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DEONTOLOGY AND AMBIANCE.

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THE UNIVERSITY OF OKLAHOMA
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JOHN MILTON AND THE DOCTRINE OF SYMPATHY:
DEONTOLOGY AND AMBIANCE


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JOHN MILTON AND THE DOCTRINE OF SYMPATHY:
DEONTOLOGY AND AMBIANCE

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To my beloved parents

Mr. and Mrs. Horace Benjamin Bennett

to whom I owe all that I am

or ever hope to be

and

The "partner of my life," Frank Delano Purnell

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MILTON AND THE DOCTRINE OF SYMPATHY:
DEONTOLOGY AND AMBIANCE

INTRODUCTION

The sympathetic impulse has engaged man throughout the ages. This intuitive awareness of a harmonious unity in the existential world is "as old as the mind of man, and doubtless as permanent."¹ Cognizant of an elemental symbiosis, man seems to have instinctively perceived a relationship among himself, his environment, and a materia prima. Such intuitive reality is a "motif of primitive myth and saga, surviving in classical mythology and speculative philosophy."² By and large, the idea of sympathy nucleates man's evolving systems of ecclesiastical and civil polity. Although in the modern age the sympathetic impulse has been checked by the inimical forces of scientism, it remains a living idea. A.Z. Butler notes its recent appearance "in the conclusions of the analytical psychologists of Vienna and Zürich--notably in the imagery and symbolism of Dr. Jung's 'Collective Unconscious.'"³ Sympathy, then, as a transcendental vision of the oneness of things is common to all ages. More or less instinctive in its manifestations,

it is elemental to man's spirituality, his sense of community and of selfhood.

Poets, philosophers, and scientists alike have exercised themselves in the quest for a precise delineation of this bond uniting created things and the Creator. Literature, by its very nature, has always been compatible with the idea of sympathy; but literature can hardly be divorced from its philosophical and scientific backgrounds. Holding almost undisputed sway over the mind of humanity in all times and places, the idea of world cohesion based on sympathy declined in emphasis in the Western world only with the triumph of the modern scientific spirit.⁴ Accordingly, literature and philosophy reflect a spiritual cleavage between man and man and man and nature--ultimately, an alienation from the primal source of his being. Thus man's perception of the essence and extent of his relatedness to himself, his God, and his world is the key to his sense of responsibility.

As a true Christian humanist, John Milton had a large vision of life in its relatedness: the sympathetic impulse is pervasive in his life and art. The idea of sympathy, it seems, made appeals both conscious and unconscious to the personal and subliminal in Milton. On the elementary level, Milton was more than a little exercised by the notion of climatic influence which inheres in a real or supposed affinity between man and nature. His works contain numerous

references to the potentially adverse effect of England's climate on his genius and that of his fellow countrymen. Phrases like "frozen North" and England's "cold climate"⁵ usually occur to indicate the poet's anxiety both about his destined fame and about his responsibility to overcome any obstacle which might frustrate this end. Milton, in the History of Britain, cites the northern climate as a cause of the intellectual shortcomings of his countrymen: "For the sunn, which we want, ripens witts as well as fruits."⁶ Perhaps the poet also had in mind the essential unity of things when he, reflecting on his mission to write the eternal work through the aid of the "instinct of nature," expresses the concern that possibly something "advers in our climat, or the fate of the age"⁷ might prevent him. But Milton had earlier testified to the relationship and responsibility between the Creator and the created in "Naturam non Pati Senium" when in opposition to the hylozoistic fallacy he asserted that the earth shall not die because the spirit of God was in created matter. Such too may be taken as a statement of implicit faith in the moral base of the universe. One last bit of evidence for Milton's more than usual concern for universal affinities needs to be cited here. Discussing the attraction of like for like in Doctrine and Discipline of Divorce, Milton considers possible causes: ". . . But what might be the cause, whether each ones allotted Genius or proper Starre, or whether the supernall influence

of Schemes and angular aspects or this elementall Crisis. . . , whether all these jointly or singly meeting friendly, or . . . unfriendly in either party."⁸

Allegorical and eclectic, Milton expresses this vision of oneness in many forms; but he never allows the form to take precedence over the substance. Milton's whole life, I suggest, was devoted, among other things, to an examination, a refinement, and an application of the doctrine of sympathy and its extensions in his ceaseless endeavor to "present [his] true account." Thus the concept of sympathy is inextricably bound to his religion, his deontology, and his ambience. It is the animating principle of his concepts of right reason and its adjuncts of Christian liberty and the law of nature, of his peculiar use of the ideas of the chain of being, the harmony of the spheres, patterns of hierarchy in the microcosm, the geocosm, and the macrocosm. Furthermore, I suggest that the sympathetic impulse underlies Milton's monistic views, especially as they influence his notions on God and the creation.

Many shaping influences contributed to Milton's world view. Since Marvell's adulatory lines on Paradise Lost first noted the richness of Milton's eclecticism, numerous books and articles have appeared ostensibly charting the labyrinthine paths of Milton's sources and ideas. The volume and scope of such works testify to the acuity of this early critical review. Of Milton's use of "fable and

old song," Marvell declared:

Thou hast not miss'd one thought that
 could be fit,
 And all that was improper dost omit.
 That Majesty which through thy Work
 doth Reign
 Draws the Devout, deterring the Profane.
 And things divine thou treatst of in
 such state
 As them preserves, and Thee inviolate.⁹

But, of course, the study of Milton's ideas has since spanned his entire canon, resulting in a fuller appreciation of the genius of the poet. Such studies have noted the regular recurrence of certain themes throughout Milton's works,¹⁰ and more recently the permanence or universality of the poet's prevailing motifs.

The redirection of criticism towards the timelessness of Milton's ideas probably received its greatest impetus from such catalytic studies as E.M.W. Tillyard's Milton (1930), Douglas Bush's Paradise Lost in Our Time (1945), and Frank Kermode's The Living Milton (1960). More and more readers have come to realize that in Milton, though much is lost to the present age, much abides. Hence the increase in popularity of Milton's works during the last decades. Perhaps this renewed interest in Milton is also a result of the redirection of man's bisocial nature toward relatedness as a process of living. This symptom is reflected in the recent ecumenical movement as well as in the political implications of the shrinking world thrust upon this age by its prodigious scientific strides.

Though there have been a number of perceptive studies appearing in the past decade or so on related ideas, no major study has been devoted to the examination of the doctrine of sympathy in Milton's canon. Some commentators have, however, had something to say in passing about this recurrent idea. Roland Frye, in God, Man, and Satan, discusses the importance of maintaining the right relationship between the created and the Creator. Focusing on Paradise Lost, he sees the repudiation of the foreordained relationship of man to man and of man to God as the cause of the Fall.¹¹ This study will work more extensively with this idea as it is reflected throughout Milton's ambience.

Michael Fixler's Milton and the Kingdoms of God is a study of the interrelationship of Milton's poetic, prophetic, and political visions. Fixler sees the "visionary ideal of Puritanism" as the unifying element of all Milton's endeavors.¹² This study aims to show that the more comprehensive and inclusive concept of sympathy is the unifying element which best accounts for Milton's recurrent ideas and endeavors. It aims to point up a difference merely of emphasis, not of kind, in the young Milton as distinguished from the Milton of the middle and final years. Walter Clyde Curry in Milton's Ontology, Cosmogony, and Physics discusses significant background concepts found in Milton's works, but he does not explicitly note the idea of sympathy. However, his concept of theopantism bears sharp resemblance to the

major premises underlying the doctrine of sympathy.

Some other notable commentators have been more explicit in their reference to the idea of sympathy in Milton's works. Both Douglas Bush, in John Milton, and Rosemund Tuve, in Images and Themes in Five Poems by Milton, indicate the importance of the idea of sympathy in Milton's early poems by asserting the anachronism of the term "pathetic fallacy" in Milton's cosmology. Miss Tuve further notes, regarding the validity of such a concept of sympathy in its traditional poetic frame of reference, that the idea of "harmony among creatures is by no means necessarily pagan even when its terms are so; the point around which the matter turns is whether the metaphors which express it are believed or not. . . . Such language neither denies a hierarchy among creatures nor a special tie between man and divinity."¹³ J.B. Broadbent expresses a similar view in Some Graver Subject when he states that Milton's world view turns on the "pantheism" which is "a wonderful realization of the ideal communion of all things and all persons 'in God.'" It implies in human relations reverence for the body because it is the stuff of God, and sympathy with all affections because they are the products of divine vitality acting in the divine substance."¹⁴ Broadbent would seem to overstate his case by labeling Milton's world view pantheistic; for in his works, as we shall see later, Milton stressed unity with the Creator because of His divine substance in all, but not

identity. In this connection Douglas Bush comments: "To Milton, God and nature are one but this does not mean a pantheistic confusion of creation with the Creator."¹⁵ The use of such a term as pantheism to describe Milton's cosmology is surely inexact, for it implies a confusion of progenitor and progeny.

George Whiting devotes considerable attention to the concept of sympathy in his book, Milton's Literary Milieu, by placing Milton's view of sympathy in perspective with the views of his predecessors and contemporaries. Whiting also shows that Milton's ideas are basically those current in his age; therefore, to assert that the poet consciously borrowed verbatim from any of his predecessors or contemporaries is a mistake.

A.Z. Butler in his essay, "The Pathetic Fallacy in Paradise Lost," concludes with Bush, Tuve, and others that the "mise-en-scène," the rich use of "sensuous image and informing symbol" all preclude the relevance of such a term as "pathetic fallacy" in the world of Paradise Lost.¹⁶ Butler also makes the crucial point that Milton, by depicting the "animate and inanimate kinds as sharing through a primal sympathy in the emotional life of man," makes sympathy the "detonating mechanism through which the central issue of the poem--the Fall, its cause, and total consequence--is given startling and dramatic realization."¹⁷ Butler does not elaborate upon his observation.

The concept of sympathy, I suggest, is seminal to Milton's poetics and moral idealism. Its function in the poet's life and art has not been sufficiently appraised. The aim of this study, then, is to supply a treatment devoted exclusively to a delineation of Milton's doctrine of sympathy and of his literary use of that doctrine. Since Milton embraced the vatic image of the poet, one can hardly divorce his life from his art--nor would he countenance the separation. To Milton, the essence of life is its unity, of mind, spirit and body, or of man and his work. Thus the pervasive symbol used to embody this idea in his works is the poem--its harmony, symmetry and proportion shaped according to a plan and a purpose. Manifestations of the idea of sympathy and its attendant doctrines, I suggest, appealed to this impulse for unity in Milton's psychology. Thus, as I see it, he made this doctrine the seminal element of his deontology and ambiance.

Milton's doctrine of sympathy is eclectic and developmental, deriving some of its character from antiquity, the Middle Ages, and from his own age's peculiar interpretation of the available tradition as well as its contributions to it. Milton's literary use of sympathy involves four varieties: divine, human, cosmic, and infernal. Paradise Lost is the classicus locus for Milton's use of these four varieties of this natural bond of things. For convenience I have further classified Milton's use of sympathy according

to mode: elementaristic, holistic, and symbolistic.¹⁸

These categories overlap many times; but the classification is based on emphasis or predominance of the salient characteristics of a given mode. The main value of such categories for this study is to suggest a kind of evolutionary tendency in Milton's use of the doctrine of sympathy.

Elementaristic sympathy is postulated on the belief in a sentient cosmos emanating from a world-soul, or materia prima, or God. Such a concept of sympathy is not necessarily religious or systematically philosophical: it may range from the most primitive belief in occult influence, animism, or correspondence to enlightened pantheism and the highest expression of immanence. The so-called "pathetic fallacy" is a popular manifestation of elementaristic sympathy, though in Milton's cosmology, as has been noted, the pathos is not a fallacy. The affinity between certain things is held to be so real that they "are similarly affected by the same influence, affect or influence one another in some occult way. . . ." (OED). Fellow-feeling, "the fact or capacity of entering in or sharing the feelings of another " (OED), is a sociological concept and a natural aspect of this vision of unity among things. Its implications are infinite. The idea that all creation is interrelated, that each shares in the substance, nature, or essence of the other is pivotal to the elementaristic mode of the sympathetic impulse in any of its forms.

Holistic sympathy implies a concept embracing the whole scheme of things. It takes the shape of a cosmology based on the deep-rooted desire of man to find an all-comprehending conception into which he can fit all the parts. The Greeks' answer to this enigma was the scala naturae, later called the Great Chain of Being. Inherent within this cosmology and germane to it is the concept of the World-Soul, a divine life-force, or some kind of permeating spirit which unites all the parts. Such a union is equated with the sympathetic bond of nature, an idea which itself is common to Greek, Roman, and Christian Weltanschauungen. Other related and systematic concepts, such as that of the world-harmony or the Pythagorean musica mundi, the notion of the micro-macrocosm, and of course, hierarchical structuring in the soul, society and the cosmos, are all informed by the belief in a primal unity of the whole universe. This unity inheres in a pre-established and unalterable principle of harmony and order.¹⁹ Milton's doctrine of right reason, Christian liberty, harmony of the spheres, and the law of nature all have orientations in a holistic attitude towards sympathy. Indeed, as I see it, such a concept of sympathy is the informing principle of Milton's ethical consciousness and his rich and distinctive iconography. This mode of sympathy in Milton's cosmology is evident throughout his canon. Ascendant in emphasis, it becomes increasingly more axiomatic in the polemic prose and reaches its climax in

Paradise Lost.

Symbolistic sympathy inheres in conceiving analogical rather than real identification or unity among the parts: parts are seen as corresponding to or symbolic of one another in part or in totality. "The symbolistic interpretation looks for a higher reality very much different from the immediate experience."²⁰ H.F. Dunbar²¹ distinguishes three kinds of symbols: the arbitrary or extrinsic symbol which denotes more or less superficial relations of contiguity or convention; the descriptive or intrinsic symbol based on some similarity; and insight symbols which denote those "which open a view on deeper and more essential things, an underlying reality of greater dignity, the fundamentals of being itself."²² Symbolistic sympathy is highly significant to Milton's peculiar art. He drew his symbols from all kinds of empirical knowledge, including nature, medicine, science, the Scriptures. Milton's belief in the unity of truth, a fact so evident in his love for the classical world, is depicted in his use of prefiguration. The symbolic relation between certain kinds of objects is indicated as that of a typus. Christ, for example, is a second Adam, Mary a second Eve. Auerbach's comment on this tradition in biblical exegesis is enlightening here:

A figural schema permits both its poles--the figure and the fulfillment--to retain the characteristics of concrete historical reality, in contradistinction to what obtains with symbolic and allegorical personifications so that the figure and fulfillment--although

the one 'signifies' the other--have a significance which is not incompatible with their being real. An event taken as a figure preserves its literal and historical meaning.²³

It is, I think, in the area of this use of symbolistic sympathy that Milton shows his greatest genius.

In Milton's use of the concept of sympathy he was a child of his age; and his age, in turn, was an heir of the Middle Ages and of antiquity. That Milton used the available tradition is a critical commonplace; that he made this tradition conform to his own experience and the assimilated experience of his age is also widely acknowledged.²⁴ That he also anticipated the best of the tradition which extends through Shaftesbury, James Thomson, Hume, Smith and the nineteenth century exponents of deontology is an important proposition which needs some investigation.

An examination of the developmental use of the doctrine of sympathy in Milton reveals the progression of the "hermeneutic circle."²⁵ "Such a movement begins with a preliminary hypothesis, arrives from there at a certain interpretation of facts, and on the basis of such an understanding, turns back towards its origin to correct and enlarge the first assumptions. By repeating itself, this movement unfolds not as a circle but as a spiral."²⁶

Milton's deontology and ambiance, I suggest, unfold in the manner of the hermeneutic circle.

From the inception of Milton's dedication of himself and his talent to a serious purpose in life, he seems to

have had a temperamental bias for perceiving a cosmic, human, and divine relatedness. In addition to evidence already cited, his earliest Psalmody and imitative pieces express infused rapture for the beneficence of God as revealed by his handiwork. From his vast realms of learning, Milton anchored his predilection in both secular and sacred doctrines: Neoplatonism, Hebraism, and Christianity were the dominant streams of influence. To these he added his own individuality.²⁷ The early poems "On the Morning of Christ's Nativity," "At a Solemn Musick," down through Comus reveal Milton's early idealistic concept of sympathy. With Comus, the spiral widens to include speculation on the notion of self-sufficiency. He tests it in the figure of the virtuous Lady; but the self is found insufficient without the aid of grace in the form of Sabrina. However, the great crisis comes in Lycidas. In this poem, I suggest, is a turning in Milton's angle of vision: there is a shift in emphasis in his doctrine of sympathy. For the first time the bond of man to his fellows emerges as a serious theme. Ancient or classical concepts of man's bonds with nature are weighed and found wanting. Like Job, Milton wrestles with his faith; he reexamines his belief in humanistic self-sufficiency. Never again is the latter a dominant principle in his thought. The spiral ascends as the poet-priest turns now to his responsibility to his fellow-man, increasingly aware of the need for fitness, but also of the limitations

placed on performance by external circumstances. The poet, in this first phase, examines the qualities needed to make of himself "a true poem," in preparation for his destined task to write the great poem.

Unsullied but more fully aware of his destiny and his duty to his Maker, to humanity and to himself, Milton is thrust into the second major phase of his life and literary experience both by the need and the occasion. In the eddies of political and religious dissent, he tested his new faith and moral idealism. Milton had no bark rigged for such troubled waters. Such worthiness comes only with experience and maturity. Thus I can not wholly agree with Fixler's assertion that "until Lycidas [Milton] expressed no real awareness that evil in life does not simply respond to philosophy and poetry."²⁸ Rather it would seem that until Lycidas, Milton based his morality on the sufficiency of the individual with little or no awareness of the limitations of that view posed by the extenuations of society and the vulnerability of the individual. Comus, however, offers an enlightening exception. Indeed until Lycidas, Milton's idealism had not been tested by harsh realism. But Milton's idealism is grounded in the doctrines of Christianity as exemplified in the life of the Son; it is the moral design for all the sons of God. In this phase, then, Milton moved from the individualistic to the group-centered position: he moved from self-regeneration to a regeneration of his country

and, implicitly, then explicitly, the world. I suggest that here Milton's goal is to make of the world a true poem by eliminating its brokenness caused by sin. The idealism of his youth is reexamined, indeed questioned. He is disillusioned with people and their institutions. The world, he decides, must wait for God's own destined time to become the true poem. Only God knows that time, Milton concludes.

From this abysmal state Milton emerges with a mature faith motivated neither by unrestrained optimism nor by reforming zeal, but one anchored in the submission of self and social duty to the will of God. Thus he repeats his basic premise as the spiral unfolds in its supernal heights.

The major poems, Paradise Lost, Paradise Regain'd and Samson Agonistes reveal Milton's enlightened Weltanschauung. They are indeed a world of one in three poems. In these works, Milton presents his summation and sentence on the sympathetic bond of nature. Relationship and responsibility coalesce in a mature view founded on God and the soul of the individual man. Morality and poetry find a happy union. All varieties of sympathy are depicted in Paradise Lost: divine, human, cosmic, and infernal. Sympathy becomes the essential unifying device, actuating the cause and consequences of the major events. The various modes of sympathy--elementaristic, holistic, and symbolistic--are masterfully portrayed, informing ambiance and deontology. In Paradise Lost also, Milton begins the final

break with humanistic self-sufficiency. In Paradise Regain'd and Samson Agonistes, Milton refines on themes already included in Paradise Lost: the pattern for gaining the "Kingdom within" as exemplified in the human-divine figure, Christ, and as in the mere mortal, Samson. Here the poet dispels all doubt as to his final evaluation of the intermingling streams of sympathy. No longer the aggressive reformer, he is one reconciled and submissive to the will of God, for therein lie true virtue and peace. Thus Milton's final position is, in a sense, his original one--but his original position examined, refined and enlarged by experience and maturity of insight. Both his ethical outlook and its ambiance reflect this progression.

A cursory survey of ancient, medieval, and Renaissance philosophy will serve as background for and explanation of the core ideas in Milton's doctrine of sympathy. Ancient and medieval poets will be cited in passing to suggest the evolutionary tendency of the idea of sympathy; contemporaneous poets such as Donne, Herbert, and Henry Vaughan will illuminate both a comparison and a contrast with the Miltonic use of sympathy.

The poems of Milton that will be discussed are those which have been mentioned with references to a few short poems from his "Imitational Pieces" and "Elegiac Verses," "Epitaphium Damonis" and his "Prolusions." Other minor poems such as "The Passion," and "Naturam non Pati senium"

will be mentioned in passing. Major emphasis in this study will be placed first on the minor poems: "On the Morning of Christ's Nativity," Comus, and Lycidas as they reflect a progression in Milton's treatment of sympathy. Secondly, representative examples from Milton's prose will be examined for the deontological significance of sympathy in the religious, domestic, and political areas. The Doctrine and Discipline of Divorce will contribute the most direct statement on the doctrine of sympathy and its importance in Milton's deontology; and other selections, such as Of Reformation, The Reason of Church Government, Areopagitica, Tetrachordon, The Tenure of Kings and Magistrates, and The Readie and Easie Way to Establish a Free Commonwealth will be used to support the major philosophical presuppositions which informed Milton's polemics. Finally, Milton's major poems Paradise Lost, Paradise Regain'd, and Samson Agonistes will illustrate a culmination and summation of the poet's use of belles-lettres and philosophy to exemplify his doctrine of sympathy.

CHAPTER I

THE PHILOSOPHICAL BACKGROUND

Sympathy is the greatest of all operations of nature. . . . The state of peace or war which exists between the various departments of Nature, the hatred or friendships which are maintained by objects dumb and destitute of sense. . . . To these states known to the Greeks by the respective appellations of 'sympathia' and 'antipathia,' we are indebted for the first principles of all things.

Pliny, Naturall Historie

The notion of sympathy has enjoyed wide subscription throughout the ages, evolving elementaristically, holistically and symbolistically, according to the mode in which it differentiated itself. Perusal of commentaries on sympathy suggests its chequered career.¹ Occurring in one form or another, it exists as a principle of medicine, as a magic communication between kindred souls or objects, and in the ethical context as a broad base for the benevolent instincts of fellow-feeling and compassion. "As a semi-scientific description of the mutual affinity between similar objects or individuals, sympathy explained not only such pharmaceutical theories as those of Paracelsus and Sir Kenelm Digby but such diversified phenomena as sympathetic inks and the Aeolian harp."²

Milton's treatment of sympathy per se is not extensive. It receives its fullest characterization in the divorce tracts and Paradise Lost. However, I suggest, the concept of sympathy is the underlying assumption of his basic tenets, the animating principle of his deontology, individual and communal, religious, domestic, and political. This theory can be tested by an analogy from the field of medicine known as the syndrome, a state in which the diagnosis of a particular condition is relatively certain to exist if specific symptoms occur concurrently. Thus since Milton's general ideational ambiance presents clear-cut patterns which depend upon the idea of sympathy for their meaning, the presence of one is taken as a sign of the other. In Milton's poetry and prose the following concepts are crucial: affinity between certain things, occult influence, the notions of microcosmus, the great chain of being, hierarchical structuring, harmony and order, and Milton's own peculiar use of the law of nature and right reason. Each of these inheres in the central belief in the unity of existence, the relatedness of all created things to the Creator. Since these concepts are present throughout Milton's works, differing primarily in degree, but seldom in kind, and since they are also characteristic of the age, Milton's so-called heresies are many times made more defensible or explicable if one is cognizant of his philosophical presuppositions.

I further adduce Milton's fondness for certain words and phrases in his literary vocabulary which indicate the sympathetic impulse even when the term itself is not mentioned: charm, incorporate, unity, harmony, mutual, nature, the bond of amity, fellowship, links, fit, adamant, accord, consent, join, music, connatural, relation, marriage, correspondence--each of which is peculiarly enriched by Milton's large vision of oneness in the human and divine spheres.

Since all of man's most lasting systems that aim to explain his natural and elemental relationships evolve from a premise of common primal source, sympathy is the operative principle which is assumed in all relatedness. The Oxford English Dictionary gives the following definitions of sympathy:

A real or supposed affinity between certain things, by virtue of which they are similarly or correspondingly affected by the same influence, affect or influence one another in some occult way, or tend towards each other; a relation between two bodily parts or between two persons such that disorder, or any condition of the one induces a corresponding condition in the other; the quality or state of being affected by the condition of another with a feeling similar or corresponding to that of another; the fact or capacity of entering into or sharing the feelings of another or other; a fellow-feeling; also a feeling or frame of mind evoked by and responsive to some external influence; community of feeling and harmony of disposition. .

(OED, X, 368-369)³

Milton's doctrine of sympathy involves any manifestation of this active instinctual force postulated on a common primal source that renders one's conscious or unconscious

awareness of relationship to himself and his kind, to his source and all other aspects of the created world. Such a relationship takes many forms; affinity, identification, and unity are its major ones. In Milton's deontology, relationship to the common source is the highest good; other relationships follow proportionately. The closer the relationship, the greater the responsibility. Milton's doctrine of sympathy is a heritage of his age; but his peculiar use of the concept enhances it and brings it to its highest level of significance both as image and principle. To understand Milton's place in the tradition, we look now at a brief historical account of relevant origins and accretions of the idea of sympathy.

The exploration of the bond among created things and a primal source goes back in Western thought at least as far as Thales (640-548 B.C.), the so-called Father of Science. Aristotle and Diogenes Laertius give some idea of its elementaristic inception in the explicit concerns of Thales regarding the influences among matter. Probably reflecting the culture of his times, Thales concluded, on the basis of his observation of the influence of the magnetic (magnesian) stone on iron, that "all things are full of gods" and that apparently inanimate things "can be alive." As the magnetic stone, or lodestone, must possess "soul" in order to move iron, so the soul is intermingled throughout the whole universe. The attractive powers of amber also became a

theoretical and empirical basis for the ancient world's belief in the divine interpenetration of the universe.⁴

Twenty centuries later Gilbert found Thales' view not entirely absurd: ". . . for the lodestone is incited, directed and orbitally moved by this force, which is all in all . . . , and seems very like a soul."⁵ The particular force that caused magnetism was indefinable, beyond rational understanding; yet it was "commonly cited as an occult force."⁶ As such it was used both literally and figuratively in conjunction with the idea of sympathy. Gilbert, for example, speaks of "a sympathy between attractor and attracted object, as . . . in Fracastoro's proposal that hairs and twigs move toward amber and toward diamond because they contain some principle, perhaps air, in common to the attractor."⁷

In the ancient world the quality of attraction possessed by the magnet was also used in reference to human affairs. Far back into antiquity one finds myths and tales of love centered in the commonly held beliefs on magnetism. Perhaps the most imaginative one is the myth of the statue of Mars constructed of iron and that of Venus, of lodestone. Inspired by the amorous breath of Venus, the statue of Mars leaped into her arms.⁸ Such a myth, then, points up vividly the power credited to magnetic attraction and, implicitly, to love and sympathy. Also it is an early manifestation of the symbolistic mode in that it is analogical.

Empedocles (490-430 B.C.), building upon Thales' foundation, sought further to explain the cause of magnetic attraction. Iron, he reasoned, had pores from which emanate "effluvia; but these pores are usually filled with air and unable to send out these emanations. When the lodestone is brought near the iron, the emanations from the lodestone drive out the pores of the iron, thus enabling the emanations of the iron to come out and seek the pores of the lodestone, which are so constituted that they receive them avidly." Empedocles' theories on the imperishability of matter and of the living force behind all motion are also implicatory; for he suggests two components of this force: "friendship, or the force of concentration, and discord, or the force of separation."⁹ These forces are highly suggestive of the sympathies and antipathies later enunciated by Pliny, for example.

Plato (427-347 B.C.) added little or nothing to the theories on magnetism. But in his "Ion Dialogues, he refers to 'a power resembling that which acts on the stone called by Euripides the magnet. For this stone does not only attract iron rings, but imparts to those rings the power of doing that very thing which itself does, enabling them to attract other rings of iron.'"¹⁰ From this observation Plato conceives what may be said to anticipate the chain of being. Of the long series of rings depending chain-like one from the other, he says, "'from that stone at the head of

them is derived the virtue which operates in them all.'"¹¹
 Later St. Augustine (354-430) made a similar observation of the iron rings attracted and suspended by the stone and the virtue which bound them together by "invisible links."¹²
 Such developments are holistic not only in orientation but also in implication.

That lodestone can be used for medicinal purposes was another popular belief. It was believed that "a piece of lodestone held in the hands would alleviate the pains of gout."¹³ This practice bears close resemblance to that of the sympathetic cures of Paracelsus and Sir Kenelm Digby of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, respectively. Furthermore, Roller notes that "through the first eleven centuries of our era the lodestone is known principally through medical uses, uses in magic, and as an example of occult powers, in the West."¹⁴ Where philosophers could not explain magnetic attraction by the theory of "soul" in matter or by mechanical theories, they fell back "upon the universal 'law' of sympathies and antipathies. If sympathy between two things was strong enough, they came together; if the antipathy was pronounced, they stayed apart."¹⁵ The concept of magnetism, then, is indubitably an accretion of the elementary concept of sympathy. Iconography and contextual reference are employed interchangeably since one is taken as a sign of the other.

As the virtue binds together a series of rings by

invisible links, so the central premise of the doctrine of sympathy is postulated on the chain of being linked together by the infused spirit of the Creator. Whiting credits the origin of the chain image to Aristotle, the latter having mentioned the concept in his commentary on the scala naturae.¹⁶ Through this concept, Aristotle fused the idea of continuity with the Platonistic doctrine of the "necessary 'fullness' of the world."¹⁷ The Platonistic fullness rests on the notion of a common primal source, the "Absolute Being," from which the "being and attributes of all other things are derivative."¹⁸ Aristotle's system is delineated in his De Anima where he suggested a "hierarchical arrangement of all organisms according to the 'powers of soul' possessed by them."¹⁹ Thus emerged the holistic conception of the universe "as a 'Great Chain of Being' composed of an immense but seldom rigorously applied logic of the principle of continuity--of an infinite number of links ranging in hierarchical order from the meagerest kind of creature . . . 'through every possible' grade up to the ens perfectissimum-- . . . the highest possible kind of creature." Each of the links in the chain has one quality which differentiates it from the creature precedent and subsequent to it in the chain. Such a conception was essential to the Neoplatonic cosmology and was credited by many scientists and philosophers and "indeed most educated men through the Middle Ages and down to the late eighteenth century," according to

A.O. Lovejoy.²⁰

Thus the "chain of being" is pivotal in the holistic mode of sympathy, for the chain is posited on the view that the created world is a kind of emanation of the virtues alive in God, as it came to be understood in the Christian-Platonic syncretism of the Renaissance world view. Its appearance in the ambiance of a writer is taken as a sign of the sympathetic impulse. Milton, like Bruno and Paracelsus, believed in that "golden chain" which links all parts of the universe,²¹ however varied they may seem to be. The idea in Bruno and Paracelsus becomes pantheism; but to Milton it is sympathy, the evidence of the divinity flowing throughout all creation uniting its parts in natural and harmonious bonds. The relationship between the Graeco-Roman World-Soul and Judaeo-Christian sympathetic immanence is summed up in a statement by Origen: ". . . the world-soul, or God, holds the different created minds together as the soul within us holds together the different parts of our body."²² It was a Neo-Platonic adaptation of a paganistic concept to Christian use. Such a view, as this study aims to show, is the animating principle in Milton's view of right reason and in his perception of the law of nature and Christian liberty--in fine, the lifeblood of his deontology and ambiance.

Milton's Weltanschauung is holistic, by and large, the Renaissance heritage from the preceding ages. Evident in all of his works, his view is most explicitly delineated and

portrayed in Paradise Lost. There are, in the world of Paradise Lost, certain "links" between heaven and earth. By right use of "created things" in accordance with the principle of sympathetic bonds, one establishes these links and effects in an ultimate unity of earthly things with the heavenly virtues. Adam in Paradise Lost, Book V, 511-12, succinctly states this notion: "In contemplation of created things, / By steps we ascend to God."²³ His world is the product of an immanent-transcendent Deity. It is monistic and thus generally follows ex Deo theoretical patterns. In structure it is hierarchical, depends upon proper relationship among its parts. Dynamic, it allows ascension by merit.

Whiting, in his perceptive study of Milton's milieu, has already observed that Milton shared most of the "predominantly orthodox beliefs with Danaeus, Du Bartas, Purchas, [Henry] More, and Raleigh," but that the poet of Paradise Lost asserts his own individuality in "substance as well as style. In his emphasis upon a divine life force, an existing chaos, the virtue of matter, and the interrelationship of all life (including the soul of man), Milton agrees most intimately with Mercator's Atlas."²⁴ There is no suggestion of indebtedness on the part of either writer, for both shared a common emporium of ideas. Nevertheless, it would seem that the individuality of which Whiting speaks here is a salient example of the importance of the idea of

sympathy in Milton, for each of the emphases above inheres in the notion of a sympathetic bond of nature postulated on a common primal source.

Another idea held in common by Milton and Mercator gives further indication of the significance of the idea of sympathy, potential and actual, in Milton. According to Whiting, both men believed that "original virtue was not wholly destroyed by Adam's sin. There are yet in the world 'the reliques of that matter, of which celestiall and super-celestiall things were created' and a natural sympathy between the higher and lower world."²⁵ Such a view, as well as those outlined in the preceding paragraph, is seminal to Milton's monistic position, for it implies a belief in an immanent-transcendent Deity. A brief look at Milton's concept of God is necessary for a fuller understanding of Milton's monism.

Whiting offers this description of Milton's God. He is a curious blend of the Neoplatonic and the Christian in that He is

Plato's Self-Sufficing Perfection and his Self-Transcending Fecundity. Through the Demiurge, his Son, Plato's Timeless and Incorporeal One (not the orthodox Trinity) becomes, without necessity, the source of the universe which is temporal, beautiful, and, before sin, beneficent.²⁶

This distinction between Milton's God and the orthodox Judaeo-Christian Deity is, I think, overly nice. Milton's God is, by and large, a union of Greek immanence and Hebrew transcendence, so there is no essential conflict in spirit

between Milton's and the orthodox biblical God--though there might be differences in aspectual emphases from time to time. Even the orthodox concept of the Trinity inheres in a kind of modal differentiation of a spiritual Deity according to his attributes of immanence and transcendence. The capability of a transcendent God to isolate an immanent factor, according to Professor Boodin, "proves it to be transcendent; for as a uniting spirit it does not belong to mere aggregation, but, as a wholeness, is transcendent both as a concept and as an experienced value."²⁷ Christ is in Milton, as in orthodox Christianity, the highest form of immanence, God made man--but not all of God. The third person, the Holy Spirit, is rather protean in Milton's theology; but He seems to be most closely connected with the sympathetic manifestations inhering in immanence.²⁸

Milton's view of God is compatible with his monistic position and serves as an ontological basis for his tendency to embrace the ex Deo theory of creation. Since he seems to hold that the universe is an emanation of the Supreme Being, it follows that the idea of God's immanence is that He is the Universe; although He is also more than it is. As Kreyche puts it, "the primary cause though extrinsic to his effects in the sense only of being distinct from them, is nevertheless present in them through a unique mode of causality that is identical with his being."²⁹ The oneness of life so explicitly stated here obviates any hostility

between matter and spirit since they constitute two phases of one eternal life and consciousness that makes up the universe. This indubitably is the view Milton found acceptable, for his monism is unmistakable in both his prose and poetry. He saw matter and spirit as emanations of the Supreme Being; so he taught that the love of God's creatures, because of divine immanence, is the essential direction to salvation or ultimate unity with God. Likewise, Milton's concept of evil as a product of the apostate will rather than of the grossness of matter is also a reflection of his monism. Milton, then, is monistic because he views the whole universe as some kind of expression of God's life in that His will sustains it and His consciousness embraces it all. The various parts differ only in degree.

The concept of degree is the informing principle of holistic sympathy in that all parts of the whole are ranked according to the portion of the divine consciousness within each of them.³⁰ On this foundation rests the concept of the hierarchy of being. Nauert, in his book on Renaissance thought, offers pertinent commentary on the concept of hierarchy in the ancient and modern world. It is the more or less typical view of the age, here expounded by Agrippa. "All parts of the universe are closely connected for the superior rules its immediate inferior and is ruled by its own supreme." In this way God transmits His power "down through the entire system." Universal harmony is dependent

on respect for such a scheme. In the "harmonious whole, which God created for his glory, every creature has its proper place and its limits which it is forbidden to transgress. To break this prohibition, to attack this order, to seek to abandon one's proper place is sin, the sin of Adam and Satan."³¹ This hierarchical structuring was held to obtain in the soul, in society at large and in the cosmos. Milton's emphasis on ascension by merit is an implicative departure on this well-known tradition. Such emphasis, I suggest, is based on his concept of relatedness and responsibility.

Though static in most of its implications or manifestations, the concept of degree and order had many applications to the macrocosm and the body politic and the body politic and the microcosm. Basically optimistic, this scheme offered unlimited hope for some; for others it offered stark despair. Milton is in the former camp because he embraced the dynamic view of the scale of things--we ascend by merit. Moreover, ascension in Milton, concomitant with the development of his other epistemological and ontological views, came to be anchored in a rationally considered dependence on God and a voluntary allegiance to Him. Such a position evinces a consciousness of "man's spiritual limitations as a fallen being as well as his spiritual potentialities as a redeemed creature."³² Thus by seeing divine harmony and order at work in the micro-macrocosm, man directs his

activities toward the source of his being rather than towards the impoverished self-sufficiency of anthropocentric humanism. The twofold rhythm of life brings hope to man, but loss of equilibrium reverberates through every sphere of thought and action bringing him disintegration and despair.

Man as the microcosm is the link between the material and spiritual worlds and the master of the forces of the created world. Sir Thomas Browne summed up this traditional idea in this way: "Thus is Man that great and true Amphibium, whose nature is disposed to live, not onely like other creatures in divers elements, but in divided and distinguished worlds."³³ The notions of man as the "middle," of the "vinculum," of "sympathy guaranteeing the unity of the universe and the parallelism of the micro-macrocosmistic events" are all interrelated and are significant elements in the structure of ancient, medieval, and Renaissance philosophy.³⁴ Milton was squarely in this tradition, using such views as image and principle in his cosmology.

