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A SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGICAL SOLUTION TO THE DILEMMA
BETWEEN THE CHICAGOAN AND IOWAN SCHOOLS
OF SYMBOLIC INTERACTION

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PREFACE

A review of symbolic interactionist literature, via study of the two major schools representative of the perspective (the Chicagoan and the Iowan), reveals a dilemma which is responsible in no small part for the failure of the perspective to represent a viable theoretical orientation in the discipline of social psychology. This dilemma is a recognition, that depending on the theoretical school of thought followed in the interactionist literature, one will encounter a greater or lesser commitment to a complete social psychological theoretical explanation. At the point of having the most complete theoretical explanation, there follows a less than empirically relevant conceptualization; while, at the point of having a less than complete theoretical explanation, the empirical relatedness of the constructs begin to come into focus. This study is an attempt to constructively react to this perceived dilemma in a theoretical as well as a methodologically innovative manner.

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CHAPTER I

AN INTRODUCTION TO SYMBOLIC INTERACTION

Some General Goals

The ultimate goal of the following remarks may be seen, most parsimoniously, as a clarification of and/or contribution to: 1) the present social psychological assumption of the correspondence of attitude and behavior, albeit the theoretical recognition of behavior as a function of attitudes and the situation; 2) the potential theoretical and empirical relevance of symbolic interaction constructs to social psychological issues (which presently is not fully appreciated); 3) the present overzealous psychologically oriented perspective of social psychology. Specifically, the empirical elucidation of symbolic interactionism will be shown to offer a most explicit theoretical accommodation to the function: Behavior = Person x Environment. The latter variable is frequently theoretically (and consequently, empirically) ignored in present social psychological conception and research; ergo, the inconsistencies in social research literature and the resultant failure of various social program agencies which use this literature to inform their programs. In order to accomplish such a goal, this paper will seek to clarify the symbolic interactionist theory, both theoretically and empirically.

Symbolic interaction, as a social psychological theoretical orientation, denotes the explanation of behavior as a function of the influ-

ence that one person has on another as a result of the individual first mentally interacting with a set of shared other definitions, leading to a definition of the situation, upon which behavior follows. This social psychological explanation of behavior is different from a sociological explanation via structural functionalism (behavior phenomena are functional for a larger group) as well as other social psychological explanations. Shaw and Costanzo (1970) refer to the latter (the social psychological explanations) as theoretical orientations. These include the reinforcement (behavior is seen as a function of reinforcement patterns); the cognitive (behavior is seen as a function of the tensions/nontensions resulting from unbalanced/balanced cognitions); the psychoanalytic (behavior is seen as a function of the result of solutions to conflicting unconscious and conscious psychological forces); and the field theoretical (behavior is seen as a function of the total field of psychological forces: individual and environmental) orientations.

With the location of interactionist arguments established in relation to the various alternative theoretical arguments, as well as a statement of some of the more ultimate needs of these theoretical arguments, the remainder of this chapter will attempt to define the major parameters of the present study. The several critical comments, theoretical and research innovations and the results, conclusions and implications of this study are all dedicated to the realization of the several general goals expressed in this section of the report.

Statement of the Problem

This research report, in seeking a theoretical as well as a methodological clarification of the interactionist theory, will concentrate

attention on the unscientific character of several of the major interactionist propositions, used in the theory. It follows, of course, that adequate theoretical propositions are based on precisely defined concepts; without these, as is the case in the present interactionist literature, measurement and systematic observation are precluded. In view of this circumstance, the first objective, besides explicitly identifying the reasons for the present methodological inadequacies, will become one of correcting this situation by the introduction and elucidation of several definitions, designed to accommodate the several reasons observed for the postulated inadequacy. This theory construction will result in the statement of two primary research questions, the answers to which will focus direct attention on the viability of the earlier arguments of the report.

In precise terms, after a review of the interactionist literature, via the two major schools (Chicagoan and Iowan) characterizing the perspective, a dilemma will be shown to become evident. This dilemma is essentially a recognition that by following one school of thought, the Chicagoan, one will have a very complete social psychological explanation, albeit, not a very empirically relevant one; by following the Iowan school of thought, however, one will have an empirically relevant theoretical statement, albeit, a not so complete social psychological explanation.

At this point the problem will become manifest. It will be shown that what is needed is a rationale that preserves the essence of the Chicagoan theoretical contribution but which at the same time accommodates a more complete and precise empirical understanding of the constructs and propositions of the theory, such as is attempted, despite

its failing, by the Iowans. Stated explicitly, the problem of this research report is: (1) the introduction of a theoretical statement (called Io-Chicagoanism), an argument which will allow not only a credible ontological description and explanation of human behavior, but which will also allow a systematic means for empiricizing this ontological description and explanation; and (2) the application of a rigorous research methodology to this argument, to show the greater empirical relatedness of the argument, relative to that of either the Chicagoan or Iowan arguments. The latter task will involve the collection of a series of self identifications, their attitudinal basis, and the creation of experimental interactional situations. Each of these procedures will serve the goal of operationalizing the major constructs of the theoretical statements. Subsequently, the actual research data will be collected, via a procedure designed to tap the actual nature and extent of the symbolic interaction, thereby identifying the relative empirical support, obtaining for the three theoretical interactionist perspectives.

CHAPTER II

CHICAGOAN AND IOWAN SYMBOLIC INTERACTIONISM

Introduction

The sequestered character of the interpretations and explanations of the symbolic interactionist theoretical orientation has too long been made viable by the commonly held, somewhat institutionalized assumption of the nonresearchability of interactionist arguments. Indeed, if saying it makes it so, then no greater evidence need be mustered, than observation of the history of the development of symbolic interactionist theory, especially as it is relevant to social psychological explanations. These remarks are made all the more discerning by observing the initial comments of contemporary symbolic interactionist writers (those few who have refused the acceptance of the relegation of interactionist theory to a philosophical rationale). Miyamoto (1959: 51) begins his article with the statement: "The interactionist point of view in social psychology was for some time mainly a framework of suggestive concepts...;" Videbeck (1960: 351) notes that: "The view that one's self conception is learned from the reactions of other individuals has achieved wide acceptance in social psychology, but its implications have not been much exploited empirically."¹ In quite direct terms, Kuhn (1964c: 5) observes

¹This observation is not to negate the few (and recently increasing) studies that have attempted to make an empirical comment on the interactionist arguments, as unreflective of the gestalt of the argument as they are. For example: S. F. Miyamoto and S. Dornbusch (1956); M. Maehn, J. Mensing, and S. Nafager (1962); E. L. Quarantelli and J. Cooper (1966); J. R. Faine (1973); V. Gecas, J. M. Calonico, and D. L. Thomas (1974).

that despite contemporary yearnings for emphasis on the advisability of research, the perspective (symbolic interaction) is quite haunted by inabilities to "close the gaps and distortions that so often lie between the imaginative theoretical model...and the operations used to investigate the empirical world." In fact, it is possible to ask with Kuhn if all social investigation is "to be limited to the ambiguities and imprecisions of *Einfuhlung* and *Verstehen*?" Unlike the early introspectionist, studying his own experience or attempting to accommodate his experience with that of others, interactionist arguments must move toward making inferences about the experiences of other persons from their verbal reports or from their responses to carefully structured situations.

Measurement is commonly accepted as the assignment of numbers of objects (events) according to rules (Stevens, 1946). It is not hard to understand measurement used in natural science, such as length and weight, but such common sense understandings often are absent in the measurement of individual and/or group phenomena (such as: socio-economic status, intelligence, and mental processes). However, the same procedure is operative, and if rules can be stated, then the implication for the measurement of anything is at least theoretically, possible (Lundberg, 1939: 68). The above is just one avenue for quantification. There is always the avenue of merely counting. In fact, the mere accommodation of a frequency count to the data can be used with sophisticated analytical methodologies and can result in quite scientifically plausible deductions and corollary implications.

The explicitness of the above statements is demanded in the light of the theoretical, substantive and empirical goals of this research. Such concerns demonstrate the interrelated, intertwined relation between

the two major purposes of this study, a methodological as well as a theoretical contribution to the development of the symbolic interactionist tradition. These issues compel attention, after any serious historical review of the development of symbolic interactionist arguments. The historical content (in all of its manifest and latest consequences and its complexities and contradictions) of the argument is easiest identified by dichotomizing it (the argument) into two theoretical and/or research trends: the Chicagoan and Iowan interactionist trends (Meltzer and Petras, 1970). The complexities and contradictions, made manifest by this dichotomous approach, not only reflect the historical content of the argument, but are reflective of current dialogue, as well. For example, Huber's recent arguments (1973: 466) purporting that: "Mead provides a way to formulate important aspects of social psychological problems but suggests few actual problems for investigation. Some of his most relevant premises are untestable...", indeed mirror the initial comments of this report. In fact, the series of comments exchanged by J. Huber (1973); R. L. Schmitt (1974); G. P. Stone, D. R. Maines, H. A. Farberman, G. I. Stone, and N. K. Denzin (1974); and J. Huber (1974) may be taken as contemporary evidence of the conclusions resulting from a historical understanding of interactionist arguments via the dichotomous procedure, discussed above.

Review of the Literature

The Chicagoan Symbolic Interactionist

George Herbert Mead's philosophical thoughts have long permeated and in fact have been the very initiators and sustainers of the life of symbolic interactionist theory; therefore, it is possible to agree with

Morris' (1934: ix-xii) interpretation of Mead (scientifically, at least) as a social psychologist:

Philosophically, Mead was a pragmatist; scientifically, he was a social psychologist...Mead adds little or nothing to the corpus of the facts of the social sciences as determined by distinctive methods of investigation; to the ideational and conceptual structure he adds much.

Of course, this recognition is not to deny the contributions of James (1890), Cooley (1922) and Thomas (1923). For example, with the work of James, Martindale (1960: 339) finds a convenient beginning point in tracing the development of symbolic interaction.

For the present exposition, however, if one follows the beginning lines of thought in Mind, Self and Society, it is possible to witness the initial concern of this paper in its budding. The total and diverse influence of Darwinian theory on the 19th century interpretation of reality in all of the sciences is quite evident. This is an observation that needs little explication; succinctly, this references Darwin's indications that humankind is a mere acting organism whose constitution and behavior are governed by sets of natural laws. This influence upon Mead is noted by Morris (1934: x):

It has been the philosophical task of pragmatism to reinterpret the concepts of mind and intelligence in the biological, psychological and sociological terms which post-Darwinian currents of thought have made prominent, and to reconsider the problems and task of philosophy from the new standpoint...the outlines of an empirical naturalism...which aims to avoid the inherited dualisms of mind and matter, experience and nature... It is a philosophy which opposes the other worldliness of the reason...and...mind...

Continuing, Morris observes, "In many ways the most secure and imposing result of pragmatic activity to date has been its theory of intelligence and mind...elaboration of this theory defines the life-long activity of Mead." This, besides clarifying the complementarity of the initial com-

ments, brings one squarely in the face of the more theoretical concern of this paper. The essence of Mead's life-long activity was his fight against the pre-Darwinian rationalized erudition of the split between the organism and the environment. For Mead, the organism and his environment were mutually determinate; that is, the activity of the organism is a function of his environmental nexus, just as the environmental nexus is a function of the activity of the organism. The emphasis presently, of course, is with the former determinate, that is, the activity of the organism as a function of his environmental nexus. It is the explication of this interest that enables the possibility of the systematic summarization of much of Mead's work.

As in any novel situation, extremities of behavior in reaction to it are quite commonplace. This is no less so for the scientist, philosopher, and/or any other reality interpreter. For example, cognizance may be taken of the behavioristic attempts at understanding these natural laws that were thought to exist and to characterize animate as well as inanimate objects. Extremity in reaction to Darwinist thought, for behaviorists, took the form of the development of a definition calling for the precise measurement and observation of all objects of study. Granting that many of their assumptions (and therefore much of their work) were crude and questionable, Mead sought a less extreme reaction to the Darwinian research implications. First, Mead believed that the scope of behaviorism could be extended to include introspective phenomena, a point on which much of his criticism of the behaviorists rested. Thus, Mead contended that the behaviorists were only considering the external aspect of the total behavior of the organism. As a corollary, Mead rejected the tenet that organisms passively respond to stimuli; rather,

organisms may dynamically select their stimuli; they may structure their own environment just as that environment may also structure their being. Thus, Mead's adaptation to the Darwinian influence (methodologically, and in terms of the relation between mind and body) is one of a more moderate stance than that of the behaviorist; rather, he espoused a "social behaviorist" approach. Indeed, behaviorism had its beginning in animal behaviorism in which only the overt behavior of the animal could be known. Actually, this may not be the only behavior characterizing the organism; perhaps there are language symbols, known only to the person having them. This is behavior, albeit, it is not observable to others, and it must be taken into consideration in any convincing account of human behavior.

Mead began the construction of his "social behaviorism" by considering the function of gestures in social acts. An idea represents an unobservable stage in an ongoing act directed toward some environmental object. Before any explicit (observable) behavior obtains, an implicit (nonobservable) behavior obtains, an internal organization and preparation for the developing overt act. Interpreting Mead further, Desmonde (1957: 55) notes that by the interpretability of these inner behavioral patterns as such, it becomes possible to construct a naturalistic theory of introspection.

It is possible to speak of the distinction between symbolic and non-symbolic interaction. Thus, Mead notes the "conversation of gestures" as representing the social situation in its most simple form, an intra-individual mental process in which a gesture on the part of one individual evokes a preparatory movement on the part of the second person, and this gesture on the part of the second calls out a response in the for-

mer, etc. This essentially involves the perception of a situation (real or otherwise) and then subsequently counter "interpretations" of it, until the situation is adequately defined. The processual nature here described does not necessarily portray the full complexity of a perceived social situation, a complexity which serves as the distinction between subhuman and human social action and as a corollary, symbolic (the use of significant gestures, just described; "inner" interdependent cognitions representing the reaction of other persons to cognized behavioral intentions and actual subsequent behavior) and nonsymbolic (use of non-significant gestures) gestures. This involves an "inner incorporated social process," whereby the consequences of actions are already present while the behavior develops. Furthermore, the capacity of the later phases of this mental act to control the earlier stages makes the organism an intelligent being, rather than a mere reacting organism, an assumption popular among the behaviorists.

