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The University of Oklahoma, Ph.D., 1967 Psychology, general

University Microfilms, Inc., Ann Arbor, Michigan

THE UNIVERSITY OF OKLAHOMA GRADUATE COLLEGE

THE EFFECTS OF STRESS AND ANXIETY ON CATEGORIZING BEHAVIOR

A DISSERTATION

SUBMITTED TO THE GRADUATE FACULTY

in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the

degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

BY

JOHN CHARLES WOLFE

Norman, Oklahoma

1967

THE EFFECTS OF STRESS AND ANXIETY ON CATEGORIZING BEHAVIOR

APPROVED BY

DISSERTATION COMMITTEE

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The writer wishes to express his appreciation to Dr. Alfred Glixman who directed the dissertation. His concern and encouragement have been of immeasurable value, and working with him has been a privilege. Appreciation is also expressed to the members of the dissertation committee, to those faculty members who allowed their students to participate as subjects, to Mr. Larry Hjelle who assisted in collecting data, to Mrs. Jean Hjelle who served as a reader, and to the Graduate College at the University of Oklahoma for purchase of the film used in this dissertation. To Bernice Glixman goes a special word of thanks for her confidence and encouragement. To my wife, Carol, for the help and encouragement in times of stress, and to my children, Faith, Hope, and Mary, my deepest gratitude.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

																							Page
LIST (OF I	ABI	ES	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	v
Chapte	\mathbf{r}																						
]	[.	INI	RO	DUC	TI	01	٧.	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	1
IJ		PRO	BL	EM	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	• ·	• •	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	14
III	[.	MEI	HO	D.	•	•		•	•	•	•		•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	16
IV	7.	RES	UL	TS	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	24
V	7.	DIS	CU	SSI	ON	1.	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•		•	•	•	34
V	Ι.	SUN	IMA:	RY	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•		•	40
REFERI	enci	es .	•	•	•	•	•	•		•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•		•	<u>ነ</u> ተነተ
APPENI	XIC	Α.		end ayl																•	•	•	49
APP E NI	XIC	В.	0	bj∈	ect	; 8	Sta	ŧtε	eme	ent	s	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	51
APPENI	XIC	C.	S	elf	. 8	Sta	ate	eme	en†	ts	•		•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	54
APPENI	XIC	D.	I	ndi	.vi	.dı	ıa]	LS	3e d	ore	s	(F	≀aw		a t	;a)		•			•		57

LIST OF TABLES

Ta ble		Page
1.	Non-relevant Stress x Relevant Stress conditions.	20
2.	H: Summary of Analysis of Variance	25
3.	Non-relevant Stress condition: Difference of Relevant Stress Condition; Differences Distributed over Anxiety Quartile	26
4.	Distribution of Means for \underline{H} over Quartile, Relevant Stress, and Non-relevant Stress	26
5.	Distribution of Means for \underline{H} , Number of Categories, and $\underline{H}/\underline{H}_{\text{max}}$ over Non-relevant Stress	27
6.	Distribution of Means for \underline{H} over Relevant Stress and Non-relevant Stress	27
7•	Distribution of Means for \underline{H} over Domain and Non-relevant Stress	28
8.	Number of Categories: Summary of Analysis of Variance	29
9•	Distribution of Means for Number of Categories over Relevant Stress and Non-relevant Stress	30
10.	Distribution of Means for Number of Categories over Domain and Non-relevant Stress	30
11.	$\underline{H}/\underline{H}_{max}$: Summary of Analysis of Variance	32
12.	Distribution of Means for $\underline{H}/\underline{H_{\text{max}}}$ over Relevant Stress and Non-relevant Stress	32
13.	Distribution of Means for <u>H/Hmax</u> over Domain and Non-relevant Stress	33

THE EFFECTS OF STRESS AND ANXIETY ON CATEGORIZING BEHAVIOR

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

This experiment is designed to study the effects of stress manipulations, as they interact with possible susceptibilities to stress, upon certain aspects of cognitive organization.

Although a number of studies have been conducted which deal with stress and such cognitive functions as memory (Chansky, 1960; D'Zurilla, 1965; Merrill, 1954), learning (Sarason, 1961), and rigidity (Pally, 1955), no studies have been found which have dealt directly with the effect of stress on the ways in which stimuli are organized. In his paper, "Cognitive maps in rats and men," Tolman (1948) has implied that such an effect exists. He posits two kinds of cognitive maps, strip and comprehensive. Strip maps, according to Tolman, are intervening brain processes which respond to only selected, limited aspects of the environment. Comprehensive maps, on the other hand, are intervening brain processes which serve more adequately in

new situations due to their greater responsiveness to stimuli within the environment.

Although several techniques for measuring aspects of cognitive organization are available, e.g., those measuring cognitive complexity (Bieri, 1955; Bieri & Blacker, 1956; Kelly, 1955), categorizing (sorting) is one technique which deals with the basic function of grouping stimulus events. This technique has come into recent prominence with the work of Gardner (Gardner, 1953; Gardner, Holzman, Klein, Linton, & Spence, 1959; Gardner, Jackson, & Messick, 1960), Sherif (Sherif, Sherif, & Nebergall, 1965), Glixman (1965), and Glixman and Wolfe (in press).

et al., 1959; Gardner et al., 1960) have examined categorizing behavior as a cognitive control. In general, "cognitive controls refers to the organizing principles that guide this interplay of action and transaction and determine what will be an adequate perceived result" (Klein, 1958, p. 99). The major emphasis in the work of Gardner and his associates was on "equivalence range," which refers to the range of stimuli in a category; i.e., for a given number of stimuli the equivalence range is inversely proportional to the number of categories used. Equivalence range has been shown to be related to a variety of functions such as object-sorting tasks, size and shape constancy judgments, and brightness judgments (Gardner, 1953; Gardner et al.,

1960).

In a study concerning attitude measurement (Sherif et al., 1965), the authors suggested the following rationale for using the categorizing technique: If a person makes a judgment pertaining to the favorableness or unfavorableness of an issue, the number of categories and the width of the categories (the distribution of items within a category) would be one way to assess an individual's attitudes without the person being aware his attitudes were being investigated. It was found that those individuals who are strongly committed (ego-involved) to an issue tend to use fewer categories and to distribute the items within the category differently than those individuals who are less committed to the issue.

Glixman (1965) dealt with the general problem of cognitive organization and with Self as substructure. He found that the number of categories into which an individual divides a meaning domain is a function of the personal relevance (self-relevance) of the domain to the person. His study demonstrated that the more relevant a domain to an individual, the fewer categories the individual uses.

The present study is concerned with the effect of stress on categorizing behavior. There are two aspects of such behavior: The number of categories an individual uses and the distribution of items over categories. Glixman (1965) has used three measures of categorizing behavior: H

(the measure of uncertainty in bits), which reflects both tendencies; the Number of Categories; and $\underline{H}/\underline{H}_{max}$ (a measure of the amount of uncertainty in the subject's response repertoire relative to the amount of uncertainty which would exist if he used all of his categories with equal frequency), which reflects the distribution of items. These measures will be used in this dissertation to describe cognitive organization.

