added to the pressure on the Prussians by threatening that the imperial fleet would aid Denmark in her blockade of Germany, if peace were not soon concluded. Bülow told the British Ambassador that in case of the refusal by the Central Power for conciliation the Prussian ministry was contemplating the question of a unilateral retreat of their troops from the Duchies.⁴⁰ In this situation, Bastide wrote Tallenay in London that the "one great thing to do is to conserve the peace and leave the peoples the power to do that which they think is in their own welfare."⁴¹

³⁷Hatzfeldt to Berlin, Paris, August 17, 1848, GSA, vol. 857, p.9.

³⁸Hatzfeldt to Berlin, Paris, August 12, 1848, GSA, vol. 857, p.1.

³⁹Arago to Bastide, Berlin, August 20, 1848, AEF, vol. 302, p. 217.

⁴⁰Tallenay to Bastide, London, August 8, 1848, AEF, vol 671, pp. 30-31.

⁴¹Bastide to Beaumont, Paris, August 24, 1848, AEF, vol. 671. p. 80.

The Schleswig Question endangered the peace of Europe in August, striking at the most vital French interest, peace. France was displeased about the prospect of a conflict between two such liberal nations as the Danish and the Germans, two "natural allies" of France. They were alienated in the Schleswig Question by the intransigent attitude of Frankfurt toward a matter that the French thought minor, and they failed to find any encouragement in the Assembly's attitude in the Poznan and Limburg questions.

In the German discussion of the annexation of Limburg, the Belgian chargé reported that the Meuse and Escaut were considered "German rivers." "Regret was expressed that these peoples who wished to be Germans had to be abandoned, and speakers formulated the conviction that Belgium, as the other distant branches, would sooner or later be united into the German Confederation."⁴² Such territorial presumption had its repercussions in Paris. Any Great Power that controlled the mouth of the Rhine and Low Countries was an easy train-ride from Paris over flat fields. Even Lamartine now opposed the narrow alliance of fraternity of France and the Frankfurt Parliament. He said the "principle certain spirits exploit in regard to Schleswig and Holstein" could equally apply to Alsace and Lorraine.⁴³

The French were not the only ones worried about the pretensions in Frankfurt. The French chargé in London, Tallenay, wrote that the English cabinet was preoccupied with the developments in Germany, as manifested in the Limburg Question and the war in Schleswig, which

⁴²Briey to Hoffschmidt, Frankfurt, August 7, 1848, AEB, Frankfurt, IV, 147.

⁴³Thom to Wessenberg, Paris, August 8, 1848, HHSA, VIII, 125.

had caused alarm to English hopes of maintaining a European equilibrium.⁴⁴ Meanwhile, Prussia worked against Frankfurt for peace.

The Prussian cabinet was encouraged by the decision at Frankfurt to give Prussia the power to negotiate in the name of Germany, writing Hatzfeldt, August 15, that peace was now possible. General Below was sent with full power to conclude a convention of armistice. Prussia thought that this conduct by Frankfurt showed a promise that they had not fully submitted to the "influence of a certain faction of the National Assembly of Frankfurt, whose speeches have often been of the nature to give birth of apprehensions of the foreign powers." Germany was thought of abroad to be occupied only with a desire to expand and despoil the bordering countries.⁴⁵

The Prussian Foreign Minister hoped that the new moderation was a guarantee of general peace in Europe, especially since the new Vicar of the Empire had peaceful views.⁴⁶

Bastide was apprehensive about the Frankfurt Assembly, thinking that its attitude was causing Austria to be intransigent in the Italian war mediation, assuming the Parliament would join her as an ally. France, therefore, had to be very careful in the reception of Raumer, the Frankfurt Assembly's envoy to France, who would be "greeted in a manner that would not in the least offend Messieurs the professors of Frankfurt." Paris was careful to use exactly the same terms as those for "M. le Baron d'Adrienne" on a similar mission in London.⁴⁷

⁴⁴Tallenay to Bastide, London, July 30, 1848, AEF, vol. 670, p. 286.

⁴⁵Berlin to Hatzfeldt, Berlin, August 15, 1848, GSA, vol 857, p. 5.

⁴⁶Ibid., pp. 5-6.

⁴⁷Bastide to Arago, Paris, September 6, 1848, AEF vol. 302, p. 247; Tallenay to Bastide, Frankfurt, September 11, 1848, vol. 806, p. 12.

When Raumer was met by the French Foreign Minister, September 7, he was told that the Parliament could not be officially recognized until the "exterior constitution" was in accord with the other German states, and they must centralize their diplomacy in Frankfurt. He then asked Raumer what would be the "territorial circumscription" of the new empire. Bastide complained:

the elevated pretensions of Frankfurt on Schleswig and Limburg caused us scruples in that regard, and that it seemed to us that the principle of assimilation of all those who spoke German in the world would well one day bring up the unitaries of Frankfurt to us to demand Alsace and Lorraine.⁴⁸

This would sound prophetic, except that Bastide belonged to the 1848 generation of dreamers, not to the Realpolitikers of 1870. Even when he spoke of war with Germany, he thought that the prestige of the Republic and liberalism in France make war by Germany impossible against her. The French Foreign Minister never understood that German nationalism could possibly be a greater force in Germany than the force of the French revolutionary mystique. When he wrote Arago two days later, he showed that he had no notion of a forceful German nationalism hostile to France. Bastide thought rather that the "professors" had no backing among the people of Germany. The country was "waiting for the signal" from France to rise in revolt. France need only to invade along the Rhine to draw to her the real German nationalists and republicans.⁴⁹

He thought that the Schleswig Question:

⁴⁸Bastide to Arago, Paris, September 7, 1848, AEF, vol. 302, p. 250.

⁴⁹Bastide to Arago, Paris, September 9, 1848, AEF, vol. 302, p. 263.

had not yet reached the stage where they would be pressed to send 15,000 men to Denmark, but, nevertheless, we are resolved not to change our declaration of guarantee [of Schleswig] that we have renewed at this moment. If it is necessary . . . to make war in Germany, we will attack at the same time in Holstein and the Tyrol, simultaneously, upholding the revolutionary demons along the Rhine, and I think the worse role will not be for France, if all the statesmen of Germany are not as deaf as those of Frankfurt. . . .⁵⁰

In the Schleswig Question, the French did not "turn against the German Party," as Alexander Scharff alleged.⁵¹ Bastide thought that Frankfurt was "deaf" to the true sentiment in Germany. Bastide never "gave up (preisgab) the policy of international reconciliation to adopt the older tradition of French policy."⁵² Bastide rejected totally Frankfurt because he thought that the Frankfurt Assembly had "given up" the policy of international reconciliation and revolutionary-democracy. He felt that they had drifted into chauvinism far removed from the purity of the "good Germans." Bastide opposed the Frankfurt conception of German unity, because he thought it was unrepresentative of the public opinion in Germany.

⁵⁰Ibid.

⁵¹Scharff, "Schleswig-Holsteins Erhebung", p. 181.

⁵²Ibid., p. 178.

CHAPTER IX

THE ITALIAN WAR AND THE FRANKFURT ASSEMBLY

In 1848 as much as 1866 the German and Italian unification questions were intimately enmeshed. In both cases the main impediment to nationalism was the multi-national Austrian Empire. The similarities of the two situations are not as remote as usually thought; the most important difference was that Bismark was content with Kleindeutsch solution of the German problem, while in 1848 this seemed treasonable to nationalists. German unification in Frankfurt meant an empire including all of Germany. This was the policy of Frankfurt which lost them much good-will abroad when it was applied to Limburg, Schleswig and Poznan which some other countries found less than 100% German.

It was possible to discuss the German and Polish portions of Poznan as it was possible to draw an ethnic line in Schleswig; however, it was most unfortunate to begin the history of united Germany with a war against Denmark which the Germans most assuredly handled very poorly from the view-point of public relations and propaganda. The German opinion was that these areas belonged to the German Empire by right because the German language was spoken there more than another. If the empire began in such a spirit of conquest, and if this "right" of nationality were recognized by international law, as the Germans:

in Frankfurt wished, what of Alsace, Switzerland, the Russian Baltic provinces? In all of these German was spoken; the more extreme "germanists" in 1848 claimed them as "German." Would the pattern of the Schleswig war be repeated to take Alsace and Lorraine from France? These questions were asked in 1848 by Guizot, Thiers, Broglie, Victor Cousin and other Frenchmen of the traditional realist-conservative school of policy. Their ideas appeared especially in such periodicals as the Revue des deux Mondes.

Later French historians have transformed the rhetoric of Frankfurt into a "threat to France." Emile Bourgeois wrote that "She had seen the French frontier menaced by the Germans in Alsace, in Savoy by the Italians."¹ Debidour alleged that:

The Germans did not wish our help. They regarded us always as enemies and reproached us more acrimoniously than ever for having acquired Alsace and Lorraine, which ought, according to them, to be returned to the German fatherland. . . . Their diverse pretensions. . . were loudly maintained by Prussia, who found there the means, not only to render herself popular, but to greatly increase her power.²

Ponteil wrote of the "jealous patriotism which the [Germans] thought was affirmed everywhere when their race (confused with language) was represented."³ Jacques Droz gives the finest summary of French public opinion toward the Frankfurt Parliament. "France saw in the principle of nationality and in the attitude of Frankfurt a disturbing

¹Emile Bourgeois, Manuel historique de la politique étrangère, (11th ed., Paris: E. Berlin, 1948), III, 312.