The primary medium for this distinction between the symbolic and nonsymbolic is language, for symbolic interaction requires that one interactant be capable of intra-individually responding to his or her own responses in the same way as he perceives that any other interactant may respond to the same response. The necessity, therefore, exists for the first interactant to have the same response possibilities as has the perceived second, third, etc. interactant(s). Additionally, the capabilities must exist for interactant one to be able to respond to his own responses through the use of some sense modality in the same way as interactant two, three, etc. It is language that meets those conditions, for one can mentally hear what he says, and thus evoke within himself the same ideas (preparations to act) as are evoked in the other person.

For example, by means of verbal response, an individual can simultaneously respond as would the other, while at the same time evoking the other's response by his action.

Through the person's capacity to use symbols and to interact symbolically, any one interactant can respond to his own behavior as he perceives some particular other or others would (i.e., he can take the role of the other); for Mead, "mind" was the term which applies to this process. Thus the mind emerges in the social act when the person is able to obtain cognitions of the perspective of the other individual, and hence is able to check his initial responses via his knowledge of the response of the concerned other to his own response. Mead (1934: 134) states:

It is by means of reflexiveness--the turning back of the experience of the individual upon himself--that the whole social process is thus brought into the experience of the individuals involved in it...Reflexiveness, then, is the essential condition within the social process, for the development of mind.

It is only one step further to seeing the possibility of "common shared perspectives," indeed, to seeing an integrated and/or set of shared integrated (or not so integrated) inner representations of outer reality. It is through the internalization of these organized attitudes of the entire group that the individual develops a complete self. The cooperative processes of society are possible only insofar as individuals can carry within themselves the numerous roles of the other people involved in group situations.

Implied in the foregoing is a certain complexity, not yet adequately described, as Mead sees it. Therefore, he references this internalized role of the other within any one person as the "Me." It is through this concept that it is possible to infer the potential influence of

social definitions upon individual behavior. The corresponding adjusted response of the interactant to the perceived other's definition is the "I." "The "I" is the response of the organism to the attitudes of the others; the "Me" is the organized set of attitudes of others which one himself assumes (Mead, 1934: 175)."

A theoretical provision for individual "freedom and dignity" is thus allowed the acting organism; he does not merely respond to outside influences, neither does he blindly follow his role definitions. According to Mead, innovation always can arise through the readjustment of the original ongoing act to the "Me;" the "I" is the source of all novelty and individuality, for it is by this readjustment that new social forms come into being. The world of interpersonal relations is, therefore, in a continual state of change via the interaction between the "I" and "Me." Indeed, it is in the fusion of the "I" and "Me" that cognizance may be taken of the fullest development of Mead's solution to the Darwinian implications concerning the dualistic relation of the environment and the organism. This is the major factor allowing the systematic and exhaustive intelligibility of Mead's work.

A theoretically giant step (in terms of Mead) is thus taken for the social psychological exposition of human behavior, perhaps the greatest of which is cognizance of an inner forum, incorporated inside individuals, representing outer reality. It is the argument of the present author that there is a great importance for preserving the basic structure of this essential proposition.

Contemporarily, Blumer (1969: 3-5) quite explicitly retains this essential position in his third proposition:

...meanings (symbols) are handled in and modified through an interpretative process used by the person in dealing with the things he encounters...[thus] while the meaning of things is formed in the context of social interaction and is derived by the person from that interaction, it is a mistake to think that the use of meaning by a person is but an application of the meaning so derived...the use of meanings...occurs through a process of interpretation...First, the actor indicates to himself the things toward which he is acting...The making of such indications is an internalized social process in that the actor is interacting with himself...Second, by virtue of this process of communication with himself, interpretation becomes a matter of handling meanings. The actor selects, checks, suspends, regroups and transforms the meanings in the light of the situation in which he is placed...

Thus, the preservation of the "inner forum" (a reflexive process in which the actor makes indications to himself, notes things, and determines the anticipated consequences for his behavior) is maintained by Blumer. Much of the same is interpretable from Denzin (1970 a,b), however, without further statements from him, it would be premature to exactly interpret his theoretical position.

Despite the notation of the theoretical importance of the Meadian proposition, fashioned by Mead and preserved by Blumer (the two major representatives of what Meltzer and Petras (1970: 3-6) refer to as the "Chicagoan school" of the symbolic interactionist theory), it is scientifically essential that convincing empirical substantiation of the proposition be elucidated. It is the general feeling of the present writer, as well as others (Kuhn and his followers; cf. McPartland and Cumming, 1958; Garretson, 1962; Vernon, 1962), that this aspect of the endeavor is seriously limited. If primary credit can be accorded to Mead for origination of the proposition, then a primary indictment can also be accorded him for his unclear definitions of the major concepts of this proposition, particularly that of the "I". This is the prime reason for the nonresearchability of symbolic interactionist hypotheses.

Methodologists concur that good definitions are essential to proper measurement. This is necessarily implied if, in fact, there is to exist an isomorphism between the quantitative definition and its qualitative referent. Ergo, a more refined definition is needed if the constructs of the Chicagoan proposition are to be made researchable. Meltzer (1964: 20) states:

Mead's position can...be criticized from a...standpoint...of methodology. First of all, Mead's theory for the most part does not seem to be highly researchable, as yet little truly significant research has been conducted chiefly in terms of his frame of reference.

This argument is the basis for the initial explicitness of concern with methodology and the anticipated methodological goals of this research. Resulting, then, is a need for a theoretical refinement, in view of the necessity for the definitional clarification of the central terms, which must obtain in order to accomplish this methodological advancement. This is certainly not to imply a theory made subservient to methodological techniques, as will be evidenced.

The Iowan Symbolic Interactionist

Manford Kuhn has perceived the ambiguity of the definition and corresponding lack of researchability of the "I" construct in the Chicagoan proposition. His attempts at the clarification of it have essentially led to his dismissal of the concept altogether. While not denying the covert facets of human behavior, the Iowa school (the second major school in the symbolic interactionist tradition) emphasizes the objective and empirical verifiability of scientific productions. Referencing his thoughts as "self" theory, Kuhn (1964a: 55) states:

It was my intention...to employ a term which would not so much differentiate an emerging point of view from the more or less orthodox ideas of symbolic interaction as it would enable, on the other hand, a distinction between a body of conjectural and deductive orientations--as represented by Cooley, Dewey and Mead--and a derivative but developing set of generalizations, tested by empirical research.

However, upon closer analysis, the viability of this perspective in Kuhn's (the major proponent in the Iowan school of symbolic interaction) thought has in many ways dictated a theoretical position divorced of the central "interpretative" essence of the Chicagoan proposition, an essence earlier noted as an essential in the social psychological explanation of human behavior. For example, Kuhn and Hickman (1956: 43) have defined the "self" operationally as the responses subjects make to the self-directed question: "Who Am I?" Theoretically, this references the self as "the individual attitudes (plans of action) toward his own mind and body, viewed as an object" (Kuhn and Hickman, 1956: 43); at a later point in Kuhn's writings, and at a conceptually clearer level, the self is seen as referring to the individual's view of himself as a social object among social objects (Kuhn, 1964b: 629). The operational manifestation of this conceptual statement is to be represented by twenty self defining statements from the person of interest. Tucker (1966: 345) notes the following assumptions predicating the test, generally known as the Twenty Statements Test (TST):

- (1) The person will refer the question "Who Am I?" to himself and not to anyone else.
- (2) The person is aware (knows) of himself and he puts this "knowledge" into words.
- (3) The person's awareness of himself is dependent upon the behavior of others in a situation and not a matter of "traits" or instincts.
- (4) The person's awareness of himself precludes the use of any fixed responses; the responses must be the person's own plan of action.
- (5) The responses to the question are not limited to the testing situation, but have applicability in a variety of situations.

These assumptions are quite suggestive of a diluting of the Chicagoan proposition, especially assumption five; it is not until the analytical procedures are applied to the subject's answers that an explicit portrayal of the compromise of the original proposition is manifested. Additionally, Denzin (1970a: 416) questions the static measurement of the self implied by Iowan research. He states:

Unless a panel design, with its measures on the same sample of selves is employed, the test ["Who Am I?"] does not measure the self as a set of tentative attitudes that are being continually redefined...

McPhail and Tucker (1972) express the same view, noting the inconsistency between verbalized self theory (as it will be subsequently outlined) and its associated research. In passing, a recent study (Mahoney, 1973), examining the day-to-day stability (nonstability) in the responses to the "Who Am I?" (TST) test, indicates that some identifications are stable across situations, while others are not. Kuhn's anticipation of this fact may be directly responsible for his own inconsistent handling of the problem.

All of the "Who Am I?" statements not identified by the analyst as consensual statements (statements requiring no further explanation to be understood, i.e., generating consensus with regard to the behavior that anyone would take with reference to the object so identified, that is, statements referring to groups and classes whose limits and conditions of membership are matters of common knowledge (Kuhn and McPartland, 1954) are considered as subconsensual. These latter statements refer to group attributes, traits, or other objects requiring further explication by the respondent in order to be understandable by anyone. An example might be: "I am a bad boy;" there is little consensus as to

the meaning of the identified object. That is, states Tucker (1966: 352):

...others will not know how to behave consistently toward objects which are identified in these terms. This...is the direct opposite of the interpretation for consensual statements...Those objects which are identified in a consensual fashion will elicit the same responses from all who come in contact with them.

This reasoning, although lacking in systematic research qualities (i.e., How does one (the investigator) know that the statement: "I am a woman" refers to a group whose conditions of membership are matters of common knowledge; more will be said on this matter in a later chapter.), is quite consistent with Mead's discussion of the necessity for distinguishing between the subjective (Kuhn's subconsensual) and the self-conscious (Kuhn's consensual). Experiences which secure objective reference are labelled objective; experiences failing to secure objective reference are subjective (private). It is Mead's contention that the self which is viewed as an object as the individual looks on others as objects is of the former nature. Mead never unambiguously nor definitively elucidates the content of the subjective experience. At one point, however, he states that the affective side of experience is mostly subjective. This is because:

The attitudes of which affection is a part so largely determine our conduct in place of the actually objective characters which are responsible for them. Whenever we do a thing just because we want to, we are confessedly subjective... Imagery is largely subjective because we depend upon our responses to imagery...to determine how we would act... (Mead, 1934: 18).

These "would be parts" of the individual's total experience are, for Kuhn, statements from the person which would require further explanation in order to be understood by others. At this point, the relevance of Cooley's (1922) third proposition (the self-feeling, consequent of

using others to judge the appropriateness of one's behavior) of the "looking glass self" becomes interpretable and its distinctiveness from the first two of his propositions becomes evident. It is also along these theoretical lines that restrictions on what shall legitimately be called self definitions are understandable; therefore, while the statement "I am a student" is permissible, the statement "I am intelligent" is not. This essentially is a restriction in the cognitive (content) attitudinal aspect of self attitudes, as will be subsequently shown. One should expect that this subjective experience will have some influence on behavior; however, the present concern is "behavior as it is informed by a social self."

The theoretical connection thus becomes manifest; the consensually identified person is "socially anchored," so the speak. Such a person can expect anyone to behave toward him in a similar manner. "If that is so, it is further reasoned, that those with the largest number of consensual statements have behaved in a greater number of different situations" (Tucker, 1966: 354), thus the idea of social anchoring.

Via aspects of the Guttman scaling technique, Kuhn is able to establish: (1) the differential saliency of the consensual to the subconsensual statements (i.e., the type of statements elicited first by the respondent), thus; (2) an individual's "locus score" equals the number of consensual references he makes (i.e., 1 to 20, depending on the number of such statements made out of the total possible twenty statements).

With this precisely structured methodology, Kuhn assumes that he has indeed accommodated a theoretical as well as a methodologically viable concatenation for representing the social science perspective. He says (Kuhn and Hickman, 1956: 133):

The social science view is that people organize and direct their behavior in terms of their subjectively defined identifications. These, in turn, are seen as internalizations of the objective social statuses they occupy...Our test elicits these self definitions.

Symbolic interaction, as far as representing the process of "defining the situation" in anticipation of behavior, becomes for Kuhn, the internalized expectations of at least one other reciprocal role.

For every role he comes to play, he assumes at least one other reciprocal role; this dual process permits him to see objects from the point of view of both the plan of action that is his role and the plan of action that he conceives to be the role of the reciprocal other (Kuhn and Hickman, 1956: 36).

The clarity of the distinction between the implied separableness of the plans of action associated with the two roles is troublesome, to begin with. It would seem that the two roles are quite correlated in view of contemporary definitions of roles as being shared expectations about the proper behavior associated with positions among the collective. This leaves less than a little room for any innovativeness in behavior. Meltzer and Petras (1970) have noted the similarity of the Iowan perspective with conventional role theory. They note that the self becomes solely a "Me". Though the present writer is not in full agreement with Meltzer and Petras' interpretation of Kuhn's theoretical modifications, it shows the ambiguities which presently characterize the Iowan interpretation of symbolic interaction. The point advanced here is that an individual's behavior (for whom a stable set of self definitions has been obtained) is to be explained only in terms of the reciprocal role other(s) and their associated expectations on his behavior. Thus, indeed, the person symbolically defines the situation before acting, just as the Chicagoans suppose, but this definition is lacking in the interaction component, especially if the situation con-

tains only one reciprocal role other. A more appropriate designation would be to use Kuhn's idea that the individual rehearses to himself the situationally called for "plans of action", before acting. In this context, a person mechanically moves (rehearses) from one self definition to the next, noting the fit with the role other definition. Such a conception is certainly not a theoretically convincing explanation of the symbolic interaction informing subsequent behavior. Further, it is not possible for the underlying self definitions to interact among themselves.