In the literature dealing with stress, two different ways of conceptualizing "stress" have been used: Stress has been considered as a set of physiological reactions (Bovard, 1959; Selye, 1956) and stress has been considered as a class of stimuli (Basowitz, Persky, Korchin, & Grinker, 1955; Haward, 1960). In spite of these differences there remains a somewhat basic definition of stress; namely, that stress is a condition that is disturbing to the individual. In this dissertation, stress refers to those physiological reactions which are produced by threatening external events, hereafter called stressors.

The most recent and pertinent research dealing with the effects of stress on cognitive processes has been conducted by Lazarus and his colleagues (Lazarus, 1964; Lazarus & Baker, 1956; Lazarus & Baker, 1957; Lazarus, Baker, Broverman, & Mayer, 1957; Lazarus, Deese, & Osler, 1952; Lazarus & Longo, 1953; Lazarus, Opton, Nomikos, & Rankin, 1965; Lazarus, Speisman, Mordkoff, & Davison, 1962;

Vogel, Baker, & Lazarus, 1958; Vogel, Raymond, & Lazarus, 1959) who have been concerned with defensive reactions to stress. For Lazarus, stress can be understood meaningfully only in terms of the personal threat that the stressor produces for the individual. For example, although both physical assault (e.g., electric shock) and psychological assault (e.g., telling a subject he has performed miserably on an intelligence test) in a laboratory experiment may produce both physiological and psychological reactions, the reactions are neither identical nor are they produced by the same intervening processes (Lazarus et al., 1962). Lazarus also emphasizes that reactions to experimental stressors are also influenced by cognitive controls, as well as by the limitations of the experimental setting itself. Rather than review all of Lazarus' work, selected studies that demonstrate his technique for inducing stress will be reviewed.

Lazarus et al., (1962) used a motion picture film as a stressor. It was believed that a properly selected film would have a great emotional impact upon subjects and consequently would serve as a stressor. The advantages of using the film were:

First, deception is unnecessary since the impact of the film is natural and appears to take advantage of the human tendency to identify with the characters and their experiences in a dramatic portrayal. . . . Films are also extremely versatile in that all manner of interpersonal situations can be portrayed, and thus the range of such situations which might serve as stressors is enlarged to include any that are conceptualized as potential stressors. Furthermore, since the

experimentally constricting and irritating deception is no longer needed, the subject can be exposed time and time again in repeated measurements designs to a variety of different types of film stressors and nonstressors.
... Finally, since the subject merely views the film seated comfortably in an easy chair, no physical assault is involved, and no confounding exists between the physical impact of a noxious stimulus and its psychologically mediated properties (Lazarus et al., 1962, p. 3).

The stressor film depicts a series of crude operations performed with a piece of flint on the penis and scrotum of several adolescent boys of an aboriginal Australian tribe, while a nonstressor (or control) film shows a day in the life of a corn farmer and his family. The study sought:

(a) to determine and document the value of the motion picture film technique as a laboratory technique of inducing psychological stress; (b) to identify appropriate response dimensions for evaluating film induced stress; (c) to examine the interrelationships among these response dimensions, and to determine their degree of agreement in pinpointing psychological stress; and (d) to do a limited survey of some of the personality sources of individual difference in reaction (Lazarus et al., 1962, p. 3).

In order to study personality variables the California Psychological Inventory (CPI), the Hysteria (Hy) and Psychasthenic (Pt) scales of the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory, a group version of the Schlesinger Picture-Sorting Test, and the Stroop Color-Word Test were employed. The above tests were administered during Session I to subjects, at which time they were informed that they would receive \$3.00 for finishing the experiment. In Session 2 (control film) and Session 3 (stressor film) the

following dependent measures were made: Two measures of autonomic nervous system activity (skin resistance and heart rate), two measures of affective response (the Nowlis Adjective Check List of Mood and a questionnaire designed explicitly for this study), and a urinalysis. A continuous recording was made of autonomic nervous activity during each film. After the movie was over the subject was taken to another room where he filled out the Adjective Check List of Mood and the standard interview questionnaire.

Results of this study indicated that the Nowlis Adjective Check List of Mood, the interview questionnaire, and both the autonomic measures demonstrated very significant increases in response to the stressor condition (subincision film) as compared to the control condition (corn farming film). The control film seems to have caused the subjects to relax below their usual tension levels, while viewing the stressor film resulted in a significant increase of selfevaluated feelings of tension in the subjects. words, the results show that the subincision film is a stressor under these conditions, and that under these conditions experienced stress accompanies physiological measures of stress. Since skin conductance and heart rate measurements showed sensitive differences between the stressor and control film, the authors felt these measures were good indicators of various types of stress. The tests used to study personality variables and their relation to a stressor

condition revealed some interactions which make common sense. For example, "subjects characterized as ambitious, shrewd, confident, impulsive, forceful, and self-centered appear to be less reactive autonomically under the stressor conditions than those identified as moderate, mature, self-controlled and responsive to the plight of others" (Lazarus et al., 1962, p. 28). Although the interview, the Adjective Check List, and autonomic reactivity across subjects correlations were very low, all the indicators revealed significant reactions to the stressor film in the direction that was expected.

In a study that demonstrated the "short-circuiting of threat" (Lazarus et al., 1965), a different stressor film was utilized. The film, which depicts three serious woodshop accidents, one of them ending in fatality, was called "It Didn't Have to Happen." The purposes of the study were to determine if the results of previous experiments (Lazarus & Alfert, 1964; Speisman, Lazarus, Mordkoff, & Davison, 1964) could be replicated and extended to other stressor films and to ascertain whether a denial orientation or an intellectualization orientation would be more effective in reducing the physiological aspects of stress reactions.

Sixty-six subjects, half of them male and half of them female, were distributed randomly over three experimental conditions. In each condition the subject heard a tape-recorded orientation passage before viewing the stressor film. The first condition contained a denial passage; the second, an intellectualization passage; and the third (a control condition) consisted of a brief descriptive summary of the film. As in the previous studies, heart rate and skin conductance were continually recorded throughout the presentation of the film.

Results indicated a marked reduction of heart rate and skin conductance after the denial and intellectualization orientations. The control group consistently had the highest values for both measures; the denial orientation was in an intermediate position; and the intellectualization orientation group had the least heart rate and skin conductance reaction. The results of this experiment, as well as others (Lazarus & Alfert, 1964; Spiesman et al., 1964) suggest that the introduction of a verbal passage to reduce the stressfulness of a film designed to promote threat is not limited to only one condition of stress or one type of defense-orientating measure. The authors conclude that the subincision film is most advantageous if one wants "the interaction between personality or social variables and a rich complex source of stress. . . . But if one plans normative research . . . then a film such as the shop safety film employed here is desirable, for it produces stable group results with a much smaller number of subjects" (Lazarus et al., 1965, p. 633).

