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BY

PAUL ROGER HOOPES

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SOCIOPOLITICAL CHANGE IN THE "URBAN LITORAL" OF ARGENTINA

APPROVED BY:

Richard D. Baker

Olivier Burman

A. V. Kondrashov

Harry Tolbert

Fred B. Silverstein

DISSERTATION COMMITTEE

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CHAPTER I

SOCIOPOLITICAL CHANGE IN THE "URBAN LITORAL" OF ARGENTINA

Accelerated by an increasing industrialization-urbanization trend, new social and institutional forms are emerging in Latin America, in which new social classes and interest groups are achieving and consolidating an expanding share of political power. This phenomenon of sociopolitical change is the subject of inquiry to which this study is dedicated.

The Problem

An increased interest in the "chemistry" and process of political and social change on the part of Latin Americanists is noted.[1] In viewing

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[1]A. Curtis Wilgus, "The Chemistry of Political Change in Latin America," The Annals, CCXLII (July, 1962), pp. 42-51; Claudio Veliz (ed.), Obstacles to Change in Latin America (London: Oxford University, 1965); Kalman H. Silvert, "Political Change in Latin America," The United States and Latin America, The American Assembly (New York: Columbia University, 1959), pp. 59-79; _____, The Conflict Society, Reaction and Revolution in Latin America (New York: American Universities Field Staff, Inc., 1966 edition), chapter 2; George I. Blanksten, "The Politics of Latin America," The Politics of the Developing Areas, Gabriel A. Almond and James S. Coleman (eds.), (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1960), pp. 455-531; Council on Foreign Relations, Social Change in Latin America Today (New York: Harper, 1960); William V. D'Antonio and Fredrick B. Pike (eds.), Religion, Revolution, and Reform: New Forces for Change in Latin America (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1964); John V. D. Saunders, Social Factors in Latin American Modernization (Nashville, Tennessee: Vanderbilt University, 1965); J. B. Maier and R. W. Weatherhead (eds.), Politics of Change in Latin America (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1964); John D. Habron, Crisis and Change in Latin America (Toronto, Canada: Canadian Institute of International Affairs,

this growing collection of research and publications on social and political change in Latin America, it is evident that many significant factors have been discovered and elaborated.[2] But, to the knowledge of the researcher, no satisfactory diagrammatic model has yet been

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1960); Mildred Adams (ed.), Latin America: Evolution or Explosion? (New York: Dodd, Mead and Company, 1963); etc.

[2]Review the bibliography cited by Merle Kling, "The State of Research on Latin America: Political Science," Social Science Research in Latin America, ed. Charles Wagley (New York: Columbia University Press, 1964), pp. 168-213. See particularly the various writings of Kenneth F. Johnson: "Ideological Correlates of Right-Wing Political Alienation in Mexico," The American Political Science Review, LIX (September, 1965), pp. 656-664; "Political Alienation in Mexico: A Preliminary Examination of UNS and PAN," The Rocky Mountain Social Science Journal, II (May, 1965), pp. 155-165; "Causal Factors in Latin American Political Instability," The Western Political Quarterly, XVII (September, 1964), pp. 432-446, and see also Russell H. Fitzgibbon and Kenneth F. Johnson, "Measurement of Latin American Political Change," The American Political Science Review, LV (September, 1961), pp. 515-526; Alan Angell, "Party Systems in Latin America," The Political Quarterly, XXXVII (July-September, 1966), pp. 309-323; _____, "The Study of Latin American Politics," Political Studies, XII (October, 1964), pp. 389-394; Robert L. Peterson, "Social Structure and the Political Process in Latin America: A Methodological Re-examination," The Western Political Quarterly, XVI (December, 1963), pp. 885-896; Peter Heintz, "Research Models for Latin America," International Social Science Journal, XV (Nov. 4, 1963), pp. 528-541; John D. Martz, "Dilemmas in the Study of Latin American Political Parties," The Journal of Politics, XXVI (August, 1964), pp. 509-531; Gabriel A. Almond, "Political Systems and Political Change," The American Behavioral Scientist, VI (June, 1963), pp. 3-10; Merle Kling, "Towards a Theory of Power and Political Instability in Latin America," The Western Political Quarterly, IX (March, 1956), pp. 21-35; Kalman H. Silvert, "National Values, Development, and Leaders and Followers: A Summary Statement of Theory, Some Research, and Some Implications," International Social Science Journal XV (Nov. 4, 1963), pp. 560-570; Irving Louis Horowitz, Three Worlds of Development: The Theory and Practice of International Stratification (New York: Oxford University Press, 1966), chapter 14; Germán Arciniegas, "Twentieth-Century Political Trends in Latin America," Cahiers d'Histoire Mondiale, VIII (Nov. 2, 1964), pp. 5-16; Paul H. Deutschmann and John T. McNelly, "Characteristics of Latin American Countries," The American Behavioral Scientist, VIII (September, 1964), pp. 25-29; and Norman E. Whitten, Jr., "Power Structure and Socio-cultural Change in Latin American Communities," Social Forces, XLII (March, 1965), pp. 320-329.

contrived for the total analysis of sociopolitical change in a Latin American context. Nor has any such visual model been coordinated with a set of quantitative measurements.

Objectives of the Study

It will be the over-all objective of this study to develop an organizational framework, with complementary methods of measurement, for describing, recording, testing, and theorizing about sociopolitical change in one specific country and region of Latin America, viz., in the "urban Litoral" of Argentina.[3] To this end, the entire work is directed. Hence, a preliminary model, with a complementary set of measures, is given at the outset and is explained in Chapter II, "The Framework and Procedures for Analysis." Then, toward the end of this study, in the concluding chapter, the original framework and its methodological correlates will be criticized and revised to fit the needs of a more realistic and appropriate approach to the study of the problem.

Apart from this over-all objective, the study has five other objectives: 1) to describe the basic structures and issues involved in sociopolitical change for the chief social classes, political-influence groups, and governments (national, provincial, and municipal) of the country, with special focus on the "urban Litoral"; 2) to test for social participation, anomie, and alienation among selected groups

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[3]The meaning and usage of the geographical designation, "urban Litoral," is discussed in the next section of this chapter, page 6.

of Argentine subjects in order to determine a) the degree of participation, anomie, and alienation which the subjects exemplify and b) the effectiveness of North American measures when used in a Latin American cultural setting; 3) to identify and measure some of the major belief systems and attitudes that influence social and political relations in Argentina; 4) to categorize and elaborate upon the various stabilizers (inputs of support or stability) and pressures (inputs of stress or demands) that either advance or threaten the stable continuation of the Argentine political system; and 5) to recommend new measures and approaches that will more effectively achieve all the antecedent objectives.

Hypotheses of the Study

One of the major emphases of this study is on the attitudes and participation of three different Argentine socioeconomic classes: the lower, lower middle, and upper middle classes. In measuring the attitudes and participation of these three classes, it is theorized that the key variables are socioeconomic status, anomie, political alienation, and social participation, and that these four variables are all interrelated. Accordingly, it is hypothesized that a low socioeconomic status, especially the environmental influences which such status entails, is likely to produce anomie and political alienation, which bear negatively on social participation and stifle social activity. In the study of socioeconomic groups in the "urban Litoral" of Argentina, anomie and political alienation are assumed to be related to,

or, positioned as two intervening variables between, socioeconomic status and social participation.[4]

To carry this hypothesis one step further, it can be theorized that the socioeconomic status and the levels of alienation, anomie, and participation of a person, especially of a resident of Argentina's "urban Litoral," will chiefly influence or determine his political participation and attitudes. However, because the number of subjects in this study is relatively small, no attempt will be made to establish statistically the relationship between the four measured variables--socioeconomic status, anomie, political alienation, and social participation--and political participation and attitudes.

Returning to the "two intervening variables," anomie and political alienation, it is observed that these two variables influence individual and group behavior in both political and social spheres. Hence it is hypothesized that anomic and politically alienated persons will not be participating much socially, in either formal or informal associations; in either society or politics. In this respect it is hypothesized that "persons of low socioeconomic activity are prone to withdraw from political activity." Next, it is held that political alienation, as measured in this study, is the reflection of a more general kind of alienation or anomie. This means that a correlation is expected to exist

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[4]Wayne E. Thompson and John E. Horton, "Political Alienation as a Force in Political Action," Social Forces, XXXVIII (March, 1960), pp. 190-195; Edward L. McDill and Jeanne Clare Ridley, "Status, Anomie, Political Alienation, and Political Participation," The American Journal of Sociology, LXVII (September, 1962), pp. 205-213; Frederic Templeton, "Alienation and Political Participation: Some Research Findings," The Public Opinion Quarterly, XXX (Summer, 1966), pp. 249-261.

between anomie and political alienation and that each individual, having been tested as being anomic will similarly test as being politically alienated. Finally, following the logic that "political alienation involves not only apathy as a response to political powerlessness but also a general distrust of political leaders who are the wielders of this power,"[5] it can be assumed that alienated respondents will react negatively toward the local and national governments and all identifiable holders of political and economic power.

The Focus of the Study

To study more effectively and concretely the problem of socio-political change, it is advantageous to focus upon the regions of greatest demographic concentration wherein increasing urbanization has raised social, economic, and political activity to ever greater levels of criticality. One of the most important economic and political regions in all Latin America is certainly the "Litoral" of Argentina, historically comprising the present-day provinces of Buenos Aires, Santa Fe, Entre Ríos, and Corrientes.[6] While some academicians view the "Litoral" region even more restrictively,[7] this study will compromise between the two views and consider the three provinces of Buenos Aires, Santa Fe, and Entre Ríos as comprising the "Litoral" and the four cities of Buenos Aires (Buenos Aires province), Rosario (Santa Fe province), Santa Fe (Santa

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[5]McDill and Ridley, ibid., pp. 206-207.

[6]Aldo Ferrer, La economía argentina, las etapas de su desarrollo y problemas actuales (Buenos Aires: Fondo de Cultura Económica, 1965), p. 40.

[7]Marcelo Isacovich, Argentina, económica y social (Buenos Aires: Editorial Quipo, 1965), pp. 272-273, designates only the two provinces of Buenos Aires and Santa Fe as comprising the "Litoral" region.

Fe province), and Paraná (Entre Ríos province) as the "urban" focus within the "Litoral" region. These four cities border on the Plate River, referred to in Spanish as the Río de la Plata, and constitute the greatest urban concentration in all Latin America. Map 1 shows the geographical location of the three provinces and their cities which constitute, for this study, the "urban Litoral."

Apart from its geographical focus, the study has a time-space focus. Its beginning is pinpointed precisely on June 28, 1966, the day of the military coup which ousted President Arturo Illia. Its date of termination is just as precise: December 14, 1966, date of the general labor strike called by the Confederación General de Trabajo (General Labor Confederation), which event was, up to that time, the most seriously and generally manifested opposition directed at the new national government. That the study concentrates on this six-month period (June 28-December 14, 1966) is quite significant. Foremost, it is a period which represents a clear separation from the social and political past and which establishes a definite orientation toward future sociopolitical phenomena. In this period every significant segment of society expresses dissatisfaction with the sociopolitical past and pronounces in favor of revolution and reform. Furthermore, during most of this period, little if any dissatisfaction is expressed or demonstrated against the deposing of President Illia and the suppressing of the political parties. Even toward the end of the period (in December of 1966), the opposition which is expressed against the national government is not over the ideas--progress, modernization, and change--of the Revolution but over the means by which these ideas are to be achieved. But perhaps most important of

all is that the time-space focus of this study proves particularly relevant in the application of the methodology outlined in the next chapter.

Limitations of the Study

This proposed research may suffer from but should not be too seriously hampered by, in the words of Kenneth F. Johnson, "the problem of instrument construction in the Spanish vernacular."[8] While difficulties in translation and meaning normally exist in any study of this type there are also problems related to whether this particular schema will be sufficiently "culture free" to be valid for cross-national use.[9] This latter problem will necessitate some changes in the original scale items destined for use in the research.

The focus of this study, as already noted, covers a large area of investigation but its methodological parameters are rather narrow. Ideally, a whole team of researchers could have been engaged for a considerably longer period of time than for the three-month period during which just the researcher gathered material. Too, it must be admitted that, although this approach claims to be a comprehensive one, the limitations imposed by time and lack of personal resources ensure that not all the important variables were tested and not all the relevant issues were explored.

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[8]Johnson, "Ideological Correlates of Right-Wing Political Alienation in Mexico," op. cit., p. 661.

[9]Arnold M. Rose, "Prejudice, Anomie, and the Authoritarian Personality," Sociology and Social Research, L (January, 1966), pp. 141-147, in testing T. W. Adorno's "authoritarian personality" scale and Leo Srole's "anomia" scale among lower-class workers in Italy, found that the former scale was "practically useless for making international comparisons" and noted certain other problems, too, in applying the latter scale, except for comparing in-groups.

Definitions of Terms Used

It is deemed advisable at this point to define the meaning and usage of the key terms that will be used extensively throughout this paper.

Sociopolitical change. As the key term in the title of this work and as the most commonly used term throughout this study, "sociopolitical change" deserves some kind of definition. "Sociopolitical" is a compound word that combines "social" and "political" and describes or refers to both the "Litoral" society and the political system of Argentina. But the use of this term in describing the political and social orders of the country will not be restricted in this study to political and social phenomena exclusively, rather a wide number of changes, e.g., changes in the national economy, will be examined if these changes influence in any way the political system (the decisionmakers and national authorities) or the social system (the commonly viewed social classes in their stratified distributions). Thus, any change which affects the political authorities or the social classes of Argentina's "urban Litoral" will be regarded as a "sociopolitical change."

The political system. Another key term in this study of sociopolitical change is the "political system." In this study, the term, "political system," will be used rather narrowly to denote only the persons who are or who could be called the "decisionmaking authorities" and the procedures and processes of decisionmaking themselves. All other elements--the political-influence groups, including the political parties; the national, provincial, and municipal

administrations which perform public functions and execute the policies decided upon by the decisionmaking authorities; and all the variables proceeding from "the total environment," including juridical and legalistic factors--will be considered as lying outside the "political system." In the "Urban Litoral" three levels of political systems exist (national, provincial, and municipal) and each one is composed of top-ranking government officials who sit in policy meetings and determine what actions if any should be taken in the geographic jurisdiction over which they rule.

Anomie. Another widely used term in this study is "anomie," which is French and means the same as the English "anomy" and the Spanish "anomia." It first appeared in English in 1591 and was in frequent use during the seventeenth century, particularly in its French spelling. It was introduced into the social sciences and popularized by Durkheim, the French sociologist, in his study on suicide. In general usage it has three meanings: 1) personal disorganization and disorientation, 2) a social situation in which norms are in conflict, and 3) a social situation in which no norms exist--a state of "anarchy."[10] In more recent usage it has acquired the dimensions of isolation (self-estrangement), normlessness, and powerlessness (system dissociation).[11] However, some

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[10]Julius Gould and William L. Kolb (eds.), A Dictionary of the Social Sciences (New York: The Free Press, 1965 edition), p. 29.

[11]Rose, loc. cit.; Wendell Bell, "Anomie, Social Isolation, and the Class Structure," Sociometry, XX (June, 1957), pp. 105-106; Elwin H. Powell, "The Evolution of the American City and the Emergence of Anomie," The British Journal of Sociology, XIII (June, 1962), pp. 156-162. The different dimensions of "anomie" are shown diagrammatically in F. B. Waisanen, "Stability, Alienation, and Change," The Sociological Quarterly, IX (Winter, 1963), pp. 24-25.

scholars in the social sciences use another term, "anomia,"[12] which in any event is not significantly different.

For this study, "anomie" will be used in referring to any or all of the preceding social situations, namely, ones in which there exist 1) a personal disorganization or disorientation, 2) a self-estrangement or isolation, 3) a sense of normlessness, 4) a feeling of powerlessness or system dissociation, and 5) a conflict of norms. The term will describe individual attitudes toward life in general but not toward any one person or entity in particular. An individual who is said to be anomic will have a general feeling of despair, estrangement, and powerlessness; and his own values will either not exist or will be in conflict with the ones that are commonly accepted by his society.

Political alienation. Whereas the term "anomie" describes a state of general feelings, the term "alienation" refers to a more specific "estrangement or separation between parts or the whole of the personality and significant aspects of the world experience." Its usage in the social sciences was most notably established by the socialist theory of Karl Marx and the sociology of Sigmund Freud. In Marxian theory, an individual is alienated from his work by the systems of economic production and class domination. This alienation or separation from his work and the products of his work results also in the individual's being alienated from nature and himself. "Freud was aware

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[12]Leo Srole, "Social Integration and Certain Corollaries: An Exploratory Study," American Sociological Review, XXI (December, 1956), pp. 709-716; Dorothy L. Meier and Wendell Bell, "Anomie and Differential Access to the Achievement of Life's Goals," American Sociological Review XXIV (April, 1959), pp. 190-191; McDill and Ridley, loc. cit.

that the demands of social structure hostile to the core of the self could be made worse by the existence of class domination."[13] Thus, in the broadest sense, "political alienation" can mean the separation or estrangement between an individual and his objective political world or between the individual and aspects of his political self. An individual who is alienated from his political environment, then, is separated or estranged from it.

The measurement of the level of "political alienation" of certain groups and classes of individuals is presently the object of a number of studies.[14]

For this study, "political alienation" will have three meanings. It will be used in the first sense to designate the disaffection, negative feelings, or dissatisfactions that an individual or an entire socio-economic class may express with regard to local municipal government and the public employes with whom the mass population of the region locally deals. A special scale will be used to measure the level of this sum of

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[13]Gould and Kolb, op. cit., p. 19.

[14]See Johnson, "Causal Factors in Latin American Political Instability," op. cit., p. 435; Marvin E. Olsen, "Alienation and Political Opinions," The Public Opinion Quarterly, XXIX (Summer, 1965), pp. 201-202; Thompson and Horton, op. cit., p. 195; Dwight G. Dean, "Alienation and Political Apathy," Social Forces, XXXVIII (March, 1960), pp. 185-186; Melvin Seeman, "On the Meaning of Alienation," American Sociological Review, XXIV (December, 1959), pp. 784-791; Arthur G. Neal and Salomon Rettig, "Dimensions of Alienation among Manual and Non-manual Workers," American Sociological Review, XXVIII (August, 1963), pp. 599-608; Louis A. Zucher, Jr., Arnold Meadows, and Susan Lee Zurcher, "Value Orientation, Role Conflict, and Alienation from Work: A Cross-Cultural Study," American Sociological Review, XXX (August, 1965), pp. 539-548; Johnson, "Political Alienation in Mexico: A Preliminary Examination of UNS and PAN," loc. cit.; Melvin Seeman, "Alienation, Membership, and Political Knowledge: A Comparative Study," Public Opinion Quarterly, XXX (Fall, 1966), pp. 353-367.

dissatisfactions and negative feelings concerning the local bureaucracy. In the second and more ordinary sense, "political alienation" will mean political estrangement, separation, or isolation. In the third and less usual sense, "political alienation" will mean either "political extremism" or a predisposition that may lead to political extremism. Political extremism is found in both the attitudes and acts of individuals or groups who advocate and use violence in disseminating their ideologies, in effecting disruptive changes in national life and in implementing revolutionary programs.[15] The predisposition toward political extremism lies in the expression and demonstration of personal dissatisfaction with or displeasure at certain acts of government and forms of national life on the one hand and the realization on the other hand that constitutional and other less-violent means will not achieve the changes in government or national life that are desired.[16] To describe a condition short of political extremism or near political extremism (a predisposition toward political extremism), the term "political disaffection" will be used.[17]

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[15]This third meaning of "political alienation" is essentially given in Johnson, "Ideological Correlates of Right-Wing Political Alienation in Mexico," op. cit., p. 657.

[16]So long as an individual or group believes that his or its goals can be achieved through constitutional and legitimate means, neither is considered to be "politically alienated." A state of "political alienation" exists once it is determined that violent or seditious behavior must be used. The individual or group that uses violence and tension is definitely considered to be "politically alienated."

[17]"Political disaffection" will refer to any kind of individual or collective dissatisfactions which criticize the government, the economy, the society, and the specific actors and forces within the same. To the knowledge of the researcher there is no precedent to justify adoption of the term. Professor Johnson uses disaffection synonymously

Other Terms

Other terms which need definition are "total environment"; the new social-group designations: "elite society," "mass society," and "marginal society"; the political-group designations: "interest groups," "pressure groups," and "tension groups"; and, the terms, "stabilizers" and "pressures." These terms will be defined as they each appear in the text of the study.

Organization of the Dissertation

In approaching the problem, conducting the research, and reporting the results of this study, ten chapters will follow: Chapter II, "The Framework and Procedures for Analysis"; Chapter III, "The Total Environment"; Chapter IV, "The Funnel of Social-Class Interests"; Chapter V, "The Funnel of Political-Group Interests"; Chapter VI, "The Funnel of Governing Interests"; Chapter VII, "Alienation and Participation"; Chapter VIII, "Attitudes and Belief Systems"; Chapter IX, "The Receiving Political System"; Chapter X, "The Responding Political System"; and Chapter XI, "The Changing Society and Political System: Conclusion."

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with alienation in "Causal Factors in Latin American Political Instability," loc. cit.; but, its use in this paper will be to specify conditions of dissatisfaction which are non-violent and non-seditious. Its dimensions embrace, in addition to personal dissatisfaction and displeasure, unfriendliness and disloyalty toward and discontent and unhappiness with certain persons and aspects of national life.

CHAPTER II

THE FRAMEWORK AND PROCEDURES FOR ANALYSIS

The "Old School" Latin Americanists employ three principal approaches--descriptive, institutional, and foreign-policy--to the study of Latin American phenomena, none of which, in the estimation of one "New School" Latin Americanist, "has proved adequate for a full and sophisticated comprehension of Latin American politics."[1] In the wake of this apparent dissatisfaction with the traditional approaches, there is a new behavioral and sociological approach to the study of Latin America, emerging for the first time among the comparative government specialists on Latin America.[2] This new empirically oriented, behavioral school is tending to adapt a variety of approaches to the study of Latin American politics and to reject the historical-institutional-legal approach. In opposition to this tendency, Professor Merle Kling warns against the wholesale adoption of "a variety of approaches"[3] and another Latin Americanist urges the retention of the more traditional

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[1]Robert L. Peterson, op. cit., pp. 885-886.

[2]See Merle Kling, "The State of Research on Latin America: Political Science," Social Science Research on Latin America, Charles Wagley, ed. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1964), pp. 168-213, especially p. 207.

[3]Merle Kling, "Area Studies and Comparative Politics," The American Behavioral Scientist, VIII (September, 1964), p. 11.

approach because it provides "a frame of reference of great value for further investigation."[4]

While the researcher classifies himself among the behavioralists and agrees with the critics of the traditional methods, he is disenchanted with the group with which he identifies because it has not yet, to his knowledge, produced anything. In effect, it appears from the perspective of the researcher that neither traditional nor behavioral methods can yield by themselves "a full and sophisticated comprehension of Latin American politics" and that what is needed is to achieve some sort of balance between the two approaches. Accordingly, it will be the approach of this study to use behavioral measures and to complement these measures with an adequate amount of historical and descriptive data.[5]

The Model of Sociopolitical Change

The outline or framework of this study is summarized in the diagrammatic model of sociopolitical change on the next page. This so-called model of sociopolitical change combines five conceptions in its structural appearance: 1) Samuel H. Beer's identification of the four variables--political culture, the pattern of power, the pattern of interests, and the pattern of policy--of a political system;[6] 2) David

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[4]Frank Jay Moreno, "The Traditional and the Behavioral," The American Behavioral Scientist, VIII (September, 1964), p. 5.

[5]"An adequate amount of historical and descriptive data" will be that amount needed to complete a meaningfull discussion of all the problems appearing in the succeeding chapters.

[6]Samuel H. Beer, "The Four Variables of a Political System" in Samuel H. Beer and Adam B. Ulam (eds.) Patterns of Government: the Major Political Systems of Europe (New York: Random House, 1962 edition),

FIGURE 2

MODEL OF SOCIOPOLITICAL CHANGE



Easton's conceptualization of political life as a system of activity which is maintained by inputs of demands and supports that are converted into outputs by the political system;[7] 3) "the need to describe what it is that lies outside of a system," viz., the total environment lying outside the structural order of a political system, as exemplified in Easton's model and in several area studies that have been done by native Argentine researchers;[8] 4) Torcuato S. Di Tella's models of social and

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pp. 32-63. The two funnels (the Funnel of Political-Group Interests and the Funnel of Governing Interests), the political-culture chamber (attitudes and belief systems), and the responding chamber for the political system, all pictured in Diagram 1, represent the four variables that Professor Beer discusses.

[7]David Easton, "An Approach to the Analysis of Political Systems," World Politics, IX (April, 1957), pp. 383-400; _____, A Framework for Political Analysis, loc. cit.; _____, A Systems Analysis of Political Life, loc. cit.

[8]Easton, "An Approach to the Analysis of Political Systems," World Politics, ibid.; _____, A Framework for Political Analysis, ibid., pp. i-xiv, 57, 59-76; _____, A Systems Analysis of Political Life, ibid., pp. 21-33, 54-56. Also see Albert Miester, Susana Petruzzi, and Elda Sonzogni, Tradicionalismo y cambio social. Estudio de área en el valle de Santa María (Rosario, Argentina: Facultad de Filosofía y Letras, Universidad Nacional del Litoral, 1963), pp. 77-86, 55-72; Instituto de Planeamiento Regional y Urbano, Plan director de Paraná. Análisis sub regional, 3 volumes (Rosario, Argentina: Facultad de Ciencias Matemáticas, Universidad Nacional del Litoral, 1963), I, pp. 1-67, II; _____, Análisis sectoral de la provincia de Entre Ríos, 3 volumes (Rosario, Argentina: _____, 1964), II, "Infraestructura"; José Luis de Imaz, Estructura social de una ciudad pampena, 2 volumes (La Plata, Argentina: Facultad de Humanidades y Ciencias de la Educación, Universidad Nacional de la Plata, 1965), I, II; Delbert C. Miller, Eva Chamorro Greca, and Juan Carlos Agulla, De la industria al poder (Buenos Aires: Ediciones Libera, 1966), pp. 9-53; Alejandro Rofman et. al., Bases para un estudio sobre la estructura económica de Rosario y su zona de influencia (Rosario, Argentina: Facultad de Ciencias Económicas, Comerciales y Políticas, Universidad Nacional del Litoral, 1966), pp. 28-33 (Mimeographed); Clara E. Badler et. al., Determinación de regiones homogéneas y áreas de abastecimiento de productos perecederos mediante métodos de análisis multivariados (Rosario, Argentina: _____, 1966), pp. 4-8 (Mimeographed); Néstor J. Castagnola and Arnoldo R. Rosenfeld, Estudio sobre la diversificación industrial en tres departamentos

political processes during the industrialization process for different Latin American countries;[9] and 5) Irving Louis Horowitz's view of processes and structures in which "that portion of social facts concerned with processes refers to changes in class, power, occupation, and prestige."[10]

There are two aspects concerning the model or sociopolitical change that should be discussed: the structural and functional aspects of the model.

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de la provincia de Santa Fe (Rosario, Argentina: _____, 1966), pp. 1-4. (Mimeographed.); Ana Rosa Centeno, "Los partidos políticos en la provincia de Santa Fe" (unpublished manuscript, Instituto de Derecho Público y Ciencias Sociales, Universidad Nacional del Litoral, 1966), pp. 1-32. All these studies, although reporting on specific aspects of social and political change, devote a modest portion of their space to elaborate ecological, demographical, and economic data, as well as data about religious institutions, public health, hygiene, foodstuffs, agriculture, industry, transportation, income, land ownership, etc. These environmental factors are condensed into eight groups of so-called "environmental components" and are dispersed around the outer perimeter in Diagram 1.

[9]Torcuato S. Di Tella, "Los procesos políticos y sociales de la industrialización," Desarrollo Económico, II (October-December, 1962), pp. 19-48, 38-40. In his study of the social and political processes of industrialization, Torcuato S. Di Tella used a model in the form of a pyramid in order to illustrate in graphic form the major different types of sociological structures that are possible at various stages of industrialization. Countries at the same industrial level as Argentina were shown with a 60 per cent base of workers and peasantry and progressing upward to a 30 per cent middle class and a ten per cent apex of bourgeoisie, with the principal line of tension fixed between the proletariat-peasantry and middle class and with greatest mobility occurring between the middle class and the bourgeoisie element. The three principal funnels in Diagram 1 are in the shape of pyramids and can be made to reflect changes in relative sizes of the various groups that constitute each funnel structure.

[10]Horowitz, op. cit., pp. 431-432. Professor Horowitz recognizes that social and political changes occur in class, power, occupation, and prestige at either individual, group, or societal levels. The diagram or research model recognizes that such changes, as Horowitz specifies, do occur through a shifting struggle of various interests that are vying for wealth, status, and mobility.

The Structural Model

It is relevant to note that Diagram 1 concerns "the total environment" of the "urban Litoral" of Argentina. From the three funnels--social-group interests, political-group interests, and governing interests--each with its own peculiar structure, flow various inputs of pressures and stabilizers (demands and support, in the terminology of David Easton) into the "chamber of political culture" and into the "political system."[11]

These two kinds of inputs (pressures and stabilizers) are received by the system authorities and then acted upon. This process of receiving inputs of pressures and stabilizers and reacting to the same is characterized by the terms: "receiving political system" and "responding political system." The political system (i.e., the authorities or decision-makers in the political system), as well as the three funnels of interests depicted in Diagram 1, are affected by conditions and developments that occur in and emanate from the "total environment."[12] As these conditions and developments pass through the three funnels (social group, political group, and governing interests), they are converted into inputs of pressures and stabilizers that will either pressure or strengthen the decisionmaking position of the system authorities.

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[11]The relative sizes of the different groups within each structure or funnel of interests will have some bearing upon the rate and volume of the flow of inputs of pressures and stabilizers into the political system. This point will be elaborated in Chapters IV, V, and VI.

[12]The "total environment" is a term that will be used to refer to the aggregate of environmental influences which impinge on the "political system." A topical listing of the total environmental components, factors, or criteria for studying sociopolitical change from outside "the political system" and the interest groups will be found in Appendix A, pages 317-321, of this study.

The Functional Model

The model of sociopolitical change is simply diagrammatic, and no mathematical values will be given to any of the visual elements in the diagram. If such a mathematical equation had been devised for use in this study, it is speculated that the whole procedure would have been reduced to a mere statistical exercise bearing little similitude to reality. The model represents only a graphic format for showing the structures and processes involved in sociopolitical change. It does not promise to measure nor to predict change within any of the structures or processes which it identifies. But it does offer a framework and several evaluative criteria which give it a small yet definite degree of precision when its guidelines are followed.

Evaluative Criteria of the Model

The evaluative criteria on which the model rests establish, first, that a study concerning social and political change should take into account the following kinds of factors: ecological, historical-evolutionary, ethnic-demographical, psychological-cultural, socio-urban, political-legal, food supply and consumption, and economic. These eight kinds of factors form the basis for sociopolitical change through the activity of social-group interests, political-group interests, and governing interests. In viewing social-group interests, it is relevant to know the percentages of individuals who show marginal, mass, or elite patterns. In viewing political-group interests, it is relevant to know the numbers and kinds of influence groups that are "interest groups," "pressure groups," or "tension groups." In viewing governing interests, it is relevant to know

the relative command of each governing force: national, provincial, and municipal.[13]

Struggle of the Interest Groups

The emphasis in this study will be upon the three kinds of interests (social-group, political-group, and governing) generally and upon the social-group interests specifically. Each group of interests has a definite structure which is subject to change through time. Since this promises to be a study of sociopolitical change, then, any changes which occur in any of the structures of the three groups of interests will be significant. Irving Louis Horowitz has commented not only on changes in structures but on changes in processes, too. There are two dimensions to the study of changing processes. One dimension is to view the "absolute" growth in power, wealth, status, or mobility at individual, group, or societal levels. This process of "shifting" hegemony of different interests among the major areas of national life and human existence (power, wealth, status, and mobility) is referred to in this study as the struggle of interest groups. In chapters IV through VI, each set of interests will be examined as to its structure and its objects of struggle. No precise measurements will be used to

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[13]The measures of socioeconomic status, anomie, political alienation, and social participation will be used to determine whether any given individual shows marginal, mass, or elite patterns. No statistical measures will be used for determining the numbers, kinds, and effectiveness of both the political-group interests and the governing interests; rather, the researcher will make rough estimations of each political-group interest and each governing interest based upon the material available to him.

determine which interests command which areas of conflict or struggle, but whenever possible quantitative data will be used in describing more fully the changes in national processes, as seen particularly in the "urban Litoral." Another dimension, described by Horowitz, concerns "how a person, group, or society is viewed by other persons, groups, and societies."[14] As Jacques Lambert is wont to point out, it is not important whether a public administration is corrupt or not, but whether the people think that public officials are dishonest.[15] One of the major objectives in this study will be to measure individual attitudes toward other governments in the world and other groups in politics, in society, and in the economy.

The Complementary Methodology

Now, in order to complement and lend more empirical credence to the so-called "model of sociopolitical change," the following subjective and quantitative measurements will be employed and their results reported: socioeconomic status, anomie, political alienation, social participation, and political attitudes.

Socioeconomic Status

While a more complex and sophisticated measurement of social class will be proposed in the final chapter of this study, in practice

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[14]Horowitz, op. cit., p. 432.

[15]Jacques Lambert, América Latina. Estructuras sociales e instituciones políticas, trans. Pablo Bordonaba (Spain: Ediciones Ariel, S. A., 1964), p. 233.

only four criteria were used: occupation and education of subject, or husband of the subject, in the case of female interviewees, and occupation and education of the father of the subject.[16] For each one of the occupational and educational indicators a score range from one to seven was constructed after the previously validated typology of Eichelbaum de Babini in her study[17] and after Dorothy L. Meier and Wendell Bell in their study.[18] Tables 1 and 2 list seven categories each of occupations and education levels, with a possible maximum of 28 points, for given responses by interviewed subjects. Ranking was done on the basis of the following summations: 0-12, the lowest socioeconomic group; 12-20, the intermediate group; and 20-28, the superior or highest group.

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[16]It may be argued that the use of occupation and education of father of subject as part of the criteria for gauging socioeconomic status will yield a distorted socioeconomic profile for each subject. However, it should be noted that the indicators of education and occupation of father have consistently achieved high-correlation scores in the Germani tests, using nearly all existent statistical measures of correlation. Furthermore, given the extra-familial pattern which characterizes Argentine society--the long period of time in which children are kept under the tutelage of and dependency on their parents, even well into adulthood, and the fact that the subject may well have lived for a considerable period under conditions commensurate with the education and occupational levels of his parent--all would seem to justify using these as socioeconomic indicators, as well as measures of social mobility between the two represented generations.

[17]Ana María Eichelbaum de Babini, Educación familiar y status socioeconómico ("Trabajos e Investigaciones de Sociología, Colección Estructura: No. 2"; Buenos Aires: Instituto de Sociología, Universidad de Buenos Aires, 1965), pp. 13-17.

[18]Meier and Bell, op. cit., p. 202.

TABLE 1

OCCUPATIONS OF SUBJECT (OR HUSBAND OF SUBJECT) AND FATHER OF SUBJECT

Occupation	Point Total
Blue-collar worker (dependent and unskilled)	1
Blue-collar worker (independent and skilled)	2
Small-scale white-collar worker (or small-public employe without specifying)	3
Small-scale businessman, medium white-collar worker	4
Professional university employe, medium businessman, lower-ranking military officer . . .	5
University professor or administrator, high-ranking employe, high-ranking military officer . .	6
Entrepreneur, top-ranking official, large landowner	7

TABLE 2

LEVELS OF INSTRUCTION OF SUBJECT (OR HUSBAND OF SUBJECT) AND FATHER OF SUBJECT

Highest Education Attained	Point Total
No School	1
Some Elementary	2
Elementary Completed	3
Some High School	4
Completed High School	5
Some College	6
Completed College	7

Political Alienation and Anomie

The previously tested and validated scales of Leo Srole[19] and Basil G. Zimmer[20] will be used in this study to measure the levels of "anomie" and "political alienation" in Argentine subjects tested in the "urban Litoral" region. Each scale has five items and five response categories. The five response categories for both scales are: estoy muy de acuerdo, estoy algo de acuerdo, no tengo opinión, estoy en desacuerdo, and estoy completamente en desacuerdo.[21]

The Srole Scale

As noted above, the Srole "anomia" scale is a five-item scale. This study will use a translated adaptation of the Ephraim Harold Mizruchi version of Srole's original five items and will include five other items interspersed among the "anomia" items in order "to reduce the possibility of the respondent operating under or developing an aquiescence set."[22]

The Mizruchi version of the original Srole "anomia" scale items is as follows:

1. Most public officials are not really interested in the problems of the common man.
2. These days a person doesn't really know on whom he can count.

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[19]Srole, op. cit., pp. 712-713.

[20]Cited in McDill and Ridley, op. cit., p. 208.

[21]In English: completely agree, agree, undecided, disagree, and completely disagree.

[22]Ephraim Harold Mizruchi, "Social Structure and Anomia in a Small City," American Sociological Review, XXV (October, 1960), p. 646.

3. Nowadays a person has to live pretty much for today and let tomorrow take care of itself.

4. In spite of what some people say, the lot of the common man is getting worse, not better.

5. Most people don't care what happens to the next fellow.

The translated revision[23] of Mizruchi's version of Srole's "anomia" scale is as follows:

1. La mayoría de la gente se interesa poco en su prójimo.

2. En los tiempos actuales no se cuenta con personas dispuestas a ayudar--no hay persona que no le falle.

3. Dadas las condiciones actuales de vida, no es posible que proyectemos para el futuro; se tiene que vivir solamente para hoy y dejar el mañana para mañana.

4. Nunca habrá solución de las dificultades económicas de que se ve rodeado este país.

5. El hombre no quiere que haya tanta miseria en el mundo, pero la permite Dios para castigar al hombre.

The Zimmer Scale

Like the Srole "anomia" scale, the Zimmer scale of "local political alienation" is a five-item scale with five similar response categories. This scale is designed to measure political alienation from local urban government and its items are as follow:

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[23]The five items read in English: 1) The majority of persons are not much interested in their fellow man; 2) Nowadays you can't find people who will help--there isn't a person who won't let you down; 3) Given the present conditions of life, it is not possible to plan for the future--one has to live just for today and leave tomorrow for tomorrow; 4) There can never be any solution to the economic difficulties which engulf this country; and 5) Man does not wish for there to be so much misery in the world, but God allows it in order to punish man. Items 1, 2, and 3 measure both a person's sense of isolation and his normlessness; and items 4 and 5 measure his powerlessness, the belief that living conditions and events in his life are not within his reach and are directed entirely by outside forces over whom he personally has no control.

1. The government of a big city like Nashville doesn't take much interest in a person's neighborhood.

2. The government of a big city like Nashville is too costly to the average taxpayer.

3. The average person can't get any satisfaction out of talking to the officials of a big city government like Nashville.

4. The government of a big city like Nashville is controlled too much by machine politics.

5. The average person doesn't have much to say about the running of a big city like Nashville.

The translated revision[24] is as follows:

1. La administración de esta municipalidad no se interesa en nuestros barrios.

2. El gobierno de esta ciudad tiene la culpa por los problemas económicos y sociales de nuestras vidas.

3. Los funcionarios públicos son sordos y no nos hacen caso cuando nos dirigimos a ellos con un problema público, como la falta de pavimentación de algunas calles.

4. Los partidos políticos se meten demasiado en los asuntos que corresponden a la administración pública de ésta y otras ciudades.

5. Unicamente el gobierno nacional es capaz de cumplir con proyectos para la gente de los barrios particulares.

Social Participation

The method for studying social participation will consist of three

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[24]These items are in English: 1) The administration of this municipality is not interested in our neighborhood; 2) The city government is responsible for the economic and social problems in our lives; 3) The public officials are deaf and pay us no heed when we approach them with an urban problem, like the need to pave more streets; 4) The political parties interfere too much in the affairs of the public administration of this and other cities; and 5) Only the national government is capable of finishing projects for the people of a particular neighborhood.

measures of the frequency and quality of formal and informal social participation of the type used by Professor Wendell Bell. The measures of social participation are the frequency of participation in certain informal groups, formal group membership, and formal group attendance.[25]

To solicit data respecting the first measure of social participation (frequency of participation in certain informal groups), the individual was asked how frequently he participated in each informal group to which he belonged. The informal groups were: relatives, friends, neighbors, and co-workers. The individual responses were then each put into correspoding categories: at least twice a week, once a week, less frequently, and never.[26]

Formal group membership was measured by the number of groups to which each respondent belonged, e.g., seven or more, six, five, four, three, two, one, none, or not ascertained. Formal group attendance, as in the measurement of informal group participation, was calculated by the frequency of attendance, e.g., more than once a week, about once a

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[25]For a look at measures of social participation which are similar to the ones adopted for this study, see Wendell Bell, "Anomie, Social Isolation, and the Class Structure," Sociometry, XX (June, 1957), pp. 105-111; _____, "Urban Neighborhood Types and Participation in Formal Associations," American Sociological Review, XXI (February, 1956), pp. 25-35; _____ and M. Force, "Social Structure and Participation in Different Types of Formal Associations," Social Forces, XXXIV (May, 1956), pp. 345-350; _____ and Marion D. Boat, "Urban Neighborhoods and Informal Social Relations," The American Journal of Sociology, LXII (January, 1957), pp. 391-398; Morris Axelrod, "Urban Structure and Social Participation," American Sociological Review, XXI (February, 1956), pp. 13-18; Scott Greer, "Urbanization Reconsidered: A Comparative Study of Local Areas in a Metropolis," American Sociological Review, XXI (February, 1956), pp. 19-25.

[26]Bell, "Anomie, Social Isolation, and the Class Structure," ibid., p. 109; Meier and Bell, op. cit., p. 202.

week, a few times a month, about once a month, a few times a year, about once a year, never, or not ascertained.[27]

The following is the format of questions used in the interview schedule for measuring social participation in the "urban Litoral" of Argentina.[28]

1. ¿Con cuánta frequencia tiene usted encuentros y citas sociales con sus parientes?

   ____ dos veces por semana como mínimo

   ____ una vez por semana

   ____ menos frecuentement

   ____ nunca

2. ¿Con sus amigos?

   ____ dos veces por semana como mínimo

   ____ una vez por semana

   ____ menos frecuentemente

   ____ nunca

3. ¿Con sus vecinos? (sin considerar los encuentros ocasionales)

   ____ dos veces por semana como mínimo

   ____ una vez por semana

   ____ menos frecuentemente

   ____ nunca

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[27]Bell, "Urban Neighborhood Types and Participation in Formal Associations," op. cit., pp. 27-29.

[28]In English the format reads: 1) How often do you visit or have social contact with your relatives (at least twice a week, once a week, less frequently, and never); 2) with your friends? (_____); 3) with your neighbors? (_____); 4) with your co-workers? (_____); 5) Do you belong to a club or to a civic, social, professional or other kind of organization? (number of times you attend the meetings of your organization--more than once a week, once a week, two or three times a month, once a month, a few times a year, once a year, never, and cannot ascertain).

4. ¿Con sus compañeros del trabajo? (fuera del trabajo)

____ dos veces por semana como mínimo

____ una vez por semana

____ menos frecuentemente

____ nunca

5. ¿Pertenece usted a algún club, organización cívica, social, profesional u otra clase de organización? _____

_____

_____

		nro de veces que concurre a ella
una	_____	_____
dos	_____	_____
tres	_____	_____
cuatro	_____	_____
cinco	_____	_____

(a) más de una vez por semana (b) una vez por semana
(c) dos o tres veces por mes (d) una vez por mes
(e) algunas veces al año (f) una vez al año (g) nunca
(h) no puedo decir

Political Attitudes

Since its development and application,[29] the Semantic Differential has been variously used to measure the attitudes of subjects concerning the particular objects which they are requested to rate according to some specified point scale with antithetical polarities. Its use is

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[29]Charles E. Osgood, George J. Suci, and Percy H. Tannenhaum, The Measurement of Meaning (Urbana, Illinois: University of Illinois Press, 1957).

particularly well established in mass communications research,[30] and it has been used to predict voting behavior[31] and to evaluate certain Latin American governments and political groups.[32]

In this study, basically the same factors (force, activity, and evaluation), scale positions (very strong - somewhat strong - not very strong - weak; very active - somewhat active - not very active - passive; and excellent - good - not very good - bad),[33] and items (the present governments of the United States, this country, Cuba, the Soviet Union, Red China, and France, plus the Aprismo movement in Perú, the peronist movement in Argentina, the FALN in Venezuela, and the National Front in Colombia) will be included that appeared in the study of "Conservative Guatemalans in 1965" by Professor Kenneth F. Johnson. But, in addition the rating schedule that will be used in this study includes the following significant groups: the political parties (UCRP, UCRI, UDELPA, Socialist,

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[30]Percy H. Tannenbaum and Mervin D. Lynch, "Sensationalism: the Concept and Its Measurement," Journalism Quarterly, XXXVII (Summer, 1960), pp. 381-392; Leslie W. Sargent, "Communicator Image and News Reception," Journalism Quarterly, XLII (Winter, 1965), pp. 35-42; Wayne A. Danielson, "Eisenhower's February Decision: A Study of News Impact," Journalism Quarterly, XXXVII (Autumn, 1956), pp. 433-441; and read the survey of studies to measure attitude in Jack Lyle, "Attitude Measurement in Communication Research," Journalism Quarterly, XLII (Autumn, 1965), pp. 606-614.

[31]George Stricker, "The Use of the Semantic Differential to Predict Voting Behavior," The Journal of Social Psychology, LIX (February, 1963), pp. 159-167.

[32]Kenneth F. Johnson, Encuesta entre ciudadanos hispanoamericanos (interview schedule printed by the School of Social Sciences at Colorado State University, 1965).

[33]The original interview schedule had four scale positions, as indicated above. But it was discovered in administering the test to Argentine subjects that a middle position was needed, so that respondents were offered five scale positions instead of the original four. The fifth position was an intermediary one, meaning "neither strong, nor weak"; "neither active, nor passive"; "neither good, nor bad"--to express "in the middle of" or "in between" the other four positions.

Communist, and Peronist); the Roman Catholic Church; the bureaucracy or middle-class public service workers; the working classes or "have-not" masses; the aristocracy (agrarian) or the large landowners; the General Labor Confederation; the local trade unions; the professionals (lawyers, doctors, engineers, etc.); the university students; the peasantry; and the industrialists or financiers.[34]

Format of Attitude Measurements

The precise structural presentation of this material to groups of subjects by the researcher was one which replicated the previously referred-to Johnson encuesta (interview schedule). Its format in this study follows on the next page.

Application of the Methodology

In order to describe the procedures for putting the preceding research methods into effect in the "urban Litoral" of Argentina, it is now appropriate to look at how the subjects were selected, how they were tested, and how the test results have been handled.

Selection of Respondents

Social science research has uncovered significant correlations between socioeconomic class on the one hand and political attitudes and

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[34]All these national groupings, apart from the specific political parties, were esteemed to be politically significant ones in Wilgus, loc. cit., and Blanksten, "Political Groups in Latin America," loc. cit. The format or precise structural presentation of this material to groups of subjects by the researcher is found in Appendix B.

Evaluación Personal

En esta página se encuentran veintiséis oraciones relacionadas con diferentes gobiernos, con movimientos políticos y con algunos grupos sociales, políticos y económicos. Se ruega que clasifique estas oraciones en las categorías de fuerza, actividad y evaluación, colocando una equis (X) bajo la frase que será la más apropriada. Ninguna oración debe tener sino tres contestaciones.

	FUERZA				ACTIVIDAD				EVALUACION			
	muy fuerte	algo fuerte	no muy fuerte	débil	muy activo	algo activo	no muy activo	pasivo	excellente	bueno	no muy bueno	malo
1. El gobierno actual de los EE. UU.												
2. El gobierno actual de este país												
3. El gobierno actual de Cuba												
4. El gobierno de la Unión Sovietica												
5. El gobierno actual de China Roja												
6. El aprismo del Perú												
7. El gobierno actual de Francia												
8. La FALN de Venezuela												
9. El Peronismo en la Argentina												
10. El Frente Nacional de Colombia												
11. La UCRP de este país												
12. La UCRI de este país												
13. El partido socialista de aquí												
14. Los comunistas de este país												
15. La Iglesia Catolica Apostólica Rmna												
16. Los militares de este país												
17. La burocracia o los empleados públs												
18. El proletariado o la clase trabajado												
19. La Confederación General de Trabajo												
20. Los gremios locales												
21. Los grandes estancieros de aquí												
22. Los industriales y los financieros												
23. Los profesionales (doctores, etc.)												
24. Los estudiantes universitarios												
25. Los campesinos y los colonos												
26. UDELPA												

behavior on the other.[35] It is the purpose of this study to seek out different socioeconomic groups with a view toward testing the attitudes and participation of each group. In this regard, it is the contention of this study that three broad socioeconomic groups are specially important in a political sense in urban Argentina: the lower class, the lower middle class, and the upper middle class. The important consideration here is to view these socioeconomic groups, existent in Argentina, in a meaningful context for purposes of sampling.

In selecting the respondents to be interviewed several objectives were kept in mind. First, it was hoped to obtain through sampling procedure a representative group of subjects to respond to a structured-interview schedule testing for levels of socioeconomic status, anomie, political alienation, and social participation and for intensity of political attitudes. Second, such sampling should conform to the present-day substantive social realities in Argentina; that is, the different groups to be interviewed should represent an approximation of or have their counterpart in the actual social structure of Argentina. Third, the sampling procedure itself should fulfill the principles of sampling as set forth by Mildred Parten,[36] or at least to comply with some

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[35]Murray B. Levin and Murray Eden, "Political Strategy for the Alienated Voter," Public Opinion Quarterly, XXVI (Winter, 1962), pp. 47-63; Thompson and Horton, loc. cit.; J. H. Lindquist, "Socioeconomic Status and Political Participation," The Western Political Quarterly, XVII (December, 1964), pp. 608-614; McDill and Ridley, loc. cit.; Templeton, loc. cit.

[36]These principles are enumerated in Mildred Parten, Surveys, Polls, and Samples: Practices and Procedures (New York: Harpers and Brothers, Publishers, 1950), pp. 221-224.

similarly rigorous standards. Finally, the sampling procedure should coincide with the objective limitations of time and resources under which the researcher was operating.

The Sampling Procedure

In practice, however, the sampling procedure deviated somewhat from its objectives in that subjects were not selected randomly. The procedure by which the subjects used in this study were sampled was the "quota sample," a modified form of stratified sampling.[37] Both the advantages and drawbacks of the "quota sample" are discussed quite cogently by Linton C. Freeman.[38] By this method, various quotas are set up and subjects are interviewed on contact until each quota within predetermined categories is filled. Table 3 gives the quotas which

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[37]Originally it was planned to draw a "random sample" of the universe to be studied. However, in view of the nearly insurmountable difficulties in cataloging the universe and the high cost and great amount of time required by such elaborate procedure, the "quota sample" approach was suggested to the researcher by one of Argentina's most respected sociologists. Interview with Professor Torcuato S. Di Tella, Centro de Sociología Comparada del Instituto Torcuato Di Tella, Buenos Aires, September 26, 1966.

[38]Elementary Applied Statistics: For Students in Behavioral Science (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1965), p. 144. Professor Freeman notes: "Investigators have used a modified form of stratified sampling called the quota sample. Quotas are determined according to the relative proportion of each subgroup in the universe and interviewers are assigned to fill these quotas. An interviewer may be instructed to select five males under 25 years of age, all in the highest socioeconomic class, ten females over 60 years, in the lowest class, and so on, depending on the relevant proportions in the universe. Thus the interviewer controls the actual sampling. This is usually an economical technique, and sometimes a successful one, but there is a chance of bias. Too much is left to the interviewers . . . Quota sampling, then, may be an effective low-budget method, but great care must be taken in its use. The universe must be properly stratified and the selection and training of interviewers must be carefully performed."

were used and filled in this study. As can be seen, the three main categories of quotas are socioeconomic status, sex, and age.[39]

The Testing of Respondents

After determining the quotas that are to be filled, the next problem is to locate the individuals who will satisfy the established quotas and to administer the various scheduled tests to them.

Originally it was planned to test several hundred subjects in much the same percentages as shown in Table 3 for the universe of ninety subjects. In practice, however, there were too many demands made upon the time of the researcher to have allowed him to conduct any more than ninety interviews. Under the original plan, the largest number of subjects would have been sampled in the city of Buenos Aires, with progressively smaller numbers of subjects being sampled in the cities of Rosario, Santa Fe, and Paraná. In practice, however, no subjects were interviewed in Paraná and only 18 subjects were interviewed in Buenos Aires, the bulk of the interviews being made in Santa Fe and Rosario. The reason for this was to take advantage of the official permission which the researcher obtained from provincial and municipal

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[39]The quotas of 18, 36, and 36 subjects for the three socioeconomic classes, as shown, are approximately in proportion to what this distribution is in actuality. The greater number of male subjects interviewed in the lower middle and working classes agrees with the greater political, economic, and social prominence of male subjects in these two classes. The distribution of ages in the sample of subjects coincides with objective reality, since recent statistics for urban Argentina show that persons in the 20-35 age group comprise very close to 22 per cent of the entire age population, those 35-50 years of about 22 per cent of the population, and persons 50-65 nearly 18 per cent. See Argentina, Consejo Federal de Inversiones, Programa conjunto para el desarrollo agropecuario e industrial (Buenos Aires: Instituto de Investigaciones Económicas, 1964), p. 79.

TABLE 3

QUOTAS ADHERED TO IN SAMPLING ARGENTINE SUBJECTS FOR INTERVIEWING PURPOSES, SEPTEMBER 14 - DECEMBER 14, 1966

Quota to be Filled	No. of Respondents In Each Category
Socioeconomic Status	
Upper middle class (20-28)	18
Lower middle class (12-20)	36
Working class (0-12)	36
Total	90
Sex	
Upper middle class	
male	9
female	9
Lower middle class	
male	21
female	15
Lower class	
male	21
female	15
Total male	51
Total female	39
Age	
Upper middle class	
male (20-35)	5
male (35-50)	4
female (20-35)	5
female (35-50)	4
Lower middle class	
male (20-35)	9
male (35-50)	9
male (50-65)	3
female (20-35)	6
female (35-50)	6
female (50-65)	3
Lower class	
male (20-35)	9
male (35-50)	9
male (50-65)	3
female (20-35)	6
female (35-50)	6
female (50-65)	3

authorities to conduct interviews in Santa Fe and Rosario. Table 4 contains a listing of the subjects used in the sample by city and socioeconomic status.

TABLE 4

NUMBERS OF SUBJECTS USED IN THIS STUDY BY CITY AND SOCIOECONOMIC STATUS

Cities	Lower Class	Lower Middle Class	Upper Middle Class	Area Totals
Buenos Aires	3	8	7	18
Rosario	16	17	5	38
Santa Fe	17	11	6	34
Paraná	--	--	-	--
Number of Cases	36	36	18	90

All interviews were made in appropriate neighborhoods for locating persons who might exemplify the desired kind of socioeconomic characteristics. The subjects were approached at the door of their dwellings by the researcher--and, there, after a brief presentation, the prospective respondent was invited to participate in an academic study which would not be used for national political ends and the content of which would become collective data and would not identify the participant in any way. Although not rigidly adhered to in every case, the researcher tried to call on every fifth dwelling unit.

Handling of Test Results

The basic handling of the data obtained from the some ninety interviews that were realized in this study presents little problem.

The previously cited studies on which each of the measures in this study is based contain rather clear instructions on research procedures and the presentation of results. But some elaboration on interpreting and determining the significance of the study data is now in order.