The epistemological bases of Greek natural science were postulated on the analogy between the macrocosm nature and the microcosm man.³⁵ Implications for wider realms perhaps developed synchronously. In religion, particularly among the Alexandrians through the influence of Philo Judaeus, oriental and occidental interpretation came together. From this development, the macro-microcosm conception became a fundamental to many Jewish and Christian

sages.³⁶ Though in St. Augustine microcosmistic ideas are limited to that of the all-pervasiveness of order--the same order which holds together the universe is also within every being, and the more clearly visible the higher the being³⁷--the notion of the parallelism of micro-macrocosmistic events and conditions is "never completely lost in Christian thinking."³⁸ The idea was powerfully subscribed to down through the Renaissance in both art and ethics.

Robert Burton in 1621 summed up the ancient and medieval thought on the microcosmos in his glowing tribute to man: "Man, the most excellent, and noble creature of the world, the principall and mighty worke of God, wonder of Nature, as Zoroastes calls him; audacis naturae miraculum, the marvaile of marvailles, as Plato; the Abridgement and Epitome of the World, as Pliny; microcosmos, a little World." The implications of such an assertion are perhaps as infinite as they are grave. Man is given much, but much from him is expected. So Burton consequently agonizes all the more over man's original sin because man was "created microcosmus, a little world, a modell of the World, sole Commander and Governour of all the creatures in it."³⁹ Thus since what happens to man is invariably reflected in the other spheres, man must diligently cultivate his little world. This he does through the use of right reason and by revelation. In this way man effects order and harmony in his soul, his body, the microcosm, the body politic, the

macrocosm and the universe at large. The underlying purpose, then, of all man's activities and thought is to repair the breach occasioned by the Fall.

An analysis of Milton's prose and poetry shows how thoroughly these ideas permeate his deontology and art. Milton teaches the unity and relatedness of life. Unlike the dualists Calvin and Hobbes, Milton does not turn away from nature as evil. Rather he, like the Cambridge Platonists, sees God and nature as degrees of the same being. Hence his repudiation of any artificial restraints on religion and morality.⁴⁰ Milton, like Augustine, Aquinas, and Hooker, felt that the calls of the "law of nature" were stronger than any man-made restrictions or codes. For them, the law of nature included "man's capacity to reason, to contemplate, to comprehend [more than infallible moral judgment] the workings of his' own mind and body as well as of plants and animals and stars, resulting in scientific judgments as well as moral ones . . . [It] incorporated means as well as ends to man's material and spiritual happiness" (CPW, I, 17-18).⁴¹ In Milton, the law of nature is at times "identical with the law of God"; in other words, it is whatever "agreed with Milton's own interpretation of the Bible" or with his own "conception of right and wrong."⁴² There are Christian, Stoic, and Aristotelian elements in the concept as Milton used it in its various contexts. But at all times the poet-philosopher held the concept to be the

highest law because it is evidence of the direct bond between man and his creator. Therefore, as long as man governs himself rationally, acts according to his innate sense of what is just and right, he is by his goodness and freedom, beyond any artificial or man-made restraints--in case of conflict.

Closely related to the law of nature and many times fused with it in Milton's thought is the pivotal concept of right reason. Douglas Bush sets forth the following analysis of the concept: "It is a kind of rational and philosophic conscience which distinguishes man from beasts and which links man with man and with God. This faculty was implanted by God in all men, Christian and heathen alike, as a guide to truth and conduct. Though its effectual working may be obscured by sin, it makes man in his degree like God; it enables him, within limits, to understand the purposes of a God who is perfect reason as well as perfect justice, goodness and love."⁴³ Without a doubt, Bush's remarks suggest the wide implications and the pervasiveness of this concept in Milton's canon. Grounded in the Miltonic consciousness of a natural bond between man and his fellows and between man and God, right reason is another manifestation of the sympathetic principle that underlies Milton's sense of the unity of all truth--thus his awareness of and love for the spiritual contributions of the classical tradition. It is the sine qua non of order and harmony in the soul, in

the microcosm and in the macrocosm.

Occurring somewhat as leit motifs in Milton's deontology and ambiance, harmony and order undoubtedly are among his most basic predilections. Milton's ideas on harmony, like those of his age, are principally an adaptation of the Pythagorean conception of the "harmony of the spheres."

Milton, in his second prolusion as a Cambridge student, sets forth his interpretation of the Pythagorean tradition. As it were, the harmonious cosmos revolves on the spindle of Necessity which contains nine "enfolded Spheres." Upon each of these spheres sits a celestial siren who makes harmonious music as she turns the spindle round, Milton was later to relate in his "Arcades." Only Pythagoras heard the harmony. As a consequence of this, he descended to the earth to teach men its basic measures. But alas, by the sin of Prometheus, man's ears were bereft of the song. Only by recapturing that pure state of innocence and virtue can man again hear the music of the revolving stars.⁴⁴

The incorporeal, mathematical harmony which Pythagoras assumed to pervade the universe--though inaccessible to human ears, but to some degree accessible to human reason because it is reducible to numbers--is identified or joined with the notion of the world-soul permeating the universe. Gregory of Nyssa (fl. 379-394) might be adduced to illustrate this point. Commenting upon the correspondence of the soul of man and his body to the artist and his

musical instrument, Gregory states that "the soul informs the different organs like a musician eliciting different tones from different strings. The soul living in and endowing with life the whole of the body is the microcosmic analogy of the soul of God in the world; this is everywhere present as is shown by the all-binding, invisible harmony of contrasting elements in this world."⁴⁵ Thus the animating principle behind the harmony in the music of the instrument or that of the world, behind the soul of the body or that of the world, inheres in an elemental symbiosis between the created and the Creator. Therefore the "element of numbers, guaranteeing beauty, order and measure to the cosmos, is the one important and lasting element of the world-soul-- consequently, the human soul."⁴⁶ Hence the importance of music down through the ages not only as figure but as fact.

The transference of this mathematico-harmonical approach to the life of man in the community was a logical and inevitable development of the stage just discussed. From antiquity down through modern times, poets, scientists, and philosophers alike have vigorously appropriated from this concept brilliant and daring figures to express concord and consent among various parts within the whole scheme of things. Democritos, a Greek philosopher of the fifth century B.C., expressed perhaps the feeling of his time when he stated that the essence and happiness of mankind consist in "harmony." Archytas, Plato's Pythagorean friend, sought

(after 400 B.C.) to find the essence of the individual soul, as of the world-soul, in tones of music.⁴⁷ Such an endeavor was possible only in a cosmology based upon an active awareness of the sympathetic bonds uniting the natural and spiritual worlds. The derivation of the simile world-harmony itself is indicative of such relatedness. Originally fashioned, it is believed, on the attributes of the human lute, the concept of world harmony was reversed by the Pythagoreans who saw the human lute as an imitation of the music of the stars. Hence the numerous parallelisms of human and divine activities, i.e., of the processes of nature, of human art and divine art, i.e., of reasonable nature.⁴⁸

The relation between friendship and music is another significant reflection of the concept of world harmony deriving from antiquity. Friendship, accordingly, might be viewed as a musical performance which consists of the tuning of two souls. In Aristotle, perfect friendship, therefore, can exist with only one person because real accord of souls is more probable with one than with two persons. And so Castiglione's The Courtier and other Renaissance treatises on the subject of friendship down through the eighteenth century cult of friendship dwelt on the relationship as the tuning of two brother souls.⁴⁹ The similitude between this idea and that of fellow-feeling which inheres in sympathy is self-evident. Agrippa, in a typical Renaissance conceit, put it this way: "The sympathy among [the parts of the

world] is like that between two harps tuned to the same pitch. If one is struck, the strings of the other will also vibrate."⁵⁰ The appropriateness of this figure, no doubt, explains the pervasiveness of the harmony theme in all contexts of natural, human, and divine relationships.

Just as cures were supposedly effected by sympathetic powders, balms, and what not, it was also deduced that music produced a curative effect upon body and soul. Hence the vogue of psalmody and devotional music, to say nothing of the numerous uses of music for secular purposes. The high esteem in which music was held during the Renaissance is a fact too obvious to require comment. Indeed, one of the most common epithets used to characterize the age is that of "the nest of singing birds."⁵¹ Shakespeare's rich iconographical use of this tradition is well known; his dramatic use of mood music is also noteworthy. Milton was squarely in this musical tradition. Both as image and principle, Milton enhanced and enlarged the concept of harmony in many of its applications, actual or imaginative.

As the Renaissance wore on, astronomy made serious inroads into the hitherto secure metaphysical strongholds. The belief in the music of the spheres drew one of the first blows. Once it was fairly well given up as principle, it continued as a prolific source of images. Sir Thomas Browne furnishes a fine example of this latter development. "There is a music where ever there is harmony, order, or

proportion; and thus far we may maintain the music of the Spheres; for those well-ordered motions, and regular paces, though they give no sound unto the ear, yet to the understanding they strike a note full of harmony." Observing the salutary effect of any music upon him, Browne assuredly arrives at the position that "the soul . . . hath its nearest sympathy with Musick."⁵² Thus it is also seen that the appeals of music were far-reaching and profound; consequently, it is many times hard to determine where the line really falls that separates its use as image from that as principle. But this was hardly a concern of Milton's age.

The idea of sympathy, then, is a fountainhead from which flowed many significant and vital streams. It touched or intermingled with the predominant currents of ancient, medieval, and modern thought. The concepts of magnetism, the chain of being, hierarchy of being, the corresponding planes of the microcosm and the macrocosm, harmony and order as well as the ethical principles of right reason and the law of nature and their numerous implications all depend for their meaning on an elemental awareness of a fundamental relationship among created things and their Creator. The nature and extent of this perceived relationship has profound implications for man's religious, philosophical (scientific), and societal doctrines. Nor is the relationship always seen from one side only. Indeed the same principle underlying the sympathetic impulse informing the concepts above is also

the theoretical basis of the tangential developments of magic, astrology, alchemy, and Hermeticism. Since they were very much a part and parcel of the intellectual equipage of Milton's age, it is well to consider their role in Renaissance art and thought.

It is generally conceded that even the most creative minds from ancient down through medieval and Renaissance times believed fully in the sympathetic bonds linking all reality, the hierarchy of being, the existence of occult qualities, the astral influences, the actions of good and bad demons, and the dignity of man as the "knot of the universe," as Ficino put it.⁵³ But the exploitation of these beliefs out of pride or hope of gain was met with censure by some of the Church Fathers. St. Augustine had objected to these practices because he suspected them to be contrary to faith and morals. So had St. Aquinas. Many others saw the belief in certain astral influences contrary to the belief in the freedom of man and could not therefore lend them total credence.⁵⁴

During the Italian Renaissance, magic and astrology rose to a new prominence. Part of the Plotinic heritage, being itself a mixture of the Neo-Pythagorean, Gnostic, and oriental sources, the Renaissance views on magic came to England, as did most of other classical learning of the age, via Ficino. With Ficino Cabbalistic, and Hermetic notions are fused with Ficinian Platonism. Consequently, the plan of

the magic involved not only sorceries, witchcraft, and demonology, but also the whole concept of the world and man's relation to it.⁵⁵ To the Renaissance mentality magic was not a force "hemming man's freedom in, but a tool used to win dominion over the world." Hence it did not portend loss of freedom; rather it promised a liberation of man from his "subjection to the usual order of nature."⁵⁶ Thus the view of man's exalted position in the universe was especially attractive to magicians. They reasoned that "since man stood between the upper and nether worlds, he could reach out and apply the powers of each to his own purposes."⁵⁷ Far from denigrating man, this view emphasized the divine power in man. Hence the popularity and wide acceptance of magic and the occult sciences.

Of course magical practices conflicted with the orthodox faith and as such necessitated at least an attempt at the reconciliation of the two. Agrippa, for one, tried to "explain much of his occultism in purely naturalistic terms." Assigning many of the so-called magical effects to natural forces, he tried to deemphasize or obliterate the stigma of demonic influence. He tried to show that the mind needed aid from God to attain power over the universe; therefore, far from jeopardizing his relationship with God, magic actually furthered his faith. "He believed that the cabalistic, Hermetic, and other supposedly ancient sources would restore knowledge of God's original revelation, and so would

assist the work of religious regeneration."⁵⁸ But Agrippa, like others of his kind, was unsuccessful in his attempts to reconcile the practice of magic with orthodoxy. Though Milton toys with the idea in some of his earlier works as a charming diversion, magic in Paradise Lost is relegated to the realm of the demons.⁵⁹

But Hermeticism and its concomitant, alchemy, fascinated the seventeenth-century mind. Based on revelation and empiricism, these traditions made up a supplementary reservoir from which Christian authors incessantly drew figures, imagery, and at times, notions. Literary references such as elixir, signatures, essences, influences, are indicative of this trend. John Donne and Sir Thomas Browne were particularly fascinated by Hermetic imagery. But as a reservoir of typology, Hermeticism had earlier gained the sanction of the Church Fathers. "Lactantius cites Hermes--along with Plato, Aristotle, Antisthenes, Thales, Anaximenes, Pythagoras, Cleanthes, Chrysippus, Zeno, Seneca, and Cicero as among the philosophers who testify mightily to the one God . . . And in the Renaissance, Richard Hooker cites 'Mercurious Trismegistus'--along with Homer, Anaxagoras, Plato, and the Stoics--in support of the proposition that" the heathens had made significant steps toward the discovery of the true God.⁶⁰ So the Renaissance man could feel fairly safe in drawing from any or all of these sources. Such a fact is further testimony of the philosophical presupposition

and universal acceptance of the doctrine of sympathy.

Since this matter was rather common property during the Renaissance and since Milton devoted a long period of his life to diligent and full study of the available tradition, his knowledge of the sources cited is a well-founded assumption. Besides, he mentions many of them in his Commonplace Book and in other pieces. At times Milton echoes others of these commentators without directly quoting them: the knowledge was so common that it was not only second-nature to Milton, but he could also count on it to be so for his audience.

Milton's doctrine of sympathy, then, is eclectic. It absorbs from the tradition whatever is suitable to its purposes and makes it into the poet's own through his unique interpretation or use. For, as Anne Ferry says, "the whole energy of his mind was directed toward the search for unity, his language reaching always toward expression of the wholeness of experience. . . . All his beliefs and habits of mind denied the division of spirit and matter, of physical and psychological experience, of fact and meaning."⁶¹ Milton's belief in the doctrine of sympathy, as I see it, is the philosophical basis of this quest for unity of experience and of the shape that it takes in his deontology and ambience. Before I test this hypothesis in a detailed examination of specific works of Milton, a preliminary inquiry is necessitated to show Milton's relationship to the literary climate

of his own age. Since the idea was rather universally accepted down through Milton's time, we gain perspective by taking a cursory glance at the doctrine of sympathy as it functioned in the works of some of his immediate predecessors and contemporaries. This inquiry will reveal both similarities and contrasts. Its aim is to suggest tendencies based on what are considered representative examples. In Herbert and Donne, the focus is on man; in Vaughan, it is on nature.

CHAPTER II

THE LITERARY PERSPECTIVE

What ever is, is Life and Energie
From God, who is the Originall of all;
Who being everywhere doth multiplie
His own broad shade that endlesse
throughout all doth lie.
Henry More, Democritus Platonissans

Then sing of secret things that came
to pass
When Bedlam Nature in her cradle was.
John Milton, "At a Vacation Exercise,"
Works, I, 45-46

As far back as Homer, the sympathetic bond of nature has been a philosophical presupposition which characterizes a dominant trend in Western world literature. The ocean grieves, the spear is brave, the grain joys in the rain--nature shares in the grief of humans and the sense of intimacy between man and the world of nature is a commonplace. Drama, poetry, especially the elegy were all informed by the concept of sympathy in image and principle. English literature, as well as its extensions, is a part of this tradition both in substance and thought. From the Anglo-Saxons to the Victorians, relatedness in the universe is a basic assumption, being most compatible with the Romantic temper. The

anonymous poet showed nature in sympathy with the plight of the wanderer in "The Wanderer." Chaucer in Troilus and Creseyde, Book III, credited this "holy bond of thynges." James Thomson, Wordsworth, and Shelley made the bond with nature their core principle of moral idealism.

American literature likewise reflects this abiding concern with the unity of existence. Many literary characters are portrayed as experiencing this bond with nature: Natty Bumpo in the prairies and woods of this country's virgin soil; Henry David Thoreau afloat on Walden Pond; Huck and Jim on the Mississippi; and Walt Whitman observing a blade of grass. Melville in Chapter LXXII of Moby Dick declared the unity of man with his fellows in his use of the rope to symbolize the bond of humanity, "the precise situation of every mortal that breathes," the "the Siamese connexion with a plurality of other mortals."¹ Likewise, Hawthorne in Ethan Brand described the human bond as all men linked together in a "magnetic chain of humanity."²

Twentieth century literature becomes increasingly a rhapsody on broken harmony, a lament for the loss of unity with God, man, and nature. Yet the sympathetic impulse is most eloquent by its conscious and unconscious denial. W.B. Yeats's cry in "Second Coming": "Things fall apart, the center cannot hold" is a bleak appraisal of the contemporary attitude.

Milton's age was the last great age with a common

center that did hold. But already the shades of a negative scientific spirit were closing in upon it and many felt that all coherence was surely gone. Others, however, like Milton, rested in the faith that things would not fall apart so long as God held the center. The turn, then, to the sympathetic bond of nature as an assurance of meaning and morality in the universe is interesting in its variety of expressions, whether from the poet or the philosopher.

The Cambridge Platonists used sympathy as a seminal concept in their apologetics. Seeking the best of both worlds, pagan and Christian, they sought to penetrate the religious conflicts of the age by appeals to sympathy. Following Whichcote, Henry More, one of the leading Cambridge Platonists, felt that emphasis should be placed not on doctrinal agreement but on human sympathy and charity.³ From More's notion of an "incorporeal substance in the human being he moved to the idea of a spirit of nature holding together the different parts of the universe."⁴ From this point, More went on to define the spiritual substance higher than the spirit of nature. This he called God. Thus More was able to evolve a world view which could accommodate scientific thought with "philosophical knowledge, spiritual insight, and religious revelation."⁵ In ethics, sympathy came to be emphasized mainly as a reaction to Hobbes's postulations on man in the state of nature as the battle of each against all.⁶ According to Crane, Hobbes jolted a

number of Anglican divines into making sympathy a primary tenet in their sermons.⁷

Indubitably, the notion of sympathy informs the best poetry of the seventeenth century, for much of it reflects the ethical concerns of the day. The vision of oneness is clearly evident in the widespread poetic concern for the rendering of the Eden myth in its many forms. Nearly every poet engaged this theme and its implications of primal harmony. Whether it was a Traherne or a Vaughan in his Edenic vision of innocence or childhood, or a Donne in his portrayal of two lovers who make each other's world, the seventeenth-century poet, invariably, goes back in one manner or the other to that period in Judaeo-Christian history when the state of perfect universal sympathy characterized the universe. Perhaps this was a means to achieve through art what reality increasingly denied.

Milton's age was not so different in the kinds of emphasis that it gave the doctrine of sympathy as it was in its applications. Shakespeare, for example, had used the idea of nature's sympathy with man to reinforce events of great moment in the lives of the great. In Julius Caesar, violent storms portend the death of Caesar. The tempest in Lear's soul is attended by a tempest in nature. But these devices do not necessarily lend themselves to deontological concerns. Shakespeare's world view, best enunciated in Troilus and Cressida, throws into relief a telling difference

between himself and Milton as well as between the tempers of their respective times. Shakespeare puts the Renaissance concept of harmony and order in the mouth of Ulysses:

The heavens themselves, the planets, and
this centre,
Observe degree, priority, and place
insisture

Take but degree away, untune that string,
And hark, what discord follows! Each
In mere oppugnancy.⁸

Milton's chain of being, as has been shown, was dynamic, allowed ascension by merit. Shakespeare's is static, indicative of the relative conservatism of the age. Milton's age was revolutionary. Milton's view of the chain further reflects his optimism regarding man's possibilities with God at the center.

The seventeenth century is generally more balanced in its perception of man's possibilities than was the Elizabethan. Perhaps three examples will serve to illustrate this point. Very much in the tradition of sympathy, each of these men was deeply religious, a lover of this world and of the other. Alike in many ways, George Herbert, John Donne, and Henry Vaughan serve as an enlightening contrast with Milton in their application of the doctrine of sympathy. The differences, as I see them then, are not so much in perception of man's relationship to God, man, and nature as in the conclusions drawn about the responsibility inherent therein.

George Herbert saw his relationship to God as that of a benign taskmaster working along with the worker and thus making the enterprise a pleasure not a task. Richard Baxter, the famous Latitudinarian, showed his estimate of Herbert by "quoting the poet's 'Home' in full at the end of his 'The Saints' Everlasting Rest'; and in the preface to his Poetical Fragments (1681), Baxter stated of Herbert's faith: 'Herbert speaks to God like one that really believeth a God, and whose business in the world is most with God. Heart-work and heaven-work make up his Books.'"⁹ Such is a splendid appraisal of Herbert's concept of relatedness and responsibility. For Herbert saw in the least significant things lessons on his relationship with God. The object is always secondary and God is primary in Herbert's deontology and ambiance. For Milton God too is always the center; but he so fuses the idea of God in all with that of God above all that his reader is forced to maintain a just sense of proportionate merit. Thus Milton never agonizes over man's unworthiness; rather he stresses his potential because man is made in God's image. This idea, as we shall see, was at the heart of Milton's deontology and ambiance. Herbert is perennially aware of man's imperfection. In "Even-Song," he expresses this conviction:

Thus in thy ebony box
Thou dost inclose us, till the day
Put our amendment in our way,
And give new wheels to our disorder'd
 clocks.

.
 My god thou art all love,
 Not one poore minute scapes thy
 breast,
 But brings a favour from above;
 And in this love, more then in bed,
 I rest.
 (Works, p. 64.)

Yet Herbert is aware of the tension of the middle state in the chain of being. Rather than worry about ascension he is reconciled to it and accepts such as the human condition.

For sure thy way is best
 Stretch or contract me, thy poore
 debter:
 This is but tuning of my breast,
 To make the musick better.

Whether I flie with angels, fall with
 dust,
 Thy hands made both, and I am there:
 Thy power and love, my love and trust
 Make one place evry where.
 ("The Temper," Works, p. 55)

Herbert's relationship to his Maker seems always to inhere in the bestowal of grace by God as an unmerited favor; Milton sees merit as a precondition to grace, as we shall see. Such an attitude towards man's potential worth explains much as to the role one plays in his advancement. Where Milton was for around twenty years engaged in active reform, Herbert is decidely orthodox--a confirmed Anglican.

Herbert is no dualist. As the last lines above indicate, he sees the unity of existence in God. Such knowledge aids his peaceful resignation to the human condition. Not disturbed by violation of degree, as was Shakespeare,

Herbs gladly cure our flesh; because
they

Finde their acquaintance there
For us the winds do blow

.....
Nothing we see but means our good.
(Works, p. 91)

But man sometimes misuses the fullness of the earth:

He treads down that which doth be-
friend him, pale
and wan.

Oh mightie love! Man is one world
and hath

Another to attend him.
(Works, p. 92)

Both worlds, however, must be kept fit for God to dwell in;
and man is given the responsibility of the microcosm and the
macrocosm. But man's insufficiency to meet his task is re-
flected in Herbert's plea:

Since then, my God, thou hast
So brave a Palace built; O dwell in it,
That it may dwell with thee at last!
Till then afford us so much wit;
That as the world serves us, we may
serve thee
And both thy servants be.
(Works, pp. 91-92)

As God is the active agent here, so generally does Herbert
think of the role of the Christian in passive terms. Thus
he subordinates every consideration to the part it plays in
cementing man's relationship to God. Herbert, then, sees the
unity of the world and hence, sympathy of the parts, in God;
but he generally is not concerned about the parts except as
they lead him to reflection on the Creator behind them.
Therefore, he studies nature because:

It is thy highest art
To captivate strong holds to thee.

· · · · ·
O smooth my rugged heart, and
 there
Engrave thy rev'rend Law and fear.
(*"Nature," Works*, p. 45)

Christ's birth and his death are prime events to Herbert for they show forth God's perfection and man's imperfection:

We cannot reach our Saviours puritie;
Yet are we bid, Be holy ev'n as he.
In both let's do our best.
(*"Lent," Works*, p. 87)

But his is not the call to an active quest for perfection that is evident in Milton, who regards man's relationship with God as an incentive to be like Him.

John Donne, another seventeenth-century poet who flourished during the transitional phase covering the first third of the century, also supplies interesting similarities and contrasts with Milton's perception and application of the doctrine of sympathy. His well-known verbal gymnastics, I suggest, find much of their source and vitality in his sympathetic impulse. His works reveal appropriations from the basic ambiance of sympathy: the chain, microcosmistic notions, the harmony theme, and the elementaristic modes of influence, affinity, and unity. Having played many parts in life--from that of the rake to that of the eminent dean of St. Paul--Donne had a broad vision of life and its essential relatedness. To Donne, love in all of its forms is the common denominator. "Since lovers are their own world, their feelings resemble, by their harmony, the concentric spheres

of the Ptolemaic universe."¹⁰ In one of his sermons, Donne expresses the sympathetic orientation of his concept of love. "Love is a Possessory Affection, it delivers over him that loves into the possession of that he loves; it is a transmutatory Affection, it changes him that loves into the very nature of that he loves, and he is nothing else."¹¹

Belief in the unity of existence brought Donne despair as well as bliss. Reflecting the great concern of the hylozoists at the turn of the century, Donne lamented the decay of the world and all of its implications. Poets grieved that because of man's original sin, the biblical prophecy of destruction by fire was hard at hand. Davies of Hereford is a splendid example:

Our Sinnes have so the Elements
 defil'd
 That they with Fire must need re-
 fined be;
 Nay, more; our sins the Heav'ns them-
 selves have soil'd;
 Then melt they must, from soile to
 set them free.¹²
 ("The Muses Sacrifice")

Such bleak portents had been precipitated by the disturbance of man's faith in the heavenly order consequent to certain scientific discoveries. Beginning perhaps with that of Copernicus in 1543 which disclosed the irregularity of the movement of some stars and planets, man could no longer be sure that order governed the microcosm or the macrocosm. The discoveries of new stars in 1572, 1600, and 1604 further accelerated the crumbling of the old medieval synthesis.

Brahe and Kepler added more experimental evidence to the data already collected on terrestrial and celestial processes. Galileo's telescope added more verification of cosmic disorder. In short, the new science gained foothold as the foundations on which the old cosmology rested began to crumble.¹³ Such a development, Donne said in "Anatomie of the World," "calls all in doubt,"

The sun is lost, and th' earth, and
no man's wit
Can well direct him where to look for
it.
And freely men confesse that this
world's spent,
When in the Planets, and the Firmament
They seeke so many new; they see that
this
Is crumbled out againe to his Atomies.
'Tis all in peeces, all coherence gone;
All just supply, and all Relation.¹⁴

Disturbance in one realm then is reflected throughout the whole. Just as "One woman at one blow, then kill'd us all," so "one by one, they kill us now," for the "first marriage was our funeral" (ll. 106-107, 105). The act which originally broke universal harmony is still the cause of death and of all that is now "quite out of joynt" (l. 192).

Union and order in the parts of this total frame had originally been evident by the fact "the noblest part, man, felt [the breach] first, and then / Both beasts and plants, [were] curst in the curse of man" (ll. 183-84). But Donne felt the process of degeneration continuous and probably then in its last days. Many years later, Donne is still concerned about the effects of the curse brought on the

"whole frame" by man's original sin, and he concludes that even now "the heavens as well as the earth" are in a state of "sensible decay and mortality."¹⁵ Milton, as we shall later see, reasoned in the opposite direction from the same phenomena: because God is perfect order, disorder cannot ultimately prevail.

But Donne can find more bliss in his microcosmistic portrayals of love as the universal principle. The little analogical world of the lovers is animated by a unity of body and soul. Though Donne does at times disparage the body in favor of the soul, typically he sees them in partnership. The body is not the soul's "dross," but its "alloy," he tells us in "The Extasie." It is through the body that the souls can reach each other. And:

On man heaven's influence workes not so,
But that it first imprints the ayre,
So soule into soule may flowe,
Though it to body first repaire.
(Works, p. 47)

The sympathy between lovers is depicted as "the soules language" (l. 22). Talk then is unnecessary (l. 20). The paradoxical nature of human love in all of its fluctuations, Donne carries over into the realm of divine love.

Basically his concern to explain his relationship to God, man, and nature are approached through the portals of love--physical, intellectual, and divine. But he had that Keatsian ability to dwell in uncertainties. Hence his lifelong intellectual struggles and his longing for heaven's

fulfillment. The feeling of sympathy between God and his creation is at the moral base of his ideas. He yearns for a closer union with God, but is ever aware of the separation caused by sin--the corrupter of both the microcosm and the macrocosm. His sermons and religious verse reflect this tension. Mainly, it takes the form of a debate between the goodness of God's grace symbolized in the blood of the lamb and the extent of man's unworthiness.

Perhaps the following passage from one of Donne's sermons, based on II Peter 1: 3-10, best summarizes his final view of the sympathetic bond of nature:

By his precious promises we are partakers of the divine nature. . . . not that we so derived from the nature and essence of God, as that our soul should be of his very substance. . . . That God should be all in all, so as that at last, the whole nature of mankind, and indeed, all other natures and substances . . . should be swallowed up, and drowned in the very substance of God himself. But this transmutation is a glorious restoring of Gods image in us, and it is our conformity to him; and when either his temporal blessings, or his afflictions, his sun, or his fire, hath tried us up to that height, to a conformity to him, then come we to that transmutation, which admits no re-transmutation, which is a modest, but infallible assurance of a final perseverance, so to be joyned to the Lord, as to be one spirit with him; for as a spirit cannot be divided, so they who are thus changed into him, are so much His, so much He, as that nothing can separate them from him; and this is the ladder, by which we try, how far we are in the way to heaven.

(Sermons, I, 164)

Though Donne was aware of each of the secular implications of this bond of nature and used them many times in his verse and prose, as any careful study of his imagery will reveal, the foregoing statement perfectly incorporates the

doctrine of sympathy in its higher manifestations. It is a statement of the unity of all in God, impaired by the Fall, of the need for restoration of this unity by accepting the redemption made available by the Son, and of his faith therefrom of a final indissoluble union with God. It differs from Milton's doctrine of sympathy only in its implicit passivity.

Though Douglas Bush mentions some instances of Donne's Anglican intolerance,¹⁶ Donne, by and large was not the revolutionary Milton was. Perhaps, with both Donne and Herbert, one of the explanations for non-revolutionary spirit--excepting their church affiliations and the relatively calm decades in which they wrote--is their comparative views on the potential nature and extent of man's capabilities and his responsibility for the amelioration of his condition. Donne could hold himself apart from the ecclesiastical and political controversies of his day by, as I see it, a negative appeal to the doctrine of sympathy: "I never fettered nor imprisoned the word Religion . . . nor immuring it in a Rome, or a Wittenberg, or a Geneva; they are all virtuall beams of one Sun, and wherever they find clay hearts, they harden them, and moulder them into dust; and they entender and mollifie waxen."¹⁷ Then, in a plea for emphasis on the common element in all religions that anticipates a statement Milton is later to make in Areopagitica, Donne says: "They are not so contrary as the

North and South Poles; and . . . they are connatural pieces of one circle."¹⁸ Milton would agree with this basic statement; but he would not stop there. Rather he would use this as a strong incentive to search for the true beam.

Henry Vaughan presents still another phase of the tradition of sympathy. While Herbert and Donne, to a large extent, were concerned with nature and man as parts of the great universal order, their focus is on man. Natural imagery is used essentially to explain man and his relationship to man or to a larger pattern of divinity. Vaughan sees the richness and sanctity of nature for itself--not however, to the exclusion of the symbolical value of the wider world of existence. He sees in nature's response to God a natural law which, in turn, leads him to see the order in the universe as a reflection of God's purpose and the evidence of the "intercourse between him and it."¹⁹ In this respect he is closer to Milton than to Herbert or Donne.

The basic concerns of Vaughan in his poetry center on God's immanence and transcendence in His creations. To express his essential ideas Vaughan, like the other poets of this period, used the available tradition. He speaks of "hidden ascents," "spheres of rings," "signatures," "harmony," "the symphony of nature," "flints," and "divine rays" in contexts other than those of devotional literature. They are the staple commodity of the Hermetic and alchemical tradition; for Hermeticism and alchemy, like magic,

have orientations in the doctrine of sympathy, as we have already seen. But such imagery was used for the negative and the positive, as Vaughan skillfully demonstrates. Such use too is inherent in the concept of relatedness. More contemporaneous with Milton than Herbert or Donne, Vaughan had more emotional attachment to nature and its bond of sympathy with God and man. Yet his concept of relatedness did not lead him to join hands in the reformation of the world; it led him to withdraw from the world as a mystic. A few examples from Vaughan's poetry will illustrate the foregoing conclusions.

Vaughan sees in magnetism clues to a universal principle in nature. From certain manifestations of this phenomenon in nature, he goes on to draw conclusions about attraction in other areas. Miss Mahood has noted that "Vaughan, more than other poets, sees this correspondence as a circulation of sympathy between the various planes of existence."²⁰ Hence the poet says in "To Amoret":

Thus to the North the Loadstones move,
And thus to them th' enamour'd steel
 aspires:
Thus Amoret,
I doe affect;
And thus by winged beames, and mutuall
 fire,
Spirits and Stars conspire,
And this is Love.²¹

As the North draws the loadstone, so lovers attract each other; and all the elements are so united by the principle of sympathy. Instinctively, then, like seeks like.

A further example of this sympathetic bond of nature may be adduced from "Cock-Crowing." Because of the affinity planted in the cock by nature, he responds to the sun by crowing:

Father of Lights! What Sunnie seed,
 What glance of day hast thou confined
 Into this bird? To all the breed
 This busie ray thou hast assigned;
 Their magnetisme works all night,
 And dreams of Paradise and light.
 (Works, II, 488)

And then Vaughan moves to the logical conclusion:

If such a tincture, such a touch
 So firm a longing can impowre
 Shall thy own image think it much
 To watch for thy appearing hour?
 (Works, II, 488)

With this mystical insight, the poet is forced to reflect on the only obstacle which prevents the perfect fusion of himself with his Maker--the veil of the flesh:

This veyle by full-ey'd love denies,
 And only gleams and fractions spies.

And in passionate plea for mystical union, he cries:

O take it off! Make no delay,
 But brush me with thy light, that I
 May shine unto a perfect day,
 And warme me at thy glorious eye!
 (Works, II, 489)

Further evidence of Vaughan's use of the elementaristic mode of sympathy is seen in his concern for astral influence. He shows the influence of the stars on plants and other forms of external nature as well as on man. Though bodies infected, depraved or dead can with stars have no sympathy,

These are the Magnets which so strongly
And work all might ^{move} upon thy light and
As beauteous shapes, we know not why,
Command and guide the eye.

For where desire, celestiall, pure desire
Hath taken root, and grows, and doth not
tire,
There God a Commerce states and sheds
His secret on their heads.
(Works, II, 490)

Thus Vaughan learns the lesson that those who give their hearts to God will likewise feel His effect as do the herbs when they "put on their youth and green" (ll. 29-32).

In a symbolic use of sympathy, Vaughan equates his lover's face with a star:

But Amoret, such is my fate
That if thy face a Starre
Had shin'd from farre,
I am perswaded in that state
Twixt thee and me,
Of some predestined sympathie.
(Works, II, 7)

Just as there is more active commerce between the stars and certain objects, so is there a stronger attraction between lovers who have a natural affinity for each other.

Vaughan, then, sees nature as a visible representation of interrelationship governing the universe. He too is concerned about the effects of the Fall on this relationship. Man, he feels, is doomed to be an exile from his former Eden, "a sully'd flowre" cast out of Paradise (Works, II, 411). But some may yearn for and achieve the mystical union with God. This is the end of Vaughan's quest.

Glimpses and fractions seen in nature are his inspiration. The bonds of nature to Vaughan, then, are real and individual. His approach is not social, but ascetic.

So three men in Milton's age shared a similar perception of the doctrine of sympathy, but differed in the application they made of its tutelage. Herbert is the most balanced in his approach to the unity of existence. But his sense of unworthiness does occasion intermittent seasons of despair. He can accept the ebbs and flows of life because "Christ left his grave-clothes, that we might, when grief / Draws tears, or bloud, not want a handkerchief." (Works, II, 112). Thus so secure did he feel in the love of God that he was not moved to a higher zeal than that of the inspirational parson.

John Donne is the most passionate in romantic and divine love, the most insatiable. Incessantly aware of his debt paid by Christ on the cross, after his commitment to the religious life, he was ever seeking ways to repay this supreme example of love--yet ever aware of the impossibility of his achieving this goal. Having known all sides of life, either vicariously or actually, he drew upon this rich repository for ways to express his yearning for a fulfillment of the unity he perceived. His distinctive conceits, his perennial debates on the relative merit of matter and spirit --only to conclude in favor of both--his bifocal view of life and death are all reflections of his desire to come to

grips with unity in disparity. He was indeed involved in mankind as a man of the world, a poet, and as a preacher. Humanity was his first concern; but he was no active reformer. Perhaps it was due mainly to Donne's "negative capability" that he, seemingly unable to dwell in certainties, did not choose the mantle of the reformer.

Henry Vaughan is most deeply immersed in the mysteries of the bond of nature as the handiwork of God. To him, nature is a symphony with God as the conductor. In praise of this perfect orchestration, Vaughan is moved to say: "Hark! In what rings/ And hymning circulation, the quick world/ Awakes and sings!" (Works, II, 424). This is the perennial miracle that Vaughan celebrates in his verse. Life to him is ever a waiting for the dawn, his symbol of fulfillment²²--the final dispensing of the darkness of this world by the Light of Lights. But the perfect sympathy of nature with God whets his desire for the mystical union with God on earth. This is his quest. Any imagery from the available tradition which helped Vaughan to express this union of life in God, he used. As his thoughts were mainly directed towards the other world, he could not be an active reformer. A mystic, he could entertain very few hopes for regeneration of any but the individual man.