One additional interpretation, implied by much of Kuhn's writings, is the necessity for the situational presence of the reciprocal role other(s) before their represented "plans of actions" can influence the individual's behavior. If indeed this is the case, restriction on the variability and range of the content of the symbolic interaction is suggested. This issue is confused, however, for at one point Kuhn and Hickman (1956: 37) observe:

By means of internal conversation, the individual tries out one possible plan of action after another, deriving from his (imaginary) conversation the probable views of reciprocal others regarding the alternative roles that he might play. In this interior conversation, he may find one role that would appear to be satisfactory in the light of what he knows about the attitudes of his reciprocal others.

Although his confused use of the term "role other" remains, one perceives (especially as an attempt is made to incorporate the applicability of the TST identifications) the possibility of a much larger range of content for internal rehearsing in an attempt to define the situation. Intuitively, this latter interpretation permits a much more viable interpretation of behavior, but it still subsumes to the initial criticism. The person in the end, no matter how much rehearsing he en-

gages, will behave in terms of the inferred situational role definition. In Kuhn's terms, he finds and operates upon the one self definition that would appear to be satisfactory in the light of what he knows about the attitudes of his reciprocal others. If he perceives the attitudes of others to be congruent with one of his self definitions, one can expect the latter to be the content of the definition of situation, according to the more liberal interpretation of Kuhn. The essence of symbolic interaction becomes reduced to a mechanistic substitution of internalized role definitions, theoretically; operationally, as is evident from the earlier discussion, this reductionism becomes even more pronounced. In other words, the Iowan interpretation, although suggesting a number of symbolic substitutions, in the end involves only one definition in the guidance of behavior.

The present author proposes that Kuhn's manner of dealing with the role of these several incorporated self definitions (as mentalistic interaction components) is comparable to the way in which Mead dealt with the "I" component of the mentalistic interaction. That is, as Mead so diligently conceptualized the "Me" and in the end recognized his failure to incorporate the individual, so Kuhn, as he so diligently worked on the empirical observability of the "Me", recognized his failure to incorporate the individual. For Mead, the problem was solved by theoretically attaching a qualificatory "I" concept to his well developed scheme. Kuhn, on the other hand, theoretically attached his empirically relevant "self" conceptualization to the immediate role that the person was playing. This qualified the role behavior of the person, creating a nonfunctional intervening link between the role expectation and the behavior. The end result, however, is role determinacy because the

person uses that definition that corresponds to the role expectation to inform his behavior. Besides the fact that little symbolic interaction is evidenced here, it is the present argument that little "role rehearsing" is evident. Indeed, all that need obtain is that the person recall the salient definitions, called for by the "role other." This automatically obtains when the situation is perceived by the person; it follows that this perceived cognition informs the person of the applicable "definition of the situation", without his searching or rehearsing his several salient internalized self definitions. This results in the conclusion that Iowan symbolic interactionism involves the rehearsal of one definition, which results from the immediate situation of experience and behavior follows accordingly. This reduces the self, as it informs behavior, to a "Me", thus destroying any type of mentalistic interaction of the character and quality as that described by the Chicagoan proposition. As a corollary, behavioral explanations and predictions in terms of the original Meadian proposition are completely altered.

In order to fully grasp the reason and motivations of Kuhn's branching from the Meadian (Chicagoan) proposition, it may be helpful to examine the intellectual setting of which Kuhn was a product. Petras and Meltzer (1970: 3-17) note Kuhn's exposure to the Meadian perspective by Kimball Young, at the University of Wisconsin, 1934 to 1941. Other concomitant influences were the writings of Gustav Bergman's logical positivism and Kenneth Spence's positivistic orientation in the philosophy of science. The impact of these influences is readily apparent in Kuhn's works, an impact seemingly (for Kuhn) necessitating a compromise of the Chicagoan proposition. Thus, Kuhn (1964a) is motivated to write of the methodologically operational demonstrability of symbolic inter-

actionism, a concern for which the Chicagoan perspective was criticized. While not explicitly (theoretically) denying the more sequestered aspects of the Chicagoan proposition of human behavior, Kuhn (and his school of followers) emphasized doubly the necessity for objective and credible indices of this subjective, as well the need for the objective study of behavior. This is a statement with which the present writer is in total agreement. But as in most cases, actions speak louder than words; thus, in his (Kuhn's) self theory, the self becomes operationally defined as nothing more than the answers to the question of "Who Am I", and upon inspection, represents a sure compromise of the original proposition. Observes Petras and Meltzer (1970: 7), "...Kuhn sought to empiricize Mead's ideas by reconceptualizing or abandoning those he deemed nonempirical and by developing techniques of observation that were consistent with this aim." It is by default that it is possible to witness the Iowan's rejection of the structural essence of the Chicagoan proposition, as they attempt to grapple with the empirical intelligibility of the perspective. The "self" for the followers of Mead, characterized as it is, by a processual nature, is laid to rest. Blumer's third proposition explicitly stated the temporariness of any type of behavior. Mead consistently spoke of a novel, creative, unpredictable aspect of behavior as informed by the self. The Iowans take no methodologically explicit cognizance of this impulsive aspect, and as a corollary, of the "I" and "Me" interaction components. The relevant answer to the question "Who Am I" for Kuhn denotes the self only in terms of his social position, thus a person may answer the question by making responses such as: "I am woman". If there is knowledge of the actor's reference groups (orientational other(s), according to Kuhn (1964c),

predictions of his self attitudes is possible and if there is knowledge of his self attitudes, predictions of his behavior are conceivable. This view, as noted disposes of the "I", and in so doing, ignores what Meltzer and Petras speak of as the processual character of the self; however, it does seek preservation of the scientific goals of the perspective.

At the same time, the central constructs in the original proposition, and as it was subsequently explained and interpreted by Blumer, are of a totally ambiguous nature in terms of concise definitions, thereby militating against any rigorous treatment. Undoubtedly, this is a function of the fragmentary interpretations and formulations of the Meadian perspective by his followers. Nevertheless, many of the central concepts are quite vague. For example, Kolb (1944: 242) refers to the "I" concept as a vaguely defined residual category. Mead somewhat more clearly specifies the nature of the "Me", but in effect, deals with the "I" qualitatively in much the same way that Kuhn deals with it both qualitatively and quantitatively. Nevertheless, he does conceive of the concept thereby avoiding a deterministic explanation of behavior, as Kuhn fails to do.

CHAPTER III

IO-CHICAGOAN SYMBOLIC INTERACTIONISM

Introduction

A dilemma is thus made explicit. Wallace (1971) speaks of the two sides of science: Good theory and/or theoretical derivations from research and good research and/or verification of theory. An explanation divorced of empirical support becomes philosophy, while research divorced of accurate hypotheses can never describe ontological reality, but only epistemological reality. The dilemma as seen by this writer can be summarily observed in Table I.

TABLE I

THE RELATION OF THEORY, SYMBOLIC INTERACTIONIST
THEORY AND RESEARCH

Theory	Research	
	Systematic Means for Empiricizing the Ontological Description	Systematic Means for Empiricizing the Ontological Description
Credible Ontological Description	?(a)	Chicagoans (b)
Noncredible Ontological Description	Iowans (c)	Pre-Meadian (d)

Cells "b", "c", and "d" respectively, have been elucidated in an explicit and/or implicit fashion in the previous section of this paper. From their consideration, a deduction was generated explicating the above portrayed Table I in terms of a major dilemma. It is the purpose of this section to lay a foundation for the theoretical erasure of that dilemma. Needed is a rationale that preserves the essence of the Chicagoan exposition as well as one that allows the empirical elucidation of this improved exposition, thus the "needed" content of cell "a".

Attention has already been called to the ambiguity of the self (especially the "I" construct) as formulated by Mead. Blumer essentially continues the Meadian tradition as far as the conceptualization of the self is concerned. However, as noted, other authors because of the flexibility of the term (Kolb, 1944; Kuhn and Hickman, 1956) have been able to arrive at variable interpretations of this concept. Indeed, Petras and Meltzer (1972) speak of the Dramaturgical and the Ethnomethodological orientation as being variants of the interactionist position. The present objective is in no way one of offering a synthesis of the various interpretations, neither is it an attempt of the writer to suggest an interpretation of the original Meadian proposition. Rather, the objective is one of theory construction, itself; a new more credible perspective is sought, one retaining the "structural essence" of the original proposition, but at the same time adding a necessary and sufficient definitional preciseness to allow the researchability of the proposition.

This vagueness, this ambiguity, etc., which persistently presents itself may, perhaps, be most cogently dealt with by investigating a broader perspective. Theoretically, it is said that behavior is a

function of the person and the environment, that is: $B = P \times E$, where P (Person) most parsimoniously refers to the person's unique psychological state and/or states. In fact, attitudes are most generally accepted as predispositions to act in affirmative or negative ways with respect to some psychological object--where this psychological object may be a symbol, person, institution, ideal, idea, etc. Indeed, the usual way of inferring the psychological state of a person with respect to one of his psychological objects is via an attitude scale. Therefore, it is felt justified in operationally speaking of the variable "person" as a set of attitudes reflecting on the psychological state (states) of some person. E (Environment) in the above formulation is found necessary in view of the variability of behavior from one setting to the next. This latter construct (the situation) is most parsimoniously linked to the person variable (his attitudes) via the person's definition of that situation. Thus, an ontological situation must be epistemologically constructed by the person in order to legitimately speak of behavior as a function of the situation and the person. Before this, of course, there is the implicit implication of perception, itself informed by various social factors.

Though theoretically social psychologists note the formulation: $B = P \times E$; as researchers, however, they tend to reduce this formulation to: $B = P$, i.e., attitudes. If one can only obtain a set of attitude scores from some person, then the prediction of his behavior is possible. This view persists, despite the inconsistency between attitudes and behavior that is well documented in the research literature (Wicker, 1969; Vroom, 1964; Linn, 1965). Even within the interactionist tradition where the guiding principle of the early interactionist was that

individuals could not be understood apart from their social situations, Cottrell (1942) was stressing the neglected area of the "situation".

Such should suggest the necessity of a close abiding by the initial formulation, an attempt which is being made by the Chicagoans, even though ambiguously. Mead, through his "Me" concept was very ably endowed, theoretically, to consider this situational input into behavior. By stopping the theoretical elaboration at this point and applying the rationale to the empirical world, it would be supposed that prediction of behavior would accurately occur merely by knowing the situation within which a person was to interact. Such is the implication one obtains from Kuhn. This is opposed to the processual behavioral formulation. Mead added a second construct to his system, the "I." It is the position of this writer that basically (though possibly not in specifics) Mead was trying to accomplish the same thing by his "I" concept (to express individuality) as contemporary writers are by their "Person" concept. Indeed, to use the variable, attitude, harmonizes very well with one's self conception as a social psychologist; thus, there is the assumption of attitudes as being socially fashioned, though they are held by the person. Such a position moves from the more totally psychological position of conceiving the person's behavior as a function of his traits (where the latter usually references an enduring characteristic of the person, leading him to respond in a certain manner in all situations), another attempt to conceptualize the innovative and unpredictable in behavior, albeit a totally individualistic explanation. Here, room is made for the social (if it is made) only as an early and most often familial influence. Ergo, via the concept, attitude, movement several degrees toward systematically accounting for the social is made.

Indeed, such was a giant step, but the time has come for a more viable systematic accounting of the social (as well as the individualistic elements). The Chicagoans imply, armed with their "I" concept, that behavior is a function of: (1) social attitudes incorporated in an individual; (2) these social attitudes will (how, one does not know) elicit a response of some type from the person.

Most recently, Lindesmith and Strauss (1968: 320) in their attempt at the interpretation of this "I", express the idea that "no hard-and-fast line can be drawn between our selves and the selves of others, since our selves exist only insofar as the selves of others." Indeed, Mead notes that one has as many selves as groups to which he belongs. However, common sense thinking runs counter to this understanding of the self, for individuality, here, calls for a concrete entity, thus because of the quite concrete observation of the encasement of the body and mind within a unity, it is seen as logically necessary that these are autonomous products. This is aggravated the more when "individuality" represents a basic component of the ethos of the culture, especially as it becomes sanctioned by religion. However, there is no need to deny individuality in asserting the basic social nature of the self (i.e., as will be seen, the novelty as to which of the selves, corresponding to the groups to which one belongs, will be operative in any one situation is quite an unpredictable aspect of behavioral prediction). The nonrealization of this is possibly one grave factor in Mead's ambiguous use of the "I" concept. He easily perceived the logical integrativeness of the social in self development, as witnessed by his detailed, coherent elaboration of it; indeed, its discussion is a major theme of his work as contrasted with his treatment of the "I" as a qualifier. This

qualifactory approach to discussing the "I" is quite possibly a reflection of the influence of the previously mentioned common sense approach. The only way for Mead to deal with this was the qualifactory use of the "I." The writer merely offers this as a conjecture which is secondary to the major concern.

Theoretical Development

The following rationale offers an elucidation of the Chicagoan "I" concept, retaining the individuality aspect while at the same time asserting the social nature of it. It is possible to start with the idea that we have as many selves as groups to which we belong. This, for Mead, represents the social input; it is the "Me," i.e., the incorporated other(s). A moment's reflection of the nature of this "incorporated other" suggests in a substantive manner what was earlier referred to as the epistemological construction of the ontological. The ontological references the social norms and attitudes which Mead so often refers to, which mediates interaction. Mead's use of the term here (as well as the seeming equality of social attitudes and social norms) varies somewhat from the thinking of contemporary writers, but it is not difficult to grasp his (Mead's) intentions; specifically, his use of the term "social attitudes of others" should be interpreted as a sociological construct, as opposed to being interpreted as a social psychological construct. Indeed, not until use is made of the term "incorporated attitude of others" does Mead move to this social psychological level of explanation. It is this that is represented in the epistemological construction. This construction is well documented by Sherif (1936: 108):

The psychological basis of the established social norms...conventions, customs, and values, is the formation of...(a) frame of reference as a product of the contact of individuals...such frames of reference are established and incorporated in the individual, they enter as important factors to determine or modify...reactions to...situations.

This is the construction of the "Me" component of the self.