Tests for Significance

In some cases, it has been determined that certain results are too obviously significant to require further statistical testing beyond the percentages and numbers of subjects that are already shown. Thus, no tests for significance have been run on test results concerning social participation and the total socioeconomic levels of anomie and political alienation of the "urban Litoral" society. But, to test data concerning anomie and political alienation by socioeconomic status and percentages of subjects having high scores of anomie and political alienation by both socioeconomic status and social isolation, Pearson's chi-square test has been applied to determine the levels of significance.[40] For determining the extent and direction of correlation between anomie and political alienation for the entire sample and then for each socioeconomic group, Pearson's coefficient of correlation (r) has been used.[41] For interpreting and presenting the results of the Semantic Differential test, an average rating has been obtained for each socioeconomic group (in each factor and for each item). Then, the standard error of the difference between two means has been computed to test the significance of the variance between the extreme ratings.

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[40] Freeman, op. cit., pp. 215-226.

[41] Ibid., pp. 89-106.

Indicies for Testing for Correlation

Four indicies--socioeconomic status, social-participation, anomie, and political-alienation--for each of the major behavioral variables are used later on in this study for testing for correlation. The socioeconomic index employed has already been described on pages 24-25. The social-participation index is also derived from the questionnaire data. Participation in informal associations has been weighted 0-6 and formal association 0-4, making a possible total of ten points, with 0-5 being a low social-participation score and 6-10 a high social-participation score.[42] The index for anomie was obtained by relaxing the five response categories to yield just three categories (agree, disagree, and undecided), to which corresponding point totals of 2, 0, and 1 were given. The score range on the five items of anomie, then, is from 0 to 10, with 0-5 being a low anomie score and 6-10 a high anomie score. Similarly, the political-alienation index was obtained by relaxing the response categories and using a point total, which in this case is 0-6,[43] 0-3 being a low political-alienation score and 4-6 a high political alienation score.

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[42]The social-participation index was calculated thusly: 0-6 for informal participation (0-none; 1-association with one or two of four informal groups less frequently; 2-association with three or four informal groups less frequently; 3-association once a week or more often with one informal group; 4-association once a week or more often with two informal groups; 5-association once a week or more often with three informal groups; 6-association once a week or more often with all four informal groups) and 0-4 for formal participation (0-none; 1-membership in one formal association and attendance once a month or less frequently; 2-membership in one formal association and weekly attendance, at least; 3-membership in two formal associations and attendance once or a few times a month; 4-membership in two or more organizations and weekly attendance, at least, of the meetings of at least two of those organizations).

[43]The reason for a lower point range in this case is that items 4 and 5 on the adapted version of the Zimmer political-alienation scale gave results which could not be trusted. As will be pointed out in the evaluation of the Zimmer scale as a tool for research in Latin America, the subjects misunderstood both the wording and meaning of these two items.

CHAPTER III

THE TOTAL ENVIRONMENT

The graphic imagery of this chapter consists of a half-circle periphery of eight "environmental components" which constitute "the total environment." These eight total environmental components are: the ecological, the historical-evolutionary, the ethnic-demographical, the psychological-cultural, the political-legal, the socio-urban, food supply and consumption, and the economic. The practice of considering the processes or systems that lie outside the structures of government and society, as described in Chapter II, will be followed in this chapter, which will deal with but a few of the more politically relevant items within the total environment of the "urban Litoral."

The Ecological Components

Since the appearance of De l'esprit des lois in which Montesquieu theorized about the bearing that such physical factors as climate and topography might have on political life,[1] only a few serious studies have attempted specifically to correlate ecological variables with political

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[1]For a cogent synthesis of the conceptions held by Montesquieu on the political relevancy of climatic and topographical factors see Lawrence Meyer Levin, The Political Doctrine of Montesquieu's Esprit des Lois: Its Classical Background ("Publications of the Institute of French Studies, Inc.;" New York: Columbia University, 1936), pp. 26-39.

variables and to trace through the effects of the former on the latter.[2] However, a growing number of studies by Argentine researchers, which are intended to treat rather specific non-ecological topics, still devote a small amount of space to identifying and describing some of the ecological factors.[3] In Appendix A, various ecological topics are listed as being relevant to sociopolitical change. But, again, in the interest of brevity, this section of the chapter will consider just the physical characteristics of the region under study: topography, climate, and resources.

Physical Characteristics

The republic of Argentina has a land surface area of some 4,055,775 square kilometers, extending in length from Bolivia to Cape Horn, 3,700 kilometers, and in breadth from the Andean chain to the South Atlantic ocean, 1,420 kilometers. The axis for this vast region is the metropolis of Buenos Aires, the dominant intermediary between the national provinces and the overseas nations, from which the great Río de la Plata network of rivers extends northward for thousands of kilometers and from which the Argentine pampa--a flat, naturally vegetated area of some 450,000 square kilometers--spreads out like an open fan with a radial distance of 580 kilometers.[4] The vastness and fertility of the pampa region and

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[2]F. Glenn Abney and Larry B. Hill, "Natural Disasters as a Political Variable: The Effect of a Hurricane on Urban Elections," The American Political Science Review, LX (December, 1966), pp. 974-980.

[3]The reader is referred to footnote "6" in the preceding chapter.

[4]Isacovich, op. cit., pp. 9-10; E. W. Shanahan, South America: An Economic and Regional Geography with an Historical Chapter (London: Meuthen and Company, Ltd., 1959), p. 170.

the extensiveness of the network of Argentine rivers that are suitable for navigation give Argentina a great productive potentiality in both agriculture and industry. That these rich natural endowments are not more fully exploited is an important fact to bear in mind when assessing sociopolitical change in this particular region.

The focus of this study will be directed at the four urban centers and their hinterlands situated along the Plata and Paraná rivers: the Federal Capital district (with 2,966,811 inhabitants in a surface area of 199.5 square kilometers) within the city of Buenos Aires,[5] Rosario (652,843 persons in 171.73 square kilometers),[6] Santa Fe (208,350 in 77-80 square kilometers),[7] and Paraná (98,318 in 24 square kilometers).[8]

Topography. The humid pampa (which takes in central and eastern Buenos Aires province, central and southern Santa Fe province, and all Entre Ríos province) and the Río de la Plata drainage basin are the two dominant topographical features within the "urban Litoral" region. There is a marked difference, however, in the topography of Entre Ríos province

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[5]Argentina, Presidencia de la Nación, Consejo Nacional de Desarrollo, Mapas y estadísticas de la república de Argentina (Buenos Aires: el Poder Ejecutivo, 1962), p. 11; Eduardo S. Calamaro, La comunidad argentina (Buenos Aires: Editorial Losada, S.A., 1963), p. 279.

[6]Most recent estimation in Clarín, June 18, 1966, p. 15; Municipalidad de Rosario, Boletín estadística de la ciudad de Rosario ("Publication Trimestral," Vol. XXVII, No. 4; Rosario, Argentina: Dirección General de Estadística del Municipio, 1960), p. 1.

[7]Felipe Justo Cervera, Estudio de la población de Santa Fe. Relación con factores económicos ("Extensión Universitaria," No. 101; Santa Fe, Argentina: Universidad Nacional del Litoral, 1966), p. 53; estimation by the researcher from recent map "Ciudad de Santa Fe," (Santa Fe, Argentina: Librería y Editorial Colmegna, no date given).

[8]Instituto de Planeamiento Regional y Urbano, op. cit., Vol. III, p. 12.

on the east side of the Paraná river. There, the earth is no longer flat but has small rolling hills, whose heights never exceed 100 meters above sea level. And while the right margin of the river banks in Santa Fe province is flat, the left margin in Entre Ríos rises 80 meters in height.[9]

These topographical differences have been immensely influential in shaping the social, economic, and political destiny of this region. The elevated topography and natural circumscription of Entre Ríos province have made of this area and of all of Argentina's northeast a less productive and more retarded region. The isolated northeast of Argentina could very well achieve a greater development if these topographical barriers could be overcome through improved communications.

Climate. The climate in the "Litoral" is temperate to subtropical, the temperature rarely falling below 0 degrees centigrade and not often rising above 26 degrees centigrade. The average rainfall is between 700 and 1000 millimeters, being heaviest in January (80-100 millimeters) and lightest in June (20-40 millimeters).[10] Primarily the climatic factor offers added support to the already ideal agricultural environment which the region enjoys. Its temperate quality is appreciated by most of the inhabitants, who for the most part find it exhilarating and conducive to work and diversion. However, the Indians or

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[9] Ibid., Vol I, 1-3, 174.

[10] Ibid., pp. 173-174; Isacovich, op. cit., p. 13; Aldo Ferrer, La economía argentina, las etapas de su desarrollo y problemas actuales (Buenos Aires: Fondo de Cultura Económica, 1965 edition), p. 40.

"darker" Argentines find the climate more stimulating to sleep; and, in the more interior cities, the afternoon siesta is a long-standing ritual. Thus, the inhabitants of Santa Fe and Entre Ríos are more sleepy and indolent than are those of Rosario and Buenos Aires.

Natural resources. The Litoral region produces no large quantity of minerals;[11] its greatest natural wealth reposes in the fertility of its soil, in the navigability of its rivers, and in the exploitation of its fish and forest products. With more than 35,000,000 hectares of pampa land receiving an annual precipitation upwards of 800 millimeters[12] and able to grow more than 23 million hectares of grains and seed crops without suffering any loss of fertility,[13] the rural Litoral adequately supports the urban Litoral and is without doubt the richest agrarian region of its size anywhere in the world. With respect to forest wealth, the upper Litoral has timber reserves of quebracho colorado[14] which total 80,000 square kilometers, and it can tap another 95,000 kilometers of quebracho which lie in contiguous provinces.[15] While nearly all fresh-water fish taken in Argentine waters are from Litoral rivers, the total

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[11]For example, it is reported that in 1956 the province of Entre Ríos produced only 1,500,000 tons of minerals which were used chiefly in construction and were valued at just 44,700,000 pesos in national currency. Instituto de Planeamiento Regional y Urbano, op. cit., I, p. 6.

[12]Ferrer, loc. cit.

[13]Isacovich, op. cit., p. 15.

[14]Gastón Gori, La Forestal. La tragedia del quebracho colorado (Buenos Aires: Editoriales Platina/Stilcograf, 1965), in a carefully documented study, describes the deleterious effects of monopoly and vested interests in a once-thriving industry, the extraction of the red quebracho (a hardwood used in tanning) in the northern Litoral forests.

[15]Isacovich, op. cit., p. 71; some 70,000 kilometers are in Chaco province and 25,000 in Misiones province.

yearly catch has shown a marked decline in recent years. The 1964 production of 14,762.4 tons decreased to 13,029.7 tons in 1965; whereas the salt-water fish catch increased from 143,587 to 172,107 tons in the same period.[16]

Historical Evolutionary Components

The region under study evolved from the most neglected of all Spanish new-world areas of settlement to notable prominence in four centuries.

Settlement and Early Growth

The precarious village that was first erected on about the site of present-day Buenos Aires in 1536 by Don Pedro de Mendoza was soon destroyed, and it was not until 1580 that the spot was resettled under the direction of Juan de Garay. In 1573, the same Hispanic explorer founded the village of Santa Fe, near the present-day city of the same name, which was transferred, between 1651 and 1660, from its then to its present site. The Indians of the region were nomadic and warlike, so that early settlers contended with them constantly. But, until its decadence after Philip III, Asunción, the present capital of Paraguay, remained the center of exploitation and received the greater emphasis in colonization and development.[17] It is recorded that in 1652 Santa Fe was "a village of about 35 huts, with neither

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[16] Dirección Nacional de Estadística y Censos, Secretaría de Estado de Hacienda, Boletín de estadística 1966 ("Boletín de Estadística," III trimestre; Buenos Aires: Poder Ejecutivo Nacional, July-September, 1966), pp. 69-70.

[17] Centeno, op. cit., p. 7; Calamaro, op. cit., p. 191.

walls nor fortifications, nor garrison, the smallest of all Spanish cities of governments of La Plata and Tucumán."[18] Rosario did not exist then, and Buenos Aires remained poor and small through the colonial period to the establishment of the Viceroyalty of Río de la Plata in 1776.[19]

The impetus that governmental decrees gave to urban growth was exemplified in the administrative directive of 1662 which made the port of Santa Fe a "Puerto Preciso," meaning that every ship traveling up the Paraná river had to register and weigh in at Santa Fe. From then on the city realized a spectacular growth.[20] While two spurts of colonization--under Juan de Garay in 1573 and Gasper de Godoy from Buenos Aires in 1618--served to populate and develop the area of the actual province of Entre Ríos, it was not until 1730 that the city of Paraná was founded.[21] Rosario had no founder nor founding date but grew "spontaneously by spiritual rather than material or political motivations" through the grouping of ranches of early settlers around the chapel erected by Domingo Gómez Recio in 1731.[22]

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[18]Leoncio Gianello, Historia de Santa Fe (Santa Fe, Argentina: El Litoral, 1955), p. 61.

[19]Buenos Aires (Buenos Aires: Peuser, 1956), section on history of Buenos Aires, unnumbered pages.

[20]Gianello, loc. cit.; see also Jose Carmelo Busaniche, Hombres y hechos de Santa Fe (Santa Fe, Argentina: El Litoral, 1955), pp. 63-75.

[21]Instituto de Planeamiento Regional y Urbano, Vol. I, op. cit., p. 7.

[22]Juan Alvarez, Historia de Rosario: 1689-1939 (Buenos Aires: Imprenta López, 1943), p. 76; Augusto Fernández Díaz, Rosario desde lo más remoto de su historia: 1650 a 1750 (Rosario, Argentina: Talleres Gráficos Pomponio, 1941), pp. 24-25; Mario C. Gómez, Rosario biográfico (Rosario, Argentina: Editorial Tradiciones, 1955), pp. 27-29; Felix A. Chaparro, Los orígenes de Rosario (Rosario, Argentina: Talleres Gráficos Pomponio, 1942), pp. 16-17, 22-23.

In the early national period, as in the colonial period, cattle was the base of the Argentine economy. Rosario with a population of 763 inhabitants in 1815 grew to have 22,492 inhabitants in 1853;[23] the Federal Capital could register 187,126 persons by 1869.[24] It was not until after the downfall of Rosas and the second half of the nineteenth century, however, that the area began to develop its administrative structures and to acquire its present urban character.

Development of Transportation

During the Rosas regime (1835-1852) the Argentine rivers were closed to navigation for the purpose of concentrating all fiscal control and wealth in Buenos Aires. But with the overthrow of Rosas and the enactment of free navigation of the Paraná river, the port of Rosario received a great influx of international trade.[25] On January 8, 1854, the Federal government granted a private company the concession to transport passengers by ship between Buenos Aires and Rosario. Before that time the trip between Buenos Aires and Rosario was made by wagon.[26] In order to construct and exploit a single-track railroad from Rosario to Córdoba over the route proposed by North American engineer Allan Campbell, the Ferrocarril Central Argentino was instituted in 1863 with 1,600,000 pounds sterling of capital. The Ferrocarril Oeste Santafesino

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[23]Gómez, ibid., p. 35; Alvarez, ibid., p. 343.

[24]Pio Isaac Monteagudo, Migraciones internas en la Argentina (Buenos Aires: Cátedra Lisandro de la Torre, 1956), p. 39.

[25]Juan Jorge Gschwind, El puerto de Rosario: su evolución historica: factores de su progreso (Rosario, Argentina: Academia Nacional de la Historia, 1942), pp. 5, 7-8.

[26]Gómez, op. cit., p. 39.

was approved in 1881 and was inaugurated on November 4, 1883. Rosario subsequently, in January of 1886, lost its advantage of being the terminal point in the FCA line when it was linked by rail to Buenos Aires. In 1884 some 27,246 passengers were transported by railroad, which figure increased to 131,432 in 1889.[27] Tables 5 and 6 give the cumulative kilometers of track laid down through thirteen presidential administrations and the comparative ranking of other Latin American countries in kilometers of track.

Political Development

The political development of Argentina has been centered mainly in the "urban Litoral," except for the sporadic influence exerted by Córdoba and the Cuyo provinces. After the establishment of the Constitution of 1853, the "benevolent" leaders of the paternalistic oligarchy rule with varying success until the turn of the century. In the waning years of the nineteenth century, two charismatic political leaders, Leandro Alem and Hipólito Yrigoyen, fused together a political movement that was known as the Unión Cívica Radical (UCR), based on popular appeal, to oppose the conservative oligarchy. But the aristocratic origin, inspiration, and tendency of the UCR leaders, who rose to challenge the conservatives and win in 1916, is one political reality that has always characterized UCR leadership.[28] While the UCR presumably represented

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[27]Juan Jorge Gschwind, Antecedentes para la historia económica de Rosario (Rosario, Argentina: Romano Hnos., S.R. Ltd., 1948), pp. 7-8.

[28]Data in José Luis de Imaz, Los que mandan (Buenos Aires: Editorial Universitaria de Buenos Aires, 1966 edition), pp. 192-203.

TABLE 5

CUMULATIVE AMOUNTS OF TRACK LAID IN ARGENTINA (1862-1916) THROUGH VARIOUS PRESIDENTIAL ADMINISTRATIONS*

Presidencies		Kilometers of Track
1862-1868	Mitre	571
1868-1874	Sarmiento	1,331
1874-1880	Avellandeda	2,516
1880-1886	Roca	5,836
1886-1892	Juárez - Pellegrini	13,682
1892-1898	Luis Saenz Peña - Uriburu	15,451
1898-1904	Roca	19,428
1904-1910	Quintana-Figueroa Alcorta	27,993
1910-1916	Roque Saenz Peña - Plaza	33,995

TABLE 6

COMPARATIVE FIGURES ON KILOMETERS OF TRACK FOR TWELVE LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES IN 1960

Countries		Kilometers
1.	Argentina	43,956
2.	Brazil	38,339
3.	Mexico	23,369
4.	Chile	8,217
5.	Cuba	4,784
6.	Colombia	3,813
7.	Bolivia	3,621
8.	Peru	3,336
9.	Uruguay	3,041
10.	Ecuador	1,152
11.	Paraguay	1,137
12.	Venezuela	821

*Source: Juan Manuel Santa Cruz, Ferrocarriles argentinos ("Cuaderno del Instituto de Derecho Público y Ciencias Sociales"; Santa Fe, Argentina: Universidad Nacional del Litoral, 1966), pp. 14, 16.

the middle class, its programs were vague and its appeal unpredictably tied to the fortunes and follies of national life. Its too close identification with its leader, Hipólito Yrigoyen, spelled its immediate collapse upon his fall in 1930.[29]

Another political movement, the Argentine Socialist party, began in the same period as did the Radical movement. It began embryonically in 1890; and, in 1896, with Juan B. Justo as its leader, it was formally organized as the Socialist party of Argentina.[30] It was hoped that the party would personify "the true reflection of Echeverrían thought"; that is, that the party would represent "the idea of human redemption and social interest--the interest of the working class."[31] But the Socialist party never seemed to impress the working-class masses for whom it was intended. And while it failed to obtain sufficient numerical strength so that it could effectively challenge its opposition, it did win elections at the municipal level and its leaders in Congress, in the legislatures, and in the Deliberating Council were among the most prominent politicians in the country.[32]

In the decade, 1920-1930, the following political currents existed: Alvear-brand Radicalism, Yrigoyen-type Radicalism, disorganized conservatism,

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[29]Rodolfo Puiggrós, El Yrigoyenismo, Vol. II: Historia crítica de los partidos políticos argentinos (Buenos Aires: Jorge Alvarez Editor, 1965), pp. 74-82.

[30]Dardo Cuneo, Juan B. Justo y las luchas sociales en la Argentina (Buenos Aires: Editorial Alpe, 1956), pp. 73-137, chronicles the founding and development of the Argentine socialist party during the years 1890-1896.

[31]Jacinto Oddone, ¿Qué es el partido socialista? (Buenos Aires: Comité Ejecutivo Nacional, 1956), p. 7.

[32]Centeno, op. cit., p. 35.

Progressive Democracy of Lisandro de la Torre, socialism of Juan B. Justo, and a weak, poorly organized communism.[33] The military coup of 1930 deposed the national, provincial, and local government officials and brought together army officers, antipersonalistas, conservatives, and independent socialists to govern a country whose structures were shattered and disorganized. The military and conservatives ruled in uneasy coalitions until the political advent of Perón. The world-wide depression and dispersion of political power had paralyzing repercussions on the national economy and stability of Argentina.[34]

The economic and political forms constructed during the 1930's proved too fragile to resist the accelerated pace of World War II politics. The National Congress and all political parties were dissolved and martial law declared throughout the republic when a fascist-styled clique of army officers effected the second twentieth-century coup d'etat on June 3, 1943.[35]

In the Perón era which followed, the personalism of Colonel Juan D. Perón earned him the allegiance of the nation's masses and his personal popularity far outstripped the meager public support that the political parties had been obtaining up to that time. But the initially strong

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[33]José S. Campobassi, "Historia de los partidos políticos argentinos (1810-1943)," Los partidos políticos: estructura y vigencia en la Argentina (Buenos Aires: Cooperadora de Derecho y Ciencias Sociales, 1963), p. 28.

[34]The instability of this period is expressly exemplified in the great turnover of city administrations in Rosario: 18 during the 1930's and 20 during the 1940's. Albert Montes, Plan Rosario. Ley nacional no. 16052 y sus antecedentes (Rosario, Argentina: Centro de Estudios Nacionales, Provinciales y Municipales, 1964), p. 66.

[35]Alberto Ciria, Partidos y poder en la Argentina moderna (Buenos Aires: Jorge Alvarez Editor, 1964), p. 98; Américo Ghioldi: De la tiranía a la democracia social (Buenos Aires: Editiones Gure, 1956), pp. 147,161-164; Julio A. Fernández, "The Nationalism Syndrome in Argentina," Journal

allegience to Perón gradually weakened and the opposition steadily grew until the Perón government fell in 1955. The subsequent military governments and interventions, interrupted by two Radical administrations, all serve to highlight what one author calls "confusion in Argentina."[36]

Agricultural Development

The Litoral provinces enjoyed an unprecedented agricultural development in the second half of the 1800's based upon an unprecedented growth in population from 100,000 to 850,000 between 1800 and 1869 and representing a growth rate of 3 per cent per annum. About three-fourths of that population was rural. More precisely, the figures show that the rural population of Buenos Aires province grew from 253,938 inhabitants in 1869 to 596,398 in 1895; the rural population of Santa Fe province in the same period from 55,278 to 67,212.[37]

One manifestation of the development of "Litoral" agriculture during this period can be seen in Table 7. The three provinces substantially increased their cultivated land areas between 1872 and 1895. During this period Santa Fe province was first in the production of wheat.[38] Of the 3,300,000 immigrants entering Argentina between 1857 and 1914, more

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of Inter-American Studies, VIII (October, 1966), p. 559;"Historia del Peronismo: el apoyo eclesiástico," Primera Plana, IV (October 24, 1966), pp. 36-38; "Historia del Peronismo: clero y gobierno," Primera Plana, IV (November 7, 1966), pp. 34-39; Julio Irazusta, Perón y la crisis argentina (Buenos Aires: Heumul S.A., 1966 edition), pp. 39-45, 127-133.

[36]Estanislao del Campo Wilson, Confusión en la Argentina (Buenos Aires: Editorial Guillermo Kraft, Ltd., 1964).

[37]Ferrer, op. cit., pp. 67, 70; Jaime Fuchs, Argentina: su desarrollo capitalista (Buenos Aires: Editorial Cartago, S.R.L., 1965), pp. 67-68; Gastón Gori, Inmigración y colonización en la Argentina (Buenos Aires: Editorial Universitaria de Buenos Aires, 1964), chapters V and VI, pp. 49-87, plus p. 88.

[38]Fuchs, ibid., pp. 51, 59.

than 90 per cent located in the Litoral provinces.[39] Of the working population classified in 1895, some 394,000 workers were employed in cattle and agriculture, another 565,000 were described as unskilled laborers (or peones), 366,000 were registered under industry, 143,000 in commerce, and 63,000 in transportation.[40] According to Horacio C. E. Giberti, the cultivation of grain and the raising of cattle were mutually stimulating, productivity in the one serving to motivate productivity in the other. The spectacular rise in grain production was maintained by the steady growth of the meat industry.[41] And it is well to add that the agricultural development achieved during this period was also fomented by a comparable development in transportation, especially railroads.[42]

Industrial Development

The rudiments of Argentine industry were evident as early as 1853; in that year there were 2,000 workers employed in 106 factories and 746 small shops. By 1895 the number of industrial establishments had increased to 22,204 in Buenos Aires, Santa Fe, and Entre Ríos provinces. Between 1887 and 1895 Buenos Aires doubled in the number of industrial establishments and the amount of capital invested in them. By the time that the industrial

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[39]Ferrer, op. cit., p. 107.

[40]Ricardo M. Ortiz, Historia económica de la Argentina, 1850-1930 (Buenos Aires, Plus Ultra, 1964), II, p. 211.

[41]Horacio C. E. Giberti, Historia económica de la ganadería argentina (Buenos Aires: Ediciones Solar/Hachette, 1961), pp. 181-186.

[42]Santa Cruz, op. cit., Chapter I, pp. 11-16.

TABLE 7

SURFACE CULTIVATED IN HECTARES FOR THREE PROVINCES
1872, 1888, and 1895*

Province	1872	1888	1895
Buenos Aires	177,000	951,377	1,395,129
Santa Fe	62,548	598,568	1,684,937
Entre Ríos	34,000	138,651	430,593

*Source: Fuchs, op. cit., pp. 37, 51, 53.

census was taken in 1914, there were a total of 48,779 industrial establishments employing 410,000 workers. The 1935 census showed 544,017 workers employed in 40,606 establishments; the 1943 census showed 997,652 workers in some 65,801 establishments. Industry continued to grow, registering some 81,000 establishments in 1948. But, from the postwar years forward total production has increased only slightly and per-capita production has steadily declined.[43]

The Ethnic-Demographical Components

It is still firmly believed by many Argentines that their country is one of the most richly endowed countries in the entire world with respect to natural resources and is actually the number one power in all Latin America and potential' ; first-rate world power.[44] Argentina's

[43]Samuel Gorbán, Plantificación industrial (Rosario, Argentina; Editorial Rosario, S.A., 1947, pp. 14-24; Isacovich, op. cit., pp. 141-147.

[44]See Roberto Noble, Argentina: A World Power, trans. J. J. Britos (Buenos Aires: Ediciones Arayú, 1961), entire book, for a scholarly and systematic development of Argentine greatness.

inability to realize more fully its imputed greatness is often blamed on its having "a scarcity and not an excess of population."[45] To explore the implications of this and other ideas related to population, this section of the chapter will look at total population, population growth trends, distribution and density of population, ethnic groups and nationalities, mobility of population, and economic aspects of population.

Total Population

The census of 1960 shows Argentina having a population of 20,088,945 inhabitants. This figure is presently approaching 24 million. The greatest demographic concentration is in Buenos Aires province, which has 9,702,000 persons, nearly half the national total. The Greater Buenos Aires area lists some 6,763,000 persons and the Federal Capital about 2,967,000 persons.[46] Santa Fe province ranks second with 1,889,533 inhabitants in the 1960 census. Within Santa Fe province, the largest city, Rosario, is listed at 594,063 inhabitants, according to the 1960 provincial census, at 596,253 persons in the municipal census of late 1960; and at 652,843 persons in an estimate made in mid 1966.[47] The second largest city in Santa Fe province, the city of Santa Fe, has 208,350

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[45]The researcher was told by one second-generation Argentine in Rosario, Argentina, "Los males de la Argentina se deben no al exceso de población sino a la carestía de la misma." Conversations with hundreds of other Argentines at all societal levels elicited similar responses.

[46]Presidencia de la Nación, loc. cit.

[47]Clarín, op. cit., p. 15; Municipalidad de Rosario, op. cit., p. 2.

persons, according to the 1960 census.[48] Entre Ríos province has an estimated population of 803,505, according to the 1960 census, with projections of 812,197 persons for 1967 and 817,166 persons for 1970. Paraná city has 98,318 inhabitants, according to an academic study of 1963.[49]

Growth Trends of Population

Within each census period (1869-1895, 1895-1914, and 1914-1947) the total population of Argentina doubled. Since the natural growth was relatively small during this period, the explanation for such rapid growth lies in the large number of immigrants, totaling 6,609,186 persons, with a positive increment of 3,473,281 persons, who arrived by ship between 1857 and 1946. The greatest increment of immigration was between 1901 and 1910, in which a net favorable total of 1,120,179 immigrants remained in the country. Of the total immigrants who have remained in Argentina during its national history, 42.5 per cent originated from Italy and 33.5 per cent from Spain.[50]

In recent years, however, the immigration wave proceeding from Europe has all but stopped. In some cases, the net population movements between Argentina and other countries are reversed in favor of the other countries, e.g., as between Argentina and the European countries, the

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[48] Justo Cervera, op. cit., p. 53.

[49] Instituto de Planeamiento Regional y Urbano, op. cit., III, pp. 12, 15.

[50] Summarized in Monteagudo, op. cit., pp. 31-34.

United States, and Uruguay.[51] The trend of declining immigration from Europe is made even more significant by the almost stagnated natural increase in population, with the provinces of Entre Ríos and Santa Fe having shown hardly any net growth in population in the past two decades.[52]

Distribution and Density of the Population

Not only do the Litoral provinces account for 61.8 per cent of the total population of Argentina, but they have the highest numbers of inhabitants per square kilometer. Of course, the greatest concentration of people is in Buenos Aires. The Federal Capital in Buenos Aires province has 14,871 persons per square kilometer while Greater Buenos Aires has 1,854 persons per square kilometers.[53] The cities of Rosario and Santa Fe have roughly about 3,799 and 2,670 inhabitants per square kilometer and contain 49.5 per cent of the population of their province.[54] The city of Paraná has roughly a density of 3,400 inhabitants per square kilometer.[55]

Data is also available on the rural-urban distribution of the Litoral population. Considering as urban those centers of population

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[51]Dirección Nacional de Estadística y Censos, Boletín de Estadística, III trimestre (July/September, 1966), pp. 15-21.

[52]Instituto de Planeamiento Regional y Urbano, op. cit., I, pp. 11-18, 189-228; II, pp. 90-112.

[53]National Census of 1960.

[54]Municipalidad de Rosario, op. cit., p. 1; Justo Cervera, op. cit., p. 15.

[55]Instituto de Planeamiento Regional y Urbano, op. cit., III, p. 15.

greater than 2,000, the urban trend for the three Litoral provinces is quite notable. Table 8 gives the number of urban centers exceeding 2,000 inhabitants and the total population in these centers for the four census periods: 1869, 1895, 1914, and 1947. The urban trend, evident in this table, continues at an even greater rate after 1947. Buenos Aires province, which had but one-tenth of the national population in 1869, acquired one-fifth in 1895, one-fourth in 1914, and about one-third in 1947. The 1960 census reveals that Buenos Aires province contains almost one-half of the national total. Somewhat less intense is the trend in Santa Fe province, where the urban population has been at least doubling between periods. Urban growth is less spectacular, however, in Entre Ríos province, never quite doubling between censuses and being surpassed by Santa Fe province in the 1869-1895 period. In just the past decade, 1950 to 1960, the percentage of urban population in Argentina shows an increase from 64 to 68 per cent and the most recent estimation places the urban figure at 75 per cent.[56]

Not only does Argentina have a much lower birth rate than do its Latin American neighbors, but the distribution of its population is economically more favorable. The wide-based population pyramid, common to other Latin American countries, is not at all pertinent to Argentina. That Argentina has lower percentages of its people between 0 and 4 and 5

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[56]Demographic data on the Argentine urban trend are to be found in Gustavo Adolfo Nores, "La población y el desarrollo económico, con referencia a la República Argentina," Revista de Economía, XIII (Nov. 19, 1963), pp. 75-120; Dora Beatriz Ventura de Rimino in Conferencia Nacional Sobre Urbanismo (Boletín No. 2, 1966), p. 16.

and 14 years of age, meaning a less parasitic and potentially more economically active population, is readily seen in Table 9.

TABLE 8

NUMBER AND POPULATION OF THE URBAN CENTERS IN THE LITORAL PROVINCES WITH MORE THAN 2000 INHABITANTS*

	Buenos Aires		Santa Fe		Entre Ríos	
	No.	Pop.	No.	Pop.	No.	Pop.
1869 census	16	53,823	2	33,839	8	49,326
1895 census	61	324,770	7	129,976	12	91,843
1914 census	121	1,124,049	41	425,484	18	159,879
1947 census	146	3,049,182	69	984,599	32	421,314

*Source: Monteagudo, loc. cit.

TABLE 9

COMPARATIVE PERCENTAGES OF POPULATION BETWEEN 0-4 AND 5-14 YEARS IN SELECTED SOUTH AMERICAN COUNTRIES*

Country	Percentage of Population	
	0-4	5-14
Argentina	10.8%	19.6%
Bolivia	16.7	25.2
Brazil	17.0	25.3
Chile	15.3	23.3
Colombia	17.3	27.0
Ecuador	17.7	26.3
Paraguay	16.9	25.6
Peru	17.5	26.6

*Source: Nores, op. cit., p. 102.

Ethnic Groups and Nationalities

Professor Gino Germani, the Argentine sociologist, attributes singular importance to the study of the past immigratory waves into Argentina in understanding contemporary Argentina.[57] Data for Argentina assembled by Professor Ana Rosa Centeno from 1947 national census figures puts into relief the impact made by immigrants on the composition of the Argentine population.[58]

It will be observed in Table 10 that immigrants have represented and continue to represent a significant percentage of the total Argentine population. The high percentage of foreigners in Argentina over the years has substantially transformed the ethnic composition of Argentina's population in making it predominantly European. Thus, until recently the two most represented nationalities in the Argentine population have been the Italian and Spanish nationalities, as seen in Table 11. The newest ethnic trends in the composition of the Argentine population, however, are ones that will be discussed in the next section of this chapter.

Mobility of the Population

Four aspects of population mobility will be considered under the following headings: births, deaths, external migrations, and internal migrations.

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[57]Gino Germani, Política y sociedad en una época de transicion. De la sociedad tradicional a la sociedad de masas (Buenos Aires: Editorial Paidos, 1966), p. 179, writes: "La Argentina contemporánea no podría ser comprendida sin un análisis detenido de la inmigración masiva." (Contemporary Argentina cannot be understood without a careful analysis of the immigration factor.)

[58]Centeno, op. cit., pp. 3-4. See the complete listing on nationalities represented in the total population of Argentina for 1947 in Appendix C.

TABLE 10

TOTAL POPULATION AND NUMBER OF FOREIGNERS
PER 100 INHABITANTS (1869-1959)*

Years	Total Population	Foreigners per 100 Inhabitants
1869 (Census I)	1,737	12.1
1895 (Census II)	3,955	25.5
1914 (Census III)	7,885	30.3
1920 (estimate)	8,754	24.0
1930 (estimate)	11,746	23.5
1940 (estimate)	14,055	18.4
1947 (Census IV)	15,894	15.3
1950 (estimate)	16,061	15.7
1959 (estimate)	20,438	14.1

*Source: Germani, Política y sociedad . . , op. cit., p. 185.

TABLE 11

PRINCIPAL NATIONALITIES PER EVERY 100 IMMIGRANTS
(NET IMMIGRATION ARRIVING BY SHIP: 1857-1958)*

Periods	Italians	Spaniards	Poles	Others
1857-1860	79	21		
1861-1870	65	21		14
1871-1880	44	29		27
1881-1890	57	21		22
1891-1900	62	18		20
1901-1910	45	45		10
1911-1920	12	68		20
1921-1930	42	26	13	19
1931-1940	33	--	58	8
1941-1950	66	29	4	1
1951-1958	58	34	--	8
Average numbers (1857-1958 . . .	46	33	4	17

*Source: Germani, Política y sociedad . . , op. cit., p. 184.

Births. The yearly total of infants born in Argentina has shown a marked and progressive decline from 490,414 in 1962 to 487,883 in 1963, to 481,639 in 1964, and to 480,585 in 1965. A decline in the total number of births can be an indicator of economic and social development characteristic of an acquisitive and industrialized country. Of the total births in 1965, the Federal Capital records 68,251; the entire province of Buenos Aires 115,299; Entre Ríos province 21,696; and Santa Fe province 39,809--which is to say that the Litoral provinces with almost two-thirds of the national population account for little more than one-third of the births in the country.[59]

Deaths. Total deaths in Argentina in 1965 were 182,412, of which 107,392 were males and 75,020 females. The Federal Capital had 35,767 deaths; Buenos Aires province 52,482; Entre Ríos province 6,581; and Santa Fe province 16,885.[60] Since 1914 the death rate has been dropping. Infant mortality is closely correlated with the level of urbanization in the different regions. Accordingly, the Federal Capital, the most urbanized area in the country, has the lowest rate, 32.3 infant deaths per thousand births; Buenos Aires province, the most urban populated, is 49.9 per thousand; Santa Fe province, second in urban population, also has the second lowest rate of infant mortality; and Entre Ríos, the least urbanized of the three provinces, is 56.8 infant deaths per thousand.[61]

External migrations. There were 966,100 persons who entered Argentina in 1965, 457,700 of which were Argentines and 508,400 of other

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[59] Dirección Nacional de Estadística y Censos, op. cit., pp. 8-12.

[60] Ibid.

[61] Isacovich, op. cit., p. 271.

nationalities. In the same period, some 939,600 persons left Argentina, 466,300 being Argentines and 473,300 foreigners. This represented a gain of 26,500 persons over losses of 2,900 Argentine males and 5,700 Argentine females and gains of 21,800 foreign males and 13,300 foreign females. Without checking gains against losses and ignoring the category labeled "others," the following nationalities entered Argentina in 1965: 13,800 Germans, 33,300 Bolivians, 28,100 Brazilians, 58,700 Chileans, 29,200 Spaniards, 32,800 Italians, 49,400 Paraguayans, and 156,800 Uruguayans. Figures for those leaving Argentina during the same period were: 14,100 Germans, 16,500 Bolivians, 27,300 Brazilians, 53,000 Chileans, 30,700 Spaniards, 34,400 Italians, 24,600 Paraguayans, and 157,300 Uruguayans.[62]

Internal migrations. The ambitious six-volume study of Entre Ríos province and Paraná reveals significant depopulating movements away from rural life along the seaward course of the Paraná to the urban centers of Paraná, Santa Fe, Rosario, and Buenos Aires.[63] The movement of Bolivians and Paraguayans into bordering Argentine provinces is but part of the same movement that these Argentine provinces have registered toward Greater Buenos Aires. This urbanization trend from the northern regions of Argentina and neighboring countries southward to metropolitan Buenos Aires is a phenomenon that will be explored at greater length in pages 100-101.

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[62]Dirección Nacional de Estadística y Censos, op. cit., p. 15-21.

[63]Instituto de Planeamiento Regional y Urbano, op. cit., Vol. I, pp. 11-18, 189-228; Vol. II, pp. 90-112.

Economic Aspects of the Population

Of an estimated population of 21,000,000 in 1963, some 9,450,000 Argentines were esteemed to be "economically active."[64] Table 12 gives the economically active population and economically inactive population by age groups. According to the data presented in the table, the most economically active years are 20 through 40. Table 13, using a smaller base of economically actives (8,220,000 persons), shows the numbers and percentages of working personnel by branch of economic activity. This table shows that agriculture and industry employ the two largest blocs of workers.

TABLE 12

PERCENTAGE OF ECONOMICALLY AND NOT ECONOMICALLY ACTIVE IN ARGENTINA IN 1963 BY AGE GROUPS*

Age Groups	Economically Active Pop. Employed	Economically Active Pop. Unemployed	Not Economically Active	Population Total
	41.2	3.8	55.0	100.0
0-13	0.8	0.1	99.1	100.0
14-19	39.1	7.9	53.0	100.0
20-29	66.7	6.0	27.3	100.0
30-39	64.0	4.2	31.8	100.0
40-49	59.5	4.4	36.1	100.0
50-59	48.5	4.3	47.2	100.0
60-69	27.5	3.0	69.5	100.0
70 plus	8.6	0.5	90.9	100.0

*Source: Consejo Federal de Inversiones, op. cit., p. 78.

[64]Consejo Federal de Inversiones, Instituto de Investigaciones Económicas y Financieras de la C.G.E., Programa conjunto para el desarrollo agropecuario e industrial (Buenos Aires: Confederación General Economica, 1964), I, p. 75.

TABLE 13

THE ECONOMICALLY ACTIVE POPULATION IN 1961 IN NUMBERS AND PERCENTAGES BY BRANCH OF ECONOMIC ACTIVITY*

Activity	Number of Workers	Total Per Cent
Agriculture	2,100,000	25.5%
Mining and fishing	55,000	0.7
Manufacturing	1,800,000	21.8
Construction	350,000	4.3
Transportation and communications	565,000	6.9
Commerce	1,265,000	15.4
Banks and other financial businesses	75,000	0.9
Government employes	1,060,000	12.9
Independent professionals	145,000	1.8
Entertainment	55,000	0.7
Lodging and accommodations	140,000	1.7
Public Health and hygiene	160,000	1.9
Domestic service	350,000	4.3
Other	100,000	1.2
Total	8,220,000	100.0%

*Source: Isacovich, op. cit., p. 281.

The Psychological-Cultural Components

It is neither the gaucho of the pampa, nor the Indian of the North, but the European immigrant who is the representative inhabitant of the "urban Litoral." In arriving in Argentina, the immigrant adapts readily to his new surroundings[65] and is soon influenced by three psychological-cultural patterns, namely: the pattern of individualism, the pattern of masculine predominance, and the pattern, or cult, of friendship. These psychological-cultural patterns are important to know because they prevade all social and political relations.

[65]José M. Ramos Mejía, Las multitudes argentinas (Buenos Aires: Editorial Guillermo Kraft, Ltda., 1952), pp. 298-300, 306,308, discusses the rapidity with which the immigrant to Argentina adapts to his new surroundings.

The Pattern of Individualism

In Argentina, "the institutions and national problems never had organic life, even in their origin." Man was absolute and absolutely everything. "There were man-institutions not institutions of man." Hence, "all attitudes and opinions lived and died in man. They were almost man." Thus, "Sarmiento was education; Alberdi, constitution; San Martín, renouncement; Rosas, despotism." Today, it is noted that "the Argentine inhabitant never identifies with society nor institutions, but with man. He is never a citizen but ever remains an individual" and that "every time Argentine life assumes a manifestation it will be espoused and elaborated by some man."[66]

The Pattern of Masculine Predominance

It is a well-established male conception that marriage gives the Argentine man the possibility of fulfilling his role of father and producer and that within the framework of raising his children and providing and caring for his wife it is not incompatible for him to spend much of his time outside the home. This conception alone is the basis of many of the existing social standards in Argentina. Under the principle of "the woman at home and the man in the street and at work," there are many public places and functions attended almost exclusively by men: soccer games, the horse races, the bars and cafes, the billiards and pool halls, sports and other chiefly male clubs, conventions and business

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[66]Julio Mafud, Psicología de la viveza criolla (Buenos Aires: Editorial Américalee S.R.L., 1965), pp. 55-57; _____, El desarraigo argentino (Buenos Aires: Editorial Américalee S.R.L., 1959), pp. 57-59.

meetings, the movie houses during mid-afternoon, etc.[67] This sexual differentiation is sedulously maintained by the Argentine man who tends to resent the present trend of female emancipation,[68] for "the man does not marry for any particular woman but only to acquire his matrimonial 'status.'"[69]

The Cult of Friendship

Argentine life is greatly influenced by what Julio Mafud calls "the cult of friendship." The particular trait developed in the Indian

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[67]A noteworthy social institution is the predominantly male theater. One particular such movie house, the Cine "Sol de Mayo" in Rosario, Argentina is worth describing. The billing is generally three features, beginning at 1 p.m., with the last series of film showings at 7:50 p.m. The main floor is occupied exclusively by the men. Any women or children who arrive are forbidden entrance except to two narrow-spaced upper balconies with just one row of chairs each. On the main floor there are no fixed rows of seats, but hard wooden chairs arranged in rows. The attractions are a triple billing, a relatively cheap entrance charge (80 pesos, roughly 30 cents), and the prerogative to smoke, drink, boo, hiss, etc., inside with no managerial interference. The vast majority of the audience consists of salaried and day laborers, with only a handful of men seen wearing suits. This contrasts with another movie house, the Cine San Martín, located farther into town from the "Sol de Mayo," frequented chiefly by men in suits and ties. The charge is 100 pesos and films prohibited to minors under 18 and 21 are featured. For some specially adult film showings, the age requirement is raised even higher and patrons are requested to present documents to prove their ages.

[68]The male resentment toward female self-assertion in national life is humorously exemplified by the brief scene which was witnessed by an acquaintance of the researcher on one of Buenos Aires' public busses. One elderly Argentine lady standing up and seemingly quite irritated that none of the males seated near her would give up his seat, finally asked one of them: "Sir, don't you think that a lady should have your seat?" "No!" the man snapped, "You ladies fought for your emancipation and got it. Now take your own chances!"

[69]Julio Mafud, La revolución sexual argentina (Buenos Aires: Editorial Américalee S.R.L., 1966), pp. 58-59.

male upon having his woman taken by the conquistador, in the gaucho upon being expelled to the pampa almost womanless and without shelter, and in the immigrant upon growing up in an almost masculine world. Thus, it is observed that "the Argentine man does not hold love but friendship as absolute." Even today the Argentine man finds it quite impossible to establish any close friendships outside his own sex, although to be sure the Argentine man may have romantic or passionate attachments with female companions. As Mafud notes, the Argentine man, who still considers being in love as a masculine weakness, "will pour out his most anxious communication and feelings upon beings of his own sex." It is noted also that, in most instances involving society and the law, the Argentine will seek out foremost a male friend who knows society or the law and not society or the law itself.[70]

The Socio-Urban Components

Urbanism (the concentration of economic activities and people in a contracted area) in Argentina has its origin in the tendency of economic activities to localize in one common area in order to minimize the costs of transportation. Therein arises the concentration of economic and demographic movements in one area of reduced space.[71] The provision of services and other attractions characteristic of urban concentrations represent a "pull" factor in stimulating rural population to migrate to the cities. The input of rural persons into more urban

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[70]Mafud, Psicología de la viveza criolla, op. cit., pp. 96-99.

[71]Philip M. Hauser, "Urbanization: An Overview," in Philip M. Hauser and Leo F. Schnore (eds.), The Study of Urbanization (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1965), p. 7.

localities is termed "urbanization." The world-wide trend toward greater urbanization[72] has been even more starkly pronounced in the developing countries of Africa, Asia, and Latin America. In 1950 the urban population of Latin America stood at 50 million; by 1965 it had increased to 115 million. This revolutionary process has only just begun in Latin America, for it is predicted that the total population there will double within the next thirty years. And because the rate of population growth in the urban sectors is almost twice that of the total actual population,[73] the social, economic, and political problems resulting from an increasing urban population are expected to intensify to an even greater level of criticality in the next decade.

Urbanization has proceeded rapidly in Argentina. Whereas the urban population in Argentina in 1869 was 26 per cent and the rural population was 74 per cent, these figures are almost reversed today. This revelation accentuates the need for providing the basic services and necessities--water, food, housing, clothing, education, health, and sanitation, fuel, transportation, employment sources, etc.--to ever growing centers of population and economic activity. The housing deficit alone is around two million dwellings and is increasing at the rate of 150,000 per year. Running water, common to most large cities, is not enjoyed by 20 per cent of the inhabitants of the second city of Argentina,

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[72]"Facts and Figures of the Americas," Americas, XVII (May, 1965), p. 46.

[73]W. Stanley Rycroft and Myrtle M. Clemmer, Office for Research Commission on Ecumenical Mission and Relations, A Study of Urbanization in Latin America (New York: The United Presbyterian Church in the U.S.A., 1963), p. ix.

Rosario. And, with 2,966,816 persons living in just 199.5 square kilometers of space, the problems of demographic congestion and lack of sufficient services are critical and demand immediate solutions.[74]

Rather than discuss the more specific problems of urbanism, which will be dealt with in the next chapter, this section of the chapter will explore briefly the present extent of facilities for mass communication, public entertainment, and education in Argentina and the "urban Litoral." With a higher degree of development in any or all of these media of expression and learning, a more rapid and consequential degree of change can take place in Argentine society and politics.

Mass communication. In mass communication media Argentina greatly exceeds the minimum communication requirements per every 100 inhabitants (10 newspapers, 50 radio sets, 2 movie theaters, and 2 television sets) set up by UNESCO as a standard "for educating the masses."

Argentina has more than 300 daily newspapers and 1300 other periodical papers. Buenos Aires alone has more than 50 dailies circulating in excess of two million copies. More than 90 per cent of the adults in Buenos Aires are regular newspaper readers and there are 16 newspapers for every 100 inhabitants. Throughout the entire national listening audience there are 10 million radio sets (50 sets for every 100 persons), ten times the recommended UNESCO quota; and 60,000 new radio sets are sold every year. At present, an estimated 1,500,000

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[74]Dr. Miguel A. Nievas Goyenzchea, Conferencia Nacional sobre Urbanismo, Boletín No. 1 (November 7-12, 1966), pp. 3-4; Calamaro, op. cit., p. 279; Rofman et. al., op. cit., pp. 16-19; Tulio Carella, Picaresca porteña (Buenos Aires: Ediciones Siglo Veinte, 1966), p. 51; interview with Nelia E. Urcola, school teacher in the Bajo (low-level slums bordering the Paraná river), Rosario, Argentina, November 14, 1966.

television sets are functioning in Argentina. In a radial 80 kilometer distance centered in Buenos Aires, there are 1,111,760 television sets for 10 million persons, with a potential audience of 40 million viewers. Transmitting to this audience are some 24 regular and 6 dependent (channels which emit the programming of a parent channel) television channels which provide between 60 and 70 per cent of their own programming.[75]

Public entertainment. It is recommended by UNESCO that there be 2 movie theaters for every 100 persons. Argentina has a total of 2,931 movie theaters, which is an average of 5.2 theaters for every 100 persons. These theaters are attended by each inhabitant an average of 6.6 times a year, according to box-office figures.[76] As to official attendance at public functions, official data show a total attendance of 2,051,000 spectators at 567 soccer games for the first six months of 1966, with box-office earnings of 473,451,000 pesos. For the Federal Capital 930,000 spectators saw 188 games and paid 228,463,000 pesos in the same period. For the first seven months of 1966, some 2,425,000 persons went to 65 horse races. Ticket sales on the race-track events amounted to 5,379,342,000, having a total value of 10,758,685,000 pesos. With respect to professional boxing during the same period, there were 27 boxing cards

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[75]See Héctor Hugo Coda, La educación y las comunicaciones de masa (Buenos Aires: Ediciones Libera, 1966), pp. 30, 44, 72-73, 82-83, 101-105; Ronald H. Chilcote, "The Press in Latin America, Spain, and Portugal," Hispanic American Report (Stanford, California: The Institute of Hispanic American and Luso-Brazilian Studies, 1963), p. xxxii; Ricco Labhardt, "Argentina's Press Defends Its Freedom," International Press Institute Report, XII (January, 1964), p. 3.

[76]Coda, ibid., p. 73.

with a total of 96 separate fights which were seen by 69,000 patrons who spent 51,518,000 pesos on entrance fees.[77]

Education. For the Litoral region the mass educational facilities are particularly impressive. In Paraná city of Entre Ríos province in 1963 there were 18,006 pupils in primary schools, averaging one primary student per every 6 inhabitants. Schools total 55, there being 13,838 students in provincial schools, 5,063 in national schools, and 2,552 in mixed schools. This averages out to one school per every 2,036 inhabitants. Only 1,155 children, or 6 per cent of primary school-age children, do not attend. Of 23,295 adolescents (14-20 years), only 5,955 or 25 per cent attend secondary school. There is only one secondary school for every 8,615 inhabitants. In Santa Fe province (of which about 50 per cent of the total inhabitants are living in the cities of Rosario and Santa Fe), there are 1,656 primary schools which are attended by 235,534 students. In addition, there are 30,149 students in 15 normal schools, four professional schools, seven national colleges, thirteen commercial schools, and twelve industrial schools in Santa Fe province. The Universidad Nacional del Litoral has an enrollment of 19,679 of which 4,464 are studying in technical fields and 15,210 in medicine, economics, law, philosophy and letters, or music. In Buenos Aires province there exist some 4,149 primary schools, of which 2,157 are in rural areas. There are 89 schools available to 6,824 students for remedial teaching and other special services. In the Federal Capital there are 783 primary

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[77] See Departamento de Estadística y Censos, "Estadística de espectáculos públicos," Boletín de Estadística, op. cit., pp. 257-258.

schools with 262,000 students; 304 secondary schools with 113,000 students; 16 technical schools with 13,000 students; and 5 national universities with 60,000 students.[78]

The Political-Legal Components

The problems of a political nature which confront Argentina during this study will be discussed in the succeeding chapters. But to mention one political-legal issue affecting national development and pressuring the political system in actuality, there is the need to modernize and move ahead economically on the one hand and the deleterious effects of repressive and outdated laws which dampen modernization and development on the other hand. More specifically, the problem concerns "the freezing of rents" and the law of occupying unused housing.

The lower classes were aided considerably in their housing expenses by these two legally established practices passed during the Perón administration. By the freezing of rents, landlords are unable to raise the rental payments of their tenants, despite the rising cost of living and the rising value in housing. Consequently, many Argentine tenants are presently paying next to nothing for the housing they are renting while their landlords are paying out for taxes and utilities a greater amount than that which they are receiving from their tenants. Another aspect of the same problem which also developed during the Perón

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[78]See Instituto de Planeamiento Regional y Urbano, op. cit., II, pp. 193-199; Eduardo S. Calamaro, La comunidad argentina (Buenos Aires: Editorial Losada, S.A., 1963), pp. 203-204, 272, 292; Centro de Investigaciones Económicas, Instituto Torcuato Di Tella, Los recursos humanos de nivel universitario y técnico en la república argentina, op. cit., pp. 76, 78, 81.

administration, allows that any unoccupied or unused housing space can be squatted upon, and it is nearly impossible to evict the intruders. Persons can even move into an occupied habitation, particularly one enclosed by a high wall, and construct their own dwelling, taking advantage of a wall structure to build from one of its corners.

Food Supply and Consumption

The data collected by the researcher concerning food supply and consumption in the "urban Litoral" is not complete enough to use here. A passable amount of data was discovered for the city of Rosario concerning its consumption habits and food-supply sources,[79] but there is some question as to the value of such data by itself and whether it is representative of the entire Litoral region. It is encouraging, however, that an Argentine university graduate department is studying specifically the problems of food supply, distribution, and consumption--and has developed a framework and model for studying these problems.[80]

The Economic Components

Of considerable importance in studying the prospects of socio-political change in the "urban Litoral" of Argentina are the economic components of "the total environment." Because many of the economic factors will be examined in succeeding chapters, this section of the

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[79] Clarín, June 18, 1966, pp. 14-15; Municipalidad de Rosario, op. cit., pp. 31-36.

[80] Badler, et al., loc. cit.; Rofman et al., op. cit., pp. 1-34; Castagnola and Rosenfeld, loc. cit.

chapter will focus on presenting the general economic "picture" of Argentina and Argentina's Litoral region.

Gross National Product

The GNP for Argentina in constant figures, which are adjusted in relation to the real value of the peso, for 1960 through 1966 is given in Table 14. It will be observed that GNP shows no pattern of steady growth but rather varies from year to year. Thus, little if any actual growth has occured in the Argentine economy over the past six years. Table 15 gives GNP during the same period but in current figures. The inflated earnings in this table depict Argentina as undergoing a phenomenal rate of economic growth and hide the economic stagnation and fluctuations that are revealed in Table 14.

Gross Domestic Product

Another way of looking at the Argentine economy is by examining the Gross Domestic Product (Producto Bruto Interno), which tells the cost of the factors comprising the goods and services that are annually produced. For 1965, the productive value of the goods sector in constant figures, was about 584,931,000,000 pesos and services made up 450,473,000,000 pesos for a total Gross Domestic Product of 1,040,404,000,000 pesos. In the goods sector in 1965, industrial production achieved 365,099,000,000 pesos of the total whereas agriculture, forestry, fishing, and hunting accounted for only 173,344,000,000 pesos of the total. Construction was third with a product of 36,831,000,000 pesos and mining last with a product of 14,747,000,000 pesos. Banks, insurance, and real estate grossed

TABLE 14

GNP IN CONSTANT FIGURES (1960-1966)*

Years	Value in Millions of Pesos	Base Index 1960=100	Percentile Variation
1960	956,500	100.0	
1961	1,022,100	106.9	6.9
1962	989,300	103.4	-3.3
1963	964,700	100.9	-2.4
1964	1,052,300	110.2	9.2
1965	1,130,300	118.2	7.3
1966	1,077,300	112.6	-4.7

*Source: Fundación de Investigaciones Económicas Latinoamericanas, Indicadores de coyuntura, No. 8 (October, 1966), p. 56. Index and variations based on figures supplied by the Banco Central de la República Argentina.