The concept of sympathy enriched the ambiance of each of these poets according to his personal predilections. But these men were basically at home in their faith; and

though the tone of each is to an extent inspirational, it is certainly not revolutionary. Deontology, then, is minimal if not completely absent. It remains then for Milton to combine the best elements of the tradition with the reformer's zeal. Milton does not agonize over man's insufficiency as did Donne or Herbert. Rather he sees unlimited possibilities for "man's immortal mind in its quest of universal knowledge and wisdom, a goal ascertainable only by the good."²³ Milton, then, places God at the center of the good life. Man created in the image of God can make of this world what God originally intended it to be through contemplation and action according to the precept and example of the Christ. We now turn to Milton's early works to see how the doctrine of sympathy functions in the poet's evolving deontology and ambiance.

CHAPTER III

THE POET HIMSELF A POEM: TOWARDS INDIVIDUAL HARMONY AND PROPORTION

He who would not be frustrate in his hope to write well
in laudable things, ought himselfe to be a true Poem,
that is, a composition, and patterne of the best and
honourablest things.

John Milton, Apology for Smectymnuus

The desire to be a true poem is a desire for harmony, for unity among the parts according to a conscious purpose and plan. If we accept Milton's own account of the evolution of his plan for excellence in his life and his art, then the desire to be a true poem is the controlling influence in his choice of a goal for himself as well as of the activities engaged in to achieve such an end. To be a true poem, then, is to shape oneself by the highest pattern of the greatest good. For Milton, this greatest good is to be found in the accumulated wisdom of the ages. From his conscientious and systematic study of this lore he affirmed his faith in the great Christian exemplar, the Son of God. The discovery of his relationship and responsibility to this pattern is, as I see it, the concern of the early poems.

Milton's early activities are mainly self-directed:

he devotes most of his time to study and contemplation. Knowledge and virtue are the means to his end, the tools with which he shapes the elements of the poem into fitness to serve. The fitness declares his relationship to the pattern, the service, his responsibility. A life of virtue, Milton had learned through his wide reading, is possible for the pagan as well as the Christian; but the quality and limitations of the pagan virtue, Milton still had to reexamine at this point. The doctrine of self-sufficiency extolled by the classics engaged Milton for a time. The early poems, I suggest, reflect Milton's attempt to come to grips with the role of individualism in the heavenly quest, its part in the composition of the true poem-poet. The "Hymn on the Morning of Christ's Nativity," Comus, and Lycidas, though all are explicitly occasional, represent successive stages in the development of Milton's perception of individual limitations and possibilities.

Milton's program of excellence, as reflected in his work of the period down to 1640, revolves around a consciousness of his relationship to the divine. As a unit it resembles an ordered pattern of meditation not unlike the Platonic ascent up the ladder of virtue through rungs of heavenward movement to a vision of unity with the divine. Woodhouse outlines such a form of meditation in another connection: "a meditation of the love of God as revealed first in the creation and then in the Incarnation, in Christ's

earthly ministry and his redemption of fallen man, with the response of love which this love demands."¹ While this pattern of necessity does not include all the poet's works, it does suggest an important tendency and it helps to explain the vision of oneness evident throughout the poet's work.

While Milton was still at St. Paul's School, he showed himself alive to nature, the external manifestation of divine immanence. The "Elegiac Verses,"² worthy of note only in passing, shows the poet's minute observation of nature as a part of God's creation. He remarks on the affinities of the grass and the dew, the violets and the grain. The depiction of the coming of the dawn with the cock as its sentinel might be said to anticipate Vaughan's "Morning-Watch." Even the "Fable of a Peasant and his Landlord" seems to be indicative of Milton's nascent interest in the elemental natural and human symbiosis by its account of the effects of greed and covetousness on a tree's productivity. In the care of the kind peasant, the tree flourished; but once it was relinquished to the selfish landlord, both the tree and fruit were lost.³ His "Elegy the Fifth," recounts the natural effects of spring, not the least of which is its real or supposed effect upon the poet's genius: "My soul is deeply stirred, is all aglow with mysterious impulses, the madness of inspiration and holy sounds stir me to my deeps within" (I, 12-15). While these are youthful efforts, they certainly indicate the poet's sensitivity to a bond of

nature and a more than casual interest in it.

Nature and the poetic talent have already been associated in Milton's early works. The indication that the poet desires a serious muse is quite evident in his first great English poem, "On the Morning of Christ's Nativity." In this poem Milton skillfully combines the themes of divine, human, and cosmic sympathy in his study of the Incarnation. The Nativity itself is not the poet's primary interest, for that limits the event to the human realm. Milton, I suggest, is concerned with the relationship which Christ's coming signified, not the mere event of His coming. Furthermore it is because of his propensity towards relationship and responsibility, which I attribute to the sympathetic impulse, that he chose such an emphasis. The questions of relationship and responsibility were very much his concern in his desire to become the "composition and pattern of the best and honourablest things." The Incarnate Christ, I suggest, not only furnishes the best example of the combination of the human and the divine--a marriage of heaven and earth--but also the best example of the pattern for Milton's poem-poet. It is Christ as the testimony of the relationship between God and His creations and Christ as the great exemplar that engaged the mind of Milton.

The relationship between God and His creation is the unifying element in the Ode. It is announced in the prologue in the skillfully adumbrated account of the divine lineage

of the Son who through maternity of a "wedded Maid, and
Virgin Mother"

Forsook the Courts of everlasting Day,
And chose with us a darksome House of
mortal Clay.
(I, 3, 13-14).

Such an account depicts the blending of the human and the divine not only in relationship but also in responsibility. The Son, through God's mercy, assumed the responsibility for man's redemption by entering the world through a human in human form. By this means, He releases "our deadly forfeit," restores our relationship with the Father abrogated by the sin of the first parents, and imposes upon man the responsibility of accepting this gift and thereby securing for himself "a perpetual peace" (I, 4, 6-7).

The meaning of the Incarnation, then, is the sealing of a bond between man and his Creator. It is the meaning of life for all who accept the gift of God's love; for Christ sets into motion the means by which man might conquer death which came into the world as a consequence of the Fall. His life is the pattern; His death is the price. So Milton does not dwell on Christ as the Bleeding Lamb. Except for the abortive effort in "The Passion," Milton wrote only one other poem on the subject of the crucifixion, "Upon the Circumcision." He returns to the theme in P.L., XII, 395-450, to indicate its place in the history of man. I suggest that one of the explanations for this reluctance is the greater appeal of the theme of Christ the Exemplar. In the latter,

the poet could find support for his concept of merit as a basis for ascent; and the life of Christ as depicted by its effect on all parts of creation is implicatory of the possibilities for the man who strives to be like Him.

Not only, then, is the poet concerned to show the relationship between the divine and human, but he is also concerned to show the relation of God to nature as well. Milton, in keeping with tradition, holds that before the Fall man, nature, and God existed in perfect sympathy; but "disproportioned sin" broke the original harmonious state. The Son's coming prepares the way for a reunion of all in God, for He is visible evidence of the relationship of the parts to a responsible whole. I think Miss Tuve's observation of peace as the center of this poem is apt because she incorporates into this term "all those wide and deep meanings [Milton] has gathered in, touching the redemption of all nature from guilty harmony and final union with the divine light."⁴ Peace is certainly an effect of the Son's coming and a manifestation of the fact that the primal union was not entirely destroyed by the Original Sin. But that peace is not yet to be. The Son sets into motion the means of reparation; but the perfect union, without which there can be no true peace, is a futuristic projection. Rather the center of the poem is the relationship between God and His creatures that it is now possible to salvage from the ruins incurred by the Fall. The effect of the Nativity of

the Son on the entire creation declares that the universal bond of sympathy, though abrogated, is not destroyed. Man's receptivity to this relationship and its consequent benefits is by choice, but nature's is instinctual.

The fact that nature is lower in the chain of being and hence has neither the understanding nor the responsibility that man has is implicit in its responses. Moreover, there is the implication that nature is more disposed to affirm its bond than is the indifferent or insensate man.

Thus in anticipation of the advent:

Nature in awe to him
Had doff't her gawdy trim
With her great Master so to sympathize.
(I, 32-34)

Then, in keeping with the traditional time of the Savior's birth, Milton further develops his idea of sympathy by showing that only in the winter could nature assure itself of putting forth its best appearance. Because nature had shared the penalty incurred by man's original sin, she "must hide her deformities" from the view of the holy guest. So

She woo's the gentle Air
To hide her guilty front with innocent Snow,
And on her naked shame,
Pollute with sinful blame,
The Saintly Veil of Maiden white
to throw.
(I, 37-44)

Such gestures may show respect, but they show little knowledge of the ways of God. Yet nature well knows through its relationship with the divine that this event has

significance even for it, because nature shares with man weal or woe, as Milton more explicitly states in Paradise Lost. So God sends down "the meek-ey'd Peace" to calm nature's fears.

Peace is the harbinger of the Christ; but true peace is a manifestation of His presence. Nevertheless, earthly peace can be only a shadow of the perfect peace which man can know only when he is finally reunited with God. This peace which she brings is the mere absence of war, not the true peace which obtains from perfect harmony with the divine will (I, 45-52):

No War, or Battel sound
Was heard the world around:
And Kings sate still with awfull eye,
As if they surely knew their sovran
Lord was by.
(I, 53-60)

Scholars generally agree that Milton here is pointing to the Pax Romana. According to the tradition, for the seven years preceding the birth of Christ the Roman world was at peace. Popularly, it was held, as Lyly comments, that "Christ would not be borne, untill there was peace throughout the whole worlde."⁵ Douglas Bush suggests that Milton wishes to develop the typological significance of peace. "Christian writers," he says, as exemplified in St. Augustine's City of God "saw a fulfillment of Old Testament prophecy in the peace prevailing in the Roman empire at the time of Christ's birth."⁶ Milton uses this earthly peace under the aegis

of the earthly kings as a type of the peace that will be perpetual when God, the King of Kings, fulfills His final promise of peace.

The Prince of Peace by His presence brings a higher type of that eternal peace, and nature feels its effects:

The Winds with wonder whist,
Smoothly the waters kiss't,
Whispering new joyes to the milde
Ocean,
Who now has quite forgot to rave,
While Birds of Calm sit brooding on
the charmed wave.
(I, 64-68)

Milton's use of the word charmed is further indicative of his concern for affinity among the parts of nature. For the seventeenth-century, the word was more charged in its meaning than it is for the modern reader. B.A. Wright, in another connection, observed that charm then referred to a "magic spell; a mysterious, extraordinary or preternatural power to influence, subdue, control."⁷ I shall later have occasion to refer to other uses of this same meaning of this word in Milton. Here the primary meaning of this word lends richness to the context. It becomes more than a record of occult effect, but a further testimony of the immanence of God in His creation. Such is indicated by the effect of His presence on the waves: the preternatural power of the Creator calms and subdues them. Since Milton had stated basically the same idea in the previous two lines, emphasis, and thus extension of the image, seems to me the only legitimate reason for the repetition.

The poet goes on to emphasize this natural sympathy between the Creator and the created:

The Stars with deep amaze
Stand fixt in stedfast gaze,
Bending one way their pretious influence.
(I, 69-71)

Milton's allusion here to astral influence is a commonplace of the age, as we have already seen in the discussion on his contemporaries. I have also noted, in the discussion on philosophical backgrounds, the stigmatization by the Church Fathers of the idea of a deterministic influence of stars on man. A quotation from Donne's "A Valediction: of My Name in the Window," will serve further to exemplify the typical notion of the power attributed to stars:

As vertuous powers which are
Fix'd in the starres, are said to
flow
Into such characters, as graved bee
When these starres have supremacie.
(I, 33-36)

One's character, as many believed, could be influenced for good or ill according to the ruling star under which he was born. Milton here at least lends tentative subscription to this notion by noting that on the night of the Nativity, the stars shed only good influence.

Nature is receptive of the divine effects, and thus it is obedient. The stars remained in open daylight; even Lucifer the "Morning-Star" remained until "the Lord himself bespake and bid them go" (I, 75-76). Milton next alludes to the standard typological use of the Sun-Son figure: the sun

not only stands still but hides its face in shame. No need for the type to remain when the reality that it pre-figures arrives: "He saw a greater Sun appear" (I, 77-84). Thus Milton celebrates the universal bond typified in the Incarnation.

But man, the prime benefactor and occasion of His coming, gave no such instinctual response to Him. The unsuspecting shepherds thought little that "the mighty Pan/ Was kindly come to live with them below" (I, 89-90) until the "music sweet" greeted their ears. Music is widely used as ambiance for the depiction of the unity of things. With this figure, Milton fuses temporality with eternity; for such music was heard only once before and will be heard again only at the end of time, according to tradition. Such a harmonious proclamation is further testimony of the inter-relationship of the human, divine, and cosmic realms.

The tradition of musical harmony is a heritage of long-standing and one of Milton's favorite figures. Harking back to the Pythagorean notion of the "music of the spheres," it was widely adapted to Christian thought as fact and figure. Unbroken harmony symbolizes and signifies unbroken unity. The state of perfect unity and perfect harmony, then, existed only, as Milton says in "At a Solemn Musick"

Till disproportion'd sin
Jarr'd against natures chime, and with harsh
 din
Broke the fair musick that all creatures made

To their great Lord, whose love their motion
 sway'd
In perfect Diapason, whilst they stood
In first obedience, and their state of good.
 (I, 19-24)

The idea of perfect harmony in Milton invariably goes back to the universal sympathy it typified. Therefore, the harmony of the spheres cannot be heard again until the reparation of the ruins occasioned by the Fall. But even now we may grasp some semblance of the archetypal harmony in our own "undiscordant voice" by which we may bring ourselves in tune with "heavens melodious noise" and effect a blissful union (I, 17-18).

That only souls in tune can hear the celestial harmony is evident by Milton's use of the idea in his mask "Arcades." Milton had written in his "Prolusion II": "If our souls were pure, chaste, and white as snow, as was Pythagoras' of old, then indeed our ears would ring and be filled with that exquisite music of the stars in their orbits; then would all things turn back to the Age of Gold." Milton goes on to fuse this idea of harmony with that of a peace so blessed that "even the gods might envy." Such a condition also bestows a privilege of sharing "the most secret mysteries of nature" (CPW, I, 239). Accordingly, Milton assigns the power of hearing the music of the spheres in "Arcades" only to the superhuman Genius of the Wood.

The Genius describes the abode of the celestial sirens in typical Pythagorean terms. The sirens

Such sweet compulsion does in musick ly,
To lull the daughters of Necessity,
And keep unsteady Nature to her law,
And the low world in measur'd motion
draw
After the heavenly tune, which none
can hear
Of human mould with gross unpurged ear.
(I, 68-73)

Sin, then, had clogged man's ears to the perfect music of the heavens. But Christ's coming brings hope of redemption from sin; therefore, it is fitting that his advent be announced by music, it too a symbol of the primal relationship and its hope of fulfillment. So the music took the souls of the shepherds "in blissful rapture" (I, 98). And nature, hearing the music, thought that "her reign had here its last fulfilling/ She knew such harmony alone/ Could hold all Heav'n and Earth in happier union" (I, 106-108). Though nature does not fully understand the ways of God--a

The power of music was of perennial fascination to and he uses its rich suggestiveness to enhance his ideas in poetry and prose. I see this predilection in the poet's sympathetic impulse. Leo Spitzer has the development of the use of musical imagery in con- with faith. Chime, specifically, as employed in the above takes on more significance when it is regarded expression of the musical harmony of the universe and same time, of the faith of believers."⁸ Milton's then, becomes a plea to man for renewed faith as a re- to this music if not as a precondition to it. Faith may be called music in tune with the heavenly harmony.

But such music cannot engage one long (I, 135), for it effects the mystical union, perhaps, and sets into motion the blissful peace of the classical Age of Gold or the

The debt incurred by man's first disobedience cannot be paid in this manner. The breach can be healed only by the "bitter cross" (I, 152). Thus will the Son glorify Himself and man (I, 154). The poet will again attempt to poeticize this paradoxical event in "Passion." But there also he sounds the note that would engage him more. Christ is the "most perfect Heroe, try'd in heaviest plight/ Of labours huge and hard, too hard for human wight" (I, 13-14). Milton was to use this idea in all of its implications as a cornerstone of his deontology, and as I believe, as the pattern for his poet as the true poem. As we shall later see, that is the central lesson of *Paradise Regain'd*.

But here in the Ode, Milton sets the tone for all his future treatments of the Son. With a backward and forward sweep into history, Milton fits the Incarnation into the scheme of the divine program. Christ is the fulfillment of the covenant made at the Fall. The oracles, which served men who did not have revelation, are now silenced. Mt. Sinai, representing a revelation to a chosen group, is in Christ fulfilled and extended. Satan, the "old Dragon,"

begins from this day his descent "under ground/ In straiter limits bound" (I, 167-169). Thus with Christ a new era begins tending toward "our full and perfect bliss." The end of this era will be signified by the completion of this binding of Satan. But this is not yet to be (I, 165-166). As Christ is a man of action, He puts to rout the false gods: the reality banishes the appearance. Man now has visible evidence of the true god:

Our Babe to show his Godhead true,
Can in his swadling bands control the
damned crew.
(I, 227-228)

Thus the true God is a God of action, and He proves His Godhead not by His death alone, but by His life also. And in the Ode Milton presents the Incarnate Christ as one who proves His relationship to the Godhead by His effects and His action. The emphasis on the Incarnation rather than the Nativity, then, would appeal more to the poet, as I see it, because of his present need for a pattern which best exemplifies relationship and responsibility. Christ is the highest example of relationship, as evidenced by His effects, and responsibility, as evidenced by His action. In the Ode, then, the pattern for man is apparent; the duty is implicit. Milton is to return to this theme time and time again, to reexamine it and to refine it.

The Ode, as Douglas Bush notes, ends quietly with an affirmation of "the bond between heaven and earth" in the

simple oblique statement⁹ that summarizes the entire relationship:

And all about the Courtly Stable,
Bright harness Angels sit in order
serviceable.
(I, 244-245)

The message of the Incarnation is the message of union with the Father in the Son. Through it the bond is sealed by which man can again experience that primal sympathy which characterized the prelapsarian state. But just as the event itself is a symbolic union of both realms, so the final reunion by which evil is overcome and eternal bliss earned must be accomplished by man in cooperation with God. The service of the angels reflect this activity of the virtuous, and the image conflated in the witty paradox "courtly stable" symbolizes the union of the human and divine.

The images which Milton uses in this Ode are all appropriate to the idea of relationship and responsibility. The poem seems to me to illuminate its deepest meaning when so read. I object to Broadbent's conclusion that the work is hysterical and "confirms a suspicion that in these stanzas Milton, faced with the rude fact of a God being born, is confused and falls into the worst kind of imagery--personification which is extremely figurative, but not in the least natural."¹⁰ I do not recognize any hysteria reflected in the poet's choice of imagery. I see his imagery as carefully patterned around the idea of the Incarnation, its blending

of opposites in a perfect union. "Wedded Maid," the "babe in smiling infancy," juxtaposed with the "bitter cross," the Babe "in swadling bands" who can "controul the damned crew," the Son as a greater Sun, and lastly the "Courtly Stable," all indicate a conscious choice of imagery to reinforce the idea. Milton is not confused that a God is being born for that is just the point: he does not see the Incarnation in such terms. To him the fusion of the divine and human in human form is the sacred miracle to celebrate. For this testimony of God's love and mercy is the greatest assurance of man's relationship to God, and it was in this relationship that Milton finds his prime inspiration to be the true poem.

Nor do I agree with Fixler's analysis of Milton's use of imagery in the Ode. He remarks that "the images in which Milton saw the Incarnation reflect his tendency to conceive the relationship of God to nature as one of effortless power."¹¹ Such a comment damns the poet with faint praise and fails to take into account the symbolistic value of Milton's images. I do not wish to duplicate Miss Tuve's perceptive study on Milton's images and themes,¹² but I would agree with her basic conclusion that Milton imagery is the result of conscientious and skillful selectivity. Furthermore, as I have suggested and hope to further demonstrate, Milton's selection of imagery here and throughout his canon is to a large extent determined by his pervasive concern

with the Creator-created relationship. In the Ode, Milton is concerned with the active commerce between the divine and created. His presentations of the sympathy between the Son and the created, effortless or otherwise, are mere recognitions or tokens of the vestigial immanence in the created. The response of such immanence to the Son's immanence bears witness of the Godhead of the Son. But the power resides in the source of all, God, and is shared in proportion to the degree of immanence in the object. Milton is later to make this idea more explicit. The Son is effective because of the immanence in Him. Implicitly such power and effectiveness are available to all the sons of God through knowledge and virtue. Hence the implication of the Incarnate Christ as the pattern for the true poem.

II

Comus, written by request in 1634, is the first of Milton's works devoted ostensibly to the theme of individual responsibility. Though the form and the occasion dictate certain choices, Milton's use of these clearly reflects his conscious attention to his personal program of excellence. A masque for the inauguration of the Earl of Bridgewater as President of Wales, Comus makes a statement on the limitations of the individual posed by circumstances external to himself and the role of divinity or grace in the quest for perfection. The work is concerned with the theme of chastity, and through its treatment of the humanistic idea of

self-sufficiency juxtaposed with the biblical idea of grace, it makes a significant statement about the poet's progress in his plan to become the true poem.

On the surface level Comus presents the story of a journey of a Lady and her two brothers to Ludlow, there to greet their parents, the earl and the countess. In the wild wood, the Lady is separated from her brothers. Deceived through the cunning of a rustic swain in disguise (Comus), she is led to his palace. Being the son of Circe and Bacchus, Comus attempts to seduce her with his magical powers. Through her inner strength (chastity), she withstands all the wiles of her captor. Through the intercedence of the Attendant Spirit, the brothers invade Comus's domains, rout him and his band but find themselves unable to mobilize their sister, paralyzed by a magic spell cast upon her by Comus. To proceed to Ludlow the intervention of a superior force is needed. Sabrina, goddess of the Severn, performs the feat by the agency of water. They go on to Ludlow where they join their parents.¹³

The poem, by the conventions of its form, presents a variety of possibilities for use of the poetic imagination, not the least of which is the study of the use or misuse of nature as a key to moral fitness. Comus, then, might be approached from this angle as another study on the theme of relationship and responsibility. Douglas Bush points to three sources, among many other possible ones, that can shed

light on the ideas in the work. Homer, Ovid, and Spenser, notwithstanding its Christian-Platonic base, supply prototypes for the encounter of heroic virtue and sensual temptation. Further devices used by Milton to convey his message are the miraculous change in forms, the presentation of chastity as an active virtue rather than a passive condition. Such were, individually and corporally, the staple of the aforementioned poets.¹⁴ The interplay of the natural and supernatural worlds, the magic and counter-magic, shepherds and pastoral motifs are likewise the staple commodity of the masque tradition. However, the form as such concerns us here but incidentally. Primarily, the message behind the form, the universals are our interest.

Many critics have had much to say--each with some truth perhaps--about Comus, its meaning or lack of it. D.C. Allen considers Comus a failure because Milton's "artistic emphasis" does not coincide with his intended "moral emphasis." More specifically, Milton fails "to establish a true intellectual conflict between Comus and the Lady" and effects an unbelievable "forest-change in the Lady" and brings her off with a tour de force as much as a true moral victory.¹⁵ R.M. Adams countered by placing the matter in perspective. So long as Comus can be read satisfyingly on the level of a public performance, reasons Adams, any metaphysical interpretation of its contents should be held suspect and kept subordinate.¹⁶ But this response strikes a blow

without answering the question. Denis Saurat finds little that is Christian in Comus.¹⁷ If the virtue assayed in this poem is discussed against a pagan background, such a fact does not necessarily render it non-Christian. Such an observation overlooks the conventions of the genre and the poet's own admonition about such forms "where more is meant than meets the ear" ("Il Penseroso," I, 120). I think Milton is here testing pagan doctrine in light of Christian revelation and that his conclusions are, contrary to Saurat, quite Christian.

A.S.P. Woodhouse has probably set forth the most meaningful answer to all such critics. Woodhouse sees the poem as an organic whole and its message as Christian, but he does not deal specifically with the debate. He sees the focus of the masque to be the insufficiency of virtue without grace. Rosemund Tuve handles the question of form and meaning. "Masques," she says, "are inescapably symbolical. The peculiar relation borne by the work of art to real happenings and meanings--symbolized, rather than described, or dramatically viewed--is borne by the action itself." Thus it not only represents but presents a basic truth by "the central figure as a 'hinge' upon which the whole invention moved, and the constantly double reference to two equally but differently real worlds."¹⁸ Thus the work requires a basic knowledge of the form and levels of meaning to perceive its full impact. Miss Tuve is able to find such unity

of form and theme in the literal and figurative meanings of the word chastity: "the chaste principle in man's total nature unseducible by that which would alienate it from its celestial original, tempting to substitute idolatries for the love of God."¹⁹ Woodhouse also seems to be correct in his analysis when he places the climax of the poem, not at the point of Comus's displacement, but at the point of the restoration of action for the Lady occasioned by the intervention of grace (Sabrina).²⁰ Such does no discredit to the Lady's virtue--it is still inviolate, signifying her fitness. Such does no discredit to the "agent of God's providence in the natural order,"²¹ the Attendant Spirit--it is the faithful guide to the means of heavenly grace. But only grace liberates. Both of the above readings are, I feel, apposite; but I think some more light can be shed on the issues Allen raised.

I suggest that the poem can also be seen as a study of contrasts aimed at testing virtue and the revelation of its insufficiency and need for a higher power, God. As such it is a further examination of the relationship-responsibility motif which I find the basic element in Milton's quest for perfection. Having already noted the poet's concern for the relationship of all in God in "The Hymn on the Morning of Christ's Nativity," I now point to Milton's study of the use of nature as a key to man's relationship and responsibility to God.

Postulating a common primal source, Milton sees all things as proceeding from God and dependent on him. At the same time all created things are related to each other. Any relationship among created things is good if it furthers man's relationship with God and nature's through man. Since man is given dominion over things, the lower things are to be used by him as tools by which he ascends to God, as Milton will later state more explicitly in Paradise Lost. Such a use is good. To pervert the use of nature to selfish ends is evil. Because the world contains both good and evil forces at work, virtue in the postlapsarian man consists not in withdrawing from the world, but in sallying forth, meeting the tests, and if fit, triumphing spiritually over evil through his own inner moral defense and, ultimately, through divine intervention. Only in this way can there be true love of virtue and freedom of the virtuous. A look at some salient examples from the poem will serve to test these hypotheses.

Milton affirms his doctrine of fitness not by one's ability to remain safe from harm but by the desire and ability of the individual to keep his soul incorruptible. Such a state insures his connection with God and its effect, virtue. Hence in the thematic passage of the poem, the relationship-responsibility motif is set forth:

Love vertue, she alone is free
 She can teach you how to clime,
 Higher than the Spheary Chime

Or if vertue feeble were,
 Heav'n it self would stoop to her.
 (I, 1018-22)

Man's responsibility is to seek virtue by a conscious acceptance of his relationship to his source. By knowledge and action he effects his ascent up the ladder of perfection, not necessarily by performance but by fitness. God intervenes with His grace at need. Milton is later to return to this idea in his concept of the law of nature.

In Comus, one of the requisites for the virtuous life is to know the right relationship between man and nature and of both to God. That what is natural is good is the underlying premise of the argument between the Lady and Comus. From the Platonists to the Hobbesians, this question was debated during the seventeenth century in social, religious and political circles. Milton doubtless was echoing some of the current notions and fallacies in the debate in Comus. According to his monistic position, Milton held nature to be good in itself when it is ordered by right reason, or evil according to the grossness of the one who orders it, as we recall from the discussion of his philosophical pre-suppositions. The right use of nature is as an instrument of God's glory in furtherance of the relationship with Him. Such a use, then, to Milton as to the Lady in Comus is good and therefore natural. Comus, on the other hand, regards that as natural which serves his selfish ends.

The fundamental dichotomy between the right use and

wrong use of nature is posed at the outset. The wild wood could indeed be a fit place for contemplation. But it could also be a workshop for evil forces, as it is here and again in Paradise Regain'd. But for those who aspire to "lay their just hands on that Golden Key/ That ope's the Palace of Eternity," little ill can ultimately befall them (I, 12-14).

Nature is seen according to the mental or moral state of the beholder, and so is it used. Bacchus misused wine. Comus, like his mother before him, misuses nature. His use of magic for evil purposes--to disguise his true nature, to change the human countenance from the "express resemblance of the gods" to "some brutish form," and his general exploitation of nature's bounty in riotous living (I, 165ff., 68-69, 58-70) all show Comus to be of the Devil's company. The Lady, on the other hand, sees the woods as "kind and hospitable" (I, 186). This, of course, is ironical in view of the evil forces present. Instead of seeing daylight sinful as does Comus (I, 126), she sees the night as "thievish" (I, 194) because it prevents their use of natural light to show her the way. But her complaint against nature is natural in that she desires its use to help her gain a legitimate end. Unlike her, Comus prefers night because it better hides his evil activities.

Nevertheless, the Lady's relationship with the divine is such that she can rely on her inner strength and upon

ultimate triumph over any evil forces in the cosmos. Such faith is confirmed by the response which she experiences, signifying sympathy between the Lady and "the Supreme good" (I, 204-216). "New enlivened spirits" manifest themselves in her (I, 227). So sweet is the song she sings that even Comus is moved by it. Such "divine enchanting ravishment" makes him realize that

Sure something holy lodges in that brest,
And with these raptures moves the vocal
air
To testifie his hidden residence.
(I, 245-247)

This power indeed has its ultimate source in the supreme good, which on the symbolical level, is God. The sympathetic bond of nature is credited by the fact that Comus, though he wills not to accept the good that the Lady embraces, can experience its effect.

Further testimony of the sympathetic effect is seen in Milton's use of music, the charms of which the poet fully appreciated. The effects of music too can be used for good or evil ends, but even Comus recognizes the superiority of that used for good. The Sirens, in their skillful though evil use of music, set off a striking chain of effects. While "culling their potent hearbs and balefull drugs," their songs would take the "prison'd soul/ And lap it in Elysium, Scylla wept/ And chid her barking waves into attention/ And fell Charybis murmur'd soft applause" (I, 252-258). Their song, though still potent and charming, was an abuse of

nature, a perversion of the good. It "lull'd the sense,/ And in sweet madnes robb'd it of it self" (I, 259-260).

Sympathy, then, can function for good or ill according to the will that orders it. So the Lady uses her talent for good and the effect is more potent, even on the arch-perverter. Never had he heard such a "sacred and homefelt delight" (I, 261). But because of his inner condition Comus, like Satan upon his approach to Eve in Eden, is charmed but not changed. He proceeds on his evil purpose.

Meanwhile back in the woods, the brothers philosophize on the relations of externals to internals. Nature seems to share in the human condition. The stars shed their influence (I. 335) but the beneficence of such influence is hampered by "usurping mists." In short, all occasions inform against them; but they comfort themselves with divine philosophy. Such discourse serves as a solace for the Second Brother's premonitions of his sister's fate: perhaps she has fallen victim to either "savage heat or savage hunger" (I, 358). The discourse also serves as a philosophical background for one side of the dialectics to be presented in the climactic scenes of the masque. The substance of the message is Platonic, but it is also a sort of type of the real Christian chastity or charity. Essentially this virtue is the precondition of the prevenient grace. It is a further indication of Milton's belief that fitness for performance rather than mere performance is the actual key

to virtue. Thus:

Vertue may be assail'd but never hurt,
Supriz'd by unjust force, but not
 enthrall'd,
Yea even that which mischief meant most
 harm,
Shall in the happy trial prove most glory.
(I, 588-591)

Thus chastity is good in itself, but incomplete. Grace is needed as its complement to insure ultimate victory. Evil is a part of the human condition for the postlapsarian man, and since it cannot be avoided, the virtuous can depend upon grace for the added power with which to defeat it.

But evil on itself shall back recoil,
And mix no more with goodness when at
 last
Gather'd like scum and settl'd to itself
It shall be in eternal restless change
Self-fed, and self-consumed.

(I, 592-597)

Such is an expression of the Elder Brother's faith in a moral universe. It likewise is the poet's own, and he will express this idea in many ways throughout his works. It is at the heart of his justification of the ways of God to men.

Comus does indeed assail the Lady with his perverted sense of things, his "rhetoric." Clearly he, like Hobbes and the Renaissance naturalists, on the one hand, had arrived from the same premise at a strikingly different conclusion from that of the Lady, Milton, the Cambridge Platonists and the Latitudinarians on the other. They all agreed that what is natural is good. But the rub comes when the word natural is defined. Both Hecate and Diana were

votaries of the moon, but the former because it aided her witchcraft and the latter, her chastity. So both Comus and the Lady appeal to the same nature. Where he exploits it for selfish gain, she would direct its sober use to the glory of God.

Such exploitation has already been seen in Comus's use of magic for evil purposes. But the Attendant Spirit later counters his magic for the good of the human condition. Magic was held in higher esteem in Milton's day than it is in ours. Many of the leading scientists--Brahe and Kepler, for example--ecclesiastics, and politicians sanctioned the use of magic for legitimate purposes.²² Milton here, notwithstanding the fact that magic is one of the staples of the mask form, seems to be in the current tradition because of the importance magic serves to the plot. However it is a part of the contrasts developed in Comus. It, like all of the other activities and ideas which Comus or the Lady affirm, is postulated on the common bond of nature, a Creator-creature relationship. The difference lies in the use or abuse of this relationship as it derives from a conscious will. This is what the Lady meant in her reply to Comus:

None
 But such as are good men can give good things,
 And that which is not good, is not delicious
 To a well-govern'd and wise appetite.
 (I, 702-704)

One may compare this later with the Son's response to the Devil's proffered banquet in Paradise Regain'd. Jesus

promises to eat "thereafter as I like the giver" (II, 322).

To justify his Sybaritism, Comus resorts to the theory of nature's plenitude, a further indication of his ability to pervert. He attempts to shift his own responsibility to nature: "Wherefore did Nature powre her bounties forth" but that they should be enjoyed else we "live like Nature's bastards, not her sons." Besides, Comus suggests, we do nature a favor when we greedily use her goods, for she would become otherwise overweighted and "strangl'd with her own fertility" (I, 709 - 728). So he moves on to his already purposed end with a classical non sequitur:

List Lady, be not coy, and not be cozen'd
With that same vaunted name Virginitie,
Beauty is Nature's coyn, must not be
hoarded,
But must be currant, and the good thereof
Consists in mutual and partak'n bliss
Unsavoury in th' enjoyment of it self.
(I, 736-741)

Comus begins from a fair premise: nature is for man's use. But he fails to make distinctions germane to the issue. The use must further man's relationship with God. Good use does not consist in furthering purely selfish ends. Comus leaps from a consideration of external nature, the common property of all, to apply the same criteria to a personal possession. The same rules do not hold. Furthermore he argues for mutual bliss without considering the Lady's wishes. So the Lady is unimpressed by his "logic"; for she knows that the principle of good consists in the exercise of reason, that faculty implanted in all men by which they

come to know and understand God's will. This reason directs the will and its consequent action affects nature for good or ill. So the Lady tells Comus to blame not "innocent nature" for his sensuality (I, 761).

The principles that the Lady expounds in her debate with Comus follow the pattern of life she has represented throughout and do not, as Allen contends, represent any drastic "forest-change" in her. The test of all good for her is whether the act furthers man's relationship with God. She defeats Comus on these grounds. Temperance in chastity becomes not a question of abstinence or moderation; conversely, it is whether the action furthers man's ties with God and uses rightly that entrusted to one's charge. As defined by Miss Tuve in the above cited reference, chastity is more inclusive than our modern term virginity. It includes all that unseducible part of man's nature that rejects anything that would alienate him from his celestial origin. Thus the Lady does not by her rejection of Comus's proposition reject marital love. Her conduct reflects no "forest-change," as Allen says. Any other conduct would have been out of character.

Since Comus is a selfish materialist, Milton does not have the Lady lecture on abstractions at this point. Doubtless, they would leave him cold. So she does not unfold "the sage and serious doctrine of virginity" to him, seeing him "not fit to hear himself convinc't" (I, 785-

Throughout, her test of what is natural or good has been whether it furthers her relationship to God. This resolve on her part, as Milton saw it, merits the aid she now receives.

Through the guidance of the Attendant Spirit, Thyrsis, the brothers are led to the Lady's rescue. They rout the enemies but cannot mobilize her. W.G. Madsen therefore interprets the symbolic meaning of the Attendant Spirit's role as being "the higher potentialities of human nature, as Comus represents the lower."²³ He seems to be on firm ground. Thyrsis does guard the good through diligence and vigilance, not omniscience. Thus he is not superhuman, but highest human: he has more insight and can extract from nature its highest uses for human need. An example of this is the haemony he supplied the brothers as an antidote to Comus's diabolical use of nature to frustrate human need. His clearer insight is also seen in the recognition of what is proper and fit for a particular occasion. Thus he could recommend haemony as the weapon to use in the struggle against Comus. A supernatural battle requires supernatural armament.

Much intellectual energy has been spent on the elucidation of the root "of divine effect" (I, 629) which the Attendant Spirit calls haemony. Most, so far as I have been able to determine, accept temperance as its figurative meaning. But I think there is much to recommend Adams's

hint that it may be a pun on the word harmony.²⁴ However, a study of the etymology reveals that the two terms are not exclusive. Spitzer holds that temperance means "a harmonious state of the mind," or tunedness of the soul in its derivative sense. His further meaning of the word is an even closer indication that at least connotatively, temperance and harmony can be used interchangeably: temperance is a state in which "all the senses converge in one harmonious feeling."²⁵ Certainly the harmonious working of reason and passion is needed at the point at which Thyrsis introduces the haemony. Indeed harmony, in the Miltonic sense of "un-corrupted nature," does not grow to its full potential "in this soyl" (I, 631), but it does in the world of the final union of all in God. A man by keeping all of his senses in proper balance may come to get some perception of this heavenly harmony, as indicated in the Ode, but he cannot know it in its fullness.

