THE PROBLEMS AND PROCESS OF IDENTITY MAINTENANCE IN THE ANTI-NUCLEAR MOVEMENT IN AMERICA: A QUALITATIVE ANALYSIS

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF TABLES

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Value-Conflict of Environmentalism vs. the Growth Ethic

In the last few generations, humans have produced complex social structures that depend on rapid use of finite resources and the technological alterations of natural environments. This history of our times can largely be understood by recognizing that technology and its guiding will of economic production has placed man in a position to undermine his own existence through environmental destruction. Because of this potential, it has become essential to recognize that the community of man must, at some point, make collective decisions about technological answers as they effect environmental questions.

The recent decade of the 1970's was a period in which there developed a growing awareness that the natural environment is not an indestructible resource. Many people have come to realize that technological innovation can be a mixed blessing. Questions are now being raised as to whether or not some of the apparent economies resulting from technological enterprise are too costly in terms of an environmental life-quality. Other people find themselves

bewildered because of a lack of adequate opportunities to become sufficiently informed so as to make appropriate judgments and influence legislation. Environmental problems as they exist today are extremely complex. There are many positions within the environmental controversy, and there exists a wide array of interest groups attempting to exert influence in various areas of vested concern. Although it is somewhat of an oversimplification, people can be separated into two camps on most environmental issues: those who place economic activity and the development of technology ahead of preservation of the environment and those whose priorities are the opposite. The paradox here lies in the fact that a society like ours, so long committed to growth, consumption, and nature exploitation, finds itself in a value conflict over previously accepted and unchallenged practices.

Ehrlich, Holdren, and Holm (1971) speak in a broader sense to this paradox by suggesting that:

> . . . the striking dualism in contemporary science and technology--monumental achievements beside astonishing omissions and misdirections--deserves the most careful scrutiny. If the present destructive course is to be altered, we must understand not only operational details of past and present errors, but also the way in which society's institutions, goals, and prejudices have interacted with science and technology to produce such imperfect results (p. 2).

From a sociological perspective, the current questions and debates over environment vs. economics form a series of value conflicts around which the battle lines are, in

many instances, clearly visible. Conflict may range in intensity from mere discontent to physical and violent confrontations, but the issue of contention remains salient: economic growth vs. environmental protection. People who align themselves with pro-growth tend to feel that there are still ample resources for exploitation, and resource shortages can only be solved through the unhindered free enterprise system. Many in this group have a vested interest in economic expansion regardless of possible environmental damage. Some pro-growth supporters challenge the basic assumptions of environmentalist arguments by stating that: (1) growth and production are not in themselves related to environmental damage, (2) slow economic growth inhibits social problem solving because of less generated revenue, and (3) only a growth economy can continue to produce a socially acceptable standard of living (Sullivan and Thompson, 1980).

On the state ballot of Missouri in the November, 1980, election was a proposition concerning the implementation of specific guidelines for the storage of nuclear waste. This issue, called Proposition II, is a valid example of the value conflict of economics vs. environment. The following is an excerpt from a letter drafted by the "No on II Committee; Missourians Against the Callaway Shutdown," and mailed to Missouri voters:

> A November proposal called Proposition II is being billed by its promoters as a 'moderate'

measure.* But what proposition II's promoters don't tell you is that II would force the shutdown of the Callaway nuclear plant located near Fulton.

The shutdown of Callaway would eliminate a supply of electricity vitally needed for our homes, offices, factories, and farms. Consider these facts:

- A shutdown of Callaway would cost over $900 million. That amounts to an average of over $500 for each and every Missouri household.
- The Callaway nuclear energy facility is designed to supply over 7 billion kilowatt hours of electricity every year.
- The energy equivalent of over 10 million barrels of foreign oil annually.
- The building of the Callaway plant and energy generated from it means thousands of jobs for Missouri people and millions of dollars to our state's economic vitality.

We need the Callaway energy plant. What we don't need are expensive new laws which cut off vitally needed energy and economic growth (Missourians Against Callaway Shutdown, 1980, n.p.).

On the other side of the controversy are those people who want to maintain the environment in an undisturbed state. For these people, continuous and unquestioned growth is seen as dangerous to natural environments. They see growth as: (1) using up limited resources, (2) increasing the quantity of pollution, (3) not leading to a more equitable distribution of income, and (4) associated with the kind of technology that often creates enormous problems. They maintain that technology is often used

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*Note: Proposition II was a proposal to have strict federal safety rules applied to the storage of nuclear waste from any future nuclear plant in Missouri. Callaway is now under construction. The proposition failed.

before its possible effects are truly understood (Sullivan and Thompson, 1980). The pro-environmentalists are willing to sacrifice certain economic goals for environmental ones, believing that economic and technological benefits cannot be enjoyed in a world with a dying ecosystem. This position is reflected in Galbraith's statement (as quoted in Lilenthal, 1975):

> . . . it is hard to suppose that penultimate Western man stalled in the ultimate traffic jam and slowly succumbing to carbon monoxide, will be especially enchanted to hear from the last survivor that in the preceding year the gross national product went up by a record amount (p. 38).

Currently, one major focus of value conflict within the environmental framework concerns the present and future production of nuclear power energy. The extreme divergence of these opinions has symbolized the controversy in recent years about energy fissioning atoms. As Weaver (1979) suggests:

> The debate has been frequently emotional, sometimes bitter, often confusing. Frightening stories about radiation hazards of nuclear materials vie with worrisome forecasts of energy famine, economic troubles and even environmental disaster if nuclear energy is abandoned (p. 459).

The debate over the use of nuclear energy is only alive because of the problem of resource depletion in the area of energy. During the last 80 years, highly industrialized societies like the United States have become increasingly dependent upon the use of finite fossil fuels for the production of energy. The present "energy crisis"

evolved because heavy demand has pushed these fossil fuels closer to exhaustion. For example, geologist M. King Hubbert estimates that the world supply of oil and natural gas will be significantly depleted within 100 years (Ehrlich, 1977). The time frame is even more constricted in our society. Given our current levels of energy use, it is estimated that America will exhaust virtually all of its own oil and natural gas resources within the next 40 years (Time, 1977).

The crises in energy has led to a reassessment of alternative sources of fuel production, with nuclear energy and coal being given top priority (U.S. News and World Report, 1977). According to proponents of nuclear energy, the development of the nuclear industry in the United States has been different from most other industrial development in society. For example, some suggest that it is one of the first deliberate attempts to understand and control the risks of an emerging large scale technology (Ramey, 1970). An early report presented by the National Research Council and the National Academy of Sciences in 1956 stated that:

> The use of atomic energy is perhaps one of the few major technological developments of the past 50 years in which careful consideration of the relationship of a new technology to the needs and welfare of human beings has kept pace with its development. Almost from the very beginning of the days of the Manhattan Project, careful attention has been given to the biological and medical aspects of the subject (p. 51).

The benefits of nuclear power have been promoted by various scientific, industrial, and citizen groups in recent years. Perhaps the argument most often presented by proponents of nuclear energy is the economic one. In its most basic structure, the economic rationale for nuclear energy includes the following abbreviated points, according to Ramey (1970):

1. Nuclear power provides competition to other energy sources--competition which benefits the consumer by keeping power costs down and rates down.

2. Nuclear power costs do not vary appreciably with location--a fact of considerable consequence to regions which are distant from fuel sources.

3. The use of nuclear power will decrease the burden on the nation's transportation systems.

4. The unit costs of nuclear plants decrease more rapidly with increased size than unit costs of other types of power plants. This characteristic is important since the general trend is toward larger and larger electric power plants. Nuclear energy has considerable potential for improved operating economics.

5. Nuclear power is produced without releasing combustion products into the atmosphere and therefore contributes significantly in the fight for clear air.

6. Nuclear plants have an aesthetically attractive appearance and in many instances provide opportunities for recreational activities in areas surrounding them.

7. The use of Nuclear Power will help conserve fossil fuels for purposes for which they are especially suited--such as raw materials for producing chemicals, rubber, and plastics (pp. 49-50).

Not many years ago prospects for the nuclear industry were booming. Nuclear electricity was seen by many as the clearest, cheapest, and most convenient form of power. Production orders for nuclear plants increased considerably and in just three years (1971 through 1973), 100 new reactors were ordered. Optimistic projections foresaw as many as 1,500 reactors in the United States by the year 2000 (Weaver, 1979).

Then came the oil embargo of 1973-74, followed by strong national pressures to conserve electricity and fuel. Immediately the price of electricity began to rise sharply and the increase in electricity demand slowed with numerous reactor orders cancelled or postponed. Concurrently, government policy shifted from unqualified promotion to mixed support. Public opinion began to change in some sectors as opponents of nuclear energy mounted demonstrations at nuclear reactor sites from Seabrook in New Hampshire to Diablo Canyon in California. They raised concern over the hazards of nuclear power which primarily focused on two major issues: (1) the safety of the nuclear reactors, and (2) the safe disposal of massive quantities of highly dangerous wastes (Dasmann, 1976).

Against this background stands an important fact: Nuclear energy is now producing one-eighth of all electric power generated in this country. At present, more than 70 nuclear power plants in 27 states have received operating licenses. More than 90 others are under construction.

Projections indicate that by 1985, our reliance upon nuclear energy will nearly triple, with over 23% of our nation's electricity coming from atomic sources (U.S. News and World Report, 1977).

Atomic power and the energy of nuclear fission has been with us since the first atomic bomb was tested in July, 1945, and used in August of that year. The following is a brief explanation of atomic power taken from No Nukes: Everyone's Guide to Nuclear Power (Gyorgy, 1979):

> Atomic power refers to the energy that is released when atoms of matter are split. In 1905, Albert Einstein showed mathematically in his Theory of Relativity that matter could be changed into energy, that it has energy in it. The famous formula $E=Mc^2$ showed how much energy could be released. The energy (e) from uranium (for example) would be equal to the mass or amount (M) of uranium, multiplied by the square (C^2) of the speed of light. Atomic power refers to the power of very specific atoms. Basically two elements are used: an isotope of uranium called uranium -235 and the manmade plutonium -239. The atoms of these materials are split for three reasons. The first is to produce an explosion--an atomic bomb. The second is to produce bomb-grade materials in a nuclear production reactor. The third use is to produce heat, make steam, and generate electricity in a commercial nuclear power plant (pp. 29-30).

A look at the history of nuclear energy in the United States shows a compelling post-war atomic development starting with with the Atomic Energy Act of 1946, which established a "five-man" Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) to be appointed by the president for five-year terms with senate approval. All research and development of atomic energy was to go through this commission whose specific purpose

was officially stated as follows:

> It is hereby declared to be the policy of the people of the United States that, subject at all times to the paramount objective of assuring the common defense and security, the development and utilization of atomic energy shall, as far as practicable, be directed toward improving the public welfare, increasing the standard of living, strengthening free competition in private enterprise, and promoting world peace (Dean, 1953, p. 23).

The accumulated power of the Atomic Energy Commission began to manifest itself in the 1960's with increased demand for electricity, and as Seaborg (1971) wrote:

> The years 1963-1967 constituted a crucial period of change for nuclear power. Costs came down further as nuclear power proponents drew up plans for 500-megawatt, and even 1,000 megawatt power plants. The first sign of a real economic breakthrough came in 1964 with the selection of nuclear power for the Oyster Creek Plant by the Jersey Central Power and Light Company. More of the new large competitive nuclear plants were selected as other utilities climbed on the nuclear band wagon. Roughly half of the new large-sized commercial power plants ordered in 1966 and 1967 were nuclear (p. 28).

The 1960's also marked a time when the United States Government and the American society in general had to contend with various social movements against the political and economic structure. The first stirrings of public opposition to nuclear energy were outweighed by other social issues. But a growing environmental awareness at the end of the decade, together with the widespread growth of atomic plants, created the atmosphere for increased public opposition toward nuclear energy in the following decade of the 1970's (Gyorgy, 1979).

In the decade of 1960, energy use more than doubled in the United States. Advertising and lifestyles encouraged heavy electrical use. According to Lapp (1971), in 1969 alone, utilities spent $323.8 million on sales and advertising, and $41 million on research and development. Consumption patterns seemed to be set in an upward motion. Although in 1969, there were only 16 "nukes" licensed to operate in America, 54 were under construction and 35 more had been ordered (Gyorgy, 1979).

As the number of nuclear plants increased from 16 to nearly 80, with many more planned and already under construction, public opposition began to spread. With this increased opposition there came increased solar-related experiments and other alternative energy sources as the decade progressed (Gyorgy, 1979).

On January 1, 1970, the National Environmental Policy Act went into effect requiring the AEC to prepare an environmental impact statement for new nuclear plants being licensed. By the early 1970's, citizen opposition to nuclear energy was becoming more aggressive and had the effect of slowing down the AEC's licensing process. According to the AEC, the average time for issuing construction permits had risen from 10 months in 1967 to more than 20 months in 1971. These delays were credited to the National Environmental Protection Agency (NEPA), the 1970 Water Quality Improvement Act, and to citizen intervening groups (Lewis, 1972).

In July, 1971, the U.S. Court of Appeals in Washington, D.C. decided in favor of the National Environmental Protection Agency and some local citizen groups against the AEC in the Calvert Cliffs case. This landmark decision informed the AEC that it did not have the right to license nuclear projects without NEPA consideration of "radiological factors." The court decision stated that:

> . . . the very purpose of NEPA was to tell federal agencies that environmental protection is as much a part of their responsibility as is protection and promotion of the industries they regulate. Whether or not the specter of a national power crisis is as real as the Commission apparently believes, it must not be used to create a blackout of environmental considerations (Lewis, 1972, p. 284).

Although this did not prevent any nuclear plants from being built, it meant that 63 pending license applications were now subject to environmental review.

The decade of the 1970's also witnessed a significant number of "dissident" scientists publically opposing the use of nuclear energy. Individual scientists like Drs. John Gofman, Arthur Tamplin, Ernest Sternglass, and Thomas Mancuso, carried on independent research concerning radiation standards and public health; research that exposed serious credibility gaps in AEC statements about radiation limits. On the anniversary of the atomic bombing of Hiroshima, the following declaration was signed by more than 2,000 biologists, chemists, engineers, and other scientists and presented to the congress and President of the United States:

> . . . the country must recognize that it now appears imprudent to move forward with a rapidly expanding nuclear power plant construction program. The risks of doing so are altogether too great. We, therefore, urge a drastic reduction in new nuclear power plant construction starts before major progress is achieved in the required research and in resolving present controversies about safety, waste disposal, and plutonium safeguards. For similar reasons, we urge the nation to suspend its program of exporting nuclear plants to other countries pending resolution of the national security questions associated with the rise by these countries of the by-product plutonium from United States nuclear reactors (Union of Concerned Scientists, 1978, p. 337).

In 1973, the Friends of the Earth environmentalist group forced the AEC, under federal law, to release documents showing a "cover-up" of a 1964 reactor safety study which concluded that in a moderate to severe nuclear accident (one facility) 45,000 people could die, 100,000 could be injured, with property damage of $17 billion or more (Nader and Abbotts, 1977). By the late 1970's, the early critics of the 1960's were being joined by more small groups of intervenors and by organizations like the Task Force on Nuclear Pollution, Friends of the Earth, and others. As people learned more about nuclear power, a new activist movement against it began to emerge, especially as legal action against plants failed to stop their construction. Citizen groups based on public education and civil disobedience in the form of nonviolent direct action began to spread throughout the nation. As the nuclear energy conflict became more exposed, its present use and future consideration became a volatile political issue, encompassing the environmental and economic questions referred to earlier.

Issue of Public Acceptance of Nuclear Power

The politics of nuclear energy in the 1970's produced a growing relationship between nuclear policy and public participation. Individuals and groups increased their demands for more input into policy making at both national, state, and local levels, and in some cases these demands were reflected in legislation. One excellent example of national legislation that encourages public participation is the National Environmental Policy Act of 1970 (referred to earlier), which contains authority for citizen lawsuits. One interesting and vital area that reflects this relationship between public and policy is the state initiative to submit the nuclear issue to direct popular vote. In 1976, for example, seven states voted on an initiative to restrict the building of nuclear plants within their jurisdictional limits--California, in the June primary election; and Arizona, Colorado, Montana, Ohio, Oregon, and Washington, at the time of the November election (Wenner and Wenner, 1978).

Because each of these initiatives was a part of the same national campaign to limit nuclear energy, all six state ballots contained nearly the same major provisions that mandated that legislatures concern themselves with (1) the safety and security systems associated with the plant; (2) the waste disposal problem; and (3) the elimination (or waiver) of the federally imposed $560 million

insurance limit for nuclear accidents. Table I lists the provisions, ranks the states according to how difficult (restrictive the question presented on the ballot was), and the percentage of the state populations voting for the nuclear moratorium.

The Wenner study of the 1976 initiative ballots found the following independent variable categories to support their own research hypothesis, as well as other hypotheses derived from earlier research:

Demographic Characteristics: being Democratic, female, white, young (under 35), better educated, and urban are associated with skepticism concerning nuclear power in these six states. These variables are also found in other nuclear power and public opinion research; for example, Dunlap and Allen (1976). According to Wenner and Wenner (1978), ecological/environmental concern has been considered a middle-class phenomenon; a concern of people who have the income, political clout, and leisure time to develop an ecological consciousness. However, wealthy people tend to favor nuclear power, whereas less affluent people tend to be more uncertain. Education is associated with skepticism toward nuclear power; affluence with acceptance of it (divergent variables). (There is also indication that less affluent, blue collar workers tend to favor nuclear energy for economic reasons in various local areas.)*

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*This study does not include operationalized variables concerning perceived risks by the citizens in the six states of nuclear accidents.

TABLE I

STATE NUCLEAR MORATORIUM MEASURES

	Legislative Approval	Safety Shown	Waste Disposal	Liability Limits	Evacuation Plans	Other	Vote for Moratorium
Oregon	2/1	X	X	Abolish	X	Cost	42%
Montana	Majority	X	X	Abolish	X	"Ban"	41%
Washington	2/1	"certain conditions"			0	"Prohibit"	33%
Arizona	Majority	X	X	Abolish	0	0	30%
Ohio	Majority	X	0	No Limit	X	Judicial	30%
Colorado	2/1	X	X	Waiver	X	Judicial	29%

Economic Variables; Moritorium Non-Supporters

People who were concerned about such issues as unemployment, electricity rates, property taxes, and who lived in heavy industrial (energy intensive) areas were more likely to vote against the moritorium in all six states.

Economic Variables; Moritorium Supporters

Persons with negative attitudes toward growth and its possible effects of increased pollution, increased congestion, and heterogeneity in local populations, tended to be in favor of the moritorium in all six states.

Wenner and Wenner (1978) conclude from their study of 1976 nuclear moritorium initiatives in six states that demographic characteristics such as sex, race, age, rural, or urban are less important in determining nuclear energy attitudes in the public than are certain situational variables, such as cost of electricity, need for increased energy use in local areas based on the type of economy and educational status of community residents. This result was supported in all six states. This study also supports other research, suggesting that during this time frame (1976), the majority of Americans were willing to accept nuclear power as a significant factor in future energy plans for the United States (Wenner and Wenner, 1978).

In the spring of 1979, a national opinion survey, conducted by the Gallup Opinion Index, found that more Americans favored "caution" in the construction of nuclear power plants, although a solid majority continued to believe that it was important to develop nuclear power as a national energy resource. This survey was taken less than a month after the March 28, 1979, nuclear plant accident at Three Mile Island, Pennsylvania.

The Three Mile Island situation helped to explain the sharp changes in public attitudes toward nuclear energy as compared to a 1976 Gallup survey (i.e., the percentage of Americans who favor a cutback in nuclear plant operations until stricter safety regulations can be developed increased from 40% in 1976 to 66% in 1979). This "go-slow" approach was generated in public attitudes reflected in the following Gallup (1979) findings:

> - Three in 10 (4 in 10 in the East) were 'extremely' (12%) or 'quite' (16%) worried about their own and/or their family's safety in the immediate aftermath of the reactor incident.
>
> - As many as 4 persons in 10 (41%) felt the situation was, in general, not handled as well as possible, reflecting the confusing early reports regarding the seriousness of the situation.
>
> - Three in every four in the survey (75%) think a situation such as the Three Mile Island plant accident is likely to happen again.
>
> - While most Americans continue to attach considerable importance to the development of nuclear power, as many as 6 in 10 (62%) say they would object to having a nuclear plant constructed near their home (within a radius of

> five miles). This proportion represents a sharp increase since the 1976 survey, when only 45% said they would have a similar objection.
>
> - American people are not ready to reject the use of nuclear power for future energy needs. Only one American in four (25%) favors shutting down all nuclear plants at this time. In addition, 63% feel that it is either 'extremely' or 'somewhat' important to have more nuclear power plants to meet the future energy needs of the nation (1976 was 71%) (pp. 1-14).

Tables II and III are percentage responses broken down into demographic variable categories which reflect two of the questions asked on the Gallup survey. These two questions are included here because of their general applicability to national nuclear issues. (Material from the Gallup Poll was both quoted and paraphrased, with selected result categories included.)

The volatile and complex nature of the nuclear energy issue is reflected in the following Gallup findings concerning economic vs. safety factors. The significant finding is that the American people as a whole place economic factors ahead of safety considerations. Some response percentages are:

> - By a vote of 50 to 41%, the public indicates it would not be willing to pay higher prices for electricity in order to reduce the nation's dependency on nuclear power.
>
> - In addition, the public, by a 56 to 31% ratio, expresses the belief that the presence of nuclear plants is less of a risk to the nation than the energy shortage that almost certainly would result if these plants were permanently shut down (Gallup Opinion Index, 1979, p. 7).

Tables IV and V show the questions and significant findings.

TABLE II

IMPORTANCE OF NUCLEAR PLANTS

Question: "In order to meet the future needs of the nation, how important do you feel it is to have more nuclear power plants--extremely important, somewhat important, not too important, or not at all important?"

	Extremely Important	Somewhat Important	Not too Important	Not at all Important	No Opinion
National	30%	33%	13%	17%	7%
Sex					
Male	40	31	10	16	5
Female	21	35	17	17	10
Race					
White	31	33	13	16	7
Non-White	24	31	17	20	8
Education					
College	37	35	10	16	2
High School	28	34	16	16	2
Grade School	23	25	13	22	17
Region					
East	27	33	16	19	5
Midwest	29	39	12	15	5
South	32	29	13	17	9
West	31	31	12	17	9

TABLE II (Continued)

	Extremely Important	Somewhat Important	Not too Important	Not at all Important	No Opinion
Age					
Total under 30	25	39	14	18	4
18-24 years	24	41	15	17	3
25-29 years	26	37	11	20	6
30-49 years	34	30	14	16	6
50 & older	29	32	13	16	10
Income					
$20,000 & over	40	34	9	13	4
$15,000-$19,999	29	36	15	16	4
$10,000-$14,999	24	34	18	17	7
$7,000-$9,999	28	33	15	15	9
$5,000-$6,999	19	28	13	32	8
$3,000-$4,999	22	27	15	20	16
Under $3,000	24	30	17	15	14
Politics					
Republican	36	35	13	10	6
Democrat	28	32	15	18	7
Independent	31	32	13	20	4
Religion					
Protestant	30	33	14	16	7
Catholic	28	37	14	15	6

TABLE II (Continued)

	Extremely Important	Somewhat Important	Not too Important	Not at Important	No Opinion
Occupation					
Professional & Business	35	36	11	16	2
Clerical & Sales	34	36	9	19	2
Manual Workers	30	33	16	15	6
Non-Labor Force	26	28	14	19	13
City Size					
1,000,000 & over	29	34	8	18	11
500,000-999,999	34	37	13	13	3
50,000-499,999	33	29	13	20	5
2,500-49,999	24	34	17	18	7
Under 2,500 Rural	28	34	16	14	8
Labor Union Families	32	35	16	14	3
Non-Labor Union Families	29	32	13	18	8

Source: Gallup Opinion Index (1979), p. 2.

TABLE III

NUCLEAR SAFETY REGULATIONS

Question: "Do you feel that nuclear power plants operating today are safe enough with the present safety regulations, or do you feel that their operations should be cut back until more strict regulations can be put into practice?"

	Safe Enough	Cut Back Operations	No Opinion
National	24%	66%	10%
Sex			
Male	33	58	9
Female	15	74	11
Race			
White	25	65	10
Non-White	14	73	13
Education			
College	33	59	8
High School	21	70	9
Grade School	16	64	20
Region			
East	23	68	9
Midwest	26	62	12
South	20	68	12
West	26	67	7
Age			
Total under 30	20	73	7
18-24 years	18	75	7
25-29 years	22	72	6
30-49 years	26	64	10
50 & older	24	63	13
Income			
$20,000 & over	30	60	10
$15,000-$19,999	24	68	8
$10,999-$14,999	24	68	8
$7,000-$9,999	18	70	12
$5,000-$6,999	15	75	10
$3,000-$4,999	17	64	19
Under $3,000	10	78	12
Politics			
Republican	32	58	10
Democrat	18	73	9
Independent	27	64	9

TABLE III (Continued)

	Safe Enough	Cut Back Operations	No Opinion
Religion			
Protestant	24	65	11
Catholic	23	67	10
Occupation			
Professional & Business	30	65	5
Clerical & Sales	29	62	9
Manual Workers	22	67	11
Non-Labor Force	20	65	15
City Size			
1,000,000 & over	21	65	14
500,000-999,999	24	66	10
50,000-499,999	21	70	9
2,500-49,999	25	67	8
Under 2,500 Rural	26	63	11
Labor Union Families	28	63	9
Non-Labor Union Families	22	67	11

Source: Gallup Opinion Index (1979), p. 6.

According to Otway, Maurer, and Thomas (1978), many technologists and scientists have been surprised at the growing strength of public opposition to nuclear power, especially in view of seemingly persuasive technical arguments promoting its use. The application of an attitude model to the issue of public attitudes toward nuclear power, however, found a relatively minor role of technical and environmental concerns is determining public attitude formation. Instead, the study suggests that the nuclear

TABLE IV

RESPONSE TO QUESTION REGARDING WILLINGNESS TO PAY HIGHER PRICES TO REDUCE NUCLEAR DEPENDENCY

	Willing	Not Willing	No Opinion
National	41%	50%	9%
Men	35	56	9
Women	46	44	10
College Background	43	50	7
High School	40	51	9
Grade School	39	47	14
East	43	49	8
Midwest	35	54	11
South	45	47	8
West	43	48	9

Source: Gallup Opinion Index (1979), p. 8.

TABLE V

RESPONSE TO QUESTION REGARDING WHETHER NUCLEAR PLANTS OR ENERGY SHORTAGES PRESENT THE GREATER RISK

	Nuclear Plants	Energy Shortage	No Opinion
National	31%	56%	13%
Men	27	63	10
Women	34	51	15
College Background	31	62	7
High School	30	58	12
Grade School	32	40	28
East	36	54	10
Midwest	25	60	15
South	29	57	14
West	35	54	11

Source: Gallup Opinion Index (1979), p. 8.

debate may be the focal point of concerns about many social issues, and that it is not merely concerned with costs and benefits in the usual sense. The authors contend that if there is a central issue in the nuclear energy controversy, that issue is personal and political power, and public input in the control of that power. For example, for the "pro nuclear energy" group, it was economic and technical benefits which accounted for most of their positive attitudes. For the "against nuclear energy" group it was risk factors, specifically the anxiety factor of psychological risk which was most important (i.e., using nuclear power will expose one to risks without one's consent, and once exposed to these risks, one has no control over them). Otway et al. interpret these findings as an illustration of the complex nature of public attitudes toward the use of nuclear power, suggesting that many people perceive risks and benefits "independently," rather than as together in a single level. For example, the belief that nuclear power use might produce sociopolitical risks (terrorism) without necessarily producing environmental risks (air and water pollution). The significant finding that those against nuclear energy tend to place emphasis on psychological and sociopolitical factors indicates that:

> Part of the opposition to nuclear energy stems from concerns which go beyond technologies to the social and political institutions they imply. These concerns include the centralization of scarce and vital resources (such as

> energy), their control by ever-larger and impersonal bureaucracies, and the growing dependence on specialized knowledge of technocratic elites . . . and presents an opportunity for political confrontation at the local level (Otway et al., 1978, p. 109).