TABLE 15

GNP IN CURRENT FIGURES (1960-1966)*

Years	Value in Millions of Pesos	Base Index 1960=100	Percentile Variation
1960	956,500	100.0	
1961	1,139,600	119.2	19.2
1962	1,403,400	146.7	23.1
1963	1,724,700	180.3	22.9
1964	2,349,000	245.6	36.2
1965	3,207,500	335.3	36.5
1966	4,079,300	426.5	27.2

*Source: FIEL and BCRA, loc. cit.

41,736,000,000 pesos and communications 8,817,000,000 pesos.[81] As the GNP figures show over the past six years, the individual cost factors for the 1960-1965 period also indicate a general stagnation in the economy. The fluctuation of the factor earnings (for example, industry produced less in 1962 than it did in 1961 and less in 1963 than in both 1961 and 1962) within the goods and service sectors is reflected in the annual gross product figures which similarly fluctuate, as shown in Table 14.

The Industrial Sector

More than seventy per cent of all the industry of Argentina is concentrated in the "urban Litoral" zone along the Plata and Paraná rivers between the ports of Santa Fe and La Plata.[82] Table 16 records the number and per cent of industrial establishments and workers in the "urban Litoral" against the national figures.

The Agricultural Sector

The Litoral region is also dominant in agricultural production, although the rest of the country is gradually increasing its percentage of the national total.[83] Table 17 presents the number of farms and agricultural workers in the "urban Litoral." The number of farms listed

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[81] Departamento de Estadística y Censos, op. cit., pp. 264-265.

[82] Isacovich, op. cit., p. 163.

[83] In 1955, the agricultural product of the Litoral earned 9.7 billion pesos, which was 66.7 per cent of the national total. In 1962, however, its percentage share fell to 63.5 per cent. Lorenzo Juan Sigaut, El desarrollo agropecuario y el proceso de la industrialización en la economía argentina (Buenos Aires: Oficina de Estudios para la Colaboración Internacional, 1964), p. 83.

TABLE 16

NUMBER OF INDUSTRIAL ESTABLISHMENTS AND WORKERS IN THE "URBAN LITORAL" (1966)*

	Number of Industrial Establishments	Number of Industrial Workers
Buenos Aires province**	50,000	342,000
Federal Capital	41,000	355,000
Santa Fe province	20,000	170,000
Rosario	8,243	75,598
Santa Fe	1,633	13,639
Entre Ríos province	4,000	20,541
Paraná	1,509	9,803
Litoral totals	115,000	887,541
National totals	151,828	1,055,496

*Sources: Isacovich, op. cit., p. 175; "Santa Fe: perspectivas y desarrollo económico," Veritas, XXXVI (June 15, 1966), p. 17; Dirección General de Estadística y Censos, Censo industrial de 1960, Boletín No. 9 (March, 1962), tabulations 1 and 11; Clarín, June 18, 1966, pp. 4-5; El Litoral, September 3, 1966, section 3, p. 2; Instituto de Planeamiento Regional y Urbano, op. cit., I, p. 228.

**Excludes the Federal Capital.

in the table covers a land extension of 11,400,000 hectares in Santa Fe province and 26,600,000 hectares in Buenos Aires province. The value of the agricultural production in Buenos Aires province is more than 30 billion pesos per year and more than 12 billion pesos a year for Santa Fe province. Data for Entre Ríos province was not collected. With respect to land under cultivation, Buenos Aires, Córdoba, Entre Ríos, Santa Fe, and La Pampa provinces contain 81.6 per cent of the cultivated area of the nation.[84]

[84]Oficina de Estudios para la Colaboración Económica Internacional, Producción agrícola argentina, a nivel provincial (Buenos Aires: Dirección de Plantificación y Estudios, 1965), pp. 14-15, 100.

TABLE 17

NUMBER OF FARMS AND AGRICULTURAL WORKERS
IN THE "RURAL LITORAL" (1966)*

	Number of Farms	Number of Workers
Buenos Aires province	101,493	339,900
Santa Fe province	56,267	171,600
Entre Ríos province	32,676	90,000**

*Source: Oficina de Estudios para la Colaboración Económica Internacional, loc. cit.; Raúl Pedro Scalibrini, Reforma agraria argentina (Buenos Aires: D. Francisco A. Colombo, 1963), p. 24.

**Represents an estimation based on population of Entre Ríos and number of workers in industry.

The Business Sector

In the first four months of 1966 Argentina's exports totaled 78,855,600,000 pesos or $426,600,000 (U.S. dollars) and its imports 45,489,800,000 pesos, or $240,900,000 (U.S. dollars). The net gain of exports over imports was 33,365,800,000 pesos, or $185,700,000 (U.S. dollars). Over the past four years exports have increased in volume and value while imports have tended to decline.[85] Concerning the domestic business sector, Buenos Aires has some 92,877 business establishments, 17,490 of which are wholesale, 59,124 retail, and 16,263 service establishments.[86] Rosario has 19,853 business operations, 2,369 of them being wholesale businesses, 13,970 retail businesses,

[85]Dirección Nacional de Estadística y Censos, Comercio exterior, C.I. 41 (January-March, 1966), pp. 2-4, 7.

[86]Calamaro, op. cit., p. 283.

and 3,514 services.[87] Data was missing for Santa Fe and Paraná.

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[87] Clarín, June 18, 1966, pp. 10-11.

CHAPTER IV

THE FUNNEL OF SOCIAL-CLASS INTERESTS

Within the components that comprise "the total environment," certain changes occur through time which set in motion processes that penetrate "the funnel of social-class interests" and enter the political system in the form of pressures or stabilizers.

This chapter will be concerned with "the funnel of social-class interests" in its role of formulating and generating a number of pressures on and stabilizers for the political system of Argentina. This latter focus on "stabilizers" for a system takes recognition of the fact that not all changes which occur inside or outside "the political environment" are of the destabilizing or disruptive type.[1]

The Social Structure

One of the underlying assumptions in this study holds that sociopolitical change is effected through 1) an aggregate force of a

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[1]It is pointed out by David Easton that change need not lead to an increase in volume of demands made upon a system; that a system will not necessarily be less stable because economic progress has resulted in an increase in organized demands, since an increased economic growth is likely to provide government with more funds with which it can more effectively satisfy the increased demands (A Systems Analysis of Political Life, op. cit., pp. 81-82); on the other hand, Louis Irving Horowitz (op. cit., pp. 431-441) proposes an ordering of theory of political change in which change is equated with instability; that the problem of development resides in determining "the point at which change can be at the expense of stability, or stability at the expense of change."

group of politically relevant causes proceeding from the total environment; through 2) a dynamic social struggle to determine the distribution of levels of power, wealth, status, and mobility among individuals, groups, and classes; and through 3) the relative size of each of the societies--the elite, mass, and marginal societies--that comprise the social-group funnel.

The Politically Significant Societies

With respect to the rate of flow of pressures and stabilizers through the social-group funnel and into "the political system," the critical or determinant variable concerns the percentages of individuals who will when tested fit into one of three societies: the elite, mass, or marginal societies. The procedure for determining these percentages consists of administering subjective-quantitative tests (measuring political alienation, anomie, and social participation) to subjects who are contacted--in this instance--by chance but whose tests are classified according to their respective socioeconomic levels, sex, and ages.[2] At this point, three kinds of hypothetical response patterns are assumed: 1) low alienation, low anomie, and high participation; 2) low or high alienation, low or high anomie, and low or high participation; and 3) high alienation, high anomie, and low participation. The first pattern

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[2]According to their total scores on education and occupation of themselves and their parents, subjects are classified into corresponding socioeconomic levels: 0-12, lower class; 12-20, lower middle class; 20-28, upper middle class. The predetermined ratio of interviews among these three socioeconomic classes is meant to simulate socioeconomic reality, as is also the ratio of male to female respondents and the ratio among the different age ranges.

it is theorized should correspond to the upper middle class, the second to the lower middle class, and the third to the lower class. But assuming that not every subject will respond in a manner indicative of his socioeconomic level, three new groupings, the "elite" society, the "mass" society, and the "marginal" society (which are sociopolitical rather than socioeconomic) are used for classifying the respondents into their respective response patterns.

The "Elite" Society

The position at the social-group funnel end in Diagram 1 is occupied by the so-called "elite" society.[3] What distinguishes this society from the mass and marginal societies, located farther up the funnel, is a particular "response" set to social participation, political alienation, and anomie.

Table 18 compares the size of original socioeconomic groupings used in the sampling and testing of subjects (the lower, lower middle, and upper middle classes, comprising about 40 per cent, 40 per cent, and 20 per cent respectively of the total sample universe) with newer sociopolitical groupings derived from the categorizing of individual responses according to three response patterns (labeled the "marginal," "mass," and "elite" societies by the researcher).

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[3]The term here, "elite," is assumed to be the more appropriate one to use. In labeling this innermost society the "ruling" or "governing" society, many "influential" but not necessarily "governing" persons would be excluded from consideration. It is a political fact that the "outs" may often exert more destabilizing pressure on a contemporary political régime and can have more influence on its dissolution than can the "ins" on the persistence and continuance of that régime. It is the objective of this scheme of classification to include all individuals who can exert influence on or otherwise determine changes that may take place in a political system.

TABLE 18

THE SOCIOECONOMIC COMPOSITION OF SOCIOPOLITICAL GROUPINGS IN NUMBERS AND PERCENTAGES

Socioeconomic Classification	Sociopolitical Classification "Elite" Society	"Mass" Society	"Marginal" Society	Totals
Upper middle class	14	4		18 (20%)
Lower middle class	13	22	1	36 (40%)
Lower class		12	24	36 (40%)
Total numbers	27	38	25	90
Total Per cent	30.0	42.2	27.8	100

The Size of the "Elite" Society

As demonstrated in Table 18, the percentage represented by the "elite" society nearly doubles the percentage represented by the upper middle class, which means that of the 18 interviewed subjects whose socioeconomic-status scores ranged between 20 and 28 points, 14 respond on the criteria (social participation, anomie, and political alienation) in a manner that agrees with the assumed response pattern for the "elite" society. From the next socioeconomic level, the "lower middle class," having a score range between 12 and 20, 13 of 36 individuals comprising that socioeconomic class respond in the same manner (low alienation, low anomie, and high participation) as should the "upper middle class." Thus, 27 subjects in all, or 30 per cent of the total

sample of respondents, reveal the three salient characteristics of the "elite" society: a social-participation score of 6 or more, indicating a high level of participation; a low political-alienation score of 3 or less; and, a low score of anomie or 5 or less.

The Characteristics of the "Elite" Society

Subjective-empirical characteristics. Socioeconomic status is taken into account largely in drawing the sample and interviewing the subjects. From there, to determine whether an individual is a member of the "marginal," "mass," or "elite" societies, the determinants are: social participation, political alienation, and anomie. The general orientation (alienated or not; anomic or not) that an individual takes toward life in general and toward local government in particular will affect how he is going to behave politically. And the potency of the influence that an individual may wield on his associates will be comensurate with the number of persons whom he is able to contact and the frequency with which he contacts them through both his formal and informal associations. Therefore, the measurable characteristics of the "elite" society are the numbers and percentages of subjects who respond high on the social-participation scale and low on the political-alienation and anomie scales. The "elite" society, then, consists of high social participants and negligibly alienated and anomic persons.

Other characteristics.[4] Apart from being less alienated from local government in particular and life in general, the members of the "elite" society are generally located in offices or positions of leadership and/or influence, being either the ruling force or decisionmakers at all levels of social, economic, and political life, or the principal molders of mass opinion, political ideologies, or academic and scholarly ideas. In other words, they are persons who occupy the highest institutionalized positions within the basic national institutional structure.[5] The "elite" society can be further characterized by the lesser degree of friction which exists among its members.[6]

The "Mass" Society

As explained in the preceding discussion concerning the "elite" society, some 13 subjects among a 36-subject sampling of the lower-middle-class society qualify as members of the "elite" society in being social participants while being neither alienated nor anomic. There are exactly 22 respondents in the lower middle class who demonstrate a response pattern

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[4]An excellent description of some of the qualitative characteristics of those who integrate this society is to be found in José Luis de Imaz, Los que mandan, op. cit., entire book.

[5]Imaz, ibid., p. 5.

[6]José Luis de Imaz in his two-volume study, Estructura social de una ciudad pampena (La Plata, Argentina: Departamento de Filosofía Instituto de Historia de la Filosofía y el Pensamiento Argentino, Universidad Nacional de la Plata, 1965), II, p. 147, discovered in having conducted opinion research on social stratification, distance, and mobility among social classes in Río Quarto, Argentina, that a great deal of affinity exists among members of the upper class; that the upper class members whom he contacted all considered themselves to be on the same social, economic, intellectual, and spiritual plane. Friction was nonexistent, the social distance being considerably less and mobility much greater for the upper class than for the members of any other social class.

indicative of the "mass" society, which is augmented by four persons from the upper middle class and twelve persons from the lower class who responded in similar manner. Thus, the "mass" society ends up with 38 persons or 42.2 per cent of the sample universe, who are neither highly alienated and socially isolated nor negligibly alienated and socially participating but who demonstrate a mixed response pattern to all these characteristics.

The Characteristics of the "Mass" Society

Subjective-empirical characteristics. Whereas the "elite" society is comprised only of those subjects who are high participants and low-alienated and low anomic persons and the "marginal" society of those who are low participants and high alienated and high anomic subjects, in the "mass" society none of the members is wholly alienated nor wholly non-participating. Consequently, the mass-social individual may be either a "participant" or an "isolate." But if he is one or the other, he does not record any of the responsive sets which complement the "elite" or "marginal" patterns. Thus, the mass-social individual, who may score as a low social participant or "isolate," does not score as being both anomic and alienated but as being one or the other or neither; the mass-social individual who is a high social participant, similarly, is not both politically alienated and anomic but one or the other or neither.

Other characteristics. The "mass" society is chiefly characterized by the socio-politico-economic heterogeneity of its members. Since the defining characteristics of this society are its "split personality" and its social-psychological ambivalency in not fitting either the "elite" (socially participating and not anomic nor alienated) or the "marginal"

(socially isolated and anomic and alienated) patterns, its membership may be drawn from all three of the socioeconomic levels used in this study: the upper middle, lower middle, and lower classes. Results of the tests, to be reported in Chapter VII, "Alienation and Participation," reveal that 22 individuals or 64 per cent of the lower middle class group fulfills the necessary conditions for "mass" society membership. One-third of the lower class (12 individuals) and from one-fifth to one-fourth of the upper class (4 individuals) are also able to qualify for inclusion in the "mass" society.

What further characterizes this "hypothetical" society is that its members are widely dispersed at all middle or mass levels of national life, most generally being found in any of the public currents: the growing numbers of small white-collar public and private employes; the thronging crowds in the streets, the restaurants, and the movie houses; the excitable spectators at the soccer games and race tracks; etc. It is an active, mass-participating society, the bases of which have long been under formation.[7] And, although its economic position has deteriorated since 1947,[8] it nonetheless has maintained its same level of consumption and other outward signs of affluency.[9]

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[7]Rodolfo Puiggrós in a lecture given at the Teatro de Independencia in Buenos Aires, attended by the researcher, December 5, 1966, enumerated in much detail the late nineteenth-century conditions and developments which laid the bases for the emergence of a "mass" society in this century. These bases are also described by Gino Germani in his Política y sociedad en una época de transición. De la sociedad tradicional a la sociedad de masas, op. cit., chapters 3, 4, 7, and 8.

[8]Justo Cervera, op. cit., pp. 37-39.

[9]It is readily admitted by Argentines at all societal levels that they have not sacrificed their acquisition of luxuries nor their expenditures on entertainment, despite increasing difficulty because

The "Marginal" Society

At the top of the funnel of socioeconomic interests is the "marginal" society.

The Size of the "Marginal" Society

Under its spatial allocation in Diagram 2, the "marginal" society is seen to occupy just 27.8 per cent of the total funnel space, as compared to 42.2 per cent for the "mass" society and 30 per cent for the "elite" society. While exactly one-third of the subjects in the lower class qualify as "mass" social members, none of the upper middle class and just one subject in the lower middle class show the "marginal" characteristics of isolation, alienation, and anomie.

The Characteristics of the "Marginal" Society

Subjective-empirical characteristics. The "marginals" are readily distinguishable by their almost complete nonparticipation, alienation, and anomie. The mental state (a great sense of normlessness, powerlessness, meaninglessness, isolation, and self-estrangement) of the "marginals," together with their anti-sociability and estrangement from pluralistic activity, almost ensures that they do not act politically

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of rising living costs and the diminishing monetary value of their currency. "We go on spending just the same. Haven't you noticed that the movie houses and restaurants are always packed? The way we spend and consume is the one great national vice." And to illustrate the veracity of the foregoing indigenous criticism, reference can be made to just one luxury item: the automobile. Whereas only a relatively small percentage of persons possessed automobiles ten years ago in Argentina, increasing numbers of middle class members, particularly, are acquiring automobiles. Data show that in 1964 the national figure was one automobile for every 16 inhabitants. But in the zones of Buenos Aires there is one car per every 5 persons; and, in Mendoza, with 109,149 persons in 1960, the figure was 1 per 5.3, decreasing to 1 per 3.7 persons in 1964 when the city had 20,000 more inhabitants (La Razón, November 16, 1966, p. 8).

in a society nor influence any political action that may be taken by a society. Consequently, insofar as sociopolitical change is concerned, the "marginal" society exerts no effective influence.

Other characteristics. As suggested by the term, the "marginals" are persons who live almost on the "outside" of society and civilized living. While there exist so-called "marginal" areas in which to live (slums, villas de emergencia, or villas miseria), objective socioeconomic indicators cannot reveal the subjective attitudes of slum inhabitants nor the meaningful sociopolitical activity by such persons. Many Argentines, it was noted, were living in "marginal" areas but did not reflect a mental set complementary to their lower living conditions. But, it can be generally said that the "marginal" person stays pretty much to himself and seldom leaves the neighborhood in which he barely subsists. His knowledge of life is thin and distorted, filled with superstition, and he is distrustful of all persons who live outside his immediate environment. He is continuously under the harsh realities of death, sickness, starvation, poverty, hard physical labor with poor compensation, and abusive treatment by those who are his socioeconomic superiors.[10]

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[10]For one of the most realistic and descriptive treatments of the type of individuals who comprise the "marginal" class and the conditions under which they live, see Bernardo Verbitsky, Villa miseria también es América (Buenos Aires: Editorial Universitaria de Buenos Aires, 1966); also, there appear the works of Juan Bosch, Cuentos santafesinos (publication data missing); Mateo Booz, Tres lagunas (Santa Fe, Argentina: Librería y Editorial Castellví, S.A., 1953); J. P. Echague, Tradiciones, leyendas y cuentos argentinos (Buenos Aires: Epasa-Calpe Argentina, S.A., 1960); and, the movie production, "Los inundados," based on the novel by Mateo Booz of the same name and produced by Productora América Nuestra in 1960.

A large proportion of the "marginal" society, because of the scarcity and irregularity of employment for its members, is counted within the "economically inactive" population.

Political Significance of the Structure

The very general theory which explains the flow of pressures and stabilizers through the social structure into the political system holds that the most catalytic bloc of individuals in forcing sociopolitical change are those represented in the "mass" society.[11] In sum, the larger the "mass" society is in relation to the "marginal" and "elite" societies, the greater will be the outputs of "pressures" on the political system; the larger the "elite" society in relation to the other two societies, the greater will be the outputs of "stabilizers" into the political system; and, the larger the "marginal" society in relation to the other two societies, the smaller will be the outputs of both "pressures" and "stabilizers."

The results. In comparing the socioeconomic (the lower, lower middle, and upper middle classes) with the sociopolitical (the "marginal," "mass," and "elite" societies) structures in Table 18, it is seen that not all lower-class members are "marginals" and not all lower

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[11]The reader is referred to the preceding discussion on the characteristics of each of these three societies. There it was noted that the "elite" society is more approving of society and government and more able to achieve its goals of change through legitimized channels; the "mass" society is not quite so approving of life and the role of government in satisfying its wants, and its members have sufficient social contacts through which they can influence the process of change; and, the "marginal" society is so estranged from society and government and its social contacts so greatly limited that its influential capacity is nill and make it a poor catalyst for any kind of change activity, even for the transformational activity which is already in progress.

middle class members are members of the "mass" society. If all socioeconomically sampled subjects were to respond on the subjective-quantitative sociopolitical tests in a pattern corresponding to their stratum (whether lower, lower middle, or upper middle class), both structures would be exactly the same. But the fact is that the "elite" society represents 30 per cent of the socioeconomic funnel as compared with 20 per cent for the upper middle class in modern society; the mass-social subjects are 42.2 per cent in the socioeconomic funnel and the lower middle class 40 per cent in society; and, the "marginals" the remaining 27.8 per cent of space in the funnel while the lower class is 40 per cent in society.

Implications for change. While in general persons who are far down on the scales of occupation, education, and socioeconomic status tend to be socially isolated, politically alienated, and anomic, such is not entirely the case for Argentine lower-class subjects. Exactly one-third of the lower class subjects in the sample show mass-social patterns in not being consistently isolated, alienated, and anomic.[12] Furthermore, it is observed that persons who are not quite so well off in terms of occupation and education may still show characteristics of the "elite" society in being socially active, not alienated, and not anomic. This suggests a favorable trend for stable and gradual evolutionary sociopolitical change in Argentina. The trend looks favorable

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[12]This result is especially significant in view of the fact that most interviews of the lower class were conducted in areas inhabited by that species of human called the inundado, a transit day laborer of precarious living facilities and habits whose impoverished dwelling is near enough to the banks of the Paraná river that he is frequently flooded out; hence, the term inundados, meaning the "flooded ones."

because, first, there are much fewer persons, only 27.8 per cent of the social structure, who are "marginals" and hence not acting in the society. This means a greater amount of over-all political activity will be generated, with more than 70 per cent of the social structure being active in socio-politico-economic life. Second, there are 27 persons, or 30 per cent of the sample, who demonstrate characteristics of the "elite" society, indicating the existence of a significant front-line of national leaders and persons of influence to foster smooth, nonviolent change and to cushion and channel the more violent pressures that are made on the system.[13]

The Social Struggle

Whereas the previous section identifies and describes those variables that help to explain the rate of flow of "pressures" and "stabilizers" into the Argentine political system, this section will discuss the content of those "pressures" and "stabilizers."

The Objects of Social Struggle

A major assumption in this study is that a political system is more directly and strongly pressured from the aspirations of individuals, groups, and societies, which aspirations arise from the struggle for 1) wealth and welfare distribution, 2) power and political participation,

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[13]The results show that 14 of 18, or 77.8 per cent of the upper middle class, are members of the "elite" society. This is significant since those who rank in the upper middle class for this study must obtain educational-occupational scores that total above 20, which in turn signifies that these individuals are high-level officials and/or highly educated persons who are on the front-line of influencing or determining policy and decisionmaking in the "urban Litoral."

3) social status (education and occupation), and 4) mobility and prestige and crystalize into "pressures" that are directed at the political system. The content of those societal demands is determined by the shifting predominance of each one of the four objects--wealth, power, status, and mobility--of social struggle and conflict. If, for example, the participants in the social struggle are chiefly concerned about the acquisition and distribution of the national wealth, then, those pressures most frequently and intensely made upon the political system will be of an economic and welfare-distributive character. Each of the previously named areas of struggle will now be elaborated somewhat.

Wealth and Welfare Distribution

Between 1890 and 1940 Argentina enjoyed a half century of stable prices and a hard currency. During this time the increase in monetary circulation paralleled closely the growth in production. But, from 1945 to 1965, international payments increased 200 fold while production only doubled. This condition was symptomatic of a most pernicious and rampant inflation, marked by a steady decline in annual per-capita income, by a stagnation of GNP, and by a persistent rise in all the cost of living indicies and the numbers and percentages of the population not economically active.[14] Consequently, demands are increasing not only for more personal

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[14]"Inflación y estancamiento económico," Panorama de la Economía Argentina, V (II trimestre, 1966), pp. 48-49; Instituto de Investigaciones Económicas y Financieras de la Confederación General Económica, Programa conjunto para el desarrollo agropecuario e industrial (Buenos Aires: Consejo Federal de Inversiones, 1964), Vol. I, pp. 13, 58-65, 78; Dirección Nacional de Estadísticas y Censos, Secretaría de Estado de Hacienda, Costo de vida, precios minoristas, salarios industriales, informe E.S. 45 (October, 1966), pp. 7-10; Clarín Económico, VI (June, 1966), p. 1.

goods but to see Argentina achieve a higher rate of development.[15] In this economic state, the more important considerations are the stagnation of the economy, the levels of wages and cost of living, ownership and control of the means of production, and economic problems that are of a social nature: housing, unemployment, health, public services, etc.

The Stagnation of the Economy

It is widely recognized that a great disequilibrium exists among the different sectors of the Argentine economy[16] and that the present economic structure is dated and dominated by vested interests that cannot be easily dislodged.[17]

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[15]"Inflación y estancamiento económico," Panorama de la Economía Argentina, ibid., pp. 52-54; Instituto de Investigaciones Económicas y Financieras de la C.G.E., ibid., pp. 184-197; Javier Villanueva, The Inflationary Process in Argentina, 1943-1960 (Buenos Aires: Instituto Torcuato Di Tella, Centro de Investigaciones Económicas, 1966 edition), pp. 35-64; Carlos García Martínez, La inflación argentina (Buenos Aires: Guillermo Kraft, Ltda., 1965), pp. 341-354, 370-373.

[16]Leopoldo Portnoy, Análisis crítico de la economía argentina (Buenos Aires: Fondo de Cultura Económica, 1961), pp. 14-16; Oficina de Estudios para la colaboración Económica Internacional, Producción agricola argentina, a nivel provincial (Buenos Aires: Dirección de Plantificación y Estudios, 1965), p. 100; _____, Economía agropecuaria argentina, problemas y soluciones (Buenos Aires: Dirección de Plantificación y Estudios, 1964), Vol. I, pp. 28-35; Instituto de Investigaciones Económicas y Financieras de la C.G.E., ibid., pp. 182-184; Benito Marianetti, Argentina, realidad y perspectivas (Buenos Aires: Editorial Platina, 1964), pp. 69-104; "Rosario y la zona de libre comercio," Zona, I (June, 1965), pp. 3-8; National Conference on Urbanism, notes on "Sesión plenaria," Rosario, Argentina, November 8, 1966.

[17]Gastón Gori, La forestal, la tragedia del quebracho colorado (Buenos Aires: Editoriales Platina/Stilcograf, 1965), entire book; "Puerto Rosario: puerto de hoy," Puertos Argentinos, VII (Nov. 15, 1963), pp. 20-25; Clarín, June 18, 1966, p. 9; Juan Lazarte, Federalismo y decentralización en la cultura argentina (Buenos Aires: Catedra Lisandro de la Torre, 1957), entire book and especially pp. 1-67; Ricardo Zorraquín Becú, El federalismo argentino (Buenos Aires: Editorial Perrot, 1958), pp. 89-118; Portnoy, ibid., pp. 191-197; Scalabrini, op. cit., pp. 23-28.

In order to reconstruct the Argentine economy and provide the necessary stability for its growth, it is surmised that a certain amount of innovation and competition will be required.[18] It needs no saying that the psychological cost of giving modernization and stability to the Argentine economy will be great, and there is no end of opposing schools on just how this modernizing and stabilizing process should be effected.[19]

Wages and the Cost of Living

Wages. It was reported that the real worker salary, based on 1948 as 100, declined to 67.3 for unskilled workers and 62.0 for workers in supervisory positions by mid 1963; and that whereas dependent workers received 50.5 per cent of the total economic remuneration as compared with 49.5 per cent for the entrepreneurs, professionals, owners, and independent workers in 1949, the former received 41 per cent compared with the latter's receiving 59 per cent in 1962.[20]

Cost of living. It would seem that salary-wise most workers are not any worse off than in past years,[21] however, the inflationary character of the national monetary unit makes such comparisons meaningless. A more revealing measure is the cost of living index, as based on some particular year. Note the results in Table 19. The white-collar

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[18]"Inflación y estancamiento económico," Panorama de la Economía Argentina, op. cit., p. 54.

[19]See the opinions recorded in Chapter VIII, pages 220-228.

[20]Isacovich, op. cit., pp. 283-289.

[21]Clarín Económica, VI (June, 1966), p. 1; see also Dirección Nacional de Estadística y Censos, op. cit., pp. 43-44.

employe class has suffered higher rises in its cost of living index than has the working class for every year since 1960. And, in September of this past year the figures reached 451.0 to 381.4 respectively.[22]

TABLE 19

CUMULATIVE INDICIES OF THE COST OF LIVING FOR WORKERS AND EMPLOYES, 1960-1966*

Years and Months	Level	
	Workers	Employes
1961	113.7	120.0
1962	145.7	153.1
1963	180.7	193.3
1964	220.7	238.6
1965	283.8	316.8
July, 1966	371.4	432.7
August, 1966	375.7	441.9
September, 1966	381.4	451.0

*Source: Fundación de Investigaciones Económicas Latinoamericanas, loc. cit.

The foregoing data lend validity to the conclusion that all socioeconomic sectors, except the very upper classes - top-level bourgeoisie,[23] have been negatively affected by national economic conditions. While the much publicized worsening condition of the worker is exaggerated and his loss a good deal smaller than he would have the national authorities believe, it is seen that the "real" wage of the

[22] Fundación de Investigaciones Económicas Latinoamericanas, Indicadores de Coyuntura, No. VIII (October, 1966), p. 9.

[23] Isacovich, op. cit., p. 282, cites data showing each bourgeois-class member receiving a remuneration figure of 8.60 to the middle-class member's 0.15 and the lower-class member's 0.10.

worker has been higher in past years,[24] which now motivates him to attempt forcing a redistribution of income that will again be in his favor. The middle class has definitely had its previous economic position impared and its "real" salary gains nullified by a superior increase in cost-of-living expenses.

Ownership and Control of the Means of Production

Basically, all the land, industry, and economic means of production have been under the ownership and monopoly of individuals who are nearly all of upper class status or of the upper middle class.[25]

Socially Derived Problems

Unemployment. It is noteworthy that Argentina, which never went above an unemployment figure of 6 per cent even during the depression, registered an unemployment figure of 8.8 per cent of its economically active population in July of 1963 and 7.5 per cent in April of 1964. For 1965 the figure was 5.8 per cent, and for 1966 it fluctuated between 5.4 per cent for July and 7.4 per cent February and March.[26] In October, 1966, it was 5.2 per cent as compared with 4.6 per cent in October of the previous year.[27]

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[24]César H. Belaunde, Problemas de política social (Buenos Aires: Ediciones Troquel, 1964), p. 47, using 1943 as the base year, surveys the comparative cost of living and nominal and real salaries for the industrial worker since 1937, noting that while the "real" salary was at 148.4 in 1963 and 142.9 in 1962 it had been 172.6 in 1958, 162.6 in 1957, 162.2 in 1949, and 156.4 in 1950.

[25]Isacovich, op. cit., pp. 292-299; Gastón Gori, El pan nuestro (Buenos Aires: Ediciones Galatea-Nueva Visión, 1958), pp. 143-145; Imaz, Los que mandan, op. cit., pp. 106-163.

[26]Fundación de Investigaciones Económicas Latinoamericanas, op. cit., p. 26; Belaunde, op. cit., pp. 101-103.

[27]La Capital, November 17, 1966, p. 7.

Housing. Lack of housing has been a continuous national and personal problem,[28] the solution of which is most pressing for the lower and middle sectors of the population. Some eight million persons in Argentina are now in need of more adequate housing. As to the deficit in number of houses needed it is estimated that the growing deficit of dwellings will reach six million by A.D. 2000.[29]

Migrations. A vast number of immigrants, an estimated two million,[30] have poured into Argentina from the bordering countries, especially from Paraguay, Bolivia, and Chile. This influx of large numbers of generally unskilled and illiterate persons constitutes not only a great problem to the national authorities but to all Argentine citizens who must compete with the cheaper foreign labor,[31] for there are many social and economic implications of such population movements. And, the extreme reverse of this situation is the emigration from Argentina of professionals and technicians.[32]

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[28]It was noted in 1939 that of 31,951 inhabitants in the city of Rosario, Argentina, only 3,392 persons were living under adequate conditions. Alcides Greca, Problemas del urbanismo en la república Argentina (Santa Fe, Argentina: Universidad Nacional del Litoral, 1939), p. 46.

[29]"Juan sin techo," Panorama, No. 43 (December, 1966), pp. 32-37.

[30]"Argentina, país invadido" Panorama, No. 37 (June, 1966), p. 94. There are an estimated 900,000 Bolivians living in the villas miseria of Buenos Aires--Confirmado, II (December 8, 1966), p. 38. In the Patagonia of Argentina, the Chileans comprise 42 per cent of the population there, and in the Chacarita station of the Urquiza railroad in Buenos Aires two trainloads of upwards of one thousand Paraguayan immigrants arrive per week--"Argentina, país invadid," Panorama, op. cit., pp. 88-89.

[31]"La inmigración de los países limítrofes," Panorama de la Economía Argentina, V (II trimestre, 1966), pp. 55-60; "Argentina, país invadido," ibid., pp. 88-94.

[32]Summarized data for the 1951-1960 period of Argentine immigrants admitted into the United States show a total of 8,515 persons, excluding unskilled workers. Of this total 3,946 were professionals and technicians,

Provision of services. The problem of not being able to provide all the population in the urban centers of the Litoral with the essential services is one that affects the lower and middle classes the most since the upper classes are either able to afford private services or to use their political connections in obtaining desired services.[33]

Health and medical care. In the areas of health and medical care, particularly, are the social-class interests well differentiated. The upper class will afford the very best of private medical care, the middle class will obtain some private and public medical assistance, and the lower class will have no other recourse than to free public medical assistance.[34]

1,377 high-level administrators, and 3,192 skilled workers. See Morris A. Horowitz, La emigración de profesionales y técnicos argentinos (Buenos Aires: Editorial del Instituto Torcuato Di Tella, Centro de Investigaciones Económicas, 1962).

[33]Parodi, loc. cit.; Arrue Gowland, loc. cit. Dirección General de Estadístico del municipio, Boletín estadístico de la ciudad de Rosario (Rosario, Argentina: Municipalidad de Rosario, 1960), pp. 25-26, 42; interview with Alberto Pedro Pablo Fiorucci, Jefe de División Técnica (Technical Division Chief), Rosario, Argentina, Oct. 18, 1966; interview with Raúl O. Ramón Flores, Comisario del Cuerpo de Bomberos Zapadores (Commissioner of Fire Fighting Units), Rosario, Argentina, Oct. 18, 1966; and interview with Julio A. Giosa, Inspector Mayor (Chief inspector, Head of Fire Fighting Units), Jefe del Cuerpo de Bomberos, Rosario, Argentina, Oct. 18, 1966.

[34]Interviews with José Ciampo and Adelina De Tulsio de Propersi, social workers, Departamento de Servicio Social, Hospital Centenario, and Lidia Hernández de Vitoriosso, Instituto Infantil, Parque 9 de Julio, Rosario, Argentina, Oct. 17, 1966; Dr. Pedro León Luque, La salud en el medio urbano (Rosario, Argentina: Conferencia Nacional sobre Urbanismo, 1966), pp. 1-7; Dr. Miguel A. Nievas et. al., Urbanismo y salud (Rosario, Argentina: Conferencia Nacional sobre Urbanismo, 1966), pp. 1-9.

Power and Political Participation

The social struggle in the sphere of power and political participation, though only moderately intense during the period of this study,[35] should receive increasing attention as the different lower and middle socioeconomic groups grow in political maturity and organization and arrive at a greater recognition as to the content of their group interests.[36]

Social Status: Occupation and Education

In the struggle for socioeconomic status, again, the lower and middle classes, but particularly the latter, are apparently at a disadvantage. With per capita industrial productivity somewhat stagnated and the agrarian sector having long suffered the same fate, the number of lower-level industrial jobs do not seem capable of meeting the increased demand created by increasing rural-to-urban migrations and migrations from the bordering countries. But, among low-level bureaucrats, many of whom are entrenched in the state monopolies, the job situation is even

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[35]This was chiefly because all political groups and movements were suppressed by the revolutionary government until it could achieve its goals and until that time when the country, in its judgment, would be ready to have political parties and to hold elections. The majority of the citizens were content to allow the new government a free hand in resolving the problems of the country and to a large degree refrained from engaging in political activity.

[36]Germani, Política y sociedad en una época de transición, op. cit., pp. 240-242, points out that the so recent formation of the industrial working class, as well as the recency of the advent of the middle classes,--this "recent formation," "without the traditions of prestige," explains greatly the irrationality of the masses in having accepted peronism (pp. 245-252) and in having lived through the contingencies of Argentina in "the post-Perón era"; and to Torcuato S. Di Tella, El sistema político argentino y la clase obrera (Buenos Aires: Editorial Universitaria de Buenos Aires, 1964), p. 9, the working class of Argentina is "a class still in formation."

more precarious.[37] As for educational opportunities among the classes, the Argentine case shows that any capable individual of lower class origin is able to alter his social position and to scale the social ladder through acquiring an adequate education. Still it is true that lower class students are enrolled in smaller proportion to the upper and other superior classes.[38] Nonetheless, the lower class students are not at a disadvantage. In the study by Gino Germani and Ruth Sautu it was discovered that lower-class students as a group are more close-knit and homogenous and hence more organized than are students of other social class origins. It was further shown that lower class students attend school and take examinations with nearly as much regularity as do the other social classes and are involved in only a few more instances of irregular behavior and infraction of rules than are other social classes.[39]

Furthermore, public higher education in Argentina is free even to foreign students (there are many Peruvian students who study in Argentine universities) and there are no high fees to pay. As for the entire social spectrum it is noted that over the years an increasing percentage of the entire population is achieving secondary and university education.[40]

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[37]As will be discussed later, many of the state ministries and departments are overstaffed, pointing toward the desirability of dismissing the surplus number of employes and threatening the ones to be dismissed with the prospect of having to be absorbed by private industry.

[38]Of the total Argentine university students, only 8 per cent are of lower-class origin. "Ideas," Extra, II (November, 1966), p. 37.

[39]Germani and Sautu, op. cit., pp. 58-69.

[40]Centro de Investigaciones Económicas, Los recursos humanos de nivel universitario y técnico en la república Argentina (Buenos Aires: Instituto Torcuato Di Tella, 1965 edition), parte I, p. 73.

Mobility and Prestige

Within both the lower and middle classes upward vertical mobility is possible. The working class, which has never regained the prestige that it formerly enjoyed during the Perón years,[41] is yet lacking in the leadership which must necessarily precede its social reassertion. The middle social range seems yet too heterogeneous ever to conceive or achieve a common ideology. Some individuals in the middle class who have not found a personal identification with that class have aligned with the lower classes and are in most cases the leaders of the working-class groups with which they have affiliated. The upper class is not able to assert itself as openly now as in the era of capitalistic development (1870-1930) and has had to settle for greater political anonymity while achieving a disproportionate share of economic wealth.

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[41]Germani, Política y sociedad en una época de transición, op. cit., p. 244.

CHAPTER V

THE FUNNEL OF POLITICAL-GROUP INTERESTS

While the fundamental approach in studying sociopolitical change in the "urban Litoral" of Argentina is total or comprehensive in purporting to view all aspects of the change process, the major emphasis in this study is on the urban community. Consequently, political groups and power blocs are not examined as extensively. Nonetheless, this chapter will focus on the structure and struggle of some of the principal political groups which wield influence on the Argentine political system during the period of this study.

It seems unrealistic to view political man as being isolated from the society in which he lives. Rather, the phenomenon of grouping provides every individual with a number of political roles and related memberships. Out of these roles and memberships, which are neither static nor regressive, various political groupings emerge. In time, every political group develops a consciousness or self-awareness of its own personality and acquires a unity of common purposes which guide its strategy and actions. Moreover, every political group has its own power base, which is partly determined by the size of the group and by the degree of cohesiveness which exists among its members.

The Structure of Political-Group Interests

The structural classification system under which the political-influence groups will be examined is the tripartite system proposed by Professor Carlos S. Fayt in which these groups are classified according to the nature of their political activity. "The funnel of political group interests" is composed of interest groups, pressure groups, and tension groups. In this chapter, each of these three kinds of groups will be defined in terms of general characteristics, which may be applied to any country, but particular groups will be identified and described as they appear in the substantive context of Argentine politics.

The Political-Group Interests

Each of the three political-group interests--interest groups, pressure groups, and tension groups--will now be defined and briefly described.

The "Interest Groups"

The position at the end of the political-group funnel in Diagram 1 is occupied by "interest groups." What distinguishes interest groups from pressure and tension groups is that interest groups petition directly the public holders of power and their right to do so is duly recognized and respected by the authorities in the political system.[1] In effect, interest groups are defined in this study as any collectivities of forces or groupings

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[1]Iris Mabel Laredo, Los grupos de presión como factores reales de poder (Rosario, Argentina: Instituto de Derecho Público y Ciencias Sociales, Universidad Nacional del Litoral, 1966), p. 16.

of interests which are found in the society, economy, or government, and which have sufficient resources and means for expressing and articulating their interests. While interest groups try to promote certain programs and ideologies and to bring the influence of their organizations to bear on the official power structure,[2] they are more highly esteemed and their political activities more fully accepted by the system authorities than is the case with pressure and tension groups. Interest groups, too, can be recognized for their rather close communication with the governing officials and their rather effective facilities for political action, as well as by the fact that they have long been in existence and their appearance on the political scene is more or less traditional.

The Size of "Interest Groups"

In this study no direct attempt was made to measure the size of the three political groups. The period of time in which this study was conducted would not have permitted a very precise measurement in any event.

The Kinds of "Interest Groups"

Whether a group is designated as an interest, pressure, or tension group depends not only on the political behavior of the group in question (whether it uses direct and legitimate means in its quest to influence the power factors) but on the official or governmental attitude toward such groups.[3] Too, an interest group, in order to be classified as such, need

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[2]Fayt, op. cit., pp. 183-184.

[3]Whereas the Argentine political parties normally function within a legitimate and constitutional framework, their dissolution and suppression by the military government during the time of this study means that their political activity is neither desired nor respected by the official power-holders. Thus, while political parties generally act under official sanction

not itself petition the public power holders if the reverse occurs and the national powerholders petition the interest group. The effect of the political system being influenced is the same in any event whether the group petitions the system or the system the group. Under this and the preceding criteria, the researcher identifies three kinds of interest groups: religious, economic, and international.

Religious. The chief religious interest group was the Roman Catholic Church itself, particularly the ecclesiastical hierarchy of the Church. In the established national and provincial constitutions, which have evolved during the course of Argentine national history, the Catholic Church was made the official state religion and authorized to receive state support.[4] In actual practice, the Church is highly regarded by the state and receives financial support. In present-day politics, it is quite obvious that the Catholic Church wields influence and helps to determine national policy.[5]

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and high esteem in Argentina, they are neither sanctioned nor highly esteemed in this instance and hence cannot be considered as "interest groups" according to the preceding definition.

[4]Salvador M. Lozada, Instituciones de derecho público (Buenos Aires: Ediciones Macchi, 1966), pp. 136-141, discusses the state and provincial constitutional precedents establishing the Roman Catholic religion as the official state religion and, as such, according it special protection and privilege. This fact has had numerous legal consequences, especially in the areas of education and marriage, favoring the position and doctrines of the Catholic Church (pp. 142-150).

[5]Luis H. Decurquez, "¿Gobierna la Iglesia hoy en la Argentina?" Política Internacional, No. 79 (September, 1966), pp. 17-19, 22-24; "Iglesia: antes que las ideas, un buen gobierno," Confirmado, II (September 22, 1966), pp. 24-26.

Economic interest groups. There are two major economic-interest groupings, both of which have long engaged in lobbying and other political activity to influence national policy and to bring about sociopolitical change, operating more or less legitimately in the political arena. Under the first grouping come two massive entrepreneurial or bureaucratic organizations. The first is represented by the Asociación Coordinadora de Instituciones Empresarias Libres (Co-ordinating Association for Free Industrial Institutions), a superstructure composed of three entities: the Unión Industrial Argentina (Argentine Industrial Union), the Cámara Argentina de Comercio (Argentine Chamber of Commerce), and the Comisión Coordinadora de Sociedades Rurales (Co-ordinating Commission of Rural Societies). The second organization is the Confederación General Económica (General Economic Confederation), a federation of three distinct sectors: the Federación de la Industria (Federation of Industry), the Federación del Comercio (Federation of Commerce), and the Federación de la Producción (Federation of Production), plus various economic federations at the provincial level. Each of these two vast organizations has sufficient political connections to influence some degree of change of policy and to make its preferences and opinions felt by the system authorities.[6] The second economic-interest grouping is composed of labor and trade-union entities and is generally represented by just two general labor organizations:

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[6] Imaz, Los que mandan, op. cit., pp. 126-142; Raúl Puigbó, Cambio y desorganización sociales (Buenos Aires: Editorial Pleamar, 1966), pp. 325-329.

the Confederación General de Trabajo (General Labor Confederation) with 2,334,380 members and the Unión Ferroviaria (Railroad Union) with 222,978 members.[7]

International interest groups. Events in Argentina during the period of this study showed the military-directed government to be highly sensitive to international bodies and world opinion. Among the more important international interest groups that were contacted and courted by the Argentine government were: Inter-American Development Bank; Export-Import Bank; GATT (General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs); International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, or, as it is more popularly called, the World Bank; the Latin American Free Trade Association; the International Monetary Fund; and the International Development Association.[8] These international organizations are classified as interest groups, because their reactions and policies toward Argentina greatly served to influence the national government in the formulation of its policies and decisions.[9]

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[7]Imaz, ibid., pp. 208-235 and particularly p. 218; "C.G.T.: en la encrucijada," Confirmado, II (December 8, 1966), pp. 17-19. While members, local chapters, and smaller divisions of these two labor organizations may not petition the power holders directly nor always resort to legal means of political action, there is at least a fair proportion of top-level activity undertaken by officials of these organizations which falls within the range of interest-group influence.

[8]"La invasión de las Malvinas," Primera Plana, IV (October 10, 1966), pp. 19-21; "Banco Mundial: informe," Primera Plana, V (November 28, 1966), pp. 75-76; "Un servicio de salvataje permanente," Análisis, VI (October 31, 1966), p. 13; Crónica, November 21, 1966, p. 4.

[9]"Tolosa: ¿héroe o traidor?" Primera Plana, V (December 6, 1966), p. 15; La Razón, Nov. 8, 1966, p. 1; La Prensa, Dec. 6, 1966, p. 1; "Energía a la caza de créditos," Primera Plana, IV (September 29, 1966), p. 61; "A la espera de dólares," Primera Plana, IV (October 10, 1966), pp. 12-14; "Podemos competir en ALALC," Análisis, VI (October 31, 1966), pp. 66-67; "Paso decisivo de los empresarios," Análisis, VI (November 7, 1966), p. 14; Esquiu, Nov. 20, 1966, p. 9; "Argentina en la Rueda Kennedy," Primera Plana, IV (October 25, 1966), pp. 61-62.

The "Pressure Groups"

Not too unlike interest groups, "pressure groups" also attempt to influence the decisions of the public holders of power.[10] However, pressure groups bring pressure to bear on the system authorities, rather than formally petitioning or presenting requests to them. That is, pressure groups are organized almost exclusively for the purpose of pressuring the political system. This is either because they do not have the close contact that interest groups have with the system authorities, or because pressure politics are their most effective "game." Their desires for certain favorable action on the part of system authorities are converted into demands and protests that are supported by pressure rather than by formalities and niceties, as with interest groups. Furthermore, pressure groups operate outside the governing framework and seek to gain the sympathy of the public as much as they seek to attract the attention of the system authorities; but, they neither create nor provoke public disorder, limiting their action to at least the appearance of legal sanction.[11] That is, pressure groups attempt to attain their desired ends without altering or jeopardizing the public order.[12] In other words, they are more prone toward demonstrations, pickets, strikes, lobbying pressure,

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[10]For an excellent handling of pressure groups vis-à-vis the public power holders, see Germán J. Bidart Campos, Grupos de Presión y factores de poder (Buenos Aires: Editorial A. Peña Lillo, 1961).

[11]Pressure groups are likely to engage in coercive measures and use all means, legal and illegal, at their disposal to further their ends, but always under the façade of normality and legality. They fear loss of position and privilege as repercussions to their exceeding the boundaries of acceptable political behavior.

[12]As Professor Fayt, op. cit., p. 185, notes concerning pressure groups: "They long to maintain or even to extend their situation or privilege or their security; that is, to conserve their benefits, advantages, utilities, or economic privileges. They do not seek to level-off the economy, or to equalize economic benefits."

etc., but are not willing to go so far in their efforts that they provoke retaliation from those whom they are pressuring; there are recognized limits to their political activity and behavior.

The Size of "Pressure Groups"

As noted under "interest groups," no attempt was made to measure the size of any of the three kinds of political groups. But "pressure groups" appear to be more numerous in Argentina than either interest or tension groups.

The Kinds of "Pressure Groups"

In accordance with the preceding definition and description, there are six major kinds of pressure groups: the armed forces: high-ranking officers, social defensive groups, professional organizations, church-related organizations, political party leaders, and moderate university student organizations.

Armed forces: high-ranking officers. This particular "pressure group" represents in simplest terms the military "outs,"[13] i.e., persons who are high-ranking officers in the armed forces but who are not accorded decisionmaking status and who do not support or remain neutral toward the persons who have decisionmaking status. In any given opportunity, their neutrality or opposition to the regime is capable of crystallizing into conspiracy and other types of political activity.[14] Because of their

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[13]The "ins" would be those members of the armed forces who are either seated in the government, as were several of the chief military personnel in the Onganía administration, or who are among those military elements supporting and backing up the ones in power.

[14]The colorado faction in the army, generally, and such enigmatic military leaders as Division General Osiris Villegas, particularly, represented a source of pressure on the Argentine government during the

high status alone, all top-level military officers represent a threat to the decisionmaking authorities.

Social-defensive groups. Among the groups that are both formally and loosely organized but which all represent a source of real pressure on any ruling regime are the various associations of retired workers and employes and those living on government pensions, the associations of retired military personnel, the association of contributors and benefactors, and the associations of tenants and renters, plus various family co-operatives. These groups are organized to act in behalf of their own social interests.[15]

Occupational organizations. The grouping of occupation organizations consists of economic, labor union, and guild divisions.

In the first division may be included all the smaller economic organizations which are appended to the two larger organizations: ACIEL and CGE. Collectively, grouped under one or the other of these two giant structures, the smaller economic groups constitute interest groups; but, individually, each smaller unit or entity is a pressure group.

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period of this study. Primera Plana related that since May of 1963, when a Christian Democrat accused him of wanting to take over the government and install a military-labor dictatorship, conspiracy and General Villegas have been synonymous. See "Ejército y gobierno: ¿hay plazos?" Primera Plana, IV (October 18, 1966), pp. 12-14. But while a much greater percentage of azules (military personnel, led by Lieutenant General Onganía who defended the national Constitution and constitutional legality against the colorados, their antithetical contemporaries, in September of 1962 and April of 1963) are found among the high governing officials, it was observed that the colorados had made inroads into controlling the universities and the means of communication. It was affirmed in November, 1966, that "the universities are in the hands of the colorados" and that "the means of communication also have been placed in the hands of ex-colorados or stalwart colorados." "Para un colorado no hay nada mejor que . . . otro colorado," Extra, II (November, 1966), p. 7. See also "El gobierno y las fuerzas armadas," Inédito, I (October 12, 1966), pp. 4-6.

[15]In this regard, it is impressive to view the movement of public co-operatives in Argentina. There were 3,433 co-operatives with 2,616,292

Thus, the following economic organizations, in acting politically wherein their own business goals are the raisón d'être, are "pressure groups": the Cámara Argentina de Fomento del Intercambio (Argentine Chamber of Exchange Development); the Unión Industrial Argentina (Argentine Industrial Union); the Cámara Argentina de Comercio (Argentine Chamber of Commerce); the Sociedad Rural (Rural Society); the Cámara de Sociedades Anónimas (Chamber of Anonymous Societies); the Federación Gremial del Comercio e Industrial (Trade Federation of Commerce and Industry); the Bolsa de Comercio (Commercial Exchange Center); and the Asociación de Fábricas de automotores (Association of Automobile Factories), which represent multiple associations of companies and individuals which pressure collectively; then, Acindar, DECA, Mercedes Benz, FIAT, ESSO, and Cantábrica, Kaiser S.A., IBM, RCA Victor, Swift (individual companies of economic stature and prominence within their respective industrial branches); and finally certain family-ownership associations: Bunge and Born, Braun-Menéndez Behety, and Di Tella.[16]

Among the organizations in the labor-union division the following stand out: the separate sixty-two national organizations which make up the CGT, e.g., Confederación General de Empleados de Comercio (General Confederation of Business Employees), La Fraternidad (The Fraternity), the Unión de Trabajadores de la Industria del Calzado (Shoe Industry Workers Union), Federación Argentina de Trabajadores de Industrias

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members in 1964. Today there are more than 4,000 co-operatives. The leading co-operatives are: agricultural (621 organizations), electric (587), milk (501), credit (432), and consumer (260). See "El destino de las co-operativas," Correo de la Tarde, VIII (September 28, 1966), p. 8.

[16]Puigbó, op. cit., pp. 327-329; Imaz, op. cit., pp. 132-139; Isacovich, op. cit., pp. 293-296.

Químicas y Afines (Argentine Federation of Chemical and Related Industries) Unión Obrera Metalúrgica (Steelworkers Union), Sindicato de Mecánicos y Afines del Transporte Automotor (Syndicate of Mechanics and Automotive Transporte Workers), Unión de Trabajadores Gastronómicos (Gastronomical Workers Union), Sindicato de Trabajadores de Industrias de la Alimentación (Workers of Food Industries Syndicate), Asociación de Trabajadores del Estado (State Employes Association), Asociación Bancaria (Banking Association), etc.; and, the provincial and other smaller divisions of the same.[17]

The third division, the guilds or trade unions, include most of the occupational categories which correspond to professionals and high-level employes, e.g., the medical association, the dental association, the association of pharmacists, the several associations of teachers and university professors, the various civil-servant or government-employe associations, etc.[18]

Church-related organizations. Apart from the Roman Catholic Church itself as an interest group, other entities within the Church, plus other denominational organizations, qualify as pressure groups. Particularly influential were the Acción Católica Argentina (a specially effective pressure group) and the different Catholic university student organizations, as well as certain priestly and other orders.[19]

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[17] La Razón, December 13, 1966, p. 1; Imaz, ibid., pp. 216-217; "La política laboral," Primera Plana, IV (September 20, 1966), pp. 18-20.

[18] Puigbó, op. cit., p. 328.

[19] Imaz, op. cit., pp. 164-183; Lozada, loc. cit.; Laredo, op. cit., p. 34.

Orthodox political party leaders. While the national political parties were not legally operative during the period of this study, they nonetheless did not refrain altogether from political activity.[20] Particularly significant was the role played by the various political-party leaders in evaluating the government and its methods, in maintaining certain laison activity, in suggesting new approaches to politics in general and political alignments in particular, and in otherwise maintaining pressure on the national political system.[21]

Moderate university student organizations. There are a large number of Argentine student organizations of different tendencies which entirely span the ideological continuum.[22] Not all, however, act as pressure groups, or are sanctioned and their activities approved by the national authorities.[23] The university organizations that act as pressure groups and are more or less tacitly accepted by the administration are:

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[20]"Políticos: soñar no cuesta nada," Primera Plana, IV (October 24, 1966), p. 21; "UCRP Speaks Out," Buenos Aires Herald, November 20, 1966, p. 2.

