HARRY S. TRUMAN, THE DEVELOPMENT AND OPERATIONS OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL, AND THE ORIGINS OF UNITED STATES COLD WAR POLICIES

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NOMENCLATURE

AEC	Atomic Energy Commission
AFSA	Armed Forces Security Agency
BOB	Bureau of the Budget
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
CEA	Council of Economic Advisers
DCI	Director of Central Intelligence
DDP	Deputy Director for Plans
FBI	Federal Bureau of Investigation
JCS	Joint Chiefs of Staff
KMAG	Korean Military Advisory Group
MDAP	Mutual Defense Assistance Program
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NCFE	National Committee for a Free Europe
NSA	National Security Agency
NSC	National Security Council
NSRB	National Security Resources Board
ODM	Office of Defense Mobilization
ONE	Office of National Estimates
OPC	Office of Policy Cooperation
ORE	Office of Research and Evaluation
OSO	Office of Special Operations
OSS	Office of Strategic Services

PPS	Policy Planning Staff
PSB	Psychological Strategy Board
ROK	Republic of (South) Korea
SANACC	State-Army-Navy-Air Force Coordinating Committee
SPG	Special Procedures Group
SWNCC	State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee
UN	United Nations
USCIB	United States Communications Intelligence Board
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION AND LITERATURE REVIEW

The National Security Council (NSC) was instrumental in shaping the Cold War policies of the United States in the immediate post World War II years. Historians and political scientists have produced several studies concerning the role and function of the NSC, but their works have not answered pertinent questions regarding the council's influence in the formulation of Cold War policy during the administration of President Harry S. Truman. The policy recommendations and their objectives that the NSC adopted and that President Harry S. Truman approved, as well as their impact on the course of the Cold War, is the focus of this dissertation. It proposes to accomplish the following: (1) analyze Truman's reasons for establishing the National Security Council; (2) examine the NSC's development and relationship with Truman; and, (3) analyze the positive and negative influence of the NSC's policy proposals and actions, intelligence directives, reports, and estimates upon the course of the early Cold War. It is my opinion that the NSC was a primary formulator of United States Cold War policy between 1947 and 1952, and as such played a much greater role in establishing America's Cold War responses than historians previously believed.

Revisionist and Post-Revisionist Scholarship

During the past decade many scholars have focused upon the emergence of an informal American empire, supported by institutional mechanisms of a Cold War state, or a national security state. Drawing from both the realist and revisionist/new left interpretations of the Cold War, a recent school of post-revisionist historians have produced a more balanced pattern of analysis and synthesis. John L. Gaddis and Daniel Yergin, considered post-revisionists, have agreed with the revisionists that the United States established a postwar American empire to promote or defend American interests abroad. Gaddis and other post-revisionists also contend that at certain times "Pax Americana" was a response to the invitations of other nations.[1]

The earliest proponent of the rise of an American empire was William A. Williams, whose neo-Marxist economic determinism and Turnerian analysis of America's "Open Door" policies were first put forth in The Tragedy of American Diplomacy.[2] The essential difference on the point of consensus between the two interpretations of American empire/globalism rests with the revisionists' use of the capitalist-offensive-imperialist model and the post-revisionists' application of the defensive-insecurity-containment model, driven by exaggerations of the communist threat. Of concern to post-revisionists in particular is the analysis and explanation of Cold War origins with an emphasis upon domestic, political-military, and bureaucratic dimensions.

In America, Russia and the Cold War, 1945-1966, Walter LaFeber adhered to the revisionist accounts of the emerging American empire of the Cold War years. But LaFeber's interest in the domestic and political aspects, with greater attention given to the bureaucratic mind set, and such realists as

George F. Kennan and Walter Lippmann, paved the way for the post-revisionist school a decade later.[3]

John L. Gaddis insisted that the Cold War "grew out of a complicated interaction of external and internal developments inside both the United States and the Soviet Union." He advocated this thesis in his work, The United States and the Origins of the Cold War, 1941-1947. Gaddis later expanded the position in his analysis of presidential administrations from Truman through Nixon, in Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of Postwar American National Security Policy, and in The Long Peace: Inquiries into the History of the Cold War. By emphasizing bureaucratic rivalries, domestic constraints, and political and geopolitical interests during and within the Truman administration, Gaddis helped to develop a more balanced interpretation of the nascent Cold War.[4]

Internal shifts in policy formulation that the NSC coordinated were affected by particular domestic, political, and international developments. Daniel Yergin's work, Shattered Peace: The Origins of the Cold War and the National Security State, was the first effort by a recent historian to analyze those shifts. Yergin demonstrated how Franklin D. Roosevelt's "Yalta axioms" of realistic diplomacy were replaced by 1946 with the Truman administration's "Riga axioms" of abandoning diplomacy and applying policies of a national security state. Yergin defined the national security state as one that was "organized for perpetual confrontation and for war." It consisted of a "unified pattern of attitudes, policies, and institutions," maintained Yergin, "that affected either of the two tasks." The "Riga axioms" were articulated clearly in the containment thesis of George F. Kennan that dovetailed with national security concerns. Those policies prompted intervention as well as containment, the development of a wartime arsenal, and the creation of a permanent war economy.[5]

In addition to Gaddis and Yergin, another recent historian has focused upon the national security concept of the Cold War. Melvyn P. Leffler demonstrated how American military strategists and defense officials stressed an expansion of military commitments around the world as early as 1945. Concerned that a major goal of the Soviet Union was to control the resources of Eurasia, Leffler maintained that the United States in turn began to acquire new naval and air bases, primarily on the periphery of the Soviet Union.[6]

Very recently, Leffler pointed out that the "core values" of the United States during the Cold War that were endangered, "were not markets, raw materials, and overseas investment opportunities, but political liberty and free enterprise at home." The Truman administration perceived that national security dictated that "the United States intervene on the periphery, rearm Germany, and militarize its foreign policy." Otherwise, Leffler argued, the United States might "encounter even greater dangers," dangers that would require the Truman administration "to multiply its defense expenditures, raise taxes, interfere in the marketplace, and infringe on individual rights," far beyond policies like NSC 68 or the excesses of McCarthyism.[7]

Literature on the National Security Council

Historians Alfred Sander and Anna Kasten Nelson have also provided insights into the establishment of the NSC and the institutional and organizational changes that strengthened it as an advisory body to the President. Both wrote that the council played a relatively insignificant role in its early years. Sander maintained that Truman did not attend regular meetings of the NSC until the outbreak of war in Korea, because he was concerned that the council as a formal entity might undercut his authority. Nelson contended that

Truman preferred to make his policy decisions first-hand, then turn to the NSC for advice. Truman distanced himself from the council from 1947 through 1950. Nelson indicated he did this because of the inherent difficulty the NSC experienced with the process of integrating Department of Defense and Department of State proposals.[8]

Sander and Nelson also focused upon the organizational evolution of the NSC. Despite the bureaucratic rivalries and tensions that existed within the NSC and Truman's lack of attendance at its meetings until mid-1950, the council's influence upon presidential policy coordination was considerably greater than Sander and Nelson contended. Neither study examined declassified NSC documents or meeting minutes that revealed the discussions and opinions of departments and their individual representatives on the NSC, as well as the policy proposals Truman approved, and NSC actions and intelligence directives that the Truman bureaucracy enacted. In fact, Sander and Nelson were correct in arguing that the NSC emerged as a much more effective body after reorganizations in 1949 and 1950. Nevertheless, the NSC, as Truman's policy coordinating entity, was not ineffective in the years 1947-1949.[9]

ENDNOTES

CHAPTER I

[1]John Lewis Gaddis, The Long Peace: Inquiries into the History of the Cold War (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987), 59. For other works that elaborate the "empire by invitation" theme see Geir Lundestad," Empire by Invitation? The United States and Western Europe, 1945-1952", SHAFR Newsletter 15 (September 1984): 1-21; idem, America, Scandinavia, and the Cold War (New York: Columbia University Press, 1980), 335; Martin H. Folly, "Breaking the Vicious Circle: Britain, the United States, and the Genesis of the North Atlantic Treaty," Diplomatic History 12 (Winter 1988): 59-77.

[2]William Appleman Williams, The Tragedy of American Diplomacy (New York: World Press, 1959). For other revisionist works of the Cold War see Joyce and Gabriel Kolko, The Limits of Power: The World and United States Foreign Policy, 1945-1954 (New York: Harper & Row, 1972); Thomas G. Paterson, Soviet-American Confrontation: Postwar Reconstruction and the Origins of the Cold War (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1973).

[3]Walter LaFeber, America, Russia and the Cold War, 1945-1966 (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1967).

[4]John Lewis Gaddis, The United States and the Origins of the Cold War 1941-1947 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1972); idem, Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of Postwar American National Security Policy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1982); idem, The Long Peace.

[5]Daniel Yergin, Shattered Peace: The Origins of the Cold War and the National Security State (Boston: Houghton, Mifflin, 1977), 5, 11.

[6]Melvyn P. Leffler, "The American Conception of National Security and the Beginnings of the Cold War, 1945-48," American Historical Review 89 (April 1984): 346-381.

[7]Melvyn P. Leffler, "National Security," Journal of American History 77 (June 1990); 151.

[8]Alfred Sander, "Truman and the National Security Council, 1945-1947," Journal of American History 59 (September 1972): 369-388; Anna Kasten Nelson, "President Truman and the Evolution of the National Security Council," Journal of American History 72 (September 1985): 360-378.

[9]Ibid.

CHAPTER II

THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL: CONCEPTS OF, AMERICAN NEEDS FOR, AND THE ORGANIZATION OF A POLICY INSTRUMENT

The passage of Public Law 253 on July 26, 1947, was a seminal event in the history of the United States. The law established for the first time statutory recognition that the formulation of the national security policy of the country required integrating political, economic, and military power, under the auspices of a National Security Council.[1] Thereafter, the ideas and institutions that governed America's Cold War policies for forty years were a direct legacy of the way the National Security Council (NSC) developed during the administration of President Harry S. Truman.

Prior to the creation of the NSC, United States national security policies had been coordinated on an ad hoc basis during both world wars by Presidents who established emergency agencies for coordinated advice, or by individual departmental secretaries who conveyed political-military policy recommendations in separate reports to the President. After the end of World War II, with the world in a constant state of flux, such processes were much too complex to be continued under the older customs of the pre-war years. The post World War II years marked the end of an era in United States foreign policy. The United States would no longer be an emerging world power

concerned with its place in the world and one that would be isolationist by tradition.[2]

When Truman became President on April 12, 1945, approximately a month before the end of the war in Europe, the United States was the most powerful nation in the world. Yet most Americans, including Truman, felt a sense of vulnerability. Events of the war years had discredited the old isolationist views of the past, and by 1946 the consolidation of Eastern Europe would persuade many Americans and government policy makers that the postwar intentions of Moscow were unilateral and dangerous to the United States.[3]

Concepts of Globalism and Containment

Consistent confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union emerged during 1946 and 1947. Waged as an on-going struggle that Bernard Baruch labeled in 1946 as the Cold War, the "two ways of life" confronted one another, each believing they were maintaining and protecting their security and world interests.[4] Non-Soviet aligned powers formed during this period what historians have referred to as the containment doctrine. American doubts about Soviet intentions lacked expression, however, until February 1946, when George F. Kennan of the Department of State outlined the concept of containment in a "long telegram" from the United States embassy in Moscow to Washington. He explained his ideas more thoroughly in his "Mr. X," article published in Foreign Affairs.[5] Kennan noted that in combination with the Marxist-Leninst ideology and the capitalist encirclement thesis, Soviet expansionism was "more dangerous and insidious than ever before."[6] He advocated that "U.S. policy toward the U.S.S.R. must be that of a long-term,



Mackinder's Pivot Area



Figure 1. Spykman's Rimland

patient but firm and vigilant containment of Russian expansive tendencies." And such a policy, he determined, should consist of "the adroit and vigilant application of counterforce at a series of constantly shifting geographical and political points, corresponding to the shifts and maneuvers of Soviet policy."[7]

The globalist policy Kennan recommended was not new; other political theorists had for many years thought it a viable policy. The British geopolitician Sir Halford Mackinder had proposed in 1904 that "Who rules East Europe commands the Heartland," and a world balance of power could only be maintained if the Eurasian "rimlands" were kept from domination by the Eurasian "heartland".[8] Nicholas John Spykman offered another political geography theory in 1944: "Who controls the rimland controls Eurasia; who rules Eurasia controls the destinies of the world." Spykman further noted that "it may be that the pressure of Russia outward toward the rimland will constitute one important aspect of the post-war settlement."[9] And long before Mackinder and Spykman, Admiral Alfred T. Mahan justified a global view of navalism that also emphasized the continental heartland. In 1900, Mahan described Russia as "a vast uninterrupted mass," dominating Central Asia. He believed that Russian expansion in Asia could be opposed by sea-transported power. This was an early version of containment. He predicted that the United States, Great Britain, Germany, and Japan would find a common interest in containing Russia and controlling China.[10]

The response of the Truman administration to Kennan's containment thesis was evident in many instances, including Truman's message to Congress on March 12, 1947, in which he announced the Truman Doctrine and proclaimed United States assistance to anti-Communist nations around the world. Secretary of State George C. Marshall outlined in an address at Harvard University on June 5, 1947, that his forthcoming Plan for European Recovery

also fit the containment scheme. Congress acted to support the containment policy by providing aid to Greece and Turkey on June 20 and July 12, 1947, by supporting in September 1947 the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance with Latin American nations, or the so-called Rio Treaty, and by increasing broadcasts of the Voice of America to Eastern European nations. To provide for the Truman administration's establishment of national security and to formulate containment into political-military terms, centralized coordination of policy would be needed. The agency created to implement that task was the National Security Council.

The Historic Concept of National Security

Like the concept of containment, the concept of national security had its roots in the past. From the earliest days as a nation, United States leaders had subscribed to the concept of national security. John Jay, who had been a frustrated Secretary of Foreign Affairs under the Articles of Confederation Government, argued in his five Federalist papers for ratification of the Constitution largely due to the needs for a strong national security policy Jay wrote that: "Nations in general will make war whenever they have a prospect of getting anything by it." Jay concluded that the United States must have "the best possible state of defense."[11]

Alexander Hamilton was the architect of national security plans during George Washington's and John Adams's administrations and agreed with Jay. Hamilton's realpolitik maxim would be that the United States must "be prepared for war while cultivating peace."[12] Hamilton recognized the need for national security through military preparedness. He also acknowledged that national

security political-military coordination "is a thing about which the best and ablest men of this country are far from being agreed."[13]

Inter-agency rivalry and disunity have been an old problem in the formulation policy, particularly in the twentieth century, but such bureaucratic tension also existed for most of the preceding two centuries. National security organization in the first Washington administration began in unity in 1789, with a Department of State and a Department of War. But the first Secretary of State, Thomas Jefferson, resigned in 1793, partly in protest to the pro-British policies of Hamilton, who held the position of Secretary of the Treasury but also served as Washington's national security adviser.[14] The requirement of national security, including an undeclared naval war with France, led to the establishment in 1798 of a separate Department of the Navy. Soon thereafter Army, under the Department of War, and Navy went separate ways. Likewise, the Department of State did not share its political policies with the two services.[15]

Throughout much of the 1800s the Army and the Navy conducted operations under the principle of "mutual cooperation." After the failure of mutual cooperation in the Battle of Santiago, Cuba, during the Spanish-American war, Secretary of War Elihu Root and Secretary of the Navy John D. Long established a Joint Army and Navy Board in 1903. During the administration of Woodrow Wilson, the "Joint Board" and the Department of State attempted a haphazard coordination of national security policy by letter writing. Despite of occasional efforts of this type, diplomatic and military policy recommendations were referred to President Wilson separately.[16]

Predecessors of the NSC

The first proposal for an organized political-military agency that would oversee coordination of national security policy developed in the post World War I years. On May 1, 1919, Acting Secretary of the Navy Franklin D. Roosevelt submitted to the Secretary of State an outline for a Department of State planning agency, separate general staffs for the Army and the Navy, and a Joint Plan Making Body made up of representatives from all three staff agencies. The "Joint Body" would be responsible for estimating national and foreign resources and defining United States war and mobilization objectives. Roosevelt's letter never reached the Secretary of State, routed mistakenly to State's Division of Latin American Affairs. Thus, the first proposal for a National Security Council was never considered.[17]

The idea of political-military coordination revived during World War II. Soon after war broke out in Europe, Secretary of State Cordell Hull formed a loosely organized interdepartmental group that took the name of the Standing Liaison Committee. Composed of a Department of State representative, the Chief of Naval Operations, and the Army Chief of Staff, it dealt with national policy that affected each department. President Franklin D. Roosevelt, however, preferred to consult directly with his chiefs of staff. In the fall of 1941 Roosevelt formed a War Council, composed of the Secretaries of State, War, and Navy, and his chiefs of staff. The Standing Liaison Committee disbanded in 1943.[18]

Roosevelt's idea for the political-military coordination of national security policy ended when the United States entered World War II. In December 1941 the "Joint Board" reorganized into the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS).[19] Preferring to work directly with his chiefs of staff, Roosevelt used the War Council as a

platform to announce military strategy and treaties that were formed with the help of the JCS. "During most of the war," writes historian Ernest R. May, "the State Department became almost an auxiliary arm of the military services." The Secretaries of War and Navy were bypassed by the JCS and the President as well.[20]

As the war progressed the Department of State began planning the initial occupation policies for liberated areas and formulating post-war treaties. Through the exchange of letters among the Secretaries of State, War, and Navy, an interdepartmental committee was established at the assistant secretary level. By 1945, in an effort to improve postwar policy coordination, Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson persuaded President Truman to formalize the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee (SWNCC), the National Security Council's immediate predecessor. SWNCC coordinated plans and recommendations for the surrender terms and occupational policies for Germany, Austria, and Japan. Because they involved military strategy as well as diplomacy, officers representing the JCS served as members of SWNCC's sub-committees. Before policy papers reached the Secretary of State and the President, they were forwarded to the JCS for comment, a practice that the National Security Council would adopt.[21]

After the passage of the National Security Act of 1947 and the establishment of a separate departmental status for the Air Force, the SWNCC was renamed the State-Army-Navy-Air Force Coordination Committee (SANACC). It continued to function until June 30, 1949, and the NSC often consulted the committee.[22] The NSC adopted four of SANACC's policy reports. A report in 1946 concerning psychological warfare was included in an NSC policy directive of 1947.[23] The council in early 1948 employed SANACC report 390-1 in its recommendation to Truman that authorized the delivery of

United States military equipment to Italy's armed forces.[24] The NSC utilized yet another report, SANACC 176/39, recommending the withdrawal of United States armed forces from postwar occupied Korea, in its formulation of a policy paper entitled "The Position of the U.S. with Respect to Korea," that it offered during the spring of 1948.[25] And following several months of consideration, the NSC adopted in early 1949 sections of yet another SANACC report that provided overall strategy for the demolition of Middle East oil production facilities in the event of a war with the Soviet Union.[26]

As the NSC gradually assumed the major functions of SANACC, the latter became an anachronism and the Department of Defense finally recommended its dissolution. The NSC agreed on June 2, 1949, and President Truman approved the action the following day. As of June 30, 1949, the National Security Council's immediate predecessor ceased to exist.[27]

President Truman's Need of a NSC

The National Security Act of 1947, better known for unifying the armed services, had created the NSC to serve the President. It was to be "a policy-forming and advisory" body, and assist him "with respect to the integration of domestic, foreign, and military policies related to the national security."[28] President Truman supported, even advocated, the passage of the act and the creation of the NSC. To understand why Truman did so, it is necessary to analyze the immediate post World War II years and Truman.

When Truman became President he was in a tenuous position of power. Since the Democratic Party's nominating convention of 1944, when he had been selected the Vice-Presidential nominee on the Roosevelt ticket, Truman had been aware of the President's deteriorating health and suspected that

Roosevelt could not complete his fourth term. Although he had served in Congress, Truman did not know much about Roosevelt's conduct of the war. As Vice-President, Truman had met with Roosevelt two or three times, and he therefore was still poorly informed. He also felt quite insecure as the new chief executive.[29]

Truman's decisions during his first two years as President were arrived at as a consequence of his Midwestern common sense and the experience he gained in his years in the United State Senate. He quickly realized that, in order to compensate for his background and to grasp the major problems, he had to establish a structured method of obtaining information about military and foreign policy affairs. Truman later wrote that the "scattered method of getting information for various departments of the government first struck me as being badly organized when I was in the Senate."[30] As Vice-President, Truman had observed that messages often were not relayed to Roosevelt. He concluded that: "The President up to that time had to make decisions sometimes 'by guess and by God,' which is not a very satisfactory way to do business."[31]

With rapid demobilization after World War II, the United States needed a national security organization and a defined mission for the armed services. For nearly two years after World War II, while the Cold War escalated, the United States had no unified national defense or national security organization. Truman came to the White House, however, with a strong background in defense organization. He had served as an Army National Guard officer in France during World War I, had studied military organization, and between the world wars became a colonel in the Army Reserve. As a United States Senator, Truman had served on the Senate Appropriations and Military Affairs Committees. During World War II he also had been chairman of the Special Committee to Investigate the National Defense Program concerned with United

States military procurement and industrial mobilization.[32] Based upon his experience, Truman later recalled: "One of the strongest convictions which I brought to the office of the President was that the antiquated defense setup of the United States had to be reorganized quickly as a step toward insuring our safety and preserving world peace."[33]

By August 1944, and throughout the presidential campaign that year, Truman advocated the integration of the Army and the Navy under a single Department of Defense headed by a civilian secretary with subordinate assistant secretaries for the Army, the Navy, and a new Air Force. The Department of War under Secretary Stimson and his successor, Robert P. Patterson, shared Truman's views. But the idea of a coequal Air Force, encompassing naval aviation, drew opposition to the plan from the Department of Navy. Truman, whose allegiance rested with the Army, supported the Department of War's unification plans.[34]

Soon after Truman became President two unification bills were introduced in Congress, and hearings on them continued into December 1945. In January 1946, Under Secretary of State Dean Acheson informed Truman that demobilization "was a matter of great embarrassment and concern" to his department in the conduct of foreign policy. Acheson also recognized that State was lacking "ideas, plans, or methods for the painstaking and exhaustive collection and correlation of foreign intelligence."[35]

The Organization of a Policy Instrument

This type of postwar problem convinced Truman to initiate a plan that would affect the coordination of information as well as provide for a highly structured military establishment. Prior to its proposing the creation of the NSC,

the Truman administration debated various plans. Secretary of the Navy James Forrestal became the most vocal advocate of a more effective coordination within the government. Favoring a new structure similar to the British War Cabinet system and a central agency that could provide accurate intelligence estimates, Forrestal approached Truman and other cabinet members in the spring of 1945 with proposed plans.[36]

Among all the studies leading to the passage of the National Security Act that which Ferdinand Eberstadt, former chairman of the Army-Navy Munitions Board during World War II, presented in his report was the most influential. Eberstadt proposed a coordinated effort among the Departments of State, Navy, and Army, and an independent Air Force, through a National Security Council. Within the NSC he suggested a central intelligence group for the purpose of supplying the council with "authoritative information of conditions and developments in the outside." Two years after Eberstadt submitted his report it took form as the National Security Council.[37]

The National Security Act established the NSC and granted the council specific functions and duties. The primary function of the NSC would be to advise the President on the integration of national security domestic, foreign, and military policies, "so as to enable the military services and other departments and agencies of the Government to cooperate more effectively in matters involving the national security." Subject to direction by the President it would be the responsibility of the NSC to: (1) "assess and appraise the objectives, commitments, and risks of the United States in relation to our actual and potential military power, in the interest of national security;" (2) "consider policies on matters of common interest to the departments and agencies of the Government concerned with the national security;" and, (3) "make such

recommendations and such other reports to the President as it deems appropriate or as the President may require."[38]

The NSC's statutory membership according to the act of 1947 would be composed of the President, Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense, Secretary of the Army, Secretary of the Navy, Secretary of the Air Force, and the chairman of the National Security Resources Board (NSRB). The President would chair NSC meetings, or in his absence, appoint another member to preside in his place. In addition, the act provided for the creation of a career staff for the NSC, headed by a civilian Executive Secretary appointed by the President (see Appendixes A and B).[39]

President Truman appointed Rear Admiral Sidney W. Souers to be the first Executive Secretary of the NSC. Souers was sworn in immediately before the NSC's first meeting on September 26, 1947. From then until his resignation on January 15, 1950, Souers assumed the position he referred to as "a broker of ideas." One contemporary observer called Souers "the President's chief informant."[40] A recent scholar determined that he filled the role of the "custodian-manager" of the NSC.[41] A successful businessman and astute intelligence officer during World War II, Souers had learned from the corporate and military worlds how to transmit ideas with a minimum of friction.[42] Less interested in the actual formulation of policy, he instead served as a key conciliator between the executive departments and the military services represented on the NSC.

Throughout Souers's term he served as Truman's "nonpolitical confidant."[43] He met with the President each morning at 9:30 a.m. to brief him on the council's agendas and discuss NSC recommendations and directives. At that time, Truman signed proposals he wanted implemented as official policy and forwarded his recommendations to the council via Souers.[44] In addition,

Souers was an administrative troubleshooter. During the NSC's formative years he helped correct several of its internal weaknesses, a task that he found natural, for Souers felt responsible for the successful operational mechanisms of the council. When he resigned in 1950, Souers noted that the NSC had become "fully accepted...valuable..well supported by the authorities...and making progress."[45]

Truman afforded Souers the time he needed to return to his business interests in 1950 by appointing him Special Consultant on National Security Matters and giving him an office in the White House. War broke out in Korea shortly thereafter, and Souers became a regular occupant of the White House.[46]

Souers's successor as Executive Secretary of the NSC was his former assistant, James S. Lay, Jr. Lay served as chief administrator over the NSC until the end of the Truman administration. Like Souers, Lay had served in the intelligence branch of the military during World War II. An Army Lieutenant Colonel by the end of the war, he returned to Washington for an assignment as Secretary to the Joint Intelligence Committee of the JCS. After discharge from the Army, he became a management analyst in charge of research and intelligence for the Department of State.[47] A young career service official, Lay was thirty-six years old when he accepted Souers's offer to become the chief assistant to the Executive Secretary of the NSC. Throughout Souers's tenure, he remained Lay's mentor. One associate of Souers noted that "he [Souers] served as a sort of informal father-confessor and guardian for Lay...present at Lay's daily briefings of the President, confidante to both."[48]

The NSC met twice a month--every first and third Thursday--in the Cabinet Conference Room of the White House. The council's staff, headed by the Executive Secretary, was housed in the Old State Department Building next to

the White House. The staff was organized into three divisions: (1) NSC Staff members, (2) a secretariat, and (3) a small group of consultants from other departments and agencies represented on the council (see Appendixes B and C).[49]

NSC consideration of policy involved three basic stages: (1) the preparation of a policy paper, either by the NSC staff, the Department of State, or State's Policy Planning Staff (PPS); (2) comment and recommendations on the paper by consultants or committees; and, (3) formal NSC discussion, with the submission of adopted policy papers to President Truman for his consideration. Truman rarely objected to or rejected the NSC's advice. Of the 124 formal policy paper recommendations submitted to him for consideration, he approved or concurred with 120.[50]

Policy recommendations the NSC developed made up four basic categories: (1) United States policy relating to geographical areas or specific countries; (2) matters relating to functional areas of atomic energy, mobilization, or foreign trade policy; (3) organizational and procedural matters of NSC operations, foreign intelligence activities, and internal security; and, (4) basic overall United States national security political, military, psychological, and economic policy. Each category related to the others, as Souers noted, forming "a basis for a balanced and consistent conduct of foreign, domestic, and military affairs related to our national security."[51]

President Truman's Use of the NSC

In addition to the formulation of policy papers, the NSC often became a day-to-day crisis forum where the council and Truman reached decisions on national security problems that required immediate action. The Berlin crisis of

1948-1949, the threatened Chinese Communist attack on the United States naval base at Tsingtao, China, in late 1948, and the emergency events during the early months of the Korean War in the summer and fall of 1950 were periods of tension when the NSC often convened in special meetings without elaborate briefings or preparations.

The NSC decided early upon the nature of its basic role. It would suggest, not determine, national security policy for President Truman, serve "as a channel for collective advice and information to the President ," and consider matters that only required Truman's attention. Known as "The Concept of the National Security Council," the role definition was circulated to all council members and NSC Staff members. It was approved by Truman on July 26, 1948.[52]

Truman endorsed "The Concept of the National Security Council," because it reassured him that the NSC would not intrude upon the authority of the President. Truman regarded the NSC, one observer noted, "with Missourian show-me skepticism."[53] He did not participate regularly in the NSC's meetings until the Korean War began, attending 12 of the council's sessions from September 26, 1947 to June 28, 1950. His disinclination for presiding over NSC meetings, however, did not signify that he refused to rely upon the council's policy recommendations. In fact, Truman told the NSC at its 38th meeting on April 21, 1949, that it "had proven to be one of the best means available to the President for obtaining coordinated advice as a basis for reaching decisions."[54]

If Truman had reservations about the NSC they may have been due to the wording of the National Security Act of 1947. Concerned that the act might be interpreted to establish a council with similar powers and responsibilities of the British War Council cabinet with a diminution of presidential authority, Truman

instead remained a distant participant.[55] He also disapproved of the statutory membership within the National Security Act. "He didn't like to be dictated to as to who came to meetings," said one former member of the Truman administration. When amendments were added to the act in 1949, making the membership flexible, it "eased the situation for him."[56]

Between 1947 and 1950 other factors in addition to Truman's concerns over the National Security Act's wording may have also limited his attendance at the council's meetings. According to both Souers and Lay, Truman believed that his expressed opinions at sessions might terminate prematurely NSC discussions or influence the members' own deliberations and final decisions on policy.[57] Clark Clifford, Truman's White House Adviser, believed that Truman did not preside regularly over the NSC simply because he received a briefing from the Executive Secretary of the Council every workday morning.[58]

Whatever indifference or caution Truman may have felt about NSC meetings began to dissolve after the Berlin blockade in 1948 and the outbreak of the Korean War, when he presided over several council meetings. If the policy debates of the council bored him, the crises of Berlin and Korea provided him with urgent issues to focus upon. Truman would later concede that the creation of the NSC "added a badly needed new facility to the government."[59] By the end of the Truman administration the NSC had become a well-integrated and functioning organization. It had held 128 meetings and taken over 697 "actions" in the form of policy approvals and recommendations, the majority affecting the course of the Cold War.

Reform and Reorganization of the NSC

The first few years of the NSC were ones of organizational and procedural change. The first NSC Staff consisted of junior-level foreign service and military officers who rotated on loan from the Departments of State, Defense, Army, Navy, Air Force, the NSRB, and the CIA. James Lay pointed out that "because it was anticipated that the majority of problems falling to the council would relate primarily to foreign affairs, the State Department was asked to provide an official to head this interdepartmental group." State's official in that capacity came to be known as the NSC Staff Coordinator (see Appendix B).[60]

In its first year the NSC Staff consisted of nine members, including the Staff Coordinator. As the council's workload increased, the staff also grew; by 1949 it had enlarged to fifteen members. Yet by 1949 the NSC Staff also began to experience problems. As matters in addition to foreign policy came before the council--defense mobilization, atomic energy, military strategy--the Staff Coordinator's allegiance to the Department of State became a hindrance to the facilitation of policy reports of a political-military nature. Further complicating coordination by 1949 was the absence of a representative of the JCS on the NSC Staff. As a result, the NSC could not anticipate or allow for JCS opinions on papers before members attended a meeting of the council.[61] In addition, NSC members submitted departmental policy recommendations directly to the council, bypassing the NSC Staff. By the spring of 1949 staff work became confused, several policy problems were turned over to the consultants, and policy papers were delayed.

The consultants to the NSC served, in the words of Sidney Souers, as "the chief policy and operational planners for each department" on the council.[62] The NSC employed an average of six consultants between 1947 and 1950.

Because they were concerned primarily with the responsibilities of their parent department or agency, consultants devoted less and less attention to the NSC policy formation process (see Appendix B).[63]

In addition to the NSC's staff problems, the council members discovered as early as 1948 that the service secretaries from the Army, Navy, and Air Force outvoted the Secretary of Defense largely on the basis of parochial determinations. Secretary of Defense James Forrestal concluded thereafter that the National Military Establishment would be improved if it were converted into a single Department of Defense, thereby reducing the Departments of the Army, Navy, and Air Force from executive departments to military departments. The secretaries of the three military departments would no longer be members of the NSC. In addition, he recommended the creation of Under Secretary of Defense, and a Chairman of the Joints of Staff.[64] Forrestal submitted his plan to a newly-formed Task Force on National Security Organization, headed by Ferdinand Eberstadt, his old friend and former author of the National Security Act of 1947. The Task Force had begun its investigations in June 1948 as part of the first Hoover Commission on Governmental Reorganization, headed by former President Herbert Hoover. Within the next few months the Hoover Commission played a significant role in the re-organization of the NSC.[65]

On February 15, 1949, the Hoover Commission submitted its report to Congress and the Truman administration. It found "continued disharmony and lack of unified planning by the National Security Organization" and recommended that "more adequate and effective relations be developed at the working level among the appropriate committees of the Joint Chiefs of Staff... and the National Security Council" as well as the CIA and the NSRB. The commission also noted that the NSC had served as "an effective mechanism" in national security policy coordination, but warned that the fact "that the State

Department has not been subordinated to the military establishment does not mean this situation will continue." It suggested that the Secretary of Defense should serve as the only military representative on the NSC, and charged that the "presence of the three service secretaries led to discussions as to which services should do what rather than of what should be done."[66]

Regarding the NSC, the commission reported that the council had made "considerable progress" and commended it for the way it dealt with matters of immediate urgency. The commission also exhorted the NSC to recast its world outlook and to make appropriate changes in order to produce better long-range planning. In addition, it recommended that "vigorous steps be taken to improve the Central Intelligence Agency."[67] The commission concluded that: "The President's authority has been curtailed by statutory stipulation of the membership and duties" of the NSC under provisions set forth by the National Security Act of 1947. Suggesting changes in the act, it noted that its provisions "set up a rigid structure of federation rather than unification."[68]

The Task Force findings for the Hoover Commission produced an immediate re-organization of the NSC and amendments to the National Security Act. On June 20, 1949, Truman responded by submitting Reorganization Plan No. 4 to Congress, which authorized that the NSC be transferred to the Executive Office of the President. This change became effective on August 20, under the Reorganization Act of 1949. Thereafter, the NSC would become an "Inner Cabinet" of the White House.[69] On March 15, 1949, Truman also delivered a special message to Congress that requested legislative reforms based upon the Hoover Commission Task Force's recommendations. On August 22, 1949, Congress made amendments to the National Security Act of 1947, and Truman signed them into law . The amendments established that the membership of the NSC would include the

President, Vice-President, Secretary of Defense, Chairman of the NSRB, and "the Secretaries and Under Secretaries of other executive departments and of the military departments... when appointed by the President, by the advice and consent of the Senate." The amendments also created a Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, a Deputy Secretary of Defense, three Assistant Secretaries of Defense Research and Development Board (see Appendix A).[70]

Before the amendments became law, Executive Secretary Souers formulated specific instructions for the implementation of NSC policy papers. Souers had been concerned for some time about the delayed paperwork by the NSC Staff. As it became clearer that the National Security Act would be changed, he began work to facilitate preliminary staff work.[71] By the beginning of the Korean War, nearly three years after the creation of the NSC, the council and its staff had evolved into a functioning agency.

The Korean War motivated additional changes in the NSC. On July 6, 1950, Truman directed that the NSC would meet each Thursday, and that all major national security recommendations would be coordinated through the NSC. Truman presided over the meetings, missing only nine of seventy-one from June 28, 1950 to the end of his presidency on January 20, 1953 (see Appendix D).[72]

Although the amendments of 1949 removed the service secretaries as statuatory members of the NSC, one or more often accompanied Secretary of Defense Louis Johnson to the council's meetings. One or more of the members of the JCS and a number of other officials, including agency or departmental advisers, usually attended on invitation. The large number of participants consequently encouraged NSC members to present their departmental rather than individual viewpoint of a policy problem. Larger attendance also made consensus more difficult, with discussions rambling and important policy

actions taken later by NSC memorandum action. As a result, Truman limited attendance at the NSC's meetings to the statutory members, the Secretary of the Treasury, Director of the CIA, Chairman of the JCS, Special Consultant to the President (Sidney Souers), Special Assistant to the President (W. Averall Harriman), and the Executive Secretary of the NSC.[73]

In July 1950, Truman also authorized a change in staffing arrangements to provide for a Senior NSC Staff, made up of six officials nominated by the statutory members, the Director of the CIA, and Chairman of the JCS. At the end of the year, Truman approved the creation of an Office of Defense Mobilization (ODM). Its Director would be authorized to attend NSC meetings as well as nominate a Senior NSC Staff representative. In 1951 Congress passed the Mutual Security Act, making the Director for Mutual Security a statutory member of the NSC. The Director also named the Senior NSC Staff member. Thereafter, the number of NSC Staff personnel, including the Senior NSC Staff, averaged between twenty and twenty-five members (see Appendix B).[74] On August 6, 1951, Truman changed the NSC Staff again when he directed the creation of a Reporting Unit to collect progress reports from all council representatives. The progress reports combined information about the implementation of NSC policies and re-evaluated the effectiveness of the policy. All this information would be available to Truman should he consider a policy review.[75] One final change in NSC operation occurred once the Korean War began, when the NSC decreased its use of outside consultants. Instead, the NSC relied upon various ad hoc committees and sub committees, working groups, steering groups, and Special NSC Staff committees for the formulation of policy reports and long-range studies. These committees and groups were composed primarily of senior policymaking officials from the executive and military branches of government (see Appendix C).[76]

The Central Intelligence Agency

Under the NSC, and reporting directly to it, existed a central intelligence group similar to the one the Eberstadt Report of 1945 had recommended, but without the powers for domestic intelligence. The National Security Act of 1947 established the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), with a Director of Central Intelligence (DCI), appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate. According to guidelines in the National Security Act, the primary duties of the CIA would be to advise the NSC on intelligence activities, make recommendations for coordinating intelligence activities, and correlate, evaluate, and disseminate intelligence. The act also vaguely made reference to certain unspecified intelligence functions when it granted the CIA the duty "to perform such other functions and duties related to intelligence affecting the national security as the National Security Council may from time to time direct."[77] The CIA was a successor to the wartime Office of Strategic Services (OSS), headed by Major General William Donovan, but abolished by President Truman on October 1, 1945. The OSS had engaged in subversive activities world-wide during World War II, and the clause of the National Security Act of 1947 allowing the CIA "to perform such other functions and duties related to intelligence," may well have been intended to provide the CIA the same privilege. Whether the Truman administration or Congress intended to authorize the CIA the roles of covert actions or independent production of intelligence is a topic of concern for scholars.[78] Clark Clifford, President Truman's White House Adviser who worked on the Eberstadt draft of the National Security Act, maintains that by the language of the act, Congress intended for the CIA to engage in covert actions, but for such activities "to be restricted in scope and purpose."[79] By 1948 the NSC, using the CIA, was

conducting covert actions and establishing the mechanisms for such operations. That year it played a role in Italy's elections and participated in 1949 and 1950 in the organization of a Free Europe Committee and Radio Free Europe for the Soviet satellite countries.

President Truman believed that Pearl Harbor and World War II had taught the United States an important lesson, that "we had to collect intelligence." When Truman arrived at the White House in the spring of 1945, he "found that the needed intelligence information was not coordinated at any one place."[80] He therefore agreed that a central intelligence group would be necessary for a complete coordination in NSC policy. In respect to his beliefs, he had Executive Secretaries Souers and Lay brief him on intelligence matters each morning when they reviewed NSC policy recommendations. And near the end of his presidency, in a speech to a CIA training group, he told agency employees: "You are the organization, you are the intelligence arm that keeps the Executive informed so he can make decisions that will always be in the public interest for his own country."[81]

Despite Truman's appreciation and use of CIA intelligence information, he remained ambivalent about the agency's use of covert operations. In later years Truman seemed to be disturbed by the cloak-and-dagger activities undertaken by a peacetime CIA. Yet, during his presidency he had authorized the first covert actions in Italy taken by the agency.[82] Truman and the NSC generally did not oppose the use of covert actions, but only opposed an excessive reliance on them at the expense of the CIA's intelligence collection duties. On one occasion when Truman was critical of the operation of the CIA, Souers wrote him that the agency had indeed drifted "far from the original goal established by you."[83] Yet Souers obviously supported the direction the CIA

had taken. According to one who has studied the CIA, both "Truman and Souers were reluctant to use covert action."[84]

Like the parent NSC, the CIA also experienced growing pains during its early years. Rear Admiral Roscoe H. Hillenkoetter, the first Director of the agency, did not have the leadership skills and bureaucratic know-how to contend with other older intelligence services within the military branches or the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) that J. Edgar Hoover directed. Protecting their bureaucratic turf, the older intelligence branches often refused to cooperate with the CIA in its collection and reporting of intelligence information. As a result, the agency at times did not predict events in a timely and organized manner.[85] In an attempt to resolve the CIA's problem with coordination of intelligence, Executive Secretary Souers asked the NSC to approve the creation of a three-member survey group that would examine the organization, operations, and personnel of the CIA, and make recommendations for improvement. The NSC named Allen W. Dulles, a former OSS officer, chairman of the group, and two former military intelligence officers, William H. Jackson and Mathias F. Correa as co-members.[86]

The Dulles-Jackson-Correa committee submitted its final report to the NSC on January 27, 1949. The report criticized the CIA's early efforts in the fields of intelligence gathering and information coordination. It called for a merger of the agency's two main branch operations in order to produce more effective long-range national intelligence estimates and expand covert operations. Coupled with the Hoover Commission's Task Force on National Security that urged "that vigorous steps be taken to improve the Central Intelligence Agency and its work," the Dulles-Jackson-Correa survey recommendations were placed by Souers on the NSC's agenda. On July 7, 1949, the NSC concurred with the Dulles-Jackson-Correa report.[87] On August 4, 1949, the council voted its

approval of the report, authorizing the establishment of new CIA offices for long-range intelligence studies, the stream-lining of CIA covert and clandestine mechanisms, and the implementation of new scientific and technological operation.[88] And in addition to NSC-directed reforms for the CIA, Congress facilitated the agency's reorganization. Congressional approval of the Central Intelligence Agency Act in 1949 authorized special training of CIA personnel, increased appropriations for the agency, and granted the Director of the CIA the right to receive and spend funds without submitting to Congress a full account of expenditures.[89]

The Korean War brought about a change for the CIA, when Director Hillencotter returned to Navy sea command on October 7, 1950. From then until the end of the Truman presidency, General Walter Bedell Smith served as Director of the CIA. Smith had been General Dwight D. Eisenhower's Chief of Staff during World War II, and in the immediate post war years the United States Ambassador to the Soviet Union. According to one scholar, Smith "was pugnacious enough to intimidate anyone," and within days after he became DCI he, "made mincemeat of CIA bureaucracy."[90] Under his leadership, and with NSC approval, the CIA expanded its activities and further consolidated its internal operation.

When the National Security Council convened its first meeting on September 26, 1947, the Cold War had begun to intensify and the six members of council, the Executive Secretary, and the Director of the CIA who sat at the large mahogany table in the Cabinet Conference Room of the White House, contributed to its escalation. Each step in the chain of operational changes for the NSC and the CIA during the Truman administration that began that day helped further the development of a national security state and encouraged the policies of containment.

ENDNOTES

CHAPTER II

[1]The National Security Act of 1947, Public Law 253, 80th Congress, 1st sess., 26 July 1947 (Washington, D.C.: G.P.O., 1947).

[2]Gaddis, The Long Peace, 21-22.

[3]Ibid.

[4]Bernard Baruch first used the expression "Cold War" in a speech on atomic energy that he delivered before the United Nations on 6 June 1946. For Baruch's speech see The New York Times, 7 June 1946. The phrase "two ways of life" was used by Truman to categorize "Nazi, Communist or Fascist" regimes as "all alike" -- each as totalitarian systems that threatened "international peace and hence the security of the United States." On this point see Gaddis, Strategies of Containment, 66.

[5]Kennan to Secretary of State, Moscow Embassy Telegram #511 ("The Long Telegram"), 22 February 1946, U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States: 1946, VI (Washington, D.C.: GPO), 696-709. (Hereafter cited as FRUS.) "X" (George F. Kennan), "The Sources of Soviet Conduct," Foreign Affairs XXV (July 1947): 566-582.

[6]Kennan to Secretary of State, 22 February 1946, FRUS: 1946, VI, 700-701.

[7]Kennan, "The Sources of Soviet Conduct," 575-576. For one of the insightful studies of Kennan's containment see Gaddis, Strategies of Containment, 19-53. On the impact of Kennan's ideas also see Clark M. Clifford, interview by Jerry N. Hess, Oral History Collection, Harry S. Truman Library, George M. Elsey, interview by Charles T. Morrissey and Jerry N. Hess, Oral History Collection, Harry S. Truman Library.

[8]Sir Halford Mackinder, "The Geographic Pivot of History," Geographical Journal XXIII (1904): 421-444. For a fuller account of Mackinder's theory see idem, Democratic Ideals and Reality: A Study in the Politics of Reconstruction (New York: Holt, 1919).

[9]Nicholas John Spykman, The Geography of Peace (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1944).

[10]Alfred T. Mahan, The Problem of Asia and its effects upon International Policies (London: Sampson Low, 1900).