There is a growing feeling that there is a gap between anonymous "expert" decisions made at the national level and the more immediate concerns of local groups of people. More people want more power over decisions that have a psychological and physical (economic, environmental) impact on them. Nuclear power may not be just another problem of technology, or environment, or energy economics. It has a psychological impact unique to our time. As Hohenemser and Kasperson (1977) assess:

> Throughout its 30-year history, nuclear power has inspired some of the major hopes and fears of mankind. While it is difficult to describe this or anecedate, to ignore the social history of nuclear power is to misunderstand its present predicament (p. 26).

The preceding sections of this chapter have presented an overview of the nuclear energy conflict in the United States. No attempt was made to cover every aspect of the issue; however, the most salient areas were treated to provide adequate background knowledge for understanding the focal problem of the dissertation.

Statement of the Problem

Recent research has recognized that social movements often confront several dilemmas in attempting to mobilize the many strategies and tactics that are necessary for

success. The strategic and tactical problems faced by the anti-nuclear movement in the United States have largely been emphasized in the research as four major elements: (1) the single-issue vs. multiple issue focus of the movement, (2) the definition of nonviolence, (3) the intent of the civil disobedience practice by the protester, and (4) the use of affinity groups and a consensus style of decision-making (Barkan, 1979). These four dilemma areas play a significant role in the public image maintenance considerations of the movement. Any social movement must effectively confront and solve the problem of public relations in order to generate and maintain a legitimate base. Decisions by movement organizations or groups concerning specific strategies and tactics must incorporate the need for a consistent, positive public image. As Wilson (1973, p. 226) states: "Many social movements are often remembered more for their tactics than for their objectives." Tactics contribute significantly to the establishment of the identity of a social movement because tactics may be all that is visible in the movement. Many social movements are not much more than tactical organizations, having little substance beyond their efforts to bring a cause to the attention of society or coerce some sphere of authority to induce change. In this paper the author will examine the issue of movement identity maintenance within the American anti-nuclear movement. Identity maintenance as an issue contains two basic areas of concern:

(1) external public relations and (2) internal membership identity. Both forms of identity maintenance are closely linked to the basic movement ideology of nonviolent direct action. Both are also closely linked to the structure of the movement organization. Nonviolent direct action as an ideology is generally more palatable to the public than is overt violence and property destruction. The anti-nuclear organizers as a group have wanted to avoid the tactical-image mistakes of early social movements, and nonviolence has been their principal method of accomplishing this. The structure of the movement has primarily evolved as a symbolic link to this nonviolent ideology. Consensus decision making and the use of affinity groups have projected a certain desired image to the public and also have served as integrating factors concerning movement membership. By maximizing individual participation, the movement's structure has produced a positive morale and minimized potential feelings of disenchantment with group decisions. The avoidance of group factionalism can also be an important property in promoting a positive public image.

The problem of external image maintenance is basically handled by and modified through the ideology and structure of the anti-nuclear movement. In terms of analysis, this represents an effective theoretical combination of the resource mobilization perspective (Oberschall, 1973; McCarthy and Zald, 1977; Jenkins and Perrow, 1977) and the traditional social-psychological approach on the

collective behavior aspects of social movements (Smelser, 1962). By theoretically combining these two perspectives, a greater understanding is generated concerning the movement dilemmas of: (1) effective use of internal resources to promote a cause, (2) the need to project a positive public image, and (3) the need to produce and maintain the psychological affinity of the membership to the movement. Identity maintenance in the anti-nuclear movement will therefore be focused within this paper on the following: nonviolent direct action, use of the mass media (rhetoric and overt action), consensus decision making, and affinity groups (structure of the movement).

The above makes use of both resource mobilization and social-psychological processes. Both external identity maintenance (psychological affinity of members to the movement) are generated and maintained by the ideology and structure of the movement. The Sunbelt Alliance Anti-Nuclear Organization, which was based in Tulsa, Oklahoma, will be used as the case study focus for the dissertation. Although the Sunbelt Alliance is no longer in existence, their organization as it did exist provides an excellent example of an anti-nuclear alliance for the purpose of this qualitative analysis. This group, with its successes and failures, existed recently enough to be used as a viable data base for generalizations concerning the movement against nuclear energy.

Methodology and Theoretical Framework

The research methodology employed in this study is a combination of semistructured interviews, observation, and document study. The semistructured interview, often referred to as the focused interview (Phillips, 1976), makes use of topic areas and general hypothesis selected in advance of the interview. The questions used in the interview, however, are not worded in advance. The interview subjects have been involved in a particular situation or process, and the researcher has provisionally analyzed this process in advance. This type of analysis allows the researcher to construct a tentative hypothesis from which an interview guide can be developed. The actual interview is focused on the subjective experiences and ideas of the subject within the framework of the questions asked (Merton, Fiske, and Kendall, 1956). This type of interview procedure allows for maximum flexibility in terms of the questions asked. The researcher can probe for more specific answers and subjective meanings from the respondent.

The second type of methodology used here is nonparticipant overt observation. With this method, the researcher does not participate in group activities, and the group participants are all aware of the nature of the research. Because much information can be gained from organized group meetings, it is believed that observation of the group members in a natural setting such as meetings, will be beneficial in data collection.

The third methodology used here is document study, in which information will be taken from various written materials concerning the ideology and strategy of the organization. Many nonpersonal materials are written continuously by organizations such as official statements of purposes and goals, memos from leaders to members, and strategy statements. These materials will be a major source of data collection. Document study has the significant advantage of neutralizing possible reactivity of the subjects that can develop from overt observation and interviewing. Validity is increased by the fact that documents and written materials are usually forms of communication that are produced for specific organizational purposes, and are not affected by researcher input.

The theoretical framework around which the data gathering and its substitutive interpretation is based, rests on the assumption that human behavior is created out of a balance of both social sources and individual creative components. The element of impression management reflects this assumption and is central to the theoretical focus of this research. Interaction and role-taking, central to the theory of symbolic interaction, allows the process of impression management to develop and continue. The collective production of specific appearance and images by groups within the anti-nuclear movement are formed by the creation of certain symbolic patterns of behavior and language systems. This cooperative action comes about through a common

definition of situations and a shared consensus of meanings. Both leaders and members in the movement identify the need to project a particular image when interacting with forces and groups outside the movement. This defined need has become a significant factor within the tactical framework of the movement and is reflected in the movement's ideological statements. Rhetoric as a strategy for forming public opinion, planned use of the mass media, and passive civil disobedience as a confrontation tactic, all reflect a movement concern for dramaturgical construction of appearance and image.

The social-psychology of the movement is also manifested in the vocabulary of motives of participation expressed by individual members. This area of focus represents a shift of emphasis from the collective identity maintenance of the group as social definition to personal identity-maintenance of members as definition of self. This personal identity is openly reflected in individual statements of rationale for joining the anit-nuclear movement, and by careful examination of individual member's values, lifestyles, and personal histories of social movement participation. This area of analysis is concerned primarily with the kind of self-identity that the movement gives to some of its members, and the appear of the movement related to susceptibility of individual members.

Possible Contributions

The dynamics of social conflict and social change are embedded within the collective behavior of social movements. These movements represent groups of people acting in what they believe are their best interests to change power relations in a given society. Social movements provide one of the few opportunities in a mass society for generic social imput into the bureaucratic power base. Bureaucracies will continue to attempt executed dominance over the lives of individuals, with the internal needs of bureaucratic structures, such as growth and expanded use of resources, often conflicting with the very people they are to serve. The anti-nuclear movement symbolizes a dialetic of increasing bureaucratic control. In just the last few years sociologists have recognized the fact that public acceptance of nuclear energy is problematic and many have sensed the research challenge in the opportunity to analyze the dynamics of the anti-nuclear movement and to study the characteristics of the nuclear contriversy as a social process. The sociological face of the nuclear energy issue is pointed to by Duncan (1978):

> There is a steady evolution in which problems are initially defined as scientific and technical, later as economic, and still later (as we are now beginning to see) as intrinsically social and political (p. 19).

Whatever the anti-nuclear movement's future, it will allow sociologists to test several hypotheses of both the

traditional and emergent perspectives on social power, collective behavior, and social movements. It is hoped that this thesis will add to the motivation for such study. More significantly, in concentrating on the social-psychology of this particular movement, using a specific group as a case study, the author hopes to contribute to the perspective of the sociology of public relations and identity-maintenance. A great amount of research and theory construction has been formulated on the macro-sociological concept of the structural causes of social movements. For example, Smelser (1962) sees any form of collective behavior as a rational, utilitarian response to some form of structural strain. Ash (1972), in a similar view, uses the Marxist concepts of power and class cleavage as causal agents. For Ash, the connection of ideology and attitudes to system produced inequality and power differences is not far removed from Smelser's notion of structural strain. Both authors emphasize conditions in the social structure as focal points for the study of social movements. Without denying the value of this approach, the author has chosen to concentrate on the internal organizational elements of the movement; how the members see themselves, what tactics must be used to foster and maintain a favorable (at best, tolerable) public image. This shift of emphasis toward the social psychology of the movement can be viewed as an extension of the theories of Oberschall (1973) and Toch (1965). Oberschall contends

that true understanding of social movements can only be reached with an analysis of collective protests within a sustained organizational base containing a continuity of leadership. The members of the movement, as well as the success of the movement, are both affected by collective goals and organizational strategy forces. He believes that group structures can best be analyzed by looking at how various resources are allocated and managed in their relation to group goals.

For Toch (1965), a person's susceptibility to join a social movement can be linked to his individual search for meaning, and a desire to be involved in a form of change that will produce that meaning. Therefore, a psychological bond exists between a movement's ability to sell itself and the individual's willingness to buy. This, according to Toch (p. 17), is the "crux of the social psychology of social movements."

The most significant appeals of a social movement are contained in its ideology, which defines the movement and its goals. Because this ideology is by definition counter to general social opinion, tactical decisions must be made concerning public relations procedures. The anti-nuclear movement has at this point opted for a passive resistance policy hoping to cultivate increased public sympathy for their cause. It is the author's hope that this thesis will contribute to the increased sociological understanding of the problems and realities of protest group mobilization and image maintenance.

CHAPTER II

REVIEW OF SELECTED LITERATURE

Environmentalism

There exists in the scholarly and professional literature an extensive amount of publications concerning environmentalism as a public issue. The word "environmentalism" now refers to a widespread social movement dedicated to the ecological protection of the environment. In the last 10 years this movement has succeeded in producing increased public concern with resource consumption and polluting activity and has prompted passage of environmental legislation and the establishment of agencies at various levels of government (Albrecht, 1976). The literature focus is an eclectic representation of environmental issues examined by a variety of sociological interests, theories, and methods. The central concern of the author's research, specifically the anti-nuclear movement, is not abundantly represented in the literature. As Duncan (1978) states:

> Several sociologists in the late 1940's and 1950's forecast that atomic energy would produce economic abundance. . . . But no sociologist foresaw how technical and social processes of nuclear power development would compromise its public acceptance and give rise to an antinuclear movement, currently led by the environmentalists (p. 1).

Presently, the relationships between nuclear energy and society have not been examined by social scientists nearly as much as the opportunity has allowed. Often times the anti-nuclear movement is analyzed within the general environmental movement framework, or is researched as a general public issue using mass opinion collecting techniques. The social-psychological dynamics of the movement have been given comparatively limited treatment in scholarly studies. Because of its relationship to the anti-nuclear movement, the author will present a brief overview of the significant research concerning the general environmental movement. This will be followed by a review of the definitive literature and research of the anti-nuclear movement in the United States.

Social scientists have focused on the origins of the environmentalist movement, with some choosing to emphasize the movement's relationship to the earlier "Preservationist Movement" (Harry, 1974), and others like Schnaiberg (1973) choosing to stress the process of political mobilization evolving from the Civil Rights and anti-war national movements. A general analysis of topic areas includes studies dealing with the significance of the public's increased recreational contact with nature, growing affluence allowing more Americans to concern themselves with aesthetic matters, and publications projecting future ecological problems (Albrecht and Mauss, 1975; Gale, 1972; Harry, 1974; Schnaiberg, 1973). Some early

attempts to measure public attitudes toward specific environmental problems such as air pollution (DeGroot, 1967), were followed by studies of attitudes toward environmental problems in general (Murch, 1971). Most of these studies simply document levels of public environmental concern (Albrecht and Mauss, 1975), but studies of the correlates of environmental attitudes have increased significantly.

An array of empirical studies have examined the membership of the environmental organizations, reflecting socioeconomic status and other traditional demographic variables (Mitchell and Davis, 1978; Sills, 1975). Attention has also been centered on the individual reasons for affiliation and participation (Faich and Gale, 1971), level of organizational commitment (Bartell and St. George, 1974), and attitudes toward environmental problems and solutions (Stallings, 1973).

Much of the previous research concerning the sources of environmental commitment has focused on the variables of education, age, income and occupational status, political ideology, and residence as predictors of individual and group concern with environmental quality. High education, youth, liberalism, urbanism, and affluence have been associated with environmental orientation (Van Liere and Dunlap, 1979). The correlations, however, are generally modest, from 0.1 to 0.4, and multivariate analyses examining the relative and cumulative effects of these variables are rare (Dunlap and Catton, 1979). Consequently,

understanding of the sociological reasons for environmental concern tends to be inconsistent and often contradictory. For example, Malkis and Grasmick (1977) found that the socioeconomic factors of education, income, and occupational status are not as crucial as age in accounting for variation in support of environmentalist ideology. Age also remained constant as the significant predictor across the two hypotheses of "occupation-centered-alienation from technology" (p. 25).

Value-conflict between environmentalism and pro-growth groups has also been the subject of some sociological interest. For example, Morrison (1973) suggests that the orientation of the environmental movement has changed from one of consensus to one of conflict, with the conflict becoming more formal, thus requiring more legal and political sophistication. He polarizes this conflict around: (1) the environmentalists, both voluntary and institutionalized, characterized as mainly white individuals with high educational, economic, and prestige levels not directly associated with organizations threatened by environmental reforms, and (2) the "growthists," generally the rest of society, the most vocal being industrialists, land developers and poor and middle-class consumers who will have to bear the cost of environmental reform. Along these same lines, the conflict theme is reflected with Albrecht (1972), who contends that members of environmentalist groups tend to: (1) challenge the growth ethic, (2) view only the

aesthetic aspect of the wilderness, and (3) develop plans for social movements that are comprehensive. Counter-groups, however, support the (1) growth of free enterprise, (2) utilitarian uses of the wilderness, and (3) issue specific plans for social action. The concept of Smelser's (1962) generalized belief in collective behavior processes is used to analyze conflict within the environmental movement (Stallings, 1973). The data shows a significant degree of heterogeneity among movement members concerning environmental problems and proposed solutions. Stallings suggests that because of the value conflict within the movement, some collective action by environmental organizations results from the emergent internal processes and structures rather than value consensus among movement participants.

Review of Anti-Nuclear Movement Literature

The majority of attention in the literature is given over to the origin of the anti-nuclear movement and the various episodes of confrontation. Different observers find various origins for the anti-nuclear movement. The intervention of the United Auto Workers (UAW) in the 1956 decision to build a breeder reactor near Monroe, Michigan, is cited by Strauss (1962) as the earliest indication that the development of atomic energy would be fought. As recently as 1974, however, Ebbin and Kasper (1974) could

find little or no evidence of a widebased communication network between various people in different areas of the country. Mazur and Leahy (1976) have described the close association of nuclear opposition to the general environmental movement of the late 1960's, noting that Ralph Nader emerged as the most prominent national movement spokesman in the early 1970's. These authors also contend that the anti-nuclear movement is closely tied to other national issues such as the oil shortage and therefore will always be subjected to oscillation of public interest. Other writers such as Weinburg (1970), Grossman (1976) and Hohenemser, Kasperson, and Kates (1977) take issue with Mazur and Leahy, proclaiming persistent increases in the nuclear opposition movement resulting in publicwide acceptance of the movement's goals. Authors such as Doff (1970) and Nemzek (1975), among others, however, see the struggle for movement credibility among the public as an ongoing battle whose outcome cannot be predicted. Related to the issue of credibility, Thompson and MacTavish (1976) contend that the public's general distrust of the Atomic Energy Commission and energy decision-makers has allowed increased toleration for the movement.

Dozens of protests have taken place throughout the United States in opposition to the construction and operation of nuclear power plants (Hill, 1977; Hines, 1977; Mohr, 1978). These demonstrations have been analyzed by some social scientists as an extension of the political

activism of the 1960's and early 1970's (Alpern, 1978). Many observers are reminded of the early days of the Vietnam peace movement (Scheiner, 1977), and others believe that the movement reflects enough opposition to nuclear power to support protests on the scale of the civil rights and antiwar demonstrations (Carter, 1979), although very little research and analysis has been done concerning the sociological aspects of the movement (Duncan, 1978). One notable exception to this absence is Barkan (1979), who looks at the tactical and organizational problems of the movement using a resource mobilization theoretical framework, which has formed the basis for earlier research on social movements such as Oberschall (1973) and Jenkins and Perrow (1977). Also significant in this area is the work of McCarthy and Zald (1977), emphasizing the variety and sources of movement resources, the relation of movements to the media, and the interaction among movement organizations. This approach tends to de-emphasize the social psychology of movement involvement allowing for increased focus on structural theories of social processes. Barkan stresses the value conflict within the anti-nuclear movement over such tactical matters as the definition of nonviolence and the use of affinity groups as a type of collective decision making. Barkan concludes that, because of tactical conflicts within the movement, the use of forums outside the movement for influencing public opinion have met with both success

and failure. A somewhat different appraisal is found with Carter (1979), who views the anti-nuclear movement as initially developing locally and regionally, as first one then another nuclear power plant project sparked controversy. This localism, however, has now spread as opposition to nuclear energy is becoming less fragmented. Individuals and groups in different geographical areas are forming an effective communications network, that according to Carter, is increasing the political power of the movement. There exists additional points of view concerning the negation of internal movement conflict. For example, Gyorgy (1979) maintains that movement process of consensus decision making among members has maximized morale and minimized feelings of disenchantment with group decisions. It has also been argued that the consensus process has functioned to maintain organizational equilibrium by reducing hostility and possible factionalism (Wasserman, 1977a,b). The internal conflict theme of Barkan is further expanded, however, in the literature focusing on the issues of individuality vs. collectivity; confrontation vs. building a base; single issue vs. multi-issue approach (Jezer, 1977). Others such as Harrington (1979) have also analyzed the need for widening the anti-nuclear movement to include the demands for radical change of the American corporate structure.

A few sociologists have given attention to internal weaknesses of social movements like the anti-nuclear

movement, in terms of neglect of "grassroots" organization as a factor in speeding the decline of the movement. For example, Obserschall (1973) suggests that the partial success of some movements has shifted activists to the environmental movement; however, any movement that is loosely structured and organized, and relies more on television and media personalities than local organization, will fail to remain viable. An opposing perspective is presented by Marx and Burkart (1977), who contend that successful modern social movements emerge by processes of symbolic interpretation of socially constructed grievances that can be "marketed" through the mass media, and this identity formation through the media transcends the ideology of the primary group within the organization. This "marketing" aspect can be seen in the anti-nuclear movement with its extreme concern for the tactic of non-violence, which has served to gain favorable attention from the national and local media (Irwin and Faison, 1978).

The question of the citizen's role in making decisions in a highly technological society has been included in some of the anti-nuclear movement literature. There are those who believe that decisions about technology and its use should be made by technical experts, those most likely to understand the complexities and details of the technology. For example Ray (1973) states that social decisions are valid on any citizen level, but scientific decisions like those involving nuclear energy must be based on the

opinion of experts. There are others, however, who argue that questions of the use of technology are social questions, not merely technical, and therefore should be kept out of sole hands of experts (Ray, 1973).

The factors of social class and other sociological-demographic variables as determining agents of support for the anti-nuclear movement have usually been seen in the literature as part of the general environmental movement. For example, Buttel and Flinn (1976, 1978) examine the traditional variables of social class and political ideology using standard methodological techniques. Also, Kronus (1977) discusses behavior mobilization of selected voluntary associations to determine their degree of success in being recruited into the environmental quality movement. More specially oriented toward the anti-nuclear movement is the work of Mazur and Leahy (1978), based on interviews with movement leaders and analyses of movement publications. Leaders of the anti-nuclear movement tend to be older, middle-class or higher, liberal, well-educated, and have a history of political activism. Members are generally recruited into the movement through prior occupational or avocational interests and organizations, and through the personal influence of friends and acquaintances. Opposition to nuclear energy coming from the movement is usually expressed in ideological forms, and the social process of recruitment acts to preserve this ideological orientation.

A number of publications concerning the issue of nuclear energy and the character of the movement against it have been produced by individuals and groups outside of the social sciences. The best example of this type of literature is Gyorgy (1979), a well-documented analysis and presentation of nuclear energy from a problems perspective. Her book, No Nukes: Everyone's Guide to Nuclear Energy, is an example of the literary extension of the anti-nuclear movement. Numerous other publications deal with the problems of nuclear power, citizen action, and viable alternatives (Berger, 1976; Hayes, 1976; Nader and Abbotts, 1977; Gofman and Tamplin, 1971; Morgan, 1977; Lovins, 1977).

CHAPTER III

THE GENERAL PROBLEM, NATIONAL ANTI-NUCLEAR MOVEMENT: EVOLUTION OF CONCERN

Inseparable from the growth of the national nuclear energy program has been the movement to stop it. The movement against nuclear power as an energy source has taken many forms and adopted numerous tactics, all with various degrees of success or failure. Citizen intervention in nuclear power issues can be explained, in part, as a natural culmination of a more generalized national concern with environmental degradation. Nuclear power plants require sites near bodies of water since large supplies of water are necessary for physical operation of the plants. The plants are then often in competition for a limited environmental resource with other uses or values, either recreational or esthetic. But the opposition of nuclear power is also based upon fear among the population of nuclear accidents, of radiation exposure, and fear of long-range unknowns; in other words, fear of commitment to a technology imperfectly understood. This fear of technological error has a clear historical foundation. Many adult Americans were first made aware of nuclear power as

a wartime force for destruction through the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and subsequent threats of nuclear war in our more recent history. The image of the "mushroom shaped cloud" remains clear and frightening in the minds of many people. Also, the development of nuclear power has been marked by several nuclear "incidents," many fairly recently, which have served to promote strident opposition and expressions of concern. As some public opinion polls reveal, many people associate "nuclear" with violence and anxiety (and with words such as fear, danger, destruction, radiation, death, and burns). A 1972 national survey pointed out that 60% of adults associated the word "nuclear" with violence/anxiety, 83% of adults and 90% of youth associated the word "atomic" with violence/anxiety. The same study also indicated that:

> . . . opposition is based primarily on concern about the safety of a nuclear power plant, only secondarily on environmental considerations. Concern about safety is expressed in general terms, or regarding possible release of radioactive substances, less often in regard to possible explosion. (However, as brought out in further questioning, concern about possible explosion is about equal to concern about radioactive substances) (Electric Companies' Public Information Program, 1972, pp. 15-17).

Looked at in this context, it is not surprising that a technology recognized in the public mind as having evolved from war use, has not won full acceptance in society for its peaceful uses. Active intervenors, in particular, are substantially concerned enough about the

dangers of nuclear power technology to donate a great deal of personal time and resources to local and translocal efforts to stop it (Ebbin and Kasper, 1974).

Different observers find various origins for the anti-nuclear movement in the United States. During the last five years dozens of protests have taken place nationally and internationally in opposition to the construction and operation of nuclear power plants. According to Alpern (1978) and Scheiner (1977), the American anti-nuclear demonstrations symbolize a new era of political activism with processes and characteristics similar to the antiwar movement of the 1960's. To conclude from this, however, that the movement is recent is to be misinformed. Perhaps the earliest indication that the development of atomic power would be a source of international conflict was the intervention of the United Auto Workers (UAW) in the 1956 decision to build the breeder reactor near Monroe, Michigan. According to Strauss (1962), the case was under litigation until the Supreme Court, in 1961, ruled against the UAW, and the construction of the Fermi-fast breeder reactor was ultimately granted. The Supreme Court, with dissenting Justices Black and Douglas, held that the Atomic Power Commission (APC) had proceeded properly in issuing the construction permit, while delaying the findings that operation of the plant would allow for acceptable protection of public health and safety. The safety issues were not resolved before a construction permit was

issued. The dissenting justices, for example, expressed their concern that public safety considerations after plant construction has begun are not likely to compromise the invested momentum of the project. The initial intervention by the labor union was viewed at the time as an isolated incident. From a historical perspective, however, this early conflict was the beginning of what was to become a continual evolution of concern of plant sitings, nuclear safety issues, and the impact of nuclear plants on the environment.

The number and intensity of active public interventions was also fed by the internal debate in the AEC (Gillette, 1972) which did not anticipate the localized interventions of nuclear licensing processes as having any implication on the national scene. Nelkin (1971) lists eight nuclear power plant controversies that developed between 1958 and 1971, in which the issues tended to be defined in terms of local interests such as the thermal pollution of bodies of water. Although there is no evidence that such controversies were the actions of a cohesive anti-nuclear movement containing a sophisticated informational network between or among various citizen group intervenors in different parts of the country (Ebbin and Kasper, 1974), these conflicts did form the ideational base for close association of nuclear opposition with the environmental movement of the late 1960's, which itensified with the so-called energy crises (Mazur

and Leahy, 1978). Mazur and Leahy observe that anti-nuclear leaders used the oil shortage to argue for conservation and more acceptable sources such as solar energy as opposed to nuclear.

Weinberg (1970) noted that public opposition to nuclear energy was first expressed by Lilenthal (1975) by posing serious questions about the structure and operation of the nuclear establishment. One of his main arguments was against the irresponsibility of building large-scale nuclear reactors without first solving the problem of radioactive waste disposal. Lilenthal maintained, according to Weinberg (p. 46) that "The future of atomic energy as a major reliance for civilian electricity is in grave doubt, and that the risks may limit or even eliminate a nationwide atomic energy program." Lehoc (1974) writes that, as early as 1959, a citizens' group named the "Massachusetts Lower Cape Committee on Radioactive Waste Disposal" pressured the AEC to discontinue dumping radioactive wastes in the Atlantic near Cape Code 12 miles from Boston, and the following year prevented the building of a nuclear waste reprocessing center on Cape Cod. In 1962, citizens won a victory against consolidated Edison of New York, preventing the building of a nuclear reactor at Ravenswood, Queens, in the middle of one of the most densely populated cities in the world (Curtis and Hogan, 1969). Two years later in 1964, residents near Bodega Head, California prevented Pacific Gas

and Electric from excavating for a reactor site which lay directly above a geological fault (Caldwell, Hayes, and MacWhirter, 1976). Early opposition was also expressed in the form of a referendum in Eugene, Oregon in 1967 to prevent a nuclear plant project on Oregon's coast, and a successful fight against "Project Ketch" in rural Pennsylvania, which was to use a 24 kiloton bomb to create a deep storage cavern for natural gas (Lewis, 1972). Barkan summarizes the early opposition by suggesting that in the 1960's and early 1970's, opposition to atomic plants centered mostly in established environmental organizations and local citizen groups who used the traditional channels of regulatory agencies and the courts. These attempts at legal intervention failed to significantly reduce the licensing and construction of nuclear power plants, even though the examples referred to above did have some impact. Barkan also maintains that the interventionist strategy tended to be confined to hearing rooms and court rooms largely removed from public attention and thereby limiting the possible contagion of movement support.