[21]It is noted that ex-President Arturo Frondizi and his adviser, Rogelio Frigerio were active in the Centro de Estudios Nacionales: Arturo Frondizi, et. al., Introducción a los problemas nacionales (Buenos Aires: Centro de Estudios Nacionales, 1965), preface and p. 299; that other major political figures were also active, particularly during the period of the study: "¿Qué pueden hacer los Radicales?" Primera Plana, V (November 29, 1966), pp. 18-20. See also footnote "46" in this chapter.

[22]Antonio Salonia, "Política educacional," Introduccion a los problemas nacionales, op. cit., pp. 187-200; Leon Berdichevsky, El peronismo en la Universidad del Litoral (Buenos Aires: Ediciones Libera, 1965), pp. 80-93; Interview with fourth-year medical student, Rosario, Argentina, Oct. 27, 1966.

[23]Berdichevsky, loc. cit.; Carlos L. Yegros Doria, La reforma universitaria hoy (Buenos Aires: Ediciones Libera, 1965), pp. 49-53; 65-78; Sergio Morero, "Rosario: el ojo de la tormenta," Primera Plana, IV (October 25, 1966), pp. 16-19.

the various university faculties and their administrators (e.g., in Economics, Exact Sciences, Philosophy and Letters, Engineering, Architecture, Medicine, etc.) and certain of the more orthodox faculty and student groups (e.g., Federación Universitaria Argentina (Argentine University Federation), Federación Universitaria de Buenos Aires (University Federation of Buenos Aires), Federación Universitaria del Litoral (University Federation of the Litoral), Federación Universitaria de Córdoba (University Federation of Córdoba), and Federación Universitaria del Sur (University Federation of the South).[24]

The "Tension Groups"

In contrast to interest and pressure groups, "tension groups" create and provoke organized crises and, on occasion, they disrupt the economic order. In their search for material security they are often found outside the law. They display a social rather than economic power in confronting the governing authorities. Tension groups are wont to choose those means which are illegal and which threaten the public order, being afraid of neither social convulsion nor anarchy and seeking a leveling of the economy and an equal distribution of the national wealth. And, because tension groups often lack the requisite funds to utilize on a grand scale the mass media and other influential propagandistic means, they often mobilize vast social sectors and deliberately create states of tension by the effects of their paralyzing and disrupting activities: strikes, sabotage, demonstrations, etc.[25]

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[24]Jorge G. Mancinelli, "Universidad: cuatro meses de botet," Imagen del País, I (November, 1966), pp. 27-30; Bernardo Kleiner, Veinte años de movimiento estudiantil reformista, 1943-1963 (Buenos Aires: Editorial Platina, 1964), pp. 342-343, 347-367.

[25]Fayt, op. cit., pp. 184-185.

The Size of "Tension Groups"

The percentage of tension groups within the total context of political-influence groups is ever in a state of flux since any group (interest or pressure) is potentially a tension group, depending on whether it feels inhibited by formal legality, whether it determines that the structure in which it operates is too restrictive, and whether it decides to use the same modus operandi as coincides with a tension group.

The Kinds of "Tension Groups"

Fulfilling the definition of tension groups are: militant political-party leaders, extremist university student organizations, working-class and middle class organizations which function as "tension" groups, and the illegal and extremist organizations that are committed to violent, anarchic, and radical political behavior. It will be recalled that not only do groups who function extra-legally outside the system qualify as tension groups, but any group is potentially or actually a tension group so long as its existence and activity are not condoned by the system authorities.

Militant political-party leaders. Differing from the orthodox political-party leaders, the militant leaders are those who are at odds with the system authorities and who feel obligated or who prefer to depart from the usual and acceptable means of influencing decision and to create "tension" in order to achieve their ends.[26]

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[26]It is worth noting the contrast in behavior between the orthodox and the militant political-party leaders. The former reorganized their

Extremist university student organizations. The rise of student political organizations as tension groups resides in two phenomena: 1) the political force of the middle classes, which greatly sense the inferiorities of underdevelopment and which have made nationalism a political doctrine and 2) the narrowness of national politics which excludes the urban proletariat from active political participation. In this kind of atmosphere, student groups are able to organize and take advantage of opportunities, backed by a sumpathetic public, to dramatize their opposition to any government.[27]

The social-tension groups. In this and the previous chapter, it was pointed out that within the lower and middle classes there exists a modest percentage of individuals who are politically alienated and yet highly participating in their societies. For both lower and middle classes the political machinery for expressing demands or wants is

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political activity in the form of study centers or communicate through publications (books and periodicals) and otherwise remain in the public light. But the militant party leaders retreated to secret havens and begin clandestine operations, without other pretense. The latter is represented by the parties at the extremes of the political poles.

[27]Some of the more influential student groups are: APRI--the Agrupación Pueblo y Reforma Indoamericana (People and Indo-American Reform Group); CEFYL-FUA (the front of the Argentine University Federation and other anti-imperialist elements); FANDEP: Federación de Agrupaciones Nacionales e Estudiantes Peronistas (Federation of National Groups and Peronist Students); MNR--Movimiento Nacional Reformista (National Reform Movement); JUP--Juventud Universitaria Peronista (Peronist University Youth); Tacaura (the ultra-nationalist group), which destroyed paintings of Elizabeth II, Prince Phillip, and Winston Churchill and defaced the walls in the British Consulate in Rosario in October, 1966; the Liga Humanista (Humanist League), and other humanist groupings; the Juventud Comunista (Communist Youth); and other Communist and Trotskyite groupings, etc.

rather ineffective and limited, so that individuals with common interests will quite often decide to band together in order to put pressure on the political system and to act as a tension group.[28]

The anarchists and extremists. If the actions of social-tension groups, or of the individuals who participate in such groups, become chronically polarized in various forms of anarchic and extremist activity,[29] such actions will represent a source of continuous instability to a system, as well as an explosive catalyst for rapid and violent change.[30]

Political Significance of the Structure

No sophisticated theory has yet been contrived concerning political groups for Argentina, apart from classifying them according to the nature of their activity (whether they go about petitioning, pressuring, or upsetting the regime in power). However, it is possible to make several non-rigid, theoretical assumptions concerning the type of political-influence activity that prevails within the Argentine political system. Normally, the society and the political system will change more

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[28]Examples of this would be the immigrant societies in Argentina at the turn of the century, the spontaneous demonstrations and marches by working-class and white-collar masses, and the tension arising from marginal social areas in which there is privation and no hope of imminent satisfaction of unattended needs or neglected services. See "De la rebelión a la madurez política: las masas argentinas buscan su rumbo," Análisis, VI (October 17, 1966), pp. 16-20.

[29]It is generally known statistically that more than two thousand bombs have been exploded in the Federal Capital in the past decade by peronist and anarcho-syndicalists.

[30]It is logical that this tension group should include all those elements definitely seeking to overthrow the régime in power by violent means, among which could figure army officers, die-hard revolutionists, and the political "outs" who have so little actual power and prestige that they are forced to embrace extremism and violence.

rapidly and radically from interest-group activity, provided that the political system possesses too low a capacity to absorb pressures and tension activity. Where the political system receives sufficient inputs of stabilizers and is sufficiently strong to withstand any degree of tension and pressures, the number of tension groups and the intensity of tension-group activity will have less significance.

The results. The structure of political groups in Argentina is a highly pluralistic one in which there appear a large percentage of pressure groups. It is observed that the different political-influence groups may perform in more than one capacity, as interest, pressure, or tension groups. Furthermore, it is seen that the degree of political freedom which different groups are accorded by their governments affect in no small manner the ideological positions taken and the methods of political action used by these groups.

Implications for change. The leading implication for change which the preceding discussion highlights is the possibility of increasing pressures and tensions because of there being too few interest groups that have official acceptance and sufficient means to act effectively and legitimately. This situation could be largely alleviated by broadening the funnel end of the political-influence structure; that is, by restoring the former political parties to legal status and by providing for the political representation and integration of the Argentine working classes.

While it is true that the political parties and the other political groups each have their own ideas and disagree as to what the country needs and appear not to accomplish anything, it is obvious that the artificial suppression and submersion of their legitimate political

activity will only force that activity to operate below the surface of legality and to emerge as explosive "tension."

The Struggle for Political Influence

This section of the chapter will discuss the objects of political struggle, from which the political system is pressured.

The Objects of Political Struggle

The same theoretical criteria that describe "the objects of social struggle" in the preceding chapter may also apply to the political-influence groups in their struggle for 1) wealth and welfare distribution, 2) power and political participation, 3) social status (education and occupation), and 4) mobility and prestige. From the struggle within and between the political groups to obtain the desires of their demanding and pressuring efforts, certain "pressures" are generated which are directed at the political system. The content of these political demands is determined by the shifting and predominance of each of the four objects--wealth, power, status, and mobility--of political struggle and conflict.

Wealth and Welfare Distribution

It was correctly stated by one source that the revolutionary government in Argentina (the same one that existed during this study) "is not a fascist government because its ideas in economic, social, and moral concepts are those of a hundred years ago. . . ."[31] The fact is

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[31]George R. Waggoner in A Report to the American Academic Community on the Present Argentine University Situation; prepared by the Fact-Finding Commission of the Latin American Studies Associations (Austin, Texas: Latin American Studies Association, 1967), p. 42.

that the ideas of the Revolution of June 28, 1966, are basically those upheld by the oligarchic, conservative governments that were ruling in Argentina until the Saenz Peña law of 1912.[32] This phenomenon can be explained largely by referring to the alignment of political groups described in the first part of this chapter. There, it was pointed out that the most influential political groups in terms of power and position are the economic groups: the ACIEL and the CGE. It is reasonable to assume that with such favorable resources these economically based interest groups should be able to influence national policy. But the activity of these two interest groups is only part of a broader, more sweeping orientation which is responsible for the content and direction of Argentine policy.

The Capitalist Orientation of Political Influence

The capitalist heritage. The capitalist period in Argentine history began shortly after the advent of the Constitution of 1853 and persisted into the twentieth century, reasserting itself strongly just before the Revolution of 1943. Its theme was expounded by Juan Bautista Alberdi: gobernar es poblar (to govern is to populate), which meant not only bringing in European immigrants to populate the sparsely settled country but also importing the progressive ideas of European civilization. In short, the capitalist colonization of Argentina was an intense phase

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[32]The more specific aspects of late nineteenth century Argentine capitalism, especially in its political machinations, can be read in Rodolfo Puiggrós, Pueblo y oligarquía, Vol. I: Historia crítica de los partidos políticos argentinos (Buenos Aires: Jorge Alvarez, Editor, 1965), pp. 67-159; still other aspects of the capitalist period are found in Gastón Gori, Inmigración y colonización en la Argentina (Buenos Aires: Editorial Universitaria de Buenos Aires, 1964), pp. 49-102.

of economic development which sought to transform Argentina into a modern nation.[33] Another of its exponents, Domingo Faustino Sarmiento, gave the structure its educational substance,[34] while ingenius developmental programs were shaped by Juan Bautista Alberdi, Julio A. Roca, Nicolás Avellaneda, Bartolomé Mitre, and other members of the "paternalistic oligarchy." The leading tenets of these programs were: suppression of the caudillos in the provinces, colonization and exploitation of the natural wealth via construction of railroads, attraction of immigrants, use of foreign capital, and orientation of the national monetary and trade policies to favor a world-trade economy.[35]

Revised industrial capitalism. But the rapid national development, based on the productivity of the agrarian sector, slowed down and even stagnated while the industrial sector continued to expand, and in productivity industry gradually surpassed agriculture.[36] Thus, a new era of industrial capitalism began which, aided by the world-wide depression

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[33]Notes by researcher of lecture given by Rodolfo Puiggrós, Buenos Aires, December 5, 1966.

[34]A. J. Pérez Amuchástegui, Mentalidades argentinas (1860-1930) (Buenos Aires: Editorial Universitaria de Buenos Aires, 1965), p. 45, and all of Chapter I, "Mentalidad de la oligarquía paternalista," pp. 13-99.

[35]Puiggrós, lecture, loc. cit.; Juan Manuel Santa Cruz, Ferrocarriles argentinos ("Cuaderno del Instituto de Derecho Público y Ciencias Sociales"; Rosario, Argentina: Universidad del Litoral, 1966), pp. 11-16; Germani, Política y sociedad en una época de transición, op. cit., pp. 179-216.

[36]Floreal A. Ferrara, Desarrollo y bienestar argentino (La Plata, Argentina: Librería Renacimiento Editorial, 1966), pp. 59-62, 79-84, 95-96; Roberto Cortés Conde, "Problemas del crecimiento industrial (1870-1914)," Argentina, sociedad de masas, eds. Torcuato S. Di Tella, Gino Germani, and Jorge Graciarena (Buenos Aires: Editorial Universitaria de Buenos Aires, 1966 edition), pp. 59-84; Samuel Gorbán, Plantificación industrial (Rosario, Argentina: Editorial Rosario, S.A., 1947), pp. 14-24; Isacovich, op. cit., pp. 141-147.

and the special protection afforded to industry by World War II, became strongly entrenched in the thinking and life of the Argentine lower classes.[37] Now, after two decades of only a slight increase in total industrial productivity and an over-all decline in per-capita industrial productivity, there is a resurgence of the old capitalism. This hegemony of the old agrarian capitalism has blended with the newer industrial capitalism to form a "revised industrial capitalism." Its political influence has worked to modify the industrial capitalism of the preceding and immediate postwar years and to insert some of the old principles of nineteenth-century capitalism which are manifested in current official Argentine policy.[38]

Revised Industrial Capitalism and Postwar Nationalism

When notice is taken of the post-war economic stagnation that has plagued Argentina and the instability and failures of all the civilian governments during this period, it seems understandable and inevitable

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[37]This fact is readily discerned even on casual contact with Argentines of different social backgrounds. It is notable that the Argentine representatives to LAFTA have not been willing to have Argentina relegated to a minor industrial role.

[38]"Imponer a la CGT desde abajo: la lucha conjunta," Política Obrera No. 8 (November 21, 1966), p. 1, appraises the government program announced November 7, 1966, as representing "the fundamental economic philosophy of financial capital in the semi-colonial days of our country." In focusing its future policy upon a greater agricultural exploitation and a freer rate of exchange, the leftist organ notes, the dictatorial régime has elected to take the country back thirty years (p. 2), thus "confirming our thesis that financial capital is running the country." Puiggrós, in his Pueblo y oligarquía, op. cit., p. 50, touches on another of the principles of nineteenth-century capitalism: "The idea that Argentina cannot progress by its own efforts, or that its own efforts should be subordinated to a program of foreign investments, prevails in the higher ranks of the armed forces, in the national civil service, and in the leadership spheres of the political parties."

that Argentina would again produce a military caudillo and readopt some of the successful economic principles of yesteryear. But such action, however inevitable, conflicts with all those interests which can be grouped under the heading of "postwar nationalism."[39] But certain factions, the industrial powers (as represented by the members of ACIEL, CGE, and lesser economic-interest entities) and the new nationalists (current members of Tacaura, Guardia Restauradora Nacional [National Restoration Guard], the humanist organizations, the peronists, labor, and the Christian Socialists) desire that something be done to revitalize the economy generally and to halt the rising cost of living specifically.[40] But from thereon, no agreement exists.

The new industrial powers are not above receiving foreign capital or in any way increasing their margin of profit, whereas the new nationalists reject any kind of foreign participation in the national economy and demand a higher rate of remuneration for the salaried sectors in the economy. On the one hand, the new nationalists want far-reaching social change but do not approve of many of the projected economic changes, such as reorganization of state enterprises and adoption of a free rate

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[39]The term, "postwar nationalism," is being used in this study to refer to the Perón-brand nationalism--Fernández, op. cit., p. 558, lists economic independence, development, and industrialization; Argentina predominant in Latin America; and xenophobia--and the nationalism of the extremist groups, calling for substantial structural changes in socio-politico-economic life under the banners of ultra-nationalists (Tacaura), Christian Socialists (Juventud Universitaria Católica), and peronists.

[40]For example, the nationalist front headed by Juan Carlos Neyra, ex-militant leader in FORJA and the UCRI, and comprising Peronists, nationalists, and Christian Socialists, came out "against the government but in favor of the Revolution." See "Otra forma de política," Confirmado, II (December 8, 1966), p. 20.

of exchange. On the other hand, the industrial powers favor vast economic modernization but are reluctant to receive any social change.[41]

The CGT and its members. The economic measures which the Onganía government adopted present a direct threat to the economic security and welfare of many CGT members. Particularly threatened are the workers in state monopolies that are losing money. Workers fear that the measures which the government adopted, e.g., devaluation of the peso, will further compromise their already decreasing standard of living. It is widely believed that the government measures taken will chiefly benefit the upper classes and jeopardize the economic status of the workers.[42]

The entrenched opposition. Most labor elements, then, oppose the economic reform measures being advocated and undertaken by the pro-capitalist government. But labor is indecisive as to whether and how it should act. Certain labor leaders, particularly, no doubt hoping for the success of the Revolution, are specially careful not to engage the rank-and-file members in early disputes or to undertake any action that will be detrimental to the economy.[43] Thus, the real and significant opposition is coming from student groups within universities. Their negative reaction to the military takeover and intervention into education in July of 1966 was immediate and sustained and has consisted

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[41]The dichotomy of interests and reactions represented by these factions are presented in some detail in Chapter X, "The Responding Political System," pages

[42]"¿Con música de futuro retornamos al pasado?" Azul y Blanco, I (November 10, 1966), pp. 4-5; La Vanguardia, Nov. 16, 1966, p. 3; Angel N. Ruiz, "Por un plato de lentejas," Propósitos, Nov. 17, 1966. p. 3.

[43]La Capital, Nov. 9, 1966, p. 7; Clarín, Dec. 2, 1966, p. 26; "CGT, en la encrucijada," Confirmado, II (December 8, 1966), p. 17.

chiefly of mass demonstrations, strikes, speeches, publications, marches, and other less violent means, although some bombs have been exploded, some property has been defaced, and some physical clashes have occurred.[44]

The Pensioners and Retired Workers

Long alienated by the runaway inflation and diminution in the real value of their retirement checks, those persons who have retired or who are living on pensions continue to pressure the government to pay them regularly, to raise the retirement pay in accordance with the cost of living, and to take measures to halt the rise in prices.[45]

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[44]Mancinelli, loc. cit.; "Ideas," Extra, II (November, 1966), pp. 32-42; "Universidad: 100 días de intervención," Confirmado, (November 17, 1966), pp. 26-28.

[45]"Los jubilados," Extra, II (October, 1966), p. 44. It is reported that the active-age population (18-55 years) in Argentina is 11 million inhabitants, of which only 8 million can be considered to be economically active. Of this total, only 4 1/2 million are enrolled in pension and retirement programs. These 4 1/2 million persons enrolled in pension programs are donating 26 per cent of their salaries to support some 2 1/2-million persons who are retired and who are receiving payments under the present system. Under Law 14,499, it is required that retirement payments constitute 82 per cent of the last paid salary to an employe. These 2 1/2-million retired workers, then, are being paid 82 per cent of their last salaries from the 26 per cent salary deductions of the 4 1/2 million working population that is enrolled in retirement programs. Simple mathematics reveals that the regular retirement deductions, although 26 per cent of the salaries of 4 1/2-million workers, does not go far enough to cover the required 82 per cent payments to the 2 1/2-million retired personnel.

It was stated in Correo de la Tarde that a new front of inter-associations of retired employes is being formed to confront the government. Among those forming the new front are: the Confederación de Jubilados Ferroviarios (Retired Railroad Workers' Confederation), the Confederación de Jubilados de Comercio (Retired Businessmens' Association), the Unión de Docentes Jubilados (Retired Teachers' Union), and the Asociación de Jubilados de YPF (Retired YPF /the state oil monopoly/ Workers' Association). See, "El doctor Merello versus el frente de jubilados," Correo de la Tarde, VIII (September 21, 1966), pp. 6-7.

Power and Political Participation

The struggle for power and political participation engage three factions, primarily: the outlawed political parties and movements (the political "outs"), the university organizations, and labor. In each instance the engaged political-interest groups are struggling to recoup the power and participation in politics that they formerly enjoyed.

The Political Parties and Movements

Leaders of the political parties and movements are directing their behind-the-scenes political activity in two directions: on the one hand, publicizing the hope that the government will soon see fit to reinstate the political parties and hold civil elections; on the other hand, working to maintain the disbanded power structure of their parties and to effect certain realignments that will work to greater advantage once their parties are again legalized.[46]

The Student Groups

It is logical to presume that the revolutionary government, which lays claim to the mission of changing and rebuilding existing national structures, would eventually propose statutes that would transform the educational structure of the country. During July of 1966 the several rumors that were circulating indicated that the government would first authorize a special commission to study university

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[46]While waiting out the governmental suppression of political-party activity, the leading politicians formed study centers: Arturo Frondizi's Centro de Estudios Nacionales; the Instituto de la Economía Social de Mercado, with Dr. Alfredo Barré acting as executive secretary; the Centro de Investigaciones Sociales Argentinas in which were ex-militants Héctor Portero of the UCRI and Carlos Neira of the Demócrata Cristiana; Pedro Aramburu's Centro de Estudios Políticos, Económicos y

problems and later draw up a new statute to go into effect in January of 1967, during the time that the students and faculty would be on vacation and thus minimize the strength of any opposition.[47]

Law 16,912 and its aftermath. Why the government acted so quickly and against its saner judgment in decreeing statute 16,912, limiting student participation in the governing and administering of the universities, on July 29, 1966, is explained only by intense pressure from the colorados to force the government to act too quickly and consequently to discredit itself. In forcing the government to act too prematurely the colorados took advantage of the existing animosity between the armed forces and the students. Even on special occasions, such as the public homage paid to the memory of General Julio A. Roca during the Illia administration when students tossed coins and pamphlets into the military throng (among which stood General Onganía), the students displayed their intolerance and scorn for the militarists.[48] Upon announcement of the new law, all public university presidents, except those of the Cuyo, Nordeste, and Sur universities, resigned--followed by the resignations of some 2,000 professors. Student demonstrations, strikes, and sit-ins, with police and military intervention, occurred with regularity--all leading up to the death of Santiago Pampillón, second-year engineering student at the University of Córdoba, who was

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Sociales, a UDELPA center; and the UCRI centers: the Centro de Estudios Legislativos and the Estudio de los Problemas Agrarios. See "Políticos: secándose al sol," Primera Plana, IV (September 20, 1966), p. 22.

[47]"Universidad, 76 días después: cuál es la salida?" Confirmado, II (October 13, 1966), p. 34.

[48]Ibid., pp. 34-37; "Para un colorado no hay nada mejor que . . . otro colorado," Extra, loc. cit.; "Universidad: crónica del exterminio," Extra, II (November, 1966), pp. 43-44.

presumably killed by a police officer during a student-police clash on September 7, 1966.[49]

The polarization of the conflict. The university conflict is one with two well-defined positions. In the first position are the government and its sympathetic supporters: some university faculty and administrators, some professionals and specialists, some high-ranking public administration and industrial personnel, etc. This position has assumed that students generally enjoy more power and prestige within the university system than their actual skills and capabilities would warrant.[50] It holds further that students are too strongly influenced by communist, peronist, and other extreme ideologies and that many of them are not "students" in even the most liberal sense.[51] But the student position is firmly rooted in the historical struggle for reform of the national universities in granting greater student autonomy, with allusions to former victims or martyrs: Roberto A. Sánchez, law student from San Juan who committed suicide in 1871 because he could no longer endure the delays which school officials were causing in his study program;

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[49]"Qué pasa en Córdoba?" Primera Plana, IV (September 20, 1966), pp. 13-16.

[50]Lambert, op. cit., p. 388.

[51]In a number of interviews with students and instructors, strong complaint was registered against "students who are not students," who "go to school to throw Molotov cocktails," etc. See also "Preocupación por la Universidad," Clarín, September 27, 1966, p. 10; Juan Carlos de la Vega, "Universidad: llave maestra del destino nacional," La Capital, September 15, 1966, p. 6. This latter point is well illustrated by statistics cited in Correo de la Tarde, September 21, 1966, p. 16. In 1964 there were 72,872 students enrolled in ten colleges. Of these, only 15,297 took examinations in four or more subjects; 27,171 in less than two subjects; 1,801 had never presented themselves for examinations; and 1,257 had not taken any examinations for more than four years.

the seditious students who instigated the University Reform in Córdoba in 1918; the victims in the clash between private and public education in 1958; the student victims of repressive police action taken in the schools of Law and Medicine in 1959 and 1962; and, most recently, the death of Córdoba student Santiago Pampillón.[52]

The CGT, the Government, and the Unions

Not only are CGT leaders in a deadlocked struggle with the government to regain some of the power they previously held, but they are also being pressured by the unions and by certain individuals who are making bids for power control.[53] The government strategy views the control of the CGT as the key factor in the implementation of its modernizing program; and, thus, effort was made by the government to influence the election of CGT officials in the fall, 1966, election and to obtain the greatest possible public support. At the same time, the individual unions and rank and file members were agitating for a head-on confrontation of labor and government and calling for their leaders to take a firm stand against the military regime.[54]

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[52]Daniel Muchnik, "¿Fue inutil el suicidio de Sánchez?" Panorama, No. 37 (June, 1966), pp. 106-113.

[53]"La revolución a la prueba: los gremios enfrentan al gobierno," Análisis, VI (October 17, 1966), pp. 56-60; "Gremios: las espadas de Damocles," Primera Plana, VI (December 5, 1966), pp. 13-16; "El extraño silencio de la CGT," Inédito, I (October 12, 1966), pp. 12-13; "CGT War Still Rages," Buenos Aires Herald, September 25, 1966, p. 2.

[54]"Todos a la conquista de la CGT," Análisis, VI (October 3, 1966), p. 20; La Vanguardia, November 16, 1966, p. 2; "Imponer a la CGT desde abajo la lucha conjunta," Política Obrera, loc. cit.; Buenos Aires Herald, November 21, 1966, p. 8; "De la rebelión a la madurez política," Análisis, op. cit., pp. 19-20.

Social Status: Occupation and Education

Little political group activity during this study was generated specifically over the problem of social status, but nearly all political activity was directed at influencing the government in its programs to reform the universities and to do something about the excess employes in state enterprises. Both these issues are closely tied to the basic government strategy: to transform the national economy and, while doing so, to control the opposition. The Argentine economic minister promised the World Bank that his government would dismiss 40,000 railroad employes, and fears of massive dismissals and reorganization shuffles have been the undercurrent of labor's opposition to the revolutionary government. And these fears have not been eased, despite the government's assurance that any dismissed government employes will be relocated in private industry.[55]

Mobility and Prestige

Much emphasis has been given the rise to prestige of the Argentine middle classes at the turn of the century and of the working-class masses with the advent of Perón. Too little emphasis, however, is given to the loss of prestige suffered by the Argentine upper classes, both at home and abroad. For both the landed and the industrial oligarchy, the progressively diminishing value of the peso, the continuous political instability, the prolonged workers' strikes, the nationalization of foreign enterprises, and the featherbedding in state-run monopolies--all have long been a source of dissatisfaction.[56]

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[55]"Las dos trochas," Primera Plana V (December 6, 1966), p. 15.

[56]In interviews with various industrialists and landowners in the Argentine cities of Santa Fe and Rosario during October, 1966, it

The new challengers. Although it has been an issue for years, the struggle between Buenos Aires and the provinces is still far from being resolved. At this precise historical moment, it seems that provincial or regional interest groups are developing and gaining in power and prestige. While there is a national struggle for prestige between the different political-influence groups and the government, there is also a less obvious but quite real struggle taking place between, for example, the agricultural and shipping interests in Santa Fe province and these same interests in Buenos Aires province. The resentment felt by provincial and regional groups outside the small periphery of Greater Buenos Aires toward the porteños (Buenos Aires-based interests) is deep seated, and its resolution can very well be at the expense of Buenos Aires.

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was lamented that the peso no longer has its pre-war value; that the oligarchy is no longer accorded prestige in international circles; that Argentina is no longer the world's leading exporter of cattle and cereals, etc. See also "Desprestigio argentino en organismos internacionales," Inédito, I (October 12, 1966), p. 15.

CHAPTER VI

THE FUNNEL OF GOVERNING INTERESTS

In viewing the present-day political society, Professor René H. Balestra recognizes three large bureaucracies: a managerial bureaucracy, a labor bureaucracy, and a government bureaucracy.[1] This chapter will look at the structure of government bureaucracies.

The Structure of Governing Interests

As in the case of the social-group and political-group interests, the governing interests have a tripartite or three-level structure. In this proposed structure, the three kinds of "governing interests" are classified according to the source of their authority and their area of jurisdiction.

The Significant Power Blocs

There are three kinds of governing interests--national, provincial, and municipal--which operate and have jurisdiction within the "urban Litoral" of Argentina.

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[1]René H. Balestra, "El sistema contemporáneo de la burocracia," Revista de la Facultad de Ciencias Económicas, Comerciales y Políticos, IV (January-December, 1961), p. 61, points out that society is under a tripartite bureaucratization in being dominated by a labor bureaucracy, a managerial bureaucracy, and a state bureaucracy.

The National Government

The national government, with its central organization located in the Federal Capital, dominates all governments in the "urban Litoral." Diagram 1 depicts the national government as the largest and most influential ruling force in the entire Litoral region.

The Components of the National Government

The national government is comprised of the President of the Argentine republic, the heads of ministries who are members of the Cabinet, the various immediate advisers and consultants who are in continuous contact with the government leaders, and the various agencies and supporting arms of the federal government and their personnel.

The Cabinet. Included in the national Cabinet are the heads of the following ministries: the Ministry of the Interior, the Ministry of Foreign Relations, the Ministry of Economics, the Ministry of Education and Justice, the Ministry of National Defense, the Ministry of Social Aid and Public Health, the Ministry of Labor and Social Security, and the Ministry of Public Works and Services.

The national decisionmaking authorities. Among those individuals who constitute the group of national decisionmaking leaders, apart from the President and Vice President, are: Dr. Mario F. Díaz Colodrero, secretary of government; Raúl Ernesto Cuello, director of the Dirección General impositiva (equivalent to U.S. Internal Revenue Service); the governmental advisers (Engineers Antonio Lanusse, Mario O. Galimberti, and Luis María Gotelli; Dr. Lorenzo A. Raggio, Dr. Manuel J. Crespo, Dr. Rubens San Sebastián, and Francisco Rodolfo Aguilar); and the various ministers and secretaries: Roberto Petracca, minister

of the newly created Ministerio de Bienestar Social (Ministry of Social Well-being); Dr. Jorge J. Salimei, minister of Economics and Labor; Eng. Adolfo Raggio, secretary of Agricultura y Ganadería (Agriculture and Livestock); Dr. Juan Manuel Saravia, Jr., undersecretary of the Interior; Carlos M. Gelly y Obes, secretary of Culture and Education; and Dr. Conrado J. Etchebarne, secretary of Justice.

The supporting agencies and arms of government. The supporting agencies and arms of government consist mainly of those individuals who are found throughout all the administrative and executive gradations of national government, branching out from the principal national power holders. The following represent the major supporting agencies and arms of national government. First, under the Ministry of Economics, there are: the Secretary of Agriculture and Livestock, the Secretary of the Treasury, the Secretary of Industry and Mining, and the Secretary of Energy and Fuel. Under the Ministry of National Defense, there are: the Secretary of War, the Secreatary of the Navy, and the Secretary of Aeronautics. Under the Ministry of Public Works and Services, there are the Secretary of Public Works, the Secretary of Communications, and the Secretary of Transportation. There are also the large state-operated and semi-state operated enterprises: Yacimientos Petrolíferos Fiscales (the state oil monopoly), Aerolíneas Argentinas (Argentine Airlines), Compañía Argentina de Electricidad (Argentine Electricity Company), Sociedad Eléctrica General de Buenos Aires (Buenos Aires General Electrical Society), Sociedad Mixta Siderúrgica Argentina (Argentine Mixed Steel Society), the Central Bank, the Caja de Ahorro Postal (Postal Savings Bank), Ferrocarriles Argentinas (Argentine Railways), etc. Within the national government are also specialized

organizations devoted to research, planning, and development, such as the Consejo Nacional de Desarrollo (National Development Council) and the Instituto Nacional de Tecnología Agropecuaria (National Institute of Agricultural Technology). The judicial supporting power holders are the Supreme Court justice and judges, plus the judges of the lower tribunals. The legislative power holders, which include both senators and deputies, or representatives, are found in the Cámara de Senadores (the Senate) and the Cámara de Diputados (Chamber of Deputies).

The Provincial Governments

The provincial governments in the Litoral region are directed by General Francisco A. Imaz, governor of Buenos Aires; Admiral Eladio Vazquez, governor of Santa Fe; and Brigadier Ricardo Favre, governor of Entre Ríos. The provincial governments are modeled after the national government in organization, so that about the same ministries and secretariats exist with the chief difference being in the more limited jurisdiction of the provincial divisions of government.

The Municipal Governments

There are four municipal governments in the "urban Litoral," *viz.*, the governments of the cities of Buenos Aires, Rosario, Santa Fe, and Paraná. Most of the urban problems confronted by residents of these four cities are within the jurisdiction of these four municipal governments. While social and political change may be dictated from above by the national and provincial governments, it is the municipality within whose jurisdiction change takes place.

Political Significance of the Structure

The conceptualized three-part structure, consisting of the national government and the provincial and municipal governments, coincides with actual realities. Because these three kinds of governments have been examined somewhat superficially in this study, it will not be appropriate to impute a political significance to this structure at this time. However, it is theorized that the stronger in resources the local or municipal governments are in terms of the provincial and national governments, the greater will be the amount of change that will occur in that society or political system. This is because municipalities are chiefly stifled in their desires to effect change by not receiving a greater share of funds from their own sources of revenue and from the higher governments.

The Governing Struggle

This section of the chapter will discuss the objects of the governing struggle, from which the political system is pressured or stabilized.

The Objects of Government Struggle

The same theoretical criteria that describe "the objects of political struggle" and "the objects of social struggle" in the two preceding chapters may also apply to the governments in their struggle for 1) wealth and welfare distribution, 2) power and political participation, 3) social status (education and occupation), and 4) mobility and prestige. From the struggle within and between the political groups

to obtain the desires of their demanding and pressuring efforts, certain "pressures" are generated which are directed at the political system. The content of these governments' demands is determined by the shifting and predominance of each of the four objects--wealth, power, status, and mobility--of political struggle and conflict.

Wealth and Welfare Distribution

The struggle to acquire wealth and to effect a more socially just distribution of welfare among the three kinds of governments (national, provincial, and municipal) is in three areas: the economic dominance of Buenos Aires, the distribution of national funds, and the reformation of certain state enterprises.

Buenos Aires Economic Dominance

The economic dominance of Buenos Aires in Argentina is an issue that has long plagued the nation.[2] This economic concentration in the urban conglomerate of the Federal Capital and the Greater Buenos Aires area is seen as a negative factor in the actual and future development of Argentina.[3] It is noteworthy that during this study the national seemed

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[2]Even in colonial times the economic interests of Buenos Aires prevailed and were in full sway during the period of Juan Manuel Rosas. See Rodolfo Puiggrós, De la colonia a la revolución (Buenos Aires: Ediciones Leviatán, 1957), entire book; Juan Jorge Gschwind, El puerto de Rosario: su evolución histórica; factores de su progreso (Rosario, Argentina: Academic Nacional de la Historia, 1942), pp. 5, 7-8.

[3]Leopoldo Portnoy, Análisis crítico de la economía argentina (Buenos Aires: Fondo de Cultura Económica, 1961), p. 14. Gorbán, op. cit., p. 90, in noting that the Federal Capital (an area of just 200 square kilometers) contains 40 per cent of the working force of Argentina, expresses the fear that "this painful reality [Buenos Aires economic dominance] has created a monster whose enormous head, which is Buenos Aires, rests upon a starved and undernourished body, which is the rest of the country." He continues: "The danger, then, resides in the possibility that this body, continuously bled of all its strength,

fully aware of this problem and promised to take steps to correct it.[4]

At the same time, the provincial power holders were able to emphasize the need for a policy that will favor the outer provinces and benefit parts of the country other than just Buenos Aires. In the meeting of governors of the twenty-three provinces, November 8-9, 1066, called by Minister of the Interior Dr. Enrique Martínez Paz to analyze diverse problems related to the functioning of provincial administrations and the co-ordination of provincial with federal planning, the governors particularly were able to underscore their own provincial problems and the needs of federal assistance.[5]

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will collapse under the weight of its gigantic head." In 1942 it was the position of the Colegio de Abogados (Bar Association) in Rosario, Argentina, that "the economic centralism in Buenos Aires is the most serious phenomenon threatening the national economy." See Juan Lazarte, Federalismo y decentralización en la cultura argentina (Buenos Aires: Cátedra Lisandro de la Torre, 1957), p. 7.

[4]The system authorities admitted the dominance of Buenos Aires over the rest of the nation and expressed the hope that the unbalanced relationship could be changed. See the text of the Presidential Address, November 7, 1966, carried in full by most Argentine daily newspapers, plus the speeches of President Onganía and Minister of the Interior Martínez Paz to the Conference of Governors, November 8, 1966; La Razón, November 8, 1966, p. 1; Crónica (Rosario), November 8, 1966, pp. 1-4; "Temas de Onganía y Martínez Paz," La Capital, November 9, 1966, p. 7; President Onganía was quoted as saying before the conference of provincial governors on November 8, "You know how much we are concerned about the situation in the provinces. I pray to God that in the not too distant future these meetings may be authentic expressions of national integration. I know that you are quite well aware that this is how 'the Revolution' interprets it. I know that you are cognizant that in this we are referring to socioeconomic activities, since 'the Argentine Revolution' does not only proclaim a federal régime but it seeks also an authentic provincial autonomy." Martínez Paz said that "there is no revolution without profound political and economic structural changes" and that many vested interests may be dislodged in benefit of the whole nation."

[5]See La Prensa, November 9, 1966, p. 1; Crónica, (Rosario), November 9, 1966, p. 1; La Capital, November 8, 1966, p. 1. The governors

The Distribution of National Funds

The major issue from the past that is important and influential in actuality is how the outside provinces should relate to the national government economically. It is known that vast sparsely populated regions of the country are economically bankrupt and the residents of these regions in need of subsidy and government funds.[6] One of the major complaints emphasized by the provinces is the seeming unequal distribution of the federal budget. It is generally believed that the provinces receive back only a small part of what they pay into the central government. In Santa Fe province the quoted statistic is 20 per cent.[7]

Law 14,788 and its aftermath. Under Law 14,788, passed January 1, 1959, the provinces should be receiving each year an increasing participation in the national taxes. In 1959, the provinces were to have received 28 per cent compared with 72 per cent for the National Government; in 1960, 30 per cent to 70 per cent; in 1961, 32 per cent

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of Córdoba, Corrientes, Chaco, Formosa, and Chubut provinces laid stress on their administrative problems and on the great need for increased regional development. Brigadier General Guillermo Brizuela, the governor of Catamarca province, said that 95 per cent of the resources of the province were of federal origin and that without aid from the central government it would be impossible to lift Catamarca out of its current economic stagnation. See also "Gobernadores, en tren de consulta," Confirmado, II (September 22, 1966), p. 20.

[6]"Entre el Pilcomayo y el Bermejo," Correo de la Tarde, VIII (November 22, 1966), pp. 18-19, reports that the geographical region in the Chaco part of Argentina between the Pilcomayo and the Bermejo rivers is inhabited by more than 15,000 persons "who have no economic resources" and to whom national welfare and assistance have not arrived.

[7]"We only get 20 per cent back of all that we pay into Buenos Aires." Comments by various individuals in Santa Fe city and Rosario, Santa Fe province, October 2-November 12, 1966.

to 68 per cent; in 1962, 34 per cent to 66 per cent; and, in 1963, 36 per cent to 64 per cent, etc., until the Federal Government would receive 54 per cent, the municipality of Buenos Aires 6 per cent, and the provinces 40 per cent. In practice, however, the national government has been receiving 75.1 per cent, the provinces only 10.6 per cent, and the city of Buenos Aires 4.3 per cent.[8]

The Restructuring of State Enterprises

Several state enterprises were threatened during this study with restructuring and other profound changes that would make them more efficient and more profitable to the state. These state enterprises were YPF (the state oil monopoly), Yacimientos Carboníferos (Coal Deposits), Gas del Estado (state gas monopoly), CADE (Argentine Electric Company), SEGBA (Buenos Aires General Electric Society), and the Instituto Nacional de Reaseguros (National Insurance Institute). There was also the creation and development of new state organisms and entities related to the housing problem and to the new monetary measures adopted by the government. But perhaps the greatest changes were instituted within the state ports and railroads.

YPF, Yacimientos Carboníferos, Gas del Estado, CADE, and SEGBA. Related to the over-all government energy policy of improving productivity in energy products and of attaining self-sufficiency in petroleum production in 1969, were the contemplated measures of reorganizing the state enterprises, such as YPF, Yacimientos Carboníferos, Gas del Estado, CADE, and SEGBA. It was planned to unify all these organisms under the same

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[8] Norberto C. Ferrer et. al., Consejo Federal de Inversiones, Co-participación provincial en impuestos nacionales (Buenos Aires: Edición UcFi, 1965), pp. 225-226, 236.

statutes, "leaving out only the distinctive characteristics of each enterprise." The reorganization of state businesses would have in view a progressive increase in productivity through eliminating much of the inefficiency and duplication of jobs in these state organisms.[9]

Meanwhile careful studies were being made as to the supply of and demand for the different energy products in order to begin certain planned projects. As a stimulus to increased petroleum production, the first planned measure was to reform the national laws to facilitate the participation of private capital and to encourage the construction of refineries and exploration for petroleum by private companies.[10] With respect to CADE and SEGBA operations, it was hoped to complete first the hydroelectric project Salto Grande and then the projects of El Chocón-Cerros Colorados. The former would be accelerated in order to interconnect the electrical systems of Argentina and Uruguay.[11]

INDER. Besides the projected changes in the antecedent fields, Dr. Salimei, economics minister, proposed also "smoothly and simply the elimination of INDER (National Insurance Institute)." INDER was founded in 1953 as a state enterprise "to prevent the excessive drain of

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[9] Crónica (Rosario), October 18, 1966, p. 1.

[10] Ibid.; Ricardo G. Hileman, "Sesenta días de petróleo," Correo de la Tarde, VIII (September 21, 1966), p. 23; "Petróleo, YPF espera la ley," Confirmado, II (December 8, 1966), p. 31; "¡Ciudado con el petróleo!" Azul y Blanco, I (November 10, 1966), p. 11; Eduardo Conesa, "El petróleo," Confirmado, II (September 20, 1966), p. 64; "Eco al interrogante: ¿qué pasa con YPF?" Correo de la Tarde, VIII (September 28, 1966), p. 15.

[11] "Energía: a la caza de creditor," Primera Plana, IV (September 20, 1966), p. 61; "¿Chocón o Salto Grande?" Primera Plana, IV (October 18, 1966), pp. 58-60, details the ramifications of both projects, including the international parties involved; "¿Ya puede comenzar la revolución?" Confirmado, II (October 27, 1966), pp. 18-19.

reinsurance abroad and to strengthen the local insurance market. . . ." But, according to many experts INDER has not fulfilled its objectives.[12]

The housing problem. While one state enterprise (INDER) was threatened with elimination, existing social needs inspired the creation of the Ministerio de Bienestar Social (Ministry of Social Welfare) under which was organized the Secretaría de Vivienda (Secretariat of Housing) and the transformation of yet another organization, the Banco Hipotecario Nacional (National Mortgage Bank), to be the principal instrument in carrying out the new government housing program. Also, the national government gave special support to the Caja Federal de Ahorro y Préstamo para la Vivienda (Federal Savings and Loan Bank for Housing) in its task of providing public funds for housing construction.[13]

Monetary organisms and mechanisms. It was predicted that government financial and economic policies would have profound effect upon the monetary organisms and mechanisms of the state.[14] And such was the case, for there were key officials in the state monetary organisms who strongly opposed the devaluation of the peso and other government policies. Their opposition to official policy resulted in their resignations. Besides the resignations, the new policy forced Argentine authorities to

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[12]"¿Qué hacer con el INDER?" Confirmado, II (November 17, 1966), pp. 30-31. For a slanted defense of INDER, see "El Instituto Nacional de Reaseguros: una ejemplar empresa del estado," Azul y Blanco, I (November 10, 1966), p. 6; "Atentado en marcha: la privatización del reaseguro," La Vanguardia, November 16, 1966, pp. 2, 4.

[13]"Con inflación no habrá viviendas," Análisis, VI (October 31, 1966), pp. 56-60; Crónica (Rosario), October 10, 1966, p. 1; La Prensa January 17, 1967, p. 1; "Caminos y viviendas," Primera Plana, IV (September 27, 1966), p. 59; "Creditor para viviendas porteñas," Análisis, VI (October 3, 1966), p. 21.

[14]Clarín, October 29, 1966, p. 11.

make overtures to international monetary organisms in an effort to obtain loans and other funds that would help offset the initial monetary losses caused by freeing the peso.[15]

The port problem. Another problem which received the attention of the national government was over one aspect of the port situation, viz., to determine each port's volume of shipping and level of modernization and development. The issue involved was whether the port interests and authorities outside of Buenos Aires would obtain greater national rights and advantages for their ports in terms of Buenos Aires port interests.[16] The national government partly resolved this problem by investing a sum of one billion pesos for improvements in all port facilities and by enacting a 24-hour shipping operation.[17]

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[15]See La Nación, November 8, 1966, p. 1; La Razón, November 8, 1966, p. 1; La Prensa, November 9, 1966, p. 1; "Los fantasmas del Banco Central," Primera Plana, IV (November 14, 1966), pp. 13-14.

[16]For example, it is well known that the port of Rosario was severly affected and artifically restricted by the passage of Law 3,885 which prohibited the port from exceeding a shipping volume of 2,500,000 tons, particularly in view of the fact that just prior to that time the port was handling a volume surpassing 6,000,000 tons. The never realized canal of Emilio Mitre, the completion of which would have given Rosario the greater advantage in modern shipping, left the port unable to receive the larger cargo ships. Thus, Buenos Aires port, which covers 5,143,426 surface hectares, or 27.6 per cent of the total portage of Argentina, handles 64.5 per cent of all shipping; whereas the port of Rosario covering 4,356,476 hectares or 23.8 per cent of national portage, accounts for but 6.7 per cent of the total shipping by Argentine portage. See "Puerto Rosario: puerto de hoy," Puertos Argentinos, VII (Nov. 15, 1963), pp. 20-25; Clarín, June 18, 1966, p. 9.

[17]Clarín, November 29, 1966, p. 18. For a criticism of nationalist orientation on government port policy, see "La reforma aduanera," Azul y Blanco, I (November 10, 1966), p. 11.

The railroad problem. The state-owned and state-operated railroads came under the greatest criticism of all state enterprises. Both railroad officials and workers were charged with gross inefficiency by the most divergent sources.[18] In sum, the railroad problem not only represents a major point of economic policy for the national authorities but also a major point of conflict in the struggle for power and wealth among the different interests.[19]

Power and Political Participation

The struggle on behalf of national, provincial, and municipal power holders to achieve ever greater power and political participation is historically well established.[20] To understand more fully the present struggle among the governments ruling within the "urban Litoral," it would be appropriate to review briefly the historical precedents of the actual conflict of power interests between Buenos Aires and the provinces.

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[18]For example, "El desastre ferroviario," Azul y Blanco, I (November 10, 1966), pp. 8-9; Orlando Marchini, "Política ferroviaria," Propósitos, XV (November 17, 1966), p. 2; "Ferroviarios," Política Obrera, No. 8, (November 21, 1966), pp. 5-6; "Rail Plan: Government Will Hear Union Views," Buenos Aires Herald, September 25, 1966, p. 10; Lozada, op. cit., pp. 438-440; Juan Manuel Santa Cruz, Ferrocarriles argentinos ("Cuaderno del Instituto de Derecho Público y Ciencias Sociales"; Rosario, Argentina: Universidad Nacional del Litoral, 1966), pp. 45-60; "¿Encrucijada: los ferrocarriles?" Imagen del País, I (September [last half], 1966), pp. 14-17; Portnoy, op. cit., p. 143; A. E. Suhr-Horeis, La Argentina: país en retroceso (Buenos Aires: Distribuidora S.R.L. "Tres Américas," 1965), pp. 155-168.

[19]See, "La batalla del riel," Primera Plana, V (December 6, 1966), pp. 12-16, for an excellent narrative of the economic and power struggle over the railroads.

[20]See Bartolomé Fiorini, "Federalismo y decentralización administrativa; democracia y servicios públicos," Revista del Instituto de Derecho Público y Ciencias Sociales, I (First semester, 1958), pp. 15-27.

Federalism and Centralism

It is in the heritage of two conflicting "isms," federalism and centralism, that the past and present struggle between Buenos Aires and the provinces resides.

Federalism. It is incorrect to assume that Argentine federalism, or its antithesis, centralism, has its origin in the colonial laws, royal decrees, and new-world governing systems of the Spanish Empire.[21] The fact is that a number of antecedent factors (racial conditioning, the geographical environment, social and religious concerns, economic struggles, and political doctrines) converged to lay the foundation for a federalist mentality in Argentina.[22] This is borne out by the fact that Argentina is theoretically a federalist nation. Throughout the national period of Argentina there has existed a modest proclivity toward federalism. While it has not always been in force, federalism is the adopted form of government, as stated in the Federal Pact of 1831 and renewed in the 1852 Agreement of San Nicolás and in the Constitution of 1853.

The immediate causes that influenced the Argentine nation to adopt federalism in the first place are named by law professor Juan Carlos Pereira Pinto: "regional isolation, necessity of defending local economies from the power of the commercial oligarchy of the Buenos Aires port, and the opposition of men of the provinces, with popular support, to Buenos Aires absolutism and centralism."[23] Thus it is in provincial

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[21]Lazarte, op. cit., p. 139; Lambert, op. cit., pp. 209, 214-215.

[22]Ricardo Zorraquín Becú, El federalismo argentino (Buenos Aires: Editorial Perrot, 1958), p. 14.

[23]Cited in Lozada, op. cit., p. 108.

opposition to Buenos Aires centralism and dominance that Argentine federalism takes its roots and tries to develop.[24]

Centralism. Centralism in the "urban Litoral" is more a reality than it is a theory or tradition. While federalism represents a movement of opposition and struggle on the part of the provinces against the larger interests situated in Buenos Aires, centralism denotes a real life situation or state of affairs in which most of Argentina's economic and political activity is concentrated in and around Buenos Aires.[25]

The dominance of Buenos Aires in Argentina can be traced back to the struggle between unitarios and federales in the 1820's, the 1830's, and throughout the era of Juan Manuel Rosas (1829-1832, 1835-1852). The unitarios were determined to unite the country a palos (by force) and to make Buenos Aires the economic and political nerve center of Argentina. In contrast, the federales wanted decentralized authority and full provincial autonomy.[26] Lazarte notes that although the unitary and federal parties seemingly disappeared after the fall of Rosas and upon subsequent unification of the nation, "they were nonetheless alive in substance, form, policy, and belief." The later autonomistas were nothing more than the federales renamed and the nacionalistas were unitarios. The politics of general Julio A. Roca followed the línea unitaria (unitary line) and in 1890 "appeared the federalism so brilliantly championed by Leandro Alem."[27]

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[24]Julio Mafud, El desarraigo argentino (Buenos Aires: Editorial Américalee, S.R.L., 1966 edition), pp. 147-148.

[25]Zorraquín Becú, op. cit., pp. 23, 35-40.

[26]Ernesto Quesada, La época de Rosas (Buenos Aires: Ediciones del Restaurador, 1950), pp. 53-57, 114-120, 125-135.

[27]Lazarte, op. cit., pp. 149-150.

A new federalism. The political and economic dominance that Buenos Aires exercises over the provinces reflects an ineffective federal system. In the past the federal government acted without regard to an over-all program of meeting the economic and social needs of the provinces within a larger framework of national integration and development.[28] But now, under the increasing pressure of some of the provinces[29] and the recognition of the national authorities that all Argentina must be integrated and equally developed, there is a new kind of federalism emerging.[30] This new federalism stresses provincial and regional development, providing national support in resolving local problems. Under this new federalism, Buenos Aires is no longer to be accorded special concessions and treatment. Its interests are to be looked after along with and not above the interests of the provinces.

Political Implications of the Struggle

Notably, the political and economic power holders in Argentina are not one and the same. The center of political power, held by the

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[28]"Simposio sobre federalismo y centralismo: las provincias en discusión," Análisis, VI (October 3, 1966), p. 19.

[29]Two examples: "Chubut quiere ser argentina," Correo de la Tarde, VIII (November 1, 1966), pp. 14-15; "El gobernador de Tucumán habla al país," Panorama, No. 34 (March, 1966), pp. 27-30.

[30]The base of a new federalism which will place special emphasis on the problems of the interior of Argentina was discussed at the Conference of Governors. One aspect of the development of the interior is the initiation of a number of public works under an over-all plan for national development. Secretary of Government Mario Díaz Colodrero has said: "Let us strive so that our interior, which up until now has been an enormous and empty extension of our port center, be transformed into the vehicle for the vigorous rise of Argentina in the Latin American world . . . ; the internal equilibrium of the country will be achieved to the degree that we put into real and not formal equality

the national authorities, is only influenced but not controlled by the economic interests. This separation of the economic from the political powers seems to imply the existence of a more decentralized government policy that favors the provinces and municipalities. Thus, while the large economic interests wield the most political influence of all political groups and while the political action taken by the federal government appears to favor these large economic interests, still this economic-interest orientation of the political leaders is broadly based and directed at the needs of the provinces in harmony with those of the entire nation.

As a consequence of this new economic and political orientation of the national government, the provinces are being made the objects and recipients of the new policy. Since it is widely recognized that the national, provincial, and municipal governments are overstaffed and have large and inefficient bureaucracies,[31] the new policies, which aim at the elimination of redundant employment and reorganization of any inefficient administration, directly threaten the economic position and power status of the affected bureaucracies.

Finally, of particular political significance is the economic and political revolution taking place in Santa Fe province and in other key provinces.[32] Despite having been stagnated economically since the

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our great historical regions with the metropolitan zone of the port." See "Un nuevo federalismo," Confirmado, II (November 17, 1966), pp. 24-25.

[31]Hillyer Schurjin, Burocracia: la máquina remolona," Panorama, no. 41 (October, 1966), pp. 36-42; A. Quintana, "Burocracia, lastre nacional," Esquiu, (November 20, 1966), p. 15.

[32]For example, in the Cuyo provinces of San Juan, San Luis, and Mendoza; in Córdoba, La Rioja, and Santiago del Estero; in the northeastern provinces of Catamarca, Jujuy, Tucumán, and Salta; in the north

1930's, Santa Fe province and, to a lesser extent, Entre Ríos province, are moving toward the "take-off" stage in the process of economic development and toward a resurgence of political power. The completion of the underground tunnel between Santa Fe and Paraná cities, the connection of the tunnel with the new highway between Santa Fe and Rosario, the realization of the contemplated hydro-electric plant at the Salto Grande site, the renovation of the ports of Rosario and Santa Fe--all these developments point toward a greater exploitation not only of northern Santa Fe province but of the other Litoral and upper provinces, not to mention the southern portions of Uruguay, Brazil, and Paraguay.

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western provinces of Misiones, Chaco, Formosa, and Corrientes; in the Comahué region, taking in the provinces of La Pampa, Río Negro, and Neuquén; and in the Patagonia region of Chubut, Santa Cruz, and Tierra del Fuego provinces.

CHAPTER VII

ALIENATION AND PARTICIPATION

It will be the purpose of this chapter to discuss alienation and participation in Argentine society. In the first part of the chapter, the disaffected sectors of urban life will be identified, as well as the themes or content of their disaffection. The second part of the chapter will report on the results of the tests conducted by the researcher to measure political alienation, anomie, social participation, and socioeconomic status among selected subjects. These measurements should reflect the capacity and inclination of the different socioeconomic groups to act politically and to effect sociopolitical change.