Lazarus has recently completed a cross-cultural study of the reaction patterns to stress in Japan (Lazarus, Tomka, Opton, & Kodama, in press) as well as relating some principles of psychological stress to dentistry (Lazarus, in press). In all of Lazarus' work using stressor films, no sex differences were reported for the physiological and psychological measurements. In summary, Lazarus and his associates' work on the appraisal of threat has pointed toward the fruitfulness of a cognitive concept of psychological stress. They admit that several problems have not yet been dealt with; for example, the problem of individual differences, and the fact that inferences that are derived from either or both self-report and motor measures are often different from those inferences derived from physiological measures.

As stated before, the purpose of this dissertation is to investigate the effect of stress on categorizing behavior. In light of the distinction between "stress" and "stressor," the purpose now is seen as that of investigating reactions to stressors. No strong predictions may be made about the effects of stress upon cognitive organization, but two expectations may be voiced. If stress increases the personal relevance of items to be categorized or if it produces a restriction of cognitive maps, then one expects that there will be a decrease in the amount of uncertainty in the categorial system, i.e., there will be fewer categories used

or a greater departure from rectangularity of distribution of items over categories or both. To the degree that stressor conditions and general level of anxiety contribute to stress, one would expect that both of these factors would produce both reactions.

For those who deal with stress there is always the question of the subject's susceptibility to the stress stimuli. Generalized anxiety may be a possible determinant of stress. One way of measuring an individual's susceptibility to stressor stimuli may then be by means of a generalized anxiety indicator, such as the Taylor Manifest Anxiety Scale (Taylor, 1953).

The following review of the literature concerning anxiety points toward the construct and criterion validity of the Taylor Manifest Anxiety Scale (TMAS). In most of the following experiments subjects were selected on the basis of their scores on the TMAS. High anxious scorers and low anxious scorers were then compared with respect to performance on some task. If differences in performance were found, they were presumed to be due to relative differences in degree of manifest anxiety. In several of these studies (Spence & Beecroft, 1954; Spence & Farber, 1953; Taylor & Chapman, 1955) the TMAS has been used to test the Hull-Spence drive theory; the scale has also been used to study the relationship between anxiety and performance (Davidson, Andrews, & Ross, 1956), anxiety and academic achievement

(Spielberger, 1962), anxiety and intelligence (Calvin, Koons, Bingham, & Fink, 1955; Dana, 1957; Matarazzo, Ulett, Guze, & Saslow, 1954), and anxiety and achievement motivation (Wrightsman, 1962). Other studies have used the TMAS in investigating the effects of stress and its relationship to anxiety (Kalish, Garmezy, Rodnick, & Bleke, 1958; Ogawa & Oakes, 1965; Sarason, 1961; Spence, Farber, & Taylor, 1954; Taylor, 1958). As stated before, these studies point toward the construct validity and criterion validity of the TMAS.

In a study designed to investigate the function of rigidity and anxiety in motor responses, Cohen (1961) selected high anxious (HA) and low anxious (LA) subjects on the basis of their TMAS scores. Each anxiety group was then further subdivided into an "Experimental Setting" or a "Clinical Setting" group. For those subjects in the "experimental" condition a key-press task was presented neutrally as a part of a laboratory experiment. For the "clinical" subjects the key-press task was presented as part of a personality investigation and followed the administration of four Similarities items, Digit Span Forward, and one Rorschach card. Results showed HA subjects had a mean rigidity score that was significantly higher than that of the LA subjects. The mean number of trials to first reinforcement was also significantly higher for HA subjects than for LA subjects. And finally, the HA subjects obtained higher acquisition scores than did LA subjects; in other words,

there was significantly less variability of response pattern for HA subjects than did LA subjects.

As stated at the beginning of this chapter, the present study is concerned with the effects of stress upon cognitive organization. In considering this relationship, it seemed advisable to consider the distinction between a stressor and stress as an internal state and to consider the role of general anxiety in producing reactions to stressors. Therefore, the present study is designed to investigate the effects of stress manipulations (stressors), as they interact with possible susceptibilities to stress (Manifest Anxiety Scale), upon the formal properties of cognitive organization (categorizing technique). The results of this study should provide greater understanding of the problems of stress and anxiety and their effect on organizing behavior.

CHAPTER II

PROBLEM

The purpose of this study is to investigate some of the ways in which stress affects cognitive organization.

Throughout this study, "stress" refers to the attempts to manipulate meanings of the experimental situation to the subjects, i.e., to the use of an intended stressor. Instructions in the experimental situation and the introduction of a presumably stressful film are used to manipulate these meanings. "Anxiety" refers to a generalized anxiety score as provided by Bendig's (1956) modified version of the Taylor Manifest Anxiety Scale. "Cognitive organization" refers to one or more measures of degree of organization provided by subjects categorizing a set of statements. it has been found (Glixman, 1965) that the meaning domain of the card-sort affects the categorization process, meaning domain is retained as a classification variable. Because the role of sex in studies of categorizing behavior is not clear (Glixman, 1965), because MAS scores are not related to sex differences (Bendig, 1954; Taylor, 1953), because no sex x stress differences have been found (Lazarus et al., 1962;

Lazarus et al., 1965), and because the use of the stress
-i - film may produce ethical problems if women are used as subjects, all subjects in this study are men.

Consequently, the specific problem under investigation is that of determining the effects of stress manipulations, anxiety level (MAS), meaning domain, and their interactions upon three measures of categorizing behavior.

CHAPTER III

METHOD

The design of this research is a 4 (anxiety) x 2 (Relevant Stress--present or absent) x 2 (Non-relevant Stress--present or absent) x 2 (meaning domain--Object or Self) factorial. In essence, each subject was first given Bendig's (1956) modified version of the Taylor Manifest Anxiety Scale (hereafter referred to as the MAS). Each subject then appeared in the experimental situation during which he categorized a set of cards, representing one of two meaning domains. The experimental conditions were structured by a set of instructions and the administration (or non-administration) of a stressor film.

<u>Subjects</u>

All students enrolled in two second level psychology courses at The University of Oklahoma took the MAS during their regular class period at the beginning of the 1966 fall semester. The scores of all the men were put into a single distribution and divided into quartiles. From each quartile 24 men were selected randomly; these 96 individuals were the

subjects for the study. The 24 subjects in each anxiety quartile were assigned randomly to a stress x meaning domain condition, with the restriction that there be three subjects in each cell (stress condition x anxiety quartile x meaning domain) and these three subjects in a cell be run as a group, with the running order of the groups randomized. Five subjects did not come to the experiment at their appointed times. Since the subject pool was exhausted, these five subjects were replaced randomly by five subjects from a pilot study run during the 1966 summer school session at The University of Oklahoma. The five replacements had been in conditions identical to those of the five missing subjects.

Anxiety

The MAS was utilized in order to obtain a measure of anxiety that was independent of the stressor conditions. This measure of anxiety was considered to be independent of the experimental manipulations since presumably it measures a general level of anxiety and since each subject took the MAS before being exposed to the specified experimental conditions. For the sake of convenience, Bendig's (1956) modified version (20 items as compared to Taylor's 50 items) of the Taylor Manifest Anxiety Scale was used. The median internal consistency reliability of the 20-item scale is .76 as compared to .82 for the 50-item scale.