²Anton Debidour, Histoire diplomatique de l'Europe: 1814-78, (Paris: F. Alcan, 1931), II, 11-12.

³Felix Ponteil, 1848, (Paris: Colin, 1947), p. 88.

conception which leads to a policy of ~~usurpation and conquest~~.⁴

The greatest sin of the German "Forty-eighters" was their neglect of public relations; instead, they had an ability to show themselves in the worst possible light, a naive concept of the problems of nationalism in central Europe where language and political borders were not coincident. Innocence in Frankfurt sounded like treachery in Paris. In areas of mixed-nationality, the Germans made their stand in 1848; tactically, this led to a propaganda defeat, for it always seemed that they made their stand on German nationality and denied the right of nation to others. Namier made the most extreme assertion that "With 1848 starts the German bid for power, for European predominance, for world domination . . ."⁵ This is, of course, highly rhetorical, and history is seldom as simple as Namier would have us believe, but it does show how the Frankfurt Parliament appeared to some people of later generations.

In spite of the attention of some French publicists and royalist politicians in 1848 to the "designs" of Frankfurt, their opinions had little influence on the romantic-liberal politicians that directed the policy of the Second Republic. Even the moderate National Assembly of May voted for a "fraternal pact with Germany" to free Poland and Italy. Most, Frenchmen, like Louis-Napoleon, knew very little of Germany and knew nothing of Prussia. "He only attached little importance to events in Germany. Like his uncle, but for other reasons,

⁴Jacques Droz, Histoire diplomatique de 1648 à 1919, (Paris Dalloz, 1952), p. 351: see also Georges Weil, L'Europe du XIX^e siècle et l'idée de nationalité, (Paris: A. Michel, 1938), p. 149.

⁵Lewis Namier, "1848: Seed plot of History," in Avenues of History, (London: H. Hamilton, 1952) p. 153.

he interested himself above all in Italy. He was prepared to let Prussia, or even aid her in unifying Germany. . . . With him France continued to march toward her destiny with blindfolded eyes."⁶

Frenchmen had little knowledge of nor interest in Germany in 1848; the principal concern was Italy, and Frankfurt's policy toward the southern peninsula was decisive for the French policy. In late summer of 1848, all eyes were on Italy and the great crisis of German history in Schleswig was of secondary interest to Paris.

The Italian and German Questions both opposed the order of 1815 and ultimately Austria's domination of the countries in the Metternich era. The difference was that the Italians also came into conflict with all Germans who thought the position of Austria in Italy was important for Germany's position in Europe, vital for the safety and independence of Germany. Theodor Schieder believed that, from the beginning, there was a conflict in Frankfurt between two concepts of nation. The first was the western European concept of the nation-state; the other was that of Herder and Mazzini, an idea of language and cultural nation that transcended state borders with the universal ideal of humanity as the most important consideration. Unfortunately, the former idea of nation predominated over the Herder-Mazzinian idea at Frankfurt, which was represented by the far left only.⁷

In May, Paris learned that Trieste was important for the German nationalists. The special agent, Bernäys, wrote that France could

⁶Gaston Zeller, La France et l'Allemagne depuis dix siècles, (Paris: Collin, 1948), p. 187.

⁷Theodor Schieder, "Das Italienbild der deutschen Einheitsbewegung," Studi Italiana, III (1959), 146-47.

have a free hand in Italy, if they left Trieste to Germany.⁸ The Sardinian Minister at Munich warned his country that the demonstration of the fleet of Sardinia-Naples had alarmed Germany. He did not doubt that if the stories of the bombardment of the city were verified, the Frankfurt National Assembly would declare war on Germany. The political consequences of an attack on Trieste would be fatal for Italy.⁹ With Venice in revolt, Trieste was the only port of the German Confederation offering access to the Mediterranean markets. When the news reached Frankfurt, May 29, of the blockade of Trieste by the combined fleets of Naples, Sardinia and Venice, there was widespread dissatisfaction. The Belgium chargé warned of the political consequences of the act in Germany.

This measure could well change the dispositions of Germany relative to the war in Piedmont, which has been in this country, at least until now, unpopular. One desired here generally that Italy would be able to constitute herself in repose. But touching Trieste, for whose solicitude the Council of 50 had sent commissions to Vienna to recommend that they not give up the important point, could change that goodwill to hostility.¹⁰

He thought that the German feeling for Trieste was as fervent as the French for the Polish Question.

On June 17, a protest was sent in the name of the German Confederation against "all acts of hostility on the part of the combined naval forces of Sardinia, Naples and Venice on the port of Trieste

⁸Bernäys to Bois le Comte, Frankfurt, May 19, 1848, AEF, MD, All, vol. 170, p. 27.

⁹Pallavinci to Pareto, Munich, May 22, 1848, quoted in Curato, "Il Parlamento de Francoforte e la prima guerra d'indipendenza italiana," ASI, CX, 280.

¹⁰Briey to Hoffschmidt, Frankfurt, May 29, 1848, AEB, All, IV, 88.

and against all violation of the territory of the German Confederation in general."¹¹

The protest of the old Diet of the German Confederation was followed a few days later by a protest in the National Assembly who declared that "An attack on Trieste will be seen as a declaration of war against Germany."¹² The Belgium chargé reported that the vote was unanimous.¹³

The activity of the Diet and National Assembly in Frankfurt greatly disturbed the French. A "Note on Germany and Austria" was written soon afterward by the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs which investigated whether there was a legal basis for the declaration of June 20.¹⁴ Bastide told Hatzfeldt that he had warned the cabinet in Turin to be careful about violating the rights of the German Confederation, and France was visibly worried by the possibility of Germany's coming to the aid of Austria in Italy.¹⁵ In late July, Schmerling told the Frankfurt Assembly that the maintenance of the blockade of Trieste had necessitated the ministry of the Empire to send the envoy of the government of Charles Albert a new note much "more energetic" than the first.¹⁶

¹¹Briey to Hoffschmidt, Frankfurt, June 18, 1848, AEB, All, IV, 102.

¹²Stenographischer Bericht über die Verhandlungen der deutschen constituirenden Nationalversammlung zu Frankfurt am Main, (Frankfurt/M.: Sauerländer, 1848), I, 391.

¹³Briey to Hoffschmidt, Frankfurt, June 20, 1848, AEB, All, IV, 102.

¹⁴AEF, MD, All, vol. 162, pp. 352-60.

¹⁵Hatzfeldt to Berlin, Paris, July 6, 1848, GSA, vol. 861, p. 54.

¹⁶Briey to Hoffschmidt, Frankfurt, July 24, 1848, AEB, All, IV, 131.

Bastide was very worried about the possibility of aid to Austria in their Italian War, asking Hatzfeldt, July 28, of a rumor that Frankfurt might declare Venetia part of the German Confederation. Berlin answered that they had heard nothing of such a rumor, but stated that public opinion in Germany would be totally opposed if the question were raised. "Germany is strong enough and large enough not to have need to extend her territory." The Prussian Foreign Minister felt that such an extension into Italy "would offer no great strategic advantages and would only be a new source of embarrassment."¹⁷

While Prussia was adamantly opposed to any entangling involvement in northern Italy, the Frankfurt Assembly passed a resolution, August 12, that the "Central Power of Germany should protect the interests of the Confederation in the Austria-Sardinian War Question."¹⁸ In the Italian Debate, Nauwerck from Berlin spoke of a "thousand years of injustice," of "violent conciliation," and made an interesting observation on German-Italian relations. "Every people must be free and independent." This was the voice of Herder and Mazzini.

I will not go back into the Middle Ages to remind you what a misfortune the Germans themselves have brought from Italy. You know the saying that 'Italy is the grave of the Germans,' Have we any interest in supporting Austria's tyranny in northern Italy? Austria was the evil spirit in Italy.¹⁹

The Liberals thought the Hohens taufen's interest in Italy had been fatal to German unity in the Middle Ages.

¹⁷Berlin to Hatzfeldt, Berlin, August 22, 1848, GSA, vol. 861, p. 95; Arago to Bastide, Berlin, AEF, vol. 302. p. 238.

¹⁸Stenographischer Bericht, II, 1568.

¹⁹Ibid., II, p. 1561.

The debate on Italy became a defense of historical writing as another Prussian, Friedrich von Raumer, author of the History of the Hohenstaufens, defended the role of Germany in Italy. He thought the foreign domination of Austria there similar to the rule of foreign royal houses in England, Sweden, Naples and Spain. He denied the possibility of making a present of freedom to another country. "You can give a country her freedom as easily as you could give a man courage and a woman her chastity." The north Italians had as good a foreign domination as Sweden, England, Naples and Spain.

"Alone, gentlemen, I have traveled through Italy . . . where I observed the condition of the people," he noticed how they were governed, and concluded that the "Austrian government seemed to be the best in all of Italy." If the government had not pleased all "spirits", this was natural; this was the conflict of nationalities. "As the Poles in Poznan have a better administration under the Prussians than they ever had under Polish domination." A few years later Raumer published a book, Zur Politik des Tages, which clearly stated the inability of the Italians to create a political unity.²⁰

Schieder believed that there was no clear position expressed over the Italian Question in Frankfurt. The conservative-Roman Catholic-universalist party was sympathetic for Austria or a Reich's traditionalism. The bourgeois nationalist-liberals were sympathetic to the argument of defense and put the principle of military strategy, expressed in the speech of General Radowitz, above the principle of nation.