Disaffection in Argentina

It is the contention of this study that nearly all the sectors of national life are politically disaffected in lesser or greater degrees. The most intensely disaffected sectors are the middle class, the independent working class, the extremist groups in the universities, and the labor organizations. Less disaffected sectors are the armed forces, the *estancieros* or landowners, the industrialists and financiers, the Roman Catholic Church, and the deposed political groups. The themes of the disaffection felt by these sectors are manifested in various aspects of social, economic, and political life.

The Disaffected Sectors in Urban Life

The following comments respecting each of the just named disaffected sectors are meant as a clarification and more precise identification of these sectors. They have been identified as being disaffected or alienated sectors by their own expressions and by the opinions expressed by other sources concerning them.

The Middle Class

The middle class, whose status and wealth are closely related to the status and prosperity of the upper class, has been in progressive decline since 1947. This group has been more affected economically than the lower class by inflation and the rising cost of living. More than the upper class, which can isolate itself socially from the lower-class masses and "undesirables," the middle class--which per force has to deal with lower-class persons but which aspires to chiefly upper-class customs and values--shows signs of being disaffected.[1]

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[1]The middle-class workers have to use public transportation and hence are exposed to the cabecitas negras (literally "little dark heads," referring to persons of more humble economic and social background, usually of Indian origin and from the more isolated rural regions of the country), having to rub shoulders with and brush against these economically and socially inferior persons. The middle-class workers go to their favorite bars and restaurants and are often unable to enjoy their food because there is a group of these cabecitas negras seated at the next table, boisteriously getting drunk. The lower class persons often file into public offices, where the middle class public administrators are working, to register their complaints and to have their needs met by free government services. Thus, the administrator or middle class employe is doubly alienated, by his reduced economic position on the one hand and by the increasing social power of working-class masses, encroaching on his sophisticated conceptions and aspirations, on the other hand.

And while the lower-class workers are disaffected against the national political system and the economic, social, and political forces that are farther up the socio-politico-economic scale, very often lower-class members will take out their disaffection and disappointments upon the innocent middle-class employes with whom they deal.[2]

In contrast, there are other middle class elements that have come to identify with labor or the working classes, being members of the same unions and participating in many of the same working federations. Their alienation is directed upward, not downward.[3]

The Independent Working Class

The independent urban day laborers represent yet another significant segment of alienated opinion. Unlike organized labor, their disaffection is less specific and more generally directed against life rather than against particular labor policies. But like organized laborers, and sometimes more so, the independent workers come in contact with undesirable working conditions and see the need for change and reform.

University Extremist Groups

Student groups became disaffected or alienated when the new government tried to reorganize the universities with less student autonomy

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[2]For example, a retired worker, Daniel Kouht, 66 years of age, shot and killed Alba Luz Miños, a female employe of the Caja de Jubilaciones Rurales (bank for dispersing rural retirement checks) on February 10, 1965. He shot her five times, in which all the pent-up wrath that he felt toward the national pension system was vehemently discharged upon an innocent worker. He had been trying unsuccessfully to complete the required procedures to receive retirement payments for more than four years. See "Los jubilados de pantalón corto," Extra, op. cit., p. 43.

[3]The middle class labor leaders and students who support the

and greater executive control in late July of 1966. Reacting to the government threat, university students gave vent to their inner alienation, which action provoked government intervention and a series of student protests, both of which resulted in a disruption of school work that could not be recouped and in a permanent schism between the government and students. The extremist groups in the universities generally espoused extreme nationalistic views and the cause of the worker and played down, except in the case of their own autonomy within the university, the plight of the higher socioeconomic classes from whence many of them had come.

The Labor Organizations

While all labor generally was alienated from government measures during September through December of 1966, the "62 standing organizations" of the CGT were more disaffected and more militant in pressuring for change than was the Central Committee of the CGT. These organizations made pronouncements of censure against the government when the CGT was yet reluctant to act. It was this labor element and more specifically the dockworkers union, SUPA, which carried out the first major strike

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cause of the working class fit into this group, which is characterized by its intense hatred for upper-class values.

[4]In viewing the extreme rightist groups of Tacaura and the Guardia Restauradora Nacionalista operating within universities, it is noteworthy how the socioeconomic composition of the participants has changed. Tacaura in its beginning consisted of exclusively upper class students pressuring for free teaching in the universities under the directorship of the clergy. With the free-teaching campaign ended and many participants leaving to form an entirely rightist organization, the GRN, Tacaura received new recruits from the middle and lower classes, which have broadened not only its philosophy but its alienation and resentment as well. See Juan José Sebreli, Buenos Aires, vida cotidiana y alienación (Buenos Aires: Ediciones Siglo Veinte, 1966), pp. 108-109.

against the revolutionary government on November 9, 1966, and was backed internationally in its position.[5]

The Armed Forces

The actual imperious role exercised by the armed forces in Argentine politics and government is not without its precedents.[6] Many times the military has been urged to take action by the civilian elements which desire a change of government. The armed forces quite often, then, act not only because they may feel displeased themselves and want a change of government but because other sectors have urged or importuned them to take action. Too, the disaffection of the military need not be as acute as in other segments of national life, for the armed forces will take action not because they have been greatly alienated or have become dissatisfied, but because they are the only organism with sufficient organization, discipline, and power to effect a change of government.

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[5]"¿Puede el Presidente ser engañado?" Confirmado, II (October 27, 1966), pp. 21-24; "CGT: ¿guerra o paz con el gobierno?" Primera Plana, loc. cit. See the discussion in Chapter X, "The Responding Political System," pages 257-282.

[6]Among these precedents are: the professional organization and acquisition of respect by the armed forces, their purchase of excessive armaments and supplies that surpassed concrete needs, the isolation of the armed forces from government at the time universal suffrage was decreed and the fact that the government never did incorporate the military into nor indoctrinate the armed forces sufficiently concerning democracy, the acquisition of numbers of armed force personnel that exceeded the numbers needed for defense purposes, the assignment of many extra-military tasks to the armed forces, the organization of the armed forces into an effective pressure group, the fact that as a pressure group it was never challenged nor halted, the notable unity and organization which gave the armed forces the advantage of being able to act as one solid force in a moment of crisis without facing any significant opposition, the strict obedience with which lower-rank personnel carried out the orders of their commanding officers, and the fact that the armed forces never confronted any negative popular reaction. See Darío Canton, "Notas sobre las Fuerzas Armadas argentinas," Revista Latinoamericana de Sociología, I

The Estancieros or Landowners

As an alienated sector, the estancieros or landowners have sufficient reason for feeling disillusioned and for being disaffected; their once predominant and sacrosanct position in the nineteenth century economic social order has all but disappeared in this century. Their first major loss of power and prestige took place with the advent of Yrigoyenism.[7] They next had to make sacrifices of their genealogical purity by accepting marriages of convenience with industrialists and "new" rich.[8] But these preliminary losses and sacrifices were as nothing when compared to the devastating frontal attack which peronism made on the landed oligarchy.[9]

The Industrialists and Financiers

Although the gradual deterioration of the economic position of the landowning class and the mutual fear of both the agricultural and industrial aristocrats caused the former to unite with the latter, both are yet antagonistic toward one another.[10] This antagonism, however,

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(November, 1965), pp. 308-312; Gino Germani and Kalman H. Silvert, "Estructura social e intervención militar en América Latina," Argentina, sociedad de masas, op. cit., pp. 228-248.

[7]Puiggrós, El yrigoyenismo, op. cit., chapters VI and VII.

[8]Sebreli, op. cit., pp. 64-66, describes the social process in which the old landed aristocracy exchanges the prestige of its name for the money of the new industrial class by entering into "marriages of convenience."

[9]Julio Irazusta, Perón y la crisis argentina (Buenos Aires: Editorial Huemel, S.A., 1966 edition), entire book; Rodolfo Puiggrós, El peronismo, Vol. V: Historia crítica de los partidos políticos (Buenos Aires: Jorge Alvarez Editor, 1965 edition).

[10]Sebreli, op. cit., pp. 65-66. The fall of Frondizi (supported by the landowners and U.S. business interests) and the later struggle

is "schizophrenic." The liberal and more revolutionary elements in both classes get along quite well with one another, whereas the more conservative landowning aristocrats refuse to associate with the industrialists and the ultra-nationalistic industrialists refuse to associate with the old-line landowning elements that are aligned with foreign interests.

The Church

In September of 1966, for the first time since 1954, an irremedial break began to loom between Church and State. Theoretically, the Church favors social and economic revolution, but there is no little fear by the Church that the Revolution will fail to achieve any lasting changes and that it may falter altogether.[11] Thus, the Church was alienated somewhat from the State, not over any anticlerical policy on the part of the government but over the antithetical situation: too much pro-clericalism by the authorities and hence too much identity of the Church with the regime.

The Deposed Political Groups

It seems logical to presume that the politicians who have been ordered to cease all future political activity and who have had their properties and other possessions confiscated will tend to be rather

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between the colorados and the azules in the armed forces in September of 1962 and April of 1963 revealed the degree to which these factions continue to be antagonistic toward one another.

[11]The government intervention in the universities and its morality campaign against pornographic literature were closely identified with the influence of the Catholic Church on government, much to the dismay of church leaders. The Argentine Catholic hierarchy did not want to risk being identified too closely with the military government, particularly if the government should fall. Such an occurrence would tend to discredit the Church, it was felt.

alienated from the forces that brought this suppression and persecution upon them.[12] By the same analysis, it is not unlikely that other political groups of weaker status are more pleased over the governmental attack on the stronger political groups than unhappy over the government circumscription of political freedom. This latter point, of course, is conjectural and no evidence has yet been found to support it.

The Themes of Urban Alienation

Now that the various disaffected sectors of national life have been described briefly, it is desirable to undertake a more definitive analysis of alienation by examining its different themes, as manifested in social, economic, and political life.

Alienation and Society

The themes of alienation in society are more starkly revealed and more easily discussed inside the framework of social contacts and social services.

Social Contacts

The upper class. First, a dislike for all industrial activity which is carried on at the expense of agricultural development is held by the land-owning class. Second, the native landowners, particularly, demonstrate alienation from the Italian and Spanish immigrants who have become their competitors. Third, this same landowning class is alienated from its own social decor, etiquette, mores, and customs. The tension of

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[12]"El martes de ceniza," Primera Plana, V (November 22, 1966), pp. 19-21.

playing "the social game," of keeping up with appearances and complying with onerous and tedious social obligations, etc., produces an emptiness and negativeness that alienates no few members of the aristocracy from the social behavior required by their own class.[13]

The middle class. Members of the middle class, according to the test results that will be presented later on in this chapter, reflect a notable ambivalence toward life: optimistic and non-alienated on the one hand and pessimistic and alienated on the other hand. They are alienated more significantly from the occupational role which they are required to play, as the buffer between the public and the higher authorities which they represent. They are subjected to abuses from both sides and are forced to suppress any feelings they may have of rebellion or violence. Next, evidence exists, through case studies and analyses of expressive forms, e.g., the lyrics to tango songs, that many middle-class men are alienated as a result of not having satisfactory relationships in love and sex.[14] The same disillusionment in love and sex is shared by many

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[13]Sebreli, op. cit., pp. 26, 43, 57-59.

[14]The common theme of many tango verses is the man who is sacrificed to and crucified by the perfidity of the Argentine woman who has deceived him. The lyrics of Discépolo show an absolute disequality between man and woman, notes Julio Mafud--the innocent man (like the unblemished lamb), in a permanent childlike state, is defrauded and impoverished in ironic mockery of the adulterous "woman of the world" who knows and controls all the rules of the game of love. The following verse illustrates not only this just-described phenomenon but also the incapacity of the bewitched man to save himself and the inevitability of his perdition: "Por vos a mi mujer la vida he destrozao, y es pan de mis dos hijos todo el lujo que te he dao. No puedo reaccioner ni puedo comprender, perdido en la tormenta de tu voz que me embrujó..., la seda de tu piel que me estremece, y al latir florece con mi perdición." Julio Mafud, Sociología del tango (Buenos Aires: Editorial Américalee, 1966), pp. 73-75, and translated: "Because of you, my woman, I have made a ruin of my life; and the luxury you enjoy represents food of

middle-class individuals in their experiences and interpretation of life in general.[15]

The working class. Related to the scarcity of housing, the rise of rent payments, speculation in housing, and the crowding of renters into inadequate quarters, the alienation of the working class is pronounced. Not only are living conditions the source of alienation but working conditions as well. The workers are alienated from the noise of factory machines, the crowdedness of the buses and trains to and from their work, the oppressiveness of foremen and others who compel them to work long and hard, etc. They find little social prestige and satisfaction from the State, as they did in the era of Perón.[16] In fact, the actual State and the armed forces alienate the workers more than ever by their repeated attacks on Perón and the peronist movement.

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which I've deprived my two children. I can't respond, I can't think, lost in the tempest of your bewitching voice...this silk of your skin against which I tremble, and upon contact it blooms, along with my perdition."

[15]In the folkloric composition, "Milonga para mi perro," by H. Guarany, one verse says: "Pero la vida es triste, si no la vivimos con una ilusión." (Translated: "But life is sad [or unbearable] unless we live it with an illusion." The message of this passage conveys rather well another Argentine peculiarity, viz., to substitute unreal but more pleasant images for the more realistic ones. Such idea consists of two interpretations: a sophist view of life and a moral necessity to rationalize its purposeful distortion in order to endure its harsh realities. The anomic character of Argentine existence is lamented in the tangos. In the cosmos of his existence the Argentine has no other possibility than to orbit in space with neither hope nor expectation. "Everything in the world has turned sterile through constant and repeated failure." It is a hopeless and normless environment: "Never expect any help, nor a hand to be lent, nor a favor." Mafud, ibid., p. 68.

[16]Sebreli, op. cit., pp. 151, 166-169, 176, 183.

Social Services

Dissatisfaction is manifested generally by all classes over the lack of inefficiency of social services: transportation, housing, health and facilities, essential services, and the general administrative handling of civil procedures. Indeed, the satisfying of individual, group, and societal demands for more and improved social services presents a formidable challenge.[17]

Alienation and the Economy

There are five general economic themes around which most expressions and forms of alienation revolve. These are: rising prices and the cost of living, stagnation of production and foreign commerce, the encroachment of foreign economic interests, the concentration on agriculture, the financial deficiencies of the government in the deficit operation of some enterprises, and the niggardly redistribution of federal funds.

Prices and the Cost of Living

The Argentines contacted in this study were most overtly alienated from high prices and increasing living costs. In most of these, the government was blamed for allowing such undesirable occurrences to take place.[18] It was noteworthy, however, that in a few cases did the alienation

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[17]For a description of the social-service problems confronting Buenos Aires intendant Eugenio F. Schettini, see "La era de los municipios," Siete Días, loc. cit. and "La nueva Buenos Aires," Confirmado, II (September 29, 1966), pp. 32-38.

[18]The researcher explored in some depth the opinions of one Buenos Aires resident who expressed intense disdain for national life. He told the researcher: "Life is bad these days. Who knows where all

of any one person result in any action whatever, either negative or positive. The prices on food staples (particularly on milk and bread) were raised substantially during latter 1966. But perhaps more exasperating to consumers than the fact that prices were rising was the fact that not all retailers charge the same prices.[19]

Cost of living and price indicies. Using 1960 as the index base, it can be seen in Table 20 that the cost of living, as respects its general level, clothing and food costs, general expenses, cleaning articles and lodging, has more than tripled in the past six years. The table shows that there has been even a substantial increase in comparing the first ten months of 1966 with the same period of 1965. Individually, most prices seem to have doubled since 1964; newspapers and magazines prices have more than doubled, as have transportation fares, while rent has more than tripled and electricity more than doubled since 1964.[20]

Stagnation of Production

The stagnation of the industrial and agricultural production and foreign commerce of Argentina is an economic reality to which a number

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this will lead? Whereas before it was rob and let live, now it's rob and let die. Before, we could always at least get by. Our politicians and civil servants lined their pockets but they never interfered with the common man. They left us alone. Now it's impossible. The government has seen to that! I'm a poor man, but I own some beat-up old cars. Now I've got to pay an exorbitant tax on them...."

[19]The researcher witnessed and was told by consumers that food prices would vary in price as much as 100 per cent from one seller to the next, as would the prices on clothing and most other consumer goods.

[20]Dirección Nacional de Estadística y Censos, Secretaría de Estado de Hacienda, Costo de vida, precios minoristas, salarios industriales, op. cit., pp. 9, 12-25.

of other problems are related, all of which cause no little alienation in the producing sectors of the economy.

TABLE 20

COMPARISON OF AVERAGE COST OF LIVING INDICIES FOR THE FIRST TEN MONTHS OF 1966 WITH THE AVERAGE OF THE SAME PERIOD OF 1965*

	Average of First Ten Months		
	1966	1965	Variations in per cent
		Index base:	1960 = 100
General Level	364.1	274.3	32.7%
Groceries	346.5	273.9	26.5
Clothing	378.7	281.7	34.4
General expenses	419.5	301.9	39.0
Cleaning articles	342.9	273.4	25.4
Rent	388.5	183.5	111.7

*Source: Dirección Nacional de Estadística y Censos, Secretaría de Estado de Hacienda, Costo de vida, precious minoristas, salarios industriales, informe S.E. 45 (October, 1966), p. 9.

Agricultural stagnation. Disaffection because of low productivity is quite evident in the agricultural sector. One leading spokesman for the Sociedad Rural, Dr. Lorenzo A. Raggio, complains that the different sectors of the Argentine economy have been struggling to gain personal advantage and forgetting the general interest and that an increased agricultural production would be in the general interest.[21] Economist Gustavo Adolfo Nores observes that the rural population has recently decreased by 4 per cent and calls for an increased agricultural

[21]Raggio, loc. cit.

production to satisfy a greater internal consumption and to obtain a greater quantity of foreign exchange with which to purchase more capital equipment.[22]

Industrial stagnation. Disaffection over industrial stagnation assumes two different forms, depending on the set of causes to which such stagnation can be attributed. Both workers and entrepreneurs are displeased with the declining per-capita production in industry, but they each disagree as to the causes. To the worker, or anyone else of similar orientation, the problem is caused and aggravated by a presumed hegemony of the landed oligarchy, whose latifundio reduces the internal market for native industry, and by becoming economically dependent on "imperialist" countries, such as "greater subjection to the United States since 1958."[23] Thus, the solution to the current industrial crisis, so far as this group is concerned, lies in doing away with the old economic structure, implementing agrarian reforms, and eradicating foreign interests from participation in the native economy.

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[22]Nores, op. cit., pp. 100-111, 119-120.

[23]Accordingly, those who push for eliminating foreign ownerships within the national economy argue that foreign control is anti-national and seeks to keep the native industry of the country from growing beyond the light-industry stage of development. Thus, foreign-based companies can sell not only heavy-industry goods but all the machinery and raw materials needed by the light industries of the country. Furthermore, once foreign capital is invested in some branch of industry it will never be content with a status quo but will continue to expand and develop, exerting increasing pressure on domestic producers to fall in line with its policies. A more detailed development of these and other points can be found in Isacovich, op. cit., pp. 147-149.

In contrast to the nationalist-brand of disaffection is that disaffection expressed by entrepreneurs and manufacturing interests who condemn what they call "false nationalism" and urge even greater domestic expansion of industry through foreign investment and participation. To them the problem is one of insufficient capital, technology (in some areas), and capital equipment, which could be supplied by foreign investment. The disaffection of this sector is expressed by denunciations of "false nationalists" and any repressive activity (such as demands for wage increases, strikes, violence, and on the job sabotage) that may threaten national development.[24]

Commercial and trade stagnation. The export and shipping sector of the Argentine economy, particularly, expresses its consternation over the many physical and legal obstacles to expanding its volume of business and trade. It is noted that Argentine ports are among the most expensive in the world.[25] Not only are local shipping and commercial interests disaffected but also the foreign trade interests which do business in Argentina.[26]

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[24]Rogelio Frigerio, "Política económica y social," Introducción a los problemas nacionales (Buenos Aires: Centro de Estudios Nacionales, 1965), pp. 94-95, 98; La Razón, December 13, 1966, p. 1, statement by ACIEL: "Pensamiento de la Federación Gremial acerca del problema ferroviario," Revista de la Federación Gremial del Comercio e Industria, XXXVII (January-February, 1966), pp. 5-6.

[25]Presidential address, November 7, 1966; Buenos Aires Herald, December 7, 1966, pp. 8-9.

[26]The Argentine companies which ship to foreign buyers complain of the indignation of their clients upon learning that they have to pay a tax on the sales of their purchases made in Argentina. See "Rosario y la zona de libre comercio," Zona, I (June, 1965), p. 8.

Foreign Economic Interests

Argentine history has been replete with examples which illustrate the more undesirable aspects of economic imperialism.[27] Such unpleasant history of foreign economic dealings has conditioned many Argentines to resent any foreign intrusion into the national economy. Even Perón could not violate successfully the "sacred cow" of economic independence.[28] The opposition that eventually overthrew Arturo Frondizi was motivated by the foreign oil contracts made by the Frondizi government.[29] Whether these two preceding assertions by North American writers are correct or not, the fact is that any participation of foreign interests, public as

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[27]Among the more outstanding ones were: the bitter rivalry among the British, Dutch, Portuguese traders during the colonial period and later into the national period, who often drove hard bargains with the Argentine merchants; the British invasions of 1806 and 1807, in which local residents rose up and defeated superior British forces without any aid from Spain; the French blockade of Buenos Aires, 1838-1840, and the combined British-French blockade, 1845-1849; the unwilling involvement in the War of the Triple Alliance, 1865-1870, with Argentina, Brazil, and Uruguay aligned against Paraguay; the intrigues and low-calibre representation of foreign diplomats, particularly from the United States; the century-long dispute over the Falkland Islands by British and Argentine forces, possession of which changed hands various times. See Mario Rodríguez, "The Genesis of Economic Attitudes in the Río de la Plata," Hispanic American Historical Review, XXXVI (May, 1956), pp. 171-189; Mario Telser, "Rosas y Sarmiento contra la agresión yankee," Política Internacional, No. 81 (November, 1966), pp. 17-19; John F. Cady, Foreign Intervention in the Río de la Plata, 1838-1850: A Study of French, British, and American Policy in Relation to the Dictator Juan Manuel Rosas (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1929), entire book; Paul D. Dickens, "The Falkland Islands Dispute between the United States and Argentina," The Hispanic American Historical Review, IX (November, 1929), pp. 471-488.

[28]William J. Stokes, Latin American Politics (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Company), p. 405, trades upon this idea in referring to the nationalist opposition which Perón provoked upon proceeding to sign an oil contract with Standard Oil.

[29]Arthur P. Whitaker, Nationalism in Latin America (Gainsville, Florida: University of Florida Press, 1962), p. 52.

well as private, in Argentina is looked upon with disfavor in many sectors of the economy.[30]

Emphasis on Agriculture

Many segments of Argentine life subscribe to a corrupted version of the well-known Prebisch thesis. In this version, it is not only charged that the primary-producing countries are at a trade disadvantage, because of the inelastic demand for primary products, but that the foreign producers of finished goods would like to maintain the same unfavorable relationship of supplying Argentina with heavy goods at higher prices and receiving primary goods from Argentina at lower prices. The idea that agricultural production should be expanded is repulsive to the industrial proletariat and to other nationalistic proponents desiring that Argentina should have a prominent industry.[31]

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[30]Opposition to foreign investment businesses, or economic assistance was the basic line of labor and nationalistic groups and was preached in Política Internacional, Azul y Blanco, and Propósitos. See "Ciudado con el petróleo: entrega a la vista," Azul y Blanco, loc. cit.; Alfredo Canedo, "Estados Unidos y la hora nacionalista en la América Latina" and Víctor Perlo, "Monopolios Norteamericanos en la América Latina," Política Internacional, No. 79 (September, 1966), pp. 7-8, 9-12; and Angel N. Ruiz, "Por un plato de lentejas," Propósitos, loc. cit.

[31]In stating that Argentina is not pro-North America simply because the United States has nothing to offer to the country, the editor of Política Internacional asserts that the United States "aspires to convert us into a large farm or plantation without basic national industries but only industries controlled by its monopolies, which sell their products at monopolistic prices...; that gives us crumbs for economic aid and under terms that are counter to our national interests...; that gives priority to Southeast Asia over Latin America...and has made Brazil its basic branch office in South America." From an editorial by Jorge Julio Greco, "USA no nos hace falta," Política Internacional, No. 79 (September, 1966), pp. 5, 37.

State Enterprises and Financing

During the time of this study, the state enterprises came under sharp criticism from various sources, as did the public administration and the federal redistribution of national income to the provinces. Common charges leveled at the government entities and their operations are: inefficiency, corruption, surplus personnel, nepotism, obsolete procedures, centralism, and partiality to vested interests.[32] The government is charged with the culpability that the enterprises are not more profitable.[33]

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[32]The Federación Gremial del Comercio e Industria (Guild Federation of Commerce and Industry) of Rosario, Argentina, criticized both technical and administrative bureaucracy in state enterprises for having perpetuated instability for so long by "false nationalism." State organisms were characterized as "unorganized incompetence." "Pensamiento de la Federación Gremial acerca del problema ferroviario," Revista de la Federación Gremial del Comercio e Industria, loc. cit. Panorama, monthly news and picture magazine, in which North American capital participates, notes that there exists on the full-time public payroll two million state, provincial, and municipal employes who consume 70 per cent of the national budget; the railroads alone, operating under an increasing deficit, still managed to hire an additional 12,000 employes since 1963. Schurjin, op. cit., pp. 37-38. See also Portnoy, op. cit., pp. 14-15; Gorbán, loc. cit.; Lazarte, op. cit., pp. 5-7, and entire book; Norberto C. Ferrer, et. al., loc. cit.

[33]Among several handbills distributed in the Chacarita-Colegiales zone of the Federal Capital the day preceding the general labor strike of December 14, 1966, is one put out by the Comisión Obrera, Popular y Estudiantil de Solidaridad con Portuarios y Ferroviarios (Labor, Popular, and Student Commission of Solidarity with the dockworkers and railroad workers), informing the reader that 480 diesel locomotives and 30,000 railroad cars are out of service "purely and exclusively because of the persistent sabotage that is being carried out against the railroad workers." The handbill charges that tools, replacement parts, and other necessary materials are not in supply; that in most repair shops the workers do not even have paint and it is normal for workers to be required to supply their own tools. Eli L. Oliver, an international labor economist and consultant for the OAS who did a study on the Argentine railroad problem for the International Transport Workers Federation, describes the policy of the Argentine government toward the railroad industry as "the height of folly" and says that instead of firing 30,000 employes it could hire another 25,000. Applying

Alienation in Political Life

Four major themes of alienation were predominant in the political arena during the course of this study: first, the suppression of full civil liberties and the censure of political activity by the military government; second, the loss of national sovereignty, as signified by British rule over the Falkland Islands and by the presence of Russian fishing vessels in or near Argentine territorial waters; third, the amount of control which the national government should exercise over the university versus the amount of autonomy that should be enjoyed by the students; and, fourth, the apparent pro-oligarchic bias and orientation of nearly all official policy.

Suppression of Political Participation

For some politicians and political activists the suspension of political activity, which is believed to be only temporary, may have been a welcome respite.[34] But for others it means delay and frustration; and many months, even years, of political work now is jeopardy. Even if full civil liberties would be granted again in six months, a year, or two years, the lost time will never quite be compensated. The alienation of

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the U.S. traffic unit to Argentine data, a total of 26,528 new jobs would have to be created in order for the labor force to increase in proportion to the increase in traffic, he says. Finally, it is specified that 20,000 train cars are needlessly out of service and that one million tons of perishable goods rot each month while waiting to be transported. Buenos Aires Herald, December 7, 1966, pp. 8-9. And displaced SUPA leader Eustaquio Tolosa lays the blame for the port problems on the government. See "Sobre el tejada de zinc caliente," Primera Plana, IV (October 18, 1966), p. 18.

[34]As implied in "Políticos: secándose al sol," Primera Plana, loc. cit.

this group has its stimulus in the extra-legality of the government in power and its attempted control over politics.[35]

Violation of National Sovereignty

The intrusion of foreign powers into Argentine territory always provokes immediate and sustained retaliation.[36] But, Great Britain ended by retaining the Falkland Islands (called "Islas Malvinas" by Argentines), so that the abortive attempt of the group of young nationalists to take-over the islands on September 28, 1966, received much commendation for its audacity and dramatic expression of national sentiment.[37] But to the government the event was internationally embarassing, and it acted swiftly to punish the youthful invaders.[38] In a related but different occurrence,

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[35]However, such alienation is expressed with measured restraint. "We should not launch out in an absurd and hysterical opposition," counsels one high UCRP official. All in all, though, the politicians feel that time will work in their favor in discrediting the actual government and in preparing opinion to support the return of the parties and groups to political activity. "El retorno de los políticos," Confirmado, loc. cit., and "Soñar no cuesta nada," Primera Plana, loc. cit.

[36]See footnote "27" in this same chapter.

[37]It is worthy of commenting that on September 28, 1966, a nationalistic group of twenty men and one woman, the so-called "Operación Condor," boarded the DC-4, LV-AGG airliner of Aerolíneas Argentinas and three hours later four of the group, armed with pistols, forced the pilot to change the travel route and land in the Falkland Islands. After landing at Port Stanley the intention of the group was revealed by radio: to reaffirm Argentine sovereignty over the "Islas Malvinas" for God and the Republic. "Operación comando en las malvinas," Panorama, op. cit., first six pages. The 62 labor organizations under the leadership of Augusto T. Vandor pronounced in favor of the invasion: "Let the members of Operación Condor be secure in the knowledge that Argentine workers accompany them in this patriotic action." The other anti-Vandorist "standing organizations" were not so willing to support the movement, although "the attitude in itself deserves our sympathy." See "La invasión de las malvinas," Primera Plana, IV (October 4, 1966), pp. 19-21.

[38]The government acted forcibly in reaffirming before international organisms the Argentine rights to the Falkland Islands but at the same time

the need to expand the declining national fishing industry[39] was made more vivid by the sighting of Russian fishing vessels in or near Argentine territorial waters. In a subsequent newspaper article it was argued: "If we don't exploit our own fishing possibilities, others will do it for us."[40]

The University and the Government

The mishandling of the university situation by the Argentine government was widely condemned both at home and abroad. That the university could not be used as a political sounding board and trampoline was unthinkable in many student circles, which went on the oppose the government's intervention in the universities and in educational policies.[41]

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denounced the partisan and non-official attempt by the individual participants in Operación Condor and promised that they would all be prosecuted in the fullest rigor of the law. "Así no recuperaremos las Islas Malvinas," Análisis, VI (October 3, 1966), p. 10. Política Internacional, No. 81 (November, 1966), in "Grupo condor, ¡salud!" on page 1, defends energetically the action of the group and laments that the more serious press and figures in the nation have so harshly condemned Operación Condor. It objects to the participants being dealt with as criminals in such severe fashion.

[39]Clarín, November 24, 1966, p. 44; Clarin, December 6, 1966, p. 15.

[40]Clarín, November 24, 1966, ibid., also editorial, "Fomento de la explotación pesquera," La Capital, November 24, 1966, p. 4.

[41]APRI (Agrupación Pueblo y Reforma Indoamericana) and MNR (Movimiento Nacional Reformista) denounced law 16,912 and the government intervention into the eight national universities to dissolve the student government organs; and they called upon all students to resist the government, praising their fellow students who had been injured or killed in skirmishes with military and police forces. "Students also prefer to study unmolested instead of losing a year of study, or being jailed, or being struck; or dying as did Santiago Pampillón. But the road of responsibility is not marked by hedonistic sentiment." Resistencia o normalización, October, 1966. The JUP (Juventud Universitaria Peronista) urged opposition to the government, as had been effected successfully in the

On the other hand, there were other students, ones whose chief purpose was to obtain an academic education, and disinterested professionals, who deplored the political antics of students and said they would rather see the university faculty and administration and responsible students have control.[42]

The Oligarchic Influence on Policy

In the first place, the tighter control over opposition activity is quite unpalatable to the political activists.[43] But when the political course of the revolutionary government was finally charted in more detail,[44] the opposition was sorely offended, for it represented to the opposition an entrega (a "selling-out" or "giving-away") of the Revolution to "the hated oligarchy."[45]

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case of all preceding post-Perón governments, claiming that "we are willing to struggle so that the blood and sweat of the worker may cease being the price which our oligarchy demands in order to repay the aid that the criminal imperialists of the North give it." JUP publication, circulated December 13, 1966. The Federación de Agrupaciones Nacionales de Estudiantes Peronistas (Federation of National Peronist Student Groups) states: "There never was, nor is there, nor will there ever be a university to serve both the government and the people, so long as the people do not control the state....In this historic dilemma...we the students should submit ourselves to the struggle of the working class...." FANDEP, loc. cit.

[42]De la Vega, loc. cit.; senior medical student, loc. cit.

[43]Attention is called to the violent protest reaction in the universities, precipitated by the attempt on the part of the government to exercise greater control over the national education system.

[44]See the first section of Chapter X, "The Responding Political System," for the decisions and specific policies of the Executive Power.

[45]Jorge Julio Greco asked, in referring to the economic ministry and those responsible for national economic decisions, "What contribution can be made by men whose panacea consists in massacring the peso, causing a redistribution of income that fattens the coffers of the latifundistas

The Development of a Selected City: Rosario

It has been contended that urbanism and its related problems contribute significantly to the extent to which urban inhabitants feel alienated. To look at this contention more concretely, the urban development of one selected city, viz., Rosario, will now be described.

Urban Development

The rapid population expansion, from 23,169 persons in 1869 to 50,914 in 1887 to 113,168 in the census of 1900, brought on critical urban problems for the city of Rosario which from then on have necessitated creative planning and administrative dedication. To mention just a few highlights in the urban growth of Rosario: running water was first installed in 1887; Dr. Luis Lamas directed the municipal government at the turn of the century and Parque Independencia, the public park which now occupies an immense area of the city, was conceived and worked on during this administration; by 1906 Rosario had 150,845 souls; in 1909, some 3,500,000 hectares were incorporated into the municipality by annexing the northern districts of Alberdi, Nuevo Alberdi, and La Florida.[46]

Metropolitan Rosario as such began in the area which is the present-day central district of the city and then extended from Pellegrini

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and exporters, ties the knot around the necks of the lower and middle classes, and leaves the national industries at the mercy of foreign investors?" Jorge Julio Greco, "Carta abierta al President Onganía," Política Internacional, No. 81 (November, 1966), pp. 4-5. "El gobierno entrega la revolución," Azul y Blanco, I (November 10, 1966), p. 3; Ruiz, loc. cit.; "Poner a la CGT desde abajo: la lucha conjunta," Política Obrera, op. cit., p. 2.

[46]Gómez, op. cit., pp. 43-47; Montes, op. cit., pp. 16-17, 65.

Avenue in three directions. To the north, a nucleus of population located around a sugar refinery that had established there; and the area, comprising the present wards of Alberdi, Arroyito, and La Florida, became chiefly residential with a number of resorts being built northward along the Paraná river. To the west, out from the railroad, an upper-class district, called Fisherton and settled mainly by English railroad executives of the Ferrocarril Central Argentino, sprang up and filled continguous areas: Echesortu, Belgrano, and Mendoza. And, to the south arose another nucleus near the Swift meatpacking plant, in what is called Lower Saladillo, or simply el bajo. Although chiefly a low-class residential district, for its most southeastern and southwestern parts consisted of villas and slums, its appearance changes to middle class in moving west toward the Tiro Suizo ward.[47]

These movements of people and constructions, which were economically inspired, disregarded long-run considerations, such as how the municipality could bring these districts the essential services; for, in the 1930's the land area of Rosario nearly equalled that of the Federal Capital in Buenos Aires, with not even one-third as many people. Only after 1935 did city ordinances require open streets, lighting, and a minimum of transportation and services. Since 1958 all subdivision of lots for construction must be preceded by paved streets, potable water, and electricity.[48]

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[47]Parodi, loc. cit.; Arrúe Gowland, loc. cit.

[48]Parodi, ibid.

Status, Alienation, Anomie, and Participation

The results of the tests conducted by the researcher on the socioeconomic status, political alienation, anomie, and social participation of Argentine subjects will now be reported.

Socioeconomic Status

The measure of socioeconomic status for the subjects who are tested in this study consists of the occupation and education of the subject and the father of the subject. The scores made on these four items are used to classify all interviewees into one of three socioeconomic strata: 0-12, lower class; 12-20, lower middle class; and 20-28, upper middle class. Table 21 shows the ranking and distribution of subjects by their scores on the socioeconomic criteria. Four successive tables, 22 through 25, show occupation and education of father and occupation and education of subject by SES levels.

TABLE 21

RANKING AND DISTRIBUTION OF SUBJECTS ACCORDING TO TOTAL SES SCORES

	SES Scores			Totals
	0-12	12-20	20-28	
Occupation-Education of Subject and Father				
Per cent	40	40	20	100
Number of cases	36	36	18	90

TABLE 22

OCCUPATION OF FATHER BY SES LEVELS

Occupation	Lower Class	Lower Middle Class	Upper Middle Class
1. Blue-collar worker (dependent and unskilled)	17		
2. Blue-collar worker (independent and skilled)	11	11	
3. Small-scale white-collar worker .	7	8	
4. Small businessman, medium white-collar worker		9	9
5. Professional university employe, medium businessman, lower-ranking military officer	1	8	4
6. University professor or administrator-high-ranking employe, high-ranking military officer .			5
7. Entrepreneur, top-ranking official large landowner			
Number of cases	(36)	(36)	(18)

TABLE 23

EDUCATION OF FATHER BY SES LEVELS

Education	Lower Class	Lower Middle Class	Upper Middle Class
1. No school	18	1	
2. Some elementary	7	5	
3. Elementary completed	10	21	8
4. Some high school		4	
5. Completed high school		5	2
6. Some college			1
7. Completed college	1		7
Number of cases	(36)	(36)	(18)

TABLE 24

OCCUPATION OF SUBJECT BY SES LEVELS

Occupation	Lower Class	Lower Middle Class	Upper Middle Class
1. Blue-collar worker (dependent and unskilled)	13	3	
2. Blue-collar worker (independent and skilled)	16	9	
3. Small-scale white-collar worker .	7	17	
4. Small businessman, medium white-collar worker		7	
5. Professional university employe, medium businessman, lower-ranking military officer			13
6. University professor or administrator, high-ranking employe, high-ranking military officer. .			5
7. Entrepreneur, top-ranking official large landowner			
Number of cases	(36)	(36)	(18)

TABLE 25

EDUCATION OF SUBJECT BY SES LEVELS

Education	Lower Class	Lower Middle Class	Upper Middle Class
1. No school	10		
2. Some elementary	11	2	
3. Elementary completed	14	22	
4. Some high school	1	3	
5. Completed high school		4	3
6. Some college		5	4
7. Completed college			11
Number of cases	(36)	(36)	(18)

In the measurement of occupations among subjects and their fathers in this study, the two largest categories are blue-collar workers (independent and skilled) and small-scale white-collar workers (ones who perform errands and other menial tasks which do not involve hard physical labor). In education, the majority of the subjects have completed grade school, followed by those with no education, those with some grade school, and those with college completed.

Socioeconomic Mobility

On the whole, it does not appear that any appreciable mobility has occurred between generations.

Lower class members. A slightly upward movement is noted in occupation and education of the younger generation. The younger generation has acquired a little more elementary education and working skill than has the former generation. But one lower-class member was greatly surpassed by his parent who had achieved a college education and was a doctor.

Lower middle class members. In the lower middle class, the same numbers and proportions of individuals are found in the middle range but more younger-generation persons are in the upper range and more older-generation persons in the lower range, indicating that some mobility has occurred.

Upper middle class. A definite occupational and educational elevation has been achieved by younger-generation members of the upper middle class over the preceding generation. This fact may suggest that the socioeconomic stratum of greatest mobility on the entire socioeconomic scale

is the upper middle class, from which ambitious individuals cam improve on their already favorable socioeconomic status in surpassing their parents. Individuals in the lower and lower middle classes were able to advance only a little farther than did their predecessors.

Political Alienation

Political alienation, together with anomie, are key variables in studying the phenomenon of mass participation in political change. Both are intermediary variables between low socioeconomic status on the one hand and low social participation on the other hand. Table 26 presents total rankings by all respondents to each of the revised Zimmer Scale items in a format which allows summary comparison along the different scale items.

Table 27, using previous socioeconomic data, shows which per cent and number of cases in each socioeconomic stratum are "alienated" and "not alienated." The sum of the questionnaire responses (from approximately 90 subjects in number) are dichotomized by collapsing the response categories in the scaling procedure, based on scale scores ranging from a low of 0 to a high of 6. Those subjects making scale scores of 4 or more are considered to be alienated while those below 4 are termed "not alienated."

Results and Discussion

General political alienation. Some two-thirds of the individuals sampled in this study are politically alienated by the revised Zimmer criteria. Item 1 (municipality not interested in neighborhoods) and item 3 (waste of time to discuss urban problems with city officials) elicited

TABLE 26

POLITICAL ALIENATION FROM LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN ARGENTINE SUBJECTS SEPTEMBER 14-DECEMBER 14, 1966, IN THE "URBAN LITORAL"

	Response Categories		
	Agree	Disagree	Undecided
1. Municipality not interested in neighborhoods			
Per cent	67	15	18
Number of cases	60	13	16
2. City government responsible for economic and social problems			
Per cent	43	25	32
Number of cases	38	22	29
3. Waste of time to discuss urban problems with city officials			
Per cent	67	16	17
Number of cases	60	14	15
4. Political parties intervene too much in city administration			
Per cent	57	21	22
Number of cases	49	18	19
5. Only national government can resolve neighborhood needs			
Per cent	55	24	21
Number of cases	47	20	18
Total average per cent	58	20	22
Average number of cases	51	17	19

the most affirmative responses or highest manifestations of alienation. The two items registering the lowest amount of alienation are item 2 (the government responsible for economic and social problems) and item 5 (only national government can resolve neighborhood needs).

Political alienation by SES strata. Out of the 34 cases in the lower class, the entire 34 respondents tested are politically "alienated," or obtain high scores on the political-alienation scale. In the lower middle class, 17 cases or 57 per cent are "alienated" with 13 subjects or 43 per cent "not alienated." Significantly, only 4 respondents, or 22 per cent, in the upper middle class have high scores of political "alienation," whereas 14 cases, or 88 per cent, are "not alienated."

TABLE 27

POLITICAL ALIENATION FROM LOCAL GOVERNMENT
IN THREE SES STRATA

	Political Alienation		
	Alienated	Not Alienated	Totals
Upper Middle Class			
Per cent	22	88	100
Number of cases	4	14	18
Lower Middle Class			
Per cent	57	43	100
Number of cases	17	13	30
Lower Class			
Per cent	100		100
Number of cases	34		34
Per Cent	67	33	100
Total Number of Cases	55	27	82

Chi-square equals 33.58, $p < .001$, with 2 degrees of freedom.

Anomie

As in the Zimmer scale on political alienation, the Mizruchi version of the Srole scale contains also five items. Table 28 gives the total rankings by all tested subjects to each of the Srole items. Table 29 pairs respondents as to whether they are "anomic" or "not anomic," based on scale scores ranging from a low of 0 to a high of 10. The respondents scoring 6 or more are rated as "anomic," with those rated as "not anomic" falling below the score of 6.

TABLE 28

ANOMIE IN ARGENTINE SUBJECTS, SEPTEMBER 14-DECEMBER 14, 1966, IN THE "URBAN LITORAL"

	Response Categories		
	Agree	Disagree	Undecided
1. Public officials not interested in common man			
Per cent	73	15	12
Number of cases	61	13	10
2. A person does not really know whom he can count on			
Per cent	56	35	9
Number of cases	47	30	8
3. A person has to live just for today			
Per cent	58	37	5
Number of cases	48	31	4
4. No solution to this country's economic difficulties			
Per cent	38	60	2
Number of cases	31	49	2
5. God permits the misery in the world, not man			
Per cent	37	58	5
Number of cases	30	48	4
Total Average Per Cent	52	41	7
Average Number of Cases	43	34	6

Results and Discussion

General anomie. Less than 40 per cent of the total sample survey are "anomic," there being 36 individuals "anomic" and 46 "not anomic." On individual items, item 1 (public officials not interested in common man), of similar bent to the items in the Zimmer scale, attracts the largest anomic response, 61 of 84 subjects, or 73 per cent, almost three-fourths. Item 3 (a person has to live just for today) and item 2 (a person doesn't know on whom he can count) obtain 58 per cent and 56 per cent respectively of the "anomic" vote. On the other hand, items 4 and 5 receive affirmation from little more than a third of the subjects who are tested.

TABLE 29

ANOMIE IN THREE SES STRATA IN ARGENTINE SUBJECTS

	Anomie		
	Anomic	Not Anomic	Totals
Upper Middle Class			
Per cent		100	100
Number of cases		18	18
Lower Middle Class			
Per cent	33	67	100
Number of cases	10	20	30
Lower Class			
Per cent	77	23	100
Number of cases	26	8	34
Per Cent	44	56	100
Total Number of Cases . .	36	46	82

Chi-square equals 30.05, $p < .001$, with 2 degrees of freedom.

Anomie by SES Strata. Even more than on the Zimmer political-alienation items, the different socioeconomic levels are distinguished in the responses given to the Srole items. According to this study, the upper middle class has no rating of "anomie" whatever, all eighteen subjects being "not anomic." The lower middle class is one-third more "anomic," there being 10 subjects or 33 per cent that test out as "anomic." But the lower class has a much higher incidence of anomie, 26 of 34 subjects, or 77 per cent, responding in the "anomic" affirmative.

Social Participation

The three measurements of social participation are: frequency and kind of informal-group participation, formal-group membership, and formal-group attendance. Table 30 shows the total frequency of informal-group participation while Table 31 shows the same by SES strata. Table 32 gives a breakdown of informal-group participation by frequency of participation and by informal groups visited. Number of formal group memberships and extent of formal-group participation are shown in Tables 33 and 35. In Table 34 the formal group memberships by socioeconomic groups are given; Table 36 gives formal-group attendance by SES levels.

Frequency of Informal Group Participation

General informal participation. Table 30 is based on 89.75 cases (90 subjects having responded in three situations and 89 subjects in one situation) which yield 359 total responses, distributed in progressive frequencies of 54, 59, 115, and 131 responses respectively. In the table it is seen that the total subjects who visit relatives, friends, neighbors, and co-workers "at least twice a week" amount to

only 15 per cent of the total. Slightly more, 17 per cent, visit "once a week"; 32 per cent "less often"; and 36 per cent "never."

TABLE 30

TOTAL FREQUENCY OF ARGENTINE INFORMAL GROUP PARTICIPATION, IN PERCENTAGES

Total Association with Relatives, Friends, Neighbors, and Co-workers	Per Cent of Total Respondents
At least twice a week	15
Once a week	17
Less often	23
Never	36
Per Cent	100
Total Number of Cases	89.75

Informal participation by SES strata. The response patterns for both lower-class and lower-middle-class subjects on total frequency of informal associations are similar, but the upper middle class differs somewhat. As given in Table 31 the lower class and lower middle class visit informal groups "at least twice a week" and "once a week" at rates of 18 per cent and 15 per cent respectively. These same classes visit informal groups "less often" at rates of 28 per cent and 30 per cent and "never" at rates of 36 per cent and 40 per cent. But in the upper middle class 8 per cent visit their informal associates at rates of 8 per cent "at least twice a week," 15 per cent "once a week," 45 per cent "less often," and 32 per cent "never." Thus, the lower and lower middle classes tend to make generally less frequent visits; but, of the visits which they make, a greater number of more frequent visits are

made than less frequent visits. On the other hand, the upper middle class makes more over-all visits; but, of the visits made, more are of the less frequent type.

TABLE 31

TOTAL FREQUENCY OF ARGENTINE INFORMAL GROUP PARTICIPATION IN THREE SES STRATA, IN PERCENTAGES

Total Association with Relatives, Friends, Neighbors, and Co-Workers	Socioeconomic Class by Percentages		
	Lower Class	Lower Middle Class	Upper Middle Class
At least twice a week			
Per cent of groups	18	15	8
Once a week			
Per cent of groups	18	15	15
Less often			
Per cent of groups	28	30	45
Never			
Per cent of groups	36	40	32
Total Number of Cases	36	35.75	18

Individual association in informal groups. Among the informal groups with which subjects associate, neighbors, and co-workers are visited the most infrequently, 51 per cent of subjects never visiting neighbors and 48 per cent never socializing with co-workers. Relatives are the most popular. Some 41 per cent visit relatives at least once a week or more often. While not quite so popular as relatives, friends are nonetheless visited to some extent by 79 per cent of the sample universe.

TABLE 32

INDIVIDUAL ASSOCIATION WITH SEVERAL ARGENTINE INFORMAL GROUPS, IN PERCENTAGE

	Relatives	Friends	Neighbors	Co-workers
At least twice a week	22	21	15	2
Once a week	21	15	12	18
Less often	30	43	22	32
Never	27	21	51	48
Per Cent	100	100	100	100
Total Number of Cases	90	89	90	90

Formal Group Memberships

Number of formal group memberships. Of the 90 total subjects, 28 belong to no formal groups, 33 to one, 16 to two, and 13 to three. Of the total of 52 subjects who have formal group memberships, 63 per cent belong to just one formal group, 31 per cent to two groups, and 6 per cent to three groups.

Formal-group memberships by SES strata. As might be expected, the lower class has the lowest level of social participation, the lower middle class the next lowest, and the upper middle class the highest participation. Some 64 per cent of the lower class belong to no organizations and 36 per cent belong to just one organization. The lower middle class registers some 14 per cent belonging to no groups, 45 per cent to one group, 19 per cent to two groups, and 22 per cent to three groups. The upper middle class subjects all belong to one or more organizations, 22 per cent having membership in one formal group, 50 per cent in two groups, and 28 per cent in three groups.

TABLE 33

NUMBER OF ARGENTINE FORMAL GROUP MEMBERSHIPS

Number of Groups	Per Cent of Population	Per Cent of Members
None	31	
One	37	63
Two	18	31
Three	14	6
Four		
Five		
Six or more		
Per Cent	100	100
Total Number of Cases	90	52

TABLE 34

NUMBER OF ARGENTINE FORMAL GROUP MEMBERSHIPS IN THREE SES STRATA, IN CLASS PERCENTAGES

Number of Groups	Socioeconomic Class by Percentages		
	Lower Class	Lower Middle Class	Upper Middle Class
None	64	14	0
One	36	45	22
Two		19	50
Three		22	28
Four			
Five			
Per Cent	100	100	100
Total Number of Cases	36	36	36

Total frequency of formal-group participation. It can be seen in Table 35 that 43 per cent of the total sample and 54 per cent of the total number who have formal memberships attend formal group meetings and otherwise participate "at least once a week" or more often. There is a progressive trend toward "more frequent" rather than "less frequent" participation.

TABLE 35

EXTENT OF ARGENTINE FORMAL GROUP PARTICIPATION

Formal Group Participation	Per Cent of Population	Per Cent of Members
Non-members		
No association	21	
Members		
Cannot ascertain	5	6
Never attends	2	3
Once a year	2	3
Several times a year . . .	6	8
Once a month	9	11
Two or three times a month	12	15
Once a week	26	33
More often	17	21
Sub Total	79	100
Grand Total	100	100
Number of Cases	90	62

Extent of formal-group participation by SES strata. As Table 36 points out, the three Argentine socioeconomic groups are rather "frequent" participants. Some 76 per cent of the formal-group members of the lower class attend organizational functions "once a week" or "two or three times a month," 61 per cent of the lower middle class attend "two or three times a month" and more frequently, as does 71 per cent of the upper middle class.

TABLE 36

PER CENT OF ARGENTINE FORMAL ASSOCIATION MEMBERS WHO ATTEND A SPECIFIED NUMBER OF MEETINGS IN THREE SES STRATA

Frequency of Attendance	Socioeconomic Class by Percentages		
	Lower Class	Lower Middle Class	Upper Middle Class
More than once a week		24	22
Once a week	46	22	41
Two or three times a month	30	15	8
Once a month	8	7	19
Several times a year	8	8	5
Once a year		5	
Never	8	12	
Cannot ascertain			5
Total	100	100	100
Number of members	13	31	18

Social Organizations

Lower class. It was previously noted that of the 36 subjects in the 0-12 socioeconomic range, only 13 have association in formal groups. Each of the 13 formal-group members is a participant in just one organization. Some 10 belong to sports clubs and 3 are affiliated with labor organizations.

Lower middle class. Some 31 of 36 lower-middle-class subjects are social participants, of which 16 belong to one organization, 7 to two organizations, and 8 to three organizations. Seventeen memberships are in sports and recreational clubs; 11 in unions and labor organizations; 10 in cultural, education, aesthetic, or academic organizations; 5 in religious organizations, apart from regular church membership; and 5 are not ascertainable.

Upper middle class. All 18 subjects in the upper middle class are "social participants", 4 belonging to one organization, 9 to two organizations, and 5 to three organizations. Fourteen of the memberships are academic and cultural, 11 sports, 4 trade-union, 4 not ascertainable, 3 church-related, and 1 ethnic.

Correlations

In examining carefully the variables of socioeconomic status, political alienation, anomie, and social participation, this study appears to confirm the initial hypothesis that a chain relationship exists among these respective variables. Indeed, individuals of lower socioeconomic status are more politically alienated and anomic than are those of higher socioeconomic status, and the lower socioeconomic individuals participate less in their society than do those in the higher socioeconomic levels. That persons of lower socioeconomic status tend to withdraw or refrain from political activity also seems to be confirmed in the modest results of this study. There is a rather high correlation between political alienation and anomie. Because of the dearth of responses on the final part of the questionnaire dealing with political attitudes, no attempt is made, however, to correlate negative political attitudes with high alienation and anomie.

Socioeconomic Status and Social Participation

In Tables 37 and 38, all individuals with high scores of political alienation and anomie are noted. They are all classified according to their socioeconomic status (lower class, lower middle class, and upper middle class) and level of social participation ("isolates" designating

low social participation and "participants" referring to high social participation).

TABLE 37

PERCENTAGE OF ARGENTINE SUBJECTS HAVING HIGH SCORES OF POLITICAL ALIENATION BY SOCIOECONOMIC STATUS AND SOCIAL ISOLATION

	Socioeconomic Class by Percentages High Alienation Scores		
	Lower Class	Lower Middle Class	Upper Middle Class
Isolates	82	12	--
Number of cases	28	2	--
Participants	18	88	100
Number of cases	6	15	4

Chi-square equals 24.90, $p < .001$, with 2 degrees of freedom.

TABLE 38

PERCENTAGE OF ARGENTINE SUBJECTS HAVING HIGH SCORES OF ANOMIE BY SOCIOECONOMIC STATUS AND SOCIAL ISOLATION

	Socioeconomic Class by Percentages High Anomia Scores		
	Lower Class	Lower Middle Class	Upper Middle Class
Isolates	88	10	--
Number of cases	23	1	--
Participants	12	90	--
Number of cases	3	9	--

Chi-square equals 23.26, $p. < .001$, with 2 degrees of freedom.

Lower class. The lower class demonstrates a significant relationship among socioeconomic status, political alienation, and social isolation. Some 28 respondents, or 82 per cent, in the lower class are "politically alienated" and "socially isolated." Significantly, all the lower class subjects achieved high scores on the Zimmer political-alienation scale. In regard to "anomie," the correlation is not so high, only 77 per cent of the lower class have high scores of "anomie." But between the variables of "anomie" and "social isolation" there exists a higher correlation, some 88 per cent of all those with high scores of "anomie" qualifying as social "isolates."

Lower middle class. As hypothesized, the lower middle class should be at a midway point on all scales, about half of the subjects scoring as being slightly "alienated" and "anomic" and slightly "not alienated" and "not anomic." The results do not follow completely this theoretical reasoning. A slight majority of lower-middle-class respondents (17-13) are "politically alienated"; but of these "alienated" persons only 2, or 12 per cent, have low scores of "social participation." But, notably, all the lower-middle-class subjects who are not "politically alienated" are "social participants," having high scores of "social participation." With regard to "anomie," just one-third of this group is "anomic," of which only 10 per cent are "socially isolated." Of the "not-anomic" persons, 85 per cent are "social participants."

