SOCIOLOGICAL FORMULATIONS

OF ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL

IDEOLOGIES

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OF ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL

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Dean of the Graduate College

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PREFACE

The study of ideology is hardly a science; thus, it is difficult
to implement standardized methodological procedures in its analysis.
It becomes necessary, therefore, to utilize an optional approach,
sociology as an art form, in gaining proper insights into the signifi-
cance of ideology as it is manifested in society via values and influ-
ences in regards to how persons act out their lives. The assumption
which is made here is that when C. Wright Mills described the "socio-
logical imagination," he was referring to individuals acting as whole
persons aware of ideological constraint.

A selection of literature dealing with ideology and the sociology
of knowledge is critically reviewed for purposes of gaining a general
understanding of the concept. This literature, not exhaustive because
of time and space considerations, is designed to introduce the main-
stream contributions of Marx, Mannheim, Sorokin and others to the
controversial nature of ideology. Issues such as "New Left," "Radical
Sociology" and the "End of Ideology" controversy are reviewed for their
impact on the concept. In a general sense, ideology is viewed here as
an "antecedent" variable or one which must be given first consideration
in any sociological analysis.

Notation is made that despite the scholastic works of Mannheim and
others, many writers in sociology use ideology as a catchall mystique
term which is devoid of meaning. In this respect, ideology shares a

common fate with other concepts such as "attitude," "culture,"
"society" and "community." Stress has been placed on economic and
political ideologies or the "prime movers" for most societies. In
brief, this is a theoretical dissertation which attempts to evaluate
constituent variables and ideas associated with the concept ideology.
It does not purport to be a final statement on the subject but more a
relative approximation of our present knowledge based on the best
evidence available.

In essence, this study attempts to take ideology out of the dark
corridors of the mind and to expose it to the bright sunlight for what
it actually means to individuals, groups and societies. The ongoing
question which this dissertation attempts to resolve is formulated in
the following way: What is this concept--ideology--that has the
capacity to be "all" or "nothing," "truth" or "distortion," "driving
force" or "deterrent" all rolled up into one "entity" or "package deal"
as corporate symbolism would have it?

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

The concept of "ideology" shares many common characteristics with

that of "social class." Both terms are extremely important to sociology

and to the social sciences and yet both terms share equally in their

ambiguities and proneness to emotional involvement. Richard Centers

comments on the latter concept:

> . . . social class identification is not now a para-
> mount aspect of the thinking of most Americans; class
> is not a salient and vital aspect of their sense of
> identity.[1]

Another social class example is that explained by Albert K. Cohen

and Harold M. Hodges, Jr. who describe a "lower-blue-collar" social

class as being a conglomeration of such characteristics as "extra

punitiveness," "simplification of the experience world," "powerless-

ness," "deprivation" and "insecurity," "anti-intellectualism," and

"authoritarianism." A closer look at this cluster of variables is

interpreted via role playing:

> . . . role relationships are more likely for the (lbc)*
> to be defined in terms of somebody responsible for
> making decisions and giving orders, and somebody respon-
> sible for carrying them out . . . the decisive question
> in "real life" situation is . . . "Who's boss?"[2]

The ideological position appears to be even more elusive than that

of the "social class" position in that there is less empirical relevance

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*lower-blue-collar

1

for its support and justification. This problem is touched on by Ernst
Cassirer who has written:

> . . . what became more important for the general history
> of ideas and for the development of philosophical thought
> was not the empirical facts of evolution but the theoreti-
> cal interpretation of these facts.[3]

There are, perhaps, some observers of our society who believe
that American Sociology is the rough equivalent of the British Fabian
Society; they would be in for a disappointment of major proportions.
If any one term depicts the essential ideological posture and orienta-
tion of American Sociology, it would be non-political subsumed under a
complex web of terminology complimentary to what is sometimes referred
to as the "establishment syndrome," or "liberal capitalism," or a crude
rationale of "laissez faire," "captain of industry" mythology centering
around anti-collectivism or extreme individualism. This amorphous
conservatism is no accident; it has many antecedents which may easily
be detected.

Among the highlights of the conservative matrix which has been
modern sociology's heritage are the combined happenings in response to
the French Revolution. Society is an organic entity and is prior to
the individual. Society is not reducible to individuals. Each individ-
ual and each social trait are parts of a system which is maintained by
needs. Next is the significance of function in society in which the
small group is the basic unit of society. The recognition of social
disorganization is viewed in opposition to the sacred values of the
society. Last, the legitimation of authority is manifested in a chain
which links family, community, class and society together.[4]

A point of some confusion is when "social class" and "ideology" are compounded into a more general concept than that discussed above. One finds some comfort in going along with the generality engendered by the following question and accompanying answer:

> Why and how do the oppressed and the exploited chal-
> lenge those who dog it and hog it? Since man's
> invention of private property and the state, a small
> minority of persons have declared their commitment
> to coerce a majority and to justify minority use of
> force in the name of a common good.[5]

However, "social class" and "ideology" are combined in the conservative manifesto as depicted above by Nisbet. This being the case one can see the extreme conservative side of traditional American Sociology where, in some respects, it is still fashionable to refer to "organic society" (if not "organic solidarity") and where "social disorganization" (more likely, "deviance") may be referred to from the point of view of "structural defects" (let alone such declarations as "anomie" or "labeling theory") and where "social system" becomes the model for everything that can be socially reified. Last, in this context, the position of authority remains paramount despite an erosion and corruption on the part of politicans and their parties. One may seek and find ideological explanations for all components of the above system.

More specifically, the conceptualization needed at this juncture is stated by John C. Leggett as follows:

> . . . we do make a distinction between ideology and
> utopia, between, in effect, obfuscation and hope.
> States depend on ideologies to foster legitimation,
> but political movements--especially the more militant
> variety--espouse utopias. Ideologies refer to idea
> systems that purport to portray reality, although gen-
> erally they obscure it. Ideologies may be specific or
> general.[6]

A more delicate if not sophisticated aspect of this critical

phenomenon is viewed by David Braybrooke who states:

> Ideology constitutes a predicament more insidious than
> the universal liability of mankind to personal prejudice.
> Social scientists can correct each other on points of
> personal prejudice, in which one man deviates from his
> colleagues--but how can they correct for a pervasive
> bias that all may share, because they belong to a given
> society and enjoy similar privileges within it?[7]

Going full cycle, in effect, going beyond the normal, ambiguous

parameters of ideology, Ivan Chapman has pointed out:

> Ideological control is concerned with power of a suffi-
> cient magnitude to be able to predict how people will
> act. This means power of the magnitude necessary to
> establish the definition of the situation as the only
> basis for social action by some single construction of
> reality and thereby excision and repression of all other
> methods of human construction of reality.[8]

It is the Chapman position which, from a sociological position,

suggests the most fruitful, if not deceitful, realization about society

in general, that there are some social "forms and fragments," both

manifest and latent, that are part of a "secret order" of things

relating to power if not coercion. These forms and fragments, although

masking as legitimate and for the good of all, are, in effect, con-

trived systems which are purposive for certain interest groups. This,

in some ways, reflects the teaching of an enlightened C. Wright Mills

whose position will be explained below. One may also include a masking

and insightful remark from Coser at this point. It is Coser's position

that, "Literature, though it may also be many other things, is social

evidence and testimony."[9]

Thus, it may be stated by way of generalization that there is a

continuum which may be detected in ideological statements which range

between the diffused and the particular but that the implications of

the former may be as important as those of the latter. One may also detect a whole gamut of economic and political ideologies as will be discussed in full below. Last, there is what may be classified as the historical dimension of ideology and this, particularly when stated in any degree of causality, is most deceiving for there are questions to be raised when hearing about the Middle Ages or the Colonial Period or even when citing an example of preliterate society in the contemporary world order. These questions are concerned with the nature of "social class," "elite position," "morality," and should also include "social change" and "legitimacy."

Ideologies, then, are more than concepts. It is true that they may be related to social class and to the "accident of history" or historical factors. It is also true that they may be rooted in a social class concept of and defense of power which is grounded in both economic and political considerations. But, ideologies are decidedly interwined with theories, propositions, assumptions, frames of reference, hypotheses, and, indeed, whole disciplines as well as doctrines and philosophies.

One may cite the field of political science as being prone to acceptance of the operationalized ideology of democracy. Economics in our society is largely the task of rationalization of contemporary corporate capitalism. Sociology as depicted by Parsons and his school is a grand theory justification and rationale of the social action components and institutions of a lifeless, rational, leaderless, non-human society. At a lower level of analysis, again citing contemporary American sociology, a good sociological study is one which has a firmed up, believable and testable hypothesis, a good "research design,"

a sufficient size of sample from a population or universe, and a test which holds true at the five per cent level or one which will be true 95 per cent of the time.

Ideologies may be compared to social classes as indicated above. They may also be compared to the popular sociological concepts of "alienation" and "anomie." Both of these terms have independent histories, schools, theories and ideologies of their own, the former being traced to Marx and the latter to Durkheim. In fact, one may go a step farther with both terms and say that they are, in effect, personifications of ideologies within themselves, or, at least fragments thereof. An explanation is in order. For the Marxian position, "alienation" is but a state of being for the proletariat under capitalism, a state of existence which robs the workers not only of economic rewards but also of dignity in association with his fellow man. One might also project that the bourgeoise, the owners of the means of production, also experience a form of "alienation" in that their greed for profits, their strongest motivating force, does not allow them to live in a world where social relations can be normal and human. Thus, the capitalist digs his own grave, both individually and collectively, and the "class-less society" lies just beyond the rugged mountains of "class conscious-ness," "class struggle," "revolution," "dictatorship of the proletariat" and the "classless society." Alienation or the separation of self from society as well as estrangement between men is a negative ideology designed to speed up the processes of social and cultural change. But, the real contradiction is that it is relatively permanent in either a pre or post capitalist society; hence, it is studied as something to be alleviated if not abolished altogether. Nevertheless, it is much more

a product of Marxian dialectics and is an ideological tool of the left.

Anomie, explained by Durkheim as a state of normlessness experienced by some individuals in organic society (as opposed to mechanistic society) may result in suicide. The individual experiences sudden change and is not able to cope with the situation. One may suddenly inherit great wealth. This, in itself, appears on the surface to be no problem, but it might be a critical problem for one who has always experienced poverty. Or, one may suddenly lose all of one's wealth which would pose no problem to some but to those who have always had wealth, it would be a serious challenge. Could a member of the Rockefeller family adjust to a minimum level Social Security retirement program? The answer to this could only be "anomie." Thus, the ideological manifestations of this concept are most viable. The major difference between "alienation" and "anomie" is structural in that the former lays blame to the social order or social system whereas the latter sees the individual being at fault in his inability to make needed adjustments. The former may be called "radical"; the latter "conservative."

It may be said, without reservation, that the popularity of a concept has little to do with its reliability. A phrase such as "survival of the fittest," for example, with all of its overtones of Social Darwinism, is not necessarily as scientific as it is metaphysical and ideological. In a similar manner the same is true of the concepts "alienation" and "anomie." It would be difficult, however, to envision the discipline of sociology minus these two terms since they are both centers of considerable research of a high order despite the recent

addition of social-psychological imputation for purposes of scaling
and operationalism.

By means of a sociology of knowledge frame of reference as will
be discussed below, the concept of ideology itself takes on new meanings
some of which are imputations of a philosophical and historical nature.
This is legitimate and it is a type of theoretical common expectation
or norm. What is more difficult to see, however, is the line between
that which is empirical and that which is metaphysical. There is no
one way to do this. Thus, ideology is a concept which should be recog-
nized as straddling the margin between science and folk belief. A
comment on the work of Karl Popper is of some assistance here:

> Hence Popper says that it is wrong to begin by accumu-
> lating observations, and it is wrong to seek confirming
> instances of a theory. Instead we should advance bold
> conjectures--derived from intuition, or creative genius,
> or any way we like--and attempt to refute them. Of
> two competing theories, the one that has run the
> greater risk of falsification, but has not been
> falsified, is the better corroborated. This does not
> mean that it is true--it may be falsified in the future--
> but it is likely to be a closer approximation to the
> truth than its rival. We can never, in science, know
> that we have discovered the truth; although there is
> such a thing as truth, it is a regulative idea which we
> try to approach, but can never be sure of reaching.[10]

Thus, if folk belief is to be considered as a logical and legiti-
mate dimension of ideology (and it certainly should be considered in
this light), it opens a whole new approach to the concept of truth in
the social sciences. This is the case because of the awareness that
ideology is linked in no uncertain terms to such phenomena as myths,
legends, folklore, sagas and theology. Looking within most schemes of
rationalization in regards to race relations, religious bigotry,
inferior education, poverty and war, one finds that ideology via myth

invariably rears its head. One might select a special case in regards

to the rationale of science. Could it be anything but a particular

kind of magic which makes all of these wonders of sight, sound and body

comfort possible? In addition to this question, could it not, in some

small way, be nothing more than the "magic of nationalism?" A lesson

in ancient history has interesting implications:

> . . . Roman science appears at its best in the depart-
> ment of "Nature Study" and at its weakest in "Pure
> Mathematics." The success or failure of the Romans
> in any scientific field may be roughly gauged by its
> nearness to one or other of these disciplines. The
> gauge must be biased, however, by the Roman desire
> for "useful studies." There was for instance . . .
> a special development in certain departments of
> Geography.[11]

The above leads one to believe that what may have been labelled

science in the ancient world would have little resemblance to that which

is designated as science today. Before there could be science there had

to be a cross-fertilization of ideas and traditions. In other words,

there had to be a change in "ideologies" (in this case, specifically,

belief systems) in order for this to occur. This took a great deal of

time to happen, much beyond the parameters of what is usually designated

the "ancient period":

> "Science and the opinion of the mob," says Pliny, are
> in direct opposition. According to the former the
> whole sphere of the earth is inhabited by men whose
> feet point towards each other while all have the heavens
> above their heads. But the mob ask how men on the anti-
> podes do not fall off; as though that did not present
> the opposite query why they should not wonder at <u>our</u> not
> falling off. Usually, however, the crowd objects if one
> urges that water also tends to be spherical. Yet nothing
> is more obvious, since hanging drops always form little
> spheres. Among his proofs of the curved surface of the
> earth is the gradual appearance of ships, mast first,
> then hull, as they approach the shore.[12]

The simplicity of the above is almost unreal and yet it is an attempt to build and devise science only with observation of concrete reality devoid of abstraction and symbols or sets and systems thereof (mathematics). Thus, the cross-fertilization or bending and blending of ideologies of science awaited later historical and cultural accidents:

> . . . the important event in the history of science in the Middle Ages is the arrival of the Arabian learning. It was the Arabian influence that finally set the intellect of Western Europe on the high road to the Renaissance.[13]

Thus, to speculate on the nature of ideology in the ancient world and into the later middle ages may appear to be a dismal and unrewarding activity. This may be true from the point of view of history and technology, but it is most illuminating from the point of view of ideology and culture. One may ask, whose ideology and whose culture? In response the most logical response is to stipulate that the acceptance of science meant the general consensus or agreement to do things in another fashion--handicrafts, navigation, agriculture, religion, war, dominance, aesthetics, and in a broad way, social organization (family life, community life, communication, transportation, trade).

It is also stimulating if not somewhat startling to know where science came from. The response to this is that it came from the most totalitarian societies (Arabian) extant in the ancient world, survivals of which had greatly deteriorated in the middle ages. Thus, by calling it discipline or whatever one wishes in this context, the politics of science is rigid. The same can be said for the politics of theology. It may well be that the ideological split caused by this old confrontation has produced, as the Freudian School may symbolize, a schizophrenic society. Looking at France in the 19th Century, a Napoleon, a

Pasteur, and a Durkheim were produced, all within a relatively few decades of one another, each acting out and being strongly influenced to some degree by the ideological confrontation described above: Napoleon using the greater terror of modern firearms and a well disciplined army; Pasteur attempting to isolate bacteria and ushering in the germ theory of medicine; and Durkheim attuned to the cohesion or lack of such in an organic model of society and reaching back to the corporate structure of the Holy Roman Empire and the Catholic Church for some semblance of resolution in the crisis of modern man.

Thus, the "crisis of modern man" may well serve as the nexus and fulcrum of ideological discourse. It is one thing to define the concept; it is much more of a challenge to explain, if only in part, the implications. One general definition is as follows:

> Ideologies are made up of cognitive and affective judgments about what elements are important in social life, the reasons these are important, the way in which social processes actually work, and the ways in which all or part of the social system ought to change. Generally, ideologies are well formulated and readily identifiable with regard to major issues and basic institutions in society; they are not as well formulated and readily identifiable with regard to minor issues and social structures.[14]

It may be a point of argumentation to accept the latter part of the above definition concerning the fact that minor issues are not as well formulated, ideologically, as major, institutional issues. One would have to deliberate quite at length to stipulate that "racism," "anti-semitism" and "McCarthyism" have been minor issues. One would have to search for satisfactory explanations for voter negativism, anti-union practices and blind faith in pseudo-patriotic organizations. In brief, one would be prone to search deeply into the structure and

causality of social movements in general. Not only that, one would be

prone to search deeply into the present composition of existing ideo-

logies to challenge whether or not large, multi-national corporations

represent an objective "freedom of enterprise" and if lobbying in

Washington, D. C. and fifty state capitols is compatible with our free

democratic institutions. One may come to the realization that there is

a matter of false representation and that, in actuality, those ideo-

logies which have been sustained by special interests are little more

than ploys or modern "Roman bread and circuses" designed to insure a

smooth transition of political and economic power from one generation

to the next.

A more concrete explanation for ideology is that which is offered

by Blumberg who raises an interesting legal question and suggests an

interesting explanation:

> How then can the court's functionaries and the clients
> it serves continue to defend as legitimate such a
> negatively evaluated, oppressive social arrangement?
> Partly the answer lies in the concept of ideology--
> the fact that "man does not live by bread alone," that
> he must seek to develop an ideology to justify, rein-
> force, and give meaning to interests he pursues. These
> ideologies and their elaborate rationales become as
> real and consequential as the material interests.
> Ideologies need not be and often are not the weapons
> of a conspiracy of rulers to keep the ruled submerged
> or to falsify a given state of affairs. On the con-
> trary, they are often nurtured and subscribed to by
> all strata, rulers and ruled alike, and to resolve the
> inevitable disordancies and incompatibilities of belief
> systems.[15]

There appear to be some weak underpinnings in the substance of

the above policy statement on an ideology of justice and jurisprudence.

One should not decry the reality of sophisticated manipulation,

persuasion and influence. Blumberg himself is aware of two

"suppositions" or universal beliefs for both the accused and his

accuser:

> (1) A defendent in a criminal court is really beaten
> by the deprivations and limitations imposed by his
> social class, race, and ethnicity. (2) . . . the
> ameliorative--therapeutic model of the court, the
> origin of which is to be found in the Positivist
> school of criminology and serves to cast the crimi-
> nal in the role of a "sick" person.[16]

The problem with the Blumberg argument is that it is both true in

some respects and false in others. The fact of the matter is simply

that the going social institutions are constantly being reinforced by

various means of propagandistic techniques. This may amount to a

"Veterans' Day" parade, a television broadcast featuring the F.B.I., a

"commercial message" via the mass media reminding us to be good savers

in building and loan organizations or banks and also reminding us to

use the proper underarm deodorant and detergent soap powder so that

our best foot or arm can be put forward with complete self-satisfaction

and self-confidence. An interesting observation which is made by

Silver is that, ". . . 'crime,' 'the criminal,' and other concepts

. . . are defined by the political organization of society . . . . Law

is the creation of a political process."[17]

Thus, what Blumberg denies and Silver infers is emphatically

implied by Wolfe whose contention is that ideologies in support of

present institutional values may be seen as instruments of repression.

His approach is as follows:

> Direct ideological repression involves both a direct
> attack on potential competing ideologies--such as a
> return to the free market from the Right or socialism
> from the Left--as well as a continued defense of the
> existing ideology of corporate liberalism.[18]

The above author continues with a question followed by a meaningful

answer:

> Do those who are engaged in ideological repression know
> what they are doing? In the twentieth century, those
> who hold power in liberal democracies have come to
> realize the importance of ideology. Acceptance of re-
> ceived ways of thinking, it has been found, is not
> accidental but has to be worked at. This need has
> given rise to a group of experts at ideological
> indoctrination . . . .[19]

Whether or not "repression" is the proper term, there are cer-

tainly a great number of expressions which fit into the frame of

reference as suggested by Wolfe:

(1) What's good for G.M. is good for America.

(2) Love it or leave it.

(3) 100 Per Cent American

(4) Freedom of Enterprize

(5) Constitutional Constructionist.

Terms which are counter to the establishment are:

(1) Limousine Liberals

(2) Intellectuals

(3) Pinks

(4) Leftists

(5) Nigger Lovers.

The point to be made between these two groups of ideological

expressions is an important one. As long as one goes with the grain

of "motherhood," "apple pie" and "democracy," there is nothing to worry

about. However, as one deviates from the "line," meaning the "estab-

lishment," there is cause for alarm, and there are self-appointed

"gate keeper" organizations such as the American Legion and the John

Birch Society which act as watchdogs of the faithful. This is not to

deprive the FBI and the CIA as well as many other "official" agencies

including the IRS of their role as guardians of democracy. What is

important for purposes of this discussion is that keepers of the faith

in the establishment are "idealists." Those who in any remote or

critical sense are opposed to present policies and who wish to realize

social change are considered the "ideologists" or bearers of "foreign

ideologies."

One notes, for example, a play on opposites which is not neces-

sarily a dialectic as much as it is a position of negative coercion

towards any infringement upon present policies. Thus, if you are not

convinced that "capitalism" and "free markets" are the best economic

systems for everyone, you are a "communist" or "socialist"--no particu-

lar distinction is necessary. For one to advocate vigorous programs

of ecological safeguards via pollution control could also be inter-

preted as anti-capitalist, hence, "ideological." The same argument

could be anticipated in regards to "labor unions," "unemployment,"

and "economic recession."

To be labeled a communist can have and has had the most serious

consequences. This is the ideology considered to be most foreign to

our "way of life." Lazarsfeld and Thielens who investigated this

problem in the late 1950's had this to say about such impact: '

> During the post-war years the college incidents which
> most frequently made newspaper headlines were those
> in which professors were charged with Communist Party
> affiliations.[20]

Some of the above activity has been designated as "witch hunting"

and there are many reports that merely being suspect of harboring

communist sympathies is tantamount to "guilt by association." It would

be interesting to replicate the Lazarsfeld and Thielens research in

view of more recent developments such as the Civil Rights Movement and

the United States involvement in Vietnam. One is reminded of the

ideological designation of congressmen and senators during the recent

war in which their voting records were equated into "doves" and "hawks"

with much more popular press notices attributed to the latter than the

former. Thus, for some reason or other, it simply was not patriotic

to be opposed to the war as unpopular and devastating as this episode

has proved to be. There is, then, within this discourse on ideology

an interesting statement by Birnbaum who states: "American society,

then, lacks the ideological resources to make a correct estimate of

its historical situation."[21] It is his position that:

> . . . the fragmentation of class struggle in America,
> the ethnic diversity of the population, have contri-
> buted to the prevention of a true cultural homogenization
> of the population. The homogenization which has now
> taken place is rather an imposed one and not necessarily
> an entirely profound one.[22]

Thus, the study of ideology is a complex one sharing some charac-

teristics with concepts such as "social class," "alienation," and

"anomie." It is the ideology of a people which directs its social

action. It is a counter ideology which is a sign that there are telling

imperfections within the social order. Many years ago the concept

"marginal man" was employed by Robert Ezra Park and others to describe

the plight of immigrants straddling both an old and new world culture.

Although this concept is not in vogue today, one may give it new

vitalization by hypothesizing that there are many who live in two (if

not more) ideological worlds: (1) reality of the present; (2) hopes

for a better future; and, perhaps, (3) a recognition that only drastic

changes can usher in the "good life."

FOOTNOTES

[1]Richard Centers, "The Psychology of Social Classes," The Impact of Social Class, ed. Paul Blumberg (New York, 1972), p. 247.

[2]Albert K. Cohen and Harold M. Hodges, Jr., "Characteristics of the Lower-Blue-Collar Class," The Impact of Social Class, ed. Paul Blumberg (New York, 1972), pp. 199-227.

[3]Ernst Cassirer, "The Crisis in Man's Knowledge of Himself," The Impact of Sociology: Readings in the Social Sciences, ed. Jack D. Douglas (New York, 1970), pp. 17-18.

[4]Robert A. Nisbet, "Conservatism and Sociology," Social Theory Revisited, ed. Clinton Joyce Jesser (Hinsdale, Illinois, 1975), pp. 18-23.

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[6]Ibid., p. 9.

[7]David Braybrooke, Philosophical Problems of the Social Sciences (New York, 1965), pp. 15-16.

[8]Ivan Chapman, The End of Free Inquiry: A Study in Reality Construction (Stillwater, Oklahoma, 1971), p. 124.

[9]Lewis A. Coser, Sociology Through Literature (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, 1963), p. 3.

[10]Peter Singer, "Discovering Karl Popper," New York Review of Books (May 2, 1974), p. 24.

[11]Charles Singer, From Magic to Science (New York, 1958), p. 5.

[12]Ibid., pp. 53-54.

[13]Ibid., p. xxv.

[14]Thomas E. Lasswell and Jerry G. Bode, Sociology in Context: Scientific and Humanistic (Morristown, New Jersey, 1974), p. 201.

[15]Abraham S. Blumberg, "Due Process and Assembly-Line Justice," The Crime-Control Establishment, ed. Isidore Silver (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, 1974), p. 121.

[16]Ibid., pp. 121-122.

[17]Isidore Silver, "Introduction," The Crime-Control Establishment (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, 1974), p. 7.

[18]Alan Wolfe, The Seamy Side of Democracy: Repression in America (New York, 1973), p. 126.

[19]Ibid., pp. 126-127.

[20]Paul F. Lazarsfeld and Wagner Thielens, Jr., "The Academic Mind," Studies in American Society, ed. Derek L. Phillips (New York, 1965), p. 159.