The present formulation retains these ideas and indeed retains the contentual nature of Mead's or the Chicagoan "Me" concept; however, it is with respect to the structural (where structural is used here to denote a location, a position, or a place in a system, for example, a mental system, consisting of mental positions, say, "individualistic cognitions" in one position and "others cognitions" in a second mental position) and functional relationships between the "I" and "Me" that a crucial reformulation is seen necessary. The writer will subsequently speak of the "content" of the "I" and the "Me" (incorporated other's definitions; attitudes), as well as a "structural relationship" between them.¹ For purposes of clarity, the "I" is seen as holding the first of two mental positions, while the "Me" holds the second. This structure refers again to the "individualistic" and "social" Chicagoan mental positions; either position, of course, could be called position one or two.

First, it is necessary to see the several incorporated selves as pre-existing within the psyche of the person, having accumulated through social relationships. These take the place, structurally, of Mead's "I." Thus, the "I" is erased from the present formulation. Instead,

¹Kolb, 1942, says that it is empty of content; actually, it is an ambiguous and ill-defined concept.

"mental position one" now has the content of Mead's "Me" construct, that is, a series of socially "incorporated others," i.e., that which some authors would refer to as "a series of socially developed selves," corresponding to the groups to which one (ego) cares about and what he feels that they ("others") think about him (ego). This content, instead of the term "Me," will now be referred to as the "Me Previous," rather than by the Chicagoan term, the "Me." In summary, "Me Previous" is thus seen as a series of incorporated social definitions from others (Iowan selves, i.e., this is the extent of the Iowan definition of the self), corresponding to the content of Mead's "Me," but, structurally, taking the place of Mead's labelled category, the "I". The "Me Previous" may be seen as "Me Previous_i," where i refers to the specific "other definition" that may be "called forth" at any particular time. The source of this "call" is referred to here as the "Me Present;" this latter takes the structural place (mental position two) of Mead's "Me;" content-wise, it has no cohort in the Meadian rationale, just as Mead's "I" has no "explicit" cohort in the present formulation. This concept ("Me Present") will be elucidated shortly.

The "Me Previous" component is a mere constellation of attitudes, relevant to the various social experiences of the individual, accompanied by some motivational disposition. It holds that any one individual will have many sets of these, in fact, the total social psychological reality of the individual may be most parsimoniously ascertained in terms of his several characterizing psychological states; these are directly relevant to attitude scales. Among several social psychological circles of thought, attitudes are seen as having three aspects: the cognitive, the affective, and the behavioral. The reader may immediately recognize

that the previous discussion forces attention directly to the cognitive aspect in the relation of the two concepts: self and attitudes, i.e., the present discussion is concerned only with mentalistic aspects of the self (cognitions; content of self) as they are responsible for behavior. This is not to reject the other of these attitudinal aspects as they are relevant to "attitudes toward one's self," but only to show their lack of importance in explaining "behavior as it is informed by a self."

A brief detour at this point seems quite appropriate. Specifically, it is now possible to meaningfully explicate the previous phrase: "behavior as it informed by a self." Behavior informed by a self (a processual self; not a structured self nor a processual self having an "I" and "Me" component) says nothing about behavior informed by stable (enduring, i.e., energy level or possibly temperament) or unstable (temporary, i.e., failure to retrieve the ball to first base quickly because of a crippled ankle) individual biological characteristics and/or physical products (i.e., the ball player who slipped on a banana peel in the outfield, failing to retrieve the ball to first base). Though recognition of this fact makes the series of present comments still less deterministic, it does serve to make one aware of more viable avenues of research (social psychological or otherwise). With the absence of a "residual category" (the "I"), one is immediately faced with viably accounting for this potential variability in behavior, rather than relinquishing it to this "dumping ground" as does Young (1940: 148).

In terms of Mead's ambiguous discussion of the "I" and, in fact, much of the work of his followers who have been theoretically trapped

by this ambiguity, the above discussion adds to the hypothesis of the functionally useless nature of this concept. If ascertainment of the social source of behavioral innovativeness is the goal, then surely a more viable explanation is necessitated, thus the above reformulation. It would be a mistake of course to speak of the complete separableness of these two modes for conduct (behavior as a function of the self or as a function of bio-physical characteristics), for indeed, the more stable biological characteristics are apt to have a direct input into the content of the self. Kolb (1944: 242) notes that perhaps the biological could be social psychologically studied in terms of a constant.

In line with Kuhn's attempt to deal with this ambiguity, he introduces the possibility of the observation of the hypothesized operative concepts. The movement away from the observation of symbolic interaction, in the Chicagoan sense has been elaborated; thus, the person is seen as directing his behavior in correspondence with one of his subjectively held identifications, the one corresponding to the situated expectation of the role other(s). The Iowan paradigm must be seen as a sophisticated form of reductionism, comparable to a model which assumes that behavior is a function of only attitudes. Rather than explaining behavior by using attitudes about objects (people, events) outside the person, Iowans use attitudes about the person himself, as he views himself as an object. This is a by-product of the attitudes that one has about various objects. Indeed, the case is made for the incorporation of the situation (perceived role other(s) definitions); however, the immediately called for behavior is responded to automatically, by using the self definition demanded by the situation, as the informant of behavior. The internal symbolic interaction is absent; rather a limited

symbolic interaction can be seen as being used for the definition of the situation, and subsequently informing the appropriate behavior.

Continuing the main trend of thought, it is possible to note in terms of this present conceptualization that in any one situation, it would be a gross oversimplification to think of a simple isomorphism existing between the various sets of attitudes and some resulting behavior in response to that situation. From pure common sense thinking, it is possible to think of "attitude set" conflicts, and their corollary emergent anxiety productions and/or hesitancy reactions to the "situationally asked for behavior;" an automatic inference is that of some processual nature and subsequently variable behavior.

The "Me Present" is the perceived situation at any particular time. As indicated, structurally, it takes the place of the Chicagoan "Me," however content-wise, it is a mere perception factor. Thus an individual coming home from a day's work, upon reaching home perceives a different situation than was perceived back on the assembly line. This perceived component is to a "limited extent socially defined" by the mere act of perception. Waller (1961: 162-163) sees group products (group attitudes, mores, etc.) before their assimilation and/or incorporation into the self, as a pre-existing definition of the situation. This is what is initially perceived, but movement to another level is necessitated before the definition of the situation, as Thomas (1923) saw it, is intelligible, i.e., the "complete definition of the situation."² This perception results in a cognitive component (the "Me

²Stebbins (1969) reflects the complexity of the processes involved in a complete "definition of the situation"; its full discussion is beyond the scope of the present study, however.

Present") which will subsequently be used as an interactional component in the "inner forum" with the relevant (i.e., "situationally called for") content of the "Me Previous," the result of which is finally a "complete definition of the situation." This is the nature of symbolic interaction, according to the Io-Chicagoan perspective.

This is different from the Iowan perspective, for the latter approach sees a "complete definition of the situation" by the mere act of perceptual definition without the subsequent processual generation of the self informing behavior. This, rather than the perceived situation itself (perceived role definition) or the individual attitude constellation by itself, is the more parsimoniously accurate demonstration of the equation: $B = P \times E$. Finally, the same may be indicated with respect to the Chicagoan perspective. Indeed, Chicagoans describe a "complete definition of the situation" as the result of a cognitive interactional process; however, because of the utter ambiguous nature of one of the interactional components, the "I," and as a corollary, its present empirico-theoretical status in the literature, this perspective is also found unacceptable.

With this present conception, there is indeed a person and a situation; the person perceives the situation; this calls out a particular self or selves, some of which may be in conflict with reference to the perceived situation; there is an interaction between these selves and the perceived situation, a resultant of which is much self anguish, anxiety and concern, et cetera. The result of this interaction is a complete definition of the situation, which informs the appropriate behavior.

Indeed, such a perspective implies the social development and nature of the entirety of the self; at the same time it implies the

uniqueness and creativeness of the behavior to any situation, which reality shows to be the case.

The reader may now ask, what has been accomplished. Namely, a refined theoretically intelligible statement of two central constructs in the social psychological explication of behavior has been made theoretically evident. A complete statement of definition has obtained in the case of both constructs, thereby correcting the previously explicated criticism of the Chicagoans, ergo, laying a foundation for the possibility of empirical verification. Concomitantly, it has been possible to retain the essential idea of the "internalized processual flow" at the base of any behavioral production, found in the initial Meadian perspective; this, the present writer deems, is essential to truly conceptualizing symbolic interaction in the explanation of human social life.

To this point (that is, theoretically at least), it is possible to envision the erasure of the polarized division of the symbolic interactionist perspective in terms of a humanistic and a scientific viewpoint. A shift away from the Iowan deterministic position, as well as the Chicagoan indeterministic position is suggested. Ergo, recognition of the processual nature of behavioral productions implies non-determinancy (a positive value at the present theoretical stage), albeit, if the cognitive components (Me Previous; Me Present) in this interaction are identifiable, a step has been made from the complete unpredictability of and/or novelty of behavior. Concretely, this is to say that if the several previous selves characterizing an individual are knowable, as well as the particular perceived situation, and further, the interactional nature of these two components is systematically inferred, then a narrower specification for behavior is enabled,

than if such knowledge were absent. For example, any one of the various Iowan selves (corresponding to the various groups from which one identifies himself) when "called out" by a situation may be retarded in its effectiveness for eliciting compensatory behavior, because of constraints from the potency of "other selves," not constraints from a "dumping ground" of constraining factors.

Research Questions

In view of: (1) the centralness of both individualistic and sociologistic factors in any social psychological exposition of behavior; (2) a history of failures with regard to adequately conceptualizing (and consequently, methodologically operating on the conceptualization) these factors in social psychological literature; (3) the inferences made available by the critical examination of the social psychological theoretical orientation, symbolic interactionism, where explicit accommodation is made for the theoretical centralness of these individualistic and sociologistic factors--a number of questions may now be posited for empirical enlightenment and/or verification.

Generally, the research question is one of discerning whether there is or there is not a significant difference in the proportion of subjects whose behavior is informed by: a Chicagoan definition of the self; a Iowan definition of the self; an Io-Chicagoan conception of the self. The term Io-Chicagoan is the term given to the symbolic interactionist rationale developed in this chapter.

Stated formally, the research question to be answered is: Is there or there is not a significant difference in the number of subjects whose behavior is and is not informed by a Chicagoan; an Iowan and an Io-

Chicagoan definition of the self?

Additionally, it is a contention that over variable situations, the number of persons whose behavior is in line with the Io-Chicagoan hypothesis will characterize a quantitatively greater number of people's behavior than either the Chicagoan or the Iowan hypotheses. Formally stated the question is: Over variable situations, will the number of persons whose behavior is in line with the Io-Chicagoan hypothesis characterize a quantitatively greater number of persons' behavior than either the Chicagoan or the Iowan hypotheses?

CHAPTER IV

METHODS OF RESEARCH

Introduction

This chapter will outline the specific methodological procedures used in the collection of the data so that the theoretically deduced research questions can be answered in a systematic manner. These methodological procedures are discussed under three separate topics: (1) Data Source Procedures; (2) Research Design Procedures; and (3) Data Analysis Procedures.

Under the section, Data Source Procedures, the task is a simple one of describing the type of sample obtained and the characteristics of this sample; additionally, the manner of actually selecting the critical subjects is generally alluded to. The Research Design Procedures section outlines the methodology involved in the complete collection of the data. These several procedures are sequentially summarized in Figure 1. The figure shows that the entire task begins by identifying the methodology involved in narrowing and ascertaining: (1) the appropriate sample of subjects; (2) the operationalization of the "Me Previous" construct; and (3) information pertaining to the potential "normative content" to be used in the operationalization of the "Me Present" in the third and fourth stages.

Initially, Twenty Statements Test instructions were distributed and from these, two consensual definitions were chosen; subsequently, the

Step One

TWENTY STATEMENTS TEST (TST)

(Instrument for identifying the self description of a respondent)

Step Two

OPEN-ENDED ATTITUDE QUESTIONNAIRE

(Instrument for identifying the attitudinal basis of
consensual TST identifications)

Step Three

OBSERVATION (INTERACTIONAL SITUATION) ONE

(Experimental manipulation operationalizing the "Me Present",
the "role definitional other", and the "Me")

Step Four

OBSERVATION (INTERACTIONAL SITUATION) TWO

(Experimental manipulation operationalizing the "Me Present",
the "role definitional other", and the "Me")

Step Five

POST OBSERVATION INVENTORY ("WHY INQUIRY")

(Instrument for identifying the relative empirical support,
obtaining for the three theoretical perspectives
under observation)

Figure 1. Research Design Summary

same students (potential subjects) were asked to detail the meaning of these two definitions (the Open-ended Attitude questionnaire). From the information obtained at this stage, experimental operationalizations of the "Me Present" (the "role definitional other" and the "Me") could be manipulated by using the information obtained from the attitude questionnaire as the "normative content mediating the interaction" in an encounter group setting (steps three and four). This, of course, represents a perceptual-cognitive factor for the subject. Thus a subject is placed in the group situations and is asked to act in specified ways. He may or may not carry out the act, but presumably he will engage in some form of symbolic interaction to a greater or lesser extent, before acting. The fifth step is designed to tap the actual nature and extent of this symbolic interaction and thereby identify the relative empirical support, obtaining for the three theoretical interactionist perspectives, outlined and explained in earlier chapters.

The resulting frequency data will be analyzed via several analytical procedures (discussed in the Research Analysis Procedures section of this chapter): test of the significance of difference between frequencies (chi square analysis); test of the significance of difference between proportions; and finally, test of stochastic processes. Conclusions concerning the practicality of the theoretical arguments can then be intelligibly discussed.

Data Source Procedures

It is customary (theoretically, at least) to insure the representativeness of the sample, so that legitimate generalizations are possible. Such a goal is well received, however, such systematization could (in-

deed should) be reserved for the more entrenched rationales. Thus, considering the exploratory and suggestive nature of the several research questions, it is in the best interest of the intentions of this paper, and as a corollary, of the more general theoretical development of these several questions, to delay acting upon this concern.