The Radowitz speech raised another point: He specifically

²⁰Ibid., II, 1567; see also Schieder, p. 148.

mentioned France whose "hegemony" in northern Italy must be resisted for the "safety of the German Confederation." This speech was greeted by "stormy applause from the Right and Center." It is highly unlikely that Paris was pleased by a defense of an imperialistic war fought for "strategic" considerations!²¹

Kunde wrote that "Raumer was far from sacrificing old lands of the Reich because of a doctrine. [Germany was asked to cut off] . . . with foolish magnanimity large stretches of land while no one gave Germany similar generosity, and he especially stressed the importance of the strategic moment."²²

The Italian Debate brought the German Confederation into open conflict with France, shortly after the first cabinet of the Central Power had been formed. A few days before, the President of the Council, Prince de Leiningen, told the Belgian chargé that he feared that nothing could be done to impede the Frankfurt Parliament from soon taking part in the war for Austria.²³

French fears of the "wild men" in Frankfurt date most clearly from the Italian Debate which made France fear such a bellicose neighbor of 45 millions. A power that stressed military considerations in drawing borders in Italy could also favor them in the Vosges as well, especially when they coincided with the French-German language frontier better than the Rhine.

²¹Ibid., II, 1566-67; Schieder, p. 148

²²Guenther Kunde, Die deutsche Revolution von 1848 und die italienische Frage, Teildruck, (Saalfeld: privately published, 1937) p. 9.

²³Briey to Hoffschmidt, Frankfurt, August 7, 1848, AEB, A11 IV, 148.

An important key to French policy toward the Frankfurt Parliament is the comment of Bernäys, "This Parliament is not the last word from Germany."²⁴ Lamartine told the Committee of Foreign Affairs of the Chamber, July 18, that the King of Prussia could "throw himself in the bosom of his people," or he could "rest in the midst of his army" and use an alliance with the Russian army to reconquer his own country. He stated that France had "nothing to fear in one or the other hypothesis about Prussia," and his formula for the foreign policy of France was still "union of France and Germany at any price."²⁵

The first hypothesis of Lamartine meant an alliance with France, the second was civil war in which France could also intervene in the name of the "democratic" Prussian element, if they showed themselves to be strong enough. Clearly, Lamartine was not an "enemy" of Germany, but the natural leader of Germany was increasingly seen as Berlin, not Frankfurt. While Frankfurt threatened France with war in Italy, Prussia offered themselves as an ally.

The British also saw no possibility of working with the "crazy professors" at Frankfurt. Cowley wrote in exasperation to Palmerston of the Foreign Minister, Heckscher, who thought nothing of threatening England and France with war to aid Austria.

What answer can you make to a Minister of Foreign Affairs who says, 'What do you think we are of-war? I am not sure that war is not the best thing for us. It must at all events settle the question of unity at once.' In short, they are a parcel of children who want whipping and caressing alternately.²⁶

²⁴Bernäys to Bois le Comte, Frankfurt, May 17, 1848, AEF, MD, All, vol 170, p. 27.

²⁵Hatzfeldt to Berlin, Paris, July 18, 1848, GSA, vol., 861, p. 67.

²⁶Cowley to Palmerston, Frankfurt, August 21 & 27, 1848, quoted in Mösse, p. 24.

However, the French also thought that the follies of Frankfurt did not destroy the principle of unity. The Prussian cabinet, which was "wisely unionist" would "be favorable to us." France had rejected the old "divide and rule" policy in Germany in favor of a policy of German unification under the leadership of Prussia.²⁷ "It is not necessary to destroy that union; it is merely necessary to arrange it; it is only necessary to impede it from going too far. That is the work of Prussia; she will not fail in it." Germany would be an "impassable barrier" between France and Russia.²⁸

German historians have never understood that hostility toward Germany on a specific question like Schleswig-Holstein, Poland, or Italy did not necessarily mean hostility toward the German unification movement. Similarly, when Paris rejected Frankfurt, it was because she thought the Parliament unrepresentative of the "true" German national movement; France was always friendly toward German unification. Bastide told Hatzfeldt, July 28, that "what was being done in Frankfurt was incomprehensible for him." Hatzfeldt still thought in late July that Bastide was more favorable than unfavorable to Frankfurt and felt that it represented the sovereignty of the German people.²⁹

Bastide wrote, October 17, that "She [Prussia] can march at the head of liberal Germany and aid us in terminating the difficulties

²⁷Arago to Bastide, Berlin, August 6, 1848, AEF, vol. 302, p.196.

²⁸Ibid., pp. 197-98; see also Arago to Bastide, August 4, 1848, AEF, vol. 302, p. 194.

²⁹Hatzfeldt to Berlin, Paris, July 28, 1848, GSA, vol. 861, p. 90; July 25, vol. 861, p. 85.

that the ambition of Vienna and that of Frankfurt" had made in Italy.³⁰ Bastide was anything but hostile to German unification, seeing Prussia as an aid in Italy against the excessive ambition of Austria and Frankfurt.

— Bastide believed that the struggle was for Italy and the right of the sovereignty of peoples. On September 26, Bastide threatened Austria with war. If the war came, the treaties of Vienna would be:

resolutely torn up and we will call for the war against the thrones all the peoples who only wait for the signal given by us. . . . It will be easy for us to find allies not only in all of Italy . . . but also in Germany and even among the states submitting today, after a fashion, to Austrian domination.³¹

While Frankfurt threatened France with intervention for Austria, Prussia "manifests an extreme desire to pacify Italy. . . . to join us to attain this end."³² The French believed that the true voice of liberal and national Germany had its spokesman in Berlin.

Frankfurt sent the worst possible representatives on missions to London and Paris, and their Foreign Minister, Heckscher, was the most unhappy choice, a most undiplomatic German. Instead of placating the "specious fears" of Amsterdam, he made the Dutch and Belgians more worried when he talked to their Ministers in Vienna in late July:

He traced the policy to be followed by Germany henceforth with vigor and perseverance which she lacked until now, but will be given by the new constitution. He developed with complaisance the favorite theme of unity and centralization

³⁰Bastide to Arago, Paris, October 17, 1848, AEF, vol. 303, p. 32.

³¹Bastide to la Cour, Paris, September 26, 1848, AEF, vol. 436, p. 229, bis.

³²Arago to Bastide, Berlin, August 14, 1848, AEF, vol. 302, p. 211.

of Germans and traced the map of the new Empire without showing the least doubt of the legitimacy of the pretensions of German patriotism.³³

When asked by the Dutch Minister if he thought the German Empire extended to the Texel and Zuider Zee, Heckscher merely answered:

Germany found her patriotism in a sentiment of law (droit) and the necessities of her political existence and in the power of expansion of her nationals which gave the means and will to triumph over the obstacles that she would meet in her march.³⁴

The representative of Belgium also objected heatedly to the "new spirit of usurpation."

Heckscher showed no doubt in the right of Germany to expand to her "natural" limits, making enemies among her neighbors, instead of allies. The sentiment of the Foreign Minister of the Frankfurt Parliament would hardly have caused confidence in Paris and London in the common sense of the Frankfurters. It seemed that Heckscher wanted a war with anyone; if he could not have one with Russia or Italy, Belgium and Holland would do. Although the language cannot be taken seriously, it is easy to understand why Bastide said that what was being done in Frankfurt was "incomprehensible." To threaten war on all fronts without an army or finances, as Frankfurt did, was illogical.

When Raumer came to Paris on a special mission to convince the French that Frankfurt should be a party to the joint French-British mediation of the Austrian-Sardinian conflict, his reception was cool. The chargé of Saxony wrote that "The principal difficulty

³³De la cour to Bastide, Vienna, July 26, 1848, AEF, vol 436, pp. 34-35.

³⁴Ibid.

that the Raumer mission is experiencing results from the fear of seeing Germany take an active part in the conflict which could arise between France and Austria over Italy."³⁵

The instructions of Heckscher for Raumer stressed that the most important thing for him to do was to gain the diplomatic recognition of Frankfurt for the German nation. "I ask you, please, to do everything possible to show the peaceful character of the German unification desires in the right light and to convince France that she should strengthen this."³⁶ Instead, Raumer told Bastide that "Germany will not see with indifference a French Army advance over the Alps, and in this case, she would probably not delay in pronouncing herself against France." There can be little doubt that Raumer was accurate when he told the Austrian chargé, Thom, that "These words made a strong impression on M. Bastide."³⁷

Rather than convince the French of the peaceful character of the Zentralgewalt, Raumer threatened the French with an invasion on the Rhine! Cavaignac was outraged with the historian-diplomat. On one side they offered German unity as a political principal but denied that the same principal of nationalism applied in the Italian Question. Frankfurt claimed to speak for all of Germany, but what of Austria and Prussia? Who was the sovereign able to negotiate in the Italian Question, Vienna or Frankfurt.³⁸ In late August, the Austrian chargé, Thom,

³⁵Bose to Dresden, Paris, September 7, 1848, Saxony, p. 171.

³⁶Heckscher to Raumer, Frankfurt, August 20, 1848, Germany, Bundesarchiv, Zweigstelle, Frankfurt/Main, Raumer Papers.

³⁷Thom to Wessenberg, Paris, September 6, 1848, HHSA, IX, 36.

³⁸Könneritz to Dresden, Paris, September 11, 1848, Saxony, p. 176.

summarized Bastide's attitudes toward the Frankfurt Parliament. He thought that the French Foreign Minister had earlier ignored completely what had happened there, but "today it is the great preoccupation, much more than Italian affairs."³⁹ The next day, Bastide wrote his agent in Vienna that "the party of progress is not our enemy in the Italian Question."⁴⁰ Bastide was opposed by the "retrograde" element at Frankfurt and Vienna.