[21]Norman Birnbaum, "Problems of Social Consciousness in America," Up the Mainstream: A Critique of Ideology in American Politics and Everyday Life, ed. Herbert G. Reid (New York, 1974), p. 11.

[22]Ibid.

CHAPTER II

REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE

The classic study in the area of "ideology" and the "sociology of knowledge" is Karl Mannheim's Ideology and Utopia.[1] This particular work is, for the most part, rooted in the Marxian tradition. For Wolfe, the two basic antecedents of the sociology of knowledge are to be found in the works of Marx and Durkheim. Mannheim's work is, in many respects, the acknowledged classic in the field.

In order to demonstrate the erudite coverage of the subject, one finds in his extensive bibliography the following organization:

I. Epistemological Aspects of the Social Sciences

    1. Presuppositions

    2. Bias and Perspective

    3. Objectivity

    4. Symbols, Meaning, Communication, and Language

    5. Evaluative and Non-Evaluative Social Science

    6. Historicism

    7. Generalizations

II. Social Movements and Intellectual Life

    1. Ideas and Ideologies

    2. Utopian Mentality

    3. Social Stratification and Weltanschauung--Sociology of

        Literature

(1)   the distinction between the "particular," the "total"

and the "general" concepts of ideology

    (a)   ideology as constituting only a segment of an

opponent's thought

    (b)   ideology as constituting the whole of an opponent's

thought (the "false consciousness" of Marxism)

    (c)   ideology as characteristic both of the opponent's as

well as one's own thought

(2)   upon reaching the "general" level (1c), the sociology of

knowledge is reached

    (a)   no human thought is free from the influence of the

ideology of its social context

(3)   the theory of ideology is the general problem of:

    (a)   epistemology

    (b)   historical sociology

(4)   the task of the sociology of knowledge:

    (a)   ideology can never be completely eradicated

    (b)   systematic analysis of ideology is necessary.[20]

The above may be evaluated not only as an endorsement of Mannheim's
position but also an attempt to systematize his sometimes fragmented
thinking on the subject of ideology and the sociology of knowledge.
The same may be said when these writers declare: "The sociology of
knowledge must concern itself with everything that passes for 'know-
ledge' in society."[21]

This position is taken in view of the fact that only a small
number of persons in any society will be engaged in theorizing, but
common place ideas and knowledge are shared by all members of society;

hence, only by exploring this fabric of meanings can a social construction of reality be made possible. One gathers from this premise that it is every bit as important for the sociologist to know and understand folklore and common sense beliefs as it is to know scientific principles. It is also of interest to recall that Sumner had a great deal more in mind than is customarily attributed to him when he pronounced that "folkways are always the right ways."

Reality for Berger and Luckmann is nothing more than the happenings of everyday life. Their method of analysis is what may be termed phenomenological. They explain their position as follows:

> The phenomenological analysis of everyday life, or rather of the subjective experience of everyday life, refrains from any causal or genetic hypotheses, as well as from assertions about the ontological status of the phenomena analyzed.[22]

In establishing the above position these authors assume that consciousness is always intentional and everyday happenings may be of both a routine as well as a specific variety. They infer, for example, that "the world of everyday life is structured both spatially and temporally."[23] Some of the characteristics of everyday happenings are not too much unlike explanations offered by exchange theory. Such terms as "negotiation" imply an ongoing confrontation between designated individuals typifying multivariate value schemes and symbols. The basis for the exchange of everyday life is always social structure.[24]

Language is given a relatively high position in the scheme devised by Berger and Luckmann. Not only are vocal signs seen as significant for carrying on the discourse and communication of society, but, more emphatically, they relate that, ". . . men must talk about themselves until they know themselves."[25]

In rounding out the subjective approach these authors point out that, ". . . the reality of everyday life always appears as a zone of lucidity behind which there is a background of darkness."[26] Their discourse is also concerned with what they call the distribution of knowledge which has obvious social class implications. They also lean towards a pragmatic interpretation of knowledge which for them is likened to a recipe or "knowledge limited to pragmatic competence in routine performances."[27] They offer as a prime example the use of the telephone in everyday life. An important summary statement is offered as follows:

> In everyday life I know . . . what I can hide from whom, whom I can turn to for information on what I do not know, and generally which types of individuals may be expected to have which types of knowledge.[28]

In their approach to objective reality the above authors present a biological and environmental model of man which is quite flexible and capable of almost anything in regards to where and how he lives including his sexual interests and activities. They infer, for example, that "just as it is impossible for man to develop as man in isolation, so it is impossible for man in isolation to produce a human environment."[29] The proper formula for human existence must include order, direction and stability. A compromise position is noted on biological factors when they exclaim: ". . . although no existing social order can be derived from biological data, the necessity for social order as such stems from man's biological equipment."[30]

From this point the writers build their case for both institutionalization and objective reality. The individual sees himself through his own "biography" or "personal history" via externalization through

interaction and value systems. A more detailed explanation is offered
as follows: ". . . the relationship between man, the producer, and the
social world, his product, is and remains a dialectical one . . . . Man
and his social world interact with each other."[31]

Put into more capsule formulation:

(1) Society is a human product.

(2) Society is an objective reality.

(3) Man is a social product.[32]

Rounding out the theory the authors state that, ". . . only with
the appearance of a new generation can one properly speak of a social
world."[33]

The institutionalized frame of reference provides the setting in
which the above interaction takes place. Children are taught to behave
properly. Adults are conditioned to exhibit the correct measure of
motivation in a society. "The more conduct is institutionalized, the
more predictable and thus the more controlled it becomes."[34] Exper-
iences retained in consciousness are referred to as sedimented.[35] The
end product of this process is explained as follows: "The objectivated
meanings of institutional activity are conceived of as 'knowledge' and
transmitted as such."[36]

Berger and Luckmann introduce explanations for role playing as
well as modes of institutionalization. An unusual example is offered
concerning Jews. They are initiated into social science by an awareness
of their problem as Jews, a distinct minority group. Yet, once they
become social scientists, they are expected to adapt a role of neutrality
or objectivity in both their studies and their social relationships.

might say that it represents a "coming of age" or maturity of sociology which has relied for such a long period on operationalism and micro-sociological techniques.

A complementary adjunct to the above study is the work of Chapman. In his first study this writer sets out to exercise the reality construction prerogative.[39] Chapman explores various forms of reality structuring including linguistic, scientific, mythical, magical, religious, dialectical and conceptual. He then proceeds to outline what he designates as the sociological task.

Beginning with the latter chapter the author declares that the sociologist has a commitment to understand man's social nature and that this cannot be accomplished by mathematical formulation alone. It is his view that, "Social science is concerned with all human constructions of reality."[40] More particularly, then, Chapman states, "The sociological approach . . . must encompass all existing social structures."[41]

What stands in the way of achieving the goal of understanding? The following are suggestions:

(1) the prevalence of "scientific escapism"

(2) the substitution of individual for world understanding

(3) the stress on rational progression rather than reality

(4) the prevalence of psychosis in current thought forms

(5) the tendency towards rational reductionism

(6) the decline in the freedom of inquiry

(7) the suppression of free inquiry

(8) the danger of an ideologically prescribed psychosis.[42]

controversy he exclaims: "The ideal thought form of distinct and separate categories is alien to the existential world of reality."[45]

This rationale is continued more in detail as follows:

In cases where we have the power to manipulate people
to the extent that they fit our categories, we have
deserted the scientific spirit, quest, and method and
have resorted to a crude ideological manipulation of
people.[46]

Myth is viewed as a method of structuring social reality. Myth is noted as a universal means of explaining reality. Chapman sees the soft sciences (social) as being subjected to adhering to the mythology of the hard sciences (physical). In a general sense this is explained as follows:

All persons in today's urban, industrial, technological
society need a closer touch with reality and reality
structuring than the mathematical, precise, rational
constructs which are forced upon them today.[47]

Other important insights offered by this writer are:

(1)   the misunderstanding in regards to magic, that it may even

qualify as a true science[48]

(2)   that religion presents many unsolved problems which have

not as yet been resolved by science[49]

(3)   that dialectical explanations dichotomize both social

reality as well as human beings.[50]

Looking into the future, Chapman sees the role of reality construction under most optimum conditions. He points out that:

Society's responsibility is to free the individual so that
he can by means of social distance and personal thought
define the situation for social action . . . . In this
manner society can be an on-going, adaptive process of
reciprocal thought and action at the individual level and
at the group level.[51]

The second work by Chapman continues to explore "ideological confusion" via what may be termed "schools of ideology."[52] This includes a close scrutiny of the Weberian Ideology, the Parsonian Ideology and a fusion of the two. An overview of the situation is offered as follows:

> Glorified rational systems . . . have no better record than glorified human beings; for rational systems by the logic of their own construction and inner working must destroy their adherents as human beings by reducing them to rational men, actors, and role-players, and finally to mechanistic bits and pieces to be used for the system needs.[53]

In this study Chapman sets out to demonstrate that reality for the average person is greatly distorted. We are "brain washed" to a large degree by a rational scheme which does not have a great deal of consideration for the individual. The author exclaims: "The person is thus reduced to stimulus-response, pain-avoidance activity, directed by an external 'other' in the interest of some rational system need."[54]

A critique of Max Weber indicates that he is concerned with a continuation of the mutilation. Thus, the ideology of profit and the ideal of power via the instrumentality of bureaucracy is recognized by Chapman to be oppressive. In brief, Weber's rationale represents a complete break with the social world.[55] The essence of the Weberian reductionism scheme is viewed by Chapman as explaining Protestantism as a scheme for accumulating profits.[56] Thus, the functions of social institutions, in a general sense, have been altered from a life-giving function to one of serving the needs of power and profit.

Chapman sees the ideological constructs of Talcott Parsons as being an outgrowth as well as a more intensive model of the Weberian scheme. He explains the "social system" of Parsons as follows:

> . . . the "social system" is an imposed scheme in that it
> does not grow out of social action but grows as an out-
> side rational scheme which is imposed upon the personal,
> social, and cultural components as an anthropomorphic
> integrator of these strictly social elements. Person and
> society are reduced by a rational scheme to a rational
> scheme . . . . All that is human or social is lost by
> being reduced to symbols and treated thereafter totally
> as symbols.[57]

Chapman carries his critique of Parsons a step further when he

exclaims:

> (1) Social action systems are ideological systems designed for
>
>   purposes of manipulation and repression.
>
> (2) Ideology and mass media aid social action in transforming
>
>   interacting people into rational symbols.[58]

A strong summary statement is offered by Chapman:

> The Parsonian-Weberian system is a system based upon
> force which is used to insure a supply for the rationally
> constructed needs of a rationally constructed system
> not based upon the nature of man nor upon the nature and
> needs of society.[59]

What Chapman sees as imperative is a re-evaluation of the works

of Mead, Thomas and James so that the ideological interpretations made

by students of Parsons can be acknowledged for what they are--distor-

tions. One prime example of this is the way in which the "definition

of the social situation" introduced by Thomas becomes the "self-

fulfilling prophecy" of Merton. In a note of finality Chapman states:

> The Parsonian ideological rational scheme with power and
> unearned social influence reduces persons and groups to
> system maintenance needs and collapses the basic social
> institutions upon which man's survival depends.[60]

Since this chapter began with Mannheim, it will serve many

purposes of logic to conclude with him. The recent work edited by

Wolff is that which will be examined.[61] In this work the editor warns

of the constant potential for misstatement and misunderstanding in translating from the German to the English language. Subjects covered by Mannheim include a critique of Georg Lukacs as well as an explanation of Weltanschauung. More central to this study is what Mannheim labels the problem of the sociology of knowledge and the ideological and sociological interpretation of intellectual phenomena.

It is Wolff's contention that the mainstream of Mannheim's work lies in "the problem of how to go about interpreting intellectual or spiritual phenomena."[62] Keen insight is exhibited by Mannheim in the following:

> . . . achieving from time to time a certain distance from his own situation and from the world is one of the fundamental traits of man as a truly human being. A man for whom nothing exists beyond his immediate situation is not fully human.[63]

The subject of "meaning" is important to Mannheim, if not central to his theory of knowledge. Wolff concludes that there are, essentially, three kinds of understanding:

(1) objective meaning - that which is given immediately

(2) expressive meaning - mediated

(3) documentary meaning - mediated.[64]

All of the above have relevance for science and the arts in different historical contexts. Mannheim is also interested in epistemology which he places into the following three categories:

(1) the known (knowledge or cognition)

(2) the knower (subject)

(3) the to-be-known (object).[65]

What is of paramount concern for Mannheim is to bridge the correlations between the three elements to gain a more genuine perspective

on reality. One important statement here is that,". . . history of
ideas becomes sociology of knowledge if it undertakes its investigation
with due regard for social strata."[66]

An example of sociology of knowledge application to conservatism
and liberalism is offered as follows:

> For the conservative the picture of things as a whole is
> inclusive and detailed; for the progressive it is more
> like a rough blueprint or groundplan. For the conserva-
> tive the present is the last stage of the past, for
> liberalism the beginning of the future.[67]

Commenting further on this dichotomy Mannheim states:

> Revolutionary thought derives its force from the desire
> to realize a rationally well-defined pattern of perfection
> of the social and political order. Conservative thought,
> opposed to the fulfillment of utopia, is forced to con-
> sider why the actually existing state of society fails
> to correspond to such a rational pattern.[68]

Turning briefly to what Mannheim labels the "problem" of the
sociology of knowledge, this relates to a comparison between the exami-
nation of a cultural or intellectual problem and that of a mathematical
problem. In the former there is no "sequence" which one may turn to;
whereas in the latter, one problem may well lead to the solution of
others. Thus, one searches for and develops a "constellation" of
ideas. This will aid the scholar to determine whether or not a solu-
tion is possible. Mannheim comments as follows:

> Whereas in mathematics and natural science, progress
> seems to be determined to a large extent by immanent
> factors, one question leading up to another with a
> purely logical necessity, with interruptions due only
> to difficulties not yet solved, the history of cultural
> sciences shows such an "immanent" progress only for
> limited stretches.[69]

Mannheim sees four essential factors to the sociology of knowledge.
They are as follows:

(1)   self-relativization of thought and knowledge

(2)   appearance of a new form of relativization introduced by
      the "unmasking" turn of mind

(3)   the emergence of a new system of reference

(4)   the desire to make this relativization total.[70]

The main task for the sociology of knowledge as explained by

Mannheim ". . . consists in specifying, for each temporal cross-section

of the historical process, the various systematic intellectual stand-

points on which the thinking of creative individuals and groups was

based."[71]   It is Mannheim's contention that historicism has already

made notable beginnings in this direction. This demonstrates the

importance of both historical as well as cultural factors in developing

a methodology for the sociology of knowledge.

What follows is a close inspection of how Mannheim, in effect,

has actually used the sociology of knowledge approach. After a close

inspection of Mannheim which may be looked upon as the classical

approach, a review of secondary sources and contemporary usages will

be presented. This is done in view of the fact that ideology remains

the single most important sociological concept which is used by some

with complete abandon as to the significance of the term.

FOOTNOTES

[1] Karl Mannheim, _Ideology and Utopia: An Introduction to the Sociology of Knowledge_ (New York, 1936).

[2] Ibid., pp. 312-337.

[3] Ibid., p. x.

[4] Ibid., p. xxi.

[5] Ibid., p. xxvii.

[6] Ibid., p. 39.

[7] Ibid., p. 41.

[8] Ibid., p. 42.

[9] Ibid., p. 61.

[10] Ibid., pp. 62-64.

[11] Ibid., p. 73.

[12] Ibid., pp. 78-79.

[13] Ibid., p. 80.

[14] Ibid., p. 271.

[15] Ibid., p. 273.

[16] Leo P. Chall, "The Sociology of Knowledge," _Readings in Contemporary American Sociology_, ed. Joseph S. Roucek (Paterson, New Jersey, 1961), pp. 288-289.

[17] Ibid., p. 296.

[18] Peter L. Berger and Thomas Luckmann, _The Social Construction of Reality: A Treatise in the Sociology of Knowledge_ (Garden City, N.Y., 1967).

[19] Ibid., p. 3.

[20] Ibid., pp. 9-10.

[21]Ibid., p. 15.

[22]Ibid., p. 20.

[23]Ibid., p. 26.

[24]Ibid., p. 33.

[25]Ibid., p. 38.

[26]Ibid., p. 44.

[27]Ibid., p. 42.

[28]Ibid., p. 46.

[29]Ibid., p. 51.

[30]Ibid., p. 52.

[31]Ibid., p. 61.

[32]Ibid., p. 61.

[33]Ibid., p. 61.

[34]Ibid., p. 62.

[35]Ibid., p. 67.

[36]Ibid., p. 70.

[37]Ibid., p. 92.

[38]Ibid., p. 147.

[39]Ivan Chapman, The End of Free Inquiry: A Study in Reality Construction (Stillwater, Oklahoma, 1971).

[40]Ibid., p. 124.

[41]Ibid., p. 7.

[42]Ibid., pp. 8-9.

[43]Ibid., pp. 14-15, p. 19.

[44]Ibid., pp. 25-26.

[45]Ibid., p. 28.

[46]Ibid., pp. 28-29.

[47]Ibid., p. 44.

[48]Ibid., p. 57.

[49]Ibid., p. 70.

[50]Ibid., p. 88.

[51]Ibid., pp. 102-103.

[52]Ivan Chapman, Maintenance of Societal Thresholds: A Social Imperative! (Stillwater, Oklahoma, 1972).

[53]Ibid., p. 13.

[54]Ibid., p. 33.

[55]Ibid., p. 55.

[56]Ibid., p. 69.

[57]Ibid., p. 107.

[58]Ibid., pp. 110-111.

[59]Ibid., p. 129.

[60]Ibid., p. 158.

[61]Kurt H. Wolff, ed., From Karl Mannheim (New York, 1971).

[62]Ibid., p. xii.

[63]Ibid., p. xvi.

[64]Ibid., p. xix.

[65]Ibid., p. xxvi.

[66]Ibid., p. xxxvi.

[67]Ibid., p. xliii.

[68]Ibid., p. xlvi.

[69]Ibid., p. 60.

[70]Ibid., p. 69.

[71]Ibid., p. 114.

CHAPTER III

A CRITIQUE OF MANNHEIM

To critique Mannheim is not to denigrate him. Few sociologists in

the twentieth century have been as productive in postulating theoretical

time-frames and bridges to the past as has Mannheim. At the outset

one may be generous in postulating the broad sweep and magnitude of

this author. As Derek L. Phillips has said of him, "Mannheim holds

that not only does the individual speak the language of his group, but

he also thinks in the manner in which his group thinks."[1] On the

negative side, Phillips points to the ambiguity of the Mannheim position.

This bleak position is the result of confusion which exists in regards

to facts, truth, and values. In a position which is not too distant

from that of Durkheim, Mannheim sees "facts" as external to the actor.

Phillips' summary statement is as follows:

> Mannheim is enormously sensitive to the influence of
> people's social positions on what they can perceive,
> what they define and accept as knowledge and truth,
> as well as their views, opinions, goals, and values.[2]

In many other respects, the orientation or system which the

sociology of knowledge suggests becomes bogged down in statements of

probability and rampant subjectivity. Mannheim seems to be aware of

this as much as he is aware of history and what Marx was capable of

doing with it. In a general sense, to borrow from the Marxian tradition,

Mannheim does not see social action of the past restricted to any

45

elite group. He is conscious of the pluralistic action of all groups.

One suggestion which may be offered here is the view of Louis J. Halle

who claims: "Ideological thinking, whether right or wrong, is norma-

tive thinking so sure of its own rightness as to be intolerant of

dissent."[3]

Another source searching for meaning in Mannheim's work cites

the work (in German) of Helmuth Plessner who pointed out that ideologi-

cal thought is essentially two things: (1) weapon and category and

(2) political mean and sociological reality.[4] In an earlier part of

this paper a critical evalution is made of Mannheim:

> [He] separated the concept of ideology from the context
> of social critique and developed his notion of the total
> concept of ideology: existential determination and
> lacking objectivity became identical . . . . [His]
> approach to ideology, in connection with Weber's rejec-
> tion of value commitments in social inquiry, became the
> basis for most future research on ideology outside the
> Marxian tradition . . . .[5]

Singelmann sees some differences and similarities between the ways

that Marx and Mannheim perceived ideology. For the former the concept

was rooted in the substantial doctrine of Hegel's philosophy, Feverbach's

anthropology and classical economic theory.[6] Both see sociology as

linked to history and both separate "ideology" from the "lie," in that

the former is a theoretical concept whereas the latter is an ethical

construct.[7] Another point is that for Marx ideology was a weapon of

attack devised to discredit a social order dominated by the bourgeoise.

For Mannheim, on the other hand, the concentration was "on the relation-

ship between particular systems of thought and historical development."[8]

It is in its departure from the hard class consciousness of

Marxism that Mannheim's relativism runs into serious trouble. Thus,

Mannheim and his followers are forced to accept all thought, no matter how trivial and inconsequential, as ideology. They questioned everything and attacked nothing. Intellectual configurations exist through social change.[9]

Still another position on the relevance of Mannheim's contribution is that of Ivan Chapman.[10] Chapman attacks the position of Mannheim not from the amount of deviation from Marxism but from the point of view of logic in that Mannheim does not do what he claims for his orientation. Chapman's statement is as follows:

> . . . his method is precisely to eliminate from considera-
> tions in the make-up of "true" social knowledge "other"
> psychological propositions and inferences than his own
> object qualities . . . negating as false all other
> psychologically apprehended meaning as well as all con-
> ventionally shared meaning.[11]

Chapman's line of reasoning includes an evaluation of Mannheim's use of the "I" and the "me" derivitive of the School of Symbolic Interaction. In addition to this, it is stated: "Mannheim was uncertain about what constituted the proper base for the critical stance called for in his sociology of knowledge."[12] Chapman summarizes his position as follows:

> Thus the sociology of knowledge, rather than being a
> method in the search for understanding, in Mannheim's
> usage became a method for imputing true social know-
> ledge to "others" and "other societies."[13]

This criticism of Mannheim suggests several different kinds of knowledge in contradistinction to Mannheim's one and only type of knowledge:

(1)   opinion knowledge

(2)   reason knowledge

(3)   intuitive knowledge

(4)   revealed knowledge

(5)   supernatural knowledge

(6)   communicated knowledge.[14]

Chapman cites the seven classes of knowledge suggested by Scheler which run the gamut from "least" artificial to "most" artificial. They are as follows:

(1)   myth and legend

(2)   folk knowledge

(3)   religious knowledge

(4)   mystical knowledge

(5)   philosophical - metaphysical knowledge

(6)   positive knowledge (mathematics, natural and cultural

      sciences)

(7)   technological knowledge.[15]

The interesting thing about the above classification is that all of the classes are subject to ideological properties and characteristics. Chapman is on the road to an important re-evaluation of the Mannheim prospectus. A definitive statement by him is as follows:

> Society as an ongoing process may produce, through the reciprocal interaction of individuals, many forms of knowledge which are then filled with content by these interacting individuals. Knowledge of this immediate social character may then be transmitted to the next generation or "others" as cultural forms of the a priori stock of social knowledge.[16]

Chapman's main displeasure with Mannheim is that he "theoretically reduced valid knowledge to imputed knowledge."[17] By the same token an orthodox Marxist writer, Arnest Kolman, sees the situation much in the same way:

> Most of our knowledge we did not acquire by our own
> observations or experiments. It is <u>transmitted knowledge.</u>
> It is based on perceptions, on sensual or visual observa-
> tions, on notions of others, and on information communicated
> to us.[18]

The above, although critical of Mannheim, actually takes little away from him as formulator and pioneer of the concept of ideology within the frame of reference of the sociology of knowledge. Most theories have combinations of both metaphysical and empirical compo- nents. Marxism, for example, may be viewed in many ways as a utopian scheme which has much more imputed than real value. The important thing is that few writers in the philosophical--historical--sociological area of ideology follow Mannheim too closely possibly because of the extreme rigidity of the rules. Most writers, then, define their terms and, usually, begin with their own definition of ideology. A fair representation of this phenomenon is as follows:

> By ideology . . . is meant here any intellectual structure
> consisting of: a set of beliefs about the conduct of
> life and the organization of society; a set of beliefs
> about man's nature and the world in which he lives; a
> claim that the two sets are interdependent; and a demand
> that those beliefs should be professed, and that claim
> conceded, by anyone who is to be considered a full member
> of a certain social group.[19]

Again, to add depth to what may serve as a rather good operational definition of ideology, the same author explains: ". . . ideologies are always internally complex and often inconsistent: different people can and do draw different practical conclusions from the same ideological premises."[20]

Thus, in a sense to critique Mannheim is to add new dimensions to the concept. It is easy to say that Scheler's work could have been the definitive study had it been translated in time. The important factor

is that there is relativity and bridges of understanding between generations largely because of the early thrust of Mannheim's work. One should note also that this allows one to utilize a technique of Marxism without adhering to the Party Line. Last, it should be stressed that with the inept sociological theory of recent generations, this technique and orientation allows one to depart from naked operationalism with its fetish for measurement and labeling of independent, dependent and intervening variables. There is no 2 X 2 table that could ever hold the limitless factors associated with ideology and the sociology of knowledge.

FOOTNOTES

[1] Derek L. Phillips, "Epistemology and the Sociology of Knowledge: The Contributions of Mannheim, Mills, and Merton," Theory and Society, I (1975), p. 64.

[2] Ibid., p. 67.

[3] Louis J. Halle, The Ideological Imagination (London, 1972), p. 116.

[4] Joachim Singelmann, "The Concept of Ideology and the Sociology of Knowledge," Paper presented before the Southwestern Sociological Association (San Antonio, Texas, March 30-April 1, 1972), p. 20.

[5] Ibid., p. 3.

[6] Ibid., p. 4.

[7] Ibid., p. 10.

[8] Ibid., pp. 10-11.

[9] Ibid., p. 16.

[10] Ivan Chapman, "The Logic of Mannheim's Social Knowledge," Paper presented before the Midwestern Sociological Association (Chicago, Illinois, April 1-3, 1975).