[11]John Jay, in Jacob E. Cooke, ed., The Federalist (Middletown, CT: Wesleyan University Press, 1961), 313

[12]Harold C. Syrett, ed., The Papers of Alexander Hamilton, Jan. 1796-March 1797, Volume XX (New York: Columbia University Press, 1974), 385.

[13]Richard B. Morris, ed., Alexander Hamilton and the Founding of a Nation (New York: Deal Press, 1957), 381.

[14]Ibid., 377.

[15]Demetrios Caraley, The Politics of Military Unification: A Study of Conflict and the Policy Process (New York: Columbia University Press, 1966), 3-4.

[16]Ibid., 5-7; Ernest R. May, "The Development of Political-Military Consultation in the United States," Political Science Quarterly 70 (June 1955): 162-166.

[17]May, "The Development of Political-Military Consultation," 167-168.

[18]Ibid., 171-173.

[19]Caraley, The Politics of Military Unification, 16. The JCS of 1941 was composed of representatives from the Army Chief of Staff, the Deputy Chief of Staff, the Chief of the General Staff's War Plans Division, the Navy Chief of Naval Operations, the Assistant Chief of Naval Operation, and the Director of the Office of Naval Operations Plans Division.

[20]Ibid., 17-20; May, "The Development of Political-Military Consultation, 174.

[21]Harry S. Truman, Memoirs of Harry S. Truman 1945: Volume I, Year of Decisions (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1955; reprint, New York: DaCapo Press, 1986), 431-432; May, "The Development of Political-Military Consultation," 175-178; Kenneth W. Condit, The History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff: The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy, Volume II 1947-1949 (Wilmington, DL: Michael Glazier, 1979), 6. (Hereafter cited as History of JCS, II.)

[22]Condit, History of JCS, II, 6.

[23]NSC 4, "Coordination of Foreign Information Measures," U.S. Congress, Senate, Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with respect to Intelligence Activities, Supplementary Detailed Staff Reports on Foreign and Military Intelligence Book IV, Report 94-755, 94th Congress, 2d sess. (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1976), 26. (Hereafter cited as Church Committee.)

[24]SANACC 390/1, 16 January 1948, Papers of Harry S. Truman, President's Secretary's File-NSC, Box 203, Harry S. Truman Library, Independence, Missouri. (Hereafter cited as PSF-NSC.)

[25]NSC 8, "The Position of the U.S. with Respect to Korea," 2 April 1948, PSF-NSC, Box 203.

[26]SANACC 398/4, 20 May 1948, FRUS: 1948, V, 2-3.

[27]NSC Record of Actions, 41st Meeting, 2 June 1949, PSF-NSC Subject File, Box 191; "Dissolution of SANACC," in NSC, "Policies of the Government of the United States of America Relating to the National Security, Volume II, 1949," 89, Ibid., Box 195. (Hereafter cited as NSC, "Policies of the Government, 1949.")

[28]The National Security Act of 1947, Public Law 253.

[29]Robert H. Ferrell, Harry S. Truman and the Modern American Presidency (Boston: Little, Brown, 1983), 40-41.

[30]Harry S. Truman, Memoirs of Harry S. Truman 1946-1952, Volume II, Years of Trial and Hope (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1956; reprint, New York: DaCapo Press, 1986), 56. (Hereafter cited as Years of Trial and Hope,)

[31]William Hillman, ed., Harry S. Truman in His Own words (New York: Farrar, Straus & Young as Mr. President, 1952; reprint, New York: Bonanza Books, 1984), 14-15.

[32]Truman, Years of Trial and Hope, 46-47.

[33]Ibid., 46.

[34]Clark M. Clifford Oral History Interview; George M. Elsey Oral History Interview; Stuart Symington, interview by James R. Fuchs Oral History Collection, Harry S. Truman Library. For the War Department's and Truman's plans of unification see Caralay, The Politics of Military Unification, 57-85. For Truman's 1944 proposal in writing see Harry S. Truman, "Our Armed Forces Must Be United," Collier's, 26 August 1944.

[35]Dean Acheson, Present at the Creation, My Years in the State Department (New York: Penguin Books, 1969), 16. Acheson's quotation cited in Walter Millis, ed., The Forrestal Diaries (New York: Viking Press, 1951), 129.

[36]Clark M. Clifford Oral History Interview; George M. Elsey Oral History Interview. For a thorough account of the various departmental and agency plans as well as Forrestal's own plan see Sander, "Truman and the national Security Council," 369-388; Nelson, "President Truman and the Evolution of the National Security Council," 361-362; Truman, Year of Decisions, 77-78. For Forrestal's own recollection of work on the National Security Act see Millis, The Forrestal Diaries, 59-64, 118-121.

[37]U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Naval Affairs, Unification of the War and Navy Departments and Postwar Organization for National Security, 79th Congress, 1st sess. (Washington, D.C.: G.P.O., 1945). Until the creation of the National Security Council, President Truman relied on an interim policy-forming group for advice -- the National Intelligence Authority (NIA). The NIA was founded by Executive Order on 22 January 1946, and comprised of Truman's Secretaries of State, War, the Navy, and his Chief of Staff. Within the NIA was an intelligence-gathering section known as the Central Intelligence Group)CIG). It was designed to take the place of the Army's dismantled Office of Strategic Services (OSS). Serving as Director of the CIG was Sidney W. Souers (January-June 1946), who later would serve as the Executive Secretary of the NSC from 1947 to 1950. His successor was General Hoyt S. Vandenberg (June 1946 - May 1947), who later would serve as the Secretary of the Air Force.

[38]The National Security Act of 1947, Public Law 253.

[39]Ibid. The NSRB was responsible for the acquisition and stock-piling of scarce metals such as tin, aluminum, and steel. On this point see Stuart Symington Oral History Interview.

[40]Margaret Truman, Harry S. Truman (New York: William Morrow, 1973), 332; Biographical Sketch of Sidney William Souers, Papers of Sidney Souers-NSC, Box 1, Harry S. Truman Library (Hereafter cited as PSS); Sidney W. Souers, "Policy Formulation for National Security," American Political Science Review 43 (June 1949): 537; Cabell Phillips, "Men Around the President," New York Times Magazine, 11 September 1949, 69.

[41]On the role of the "custodian-manager" see David K. Hall, "The 'Custodian-Manager' of the Policymaking Process," in Karl F. Inderfurth and Loch K. Johnson, eds., Decisions of the Highest Order: Perspectives on the National Security Council (Pacific Grove, CA: Brooks/Cole, 1988), 146-154.

[42]Biographical Sketch of Sidney William Souers, PSS-NSC, Box 1; Current Biography 1949 (New York: The H.W. Wilson Co., 1949), 577-578; David F. Barrett, "Admiral Sidney W. Souers," The Eastern Underwriter, 18 December 1959; Thomas Troy, Donovan and the CIA: A History of the Establishment of the Central Intelligence Agency (Frederick, MD: University Publications of America, 1981), 250-252.

[43]Memorandum, Sidney Souers to Harry Truman, 17 November 1949, PSS-NSC, Box 1; Souers, "Policy Formulation for National Security," 537; "The Security Council at Work," The Reporter, 10 May 1949, 9; Joseph and Steward Alsop, "How Our Foreign Policy is Made," The Saturday Evening Post, 30 April 1949, 116.

[44]Stuart Symington Oral History Interview; Phillips, "The Men Around the President," 69; Alsop, "How Our Foreign Policy is Made," 114.

[45]Sidney Souers to Ferdinand Eberstadt, 4 October 1949, PSS-White House Counsel, Box 1.

[46]Harry Truman to Sidney Souers, 22 December 1949, Ibid.

[47]The New York Times, 22 December 1949, 6; 17 January 1950, 29; Current Biography 1950 (New York: The H.W. Wilson Co., 1950), 329-331; "People of the Week," U.S. News and World Report, 30 December 1949, 36-37.

[48]Richard E. Neustadt, "Notes on the White House Staff Under President Truman," June 1953, 40, Papers of Richard E. Neustadt, Subject File, Box 10, Harry S. Truman Library.

[49]Souers, "Policy Formulation for National Security,"537. For specific staff members and consultants see Appendix of this study.

[50]Ibid, 540; James F. Lay, Jr., in Francis H. Heller, ed., The Truman White House: The Administration of the Presidency 1945-1953 (Lawrence, KS: The Regents Press of Kansas, 1980), 207; Raymond P. Brandt, "How U.S. Defense Policies Are Made; The Inside Story of National Security Council," St. Louis-Post Dispatch, 29 February 1948, 1C.

[51]Lay, in Heller, The Truman White House, 207; Souers, "Policy Formulation for National Security," 539.

[52]The Concept of the National Security Council, 26 July 1948, in "Current Policies of the Government Relating to National Security, Volume III," PSF-NSC, Box 195.

[53]Patrick Anderson, The Presidents' Men: White House Assistants of Franklin D. Roosevelt, Harry S. Truman, Dwight D. Eisenhower, John F. Kennedy and Lyndon B. Johnson (New York: Doubleday, 1968), 172.

[54]Summary of Discussion at the 38th Meeting, 21 April 1949, PSF-NSC, Box 220.

[55]Truman, Years of Trial and Hope, 59-60.

[56]Elmer Staats, in Kenneth W. Thompson, ed., Portraits of American Presidents, Volume II The Truman Presidency: Intimate Perspectives (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1984), 93.

[57]Souers, "Policy Formulation for National Security," 541; Lay, in Heller, The Truman White House, 207.

[58]Anderson, The Presidents' Men, 170.

[59]Truman, Years of Trial and Hope, 59.

[60]Souers, "Policy Formulation for National Security," 537; Lay, in Heller, The Truman White House, 207.

[61]Memorandum, Hugh Farley to Sidney Souers, "Procedure for JCS Views on NSC Reports," 14 October 1948, PSS-NSC, Box 1. The Secretary of Defense, on his own initiative, circulated NSC papers to the JCS for their comments, then returned them to the NSC.

[62]Souers, "Policy Formulation for National Security," 538.

[63]This was true of George Kennan, who resigned from the State Department in 1949, as well as others.

[64]Clark M. Clifford Oral History Interview; George M. Elsey Oral History Interview; National Military Establishment, First Report of the Secretary of Defense (Washington, D.C.: G.P.O., 1948). This report stemmed largely from interservice fighting for scarce military budget. Forrestal had met with his chiefs at Key West (March 12-14) and Newport (August 20-22) to resolve the differences, but to no avail.

[65]The (Hoover) Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government had been approved July 7, 1947 by the 80th Congress. The Task Force on National Security Organization was but one of many "task forces" established by the commission. The Hoover Commission's recommendations helped Truman reorganize much of the Executive Branch and its administrative operations. For a thorough examination of the reorganization see William E. Pemberton, Bureaucratic Politics: Executive Reorganization During the Truman Administration (Columbia, MO: University of Missouri Press, 1979).

[66]The National Security Organization: A Report to the Congress by the Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government, February 1949 (Washington, D.C.: G.P.O., 1949), 5, 19; Foreign Affairs: A Report to the Congress by the Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government, February 1949 (Washington, D.C.: G.P.O., 1949), 62, 68.

[67]The National Security Organization, 19; idem, Appendix G, 2, Papers of Harry S. Truman, Records of the NSC, Box 12, Harry S. Truman Library (Hereafter cited as PHT-NSC.)

[68]The National Security Organization, 8-9.

[69]NSC, "Policies of the Government, 1949," 117; Pemberton, Bureaucratic Politics, 114; George A Wyeth, Jr., "The National Security Council," Journal of International Affairs (1954): 187. For the role of the Bureau of the Budget in the transfer of the NSC to the Executive Office see Anna Kasten Nelson, "National Security: Inventing a Process (1945 - 1960)," in Hugh Helco and Lester Salamon, eds., The Illusion of the Presidency (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1981), 234-235.

[70]Memorandum, Clark Clifford to Harry Truman, "Revision of the National Security Act," 8 February 1949, Papers of Clark M. Clifford, National Military Establishment, Box 16, Harry S. Truman Library; U.S. President, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United Stated, Harry S. Truman, Containing the Public Messages, Speeches, and Statements of the President, 1949 (Washington, D.C.: G.P.O., 1964), 163-164, 417-418 (Hereafter cited as Truman Public Papers); Truman, Years of Trial and Hope, 50; The National Security Act of 1947, As Amended, Public Law 216, 81st Congress, 1st sess., 10 August 1949 (Washington, D.C.: G.P.O., 1949).

[71]Memorandum, Sidney Souers to NSC, "Implementation of NSC Papers," 12 August 1949, PSF-NSC, Box 191.

[72]Minutes of the 60th Meeting, July 6, 1950, PSF-NSC, Box 208.

[73]Harry Truman to Sidney Souers, 19 July 1950, PSS-White House Counsel, Box 1.

[74]George M. Elsey Oral History Interview; Organization and Procedures of the National Security Council: NSC Reorganization, in NSC, "Policies of the Government of the United States of America Relating to the National Security, Volume III, 1950," 94-95, PSF-NSC, Box 195 (Hereafter cited as NSC, Policies of the Government, 1950"). See Appendix of this study for members of the Senior NSC Staff.

[75]NSC, "Policies of the Government of the United States of Relating to the National Security, Volume VI, 1951," 101, 164, PSF-NSC, Box 195 (Hereafter cited as "Policies of the Government, 1951,").

[76]The better known committee was the Ad Hoc Committee for NSC 68. See Appendix of this study for the various committees and groups and their members.

[77]The National Security Act of 1947, Public Law 253.

[78]For various opinions see Church Committee, 25-31; Tom Braden, "The Birth of the CIA," American Heritage 27 (February 1977): 11-13; John Prados, Presidents' Secret Wars: CIA and Pentagon Covert Operations Since World War II (New York: William Morrow, 1986), 27-28; Phillip Knightley, The Second Oldest Profession: Spies and Spying in the Twentieth Century (New York: W.W. Norton, 1986), 246; John Ranelagh, The Agency: The Rise and Decline of the CIA (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1987), 112-116; Rhodri Jeffrey-Jones, The CIA and American Democracy (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1989), 41.

[79]Clark Clifford quote cited in Harold Honju Koh, The National Security Constitution: Sharing Power After the Iran-Contra Affair (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1990), 103.

[80]Truman, Years of Trial and Hope, 56.

[81]Harry Truman quote cited in Walter Laquer, A World of Secrets: The Uses and Limits of Intelligence (New York: Basic Books, 1985), 72-73.

[82]Ibid., 73.

[83]Sidney Souers to Harry Truman, 27 December 1963, PSS-Correspondence, Box 1. Truman had been critical after the Kennedy administration's Bay of Pigs fiasco.

[84]Jones, The CIA and American Democracy, 62.

[85]Ibid., 45-46.

[86]Ibid., 86; Survey of the Central Intelligence Agency, NSC, "Policies of the Government of the United States of America Relating to the National Security, Volume I, 1947-1948," 66, PSF-NSC, Box 195. (Hereafter cited as NSC. "Policies of the Government, 1947-1948.")

[87]The Dulles-Jackson-Correa Report to the National Security Council on the Central Intelligence Agency and National Organization for Intelligence, January 1, 1949, in William M. Leary, ed., The Central Intelligence Agency: History and Documents (University, AL: The University of Alabama Press, 1984), 134-142; NSC 50, "The Central Intelligence Agency and National Organization for Intelligence," NSC, "Policies of the Government, 1949," 109, PSF-NSC, Box 195.

[88]NSC 50, "The Central Intelligence Agency and National Organization for Intelligence," 4 August 1949, NSC, "Policies of the Government, 1949," 109, PSF-NSC, Box 195.

[89]Jones, The CIA and American Democracy, 59-60; Ranelagh, The Agency, 193-195.

[90]Prados, Presidents' Secret Wars, 82.

CHAPTER III

NSC POLICIES AND RECOMMENDATIONS, 1947-1948

At the first meeting of the NSC on September 26, 1947, Executive Secretary Souers addressed the council and its staff concerning policies and procedures. Perhaps more important, the council noted and discussed the first of many monthly reports that the CIA produced--the "Review of the World Situation as It Relates to the Security of the United States." The CIA maintained that the Soviets were intent upon spreading their influence by "deliberately conducting political, economic, and psychological warfare against the United States." In addition, the CIA stressed that "the greatest danger" to the security interest of the United States would be the "possibility of economic collapse in Western Europe" as well as the lack of political "stabilization and recovery in Europe and Asia." This in turn, the report concluded, might lead to the "consequent accession to power of Communist elements."[1]

The NSC and Early Cold War Policies

In fact, Communist involvement threatening the stability and independence of Greece was already underway. The problems in Greece provided the first test of the containment policy and tested the political-military coordination capabilities of the NSC. By 1947 Britain had decided to withdraw its support from Greece, leaving the country tentatively vulnerable to a Communist take

over. Since the end of World War II Greece had been embroiled in a civil war, wracked by rampant inflation, and ruled by an oligarchic right-wing government. The British had restored the Greek monarchy to power, maintained occupying forces in Greece, and provided assistance to its beleaguered economy. By 1946 Communists and other leftist resistance groups formed an alliance to oust the monarchy. Throughout 1946-1947 guerilla warfare ensued and escalated, due largely to aid the Communist regimes of Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, and Albania provided. The British government decided that stopping Communism in Greece was too difficult and expensive and thus in February 1947, the British government announced it was terminating all forms of assistance to Greece. By the time the NSC analyzed the situation in Greece, the United States already had announced the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan.

In the spring of 1947, Congress studied the amount of economic aid necessary for Greece under a proposed Greek-Turkish Aid Act, and learned from the Truman administration that United States military personnel might be needed to provide technical assistance and training for the Greek National Army. Following an intensive inspection of Greece, Major General Stephen J. Chamberlin, Director of Army Intelligence, reported on October 20 that the situation was desperate for the Greek nationalists. Poorly equipped, ill-trained, and demoralized, the Greek National Army, General Chamberlin noted, ran a high risk of losing to the communist insurgents. The general recommended that the United States send a military advisory and planning group for the purpose of offering operational advice to the Greek national forces.[2]

Secretary of State George C. Marshall forwarded Chamberlin's report to the NSC. On October 31, 1947, the council approved his suggestions and recommended "the diversion for military purposes" portions of American financial assistance "previously allocated" for the economic reconstruction of

Greece.[3] Secretary Marshall transmitted the NSC's request on November 4, and President Truman approved the dispatching of nearly 200 United States military personnel and financial support the next day.[4] Thus, the United States's Cold War military policy was implemented for the first time on the basis of NSC recommendation.

By the fall of 1947 the Soviet Union had tightened its control over Eastern Europe. Congress debated the placement of an embargo on US-Soviet bloc trade in an effort to cut off Western trade and technology from the USSR and its satellites. The Department of State did not believe that strict export controls were needed and that any loopholes in export laws were too tedious to warrant significant revision. At the same time the NSC initiated its study of export controls to the USSR and Eastern Europe.[5] At its fourth meeting on December 17, 1947, the NSC adopted a proposal of the Secretary of Commerce recommending stricter controls be placed on all American exports of scarce and strategic materials to Europe. The NSC also agreed to apply the "R procedure," restraining the trade of military-related material to postwar "recovery zones." Because the report declared all of Europe a recovery zone, requiring export controls, the "R procedure" controlled all shipments of goods to Eastern European nations. The Department of State approved the report, although, in the words of Under Secretary of State Robert Lovett, it "would prefer controls to be placed upon specific export items for the world at large."[6] Truman approved the recommendations the following day.[7] As a result, the Truman administration by 1948 had eliminated virtually all trade with the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. The only additional export control measures that the NSC considered concerned the sale of aircraft-related parts to the Eastern bloc and the USSR.[8]

Economic and military measures employed during 1947 were innovative foreign policy methods--methods of a newly-operating national security state. But there was another option that the United States began to employ actively early in 1948--covert action. Commonly referred to as "psychological warfare," covert action was an instrument designed to frustrate "Soviet ambitions without provoking open conflict."[9] SANACC proposed psychological warfare in late 1946.[10] One of the weakness of the older intelligence services had been the lack of any effective covert intelligence capability. SANACC had recognized the flaw, and so did the NSC. On December 17, 1947, the NSC and President Truman approved the Pentagon report, which maintained, although vaguely, that the CIA would in conjunction with military intelligence and Department of State guidance, use "information measures designed to influence attitudes in foreign countries in a direction favorable to the attainment of US objectives."[11] Two weeks later the CIA established a Special Procedures Group (SPG) to carry out the mandate.[12] The SPG's first assignments were to initiate psychological operations in Central and Eastern Europe.[13] In preparation for these and future activities, the NSC approved SPG acquisition of a printing plant for clandestine publications, a short-wave radio transmitter for signals across the "Iron Curtain," and the first units of balloon fleet to carry print materials into the Soviet satellite countries of Eastern Europe.[14]

Psychological warfare marked the beginning of an early and progressive bureaucratic growth of the National Security Council and the Central Intelligence Agency. In fact, by 1947, the CIA had adopted a secret slogan, "bigger than State by forty-eight."[15] As one historian of the intelligence community noted, the CIA "was not merely in the business of collecting information about what was happening in the world ...it saw its duty as making things happen."[16]

The NSC's influence upon foreign and military policy increased in 1948 as tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union intensified. In February 1948, a Communist coup succeeded in Czechoslovakia. One month later the Soviet delegation stormed out of the Four Power talks in Berlin. At the same time, the growing Communist party support at the polls and within labor organization threatened Italy and France. From January through April of that year, the NSC concentrated on developments in Greece and Italy. By summer, however, national security managers became more concerned with Western Europe, as resistance to American economic reconstruction efforts there emerged and the Soviet Union initiated the blockade of Berlin.

Intelligence estimates and reports in early 1948 stressed that although the Soviet Union had not intervened directly in the ongoing Greek civil war, it was providing "increasing moral and material aid to the Greek insurgents through [its] Satellite States." Concluding that the Soviet Union would avoid a "direct conflict with the United States," the CIA warned that an absence of American counteraction in Greece "could result in substantiative psychological and political repercussions," and in eventual "international panic." Focusing upon geopolitical and economic interests, the intelligence reports advocated a greater American presence in Greece to prevent Soviet military access to and "domination of the Straits," the fall of Italy to the Communist party, and Soviet domination of Iran and the Kurdish area of Iraq. The most serious economic consequence of indirect or direct Soviet control of Greece that caused the CIA concern was the possible loss of United States access to "petroleum resources of the Middle East," an area that provided about forty percent of the world's oil reserves. This petroleum was necessary for the economic recovery of Western Europe.[17]

Despite intelligence assessments that urged an ever greater American presence in Greece, debate over the application of direct American action there developed within the Truman administration. In January 1948, the NSC staff advocated the deployment of United States troops to Greece if Communist forces from Soviet bloc nations overtly intervened there. At the fifth meeting of the NSC, Secretary Marshall pointed out that the report had not assessed the military forces and logistics of the enemy. Furthermore, the report neglected, said Marshall, to take into account any possible effects troop deployment to the Mediterranean would have on the American public or the domestic economy. Based on the council's discussions of those weaknesses, the administration deferred any action on the NSC report and returned the draft to the NSC staff for revision.[18] When completed, the revised version specified various options the United States should take to defeat the Greek insurgency. It recommended that the United States opt for one or more of the following actions: (1) the deployment of a token combat force; (2) strengthening of United States forces in the Mediterranean region; or, (3) the partial mobilization of United States forces as an indication of America's determination to resist communist expansionism. On February 12, 1948, the council made minor revisions in the report and sent it to Truman. The next day Truman approved the new version as policy.[19]

In the opinion of members of the JCS, the possibility of partial mobilization in the Mediterranean or the Middle East as outlined in the report required increasing appropriations for the supplemental military budget of 1948. President Truman refused to increase the budget.[20] By the arrival of summer, the NSC Staff issued a new draft report on Greece. In this report it recommended that military action should only be made "in the light of the overall world situation and not primarily as a contribution to the solution of the problem in Greece." Reflecting JCS opinion, the report cautioned restraint and

the continued application of indirect military tactical advice and supply support to the Greek National Army. The council also amended the report to guarantee reevaluation of United States policy toward Greece should the situation deteriorate. The report was forwarded to the President who approved it on June 21.[21]

As United States financial assistance to Greece increased, Yugoslavia provided more support for insurgent forces. The Communist guerrillas conducted several successful raids early in the year with the help of the Yugoslavian government. The Yugoslavian assistance was for naught, for some months later the insurgents suffered major defeats, not because of American intervention, but due to a split in the Greek Communist party as a consequence of Yugoslavia's June 1948 expulsion from the Soviet bloc. Pro-Yugoslavian forces implemented full-scale conventional warfare in an effort to counter American assistance, and the switch from insurgent raids to larger battles proved disastrous for the Yugoslavia-allied Greeks. By the spring of 1949 a cease-fire was implemented, and five months later, on October 16, 1949, the Greek civil war ended with a reactionary national government in control of the country.[22]

For the NSC and the Truman administration, Greece's needs were less important than the general security and United States interests in the overall Mediterranean area. This had been the conclusion in late 1947 as the British stepped up efforts to withdraw from the region. By 1948 Greece became the focus of the NSC.[23] The Truman administration concluded that the Greek national victory in 1949 was an American victory against international Communism. United States economic containment coupled with military containment thus had succeeded in Greece. After 1949, Greece was the model that the United States followed in its counterinsurgency efforts, and this success

seemed to predict that anti-Communist guerrilla operations in other parts of the world--particularly in the Philippines and in Indochina--would for a long time be a viable option for the United States.[24]

The NSC and the March War Scare of 1948

The cautious position that the NSC took regarding direct military action in the Greek civil war was the result of a war scare. Pentagon advisers feared the provocation of a war with the Soviet Union.[25] The crisis intensified when General Lucius D. Clay, Commander in Chief of the European Command, cabled General Omar Bradley, Army Chief of Staff, that "sudden warfare" could be precipitated due to Soviet military activities in West Berlin.[26] The threat of war initiated a flurry of intelligence reports from the CIA that helped to reinforce the scare. Many of the reports, however, reinforced this by explaining that United States successes in Europe posed an economic and military threat to the Soviets.[27]

One widely-circulated March 2, 1948, CIA estimate, when considered with information from the intelligence branches of the State, Army, Navy, and Air Force Departments, had an especially significant influence upon the national security establishment. This report indicated that the coup that had occurred in Czechoslovakia in February had been consistent with the "Soviet intention" to consolidate its control in Eastern Europe "as a vital measure of security". The fall of Czechoslovakia, the CIA maintained, did not reflect "any sudden increase in Soviet capabilities, or any change in current Soviet policies or tactics." If "any direct Soviet military action" developed during the year, the CIA warned, it would be as a result of "on going American initiatives" in Western Europe. However, the Communist coup in Czechoslovakia had "created widespread

apprehension," the CIA asserted, and communist "political action committees" in Italy and France posed a serious threat to the security of the Western bloc because they were of a "similar" type to those that had "played so effective a part in the Czechoslovakian coup." United States intelligence concluded that the "most serious and immediate danger of an extension of Communist influence in Western Europe is the growing possibility of a Popular Democratic Front victory in the Italian elections of April 8."[28]

The coup in Czechoslovakia, warned the NSC, indicated that the United States needed to do more to oppose Soviet Communist expansionism more actively. In the midst of the March war scare over Europe, the NSC began a re-examination of United States political-military strategy. In this policy study the NSC proposed a counter-offensive against Communism that included the continuance of "overwhelming U.S. superiority in atomic weapons, the rearming of the United States under universal military training, the strengthening of United States assistance to Europe", and "a coordinated program to support underground resistance movements behind the iron curtain." The report was vague about the implementation of its proposed programs, but it gave some guidelines for future United States Cold War policy initiatives the NSC considered. Truman had not yet approved the new report when events in Italy turned his attention from Eastern Europe towards the Mediterranean once again.[29]

The NSC and the Cold War in Italy

A joint United States-British occupation of Italy that had existed until the ratification of a peace treaty in February 1947 encountered problems. The terms of the treaty stipulated that the last Allied troops would withdraw by

December 14, 1948. Italy would forfeit its colonial empire in North Africa, and the Italian government would agree to specific reparations and military restrictions. In addition, the area in and around Trieste, a controversial northern locale with neighboring Yugoslavia, was to become a "free territory" under a combined United States-British peace-keeping operation.[30]

The Italians considered the peace treaty humiliating. Complicating matters, the Italian economy suffered from high postwar inflation and unemployment under an unstable government of Christian Democrats and communist-socialist factions. Premier Alcide de Gasperi dissolved the government in May 1947 in an effort to remove the leftist influence. In retaliation, and hoping to remove the de Gasperi leadership, the left-wing groups initiated several nation-wide strikes.[31]

As the deadline for withdrawal of United States-British troops neared and reports of Communist political activity in Italy reached the administration, Truman and Souers put the matter before the NSC for evaluation.[32] The NSC was already alerted to the problem, for on September 27, 1947, Secretaries Lovett and Forrestal had submitted a Policy Planning Staff (PPS) report that the Department of State produced that predicted a Communist coup, assisted by Yugoslavian military aid. George Kennan of the PPS suggested that Italy was the "key point" in Europe, for if the communists were to win there, "our whole position in [the] Mediterranean, and possibly Europe as well, would probably be undermined." Truman began to feel the pressure. In a letter to his wife, three days after receiving the Department of State report, he wrote: "Yesterday was one of the most hectic days...Suppose, for instance, that Italy should fold up and that Tito then would move into the Po Valley. All the Mediterranean coast of France is open to Russian occupation. We withdraw from Greece and Turkey and prepare for war. It must not happen."[33] After contemplation, the NSC

recommended that the United States send technical advisers to the Italian armed forces and actively combat Communist propaganda in Italy with psychological warfare, and "by all other practicable means." It concluded that should "a communist-dominated government [be] set up in all or part of Italy" prior to the withdrawal of United States occupational forces, the United States should suspend all original agreements with Italy and retain its military presence there.[34]

On March 10, 1948, the day the CIA circulated its March intelligence report, President Truman approved the NSC recommendation for arms shipment to Italy.[35] With elections in Italy scheduled for April, Truman also approved yet another NSC suggestion that the United States return Triest to Italy and authorized CIA covert political and financial assistance to the Christian Democratic and Social Democratic parties in the forthcoming elections.[36]

The CIA had already begun a propaganda campaign in Italy by the time Truman approved returning Triest and the beginning of covert operation. Most American propaganda stressed the importance of the Marshall Plan to the Italian economy and its recovery, as well as United States support of the de Gasperi government. Italy was saturated with documentary films on American democracy. Hollywood distributors also made copies of the movie "Ninotchka," Greta Garbo's film of 1939 that satirized Soviet life, available to Italian movie houses. The Voice of America increased radio broadcasts to Italy featuring Italian-Americans like former boxing champion Rocky Graziano and New York City Mayor Vincent Impelliteri, in broadcasts with other famous Americans such as Dinah Shore, Bing Crosby, Eleanor Roosevelt, and Walter Pidgeon.[37] American propaganda influenced the election in Italy, helping the Christian Democrats poll nearly forty-nine percent of the popular vote and allowing them to capture a majority of seats in the Italian Parliament.[38]

Making CIA Covert Action Possible

Encouraged by the success of American covert intervention in the Italian elections, George Kennan responded in May with a proposal for the expansion of United States covert activity from that of psychological and propaganda warfare to one of covert political action for the specific purpose of lending support to anti-Communist parties within foreign governments.[39] Weeks later the NSC approved Kennan's recommendation. On August 19 the NSC issued a directive that would increase United States covert operations against the Soviet Union, and in all "threatened countries of the free world." It expanded covert actions related to and including political, psychological, and economic warfare, sabotage, anti-sabotage, various modes of subversion against hostile states, and limited paramilitary contingency operations. It also established the Office of Policy Coordination (OPC) within the CIA. It placed only a single restriction on the OPC; its operations had to be "planned and conducted so that any U.S. government responsibility for them is not evident to unauthorized persons and that if uncovered the U.S. government can plausible disclaim any responsibility for them."[40] The NSC placed OPC under the supervision of the Secretaries of State and Defense. The Secretary of State would choose the OPC's director. In August, Secretary Marshall selected Frank Wisner, a former OSS agent assigned to Rumania and then Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Occupied Areas. William Colby, one of the agents Wisner recruited into the OPC, recalled that: "Wisner landed like a dynamo, read all the intelligence and set out to form a clandestine force worldwide."[41] Wisner's OPC drew eventually from a large number of Ivy League graduates and OSS veterans. A determined man, Wisner worked to develop an organization that epitomized the "can-do" attitude characteristic of the old OSS.

The NSC report and guidelines differed in one respect from Kennan's original proposal in placing the responsibility for covert actions under the authority of the CIA, not the Department of State. In addition, all covert operations would be allocated funds from the CIA's budget, and thus would escape congressional oversight. By early 1948, OPC operated on a budget of $4.7 million with a staff of 302 intelligence officers and seven field stations. By 1949 its budget and staff doubled.[42] The United States national security state had passed a crucial stage in development with the official implementation of this report. The Cold War had evolved into a reality that security managers of the NSC and the Truman administration seemingly could manage through a combination of economic and military containment and covert action. But what had been a moderate, and perhaps cautious approach by the NSC through late 1947 and early 1948, took on the tone of a strong anti-Soviet position by the summer of 1948. Then, the supposed war crisis environment that had enveloped the Truman administration and the Pentagon in March, had become a near reality over the stabilization of Germany and the Berlin crisis and blockade of 1948-1949.

The NSC and the Cold War in Western Europe

At the Potsdam Conference in 1945, the Big Three Powers had agreed that Germany should eventually be reunited. From 1945 through 1947, the Truman administration pressed for German reunification based on the concept of a Western European "third force." The "third force," according to one historian of the Cold War, would be "built upon a foundation of European self-confidence." It would provide a balance of power in Europe, a more viable alternative for the United States than a bipolar sphere of influence system

between the Soviet Union and the United States. Under a balance of power system, Western Europe would exist as a politically independent, economically prosperous center of power around a unified Germany. Through 1946 and 1947, however, German issues such as currency reform and reparations payments created Allied differences with the USSR at the London Conference of Foreign Ministers. The conference adjourned in December 1947 with no firm resolution on the issues and with no unified Germany.[43]

The failure of the London Foreign Ministers Conference in 1947 doomed the "third force" concept that rested upon a unified Germany. Instead, the Truman administration opted for the second-best chance, the integration of western Germany into the European community under the Marshall Plan's European Recovery Program (ERP). By doing so, the Truman administration hoped it could forestall American military spending and prevent a major United States commitment to Europe's security. That would not be the case.

On March 17, 1948, Britain, France, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg signed the Brussels Pact, a collective defense treaty. This pact was called the Western Union, based upon the ideas of Ernest Bevin, the British Foreign Minister. Bevin hoped it would establish a precedent for a future North Atlantic alliance around which the United States, Germany, Scandinavia, Greece, Italy, Portugal, and Spain could organize defensive measures. Concerned about the possibility of a Soviet military attack and the reintegration and rearmament of western Germany, Britain and France insisted that Western Union defense planning could not ultimately succeed without a firm United States commitment to Europe's security.[44]

The Czechoslovakian coup and the war scare of February and March 1948 united United States security opinion behind the idea of a western alliance. On March 12, Secretary Marshall told the British that the United States

was "prepared to proceed at once in the joint discussions on the establishment of an Atlantic security system." Five days later, Truman advised Congress about the European situation.[45] On March 20, the NSC called for "a world-wide counter-offensive" against the Soviet bloc, including United States military assistance to the Western Union. Shortly thereafter, secret consultations concerning United States participation in an alliance began at the Pentagon between the United States, British, and Canadian representatives.[46]

Anticipating the creation of a North Atlantic alliance, the Department of State sent the NSC a position paper, prepared by the PPS, on United States policy regarding the Western Union.[47] This paper became part of an NSC report that recommended that the United States support, but not join, the Brussels Pact. Instead, it suggested that the United States consider the development of a larger collective security alliance that involved the United States, other North Atlantic nations, and members of the Brussels Pact. The NSC also suggested that the United States provide military assistance to potential North Atlantic alliance members and that the President call a conference to draft a mutual defense treaty modeled after the Rio Treaty of 1947 with Latin American nations. The treaty would also reiterate that an attack on one member nation would be considered an attack against all member nations.[48]

After receiving the report, the JCS requested that the NSC clarify the military objectives of the proposed policy. Before the NSC could do so, however, the Department of State submitted a modification to the NSC report recommending that European members demonstrate a need and willingness for "self-help" prior to any United States military assistance. Instead of making specific terms of reference regarding a treaty, the report contained an Annex with a resolution for introduction in the United States Senate. It sanctioned "the

progressive development of regional and other collective arrangements for individual and collective self-defense." The report also recommended that Congress be consulted before any action on a treaty. The NSC did not argue with this last provision and deferred action on the suggestions.[49] At the same time under Secretary Lovett and Department of State officials initiated several exploratory meetings with the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and its chairman, Senator Arthur Vandenberg, a proponent of foreign policy bipartisanship efforts.[50]

By June 11 the Senate voted for Resolution 239, better-known as the Vandenberg Resolution, after its author Senator Arthur Vandenberg. The resolution repeated verbatim the report of the Department of State, suggesting that the United States pursue establishment of "regional and other collective arrangements" for mutual defense.[51] The adoption of the Vandenberg Resolution made it likely that the Senate would approve a collective treaty along its line and assured United States membership and participation in the North Atlantic Treaty Alliance (NATO) by April 4, 1949. On July 1 the NSC adopted an amended version of the State Department's report that included the Vandenberg Resolution. The council also adopted a new report on military assistance to noncommunist nations. It also reassured the JCS the report also noted that "excessive" assistance would be prohibited if it jeopardized "the minimum material requirements of the United States armed forces," and that military aid to noncommunist countries "should not be inconsistent with strategic concepts approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff." Early in July Truman approved the final draft of this policy statement.[52]

The Berlin Crisis: Blockade and Airlift

Meanwhile, the London Conference of the Council of Foreign Ministers reconvened from February through June of 1948 without inviting the Soviet Union. During that time France, Great Britain, and the United States proposed a constitutional convention to establish a West German state, and worked to institute currency reform. On March 20, alarmed by the steps taken at the London Conference, particularly the proposal to create a West German state, the Soviet delegation walked out of the Allied Control Council meeting in Berlin. Eleven days later the Soviets implemented a mini-blockade of the city of West Berlin, refusing mail and freight shipments to and from the west sector of the capitol. On June 24, one day after the new German currency was issued by American, British, and French occupation authorities, the Soviets blocked all overland routes between West Germany and West Berlin. The Berlin blockade, or the first Berlin crisis, had begun.[53]

As early as December 22, 1947, the CIA had warned the Truman administration in a special evaluation that the Soviet Union might "undertake a program of intensified obstructionism and calculated insult in an effort to force the U.S. and the other Western Powers to withdraw from Berlin." The intelligence report concluded that the USSR "will probably use every means short of armed force" and that devices such as "obstruction to transport and travel to and within the city," could be employed.[54] In spite of warnings months prior to the blockade , the NSC took no initiatives regarding United States military and diplomatic commitments to Berlin. In all matters, "the initiative, the impetus, the guide, the force of anything that was done," recalled Assistant Secretary of State for Occupied Areas Charles Saltzman, "was coming more from General [Lucius] Clay and the Secretary of the Army, than it was from the



Figure 2. Divided Germany (1948)

President and the National Security Council."[55] In January 1948 the Army conducted a study of possible courses of action should the Soviets force the United States out of Berlin. Secretary Kenneth Royall circulated the report for information only.[56] In April the CIA warned that: "Not intending an actual resort to force... the USSR will probably resume its efforts to force a Western withdrawal from Berlin." In a special intelligence estimate on April 2, the CIA and an ad hoc committee made up of Department of State, and Army, Navy, and Air Force intelligence agencies noted that Soviet forces had the capability of "overrunning" all of Western Europe and the Middle East, but it concluded that the USSR would not resort to "direct military action throughout the rest of the year."[57]

General Clay urged Truman to commit the United States to "any lengths" to support Berlin.[58] Although Clay was never fully convinced that the Soviets wanted a direct military confrontation with the United States, he did not discount the possibility. "If the Soviets want war," Clay cabled Secretary Royall the day after the blockade was implemented, "it will not be because of [the] Berlin currency issue but because they believe this is the right time."[59] President Truman responded that "We are going to stay period," and approved an airlift of food and medical supplies that began on June 26, as C-47 cargo planes carried freight into Berlin.[60] Truman ordered that the airlift be organized full-scale and that every plane in the European Command be pressed into service. By August 20, C-47 and C-54 cargo planes were carrying nearly 3000 tons of supplies per day; by September 9, the average daily airlift had reached 4000 tons.[61]

The early airlift accomplishments were impressive, but General Clay believed that further measures were needed to ward off the Soviets. On June 27 the general called for the use of United States overland armed convoys to

break the blockade and endorsed a recommendation from the British government that the United States deploy B-29 atomic bombers to West Germany and England. At a White House meeting the next day Truman met with advisers and approved the bomber deployment to West Germany. On July 2, the Strategic Air Command (SAC) went on alert, and a SAC bombardment group moved to western Germany.[62]

National security managers considered three alternatives to the Berlin Crisis: (1) to withdraw from Berlin, (2) to stay and run the risk of military confrontation with the Soviets, or (3) to delay in hopes of negotiating a settlement. At the same time much discussion focused on whether or not to begin a complete deployment of B-29 squadrons to England. The Truman administration hoped that their arrival in Western Europe would force the Soviets to the negotiating table.[63]

The Berlin crisis dominated most of the discussion at the NSC's July 15, 1948, meeting. With Truman presiding, the council debated the escalation of the airlift, the American public's reaction to events in Germany, and the complete deployment of B-29 squadrons to England. Secretary Forrestal warned the NSC that the services were facing an October 15 deadline. He stated that the Soviets were well aware that flying weather would be too poor for the airlift to continue beyond October. Therefore, a decision would be needed whether United States-armed convoys should be sent to Berlin. Secretary Royall agreed that the airlift probably could not carry through the winter, but he had no doubt the United States could continue the operation until October.[64] Secretary Lovett also told the NSC that the Department of State had received formal invitation from the British government for the B-29 squadrons. Secretary Marshall pointed out one advantage of sending the planes; it would be a further indication of America's resolve to contain Soviet

expansionism. More important, he noted, such a decision would stimulate French and British determination and might offset any tendency on their part toward an appeasement. Concerned about the public reaction to the Berlin crisis, Secretary Forrestal said that he felt "the American people were not aware of the seriousness of the Berlin crisis either."[65]

The NSC agreed to reserve a decision regarding an increase in the airlift until the Air Force and JCS could provide more information. More important though, the council recommended, and Truman approved, the deployment of two B-29 groups to England, but it provided no specific directions for their use. There were, however, no atomic bombs on the B-29s deployed. In fact, the planes at that time were not even fitted for the delivery of atomic bombs. As another scholar points out, the Berlin B-29 deployment "emphasized the extent to which credibility could be made to compensate for capability."[66] The NSC had suggested the first application of the deterrence doctrine in Cold War history. No doubt the deployment of the B-29s was more symbolic than a threat of nuclear retaliation. The national security managers did not want to provoke war with the Soviet Union if possible; nor did the Pentagon feel that American ground force capabilities were adequate for breaking the blockade at that time. President Truman, the underdog in the upcoming presidential election, also preferred a strong, yet moderate approach to Berlin, in order to allay his political critics.