But fitness makes one more able to receive God's grace, not to dispense with it. Thus the Lady is delivered by one who is generally considered the agent of God's grace in the poem, the "pure" Sabrina (I, 825). Purity is the necessary quality of a redemptive agent, just as Milton held it to be for the great poet. With this act a sense of rightness is restored and virtue rewarded. Rescue, however, does not preclude further vigilance and diligence in the pursuit of knowledge for the cultivation of virtue. This is

evident in the Attendant Spirit's final words:

Let us fly this cursed place,
Lest the Sorcerer us entice
With som new device.

(I, 938-940)

Such will be necessary until they "com to holier ground;" and they will also need a guide (I, 942-943). Meanwhile the rhythm of the universal heart-throb (to borrow Hawthorne's phrase) is restored. The "Stars grow high" to reflect nature's sympathy with the affairs of man just as they had been hidden by mists when man's affairs were awry. But night sits monarch yet in the mid sky (I, 956-957), signifying the fluctuations of light and darkness attendant with the human condition. Man can see but through a glass darkly. Only at the "father's residence" is there perfect illumination (I, 946).

Thus Comus deals with the question of individual fitness. Such fitness is gained through a regimen of experience by which the individual learns to recognize the right relationship between himself and his Creator and the right use of that which is entrusted to his care. True fitness consists in an active pursuit of the good from among the evil. It is an inner condition deriving from a conscious relationship with the Creator. This relationship is developed by knowledge, contemplation, experience, and revelation. The right relationship, then, requires of the individual chastity, inner sanctity, not performance for that

can be curtailed by externalities. But nothing can harm the sanctity of one's mind against his will. The true poem must possess chastity, a sound Creator-creature relationship, and reason to know right from wrong to guide the will in its choices. But it is not by this made self-sufficient; it must have grace to insure its ultimate triumph over evil. This I believe is the message Comus has for Milton's study on relationship and responsibility in his quest to be the true poem.

III

Milton continues to unfold his vision of perfection, and once again he is called upon to write before he is ready to write the great poem. And once more, the poet by his study of the secular and theological assumptions of the doctrine of sympathy, arrives at a convincing statement on the interrelationship of things and the responsibility inherent therein. The occasion is the death of Camus's "dearest pledge," Edward King. Lycidas is Milton's contribution to the group of elegies written for this occasion. As Hanford has well stated, this poem "bears its meaning plainly enough on its face, and there has been little room for disagreement regarding its larger features; [but there are] a few famous cruxes in particular passages."²⁶ These famous cruxes have stimulated much critical activity; yet few fail to conclude with Mark Pattison that Lycidas "is the highwater mark of English poetry."²⁷ I concur in Pattison's judgment.

We need not here cross all these crowded ways of Lycidas commentary, but some must be noted. At least one early critic engages us for his astute observation on the subject of the poem. Legouis remarks: "Ce n'est pas King qu'il faut y chercher, c'est Milton lui-même."²⁸ Such a notice is significant and certainly goes far towards opening up new levels of meaning for the poem; but it does not go far enough. It lacks precision in that it fails to say exactly how Milton is the subject of a poem ostensibly about King. D.C. Allen attempts to meet this need in his analysis of the poem by saying that "Lycidas moves as a pendulum between the universal and the particular, between the special lesson of the inner Milton and the cosmic principle drawn therefrom that each man is part of the human estate."²⁹ This I think is correct. But Allen goes on to say that "the subject of the poem is seldom Edward King, and his death is not the real occasion of the poem."³⁰ This, I feel, is an overstatement; and Allen, like Legouis, fails to explain the basis of his observation. I suggest that there is identification of the poet with his subject; but there is also the identification of both with mankind and with the source behind them. Thus I see this poem as a study on the sympathetic bonds of nature; and viewed as such, King is the subject and his death is the occasion.

Milton's role in the poem, then, is seen not as a thinly veiled persona for an Ausdruck of Hobbesian self-love

nor for a prayer of gratitude that "there but for the grace of God go I." Rather it is viewed as a manifestation of the sympathetic bond of nature like that which Donne expresses so well in his "Meditation XVII": "Any man's death diminishes me, for I am involved in mankind."³¹ I suggest that this identification evolves from the individual or particular to humanitas, identification with mankind in general, to an identification with the cosmos and finally, with the divine source behind them. Such a consideration derives from the fact of King's death and evolves to the fact of death itself, its causes and final remedy, to the universal principle behind all.

The essential question posed by Lycidas, apropos of this paper, is individual responsibility in a world of mutable relationships. Through the juxtaposition of the natural and unnatural, Milton moves from the natural and the unnatural to the supernatural. To ply one's trade, to be diligent in the pursuit of knowledge and virtue is natural. But is it natural to be cut off by premature death or worldly corruption short of fruition? Such a question leads the poet to a reflection on the interrelationship of man to man, of man to nature, and of all to God.

King's death is the pivotal event. Douglas Bush feels that there is no reason to assume a "close connection" between King and Milton.³² But they did know each other. They were similar beings with similar aspirations. As such

it was Milton's duty to sing for King as others should do for Milton upon the poet's own death. Implicitly stating their bond, the poet enumerates their points of identity. They shared like goals: both aspired for service to their Maker as poet and/or priest; like talents: both could sing (write poetry); like occupations: both, according to the convention, were shepherds (in reality, Cambridge students).

For we were nurst upon that selfsame
hill,
Fed the same flock; by fountain, shade
and rill.

(I, 23-24)

Both led chaste lives. The identification therewith ceases as a fact, but not as a principle. Lycidas is dead; he is alive. And (no doubt Milton thinks) so is death alive.

Contemplation on the fact of King's death leads the poet by way of the elegiac tradition to a contemplation on nature. But he goes further than the tradition. From the study of nature's relationship to man, the poet moves to first causes and to an affirmation of the moral order in the universe. The poet's movement from identification of man with man to identification of man with the cosmos raises the question of relationship and responsibility both to mourn and to question the cause for mourning--death. Since nature and man are involved in King's death, they both grieve. The contemplation of death as a universal fact of life leads to identification with humanitas, for death is a universal reality. Lycidas, then, becomes a commemoration of the common

lot of both the all in King and of the King in all. But this only states the common lot, it does not explain it. Final explanations lie in the realm of transcendence. In this way, the contemplation on the meaning of death leads to significant insight on relationship and responsibility as the universal principle.

To illustrate further the function of the idea of sympathy in Milton's treatment of his subject, I adduce by way of contrast the poet's other famous elegy, "Epitaphium Damonis." This poem was written to mourn the death of a bosom friend, Diodati. Here the poem is not universal, but personal. I suggest that the nature of Milton's relationship with the two men dictated the difference in treatment. With King there was identification; with Diodati, fellow-feeling. Scheler points out the essential differences. "Identification (1) takes place below the level of waking consciousness (2) is automatic (involuntary) in operation (3) is confined to the sphere of vital consciousness, in subject and object alike. . . ." ³³ In fellow-feeling, the subject has a reality of his own though he is united by a bond of mutual feeling. "It springs," says Scheler, "rather from the freedom of personality as against the sway of impulse in general." ³⁴ The two beings are kindred souls, not an emotional identity. Since the first is a qualitative extension of the latter, they differ in degree but not essentially in kind. "The moral principle of the Identity

of Being imposes a common ethical obligation"; love or very close fellow-feeling, "is unaware of the universal nature of the obligation [except in] a particularized sense."³⁵ Thus King, an acquaintance, is elegized in a universal manner; but Diodati, a bosom friend, is mourned in a more particularized manner.

The same elegiac conventions are employed in "Epitaphium" as in Lycidas. But the selection of details attests a closer bond, not just a common lot. Their experience was a mutuality, perhaps unique for the two of them. There is no universal obligation to mourn for him, but there is a very real personal one. Contemplation on nature, again, leads him to a sense of a corresponding reality about man.

How unlike the bullocks that frolic over the meadow!
Of one heart are they, one with another, by the law's
decree, close comrades all. No one of them sets apart
from the herd or this or that as his [peculiar]
friend. (I, 122-125)

Bullocks, asses, wolves, in general, the lower animals have an instinctual awareness of their bond and do not exercise a conscious will to set up artificial walls or preferences among their kind as man does. They are all mutually companions together.³⁶

But the "law of the deep is the self-same law." The sea-calves and the birds all react to the bond of sympathy, and have neither the need nor the ability for conscious valuation. Such creatures, likewise, do not suffer, as does

man, when a companion dies. Each of them straightway "seeks another to be his comrade" (I, 128-138). Human beings, having a conscious will, are different. Mortals "are harried by accursed fates, alien to one another in soul, and discordant in spirit" (I, 137-39). It was nevertheless his will which caused the first discord; for this antipathy is a result of the Fall, as the poet sees it. But the will in postlapsarian man at its best is volitional and valiative: "hardly does a man find out of a thousand one--only one--that matches himself" (I, 139-140). Thus though all are related by the bond of sympathy, some are by nature more closely related than others because they have greater similitude.

The idea of greater sympathy based on greater similitude has been expressed in many ways, but Milton here alludes, I think, to the notion of the twin-soul. Harking back at least as far as antiquity, Plato's myth of Androgyne is perhaps the most famous Western rendering. According to this myth, Androgyne, the original being, was split in half by Zeus. Thus the idea of the self-other-self motif. Egyptian lore also had earlier contained the myth that mankind was originally of both sexes united and afterwards divided into male and female.³⁷ So the idea became pervasive in treatises on friendship that to find a true friend is to find one's other half, that being closest to one in unity of mind and spirit. The two become one soul in two

bodies.³⁸ "Such a friendship is durable and is based on virtue and reason, not on passing accidents."³⁹ "Real friendship, then, derives from nature, the inclinations of the soul joined with love--rather than from a sense of utility."⁴⁰ Milton's idea of quality-quantity in friendships, as stated in line 140 is similar. The quality of friendship is in inverse proportion to the quantity: "hardly one in a thousand." This is the highest compliment to their mutual bond.

Damon too performs a role somewhat like that of the guardian spirit, as does Lycidas. He is skilled in healing potions, and the arts of healing--but he could not heal himself (I, 192-198). Milton here examines much of the magical lore postulated on the sympathetic bond of nature. The idea of sympathetic cures, occult affinities and effects are all cases in point. But again these elementaristic manifestations of sympathy point to a larger meaning, the higher power behind all. Such a reflection leads Milton to consider the responsibility incumbent upon his poetic gifts. And the return to Damon in the skies at the nuptial feast "amid the souls of heroes, and amid the gods that live for ever . . . quaffing eternal draughts . . . drinking joys with holy lips" is the poet's consolation (I, 264-266). He is further comforted by the hope of a new and higher relationship with his beloved friend: he requests Damon's tutelary presence with him on earth (I, 267-273). The consolation too, then,

is personal.

So "Epitaphium" is a poem about a personal grief occasioned by a personal loss. The grief is not universalized though it is placed in a universal frame. The difference then in the treatment of these two elegies lies in the difference of the poet's relationship to the subjects. But the subject of Lycidas is Edward King, "a learned friend" (I, p. 76), just as the subject of "Epitaphium" is Charles Diodati, a friend, "as close as e'er men were" (I, p. 294). And the occasion of Lycidas is the death of King. A few examples from the poem will serve to illustrate these facts.

The poet passes from identification of man with man to a study of nature's relationship with man. Is nature benign, hostile, or indifferent? Perhaps it is benign if it mourns for Lycidas:

Thee the Woods, and desert Caves,
With wilde Thyme and the gadding Vine
o'regrown,
And all their echoes mourn. (I, 37-41)

The "Willows, and the Hazel Copses green" can no longer fan their "joyous Leaves" to Lycidas' "soft layes" (I, 43-45). But why should nature mourn if nature had failed to protect the head of Lycidas (I, 50-55)? As Allen observes, Milton's choice of imagery in the preceding lines hints a kind of perversity in nature: "the thyme is wild, the vine gadding and o'ergrown, the top of Mona is shaggy. Living color is almost wanting."⁴¹ In addition to these natural excesses,

the poet muses on unseasonability in things: "the white thorn blooms unseasonably."⁴² And the poet imagines a further randomness in nature's action instead of that according to the order and harmony that nature is supposed to exemplify: the canker in the rose, a taint-worm among the herds, and the killing frost on the flowers. So the poet, of course, relates these ideas to the occasion of his grief. Lycidas' death ere his prime is as unseasonable, as unnatural as the randomness in nature.

The fact that nature mourns but did not prevent the young man's death is a fact that gives the poet some pause. He recalls the archetypal poet "whom universal nature did lament" (I, 60). To expect the nymphs to save Lycidas when in reality they did not save Orpheus is to foolishly dream, to dignify myth with validity. As the myth goes, the Muses protect their sons; but the muse, Calliope, that bore Orpheus, could not prevent his horrid death (I, 55-63). The poet here seems to bring the entire mythological tradition to a severe examination in this note: the beautiful relationship between nature and man which the myths depict, perhaps, was never really true--only imaginative efforts to explain the nature of existence. This, then, prepares the way for the higher flight of the poet's song.

Of greater concern for the present is the poet's fear that the muse is thankless. If so, why "scorn delights and live laborious dayes?" And the answer takes the poet

beyond the realm of the here and now: "Fame . . . (That last infirmity of Noble mind)" is the incentive (I, 70-71). Hume was later to make a statement connecting the desire for fame with sympathy that is instructive here: "he finds one of its causes in the opinions of others, whose influence upon us is due to 'that propensity we have to sympathize with others, and to receive by communication their inclinations and sentiments, however different from, or contrary to, our own.'" ⁴³ This is no doubt true of Milton's desire for worldly fame. But the poet here transcends the mundane level to a meaning of real fame. For how can one hope for fame in a world of chance if when hopes are highest and perhaps nearest fruition, "Comes the blind Fury with th' abhorred shears,/ And slits the thin spun life" (I, 75-76)? Who knows but that early death might negate all worthy efforts? This is a chilling reflection to the young ambitious mind. Only a contemplation of fame which rewards fitness and not performance is the answer. Such is heavenly fame:

Fame is no plant that grows on mortal
soil
But lives and spreads aloft by those
pure eyes,
And perfect witness of all- judging Jove;
As he pronounces lastly on each deed,
Of so much fame in Heav'n expect thy
meed.

(I, 78, 81-84)

So Milton strikes the higher note in his song. Like the harmonious blending of the waters of the fountain Arethuse and the river Alpheus, the poet thus unites the concerns of

heaven and earth.

The poet again turns to a contemplation of nature to probe her possibly hostile role in human affairs. He moves from the particular, Lycidas, to the general, humanitas.

He ask'd the Waves, and ask'd the fellow
 Winds,
What hard mishap hath doom'd this gentle
 swain?
And question'd ev'ry gust of rugged wings
That blows from off each beaked
 Promontory
They knew not of his story.

(I, 91-94)

Possibly nature is indifferent. For as Hippotades says:
"The Air was calm"; and nature in general was peaceful on the
day Lycidas was drowned (I, 95-99). As nature is apparently
inculpable in the death of Lycidas, or at least it speaks a
varied language, Milton turns to man to explain human af-
flictions.

The general human condition itself, theology teaches, is a result of the Original Sin. Since concomitant results of this sin were reflected throughout the universal frame, it follows that if man suffers from adverse effects of nature, he himself is ultimately to blame since he committed the initial act which broke primal unity. So the poet retreats by way of the riddle of cause and effect in nature:

It was that fatal and perfidious Bark
Built in th' eclipse, and rigg'd with
 curses dark
That sunk so low that sacred head of
 thine.

(I, 100-102)

In these lines the poet goes everywhere and no where at the same time. If astral influence, or natural forces can determine an action or its outcome exterior to and superior to the victim, then are the laws of the universe just? But the gnawing question remains: Can man blame others for what he set out of order? Yet because man's head is sacred, there is indication of his connection with the divine. Such merits the concern of the Creator; but it also places into His hands the responsibility for ultimate control of the universe. A sense of order is experienced when man considers his limited vision and hence his limited understanding. He affirms his faith in a higher being and in a higher order - than that which he now experiences.

The poet then turns again to his grief in the procession of mourners; for not only he grieves, but there is a common bond of grief for Lycidas. The mourners once more set into bold relief the interrelationship of the divine, human, and cosmic spheres. The grief which each articulates is indicative of his place in the scheme of things. Camus, representing the academic community, is limited in his vision of the ways of God and man. He mourns the death of his dearest pledge (I, 107). Perhaps there is a type of identification of pledge and professor. This would then compound the grief for it represents the frustration of Camus or the academic community to fulfill itself in the youth of promise. This movement, then, continues to develop the theme of

brokenness in the world which man⁷ set into action by his primal disobedience.

But having so lived, Lycidas belongs not only to this world but to the other one as well. The "Pilot of the Galilean lake" speaks for the divine realms. He introduces the consideration of a higher will and a higher order into which this event must be placed. True Lycidas could have been spared. True a good man is taken while many evil ones remain and flourish. But the fact that the speaker holds two keys in his hands: ("The Golden opes, the Iron shuts amain") is, as I see it, symbolic of the now limited penetration of the human into the divine. But as the golden key opens, there is hope that at a certain time all mysteries involving the ways of God and man will be dispelled.

The answer to the Jobean riddle, why do the good suffer while the evil flourish, lies in the general plan of universal order. Comfort may be taken in the fact that at the appointed time all seeming disorder will be set in order. The brokenness--corrupt clergy and all of its attendant vices--will be finally repaired. But this is not to be yet:

That two-handed engine at the door,
Stands ready to smite once and smite no
more.

(I, 130-131)

Perhaps this is cold comfort to one of limited vision; but it affirms moral order in a moral universe. I object to Fraser's conclusion relative to lines 130-131. He states that "Milton at least meant a topical and political

allusion here; and I do not think that he was by temperament the sort of man who would wait patiently for the Day of Judgement for his enemies to get their deserts."⁴⁴ This reference to "that two-handed engine," I think, goes further than a topical or political allusion. As I interpret the phrase, it is an oracular expression of Milton's perception of the divine-human correlative.

While I do not categorically disallow such topical and political allusions, I am unable to find one to which Milton could have attributed the power to "smite once and smite no more." Certainly, Milton was not one passively to bide his time in the face of evil (if this is what Fraser means by wait); but he was also aware of human limitations, in spite of conscious effort. Milton's deontology, as revealed in his works thus far considered, insists that it is man's obligation to try. The time perspective is also an important element in Milton's ethical system. Paradise Regain'd turns on the very axis of the right time for the virtuous action. The life of Christ, as exemplified in this poem and as related in the Bible and in exegetical tracts, is a study in the awareness of the fitting time, of kairos.⁴⁵

I see the "two-handed engine at the door" as an implicit statement of the divine-human effort needed to ultimately defeat the evil occasioned by the Fall. God works through the fit individual: his relationship to God

poses this responsibility. But human hands are limited in their ability to perform, as Milton had shown in Comus. Hence the need of divine assistance. Man must do what he can here and by this effort secure the grace of God through whose power evil will be finally smitten. Perhaps Christ, the highest embodiment of the divine-human correlative, is also symbolically that two-handed engine. Support for this view can be found in James 5:8-9 (RSV): "You also be patient. Establish your hearts, for the coming of the Lord is at hand. Do not grumble, brethren, against one another, that you may not be judged; behold, the Judge is standing at the doors." The passage in question, then, would seem to be prophetic in nature and informed by the notion of kairos. Such an interpretation not only increases the verity of the statement, but also makes it positive rather than negative in its import.

The poet again returns to nature in quest for this order. Both the theme and the elegiac conventions demand it; for he is yet in the world with real griefs and real brokenness. The procession of the flowers is cut short by the poet's awareness that this "is false surmise" (I, 153). Lycidas does not lie in the hearse, but is now being washed far away by the waves "under the whelming tide." Or perhaps, he is at the "bottom of the monstrous world" (I, 154-158). Milton has here in this image conflated two ideas: the malevolence of the human world like that of the

lower world are both caused by sin. In the former, the sin is by the apostate will; in the latter, the malevolence is by consequence of the initial apostasy--for man's first sin corrupted the original bond of amity which existed between himself and the creatures. Both worlds are monstrous, then, to the extent that they are of Satan's league.⁴⁶ Thus the poet sweeps from the consideration of nature's benignity, as represented by the flowers that mourned in procession, to nature's malevolence. But his portrayal is yet within the human framework. Thus he can find consolation for his musings on the fate of Lycidas' body by pointing to the dolphins, who protect those whom the muses love (I, 164). This prepares the way for the higher confirmation of hope.

The rhythm of nature again bears out the unity of existence. Just as the sun sinks and rises, the affairs of man ebb and flow, so, though Lycidas' body be "sunk beneath the watry floar" (I, 167), he will be "mounted high,/ Through the dear might of him who walked the waves" (I, 171-172). Here the poet adduces the highest proof of relationship, as he had in the Nativity Ode, the Incarnation. Not only is this proof of relationship it is also proof of the divine control of the universe. This also proves that death is not the end of all for Lycidas. He has hope in the "blest kingdoms meek of joy and love." For he is joined

In solemn troops, and sweet Societies
That sing, and singing in their glory
move

And wipe the tears for ever from his
 eyes.
 (I, 178-181)

From the world of brokenness Lycidas has gone to a world of perfect unity. There he performs a greater service than he could have on earth. Not to be the poet's personal tutelary spirit (as is Damonis) Lycidas is:

Genius of the shore,
 In thy large recompense, and shalt be
 good
 To all that wander in that perilous
 flood.
 (I, 183-184)

So the relationship and responsibility theme is again the keynote in the poet's reflections on the nature of reality. Milton arrives at a satisfactory statement on the problem of death and its place in the scheme of things only through a conscious examination of the sympathetic bond of nature and its implications. To convey the idea, Milton uses the standard imagery of a chain of beings linked in a mutuality of existence. In Lycidas the chain idea is implicit in the effects and affinities described. Likewise, the poet considers the identification of man with nature, of man with man, of man with mankind, and finally his identification with the divine. Always the relationship poses the responsibility, the rejection of which sets at variance the natural order. Therein lies the cause of all man's misery, even death. The higher the nature the greater the responsibility.

Thus in the three poems, "Hymn on the Morning of Christ's Nativity," Comus, and Lycidas, Milton examines aspects of the pattern for the good life and, as I see it, incorporates them into his program for the perfect poem. The Ode, I have suggested, supplied his basic pattern in its presentation of the Incarnate Son as man in his highest potential. Christ's coming seals the relationship between God and man and the bond of all creatures both to the Creator and to each other. Highest good lies in the conscious submission to His will. The Son as exemplar inspires Milton's quest for the highest merit; it is by following His example that all the sons of God ascend toward the divine and finally become reunited with Him.

Comus broadens the spiral of the Miltonic quest for excellence. The poet extols the virtue of chastity, inner sanctity; for it is a precondition of God's grace. The individual has the duty to maintain the purity of the temple of his mind. Meeting this responsibility does not render him, however, self-sufficient; it renders him worthy to receive divine assistance without which he could not ultimately triumph over the evils that he must encounter as a part of the human condition. The measure of fitness, then, is not performance, but one's active relationship with the divine. Such a relationship gives value to all other relationships.

Lycidas continues the spiralling ascent toward the good life. Merit and the ability to perform are considered

in relation to their susceptibility to chance and the mutability of human existence. The poet emerges with an awareness that man's view is limited. To fully understand the parts one must view them from the perspective of the whole order. This man cannot do in his time and place. Yet from his observations in the natural realm and by the proof of the Incarnation, he can know that all things are related and find their source and recompense in the immutable will of God. Thus a man has only the responsibility to be fit; the control and final answers rest in the divine hand. These are indeed chilly altitudes (to borrow Legouis's phrase). Perhaps they are too chilly for the atmosphere of a perfect poem. But these aspects do fit the perfect pattern, the example of the Christ. Milton, the young idealist, embraces them as part of his program to make of himself a perfect poem. But a poem is not its own excuse for being. The poet is soon to leave his ivory tower and come down into the fresh, though hot and thorny, fields of the real world.

CHAPTER IV

THE WORLD A POEM: TOWARDS

THE HOLY COMMUNITY

No man is an island, entire of itself; every man is a piece of the continent, a part of the main. . . . No man hath affliction enough that is not matured and ripened by it, and made fit for God by that affliction.
John Donne, "Meditation XVII"

The end of all learning is to repair the ruins of our first parents by regaining to know God aright, and out of that knowledge to love him, to imitate him, to be like him.

John Milton, "Of Education"

From the outset of his dedication of his life to a serious purpose, John Milton was a man with a cause. Indications of this impulse are evident in one of his academic exercises, "Prolusion II." Here he declares that "even a single individual endowed with the gifts of Art and Wisdom, may often prove to be a great gift of God and sufficient to lead a whole state to righteousness."¹ We have noted his diligent pursuit of knowledge and virtue. It would seem evident that Milton considered himself a "great gift of God" sufficient to lead his country to righteousness. His sense of mission, then, broadens from the individual quest for perfection evident in the earlier works to that of a vision

of perfection for his country as the holy community, and by growing disillusionment and depth of perception, to a vision of the world as the holy community.

Having consecrated himself as the "relater and interpreter of the best and sagest things among his own citizens" (CPW, I, 811-12), after due consideration Milton entered the hot and dusty arena of religious controversy: the question of moment in his country. Although he does not here discount influence abroad, he is content now with "the British Islands as [his] world" and the Puritan dilemma as his cause (CPW, I, 812). From this center, by occasion and proclivity, Milton moves into the domestic and political realms to repair any ruins he encountered. For he felt the world was what its good people made it, and he desired to make of it a perfect poem, a composition of the best and noblest things.

Milton's holy community evolves from an active awareness of his relationship both to God and his fellowman. Its constituents are those "ingrafted in Christ and its effects" says Milton in Christian Doctrine.² Milton saw it as his responsibility to relate to the people of England the effects of this connection with Christ: a life of virtue and good citizenship. Where there were relapses from justice and "God's true worship," he saw it incumbent upon himself to inveigh against them and instruct his fellowmen in the means of restoration to true piety (I, 816-17). His constant and

ceaseless struggle is directed towards regaining that original goodness which characterized the primal state. He saw no essential split between happiness in this world and the next. Thus he stated in "Prolusion VII": "Nothing can be accounted justly among our causes of happiness unless it takes into consideration both that eternal life and this temporal life" (CPW, I, 291). So Milton's poem-world is the holy community, deriving all virtue and all worthy knowledge from its relationship with God, the source of all good.

Milton's apologetics, then, spring from a genuine human sympathy, from a deep sensitivity of his relationship to God and its incumbent responsibility. He had promises to keep--but first with God, then with his fellow man. The test of any good was its harmony with the divine will as revealed in Holy Writ and the interpretation of its teachings by the mind in the right relationship with God. This one must understand to deal justly with Milton's polemic prose. His antipathies, his sympathies or loyalties all have their seat in his commitment to his Maker. The end of all action as well as "the end of all learning is to repair the ruins of our first parents" ("Of Education," CPW, II, 366-67) and to regain that perfect unity and bliss of the primal state. Only through building the holy community could this desired end be reached.

In the antiprelatical tracts,³ Milton is swimming with a strong tide at his back. His position within the

Puritan controversy is at neither extreme. Here the appeals to the individual's conscience in the realm of things indifferent--things not expressly prohibited by Scripture--and to respect for discipline as a cohesive force in the church and civil affairs supply him grist for his own mill. Later, when he is faced with a personal dilemma, the desertion of his bride of a month,⁴ Milton is brought home to himself with apparently no company. Here he has a high personal stake and cannot avoid the judgment of others. He wrestles with his relationship to God, to his fellowman, and to himself as an individual destined to serve both. Christian liberty, inherent in the law of nature, takes on added significance in Milton's thought. From the spirited display of defensive tactics exhibited in the divorce pamphlets, Milton was to rush into the political crisis at mid-century, perhaps not as an angel, but certainly as no lunatic or fanatic--though some sage and serious commentators have expressed doubt concerning the latter.⁵ Indubitably, Milton views all of his sallies as part of the general reformation aimed towards the realization of the holy community, the reparation of the ruins caused by our first parents.

Milton aligned himself on the side of the Puritans in the religious controversy, for there he saw the hope of the fulfillment of his dreams for the holy community. Thus he became a Presbyterian; but when "New Presbyter" proved to be "Old Priest writ large," as he put it in his sonnet

"On the New Forcers" (Works, I, l. 20),⁶ he moved on to become an Independent and from there to become independent. It is easy to see this development as inevitable for one who loved truth more than tradition and systems. Always in Milton, as Diekhoff notes, politics and ethics emerge openly as "not separate disciplines but parts of one."⁷

Milton's position, or rather, his base of operation in the Puritan controversy--for Milton could hardly be said to maintain a position except as it had God as the center--is somewhere between the two extremes. Henry Ainsworth represents one of these poles. He envisioned the holy community or the kingdom of Christ as "no earthlie monarchie."⁸ It was therefore "able to beat down, break in pieces, and grind to powder all adverse power and domination; whether of this world, or the spirituall wickedness which is in high places."⁹ Implications are here for both endless divisions and lack of tolerance.¹⁰ But on the other side is a more sobering view as stated in the first Moravian tract in English. With greater tolerance than Milton, according to Hughes, "the Moravian pled that love could, 'assimilate' all men. 'It did assimilate Christ into us, and now if we will entertaine it . . . it will assimilate our Soules to his, and bring us into the perfect state of true felicitie We will not live to our selves, but unto the Communion of Saints.'"¹¹ This spirit of tolerance is somewhat reminiscent of Donne's statement on the schisms as being all beams of

the same sun. But it is a little too moderate a view for Milton.

Milton's medial position in the controversy allowed him the use of tactics from both extremes. Even at the beginning, he was not beyond harshly castigating against his opponents. In Animadversions, he justifies this weapon of controversy in this way: "I suppose . . . it will be nothing disagreeing from Christian meeknesse to handle [any notorious enemy to truth and his countries peace, especially that is conceited to have a voluble and smart fluence of tongue . . .] in a rougher accent, and to send home his haughtinesse well-bespurtd with his owne holy-water" (CPW, I, 662). But the positive side of Milton's efforts to reform the religious practices of his day revolves around the use of the Scriptures. His statement in Of Reformation best summarizes his view. Insisting that no special learning is necessary to comprehend the Scriptures, he goes on to say:

The very essence of Truth is plainnesse, and brightnes; the darknes and crookednes is our owne. The Wisdome of God created understanding, fit and proportional to Truth the object, and end of it, as the eye to the thing visible. . . . If we will but purge with sovraign eyesalve that intellectual ray which God hath planted in us, then we would beleeve the Scriptures protesting their own plainnes, and perspicuity, calling to them to be instructed, not only the wise, and learned, but the simple, the poor, the babes, foretelling an extraordinary effusion of God's spirit upon every age, and sexe, attributing to all men, and requiring from them the ability of searching, trying, examining all things, and by the Spirit discerning that which is good.

(CPW, I, 566)

When Milton voiced this doctrine, he laid the groundwork for

all of his efforts in the religious, domestic, and political realms.

It is no doubt that Milton saw his activities of the next twenty years as a part of his whole perception of the spirit of his relationship-responsibility theme. But they were not without their personal rewards for him in his individual quest for perfection. As Aristotle once said, "by acting in the various relations in which we are thrown with our fellow men we come to be, some just, some unjust; and by acting in the dangerous positions and being habituated to feel fear or confidence, we come to be some brave, others cowards."¹² Milton reflects this same opinion in one of his letters: "It is an established fact that virtues are nourished most and flourish most in straitened and hard circumstances" (Works, II, 114-15). Small wonder that he did not shirk the heat of the battle.

In the heat of the battle Milton uses the Bible as his armor. With its accoutrement, he challenged custom, tradition and error in any of their guises. "The Bible," he says, "should perfect the law, not imitate it" (CPW, I, 764). Beginning with the attack on the hierarchy in the Anglican church and what he considered its attendant tyranny over the human spirit, Milton in support of reform declared that "there is a certaine attraction and magnetic force betwixt the religion and the ministeriall forme thereof" (CPW, I, 766). He broadened his base of attack rather easily as he

connected these ecclesiastical affairs with the total destiny of England, individually and corporally.

It was also an easy step from the affirmation of the right of a man to interpret the Bible for himself to that of the appeal to man's innate sense for what is right and good when parts of the Bible conflict or mystify. Such a view, of course, glorified the individual, but only the individual rightly guided by reason, or as Milton and his age called it, Right Reason. The concept was, like most of the ideas of the age, a footnote to Plato. The ancient philosopher had earlier held that . . . "in its own right Nature would not concern the intellect at all, for the proper and adequate object of the intellect is not the symbols but the God whom they partially disclose."¹³ The Christianized extrapolation of this essential position is "that nature and Scripture alike are read by aid of a direct light from God. There is no difference in principle between natural knowledge and the divine knowledge which makes wise unto salvation."¹⁴ Hence there is no divorcing politics from ethics nor of the principles of right action for individuals from those of social groups.¹⁵ Just as one understands the order of nature around him through God's light in every man alike, one can also understand God's requirements of him to effect a life of virtue through this same right reason.¹⁶

The exercise of right reason is necessary for one to achieve true and substantial liberty and Milton makes it

major emphasis in his program for the holy community. Added to right reason and indispensable to its perpetuity is discipline. In Reason of Church Government, Milton expresses his high estimate of this quality. In human affairs, there is no "sociable perfection in this life civill or sacred that can be above discipline, but she is that which with her musicall chords preserves and holds all parts thereof together" (CPW, I, 751). Such discipline, as Milton sees it, is possible only when the parts are in contact with their source. And this discipline insures the true liberty, for it serves "to inbreed in [one that] generous and Christianly reverence one of another, the very Nurs and Guardian of Piety and Vertue" (CPW, I, 841). Later Milton restated the importance of discipline to "true and substantial liberty" in The Second Defence (1654). Responding to criticism of his role in the military affairs of his country, Milton justified his pamphleteering activity in behalf of religious, domestic, and political freedom as superior to and more compatible with his calling than warfare. Such liberty as that which furthers the goals of the holy community "must be sought, not without, but within, and . . . is best achieved, not by the sword, but by the life rightly conducted" (CPW, IV, pt. I, 624).

That Milton could not and did not divorce his ethical and political principles is further evident in his other polemic works. At no time does he place higher authority in

anything else than he does in the Bible. Seeing himself as a partner with God in the affairs of the world, Milton continued to labor for the common good through his counsel and exemplary life. Already having previously considered the topic of divorce, in 1642, upon his desertion by his new bride, Mary Powell, Milton was forced to carry his battle for human freedom into the domestic area. The Doctrine and Discipline of Divorce, appearing anonymously in August 1, 1643,¹⁷ is Milton's answer to this call of duty. This pamphlet touched off one of the most explosive reactions he was ever to encounter. The nature of this controversy did not inspire supporters, and Milton was almost alone in his stand on divorce. Again he used the Bible to buttress his argument. The initial tract is followed by the appearance of an enlarged edition of the original with the author's name in January or February, 1644. The Judgment of Martin Bucer concerning Divorce, an extraction from a respected authority designed to win support for Milton's own position, appeared in August, 1644. His own Tetrachordon appeared in 1644. It was an attempt to reconcile the four key passages of Scripture on which he based his argument for divorce: Genesis 1: 27-28 compared and explained by Genesis 2: 18, 23, 24; Deuteronomy 24: 1, 2; Matthew 5: 31, 32 with Matthew 19: 3-11; I Corinthians 7: 10-16. Finally in answer to severe attack on his Doctrine and Discipline of Divorce, Milton published his acrid reply, Colasterion, in March,

1645.¹⁸ Since the latter pamphlets are for the most part refinements on the original, I consider the Doctrine and Discipline as the statement of Milton's basic doctrine concerning divorce.

The divorce tracts are pivotal in Milton's apologetics. Not only do they make the most explicit prose statement of Milton's doctrine of sympathy and its importance in the commerce between man and his fellows and between man and his God, but they also mark the beginning of a new direction in Milton's concept of the law of nature in the affairs of man.

Most authorities agree that the divorce tracts were precipitated by Milton's personal dilemma,¹⁹ but many also have pointed to their transcending mere self-interests to a universal application. Fixler, I think, is right in his contention that Milton allows charitably for the human condition of postlapsarian man in the divorce tracts because such is the basis for his efforts to achieve Christian liberty. "The stress on human imperfection," Fixler says, "led Milton to assert most forcefully the inviolability of the individual conscience in deciding what was not to its own spiritual enhancement."²⁰

Christian liberty, as a necessary precondition for the achievement of the holy community, then becomes the key idea in Milton's deontology. As Milton had not earlier thought of the attainment of the holy community through

juridical means, he had not up to the point of the divorce controversy recognized any conflict between the law and the exercise of his Christian liberty.²¹ But as time wore on, Milton came to see such a conflict and thereupon severed his ties with any activities which abrogated his liberty. The later stage of this same development finds him justifying the regicide in 1649 and proposing a plan for the Christian commonwealth--on the eve of the Restoration. He follows the same line of development in his religious affiliations, moving steadily towards independency. It was, I believe, his efforts to gain a hearing for his divorce propositions that brought Milton to a clarification of his doctrines on the inviolability of the human conscience.

Milton approached the matter of divorce, first, from the standpoint of "things indifferent." As he saw it, this was a realm of human activity in which the church should not interfere. Likewise, it was beyond the legitimate scope of civil law. The burden of Milton's argument, as Barker summarizes it, "is not the prevention of mistakes through discipline but the freedom of divorce necessary if the unhappy consequences are to be avoided."²² Milton uses for support "an insistence on the infinite mercy of divine charity and a defence of the legitimate (if frail) inclinations of human nature."²³ For the strength of his case, he depended not only upon the Bible, but also upon the faculty of reason (CPW, II, 242). "The center of reference in the divorce

tracts," says Barker, "shifts from the revealed word of God to the rights of the individual believer."²⁴ The implications of such a shift are phenomenal, as the Presbyterians recognized in their refusal to support him. Much of Milton's attack on the bondage of canon law was nullified by the fear of possible anarchy. Milton parries by accusing the ecclesiastics of being more interested in bodily needs than spiritual or intellectual needs. Thus connecting episcopal hierarchy with "the licentiousness which it would foster for its own tyrannous purposes."²⁵ In this way Milton was able to join the cause of the general reformation with that of the divorce tracts.