Upper middle class. Only 4 individuals, or 22 per cent of the upper middle class are "politically alienated." Of that total, all, or 100 per cent, are high "social participants." All of the 78 per cent of

the subjects "not alienated" are also "not socially isolated." None of this group has high scores of "anomie," and all subjects of this class have high scores of "social participation." Thus, the highest confirmation of the hypotheses of the study is found in the upper middle class.

Alienation and Anomie

The preceding results on socioeconomic status and the variables of alienation, anomie, and social isolation strongly support the postulated theses concerning the existing interconnections and interrelationships among the four factors in question. But what of the relationship between political alienation and anomie? Table 39 gives the percentage of subjects having the same and different levels of scores on both political alienation and anomie. As can be seen, 63 of the 82 total respondents, or 77 per cent, have the same level of scores on both alienation

TABLE 39

PERCENTAGE OF SUBJECTS HAVING SAME AND DIFFERENT LEVELS OF SCORES ON BOTH POLITICAL ALIENATION AND ANOMIE

	Alienation-Anomie
High scores in both	44
Number of cases	36
Low scores in both	33
Number of cases	27
Different scores in both	23
Number of cases	19
Total Number of Cases	82
Total Percentage	100

and anomie. Some 44 per cent have high scores on both and 33 per cent low scores on both, with 23 per cent scoring differently (high on one scale but low on the other).

Correlation coefficient. A more rigorous measure, Pearson's correlation coefficient, is used in testing the correlation between political alienation and anomie. The first step in calculating this correlation is to tabulate the individual scores, of which there are eighty two. Next, the scores are ranked in columns, political alienation scores comprising the "x" column and anomie scores comprising the "y" column. Then, Pearson's equation[49] is applied to this raw data and the result is a coefficient of .564. This means that 31.81 per cent of the variation in "y" (anomie) is explained by "x" (political alienation). As to the level of significance, it is noted that the coefficient of .564, derived from 82 responses or frequencies of scores, is significant beyond the .001 level.

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[49]Pearson's correlation coefficient is determined in this study from this equation:

$$r = \frac{\Sigma XY - \frac{(\Sigma X)(\Sigma Y)}{N}}{\sqrt{\left[\Sigma X^2 - \frac{(\Sigma X)^2}{N}\right]\left[\Sigma Y^2 - \frac{(\Sigma Y)^2}{N}\right]}}$$

CHAPTER VIII

ATTITUDES AND BELIEF SYSTEMS

Attitudes and belief systems figure into Diagram 1 at the juncture of the three funnels (social-group, political-group, and governing interests) and constitute the receptive and regulatory chamber for all political and environmental pressures applied to the political system. To the extent that the political actions by system authorities find their legitimacy in the set of attitudes, values, and belief systems held by the political culture, the power-controlling and decisionmaking forces can decide policy and authoritatively allocate values for members of the political system without sensing too much outside pressure in the form of negative responses to official policy. But when the policies of the system authorities run counter to the attitudes, values, and beliefs that are reflected in the political culture, the political system may then receive a negative "feedback response" that could well provoke changes within and by the political system.

Political Attitudes

Attempts were made during the period of this study to gauge public opinion with respect to the June revolution itself and concerning

particular political, social, and economic groups in the country. The first part of this section of the chapter will report on the results of interviews conducted by the research departments of two Argentine publications on the public reaction to the revolution. The second part of this section will discuss the results of the interviews conducted by the researcher in which subjects rated the major political, social, and economic groups which are generally prominent in national life, plus some six major foreign governments.

The Revolution of 1966

At various times after the revolution of June 28, 1966, took place, the research department of an Argentine publication[1] interviewed 1000 subjects by unstructured street contact in the metropolitan districts of Barrio Norte, La Boca, Once, Flores, Barrio Rivadavia, Avellaneda, Villa Ballester, San Martín, Ciudadela, Norte, Haedo, the metropolitan port zone, and La Plata. Another publication[2] conducted 300 interviews during the first thirty days of the new government to establish opinion concerning it. The sampling of subjects was based on a proportional socioeconomic distribution of the population, but the individual subjects were contacted by probalistic or fortuitous contact. A second

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[1]The publication is Correo de la Tarde, a weekly publication of the Instituto Promotor de los Argentinos (Institute for Promoting Argentines). See "Once mil respuestas traducen alarma," Correo de la Tarde, loc. cit. The questionnaire herein reported was presented at various times (the latter part of each month from July to September), so that a comparison of the results in different time periods is possible.

[2]Panorama (having North American economic ties with Time-Life International). See "Habla el pueblo: qué espera del gobierno," Panorama, No. 40 (September, 1966), pp. 12-21.

opinion survey was published by Correo de la Tarde during October 26-28, 1966, based on the same geographical areas.[3]

Expectations of Citizenry (Panorama Survey)

Responses to the Panorama survey compiled during the first thirty days of the revolution reveal that at the outset the majority of the people, some 74 per cent, felt that the government would benefit and act on behalf of the entire country. It is noteworthy that some 66 per cent of the workers said that they would support the government. To the question asking which group would best direct the country forward, 37 per cent said the armed forces, 16 per cent the economists, 13 per cent the workers, 9 per cent the universities, and down to 4 per cent in favor of the entrepreneurs. Among the leading national problems, 82 per cent pointed to the cost of living, 59 per cent to housing, 49 per cent to industrial development, 41 per cent to education, 27 per cent to pensions and retirements, 26 per cent to labor problems, 25 per cent to salaries and unemployment, and down to only 20 per cent considering as important agricultural promotion and development.[4]

Asked which of six political leaders (Frondizi, Illia, Alsogaray, Aramburu, Onganía, or Perón) the country needed most in order to progress, 47 per cent of the subjects singled out Onganía, 12 per cent Perón, 6 per cent Frondizi, 4 per cent Alsogaray, 3 per cent Aramburu, and 1 per cent

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[3]"El hombre común sigue esperando," Correo de la Tarde, VIII (November 1, 1966), pp. 32, 18. This questionnaire also reported on responses made at different times to the same identical questions.

[4]"Habla el pueblo: qué espera del gobierno," Panorama, op. cit., pp. 12-17.

Illia. Some 68 per cent of the respondents felt that the government would preserve the exercise of freedom. Seventy six per cent attributed to the government a longevity of at least two years, 16 per cent predicting that it would have a duration of from five to eight years and 31 per cent predicting a duration of more than eight years. The majority of those interviewed, 68 per cent, predicted that the then current government would transfer power by holding elections.[5]

Reactions of Citizenry (Correo de la Tarde Surveys)

Necessity of the June 28, 1966 revolution. The largest bloc of the citizenry, 45.3 per cent, still were of the opinion in late October that the revolution was necessary, although this figure diminished from 77.2 per cent in late July and from 58.7 per cent in late August. The percentage of those believing that the revolution was not necessary steadily increased from 17.4 per cent in late July to 29.5 per cent in late September and to 30.2 per cent in late October. The diminution of the "yes" replies and the increase in "no" replies was indicative of growing public discontent, as was also the increase in the percentage of subjects "without opinion," from 5.4 per cent in late July to 24.7 per cent in late August, to 27.3 per cent in late September.[6]

Continuation of previous government. The percentage of those desiring that politics should continue as they had prior to the revolution increased from late August (19.2 per cent) to late September (29.3 per

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[5] Ibid., pp. 18-21.

[6] "El hombre común sigue esperando," Correo de la Tarde, op. cit., p. 32.

cent) but then decreased during October (27.2 per cent).[7]

Continuation of the Revolution or return to political parties. In the survey that Correo de la Tarde conducted in October of 1966, subjects were asked for the first time whether the revolution should first fulfill its announced designs or whether elections should be called at once to return the country to the political parties. Some 61.8 per cent favored the former course and 21.9 per cent the latter, with 16.3 per cent having no opinion or being doubtful.[8]

Knowledge of the objectives of the revolution. In order to test opinion on the preceding query, Correo de la Tarde asked subsequently the extent to which subjects knew the objectives of the revolution. In this query 72.2 per cent of the subjects indicated that they knew very little--next to nothing--and were not interested in the objectives of the revolution. This response seems to show that the common man wants change per se but is confused as to all that such change may encompass.[9]

Emotional reactions to the revolution. Interviewees were tested as to which of several emotional states (optimism, happiness, hope, depression, fear, expectation, confidence, shame, pride, sadness, or indifference) best described their reactions to the revolution. The state of "fear" increased in persons tested from 21.3 per cent in late July to 34.0 per cent in late October, whereas "hope" decreased in subjects examined from 27.2 per cent to 20.3 per cent in the same two periods. "Depression" increased from 2.4 per cent in July to 10.6 per

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[7] Ibid.

[8] Ibid.

[9] Ibid.

cent in August and to 20.2 per cent in September, and then declined to 18.2 per cent during October. "Optimism" and "confidence" increased from 2.1 per cent to 6.2 per cent and from 3.1 per cent to 10.3 per cent respectively from July to October. "Expectation" declined from 15.2 per cent in July to 2.2 per cent in October. "Indifference" declined from 6.2 per cent in July to 2.5 per cent in October. All in all, it is noted that negative sentiments increased from July through September, but decreased during October. Negative sentiments were reduced from 66.4 per cent of the total in September to 61 per cent in October.[10]

The tendency of the Revolution. Subjects had numerous descriptive terms (some 19 in all) by which to label the revolution. In late September, the vast majority of interviewees felt that the revolution was of a "markedly undefined" tendency and also "clerical" and "nationalist." In October it was again "markedly undefined," but in addition "centralist" (Buenos Aires oriented), "nationalist," "clerical," "militarist," "rightist," "franco-oriented," and "corporatist," which all added up to 39.5 per cent of the total items by which the revolution was described.[11]

Most effective government measure. The government acted swiftly in restoring order to the ports, suppressing activity by political parties, intervening in the universities, and handling the Tucumán problem. Of those who commented on the most effective measures taken by the government, some 40.2 per cent pointed to the government measures to organize and

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[10] Ibid.; "Once mil respuestas traducen alarma," Correo de la Tarde, loc. cit.

[11] "El hombre común sigue esperando," ibid., pp. 32, 18.

straighten out the ports, 33 per cent to the doing away with political parties, 18.3 per cent to the intervention in the universities, and 8.5 per cent to the Tucumán problem.[12]

First measure that the government should take. Of striking significance is that the largest bloc of citizenry, 24.6 per cent, would imprison or repress the speculators (stock and money exchangers) as its first measure if it were in power. Among the other percentages of respondents, 21.4 per cent said they would straighten out the railroads; 18.1 per cent would end all the strikes; 8.3 per cent would take care of the retired people; 7.8 per cent would effect large public works; 8.0 per cent would take other measures; and, 11.8 per cent had no opinion or no concrete measure in mind.[13]

The principles of Onganía. In late August, the chief characteristics making up the image of Onganía were "patriotic," "honest," "balanced," "indecisive," and "disciplined." In late September, Onganía was rated as being "indecisive" (20.01 per cent), "honest" (15 per cent), "disciplined" (12 per cent), "patriotic" (10.35 per cent), and "subject to influence" (10.2 per cent).[14]

Good and bad procedures of the government. In late September, some 22.5 per cent of the respondents believed that the government acted well in no situation, 18.5 per cent said it acted well in foreign relations, and 14.3 per cent noted it did well in education; whereas, 24.5 per cent

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[12] Ibid., p. 18.

[13] Ibid.

[14] "Once mil respuestas traducen alarma," loc. cit.

thought it acted badly in all matters, 15.4 per cent said it proceeded badly in general policy, 14.7 per cent said badly in economic affairs, 14.3 per cent badly in labor, and 12.3 per cent badly in education.[15]

International Political Attitudes

Six foreign governments and seventeen national groups were classified according to three factors (force, activity, and evaluation) of the Semantic Differential by from 30 to 73 subjects giving ratings on each item. Table 40 gives the average ratings of six foreign governments and Tables 41 through 44 in this chapter and Tables 45 through 49 in Appendix D give the average ratings of seventeen national groups on each of these factors by socioeconomic strata. The tables in Appendix D also show the number of respondents who have rated each item. In compiling individual scores to arrive at the average ratings, the values of 2, 3, 5, 7, and 8 were computed into each of the five-point scales in order to highlight the extreme positions and reveal more strikingly the differences among the three socioeconomic groups. It should be noted that the more intensely positive the political conception (strong, active, and good) being recorded the smaller the average score; the less intensely positive the conception (weak, passive, and bad), the larger the average score.

The Socioeconomic Groups

It is regretted that only a few of the subjects in the lower and lower middle classes rated the six foreign governments in this study.

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[15] *Ibid.*

The time factor and the relative unfamiliarity of the lower classes with some of the foreign governments considerably reduced the number of expected responses. Nonetheless, a few generalizations are possible with regard to the responses that were given and that are shown in Table 40.

While the upper middle class does not differ too much from the lower middle and lower classes in its average ratings bestowed upon the governments of France and Red China, it differs markedly in its ratings of the government of Argentina. It shows a more negative conceptualization of the political strength, activity, and worth of its own country than do its lower socioeconomic counterparts. The upper middle and lower middle classes are quite close to one another in their ratings of the governments of the United States and Cuba, and they are more closely in agreement in their ratings of the six foreign governments than is the lower class with either the lower middle class or the upper middle class, except in the instance of Russia in which the two lower socioeconomic levels view the Russian government more positively than does the upper middle class. Apart from its similar ratings of the Red Chinese and French governments, the lower class does not agree with the two higher socioeconomic groups on its ratings of the United States, Argentine, and Cuban governments. On these, the lower class exemplifies a more positive or favorable evaluation than do the other two classes.

The Foreign Governments

The government of the United States. In the minds of lower class subjects, the U.S. government is seen as being stronger, more active, and

TABLE 40

AVERAGE RATINGS OF FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS ON THREE FACTORS BY SOCIOECONOMIC STRATA



Upper middle class---- ∘∘Extreme groups significant beyond .05 level
Lower middle class-∘-∘ ++Extreme groups significant beyond .01 level
Lower class———— **Extreme groups significant beyond .001 level

more virtuous, although neither the upper middle class nor the lower middle class rate it too unfavorably. It is rated below the median scale position (5) on all three factors by all three classes, meaning that in the minds of all subjects it tends more toward strength than weakness, more toward activity than passivity, and more toward virtue than virulence.

The government of Argentina. Notably, the lower class sees the Argentine government as being "rather strong," "rather active," and "rather good." The upper middle class, however, rates the government of Argentina as being "rather weak," as being "midway between activity and passivity," and as being "rather bad." To the lower middle class, the Argentine government is "somewhat weak," "rather active," and "mediocre." On the evaluation factor, it is noted that the upper middle class rates the Argentine government as "rather bad," the lower middle class rates it "somewhat good," and the lower class rates it "good."[16]

The government of Cuba. All three classes basically agree that the government of Cuba is "rather strong" and "active," with the upper middle class rating it less active than the lower two classes. On the evaluation factor, the lower middle class rates it as being "bad," the upper middle class rates it "not so good," and the lower class rates it as being "good."

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[16]These results do not coincide with the hypothesis that the more anomic, politically alienated, and isolated that a subject is, the less he will participate politically and the more negative will be his political participation (in the event that he participates at all) in politics. While it is more or less correct in assuming that an estranged and isolated individual will not participate politically, the results from this Semantic Differential test suggest that the estranged and isolated individual is more inclined to respond positively than negatively in national or international politics. It is the partly anomic, the partly alienated, and the partly isolated individual who is the one most inclined toward negative political participation.

The government of Russia. On the force and activity factors it is seen that a progressively positive political rating occurs from the upper middle class to the lower middle class to the lower class. Accordingly, the Russian government is seen as being "strong" and "active" by the upper middle class, as being stronger and more active by the lower middle class, and as being stronger and more active by the lower class. On the good-bad scale, the lower middle class views the government of Russia as being "good" while the upper middle class sees it as "not so good" and the lower class esteems it as being "neither good nor bad."

The government of Cuba. All three classes agree that the government of Red China is quite "strong" and "active," and all three classes rate it as being "bad," with the strongest rating of "bad" coming from the lower class and the least strong rating of "bad" from the upper middle class.

The government of France. With little variation among their scores, all three classes esteem the government of France to be "quite strong," "highly active," and "excellent."

To sum up these observations, the following two conclusions are offered. First, the upper middle and lower middle classes in general give higher or more negative ratings to these six foreign governments than does the lower class. This may be due to a difference in education and communication. It is speculated that the two higher socioeconomic classes are more informed and their evaluations reflect a more knowledgeable frame of reference. This seems to suggest that negativism evaluating other governments increases with greater education and access to information. Second, the lower class tends to view all governments as being stronger,

more active, and more virtuous than do the two other classes, with the exception of the evaluative factor for the government of Red China. The lower class sees the Red Chinese government as "bad."

National Political Attitudes

Perhaps greater confidence can be placed in the results concerning national political attitudes since the number of subjects rating the seventeen different politically significant groups, movements, and organizations in Argentina was higher than it was for the number rating the six foreign governments. The results of these ratings by socioeconomic strata will now be presented under four headings: political parties and movements, power blocs, occupational groupings, and economic interests.

Political Parties and Movements

The six political parties and movements that are rated by Argentine subjects in the "urban Litoral" region are: the UCRP (Unión Cívica Radical del Pueblo), the UCRI (Unión Cívica Radical Intransigente), the UDELPA (Unión del Pueblo Argentino), the Socialist Party, the Peronist movement, and the Communists. The factor ratings of these six parties and movements by the three socioeconomic classes are shown in Table 41.

In examining the average ratings of these six political groupings by the three socioeconomic classes, it is quite striking that the three political parties (UCRP, UCRI, and UDELPA) are rated quite negatively on all three factors by all three classes of subjects. All three classes agree that the UCRP is "quite weak" but a "little bit active" and "not so good." The average ratings on the UCRI, like the ratings given to the

TABLE 41

AVERAGE RATINGS OF POLITICAL PARTIES AND MOVEMENTS ON THREE FACTORS BY SOCIOECONOMIC STRATA



Upper middle class---- ∘∘Extreme groups significant beyond .05 level
Lower middle class-∘-∘ ++Extreme groups significant beyond .01 level
Lower class———— **Extreme groups significant beyond .001 level

UCRP, show little if any variance among the three classes in regarding the UCRI to be "rather weak," only "slightly active," and "not so good." The ratings go even higher or in more negative directions for the UDELPA party. On the evaluative factor, UDELPA is rated "about even," or in the middle, by the upper middle class, whereas the lower middle and lower classes categorize it as "bad."

While the Socialist Party is not liked by any of the groups, it is still not as much disliked as the three preceding political parties. To all classes, it is "weak," "inactive," and "not so good." As could be expected, the Peronist movement is rated progressively more positive in going from the highest to the lower socioeconomic class, but the differences surprisingly are slight ones and do not justify concluding that the Peronist movement is viewed more favorably by the lower socioeconomic classes. As can be seen in Table 41, Peronism is considered to be "neither strong nor weak," "neither active nor passive," and "neither good nor bad" by all three socioeconomic groups. And, apparently the Communists are not very popular. They are rated as being "somewhat weak," "not very active," and "bad."

The Power Blocs

Regarded by the researcher as perhaps the four strongest or most influential power blocs outside the government structure itself, the Roman Catholic Church, the armed forces, the CGT (General Labor Confederation), and the university students all seem capable of acting upon and changing the national social and political orders. These power blocs or entities are rated in Table 42.

TABLE 42

AVERAGE RATINGS OF POWER BLOCS ON THREE FACTORS BY SOCIOECONOMIC STRATA



Upper middle class---- ∘∘Extreme groups significant beyond .05 level
Lower middle class-∘-∘ ++Extreme groups significant beyond .01 level
Lower class———— **Extreme groups significant beyond .001 level

Whereas all three classes display with little variation among them a general disdain for political parties and a general indifference toward political movements, there are significant differences among the classes in their ratings of the four power blocs. The lower class looks upon the Roman Catholic Church as being politically stronger, more active,

and more virtuous than do the other two classes. The lower middle class rates the Church as being stronger and more active than does the upper middle class, but the latter judges the Church to be "somewhat good" whereas the former rates the Church as "neutral" (neither good nor bad). The upper middle class views the armed forces as being a little weaker, a lot less active, and less virtuous in politics than do the other two classes. All three classes, however, rate the armed forces as being "quite strong," "quite active," and "not so good." The CGT is rated the most favorably by the lower class, although all three classes consider it to be "strong," "active," and "good." Similarly the university students are rated as being "strong," "active," and "good" by all three classes, although the students are rated as being stronger by the lower class, as being less virtuous by the lower middle class, and as being more active and more virtuous by the upper middle class.

Occupational Groupings

Four major occupational groupings--the bureaucracy or public service employes, the industrial working class or proletariat, the professionals, and the peasantry--are rated by the respondents. Table 43 records the average ratings on the three factors by the socioeconomic classes.

Generally, all three classes rate the bureaucracy as a negative element in the national political context. The lower middle class, in which no few of the subjects are bureaucrats themselves, rate the bureaucracy as being weaker and less active politically than do the other two classes. But the lower class imagines that the bureaucracy

TABLE 43

AVERAGE RATINGS OF OCCUPATIONAL GROUPINGS
ON THREE FACTORS BY SOCIOECONOMIC STRATA



Upper middle class----- ∘∘Extreme groups significant beyond .05 level
Lower middle class-∘-∘ ++Extreme groups significant beyond .01 level
Lower class———— **Extreme groups significant beyond .001 level

is stronger and more active. On the evaluation factor, the lower class views the bureaucracy as "not so good" and the upper middle class sees it as "somewhat bad." As may be expected, the lower class considers

the industrial working class to be politically stronger, much more active, and rather more virtuous than do the two higher socioeconomic classes, although all three classes deem it to be from slightly to very strong, from neutral to highly active, and from somewhat good to excellent. The professionals are rated quite strong and active and somewhat good by the lower class and the lower middle class, but they are rated as being only a little bit strong, somewhat passive, and not so good by the upper middle class. None of the classes rate the peasantry as being "strong" or "active" in politics, but all three classes view it as being politically "good" to "excellent."

The Economic Interests

The three groups which constitute "the economic interests" are: the local trade unions, the large landowners, and the industrialists and financiers. In Table 44 these groups are rated on force, activity, and evaluation by the socioeconomic classes.

The upper middle class subjects are by and large unaware of and unwilling to pass judgment on the local trade unions. As can be noted, the lower class rates the local trade unions more favorably on all three factors than does the lower middle class. With regard to ratings of the large landowners and the industrialists and financiers, it is significant that these two groups are rated progressively more favorably in moving from the highest to the lowest socioeconomic levels. Communist and other leftist propaganda, which is most generally directed at the lower socioeconomic levels, attributes the ills of the working classes to exploitation by the landowners and capitalists. As this table shows, however, the

TABLE 44

AVERAGE RATINGS OF ECONOMIC INTERESTS ON THREE FACTORS BY SOCIOECONOMIC STRATA



Upper middle class---- ∘∘Extreme groups significant beyond .05 level
Lower middle class-∘-∘ ++Extreme groups significant beyond .01 level
Lower class———— **Extreme groups significant beyond .001 level

lower class regards the landowners as being quite "strong," "active," and "good" politically. The lower middle class views the landowners as being less so, and the upper middle class views them as still less strong and active but a little more good. The industrialists and financiers are rated only "somewhat strong," "rather active," and "not so good" by the upper middle class, whereas both the lower class and lower middle class rate this group as being quite "strong," "active," and "good."

Political Belief Systems

Political belief systems in the "urban Litoral" in Argentina consist of both the "is" and the "ought," together forming existential and normative propositions concerning the actual and ideal behavior of men and societies. It will be the purpose of this section of the chapter to examine more methodically and in greater detail the relevant political values manifested in Argentine society and how these values affect behavior on the political scene.

Existential and Normative Values

It is of paramount importance to realize that the image of reality that an individual constructs in his mind is of greater consequence than is the concrete reality itself. Expressed in more specific terms, the conceptions held by Argentines concerning what is and what should be the actual state of political affairs in their country are more relevant and important than is the actual state of political affairs there per se.

The preceding section reported on the investigation of the personal conceptualizations of political groups and governments. The subjects tested revealed their "value conceptions" of the groups and governments which they rated. In this part of the chapter, the focus will be on some of the more important value conceptions and beliefs[17] that determine the correctness of the lenses through which Argentines view their political environment.

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[17]While this is meant to be a total approach, admittedly not all relevant aspects of Argentine political culture and belief systems, given the several limitations of this research, can be covered in this paper.

General Orientation toward National Life

So far as individual conceptualization of national life is concerned, the approach or direction taken by Argentines is either incurably optimistic or utterly pessimistic. To illustrate this fact, it is sufficient to cite the opinions of two nationally prominent persons who have distinguished themselves in the same field of endeavor. Both are actresses who give their views concerning national life.[18]

> The life situation is dependent on each individual. The governments do not matter. For example, if there is a good horse race on (Forlí is running), the race track is crowded with people. With respect to the government, I can say that I am hopeful. We've got to have faith. Life has knocked me around but I keep on believing.--Tita Merello.

> To say what I am thinking [about the national situation], I will have to use a crude expression: from bad to worse, from every point of view. In my activity I am completely paralyzed. We don't know where we are going.--Beatriz Matar.

Value Conceptions concerning the Nation

The most important general value conceptions held by Argentines were those concerning the nature and potentiality of their country in terms of its strengths and weaknesses.

The Greatness of Argentina

The idea is still rampant among Argentines (because it has existed for so long and was so conclusively confirmed in the first half of the century) that their country is the most developed of the Latin American countries and one of the great commercial powers of the world. The

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[18]Opinions cited in "Argentina pregunta ¿cómo vamos?" Extra, II (October, 1966), pp. 52-53.

present contradiction in Argentina--between this widely disseminated and deeply instilled belief and harsh economic realities that have written a tragic postlude to Argentina's former high rate of economic development--is not seen with equal clarity by all Argentines.[19]

The Problem with Argentina

Lack of integration and participation. It is current among the Argentine "intelligentsia" that the ills of the country are the result of an insufficient social integration and participation.[20]

> Enough of the theories and cure-alls. What must be done is to form a body of workers, managers, professionals, and university and technical personnel in order to discover the best means for resolving the problems that affect Argentines.--Luis Angeleri, labor official.

> The problem with Argentina arises in the marginalization of the working class, which exists in national life solely for the purpose of being servants to the rest of society.--Juan Carlos Marin, sociologist.

> /National life is worsened by/ lack of a sense of nationality, by more individual behavior than social action, by a lack of concern with transcendental problems, and by not giving opinions for fear of becoming involved.--A. J. Amuchástegui, historian.

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[19]The failure to distinguish between what Argentina is in past realities or wishful conceptions and what the country is in actuality reflects the same defect (or, if you will, virtue) characteristic of the inner man. "The Argentine tends more toward seeing himself as he would like to be or not like to be rather than seeing himself as he in reality is, and so he is disoriented." Salvador Nielsen, "¿Estamos sumergidos los argentinos? ¿Qué nos pasa?" Panorama, No. 41 (October, 1966), pp. 53, 57. As financier Alejandro Shaw, put it: "We were taught in school that our country was the most advanced and progressive in all Latin America, but we now discover, in view of the evidence, that if this were true, it no longer remains so." Cited in Nielsen, ibid., p. 59. Note, too, how insistent Raggio, loc. cit., is that Argentina is not an underdeveloped country, but is slowed down by obstacles that it could well surmount. See also Noble, loc. cit.

[20]Cited in Nielsen, ibid., p. 59.

Lack of purpose and dedication. From other intellectuals and national figures a simpler explanation is offered for the failure of Argentina to achieve a higher degree of development, viz., that the inhabitants of the country have neither goals nor initiative.[21]

> We live in an illogical country. While vitality is the first fruit to bloom here, there is no continuity nor organization. We have a life ferment that is not channeled. We live as the reflection of other countries.--Gyula Kosice, artist.

> We are a new country with no objectives, with no true teachers; what happens to us happens because of the deformed images to which we respond in all experiences.--Egle Martín, entertainer.

> What we need is to make the present system function better, fundamentally through a system in which is will be possible for adversaries to co-exist, whether it be a liberal democracy or some other system.--Torcuato Di Tella, industrialist.

> What's wrong with us is that we have not wanted to work; and, in addition, each person has his own solutions for straightening out the country. What then is the real solution? Three words: work, work, and more work.--Clemente Lococo, Jr., industrialist.

Inequitable distribution of wealth. The working class and its defenders firmly believe that the big economic and financial interests of the country function and conspire to exploit the workers.[22] The middle class blames directly the shifting social structure and rise of the proletariat and indirectly the government for permitting the

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[21] Ibid.

[22] The newest revolution in Argentine politics (marked June 28, 1966, date of the military coup ending the civilian Radical administration of Arturo Illia) has been greatly hampered in obtaining mass support for its various economic measures, particularly, because the mass working population firmly believes, despite the great amount of official pronouncements to the contrary, that its revolutionary government acts only in support of the old-line conservatives and landed oligarchy and "sells out" the country to foreign imperialists, thus "destroying the Argentine

inflationary trend that has taken away its purchasing power.[23] And the upper classes throughout the various geographic regions vie against one another to obtain greater shares of the national wealth.[24]

Actions and Beliefs Inherited from the Past

Certain beliefs have prevailed in Argentina through time and have particularly conditioned the present belief systems. It is certain that they will continue to influence Argentine thinking processes and behavior.

Heritage of Aggression and the Scapegoat

From the aggressive persecution directed by Juan Manuel Rosas against his political enemies and the civil strife of the *caudillo* era to the devastating Indian campaigns led by General Roca, the vindictive

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economy and submerging the people in a sea of misery, hunger, and unemployment." "Onganía-Alsogaray: hambre-desocupación-entrega," printed notice by the Argentine Communist Party (Capital Federal /Barrio Once/: December 9, 1966).

[23]Instituto de Investigaciones Económicas y Financieras de la C.G.E., *loc. cit.*; Isacovich, *op. cit.*, pp. 283, 289; Fundación de Investigaciones Económicas Latinoamericanas, *loc. cit.*; Belaunde, *op. cit.*, pp. 72-75, 101-104. The Sindicato de Vendedores de Diarios y Revistas de la Capital y Gran Buenos Aires (Trade Union of Newspaper and Magazine Sellers of the Capital and Greater Buenos Aires), in analyzing the results of the first five months of the "Argentine Revolution," pointed out as one result: "fiscal policy impoverishing vast sectors of the middle class." (Buenos Aires: December 13, 1966).

[24]"For 55 years we have been struggling against the economic interests of Buenos Aires that have not permitted us to expand. Only now are we starting to break through the chains of centralized policies and control. For years now we have seen all our best technical people taken away by Buenos Aires. As soon as some one here shows any promise whatever, Buenos Aires will grab him up. But once the tunnel and highway are completed /see pages 246-247/ and our port /Santa Fe/ is renovated and enlarged, we will achieve a high degree of development. We

attacks upon the Argentine oligarchy particularly by Eva Perón, and the vengeful purges of peronists that followed, Argentine political history abounds with examples of aggression. The object of this aggression is referred to by Argentine author Julio Mafud as the chivo emisario, or scapegoat. For men as politically and mentally diverse from one another, as were Rosas, Sarmiento, and Hernández, the Indian was the national scapegoat. Later, after the Indian was exterminated, the gaucho became the national scapegoat. Still later, the scapegoat was elevated to the political arena and became converted into the opposing party and the defeated or outgoing government. Ever since then the opposition parties and past government administrations have always been at fault and to blame for all the national crises and ills.[25]

Heritage of Absolutism

Evidenced in the uncompromising struggles between unitarios and federales, in which excesses abounded on both sides and neither side was willing to concede any of its principles,[26] this mental state has

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will tap all the wealth of the North, not only the Litoral but the entire Paraná basin, including parts of Uruguay, Paraguay, and Brazil." Interview with youthful business executive, Santa Fe, Argentina, October 10, 1966.

[25]For a more extensive discussion of the chivo-emisario phenomenon in Argentina, see Mafud, El desarraigo argentino, op. cit., pp. 66-68. Salvador Nielsen, loc. cit., observes that "something of a persecution complex oppresses the Argentine soul . . . [so that] the Russians, the North Americans, the British, the Nazis, the Jews, the liberals, the anti-liberals, the rich, the poor, or the state are to blame. All national ills are traced to the archaic agrarian-cattle structure or to the impatient developmentalists." José Miguens, sociologist, states: "Social life is highly neurotic. The typical life is filled with neuroses. The typical life is a paranoic life. There is no dialogue, just aggression."

[26]Quesada, loc. cit.

been rather influential in shaping the course of Argentine political life. In the absolutist frame of mind, the individual is "absolutely correct"; his ideas are the only ones plausible and he alone is able to perceive "the national reality." His opponents are "absolutely" wrong, and their ideas are not at all appropriate nor in keeping with the national reality. This mental set renders political compromise out of the question,[27] and tends to engender a superfluity of ideologies and political positions.

Heritage of Xenophobia and International Distrust

That Argentina resents any foreign intervention into either its economy or politics has been substantially documented in the preceding chapter. This historical resentment and distrust of foreign powers has found its way into that broad range of ideology that constitutes the most prevalent kind of Argentine nationalism.[28]

The National Cult of Courage and Heroes

The national cult of courage is regarded as a sociological institution which lies between barbarism and civilization and provides "the only civilizing element that structured and channeled human life

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[27]The unerring and adamant refusal to compromise in the face of an overwhelming opposition has led no few Argentine political figures--see Jorge Sánchez Arana, "Los presidentes no se mata," Extra, II (October, 1966), pp. 55-60--such as Leandro Alem, Horacio Quiroga, Leopoldo Lugones, and Lisandro de la Torre, to commit suicide.

[28]Fernández, op. cit., p. 558, describes the Perón kind of nationalism in which xenophobia is one of the chief component elements.

during a period famed for its incivility."[29] Under the national cult of courage, men are judged not by their words but according to the courage they display and the valor of their actions. On the foundation of courage and heroic deeds alone Argentine society and politics are structured.[30] This traditional affection for the courageous man or the caudillo is esteemed to be very much alive today in the Argentine soul.[31]

> The spirit and character of the Argentine man are molded on the background of these sentiments described by Juan Agustín García: the native code of honor, the national cult of courage, and disrespect for the law. To these we should add the Catholic faith and the familial tradition of friendship and hospitality.--Enrique Fentanes, inspector general of the Federal Police.

> We Argentines practice the cult of heroes and we have gone too long a time without heroes. The bad part about this is that we continue to believe that national reconstruction does not begin nor repose in the action of every one of our fellow patriots but rather is the exclusive result of the action of the "magic wand."--José Luis de Imaz, sociologist.

Argentina in the Contemporary World

The foreign policy and international disposition of Argentina resemble in certain respects those of its European cultural model,

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[29]Julio Mafud, El desarraigo argentino, op. cit., pp. 61-63, discusses specifically el culto nacional del coraje (the national cult of courage).

[30]Four periods in Argentine political history particularly demonstrate the phenomena of courage and heroics: the chaos of the 1820's, the caudillism of Juan Manuel Rosas (1826-1851), Yrigoyenism (1890-1930), and Peronism (1943-1955).

[31]Cited in Nielsen, loc. cit.

France under De Gaulle. Its foreign dealings have reflected a ruggedly independent and nationalistic course, and its external like its internal policies and ideologies have reflected a superfluity of ideas with a frame of reference tending toward authoritarian solutions.

Economic Nationalism

The doctrine of "economic nationalism," which calls for not only increasing national productivity but also for decreasing the participation of any foreign or external interests in the national economy, is subscribed to by the majority of Argentines.[32]

Foreign Participation in the Economy

An antithetical belief to the above is the one held by many of the landowning oligarchy, or at least attributed to the agrarian aristocracy,[33] that the country cannot develop nationally without receiving

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[32]The 1963 election of an obscure country doctor, Arturo Illia, to the highest national office reflected in part the great public support engendered by the campaign promise made by Dr. Illia and his running mate Carlos H. Perette to annul foreign oil contracts. The UCRP, led by Ricardo Balbín, favoring the granting of oil concessions to foreign companies and paying those companies with the oil they produced, lost out in the 1957 elections.

[33]The day after the Presidential Address of November 7, 1966, in which many opponents charged the revolution with yielding to the large economic interests of the country, the elementary-school children of working-class parents in one particular school commented to their teacher: "Have you heard, teacher, that the Japanese are going to come and take over our railroads? Isn't that a macana [bad deal or revolting development]?" Such conclusion was drawn 1) from the affirmation by President Onganía that unprofitable state enterprises would either begin to correct their deficit operations or be turned over to private enterprise and 2) from the increasing relations between Argentina and Japan. This comment is a defensive one and shows the propensity of the working class to believe the worst of their government which, to them, is desirous of bringing in foreign capital and expanding economic relations with foreign powers.

considerable aid and capital from abroad. This conception is termed "anti-national" by nationalists.

A Significant Agrarian Destiny

One of the chief reasons why agricultural production has remained stagnant in this century, apart from the latifundist structure and the dilatory application of modern technology,[34] lies in the belief that an increased agricultural production will further subordinate Argentina as a primary producer, subject it to the inelasticity of demand for primary products, and place it in a disadvantageous trade position. But elsewhere it is believed that this reasoning ignores the reality of a more promising agricultural future for Argentina.[35]

Latin American Economic Integration

Argentina is viewed as being in a condition of stagnation in which most sectors of national life have suffered a marked decrease in real income and standard of living. Part of this stagnation is the result of archaic social and economic structures which resist change and reform. Thus, more and more Argentines are reaching out for a single new economic solution to topple the old structures and more and more they

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[34]See Raúl Pedro Scalibrini, Reforma agraria argentina (Buenos Aires: D. Francisco A. Colombo, 1963), pp. 37-41; Ventura Morera, Agricultura e industria (Buenos Aires: Editorial Universitaria de Buenos Aires, 1963), chapter 22.

[35]Interview with Alquiles Allevi, agricultural exporter, Santa Fe, Argentina, October 8, 1966. Mr. Allevi affirmed his belief to the researcher that the future of his country lies in the exportation of agricultural products. It was further his opinion that the productive potential of the farm land is only being partly exploited and that shipping can be greatly expanded. He told the researcher: "There is no hope in industry alone. We must rededicate outselves to agriculture. Only in agricultural production is the future of Argentina secure."

are turning to the prospect of Argentina becoming both a primary exporter and industrial power within an economically integrated Latin America.[36]

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[36]This was borne out by newspaper and magazine accounts of the proceedings of the LAFTA meetings in which the Argentine government, various economic interests, and diverse groups seemed to place much emphasis on faith in LAFTA.

CHAPTER IX

THE RECEIVING POLITICAL SYSTEM

Whether a political system or a society undergoes any change or not will depend on all the preceding elements that have been discussed (the total environment; the funnels of social-group, political-group, and governing interests; and the chamber of political culture), plus the receiving and responding capabilities of that political system. This chapter will deal specifically and entirely with the receiving contemporary political system in the "urban Litoral" of Argentina.[1]

The Change Capability of the System

The stability of the political system in question may depend on its ability either to resist or to undergo change. Every system receives a certain amount of pressures and stabilizers. When a system is bombarded by excessive pressures its stability is placed in jeopardy. The simultaneous presence of a number of stabilizers in a political system will give that system a certain strength or capability to absorb and resist all the incoming pressures and the demands for certain changes. Or, a system can utilize the margin between stability and instability, which

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[1]Being considered as the political system of the "urban Litoral" are the decisionmaking authorities at the national, provincial, and municipal levels.

stabilizers have provided for it, in order to respond to demands for change and to effect notable changes outside and within the system. The kinds of pressures and stabilizers which affected the political system in the "urban Litoral" during the period of this study will now be elaborated. The procedure for determining the emerging pressures and stabilizers which influence the system is one that is admittedly casual. The identification and elaboration of these so-called pressures and stabilizers are dependent on observations made by the researcher, on the relevancy and exactness of the sources that are used, and on the interpretation given phenomena in determining whether they are primarily pressures or stabilizers.

Pressures

Pressures for change need not be violent in order to force and bring about desired changes. Neither do the changes that occur need to be disruptive ones that lead to political instability. In fact, change-inducing pressures can very well be conducted toward greater stability of the system. If the initial inflow of pressures is interpreted as being the forerunner of more intensified future pressure, the system authorities may take the initiative in effecting the desired changes themselves, or they may counteract by blocking the entrance of the pressures into the system and by stifling the originators of pressure on the system.

Wealth and Welfare Distribution (Pressures)

Inflation. The political system in the "urban Litoral" is

pressured intensely from the inflationary character of the national economy. This inflation is in response to a stagnated and chaotic economy in which per capita production has been declining ever since the end of World War II. Greatly accentuating the inflationary pressure and slowdown in productivity is the ever increasing consumption at home and the somewhat variable and decreasing exportation abroad.

Devaluation. The system is pressured also from its short-run inflationary measure of devaluation of its currency. Devaluation serves to heighten the effects of the already rapidly moving inflation and the rising cost of living and to contradict the professed principal goal of the new government, viz., to eliminate inflation. Opposition forces are able to say that it is strange for a government that is so determined to revitalize the economy to start off with a measure so clearly inflationary.

Rising expectations. An awareness on the part of the lower and middle classes of a seeming unequal distribution of wealth and the revolution of rising expectations underpin a destabilizing flow of pressures and demands into the system. This flow of pressures and demands takes recognition of the very real decrease in salaries and standard of living for the lower and middle classes. The remuneration of salaried employes, as a percentage of total production or income, has been declining more or less steadily since 1950.[2] As was pointed out in chapter IV, both the lower and middle classes, but especially the latter, have been affected by the rising cost of living, with which salaries have not kept abreast.

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[2]Ferrara, op. cit., p. 122, shows salaried employes receiving 43.1 per cent of total national income in 1961 as compared to 50.5 per cent in 1952.

Population and services. The continued migration of persons from Bolivia, Paraguay, and Chile to urban centers in Argentina highlight the pressing problems of inadequate housing,[3] and the increasing difficulties of providing all urban residents with the necessary health, medical, police, fire, and other public services, such as urban transportation and the utilities (gas, running water, electricity, etc.).[4]

Retirement funds. The presence of some 4 1/2-million persons dependent on pensions and retirement checks which are being irregularly received and whose value is being eroded away by the rising cost of living represents yet another form of pressure on the system. The system is forced to meet the pension payments, which it cannot afford financially, and to handle the rising dissatisfactions which proceed from the group of pensioners and retired persons.[5]

Modernization. Pressure is further derived from the agrarian and industrial sectors which want the government to introduce technological

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[3]The current housing deficit, as noted, is made more critical by pernicious inflation which erodes away savings. In a recent survey by the Consejo Nacional de Desarrollo (CONADE) it was discovered that lower class families with average incomes and needs can only save 3.4 per cent of their gross income for housing and middle class families 12.8 per cent. Under continued inflation and the rising costs of building materials the savings figures are rapidly dissolved. In actuality there are 4,570,000 dwellings for 5,920,000 families, representing a deficit of 1,350,000 units dispersed irregularly throughout the different economic regions. See "Con inflación no habrá viviendas," Análisis, loc. cit.; Dirección Nacional de Estadísticas y Censos, Secretaría de Estado de Hacienda, "Indice del costo de la construcción en la Capital Federal," Edificación, Informe E. 16 (June, 1960), pp. 8-22.

[4]See pages 100-102 and Ferrara, op. cit., pp. 151-291.

[5]Interviews with a number of pensioners and retired employes elicited that the government during the period of this study was paying just once every four months, and that payment was for just two months at a time. Thus pensioners were collecting only half of what was due them.

reforms so that productivity will increase. The exporting interests are acutely aware that Argentina has been losing its relative share of the world agricultural market for some time[6] and also that the absolute foreign exchange earnings from exports have been diminishing for some time.[7]

Neglected sectors. Pressures are coming from yet another aspect of deficient economic development, viz., from not exploiting certain industries or economic opportunities to their fullest potential. In neglecting to develop fully all the indigenous economic possibilities, the Litoral region and the Argentine nation are losing valuable exchange earnings, as well as inviting non-nationals to come in and exploit the economic areas being neglected by national interests.[8]

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[6]For example, comparing Argentina with the United States in Fuchs, op. cit., p. 522, it is seen that in the 1930-1934 period Argentine wheat exports accounted for 30 per cent of the world wheat market to 6.7 per cent for United States wheat exports; in 1960, however, the United States gained 51 per cent of the wheat market and Argentina dropped to just 8 per cent. In corn exports in the first period, Argentina had 66.3 per cent of the world market to 1.3 per cent for the United States; in 1960 it was 16.5 per cent for Argentina and 52.8 per cent for the United States. In flax exports, Argentina fell from having 60 per cent of the world market in 1935-1938 to 31 per cent in 1960 as compared with the 47 per cent of the market achieved by the United States in 1960. The United States had no flax exports in the 1935-1938 period.

[7]Ferrara, op. cit., p. 110, shows that as a relative percentage of GNP export earnings have fallen from 27.1 per cent in the 1900-1904 period to 21.9 per cent in the 1930-1934 period to 7.4 per cent in the 1950-1954 period to 6.8 per cent in 1955, etc., giving indication of a steady diminution.

[8]The most striking example of a neglected Argentine industry that invites foreign interposition occurred when no fewer than 22 Russian fishing ships were observed on November 17, 1966, to be operating in or close to Argentine territorial waters, according to naval authorities. See Clarín, November 25, 1966, p. 44. The problem is related to the slowness of Argentine fishing organizations in putting into effect their own plans for greater exploitation of the national fishing industry and to the great lack of ships.

Provincial development. Demands of the outlying provinces and outlying provincial-based industries to receive greater shares of the national wealth and to achieve greater productivity in terms of Buenos Aires and the Federal Capital are being made with increasing success, particularly in light of the new revolutionary government's commitment to regional and provincial development.

Liberal economic policy. Not only are the provinces and certain provincial economic interests pressuring for a reformed economic policy but the entire spectrum of economic strategists and owners of the means of production seem to be pushing for a return to economic principles of the "capitalist" era: a free rate of exchange; modernization of business, industry, and agriculture; closer ties with the various international trade organisms; more private ownership of state businesses; greater efficiency in state enterprises; and, greater productivity in agriculture.

Rapid development. It is quite evident from increasing expressions of dissatisfaction that the system authorities will have to satisfy the demands from all sectors of society and the economy for reducing national

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Concerning the need for more Argentine ships, recent data show that Empresas Líneas Marítimas Argentinas (ELMA), the government shipping firm, has a total of 48 ships which carry a 428,000 ton total load, or 6 per cent of the total foreign transportation. Private Argentine shipping enterprises account for 12 per cent of foreign shipping, leaving a total of 82 per cent of all foreign transportation being performed by non-Argentine ships. See "Urgente necesidad de bodegas argentinas," El Economista, XVII (September 24, 1966), p. 1.

Another case of the same problem is publicized by the nationalist periodical, Azul y Blanco, I (November 10, 1966), p. 10, in which it attacks "El tercer vuelo semanal de Braniff." The article charges that Braniff International, a North American based airlines company, is ceded a third weekly flight by the Dirección Nacional de Aviación Civil (National Civil Aviation Agency), benefitting a foreign enterprise "to the detriment of Aerolíneas Argentinas."

deficits and promoting rapid economic growth. Failure to accomplish either or both of these tasks may well spell the end of the June 28, 1966, government.

Power and Political Participation (Pressures)

The strongest pressures on the government during this study originated in the following spheres of power: the dissident government officials and officers in the armed forces; the university students, particularly the extremist groups; the middle and lower classes generally; the middle class bureaucracy and the urban workers in the CGT; the provincial governments and officials; the leaders of the dissolved political parties and movements; the large economic organizations: ACIEL and CGE, and certain international organisms: LAFTA, IMF, the World Bank, GATT, etc.[9]

The dissident officials and officers. Much in evidence at the time this study was in progress, in the latter quarter of 1966, was the lack of agreement among leading figures in the national government and armed forces which resulted in several key resignations.[10] It was noted that President Onganía and the other officers in the government had erected a communications barrier between other officers of the armed

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[9]The reader is cautioned against equating pressure activity with opposition activity. The fact that all these preceding groups are sources of demands and pressures upon the political system does not mean that all these groups opposed the regime or national government. It was observed in chapter VIII that the majority of the members of the strongest of all pressure groups, the labor or working class, said that they initially supported the government, according to a magazine survey.

[10]Crónica (Rosario), November 8, 1966, p. 1. Besides Dr. Felipe S. Tami, president of the Banco Central, there were two other members of the economic cabinet: Dr. Héctor Salduendo, vice president of the same,

forces and themselves, which was regarded as a potentially explosive condition.[11]

The university. It has been noted that the universities were among the first to oppose the new government and continued to be a source of continuous pressure on the government throughout the period of this study. Nearly all student groups acted and demonstrated on behalf of their autonomy and political freedom within the university. The new regime admittedly erred badly in attempting to resolve the crisis. While it felt it needed to suppress university opposition, its intervention and proposed reorganization schemes brought it wide criticism not only from within Argentina but from abroad as well.

The middle and lower classes. The rising cost of living and prices, plus the multitude of unpleasantries of urban life which contribute to alienation, created personal demands among the middle and lower classes for the government to correct all the grief-causing miseries of life. Individuals tended to believe that all the problems of life are ones which might be resolved politically and to expect the government to take the initiative to put into effect the kinds of developmental programs deemed necessary.

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and Dr. Allieta Guadagni, arbitrator in the Consejo Federal de Inversiones, who resigned. See also "Primera crisis del gobierno," Análisis, VI (October 3, 1966), pp. 8-10, and the exposition in the next chapter with respect to the reactions to government policy on pages

[11]This condition is described quite fully in "Ejército y gobierno; ¿hay plazos?" Primera Plana, IV (October 24, 1966), pp. 12-14. One result of such condition, as this article points out, is the possibility of the rise in popularity of other high military officials, e.g., General Osiris Villegas, who achieves more rapport with the public and who can well displace the present power leaders if they remain aloof from and ignore him. See also "El gobierno y las fuerzas armadas," Inédito, I (October 12, 1966), pp. 4-5.

The middle class bureaucrats (CGT). Working through their unions under the banner of the CGT, middle-class workers and white-collar bureaucrats expressed opposition to all the government-announced programs of restructuring state enterprises. It was feared with reason that the public administration might be overhauled too drastically and that public employes would be dismissed *en masse*. The white collar, lower-level civil employes pressured the government to reconsider and to make careful studies before attempting any such renovation of state-operated businesses.

The organized workers (CGT). Solidly aligned against any form of government or political group in which it does not have meaningful expression and authority, the worker organizations of the urban working class appeared to oppose most government policy. Any measure or policy passed after November 7, 1966, which did not produce immediate benefits to the workers, incurred the opposition of the labor organizations. The workers themselves represented a constant pressure on the system not to put any measure or policy into effect that might further compromise the already low standard of living which they were suffering. In opposing government policies, the workers had also come to demand greater political participation.

The provinces. Added pressure was put on the federal government by the provinces to obtain beneficial public works, a greater proportion of the national budget, and more political power in terms of the vested interests of Buenos Aires.

The politicians and parties. Because the instigators of the June 28, 1966, revolution were coming under increasing criticism and

their public support was beginning to weaken, the former political-party leaders took heart and began to pressure for a return to power and for the restoration of the national constitutional and electoral machinery.[12]

ACIEL and CGE. It was concluded in the previous chapter on political-interest groups that the industrialists and landowners had considerable influence on the economic policies that were adopted by the revolutionary government and were urging more action on the international front in opening new markets and liberalizing trade policies.[13]

International organisms. With the devaluation of the peso and the projected plans for rapid economic expansion and modernization, Argentine authorities became highly dependent upon international monetary organizations and agencies. In order to obtain funds from abroad, the government had to comply with the demands of the international monetary organisms and to show positive signs of being a good credit risk. In this regard, the national authorities were restricted as to how far they could yield to nationalists and yet fulfill the stipulations laid down by their international creditors.

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[12]"Políticos: las alegres divagaciones," Confirmado, II (November 3, 1966), pp. 25-26, cites ex-president Pedro Eugenio Aramburu as saying that it is indispensable to seek a constitutional solution to the current crisis by way of elections and necessary to create two or three strong parties that could encompass the chief tendencies in political activity. Also "Políticos: soñar no cuesta nada," Primera Plana, loc. cit., and "Expropriaciones: el martes de ceniza," Primera Plana, V (November 22, 1966), pp. 19-21.

[13]An example of the pressure from this group exerted on the federal government to use political channels to further its economic interests was seen in the appointment of the capable Adalberto Krieger Vasana as Argentine ambassador to GATT to pressure for more favorable trade agreements with the European Economic Community countries.

Status: Occupation and Education (Pressures)

Rural worker deficit. The relative and absolute decline in the number of workers occupied in the agrarian sector[14] presented a serious problem to the system authorities in their efforts to increase agricultural production.

Underemployment. In inverse relationship to the lack of workers in the agricultural sector there existed an apparent surplus of white-collar employes in the state enterprises and services and of laborers in the manufacturing sector. Moreover, this problem of surplus labor was compounded by an already high figure of unemployment and by a decreasing number of persons considered to be economically active.

Railroad employes. The most concrete occupational pressure derived from the possibility of dismissal of 40,000 railroad employes and the assertion by private industry that it was not in condition to absorb additional employes released from the railroad service.[15]

University extremism. The operation of extremist student political groups within the universities precipitated a government intervention which raised the question of how much university autonomy in

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[14]Ferrara, op. cit., p. 126, shows that rural workers have decreased from 2,211,100, or 29 per cent of the economically active population, in 1950 to 1,515,000, or 19.1 per cent, in 1963.

[15]While it was widely publicized that the government would dismiss some 40,000 to 50,000 railroad employes at the time it would announce its railway reorganization plan, it was made public that annually about 17,000 railroad employes retire or otherwise leave their jobs. Thus, the government needed only to freeze replacement vacancies and redistribute the personnel to achieve its goal. See Buenos Aires Herald, November 27, 1966, p. 10; "La batalla del riel," Primera Plana, V (December 12, 1966), p. 15. On December 1, 1966, the Federación Económica issued the statement that "private enterprise is not in condition to absorb a large working force from state enterprises." See Crónica (Buenos Aires), December 1, 1966, p. 5.

terms of how much government control. To what extent should the government intervene in the educational system, and how much freedom should the universities be allowed? On the answer to these questions would depend the orientation and intensity of opposition from the university community.[16] The government announced to the press that it would issue new university laws and guidelines prepared by the Consejo Asesor Especial (Special Consulting Council) on January 6, 1967, in which the universities would be placed under the jurisdiction of the Executive Power. Under the new laws, the administration and government of the universities would be vested in the professors, administrators, and their associates. "The students would retain a voice in university government, but would have no vote; that is, they would be heard from but would not rule."[17]

Migrations. Another aspect of the occupational and educational problems confronted by the political system was the exodus of Argentine technicians, professionals, skilled workers, and university professors. Nearly all the key personnel in the exact sciences of the University of Buenos Aires was reported to have resigned, and it is frequently reported that Argentina has lost 5000 engineers to other countries,[18] pointing up the need to generate an economic and political atmosphere more conducive to intellectual achievement.

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[16]"Universidad, 76 días después: ¿cuál es la salida?" Confirmado, II (October 13, 1966), pp. 34-37. The government attempted to resolve the issue with Law 16,912, announced on July 29, 1966, to which there was immediate negative reaction: resignations and physical violence.

[17]Crónica (Buenos Aires), December 1, 1966, p. 5.

[18]"Universidad, 76 días después: ¿cual es la salida?" Confirmado, ibid., p. 34; Morris A. Horowitz, loc. cit.

Foreign students. It was observed that many foreign students, especially from Perú, were enrolled in the Argentine universities. The majority of the Peruvian students were located at La Plata and the Litoral universities and nearly all were involved in extremist politics.[19]

Mobility and Prestige (Pressures)

Ineptitude. It is believed, because of the spoils system and normal administrative corruption, that individuals who are less capable to perform the assigned functions of their jobs have come to hold key positions in the government administration, in state enterprises, and in the universities. This is highly conjectural; but, it is conceivable that if the spoils system has played a major part in office holding and that a significant number of office holders are incompetent and inept, then this would represent a source of pressure on the stability of the political system in the "urban Litoral." But it is hypothesized that ineptitude is not a major pressure on the system right now.