The most important decision of the Berlin crisis was made at the sixteenth meeting of the NSC on July 22. Truman chaired the meeting and focused discussion on the future course of action on Berlin. General Clay, whom Truman had called to Washington days earlier, explained existing options for the United States. The Joint Chiefs of Staff and various high-ranking service officers and advisers also attended.[67] Clay told the NSC that the

"Abandonment of Berlin would have a disastrous effect upon our plans for Western Germany." He said that Berliners were "determined to stand firm," and that the United States should "remain in Berlin in any event." He also recommended that 75 additional C-54 cargo planes be added to continue the airlift, and suggested that the construction of a new airdome in Berlin be completed by October 15.[68]

Following Clay's report, Air Force Chief of Staff General Hoyt Vandenberg objected to the proposed escalation of the airlift. Should war break out, Vandenberg noted, the Air Force could lose many of its planes. This would "greatly restrict," he warned, "the ability to wage strategic warfare" as well as the "ability to reinforce outlying garrisons." Secretary Marshall then asked Clay what opinion he had concerning the use of United States armed convoys. Clay pointed out that the initial Soviet reaction would be to set up road blocks. The final reaction to armed convoys, said Clay, of course might be "armed attack" by the USSR. This prompted Truman to ask Clay if he thought the Soviets would go to war. The general replied that they would not interfere with the airlift "unless they mean to go to war." At present, Clay noted, "they are operating with great care... there have been no troop movements or other such signs to indicate preparations for war." Truman then concluded that the airlift, in his words, "involved less risks than the armed convoys," and left the meeting.[69] Following Truman's departure the NSC adopted all of General Clay's report, agreed that American dependents in Berlin should be evacuated by the end of August, added a directive that specified all B-29 bombers based in England "should not conduct mass maneuvers over Germany or the Mediterranean," and noted that the United States should seek a direct diplomatic approach with the Soviets.[70]

After considering NSC recommendations, Truman committed the United States to defend Berlin. The council had served as a vehicle for crisis decision making. In the middle of the meeting, Truman had made his decision to hold Berlin regardless of the risks or the consequences. He also resolved that the airlift would be the best course, thereby lessening the probability of war with the Soviet Union. The NSC and Truman had worked their way through the months of the "pre-crisis period," on Berlin, a period that risked direct military conflict with the USSR. Nevertheless, a "post-crisis period" continued throughout the rest of the year and into 1949. Much uncertainty would continue because basic national security values such as United Stated credibility in Western Europe, the formation of a West German nation, and the economic, military, and political components of the containment policy were still besieged by the Soviet blockade.[71]

Throughout most of August and early September of 1948 several meetings took place between American and Soviet diplomatic representatives. Little headway ever came from these meetings regarding a negotiated settlement on Berlin. It soon became apparent that the talks were breaking down. Frustrated at this point, Truman called a second special meeting of the NSC for the purpose of considering the Berlin negotiations. On September 9 Secretaries Marshall and Lovett reported to the NSC that diplomatic endeavors had deteriorated to the point that "the negotiations may blow up shortly." Marshall noted specifically that he regarded the prospect of a negotiated settlement on Berlin as extremely remote. The situation in Berlin he said "was discouraging and serious." Lovett proposed a course of action that the Department of State had suggested that recommended resuming talks in Moscow and, if no satisfactory conclusions could be reached, to refer the Berlin situation to the

United Nations Security Council. The NSC and Truman concurred in this recommendation.[72]

The council also heard a progress report on the airlift from Secretary of the Air Force Stuart Symington. He pointed out that the United States had been averaging 4000 tons of supplies during most of August, and he recommended increasing the average to 5000 tons with the addition of more C-54 cargo planes. Lovett also noted that a "new element" had been introduced by "riots in Berlin and by the new evidence of belligerence which," he concluded, "was certainly not accidental." Symington and Lovett questioned that in view of the seriousness of the situation whether the NSC should consider plans in the event an emergency or military conflict broke out in Berlin. After further discussion, the NSC concluded it would be preferable to explore any war plans first with the JCS and at the same time with the President.[73]

The next day the service secretaries, the Joint Chiefs, Marshall, and Forrestal held a meeting to reach "fundamental decisions" on the use, plans, and targets for American air-atomic operations out of England. On September 13, Forrestal, Royall, and Army and Air Force representatives outlined the Pentagon's air-atomic plans for Truman. The briefing obviously bothered Truman as he recorded in his diary that "Forrestal, Bradley, Vandenberg, Symington brief me on bases, bombs, Moscow, Leningrad, etc. I have a terrible feeling afterwards that we are very close to war. I hope not... Berlin is a mess."[74]

On September 29 the United States, Britain, and France petitioned the United Nations Security Council to investigate the Soviet Union's blockade of Berlin. Meanwhile, the Department of State continued to negotiate with Soviet officials and the airlift went on. The JCS, however, produced two reports that assessed the risks involved with the airlift. Both reports were especially critical

of the Truman administration for allowing foreign policy initiatives to outrun the nation's military capabilities. One report stressed that an alternative plan would be needed in case an outbreak of sudden hostilities threatened the United States presence in Berlin or the airlift itself. The second report concluded that to continue the airlift beyond March 1949 would require additional military budget supplements.[75] The NSC held a third special meeting on October 14. Concerned about a possible Soviet interruption of the Berlin airlift, the NSC heard both JCS reports. After some discussion NSC members stated that they believed that the JCS had exaggerated the risks of the airlift to justify additional appropriations. Despite this report, the Department of State supported the JCS request for additional money to allow continuance of the airlift. The JCS then advised the NSC of future military requirements. The NSC discussed and then forwarded to Truman four recommendations: (1) the airlift be augmented by 66 additional C-54 planes; (2) aviation fuel stockpile requirements be reviewed; (3) $25 million in supplemental funding be authorized for the Air Force, with future personnel ceilings increased for the Fiscal Year 1949; and, (4) the Air Force be authorized to procure additional transport planes in order to offset depreciation and attrition imposed by the airlift.[76] On October 22, after consulting with the Bureau of the Budget, Truman approved the NSC's recommendations for 66 more C-54 planes, and a review of gasoline stockpiles, and noted that "steps would be taken to insure adequate personnel and financial support" for the airlift. He left, though, the finer points of budget supplements for the Bureau of the Budget. After some delay the Bureau consented to the council's requests.[77] Thus, by October the NSC and President Truman provided for the continuation of the airlift, if necessary, through 1949.

The blockade of Berlin proved that the NSC could play a larger role in the process of collecting and centralizing information from many bureaucratic

sources. It also established that the council provided the institutional and ad hoc decision-making forum necessary during a crisis. The mechanisms set up under the National Security Act of 1947 assisted Truman with his decisions during the crisis, but problems also appeared. Most noticeably, the NSC had made no recommendations on Berlin for Truman before the blockade occurred, nor had it established a long-range policy proposal for military strategic planning during an emergency. Secretary Forrestal was aware of the dearth of strategic planning, particularly for the use of atomic weapons, as B-29 aircraft were deployed to England. At that time he had called for an independent NSC review that would serve his department and the JCS in two ways: first, procure from the NSC and the President a stated policy for the custody and use of atomic weapons and the application of conventional forces; second, promote and justify an expansion of the armed services within a tighter proposed budget for Fiscal Year 1950. Forrestal suggested that the NSC conduct a review of United States military preparedness that would warrant both considerations. On July 12, in a memorandum to the council and Truman, Forrestal stated that a "national policy" based upon security threats related to the USSR was imperative.[78]

The Cold War Debate on Atomic Policy

Since 1945 there had evolved within the Truman administration a debate over whether the military or civilian branches of the government should retain custody of atomic weapons. The development of the atomic bomb during World War II had been supervised by an agency of the War Department, the Manhattan District Project. In early 1946, Truman had requested that Congress enact a law that placed custody of the atomic energy program in civilian hands.

Congress responded with passage of the Atomic Energy Act of 1946. The act established a five-member Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) along with various civilian and military committees subordinate to it, each guaranteed consultation regarding matters before the commission. The act also provided for presidential authorization over the transfer of atomic weapons and materials.[79] In spite of the confusion that resulted from the B-29 deployment during the Berlin crisis, Truman refused to surrender civilian custody of the atomic bomb. Pragmatic reasoning, coupled with political strategy, apparently affected Truman's decision. On July 23, the President told Secretary Forrestal that "political considerations" made the transfer of custody moot, but he added that he might "take another look at the picture" after the election.[80]

The issues of whether atomic weapons would be used, the objectives employed, and choice of targets if they were used, concerned Truman. "Lack of high level policy guidance, aggravated by extreme secrecy," points out a historian of nuclear planning, "retarded coordinated planning for nuclear war."[81] The Department of Defense's concerns regarding coordination of a nuclear policy were alleviated partly when Truman and Forrestal discussed the issue on July 15. Both concluded that a flexible weapons policy should be adopted. The President explained, however, that he wanted to keep his options open and civilian custody secure in light of the Berlin crisis and the custody dispute between the military and the AEC. He told Forrestal that the decision to use the atomic bomb should be the President's and not that of "some dashing lieutenant colonel."[82] Truman had agreed on a flexible atomic policy for the future during his discussions with Forrestal, but after consulting with the Chairman of the AEC, David Lilienthal, he notified the Secretary of Defense differently. "I do not feel justified in exercising my authority under the provisions of the Atomic Energy Act," Truman stated, "to order the transfer of the stock piles

to the Armed Services." Truman concluded that "national security will be both safeguarded and promoted" if the military and the AEC collaborated "by refining the existing arrangements."[83]

By mid-September the NSC completed a long-awaited policy statement on atomic weapons and at the same time resolved the old custody dispute. The NSC suggested that "in the event of hostilities the National Military Establishment must be ready to utilize promptly and effectively appropriate means available, including atomic weapons," and "the decision as to the employment of atomic weapons in the event of war is to be made by the Chief Executive."[84] The NSC issued a broad and somewhat vague policy statement with this report. And it left unresolved when and how atomic weapons should be used. The NSC did, however, resolve the earlier issues about which entity would retain custodianship of atomic weapons and whether the United States would use them in the event of a war. Because the NSC did not specify how atomic weapons would be applied during a wartime situation, Truman never approved this report. Yet, the report may have reflected his opinion on atomic weapons and atomic policy. He met with Secretary Forrestal and other members of his administration three days before the council adopted its report, and Forrestal noted that, "Truman said that he prayed that he would never have to make such a decision, but that if it became necessary, no one need to have a misgiving but what he would do."[85]

Throughout the rest of Truman's presidency military planners and nuclear strategists initiated several research and development projects that created various atomic and thermonuclear weapons. And as nuclear energy knowledge and application increased during those few short years, the likelihood of restrictions on the use of nuclear weapons decreased. This became even more apparent after the Soviet Union detonated its first atomic

bomb in the fall of 1949, and its first hydrogen bomb in 1951. The NSC offered no additional policy statements on the use of atomic or thermonuclear weapons.[86] But as events of the nuclear age unfolded amid Cold War tensions, Truman often asked the NSC for political-military coordination of the less general but more complicated issues of fissionable materials and the arms race.

The Cold War in the North Atlantic and Scandinavia

As the military prepared air-atomic strategies, the Truman administration moved to add Greenland and Iceland to the postwar base system. In late 1947 the NSC facilitated the development when it affirmed, and Truman concurred the "strategic importance" of the two base areas. Truman authorized negotiations in order to retain postwar installations on each.[87] The Truman administration viewed Greenland and Iceland as necessary augments of the United States air base system. Not only would both sites protect the polar air-atomic defense and communication route, but they also would thwart any immediate Soviet efforts to establish military installations on Norway's Spitzbergen archipelago and Bear Island.[88]

Soon after the USSR invited Finland to sign a mutual assistance pact in February 1948, the Scandinavian countries of Norway, Denmark, and Sweden also became strategically important to the national security managers. At its March 23 meeting the NSC discussed the authorized strength of United States armed forces. In the course of the discussions Secretary Marshall told the NSC that the United States had to "find out what can be done to deter the Russians" in Scandinavia, particularly actions he emphasized that would "have a maximum of encouraging effect upon the other countries of Europe." Marshall

felt that for two months the administration needed "to give the Russians pause in their pressure on Norway, Denmark, and Greece", however, he cautioned, without the United States's military "going into general mobilization." With this in mind and yet concerned that all of Scandinavia might fall to Soviet control as had Czechoslovakia days earlier, the United States recommended that the region be integrated in a future North Atlantic defense alliance.[89]

In early September the council adopted, and Truman approved, a report on Scandinavia in which members of the NSC noted that the region "lies astride the great circle air route between North America and the strategic heart of Western Russia." In order to prevent "Soviet domination" of the region the NSC recommended that the United States: (1) extend economic aid "by means of favorable U.S. foreign trade policies" to Norway and Denmark; (2) provide military equipment "as a deterrent to Soviet armed aggression" to Norway and Denmark; (3) combat Soviet propaganda in Scandinavia with an "intensified U.S. information program;" and, (4) influence Sweden to abandon its "subjective neutrality and look toward eventual alignment" with the Western Powers.[90] By April 4, 1949, Norway, Denmark, and Iceland joined NATO as cooperative members; Sweden, however, remained uncommitted. Military containment denied the USSR base sites in Scandinavia and the North Atlantic, insured the so-called "stepping stones countries" communication links between the United States and Western Europe, and helped promote the polar strategy concept in Air Force circles. Economic containment insured that much of Scandinavia would remained tied to Western Europe.

The NSC and Cold War National Security Plans

Meanwhile, as the NSC formulated policy on atomic weapons and Scandinavia, it also began work on reviewing Secretary Forrestal's request on the degree and character of United States overall military preparedness. At its August 5 meeting, the NSC sent its suggestions to the Department of State.[91] This report influenced George Kennan and the PPS. As a consequence of this report and world conditions, the Department of State issued its strongest anti-Soviet Cold War policy recommendations yet.[92] On November 27, 1948, the NSC, with assistance from several military and civilian agencies, offered the final revision of a policy for the Cold War. Truman accepted the basic tenants of this report as the guideline for United States policy in the confrontation with the Soviet Union.[93] The new policy suggested that three steps be taken in order to protect the security interests of the United States: (1) the United States had to "develop a level of military readiness... maintained as long as necessary as a deterrent to Soviet aggression;" (2) the nation needed to proceed immediately to maximize its "economic potential" during peace time in order to establish and maintain "essential reserves readily available in the event of war;" and, (3) a concerted effort had to made to "strengthen the orientation" of all non-Soviet nations toward the interests of the United States and that of American security. The primary efforts of the United States in the non-Soviet world would concentrate upon economic and political stability and military capability.[94]

In addition to its recommendations securing national interests world-wide in preparation for confrontation or war with the Soviets, the United States now re-emphasized and strengthened the primary principles of American national security and the containment doctrine. First, it stressed that "the gravest threat to the security of the United States... stems from the hostile designs and

formidable power of the U.S.S.R., and from the nature of the Soviet system". Second, the political, economic, and psychological warfare the Soviets waged threatened "the relative world position of the United States" and disrupted its "traditional institutions." Third, any Soviet domination of "the potential power of Eurasia," either by military, political, or subversive actions, "would be strategically and politically unacceptable to the United States."[95] This new policy represented the second major step, after initial establishment of a policy, insofar as the creation of a Cold War national security state existed.

The NSC and the Cold War in the Middle East

Yet the policy the Truman administration accorded Western Europe did not mean that the national security managers ignored the rest of Eurasia. In the Middle East, Palestine and many of the Arab states had been under the British sphere of influence since the 1920s. By 1947, as in Greece, the British sought United States influence and security in the region. Of particular sensitivity for the Truman administration was the Holy Land, where Jewish and Arab nationalists began to fight over the creation of a Jewish homeland in Palestine. Just as important, however, would be the security of Middle Eastern petroleum reserves--the economic recovery of Western Europe made United States access to Persian Gulf oil supplies critical.[96]

Palestine was the historical homeland of the Jews. Since 1897, with the founding of the World Zionist Organization, efforts had been sustained to reestablish a Jewish state. After World War II hundreds of thousands of Jewish immigrants, many survivors of the Nazi holocaust, sought refuge in Palestine. As Jewish pressure to establish a national homeland there intensified, Arab hostilities increased, and violence swept the area. By early 1947 Great Britain

petitioned the United Nations for relief from its earlier mandate in Palestine. On November 29, 1947, the UN voted to partition Palestine and recognized a Jewish claim to part of the region.[97]

Although the Roosevelt administration had pursued a policy of neutrality and nonintervention in the Middle East, Truman supported the creation of a Jewish state in Palestine. The holocaust in Europe in the 1930s and 1940s had deeply impressed Truman. As he later recalled: "The fate of the Jewish victims of Hitlerism was a matter of deep personal concern to me."[98] Yet politics may have affected Truman's pro-Zionist sentiment even more. It had become clear that Truman might encounter a tough battle during 1948 to capture the Democratic Party's presidential nomination, much less win the election. Truman's policy of containment and the Berlin Airlift, although popular with the American public and Congress, had bred apprehension among liberals of the New Deal coalition. Progressive Party candidate Henry A. Wallace argued that Truman's policies had provoked the Soviets. Wallace called for reconciliation with the USSR. Republican party candidate Thomas E. Dewey waged a pro-Zionist campaign. He also attacked Truman's foreign policy on the grounds that Truman's campaign promises might create unnecessary obligations for a newly elected Republican administration.[99]

Clark Clifford of Truman's staff engineered a political strategy to improve Truman's flagging popularity. He suggested that Truman call for tax reforms and other measures to curb inflation, and lower federal expenditures. Clifford also thought Truman should target ethnic and black voters, and support the creation of a Jewish state in Palestine, to help him capture American Jewish votes. By March Truman faced two opposite policy recommendations. While Clifford and other political advisers advocated support for the partition of Palestine, the Department of State, the Pentagon, and the intelligence

community were opposed to it and recommended a plan that would establish a truce between Arab and Jewish groups, and a provisional UN trusteeship over Palestine.[100]

The opposition to partition by the Department of State, the Pentagon, and the intelligence community began in late November 1947, when Secretary of the Army Kenneth Royall requested that the NSC "assess the implications of current United Nations discussion of the problem of Palestine on the security interests of the United States." Of particular concern to Royall and Secretary Forrestal was the prospect that the United States might be requested to contribute troops under a UN trusteeship. In response, the NSC recommended that the Department of State initiate a comprehensive review of United States policy on Palestine.[101] By late 1947 and early 1948 the CIA and the Department of State cautioned against United States support of partition. Both feared that a UN military contingent to enforce the partition would not only require the use of American troops, but also Soviet troops as well. The CIA warned that a Soviet military force "will undoubtedly seek to include elements specially trained in Soviet subversive activities," and concluded that the USSR would "make every effort...to increase the anti-U.S. sentiment that is already strong among the Arabs."[102] By March 1948 the Department of State and the Pentagon convinced Clifford that the partition plan be set aside in favor of trusteeship. On March 18, Clifford finally agreed and suggested to Truman that he enforce the recommendations for trusteeship. The next day American representatives placed the trusteeship proposal before the United Nations Security Council. On March 25 Truman issued a public statement in which he announced support of a provisional trusteeship plan, pending the orderly permanent settlement of a Jewish state.[103] On May 14, 1949, Jewish leaders in Palestine declared the creation of the new state of Israel. Ten minutes later

Truman announced United States recognition of Israel. It would be one of the few times that he disregarded the advice of the NSC and the Department of State. More important, he made it clear that foreign policy decisions rested with the chief executive.[104]

As soon as Israel announced independence, armed forces of the Arab League attacked, and the first Arab-Israeli War began. During the first six months of the war, Secretary Forrestal received requests from the Department of State for additional military personnel to protect the United States consulate in Jerusalem and to increase logistical support for the UN peace-keeping mission. The JCS feared that repeated UN requests would cause the deployment of United States combat troops in Palestine and lead to the possibility that Soviet or Soviet bloc forces might also intervene.[105] By the summer of 1948, the CIA warned United States government policy makers that Czechoslovakian clandestine air operations to Palestine had been confirmed and that the USSR had made arms shipments both to Arab nationalists and the Israelis.[106]

The reports of Soviet intervention in Palestine coupled with Pentagon concerns about the risk of a US-USSR confrontation there prompted Forrestal to ask the NSC for advice. On August 19 the council noted that the attempt to establish peace in Palestine with United States troops could deplete troop strength around the world and risk military confrontation with the USSR in Palestine. The NSC, though, referred the report to the Department of State for further study.[107]

At its next meeting, the NSC again discussed this problem and the Department of State report on the situation in Palestine, but reached no conclusion. Forrestal pointed out that from the military perspective the whole Middle East "was like a piece of flypaper. Getting stuck on one part would get

us stuck on all." Lovett pointed out that the United States could not stop the Soviets if they sent troops "in response to a plea for help" from Israel. And the Department of State, he concluded, "was not willing to make a commitment not to send U.S. troops to Palestine."[108] On November 23, following Truman's victory in the election, the council adopted an NSC Staff report that recommended that "in any event the United States should not accept any proposal for a Jerusalem police force," particularly if such an armed contingency included the United States, the USSR, or any Soviet satellites. Truman approved the policy report the following day on the premise that no United States troops would be deployed to Palestine throughout his presidency.[109]

Neither the NSC nor the Department of State played a role in determining Truman's decision to recognize Israel. The NSC did, however, help resolve the on-going debate between the Departments of State and Defense about whether United States troops would be sent to the Middle East as a peace-keeping force. The NSC's role in the coordination of United States policy regarding protecting petroleum resources in the Middle East would be greater. As American policy toward Israel strengthened and tension increased in the Middle East, the defense of Western oil reserves became a matter of concern for the NSC. In May 1948 the council requested that the Pentagon examine the feasibility of defending oil fields in the Persian Gulf region.[110] Of particular interest was the ability of United States forces to protect American and British investments in Saudi Arabia, Iran, and Iraq, especially the recent trans-Arabian pipeline construction by the American oil firm ARAMCO, designed to transport Persian Gulf oil to Mediterranean port cities in Lebanon. Because of conflicting strategies offered by the JCS, the report was assigned to the Pentagon working group, SANACC.[111] SANACC finalized a US-British contingency strategy by

May 20 that concluded that in the event of a general war with the Soviet Union, it would be likely that the oil fields would be overrun by Soviet forces. To prevent Soviet control or burning of Middle East petroleum reserves during a wartime situation, it maintained that United States and British forces would have to plug or obstruct the oil wells and destroy or remove all equipment from the fields. Warning that such action could jeopardize the economies of the oil-producing states for an extended period, SANACC concluded that the measures recommended should "only be taken as a last resort."[112] By fall of 1948 the NSC staff circulated a report that adopted the SANACC study's findings. After Department of State consultation with American corporate oil representatives and procuring Pentagon and intelligence written recommendations, the council adopted a report on January 6, 1949, that established a policy for destroying oil production if necessary. President Truman approved the policy four days later.[113]

The NSC and the Cold War in East Asia

Although events in Europe and the Middle East were a major concern of the Truman administration in 1947 and 1948, China was also a problem. It had become a republic in 1911 under the rule of Sun Yat-sen, a nationalist who promised China progressive economic and social modernization. He died in 1925, however, and his death initiated a violent civil war between the Nationalists, under Chiang Kai-shek, and the Communists, led by Mao Tse-tung. When the Japanese invaded China in 1937 the two factions declared a temporary truce. Yet for most Americans during World War II, Chiang's Nationalist government became the symbol of Chinese resistance to Japanese

aggression, and Americans viewed him as the rightful successor of the modernization movement launched by Sun Yat-sen.[114]

Although the Nationalist government became corrupt and inept, it received continued strong United States support, financially and militarily after Japan's surrender. This occurred partially as a consequence of the lobbying efforts of Madame Chiang, who cultivated close ties with a loosely knit group of American political and business leaders known as the "China bloc." While President Truman despised Chiang's corruption, he reluctantly promised military assistance as the civil war between the Nationalists and Communists renewed in the immediate postwar years. The Soviet Union responded as well by providing captured Japanese weapons to Mao's forces. The United States countered by airlifting and sealifting Chiang's troops to northern China and landing nearly 50,000 United States Marines in the Peking-Tsingtao area to help block the Communist armies from capturing the cities. In an effort to mediate a cease-fire and form an eventual coalition government, Truman sent Army Chief of Staff George C. Marshall to China in December 1945. Marshall returned to the United States in January 1947 to assume the office of Secretary of State, writing off his mission as a failure and declaring that neither the Nationalists nor the Communists wanted to cooperate.[115]

By 1947 China became a subject of congressional attention, especially among conservative Republicans favorable towards Chiang's government. With growing pressure from Capitol Hill, Secretary Marshall asked Lieutenant General Albert C. Wedemeyer, former United States commander in the China Theatre from 1944 to 1946, to head a fact-finding mission to China and Korea. Wedemeyer presented a report to Truman on September 19, 1947. This report resembled General Chamberlin's report on Greece. Wedemeyer indicated that there was in China a rapidly deteriorating political, military, and economic

environment in the face of a well-organized and very determined communist foe. He recommended increased military and economic assistance to the Nationalists, as well as military and technical advisor aid. He proposed that the UN establish a trusteeship or guardianship of Manchuria and inauguration of a five-year economic recovery program. The Truman administration did not make the report public, largely because the UN trusteeship proposal might suggest that the Nationalist government was unable to govern China. Only Truman and Secretaries Marshall, Forrestal, and Lovett got a copy of the report.[116] The government, however, did act upon some of Wedemeyer's suggestions. In the fall of 1947, Marshall and Forrestal approved munitions shipments to Chiang's forces and granted permission to the United States Army Advisory Group left in China to advise Chiang and train new recruits.[117]

During the winter of 1947-1948 the issue of extending economic and military aid to the Nationalists persisted. As escalation in fighting occurred, it became increasingly apparent that the Nationalist military position, especially in Manchuria, was deteriorating, even with an advantage in manpower. The Truman administration feared that a Communist victory would have serious implications for United States interests in East Asia, but both the State and Defense Departments disagreed as to what could or should be done. Because of Chiang's unwillingness to establish an honest and competent government, the Department of State concluded that there was little hope of defeating the Communists, and it began to advocate a policy of gradual disengagement. The Department of Defense and the JCS maintained that the Department of Stateunderestimated the gravity of the political-military situation in China, and these departments advocated continued and increased assistance to Chiang's government.[118]

In January and February of 1948 the NSC began work on a long-term policy for China. At the NSC's February 12 meeting, Marshall announced that he would ask Congress for $500 million in additional nonmilitary assistance. Marshall told the NSC that he would oppose further military aid, because any military solution would obligate the United States to take over the Chinese government. On March 26 the NSC Staff presented its interpretation regarding assistance to China. A final policy statement would not be issued until a comprehensive Department of State study could be completed. This tentative report, however, recommended that the United States provide short-term assistance to China.[119] Congress agreed and quickly passed the China Aid Act of 1948, authorizing $436 million in aid for one year. As a consequence of congressional action, the NSC abandoned its suggestions. Truman signed the congressional bill on April 3, but United States assistance was too little and too late to reverse the deterioration of Chiang's forces. By May the prospect of a Communist victory seemed strong as Mao's forces closed in on the Shantung peninsula. The Truman administration realized that a consensus would have to be reached regarding the reduction or deployment of United States military forces in China. Washington officials focused on the city of Tsingtao, where the largest United States Marine and Naval base was located. Admiral Oscar C. Badger, Commander of United States Naval Operations, cabled the Pentagon that the American base, with its 3600 personnel and dependents, might be in danger of an imminent attack from Mao's forces.[120]

The situation in Tsingtao was referred to Forrestal, who in turn recommended that the NSC study this rather sticky problem.[121] The JCS had ordered Admiral Badger to evacuate his forces if the city were threatened. The Department of State requested an immediate withdrawal of all United States forces. Before the NSC could reconcile the differences between State and the

JCS, the USSR imposed the Berlin blockade.[122] By July, however, the NSC became concerned that an immediate evacuation from Tsingtao might damage United States credibility and thereby make it more difficult to convince the Soviets that America would stand firm in Berlin. The NSC therefore decided to defer action on Tsingtao for thirty days.[123] Truman also decided to delay evacuation of United States forces from Tsingtao until after the November election. On October 21 the NSC agreed that Badger should stay in the city.[124] In a special meeting the day after Truman's victory in the election, the NSC at Truman's request reexamined Badger's orders. The Department of State proposed an official report, which the NSC adopted, recommending the orderly withdrawal of non-military American dependents as well as the provision of Marine reinforcements and the strengthening of the Navy's defenses at Tsingtao. Truman approved the decision.[125] Within a month, Chiang retreated from the Shangtung peninsula and relocated further south to Formosa.

The Department of State suggested on December 16 the immediate evacuation of all United States forces from Tsingtao. It also opposed the establishment of naval facilities on Formosa with Chiang's forces.[126] Five days later, the JCS concurred. Truman approved the recommendations on December 24, initiating the gradual evacuation of the last American forces from China. The withdrawal was completed by the following spring.[127] The United States had narrowly avoided becoming embroiled in the Chinese civil war, largely because events in China had received low priority attention from Truman and the NSC. "The magnitude of the tasks of establishing order and of repulsing the Communist challenge," contends East Asian historian William Whitney Stueck, "was far greater than in Greece."[128] A lack of confidence in the Nationalists' ability to succeed, military commitments in the Mediterranean

region, and economic recovery assistance to Western Europe, combined with cuts in the postwar defense budget, justified in the minds of some policy formulators less concern for the situation of Chiang's government. But by early 1949, as the collapse of the Nationalist government approached rapidly, President Truman and the NSC found it imperative to proceed with a long-range anti-Communist policy on China.

As containment and national security programs in Europe and the Middle East proceeded, and China was left to Mao's impending control, the national security managers determined that Japan, like Germany, must serve as a democratic bulwark against Soviet expansionism, and it must be a catalyst for East Asian regional economic recovery. Japan would be considered a vital component in the United States "defensive perimeter," in the Far East. The concept, as foreign policy historian John L. Gaddis pointed out, maintained "the safeguarding of selected island strong points," including Japan, the Philippines, and Okinawa, "while avoiding potentially debilitating commitments on the mainland."[129] The United States had insisted on a free hand in Japan's postwar administration, with executive powers granted to the Supreme Commander of Allied Powers, General Douglas MacArthur. In March 1947 MacArthur stated that he believed Japan was ready for an end to United States occupation and that America should proceed with a permanent Japanese peace treaty. The PPS initiated a study concerning a treaty with Japan following a fact-finding mission there by George Kennan. Upon his return Kennan summarized his findings in a report sent to the NSC in June.[130]

Kennan proposed that the United States not press for a treaty at the time. Instead, Japan's economy should be strengthened in preparation for ending United States military occupation. During the phase, the United States should gradually turn over to the Japanese responsibility for their government and

internal security. Post-treaty security should include long-term retention of Japan's islands south of the 29th parallel. Kennan also suggested that United States naval base operations at Tokyo Bay be transferred to Okinawa. After the NSC Staff studied Kennan's proposals in PPS 28, it issued a modified report in September, which it recommended that the future of the United States naval base at Tokyo Bay be decided at a future peace conference. It also noted that Japan's war potential should be controlled by placing restrictions on the stockpiling of strategic war materials and prohibiting the manufacture of weapons and aircraft.[131] When Secretary Forrestal submitted this report to the JCS, many objections were raised concerning the 29th parallel as a designation of United States strategic control. The JCS believed that Marcus Island, Nanpo Shoto, and the Ryukyus Islands also needed to fall within the American sphere. On September 30 the NSC considered but offered no definite decision on the report. On October 7 the NSC avoided delay by agreeing to consider the islands separately at a later date. It adopted the rest of the policy, and Truman approved it two days later.[132] Truman then sent a special emissary to oversee the reconstruction of Japan's economy and to assist General MacArthur, but the process was slow and the NSC considered the situation in Japan several times between 1949 and 1951.

Like China and Japan, Korea also was a Cold War security problem for the NSC. An impoverished country under Japanese military rule from 1910 through 1945, Korea lacked the indigenous self-government and stability of Japan. At the end of World War II, Allied commanders placed the country under the temporary administration of the United States and the USSR. Divided at the 38th parallel, American forces occupied the South and Soviet troops occupied the North.[133]

Both the United States and the USSR had advocated a peaceful reunification of Korea, but the Cold War prohibited any such prospect. The USSR recommended that all occupation of Korea be withdrawn be early 1948, yet refused to allow UN-sponsored elections in the North. As the United States was faced with a shortage of troops to meet requirements elsewhere, the problem of prolonged military occupation in Korea became a concern for the NSC and for Truman. The United States Army recommended that all efforts be made for a withdrawal of forces from Korea by December 31, 1948. The Department of State opposed setting a firm date and argued for a stronger United States commitment.[134]

A few months prior to the UN-sanctioned elections in the South, the NSC examined a SANACC policy statement on Korea that the JCS had approved. This statement recommended withdrawal of forces by December 31, and endorsed continued United States economic and military aid to the anti-communist government of Syngman Rhee. Secretary Forrestal asked the NSC how much "face" the United States might lose by withdrawing from Korea. Secretary Lovett conceded that such action would be "the best we can expect to do," and he believed the policy satisfactory to the Department of State. The strongest objection came from Secretary Royall, who argued that the United States should not make "the establishment of an adequate internal security force a prior condition for our withdrawal." The rest of the council agreed and the paper was amended to reflect Royall's view.[135] Truman agreed and American military withdrawal from South Korea seemed probable. By the end of 1948 South Korean military forces should be strong enough to provide, according to the NSC, "so far as practicable, effective protection for the security of South Korea against any but an overt act of aggression." The NSC proposal also noted that a victory by "Soviet-dominated forces" below the 38th parallel

would have a negative psychological impact upon much of East Asia as well as the United Nations. Despite the United States inability to protect South Korea from outside attack, the report noted that efforts should be made, including full cooperation with the United Nations, to prevent communist control of the country.[136]

By the fall of 1948 rumors circulated in South Korea that the North was planning an invasion to reunify the country. At the urging of the Department of State and United States representative to South Korea, John Muccio, the Army delayed its schedule for withdrawal until January 15, 1949, and agreed to leave one combat team of 7500 men in place as reenforcements.[137] Concerned about the potential impact of communist control of the Korean peninsula upon the United States position in Japan, the Department of State recommended in December that the NSC reconsider its position in respect to Korea. The Department of State's request for a policy change occurred at a time when Secretary Marshall had arranged to retire, and Under Secretary Lovett had also planned to leave the Department of State. It would be many months before the NSC would make a thorough review of the situation. Nevertheless, the stage was set for continued debate about Korea. The Korean War was nearly two years away, and several opportunities would occur to avoid it. However, as Truman began a full term as President, divisions within the administration, and greater priorities in other parts of the world made any early coordinated strategy toward Korea most unlikely.[138]

Between 1947 and 1948 the doctrine of containment took shape and the United States adopted overall policies to retard Soviet expansion. The United States government employed the first containment methods somewhat inconsistently as it sought some viable guidelines to follow. The NSC in those early days had not settled into its role of hard-lining the Soviet Union, at least

not to the extent it would later. The parameters and general concepts of containment, however, were more closely established during this period. Basically, the NSC headed toward a more confrontational set of Cold War policies toward the Soviet Union.

ENDNOTES

CHAPTER III

[1]Minutes of the 1st Meeting, 26 September 1947, PSF-NSC, Box 203; CIA-1, "Review of the World Situation As It Relates to the Security of the United States," Ibid. (Hereafter cited as "Review of the World.").

[2]FRUS: 1947, V, 226-231; Condit, History of JCS, II, 36-38.

[3]"Extension of Operational Advice to the Greek Armed Forces," 31 October 1947, PSF-NSC, Box 193.

[4]Memorandum, George Marshall to Harry Truman, 3 November 1947, PSF-NSC, Box 193.

[5]PPS 17, 26 November 1947, FRUS: 1947, IV, 489-507; Robert Lovett to Averell Harriman, 8 December 1947, Ibid., 508-509.

[6]"Control of Exports to the USSR and Eastern Europe, nd, PSF-NSC, Box 203; Minutes of the 4th Meeting, 17 December 1947, Ibid.

[7]"Control of Exports to the USSR and Eastern Europe," 18 December 1947, NSC, "policies of the Government, 1947-1948," 28, PSF-NSC, Box 195; Memorandum, Sidney Souers to Harry Truman, 17 December, Ibid., Box 203.

[8]NSC 15/2, "U.S. Aviation Policy Toward the USSR and Its Satellites," 13 July 1948, NSC, "Policies of the Government, 1947-1948," 29-30, PSF-NSC, Box 195.

[9]Church Committee, 26.

[10]Ibid., 27-29. Psychological warfare was proposed by the State-Army-Navy-Air Force Coordinating Committee as SANACC 304/11.

[11]Ibid., 28; NSC 4, "Coordination of Foreign Information Measures," 17 December 1947, PSF-NSC, Box 203.

[12]Church Committee, 28.

[13]Ibid., 29.

[14]Ibid.; NSC Record of Actions, 13 January, 12 February 1948, PSF-NSC, Box 191.

[15]Knightly, The Second Oldest Profession, 244.

[16]Ibid.

[17]CIA-4, "Review of the World," 12 January 1948, PSF-NSC, Box 203; CIA-ORE-69, "possible Consequences of Communist Control of Greece in the Absence of United States Counteraction," 9 February 1948, PSF-Intelligence File, Box 256.

[18]Minutes of the 5th Meeting, 13 January 1948, PSF-NSC, Box 203.

[19]Minutes of the 6th Meeting, 12 February 1948, Ibid.; Memorandum, Sidney Souers to Harry Truman, 12 February 1948, Ibid.; NSC 5/1, NSC 5/2, "The Position of the United States with Respect to Greece," 2, 12 February 1948, FRUS: 1948, IV, 2-7, 46-51; NSC 5/2, PSF-NSC, Box 203

[20]James Forrestal to the NSC, 19 April 1948, FRUS: 1948, I, pt.2, 564-567; Condit, History of the JCS, II, 48.

[21]NSC 5/3, NSC 5/4, "The Position of the United States with Respect to the Use of U.S. Military Power in Greece," 25 May, 25 June 1948, FRUS: 1948, IV, 93-95, 101; NSC, "Politics of the Government, 1947-1948," 9-10, PSF-NSC, Box 195.

[22]Edgar O'Ballance, The Greek Civil War, 1944-1949 (New York; Frederick A. Praeger, 1966), 156-157, 212-213. Also see CIA-1-49, "Review of the World," 19 January 1949, in which the CIA maintained that a reactionary government, or a "dictatorial solution" would be the only possible answer to the military stalemate and inflated economic situation in Greece.

[23]A formal United States policy on the Mediterranean-Middle East region had been approved by the NSC on 12 November 1947, and by Truman on 24 November 1947. The so-called American Paper enunciated that the United States would "support the security" of the region and "assist in maintaining the territorial integrity and political independence of Italy, Greece, Turkey, and Iran." See memorandum, Robert Lovett to Harry Truman, 24 November 1947, PSF-NSC, Box 203; "The American Paper," FRUS: 1947, V, 575-576, 623-624.

[24]For a full account of the origins of the counterinsurgency doctrine and its application see Douglas S. Blaufarb, The Counterinsurgency Era: U.S. Doctrine and Performance 1950 to the Present (New York: The Free Press, 1977).

[25]Leffler, "The American Conception of National Security and the Beginnings of the Cold War," 373-374; Yergin, Shattered Peace, 350-351.

[26]Lucius Clay to Omar Bradley, in Jean Edward Smith, ed., The Papers of General Lucius Clay: Germany 1945-1949 Volume I (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1974), 568-569.

[27]CIA-4, CIA-3-48, CIA-4-48, "Review of the World," 12 January, 10 March, 2 April 1948, PSF-NSC, Box 203.

[28]CIA 3-48, CIA-4-48, "Review of the World," 10 March, 2 April 1948, Ibid.

[29]NSC 7, "The Position of the United States with Respect to Soviet-Directed World Communism," 30 March 1948, FRUS: 1948, I, pt.2, 546-550; Thomas H. Etzold and John Lewis Gaddis,eds., Containment: Documents on American Policy and Strategy 1945-1950 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1978), 164-169 (Hereafter cited as Containment); PSF-NSC, Box 203.

[30]James E. Miller, The United States and Italy, 1940-1950: The Politics and Diplomacy of Stabilization (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1986), 193-205, 213-223. For the context of the treaty see U.S. Department of State, A Decade of American Foreign Policy: Basic Documents, 1941-49 (Washington, D.C.: G.P.O., 1950), 460-465.

[31]Miller, The United States and Italy, 205-210, 223-237.

[32]Memorandum, Sidney Souers to Harry Truman, 12 November 1947, PSF-NSC, Box 203.

[33]PPS 9, "Possible Action by the U.S. to Assist the Italian Government in the Event of Communist Seizure of North Italy and the Establishment of an Italian Communist 'Government' in that Area," 24 September 1947, in Anna Kasten Nelson, ed., The State Department Policy Planning Staff Papers 1947 (New York: Garland Publishing, 1983), 102 (Hereafter cited as PPS Papers); Ray S. Cline, Secrets, Spies and Scholars: Blueprint of the Essential CIA (Washington, D.C.: Acropolis Books, 1976), 99-100; Robert H. Ferrell, ed,. Dear Bess: The Letters from Harry to Bess Truman 1910-1950 (New York: W.W. Norton, 1983), 550.

[34]NSC 1/1, NSC 1/2, "The Position of the United States with Respect to Italy," 14 November 1947, 12 March 1948, FRUS: 1948, III, 724-726, 765-769; Memorandum, Sidney Souers to Harry Truman, 11 March 1948, PSF-NSC, Box 203. Supply of military equipment to the Italian armed forces was approved by SANACC on 16 January 1948, and by Truman 12 February 1948. See SANACC 390/1 and Memorandum, Harry Truman to Sidney Souers (non-letterhead), Ibid.

[35]Memorandum, Harry Truman to James Forrestal, 10 March 1948, PSF-Chronological File, Box 285.

[36]NSC 1/3, "The Position of the United States with Respect to Italy in the Light of the Possibility of Communist Participation in the Government by Legal Means," FRUS: 1948, III, 775-779, 868-890; PSF-NSC, Box 203.

[37]Miller, The United States and Italy, 248; James E. Miller, "Taking Off the Gloves: The United States and the Italian Elections of 1948," Diplomatic History 7 (Winter 1983): 48-49; Cline, Secrets, Spies and Scholars, 99-102.

[38]Miller, The United States and Italy, 249; Alan A. Platt and Robert Leonardi, "American Foreign Policy and the Postwar Italian Left," Political Science Quarterly 93 (Summer 1978/1979): 202.

[39]Church Committee, 29.

[40]Ibid., 29-30; Memorandum, Sidney Souers to the NSC, "Establishment of a Special Services Unit in the Central Intelligence Agency," 2 June 1948, PSF-NSC, Box 203; NSC 10/2, "Office of Special Projects," 18 June 1948, Ibid.; Etzold and Gaddis, Containment, 125-128.Honorable Men: My Life in the CIA (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1978), 73.

[41]Minutes of the 18th Meeting, 19 August 1948, PSF-NSC, Box 203; Church Committee, 30; William Colby and Peter Forbath, Honorable Men: My Life in the CIA (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1978), 73.

[42]Knightley, The Second Oldest Profession, 248.

[43]Gaddis, The Long Peace, 64.

[44]Memorandum, Sidney Souers to the NSC, "Paraphrase of a Recent Telegram From Mr. Bevin," 23 April 1948, PSF-NSC, Box 203. For a thorough analysis of the British initiative in the form of NATO see Lundstad, "Empire by Invitation?," 5; Folly, "Breaking the Vicious Circle," 59-77; Timothy P. Ireland, Creating the Entangling Alliance: The Origins of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1981), 48-79.

[45]George Marshall to Lord Inverchapel, 12 March 1948, FRUS: 1948, III, 48; Truman Public Papers, 182-186.

[46]Sidney Souers to the NSC, NSC 7, 20 March 1949, FRUS: 1948, I, pt. 2 548-550. The Pentagon Talks concluded with a recommendation that the Western Union include eventually the Scandinavian countries, Austria, Germany, and Spain. See minutes of 6th Meeting of Pentagon Talks, 1 April 1948, FRUS: 1948, III, pt. 3, 71-75.

[47]George Marshall to Sidney Souers, 24 March 1948, FRUS: 1948, III, 61-64.

[48]PPS 27/1, "Western Union and Related Problems," 6 April 1948, in Nelson, ed., PPS Papers 1948, 165-171; NSC 9, "The Position of the United States with Respect to Support for Western Union and other Related Free Countries," 13 April 1948, FRUS: 1948, III, 85-88.

[49]Memorandum, George Kennan to Robert Lovett, 7 May 1948, w/encs (NSC 9/2), FRUS: 1948, III, 116-119; Minutes of the 11th Meeting, 20 May 1948, PSF-NSC, Box 203.

[50]George F. Kennan, Memoirs, Volume I (Boston: Little, Brown, 1967), 405-407.

[51]Senate Resolution 239, 11 June 1948, FRUS: 1948, III, 135-136. For an in depth history of the formulation and ratification of the treaty see Ireland, Creating the Entangling Alliance, 80-151. For the context of the North Atlantic Treaty, 4 April 1949 see A Decade of American Foreign Policy, 1339-1356.

[52]NSC 9/3, "The Position of the United States with Respect to Support for Western Union and other Related Free Countries," 28 June 1949, FRUS: 1948, III, 140-141; NSC 14/1, "The Position of the United States with Respect to Providing Military Assistance to Nations of the Non-Soviet World," 1 July 1948, Ibid., 585-588; Minutes of the 14th Meeting, 1 July 1948, PSF-NSC, Box 204. For official approval by Truman see NSC, "Policies of the Government, 1947-1948," 37-39.

[53]General Lucius D. Clay, interview by Richard D. McKinzie, Oral History Collection, Harry S. Truman Library. Yergin, Shattered Peace, 365-377; Truman, Years of Trial and Hope, 120-123.

[54]CIA-Special Evaluation No. 23, "Possible Soviet Action in Berlin as a Result of the CMF Breakdown," 23 December 1947, Papers of Harry S. Truman, Records of the NSC, Box 2. (Hereafter cited as PHT-NSC).

[55]Charles Saltzman Oral History Interview, Oral History Collection, Harry S. Truman Library.

[56]Lucius Clay, in Smith, The Papers of General Lucius Clay, Volume II, Ibid.

[57]CIA-4-48, "Review of the World," 2 April 1948; CIA, "Possibility of Direct Soviet Military Action During 1948," 2 April 1948, PSF-NSC, Box 203; Millis, The Forrestal Diaries, 409.

[58]Truman, Years of Trial and Hope, 148-149.

[59]Lucius Clay to Kenneth Royall, in Smith, The Papers of General Lucius Clay, Volume II, 702.

[60]Truman, Years of Trial and Hope, 123-124; Clay in Smith, The Papers of General Lucius Clay, Volume II, 709-710.

[61]Millis, The Forrestal Diaries, 452-455; Condit, JCS History, II, 133-134.

[62]Millis, The Forrestal Diaries, 452-453.

[63]Summary of Discussion at the 15th Meeting, 16 July 1948, PSF-NSC, Box 220.

[64]Ibid.

[65]Ibid.; NSC Action 77, "Dispatch of B-29 Bombers to the British Isles, 15 July 1948, NSC, "Policies of the Government, 1947-1948," 133, PSF-NSC, Box 195.

[66]Condit, JCS History, II, 139; Gaddis, The Long Peace, 110.

[67]General Lucius D. Clay Oral History Interview; Minutes of the 16th Meeting, 22 July 1948, PSF-NSC, Box 204.

[68]Summary of Discussion at the 16th Meeting, 23 July 1948, PSF-NSC, Box 220.