Already in Comus Milton had examined the importance of the freedom of the mind in the pursuit of goodness. The inviolability of the human conscience was also shown to be the greatest protection against evil. Just as fitness in the individual and in the community of individuals comprising Milton's envisioned community of saints was determined by unity of mind and spirit with the will of God, so fitness in marriage is, according to Milton's view, to be determined by the unity of the mates in mind and spirit. So the work of freeing man from the enthralling divorce law is the duty of all men of God. To the extent that it frees man from the tyranny of custom joined with error (CPW, II, 223), it is an integral part of the reformation.

Milton first argues for the recognition of divorce

a vinculo, with the right of both parties to remarry. He urges liberalization of the grounds for divorce to include incompatibility and for the removal of divorce from public jurisdiction whether ecclesiastical or civil, to private (CPW, II, 146). The frame of the argument was constructed of the four key Scriptural passages just cited. The burden of the argument rested on the sayings of Moses and Christ. The crux of Milton's case centers, finally, on Genesis 2: 18: "And the Lord God said, It is not good that man should be alone; I will make him an help meet for him" (italics added). Thus Milton sees Scripture as testing a marriage by the fitness (meetness) of its partners.

It is in his elucidation of the word meet that Milton comes to rely heavily on the concept of sympathy as a most potent force in the affairs of man. A mate that is meet is fit to "serve the chiefest and noblest end of marriage" (CPW, II, 246). Placing greater value on the spiritual side of marriage, Milton sees its chief end as "a meet and happy conversation" (CPW, II, 246). A marriage which does not serve this end is null and void to Milton. Conversation, however, includes "the actions of consorting or having dealing with others; living together; commerce, intercourse, society, intimacy" (OED). But even so, it shifts the emphasis from that of their present canon law which allowed remedy from a marriage only for adultery or impotency. To Milton, this statute spoke only to the

secondary end of marriage, carnality, not to its primary end. Such a law, Milton argued, abrogates the ordinance of Christ, "the supreme dictate of charitie" (CPW, II, 250). Moreover, the law as it now stands is an incentive to obliquity. Deprived of the chief end of marriage, one is likely to seek redress elsewhere, or from necessity, "despair in Vertue and mutin against divine providence" (CPW, II, 254). Thus he arrives at the point which logically follows. If the reason for the marriage is meetness and the meetness is absent, one is free to conclude that when the reason for inseparability disappears, the inseparability also disappears (CPW, II, 150).

Milton's theory of inseparability evolves from the passage, Gen. 18: 24. "Therefore shall a man leav his father and his mother, and shall cleav to his wife; and they shall be one flesh" (CPW, II, 603). This dictum immediately calls up the archetypal marriage of Adam and Eve. Thus in this question, as in all others that Milton considers, he goes back to the Fall from which sprang all of man's woes. It is because of the Fall that man and, likewise, his institutions are imperfect. Milton feels, therefore, that proportional allowance should be made for man's fallen condition both in the construction and execution of customs, laws, and institutions. In prelapsarian man, there was nothing to prevent the true unity of mind, body, and spirit. But even then Milton sees that the unity of mind and spirit

was preeminent as the cause of inseparability. The full perfection of marital unity experienced by Adam and Eve is attainable for postlapsarian man only in such proportion as is his exercise of Christian liberty (CPW, II, 227). Where an erroneous custom or law curtails man's privilege of rectifying his mistakes in marriage or in any of his human activities, such a custom or law nullifies its effect, ill serves its true purpose. It then becomes the responsibility of the fit members of society to institute its reform or abandonment.

The true test of a law on marriage, Milton argues, is whether it insures each of the partners a fit mate. The main element in fitness is sympathy, that is, the mutual bond of amity and concord (CPW, II, 272). Among human beings, the degree of sympathy varies from individual to individual. The primary reason for marriage, as Milton sees it, is this natural affinity which joins like to like. Only in such a mutual relationship is there the implicit responsibility to become one flesh, one mind, one spirit. Only then does the condition of inseparability prevail. As we shall see, Milton was to return to this basic idea of marriage again in Paradise Lost and in Samson Agonistes.

Milton further argues for the right to pursue marital harmony by his appeal to the goodness of God and the necessary goodness of his gifts to man. Since God provided the first union as a comfort for man, it is right to expect

marriage to be "meetly helpful" (CPW, II, 326). A law that makes an unfit marriage binding is a greater hardship on man than Christian charity demands, or as Milton believes, approves. For "the fit union of [the partners'] souls be such as may even incorporate them to love and amity; but that can never be where no correspondence is of the minde; nay instead of beeing one flesh, they will be rather two carkasses chain'd unnaturally together; or as it may happ'n, a living soule bound to a dead corps" (CPW, II, 326-327). So powerful is the sympathetic impulse that no true love or marriage can exist without it. So "it is not the joyning of another body" that makes a marriage, "but the uniting of compliable minds" (CPW, II, 327). Without the antecedence of sympathy, to be of one flesh is "no blessing, but a torment, nay a base and brutish condition" (CPW, II, 327). So to reduce man who is made in the image of God to this state by a fallible law is an abomination of the spirit of God, an abuse of something he ordained good (CPW, II, 326).

Since laws made by fallible men must inevitably be fallible, Milton resorts to the law of nature as the individual guide in what is right for himself. Where a man "for just and natural cause [has] discover'd he cannot love," there is a law more ancient and more deeply "ingrav'n in blameless nature than the other" which compels him to separate (CPW, II, 330). Milton further develops his idea of right relationship and concomitant responsibility in a

rather far-fetched Mosaic-Platonic myth. "Love was the Son of Lonelines, begat in Paradise by that sociable and helpfull aptitude which God implanted between man and woman toward each other" (CPW, II, 252). Implicitly, then, the perfect union is joined by God and should not be put asunder. But an unsuited match is no union and "there is no power above their own consent to hinder them from unjoyning" (CPW, II, 328). But this privilege presupposes the rational use of this liberty.

Milton meant these freedoms only for the rational and disciplined individual. His liberty is not license. Man-made laws which conflict with the law of nature in the rational soul supercede their diocese. For they hinder "those deep and serious regresses of nature in a reasonable soul" (CPW, II, 346). It is the natural right of such a person to recollect himself "from that mistak'n help . . . [and] unpredestin'd misery" and to seek the "person created for him" (CPW, II, 346). "To detain him by compulsion . . . is in diameter against both nature and institution" (CPW, II, 346). Against this height of presumption, Milton, following Moses, warns: "Force nothing against sympathy or naturall order, no not upon the most abject creatures" (CPW, II, 272). "To command love, to forbid dislike against the guiltles instinct of nature, is not within the province of any law to reach, and were indeed an uncommodious rudenes, not a just power," Milton declares (CPW, II, 346).

Natural selectivity in man is inevitable. Whether he looks for his twin-soul as in "Epitaphium Damonis," or the "help meet," Milton says that "there is a hidden efficacy of love and hatred [sympathy and antipathy] in man as well as other kinds, not morall, but naturall" (CPW, II, 271). Though either of these impulses may be dormant in the choice of a mate, it cannot be so in the success of the match. Milton supports his claim for this powerful element in human commerce by biblical and classical evidence. From the Bible he cites Ecclesiastes 13: 16: "A man will cleave to his like." From classical lore, he cites Homer: "God brings like unto like" (Odyssey, XVII, 218). He further notes that not every man or woman is fit for each other. The chance is great that unsuitedness might develop or be discovered after marriage; in such a case this is not necessarily the fault of the mismates. Nevertheless, Christian charity demands a remedy (CPW, II, 272-273). And in a classic statement on the doctrine of sympathy, Milton clinches his argument for amelioration of external restraints on the human spirit:

Seeing there is indeed a twofold Seminary of stock in nature, from whence are deriv'd the issues of love and hatred distinctly flowing through the whole masse of created things, and that Gods doing ever is to bring the due likenesses and harmonies of his workes together, except when out of two contraries met to their own destruction, he moulds a third existence, and that is error, or some evil Angel which either blindly or maliciously hath drawn together in two persons ill imbark't in wedlock the sleeping discords and enmities

of nature . . . what folly it is to stand combating
and battering against invincible causes and effects.

. . .

(CPW, II, 272)

Milton, then, sees the sympathetic bond of nature as a universal principle, powerful though nonmoral. Ordered by the reasonable soul, its claims are undeniable. But in no case can or should it be forced or commanded. Thus Milton sees sympathy in the human psychology as equal to or synonymous with the claims of the law of nature. In Milton's deontology, this law of nature is the highest law. So relationship and responsibility again become the standard of measurement for Milton's apologetics. Indeed it is here that he gains his greatest psychological advantage when he argues from the premise of sympathy. It is at once a strong plea for human dignity and a just defense of the claims of nature and charity "to which all other ordinances give up their seals" (CPW, II, 334).

But at this point, Milton has not yet sufficiently harmonized the seeming conflicts in the Biblical pronouncements on divorce. He himself had pleaded eloquently in the antiprelatical tracts for the recognition of the Bible as the sole guide in matters of the conscience. In spite of the growing tolerance for his cause, ecclesiastical surety dictated a just settlement of this claim. Milton wrote Tetrachordon to meet this need. It is, as I believe, only when he draws upon all of his resources to face this task of reconciling the texts that Milton comes to recognize the

full implications of the doctrine of Christian liberty. By enlarging his concept of reason, nature, and Christian liberty in his successive tracts, Milton emerges finally with a gallant defense of human or natural liberty.

The revised version of Doctrine and Discipline of Divorce considers the relationship between the Old and New Testaments by limiting the application of the respective pronouncement on divorce to its respective dispensation. Milton buttresses this point by stating that "Divorce is not a matter of Law but of Charity" (CPW, I, 345). As such it is God's law, beyond human jurisdiction. God's law "requires the observance thereof not otherwise then to the law of nature and of equity imprinted in us seems correspondent" (CPW, II, 297). This step, it seems, takes him beyond the Bible as well as beyond civil law. But Milton feels that no law of God is contrary to nature. Thus he sees divorce from an unfit mate as natural and any prohibitive measure as "not only against nature but against law [for] law and nature are not to go contrary" (CPW, II, 346). The question confronting civil authorities and the "reasonable soul" is "how far the territory and dominion extends of just and honest liberty" (CPW, II, 227). For Milton's liberty is not license.

The question of harmonizing the texts on divorce from the Old and New Testaments is to provide an answer for the overall question of liberty. Milton approaches the problem

by extending in Tetrachordon the figurative interpretation already given the key passages in the earlier editions of the divorce tracts. The use of the law of nature to justify human action demands that one must show its applicability to all men and times. To appeal to the Bible as the final court of authority demands that the New Testament must not abrogate the Old. Thus Milton to meet these problems broadened his concept to include a primary and secondary law of nature, the first to man in the unfallen state and the latter to fallen man (CPW, II, 156). "Had men continu'd perfet, it had bin just that all things should have remain'd as they began to Adam and Eve. But after the sons of men grew violent and injurious, it alter'd the love of justice and put the government of things into a new frame" (CPW, II, 665). So through the broadening of the concept of the law of nature, Milton not only explicates "hardness of heart" to mean "the imperfection and decay of man from original righteousness" (CPW, II, 154-155), but he resolves the apparent conflict between the Old and New Testament passages.

Furthermore, Milton's new interpretation, by extending its application to embrace all fallen mankind, broadens his concept of liberty from Christian to natural liberty (CPW, II, 155). But this liberty is not license for non-Christians; nor had it been so for Christians. It depends on an objective standard of righteousness, allowing "just and natural privileges" for the inwardly good. This

extension is possible because "there are left som remains of Gods image in man, as he is meerly man" (CPW, II, 591). This is certainly a significant step in Milton towards a universality not characteristic of the seventeenth-century polemicists. It is due to his idea of the unity of mankind in God that he is able to arrive at such a position. Even here Milton is moving his boundaries towards a universal encompassment.

Milton goes on to other implications of this secondary law of nature for the more secular idea of the "law of nations" and thus integrates the case for divorce with that for Parliamentary supremacy: "They are twin consequences of a single principle, the jurisdiction of the secondary law of nature" (CPW, II, 661-662). Milton had learned the tactic from Parliament itself, Ernest Sirluck observes (CPW, II, 157). Just as the secondary law of nature provided, according to Milton's argument, a test of the validity of human laws with reference to marriage, so "it will do the same with reference to the state" (CPW, II, 158).

Milton's first ardent defense of the principles of individual liberty in state affairs grew out of his own experiences with censorship in the publishing of his divorce tracts. His response to this curtailment of human freedom called forth what many believe to be the most brilliant defense of the freedom of the press even penned, Areopagitica (1644). In this pamphlet, Milton builds on the foundation

of innate human dignity. He makes an eloquent plea for the freedom of postlapsarian man (with certain securities against popery and open superstition) to explore in unity "through a bond of peace" the whole emporium of ideas (CPW, II, 565). Such a freedom is necessary if one is to gain sufficient skill in sifting the good from the bad in the fallen world. To prevent this open and free inquiry is "to bind Truth while she sleeps" (CPW, II, 563). Furthermore, we but enthral her in the gripe of custom viewing her with bleared eyes dimmed with prejudice (CPW, II, 564-565).

Milton can welcome sects as they represent the "earnest and zealous thirst after knowledge and understanding which God has stirred up in this city" (CPW, II, 554). Then with genuine humanitas, Milton goes on to express his vision of the holy community. "A little generous prudence, a little forbearance of one another, and som grain of charity might win all these diligences to joyn and unite in one generall and brotherly search after Truth" (CPW, II, 554). Such a statement does not portray the cold and surly "exasperated individual [who] makes self-righteousness the law of right" which Paul Elmer More, à la mode de Dr. Johnson, finds.²⁶ Rather it is a man in search of truth, a quest preconditioned not only by charity and goodness, but also by an awareness of man's limitations. Milton's appeals for a concept of right are not simply addressed to nature, but to nature in harmony with God's will. A law emerging from such

a source is not only natural, but it is for the good of man, as Milton saw it--though such a law might many times be in conflict with civil laws, customs, and traditions. Not that he loved public esteem less, but that he loved liberty and truth more.

Only one with a natural human sympathy could look beneath the surface dissimilitudes to a mutuality of aspirations which could ultimately subsume the differences. That Milton desires such a harmonious quest for common good is evident by this positive tolerance of schisms and sects--though he did have a blind spot where papists are involved. But here again, I think this is because he saw them as antipathetic to the cause of freedom of the human spirit. For he says, the goal of the quest for truth, for perfection consists in this "that out of many moderat varieties and brotherly dissimilitudes that are vastly unproportional arise the goodly and graceful symmetry" (CPW, II, 555). That only can guarantee the power of truth to triumph over error: "for opinion in good men is Truth in the making" (CPW, II, 554).

The individual's right to moral choice should not be curtailed by laws, civil or sacred. Righteousness is not a matter of laws, Milton held, but of inward discipline. For an individual to perfect himself and sharpen his abilities to discern the good, an individual's "actions must be all elective and unconstrained" (CPW, II, 342). The test of this open choice is the open field. For Milton says that he

cannot praise a fugitive and cloister'd vertue, un-exercis'd and unbreath'd, that never sallies out and sees her adversary, but slinks out of the race, where that immortall garland is to be run for, not without dust and heat. Assuredly we bring not innocence into the world, we bring impurity much rather: that which purifies us is triall, and triall is by what is contrary.

(CPW, II, 515)

Such a gallant plea for freedom of the good man to test and try the conditions of this world is evoked by Milton's ever-present desire to gain approval in his Task-Master's eye. Milton saw this as the sine qua non of his relationship with God and man. But this sense of responsibility did not always promise calm waters, as he had earlier divined and as he restates it in Areopagitica in the passage just cited. But his assertion in Doctrine and Discipline is prophetic in its insight: "No man knows hell like him who converses in heaven" (CPW, II, 333).

As time wore on, occasion and duty again called Milton into the service of the reformation and, as he saw it, the service of liberty. Called forth by the regicide of Charles I, The Tenure of Kings and Magistrates was Milton's contribution to the urgency of the moment. The hounds of history were in hot pursuit of England's destiny. The clamor and shout of factions resounded in every corner. But Milton heard the voice of freedom and, as he saw it, aligned himself with freedom's cause. The cause of freedom meant the death of a Charles who happened to have once been a king, as Milton would interpret it. It also seemed that the

installation of a commonwealth was the best means to freedom and piety, so he supported it. But it was only for the end of freedom that Milton, I believe, made any of the commitments he was to make during this crisis.

In Of Reformation, Milton had earlier stated: "We know that the monarchy is made up of two parts, the liberty of the subject and the supremacy of the king" (CPW, I, 592). Position here would seem to indicate a conscious priority, but if it does not the course of Milton's thought and activities does. Being at the time in favor of the monarchy and against the prelates, he strikes an oracular note: "What [is] more baneful to a monarchy than Popular commotion?" (CPW, I, 592). It is also ironical to note here that Milton argues against James I's clairvoyance: "No bishop, no King" (CPW, I, 582). Yet even then Milton is no confirmed monarchist as may be inferred from the drift of his remarks. More indicative is his assertion: "Let not human quilllets keep back divine authority. It is not common law, nor the civil, but piety and justice that are our foundresses; they stoop not, neither change color for Aristocracy, democracy, or Monarchy, nor yet all interrupt their just courses; but farre above the taking notice of these inferior niceties with perfect sympathy, where ever they meet, kisse each other" (CPW, I, 605-606). Therefore, it is certain that so long as any form of government incorporates justice and piety, it is satisfactory to Milton. Substance not form

is his standard of value. Here, as ever, merit is the yardstick by which he measures any person or institution.

Milton must adhere to an intrinsic standard of values because he measures everything with a free and inquiring spirit (CPW, III, 198), not by tradition, custom, and legal sanction. The reason of government, as Milton sees it, is individual freedom. Since as a consequence of the Fall, man's ability to exercise free will is impaired, a common league for benefit of all is thought necessary. Foreseeing that fallen man's propensity "to doe wrong and violence" might lead to the untimely destruction of all, "they agreed by common league to bind each other from mutual injury, and joyntly to defend themselves against any that gave disturbance or opposition to such agreement" (CPW, III, 198-199). So the foundation of government rests on the assumption of relationship and responsibility.

The relationship of the governed to the governor is mutual, and so is the responsibility. This contract is binding if the cause obtains for which it was instituted. Governorship originally was delegated on the basis of merit "to one whom for eminence and wisdom and integritie they chose over the rest" (CPW, III, 199). But this power is retained by consent of the governed; for each, having "originally and naturally the same powers and unitedly in them all," reserves the right to be "his own partial judge" (CPW, III, 199). Here, again, Milton's hierarchical

structure rests on merit, mutual relationship and mutual responsibility.

The king is, in a sense, the other self of the populace, since he rules "by vertue of thir intrusted power, [and executes] that justice which else every man by the bond of nature and of Cov'nant might have executed for himself or one another" (CPW, III, 199). So a king, lord, or master derives his name from the abstractions which the concretion should represent. If the two elements are not cojoined there is no king. Such offices, Milton maintains in The Tenure, "are relative, and relations have no longer being than the relation" (CPW, III, 229). Such a statement reinforces Milton's contract theory and underscores the importance to which he attributes sympathy in human intercourse: only where there is mutual sympathy can there be an unbreachable contract.

As in marriage, where without love and sympathy there is no true marriage, so in government, where without mutual amity between ruler and ruled there is no true king and no loyalty incumbent upon the subjects. "Who knows not that a King is a name of dignity and office, not of person: Who therefore kills a King, must kill him while he is still a king?" (CPW, III, 233). Thus Milton disposes of the claim of regicide by contending that Charles I was not a king but a tyrant, an enemy; and "the law of nature justifies any man to defend himself even against the King in person . . .

and justice don upon a Tyrant is no more but a necessary self-defence of a whole Common wealth" (CPW, III, 254). Milton, of course, is here poles apart from Hobbes's tenets on the theory of government.

Hobbism had not yet made its official advent upon the English scene at the time of The Tenure; but the ideas were already in the air. Hobbes's treatise, Considerations upon the Reputation, Loyalty, Manners, and Religion of Thomas Hobbes . . . had earned for him banishment from England around 1640.²⁷ Even before his Leviathan in 1651, then, his notion that sympathy is self-love to the exclusion of others was well known in learned circles. Upon such a theory, Hobbes evolved his theory of politics. Since man exists in a state of each against all, a ruler must be given unlimited exercise of authority over the people to prevent mass suicide, Hobbes reasoned (CPW, IV, pt. I, 31). This is indeed a bleak view of man's potential. But, as has already been suggested, Milton reasoned from the same premise to the opposite view of man.

The idea of interrelatedness is seminal in Milton's deontology: he always reasons from this premise. Such a view lies at the heart of his aspirations for a better England and, as he had indicated in Areopagitica, the role of England in reforming the world. "Who knows not," he says in The Tenure, "that there is a mutual bond of amity and brotherhood between man and man over all the world, neither is it

the English Sea that can sever us from that duty and that relation." But the closer the bond the greater the responsibility: "a straiter bond ther is between fellow-subjects, neighbours and friends" (CPW, III, 214).

With the assurance of human relationship and human responsibility, Milton led on amidst encircling hostility. Many, whether through myopia or predisposition, could not be convinced by his argument. Though Milton was in March, 1649, appointed Secretary for Foreign Tongues to the Council of State,²⁸ such an appointment only rendered him more vulnerable to the showers of criticism being heaped upon his head at the time. Increasingly, he became the butt of both national and international aspersion. To justify a regicide was incomprehensible to Milton's critics, so little account did they take of his distinctions. So Milton's first duty in his official capacity was to answer the propagandistic treatise Eikon Basilike (1649), issued by one of the royalist sympathizers. In this work, Eikonoklastes, Milton elaborated upon his basic thesis already set forth in The Tenure. But Milton is by now not only disillusioned by the kingship, as he knew it, but also doubtful that any individual could ever qualify for a king, as he conceived the office. So, in refutation of James I's advice to Charles I: "Keep to the true principles of piety, vertue, and honour, and [you] shall never want a Kingdom"--Milton rejoined: "People of England, keep ye to those principles, and ye

shall never want a king" (CPW, III, 581).

At no time did Milton shrink from the heat of the battles that he entered in defense of his country and of himself. In his defense tracts he elaborated on the basic ideas already expressed on the relationship-responsibility theme. He crushed his enemies with levity and logic--all, as he saw it, in defense of truth and liberty. But the greatest battle that he faced during the early years of the fifties was the battle for his eyesight. This one he lost decisively in 1651.²⁹ Likewise he lost his wife Mary Powell in 1652. But he did not lose his resolve "to present [his] true account," as he tells us in "On His Blindness" (Works, I, ll. 5-14).

Milton's eternal and sincere devotion to liberty and human welfare is perhaps best illustrated in his latest political pamphlet, The Readie and Easie Way, published on the eve of the Restoration when hopes of its fruition were dimmest and the personal risk severest. The pamphlet outlines a plan for a commonwealth, which he now sees as the best means by which the just claims of the individual could be served. His government is still of the elect, and election is still postulated on merit. Since few would achieve this merit, the government must be constituted of the "fit . . . though few" (Works, II, P.L. VII, 31). To insure against corruption, it is rotating in its membership. Milton's standard of merit is not purely subjective; for a

precondition of it is relationship to God and receptivity of its effects. As he had now despaired of finding the desired quality in a single man, he recommends a republic based on aristocracy of merit.

The commonwealth that Milton envisions more nearly than any other form of government seems to him to insure the demands of God and human nature. It is "not only held by the wisest men in all ages the noblest, the manliest, and the equallest, the justest government, the most agreeable to all due libertie and proportioned equalitie, both human, civil, and Christian, most cherishing of vertue and true religion," (Works, VI, 119) but, as Milton sees it, "the happiness of a nation must needs be firmest and certainest in a full and free council of their own electing, where no single person, but only reason swaies . . . within the joint providence and counsel of many industrious equals" (Works, VI, 121-122). Here Milton sets aside all doubt as to his motivation for acting: human sympathy. His proposed governmental system is predicated on the welfare of proportionately equal persons with the checks and balances to insure the rights of the individual. Milton's principle of equality also recognizes and rewards merit: it is proportioned on the measure of the divine image in each. Thus again, the doctrine of sympathy provides the origin of Milton's insights.

Milton's theory of government is not contrary to his cosmological scheme of the chain of being, as many would

suppose. Almost universally held to require the monarchical form of government, the chain idea, as Allers points out, need not imply a monarchy. To put it microcosmistically, there can be "a democracy of cosmic powers or stellar spirits."³⁰ Allers further notes that "no such conception [of the universe as a republic] seems to exist."³¹ If this is true, then Milton has in this insight also blazed a new trail, which is more to the credit of his sympathetic impulse. Actually it was primarily Milton's desire to clarify the relationship-responsibility matter that led him to this conclusion. It was also for this same reason that he renounced his passing tolerance for monarchy.

Aware of the impending Restoration, Milton sees it as his responsibility to relate this means of deliverance to his fellow country men. Although his hopes for the "Good Old Cause" are almost nil, he still hopes for the best. But as he could see, the people by their actions rather seek to be "by nature slaves and arrant beasts, not fit for that liberty they cri'd out and bellow'd for, but fitter to be led back into thir old servitude" (CPW, III, 581). This too is in harmony with Milton's theory of nature: only the fit is free to govern himself ("Second Defence," CPW, IV, pt. I, 684). So his expected "harvest of glory" of which he had spoken so fervently in the Second Defence (CPW, IV, pt. I, 685), threatens now to become a famine. This is one last effort to save the remnants. England could be governed by a

freely elected body called by "the voice of liberty," whose "members are just and [of necessity] qualified . . . men not addicted to a single person or house of lords," that is, men with no entangling alliances, "ablest men chosen by the people to consult of public affairs from time to time for common good"; where sovereignty is delegated not transferred; where allowance for rotation is partial so as to insure permanence based on quality (Works, VI, 125-127). But instead of choosing Milton's system with the appeals of stability, self-evaluation, equality and insurance of human liberty, they chose the alternative which offered only tyranny over the human spirit, as Milton perceived it. It was to prevent this deathblow to freedom that Milton spoke.

But the tides were now fully against the realization of Milton's program for the holy community. His hopes for England had turned on the pivot of true religion from which all other virtues depend. To achieve the reparation of the brokenness caused by the Original Sin, man has to have freedom of the human spirit to pursue in a common bond for common good the paths of piety, justice, and truth. Laws which abrogate this basic right are contrary to the law of nature and should be abandoned or rectified--whether in religion, domestic affairs such as divorce, or a system of government. This is the message of the polemic prose.

Having fallen on the evil days of the Restoration as he is later to say in Paradise Lost, Milton seeks the

comfort of his own mind. His hope now lies in the reformation of the individual. The world is not yet ready for the complete reparation of its ruins. And one must say regretfully that Milton was not quite ready for the world; for he did not always properly gauge the time factor nor the level of achievement possible in a given situation. But one can never say that he did not hope for the best for his countrymen and that he did not give of his best to achieve it.

Milton did not, however, give up his hopes to repair the ruins caused by Adam and Eve. He continued to use his knowledge and talent in the high realm of art, summarizing the whole theme of relationship and responsibility in justification of the ways of God to man. Though much of his more direct literature of utility is buried, there is much yet left to praise in the eloquent strains of human sympathy which reverberate throughout these volumes of polemic prose. And though his age received them little, his soul found among them the elements of the perfect poem, which he, the perfect poet, can now write.

CHAPTER V

THE TRINAL POEM AS A WORLD OF THREE IN ONE:

A VISION OF THE DIVINE-HUMAN CORRELATIVE

The correspondence and relation of all parts of nature to one author, the dependence of every piece and joint of this frame of the world, the admirable order, the immutable succession . . . : in all these, though there be no sound, no voice, yet we may even see that it is an excellent song, an admirable piece of music and harmony.

John Donne, Sermon, April 19, 1618

. . . that to the highth of this great Argument
I may assert Eternal Providence,
And justifie the ways of God to men.

John Milton, Paradise Lost, I, 24-26

Abercrombie says the function of an epic is the exhibition "of life in some great symbolic attitude."¹ Implicitly, then, the epic aims to present a world from a conscious point of view extolling its pattern and justifying its operations according to a total plan. Such is the "necessary foundation for any subsequent valuation of life."² Marvell's observation that Milton did not omit from his great epic of the Christian faith anything that "was fit" is indicative of the perfection of this "great attitude" as to substance. Isabel MacCaffrey in Paradise Lost as "Myth"

remarked on its perfection as to shape, noting which Anne D. Ferry was persuaded that the poem has such completeness of form "as if it were itself a world."³ Indeed Milton does present the Christian world in symbolic attitude. It is a moral universe created in poetry.⁴ The poem reflects man's basic allegiances to all created things and to the Creator, a unified vision of relatedness and responsibility. It is the presentation of the human figure in consciousness of the bonds between himself and that which is external to yet contained within himself. In a real sense, we perceive this world, for we, like the Creator, the archetypal man and woman, the diabolical forces, are a part of this world. It is a world then, of cosmic dimensions, spanning divine, human, and infernal realms. At the center of this world, physically, psychologically, and theologically stands the archetypal man--Everyman. Man in relationship to his source, to himself, and to his world is the conscious idea. Thus Milton's cosmogonic attitude aims to justify relationship and responsibility in a world begun in perfect unity, disrupted by sin, and to be reunited by love. Hence sympathy is not only the seminal idea, but it is also the shape of this poem--of one in three.

In Paradise Lost Milton presents the total picture of man's relationship to the divine, human, and infernal realms in its outlines. Thus it includes the essence of Paradise Regain'd and Samson Agonistes, for they indeed are

a part of this total frame. Such Hanford must have had in mind when he observed long ago that the poet's last three works are complementary in theme and ethical idea.⁵ Therefore, I consider these three as one great poem embodying the total moral universe of man, proceeding from the point where he is given a paradise, to man's temptation, his sin, and consequent loss of Eden, to his restoration from that loss according to the pattern given by "one greater man" both human and divine, and, finally, by the highest level of human potential exemplified in a mere individual man in touch with God, who of free but erring will is, by obedience, restored to grace. Thus he completes the scheme of salvation, asserts eternal providence and justifies fully the ways of God to men. The poems are virtually one in their symbolic and actual attitude toward relationship and responsibility.

Paradise Lost is furthermore the trinal poem because it represents the majestic pinnacle of Milton's entire canon in its completeness as to theme and thought. Milton's entire life and art has been an examination and valuation of the unity of existence, the measure of the sympathy between the self and not self as an individual, a group, a nation, and then, a world, a universe. His language peculiarities reflect this endeavor to express this perceived unity of experience. His monism, as reflected in his theories on creation, on God, on body, mind, and spirit also testifies

to his essential view of the relatedness among the parts.

It was typical of Milton always to begin with the Fall in any issue that engaged him. The Fall is the background against which he propounded his radical views on religious reformation, on divorce, and on political procedures. One of the chief goals of his educational scheme was to repair the ruins occasioned by the Fall of our first parents. Now, to reconcile any seeming conflicts in post-lapsarian experiences, Milton begins with the initial breach between God and man which in turn takes him to Satan, the anterior agent of all evil and the first disrupter of unity. Because man as a free consentor willed his action, he bears the responsibility for such actions. The relationship between God and His creation, then, is one of receptivity of His immanence by choice. Alienation from the source and its consequences issue from unreceptivity and a negative choice. Such a world is not predetermined; if it were, man indeed could not be held a responsible being. Relationship, though natural, obtains its morality from a conscious, free receptivity of its primal source; conversely, it obtains its lack of morality from a repudiation of that primal source. Hence the justification of the ways of God to man and of man to man.

Milton's choice of the "Eden Myth" to present life in symbolic attitude is therefore an indispensable donnée: the story must not be limited by time, place, nor ethnic

group. Perhaps this is why Milton abandoned his idea of a national epic, having concluded that England was not suited for lack of "fit" numbers to be symbolic of God's holy community. Furthermore the course of his life pattern reflects a broadening of human sympathy. Its subject must be humanitas, its place, the universe and its time, both within history and eternity. Only then could one have a foundation for a true valuation of life. Most familiar to Western readers in the version recorded in Genesis and modified by subsequent Jewish and Christian exegetes, the Eden myth is, nevertheless, broadly human. The Chinese, Arabs, Egyptians, Hellenes, and Germans as well as the African, American, and Ottoman tribes all preserve a tradition "that the first man was formed of clay, that he was led astray by a woman or a serpent, thus losing his original happiness."⁶ Such an account of the universality of the myth augurs well for its validity and also for the common bond of humanity. "In a word, the Eden myth, like the death-and-resurrection myth, is a myth, an expression of a persistent pattern of experience and devotion, fears and desires that are common both to primitive societies and to at least the less fully accessible levels of all men's minds."⁷

No doubt Milton in his choice of subject matter for his epic was also answering Hobbes's negation of the premise of sympathy as mere self-love. Besides the fact that Hobbes took the short view of man while Milton took the long one,

the point of departure for the two men differs: Milton was interested in first principles, origins Hobbes, only in pragmatic terms, the nature of the State. Undoubtedly, any meaningful and lasting valuation of life must be more broadly based than was Hobbes's. Hobbes's man is an isolated individual in search of reunity for his own satisfaction and preservation of life.⁸ Unity in such a scheme can be merely contiguous, never continuous. Milton's man is the individual in relationship to God and his fellows by consequence of a natural bond. He has responsibility not only to himself but to all because he is a part of all. Hobbes's system depends on an empirical valuation of history and the contemporary situation and would give the prince the power rather than the people. Milton's has the broad perspective of eternity and a teleological evaluation of time and place. For him "the closer we come to nature, the clearer it is that the power of the people surpasses the king's."⁹ To Milton, then, the natural is that which is most receptive to divine influence.

The law of nature assumed man's ability to rise "by degrees to perfection" as he said in the second edition of Readie and Easie Way (1660) (CPW, IV, pt. 1, 36). Milton however failed to assess realistically the timing of these degrees of perfection. So, according to Don Wolfe, Hobbes was a more accurate prophet of England's immediate destiny, but not perhaps of its long range destiny (CPW, IV, pt. 1,

35ff); for England has since moved more in Milton's direction than Hobbes's. Milton's last poems incorporate this vision of ultimate perfection of the divine purpose in the universe, in spite of the apparent failure of his present dreams to materialize.

Paradise Lost presents a scala naturae, a chain of being uniting all creatures in a bond of sympathy from the lowest up to God, structured according to the proportionate share of these beings in the divine immanence. Thus hierarchical positioning is dynamic with ascension made possible by merit. Such order obtains in the divine, human, and infernal realms as well as in psychological realm. All work together to effect the highest good, which tends toward and from God.

A world so structured does not allow evil as an ontological condition of matter, because matter differs from spirit not in kind, but degree. As Milton says in Christian Doctrine, "Matter, like the form and nature of the angels itself, proceeded incorruptible from God" (Works, XV, 24-25). And again in Paradise Lost, Raphael states the scheme of this universe:

O Adam, One Almighty is, from whom
All things proceed, and up to him return,
If not deprav'd from good, created all
Such to perfection, one first matter all,
Indu'd with various forms, various degrees
Of substance, and in things that live,
 of life;
But more refin'd, more spiritous, and
 pure,

assignd, .
 Till body up to spirit work, in bounds
 Proportion'd to each kind.¹⁰

ship, and by dynamism.

Since God is the source of all, Milton's cosmology allows for His immanence as well as His transcendence. The ex Deo theory of creation best accommodates Milton's view of God and the structure of the universe.¹¹ It is impossible for God to be affected by evil in any way; therefore, to render a portion of the universe capable of corruption in use, but not essence, and thus unpredetermined, God withdrew a portion of Himself from it and assigned the role of creation to the Son (Works, XV, 9). To the extent that a portion of creation is removed from God it is imperfect. Hence the structural principle of the hierarchy obtaining in the universe.

The nature of the theme treated in Paradise Lost demands some appearance of God in the epic. Thus it is that Milton presents the traditional anthropomorphic God as well as the infinite transcendent Deity:

Boundless the Deep, because I am who
fill
Infinitude, nor vacuous the space
Though I uncircumscrib'd my self re-
tire,
And put not forth my goodness, which
is free
To act or not, Necessitie and Chance

Approach not mee, and what I will is
fate.
(VII, 168-173)

Such a view of God is Biblical and subsumes the traditional anthropomorphic God that is employed to accommodate man's intelligence. But it does not seem fair to say that Milton thought he had defined God, in either orthodox or heterodox terms, as he presented Him in Paradise Lost. In Christian Doctrine, Milton says "to know God as he really is, far transcends the power of man's thoughts, much more of his perception" (Works, XIV, 31). Such a comment should remove Milton from the calumny of those who look upon Milton's God as being consciously definitive.¹²

Thus at the top of the scale of being is God, the highest perfection of all attributes of goodness, love and justice. There is orderly progression inherent in the structure. The potential of the parts is realized only as they tend toward God, "the primary, absolute and sole cause of all things" ("Christian Doctrine," Works, XV, 21). This upward inclination is the sine qua non of order in the divine, human, and infernal realms. If this upward inclination is lacking, alienation and consequent disorder--rebellion, apostasy, disobedience--with its attendant chaos ensues. Only through a redirection of one's aspirations towards God and submission to His will can restoration be accomplished. This fact, Milton illustrates on the divine level in the fall of the apostate angels, and on the human

level in the fall of man. Such a scheme is postulated on the use of free will. The exercise of right reason insures the proper use of the free will.

We look first at the heavenly order, for from it issue all the subsequent order or lack of it--to the extent the parts are removed from this divine realm. It is also in the heavenly realm that the pattern of all goodness is perfected; so is the pattern of relationship and responsibility. Heaven represents the highest of realms and its constituents represent the highest essence descending from God and the Son down through the angelic degrees of "thrones, dominations, principedoms, vertues, powers" (VI, 601). A parodic version of this same order exists in hell, as we shall later see. Don Wolfe makes the comment, regarding this scheme of order: "Though Milton in his apologetics recommends rule only by consent of the governed, no more consent of the governed obtains in Hell than in Heaven."¹³ The comparison, as I see it, does not hold, mostly because of its unfortunate implications. The two orders are poles apart. Consent of the governed does exist in heaven and is freely given so long as unity obtains. Failure to consent is the choice Satan exercised, and so did his followers. Even so, rule in hell is tyrannical and manipulative; in heaven, it is loving and just. Milton's apologetics were directed towards the alleviation of fallen man's condition and an ultimate reparation of the ruins caused by man's first sin. Milton did not

object to submission to one's superior in virtue and intelligence even in his apologetics. There is hardly any comparison between the best man's merit to be ruler and that of God. Milton's angels understand this and thus serve God in true freedom "united as one individual Soule/ Forever happie" (V, 610-611).