The MAS was administered during the regular psychology class session by a confederate examiner (a

graduate student in psychology), who introduced himself and his purpose in the following way:

I am a graduate student in psychology. We are in the process of collecting data for a general subject pool and would like to ask you to volunteer for the subject pool. I am sure you will find this an interesting task and I encourage you to take part. Those of you who wish to participate are asked to stay for 10 or 15 minutes; the rest may be excused. Please fill in the necessary information at the top of your sheets, and then answer the questions either "True" or "False" depending on how you feel about the questions.

All men and women were given the MAS, but only the protocols of the men were used. Protocols were scored by counting the total number of anxious responses (Taylor, 1953) of each subject. All men then were grouped into quartiles based on their anxiety scores.

Stress Conditions

Subjects were contacted in their regular classes approximately two weeks after having taken the MAS. The instructor introduced the examiner as "Mr. Wolfe, who wishes to say some things to you about participation in a research project." After some introductory remarks, the examiner asked the males of the class to fill out a schedule sheet indicating their preferred days and times for participation in the research study. All subjects were scheduled and each was contacted prior to his participation in the research project (except for the five subjects drawn randomly from the pilot study). The schedule was arranged so that three subjects appeared for the experimental session at the

same time. After the three subjects, who were to be run as a group, entered the room and sat down, they were asked to supply their names and ID numbers. Then the appropriate stress (or no-stress) condition for their particular group was administered.

There were two types of stress manipulations, task relevant and task non-relevant. Task relevant stress involved telling subjects that the categorizing task was a personality test, in this way making the stress relevant to the task. Task non-relevant stress involved showing subjects a stressful film, which, in itself, had no direct relevance to or connection with the categorizing task. A stressor film dealing with three serious woodshop accidents, titled "It Didn't Have to Happen" (Lazarus et al., 1965), was used as a source of task non-relevant stress.

Each stress dimension (kind of stress) had two values, Stress Absent and Stress Present. The interaction of the two stress dimensions resulted in four conditions: Relevant Stress Absent, Non-relevant Stress Absent (00); Relevant Stress Absent, Non-relevant Stress Present (0N); Relevant Stress Present, Non-relevant Stress Present (RN); and Relevant Stress Present, Non-relevant Stress Absent (RO). These conditions are presented in Table 1.

In the 00 condition, after the examiner attempted to establish a warm and friendly atmosphere and to reduce any fear of time pressure, subjects were given the categorizing

task with the instructions as they appear on p. 22. In this condition neither the film nor the personality interpretation of the sorting task was introduced.

Table 1

Non-relevant Stress x Relevant Stress Conditions

Non-relevant Stressor		Relevant Stressor (Personality test)				
(Film)	Absent	Present				
Present	ON	RN				
Absent	00	RO				

The ON condition included the same introductory remarks as the OO condition, after which the film was introduced by the following statement:

The film you are about to see is an industrial film on safety. Please observe the film carefully. I will ask for any questions after we are finished.

Then the categorizing instructions were given as in the 00 condition. In the ON condition only the non-relevant stressor was present.

The RO condition did not entail presenting the stressful film but did include telling the subjects the task was a "personality test." In this condition only the relevant stressor appeared. Introductory remarks were the same as in the previous two conditions, but the categorizing instructions were preceded by the following instructions:

The task you are about to perform is a personality test designed to measure different aspects of

personality. You may be called back for further testing later. Please listen carefully.

Then the categorizing instructions were given (see p. 22). In this condition, only the stressor relevant to the task was present.

The RN condition consisted of the same introductory remarks as the other three conditions, followed by the introduction of the stressful film as in the ON condition. Following the film subjects were given the same instructions as in the RO condition, as well as the categorizing instructions as given in the previous three conditions. In this condition (RN) both the relevant stressor and non-relevant stressor were present.

Categorizing

The task-for each subject was to categorize a set of 50 statements, each typed on a 4" x 6" card. For each subject the set of statements represented one of two meaning domains, referred to as "Object" or "Self."

Object statements consisted of a set of 50 descriptions of dime store objects drawn randomly from Gardner's (1953) original set of 73 items. Self statements consisted of a set of 50 self-referring statements drawn randomly from Butler and Haigh's (Roger & Dymond, 1954, pp. 79, 275-277, 388, 389) original set of 92 items.

The task for each subject was to take his set of 50 cards (Object or Self) and place the cards into piles. The

subject was to place cards into piles which he felt belonged There were no restrictions on the number of piles together. he could use nor on the number of cards in a pile. For each subject, three scores were determined from the categorization procedure: \underline{H} (the measure of uncertainty in bits; $\underline{H} = -\sum P_i \log_2 P_i$ where P_i is the probability of being in the i category), the Number of Categories, and H/H_{max} (a measure of the amount of uncertainty in the subject's response repertoire relative to the amount of uncertainty which would exist if he used all of his categories with equal frequency; $H_{\text{max}} = \log_2$ for the number of categories). These measures indicate the degree of organization in the categorization response. Where the values are low, the degree of organization is high; where the scores are high the degree of organization is low.

A modified version of Gardner's (1953) instructions was given orally to all subjects for the categorization task. These instructions were as follows:

First of all, I want you to know that there is no answer to this task. Everyone does it in his own way. I want you to do it in the way that seems most natural, most logical, and most comfortable to you. The instructions are simply to put together into groups the statements which seem to you to belong together. You may have as many or as few statements in a group as you like, so long as the statements in each group belong together for one particular reason. If after you have thought about all the statements, a few do not seem to belong with any of the others, you may put these statements into groups by themselves. Please sort all the statements.

All subjects were told they had participated in a study of reactions to stress. Subjects in the ON, the RN, and the RO conditions had the nature of the manipulations explained to them. Subjects in the OO condition were told they had served in a control condition. All subjects were asked not to discuss the study with anyone until the study was completed. The examiner promised to reserve a time, after the completion of the experiment, to explain the dissertation to all who had taken part.

CHAPTER IV

RESULTS

In order to evaluate the effects of Relevant Stress and Non-relevant Stress on categorizing behavior, three measures of the categorizing procedure were analyzed (\underline{H} , Number of Categories, and $\underline{H}/\underline{H}_{max}$). For each measure the statistical design was a + x 2 x 2 x 2 factorial: Anxiety (Quartile 1 indicating Low Anxiety; Quartile + indicating High Anxiety), Domain (Object or Self), Relevant Stress (personality test, absent or present), and Non-relevant Stress (film, absent or present). An analysis of variance was conducted for each of the scores.

Where significant interactions were found, individual \underline{t} -tests were performed between the means of the appropriate cells. For all \underline{t} -tests the error terms are based on the appropriate error term taken from the overall analysis of variance; hence, for all such tests, $\underline{df} = 64$. A significance level of .05 is used to evaluate all statistical tests.

The data relevant to \underline{H} may be found in Table 2. The following effects were significant: Domain, Non-relevant Stress, Domain x Non-relevant Stress, Relevant Stress x

Non-relevant Stress, and Anxiety Quartiles x Relevant Stress x Non-relevant Stress. In order to evaluate the second-order interaction, a separate analysis of variance was conducted for each Anxiety Quartile. Only for Q2 was there a significant R x N interaction.