Arago assured him that although the Frankfurt policy was hostile to French opinion, he had been assured in Berlin that it was being modified from day to day. "The National Parliament will return from its errors, or it will soon come under the influence of the Prussian cabinet, which is frankly liberal."⁴¹ In the long run, Bastide was confident that the real national party in Germany would be friendly to France, because while Austria only invoked "the right of property" in Italy, "We are the representatives of the opposed principle of the sovereignty of peoples."⁴²

In spite of the imprudent observations of Raumer, Bastide was always very indulgent with the professor-diplomat. The Frenchman was so courteous, that Raumer thought that his mission was on the verge of complete success and that the French would recognize the National Assembly as the spokesman for all of Germany! The Frankfurt secretary

³⁹Thom to Wessenberg, Paris, August 26, 1848, HHSA, VIII, 201.

⁴⁰Bastide to la Cour, Paris, August 27, 1848, AEF, vol. 436, p. 119.

⁴¹Arago to Bastide, Berlin, September 8, 1848, AEF, vol. 302, p. 261.

⁴²Bastide to la Cour, Paris, September 26, 1848, AEF, vol. 436, p. 228 bis.

of State for Foreign Affairs asked Tallenay, the French chargé in Frankfurt, about a choice for the "new" post in Paris.⁴³

Bastide answered that Raumer had misunderstood the conversation. He had said that he would be happy when completely official relations could be established between Frankfurt and Paris. But there was only a provisional state at present; it was unknown if there would be an empire or a republic, if the envoy of Frankfurt would represent at the same time Prussia, Austria, Bavaria, etc. or what the territorial limits of the new state would be. Meanwhile, he had told Raumer, it was improbable that there would be an official recognition of the representative of Frankfurt. Bastide wrote Tallenay to assure Schmerling, who had replaced Heckscher as Foreign Minister, "No hostile thought of ulterior motive enter in our reserve." France still wished the "pact fraternel avec Allemagne." While the relations were not official, the French wished for them to be as friendly as possible.

Bastide used extreme reserve when dealing with Frankfurt. A letter of Schmerling communicated to him by Raumer posed the principle that even the army of Radetzky in Italy belonged to the Vicar General of the Empire; that is, the supreme commander of the Austrian army in Italy was the Frankfurt Parliament. Another consideration that made him hesitate was that while proclaiming the principle of nationalities, they opposed the Italian nationality by openly announcing in advance of the mediation the intention of conserving for Austria, Lombardy and Venetia. France might have been more inclined to recognition if "in the Italian affairs, Frankfurt presented herself

⁴³Tallenay to Bastide, Frankfurt, October 2, 1848, AEF, vol. 806, pp. 98-99.

to us as an auxiliary of the principles of democratic nationalities, and not as a defender of the treaties of 1815 and the rights of Austria."⁴⁴

The unitary movement in Germany was as poorly served in London as in Paris. The special envoy there, Baron Andryan, was as absurdly bellicose as Raumer; both utterly failed to carry out their instructions to show the peaceful mood of Germany. The London papers of October 18 and 19 were filled with reports that the Central Power of the German Empire was on the verge of intervening militarily in Italian affairs. When the French Ambassador, Beaumont, saw Andryan, he spoke of an army of 50,000 men in southern Germany as an "observation army" in case of attack if the south Tyrol were menaced by an aggressor. "Baron Andryan told me of the great interest that the German Empire had in the Italian Question, of the impossibility for Germany to let her natural frontiers be cut into in northern Italy, and consequently the necessity for her to be near to see what happened." When Beaumont said that this action showed no deference for the mediating powers in the dispute the German replied that nothing would be done if the mediating conference opened, and assured him that on the day the conference opened the army of observation would be dissolved.⁴⁵

When the French asked in Frankfurt about this army, Tallenay wrote that he and Cowley, the English chargé, had no knowledge of the forming of such a force. The only known troops were those in

⁴⁴Bastide to Tallenay, Paris, October 5, 1848, AEF, vol. 806, pp. 110-11.

⁴⁵Beaumont to Bastide, London, October 20, 1848, AEF, vol. 671, pp. 268-72.

Thuringen, Wuerttemberg and Baden used to keep down the anarchist elements. Tallenay doubted the report since it would have been difficult for the Central Power to dispose 50,000 men at a time when Germany hardly had enough troops to keep order at home, to say nothing of the expense.⁴⁶ Andryan's blustering language about "natural frontiers" in northern Italy, which indicated that he believed that Lombardy and Venetia were integral parts of the German Confederation, was a grave disservice to his mission to gain support abroad for the cause of German unity.

⁴⁶Tallenay to Bastide, Frankfurt, October 30, 1848, AEF, vol. 806, pp. 164-66.

CHAPTER X

POLAND: PHASE II

The Polish Question was the most complicated for French policy in 1848. It was the symbol of total victory for the new order of Europe. With the change in central Europe, all the dreams of the French would have been within grasp. It meant a new order in Vienna as well as Berlin, with Bastide and Cavaignac taking the place of Metternich as the axis of the European system. As before, the success for the Poles was impossible without the aid of the Germans. First, the revolution must triumph in Germany, then it would necessarily follow in Poland.

The first warning about the character of the new Frankfurt Parliament toward the Poles was sent by Bernäys, May 19.¹ "From what I hear here . . . do not hope for anything at all for Poland. The Poles are detested by all Germany. For her, Germany, at least, the Parliament, will do nothing. . . However, this Parliament is not the last word in Germany.

The Saxon Ambassador saw Bastide, May 20, and the new French Foreign Minister talked of the necessity of peace for the consolidation of the revolution. He thought that there would be no need for French intervention in the Italian dispute, because "The pen

¹Bernäys to Bois le Comte, Frankfurt, May 19, 1848, AEF, MD, All, vol. 170, p. 27.

is mightier than the sword." He was equally peaceful in discussing Poland, saying that Poland could only be saved by peace.

She depends on the good will of Germany, which we influence by example and by moral influence. The reported victory of the people of Vienna--the 15th--will aid the Poles. The more the Austrian Empire and Germany break with the old system, the more Poland will find support in these nations, and I think that it will soon be possible to organize a diplomatic intervention of all of the continent in favor of Poland.²

Bastide wrote to Savoye, a few weeks later, a similar fraternal message stressing the importance of Germany to Polish freedom.

Above all cultivate good and frequent relations with the members of the Parliament. It is in their conviction that it is essential to make prevail the principle of a narrow alliance between France and Germany. It is by the realization and the sincerity of that fraternal alliance that it will be possible to accomplish the fruitful results for liberty, civilization and true international law. It is from this union that the great inequity of the partition of Poland will be redressed.³

Bastide was enthusiastic about the resolution of Drouyn de Lhuys passed in the French National Assembly, May 24.

The National Assembly urges the Executive Commission to take as a rule of conduct the unanimous wishes of the Assembly, summed up in these words: fraternal pact with Germany, reconstitution of independent, free Poland, emancipation of Italy.⁴

Bastide hoped that Frankfurt would "reply to the voice of France" by a similar declaration. In other words, Bastide had not taken any notice of Bernäy's letter concerning the sentiments of the Germans towards the Poles, and he seemed ignorant of any change in

²Könneritz to Dresden, Paris, May 22, 1848, Saxony, pp. 101-02.

³Bastide to Savoye, Paris, June 8, 1848, DDF, II, 731.

⁴Ibid.

German public opinion since the March Revolution. It is as though the Foreign Minister worked in a vacuum cut off entirely from events in Germany.

Savoye warned, June 11, that national pride had poisoned the question of Poznan. The delegates were afraid to stand up to the charge of having "abandoned the cause of nearly a half-million Germans who live in the Grand Duchy." This seemed "un-German" in the atmosphere of Frankfurt, susceptible as other national movements to irredentist feelings; however, it was not yet clear that the Germans in Poznan would be included in the German Confederation.

The President of the Assembly, Heinrich von Gagern, in an interview with Ladislav Plater, a Polish traveler from Paris, "assured him of the good intentions of the majority of the members of the Parliament relative to the reconstruction of the Polish nationality." The German and Polish Questions were still intimately tied.⁵

Arago wrote from Berlin that the reconstruction of a really free Polish nation was intimately attached to the movement for democratic unity in Germany. Until this was done, Germany would make promises and temporize, but nothing would be done. Only with the victory of the radicals in Berlin, the democratic party of German unity, would Poland be reconstituted.⁶

On June 10, Dr. Kraetzer-Rasserts reported to Bastide of a trip from Aachen along the Rhine to Strasbourg. He found that the general opinion was anti-Prussian and very favorable to France

⁵Savoye to Bastide, Frankfurt, June 11, 1848, DDF, II, 793.

⁶Arago to Bastide, Berlin, June 17, 1848, DDF, II, 963.

He also talked to Mrs. Hecker, the wife of a leader in the first Baden rebellion, who brought news of the great progress of the "republican principle" in Germany. At Koblenz and Mainz the people talked openly not only of the republic, but the arrival of the French; not isolated individuals awaited the French, but seven-eighths of the entire population. Kraetzer thought that the way of life of the German Rhine provinces were more French than Alsace and Lorraine. In Baden, "except for the intervention of 60,000 foreign troops, it would to-day be a republic."⁷ The rest of Germany, though, was very far from being ripe for republican institutions.

He spoke with two reactionary deputies in the Frankfurt Assembly, Lichnowsky and Diebenrook, on a Rhine steamer. Both "trembled with anger in thinking of the re-establishment" of Poland, and they cited the horrors of the Poles against the Germans in Poznan. Kraetzer asked if Frankfurt would allow a French army to cross Germany to go to the aid of the Poles.