Original discord was introduced into heaven by a turn from God towards self, the essence of all forms of sin. Lucifer, an angel of high degree, rebelled against God because He elevated his Son to his right hand. Beside himself, Lucifer also "infused bad influence into the warie brest" of a number of other angels who also rebelled (V, 695). Order is to be restored only by the Son. Milton's explicitly metaphorical (V, 573) depiction of the cause and consequences of this activity is in keeping with the relationship and responsibility which underlie the harmony in all spheres.

The first rebel and his followers, consisting of "a third part of heaven's Host" (V, 710), by their own free will separate themselves from God by choosing not to serve the divine will. Disobedience breaks union. In search of freedom, they gain "splendid vassalage" (II, 251-252). Satan has high intelligence and ability, but turned from God these qualities can be used only for destruction. He can infuse only bad influence. All his values revert. His logic is distorted, therefore, his characteristic duplicity is revealed by his speech. In a distorted version of the law of

nature which depends for its credence on proper relationship with the source, Satan declares his independence:

Natives and Sons of Heav'n possess
 before
 By none, and if not equal all, yet
 free
 Equally free; for Orders and Degrees
 Jarr not with liberty.

(V, 790-793)

This statement is only partially true. The angels were possessed by God; and so long as they were united to Him, by consequence of this union, they were free. Only separateness, in Milton's view of things, brings servitude, whether the servitude is to oneself or to an unworthy master. Also inherent in the heavenly scheme is ascension by merit: the Son gains His position by His creative activities (VI, 43). Thus it is beside the point to talk of equal freedom. Who indeed raised Satan to leadership? Right relationship with the Father insures that "All honor to him/ Returns to our own" (V, 844-845), as Abdiel makes clear. But Satan and his group decide that they would be their own standard of good: "Our puissance is our own, our own right hand/ Shall teach us highest deeds [and] who is our equal" (V, 864-866).

Rebellion brought such discord in heaven that it disturbed "Heav'n's peace and into Nature brought/ Miserie, uncreated until the time of [Satan's] crime" (VI, 267-270). Nature, then, in sympathy with the total of which it is a part reflects the discord. As the "Sovran spoke":

clouds began
 To darken all the Hill, and smoak to
 rowl
 In duskie wreathes, reluctant flames,
 the syne
 Of Wrath awak't.

(VI, 55-60)

As the battle wore on, Satan and his forces use nature in the construction of firearms in heaven (VI, 480ff.). This is a misuse of nature which must be compared with the constructive use of it the Son is later to make.

The conduct of the battle is an interesting study in relationship and responsibility. The Son because of His relationship and His proven sense of responsibility will gain the glory for the restoration of order in heaven. But this must be done according to God's plan. The Almighty could have with one blow "with one solitarie hand" finished all (VI, 138-142); but He gives His servants tasks to prove themselves. So Michael and Gabriel first have their day on the field in battle with the diabolical forces. Though they cannot win, they can prove their obedience, "their union irresistible" (VI, 63) with the divine will.

In his portrayal of the angelic warfare Milton reveals his monism. The strange wounds and recoveries which he describes the angels undergoing are mainly reflections of the angelology of the age.¹⁴ But here again the poet expresses his own individualism, especially in the area of the increased similarity between the angels and men.¹⁵ This has the effect of narrowing the boundary lines between heaven

and earth, thus increasing the sympathy between the divine and human realms. A detailed examination of this phenomenon is beyond the scope of this paper. But the poet's imaginative portrayal of this abstraction in concrete terms reveals his philosophical predilections. As Raphael tells it, the battle between the good and evil forces reveal that though they are both wounded, the wounds heal quickly and easily. Only with Satan's cleverly devised engine are the apostate angels able to gain hold for a time. But the angelic host counters with the natural weapons of plucked up hills, mountains, woods, rivers (VI, 64Off.). The rebel host returns the same. So they fight an indecisive battle; neither side could displace the other. Yet the angelic force under the leadership of Michael and Gabriel do their best, just as the "fit but few" in the future world must do, though they nor their human counterparts can ultimately triumph over evil. That feat lies in the power of God only, at his ordained time.

So the ordained time for the Son's true glory and that of the Father arrives. In the Chariot of Paternal Deitie (VI, 750), in perfect obedience and bliss, the Son fulfills the Father's will, ends the war, casts out the rebel forces; thus He restores order in heaven to the glory of the Father:

Thou shalt be All in All, and I in thee
For ever, and in mee all whom thou lov'st:

But whom, thou hat'st, I hate and can
 put on
 Thy terrors, as I put thy mildness on--
 Image of thee in all things.
 (VI, 732-736)

The Son's will is perfectly fused with the Father's. This empowers Him to perform God's will--not of His own, but of God's might (VI, 737). Even the chariot in which He rides is "instinct with Spirit" (VI, 752). He obeys God, and nature, as the angel relates it, obeys Him:

Before him Power Divine his way prepar'd
 At his command the uprooted Hills retir'd
 Each to his place, they heard his voice
 and went.
 (VI, 780-782)

The restored order is also reflected in nature: "with fresh Flourets Hill and Valley smil'd" (784); and heaven is again at peace.

But the apostate angels cannot, by their own choice, receive the benign influence of the Son; conversely, they become more resolute in sin. Thus they receive eternal separation from God, banishment from heaven: "Disburd'nd Heav'n rejoic'd and soon repair'd/ Her mural breach, returning whence it rowld" (VI, 878-879). But in the infernal region the opposite of the heavenly state exists; for hell is, spiritually and physically, existence without God. In such a place there can be no true peace or harmony.

II

Hierarchy in hell parodies that of heaven. Satan is elevated, or rather he elevates himself, to leadership by

an inverse merit: he is the least worthy of redemption and thus the most worthy to rule in hell. Their bond is their common hate of the divine. As hatred is divisive, there is not unity of mind. Thus Satan does not trust open parley to secure his wishes; he uses the dubious technique of "stacking the deck," arranging the outcome of the infernal council in advance with Beelzebub. Because the demons are slaves both to Satan and to themselves, they do not know the difference.

Satan assumes the role of deliverer of the devils, not so much because he feels responsible to them, but because he desires self-glory (I, 39-40). Every action of Satan's is directed inward. His hatred is really self-hatred. Just as sympathy is all-inclusive, so antipathy is all-exclusive--even of self. To Satan love or hate is alike, both being eternal woe; for he himself is hell (IV, 69-70, 75). He cannot ever be raised, for his goal is to be self-raised (I, 633-634). By a denial of his origin (V, 860-864), Satan cuts himself off from the source of good; therefore, none of his actions can be good. In fact, evil is his good (IV, 110). Like an uprooted tree, the more separated Satan becomes from his source the more degenerated his condition. In the garden of Eden, the epitome of harmony and bliss in its primal state, Satan saw "undelighted all delight" (IV, 286). His heart no longer beats to the universal heart throb, for he is cut off from the totality of things. He is

forever tormented "as from a hateful siege of contraries" (IX, 121-122). Turned in upon himself, he is driven towards the domination of others. Self-acceptance for the demonic, as Frye points out, "is possible only by means of incorporation of other selves, as though the self could only buttress its selfhood by reducing other selves to serfdom or by destroying them."¹⁶

In Satan, Milton depicts the embodiment of separation from God. Hence Satan, like Comus and all others without the proper relationship to God, can never use God's creation wisely. Rather he has a desire to "waste his whole Creation or possess /All as our own" (II, 365-366). Satan's ascendancy in hell, though admired by the demons, is in fact a descendancy. As he says, "With diadem and Scepter high advanc'd/The lower still I fall, onely Supream/ In miserie" (IV, 90-92). So aiming high Satan fell to the lowest point in the chain of being, the abyss of hell. To assert himself, he in reality rejected himself. As a figure and as a fact, then, Satan becomes the reverse of the relationship-responsibility pattern that makes for good in the divine, human, and infernal realms.

The role of Satan in the world is to frustrate God's plans. All of his actions are to that end. Man in Paradise Lost is his primary target. To effect his revenge on the divine for having banished him from heaven, he devises a plan to deceive man. The pattern of his guises reflects the

degeneration of his character. His incarnation is just the opposite of that of the Son. Satan's "foul descent" (IX, 163) takes him from a toad to a serpent. His creations too are unnatural. His daughter Sin, as Milton personifies her in the poem, springs from his head full grown at the time of his consent to the idea of usurpation of heaven. She embodies Satan's actions, his self-love, his destructive quality. She is at once attractive and repulsive, the perfect image of the Arch-Fiend. With a female upper part and serpentine lower (II, 650ff.), she represents the nature of temptation, which, to some, may be attractive at a distance but usually repulsive upon a closer view. The incestuous union of this couple brings forth Death, and in turn, a host of hell-hounds. The total relationship is one of disgust and horror, a symbolic presentation of the essence of sin. Milton skillfully blends fact and figure to portray the reality of sin and all of its effects, its ugliness, its horror, and its misery.

The mutual bond among Satan and his family is just as ominous. Sin and Death are Satan's other selves. Only they have latitude in hell. Satan's former cohorts in sin are now his slaves. Only Sin and Death share with him perfect sympathy and loyalty. Milton's genius in depicting this indissoluble bond among them is superb. They not only share the closest bond known to man in the parent-progeny relationship, but this tie is compounded by the husband-wife

bond, and further by the endless unions of Sin and Death, from which spring hell-hounds receiving their daily subsistence (to the agony of Sin) at their mother's entrails (II, 781ff.). This scene is rare in its consummate depiction of the infernal bond of horror, the complete reversal of the bond of sympathy uniting the divine. It is hell, the universe of death, the seat of evil where even nature "breeds perverse all monstrous, all prodigious things/ Abominable" (II, 624-626).

III

Man enters the universal picture with the sides sharply drawn. He is a creature made in the image of God (IV, 291-292; 364) and given dominion over the earth on which he is placed (IV, 430-434). He in his primal state is the perfect embodiment of the divine-human correlative in relationship and in responsibility. The divine will is that "Earth be chang'd to Heav'n and heav'n to earth,/ One Kingdom, Joy and Union without end" (VII, 160-161). But Satan, conversely, proposes that "Earth with Hell/ [should] mingle and involve" (II, 383-384). Now the first plan enhances relationship with the Creator and insures perpetual bliss and peace; but the second breaks union and incurs discord and misery. Satan schemes, God permits, but man only can consent. The gift of heaven is incumbent upon man's conscious receptivity and God's grace. In short, it is based upon a free and open choice between alternatives: obedience to God

and life or disobedience and death.

Milton's stated purpose for Paradise Lost is to "justify the ways of God to men." Because it is in the cause and consequences of man's first disobedience that justification lies, Milton's concern in the poem is to present the act in its fullest outlines. Wolfe says, "one is aware that Milton's theme is justification of God's judgment, not sympathy for man's sinful actions in the face of inexorable environmental determinants."¹⁷ If this assertion be true, then man was not a free agent; and Milton's poem fails to realize its purpose. I propose to show that Milton not only presents a sympathetic view of the Fall, but that he makes sympathy itself the actuating principle in every important incident in the poem, including the Fall. Furthermore I suggest that at no time are man's actions determined by his environment; for man was given dominion over his environment, not it over him. If he does allow his environment to control him, this control can be only an ironic reversal for which he is in some way to blame.

Milton holds that man was free to stand or fall (III, 99). To be free there must be no necessity, but a choice of alternatives. If man had not been given free will, he could not have achieved his humanity (III, 125-126); nor could God's ways be considered just. "But God left free the Will, for what obeys/ Reason is free, and Reason he made right" (IX, 351-352). Right reason and the exercise of free will

are interdependent, but not synonymous. But the proper function of the will depends on the condition of the reason; and it is man's responsibility to keep his reason right. So a possible answer to the dilemma of man's Fall lies in his relationship to God, to his fellowman, and to nature and the acceptance of his responsibility to them. At no time is his relationship to either predetermined, except as man himself wills it so. For man's world depends on what man does with what he is given. The case would seem to rest on the fact that man is given enough to effect good or ill and that he is given the choice between two clear alternatives. Milton, then, presents such a world in his study of the ways of God to man. I now examine this world in detail.

The bond of sympathy which unites all elements in Paradise Lost extends from God down to the lowest creation (V, 470-563). Satan and his fellows, because of their own will and deeds, exist beyond this scheme in what might be called harmonious antipathy or negative sympathy (X, 247). They do not share the mutual rapport which runs throughout the world. Their bond is that of hate and is consequently divisive, a negation of virtue. All beings and natural objects in Paradise tend toward God and ascend by merit. Following tradition, Milton places man at the central position. With Eve as his helper, not his equal, Adam is given dominion over the terrestrial spheres. The Fathers of the Church along with many other ancient, medieval, and Renaissance

authorities, shared this view. Furthermore, they gave man the dignified position as spectator of the universe, as the microcosm containing the reflection of the universe within himself. Inherent in this idea I find evidence for the sympathetic bond of nature. The parts of this world, like the parts of the body, all depend on this feeling of natural similitude and are all connected in natural communion. The stronger the relation, the stronger the sympathy, as Milton had indicated in the Doctrine and Discipline of Divorce.

Man is placed in the world, primarily, to achieve perfection and by this attain the heavenly state. I cannot agree with Madsen's position that "in Paradise Lost it is not the business of man to try to spiritualize his body and rise in the scale of nature but rather to accept the human condition: to learn what his nature is and be true to it."¹⁸ This statement seems to me either to beg the question or to be patently self-contradictory. Madsen, if I read him correctly, assumes the human condition to be static. This then, excludes progression, which in prelapsarian man included ascension in the scale of being, as Raphael tells Adam (V, 470-472), and ultimate spirituality: "As neer to him plac't or neerer tending/ Till body up to spirit work in bounds proportion'd to each kind" (V, 478-479). This is the meaning of ascension by merit in Milton's cosmology. True "to try [specifically] to spiritualize his body and rise in the scale" is not man's primary business. His

business is to obey God, and such obedience carries concomitantly the rewards of ascension and spirituality. Man's sin was to attempt the ascension by repudiating the work and orderly process. Both, but especially Eve, discount the time factor by attempting to overleap the intervening steps between body and spirit. This attempt to rise in the scale was for Adam, if considered at all, only secondary, as we shall later see.

Milton's entire justification rests on perspective, of which time is an integral part. Man's view is limited by time and place; God's is unlimited. God's time is ordained by himself. This Milton knew as early as the Nativity Ode, and this he reaffirmed in Lycidas, and in the polemic prose. In Paradise Lost he makes his summary statement. Not only is time important to man's role in the world, but so is it necessary that he direct his efforts toward God, maintain the right relationship. So doing, he benefits from God's goodness, enjoys "choice unlimited of manifold delights" (IV, 435). Nature exists in perfect harmony, "linkt to him in weal and woe" (IX, 132-34). Adam, higher up, inclines toward God through "contemplation and valor" and Eve to God in him through "softness and sweet attractive Grace" (IV, 435): "Fair couple linkt in Nuptial League" (IV, 339). All this state is mutually dependent. Disturbance in any part produces a sympathetic reaction in the entire frame.

Everything in this world is contingent upon keeping

the proper order and subjecting all to the test of "Reason, Loyal, Just, and Pure" (IV, 755). Adam's love for Eve and Eve's love for the physical Eden are proper if kept in balance, that is, used as instruments by which they mount to God. To be excessive in zeal for God is not sin; to be so in anything else is idolatrous (III, 696). Any action is good so long as it furthers man's relationship with God.

Adam is the fount of Reason, then, man's closest link with God, being higher in the Chain of Being. He should rule and be granted obedience--"with gentle sway" (IV, 308), but "his fair large Front and Eye declar'd/ Absolute rule" (IV, 301). Hence it is clear that Adam is the head and that on him, therefore, rests responsibility for decision-making. This view of the male is grounded in the patristic, philosophical, and political thought of the age respecting universal order. Multiple examples point to this same conviction. Bishop Edward Reynolds expressed it in this way: ". . . as God is in his Temple, the Church, So is He in his Pallace, (if I may call it so) the World, a God of order . . . so that all things depend on his Government, without violence, breach, or variation. And this Order and Wisdom, is seene chiefly in the sweet subordination of things each to other, and happie inclination of all to their particular ends, till all be reduced finally unto Him."¹⁹ It is axiomatic in Renaissance thought that "there is an eternal order within which all things exist and outside which they are

doomed to self-destruction."²⁰

In the Garden of Eden the initial state was characterized by blissful order. Eve, "Sole partner and sole part of all these joys [is] / Dearer . . . then all" (IV, 411-12). Time and time again Milton emphasizes the perfect harmony, the oneness, the ideal love and sympathy of the pair. There is "Union of Mind, or in [them] both one Soule;/ Harmony to behold in wedded pair/ More grateful than harmonious sound to the eare" (VIII, 604-606). Such fellow-feeling is possible only between Adam and Eve; this is the reason God gave her to Adam (IV, 412). Following Adam's first recognition of his union and duty to a superior being, and his relationship and responsibility to the creatures by such knowledge "God endu'd [his] sudden apprehension" (VII, 339-356), he sensed that neither they nor his solitude completely fulfilled his needs. God, he felt, was too high and the creatures too low:

Among unequals what societie
Can sort, what harmonie or true delight?
Which must be mutual, in proportion due
Giv'n and receiv'd . . .

(VIII, 383-386)

Then in recognition of the need of man for man, Adam continues: "Of fellowship I speak/ Such as I seek, fit to participate/ All rational delight" (VIII, 389-391).

Sociality is possible only among like kinds: lioness and lion, but not bird and beast not ox and ape (VIII, 393-397). The farther apart beings are in the scale of nature,

the lesser the possibility of true communion. So God gives him one "of his likeness, fit help, his other self" (VIII, 450-451). Thus Adam shows an understanding of the nature of man as well as of the creatures by expressing his need for fellowship. Perhaps concupiscence is implicit in Adam's request for a fellow man; for Milton did not share the Augustinian view that concupiscence was the "material element of the original sin."²¹ Milton praised highly wedded love. It, he says, is the

Perpetual Fountain of Domestic sweets
Whose bed is undefil'd and chaste pro-
nounc't
Here Love his golden shafts imploies,
here lights
His constant Lamp.
(IV, 760-761, 763-764)

Doubtlessly aware of the Reformation attitude stemming from Augustine, Milton would seem to have them in mind here: "Whatever Hypocrites austere talk/ Of Puritie and place and innocence,/ Defaming as impure what God declares/ Pure . . ." (IV, 744-747); marital love founded on reason, is the symbol of "all relations dear and all the charities" because it not only unites in perfect love and sympathy, but it is also creative (IV, 750-759). And Adam does say that man must manifest his single imperfection by propagating which "requires collateral love, and dearest amitie" (VIII, 422-426).

But more desirous is Adam here of companionship, some one to share a mutuality of mind and spirit which

Milton extolled in the divorce tracts as the heart of the marital union. The fact of Milton's repeated emphasis on their being of one soul each time he speaks of their union indicates the indispensability of this element in the Adam-Eve relationship. They are one, incomplete one without the other:

Part of my soul, I seek thee, and thee
claim
My other half.

(IV, 487-88)

But Eve was not only made for Adam, she was made from him (IV, 440-41). So the fact that they are one has a physical basis also: from Adam's rib, God made Eve. Thus Adam declares: "I now see/ Bone of my Bone, Flesh of my Flesh, my self/ Before me" (VIII, 494-96); and Eve likewise recognizes the bond: ". . . I was form'd flesh of thy flesh,/ And without whom am to no end, my Guide/ And Head" (IV, 441-42). So they are individuals, but it takes both of them "hand in hand" (IV, 321) to make harmony in Eden. They need each other to function as a whole; for they complement rather than supplement each other. Hence their mutual interdependence.

That what affects one affects the other is confirmed in at least three crucial scenes in the poem. The first of these is in the lines foreshadowing Eve's fall wherein she relates her dream to him. Adam says: "The trouble of thy thoughts affects me equally" (V, 96-97). The second is in the dramatic scene of Eve's disobedience. Adam and Eve

share a community of feeling though separated; he felt the pangs of Eve's sin before she told him: "Yet oft his heart, divine of something ill,/ Misgave him" (IX, 845-46). The third is the climactic scene of Adam's fall: "And mee with thee hath ruin'd" (IX, 906). Therefore, it is clear that the right relationship among the elements in Paradise must be maintained by knowlege, diligence, vigilance, and self-discipline. The fate of each is interdependent; but the nobler the nature, the greater the responsibility.

The foreshadowing of a breakdown in order is seen early in the interplay of relationship in Eden. The tendency to incline toward a lower object is particularly evident. Eve shows a greater affinity for the lower things than she seems to manifest for her achievement of perfection. She is innocently drawn to the lake where she "with answering looks/ Of sympathy and love" (IV, 464-465) beholds her own image. But gently corrected, she replaces unknowing self-love with that of a fitter object, Adam. Her propensity for the lesser good is also evident in the fact that her dream, though uninvited, is from all indications cherished. This condition made her vulnerable to temptation. The dream is innocent so long as it is held inferentially and not experientially.²² Thus Adam tells Eve:

Evil into the mind of God or man
May come and go, so unapprov'd and
leave
No spot or blame behind.

So Adam rests his case on the hope that Eve "Waking . . . never wilt consent to do" what she "didst abhor to dream" (V, 119-121). Inferential knowledge (as is now the case of Eve's dreaming) becomes experiential only with consent whether deceived or knowing. Such is the tenor of Adam's discourse on the soul's faculties, reason and its servants (V, 101-102). And thus he presents the corresponding hierarchical structure of the psychological-cosmological realms. But the scale here is static. Reason in the psychological realm is chief and must never relinquish its rule to a lesser faculty. Twinned with reason is the will (XII, 83-84). Reason, then, must be right to insure the right exercise of the will. If it is dimmed by passion or prejudice, the reason is not right, nor is the order.

Indubitably, the patristic and classical tradition stand behind this typically Miltonic view of reason. In his earlier poetry, his polemic prose, and now in the major poetry, Milton extolls the virtues of reason. As Douglas Bush says, right reason finds its "greatest exponent" in seventeenth-century England in Milton.²³ I have already had occasion to relate this concept to Milton's doctrine of sympathy. Because it "links man with man and man with God . . . is a faculty implanted by God in all men . . . as a guide to truth and conduct," it enables [man] within limits to understand the purposes of a God who is perfect justice, goodness, and love."²⁴ Man's receptivity, then, must be

directed towards this channel of perfect justice, goodness and love to realize this divine gift. When he turns away through pride, self-centeredness or passion, he forfeits the directive power of right reason. Alienated from his source he, like a branch severed from the tree, withers, and finally dies to goodness, justice, truth and freedom. The persistent inclinations of both Eve and Adam towards a lesser object, uncorrected, are steps away from God.

Eve's affinity for the lesser good also shows in her anxious care for the luxurious growth of her garden. It is evident earlier when she leaves the company of Adam and Raphael, preferring to hear the divine instructions from Adam: "hee, she knew would intermix/ Grateful digression, and solve high dispute/ With conjugal Caresses" (VIII, 54-56). She rather chooses to spend this time in the garden. Most tragically, it is because of insufficient care of the garden that she recommends division of labor on the fateful day of their temptation and fall (IX, 205-220). Though many other circumstances interact, as I see it, to produce the end result, the fact still remains that Eve in anxious care bends too much of her feelings to lower things and not enough to higher claims, as Adam's futile remarks to her before she departed indicate:

Love not the lowest end of human life
 For not to irksom toile, but to delight
 He made us, and delight to Reason joyn'd.
 (IX, 241-243)

What needs to be done their "joynt hands" can perform. She, trusting unwisely and too much in her own strength, shows more care for her garden than for their mutual happiness and safety. When they leave Paradise, it is her flowers that she seems most loath to part with:

O flours,
That never will in other Climate grow,
My early visitation, and my last
At Ev'n, which I bred up with tender hand
From the first Op'ning bud, and gave ye
Names.

(XI, 273-277)

Adam's fall is foreshadowed also in his inclining toward a lower being, Eve. The strong bond of sympathy uniting him and Eve has already been indicated. I further adduce the preternatural influence Eve's person exerted on him: ". . . passion . . ./ Commotion strange . . . the charm of Beauty's powerful glance" (VIII, 530-533); this, I agree, is surely love. Spenser, whom Milton called a "better teacher than Scotus or Aquinas"²⁵ perhaps stated the Renaissance idea of love as well as any: "Love is a celestiall harmonie, of likely harts . . . which joyn together in sweete sympathie,/ To work each joy and true content" ("Hymn of Beauty").²⁶ Such a statement precisely characterizes the love of Adam and Eve in Paradise. This love is good until "wisdom" does indeed "lose discount'nanc't" and all "higher knowledge" does in her presence "fall degraded" (VIII, 551-555). When this inversion takes place, Adam's position as head is challenged,

order is discredited, vulnerability ensues. Order must be restored or destruction is inevitable. In this way Milton skillfully employs the traditional Renaissance notion to portray the ideal relationship of man to God and of man to man. It is theologically, philosophically, and rhetorically sound. In his relationship to Eve, I submit, Adam is less disciplined, less vigilant, and seems to possess less necessary knowledge--therein lies his vulnerability.

In this passage (VIII, 529-533), Milton anticipates his statement in IX, 999: Adam "was fondly overcome with Female charm." I suggest that here Milton is being deliberately ambiguous, perhaps to allow for the traditional implications of Adam's romantic attachment to Eve as the decisive factor in Adam's fall as well as to show cognizance of the powerful sympathetic bond implicit in the word "charm," quite evident to the seventeenth-century reader. Tillyard²⁷ says and Waldock feels that this line is a misfit. Waldock calls it "a clash . . . between Milton's theory of a matter and the matter as he has actually presented it."²⁸ B.A. Wright points out the interesting view to which I earlier referred in another connection, that "charm as used here of feminine beauty . . . has lost its original force. In Milton's time the primary meaning was still 'a magic spell; a mysterious, extraordinary or preter-natural power to influence, subdue, control.'"²⁹ Such a fact not only helps to elucidate Milton's comment, but it also would seem to

vindicate Milton from the charge that he failed to justify its inclusion. Inasmuch as the poet has clearly emphasized the sympathetic bond which unites Adam and Eve and the world of Eden, an integral part of which is the element of magical charm--most potent where love or greater similitude exists--it follows that such a force not carefully disciplined would be an important and perhaps decisive element in man's disobedience. It surely renders him vulnerable.

Professor Sims's observation on the "semantic significance" of the term charm in Milton's vision of the blissful Eden in Book IV is also instructive here. He refers to Helen Darbishire's commentary on her sudden awakening to the rich suggestiveness of the phrase "charm of the earliest birds" (IV, 642) when she heard an old country woman use the phrase in a similar way. Only then did she recall the Old English derivation of charm in ciern which means "buzzing or twittering of birds."³⁰ The linguistic appropriateness of charm to describe the Edenic setting, Professor Sims points out, is quite singular; for it lends emphasis to the blending of the peaceful setting and the soft sounds of the "gentle, yielding (even when questioning) dependency of woman at her loveliest."³¹ Thus Milton's contextual use of the term is ever consistent, though the meaning may slightly vary. Whether Eve's charm is displayed as a physical quality or as the soft twittering of "sweet Converse and Love (IX, 909), it is a power which exerts a preternatural influence

on one bound to her by the bond of sympathy. Thus this power must be kept under gentle submission and must not be allowed ascendancy in the conduct of the affairs of Eden for which it is ill-suited. It is to be enjoyed, not worshipped. Adam's response indicates that Eve's argument for division of labor is certainly not girded by logic. But there is a tragic discrepancy between his words and his actions here. Such a development signifies his abdication of right reason to passion. Sympathy can be equally operative in either state.

It is well at this point to review Milton's doctrine of sympathy to see how it functions in the crucial event of the poem. Sympathy, though instinctual or natural, is non-moral. It is not a quality of the soul, for it exists throughout the scala naturae. It joins man to man, man to God, and man to the lower creatures. It is that operative principle which forms the common bond of all things from the highest to the lowest. It is powerful, should not be forced, and cannot be commanded. Since Milton holds that the amount of sympathy differs among the parts in degree not in kind, the relationship and responsibility differ in degree not in kind among the parts. In God, the source of all, lies perfection. Everything else achieves its measure of perfection from this source by its conscious receptivity, as in man and those higher in the scale, and by instinct in those lower in the scale. Only man and his superiors can exercise reason and will for only they have a soul.

Responsibility for guiding the function of sympathy, in the psychological realm, rests in the reason and the will. Responsibility for the lower creatures in Milton's cosmology rests in man; they enjoy his weal or incur his woes. Goodness at no time is separable from God. He is the primary efficient cause of goodness and man is the proximate cause ("Christian Doctrine," Works, XVII, 26-27). So no action turned from God is good.

In the crucial scene of the poem the vulnerabilities just outlined are set forth in bold relief. (Here the romantic element is momentous; in the actual Fall, fellow-feeling or the sense of oneness is paramount.) The question is whether Eve and Adam will divide to better tend the garden (a task hardly urgent) or fortify against a common enemy whose harm is certain as to fact but not necessarily as to time. Together they are strong; it is "hopeless to circumvent them join'd" (IX, 260). Apart they are weaker, subject to harm (IX, 251-259). Adam debates noncommittally, what seems to me, and as the Lady in Comus showed of chastity at the climax of her temptation, an undebatable question. He weakly defends a just position; he poorly impresses upon Eve the profundity of the situation. In the end he gives in to her, perhaps out of love and fear of incurring her displeasure and hence his own, for she is his other self. But to be self-centered is to turn from God and to likewise turn toward a lower being.

Adam's step may find some justification in the feelings, but it can hardly be sanctioned by reason. To be ruled by the feelings rather than the rational faculty therefore was anathema to the Renaissance belief in order. This too was a heritage of the age. Medieval psychology-ethics and Christian writers generally place passions in the appetitive part of the soul and to the sensitive appetite rather than to the intellectual appetite called the will. Considered in themselves as movements of the irrational appetites, passions contain no moral good or evil but are subject to the command of reason and will.³² They are good when controlled by reason, as Adam explained to Eve, and evil when not so controlled. This is the substance of Raphael's remarks to Adam: "Accuse not Nature, she has don her part/Do thou but thine" (VIII, 561-562).

Raphael warns Adam that the same "touch" in cattle and beasts must not "subdue/ The Soule of man, or the passion in him move" (VIII, 579-585). The distinction which Raphael makes for Adam is crucial as the course of events develops. True love is good; for it "refines/ The thoughts, enlarges the heart, hath his seat / In Reason, and is judicious, is the scale" by which man ascends the ladder to heavenly love. It is not carnality, which even "the beasts share" (VIII, 588-594). Thus true love must be guided by reason; it inheres in the love of God. Such love Adam and Eve enjoy as long as their orientations are God-directed. By following

his lower feelings rather than his reason, Adam abdicates his position as leader. As Eve's ability to make decisions, especially where knowledge was lacking (as it is here), has been wanting in several instances already pointed out, what she needs is guidance, not indulgence. Eve herself later says: "Why didst not thou the Head/ Command me absolutely not to go . . .?" (IX, 1155-56); and this is the essence of the Son's remarks: "Was shee thy God . . . thy guide,/ Superior, or but equal . . ./ She was . . . to attract thy Love, not thy Subjection" (X, 145-53). Since reason must guide the will, the channels must be kept clear lest it misinform and guide amiss.

Free will is, as we have seen crucial to any human act. Since the case of man rests on this faculty, a brief look at some of the typical commentary on free will is indicated. Hooker holds that man is free to choose evil from good only when he possesses adequate knowledge, when the gift of reason is not blurred by custom and/or passion.³³ Milton would agree with this basic observation. Adam does have adequate knowledge to evaluate the choice he is making. And Milton would also see it as man's responsibility to keep his gift of reason unsullied by custom and passion. This is the crux of Raphael's remarks. Ursinius, a sixteenth-century theologian, is close to Milton's and the modern view of the doctrine of free will. Ursinius sees freedom as the individual's ability to act on its own judgment "in

accordance with the order congruent with its nature, and to enjoy good things suited to it, without prohibition or hindrance, and not to sustain defects or burdens not proper to its nature."³⁴ Now if one accepts the terms of Milton's cosmology, then Adam does have the capacity to act in harmony with order congruent with his nature, and so long as he tends towards God, to which his nature inclines, he enjoys bliss unlimited. He sustains burdens not proper to his nature when he bends towards a lower creature's will rather than towards God. This first happens when he agrees to a division of labor, although he knows Eve's case is faulty. In bending his will to hers he becomes more like her and less worthy of his role as her guide: Milton signifies this by the epithet, "domestick Adam" (IX, 318). And finally, "Go; for thy stay not free, absents thee more" (IX, 372) is not only poor judgment, but is also a selfish evaluation rather than one in harmony with the divine will. No doubt Eve could have been persuaded by logic as she had before. Her "native innocence" is not sufficient for sole reliance. God had done his part by her by placing her in Adam's charge, not on her own (IX, 372-374). Adam's act is a departure from the order set for him and for Eve. But Adam is here yet a free agent with the responsibility to maintain his relationship with God through diligence and vigilance in knowledge and virtue. If he allows his reason to inform his will falsely, the original fault is still his.

Through a gradual and almost imperceptible process, Adam has allowed himself to allot to Eve a higher place than that destined for her. He has failed to heed Raphael's warning (VIII, 562-67). His reasoning power is sufficient to withstand sin so long as he lets it be his guide. But as one giving-in leads inevitably to another, the first step uncorrected is a step from God and toward the Fall. Adam, by his giving in thus to Eve, places his responsibility in Eve and thus abrogates his responsibility to God. Given the circumstances subsequent events, like those of a Greek tragedy, are all but inevitable. The breakdown in the proper relationship among the elements in Paradise Lost is, in short, reflected in the will; no longer does the will of man exist in perfect harmony with God's, nor with that of each other. Though the bonds of nature are weakened, they are not destroyed.

Cut off from her sustaining powers, no longer "hand in hand" with her "associate sole," (IX, 227) Eve falls victim to the subtle tempter. So:

Her rash hand in evil hour
Forth reaching to the Fruit, she pluck'd,
 she eat.
Earth felt the wound, and Nature from her
 seat
Sighing through all her Works gave signs
 of woe,
That all was lost."

(IX, 780-784)

Milton's entire account of the effects of the fruit and of the act of sin is informed by the doctrine of sympathy.

Eve's obeisance to the tree was done in homage to "the power/That dwelt within, whose presence had infus'd/ Into the sciental sap . . . drink of Gods"(IX, 835-838). But more significantly, Adam himself also felt the wound of Eve's sin (IX, 845-846). Rushing to meet Eve with a floral garland in his hand, he, upon discovery of the cause of his misgiving, let the wreath fall to the ground "and all the faded Roses shed" (IX, 893), marking the occurrence of the first death in Eden--the natural consequence of sin. Now that his bond with God has been weakened by his own laxity, Adam is now, I suggest, deprived of the sustaining powers of God's goodness. His reason is no longer right and can thus misinform his will. Man is insufficient to stand alone. The Renaissance view of human nature generally held is set forth by Purchas: "The Bodie is derived from earth not the Sunne, Stares and any part of the Aethereall superior world . . . from the lowest and basest of all." But man has a soul and through the soul, man receives divine sustenance. "Such a Power has the Soule in and over the Bodie; but voluntarily admitting, committing such Tyrannie . . . how often does the Soul for Sensuall and bodily respects forget [its] spirituall Nature."³⁵ Henry More expressed a similar idea: "The Soul by sympathizing too much with the Brutish Body becomes brutish herself and loses her Divinity."³⁶ Without the sustaining power of God's goodness to direct the reason which in turn directs the will, the bond of love and

sympathy is too strong a force to be denied. Deficient in the knowledge of the ways of God and man and of human nature, yet equipped with the essential knowledge to obey and thus stand, man places himself in a position of having to make a choice between God and man. The preliminary acts had so dimmed his reason that he no longer has sufficient understanding to guide his will rightly.

Adam places himself in an untenable position when he bends his will to his feelings, not in full knowledge nor perhaps intentionally--but the inevitable consequence is the same. Upon discovery of Eve's transgression, he was "amaz'd,/ Astonied stood and Blank, while horror chill/Ran through his veins" (IX, 889-891); for he did not wish to disobey God's interdiction. But he had placed himself in such a position that, as he understands it and also according to the terms of Milton's cosmology, Eve's fall is his fall (IX, 906-907); and her fall is the ruin of nature also (IX, 940-942) and that of the whole of mankind (IX, 416).

As I see it, this concept of the sympathetic bond of all created things underlies and is the animating principle that informs Adam's crucial decision to fix his lot with Eve; and Eve's fall, too, was actuated by her links with nature. The concept of sympathy forms a dominant philosophical background for the theme of Paradise Lost. As I have already shown, it is evident in every important scene involving man and so it is vividly portrayed in the speech

made by Adam upon his discovery of Eve's transgression. I concur in the view that this speech is the climax of the poem and that, as has been asserted by Waldock and Hughes,³⁷ all else in the poem depends upon how this speech is read.

Generally overlooked, underestimated, or, perhaps, misread by previous commentators on the Fall, it shows sympathy as a significant motivating factor for the act of disobedience by man.

And mee with thee hath ruin'd, for with thee
 Certain my resolution is to Die;
 How can I live without thee, how forgo
 Thy sweet Converse and Love so dearly join'd,
 To live again in these wilde Woods forlorn?
 Should God create another Eve, and I
 Another Rib afford, yet loss of thee
 Would never from my heart; no, no, I feel
 The Link of Nature draw me: Flesh of Flesh,
 Bone of my Bone thou art, and from thy state
 Mine never shall be parted, bliss or woe.

So having said, as one from sad dismay
 Recomforted, and after thoughts disturb'd
 Submitting to what seem'd remediless,
 Thus in calm mood his Words to Eve he turn'd.