By the early 1970's, there were numerous local energy groups in the United States, and legal intervention in the AEC's regulatory proceedings became more widespread as a movement tactic. Intervention organizers were able to force numerous new safety requirements upon the nuclear industry and collected important information on the nuclear issue to disseminate to the media. These activities bought

needed time to allow the general public to consider the implications of nuclear construction. Lengthy interventions against the Calvert Cliffs (Maryland), Vermont Yankee, Indian Point (New York), and Midland (Michigan) reactors led to a series of legal challenges and precedents that laid the basis for future debate.

As mentioned earlier, however, the interventions had their costs. They were expensive, complex, and technical, and basically incomprehensible to the average citizen. Because the events usually took place in Washington, D.C., they were far removed from the public eye, and therefore had greater difficulty in raising needed funds for legal fees. Members of the intervention groups tended also to be mainly middle-class, highly educated professional people, which further served to separate the thrust of the movement from the public mainstream (Gyorgy, 1979).

Beginning in the early 1970's, opponents of nuclear power had become impatient with the legal intervention process. As the struggle escalated, more citizens from around the country began to coordinate their efforts, and a national movement began to grow, helped along by a small but dedicated group of citizen activitists. The point of controversy seemed to begin in earnest in 1969-1970 when several anti-nuclear articles and books raised serious questions about the effects of nuclear power plants. They illustrated the growing concern among some scientists and members of the public about the implications of the national

commitment to nuclear power and about the growing number of nuclear plants that were being built around the country. During this same period, the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 was being debated in congress and environmental concerns were becoming more politically feasible. This led to a confluence of issues, the boundaries of which included quality control in construction, environmental impacts, radiation exposure and its cumulative effects, and the possibility of nuclear plant accidents. These were intertwined with a rapidly growing public demand for electrical energy (Ebbin and Kasper, 1974). The National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 became law on January 1, 1970. The stated purpose of the Act was:

> . . . to declare a national policy which will encourage productive and enjoyable harmony between man and his environment; to promte efforts which will prevent or eliminate damage to the environment and biosphere and stimulate the health and welfare of man; to enrich the understanding of the ecological systems and natural resources important to the nation; and to establish a Council on Environmental Quality (Ebbin and Kasper, 1974, p. 27).

In addition to the new law, pressure brought by intervention groups acted to force the AEC to open to the public their previously closed meetings. Groups such as the Union of Concerned Scientists (Cambridge, Massachusetts), Businessmen for the Public Interest (Chicago, Illinois), and Ralph Nader all had an impact on the AEC change of attitude toward public intervenor groups. According to Ebbin and Kasper (1974), while it would be incorrect to

characterize the active intervenor groups as representative of the general public will, it would be equally incorrect to dismiss their contentions as self-serving or as anti-technology in general. They were, for the most part, "intelligent and upstanding members of their communities who are concerned or, perhaps, afraid of nuclear power" (Ebbin and Kasper, 1974, p. 9).

The interpretation of the motivation of citizen group intervenors might best be understood as related primarily to feelings of powerlessness before the decision making processes of the federal government. As Ebbin and Kasper (1974) conclude:

> Though intervention is expensive and laborious, frustration with the inability to stem an apparent tide of technological determination, fear of nuclear technology, and anger with the trade-off of diminishing natural resources for economic growth compels these citizens to make their voices heard. The physical ecology is a major issue, but the human ecology, the intangibles of quality of life, the realization that having more may mean enjoying less, and headlines about technology-related problems, as well as daily articles in the press about corruption in high places, also contribute to their concern. Perhaps, only perhaps, the basic issue amounts to considerably more than merely interventions in local nuclear power reactor siting cases. Perhaps it is really a crisis of governance (p. 32).

By the early 1970's, nuclear reactor orders had reached the level of over 30 annually, nationwide. In the midst of this rapid expansion, consumer advocate Ralph Nader became involved in the forefront of the anti-nuclear movement. Nader's "Public Interest Research Groups" convened the first

national anti-nuclear conference called "Critical Mass," held in Washington, D.C. in 1974. Public education campaigns, state-level lobbying, and subsequent national conferences, all became a significant thrust of Nader's student-based organization against nuclear energy.

The nuclear issue served to split apart the nation's oldest and most influential environmental group, the Sierra Club. David Brower had resigned as president of the Sierra Club because it had refused to take a specific stand against atomic energy. Later he formed the Friends of the Earth organization which has taken a strong anti-nuclear position and has helped develop a worldwide network of ecology activists.

Another group with considerable influence was the National Intervenors, a coalition formed in the early 1970's to act as a disseminator for legislative information concerning the nuclear energy issue. According to the National Intervenor's newsletter of September, 1974, more than 130 separate groups comprised the organization. By 1974, the legal intervention process was clearly being rejected by more and more activists. The tolerance for the autonomy of the AEC in nuclear energy matters was wearing thin. Many anti-nuclear activists were now ready to take their case directly to the public rather than relying on government and industry "experts" in judicial proceedings. The use of the citizen initiative (anti-nuclear referenda), a legislative process legal in 17 states, became a new tactic

of confrontation. According to Barkan (1979), these referenda had mixed results. For example, a 1974 anti-nuclear ballot issue in western Massachusetts won 48% of the vote; referenda in many other states in 1976 lost by two to one margins. Some of the most significant attempts at citizen initiatives during this time are as follows: in 1972, citizens of southern California placed a clean environment act initiative on the state ballot. The bill which included a five year moratorium on atomic construction was defeated by a two to one majority. This defeat was thought by some supporters to be the partial result of the word "moratorium," which may have had "negative connotations" in the public mind because of the Vietnam War. Other reasons for the defeat were probably due to the lack of time for the public education about the bill, plus the large amounts of money used by the nuclear industry to promote its defeat (Gyorgy, 1979).

As mentioned above, in 1974, nuclear opponents in Western Massachusetts fared considerably better. Voters in three Connecticut Valley counties projected a 48% support of a referendum against the building of twin reactors at Montague. In addition, nearly 33% of the voters registered their willingness to dismantle operating reactors at Rowe, Massachusetts, and Vernon, Vermont. Because this was the first ever initiative in the United States on reactors already in operation, even the supporters of the

referendum had predicted only a 10% showing at best at such an early stage of opposition (Gyorgy, 1979).

In the spring of 1976, another nuclear initiative went onto the ballot in California, calling for a series of health and environmental restrictions on reactor specifications. This proposal was defeated by the public by two to one. The following fall, similar resolutions were on ballots in Arizona, Oregon, Washington, Montana, Colorado, and Ohio. All six initiatives were defeated, losing in Oregon by 56% to 42%, in Montana by 60% to 40%, and by two to one margins in the remaining four states. A major factor in the outcome of these six initiatives was the large amount of money poured into the campaigns by the nuclear industry. New Age (1976) made the following comment:

> The industry poured in from ten to one hundred times as much money as the proponents had to spend. In all cases they portrayed the proposed reforms as being a blanket ban on nuclear construction, and went to great expense to convince the electorate that the bills would cost them jobs and money (p. 8).

Nuclear opponents were also forced to realize that other reasons for defeat existed beyond being outspent. For example, an article in Mother Jones (1977) by Gofman, pointed to the wording of the initiatives and to economic factors as causes of rejection. Gofman criticized the propositions for being unclear and contradictory, focusing on health and safety reforms which were often difficult to understand. He suggested that many times people voted against the

initiative falsely, thinking they were voting against nuclear power, and that a clear "yes" or "no" choice on atomic energy would have been better wording on the nuclear questions. At the same time, he said, the nuclear industry was successful in convincing the majority of the public that stopping nuclear power would cost jobs, blackouts, and increased electric bills. Gofman went on to state:

> With a combination of facts, half-truths and outright lies, industry effectively hammered out a case aimed at the average voter's economic self-interest (p. 15).

Some of Gofman's criticisms were proven correct by the Construction Work in Progress (CWIP) vote in Missouri. Missouri voters, unlike the anti-nuclear initiatives in other states, were opposing nuclear construction by a two to one margin. The Missouri Initiative opposed the CWIP, a billing procedure by which utilities charge consumers for nuclear construction projects while they are being built. The voters banned the CWIP from Missouri, with the resulting cancellation of at least one reactor. This economic issue of cost was clearly argued and promoted by the nuclear opponents and managed to catch on elsewhere. In New Hampshire, for example, CWIP rates were used to build the Seabrook plant and became a conflicting political issue in the 1978 gubernatorial race (Gyorgy, 1979).

The referenda process had some measurable results, but overall had been slow and expensive, and had no effect on reactors already near completion. Nuclear opponents

realized that new tactics of confrontation must be tried, and the politics of direct action developed as the next stage of the movement.

The first significant protest action against atomic power plants was the 1974 toppling on Washington's birthday of a nuclear plant weather observation tower by Samuel Lovejoy, a Massachusetts farmer. Lovejoy said he wanted "to twist some heads around here. I wanted people to think, 'that guy's willing to go to jail--these nuclear plants must be heavier than I thought'" (Kifner, 1974, p. 33). His arrest and subsequent trial received considerable coverage in the local and national press and helped make nuclear power a major topic of debate in western Massachusetts (Wasserman, 1977a). Lovejoy presented the following statement in which he took full responsibility for his action:

> In the long-established tradition of challenging the constitutionality of particular events, I readily admit full responsibility for sabotaging that outrageous symbol of the future nuclear power plant. . . . Positive action is the only option left open to us. . . . It is my firm conviction that if a jury of 12 impartial scientists was empanelled, and following normal legal procedure they were given all pertinent data and arguments: then this jury would never give a unanimous vote for deployment of nuclear reactors amongst the civilian population. Rather, I believe they would call for the complete shutdown of all the commercially operated nuclear plants. . . . Through positive action and a sense of moral outrage, I seek to test my convictions (Gyorgy, 1979, p. 402).

Lovejoy went on trial in September, 1974, on charges of

malicious destruction of private property and was acquitted because of a faulty indictment. Protests in other parts of the country were slow in coming, however, as during the next year opposition to nuclear plants remained restructed to referenda and intervention attempts as discussed above.

In February of 1975, some 30,000 farmers, students, and environmentalists marched onto the site of a proposed nuclear plant in Whyl, West Germany, and stayed there in varying numbers for nine months, forcing the cancellation of the construction (Hines, 1977). This action inspired nuclear opponents throughout the world. It appeared to many that by force of numbers, nonviolent direct action might succeed against nuclear power where intervention and referenda had failed.

The first American occupation occurred in August, 1976, at the Seabrook plant site on the New Hampshire seacoast. During the previous eight years, Seabrook residents had opposed the plant before regulatory agencies and in a town meeting vote. Spurred by the failure of these methods and the success at Whyl, the Clamshell Alliance was formed. On August 1, 600 people protested at the Seabrook plant site, with 18 arrested for unlawful trespassing. In May, 1977, more than 1,400 people from the New England region and other states were arrested for occupying the Seabrook construction site. Their act of civil protest received significant nationwide media coverage and served to

transform Seabrook into a national symbol of opposition to nuclear power plants (Wasserman, 1977a; Kifner, 1974).

The Clamshell Alliance spawned the formation of other anti-nuclear groups in various other states. Occupations were also being planned at Diablo Canyon, California; and at Trojan in Oregon, where America's largest reactor was already in operation. The forming of groups such as the Abalone Alliance in California and the Crabshell Alliance in Washington state, led to the reality of half of the nation's 65 atomic power plants becoming targets of organized opposition by June of 1978 (Kuhn, 1978). A number of demonstrations have taken place at numerous plant sites, including more than a dozen occupations in such states as California, Oregon, Colorado, Pennsylvania, and South Carolina. Arrests at these sites have ranged from 14 to 500 (Soloman, 1977; Baechler, 1978; Hurst, 1978; Scheiner, 1978; Wallace, 1978). Using the Clamshell Alliance and its Seabrook occupations as a model, these other organizations have employed nonviolent civil disobedience as the primary tactic of protest and adopted a consensus style of decision making involving the use of affinity groups. Later chapters of this paper will provide a discussion of these methods in detail.

June 25, 1978 saw the largest anti-nuclear plant rally yet in the United States. More than 18,000 people engaged in a rally sponsored by the Clamshell Alliance in which information booths and exhibits on nuclear power, conservation,

and alternative energy sources were used to educate the public towards opposition of nuclear energy. The action at the site was followed by the occupation of the nuclear regulatory commission on June 28, 1978. After a three day action in which 50 of 250 protesters were arrested, the Commission decided to suspend construction at the site.

Previously, on April 29, 1978, 5,000 people organized by the Rocky Flats action group, the American Friends Service Committee, Mobilization for Survival and others gathered at the Rocky Flats construction site 16 miles northwest of Denver, Colorado, to focus on occupational dangers, pollution, and the potentially dangerous transporting of plutonium. As a partial result of the growing "negativism" of the nuclear resistance movement, the demonstrators at Rocky Flats attempted to focus on "positive" alternatives. For example, workshops at a nearby Denver college emphasized possible alternatives to nuclear energy that would also promote job security. Perhaps the most dramatic of the Rocky Flats demonstration occurred when 12 members of the American Friends Service Committee and Southerners Mobilizing for Survival drove a flat bed truck to Denver loaded with empty barrels labeled "plutonium." The truck followed the exact route for the federal government's proposed delivery of plutonium from the Savannah River nuclear plant in South Carolina to the Rocky Flats site. The group held press conferences in Atlanta, Nashville, Memphis, Wichita, and other cities to inform the

public that 18 states would be involved as part of the transportation route (Szita, 1978).

On Monday, October 29, 1979, the 50th anniversary of the Great Stock Market crash, the Manhattan Project Committee promoted a mass demonstration in front of the New York Stock Exchange on Wall Street for the purpose of raising public consciousness concerning America's corporate power structive and its relationship to nuclear energy. Representatives of the Manhattan Project stated the following in a pamphlet entitled, "Take it to Wall Street":

> The Wall Street action, part of the Manhattan Project, is a direct action campaign aimed at raising public consciousness about the way corporations and the financial community control people's lives. The campaign's goals are to show the countless abuses forced upon the American people--disproportionately and minority people--by the same institutions and the same system that pushes nuclear poses and weapons: To focus on nukes as just one symptom of an economic and energy system based upon corporate profit and the expense of human need; and to open discussion on the alternative directions for our society that we might choose to take. The organization saw a possible alternative direction in some of the following: '(1) Stop financing the nuclear industry; shut down all nukes; zero nuclear weapons, (2) full employment, health care and housing through a peace-time economy, (3) public ownership and democratic control of energy industries; safe renewable energy; affordable heat and transportation; no winter shut-offs, and (4) stop nuclear exports and exploitation of native Americans, Black South Africans and other people (Manhattan Project, 1979, p. 2).

The Manhattan Project Committee aimed at promoting their understanding of the need for stopping nuclear energy investments and increasing the funding of human needs. It

is their belief that a challenge to nuclear power requires an assault upon the basic corporate priorities that form the basis of the entire American economy. Because the nuclear industry is funded by large multi-national corporations, the prevention of nuclear power must start with the prevention of uncontrolled corporate power. The contemporary protest movement against nuclear power has confronted the single-issue vs. multiple-issue dilemma, but the majority of nuclear opponents have opted for the single issue focus of limiting nuclear plant construction. The Manhattan Project Committee was the first American organization to actively campaign for a multi-issue approach for the movement. Their intent is echoed by Harrington (1979), who emphasizes that the anti-nuclear movement must adopt a more widebased approach than the one it traditionally has promoted. The basic proposition, says Harrington (p. 280), is not simply to "end nuclear energy for all the obvious reasons. It must be: end nuclear energy through a full employment program that will produce an alternate technology of human scale." Harrington concludes that such a focus points in the direction of two basic considerations:

> It allows the anti-nuclear movement to reach out to unions, much as groups like Environmentalists for full Employment have begun to do. And it focuses on the fact that the movement will be radical or else it will fail--that is, that a resolution of the current nuclear crises requires a defeat of the corporate power that has dominated American energy policy from the beginning (p. 280).

Regional Overview

The following section is a regional overview of anti-nuclear organizations based on one representative group from various geographical areas of the United States:

New England Region: Upstate People for Safe Energy Technology (UPSET), New York

Since 1973, citizens in northern New York state have been fighting the construction of a 765,000 volt power-line, the largest powerline ever planned for the north-east. UPSET maintains that the huge powerline is a "backdoor" method for the future construction of central-ized nuclear power plants, for which the line will serve as a transmission facility. Originally, the movement against the line focused on court battles against the Power Authority of the State of New York (PASNY). UPSET formed in 1974, obtaining intervenor rights in the Public Service Commission hearings concerning the construction of the line. Along with this intervenor status, exten-sive effort went into public education about the rela-tionship of powerlines to nuclear plants. The education campaign involved door-to-door convassing, petitioning, letter writing, floats in parades, field days, and infor-mation booths at county fairs. UPSET turned more active in the fall of 1976, when over 500 people walked six miles,

from Ft. Covington to Bombay at the northern end of the proposed line, to express their opposition. In December of 1976, three farm women led by the Iroquois woman Jane Standing Still, went to jail for blocking construction of the line. Since 1976, over 40 people have been arrested for sitting on bull dozers, for sitting in elm trees, and for parking tractors in front of PASNY machinery. In both March and August of 1977, 1,000 people walked various lengths of the proposed line route to express their continuing opposition to the power line. The UPSET organization is opposed to the 765 KV power lines for the following reasons (partial list):

1. Adverse impact on agriculture: loss of land, soil compaction, interference with drainage, destruction of houses and barns, lowering of land value and erosion of the tax base.

2. Visual and psychological pollution (four towers per mile; each tower about 175 ft. tall; each tower base taking of 1/4 acre of land).

3. Adverse health and safety effects: cardiovascular stress on humans and animals caused by the powerful electric field; production of nitric oxide; constant psychological nuisance of audible noise, visible light, and radio-TV interference; creation of a magnetic field which may interfere with migration of birds, flight patterns of bees; possible effects on global weather patterns.

4. Eventually the line will serve large generating stations in upstate New York, and according to planning maps, those will be nuclear power plants. We are opposed to nuclear power plants because they represent a physical menace to present and future generations, and the construction of nuclear

generating stations discourage energy conservation and decentralized energy systems, both of which we consider essential to our survival.

5. We are opposed to the construction of the 765 KV line because of its connection with the James Bay Hydroelectric Project. That project which will flood 63,000 square miles of Cree and Inuit Indian Lands in Canada, will eventually provide the power to be shipped to New York City along the proposed line. We do not wish to be responsible for this disruption of, and safety threat to, the lives of Native North American people.

6. There will be no economic or social benefit to the north country, save a very few short-term jobs.

7. There may be a growth in unemployment and welfare roles as landowners are deprived of traditional means of livelihood.

8. Those who truly stand to gain from the construction of powerlines are investors in nearly $200 million worth of tax-free bonds which will finance the project.

9. The powerline will further entrench wasteful energy policies by encouraging further subversion of the democratic process, and discouraging development of alternative energy sources (Gyorgy, 1979, pp. 408-411).

Mid-Atlantic: Environmental Coalition Nuclear Power (ECNP)

One of the most active anti-nuclear groups in the United States has been the Environmental coalition on Nuclear Power (ECNP), an organization of individuals in Pennsylvania and neighboring states interested in the impact of nuclear power problems on society, the economy, and the environment. This organization has influenced

public opposition that defeated the following projects:

1. The AEC Plowshare Project Ketch (1967-1968), a plan to explode over 1,000 nuclear bombs underground in central Pennsylvania.

2. A proposal to locate the demonstration breeder reactor in northeastern Pennsylvania, now referred to as the Clinch River Breeder Reactor.

3. Energy packs (1975), the national test case for nuclear energy centers.

4. Leasing of state-owned game lands for uranium prospective (1974).

5. Commercial low-level radioactive waste disposed site proposed by Chem-Nuclear (1976).

In litigation and intervention ECNP member groups have obtained the following:

1. Cancellation of two Newbold Island Reactors (NJ) on the Delaware River in 1973, which reversed the AEC urban siting policy.

2. Delayed for five years the construction at Hope Creek, the alternative site for Newbold Island.

3. Establishment of AEC policy of requiring cooling towers on inland water bodies (1974 Peach Bottom case).

4. Requirement of additional iodine hold-up systems (1973, Three Mile Island Unit 1).

5. Forced the NRC to vacate the radon number (74.5 curies) from the standard S-3 table, summary of the Environmental Effects of the Nuclear Fuel Cycle, and to admit under oath that the total number of curies attributable to Randon-222 will amount to billions of curies (premature deaths) per annual fuel requirement per reactor. This is still in litigation on grounds of NEPA and other violations.

6. Caused cancellation of Fulton MTGR1 and II in 1975 in consequence of intervention delay.

7. Forced cancellation of Summit I and II, Delaware (1977).

8. Appeal Board Decision remanding Three Mile Island II to the Appeal Board for reconsideration of the aircraft crash probability and the risk assessment issue (Gyorgy, 1979, p. 415).

Southeast Region: Catfish Alliance

The Catfish Alliance began in the fall of 1977 and is composed of individuals and groups from eight separate southern states: Alabama, South Carolina, Louisiana, Tennessee, Florida, North Carolina, Georgia, and Mississippi. The alliance was formed for the purpose of establishing a decentralized coordinating communications network for the southern region. In September, 1977, the group met for the first time at Monte Sono State Park, Huntsville, Alabama, and issued the following declaration of purpose:

> We the citizens of the Southern States stand in alliance to:
>
> A. Oppose the development of nuclear power;
>
> B. Make known to our fellow citizens the complete facts regarding nuclear power and solar energy and the great potential in energy conservation, to reassert our inherent democratic right to decide and direct our lives and the future of our communities;
>
> C. Take responsibility for our regional energy development to tap our inexhaustible source of solar energy and develop a decentralized solar economic base of permanent job opportunities to benefit our people rather than those who exploit us for profit;
>
> D. Bring to the forefront of our consciousness to live in harmony with our Earth as good stewards. To further this purpose we found the Catfish Alliance and commit our lives, fortunes, and sacred honors (Gyorgy, 1979, p. 415).

Ohio River Region: Paddlewheel Alliance

Early in 1977, citizens from the Ohio Valley region walked from Louisville to Washington, D.C., to request a nuclear moritorium in the Ohio valley and to protest against the Seabrook, New Hampshire, nuclear site. The major concern of these people was the proposal by the Public Service Company of Indiana to build a twin reactor nuclear plant at Marble Hill, Indiana, eight miles from Cincinnati, Ohio, and 28 miles from the Louisville, Kentucky, water system intake pipes. Paddlewheel Alliance is a direct action organization that grew out of the March to Washington in 1977. They maintain that because legal tactics have failed, they are attempting to build a dramatic popular opposition to Marble Hill and the power plant proliferation in the Ohio River region. A partial organizational statement of the Paddlewheel Alliance is:

> We are walking from Louisville to Washington to symbolize the frustration and anxiety citizens across the nation and experiencing each time a nuclear reactor is proposed for their area of the country. In our area the citizens face the possibility of 100 to 200 power plants located on the Ohio River, of which 20% are projected to be nuclear.
>
> The continued lack of representation within the bureaucracies and the lack of due process of law within the Nuclear Regulatory Commission hearings offers the public no redress of grievance. It is for this reason that citizens of New Hampshire and others across the country have determined that civil disobedience is the only remaining alternative (Gyorgy, 1979, pp. 424-425).

Midwest Region: Great Plains Federation

In April, 1976, construction began on the Callaway County nuclear plant near Fulton, Missouri. Early opposition in the form of attempted legal intervention had failed. In November, 1976, people from Kansas City, Columbia, Fulton, and St. Louis linked up for a 38 mile, three-day march, from Columbia to the Callaway plant site. The climax of the march brought together several groups already formed, including Missourians for Safe Energy, Kansas City People's Energy Project, and People for Disarmament and Social Justice of St. Louis. These groups, together with others, formed the Great Plans Federation/ Missourians for SAFE Energy/Sunflower Alliance. On April 30 to May 1, 1977, the Federation conducted a Safe Energy Fair about three miles from the Callaway reactor site. The fair included solar displays, music, food, camping, and nuclear protest. Education, outreach work, film showings, public meetings, and newsletter production continue to be the activity of this organization dedicated to stopping nuclear power in the midwest region. The Great Plains Federation Statement of Purpose was adopted on September 11, 1977. It reads as follows:

> We are united in active non-violent opposition to the development and maintenance of nuclear power plants anywhere. 'Non-violence' should be understood as a respected non-destructive and fair attitude toward our fellow humans.

> Alliance members and other individuals and groups use a wide variety of methods such as, education, legislative, court and regulatory action, referendum, petitioning, demonstrations, and other forms of public protest in their efforts towards this common goal. We support and welcome all efforts towards these ends.
>
> We support and encourage conservation of our natural resources--which means doing better, not doing without--and widespread conversion to safe, clean, and renewable energy sources such as solar and wind power. These sources are best used in a decentralized manner under local control. Nuclear power poses an unnecessary threat to our health, safety, and the quality of our society. Our concern for all life requires us to take action (Gyorgy, 1979, pp. 436-437).

Rocky Mountain/Southwest Region:

Cactus Alliance

On October 1, 1977, citizens from the states of Colorado, New Mexico, and Nevada formed a regional anti-nuclear alliance to work against all aspects of nuclear energy and nuclear weapons. The organization describes its purpose as:

> A coalition of citizens dedicated to the betterment of life through the advancement of the ideals and values of respect for life and health, and of sensitivity to the earth and its systems. These bring us into opposition with:
>
> A). The high cost and risks, especially health risks, of nuclear energy,
>
> B). The introduction of radioactive wastes into the environment, and
>
> C) The production, proliferation, and use of nuclear weapons. We actively support the alternatives of strict conservation practices, the reduction of technology to meet

> human needs, and the full development of alternative energy sources along with decentralization of energy systems. To this end we pledge to further our goals by means of education, communication, direct action, and community organizing. Recognizing the importance of cooperative regional action, we of the western intermountain states are working together (Gyorgy, 1979, pp. 444-445).

Pacific Northwest/West Coast Region: Trojan Decommissioning Alliance

During the summer of 1977, the Trojan Decommissioning Alliance (TDA) formed in Portland, Oregon, as a statewide coalition in opposition to the Trojan nuclear power plant, the largest operating plant in the United States. The Trojan plant has been the site of three nonviolent actions promoted by the TDA. The last demonstration occurred in the summer of 1978, when 200 people were arrested during a four-day blockade of plant entrances. After the arrests the TDA issued the following statement:

> 'We are taking action in self-defense, in defense of the people of the Northwest, and for children and grandchildren who are already burdened by the nuclear wastes generated by Trojan and other nuclear reactors' (Gyorgy, 1979, p. 451).