[11] Ibid., p. 6.

[12] Ibid., p. 7.

[13] Ibid., pp. 8-9.

[14] Ibid., pp. 9-10.

[15] Ibid., p. 10.

[16] Ibid., p. 11.

[17] Ibid., p. 13.

[18] Arnest Kolman, "Considerations About the Certainty of Knowledge," Occasional paper No. 2, The American Institute for Marxist Studies (1965), p. 7.

[19]Patrick Corbett, _Ideologies_ (New York, 1965), p. 12.

[20]Ibid., p. 150.

CHAPTER IV

MAINSTREAM MATERIALS

In most instances the student who is exposed to ideology as a
concept and the sociology of knowledge as a sub-discipline specializa-
tion will become conditioned by the textbook materials selected by his
or her sociology instructor. This chapter deals with such a situation
and such materials, namely, Edward Shils' "The Concept and Function of
Ideology"[1] and James E. Curtis and John W. Petras, editors, The
Sociology of Knowledge: A Reader.[2] An earlier work which may also be
evaluated is that by Jacques J. Maquet.[3]

Beginning with the work of Shils one becomes somewhat aware that
there are two principles involved in his approach to ideology:

(1)   a departure from what he refers to as the European tradition,
      namely the writings of Marx and Mannheim

(2)   a general tendency to attempt some operational conceptualiza-
      tion within the broad category of the area of ideology.

The above approach is not completely negative, but it must be pointed
out here that some distortion is noted. What this indicates is quite
simple. Either one discusses "ideology" or one does not discuss
"ideology." There is nothing wrong with attempting to build or generate
theory and methods from ideological constructs, but it may end up as
something completely different, namely, a category of Parsonian
"structural-functionalism."

What Shils does contribute, however, are some concepts which may have limited utility for future research. Those which are most meaningful are as follows:

a. "ideological primary groups"--the group which establishes a new ideological tradition

b. "proto-ideological primary groups"--that group or gang which has an inadequate conception of society, hence an inadequate mode for changing it

c. "charismatic ideology"--that ideology can and may be the creation of the vision of a charismatic leader.

Much of the standard material is reviewed by Shils who sees ideology as an attempt to create intellectual order in the universe. The debate on truth and falsification is aired as well as the heritage of ideology in its comparison with science. There is also a brief summary of the "end of ideology" controversy which will be presented below. Shils sees Marxism as the only great "ideology" which has a substantial "scientific" content. For one indoctrinated with this school of thought, he or she could easily turn the logical correlates around by saying that this is the only great (social) "science" which exhibits a more than substantial "ideological" content.

In a general sense, the question raised here concerning the Shils article is as follows: can college and university students, research scholars and laymen obtain sufficient information from the article to enable them to proceed with their intellectual pursuits? The answer must be in the negative. One may also go so far as to contend that despite good if not incomplete source materials the Shils article is

more a product of distortion than of a fair and objective assessment of the concept ideology.

What if an investigative reporter were writing a series of articles on "left wing" as compared to "right wing" social movements, and he or she came upon the Shils article? How much utility would there be in evaluating the proposition that ideological culture interferes with truth? Should one adapt the Shils position, it would be necessary to dichotomize between "real" as opposed to "nominal" truths. It would also be necessary to use such concepts as "norms," "sub-cultures" and "institutions" to present a complete evaluation. Shils is guilty of his own accusations. He writes about ideology as he would prefer it to be rather than how it is presently evaluated.

The Curtis and Petras reader is a much more elaborate work which combines an old tradition as well as a new tradition with an adequate critique of ideology and the sociology of knowledge. Should our investigative reporter be referred to this work and should he or she spend adequate time with its contents, the resulting product--a series of articles dealing with an ideological theme--could be much more substantial.

At the outset one notes authors and articles which may be more identified with social-psychology, sociological theory and industrial sociology. A secondary observation may be that several authors are included (Parsons, for example) who have little identification with this area. Much of this, however, is explained by the editors who collaborate on a substantial introduction to the book, running some eighty-five pages of text and notes.

They see some common identities between the concepts "attitude" and "ideology" in that both suffer imprecise definition. One may comment here that an attempt has been made for the former by W. I. Thomas and for the latter by Mannheim. This, of course, is not all to the negative. What may actually be at work here is that both attitude and ideology lie atop a sea of many unknowns if not unknowables within the realm of society and culture. It may also indicate that one requires a greater knowledge of biology to understand emotional and cognitive states of man just as one needs knowledge of social history and folklore to adequately understand ideology. The fact, however, that both terms generate speculation and controversy could indicate a healthy sign for the social sciences in general. What is equally important, as noted by Curtis and Petras, is the popularity of the terms "attitude" and "ideology." Such popularity may well be based on the need to know more about the relationship between the individual and society.

The point of departure for Curtis and Petras is the statement made by John Dewey in 1915 that "pure ideas" and "pure reason" are nonexistent. One wonders why Dewey is cited rather than William James who is the recognized pioneer of both pragmatism as a philosophy and symbolic interaction as a school of social science.

In a more general sense they note a blending of three "traditions" which at present constitute the field of the sociology of knowledge:

(1) the German philosophical-sociological tradition (folk psychology)

(2) the French sociological and social-psychological tradition (Durkheim)

(3)   the American social behaviorists (Chicago School).

Should one claim that the sociology of knowledge is an untenable point
of departure for the investigation of socio-cultural phenomenon, it
can be established as noted above that the three derivatives as indi-
cated above are incompatible with each other. In a general sense if
there is any agreement, it would be with the notion as formulated first
by the German scholars that material conditions are relative to cultural
conditions.

Another approach indicated by Curtis and Petras but in no way
developed or expanded by them is that the general area of the sociology
of knowledge represents, in an historical sense, a "graveyard" of
aborted theoretical ideas and fragments which could not make it solo
(on their own) but which are now assembled in close proximity to one
another under the broad umbrella of the "sociology of knowledge" as a
category if not a sub-discipline. When a writer speaks of a "problem"
within the broad spectrum of the sociology of knowledge, it is usually
one of the elements which become conspicuous by their incompatability
with other elements which he or she refers to. By the same token, when
a new "branch of knowledge" or a "specialization" becomes a "spin-off"
(to use a modern, American corporation term) from the "sociology of
knowledge" such as recent developments in phenomenology, it is indica-
tive of the same process operating in a different direction. It is not
unlikely that there will be more of this in the future. One should not
forget for a single moment the number of disciplines that have an
interest in this area. The list includes sociology, psychology, social-
psychology, philosophy, economics, political science and history. Each
of these disciplines with their numerous specializations is engaged in

research, methodology and theoretical formulations. Each discipline,

then, is in a good position to rediscover the "sociology of knowledge"

from time to time and to extract out certain fragments for cross-

fertilization and for future elaboration. One may surmise from this

that old ideas in the social and cultural sciences (the so-called

"soft sciences") never die, they just accumulate as part of the

sociology of knowledge until they are regrouped and become discovered

by some research team badly in need of a concept or explanation.

In further developing the theme for their edition Curtis and

Petras state:

> The frames of reference utilized by the three branches
> can be characterized briefly as follows. The German
> branch tended to combine a philosophical spiritualism
> with Verstehende Soziologie and a concern for the
> "universal processes of history." The French branch,
> epitomized in the works of Durkheim and the crowd
> psychologists, emphasized the relationship between
> individual minds and society, as well as the structuring
> influence of the particular sociocultural environment.
> Historical processes were de-emphasized in favor of the
> connection between the mind of the individual and a
> particular society at a particular time. The most
> prominent feature of the American tradition has been its
> emphasis on interdependence as the essential variable
> in understanding the relationship between the individual
> and the sociocultural group.[4]

Although the above themes are given a full treatment throughout

the text, it is apparent early in the volume that many writers add

little to the preconceived idea of "ideology" and the "sociology of

knowledge." One may spend many pages in comparing the young Marx

with the old Marx or with splitting hairs between Mannheim's concepts

of "relationism" as opposed to "relativism" or the rediscovery of

Pareto during the 1960's; the important consideration is what is

accepted and what has durability. Thus, "ideology" and the "sociology

of knowledge" approximate other ideas and concepts which includes the
following: "deception," "power," "strategy," "consciousness," "social
class" (including "bourgeoise" and "proletariat"). Stated in other
terms, ideology is analogous with political and economic machinations.
At best, ideology (and its rationale, the sociology of knowledge) is
a rationale for not only doing something or anticipating doing something,
it is a rationale for having done something; thus, it is and may be
utilized as a rationale for supporting the status quo. When this posi-
tion is recognized, one is able to see how such factors as "patriotism,"
"religious principles" and "civic responsibility" need not be imple-
mented separately since they are supporting propositions and clauses of
mainstream ideologies.

Another manifestation which may be dwelt upon within the Curtis
and Petras text is the drawing within the mainstream of both classi-
cal and contemporary authors who have made some contribution to the
subject of "ideology" and the "sociology of knowledge." Such a list
would include Bacon, Comte, Scheler, Grunwald and Weber. In some cases
it is a matter of language barrier. In other cases it is more an
"expansion" or "linkage" with another discipline where there has been
some preliminary development.

An example of the above may be as follows. The cultural anthro-
pologists since 1948 have used a concept which is called "enculturation"
which indicates the degree of success one achieves within his culture.
One may surmise, as Melville Herskovits did not, that this concept has
"ideological" properties and characteristics. Should this happen, then,
another concept becomes "ideological" despite the fact that nothing is
really settled as to the meaning of ideology as a concept.[5]

Curtis and Petras cite an actual as opposed to an imagined case of the above:

> Scheler uses the term "codetermination" in explaining the relationship between the mind and social factors, in order to differentiate himself from Durkheim and Marx. Unlike Durkheim, Scheler separates the "object of selection" from the content and validity of ideas.[6]

When pressed to its ultimate conclusions the "sociology of knowledge" with its concomitant concept, "ideology," not only serves as a critique of the political, economic and social order, but it also serves as a critique of science and, ultimately, the social sciences. Thus, the mere existence of science can be traced to ideological properties if not motivations. Finally, the purposes that social science, in particular sociology, serves have clear-cut linkages to ideology. The fact that science is usually thought of as secular is indicative of a long standing "tug-of-war" between the secular as opposed to the sacred forces, resulting in the capitulation of the latter. The question, also, of the function and purpose of sociology has been raised too many times in recent decades not to be aware of the rationalizing tendencies of this social science in making its peaceful coexistence possible within the social order.

What has happened in the case of sociology is somewhat analogous to what has happened in our society with respect to the labor movement. Ronald Segal in an introspective work originally published in 1971 has stated: "The trade unions provide their members with a sense of protection against outrage by capital, while having themselves been assimilated into the system's efficient functioning."[7] Thus, both the profession and the labor movement work in behalf of the system. Should one seek to find a plausible explanation, it might be indicated that

both are (ideologically) locked into the system. Secondly, the system

does not expect nor does it receive full cooperation from all of its

parts and elements. Third, as Georg Simmel theoretically demonstrated

many years ago in his essays on the "sociology of conflict," many

individuals as well as institutions maintain a semblance of cohesion

because of conflict.[8]

With this constant stream of "in-puts" and "out-puts" regarding

the "sociology of knowledge," one may suggest that a final theoretical

formulization will never take place. Judging from this state of flux

as indicated by Curtis and Petras, this is indicative of the vast pro-

pensities of this area. No one can argue with this position as long

as a state of complete and total theoretical anarchy can be prevented.

One may be cautious, however, of the label of ideology and the mystique

of the "sociology of knowledge." This noted caution is what leads

Curtis and Petras to an important policy statement early in their text

that a definition of the "sociology of knowledge" is, at present,

impossible.

Some insight is afforded by these writers in their assessment of

Dewey and Mead:

> . . . the works of Mead come to grips with the most
> critical question confronting the sociology of knowledge:
> Is such an approach epistemologically possible? At the
> same time, Mead's works, like Dewey's, are linked to the
> French branch of the sociology of knowledge perspective
> through their concern with minds arising out of the social
> process. Although the emphases are decidedly different,
> the underlying principles are similar.[9]

The Curtis and Petras text is one which should advance our

understanding of ideology and the sociology of knowledge. This state-

ment can be made with few if any reservations at this time. Yet, it

is interesting to note that contributors to the volume, particularly

those of contemporary vintage (Merton, Parsons, Wolff and Znaniecki to

name but only a few) see this issue largely from their own theoretical

heritage and position. Thus, they add to the body of knowledge by the

weight and thrust of their interest and contribution. Concomitantly,

they take away from the general knowledge by their lack of homogeneity,

their lack of consensus, their motivation and greed in attempting to

establish a "beach-head" for their orientation and point of view and,

finally, their inability to understand diverse positions based largely

on theory and hypotheses without substantial data for proper tabulation

and testability. It is almost as though sociologists have assumed

the role of philosophers and the latter have assumed the role of the

former with the end result being an acute form of anomie. One must

account for various dimensions to do with time, language and levels of

understanding. But one must also anticipate a higher degree of syn-

thesis in the future in regards to a school of the sociology of

knowledge.

What is actually needed are two entities:

(1)   whole man

(2)   whole knowledge.

There must be some admission on the part of scholars that these

entities have not materialized in the past. What exists at the present

time amounts to fragmentation both of concepts of man as well as con-

cepts of knowledge. A "conspiracy theory of knowledge" and a bureau-

cratic blueprint for man and his actions will not suffice even if

subsumed under the double-barreled headings of "social action" and

"social system." Hence, if there is an underlying theme which pervades

the Curtis and Petras text it is that such potential and possibilities exist for a future "sociology of knowledge."

Delving deeply into the various approaches to the sociology of knowledge, Curtis and Petras find themselves in the middle of some of the most critical problems of sociology, that concerning values and the role of the sociologist. Here, in addition to presenting what may be termed "standard materials"--the writings of Weber, Mills, Lynd and Gouldner--reference is also made to the "sociology of sociology" from which little substantial data have been accumulated. In getting involved with the critical issues the authors imply that the sociology of knowledge should be used as an "antecedent" variable in that if greater care is given to understanding the sociology of knowledge, much confusion which presently exists in contemporary sociology can be rectified.

In advancing their position on the "sociology of sociology" the authors summarize what has been done thus far:

> There have been at least four lines of inquiry. First, through the years, scholars have utilized an implicit sociology of knowledge in several fine studies of trends and movements in the history of social thought. This type of research has been greatly extended in the past few years. Second, and more recently, there have been indications that comparative studies of sociology in various countries are beginning to receive more atten- tion. Third, limited research has developed on certain values and interests of sociologists--e.g., studies of their voting behavior, styles of work, and publication productivity. Finally, there has been continued interest in the implicit ideologies and value premises in certain areas of contemporary American theory and research.[10]

In brief, the Curtis and Petras book is one which is designed not only for starting the student in the path of learning about the sociology of knowledge but for also introducing the student to the

many problems and controversies inherent in this field of study. One

learns that there is a linguistic or communication problem as well as

a historical and cultural problem. There is a problem of conceptuali-

zation as well as a problem of reductionism. There is a problem of

stereotype as well as a problem of values. Despite all of this the

sociology of knowledge looms large on the horizon as an area of sociol-

ogy which holds the promise for an amalgamation of theory and practice.

Through this vast maze of confusion the sociology of knowledge appears

as the proper formula for understanding man and society.

One might say as Max Scheler has done that this field is yet in

its incipient stages. He points out that:

> The problems of a sociology of knowledge and cognition, in
> their variety, scope, articulation, and intrinsic inter-
> relatedness, have hitherto hardly been perceived or cor-
> rectly posed, to say nothing of being solved.[11]

The Curtis and Petras text goes a long way in its indoctrination

of the reader into the field of the sociology of knowledge. There are,

however, noticeable omissions and deletions such as the works of Bell,

Veblen and Sorokin. Some discussion is projected for the above, but

there is no excerpt by which the reader can make valid and meaningful

comparisons. Some of the articles which are included are those which

are at the fringe of this sub-discipline. Such an article would be that

contribution by Karl Popper. In a rather negative note he says:

> The sociology of knowledge is not only self-destructive,
> not only a rather gratifying object of socioanalysis, it
> also shows an astonishing failure to understand precisely
> its main subject, the social aspects of knowledge, or
> rather, of scientific method.[12]

In this connection one sees Popper as one bent on destruction of

the incipient technology associated with the sociology of knowledge.

Such is not the case. All that he is doing is reminding the reader that prior to Marx and his present generation of supporters both Hegel and Kant established procedures for evaluating knowledge which have been badly neglected if not distorted. Thus., Popper sees himself as a critique of the strict philosophical constructs associated with the sociology of knowledge. His mention of the concept "socio-analysis" is designed to counter the popular concept "psycho-analysis." Much of this comparison is left to the reader's imagination. One should, of course, take into consideration the humorous intent of this writer, well-known for brilliance and wit.

Any summary of the Curtis and Petras reader should take into consideration the fact that it does present a fair rendition of the field. All of the articles have some interest to the developmental stages of our understanding of ideology and the sociology of knowledge. In some ways this collection of essays reminds one of the famous sociology text edited by Robert Ezra Park and Ernest W. Burgess, An Introduction to the Science of Sociology, because the Park and Burgess text also contained what they considered to be the best representative essays on sociology up to that time. One should spend considerable time in an analysis and comparison of both texts.

On the whole, techniques of analysis and formulation in the sociology of knowledge strike one as looking for something which does not exist or, should it exist, there is no present mode of understanding requisite with its complete evaluation. Indecision begets further indecision. Futility leads to further futility. Playing the game of variables, typologies, hypotheses and temporal priority leads one absolutely nowhere. The crisis leads to panic. The panic leads to

prolonged ignorance. The problem calls for cool, dispassionate famil-
iarity with social and cultural history. The situation requires a type
of objectivity which allows for a fair elaboration of bias and sub-
jectivity. In some remote, implicit manner the Curtis and Petras reader
provides for a significant amount of objectivity in this area. It may
be replete with shortcomings, but it displays enough of both classical
and contemporary materials to be worthy of a place in the mainstream of
sociology of knowledge developments.

A third volume of some merit is that by Maquet.[13] What is impor-
tant here is: (1) a multilingual bibliography of leading works up to
1950 and (2) a full treatment of Sorokin as a contributor to the
general area of the sociology of knowledge. It is the opinion of
F.S.C. Northrop in his preface to this work that the choice of Sorokin
for inclusion alongside Mannheim is a good one.

Maquet sees the broad guidelines of the sociology of knowledge as
encompassing three main factors:

   (1)   the conditioning social facts;
   (2)   the ideas making up human knowledge which are
         conditioned; and
   (3)   the relation joining the former factor to the
         latter.[14]

The treatment afforded Mannheim may be judged as fair and adequate.
One should keep in mind the date of publication of this volume which
was not too distant from those of Mannheim, both German and English
editions. Mannheim is seen as exploring meanings and connections
between a social group and an intellectual perspective. This same
theme is projected for the whole field of the sociology of knowledge:

   The sociology of knowledge, a positive science, has as
   its ambition a precise description of the way in which
   certain social factors influence certain mental

productions, and to do so follows a strict method
of observation.[15]

Perfection is not a primary characteristic of the above method which
is assumed to lead to "generalizations" and, finally, to "theories."
All of this takes place in the shadow of philosophy.

It is with the evaluation of Sorokin's works that this volume
establishes a claim to classical status. For Sorokin there are three
manners of indicating truth: (1) ideational, (2) idealistic, and (3)
sensate. The "ideational" is one in which there is a denial of the
senses. The "sensate" depends on the senses for its particular brand
of knowledge. The "idealistic" represents elements of both of the
above. An interesting comment by Maquet is as follows:

> The only difference between Sorokin's method and that of
> the historians of ideas is that he has endeavored to
> base his evaluations of the influence of trends of
> thought upon the examination of all the thinkers of a
> period and upon a more precise determination of their
> recognized value.[16]

What is of extreme importance to Sorokin is what he classifies as
six main trends within the three systems as described above. These
are as follows:

(1) empiricism: sensory perception as the source of knowledge

(2) rationalism: two forms—religious or ideational and
idealistic

(3) mysticism: geared to a recognition of truth founded on
faith

(4) skepticism: a doubt as to the possibility of valid knowledge

(5) fideism: truth may be achieved only by an act of the will

(6) criticism: a form of agnosticism which implies that ultimate
reality can never be known.

The system proposed by Sorokin establishes that social and cultural change are constant variables involved in broad transitions of ideologies or beliefs and attitudes corresponding to the social and cultural values. This explanation is somewhat clarified by the author:

> Sorokin utilizes the analogy of the living organism to make his principle understood. Even if the exterior conditions were such as to remain always constant, one could not prevent a man from changing as the years go by. This naturally does not prevent the acknowledgment of the role of exterior forces in the changes in the sociocultural systems. Their interaction with the immanent principle accentuates the tendency toward change.[17]

Twenty-five years ago it appeared that Sorokin and his complex sociocultural postulates and theories would blend into those of Darwin and Einstein. Such has not been the case. The approach by Sorokin is a complex one. History for Sorokin is not a simple rendition of the past; it represents a force. People are not just warm bodies. They are amalgams of organic wholes who breathe meaningfully because of their concise value systems. Society is ever and always a potential entity awaiting new forms of stimulation and conditioning. Perhaps some of this represents Sorokin's own experiences working both under Pavlov in applied psychology and Kerensky in political manipulation. Some insight is gained in the following statement: "Sorokin defines influence by the procedure by which he attributes values to each thinker."[18]

The rise and fall of Sorokin's productivity and influence is not the subject of this dissertation. But, it is reasonable to assume that scholars of the future will rediscover these scholarly contributions to the sociology of knowledge. This, unfortunately, was not the

case with the Curtis and Petras volume. Perhaps the problem with Sorokin is that his sociology of knowledge is lacking in ideology.

The last study to be considered within the category of "mainline materials" is the recent work by Nettler.[19] This author devotes a whole chapter of the book to what she calls "ideological explanations." Here one finds some of the clearest statements about ideology that are available in the present literature. One of the interesting points explained is that in the 18th Century ideology meant "social science." By the 19th Century it had become "false consciousness." More recently it is explained as follows: "The hallmark of the ideological explainway is that it rests on statements false, unproved, or unprovable through reference to empirical rules."[20]

A more detailed accounting of contemporary use is as follows:

> The theme of ideology is doctrine . . . . [It] includes
> the interwoven explainways called "magical," "mythical,"
> and "religious." It prevails in the moral beliefs we
> need and in the political and juridical perspectives
> invoked in their name. Ideology resides in the explana-
> tory principles of "luck," "fate," and "God's will."
> It is the prevailing way of explaining collective
> behavior and it combines with empathy to clarify
> individual action.[21]

But ideology is more than luck or fate:

> [It] is action-oriented. The sterile descriptions read
> from the actuary's tables do not tell "what is to be
> done." Ideologies do. The urge to act with one's
> explanations is energized by the tendency to evaluate
> what one describes. It may be partly measured in
> explanations by the ideology sentence-ratio.[22]

Thus, what may be lacking in the Sorokin model is available in the Nettler model. The former builds a "sociology of knowledge" without ideology. The latter "explains" ideology without a "sociology of knowledge." Who is right?

FOOTNOTES

[1] Edward Shils, "The Concept and Function of Ideology," *International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences* (New York, 1968), VII, pp. 66-76.

[2] James E. Curtis and John W. Petras, eds., *The Sociology of Knowledge: A Reader* (New York, 1970).

[3] Jacques J. Maquet, *The Sociology of Knowledge: Its Structure and Its Relation to the Philosophy of Knowledge* (Boston, 1951).

[4] James E. Curtis and John W. Petras, eds., *The Sociology of Knowledge: A Reader* (New York, 1970), pp. 6-7.

[5] Melville Herskovits, *Man and His Works* (New York, 1948).

[6] James E. Curtis and John W. Petras, eds., *The Sociology of Knowledge: A Reader* (New York, 1970), p. 16.

[7] Ronald Segal, *The Struggle Against History* (New York, 1973), p. p. 10.

[8] Georg Simmel, "The Sociology of Conflict," *The American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 9 (January, 1904), pp. 490-525.

[9] James E. Curtis and John W. Petras, eds., *The Sociology of Knowledge: A Reader* (New York, 1970), p. 21.

[10] *Ibid.*, p. 51.

[11] *Ibid.*, p. 161.

[12] *Ibid.*, p. 653.

[13] Jacques J. Maquet, *The Sociology of Knowledge: Its Structure and Its Relation to the Philosophy of Knowledge* (Boston, 1951).

[14] *Ibid.*, p. xii.

[15] *Ibid.*, p. 10.

[16] *Ibid.*, p. 127.

[17] *Ibid.*, p. 161.

[18]Ibid., p. 171.

[19]Gwynn Nettler, _Explanations_ (New York, 1970).

[20]Ibid., pp. 177-178.

[21]Ibid., p. 179.

[22]Ibid., p. 184.