Bold deed thou hast presum'd, advent'rous
 Eve,

And peril great provok't, who thus hath dar'd
 That sacred Fruit, sacred to abstinence,
 Much more to taste it under ban to touch.
 But past who can recall, or don undoe?
 Not God Omnipotent, nor Fate; yet so
 Perhaps thou shalt not Die, perhaps the Fact
 Is not so hainous now, foretasted Fruit,
 Profan'd first by the Serpent, by him first
 Made common and unhallow'd ere our taste;
 Nor yet on him found deadly. . . .

Then sidetracked by fallacious reasoning and lack of knowledge, Adam decides that eating of the fruit may not bring death, but "proportional ascent" as it did for the serpent. Or perhaps God will not allow his plan for men to be thus

thwarted:

Nor can I think that God, Creator wise,
Though threat'ning, will in earnest so
destroy
Us his prime Creatures, dignifi'd so high,
Set over all his Works, which in our Fall,
For us created, needs with us must faile,
Dependent made; so God shall uncreate,
Be frustrate, do, undo, and labor loose
Not well conceiv'd of God, who though his
Power
Creation could repeat, yet would be loath
Us to abolish, least the Adversary
Triumph and say; Fickle their State whom God
Most favors, who can please him long?

Though he struggles with the tragic implications of his act and briefly digresses on false hopes and possible ways to avert the dire consequences of his action, he knows his lot is fixed with that of Eve:

However I with thee have fixt my Lot,
Certain to undergo like doom: if Death
Consort with thee, Death is to mee as Life;
So forcible within my heart I feel
The Bond of Nature draw me to my owne,
My own in thee, for what thou art is mine;
Our State cannot be sever'd, we are one,
One Flesh; to loose thee were to loose
myself.

(IX, 908-959)

The overt act of Adam's eating the fruit was a natural consequence of the acts which preceded it, so inter-related are the parts of their world. This is what Adam means by the "bond of nature" (IX, 956), not the "uxoriousness" and "gregariousness" which Tillyard and others have cited;³⁸ Nor yet "the heroics" which Rajan³⁹ finds implicit in these lines; nor the self-love which Summers' commentary charges.⁴⁰ It is more than the love "untouched by

sensuality" which Wright⁴¹ and Hanford⁴² find--though certainly that love is present. But as Milton has pointed out time and again, there can be no real love where sympathy does not exist; and conversely, sympathy is strongest where love is strongest. Nor does Adam's bond mean merely that of sympathy as compassion, which Wolfe indicates by his statement: "It was not only the charm of Eve that swayed Adam's judgment; it was a sympathy born of crisis for a fellow human in despair."⁴³ Samuel Purchas is closer to Milton's line of thought and expresses the seventeenth-century idea of sympathy as the link of nature: "Such indeed is the sympathie betwixt the Soule and Bodie, that as Adam and Eve, they take part each with the other, though it be in the forbidden fruit; both tempting and tempted of each other, living and dying together."⁴⁴ This is the sympathy of actual identification, natural, not born of a crisis, so that the fate of one is the fate of the other.

Throughout Paradise Lost, indeed, throughout the whole body of his works, Milton has prepared the reader for such a dramatic affirmation of man's common bond by his emphasis on relationship and responsibility. In every important scene in Paradise Lost involving the divine and human realms, Milton has emphasized this unity and freedom in God. There may exist a bond without God (as is the infernal bond), but such a bond cannot be creative, free, or pleasurable. Sympathy is the operative principle in any bond. It gains

its morality by the direction of the conscious will. Here, the will having been itself misinformed, misdirects sympathy. Thus sympathy becomes the actuating principle which separates man from God and joins him to his fellow. Under the circumstances, the single act accomplishes both results. Sympathy is not the cause of man's sin, that lies in the will: but it is the irresistible force in the completion of the act begun in Adam's turn from God towards Eve. Only at the act of Adam is the original sin completed.

Because Adam's rational faculty is dimmed, he sees the situation remediless (he did not know of God's mercy nor had he needed it before), but one thing is clear, whatever the consequences:

So forcible within my heart I feel
The Bond of Nature draw me to my own,
My own in thee, for what thou art is mine:
Our State cannot be sever'd, we are one,
One Flesh; to lose thee were to lose myself.
(IX, 954-959)

Within this speech is the declaration of an existing bond; it is internal, natural, forceful, mutual, and magnetic; it is a bond which cannot be severed and hence the fate of one is the fate of the other. It declares a fusion of the selves, so that the self of one includes the self of the other. As a result of this there is mutual and complete participation in various experiences so that if one suffers or enjoys, the other is similarly affected. This is true not only because they love each other, but also because they are indissolubly joined by that mutual bond of amity which unites

all creation; but the closer the similitude the greater the sympathy. Theirs is the archetypal human union. This Milton, on sound theological basis, made the cornerstone of his divorce tracts. When Adam and Eve fell, by this same union all mankind through them fell (IX, 784). Relevant to this, Milton in Tetrachordon describes this human bond as "an intimat quality good or evil, through the whole progeny of Adam, which like a radical heat, or mortal chilnes joynes them or disjoynes them irresistibly" (CPW, II, 606). Thus the bond lacks a valutive capacity, though its power is irresistible. Like the passions, it receives its morality from man's rational faculty.

Marjorie Nicolson's remarks on right reason are instructive here: it is "a faculty innate, shared by man with God, an infallible judge of right and wrong, which directs and orders the will, the instincts and appetites."⁴⁵ Thus since man has responsibility for maintaining control over his reason, any action which ensues as a consequence of rational ineptitude cannot be deterministic. This I suggest, frees Milton's justification of the ways of God to men from the charge of determinism. But the function of sympathy is clear. Upon Adam's partaking of the fruit, "Earth trembl'd from her entrails, as again/ In pangs, and nature gave a second groan,/ Sky low'r'd, and muttering thunder, some sad drops/ Wept at completing of the Mortal Sin original" (IX, 1000-1004 [*italics are mine*]). Here the bonds of nature are

again affirmed, signifying the universal effect of man's act. Nature, according to biblical tradition, reacts again in a similar manner upon the completion of Christ's vicarious Atonement for the Original Sin (Matthew 27: 51-54; Mark 15: 33-39; Luke 23: 44-47).

To explain Adam's plight in this manner justifies his ways with Eve more than it does with God, to be sure. But it gives insight into an essential symbiosis between man and the universe. Whatever may be said of the delusions or fantasies in Adam's logic, the important truth remains that the action precipitated by it is real enough and the consequences are inevitable. A person frightened by an imaginary danger may be affected just as much as by a real one. Adam's fall is neither illusion nor projection, nor is it a subtle psychical deception--it is a sober reality, and so are its consequences.

Only once before had such a strong statement of fellow-feeling and self-sacrifice like that by Adam been expressed in Paradise Lost. That was in heaven on the occasion of the Son's offering of Himself for the sin of mankind (III, 217-265). Though both Adam and the Son, as Milton depicts the story, are to an extent uninformed about the real nature of death at the time they give themselves, the main motivation is sympathy and a feeling of identity with the transgressor (III, 141, 238). For the Son, the identity is by anticipation (III, 283, 297, 410, 411). The

declaration of each is greeted by praise. Eve praises Adam: "O glorious trial of exceeding love/ Illustrious evidence, example high!" (IX, 960-61). The angelic choir praised the Son: "O unexampl'd love . . ." (III, 410). It is easy to see that the vicarious atonement of the Son is superior to Adam's self-sacrifice: the first is to bring life and the other brought death. The voluntary, redemptive death of the Son is an act of pure, immortal love, completely unselfish, its cause greater, its agent abler, but most of all because it serves to augment the glory of God (III, 297; 280-281; 269-71; 410-11).

The reaction to man's Fall is parodied in Hell by Sin and Death. They discovered the Fall through sympathy with Satan. By the active principle which unites Sin and Death to Satan they not only communicate at a distance, as did Adam and Eve whose union they parody, but also experience occult attraction and influence. Sin and Death cannot "miss the way, so strongly drawn/ By this new felt attraction and instinct" (X, 262-63).

Methinks I feel new strength within me rise,
 . . . whatever drawes me on,
 Or sympathie, or som connatural force
 Powerful at greatest distance to unite
 With secret amity things of like kinde
 By secretest conveyance. Thou my Shade
 Inseparable must with mee along:
 For Death from Sin no power can separate.
(X, 243, 245-251)

Though their bond is destructive, it is nevertheless as powerful as the human bond:

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With the Fall all values invert in due course.

Through the sympathetic bond of nature all creation incurred

(X, 710-714)

(X, 668-671)

(X, 671-675)

— —

sympathy, for it makes the change a spontaneous reaction:

At that tasted Fruit
The Sun, as from Thyestean Banquet, turn'd
His course intended; else how had the World
Inhabited, though sinless more then now,
Avoided pinching cold and scorching heate?
(X, 687-691)

Nevertheless, the changes in the solar system produced "like change on Sea and Land" (X, 693): a perpetual revolution of hot and cold seasons, irregular planetary motions, storms, tempests, malignant astral influence. In short, nature now speaks in a various language--not in her old harmonious voice (X, 651-719).

But it is to man we turn with keener discernment for in him lies the cause and the cure. In him "high Winds worse within/ Began to rise" (IX, 1122-23); for disorder is reflected in the microcosm as well as the macrocosm. Fierce passions replaced the rule of reason. Antipathy replaced sympathy. The "calm region once/ And full of peace, now tost and turbulent" (IX, 1125-26):

For Understanding rul'd not, and the Will
Heard not her lore, both in subjection now
To sensual Appetite, who from beneath
Usurping over sovran Reason claimd
Superior sway.

(IX, 1127-1131)

There is no harmony within, so this condition is reflected in the actions. Charges and countercharges flow. Hatred of self is reflected in hatred of the self in others. Embraces (IX, 990) turn to seizures (IX, 1015); love to lust (IX, 1013); innocence to guiltie shame (IX, 1058).

Thus they in mutual accusation spent
The fruitless hours, but neither self-
 condemning,
And of their vain contest appear'd no
 end.

When the voice of God was heard to pronounce sentence "Love was not in their looks, either to God/ Or to each other" (X, 111-112); so each shifted responsibility for their sin from himself to another.

For Adam:

This woman whom thou mad'st to be my help,
And gav'st me as thy perfet gift, so good,
So fit, so acceptable, so Divine
That from her hand I could suspect no ill
She gave me of the Tree, and I did eate.
(X, 125-128, 143)

This statement by Adam is indicative of his postlapsarian logic. True, Eve was good and fit, as he says, but not to be his leader. For turned from God, nothing is good; turned towards God, all is good. As Milton sees it from his monistic basis, the fault was not in the gift but in its use. Adam has a keen view of their relationship but not of his responsibility to make of this relationship something good. Thus God's reply:

Was she made thy guide,
Superior, or but equal, that to her
Thou didst resigne thy Manhood, and the Place
Wherein God set thee above her made of thee,
And for thee.

(X, 146-150)

And Eve says: "The Serpent me beguil'd and I did eate"
(X, 162), again indicating a conscious rejection of a higher
for a lower being.

Justice must take its course. They receive their just sentence; but it is to be justice tempered with mercy (X, 59). Eve, the first to sin, is also the first to redirect herself from herself. Only then can she admit her transgression and seek redress.

Between us two let there be peace, both
 joyning,
 As joyn'd in injuries, one enmitie.
 (X, 924-925)

Since she has sinned against both God and Adam and he against only God, she is willing to bear the whole guilt. Only when this step is taken can they be reunited. Only then can they be said to share common guilt or good. So Adam is moved to reconciliation with her by accepting his responsibility that "on this head all might be visited" (X, 955). Now they can "strive in offices of Love, how they may lighten/ Each others burden . . ." (X, 959-61). They can now turn toward God "confess and pardon beg" (X, 1088-90). Only when each is willing to accept his responsibility can the right relation be restored, first between man and man, and then, between man and God. Prevenient grace had thus made their prayer possible. The Son intercedes and mercy tempers justice. They must incur the penalty for sin, be banished from Paradise, but there is hope of redemption by means of the Son. Adam receives sign of his renewed relationship:

. . . Persuasion in me grew
That I was heard with favour; peace returnd

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By this promise, mankind may repair the ruins occasioned by the Fall. Eve, who committed the initial act of disobedience, will be an instrument by which this is achieved. "Mother of all Mankind" (XI, 159), her daughter Mary, a Second Eve, will bear the Second Adam. Thus is the divine-human correlative to be perfected; for this Son will be the highest human and the lowest form of the transcendent Deity--a union of the human and divine hands in the accomplishment of the final reparation of the ruins caused by the first sin.

Further effects of their sin reveal themselves, signs of the irreversibility of the divine decree (XI, 181). Nature reflects its steady decline from its prelapsarian state: day becomes dark and beast pursues beast (XI, 181-207). This dissonance is a fitting harbinger of the dire news which Adam and Eve presently receive. They must leave Eden. But Michael comforts them: God's

omnipresence fills
Land, Sea, and Aire, and every Kinde that
lives,
Fomented by his virtual Power and warm'd:
. . . surmise not then
His presence to these narrow bounds confin'd
Of Paradise or Eden.

(XI, 335-337, 340-342)

The world then is larger than Eden, and so are Eden's consequences. Adam is shown the future. He beholds further effects of the brokenness the primal parents caused: envy, strife, misery, death. He weeps: "Though not of

woman born; Compassion quell'd/ His best of Man" (XI, 495-497). The deformities exhibited in the future man, as Adam recognizes, pervert the Maker's image in man--just as had the Original Sin. Future sin and the original sin are essentially the same: both break fealty with the Maker:

Thir Maker's Image . . . then
 Forsook them, when themselves they
 villifi'd
 To serve ungovern'd appetite, and
 took
 His Image whom they serv'd, a brutish
 Vice,
 Inductive mainly to the sin of Eve.
 (XI, 515-519)

Adam is warned of the differences between appearance and reality. Men will be misled by a seeming good if they attempt to use pleasure as the standard for true virtue, just as the archetypal man was. The desire for power is to be the bane of future man just as it was for the original man. The angel informs Adam that the usurpation of power is a perennial destroyer of "concord and the law of nature from the Earth" (XII, 25-30).

But man cannot redeem himself. His hope is fulfilled by the promise made after the Fall: God with man unites to recure the death wound made by Satan and thus bruise the serpent's heel (XII, 382). But man has a part--like the role of the good angels in the heavenly battle, or the two-handed engine in Lycidas--salvation is to be achieved "by [the Savior's] works [in thee and thy Seed]" in the human race (XII, 390-395). The supreme penalty for man is paid

on the cross for all who accept him. These he will return to gather unto himself (XII, 460-465). In the interim, a Comforter abides within the believers as a guide and protector. Through him the elect can endure the brokenness that characterizes the world (XII, 485-520). Through grace Adam and his progeny can find a "Paradise within" by learning true patience, temperance, "Joy with fear and pious sorrow, equally enur'd by moderation" (XI, 360-364):

Onely add
Deeds to thy knowledge answerable, add Faith,
Add Vertue, Patience, Temperance, add Love,
By name to come . . . called Charitie, the soul
Of all the rest: then wilt thou not be loath
To leave this Paradise, but shalt possess
A paradise within thee, happier farr.
(XII, 582-587)

Thus can Adam be comforted and comfort Eve. So they leave Paradise united:

They hand in hand with wandring steps and slow,
Through Eden took their solitary way.
(XII, 648-649)

The role of the Savior is refined in Paradise Regain'd. Christ, as Milton had earlier declared, is the "most perfect Heroe try'd in the heaviest plight/ Of labours huge and hard, too hard for human wight" (I, 13-14, 23). He portrays the exalted man in unity with the will of God. Milton, as I have indicated, saw the pattern of Christ's life as exemplary to man; for man by submitting himself to the will of God may to that extent become one with Him. There were other traditions of Christology available, the one of Christ as the Suffering Servant, for example. But

the one of Christ as the Exemplar of humble faith and obedience seems to have appealed most to Milton. Yet, as Barbara Lewalski notes, Milton does not exactly fit into any of the "common christological positions," though he incorporated views from many.⁴⁶

The elements which Milton selected for his view of Christ's nature further indicate his sympathetic impulse. Each element is not only compatible with the poet's doctrine of sympathy, but it is also more credible because of such an orientation. Milton shares the Arian belief that Christ's nature is a fusion of the divine and human into a single person at the Incarnation. While the individual natures retain their distinct properties, a single person with what seems to be a single understanding and will is formed. The process by which this is accomplished is called "emptying" of the divine nature.⁴⁷ Having biblical sanction, the term is variously interpreted. Milton's interpretation lends itself to his standard effects and affinities inhering in a natural relationship that increases in quality with the assumption of responsibility. Milton's literal acceptance of the term emptying is compatible with his views on the Godhead, the creation, and his doctrine of sympathy. Moreover his view has much to substantiate it biblically and linguistically. For the first, the matter of growth as indicated in Luke 2: 52 is harder to explain for one already divine. That Christ could increase in "wisdom and stature and in favor

with God and man" favors, then, a literal interpretation of "emptying."

Milton also presents Christ as a summation of the human race. Such a presentation is evidenced by his symbolistic use of typology. Since typology has its orientations in the unity and identification of several entities, its use is a further indication of Milton's sympathetic impulse. Milton has here a rich tradition on which to draw. Origen had earlier "synthesized the various approaches by taking the Old Testament figures as types of the total reality that is Christ, and therefore as shadowing forth, variously, the historical events of his life as related in the Gospel, his mystical life in the church as a whole or in each individual member who has 'put on Christ,' or his glorious appearance at the end of time."⁴⁸ But Milton as usual enhances the available tradition. As Mrs. Lewalski says, the poet's use of typology is an "important dimension in Milton's achievement in the poem. Milton's special accomplishment is to make typological allusions part of the debate-duel between Christ and Satan and thus to make them wholly organic not only to the theme but also to the dramatic movement of the poem--Christ's discovery of himself and his role through the temptation encounter."⁴⁹ Thus the idea of sympathy is not only the animating idea of Milton's portrait of Christ, but it is also a structural principle.

Paradise Regain'd, as Mrs. Lewalski points out,

depends on the nature of Christ's identity for "the substance of its dramatic action."⁵⁰ That the concept of Christ's emptying himself of divinity furnishes the central theme for the poem is also significant for Milton's deontology and ambiance. Because the Son is at the outset of his career emptied of his divine component, he is a fitter exemplar for the mere human. The effects of his growing relationship with the divine can not only produce the dramatic tension of the work, but can also be depicted with the conventional ambiance of sympathy, especially the accessions of divine power in response to the Savior's growth. Thus the Son maintains his relationship through steadfastness and obedience; and God in turn responds with "divine illumination activating the divine" in the correspondent.⁵¹

The classicus locus for the biblical sanction of the term "emptying" as a descriptive term for the process of the Incarnation is Phillipians 2: 6-8 . . . "Christ Jesus, who though he was in the form of God, did not count equality with God a thing to be grasped, but emptied himself, taking the form of a servant, being born in the likeness of men" (RSV). Almost universally, patristic interpretation held "Christ's voluntary renunciation of the glory of God, but it did not imply his actual denuding himself of his power and his divine attributes; indeed Church Fathers and reformers alike held that the Son 'emptied himself' only with respect to the hypostatic union, but that he continued to

exercise his divine power and attributes, outside that union, in his eternal subsistence in the Trinity."⁵²

The first example of Milton's use of prefiguration in Paradise Regain'd is that of Christ as the Second Adam. Biblical precedence for this type is extensive. Perhaps the more usual locations are Phillipians 2:5-11; I Corinthians 15:45-49 and Romans 5:14, 19 (All RSV). The last is typical: "Yet death reigned from Adam to Moses, even over those whose sins were not like the transgression of Adam, who was a type of the one who was to come" (14) and "For by one man's disobedience many were made sinners, so by one man's obedience many will be made righteous" (19). More explicitly, I Corinthians 15 sets up a comparison between the type and the reality: "The first Adam became a living being; the last Adam became a life-giving spirit" (45). "Just as we have borne the image of the man of dust, we shall also bear the image of the man of heaven" (49). From this biblical and exegetical tradition one could readily find sanction for the typology Milton employed. But in some christologies, this Adam-Christ analogy might seem a bit nonparallel. Milton's portrait of the Son in Paradise Regain'd suggests an eclecticism grounded on biblical authority and exegesis which is credible. I have already pointed to Auerbach's study on typology in which he states that the "figural schema permits both poles, the figure and the fulfillment to retain characteristics of concrete

historical reality."⁵³ Figural realism, then, was approved and defended by the Church Fathers, especially Tertullian, Jerome, and Augustine.⁵⁴

Milton in the induction to Paradise Regain'd sets the stage on which the action is to unfold. Christ, through His facing and surmounting the temptations to which the devil subjects Him, is to be a recapitulation of the major heroes of the long line of the human race. Through these temptations Christ also comes to understand His own nature and to experience the illuminating effects of His relationship with the Father. Since the Second Adam obeys where the First Adam disobeyed, Milton's emphasis is not on the Crucifixion, but on "firm obedience truly tried" (I, 14). It is in His temptations that Christ most nearly approximates the condition of man. It is there also that He proves His merit to give His life as a ransom for the sin of mankind. The temptations follow a pattern similar to that of Milton's own life: individual, or special to a wider appeal, or the universal, and then to individual again. Some critics have detected at least a bit of aesthetic sympathy of the poet for his subject. The fact that Milton had by this time settled for his kingdom within is perhaps support for this view.

The angle of vision in Paradise Regain'd is individual, no longer explicitly corporate as it was in the prose and Paradise Lost. The focus is on the individual man in

harmony with the divine will. Thus the first temptation directed at self-centeredness is well calculated. Satan, feeling that the call of hunger might make Christ vulnerable suggests that he turn stones into bread. Adding to the Gospel accounts of the temptations, Milton uses the further temptation of the devil's banquet, the temptation to judge good by appearance and pleasure to the individual. The second temptation is group oriented; the temptation to rule over one's fellow-men. In Milton's deontology such a privilege cannot be granted before one is master of himself. Even so none of this is Satan's to give. The last is the temptation to Godhead. It is the culmination of the ascending order of the three temptations. So the place is twice significant: the pinnacle of the temptations is on the pinnacle of the temple. And the outcome is made even more strikingly significant by Milton's description of it:

'Tempt not the Lord thy God, He said
and stood.
But Satan smitten with amazement fell.
(IV, 561-562)

Such a stand not only established Christ's divinity, but it marked the beginning of Satan's end as a demonic force in the world. The first Adam had been driven out of Eden into the wilderness; but Christ here raises Eden in the wilderness. Just as Adam's sins had prefigured all the types of later sins, so Christ's obedience points the way to the means of triumph over all types of disobedience.

Christ is also a Second Job, He represents a higher

patience. Though Satan had tempted Job and failed (I, 147), he did not learn from his failure. But Christ too is

Of female Seed, far abler to resist
All his sollicitations, and at length
All his vast force, and drive him
back to Hell,
Winning by Conquest what the first man
lost
By fallacy surpriz'd.

(I, 151-155)

Job was marked in heaven as a just man. Though little known on earth he had true fame in heaven (III, 1164-70). Christ represents the epitome of what the perfect man Job had exemplified.

Christ also sums up the figures Moses, and Elijah, the founder of the Law and the restorer of the Law respectively. Again, Christ is to fulfill them not repeat them. So he is the proclaimer of the new law which subsumes the old.⁵⁵ He institutes the rule of love instead of Law. Mrs. Lewalski notes that the appearance of Moses and Elijah at Christ's transfiguration confirms the relation between them and Christ.⁵⁶ That the role which Christ plays is unique is evident by the new illumination which he receives from this encounter with Satan:

God has now sent his living Oracle
Into the World, to teach his final will,
And sends his Spirit of Truth henceforth
to dwell
In pious Hearts, an inward Oracle
To all truth requisite for men to know.
(I, 460-464)

Thus again Milton emphasizes the relationship which the

Father keeps with all of his sons. He makes known to those "engrafted in Christ" through a "comprehension of spiritual things . . . all that is necessary for eternal salvation and the true happiness of life," he says in Christian Doctrine (Works, XVI, 7).

Milton further includes in the typological treatment of the Christ of Paradise Regain'd such classical figures as Socrates and Hercules, types of ethical knowledge and heroism (III, 95-99; IV, 564-571). Milton is here paying tribute to virtue--even of a pagan--for every man, as Milton had said, has a spark of the divine yet remaining in him. But by this same stroke Milton also places things in perspective. Just as the virtue of Christ is the highest form, as Milton sees it, so biblical knowledge takes priority over all other learning. No other songs can compare "with Sion's songs, to all true tastes excelling,/ Where God is prais'd aright, and Godlike men" abide (IV, 345ff). But "moral vertue" signifying the "light of nature not in all quite lost" is worthy of praise (IV, 351-355).

As Christ grows in knowledge and proves himself by meeting and surmounting his trials, he grows in relationship with God. At the beginning of his awareness of his mission, signs of his calling manifested themselves within him. His "spirit aspired" toward paths not destined for him: "Victorious deeds flamed in my heart, heroic acts, one while/ To rescue Israel from the Roman yoke" (I, 15-17). He still

needed the benefit of study and experience to learn God's will for him. The wilderness provides the recess needed to contemplate the will of God. Through each victory over temptation he grows in insight. This in turn makes him fitter for the next trial and renders him more receptive of divine illuminations. His job is to obey God and by so doing he maintains his relationship with God and receives the concomitant rewards. He cannot accept Satan's gifts for he, like the Lady in Comus, must judge the gift by the giver (II, 322). He can renounce all classical learning and all wealth and power because nothing is good which does not come from God. So the Second Adam through study and diligence learned the right relationship, was obedient to it, and thus succeeded where the First Adam failed.

Milton in Paradise Regain'd also places the negative manifestations of the sympathetic bond of nature in perspective. He assigns to Satan astrological manipulations, portents, presages, omens, oracles, and dream interpretations that claim the power to predict the future (I, 394-396). Certainly this would seem to be an assessment Milton makes on the pseudo-sciences of his age. Milton by the same token repudiates any deterministic influence over man and places his responsibility for his virtue on his free use of reason and will. Only then can man build the kingdom within.

Samson Agonistes, according to widely accepted chronology is Milton's last completed work.⁵⁷ It presents

as hero a man, not a demigod, who was "chosen" and afterwards relapsed from his responsibility as inherent in his relationship with God and thus forfeited it. Cut off from his sustaining power, he experienced the gall and wormwood of a life without God. Unlike Satan who suggested: "if I was, I am; relation stands" (P.R., IV, 519), Samson learns that dynamic, creative relationship is one's own responsibility. Relationship does not stand; it either progresses or retrogresses. So when Samson comes to recognize his responsibility for his plight, he is again able to reestablish his broken bonds by submitting himself freely to God's will. Thereupon he is restored to grace. But like Adam, he must pay the penalty for his sins.

Hanford feels that Milton's choice of Samson for a subject, beyond any obvious analogies between the two men's physical and political conditions, is also the poet's desire to show an example of "one who enjoys a direct and special relation with the Divine" who because of this relation "achieves his triumph before the time of the Redeemer."⁵⁸ Hanford sees in such a gesture proof that Milton felt that the "blood of Christ's sacrifice is plainly no necessary instrument of salvation; even his example may be dispensed with by those who enjoy a direct relation with the Divine."⁵⁹ Whether Hanford is right here or not, then Milton has not only broadened his sympathies to include all mankind as eligible for the holy community, but he has precisely

anticipated the direction of twentieth-century radical theology. At the same time he underscores his entire relationship-responsibility motif. Moreover he indicates the basis of his emphasis on Christ as the Exemplar, an exalted man. Certainly this view reflects the movement of Milton's own faith during the later days. He not only repudiated any denominational ties, but he also divested his religion of any externality except the word of God as revealed in the Scriptures and as interpreted by himself.

Samson, however, was "chosen" and the Hebrews did look forward to Christ as has already been indicated in the discussion on Paradise Regain'd: the prophets themselves were types of Christ. Christ's coming extended the scope of salvation, making it available to all. Milton, I think, has even a more inclusive "all" in mind than the traditional Christians and Jews.

Samson is, according to Hanford, "the nearest possible fulfillment in the life of mortal man" of that "'better fortitude of patience and heroic martyrdom,' fulfilled by the portrayal of a divine pattern in Paradise Regained."⁶⁰ His trials and conflicts alike reflect the aspirations of the divine community and the human frailties which sometimes thwart them. But his ability to reassert himself in God is the hope of the mortal man. Samson's whole career, as depicted by Milton, is a study in the relationship-responsibility motif inhering in sympathy.

Though chosen by God "as a person separate of God [and] design'd for great exploits" (II, 23-32), Samson repudiated his gifts by his lack of vigilance, diligence, and obedience. Though with man there is always the possibility of return, the return must be effected by the use of his conscious will. At the opening of Samson, Milton depicts the hero as cut off from God's grace, having severed his relationship by his turn from God to Dalila. He is tangl'd, as Milton puts it in Paradise Regain'd, in an amorous net:

Such objects hath the power to soft'n
 and tame
Severest temper, smooth the rugged'st
 brow,
Enerve, and with voluptuous hope dissolve,
Draw out with credulous desire, and lead
At will the manliest, resolute**s**t brest,
As the Magnetic hardest iron draws.
(II, 163-168)

Succumbing to this net has been the plight of many a good man since Adam, as the tradition goes; for the attraction of the net is irresistible unless reason is sovereign. So Milton here records the consequences of Samson's relapse from vigilance and obedience. To fall in love and to marry is good, Milton held. But to allow it to interfere with one's duty to God is not good. A choice of a mate then must be rational; for true love has its seat in reason, as Milton reiterated in Paradise Lost. Moreover the mate must be a help meet, not a mismatch, as the divorce tracts showed at length. Samson in self-pity mourns his plight: enslav'd
"to grind in Brazen Fetters under task/ with this Heaven

gifted strength . . . Eyeless in Gaza" (ll. 32-41). Until he can come to see his plight as his own responsibility both as to cause and cure, he cannot move towards God.

Samson is at the first step in his restoration when he comes to blame himself instead of God: "What if all foretold/ Had been fulfilled but through mine own default/ Whom have I to complain of but myself?" (ll. 44-46). Such a reflection is a gleam of redemption, for it predicts the return of Samson's ability to accept responsibility. But he must come to fuller recognition of the circumstances before his ultimate redemption. This is achieved in part by the temptations proffered him by his succession of visitors. Each visitor brings him new illumination as is signified by his reception of "secret refreshings from above (ll. 664-666).

Even out of his deepest agony he comes to gain certain insights. Though physically blind, he has the compensation of "the light in the soul" (l. 92). Samson's comment that the soul is "in every part" (l. 92) has been used to support the charge of the Mortalist heresy in Milton. I do not think such a use is peculiar to Milton. Genesis 2:8 "and man became a living soul" is a case in point. Here also the poet's monistic position is evident for he considered matter to be an extension of spirit. The particular frame of reference in which Milton employs this concept of soul certainly enhances the basic idea; for it must be

comforting to a blind person to know that the light of the soul cannot be extinguished by injury to a single part. But even here Samson has not come to the real insight needed to redress himself to God. "He is," as Broadbent says, "valuing himself rather than doing anything."⁶¹

Samson begins to evaluate the cause for his plight. Though he sees himself partially to blame, he has a neat way of shifting the responsibility. Like Adam, he sees his marriage as divinely ordained. Dalila, like Eve to Adam, is a divine gift that betrayed him. Samson, of course, arrived at the conclusion that it was the divine will for him to marry Dalila by indirection. Of his first marriage, he says ". . . What I motion'd was of God; I knew/ From intimate impulse, and therefore urg'd the marriage on" to serve divine ends (ll. 222-224). Consequently, after the marriage to Timna, a Philistine, proved false, Samson concluded that the marriage to Dalila was "lawful from his former act/ And the same end" (ll. 231-232). Hence the same "divine" inspiration which moved Samson to marry one Philistine moved him to marry the other. Perhaps the latter marriage was Samson's own will not the divine; certainly the consequences seem to indicate this. Even so, at no time is Samson's fate determined; it is, ever subject to his conscious will. Thus Samson does come to see that "She was not the prime cause, but I my self" (ll. 220-236). Samson himself gave her the secret which led to his captivity. And he also sees that

he himself is not entirely to blame for his nation's bondage: much of it is due to its own corruption. Likewise had Milton conceived the self-enthralment of England at the Restoration. Therefore, though many are not always able to see it, there is moral order in the universal scheme. As the Chorus points out: "Just are the ways of God/ And justifiable to men" (ll. 293-294). Samson must come to this point before he can submit his will to the divine will.

Samson is gradually made aware of the divine will by the succession of visitors. Manoa, his father, brings home the point that Samson's betrayal involves more than simply yielding to sensuality: it was a repudiation of God and country (ll. 420ff.). Manoa's plan for Samson's restitution, not biblical, also represents a departure from the divine will to man's will. Patently ironic, he says: "Dagon must stoop" and in such a manner of discomfort as shall "with confusion blank his Worshippers" (ll. 468-471). He offers to ransom his son (ll. 480ff.). He advises repentance; but the instinct of self-preservation mitigates the effect of this advice for he also tells Samson to avoid punishment (l. 504). He epitomizes man's limited view of the ways of God with man. God does not require a ransom for pardon; rather he requires the death of the apostate will, for the will alone brings separation from him.

Samson's response is indicative of this insight: pardon, he desires, but no thought of life preservation

(11. 521-522). Full of the divine instinct he had performed some heroic deeds as long as he had preserved his relation. But he broke fealty when he became insatiate with hubris, the reliance upon self and not upon the source of his strength. He thereupon fell from glory into the lascivious "lap of a deceitful Concubine" (11. 535-540). Neither wine nor warriors had been able to so conquer and reduce him (11. 521-540). Contemplation on his past and present circumstances enables Samson to move closer to the point of reestablishment with his Maker; for in the face of physical and mental anguish divine philosophy little avails. Only within can he seek to feel:

Some source of consolation from above;
Secret refreshings, that repair his
 strength
And fainting spirits uphold.
 (11. 663-666)

Such is the way God makes his relationship known to men. Because men vary in their receptivity of this human-divine bond, some succeed and others fail. Success or failure obtains in proportion to the receptivity of the natural relationship between God and his creatures, according to Milton's deontology. Once the relationship is accepted and a relapse in responsibility ensues, the fall is many times greater than the elevation (ll. 667-686). And:

Causeless suffering
The punishment of dissolute days . . .
Just or unjust, alike seem miserable,
For oft alike, both come to evil end.
(11. 701-704)

These lines reflect man's limited vision. God's ways are beyond such valuation.

Samson's next visitor is Dalila. Milton's non-biblical precedence in making Dalila Samson's wife forces us to make further associations between them and the archetypal union of Adam and Eve. The first statement that Samson utters upon Dalila's approach calls up all the qualities that Milton extolled in a wife in his divorce tracts as well as in Paradise Lost. Samson summarily rejects Dalila: "My wife, my traytress" (l. 725). The two concepts wife and traitress are irreconcilable opposites in Milton's view. The key here, as in the divorce tracts, is that a mate must be a help meet for the spouse: there must be mutual love and sympathy, unity of mind and spirit between them. In such a case betrayal is impossible. Samson's union to Dalila was one of passion rather than of love and sympathy: "over-potent charms," as Manoa says (l. 426). Her betrayal is not only against the law of nature which prevents any force of sympathy against the correspondent, but it is also against the "law of nations" (l. 890). Dalila as Samson's wife became one with his country, thus severing her ties with her former country. She broke fealty with her marriage bond when she "conceiv'd her spurious first-born--Treason" (ll. 388-391) and "made him traitor to himself" (l. 401).

Dalila's love was completely self-centered, which true love cannot be. In her opening plea for reconciliation

(11. 766-818), she mentions some form of I at least twenty times. The whole weight of her argument is directed towards what benefits her. She reveals that even her plot to learn his secrets was motivated by her fears that he would one day leave her as he had Timna. So she proceeded to learn:

How to endear, and hold thee to me
 firmest:
No better way I saw then by importuning
To learn thy secrets, get into my power
Thy key of thy strength.
(11. 796-799)

But weakness is no excuse, neither for Samson nor Dalila. There is a tinge of selflessness in Dalila's plea of patriotism, "the bonds of Civil Duty and of Religion" (ll. 834-835) as the causes of her betrayal. But this plea is nullified because her marital bond supercedes such a civic bond. This Samson points out to her (ll. 885ff.). Both the law of nature and the law of nations sanction this precedence.

Dalila then proffers Samson the temptation to slothful ease and sensuality, a two-pronged hook offering something both to herself and to him. But Samson's growth over his earlier state is evident in his answer to her: "It fits not; thou and I long since are twain" (l. 929). His recognition that since there can never be a spiritual and mental bond between them, they can never really be one in love and sympathy. They must therefore be twain in body as in mind and spirit. This statement signals his final break with Dalila and his triumph over sensuality. She no longer has influence over him:

thy ginns, and toys;
Thy fair enchanted cup, and warbling
 charms
No more on me have power, their force
 is null'd.
 (11. 932-934)

Moreover, Samson now realizes the man's place as the head of the ship of matrimony. To enter into this league which Dalila proposes would be to surrender his inward freedom; for freedom depends on the maintenance of the right relationship among things. Moreover the jail in which he is now imprisoned is liberty compared with the bondage to which Dalila's proposition would subject him (ll. 940-950).

Dalila's hopes vanish when she finds that she no longer exercises the preternatural influence on Samson that she once did. The fact that Samson refuses to touch her hand is significant. The joining of the hands, as I have indicated in my reading of Paradise Lost, is symbolic of unity in Milton. Dalila sought by this means to reawaken the old affinities between them, thus to ensnare Samson again as she had before. But Samson is now in control, and the touch can only have the opposite effect. It can only arouse the antipathy which Samson now feels for Dalila (ll. 952ff.). Only at the end is one made aware of the real import of her visit. Pretending love and good, she is truly "a manifest Serpent by her sting/ Discover'd in the end, till now conceal'd" (ll. 996-998). Samson's victory was quite fortunate--though the credit is to his growth in resolve, not to chance--for Dalila sought only his further ruin through the clever

stratagems of the Arch-Fiend to whom she is here metaphori-
cally equated.