Indeed, conceding positive support for the several research questions, other intermediate sampling stages would seem mandatory before arriving at a stage of seeking systematic inferences. Here, reference is to Glaser and Strauss' (1969) suggestion for theoretical sampling. Though not in agreement with the total thesis of these two authors, the present writer does identify with their cautious approach to "knowledge generation".

Conceiving such, as the rationale behind the sampling motivations of the writer, it is possible with a clearer conscious to elucidate the sampling plan. The research design utilizes a non-probability sample of 100 subjects. Additionally, two confederates are demanded by the research procedure. The subjects were introductory sociology students, selected on the basis of their Twenty Statements Test (TST) identifications and the corresponding research needs. It is sufficient to note, presently, that all students in five sections of Introductory Sociology were initially confronted with the TST instructions from which the pool of subjects was subsequently chosen.

Research Design Procedures

Collection of the data will entail a rather complex procedure. The totality of the experimental manipulations and data inference procedures should enable observations informing the feasibility of the equivalence

of knowing the self defining process and his or her behavior (see Figure 1).

Initially, TST instructions (Appendix A) were distributed to several sections of classes in introductory sociology, during the fourth and fifth week of the Fall term (1974). Two weeks later and over a two week period, these same respondents were given a general attitude questionnaire. The students actually involved in the experimental phase of the study were volunteers from this established usable pool. Finally, over a 12 day (2 hours/day; 4-6 subjects/hour) period, these subjects received several experimental manipulations, from which the results served as the basic source of data for testing the research questions. For no one subject did the time involved, take more than 15 minutes. Confederates (one male and one female) used in these procedures were students from a social psychology class whose appearance and mannerisms were little different from the introductory sociology student. Their role was central to the success of the experiment. Thus, in depth training was mandatory in the pre-experimental enactments and refinements of the actual experimental procedures.

These general remarks may now be specifically identified. To test the research questions, a distinct encounter group for each subject was necessitated, where any one of these groups consisted of two confederates and a naive subject (S_i , where i is the particular subject: 1, 2, ... 100), representing the social structure(s) by which the subject (i) had earlier identified him or herself. That is, the confederates were told to act in certain specified manners, corresponding to the content and inferences drawn from the attitude questionnaire used at the time of the second contact with the subject. For example, a subject, perhaps init-

ially most strongly identifies herself (via the TST instructions) as: "I am a woman"; subsequently after content analyzing (via theme analysis, i.e., the predominate subject-predicate combination) her response to the second attitude questionnaire, which open endedly probed the content of this identification, an inference was made, say, as to the liberationist orientation of the subject. The latter was the case for the present research. From this inference, the sociocultural structure of the group is determined; that is, the confederates structure their behavior so as to reflect the opposite orientation to that of the critical subject. More specifically, as the subject enters the waiting room, one of the confederates (the female) is attempting to persuade the second confederate to sign a letter which is, ultimately, to be sent to the school newspaper. The content of the letter is in support of some policy on women's liberation (signing or not signing a letter in support of a women's liberationist ideology, supporting agitation for a student women's boycott of classes). The second confederate acts in a neutral manner, but demonstrated a predisposition toward or away from signing, depending upon the inferences drawn about the liberationist orientation of the subject. For example, if a pre-liberationist estimation of the subject availed, then the second confederate leaned away from signing. In this atmosphere of uncertainty on the part of the second confederate, the first confederate invites the critical subject into the conversation, seeking his or her support for the same letter.

It should be made evident that the TST identification initially chosen to represent the "most favorable identification" was one of the statements in the upper one half of the consensual statements. Kuhn and McPartland (1954) note that usually half of the twenty statements are

consensual (i.e., the first ten). The particular statement, chosen among the top one half was selected according to whether other subjects had the particular statement listed at any position among the top one half of their statements. This was necessitated so as to make the actual data gathering procedures as economical and comparable as possible. Of course, it was felt that the selected statement met the characterizing criterion of consensual statements.

Once a TST statement, along with one other had been chosen, the second of the above referenced questionnaires was constructed.¹ This schedule consisted of two open ended questions (see Appendix B) and was given to the appropriately selected TST respondents. These two questions, reflecting the two consensual Iowan self identifications merely ask the respondent to speak at length on what it personally means to be a student and what it personally means to be a male or female. For any one subject, each of his responses were separately content analyzed, the ultimate goal being the selection of the dominant attitudinal theme within each particular Iowan self definition. From this point on, laboratory procedures ensued.

That is, the investigator, upon reaching such and such an attitude inference from the responses to the latter questionnaire, informed the confederates of their role playing duties (brief interactional scripts) in the experimentally created encounter groups. These scripts were de-

¹The next most popular consensual identification, besides "I am a male (female)" was: "I am a student". It is necessary in the analysis of the data to have attitudinal information on this additional identification (i.e., on at least one other consensual statement, that is, in addition to the statement chosen for the principle concern). This second attitudinal theme is not of immediate relevance, and will be further and most profitably developed at a later point.

signed so as to objectively portray a situation for perception by the naive subject. The situation staged, as noted earlier, was opposite, in terms of the "normative content" guiding interaction, the inference drawn from the second questionnaire. The content of this situation, once perceived, is the "Me Present."

A naive subject, thus enters the contrived group, unsuspectingly; the subject is under the impression that he or she and the two confederates are all subjects sitting in a waiting room in anticipation of an experiment.

The familiarity of waiting room conversations is quite familiar to everyone and no less should be expected for the present, especially if matters are helped by the subject's role set (the two confederates). This waiting room group becomes an interactional situation which when phenomenologically perceived by the subject constitutes what has been earlier referred to as the "Me Present"; recall that the data for the "Me Previous", the second of the revised Chicagoan constructs, has already been collected. This perception is not assumed to be a given (i.e., recognizable and interpreted similarly by everyone). The incorporation of this assumption is in line with orthodox interactionist literature. For example, Thomas and Kuhn (1950) note that the definition of the situation is dependent not only upon objective reality, but also subjective appreciation and often there is a "wide discrepancy between the situation as it seems to others and the situation as it seems to the individual..." Therefore, at a later stage, via a post experimental interview, information on just what the subjects' did perceive was obtained; only in those cases where there was a congruence between what the subject perceived and what was experimentally intended, will

the subject's data be used in the analytical procedures. Initially, however, only a behavioroid measure was obtained by the confederates, depending on whether the subject conformed or failed to conform to the confederate's enticements (signing or not signing the letter).

After this initial observation (situation One), the investigator enters, informing one of the confederates that he is now ready for him or her. They (the investigator and the first confederate, the female) depart, leaving the second confederate and the subject in the waiting room. At this point, the second confederate, who in the previous situation played a confused and undecided role in reacting to the enticements of the first confederate, uses the previous experience (signing or not signing a letter) for his own purposes. Trying to show a continuity between their previously shared experience, the confederate purposes that he and the critical subject write their own letter to the school paper, expressing their vehemency toward being obligated (class requirement; conditional for extra credit, etc.) to participate in experiments as part of their education as students. The confederate observed whether the subject agreed to release his or her address, so they could be contacted at a later time in order to work on the suggested project. This second observation (situation Two) was an attempt to situationally represent the interpretations of the deductions made from the content analysis of the subject's response to the second questionnaire (Appendix B). All of the responses were categorized so as to reflect a theme of the instrumental value of being a student. Typical of the responses is the following: "Being a student means a better opportunity for acquiring more education and later obtaining a job better than I would be able to get without a degree." It should be observed that the second confederate

did not intentionally take an orientation opposite that of the subject in this situation. The reason for this was the "uninvolving nature" of this particular argument. That is, it was felt that the subject would fail to be affected (involved) in the called for behavior, if the task was perceived as one of merely agreeing to co-sign a letter in support of the idea that their role as student was congruent with their obligations for experimental participation.

Additional interactional encounters (both those relevant to variable self identifications and to role situations lacking a relevant self definition) would be relevant for comparative purposes at this point. However, such is beyond the present endeavor. Such, of course, is the next most logical research step, contingent upon the correspondence of the present hypothesis with reality. And, as will be shown later, whether the present hypotheses are supported or not, a significant advance will have been taken in the empirical observability of the central concepts of the symbolic interactionist perspective. A third, or more situations might be created, calling for a certain behavior(s) on the part of the subject. The second interaction situation (just described) was relevant only in the latter phases of the analysis of the data.

The next experimentally relevant manipulation was seen essentially as a post experimental interview with the subject. After the second observation situation, the investigator returned to the waiting room, dismissing the remaining confederate. He then explained the actual experimental hypothesis; apologies were given and the subject was asked if he had any suggestions for improving the experiment. With these procedures, it was assumed that the subject would have some commitment to the experiment; thus he was asked not to disclose his experiences, as there

were possibly other subjects in his sociology class who had yet to receive the experimental manipulations. As a measure for the insurance of subsequent subject loyalty, a behavioroid commitment was sought from the subject, i.e., stating his future availability as a confederate for the experiment. All of the previous represents an attempt to gain the confidence of the subject.

This accomplished, the experimenter asked the subject to briefly tell why he behaved as he did; what cognitive thoughts informed his behavior in any one situation. This is referred to in Figure 1 as the "Why Inquiry". The subjects were asked explicitly: (1) their thoughts positively supporting the "called for" behavior; (2) their thoughts which negatively evaluated the "called for" behavior. The answers to these questions were obtained by providing a structured inventory check list to each subject, tailored to each uniquely. That is, subjects, in answering the above questions, completed an inventory (Appendix C) which listed their unique consensual statements. The statements, of course, were obtained from the initially collected TST identifications, by prescribed procedures, outlined earlier (Tucker, 1966: 353). All of the consensual definitions, including the situationally operative definition--representing the "Me Present", were merely listed for both interactional situations. Each list was concluded with an "Other" category, referencing the fact that not any of the consensual statements were associated with the cognitions informing their behavior in the interactional situation(s).

Responses were interpreted in terms of whether they could be scored as support for the Chicagoan, Iowan, or Io-Chicagoan perspective. Thus, a subject who in any way checked the "Other" category (included at the

end of the series of consensual items--the "Me Previous"), on the inventory, supported the Chicagoan hypothesis. Subjects checking only the sex identification category for situation One and the student category for situation Two supported the Iowan interpretation. Checks in one or several of the categories, not including or including respectively, a check in the sex identification (student identification) category, constituted support for the Io-Chicagoan hypothesis.

The above procedures were carried out for both the aforementioned TST identifications, over the test population, the result being a frequency count of relative support for the three perspectives. Table II summarizes much of the arguments to this point; it is the cells of this table that will receive the differential accumulation of empirical support. The association between this scoring procedure and the elucidated theoretical rationales is quite evident. It is only with the results of the "Why Inquiry" that it becomes possible to precisely answer the question of just which theoretical perspective the data supports in each experimental situation; ergo, and in order to recapitulate, if the analysis shows one or more responses to the "Why Inquiry" which correspond to one (excluding the situational perceptual cognitive factor, the "Me Present") or several (excluding or including the situational perceptual-cognitive factor) of the underlying social selves, then the inference will be of an interaction between a "Me Previous" and a "Me Present". Quite naturally, this implies the additional assumption that the subject is able to accurately concatenate and recall the cognitive elements that informed his behavior. If substantial support obtains in this category (via replication of these procedures), then "behavior informed by a self" would be more credibly discussed from the perspective outlined in

TABLE II
EXPERIMENTAL INTERACTION SITUATIONS PER SUBJECT

	Interaction Situation One			Interaction Situation Two		
	<u>RI</u>	<u>II</u>	<u>NI</u>	<u>RI</u>	<u>II</u>	<u>NI</u>
1 Io-Chicagoan Hypothesis						
2 Chicagoan						
3 Iowan						
1 Io-Chicagoan						
2 Chicagoan						
3 Iowan						

RI = Relevant

II = Irrelevant

NI = No

the theoretical development of this paper. A major gain would be the demonstration of the hypothesis of the less than total unpredictability of behavior. Mead's "I" was unpredictable (creativity; innovativeness), leading to an unpredictable explication of behavior as it is informed by a self. Indeed, the unpredictable estimation of behavior for the I-Chicagoan perspective still remains. This is because the identification of the actual "internalized other(s)", of the several available, which are used in defining a situation and the outcome of these implicated "internalized other(s) in their interaction with the "Me Present" is still indeterminate. However, the total unpredictability of the originality in behavior is narrowed. As such, the remaining "originality" remains as a residue, awaiting further clarification. An additional research assumption is made that the subject will perceive a situation in terms of its objective implications (in case the subject does not, however, recall that this is controlled for).

If the analysis of the check list in any way showed that the subject had checked the "Other" category, thus implying that his cognitions replicated none of his underlying self identifications, but rather, represented novel and innovative cognitions, then the interpretation would be a Chicagoan operative self, involving the interaction of an "I" and "Me".

Subjects failing to check any category other than that which was reflected by the situationally relevant perceptual-cognitive factor were seen as supporting the Iowan self conception, the latter involving no interiorized interaction.

Finally, the subject was queried as to his perceptions in the interactional situation (i.e., the "Me Present" content). The reader

should recall the earlier discussion of the importance of this procedure as a control measure. Only in those cases where there was a congruence between the assumption predicating the rationale and the subject's actual perceptions was the subject's data retained in the analytical procedures.

Such are the procedures and the rationale for generating the data. It is understandable that replication of these procedures over a series of subjects should generate frequency distributions, thus setting the stage for a precise analysis of the data.

Data Analysis Procedures

The reader should, by now, already be aware of the several definitions informing the various relevant concepts. For reasons of formality, the following definitions are explicitly noted:

The "Me Previous" is the collection of consensual statements obtained from the self directed question, "Who Am I?", the TST.

The "Me Present" is the normative content mediating the interaction of any one experimentally contrived group (i.e., Relevant Structure). The source of the normative content refers to one of the consensual responses among the initial half of the TST responses of the subject.

The "I" references responses to a post experimental interview question ("why inquiry") which fails to replicate any of the TST consensual categories, i.e., which fails to have an empirical correspondence among the TST consensual identifications. The "Me" is defined similarly to the "Me Previous."