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[19]Interviews with key faculty members and native student leaders revealed a quite bitter antagonism toward the Peruvian students, particularly, who enjoyed all the benefits accorded an Argentine student (free tuition and low-cost subsidized board and room) and yet rewarded the Argentine government by engaging in disruptive political activity. "You try not to be prejudiced," the researcher was told by a senior medical student, "but these Peruvians come here exclusively to make trouble. Many of them receive regular pay checks from Moscow and Peking, I know for a fact. Besides we don't communicate with them. I listened to one of them speak for half an hour the other day. Oh, I understood all the words, but the way he put them together, it just didn't make any sense. Very few of them ever finish school. The ones who do finish school stay here instead of going where they are most needed, namely, back to their own country."

Insufficient social mobility and political participation. Both these related sources of pressure--insufficient mobility and participation--appear significant in the Argentine political context. Professor Puigbó pictures the perfectly mobile society as being one in which "all social functions are adequately distributed among the most capable persons so that the functions are taken care of in the most efficient manner."[20] Twisting the same theory to fit political participation, it can be said that the ideal political situation is one in which all important groups and ideologies are proportionately represented according to their importance to and capabilities in national politics. Again, this is conjectural and even tauntalogical; but it can be theorized that to the extent that Argentine society is insufficiently mobile, according to the definition given, and certain major groups and ideologies are not represented in national politics, the political system of Argentina's "urban Litoral" will be pressured.

Stabilizers

While "pressures" are chiefly oriented toward instability, although sometimes pressures will induce a political system to become more stable, "stabilizers" have quite the opposite orientation. There will be instances wherein stabilizing inputs into a system (such as that type of stabilizers often exploited by dictatorial regimes, viz., appeal to nationalism, to obtain public support) serve only to perpetuate the ancién régime. At other times, stabilizing inputs do nothing more than to make possible the smoother and less violent transition of

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[20]Puigbó, op. cit., p. 83.

a political system. Too, stabilizers can be of such character as to make future rapid political change highly possible, merely by their presence in the political system. For example, the mass citizenry of a country is alienated from the inability of the civilian government to act under conditions of runaway inflation, so that a vast public opinion may develop favoring a strong military dictatorship that will act forcibly in the economy. This public opinion favoring a more forcible government will provide an element of initial stability to a political system that is headed up by a more forcible kind of government, such as occurred in Argentina on July 28, 1966.

Wealth and Welfare Distribution (Stabilizers)

Developments and trends in agriculture. The distribution between agriculture and industry as percentages of GNP and the distribution of economically active workers in both these sectors have more than reversed during this century.[21] However unfavorable these two trends may appear so far as agriculture is presently concerned, there are yet several favorable long-run trends for agriculture.

More specifically, the demand for agricultural products is expected to increase during the remainder of this century. Already the

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[21]Ferrara, op. cit., p. 47. Data based on figures elaborated by CONADE (Consejo Nacional de Desarrollo). In the 1900-1904 period, agriculture accounted for 33 per cent of GNP and industry 13.8 per cent; in 1930-1934, agriculture 25.1 per cent and industry 18.4 per cent; in 1950-1954, 16.6 per cent and 22.7 per cent; in 1960, 15.1 per cent and 34.8 per cent; in 1969 an estimated 13.9 per cent and 39.1 per cent. The economically active population distributed between the two sectors was 39.2 per cent in agriculture in 1900-1904 and 19.8 per cent in induring the same period. In 1950-1954, it was 26.7 per cent and 22.6 per cent respectively; in 1960, 18.6 per cent and 26.9 per cent; in 1969, an estimated 16.3 per cent and 29.1 per cent.

elasticity of demand for primary products is beginning to shift and demand for agricultural products is becoming elastic.[22] Whereas Argentina has received decreasing prices for its primary exports in the post-war years and has paid increasing prices for capital equipment and finished goods this unfavorable relationship in changing. There are few regions of the world that can relatively easily achieve a surplus in wheat and other agricultural products: Argentina, Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the Soviet Union, and the United States. None of the preceding countries have a region comparable in fertility and ideal climatic conditions to the Argentine humid pampa. During the period that data was being gathered for this study (fall, 1966), there was abundant evidence that Argentina is rapidly moving toward technological modernization in agriculture[23] and in the areas of transportation and shipping.[24]

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[22]As noted by Dr. Pedro García Oliver, "Exposición demográfica, necesidad de alimentos y producción agraria," El Cronista Comercial (July 30, 1966), p. 1.

[23]The work of the Instituto Nacional de Tecnología Agropecuaria (National Institute of Agricultural Technology) and such diverse private organizations as the Consorcios Regionales de Experimentación Agrícola (Regional Union of Agricultural Experimentation) has stepped up considerably. Whereas INTA had 2,343 employes in 1958 this figure increased to 3,991 in 1963. Of these totals, there were 954 technical specialists in 1963 to 528 in 1958, 341 assistants to specialists in 1963 to 225 in 1958, 420 administrative personnel in 1963 to 278 in 1958, 2,085 workers in 1,183 in 1958, and 160 service personnel in 1963 to 105 in 1958. Some 96 per cent of the total 1963 personnel were functioning in the interior of the country in 40 experimental stations, 10 institutes, and 148 extension agencies. See INTA, Características más importantes de la organización del INTA, No. 17 (Buenos Aires: Secretaría de Estado de Agricultura y Ganadería de la Nación, 1964), pp. 2, 16.

[24]García Oliver, op. cit., pp. 4, 14; Raggio, loc. cit. There is as of late a gradual but constant expansion of the demand for Argentine agricultural production. The EEC may well change its excessive protectionist policies. The Argentine government has announced that it will modernize

Total national development. The "new federalism," discussed in the preceding chapter, is placing the emphasis on total national development and drawing up over-all plans that include a number of public works and developmental projects that benefit regions and provinces other than the Federal Capital and Buenos Aires.[25]

Economic growth of the provinces. The two massive hydro-electric plants to be developed in the outlying sites of Salto Grande and Chócon-Cerros Colorados; the future exploitation of the iron ore and mineral reserves at Sierra Grande; the underground tunnel connecting Entre Ríos and the north with Santa Fe and central Argentina; the renovation of the ports of Rosario, Santa Fe, and Bahía Blanca; the construction of new highways; the federal aid money to be distributed to the provinces for their development--all these developments point toward greater national integration and economic growth.[26]

The most spectacular public work which is destined to produce far-reaching change in the "urban Litoral" of Argentina is the Paraná-Santa Fe underground tunnel now under construction. For the purpose of ending the long-existing isolation of the northeastern from the

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and reorganize its transportation and port facilities, which will help to handle the harvests more efficiently; and the cultivation of crops is expected to be adjusted to the demands of advanced technology.

[25]"Un nuevo federalismo," Confirmado, loc. cit.

[26]Government Secretary Díaz Colodrero said of the Santa Fe-Paraná underground tunnel, one of the several big projects in outlying provinces, that it was "something more than a vital instrument of communication between two provinces; it has an inestimable value as a tool for the development of the Northeast." Ibid., p. 25.

southwestern Litoral and of deriving greater economic advantage from tapping the wealth of the northeast provinces, an underground tunnel and connecting highway are being constructed. The work was begun on February 3, 1962, to build a tunnel which would cross the Paraná river and link the cities of Santa Fe and Paraná.[27]

To complement the Paraná-Santa Fe Underground Tunnel, 146 kilometers of new highway is being constructed to connect Rosario, Arroyo del Medio, Santa Fe, and Paraná. Cost of the project is about 7,300,000,000 pesos. After its completion, it is expected that traffic between Santa Fe and Entre Ríos provinces will increase from 25,000 vehicles per week to some 150,000. Passengers will also increase from 100,000 to 300,000 per week.[28] Like the tunnel project, this one also is to be amortized by the collection of fees.[29]

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[27]The project is scheduled to take five years to complete, but in late 1966 it was estimated that two years of construction work yet remained. Total cost of the operation is set at 5 billion pesos, which sum is to be repaid from toll fees within five years. One national and two international firms are contracted and are completing their respective assigned tasks: Hochtief of Essen, Germany; Vianini of Rome, Italy; and Sailav of Buenos Aires. In its length the tunnel will measure 2,397 meters (containing 36 tubes of about 65 meters each) and 7.5 meters in width with a free height of 4.4 meters. Interview with Abelardo Mario García Sarubbi, director of the Office of the Paraná-Santa Fe Tunnel Commission, Santa Fe, Argentina, October 9, 1966; "Tunnel sub-fluvial Paraná-Santa Fe," Puertos Argentinos, VII (Nov. 15, 1963), pp. 26-28.

[28]García Sarubbi, ibid.; interview with Engineer Nardelli, provincial de Vialidad, Santa Fe, Argentina, October 8, 1966; Santa Fe, Dirección Provincial de Vialidad, Autopista: Santa Fe-Rosario, Arroyo del Medio (March, 1965), entire work.

[29]For a discussion of the legal aspects of toll roads and the collection of fees, see J. Magdalena Derenzi de Vigliano, Tasa de peaje (Rosario, Argentina: Instituto de Derecho Público y Ciencas Sociales of the Universidad Nacional del Litoral, 1966.

Demographic-economic potential. Not only does Argentina have a low birth rate, comparable to that of the United States, but the distribution of its population is economically favorable. The wide-based population pyramid, common to other Latin American countries, is not at all pertinent to Argentina. As was pointed out in chapter III, Argentina has lower percentages of its people between 0 and 4 and 5 and 14 years of age, meaning a less parasitic and potentially more economically active population.[30]

International negotiations. In the international sphere, the favorable outcome of current negotiations could decisively affect for the better the internal economy and distribution of wealth in Argentina. On the one hand, there are the direct negotiations being conducted by Argentine representatives with international economic agencies, such as the World Bank, the Export-Import Bank, etc., to obtain loans and grants. Then, there are Argentine representatives who are pressuring for more favorable concessions in the meetings of such organisms as LAFTA, the IMF (which is considering the possible reform of the international monetary system), and the EEC countries. Italy has been contacted formally by Argentina to reduce its tariffs on Argentine exports.[31]

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[30]Nores, op. cit., pp. 75-120, 102. Also see Table 9 on page 61 of this study.

[31]"Si todos los ricos del mundo" and "Crisis en serie" Confirmado, II (October 13, 1966), pp. 64-65, 67; "La batalla del intercambio," Confirmado, II (December 8, 1966), p. 29; "Un dulce sabor a ministerio," Primera Plana, IV (October 13, 1966), p. 26; "Si llegan las lluvias," Confirmado, II (October 6, 1966), pp. 64-65; "Políticas para negociar," Confirmado, II (November 24, 1966), pp. 30-32; "ALALC: para conocer a Pepe," Primera Plana, IV (November 15, 1966), pp. 58-60.

Power and Political Participation (Stabilizers)

Consolidation of power. Perhaps one of the most notable consequences of the 1966 Argentine revolution is the new consolidation of national political forces that is taking place among Christian Democrats (the Radicales), socialists, and peronists.[32] Although it may seem a paradox, the consolidation of political forces is seen as a stabilizing situation in Argentine politics. This is because in the past Argentine politics has been characterized by a wide diffusion of political ideologies and movements which have inhibited the development of any political consensus. But in mid-December of 1966 various political groups combined in opposition to the government. This consolidation of opposition, however, is somewhat matched by the consolidation of supporting forces, viz., the large economic interests (ACIEL and CGE), which have aligned behind many of the government policies.[33] Thus, two main political tendencies (those in opposition to or support of the current government) are beginning to form. Both tendencies profess the same ends in wishing to see Argentina develop and achieve greatness. But the means by which these ends are to be achieved are quite different from each tendency. Nonetheless, the polarization

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[32]"Las indefiniciones alientan al crisis," Análisis, VI (October 31, 1966), pp. 8-9; "Expropriaciones: el martes de ceniza," Primera Plana, loc. cit.; "Soñar no cuesta nada," Primera Plana, loc. cit.; "Las alegres divagaciones," Confirmado, loc. cit.

[33]"Gobierno: después de la devaluación," Primera Plana, IV (November 15, 1966), pp. 12-13; "Industria: ¿de vuelta al campo?" Confirmado, II (December 1, 1966), pp. 28-29; "Paso decisivo de los empresarios," Análisis, VI (November 7, 1966), pp. 14-15.

of interests is viewed optimistically as a step toward a more firmly based political consensus, which appears to lend more stability on the political system than formerly.

Institutionalization. Facilitating the consolidation of power and expression of interests is the high degree of organization and institutionalization which national life has achieved in business, government, labor, trade, and politics. With the presence of large power blocs and groups of influence (labor, employes' organizations, cooperatives, managerial and professional associations, etc.), more effective confrontation and negotiation is possible,[34] even despite efforts on the part of the government "to muzzle" all opposition activity. Labor and business are more bureaucratized and better organized than ever. The consumer is well organized in certain areas of consumption, particularly in housing and public services. That is, because of the increasing institutionalization of national life, there are an increasing number of centralized structures developing. With the increasing development of centralized structures, an increasing number of top-level officials, representing the major sectors of national life, are able to come together and confront one another in a more direct and efficient manner.

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[34]"Gremios: el tamaño de una rebelión," Primera Plana, V (November 22, 1966), p. 14; Crónica (Rosario), October 15, 1966, p. 1; Revista del Instituto de Derecho Público y Ciencias Sociales, Nos. 12/13 (II semester, 1963; I semester, 1964), entire issue, especially José C. Rolt, "Cooperativas de consumo," pp. 19-28; Gabriel Perren, "Cooperativas agropecuarias," pp. 29-32; Enrique Conora Martínez, "Cooperativas de servicios públicos," pp. 33-42; Aurelio Flores, "Cooperativas de crédito," pp. 43-50; etc.

Political maturity. Through the pre- and post-Perón years, Argentines have been increasing in political maturity, as was evidenced after the June 28, 1966, coup. Neither the Church, the entrepreneurs, nor the labor syndicates were willing to assume the responsibility of managing a government installed and sustained by force. The hierarchy of the Catholic Church in Argentina went out of its way to avoid being cast in the role of either supporter or instigator of the new government. It was the regime that was currying the favor of the Church and not vice versa. Although big business praised the measures which the government later adopted, its initial reaction was aloof, as it adopted an attitude of "let's wait and see." And, in evaluating the reaction of labor to the new government, it is noteworthy that labor kept its distance for four months, waiting for the government to define its position and develop its programs. In fact, the first significant opposition to the government by labor did not occur until November 9, 1966, more than four months after the advent of the government and two days after the government adoption of a pro-capitalist program of development. In short, none of these major blocs of power and influence would accept any paternalism in exchange for unconditional support of the government. The new government was judged chiefly on the basis of its performance in resolving national problems. It was neither blindly supported nor blindly opposed by the majority of the citizens, and support of or opposition to the government did not come until after it had clearly defined its position.[35]

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[35]"Primera crisis del gobierno," Análisis, VI (October 3, 1966), p. 8.

The finality of the revolution. It was commented by nearly all participants in Argentine politics that the long cycle of indecisive and chaotic politics had come to an end. The revolution of 1966 definitely and absolutely placed the country at a new directional point from which it could not return. For the future, it would be impossible to turn back to old and discredited solutions and to follow old and discredited leaders. No matter what changes of government might occur, or whatever new government might assume power, no regime nor any series of national programs would be able to deny the platform of the new government: modernization and development; structural and ideological change.[36]

The control of the CGT. In effecting the proposed changes and controlling the opposition, the government realized that the key to its success was the CGT.[37] With respect to controlling the CGT, the government did quite well in achieving its objective. It was able to hold out against and put down the port strike and international boycott; to weather the several other major strikes; and attempt to wield influence, but with no success, in the election of certain CGT officials.[38]

Status: Occupation and Education (Stabilizers)

New job opportunities. With the inauguration of new federally and locally sponsored projects and national development programs, a number of new jobs were being created which would provide greater employ-

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[36]Ibid., p. 9.

[37]Ibid.

[38]"¿La revolución clausurada?" Confirmado, II (October 13, 1966), pp. 18-19; "Portuarios," Confirmado, II (December 1, 1966), p. 17; "Unidad interna y boicot internacional," Análisis, VI (November 7, 1966), pp. 16-17; "El extraño silencio de la CGT," Inédito, loc. cit.

ment opportunities.[39] Not in every case, however, was indigenous manpower utilized.[40] When new projects were begun or new factories and other economic stimuli were introduced in the upper Litoral region in the vicinity of Paraná and Santa Fe cities, it was noticed that the exodus of persons to Rosario and Buenos Aires was effectively stopped.[41]

New stress on agriculture. The realization was widely shared that Argentina should increase its agricultural production and exports of agricultural products[42] and that by increasing agricultural production Argentina can bring in additional earnings of foreign exchange and industry can then be expanded further by investing the exchange earnings from agricultural exports into capital equipment.

High literacy rate and increasing level of education. That Argentina has a high rate of literacy and that its general population is achieving a progressively higher level of education, do not necessarily mean that the country will be any more stable or will change any more rapidly. Nonetheless, it is believed that the high literacy rate and

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[39]"¿La revolución clausurada?" Confirmado, ibid., p. 18.

[40]Interviews with planning and construction personnel revealed to the researcher that many of the manual laborers on the underground Santa Fe-Paraná tunnel project are Bolivians, not Argentines.

[41]Instituto de Planeamiento Regional y Urbano, op. cit., II, p. 109.

[42]Dr. Lorenzo A. Raggio argues in "El pensamiento institucional y el oficial en la exposición del centenario de la Sociedad Rural Argentina," Revista de la Bolsa de Cereales, LIII (August 4, 1966), pp. 5-7, that "Argentina is not an underdeveloped country but is slowed down by factors that it can well overcome" and that "with a strong agrarian base, the country can progress economically." Martín Bloque urges a greater wheat production in "Necesidad y conveniencia de una mayor producción de trigo," El Economista, July 20, 1966, p. 5. Dr. Pedro García Oliver, loc. cit., calls for applying "the most advanced technologies" to increase agricultural production.

the increasing education of the population represent "stabilizers" for the political system of Argentina's "urban Litoral." This is because a more educated and literate population will be more economically and intellectually active than a population not quite so educated and literate. With greater levels of education and literacy, a greater economic output and greater political maturity are achieved.

While Argentine elementary schools show a desertion rate of 56 per cent before the end of the seventh grade, this rate is lower than it is for other Latin American countries. The number of secondary-school graduates in Argentina has nearly quadrupled in the past 20 years, with university enrollment showing an even higher rate of increase over the same period. In fact, the level of education for the population as a whole has been steadily increasing every year. For some time, too, the literacy rate has been above 90 per cent.[43]

Prestige and Mobility (Stabilizers)

Institutions of vertical mobility. For achieving prestige and mobility in Argentina the following institutions have proved effective: the armed forces, the clergy, educational institutions, political parties, professional organizations, managerial organizations, and marriage.[44] Membership in any of the preceding definitely confers some degree of prestige and mobility, and persons of low social status have been known

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[43] Centro de Investigaciones Económicas, Instituto Torcuato Di Tella, Los recursos humanos de nivel universitario y técnico en la república Argentina, op. cit., Parte I, pp. 60-73, 81, 290-291; Ferrara, op. cit., pp. 242-246.

[44] Puigbó, op. cit., pp. 87-90.

to surpass considerably an initially low social status by having entered or excelled in one of the institutions, as did Hipólito Yrigoyen in the Unión Cívica Radical, Juan Domingo Perón in the armed forces, Risiera Frondizi in the university, etc.[45]

Vehicles of social transformation. As was pointed out in chapter III,[46] mass-communication media and mass forms of public participation and education are providing the modus operandi whereby Argentine society is developing and becoming increasingly mobile. Ideas and emotions are freely expressed and exchanged and the demarcation is progressively less rigid between classes. It is maintained that the high development of mass-communication systems, public-entertainment facilities, and educational opportunities results in considerable support for the political system in allowing for the more rapid dissemination of new ideas and the more rapid acceptance of innovations. Furthermore, the population as a whole tends to be more productive and more mobile than it would be if these factors were otherwise not so fully developed.

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[45]Imaz, Los que mandan, op. cit., pp. 192, 134, 128, 58-60. In the Imaz study on the ruling elite in Argentina, it was reported that 36 per cent of the Socialist party leadership and 10 per cent of the Radical party leaders came from lower and lower middle class backgrounds; that 17 per cent of the leaders in the Unión Industrial, 47 per cent of the Cámara Argentina de Comercio, and 37 per cent of the Confederación General Económica were "self-made men" rising from the lower social strata; that 26 per cent of all the industrialists and businessmen had begun their careers "at the bottom" of the socio-economic ladder; and that 73 per cent of the brigadiers and generals in the armed forces originated from the wealthy bourgeoisie, 25 per cent from the dependent middle class, and only 2 per cent from the working class.

[46]See the discussion concerning mass communication, public entertainment, and education, pages 71-74.

Pressures and Stabilizers: A Balance Sheet

In retrospect, the chief pressures that are applied against the Argentine political system are those of a more immediate urgency (opposition strength, inflation, economic stagnation, rising expectations, unequal development, depopulation of rural areas, etc.), needing the substantive attention of the governing authorities. On the other hand, the chief stabilizers upholding the Argentine system are of a future fulfillment and by their nature much less real and concrete. Consequently, whether the Argentine political system can retain its identity and authority over the country, depends largely upon the strength and rate of development of each stabilizing tendency. In short, it is the speculative opinion of the researcher that to the degree that the various trends toward greater economic development, political consolidation, and social mobility continue at a rapid rate, the Argentine system will have sufficient incoming support to absorb and withstand the disequilibriating effects of the incoming system pressures.

CHAPTER X

THE RESPONDING POLITICAL SYSTEM

The culmination of the process of sociopolitical change in which this entire work has been pointed takes place in "the responding political system." It is here that the system authorities interpret the incoming flow of pressures and stabilizers. On their ability to withstand the inputs of destabilizing pressures and to order supports in their behalf, depends in part the stability of the political system and the amount of sociopolitical change that occurs. The other half of this process reposes in the interaction between the policies and acts of the governing authorities and the reactions and feedback responses coming from the total environment and the political system. This chapter will examine the executive policies that were formulated in the latter quarter of 1966 and the overt opinions, responses, and reactions of the different sectors of national life to these policies.

Decisions: Content, Method, and Responses

While the announced objective of the June 28, 1966, coup was the modernization and development of the Argentine economy,[1] official efforts to realize this objective proceeded without the inclusion and

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[1]"Primera crisis del gobierno," Análisis, loc. cit.

participation of the working masses. The socioeconomic structure did not visibly change, and the owner-worker relationship failed to vary significantly. And, most importantly, there was no mobilization of the masses for a collective effort in support of the revolution. The masses (and here is meant both white-collar and blue-collar workers) desired a more comprehensive revolution that would erect a "new" revolutionary ideology and not an ideology that smacked of the liberal capitalism of yesterday.[2]

General Content of Decisions

All official policy issued during the latter quarter of 1966 reflects a common general content, viz., a rejection of the tried and discredited actions of the political parties and a return to the tried and more successful policies of the previous liberal-economic era.[3] Stated more concisely, the elimination of inflation was the standard on which most government policies were based.[4]

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[2]Rodolfo Puiggrós, lecture given at Teatro de Independencia, Buenos Aires, December 19, 1966. The reader is also referred to the documented opinions of the workers organizations, as recorded in chapter VIII, pages 221-223.

[3]Enrique Martínez Paz, the minister of interior, synthesized quite cogently this concept in a speech delivered in Salta, Argentina, on November 26, 1966, in which he stated that the old politics have definitely ended. "Let this be well understood. They have ended because they are the expression of particular interests that do not coincide with those of the nation." Clarín, November 27, 1966, p. 18.

[4]President Juan Carlos Onganía, official speech to the nation, November 7, 1966.

General Implementation of Policies

On the one hand, the revolutionary government was willing to implement its policies "without resort to oppression, despotism, or tyranny."[5] On the other hand, as expressed by General Julio Alsogaray, "Nobody or anything will make us depart from the course we've charted. We are prepared to destroy without consideration every enemy within or without who may stand in the way of the revolution."[6] That is, the government was determined that the revolution should succeed and was willing to use force to make it succeed. But force could be used only when other measures had failed to achieve the desired results.

Decisions: Specific Content and Reactions

The major decisions made during the period of this study were announced in the form of official speeches and decrees, the most important one being the Presidential Address of November 7, 1966.

The Presidential Address of November 7, 1966

The major pronouncement of policy by the revolutionary government during the time period of this study (June 28, 1966 - December 14, 1966) was the message to the country delivered by President Lieutenant General Juan Carlos Onganía at the Salón Blanco (White Room) in the House of Government on November 7, 1966.

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[5] *Ibid*.

[6] Cited in *Clarín*, December 14, 1966, p. 8.

Background to the Address

Since the governing authorities came into power following the ousting of President Arturo Illia from office on June 28, 1966, they had not specified in detail nor with clarity the policies by which they intended to govern the country. But pressures for positive action on the part of the new government and for the government to produce a declaration of principles and guidelines continued to increase. Too, the government itself was anxious to conclude its studies of national problems and to take firm measures. Through late October the national decisionmakers met and worked on the details of the forthcoming presidential message that would define more clearly the position of the government. The President conferred with members of his cabinet about the forthcoming message for three hours on October 28, 1966, to obtain their reaction.[7] The speech was then reworked and presented on November 7, 1966, the President himself making the final changes and corrections in his speech.

Content of the Address[8]

At the beginning of his speech, President Onganía affirmed that "the revolution, inspired by a collective will, does not recognize enemies in any particular sector of the population." The true adversaries

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[7]Clarín, October 29, 1066, p. 1. There were thirty in attendance including President Onganía and such problems as prices and salaries, foreign trade, energy projects, capital for housing and the Tucumán problem were discussed.

[8]The following report on the contents of the Presidential message of November 7, 1966, was extracted from the verbatim text, which was reproduced in the daily newspaper Crónica (Rosario), November 8, 1966, pp. 1-3.

of the government and the entire nation, he pointed out, "are inefficiency, dated structures, vested interests, laziness, and disorientation, and all that which has these many years paralyzed the country and compromised the Argentine citizen." Stating that the theme of the new policy should be structural modernization, the President then went on to formulate the broad bases of policy and proceed into specific action programs.

Sacrifice from all. The government urged the citizenry to exert efforts in behalf of the general welfare of all members of the community. "The sacrifice of today will be the measurement of Argentina tomorrow, and in no wise the benefit of another sector or social group."

Inflation and the peso. "The revolution states its intention of putting an end to inflation." It is not enough that intentions be sincere; they must be backed up with drastic and even painful action. In putting an end to inflation, the government could have simply cut back its expenses; but, instead, it has determined to contain public expenses while expanding private activity. "The fundamental measure of economic character now consists of freeing the exchange market," being careful to avoid any abuses or misuses that could arise.

Excessive public employes. "Transferring some state enterprises to private enterprise and reorganizing the remainder would eliminate the principal causes of the present deficit," but a large part of this deficit is the surplus of public servants, "which will have to be stopped at all administrative levels." To the degree that private industry can grow, the public sector can give up increasing percentages of its workers.

Taxes. The payment of taxes is a responsibility which the government will enforce by law. Persons will be taxed progressively according to their ability to pay. The government will reorganize the tax-collecting organisms with a view toward improving their operation and increasing their contribution to the national revenue.

Savings against inflation. "As an additional measure of containing inflation and the underemployment of manpower, the Banco Hipotecario Nacional will at once launch a new public subscription to its savings and loan plans to the sum of 14,400,000,000 pesos." In addition, 7,600,000,000 pesos will be used to take care of rising sums of subscribed contracts. The free exchange rate will have repercussions on prices, especially the prises of Argentine exports. "This will represent a smaller internal consumption of goods that will in turn mean income to the country." Furthermore, the official policy of stabilizing salaries will go hand in hand with the policy of returning to a hard currency.

Speculation: a repressive measure. Laws and norms will be established to prevent speculation with the vital necessities of the population. The country cannot undertake to develop industrially without consolidating the base of its economy, which is agriculture. "Agriculture provides the country with foodstuffs and exportable products."

Adverse factors to agricultural production. A number of factors (differences in the exchange rate to the detriment of exports, holding back certain quantities of exports, unjust regulations concerning transportation of the harvested crops, etc.) have impeded investments in the

technological development of agriculture. The government has totally lifted all restrictions on meat and grain exports and has sought to facilitate greater movement of foodstuffs in the internal market. It will also be the policy to promote the shipping of live cattle to countries which lack refrigeration facilities. The new emphasis on agriculture will be supported by renovations in transportation media, especially the railroads and the ports. "But let it be clearly understood that the government intends that this rural development be the impetus in effecting complete industrial transformation."

Support to the farmer: technology. "The farmer can have the economic security to invest in technology and modernization of agricultural productivity." The government will support farmers with technical assistance, with national and international credit, and with all the resources at its disposal to resolve the problems of infrastructure, of rural electrical development, of trucks, ports, and railroads. In helping to promote agricultural development, the state will insist on increases in production. All land will be put to intensive use. The activities of INTA (Instituto Nacional de Tecnología Agropecuaria) will be expanded and more widely dispersed, and all private agricultural organizations, such as CREA (Consorcios Regionales de Experimentación Agrícola) will be supported and encouraged.[9] "In the past the policy was to export the excess once the necessities of internal consumption were met. The cure now will consist in exporting all that it is possible to export and consume the remainder."

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[9]INTA and CREA are described in chapter IX, pages 244-245.

Commitments in foreign trade. Argentina has affirmed its willingness to comply with all its commitments in foreign trade and to increase its contribution to international commerce. But the trade relations of the country should be reciprocal. "The LAFTA countries deserve preference within the plans to expand foreign trade."

The national ports. "The first government measure to remove the obstacles to exportation and importation consisted of firmly directing the reorganization of customs in benefit of Argentine businessmen, as well as foreign business interests." Similarly, the government has proceeded to reorganize the national ports, which have been considered "the most expensive in the world." To correct this situation, the government now envisions not only physical renovation but worker and administrative renovations as well.

Investment: foreign and domestic. "Financial stability and the monetary policy of the government will induce national savings to be invested into national industry." The country neither fears nor distrusts other countries. "The confidence of foreign investors will reside in the conviction that Argentina keeps its word and is as mindful of its rights as it is of its obligations." But faith in the industrial future of Argentina will be substantially reflected by national investment, foreign capital representing but a small part of the over-all total investment.

Industrialization. The actual deficient economic growth of the country has restricted the exploitation and consumption of iron, steel, and energy, but measures will be adopted to increase production of these to meet consumption needs. It is projected to produce 4,000,000

tons of steel for 1970-1972. Priority has been given to the expansion of SOMISA (Sociedad Mixta Siderúrgia Argentina) to reach a productivity of 2,000,000 tons by 1970. Altos Hornos Zapla of Frabricaciones Militares will plan on increasing its production to 190,000 tons in the first months of 1970. It is also planned to increase the production of particular steel plants and the exploration for and extraction of iron ore.

Electrical energy and expansion. To fill the new accelerating demand for energy created by the promotion and growth of industry, concrete projects will be undertaken: El Chocón-Cerros Colorados and Salto Grande. "Before the end of the year, the government will have made the decision that is presently under study to assure the realization of both projects, while continuing its study of installing, in addition, a nuclear-electrical center."

Exploitation of oil. It is admitted that oil production has stagnated since the annulment of foreign-oil contracts, supply not having kept pace with increasing demand. The government will continue negotiating with the affected firms with the object of fulfilling its original contract obligations toward them. "But we are more concerned about the future than the past." The government will seek to reorganize YPF (Yacimientos Petrolíferos Fiscales), the state oil monopoly, and encourage the colaboration of private enterprise in the exploration, refining, and sales of petroleum products.

Reorganization of the railroads. The railroads will soon be reorganized according to conclusions drawn from exhaustive studies. The

new railroad policy, which will be presented in the near future, will call for the reorganization of the central organism of the railroad enterprise and the workshops, for the establishment of adequate labor regulations, for elimination of the greater deficit which is being borne by all Argentines, etc. "In confronting the railroad problems the government complies with one of the postulates of the revolution."

Road construction. "Along with the reorganization of the railroads, the government will also undertake the building of highways and routes that will begin with the integral reconstruction of 3,000 kilometers of poor roads and the completion of 3,000 kilometers of new roads. Provinces and municipalities will receive federal assistance in their road-construction programs. In further development of its transportation facilities, the government contemplates the investment of one billion pesos in improving its airport facilities. "Both projects are closely linked to the concept of regional development, which the Argentine revolution is promoting."

Regional development. It is proposed to include the provinces within the scope of national development, without violating their identity and secular tradition. In this emphasis on regional development, "mineral extraction will acquire a particular importance." The publicized Tucumán problem will be attacked forcibly. The economy of Tucumán will be developed and diversified," and all residents there "can be assured that the entire country will share in the task of lifting up its prostrated economy. A starting fund of one billion pesos has been deposited in the provincial bank, and another two billion pesos will follow."

Comments on the Address

As can be supposed, the larger business, industrial, and farming interests of the country were laudatory in their comments on the presidential address; the labor unions and small independent working interests were cautious to praise the address but quick to criticize and condemn its content. A mixture of opinions characterized the remainder of the Argentine community.

The Economic Interests

The ACIEL. The president of ACIEL (Co-ordinating Association for Free Industrial Institutions) Dr. Manuel Fontecha Morales, replied: "My opinion is favorable. It is a seriously pronounced speech. The President of the Nation has contemplated in his speech nearly all the points that the country has to resolve immediately. Above all, it is appropriate to praise the measure of adopting a free rate of exchange."[10]

The Sociedad Rural Argentina. The second vice president of the Argentine Rural Society, Luis J. Firpo Miro, said that the speech was "very good in that which respects economic measures in general and with relation to agriculture in particular." He said that now new hope existed for rural development and that improvement in exports could be expected. His remarks were prefaced: "The esteemed President has directed a message to the Nation that was anticipated and which the country needed."[11]

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[10] La Razón, November 8, 1966, p. 1.

[11] La Prensa, November 9, 1966, p. 7.

Bolsa de Comercio. Dr. Luis M. Baudizzone of the Bolsa de Comercio (Commercial Exchange Center) noted that following the presidential message there occurred a sharp increase in the volume of operations and an improvement in the level of prices--all of which were sufficient indicators of the value of the speech.[12]

Asociación de Bancos. The president of the Asociación de Bancos (Bankers' Association), Francisco Dellepiane, said that the address was, in his judgment, "realistic, firm, and valient" insofar as it focuses on economic measures and general orientation. "The decision to devaluate the peso is the most important item in the speech."[13]

Confederaciones Rurales Argentina. Dr. Juan A. Piran of the Confederaciones Rurales Argentinas (Argentine Rural Confederations) confirmed that the speech "caused a very good impression in rural circles and coincided with the principles supported by the agricultural entities."[14]

Cámara de Exportadores. Juan B. Martín of the Cámara de Exportadores (Chamber of Exporters) acknowledged that freeing the exchange rate would encourage greater exports. If the government program for stimulating exports were carried out as planned, the export industry would be in good condition by 1970.[15]

Corporación Argentina de Productores de Carnes. CAP (Argentine Corporation of Meat Producers) vice president, Humberto Volando, declared the message to be "valient in implanting a reality and deciding important things."[16]

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[12]Ibid. [13]Ibid. [14]Ibid.

[15]La Nación, November 9, 1966, p. 8.

[16]Ibid.

Comisión Coordinadora de Entidades Agropecuarias. Secretary of this Commission (the Co-ordinating Commission of Agricultural Entities), Jorge Zorregieta, reported that "the message was very well received in all the agricultural community" and praised the government for its "special promotion of agrarian production."[17]

La Bolsa de Cereales. This organism (the Grain Exchange) declared that the freeing of the exchange rate and the removing of other obstacles to exports, announced in the speech, were good measures to have taken.[18]

La Bolsa de Comercio de Rosario. Eduardo Luis López of the Bolsa de Comercio de Rosario (Rosario Commercial Exchange Center) stated: "I accord an exceptional value to this exposition of President Onganía. It is quite a contrast to the past twenty years."[19]

Sociedad Rural de Rosario. Federico S. Garrone, vice president of the Sociedad Rural de Rosario (Rosario Rural Society) said that "the freedom of the exchange market is the barometer that measures the economic and financial wealth of the country" and "the only way to recoup the hardness of our national currency, which was one of the most highly valued in all the world at the end of the war."[20]

The Working Interests

Unión Ferroviaria. President of the Unión Ferroviaria (Railroaders' Union), Antonio Scipione, was quite explicit in his objections concerning

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[17] Ibid.

[18] La Prensa, November 9, 1966, p. 7.

[19] Ibid. [20] Ibid.

the address. To him, the speech "clearly evidenced the purpose of reinstating political schemes that the times and progress surpassed some decades ago."

> . . . Those who pretend to govern are on the wrong path in excluding the popular sectors. The policy of the government is a cereal and pastoral policy that will close down factories and plants, will hurt the acquisitive power of the salaried worker, and will annul the social legislation attained by the workers. I have not the slightest doubt that right now the Sociedad Rural and ACIEL and other entities . . . are gleefully editing their declarations of unconditional support of the presidential message.[21]

CGT. The ex-secretary general of the CGT (General Labor Confederation) and leader of the "62 standing organizations," established entities within or components of the CGT, José Alonso, made it clear that he regarded the new policy as a reversion to the old liberal line. "It erects a blockade to national consumption in its policies" through its proposed firings of workers and privitization of state enterprises. "This signifies the paralyzation of industry" in making Argentina the exporter of primary products but the consumer of manufacturing products. In short, the policy requires the least effort on the part of the government and the greatest sacrifice on the part of the popular class.[22]

The Socialist party. Socialist party leader, Professor Américo Ghioldi, replied that the important thing to realize with respect to the monetary devaluation is that definite and particular sectors will be concretely benefitted and other sectors concretely harmed. It will also be of interest, said Professor Ghioldi, to note precisely who

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[21] La Razón, November 8, 1966, p. 1.

[22] Ibid.

delivered or prepared the speech and who will be responsible for its execution.[23]

Other Responses by the Political System

The presidential message to the country laid the framework to which future federal measures, decrees, and programs were attached. The following represents more or less a chronological review of these federal measures, decrees, and programs.

Devaluation of the peso. The Argentine peso had its value fixed at 215 pesos to the dollar for purchasing and 218 for selling on August 9, 1966. Under the free-market rate, which went into effect on November 9, 1966, the value of the peso settled at 245 for buying and 255 for selling. The purpose of the devaluation move, apart from stimulating exports, was to facilitate the inflow and outflow of capital; and, as the economics minister, Dr. Jorge Néstor Salimei, said, the measure was not a devaluation but the fitting of the currency to its true value.

Foodstuffs and supermarkets. The passage of Law 17,017, announced in La Nación on November 19, 1966, had as its objectives to achieve greater control over prices and to take effective action against any infractions in the pricing of foodstuffs.[24] The past abuses in the pricing of foodstuffs were well noted,[25] and the government was attempting not only

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[23] La Prensa, November 9, 1966, p. 1.

[24] La Nación, November 19, 1966, p. 1.

[25] Salvador Nielsen, "Los intocables," Panorama, No. 42 (November, 1966), pp. 36-42, describes the pricing of foodstuffs whereby the producer sells cheaply and the buyer pays dearly as the daily drama of the Argentine economy. One result of pricing disequilibrium is the contraband of foodstuffs which enter the market illegally and which represent

to prevent any excessive rise in prices but to encourage a more regular flow of food products into urban markets through the stabilizing of prices. In this same vein, the Law of Supermarkets was subsequently passed, establishing new norms to ensure that supermarkets would provide certain minimum services and kinds and amounts of foodstuffs.[26]

General price fixing. It was reported on November 22, 1966, that the government would seek control over prices in general and would fix the levels of prices.[27]

New rental laws. It was anticipated on November 22, 1966, that the government would produce a new law on renting apartments, homes, and other housing space, "for the existing rental laws have lost their relevancy to present-day realities."[28]

Renovation of the ports. On November 29, 1966, it was announced that an investment exceeding one billion pesos would be made to improve Argentine ports and to provide new facilities for more efficient service. Ships were henceforth expected to operate 24 hours a day.[29] Previous to this announcement the government had reorganized the working schedule for dock workers, from which plan notable positive results were obtained.[30]

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a contamination threat or health danger. See Ramón Nodaro and Rolando Hanglin,"Los evenenadores," Panorama, No. 34 (March, 1966), pp. 52-61.

[26]La Razón, November 22, 1966, p. 16.

[27]El Mundo, November 20, 1966, p. 5.

[28]La Razón, November 22, 1966, p. 1.

[29]Clarín, November 29, 1966, p. 18.

[30]"Impacto de la reforma portuaria," El Economista, XVII (October 29, 1966), p. 2 Decree No. 2729-66 divided the working day of dock workers into two labor periods. In a comparative study of one cargo

The reorganization of the railroads. The railroads, having been for some time a kind of national cancer[31] and their reform having been imminent ever since the presidential address, were reorganized in complete detail on November 28, 1966. All parties to the disputed action had been anticipating the move. As early as November 16, 1966, President Onganía held discussions with La Fraternidad and Unión Ferroviaria.[32]

The government studied the position of the railroad workers in terms of its reorganization plans and then made its decisions on November 25, 1966.[33] On that occasion President Onganía commented: The railroads that we now have are not those which correspond to the future of the country."[34] The two major postulates of the reorganization plan were anticipated in La Nación (November 28, 1966): private enterprise would be allowed to participate and various workshops would be closed.[35]

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ship operating before and after the port reform, it was observed that the cost per day under the new system decreased from 799,380 pesos to 582,920 pesos. Engineer Antonio R. Lanusse, transportation secretary, in speaking before the Cámara Argentina on December 6, 1966, affirmed that the new regulations for dock workers had already obtained an average economic savings of 30 per cent and had reduced the time in which ships were docked for loading and unloading 50 per cent. La Nación, December 7, 1966, p. 1, plus.

[31]See Lozada, op. cit., p. 439; "El desastre ferroviario," Azul y Blanco, loc. cit.; Santa Cruz, op. cit., entire publication.

[32]El Mundo, November 16, 1966, p. 8.

[33]La Prensa, November 25, 1966, p. 1.

[34]Clarín, November 25, 1966, p. 15.

[35]La Nación, November 28, 1966, p. 1.

The program in full was an extensive document of 500 items which was synthesized to 84 items for publicity purposes.[36] Transportation Secretary Lanusse affirmed that long-distance fares would be raised 50 to 60 per cent from December 24 on, and of the 25 workshops presently operating six would be gradually eliminated.[37]

The housing problem. The government program to eliminate the housing deficit moved rapidly forward. On November 8, 1966, it was publicized that the Inter-American Developmental Bank had extended credit of $19,200,000 (U.S. dollars) to Argentine housing authorities for the construction of 6,800 homes in Buenos Aires.[38] Ernesto García Olano, secretary of housing, stated that 130,000 dwelling units would be constructed during 1967 with a capital of 200 billion pesos financed through the Banco Hipotecario Nacional.[39] The secretary and undersecretary of housing, the minister of welfare, and the secretary of government all met on December 5, 1966, to further the projection of housing plans.[40]

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[36]Reproduced in Clarín, December 3, 1966, pp. 12-13, the document contained the following chapters: Administrative Order, Operative Modernization, Commercial Exploitation, Contracts, Working Regulations and Labor Agreements, Workshops, Replacement and Repairs, Scope of the Enterprise, Need of the Plan, Specific Regulations of Law 11,594 for Railroad Personnel under National Jurisdiction, etc.

[37]La Nación, December 7, 1966, p. 1, plus; Buenos Aires Herald, December 7, 1966, p. 9.

[38]Crónica (Rosario), November 8, 1966, p. 1.

[39]Clarín, December 3, 1966, p. 16; Buenos Aires Herald, December 4, 1966, pp. 10-11. Of the total dwellings to be built, 40,000 were to be built and financed by labor unions, 63,000 were destined for middle income families, and 70,000 for the lower-income sector. Loans would be furnished to the middle-income sector payable in 8 to 12 years at interest rates of 9 to 15 per cent and to the lower-income sector payable in 20 to 30 years and from 5 to 15 per cent interest.

[40]La Prensa, December 6, 1966, p. 1.

On December 8, it was announced that the welfare ministry had accepted $17,000,000 (U.S. dollars) from the AFL-CIO center in the United States to be distributed among four Argentine unions for the construction of dwellings.[41] On January 17, 1967, the housing secretary declared that 6,020 housing units were being constructed by the Banco Hipotecario Nacional and would be ready to inhabit sometime in the first four months of 1967, and in March another 1,784 units would be started. Later on in the year there would be another 2,034 houses begun under credit from the Inter-American Bank for Development.[42]

Educational reform. A comprehensive reform of the national education system, entitled "operative decentralization" came into effect. This meant that the responsibility for educational planning would be in the hands of the provinces, except for certain normative aspects.[43]

Reaction to Government Policies

Categorization of Reactions

In categorizing the reactions to the preceding government policies on the part of various interests and sectors of national life, it was noted that ACIEL (the big industrialists in UIA and the big hacendados in the Sociedad Rural) applauded the policies presented by the government

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[41] Clarín, December 8, 1966, p. 15. The Argentine unions were: the Unión Ferroviaria, Sindicato de Luz y Fuerza, Federación de Empleados y Obreros de Correos y Telecomunicaciones, and Unión Obreros y Empleados Municipales.

[42] La Prensa, January 17, 1967, p. 1.

[43] El Mundo, December 13, 1966, p. 5.

and in every respect responded favorably. The CGE (the smaller industrialists and businessmen and importers) was "more conservative in its applause" and responded more cautiously. The CGT, in further contrast showed its disconformity with nearly every measure taken, noting that the currency devaluation would transfer some 200 billion pesos of income from the working sector and would cause the cost of living to rise some 25 per cent.[44]

Examination of Opposition Activity

Four aspects of the position and activity of the opposition to government policies will be looked into: strikes, demonstrations, declarations, and resignations.

Strikes

The transportation strike of November 9, 1966. Inspired by Eustaquio Tolosa, secretary general of the Confederación Argentina de Trabajadores and of SUPA (Sindicatos Unidos Portuarios Argentinos), as a show of opposition to the proposed changes and policies of the government, the strike of November 9, 1966, under the auspices of the Confederación Argentina de Trabajadores del Transporte (CATT), was only partial, limited to railroads and ships.[45] The strike met with strong opposition within CATT itself--from UTA, Federación de Camineros, Asociación del Personal Aeronaútico, and Asociación Argentina de Aeronavegantes--which

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[44]See "Nueva política económica: comienza la suba de precios," Esquiu (November 20, 1966), pp. 9, 20.

[45]La Razón, November 8, 1966, p. 16; La Prensa, November 9, 1966, p. 1.

did not support the strike, because of the understanding that "the existing bases for negotiating a settlement were sufficiently hopeful to proceed with them."[46] But labor leader Tolosa and his workers struck anyway. Then the government seized SUPA, put a Navy captain in charge as interventor, hired strike breakers, and forced general secretary Tolosa to flee to Montevideo, Uruguay. From there, supported by the International Transport Workers Federation, Tolosa continued to direct the dock strike, which was eventually broken when the several countries applying international sanctions decided not to continue adherence to the sanctions.[47]

The CGT strike of December 14, 1966. As an act of protest to the dispositions of the government to solve the problems of the ports, the sugar industry, and the railroads, the CGT called a full 24-hour strike for December 14, 1966.[48] The physical effectiveness of the strike, however, was minimal in the estimation of the researcher, who experienced no transportation difficulties from the strike (most of the private bus lines were running that day).

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[46]"Complicadas situaciones enfrenta la CGT," Esquiu, (November 20, 1966), p. 10.

[47]The Chilean government found out very quickly that the country was losing too much trade income in supporting the cause of the Argentine dock workers and discontinued its support. The Uruguayan government, too, became disenchanted with the high price it was paying to support the politically overtoned strike and began urging that Eustaquio Tolosa leave the country. Buenos Aires Herald, December 7, 1966, pp. 8-9; "Las espadas de Damocles," Primera Plana, op. cit., p. 13.

[48]La Razón, December 13, 1966, p. 1. The ACIEL stated that it rejected "as false the arguments of the worker center"; and the strike was purely political; and that strikers seemed to ignore that "Argentine ports were declared the most expensive in the world" and should be cleaned up.

The university student strikes. Strikes of students and demonstrations of protest by students during the period of this study were quite effective in dramatizing the very thing which the regime tried most "to play down," viz., its military characteristics and mentality. The physical intervention of the armed forces and the use of force in the University of Buenos Aires and the University of Córdoba, particularly, were out of character with the patriotic fervor, the strict adherence to the Constitution, and the free exercise of all civil liberties that depicted the civilian role being played by the military government. Student strikes and other demonstrations accomplished little by way of making or influencing any specific changes, but they did tend to publicize the most undesirable aspect of the current regime: its quick resort to force in order to quell or suppress its opposition.

Demonstrations

In comparison to previous worker-government history, worker demonstrations were less violent and more controlled during the period of this study. However as the port strike entered its seventh week, minor demonstrations were noted.

Bomb explosions. After the sweeping indictment issued by leftist and rightist labor groups that Argentine leaders are following anti-nationalistic policies contrary to popular interests, five bombs were exploded between 1 p.m. on December 8 and 1:20 a.m. on December 9, 1966, according to the Buenos Aires Herald.[49]

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[49] Buenos Aires Herald, December 9, 1966, p. 8.

Mass demonstrations. Apart from student demonstrations and marches, there are those demonstrations that are inspired in behalf of some particular political cuase. For example, some 500 workers demonstrated outside the CGT headquarters in behalf of SUPA labor leader Eustaquio Tolosa, calling for him by name in an impressive show of support.[50]

Declarations

The following are more or less typical of official opposition declarations.

CGT. The official policy of the revolutionary government was attacked in a declaration published the day of the worker strike by the Central Committee of the CGT. The declaration contained five points: 1) December 14, 1966, was designated as the day on which to realize a 24-hour strike of all the labor activity falling within CGT jurisdiction; 2) a brief exposition censuring the economic and social policies of the government was to be published by the Central Committee of the CGT; 3) the working class was to be mobilized through calling a number of public meetings and assemblies; 4) an analysis was to be made of the results of the strike; and 5) a special committee was to be named to publish the official CGT document the following Monday.[51]

Railroad unions. The Unión Ferroviaria and La Fraternidad formally rejected the new working regulations issued by the government,

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[50]Crónica (Buenos Aires), December 1, 1966, p. 3.

[51]Crónica (Buenos Aires), December 14, 1966, p. 2.

noting that the first time they had been exposed to the new railroad regulations was at the time they appeared in newsprint.[52]

Federación Obreros y Empleados Telefónicos de la República Argentina. The workers and employes of the telephone union also issued an official statement condemning government policy. The following points were made: 1) the government has demonstrated no actions to back up its words; 2) the revolution enjoys no popular participation; 3) the government policies have caused new worker sacrifices, thus weakening the income of the workers and hence the amount of income derived from internal consumption; 4) the government has only stabilized wages, not prices; and 5) the policy to turn state businesses over to private enterprise has placed the former into the hands of foreign interests and thus has threatened the economic independence of the country.[53]

FANDEP. The Federación de Agrupaciones Nacionales de Estudiantes Peronistas (Federation of National Groupings of Peronist Students) issued a declaration the evening previous to the December 14, 1966, strike in condemnation of government policy and in support of the worker strike, stating that "the policy of the present military dictatorship is one of concentrating power and dividends in the hands of a native and foreign exploiting minority at the price of increasing unemployment, misery, hunger, and loss of national patrimony."[54]

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[52] El Mundo, December 12, 1966, p. 13; Buenos Aires Herald, December 7, 1966, pp. 8-9.

[53] El Mundo, ibid.

[54] FANDEP, "Los peronistas universitarios y el paro del 14-12-66," mimeographed leaflet, Buenos Aires, December 13, 1966.

Resignations

Key resignations occurred during the period of this study in financial, municipal, and military circles. These resignations served to dramatize the disconformity and confusion that reigned among the national power holders with respect to decisions and policies.

Felipe Tami and his colaborators. Dr. Felipe Tami, president of the Banco Central (Central Bank) and his colaborators--Eduardo Zalduendo, second vice president of the Bank; the financial advisers Alberto Petrecolla and Gustavo Miranda Gallino; Francisco Valsecchi, trustee of the Bank; and Alieto Guadagni, comptroller of the Consejo Federal de Inversiones--resigned in protest against the financial orientation of the government economic policy. The Tami school opposed the proposed government measures on the grounds that they had a regressive rather than a progressive focus. They are of the opinion that the only consequences of freezing salaries and reducing government expenditures will be economic contraction, increased unemployment, "a sharp increase in the level of prices, and a spectacular drainage of monetary reserves with the prospect of an immediate foreign debt."[55]

Enrique H. Green Urien. Naval captain Enrique H. Green Urien, secretary of food supply and of the municipal police of Buenos Aires, presented his resignation and had it accepted by the municipal intendant Colonel Eugenio F. Schettini. Along with Captain Green Urien, the

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[55]"Después de la caída," Primera Plana, V (November 22, 1966), pp. 23-25; "Escándolo en la familia," Primera Plana, IV (November 1, 1966), pp. 13-14, precipitated a number of forthcoming resignations if official policy did not alter its position in different cases; "¿Con música de futuro retornamos al pasado?" Azul y Blanco, loc. cit.

general directors and advisers in his department resigned also, among them being Luis Margaride, the inspector general for the municipal police. The resignations exemplified differences in viewing the approach to communal problems and were directed against the official policies to turn street cleaning over to private enterprise and to establish new norms to control the sale of meat in municipal markets.[56]

General Pascual Pistarini. On December 5, 1966, Lieutenant General Pascual Pistarini, commander-in-chief of the Army and the leading force behind the most recent military coup, after failing to agree with President Onganía on certain military assignments and promotions, presented his resignation. That same day General Julio Rodolfo Alsogaray, head of the First Division of the Army, was offered and accepted the new post. General Pistarini retired amid speculation that something more than a disputation over military assignments was involved and that other resignations and even conspiracies might follow.[57]

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[56]La Nación, November 24, 1966, p. 1; Crónica (Buenos Aires), November 24, 1966, p. 8; El Mundo, November 24, 1966, p. 6.

[57]"La Nación: 360 días antes," Confirmado, II (December 8, 1966), pp. 16-17; "Ejército: algo más que traslados," Primera Plana, V (December 13, 1966), pp. 12-14; Clarín, December 8, 1966, p. 22.

CHAPTER XI

THE CHANGING SOCIETY AND POLITICAL SYSTEM (CONCLUSION)

This has been an empirical and descriptive study of sociopolitical change in the "urban Litoral" region of Argentina. While the over-all approach in the study is comprehensive in purporting to view every aspect of sociopolitical change, the major focus has been on the urban community. The purpose of this chapter will be to review some of the major findings in this study, to evaluate the approach that was used to study the problem, and to report the conclusions of the researcher concerning sociopolitical change in the "urban Litoral" of Argentina.

Discussion of the Findings

At the time this study was begun, it was hypothesized that the key variables in understanding sociopolitical change among members of the urban community in Argentina's "urban Litoral" were: socioeconomic status, anomie, political alienation, and social participation. To these was added the measurement of political attitudes, applying the Semantic Differential to several foreign governments and to certain national groups, movements, and parties which are considered to be

politically significant by George I. Blanksten, A. Curtis Wilgus, and the researcher.[1]

The theory concerning these variables holds that a low socioeconomic status is likely to produce or to condition states of anomie and political alienation, both of which are considered to be intervening variables between low socioeconomic status and low social participation. All three of these variables (socioeconomic status, anomie, and political alienation), then, are linked to social and political participation. The conditions of low socioeconomic status, high anomie, and high political alienation almost ensure that a person does not participate much socially or politically. In the event that a person who is anomic, alienated, and isolated participates politically, his behavior will most likely be negative.