The reactionaries were not afraid that the French would stay in Germany, because they had confidence in the German armies, and the French could be "chased out." What they really feared were the writings and ideas of the revolutionary army which they would spread on their passage through Germany and which would not be so simple to "chase away."⁸

Kraetzer also sent the military statistics of Aachen, Cologne, Koblenz, plans of the cities and forts of Mainz, Rastatt, and Baden.

⁷Kraetzer-Rasserts to Bastide, Strasbourg, June 10, MD, All, vol. 129, pp. 5-8.

⁸Ibid.

He mailed tables of statistics of field armies and garrisons of the federal German army, the Austrian army, and the Prussian army. He warned Bastide, June 19, that the Russians had moved 100,000 men to the Poznan border and the Russian fleet in the Baltic was preparing for a great blow. Bastide told the Saxon Ambassador the same day that he had information that convinced him that an immediate war between Russia and Germany was unavoidable.⁹

The same day, the Belgian chargé reported the project of the Minister of the Interior for the mobilization of 300 battalions of the National Guard. Lamartine protested that the French had no thought of aggression, but the presence of the armaments in northern Europe and the complications of the war in Lombardy forced the French to take a defensive attitude.¹⁰

Arago wrote from Berlin of a cabinet crisis and of the fears of a Russian invasion in the Prussian Assembly.

It is evident to me that Russia is only waiting for a good occasion to intervene violently in Prussian affairs, or rather in German affairs. I believe that the Emperor declared by a top secret note, that he considered it a casus belli for the Prussians to permit a Polish organization of Poznan. It is necessary for us to be prepared for this eventuality. . . . A great majority of the German nation is presently sympathetic to us and shows at the same time a profound aversion for Russia. . . the Polish cause is odious for Russia. In this question [of Poland] Germany is divided. We should support Poland, without letting ourselves get embroiled with Germany under the menaces of Russia. Wait patiently awhile, which will not be long. Germany, whose ideas come toward us quickly, will throw herself completely into the arms of France when Russia attacks her. United with Germany, we will reinstate Poland to the applause and with the concourse of all of the

⁹Koenneritz to Lemaistre, Paris, June 19, 1848, Saxony, p. 118.

¹⁰Ligne to Hoffschmidt, Paris, June 19, 1848, AEB, XIII, 219.

German Confederation. I do not know a single German patriot to whom the unity of Germany does not mean the necessity of the reconstruction of an independent and free Poland.¹¹

When the Russian attack came, Germany would have to turn to France; meanwhile, France would say as little as possible so the Polish Question could remain dormant. Until Russia attacked, the most important thing for France to do was to avoid all contact with German internal questions, not to take sides in the controversies, not to seem to take part in any of the sectional conflicts or cabinet crises. France should be unobtrusively promoting Polish interests, waiting for the victory of the democrats in Germany.

Bastide answered Arago after the June Days in Paris, June 29. He appreciated his observations on continuing to protect the Polish nationality without sacrificing good relations with Germany. He thought it best to do nothing more now other than the protest to the Prussian cabinet that Arago had delivered earlier in the month against the division of Poznan along national lines. "That protest subsists; that is enough for the present."¹² The Poles would have to wait for the revolution to run its course in Germany.

Bastide thought this was not far off. He got letters from a Heinrich Boernstein, most likely one of the members of the presidium of the "German Democratic Society" by that name, a publicist. These letters are in the Mémoires et Documents of the French Foreign Ministry, entitled "News bulletins of Germany." A typical "bulletin" announced from Berlin on July 29, "The revolution marches with great

¹¹Arago to Bastide, Berlin, June 20, 1848, DDF, II, 1036.

¹²Bastide to Arago, Paris, June 29, 1848, DDF, II, 1157.

steps in Berlin. The question of the day is the monarchy or a republic?" Another one, datelined Vienna, June 26, told of the discontent with Archduke Johann whose powers were too limited to do anything. Whatever he did there would be a new and more radical revolution.

The bulletin from Berlin, June 30, warned that "the language of the clubs has become more and more violent, the political placards and wall posters increase and a great exasperation reigns among the workers. The National Guard is soft and indecisive and the garrison is very weak and partly demoralized."

He wrote, from Vienna, June 27, that everything was the same. There was weakness and irresolution at the top and absolute lack of political education below. Neither the government, nor the people knew what they wanted. There was anarchy everywhere. The Empire was falling apart because it lacked a single nationality. The press was in a pitiful state mistaking license for liberty.¹³

Under Frankfurt, dated June 30, he wrote that Archduke Johann had been elected as Vicar of the Empire, but he would merely be a straw man for a small clique of constitutionalists, who directed affairs there. A new revolution was coming, guided by the "inexorable force" of the idea of German unity. "Not only Johann and his clique would vanish, but also the 35 princes ruling in Germany." Germany marched inevitably toward the republic; it was only a matter of time.¹⁴

Boernstein warned, July 1, that the policy of the Prussian cabinet was for rapprochement with Russia at the expense of France with

¹³All hand-written and signed, "Henri Boernstein" in AEF, MD, All, vol. 129, pp. 21-23.

¹⁴Ibid., p. 23.

a "badly disguised distrust towards France."¹⁵ Kraetzer similarly reported, July 12, that the republican principle was making rapid progress in Germany. "The more Germany is left to herself and that France avoids giving the least slight to the existing governments of Germany, the more the monarchical system will use itself up in the battle of opinion." The friendly disposition towards France was gaining ground in spite of the efforts of the German governments to compromise it.¹⁶

Through these rose tinted glasses, Germany was on the road to the new national order. If Bastide took these reports seriously his conduct of reserve is easily explained; he thought that the world would change itself to suit France, there was no need to be too active in formulating revolt. Europe was revolutionary enough for France, and he even favored strong action in Berlin and Frankfurt to counter the more extreme "communists."¹⁷

The Assembly in Berlin was a consistent critic of the division of Poznan along national lines. Namier never mentioned this body's decision of July 4 when they appointed a commission of inquiry with full powers. Arago thought that, "That decision. . . destroys all the proposed divisions" of Poznan made until now.¹⁸

¹⁵Ibid., p. 25.

¹⁶Kraetzer-Rasserts to Bastide, Strasbourg, July 12, 1848, AEF MD, All, vol. 163, pp. 1-2.

¹⁷Hatzfeldt to Berlin, Paris, July 25, 1848, GSA, vol. 861, p. 85; September 13, 1848, vol. 863, p. 24.

¹⁸Arago to Bastide, Berlin, July 4, 1848, AEF, vol. 302, p. 142, passage underlined twice in Paris.

Arago claimed, two days later, that the inquest indicated a "happy change in the influence of France." If Poland were not now being reconstituted, at least the partitions of Poznan were being questioned. The inquest could only do good.¹⁹ Bastide was very pleased about the inquiry in Poznan, and he thought that France had done all that they could, for the present, in making Germany appreciate right and equity in the Poznan Question.²⁰

A few days later, Mieroslawski, the leader of the risings in Poznan in April and May against the Prussian army was released by Prussia. Arago thought this was significant, because it showed that the Prussians "wished to have a good solution to the affairs of the Grand Duchy."²¹

Bastide thought now that the language of the French in Berlin had had an effect on changing the opinion to one conforming more to French ideals on Poland. "The inquest ordered by the Berlin Assembly on the events in the Duchy of Poznan is the first favorable symptom" of a change. He urged Savoye to agitate in Frankfurt against the division of Poznan into German and Polish zones, to uphold justice, law, and true liberalism; Germany ought to see that it was in their real interest to reconstruct Poland.²²

Bastide hoped the instructions for the commission of inquiry in Berlin would be countered by a similar proposal in Frankfurt.

¹⁹Arago to Bastide, Berlin, July 6, 1848, AEF, vol. 302, p. 143.

²⁰Bastide to Arago, Paris, July 11, 1848, AEF, vol. 302, p. 152.

²¹Arago to Bastide, Berlin, July 15, 1848, AEF, vol. 302, p. 157.

²²Bastide to Savoye, Paris, July 21, 1848, AEF, vol. 805, p. 223.

Instead, they rejected Robert Blum's motion for such a commission 333 against, 139 for, and 85 absent; the Frankfurt Assembly then approved the division of Poznan and admitted its representatives 342 to 31 with 31 abstaining and 157 registered absent.²³ The French defeat could not have been more crushing, since Bastide had been so outspoken on the question.

The overwhelming vote in Frankfurt alarmed the Poles in Berlin, who asked Arago for the French to publish a protest against the new division of Polish territories in the newspapers. The Poles thought that an official document would favorably influence public opinion in Berlin and perhaps in Frankfurt, but the real reason was to "calm the Poles in their anguish."²⁴

Bastide saw the folly of such a document which would be interpreted in Frankfurt as a denial of the right of the Assembly to draw the borders of the German Confederation. France should say as little as possible on the question of Poznan at this time; Bastide had said more than enough before the vote in the Great Polish Debate in Frankfurt, and Frankfurt was deaf to French arguments about "liberalism," "right," and the "true interests of Germany." He wrote at the top of this despatch of Arago, "do not publish anything in the newspapers and do not warm things up."²⁵

Although Arago had warned that the election of Archduke Johann would drag Germany into the struggle with Italy, July 7,²⁶ the votes

²³Namier, 1848, p. 110.

²⁴Arago to Bastide, Berlin, July 22, 1848, AEF, vol., 302, p. 165.