Table 2

H: Summary of Analysis of Variance

Sour	ce of Variance	<u>df</u>		
T	ot a l	95	Mean Squares	<u>F</u>
В	etween groups	31		
(A) (D) (R) (N)	Anxiety Quartiles Domain Relevant Stress Non-relevant Stress	3 1 1	.44 37.92 .02 3.07	89.22** 7.23**
	A x D A x R A x N D x R D x N R x N	33111	•35 •36 •87 •00 3•31 2•63	7.80** 6.18*
	A x D x R A x D x N A x R x N D x R x N	3331	• 3 ¹ + • 23 1 • 18 • 39	2.78*
	A x D x R x N Error (Within)	3 64	•41 •43	

^{*}p < .05

An idea of the magnitude of the atypicality of Q2 is presented in Table 3.

^{**}p < .01

Table 3

Difference between Differences Distributed over Anxiety Quartiles
[(R-0)N minus (R-0)0]

Q 1	Q2	Q3	\mathcal{Q}_{j+}
-1.82	11,20	3.94	3 • 27

The distribution of means over A, R, and N conditions appears in Table 4. Relevant Stress Present in Q2 was the only condition that reversed the effects between Non-relevant Stress Absent and Non-relevant Stress Present; i.e., in all other conditions there was no difference or H was smaller in the Non-relevant Stress Present condition. (Table 4 and Table 5).

Table 1+

Distribution of Means for H over Anxiety Quartile,
Relevant Stress, and Non-relevant Stress

Non-	Q	1	Q	2	Q.	3	Q	4
relevant Stress				elevan		- 		_
	Abs.	Pres.	Abs.	Pres.	Abs.	Pres.	Abs.	Pres.
Present	2.65	2.27	2.59	3.40	2.11	2.72	2.63	3.02
Absent	3.02	2.95	3.33	2.29	3.08	3.14	3.29	3.13

Table 5 Distribution of Means for \underline{H} , Number of Categories, and $\underline{H}/\underline{H}_{max}$ over Non-relevant Stress

	Non-relev	ant Stress
	Absent	Present
丑	3.03	2.67
Number of Categories	12.38	9.46
$\underline{\mathtt{H}}/\underline{\mathtt{H}}_{\mathtt{max}}$.91	.89

The data for the R x N interaction appears in Table 6. The presence or absence of Non-relevant Stress (N) made a significant difference ($\underline{t} = 3.67$) only when Relevant Stress (R) was absent.

Table 6

Distribution of Means for <u>H</u> over Relevant Stress and Non-relevant Stress

Non-relevant Stress	Relevant Stress Absent Present				
Present	2.49 2.85				
Absent	3.18 2.88				

The distribution of means over D and N conditions appears in Table 7. Individual \underline{t} -tests indicate that the mean for Object, Non-relevant Stress Present is less than the mean for Object, Non-relevant Stress Absent ($\underline{t} = 3.83$); Self, Non-relevant Stress Present is not significantly

different from Self, Non-relevant Stress Absent; for Non-relevant Stress Absent, the mean for Self is less than the mean for Object ($\underline{t} = 8.61$); and for Non-relevant Stress Present, the mean for Self is less than that for Object ($\underline{t} = 4.73$).

Table 7

Distribution of Means for \underline{H} over Domain and Non-relevant Stress

Non-relevant	Doma	in
Stress	Object	Self
Present	3.12	2.23
Absent	3.84	2.22

The main effects now may be understood in light of the interaction effects: For N, \underline{H} was smaller when the stress was present than when it was absent (Table 5); this effect was not uniform over Anxiety Quartiles (Table 4), R conditions (Table 6), or Domains (Table 7). For D, \underline{H} was smaller for Self than for Object over all conditions, but the difference was greater when Non-relevant Stress was absent than when it was present.

With the exception of the A \times R \times N interaction, the results for Number of Categories are very similar to those for \underline{H} . The data relevant to Number of Categories may be found in Table 8. The following effects were significant: Domain, Non-relevant Stress, Domain \times Non-relevant Stress,

and Relevant Stress x Non-relevant Stress.

Table 8

Number of Categories: Summary of Analysis of Variance

Source of Variance	<u>df</u>		
Total	95	Mean Squares	<u>F</u>
Between groups	31	•	
(A) Anxiety Quartiles(D) Domain(R) Relevant Stress(N) Non-relevant Stress	3 1 1	34.31 1962.04 8.17 204.17	83.3 ⁴ ** 8.67**
A x D A x R A x N D x R D x N R x N	3 3 1 1	27.24 9.53 27.86 2.04 273.38 121.50	11.61** 5.16*
A x D x R A x D x N A x R x N D x R x N	3 3 1	29.7 ¹ 4 5.62 52.69 35.0 ¹ 4	
AxDxRxN	3	9.12	
Error (Within)	64	23.54	

^{*}p < .05

The distribution of means over R and N conditions appears in Table 9. Again, the-presence or absence of N made a significant difference ($\underline{t} = 3.69$) only when R was absent.

^{**}p < .01

Table 9

Distribution of Means for Number of Categories over Relevant Stress and Non-relevant Stress

Non-relevant Stress	Relevant Absent	t Stress Present
Present	8.04	10.88
Absent	13.21	11.54

The distribution of means over D and N conditions appears in Table 10. Again, individual \underline{t} -tests indicate that the mean for Object, Non-relevant Stress Present is less than the mean for Object, Non-relevant Stress Absent ($\underline{t} = 4.49$); for Self, the mean for Non-relevant Stress Present is not significantly different from that for Non-relevant Stress Absent, the mean for Self is less than that for Object ($\underline{t} = 8.87$); and for Non-relevant Stress Present, the mean for Self is less than that for Object ($\underline{t} = 8.87$); and

Table 10

Distribution of Means for Number of Categories over Domain and Non-relevant Stress

Non-relevant	Doma	in
Stress	Object	Self
Present	12.29	6.62
Absent	18.58	6.17

The main effects may be understood in view of the interaction effects: For N, the Number of Categories was smaller when the stress was present than when it was absent (Table 5); this effect was not consistent over R conditions (Table 9) or Domains (Table 10). For D, the Number of Categories was smaller for Self than for Object over all conditions, but the difference again was greater when Non-relevant Stress was absent than when it was present.

Except for the N main effect and the A x R x N interaction, the results for $\underline{H}/\underline{H}_{max}$ are similar to those for \underline{H} and Number of Categories. The data relevant to $\underline{H}/\underline{H}_{max}$ may be found in Table 11. The following effects were significant: Domain, Domain x Non-relevant Stress, and Relevant Stress x Non-relevant Stress.

The distribution of means over R x N conditions appears in Table 12. The presence or absence of N once again made a significant difference (\underline{t} = 2.22) only when R was absent.