Six months later the plant was shut down following the diacovery that its control building did not meet earthquake standards. The Trojan Decommissioning Alliance has issued a Declaration of Nuclear Resistance which, in part, demanded:

A). . . . an immediate and permanent halt to the construction and operation of nuclear power plants;

B). (that) a supply of energy is a natural right and should in all cases be controlled by the people. Private monopoly must give way to public control;

C). (that) in concern with public ownership, power supply should be decentralized, so that environmental damage is further minimized and so that control can revert to the local community and the individual;

D). Any job lost through cancellation of nuclear construction or operation (must) be immediately compensated for in the natural energy field (Gyorgy, 1979, p. 452).

Type of Movements

Types of social movements vary considerably, and researchers in this field have generated various ways of categorizing them. One relatively simple approach is that suggested by Aberle (1967), in which he begins by determining whether it is the "social structure" or the "individual" that the social movement attempts to change or resist changes in, and then whether the change that movement members envision is a partial or total one. Aberle divides social movements along the two dimensions of: the locus of change sought, and the amount of change sought. Cross-classification on these two dimensions generated four possible types of social movements. Perry and Pugh (1978) summarize Aberle's typology:

> Transformation movements aim at the total change of a social structure, and they generally envision a cataclysmic upheaval as a

> precondition for the occurrence of such an all-embracing change. . . . Refomative movements aim at only the partial change of a social structure. They do not anticipate cataclysmic violence and are more circumspect in their goals. . . . Redemptive movements aim at the total change of the individual since they explain social problems by blaming personal weaknesses among those involved. . . . Alternative movements seek only limited changes in individuals (pp. 226-227).

Ash (1972) developed a five-part typology of social movements. First is the "class-conscious revolutionary movement," whose objective is to take control of the state and its social control forces by the use of nonlegitimate (from the state's point of view) strategies and tactics (p. 6). A second type are the "class-conscious movements without a program of immediate revolution (p. 7). These movements are likely to function within the structure of the target society. They may desire to change the class system, but choose strategies such as promoting political candidates for election rather than attempting revolution to gain state control. The "reform" movement is the third type in Ash's scheme (p. 7). This movement uses legitimate activities and does not attempt to change either the class system or the control of the means of production. The fourth type is the "counter-revolutionary" movement which attempts to reestablish a prior class of economic structure (p. 7). Finally, the "coup d'etat" is a movement which seeks to replace one set of political rulers with another, without making any significant change in the current class structure of society.

Turner (1969) was one of the first American sociologists to conclude that goals and tactics of many recent social movements were linked to individual feelings. Feelings of alienation were previously considered personal rather than social problems by most scholars. Turner's thesis is that the protest movements of the 1960's were symbolic or expressive rather than ameliorative. He contends that we can no longer ignore the typology of the expressive movement and must give it equal status to the more traditional categories of revolutionary, regressive, and reformist movements.

One of the best known and most influential typologies of social movements is that of Blumer (1951). Using tactics as his frame of reference, he distinguishes between: (1) the general social movement, (2) the specific social movement, and (3) the expressive social movement. The general social movement lacks specific goals and a coordinated program. These movements develop gradually out of "cultural drifts" and slow changes in social values. Specific social movements evolve out of general movements and may be of a reform or revolutionary nature. Reform movements accept the basic social order in which they exist and seek to change only some part of it. Both reform and specific movements contain well-defined goals, a definite leadership and organization, and a highly developed "we consciousness" sustained through an ideology.

A revolutionary movement, in contrast, has the function of introducing a new set of values to replace the dominant ones.

Expressive social movements, rather than attempting to change society, act as release mechanisms for various kinds of expressive behavior. Religious movements, for example, provide for a release of tension without a thrust for social change. Expressive movements tend to be inwardly directed, having more concern with the values of their own members than the objective conditions of the outside society (Blumer, 1951).

The anti-nuclear movement in the United States may be classified as basically a specific-reform social movement. It has worked for limited change by influencing public opinion through an appeal to moral and ecological values. From the beginning the movement established the well-defined objective of preventing the increase of nuclear power as an energy resource. The tactics for this prevention were also collectively defined within the movement, although at times some internal conflict has been generated over strategy and tactics. The anti-nuclear movement has made use of established institutions, especially the media, to develop a public opinion favorable to its aims. Through the media the movement has sought to establish a public issue concerning the negative aspects of nuclear energy. Using a discussion

process in order to persuade an "inert" population, the movement has sought social change and a reaffirmation of the ideal ecological values of society.

CHAPTER IV

THE SPECIFIC PROBLEM

Sunbelt Alliance: Origin, Purpose, and Structure

The Sunbelt Alliance was an Oklahoma-based, anti-nuclear organization formed in June of 1978 in Tulsa, Oklahoma. It was formed in order to stop the proliferation of nuclear power through nonviolent direct action.

Origin

In May of 1973, the Public Service Company of Oklahoma (PSO) announced plans to build two nuclear power plants (Black Fox 1 and 2) near Inola, Oklahoma, a small community about 13 miles east of Tulsa. Plans were also projected to convert Camp Gruber, a large public hunting area in eastern Oklahoma near the Arkansas border, into a large, energy-producing complex. In 1973, the Oklahoma Citizens Action for Safe Energy (CASE) was formed as a result of a study of nuclear power by a small group of Oklahoma citizens. In the fall of 1975, CASE informed the AEC of its intention to intervene in the legally required public hearings concerning the proposed construction of Black Fox. The AEC tried unsuccessfully to persuade CASE

not to intervene in the public hearings. CASE secured the services of attorneys and expert witnesses for use in the hearings and succeeded in building a strong argument against the proposed nuclear power plants.

In 1974, the Oklahoma Corporation Commission refused to grant PSO's requested rate increase for electricity consumers in Oklahoma, forcing the utility to delay their Black Fox plants for one year. The following years, CASE sponsored numerous workshops promoting alternatives to nuclear energy, and on May 3, 1978, "Sun Day" to promte solar energy in Oklahoma.

In June of 1978, the Sunbelt Alliance formed, as a response to the limited success that CASE had achieved in preventing the ongoing construction of Black Fox. Sunbelt began to actively campaign against the projected 1984 completion of Black Fox 1. In the beginning, Sunbelt was based only in Tulsa, Oklahoma, but rapidly spread to other Oklahoma communities. On March 13, 1982, one of the founders of the Sunbelt Alliance related the following account of the group's beginning to the author:

> I was in Tulsa walking through Riverside Park when I noticed some people handing out anti-nuke literature, which, after reading, I thought sounded very biased and exaggerated. I decided to check it out further and went to the public library. After reading some sources, I found to my satisfaction that the claims against nuclear energy were valid, maybe even understated. I decided to organize a Sunbelt group in Stillwater with the help of the Tulsa organization. I went to 'Hill House' in Tulsa and trained under the guidance of a man from the Clamshell Alliance who was in Oklahoma to organize the movement. We advertised for our

> first meeting, called 'Nuclear Power in Oklahoma,' and a representative from CASE and Clamshell spoke before a large audience on campus. From this we received about 40 interested supporters and the Sunbelt battle in Stillwater against Black Fox was on its way.

The Sunbelt Alliance was a coalition of people who had, as a matter of conscience, strong objections to the proliferation of nuclear power and energy in America and throughout the world. The collective objections were based in each individual's personal recognition that direct action is necessary to prevent the continued growth of a nuclear technology that poses economic, health safety, and environmental threats. This collective commitment is found in an organizational description statement which reads, in part, as follows:

> The Sunbelt Alliance is not the embodiment of any ideology, attitude or set of values. Just as our objections stem from diverse roots, our backgrounds and beliefs cover a wide spectrum of political and social perspectives. People do not join the Sunbelt Alliance because of a common overview of our political world as one would join the Democratic Party. People join the Sunbelt Alliance because they share a resolute opposition to nuclear power.
>
> This allows the Sunbelt to assume a multitude of 'personalities,' of strategies, and of projects. As a result, we can maintain an assault on Nukes from many fronts, and provide persons with a structure that will afford them their most effective political voice.
>
> The concept of an 'alliance,' or a group bound by commitment instead of perspective, allows a great deal of freedom for political expression. It is an immutable requirement that all persons within the Sunbelt Alliance conduct such expressions non-violently and respectfully. But other than this we assume in good faith

> that each affinity group and chapter will manifest its opposition in a responsible manner. The Sunbelt Alliance is not an organization through which every activity must gain approval or endorsement; nor do we wish to be. We do not seek to censor, censure or pass judgement on each other. The Sunbelt Alliance is a mechanism, a vehicle, with which individuals can mount a maximum of political influence. It is predicated upon a tolerance and respect for our colleagues, and an absolute intolerance of nuclear power.
>
> Although, as an alliance, we do not have a singular ideology, we do have a singular purpose--to halt the proliferation of nuclear technology generally, and to permanently halt the construction of Black Fox specifically. We feel that only the people possess the authority to decide the issue of nuclear power and so we take the issue to them (Sunbelt Alliance, 1979e, p. 5).

As the Sunbelt organization grew in membership, several different areas of support evolved. The alliance consisted of Supporters of Silkwood, Musicians Against Black Fox, Tulsa University Students Against Black Fox, the Oklahoma City Branch of Sunbelt, and a number of concerned individuals. The fall of 1978 saw a number of activities generated by the Sunbelt Alliance, including cosponsorship, with the Supporters of Silkwood and CASE, of the September 3 Jackson Browne concert, a picnic/rally with live music the afternoon of the Browne concert; an educational conference on September 16 in Aaronson Auditorium at the Tulsa City/County Library; an occupational action at Black Fox Station on October 7, 1978, in conjuction with other occupations that were scheduled around the nation. The Stillwater chapter of the Sunbelt

Alliance, along with other anti-nuclear organizations, joined together to form Oklahomans for Nuclear Safeguards (ONS) in November of 1979. The newly formed group attempted to get 65,000 signatures from voters to get the question of nuclear safeguards on the November, 1980, state ballot. The petition, in part, read:

1. Nuclear facilities must accept complete liability when accidents occur.
2. The effectiveness of all safety systems must be tested under conditions substantially similar to operation.
3. Radioactive materials must be handled in a fully safe and secure manner.
4. A bond must be posted prior to construction to provide for the decommission of a spent nuclear facility.
5. There must be adequate protection from theft and terrorism (ONS, 1980, p. 1).

In the fall of 1979, 52 shipments of spent nuclear fuel rods were to be routed through Oklahoma's highways from San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station in California to the General Electric waste dump facility in Illinois. The Sunbelt Alliance and Oklahoman's for Nuclear Safeguards held training sessions in Tulsa concerning methods to stop the trucks as a protest and the legal implications of such a stoppage. On November 17, a "Walk Your Neighborhood Day for ONS" was held in Stillwater, Tulsa, Oklahoma City and other Oklahoma communities. Representatives of Sunbelt canvassed door-to-door gathering signatures in support of the petition. Also, signature booths were set

up at the Payne County Fair, the Oklahoma State University Student Union, and in downtown Stillwater.

Fund raising events were held beginning in the fall of 1979, including a series of local concerts held in Stillwater, Tulsa, Norman, and Oklahoma City. Holley Near--singer, songwriter, and cultural workers on a United States tour "For a Non-Nuclear Future," performed with J. T. Thomas at the Brook Theater in Tulsa on November 11, 1979. The following day, Randy Crouch and the Flying Horse Opera, and the Sam Man Band performed at the Boomer Theater in Norman. On November 13, Sunbelt held a Silkwood Commemoration at Kerr Park in Oklahoma City in conjunction with a Silkwood teach-in the following day at Morton Hall in Oklahoma City. A candlelight ceremony was part of the program that included speakers Holley Near; Mishu Kakuu, a Black Hills Alliance spokesperson; Makoda, and Billy Davis, who did investigative work on the Karen Silwood case. On November 27, several hundred people, many of whom were Sunbelt members, demonstrated outside the Oklahoma State office building in Oklahoma City, portraying an "angry mob" in reaction to requested rate hikes by the Public Serivce Commission of Oklahoma for the purpose of raising added funds to construct Black Fox 1.

Beginning on December 1, 1979, Sunbelt published its first statewide monthly newsletter containing articles on organization activities and anti-nuclear information. Also, an all-volunteer staff of Sunbelt members and others,

published a special spring issue of "Wellspring" in Stillwater. According to Sunbelt, this local publication was devoted to "self-sufficiency, alternatives, and the healing of the body, mind, and spirit (Sunbelt Alliance and Oklahomans for Nuclear Safeguards, 1979, p. 2). The scope of the articles included organic gardening, alternative education, crafts, politics, philosophy, poetry, and art work.

On April 26-28, 1980, many Sunbelt Alliance members participated in the National Anti-Nuclear March on Washington, D.C. The three-day schedule of activities included a massive march on the Washington, D.C. mall; a "religious day," in which Sunbelt members performed the "symbolic funeral" with thousands of others; and peaceful protests at the Department of Energy, Nuclear Regulatory Commission, the Pentagon, and the Bureau of Indian Affairs. Sunbelt Alliance issued the following statement concerning the significance of the March on Washington:

> On April 26-28 people from all over the country that are concerned and outraged over the needless proliferation of nuclear power will converge on Washington, D.C., bringing a clear and definite message to the federal government. STOP NUCLEAR POWER NOW! (Sunbelt Alliance and Oklahomans for Nuclear Safeguards, 1979, n.p.).

Prior to the march, an "information sheet" was drafted which read as follows:

> Living in a democracy means that we are all part of the crucial struggle concerning which energy path to follow. The survival of untold future generations and the quality of life that will be experienced tomorrow are created by the choices made today. Catastrophic accidents,

> genetic mutations, cancer, environmental damages, erosion of our civil liberties, and the continued corporate dominance of our lives is a legacy that must not be tolerated.
>
> By pushing an energy policy that promotes nuclear power, the federal government has sold out the American people to Big Oil, the nuclear industry, and the utilities--an interlocking group of corporations bound together by the desire for high profits that are acquired by handcuffing the energy consumer to centralized power. Nuclear power's existence depends on our tax dollars. It is our right to make the choice and our responsibility to make that choice known. It is our obligation to make sure that choice is carried out.
>
> With the sun's unlimited energy supply to meet our needs, it is inexcusable that a program has not been implemented at least as large as the program that put a man on the moon. The lack of such a program reveals the importance the government places on meeting our needs compared to the desires of EXXON and other energy corporations.
>
> It is imperative that every person aware of the dangers becomes involved by voicing their opposition and communicating to the American people the magnitude of this issue. Your participation in the March on Washington is greatly needed. Won't you please come to Washington? (Sunbelt Alliance and Environmental Action Coalition, 1980, n.p.).

Prior to April, on March 28, a day of local activities was held around Oklahoma, designated as "Three Mile Island + 1 Day" in which a series of meetings and rallies were held as reminders of the Three Mile Island incident.

The Sunbelt Alliance, together with the national anti-nuclear movement, adopted one basic strategy in its effort to stop nuclear power. That was to create enough public pressure so that government and the nuclear industry will find it both politically and economically too costly

to proceed with nuclear energy construction. This basic strategy for change was implemented through a variety of tactics. One of the most basic is public education, which has been promoted through public speeches, public meetings and debates, film presentations, writing and distributing literature, and appearances on radio and television talk shows, to name only some. For example, a representative of the Sunbelt Alliance engaged in a public nuclear debate with the chairman of Oklahoman's for Nuclear Energy on October 29, 1979, in the Student Union Ballroom on the Oklahoma State University campus. The event was sponsored by the Oklahoma State University Environmental Awareness Center, and a large audience was present. The writing and distribution of literature has also been an organizational tactic of Sunbelt in which a variety of anti-nuclear literature has been produced on information sheets and flyers and distributed throughout Oklahoma. Much of the Sunbelt Alliance literature contained similar themes. For example, the economics of nuclear power was often presented in the literature as a corporate system of energy production and distribution that is part of an overall framework of a concentrated economic power structure. This power base, it was argued, will continue as long as nuclear energy remains profitable through large investments and non-competitive monopolies. Continued expansion of nuclear power can virtually guarantee high profit margins for some large American Corporations

while lessening the public control over energy design decisions. Some specific remarks related to this theme are found in the Sunbelt statement on "Jobs and Energy":

> Corporate energy interests, along with most industrialists and some agencies of the government, are vigorously urging the rapid expansion of energy production. The energy systems they are promoting are large in scale, technologically complex, wasteful, environmentally destructive and dangerous to energy industry employees and the public--it is for good reason that the public has been led to believe that energy expansion has been the springboard to economic growth, the 'good life,' and jobs.
>
> Industry has been able to replace human labor economically with energy purchased at very low rates from an ever-expanding energy industry which has been accumulating ever-increasing profits. The small consumer has been picking up the tab: industries traditionally have paid less than individual consumers for each unit of energy used. In addition, by bearing most of the environmental and disease costs associated with energy, and by permitting substantial government assistance to energy companies, the public has actually been subsidizing industrial use of cheap energy to replace human labor. Surely, there is a better path to prosperity and jobs. Energy production is not a goal in and of itself. Energy should be utilized to serve people, to provide the freedom for all people to have richer, easier, healthier lives. That a nation uses vast amounts of energy does not reveal to what extent the energy is actually being put to wise, effective use by its people.
>
> The best approach to energy sufficiency, economic prosperity and jobs is that which combines increasing energy efficiency with a variety of diverse and safe energy-supplying technologies. This approach is not 'anti-technology,' as sometimes is alleged by the large energy interests. In fact, technological innovation will be a key to achieving success with this approach--but the technologies involved need to be ones which can be controlled by the American people, not ones so elaborate

> and complex that people have to be kept far away from them or from decisions concerning them.
>
> And this is not a 'no-growth' approach, or one which advocates a return to drudge labor. To the energy industry, 'growth' has always meant growth in energy production in order to satisfy its own needs, no matter the consequences for the rest of society. But to others, 'growth' means a national policy of full employment, improved standards of living, improved job safety and public health, expanded opportunities for leisure activities and the development of rewarding relationships with other people (Sunbelt Alliance, 1979c, n.p.).

Another persistent theme of Sunbelt Alliance educational literature was alternatives to nuclear energy. There is a wide variety of alternative sources of power available for use now and in the future, according to movement literature. Power potentials of the sun, wind, water, and earth can become technologically efficient and cost-effective if they are given the proper public and private priorities. The anti-nuclear spokespersons contend that our energy future does not have to depend on choosing one of these technologies, but flexibility and multiple use of a combination of systems could meet the different needs for power that exist. "Appropriate technology" is a term that is often used to explain the desirability of alternative energy sources. Anderson (1978), in Solar Age magazine, defines appropriate technology this way:

> Appropriate technology embodies many beneficial features:
>
> (1) It makes efficient use of energy and other resources, and in other ways enhances environmental quality;

(2) It is light on capital use and particularly conducive to small business participation;

(3) It depends as much as possible on, and seeks to dignify, human labor;

(4) It uses local materials and labor;

(5) It is simple to install, operate, and maintain;

(6) The technology serves people rather than dominates them--it is responsive to human needs;

(7) It emphasizes technologies conducive to decentralized control (individual, collective, community) and democratic decision-making;

(8) It results in durable recyclable systems and/or products, and offers low life-cycle costs to the user (p. 2).

The Sunbelt Alliance argued that solar, wind generation, biomass conversion, and conservation are all viable possibilities for energy use regardless of "propaganda" to the contrary. For example, the organization maintained that:

> We have been led to believe by the energy companies that alternative technologies, such as solar and wind, are not available at present in a practical or economical way. According to their figures, it will be about fifty years before massive, centralized alternative technologies will be available to meet even a small fraction of our energy needs.
>
> While these centralized technologies are now here nearly developed, this argument misses one of the main benefits of alternative technologies: they are by nature decentralized and adaptable to many different conditions and needs. The energy companies have everything to lose by people being able to take their power into their own hands!!

> . . . there has been a campaign on the part of the energy industry to mislead the public into believing that the bulk of energy waste is caused by the average citizen who is too lazy to walk, or too pampered to live and work with the thermostat at a low setting. The 'lazy citizen' theory ignores the reality that wasteful energy consumption has been encouraged to increase the profits of energy producing companies. It also does not take into account that accurate information on energy matters and alternative methods of energy supply have not been available to the consumer (Sunbelt Alliance, 1979a, n.p.).

The final theme found in Sunbelt Alliance literature focuses on health and safety factors in nuclear energy use. The economics of nuclear power are increasingly disastrous in terms of health dangers which are viewed as inseparable from environmental dangers. Nuclear opponents are ecologists, concerned with the total ecological system. The generally stated reasons why nuclear plants are dangerous are:

1) Radioactive poisons from used nuclear fuel can cause cancer, leukemia, birth defects, genetic damage, heart disease, premature aging, and general poor health.

2) Every nuclear power plant releases some radioactive poisons to the environment.

3) An accident could release enough radiation to kill thousands of people and contaminate cities, land, and water for decades.

4) One of the poisons created--plutonium--is the raw material of atomic bombs. Theft of plutonium or enriched uranium could lead to nuclear disaster or cancer epidemics.

5) The nuclear fuel cycle from the mining of uranium to waste storage endangers its workers and communities near nuclear facilities. Workers and their offspring are the the ones who bear the brunt of the nuclear threat (Gyorgy, 1979, p. 72).

Because of these health and safety hazards, the Sunbelt Alliance maintains that many nuclear advocates have become doubters. The Alliance states that the issue of nuclear safety has been, perhaps, the most debated of all. Depending on which experts you listen to, all aspects of handling of the highly toxic materials are completely safe and under control, or very unsafe and likely to poison millions. Coincidentally, many experts who have declared nuclear power to be completely safe work for the nuclear industry or the utility companies, while some of the experts who speak on its dangers have left highly paid and prestigious jobs with the nuclear industry. On February 2, 1976, three nuclear engineers at General Electric explained their reasons for leaving of their jobs to the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy:

> 'We resigned because we could no longer justify devoting our life energies to the continued development and expansion of nuclear fission power--a system we believe to be so dangerous that it now threatens the very existence of life on this planet.'. . . Obviously, the myth of nuclear reactor 'safety' needs more than casual consideration, as does the myth that alternative energy sources which are far safer and less costly than nuclear power, can only be feasible for in the future (Sunbelt Alliance, 1979b, n.p.).

Since the Sunbelt Alliance was formed, 379 charges of criminal trespass have been leveled against organization members. Many of these charges are the result of various forms of nonviolent direct action which the Alliance uses as its main form of confrontational policies. Nonviolent

direct action can include a variety of tactics as it is practiced by both the Sunbelt Alliance and the National Anti-nuclear movement. Nonviolent civil disobedience and occupation/restoration are two significant forms of nonviolent direct action which will be discussed in a later section of this research. The following is a brief explanation of some of the actions that resulted in legal sanctions against Sunbelt members. The activities of the Sunbelt Alliance are more than educational literature:

> Oct. 7, 1978:--348 members of the Sunbelt were arrested in the first occupation of the Black Fox construction site. Twelve minors who crossed the fence and occupied the site were not charged with violating any issue. No persons were detained. The arrest procedure was arranged beforehand and proceeded very smoothly. All persons were booked at the site and received a citation for trespassing. Those persons were required to either post a $25 bond by mail or to appear for arraignment in Rogers County on specified dates. Of those arrested, 132 were found guilty on March 30, 1979, due to the prosecution's failure to prove one of the essential elements in the case. Bond was returned to them. The remaining persons did not contest the charges and forfeited their bonds without any trial.
>
> Oct. 31, 1978:--On Halloween night, fourteen persons stole onto the construction site and chained themselves to bulldozers. The 'Halloween Fourteen,' as they came to be known, were arrested and charged with criminal trespass. These persons were taken to the Rogers County Jail and bond was set at $50 apiece. One person was forced to pay the bond because of work obligations. The remaining thirteen went on a hunger strike demanding that they be released on their own recognizance. After two days, their demands were met and all of them were released. . . . These persons have been denied a trial by jury in spite of a state law that gives them that right. . . .

January 4, 1979:--Seventeen persons were arrested for occupying an unloading dock at the Port of Catoosa. This dock was to be used to unload a reactor pressure vessel bound for the Wolf Creek Station in Kansas. The blockaders were arrested and taken by bus to Rogers County. Originally, they were charged with unlawful assembly, but charges were later reduced to criminal trespass. Although no one but the authorities can say for certain, it is common opinion that the unlawful assembly charge was for the benefit of the press and the authorities probably never intended to charge us with anything other than trespass (Sunbelt Alliance, 1979e, pp. 13-14).

CHAPTER V

APPEARANCE AND MAINTENANCE OF IMAGE: STRATEGY AND TACTICS

Although a social movement is not organized in the absolute sense of the term, it faces structural problems that must be addressed if it is to survive. The manner in which these problems are confronted usually involves some degree of organization in terms of which to meet present and future contingencies. The purpose of this chapter is to focus on the major structural problem of coordinating the activities of the movement in its interaction with other social groups and the public in general; that is, developing and executing strategy and tactics. This structural problem, as well as others not included here, is handled through the movement's style of organization. As Lang and Lang (1961) suggest, the movement's style of organization refers to the general mode of regulating relations within a movement, resolving its conflicts and meeting external contingencies (Lang and Lang, 1978). The first two elements of this organizational style are related to internal problems that a movement must face, and are the subject of later chapters. The third element of meeting external contingencies is of importance here and will be

discussed within the framework of impression management. This is defined by Tedeschi and Riess (1981) as consisting of any behavior by a person that has the purpose of controlling or manipulating the attributions and impressions formed of that person by others.

Individuals engage in behaviors to promote identities that will enhance their ability to influence others. Thus, actors may attempt to develop their appearance of trustiworthiness, expertise, credibility, and prestige. The actor is concerned with the impressions that others form of him, and he will take some action (referred to as impression management) to prevent or lessen negative impressions and to enhance positive impressions (Tedeschi, and Riess, 1981).

For the most part, these attempts at influencing the reactions of others have been ignored by sociologists and social psychologists. However, Burke (1952), Mills (1940), and Goffman (1959) have focused on impression management processes used by individuals in everyday social interaction. Of these, perhaps the best known is Goffman's The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life (1959). Within the framework of theatrical performance, Goffman focuses on the structure of social interaction that emerges as a result of people engaging in interaction presence with others. Of particular significance, according to Goffman, is the maintenance of a definition of the behavioral situation by the actor or actors who create and maintain a

definition of reality to which others respond. This perspective recognizes that the definition of the situation is often part of a projection created and sustained through cooperation with others. The term "performance team" is applied to the set or group of individuals who collaborate to generate a particular definition of social reality (Goffman, 1959). Of significant importance in promoting this definition is the process of impression management, or the act of creating a favorable impression. Goffman uses the term "dramaturgical circumspection" to explain the necessity of the performers to "determine in advance how best to stage a show" or image (p. 79). He suggests that knowledge of the audience and correct casting of the parts are contingencies that must be managed in some way by the actors.

Although Goffman's (1959) theoretical framework centers around face-to-face human interaction, his concept of impression management can be applied to group structures like social movements. As Klapp (1972) argues:

> . . . movements trying to grow--want publicity; but what they really need is not just attention to their movements but also dramas of appropriate kinds that will confer new roles on them, villian roles on their enemies, and a plot pattern on the action in which followers can believe and the public at large can perceive (p. 368).