²⁵Ibid.

²⁶Arago to Bastide, Berlin, July 7, 1848, AEF, vol. 302, p. 148.

on the Poznan Question showed blatantly the weakness of French influence on Frankfurt. At this time, Bastide began to fear Frankfurt's intervention in Italy in favor of Austria, and he took an interest in the Schleswig Question for the first time since before the June Days. The French saw Frankfurt's stand of the rights of the German nation in the Poznan Debate shocking. Even a paragraph protecting the nationality of Poles living in the eastern provinces of Prussia was rejected.

Bastide was disgusted with the "sorry spectacle of political morality in the questions of Schleswig and of the Grand Duchy of Poznan. . . . It is even to be feared that an exaggerated and extended view of the principle of nationality and German unity will go directly against the end that they wish." Bastide had not rejected the principle of nationality or even of German nationality of unification. He thought that the spirit shown by Frankfurt in the Poznan Question would ruin the cause of nationality in Germany and in Europe.²⁷

Arago was still optimistic "in spite of the mistakes of the Frankfurt Parliament, the separatist reaction hardly makes any progress." France still supported the unity movement in Germany. He also had a "firm hope" that the Berlin cabinet would "persist in regard to Poznan in a policy more just" than that of Frankfurt.²⁸ He advised sending a precise note to the Prussian government conforming to the protest of June 9.

Savoye attributed the vote in the Poznan Question to a

²⁷Bastide to Arago, Paris, July 31, 1848, AEF, vol. 302, p. 187.

²⁸Arago to Bastide, Berlin, August 1, 1848, AEF, vol. 302, p. 189.

compromise in the National Assembly between the Prussian party and the Austrian party. Prussia was given the extra votes of the delegates from Prussian Poznan in return for approval of the election of Archduke Johann, an Austrian, as the Vicar of the Empire. Whatever the cause, Bastide thought that the French should protest. The protest should be made in the cabinet and not publicly.

Today, that all is over, I see little timeliness to publish in the newspapers, as you recommended the representations of June 9. In the general situation of Europe and relative to other questions, that of the Duchy of Poznan is of secondary interest.²⁹

It is difficult to see how A. J. P. Taylor drew the conclusion that Bastide sent Arago to Berlin and "instructed him to drop the Polish Question and to keep quiet: 'do not publish anything in the papers and do not excite people:'"³⁰ Everything is wrong with this statement. First, these words were written on a despatch of Arago's in Paris, and not sent to him. More importantly, they only refer to the days immediately after the Polish Debate in Frankfurt, not on his arrival in Paris. His instructions in June, on the contrary, were to make a very forceful protest to Arnim, not to "drop" the question. Last, the comment belongs in the context of the danger of an intervention of the Assembly in early August in the Italian War with Austria, with the intransigence of Frankfurt in the Schleswig War, and with their behavior in the recent Polish Debate, for which Arago wished to publish an official protest in the newspapers. All that Bastide sent to Arago was the comment that now that

²⁹Bastide to Arago, Paris, August 1, 1848, AEF, vol. 302, p. 188.

³⁰A. J. P. Taylor, The Struggle for Mastery in Europe: 1848-1918, (London: Oxford University Press, 1957) p. 15

the debate was over in Frankfurt, he could see little aid for the Poles in publishing a protest, at that time.

Bastide had not lost sight of the fact that the Poles must have German help to reconstitute their nation-state. Now that it was obvious that Frankfurt was unwilling, as then constituted, to aid the Poles, a "new ally" was needed. Germany must be united to free Poland, and Prussia was the candidate, since Frankfurt had totally betrayed the national principle. Arago understood the despatch in this meaning, and reported that Prussia would rally to her the true German nationalists, who had been betrayed in the Polish Debate.

Arago disagreed with Bastide that the division of Poznan was then final, and he thought Prussia would right this wrong.

In your despatch of August 1 on the subject of the vote in Frankfurt on the Poznan question you said "today all is consummated." I do not think this is so. From the decision of the Parliament to the execution is distant, and the execution can only come from Prussia. It is more than uncertain. I believe firmly that the Grand Duchy will never be divided.³¹

Bastide was impressed with Arago's explanation of the disposition of the Berlin cabinet and National Assembly in the Poznan Question and authorized him to give the Prussian government a note in the sense of the despatch of June 9. He left to Arago the discretion to edit this note along the lines he had indicated himself. The instructions to Arago of August 1 to do nothing, for the time being, in the Polish Question were rescinded on August 16.

By August and September, the Berlin National Assembly was dominated by liberal-democrats. September 8, Arago wrote that peace

³¹Arago to Bastide, Berlin, August 4, 1848, AEF, vol. 302, p. 195.

in Schleswig had been approved in this Berlin Assembly the day before, and he spent the morning of the eighth talking with a great number of deputies of all nuances of the opposition, principally those with designs for various ministries. Arago told them "with careful reserve" of his fears from the "European point of view," and he stated that the policy of the present Prussian government of Auerswald was "preferable to Frankfurt." He said that this policy of the latter "menaced at the same time Poland and Italy."

All cried out without exception. . . . They wished to do for all Poznan the same as France, first, because it was just and right for the Poles, then because they wished to be friends of France; as for the war in Italy, in any case, they would never join Austria. They added that the policy of Frankfurt modified itself from day to day, and the Frankfurt Assembly would change from its errors, or that it will come soon under the influence of the Prussian cabinet.³²

Not only was the majority of the liberal-democratic Berlin Assembly favorable to France and Poland, but Arago wrote, September 19, that he had received a visit from General von Willisen an intimate friend of King Frederick William IV, who had been charged by him with a special mission to tell Bastide that the King would stand by his "solemn promises that he had made in the month of March."³³ Willisen had been sent because "the King would not wish the government of the French Republic to doubt his sincerity."³⁴ In September, Frederick William IV repeated to the French the promise of the reconstitution of Poland and that Prussia would be absorbed into Germany.

³²Arago to Bastide, Berlin, September 8, 1848, AEF, vol. 302, p. 261.

³³Arago to Bastide, Berlin, September 19, 1848, AEF, vol. 302, p. 289.

³⁴Ibid.

Bastide was so impressed with events in Prussia that he came to see Hatzfeldt, September 21. The Foreign Minister told him that he was interested not only in a pacific solution of the difficulties in Italy, but also in an intimate rapprochement with Prussia. He thought that Prussia should take an active part as a Great Power in Italian affairs and that France and Prussia should work together. Bastide told Hatzfeldt "I will always work in accord with you to increase the position of Prussia and augment her influence, because I am convinced that it is in the true interests of France."³⁵

Two hours later, Bastide returned to Hatzfeldt's house to meet him before they went together to see Cavaignac. They again talked intimately. Hatzfeldt concluded from the conversations that the "Minister of Foreign Affairs has the interests of Prussia at heart almost as much as a Prussian himself." Bastide said that he wished Prussia to dominate Germany and not Frankfurt.³⁶

Very confident in the support of Prussia, Bastide wrote the threatening letter to la Cour, September 26, that in case of war "Germany" would be with France against Austria.³⁷ Prussia had reiterated her promises of March, and the French policy for the reconstitution of the Polish state seemed on the verge of total victory in late September.

In October, as revolution raged in Vienna, Prussia debated

³⁵ Hatzfeldt to Berlin, Paris, September 21, 1848, GSA, vol. 863, pp. 46-47.

³⁶ Ibid.

³⁷ Bastide to la Cour, Paris, September 26, 1848, AEF, vol. 436, p. 229 bis.

the fate of her Polish provinces in a spirit not mentioned by Namier. Arago thought that Arentz, the president of the committee of inquiry for Poznan appointed by the Berlin Assembly, opposed all division of territory, and that the Assembly itself seemed favorable to his proposal. It would leave intact the territory of Poznan and recognize the right of nationality of the Poles in the Grand Duchy.³⁸

On October 23, he reported that the Assembly had rejected the annexation of part of the territory of Poznan into the German Confederation. "The line of demarcation, the annexation, partition, all resolved and voted in so violent a fashion in the Frankfurt Parliament" were rejected by Berlin. After rejecting the partition of Poznan into German and Polish zones, they voted on the Phillips Amendment:

The rights which have been recognized toward the inhabitants of the province of Poznan, since their union with Prussia are solemnly guaranteed. These rights will be regulated in the future by an organic law which will be promulgated at the same time as the constitution.³⁹

Arago was ecstatic. "We have attained the result of all our efforts. The victory is complete. . . . The Duchy of Poznan will not be German; it will remain intact for Poland. Prussia had not refused anything that France asked of it."⁴⁰

When Arago learned that Bastide had been replaced as Minister of Foreign Affairs, his first act was to write to Drouyn de Lhuys about the Poznan Question. He pointed out the partition of the

³⁸Arago to Bastide, Berlin, October 20, 1848, AEF, vol. 303, p. 41.

³⁹Arago to Bastide, Berlin, October 23, 1848, AEF, vol. 303, pp. 44-45.

⁴⁰Ibid.

territory "contrary to the treaties and against the interests of Germany," had been avoided.⁴¹ The myth that the French had no interest in Poland under Bastide must be rejected as baseless.

⁴¹Arago to Drouyn de Lhuys, Berlin, December 28, 1848, AEF, vol. 303, p. 149. Knapowska's assessment of French and Prussian policy toward Poland in 1848 is untenable, because she, Namier and C. E. Black failed to study the fate of the Polish Question after the Frankfurt Polish Debate. This gives a picture of French and Prussian intentions that is totally false.