[69]Ibid.

[70]NSC Decisions, "The Situation in Germany," Minutes of the 16th Meeting, 22 July 1948, PSF-NSC, Box 204.

[71]George M. Elsey Oral History Interview. The "pre-crisis period" and "post-crisis period" are the focus in Avi Shlaim, The United States and the Berlin Blockade, 1948-1949: A Study in Crisis Decision-Making (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983).

[72]Summary of Discussion at the 20th Meeting, 9 September 1948, PSF-NSC, Box 220; Minutes of the 20th Meeting 7 September 1948, Ibid., Box 204.

[73]Ibid.

[74]Robert H. Ferrell, ed., Off the Record: The Private Papers of Harry S. Truman (New York: Harper & Row, 1980), 148-149. For the HALFMOON Short Range Emergency War Plan see Etzold and Gaddis, Containment, 315-323.

[75]Condit, JCS History, II, 151-154.

[76]Summary of Discussion at the 24th Meeting, 15 October 1948, PSF-NSC, Box 220; Minutes of the 24th Meeting, 14 October 1948, Ibid., Box 204.

[77]Memorandum, Harry Truman to Sidney Souers, 22 October 1948, PSF-NSC, Box 204.

[78]James Forrestal to Sidney Souers, 10 July 1948, in NSC 20, "Appraisal of the Degree and Character of Military Preparedness Required by the World Situation," 12 July 1948, PSF-NSC, Box 204; FRUS: 1948, I, pt. 2, 589-592. For insightful assessments of Forrestal's initiative and the NSC 20 Series see Joseph M. Siracusa, "NSC 68: A Reappraisal," Naval War College Review 33 (1980): 6-7; Yergin, Shattered Peace, 398-399.

[79]The Atomic Energy Act of 1946, Public Law 585, 79th Congress, 1st sess., 1 August 1946 (Washington, D.C.: G.P.O., 1946).

[80]Millis, The Forrestal Diaries, 461.

[81]David Alan Rosenberg, "The Origins of Overkill: Nuclear Weapons and American Strategy," in Norman A Graebner, ed., The National Security: Its Theory and Practice, 1945-1960 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986), 129.

[82]Millis, The Forrestal Diaries, 458.

[83]Harry Truman to James Forrestal, 6 August 1948, PSF-Chronological File, Box 285.

[84]NSC 30, "United States Policy on Atomic Warfare," FRUS: 1948, I, pt. 2, 624-628; Etzold and Gaddis, Containment, 339-357; PSF-NSC, Box 204; Minutes of the 21st Meeting, 16 September 1948, Ibid., Box 220.

[85]Millis, The Forrestal Diaries, 458.

[86]According to David Alan Rosenberg, NSC 30 would be the single American policy statement "for atomic welfare approved by the NSC until 1960." See Rosenberg, "The Origins of Overkill," 130.

[87]NSC 2/1, "Base Rights in Greenland, Iceland, and the Azores," 25 November 1947, PSF-NSC, Box 203; Minutes of the 2nd Meeting, 14 November 1947, Ibid.

[88]By 1948 the President's Air Policy Commission and strategic planners such as Bernard Brodie argued that a Soviet nuclear attack could come by way of the polar region, especially since it represented the shortest and least defended distance. For elements of the polar strategy see Survival in the Air

Age: A Report by the President's Air Policy Commission (Washington, D.C.: G.P.O. in 1948), 10-19; Yergin, Shattered Peace, 210-211.

[89]Minutes and Summary of Meeting Discussion at the 8th Meeting, 23 March 1948, PSF-NSC, Box 203; Senate Resolution 239, 11 June 1948 (Vandenberg Resolution), FRUS: 1948, III, 135-136.

[90]NSC 28/1, "The Position of the United States with Respect to Scandinavia," 2 September 1948; Summary of Discussion at the 19th Meeting, 3 September 1948, PSF-NSC, Box 220; Minutes of the 19th Meeting, 2 September 1948, Ibid., Box 204. On 3 December 1948, the NSC recommended that the State Department continue negotiations with Denmark for base-rights in Greenland, but discontinue negotiations with Norway for base-rights in Spitzbergen. NSC 32/1, "Current Position of the United States Respecting Base Negotiations with Denmark and Norway," 2 December 1948, concurred in by the President on 3 December 1948, NSC, "Policies of the Government, 1947-1948," 27, Ibid., Box 195.

[91]Minutes of the 17th Meeting, 5 August 1948, PSF-NSC, Box 204.

[92]PPS 38 (NSC 20/1), "United States Objects with Respect to Russia," 18 August 1948, in Etzold and Gaddis, Containment, 173-203; Nelson, PPS Papers 1948, 372-411. PPS 33 (NSC 20/2), "Factors Affecting the Nature of the U.S. Defense Arrangements in the Light of Soviet Policies," 23 June, 25 August 1948, in Nelson, PPS Papers 1948, 281-292; FRUS: 1948, I, 621-623. For a thorough analysis of the PPS proposals see Gaddis, Strategies of Containment, 48-51.

[93]NSC 20/4, "u.S. Objectives to Counter Soviet Threats to U.S. Security," 23 November 1948; Minutes of the 27th Meeting, 23 November 1948, PSF-NSC, Box 204; FRUS: 1948, I, pt.2, 663-669; Etzold and Gaddis, Containment, 203-223. NSC 20/4 was prepared on the basis of NSC 20/1 and 20/2, and CIA-ORE 60-48, Threats to the Security of the United States," 18 September 1948, and submitted to the council as NSC 20/3. With minor revisions it was approved as NSC 20/4 and submitted to Truman for consideration.

[94] Ibid.

[95]Ibid.

[96]David S. Painter, Oil and the American Century: The Political Economy of U.S. Foreign Oil Policy, 1941-1954 (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986); Michael B. Stoff, Oil, War, and American Security: The Search for a National Policy on Foreign Oil, 1941-1947 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1980).

97Ben Halpern, "The Idea of the Jewish State," in Robert Silverberg, If I Forget Thee O Jerusalem: American Jews and the State of Israel (New York: William Morrow, 1970); A Decade of American Foreign Policy, 820-839.

98Truman, Years of Trial and Hope, 132; Michael J. Cohen, Truman and Israel (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990) 44-56; Dean Rusk Oral History Interview, edited by Garrett Epps, Duke Living History Program, Duke University.

99George M. Elsey Oral History Interview; Cohen, Truman and Israel, 240-256; Alonzo L. Hamby, Beyond the New Deal: Harry S. Truman and American Liberalism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1973), 209-212; Robert A. Divine, "The Cold War and the Election of 1948," Journal of American History 59 (June 1972): 90-110.

100"Summary of Policy Proposals for American Policy in Palestine," PCC, Box 14

101Kenneth Royall to Sidney Souers, 24 November 1947, FRUS: 1947, V, 1283.

102PPS 19, "Position of the United States with Respect to Palestine," 20 January 1948; PPS 19/1, "Mr. Rusk's memorandum of January 26, 1948 Concerning PPS 19, 29 January 1948, PPS 21, "The Problem of Palestine," 11 February 1948, in Nelson, The PPS Papers 1948, 34-77, 80-88; CIA-3, "Review of the World," 17 December 1947, PSF-NSC, Box 203.

103Dean Rusk Oral History Interview; George M. Elsey Oral History Interview; Clark M. Clifford Oral History Interview; Clark Clifford, "Recognizing Israel," American Heritage (28 April 1977): 4-11; Truman Public Papers, 190-193; A Decade of American Foreign Policy, 839-841.

104A Decade of American Foreign Policy, 843-844; Truman Public Papers, 258.

105Condit, History of JCS, II, 100-108.

106ORE 38-48, 27 July 1948, FRUS: 1948, V, pt.2, 1240-1248; Memorandum, Roscoe Hillenkoetter to Harry Truman, 20 July 1948, 5 August 1948, PSF-Intelligence File, Box 249.

107NSC 27, "U.S. Military Point of View for the Eventuality of United Nations Decision to Introduce Military Forces into Palestine," Summary of Discussion at the 18th Meeting, 20 August 1948, PSF-NSC, Box 220.

108NSC 27, NSC 27/1, PSF-NSC, Box 204; Summary of Discussion at the 19th Meeting, 3 September 1948, Ibid., Box 220.

[109]NSC 27/3, "Provision of a Police Force for Jerusalem," 23 November 1948, NSC, "Policies of the Government, 1947-1948," 25-26, PSF-NSC, Box 195; Minutes of the 27th Meeting, 23 November 1948, Ibid., Box 204.

[110]Memorandum, James Forrestal to Sidney Souers, 21 May 1948, PSF-NSC, Box 203.

[111]For American investments in the ARAMCO pipeline see Painter, Oil and the American Century, 117-119,

[112] SANACC 398/4, 20 May 1948, FRUS: 1948, V, 2-3.

[113]Summary of Discussion at the 19th Meeting, 3 September 1948, PSF-NSC, Box 220; NSC, "Policies of the Government, 1949," Appendix E, Annotated List of NSC Reports, 124-125, Ibid., Box 195.

[114]Michael Schaller, The U.S. Crusade in China, 1938-1945 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1979); John K. Fairbank, The United States in China (New York: Viking, 1967); William Whitney Stueck, Jr., The Road to Confrontation: American Policy toward China and Korea, 1947-1950 (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1981).

[115]Ibid.

[116]Stueck, The Road to Confrontation, 46-52; A Decade of American Foreign Policy, 703-713.

[117]Minutes, Meeting of Committee of Two, 3 November 1947, FRUS: 1947, VII, 908-912. The Wedemeyer Report was released as part of the China White Paper in 1949, see Department of State, United States Relations with China With Special Reference to the Period 1944-1949 (Washington, D.C.: G.P.O., 1949), 764-814.

[118]Stueck, The Road to Confrontation, 58-61.

[119]Minutes and Summary of Discussion at the 6th Meeting, 12 February 1948, PSF-NSC, Box 203; Millis, The Forrestal Diaries, 372; China White Paper, 380-384; NSC 6, "The Position of the U.S. Regarding Short-Term Assistance to China," 26 March 1949, FRUS: 1948, VIII, 44-60.

[120]A Decade of American Foreign Policy, 713-715; Record of NSC Actions, 9th Meeting, 2 April 1948, PSF-NSC Subject File, Box 191; Stueck, The Road to Confrontation, 61-65; Cable, Admiral Badger to CNA, 3 May 1949, FRUS: 1949, VIII, 310-311, 316-318.

[121]NSC 11, "Action by U.S. Forces at Tsingtao in Defense of U.S. Lives and Property," 24 May, FRUS: 1949, VIII, 314-316.

[122]James Forrestal to George Marshall, 17 June 1949, FRUS: 1948, VIII, 319-312; Condit, History of JCS, II, 456-457.

[123]Summary of Discussion at the 15th Meeting, 16 July 1948, PSF-NSC, Box 220.

[124]Memorandum, Harry Truman to James Forrestal, 18 October 1948, FRUS: 1948, VIII, 326-328; NSC Record of Actions, 25th Meeting, 21 October, PSF-NSC Subject File, Box 191.

[125]NSC 11/1, "U.S. Armed Forces at Tsingtao," 19 October 1948, PSF-NSC, Box 204; Minutes of the 26th Meeting, 2 November 1948, Ibid.; Memorandum, Sidney Souers to Harry Truman, 3 November 1948, Ibid., Box 220.

[126]NSC 11/2, "U.S. Armed Forces at Tsingtao" 15 December 1948, PSF-NSC, Box 205; Minutes of the 13th Meeting, 16 December 1948, Ibid.

[127]Memorandum, William Leahy to James Forrestal, 20 December 1948, PHT-NSC, Box 9; NSC 11/3, "U.S. Armed Forces at Tsingtao," 24 December 1948, NSC, "Policies of the Government, 1947-1948," 2, PSF-NSC, Box 195.

[128]Stueck, The Road to Confrontation, 56.

[129]Gaddis, Strategies of Containment, 41. On this point see Michael Schaller, The American Occupation of Japan: The Origins of the Cold War in Asia (New York: Oxford University Press, 1985), 77-106.

[130]Kennan, Memoirs, Volume I, 382-391; PPS 28, 25 March 1948, FRUS: 1948, VI, 691-696. The paper was referred to the NSC Staff and reissued as NSC 13 on 2 June 1948, PSF-NSC, Box 204.

[131]NSC 13/1, "Recommendations with Respect to U.S. Policy Toward Japan," 24 September 1948, PSF-NSC, Box 204.

[132]Memorandum, The Joint Chiefs of Staff to James Forrestal, 29 September 1948, Ibid; Summary of Discussion at the 22nd Meeting, 1 October 1948, Ibid, Box 220; Summary of Discussion at the 23rd Meeting, 8 October 1948, Ibid. Truman also approved paragraph 5 of NSC 13/2 on 5 November 1948, stating the United States intended to maintain long-term military facilities at Okinawa, Memorandum, Sidney Souers to Harry Truman, 27 October 1948, Ibid., Box 204.

[133]Stueck, The Road to Confrontation, 19-28.

[134]Ibid., 82-100; Dean Rusk Oral History Interview.

[135]SANACC 176/39, NSC Record of Actions, 9th Meeting 2 April 1948, PSF-NSC, Box 191; Summary of Discussion at the 9th Meeting, 2 April 1948, Ibid., Box 220; NSC 8, "The Position of the U.S. with Respect to Korea," Ibid., Box 203. For a fuller analysis of SANACC's report see James P. Schnabel and Robert J. Watson, The History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff: The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy, Volume III, The Korean War (Hereafter cited a Schnabel and Watson, JCS History III.) (Wilmington, DE: Michael Glazier, Inc,. 1979), 15-17.

[136]NSC 8, "The Position of the U.S. with Respect to Korea," PSF-NSC, Box 203. Portions of printed in FRUS: 1948, VI, 1168-1169.

[137]Condit, History of the JCS, II, 515-516; Schnabel and Watson, History of the JCS, III, 19-21.

[138]Stueck, The Road to Confrontation, 105.

CHAPTER IV

THE NSC AND WORLD CRISES, 1949

The first nine months of 1949 were largely full of positive change and optimism for the NSC and President Truman. In April CIA members spoke of America having "checked the Soviet-Communist activities that were seeking to break down Western Europe."[1] A few months after Truman began his new term in the White House, American and Soviet negotiators announced an end to the Berlin blockade, Western European nations formed the NATO pact, the Greek civil war wound down, the Arab-Israeli War ended, and the government reorganized the NSC and the CIA. The membership of the NSC also changed with the resignations of Secretaries George C. Marshall, James V. Forrestal, and Kenneth Royall early in the year. Truman replaced these men with Secretary of State Dean G. Acheson, Secretary of Defense Louis A. Johnson, and Secretary of the Army Gordon Gray.

Optimism among the Western Allies changed, however, in the fall of 1949, when the United States discovered that the Soviet Union had exploded an atomic bomb. As if that were not enough bad news, on October 1, Mao Tse-tung's Communist forces marched into Peking and proclaimed the creation of the People's Republic of China. Many Americans and members of Congress questioned why the Truman administration allowed China to fall to Communism and how the Soviets acquired highly classified atomic secrets. The answers for most were seemingly that the administration had been too soft on Communism. Under growing anti-Communist pressure at home and threatened national

security policies abroad, the NSC and President Truman responded by intensifying the Cold War and preparing national security policies that stressed offensive global objectives.

The NSC and the Cold War in Western Europe

The Berlin Blockade and the United States airlift to the city continued for the first six months of 1949. During the winter months West Berliners endured a shortage of fuel supplies and suffered food rationing. United States national security managers did not know how long, in spite of the airlift, West Berlin could manage the hardships. Although no agreements to end the blockade were reached through the United Nations, other diplomatic channels opened by spring. American and Soviet representatives negotiated secret talks during February and March, and by April they, British and French negotiators were working on a final settlement. To the relief of all the western representatives, the settlement recognized that the blockade would end on May 12 and that the Council of Foreign Ministers would convene for the purpose of resolving the problem of Germany.[2]

When it became clear that the diplomatic impasse with the Soviets might end, the NSC established a special subcommittee to deal with the German question. Made up of the Secretaries of State, Defense, the Army, the Economic Cooperation Administration, and a small steering group under the direction of George Kennan, the subcommittee held several meetings to reexamine overall United States policy toward Germany. By March it produced a report that Secretary Acheson submitted to President Truman (see Appendix C).[3] On May 17, prior to the Council of Foreign Ministers Conference in Paris, the NSC met to consider American plans as well as what action might be

needed should the conference adjourn without a settlement on Germany. Secretary Acheson told the council that "'Germany' had become only a geographical expression, a word, with no government and no state." He also noted that the priority for the Council of Foreign Ministers Conference would be "to go ahead with the Western German government," with hopes that "any unification of Germany as a whole should grow out of that."[4] The NSC questioned Acheson whether the State Department had an alternative plan should the Soviet Union attempt a second future blockade. Acheson reviewed several options, but concluded that the "best we could hope for" would be a West German government and police force that "could initiate steps to get the Soviets back as far as we could." President Truman, presiding over the meeting, noted that he would "make the decision when the time came," but suggested that Secretary Symington "keep the airlift handy." After further discussion the NSC decided that a study would be needed of possible United States courses of action in case the USSR reimposed the blockade.[5]

Nearly one week after the NSC meeting, the Council of Foreign Ministers convened in Paris, and in Bonn, Germany, a parliamentary council declared the creation of the Federal Republic of West Germany. The NSC suggested a course of action for the United States in the event the blockade was reimposed. Truman agreed with the recommendation. In the event of another Berlin blockade the United States should take two actions: (1) establish another airlift at full capacity, and (2) implement a counter-blockade on East Berlin. The report also suggested that United States "interim measures," particularly the maintenance of aircraft and continued stockpiling in Berlin, should be taken should a second airlift be needed.[6]

On June 16 the NSC convened to consider JCS contingency plans for stand-by airlift operations, but the Council of Foreign Ministers Conference

adjourned without a new blockade materializing.[7] By July 7 Secretary Acheson told the NSC that in light of the conference's conclusion, the Soviets would not try to reimpose a blockade.[8] Thereafter, the JCS reviewed the airlift and reported to Secretary of Defense Johnson that a gradual phase-out could begin by August 1. On July 27 the NSC recommended ending the airlift as soon as possible. It also suggested that should events render a necessary second airlift, one could be resumed within a ninety day period. As usual, Truman sanctioned the report. By September 30 the United States Air Force concluded all airlift operations.[9] The first Berlin crisis had ended, but a protracted Cold War crisis between the superpowers that at times verged on war or the use of atomic weapons by the United States would ensue. In October, a People's Congress met in East Berlin and declared the formation of the German Democratic Republic under Soviet sponsorship. Thus, by late 1949 the line of containment had been drawn in Europe.

The NSC and the Cold War in Eastern Europe

As the Berlin crisis ended, the United States's national security managers were presented with an unexpected Cold War rapprochement in Eastern Europe. In June 1948 the USSR expelled Yugoslavia from its Cominform, and the Kremlin called for the expulsion of its leader, Josef Tito. A Yugoslav resistance leader during World War II who turned Communist, Tito rose to power as a powerful dictator in the immediate postwar years. Yet Tito pursued and maintained independent Leninist political, economic, and military controls that soon prompted a falling out with the Soviet Union. After Yugoslavia's break with Moscow, the NSC recommended that the United States should encourage

Tito's defection from the Soviet bloc by moving very gradually to provide Yugoslavia with economic and military assistance.[10]

By early 1949 the Soviet Union placed an economic blockade on Yugoslavia, and the Truman administration became concerned that Tito might not achieve economic independence from the USSR. The PPS suggested that the United States relax export controls on Yugoslavia, and in February it so advised the NSC. The NSC then approved the report with revisions and submitted it to President Truman for consideration. Truman approved the policy report the next day.[11] The NSC suggested that "Tito has successfully defied the Kremlin myth and effectively destroyed the legend of the infallibility of Stalin." Hopeful that Yugoslavia might serve as an example to other Soviet satellite states, the report recommended that the United States assist Tito's break, but with an understanding that Yugoslavia should withdraw any future support for the Greek insurgency movement. It further noted that American support to Tito should be rendered by extending commercial credits, licensing for export American material goods not in short supply, and removing the export prohibitions on the shipment of munitions and materials required for production of munitions. The NSC stressed that export controls should only be lifted in a "quiet and routine manner," with no public announcement. This approach, it maintained, would prevent any public conclusion that the Truman administration was "making a radical change" in policy towards Yugoslavia.[12]

After the approval of the new United States policy towards Yugoslavia, the NSC established a special ad hoc committee consisting of representatives from the Departments of State, Defense, Commerce, and the AEC. The committee reviewed all Yugoslav export license applications and recommended approval of changes by the Secretary of Commerce.[13] In March Yugoslavia requested an export license for a steel mill. The NSC ad hoc committee, State, and

Commerce favored United States license approval, but Secretary of Defense Johnson opposed acceptance of the application. After several months of debate, State and Commerce prevailed and announced the steel mill deal in September. Thereafter, the Truman administration did not publicize widely its trade relationship with Yugoslavia. The American public and Congress were still anti-Communist, and despite support for Truman's containment policies, some members of Congress charged that the administration had been soft on Communism.[14]

At the same time the administration considered the steel mill export to Yugoslavia, the NSC adopted, and Truman approved, changes in its policy of 1948, in respect to "the USSR and its Satellites." The changes excluded Yugoslavia from United States aviation export restrictions, and thereafter allowed Yugoslavia export license application for American aircraft, spare parts, and aviation fuel.[15] In addition, the Export-Import Board approved a $20 million loan to Yugoslavia, and the United States supported a loan from the International Monetary Fund to Yugoslavia of $3 million.[16] United States economic assistance helped stabilize the Yugoslavian currency and stimulated trade opportunities. By the fall of 1949 Yugoslavia had achieved economic independence from Moscow and gained admittance to the United Nations Security Council. The success of Tito's break, however, led to Soviet military pressure. In November the CIA reported that the USSR had taken paramilitary and clandestine actions to undermine Tito's regime, and noted that the Yugoslavs were "taking defensive measures against the eventuality of large-scale guerrilla infiltration or direct military action."[17] Concerned that Tito might not withstand a Soviet attack, the NSC recommended and Truman approved, that the United States provide Yugoslavia "quiet" non-grant military assistance should it become necessary.[18] Tito would not be informed of the decision, and

no military aid would be sent to Yugoslavia in 1949-1950. NSC recommendations on Yugoslavia, however, provided Truman a more realistic approach to Cold War Policy. By 1951 the council re-evaluated United States policy towards Yugoslavia when Tito sought stronger support from the Truman administration.

What came to be known as "Titoism," or the defection of a former or supposed Soviet-supported state, would be regarded by the national security mangers "not as an isolated phenomenon," states one Cold War historian, "but rather as a precedent to be encouraged elsewhere."[19] Thereafter, United States policy towards Eastern Europe underwent a dramatic change. Instead of applying containment to the Eastern bloc nations, the Truman administration initiated a pre-liberation approach that focused upon undermining and fragmenting Soviet control in the regions. Thinking along these lines, the intelligence community reported in the fall of 1949 that "nationalist sentiment embodied in the Yugoslav-Communist doctrine already has attracted some followers in the Communist ranks, including some of the satellite states." In addition, the CIA noted that "Tito's successful defiance" had proven that international Communism was not monolithic. Believing that Yugoslavia's defection emphasized an "unresolved strain" in the Communist doctrine and its political organization, the CIA noted that Titoism "may develop into a means of pulling together an anti-Soviet opposition."[20]

The NSC had advocated a similar policy in 1948 that had recommended the "de-Communization" of the Soviet Union after a war, by cultivating the establishment of several ethnic-national, and independent pro-United States republics, particularly among the White Russians, Ukrainians, and the Baltic states.[21] The emergence of Titoism by 1949 led the NSC to develop further the argument that favored United States encouragement of traditional nationalistic

identity and opposition to Soviet control. In September 1949 the NSC formulated a policy statement in respect to Soviet Satellites in Europe. The policy originated in the Department of State, and the NSC revised and adopted it. Truman approved the new statement. The statement stressed that the "ultimate aim" of the United States must be "the appearance in Eastern Europe of non-totalitarian administrations willing to accommodate themselves to, and participate in, the free world community." Noting that cultural and nationalistic grounds existed in Eastern Europe, the NSC advocated that the United States "foster a heretical drifting-away process" from the Soviets by the satellite states. While recognizing that the democratication of Eastern Europe would not be imminent, the NSC remained hopeful that American policy could foster the development of "two opposing blocs in the Communist world--a Stalinist group and a non-conformist faction."[22] The NSC recommended that the United States take two steps to foster Titoism in Eastern Europe: (1) disrupt the Soviet-satellite relationship with American psychological warfare, and (2) encourage nationalism with a pro-West "offensive" that would be "maintained not only on the overt but also the covert plane."[23] On the overt level, the Truman administration opposed actively in the United Nations human rights abuses in the Soviet satellite states. On the covert level, the administrations activities were much more varied and intense. The NSC stepped up psychological warfare plans for Eastern Europe and authorized a number of CIA and CIA-funded operations designed for Eastern Europe. Both endeavors sought the cultivation of Titoism throughout the Soviet bloc and represented a new covert program by the NSC and the Truman administration.

In early 1949 the NSC placed the responsibility for coordination of overt propaganda activities within the Department of State. State's efforts suffered from interbureaucratic rivalry, but it achieved some success by August when it

announced that measures had been taken to counteract Soviet jamming of Voice of America broadcasts from the United States and the United Kingdom.[24] After early 1950 the NSC proposed, and Truman approved that the Department of State would be responsible for the coordination of both overt information programs and covert psychological warfare in times of war. The operations included all covert and broadcasting monitoring services of the DIA, all foreign information services of the Department of State, and all Armed Forces' overt informational services. The changes broadened the Department of State's propaganda capabilities, particularly in Europe.[25]

The CIA's covert operations also expanded in 1949. By June the OPC, under Director Frank Wisner, helped establish Radio Free Europe with clandestine funding from the CIA. The true coordinating agency of Radio Free Europe would be the National Committee for a Free Europe (NCFE), a private organization set up by former Department of State and OSS officials and advised by Frank Wisner, George Kennan, and Allen Dulles. The NCFE would be committed to liberating Eastern Europe from Soviet control and assisting refugees from Soviet bloc countries who had made their way to the United States. From the cadre of Eastern European emigres the NCFE contacted, the OPC also gained intelligence information and recruited personnel for CIA training. The NCFE hired the emigres for employment with Radio Free Europe, primarily as foreign language broadcasters or as translators and writers. Radio Free Europe began beaming programs over the Iron Curtain in early 1950, shortly after it received its first shortwave radio transmitter donation from Wisner's OPC. By the end of the Truman presidency, Radio Free Europe had broadcast facilities throughout Germany, North Africa, and the Iberian Peninsula, and was receiving as much as $30 million a year through the OPC.[26]

In Western Europe CIA-OPC operators organized a large network of stay-behind agents in Germany, France, Austria, Italy, and Scandinavia. These agents provided contacts and potential CIA agents from a growing Soviet bloc refugee population in displaced persons camps throughout Western Europe. Many CIA-trained emigre agents were returned to their native countries to gather intelligence. Hundreds of others were parachuted home to assist national anti-Soviet groups form paramilitary destabilization fronts in Poland, the Baltic states, and Albania.[27]

The demands for intelligence information and the recruitment and training of large numbers of Eastern European emigres led the CIA and the United States Army's Intelligence Corps to develop the first CIA-Nazi Cold War connections. Because many former Nazi officers were vehement anti-communists, the CIA and the Army secretly accepted their services in the postwar years. The most notorious Nazi the CIA employed was Klaus Barbie, "the butcher of Lyon." Before American officials assisted his escape in 1951 to South America, the CIA used Barbie for his connection to a ring of anti-Communist Nazi agents.[28] One of the most successful stay-behind agents for the CIA was Reinhard Gehlen. A former head of Hitler's military intelligence in the East, Gehlen offered his services and his files on Soviet operations to the CIA at the end of the war. Gehlen's organization and contacts in East Germany and Eastern Europe provided many new intelligence emigre agents in 1949 and later years.[29]

In spite of all the time and work involved in the CIA-OPC Eastern European operations, significant obstacles blocked the successful emergence of another Tito. The CIA could not verify information from inside the Soviet bloc provided by emigre agents. Soviet agents often penetrated emigre resistance and destabilization fronts. By 1950 the USSR tightened its security controls on

Eastern Europe, making open resistance extremely difficult. Nevertheless, the NSC and the CIA continued to wage a costly covert counteroffensive until the end of the Truman presidency, when all major resistance groups had disbanded or been eliminated, and the OPC abandoned its activities behind the Iron Curtain as unproductive.[30]

The NSC and the Cold War in the Mediterranean

The strained relations between Yugoslavia and the USSR adversely affected the Communist insurgency movement in Greece, with Tito gradually refusing Yugoslavian support to the guerillas. As a result, on January 15 the NSC suggested that the development of the Greek civil war was insufficient to justify sending United States armed forces. By summer Tito ordered the Greek insurgents to pledge their loyalty to him rather than the Soviets, the guerrilla leadership refused, and Yugoslavia shut off further support and closed its borders. In October, the weakened Greek guerrillas declared a cease-fire.[31]

For the national security managers the Greek civil war also emphasized the strategic importance of Turkey to the Mediterranean region's security. Located on the Black Sea straits and southwest of the USSR, Turkey was more valuable than Greece as a possible jump-off point for United States air operations against the USSR. The Truman administration had not forgotten that the Soviets had threatened Turkey in August of 1946, when the USSR demanded rights to establish naval stations along the straits as well as the retrocession of eastern Turkish provinces. After several months of a war of nerves, the Soviets withdrew their demands. As a result, Congress voted to provide Turkey military and economic assistance under the Greek-Turkish Aid

Acts of 1947 and 1948. Under their support Turkey had received over 200 United States bombers and 81 cargo planes.[32]

Throughout 1948 and 1949 the Turkish government requested a United States-Turkish military alliance. After the North Atlantic Treaty had been signed in April 1949, Turkey became more determined for American protection. Although Turkey did not join NATO until 1952, the NSC and the JCS recommended that Truman provide the Turks with sufficient support until that time. In late December 1948, Secretary Stuart Symington submitted a report to the NSC requesting the United States finance construction of several airfields in Turkey. The NSC agreed to consider the proposal and directed the NSC Staff to use it in an overall policy on Greece and Turkey.[33]

In March 1949 the NSC Staff stressed that it would be "in the interest of U.S. national security that neither Greece nor Turkey fall under Communist domination." The NSC recommended that the United States: (1) continue to strengthen the Greek military establishment until it would be "capable of maintaining internal security;" (2) provide increased support to Turkey in order to develop the "combat effectiveness" of its armed forces; and, (3) construct air bases in Turkey, under Congressional funding, and with a provision that allowed United States peacetime use of the airfields.[34] The NSC also noted that "Turkey is strategically more important than Greece," and cautioned that should it "come under Communist domination, U.S. security interests in the Middle East and Eastern Mediterranean areas would be critically affected." Secretary Acheson questioned the recommendation for air bases in Turkey and wondered whether "there was a danger" that the Soviets might perceive that the United States was "encircling the USSR with a lot of jumping-off places." Secretary Royall felt that the "fields were essential." Acheson replied that in light of the North Atlantic Treaty, the Department of State should study the

"whole matter of peripheral bases." On that point the NSC agreed to drop references to Turkish air base construction. Truman approved the policy report the next day.[35] In accordance with the NSC's recommendations, Truman also requested that Congress provide additional funding for both Greece and Turkey. As a result, when Congress passed the Mutual Defense Assistance Act in October 1949, Greece and Turkey were earmarked to receive $211 million in aid through 1950.[36]

Meanwhile, the JCS recommended that the United States stockpile 12,000 barrels of aviation fuel in Turkey for Western European air base reserves. On April 2, Secretary Johnson requested that Executive Secretary Souers place the matter before the NSC in conjunction with the pending proposal for Turkish airfields.[37] At its thirty-eighth meeting, with Truman presiding, the NSC considered the Department of State's views on stockpiling petroleum. The NSC asserted that "at this time" it would be "unwise" for the United States to arrange construction of airfields or the stockpiling of aviation gasoline with the Turkish government. Secretary Johnson told the NSC that the Pentagon "still favored" both proposals. He concurred, however, in the Department of State's opposition, but added that the National Military Establishment "might bring the matter up again at a more appropriate time." Truman told the council that he had "talked the question over" with Secretary Acheson, and he endorsed the idea that the Department of State "should keep the matter under continuous review." The NSC members agreed.[38]

Apparently the matter of the Turkish airfields seemed premature. But because Truman and the NSC had objected to the proposal on the basis of timing, the Air Force proceeded with its plans. That fall support for Turkey from the Mutual Defense Assistance Act appropriated by Congress allowed work on five Turkish air bases to proceed by 1950.[39] In addition to the new air bases in

Turkey, the United States also expanded its strategic air capability with the acquisition of base-rights in the Cairo-Suez area and the United Kingdom. The Secretary of Defense had submitted the proposal to the NSC. Lieutenant General Lauris Norstad of the United States Air Force told the NSC that coastal bases in the United Kingdom did not provide United States B-29 bombers "adequate defense because of the exposure." In addition, Norstad pointed out that the Suez bases required "greater urgency", because the British had negotiated a critical materials arrangement with the Egyptian government. If the materials were not used in the construction soon, Norstad said, "they might be lost." Convinced by Norstad's argument, the council amended the policy report slightly and approved it by memorandum action. This policy authorized the Department of State to initiate negotiations with the British regarding joint-funding and approved the construction of four new airfields in the United Kingdom and one in Cairo-Suez. Truman approved the policy three days later.[40] Consequently, the new airfields in Turkey and Egypt provided the United States by 1950 the capability to launch a strategic air offensive into the southern regions of the USSR.

The NSC and the Cold War in East Asia

Throughout 1949 few major differences existed between the Departments of State and Defense regarding United States Cold War policy toward Europe and the Mediterranean region. That harmony would not continue with the Cold War in Asia. Beginning in mid-1949 the advance of the Communists in China forced a re-evaluation of the Truman administration's East Asian policy. While the Department of State pressed for a "wait-and-see" policy towards China, hoping to exploit any conflict of interest between Peking and Moscow, the

Department of Defense sought greater military assistance to non-Communist forces in order to thwart further Soviet influence in Asia. In turn, the NSC became the focus and the prime mediator of these broad policy differences.

On New Years Day of 1949, Chiang Kai-shek offered to step down as leader of Nationalist China and proposed peace negotiations with Mao's Communists. Several days later the CIA reported that the "final collapse" of Chiang's government would be imminent and that "no realistic means is presently at hand to prevent the establishment of a Communist-dominated regime" in China.[41] As Chiang's forces struggled south toward Formosa, the NSC and the Department of State began work on a re-evaluation of United States policy toward China. In early February the NSC adopted an earlier policy paper that Kennan and the PPS had prepared. This policy recommended that the United States maintain a flexible approach towards China's Communists, while "avoiding irrevocable commitments to any one course of action or to any one [Chinese] faction."[42]

Due to the impending demise of Chiang, the NSC also believed that further United States military aid to China could not be "used effectively." Therefore, at the same time the NSC sent to Truman for consideration a statement in respect to United States aid to China. With the China Aid Act of 1948 nearing expiration in April, the NSC recommended that Truman "advise key members of Congress" that he considered "it to be in the interest of national security to suspend further shipments under the Military Aid Program for China."[43] Two days later Truman consulted with congressional leaders and found them unanimously opposed to the NSC's recommendation. Believing that the cession of military aid would be a betrayal of Chiang's government, Senator Arthur Vandenberg told Truman that America would be accused of giving "poor China the final push into disaster."[44]

On February 8, Truman informed the NSC that "in order not to discourage continued Chinese resistance to Communist aggression," shipments of United States military assistance "should not be suspended nor terminated." However, he also noted that "no effort should be made to expedite deliveries." Although Truman believed that the United States had been wasting its money with military aid to Nationalist China, he vacillated between the NSC's recommendation to cut it and political pressures from Chiang's long-time supporters in Congress. Truman's approval of the NSC report, however, would be indicative of his willingness in the near future to consider an alternative policy toward Chiang as well as toward Mao's Communists. [45]

Within the Department of State many, including Dean Acheson, George Kennan, and John Patton Davies, believed that the United States might benefit from the nationalistic nature of the Communists and from Mao Tse-tung's "Titoistic" tendencies. The PPS stressed that Mao could be potentially more of a heretic than Tito because he had been "entrenched in power for nearly ten times the length of time." Therefore, when the Chinese Communists acquired control, they would assert their independence from the Soviet Union.[46] Hoping eventually to dissociate the United States from Chiang's Nationalists, the Truman administration pursued the "Titoist" argument in policy. On March 3, the NSC adopted and Truman approved a revised policy paper. At the meeting, Executive Secretary Souers pointed out to the NSC that it recommended how the United States should "exploit opportunities" with regard to Communist China. Secretary Royall believed, as did General Wedemeyer, that there were "a number of anti-Communist leaders in East China whom we should support." W. Walton Butterworth, Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs for the State Department, pointed out that "such a course of action...would commit us on the mainland and would give the Communists a real propaganda issue." Economic

Cooperation Administrator Paul Hoffman concluded that the NSC Statement "was our only possible policy at the moment."[47] The NSC noted that "eventually most or all of China will come under Communist rule." It also stressed that "the full force of nationalism" had not been released in China, and asserted that the United States should "exploit through political and economic means any rifts between the Chinese Communists and the USSR." The report concluded that the United States should "nourish and bring to power a new revolution" in China that would "modify the composition and character of the Chinese Communists so that they became a truly independent government." Cautioning restraint and patience, the NSC suggested that "the Kremlin waited twenty-five years for the fulfillment of its revolution in China. We may have to persevere as long or longer."[48]

Although the NSC had recommended that the United States abandon Chiang's Nationalists and foster Chinese Titoism, the NSC only provided one suggestion how the Truman administration could encourage a Sino-Soviet rift. In March the NSC adopted, and Truman approved, a policy in respect to trade with China. The Department of State and the NSC believed that Mao's Communists would eventually need Western and Japanese commerce and technology to develop China's economy. The NSC recommended that the United States allow a controlled trade between China, Japan, and the West. Trade of strategic A-1 items would not be shipped to China, while civilian B-1 goods would be allowed. According to the NSC, a "fear and favor" trade policy would hopefully slow down or prevent Soviet economic influence in a new China as well as discourage the shipment of items from China to the Soviet bloc. Most important, Sino-Japanese trade would benefit Japan's economy and production, furthering its emergence as the hub of regional stability.[49] The commercial policy the NSC recommended remained in operation until a Sino-

Soviet Treaty of Friendship was signed in 1950; only then did the United States drop any hopes of cultivating Titoism in China.

Soon after the council formulated its policy, the Truman administration began work to divert Congress from passing another China Aid Act. The Department of State requested a temporary extension of military aid to Chiang to last until February 15, 1950, and Congress approved the extension without any additional appropriations. Yet in the spring, Mao's forces launched a massive offensive, capturing the cities of Nanking and Shanghai. By October 1, the Communist armies captured the last of all Nationalist provinces, proclaimed the People's Republic of China, and thousands of Nationalist Chinese, including Chiang Kai-shek, took refuge on the offshore island of Formosa.[50]

During World War II the United States had recognized Formosa as a part of China and supported China's efforts to reclaim it from Japan's control. Because no formal peace treaty had been finalized with Japan in February 1949, Truman approved an NSC suggestion that "the U.S. should seek to develop and support a local non-Communist Chinese regime" on Formosa and offer economic and diplomatic assistance to "provide at least a modicum of decent government for the island."[51] One month later the Department of State sent a secret mission to Formosa to offer United States diplomatic and military assistance. The Communists did not know of the United States offer.[52]

In late 1948 the Joint Chiefs had advised the NSC on the strategic importance of Formosa and its place in the "defensive-perimeter" with Japan, the Ryukyus, and the Philippines.[53] In February the JCS again emphasized that "Formosa's strategic importance is, nevertheless, great." The report also recommended that "some form of military support" should be made to Formosa, but limited only to "the stationing of minor numbers" of United States naval fleet units at Formosan ports.[54] Hoping to avoid a complete break with the Chinese

Communists, the Department of State took exception with the JCS regarding overt military support to Formosa. At the NSC's thirty-fifth meeting, Secretary Acheson told the council that America "cannot afford to compromise an emerging new U.S. position in China by overtly showing a pronounced interest in Formosa." "If we are to intervene militarily" in Formosa, Acheson pointed out, "we shall, in all probability, do so in concert with like-minded powers."[55] Acheson also complained that the JCS "had not clearly answered the question" whether they "recommended that overt military action should be taken...either now or at any time in the future." Secretary Royall said he felt that there may be "serious differences of opinion" among the JCS whether "Formosa was not more important than Japan...to the defense of the Philippines and Okinawa." Acheson then proposed the NSC support a policy of no deployment of "units of the U.S. fleet . . . off Formosan ports." Truman agreed with this change. Weeks later, Secretary Johnson requested a re-evaluation by the JCS of Formosa's strategic importance. The JSC reconsidered its position and by April 2 informed the NSC that Formosa's strategic significance did not justify "overt military action by the United States ...so long as the present disparity exists between our military strength and our global obligations."[57]

The Department of State's continuing efforts to pursue a policy of benign neglect toward Chiang's Nationalists on Formosa received NSC approval a few weeks after Chiang fled China. At its forty-seventh meeting on October 20, the council approved a strong Department of State message to Chiang advising him that "the U.S. Government does not intend to commit any of its armed forces to the defense of the island." The message also reflected United States disapproval of Chiang's former inept governance of China. It noted that United States economic assistance would be provided the Nationalists "under existing

legislation," but warned Chiang that "any additional aid will depend upon the future performance of the Chinese administration of Formosa."[58]

At the same time that the NSC supported the Department of State's efforts to disassociate United States policy from Formosa, it considered similar JCS views on the colonies of British Hong Kong and Portuguese Macao. The NSC also stressed that "it would be unwise" for the United States to contribute military forces for the defense of the two foreign colonies "unless we are willing to risk major military involvement in China and possibly global war." The NSC noted Acheson's observation that the JCS recommendations "would not be affected by U.S. moral support of a British appeal to the United Nations" should a Communist offensive be made on Hong Kong, "since the USSR would certainly veto" any United Nations Security Council employment of UN armed forces. With minor revisions the report was forwarded to President Truman as only a recommendation that did not require his policy approval.[59]

While the NSC focused upon policy formulation and coordination for China, Formosa, Hong Kong, and Macao, re-evaluation of United States policy towards Japan, Korea, and French Indochina also required its attention. By the spring of 1949 the Truman administration had revised slightly its policy toward Japan. Although General MacArthur remained firm in his support of an immediate negotiation of a treaty, the NSC circulated a new policy report that stated the United States would not seek a treaty until the Japanese economy showed signs of recovery and the government regained political self-confidence. In order to stimulate Japan's economic self-sufficiency, the NSC recommended that "all industrial facilities, including so-called 'primary war facilities' designed for reparations to the U.S.," be utilized for economic recovery. It also directed that the United States reduce its occupation forces gradually, reduce United States involvement in Japan's internal affairs, and

help strengthen Japan's internal security forces. Furthermore, the defensive security of Japan would be established by United States retention "on a long-term basis" of American base facilities of Okinawa, the Ryukyus Islands, and Marcus and Nanpo Shoto islands. Truman, after consideration of the report, on May 6 accepted the NSC recommendations. Implementation of the policy, at least complete implementation, did not occur as a consequence of growing anti-American sentiment within Japan.[60]

Soon after the approval of the NSC report, Washington officials heard that the Japanese were becoming disillusioned with United States military occupation. The CIA had warned that the Japanese Communist factions were encouraged and non-Communist groups alarmed by reports "that U.S. policy is 'writing-off' Japan."[61] By summer, Japanese unrest erupted as a series of strikes were called and terrorist actions occurred against local citizens who were affiliated with United States military forces. At the same time a rift emerged in the Truman administration over the occupation policy.[62]

For some time the Department of State had supported General MacArthur's insistence on signing an early treaty. When Secretary Acheson learned of the local unrest in Japan, he argued for an immediate treaty to assure continuing Japanese friendship and United States security in Asia. The Department of Defense and the JCS believed that a treaty would be premature. Hoping to diffuse Department of State efforts, the JCS submitted a report to the NSC that recommended a continuing United States military presence in Japan, and new requirements for a United States naval base at Tokyo Bay, and suggested that any future treaty negotiations include the USSR as well as the "de facto Government of China."[63] However, faced with mounting policy decisions on China and Formosa and an over-all policy recommendation on

Asia, the NSC would not provide a solution to the differences between State and Defense on Japan until early 1950.