"Conforming behavior" and "Nonconforming behavior", respectively, are behavior commitments with respect to some particular behavioroid measure either in agreement with or not in agreement with it.

"Chicagoan informed behavior" corresponds nominally to the symbolic interactionist arguments of Mead and Blumer; operationally, it is represented by a person (represented in terms of a frequency mark) whose behavior has been inferred to be a function of the interaction of an "I" and "Me."

"Iowan informed behavior" corresponds nominally to the symbolic interactionist arguments of Kuhn and his followers; operationally, it is represented by a person (represented in terms of a frequency mark) whose behavior has been inferred to be a function of his "conforming behavior" with no interaction of neither an "I" and "Me," nor a "Me Previous" and "Me Present."

"Io- hicagoan informed behavior" corresponds to the symbolic interactionist theoretical argument introduced in the present study; operationally, it is represented by a person (represented in terms of a frequency mark) whose behavior has been inferred to be a function of the interaction of a "Me Previous" and a "Me Present."

With these definitions made explicit, it is possible to continue with the objective in this section. Data from the first experimental manipulation (interactional situation One) and the corollary interview question accompanying it are relevant to the first three cells of Table II, interaction situation One, while the data obtained for the second interactional situation (observation Two) are relevant to the latter three cells of the table. In this same table, relevant interaction (RI) has reference to the meaningfully purposive interaction of the two mental constructs: "Me Previous" and "Me Present." Irrelevant interaction (II) references interaction between an unknowable (at least until after some action and even then one is forced to properly speak of

a "Me") "I" component and a "Me" component. Nonrelevant interaction (NI), naturally refers to the fact that there is no "inner forum" interaction between such mental constructs. The terms relevant and irrelevant and nonrelevant interaction seek to summarize the theoretical elucidation of the three symbolic interactionist perspectives, explicated earlier.

With the cells of Table II differentially filled with frequencies, the first and most intuitive analytical task is that of establishing the significance or nonsignificance of difference between the cell frequencies and proportions. The usefulness of this approach is to show in as a conclusive way as possible, either the support or nonsupport for the arguments of this paper. The frequencies will enable not only the possibility of statistically manipulating them, but of working with proportions. The first operation is one of looking at the significance of differences between the three theoretical rationales for each situation. A chi square goodness of fit test was used to establish these estimates. In further testing of the primary research question, it was necessary to observe the total frequency count for cell 1, as contrasted with those of cells 2 and 3, respectively; and also, the frequencies of cell 2 was compared with those of cell 3. The same relations were also observed for the second observation (cells 4, 5, 6). These frequencies were converted to proportions (dividing each total by the total possible frequencies), after which use was made of the Lawske-Baker Nomograph (Downie and Heath, 1965: 150-151) to observe the particular empirical omega values; these observed omega values can be compared with theoretically occurring critical omega values in order to determine whether each or any of the specified difference relations were significant at a speci-

fied level of confidence. From this, inferences as to whether these particular subjects behave more in terms of the: Iowan, Chicagoan, or Io-Chicagoan rationales is possible.

Finally, because a certain nondefiniteness was perceived in the above analytical procedures, it was decided that more strigent conclusions could be drawn if it were possible to accommodate some procedure which would generate a series of effect parameters for the several postulated conditions. Ideally, the application of some multivariate stochastic process would be desired at this point, but perceiving its nonapplicability, it is instead useful to consider the present data in the light of a more simplistic stochastic process, intimately related to the more informative stochastic processes. Coleman's (1964: 135-139) outline of the use of this analytical procedure may be referred to as a Differential Rate procedure. Here, under the assumption of the existence of a state of aggregate equilibrium (limits on shifts between theoretically related states (categories)), it is possible to precisely and quantitatively speak of empirical behavioral implications represented by the three elucidated symbolic interactionist perspectives in this paper. The ultimate intention is one of establishing the specific equilibrium points of the number of subjects whose behavior is Iowan self informed (or Chicagoan or Io-Chicagoan) at any one time and again at a subsequent time relative to the equilibrium points of the number of subjects whose behavior is informed by each of the alternative self definitions.

Perhaps the suggested rationale may be most parsimoniously understood by a further consideration of the several necessary parameters needed in order to establish the equilibrium points. The several tran-

sition rates suggest the necessity of several calculations, appropriate for two by two contingency tables. From the data collection procedures of this research, tables, as formatted and represented in Tables V, VI, VII (Chapter V), would have to be filled in order to calculate the transition rates and subsequently, the equilibrium points.

The relative frequencies appropriate for each of the cells of the several tables show the subjects, as they are differentially dichotomized for specific analytical purposes at each of two time periods, according to the theoretical perspective supported by the tabulation of their "Why Inquiry" inventory responses. Such a tabular presentation allows portrayal of whether the same subjects, whose responses supported one theoretical perspective at time One, supports the same theoretical perspective at time Two. For example, with Table V, it is possible to observe the number of people whose responses supported the Chicagoan and/or the Io-Chicagoan perspectives (state j), at time One, relative to the number whose responses have shifted to supporting the Iowan interpretation (state l), at time Two. This procedure thus indicates important shifts in both the hypothesized directions, during the intervening period, but the extent to which these shifts tend to counteract one another is the important question for the present research questions. Here, reference is particularly to the relative equilibrium points.

The equilibrium points are denoted by $N_{i\infty}$ and $N_{j\infty}$, where i and j represent the state(s) and ∞ is t (the number of observation time intervals) at infinity. The interval for the present calculation is one. This is because data from two interactional situations have been collected, thus there is one interval between them. It was for this reason that two interactional encounter situations were necessary in the

collection of the data. The established points can be seen as a function of several transition rates (q_{ij} or q_{ji} , where i references a specific theoretical state: 1,2,3 and j references a specific (or specific set) alternative theoretical state(s): 1,2,3, at some subsequent time. Thus the following rates may be designated: q_{1j} (the rate of the number of subjects in state one who shift to state two (Chicagoan) or state three (Io-Chicagoan) at any subsequent time, where state one refers to behavior as a function of the Iowan self conception); q_{2j} (those shifting from state two to state one or state three); q_{3j} (those shifting from state three to state one or state two). The rates: q_{ji} ; q_{j2} ; q_{j3} reflect the opposite transition process. The equilibrium points ($N_{i\infty}$ or $N_{j\infty}$, where i (or j) represents the state (or states) and ∞ is t (number of observation time intervals at infinity) are as defined. In the calculations, when N_{it} (the number in some state at time) is substituted by $N_{1\infty}$ (or $N_{2\infty}$ or $N_{3\infty}$) and the appropriate equations are solved, the aggregate equilibrium points can be established. These points will allow a definitive conclusion for the second research question.

By looking at these points (that is, after having solved for each of them) in a comparative fashion, it is possible in a definitive manner to observe whether over time, the behavior of the subjects of this research is informed more characteristically by a self defined in terms of the Chicagoan, Iowan, or Io-Chicagoan symbolic interactionist theoretical perspectives.

The reader should recall that the ultimate concern, here, is a more precise quantitative statement (i.e., information in addition to the statement: "there is a significant difference"). Either the latter and/or some other elaboration technique usually obtains. As Coleman

(1964: 190) states:

...the usual procedure for multivariate analysis of attribute data remains as always: we lay out in tabular form the data in its full grandeur, then examine the percentages in the dependent attribute among the various classifications.

Such a multiangulated approach to data analysis, as the above, is especially relevant in the initial stages of any theoretical exploration (indeed, an argument can be made for such an approach at any theoretical stage). This statement will become increasingly meaningful with the progression of this research report.

CHAPTER V

RESULTS OF THE METHODOLOGICAL PROCEDURES

Research Question One

Data to answer the primary research question is presented in Tables III and IV. Significant X^2 goodness of fit values of 16.11 and 23.68 for observations One and Two, respectively, obtain, summarizing the differential empirical support for the three tested theoretical perspectives. This is to say that there are significant differences, for both testing situations, in the empirical support obtaining for the Chicagoan, Iowan, and Io-Chicagoan theoretical perspectives. The next step in the clarification of these two overall measures involves the individual study of the several relationships possible between the three perspectives at each observation point. At this stage of analysis, it will become possible to note a few additional comments in relation to the overall trend. Use of the Lawshe-Baker Nomograph (Downie and Heath, 1965: 150) enables such an examination in terms of the relevant differential proportions. For observation (situation) One, critical omega values (.05 significance level) of .42, .30, and .41 are found, corresponding respectively to the obtained omega values of .62 (describing the proportion difference between the Chicagoan and Iowan empirical support), .18 (describing the proportion difference between the Chicagoan and Io-Chicagoan empirical support), and .77 (describing the proportion difference between the Io-Chicagoan and Iowan empirical support).

TABLE III
 FREQUENCY OF DIFFERENTIAL EMPIRICAL SUPPORT FOR THREE (3)
 MAJOR INTERACTIONIST THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES
 FOR OBSERVATION (SITUATION) ONE

Theoretical Perspective	Theoretical Support			
	Obtained Frequency	%	Expected Frequency	%
Iowan	15	15	33.33	33.33
Chicagoan	37	37	33.33	33.33
Io-Chicagoan	48	48	33.33	33.33
Totals	100	100	99.99	99.99

$$\chi^2 = 16.11 \text{ (P} < .05; \text{ df} = 2; \text{ N} = 100).$$

TABLE IV
 FREQUENCY OF DIFFERENTIAL EMPIRICAL SUPPORT FOR THREE (3)
 MAJOR INTERACTIONIST THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES
 FOR OBSERVATION (SITUATION) TWO

Theoretical Perspective	Theoretical Support			
	Obtained Frequency	%	Expected Frequency	%
Iowan	56	56	33.33	33.33
Chicagoan	19	19	33.33	33.33
Io-Chicagoan	25	25	33.33	33.33
Totals	100	100	99.99	99.99

$$\chi^2 = 23.68 \text{ (P} < .05; \text{ df} = 2; \text{ N} = 100).$$

observation (situation) Two results in critical omega ($P < .05$) and observed omega values, respectively, of: .37 and .76 (Chicagoan and Iowan); .42 and .21 (Chicagoan and Io-Chicagoan); .33 and .56 (Io-Chicagoan and Iowan). Conclusions concerning these observations avail deductions of significant differences in the proportions between the Chicagoan and Iowan support for both observation time periods; non-significant proportion differences between the Chicagoan and Io-Chicagoan support for both observation time periods; and finally, significant proportion differences between the Io-Chicagoan and Iowan support for both time periods. These conclusions, taken at face value, represent a degree of confidence in the stability of the differences, at least over these two time periods and for the associated situations.

However, upon closer analysis, an inconsistency forces itself to attention. The results at this stage of analysis show that there is a significantly greater proportion of support for the Chicagoan perspective when compared with the Iowan perspective for situation One. Analysis of situation Two, however, shows the opposite conclusion; there is significantly more support for the Iowan perspective than the Chicagoan perspective. The lack of the accumulation of significant support for either perspective is evident in the case of the comparison of the Chicagoan and Io-Chicagoan categories, for both situations. Additionally, situation One shows the significantly greater support for the Io-Chicagoan perspective, when contrasted with the support received by the Iowan perspective, however, a direct reversal in these conclusions is necessitated for situation Two; that is, there was significantly more support for the Iowan perspective as contrasted with the Io-Chicagoan perspective.

The additional findings at this stage of the analysis certainly do constitute a matter for further concern.

Research Question Two

For this reason and in an attempt to accommodate a more precise set of analytical procedures, the data was analyzed at a third stage, in anticipation that some further insights might avail. Tables V, VI, and VII summarize the pertinent information: equilibrium points and transition rates.

Both Tables VI and VII show, respectively, the much higher rates of transition (1.499 and 1.459) for subject migration from their initial position in state 2 (Chicagoan) and state 3 (Io-Chicagoan) to states: 1 or 3 (that is, to the states associated with the Iowan or Io-Chicagoan perspectives) and 1 or 2 (Iowan or Chicagoan). These respective transition rates should be seen relative to those moving from states 1 or 3 (Iowan or Io-Chicagoan; Table VI) to state 2 ($q_{j2} = .277$); and, for Table VII, those moving from states 1 or 2 (Iowan or Chicagoan) to state 3 ($q_{j3} = .323$). Each of the rates in Tables VI and VII can, in turn, be compared to the associated rates of movement in Table V. Table V summarizes the rate of moving from state 1 (Iowan) to states 2 or 3 ($q_{1j} = .737$) and from states 2 or 3 (Chicagoan or Io-Chicagoan) to state 1 ($q_{j1} = 1.319$). In less technical terms, the six rates precisely attest to the fact that behavior which is interpretable in terms of the Iowan or Chicagoan or Io-Chicagoan self definition on the first observation is more likely to be interpretable by the Iowan definition, rather than either the Chicagoan or Io-Chicagoan definition, on the second observation (situation).