CHAPTER XI

ECONOMIC MOTIVATION OF FRENCH POLICY IN GERMANY

The economic motivation of French policy toward Germany has been ignored in spite of the existence of long Memorandum personally edited by Bastide in the French Archives. The French were highly interested in Franco-German commerce and its growth, giving the following figures:

1841	149,500,000 Francs
1845	171,000,000 "
1846	168,500,000 " (a year of depression) ¹

The first part of the document was a history of the rise of the Zollverein and the economic thought of protectionism in Germany. It took special note that the coastal states had refused to join the Zollverein and had a privileged status controlling the mouths of rivers in Germany and were the outlets for commerce. Access to the sea had been an object of the treaty concluded with Belgium, September 1, 1844.

In recent years there had been negotiations with the United States and Brazil for the entry of German goods at reduced rates. In Germany these attempts to increase foreign commerce had caused a

¹Bastide to Savoye, Paris, August 5, 1848, AEF, correspondence commerciale, Frankfurt, III, p. 213, (hereafter cc').

heated discussion between the proponents of free trade, especially in Hamburg, and supporters of "differential duties" among those wishing to benefit German industry and commerce by diplomatic negotiations. The states of the north who were not members of the Zollverein and the Baltic provinces of Prussia were opposed to the system. The southern states were proponents of the adoption of differential duties, using to spread their propaganda the Zollvereinblatt, the Gazette of Augsbourg, and newspapers of Heidelberg and Cologne. Free trade was endorsed by the Correspondent of Hamburg, the Boersenhalle, and the Boersenliste.

In the constitutional states the debate had been carried to the chambers. Deputy Schatzle in the Bavarian chamber said, "An act of navigation and a system of differential duties would develop the direct commerce and would serve as a spur to the abilities of the maritime cities to facilitate the disposition of our manufactured products in the transatlantic countries."²

The Hamburg Correspondent replied:

Our German brothers of the maritime cities are very well placed by their intermediary commerce and are not disposed to abandon these ways whose results are certain for the advantages and commercial results; one cannot hope to seduce them in making an appeal to their patriotism, in invoking the phantom of commercial and political unity in Germany. Free trade is the order of the day and Richard Cobden is the man of the day. . . . Your words speak of commercial unity of Germany, and you only think of a Zollverein!³

The language got so violent that the Zollvereinblatt expressed the wish that the port of Hamburg be silted over! Clearly, the

²Ibid., p. 221.

³Ibid.

discussion in Germany was far from unified on the means of economic unification. However, in spite of the opposition, not only of Hanover, but also of certain south German states, according to Bastide, "public opinion was pronounced with too much energy in favor of the unitary principle for it not to triumph over all resistance."⁴

Bastide believed that the "new order" was inevitable in Germany and would necessarily triumph over economic interests which were so opposed to unification. Notice that "public opinion. . . will triumph over all resistance," not mentioning the Frankfurt Assembly. In the original draft written in July, he wrote, "Now that the unity of Germany touches at her realization;" the final form contained the same feeling of confidence in the "energy in favor of the unitary principle." The attitude in Paris is far from quixotic or dejected by the inevitability of unity in Germany.

"Interests do not in the least change for political sentiments, and one can predict now with what vivacity the struggle will renew which they proceed to organize the economic system of the great German union." France should observe how the two views of protection and free trade progressed in the debate over principles.

"But above all the industrial product with the growth of productive forces in Germany demands our attention." Bastide saw the role of the state to protect and extend the commerce of France, to extend markets by a diplomatic means. It was axiomatic to the French that the interests of France in Germany demanded a Kleindeutsch policy which would exclude Austria from the economic and political borders

⁴Ibid., pp. 225-26.

of the new German Empire. Prussia should dominate Germany because French capitalistic interests would be injured by Austrian control of the German economy.

Bastide's attention was drawn to the "vast Empire of Austria," where a protective policy had created a condition of virtual autarky, with powerful manufacturers established in Bohemia, Moravia, Styria, the Archduchy of Austria and Carinthia furnishing finished goods for the rest of the empire. Very high tariffs assured that the agricultural population of Galicia, Hungary and Lombardy-Venetia would trade with the industrial regions within the empire. The Foreign Ministry thought it "remarkable" that the division of agricultural-industrial zones was precisely those of the border of the German Confederation.⁵

Their accession to the Zollverein would have as an effect to increase the element of production and would not fail to react on the common policy of the association. In the end to assure an outlet for goods, one will naturally be led to reserve more and more of the national market for national manufacturers by raising tariffs. It is even believed that German products will be given a privileged position in the markets of Hungary and Italy. These measures would be particularly unfavorable to us.

Prussia was favored because she was more economically liberal than Austria, as well as more politically liberal. Notice the growth on French goods entering the Zollverein in 1846. The total value was 61,612,157 francs, compared to 38,142,756 francs in 1837. The total tariff on French goods in 1846 entering the Zollverein was only 220,500 francs; that is 1/3 of 1% of the total value. Compare this with the French imports from the Zollverein: in 1846, 47,885,215 francs, compared with 34,440,785 in 1837; The French charged tariffs of 5,240,412.

⁵Ibid., pp. 228-229.

The French government made a "profit" of over 5 million francs in customs duties, charging a toll of 1/9 of the value on German goods. Also, France had a very favorable balance of trade making over 13,000,000 francs, an item thought highly important in the 19th century. France shipped 18,954,864 francs worth of products to the Hanseatic cities, who were not members of the Zollverein, in 1846, paying tariffs of 26,130 francs; France imported goods worth from them 6,832,851 and took in 260,861 in tolls.⁶

The type of goods is also important. Germany was in a quasi-colonial position toward France in the first half of the 19th century; the Germans exported raw materials and imported mainly finished goods. One-quarter of the French exports to the Zollverein was silk material, another tenth was wool stuff, the next in importance were cotton material, wine, unfinished silk, leather goods and paper products. The Zollverein paid in wool, cattle, grain, coal, hair and bristles, ashes and goldsmith waste, and horses.⁷

Germany's relative importance for French commerce was constant in the first half of the century. The most important trading partners of France during the Restoration were the French colonies, Netherlands, the United States, Sardinia, Great Britain, Germany (without Prussia and Hanseatic cities), former Spanish colonies in America, and Tuscany. Austria was number 19 during the Restoration below Haiti.⁸

⁶Rudiger Renzing, Die Handelsbeziehungen zwischen Frankreich und Deutschland von der Gründung des Zollvereins bis zur Reichgründung, (Frankfurt/M., doctoral dissertation, 1959), pp. 158-64.

⁷Ibid., pp. 161-62.

⁸Ibid., p. 114.

In 1846, France had the greatest commercial exchange with the United States, Great Britian, Sardinia, Belgium, Zollverein with Hanover, Spain, Algeria, Switzerland, Russia and Turkey. Austria was not among the most important twenty trading partners of France in 1846. Not only did Austria not trade with France, but the quality products of Vienna were a very serious competitor for the "articles of Paris." Austria was an important exporter on the world luxury market.⁹

French shipping interests would have also suffered under Austrian control of the new German Empire. Bastide's memorandum gave these figures on the ships leaving and entering France from German ports.¹⁰

Total ships leaving France for		Number under French flag
Zollverein	213	12
Mecklenburg	37	1
Hanover	9	0
Schleswig-Holstein	<u>7</u>	<u>1</u>
	265	14
Total ships entering France from		
Zollverein	336	15
Mecklenburg	18	1
Hanover	3	0
Schleswig-Holstein	<u>8</u>	<u>1</u>
	365	16

¹⁰Bastide to Savoye, Paris, August 5, 1848, AEF, cc, Frankfurt, III, 230-31.

For Austria they had only the number entering and leaving Trieste. There were 71 Austrian ships and 7 French coming from Trieste into French ports; leaving French ports going to Trieste was a total of 148, of which 9 were French.

Among the Hanseatic cities, only Hamburg had a significant trade with France, but with a very different pattern for the French merchant navy. There were 141 ships leaving France for Hamburg, of which 73 were French, 4 Hamburg, and 64 various; leaving Hamburg coming to France were 90 ships, with 71 French, 7 Hamburg, and 22 from various countries. The reason was that the Hanseatic cities were the only states in Germany where the French ships were treated like those of any other country, and they had no special disadvantages. In their own parts the French ships profited from special legislation.¹¹

Bastide thought that it was easy to see the damaging results to the French navy of the adoption of an act of German navigation putting the Hanseatic ports under the same law as Austria and the Zollverein. In 1848 there were 160 French ships that carried the French flag to the Hanseatic ports; their economic position would be gravely endangered by a uniform code of navigation in Germany. This would have the effect of a surtax on French shipping.¹²

The French diplomatic agents were counseled, "We cannot lose sight of any of our essential interests, and in the presence of attacks which they seem menaced, it is a duty (devoir) of the legation to

¹¹Ibid.

¹²Ibid., p. 231.

to redouble its watchfulness and the activity of its information." French policy was deeply motivated by economic considerations. The area of greatest interest to France in 1848 was northern Italy. While Sardinia alone was the third most important French trading partner, Austria had very little commerce with France. If Venetia and Lombardy became independent with their own commercial legislation, there would be a very large potential commercial market for France.

In Germany, it was equally important to close out Austrian influence because the Austrian manufacturers would take the place of the French, and cut off a source of French raw materials. French shipping interests had more hope from Prussia where the cabinet was known to oppose subsidies for shipping,¹³ and the Hanseatic cities would have had a far greater relative importance and bargaining position in a smaller Germany than a larger. The north German ports were also very badly affected by the Schleswig-Holstein War, because the Danish were seizing German shipping and had blockaded the German ports.