As preparations for the evacuation of remaining United States occupation forces from South Korea continued on schedule, the Army requested General MacArthur's advice on the withdrawal. Reflecting some doubt, MacArthur stated that the United States could not "establish Korean security forces capable of meeting successfully a full-scale invasion from North Korea." Nevertheless, he added, the best time for final American troop withdrawals would be May 10, 1949, the first anniversary of South Korea's elections. Thereafter, should further training assistance of South Korean forces be needed, MacArthur pointed out, it "could be dispersed through a military mission."[64]

In response to Army and Department of State requests, the NSC Staff prepared a revised policy on Korea for 1949. This report concurred with MacArthur's recommendations for a prompt withdrawal and training assistance under a United States military mission. The NSC specified that: (1) withdrawal of all United States combat troops should be made "on or about" June 30, 1949; (2) complete withdrawal should not occur until a 65,000-man army of the Republic of South Korea (ROK) had been established and exhibited itself "capable of maintaining internal order...and of assuring border security;" (3) at the time of withdrawal, the United States should transfer to the ROK "at least a six-months stock-pile of military equipment and supplies;" and, (4) following withdrawal, the United States would continue economic and political support to the ROK as well as technical and military training to its army, police, and coast guard under a United States Korean Military Advisory Group (KMAG).[65]

The JCS recommended that the policy report be revised to insure that the United States would not have a future obligation to provide ROK forces with air or naval support.[66] At its thirty-sixth meeting on March 22, the NSC considered

the Joint Chief's revision requests. Secretary Acheson noted that the Department of State accepted the changes. Secretary Royall commented that "the paper was an excellent solution of a tough problem." U.S. Ambassador to Korea John Muccio, who attended the meeting while in Washington, agreed with Royall. When the NSC asked Muccio about the internal condition of South Korea, he replied that "there were still many question marks," but added that United States support of the ROK military "constituted a calculated risk that had to be taken." After some further discussion, the NSC adopted the NCS revisions.[67] On April 20, less than a month after Truman approved this policy, the United States extended official recognition to the new Republic of South Korea. And in accordance with the NSC's recommendations, United States combat troops withdrew from the country on June 29. A new phase of United States-Korean relations had begun. Although fully independent, South Korea would remain dependent on the Truman administration and its military and economic assistance.[68]

By July 1, a 500-man force of the United States KMAG became permanent under the command of Brigadier General William L. Roberts and part of the American Mission under the administration of Ambassador John Muccio. United States assistance to the ROK for fiscal year 1950 would be requested by Truman in July and granted by Congress in October under the Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949. After a bilateral treaty had been finalized between the United States and the ROK in early 1950, $10 million in U.S. military aid was earmarked for the ROK. Based upon reports of a North Korean military buildup and a series of clashes along the 38th parallel between North Korean and ROK troops, both Roberts and Muccio believed United States support would not be enough should a North Korean attack occur. Their concern, however, fell on deaf ears, for by the fall of 1949 the course of the Cold War changed

dramatically in Asia with a Communist victory in China.[69] The fall of China caused the United States to leave more troops in Korea than had originally been planned, and it also prompted the arming, albeit lightly, of ROK regular army troops.

Unlike Korea and Japan, where the United States had greater security interests, Indochina had been a colonial outpost of France since the 1800s. Yet in the wake of the fall of China it also became the focus of attention for the national security managers. The Japanese had occupied Indochina from 1941 through 1945. The French returned there after Japan's surrender to find they were challenged by a well-organized anti-colonial movement led by Ho Chi Minh. A Communist revolutionary and leader of the Communist faction called the Vietminh, Ho, had established the so-called Democratic Republic of Vietnam. Negotiations were conducted briefly between the French and the Vietminh, but a guerrilla war broke out in 1946 that slowly engulfed the whole country.[70]

Until the summer of 1949 the Truman administration avoided direct involvement in the French effort to retain Indochina.[71] But as French control over Indochina eroded, many in the Truman administration began to worry that costs there would ruin France's economy and in the long-run seriously hinder its contribution to European recovery. The PPS had constructed a thorough study of Indochina in mid-year that suggested indirect United States intervention in order to pressure the French to "adapt their policies to the realities of the current situation." It criticized the French for squandering resources in a battle between the forces of "a native regime" and nineteenth century imperialism. More importantly, the report initiated a new containment concept for Asia. Referring to the area extending from Japan through Southeast Asia and on to India and Australia as the "great crescent," the report

emphasized that if Japan were to become the economic bulwark for the region, it would need Indochina as a source for raw materials and as a market for its manufactured goods. In July Acheson submitted the report to the NSC for consideration. The NSC issued a policy statement that would serve as a long-range policy on Asia.[72]

In order to ensure a non-Communist Indochina the Truman administration also backed France's so-called Bao Dai solution in 1949. A former emperor of the Annam region in Indochina under the French and Japanese colonial regimes, Bao Dai would be placed back on the throne as the nationalist ruler of the country. But Bao Dai would be recognized quickly by Ho's Vietminh as a mere French puppet. As the Vietminh insurgency gained momentum and the French continued to weaken, Indochina would become an ever greater concern for Truman and the NSC during the next year.[73]

The rapidly changing course of events in Asia had prevented the NSC from producing a broad United States policy for the region. In June, Secretary Johnson submitted a request to the NSC for such a policy. At the same time Johnson also vented his disapproval of the Department of State's policy directions. "I am becoming increasingly concerned at the course of events in Asia," Johnson wrote. Noting that a "major objective" of United States policy was the containment of Communism, Johnson chastised the NSC for not producing "a carefully considered and comprehensive plan to further that objective." Critical of the State Department's "day-by-day, country-by-country approach," Johnson urged that the NSC begin work on a long-range study that would "reexamine and correlate the current policies" as well as "appraise the commitments and risks" of various courses of United States action in Asia.[74] The NSC heeded Johnson's request, and in late October it recommended that similar measures to those proposed to contain Communism in Western Europe

also be applied to Asia. Specifically, the NSC urged increased economic assistance to non-Communist countries and a regional or "Pacific Association" defense pact of non-Communist Asian nations. In addition, it recommended a peace treaty with Japan and the establishment of a United States strategic defense line from Japan, to the Ryukyus, Formosa, and the Philippines.[75]

The NSC took no further action on the report until after the Formosan problem had been decided. Meanwhile, Secretary Johnson urged the JCS to reappraise their views on the strategic importance of Formosa. They submitted their report to the NSC in early December and the NSC, after some study, recommended that the United States provide Formosa with a "closely supervised program of military aid" under the Mutual Defense Assistance Program.[76] At the same time the NSC Staff consulted with the Department of State on its long-range policy toward Asia and issued a revised version, with State recommendations.[77] On December 29 a special NSC meeting convened, with Truman presiding, to consider the Asian situation. This meeting provided a forum for the climax of the State and Defense Department's confrontation. Before the meeting, Johnson and Acheson both had lobbied Truman to support their positions. On December 22, Truman told Johnson that he would not argue about the "military considerations;" he would side with the Department of State. Realizing that Truman had made his decision, Johnson left the following day for a vacation and remained out of town until after the NSC meeting on the matter.[78]

Secretary Acheson told the NSC that its suggestions "incorporated many policies already being followed by omitting others such as those relating to a Japanese Peace Treaty." He noted that the Department of State agreed with the Department of Defense and the JCS that the United States military position in Japan, the Rukyus, and the Philippines should be strengthened "on the

understanding" that the position did not change "present policy as contained in" the NSC report. Truman also agreed that the NSC should not recommend a formal peace treaty with Japan. He further stated that at the Potsdam Conference in 1945, "the United States, Britain, and China had suggested surrender terms to Japan." Because the USSR did not participate in the terms, Truman emphasized, the United States position on Japan "was a partnership affair with Britain and China only."[79] Acheson also told the NSC that its report "contained alternate conclusions concerning Formosa." General Omar Bradley, presenting the views of the JCS, said that the Department of Defense "version on Formosa was preferable from the military point of view." Acheson questioned the general why the JCS changed its recommendations on Formosa from those earlier in the year. Bradley retorted that the JCS opinion on military aid and advisers changed in October after Communist China's success on the mainland, but with no additional defense funds, they did not press the issue. The NSC proposals, Bradley explained, were "based on the existence of funds under Section 303 of the Mutual Defense Assistance Act." After the Bradley-Acheson exchange, the council made some minor revisions, and reissued the policy report.[80]

This policy statement redefined United States policy toward Asia not only to effect "gradual reduction and eventual elimination of the power and influence of the USSR in Asia," but also to develop "the nations and peoples of Asia on a stable and self-sustaining basis," and to prevent "power relationships in Asia" that would enable other nations or other alliances "to threaten the security of the United States from that area." To achieve these objectives the NSC recommended that the United States encourage non-Communist forces to take the initiative, support voluntary regional associations of non-Communist states, and cultive an atmosphere in Asia conducive to economic recovery, the

multilateral revival of trade, and eventual political stability.[81] Specifically, the NSC advocated that the United States had a legitimate interest in maintaining a defensive perimeter in the Pacific, but "should continue the policies of avoiding military and political support of any non-Communist elements in China." Japan would be "reevaluated by the NSC after a decision regarding a peace treaty had been arranged." South Korea, it recommended, should continue to receive United States political, economic, technical, and military support. Colonial-nationalistic conflicts, particularly "the problem of French Indo-China," should be approached "to satisfy the fundamental demands of the nationalist movement while at the same time minimizing the strain on the colonial powers who are our Western allies." The NSC directed that the United States should continue the policy set previously for Formosa, and provide immediately the nation the remaining $75 million in funds from Section 303 of the Mutual Defense Assistance Act.[82] President Truman approved the report on December 30, but indicated in a margin note that he might be reluctant to follow up with funding to Formosa. He added: "A program will be all right, but whether we implement it depends on the circumstances."[83] Truman's approval of the NSC Asian policy statement ensured the Department of State's position on Asia. But as 1950 began, the White House, the Department of State, and the NSC learned that the policy of encouraging Chinese Titoism would not be so amenable to the China bloc, the press, or the American public.

The Hydrogen Bomb Debate and the NSC

Besides the success of the Chinese Communists, another event occurred in 1949 that changed the Cold War and furthered the perceived Soviet threat in the minds of the national security establishment. On August 29, the USSR

detonated its first atomic bomb in the Eastern Siberian Plain. Five days later, on September 3, an American B-29 reconnaissance plane over the Northern Pacific collected an unusual rainwater sample. The AEC conducted several tests on the sample and determined it contained elements of radioactive material. Executive Secretary Souers immediately informed Truman that the Soviets had exploded an atomic device. Still unsure whether a nuclear accident had occurred or whether the USSR had exploded an atomic weapon, the White House dispatched planes from the Air Force Long Range Detection Staff into the Pacific for additional samples. The AEC called in its Advisory Committee of top nuclear physicists to examine the new samples, and after several days of testing confirmed that the Soviets had indeed exploded their first atomic bomb. Disbelief and shock swept Washington from the Pentagon to the intelligence community to the Congressional Joint Atomic Committee.[84] The fact that the Soviet Union had broken the United States atomic monopoly shook those, including President Truman, who had believed that the Soviets did not have the capability to produce an atomic bomb for at least four or five more years. Nearly a year earlier the CIA had reported to Truman that "the most probable date" the USSR could perfect an atomic device "would be mid-1953."[85] But others, including some of the leading scientists, estimated that the Soviets would have an atomic bomb much earlier. Dr. Vannevar Bush told Secretary Forrestal in late 1945 that the Russians "might equal our 1945 position by 1950." And in a 1946 collection of essays on atomic energy entitled One World Or None, physicists Hans Bethe and Fred Seitz predicted a Soviet atomic bomb as early as 1951.[86]

As the atomic cloud drifted across North America, over the Atlantic, and toward the British Isles, the AEC agreed that a public announcement of the discovery would be necessary. AEC Chairman David E. Lilienthal cut short a

vacation and arrived in Washington on September 20. Lilienthal contacted Souers, who arranged an appointment with Truman for late that afternoon. Lilienthal pleaded with Truman for an immediate announcement, but Truman refused. Truman told the AEC Chairman that he feared an announcement so soon might provoke "chaos in Europe and hysteria in this country." Truman explained that his reluctance was based on the recent British devaluation of their currency, as well as an economic slowdown and series of coal and steel strikes here at home. Showing Lilienthal to the door, Truman also mentioned that he had not been convinced that the Russians really had the bomb. A discouraged Lilienthal left the meeting only to be told by Souers that generals Bradley and Johnson and the JCS had also urged Truman to make an announcement at once, albeit with no success. The next morning Souers informed the AEC that they thought Truman would act by the end of the week.[87]

Only after Truman received a signed statement from each member of the AEC Advisory Committee of scientists swearing they believed that the Soviets had detonated an atomic bomb did he begin to prepare to tell the public.[88] On the morning of September 23 he informed his Cabinet and issued a routine and short statement to the press. Carefully crafted, the public statement referred to the Soviet bomb only as "an atomic explosion," and called for future "effective enforceable international control of atomic energy."[89] In the words of one contemporary observer, Truman made sure "the world received the sensational news without sensational reaction."[90]

The detonation of a Soviet bomb moved the Truman administration to review its defense capabilities and to decide quickly on the development of an ever more powerful nuclear weapon, the hydrogen bomb. Known as the "superbomb," the hydrogen bomb operated on a thermonuclear chain reaction, or fusion of light elements, triggered by an atomic weapon, and provided nearly

100 times more explosive yield than the atomic bomb in the United States stockpile. In 1945-1946, Dr. Edward Teller of the Los Alamos, New Mexico research labs first explored theoretically the idea of fusion and a super bomb. By October 1949, a pro-super lobby had formed, with Teller at its head and strong support from AEC Commissioner Lewis Strauss, the Pentagon, and the NSC.[91] On July 26, President Truman requested that a Special NSC Atomic Committee provide him with a complete review of the United States atomic energy program. Truman had approved a joint recommendation of the AEC and the JCS that spring that proposed a substantial three year acceleration in the production of atomic materials and weapons. He directed that Souers form a committee made up of the Secretaries of State and Defense and the Chairman of the AEC that would assess the stock-piling program and its relation to the fiscal year 1951 national security program.[92]

By October 10, nearly a month after Truman had been informed that the USSR had exploded its atomic bomb, the NSC Committee reported "that the proposed acceleration of the atomic energy program is necessary in the interests of national security." The report stressed several reasons why the NSC Committee believed that an accelerated atomic energy program should go forward, including: (1) international controls on atomic energy had failed to develop; (2) the growth of United States defense commitments in Europe and elsewhere globally had expanded; (3) United States atomic testing programs in 1948 had achieved success and new breakthroughs; and, (4) the USSR had acquired atomic capability. The report concluded that it would be imperative for the United States to accelerate its production and stockpiling of atomic materials and weapons before the USSR developed a "significant" atomic stockpile of its own. A week after receiving the Special NSC Atomic Committee's report, Truman approved the expansion program.[93] But by the

end of the year the impact of the Soviet's atomic explosion had given many scientists and Washington officials reason to argue that the United States needed to reassert its dominance in nuclear capability by moving quickly towards the development of the thermonuclear hydrogen bomb.

By October, the AEC's Lewis Strauss and the NSC's Sidney Souers had become two of the earliest proponents of the hydrogen bomb, and their influence upon President Truman may well have helped him determine his decision to go ahead with the hydrogen bomb. Strauss argued that the United States should regain its nuclear monopoly, but that could only be achieved with a "quantum jump" that only the hydrogen bomb promised.[94] With the exception of AEC Commissioner Gordon Dean, Strauss found little support for the development of a thermonuclear weapon within the AEC. Strauss then turned to Souers for advice. Like Strauss, Souers believed that the hydrogen bomb was vital for America's national security. Souers told Strauss that he did not think President Truman was aware of the possibility of a thermonuclear weapon. And after approaching Truman on the subject, Souers later informed Strauss that Truman "seemed to know nothing about the Super [bomb], but showed an immediate interest," and that he wanted Strauss "to force the issue up to the White House and do it quickly."[95]

Meanwhile, in early November the AEC voted against the hydrogen bomb program, and Lilienthal forwarded the AEC report to President Truman. The report listed several "general conclusions" the AEC believed should be considered before the United States proceeded with a hydrogen bomb. It did not mention directly moral issues, but its tone indicated that a majority of the members of the AEC had doubts about the moral aspects of such a destructive weapon.[96] General Bradley also informed Secretary Johnson that the JCS believed that a hydrogen bomb program should proceed immediately. The

JCS harbored concerns that the Soviet Union might also perfect a hydrogen weapon. "Possession of a thermonuclear weapon by the U.S.S.R.," the JSCS stressed, "without such possession by the United States...would be intolerable."[97]

Faced with the two conflicting proposals, Truman reappointed the Special NSC Atomic Committee for the specific purpose of studying the hydrogen bomb proposal. To support the committee, a working group headed by Souers was also created, composed of representatives from the State and Defense Departments and the AEC.[98] The committee convened on December 22, but due to the recalcitrance of Secretary Johnson and Chairman Lilienthal, no resolution could be reached.[99] Thereafter, several indecisive weeks passed during which time Strauss, Johnson, the JCS, and the AEC lobbied Truman for their respective positions.[100] At the same time, Secretary Acheson, who had held reservations about the hydrogen bomb program, also joined the pro-super lobby. Many officials in the Department of State, however, did not agree with Acheson's new-found position. George Kennan, for one, had opposed the growing move toward military rearmament as a strategy of the Cold War. By late fall Kennan asked to be relieved of his position as Director of the PPS and began to turn much of his work over to his successor, Paul Nitze.[101]

By late December President Truman informed the Special NSC Committee he wanted a decision at once. By the time the committee and its working group met a second time, on January 31, 1950, the pro-superbomb forces had massed against Lilienthal and the AEC. Lilienthal pleaded forcefully his objections to the proposed hydrogen bomb program, saying repeatedly that he had a "visceral feeling this is wrong." In spite of his arguments, Secretaries Acheson and Johnson outvoted him. Following the vote in favor of a United States thermonuclear program, the committee issued a draft report based on

recommendations proposed earlier by working group member a Deputy Director of the PPS, Paul Nitze. The draft report suggested that Truman direct the AEC to "determine the technical feasibility of the hydrogen bomb;" and that the Secretaries of State and Defense "undertake a reexamination of our objectives in peace and war" and their effect on strategic planning, "in light of the probable fission bomb capability and possible thermonuclear bomb capability of the Soviet Union."[102]

Executive Secretary Souers delivered the committee's vote and draft report to Truman. Souers also told Truman: "I don't think you have a choice. It's either we make it or wait until the Russians drop one on us without warning."[103] By early afternoon the committee met briefly with Truman, and each member--Acheson, Johnson, and Lilienthal--presented their conclusions orally. Truman listened quietly, then told them he would approve the committee's recommendations. Truman also stated that he believed the United States "should never use these weapons but the Russian's behavior left no choice but to make them."[104] A few hours later Truman issued a public statement that directed the AEC "to continue its work on all forms of atomic weapons, including the so-called hydrogen or super bomb."[105]

President Truman used the Special NSC Committee and its working group to help him arrive at one of the most important decisions of his presidency. As a result of its deliberations and recommendations, Truman gave the go-ahead to proceed with a hydrogen bomb program, and with it initiated the militarization of the Cold War. From 1947 through 1949 the Departments of Defense and State agreed that postwar American power was limited and that programs of economic containment coupled with limited military assistance and covert actions would be sufficient to thwart Soviet expansionism. The nation's postwar financial constraints had also contributed to the curtailment of United States

military spending. From 1945 to 1947, United States forces had declined from 12 million men to 1.5 million men, and the Pentagon came to rely more on atomic capabilities to make up for the loss in conventional manpower. In addition, fears of growing postwar inflation led Truman's economic advisers to hold military spending to no more than $15 billion a year. This budget restraint had been supported by the general assumption that the Soviet threat was intended to provoke the United States into exceeding that limit.[106] United States national security policies had focused upon vital American interests in Europe and peripheral interests in Asia and the Middle East. But within a matter of months the geographical scope of the Cold War expanded from Europe to Asia, and the United States had lost its atomic monopoly. For the NSC and Truman, the international situation changed gravely. Thus, by 1950 containment would not only rely upon economic assistance, but also upon increasing military assistance, the stationing of American troops in Europe, the rearmament of Germany, a thermonuclear arms race with the Soviet Union, higher military expenditures, and a global policy of resisting Communism.

ENDNOTES

CHAPTER IV

[1]CIA-4-49, "Review of the World," 20 April 1949, PSF-NSC, Box 220.

[2]Acheson, Present at the Creation, 267-274. For text of the negotiations see FRUS: 1949, III, 643-817.

[3]Summary of Discussion at the 32nd Meeting, 27 January 1949, PSF-NSC, Box 220; Memorandum, Dean Acheson to Harry Truman, 31 March 1949, FRUS: 1949, III, 142-143.

[4]Summary of Discussion at the 40th Meeting, 18 May 1949, PSF-NSC, Box 220.

[5]Ibid.

[6]NSC 24/2, NSC 24/3, "Possible U.S. Courses of Action in the Event the USSR Reimposes the Berlin Blockade," 2 June 1949, SPF-NSC, Box 206; NSC Memorandum Approval, 14 June 1949, Ibid., Box 191.

[7]Minutes of the 42nd Meeting, 16 June 1949, PSF-NSC, Box 206; Condit, History of the JCS, II, 160-161.

[8]Summary of Discussion at the 43rd Meeting, 8 July 1949, PSF-NSC, Box 220.

[9]Condit, History of the JCS, II, 159; NSC 24/4, "Phase-Out of the Berlin Airlift," 27 July 1949, PSF-NSC, Box 193; NSC Memorandum Approval, NSC Record of Action, Ibid., Box 191; Memorandum, Sidney Souers to Harry Truman, 28 July 1949, Ibid., Box 193.

[10]Gaddis, Strategies of Containment, 67-68; NSC 18, "The Attitude of This Government Toward Events in Yugoslavia," 2 September 1948, Minutes of the 19th Meeting, 2 September 1948, PSF-NSC, Box 204. For PPS 35 see FRUS: 1948, IF, 1079-1081; Etzold and Gaddis, Containment, 169-172.

[11]PPS 49, 10 February 1949, Nelson, PPS Papers 1949, 14-25; NSC 18/1, NSC 18/2, "Economic Relations Between the United States and

Yugoslavia," 18 February 1949, PSF-NSC, Box 205; Summary of Discussion at the 34th Meeting, 18 February 1949, PSF-NSC, Box 205; Summary of Discussion at the 34th Meeting, 18 February 1949, PSF-NSC, Box 220.

[12]Ibid.

[13]NSC Progress Report on NSC 18/2, 11 April 1949, PSF-NSC, Box 205

[14]NSC Progress Report on NSC 18/2, 27 May 1949, Ibid. For a fuller analysis of the steel mill deal and its publicity see Lorraine M. Lees, "The American Decision to Assist Tito, 1948-1949," Diplomatic History 2 (Fall 1978): 415-418.

[15]NSC 15/1, "U.S. Civil Aviation Policy Toward the USSR and its Satellites," 15 August 1949, NSC Memorandum Approval, 15 August, PSF-NSC, Box 191.

[16]NSC Progress Report on NSC 18/2, 9 November 1949, PSF-NSC, Box 205.

[17]CIA-11-49, "Review of the World," 16 November 1949, PSF-NSC, Box 207.

[18]PPS 60, "Yugoslav-Moscow Controversy as Related to U.S. Foreign Policy Objectives," 10 September 1949, Nelson, PPS Papers 1949, 139-150; NSC 18/4, "United States Policy Toward the Conflict Between the USSR and Yugoslavia," 17 November 1949, PSF-NSC, Box 207. Unfortunately much of NSC 18/4 still remains sanitized today. Small portions of it, however, are published in a sanitized version of FRUS: 1950, IV, 1341-1348.

[19]Gaddis, Long Peace, 68.

[20]CIA-10-49, "Review of the World," PSF-NSC, Box 206; CIA-11-49, Ibid., Box 207.

[21]NSC 7, "The Position of the United States with Respect to Soviet-Directed World Communism," 30 March 1949, Etzold and Gaddis, Containment, 164-169; NSC 20/1, "U.S. Objectives with Respect to Russia," 18 August 1949, Ibid. 173-203.

[22]NSC 58/2, "United States Policy Toward the Soviet Satellite States in Eastern Europe," PSF-NSC, Box 207; FRUS: 1949, V, 50-51.

[23] Ibid.

[24]NSC 43, "Planning for Wartime Conduct of Overt Psychological Warfare," 23 March 1949, PSF-NSC, Box 193; NSC Progress Report on NSC

43, 1 August 1949, Ibid., Box 198. For a fuller analysis of psychological warfare operations and the coordination efforts under USIE see Nelson Ovia Wood, "Strategic Psychological Warfare of the Truman Administration: A Study of National Psychological Warfare Aims, Objectives, and Effectiveness," (Ph.D. diss., The University of Oklahoma, 1982).

[25]NSC 59, "The Foreign Information Program and Psychological Warfare Planning," 10 March 1950, NSC "Policies of the Government, 1950," 37-39, PSF-NSC, Box 195; Ibid., Box 193; Wood, "Strategic Psychological Warfare of the Truman Administration," 123-124.

[26]Sig Mickelson, America's Other Voice: The Story of Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty (New York: Praeger, 1983), 17-22, 29-30; Harry Rositzke, The CIA's Secret Operations: Espionage, Counterespionage, and Covert Operations (New York: Readers Digest Press, 1977), 156-159; Prados, The Presidents' Secret Wars, 34.

[27]Rositzke, The CIA's Secret Operations, 27-29, 41-45, 166-173; Thomas Powers, The Man Who Kept Secrets: Richard Helms and the CIA (New York: Knopf, 1979), 38-40; Prados, The Presidents' Secret Wars, 41-44. For an in depth analysis on Albania see Nicholas Bethell, Betrayed (New York: Times Books, 1984).

[28]Jones, The CIA and American Democracy, 103-104. Recent information on the CIA-Barbie connection includes Allan A. Ryan, Jr., Klaus Barbie and the United States Government: The Report, with Documentary Appendix, to the Attorney General of the United States (Frederick, MD: University Publications of America, 1984).

[29]Jones, The CIA and American Democracy, 104-105; Prados, The Presidents' Secret Wars, 36-37, 40-41; Ranelagh, The Agency, 137-138, 770. For other CIA-Army-Nazi connections recently investigated see Office of Special Investigations, Robert Jan Verbelen and the United States Government: A Report to the Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division, U.S. Department of Justice, June 1988, Neal M. Sher, Aron A. Golberg, and Elizabeth B. White. (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Justice, 1988).

[30]Rostizke, The CIA's Secret Operations, 168-173; Powers, The Man Who Kept Secrets, 40-43.

[31]NSC Memorandum Approval, NSC 5/4 (Conclusions), NSC Record of Actions, 10 January 1949, PSF-NSC, Box 191; O'Ballance, The Greek Civil War, 179-202.

[32]For the 1946 USSR-Turkey incident see Bruce R. Kuniholm, The Origins of the Cold War in the Near East: Great Power Conflict and Diplomacy in Iran, Turkey, and Greece (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980), 255-270,

358-378. For US air supplies to Turkey in 1948 see Leffler, "The American Conception of National Security," 372-273.

[33]NSC 36, "The U.S. Position With Respect To Turkey In The Light Of U.S. Security Interests in the Middle East, Particularly As Respects Air Power and The Greek and Turkish Aid Program," 1 December 1948, NSC, "Policies of the Government, 1947-1948," 88, PSF-NSC, Box 195.

[34]NSC 42, "U.S. Objectives with Respect to Greece and Turkey to Counter Soviet Threats to United States Security," 4 March 1949, PSF-NSC, Box 205.

[35]Summary of Discussion at the 36th Meeting, 23 March 1949, PSF-NSC, Box 220; NSC 42/1, Appendix E. Annotated List of NSC Reports, NSC, "Policies of the Government, 1949," 128, Ibid., Box 195.

[36]A Decade of American Foreign Policy, 1356-1365.

[37]Memorandum, Louis Johnson to Sidney Souers, 2 April 1949, PSF-NSC, Box 206.

[38]NSC 36/1, "Construction of Airfields and Stockpiling of Aviation Gasoline in Turkey," 15 April 1949, NSC, "Policies of the Government, 1949," 19, PSF-NSC, Box 195; Summary of Discussion at the 38th Meeting, 21 April 1949, Ibid., Box 220.

[39]Memorandum, John Ohly to General Lemnitzer, 28 February, 26 April 1950, FRUS: 1950, V, 1234-1235, 1250-1251.

[40]NSC 45, "Airfield Construction," 17 March 1949, PSF-NSC, Box 205; Summary of Discussion at the 36th Meeting, 23 March 1949, Ibid., Box 220; NSC 45/1, "Airfield Construction in the United Kingdom and the Cairo-Suez Area," 15 April 1949, NSC Memoranda Approvals, Box 193; NSC 45/1, Memorandum Approval 15 April 1949, NSC Record of Action, PSF-NSC, Box 191.

[41]Stueck, The Road to Confrontation, 115;CIA-1-49, "Review of the World," PSF-Intelligence File, Box 250.

[42]PPS 39, PPS 39/1, "United States Policy toward China," 15 September, 23 November 1948, Nelson, PPS Papers 1948, 412-452; NSC 34/1, "United States Policy Toward China," 11 January 1949, Minutes of the 34th Meeting, 3 February 1949, PSF-NSC, Box 205; FRUS: 1949, IX, 474-475, 484-485; Etzold and Gaddis, Containment, 247-251.

[43]Memorandum, Sidney Souers to Harry Truman, 3 February 1949, PSF-NSC, Box 205; Minutes of the 34th Meeting, 3 February 1949, Ibid., NSC 22/3, "Current Position of the United States Respecting Delivery of Aid to China," 2 February 1949, Ibid.

[44]Arthur H. Vandenberg, Jr., The Private Papers of Senator Vandenberg (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1952), 531.

[45]NSC, "Policies of the Government, 1949," 11, PSF-NSC, Box 195.

[46]NSC 34, "United States Policy Toward China," 13 October 1948, FRUS: 1948, VIII, 146-155; Etzold and Gaddis, Containment, 240-247.

[47]Summary of Discussion at the 35th Meeting, 4 March 1949, PSF-NSC, Box 220.

[48]NSC 34/2, "United States Policy Toward Chins," 28 February 1949, FRUS: 1949, IX, 492-495.

[49]NSC 41, "United States Policy Regarding Trade with China," 28 February 1949, FRUS: 1949, IX, 826-834; Minutes of the 35th Meeting, 3 March 1949, PSF-NSC, Box 205; Stueck, The Road to Confrontation, 120.

[50]Stueck, The Road to Confrontation, 120.

[51]NSC 37/2, "The Current Position of the United States with Respect to Formosa," 3 February 1949, NSC, "Policies of the Government, 1949," 14, PSF-NSC, Box 195; FRUS: 1949, IX, 281-282.

[52]Stueck, The Road to Confrontation, 119.

[53]NSC 37, "The Strategic Importance of Formosa," 1 December 1948, PSF-NSC, Box 205; JCS to James Forrestal, 24 November 1948, FRUS: 1949, IX, 261-262.

[54]NSC 37/3, "The Strategic Importance of Formosa," 11 February 1949, PSF-NSC, Box 205; FRUS: 1949, IX, 285.

[55]Statement by the Secretary of State at the 35th Meeting of the National Security Council on The Formosan Problem, PSF-NSC, Box 205.

[56]Summary of Discussion at the 35th Meeting, 4 March 1949, PSF-NSC, Box 220; NSC 37/5, "Supplementary Measures with Respect to Formosa, 1 March 1949, FRUS: 1949, IX, 290-292.

[57]Memorandum, Louis Johnson to Sidney Souers, 2 April 1949, PSF-NSC, Box 205.

[58]NSC, "Policies of the Government, 1949," 16-17, PSF-NSC, Box 195.

[59]NSC 55, "Implications of a Possible Chinese Communist Attack on the Foreign Colonies in South China," 26 July 1949, PSF-NSC, Box 206; NSC

55/1, "British Views Respecting Hong Kong," 17 October 1949, Summary of Discussion at the 47th Meeting, 20 October 1949, Ibid., Box 220.

[60]NSC 13/3, "Recommendations with Respect to United States Policy Toward Japan," 6 May 1949, NSC Memorandum Approval, NSC Record of Action, PSF-NSC, Box 191; NMSC, "Policies of the Government, 1949," 26-28, Ibid., Box 195.

[61]CIA-3-49, "Review of the World," 16 March 1949, PSF-NSC, Box 205.

[62]Schaller, The American Occupation of Japan, 136.

[63]Ibid., 164-177; NSC 49, "Current Strategic Evaluation of U.S. Security Needs in Japan," 15 June 1949, FRUS: 1949, VII, pt. 2, 774-777; Etzold and Gaddis, Containment, 231-233.

[64]Schnabel and Watson, History of the JCS, III, 27.

[65]NSC 8/1, "The Position of the United States with Respect to Korea," March 16, 1949, PSF-NSC, Box 205.

[66]Memorandum, JCS to James Forrestal, 23 March 1949, Ibid.

[67]Summary of Discussion at the 36th Meeting, 23 March 1949, PSF-NSC, Box 220; Dean Rusk Oral History Interview.

[68]Schnabel and Watson, History of the JSC, II, 27.

[69]U.S. Department of the Army, Military Advisers in Korea: KMAG in Peace and War, by Robert K. Sawyer (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Chief of Military History, 1962), 44-47; Schanbel and Watson, History of the JCS, III, 28, 42-43; John Muccio to Dean Acheson, 16 September 1949, FRUS: 1949, VII, 1079-1080.

[70]W. Averell Harriman Oral History Interview, edited by Garrett Epps, Duke Living History Program, Duke University; For a thorough analysis of the early history of Indochina see Edgar O'Ballance, The Indochina War, 1945-1954: A Study in Guerilla Warfare (London: Faber and Faber, 1964). Stanley Karnow, Vietnam: A History (New York: Viking, 1983); Gabriel Kolko, Anatomy of a War (New York: Pantheon, 1985); Bernard Fall, The Two Viet-Nams: A Political and Military Analysis (New York: Praeger, 1963); Ellen Hammer, The Struggle for Indo-China, 1940-1954 (Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1966); George C. Herring, American's Longest War: The United States and Vietnam, 1950-1975 (New York: Knopf, 1985); Lloyd C. Gardner, Approaching Vietnam: From World War II Through Dienbienphu 1941-1954 (New York: W.W. Norton, 1988).

[71]Clark M. Clifford Oral History Interview; Acheson, Present at the Creation, 671-672. The best reference for the 1945-1949 attitude of the Truman

administration toward Indochina is U.S. Department of Defense, United States-Vietnam Relations 1945-1967, Book 8 (Washington, D.C.: G.P.O., 1971), 1-151 (Hereafter cited as United States-Vietnam Relations.).

[72]PPS 51, "United States Policy toward Southeast Asia," 19 May 1949, Nelson, PPS Papers 1949, 32-59; NSC 51, "United States Policy Toward Southeast Asia," 1 July 1949, NSC, "Policies of the Government, 1949," 130. For the Great Crescent concept see Michael Schaller, "Securing the Great Crescent: Occupied Japan and the Origins of Containment in Southeast Asia," Journal of American History 69 (1982): 392-414.

[73]For a more in depth treatment of the Bao Dai solution see Gary R. Hess, "The First American Commitment in Indochina: The Acceptance of the 'Bao Dai Solution,' 1950," Diplomatic History 2 (Fall 1978): 331-350.

[74]NSC 48, "United States Policy Toward Asia," 10 June 1949, PSF-NSC, Box 206; Memorandum, Louis Johnson to the NSC, 10 June 1949, United States-Vietnam Relations, 217-218.

[75]Memorandum, Charlton Ogburn, Jr. to State Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs, 2 November 1949, FRUS: 1949, IX, 160-161.

[76]NSC 37/9, "Possible United States Military Action Toward Taiwan not Involving major Military Forces," 27 December 1949, PSF-NSC, Box 206, FRUS: 1949, IX, 460-461.

[77]NSC 48/1, "The Position of the United States with Respect to Asia," 23 December 1949, United States-Vietnam Relations, 226-264; Etzold and Gaddis, Containment, 252-269.

[78]Lewis Johnson Testimony, 14 June 1951, U.S. Congress. Committee on Armed Services and Committee on Foreign Relations. Military Situation in the Far East. Joint Hearings. 82nd Congress, 1st sess., 1951.

[79]Summary of Discussion at the 50th Meeting, 30 December 1949, PSF-NSC, Box 220.

[80]Ibid.

[81]NSC 48/2, "The Position of the United States with Respect to Asia," 30 December 1949, United States-Vietnam Relations, 265-272; Etzold and Gaddis, Containment, 269-276; FRUS: 1949, VII, 1215-1220; PSF-NSC, Box 207.

[82]Ibid.

[83]Ibid.

[84]Richard G. Hewlett and Francis Duncan, Atomic Shield, 1947/1952: Volume II A History of the United States Atomic Energy Commission (University Park: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1969), 362-366; Raymond P. Brandt, "Inside Story of Announcement of Reds' Atom Bomb Revealed," Washington Evening Star, 28 September 1949.

[85]Ranelagh, The Agency, 171.

[86]Herbert F. York, The Advisors: Oppenheimer, Teller, and the Superbomb (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1976), 35.

[87]Hewlett and Duncan, Atomic Shield, 365-367; David E. Lilienthal, The Journals of David E. Lilienthal Volume II: The Atomic Energy Years (New York: Harper & Row, 1964), 569-572.

[88]York, The Advisors, 34; Lewis L. Strauss, Men and Decisions (New York: Doubleday, 1962), 205.

[89]Brandt, Washington Evening Star, 28 September 1949; Strauss, Men and Decisions, 205; Hewlett and Duncan, Atomic Shield, 367-368; Truman Public Papers, 485.

[90]Brandt, Washington Evening Star, 28 September 1949.

[91]York, The Advisors, 21-24, 45.

[92]Harry Truman to Sidney Souers, 26 July 1949, NSC-Subject File, PSF-NSC, Box 198; FRUS: 1949, I, 501-502; Hewlett and Duncan, Atomic Shield, 182-183.

[93]Report to the President by the Special Committee of the National Security Council on the Proposed Acceleration of the Atomic Energy Program, 10 October 1949, FRUS: 1949, I, 559-564.

[94]Memorandum, Lewis Strauss to AEC Commissioners, 5 October 1949, in Strauss, Men and Decisions, 216-217.

[95]Roger M. Anders, ed., Forging the Atomic Shield: Excerpts from the Office Diary of Gordon E. Dean (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1987), 35; York, The Advisors, 60; Hewlett and Duncan, Atomic Shield, 373-374. For the debate within the AEC over the hydrogen bomb program see Anders, Ibid., 57-64; York, Ibid., 46-65.

[96]David Lilienthal to Harry Truman, 9 November 1949, FRUS: 1949, I, 576-585.

[97]Memorandum, Omar Bradley to Louis Johnson, 23 November 1949, Ibid., 595-596.

[98]Harry Truman to Sidney Souers, 19 November 1949, Ibid., 587-588; Anders, Forging the Atomic Shield, 62; York, The Advisors, 65-66; Truman, Years of Trial and Hope, 309.

[99]Lilienthal, The Journals of David E. Lilienthal Volume II, 613-614; Acheson, Present at the Creation, 348; Hewlett and Duncan, Atomic Shield, 398.

[100]Strauss, Men and Decisions, 219; Hewlett and Duncan, Atomic Shield, 395-396; Lilienthal, The Journals of David E. Lilienthal Volume II, 615; York, The Advisors, 66-67; Memorandum, Omar Bradley to Louis Johnson, 13 January 1950, FRUS: 1950, I, 503-511.

[101]York, The Advisors, 66-67; Kennan, Memoirs Volume I, 471.

[102]York, The Advisors, 68; Hewlett and Duncan, Atomic Shield, 406-407; Acheson, Present at the Creation, 348-349; Lilienthal, The Journals of David E. Lilienthal Volume II, 623-632; James R. Shepley and Clay Blair, Jr., The Hydrogen Bomb: The Men, The Menace, The Mechanism (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1954), 87. For the context of Nitze's recommendations see Memorandum, Paul Nitze to Dean Acheson, 19 December 1949, FRUS: 1949, I, 610-611. Lilienthal's influence may have been weak because he had submitted his resignation from the AEC several months before the hydrogen bomb debate.

[103]Souers quote cited in Shepley and Blair, The Hydrogen Bomb, 88. Shepley and Blair were reporters who interviewed the participants months after the hydrogen bomb decision.

[104]Ibid.; Hewlett and Duncan, Atomic Shield, 408; York, The Advisors 69-70; Truman, Years of Trial and Hope, 309. The official written report by the NSC special Committee would not be presented until March 1950, apparently because committee members preferred to give their oral reports to Truman beforehand.

[105]Ibid., Truman Public Papers 1950.

[106]Warner R. Schilling, "The Politics of National Defense: Fiscal 1950," in Warner R. Schilling, Paul Y. Hammond, and Glenn H. Snyder, Strategy, Politics and Defense Budgets (New York: Columbia University Press, 1962), 100-106.

CHAPTER V

THE COLD WAR TURNS HOT AND THE NEED FOR REVISING RECOMMENDATIONS, 1950

The events of 1950 marked a perilous phase in the Cold War and were in many ways the by-products of those of the previous years. The Truman administration had rhetorically presented a tough containment policy, but for obvious reasons had not attempted to explain to the American public that Communism might not be dangerous to individual Americans. By early 1950 the administration probably developed a siege mentality with the fall of China to Mao's Communists, the USSR's testing of its first atomic weapon, the anti-Communist and internal subversion atmosphere in the United States fueled by the espionage cases of Alger Hiss in January and Klaus Fuchs in February, the emergence of McCarthyism and its emotional red-baiting, and Republican congressional criticism. Thus, months before war broke out in Korea, America's Cold War national security policies toughened in response to the rising tide of domestic political hysteria and criticism. Adding to domestic pressures would be international pressures, particularly the concern that the Soviet Union was "mounting a new offensive"--a factor that was reinforced when North Korean forces attacked South Korean positions south of the 38th parallel on June 25, 1950. Thereafter, what had previously been an NSC limited response to the perceived Soviet threat by the NSC, in turn became a global response to the perception of monolithic Communism.[1]

Two days after Truman authorized that work proceed on the hydrogen bomb, the British arrested nuclear physicist Klaus Fuchs for passing atomic secrets to the Soviets. A German emigre, Fuchs had worked on the Manhattan District Project during World War II and participated in the early fission conferences at Los Alamos in 1946.[2] On January 27, 1950, while working in England, Fuchs confessed that he had been a Soviet agent from 1942 through 1949. The AEC met three days after Fuchs's confession and determined that he might have learned enough to pass on information about the hydrogen bomb to the USSR. Although the Special NSC Committee dealing with atomic proliferation had been informed of Fuchs's confession when it convened on January 31, no discussion of the matter occurred at the meeting.[3] Truman did not know of Fuchs's arrest until February 1, when Director of the FBI J. Edgar Hoover phoned Souers and advised him that he "might want to pass this information on to the president."[4]

The news of Fuchs's confession and arrest confirmed in the minds of many Pentagon planners that the Soviets might have passed along enough information to help the Soviets construct a hydrogen bomb. By late February the JCS and Secretary Johnson urged Truman to speed up hydrogen bomb production.[5] In response to this request, Truman reassembled the Special NSC Committee. On March 9 the committee submitted its report on the development of thermonuclear weapons. It noted that work on the hydrogen bomb was underway, but recommended that Truman stress that "the thermonuclear weapon program is regarded as a matter of the highest urgency." Truman approved the committee's report the next day and ordered the implementation of its findings.[6]

The Re-evaluation of National Security: NSC 68 Series

In late 1952 the United States detonated its first hydrogen bomb, and in August 1953 the USSR exploded its first thermonuclear device. The Pentagon began to forecast "A-Day"--the last time that the United States could launch a nuclear attack against the Soviet Union without risking direct retaliation. By April 1950, the NSC marked A-Day as 1954.[7] When Truman issued the directive on January 31 to proceed with the hydrogen bomb, he also instructed the Secretaries of State and Defense to provide a reevaluation of United States national security policy in light of the fall of China, the Soviet's atomic bomb, and the American hydrogen bomb program.[8] Executive Secretary Souers had already recommended a similar assessment on January 5, and the NSC had concurred in the proposal.[9] The preliminary report was assigned to an ad hoc State-Defense Policy Group headed by Paul Nitze. In early April the committee submitted its report NSC 68 to Truman and the NSC, and it became the first formal national security policy statement of the United States.[10]

Although lengthy and rambling, the central message of NSC 68 was clear, and its tone more hostile toward the Soviet Union than any before it. It portrayed the USSR as aspiring to world hegemony, did not rule out the possibility of a war between the United States and the Soviet Union, and advocated a broader, more expensive, and global American effort to counter the threat of international Communism.[11]

NSC 68 characterized in sharp contrasts the differences between the United States and the USSR as being those between a free society and a "slave state." The free society, it noted, used military force only when attacked. The slave society used military force to threaten others.[12] It portrayed the

Kremlin leaders as hostile and uncompromising, determined to acquire "the domination of the Eurasian land mass" and dedicated to the subversion of the non-Soviet world. "The United States, as the principle center of power in the non-Soviet world and the bulwark of opposition to Soviet expansion," the report stressed, "is the principal enemy" of the USSR.[13] The NSC asserted further that "the intensifying struggle" between the United States and the USSR "requires us to face the fact that we can expect no lasting abatement" of the Cold War. "The issues that face us," the report warned, "are momentous, involving the fulfillment or destruction not only of this Republic but to civilization itself."[14] The report concluded that the United States would have to frame an adequate response for meeting the Soviet threat. "Our free society, confronted by a threat to its basic value, naturally will take such action," the NSC confirmed, "including the use of military forces, as may be required to protect those values."[15]

Unlike earlier NSC policy recommendations for containment that focused United States efforts on certain limited and vital strong-points in Europe and Asia, the NSC in this statement believed that "a defeat of free institutions is a defeat everywhere." Therefore, it concluded, the only effective response to international Communism would be an accelerated build-up of United States atomic, thermonuclear, and conventional military strength. Noting that "within the next four or five years the Soviet Union will possess the military capability of delivering a surprise atomic attack" upon the United States, "the risk of war with the USSR," the NSC warned, made the "present programs and plans" of the United States dangerously inadequate, in both timing and scope." "Without superior aggregate military strength, in being and readily mobilizable," it concluded, "a policy of 'containment'--which is in effect a policy of calculated and gradual coercion--is no more that a policy of bluff."[16]

Although the NSC advocated the globalization of United States containment efforts and the accelerated increase of America's military capabilities, it was intentionally vague about the specific expansion of national security programs and their costs. However, by endorsing a substantial increase in United States military expenditures, foreign military and economic aid programs, and stepped-up measures in intelligence and covert operations, internal security and civil defense, the NSC argued for a new economic departure in national security policy. It challenged the fiscally conservative assumptions from 1947 through 1949 that larger increases in postwar American military expenditures would lead to inflation, higher taxes, and financial ruin. The authors of the NSC statement were influenced by the ideas of Leon Keyserling, the Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisors. Keyserling introduced Keynesian economics to the Truman administration in early 1950. He had suggested that government deficit spending, coupled with an expanding economy and increased federal revenues, would provide more federal expenditures available for Truman's domestic Fair Deal program.[17] The authors of the NSC statement advanced a similar Keynesian argument by pointing out that the American experience in World War II proved that the United States could afford both guns and butter. In what would be a message for President Truman, the NSC stated, that "budgetary considerations will need to be subordinated to the stark fact that our very independence as a nation may be at stake." As Acheson later recalled, the NSC statement should be used to "bludgeon the mass mind of 'top government' that not only could the President make a decision but that decision could be carried out."[18] A fiscal conservative and former small businessman, Truman resisted and questioned the cost implications of this NSC report. After examining the policy report, Truman sent a letter to the new Executive Secretary of the NSC, James Lay, that requested

"urgent completion" of the NSC report. But as he was concerned about the budgetary implications, Truman also inquired about the nature of the programs and their probable cost. He requested that the Economic Cooperation Administrator, the Director of the Bureau of the Budget (BOB), and the Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers (CEA) participate in the council's consideration of the NSC suggestions.[19]

When the NSC convened on April 20 it discussed the report again and agreed to establish an ad hoc committee to respond to Truman's directive. The Ad Hoc Committee consisted of representatives designated by each NSC member, as well as representatives from the Secretary of the Treasury and representatives from the three economic agencies whom Truman would appoint (see Appendix C). The committee was assigned the task of preparing an assessment on programs and costs by August 1. Although the committee began work on cost estimates, the Korean War postponed its work.[20] Truman did not approve the policy statement on this matter until September 30, 1950, nearly three months after the Korean War began. The war loosened Truman's fiscal restraint and convinced him that the United States needed to increase its military and international security programs. On September 21 the Ad Hoc Committee submitted to the NSC its report of tentative cost estimates for national security programs from 1951 to 1955. Truman presided over a meeting that considered the suggestions and noted that the programs and estimated costs of the report "were not final." He suggested that the NSC approve the policy formulated, "but work out the details as the programs are developed." He also praised the NSC for its accomplishments, saying that "this project set a new record in the United States Government since it represented an over-all approach by all interested departments and agencies to the vital field of national security." Truman then directed that the NSC Senior Staff

prepare revised cost estimates of the NSC report and its Annex, and "keep the entire study under continuous review." As Truman suggested, the council adopted the conclusions of the report "as a statement of policy to be followed over the next four or five years." He agreed that "the implementing programs" should be acted upon "as rapidly as possible." Truman approved the conclusions of the NSC formally the next day.[21]

On December 8 the revisions of the report and its Annexes were completed by the NSC Senior Staff and circulated to government officials. The document included a table of cost estimates covering the programs. The report also contained a statement by CEA Chairman Keyserling on the implications of the proposed programs and their impact upon the domestic economy. Keyserling argued that the programs recommended by the NSC "fall about half way between 'business as usual' and a really large-scale dedication of our enormous economic resources." Although Keyserling acknowledged that implementation of the policy would be a "large-scale dedication" for the national economy, he also stressed that the programs and their costs were "far short of an all-out...mobilization for war purposes."[22]

On December 14 the council, with Truman presiding, considered all the efforts and discussion in respect to the new policy. Some members were hesitant to approve the cost estimates until Keyserling reassured them that "the economy could stand the job required by the NSC report," and he noted that "no reduction of effort was necessary." After minor changes were made, the council adopted the amended policy report and Truman issued a policy directive that stated that the report is approved as a working guide for the urgent purpose of making an immediate start." Truman indicated that the programs contained in the new statement were "not final" and directed the Secretaries of State and Defense to conduct a joint review of political and military strategy.