CHAPTER V

THE END OF IDEOLOGY DEBATE

Daniel Bell did more than initiate a controversy when he compiled

his now famous text, The End of Ideology. Although this material was

originally designed as a critique of political and economic values of

the 1950's, by the 1970's many intellectuals and serious scholars use

Bell as a point of reference for the total concept of ideology. Two

statements by Bell are important for this analysis:

(1) Ideology is the conversion of ideas into social
    levers . . . . For the ideologue, truth arises in
    action, and meaning is given to experience by
    the "transforming moment."[1]
(2) In our time, the conspiracy theory of events has
    gained ground. Along with those suspicions,
    there is an accompanying decline of moral
    temper.[2]

The implications of these statements as far as political and

economic matters are concerned are far reaching. What it amounts to

is a type of situational formula for ideology. Robert E. Lane, writing

in the 1960's, makes an interesting comparison between Bell's thesis

and a similar thesis developed by Henry Aiken.[3] Lane's initial comments

are as follows:

What is implied in this contrast is, first, that analysis
is taking the place of ideology; second, that at mid-
century there is a kind of exhaustion of political ideas
in the West, and hence, third, that the transformation
of broadly conceived political ideas into social action
is no longer the center of an exciting struggle.[4]

In his study Lane makes a dichotomous distinction within ideo-
logies. For him there are the "forensic" ideologies of a conscious
ideologist and there are the "latent" ideologies characteristic of a
common man. Both are important insofar as the stated controversy is
concerned.[5]

Edward Shils takes a strong position in this ongoing controversy.
For him, similar to the well-worn imperialist slogan, "there will
always be ideology" since it is part of what he calls the "human
condition." Shils projects his argument as follows:

> As long as human societies are afflicted by crises and
> as long as man has a need to be in direct contact with
> the sacred, ideologies will recur. As long as there is
> a discrepancy between the ideal and the actual, a strong
> impetus for ideologies will exist.[6]

As an indication that there was never full consensus in the
Daniel Bell position on ideology, the following declaration is inserted
for purposes of comparison:

> It is a shame that the West has been on the defensive
> all these years. The time has come to pass to the
> offensive on every front. The initiative should be
> seized in a dozen fields, especially the political,
> moral, personal, intellectual, and spiritual. To think
> of vigorously and relentlessly challenging the Communists
> on their theory of man, government, and history, on whether
> the mind is really free in their realm, on why they broke
> away from the wonderful spiritual heritage of their peoples,
> and on why they persecute those who believe in God and
> Christ is quite revolutionary these days when the utmost
> that people seem to be capable of thinking of is "systems,"
> "societies," "gross national products," and who is going
> to reach the moon first.[7]

What Malik does not take into consideration is that there has been
a shift in ideologies in the West in that "systems," "societies," "gross
national product" and "flying to the moon" are more important than
winning "wars against poverty" and in guarantees of "civil rights" for

depressed classes. Nevertheless, displacement of values does not and should not imply termination of such values via their ideological symbols. There is still a great deal of latitude in the American society for adventures and persistence regarding "democracy," "freedom," and "open-class folklore." The more dominant ideologies, however, have a tendency to take such values for granted as if they have already been achieved and now it is our duty to be loyal to national values within a sea of international relations and competition, hence, our preoccupation with the "race to the moon" and the "gross national product." In essence it is as if we have experienced our second political and economic revolution without firing a single shot. We have achieved our ends, ambiguous as they may be, without the tragedy of bloodletting and internal strife. It is almost as humorous as John Kenneth Galbraith telling his "mom and pop" business participants in the American economy that they are as important and powerful as the top 500 corporations.[8]

Another ideological theme which has never expired completely is the super-patriotism of "anti-communism." Whereas Malik argues for the need of a "western revolution," Gonzalez argues to the contrary because of the preoccupation with anti-communism. His remarks are as follows:

> No Western capitalist nation is so brainwashed today as America. The anti-Communist propaganda which has been turned out in the last fifteen years has permeated and impregnated everything--the press, literature, TV, films, radio, the university, the pulpit, the school, and the home. In this propaganda, Communism is more than a theory or an economic, political, and social system which now governs nearly half the human race. It is something monstrous, diabolical, evil, atheistic, and noxious that must be destroyed as a dangerous plague at whatever price and by whatever means.[9]

The above description of keeping ideology alive in America may indicate that there has been a tendency to overdo the conspiracy

theory of ideology. What with both "cold" and "hot" war experiences
in recent decades, there is now more a movement under way of detente
or "strained relations" with societies dominated by socialistic socio-
economic systems. But, in essence, whether the above is right or
wrong, it takes away considerably from the "end of ideology debate" as
proposed by Daniel Bell and his associates. Yet another example of
substantial reasoning against the so-called controversy is that suggested
by Feliks Gross. His appraisal of ideology is as follows:

> Ideology rationalizes or states explicitly the socioeconomic
> interest of a social group or class; it contains value
> structures and goals and supplies a sense of direction
> for political action; it supplies rationalization of the
> quest for power; it is a powerful integrating force and
> appeal to identity; in appealing to economic and polit-
> ical interests and to noneconomic motivation such as
> psychological and moral needs, it harbors pragmatic,
> rational, and emotional appeals of the movements and,
> last but not least, ethical appeal. Generally, it is
> the ideology, the goals, that move the followers of a
> movement to action.[10]

An appraisal of the above appears to slant the argument in the
direction of ideology. Thus, it is not too important what type of
ideology one adheres to since the important consideration is that some
particular ideology will act as catalyst in a particular social situa-
tion or will serve as the mortar to bind the bricks of political life
together. One sees the individual as a kind of robot in such explana-
tion. It appears as though the individual is programmed in accordance
with a particular type of ideology. Some insight into the role of the
individual is explained by Maurice Friedman who states:

> We become ourselves through each particular action; we
> choose ourselves in each act of becoming. Actually, we
> cannot know our real potentialities in the abstract at
> all. All we can know are generalizations about ourselves
> from past situations in which we have had other and
> different resources. Our actual resources are inseparably

>bound up with what we are as persons, with our
>direction as persons, and with what calls us out
>in the concrete situation. We cannot foresee these.
>Potentiality is not in us as an already existing
>objective reality. We know it only as it becomes
>actuality in our response to each new situation.[11]

To properly understand Bell's position on ideology it is necessary to refer to one of his earlier works.[12] In a text published originally in 1952 his comments point towards the general direction of not only unmasking ideology but also commenting on its decline. The point of departure for this discourse centers around the failure of socialism in America. As Bell stated in this study, ". . . the failure of the socialist movement in the United States is rooted in its inability to resolve a basic dilemma of ethics and politics."[13] In a more detailed description Bell states:

>Neither nineteenth-century American radicals nor the
>American socialists faced up to this problem of social
>compromise. The utopias that were spun so profusely
>in the nineteenth century assumed that in the course of
>evolution "reason" would find its way and the perfect
>society would emerge.[14]

One of the major handicaps for the movement as seen by Bell is that, "Socialism is an eschatological movement, it is sure of its destiny because 'history' leads it to its goal."[15]

Drawing from the literature of Marxism, Bell demonstrates that all claims made for the proletariat in America were refuted by advanced technology and a welfare oriented labor movement. Stated in Bell's own words: "In the America of the nineteenth century, almost every social movement had involved an effort by the worker to escape his lot as a worker."[16]

With conditions and events working them as a political party and as a social movement, Bell demonstrates that radicalism as such has

never been a part of the mainstream of American politics. Using the

American Federation of Labor as his point of leverage, the formula as

proposed was that the laboring man was as good as the business man.

This was a more dazzling attraction than that of socialism which was

waiting for the inevitable decline of capitalism with all of its greed

and inequities.

In explaining the decline and fall of American socialism Bell

explains:

> The subsequent history of American socialism is the
> story of breakup and decline. Although 1912 was the
> high-water mark of the socialist vote, it also brought
> an uneasy awareness that the party would never be a
> major force in American politics.[17]

Anticipating his later "end of ideology" position in this text,

Bell contends:

> American society at the middle of the twentieth century
> was evolving in a far different direction from that pre-
> dicted by Marxist sociology . . . . The old simplistic
> theories no longer hold. We seem to be evolving toward
> some form of technical-military-administrative state,
> especially as the pressures of a permanent war economy
> bring into focus a priority of needs which are national
> in character and override the demands of any particular
> interest group.[18]

It should be noted at this juncture that Bell was not alone in

taking his "end of ideology" position. Among writers who were writing

in this same tradition was Harold Lasswell.[19] With his now famous

concept of the "garrison state," Lasswell, in a general sense, per-

ceived a movement away from democrary towards fascism.[20] In yet

another study a detailed explanation is offered:[21]

> The study involved the content analysis of editorials
> in the prestige newspapers in five industrial nations:
> the U. S., Britain, France, Germany, and the U. S. S. R.
> It was assumed that in every country, the ideology of
> the ruling elite is reflected in the editorial content

of the prestige newspapers. The analysis revealed that
in the years 1890 to 1950 a change had indeed taken
place, and that the values of democracy and interna-
tionalism were losing ground while those of totalitarian-
ism, militarism, conflict, and aggression were gaining.[22]

Prior to Bell's statement of policy on ideology, he attended a

"Future of Freedom" meeting held at Milan, Italy, in 1955. Accompanying

him on this journey were Seymour Martin Lipset and Edward Shils who are

also involved in the debate but not to the extent that Bell is involved.

However, with these scholars in some degree of consensus and others

such as Raymond Aron and Gunnar Myrdal taking similar positions the

criticism of established ideologies becomes more than an incidental

issue. David R. Segal has written of this situation in the following

manner:

> Their argument was that, largely because of increasing
> economic affluence in the Western industrial nations,
> extremist ideologies appeared to be declining. This
> decline was reflected in the observation that the
> extremes of political right and left had been shown to
> have similarities that were more impressive than their
> differences.[23]

More specifically, Bell's position is as follows: ". . . the

ideologies that had emerged from the politics of nineteenth-century

Europe were by the 1950's exhausted."[24]

Expanding on the above premise, Bell argues that radical ideologies

had not "delivered" the good life. In other words, they had not lived

up to their expectations. The horrors of both Nazi and Soviet forced-

labor (death) camps could not be denied. Also of some major signifi-

cance for Bell is the liberalization of the capitalist system and what

has come to be called the rise of the "welfare" state. In brief,

American citizens enjoyed the best of two worlds without participating

in the 19th Century, classical "struggle."

Thus, one gathers from reading Bell along with Lipset and Myrdal that the fundamental problems of our western society have been solved. Lipset's views are most concise. He states that:

> Greater economic productivity is associated with a more equitable distribution of consumption goods and education—factors contributing to a reduction of intrasocietal tension . . . . And increased education enhances the propensity of different groups to "tolerate" each other, to accept the complex idea that truth and error are not necessarily on one side.[25]

Speaking out on this issue at an earlier date, Lipset follows a similar line of reasoning. He exclaims:

> The characteristic pattern of stable Western democracies in the mid-twentieth century is that they are in a "post-politics" phase—that is, there is relatively little difference between the democratic left and right, the socialists are moderates, and the conservatives accept the welfare state. In a large measure this situation reflects the fact that in these countries the workers have won their fight for full citizenship.[26]

Both Lipset and Bell have strong congruence with respect to their positions on the end of ideology debate. This can have important implications for the future of such fields as "political sociology," "the sociology of law," "social institutions," and "collective behavior" as well as "complex organizations." Gouldner is critical of their approach and relates it to an over emphasis if not a primary preoccupation with "methodology" which he interprets as conducive to totalitarianism, a kind of constant if not immediate check on the population.[27]

Myrdal, another exemplar of the end of ideology school, builds his case on logical, historical grounds:

> Marx had little to say which directly concerns the present world problems. In fact, Marx and his more immediate followers did not envisage very clearly

the post-colonial problems with which we are wrestling,
and this should not surprise us, as he wrote so long
ago and so many things have happened since.[28]

Despite the above details, it is Bell who is most clear in his
position on the end of ideology. It is a matter of closing the book
on the past and opening the book on the future. There are interesting
conditions and reservations. There is to be no end of speculation
about utopia. Utopia is still, for Bell, a driving force in civiliza-
tion. Put into Bell's own formula, he states that: ". . . a utopia
has to specify where one wants to go, how to get there, the costs of
the enterprise, and some realization of, and justification for the
determination of who is to pay."[29]

Thus, the end of ideology calls for an end of rhetoric and those
rhetoricians who have envisioned revolution as a means to an end if not
an end in itself. Judged from the Mannheim perspective, Bell's fol-
lowing statement makes no sense at all:

The problems which confront us at home and in the world
are resistent to the old terms of ideological debate
between "left" and "right," and if "ideology" by now,
and with good reason, is an irretrievably fallen word,
it is not necessary that "utopia" suffer the same fate.[30]

Searching desperately for support and justification for his
theoretical position, all that Bell can come up with is a quotation
from Thomas Jefferson that, "'the present belongs to the living.'"[31]
This is almost as diluted as Nettler's citation of Bell, who, she says,
"has defined an ideologist as a man running down the street shouting,
'I've got an answer! Who's got a question?'"[32] Last, it is Bottomore
who points out that America, stripped of the input of European ideas
and ideologies, is, indeed, a cultural and intellectual wasteland.
His conception of an "ideologist" is as follows: ". . . a producer of

general ideas which criticize fundamental aspects of the social struc-
ture and culture [who] may still be regarded with some suspicion or
aversion."[33]

It is, however, with a direct answer to Bell and his associates,
that the controversy becomes interesting.[34] This particular volume
contains the original article published by Bell. There are, of course,
articles contained within this volume which display various shades of
opinion.

One which is particularly potent is that by Lewis S. Feuer which
he calls "Beyond Ideology." For him, a man without an ideology--a
rarity--may be likened to a man without a country. For Feuer the argu-
ment is one which demonstrates the following:

> The adherent to ideology believes that the making of
> history is its handmaiden. He demands for himself and
> his followers the assurance that "history is on our
> side." Ideology makes men believe that they are acting
> with the blessing, with the sanction of the Total Uni-
> verse . . . . All the modes of ideology have a common
> source of emotional satisfaction.[35]

Despite pros and cons of numerous distinguished writers in
sociology and related fields, there is a reluctance on the part of
one author to enter into the controversy. It is William Delany's
contention in his paper, "The Role of Ideology: A Summation," that
we cannot discuss something that we know so little about. He reasons
that the most plausible explanation for this dilemma is that American
academic sociology has stressed empirical studies and has neglected
theoretical studies.

Delaney sees his position as one which is in opposition to the end
of ideology school. He explains in part, as follows, with a quotation
from Norman Birnbaum:

"The sociological study of ideology raises, in acute
form, some of the most pressing problems of contemporary
sociology. It entails a confrontation of Marxism, in
its several versions, and bourgeoise sociology . . . it
is at the intersection of the empirical and philosophical
components of our discipline . . . . [It raises] a number
of questions to which no answers of a conclusive sort
have yet been found: in particular, the question of the
precise relationship [and interrelationship] of ideas and
social structure, and the vexed concept of interests . . . ."[36]

Professor Delaney feels that, "Values are inevitable and desirable in social science . . . . It is not <u>that</u> they enter, but <u>how</u> they enter social scientific work that is critical."[37] This writer resolves the issue by noting four hypotheses:

    (1)   a lessening of support for Marxist ideologies in the West with an increasing support for such ideologies in the East;

    (2)   a type of bell-shaped curve concerning utopia in the West;

    (3)   a secularization of "ideologies" and "utopias" in the West; and

    (4)   less influence of political utopias in the social and political movements of the West.[38]

Other interpretations of the controversy are equally as interesting as the above. Irving Kristol, one of the bright contemporary sociological writers, after a thorough analysis of Bell's book, states:

There is no question that terribly important things have
happened to America in recent decades; but "the end of
ideology" is not one of them, and Mr. Bell's title is in
that respect a little misleading. The feverish urge for
material improvement and technological innovation is as
prevalent as it ever was; the need for easy explanations
of the tangled, incomprehensible reality is as pressing.
What <u>has</u> happened is that one particular form of ideology
has collapsed. By the "end of ideology," Mr. Bell appears
to mean, above all, the collapse of the socialist ideal.
And he is quite correct in the emphasis he puts upon this
event.[39]

Dennis Wrong's critique of the "issue" with both Bell and Lipset in mind is that they remain too Marxist. For Wrong, what is important is the vision of a new society, ". . . a vision that must deeply penetrate human consciousness before the question of how it might be fulfilled is seriously considered."[40] Michael Harrington views the end of ideology as a "catastrophe." Making an assumption that a new social order is an imperative Harrington points out that, "Businessmen and bureaucrats are notoriously unprepared for the creation of a new, and anticapitalist, social order."[41]

Irving Louis Horowitz, in his attack on the end of ideology issue, spends more time castigating Lipset than Bell. As he reads the former and attempts an evaluation he says, "Right must become Left, fear must become morality, and confusion must become democracy."[42] In a heated conclusion which attempts to expose Lipset as the conservative which he is, Horowitz quotes Marx: "'Impotence expresses itself in a single proposition--the maintenance of the status quo.'"[43] In a general sense this writer sees the end of ideology debate as an attack on left-wing or radical (socialist) ideology.

Stephen W. Rousseas and James Farganis, writing on "American Politics and the End of Ideology" see the problem largely as one replete with confusion over terms. Their key statement reaffirms the classical concept of Mannheim.

> When Bell and Lipset speak of the "end of ideology,"
> what they mean is the "end of utopian thought," for
> they are both clearly referring to the decline of
> socialist or Marxian ideas within the context of an
> affluent Western society.[44]

Perhaps the clearest statement on the issue is that presented by Robert A. Haber. After describing a brief history of the concept

ideology, he explains the problems as he understands them in his paper:
"The End of Ideology as Ideology." These are as follows:

(1) ideology has no central meaning; it is multiple in scope;

(2) no way to test, empirically, whether or not ideology has
ended; and

(3) theory is untenable in that it describes a change and
implies that it is for the good.[45]

Professor Haber makes a distinction between "ideological" as
opposed to "reformist" thinking. For him, "The 'end of ideology' theory
is really an 'end of ideological politics' theory."[46] According to the
scheme as presented here the end of ideology school is more "reformist"
than "ideological." Ideology, as such, must contain certain elements
in order to be an intellectual force:

(1) values, moral in tone, assumed as absolute:

(2) a projected model of the "good society;"

(3) an on-going criticism of the present system;

(4) a plan to spring the present to the future.[47]

Daniel Bell and Henry David Aiken defend themselves and their
colleagues by referring to a maze of historical events and interpreta-
tions. Thus, ideology was born within a framework of alienation, but
Marxism later became an ideology in its own right. Hence, what they
object to is ideology as a secular religion. Aiken labels current
"political ideology as nothing but political discourse . . . on its most
general formative level."[48]

Again, one notes the dance of semantics and the reaffirmation of
intellectual honesty on the part of Bell and his associate (Aiken).
The central problem lingers on political and economic matters as will

be discussed below. The important thing to emphasize at this point is the adherents to the Mannheim position and those with other views; it is similar to accepting or rejecting Malthus.

Although it may sound muted and somewhat dated, the "end of ideology" debate ranks in the forefront of sociological developments during the past two or three decades. In one sense it is reminiscent of Floyd Allport's contention that there is no such thing as the "group" but only the "individual" and his or her immediate milieu. In another sense it reminds one of Herbert Blumer representing sociological theory in his challenge to the operationalism proposed by G. A. Lundberg. One might also compare the "ideology confrontation," to some extent, to the sociological tradition of the Ward-Ross controversy. Perhaps this is what keeps modern sociology a viable social science. However, despite this tradition and freedom of insight, there are some consequences of this movement which may be listed as follows:

(1) this has created a greater degree of confusion in regards to the concept ideology;

(2) some would contend that the end of ideology represents a position of consensus and support for the status quo;

(3) the question of whether or not the old ideologies are still with us;

(4) the arguments proposed by Bell, Lipset, Aiken and others hardly seem to hold true for the ranks of the laboring classes and the unemployed in America today;

(5) welfare state measures may compromise capitalism but capitalism is still the essential economic system;

(6) judging from voter participation, industrial strikes, and

civil rights demonstrations, the end of ideology is not yet

in sight even though we may be experiencing changing

ideologies.

In addition to the above, one may compare this debate to that

more recently instituted by Gouldner even though his ideas concerning

value judgments of sociologists are derivative of the works of Max

Weber.[49] The contention by Gouldner that there are two branches of

sociology: (1) American Academic and (2) European Marxian, is cer-

tainly based in ideological postulates and constructs. More specifi-

cally, Gouldner's stress on what he conceptualizes as "domain

assumptions" definitely has strong ideological linkage.

It could be projected that to settle the ideology debate would,

in turn, resolve many other problems inherent in sociology. One

approach to this problem would be for sociologists to be grounded more

in relative than absolute perceptions. How could this be done, one may

ask. Perhaps a balance of training in philosophy and history to temper

the rigidity of methods and statistics could serve as a beginning.

But, it may be argued, was not Daniel Bell trained in such a manner?

The same could be said for Seymour Martin Lipset, Gunnar Myrdal and

others of the end of ideology persuasion.

Why, then, are such writers willing to acquiesce insofar as

traditional ideologies are concerned? Is it that they invite a more

favorable corporate public to support their ideas? This seems to be

more than an incidental explanation for their type of orientation.

How many sociologists are regular contributors to _Fortune_ magazine?

Daniel Bell is well known to _Fortune_ readers. How many social

scientists have been given blank checks for research? Gunnar Myrdal

has been sponsored by the Carnegie Corporation in his now classic

rendition of race relations in America--An American Dilemma.

Thus, the question may be raised, is the end of ideology a sign

for the end of free inquiry in the social sciences and in the humani-

ties? Are we to assume that progress is measured in motor car produc-

tion and executive salaries? Such rationalization may not be too far

removed from social reality. And what are the alternatives? Is

Fascism or Communism inevitable once we decline to support the present

social order? Why is Daniel Bell so concerned and so preoccupied with

explaining "post-industrial society"? Is this merely a subterfuge

brought on by his position in the "end of ideology" debate?

Professor Bell continues with his thesis in a new work.[50] This

new text has been praised and criticized by many scholars in leading

sociological journals. The essence for purposes of this dissertation

is that it is an expanded continuation of the end of ideology debate

which has been labeled an end of utopia treatise by Reinhard Bendix.

Since it is a continuation of this controversy, it is a further attempt

to create for present day sociology a conservative image. Thus, what

Parsons has accomplished for ideology by ignoring international issues

and affairs, Bell has done by masking himself as a liberal or radical

while projecting conservatism by mutilating ideology. Ideology, the

opposite of science, is a symbol of hope for man caught up in what Max

Weber called the "iron cage" or what is representative of bureaucratic

life in the post capitalist West.

FOOTNOTES

[1] Daniel Bell, The End of Ideology: On the Exhaustion of Political Ideas in the Fifties (New York, 1960), pp. 370-371.

[2] Ibid., p. 193.

[3] Henry D. Aiken, The Age of Ideology: The Nineteenth Century Philosophers (New York, 1956).

[4] Robert E. Lane, Political Ideology: Why the American Common Man Believes What He Does (New York, 1962), p. 15.

[5] Ibid., p. 16.

[6] Edward Shils, "The Concept and Function of Ideology," International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences (New York, 1968), VII, p. 75.

[7] Charles Malik, "The Need for a Western Revolution," in Alan F. Westin, Julian H. Franklin, Howard R. Swearer and Paul E. Sigmund (eds.), Views of America (New York, 1966), p. 208.

[8] John Kenneth Galbraith, The New Industrial State (New York, 1967).

[9] Manuel Pedro Gonzalez, "Anti-Communism in the United States," in Alan F. Westin, et al. (eds.), Views of America (New York, 1966), p. 211.

[10] Feliks Gross, The Revolutionary Party: Essays in the Sociology of Politics (Westport, Connecticut, 1974), pp. 85-86.

[11] Maurice Friedman, To Deny Our Nothingness: Contemporary Images of Man (New York, 1967), p. 25.

[12] Daniel Bell, Marxian Socialism in the United States (Princeton, New Jersey, 1967).

[13] Ibid., p. 5.

[14] Ibid., p. 8.

[15] Ibid., p. 9.

[16] Ibid., p. 11.

[17]Ibid., p. 90.

[18]Ibid., pp. 192-193.

[19]Harold D. Lasswell, The World Revolution of Our Time (Stanford, California, 1961).

[20]Harold D. Lasswell, "The Garrison State," American Journal of Sociology, 46 (1941), pp. 445-468.

[21]Daniel Lerner, Ithiel de Sola Pool, and Harold D. Lasswell, "Comparative Analysis of Political Ideology," Public Opinion Quarterly, 15 (Winter, 1951-52), pp. 715-733.

[22]David R. Segel, Society and Politics: Uniformity and Diversity in Modern Democracy (Glenview, Illinois, 1974), pp. 55-56.

[23]Ibid., p. 56.

[24]Ibid., p. 56.

[25]Seymour Martin Lipset, Revolution and Counterrevolution: Change and Persistence in Social Structures (New York, 1970), p. 268.

[26]Seymour Martin Lipset, Political Man: The Social Basis of Politics (Garden City, New York, 1963), p. 82.

[27]Alvin W. Gouldner, The Coming Crisis of Western Sociology (New York, 1971), pp. 47-51.

[28]Gunnar Myrdal, Beyond the Welfare State (New York, 1967), p. 184.

[29]Daniel Bell, The End of Ideology: On the Exhaustion of Political Ideas in The Fifties (New York, 1960), p. 405.

[30]Ibid., p. 406.

[31]Ibid., p. 406.

[32]Gwynn Nettler, Explanations (New York, 1970), p. 190.

[33]T. B. Bottomore, Critics of Society: Radical Thought in North America (New York, 1968), p. 138.

[34]Chaim I. Waxman, ed., The End of Ideology Debate (New York, 1968).

[35]Ibid., p. 65.

[36]Ibid., p. 293.

[37]Ibid., p. 294.

[38]Ibid., p. 301.

[39] Ibid., p. 113.

[40] Ibid., p. 124.

[41] Ibid., p. 350.

[42] Ibid., p. 167.

[43] Ibid., p. 181.

[44] Ibid., p. 212.

[45] Ibid., p. 183.

[46] Ibid., p. 185.

[47] Ibid., p. 186.

[48] Ibid., p. 264.

[49] Alvin W. Gouldner, The Coming Crisis of Western Sociology (New York, 1971), pp. 47-51.

[50] Daniel Bell, The Coming of Post-Industrial Society (New York, 1973).

CHAPTER VI

RADICAL SOCIOLOGY AS IDEOLOGY

In contemplating what, specifically, is involved in the category

"radical sociology," one is confronted with similar issues such as

those which have been noted for "ideology" and the "sociology of know-

ledge." It appears that one may note some similar characteristics in

that "ideology" is to "New Left" as "radical sociology" is to the

"sociology of knowledge." It may be mentioned here that the New Left

Movement, such as it is and continues to exist, has been supported by a

minority of sociologists both as writers or ideologists as well as

activists or participants.