The distribution of means over D and N conditions appears in Table 13. Again, individual \underline{t} -tests indicate that the mean for Object, Non-relevant Stress Present is less than for Object, Non-relevant Stress Absent ($\underline{t}=2.77$); for Self, the mean for Non-relevant Stress Present is not significantly different from that for Non-relevant Stress Absent; for Non-relevant Stress Absent, the mean for Self is less than that for Object ($\underline{t}=3.33$); but for Non-relevant

Stress Present, the mean for Self is not significantly different from that for Object ($\underline{t} = .55$).

Table 11 $\underline{H}/\underline{H}_{max}$: (Mean Squares x 1000) Summary of Analysis of Variance

Source of Variance Total Between groups	<u>đf</u> 95 31	Mean Squares	<u>F</u>	
(A) Anxiety Quartiles (D) Domain (R) Relevant Stress (N) Non-relevant Stress	3 1 1	1.39 18.29 .01 3.90	4.68*	
A x D A x R A x N D x R D x N R x N	3 3 3 1 1	.97 9.31 8.53 .53 21.19 19.00	5.42* 4.86*	
A x D x R A x D x N A x R x N D x R x N	3 3 1	.89 8.94 3.32 .36		
AxDxRxN	3	7.06		
Error (Within)	64	3.91		

^{*}p 4.05

Table 12 Distribution of Means for $\underline{H}/\underline{H}_{\text{max}}$ over Relevant Stress and Non-relevant Stress

Non-relevant	Relevant Stress
Stress	Absent Present
Present	.88 .91
Absent	.92 .89

Table 13 Distribution of Means for $\underline{H}/\underline{H}_{\text{max}}$ over Domain and Non-relevant Stress

Non-relevant	Domain		
Stress	Object	Self	
Present	.89	.90	
Absent	•94	.88	

The overall Domain effect may now be understood as being carried by the Non-relevant Stress Absent condition; $\underline{H}/\underline{H}_{max}$ for Self (\overline{X} = .89) was smaller than for Object (\overline{X} = .91; \underline{t} = 2.16).

In summary the following conclusions seem warranted, even though discrepancies exist for Q2, Relevant
Stress Present for H: By and large, values for Self were
less than for Object, and Non-relevant Stress Present produced lower scores (a greater degree of organization) than
did Non-relevant Stress Absent for Object but not for Self.
All three measures indicated that the presence or absence of
Non-relevant Stress made a significant difference only when
Relevant Stress was absent.

CHAPTER V

DISCUSSION

The degree of Anxiety as measured by the MAS did not result in differential responses to the stress manipulations. Since this was an exploratory study the effect of the procedures on subjects is not known and the discriminating ability of the MAS is not certain. Two proposals could be offered: The test may not measure what it purports to measure, or it may make little difference how anxious a subject is prior to a stressful situation for all subjects may react in a like manner to the stressor.

For H there was an A x R x N effect. This was reported as being a function of the atypicality of Q2, Relevant Stress Present group; in this condition R and N were confounded with A. It is not known why this group was so different from the other groups, but there was one subject in the Q2, Relevant Stress Present, Non-relevant Stress Absent condition who categorized Self statements that "pegged" the experiment in the sense that he believed the administration of the MAS by the confederate examiner was part of the entire experiment. Whether or not this resulted in an

atypical response is not known.

It was consistently found in all three measures that the degree of organization for the Self Domain was higher than for the Object Domain. This served, in part, as a replication of previous research (Glixman, 1965; Glixman & Wolfe, in press). In the present study this effect was due to the fact that the Object minus Self difference was greater when the Non-relevant Stress was absent. because the values for Object decreased when the Nonrelevant Stress was present but the values for Self did not. In other words, the information in the Object Domain was reduced by the stressor film as the subject placed greater organization on the task. This was an expected finding; the stressor film evidently increased the personal relevance of items to be categorized and perhaps produced a restriction of cognitive maps (Tolman, 1948) resulting in a decrease in the amount of information in the categorial system. Self there was no significant difference between the Nonrelevant Stress Absent and Non-relevant Stress Present conditions. This may be accounted for by the fact that the subject was already minimizing his uncertainty by using approximately 2.6 bits of information in the Non-relevant Stress Absent condition; therefore there was little latitude to constrict the number of categories for the Self Domain in the Non-relevant Stress Present condition. For the Self Domain the organization was already relatively high in the

Non-relevant Stress Absent condition, no doubt due to the Self Domain being personally relevant to the subject.

The degree of organization was found to be greater for those subjects who saw the film than for those who did not see the film. As mentioned before, this effect was stronger for the Object Domain than for the Self Domain, due to the fact that the Self Domain was already strongly organized in the Non-relevant Stress Absent condition. The effect is also stronger for Relevant Stress Absent than for Relevant Stress Present; i.e., there was greater organization when the Relevant Stress was absent than when it was present. This was an unexpected finding and is explained in the next two paragraphs.

The fact that there was the least degree of organization when both Non-relevant Stress and Relevant Stress were absent is in accordance with the expectations of the study; i.e., a stressor condition should reduce the uncertainty and increase the relative degree of structure placed on a task. In other words, the subject limits his usage of the information available. But it now becomes necessary to explain why the greatest degree of organization (low score values) did not occur when Non-relevant Stress and Relevant Stress were both present. It is suggested that after seeing the stressor film (Non-relevant Stress Present) and then being told that the task they were about to perform was a personality test and that they "may be called back for further testing"

(Relevant Stress Present), subjects became cognitively more highly differentiated; i.e., the subjects looked for more ways to discriminate among items. Subjects in this condition may feel they "have to perform correctly" in order to reduce the possibility of being given a negative psychological diagnostic label; under these conditions structure breaks down and uncertainty increases. This view is supported, in part, by the remarks of one subject who, after the experiment said, "I thought you were going to find out something about my mental health and as a consequence I was very careful in selecting which cards went into a pile." The above interpretation is also supported, in part, by the fact that there was greater organization in the ON condition than in the RO condition (see above). In other words, the Non-relevant Stress Present condition resulted in a constriction of subjects' cognitive organization, but the Nonrelative Stress in conjunction with the Relevant Stress produced an opposite effect.

It now becomes essential to explain why there was an N effect (stressor film) but not an R effect (personality test instructions). It seems, both from the data and from observations during the experiment, that the film had a great deal more impact upon subjects than did the personality test instructions. Nearly all subjects gave an involuntary startle reaction upon seeing the first accident in the stressor film. Several closed their eyes as they

anticipated the second and third accidents. The fact that the film does produce stress is well attested to by the work of Lazarus and his associates (1965). Just the personality test instruction, by itself, seems to have little, if any, effect upon subjects.

It can now be said that a stressor situation does indeed affect organizing behavior. There is also evidence to suggest that organization involves a two-stage process (Glixman, 1965). In the first stage subjects regulate the magnitude of information with which they have to deal by determining the number of categories to be used. Then in the second stage they make another kind of adjustment by using some of the categories more often than others. When subjects use a small number of categories there is a high degree of organization, but there is a greater risk of having misplaced the items. Subjects are able to compensate for being overinclusive by placing few items in a category they evaluate as important and a relatively greater number of items in a category that is judged less relevant. This interpretation seems supported by the fact that subjects in the N conditions would categorize and re-categorize, appearing very intent on fixing the number of categories and then being very selective of which cards went into a category.