The joint review, Truman requested, should stress "increasing and speeding up the programs outlined" in the document and would be due on December 31, 1950.[23]

Historian Paul Hammond suggested that the NSC report "emphasized a general objective," and it left "executive Leadership the flexibility and discretion it would need to achieve that objective." By the end of 1950, Truman had requested from Congress $28.4 billion more for United States defense programs, and an additional $4 billion supplement for foreign military assistance. The fiscal year 1951 budget for defense programs would be accelerated from the original proposal of $13.5 billion to $48.2 billion, an increase of 257 percent.[24] The total budget for both defense and international assistance programs increased from $17.7 billion in fiscal year 1950 to $52.6 billion in fiscal year 1953. Funding supported new or expanded programs for nuclear weapons, air base construction, the dispatch of four more United States Army divisions to Europe, increased covert operations, increased economic and military foreign assistance programs, and United States military commitments in Asia, including the American military buildup in the defense of Korea, Taiwan (Formosa), and greater military assistance to the French in Indochina.[25]

Without the Korean War, however, it is unlikely Truman would have authorized but a minimal budgetary increase for the NSC programs over the guarded $13 to $15 billion defense ceiling. The NSC report had been placed on the national security managers' agenda, though, at a critical juncture in the history of the Cold War. Its recommendations helped provide the expansion of military and international security programs throughout the Korean War and the last one third of the Truman presidency. As Secretary Acheson put it, the American military commitment to South Korea "removed the recommendations

of NSC-68 from the realm of theory and made them immediate budget issues." The North Korean invasion of South Korea "could hardly have come at a better time to ensure implementation of NSC-68," contends historian John L. Gaddis, because "the Korean War appeared to validate several of NSC-68's most important conclusions." "The real significance of NSC-68 was its timing," concludes historian Samuel Wells, "the tocsin sounded just before the fire." And another scholar of the national security establishment points out correctly that "the existence of NSC-68 made it possible to move into a general program of rearmament with only a minimum of impendences and fumbling."[26]

The NSC and the Cold War in the Middle East

Indicative of a tougher anti-Soviet response on the part of the NSC and President Truman in early 1950 were new or revised policies implemented concerning the countries of the Middle East and the French efforts in Indochina. Preceding the Korean War, but formulated during the council's work on the NSC 68 Series, in each case the recommendations of the NSC broadened the Truman administration's military and economic containment efforts. By the summer of 1949 the situation in the Middle East had stabilized. The First Arab-Israeli war had concluded with a signing of an armistice in August, but the national security managers remained concerned about Soviet influences in the region. Although the United States became increasingly more supportive of Israel after 1949, the Truman administration also tried to cultivate friendly relations with the Arab states of Egypt, Transjordan, Lebanon, and Syria.

In late 1949 the NSC adopted, and Truman approved, a more conciliatory policy toward Israel and the Arab states in an effort to thwart Soviet influence in the region. The policy suggested five major U.S. objectives: (1) the future

economic and political "stability" of both Israel and the Arab states would be "of critical importance" to United States security interests in the region; (2) the United States should seek "the respect" and "good will of all the peoples of the Near and Middle East," as well as "their orientation toward the West and away from the Soviet Union;" (3) Israeli and Arab differences "should be reconciled" so that both "would act in concert to oppose Soviet aggression;" (4) solutions concerning the economics, politics, and social problems of the area should receive "impartial...advice and guidance: from the United States;" and, (5) unilateral collaboration between the United States and the United Kingdom should be emphasized in order to achieve basic United States objectives in the region. In addition, the United States "should bear in mind the desirability of collaborating" with France, Turkey, and other Moslem non-Arab states, "for the same purpose whenever it is feasible and practicable."[27]

When Truman approved the NSC report on the Middle East, he also endorsed its recommendation that the export of armaments to the Middle East "be strictly limited to such arms as are within the scope of the legitimate security requirements" of the region, primarily those of internal security and self-defense. But by the winter of 1949-1950, as American and British military investments and interests increased in Egypt, it became necessary to clarify the meaning of the report's language of "legitimate security requirements."[28] In an attempt to do so and re-evaluate United States arms policy toward the Middle Eastern countries, the NSC Staff completed a new draft policy report that emphasized that "Anglo-Egyptian and other Anglo-Arab" military cooperation efforts must be maintained and concluded that such collaborations were necessary if the region was to be "militarily strengthened for defense against Communist aggression."[29] At its April 6 meeting the full NSC considered the draft report and agreed to add a paragraph to the report that stressed that any

United States armament exports to the Middle East should be made with full knowledge of the "undesirability of increasing the instability and uneasiness in the Arab-Israeli area." When Truman read the reissued NSC report he was concerned that it might be construed as pro-Arab. He therefore returned it to the NSC for revision.[30]

On May 10 the Department of State submitted its view of the NSC report. Department of State officials stressed that the United States should "avoid being drawn into any arms race in the area," but recommended that America should provide "sympathetic consideration" of any Israeli requests for "defensive military sufficient to discourage attack beyond its borders." Furthermore, should arms shipments provided by the United States, Britain, and France provoke Arab-Israeli hostilities or should another Arab-Israeli war occur, the United States should seek "public statements" that Britain and France would take "vigorous action both within and without the United Nations" to end the conflict.[31] The JCS also reviewed the NSC document and informed Secretary Johnson that the reference to a public commitment of the three powers to maintain peace in the Middle East would be "incompatible" with America's security interests as defined in the 1948 policy recommendation of the NSC. Johnson proposed that the NSC add a sentence to the final report that read: "Such action would not involve the use of U.S. military forces." The NSC approved the addition by memorandum action on May 7, and two days later Truman approved it.[32]

To implement the recommendations of the NSC report, Secretary Acheson met with British and French representatives in London to work out a tripartite declaration of arms shipments to the Middle East. Signed on May 25, 1950, the declaration announced that Israel and the Arab states were entitled to "a certain level of armed forces for the purposes of assuring their internal security and

their legitimate self-defense," but the sale of armaments to countries of the Middle East would require assurances of nonaggressive use. In addition, should Arab-Israeli hostilities resume, the three powers would take action consistent with United Nations obligations to protect the established Middle East frontiers and armistice lines.[33] The recommendations of the NSC report and their culmination with the tripartite declaration assured increased United States armament assistance to Israel, an expanded and continued British and French role in the Middle East, and thereby together, prevented a threatened Israel or frustrated Arab states from turning to the USSR for aid and intervention.

The NSC and the Cold War in Indochina

At the same time the NSC helped revise United States policy toward Israel and the Arab states, it also undertook a re-examination of policy regarding Indochina. The new policy initiative evolved in part as a response to the Communist success in China and as a reaction to Soviet and Communist Chinese diplomatic overtures towards Ho Chi Minh's insurgent government. In early January the USSR and Communist China recognized Ho's Democratic Republic of Vietnam as the legitimate government. Secretary Acheson responded quickly that the Soviet-Chinese acts of recognition "reveals Ho in his true colors as the mortal enemy of native independence in Indochina."[34] At the same time, the CIA warned the national security establishment that the USSR's recognition of Ho, coupled with that of Communist China, "will stiffen the spirit of Ho Chi Minh's followers." "Moreover open Soviet endorsement of Ho," the CIA stressed, would soon lead to the shipment of "significant quantities of military supplies from the nearby Chinese Communist armies." Thereafter, intelligence



Figure 3. Southeast Asia (1950)

analysts concluded, Sino-Soviet military assistance to the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, could force a French withdrawal from Indochina "in less than two years," if the French "do not receive aid from other Western Powers."[35]

Weeks later the French attempted to dilute the Soviet-Chinese acts by granting independent status to Vietnam and the Kingdoms of Laos and Cambodia as Associated States of the French Union. On February 7 the Truman administration extended United States recognition to Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia.[36] Three weeks later the Department of State submitted a draft report on Indochina for NSC consideration. The NSC studied the conditions and issued a report that first proposed the Domino Theory. It stressed that "Indochina is a key area of Southeast Asia and is under immediate threat." Should Indochina fall under the control of a "Communist-dominated government," other Southeast Asian countries, particularly neighboring "Thailand and Burma could be expected to fall under Communist domination" in a chain-reaction. To prevent a domino-collapse of Southeast Asia, the report recommended that the Departments of State and Defense "should prepare as a matter of priority a program of all practicable measures to protect United States security interest in Indochina."[37] The JCS and Secretary Johnson supported the development of State's objectives outlined in the report. "If Southeast Asia is lost," the JCS warned, the security of Japan, India, and Australia, the "three major non-Communist base areas" of the United States, would be threatened. Concurring in State's domino theory, the JCS also noted that "The fall of Indochina would undoubtedly lead to the fall of the other mainland sections of Southeast Asia." "It appears obvious from intelligence estimates that the situation in Southeast Asia has deteriorated." the JCS pointed out, "and, without United States assistance, this deterioration will be accelerated." To contain further Communist expansion in Asia the JCS recommended "early

implementation of military aid programs for Indochina, Indonesia, Thailand, the Philippines, and Burma," but urged that assistance be integrated with other United States economic and political programs.[38]

After receiving the views of the JCS, the entire NSC formally adopted the report. Truman approved this new Southeast Asian policy on April 24, and he directed the Departments of State and Defense to develop a program to protect America's security interests in Indochina.[39] On May 2, Truman also released $10 million of $75 million form the Mutual Defense Assistance Program's Section 303 funds and transferred it to the Department of Defense for military assistance in Indochina. One week later Acheson and the French Foreign Minister Robert Schuman agreed to an American-French mutual support pledge of cooperation in Indochina. After the outbreak of the Korean War the following month, Truman announced further United States assistance would be provided to help the French. By the end of 1950 the administration had committed $133 million in American military assistance to the French effort. Thus, on the basis of the NSC policy statement, the United States had moved from a hands-off position regarding Indochina to one of commitment and had taken the first of many steps that would lead to direct American involvement in Southeast Asia.[40]

The NSC and the Korean War

Throughout early 1950, with work underway on the NSC report dealing with Indochina, the national security managers were becoming prepared for another international crisis. It began on early Sunday morning, June 25, 1950, when North Korea invaded the Republic of South Korea. Just before dawn, 110,000 North Korean soldiers crossed the 38th parallel. As they moved down

a corridor towards Seoul, the South Korean military recalled its forces, one-third of which were on weekend leave. Ambassador Muccio cabled the Department of State. His message arrived in Washington at 9:26 p.m., on Saturday, June 24, and concluded: "It would appear from the nature of the attack and the manner in which it was launched that it constitutes an all-out offensive against the Republic of Korea."[41] Spending a quiet Saturday night with his family in Independence, Missouri, President Truman was unaware of the developments that would lead to what he later recalled were his "most important decision as President."[42]

Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs Dean Rusk received Muccio's dispatch and immediately telephoned Secretary Acheson who had been vacationing at his Maryland farm. At 11:20 p.m. Acheson telephoned Truman in Independence to inform him of the North Korean invasion. Truman told Acheson that he would return to Washington at once, but Acheson dissuaded him until the Department of State could appraise the situation. Acheson also recommended that the United States request an emergency meeting of the United Nations Security council to declare that North Korea had committed an act of aggression and to call for a cease-fire. Truman agreed.[43] Acheson called Truman a second time at 2:45 p.m. Sunday. He told Truman that the U.N. Security Council would meet early that evening to consider the Department of State's resolution. He also informed Truman that the attack had been confirmed and that the South Korean front was "disintegrating." Truman told Acheson that he would fly to Washington at once, and he asked him to provide a list of criteria for his review when he arrived.[44]

During his flight back to Washington Truman began to analyze the importance of the events in Korea. He later recalled that the time had given him a chance to think about other historical acts of aggression--Manchuria, Ethiopia,

and Austria. "Communism was acting in Korea just as Hitler, Mussolini, and the Japanese had acted ten, fifteen, and twenty years earlier," Truman concluded. From that analogy, Truman arrived at a premise that would influence his decision-making in the following critical days: "If the Communists were permitted to force their way into the Republic of Korea without opposition from the free world..it would mean a third world war, just as similar incidents had brought on the second world war."[45]

Neither President Truman nor the NSC were prepared for the North Korean attack on South Korea. It came as a surprise because the NSC, the JCS, and the Department of State had been preoccupied during 1949 and early 1950 with the possibility of a war with the USSR in Europe. Although NSC 68 had emphasized that Soviet atomic capabilities had converted future Cold War hostilities to "piece-meal aggression," and some Soviet analysts in the Department of State were expecting limited military action along the Soviet sphere of influence, Korea was not a concern.[46] As Acheson later recalled: "For some months, after tensions had mounted after the Berlin blockade, we had exercises on danger spots for renewed Soviet probing of our determination. Korea was on the list but not among the favorites."[47] Further complicating matters had been the intelligence failure to predict the North Korean attack. Since United States troop deployment had begun in 1949, intelligence reports had increasingly warned of a North Korean troop build-up along the 38th parallel, but no single estimate indicated that a North Korean offensive would be imminent. Since 1949 the NSC had received numerous intelligence reports suggesting the possibility of a North Korean attack, but because no invasion materialized, many national security managers doubted the validity of a North Korean attack.[48]

The CIA's failure to predict the invasion of South Korea received congressional criticism and press reports of intelligence ineptness. DCI Hillencotter claimed that the CIA had provided ample warnings and suggested that either the reports had not received correct evaluation, or else they had been ignored at the administration's departmental levels.[49] According to intelligence historian Phillip Knightley, the reports were" ignored in Washington," because they "conflicted with the CIA's prevailing view on the East-West confrontation."[50] Furthermore, had the national security establishment treated the reports seriously, a major reassessment would have been required of Sino-Soviet intentions. In the end, it became much easier for the NSC to dismiss them.

Throughout early 1950 the administration's policy towards the Far East continued to emphasize a reliance on the "defensive perimeter" concept. As early as January 12, 1950, Secretary Acheson had delivered his famous National Press Club Speech in which he detailed the fixed limits of United States responsibility and interests in Asia, and outlined the strategic military conclusions that the JCS and Defense had reached months earlier. Acheson declared that the American defense perimeter ran from the Aleutians to the Philippines, including Japan and the Ryukyus, but not Formosa or Korea. Wars on the Asian mainland, Acheson stressed, should be fought only by Asians. He pointed out that Asian stability could not be ensured by military protection alone and that Asian nations could only withstand Communist "subversion and penetration," if they developed stable economies and democratic institutions. Outside its defense perimeter, the United States would offer its economic, technical, and political support, Acheson pointed out, but should a military attack occur on the mainland, "the initial reliance" and burden of resistance would fall on the native people themselves.[51] By the end of the year the

"defensive-perimeter" concept had been refuted, and the United States Cold War policies of containment embraced all the principles of NSC 68.

Two days after the North Korean invasion Truman briefed congressional leaders and told them: "This act was very obviously inspired by the Soviet Union. If we let Korea down, the Soviets will keep on going and swallow up one piece of Asia after another."[52] By the time Truman had informed the leaders of Congress that the United States would take firm action in Korea, he had already met with his top national security advisers. Unlike the Berlin crisis and blockade, however, Truman did not immediately call a special meeting of the NSC. Preferring to wait for U.N. resolutions, congressional response, and for what he called " survey of the most recent developments reported from Korea," Truman did not convene the NSC until three days after the North Korean attack.[53] When the NSC met on June 28 and June 29, Truman requested its recommendation to deploy American ground troops in South Korea, a decision that broadened the United States commitment and one that the president did not wish to make without full NSC consideration.

In the evening hours of June 25, Truman met briefly with thirteen national security advisers at the Blair House, his temporary residence across the street from the White House. At the meeting he ordered General MacArthur to provide military supplies to the ROK and dispatched the United States Seventh Fleet north to be put under MacArthur's command.[54] Hours before the Blair House meeting the U.N. Security Council had voted unanimously, with the USSR delegate absent, for a North Korean withdrawal behind the 38th parallel, an immediate cease-fire, and for assistance from U.N. member states "in the execution of the resolution."[55] At this meeting Truman and others questioned for the first time the role of the USSR in North Korea's invasion. Though there had been no evidence of direct involvement by Moscow, Truman and his

advisers believed that the USSR had instigated the attack to deflect United States attention from Europe and expand into the Far East simultaneously. General Bradley commented that the Russians were "obviously testing us" in Korea, and Truman told the Blair House conference participants that he thought "the line would have to be drawn."[56] Thinking back on that moment Truman later recalled that he believed: "What was developing in Korea seemed to me like a repetition on a larger scale of what had happened in Berlin. The Reds were probing for weaknesses in our armour," Truman noted, "we had to meet their thrust without getting embroiled in a world-wide war."[57]

By Monday, June 26, the situation in South Korea had deteriorated rapidly. As North Korean troops closed in on Seoul, and Syngman Rhee's government prepared to evacuate the South Korean capital, Truman called another emergency meeting at the Blair House. During the meeting Truman read a report from General MacArthur that predicted that a "complete collapse [of South Korea] is imminent." Then, on Acheson's recommendation, Truman dispatched the Seventh Fleet to defend the Formosa Strait, ordered MacArthur to commit U.S. air and naval forces to support the South Korean Army, and authorized increases in United States assistance to help the French defeat the Vietminh and assist the Philippine government to suppress a strengthening Communist insurgency movement.[58]

Although Truman had decided to deploy American air and naval forces to Korea, he specified that all operations be restricted south of the 38th parallel, and he did not commit American ground troops. General Bradley told the president that if United States ground forces were deployed in South Korea, it would require complete mobilization, and the JCS were reluctant to commit ground troops without complete mobilization. Truman agreed that the question of mobilization would require JCS study beforehand and added: "I don't want

to go to war." Next, Truman approved a Department of State resolution drafted for proposal before the U.N. Security Council. It requested that all U.N. member states "provide assistance to the Republic of South Korea as may be necessary to repel the armed attack and restore international peace and security in the area."[59]

The next day the U.N. Security Council adopted the United States resolution that Truman had approved hours earlier. Truman then informed the American public in a brief statement that they had "ordered United States air and sea forces to give the Korean Government troops cover and support." But before releasing the statement Truman briefed congressional leaders and received their approval. Because he assumed that as commander-in-chief he did not need approval from Congress for United States air and naval deployment, Truman did not seek it.[60] The only other decisions that remained would be whether American ground troops should be committed to South Korea and whether the United States should cross the 38th parallel, and they rested upon the NSC's recommendations of June 29 and September 7, 1950.

At approximately 2:30 p.m. on Wednesday, June 28, while the NSC was meeting to consider the crisis, the Senate voted unanimously to grant Truman the authority to activate the armed forces reserves and extend the selective service by roll call. In spite of Senate actions that day the focus of attention for the Truman administration was the NSC. Besides President Truman, Vice-President Alben Barkley, Secretaries Acheson and Johnson, and Chairman of the National Security Resources Board Stuart Symington, the statutory members of the NSC, twenty-two additional participants attended the meeting, including executive department and intelligence advisers, the entire JCS, and the service secretaries. The only subject the NSC and Truman addressed concerned the Korean crisis and its global implications.[61]

President Truman opened the meeting by reading a statement of the latest developments in Korea. He then directed the NSC to undertake immediately a complete review "of all policy papers affecting the entire perimeter of the USSR," and prepare for his consideration courses of action in the event that Soviet forces enter Korean hostilities. Truman also agreed with Secretary Acheson that the Department of Defense should prepare for the NSC a review of United States military capabilities and options. Secretary of the Army Frank Pace told the NSC that military intelligence had initiated a search for "clear evidence of Soviet participation in the Korea fighting." Truman replied that he also wanted "special attention" given to other sensitive areas, especially Soviet activities in the vicinity of Yugoslavia, northern Europe, and northern Iran. Averell Harriman reported on the European reaction to the crisis in Korea and noted that "prior to the President's announcement [on June 27], the Europeans were gravely concerned that the United States would not meet the challenge in Korea." Truman's actions provided Europeans "great relief," said Harriman, "since they believed disaster would be certain otherwise." Truman then informed the council that some congressional leaders had questioned "whether other U.N. nations would be willing to help." Indicative of U.N. member assistance, the President told the NSC of a British offer of naval aid. The NSC agreed with Truman that the British offer should be accepted and that Senate leaders should be informed of the offer.[62]

At the conclusion of the meeting Pentagon officials raised the question of American forces crossing the 38th parallel to pursue North Korean forces. Secretary of the Air Force Thomas Finletter announced that after two days of operation the Air Force was "having difficulty in combating the Red Korean planes" over South Korea. The problem, he maintained, existed because United States forces had been prohibited from moving north of the 38th parallel.

Until American air power could destroy North Korean bases and pursue North Korean aircraft northward, Finletter concluded, "we could not effectively stop" the North Korean offensive. Truman acknowledged Finletter's concerns, but believed that the decision to cross the 38th parallel should be considered at a later time. Acheson replied that he "hoped the line would not be crossed by 'accident.'" Secretary Johnson reassured the NSC that "current orders clearly specified staying inside the 38th parallel." Assessing United States actions and responsibilities up to that point, Acheson noted that the United States may find "it imperative to accept full-out war." Truman then concluded that he believed "we should not back out of Korea unless a military situation elsewhere demanded such action."[63]

Although Truman and the NSC had not sanctioned the use of ground troops in Korea nor authorized the movement of troops north of the 38th parallel on June 28, the events of Thursday, June 29 hastened the full commitment of American forces in Korea. The JCS prepared a draft directive for General MacArthur that authorized the extension of American air and naval forces north of the 38th parallel. The JCS also recommended reluctantly the commitment of United States token ground forces for communication and transportation services "as a matter of urgency" and noted that if the Soviet Union intervened openly in Korea or seized "the opportunity to take aggressive action in Western Europe," the United States should proceed with complete mobilization. Realizing that the deployment of ground troops would require Truman's authorization, Secretary Johnson called the President and suggested another meeting of the NSC for its consideration. Truman agreed and called a meeting for 2:00 that afternoon.[64]

The NSC convened at the appointed time and Johnson read the JCS draft directive prepared for MacArthur. Truman and Acheson supported the

directive's orders for American air and naval operations north of the 38th parallel, and for the proposed commitment of limited ground forces. Truman objected to the last paragraph of the directive, however, and told the NSC that he "wished to give no implication that we were planning to go to war with Russia under present circumstances." Truman also informed the NSC that he wanted "to take every step necessary" to force North Korean troops back across the 38th parallel, but that air and naval operations into North Korea "should be designed only to destroy munition supplies." Truman pointed out that he wanted it understood that American operations "were designed to keep the peace in Korea and to restore the border."[65]

The NSC also discussed two other related matters: the People's Republic of China had criticized United States support of South Korea, and the USSR had refused an American request to mediate the crisis in Korea. Acheson read the Soviet statement to the NSC. It condemned South Korea for starting the war and declared that the USSR would adhere to the "principle of the impermissibility of interference by foreign powers in the internal affairs of Korea." Acheson told the NSC that the "two communications taken together seemed to indicate that the Soviets would not intervene themselves in Korea, but might utilize the Chinese Communists." Acheson then requested, and the NSC agreed to, the public release of the United States request to the USSR as well as the Soviet reply. Acheson also reported that India, Australia, New Zealand, Canada, and the Netherlands had made offers of assistance. Truman responded that he wanted "all offers by other members of the United Nations" accepted to ensure that the response "may be truly representative of the United Nations." Truman then concluded the meeting by stating that he wanted all U.N. armed force contingents placed under the command of General MacArthur

and that the general be directed "to make a full and complete report on the situation in the Far East each day."[66]

Later that evening Acheson and Johnson approved a new directive to MacArthur. It authorized the general to use American air and naval forces to provide the "fullest and possible support" for South Korean troops, to employ limited United States Army ground troops for "essential support service," to "insure the retention of a port and air base" near Pusan, and to "defend Formosa against invasion or attack by Chinese Communists", as well as prevent the Chinese Nationalists from using Formosa "as a base of operations against the Chinese Mainland." MacArthur was directed only to take defensive measures, and in addition, should "Soviet forces intervene in Korea," to report to Washington and "take no action to aggravate the situation."[67] Truman's orders to MacArthur reached Tokyo on the morning of June 30. MacArthur had just returned from a personal visit to the front line in Korea, witnessed the North Korean capture and burning of Seoul, and ordered United States air strikes above the 38th parallel. From his battle front observations MacArthur determined that United States combat troops would be necessary to halt the North Korean advance toward Pusan. After he arrived in Tokyo and received additional reports that North Korean forces had broken the ROK defenses at the Han River and were moving to capture the whole peninsula, MacArthur sent an urgent request to the Pentagon. The cable asked for one regimental combat team to strengthen United States units and an additional two divisions to mount an early counter-offensive.[68]

MacArthur's dispatch arrived in Washington in the middle of the early morning hours of June 30. At 5:00 a.m. Secretary Pace telephoned President Truman and relayed MacArthur's request. Truman authorized immediately the deployment of a regimental combat team, but not the two divisions for a

counter-offensive. Later that morning Truman met for about thirty minutes with several advisers and informed them of MacArthur's request. The group did not object to the general's proposal to engage United States combat troops in a counter-offensive, and Truman decided shortly thereafter to allow MacArthur "full authority" to use American troops under his command in Japan for combat in Korea. In addition, Truman also directed a naval blockade of North Korea.[69]

As Acheson later recalled: "Friday's decisions were the culminating ones of a momentous week. We were then fully committed to Korea."[70] Not only had the Truman administration committed the United States to a lengthy military action and eventual stalemate, but it also had taken America into a war to block Soviet expansion in Asia. It reasserted the credibility of the United States to resist aggression by states that were proxies of the Soviet Union. Throughout 1948 and 1949, the NSC, the Department of State, and the Pentagon had determined that the Korean peninsula was only of a peripheral interest to the United States. Throughout the week of June 25 to June 30 it became instead a symbol of vital interest. "What Korea showed," points out historian John L. Gaddis, "was that even regions not deemed vital could become vital if threatened by a hostile military force."[71] For the national security establishment Korea's loss to Communist control symbolized the first domino in the Far East. In addition, a Communist Korea could threaten Japan's security militarily and economically.[72]

By June 30, 1950, the United States had headed down the long road of Cold War globalism, the "defensive perimeter" had expanded to include Korea and Formosa, and Americans would fight on the Asian mainland in the interests of United States national security and global containment. Within months the Truman administration would adopt the national security premises of NSC 68,

enact larger military budgets for the United States and its allies, and seek not only to liberate all of Korea from Communist control, but also to reunify Korea.

The United States became committed to Korea before the NSC could provide President Truman sort-term assessments as well as long-range policy objectives concerning Soviet initiative or possible Chinese Communist intervention. Nor had the NSC been afforded enough time to formulate recommendations regarding the future of the Korean 38th parallel or the possibility of Korean unification. The first concern for the national security establishment would be determining United States policy toward the Soviet Union. In early July the NSC Staff studied all United States policies affecting the entire perimeter of the USSR. In a draft of a policy statement concerning Korea the NSC determined that there had been "no conclusive indication" that Moscow intended "to launch a global war" at the time North Korea invaded the South. Yet the danger of the Soviets initiating a global war, either by deliberation or by miscalculation, the report warned, "may have been increased by the Korean war." The NSC also indicated that "no conclusive evidence" existed that indicated the USSR would commit Soviet troops, either "alone or with satellite forces, in isolated or piecemeal attacks" along its periphery. The NSC concluded that the USSR would most likely use "Chinese Communist forces in Korea and against Formosa," and "inspire aggression by satellite forces against" Western Europe, Yugoslavia, Greece and Turkey, Hong Kong and Macao, and Southeast Asia.[73]

At its July 6 meeting the NSC noted and discussed a statement that NSRB Chairman Stuart Symington read, entitled "Suggested Action by the NSC for Consideration of the President in the Light of the Korean Situation." Symington noted that the invasion of South Korea "came as a surprise and shock, not only to the people of the United States and the world, but also to the people around

this table." And, warned the NSRB Chairman, "there are further shocks which must be absorbed, the possible consequences of which it is our duty to present to the President." Symington urged that the NSC propose a long-range strategic defense plan, without which he emphasized, "it will be impossible for the United States to settle this dispute in this little country of Korea for some months." Then Symington recommended that the NSC consultants consider his request in connection with their work on the NSC 73 Series. The council approved his request and circulated the statement to all departments and agencies concerned with the task of mobilization.[74]

Symington's appeal to the NSC did not result in an approved policy of the NSC. However, portions of his report influenced Part II of NSC 73/4, in which the NSC recommended that the United States should: (1) rapidly increase the build-up of its military strength; (2) implement measures "which will follow from NSC 68;" (3) "form the basis for fighting a global war should war prove unavoidable;" and, (4) in the event of overt military action, "take appropriate air and naval action outside Korea against Communist China."[75]

At the same time the NSC considered the drafts of NSC 73/4, the UN Security Council confirmed the leading role of the United States in Korea. On July 7 the Security Council adopted a resolution establishing a unified command over all combined UN forces engaged in Korea, headed by a UN commander designated by the President of the United States. Truman had already directed his choice for the position at the June 29 NSC meeting: General of the Army Douglas MacArthur for the position of UN commander. Truman approved their recommendation later that day.[76]

As MacArthur assumed his new position, North Korean troops forced UN ground units to retreat down the Korean peninsula. By early July they were confined to the Pusan perimeter, on the far southeast edge of Korea. In

response to the North Korean advance MacArthur began to revise his estimates upwards. As early as July 2, 7, and 9, he requested more American and UN reinforcements for a counter-offensive and an amphibious operation that would land behind North Korean Lines at Inchon.[77] In response to MacArthur's proposed operations, Truman requested on July 17 that the NSC provide him a recommendation that specified United States policy in the event that North Korean forces were driven back across the 38th parallel by UN units.[78]

As the NSC began to work on Truman's directive, the prospects of Soviet forces intervening in the war seemed less ominous. Throughout July the USSR did not move toward military involvement in Korea, and United States intelligence estimates indicated that the Soviets would not risk "full-scale war with the Western Powers." Instead of a general war, the CIA stressed, the United States could expect the USSR "to localize the Korean conflict," by providing arms and material assistance to North Korea.[79] Believing that Moscow had been surprised by the rapid reactions of the UN and the intervention of United States military forces in Korea, the CIA as early as July 8 concluded that: "Nothing in the Korean situation as yet indicates that the USSR would deliberately decide to deploy Soviet forces in direct military action precipitating global war."[80] The hands-off approach that the USSR took in the summer months continued throughout the fall of 1950 and encouraged the national security managers as well as General MacArthur to pursue a more aggressive policy in Korea. Indicative of the NSC's lack of concern about immediate Soviet military intervention in Korea was the council's half-hearted adoption, and Truman's approval, of NSC 73/4 as a "working guide." The NSC, however, did not abandon its earlier warning that the United States must still fear Moscow's "overt use of organized Chinese Communist forces in Korea."[81]

The new suspicion of the People's Republic of China revealed that the NSC and Truman were becoming less willing to act in accordance with earlier policies concerning China. At the same time, the JCS reasserted Formosa's strategic importance. On July 27 the NSC adopted a JCS proposal, endorsed by General MacArthur, that would strengthen Formosa against invasion. Truman agreed in principle with this policy report that recommended "irrespective of the situation in Korea, the United States plan to continue the present policy of denying Formosa to Communist forces." The report also stressed that "if the capture of Formosa by the communists is to be prevented," the United States would have to revise its policy of denying military material and supplies to Chiang's Nationalist government.[82] With the approval of this report, the United States officially recognized the strategic importance of Formosa, and the Truman administration found it impossible to distance itself from Chiang. The Korean war forced an end to Acheson's and Truman's neutral disengagement efforts of 1949. By August Truman approved a United States military mission to advise Chiang's troops as well as $14 million in military assistance to the Nationalist government. And in October Acheson agreed reluctantly to work with the UN for the neutralization of Taiwan.[83]

To provide for an adequate defense of Formosa the JCS followed up the NSC report with a request that Secretary Johnson secure NSC approval for periodic United States photo reconnaissance flights over the China coast south of the 32nd parallel. The JCS argued that intelligence reports indicated "that sufficient build-up of troops and water lift now exist on the China coast," and without photographic reconnaissance an amphibious assault against Formosa would be difficult to defeat.[84] The Department of State commented on the request and added four restrictions: (1) General MacArthur should "exercise caution to avoid creating hostilities" with the People's Republic of China; (2)

avoid widening the Korean conflict; (3) conduct reconnaissance "to the maximum extent possible outside Chinese territorial waters;" and (4) avoid giving the Chinese Communists "any impression" that American aircraft were "making a serious attempt to penetrate the mainland."[85] After the JCS accepted the Department of State's additions, the NSC approved the reconnaissance request on August 3 and instructed the Secretaries of State and Defense to "jointly work out" its implementation. Aerial reconnaissance missions began within a week thereafter.[86]

Throughout July and August the Truman administration did not publicly specify United States military objectives beyond the language of the UN resolutions. However, with mid-term elections pending in November, Truman's congressional critics, including the bipartisan China bloc, clamored for a military offensive against North Korea.[87] General MacArthur also issued several optimistic statements touting his plans for a military conquest of North Korea and the eventual military occupation and political unification of all of Korea. When Generals J. Lawton Collins and Hoyt S. Vandenberg visited MacArthur at his headquarters on July 13, MacArthur informed them of his perceived mission: total defeat of the North Korean forces. And, he added, after the defeat, "it might be necessary to occupy" as well as "compose and unite" Korea.[88]

With US-UN troop build-ups continuing in Korea and MacArthur's operational plans clearer, the national security managers began to consider seriously the possibility that North Korean troops would be driven across the 38th parallel and that all of Korea could be liberated from Communist political-military influences. On September 7, one week before MacArthur's bold Inchon landing took place, the NSC Staff offered suggestions in respect to the possibilities in Korea. The report indicated for the first time that the Truman

administration had made plans to cross the 38th parallel and unite Korea. It stated clearly that:

> The United Nations forces have a legal basis for conducting operations north of the 38th parallel to compel the withdrawal of the North Korean forces behind this line or to defeat these forces. It would be expected that the UN Commander would receive authorization to conduct military operations, including amphibious and airborne landings or ground operations in pursuance of a roll-back in Korea north of the 38th parallel, for the purpose of destroying the North Korean forces, provided that at the time of such operations there had been no entry into North Korea by major Soviet or Chinese Communist forces. . .

The NSC also recommended that no UN operations extend "close to" the Manchurian and Soviet borders of North Korea. And in the event Soviet or Chinese Communist forces occupied North Korea, the report stressed, the UN commander "should reoccupy Korea up to the 38th parallel."[89]

At the NSC meeting on September 7 General Bradley read JCS comments on the NSC report. The JCS agreed in principle with the policy but expressed doubt that the front should be stabilized along the 38th parallel. Secretary Acheson told Bradley that the members of the JCS were wrong to conclude that the NSC report suggested stabilization of a front at the 38th parallel. He went on to suggest that before US-UN forces launched a mass invasion north of the parallel, General MacArthur should come to Washington for a "final decision." Secretaries Bradley and Johnson concurred in Acheson's proposal. The council then adopted NSC 81 subject to redrafting by the Departments of State and Defense.[90] On September 9, the discussion led to an amended version of this policy report. The NSC report included three revisions. First, advance Presidential approval would be required before US-UN operations took place north of the 38th parallel. Second, previous military operations restricted "close to" the Soviet and Manchurian borders by the NSC report were granted more flexibility by being restricted from extending "across" the borders. Third, political

objectives for postwar military occupation of Korea needed to include the UN adoption of three phases: (1) military occupation until internal security of Korea had been established; (2) free national elections held under UN auspices; and, (3) withdrawal of all non-Korean UN forces and the extension of UN unification assistance.[91]

On September 15, two days after Truman approved this NSC report, MacArthur staged the successful Inchon landing. The nature of the war changed significantly. After the landing at Inchon, US-UN troops were only a few hundred miles from the 38th parallel. Within two weeks, MacArthur's forces isolated North Korea's supply lines and liberated most of South Korea. Hopeful for a quick victory, the Truman administration evoked the policy recommendations of the NSC report and thereby cleared the way for moving the war north of the 38th parallel. On September 27, Secretary of Defense George C. Marshall, who had recently succeeded Louis Johnson, requested that Truman approve a directive to MacArthur that implemented the "military aspects" of the NSC report. Marshall informed Truman that his approval would permit MacArthur "to conduct the necessary military operations...to destroy North Korean forces." Without hesitation Truman authorized the directive.[92] Seoul was liberated the next day. On September 20 President Syngman Rhee reestablished the ROK government, and the first of South Korean troops crossed the 38th parallel. On October 7, American forces moved north of the parallel, and a jubilant UN General Assembly voted to adopt the three occupation and postwar unification recommendations that the NSC suggested.[93]

As MacArthur's forces drove north toward the Yalu River along China's border, the national security establishment dismissed all previous concerns about the crossing of the 38th parallel. Although the possibility of Chinese

military intervention in Korea had been considered and noted officially in two NSC reports, the United States considered bellicose threats from China as propaganda bluffs and as part of a Sino-Soviet war of words to frighten US-UN troop withdrawal from Korea. As early as August, Mao Tse-tung and his foreign minister Chou En-lai issued warnings that echoed one theme: if American ground forces crossed the 38th parallel the People's Republic of China would intervene to protect its borders.[94] On October 8, despite the Chinese warnings, the JCS and Truman directed MacArthur to continue military action "in the event of the open or covert employment anywhere in Korea of major Chinese Communist units."[95]

General MacArthur did not believe that the Chinese would intervene in the war. When President Truman met with MacArthur at Wake Island on October 15, the general assured him that "the victory was won in Korea," and emphatically noted that "the Chinese Commies would not attack."[96] Two days after Wake Island, as MacArthur's forces closed in on Pyonyang, the North Korean capital, Truman publicly notified China that the United States had "no aggressive designs in Korea or in any other place in the Far East or elsewhere."[97] The Chinese were not convinced, and in less than a week the confidence of the Truman administration as well as its credibility would be shattered.

MacArthur's troops continued to drive north during mid-October toward the Manchurian border. On October 25 they encountered the first Chinese Communist units forty miles south of the Yalu. United States policy, however, did not change, and by October 31 the NSC and Truman approved a directive to MacArthur that had been "formulated in implementation" of the NSC Statement on Korea. The directive ordered the occupation of North Korea.[98] The next day Chinese MIG fighter planes appeared along the Yalu, and

Chinese troops and material began pouring over the river's bridges from Manchuria. On November 6, MacArthur cabled Washington, declaring that "the only way to stop this reinforcement of the enemy is the destruction of the bridges by air attack."[99] The JCS directed MacArthur to proceed with bombing the northern borders, but restricted it to the "Korean end of the Yalu bridges." Three days later the NSC concurred in the JCS directive: "General MacArthur's directive should not be changed at present. Meantime, General MacArthur is free to do what he militarily can under his present directive without bombing Manchuria."[100]

With United States bombing raids came a lull in the fighting. His confidence renewed, MacArthur began preparations for a new offensive that he claimed would bring about a final victory. Then, on November 24, as he began his "end-the-war" offensive and US-UN forces closed in on the border along the Yalu, 200,000 Chinese troops counterattacked.[101] Thereafter, "an entirely new war," as MacArthur defined it, had begun.[102] As his troops retreated south toward the 38th parallel in disarray, MacArthur cabled Washington on November 28 that he urgently needed more reinforcements to fend off the Chinese; otherwise he would have to begin an evacuation of UN forces. Later that day President Truman received MacArthur's request. In need of advice, he called an emergency meeting of the NSC for 3:00 p.m. that day. As in the instance of the Berlin crisis nearly two-and-one-half years earlier, the NSC provided Truman the forum he needed to reach a very difficult decision.[103]

With the JCS, the three service secretaries, and their advisers present at the NSC meeting, General Bradley read MacArthur's cable. Bradley then told the council and the additional participants that "the Chinese Communist offensive might be limited." Because the present JCS directive "authorizes General MacArthur to take up defensive positions," Bradley noted, no new

directive would be needed "at least for the next 24 to 48 hours." After Bradley summed up the situation in Korea, Secretary Marshall read a memorandum from the service secretaries. He told the NSC that the most important point raised in the memorandum was that the United States "should not become engaged individually or as a member of the UN in a general war in China with the Chinese Communists." General Bradley replied that the JCS "also feel strongly that we should not become involved in a general war with Communist China." Because the JCS preferred waging a limited war, Bradley noted, they "do not see the advisability of sending more troops to General MacArthur at present." Vice President Barkley commented that the service secretaries' memorandum "indicated a tragic manpower shortage." He questioned whether US-UN forces could "hold the line" without more reinforcements. Marshall agreed with Barkley that "it was a gloomy picture," and added that he thought "the choice was between having our hands tied in a war with China, or how we can withdraw with honor."[104]

Near the end of the meeting Secretary Acheson told the NSC that he believed "this development brings us much closer to the danger of a general war." Acheson emphasized that "we should not lose what we have." Then he advanced the argument that the United States must "try to get out [of Korea] so that we can meet real dangers that face us in other parts of the world. " Instead of providing MacArthur more reinforcements, Acheson argued that the United States "should build up our forces in Western Europe" to meet any future or immediate Soviet threats there. Then Acheson questioned whether MacArthur understood his directive and told the NSC that it should be emphasized to MacArthur that "the UN and US policy is not that we want to occupy Korea." Nor, Acheson added, is the objective "to defeat the Chinese Communists in Korea." Instead, he concluded that "The main objective we should try to

achieve now is to terminate this Korean situation." After listening intently to the council's deliberations, Truman ended the meeting by telling the NSC that he believed "the most important thing now is to hold the line."[105]

The consensus of the NSC on November 28 had been unanimous. Earlier objectives that had concentrated on a military occupation of North Korea and the eventual postwar political unification of Korea were discarded. The NSC and Truman had determined that by engaging in a general war with China or extending the war into China, the United States would run a greater risk of confrontation with the Soviets in Western Europe. Therefore, the Truman administration chose to wage a limited war in Korea and avoid any chance of a potential East-West global confrontation. The quest for the liberation of Korea had been eliminated during the course of the meeting, and containment had again become the primary goal of the United States Cold War policy.