What this represents is, in effect, a conscious rejection of the

ideology of academic sociology which, calling itself "value-free," is,

concomitantly, non-political. Thus, as Jerry Rose has recently stated

in an elaboration of Mannheim's position:

> . . . people do not choose their basic ways of thinking
> about and evaluating the world. The basic values and
> structural arrangements of a society are incorporated
> in the behavior of every person with whom the person
> associates, and he breathes Puritan or democratic or
> authoritarian ways of life as he would breathe the air
> itself.[1]

The above is helpful in explaining the relationship between radical

sociology and the New Left for the former is considerably smaller in

size than the latter. Sociologists, however, do have a role to play in

the "movement," which identifies itself with all of the civil rights

issues extant in America since 1954, the year of the famous bus strike in Montgomery, Alabama.

Radical sociologists, on the other hand, are those who, being fed up with the erudite sterility of Parsonian theory and its action to end all action, joined the movement to make a genuine rather than nominal contribution to society. Since this activity is still in progress, it will be difficult to resolve issues into final conclusions. Tentative assessments, however, will be in order.

By following the broad outlines established by Albert Szymanski, one is quickly introduced to radical sociology.[2] In a type of "preamble" to the movement this writer states:

> There is today a growing current of dissatisfaction with
> the state of contemporary sociology. Sociologists through-
> out the country seem to be realizing that something is
> amiss. Young professors formulate or reformulate virtually
> every conceivable approach to sociological methodology and
> theory. Older professors defensively rewrite their earlier
> work. Students rebel against established notions, dis-
> respectfully rejecting the work of teachers.[3]

Szymanski, citing contemporary works by Paul Baran and Paul Sweezy (Monopoly Capital) and John Kenneth Galbraith (The New Industrial State), establishes the fact that the USA is dominated by "corporate capitalism." Another assumption made, in anticipation of developing a theoretical frame of reference, is that sociology has two main functions:

(1) legitimation for the system

(2) development of practical knowledge.[4]

This being the case, this writer refers to contemporary sociology as "corporate sociology" because it is a part of the corporate system. The two major preoccupations of corporate sociology include what this

writer refers to as "Abstracted Empiricism" and "Grand Theory." The

former is preoccupied with the fetish of research and survey methods;

the latter, the antithesis of the former, is personified by the work of

Talcott Parsons and his "school" which is preoccupied with the formula-

tion and reformulation of concepts and models which have little connec-

tion with empirical research. Parsonian theory is evaluated as neither

useful, insightful nor original.[5]

What does exist in the realm of applied sociology is funded largely

for purposes of manipulation of the population. Thus politicians and

corporations are eager for sociology to be "practical" so that they

can have assistance in slaughtering ever more sheep for ever less costs

and ever higher profits and taxes. Politicians, specifically, are eager

to learn and to devise new ways of staying in power. Thus, with

the success of "econometrics" the politicians and corporation managers

wait in the wings for the development of "sociometrics," accurate and

useful sociological knowledge to meet future contingencies of unemploy-

ment, housing, race riots, high crime rates and, perhaps, "children's

lib."[6]

The built-in mechanism or assumption that social science has all

the answers merely adds to the mystique so that many sociologists

feel that they will soon have the answers. Meanwhile, in reading the

same journals, attending the same meetings, doing similar research,

the sociologist becomes more conservative. Dominant groups with

linkage to the corporate world control the journals, the types of

articles that will be published, the types of courses that will be

offered and who will be promoted or invited to visit the "distinguished"

universities; they are, in effect, the "gatekeepers" of sociology.[7]

Enter, Radical Sociology! A simple formula is recognized. Make sociology responsible to the needs of society. In a broad sense the ideology is dichotomous: (1) something that may best be described as "the pursuit of understanding of the real nature of man and society and (2) a commitment to the self-realization of human potentialities."[8]

In addition to the above, the cross professionalism of bureaucratic, corporate socialism is to be relinquished in view of the total commitment of the radical sociologist. The new ethic is to include a driving curiosity to understand man combined with a healthy skepticism for all ideas both inside and outside of sociology. Most important of all, the radical sociologist is to encourage a compassion for people. In a general sense, what lies at the bottom of the new creed is C. Wright Mills and his expounding of the "sociological imagination." With Mills such questions as the structure of society and the nature of social change were foremost in view. It should be remembered, also, that much of Mills' theoretical work was an attempt by him to move sociology away from the yoke of Parsonian sterility. One of the questions not raised in this formulation is what of the other disciplines and faculties? Are they to remain conservative while sociology becomes radical? Many other questions could be raised by this controversy.

It would appear that what Szymanski has in mind is in constructing a device to insure that the sociologist will not be alienated from social reality. He is emphatic when he exclaims that: "Radical sociologists . . . should accept nothing on faith and authority. Only that which can be demonstrated rigorously and clearly to each individual should be accepted."[9] He calls for professional sociologists to purge

their minds of past experiences, in particular of sacred values. It

is, of course, a problem of projection to determine where the new

methods and concepts will come from. As for Szymanski the important

consideration is that they not be derivative of corporate America.

He also calls for laboratories on a 1:1 basis with classroom instruc-

tion and a rigid attempt to meet the personal needs of students.

The future for the sociologist should be a bright and meaningful

one. He should be a social critic, but he should also be able to

relate to people and their problems. Szymanski sees the sociologist

in the role of social engineer if not sociopathologist:

> One of the radical sociologist's major tasks is thus to
> analyze and elaborate the details of man's human nature
> and potentialities, and how they can be maximally ful-
> filled. What are man's innate material and human needs,
> and what are the conditions of their satisfaction, i.e.,
> what kinds of sexual arrangements, child rearing patterns,
> character structures, personal relations, economic organi-
> zation, political forms, etc., would maximize the satis-
> faction of man's needs, or the fulfillment of his
> potential?[10]

The radical sociologist, according to this source, should not

hide behind the sacred myths of "objectivity" and the "making of

value judgments." He or she should be armed with the tools of intel-

lectual honesty:

> . . . a radical sociology must elaborate a counter
> definition of social reality. It must explain how
> badly the present society functions, how people's
> private frustrations stem from the social structure,
> how unnecessary and oppressive the present institu-
> tional arrangements are, and how much better an
> alternative social order would work.[11]

There should be, then, a unity of political and social activities

properly balanced by the radical sociologist and his proper service

to his clients, members of society. It is not clear whether recipients

of the radical sociologist's services are to be students, citizens,
or both. In essence, for Szymanski, the radical sociologist should
live the life of a "radical intellectual" rather than as a "guilty
liberal" or "union organizer."[12]

What radical sociology implies, in essence, is a turning around
of the whole enterprise. Shades of Lester Frank Ward who at the turn
of the century proposed a dichotomous sociology which would be divided
into "pure" and "applied" divisions. Echoing Comte, Ward pointed
out in 1906 that:

> Sociology has enabled us to orient ourselves in this great
> maze of human life, to see what the human race is, how it
> came into existence, approximately when and where it
> began, in what ways it has developed and advanced, and
> how it has come to be what we find it.[13]

If there was a time that could be designated as the high water
mark for radical sociology, it would probably be August, 1968, when
the American Sociological Association was meeting in convention at
Boston. This writer was present in the general assembly meeting when
there was a sudden change in the program. This abberation was prompted
by the radical wing of the A. S. A. What resulted was a most interest-
ing paper, if not proclamation, delivered by a young, serious-minded
graduate student in sociology, Martin Nicolaus. Sociology was lam-
basted as propaganda. It was designated as a source of manpower for
the official bureaucracy which has its national office in Washington,
D. C., with a lobbyist who is paid twenty thousand dollars a year.
Nicolaus continues:

> Radical and liberal sociologists have been fired without
> any spontaneous sign of interest or concern from the
> ASA. On the scholarly level, the drift to the right is
> observable in the pages of the ASA's official American
> Sociological Review, where the totalitarian implications

of the functionalist method when coupled to techno-
logical means and modes of research can be studied in
full theoretical bloom.[14]

To support the ideology of radical sociology are many books and

articles recognizing the need for a change of identity, David Horowitz

speaks of using the wrong models to interpret American society.

Sidney Willhelm demonstrates that our society supports a racist ideology.

There is much linkage to student revolt movements and the New Left.

Bogdan Denitch, for example, sees the New Left as a "symptom of a major

change in modern industrial society."[15]

No one is better equipped to provide the bridge between radical

sociology and the New Left than C. Wright Mills. In doing so he

answers the "old women" of the "end of ideology" school by indicating

that students are on the move again, call it utopian or whatever you

desire! The crux of the Mills position is as follows:

> The Right means . . . celebrating society as it is, a
> going concern. Left means . . . structural criticism
> and reportage and theories of society, which at some
> point or another are focused politically as demands and
> programs. These criticisms, demands, theories, programs
> are guided morally by the humanist and secular idea of
> Western civilization--above all, reason and freedom and
> justice. "To be Left" means to connect up cultural with
> political criticism, and both with demands and programs.[16]

Mills, in his now famous letter, offers "radical advice" to the

movement. "Forget Victorian Marxism," he says, "except, whenever you

need it; and read Lenin again (be careful)--Rosa Luxemburg, too . . .

study . . . new generations of intellectuals around the world as real

live agencies of historic change."[17]

Noam Chomsky, another proponent of New Left policies, has a great

deal to say which complements the Mills position. Intellectuals must

be prepared to face repression. He is concerned, for example, with

creating the future rather than experiencing an unrelated flow of

events. He continues:

> The opportunities for intellectuals to take part in a
> genuine movement for social change are many and varied,
> and I think that certain general principles are clear.
> They must be willing to face facts and refrain from
> erecting convenient fantasies . . . . They must avoid
> the temptation to join the repressive elite . . . .[18]

Throughout the literature on the "movement" there is a feeling

of frustration or acute alienation. Concomitantly, there is also

noted a linkage or identification with other movements. Incidents,

strikes whether by students or industrial workers, wars which are

considered unjust, inequities in justice displayed to youth, women,

blacks and other minorities, are all included in this category. It

is the system which is at fault and those who support the system are

opportunists and lackeys.

Michael Harrington's views on this are as follows:

> The great gift which the New Left received from the Negro
> movement and, in turn, transmitted to the collegiate
> young of the middle class, was a sense of social out-
> rage . . . . The New Left applied this civil rights emotion
> and attitude to the problem of poverty, and then to the war
> in Vietnam. The result was an existential, moralistic,
> and quite emotional critique of the entire society and,
> in particular, a sense that the self-proclaimed reformers
> and social changers were hypocrites for maneuvering
> within the framework of the possible when what the times
> called for was a nonviolent John Brown.[19]

Thus, for whatever purpose it may originally have intended to

serve, the rude awakening is that most sociologists, with all due

respect to the New Left, are affiliated with colleges and universities

largely dominated by state and federal funding agencies. Consequently,

to keep working, the sociologist with radical inclination is encouraged

to fit into a particular mold, bureaucratic in scope, conservative

with regards to social change and political experimentation.

But, equally important as the above, the ideology of New Left politics and radical sociological professionalization is not a mirage on the horizon. It is a social reality in its own right fortified by the legend of the Haight-Asbury "Diggers" of San Francisco and the stimulating, if not tragic, folklore of contemporary communes in remote rural parts of the United States.

Gains have been made to some extent in that there has been fulfillment in regards to the Vietnam war, a complete public humiliation on the part of purveyors of U. S. foreign policy. Students have rights. Blacks, although heard from more frequently, are still poor and out of the mainstream of American life.

The ideology of New Left politics may be a sleeping giant or it may go away as Nixon and Agnew did without really changing anything. Perhaps sociology professors will not discourage undergraduate students in the future who say that they desire to study sociology because they want to help people. It may dawn on the sociological technician that the computer is not the finalization of his calling; people and their problems are much more significant.

FOOTNOTES

[1]Jerry D. Rose, Introduction to Sociology, second edition (Chicago, 1974), p. 107.

[2]Albert Szymanski, "Toward a Radical Sociology," in J. David Colfax and Jack L. Roach, eds., Radical Sociology (New York, 1971), pp. 93-107.

[3]Ibid., p. 93.

[4]Ibid., p. 94.

[5]Ibid., pp. 94-95.

[6]Ibid., pp. 96-97.

[7]Ibid., pp. 98-99.

[8]Ibid., p. 100.

[9]Ibid., p. 102.

[10]Ibid., p. 105.

[11]Ibid., pp. 105-106.

[12]Ibid., p. 106.

[13]Henry Steele Commager, ed., Lester Ward and the Welfare State (Indianapolis, 1967), p. 373.

[14]Martin Nicolaus, "The Professional Organization of Sociology: A View From Below," in J. David Colfax and Jack L. Roach, eds., Radical Sociology (New York, 1971), pp. 56-57.

[15]Bogdan Denitch, "The New Left and the New Working Class," in J. David Colfax and Jack L. Roach, eds., Radical Sociology (New York, 1971), p. 347.

[16]C. Wright Mills, "Letter to the New Left," in Priscilla Long, ed., The New Left: A Collection of Essays (Boston, 1969), p. 19.

[17]Ibid., p. 25.

[18]Noam Chomsky, "Knowledge and Power: Intellectuals and the Welfare-Warfare State," in Priscilla Long, ed., The New Left: A Collection of Essays (Boston, 1969), p. 194.

[19]Jack Newfield, A Prophetic Minority (New York, 1966), p. 12.

CHAPTER VII

ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL IDEOLOGIES

Peter Berger, in formulating a theoretical position for the
sociology of knowledge, reminds us that "every society contains a
repertoire of identities that is part of the 'objective knowledge'
of its members."[1] To a large extent these are commonplace assumptions
made within the various segments of society at any given time. These
may be considered "internalized" values within the individual. Using
the central ideas of Cooley and Mead, Berger establishes the following
dialectic:

> Self and society are inextricably interwoven entities.
> Their relationship is dialectical because the self,
> once formed, may act back in its turn upon the society
> that shaped it . . . . The self exists by virtue of
> society, but society is only possible as many selves
> continue to apprehend themselves and each other with
> reference to it.[2]

Society, according to the logic developed by Berger, is genuinely
capable not only of generating social structure for its subsistence,
but it is also capable of spinning off social worlds of thought and
value processes or codes by which men live their lives in an effort to
gain purpose and status. Stated in other terms: "Society not only
defines but creates psychological reality."[3] Among the more dominant
"social worlds" which have strong ideological tendencies are the
economic and the political areas; in fact, just as many persons identify
sociology with problems, the same can be said for a strong identification

with ideology as that which has to do with the economic and political

phenomena. Once this is established, it is easier to see the various

gradients or degrees of liberality or conservatism within each of these

ideological areas.

One can build a rather strong case for this argument as projected

above for, as Berger points out:

> Socialization is only possible if, as Mead put it, the
> individual "takes the attitude" of others, that is,
> relates to himself as others have first related to him.
> This process, of course, extends to the establishment
> or identity itself, so that one may formulate that
> social identification both precedes and produces self-
> identification.[4]

It is somewhat reasonable to assume from the above that it is

possible to build a dialectic without Marx, although some would feel

on more secure ideological grounds by referring to Marx. There are

others who believe that it is necessary to go beyond Marx. Popper

has pointed out, emphatically, that sociologists oftentimes do not

know where their dialectic is coming from. His position is as

follows:

> How little the sociologists of knowledge have succeeded
> in socio-therapy, that is to say, in eradicating their
> own total ideology, will be particularly obvious if we
> consider their relation to Hegel. For they have no idea
> that they are just repeating him; on the contrary, they
> believe not only that they have outgrown him, but also
> that they have successfully seen through him, socio-
> analyzed him; and that they can now look at him not from
> any particular social habitat, but objectively, from a
> superior elevation. This palpable failure in self-
> analysis tells us enough.[5]

Despite any shortcomings of the sociology of knowledge as per-

ceived by Popper, Berger is on solid ground when he incorporates it

into the school of symbolic interaction. He elaborates his position

by showing that:

> One may expand the Meadian phrase, then, by saying that
> the individual takes the world of others as he takes their
> attitudes and roles. Each role implies a world. The
> self is always located in a world. The same process of
> socialization generates the self and internalizes the
> world to which this self belongs.[6]

First, the important thing to note in the context of this dis-

cussion is that sociology has placed far more emphasis in the past

on the "cult of objectivity" than in drawing the type of conclusions

reached by Berger above. Secondly, there has been a conspiracy of

silence in sociology attributed to "political" and "economic" areas

in general. True, the introductory text books do speak of the several

"social institutions" but, for the most part, in a cursory, subdued

manner. Thirdly, there has been an attempt to link economic and

political concerns with "Marxism" and "Marxism" with ideology. Thus,

the end product has been the type of confusion which is about as far

removed from objectivity as one can possibly imagine.

In carrying this projection to a higher level one is astounded

to learn that:

> The indoctrination of American intellectuals with the
> ideology that social science consists of "the counting of
> things" has left most of them unprepared to understand how
> the nose of American imperialism, the most powerful in
> history, can be tweaked by communists in Asia or colonels
> in South America.[7]

Social science and sociology, in particular, is certainly more

than a play on numbers. It is the thesis of this essay that economic

and political ideologies are primary in their influence, particularly

in a democratic society, although they may be arrested somewhat in a

totalitarian society. This is done in order to make two assumptions

that should be clarified at this point: (1) that other "ideologies"

are secondary when ranked with those of the economic and the political

and (2) that democracy is a stable category. A distinguished writer

has recently challenged the latter in the following manner:

> . . . [democracy] has become a subject of ideological
> debate . . . the term makes two points about political
> system which it is used to describe: one is that the
> system possesses a more or less determinate set of
> characteristics which may be taken to constitute "rule
> by the people;" the other is that the system deserves
> to be commended.[8]

The implications of Professor Skinner's critique of democracy is

that it is a special type of political ideology. Much can and does

depend on who is defining the concept and under what conditions. The

same could be said insofar as purpose is concerned, such as indoctrina-

tion, propaganda, militarism, patriotism or civic pride. It should

be stated that America has no equivalent of Leninism, and its revolu-

tion was two hundred years ago as compared to fifty-two years for the

USSR. Old revolutions are not conducive to sharp ideological configu-

rations, which may account for much of the dissent and lack of social

solidarity in the present American society.

Much could be said about social stratification and the central

ideologies of politics and economics; Paul Jacobs adequately de-

scribes, for example, what it means to be poor in America. How, as

one may anticipate, purchasing a car by a middle-class American is

relatively a simple matter when compared to the same transaction for

the poor man. Also, the more than incidental differences in housing,

food, health and recreation. The poor, according to Jacobs are taken

by the "mouse house" (loan company) and the private money order company

since most poor pay bills by cash rather than by check and at a much

more regular rate than their middle-class counterpart. The poor are

"losers" in America with little legislation going for them.[9] Do they

uphold the same ideologies?

To expand on the democracy theme one must take into consideration

historical conditions and social change. E. H. Carr has summarized

this quite well as follows:

> Modern democracy, as it grew up and spread from its focus
> in western Europe over the past three centuries, rested on
> three main propositions: first, that the individual con-
> science is the ultimate source of decisions about what is
> right and wrong; second, that there exists between differ-
> ent individuals a fundamental harmony of interests strong
> enough to enable them to live peacefully together in society;
> third, that where action has to be taken in the name of
> society, rational discussion between individuals is the
> best method of reaching a decision on that action. Modern
> democracy is, in virtue of its origins, individualistic,
> optimistic and rational. The three main propositions on
> which it is based have all been seriously challenged in the
> contemporary world.[10]

Professor Carr, with some prompting from Max Weber and Karl

Marx, sees the continuation of democracy in the future more at the

collectivist than at the individualistic level. He stipulates:

> Mass democracy calls just as much as individualist
> democracy for an educated society as well as for
> responsible and courageous leaders; for it is only
> thus that the gap between leaders and masses, which
> is the major threat to mass democracy, can be bridged.[11]

It is interesting to note that Professor Carr's book, originally based

on radio broadcasts delivered over stations of the British Broadcasting

Company, was on the recommended reading list published by C. Wright

Mills prior to his death.[12] The important point for purposes of this

analysis is that the above summary is one which allows both for

ideology and shades of opinion.

A sociological formulation of an economic or political ideology

is usually developed in a sophisticated, implicit manner. It may or

may not be at the conscious level. For all practical purposes, the

way that one identifies with political and economic conditions, ideo-

logically, will color, if not contaminate, one's writing and teaching.

For sociology as a discipline and for sociologists as professionals,

there are some interesting bench marks and points of departure.

Irving Louis Horowitz has, for example, made an interesting three-

way comparison of how ranking sociologists employ the works of Max

Weber in their respective orientations:

> . . . Weber was instrumental in opening up a vast
> network of problems handled quite differently by
> Parsons, Merton, and Mills. Weber became in American
> sociological history the form of legitimation for the
> conservatism of a Parsons, but no less for the liberal-
> ism of a Merton and the radicalism of a Mills.[13]

In another context which has important ideological overtones for

sociology, Professor Horowitz states: "To be a Parsonian became for a

long time the only way a person in American sociology could tolerably

deal with big issues without being condemned as a Marxist."[14] This

statement was made at a time when to be labeled a Marxist was to be

designated an outcast.

Noting that Marxism pioneered developmental "models" in sociology,

Horowitz, in a more recent article, warns that, "Though the ideologist

does not consider the ethical question whether development is worthwhile

or needed, he must still evaluate the worth of available types of

development."[15]

> Professor Horowitz states his case more specifically:
>
> The ideologists tend to obfuscate and distort fundamental
> similarities between systems for the sake of preserving
> the separateness of their own, whether it be called "The
> American Way" or "The Communist Road." Ideologists tend
> also to assume a world of total voluntarism, as if human
> development were dictated exclusively by choice and

consensus, without limitation imposed by national
boundaries, traditions, political systems, or economic
potential. If the sociologist is not himself to become
an ideologist, he must cut through the ideological
rhetoric and search out areas of convergence as well
as differentiation. At the same time, due recognition
must be accorded the role of ideology in defining
developmental goals.[16]

Horowitz utilizes a statement by Sorokin in attempting to clarify

the problem of ideology as it applies to developmental areas. It is

Sorokin's position that, left to their own resources, scientists from

both the USA and USSR could mutually profit from the scientific dis-

coveries as well as inventions of each other.[17]

The important resolution at this juncture is that ideological

considerations are important and they are not to be ignored or assumed

to be homogeneous. In some respects the ideology is the prior or

antecedent variable to be considered in any configuration of social

relationships. For sociology it is important to see, as Horowitz has

indicated above, what the role of ideology meant for such distinguished

sociologists as Parsons, Merton and Mills, based, of course, on their

writings.

Judging from the position of radical sociology and New Left poli-

tics, Parsons is persona non grata for the "thinking" sociologist.

It is interesting to note that despite the wide differences between

Parsons and Mills, that according to Gouldner, they also exhibit con-

sensus in regards to some critical issues. Gouldner states:

In effect, Parsons comes surprisingly close to agreement
with some of the most fundamental conclusions which
C. Wright Mills had arrived at. The critical difference
between them on this involves primarily not the empirical
imputations about what is happening to the structure of
power in the United States, but rather the legitimacy of
this development and of the new power elite itself.[18]

For purposes of this study, with all due respect to Professor Gouldner's position, we can remark that there are decided "ideological" differences between Parsons and Mills. Parsons, of course, is a scholar of many "moods" if not many "revisions." Looking at some of his more recent works is most revealing.

Beginning with a negative note, Parsons shows that with respect to Marxism and developing countries: "An ideology of political activism must also focus the blame for the parlous state of society, often eventuating in a semi-paranoid theory of conspiracy."[19] In other essays dealing more specifically with the problem, it is not too unrealistic to say that what Parsons is attempting to do is to subvert ideology to his already well-known theories of social system and social action.

Ideology, using a watered down version of the Mannheim model, fits into the paradigm of "institutionalization." He explains in the following example how it is to be employed:

> Thus the business ideology, for instance, substantially exaggerates the contribution of businessmen to the national welfare and underplays the contribution of scientists and professional men. And in the current ideology of the "intellectuals," the importance of social "pressures to conform" is exaggerated, and institutional factors in the freedom of the individual are ignored or played down.[20]

At times it appears as though Parsons is not taking ideology into consideration at all but that he is merely putting in place those elements of the "social system" which have some bearing on "power." It is "power," then, that is important to the system rather than a distortion if not a complete obliteration of Mannheim's "ideology." An example of this process of synthesizing to oblivion is the following as Parsons insists on levels of analysis:

. . . in considering an ideology, values must be specified
to the level of different subsystems of the society, like
businessmen or intellectuals, and the degree of their com-
patability with each of the noncultural components . . . .[21]

Parsons in his many theoretical sociological studies never really
comes to grips with the core of ideology although much of his conserva-
tive political and economic tendencies are manifest in his philosophy
of Grand Theory. Statements such as the following are good representa-
tions of the above: ". . . our concern in discussing ideologies is
with deviance from an ideal type defined by a value-science integrate
. . . ."[22]

The proof of Parsons' ideological conservatism is to be found in
the fact that the majority of New Left and radical sociologists single
him out as the culprit of do-nothing, conservative sociology. In Max
Weber, as the student of sociology may plainly see, Parsons had found
his substitute for Marx as well as Mannheim. Thus, one finds this
sort of reasoning in Parsons' more recent studies:

. . . Weber's capacity to handle the relations between
cultural movements and social organization in an
historical and comparative context was such that a
return to utilitarian modes of thought seems equally
out of the question.[23]

C. Wright Mills, in his own prosaic style, has explained the
Parsonian position on ideology quite well. He addresses, generally,
Parsons and his followers:

The Grand Theorists represent a partially organized
attempt to withdraw from the effort plainly to describe,
explain, and understand human conduct and society: in
turgid prose they set forth the disordered contents
of their reading of eminent nineteenth-century sociolo-
gists, and in the process mistake their own beginnings
for a finished result.[24]

Looking at ideology and the sociology of knowledge from the liberal point of view is Robert K. Merton, a student of both Parsons and Sorokin. The statement might be made here that Merton spends more time critiquing Mannheim and Marx than in consciously employing these theoretical constructs. One may see ideological characteristics involved in Merton's "manifest and latent functions" as well as his "self-fulfilling prophecy," but these are more incidental than purposive.