This is the process of creating and maintaining a public image that will promote the maximum amount of favorable public will toward the movement's specific objective. An

outward movement such as the anti-nuclear one, seeks to generate support from large public masses, not simply individuals. In order to accomplish the goal of mobilizing mass support, extensive use of mass propaganda through education and various pressure tactics are used. To understand a social movement it is always necessary to refer to the opposition it encounters. By definition a social movement always represents some socially unrecognized interest. Opposition to a movement need not only be in a direct, active form. It also includes that part of the public that potentially can be persuaded to convert to the movement's cause.

The direction of the movement must appear to be a solution to a problem that the mass public shares in common, but may have unfocused sentiments about. The potential for public conversion in support of a movement rests on the ability of the movement to convince the public it faces a social problem that needs attention. Often, the methods used to gain support are more important than the threat of the problem itself in determining movement success. In the case of nuclear energy, for example, the way the issue is defined by the movement can determine the amount of public support. The interaction of the movement with its "host society" presents a fundamental dilemma for the movement. The dilemma consists of trying to maintain an identity and a continuing commitment to principles, while still trying to broaden its

support base. In the anti-nuclear movement, demonstrations, debates, and site occupations are necessary if the membership morale and belief in the movement's purpose is to be maintained. At the same time that galvanizing sentiment within the movement is necessary, there also must be movement consideration for increasing its circle of sympathizers within the public at large. The movement, in order to be effective,usually has to make certain pragmatic compromises in its "image style" to attract as much public support as possible. While the movement is working to expand its membership and support base, it must also contend with cooptation and repression attempts by society. Mauss (1975) defines these:

> By 'co-optation,' we mean ameliorative gestures in the direction of meeting and neutralizing the movement's criticisms, combined with a propaganda effort emphasizing those interests and values which the society shares with the reform movement. By 'repression,' we refer to social control techniques ranging from police action to ridicule, which can and do occur across all the institutions of the society (pp. 55-56).

The success of a social movement is determined in large measure by its own methods of manipulating and responding to external contingencies. The style of impression management that the social movement adopts is highly correlated to its ability to effectly deal with these outside forces. By social movement impression management the author is referring to: the movement's ability to perceive and in some measure counteract the effects of

external social forces in such a way as to promote the maximum favorable public response to its existence (definition the author's). The maintenance of a particular public image in relation to the above definition forms the basis for the movement's selected strategies and tactics. The need to win external support may be seen as a function of these two dimensions. The remainder of this section focuses on the specific strategies and tactics of the anti-nuclear movement in general and the Sunbelt Alliance in particular, in terms of appearance and image functions.

Appearance and Image: Specific Strategy and Tactics

Nonviolent Civil Disobedience

Nonviolent civil disobedience, as promoted and practiced by the anti-nuclear movement and its affinity groups (including the Sunbelt Alliance), is a combination of the desire for direct action and the ideology of nonviolence.

The politics of direct action to some extent may be an outgrowth of the earlier movement frustrations with the tactics of legal intervention, discussed earlier. However, Gyorgy (1979) contends that there were important ideological differences between the early intervenors and the new movement activists. Gyorgy, as a member of the Clamshell Alliance, explains the differences in terms of background

and political orientation of the new members. She writes:

> In the mid to late 70's, as the nuclear program spread across the country, people who had been politically active in the late 60's began to get involved in the nuclear issue. The new nuclear opponents found the same kinds of coverups, lies, vested corporate interests and inhumanity involved in nuclear power as in the war issue. In fact, nuclear power seemed in many ways to be 'the Vietnam War brought home.' By aiding the nuclear industry while assuring the public it has nothing to fear, the government was supporting an energy source that could prove as lethal as any war.
>
> . . . one important lesson learned during the Vietnam War days was that a citizen's actions--at all levels--does bring change and the way that people act has a lot to do with the kinds of change they'll get. . . .
>
> Both the anti-war movement and the earlier civil rights movement demonstrated the power of individual and especially collective civil disobedience. It was this tactic that broke through racist barriers in the South and 'raised the special cost' of the Vietnam War to the point where policymakers had to take notice (p. 388).

Direct action as a tactic of the anti-nuclear is based on the belief that nuclear power must be opposed in ways beyond educational efforts or legal confrontational tactics. Direct action is aimed at raising the social and political costs of pursuing the national nuclear program, while also educating the public concerning nuclear energy dangers. These actions can range from educational canvassing to rallies, marches, demonstrations, and occupations of specific nuclear facility targets.

Direct action can either be violent or nonviolent in nature. The direct action tactics of the anti-nuclear

movement have been nonviolent in orientation, both at the national and local group levels. As Alpern (1978) has pointed out, there has been a surplus of nuclear power plants winning very favorable attention in the national and local press. According to many anti-nuclear activists, the protest and civil disobedience of the Vietnam peace movement were necessary tactics for bringing public pressure on the federal government to end the war. However, many also feel the violence of the movement often obscured the main goal of ending the war, and they look more favorably on the nonviolent direct action of the civil rights movement in terms of public sympathy and good realization (Alpern, 1978). According to Sharp (1973), nonviolent action is a generic term that includes a variety of methods of protest, noncooperation, and intervention, in all of which the actors behave by doing or refusing to do, certain things without using physical violence. Therefore, Sharp suggests that nonviolence is not passive inaction; not merely the absence of violence but the particular philosophy of action that can produce certain consequences:

> When people refuse their cooperation, withhold their help, and persist in their disobedience and defiance, they are denying their opponent the basic human assistance and cooperation which any government or hierarchical system requires. If they do this in sufficient numbers for long enough, that government or hierarchical system will no longer have power. This is the basic political assumption of nonviolent action (p. 64).

Pelton (1974) also maintains that nonviolence is action

oriented; it is action that does not avoid conflict but seeks to confront conflict and resolve it. Pelton maintains that inaction can contribute to injustice, and the avoidance of injustice is at the philosophical base of nonviolence. He states that nonviolence is:

> . . . action based on the refusal to do harm and injustice or to allow harm and injustice to exist. Nonviolence not only suggests that we act in a manner that will not harm anyone but that we strive to root out injustice in the world. Nonviolence then is action that does not do or allow injustice. It might be thought that the nonviolent activist believes that he knows precisely what constitutes justice, or thinks that he has cornered the market on truth; not so. It is partly because the nonviolent activist believes that he cannot know absolute truth, and that he can act only on the basis of what he considers to be injustice, that he uses nonviolent means. He believes that violence carries an implicit judgment on other men that contains a finality that no man is fit to impose upon others. No one is fit to judge because they are trapped by their own subjective reality. Thus, the concept of truth in the philosophy of nonviolence is that of relative truth (pp. 14-15).

Nonviolence is a philosophy of means which rests upon certain moral premises, but it is also a very instrumental tactic for public relations purposes when used by a movement. As Pelton (1974) discusses in his section on functions of nonviolent protests, such actions can serve the purpose of diverting public attention to a focused issue or alleged injustice. Nonviolent protests can produce subsequent persuasion by arousing curiosity and promoting a frame of receptiveness for new information. A protest action can also, according to Pelton, draw sympathizers

into active participation in the movement, serving the purpose of mobilizing people into active commitments, while at the same time, allowing for the least risk of offending the public at large.

Therefore, although some anti-nuclear protesters view nonviolence as a philosophical principal guiding all personal and political behaviors, many within the movement have adopted it as the most rational strategy for the goal-realization of ending nuclear power. There is a distinction between conscientious and pragmatic nonviolence (Stiehm, 1968). Also, the concern with nonviolence has several tactical objectives, according to Barkan (1979):

1. To present a favorable image to the public and elected officials through the news media;

2. To reduce the potential for outbreaks of violence, which could not only lead to physical injury but also discredit the movement and divert attention from the nuclear power issue;

3. To present a contrast to the 'violent technology' that the protesters claim nuclear power represents;

4. To deflect actions by possible 'agents provocateurs' of the kind that helped undermine the Vietnam peace movement;

5. To maintain good relations and develop lines of communicating with the police and National Guard (p. 26).

The Sunbelt Alliance understands the necessity of having a strategy of nonviolent direct action in order to best exercise the power of the people to bring about change. As the Sunbelt Alliance educational literature states:

> People--you and I--do have the power to bring about change, but in speaking of this change we must constantly remember that our actions effect our goals. If our actions appear divisive or impure, our goals will never be accomplished, but if our actions are just and loving--individually and collectively--then a more just, loving and non-nuclear society is feasible. For this reasons, the Sunbelt Alliance is making a commitment to non-violent direct action, morally, spiritually and tactically, to create a non-nuclear future for ourselves and for future generations. . . .
>
> Non-violent direct action is, in essence, taking a cause which affects us all, to the people in the most direct and peaceful ways possible. We are the people who can and will effect change; who can and will--STOP BLACK FOX! (Sunbelt Alliance, 1979d, p. 2).

For the anti-nuclear movement in general and the Sunbelt Alliance in particular, nonviolent direct action has been a means of mobilizing public support for the movement by attempting to convince the general society that actions taken against a perceived unjust situation are valid. For some members of the Sunbelt, nonviolence is a total way of life, while for others it is used as a means for instigating social change. It is important that the anti-nuclear movement involve a diversity of membership. As stated by Gyorgy (1979), some organizers have expressed concern that direct action tactics such as site occupations are alienating to many working and older people. But nonviolent civil disobedience is viewed by a growing number of people as necessary and effective, and thus far none of the thousands of arrests at nuclear sites have involved violence. The movement has taken up direct

action on the assumption that civil disobedience is effective only when it is totally nonviolent. The Sunbelt Alliance uses a quote from Ghandi (1954) in its founding statement which communicates that nonviolent civil disobedience is:

> the right that belongs to every human being and it becomes sacred duty when it springs from civility or, which is the same thing, love. . . . In those instances where democratic procedures have been damaged through default or design, and where the legal machinery has been turned towards a travesty of justice, civil disobedience may be called into play (p. 37).

From the perspective of Sunbelt, nonviolent civil disobedience is behavior which illustrates people's commitment to stop nuclear power by showing an informed public's dissatisfaction with a technology of environmental harm and economic domination, and by contrast, promoting a philosophy of concern and empathy for people and the ecosystem. Accordingly, the four main facets of behavior that symbolize this concern are: (1) no acts of violence, either physical or verbal; (2) behavior that gives security forces no reason to feel threatened; (3) total honesty, openness, and communication, and (4) steadfast adherence to nonviolence even if threatened or assaulted (Sunbelt Alliance, 1978a). Stated in different terms, Sunbelt believed nonviolent civil disobedience to be dependent on "reason, imagination, and discipline" (p. 9), reflected in these specific guidelines found in their occupation handbook:

1) Our attitude towards officials and others who may oppose us should be one of sympathetic understanding of the burdens and responsibilities they carry.

2) No matter what the circumstances or provocation, we should not respond with violence to acts directed against us.

3) We should not call names, make hostile remarks or exploit the weaknesses that we perceive in others.

4) When faced with an unexpected provocation, we should attempt to make a reasoned, positive, creative, and sympathetic response. We should speak to the best in all people.

5) We should attempt to interpret as clearly as possible to any whom we are in contact with--and especially to those who may oppose us--the purpose and meaning of our actions (p. 9).

Although civil disobedience through the occupations of various nuclear plant sites have helped focus national, regional, and local attention on nuclear power as an issue, value conflicts over their nature and intent and over the meaning of nonviolence have led to some disagreements within the anti-nuclear movement. Many of the anti-nuclear alliances have not been very specific in their goals of site occupations, often merely announcing that they are for the purpose of "stopping" or "opposing" nuclear power. Some alliances have declared both a symbolic goal of dramatizing opposition to nuclear power as well as an obstructionist goal of blockading sites until construction is ceased (McQuiston, 1979).

Many anti-nuclear protesters are committed to civil disobedience for purely coercive or obstructionists

reasons, and at some of the occupation sites tactical arguments have occurred as a result. For example, at the May, 1977, Seabrook occupation where over 1,400 were arrested, the Clamshell Alliance had expected everyone to be taken into custody immediately upon entering the construction area. When they were surprisingly allowed onto the plant's parking lot, they sat down to discuss their next plan of action. Many thought they should remain where they were, while others wanted to take a more aggressive posture and stop incoming cars containing plant personnel and cut through the fence surrounding the site. Both of these suggestions were defined as acts of violence by those wishing to remain passive (Rosenblith, 1977; Hedemann, 1977). A similar tactical conflict over the purpose of civil disobedience occurred at the April, 1978, occupation of the Rocky Flats Nuclear Plant in Colorado. Approximately 150 protestors sat down on the railroad tracks inside the plant site. Eventually the group split between those who wanted to wait for the trains, and those who believed that a 24-hour sitting vigil was enough. Thirty-five stayed and were arrested six days later (Kuhn, 1978).

The Sunbelt Alliance has used various techniques of preparation to attempt to avoid voilence and promote strategy cohesiveness during occupations. Nonviolence training sessions are required by the Sunbelt organization for everyone participating in an occupation/restoration

action. The process of occupation/restoration as defined by the Sunbelt is based on the belief that:

> We have the right to occupy a nuclear site and restore at its natural non-nuclear state to prevent the commission of a far greater crime--the implications of which we are just beginning to discover. In order for an occupation/restoration (O/R) to be effective and ensure non-violence and solidarity, every everyone must attend training sessions and be in an affinity group. This is a way for the decision-making process to be decentralized and more efficient, enabling everyone to take part in the process which determines the group's actions.
>
> It should be remembered that the practice of non-violence is not restricted to occupations, but extends to all aspects of our organization. For if we join together in common spirit we can prove, non-violently, that life is more important to us than the life threatening technology of nuclear power (Sunbelt Alliance, 1978b, n.p.).

Training sessions for the June 2, 1978, Black Fox occupation were usually five to seven hours long and involved 15 and 30 people per session. These sessions were designed to accomplish a variety of objectives. A history of the Sunbelt Alliance and their opposition to Black Fox was presented for the purpose of giving the potential occupier an increased understanding of the reasons behind the organization's structure and its protest tactics. One workshop session consisted of training in "creative listening skills" and quick decision making techniques within the organization framework of consensus. Another workshop centered around role playing for the purpose of putting people in the roles of "authorities, workers, media people, and occupiers to gain an understanding of the emotions

people experience in stressful situations (Sunbelt Alliance and Oklahomans for Nuclear Safeguards, 1979, pp. 9-10). Because various types of stress may be experienced during protest occupations, role-playing allows organization members to anticipate how they will react in those situations.

An important element in the training sessions was the knowledge received concerning nonviolent responses to violence. This knowledge was viewed as essential preparation for the diffusing of possible spontaneous or organized violence directed against occupiers and demonstrators. The following is representative of the Sunbelt's strategy on responses to violence or threats of violence directed against its members, as contained in the Black Fox occupation Handbook:

> When confronted by a potentially violent situation those prepared to hold their tempers while taking initiative, such as peacekeepers, should come forward. Others are protected by remaining back until the tension is resolved. Initiating eye contact and physical vulnerability with either a lone individual or a group leader is very important. Going forward with open hands and stance, smiling slightly and saying, 'Hi, my name is _____, what's yours?' is deceptively simple yet it is the deceptively simple, the ordinary, that is exactly the key to resolving the violence. By regaining the human encounter, by re-establishing the ordinary and the personal, you remove the random and anonymous elements of senseless violence.
>
> We are socialized from birth to be hostile, suspicious and aggressive. Many people are not familiar with non-violence and their encounter with you may be their first exposure to a person who will not be provoked to violence. Quiet confidence and respect for the other is fundamental, even when that person is not

> respectful of us. Be quick to recognize the good in the other person without compromise to our position.
>
> There are times when one needs to defend one's self physically. This does not mean to retaliate, but rather to assume a position of least harm to your physical self. All occupiers and supporters should know the 'nonviolent defense posture.' It involves clasping the hands over the head, elbows drawn in to hold the head stable, drawing the knees up with the legs tucked under. This forms a ball, face down, stomach and genitals covered. This position is a last resort in response of violence.
>
> Being in the presence of violence to another, particularly to a member of your affinity group, can be as devastating as being the victim. Remain calm. Gently talking to the hostile person can sometimes help them regain their humanity. It is also possible to interpose yourself between the hostile and the victim; but recognize the risks involved. This gesture of personal sacrifice will often give the attacker pause and make them think again. Vulnerability, as in the interposing of women and children, is often disarming to the attacker, but don't count on it (Sunbelt Alliance, 1979e, p. 11).

Basically, the Sunbelt group's responses to violence were both practical and philosophical. The practical responses to personal violence included suggestons for:

> --calm
> --quiet confidence and respect for the other person
> --eye contact
> --physical vulnerability (openness)
> --taking initiative, offering a greeting
> --genuine humor (not at another's expense)
> --orderly movement, deliverate, unfrantic
> --interposing between attacker and victim
> --nonviolence defense posture (Sunbelt Alliance, 1979e, p. 11).

The philosophical responses to violence emphasized dealing with psychological stress and the cultivation of

a sense of inner strength, as expressed in the Sunbelt Alliance Black Fox Occupation Handbook (1979e):

> The power of nonviolence includes the ability to witness violence without becoming engulfed in it. The difficulty of violence psychologically has less to do with the physical pain than the confusion, the terror and the hurt in realizing that someone else is doing that to you. All participants should reflect beforehand on those parts of themselves and their collective identity which cannot be taken by jail, by physical injury, or by any external force. In your own mind, you are free forever (p. 11).

At the close of the Sunbelt training sessions, those that decided to participate in the Black Fox occupation formed affinity groups which will be discussed in the following chapter.

Maintenance of Movement Image Through the Media

Many environmentalists have been aware for many years that effective, public relations is one of their antagonists' most powerful weapons. They have often pointed to omissions in government press releases, distortions in the corporation-inspired feature story, and the scarcity and imbalance of media content on issues of the environment (Sandman, 1977). The ecology movement, in general, during the early 1970's, spent about $500,000 per year in media advertising in order to counteract an average of about $3 billion in corporate expenditures on the same subjects. Many of these environmentalist movement

advertisements attached to prevailing lifestyle of the nation and spoke of an inevitable conflict between corporate growth and the ecological health of the earth. They described a growing environmental destruction which reflected itself in individual lives as well as economic policies. The social movements of the 1960's had become almost totally media based by the 1970's and the ecology movement assumed television, for example, could be a potentially useful tool in expanding knowledge about the nature of the ecosystem and its needed protection from human harm. As Mander (1978) suggests, however, the reality of a media oriented society may have changed not only the tactics of the ecology movement, but also its emphasis. He states that he:

> watched and participated as they changed their organizations' commitments from community organizing, legal reform processes or other forms of evolutionary change to focus upon television. Educational work was sacrificed to public relations work. The goal became less to communicate with individuals, governments or communities than to influence the media. Actions began to be chosen less for their educational value or political content than for their ability to attract television cameras. Dealing directly with bureaucracies or corporations was frustrating and fruitless. Dealing with communities was slow. Everyone spoke of immediate victory (p. 20).

Sandman (1977) further stresses the role of the media as a format for introducing environmental issues. As a public relations expert in environmental communication, he emphasizes that an issue needs a media event in order to

become public knowledge. He advises the environmentalists that their goal should be:

> an event that's important enough and public enough to justify the story in the minds of the reporters. Of course, some events are better than others. Try for one that is convenient and easy to cover, that has some human-interest value and good picture possibilities for broadcasting, and that is consistent with the image your group wants to project. Let the media know in advance what you are doing, and have a handout ready for passers-by and a news release ready for reporters who don't show (p. 4).

During the last decade, there have been numerous films and other audiovisual materials produced by various anti-nuclear organizations as public information techniques. These films present arguments against nuclear power, while at the same time, promote specific images of anti-nuclear groups for public consumption. According to Smith (1980), the production and distribution of these films often meets extreme resistance from the nuclear industry. She quotes California film maker Don Widener as stating that: "There is an ongoing effort to suppress all anti-nuclear media coverage. Anyone trying to produce nuclear films hears from the industry" (p. 153). Widener claims he was threatened in the middle of the night by the director of public relations at the AEC while he was working on "The Powers That Be." Smith states that:

> Today, the nuclear industry is spending more and more of its energy and resources on self-defense. In addition to stepped-up advertising and public relations programs, the industry is attempting to block production or airing of films and television shows that depict a less than rosy picture of nuclear power.

> The industry's efforts have gone so far as to intimidate and stifle the civil liberties of several television and film producers attempting to document some of the flaws in nuclear technology (pp. 153-154).

Despite the nuclear industry's efforts to discourage and suppress anti-nuclear films, the volumn of such films has been growing. The following is a representative list of such films by titles and producers:

1. 'The China Syndrome' (1979), full-length film from United Artists.
2. 'Danger, Radioactive Wastes' (1977), NBC-TV; from Suffolk for Safe Energy.
3. 'Energy: The Nuclear Alternative' (1973), Citizens Energy Council.
4. 'The Medical Implications of Nuclear Energy,' Earth Energy Media.
5. 'Radiation and Health,' Green Mountain Post Films.
6. 'Last Slide-Show,' Mobilization for Survival.
7. 'Nuclear Nightmare Slideshow,' Mobilization for Survival.
8. 'Better Active Today Than Radioactive Tomorrow,' Green Mountain Post Films.
9. 'Lovejoy's Nuclear War' (1975), Citizens Energy Council.
10. 'Nuclear Stew: Arizona Style,' Committee for a Non-Nuclear Future (Reader, 1980, p. 132).

The power of nonviolent direct action as a movement tactic depends upon an appeal to the conscience of the public. In a mass media society, television must be used as a medium for dramatizing and publicizing demands and issues to the American citizen. Television has become a

leading force in the arsenal of public relations tactics for the anti-nuclear movement, especially during occupations of nuclear sites. The Sunbelt Alliance referred to the "unfortunate reality" of having to rely upon the media during the June 2, 1979, occupation of Black Fox in order to "convey the spirit and content of our actions" (p. 17). The above reference to the "unfortunate reality" was based on the belief by the organization that they had been "victims of excesses and abuses" by the press and television. An entire section of the Black Fox Occupation Handbook is devoted to informational tactics on methods to minimize the potential for media victimization. The following is a statement from Sunbelt concerning appropriate tactics when interacting with media representatives:

> A reporter may approach any participant during the action. Be friendly and polite above all else. You will be giving witness to the integrity of our efforts, so speak calmly but confidently. Avoid using rhetorical language. Instead, choose your own words, those which come most naturally, and try to convey your personal experiences and feelings in simple, direct terms. Enunciate the purpose of your actions and speak to those substantive issues that are most compelling to you. It might be of benefit to you to prepare a short statement that is a succinct explanation of why you are there. Although it would probably be best not to memorize a statement, a carefully conceived argument will be something that you could rely upon if approached by a reporter. People planning to participate in the June action should take time to write letters to the editor of your local newspaper explaining your motives. Each area should make contact with the local press and convey to them the issues surrounding nuclear power. This can be accomplished by appearing on radio and TV talk shows. Though important everywhere, it is critical in areas

> where the Sunbelt has not had a local group in the past.
>
> Its important to know the basic facts and figures about nuclear power. Credibility can easily be damaged if it becomes apparent that you don't know what you are talking about, or if you use incorrect information. . . . Please, do not give estimates of how many occupiers are expected.
>
> Remember, no one is obligated to speak to the press. If you are uncomfortable speaking to them, politely decline. On one level, an occupation is a public event; on another level its a very personal experience. A pleasant decline will be respected.
>
> The very structure of the Sunbelt Alliance evolves around public relations through media exposure. Task forces within the organization function as 'an information distribution network, media coordination group, a printing committee, a fund raising committee, a member education program, local outreach, state and national outreach, and a printed media committee for (clip-files, educational materials, etc.)' (Sunbelt Alliance, 1979e, pp. 17-18).

Reliance on the media for public exposure is found throughout the national anti-nuclear movement. The media is used by the national movement as an effective way to disseminate anti-nuclear information and to promote a positive public image for the movement itself. The "media task force" within various anti-nuclear organizations is an important factor for coordinating media events among the various affinity groups. For example, the Coalition for a Non-Nuclear World, based in Washington, D.C., printed and distributed an information sheet prior to the Three Mile Island anniversary day in April, 1980, which contained, in part, the following information:

Dear Local Contacts:

With the TMI anniversary fast approaching, we wanted to let you know about some press efforts on behalf of the Coalition, the anti-nuclear movement in general, and the pro-nuclear forces. The week from March 23-30 will be saturated with nuclear-related stories:

24 -- A tentative press conference with well-known anti-nuclear spokespeople such as Ralph Nader and Henry Kendall.

25 -- The Atomic Industrial Forum has scheduled a major press conference, and encouraged local press conferences or briefings around the country (see the enclosed memo describing their efforts).

26 -- The Coalition for a Non-Nuclear World will hold a press conference announcing the April 26-68 activities (see the enclosed press release).

27 -- Anti-nuclear groups in Harrisburg will hold a briefing.

28-30 -- Local events in Harrisburg and around the country (see tentative listing of local events enclosed).

When you do local press work and hold local actions, please mention that your group is part of the Coalition and that you are planning to attend the events here next month. This will give the press a sense of unity in the movement, and show the grass-roots nature of the April actions.

Will you be holding a press conference to discuss nuclear issues? If you do not plan to hold a press conference or do major press work around local events, we encourage you to reproduce the Coalition's release and mail it to your press contacts. We have left space for you to type in a local contact and telephone number; or, if you wish, send the release along with a letter on your organization's stationary (Kehoe, 1980, n.p.).

Rhetoric as a Strategy in Forming Public Opinion

Oberschall (1973, p. 28) has characterized the central problem of mobilization for a social movement as one of "resource management"--the acquisition and use of money, time, talent, energy, and commitment, frequently in the face of opposition and repression from a hostile society trying to deny the movement such resources. This dilemma of determining the most effective allocation of limited social movement resources is formed in fact by the potential power of the movement in terms of the level of internal resources and skills and the degree of social threat posed by the movement by disruption or non-cooperation. The anti-nuclear movement possesses many internal resources and skills such as leadership, writing, and speaking prowess (Barkan, 1979), much the same as the draft resisters during the Vietnam War who were middle class and relatively well educated (Baskir and Strauss, 1978). The numbers of the anti-nuclear movement have not been large enough, however, for their protest actions to present a great threat of disruption to atomic plants. Because the strength of the movement lies in its internal resources (education and communicative skills of its members), and its weakness has been a lack of power (limited numbers) to pose severe physical disruption to nuclear

energy construction, the movement has focused on its public image via the press (Baskir and Strauss, 1978).

Because of the structural, space, and time limitations of the mass media, information communicated by it is largely descriptive, not analytical. Social movements existing in a mass media culture must rely heavily on the form of information they want to communicate through the media, and less on the content of that information. Once a movement has a viable organizational structure, formal or informal, with committed members and able leaders, then a further critical element in successful mobilization becomes the group's appealing ideology or set of beliefs. One of the most important functions of an ideology is the legitimation of a movement, the explanation of the need for the movement or why it exists. Frequently, the important elements of an ideology are expressed in the form of slogans and symbols, which are designed to succinctly express the legitimacy of a movement and what it stands for. To the extent that they "catch on" and become popular or faddish, they provide an important public support to a movement, even though their full meanings may not be understood by those who verbalize them.

Slogans as a form of oversimplified rhetoric are intended to give brief and impressive expression to the basic content of the movement's ideology. They are heavily relied upon as a strategy of image maintenance by mass movements in a mass media society. Descriptive phrases and

slogans are more easily communicated and received within the framework of a mass media technology. As Mander (1978) stresses, because of the technical limits of mass media technology:

> . . . superficiality is better television than depth; verbal information is easier to convey than sensory information, since television can deliver words with little information loss; short subjects are simpler to transmit than multifacted information; the one is easier than the many; quantity is easier than quality; the bizarre always gets more attention than the usual (p. 325).