TABLE V

OVER TIME FREQUENCIES OF SUBJECTS MOVING FROM STATE 1 TO STATE j
(STATES 2 OR 3) AND FROM STATE j TO STATE 1

Observation Two	Observation One	
	State 1	State j
State 1	11	47
State j	5	37

$$q_{1j} = .737$$

$$q_{j1} = 1.319$$

$$N_{1\infty} = 64$$

$$N_{j\infty} = 36$$

TABLE VI

OVER TIME FREQUENCIES OF SUBJECTS MOVING FROM STATE 2 TO STATE j
(STATES 1 OR 3) AND FROM STATE j TO STATE 2

Observation Two	Observation One	
	State 2	State j
State 2	11	8
State j	26	55

$$q_{2j} = 1.499$$

$$q_{j2} = .277$$

$$N_{2\infty} = 15$$

$$N_{j\infty} = 85$$

TABLE VII

OVER TIME FREQUENCIES OF SUBJECTS MOVING FROM STATE 3 TO STATE j
(STATES 1 OR 2) AND FROM STATE j TO STATE 3

Observation Two	Observation One	
	State 3	State j
State 3	15	8
State j	32	45

$$q_{3j} = 1.459$$

$$q_{j3} = .323$$

$$N_{3\infty} = 18$$

$$N_{j\infty} = 82$$

In generalizing the relative theoretical support, over time, beyond the two present observations, the functionality of the equilibrium points becomes evident. Thus $N_{1\infty}$ (Table V) contains 64 people out of 100 while $N_{j\infty}$ (the aggregate equilibrium number of subjects, at anytime, whose behavior is informed by one of the self process rationales other than the Iowan rationale, i.e., the Iowan rationale is synonymous with state 1) contains 36 out of the 100. From Tables VI and VII, the numbers, respectively, for: $N_{2\infty}$, $N_{j\infty}$, $N_{3\infty}$, $N_{j\infty}$ are: 15, 85, 18, and 82. The immediate task thus becomes one of establishing the relative proportion differences (significant or nonsignificant) between the empirical support obtaining for the three theoretical perspectives. The first question is whether $N_{1\infty}$ (64) is similar to $N_{2\infty}$ (15); that is, is there a significant difference in the subjects moving from state 1 to states 2 or 3 and these moving from state 2 to states 1 or 3. In order to make an empirical comment on this question, it is necessary to look at the relative change in frequencies of support for the various theoretical perspectives, over time. For the first question, attention should be directed to Tables V and VI. Directing attention first, to Table V, this rationale suggest the relevancy of the number of subjects initially in state 1 at observation One who migrated to states 2 or 3 by observation two. It is found that of the 16 subjects in state 1 initially, 5 of them actually did make the above migration, that is .31 of the initial 16 migrated. Using the same logic in Table VI (however, for state 2 relative to states 1 or 3), the proportion is .70. The z value ($z = -2.84$; $P < .05$) shows that the two proportions, are significantly different.

A second question is whether $N_{1\infty}$ (64) relative to $N_{j\infty}$ (36) is significantly different from $N_{3\infty}$ (18) relative to $N_{j\infty}$ (82). Using the same

rationale as was used in answering the above question, a significant z value of -2.76 ($P < .05$) obtains, describing the relation of the respective proportions. The final z value ($.20$), describes the over time nonsignificant difference between $N_{2\infty}$ (15, in relation to $N_{j\infty}$ (85)) and $N_{3\infty}$ (18, in relation to $N_{j\infty}$ (82)).

This latter difference, of course, reflects the fact that with the present data, neither the Chicagoan nor the Io-Chicagoan interpretation is superior relative to the other in the amount of support that obtains for either, crosssectionally or overtime. With respect to the second question of this section (the significance of difference between the equilibrium points, $N_{1\infty}$ and $N_{3\infty}$, relative respectively, to " $N_{j\infty} = 36$ " and " $N_{j\infty} = 18$ "), there is strong support for the Iowan interpretation. Finally, referring back to the first question in this section (the significance of difference in the number of subjects, moving from state 1 to states 2 or 3 and those moving from state 2 to states 1 or 3), the results also give support to the belief that over time ($t = \infty$), it is possible to expect behavior to be more in line with the Iowan interpretation, rather than the Chicagoan or Io-Chicagoan interpretation; and further the aggregate equilibrium points establish the exact points of expectation. Overall, therefore, and in answer to the second research question of the chapter, the viability of the Iowan interpretation for the present data is quite precisely evident. That is, over time (over variable situations) it is possible to expect behavior to be significantly more in line with the Iowan rationale rather than the Io-Chicagoan rationale, as was suggested in the statement of the research question in Chapter III, or the Chicagoan rationale.

CHAPTER VI

SUMMARY, IMPORTANCE AND IMPLICATIONS OF THE STUDY

Symbolic interaction, as a social psychological theoretical orientation, denotes the explanation of behavior as a function of the influence that one person has on another as a result of the individual first mentally interacting with a set of shared other definitions, leading to a definition of the situation, upon which behavior follows. This social psychological explanation of behavior is different from a sociological explanation via structural functionalism (behavior phenomena are functional for a larger group) as well as other social psychological explanations. Shaw and Costanzo (1970) refer to these social psychological explanations as theoretical orientations. These include the reinforcement (behavior is seen as a function of reinforcement patterns); the cognitive (behavior is seen as a function of the tensions/nontensions resulting from unbalanced/balanced cognitions); the psychoanalytic (behavior is seen as a function of the result of solutions to conflicting unconscious and conscious psychological forces); and the field theoretical (behavior is seen as a function of the total field of psychological forces: individual and environmental) orientations.

With the location of interactionist arguments established in relation to various alternative theoretical arguments, the purpose of this chapter may be seen as one of "closing and then reopening ranks". That is, the present chapter has as its goal the provision not only of a

succinct review of the arguments and findings of the preceding chapters, but a larger goal, that of deducing a number of theoretical and research implications from the comments made in the preceding chapters.

The study began by examining the institutionalized assumption of the nonresearchability of symbolic interactionist explanations; anti-thetical to this, observation was made of the landmark theoretical contribution of interactionist arguments in the works of Cooley and Mead. This contribution was seen as constituting the basis of a viable social psychological theoretical perspective. In fact, Hollander (1968), in a contemporary introductory social psychology text, speaks of the contribution of interactionist thoughts in the early development of social psychology. From just this cursory and yet undeveloped discussion, the merit of inferring a dilemma in the tradition (the interactionist tradition) was seen as a viable one. The development of this dilemma was presented in terms of the Chicagoan and Iowan interactionist perspectives. Chicagoan symbolic interaction was seen as a reaction to behaviorist assumptions, therefore, Mead contended that behaviorist considered only the external aspects of total behavior. Mead's "social behaviorism" argues for nonsignificant as well as significant gestures in behavioral explanation. Recognition of an inner-incorporated mental process, involving an interaction of an "I" and "Me", was especially stressed. The mediating role of language, in this process, was also discussed. It was noted that implied in the foregoing was a certain complexity, only adequately described by further examination of the concepts: "I" and "Me". It was through the latter concept that it was possible to infer the potential influence of social definitions upon individual behavior. The corresponding adjusted response (many times

novel and innovative) of the interactant to the perceived other's definition was seen as the "I". It is via the interaction of these two mental components that one may most parsimoniously and correctly observe the referents in contemporary definitions of social psychology. In any theory of behavior, it was noted that it was of utmost importance to preserve the basic essence of this proposition, an "inner incorporated process". Presently, Blumer was seen as one who explicitly retains the idea.

Though noting the theoretical importance of the Chicagoan proposition, it is scientifically essential that convincing empirical substantiations of it be made evident. The latter has not been an easy task for the Chicagoans; the reasons for this were found to rest mainly in the inadequate and/or inconsistent definitions of the major concepts. Along these lines, discussion was made of Mead's qualifactory use of the "I" concept. For example, Kolb (1944) was noted as referring to the "I" as a vaguely defined residual category. Indeed, it is the feeling of the present writer that if primary praise can be accorded to Mead for originating the proposition, then a primary indictment can be accorded him for his unclear definitions of the major concepts of the perspective.

Iowan interactionist, represented mainly by Manford Kuhn (1956, 1964), have perceived this definitional ambiguity and led by an emphasis on empirical verification, have dictated a theoretical position, divorced of the "interpretative essence". For example, Kuhn has defined the "self as the responses subjects make to the self-directed question: "Who Am I?" This was seen as certainly a step in a definitionally precise direction; however, the complete Iowan argument was seen as logically unacceptable, despite its theoretically explicit accommodation of

an argument of an internal rehearsing process, because of the implicit corollary deductions which follow the complete Iowan argument (i.e., that the acting person mentally and internally searches for that self definition that corresponds to the perceived role other definition). If the latter is the case, then the acting person would need to mentally search (rehearse) his self definitions no further than the immediate perceived role other definition. The immediate inference of this logic was that behavior is role defined. Even granting that the person does rehearse his several constituting self definitions in the Iowan manner, the resulting interpretative process was seen as still not comparable to the Chicagoan implication of a mental interaction not only between the "Me" (role definitional other) and the "I" (consensual self definition), but also between the "I" components themselves (whatever they may be).

In terms of the above arguments, the postulated dilemma within the interactionist tradition was seen as becoming quite real. This dilemma, stated in formal terms, was posed as a question: Is the goal one of empirically relevant but incomplete theory, or of nonempirically relevant but complete theory. A rationale that preserved the Chicagoan interpretative and processual essence was seen as needed, which at the same time would be defined precisely enough to allow its empirical elucidation.

A conceptualization (the Io-Chicagoan) was introduced that was seen as retaining this essence and indeed retaining the contentual nature of the Chicagoan "Me". It was with respect to the structural (where structural refers to a position in a system, i.e., a mental system, consisting of mental positions, say "individualistic cognitions" and "others cognitions") and functional relationships between the "I" and "Me" that a reformulation was seen necessary. This was accomplished by

positing a processual relation between a "Me Previous" (collection of consensual Twenty Statements Test responses--TST identifications, having an attitudinal base) and a "Me Present" (a perceptual-cognitive factor of the immediate normative content, mediating interaction).

In the theoretical elucidation of the scheme, several mentally incorporated selves (socially accumulated) were seen as pre-existing, structurally taking the place of the Chicagoan "I". This, of course, was noted as quite similar to the Iowan rationale. Thus mental position one (arbitrarily defined; the underlying self component), previously occupied by "I" content was seen as now having the content of the Chicagoan "Me". This, of course, was based on the assumption that the content of the "Me" consisted of several self-role other input definitions and not just one; if the latter obtained, the "Me" would be comparable to the Iowan "role definitional other" and the Io-Chicagoan "Me Present". This content was referred to as the "Me Previous". "Me Previous;" refers to the specific consensual definition called forth at any particular time. The source of this call was referenced as the "Me Present"; the latter occupies mental position two; structurally, it takes the place of the Chicagoan "Me", content wise, it lacks a Chicagoan cohort, just as the "I" has no "explicit" cohort in the current formulation. The "Me Present", seen as the perceived normative content mediating interaction in any situation, is again quite comparable to the Iowan "perceived role other definition".

Though the comparability between the Iowan and the Io-Chicagoan perspectives was seen as constant to that point, the latter formulation was identified as accommodating not only a testable statement of definition, but also was noted for retaining the "essence" of the original

Chicagoan proposition. Other advantages followed also, including its (the Io-Chicagoan rationale) utility in positing further research questions; yet, this argument was tempered with the realization of its less than deterministic explanation. The following research questions thus became evident: 1) Is there a significant difference in the number of individuals whose behavior is informed by a Chicagoan, Iowan, or Io-Chicagoan conception of the self? 2) Over variable situations, will the number of persons whose behavior is in line with the Io-Chicagoan hypothesis characterize a quantitatively greater number of person's behavior than either the Chicagoan or the Iowan hypotheses?

To test these questions, data was collected from introductory sociology students (selected on the basis of the responses obtained from their TST and the attitudinal basis underlying these responses). Students were selected if they identified themselves by "sex" and by the term "student", among the first ten responses. These students then elaborated the meaning of being a "male" or "female" and the meaning of being a "student" for them. Next the selection process involved taking those potential subjects whose responses after content analysis suggested an attitude favorable or unfavorable with respect to the women's liberationist ideology and an utilitarian attitude toward their status as a student. Students meeting the above criteria served in the experimental phase of the data collection procedures. This involved a distinct encounter group (two confederates and a naive subject). The confederates, while the subject was under the impression that he/she and the other two people were waiting to participate in an experiment, acted in a specified manner, i.e., contrary to the attitudinal implications inferred earlier from the subject. The confederates noted whether the

subject would commit him/herself to some behavior in line with the operative normative standards, portrayed by the confederates. This perceived situation by the subject is the "Me Present". Afterward, subjects completed an inventory, listing the consensual statements of the subject. To complete this inventory, subjects recalled the cognitions (positive and negative) involved in the earlier encounter with the confederates. Responses were interpreted in terms of whether they could be scored as support for the Chicagoan, Iowan, or Io-Chicagoan.

These procedures, followed for both the aforementioned TST identifications, over the test population, resulted in a frequency count of relative support for the three perspectives. Simple test of the significance of difference in frequencies and proportions, and a stochastic analysis, referred to as a Differential Rate procedure, were calculated in order to precisely establish the relative support for the three theoretical perspectives.

The results of these procedures were seen as offering direct answers to the research questions. The answer to the first research question (Is there a significant difference in the number of individuals whose behavior is informed by a Chicagoan, Iowan, or Io-Chicagoan conception of the self?) was "yes". Specifically, the results showed that there was a significantly greater proportion of support for the Chicagoan perspective when compared with the Iowan perspective for situation One. Analysis of situation Two, however, showed the opposite conclusion; there was significantly more support for the Iowan perspective than the Chicagoan perspective. The lack of the accumulation of significant support for either perspective was evident in the case of the comparisons between the Chicagoan and the Io-Chicagoan categories for

both situations. With respect to the Io-Chicagoan and the Iowan rationales, situation One showed the significantly greater support for the Io-Chicagoan perspective, when contrasted with the support received by the Iowan perspective; however, a direct reversal in the conclusions was necessitated for situation Two. There was significantly more support for the Iowan perspective as contrasted with the Io-Chicagoan perspective.

The answer to the second question (over variable situations, will the number of persons whose behavior is in line with the Io-Chicagoan hypothesis characterize a quantitatively greater number of persons' behavior than either the Chicagoan or the Iowan hypotheses?) was "no". Specifically, the results showed, for the present data, that over time, it is possible to expect behavior to be significantly more in line with the Iowan rationale, rather than the Io-Chicagoan rationale or the Chicagoan rationale.

It is in terms of these answers to the research questions that a few general comments can be made concerning the importance and the implications of the present study.