Striking out on a structural-functional format, one observes Merton finding much fault with Mannheim. He says in regards to this that, "Mannheim's analysis is limited . . . by his failure to specify the type or mode of relations between social structure and knowledge."[25] Projecting along these lines Merton uncovers other defects centering on "causation," "interest assumptions," "focus of attention," "pre-conditions" rather than "necessary conditions" and the problems inherent in such qualifying terms as "compatibility," "congruity," "harmony," "consistency" and "contrariety."[26]

One has the feeling that Merton discovered the sociology of knowledge and ideology too late in life to fit them into the scheme of functionalism despite the fact that much of his findings are like one of his favorite expressions, "serendipity," which, when recognized as "uncommon unexpectations" also do not have any particular place to hide within the "system." Merton, the great defender of the "socio-logical position" in the New York Times and at various prestigious "world congresses" over the years is a "late bloomer" as far as the use and implementation of ideology is concerned. He spends a great deal of time explaining "power," citing quite often the works of

Daniel Bell, and less than a page in his seven hundred page "major

sociological contribution" explaining the "welfare state." A student

of sociology should question a major scholar's great preoccupation

with "prediction" and, concomitantly, his limited interest in the

"sociology of knowledge" which establishes procedures for an interpre-

tation of the past. What sense can prediction of the future make if

we are hazy about the past and confused about the present? How many

contemporary scholars, including Merton, can adequately explain how

our social institutions have evolved other than to apply labels such

as "European Tradition" or "Colonial Policy" or "Frontier Heritage"?

How many who are presently keen on the game of tennis know that there

was a rise and fall of this sport in France during the Middle Ages?

How many experts in "juvenile delinquency" are aware that there was

no such problem in Europe during this same period?[27]

It is interesting to note where Theodore Roszak places Merton in

his recent critique of American society:

> It is along such lines, following the equation science =
> Reason = all good things, that Karl Popper, Joseph Needham,
> J. Bronowski, C. P. Snow, and Robert K. Merton have iden-
> tified the scientific temperament as the secret of the
> democratic "open society" . . . impersonal knowing is
> the strongest defense of personal right.[28]

Third in this category of sociologists who see different "meanings"

in the same Max Weber is C. Wright Mills who still represents the

radical posture of American sociology. One can say considerably more

about Mills who despite his untimely death in 1962 still remains very

much the "sociologist of knowledge."

It is interesting to show what kind of harassment Mills was sub-

jected to during his own lifetime. The following is a critical review

of one of his most significant books, The Power Elite, as reviewed by

Talcott Parsons:[29]

> . . . in this, as in some of his previous writings, Mills'
> general tone toward both men and institutions is sharply
> caustic. The Power Elite certainly purports to be an
> exposition and an explanation of what has been happening
> in American society, but it is equally an indictment.
> There is no pretense of even trying to maintain a scien-
> tific neutrality; the book is a fiery and sarcastic attack
> on the pretensions of the "higher circles" in America,
> either to competence in exercise of their responsibilities,
> or to moral legitimation of their position.[30]

In effect, the concept of power elite for Mills was ideological

in scope with broad support in empirical findings and social class

as well as elite formations. It is not an oversimplification to

argue, for example, that Mills would expect Parsons or even Merton to

understand his position. Judged from critiques of one another's

books and articles, Mills understood them better than they understood

him. For Mills, the social scientist must not only think, but he

must also act. It is necessary, for Mills, to know exactly what

Marx stands for without all of the propaganda to the contrary. An

example of Mills ideological thinking is as follows:

> A political philosophy tells us how to find out where we
> stand and where we may be going; it gives us some answers
> to these questions; it prepares us for the possible
> futures. To examine any political philosophy, then, we
> must examine it as an ideology, a statement of ideals, a
> designation of agency or agencies, and as a set of social
> theories . . . . As ideology, liberalism and marxism have
> both been made vulgar and banal; each supplies cliches for
> the defense of a great power state and for the abuse of
> the other bloc and all its works.[31]

Mills continues with his discussion of ideology:

> Ideology, as the public face of a political philosophy,
> very often becomes simply myth or folklore; very often
> too, even a minimum of ideology withers away: all that
> is left is an empty and irrelevant rhetoric. Such

ideological message as may once have prevailed is no
longer persuasive. Indeed, it even becomes difficult
to state clearly.[32]

One notes a difference here in using ideology as the face of

political philosophy instead of finding fault with Mannheim and

speculating on what he really had in mind when he wrote Ideology and

Utopia. Mills bypasses Mannheim and goes directly to the source,

Marx, whom he sees as a humanitarian, a moralist and a thinker of the

highest rational magnitude. Mills formulates a sharp oversimplication

of the Marxian ideology which spells out in no uncertain terms: "You

do not have to be poor any longer!"[33] Compare this to the "conserva-

tism" of a Parsons or the "liberalism" of a Merton and you can hardly

find the person trapped in the "social system" or "functional

requisites."

In another book Mills uses his ideological insights to warn the

great powers. He exclaims:

> Our politics, in short, must be the politics of responsi-
> bility. Our basic charge against the systems of both the
> United States and the U.S.S.R. must be that in differing
> ways they both live by the politics of irresponsibility.[34]

The above may be considered technical statements about ideology.

A more general statement is as follows:

> Nowadays men everywhere seek to know where they stand,
> where they may be going, and what--if anything--they can
> do about the present as history and the future as respon-
> sibility. Such questions as these no one can answer once
> and for all. Every period provides for its own answers
> . . . . I also mean that our major orientations (ideologies)
> --liberalism and socialism--have virtually collapsed as
> adequate explanations of the world and of ourselves.[35]

Thus, the insights and positions of three of America's outstanding

sociologists have been reviewed for their ideological posture on

economic and political matters. Parsons appears to give the least

attention to the subject since he is the least internationally oriented of the three. It is interesting to compare him, specifically, to Sorokin who uses sociology of knowledge, with or without ideology as his basic frame of reference. Parsons' major stumbling block appears to be the concept of social system (two persons to a nation-state) which is so technically ambiguous that it ignores basic issues and values which are important to man and to society.

Merton, on the other hand, prefers to shadow box with Mannheim and ends up proving little that was not already well-known about ideology and the sociology of knowledge. What he ends up doing is constructing a "Paradigm for the Sociology of Knowledge" which is centered around the following questions:

(1) Where is the existential basis of mental productions located?
(2) What mental productions are being sociologically analyzed?
(3) How are mental productions related to the existential basis?
(4) Why? (sic) manifest and latent functions imputed to these existentially conditioned mental productions.
(5) When do the imputed readings of the existential base and knowledge obtain?[36]

It does not appear that Merton is quite as successful with this model as that which he has constructed for "social structure and anomie." Judging from space allocation in his major study he has given far more space to the latter than he has given to the former. In a way he buries "ideology" along with "moral beliefs," "philosophy," "religious beliefs," "social norms," "positive science" and "technology" which can create more problems than it can solve. The "method" proves hopelessly bogged down in what might be a type of American formal sociology that has arrived on the scene too late with too little.

Mills is much more attuned to ideology than Parsons who is enamored with his own brand of hubris and Merton who, in most respects, acts and writes as though he is embarrassed by having discovered ideology and the sociology of knowledge after he embraced anomie and incorporated it into "theories of the middle-range." There is no "middle-range" for Mills. There is, instead, man and society and all that stands in the way of productivity, harmony and purpose in life. These values exist. They are the "social worlds" of which Berger speaks derivative of Mead and Cooley and their basic frame of reference, symbolic interaction. But, this symbolic interaction, according to how it is interpreted by Mills, is not going to spring full circle at us just by giving lip service to it. Nor is the good life going to happen by rejecting great philosophies without hearing them out properly.

A good example of how Mills resolved the "ideological problem" of Marxism is as follows:

> I happen never to have been what is called "a Marxist,"
> but I believe Karl Marx one of the most astute students
> of society modern civilization has produced; his work
> is now essential equipment of any adequately trained
> social scientist as well as of any properly educated
> person.[37]

To project even to a greater degree, Mills was concerned about the lack of first rate scholars in the second half of the twentieth century who could carry on the work of the masters of the nineteenth century of which Marx is a product. There were no new Max Webers on the scene in his estimation and those who gravitated to Parsons and Grand Theory did not adequately understand either the problem or the mission.

Perhaps a scholar of the magnitude of a Mills is tall enough, intellectually, to work around the stigma inherent in Marxism. How often do we hear in classroom situations and read in textbooks that if we accept Marxism that there is nothing further for the professor to explain? How ridiculous a position this turns out to be. A simple formulation of Marxism is that it is half concerned with "economic determinism" and half concerned with "ideology." This being the case (and this is actually bypassing much of importance in Marxism) all that is needed for some recognition is that the ideological part is most sociological in scope and nature. After all, the philosophical position is already taken. The economic position is nothing more than the engine tracking social relationships through historical eras and periods. It is, however, for the sociologist to examine the class structure of a society. Hasn't this been done by W. Lloyd Warner and his students as well as by psychologists, historians and archaeologists? Hasn't this subject of social class been one of the more popular debates in sociology based on the Davis-Moore hypothesis? How many sociologists, for example, have been concerned enough to read Gunnar Landtman's Origin of the Inequality of Social Classes? Much more, indeed, could be said of this issue.

It is, thus, Mills, despite his many excursions into pragmatic backroads, who has the closest approximation to a sociological formulation of economic and political ideologies. What is more simple than "social worlds" of purpose and value linking man to society in a manner of time and place perspective? Essentially, this is what the work of Mills suggests. Mills asks for a reconstruction of reality including Mead's whole man (both "I" and "me"). Mills asks us to

separate propaganda from ideology and to investigate the dominant

philosophies extant because their teaching has meaning and purpose

when given proper application. Mills relegates "value judgments"

and their taboo dimensions by social scientists to the ash can of

academia. Mills asks for a new set of norms to evaluate knowledge.

Mills encourages the sociologist to pioneer new ideologies of purpose

rather than to be afraid of deviation from the norm of conservatism.

Put in different terms, if we do not develop new ideologies, we will

be stuck with worn out, meaningless ideologies.

One who sees "philosophy" largely as "politics" and who writes

in a tradition akin to Mills is Herbert Marcuse. A splendid rendition

of how our society operates with a set of obsolete ideologies is the

following:

> Late industrial society has increased rather than reduced
> the need for parasitical and alienated functions . . . .
> Advertising, public relations, indoctrination, planned
> obsolescence are no longer unproductive overhead costs but
> rather elements of basic production costs. In order to be
> effective, such production of socially necessary waste
> requires continuous rationalization -- the relentless utili-
> zation of advanced techniques and science. Consequently,
> a rising standard of living is the almost unavoidable by-
> product of the politically manipulated industrial society,
> once a certain level of backwardness has been overcome.[39]

A complementary statement by Mills on this same ideological theme

is as follows:

> The old social anchors of individual freedom and individual
> security of small scattered properties and small-scale
> communities are gone; the roots of these values in autono-
> mously operating institutions are dried up; the seat of
> rationality is no longer unambiguously the individual; the
> centers of power are as often hidden as explicit.[40]

Thus, the heritage of a Mills is long lasting and is not confined

within the arbitrary walls of one discipline. What this represents is

a concrete case for the sociologist to break out of his or her

"non-ideological" shell and to resume the work instituted by such

founding fathers as Comte, Spencer, Marx, Ward and Sumner. Despite

their ideological differences they never lost sight of man's position

in society. It is a major source of embarrassment in our day to

have sociological ideas exploited and contaminated by such ideologically

oriented writers as Daniel Patrick Moynihan, Margaret Mead, Herbert

Marcuse, Kenneth Boulding and others. It is as though it would be

more important to hold a Ph. D. in history in order to write a socio-

logical treatise. This happens to be the case not only for Moynihan

but also for Staughton Lynd and Theodore Roszak. It might help also

to be grounded in economics like Boulding or in biology like Commaner

and Ehrlich. There is probably more good sociology in one issue of

the New York Review of Books than in a whole semester of college level

introductory sociology.[41] There are, from time to time, sociologists

included in various issues but more than likely it will be someone

from Oxford, England, or Cambridge, Massachusetts, or, perhaps, the

New York City intellectual establishment some of whom are not only

non-sociological but, as may be anticipated, anti-sociological. Much

of this dilemma we may attribute to the sociologist being too preoc-

cupied with "method" and having failed to do his ideological homework.

Of course, leadership or charisma, as Max Weber has indicated, is

important in leading social movements. Perhaps the death of Mills has

left sociology in an ideological vacuum which is, as yet, awaiting

replacement and rejuvenation.

There may be other reasons for that which may be termed "ideo-

logical drift." Although there is no one central answer, one

significant suggestion is made by David Riesman and Michael Maccoby.

They contend that:

> There has never been in American life anything comparable
> to the Fabian Society. Woodrow Wilson and Franklin
> Roosevelt gathered around them an ad hoc team of advisers
> who included a number of bright lawyers, economists, and
> political scientists, but neither these nor their journal-
> istic and academic allies created anything like an ethos
> or a basis for interpreting the relation between specific
> pragmatic measures and over-all social and political
> change.[42]

This same "ideological drift" or lack of consciousness on the

part of American sociologists is manifested in the following quota-

tion from Horowitz. If the cultural ideas of Riesman and Maccoby

may be envisioned as "cause" the Horowitz thesis may be taken as

"effect." Horowitz states the following:

> Why is it that sociology in the United States has been
> delinquent in forging a general theory of social devel-
> opment? Historically, sociologists were pioneers in
> precisely this field. Ferdinand Toennies' remarkable
> typology of Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft socio-cultural
> structures is at its source an historical account of the
> machinery through which community-agrarian patterns dis-
> solved and gave way to a societal-industrial pattern.
> Toennies' description of European capitalism still forms
> the basis for much discussion of what a developed society
> necessarily includes and excludes . . . [thus] . . .
> the problem of development was uppermost in the minds of
> the "classical" sociologists.[43]

Other "classical" sociologists named by Horowitz as being in the

same class and having similar developmental interests comparable to

Toennies are Max Weber, Werner Sombart, Georg Simmel, W. I. Thomas,

Florian Znaniecki and Karl Mannheim. In answer to his own question

Horowitz seems to think that the rise of socialism has confounded and

confused sociologists. This appears to be a good explanation and

may account for the great preoccupation of operationalism and metho-

dology. Thus, the contemporary American sociologist envisions himself

as an alienated "answer man" rather than as a leader (in and out of
the university) with a purpose in the community. Other reasons may
include the threat of political intimidation should he take a stand
and the so-called success model of the corporation where individuals
get lost amidst products and promotions.

Michael Harrington adds to the confused picture when he states
that:

> For now, there is the crisis of belief and disbelief. The
> simultaneous undermining of confidence in the two Western
> ideals of man was parallel to, and related to, the decline
> of both the capitalist and socialist ideologies. So there
> is a massive intersection of uncertainties, a time of
> interregnum [pause] and indeterminancy.[44]

In his recent book on social reform Arthur B. Shostak attempted
to place contemporary intellectuals into four categories: "conserva-
tive," "liberal," "radical," and "visionary."[45] Without going too
much into the issues involved, the following names are placed into the
above ideological subdivisions along with the publications associated
with each group.

Reversing the above order and searching for sociologists, one
begins with the "visionaries." According to Shostak these include
Edgar Z. Friedenberg, Norman Brown, R. D. Laing, Abraham Maslow,
Theodore Roszak, Arthur Waskow, Alan Watts and Germaine Greer. Perhaps
the name of Friedenberg in this list is best known as a sociologist
although Roszak, a historian, is assumed to be a sociologist of the
"air conditioned nightmare." The principle theme noted here is to
prompt mankind to rejoin history. Among the publications within
which they frequently publish are The Mother Earth News, Manas,
Commonweal (a Catholic magazine) and Futures Unconditional. Their

major preoccupation, according to Shostak, is to encourage a renaissance in values and man's mission on earth.

The second group are the "radicals" and among this cadre of intellectuals and ideologues are Gary Marx, Richard Flacks, Michael Harrington, Eugene D. Genovese, Paul Goodman, Paul Sweezy, and Angela Davis. The latter two are representatives of the American Communist Press. C. Wright Mills would qualify for this group were he still alive. Goodman, an interesting and introspective writer of the 1950's and 1960's, known for his Growing Up Absurd died within the past year.[46] The first two names on the list are sociologists. The central motif of this group is "revolution" and their principle means of explanation is via economics and ideology. Publications to which they contribute include The Nation, Monthly Review, Ramparts, New Society and Telos.

Third come the "liberals" who have been using the Vietnam War in recent years as their main vehicle along with the "promise of world peace." They also have an active interest in remaking history in their image with a strong program of "science" and "technology" included for good measure. Among the publications which invite their offerings are The Progressive, Atlantic, Harper's, Saturday Review, The New Republic and America. Among them are some of the best known contemporary sociologists: Seymour Martin Lipset, Daniel Bell, John Kenneth Galbraith, Herbert Gans, Irving Howe, Edward Kennedy, Bayard Rustin, Harriet Van Horne and Nathan Glazer.

The fourth group are the "conservatives" who exhibit a mild form of distrust of their fellow man. From time to time their articles are to be found in The National Review, The New Leader, The Public Interest, Time and Commentary (a Jewish publication). Their collective views

on reform refer you to "the good old days." Their names include Irving Kristol, William F. Buckley, Jr., William Chamberlain, Theodore Hess, Russell Kirk, Jerome Tuccille, Ernst Van Dan Haag and Ayn Rand.

Shostak admits that this list is incomplete and that his sample is small. He questions his typologies as to their validity. Missing, of course, are prominent publications like the New York Times and Newsweek. There has also been a great deal of sociological material of late in the Wall Street Journal and Fortune. Last, nothing is said about the journals and whether or not they favor radical or conservative type articles. How does one classify a statistical article? Nevertheless, the Shostak typologies have some merit for this analysis.

It is interesting at this point to single out one of the prominent sociologists above and to look into the reasons why he has toned down his radicalism. Nathan Glazer who worked for the government in Washington says:

> I learned, to my surprise, that most of the radical ideas
> my friends and I were suggesting had already been thought
> of, considered, analyzed, and had problems in their imple-
> mentation that we had never dreamed of. I learned to
> respect many of the men who worked in the huge bureaucra-
> cies, who limited their own freedom, and who made it possi-
> ble occasionally for the radical ideas of others to be
> implemented. I learned that the difficulty with many
> radical ideas lay in the fact that so many varied interests
> played a role in government, and that most of them were
> legitimate interests.[47]

Another list for brief mention includes all of the authors who reviewed C. Wright Mills' Power Elite.[48] Here the categories are three: "liberal," "radical" and "highbrow." The liberal critics include Robert A. Dahl, William Kornhauser, Talcott Parsons, Dennis H. Wrong and A. A. Berle, Jr. The radical critics are Robert S. Lynd, Paul M. Sweezy and Herbert Aptheker. The third and last category,

highbrow, implies those critics, according to Mills, who were above
it all. These included Philip Riaff, Richard Revere and Daniel Bell.
One may question why Parsons is placed among the liberals when he is
generally considered more in the conservative camp. It is difficult to
expect labels to always be consistent. It will be interesting to see,
for example, how radical some of the student protesters of the late
1960's and early 1970's will be when they gain some type of professional
status.

The next consideration is to briefly review what, in essence,
are the principle American ideologies. According to one group of
writers, they can be enumerated as follows: "capitalism," "liberalism,"
"reform liberalism," "conservatism," "minority liberation," "women's
liberation," "the New Left" and "Marxism and Socialism."[49] The latter
category includes the "welfare state." It is their contention that,
"these selections represent the major dimensions of the leading systems
of thought in the United States of the 1970's."[50]

Although this list is not exhaustive by any means it does pro-
vide for a good representation of current ideologies. One notices
the absence of religious and racist ideologies, even though the latter
may be contained under both "minority liberation" and the "New Left."
The important point to make here is that these central ideological
themes rest largely on political and economic considerations. Sheldon
Wolin has explained this quite well when he said:

> Political society does not experience "disease," but
> conflict. It is not overrun with harmful bacteria, but
> "individuals with hopes, ambitions, and fears" that are
> often at odds with the plans of other individuals; its
> end is not "health," but the endless search for a founda-
> tion that will support the mass of contradictions present
> in society.[51]

One is astounded by the absence of sociologists as contributors

to the above. Names such as Abe Fortas, Milton Friedman and Walter

Lippman are not known in American politics and economics for their

ideological postures, but their essays are main-stays in this volume.

In a companion volume these same writers explain their position more

fully:

> We shall try to . . . avoid the mistakes of the "end of
> ideology" thesis as well as its antithesis--overestimation
> of the significance of ideological conflict . . . the
> character and development of ideologies must be studied
> from an impartial perspective.[52]

For this group of writers ideologies are beliefs and hopes inte-

grated into pictures which show:

> (1) how the present social, economic, and political order
>   operates,
> (2) why this is so, and whether it is good or bad, and
> (3) what should be done about it, if anything, may be
>   termed an "ideology."[53]

It may be necessary to fill in the blank spaces of the above

scheme. Before these "social worlds" can be fully perceived, it is

necessary for some type of awareness or consciousness to take place.

The psychological awareness of differential properties such as what

is "black" or "white" is not the answer. It is more a blend of moral

awareness and W. I. Thomas' idea of the definition of the social

situation that can be utilized here. Thus, the sociologists' reaction

to political and economic problems is the essence of the sociological

formulation of ideologies. Despite radical tendencies it might be

said that the works of C. Wright Mills and Herbert Marcuse furnished

a ready formulation for New Left politics because it coincided,

theoretically, with their central theme which was not "revolution" as

much as it was "outrage." An example of this is as follows:

> This country, with its thirty-some years of liberalism, can send 200,000 young men to Vietnam to kill and die in the most dubious of wars, but it cannot get 100 voter registrars to go to Mississippi.[54]

The message that these writers attempt to convey, with some contradiction, is that as long as one's ideology does not deviate too far from "capitalism-liberalism" it is on safe grounds. This can include all forms of individualistic abberations. Once, however, one goes beyond the norms of individualism into the camp of collectivism one is suspect. Among the contradictions one may locate within this rationale is that the corporation is an individual and that the state treats all of its citizens with equal justice and consideration.

As the sociologist ponders the above it may be that, physically, his or her mission insofar as formulation of ideologies are concerned, can only be partially realized and fulfilled on the university campus. It may be that like the Chinese "foot doctors" who administer to primary public health needs of an agrarian population of millions the American sociologists will have to take to the backroads and explain what citizenship means and how ideology works. Durkheim said that we need lawyers to remind us of the rights we have lost as members of society. Lawyers have not maintained the necessary level of integrity to perform this necessary service; they have been characterized as both "priests" and "prostitutes" of the capitalist system. New Left politics and radical sociology has a mission in mind for sociologists who prefer to be more than merely teachers of sociology. Thus, if the sociologist is so concerned with publication and consultation, let him go forth to the people. His rewards may be moderate. He will be in a position to gather genuine, spontaneous data, always a methodological

problem. He will be plugged in to genuine publications of how people really feel about important issues. It may be that he will have to do as the old generation of midwives, "live off the garden." There is no law that says that this cannot happen. The FBI may be concerned since they must constantly seek new activities to justify their existence. The alternatives are bleak: teaching dull college students who firmly believe (a false ideology) that a college degree is designed to help them secure employment. One notes that reacting to a captive audience of students is not the same as reacting to society. An alternative of straight teaching may be leaving the campus every other year in order to keep plugged in to social reality.

Visiting communes is no substitute for visiting representative communities. Communes have their own problems and are simply nothing more than temporary settlements of fragmented individuals who have given up the struggle completely and who seek solace among members of their own kind in the mud and sweat of a primitive sub-culture.[55] "The commune . . . includes sharing housing, economic activities and income, child-rearing, and perhaps even sex in the form of an extended family."[56]

The important thing to remember is that no matter what changes are wrought by communes or other forms of experimental group living there is little immediate impact insofar as society at large is concerned. The point can be made that communes may have a discordant effect in society. It might be that since we know that they are available that we feel as though there is little need for society at large to continue to entertain ideologies. The crux of the matter is

that communes can be rejected and that persons can return to Roszak's "air conditioned nightmare."

Other critics of American ideologies see a relationship where power is valued more than knowledge and that what we have is a kind of "voluntary totalitarianism" rather than a "participatory democracy." Harvey Cox summarizes the issue quite well when he states: "We persist in living by stale ideologies deriving from a bygone day."[57]

Staughton Lynd, on the other hand, fears that issues in regards to New Left politics will eventually be watered down. His statement is as follows:

> The New Left leaders are afraid of the American talent for assimilating dissent--and this is already happening to some of their ideas. Practically everybody has a kind word for decentralization, in the interests of efficiency if not humanity; the war on poverty, while now bogged down, will be carried on . . . . The present New Left will undoubtedly fade without producing many middle- aged radicals.[58]

One subject which will only be briefly touched on here is "ideol- ogy" and "law." Many public officials seem to be unaware of what Sumner said many years ago about laws being grounded in the mores. An English writer feels strongly that:

> In a democratic society at least, laws, if they are to be successful, must rest largely upon consent . . . . If laws are to be effectively obeyed, their demands cannot go much beyond what people are prepared to do.[59]

Perhaps the impending danger of ideology is that it is a recogni- tion that political and economic conditions can be different than they presently are. Some might label this purposive social change. It is the promise of security which works against the grain of ideology. It is also the type of teaching which tells us in no uncertain terms that major historical events are in the past since they are unnecessary for

for the future. Thus, democracy has been achieved by our forefathers

and we are here to enjoy the fruits of their labors.