Ideologies and slogans also have an important individual function for movement members, as well as the aid they give to the mobilization process. They help the members feel a part of something important, and they provide a sense of certainty and meaning for individual members. The Sunbelt Alliance reflects the national anti-nuclear movement in terms of its use of rhetoric in the form of ideological slogans. The following slogans are representative of the slogan rhetoric produced by the anti-nuclear movement. Many of these slogans can be found within Sunbelt Alliance literature:

"Better Active Today--Than Radioactive Tomorrow!"

"Demonstrate--Our Future Depends on It."

"By Joining Hands Across the Nation, We, as a People's Movement, Can and Will Stop the proliferation of Nukes."

"Peace and No Nukes."

"Educate, Agitate, and Organize Against Nukes."

"What do You do in Case of a Nuclear Accident--
Kiss Your Children Good-Bye?"

"Diablo at Fault."

"Hold the Baloney! Live Without Trident."

"Nuclear Pollution Has no Solution."

"God Bless Our Efforts to Stop Nuclear Power."

"Nuclear Leaks can Cause Human Freaks."

"Beware: Nuclear Power Poisons."

"Plutonium Politics can Mean no Votes for Our
Children."

"What do You do With a Used Nuke?"

"Rock-A-Bye Baby--In the Tree Top--Let's Make Be-
lieve the Fallout Will Stop."

The self-defined names of various anti-nuclear organizations also have the function of providing expressive symbolic information to outsiders. The majority of or organizational names project images that evolve around one of three basic meanings: (1) environmental awareness, (2) geographical location, or (3) people-centered (grass-roots) participation. Examples of these themes can be seen in the following organizational labels:

Clamshell Alliance (New Hampshire)
People's Power Coalition (New York)
SEA Alliance (SAFE Energy Alternatives (New Jersey)
Oystershell Alliance (Louisiana)
Catfish Alliance (Alabama)
Northern Sun Alliance (Minnesota)
Great Plains Federation (Missouri)
Armadillo Coalition (Texas)
Cactus Alliance (New Mexico)
Crabshell Alliance (Washington State)
Sagebrush Alliance (Nevada)
Abalone Alliance (California)
Mothers for Peace (California)
Upstate People for Safe Energy Technology (UPSET)
(New York)

Safe 'n Sound (SAFE Energy on Long Island Sound) (New York)
League Against Nuclear Dangers (LAND) (Wisconsin)
Citizens Against Nuclear Threat (CANT) (New Mexico)
Mobilization for Survival (Colorado)
Nuclear Objectors for a Pure Environment (NOPE) (Vermont)
People's Power Project (Missouri)
Paddlewheel Alliance (Kentucky-Ohio)
Citizens for Tomorrow (Wisconsin)
Sunbelt Alliance (Oklahoma)

Wilson (1973) posits that many social movements are often remembered more for their tactics than for their objectives. For example, Wilson sites student movements such as the Free Speech Movement and Students for a Democratic Society (SDS), which have achieved much of their notoriety through the use of disruptive and violent tactics and not through their verbalized goals and objectives, which were often poorly formed by the leaders and not understood by the public. Tactics contribute significantly to the establishment of the identity of a social movement because "tactics may be all there is to see" in the movement (p. 226). Many social movements are not much more than tactical organizations, having little substance beyond their efforts to bring a cause to the attention of society or coerce some agent of authority. Again, for example, the Free Speech Movement defined its priorities around tactical actions such as disruptive demonstrations, instead of "projects such as building up a loyal following or establishing an organization" (p. 227).

As stated earlier, anti-nuclear organizers as a group wanted to avoid the tactical-image mistakes of earlier

movements. The strategy of appealling to a grass-roots public was defined as best accomplished through the tactics of nonviolent civil disobedience and careful image maintenance through the mass media. Rhetoric as a strategy in forming public opinion is symbolically consistent with the nonviolent values of the movement ideology. It acts to establish public sympathy in accord with the overall strategy of nonviolent direct action. Furthermore, the reality of a mass media culture necessitates relying on condensed, symbolic communication to increase public knowledge of the purpose of the movement and to generate mass support. Image maintenance of the anti-nuclear movement is a function of the moral constraints implicit in their ideology and the structure of a mass media technology on wich they must depend for distribution of educational and ideological information.

Single Issue vs. Multiple Issue

Social movements throughout American history have had to decide on the number of issues to emphasize. For example, the Vietnam peace movement was divided by arguments over whether to emphasize only the war issue or tie the war to issues of economic imperialism and racism. The current protest movement against nuclear energy has also contained debates and conflicts over the single issue vs. multiple issue dilemma. Supporters of the single issue approach have argued that expanding the movement's

focus beyond that of nuclear power plants would become a source of alienation among the general public and target industry officials. Consequently, the anti-nuclear movement has generally avoided issues of corporate capitalism and socialism (Jezer, 1977). According to Alpern (1978), this issue dilemma is underscored by questions raised and statements made by nuclear industry representatives concerning the movement's true purpose. As one industry spokesperson has asked, "Is it to stop just one form of energy, or is it social and political change?" (Alpern, 1978, pp. 27).

Supporters of widening the movement's focus argue the necessity of attacking capitalism and promoting socialism if significant social change is to be achieved, and assert that only this multiple issue approach would appeal to workers and minorities (Hedemann, 1977). One socialist, for example, has labeled the political ideology of the Clamshell Alliance as "incredibly mushy," while another has emphasized the need to stress workplace conditions in alternative sources of energy (Jezer, 1977, p. 17). The rationale of including less related issues to the question of nuclear technology has also been a source of conflict. For example, during the May, 1977, Seabrook occupation, a lesbian feminist affinity group, dressed in lavender, arriving at the scene, prompted one local organizer to complain that bringing in the gay issue would alienate New Hampshire locals (Drolet, 1977).

The internal conflict over whether or not to widen the scope of the movement has had the effect of producing occasional contradictions in rhetoric style and content. The projection of a desirable public image has been accomplished by the use of verbal and written statements designed not to alienate a conservative public. This dominant public relations strategy has been a national outgrowth of the ideology of nonviolent civil disobedience. Passive action is symbolically tied to rhetoric that is nonabrasive and humanistically oriented. However, there remains examples of verbal and written communication within the movement that is reminiscent of verbal attacks on the "establishment," and the intellectual elitism produced by the counter-culture peace movements of the 1960's. This style of rhetoric basically confronts the lifestyles and values of the same general public that tactics such as nonviolent direct action were designed not to antagonize. Although much of this rhetoric does not evolve from formal organizations such as the Sunbelt Alliance, it does encompass the general philosophical boundaries of the movement. For example, the following "Parable of the Atomic Fox," written by Father Bill Skeehan and published by the Tulsa Free Press, deals with the Black Fox nuclear power site by illustrating a moral attitude:

> Once upon a time, in America's most beautiful city, a baby fox was born. Being the first born, he was called Atom. Quietly and

> slyly, he grew into a great black predator, hovering over the Eastern skies, waiting for his time, his own coming into power, waiting to pounce on the unexpecting city, laying waste its water and air. A fearless band of citizens, little, powerless people, organized Citizen's Action for Safe Energy, to confront Atom. For years, his mother, the local goddess of light, had made powerful friends among the city fathers and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
>
> But the real evil was THE POWER, another, deeper, hidden power, lying within this rich, lovely city. A power which creates selfish, aggressive, political and commerical empires --that negative, hopeless, and fear-ridden perception of reality that penetrates 'good' people, who were chased back into their shells, hounded by their own habits of fear and by a society that had a vested interested in exaggerating it. Why 'fight City Hall,' or the ominous NRC?'
>
> The case was heard, but not really heard, for THE POWER was present and mother fox prevailed. She said, 'Let there be light, and there was light,' and the light of her eyes was Atom, the Black Fox. His lair was built.
>
> Many years passed. THE POWER remained. Atom, the Black Fox, was lord. Yet, imperceptibly, the light ebbed and slowly dimmed. Finally, only darkness remained (Skeehan, 1978, p. 8).

A feature story in the Tulsa Free Press, entitled, "Fox Breaks Ground Heads," is another example of rhetoric not designed to appeal to a wide public audience. The content of the story details some violent behavior directed toward Sunbelt Alliance members as they were protesting groundbreaking ceremonies at Black Fox. The introduction part of the article, however, expresses an overt "disdain" for the values and lifestyles of mainstream American society:

One would think such a tragic occasion would be accompanied by indignant thunder and righteously aimed lightning bolts, but that was not the case. As if to prove that we are on our own in the reality of our choosing, the sun faithfully illuminated the whole scene; relentlessly scorching the participants seated in metal folding chairs, fanning themselves, and disregarding the source of all life on this planet.

The speakers gathered on the flag-bedecked rostrum to congratulate themselves on how well they have done in making themselves wealthy; in concealing their malevolent intentions from those to whom they are responsible; in launching the largest construction project in Oklahoma's history; and providing hundreds of working class people with a chance to be significantly included in the destruction of mankind and the elevation of cancer from a chance disease to a national way of life. One gets the impression that these heartless mannequins would set up concession stands and sell tickets to Judgement Day, then again, maybe they already have.

A small group of people loosely affiliated with the Sunbelt Alliance, an organization opposing the proliferation of nuclear plants in the Southwest, stood conspicuously to one side. Dressed in black, symbolic of mourning, they looked on incredulously as the bulldozers scurried to and fro in the distant valley; snorting, churning up rodigious clouds of top soil mingled with exhaust fumes, appearing to be surreal insects greedily consuming everything in sight.

The Catoosa High School band plodded through an old Beatles tune while the pubescent cheerleading squad pranced and smiled nervously through gleaming braces, the sun flushing their rouged cheeks. Their proud parents probably fear food stains on their uniforms more than the incipient cancer epidemic they so innocently celebrate.

The first speaker, a philistine responsible for the benediction, tells us that '. . . the power of the Lord can be generated in our lives.' He liberally quotes from the Bible

> that man is above everything on earth, thanking God and Public Service Co., all in the same breath. The bulldozers belch their approval. One hundred thousand years--plutonium is forever and ever, amen (Tulsa Free Press, 1978, p. 3).

CHAPTER VI

PERSONAL IDENTITY MAINTENANCE AND MOVEMENT PARTICIPATION

Mobilization: Developing and Sustaining Member Commitment

Because social movements are deliberate collective enterprises that seek to promote or resist social change, they must develop contingencies for their growth and development. The focus of this section concerns the problem of accounting for extreme commitment to the movement and the role of the movement's organizational structure in this accountability. Once an individual has become a member of a social movement, how is commitment developed? Answering this question will take up the bulk of this chapter. First, however, a brief overview of recruitment theories will be presented.

Among the many attempts to clarify the recruitment processes of social movements, various forms of motivational analysis have been used, as represented in such works as Cantril (1941) and Toch (1965). The motivational model of analysis has typically focused on the identification of the psychological factors which seem to make people susceptible to movement appeals and which motivate

them individually to sustain group affiliation. Zygmunt (1972) suggests that motivational analysis has generally taken the form of attempts to establish a "psycho-functional" connection between the appeals of the social movement's ideology and the social-psychological characteristics of potential or actual members. He writes that:

> These connections have been commonly treated in terms of some variant of the idea of functional complementarity and elaborated in various theories of 'conversion susceptibility' or movement 'attraction.' The dominant imagery has been essentially 'psycho-economic,' depicting a situation of psychological 'supply and demand.' The 'demand' side of the psychological equation would be represented by the personality structure, with its needs, drives, and other motivational predispositions, and the 'supply' side, by the movement itself, with its promises and opportunities for need-gratification, tension-reduction, catharsis, predispositional expression, etc. (p. 43).

Social movements, from this perspective, are viewed as potential sources for the restoration of individual psychological equilibrium. Some examples of this type of analysis are found in the early work of Cantril (1941) and the later writing of Toch (1965), both representing social-psychological focus. Earlier writers, for example, Lasswell (1930) and Rinaldo (1921), emphasized deep-rooted personality factors as motives for political group identification. The latest of the above mentioned, Toch (1965), is illustrative of more recent social-psychological motivational analysis. The key concept in his approach is the experiencing of a problem in a thinking, reacting

individual. Toch asserts that the gravity of problems felt by people can only be understood in the context of attitudes, feelings, expectations, and needs of affected persons. For problem situations to produce a social movement, people must feel the problem, believe something can be done about it, and want to do something about it. All of this must occur within individuals before a collective action can occur. A person's susceptibility to join a social movement can be linked to his or her individual search for meaning and a desire to be involved in a form of change that will produce that meaning. Therefore, a psychological bond exists between a movement's ability to promote itself and the individual's willingness to accept. For Toch, the appeals of the movement and the acceptance or rejection of those appeals by individuals is the major element in the linkage between the social and the psychological. Toch suggests that most membership into social movements is recruited from the "ranks of the desperate." This individual malady, however, is soon turned into a feeling of mutual reciprocity among the members of the movement. The mutuality of membership is a collective response to personally perceived social problems that are too frustrating to cope with alone, or problems that do not contain an individual solution. Toch highlights the personal benefits of social movements that stress pervasive conspiracy. This type of movement tends to exaggerate the

force it is fighting against in order to cement tension against it. It has the effect of simplifying the member's system of reasoning concerning the focused target. Toch does allude to the difference between personal perception and the reality of the movement as a possible motive for disaffection from the movement (Toch, 1965).

Toch's (1965) social-psychological theory can be criticized for emphasizing psychological factors at the expense of the sociological. He gives little focus to the reality of objective social conditions that must be identified as needed targets for change. Social movements are collective responses to a perceived difference between social ideals and social reality. While it is true that individual perception of social reality is an important factor for motivation to join a social movement, the movement itself, as well as the social condition it is reacting to, can influence that perception. His treatment of the reasons for continued commitment of members to the movement is very scant. He fails to focus on the role of group structure and process in generating and keeping membership.

The concept of alienation is often seen in the literature as a primary indicator of social movement affiliation and involvement. As Zygmunt (1972) stresses, however, alienation may be manifested in a variety of ways, and many "alienated" people do not become involved with organized movements. He posits that neither alienation from

a specific social reality, nor attraction to a social movement, can be fully understood only in terms of appeals and susceptibilities. Social movements, according to Zygmunt (1972), are not merely vehicles through which already existing alienation may be expressed and remedied; they are themselves agents of alienation. For example, analysis of member recruitment to the sit-in movement reflects that individuals with "relatively stable, permanent deprivations," people who appear to be predisposed to movement affiliation, were "relatively late joiners" (Pinard, Kirk, and Von Eschen, 1970, p. 355). Evidently, these people had to be convinced that their deprivations could be changed through collective action. Their personal alienation was only a motive force for commitment after the movement itself agitated the feeling. Agitation by the movement must be seen not only as drawing on predeveloped feelings of alienation, but also as creating and sustaining them by providing more specific targets (Lang and Lang, 1961). Motivational analysis merely treats alienation as a prestructural disposition which enhances recruitment susceptibility, not as an emergent process of interaction between individuals and movement structure. There is a frequent disregard of the role of movements themselves in generating and intensifying it (Zygmunt, 1972).

Proponents of the motivational approach have used these selected dimensions of the recruitment process to

explain motives for movement involvement. The methodological validity of these analyses is often empirically weak. Assumptions about the psychology of human motives are introduced but not tied to specific movement organizations. Often times the psychological motives for participation and psychological results of actual participation are confusingly entangled (Zygmunt, 1972).

A more realistic and fruitful analysis of movement membership must focus on membership management, with special emphasis upon the movement as a structural process of fortifying individual commitments. Social movements can change over time. How do they continue to hold members to the goals and tactics of the organization? The movement must anchor individual self-identity to the group structure. Continued involvement from individual members is a variable tied to psychological commitment. Not all members of social movements are necessarily deeply committed nor does membership itself necessarily evolve into a deep commitment. As the length of membership extends, many individuals may become more closely associated with the movement by the expending of accumulated time and energy, receiving increased support from other members, and having a continual reinforcement of their needs and beliefs (Milgram and Toch, 1969). These elements are enhanced by the factors of: (1) inside reward contingencies, (2) the instrinsic rewards of various activities, and (3) the development of morale (Perry and Pugh, 1978).

The understanding of these elements is best achieved by focusing on the impact of the organizational pattern and structure of the social movement. The relationship of organization to individual identity maintenance represents a symbiosis between psychological process and social structure. A social movement is therefore faced with a dilemma: while it needs organizational projection of a positive image to the public, it must also maintain member loyalty by sustaining internal identity maintenance. The anti-nuclear movement has addressed this dilemma by fusing maximum participant involvement with the expressed ideology of the movement. The organization of strategies and tactics compliment movement goals, public identity maintenance, and internal solidarity. Activity in the movement contributes toward solidifying self-conception when it gives the individual a significant part to play in processes that highlight the movement's goals and when it allows for the feeling of individual contribution.

Personal Identity Maintenance and Movement Participation

Every organized social movement represents some type of symbolic and normative structure into which members must be incorporated. The success of the movement depends upon its ability to draw individuals into the social-psychological framework of its influence and maintain

their loyalty to the group. Mobilization of people for action not only involves a collective definition of purpose but also individually altered routines that are necessary to sustain the movement (Garner, 1977). Every movement group who seeks continued allegiance from its members must promote the incorporation of individual membership into individual self-conception. The greater an individual's personal identity with a movement, the greater his or her commitment to the movement goals is likely to be. The specific purposes of the movement's formation are often not enough in and of themselves to sustain individual loyalty and recruit new members. The structure of the organization in terms of the methods used to realize its purposes plays a significant role in keeping members. The structure of the anti-nuclear movement is a realistic reflection of its purpose. Anti-nuclear ideology carries with it a philosophical orientation toward democratic or "grass-roots" participation in social decision making. This philosophy of equal participation carries over into the structure of movement decisions concerning strategy and tactics. The individual member is less likely to lose his or her personal identity in a group situation that allows for meaningful personal input concerning group decisions. The dichotomy between leadership and membership is more difficult to evolve in a group structure that encourages egalitarian participation. The structure of the movement

in the form of consensus-style decision making and affinity groups, ideally prevents any individual member from being denied access to decision inputs.

Group Dynamics: A Relationship Between Process and Structure

To answer the question of how a movement group can generate and maintain a positive self-identification to the movement among the individual members, a theoretical explanation is needed to form a base for later empirical examples. The generalizations emerging from these theoretical comments will be applicable to the structure and process of the Sunbelt Alliance. The concept of group dynamics must include an understanding of the concept of group. As Lewin (1948) writes:

> The essence of a group is not the similarity or dissimilarity of its members, but their interdependence. A group can be characterized as a 'dynamical whole' containing a subjective or psychological interdependence among the individuals who form its membership (p. 54).

French (1944) points out that, in addition to interdependence, membership in a group presupposes identification with the group. Deutsch (1959) indicates that the interdependence is that of promotive or cooperative interdependence, rather than, for example, competitive interdependence. Therefore, a group can be defined as being composed of individuals who mutually perceive themselves to be cooperatively interdependent in some degree.

Thus, group dynamics implies a focus on the internal characteristics of groups, that is, on internal structural and dynamic properties. One of the significant experimental concepts of group dynamics is that of group cohesiveness. It is intuitively clear that cohesiveness refers to the elements which bond the parts of a group together and serve to negate disruptive influences. These elements act on members to remain in the group. Group cohesiveness is based on the degree of perceived cooperative interdependence among members and to the strength of goals about which the members are cooperatively interdependent (Zander and Cartwright, 1962).

Summarizing the large amount of research dealing with the concept of group cohesiveness, Collins and Guetzkow, Hare, McGrath and Altman, as cited in Deutsch (1968) suggest that:

> We can state that cohesiveness, as measured by interpersonal congeniality, the desire to remain a member of the group, attitude toward the group's functioning, or other similar measures, is consistently associated with communication among group members, readiness of group members to be influenced by the group, consensus among members on attitudes and beliefs that relate to group functioning, a sense of responsibility toward other group members, a feeling of personal ease and security within the group on the part of group members, and so forth. Also, task effectiveness is in general positively correlated with cohesiveness if high accomplishment on the task is valued by the group . . . and if the task is such that its performance is likely to be enhanced by increased group effort (p. 469).

Various measures of cohesiveness have been employed to help generate a common definition of the concept. One such measure focuses on the communication process within groups as it arises from pressures toward uniformity (Back, 1951). Lack of agreement among group members provides an unstable basis for beliefs and actions which depend on social consensus for their support. This need for group consensus generates the need for uniformity. According to Festinger (1950), pressures toward uniformity among group members may also arise because uniformity is necessary in order that the group may realize some goal. Festinger states that greater uniformity in opinion within a group may be brought about either be (1) communication, directed at changing the positions the individual members occupy relative to one another (for example, by attempting to influence others to change their opinions or by changing one's own opinions), or (2) by rejecting or excluding individuals with deviating opinions from influential group decision making (Festinger, 1950). These two elements closely parallel the function and consequences of consensus-style decision making within the anti-nuclear movement. This process of maximizing the feeling of individual participation in Sunbelt group decisions will be explored later in this chapter.

For the present, it should be noted that consensus (as well as the use of affinity groups to be treated later also) represents within the Sunbelt group a property which

reflects the internal structure and characteristic methods of working. These forms of group relations also determine the extent to which members develop shared perspectives concerning organizational problems and goal expectations. They influence the motivation of individual members to perform the activities by producing congruence of attitudes and a sense of cohesiveness. The anti-nuclear movement stresses the assumption that members are decision makers whose individual choices must be channeled in such a way as to allow expression, yet be oriented toward the collective will of the group. Consensus style decision making approaches the realization of this balance. It recognizes the importance of group decision making and participation in motivating people. The solidarity that exists among members, in individual terms, is the attractiveness that the group has for each member. Every group has qualifications for membership. The individual knows what makes him or her eligible and he or she is aware that membership requires certain kinds of conduct, attitudes, and responses to situations important to the group as a whole. Most individuals seek to accommodate themselves to the demands of the group up to the point of consistency with their personal values and norms. The greater the interdependence of each member to the other, the greater the sense of direction the group can maintain in terms of goal realization. Individuals with similar points of view, desires, values, and norms tend

to cluster together and thus social movements are born. Life as a viable movement, however, can only be sustained if member identification to the movement remains strong. The process of individual interaction within the structural framework of the group is the key element in the movement's viability.

The group dynamics of the anti-nuclear movement has emphasized the necessity of compatability between process and structure. The linkage between process and structure is represented in the formation of superordinate goals which are equally compelling for all but which cannot be achieved by the efforts and resources of one individual alone. In general, cohesiveness is increased by conditions which cause group members to develop common perceptions of problems, to evolve shared perspectives of themselves and their group, and to become consistently and harmoniously involved with the strategies and tactics for the realization of group goals. The use of the consensus decision rule by Sunbelt is a method wherein all individual viewpoints are considered until a decision can be reached which incorporates the concerns of all members and to which all can give their consent. This means that the group looks for the "sense of the meeting" which involves the search for a proposal which will envelope the concerns of the individual group members as well as the needs of the group as a whole. The consensus method can only work effectively in groups of people who have a feeling of integration with

each other and an agreement on common values. As Hare (1962) points out:

> Members will be satisfied with the group if it has been able to solve the particular task or social-emotional problem in which they are most interested. However, high productivity in the task area is not always associated with satisfactory relationships in the social-emotional area. In authoritarian groups and competitive groups, high productivity is often gained at the expense of member satisfaction (p. 356).

Consensus decision making in the Sunbelt Alliance is designed to produce a communication network with maximum feedback by individual members. When free communication is maximized, each strategy advocated by a member has realistically equal opportunity of being selected by the group, resulting in decisions that are often the median of individual opinions. The following pages are a discussion of how this specifically operates in the Sunbelt Alliance.

The Sunbelt Structure of Member Participation and Its Impact

Several scholars have analyzed the impact of the organizational pattern and structure of social movement groups on their ability to reduce factionalism and sustain internal loyalty. The anti-nuclear protest alliances have largely developed a specific organizational pattern following the example of the Clamshell Alliance. To avoid the centralized power structure that anti-nuclear protesters believe was a significant weakness of the Vietnam anti-war movement, the alliances have emphasized democratic decision

making and maximum participation by all members. Influenced by Quakerism, the alliances are nonhierarchical and decentralized. There are no elected officers or other levels of membership, and there is no centralized leadership. Rotating "facilitators" take the place of permanent chairpersons at meetings, and frequently everyone present must have an opportunity to speak before anyone can speak a second time (Gamson, 1975).

Using the meeting process of the Quakers as a model, the anti-nuclear alliances reach decisions by the process of consensus, not by majority vote. Meetings take no action that is not consented to by every participant. The members who do not agree but do not feel strongly enough to block consensus may "stand aside" to allow the group to reach a decision, regardless of total group consensus (Barkan, 1979). The purpose and process of consensus decision making as a form of group dynamics was clearly expressed by the Sunbelt Alliance in their Black Fox Occupation Handbook. The organization defines the philosophical base of this form of activity by initially stating that:

> Democracy by consensus is an old and little used form of collective decision making. It has been carried into the present by the Religious Society of Friends (Quakers) who learned it from the Native Americans in the days before the original American Revolution. Consensus is a cooperative way for people to relate to each other as a group. But not every decision can be made in unison. Experience instructs us that times will arise when central decisions are ones that certain persons will not be able, for a variety of reasons,

> find an absolutely unified ground. Most often, motivated by principles, in rare instances motivated by the intent to disrupt, small groups of dissenters have occasionally crippled other alliances by blocking consensus. For this reason, the Sunbelt Alliance has adopted a consensus/two-thirds majority method of decision making. We strive first and foremost for a consensus within the group, but if that is unattainable, a two-thirds majority decision will be adopted as policy (Sunbelt Alliance, 1979e, p. 7).

The anti-nuclear alliances have been forced to make a trade-off between the psychological and tactical benefits of the consensus process, and the ability to act quickly in conflict situations. The Sunbelt Alliance recognized, for example, that reaching a true consensus can often be a protracted process and that decision making can fail to function smoothly. As Kuhn (1978) emphasizes, during times of stress or in situations that demand quick action, the decision making process of many nuclear protest groups has broken down. As an example, Kuhn documents that following the arrests of 280 persons during the April, 1978, occupation by the Palmetto Alliance of a nuclear waste plant site in South Carolina, 30 representatives of other groups making up the Alliance debated the question of bail solidarity. One side was proposing to pay up to $25 bail per individual to avoid adding to the expense of incarceration by local residents. A more radical group argued that no bail money should be paid. Although a majority vote would have quickly resolved the conflict,

discussion continued for nine hours until consensus favoring the $25 payment was finally reached (Kuhn, 1978).

During the May, 1977, occupation of the Seabrook, New Hampshire nuclear plant site, affinity group decisions were hampered by the failure to reach group consensus. When the occupiers first entered the site, decision making broke down in an effort to decide what to do next, as affinity group representatives seemed to be coming back from coordinating meetings with "orders from above." The coordinating committee spent most of the day discussing such issues as what to name the site, instead of what action should be taken next (Hedemann, 1977). In other meetings during the following days, confusion over the meaning of consensus led to many debates over various issues. As one member stated:

> Some felt consensus required agreement by everyone, rather than a sensitivity to the strength of opinions and a willingness to step aside if your opinion was not based on a strongly-held principle (Hedemann, 1977, p. 14).