When \underline{H} is broken into components, Number of Categories and $\underline{H}/\underline{H}_{max}$, the results are not always the same. This was evident by the fact that there was a significant

Non-relevant Stress effect for Number of Categories but not for $\underline{H}/\underline{H}_{max}$. This may be due to the fact that after the first stage in the N condition (determining a smaller number of categories), subjects did not need to adjust the distribution of items over categories in a different manner. Or put another way, the N conditions did not seem to affect the optimal level of organization for subjects in terms of a departure from the degree of rectangularity of the distribution of items over categories, even though less information was being used in the categorial system.

This study has demonstrated that stress manipulations do affect aspects of cognitive organization, particularly the Object Domain. Another study that eliminates the anxiety measurement and personality test instructions might provide a more clear-cut picture of the effects of stress on categorizing behavior. The stressor film effectively produced lower scores (greater degree of organization) for the Object Domain but not for the Self Domain. It should be emphasized that understanding the function of the meaning domain is crucial to understanding the behavioral concomitants in everyday life. The present study has helped to provide information on the effects of stress on categorizing behavior.

CHAPTER VI

SUMMARY

Although the area of stress and anxiety has received much attention in psychological research in the past three decades, there have been no investigations that have dealt with the effects of stress on cognitive organization. This study investigated the effects of stress manipulations, as they interact on possible susceptibilities to stress, upon certain aspects of cognitive organization.

The specific problem under investigation concerns the effects of stress manipulations (Non-relevant Stress, absent or present; Relevant Stress, absent or present), Anxiety scores (Bendig's short form of the Taylor Manifest Anxiety Scale), meaning domain (Object items or Self statements), and their interactions upon three measures of categorizing behavior (H, Number of Categories, and H/Hmax). It was expected that stress would either or both increase the personal relevance of items to be categorized or produce a restriction of cognitive maps, resulting in a decrease in the amount of information in the categorial system; that is, there would be fewer categories used or a greater departure

from rectangularity of distribution of items over categories or both.

The anxiety measurement did not give evidence for differential responses among quartiles as a result of stress manipulations. It was suggested that this could have been a function of the test or perhaps a function of subjects reacting to stress in very similar ways regardless of the amount of anxiety they brought into the stressful situation.

The results of this study provided strong support for the expectation that there would be fewer categories used in the stressor situation, but not for the expectation that there would be a greater departure from rectangularity of distribution of items over categories. For the Object Domain there was a greater degree of organization under the Non-relevant Stress Present condition (in all three analyses) than in the Non-relevant Stress Absent condition, indicating an increased personal relevance of items to be categorized and a decreased amount of information in the categorial system. For Self there was no significant difference between conditions in which Non-relevant Stress was present and those in which it was absent. This may be explained by the fact that subjects were only using 2.6 bits of information when Non-relevant Stress was absent and there was little latitude to constrict further when Non-relevant Stress was present. Expectations for the study were also supported by the findings that the lowest organization

occurred when both Non-relevant Stress and Relevant Stress were absent. The highest degree of organization did not occur when both Non-relevant Stress and Relevant Stress were present, as expected, but rather when Non-relevant Stress was present and Relevant Stress was absent. This was interpreted as meaning that the subjects became more discriminating when they thought they might receive a diagnostic label (Relevant Stress Present condition), resulting in an effect opposite to that expected.

Apparently the Relevant Stress, by itself, had little, if any, effect on subjects; on the other hand, the Nonrelevant Stress was very effective in producing greater
organization and structure on the Object Domain. The film
(Non-relevant Stress) evidently carries a great deal more
impact than does the personality test instructions (Relevant
Stress).

The fact that $\underline{H}/\underline{H}_{\text{max}}$ was affected differently by the stressor film than was Number of Categories suggests a two-stage process in organizing behavior (Glixman, 1965). There was a significant Non-relevant Stress effect for Number of Categories but not for $\underline{H}/\underline{H}_{\text{max}}$.

It has been demonstrated that cognitive organization is significantly affected by a stressor situation, particularly in the Object Domain. Eliminating the anxiety measurement and personality test instructions may prove helpful in

better ascertaining the effects of stress on organizing behavior.

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APPENDIX A. BENDIG'S MODIFIED VERSION OF THE TAYLOR

MANIFEST ANXIETY SCALE

MANIFEST ANXIETY SCALE (short form) and Anxious Responses

Anxious Re s ponses	MAS
<u>T</u> 1.	I work under a great deal of tension.
<u>T</u> 2.	I find it hard to keep my mind on a task or job.
<u>T</u> 3.	I am certainly lacking in self-confidence.
<u>F</u> 4.	I am happy most of the time.
<u>T</u> 5.	I certainly feel useless at times.
<u>T</u> 6.	I frequently find myself worrying about some- thing.
<u>T</u> 7.	I have periods of such great restlessness that I cannot sit long in a chair.
<u>F</u> 8.	I believe I am no more nervous than most others.
<u>T</u> 9.	Life is a strain for me much of the time.
<u>T</u> 10.	I am more sensitive than most other people.
<u>T</u> 11.	I cannot keep my mind on one thing.
<u>T</u> 12.	I feel anxiety about something or someone almost all the time.
<u>T</u> 13.	I am inclined to take things hard.
<u>T</u> 14.	I am not unusually self-conscious.
<u>T</u> 15.	I have sometimes felt that difficulties were piling up so high that I could not overcome them.
<u>F</u> 16.	I am usually calm and not easily upset.
<u>T</u> 17.	At times I think I am no good at all.
<u>T</u> 18.	I am a high-strung person.
<u>T</u> 19.	I shrink from facing a crisis or difficulty.

T 20. I sometimes feel that I am about to go to pieces.

APPENDIX B. OBJECT STATEMENTS

Object Statements

Item number	St a tements
2	Red and white oilcloth
3	Half bar of soap
<u>1</u>	Yellow pencil
5	Small glass jar
7	Flashlight bulb
8	Small light bulb
2 3 4 5 7 8 9 11	Small blue candle
	Blue plastic candle holder
1,3	Dime
14	Penny
17	Metal spoon
18	Small red plastic spoon
19	Small blue plastic spoon
20	Small red plastic knife
21	White plastic button
22	Cigarette
23	Cigar wrapped in cellophane
27	Padlock and key-green design
28	Block of wood with nail
29 30	Block of wood painted yellow
30	Block of plywood with red paper pasted on one side
30	Small printed picturecolored Western scene
32	Ping pong ball
3 <u>4</u>	Piece of white chalk
35	Black and yellow fishing fly
32 33 35 37 38 39 40	Hairpin
38	Pipe bowl
39	Pipe stem, fits pipe bowl
40	Bottle of mercurochrome
41	Nail
43	Picture postcardblack and whitewood scene
7474	Piece of large white candle
45	Small cork
\ +7	Orange sucker with paper handle wrapped in
١.٥	cellophane
48	Orange vitamin pill
49	Metal staple with paper on head
51	Olive drab whistle with star design
52	Small pebble
49 51 52 53 58 59 60	Mothball
<u>ე</u> წ	White rectangular card
5 9	Two German stamps, attached1 red, 1 green
60 60	Whiskbroom
65 66	Rubber nipple
66	Green plastic earring with metal clip

Item number	Statements
68	Suede brushmetal and wood with paper price tag
69	Piece of fine sandpaper
70	Plastic dark glasses with metal clip
71	Red lipstick container
72	Screwdriver
73	Piece of red crayon

APPENDIX C. SELF STATEMENTS

Self Statements

Item number	Statements Statements
1	I feel uncomfortable while talking with someone.
5 6 .7 9	I often kick myself for the things I do. I often feel humiliated.
9	I doubt my sexual powers. I have a warm emotional relationship with others.
11 15 17	I am responsible for my troubles. I can accept most social values and standards. I have a hard time controlling my sexual de-
18 20	sires. It is difficult to control my aggression. I am often down in the dumps.
21 26	I am really self-centered. I can usually live comfortably with the people around me.
27 28	My hardest battles are with myself. I tend to be on my guard with people who are somewhat more friendly than I had ex-
29 30 336 37 38 39 40 41	pected. I am optimistic. I am just sort of stubborn. I feel helpless. I can usually make up my mind and stick to it. My decisions are not my own. I often feel guilty. I am a hostile person. I am contented.
42 44 47 52	I am disorganized. I am poised. I am impulsive. I have the feeling that I am just not facing things.
53 59 60 61 62 66 68 77 77 74	I am tolerant. I feel inferior. I am no one. Nothing seems to really be me. I am afraid of what other people think of me. I am ambitious. I despise myself. I just don't respect myself. I am a dominant person. I am assertive. I am confused. I am satisfied with myself. I am a failure. I am likable.

Item number	Statements			
78 79 83 88 89 93 99 99 99	I am relaxed, and nothing really bothers me. I am a hard worker. I feel emotionally mature. I really am disturbed. I feel insecure within myself. I am intelligent. I feel hopeless. I am inhibited. I am unreliable. I feel adequate. I am worthless.			

APPENDIX D. INDIVIDUAL SCORES (RAW DATA)

Relevant Stress Absent, Non-Relevant Stress Absent: Raw Scores For All Subjects over Quartiles and Domains

Quartile and Domain	Subjects	Number of Categories	<u>H</u>	<u>H/H</u> max
1Q, Object	1.	16	3.88322	•9708
	2.	21	4.25632	•9691
	3.	14	3.70129	•9722
1Q, Self	4.	5	1.89535	.8162
	5.	8	2.95755	.9858
	6.	3	1.42787	.9009
2Q, Object	7.	19	3.91671	.9220
	8.	21	4.20651	.9578
	9.	26	4.37632	.9311
2Q, Self	10.	· * 11	3.23448	•9351
	11.	6	2.35659	•9116
	12.	4	1.91589	•9579
3Q, Object	13.	12	3.48174	•9712
	14.	23	4.40851	•9745
	15.	25	4.43142	•9542
3Q, Self	16. 17. 18.	656	2.30142 1.76842 2.12066	.8903 .7616 .8204
ትQ, Object	19.	17	3.82329	•9355
	20.	17	3.62775	•8876
	21.	31	4.68851	•9464
4Q, Self	22.	8	2.82305	.9410
	23.	7	2.45897	.8760
	24.	6	2.32324	.8987

Relevant Stress Absent, Non-relevant Stress Present: Raw Scores For All Subjects over Quartiles and Domains

Quartile and Domain	Subjects	Number of Categories	<u>H</u>	<u>H/H</u> max
1Q, Object	1.	<u>ዛ</u>	1.96821	•9841
	2.	10	2.80770	•8452
	3.	1 ዛ	3.63922	•9559
1Q, Self	4.	Կ	1.94283	.9714
	5.	8	2.78878	.9296
	6.	8	2.72899	.9097
2Q, Object	7.	14	3.30543	.8682
	8.	6	2.11436	.8179
	9.	12	3.42464	.9553
2Q, Self	10.	¥	1.68530	.8426
	11.	6	2.47624	.9579
	12.	8	2.54027	.8468
3Q, Object	13.	8	2.58227	.8608
	14.	7	2.35185	.8378
	15.	7	2.30134	.8198
3Q, Self	16.	6	2.42623	.9386
	17.	3	1.47308	.9294
	18.	4	1.52417	.7621
4Q, Object	19.	12	3.38051	.9430
	20.	19	3.59615	.8466
	21.	12	3.07448	.8576
4Q, Self	22.	3	1.11421	.7030
	23.	10	2.92225	.8797
	24.	4	1.68747	.8437

Relevant Stress Present, Non-relevant Stress Present: Raw Scores For All Subjects over Quartiles and Domains

Quarti and Dom		ects Numbe	r of ories <u>H</u>	H/H _{max}
1Q, Obj		1. 2 2. 3.	0 3.88 8 2.40 6 2.40	573 .8019
1Q, Sel	f	94. 5. 6.	2 .95 6 2.45 3 1.53	819 .9582 475 .9496 104 .9660
2Q, Obje		7. 1 8. 1 9. 1	1 3.27 3 3.40 6 3.88	735 . 9209
2Q, Seli	1.	0. 1 1. 2. 2	8 2.86	748
3Q, Obje	1)	31 +. 5. 1	5 3.556 9 2.706 8 3.906	065 .8519
3Q, Seli	11	7• 1	3 1.539 0 2.909 4 1.698	915 .8757
4Q, Obj∈	ect 19 20 21	Ď. 2	5 4.393 2 4.22 7 2.17	529 •9476
4Q, Self	? 2: 2 ⁾	2. 3. +. 1.	3 1.42′ 8 2.66′ 3 3.208	,8890

Relevant Stress Present, Non-relevant Stress Absent: Raw Scores For All Subjects over Quartiles and Domains

Quartile and Domain	Subjects	Number of Categories	<u>H</u>	H/H _{max}
1Q, Object	1.	24	4.30858	•9397
	2.	18	3.75792	•9012
	3.	21	4.00568	•9120
1Q, Self	4.	6	2.27749	.8810
	5.	6	1.82199	.7048
	6.	4	1.52417	.7621
2Q, Object	7.	5	2.07002	.8915
	8.	16	3.78812	.9470
	9.	11	2.69013	.7777
2Q, Self	10.	ታ	1.48620	•7431
	11.	ታ	1.98504	•9925
	12.	ታ	1.72754	•8638
3Q, Object	13.	2 ¹ +	4.16038	.9074
	14.	6	2.43922	.9436
	15.	19	4.12903	.9720
3Q, Self	16.	5	2.30756	.9938
	17.	15	3.64744	.9336
	18.	6	2.12858	.8234
ትQ, Object	19.	19	4.09102	.9630
	20.	29	4.62161	.9513
	21.	12	3.40090	.9486
4Q, Self	22.	՝	1.56313	.7816
	23.	11	3.15561	.9123
	24.	14	1.96841	.9842