It is a matter of record that the New Deal of the 1930's and

1940's had ideological characteristics. One interested source evaluates

this period as follows:

> Though the New Deal was non-ideological, this does not mean
> that it was anti-ideological. In fact, it was shot through
> with ideologies, or utopias, whichever emphasis one may
> prefer. Total planners and piecemeal planners, budget-
> balancers and deficit-spenders, trust-regulators and trust-
> busters, protectionists and free traders, "sound money"
> proponents and inflationists--all vied with each other
> under the hospitable tent that was the New Deal . . . . The
> New Deal was engaged in a continuous effort to disengage
> itself from ideological commitments.[60]

The above, of course, is open to some debate. One might speculate

that the New Deal, appearing as a radical innovation at its inception

in 1933, was, in effect, a stop-gap measure on the part of the govern-

ment to placate the threat of impending radical pressures from outside

the government. When the threat of radicalism vanished during the

incipient stages of World War II, the New Deal also vanished. One

could also argue in favor of the New Deal being considered an ideology,

if, for no other reason, as a middle-ground between capitalism and

socialism containing characteristics of each system. It might be that

some political scientists cannot see their way to step outside of our

present set of institutions to see the situation from a genuine

intellectual-ideological position.

One sociologist who has no problem in making sensible comparisons

along ideological lines is Norman Birnbaum. It can be said of him

that he is as familiar with European as he is with American sociology.

If anyone is capable of continuing in the tradition of C. Wright Mills,

it is Birnbaum. In one of his early papers he attempted a comparison

of Marx and Weber where he concluded:

> Weber . . . utilized Marx, not by accepting his hypotheses,
> but by testing them and amending them. He eschewed (avoided)
> the assumption of a mechanical production of values (and of
> ideology, generally) and made explicit what Marx had left
> implicit: the psychological functions of belief systems
> . . . he gave the ideological variable an explicit indepen-
> dent status in the analysis of social change . . . but he
> left implicit . . . the psychological origins of an
> ideology.[61]

The above is important for several reasons. Birnbaum writes in

the tradition of Marx and Weber. He never loses sight of the major

promises attributed to ideology. He constantly searches for an answer

as if he were Marx evaluating Weber, or, from time to time, Weber

evaluating Marx. The common ground, of course, is two-fold: ideology

and the capitalist system. This explains why he can shift from

bureaucracy to religion to higher education without losing time or

composure. This also explains how he can critique the works of David

Riesman as effectively as he can explore the myths of the British

Empire.

In one of his most important articles Birnbaum sees the crisis of

the sociological study of ideology as one which "entails a confronta-

tion of Marxism . . . and 'bourgeois' sociology."[62] It is interesting

to note that this essay, "The Sociological Study of Ideology, 1940-

1960," appeared approximately ten years before Gouldner's The Coming

Crisis of Western Sociology. Gouldner cites Birnbaum only once in

regarding Marxism's ability to continue to change without loss of

identity and purpose.

Expounding the Marxian interpretation is one of the hallmarks of

Birnbaum's craft. For him it is class relations, not class per se which

should be the focus of attention. Also, Mannheim's relative position

is awkward, but it is something to get started with. Mead is also

important for the scientific study of the sociology of ideology.

Central to Birnbaum's writing is that ideology is not properly under-

stood by sociologists. He explains as follows:

> The primary ideological difficulty of many contemporary
> sociologists is that they are unwilling to face up to the
> implications of the problem of ideology in their own work.
> The promise of the achievement of a science (with an
> articulated body of concepts, verified hypotheses, and
> standardized techniques) has been taken for the achive-
> ment itself.[63]

> Additional comments on ideology by Birnbaum are as follows:

> (1) Social consciousness is not exhausted by ideology.
> (2) We must understand the social psychology of a class
>   in order to understand its ideology.
> (3) The ideology of a class, however, cannot be derived
>   directly from its psychology.
> (4) Ideology is . . . the assimilation in thought of real
>   social relationships.
> (5) The persistence of religion in capitalist society can
>   be explained not alone by its utilization by the
>   exploiting classes, but because of the persistence of
>   fear.
> (6) The concept of ideology has been severed from its
>   philosophical bases and discussions of it no longer
>   entail epistemological dispute.[64]

The above all lend themselves to interesting hypotheses if not

formulations of ideology. Birnbaum is distressed at the lack of inte-

gration between political science, history, philosophy and sociology

in that they need each other to accomplish meaningful ends in research.

He points out, also that "Marx--after a century of refutations--is

the one sociologist who cannot be ignored."[65] Perhaps the remarkable

thing about Birnbaum is that he can be as critical of the Soviet

Union as he is of the United States. His erudite scholarship is of

the highest magnitude and his writing is expressive of independence,

creativity, imagination and brutal honesty. If C. Wright Mills fostered the sociological imagination, it could be said that Birnbaum fostered the position of ideology from fragments of philosophy to wholistic social reality.

Birnbaum totally rejects the "end of ideology" debate and spends a great deal of time explaining that technicians can be as ideological as politicians. In another connection he rationalizes the many faces of power when he says: "One of this century's great cultural shocks . . . has been this: the spread of education and literacy, the experience of self-government, has not in fact made men more sovereign."[66]

The problem of ideology appears to be moving into the mainstream of American sociology at a slow but steady pace. At the 1974 meeting of the American Sociological Association there were some nine papers presented representing ideological themes:

<center>ASA Annual Meeting: 1974</center>

<center>Papers Dealing with Ideology/Sociology of Knowledge</center>

(1) "Political Ideology and the Chicano Movement," Gerald Rosen, California State University, Fullerton
(2) "Ideology, Social Structure, and Crisis," Jean Lipman-Blumen, National Institute of Education
(3) "Feminist Ideology and Hard-Nosed Methodology," Robert Brannon, Brooklyn College, CUNY
(4) "Professional Ideologies and Specialized Medicine: 1967 to the Present," Gail Lee Cafferata, University of Rochester
(5) "Phenomenological vs Structural Marxism: An Ideological Debate," John Horton, University of California, Los Angeles
(6) "Myth and Scientific Versions of Idealism in the Sociology of Knowledge," Martin Wenglensky (no affiliation provided)
(7) "A Problem of Scoiological Praxis: The Case for Interventive Observation in Field Work," Y. Michal Bodemann, Brandeis University

(8) "Can and Should Ideology be Avoided in Scientific
Civilization?" (bilingual), Leopold Rosenmayr,
Institut fur Soziologie, Austria

(9) "The State and Ethnocentrism," Jan Smith, University
of Pennsylvania

In addition to the above, one finds other works featuring the

theme of "ideology" which are substantial contributions towards a

general understanding of the subject. Among this group would be the

following:

(1) Ideology and Discontent[67]

(2) Visibles and Invisibles[68]

(3) Worlds of the Future[69]

(4) Ideology and the Development of Sociological Theory[70]

(5) The Discovery of Society[71]

(6) Ideology and Change.[72]

What these studies indicate is that there are new developments

and new interests in the formulations and understandings of ideologies

and related topics. A case can be made for the fact that the true

frontiers of sociology do not lie in "computer science." The true

frontiers of sociology lie in developing "social worlds" of under-

standing for "whole man." There are new discoveries to be made and

whether they be called concepts, principles or theories is not of

primary importance. There are also new "roles" awaiting the sociolo-

gist who can but live only a "half-life" within the cloister of the

university.

Many years ago Bertrand Russell said that a student in America

could only get a good education despite the system--that the system

worked against his getting a good, sound education. He also said

that professors in both England and America should be reminded that

the student knows how to read. Thus, the ideal situation is to have

the student visit with the professor from time to time and to take

his examinations when he is ready. Were this system incorporated into

the present mode of higher learning, the sociologist could be free

to study groups, communities, industries, problems and ideologies.

FOOTNOTES

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[12]C. Wright Mills, "IBM Plus Reality Plus Humanism = Sociology," in Ephraim H. Mizruchi, ed., The Substance of Sociology: Codes: Conduct and Consequences (New York, 1967), pp. 60-66.

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CHAPTER VIII

A NEW MODEL FOR IDEOLOGY

There is little unanimity in the use of the concept "ideology" in the literature of social science and the humanities. In this connection "ideology" shares some common attributes with "sociology" itself; hence, when they are used together there is even more confusion. Divorced from its "sociology of knowledge" frame of reference, ideology approximates something akin to a belief system, rational or irrational, supported by a degree of consensus in the society or in the group to which it is applicable. This, of course, does not allow a great deal of latitude for scientific studies, which may in itself explain why scholars other than followers of Mills and Birnbaum have turned their backs on ideology as a tool of scientific explanation for the behavioral sciences.

A good example of what is implied above is, perhaps, more familiar to the "political scientist" than to the sociologist other than to the "political sociologist." It is the political scientist who lives with various explanations of "democracy" during most of his career in our society--something which might be described as a "keeper of the faith." After writing a whole book on the "theory of democracy," this is how a reputable political scientist handles the problem:

> As to the theory of democracy in general, the tenor of
> this essay has been that democracy is best thought of as
> a political system together with its explanatory and

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justifying theory. Democracy in this view is not a unique
ideology, comparable, say to Marxism--Leninism with its
interpretation of history and its recipe for utopia. That
is, it is not a comprehensive philosophy embracing all of
life and pointing the way to invariable ideals by means
of a fixed policy program.[1]

Even the "best-selling" author, Alvin Toffler, formerly associated

with magazines such as Fortune and Playboy and who knows when and when

not to use sociological interpretations, approaches ideology in the

following manner:

> No man's model of reality is a purely personal product.
> While some of his images are based on first-hand observa-
> tion, an increasing proportion of them today are based on
> messages beamed to us by the mass media and the people
> around us. Thus the degree of accuracy in his model to
> some extent reflects the general level of knowledge in
> society. And as experience and scientific research pump
> more refined and accurate knowledge into society, new
> concepts, new ways of thinking, supersede, contradict,
> and render obsolete older ideas and world views.[2]

One also wonders on what empirical grounds another popular

author, Charles A. Reich, can become so "ideological" in view of the

fact that even with the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to

bolster the sagging Constitution, the Civil Rights Movement has all

but ended in confusion and remorse. Reich proclaims:

> Today we are witnesses to a great moment in history:
> a turn from the pessimism that has closed in on
> modern industrial society; the rebirth of a future;
> the rebirth of a people in a sterile land. If that
> process had to be summed up in a single word, that
> word would be freedom.[3]

The above example may well be a case of an author using the sociol-

ogy of knowledge frame of reference without himself being aware of it.

In one of the few empirical studies dealing with this subject, John

Walton, finds that he has a problem of definition. The manner in

which he seeks a solution is as follows:

> Mannheim recognized two usages of the "theory of ideology,"
> the first referring to intentional falsifications or
> incorrect observations . . . and the second referring to
> "total mental structure" . . . he termed the first type
> "particular" conceptions and the second "total" concep-
> tions . . . it was the second type that interested
> Mannheim . . . .[4]

The above writer attempted to measure "ideological" perspectives
against symbols of "power." Although his conclusions are tentative,
"this analysis documents the significance of the sociology of knowledge
as a perspective for interpreting social research."[5] This study does
not attempt to develop a model for ideology or the sociology of know-
ledge but, for practical purposes, it may serve as a beginning.

However, in a simple way, the first type of John Walton's explana-
tion may be referred to as the "Marxian" model and the second type as
the "Mannheimian" model. The problem with this explanation is that
some writers use the former when they really mean the latter and vice
versa.

The concept, if not methodology, of models may be used in the
sense that Ralph Thomlinson has explained:

> Models have three connotations. They may represent states,
> objects, and events in much the same sense in which an
> architect constructs a small-scale model of a building.
> They may imply a degree of perfection or idealization, as
> in a model student or a model husband. Or they may demon-
> strate how something works. Generally models are less
> complicated than reality and hence lead more to causal
> generalizations. They are also easier to manipulate and
> transport than the real thing.[6]

In a general sense, by utilizing Thomlinson's concept of model,
one could say that, for all practical purposes, an ideology is a model,
per se, since it explains a position about society that may be far
removed from reality or it may point to the way that society should be
(utopia) rather than the way that it actually is. One could also read

many gradations into the scheme from "positive" to "negative," from
"false" to "true" or from "radical" to "conservative." One could
debate the issue at length in order to determine which "model," the
"Marxian" or the "Mannheimian," comes closest to the "fallacy of
affirming the consequent" in that "its conclusion may be false even
if its promises are true."[7] Or, from a different viewpoint, one could
pay heed to Jerome R. Ravetz who cautions:

> The ideal of science as demonstrative knowledge excludes
> the possibility of the obscurity of the very objects of
> the demonstration; and in the dominant traditions of the
> philosophy of science, such an obscurity would destroy
> the claim of science to be knowledge of any worthwhile
> sort . . . the basic categories of our experience are
> incapable of precise definition and unique analysis.
> Concepts such as "cause," "change," and the like, have
> in them an inexhaustible supply of subtleties and
> ambiguities as material for philosophical inquiry.[8]

Thus, in projecting models, one should proceed with caution. A
comment from Florian Znaniecki warns that: ". . . the people who wish
to solve a practical problem are an integral part of that very problem
and no technological or ideological activity can be isolated from other
activities of its kind."[9]

Znaniecki continues:

> The kind of knowledge they deem useful is conditioned
> by their vision of the future, and this vision is limited
> in turn by the kind of knowledge they have already
> utilized in their roles as participants in the present
> culture.[10]

Using the above for guidelines, it is possible to list the fol-
lowing characteristics which manifest themselves in attempting to
conceptualize via ideological model building:

(1) concepts of ideology can be, at best, approximations

(2) concepts of ideology do not lend themselves to the conven-
     tional scrutiny of logic

(3)   concepts of ideology are grounded in culture

(4)   concepts of ideology are links to social reality

(5)   concepts of ideology which display critical limitations

      are reflections of concrete, social limitations.

In addition to the above some further insight into the problem is offered by John C. McKinney who states:

> Knowing is not a matter of proceeding from the uncertain
> effects in the individual to the world beyond which is
> supposed to cause those effects--scientific research
> always posits an unquestioned world of existence within
> which its problems appear and are tested. Any part of
> this world may become problematic and, therefore, an
> object of the knowing process.[11]

This same writer advises: "There is no such thing as a type independent of the purposes for which it was constructed."[12] One has the feeling that by following McKinney that there is no room in his scheme for ideology. How does one differentiate, for example, the difference between "knowing" and "ideology"? It might be, not only reacting to McKinney's postulates, but to Znaniecki's as well, that the last hope for eventually mastering the "methodology of ideology" would be with some linkage between sociology and social psychiatry so that dreams (both from sleeping as well as from day dreams) could be scientifically evaluated for ideological content.

Still another view of ideology is helpful in an attempt to resolve ideologies into models:

> Ideologies are composed of what men believe to be man's
> purposes . . . they purport to define what man's purposes
> ought to be, as well as what they are . . . [also] ideolo-
> gies are not set up to be empirically tested, but are
> believed absolutely to be true; they function at the level
> of social myth . . . [and] ideology has, in the past,
> usually defined its opposite as evil or as something to
> be eradicated . . . .[13]

The above writer feels as though "ideologies of the future may take on more of the intellectual quality of scientific theory."[14] This may be an important development for the future. For the present one may enumerate the following propositions:

(1)   ideologies do not lend themselves to empirical evaluation

(2)   ideologies are used as mechanisms of persuasion

(3)   ideologies compete with theories for the establishment of belief and truth

(4)   ideologies, in a crude way, may be considered as self-contained models

(5)   ideologies are more conducive to philosophical than sociological manipulation and evaluation.

Another approach to the attempt at model building is what may be called evaluating proximity to the "dominant system of thought." The proponents of this model explain, at length, as follows:

> By "dominant system of thought" we mean capitalism--liberalism extended and deepened, expanded comprehensively to incorporate the language, concepts, logic, premises, assumptions, and other tools of thinking generally available to people in the society.[15]

There are, however, variations on this theme. As long as no ideological change is anticipated such as the current "pitch" on television of "Baseball, Hotdogs, Apple Pie, and Chevrolet," this may be considered within the norm. The same would apply to "some anticipated change" but not radical change to completely transform the "system." This is why, perhaps, "New Deal" and "Welfare State" as well as "Democracy" remain such excellent subjects for debate in conventional sociology and political science text books.

These same authors raise the question: "What would it take to go beyond this sytem of thought?" Their reply is as follows: ". . . it would require not a reordering of values, but the complete rejection of many traditional values and the inclusion of new and unfamiliar values in their place."[16]

Once again, it is not too difficult to evelute the "positive" position--as stated above--and the "negative" position as being nothing more than Mannheim and Marx with some variation on the classical theme. Or, stated in more simple terms: "Democracy" is the dominant theme and "Marxism-Leninism" is the negative theme. From the point of view of cultural relativity, however, inside the USSR the USA system could be "Bourgeoise Capitalism" and the positive-negative polarity system could be reversed.

Thus, one may suggest to the concerned scholar, that any meaningful model of ideology should be grounded in culture. Znaniecki calls our attention to this important consideration. It may be stated, also, that in addition to "positive" and "negative" differentials in ideologies one may observe those that are "active" and "passive," "singular" and "pluralistic" and that they are relative, at all times, to "time," "place" and "circumstances" as inferred above in the example of USSR and USA ideological formulations from within. One should not forget, also, that in addition to "economic" and "political" ideologies or those relating to the "political-economy" in the 19th Century tradition, there are also those relating to religion and ethnic or racial identity.

What this complex problem suggests is that ideologies are pluralistic rather than singular. One may support both "dominant" and "passive" or "marginal" if not "negative" ideologies at the same

time. It is similar to the situation with Black Americans who may be

of minority status because of skin color but who are of majority

status because of religion, Christianity. Thus, one may suggest cer-

tain similarities between ideologies as explained above and an inter-

pretation of culture from the old German-Austrian "Kulturkreislehre"

(Culture Circles) School. This theory, in brief, is stated as follows:

> If . . . a culture complex embraces all the essential and
> necessary categories of human culture, material culture,
> economic life, social life, custom, religion, then we
> call it a "culture circle," because returning into itself
> and, hence (sic), also assures its independent existence.
> Should it neglect or fail to satisfy one of the more im-
> portant human needs, then a substitute for this must be
> called from another culture--the greater the number of
> such substitutes that are required, the more it would
> cease to be an independent culture circle.[17]

"Culture circles," according to Wilhelm Schmidt, have "time"

and "space" dimensions and may be likened to an "organism." Two main

types of "culture circles" are those which have continuous distribu-

tion and those which have discontinuous diffusion. The former may be

likened to branches of a tree which represents close and harmonious

growth and relationships. The latter are negative and point to slow

transitions in different directions.[18]

Much more could be projected here insofar as comparing "ideologies"

to "culture circles." This, of course, would project a much more

complex model than that which is presently utilized. Thus, purposes

of this comparison are more exploratory than definitive. This could

be the subject of a great deal of research in the future.

Additional insight afforded by the "Culture Circle School" is

as follows:

It is not so much a matter of facilitation or hindering
of the diffusion of culture, but rather to what place
the older culture strata will be pushed by the later
younger cultures. The latter are in general more advanced
economically and, consequently, also greater in numbers.
Therefore, they will not overlay the older cultures and
mingle with them except where the older cultures cannot
yield any more, but they will crowd them out and push them
into so-called "out-of-the-way districts."[19]

The above demonstrates the possibility of a conceptualization of

ideology in a new dimension which can be more applicable to research

and to general understanding. It appears that the great preoccupation

with ideology has been in tracing its origins, historically, and in

establishing its linkages between the past and the present. This is

not to denigrate the value of scholars engaged in historiography,

epistemology and phenomenology. But sociology requires an explanation

which, if not empirical, can at least assimilate conditions of

empiricism if it is not to become a desiccated social science. Thus,

sociology has outgrown its earlier philosophical preoccupation with

the "law of universal evolution."[20]

What the above discourse may suggest is that it may be more impor-

tant for the sociologist, philosopher, political scientist and other

interested scholars including journalists and free-lance writers to

perform their services based on a more equitable division of labor if

that is possible. This would permit the sociologist to be more con-

cerned with the function of ideologies, latent and manifest, rather

than with evolving philosophical systems for which, in most cases, he

is poorly prepared. By the same token, there is no reason for "ideol-

ogy" to be a "dumping ground" of confusion. As long as it remains a

mystique and a summary for confused thinking, it can hardly be

evaluated for what it is, the antecedent if not independent variable in a socio-cultural setting. At present there is no possible way to adequately explain the principle of conversion with respect to ideology despite the emphasis placed on actors, particularly leaders, who carry out or personify the ideology. Also, as implied in the comparison of ideology to culture circles, there is much more need for a means of evaluating competing if not alternative ideologies than that which presently exists.

Another suggestion for a developing model of ideology might contain a means of differentiating between primary, secondary and tertiary levels. By way of suggestion one may conceive of the concept "chosen people" as a primary ideology, "ethclass"--status of blacks among blacks--as a secondary ideology and one's views on American Indians (whether they should retain their own cultural identities or become full assimilated Americans) as a tertiary ideology. It could even turn out in some cases that secondary and tertiary ideologies would be more important for some individuals than would primary ideologies. An individual could be little moved by national or international politics (primary) but be extremely concerned with racism (secondary or tertiary depending on his or her identity and situation).

Some may contend that ideology is the proper vehicle for persuasion in mass society, and this is of primary concern to the political scientist. There should also be ideological grounds for comprehending that which gives competition to "charismatic leaders." Despite Mills and others who contend that "liberalism" has seen its best days, one might argue that in provincial states in America such as Arkansas and

Oklahoma that "liberalism" is about as radical as one may be and still hold public office or work as a state functionary.

The proper understanding of ideology, however, remains the key to the comprehension of the values which motivate individuals to participate in social movements. Alvin Toffler is of the opinion that three ingredients are needed for proper execution of any community enterprise: (1) the creator element which includes such individuals as playwrights, poets, novelists, composers and others of a creative stamp; (2) the disseminator element or those institutions which communicate the work of the creator to the public; and (3) the con-sumer or the one who purchases the ticket for the spectacle. This same formulation can help to understand who buys what social movement because of the expectation of benefits for everyone (ideology).[21] In other words, ideology, in the above sense, can be equated with the purchase of a ticket or "package deal" designed to do one of two things: (1) maintain the status quo or (2) change some aspect of the social order, other things being held equal.

One problem which any model of ideology would have difficulty in containing as well as in explaining is what has come to be known as "ideological repression." This, in many ways, would call for some critical social-psychological explanations. Alan Wolfe who has written a book on this topic explains as follows:

> Direct ideological repression involves both a direct attack on potential competing ideologies--such as a return to the free market from the Right or socialism from the Left--as well as a continued defense of the existing ideology of corporate liberalism.[22]

Professor Wolfe explains further when he says:

In the twentieth century, those who hold power in liberal
democracies have come to realize the importance of ideol-
ogy. Acceptance of received ways of thinking, it has
been found, is not accidental but has to be worked at.
This need has given rise to a group of experts at
ideological indoctrination . . . .[23]

There are two important conclusions arrived at by Professor

Wolfe which are as follows:

> (1) The goal of ideological repression now is to win
>   support for the capitalist system, not for any one
>   of its policies.
> (2) The ultimate goal of ideological repression is to
>   help people support their own repressors.[24]

Joyce Kolko sees a similar development in her recent book when

she states:

> Anti-Soviet ideology is certainly agreeable to America's
> more sophisticated leaders, but only so long as it serves
> their interests. The so-called "Cold War" set the frame-
> work of these interests for more than two decades and
> two wars.[25]

In addition to the above, there are several critical questions

which should be asked in developing a model of ideology. They are

as follows:

> (1) Where does the ideology come from?
>
> (2) How old is the ideology?
>
> (3) Under what conditions is the ideology most potent?
>
> (4) What is the strength of the ideology?
>
> (5) How radical is the ideology?
>
> (6) How conservative is the ideology?
>
> (7) How far removed from truth is the ideology?
>
> (8) How does the ideology compare to social reality?

The above questions should be helpful in establishing certain

guidelines. The same may be said for the following statements which

recognize the significance of ideology. These definitions are as
follows:

(1) <u>Loneliness</u>: no man or woman is an "isolate" with respect
to ideology.

(2) <u>Morality</u>: the ability of the individual and group to accept
some ideological influences and to reject others.

(3) <u>Ethics</u>: the extent and ability of being sophisticated to the
point of balancing ideological inputs and outputs.

(4) <u>Bureaucracy</u>: that type of social organization which prohibits
both "false" and "real" self-consciousness.

(5) <u>Power</u>: the extent to which distortion is managed in order
to circumvent the free play of humanistic ideological
intercourse.

(6) <u>Beauty</u>: the look or feel of harmonious ideologies.

(7) <u>Politics</u>: the ability to create primary ideologies and to
justify their existence even though they are drawn from
secondary or tertiary levels or from their opposites or from
rejected ideologies.

(8) <u>Social Movements</u>: the ability to synchronize leadership,
followers and doctrine (ideology) so that all three elements
reflect similar degrees of symbolism in search of purposive
social change.

(9) <u>Depressed Class</u>: one in which the ideology is weak, dis-
torted or non-existent by community norms.

(10) <u>Education</u>: a process in which technology is subsumed under
an ideological umbrella so that the individual may safely be
drawn into the system.

(11) Radicalism: the inclination to measure positive ideologies

exclusively in terms of their opposites.

(12) Utopia: that place where ideology and social reality are one

and the same.

(13) Propaganda: a form of mutilated ideology since it has been

stripped of any potential for rationalization.

Robert E. Lane in his book Political Ideology also offers some

interesting characteristics of political ideologies which are important

for contemplating a model:[26]

(1) They deal with the questions: Who will be the rulers?
     How will the rulers be selected? By what principles
     will they govern?
(2) They consistute an argument; that is, they are intended
     to persuade and to counter opposing views.
(3) They integrally affect some of the major values of
     life.
(4) They embrace a program for the defense or reform or
     abolition of important social institutions.
(5) They are, in part, rationalizations of group interests
     --but not necessarily the interests of all groups
     espousing them.
(6) They are normative, ethical, moral in tone and
     content.
(7) They are (inevitably) torn from their context in a
     broader belief system, and share the structural and
     stylistic properties of that system.[27]

Professor Lane adds to the above characteristics with some

theoretical statements on ideology. He begins:

Most ideologies have these qualities:
(1) They are group beliefs that individuals borrow; most
     people acquire an ideology by identifying (or dis-
     identifying) with a social group.
(2) They have a body of sacred documents (constitutions,
     bills of rights, manifestos, declarations), and heroes
     (founding fathers, seers and sages, originators and
     great interpreters).