The Sunbelt Alliance attempted to reduce the possibility of similar decision making conflicts by opting for a combination consensus/two-thirds majority decision making format. The organization adopted and distributed a basic set of rules for the consensus process evolving from a clearly defined group-interaction ideology:

> Consensus requires that everyone con-sent; it does not required that everyone agree. We are an alliance that formed for a purpose and, in order for us to reach consensus,

we must inculcate in ourselves a willingness, a desire, to reach consensus. As an alliance of diverse people with diverse perspectives, we seek to cooperate with one another not to dominate one another. . . . The fundamental responsibility of consensus is to assure others of their right to speak and be heard.

Sunbelt Alliance Rules of Consensus:
--Be clear about areas of agreement.
--The situation needing consideration is discussed. A clear idea of what decision needs to be made is formulated. A proposal can then be made. (Part of this discussion should bring out the present position or course of action of the group as it relates to the issue at hand.)
--People present who do not speak are assumed to have no strong feeling on the matter.
--After adequate discussion, it is asked if there is any opposition to the proposal as stated.
--If there are no objections, the proposal can be formally stated and adopted.
--Opposition to the proposal will block its adoption.
--If the objections can be satisfied, a sense of the meeting can be taken again. If there are no further objections, the proposal can be adopted.
--If an objection cannot be satisfied, and no creative alternative solutions can be offered which meet no objections, then a vote on the proposal is taken. A 2/3 majority is sufficient to adopt the proposal.

Since the object is consent, not agreement, there are ways to object without blocking consensus:

--Non-support ('I don't see the need for this, but I'll go along').
--Reservations ('I think this may be a mistake, but I can live with it').
--Standing aside ('I personally can't do this, but I won't block others from doing it').
--Withdrawing from the group.

Because of the fragile nature of this decision making process, we all must temper our aspirations for the group with some basic guidelines for the consensus process.

> --Responsibility - Block consensus only for serious, principled objections. Help others find ways to satisfy your objections.
> --Respect - Accept objections, trust those who make them to be acting responsibly. Help find ways to satisfy objections.
> --Cooperation - Look for areas of agreement and common ground; avoid competitive right/wrong, win/lose thinking. When a stalemate occurs, look for creative alternatives, or the next most acceptable proposals. Try to advance the group synthesis.
> --Creative Conflict - Try to resolve the conflict. Don't abandon an objection for 'harmony' if it is a real problem that you are speaking to. Don't try to trade-off objections.
>
> We all have the same purpose: to nonviolently stop nuclear power. Seemingly irreconcilable differences can be resolved if people speak their feelings honestly and genuinely try to understand all positions (including their own) better (Sunbelt Alliance, 1978b, pp. 7-8).

The Sunbelt Alliance was partially successful in guarding against decision making problems during occupation situations by developing contingency plans concerning the structure of decision making before the actual occupation. These plans are developed through a consensus format and then distributed to all support people before the occupation. For example, prior to the October 7, 1978, occupation of Black Fox, the Alliance distributed the following information to interested persons:

> Decision making for the occupation/restoration will be as follows:
>
> The steering committee will divide itself according to those who will occupy and those who will do support. The occupying steering committee will be expanded for the duration of the action (beginning on the evening of October 6, when all affinity groups should

> be at the staging area) by one spokesperson from each affinity group. The support steering committee will be likewise expanded by a spokesperson from the support affinity groups. This type of decision making will allow both continuity going into the action and an increased democratization for the duration of the action (Sunbelt Alliance, 1978b, p. 2).

The benefits of consensus as a decision making process are both affective and organizational. By maximizing individual participation, consensus produced positive morale and minimized potential feelings of disenchantment with group decisions. The individual's sense of personal identity and contribution was enhanced because of the opportunity for information input into the collectivity, and because the group is defined as an extension of its individual contributors, not as an entity that suppresses individual significance in favor of structural hierarchy or a centralization of power. In terms of organizational maintenance, consensus has lessened hostility and group factionalism, and has thus served as a type of internal control based on the effective balance of individual identity maintenance and organization progress through group cooperation. When Sunbelt practiced non-consensus methods in the later stages of the movement, factionalism within the group was the result. This will be focused on in a later section of this paper.

The emphasis of the anti-nuclear alliances on maximum individual participation is also reflected in the decision making structures they have adopted. According

to Barkan (1979), to reach "general" strategic decisions, each of the local groups that feeds into the larger, regional or statewide alliance chooses a spokesperson to represent it in a coordinating committee that makes decisions on this larger level, using the consensus method. Decisions reached by the coordinating committee are subject to approval by all the local groups, and thus a major decision may take two weeks or more to complete.

The Sunbelt Alliance, as a regional organization, contained the local groups in the following cities: Tulsa, Oklahoma (Sunbelt Alliance office), Oklahoma City, Oklahoma (Sunbelt Alliance office), Norman, Oklahoma, Stillwater, Oklahoma, Fayetteville, Arkansas, Tahlequah, Oklahoma, and Witchita, Kansas. A significant part of the decision making structure during the planning and carrying out of specific protest occupations has been the affinity group. These groups had the function of the local groups referred to above and provided an important way to insure maximum participation and group support. The term "affinity group" is one the anti-nuclear movement has taken from the Spanish Civil War of the late 1930's, where small groups were the base of the nationwide anarchist organization. Organizing affinity groups is a way of accomplishing goals while allowing for the existence of group process through individual dynamics. Usually composed of 10 to 20 people, they are large enough to be powerful and active, yet small enough to provide individuals with a sense of

equal participation (Gyorgy, 1979). Affinity groups are mostly formed during nonviolent training sessions preceding nuclear plant site occupations, and usually disband following the occupation and its legal consequences. These groups are organized on the basis of friendship ties, or other sources of individual alliances. The Sunbelt Alliance organized its affinity groups around "a common core interest, such as women's and men's, peacekeeping, old friends, or people who work together" (Sunbelt Alliance 1979e, p. 12).

In order to reach decisions during the planning and action of an occupation, every affinity group selects an individual to represent it on a coordinating committee. The decisions made by this committee must be approved by all affinity groups using the consensus process. The movement defines affinity groups as important beyond the short-term aspects of decision making. Gyorgy (1979) sums up the significance of affinity groups by suggesting that:

> The methods of organization that have been adopted and developed by the anti-nuclear movement in the new direct action alliances do not pretend to solve the problems of sexism, dominance and authoritarianism that are such an integral part of our society. But they are an expression of intent and interest in building a society where people do not dominate and abuse either nature or each other (p. 389).

The Sunbelt Alliance maintained that affinity groups have three basic functions:

1. They serve as a source of support for their members and thereby are a concrete reminder

> of our solidarity. By generating trust, they work against the possibility of disruption by provocateurs. They also provide emotional support in stressful situations.
>
> 2. They are the basic decision-making structure for the occupation. They allow for decentralized tactical decision-making through use of consensus, thus evoking personal empowerment by giving all participants a voice in decisions. In this way, representatives (spokes) from each affinity group will work together for coordination and decision-making. In this way, everyone's needs are taken into account.
>
> 3. Each affinity group aims for self-sufficiency on the site, planning its own support (for instance, food, medical, transportation, legal, and other needs. Within the affinity group, individuals will need to take or share responsibility for certain roles, including those of media, medical, peace keeping, spoke and perhaps legal personnel (Sunbelt Alliance, 1979e, p. 12).

Affinity groups are thus intended to produce the same affective and organizational benefits that characterized the consensus process of decision making. The groups serve as an integrating force that reduces the potential of the individual losing his or her identity in a collective structure. Organizationally, affinity groups provide emotional and tactical support during occupations, where each group remains together and is self-sufficient. These groups also have produced a high degree of order and disipline during the occupations, helping to project a nonviolent image. Finally, the affinity group structure is a way of identifying potential disrupters of the nonviolent ideology of the movement (Kuhn, 1978).

The Sunbelt Alliance, as an organization, helped prepare its members both physically and psychologically for occupation/restoration situations. The organization accomplished this through the distribution of printed suggestions or "guides" that benefited each member during the protest. This type of individual preparation has two significant benefits. First, it insures that many potential problems of food, supplies, and health care will not occur during the occupation. Such problems, although personal in nature, can be a disruptive influence on the group process and accomplishments during occupation. Second, this form of preparation is a method of more fully integrating the individuals into the group structure. It provides the individual with a sense of security and readiness, and fosters the idea that each individual is an important contributor to the success of the protest. Under the title of "Be Prepared," the Black Fox Occupation Handbook contains several suggested areas of personal readiness for individual occupiers. The suggestions are prefaced by the following general statement:

> When gathering together your personal items, you should keep in mind the weight and bulk of the materials you bring, as well as the situation you are bringing them into. Oklahoma in June can be very hot, full of vengeful flying insects and very dusty. It can also be rainy and cold, especially at night.
>
> Your personal items should all fit into (or be lashed onto the outside of) a pack. Framed backpacks can carry heavier, bulkier

> loads than frameless ones but they can be cumbersome in tight situations (e.g., packed into buses). Frameless packs have a problem with being very sweaty as they lie directly on the back. You should bring a sleeping bag or bedroll--a thin pad beneath would supply insulation and comfort (Sunbelt Alliance and Oklahomans for Nuclear Safeguards, 1979, p. 19).

The personal items of clothing, toilet items, and equipment are suggested as follows:

Clothing required:

--one pair of good hiking shoes
--two pair long, loose pants
--two loose, long-sleeved shirts
--two sets underwear
--two pair wool socks
--hat with (wide) brim
--one pair work gloves
--one jacket
--one set raingear (preferably a rain suit)
--sunglasses
--belt
--towel

Optional:

--one pair shorts or bathing suit
--windbreaker jacket
--one pair light shoes or sneakers (not sandals)
--extra socks/underwear
--insect head net

Toilet items:

--toilet paper
--toothbrush/paste
--soap/washcloth
--sunscreen lotion

Equipment:

--wallet with (optional) I.D.
--money, including change
--Occupation Handbook
--notebook, pen/pencil and stamps
--large spoon and cup or bowl
--flashlight (optional: extra batteries)
--matches
--pocket knife

--first aid supplies and personal medications
--tent and sleeping gear
--insect repellant
--gas attack equipment (see 'medical info.')

Optional:

--camera and film
--birth control supplies
--tobacco supplies
--reading material
--road maps of Oklahoma

> Natural fibers breathe best and wool stays warm when wet. Clothing should be light, loose and comfortable. Avoid expensive equipment and expect that anything brought might be lost or damaged. Please label all of your belongings with name, address, and affinity group. Avoid wearing jewelry. Avoid open fires and test cooking or candles in the tent, due to the danger of fires in a crowded area. No firewood is available on the site.
>
> You should bring an absolute minimum of 1-1/2 gallons of water (only 12 pounds); 2-2-1/2 gallons are recommended (Sunbelt Alliance, 1979e, p. 19).

The Sunbelt Alliance, through its affinity group structure, planned for the responsible operation and completion of its proposed occupations. Social actions of this type require cooperation and communication between the various affinity groups. Each Sunbelt affinity group assumed the responsibility of providing for anticipated "group" needs. As stated earlier, the small size of the affinity groups (10-20 persons) allowed for collective task realization, while permitting relatively equal cooperative input from the individual members. The solidarity of the affinity groups as separate units is based on the provision of various group needs during the occupation action. As the Alliance stated:

> Each affinity group should bring its own shelter. An inexpensive 'tent' can be constructed by fastening two ponchos of the same type along their edge. . . . Add some mosquito netting or a lot of insect repellant and you have a good, warm weather tent.
>
> The affinity group should also bring cooking utensils, rope, first aid supplies, sewing materials, shovel, trash bags, a repair kit with pliers, heavy tape, safety pins, glue, twine, etc. and any other materials they feel are necessary. . . .
>
> Self sufficiency concerning food is urged as the most efficient way of meeting our group needs. Each affinity group should come with at least four days worth of food. . . .
>
> It is suggested that all food be non-perishable and easy to store or pack. Foods such as dried fruits, nuts, seeds, peanut butter, dark breads, vegetables, hard cheeses, relatively short cooking grains and beans, granola, gorp, salami, powdered milk, fresh fruit, peas and sprouting containers are good items. . . .
>
> People with special dietary needs should come prepared and also refer to the medical section of the Handbook. Fasting is not recommended (Sunbelt Alliance, 1979e, pp. 20-21).

The Sunbelt Alliance stressed the importance of individual physical and psychological health in order to insure the success of the occupation action. Here again, the emphasis is placed on the self-sufficiency of each affinity group. A warning of possible problems during occupation underscores the need for group and individual readiness:

> Due to the situation we will be in--with poor or non-existent communication resupply, transportation and evacuation systems; exposure to sun and heat and/or rain and cold and mosquitos, black flies and poison ivy;

> crowding and noise; very limited food and water; possibility of police use of violence and/or gas, those occupying must be prepared to take care of their own physical and psychological health needs and conduct themselves in such a manner as to avoid or minimize medical problems wherever possible. . . .
>
> By and large, those who occupy sites should be only those people who are capable of withstanding the severe physical and psychological stresses anticipated with minimal wear and who will be able and willing to conduct themselves with enough cooperation and self-discipline in manners of safety, sanitation and support of the well-being of the other occupiers to help prevent or minimize problems in these areas. . . . (Sunbelt Alliance 1979e, p. 21).

Sunbelt urged people with health conditions that might be aggravated by the occupation action to consider a support role of some kind. This caution acts to reduce the possibility of unnecessary strain on other occupiers taking valuable time away from their purpose in being there. The Alliance recommended that those who should not occupy include:

1. people who cannot stand prolonged periods of psychological stress.
2. people with possibly life-endangering medical conditions such as asthma, heart diseases, epilepsy, severe environmental allergies, bleeding problems, kidney problems and pregnancy.
3. people whose conditions are not life threatening but can still be severely aggravated by the situation (making themselves and others miserable such as sun) (Sunbelt Alliance, 1979e, p. 21).

Finally, as a way of tolerating the various physical and psychological stresses that can occur during an occupation, personal and group conduct was outlined by the Alliance by suggesting that everyone:

1. eat well and get enough sleep both before and during the occupation.

2. wear the correct clothing: cover up from sun, rain, insects, and poison ivy and do not go barefoot. We cannot spare the water needed to treat the problems caused by not doing so.

3. cooperate with safety and sanitation suggestions of the medical team. We will also try to arrange to have 'quiet areas' designated at each occupation site for getting away from the crowds and noise.

4. bring a quiet personal activity to withdraw into as necessary (e.g., knitting, reading material), as well as some activities to do as a group (e.g., musical instruments). Quiet times are important too (Sunbelt Alliance, 1979e, p. 22).

The medical team at the occupation site was responsible for supplying over 69 separate first aid items. Each individual was also encouraged to carry on his/her person small first aid items such as bandaids, gas attack supplies, and insect bite medicine (Sunbelt Alliance and Oklahomans for Nuclear Safeguards, 1979).

CHAPTER VII

INTERVIEWS: SUNBELT ALLIANCE

CORE MEMBERSHIP

The core membership of the Stillwater chapter of Sunbelt consisted of approximately 10 individuals who were significantly involved in the structure and processes of the organization from its inception. Although some of these initial members have now left the community of Stillwater for various places, many are still living in the area and were very willing to be interviewed concerning their personal observations of Sunbelt. This section represents a combination of input based on personal interviews with many of the core members of the Stillwater Sunbelt Alliance. An attempt is made to reflect each person's individual conception of the organization concerning structure, strategy, tactics, and goal realization. A major focus of the interviews is also the element of individual identity maintenance provided by the movement, as the members defined it. Because of the political nature of this social movement, the persons interviewed are not referred to by exact name. This is done as a compliance to the request of some of the individuals, as

well as a way of, hopefully, insuring a complete and honest response to the questions.

At the time of the interviews, the Sunbelt Alliance was no longer functioning as an active anti-nuclear organization anywhere in the state of Oklahoma. As of March, 1982, the construction of Black Fox 1 near Inola, Oklahoma, was cancelled, thus assuring at least a temporary victory for the anti-nuclear forces in Oklahoma. Every person interviewed was asked to perceive the movement organization at the time of their active membership, and not as an after-the-fact involvement. The social network, making up the original core membership of the Stillwater Sunbelt group, is still present in the community, with most respondents reflecting a sense of solidarity with the group as a whole. The following section is divided into categories reflecting focused variables of interest to this study. A series of open-ended questions were solicited from every subject interviewed, and individual expression of responses was encouraged. Most interviews were relatively lengthy, with average interview time being approximately 1-1/2 hours. One interview lasted 45 minutes, while two others lasted over three hours. These interviews were conducted in Stillwater, Oklahoma on March 12-13, 1982.

Purpose for Joining the Movement

Most respondents indicated that their major purpose

for joining was a personal fear and dislike for nuclear power as an energy source in American society in general and Oklahoma in particular. For example some specific responses given were:

> I felt this was a way of expressing a long-time criticism of nukes.
>
> I saw it as an opportunity to help promote environmental salvation. I could not consciously stand by and allow Black Fox to be built.
>
> I wanted to do something about Black Fox, and saw my chance and went for it. The mess we have brought upon ourselves has got to be stopped, and I figured why not help stop it.
>
> I couldn't pass up a chance to actively try and prevent something that I was strongly opposed to. How many chances do we get like that--not many.
>
> I hate nuclear power and everything it stands for; that's all the reason I needed. I am not very reflective about these sorts of things. Something is either right or wrong and Black Fox is very wrong.

Perhaps the single most striking feature of the respondents regarding the reason for movement participation is their belief that society will face an ultimate "eco-catastrophe" unless immediate and successful efforts are made to halt the construction of nuclear power facilities. As reformists they were generally knowledgeable about the potential dangers of nuclear energy and felt a strong need to influence public decision making about these dangers.

As individuals, many of the respondents seemed committed to model their personal behavior after their ideals,

and try to convince others to do likewise. Such processes tend to occur in ideological primary groups where shared beliefs are linked to the establishment of personal and collective identity. The respondents all seemed to have a strong desire to "do good," or positive, as they defined it; to give of their time and resources to the common objective of the group; and to respond to a personal sense of dissatisfaction with the proposed construction of Black Fox. Participants were bonded together by a common set of beliefs that differentiated them from nonparticipants based on personal assessments of a target (Black Fox) responsible for their anxiety. Stated differently, these individuals appear to have adopted an environmentalist definition of the problem--that society faces a severe crisis and that a grass-roots organization is the best way of coping with it in the immediate sense.

There is a great deal of literature on the personal and psychological reasons behind decisions to affiliate with social movements, but there is very little agreement among scholars about these motivations (Cantril, 1941; Heberle, 1951; Lang and Lang, 1961; Toch, 1965). Some theorists have claimed that joiners possess extreme psychological traits such as fanaticism or obsession found in the "authoritarian personality" or in the "true-believer" (Adorno, 1950; Hoffer, 1951). There may be some psychologically extreme people involved in social movements, but such people are also found in other group

structures within society. Furthermore, if individuals do feel needs for affiliation or identity, these are likely to be as much social as psychological products. As Snow and Zurcher (1980) suggest, the extramovement social network may play a significant part in movement recruitment as well as "structural proximity, availability, and affective interaction with movement members" (Snow and Zurcher, 1980, p. 787). They posit that:

> However reasonable the underlying assumption that some people are more susceptible than others to movement participation, that view deflects attention from the fact that recruitment cannot occur without prior contact with a recruitment agent. . . . This brings about the question of: what determines which potential participants are most likely to come into contact with and be recruited into one movement rather than another? (p. 789).

The strength of qualitative research is that it reduces the reliance on esoteric theoretical constructs and relies more on the respondent's self-defined reasons and motives. A sufficient explanation of motivation for joining a social movement can be found in an expression of the individual's focus and intensity of interests. If a person's economic, political, moral, or other interests are threatened, or if he defines them as threatened, then no other special theory is needed. Social movement joiners are activists just like anyone else in these respect. Oberschall (1973) states the matter as follows:

> No one is in a position to disregard where his next meal is coming from and whether he is going to have a roof over his head. Leaders and active participants in social movements

> are no different from other people: they fear punishment; they are vulnerable to social and economic pressures; they seek support and economic security; some can be co-opted; others corrupted (pp. 159-160).

In summary, as Mauss (1975) writes:

> (1) a person becomes, and continues to be, an active member of a social movement out of certain interests that are usually quite plausibly inferred and easily understood from (a) his or her position in the social structure, and/or (b) his or her special interests of an economic, social, political, occupational, moral or psychological kind; (2) a person's participation in and enthusiasm for a social movement can be expected to use or fall in accordance with his own calculus of the risks vs. the rewards he is likely to encounter inside and outside the movement, taking into account the variety and hierarchy of his interests (p. 51).

There is some indication that a few of the core members joined Sunbelt for more than environmental concerns. One core member, for example, stated that he saw the movement as an effective way to release some "personal energy" and as a way of expressing "frustration with the whole capitalist industrial system." He maintained that the oil industry was too large and entrenched to effectively attack environmentally. He saw the nuclear energy industry as a tangible alternative for the focusing of his personal concerns over increased industrial control of the environment for profit.

Personal Identity Maintenance Received From the Movement

As a group, the core members of Sunbelt expressed

generally positive feelings about their experience in the movement. The intensity of this feeling varied from person to person, with some individuals expressing disatisfaction with "infiltration" and changes in ideology and tactics in the later phases of the movement. The following is a representative description of various respondents concerning the issue of personal identity maintenance and degree of satisfaction or dissatisfaction with the movement.

Interview One

The first interview involved a young man in his early twenties who is majoring in horticulture at Oklahoma State University, living in a small apartment off-campus. He expressed a lot of positive feeling about the Sunbelt group, describing it as "very people oriented" and as an "educational and democratic experience." He said the group was well organized against the possibility of personal "ego trips." He used the example of the rotating role of meeting facilitator to support his point. At every Sunbelt meeting, a different person was designated by the group as facilitator or controller of who could speak and when. This served the purpose of promoting order and clarity while reducing the possibility of arguments and speaking out of turn. Every person was allowed to finish his or her statement without being interrupted. The revolving facilitator role also fostered a sense of

leadership diversity among the members. He further maintained that the structure of the movement evoked within him a "sense of the right method, especially with consensus style decision making." He further indicated that the group was deeply concerned with presenting a particular image to the public. He maintained that they did not "want to present themselves as sloppy, hippy radicals, but as intelligent persons with a community service mission." They had to work hard to promote the image of "not being radical freaks." In some instances, their image promotion paid dividends. In the early spring of 1980, a series of courthouse meetings were held in Perry, Oklahoma, regarding the proposed construction of a chemical waste dump on Blackberry Creek. Members of the Sunbelt Alliance were present to voice opposition to the proposal and were received positively by most of the local citizens attending the hearings. As the respondent claimed, "The locals were glad to see Sunbelt there." The major method employed by Sunbelt to promote a positive public image was the use of carefully prepared public statements containing some factual substance about the dangers of nuclear power and well planned rallies and takeovers.

In late October of 1979, a "mock funeral" was staged by the Stillwater and Tulsa Sunbelt chapters at the headquarters of the Public Service of Oklahoma in Tulsa. A casket was carried around the entrance to the building

followed by Sunbelt members symbolically dressed as the "grim reaper of death." They demanded, but were refused, an audience with the president of Public Serivce of Oklahoma. The "mock funeral" was described as a "creative theatrical statement that symbolized all who have died, are dying, and will die from the use of nuclear energy." The Tulsa media was present at the demonstration and pictures and interviews were freely given. This type of symbolism was necessary, according to the respondent, in order to focus dramatic attention on the urgency of combating nuclear energy in Oklahoma.

In responding to the question of personal identity maintenance gained from movement participation, this respondent indicated that he felt the Sunbelt movement was like a "social experiment that was one of the most effective group activities to ever happen in Oklahoma." The movement gave him some identity that he didn't have before because of its focus on a common issue with others who felt the same way. He described the group as:

> . . . like a family with the first Black Fox occupation (October 7, 1978); the most beautiful experience because of a strong sense of solidarity. The movement contained part of the activism of the anti-war movement but with a distinct spiritual component of the Woodstock generation; it was in the beginning a 'beautiful people movement'; a moral issue with the opportunity to put yourself on the line.

Sunbelt received national publicity because of its group occupations in a "conservative, reactionary state like

Oklahoma." They became representative of the intensity against nuclear power construction and were often referred to by other national anti-nuclear groups as the "crazy Okies."

As the movement progressed, however, this respondent became partially alienated with its direction. The Tulsa Sunbelt group began pushing for movement involvement in the protest of corporate power as a worldwide issue. Following the Iranian hostage incident in early November, 1979, the Tulsa Sunbelt group wanted to publically criticize the United States' involvement with the "corrupt and oppressive" reign of the Shaw of Iran. Many individuals in the Stillwater group wanted to remain a single-issue movement, focusing exclusively on the proliferation of nuclear energy. These people believed that Sunbelt involvement in other political issues would destroy the movements' credibility with the public. This was especially a concern because of widespread public sentiment in Oklahoma against the new revolutionary government of Iran following the American hostage incident. Following a statewide Sunbelt meeting in mid November of 1979, in which the "Iranian issue" was debated, the Sunbelt group split into factions and faded as a cohesive anti-nuclear organization. Overall, this respondent viewed the Sunbelt movement as positive individual experience and an effective social protest. He did, however, regret the attempted expansion of the movement into other political issue areas

and found it increasingly difficult to identify with the movement in its later stages.

Interview Two

The second respondent was a young woman in her mid-twenties who is currently a student at Oklahoma State University majoring in a physical science area. She joined the Sunbelt organization in Stillwater approximately two months before the first occupation of Black Fox. She does not consider herself as a political radical, only a "concerned environmentalist." Her general impression concerning her personal experiences with Sunbelt were not as positive as those of the first respondent. Her initial response to the group was one of "surprise," because of the intensity of the training sessions. She perceived them as "exaggerating" the probability of violent confrontations with nerve gas and police harassment and felt as if there were attempts by some of the members to "unrealistically dramatize" the potential threat to the group. She stated that she did have a positive feeling about the small group concept and its participatory framework. As she became more involved in group meetings and activities, she became distressed about the gradual evolvement away from consensus decision making. She reported that one individual from Tulsa began to take on leadership responsibilities and that even

a "suggestion of a leader went against her idea of what the group was all about."

She questioned the motives of some of the group members as to whether they were more interested in self-enhancement and gratification than in the real issue of nuclear power. She was strongly opposed to a multiple-issue involvement by Sunbelt and believed that the Sunbelt name should not be used to "strike out at other issues such as the American involvement in Iran." She voiced the opinion that the first Black Fox occupation in October, 1978, had a significant positive effect on promoting public awareness concerning the dangers of nuclear energy. However, she became disenchanted with the movement on the night before the second Black Fox occupation on June 2, 1979. She disliked both the "pep rally" atmosphere with a few vocal leaders, and the fact that "outsiders and harassers had infiltrated the occupation site." She and some others left the occupation site and were not arrested with the group on the following day. Between the first and second Black Fox occupations, she observed a "change in some people" toward a more pronounced leadership role and, as a result, the membership became less stable, with many individuals "coming and going" in terms of group support. She concluded the interview by saying that the purpose of the movement had been at least partially compromised by a few individuals who "took it upon themselves to define the purpose

and activities of the group." She believes that the Sunbelt name was "ruined in Stillwater and in Oklahoma" because of its attempted involvement with social issues not directly related to environmental protection. She did acknowledge the Sunbelt contribution to the prevention of the completion of Black Fox as significant, but does not feel much personal affinity with the successes of the group.