The test results. Three distinctive patterns or sets of political attitudes, which are closely related to socioeconomic status levels and social participation indicies, emerge from the findings in this study. Special terms have been employed ("elite," "mass," and "marginal" societies) in order to denote each of these response patterns or sets. The meaning and use of these terms is given in the first part of Chapter IV, "The Funnel of Social-Group Interests." There, it is found that persons who are in the upper socioeconomic level reflect three distinctive characteristics: 100 per cent of them are not anomic, 78 per cent are not politically alienated, and 100 per cent are social

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[1]Wilgus, loc. cit.; Blanksten, "Political Groups in Latin America," loc. cit.

participants. Of the persons who are in the intermediary socioeconomic position, 77 per cent are not anomic, 43 per cent are not politically alienated, and 81 per cent are social participants. In the lower socioeconomic level, 23 per cent of the subjects are not anomic, "0" per cent are not politically alienated (or, that is, 100 per cent of them are politically alienated), and 18 per cent are social participants.

Apart from the very definite response differences on the measures of anomie, political alienation, and social participation for each socioeconomic group, there are yet noticeable differences which characterize them in their responses to foreign governments and national politically significant groups. The findings show that the lower class tends to rate the different foreign governments and national groups more positively (stronger, more active, and more virtuous) than do the lower middle and the upper middle classes. These findings contradict one aspect of the original hypothesis. It has been proposed that the existence of low socioeconomic status, high anomie, high political alienation, and low social participation implies that there will be either no political participation or negative political participation. But, the lower class, which exemplifies the patterns of low socioeconomic status, high anomie, high political alienation, and low social participation, generally rates foreign governments, its own country and different political groups within its country more favorably in terms of force, activity, and evaluation than do the two other classes.

It will be recalled that in the ratings of foreign governments given by the three classes, the present government of France is seen as

being the strongest, the most active, and the most virtuous. All three classes consider the government of Red China to be quite strong, quite active, and "bad," while the Soviet Union is seen as being rather strong and active by all three classes, and lower middle and lower classes rate it as being "good" at the same time that the upper middle class rates it as being "not very good." Finally, the lower class rates the governments of Cuba and Argentina more favorably than do the other two classes and the United States is rated more favorably by the lower class and less favorably by the two other classes.

It is quite significant that almost all the national political parties and movements in Argentina are judged to be "weak," "passive," and "bad." The only two exceptions are the Socialist and Peronist parties, which are rated in the middle position on the force, activity, and evaluation scales. The university students and the General Labor Confederation are rated as being "strong," "active," and "good" by all three classes. But the Roman Catholic Church and the armed forces are rated as being stronger, more active, and more virtuous by the lower class and much less so by the upper middle class. The bureaucracy is seen as a negative element in the national political context by all three classes, being rated as "weak," "passive," and "not so good." The lower class rates the industrial working class as being stronger, more active, and more virtuous than do the two higher socioeconomic classes. The upper middle class judges the professionals less favorably than do the other two classes. None of the classes rate the peasantry as being strong or active in politics, but all three classes

esteem it to be quite good. Finally, it is notable that the lower class rates the local trade unions, the large landowners, and the industrialists and financiers more positively on all factors than do the other two classes. On the above three items, there is a progressive gradation from more negative to more positive ratings in moving from the highest to the lowest class.

Implications. These reported results suggest that the key variables of socioeconomic status, political alienation, anomie, and social participation only condition and help to influence but apparently do not entirely determine political attitudes and action. Because an individual is negatively predisposed toward life in general and toward the local public administration in particular, does not mean that he holds negative attitudes concerning other national groups and foreign governments. In fact, the results of this study reveal that the great class antagonisms and alienation from the capitalist class which is supposed to propel the lower class toward the classic revolution are almost non-existent.

Furthermore, these variables, more than just conditioning or preparing an individual to be negatively predisposed, are vital concepts in explaining the extent to which an individual may be politically effective. The terms for describing each of the response patterns--the "elite" society, the "mass" society, and the "marginal" society--are quite graphic for this purpose. The marginal-society member is so estranged and isolated from society and so completely anomic and alienated from life and the political system that he may probably never act or want to act in his society in any meaningful political way. The mass-society

member, however, is nearly as politically alienated but far less anomic and much more of a social participant than is the marginal-society person. He may also be more politically effective in bringing about sociopolitical change than is the elite-society individual who is too little alienated and too little anomic even to desire to promote any kind of change in society or the political system. The mass-society member is sufficiently alienated to want to achieve some kind of change but not to the point that he will refrain from expressing himself politically. And, unlike the marginal-society person, who has only a few or probably no social contacts, the mass-society persons enjoys membership in several formal associations and has an impressive inner circle of friends, relatives, co-workers, and neighbors whom he can influence politically or who will influence him politically. Therefore, more than being a series of variables which explain and are related to one another, socioeconomic status, political alienation, anomic, and social participation are variables which may be used more effectively to predict the capacity of the society at large to effect sociopolitical change.

Now, since marginal-society persons are so anomic, politically alienated, and socially isolated that they do not participate politically in their society, they probably do not participate in many other aspects of national life, not the least of which are politics and education. And in this observation lies the possible explanation concerning the response set on political attitudes of the lower class. It is noted that members of the upper middle class, who are more informed and who

participate more in public life than the lower class, rate both the government of the United States and the government of Argentine quite a bit more negatively than does the lower class. The ratings by upper-class subjects are no doubt based on a greater depth of experience and knowledge than are the ratings of the lower class.

Consider, now, the fact that the upper middle and the lower middle classes react more negatively toward or rate less favorably foreign governments and different national political groups. The implication is that the lower class, which is not likely to act politically because of its alienation and isolation, is the class which is the most favorably predisposed to accept and to support other groups. But the two higher socioeconomic levels, which act politically in society, do not view as positively or as favorably the various internal and external forces and groups.

Of the six foreign governments, France alone is viewed favorably by all three classes.[2] Italy and Spain were not rated by subjects, but it is hypothesized that Spain and Italy, especially, would be rated quite positively by Argentine subjects. The United States is not thought too highly of by the two higher socioeconomic classes on the evaluative factor, but neither is it thought of as being at all "bad." Cuba, Russia, and Red China are rated as being rather strong and active by all three

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[2]This can be largely explained by the cultural heritage received from France, by the close cultural ties which Argentines maintain with France, and by the personal magnetism of President Charles De Gaulle who incarnates the caudillo or heroic leader in the minds of Argentines.

classes, but on the evaluative factor Red China is regarded as "bad," Cuba is "bad" to the upper middle and lower middle classes, and Russia is "bad" to the upper middle class. All of this implies that the government of Argentina can have much closer relations with Southern Europe but it should move cautiously in being identified with the United States and the Soviet Union and should avoid any political identification or sympathy with Castro's Cuba or Mao Tse Tung's Red China.

In viewing ratings by subjects of the national politically significant groups, it would seem that all the political parties and movements in Argentina are in deep trouble in not having popular acceptance. The two post-Perón divisions, the UCRP and the UCRI, of the Unión Cívica Radical of Leandro Alem and Hipólito Yrigoyen and Pedro Aramburu's UDELPA are conceived of in only negative terms: weak, passive, and bad. The Radical party has failed to bring stability and development to its country and, as was noted in Chapter VIII, "Attitudes and Belief Systems," its loss of political control to the armed forces on June 28, 1966, and the subsequent suppression and confiscation of the property and goods of the Radical party by the military regime have not been lamented by the Argentine classes, outside of the individual Radicales themselves. Under these circumstances, the only logical course for Argentine political parties and movements in gaining public acceptance and support is to reorganize and to create new political alignments.[3] It is imperative for all the political parties and splinter

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[3]One such new alignment could be headed up by UDELPA leader Pedro Eugenio Aramburu, and could attract some of the estranged UCRP followers. In addition, this group could hope to evolve into an eventual coalition with the Peronists. See "Soñar no cuesta nada," Primera Plana, loc. cit.

groups to consolidate into "new" political bodies that will more fully represent the actual political tendencies existent in the "urban Litoral" of Argentina if the politicians ever hope to gain an acceptance on the part of the public.

The social classes seem to be favorably impressed by the political strength, activity, and worth of university students and labor organizations. Both of these political groups apparently have a vast public sentiment supporting their political positions and activities. This great political acceptance or popularity of the Argentine labor forces and student groups should not be underestimated. Finally, the fact that almost every major national political group, with the exception of the political parties, has an acceptance with and is highly esteemed by the lower class would suggest that any of these major political groups could work more closely and profitably with lower-class persons.

Conclusions Concerning the Approach

The basic approach in this study of sociopolitical change in the "urban Litoral" of Argentina may be summarized in "the model of sociopolitical change" and its complementary methodology.

The Model of Sociopolitical Change

As stated in chapter II, "the so-called model of sociopolitical change combines five conceptions in its structural appearance."[4] Each one of these conceptions is derived from the work of well-respected

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[4]See pages 16 and 17 of this study.

academicians and researchers: Torcuato S. Di Tella, David Easton, Irving Louis Horowitz, Samuel H. Beer, and various Argentine scholars: Albert Miester, Susana Petruzzi, Elda Sonzogni, Ana Rosa Centeno, José Luis de Imaz, Delbert C. Miller, Eva Chamorro Greca, Juan Carlos Agulla, Alejandro Rofman, Clara E. Badler, Néstor J. Castagnola, Arnoldo R. Rosenfeld, and others.[5]

Now, as to whether these diverse conceptions can be ordered into a diagrammatic model after the manner in which they have been ordered for this study is subject to question. The most important single conception to the model is the identification of the political variables by Samuel H. Beer. Are the only significant variables in politics the ones that Professor Beer describes: political culture, the pattern of power, the pattern of interests, and the pattern of policy? Can all political phenomena be categorized under these four variables? The researcher responds affirmatively to both these interrogations and maintains that this study is a confirmation of the completeness and relevancy of these four variables in evaluating a political system or, as in this use, the processes of social and political change.

The other conceptions represent clear and logical theory: "the need to describe what it is that lies outside a system"; "the view of political life as a system of activity which is maintained by inputs of demands and support that are converted into outputs by the political system"; the conceptualization of the different types

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[5]See footnotes "5" through "10" on pages 16-19.

of sociological structures that are possible at various stages of industrialization; and the importance of viewing "changes in class, power, occupation, and prestige" when studying the structures and processes of sociopolitical change.

The evaluative criteria of the model all conform to substantive realities. It is not logical to study sociopolitical change from within structural society or the political system and to ignore the vast range of factors which comprise "the total environment." This study has looked at the various components of the total environment and has identified some of the more politically relevant developments. The model separates the social classes, the political-group interests, and the governing interests into different "funnels" through which flow "pressures" and "stabilizers" into "the political system." The evaluative criteria say that "in viewing social-group interests, it is relevant to know the percentages of individuals who show marginal, mass, or elite patterns"; "in viewing political-group interests, it is relevant to know the numbers and kinds of influence groups that are 'interest groups,' 'pressure groups,' and 'tension groups'"; "in viewing governing interests, it is relevant to know the relative command of each governing force: national, provincial, and municipal."

It is concluded that the evaluative criteria, like the model itself, represent actual realities and are useful in predicting roughly the rates and intensity at which a political system will be pressured or relieved of pressure. However, these criteria are very general in their nature and refer solely to structures and not to processes. It

is recognized that it would be well to develop the structural parts of the model more fully and specifically and to distinguish different types of groups within each of the groups already noted. With more careful classification this can be done. Perhaps, it is even possible to designate mathematical values for the six parts of the visual model and to come up with an equation that will summarize all the past historical developments in each of the variables of a political system and its related environment. The summary equation of the historical developments can then be put over the present or predicted developments in the same basic six variables and the resulting value will yield the sociopolitical change that will occur in the region for which data is being manipulated.[6] But this step of quantifying the elements in the model of sociopolitical change needs considerable study in order to identify and classify all the important variables.

The Complementary Methodology

The complementary measures that were employed in this study are explained rather fully in Chapter II, pages 23-33. It would now be well to review each of these measures as tested in practice with a view toward improving them for future use.

Socioeconomic Status

In practice only four criteria were used to measure the socioeconomic status of respondents: occupation and education of subject,

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[6]In simplest form this equation is change (C) is derived from taking the sum of the relevant political factors through historical time (N) over the recent developments in the total environment and political system (n-1); that is, $C = \frac{N}{n-1}$

or husband of the subject, in the case of female interviewees, and occupation and education of the father of the subject. The typology and indicators for each of these criteria is given in pages 24 and 25. While these four indicators have proved quite satisfactory in measuring socioeconomic status, they are nonetheless objective ones. It is proposed that a second dimension be added to the measurement of socioeconomic status, namely, a subjective dimension. The subjective indicators are ones that have been used by Kalman H. Silvert and are elaborated by Gino Germani.[7]

It is suggested, then, that after the subject has responded on the previous indicators of occupation and education of himself and his father, he be requested to view nine situations to which a person may belong. He will mark just one of them. The first set of three choices are oriented toward an economic conceptualizations: the wealthy, the medium, and the humble; the second set toward a scale of "prestige": upper class, middle class, and popular class; and the third set toward certain ideological connotations: grand bourgeoisie or aristocracy, bourgeoisie, and proletariat. The preference of the subject for one or another of the nine alternatives provides the possibility of measuring for different aspects of self-affiliation and for comparison and correlation with the objective factors of socioeconomic status.

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[7]Gino Germani, Clase social subjetiva e indicadores objetivos de estratificación ("Investigaciones y Trabajos del Instituto de Sociología, Colección Datos: No. 3"; Buenos Aires: Instituto de Sociología, Universidad de Buenos Aires, 1963), p. 5.

Anomie

The translated revision of Mizruchi's version of Srole's "anomia" scale[8] has proved to be particularly well adapted to Argentina and no doubt would be to other Latin American countries. Subjects from all levels of society appear to have understood clearly all the items on the scale and to have given valid responses to each of the items. Items 4 (there can never be any solution to the economic difficulties which engulf this country) and 5 (man does not wish for there to be so much misery in the world, but God allows it in order to punish man), which are innovations of the researcher, are ones which attract affirmative responses almost exclusively from lower class subjects and lower middle class subjects who are of a similar attitude set. Not only then is this adapted version of the "anomia" scale applicable to Argentine social classes in general, but to the lower classes of Argentina in particular. And the scale seems to measure in fact what it claims to measure: a person's sense of powerlessness, normlessness, and isolation.

Political Alienation

The scale developed by Basil G. Zimmer for measuring local political alienation in Nashville, Tennessee, was adapted for use in this study.[9] Items, 1, 2, and 3 are more or less understood by subjects, and the subjects in this study appear to have responded fairly well to these three items. But, items 4 (the political parties interfere too much in the affairs of the public administration of this and other cities) and

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[8]See pages 26-27 and Appendix B, pages 325-326.

[9]See pages 27-28 and Appendix B, pages 323-325.

5 (only the national government is capable of finishing projects for the people of a particular neighborhood) have been poorly understood and do not seem relevant at all for use in Argentina. Most of the subjects, particularly from the lower class, are so negatively conditioned, so far as political parties are concerned, that it seems to have caused some distortion in their responses. It was not too infrequently that a subject, upon hearing item 4, would reply: "Yes, that's right! The political parties interfere too much in everything."

On item 5, it seemed that in many instances the subjects failed to understand the intent of the statement. "Yes," would be the reply, "the national government is capable of completing its projects." To get around this obvious misunderstanding, the researcher would draw a hypothetical mental picture for the subjects. Thus, he would say: "Now, let's suppose you want to have a bridge built in this neighborhood. Which government would best be able to build this bridge for you, the national government, the provincial government, or the local municipal government?" Most of the respondents, even after this attempted simplification, failed to understand the problem and some of the responses were quite interesting. For example: "But we've already got a bridge." "I don't know which government. I'll have to wait and see which one gets here first. The one that gets here first will be the one that builds it." "It would take all three governments and a lot of prayers--and about ten years to build the bridge."

Alienation from work. Apart from being misunderstood on its last two items, the Zimmer political alienation scale focuses the entire blame

on the local public administration (as well it should, since that is its purpose). Even with five other nonrelated items interspersed between the Zimmer items, it is felt that the respondent acquires a fixed disposition or response pattern and that all his alienation from life in general and from government in particular tends to group around a scapegoat: the local municipality and public officials. This effect has suggested a new approach in the measurement of political attitudes in which subjects can choose among several specified scapegoats. In summation, it is suggested that the Zimmer scale be condensed into one item on the new measure of political attitudes and that a different scale, covering another aspect of alienation, be adopted.

An acceptable and relevant measure for such purpose, it is theorized, is the Leonard I. Pearlin alienation-from-work scale, as used by Louis A. Zurcher et. al.[10] This particular scale, which is a four-item one, should "involve more than powerlessness that people experience"; it should "also capture an overtone of resentment at being deprived by outside forces of greater control over one's own work."[11]

1. How often do you do things in your work that you wouldn't do if it were up to you (never, once in a while, fairly often, very often)?

2. Around here it's not important how much you know, it's who you know that really counts (agree, disagree)?

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[10] Louis A. Zurcher, Jr.; Arnold Meadows; and Susan Lee Zurcher, "Value Orientation, Role Conflict and Alienation from Work: A Cross-Cultural Study," American Sociological Review, XXX (August, 1965), pp. 539-548.

[11] Leonard I. Pearlin, "Alienation from Work: A Study of Nursing Personnel," American Sociological Review, XXIX (June, 1962), pp. 314-326, especially 315.

3. How much influence do people like you have on the way the hospital is run (a lot, some, very little, none)?

4. How often do you tell your superior your own ideas about things you might do in your work (never, once in a while, fairly often, very often)?

The translated revision of these items[12] is as follows:

1. ¿Con cuánta frecuencia desempeña usted deberes en su trabajo que no haría si fuera usted su propio jefe (nunca, de vez en cuando, algo frecuentemente, muy frequentemente)?

2. No importa que yo sea muy hábil en mi trabajo, lo que vale más es ser muy amigo de todos mis jefes (estoy de acuerdo, no concuerdo).

3. ¿Cuánta influencia tiene un (obrero) (empleado) como usted sobre cómo se hacen las cosas en el trabajo (mucha, alguna, poca, ninguna)?

4. ¿Con cuanta frecuencia divulga usted a su jefe sus propias ideas sobre cómo se debe hacer las cosas en su trabajo (nunca, de vez en cuando, algo frecuentemente, muy frecuentemente)?

Two additional items will follow the Pearlin scale, measuring the degree of satisfaction of a worker with his present position and his plans to continue. The items were used and validated in a cross-cultural study which also employed the Pearlin scale.[13] In this study, the items were:

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[12]Translated more or less literally: 1) How often do you perform tasks in your work that you wouldn't do if you were your own boss (never, once in a while, fairly often, very often)? 2) If doesn't matter that I may be skillful in my job, it is of greater value to be very friendly with all my superiors (agree, disagree); 3) How much influence does a (worker) (employe) have upon the way things are done at work (much, some, little, none)?; 4) How often do you divulge to your boss your own ideas about how things should be done at work (never, once in a while, fairly often, very often)?

[13]Zurcher, Jr.; Meadows; and Zurcher, op. cit., p. 543.

1. Do you plan to continue your present job for the rest of your working career (yes, no)?

2. Is your satisfaction with the present position you hold above average, average, or below average?

These two items are translated and revised[14] as follow:

1. ¿Piensa usted seguir en su empleo u oficio actual hasta que se jubile (sí o no)?

2. ¿Hasta qué grado está satisfecho con su empleo u oficio actual (satisfecho, indiferente, o insatisfecho)?

Social Participation

The constructed measures of the frequency of participation in certain informal groups, formal group membership, and formal group attendance[15] have proved quite satisfactory in measuring the social participation of the inhabitants of Argentina's "urban Litoral" region. In future interviews to measure social participation, however, it is recommended that not only should the measures of social participation used in this study be retained but that other measures should be added to lend more precision to the measurement of social participation.

The proposed additions are of the types elaborated by Albert Meister, Susana Petruzzi, and Elda Sonzogni in their sociological study in the Santa María Valley of Argentina and by Theodore Caplow, Sheldon Stryker, and Samuel E. Wallace in their sociological study in San Juan, Puerto Rico. Relevant parts of the interview schedules used in both

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[14]Translated: 1) Do you intend to continue in your present job or position (yes or no)?; 2) To what extent are you satisfied with your present job or position (satisfied, indifferent, or dissatisfied)?

[15]See pages 28 to 31 and Appendix B, pages 322-323.

these studies are now presented in English. The original Spanish version used in the study of Caplow, Stryker, and Wallace does not appear in their book.

Social Participation and Recreation[16]

1. Are parties held in the neighborhood?

2. What kind of parties are they?

3. Where are they held?

4. Who organizes them?

5. Do you attend them?
   a. If "yes," who else attends?
   b. If "no," why don't you attend?

6. Do you have parties and meetings in your home?
   a. If "yes," who do you invite (name, occupation, address)?

7. When do you hold these parties and meetings?

8. And if you were to hold a big party in your home, who would you like to invite?

9. Do any of these persons you'd invite to your party throw parties also?

10. Do you attend them?

11. Who are your three best friends (name, occupation, address)?

12. Are your neighbors also counted among your friends?

13. When would you say that a person is a good neighbor?

14. And, do you go to parties in other neighborhoods?
    a. If "yes," why?
    b. Where are these parties held?
    c. For what purposes are they held?

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[16]From Miester, Petruzzi, and Sonzogni, op. cit., pp. 102-103.

15. Do you visit the Church or go to Church meetings?

16. To what associations do you belong (organization, attendance, and positions)?

Questions Related to Social Participation[17]

1. Who are your three best friends among your neighbors?
   a._____ b._____ c._____

2. Which three of your relatives have you seen most frequently during the last month? What is your relation to each person? How frequently have you seen each person during the last month?

   Name:
   Address:
   Relation:
   Scale Value:

3. Do you work outside your home? (If yes, continue; if no, go on to the following series) Yes_____ No_____

4. Who are your three closest associates at work? How frequently do you lunch together with each of these persons? Do you drink coffee or go to any work related activities together? What position does that person have at your place of employment?

   Name:
   Address:
   Relation:
   Scale Value:

5. Of those persons with whom you go out and visit, etc., who are the three you have seen most frequently during the last month? Aside from being your friends, do you have any other relationship with them? (Relatives, work associates, etc.) How frequently have you visited them during the last month?

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[17]From Theodore Caplow, Sheldon Stryker, and Samuel E. Wallace, The Urban Ambience: A Study of San Juan, Puerto Rico (Totowa, New Jersey: The Bedminster Press, 1964), pp. 235-236.

Name:
Address:
Relation:
Scale Value:

6. Do you have any relatives or neighbors working in the same place where you work? Yes_____ No_____

7. Now I would like to ask you about your relationship to your husband's relatives, work associates, and recreational friends. Of your husband's relatives which three has he seen most often during the last month? What relationship are they to him? How often have you seen them?

   Name:
   Address:
   Relation:
   Scale Value:

8. Would you be able to tell me which three persons are your husband's closest work associates? What positions do these persons have at his place of employment? How often have you seen each of them during the last month?

   Name:
   Address:
   Relation:
   Scale Value:

9. Are your husband's three closest recreational friends the same ones as yours? Yes_____ No_____ Some_____
   (If "no" or "some" continue to next question.)

10. Of your husband's recreational friends, which three has he seen most often during the last month?

    Name:
    Address:
    Relation:
    Scale Value:

11. Do you believe that this neighborhood is a good place to live? Why or why not? _____
    _____

12. Do you intend to stay here permanently? Yes_____ No_____ If not, to what part of the city do you intend to move? _____

Political Attitudes

The Semantic Differential measurement, based on the format developed by Kenneth F. Johnson, proved to be highly applicable to the Argentine socioeconomic groups on whom it was tested. That is, the subjects who responded to the questionnaire appeared to understand nearly all the items and the factors on which their ratings were based. In light of the experience of the researcher in administering this test to Argentine subjects, several changes in the original format are proposed.

First, it is recommended that the force, activity, and evaluation scales each have five instead of four positions. Subjects of very low socioeconomic status and very little formal schooling not only understood quite clearly this test and what it requires but they objected to having just four positions (for example: very strong, somewhat strong, not very strong, weak) and told the researcher that they wanted to rate particular items at a position which they called término intermedio (middle point). Thus, a fifth position was added, which was the midway point between the extremes of each factor.

Second, while three of the original Johnson items (the aprismo of Perú, the FALN of Venezuela, and the National Front of Colombia) were undoubtedly well known by conservative Guatemalan subjects, most Argentine subjects were totally unfamiliar with these political movements. Thus, it is suggested that these particular international items, as with the various national groups and movements, can be changed to suit the locality and the political knowledge of the native inhabitants.

In the case of Argentine socioeconomic groups, it is proposed that three foreign governments be substituted for the more unfamiliar Latin American political movements. The three governments are Italy, Spain, and Great Britain. It would be particularly interesting to obtain ratings on these three governments. Also, other governments and entities could be added to the list: the European Economic Community, the government of West Germany, the government of Japan, the government of Israel, the government of the United Arab Republic, the government of Brazil, the government of Chile, the government of Uruguay, the government of Paraguay, and the government of Bolivia.

Conclusions Concerning Sociopolitical Change

It is the purpose of this final part of the chapter to note the elements of persistence and change in the society and political spheres of the "urban Litoral" of Argentina.

Elements of Persistence

It is predicted that the following elements will not change appreciably within the next decade, thereby continuing to support or to pressure Argentine society and politics as they have done during the period of this study.

High level of social development, communications development, and educational development. Argentines will continue to be avid readers, viewers, sports fans, and movie goers. Despite the resignations of many key university professors, Argentine universities and all national public schools should continue to provide the inhabitants of the "urban

Litoral" with an educational opportunity superior to other Latin American countries. Argentine society will also continue as a highly pluralistic one, characterized by numerous roles and by a large and varied number of organizations.[18]

Concentration of population in the "urban Litoral." The Litoral provinces contain 61.8 per cent of the total population of Argentina and have the highest numbers of inhabitants per square kilometer. It is predicted that this percentage and ratio will stay about the same during the next decade, being aided somewhat by the increasing numbers of Paraguayans, Bolivians, and Argentines from rural regions who migrate to the four urban centers selected in this study.[19]

Unrealized productive potential. The "urban Litoral" has a vast productive potential in both industry and agriculture which is not being realized. That industrial and agricultural productivity in this region is stagnated, is one economic reality that specially affects the future of Argentina. Presently, the agrarian sector is pressuring for and obtaining long-needed improvements and technological developments, although it is argued by many "nationalists" that by improving its agricultural production Argentina will become the world's food supplier and its industrial growth will be retarded. While the productive potential of Argentina is admittedly great, the obstacles to achieving this potential remain so difficult to overcome immediately that Argentina will probably not realize its fullest productive potential for some time yet to come.[20]

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[18]Support for this contention can be found on pages 72-75, 187-194.

[19]See pages 56-61, 64-65, 100-102, 233, 248.

[20]See pages 43-47, 49-50, 54-56, 79-82, 165-168, 220-222, 227-229, 244-245.

Pressing urban problems. The strides that are being made by the national and municipal governments in Argentina in eliminating the housing deficit and other urban problems will continue to be offset by migrations of generally less educated, less skilled, and less healthy persons from the neighboring countries into Argentina. Unemployment will remain fairly high (between 5 and 8 per cent) as it has in the past, but should never exceed 10 per cent. Municipal governments will continue to have difficulty in providing all urban residents with the necessary health, medical, police, fire, and other public services, such as transportation, gas, running water, electricity, etc.[21]

Personalism, individualism, and friendship in politics. The patterns of personalism and individualism and "the cult of friendship" are well established in Argentine political culture and should affect national politics for some time. Personalism will continue to dominate the institutions, and the Argentine will ever be an individual rather than a citizen. These cultural peculiarities present a political climate that is more conducive to caudillismo and personalistic leadership than to democracy and democratic institutions.[22]

Low wages and high cost of living. The salary of the workers is expected neither to improve nor to worsen during the next decade. It is predicted that the percentage of the total economic remuneration received by dependent workers will stay at about 41 per cent because of competition from skilled workers and technicians who are more in

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[21]See pages 58-59, 64-65, 100-102, 164-165, 171, 176-177, 233.

[22]See pages 67-70, 149-151, 223-226.

demand. The pressure exerted by organized labor and the social conscience of government leaders, however, should keep the remuneration to the workers from falling below its present level. The level of prices will rise for the next five years at about the same rate as during the past ten years. Any economic measures that have been or will be taken shortly should not have much immediate effect in halting the inflationary trend. But the long-run prospects are favorable. It is proposed that the present rising cost of living in Argentina will be entirely checked when the "urban Litoral" becomes the world's foremost agricultural export center at the same time that a thriving native industry exists.[23]

Capitalist orientation of the economy. To the dismay of many nationalist elements the economic powers will retain full sway in Argentina for many years yet. The Argentine capitalists and foreign investors are well organized and own the national productive capability. The government policies and programs that were inaugurated during this study have given additional strength to the economic powers, strength which cannot be easily taken away.[24]

The university: a political battleground. No amount of government studies and decrees can put an end to political activity within the Argentine universities. Law 16,912 has only served to increase student insistence upon university autonomy and to inspire the opposition of students and student groups to whatever measures threaten their autonomy. The national heritage of freedom and individualism is so much identified with the right of students to engage in political

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[23]See pages 97-100, 164-168.

[24]See pages 110, 123-127, 146-147, 159-160, 166-168, 175, 228, 239, 248, 260-273.

activity in the universities and to have a respected voice in the administration of their universities that no political regime will ever eradicate the tradition of student autonomy and control.[25]

On the other hand, the national government and other elements, such as the economic powers (ACIEL and CGE) and certain political conservatives and professionals, wish to see the universities "cleaned-up" and made centers of learning rather than "hot-beds" of political action and violence. The attempt by the new government to straighten out the universities and to reduce their political role touched off more violence and activity than it was able to suppress or discourage. But it appears that the new government, as well as all succeeding ones, will try to reform the universities. Such attempts will ensure that the universities remain political battlegrounds in which any opposition to government policy can be dramatically manifested.[26]

Disaffection of the middle class. The middle class, more than any other social class, demonstrates an active disaffection and dissatisfaction with national life. Unlike the lower class which is quite isolated and void of hope and norms, the middle class feels that its efforts can alter the disagreeable aspects of national life and that it can achieve a greater share of the national wealth. It is quite likely that the middle class will stay disaffected for some time and will be a continuous pressure on the political regimes to enact policies and take measures that will improve its economic and social position.[27]

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[25]See pages 117-118, 120, 128-133, 174-175, 240-243, 278, 280.

[26]See pages 128-129, 130-133, 174-175, 275, 278-280.

[27]See pages 98-100, 155-157, 164-165, 237-238.

Rising expectations. The revolution of "rising expectations" will not be put down in this or the next decade in the "urban Litoral" of Argentina. The system authorities will have to satisfy demands that proceed from all sectors of society and the economy for reducing national deficits and promoting rapid economic growth.[28]

Resentment toward foreign economic interests. Perhaps the most persistent element throughout the national history of Argentina is the national resentment against any and all economic intrusion from abroad. "Argentina for the Argentines" is the motto which guides Argentine thinking in its dealings with foreign economic interests. The presence of Russian fishing vessels off Argentina's southern coast in November of 1966 was resented just as much as were the foreign oil contracts which the Frondizi government negotiated in 1958, as is the continued reign of Great Britain over the Falkland Islands, and as is the ceding of a third weekly flight to Braniff International airlines in November of 1966.[29]

Unrealism and distorted images concerning the greatness of Argentina. Since the psychological state of an individual is quite difficult to change, it seems reasonable to assume in this case that Argentines will maintain their same vice or virtue of looking at life as they would either like it or not like it to be instead of as it really is. In light of this same proclivity, it can also be assumed that Argentines will go on viewing their country as being one of the greatest and richest in all Latin America and in the entire world.

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[28]See pages 96-98, 232, 235-236.

[29]See pages 126-129, 168-170, 173-175, 225, 227-228, 239-280.

This image of Argentina as a great economic power has persisted through twenty years of inflation and deficit budgets and should continue indefinitely into the future until the time when Argentina may very well be every bit as economically great as it is now believed to be.[30]

Deficit government spending and missed retirement payments. The government programs for public works and the modernization of transportation and port facilities will practically guarantee that deficit budgets continue and retirement checks will persist in being irregularly received, although their real value is being continuously diminished by the rising cost of living.[31]

Elements of Change

The following elements either have changed significantly within the period of this study (June 28-December 14, 1966) or show indication of changing within this decade.

More "Indianism" in the national population. With respect to the ethnic composition of the population of Argentina, noticeable changes are already in progress. With migration from Europe all but stopped, with many skilled workers and technicians migrating to the more developed countries, and with large numbers of Paraguayans, Bolivians, and Chileans entering the country, the national population of Argentina is rapidly losing its European character and becoming more "Indian." This ethnic transition is indicative of increasing illiteracy, unemployment, and

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[30]See pages 220-222.

[31]See pages 114, 129, 143-148.

other demographic and economic problems of a social nature, since those persons who migrate from the bordering countries, as already noted, are generally less educated, less skilled, and less healthy than are the Argentines.[32]

New political forces. With the termination of the "old" politics, it is predicted that the former political parties will not emerge again as they were before June 28, 1966. The more time that transpires between the date on which the political parties were deposed and the earliest date at which the political parties are allowed to function once more, the more certain is the prediction that the political parties will not continue in their previous forms. During this study, many of the national political leaders were contemplating and discussing the prospect of forming new fronts and coalitions.[33]

Development of the provinces and outer regions. The construction of the hydroelectric complex, Chocón-Cerros Colorados, and the extraction of iron ore from the Sierra Grande site were planned at least as early as 1958, at the beginning of the Frondizi administration. But the greatest impetus given to such projects and developmental schemes was during the latter part of 1966. These two projects, plus the proposed Salto Grande hydroelectric plant, the highway and tunnel projects in Santa Fe province, the renovation of various national ports, and the increasing federal support of such projects--all these developments point toward greater economic growth in the areas which are affected.

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[32]See pages 64-66, 100-102, 233.

[33]See pages 117, 119, 130-131, 360-361, 172-173, 238-239, 249-251.

The upper "urban Litoral," Santa Fe and Paraná, particularly, will enjoy a higher level of economic activity once the Paraná-Santa Fe Underground Tunnel is completed; and then, this increased prosperity, it is predicted, will considerably decrease the flow of in-migrants from these two cities into Rosario and Buenos Aires. Partly contingent upon how extensive is the renovation work of its port facilities, Rosario should also begin to enjoy a higher rate of economic development.[34]

A new political creed: dedication to development. The revolution of 1966 most definitely put an end to the old politics. In the future it will not be possible for the governing authorities to turn back to old and discredited solutions or to follow the formulas of old and discredited leaders. No matter what changes may occur, or whatever new regime may come into power, no government nor any series of national programs can deny the basic aim of the new government: to modernize and promote the development of Argentina.[35]

Increasing political maturity. Argentine citizens are increasing in political maturity, as was evidenced after the military coup of June 28, 1966. None of the major blocs of power or influence would accept any paternalism in exchange for unconditionally supporting the government. The new government was judged solely on the basis of its performance in resolving national problems. It was neither blindly supported

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[34]See pages 135, 141-144, 148-153, 235, 238, 246-248.

[35]See pages 144-149, 170-171, 233-236, 260-266, 271-275.

nor blindly opposed by the majority of the citizens, and the support of or opposition to the government did not come until after it clarified its position. But there were other manifestations of political maturity, too: relatively little violence, organized and controlled opposition, and more consideration of the "national good" or "general welfare."[36]

Slow-down in the rural-urban trend. With the urban population of Argentina at nearly 75 per cent of the total national population, it is predicted that the rural-urban trend will slow down gradually in this and the next decade, especially if agriculture continues to be promoted as it was in the last half of 1966.[37]

Increasing international ties. While the long-existent, chronic resentment toward foreign powers and enterprises still lurks menacingly in the background of contemporary events and negotiations, the new government is nonetheless courting the international monetary organisms to obtain funds for meeting housing needs and for offsetting preliminary money losses caused by devaluation of the national currency. The government is also seeking to induce more inflow of foreign capital by erecting a more favorable climate for investment. The Argentine government is not likely to turn its back on foreign investment and development of the national economy however strongly the nationalists may oppose foreign economic ties.[38]

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[36]See pages 200-206, 251.

[37]See pages 59-61, 70-72.

[38]See pages 111, 227-229, 232, 236, 239, 248, 262-265.

Increasing emphasis on agriculture. Complacency in agricultural production has lulled Argentina into more than a quarter century of low productivity and declining per-capita exports. But during the time of this study official policy pledged government support in modernizing and improving the facilities and productivity of the agrarian sector. The official policy was backed up by much private determination to increase harvests and reconquer world markets.[39]

Final Statement

By and large the Argentine academicians and scholars appear to be well informed on the problems of their own country and it is not likely that Latin Americanists from other countries can uncover any areas of social science research that have not already been investigated with much sophistication by native researchers. Therefore, this study has no illusions of competing with the more exhaustive studies performed by Argentine researchers, such as the ones cited in the bibliography. In fact, one of the most significant contributions that this study makes, in the mind of the researcher, is to publicize the existence and content of native material. Because of this basically Argentine orientation in researching the problem of sociopolitical change in the "urban Litoral" of Argentina, very few of the works on Argentina by North Americans appear in the text or bibliography. While a large number of North American sources are cited in the chapter on methodology, these sources could have been supplanted by Argentine studies, except in the instance of some of the measurements.

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[39]See pages 244-245, 253, 262-264.

However, it has been more the purpose of this study to develop general methods that can be further perfected not only for use in Argentina but in other Latin American countries as well. It is felt that in the main the study achieves this objective. A visual structure for analysis and a number of measurements have been developed and tested. The preceding chapters of this study constitute the application of this structure and these measurements.

As for the special focus on the "urban Litoral" of Argentina, admittedly too much data exists to be assimilated and condensed into a single study. Nevertheless, this study represents an attempt to do this very thing. Whether or not it has succeeded in its intent, is left to the judgment of its readers and critics. But the results of the study are in nowise comprehensive nor conclusive. In the opinion of the researcher there still exists the need for additional research and experimentation. In future studies of this type it would be well to improve the judgment tests that are used, to increase the size of the sample, and to give quantitative values to the visual elements in the model.

APPENDIX A

A TOPICAL OUTLINE OF THE COMPONENTS OF "THE TOTAL ENVIRONMENT"

A. Ecological Components
   1. Physical characteristics and natural resources
      a. geographical space--size and extent of territory
      b. topography; salient geographic features
      c. climate
      d. supply of basic raw materials
      e. nature and accessibility of flora and fauna
   2. Use and characteristics of land
   3. Physical planning
      a. location of markets and business centers
      b. residential location and growth
      c. transportation and communication networks
      d. planning and physical expansion

B. Historical Evolutionary Components
   1. Founding and early growth
   2. Municipal development
      a. legal precedents
      b. administrations
      c. establishment and growth of basic services
   3. Economic development
      a. transportation
      b. communications
      c. commerce
      d. finance
   4. Industrial development
      a. light industry growth
      b. heavy industry
      c. workers
      d. industrial organizations
   5. Social development
      a. demographic growth
      b. emergence and growth of classes
      c. activities and organizations
   6. Cultural development
      a. theaters, parks, and public places
      b. organizations
      c. promoters and creators
   7. Political development
      a. ideologies
      b. parties
      c. personalities

C. Ethnic-Demographical Components
   1. Total population
      a. recent and expected growth
   2. Distribution of population
      a. rural-urban trends
      b. economic distribution
   3. Composition of population
      a. sex and age groups
      b. ethnic groups and nationalities
   4. Mobility of population
      a. emigrations
      b. in-migrations
      c. immigrations
   5. Characteristics of the population
      a. economic activity; the "economically active"
      b. occupational distribution
      c. literacy

D. Psychological-Cultural Components
   1. The "Argentine man"
      a. heritage of chaos
      b. aggressive nature
      c. conceptions of sex and love
      d. nationalism
      e. cult of friendliness
      f. quest for liberation
   2. The "Argentine woman"
      a. types of women
      b. types of female activity
      c. myths of femininity
      d. institutions and roles
      e. conceptions of sex and love
   3. The Argentine mentalities
      a. the paternalistic oligarchy
      b. the <u>picaresque porteño</u>
      c. the <u>gaucho</u>
      d. the <u>gringo</u>
   4. The cultural heritages
      a. Indianism
      b. Europeanism
      c. Capitalism and imperialism
   5. New currents
      a. lunfardo and "la Boca"
      b. the <u>viveza criolla</u>
      c. the <u>vivo</u> and the <u>pícaro</u>
      d. the <u>cachada</u>

E. Socio-urban Components
   1. Social stratification and relations
   2. Mores, norms, and values
   3. Dimension and composition of the family
   4. Education
      a. number of students--ages and grades
      b. number and kinds of schools
      c. teachers and education of teachers
      d. per cent and causes of absenteeism
   5. Housing--number and condition of dwellings
   6. Cost of living, level of prices and wages
   7. Organizations
      a. mutual benefit associations
      b. business concerns
      c. service organizations
      d. common weal organizations
   8. Mass communications and society
   9. Religious institutions and practices
   10. The sociology of migrations
   11. The phenomenon of urbanization
      a. statistical dimensions
      b. the "high-primacy" pattern
      c. the "push" - "pull" factor
      d. provision of services
      e. unemployment
      f. the villas de emergencia
      g. delinquency
   12. Health and medical care

F. Political-Legal Components
   1. The constitution
      a. the May Revolution: antecedents, developments
      b. first attempts (1810-1820)
      c. the Constitution of 1819
      d. " " " 1826
      e. " " " 1853
      f. reforms of 1866, 1898, and 1957
   2. The form of government
      a. representation
      b. article 22
      c. the Republic
      d. articles 29 and 95
   3. The federal organization of Argentina
      a. concept and history of federalism
      b. the provinces: autonomy and powers
      c. federal intervention
      d. municipal administration
   4. Financial administration of the state
      a. taxes
      b. customs
      c. general accounting

5. Civil rights and individual freedoms
6. National defense and the armed forces
7. The legislative power
   a. the Senate
   b. the Chamber of Deputies
8. The judiciary
9. The executive power
   a. election of President
   b. duties of President
   c. scope of executive authority
10. Public administration
   a. codification of administrative law
   b. the administrative acts
   c. the concept of public utility and state enterprises
   d. employes and civil servants
   e. public services
   f. administrative contracts
   g. the police power of the state
   h. administration and justice

G. Food Supply and Consumption
1. Urban centers and regions of supply
2. Regional production and its value
3. Transportation to and distribution in urban centers
   a. truck routes
   b. railroad routes
   c. water routes

H. Economic Components
1. Basic economic structure
   a. the basic system--configurations and párameters
   b. communications and transportation
   c. sources of employment
   d. socially derived problems
      1. unemployment
      2. property
      3. migrations
2. Industrial sector
   a. number and type of establishments
   b. domestic and foreign production
   c. raw materials
   d. working force
   e. industrial communications and transportation
3. Commerce and Services
   a. markets' value of commercializations
   b. wholesale and retail organisms
   c. business enterprises
   d. costs of production and marketing

4. Construction sector
   a. cost of construction
   b. price of building materials
   c. building permits granted
   d. certificates of completion
5. Finances and investment
   a. in the public sector
   b. in the private sector
   c. evolution of deposits and credits
   d. capacity of financing
   e. interregional routes and sources
6. Agrarian sector
   a. inventory of production
   b. division of the land
   c. technological development
   d. organizations

APPENDIX B

ENCUESTA ENTRE CIUDADANOS EN LA ZONA
DEL RIO DE LA PLATA

Estimado ciudadano:

Con el objeto de conocer la opinión colectiva de la gente con quién se vinculan para entrevistar, el Sr. Paul Hoopes y sus colaboradores efectúan una encuesta académica de índole político y social entre los ciudadanos que viven en la región del río de la Plata. Sería de nuestro agrado que usted participara en este proyecto. Sus contestaciones y opiniones serán tratadas en forma completamente confidencial.

Parte uno: data personal

1. ¿En qué lugar nació usted? _____

2. ¿Dónde nacieron sus padres? _____

3. ¿Qué clase de trabajo hizo su padre durante la mayor parte de su vida? _____

4. ¿Tuvo la oportunidad su padre de asistir a alguna escuela? ¿Hasta qué grado llegó él? _____

5. ¿En qué ciudades o regiones ha vivido usted?_____

6. ¿Donde nacieron sus hijos y espos(o) (a)? _____
_____

7. ¿En qué escuelas se educó usted? _____
¿Hasta qué grado cursó? _____

8. ¿En qué trabaja usted actualmente? _____
¿Qué ocupación le gustaría tener si se le facilitaran los medios para lograrla? _____

9. ¿Cuales son las trabas que más impiden que usted no disfrute tanto de la vida económica y social? _____
_____

Parte dos: información social

1. ¿Cuántas veces visita usted a sus parientes?

____dos veces por semana como mínimo
____una vez por semana
____menos frecuentemente
____nunca

2. ¿a sus amigos?

____dos veces por semana como mínimo
____una vez por semana
____menos frecuentemente
____nunca

3. ¿a sus vecinos? sin considerar los encuentros ocasionales

____dos veces por semana como mínimo
____una vez por semana
____menos frecuentemente
____nunca

4. ¿a sus compañeros del trabajo? fuera del trabajo

____dos veces por semana como mínimo
____una vez por semana
____menos frecuentemente
____nunca

5. ¿Pertenece usted a algún club, organización cívica, social, profesional u otra clase de organización?_____

	nro de veces que concurre a ella
una_____	_____
dos_____	_____
tres_____	_____
cuatro_____	_____
cinco_____	_____

(a) más de una vez por semana (b) una vez por semana
(c) dos o tres veces por mes (d) una vez por mes
(e) algunas veces al año (f) una vez al año (g) nunca
(h) no puedo decir

Parte tres: opiniones sobre la vida urbana

En este parte se ruega que usted nos indique hasta qué grado esté de acuerdo con las siguientes oraciones. Las contestaciones son las siguientes:

A. Estoy muy de acuerdo_____
B. Estoy algo de acuerdo_____
C. No tengo opinión_____
D. Estoy en desacuerdo_____
E. Estoy completamente en desacuerdo_____

A._____
B._____
C._____ 1. Se ha dicho que los padres de carácter débil crían a hijos
D._____ que tienen mayor posibilidad de ser delincuentes.
E._____

A._____
B._____
C._____ 2. La administración de esta municipalidad no se interesa
D._____ en nuestros barrios.
E._____

A._____
B._____ 3. Es la gente de los barrios que falla en no comunicarse
C._____ con los funcionarios públicos para ponerles al tanto
D._____ de las cosas que necesita.
E._____

A._____
B._____
C._____ 4. El gobierno de esta ciudad tiene la culpa por los
D._____ problemas económicos y sociales de nuestras vidas.
E._____

A._____
B._____
C._____ 5. El vicioso se perjudica a sí mismo y nadie tiene la
D._____ de que los hijos deb borracho caminen descalzos.
E._____

A._____
B._____ 6. Los funcionarios públicos son sordos y no nos hacen caso
C._____ cuando nos dirigimos a ellos con un problema público,
D._____ como la falta de pavimentación de algunas calles.
E._____

A._____
B._____ 7. Nunca hubo un verdadero partido liberal ni un verdadero
C._____ partido conservador, sino tres grandes divisiones: los
D._____ gobernantes, los conspiradores y los indiferentes.
E._____

A.____
B.____ 8. Los partidos políticos se meten demasiado en los asuntos
C.____ que corresponden a la administración pública de ésta
D.____ y otras ciudades.
E.____

A.____
B.____
C.____ 9. Los jefes de fábricas que hacen armamentos fomentan
D.____ las guerras para su propia ventaja.
E.____

A.____
B.____
C.____ 10. Unicamente el gobierno nacional es capaz de cumplir
D.____ con proyectos para la gente de los barrios particulares.
E.____

Parte cuatro: opiniones sobre la vida en general

A.____
B.____
C.____ 1. No se debe prohibir de que los maestros de escuela
D.____ ocupen puestos en el gobierno nacional.
E.____

A.____
B.____
C.____ 2. La mayoría de la gente se interesa poco en ayudar a su
D.____ prójimo.
E.____

A.____
B.____
C.____ 3. La falta de trabajo en este país se debe mayormente a
D.____ los empresarios que quieren dominar la política.
E.____

A.____
B.____
C.____ 4. En los tiempos actuales no se cuenta con personas
D.____ dispuestas a ayudar--no hay persona que no le falle.
E.____

A.____
B.____
C.____ 5. Los mayores de edad exageran el grado a que ha llegado
D.____ la delincuencia de menores.
E.____

A.____
B.____ 6. Dadas las condiciones actuales de vida, no es posible
C.____ que proyectemos para el futuro; se tiene que vivir
D.____ solamente para hoy y dejar el mañana para mañana.
E.____

A.____
B.____
C.____ 7. Con respecto a la política, los estudiantes universitarios
D.____ suelen ser fanáticos y dogmáticos.
E.____

A.____
B.____
C.____ 8. Nunca habra solución de las dificultades económicas de
D.____ que se ve rodeado este país.
E.____

A.____
B.____ 9. Aunque la industria extranjera contribuyese a los ingresos
C.____ de este país, preferiría que el gobierno nuestro la
D.____ nacionalice.
E.____

A.____
B.____
C.____ 10. El hombre no quiere que haya tanta miseria en el mundo,
D.____ pero la permite Dios para castigar al hombre.
E.____

APPENDIX C

TABLE 45

AVERAGE RATINGS OF FOREIGN GOVERNMENT ON THREE FACTORS BY SOCIOECONOMIC STRATA

	Force	Activity	Evaluation	Number of Respondents
The United States				
Upper middle class . .	3.90	3.50	4.67	18
Lower middle class . .	4.87	2.75	4.33	15
Lower class	2.50	2.42	2.83	12
Argentina				
Upper middle class . .	6.05	4.83	6.17	18
Lower middle class . .	4.70	2.87	4.33	13
Lower class	2.62	5.00	3.56	8
Cuba				
Upper middle class . .	3.72	3.66	5.62	18
Lower middle class . .	2.74	4.06	6.97	15
Lower class	2.11	3.88	3.78	9
Soviet Union				
Upper middle class . .	3.18	3.56	6.06	18
Lower middle class . .	2.94	3.00	3.40	15
Lower class	2.44	2.44	4.56	9
Red China				
Upper middle class . .	2.72	2.90	6.62	18
Lower middle class . .	2.46	2.40	7.61	15
Lower class	2.50	2.75	8.00	4
France				
Upper middle class . .	2.20	2.78	3.07	18
Lower middle class . .	2.80	3.27	2.80	15
Lower class	2.22	2.22	2.59	9

TABLE 46

AVERAGE RATINGS OF POWER BLOCS ON THREE FACTORS BY SOCIOECONOMIC STRATA

	Force	Activity	Eval-uation	Number of Respondents
The Roman Catholic Church				
Upper middle class . .	4.40	5.45	4.22	18
Lower middle class . .	3.40	4.60	4.93	27
Lower class	3.04	2.96	3.59	27
The Armed Forces				
Upper middle class . .	3.22	4.72	6.61	18
Lower middle class . .	2.19	2.69	5.35	26
Lower class	2.14	2.92	5.48	28
The General Labor Confederation				
Upper middle class . .	4.75	3.38	4.25	16
Lower middle class . .	4.26	4.00	4.96	23
Lower class	2.92	2.96	3.56	25
The University Student Groups				
Upper middle class . .	4.82	2.67	2.90	18
Lower middle class . .	3.59	3.08	4.96	27
Lower class	2.50	2.77	3.77	26

TABLE 47

AVERAGE RATINGS OF POLITICAL PARTIES AND MOVEMENTS ON THREE FACTORS BY SOCIOECONOMIC STRATA

	Force	Activity	Evaluation	Number of Respondents
UCRP				
Upper middle class . .	7.12	5.95	6.50	18
Lower middle class . .	6.87	4.85	6.41	27
Lower class	6.96	6.04	5.81	26
UCRI				
Upper middle class . .	6.00	5.50	6.56	18
Lower middle class . .	6.34	4.70	6.30	27
Lower class	6.80	6.31	6.96	26
UDELPA				
Upper middle class . .	7.08	7.07	4.92	13
Lower middle class . .	6.70	7.75	7.81	16
Lower class	7.72	7.06	7.90	18
The Socialist Party				
Upper middle class . .	7.07	6.75	5.81	18
Lower middle class . .	5.96	6.23	5.85	27
Lower class	7.76	6.45	6.89	25
The Peronist Movement				
Upper middle class . .	5.05	5.00	5.34	18
Lower middle class . .	5.67	5.60	4.30	27
Lower class	5.60	5.28	4.63	29
The Communists				
Upper middle class . .	6.45	5.00	6.40	18
Lower middle class . .	5.04	4.31	7.51	26
Lower class	4.42	5.71	6.75	24

TABLE 48

AVERAGE RATINGS OF OCCUPATIONAL GROUPINGS ON THREE FACTORS BY SOCIOECONOMIC STRATA

	Force	Activity	Evaluation	Number of Respondents
The Bureaucracy				
Upper middle class . .	4.30	5.60	6.65	17
Lower middle class . .	6.19	5.64	4.90	27
Lower class	3.50	4.87	5.20	26
The Industrial Working Class				
Upper middle class . .	4.75	5.06	4.12	16
Lower middle class . .	4.97	4.11	4.41	27
Lower class	3.18	2.82	3.40	27
The Professionals				
Upper middle class . .	4.50	5.50	5.10	18
Lower middle class . .	2.89	3.18	4.26	27
Lower class	2.22	2.89	4.22	28
The Peasantry				
Upper middle class . .	7.33	7.40	2.80	15
Lower middle class . .	5.11	4.51	3.42	26
Lower class	5.71	5.84	3.25	28

TABLE 49

AVERAGE RATINGS OF ECONOMIC INTERESTS ON THREE FACTORS BY SOCIOECONOMIC STRATA

	Force	Activity	Evaluation	Number of Respondents
The Local Trade Unions				
Upper middle class . .				5
Lower middle class . .	5.73	5.77	6.18	22
Lower class	4.14	4.14	3.05	21
The Large Landowners				
Upper middle class . .	4.18	5.05	4.50	17
Lower middle class . .	3.87	4.08	4.65	23
Lower class	3.19	3.27	3.96	26
The Industrialists/ Financiers				
Upper middle class . .	4.38	3.18	5.50	17
Lower middle class . .	2.76	2.88	3.40	25
Lower class	2.22	2.90	3.59	27

APPENDIX D

TABLE 50

NATIONALITIES REPRESENTED IN THE TOTAL POPULATION OF ARGENTINE AND SANTA FE PROVINCE IN 1947*

Nationality	Total Republic	Total Santa Fe
Total Argentines	13,457,900	1,479,650
Total Americans	329,864	11,023
Bolivians	47,774	362
Brazilians	47,039	3,961
Canadians	558	23
Mexicans	834	38
Paraguayans	93,248	2,054
Uruguayans	73,639	3,279
Venezuelans	1,842	40
Other Americans . . .	64,930	1,266
Total Europeans	2,018,791	204,952
Germans	51,618	3,012
Austrians	33,248	3,361
Belgians	2,848	278
Britains	11,425	754
Czechoslovakians . .	18,983	1,163
Danish	3,544	89
Spanish	749,392	55,763
French	33,465	2,697
Greeks	7,671	520
Dutch	2,875	194
Hungarians	9,623	387
Italians	786,207	115,993
Norwegians	639	16
Polish	111,024	5,989
Portuguese	25,301	1,113
Rumanians	14,542	987
Russians	89,983	5,767
Swedish	1,269	62
Swiss	10,102	1,462
Yugoslavians	29,164	3,700
Other Europeans . . .	25,868	1,645

TABLE 50--(Continued)

Nationality	Total Republic	Total Santa Fe
Total Asians	81,460	7,002
Armenians	4,224	60
Japanese	5,244	255
Lybians	13,505	1,031
Syrians	32,789	3,310
Turks	18,225	1,240
Other Asians	7,473	1,106
Total Africans	2,459	224
Total Oceanians	1,073	32
Undetermined	2,280	83
TOTAL	15,893,827	1,702,975

*Source: National Census of 1947; compiled by Centeno, op. cit., pp. 3-4.

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