The Prussians were also using commerce to gain the friendship of the French. Arago reported, August 14, that the Prussian Minister of Commerce and former President of the Assembly of Berlin had talked to him. "He told me that he would be disposed to conclude with us a great commercial treaty on all the objects of French and German factories, a treaty which, according to him, would be equally favorable

¹³Great Britain, Parliament, House of Commons, Sessional Papers, "Memorial of the Prussian Department of Trade on the question of the projected system of Differential Duties to which reference is made to the Report of the Committee of the Senate of Hamburg on that Question," 1847-48, LXI, 125-39.

to the industry of the two countries."¹⁴ At the same time they talked about Italy. The Prussian said that he hoped the French-English mediation would succeed, and added explicitly that "Prussia would be happy to cooperate in it."¹⁵

The Prussians asked to be brought actively into the mediation between Vienna and Turin at the same time that they made overtures on the possibility of a commercial treaty of gigantic proportions, in effect, making France a member of the Zollverein! Prussia also made the French realize the importance of Germany by enacting a special duty on French goods which amounted to the same amount as the export subsidy the French National Assembly voted June 10.¹⁶

Without a doubt, commercial interests exerted an effect on French policy; it is impossible to say in what degree, other than that business was very closely noticed in Paris by the Foreign Minister personally. He was especially interested in the Zollverein surtax which had off-set the French export subsidy on manufactured articles and he instructed Arago to proceed with the discussions of commercial treaty. But economics is not the only factor in politics; Arago wrote:

¹⁴Arago to Bastide, Berlin, August 14, 1848, AEF, cc, Berlin, IX, p. 117.

¹⁵Arago to Bastide, Berlin, August 14, 1848, AEF, vol. 302, p. 211.

¹⁶Arago to Bastide, Berlin, August 2, 1848, AEF, cc, Berlin IX, 112; Bastide to Arago, Paris, August 31, 1848, IX, 119-20; September 30, 1848, IX, 124, December 9, 1848, IX, 138-39; Renzing, p. 42.

The Legation of the Republic has not lost view for an instant all that could interest our commercial relations with Germany and particularly with Prussia. You know. . . that in the state of fermentation and travail which operates in Germany and the grave circumstances in Prussia, political interests dominate commercial questions.¹⁷

¹⁷Arago to Bastide, Berlin, October 4, 1848, AEF, cc, Berlin, IX, .127. The French definitely thought that the German actions were economically motivated. During the most important crisis of the Frankfurt Assembly, the debate on the armistice of Malmö, Tallenay thought that the south Germans voted to continue the war, because it was good for business, while the north Germans were for peace, because it was damaging their commerce. Tallenay to Bastide, Frankfurt, September 14, 1848, AEF, vol. 806, p. 23.

CHAPTER XII

KLEINDEUTSCH OR GROSSDEUTSCH?

In the fall of 1848, the question in Frankfurt as well as France was "Kleindeutsch", a unification of Germany under Prussia without Austria, or a return to the loose federal form of the German Confederation which would include the German parts of the Austria, a "Grossdeutsch" solution to the German problem. France supported Prussia because of her stands in Schleswig, Italy and Poland, and for French commercial interests. France favored Berlin, because her Assembly was the most democratic in Germany. They hoped that she would pressure Vienna to prevent the necessity of a French-Austrian confrontation in Italy.

Bastide as well as Bismarck understood that Austria must be given a new "mission" to replace her traditional position in Italy and Germany. Bastide spoke with the Austrian chargé, August 22, of the new role of Austria, professing the friendship of France as much as Lamartine had before him. He first spoke about the principle of nationality which had been recently abused as a political program. He complained of the way the principle of nationality had been misused by Frankfurt. France did not wish for all the powers which constituted Germany to be absorbed in that country.

We wish a Prussia, a Saxony, a Bavaria; we wish above all an Austria, an Austria strong not only in Germany, but also in the east, where she is called to develop her riches and her power; it is on that side that we wish that she move back her frontiers, making herself the mistress of all the inferior course of the Danube and extending her possessions to the Black Sea. If the cabinet of Vienna would wish to give this tendency to her policy, it can count on the sincere and energetic support of France.¹

This is the same proposal that Lamartine had made to Apponyi the first of May and the mediation in Italy had failed to alter the main line of the French-Austrian policy. The policy was also suggested in a letter from August Picard, which was specifically aimed against Russia, since the revolution was "an anti-Russian movement."²

In the debates of Frankfurt, in late October, for a larger and smaller German state, Bastide was pleased by the reserve that Tallenay had maintained in Frankfurt. "The diverse and often unforeseen events of which Germany has been the theater" made it necessary to use "the greatest circumspection." France had to be careful:

not to wound the opinion that in Frankfurt tries to constitute a German unity. That opinion has some respectability in that it reposes, at least in part, in the interests of the people. On the other hand, we will risk giving offense to a force that does not concern the interests of France. We should leave Germany alone. . . . I believe, in effect, that Frankfurt has lost much of the force of initiative and centralization.³

Henceforth there would no longer be a serious rivalry between Berlin

¹Thom to Wessenberg, Paris, August 23, 1848, HHSA, VIII, p. 184.

²August Picard, "Note sur la Russie et l'Autriche," June 21, 1848, AEF, MD, Russie, vol. 43, p. 344.

³Bastide to Tallenay, Paris, November 2, 1848, AEF, vol. 806, p. 174.

and Vienna, because of the recent events in using the troops of General Windischgraetz. "I think, however, that Austria has ceased from now on (dés à présent) to be able to be considered as a German power."⁴

The Bohemians and Croats had put down the insurrection in Vienna "more for their profit than for the advantage of the old empire." Dependent of Jellavich, Austria "can no longer be more than a slavish power, and she seems to me to have lost all chance to exercise a preponderance in Germany." This meant two things, Prussia would not fail to extend her domination over southern Germany. The second was that Austria, being for all purposes a slavish country, would in conflict with Russia, who wished to use Pan Slavism to extend her influence into western Europe.

Austria, having lost her German character, can no longer count on the German Confederation to aid her in maintaining her pretensions in Italy; under these different points of view, it indicates that the present state of things is favorable to French policy.⁵

Arago wrote that the separation of Austria and Germany was evident. Windischgraetz had intentionally killed Robert Blum, a deputy of the Frankfurt Assembly, after the revolt in Vienna to alienate Frankfurt. "Austria is a slavish empire. I regarded this transformation for a long time as a necessary fact."⁶

With the decline of Austria, in French estimation, the French

⁴Ibid.

⁵Ibid., 174-75.

⁶Arago to Bastide, Berlin, November 18, 1848, AEF. vol. 303. p. 111.

awaited the Prussians to take supreme control of southern Germany as they controlled the north.⁷ This process had increased the influence of France.

Germany was no longer a federation of kings, sovereigns and absolute princes; it is the peoples who know and want liberty, who will never suffer a war of principle to be fought against France. So prudent, so restrained, so moderate, until now, France would have an invincible force . . . taking in hand the flag of propaganda and saying to Europe that the French army had no other watchword than the emancipation of peoples.⁸

As Louis-Napoleon came to power, Tallenay reported that the Frankfurt Assembly had lost all force in Germany. "In the present circumstances it cannot live, but it does not wish to die."⁹

Arago was dejected in Berlin.

Oh, if he [Frederick William IV] had wished to follow the advice of the men who sometimes counseled him, if he had conserved the Prussian Assembly, if he had chosen his ministers from the benches of that Assembly, he would already have in his hands the government of the Empire. Prussia would lead the German Empire, and Germany would be our necessary ally. But he has made mistakes and done otherwise, but all is not lost.¹⁰

Arago thought that the election of a liberal chamber in February, 1849 was the hope of "all intelligent men, the partisans of a French alliance." Those who supported Frederick William IV as

⁷Tallenay to Bastide, Frankfurt, November 5, 1848, AEF, vol. 806, p. 180-82; November 8, 1848, vol. 806, pp. 187-88.

⁸Arago to Bastide, Berlin, November 25, 1848, vol. 303, p. 315.

⁹Tallenay to Bastide, Frankfurt, December 21, 1848, AEF, vol. 608, p. 315.

¹⁰Arago to Paris, Berlin, December 21, 1848, vol. 303, p. 146.

the administrator of the German Empire were asking simply for a German Council, a council of states, a restoration of the old Diet. "Germany does not wish that restoration."¹¹

As Louis-Napoleon was installed as President of the Republic, a phase in French history closed, the rule of foreign affairs by Bastide and Lamartine, "ideological republicans" who favored German unity for philosophical and economic reasons. Their principal goal had been the national reorganization of central Europe, with Austria to be given a new role with Poland as slavie barriers to the expansion of Russia to the west. With the slavie Austrian Empire extended to control the mouth of the Danube, Russia would be closed-off from the Balkans.

Bastide based his policy on optimistic reports of conditions in Germany, and his opposition to Frankfurt was caused by a feeling that it was "betraying" the German nation, not that the German nation had betrayed France. Above all, Prussia and a Kleindeutsch policy which excluded the German portions of Austria and Bohemia was seen as favorable to French interests. The use of force in Germany was contemplated only to aid unification, never to hinder it. The misconceptions of Erich Marcks, Alexander Scharff and Kurt von Raumer are historically untenable.¹²

¹¹Ibid.

¹²cf. Alexander Scharff, "König Friedrich Wilhelm IV.," pp. 165-66.

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