Interview Three

This interview was conducted with a female in her late twenties who had been a part-time college student, but is presently making her living in handcrafts. She labeled herself a "political activist" who considers environmental problems the most significant issues of our time. She had been involved in protests against the Vietnam War in its later stages. She joined the anti-nuclear movement in April, 1979. She perceived the Stillwater Sunbelt group as the most active in the state, and believed that it was a "positive experience" because of the intense group commitment to stop nuclear power in Oklahoma. Like the previous respondent, however, she became disillusioned with the organization at the time of the second Black Fox occupation in June of 1979. She related that the primary intent of the group was to surround parameter buildings and set up tents during the second occupation. The Stillwater group, in cooperation

with other Sunbelt chapters, had agreed to this plan prior to arriving at the occupation site. After their arrival, however, a "small number of individuals decided to cross the inner fence in order to get arrested." She and others did not agree with the new plan and left the site before the actual occupation. She was angry because "three or four people" had taken it upon themselves to instigate the alternative plan. She remained affiliated with Sunbelt until late December of 1979. At this time, the Tulsa group had become involved with other political and social issues, some of which she was philosophically opposed to. She noticed, for example, that various people outside the movement changed their reaction to Sunbelt from a positive to a negative one following the group's attempt to become publically critical of America's involvement in Iran. Even though she considers herself to be a political activist, she disliked the group's orientation toward multiple issues. She concluded by saying that if she had it to do over again, she would have become involved in the more "conservative CASE organization which remained committed to stopping nuclear energy as its only purpose."

Interview Four

This respondent joined Sunbelt six months after its inception and remained very active in the organization until its conclusion. She considers herself to be an "activist-radical" and assumed the role of a "vocal

spokesperson" within Sunbelt. She admitted that she had an "ego involvement" with the organization and her leadership role in it, but always tried to temper that by maintaining a personal commitment to the prevention of Black Fox. She praised the consensus style of decision making and considered the "democratic experiment" to be a lasting, positive influence on her life. The only personal dilemma she confronted as a result of her affiliation with Sunbelt was the need to separate her anti-nuclear activity from her professional life. At the time of her Sunbelt membership, she was a state employee and therefore felt it necessary to keep her political protest activities separated from her work. The more actively involved with the organization she became, the more difficult the separation became. As Sunbelt's activities became more intense, and their media exposure increased, she experienced some antagonism from her work associates. She handled these conflicts by "never discussing her Sunbelt activity while at work."

She maintained that the structure of the Sunbelt organization was effective in preventing factionalism within the group. She suggested that some individuals believed that small groups within Sunbelt should be allowed to protest nonviolently on any issue. She was much more interested in intense focusing on the single-issue of nuclear energy in order to protect the "public image of the group, and to insure success in stopping Black Fox." She took at

least partial credit for the idea of the "mock funeral" used as a symbolic protest tactic by Sunbelt. She described the creation of the idea as follows:

> We were driving back to Stillwater after the first Black Fox occupation, and it was a rainy night. I was in the lead car and when I looked back I saw a long line of car lights through the rain; it occurred to me that it resembled a funeral procession. The idea struck me that a mock funeral procession would be a great way to dramatize the death and destruction of nuclear energy. We used it and the idea spread to other nuclear groups throughout the United States, especially after the media had picked it up.

Interview Five

This interview was with a young student in his early twenties who joined Sunbelt at its inception and was an active member until the second Black Fox occupation in June of 1979. He stated that he was "not real open about his membership in the organization, but he never denied his affiliation with the group when asked." He had positive feelings about consensus decision making and affinity groups, although he maintained that some in the movement were "intimidated by the peer pressure to conform to the group process." He described the first Black Fox occupation as "fun; like war games with media hype and contingency plans." He also suggested that Sunbelt was exciting because it was a type of "dramatic street theater" in which the "recognition for the anti-nuke issue was good, but a bad image for the group." The author asked him to

elaborate and he suggested that the public image of Sunbelt was constantly having to battle against the more "mainstream CASE organization for legitimacy with the public," and although Sunbelt was more successful in dramatizing the anti-nuclear issue, CASE promoted a more positive image in the mind of the public because of their leadership and tactical use of public hearings and the court system.

By the time of the second Black Fox occupation, the "media hype" had alienated this respondent to the point of disaffectment from the group. He stated that he favors "political tact," especially in a conservative state like Oklahoma, and therefore had little desire for a multiple-issue focus for Sunbelt. He pointed to the attempted group involvement in the Iranian issue in the fall of 1979, as a "bad political move," in that the people of Oklahoma could "not identify with extremist politics." He refused to participate in the second occupation of Black Fox, but holds no "really negative feelings" toward the movement. He concluded by suggesting that the "ideals of the movement were very worthwhile," even though he could not personally accept the direction of the movement in its later stages. He maintained that the Sunbelt alliance should be given almost complete credit for the prevention of Black Fox.

Interview Six

This respondent was one of the original founders of the Sunbelt Alliance in Stillwater and remained very active in the group until its demise. He labeled himself as a student activist during the Vietnam era, and felt the nuclear energy issue to be as significant as any America has faced since the war in Southeast Asia. After contact with the Tulsa Sunbelt group, he decided that his presence on the Oklahoma State University campus would be a logical link for Sunbelt in Stillwater, and the chapter was initiated through a campus meeting called "Nuclear Power in Oklahoma." This respondent was "trained" in nonviolence and the concept of affinity grouping by a representative of Clamshell Alliance who was in Oklahoma to help organize an anti-nuclear network in Oklahoma. Several meetings were arranged in which members were recruited and trained for the first occupation of Black Fox in October of 1978.

Following the first occupation there was a "profound sense of accomplishment; it was the largest single act of civil disobedience in the history of Oklahoma." After the first occupation, the media identified this respondent as the leader or president of the Sunbelt Alliance in Stillwater. He strongly denied this, saying that "every person in the group rose to their own ability." He suggested that he and a few others may have given some

direction to group activities, but that decisions were mostly consensus based. This respondent stated his belief in the importance of positive public relations balanced with the "clear message" that Sunbelt was willing and capable of using any method short of a serious felony to prevent the construction of Black Fox. The group tried to achieve some measure of personal repose with the authorities in Oklahoma. They interacted with many state and local law enforcement personnel on a first-name basis, and tried to cultivate a respect among these officials for their conduct and purpose.

A few individuals in the movement, including this respondent, wanted the Public Service of Oklahoma (PSO) to view Sunbelt as "more than just hippies having fun." They felt it necessary to convey their serious commitment to stopping nuclear energy construction. The element of surprise was also missing from Sunbelt tactics, as this respondent describes:

> We needed to make the point that successful protest requires personal initiative--having to bring an idea for action before group consensus was in a sense telling PSO the plans. We believed that creative nonviolence was needed to take PSO completely off guard.

Although this concept represented a "divergence in function of Sunbelt," a "gorilla unit" was quickly formed in October of 1979. The "Halloween 14," as they were called later by the media, without Sunbelt group consensus, invaded Black Fox and were arrested for unlawful

trespassing on state property. The actual event was described as follows:

> We wore ski masks and dark clothing and jumped from a van with our only enemy a full Halloween night moon. We walked through several pastures filled with ravines and brush and finally reached PSO land--after crossing the fence, we walked and belly crawled until we reached the reactor site. The heavy machines were digging even at this late hour. We watched under cover until they stopped for a break. We darted out of the shadows and all 14 of us chained ourselves to the earth movers.

After the "Halloween 14" incident this respondent, by his own admission, became more "radicalized." He began giving public talks about the dangers of nuclear energy and became heavily involved in public relations and education work. He was able to convince the "right people" to pressure the Oklahoma State University Student Senate to allocate funds for inviting to campus a nationally known critic of nuclear energy. The Young Americans for Freedom chapter at Oklahoma State University were very vocal against using student senate funds to sponsor an anti-nuclear spokesman whose views all students did not agree with. There was an "information war" between Sunbelt Alliance and pro-nuclear forces in Oklahoma following "Halloween 14" and the second Black Fox occupation.

Sunbelt was able to make enough money to support its activities and publications by asking rock bands to give benefit concerts in and around Stillwater. This respondent knew many personal contacts in the music business,

and together with private contributions was able to help generate adequate organizational funding.

Some Sunbelt members believed that they did not have ongoing participation. After the first Black Fox occupation, there was nothing to keep them active; two or three handled most of the "newspaper debates" between Sunbelt and PSO and the production of educational literature. Each group member had different levels of commitment. For the core activists, site occupation was only one phase of an overall confrontation approach. "Courtroom battles" between Sunbelt members arrested after occupations and PSO prosecution attorneys. The purpose of this was "public exposure" with the opportunity to debate nuclear issues. This respondent referred the author to a legal information section in the Black Fox Occupation Handbook, June 2, 1979, which reads in part:

> We regard the occupation as a moral imperative; but as long as the state continues to support the construction of Black Fox, our actions most likely will be viewed as criminal and will thus bring us into the courtroom area. It is important that you realize that the responsibility that you assume when you go over the fence does not end once you pass out of the gate. Your presence in court has the same meaning and effect as your presence on the construction site. (Sunbelt Alliance, 1979e, p. 13).

Asked about his feelings toward consensus style of decision making, he responded by suggesting that

> Consensus has two possible outcomes, and that what is decided by group consensus may not always be in the best interest of why the group was formed in the first place.

He used as an example the "negative result of consensus" during the second Black Fox occupation. He stated that:

> PSO wanted us to march to the site trailers, receive our tickets for unlawful tresspassing, and then go home. When a large group of us arrived at the fence, a few of us decided to go the opposite direction from what had been planned, in order to encircle the buildings. One group representing only 10 people, refused to agree with the last minute change of plans and so most went unwillingly, like sheep, to get their tickets. This was a clear case of the majority will not ruling because of the restraints of consensus decision making.

In terms of personal identity received from the movement, this member seemed to view the organization and its activities as a positive contribution to his personal life. He was "proud" of the national exposure that Stillwater Sunbelt received and felt that he had played a significant role in that. The Stillwater chapter was widely known as the "street theater group" because of their dramatic symbolism in protest tactics such as "Halloween 14" and the "mock funeral." At the National Nuclear Moratorium Day held in Washington, D.C. on April 26-28, 1980, the Sunbelt Alliance was well represented with eight individuals from Stillwater alone. The "Okies were popular at the rally," and played a very significant role in the events, as this following account suggests:

> Nearly 8,000 people were massed in front of the Department of Energy with hundreds of police looking on. There seemed to be no focus or leadership, just a lot of nervous people. The Sunbelt group got the coffin out of our bus (named the White Fox, with Indian paintings on the side) and began to

> stir the crowd up. We were asked to lead the march to the Pentagon from the Department of Energy. The crowd started singing 'can't stop the spirit, its like a mountain,' and a huge funeral procession with 8,000 people snaked through the streets of Washington, led by Sunbelt and our coffin.

Some Sunbelt members, including this respondent, were also active in other anti-nuclear rallies and occupations at various locations throughout the United States. According to this member, the May, 1980, attempted occupation of the Seabrook, New Hampshire site was the most memorable because of the intensity of the protestors and the violence of the police.

His concluding remarks indicated that he felt Sunbelt was a positive experience in that it proved that "a grassroots movement could still affect social change." He regretted that the "Halloween 14" episode was a source of internal conflict in the group and that multiple-issue questions had forced the disaffection of some core members from the group. He stated that the media had falsely labeled student demonstrations against the deportation of Iranian students as instigated by Sunbelt. Although some Sunbelt members did take part, it was never sanctioned by the organization. Personal identity with the movement and a strong sense of accomplishment were overriding themes in his concluding remarks.

CHAPTER VIII

CONCLUSION

Perhaps no social movement can completely escape the internal and external concerns of protest activity. The strategic and tactical problems of movement groups evolve from their attempts to mobilize needed external resources. The solidarity and morals of the individual members must also be maintained, making for even more significance in the movement's tactical and strategic priorities. No two social movements are exactly alike, and the problems they encounter take particular forms depending on the specific historical and social context in which the movement emerges. The degree of opposition the movement encounters and the "cultural ethos" of the society in which the movement finds itself are both pivotal factors in its structure and process. However, the preceding chapters of the problems of the anti-nuclear movement illustrate the difficulties facing many types of social movements. The particular external and internal considerations of the anti-nuclear movement are handled through and modified by its focus on nonviolence and civil disobedience and by its innovative use of affinity groups and a consensus style of decision making.

The external contingencies of the anti-nuclear movement have largely focused on the need to create a favorable public image in order to win mass support for their cause. The technique of "impression management," as defined earlier, is for the express purpose of generating and maintaining a public image that will promote a broad based support dimension. The movement has selected the tactic of nonviolent direct action in order to present a positive image to the public and elected officials through the news media. This type of direct action is symbolically tied to the carefully selected rhetoric of the movement which has remained, for the most part, a method of generating descriptive and symbolic information for public consumption.

Nonviolent direct action is an incorporated philosophy of action that strengthens the ideological character of the anti-nuclear movement. The Sunbelt Alliance also used nonviolence as a philosophy of means instrumental to public relations purposes. The organizational literature concerning the use of nonviolent direct confrontation is based on the idea that actions affect goals. Their reference to the "individual and collective purity" brought about by the exercise of nonviolence is an attempt to fuse moral integrity with tactical behavior. Sunbelt made use of specific techniques in hopes of promoting this "purity" and to avoid the internal value conflicts among its membership. Nonviolent training sessions, for example, gave the

group a sense of philosophical and tactical solidarity while also preparing them for responses to possible violence. The majority of core members interviewed defined nonviolence as a necessary and natural element of an environmental movement. The idea here is that the potential violence and destruction of nuclear energy can best be showcased by a philosophical and behavioral reaffirmation of its opposite. Most of the Sunbelt members had no personal dilemma in coping with a philosophy that they structured their individual lives around. The latent effect of nonviolence in promoting public good will was for many in the movement a natural and desirable behavior. The "beautiful people" movement, as one member referred to it, wasn't just a political statement; it was a statement of life values. There were no recorded incidents of initiated or reactionary violence among any Sunbelt members at any time during the organization's activities. This consistency no doubt played a significant role in Sungelt's success at public relations in Oklahoma. Although they had to fight many stereotypes and labels from a "conservative" public, violence and destructive aggression were not among them.

Image maintenance was also promoted by Sunbelt through its effective and consistent use of the media. Some of the core members of the organization had a thorough understanding of the value of media use for information dissemination

and favorable public exposure. Many respondents consistently referred to "one or two individuals" within the core group that made intelligent use of press contacts and public relations techniques. Many of Sunbelt's activities were specifically designed to generate media interest and subsequent public exposure. The "Street Theater" tactics of the group making use of such dramatic symbolism as the "mock funeral" and the "Halloween 14" occupation, were effective because of the media interest in their coverage. Like any insurgent organization, Sunbelt had to battle against biased and inaccurate media coverage of their activities. However, the speaking and writing skills of a few core members of Sunbelt gave them an advantage that perhaps some other anti-nuclear organization did not possess. One individual was often referenced by other members for his "ability to use the media in a dynamic and skillful way." There was criticism by a few of the members concerning the compromising of group principles for personal media exposure on the part of some core members. However, as one individual stated:

> We knew from the beginning that we were fighting a public relations problem. We identified the people in the group with the most skill in overcoming the problem in hopes of turning the media to our favor. There was some animosity about one or two getting all the coverage, but most realized the value of their talents for the good of the group.

The structure of Sunbelt was based on the need to generate public exposure through the media. The "media

coordination group" was one of the most active within the organization. The Sunbelt reliance on the media for image promotion and generation of public awareness to the nuclear issue was in line with other alliance groups in the movement. By responding to reporters' questions in an intelligent and sincere manner; by exhibiting nonviolence in their protests and occupations; and by making effective use of the media as an informational ally, Sunbelt was able to promote its cause. The methods used by Sunbelt to produce a certain public image established a "circle of consistency" in which they appeared to "practice what they verbalized." The media coverage of Sunbelt nonviolent direct action served to dramatize the nuclear issue while giving a measure of legitimacy to the group behind the movement. The integrity of nonviolence was not compromise through media exposure. As a result, the issue of nuclear energy was promoted because Sunbelt was able to effectively promote itself.

The internal contingency of the movement evolves around the need to generate and sustain individual member commitment and energy to the organization. The use of affinity groups and consensus style decision making are the pivotal elements in this process. In the case of Sunbelt, both of these forms of group dynamics were viewed favorably by the majority of members. Factionalism within the group was not the result of any ideological conflict over the acceptance of these elements as ideals. Rather, it

was a result of an inconsistency between the ideal structure and the actual process. Prior to the first Black Fox occupation, the group displayed a cohesiveness of purpose that seemed to be strengthened by the practice of consensus. During the first occupation, the cooperation and unity among the various affinity groups was viewed by most members as a "beautiful experience." However, their concern with the image presented to the public intensified ideological conflicts within the Sunbelt group over strategy and tactics. The choice of issues and the decision making process were the two important sources of tension following the first Black Fox occupation. The proponents of the multiple-issue approach wanted the alliance to expand its protest base from merely reacting to one form of energy use to include social and political change. Some of the core members pushed for increased group emphasis on the elimination of nuclear weapons. They argued that a real relationship existed between environmental concern over atomic plant construction and the proliferation of nuclear weapons. The majority of Sunbelt members, however, viewed this as an uneasy relationship, opting for the single environmental issue of nuclear power in Oklahoma. Their feeling was that a broadening of focus would make it more difficult for state residents to identify favorably with the movement. This argument was particularly intense during the later stages of the movement, when such issues as

America's involvement in Iran was considered by some group members as a legitimate target of protest expression.

Another source for internal conflict in Sunbelt centered around the specific goals of their site occupations. Some members were committed to the symbolic aim of dramatizing opposition to nuclear power through passive, non-obstructionist tactics. During the second Black Fox occupation, for example, many Sunbelt members and sympathizers were satisfied with voluntary compliance to ities' demands to leave the site. A second group wanted to blockade and occupy the site for a longer period. This resulted in a tactical argument at the occupation site which factionalized Sunbelt to the point of a permanent split of some members from the organization. It was also expressed that the "radical faction" had undermined the group process of consensus by "taking it upon themselves to alter tactics at the last minute." Both the affective and structural benefits of consensus participation were seen by some members as "co-opted" through the unearned influence of a few vocal individuals.

The Sunbelt alliance encountered difficulties in the choice of issues, tactics, and organization which trouble all social movements and can eventually generate group factionalism. Within the Sunbelt group, these dilemmas were intensified by the size of the group. The smallness of its membership eventually allowed individual personalities to gain control over the structure and ideology of

the organization; the same structure that earlier had been successful with winning publicity and achieving a favorable image. The group's moderate tactics, used to promote a positive public image, eventually alienated the movement's activists. The structure and process of the organization, which, in its beginning, was solidly merged through group commitment to an ideology and a goal, became separated. The separation occurred because of the group's inability to adequately respond simultaneously to external and internal contingencies.

By tying together the two dimensions of external image maintenance and internal member identity to the movement, this analysis has provided a more dynamic way of understanding the origin and consequences in a particular social movement of problems of strategy, tactics, and organization. Although many anti-nuclear alliances have practiced evaluation of these difficulties, these dilemmas may continue as the movement grows. There is evidence that the anti-nuclear movement in the United States may continue to spread, especially concerning the issue of nuclear weapons. Also, if the construction of nuclear energy plants continue, even at a decreased rate, more insurgent groups can be expected to evolve. As Barkan (1979) notes:

> . . . the dilemmas of the anti-nuclear movement underscore its instrumental nature; if its efforts were primarily irrational expressions of distress, there would be little concern over proper strategy, tactics and organization (p. 34).

As stated in Chapter VI, the sociological analysis of social movements in recent years has focused on the instrumental-organizational quality of social movement activity while deemphasizing the traditional collective behavior orientation of social discontent. The members of social movements are seen as affected by collective goals and organizational control factors rather than merely alienation or some form of "irrationality." This approach views social movement organizations as having a number of strategic tasks which include mobilizing support, appealing to mass publics, and promoting social change through specific targets. The movement's relationship to the larger society is analyzed through the framework of rational appeal procedures, as opposed to uncoordinated, violent, or defiant gestures. As discussed in Chapter VI, this approach, although analytically stronger than more traditional collective behavior theory, is nevertheless beset with a lack of unity and a theoretical disregard for the interaction between the importance of external support and the need for internal solidarity maintenance. There has been relatively little systematic research on the dynamics of this interaction process. In order to shed greater theoretical light in this area, this dissertation has contributed to the resource mobilization perspective by theoretically reducing the significant variables of concern to the issues of external image maintenance and personal identity maintenance of the movement members. This analysis has

stressed the constant dilemma of maintaining a balance between the structure of the movement and the actual process by which this structure is or is not carried out.

Every problem of strategy the movement confronts is based on the need to generate and maintain favorable public identity, while simultaneously maintaining the personal commitment of its members to the organization. This theoretical approach represents a social psychological analysis in which the dynamics of interaction are viewed both externally and internally in relation to the movement structure and process. The findings on the data collected indicate that the Sunbelt Alliance anti-nuclear organization experienced a dilemma resulting from the tension between external and internal contingencies. The promotion of cooperative interdependence based on member cohesiveness within the group suffered because of the inability of the organization to maintain consistent agreement concerning external targets. The structure of the group, which in essence, is its goals and ideology, was not consistently reflected in its process. Disagreement over external priorities eventually reduced internal solidarity, and the organization dissolved.

Some important theoretical implications are suggested by the findings of this research. First, in contrast to the traditional assumption that social movements are held together mainly by the collective alienation of their members, these findings indicate that the solidarity and morale

of the movement's members must also be maintained by constant attention to internal factors generating commitment. The "external enemy" is not enough when disagreement within the movement occurs concerning how to respond to that enemy. Because social movements are social networks constituting microstructures, these variables are of equal or greater importance than macro-social factors in effecting the goal realization of the movement.

Secondly, the case of Sunbelt indicates that some success in meeting external contingencies can produce internal disruption. The accomplishments of the organization in terms of media exposure and public image maintenance were strong enough, that some members eventually proposed a multiple-issue base of protest. This change of direction away from the single issue of nuclear energy caused ideological factionalism within the organization from which it never totally recovered. The basic tension between external and internal contingencies represents the social psychological dynamics of protest movements. Social movements are organized, but not in the same way as highly inflexible systems. They are in a constant state of flux and the group must always be aware of a basic dilemma: While it needs organization to promote its basic goals of social change, it also must respond to problems of the internal process of maintaining member loyalty. The Sunbelt group allowed the success of meeting its external problems to influence its internal consistency.

It should be noted that the data of this study is from only one group, and the inferences to be made from this study are, strictly speaking, to the population of the Sunbelt Alliance in Oklahoma. More theoretically viable generalizations are possible with an enlarged data base. However, this analysis was conceived and completed as an attempt to direct further research into social psychological dynamics of protest movements. The organization used as the data base is typical in many ways to most anti-nuclear protest groups. Its size, type of members, and organizational structure are all consistent with the character of other regional groups reflected in the descriptive literature. The absence of hard data and empirically based relationships may lend a feeling of inconclusiveness to this study. However, the observations made are clearly defined and focused. To that end, the goal of this analysis has been a theoretical consideration of the particular dynamic tension between the external and internal contingency considerations of reform social movements. This study will hopefull stimulate further critical inquiry into the nature of this dynamics. Throughout this paper there are unanswered questions. The study of social movements has never received the theoretical and research attention as many other areas of human behavior. Yet, the study of social movement dynamics contributes to our understanding of the behavior of people in groups and of social conflict

and change. It is thought that this paper will contribute to that understanding.

Finally, although the Sunbelt Alliance could not escape certain problems of structure and process, many of its former members view the movement as a resounding success. They make a strong case for their position. As of this writing, Black Fox will not be built!

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APPENDIX

SUNBELT ALLIANCE BY-LAWS

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I. PROCESS

All decisions, both at the local and organizational level, shall be made by consensus/two-thirds majority rule. Consenus/two-thirds majority rule attempts to keep in balance both the ideal the Alliance has of bringing all participants into unanimity before doing an action or making a decision and the equally important imperative of keeping the Alliance effective in stopping nuclear power. Whenever a proposal is made, therefore, the group should decide a time by which a decision should be made. If, by the deadline, the group has not reached consensus, a two-thirds majority approval shall be sufficient for the group to move forward.

II. CRITERIA FOR APPROVAL AS SUNBELT ALLIANCE ACTIONS

A. All actions must be done within the context of the Sunbelt Alliance commitment to communicative nonviolence. This means specifically:

1. There will be full cooperation with the arrest procedure.
2. There will never be any type of property destruction.
3. There will be adherence to the 10 guidelines adhered to for the October 7th occupation/restoration unless decided specifically otherwise through the due process.

B. All actions must come within the context of the Sunbelt Alliance's purpose of stopping nuclear power generally and Black Fox in particular.

III. STRUCTURE

A. Local Steering Committees

1. The purpose of local groups is primarily to facilitate local outreach and education as well as to coordinate regional wide actions such as occupations and blockades.
2. There should be regularized weekly meetings of all local groups, more often if necessary.
3. Each local Sunbelt Alliance chapter shall send two representatives, preferably a male and a female, to the regional coordinating committee.

B. Regional Coordinating Committee

1. The purpose of the Regional CC is to facilitate both informational sharing/gathering between local Sunbelt Alliance groups and to facilitate decision making that will effect the Alliance as a whole.
2. The CC will be made up of two representatives from each local group.
3. In order for any proposal to become Sunbelt Alliance policy it must be passed by the CC as well as by each local group.
4. If, by the time decisions must be made, a local group has not decided or cannot come to agreement locally, the group's representatives must stand aside in the CC voting.
5. Committees which are regionally wide in nature such as the legal, training, and blockage committees shall each have one representative on the CC and shall have equal standing with the local representatives to the CC.
6. CC meetings shall be held at least every other week, more often if necessary.
7. Meetings should be rotated among the respective local groups to keep within the spirit of decentralization.

C. All meetings, both local and regional, shall be open to all interested in attending. The only exception to this shall be the press, if and when sensitive issues of strategy and tactics are being discussed. Any exclusions should be done on a case by case basis.

D. Committees/Taskforces

1. Committees and Taskforces should be set up as deemed necessary by the local groups and the CC to effectuate policy and to make specific proposals for consideration.
2. Regional wide committees shall have one representative on the CC.
3. All committees should attempt to keep a balance between old and young, male and female, as well as differing points of view that need consideration.

IV. <u>OFFICES</u>

A. The main office shall continue to remain in Tulsa. The center of the struggle is here and it is theplace in which the Sunbelt Alliance began

in June, 1978. It is in Tulsa also that the greatest continuity will remain. As the main office, it is important that any decisions of a regional nature, particularly with regard to actions at Black Fox, have adequate Tulsa input.

B. Local offices shall be set up where and whenever the local group deems it necessary to further local outreach and to coordinate Sunbelt Alliance activities at the local level.

V. MEMBERSHIP

A. Any person may join the Sunbelt Alliance if that person shares the goals and objectives of the Alliance. The goals of the Alliance are to stop nuclear power on this planet through the means of communicative nonviolent action as well as to demonstrate the viability of alternative energetics. The specific objective of the Alliance is to unconditionally halt the construction of Black Fox.

B. Local Sunbelt Alliance groups shall be formed and have standing on the CC when there are enough individuals to form one at any given locale.

VITA

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