Figure 4. Korea (1950-53)

ENDNOTES

CHAPTER V

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[4]Williams, Klaus Fuchs, 116.

[5]York, The Advisors, 70; Louis Johnson to Harry Truman, 24 February 1950, FRUS: 1950, I, 538-539; Truman, Years of Trial and Hope, 309-310.

[6]Report to the President by the Special Committee of the National Security Council on the Development of Thermonuclear Weapons, 9 March 1950; FRUS: 1950, I, 538-539; Hewlett and Duncan, Atomic Shield, 417; York, The Advisors, 70; Truman, Years of Trial and Hope, 310.

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[11]For the complete text of NSC 68 see FRUS: 1950, I, 235-292; Etzold and Gaddis, Containment, 385-442.

[12]FRUS: 1950, I, 238-242, 253, 261.

[13]Ibid., 385-387.

[14]Ibid.

[15]Ibid, 244.

[16]Ibid, 251, 265-267, 282.

[17]Ibid., 283-285, 256-258; Gaddis, Strategies of Containment, 93-94. For Keyserling's impact on Fair Deal expenditures, see Alonzo L. Hamby, "The Vital Center, the Fair Deal, and the Quest for a Liberal Political Economy," American Historical Review 77 (June 1972): 633-665.

[18]FRUS: 1950, I, 285; Acheson, Present at the Creation, 488.

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[20]Memorandum, James Lay to the NSC, 17 April 1950, PSF-NSC, Box 208; Summary of Discussion at the 55th Meeting, 21 April 1950, Ibid., Box 220.

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[22]NSC 68/3 and Annexes to NSC 68/3, NSC "Policies of the Government, 1950," 45, Ibid., Box 195; FRUS: 1950, I, 430.

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[24]Hammond, "NSC-68," 361, 351-359; Gaddis, Strategies of Containment, 43.

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[34]"Kremlin Recognizes Community Movement in Indonesia," Statement by Secretary Acheson, 1 February 1950, Department of State Bulletin (13 February 1950), 244.

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[42]Merle Miller, Plain Speaking: An Oral Biography of Harry S. Truman (New York: Berkeley, 1974), 284; Truman, Years of Trial and Hope, 331-332.

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CHAPTER VI

THE KOREAN WAR AND ITS IMPACT ON POLICY FORMATION, 1951-1952

While the United States was fervently involved articulating a Cold War policy for many areas of the world, it suddently had to re-evaluate its strategy in 1951. As the Cold War was becoming somewhat hotter, Truman and the NSC began to view containment differently and to consider implementing new strategies. Truman's decision in 1951 not to run for re-election also prompted changes in NSC and administration policies. These aggregate changes affected not only Asia but also every other section of the world in respect to United States diplomacy.

A day after the emergency meeting of the NSC on December 28, 1950, the JCS sent a new directive to General MacArthur to hold a line somewhere in Korea, without substantial reinforcements and inflict maximum damage on the enemy's positions. The JCS also asked for MacArthur's comments on the directive and the situation in Korea. In response, MacArthur replied the following day proposing the widening of the war against China. He noted that if the United States or the U.N. understood "the State of War which has been forced upon us by the Chinese authorities," then retaliatory measures necessary would include: (1) a naval blockade of China's coast; (2) the destruction of Chinese military-related industries by air and naval raids into

Manchuria; and, (3) the use of reinforcements from Chiang Kai-shek's Nationalist forces in Korea and on the Chinese Mainland.[1]

MacArthur received no immediate reply from Washington regarding his proposal to widen the war; reports from the battlefield worsened. On December 31, 1950 and January 1, 1951, the Chinese launched a second offensive, driving allied forces south of the 38th parallel. General Matthew Ridgeway, who had taken charge of the Eighth Army, retreated to Seoul, but was forced to evacuate the capital on January 4. Five days after the evacuation of Seoul the JCS informed MacArthur that any retaliatory actions against China must wait and that he must continue to defend Korea. MacArthur sent an immediate request for clarification to the JCS, asking if United States political policy emphasized maintaining an indefinite military position in Korea or evacuating as soon as possible.[2]

When Truman received MacArthur's query, he called a special meeting of the NSC on January 12 for the sole purpose of considering United States policy and military operations in Korea.[3] Secretary Marshall read MacArthur's cable to the NSC. He told the NSC that his first concern was "the state of morale in Korea," and proposed that Generals Lawton Collins and Hoyt Vandenberg go to Korea to investigate. The NSC then discussed and concurred in a draft message that the JCS had proposed to send to MacArthur. Truman authorized the JCS to dispatch the message that repeated that MacArthur hold a line as long as possible. Secretary Acheson thought that Washington should "let General MacArthur know more why it is desirable for us to stay in Korea." Marshall then stated that he felt it important "to make a differentiation between the political and military aspects" of the message. President Truman retorted that MacArthur "was liable to mix the political and military aspects anyway," but concluded that "we try to keep them clear." The NSC then agreed that the

Department of State should prepare a second message for MacArthur dealing with the political aspects involved in Korea.[4] The next day Truman used the Department of State draft to inform MacArthur of Washington's goals in Korea. Truman's personal message apparently relieved MacArthur, especially the president's statement that in the event of a forced withdrawal, the United States would "not accept the result politically or militarily until the aggression has been rectified." When Generals Collins and Vandenberg arrived in Tokyo in mid-January, MacArthur informed them that he finally understood that he must remain in Korea indefinitely.[5] The decision the NSC reached on December 28, 1950, to forward two separate messages to MacArthur, one political and another military, helped clarify United States goals and settle the general. Despite the NSC's efforts, within two months General MacArthur challenged directly the administration's policies to wage a limited war in Korea.

By mid-winter 1951 the tide of battle had turned in Korea. General Ridgeway's forces moved slowly back north toward the 38th parallel and on March 14 recaptured Seoul. By the end of the month US-UN troops reestablished a defensive position along the 38th parallel, removing any doubts about their ability to hold a line in Korea. As news of Ridgeway's successes reached Washington, the Department of State began preparations for a U.N. cease-fire initiative.[6]

In early March MacArthur began to belittle Ridgeway's limited war efforts. Thereafter, he issued a barrage of public statements that would eventually give President Truman reason to order his dismissal. By mid-March, still seeking total victory and the liberation of Korea, MacArthur began to exaggerate the military success of US-UN campaigns. On March 24, he publicly demanded that the Chinese surrender before they met defeat on the battlefield. That unauthorized statement seriously damaged the Department of State's efforts to

open U.N. armistice negotiations. The same week MacArthur demanded the Chinese surrender, he sent a letter to Congressman Joseph Martin criticizing the Truman administration's policy of limited war in Korea as well as its refusal to use Chinese Nationalist troops for an offensive against Communist China.[7]

MacArthur's proposals were in fact similar to two earlier recommendations considered, but that the NSC had not adopted during the darker days of the war. On January 17 the NSC staff had issued a report that the JCS had submitted originally to the NSC on January 12, 1951. The JCS had called for a naval blockade of, tactical air warfare against, and increased anti-Communist guerrilla activities, using Nationalist troops from Formosa, against and within China. Because the NSC found the report lacking a statement of United States objectives, it referred it back to the NSC staff for further evaluation.[8] One week after the NSC considered the report, it received a different plan from Stuart Symington, chairman of the NSRB. Symington's proposal called for a US-UN evacuation from Korea, followed by United States air-and-sea nuclear attack against China, and possibly a nuclear campaign against the USSR.[9] The report provoked considerable discussion at the council's January 24 meeting. On the substance of the draft report, Acheson stated that he believed "if the United States followed certain courses recommended in this paper, it would probably bring on a third world war." Acheson pointed out, however, that the NSC report contained another idea, "the idea that we should at the present time make political use of the atomic bomb." After further discussion Truman, Acheson, Marshall, and Bradley each stated that the NSC report should be referred to the Secretaries of State and Defense and used in conjunction with a joint review of politico-military strategy.[10]

MacArthur may have learned through his Washington contacts of the pending NSC reports and determined that his proposals for a wider war could

change Truman's limited war objectives. If so, MacArthur's strategy did not materialize. On April 5, Representative Martin read MacArthur's letter before Congress. When Truman heard the contents of the letter he decided to fire MacArthur.[11] On April 6, in exasperation, Truman wrote in his diary: "MacArthur shoots another political bomb...This looks like the last straw. Rank insubordination...I've come to the conclusion that our Big General in the Far East must be recalled.[12] On April 10, Truman relieved MacArthur, and named General Matthew Ridgeway as U.N. Supreme Commander.[13]

Re-evaluation of East Asia Policy

The change in command led the Department of State to renew its efforts to open armistice negotiations with the Chinese. In the spring of 1951 United States ground troops in Korea stalled along the 38th parallel, the war had become unpopular in America and among Allied nations, and the war effort strained the domestic political climate and economy. U.N. negotiations began on July 10 at Kaesong, and after a brief disruption resumed on October 25 at Panmunjom, only to continue for nearly two more years.[14] As the situation improved in Korea by early spring, the NSC Staff began the revision of several United States policies, starting with United States policy in the Far East. The existing policy had been accepted before the beginning of the Korean war. After several weeks of intense work, the NSC Staff and the entire NSC produced a revised policy proposal. This policy recommended several objectives in respect to Asia, the "ultimate objectives" of which would be the political, not military, unification of Korea through "appropriate U.N. machinery." Furthermore, the NSC stressed that the political unification of Korea would have to follow four procedures: (1) the termination of all hostilities "under appropriate

armistic arrangements;" (2) establishment of the ROK "over all Korea south of a northern boundary;" (3) withdrawal of non-Korean forces "by appropriate stages;" and, (4) "the building of sufficient ROK military power to deter or repel a renewed North Korean aggression."[15] The NSC also called for several current objectives in Asia while the political unification of Korea was being sought. Regarding Korea and the war there, the policy report suggested that the United States: (1) continue to oppose and penalize the aggressor; (2) avoid extending hostilities "into a general war" with the Soviet Union or Communist China; (3) continue the provision of military, economic, and political assistance for the defense of Formosa; and, (4) intensify and expand United States activities designed to "develop non-communist leadership" in Communist China, and "detach China as an effective ally of the U.S.S.R." For the rest of Asia the policy report suggested that the United States: (1) continue to assist nations in South and Southeast Asia "develop the will and ability to resist communism from within and without;" (2) proceed with the conclusion of a peace treaty with Japan as well as the negotiation of a bilateral security agreement with Japan; (3) develop and maintain security relations and arrangements with the Philippines, Australia and New Zealand; and, (4) proceed with the provision of "timely and suitable military assistance" to the French effort in Indochina. In spite of all the objectives put forth by the NSC, the major goal would be for the United States to limit the scope of fighting and end the conflict in Korea. [16]

Following the approval of the NSC statement, the JCS directed General Ridgeway on May 31 to attack enemy forces and inflict maximum losses on them. Thereby the United States might "create conditions favorable to a settlement."[17] But by late 1951, as Ridgeway's forces continued to hammer away at North Korean and Chinese units, the armistice talks bogged down over the demarcation and inspection arrangements between forces. The JCS



Figure 5. People's Republic of China (1950

became concerned about the prolonged negotiations and submitted a draft report to the NSC for consideration. This proposed report called for a review of United States military policy in Korea in the event that armistice negotiations failed. Instead of presenting this report to the council, the Senior NSC Staff used it in connection with a similar study.[18] On December 7, 1951, the NSC staff finally completed a statement that Truman approved.[19]

The new NSC policy statement approved the limited war objectives recommended earlier, but added JCS suggestions, focusing the policy paper on actions to be taken if an armistice in Korea could not be concluded. If no armistice materialized, the NSC recommended that the United States intensify military operations in Korea. In addition, restrictions were to be removed "against advances or attacks in Korea," including restraints on unilateral air force strikes against Chinese air bases, if the president approved, and the United States's continued bombing of "Yalu River dams and power installations" on the Korean side of the river. The NSC also recommended "a vigorous campaign of covert operations," designed to aid anti-Communist guerrillas in Korea and Communist China, and "disrupt enemy lines of commendations." The policy report concluded that in case the enemy "deliberately" delayed armistice negotiations in order to increase purposefully offensive capabilities, the United States should "increase pressures on the aggressor by stages," including economic and political pressures "through U.N. and diplomatic channels," and execute military actions proposed in the event of an armistice failure.[20]

Armistice negotiations dragged on through 1952 and by spring stymied on the issue of prisoner-of-war exchange. With the ground war in Korea stalemated and no armistice imminent, the Truman administration resorted to NSC suggestions made in its previous statement. In an attempt to force a

settlement, the United States began saturation bombings of North Korean cities, including the capital of Pyongyang that was bombed heavily, and Yalu River power installations. The strategy of saturation bombing, however, produced no formal armistice before President Truman left office.[21] The Korean War continued for six more months into 1953. By the time an armistic was concluded on July 27, 1953, the war had initiated significant changes or modifications of United States national security policies regarding Western Europe, the United States intelligence community, Japan, Indochina, and the Middle East.

The NSC and the Cold War in Western Europe

Although the Truman administration responded to the Communist challenge in Korea with a military commitment, the NSC and the President believed that the Soviet threat to Western Europe remained the primary threat to American national security interests. As US-UN troops retreated south of the 38th parallel in 1951, the war's problems did not dislodge the national security establishment's interests from what had been determined as the first United States Cold War priority--the defense of Western Europe. The North Atlantic Treaty signed on April 4, 1949, had merely initiated a defensive alliance that included the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Canada, Denmark, Norway, Belgium, Luxembourg, Portugal, and Iceland. Despite United States military supply assistance to Western Europe under MDAP in 1949 and 1950, the Truman administration had made no military ground or air force commitments to Europe. Therefore, the ability of European NATO members to defend themselves from Soviet aggression remained uncertain when the Korean war began.[22]

With the beginning of the Korean war, the NSC considered rearming the rest of Western Europe. In 1951 the NSC completed several policy recommendations it had initiated in mid-1950 that justified the rearmament of Italy, Germany, Greece, Turkey, and Spain on the basis of their importance to United States security and their overall contribution to European defense. In January 1951 the council adopted, and Truman approved, a policy that recommended that the United States revise the 1947 Treaty of Peace, which placed limitations on Italy's military buildup and restricted the possession of certain types of weapons. The NSC stressed that it was "important to the security of the United States and other NATO countries that Italy meet in full its defense obligations as may be agreed in NATO."[23] On September 1951 the Department of Defense supported the conclusions of the NSC report, and suggested that under the Treaty of Peace the Italian army could not, "according to NATO standards, attain an effective strength and organization."[24] Two months later British, French, and American negotiators acted to remove the treaty restrictions, and Washington lifted all restrictions on military equipment to Italy under the MDAP.[25]

Unlike Italy, which had been accepted as a member of NATO in 1949, the rearmament of West Germany posed special problems for America's European allies and the Truman administration. In the summer of 1950 the NSC considered reports of the Department of Defense and the JCS that recommended the rearmament of West Germany and German contribution to the European Defense Community. At that time the Department of State and President Truman believed the Pentagon requests premature.[26] Nevertheless, a German contribution to European defense became more important to Secretary Acheson as the war in Korea convinced him that a "forward strategy" in Europe would be vital as well. Both were divided countries with an armed

Communist government on one side. Germany, Acheson concluded, might therefore become the next conflict to deter Soviet aggression.[27]

At the same time that MacArthur's forces moved into North Korea the State and Defense Departments sent a joint recommendation to the NSC that focused on Europe. This report advised that United States military forces "be committed to the defense of Europe at the earliest feasible date" and recommended a total United States combat-ready force strength in Europe of "about 4 infantry divisions and the equivalent of 1-1/2 armoured divisions, 8 tactical air groups, and appropriate naval forces." The NSC report also stressed that Americans should hold all critical NATO positions, including the Supreme Commander for the European Defense Force. More important perhaps, the NSC recommended that NATO "should proceed without delay with the formation of adequate West German units" and noted that in the time that German units could be trained and equipped "the appropriate framework for their integration into a European defense force" would be developed. The NSC statement did not go before the council for discussion. The NSC concurred, however, in its provisions, and President Truman on September 11, 1950, approved it, though he did not like it. Truman remained reluctant to endorse publicly German rearmament and NATO participation. Although he announced that the United States would send four combat divisions to Western Europe he did not mention proposals for Germany.[28]

Truman's endorsement of the NSC policy allowed Secretary Acheson to prepare for a new United States policy toward Germany. On September 15, 1950, Acheson presented the American position, based on the NSC report, at the fifth North Atlantic Treaty Council session in New York. With little debate the delegates approved an integrated defense force for Western Europe as well as an American Supreme Commander of NATO. A majority of delegates also

agreed in principle that West Germany should participate in the defense of Europe. The French, however, opposed German inclusion within a European army, leaving no final decision on German rearmament until late in the year. At the next North Atlantic Treaty Council session in Brussels, Belgium, in December 1950, the French agreed to accept German combat regimental teams in NATO, providing they would never exceed twenty percent of all NATO forces. However, the rearmament of West Germany and its future membership in NATO remained unresolved. The process of formulating the European Defense Community under NATO continued through the end of the Truman administration.[29]

In August 1951 the NSC concurred in, and Truman approved of, another policy statement on German rearmament. This policy statement again called for West German participation in the European defense alliance, but also recommended that "individual fears" of the Europeans must be solved by NATO and the process of Continental European integration.[30] Finally, when the North Atlantic Council ministers met in Lisbon, Portugal, in February 1952, they agreed that the Allied occupation of West Germany would end and that twelve West German military divisions could enter the European Defense Community. In addition, the Lisbon session approved a United States resolution that called for doubling NATO forces to fifty divisions by the end of the year.[31] Thus, after several months of negotiations the policy statements recommended in the NSC reports became reality. By the time President Truman left office, NATO's conventional military forces had secured the defense of Western Europe as far as the Elbe River and West Germany would be making preparations for NATO membership by 1954.

The inclusion of West Germany in the European Defense Community did not fulfill all of the Truman administration's national security requirements for

Western Europe in 1951 and 1952. At the same time that the NSC proposed the rearmament of Italy and Germany, it recommended adding Greece and Turkey to the NATO alliance. Both had received substantial United States military assistance, yet the NSC members believed that both remained vulnerable to future Soviet military aggression. More important, however, Greece and Turkey were strategic geographical positions for the NATO defense of Western Europe and United States security of the oil-rich Arab states of the Middle East. In May of 1951 the NSC adopted, and Truman approved, two reports on Greece and Turkey. Secretary Acheson then requested that the North Atlantic Council invite Greece and Turkey to join NATO. After changes were made in the NATO charter, delegates at the Lisbon session in February 1952 voted formally to admit Greece and Turkey. Thereafter, on the basis of the NSC reports, the NATO defense system extended from the Western Hemisphere to the Caucasus Mountain borders of the USSR.[32]

The advent of the Korean war also caused increased concern in Washington about the vulnerability of Yugoslavia and Spain to Soviet attack. Although the NSC did not consider either country for NATO membership, it did recommend United States military assistance for both, as well as United States bilateral military cooperation with Spain. The case of Yugoslavia had been important since 1949, when the NSC recommended United States economic assistance to Belgrade under the provisions of an NSC report and non-grant military aid in the event of an attack on Yugoslavia under the recommendations of yet another document. By early 1951 Yugoslavia officials sought assurances from the Truman administration that in the event it was attacked by the USSR or Soviet bloc countries attacked their country, they would receive direct military aid from the United States. The NSC considered the matter and issued new reports with respect to Yugoslavia.[33] The NSC recommended that in the event

of a Soviet or Soviet-sponsored attack on Yugoslavia, direct military assistance, training, and technical support be provided the Belgrade government on "a status equal to that of N.A.T.O. countries," and "in cooperation" with other NATO countries. Following a formal request for military assistance from Yugoslavia three months later, Truman agreed with the policy and authorized new military assistance be provided Yugoslavia under the Mutual Defense Assistant Program fund. No other NSC policy change toward Yugoslavia occurred during Truman's presidency, but United States assistance provided Yugoslavia from 1949 through 1952 drew the former Soviet bloc nation closer to the Western alliance and secured the maintenance of a non-Soviet and independent Yugoslavia for the future.[34]

At the time the NSC recommended that the United States provide direct military aid to Yugoslavia, it also argued in favor of American diplomatic rapproachment and eventual bilateral military cooperation with Spain. Located strategically on the Iberian peninsula and the Atlantic seaboard, the NSC had deemed Spain important as early as 1948. At the time the council had recommended that the United States normalize political and economic relations with Spain, and the Pentagon had urged the acquisition of United States naval and air base rights in Spain. President Truman, however, refused to consider either proposal. Truman not only personally disliked Spain's dictator, General Francisco Franco, but also recognized that America's European allies had isolated Spain for its continuing facist political ideology and military regime.[35] As United States attention shifted toward developing the European Defense Community and strengthening the NATO alliance, Spain again appeared on the agenda of the NSC. In 1950 the Department of Defense initiated a study of Spain that it ultimately submitted for NSC consideration. The study urged the United States and its allies to seek "military accessibility and military

cooperation with Spain" in order to ensure the fullest defense of Western Europe from Soviet attack. Believing that United States military cooperation with the Franco government might "interfere with the accomplishment" of NATO objectives, the Department of State and President Truman returned the Pentagon's proposed policy to the NSC for further evaluation.[36]

Despite executive branch opposition to any formal United States policy toward Spain, a pro-Spanish bloc formed in Congress in alliance with military service representatives. In conjunction, they pushed through a $62.5 million loan for Franco's government. By early 1951 the JCS also proposed that the United States recommend NATO membership for Spain.[37] After several months of work, the NSC Staff issued a report that recommended Spanish membership in NATO be delayed in lieu of an American-Spanish bilateral military and mutual security arrangement. The NSC approved the policy report on June 27, 1951, and Truman approved it the following day. To implement the recommendations of the report, Truman sent a military team to Madrid for base rights negotiations. On the basis of the NSC document, by November 26, 1953, an official treaty for the establishment of bases was concluded. In return for the use of Spanish bases and the construction of new American air and naval bases in Spain, the United States granted Spain nearly $250 million in military assistance.[38] The eventual acquisition of the rights to establish bases in Spain provided an important western defensive position for Europe, and ensured that Franco's government would not become politically neutral in any future Cold War East-West conflict or military confrontation.



Figure 6. N.A.T.O. Europe (1950)

The Impact of the Korean War on U.S. Intelligence

During the Korean war both the Pentagon and executive departments of the Truman administration demanded greater intelligence information, psychological warfare, and covert-paramilitary operations that the CIA provided. Coinciding with the Korean war was the replacement of DCI Hillencotter with General Walter Bedel Smith. Smith's term marked a period of rapid growth for the CIA. During his tenure new planning, management, and implementation mechanisms as well as additional personnel were added to clandestine intelligence and covert operations.

To improve the CIA's intelligence estimates Smith created a new and separate office, the Office of National Estimates (ONE), and appointed William Langer, a professor of diplomatic history at Harvard University and former World War II Director of OSS Research and Analysis, as the head of the new analytic and estimative body. Then to develop timely coordination of intelligence reports, Smith insisted that Department of State and military intelligence units participate in the drafting of all ONE estimates, which he personally presented to Truman.[39]

Smith also streamlined the coordination of CIA clandestine operations, an effort he called the "fusion project." In January 1951 he recruited Allen Dulles to serve as Deputy Director for Plans (DDP) at the CIA. Dulles managed the CIA's two units responsible for collecting clandestine intelligence, the OPC and the Office of Special Operations (OSO). In August 1951 Dulles became Deputy DCI. The following year, the NSC approved the official merger of OPC and OSO into a new Directorate of Plans, that former OPC director Frank Wisner directed.[40] The major focus of CIA growth during the Korean war was in clandestine services. From 1950 to 1952 the OPC staff grew from 302 to 2,812

and included an additional 3,142 overseas contract personnel. At the same time its budget increased from $4.7 million to $82 million, and its field stations increased from seven to forty-seven.[41] As the OPC grew, covert operations rather than clandestine espionage became the primary focus of the CIA.[42]

Two factors promoted covert actions and OPC growth. First, both the Department of State and the JCS recommended the use of covert paramilitary operations to augment regular military operations in Korea and China.[43] Second, the perceived Soviet threat policymakers held condoned OPC activity "without providing scrutiny and control." In 1950 and 1951 NSC directives regarding covert operations "laid out broad objectives and stated in bold terms the necessity for meeting the Soviet challenge head on." The national security managers had described the USSR as waging a worldwide "struggle for men's minds" and called for a United States counteroffensive that would include covert psychological, economic, and political warfare against Communist regimes.[44] In response to the growing paramilitary support needs of the military in Korea, the NSC and Truman approved in October 1951 "an intensification of covert action" and granted greater responsibility to the Director of Central Intelligence "in the conduct of covert operations."[45]

As the Korean war and the NSC both served to increase the growth of covert operations, they also provided the impetus for improved psychological warfare methods. Truman had an interest in psychological warfare and believed it had an important role as a policy instrument in the Cold War. As early as 1949 he had approved a coordinated program for foreign information and psychological warfare within the Department of State.[46] On April 20, 1950, in response to Soviet propaganda and jamming of Voice of America signals, Truman called publicly for a "Campaign of Truth," directing United States information specialists to counter "Communist-inspired lies" about America.[47]

A few months after Truman's call for a Campaign of Truth the Department of State submitted a Plan for National Psychological Warfare. The Senior NSC Staff also prepared a reference memorandum on the subject. On January 4, 1951, the NSC considered the Senior Staff's memorandum, and Truman referred it, along with JCS comments, to Sidney Souers and the Bureau of the Budget for further study.[48] In response to Truman's request, Souers submitted a recommendation that called for the formation of an interagency Psychological Strategy Board (PSB), made up of the Under Secretary of State, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, the Director of Central Intelligence, and a representative of the JCS, and headed by a director appointed by the President. Reporting directly to the NSC, the PBS would authorize and coordinate all national psychological operations, policies, and programs. Truman approved the Souers-BOB recommendations and in a secret directive on April 14, 1951, authorized the creation of a PSB.[49]

The first Director of the PSB Truman appointed was Gordon Gray, the former Secretary of the Army. Gray served as Director from July 1951 until February 1952, when he resigned to return to the presidency of the University of North Carolina. Later Gray recalled that he had assumed the position of Director of the PSB at a time when the United States "had to do more than we had done in the past to win and hold the confidence of our friends abroad and weaken the will of our enemies."[50] Although the PSB had difficulty compelling other agencies, particularly the CIA, to follow its policy decisions, it coordinated a number of psychological warfare plans that were implemented by the Truman administration and authorized by the NSC. The first PSB plan, approved on December 20, 1951, established international programs under the Mutual Security Agency and the Department of State to resettle and to provide for emigres from Soviet bloc nations. Others executed in 1952 included: (1) a

psychological operations plan designed to promote UN Korean case-fire negotiations; (2) an emergency plan in the event Korean armistice negotiations broke down; and, (3) establishment of national objectives to be executed upon Presidential proclamation in the event of a general war.[51]

Under the national security establishment's Campaign for Truth, psychological warfare took on several methods that included increased VOA broadcasting efforts, greater intelligence support for the VOA, and the establishment of more Department of State information and cultural exchange programs worldwide. Other unique approaches involved placing American business advertising ads in foreign magazines, newspapers, and on foreign radio programs, as well as selling American calenders abroad that depicted scenes of life in the United States.[52] And in addition to continued OPC support for Radio Free Europe, the CIA and the OPC also funded radio broadcasting operations of a new program, Radio Liberty. Headed by a private organization, the American Committee for Freedom for the Peoples of the USSR, Radio Liberty by 1951 was beaming American information programs directly into the Soviet Union. Perhaps the most innovative psychological warfare strategy conceived during the last years of Truman's presidency involved a Free Europe Committee balloon launch that dropped millions of pro-American leaflets over Soviet bloc countries in August of 1951.[53]

In addition to psychological warfare organization and implementation designed to counter Soviet and Chinese propaganda in 1951 and 1952, the Truman administration and the NSC also supported the collection of communications, or signals intelligence, under the Armed Forces Security Agency (AFSA). Composed of the three military services signals intelligence units, the AFSA monitored Soviet signals and radio messages routinely until late 1952. The AFSA was replaced by the National Security Agency (NSA) on

November 4, 1952. The NSA reported to the Department of Defense and became the sole agency responsible for the collection of advanced signals communications intelligence. Operating under the advisory body of the United States Communication Intelligence Board (USCIB), which reported to the NSC and the CIA, the NSA did not receive its official status until President Truman issued an NSC intelligence directive for collection of advanced signals communications on December 29, 1952. Within weeks after he approved the creation of the NSA, Truman left office. But United States intelligence operations and systems remained long thereafter as one of the closely guarded secrets of the Cold War.[54]

The NSC and the Cold War in Japan and Indochina

Just as the Korean war helped change United States policy towards continental Europe, it also facilitated a peace treaty with Japan and affected United States policy toward Indochina. Prior to the outbreak of the war the Departments of State and Defense had deferred decision on a Japanese peace treaty. Because policymakers perceived community aggression in Korea as threatening to the security of nearby Japan, the two departments issued a joint memorandum to President Truman in the fall of 1950 that suggested that the United States should proceed with preliminary negotiations for a Japanese peace treaty. Truman approved the joint memorandum and sent it to the NSC. The NSC Staff concurred in the State and Defense proposal.[55] This policy statement outlined the terms and security requirements that American negotiators followed in their month-by-month deliberations with Japan and the Allied Powers. It recommended five major stipulations to be followed in the

formulation of a final treaty: (1) the treaty would become effective only when United States interests dictated and "in no event until after favorable resolution of the present United States military situation in Korea;" (2) the treaty would provide that "foreign forces unacceptable to the United States not be permitted" in the Japanese islands south of Sakhalin and the Kurile Islands; (3) the treaty would assure that all Japanese resources "be denied to the USSR;" (4) the treaty would guarantee continued "United States strategic trusteeship over the Mariana, Caroline, and Marshall Islands," as well as "United States exclusive strategic control" of Marcus Island, the Ryuku Islands (south of Latitude 29° north), and southern Nanpo Shoto Island; and, (5) the treaty would not prohibit Japanese self-defense, would provide for initial garrisoning in Japan of "forces acceptable to the United States under a United States military command," would not prohibit United States forces garrisoned in Japan from putting down "large-scale internal riots and disturbances" if requested by the Japanese government, and would guarantee the United States "the right to maintain armed forces in Japan, however, for so long, and to such extent as it deems necessary."[56]

After NSC had established the text of the treaty, a convention of world delegates was called for its signing. On September 4, 1951, some fifty nations attended the San Francisco Conference. When the conference agreed to follow the strict rules that the United States established prohibiting any alteration of the treaty, the Soviet, Czechoslovakian, and Polish delegates walked out. Despite Soviet protest, forty-nine nations signed the treaty on September 8, restoring Japan's sovereign status and opening the way for the end of United States post-World War II occupation on April 28, 1952.[57]

The Japanese peace treaty had been nonpunitive, free of post-treaty stipulations, and created to grant Japan the opportunity needed to emerge as a

politically stable and economically prosperous non-Communist nation.[58] Nevertheless, the national security managers concluded that one additional matter needed clarification--the rearmament of Japan and its defensive alignment with the United States. On February 15, 1952, the State Department sent Truman a draft report for interim policy guidelines on Japan. Truman agreed with the report's basic United States objective that the security of Japan was "of such importance to the United States position in the Pacific area" that hostile forces should not be permitted to gain control of any part of its territory. Truman sent the report to the NSC, which agreed and issued a statement of its own based on the Department of State document.[59]

The Senior NSC Staff used the NSC report in preparation of a policy report it had underway on the security of Japan. By July 18, 1952, the Senior Staff completed the work and issued a policy declared that the United States "would fight to prevent hostile forces from gaining control of any part" of Japan. It also recommended that the United States develop Japan's military strength and "capability for self-defense" so that it could contribute to the security of the Pacific area, develop a prosperous economy and politically stable representative government, and "return to the international community." In addition, the NSC advised that the United States "in the foreseeable future" retain armed forces in Japan and the Pacific area in order to strengthen the interim security and defense of Japan from any military threat by Soviet or Chinese Communist forces.[60]

By late 1952 United States assistance and military support helped augment Japan's National Police Force and Maritime Security Force. Although a United States military defense force remained at installations in Japan for years after the Truman presidency ended, the United States-Japan security arrangement outlined in the NSC document proceeded slowly as the Japanese

government resisted American pressure for rearmament. The markets of China and Southeast Asia that American national security planners had envisioned for Japan did not materialize during the Korean war years. Instead, by 1951 and 1952 United States-Japanese cooperation emerged as American military procurement programs began to rely on Japanese-produced technology. Although the NSC did not so plan, United States military purchases contributed to the economic, technological, and military integration of Japan, helped establish a new United States-Japan relationship, and provided the initiative for the emergency of an innovative Cold War economic miracle for decades to come.[61]

From the beginning of the Korean war, United States national security interests in Asia also became linked to the fate of Indochina. This had been the preliminary position of the NSC since 1949 and early 1950. But it became ever clearer in the spring of 1950 when the NSC and President Truman determined officially that Indochina was the "most strategically important area" of Southeast Asia. At that time the Truman administration accepted the premise of the domino theory advanced in NSC 64.[62] In response to reports in April 1950 that the People's Republic of China had established military training programs in South China for Viet Minh battalions and provided extensive military equipment to Viet Minh forces, the Truman administration authorized increased United States military assistance for the French effort and provided a Military Advisory Group to Saigon under the command of Brigadier General Francis G. Brink.[63]

With American military commitments in Korea and Western Europe during 1951 and 1952, the Truman administration allowed France the primary responsibility of containing Communism in Indochina. Throughout the last years of his presidency Truman adhered to NSC recommendations and refused to send United States combat troops into Indochina. The NSC had

recommended in 1950 that even in the event of overt Chinese military intervention in Indochina, the United States should avoid a military commitment and instead rely on accelerated economic, military, and technical aid to the French. This position was re-emphasized in an NSC report of May 1951, further re-affirming the French responsibility in Indochina.[64] But to keep the French fighting, plus encourage their badly needed support for German rearmament and finalization of the European Defense Community, United States economic and military aid for France mushroomed. For fiscal year 1951 the United States supplied France $21.8 million in economic and technical assistance, and $425.7 million in military aid. For fiscal year 1952, United States assistance to France increased to $24.6 million in economic and technical assistance and $520 million in military aid.[65] Acheson later recognized the dilemma thrust upon the Truman administration when he wrote that "withholding help to France would, at most, have removed the colonial power. It could not have made the resulting situation a beneficial one for Indochina or for Southeast Asia, or in the more important effort of furthering the stability and defense of Europe."[66]

Despite United States assistance, the French sustained heavy losses in 1951 and 1952. In December 1951, France requested that a military consultation take place between the United States, France, and Britain regarding concerted action in the event Chinese military intervention occurred. Military representatives met in Washington in early January 1952, but no assurances were given France as to what course would be taken if China became militarily involved in Indochina. After Acheson reviewed the tripartite military discussions, he informed French diplomats in Saigon that the JCS could not commit or indicate the extent of United States military assistance in the event of a Chinese invasion. But Acheson informed the French that General Bradley had indicated he would recommend to the president that a declaration

be issued to Communist China that "retaliation would follow any aggression" in Indochina.[67]

Following the tripartite military discussions and the proposed JCS warning to China, the NSC began work on a re-evaluation of United States policy toward Southeast Asia. In February 1952 the NSC Staff issued the first of a series of policy reports on Southeast Asia. The NSC warned that the loss of Southeast Asia to communist control would: (1) put economic and political pressures on Japan; (2) open sources of strategic materials to the Soviet bloc; (3) jeopardize communication lines and trade routes to South Asia; and, (4) render the United States position in the Pacific "precarious." Regarding Indochina, NSC 124 suggested that if Communist China intervened "the U.S. should take appropriate military action as part of an U.N. action or in conjunction with others" to support France.[68] The NSC received critical comments from the CIA and the JCS. In late February the CIA estimated that a unilateral warning against Chinese intervention in Southeast Asia "would deter" China. However, the CIA also believed that any UN action would probably bring about a response similar to that regarding Korea. The JCS expressed concern that any military operation in defense of Indochina would risk direct Untied States military retaliation on Communist China itself--a course of action that might result in a long and expensive war.[69]

At the NSC meeting on March 5, 1952, the council considered the Southeast Asia position and comments of the JCS. After discussing the draft report the council agreed that the greater danger to Southeast Asia was subversion, not external aggression. Nevertheless, the NSC recommended that the military implications of going to war with China be studied further and referred the report back to the NSC Staff for reconsideration. Meanwhile, the French determination to remain in Indochina appeared to be weakening.[70]

Following four months of work, the NSC Staff issued a revised report on United States policy toward Southeast Asia. At the NSC meeting on June 25 the council made minor amendments to the policy report. The new policy reasserted the original objectives toward Southeast Asia that were contained in the earlier report. The primary objective of United States policy would be "to prevent the countries of Southeast Asia from passing into the communist orbit." With respect to Indochina, the policy report stated that the United States should: (1) "continue to assure the French that the United States regards the French effort in Indochina as one of great strategic importance in the general international interest rather than in the purely French interest;" (2) use a variety of political, economic, military, and social programs to achieve United States influence in Indochina; (3) provide increased assistance on a high-priority basis; (4) oppose any French withdrawal from Indochina; and, (5) seek UN warning and collective military action against any Communist Chinese intervention.[71]

The actions proposed in the NSC document were much different from those in earlier documents, and the new position indicated a willingness on the part of the NSC and Truman to have the United States intervene militarily, if necessary to stop the spread of Sino-Soviet influence in Southeast Asia. The fear that the loss of Indochina to Communism, particularly the new aggressive Sino-Soviet brand of Communism that revealed itself in Korea, would lead to the loss of all of Southeast Asia gave the NSC and Truman reason to conclude that the United States would not lose Indochina without a struggle. Although the United States could have disengaged from Indochina, this report increased America's stake and commitment there.

The NSC and the Cold War in the Middle East

As in Indochina, events in the Middle East during 1951 and 1952 served to strengthen United States strategic interests in the region, but they also created an ambiguous role for America. The instability of the Middle East worsened in the early 1950s as growing nationalism turned anti-Western. Although direct Soviet military action in the region was not considered a possibility, the NSC became concerned that Soviet influence could expand in the Middle East if open confrontations erupted against Western interests.

The United States's dilemma in the Middle East took on several aspects. First, by early 1951 United States support for Israel threatened to undermine the early efforts of the NSC and Truman to maintain a balance of power in the region and to jeopardize United States-Arab relations. Second, as Middle Eastern nationalism became anti-British, the United States policy of Anglo-American collaboration in the region strained United States-British relations and threatened America's access to Persian Gulf oil. And third, when traditional diplomatic approaches failed to improve United States-Arab relations, the Department of State began to rely on American oil companies to promote United States interests and influence with the oil-rich Arab states. The involvement of American oil companies expanded after the Korean war began, when in December 1950 United States producers adopted a fifty-fifty profit-sharing agreement between Saudi Arabia and ARAMCO. The Department of State supported the ARAMCO-Saudi arrangement, and the Saudi government benefited as well from increased oil revenues.[72]

As the United States-Saudi relationship developed in 1951, problems ensued for Britain in the Middle East. Anti-British nationalists in Egypt and Iran began to challenge British influence. In March of 1951, the NSC accepted, and

Truman approved, a new policy statement for the Middle East that allocated primary military responsibilities to Britain for the defense of Israel and the Arab states. However, the NSC also acknowledged that the United States had a vested interest in the Middle East and recommended that political-military discussions take place between the United States and Britain. Future talks with the British, the NSC noted, would be necessary to designate the responsibilities of Anglo-American collaborative efforts "in strengthening the several Arab States and Israel" and their "will and ability to resist penetration by the U.S.S.R."[73]

On November 10, 1951, the United States, Britain, France, and Turkey agreed to establish a Middle East Command. This command would serve to secure the cooperation "of all interested States" in the Middle East that were "willing and able to undertake the initial defense of their area." The Allied Powers in turn would assist the Middle East Command by providing the organization, military equipment, and technical training. Yet despite collaborative efforts like the Middle East Command, the Truman administration found it increasingly difficult to maintain and defend United States and Western interests in the region.[74]

In 1952 the United States assumed a greater leadership role in the Middle East, but preferred to allow the British the primary responsibility for defense of the region. Under the recommendations of the NSC, American national security interests became clearer. The NSC suggested that the major objectives of the United States in the Middle East as of 1952 should concentrate upon: (1) overcoming or preventing instability in the Arab states and Israel that "threatens Western interests;" (2) preventing "the extension of Soviet influence" in the region, while strengthening Western influence; and, (3) insuring that "the resources of the area are available to the United States and its allies." More

important perhaps, the NSC recommended that the United States "should be prepared to play a larger role in safeguarding Western interests in the area."[75]

Both of the reports emphasized one primary concern of the Truman administration--the instability of the Middle East could allow Soviet expansion or influence into the region. That concern materialized in Iran in 1951, when a major dispute broke out between the Iranian government and the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (AIOC) of Great Britain. At that time Iranian nationalists expressed the explicit economic grievances that their government had against the AIOC, particularly British exploitation of their country's oil resources and oil profits. Coupled with economic issues, political differences also aggravated the situation. According to analyst Barry Rubin, the "very size and importance" of the AIOC "came to symbolize foreign domination of Iranian affairs."[76] When the AIOC refused to grant equitable profit-sharing to the Iranian government, as ARAMCO had done in Saudi Arabia, Iranian nationalistic resistance moved one step further. On April 30, 1951, under the leadership of Prime Minister Mohammed Mossadeq, Iran nationalized its oil industry. By that fall strikes forced the AIOC to close its operations, and Britain imposed a boycott on Iranian oil in an effort to end the nationalization.[77]

Although the United States had pursued a neutral and non-interventionist role in Iran from 1947 through 1950, by 1951 national security managers and the intelligence establishment began to worry that the British boycott of Iranian oil might cause the economic collapse of Iran. This in turn, they reasoned, would give the growing pro-Soviet Tudeh Party in Iran an opportunity to take over the government. The CIA warned that if the crisis in Iran became "prolonged by an unyielding attitude on the part of the British, or by some unpredictable development," then Soviet armed intervention could also be a possibility. In light of these concerns and with the Iranian crisis escalating daily,

the NSC began work on a new policy for Iran. On June 27, 1951, the NSC recommended that the United States "bring its influence to bear in an effort to effect an early settlement of the oil controversy between Iran and the United Kingdom."[78] Simultaneously, as the United States expressed its policy, the British demanded full compensation from Iran for nationalization and its resulting loss of British oil profits. Mossadeq refused. The United States initiated negotiations with British and Iranian officials, and President Truman sent his ablest statesman, W. Averell Harriman, to London and Tehran to defuse the crisis and break the impasse between the two countries over nationalization and compensation. Both the Department of State and Harriman focused on arranging an agreement whereby the British would recognize Iranian nationalization in return for financial compensation. But the Truman administration's mediation efforts failed when Britain agreed to accept nationalization only if AIOC management retained control over Iran's oil production.[79]

Although sporadic Anglo-Iranian negotiations continued through late 1951, the crisis worsened as the British-imposed boycott depleted Iran's oil revenues. On the verge of economic collapse and with Tudeh Party opposition mounting against the Mossadeq government, Iran sought United States financial assistance. The Truman administration agreed to provide limited technical and military aid, but could promise no substantial financial loan until Iran settled its differences with Britain and the AIOC. On August 22, 1951, Secretary Acheson informed the NSC that the British "were trying desperately to meet the Iranian demands," but he expressed regret that any British agreement still hung on concessions that limited Iranian sovereignty and gave "the British a monopoly on the sale of Iranian oil." Acheson also warned the NSC that Mossadeq "would be compelled to resign if the talks did finally and irrevocably break

down."[80] One month later the CIA reported that Iran would "probably remain internally unstable" through 1953 and concluded that a failure of Anglo-Iranian negotiations "may well lead to economic chaos and increase the danger of a Communist (Tudeh) coup" in Iran.[81]

Even though the Truman administration recognized that the economic and political issues could threaten the Mossadeq government and the domestic security of Iran, it preferred to apply pressure on both Britain and Iran. By 1952 the situation changed in Iran as a frustrated Mossadeq turned to the USSR for a Soviet oil purchase agreement, began to issue public pronouncements that called for Iranian neutralism in the Cold War, and acquired emergency dictatorial powers that gave him control of the Iranian armed forces. The rapidly changing events and Iran's apparent rapproachment with the USSR required an immediate re-evaluation of United States policy. The NSC became alarmed and warned that "the Iranian situation contains very great elements of instability." In a new policy paper that superseded the earlier report on Iran, the NSC recommended that the United States follow a different plan of action in Iran.[82] The NSC urged the United States to: (1) prepare "to take necessary measures to help Iran start up her oil industry and to secure markets for her oil;" (2) "provide prompt United States budgetary aid to Iran," pending the restoration of the Iranian oil industry and markets; and, (3) prepare to request Presidential authority and approval for "voluntary agreements and programs under Section 708 (a) and (b) of the Defense Production Act of 1950," that would encourage American companies to purchase and market Iranian oil. The council and President Truman approved the report on November 20, 1952.[83]

As a consequence of the recommendations of the NSC, Truman made one last effort to solve the Iranian crisis. On November 26 he approved a $100 million loan to Iran in return for future Iranian oil deliveries to the United States.