In a perfect footnote to Milton's previous statements on the misfit in marriage, the Chorus sums up Dalila as a mate: appearing good, soft, modest, demure, meek,

Once joyn'd, the contrary she proves,
Intestin, far within defensive arms
A clinging mischief, in his way to
Adverse and turbulent, or by her
Draws him awry enslav'd.

And the disruption of hierarchy, without or without, in marriage, religion or politics, breeds chaos. So:

With dotage, and his sense deprav'd
To folly and shameful deeds which
 ruin ends.
What Pilot so expert but needs must
 wreck
Embarqu'd with such a Stears-Mate
 at the Helm?
 (11. 1035-45)

Man, says Milton, must pilot the ship of matrimony, or certain ruin is inevitable. This is God's universal law (1. 1053). Had Samson maintained the correct relationship in his marriage and had Dalila acted according the positive dictates of the bond of sympathy inherent in her marriage union, the story could not have been a tragedy. Thus Milton's doctrine of sympathy not only enhanced this theme based upon the lineaments of the Bible story of Samson, but it gave the story its essential meaning as a conscious work of art. Further illustrative detail will support this basic

But Samson is yet not completely recovered. Milton again adds to the biblical story the character Harapha, Samson's final visitor. The "braggart soldier" or miles gloriosus is a challenge to Samson's pride and a stimulus to activity. He is an invitation to a final conquest of despair. Harapha chides Samson by branding his strength spurious. Not a gift of God, as Harapha sees it, Samson's strength is the product of diabolic forces: spells

(11. 1132-38)

But Milton distinguishes between the power which comes through sympathy with God and that which derives from human manipulations of the natural bond of things. The miraculous

quality of the form of the divine sympathy must be accepted on faith and in obedience, as Samson explains:

I know no Spells, use no forbidden Arts
My trust is in the living God who gave me
At my Nativity this strength difus'd
No less through all my sinews, joints,
and bones.
(11. 1140-45)

So long as Samson kept the "pledge of [his] unviolated vow," the strength endured. But when he broke his relationship with God, he no longer received the benefits of that relationship.

Samson reaffirms his faith in God by his answer to Harapha's taunt. In a single combat between himself as God's representative and Harapha as Dagon's representative, Samson vowed that God's side would win (11. 1150-65). But Harapha refuses, for he came to flout a weak man not to fight a strong one. Seeing that Samson is not as he expected, Harapha departs. Samson has met this challenge successfully. Though the Chorus predicts the life of a patient and enduring saint (11. 1287-88) for Samson, his peace lies in the complete submission of his will to God's will. His ultimate victory will lie in "the magnitude of the mind" (1. 1279). But he is now in position to receive God's will for he has signs of his reestablished relation with God in the return of the "consecrated gift of his strength" along with his hair (11. 1354-56).

Samson discovers the will of God through the bonds of sympathy and thus submits himself to it. At first, not

yet aware of God's purpose for him, he refuses the Philistines' invitation to sport. He considered it idolatrous. But in this gesture he demonstrates his loyalty to God, placing it above his own personal safety. To obey outwardly to avoid the repercussions of his refusal to obey a royal command is just as culpable as to give wholehearted commitment. Still this gesture of self-denial is a submission of self to the divine will and relation is signalled by "some rousing motions" (ll. 1381-83), the communication of the divine will. Samson then can answer affirmatively to the second invitation to come to the temple, for he knows it is the will of God.

Samson must deliver his people by self-sacrifice. He divines: "This day will be remarkable in my life/ By some great act, or of my days the last" (ll. 1387-89). But by his obedience he, like the phoenix, gains new life (ll. 1699-1709) "Though [his] body dies, [his] fame survives" (l. 1705). Samson, then, becomes the agent of the Philistines' destruction and of his own also. Such is the inscrutability of the ways of God to man. For the relationship and responsibility of man to God and of man to man must always obtain from his relationship with God and this relationship chastens and refines all other actions and relations. Samson's act is sacrificial because it is not selfishly oriented and because it is in harmony with the Divine will (ll. 1689-90). The Philistines' self-destruction

was brought on by their selfishness and greed, their desire to use a fellow being (ll. 1675-1681) for their own selfish ends. The first is good; the second is evil.

Thus Milton in his trinal poem justifies the ways of God to man. In Paradise Lost, the circle is complete. Paradise Regain'd and Samson Agonistes refine the basic assumptions of Paradise Lost. The message is clear. Sympathy is the universal principle of unity, operative in divine, human, and infernal realms. God is the source of all good. He spreads His divine beneficence to all who receive it by their own free will. To enjoy a direct and special relation with God involves a conscious submission to His will and obedience to it. Disobedience breaks fealty. In the divine realm, Satan and his host disobeyed and broke the primal union in the universe. All other sin stems directly or indirectly from this first. Upon the establishment of the human realm, man was placed in a realm of perfect bliss and harmony with God. Incumbent upon him was the responsibility to obey and thus make of his world a heaven. Tempted to disobey by the diabolic forces, man yielded and thereby broke fealty. But God's justice is tempered by mercy. Thus through His Son, man by his acceptance of the gift of redemption, can again be restored to the harmony lost in Eden. He can by virtue and patience achieve a Paradise within and finally be reunited with his Maker.

CONCLUSION

The idea of sympathy as a transcendental vision of oneness in the universe had not yet felt in Milton's age the hostile effects of scientism it was later to feel. Often used widely in secular and religious contexts ranging from the most elementary recognition of effects and affinities, astral influence, a magic communication of kindred souls, to the wider implications of the commerce between this world and the other, the idea of sympathy was appropriated as both fact and figure. Postulated on the awareness of a common primal source, the essence of the concept is the bond among created things and the Creator. Therefore the idea came to be used more and more in religious contexts by ministers to underscore their ethical teaching on man's relationship to God and to his fellowman. As the seventeenth century wore on, the doctrine of sympathy became a main weapon in the hands of the Puritans and Latitudinarian divines against Hobbism and many of the inimical effects of the scientific spirit.

This study has demonstrated Milton's use of the doctrine of sympathy in his deontology and ambiance. Appealing to the subliminal and personal in Milton, the sympathetic

impulse lies at the heart of his perception and expression of his vision of oneness. Milton's deontology arises from a deep sensitivity of his relationship to God and his fellow-men. From this relationship he arrives first at an awareness of his responsibility to God; then all other relationships follow proportionately, the closer the relationship the greater the responsibility. His so-called heresies, his blending of the spiritual and the sensible, his theories on the Godhead and creation, his high moral idealism, his sense of mission, his antipathy for the slavish regard for tradition and systems, his peculiar language patterns--all have their orientation in the poet's quest for unity among the dissimilitudes of existence.

The poem, in Milton's ambiance, early becomes a symbol of the unity, harmony, and proportion which he desired in his personal life, in the world as a holy community, and in the moral universe he perceived. It embodies the principle of relationship among parts to their creator which Milton desired between parts of the world and their Creator. According to the receptivity of the parts, the Creator shapes them to a conscious purpose and plan. So Milton felt that an individual, as a consequence of his conscious receptivity of his relationship to God, strives to make of himself a poem, a "composition, and patterne of the best and honourablest things." By the same token, he accepts the responsibility to make of the world a poem, and then, as he is

called, he writes the perfect poem, or performs his best in whatever his endeavor. But he is judged finally according to his fitness, not his performance.

Interrelationship, then, becomes the key to Milton's deontology and ambiance. God is the highest good, and all other good obtains from the relationship one effects with him. Milton's whole intellectual and spiritual energy, I suggest, was devoted to an examination and refinement of his perception of the common bond of nature. For this he appropriated the traditional doctrine of sympathy and brought it to an unparalleled significance as image and principle. From his earliest works to his latest he studied the relationship of man to God, to himself and his kind, and to nature. His keen sensitivity to the sympathetic bond of nature animated his love of chastity, his appreciation for the dignity of the individual spirit, his love of liberty, and his defense of the just claims of the law of nature in a reasonable soul. From the first to the last, his desire was to regain that primal unity between God and the universe which was abrogated by the Fall. And all of his knowledge and talents were directed to that end.

Milton's sense of duty led him to become active in reform because he had a deep sense of responsibility to God and his fellowman to make of the world what it should be. He lent the whole force of his talents and industry to achieve for his country the freedom which he felt the human

condition demanded in religion, domestics, and politics. With the Bible as his guide and the final interpretation of the Scriptures the reserved privilege of those "engrafted in Christ," he attacked established authority, cherished idols, and custom joined with error in any of its guises. Though often branded as a heretic or a flout because of his activities, Milton did not join the hot and dusty fields of controversy for the love of battle. He joined it out of love of God and truth.

Milton's vision of unity led him through nature to great insight into human nature and God. His study of the effects and affinities in nature gave credence to his basic assumptions on the relatedness in the universe. And contemplation on nature again took him back to the notion of the primal unity and the effects of the first sin. Milton's nature was sentient. It shared in the affairs of man for both weal and woe. Likewise, he believed that nature's proper use depends on the quality of the user's relationship to God. Nature is an instrument by which man ascends to God, never a substitute for man or God. Therefore, the images which Milton selected from nature were always informed by this rich sense of the relatedness of all in God.

From the quest for individual merit or fitness evident in the first phase of Milton's work to the test of this idealism in the revolutionary activities of the second, Milton sought to attain the individual and corporate poem

shaped to the pattern of the best and noblest things revealed by God in His works and in the Scriptures. In the last phase, he wrote the perfect poem for which he had spent the main part of his life in preparation. Having emerged from the world of action with a matured insight, he was no longer dedicated to passionate reform of the world. His hope now rested in the hope for individual regeneration. He now realized that the kingdom without must await the destined time for all parts to find their place in the total frame; but the "fit" could even in his earthly sojourn attain the kingdom within. This Milton expressed in the trinal poem, his last three works, in which he both climaxed and summed up his vision of the sympathetic bond of nature. All parts of the universe are interrelated. Within the larger whole are smaller units related to each other by a common bond. Each part is separate yet a part of the whole; thus what happens in one part affects the whole. And every act has divine and eternal reference. Hence sympathy in Milton is not only the ideational principle, but it is the structural principle as well, informing all parts of his life and his art: each part is an integral part of the whole. In the midst of barbarous dissonance, he spoke with a harmonious voice in tune with the divine.

NOTES

INTRODUCTION

¹A.Z. Butler, "The Pathetic Fallacy in Paradise Lost," Essays in Honor of Walter Clyde Curry (Nashville, 1954), p. 278.

²Butler, p. 278.

³Butler, p. 278. See Max Scheler, The Nature of Sympathy, tr. Peter Heath (New Haven, 1954), pp. 94-95. Scheler also lists Fechner, Bergson, phenomenology, vitalism, and the disciples of Stefan George and the Youth Movements as indications of the presence of the sympathetic impulse in recent times.

⁴Scheler, p. 82.

⁵"Mansus," The Works of John Milton, 18 vols. ed. Frank A. Patterson (New York, 1931-1938), I, pt. I, ll. 24-29. All quotations of Milton's prose and poetry used in this study are from this edition unless otherwise indicated. Hereafter cited as Works; volume, page or book and line number will be listed parenthetically in the text after this opening section. "Areopagitica," Complete Prose Works of John Milton, ed. Don M. Wolfe (New Haven, 1953-), II, 490.

Hereafter cited as CPW with volume and page number in text following opening section. "Paradise Lost," IX, 45.

⁶Works, III, 325.

⁷CPW, I, 814.

⁸CPW, II, 271.

⁹The Poems and Letters of Andrew Marvell, 2 vols. ed. H.M. Margoliouth (Oxford, 1927), I, 131-132.

¹⁰For example, Edward S. LeComte, Yet Once More (New York, 1953), passim.

¹¹Roland M. Frye, Man, God, and Satan (Princeton, 1960), pp. 21-91.

¹²Michael Fixler, Milton and the Kingdoms of God (Evanston, 1964), p. 9. See also p. 109.

¹³Rosemund Tuve, Images and Themes in Five Poems by Milton (Cambridge, Mass., 1957), p. 108.

¹⁴J.B. Broadbent, Some Graver Subject (London, 1961), p. 210.

¹⁵Paradise Lost in Our Time (Gloucester, 1957), p. 39.

¹⁶Butler, pp. 277-278.

¹⁷Butler, p. 278. This observation is similar to my own thesis; however, we arrived at our conclusions independently. Butler does not deal with sympathy from the deontological angle, nor does he treat its philosophical backgrounds.

¹⁸The terms for these modes were suggested to me by Rudolf Allers' study, "Microcosmus," Traditio, II (1944),

321-326.

¹⁹See Leo Spitzer, "Classical and Christian Ideas of World Harmony: Prolegomena to an Interpretation of the Word 'Stimmung' (part II)," Traditio, III (1945), 420, and passim. See also George W. Whiting, Milton's Literary Milieu (Chapel Hill, 1939), p. 31.

²⁰Allers, 327.

²¹Harriet F. Dunbar, Symbolism in Medieval Thought and Its Consummation in the Divine Comedy (New York, 1961), pp. 8ff. My summary follows that of Allers, 328.

²²Allers, 328.

²³Erich Auerbach, Mimesis, tr. Willard Trask (New York, 1957), p. 171.

²⁴D.P. Harding, The Club of Hercules (Urbana, 1962), p. 1.

²⁵See J. Wach, Das Verstehen: Grundzuge einer Geschichte der hermeneutischen Idee, Vol. 1 (Tübingen, 1926), quoted in Allers, 320.

²⁶This summary follows Allers, 320.

²⁷Whiting, p. 35. W.C. Curry, Milton's Ontology, Cosmogony, Physics (Lexington, 1957), pp. 10-11.

²⁸Fixler, p. 51.

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CHAPTER I

¹See Max Scheler, The Nature of Sympathy, tr. Peter Heath (New Haven, 1954), pp. 51ff. and 77ff.

²Roy R. Male, "Shelley and the Doctrine of Sympathy," The University of Texas Studies in English, XXIX (1950), 183.

³See OED, X, 368-69. I have summarized, omitting the intervening illustrative detail. A few examples are incorporated here. Thomas Heywood (1595) exemplifies the Renaissance notion of the major role of sympathy in the nuptial alliance: "So sweet a simpathie, As crownes a noble marriage." (English Traveller, I, I, 159). In any relationship, says Lyly in his Euphues (1579): "Does not simpathy of mindes make the conjunction of manners?" Sympathy functions likewise in woe as well as bliss. Shakespeare's Titus Andronicus, III, I, 148, can be cited as an example of identification in suffering: "O what a sympathy of woe is this!" (1588). Samuel Purchas, in his Pilgrimage (1613), similarly shows cognizance of a universal bond of nature: "Crabbes heere with vs haue a sympathy with the Moone, and are fullest with her fullness" (V, XIII, 431).

J. Hayward, tr. Biondi's Eromena 81, declared: "Among the hidden secrets of nature, that of sympathizing is one of the truest."

⁴G.S. Kirk and J.E. Raven, The Pre-Socratic Philosophers (Cambridge, 1963), pp. 94-95.

⁵William Gilbert, De Magnete (London, 1600). Quoted in Alfred Still, Soul of Lodestone (New York, 1946), p. 11.

⁶Charles G. Nauert, Jr., Agrippa and the Crisis of Renaissance Thought (Urbana, 1965), p. 252.

⁷Quoted in Duane D. Roller, The De Magnete (Amsterdam, 1959), p. 105.

⁸Still, p. 7.

⁹Still, p. 13.

¹⁰Still, p. 19.

¹¹Still, p. 19.

¹²Quoted in Still, p. 20.

¹³Still, p. 18.

¹⁴Quoted in Roller, p. 29.

¹⁵Still, p. 22.

¹⁶Whiting, Milton's Literary Milieu (Chapel Hill, 1939), p. 30; A.O. Lovejoy, The Great Chain of Being (Cambridge, 1936), p. 58.

¹⁷Lovejoy, p. 55.

¹⁸Lovejoy, p. 54.

¹⁹Lovejoy, p. 58.

²⁰Lovejoy, p. 59.

²¹The Complete Prose Works of John Milton, ed. Don M. Wolfe, Vol. I: 1624-42 (New Haven, 1953), 236. Subsequent references to Milton's prose taken from this edition will be cited as CPW with volume and page number listed parenthetically in the text.

²²Quoted in Leo Spitzer, "World Harmony," Traditio, II (1944), 424. See The Sermons of John Donne, eds. Evelyn M. Simpson and George R. Potter, 10 vols. (Berkeley, 1958), IX, 97. "That this spirit of God may be that universall power, which sustaines, and inanimates the whole world which the Platoniques have called the soule of the world, and others intend by the name of Nature . . . we call the Providence of God."

²³John Milton, "Paradise Lost," The Complete Works, ed. Frank A. Patterson, 18 vols. (New York, 1931-1938), VIII, 90ff.; V, 470-505; V, 511-12. Subsequent quotations from Milton's poetry and those from the prose not taken from the CPW will be taken from this the Columbia Edition, 18 volumes; the references to prose passages and the short poems are to volume and line; for the long poems, the references are to book and line number--these will be cited parenthetically in the text, preceded by Works, if necessary for clarity.

²⁴Whiting, p. 35.

²⁵Whiting, p. 31.

²⁶Whiting, p. 35.

²⁷Quoted in John Wright Buckham, "Immanence-

Transcendence," Journal of Philosophy, XXVIII (1931), 210.

²⁸See Maurice Kelley, This Great Argument (Princeton, 1941), pp. 106-118. Kelley states that "in Milton's theology the Third Person is no mere figure of speech, nor is the chapter devoted to it [in Christian Doctrine] a blasphemous denial of its very existence. Milton, it is true, denied it deity, but on the other hand, he believed that in the salvation of man's soul its work was vital and important, and that in Christian ethics it alone was the final and infallible guide." (p. 107). Thus I see the Holy Spirit as that closest link between God and His creatures (since the Ascension). Hence its connection with sympathy.

²⁹R.J. Kreyche, God and Reality (New York, 1965), p. 38.

³⁰Science has long since shown that life in a mineral responds to stimuli and can be poisoned as certainly as an animal can. Scientific discovery has also swept away the theory of the ultimate atom and showed that it is in fact but a center of force. All this bears out the monistic position--matter is but a form of life, and that all life is one life. See L.W. Rogers, Elementary Theosophy (Wheaton, Ill., 1929), p. 19.

³¹Nauert, p. 265.

³²M.M. Mahood, Poetry and Humanism (New Haven, 1950), p. 19. (See also pp. 14-20.) Mahood quotes Maritain's distinction between two kinds of humanism: theocentric and

anthropocentric.

The first kind of humanism recognizes that the centre for man is God; it implies the Christian conception of grace and freedom . . . The second kind of humanism believes that man is his own centre, and therefore the centre of all things. It implies a naturalistic conception of man and freedom.

³³Thomas Browne, "Religio Medici," The Works of Sir Thomas Browne, 6 vols., ed. Geoffrey Keynes, Vol. I (London, 1928), I, 34, 43. Subsequent quotations from Sir Thomas Browne will be taken from this edition. The references to prose passages are to part, section, and page number and will be listed in that order.

³⁴See Rudolf Allers, "Microcosmus," Traditio, II (1944), p. 391.

³⁵R.G. Collingwood, The Idea of Nature (New York, 1960), p. 3.

³⁶Marjorie H. Nicolson, The Breaking of the Circle (New York, 1962), p. 21.

³⁷Saint Augustine, The City of God, ed. Marcus Dods, Vol. I (New York, 1948), p. 462.

³⁸Nicolson, p. 21.

³⁹Robert Burton, The Anatomy of Melancholy, ed. Rev. A.R. Shilleto, Vol. I (London, 1896), I, i. Subsequent quotations from Burton's Anatomy are from this edition; member and page number will be cited after the abridged title Anatomy.

⁴⁰Bush, Paradise Lost in Our Time, p. 39.

⁴¹See also Richard Hooker, Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity, III, viii, ed. John Keble (London, 1836), 475, 513, 515.

⁴²Don M. Wolfe, Milton in the Puritan Revolution (New York, 1941), p. 330.

⁴³Bush, Paradise Lost in Our Time, p. 37.

⁴⁴See CPW, I, 236 and also "Arcades," Works, I, 72.

⁴⁵Quoted in Spitzer, 424.

⁴⁶Spitzer, 418.

⁴⁷Spitzer, 418.

⁴⁸Spitzer, 414.

⁴⁹Spitzer, 420-21.

⁵⁰Quoted in Nauert, p. 265.

⁵¹See A.H. Moncur-sime, Shakespeare: His Music and His Song (London, N.D.); E.W. Naylor, Shakespeare and Music (London, 1931); John Hollander, The Untuning of the Sky (Princeton, 1961).

⁵²Religio Medici, II, IX, 87-88.

⁵³Nauert, p. 234.

⁵⁴See Allers, 363; Nauert, pp. 223-24.

⁵⁵Allers, 357; Nauert, p. 223.

⁵⁶Nauert, p. 235.

⁵⁷Nauert, pp. 234-35.

⁵⁸Nauert, pp. 200, 246, 258-59, 271.

⁵⁹See, for example, Comus, ll. 63ff. and "Il Penseroso," ll. 89ff.

⁶⁰Ross Garner, Henry Vaughan: Experience and the Tradition (Chicago, 1959), pp. 63, 77.

⁶¹Anne D. Ferry, Milton's Epic Voice (Cambridge, Mass., 1963), p. 112.

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CHAPTER II

¹Moby-Dick or The White Whale, ed. Luther S. Mansfield and Howard P. Vincent (New York, 1952), p. 318.

²The Complete Novels and Selected Tales of Nathaniel Hawthorne, ed. N.H. Pearson (New York, 1937), p. 119⁴.

³Seventeenth Century Verse and Prose, eds. Helen C. White, Ruth Wallerstein, and Ricardo Quintano, 2 Vols. (New York, 1952), II, 59-60).

⁴White, II, 60.

⁵White, II, 59-60.

⁶The Complete Prose Works of John Milton, ed. Don Wolfe (New Haven, 1953-1966), IV, pt. I, 31. Hereafter cited as CPW with volume and page number listed parenthetically in text.

⁷Ronald S. Crane, "Suggestions Toward a Genealogy of the 'Man of Feeling,'" ELH, I (December, 1934), 205-211.

⁸The Complete Works of William Shakespeare, Shakespeare Head Edition (New York, 1938), I, iii, 88-109, 110-112, p. 720.

⁹Quoted in The Works of George Herbert, ed. F.L.

Hutchinson (Oxford, 1941), p. xliv. Subsequent quotations from Herbert's poetry will be taken from this edition; and page number will be listed parenthetically in the text, following the title Works.

¹⁰M.M. Mahood, Poetry and Humanism (New Haven, 1950), p. 96.

¹¹The Sermons of John Donne, eds. George R. Potter and Evelyn Simpson, 10 Vols. (Berkeley, 1953), I, 184-85. Subsequent quotations from Donne's sermons will be taken from this edition unless otherwise stated. Volume and page number will be listed parenthetically in the text. Cf. II Peter, 1: 2-8.

¹²Quoted in Victor Harris, All Coherence Gone (Chicago, 1949), p. 121. See II Peter 3: 11-13.

¹³Michael Macklem, The Anatomy of the World (Minneapolis, 1958), pp. 10-11, 12.

¹⁴"Anatomie of the World," The Poems of John Donne, ed. Sir Herbert Grierson (London, 1933), ll. 205-214. Subsequent references to Donne's poetry are to this edition; and page numbers will be listed parenthetically in the text.

¹⁵"Sermon XXXVI, Preached Upon Whitsunday," Sermons, LXXX (London, 1640), p. 357.

¹⁶Bush, John Milton, p. 82.

¹⁷John Donne, Letters to Severall Persons of Honour, ed. Charles E. Merrill (New York, 1910), pp. 25-26.

¹⁸Donne, p. 26.

¹⁹Ross Garner, Henry Vaughan: Experience and Tradition (Chicago, 1959), p. 116.

²⁰Mahood, p. 272. Miss Mahood does not seem to have noticed the preponderance of this idea of correspondence in Milton.

²¹The Works of Henry Vaughan, ed. L.C. Martin, 2 vols. (Oxford, 1914), I, 13. Subsequent references to Vaughan's poetry will be taken from this edition; volume and page number will be listed parenthetically in the text.

²²Cf. Mahood, p. 274.

²³Douglas Bush, John Milton (New York, 1964), p. 27.

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CHAPTER III

¹A.S.P. Woodhouse, The Poet and His Faith (Chicago, 1965), p. 31.

²The Complete Poetical Works of John Milton, ed. Douglas Bush (Boston, 1965), p. 9.

³The Works of John Milton, ed. Frank Allen Patterson, 18 vols. (New York, 1931-1938), I, 231. Hereafter cited as Works. Subsequent quotations from Milton's poetry are from this edition unless otherwise stated. Volume and line number will be cited parenthetically in the text.

⁴Rosemund Tuve, Images and Themes in Five Poems by Milton (Cambridge, Mass., 1957), p. 38.

⁵Euphues, Ed. Arber, p. 456. Quoted in Milton: Complete Poems and Major Prose, ed. M.Y. Hughes (New York, 1957), p. 44.

⁶Bush, Poetical Works, p. 66.

⁷B.A. Wright, Milton's Paradise Lost (London, 1962), p. 162.

⁸Leo Spitzer, "Classical and Christian Ideas of World Harmony," Traditio, III (1945), 312.

⁹Douglas Bush, John Milton (New York, 1964), p. 37.

¹⁰J.B. Broadbent, "The Nativity Ode," Frank Kermode, The Living Milton (London, 1960), p. 21. See "Upon a Circumcision," ll. 19-22.

¹¹Michael Fixler, Milton and the Kingdoms of God (Evanston, 1965), p. 58.

¹²Tuve, passim.

¹³Woodhouse, p. 97.

¹⁴Bush, John Milton, pp. 49-50.

¹⁵Don C. Allen, The Harmonious Vision (Baltimore, 1954), pp. 35, 36-37.

¹⁶Robert Martin Adams, Ikon: John Milton and the Modern Critics (Ithaca, 1955), pp. 4-5.

¹⁷Denis Saurat, Milton: Man and Thinker (New York, 1925), p. 16.

¹⁸Tuve, pp. 115, 137-38.

¹⁹Tuve, pp. 116, 120.

²⁰Woodhouse, p. 98.

²¹Woodhouse, p. 98.

²²See Charles Nauert, Agrippa and the Crisis in Renaissance Thought (Urbana, 1965), pp. 234-35; Rudolf Allers, "Microcosmus," Traditio, II (1944), 362-63.

²³W.G. Madsen, "The Idea of Nature in Milton's Poetry," Three Studies in the Renaissance (New Haven, 1958), p. 216.

²⁴See Adams, Ikon, p. 11.

²⁵Spitzer, 413. See 424-426. OED also gives the following as etymology for temperance: --Temperance; ad temperantia - moderation; temperament ad. L. temperamentum--moderation. Both temperance and harmony share a common etymology.

²⁶James Holly Hanford, A Milton Handbook (New York, 1961), p. 169.

²⁷Quoted in Hanford, p. 168.

²⁸Émile Legouis, Histoire de la Littéraire Anglaise (Paris, 1933), p. 567.

²⁹Allen, p. 61.

³⁰Allen, p. 61.

³¹John Donne, Devotions upon Emergent Occasions and Death's Duell, Abbey Classics Edition (London, N.D.), p. 109.

³²John Milton, p. 61.

³³Max Scheler, The Nature of Sympathy, tr. Peter Heath (New Haven, 1954), pp. 96-97.

³⁴Scheler, pp. 8ff., 71.

³⁵Scheler, pp. 68-69.

³⁶Hughes, Poetry and Major Prose, p. 134.

³⁷Summarized from Roy Raymond Male, "The Power of Sympathy: A Study of Shelley's Moral Ideas" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Dept. of English, University of Texas, 1950), pp. 32-33.

³⁸See Laurens J. Mills, One Soul in Bodies Twain (Bloomington, Ind., 1937), p. 4, and passim.

³⁹Mills, p. 4.

⁴⁰Mills, p. 11.

⁴¹Allen, p. 65.

⁴²Allen, p. 65.

⁴³Quoted in R.R. Male, "The Power of Sympathy,"
pp. 34-35.

⁴⁴"Approaches to Lycidas," Frank Kermode, The Living Milton (London, 1960), p. 50.

⁴⁵See Laura Bowman Zwicky, "Milton's Use of Time: Image and Principle" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Dept. of English, University of Oklahoma, 1959), pp. 105-107 and passim.

⁴⁶The phrase "bottom of the monstrous world" seems to underscore the brokenness in the universe by calling attention to the unnaturalness in the lower world actuated by instinct in juxtaposition with the unnaturalness in the human world caused by nullity of will. Both the monstrous animals and the "monstrous" humans act without a will dictated by reason.

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CHAPTER IV

¹Complete Prose Works of John Milton, ed. Don M. Wolfe (New Haven, 1953-), I, 292. Subsequent quotations from Milton's prose are from this volume unless otherwise indicated. Other citations will be listed parenthetically in the text as CPW, with volume and page number.

²The Works of John Milton, 18 vols. ed. Frank Allen Patterson (New York, 1931-1938), XVI, pt. I, 21. Hereafter this edition will be cited as Works with volume and page number listed in text. For poetry, the last number indicates line.

³The antiprelatical tracts appeared during the years 1641-1642. There are five in all: Of Prelatical Episcopacy (1641); Of Reformation (1641); The Reason of Church Government (1642); An Apology for Smectymnuus (1642); Animadversions (1642).

⁴Arthur Barker, Milton and the Puritan Dilemma (Toronto, 1942), p. 65. Having married Mary Powell in May or June, 1642, Milton found himself deserted when his bride returned to Forest Hill after a month of married life and

refused to come again to her husband in London at the appointed time.

⁵For example, Paul Elmer More and Samuel Johnson. See note 25 infra.

⁶Cf. E.M.W. Tillyard, Milton (London, 1946), 218-219.

⁷John S. Diekhoff, Milton's Paradise Lost: A Commentary on the Argument (New York, 1946), p. 142.

⁸Henry Ainsworth, The Communion of Saints (Amsterdam, 1640), p. 161. Quoted in Merritt Y. Hughes, Ten Perspectives on Milton (New Haven, 1965), pp. 33-34.

⁹Hughes, p. 33.

¹⁰Hughes, p. 33.

¹¹Quoted in Hughes, pp. 33-34.

¹²The Ethics of Aristotle, ed. Earnest Rhys (New York, 1942), pp. 26-27.

¹³A.E. Taylor, Platonism and Its Influence (Boston, 1924), p. 44.

¹⁴Taylor, p. 47.

¹⁵Taylor, pp. 57-58.

¹⁶As he says in Christian Doctrine: "Man was made in the image of God and had the law of nature implanted in him." Works, XV, 114-115.

¹⁷See Douglas Bush, John Milton (New York, 1964), pp. 83-85.

¹⁸See J. Milton French, The Life Records of John

Milton (New Brunswick, 1950), II, 87-91, 96, 105, 123-124.

¹⁹See CPW, II, 137-138.

²⁰Michael Fixler, Milton and the Kingdoms of God (Evanston, 1964), p. 111.

²¹Fixler, p. 111.

²²Barker, p. 66.

²³Barker, p. 66.

²⁴Barker, p. 67.

²⁵Barker, p. 67.

²⁶Paul Elmer More, "How to Read Lycidas," Milton's Lycidas, ed. C.A. Patrides (New York, 1961), pp. 85, 86.

²⁷Marjorie H. Nicolson, "Milton and Hobbes," SP, XXII (1926), 407.

²⁸French, II, 236.

²⁹French, II, 339.

³⁰Rudolf Allers, "Microcosmus," Traditio, III (1944), 368. The chain idea in its refinements was often static, but its mere lineaments admit dynamism.

³¹Allers, p. 368.

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CHAPTER V

¹Lascelles Abercrombie, The Epic, 2 vols. (London, 1920), II, 69.

²Abercrombie, II, 69.

³Milton's Epic Voice (Cambridge, Mass., 1963), p. 148.

⁴W.G. Madsen, "The Idea of Nature in Milton's Poetry," Three Studies in the Renaissance (New Haven, 1958), p. 234.

⁵John Milton's Samson Agonistes, ed. Ralph E. Hone (San Francisco, 1966), p. 172.

⁶George Nitchie, Human Values in Robert Frost (Durham, N.C., 1960), p. 69.

⁷Nitchie, p. 69.

⁸See John MacMurray, Persons in Relation (London, 1961), p. 134.

⁹Complete Prose Works of John Milton, ed. Don M. Wolfe (New Haven, 1953-), IV, pt. I, 467. Hereafter cited as CPW with volume and page number listed parenthetically in the text.

¹⁰The Works of John Milton, 18 vols., ed. Frank Allen Patterson (New York, 1931-1938), II, pt. I, V, 469-479.

Subsequent quotations from Milton's poetry are from this edition. Book and/or line number will be listed parenthetically in the text.

¹¹There are arguments for and against the ex Deo theory and so for the ex nihilo (creation out of nothing) theory. I feel that the weight of the argument rests on the side of the ex Deo as far as Milton is concerned. Woodhouse and Adamson influenced me most. Woodhouse in The Poet and His Faith (Chicago, 1965), p. 105, says that Milton holds that "God is the source of every substance, and includes in himself the one primal substance." Adamson, in "Milton and the Creation," JEGP, LXI (1962), 756ff., shows that the ex Deo theory has a reputable Christian tradition, p. 759 and passim.

¹²The most famous critic of this school is William Empson. See his Milton's God (Norfolk, Conn., 1961), passim.

¹³Don Wolfe, Milton and the Puritan Revolution (New York, 1941), p. 344.

¹⁴See Robert West, Milton and the Angels (Athens, Ga., 1955), pp. 150-151, and passim.

¹⁵West, p. 168.

¹⁶R.M. Frye, God, Man, and Satan (Princeton, 1960), pp. 29-30.

¹⁷Wolfe, Puritan Revolution, p. 265.

- ¹⁸Madsen, p. 236.
- ¹⁹Edward Reynolds, A Treatise of Passions (London, 1640), p. 75.
- ²⁰Quoted in B. Rajan, Paradise Lost and the Seventeenth Century Reader (London, 1962), p. 55.
- ²¹Quoted in Madsen, p. 243.
- ²²Woodhouse, p. 113.
- ²³Douglas Bush, Paradise Lost in Our Time (Gloucester, 1957), p. 37.
- ²⁴Bush, Paradise, p. 37.
- ²⁵"Areopagitica," CPW, II, 516.
- ²⁶The Complete Poetical Works of Edmund Spenser, eds. J.C. Smith and Ernest De Selincourt (London, 1946), p. 592.
- ²⁷E.M.W. Tillyard, Milton (London, 1946), p. 263.
- ²⁸A.J.A. Waldock, Paradise Lost and Its Critics (Cambridge, England, 1947), pp. 48-49.
- ²⁹B.A. Wright, Milton's Paradise Lost (London, 1962), p. 162.
- ³⁰Quoted in James H. Sims, The Bible in Milton's Epics (Gainesville, 1962), p. 94.
- ³¹Sims, p. 94.
- ³²Etienne Gilson, Moral Values and the Moral Life: The Ethical Theory of St. Thomas Aquinas (Shoe String, 1961), pp. 79-90.
- ³³Richard Hooker, Of the Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity, ed., John Keble (London, 1836), I, ix, 296-297; x,

302-303.

³⁴Quoted in R.M. Frye, p. 35.

³⁵Samuel Purchas, Microcosmus (London, 1619), p. 21.

³⁶Helen C. White, et al., Seventeenth Century Verse and Prose, 2 vols. (New York, 1952), II, 78.

³⁷Waldock, p. 47; Merritt Y. Hughes, John Milton: Paradise Lost (New York, 1962), p. xx.

³⁸Tillyard, pp. 262-263.

³⁹Rajan, p. 72.

⁴⁰Joseph Summers, "The Voice of the Redeemer in 'Paradise Lost,'" PMLA (December, 1955), 1086. Summers feels that Adam's words in IX, 900ff. are prompted more by self-love than by love for Eve.

The moment when he denies his freedom . . . he loses it Adam loses himself in a nightmarish realm of casuistry and "perhaps" where neither resolutions nor motivations have clarity (ll. 921-159). . . . He is eccentric and illogical. . . . The passage is moving, not because of its nobility, but it recreates the easy and "sincere" manner in which man falls victim to his ignorance and rhetoric. . . . The statement of identity is false. And the final phrase "to loose thee were to loose myself," states exactly Adam's paradoxical refusal: he resolves on a half believed self-destruction because he fears loss of self.

Summers's remarks completely ignore the doctrine of sympathy as it functions in the ways of man with man. Consequently his position is not, as I see it, tenable.

⁴¹Wright, p. 176.

⁴²James H. Hanford, The Poems of John Milton (New York, 1953), p. 198.

⁴³Wolfe, Puritan Revolution, p. 349.

⁴⁴Purchas, Microcosmus, p. 226.

⁴⁵Marjorie Nicolson, "Milton and Hobbes," SP, XXIII (1926), 419.

⁴⁶Barbara Lewalski, Milton's Brief Epic (Providence, 1966), pp. 157, and 133ff.

⁴⁷Lewalski, pp. 156-158.

⁴⁸Lewalski, pp. 168-169.

⁴⁹Lewalski, pp. 166-167.

⁵⁰Lewalski, p. 133.

⁵¹Lewalski, pp. 158-159.

⁵²Lewalski, p. 156.

⁵³Erich Auerbach, Mimesis, tr. Willard Trask (Garden City, 1957), p. 171.

⁵⁴Auerbach, p. 171.

⁵⁵Lewalski, p. 207.

⁵⁶Lewalski, p. 207.

⁵⁷See William Riley Parker, "The Date of Samson Agonistes," ed. Ralph E. Hone, John Milton's Samson Agonistes (San Francisco, 1966), pp. 218ff. There is some disagreement as to the date of the beginning of the poem and of its stages of development. Although I accept the traditional chronology, the question of dating does not seriously affect my reading in any way.

⁵⁸"Samson Agonistes and Milton in Old Age," Hone, p. 181.

⁵⁹Hanford, in Hone, p. 181.

⁶⁰Hanford, in Hone, p. 181.

⁶¹J.B. Broadbent, "Milton's Rhetoric," MP, LVI
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