And all ideologies, like all other beliefs, imply an empiri-
cal theory of cause and effect in the world, and a theory
of the nature of man.[28]

Next, one should not forget the Marxian position on ideology

which is for the most part directed against the bourgeoise:

> Every ideology systematizes [formalizes] an aggregate of
> illusions, mutilated and distorted representations which
> nonetheless retain sufficient reference to "reality"
> (praxis) to appear true, to find a place in this reality,
> to be experienced.[29]

The above materials are offered as suggestions and approximations

to a model of ideology which, at present, can be only in its incipient

stages. The ideas from Lane are well known. The questions raised by

the writer along with the several definitions are synthesized from

readings and thoughts on the subject. Ideology is still considered

more a side line with sociologists. In some respects, more serious

work has been done by political scientists, but their work suffers from

narrow limitations.

The culture circle theory is offered here as no panacea. It is

merely a suggestion. One should be aware of the fact that false inter-

pretations are possible by using the method of culture circle theory.

Ideology is an entity, thus far, which confounds many social scientists.

It reminds one of the fact that William James, the great American

scholar of the late 19th Century and early 20th Century, "never found a

cure for his neuroses, but he learned to live with them."[30] So it is

with ideology and the field of sociology at this time. For others, a

small number who are searching for more than a cursory explanation of

society, ideology may be likened to being the poetry of sociology,

theory the prose. For others ideology may be viewed as the "advance

man" of sociology in that if we know the symbols we can make some

meaningful predictions concerning the future devoid of empty

stereotypes. For all of this to materialize a model of ideology would

be helpful; it would be both a discovery and an invention. It would

be a major social scientific breakthrough.

FOOTNOTES

[1] Henry B. Mayo, _An Introduction to Democratic Theory_ (New York, 1960), p. 309.

[2] Alvin Toffler, _Future Shock_ (New York, 1971), p. 156.

[3] Charles A. Reich, _The Greening of America_ (New York, 1971), p. 379.

[4] John Walton, "Discipline, Method, and Community Power: A Note on the Sociology of Knowledge," in Lawrence Rosen and Robert West, eds., _A Reader for Research Methods_ (New York, 1973), p. 246.

[5] Ibid., p. 243.

[6] Ralph Thomlinson, _Sociological Concepts and Research_ (New York, 1965), p. 119.

[7] Carl G. Hempel, _Philosophy of Natural Science_ (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, 1966), p. 7.

[8] Jerome R. Ravetz, _Scientific Knowledge and Its Social Problems_ (New York, 1971), pp. 212-213.

[9] Florian Znaniecki, _The Social Role of the Man of Knowledge_ (New York, 1968), p. 89.

[10] Ibid., p. 89.

[11] John C. McKinney, "Constructive Typology: Explication of a Procedure," in John T. Doby, ed., _An Introduction to Social Research_, second edition (New York, 1967), p. 213.

[12] Ibid., p. 217.

[13] Severyn T. Bruyn, _The Human Perspective in Sociology_ (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, 1966), pp. 71-72.

[14] Ibid., p. 72.

[15] Kenneth M. Dolbeare, Patricia Dolbeare and Jane A. Hadley, _American Ideologies_, second edition (Chicago, 1973), p. 274.

[16] Ibid., p. 275.

[17]Wilhelm Schmidt, <u>The Cultural Historical Method of Ethnology</u> (New York, 1939), p. 176.

[18]Ibid., pp. 178-179.

[19]Ibid., p. 198.

[20]Emile Durkheim, "Sociology," in Kurt H. Wolff, ed., <u>Essays on Sociology and Philosophy</u> (New York, 1960), p. 379.

[21]Alvin Toffler, <u>The Culture Consumers</u> (New York, 1973), p. 60.

[22]Alan Wolfe, <u>The Seamy Side of Democracy: Repression in America</u> (New York, 1973), p. 126.

[23]Ibid., pp. 126-127.

[24]Ibid., p. 133.

[25]Joyce Kolko, <u>America and the Crisis of World Capitalism</u> (Boston, 1974), p. 151.

[26]Robert E. Lane, <u>Political Ideology: Why the American Common Man Believes What He Does</u> (New York, 1962).

[27]Ibid., pp. 14-15.

[28]Ibid., p. 15.

[29]Henri Lefebvre, <u>The Sociology of Marx</u> (New York, 1968), p. 119.

[30]Gay Wilson Allen, "William James," in Ralph Ross, ed., <u>Makers of American Thought</u> (Minneapolis, 1974), p. 54.

CHAPTER IX

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

Ideology is one of the most important concepts extant in the

social sciences and in sociology, in particular; yet it remains, at

the same time, one of the least understood terms in the literature of

both the social sciences and the humanities. Two trends are noted:

(1) it is used as a catch-all for all factors and tendencies which

have not been explained and (2) it is used in a manner which can be

called nothing other than distortion. There are the classical European

definitions which derive from Marx and Mannheim but, for most contem-

porary use, the term is employed as a kind of mystique explanation for

why individuals and groups react or respond in a certain manner or

why they uphold a certain attitude rather than another. In brief, it

amounts to the implementation of ideology as myth or folklore. It is

the contention made in this dissertation that ideology is too important

to be neglected.

Be that as it may, much is hidden from view insofar as any investi-

gation of ideology is concerned. This is why the concept "ideological

drift" may turn out to be the unknown entity which determines the

success or failure of certain critical social relationships, particu-

larly those concerned with diplomacy and protocol. It would appear,

then, that compatibility has many sides other than what is ordinarily

believed to be most significant. It is conceivable, then, that in the

future, sociologically, one may not only be known by such common

attributes as age, sex, race, educational level and income level but,

also, by "ideological level." Perhaps some of this is taking place

at the present time.

For the present, ideology will reamin for some time as a formula-

tion for disenchantment with the world. It appears that what is taking

place in our society is an attempt to "break out" of the shell which

the above personifies. There are demands for "rights" of one group

without any concern for the ultimate outcome insofar as society as a

whole may be concerned. Leonard Reissman has explained this dilemma

quite well. He points out that:

> There is a wide chasm that separates black militants from
> white liberals, even though both contend that their objec-
> tive is to achieve equality. For the latter, the means
> leading to cultural integration are less important than
> the goal itself. For black separatists, on the contrary,
> it is the means that are of primary importance because
> the success of the goal depends on them. Therefore, the
> development of a viable base for political power and con-
> trol must get the highest priority.[1]

Perhaps there is something biological or organic involved in

ideology that is not too well understood. It would, for example, if

we take Reissman's observation seriously, require more than "busing

to achieve a racial balance" to level these structural differences

among American citizens. Reviewing the recent literature on poverty

and the disadvantaged, for example, one finds the following which

indicates more than a mere passing recognition on the part of the

following author:

> It has been demonstrated that in the lower income groups
> nutrition problems can permanently damage the brain cells
> of the individual. Technology may have few answers here.
> For those cildren born and reared in homes where poor

nutritional habits exist, the best teachers and the
best facilities may be less than a satisfactory
answer.[2]

How is one to reconcile the reality of the above positions with,

as Mills has indicated, the worn out ideology of liberalism? Going

even beyond that, how can one make sense out of the insight of Barbara

Ward who has written:

> The Renaissance and the Reformation vastly reinforced
> both the secular knowledge and the political self-
> confidence of the rising middle class. They were now
> ready to produce the new forms of cohesion, explanation,
> and function which ended, presumably forever, the old
> unified empires and have dominated the world ever since.[3]

How simple this reconciliation can be for those who have given up

on the sociology of knowledge. One writer, for example, has noted the

following:

> Since Mannheim's work has been so thoroughly criticized,
> does it follow that sociology has no claim to the study
> of knowledge? It is the thesis of this paper that the
> sociology of knowledge has no legitimate epistemological
> branch and that only when dealing with substantive aspects,
> i. e., the relationship between ideas and social condi-
> tions, is the sociologist qua sociologist upon legitimate
> grounds.[4]

Evaluated in a more positive light the problem looks quite dif-

ferent. This, in effect, lends a great deal of support to the present

study:

> Mannheim's conclusion stresses the dynamism of his intel-
> lectual positions; the methods originating in the cultural,
> philosophical-historical, and civilizational spheres are
> freely interchangeable since each sociocultural phenomenon
> contains a psychic-emotional, dialectically-rational, and
> progressively-rational stratum.[5]

Among Mannheim's problems which he attempted to resolve was his

confrontation with the "cult of the proletariat" and the fact that

he felt that modern man could be explained only from the point of

view of historiography. "His struggle against the relativistic conse-

quences of his thorough going historicism ends equally fatefully with

the admission that there remains nothing in the end but commitment to

ethical and political pragmatism."[6]

The above may be assessed as technical problems in this field

which, with proper diligence, can be resolved to the mutual satisfac-

tion of concerned scholars and their respective disciplines. An

updating of Mannheim is needed for progressive studies to be made in

the area of the sociology of knowledge. Indeed, that procedure has

already begun as explained in this study. If Mannheim is not updated

in the future, he will be relegated to historical obsolescence much

as Isaac Newton's theory of gravity ultimately gave way to Albert

Einstein's theory of relativity.[7] When Newton had a problem which he

could not explain "scientifically," he could always explain that the

heavenly bodies responded in such a manner because it was God's will!

With Einstein it was a different matter. When he wrote, the ideology

of science was secularized to such a degree that "curved space" was

a much better explanation than a resort to supernatural powers.

It may be that Newton is still more important to social scientists

than they recognize or they are willing to admit:

> Certainly the most important long-range attempt to intro-
> duce scientific method into social and political considera-
> tions was made by a group of Parisian social philosophers
> including the important Socialist theorists, Saint-Simon
> and Charles Fourier, and the founder of Positivism, August
> Comte. The Newtonian stimulus to the work of these men is
> attested to in Saint-Simon's early attempts to urge a
> Religion of Newton to replace traditional Christianity . . .
> [and] . . . the attempt to construct a science of society
> patterned on the natural sciences.[8]

One could surmise from the above that it has taken some 150 years to recognize that sociology may be on the wrong track, that the natural science model poses much too many pitfalls and shortcomings for the social scientist and that since "value free" sociology is a "myth" it is now equally important for the sociologist to know his "ideology" as well as his "methodology." Even Galileo and Descartes in their own time were aware of what Jerome R. Ravetz calls "ideological sensitivity" and its limitations.[9]

Thus, the recognition of ideology as potential action and a source of integration by the sociologist is important. If this is neglected, the sociologist will find himself taking a posture on issues of which he or she is not only unfamiliar but, in some cases, totally ignorant. A case in point would be the rise of Skinner on the horizon of behaviorism. With the popular press hammering away at the loss of "autonomous man" and the wonders of "operant conditioning" the sociologist of traditional training is hardly able to cope with the strong totalitarian undercurrents involved in this type of discourse.[10]

It was not many years ago when Skinner was arguing in favor of "teaching machines." He stated:

> . . . we can solve the problem of education without dis-
> covering or inventing additional reinforcers. We merely
> need to make better use of those we have. Human behavior
> is distinguished by the fact that it is affected by small
> consequences. Describing something with the right word
> is often reinforcing.[11]

The issue could be about other things as well, such as innate differences in IQ scores by racial stocks, unemployment, marijuana, sex without responsibility, the Department of Defense Budget. One subject which certainly should be of concern to the sociologist from

the ideological point of view is what has come to be called the

"information explosion." This is an area which has been developing

rapidly as a result of almost constant involvement in warfare combined

with computerization. A brief history of this activity is given by

William Preston:

> In 1903 the United States officially began the investiga-
> tion of opinion among alien arrivals. From that moment
> its hostility to "subversive" ideas that might weaken the
> state or disturb the peacefulness of social and economic
> relations has steadily grown. The demands of an increas-
> ingly military administrative regime for conformity and
> reliability, while more intense, are certainly not new.
> Before the New Deal interlude a pattern of suppression
> was established, much of which became the root of present-
> day growth. The thirty years from 1903 until 1933 were
> the first phase of the red scare of today.[12]

Linked with the above another author points out that, "Our nation

displays a pathological reluctance to debate real issues . . . opinion

makers resort to . . . formulas stating that America is a healthy land

and the world's most developed nation."[13] This is obviously what

Donald B. Macrae, the British sociologist, has in mind when he claims:

". . . ideology is both the distortion of thought by interest--public

or private, consciously or unconsciously known--and the study of such

distortion."[14]

The question which one might raise from Macrae's ideological

promise is how do we differentiate between voluntary and involuntary

ideologies? The best response that can be obtained from this writer

is that, "Every ideology is in a sense a myth, for it declares the

premises and circumstances on which a man will act, accept, reject,

dispute, or struggle."[15] Last, this writer takes issue with Marx when

he states: "In Marx power follows wealth; in life wealth much more

frequently follows power."[16]

One should not anticipate too much by way of critique from Macrae
since his group of essays are not necessarily too well integrated.
But he does show some brilliant insights, in particular, when he com-
pares Hobbs to Marx:

> Just as Hobbs was only in part right in seeing man as a
> wolf to man, so was Marx only in part correct in seeing
> classes as ever and irreconcilably opposed, for ideology
> is always somewhat shared.[17]

The above may aid our understanding in that, at this late date,
two hundred years after a national revolution, we find that we pay
more lip service to democracy than genuine support. If the truth
were really known and there is always the question of what is meant by
truth, it would probably be revealed that we, as a society, are much
more preoccupied with an interest in fascism than we are in democracy.
Perhaps this is what Mosca and Pareto had in mind in their implications
that: "Political ideologies . . . meet a real social need.   They
permit the mass to consider itself ruled according to some great moral
principle."[18]

One is almost prone to review the works of Freud in order to deter-
mine what, if any, insight may be revealed in explaining a society's
receptive position towards fascism.   There is, of course, the well
known thesis of Erich Fromm.[19]   It may reflect the long period of
dependency of American youth.   Or, perhaps, the Freudian premise that
problems of childhood which are not resolved later appear as adult
problems.   This may be analogous to the fact that ideologies and the
problems which they create may never be completely resolved.   Yet, it
is the natural function of society to allow the possibility to exist
that the ideology may, one day, become social reality minus the

"political corruption" of the intervening period. This might, for keeping with the Freudian tradition, be referred to as "ideology in limbo."

Morris Janowitz explains the response of an organized, professional group to morals and ethics which must be resolved for the group to continue. In his timely essay, "The Ideology of Professional Psychologists," he argues that: "American psychology bears the strong imprint of an intellectual reaction to Freudian theory, in which the foreign matter has been dealt with by partial incorporation."[20] As for the solution to the problem of fascism, this term appears every bit as ambiguous as the term ideology.[21]

There have been numerous problems involved in the creation of this study. Leon Bramson has indicated what to expect in such an undertaking: "There exists no study which attempts to deal with the history of American sociology from the standpoint of the sociology of knowledge, or as a sustained effort in intellectual history."[22] There is much more material in political science than in sociology. Some of this, as indicated above, has definite limitations.

Considerable material pertaining to ideology may be obtained from the underground press. One example follows:

    Wanted: JESUS CHRIST
    Alias: The Messiah, Son of God, King of Kings, Prince of
    Peace, etc.
    *Notorious leader of an underground liberation movement
    *Wanted for the following charges:
      - Practicing medicine, wine-making and food distribution
        without a license.
      - Interfering with businessmen in the Temple.
      - Associating with known criminals, radicals, subversives,
        prostitutes, and street people.
      - Claiming to have the authority to make people into God's
        children.

*Appearance: Typical hippie type--long hair, beard, robe,
 sandals, etc.
*Hangs around slum areas, few rich friends, often sneaks out
 into the desert.
*Has a group of disreputable followers, formerly known as
 "apostles," now called "freemen" (from his saying: "You
 will know the truth and the truth will set you free").
 BEWARE--This man is extremely dangerous. His insidiously
 inflammatory message is particularly dangerous to young
 people who haven't been taught to ignore him yet. He changes
 men and claims to set them free.
 WARNING: HE IS STILL AT LARGE![23]

This study has made a strong effort to contrast ideologies with
value judgments as formulated for the most part in economic and politi-
cal doctrines. As Gustav Bergmann has asked: "[Who] could for one
moment live without making value judgements, and who, even if we could,
would want to?"[24]

Among the revelations within this study which are of importance
to the sociologist are the fact that dominant ideologies within the
USA and the USSR are "truths" within these respective "super" socio-
cultural "worlds." The same point could be argued for the Third World
societies. As trade and diplomatic intercourse bring the two or three
worlds closer together, one may anticipate sharper definitions, if not
clashes, of ideological positions to take place. Or, one may remain
preoccupied with power and the conspiracy of silence. Or, one may
attempt a closer reading of social history and find that societies
with their respective ideologies have always been in a perpetual state
of fusion. It really isn't necessary for the capitalist to "dig his
own grave" as the Marxian system of "dialectical materialism" would
have it. He may be swept aside by changing ideologies at any moment.
He may later emerge as the "managerial class."

This study has attempted to do several things:

(1) to present the case for ideology as it presently exists;

(2) to review constituent literature and the critique of some

principle authors;

(3) to acknowledge the ongoing debates concerning ideology;

(4) to suggest a possible model for ideology;

(5) to demonstrate that the sociologist is, largely, ideologically

naive.

In addition to the above, there have been several attempts to

relate ideology to its proper perspective. No firm conclusions may

be drawn from the above other than to say that "economic" and "politi-

cal" ideologies remain dominant driving forces. One need not be com-

mitted to Marxism in order to agree with Lenin's statement that,

"Political institutions are a superstructure resting on an economic

foundation."[25] Nor for that matter does one need to profess any

particular ideology to subscribe to the following axiomatic statement:

"For the sake of maintaining modern organization, an imprisoned minority

must control a manipulated majority."[26]

One may begin to see some similar patterns of development in the

idea of culture circles transformed to ideology. Perhaps there are

"ideological layers" if not "ideological circles" which are formed in

patterns of stratification. Although the theory of culture circles

is no longer popular in cultural anthropology, it could possibly be of

some utility in sociology. Ideology, in this sense, is largely "cul-

ture history"; hence, the transition should not be too difficult.

This type of analysis appears important since our complex lives

are already stratified into several levels or layers. Irving Howe,

frequent collaborator with Lewis Coser on matters pertaining to

ideology, points out that we are confronted with three stages during this, the contemporary period. He enumerates as follows:

(1) precapitalist--race, illiteracy, backwardness;
(2) capitalist--class conflict, economic crisis, distribution of wealth;
(3) postcapitalist--quandaries concerning work, leisure, morality, and style, such as are sometimes described as existential . . . .[27]

All three of these levels of "disorders," according to Howe, are experienced pluralistically under "late capitalism." "Problems," he claims, "suddenly appear . . . that we had supposed would emerge only under socialism."[28] Thus, economic leveling, whenever it occurs, can create its own set of problems.

Perhaps, the negating factor that Howe is searching for is bureaucracy, that type of social organization which responds the same under any ideology. This is what Max Weber attempted to explain in his writings on this subject. Professor Scaff has recently noted:

. . . bureaucracy raises a nearly insurmountable barrier against political leadership, and even more significantly, it supports an idea of action that increasingly permeates the political order. Not only the bureaucrat, but the citizen as well becomes a "man of order," driven to act only when his security is at stake.[29]

What the sociologist should keep in mind is something that might be called, for lack of a better term, the "cost of ideology." Discredit of welfare state policies and the various "deals" (New, Fair, and other lesser models). Because welfare programs may be called "give-aways" or "down the sewer" actions on the part of the state, we allow our ideology of "good government" to hold back on health and education measures (more recently, housing may also be included).

It is, more specifically, contamination with "communism," the "bitch goddess," that dictates much of this action just as purging the

Red Guards in the People's Republic of China or the blood letting of

the Stalin era in the Soviet Union was designed to rid these societies

of capitalistic influences. As Professor Wesson has recently reported:

"There is apparently no [Soviet] ideology of radical change, and if

Marxism-Leninism has had any effect, it has been to discredit

alternatives."[30]

The sociologist should be on guard for what may be called the

"blind spots" in a society with roots in ideology. Louis J. Halle has

commented on this topic in the following manner: "Ideological thinking,

whether right or wrong, is normative thinking so sure of its own right-

ness as to be intolerant of dissent."[31] Blind spots may be traced to

other origins. For example:

> Human nature being plastic, ideologies, by blessing some
> characteristics and damning others, help to produce a
> real difference in the quality of life between one people
> and the next . . . different people can and do draw
> different practical conclusions from the same ideological
> premises.[32]

Ideology, then, it may be argued, plays more than a minor role

in the structure of society. A critique of how the sociologist may

be oblivious to the problem is adequately summarized by Richard Quinney:

> The myth of rationality has thus prevented us from knowing
> about anything other than what presently exists. Working
> from a positivistic epistemology, the scientist has never
> been able to transcend the world that is . As a consequence
> we have not been able [and have not dared] to exceed the
> limits of ordinary experience. Politically, our science
> has been an alibi for the status quo. Little wonder that
> twentieth century man has not risen above the problems of
> the age.[33]

One is prone to say that the sociologist cannot adequately study

ideology since he cannot escape from it in order to do so. A basic

problem of ideology is explained by Quinney which, in effect, could

hardly be any different from other disciplines. For such disciplines, the "map" has become the "territory" and it may well be the wrong map.

Another scholar who is perceptive of ideology sees the problem from the point of view of American foreign policy. His interpretation is as follows:

> At the root of the American crisis in foreign policy, then, is a failure of political intelligence, an incapacity to see the world for what it is rather than what we would like it to be and, consequently, an unwillingness to adjust to the "real" world with its never ending conflict and strife.[34]

Professor Tucker continues: "The irony--and to some the tragedy-- of America's position today is that at the height of her power her purpose has become increasingly irrelevant to most of the world."[35]

Thus, ideology is out there awaiting study by competent sociological theoreticians. There are many observations to be made in the future. What has been presented here may be viewed essentially as a preface to future major studies on this important subject as yet unwritten. As long as the social scientist relegates ideology to a minor role, he or she will be making an incomplete contribution. What must be done is to consciously study the force of ideology as it condemns some social movements and blesses others, as it distorts truth in some circles and obliterates it in others.

FOOTNOTES

[1] Leonard Reissman, Inequality in American Society (Glenview, Illinois, 1973), p. 95.

[2] Wil J. Smith, "Conference Analysis," in Paul W. DeVore and Wil J. Smith, eds., Education in a Technological Society (Morgantown, West Virginia, 1970), p. 86.

[3] Barbara Ward, Nationalism and Ideology (New York, 1966), p. 47.

[4] Robert H. Coombs, "Karl Mannheim, Epistemology and the Sociology of Knowledge," The Sociological Quarterly, Vol. 7, No. 2 (Spring, 1966), p. 232.

[5] Gunter W. Remmling, "Philosophical Parameters of Karl Mannheim's Sociology of Knowledge," The Sociological Quarterly, Vol. 12, No. 4 (Autumn, 1971), p. 543.

[6] Ibid., pp. 544-545.

[7] Richard Olson, ed., Science as Metaphor: The Historical Role of Scientific Theories in Forming Western Culture (Belmont, California, 1971).

[8] Ibid., p. 73.

[9] Jerome R. Ravetz, Scientific Knowledge and Its Social Problems (New York, 1971), p. 391.

[10] Arthur R. Jensen, "Skinner and Human Differences," in Richard Olson, ed., Science as Metaphor: The Historical Role of Scientific Theories in Forming Western Culture (Belmont, California, 1971), pp. 177-198.

[11] B. F. Skinner, "Why We Need Teaching Machines," in Robert W. Marks, ed., Great Ideas in Psychology (New York, 1966), p. 515.

[12] William Preston, "The Ideology and Techniques of Repression, 1903-1933," in Harvey Goldberg, ed., American Radicals: Some Problems and Personalities (New York, 1957), p. 240.

[13] Denis A. Goulet, "The United States: A Case of Anti-Development," in Herbert G. Reid, ed., Up The Mainstream: A Critique of Ideology in American Politics and Everyday Life (New York, 1974), p. 179.

[14]Donald G. Macrae, Ideology and Society: Papers in Sociology and Politics (New York, 1962), p. 64.

[15]Ibid., p. 65.

[16]Ibid., p. 67.

[17]Ibid., p. 72.

[18]Geraint Parry, Political Elites (New York, 1969), p. 57.

[19]Erich Fromm, Escape From Freedom (New York, 1965).

[20]Morris Janowitz, Political Conflict: Essays in Political Sociology (Chicago, 1970), p. 266.

[21]A. James Gregor, Fascism: The Classic Interpretations of the Interwar Period (Morristown, New Jersey, 1973).

[22]Leon Bramson, The Political Context of Sociology (Princeton, New Jersey, 1969), p. 73.

[23]William McPherson, ed., Ideology and Change: Radicalism and Fundamentalism in America (Palo Alto, California, 1973), pp. 279-280.

[24]Gustav Bergmann, "Ideology," in May Brodbeck, ed., Readings in the Philosophy of the Social Sciences (New York, 1968), p. 134.

[25]Joseph Raffaele, System and Unsystem (New York, 1974), p. 181.

[26]Ibid., p. 182.

[27]Irving Howe, The Critical Point on Literature and Culture (New York, 1973), p. 20.

[28]Ibid., p. 28.

[29]Lawrence A. Scaff, "Max Weber's Politics and Political Education," American Political Science Review, Vol. LXVII, No. 1 (March, 1973), p. 135.

[30]Robert G. Wesson, "Viability of the Leninist Synthesis," Orbis, Vol. XVII, No. 4 (Winter, 1974), p. 1247.

[31]Lewis J. Halle, The Ideological Imagination (London, 1972), p. 116.

[32]Patrick Corbett, Ideologies (New York, 1965), p. 150.

[33]Richard Quinney, "From Repression to Liberation: Social Theory in a Radical Age," in Robert A. Scott and Jack D. Douglas, eds., Theoretical Perspectives on Deviance (New York, 1972), p. 325.

[34]Robert W. Tucker, _Nation or Empire? The Debate Over American Foreign Policy_ (Baltimore, 1968), p. 86.

[35]Ibid., p. 160.

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