Of course, the general factor guiding the above arguments as well as underlying the present comments has been and is a search for the clarification, theoretically and empirically, of the symbolic interactionist orientation as a social psychological theoretical (research) perspective; the specific corollary is the intention of making the perspective a viable one within this substantive area. A step in this direction has certainly been taken, whatever the present inadequacies in the operationality of these several theoretical concepts. At the same time, it is noted that though many of the definitional problems that

beset the interactionist orientation, have been encountered in the present study, many other perplexities are present, whose clarification await attention. For example, what is the precise relation between the "Me" and the "generalized other"? Is the understanding of the "Me" to be a broader category subsuming the "generalized other" or is it to be equated with the "generalized other", that is, do both the "Me" and the "generalized other" refer to one or several internalized other(s). Perhaps the even more basic question, in this context, is just what the consensus of agreement is on the meaning of any one of the terms. Indeed this relation must be clarified before it will be possible to seek answers to the subsequent questions of the nature of the relation between the "Me", "generalized other", "Me Previous", and "Me Present." This understanding would add to the further development of the interactionist orientation. A series of additional hypotheses have emerged from these arguments, as well.

It would be of interest to examine the research questions of this study over varying contrived interactional situations, i.e., groups whose "given off" perceptual-cognitive content corresponds to lesser relevant consensual (TST) identifications (TST consensual identifications occurring in the latter half of the TST instrument) of the subject, or to nonrelevant consensual identifications (having no TST consensual identification cohort among the subject's TST responses). With this data, further questions would become evidenced, i.e., questions of the "inner forum" experience. What, for example, characterizes the "inner forum", when the "Me Present" cognition does not correspond to any of the "Me Previous" cognitions, or when it has various conflicting states relevant to the "Me Previous".

Additionally, it has been observed that the actual data rest upon the assumption that the subject is able to accurately concatenate and recall the cognitive elements that informed his behavior at some specified time. Just how adequate this assumption is is an empirical question. Research endeavors seeking the determination of the extent of the discrepancy between this assumption and empirical fact are mandatory. The investigator's experience in this research attest to this fact. For instance, while for many of the subjects, responding to the inventory check list was of little difficulty, for others, it was a most difficult task. The need for the establishment of the systematic quality of the above methodology could be increased by incorporating a means of structurally (therefore more precisely) gathering information on the person's groups to which he refers himself for behavior in any situation. This suggest the usefulness of some procedure or modification of some procedure that could take the place of the consensual inventory check list and the assumptions which underlie its use. This latter procedure, of course, would be dependent upon its own assumption (that indeed a relation exist between the self and one's reference other(s)), but it is based on a theoretical assumption, the adequacy of which could be tested and used as a check on the postulated relationship of self informative indications and their relationship to one's socially significant other(s) from which these definitions are obtained.

In a similar vein, serious consideration must also be given to what has earlier been referred to as the "lack of systematic research qualities" in the categorizing of the TST identifications into consensual and nonconsensual statements. McPhail (1968), has shown the theoretical definition of consensual statements (self statements agreed

upon and requiring no further interpretation) to be empirically unfounded. Additionally in this same article, the writer questions the ordinality assumption (that consensual and subconsensual statements form an ordinal scale when examined with Guttman's model for scalogram analysis), an assumption basic to the research procedures of this study. These various questions cast doubt on the validity and reliability of the TST as it is used in the operationalizations of the basic construct of this paper. An accommodation to these criticisms of the measurement instrument is indeed in order.

This topic raises a deeper matter concerning the relationship between the Iowan and Io-Chicagoan perspectives. Both the similarities and the differences of the two approaches have been discussed. The reader will recall that a major theoretical and research distinction between the two revolves around the role of the "processual nature of the self"; that is, the theoretical incorporation, as well as the research incorporation of a intra-individual mentalistic interaction process. This argument, it was argued, held because of the deductive implications of Kuhn's theory. Thus, for example, the perceived role other definition indeed calls forth the appropriate consensual self definition; this was seen as the extent of the symbolic interaction, however. Logically, there would not need to be any further mental interaction. Although this is the only logical implication, it would be interesting for research purposes to disavow this implication and allow that the person does indeed rehearse many of his incorporated definitions. This would bring the Iowan and Io-Chicagoan perspectives much closer conceptually, in terms of the importance of the processual role of the self. The two perspectives would still remain distinct, however. This difference is

reflected by the fact that the ultimate self definition informing behavior, for the Iowans, would be one congruent with the role other definition. This would not necessarily be the case for the Io-Chicagoan perspective. Indeed, according to the latter perspective, the person may go through a long line of rehearsed consensual definitions as well as their interactions with each other. The result may be that the person may act in line with the "Me Present" (role other definition), but it is just as likely that he will not act in this manner because another consensual definition may have a potency value for him that exceeds the value of the self definition, corresponding to the "Me Present". This once again details the totally deterministic orientation of the Iowan perspective, albeit the less than nondeterministic, as well as the less than deterministic approach of the Io-Chicagoan approach when it is compared with the Chicagoan and Iowan perspectives, respectively.

This more liberal interpretation of the Iowan perspective is one that could be empirically tested if the interpretation is believed to have merit. All that would be necessary, from the perspective of the present research paradigm would be to incorporate into the post experimental inventory a statement asking the respondent to make a distinction between predisposing and precipitating consensual alternatives. In this case, the inventory check list could have responses in more than just the "Me Previous" definition, corresponding to the "Me Present" cognition, and support would accumulate for both the Iowan and Io-Chicagoan perspectives. Additionally, however, the respondent would mark the precipitating factor that led to his behavior. If the so-marked category was one corresponding to the "Me Previous", support could be scored for the Iowans; if the marked category was any of the other definitions

(that is, besides the "Other" category) as well as the definition congruent with the "Me Present", support would obtain for the Io-Chicagoan perspective. The resulting nonmutually exclusive nature of the category responses would, of course, necessitate an accommodating statistical analysis technique. This scoring suggestion is only one, and perhaps indeed needs further refining and/or modification. The major point presently is not to arrive at a definitive solution to the several implications being voiced, but only to make a few of them (and the consequences following their application) evident.

Additionally, the need for a more parsimonious measurement procedure is another implication from the above procedures. Perhaps some scoring procedure could be found relevant for distinguishing among subjects' "modes of behavior as informed by a self;" interest would then arise concerning the variation of the scores, thus suggesting other statistical and/or analytical techniques.

Also, the issue of the relevance of some type of computer simulation algorithm is evident. What are the possibilities of a computer program which starts with known attitudinally based self identifications and a specific discussion topic (i.e., the situational perceptual-cognitive factor in the above conception--the Me Present), with the ultimate objective being the prediction of the behavior informing qualities of the self (i.e., the Iowan, Chicagoan or Io-Chicagoan). Intervening in the simulation procedure, various contingencies could be provided for (for example and hypothetically, the assumption might be that the more, "socially anchored" person will be one whose behavior is informed by an Io-Chicagoan interpretation of the self. The results could be compared to actual findings and the discrepancies, used as an

indication of the appropriateness of the simulation. The possibilities here are tremendous, especially considering the larger number of contingent variable conditions which can be handled by the computer, relative to the unaided human brain.

Another implication, stressed throughout this study has been the emphasis on the importance of offering a most explicit and credible theoretical accommodation to the guiding human behavioral function: Behavior = Person X Environment. This latter variable is most often theoretically (and consequently, empirically) denied present social psychological conception and research, thus the inconsistencies in socio-psychological literature and the resultant failure of various social program agencies which use this literature to inform their programs. An even greater accommodation to the situation can be demanded. That is, one can obtain such measures as those postulated in this study by the study of the actual groups of which the subjects are participants. This research design would study subjects within their actual reference groups, among individuals who constitute real significant others for the subjects.

The final, but perhaps most immediate implication that is evidenced from the summary and conclusions presented in this chapter is recognition of the fact that in spite of the apparent conclusiveness of the above findings, it is necessary to recognize that what comes out of an analysis is only as good as what goes into it; therefore, it is of extreme importance to refrain from accepting the above conclusions without additional interpretation and discussion of them. The first remark that can be made is directed to the latter stages of the analytical procedures (answering the second research question). It is quite evident that

the value of the respective transition rates within each table (Tables V, VI, VII; Chapter V) will be a function of the time priority of the respective observations and the associated experimental situations. That is, the rate will reflect the change in frequencies with respect to their initial magnitude (situation One) and the magnitude at a subsequent time (situation Two). This should represent little problem, as long as the referents of the observations (the situations) are theoretically equated. However, if they are not, then it is possible to anticipate the meaninglessness of the relative transition rates and their consequent aggregate equilibrium points.

The specific situational referents for the present research were the cognitions informing the behavior of: 1) signing or not signing a letter to the school newspaper in support of women's liberation; 2) co-signing or not co-signing a letter to the school newspaper, supporting arguments against a mandatory class policy of using students in social psychological experiments. The two situations were experimentally created in order to represent situations, which when cognized by the subject would constitute a perceptual-cognitive factor, a factor reflecting a central part of his self definition. The two self definition factors, corresponding, respectively, to the two experimentally manipulated perceptual-cognitive factors were: "I am a male (female)" and "I am a student". The hypothesis suggested, presently, is that there is something consensually different about the meaning to an individual of identifying himself as a male/female and identifying himself as a student. Indeed, both of these definitions are consensual definitions, as opposed to nonconsensual ones; that is, the person identifies him/herself in terms of observable social categories. However, the present

hypothesis is that it is necessary to make an additional distinction among the consensual definitions themselves. As a step in this direction, it would seem that the variable of the "temporariness" or "permanency" of the self definition for the respondent must be taken into consideration. The permanency of one's sex identification is quite evident. In general interactionist terms, the totality of one's role identities often can be seen as revolving around the sex identification. Thus, it should be expected that any situation presenting itself directly to this central identity will therefore implicate a greater number of other identities than if a less central (less meaningful) identity had been confronted. It follows that the identification of one's self as a student, while important, is a definition of extreme transiency. Theoretically and as reflected in the obtained results, the deduction can be made that the recognition of the relevance of the perceptual-cognitive factor for the person's self identity is more meaningful if that factor and the corresponding self definition is a more or less permanent one; in such a permanent, meaningful case, the person will take more time symbolically weighing his "Me Previous", making sure that the implicated behavior will not result in some unwanted consequence. For the perceptual-cognitive factor associated with a less permanent self definition, the degree of its connectedness should not be as great as in the former case; therefore, the person should not feel that he must weigh the consequences as carefully.

The totality of this argument is reflected in all aspects of the present data analysis. During observation One (situation One, the sex identification experimentally manipulated factor), only 15 out of 100 of the subjects' responses could be interpreted in terms of the Iowan

perspective in contrast to 48 out of 100 (almost 50%) via the Io-Chicagoan perspective and 37 out of 100 for the Chicagoan perspective. This can be compared to observation (situation) Two, the student identification experimentally manipulated factor; 56 out of 100 (over 50%) of the responses were coded in terms of support for the Iowan interpretation, comparable to 19 out of 100 and 25 out of 100, respectively, for the Chicagoan and Io-Chicagoan interpretations. Of course, the significant proportions for situation One reflect this argument in more cogent terms.

The immediate implication of these arguments is the empirical representation and testing of additional consensual self definitions (hypothesized permanent and temporary ones) to see if the same findings as above, obtain. If they do, a significant trend observed in this research, especially in situation One, deserves much further empirical consideration. This trend is reflected in the significant difference found between Iowan and Io-Chicagoan empirical support. Additionally, despite the lack of significant difference between the Chicagoan and the Io-Chicagoan empirical support and even if the discussion and interpretation of the present findings do not hold in future research, a credible alternative theoretical symbolic interactionist perspective has been demonstrated, both substantiatively and empirically. This is indeed a step above and beyond the dilemma that presently characterizes the two most popular symbolic interactionist perspectives.

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A P P E N D I X E S

APPENDIX A

TWENTY STATEMENTS TEST

There are 20 numbered blanks on the page below. Please write twenty different answers to the question 'Who Am I' in the blanks. Just give twenty different answers to this question. Answer as if you were giving the answers to yourself, not to somebody else. Write the answers in the order that they occur to you. Don't worry about logic or importance. Go along fairly fast, for time is limited, i.e., 12 minutes.

I am:

1. _____
2. _____
3. _____
4. _____
5. _____
6. _____
7. _____
8. _____
9. _____
10. _____
11. _____
12. _____
13. _____
14. _____
15. _____
16. _____
17. _____
18. _____
19. _____
20. _____

APPENDIX B

OPEN-ENDED ATTITUDE QUESTIONNAIRE

Earlier in the semester, you filled out the initial part of this questionnaire. The second stage of the present research endeavor is merely one which seeks a further clarification of a couple of your initial answers. Specifically, you mentioned that you were: 1. a student; 2. a male (female) and/or man (woman).

For each response label below: (student; male (female) and/or man (woman)), please write one sentence describing what that response means to you. For example, write one sentence telling what being a student means to you, that is, for you, what is the most important thing about your being a student. Do the same thing for the second response, i.e., what is the most important thing about being a male (female).

STUDENT

MALE (FEMALE) AND/OR MAN (WOMAN)

If you would be willing to participate in an experiment in the Sociology Dept., sometime within the next 4 or 5 weeks, please indicate, by writing your telephone number, where you can be reached, on the line below. It will take only about 10 or 15 minutes of your time. Thank you.

APPENDIX C

POST OBSERVATION INVENTORY CHECKLIST

(AN EXAMPLE)

In the second waiting room, you were asked to sign a letter to the O'Colly, supporting some viewpoint. You either did or did not sign. Please rethink what your thoughts were at that time, leading you to sign or not sign the letter. Consider both thoughts which led you to and away from signing.

If your thoughts leading you to sign or not sign were related to any of the items below, please put a check in each applicable blank of the first column. For example, ask yourself: Was the reason I signed (or did not sign) the letter related to the fact that I am in a Fraternity. If it is, then check Fraternity. If the reason is not in the list (i.e., you cannot associate the reason(s) with any of the categories), then check Other.

A Woman	_____	_____
A Student	_____	_____
A Wife	_____	_____
A Daughter	_____	_____
A Sister	_____	_____
Other (Please Specify)	_____	_____

Now use the same directions for the situation, where the confederate attempted to get you to walk out of the experiment. This time make checks in the second column of blanks. Thank you.

VITA

Ronnie Carmichael Manuel

Candidate for the Degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

Thesis: A SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGICAL SOLUTION TO THE DILEMMA BETWEEN THE
CHICAGOAN AND IOWAN SCHOOLS OF SYMBOLIC INTERACTION

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