In addition to the loan, American companies would be encouraged to purchase Iranian oil, either alone or from the AIOC, with United States-Iran compensations provided the AIOC at a later time. However, to gain the cooperation of American companies the NSC realized that the administration had to drop a June 1952 Department of Justice antitrust suit against them. The suit became a major topic of discussion at the December 16, 1952, and January 8, 1953, meetings of the NSC.[84]

The Departments of State, Defense, Interior, and Commerce each argued before the NSC that prosecution of criminal proceedings against American oil companies would only jeopardize United States national security interests in Iran and the arrangements underway to stabilize Iran's economy and political environment. As a result, the NSC issued a statement about petroleum supplies. In this document the NSC recommended that the Department of Justice drop all criminal charges against American oil companies and prepare a civil antitrust suit that would be instituted at a later date. On January 8, President Truman informed the NSC that he "had always been a strongly anti-trust President." Nevertheless, because Truman believed "that the national security was at stake," he told the council that he would approve the recommendations of the NSC.[85] Truman authorized the cancellation of the Department of Justice's criminal suit, and American companies consented to an arrangement worked out by the Department of State that allowed them to purchase Iranian oil from the AIOC. On January 15, 1953, the American-AIOC agreement was presented to Mossadeq as part of a United States-British proposal. But because the British still demanded full compensation for past losses, Mossadeq rejected the final offer.[86]

Time ran out in spite of the NSC efforts and Truman's determination to settle the Iranian crisis. Like the Korean war and the problem of Indochina, the

impasse in Iran continued into 1953, long after Truman's presidency ended on January 20.[87] Had the Truman administration demanded greater concessions from the AIOC or understood that America's subtle support for British demands forced Mossadeq to employ a traditional Iranian tactic, that of playing off one greater world power against another, its mediation efforts might have made a difference for United States policy in the Middle East. Because the NSC and President Truman believed that Soviet influence in the Middle East and Iran constituted a greater threat to United States national security interests than did the Anglo-American collaboration, United States policy formulated in 1951 and 1952 instead ironically contributed to the region's instability over the next forty years.

As of 1951-1952 NSC policies became more aggressive, global, and interventionist in respect to national security interests. By 1952 this period had created the framework of Cold War diplomacy that Truman's successors followed. These policies intensified the confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union. Moreover, policies toward certain areas of the world remained to be clarified.

ENDNOTES

CHAPTER VI

[1]Collins, War in Peacetime, 246-248; Schnabel and Watson, History of the JCS, III, 397-400; Douglas MacArthur to the JCS, 30 December, FRUS: 1950, VII, 1630-1633; Goulden, Korea, 429-431.

[2]Schnabel and Watson, History of the JCS, III, 406-411; Truman, Years of Trial and Hope, 433-434; Goulden, Korea, 433; FRUS: 1951, VII, pt. 1, 41-43, 55-56.

[3]Truman, Years of Trial and Hope, 434.

[4]Summary of Discussion at the 79th Meeting, 13 January 1951, PSF-NSC, Box 200.

[5]Truman, Years of Trial and Hope, 434-436; Acheson, Present at the Creation, 516; Collins, War in Peacetime, 254-255; Goulden, Korea, 445.

[6]Truman, Years of Trial and Hope, 438-440; Goulden, Korea, 447-459.

[7]Goulden, Korea, 478-485; Acheson, Present at the Creation, 528-520; Truman, Years of Trial and Hope, 440-442. For a complete account of events leading up to MacArthur's dismissal see Schnabel and Watson, History of the JCS, III, 505-562 and Spanier, The Truman-MacArthur Controversy, 187-256.

[8]NSC 101, "Courses of Action Relative to Communist China and Korea," 12 January 1951, PSF-NSC, Box 211; FRUS: 1951, VII, pt. 1, 79-81; Summary of Discussion at the 80th Meeting, 18 January 1951, PSF-NSC, Box 220.

[9]NSC 100, "Recommended Policies and Actions in Light of the Grave World Situation," 11 January 1951, Records of the National Security Council: Parts 1-4: 1947-1953, Microfilm. (Washington, D.C.: University Publications of America, 1984).

[10]Summary of Discussion at the 81st Meeting, 25 January 1951, PSF-NSC, Box 200.

[11]Acheson, Present at the Creation, 520; Goulden, Korea, 484-486.

[12]Truman Diary, 6 April 1951, in Ferrell, Off the Record, 210-211.

[13]For the steps that Truman took to dismiss MacArthur see Truman, Years of Trial and Hope, 442-450; Acheson, Present at the Creation, 521-522; Goulden, Korea, 548-586.

[14]Acheson, Present at the Creation, 529-538; Truman, Years of Trial and Hope, 455-462; Goulden, Korea, 548-586.

[15]For the NSC 48 Series of 1949 see Chapter IV of this study. NSC 48/5, "United States Objectives, Policies and Courses of Action in Asia," 17 May 1951, United States-Vietnam Relations, 425-445; FRUS: 1951, VII, pt. 1, 35-37, 51-54, 439-442. NSC 48/5 superseded policy statements in NSC 48/2, the NSC 13 Series, the NSC 34 Series, the NSC 37 Series, the NSC 81 Series, and constituted completed action on the NSC 101 Series.

[16]Ibid.

[17]Schnabel and Watson, History of the JCS, III, 492-495.

[18]Goulden, Korea, 567-585; Acheson, Present at the Creation, 537-538; NSC 188, "United States Courses of Action in Korea," 9 November 1951, PSF-NSC, Box 216; NSC 188/1, "United States Objectives and Courses of Action in Korea," 7 December 1951, FRUS: 1951, VII, pt. 1, 1259-1263.

[19]Minutes of the 110th Meeting, 19 December 1951, PSF-NSC, Box 216; Memorandum, James Lay to Harry Truman, 20 December 1951, Ibid.

[20]NSC 118/2, "United States Objectives and Courses of Action in Korea," 20 December 1951, FRUS: 1951, VII, pt. 1, 1382-1399.

[21]Acheson, Present at the Creation, 652-657; Goulden, Korea, 587-592, 618-623.

[22]Acheson, Present at the Creation, 437.

[23]NSC 67/3, "The Position of the U.S. with Regard to the Communist Threat to Italy," 5 January 1951, PSF/NSC, Box 207; FRUS: 1951, IV, 543-545.

[24]"The Effects of Limitations Imposed by the Italian Peace Treaty on Italian Obligations Under N.A.T.O. Plans," 17 September 1951, FRUS: 1951, IV, 670-671.

[25]Dean Acheson to Alberto Tarchiani, 21 December 1951, Department of State Bulletin (3 December 1951): 1050.

[26]NSC 71, "United States Policy Toward Germany," 8 June 1950; NSC 71/1, "The Rearmament of Western Germany," 3 July 1950, PSF-NSC, Box 208; Memorandum, Dean Acheson to Harry Truman, 30 June 1950, Ibid.; Memorandum, Harry Truman to Dean Acheson, 16 June 1950, Ibid.

[27]Acheson, Present at the Creation, 437; Lawrence W. Martin, "The American Decision to Rearm Germany," in Stein, American Civil-Military Decisions, 650.

[28]NSC 82, "United States Position Regarding Strengthening the Defense of Europe and the Nature of Germany's Contribution Thereto," 8 September 1950, NSC, "Policies of the Government, 1950," 5-9, Ibid., Box 195.

[29]NSC Progress Report on NSC 82, 9 October 1950, Ibid., Box 209; Martin, "The American Decision to Ream Germany," 657-659; Acheson, Present at the Creation, 440, 457-459; General Lucius D. Clay Oral History Interview. General Dwight D. Eisenhower was appointed Supreme Commander of NATO at the Brussels meeting.

[30]NSC 115, "Definition of United States Policy on Problems of the Defense of Europe and the German Contribution," 1 August 1951, approved by NSC Memoranda Action on 30 July 1951, PSF-NSC, Box 193.

[31]Walter LaFeber, America, Russia, and the Cold War 1945-1966, 128-129.

[32]NSC 103/1, "The Position of the United States with Respect to Greece," 14 February 1951, PSF-NSC, Box 211; NSC 109, "The Position of the United States with Respect to Turkey," 11 May 1951, FRUS: 1951, V, 1148-1162.

[33]CIA, NIE-29, "Probability of an Invasion of Yugoslavia in 1951," 6 March 1951, PSF-NSC, Box 211; NSC Progress Report on NSC 18/4 and NSC 18/2, 16 October 1950, Ibid., Box 209; NSC 18/6, "The Position of the United States with Respect to Yugoslavia," 7 March 1951, Ibid., Box 211.

[34]NSC 18/6, "The Position of the United States with Respect to Yugoslavia," 7 March 1951, Ibid., Box 211.

[35]NSC 3, "United States Policy Toward Spain," 17 December 1948, NSC, "Policies of the Government, 1947-1948," 28, PSF-NSC, Box 195; Theodore J. Lowi, "Bases in Spain," in Stein, American Civil-Military Decisions, 673-676.

[36]NSC 72, NSC 72/1, "United States Policy Toward Spain," 8 June, 3 July 1950, PSF-NSC, Box 208; Memorandum, Dean Acheson to Harry Truman, 30 June 1950, Ibid.

[37]LaFeber, America, Russia, and the Cold War, 127; Lowi, "Bases in Spain," 677-682; NSC 72/3, "United States Policy Toward Spain," 29 January 1951, PSF-NSC, Box 211.

[38]NSC 72/6, "United States Policy Toward Spain," 27 June 1951, PSF-NSC, Box 213; NSC Progress Report on NSC 72/6, 7 September 1951, Ibid., Box 214; FRUS: 1951, IV, pt. 1, 818-822, 834-835; LaFeber, America, Russia, and the Cold War, 127-128.

[39]Jones, The CIA and American Democracy, 67; Cline, Secrets, Spies and Scholars, 111-112. Cline worked with Langer at that time. The CIA's National Intelligence Estimates (NIE) replaced the earlier monthly reports "Review of the World Situation," which were discontinued on December 1, 1950.

[40]Cline, Secrets, Spies and Scholars, 113-114; Prados, Presidents' Secret Wars, 82-85.

[41]Clin, Secrets, Spies and Scholars, 115; Church Committee, 31.

[42]Jones, The CIA and American Democracy, 68; Church Committee, 38.

[43]Church Committee, 31. For details on the paramilitary operations conducted or developed by the CIA in Korea or China see Prados, Presidents' Secret Wars, 61-78, 88-89; Alfred H. Paddock, Jr., U.S. Army Special Warfare - Its Origins: Psychological and Unconventional Warfare, 1941-1952 (Washington, D.C.: Fort Lesley J. McNair: National Defense University Press, 1982); William M. Leary, Perilous Missions: Civil Air Transport and CIA Covert Operations in Asia (University, AL: The University of Alabama Press, 1984).

[44]Church Committee, 32.

[45]Ibid.; Prados, Presidents' Secret Wars, 84.

[46]See earlier reference to NSC 43, "Planning for Wartime Conduct of Overt Psychological Warfare," 23 March 1949.

[47]Truman Public Papers 1950, 260-264.

[48]NSC 74, "A Plan for National Psychological Warfare," 10 July 1950, Appendix C. Annotated List of NSC Reports, NSC, "Policies of the Government, 1950," 121, PSF-NSC, Box 195; Memorandum, James Lay to the NSC, "The National Psychological Effort," 14 September 1950, Ibid., Box 210; Minutes of the 77th Meeting, 4 January 1951, Ibid., "Whispers," U.S. News and World Report, 9 March 1951, 6.

[49]"Psychological Strategy Boad," NSC, "Policies of the Government, 1950," 168-169, PSF-NSC, Box 195; George Elsey Papers, National Defense, Box 89.

[50]Gordon Gray to Harry Truman, and attached "The PSB Concept," 22 February 1952, HTP, White House Central Files, Box 1656; Prados, Prsidents' Secret Wars, 86-87; Gordon Gray Oral History Interview by Richard D. McKinzie, Oral History Collection, Harry S. Truman Library. Successors of Gray included Dr. Raymond B. Allen and Admiral Alan G. Kirk.

[51]Appendix D. to No. 6, "The National Psychological Program" of NSC 135, Summary of a Report from the CIA, 1 August 1952, PSF-NSC, Box 218; Report to the President, NSC Reporting Unit, Brief No. 6, "The National Psychological Effort," 2 September 1952, Ibid.; Prados, Presidents' Secret Wars, 84-85. Unfortunately, most PSB records have been reclassified after previous release.

[52]NSC 66/1, "Intelligence Support for the Voice of America with Regard to Soviet Jamming," 19 January 1951, adopted by NSC Memoranda Action on 27 February 1951, approved by Truman on 28 February 1951, PSF-NSC, Box 193; Edward W. Barrett, "U.S. Informational Aims in the Cold War," Department of State Bulletin (19 June 1950): 992-995; John M. Begg, "The American Idea: Package It for Export," Department of State Bulletin (12 March 1951): 409-412.

[53]Mickelson, America's Other Voice, 63-67, 56; Prados, Presidents' Secret Wars, 35; Jones, The CIA and American Democracy, 60.

[54]James Bamford, The Puzzle Palace: A Report on America's Most Secret Agency (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1982), 2-3; John Prados, (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1982), 2-3; John Prados, The Soviet Estimate: U.S. Intelligence Analysis and Russian Military Strength (New York: Dial Press, 1982), 27.

[55]NSC 60/1, "Japanese Peace Treaty," 8 September 1950, NSC, "Policies of the Government, 1950," 15-17, PSF-NSC, Box 195.

[56]Ibid.

[57]"The Position of the United States Delegation at the San Francisco Peace Conference," 29 August 1951, Ibid.; Schaller, The American Occupation of Japan, 293-294; Acheson, Present at the Creation, 541-550.

[58]For the context of the Japanese Peace Treaty see United States Department of State, American Foreign Policy: Basic Documents 1950-1955, Volume II (Washington, D.C.: G.P.O., 1957), 425-440.

[59]Memorandum, Acting Secretary of State and Secretary of Defense to Harry Truman, 15 February 1952, FRUS: 1952-1954, XIV, pt. 2, 1159-1165;

NSC 125, "Interim Policy with Respect to Japan," Appendix B. Annotated List of NSC Reports, NSC, "Policies of the Government, 1952," 141, PSF-NSC, Box 195.

[60]NSC 125/1, NSC 125/2, "United States Objectives and Courses of Action with Respect to Japan," 18 July, 7 August 1952, FRUS: 1952-1954, XIV, pt. 2, 1300-1308; Summary of Discussion at the 121st Meeting, PSF-NSC, Box 220; Memorandum, James Lay to Harry Truman, 7 August 1952, Ibid., Box 218.

[61]Schaller, The American Occupation of Japan, 293-298.

[62]NSC 64, "The Position of the United States with Respect to Indochina," 27 February 1950, United States-Vietnam Relations, 282-285; FRUS: 1950, VI, 744-747. For NSC 64 also see Chapter V of this study.

[63]NSC Progress Report on NSC 64, 15 March 1951, PSF-NSC, Box 212.

[64]NSC 64, "The Position of the United States with Respect to Indochina," 27 February 1950, NSC 48/5, "United States Objectives, Policies and Courses of Action in Asia," 17 May 1951, United States-Vietnam Relations, 282-285, 436.

[65]NSC Progress Report on NSC 64, 15 March 1951, PSF-NSC, Box 212; Allan B. Cole, ed., Conflict in Indochina and International Repercussions: A Documentary History, 1945-1955 (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1956) 259-261.

[66]Acheson, Present at the Creation, 673.

[67]Ibid., 675: David Bruce to Dean Acheson, 22 December 1951, Dean Acheson to Saigon, 15 January 1952, United States-Vietnam Relations, 460-465-467.

[68]NSC 124, "United States Objectives and Courses of Action with Respect to Communist Aggression in Southeast Asia," 1 February 1952, PSF-NSC, Box 120; Annex to NSC 124, 13 February 1952, United States-Vietnam Relations, 468-476.

[69]CIA, SE-22, "Consequences of Certain Possible U.S. Courses of Action with Respect to Indochina, Burma, or Thailand," 29 February 1952; Memorandum, Hoyt S. Vandenberg to the NSC, 4 March 1952, United States-Vietnam Relations, 477-493.

[70]Summary of Discussion at the 113th Meeting, 6 March 1952, PSF-NSC, Box 220.

[71]Summary of Discussion at the 120th Meeting, 26 June 1952, Ibid.; NSC 124/2, "United States Objectives and Courses of Action with Respect to

Southeast Asia," 25 June 1952, Ibid., Box 217; Memorandum, James Lay to Harry Truman, 25 June 1952, Ibid. For other citations of NSC 124/2 see United States-Vietnam Relations, 520-534; FRUS: 1952-1954 XII, pt. 1, 123-134.

[72]For a more in-depth analysis of the conflicts and the ARAMCO-Saudi arrangement see Painter, Oil and the American Century, 153-171; Irvine Anderson, ARAMCO, the United States and Saudi Arabia: A Study of the Dynamics of Foreign Oil Policy, 1933-1950 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1981).

[73]NSC 47/5, "United States Policy Toward the Arab States and Israel," 17 March 1951, NSC, "Policies of the Government, 1951," 29-31, PSF-NSC, Box 195. For NSC 47/2 and NSC 65/3 of 1950 see Chapter V of this study.

[74]NSC Progress Report on NSC 47/2, NSC 47/5, and NSC 65/3, 23 April 1952, Ibid., Box 216; Acheson, Present at the Creation, 562-568. The Middle East Command was opposed by Egypt on 15 October 1951, and never materialized fully during the last year of the Truman Administration.

[75]NSC 129/1, "United States Objectives and Policies with Respect to the Arab States and Israel," 24 April 1952, NSC, "Policies of the Government, 1952," 28-33, PSF-NSC, Box 195; Memorandum, James Lay to Harry Truman, 24 April 1952, Ibid., Box 216; FRUS: 1952-1954, IX, 222-226.

[76]Barry Rubin, Paved with Good Intentions: The American Experience and Iran (New York: Oxford University Press, 1980), 43; Painter, Oil and the American Century, 173; Acheson, Present at the Creation, 503.

[77]Rubin, Paved with Good Intentions, 51, 61, 63; Painter, Oil and the American Century, 173; Acheson, Present at the Creation, 503.

[78]CIA, Special Estimate-3, "The Current Crisis in Iran," 16 March 1951, PSF-NSC, Box 212; Minutes of the 87th Meeting, 21 March 1951, Ibid.; NSC 107/2, "The Position of the United States with Respect to Iran," 21 March 1951, NSC, "Policies of the Government, 1951," 17-23, PSF-NSC, Box 195.

[79]Rubin, Paved with Good Intentions, 65-68; Painter, Oil and the American Century, 174-179; Acheson, Present at the Creation, 506-509, 679-680.

[80]Rubin, Paved with Good Intentions, 72; Summary of Discussion at the 100th Meeting, 23 August 1951, PSF-NSC, Box 220. Regretfully, several of the NSC meeting discussions on the subject of Iran during 1951 and 1952 are still "sanitized."

[81]CIA, Special Estimate-13, "Probable Developments in the World Situation Through Mid-1953," 24 September 1951, PSF-NSC, Box 215.

[82]Rubin, Paved with Good Intentions, 72-73; NSC 136/2, "The Present Situation in Iran," 20 November 1952, NSC, "Policies of the Government, 1952," 35, PSF-NSC, Box 195.

[83]NSC 136/2, "The Present Situation in Iran," 20 November 1952, NSC, "Policies of the Government, 1952," 34-36, PSF-NSC, Box 195. Unfortunately, portions of NSC 136/2 as well as NSC meting discussion at the 125th meeting remain "sanitized" at present.

[84]Rubin, Paved with Good Intentions, 75; Painter, Oil and the American Century, 186-1988; Acheson, Present at the Creation, 683-684.

[85]Summary of Discussion at the 127th Meeting, 17 December 1951, PSF-NSC, Box 219; Summary of Discussion at the 128th Meeting, 9 January 1953, Ibid.; NSC 138/1, "National Security Problems Concerning Free World Petroleum Demands and Potential Supplies," 8 January 1952; FRUS: 1952-1954, IX, 637-655.

[86]Painter, Oil and the American Century, 188-189.

[87]A joint CIA-British intelligence plan to overthrow the Mossadeq government was considered during the last weeks of the Truman presidency. However, DCI Smith and Deputy Director Dulles believed that neither Truman nor Acheson would approve the covert action. Nevertheless, the CIA continued its planning, and under the Eisenhower administration, in August 1953, orchestrated an Iranian-CIA sponsored coup which removed Mossadeq from office and thereafter established Sha Reza Pahlevi as the sole ruler of Iran through 1979. For details of the CIA-sponsored coup see Kermit Roosevelt, Countercoup: The Struggle for the Control of Iran (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1979).

CHAPTER VII

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

On the morning of January 20, 1953, President Harry S. Truman left the White House for the inaugural ceremonies of his successor, Dwight D. Eisenhower. With his successor properly in place, Truman headed to Missouri. En route he stopped over at Dean Acheson's home in Georgetown for an afternoon luncheon and reception and then boarded a train for Independence, Missouri.[1] In the nearly seven years since he had become President, little remained the same in world affairs. Truman, the National Security Council, and the nation had inherited a new world order created by the aftereffects of World War II. Post-war problems that at first had been primarily the concern of Great Britain now had become the responsibility of the United States. No longer was there a traditional balance of power in world affairs. Instead, there developed a Cold War between the USSR and the United States. In this confrontation, America forged a policy of containing Soviet expansion and influence that included direct intervention in Europe, the Mediterranean, Asia, the Middle East, and elsewhere that placed great burdens on national capabilities and resources.

The end of the Truman presidency provides an important vantage point for evaluating the formative years of the National Security Council, the Cold War, and American globalism. The demands of the Cold War tested the NSC beginning with its initial establishment by the National Security Act in 1947. Over the years it gradually had produced a system for dealing with national

security issues. By January 1953, it had passed the test, received Truman's approval, and had become the central coordinating and advising body responsible for the formation of United States political-military policy. Truman believed that the primary function of the NSC was only to advise. Even so, Truman believed that the NSC was necessary, and he used it regularly. He later wrote that the NSC "gave us a running balance and a perpetual inventory of where we stood and where we were going on all strategic questions affecting the national security."[2]

The numerous problems and near chaos of the international scene in the immediate post-World War II years and the uncertain direction of United States foreign policy complicated the needs of United States national security. As a consequence of these needs the NSC emerged as the badly needed agency for the orderly formulation both of United States foreign and defense policy. Interagency rivalry had prompted the creation of a national security council, for Truman's Secretary of Defense James V. Forrestal wanted to ensure that the Department of Defense had at least as great a role in Cold War policy decisions as did the Department of State. And in its early years the NSC aligned more frequently with the Pentagon. The Secretary of State served as a statutory member of the NSC, but Department of Defense representatives--the Secretary of Defense and the three service secretaries--outnumbered him. In 1949, a balance of power in the NSC was created when Congress amended the National Security Act, eliminating the three service secretaries from membership. That same year the Vice-President became a statutory member, and the NSC became part of the Executive Office of the President. Those changes, combined with the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense serving as coequal members of the NSC, made the council the leading arbiter of Cold War policy after Truman.

Except for a brief period of inter-departmental rivalry and semiparalysis when Secretary of State Dean Acheson and Secretary of Defense Louis Johnson were hardly on speaking terms, the NSC functioned well as Truman's chief instrument of policy coordination. As a consequence of domestic political implications, Truman made one foreign policy decision without consulting the NSC, the decision in 1948 to recognize Israel. From 1947 to 1952, except for this decision, the NSC suggested all crucial Cold War policy decisions. Thus, in some respects the NSC provided for the first time in United States history an opportunity for advisers and policymakers of superlative abilities in foreign and defense fields to meet in an official, coordinated, and influential group. During his presidency Truman benefited from the talents of NSC members like Forrestal, George Marshall, George Kennan, Dean Acheson, Robert Lovett, Averell Harriman, Omar Bradley, Paul Nitze, and many others.

The NSC coordinated and shaped the pivotal decisions of the early Cold War in three ways. One, by the NSC Staff, that was composed of representatives of the major executive departments. Two, by the statutory members of the NSC or the JCS, who proposed draft reports to the NSC Staff for consideration. Or three, by groups of consultants or advisers who worked on special NSC policy recommendations. Important issues that the NSC considered were the Berlin blockade and crisis of 1948-1949, the expansion of CIA covert operations and various forms of United States psychological warfare abroad, the creation of the NATO alliance, the decision to develop a hydrogen bomb for the United States, the creation of the United States two-China policy, and the commitment of US-UN troops to the Korean war as well as the decision to wage a limited war in Korea. Yet, throughout the period the overwhelming policy issue that concerned the NSC and Truman was the containment of Soviet expansion. Whether through military conquest, annexation, or the

acquisition of new pro-Soviet Communist regimes, Soviet expansion threatened United States national security interests, and the NSC and Truman were determined that it had to be prevented at whatever cost.

One factor that complicated the Cold War policies of the Truman administration and even later was that during the post-World War II era, Congress limited military expenditures. As a consequence the United States was ill-prepared to confront the Soviets in conventional military fashion in any location. The doctrine of massive atomic retaliation had not yet taken form. Additionally, such political considerations as Allied commitment both to the United States and its containment objectives were important in policy formation. Beginning with the NSC 20 Series in 1948, however, and culminating with the NSC 68 Series in 1950, the National Security Council suggested, and Truman approved, a global policy of containment. Based on Western positions of strength and designed to establish a world balance of power against the perceived monolithic Soviet bloc, and considering limitations the policies of American globalism were clearly defined.

The United States was over-extended militarily during 1950-1952. The NSC and Truman encountered difficulties continuing the containment policy that focused upon Europe, while simultaneously waging a war on the Asian Mainland. As the United States became involved with NATO and the rearming of Europe, it became critical that good relations continued with the governments there, especially Great Britain and France. The complexities of involvement in several areas of the world weakened Truman's support for Third World decolonization movements that threatened the last vestiges of European empires. To contain Soviet influence in the Third World during the years 1950-1952, primarily in Southeast Asia and the Middle East, the NSC and Truman adopted policies that advocated United States support of our allies in those

regions. The long-term implications derived from United States support of the French-effort in Indochina and the British occupation of the Middle East served to make the United States a surrogate colonial power in those regions for decades after the Truman era of the Cold War ended.

During 1951 and 1952 the policies of United States national security and containment that the NSC recommended and that Truman implemented evolved primarily as a reaction to the Soviet threat. Before the creation of the NSC, government leaders made Cold War strategy and policy decisions without the benefit of a specialized and knowledgeable group studying the problems. Once the NSC began to function as Truman wished, he and its members studied all Cold War problems, providing at least carefully premeditated responses.

ENDNOTES

CHAPTER VII

[1]Ferrell, Harry S. Truman and the Modern American Presidency, 151.

[2]Truman, Years of Trial and Hope, 59.

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APPENDIXES

APPENDIX A

STATUTORY MEMBERS OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL, 1947-1952

1947 - 1948

Harry S. Truman, The President of the United States, Chairman
George C. Marshall, The Secretary of State
James V. Forrestal, The Secretary of Defense
Kenneth C. Royall, The Secretary of the Army
John L. Sullivan, The Secretary of the Navy
W. Stuart Symington, The Secretary of the Air Force
John R. Steelman, The Acting Chairman, National Security Resources Board
Arthur M. Hill, The Chairman, National Security Resources Board*

1949

Harry S. Truman, The President of the United States, Chairman
Alben W. Barkely, Vice President of the United States
Dean G. Acheson, The Secretary of State
George C. Marshall, The Secretary of State*
Louis A. Johnson, The Secretary of Defense
James V. Forrestal, The Secretary of Defense*
Gordon Gray, The Secretary of the Army
Kenneth C. Royall, The Secretary of the Army*
Francis P. Matthews, The Secretary of the Navy
John L. Sullivan, The Secretary of the Navy*
W. Stuart Symington, The Secretary of the Air Force
John R. Steelman, The Acting Chairman, National Security Resources Board

1950

Harry S. Truman, The President of the United States, Chairman
Alben W. Barkely, Vice President of the United States
Dean G. Acheson, The Secretary of State
George C. Marshall, The Secretary of Defense
Louis A. Johnson, The Secretary of Defense*
W. Stuart Symington, The Chairman, National Security Resources Board
John R. Steelman, The Acting Chairman, National Security Resources Board*

1951

Harry S. Truman, The President of the United States, Chairman
Alben W. Barkely, Vice President of the United States
Dean G. Acheson, The Secretary of State
George C. Marshall, The Secretary of Defense*
Robert A. Lovett, The Secretary of Defense

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* Former members who did not serve out tenure in office.

Jack O. Gorrie, The Chairman, National Security Resources Board
W. Stuart Symington, The Chairman, National Security Resources Board*
W. Averell Harriman, The Director for Mutual Security

1952

Harry S. Truman, The President of the United States, Chairman
Alben W. Barkely, The Vice President of the United States
Dean G. Acheson, The Secretary of State
Robert A. Lovett, The Secretary of Defense
Jack O. Gorrie, The Chairman, National Security Resources Board

* Former members who did not serve out tenure in office.

APPENDIX B

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL PERSONNEL, 1947-1952

1947 - 1948

Executive Secretary

Sidney W. Souers, Executive Secretary
James S. Lay, Jr., Assistant Executive Secretary
Hugh D. Farley, Assistant Executive Secretary

Observer and Adviser

Rear Admiral Roscoe H. Hillencotter, The Director of Central Intelligence

Consultants

George F. Kennan, The Department of State*
George H. Butler, The Department of State
Lieutenant General Albert C. Wedemeyer, The Department of the Army
Vice Admiral F.P. Sherman, The Department of the Navy*
Vice Admiral A.D. Struble, The Department of the Navy
Lieutenant General Lauris Norstad, The Department of the Air Force
Daniel C. Fahey, The National Security Resources Board

NSC Staff Members

Coordinator: Harold Shantz, The Department of State
Coordinator: George H. Butler, The Department of State*
Assistant to the Coordinator: Marion W. Boggs
State Member: Lampton Berry
State Member: Henry S. Villard*
State Member: Max W. Bishop*
Army Member: Colonel Hugh C. Johnson
Army Member: Lieutenant Colonel T.W. Parker*
Army Member: Colonel Douglas V. Johnson*
Assistant Army Member: Lieutenant Colonel W.M. Skidmore
Navy Member: Captain A.C. Murdaugh
Navy Member: Captain B.L. Austin*
Air Force Member: Colonel R.A. Grussendorf
Air Force Member: Colonel T.C. Rogers*
Air Force Member: Lieutenant Colonel R.D. Heflebower*
Air Force Member: Lieutenant Colonel A.B. Swan*
Assistant Air Force Member: Colonel R.P. Fulcher
National Security Resources Board Member: Edward P. Williams
Alternate Central Intelligence Agency Member: Ludwell L. Montague

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* Former members who did not serve out tenure.

Special Consultant on Internal Security

Joseph Patrick Coyne

1949

Executive Secretary

Sidney W. Souers, Executive Secretary
James S. Lay, Jr., Assistant Executive Secretary
Hugh D. Farley, Assistant Executive Secretary
James Patrick Coyne, NSC Representative on Internal Security

Observer and Adviser

Rear Admiral Roscoe H. Hillencotter, The Director of Central Intelligence
General Omar N. Bradley, United States Army, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

Consultants

Dean Rusk, representing the Secretary of State
George M. Butler, representing the Secretary of State*
Major General James H. Burns, (Ret.), representing the Secretary of Defense
Major General Alfred M. Gruenther, representing the Secretary of Defense*
Lieutenant General Albert C. Wedemeyer, representing the Secretary of the Army*
Vice Admiral A.D. Struble, representing the Secretary of the Navy*
Lieutenant General Lauris Norstad, representing the Secretary of the Air Force
Daniel C. Fahey, representing the Chairman, National Security Resources Board

NSC Staff Members

Coordinator: Max W. Bishop, The Department of State
Coordinator: Harold Shantz, The Department of State*
Assistant to the Coordinator: Marion W. Boggs
State Member: Max W. Bishop
State Member: Lampton Berry*
Defense Member: Colonel G.R.E. Shell
Defense Member: Colonel Albert C. Franklin, Jr.*
Army Adviser: Colonel Hugh C. Johnson

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* Former members who did not serve out tenure.

Alternate Army Adviser: Lieutenant Colonel J.P. Daley
Assistant Army Member: Lieutenant Colonel W.M. Skidmore*
Navy Adviser: Captain A.C. Murdaugh*
Navy Adviser: Captain J.H. Thach, Jr.
Air Force Adviser: Colonel Paul E. Todd
Air Force Member: Colonel R.A. Grussendorf*
Assistant Air Force Adviser: Colonel R.P. Fulcher
National Security Resources Board Member: Nels Stalheim
National Security Resources Board Member: Edward P. Williams*
Alternate Central Intelligence Agency Representative: Ludwell L. Montague

1950

Executive Secretary

James S. Lay, Jr., Executive Secretary
Sidney W. Souers, Executive Secretary*
S. Everett Gleason, Deputy Executive Secretary
Hugh D. Farley, Assistant Executive Secretary
James Patrick Coyne, NSC Representative on Internal Security

Observers and Advisers

Rear Admiral Roscoe H. Hillenkoetter, The Director of Central Intelligence*
Lieutenant General Walter Bedel Smith, The Director of Central Intelligence
General Omar N. Bradley, United States Army, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
Sidney W. Souers, Special Consultant to the President
W. Averell Harriman, Special Assistant to the President

Consultants

Dean Rusk, designed by the Secretary of State*
Philip C. Jessup, designed by the Secretary of State
Major General James H. Burns, United States Army, (Ret.), designed by the Secretary of Defense*
Major General Sidney P. Spalding, United States Army (Ret.), designed by the Secretary of Defense
Daniel C. Fahey, designed by the Chairman, National Security Resources Board*
Thomas G. Lamphier, Jr., designed by the Chairman, National Security Resources Board

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* Former members who did not serve out tenure.

NSC Staff Members

Coordinator: Max W. Bishop, The Department of State
Assistant Coordinator: Marion W. Boggs
State Member: Max W. Bishop
Defense Member: Colonel G.R.E. Shell
Alternate Defense Member: Colonel S.B. Mason*
Alternate Defense Member: Lieutenant Colonel Fred R. Zierath
National Security Resources Board Member: Nels Stalheim
Army Adviser: Colonel Hugh C. Johnson*
Army Adviser: Colonel John E. Theimer
Alternate Army Adviser: Lieutenant Colonel J.P. Daley
Navy Adviser: Captain J.H. Thach, Jr.*
Navy Adviser: Captain Roland F. Pryce
Alternate Navy Adviser: Lieutenant Commander Ward S. Miller
Air Force Adviser: Colonel Paul E. Todd
Assistant Air Force Adviser: Colonel R.P. Fulcher*
Alternate Central Intelligence Agency Representative: Ludwell L. Montague

Senior NSC Staff

Philip C. Jessup, nominated by the Secretary of State
Thomas K. Finletter, nominated by the Secretary of Defense
Robert J. Smith, nominated by the Chairman, National Security Resources Board
William McChesney Martin, Jr., nominated by the Secretary of the Treasury
Rear Admiral Roscoe H. Hillenkoetter, The Director of Central Intelligence*
Rear Admiral E.T. Wooldridge, nominated by the Joint Chiefs of Staff

1951-1952

Executive Secretary

James S. Lay, Jr., Executive Secretary
S. Everett Gleason, Deputy Executive Secretary
Hugh D. Farley, Assistant Executive Secretary
Joseph Patrick Coyne, NSC Representative on Internal Security

Observer and Adviser

General Omar N. Bradley, United States Army, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

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* Former members who did not serve out tenure.

Lieutenant General Walter Bedel Smith, United States Army, The Director of Central Intelligence
Sidney W. Souers, Special Consultant to the President
W. Averell Harriman, Special Assistant to the President and Director of Mutual Security
Gordon Gray, Director, Psychological Strategy Board

Senior NSC Staff

State Member: Charles E. Bohlen
State Member: Phillip C. Jessup*
Alternate State Member: Walter N. Walmsley
Acting State Member: Paul H. Nitze
Defense Member: Franc C. Nash
Defense Member: Thomas K. Finletter*
Deputy Defense Member: Charles P. Noyes
National Security Resources Board Member: Edward T. Dickinson
National Security Resources Board Acting Member: Gilbert C. Jacobus
National Security Resources Board Member: Thomas G. Lanphier, Jr.*
Mutual Security Member: Brigadier General Frank N. Roberts
Central Intelligence Agency member: Allen W. Dulles
Office of Defense Mobilization Member: J. Murray Mitchell
Treasury Member: William McChesney Martin, Jr.*
Acting Treasury Member: C.D. Glendinning
Joint Chiefs of Staff Member: Rear Admiral E.T. Wooldridge
Psychological Strategy Board Adviser: George Morgan
Psychological Strategy Board Adviser: Robert Cutler*
Psychological Strategy Board Adviser: Tracy Barnes*

NSC Staff Assistants

Coordinator: Marion W. Boggs
State Member: Walter N. Walmsley
State Member: Harry Schwartz
State Member: Max W. Bishop*
Defense Member: Captain John A. Webster, United States Navy
Defense Member: Lieutenant Colonel E.M. Harris*
National Security Resources Board Member: John F. Weaver
National Security Resources Board Member: Nels Stalheim*
Treasury Member: Arthur F. Blaser, Jr.
Treasury Member: G.A. Costanzo*

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* Former members who did not serve out tenure.

Joint Chiefs of Staff Member: Colonel W.J. Verbeck
Joint Chiefs of Staff Member: Colonel M.S. Savage*
Central Intelligence Agency Member: Ludwell L. Montague*
Office of Defense Mobilization Member: Louis Glaser
Army Adviser: Colonel Hugh Cort
Army Adviser: Colonel John E. Theimer*
Navy Adviser: Captain Charles E. Weakley
Navy Adviser: Captain Roland F. Pryce*
Alternate Navy Adviser: Captain William A. Thorn
Air Force Adviser: Colonel Paul E. Todd

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* Former members who did not serve out tenure in office.

APPENDIX C

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL COMMITTEES AND GROUPS, 1947-1952

1947 - 1948

Central Intelligence Agency Survey Group

Member: Allen W. Dulles
Member: Mathias F. Correa
Member: William H. Jackson
Staff: Robert Blum
Staff: Wallace Sprague
Staff: Joseph Larocque, Jr.
Staff: Edward L Saxe

1949

NSC Subcommittee on Germany

Dean Acheson, The Secretary of State
Louis A. Johnson, The Secretary of Defense
James V. Forrestal, The Secretary of Defense*
Gordon Gray, The Secretary of the Army
Kenneth C. Royall, The Secretary of the Army*
Paul G. Hoffman, The Economic Cooperation Administrator

Special Committee on NSC 50, Paragraph 6a (1)

Carlisle H. Humelsine, representing the Secretary of State
General Joseph T. McNarney, representing the Secretary of Defense

NSC Special Staff for NSC 18/4, Paragraph 28 Project

John O. Bell, Department of State
Lieutenant Colonel Thomas E. Holland, Department of Defense
Abraham J. Harris, Department of Justice
T.R. Baldwin, National Security Resources Board
William Finan, Bureau of the Budget

1950

NSC Special Staff for NSC 66, Support for the Voice of America in the Fields of Intelligence and of Research and Development

Howland Sargent, Department of State
Brigadier General John Magruder, Department of Defense
Curtis B. Plummer, Federal Communications Commission

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* Former members who did not serve out tenure in office.

Ad Hoc Committee for NSC 68, U.S. Objectives and Programs for National Security

Paul Nitze, for the Secretary of State
General Omar N. Bradley, for the Secretary of Defense
Major General J.H. Burns, United States Army (Ret.), for the Secretary of Defense
George C. Haas, for the Secretary of Treasury
Thomas G. Lanphier, Jr., for the Chairman, National Security Resources Board
Richard M. Bissell, Jr., for the Economic Cooperation Administration
William F. Schaub, for the Director, Bureau of the Budget
Hamilton Q. Dearboarn, for the Chairman, Council of Economic Advisers

Special NSC Committee on Proposed Procedure for Handling NSC 68

Carlisle H. Humelsine, Department of State
Frank Pace, Jr., Department of Defense
Thomas G. Lanphier, Jr., National Security Resources Board

APPENDIX D

OFFICIALS INVITED TO PARTICIPATE IN CERTAIN MEETINGS, 1947-1952

1947 - 1948

John W. Snyder, The Secretary of the Treasury
Tom C. Clark, The Attorney General
W. Averell Harriman, The Secretary of Commerce*
Charles Sawyer, The Secretary of Commerce
Maurice J. Tobin, The Secretary of Labor
Paul G. Hoffman, Economic Cooperation Administrator
Joseph J. O'Connell, Jr., The Chairman, Civil Aeronautics Board

1949

John W. Snyder, the Secretary of the Treasury
Charles Sawyer, the Secretary of Commerce
Tom C. Clark, The Attorney General
Paul G. Hoffman, Economic Cooperation Administrator
Joseph J. O'Connell, Jr., The Chairman, Civil Aeronautics Board
Edwin C. Nourse, Chairman, Council of Economic Advisers

1950

John W. Snyder, The Secretary of the Treasury**
J. Howard McGrath, The Attorney General
Charles Sawyer, The Secretary of Commerce
Maurice J. Tobin, The Secretary of Labor
Charles E. Wilson, Director of Defense Mobilization**
Paul G. Hoffman, Economic Cooperation Administrator
William C. Foster, Economic Cooperation Administrator
Joseph J. O'Connell, Jr., The Chairman, Civil Aeronautics Board
Frederick J. Lawton, Director, Bureau of the Budget
Leon H. Keyserling, Chairman, Council of Economic Advisers
General Omar N. Bradley, United States Army, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff**
Sidney W. Souers, Special Consultant to the President**
W. Averell Harriman, Special Assistant to the President**
Rear Admiral Roscoe H. Hillenkoetter, The Director of Central Intelligence*
Lieutenant General Walter Bedel Smith, United States Army, The Director of Central Intelligence**

1951-1952

John W. Snyder, The Secretary of the Treasury**
James J. McGranery, The Attorney General
Oscar L. Chapman, The Secretary of the Interior
Charles F. Brannan, The Secretary of Agriculture

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* Former members who did not serve out tenure in office.

** Directed by President Truman to attend all meetings as of July 1950.

Charles Sawyer, The Secretary of Commerce
Maurice J. Tobin, The Secretary of Labor
Henry H. Fowler, The Director of Defense Mobilization**
Charles E. Wilson, The Director of Defense Mobilization**
John R. Steelman, The Acting Director of Defense Mobilization**
Gordon Dean, Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission
Frederick J. Lawton, The Director, Bureau of the Budget
Donald W. Nyrop, Chairman, Civil Aeronautics Board
Ernest W. Ramspeck, Chairman, Civil Service Commission
Leon Keyserling, The Chairman, Council of Economic Advisers
Millard Caldwell, The Federal Civil Defense Administrator
William C. Foster, Economic Cooperation Administrator
Richard M. Bissell, Jr., Acting Economic Cooperation Administrator
Herbert E. Gaston, Chairman, Export-Import Bank
General Omar N. Bradley, United States Army, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff**
W. Averell Harriman, Special Assistant to the President and Director of Mutual Security**
Sidney W. Souers, Special Consultant to the President**

** Directed by President Truman to attend all meetings as of July 1950.

VITA

Sara L. Sale

Candidate for the Degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

Thesis: HARRY S TRUMAN, THE DEVELOPMENT AND OPERATIONS OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL, AND THE ORIGINS OF UNITED STATES COLD WAR POLICIES

Major Field: History

Biographical:

Personal Data: Born in Neosho, Missouri, February 27, 1954, the daughter of Onal C. and Margaret L. Sale.

Education: Graduated from Neosho High School, Neosho, Missouri, May, 1972; received Bachelor of Arts Degree in History from Missouri Southern State College in July, 1977; received Master of Arts Degree in History from Central Missouri State University in August, 1979; completed requirements for the Doctor of Philosophy Degree at Oklahoma State University in May, 1991.

Professional Experience: Assistant Professor of Social Science, Department of Social Science, Missouri Southern State College, August, 1989 to present; Teaching Associate, Department of History, Oklahoma State University, August, 1986 to December, 1988; Social Science Instructor, Neosho High School, August, 1985 to May, 1986; Adjunct History Instructor, Social Science Department, Longview Community College, August, 1979 to July, 1985; Adjunct History Lecturer, History Department, Rockhurst College, August, 1980 to July, 1985.

Professional Memberships: American Historical Association, Center for the Study of the Presidency, Harry S. Truman Library Institute, Organization of American Historians, Phi Alpha Theta, Phi Kappa Phi, State Historical Society of Missouri, The Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations