ACTOR/OBSERVER CONSIDERATIONS IN A ROLE-PLAYING PARADIGM

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION AND STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

Introduction

There has been recent concern about the ethical and methodological consequences of deception in psychological experimentation. Role playing, defined in this paper as a methodology in which subjects are asked to pretend that they are in a particular situation and to predict what their behavior would be, offers one alternative to deception. There are many variants of role playing, depending upon the amount of information given to the subjects and their degree of active involvement in the role. The data obtained when using these role-playing variants have uncertain validity. Presumably the more realistic the situation is made the better able the subject should be to imagine what he would actually do if he were in the real situation.

The present study attempts to investigate some of the variants of role playing by employing the Asch-backwards paradigm (Kane and Tedeschi, 1972). In Asch's original studies (1956), three or more persons acted as confederates by giving unanimous erroneous line judgments on a standard line-judgment task. The subject believed the confederates were subjects like himself. His line-judgment response always followed the responses of the confederates. The dependent variable was whether he conformed to their erroneous judgments or made independently correct judgments. Asch found that the majority of people did in fact conform

to the group's erroneous judgments. Kane and Tedeschi wanted to see what individuals think of persons who conform to their erroneous judgments. In the Asch-backwards paradigm they adopted, three subjects were told that they would serve as the confederates in the original Asch situation. In reality they were the actual subjects and the "subject" in the original Asch experiments was actually a confederate who consistently conformed to their erroneous line-judgments or made independently correct judgments on each trial. Subjects were then asked to rate the "subject" (confederate) on the basis of his behavior. They found that conforming "subjects" were rated more negatively than the independent "subjects", suggesting that conformity may be costly in terms of negative evaluations.

A modified version of the Asch-backwards situation is enacted in the present study with the "subject" serving as an actor and one of the "confederates" serving as an observer in order that role playing may be investigated in terms of actor/observer considerations. Attribution theoriests investigate the responsibility attributions made by individuals, and Jones and Nisbett (1972) have shown that persons who actually perform the behavior make different attributions than do persons who merely observe the action. Actors tend to focus on situational cues while observers usually consider the dispositional traits of the actor. If the consideration of different factors lead to divergent responsibility attributions, as has been shown, then it is likely that different factors are similarly considered by role players depending upon whether they are asked to assume the role of an actor or observer. The consideration of the more general dispositional factors, characteristic of observers, should be easily duplicated in a role-playing situation. A recent study by Vance and Helm (1975) supports this contention. Using the Asch-backwards paradigm, they asked the confederates (observers) to rate the

independent or conforming subject (actor) on the basis of his behavior in the experiment, replicating the Asch-backwards study by Kane and Tedeschi. In addition, they asked role-playing subjects to rate an imaginary person on the basis of a written description of his conforming or independent behavior in the traditional Asch conformity situation. These role-playing subjects did not actually experience the experimental situation, but were able to accurately match the impression ratings provided by the subjects who actually participated in the enactment of the Asch situation itself. It should be much more difficult for subjects who are asked to assume the role of an actor, by rating or predicting his own behavior, to accurately match similar ratings or behaviors provided by other subjects who actually experienced the experimental situation. Since actors are thought to consider situational cues, role-playing subjects who have not experienced these cues would not be able to consider them and, hence, would not be expected to respond to a written description as they would actually respond in a real situation.

The present study is a partial replication of the earlier studies by Kane and Tedeschi (1972) and Vance and Helm (1975). In addition, the "subject" (actor) in the Asch-backwards situation is asked to provide ratings of herself, and two groups of role-playing subjects with varying degrees of active involvement in the experimental situation are asked to assume the role of actor and provide ratings of themselves in that role. In essence, all subjects are asked to play a role, but with differing levels of information. Subjects in the _in situ_ (the term _in situ_ translates roughly "in the original situation") condition are deceived as to what their actual role will be. They are told that they are to act as accomplices in the experiment, but in reality they are

actual subjects. The subject who is asked to assume the role of the "subject" in the Asch-backwards situation in order to deceive the "confederates" actually servers as the actor in the actor/observer context, and her conforming or independent behavior provides the action to be observed. The actor provides ratings of herself and how she expects to be rated by the "confederates". The three "confederates" are also subjects, each fulfilling a different role in the experiment. One of the "confederates" assumes the role of an observer, rating the actor on the basis of her behavior in the experimental situation. The actual actor and observer have therefore assumed a role, but rate the actor from their own points of view rather than predicting the ratings someone else would make, thus distinguishing them from the role-playing subjects in the experiment. The other two "confederates" are asked to role play the situation by predicting the "subject's" (actor's) ratings, one predicting how she will rate herself and one predicting how she will expect to be rated by the "confederates". These role players differ from those in the scenario condition in that they are deceived as to the true purpose of the experiment and their role in it, while they actually experience the experimental situation in its entirety.

Subjects in the scenario condition ("scenario" will indicate that subjects did not actually experience the experimental situation, but were instead given a written description of the situation) are given written information about the experiences of the subjects in the <u>in situ</u> condition and are asked to predict the ratings provided by the <u>in situ</u> subjects. They are not deceived as to their role in the experiment.

Statement of the Problem

Miller (1972) has reviewed the pros and cons of role playing in an article expressing the major emphases of the advocates and opponents. According to Miller, the proponents of role playing have emphasized what they consider as its two primary attractions: (a) a more ethically dignified atmosphere characterized by honesty and collaboration; and (b) the potential for bypassing certain response styles of reactive dispositions. Opponents of role playing, on the other hand, argue against the validity of role-playing predictions, asserting that reports from role players have an introspective nature that is unreliable in predicting the actual outcome of experiments. Thus, there is a dilemma. Laboratory procedures offer experimental rigor but are frequently inconvenient, and more often deceptive; role-playing procedures offer high utility and no deception, but may have questionable validity. Regardless of the various viewpoints of the proponents and opponents of role playing, most tend to agree that experimental investigation is needed to set the limits for role playing. Thus far, the investigations have been few and the results varied.

The present study was undertaken to further define the limits and utility of role playing by experimentally applying the concepts of a relatively new theoretical principle, the actor/observer attributional divergence (Jones & Nisbett, 1972), to its investigation. The study partially represents a replication of two studies, Kane and Tedeschi (1972) found that those who make independent judgments in an Asch (1956) line judgment task are generally rated more positively than are conformers in the same task. They concluded that conforming behaviors may be costly in terms of negative evaluation. Vance and Helm (1975) found that

such attributions could be accurately matched by role-playing observers who had not actually observed the behavior but had merely read a description of it. The factors considered by observers appear readily accessible to role players who assume their point of view. Persons who actually perform the behavior, however, rely on more circumstantial information concerning the event. Such information is typically gained only in an experiential context and would seem difficult for role players who did not experience the situation to comprehend. The major question asked in the present study is whether scenario and in situ role-playing actors can match the pattern of attributions provided by in situ actors who rate themselves. If in situ role players successfully match the ratings of the in situ actors but scenario role players do not, this would imply that the situational factors experienced by in situ actors greatly affect the actors' impression ratings, as the principles of the actor/observer divergence phenomena would lead one to expect, and that these factors are not salient outside of an experiential context. Since they are not experienced by scenario role players they cannot be comprehended by them. Consequently, these role players should fail to match the pattern of ratings provided by in situ actors.

In situ and scenario actors in the present study are not only asked to make self-attributions, but also to predict the attributions made to them by observers. Impression management theory (Goffman, 1969) supports the contention that people (actors) are concerned about their evaluation by others and therefore attempt to assess the effects of their behaviors on the others' attributions. It is presumed that impression management activities and assessments of others' impressions of us dominate many of our everyday behaviors has recently been stressed by

such writers as Laing, Phillipson and Lee (1966) and Middlebrooks (1974), and its validity was clearly demonstrated in a study by Whiteside and Helm (1975) who employed an Asch-backwards paradigm similar to the one used in the present study. They found that self-impressions differed little as a function of actors' conforming or independent roles, but differences were quite evident when actors predicted the attributions made to them by others, indicating that they were concerned with impression management notions. It is likely that such concerns are dealt with only in situations where actual interpersonal interactions are experienced. Whether similar effects can be realized in a scenario re-enactment of the situation has not been demonstrated. The inclusion of both perspectives (SELF and OTHER'S VIEW) provided the advantage of assessing the effects of actors' self and impression-management concerns in both concrete (in situ) and abstract (scenario) settings.

Thus, this study re-enacts the Asch (1956) conformity situation, with one of the "confederates" serving as an observer and a "subject" serving as an actor in the in situ situation. Both observers and actors provide impression ratings of the actor in each instance and actors predict the observers' ratings. Role-playing subjects in the in situ condition are asked to predict the ratings provided by the in situ actor. Role-playing subjects in the scenario condition are provided with information concerning the in situ situation and are asked to predict the impression ratings of the participants on rating scales which are identical to those used in the in situ setting. The Asch-backwards paradigm (Kane and Tedeschi, 1972) is incorporated in the present study for two primary reasons. First, two previous studies (Kane and Tedeschi, 1972; Vance and Helm, 1975) which employed this paradigm have made data

available for replication in this study. Secondly, the conformity variable has typically been used in studies investigating the limits of role playing (Willis and Willis, 1970; Horowitz and Rothschild, 1970), and this particular paradigm is such that the behavior of the actor can be exactly defined in terms of conformity or independence.

CHAPTER II

REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE AND STATEMENT OF HYPOTHESES

Introduction

In 1954, Edgar Vinacke expressed concern over the deception of human subjects in experimentation, and asked for ". . .the proper balance between the interests of science and the thoughtful treatement of the persons who innocently, supply the data. . ." (p. 155). Herbert Kelman revived interest in the issue in 1967 when he asserted that the problem of deception in social psychological experiments had taken on increasingly serious proportions since Vinacke's (1954) article. He pointed out the ethical implications of widespread deception, insisting that the experimenter-subject relationship "is a real interhuman relationship, in which we have responsibility toward the subject as another human being whose dignity we must preserve" (p. 5).

Kelman also expressed concern about the methodological implications of deceptive research practices, suggesting that the basic assumption in the use of deception -- that the subject's awareness of the experimental conditions and phenomena under study would alter his behavior such that valid conclusions could not be obtained -- is constantly being threatened since the level of sophistication in the subject pool is necessarily raised with each exposure of experimental deception. The truly naive subject has become rare indeed and the actual assessment of subjects'

suspicions is now itself a phenomenon of investigation (Rubin & Moore, 1971; McGuire, 1969). Kelman's concern led him to predict long-term negative consequences, both methodologically and ethically, for a discipline (social psychology) whose basis for developing a field of inquiry is massive deception. He concluded by suggesting that the problem be dealt with through increased awareness of the negative implications of deception, resulting in its use only when justified; the exploration of ways to counteract and minimize the negative consequences of deception when it is used; and, the development of new experimental techniques that dispense with deception and rely on subjects' positive motivations. Kelman suggested role playing as a possibility for one of these new experimental techniques, thereby involving the subject as an active participant in a joint venture with the experimenter. In summarizing several studies which dealt with role playing, Kelman concluded:

> While there is obviously a great deal that we need to know about the meaning of this situation to the subjects, they did react differentially to the experimental manipulations and these reactions followed an orderly pattern, despite the fact that they knew it was all make-believe (p. 10).

The Role Playing-Versus-Deception Debate

Kelman's negative view of deception and his optimism toward role playing as its possible alternative found immediate support from others (Ring, 1967; Brown, 1962, 1965; Schultz, 1969). Roger Brown (1962) believed role playing subjects actually gave more valid information than that provided by the "hoodwinked" subjects of most deception experiments. In agreement, Schultz (1969) added, ". . .the best way of investigating the nature of man is to ask him" (p. 227). Schultz adovcated two methods which employed the "asking" technique, one of which was the role playing

approach suggested by Kelman (1967). The other, suggested by Jourard (1968), involved a mutual self-disclosure between the experimenter and the subject. Both approaches adopt a more realistic image of the human subject, changing, as Jourard pointed out, "the status of the subject from that of an anonymous object of our study to the status of a person, a fellow seeker, a collaborator in our enterprise" (Jourard, 1968, p. 25).

The opposite position concerning role playing has been taken by numerous other social psychologists, however. In the revised Handbook of Social Psychology (1968), Aronson and Carlsmith argue against role playing, asserting that it lacks realism. Accordingly, "There are some very serious difficulties with the role-playing approach; these are similar to the problems arising from introspective reports" (p. 27). These men were joined by other researchers who pointed out the extreme limitations of utility and generalizability associated with a role-playing paradigm (McGuire, 1969; Freedman, 1969; Carlson, 1971; Kiesler, Collins, & Miller, 1969). Freedman (1969), especially, presented some very convincing arguments, leading to this conclusion:

> I think it is a very serious mistake to consider role playing an acceptable substitute. On the contrary, the use of role playing under most circumstances constitutes a return to the prescientific days when intuition and consensus took the place of data (p. 108).

Freedman continued by listing four ways of utilizing role playing: (a) as a straight substitute for experimental research, (b) alongside experimental research with the eventual intention to use it as a substitute should it prove to produce equivalent results, (c) as a substitute only when experimental research on the problem is impossible, and (d) to produce data specifically designed to test a theory, as was done by

Bem (1967) in his explanation of the cognitive dissonance phenomenon. According to Freedman, all but the first are somewhat acceptable. He considers role playing as a straight substitute for experimental research, the use of role playing gives, "additional knowledge about role playing itself, about people's assumptions about the world and how they differ from reality" (p. 109), and may eventually allow the researcher to use role playing instead of the experimental paradigm with some confidence in that situation.

Thus, role playing may be beneficial as a phenomenon for study in itself, giving evidence as to what affects people's guesses or judgments in particular situations. Attribution theorists have investigated these effects by considering the causal attributions made by different individuals. Heider's (1958) naive man-on-the-street is said to consider both the situation and the actor when assigning causality for an act. Investigators who have extended Heider's ideas have learned to qualify his assumptions. They have discovered a distinct difference between individuals who merely observe the action and those who actually perform it (Jones & Nisbett, 1972; McArthur, 1972; Storms, 1973). Actors tend to emphasize situational concomitants as causes of their acts, while observers consistently stress the actor's characteristics as producing behaviors. Obviously, this divergence exists because of a basic difference in the types of information being considered by them. If the consideration of different factors can influence the causal attributions made by individuals, it seems certain that considerations of the actor-observer divergence would be useful in assessing the data of role-playing subjects. Except for the Vance and Helm (1975) study, the divergent viewpoints demonstrated by actors and observers have been overlooked in the writings of role-playing investigators.

The Actor/Observer Divergence

According to Jones and Nisbett (1972): "There is a pervasive tendency for actors to attribute their actions to situational requirements, whereas observers tend to attribute the same actions to stable personal dispositions" (p. 80). This is due to the fact that actors and observers bring different information to bear on their inferences about the actor and his environment because different aspects of the event are available or salient for them. For the observer, the actor's behavior is the "figural stimulus against the ground of the situation". Thus, the action itself is more salient to the observer and is the focal, commanding stimulus. His knowledge is limited with regard to the actor's emotional state, intentions, or personal history; thus, the observer is characteristically normative and nomothetic, comparing the actor with other actors and judging his attributes accordingly. The actor, on the other hand, is more inclined to use an idiographic reference scale, judging his actions with reference to his other previous actions rather than to the behaviors of other actors. His attention is directed outward toward the environment with its constantly shifting demands and opportunities. Subsequently, he perceives his behavior to be a response to environmental cues that trigger, guide, and terminate it. Behavior is thus seen by the observer to be a manifestation of the actor and is seen by the actor as a response to the situation. Presumably, the more the observer is set to empathize with the actor, the more similar their attributional perspectives will be, but the observer is ordinarily expected to show that general observer tendency to underestimate the role of the environment.

Jones and Nisbett go on to speculate concerning the "correctness" of each of these divergent trends. They feel that the observer often errs by over-attributing dispositions, since evidence for the existence of personality traits in sparse (Mischel, 1968). They write:

> Without insisting that the actor is usually right, we can point to many instances where the observer's interpretation of behavior is simply wrong. . . the observer seems to underestimate the power of the situation and to overestimate the uniqueness of the (in fact modal) response (p. 88).

They conclude the "traits exist more in the eye of the beholder than in the psyche of the actor" (p. 89).

It is not surprising that Vance and Helm (1975) could demonstrate the validity of the data provided by role-playing observers in relation to that provided by in situ observers, since the attributions of both are based on very limited information and generalized "traits". It should be much more difficult to demonstrate such validity between role-playing and in situ actors, however, since actors typically provide data of an "idiographic" nature based on their reactions to the situational cues. Role players who actually experience the experimental situation should be much more successful in duplicating the response pattern obtained from the in situ actors. It is expected that impression management notions will be depicted in the OTHER'S VIEW perspective provided by in situ actors, displaying a marked departure from their self ratings, since it has been demonstrated that people are concerned with their evaluations by others (Whiteside and Helm, 1975). All individuals, after all, are perforced both actors and observers, and, as has been domonstrated (Storms, 1973), are simultaneously aware of the considerations which are appropriate to the other role. As mentioned earlier these impression management notions probably result from perceived or anticipated interactions with others and may not become salient for role players in a

scenario situation. Role players who experience the interaction should be better able to assess the actor's impression management concerns and correctly predict her OTHER'S VIEW ratings.

Role-Playing Paradigms

The operational definition of role playing is of foremost importance in experiments comparing deception and role-playing methodologies. In 1967, Greenberg used a role-playing procedure that has come to be known as the "forewarning" technique in an effort to replicate an earlier study by Schachter (1959). In Schachter's study, high-and-low-anxiety states were created in subjects by telling them that they were about to receive either a series of rather severe and painful electrical shocks (high anxiety) or a series of mild electrical shocks (low anxiety). Subjects in both groups were subsequently told that it would take a few minutes to prepare the apparatus and that each subject could spend this waiting time alone or in the company of others. Each subject was then presented with two scales which measured his willingness to wait alone or in the company of others, providing a measure of his need for affiliation. No shocks were administered, as the experiment terminated at this point. Schachter found that high anxiety produces a greater tendency to prefer affiliation than low anxiety only among firstborn and only child subjects and not among later-born subjects, and that firstborn and only child subjects have a greater desire to affiliate with others than later-born subjects only under conditions of high anxiety but not under conditions of low anxiety.

Greenberg used the forewarning procedure of role playing to test for the same results. Although he asked his subjects to role play, he

omitted detailed descriptions of the experimental manipulations. Each subject was simply asked to assume the role of a subject who was about to receive the electrical shocks, either severe or mild. The results of Greenberg's experiment are complex. The anxiety manipulation was successful only for firstborn and only-child subjects, not later borns, and the statistical analysis on the 2 x 2 design (Birth Order x Manipulation Anxiety) revealed no significant differences between any of the experimental conditions: high anxiety - first born and only children, high anxiety - later-born children, low anxiety - first born and only children, and low anxiety - later-born children. He then partitioned his subjects into two different groups based on perceived anxiety. Categorized in this manner, the data confirmed Schachter's (1959) finding that high anxiety produces greater affiliation than low anxiety among first-born and only-child subjects. Despite these qualifications, Greenberg regarded his experiment as a success in terms of the stated purpose of his study, though others (e.g., Miller, 1972) have disagreed.

Greenberg's results did, however, seem promising to role-playing advocates. A few years later, Willis and Willis (1970) attempted a different type of role-playing procedure, known as "prebriefing", in a basic conformity experiment. This "prebriefing" variant of role playing involves the detailed presentation of experimental conditions to role-playing subjects, in contrast to the forewarning technique which does not provide a full description of the situation. The results were promising, though somewhat limited, since the interaction that occurred in the actual experiment was not obtained in the role-playing phase. Willis and Willis concluded:

> In this experiment role playing has shown some capacity to duplicate results obtained by conventional deception techniques. However, this capacity was limited to the more obvious main effect. . . The more subtle, and more interesting, interaction . . . was not picked up by the role-playing techniques . . . We tentatively conclude that role playing provides an appropriate alternative to deception only insofar as obvious effects are under consideration (p. 476).

Horowitz and Rothschild (1970) contrasted the effects of the "prebriefing" and "forewarning" role-playing techniques with live deception in a modified Asch conformity experiment. They concluded:

> . . . it does appear that the forewarned variant has been an effective substitute for deception in both the Greenberg (1967) experiment and the present study. The forewarned variant appears to mitigate the ethical pitfalls of deception without vitiating the experimental realism of the manipulations (p. 226).

As mentioned in Chapter I, Vance and Helm (1975) demonstrated that the dissimilar effects obtained by the "prebriefing" and "forewarning" procedures would not occur in the role playing of impressions ratings if the impressions are limited to the observer's perspective (Jones & Nisbett, 1972). They noted that role-playing data that matches the data provided by _in situ_ subjects has more often been produced when subjects have behaved as observers, emphasizing an actor's traits (similar to forewarning procedures), rather than as actor's, concerned with the effects of circumstances (similar to prebriefing procedures). Using Asch's conformity paradigm as modified by Kane and Tedeschi (1972), they found parallel patterns of trait impressions in the _in situ_ condition and written-scenario conditions, indicating that role-playing observers can accurately predict attributions made by "deceived" _in situ_ observers. They then suggested that role players who must adopt actors' considerations might not accurately predict the attributions of _in situ_ actors when they cannot experience the actual situation. The present study provides a test of that proposition.

Hypotheses

There are three explicit hypotheses concerning the present study, two of which involve replications of earlier studies.

Hypothesis I

Kane and Tedeschi (1972) found that the independent, or nonconforming, subjects in the Asch line-judgment situation were rated more positively by the conforming subjects, suggesting that conformity is costly in terms of negative evaluations. The first hypothesis of the present paper is a restatement of their findings:

> 1) In the *in situ* version of the study, the independent actor (subject) will be rated more positively by the observer (confederate) than will the conforming actor, replicating the study by Kane and Tedeschi (1972).

Hypothesis II

Vance and Helm (1975) found that role-playing confederates could accurately match the pattern of impression ratings provided by the *in situ* confederates when rating subjects on the basis of their conforming or independent behaviors in the Asch-backwards situation. The second hypothesis of this paper is a restatement of their findings:

> 2) Role-playing observers (confederates) will be able to accurately match (the pattern of significant differences will be the same) the impression ratings provided by the *in situ* observers (confederates), replicating Vance and Helm (1975).

Hypothesis III

Experimental research investigating the effectiveness of role playing as an alternative methodology to deception has yielded varied

and inconclusive results (Greenberg, 1967; Willis and Willis, 1970; Horowitz and Rothschild, 1970). Vance and Helm (1975) have suggested that these divergent results might stem from the divergent considerations common to actors and observers (Jones & Nisbett, 1972). As indicated by Jones and Nisbett (1972), observers of behavior typically consider the more general dispositional factors of the actor. These behaviors which observers interpret in terms of dispositional factors can be described in writing, and can therefore be established in a role-playing situation without the subjects actually experiencing the experimental situation itself. Vance and Helm (1975) used this approach to show a high level of empirical accuracy between in situ and role-playing observers, who appear to judge others on a nomothetic basis. Actors, on the other hand, use an idiographic reference scale, focusing on the specifics of the stimulus situation and, probably, the effects of their actions upon the impressions of others. Their considerations should thus be more difficult to re-enact in a role-playing situation. If role players are allowed to experience the same experimental situation as was experienced by the in situ actors, however, the factors considered should be somewhat similar for both in situ actors and in situ role-playing actors. Explicitly stated, the final and most important hypothesis of the present paper is:

> 3) Role-playing actors in the scenario condition will not be able to accurately match the impression ratings provided by the in situ actors (subjects). Role-playing actors in the in situ condition will be able to accurately match (the pattern of significant differences will be the same) the impression ratings provided by the in situ actors (subjects).

CHAPTER III

METHODS AND PROCEDURES

Subjects

One-hundred twenty female Introductory Psychology students participated in the experiment for extra class credit and were randomly assigned to either the conform or independent experimental conditions and to the various phases of the study (in situ versus scenario, actor versus observer).

Instruments

The nature and results of the original Asch studies were described to all subjects in both the in situ and scenario versions of the study. In addition to this, the Asch-backwards studies (Kane and Tedeschi, 1972) were explained to the in situ actors. The standard Asch-backwards experiment, as adopted by Kane and Tedeschi, was employed in establishing the experimental manipulation in the in situ version of the present experiment. The instruments used in the experimental manipulation were 18 stimulus cards, similar to those used in Asch's original studies (1956). Each consisted of a stimulus line followed by three lines varying in length, only one of which equaled the length of the stimulus line.

Following the line-judgment activities (see Procedures, below), identical impression scales were used in each of the experimental conditions in both the in situ and scenario studies and for both actors and

observers. A version of the Semantic Differential (SD: Osgood, Suci and Tannenbaum, 1957) provided ratings on Activity, Potency, Evaluation and Affect dimensions, and on polar-adjective scales measuring Accommocation, Cooperation, and Inhibition (Appendix A). Each polar-adjective scale was scored from 1 to 7. The Activity dimension included the sum of active-passive, progressive-regressive, stable-changeable, and calm-excitable polar adjective scales; the Affect dimension included the sum of friendly-unfriendly, pleasant-unpleasant, insincere-sincere, and trustworthy-untrustworthy polar adjective scales; the Evaluation dimension included the sum of bad-good, dishonest-honest, harmful-beneficial, and king-cruel polar adjective scales; and the Potency dimension consisted of the hard-soft, cautious-rash, weak-strong, and severe-lenient scales.

Design

Forty subjects were assigned to the role of observer in either the conform or independnet line-judgment condition and in either the in situ or scenario phase and provided ratings of the actor (OTHER perspective) based on their observation of the actor's behavior in the experiment or a written description of that behavior. The observers in the in situ condition served as confederates in the experimental manipulation and their ratings provided a replication of the Kane and Tedeschi (1972) study. Those in the scenario condition predicted the ratings of the in situ observers, providing a replication of the Vance and Helm (1975) study.

Eighty subjects were assigned to the actor role in either the conform or independent condition. Twenty of these were in the scenario condition. Sixty of the actors participated in the in situ condition, but only

twenty of the *in situ* actors actually acted out the actor role in the Asch-backwards paradigm, rating themselves (SELF perspective) and how they expected to be rated by others (OTHER'S VIEW perspective) in repeated measures. The ordering of the two rating tasks across subjects followed an *abba* pattern, with both ratings taken after the presentation of the Asch paradigm and the line-judgment activities. The other *in situ* actors were role players acting as "confederates" during the experimental manipulation and then predicting the ratings provided by the *in situ* actors from either the SELF actor's view of self) or OTHER'S VIEW (actor's view of how observers see her) perspectives (nonrepeated measures). The twenty "actors" in the scenario condition predicted the SELF and OTHER'S VIEW ratings (repeated measures) provided by the *in situ* actors on the basis of a written description of the situation. The ordering of the two rating tasks across these subjects also followed an *abba* pattern. Thus, there were *in situ* actors who participated as "subjects" in the Asch-backwards manipulation and provided ratings of SELF and OTHER'S VIEW, *in situ* role-playing actors who experienced the experimental situation by participating as "confederates" in the Asch-backwards manipulation and predicted the SELF and OTHER'S VIEW ratings of the *in situ* actors, and role-playing actors in the scenario condition who did not experience the experimental situation but predicted the SELF and OTHER'S VIEW ratings of the *in situ* actors following a written description of the experimental manipulation.

There were eight sets of data on which one-way ANOVA's (producing an *F*-value which corresponds to t^2) were performed, each with 1 and 18 degrees of freedom (n = 10 per cell). The independent variable in each condition was whether the actor conformed or made independently correct

line judgments. Two of the tests were performed on sets of data provided by observers, one by in situ observers (OTHER perspective) and one by role-playing actors in the scenario condition (OTHER perspective), allowing a replication of the Kane and Tedeschi (1972) and Vance and Helm (1975) studies. Six tests were performed on sets of data provided by actors, two by in situ actors (SELF and OTHER'S VIEW perspectives), two by role-playing actors in the in situ condition (SELF and OTHER'S VIEW perspectives), and two by role-playing actors in the scenario condition (SELF and OTHER'S VIEW perspectives).

It should be noted that the design of the present study does not present an opportunity for exploring the utility of role playing in "picking up" the subtle interactions of experimental dimensions, a problem which has been raised by other role-playing investigators (Willis and Willis, 1970).

Procedures

Five subjects and two experimenters were used for each experimental setting. Both male and female experimenters were used in each of the experimental conditions.

In Situ Actor ("Subject")

The first subject to arrive was designated as the in situ actor. She was taken to a separate room by E_1 and was given the following instructions:

> In the 1950's Solomon Asch did a series of studies on social conformity. Groups of three to nine individuals took part in the experiments in visual discrimination. The length of a standard line had to be matched to one of three other lengths. One of the three lines was equal to the standard line and the other two lines

> differed considerably from the standard line. Individuals acted as accomplices by reporting unanimous, erroneous or wrong judgments on twelve of the eighteen trials. Asch wanted to see if the subject would conform to such wrong judgments of the group. His results showed that in a large majority of cases the subject did indeed conform to wrong judgments. We are interested in extending Asch's study to find out how the confederates viewed the subjects who either conformed or didn't conform to their erroneous judgments. Therefore, we would like you to be an accomplice in this experiment by posing as an actual subject in the Asch conformity situation. We have signed up three other girls for this experiment. When they arrive they will be taken to another room and will be told that we are simply replicating Asch's original experiment to see if the majority of people still conform to group pressure today as they did in the '50's when Asch was conducting his experiments. They will not be aware that the experiment has been reversed and that <u>they</u> are now the actual subjects and <u>you</u> are the confederate. Since there are two experimental conditions in this study, one where the individual conforms and one where she does not conform, you may choose which role you want to play. However, we have been trying to keep an equal number of people in each condition as we run the experiment, and the last girl who helped us by being a confederate chose to <u>not conform</u> (or <u>conform</u>), so I would really like for you to <u>conform</u> (or <u>not conform</u>).

Further explanation was given when necessary to insure that the subject understood what her behavior in the situation should be. "Suggestions" as to which role to select were readily accepted; in either role, the subjects' behaviors were mandated by the experimenter.

<u>Scenario Condition</u>

As the other subjects arrived they were taken to the experimental room by $\underline{E_2}$. If four subjects were present in the experimental room, the last subject was taken to a separate room following a brief introduction to the Asch paradigm and was asked to participate in the scenario portion of the experiment. If fewer than three subjects were present in the experimental room, the Asch paradigm was explained to them all and all subjects (including the first subject who was isolated in the separate room) were asked to participate in the scenario portion of the experiment.

In any event, scenario subjects were randomly assigned to one of four conditions (actor-independent, actor-conform, observer-independent, or observer-conform) and were given one of the following sets of instructions:

> Actor-Independent. Pretend that you are the subject in the Asch experiment just described to you in the experimental room. You did not conform to the erroneous judgments of the three confederates; instead, you made independently correct judgments in all cases. (a) Complete the following as you, the subject, would rate yourself under these circumstances (SELF perspective). (after completion of the first form) (b) Now mark how you think the confederates would rate you after you did not conform to their erroneous judgments (OTHER'S VIEW perspective). (a and b were counterbalanced in abba order.)
>
> Actor-Conform. Pretend that you are the subject in the Asch experiment just described to you in the experimental room. In each instance, you conformed to the erroneous judgments of the three confederates. (a) Complete the following as you, the subject, would rate yourself under these circumstances (SELF perspective). (after completion of the first form) (b) Now mark how you think the confederates would rate you after you had conformed to their erroneous judgments (OTHER'S VIEW perspective). (a and b were counterbalanced in abba order.)
>
> Observer-Independent. Pretend that you are one of the confederates in the Asch experiment just described to you in the experimental room. The subject did not conform to the erroneous judgments which the three of you made; instead, she made independently correct judgments in all cases. Complete the following as you, a confederate, would rate the subject in this experiment (OTHER perspective).
>
> Observer-Conform. Pretend that you are one of the confederates in the Asch experiment just described to you in the experimental room. In each instance, the subject conformed to the erroneous judgments which the three of you made. Complete the following as you, a confederate, would rate the subject in this experiment (OTHER perspective).

In Situ Confederates

When the required number of subjects were available for the experiment, the three subjects in the experimental room were seated in a row and were told the following:

In the 1950's Solomon Asch did a series of studies on social conformity. Groups of three to nine individuals took part in experiments in visual discrimination. The length of a standard line had to be matched to one of three other lengths. One of the three lines was equal to the standard line and the other two lines differed considerably from the standard line. Individuals acted as accomplices by reporting unanimous, erroneous or wrong judgments on twelve of the eighteen trials. Asch wanted to see if the subject would conform to such wrong judgments of the group. His results showed that in a large majority of cases the subjece did indeed conform to wrong judgments. We are interested in repeating Asch's study to see if people today still conform as they did in the '50's. I would like for you to take part in this experiment as confederates. Another girl has been signed up for the experiment, but she hasn't shown up yet. When she does, another experimenter will visit with her until we are ready for her in here so that she won't be overly suspicious and realize that you all are actually confederates instead of subjects like herself. I want you (indicating 1st subject in row) to report wrong judgments on all trials except #1, 2, 5, 10, 11, and 14. These are written inconspicuously on the board. You may choose either of the wrong lines, but be sure not to choose the line which matches the standard. Both of you (indicating 2nd and 3rd subjects in row) will agree with her on all 18 trials. (A brief explanatory discussion followed by a rehearsal.) Now I'll go and see if the other girl is here yet.

Experimental Manipulation for In Situ Condition
(Asch-backwards Paradigm)

The "subject" who had been separated in another room joined the others in the experimental room and was seated so that her line-judgment responses were always given last. The second experimenter then presented the following instructions for the line-judgment task:

> This is a task involving the discrimination of line lengths. On the left is a card with one line; the card at the right has three lines differing in length, numbered 1, 2, and 3 from left to right (show first card). One of the three lines at the right is equal to the standard line at the left. You will decide in each case which is the equal line. You will state your judgments in terms of the number of the line. There will be 18 such comparisons in all. As the number of comparisons is few and the group samll, I will call upon each of you in turn to announce your judgments which I shall record here on a prepared form. Please be as accurate as possible.

During these trials the "subject" either conformed to the erroneous judgments of the "confederates" or made independently correct

judgments in each case, as she had previously agreed to do. Upon completion, the "subject" was again taken to a separate room for an alleged debriefing.

In Situ Actor ("Subject")

Isolated again in the separate room, the "subject" was told the following:

> We appreciate your cooperation in helping us carry out this experiment. The three subjects are now rating you on the basis of your behavior in the experiment. We would like you to complete a similar form (a) rating yourself (SELF perspective). (after completion of the first form) (b) Indicating how you expect them to rate you (OTHER'S VIEW perspective). (a and b were counterbalanced in abba order.)

In Situ Confederates

After the "subject" was taken to a separate room for an alleged debriefing, the "confederates" were told the following:

> Another experimenter is explaining to the subject the part that you played as accomplices. He is also asking her to rate herself on this form (indicating Semantic Differential) and to complete an identical form as she thinks you, as confederates, would rate her. In addition to this, we are interested in finding out how you actually do feel about a subject who behaves as she did in a comformity experiment, how you think she would rate herself, and how you feel she would predict your ratings of her. I want you (indicating one of the subjects, as randomly determined prior to the experiment) to complete this form expressing your true impressions of the subject (in situ observer - OTHER perspective). I want you (indicating a different subject as randomly determined prior to the experiment) to complete this form as you think she is actually rating herself (in situ role player - SELF perspective). And I want you (indicating remaining subject) to complete this form expressing how you feel the subject expects to be rated by you (in situ role player - OTHER'S VIEW perspective). Please be as accurate and honest as possible.

Upon completion of the forms, all subjects were thanked for their participation in the experiment, asked not to discuss the experiment with anyone, and were told that feedback concerning the experiment

(debriefing) would be provided upon completion of the experiment by their class instructors (this was accomplished by handout material which included paragraphs describing the outcomes of several other experiments).

CHAPTER IV

RESULTS

One-way ANOVA's (producing an F-value which corresponds to t^2) were performed on eight sets of two-group data, with 1 and 18 degrees of freedom in each set (n = 10 per cell). The lowest acceptable levels of significance was the .05 level in each case.

Hypothesis I: Observers in *In Situ* Interaction

When rating actors on the OTHER perspective, the *in situ* observers differentiated on all but one of the seven measures (Activity) on the basis of the observed conforming or independent behavior of the actor in the Asch-backwards paradigm (Table I). As can be seen in Table III, these observers rated conforming actors significantly higher on Accommodation, Cooperation, and Inhibition and significantly lower on Affect, Evaluation, and Potency than they rated independent conforming actors. It is clear that the conformity manipulation was successful and and that conforming subjects received negative ratings on the basis of this manipulation, generally replicating the findings of Kane and Tedeschi (1972).

Hypothesis II: Role-Playing as Observers in the Scenario Condition

As can be seen in Table II, when scenario observers rated actors on the OTHER perspective, they, too, differentiated on all but one of the seven measures (Activity) on the basis of the described conforming or independent behavior of the actor in the Asch-backwards paradigm. Inspection of the means (Table III) indicates that the judgments of scenario observers were in complete agreement with those judgments of *in situ* observers, rating conforming actor significantly higher on Accomodation, Cooperation, and Inhibition and significantly lower on Affect, Evaluation, and Potency than they rated independent actors. The findings of Vance and Helm (1975) were thus replicated--role-playing observers can accurately predict the ratings of *in situ* observers when rating an actor from the OTHER perspective, even though they did not experience the experimental situation.

Hypothesis III: *In Situ* Actors, *In Situ* Role-Playing Actors, and Scenario Role-Playing Actors

When *in situ* actors were asked to rate themselves following the enactment of the Asch-backwards situation, they did not differentiate on any of the seven dependent measures (Table IV) as a result of their behavior in the experiment. This lack of effect possibly results from the limited choise of behavior granted them. They did, after all, simply agree to behave in the manner suggested to them by the experimenter. There is no reason to expect them to accept responsibility for their behavior in this situation. *In situ* role-playing actors who had experienced

TABLE I

SUMMARY ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE OF
OTHER PERSPECTIVE BY
IN SITU OBSERVERS

Analysis	Source	SS	df	MS	F ratio
Activity	Between Subjects	4.05	1	4.05	.86
	Within Subjects	84.90	18	4.72	
Accommodation	Between Subjects	12.80	1	12.80	6.98**
	Within Subjects	33.00	18	1.83	
Affect	Between Subjects	156.80	1	156.80	12.04**
	Within Subjects	234.40	18	13.02	
Cooperation	Between Subjects	51.20	1	51.20	20.03***
	Within Subjects	46.00	18	2.56	
Evaluation	Between Subjects	101.25	1	101.25	10.33**
	Within Subjects	176.50	18	9.80	
Inhibition	Between Subjects	26.45	1	26.45	13.19**
	Within Subjects	36.10	18	2.00	
Potency	Between Subjects	378.45	1	378.45	44.44****
	Within Subjects	153.30	18	8.52	

* .05
** .01
*** .001
**** .0001

TABLE II

SUMMARY ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE OF OTHER PERSPECTIVY BY ROLE-PLAYING OBSERVERS IN SCENARIO CONDITION

Analysis	Source	SS	df	MS	F ratio
Activity	Between Subjects	31.25	1	31.25	3.10
	Within Subjects	181.30	18	10.07	
Accommodation	Between Subjects	18.05	1	18.05	6.28*
	Within Subjects	51.70	18	2.87	
Affect	Between Subjects	125.00	1	125.00	9.27**
	Within Subjects	242.80	18	13.49	
Cooperation	Between Subjects	125.00	1	125.00	244.57****
	Within Subjects	9.20	18	0.51	
Evaluation	Between Subjects	110.45	1	110.45	7.17**
	Within Subjects	277.30	18	15.41	
Inhibition	Between Subjects	48.05	1	48.05	19.79***
	Within Subjects	43.70	18	2.43	
Potency	Between Subjects	361.25	1	361.25	33.23****
	Within Subjects	195.70	18	10.87	

* .05
** .01
*** .001
**** .0001

TABLE III

MEANS OF OTHER PERSPECTIVY BY
IN SITU AND SCENARIO
OBSERVERS

Analysis		Live	Role Playing
Activity	Conform:	13.60	13.90
	Independent:	14.50	16.40
Accommodation	Conform:	5.70	5.20
	Independent:	4.10	3.30
Affect	Conform:	17.00	16.60
	Independent:	22.60	21.60
Cooperation	Conform:	6.40	6.80
	Independent:	3.20	1.80
Evaluation	Conform:	18.00	16.90
	Independent:	22.50	21.60
Inhibition	Conform:	4.30	5.30
	Independent:	2.00	2.20
Potency	Conform:	10.40	9.80
	Independent:	19.10	18.30

TABLE IV

SUMMARY ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE OF SELF PERSPECTIVE BY IN SITU ACTORS

Analysis	Source	SS	df	MS	F ratio
Activity	Between Subjects	4.05	1	4.05	.34
	Within Subjects	215.70	18	11.98	
Accommodation	Between Subjects	1.80	1	1.80	.79
	Within Subjects	41.20	18	2.29	
Affect	Between Subjects	80.00	1	80.00	2.86
	Within Subjects	503.20	18	27.96	
Cooperation	Between Subjects	1.25	1	1.25	.54
	Within Subjects	41.70	18	2.32	
Evaluation	Between Subjects	11.25	1	11.25	.71
	Within Subjects	285.70	18	15.87	
Inhibition	Between Subjects	.80	1	.80	.16
	Within Subjects	91.00	18	5.06	
Potency	Between Subjects	20.00	1	20.00	1.23
	Within Subjects	292.80	18	16.27	

the experimental Asch-backwards situation by acting as "confederates" also did not differentiate on any of the dependent measures when predicting the SELF ratings of the in situ actor ("subject") (Table V). It is important to note, however, that role-playing actors in the scenario condition responded to the description of the conforming or independent behavior of the in situ actors by differentiating on five of the seven dependent measures (Table VI). As indicated in Table VII, when these role players were asked to assume the role of actor, those in the conform condition rated themselves significantly higher on Accommodation, Cooperation, and Inhibition and significantly lower on Affect and Potency than did the role players in the inedpendent condition. It appears that while in situ role-playing actors who have participated in the experimental situation can successfully match the pattern of impression ratings provided by in situ actors on the SELF perspective, role-playing actors in the scenario condition who have not experienced the situation cannot. It is likely that in situ actors view the event and their role in idiosyncratic terms related to the environmental stimuli, making it difficult for role players who have not experienced the situation to match their impression ratings.

When asked to rate themselves as they expected to be rated by the observers ("confederates"), in situ actors departed markedly from their SELF ratings, differentiating on six of the seven dependent measures in this instance (Table VIII). The means in Table XI indicate that conforming actors expected to be rated significantly higher on Accommodation, Cooperation, and Inhibition and significantly lower on Affect, Evaluation, and Potency by the observers ("confederates") than did independent actors. It is interesting to note that this expected pattern of results exactly

TABLE V

SUMMARY ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE OF SELF PERSPECTIVE BY IN SITU ROLE-PLAYING ACTORS

Analysis	Source	SS	df	MS	F ratio
Activity	Between Subjects	7.20	1	7.20	.63
	Within Subjects	205.80	18	11.43	
Accommodation	Between Subjects	2.45	1	2.45	1.69
	Within Subjects	26.10	18	1.45	
Affect	Between Subjects	7.20	1	7.20	.38
	Within Subjects	340.80	18	18.93	
Cooperation	Between Subjects	9.80	1	9.80	2.07
	Within Subjects	85.40	18	4.74	
Evaluation	Between Subjects	48.05	1	48.05	2.89
	Within Subjects	298.90	18	16.61	
Inhibition	Between Subjects	1.80	1	1.80	.70
	Within Subjects	46.00	18	2.56	
Potency	Between Subjects	18.05	1	18.05	3.65
	Within Subjects	88.90	18	4.93	

TABLE VI

SUMMARY ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE OF SELF PERSPECTIVE BY ROLE-PLAYING ACTORS IN SCENARIO CONDITION

Analysis	Source	SS	df	MS	F ratio
Activity	Between Subjects	33.80	1	33.80	3.08
	Within Subjects	197.40	18	10.97	
Accommodation	Between Subjects	48.05	1	48.05	30.35****
	Within Subjects	28.50	18	1.58	
Affect	Between Subjects	72.20	1	72.20	5.02*
	Within Subjects	259.00	18	14.39	
Cooperation	Between Subjects	51.20	1	51.20	14.27**
	Within Subjects	64.60	18	3.59	
Evaluation	Between Subjects	45.00	1	45.00	3.42
	Within Subjects	236.80	18	13.16	
Inhibition	Between Subjects	54.45	1	54.45	17.98***
	Within Subjects	54.50	18	3.03	
Potency	Between Subjects	145.80	1	145.80	6.37*
	Within Subjects	412.20	18	22.90	

* .05
** .01
*** .001
**** .0001

TABLE VII

MEANS OF SELF PERSPECTIVE BY IN SITU ACTOR, IN SITU ROLE-PLAYING ACTORS, AND SCENARIO ROLE-PLAYING ACTORS

Analysis		In Situ Actors	Scenario Role-Playing Actors	In Situ Role-Playing Actors
Activity	Conform:	13.80	15.50	13.90
	Independent:	14.70	18.10	15.10
Accommodation	Conform:	5.80	5.90	5.50
	Independent:	5.20	2.80	4.80
Affect	Conform:	20.20	19.30	22.40
	Independent:	24.20	23.10	23.60
Cooperation	Conform:	6.30	5.70	4.90
	Independent:	5.80	2.50	3.50
Evaluation	Conform:	21.30	20.40	21.50
	Independent:	22.80	23.40	24.60
Inhibition	Conform:	3.30	5.70	4.40
	Independent:	2.90	2.40	3.80
Potency	Conform:	13.60	13.30	14.60
	Independent:	15.60	18.70	16.50

TABLE VIII

SUMMARY ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE OF OTHER'S VIEW PERSPECTIVY BY IN SITU ACTORS

Analysis	Source	SS	df	MS	F ratio
Activity	Between Subjects	61.25	1	61.25	4.03
	Within Subjects	273.30	18	15.18	
Accommodation	Between Subjects	26.45	1	26.45	9.43**
	Within Subjects	50.50	18	2.81	
Affect	Between Subjects	273.80	1	273.80	15.50***
	Within Subjects	318.00	18	17.67	
Cooperation	Between Subjects	22.05	1	22.05	4.70*
	Within Subjects	84.50	18	4.69	
Evaluation	Between Subjects	151.25	1	151.25	7.64**
	Within Subjects	356.50	18	19.81	
Inhibition	Between Subjects	33.80	1	33.80	8.20**
	Within Subjects	74.20	18	4.12	
Potency	Between Subjects	186.05	1	186.05	5.75*
	Within Subjects	582.90	18	32.38	

* .05
** .01
*** .001
**** .0001

TABLE IX

SUMMARY ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE OF OTHER'S VIEW PERSPECTIVE BY IN SITU ROLE-PLAYING ACTORS

Analysis	Source	SS	df	MS	F ratio
Activity	Between Subjects	54.45	1	54.45	2.28
	Within Subjects	430.50	18	23.92	
Accommodation	Between Subjects	7.20	1	7.20	3.43
	Within Subjects	37.80	18	2.10	
Affect	Between Subjects	61.25	1	61.25	2.89
	Within Subjects	381.70	18	21.21	
Cooperation	Between Subjects	57.80	1	57.80	29.73****
	Within Subjects	35.00	18	1.94	
Evaluation	Between Subjects	120.05	1	120.05	6.95**
	Within Subjects	310.90	18	17.27	
Inhibition	Between Subjects	12.80	1	12.80	6.98**
	Within Subjects	33.00	18	1.83	
Potency	Between Subjects	224.45	1	224.45	18.32***
	Within Subjects	220.50	18	12.25	

* .05
** .01
*** .001
**** .0001

TABLE X

SUMMARY ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE OF OTHER'S VIEW PERSPECTIVY BY ROLE-PLAYING ACTORS IN SCENARIO CONDITION

Analysis	Source	SS	df	MS	F ratio
Activity	Between Subjects	36.45	1	36.45	1.90
	Within Subjects	345.30	18	19.18	
Accommodation	Between Subjects	72.20	1	72.20	83.31****
	Within Subjects	15.60	18	.87	
Affect	Between Subjects	.45	1	.45	.02
	Within Subjects	324.10	18	18.01	
Cooperation	Between Subjects	115.20	1	115.20	172.80****
	Within Subjects	12.00	18	.67	
Evaluation	Between Subjects	12.80	1	12.80	.70
	Within Subjects	330.40	18	18.36	
Inhibition	Between Subjects	20.00	1	20.00	4.46*
	Within Subjects	80.80	18	4.49	
Potency	Between Subjects	732.05	1	732.05	59.76****
	Within Subjects	220.50	18	12.25	

* .05
** .01
*** .001
**** .0001

TABLE XI

MEANS OF OTHER'S VIEW PERSPECTIVE BY IN SITU ACTORS, IN SITU ROLE-PLAYING ACTORS, AND SCENARIO ROLE-PLAYING ACTORS

Analysis		In Situ Actors	Scenario Role-Playing Actors	In Situ Role-Playing Actors
Activity	Conform:	10.90	13.40	13.90
	Independent:	14.40	16.10=	17.20
Accommodation	Conform:	6.20	6.00	5.10
	Independent:	3.90	2.20	3.90
Affect	Conform:	13.20	17.70	18.70
	Independent:	20.60	18.00	22.20
Cooperation	Conform:	6.40	6.60	6.30
	Independent:	4.30	1.80	2.90
Evaluation	Conform:	14.50	17.40	18.00
	Independent:	20.00	19.00	22.90
Inhibition	Conform:	5.30	5.60	3.90
	Independent:	2.70	3.60	2.30
Potency	Conform:	9.90	9.10	12.10
	Independent:	16.00	21.20	18.80

matches those actually given by the observers when rating the actors (see Table I and II). But more to the point, role-playing actors in the in situ condition significantly differentiated on four of the dependent measures when predicting the in situ actor's OTHER'S VIEW ratings (Table IX), predicting that conforming actors would expect to be rated higher on Cooperation and Inhibition and lower on Evaluation and Potency than would independent actors (Table XI). Although the Accommodation and Affect measures failed to reach the .05 significance level, these measures did approach significance (Accommodation: $F = 3.43$, $p < .08$; Affect: $F = 2.89$, $p < .10$), again indicating that role players who have experienced the experimental situation experienced by in situ actors can predict their impression ratings with at least a fair degree of accuracy. Role-playing actors in the scenario condition did not accurately match the OTHER'S VIEW pattern of ratings provided by the in situ actors (Table X), however, failing to differentiate on the Affect and Evaluation dimensions which were significant for the in situ actors in this perspective. They did agree with the in situ actors on the other measures, predicting that conforming actors would expect to be rated significantly higher on Accommodation, Cooperation, and Inhibition, and significantly lower on Potency than would the independent actors (Table XI). Again, it appears that role-playing actors who have not experienced the experimental situation are less able to accurately match the ratings of in situ actors, supporting the third and major hypothesis of this study. It is interesting to note, however, that the ratings which the scenario role players could not accurately predict deal essentially with how well one feels that she is liked by another (Affect and Evaluation - OTHER'S VIEW) and how she views herself. All role players were able to accurately predict

how the actor would expect others to rate her on behavioral and strength dimensions.

Results of a Supplementary Investigation

It occurred to the writer that the divergent results obtained from *in situ* actors and scenario role-playing actors might be nothing more than a reflection of the different information provided them. Due to the experimental manipulation, it was necessary to fully inform the *in situ* actors of the Asch-backwards paradigm and their part in its enactment. This information was not given to the role-playing actors in the scenario condition. The *in situ* actors completed their rating forms for the two perspectives (SELF and OTHER'S VIEW) wholly aware that their behavior in the experimental room had been merely a compliance to the wishes of the experimenter, with minimal choice on their part. The scenario role-playing actors assumed the role of actor without this awareness. The obtained results might have been accounted for if similar information had been given both sets of subjects. It was determined that some type of experimental check was necessary to clarify these results. Twenty female undergraduates were asked to participate as role players in the experiment, 10 in the conform condition and 10 in the independent condition. These subjects were given information identical to that given to the *in situ* actors, including the experimenter's "suggestions" for their behavior in the experimental room. They were also told that in every case the *in situ* actors had agreed to comply with these suggestions by either consistently conforming or making independently correct line judgments following the unanimous, erroneous judgments of the confederates. These subjects were given the same instructions as had previously been

given to the scenario role-playing actors in the original experiment (see "Procedures" in Chapter III) and were asked to complete an identical version of the Semantic Differential (Appendix) from both the SELF and OTHER'S VIEW perspectives. Again, these perspectives were presented to the subjects in abba order. Analysis of the data (one-way ANOVA's producing an F-value which corresponds to t^2, with 1 and 18 degrees of freedom and n = 10 per cell) revealed that these role players differed from the original role-playing actors in the scenario condition only one measure, the Affect dimension on the SELF perspective. The current role players failed to differentiate on this measure whereas the original role players had made this differentiation on the SELF perspective. Both sets of role players agreed completely on ratings for the OTHER'S VIEW perspective. It appears that when role players are aware that their supposed behavior is somewhat externally controlled they are not likely to change their self Affect rating as a consequence of that behavior. More importantly, the similarity of results obtained by these two sets of scenario role-playing actors lends credence to the main hypothesis set forth in this paper -- role-playing actors who have not actually experienced the experimental situation cannot accurately match the ratings of in situ actors in either the SELF or OTHER'S VIEW perspectives, even when identical information is given to both in situ and role-playing actors.

CHAPTER V

DISCUSSION

The present data supported the three hypotheses which were developed in this paper. When rating actors on the basis of their conforming or independent behavior in an Asch-backwards situation, the "confederates" tend to rate the conforming actors more negatively than they rated the independent actors, confirming the original findings of Kane and Tedeschi (1972). Role players who did not experience the situation accurately matched this rating pattern when the conforming and independent behaviors were described to them, replicating an earlier study by Vance and Helm (1975). Finally, role-playing subjects who assumed the role of the conforming or independent actors after participating in the experimental situation predicted the SELF and OTHER'S VIEW ratings of *in situ* actors fairly accurately, while role players who predict these ratings without benefit of experiencing these situational cues did not accurately match the actual SELF and OTHER'S FIEW impression ratings. This is probably due to the circumstantial nature of the factors being considered by *in situ* actors, a state of information which is difficult to induce in role-playing subjects by a mere description of the situation.

The present experimental results appear to make a useful contribution to the existing literature. As was noted in the literature review, role-playing research has typically investigated the prediction of actual behaviors rather than the impression ratings which were considered in

the present study. The present results, however, demonstrate that the actor/observer divergence appears in impression ratings, and is associated with role-playing accuracy. The informational factors considered by an observer are readily accessible to role players even when they have not actually experienced the situation, while those considered by actors apparently become salient only in the context of actual experiences and, consequently, are not comprehended by role-playing subjects who only read a description of the situation. These considerations seem to substantiate the argument that one's viewpoint becomes important in the role-playing of actual behaviors. Individuals must adopt either an actor or observer viewpoint when contemplating an act or a situation, and will consider primarily, if not exclusively, the set of factors which are appropriate to their viewpoint.

It would seem that the factors being considered by role-playing subjects and their degree of active involvement in the role are crucial determinants in their ability to duplicate results obtained in studies which employ deception. When asked to assume the role of an observer, such as when an individual's behavior is described to them and they are asked to rate him on the basis of that behavior, role-playing subjects can consider the same dispositional or "trait" factors that are thought to be considered by those who actually observe the behavior first-hand. When role-playing subjects similarly are asked to assume the role of the actor himself, however, the situation is changed markedly. The environmental cues, with which the actual actor is concerned and to which he is responding, are not available to the role player. The role player has only limited information concerning the behavior he supposedly emitted, without benefit of situational cues which are available only in

an experiential context. He is forced to focus on factors which differ considerably from those being considered by actors who are actually experiencing the situation in situ.

The limits of role playing should now be more clearly defined: role players who assume a role on the basis of written information are more accurate when their judgment involves consideration of general dispositional type factors rather than environmental factors, which probably become salient for the subject only as they are actually experienced by him. When role players must consider factors typically considered by actors, they must necessarily be exposed to the environmental cues relevant to the situation. Role-playing subjects who do not experience the research setting in situ are therefore most accurate as observers, making judgments only about the more general dispositional traits of the actor.

The evidence indicates that first-hand knowledge of the circumstances is sufficient to accentuate the situational concomitants of action for role players. Even identical information may not be necessary since the in situ role-playing actors were able to match the ratings provided by the real actors without knowing that the actors were behaving under experimental constraint. Their familiarity with the experimental situation apparently caused them to minimize attributions of personal differences which others, who had not had this experience (scenario role players) associated with the reported behaviors. They were at the same time, however, aware that the servers would make attributions of personal differences. The in situ role-playing actor, with exactly the same information as the in situ observers, knew that the real actor would deny attributions of personal differences and simultaneously knew that the real observers would make these personal

attributions. Only the scenario role-playing actor lacked sufficient information to recognize that the actor would deny personal reasons for her action, even when they were told that the actors were acting under experimental constraint. Scenario role-playing actors apparently made self attributions as if they were observers. That is, they were quite willing to guess that if they had behaved as the written scenario suggested, it must be due to some personal quality inasmuch as they reported personal attributions which were distinguished as a function of behaviors.

The results of the OTHER'S VIEW predictions seem to show that impression management attempts to ascertain the nature of the impression another gains are fairly accurate under both "real" and "abstract" conditions, except when the attribute under consideration deals with liking in which case scenario role players fail to differentiate on the basis of their supposed behavior.

A disadvantage in the design of the present study was mentioned in Chapter III of this paper. The design did not allow a test of the ability of role players, whether actors or observers, to depict the subtle interaction effects which are often of primary interest to experimenters in the behavioral sciences. Subsequent research in this area should be directed toward a test of the effectiveness and accuracy of role-playing actors and observers in relation to the statistical interactions of the independent variables. The present data suggests that if subtle statistical interaction effects are to be "picked up" by role players it may be under conditions of high actor-observer empathy, and when role players can actually experience the experimental situation. It is under these circumstances that role players are able to consider the widest range of information in formulating their predictions.

It is of interest to note the high degree of accuracy with which actors anticipated how they would be rated by observers in the *in situ* phase of the study. The results indicate that actors can accurately predict how observers will rate them even though this represented a drastic departure from how they actually rated themselves. This would suggest that interaction analyses would be aided by taking into account not an actor's awareness of his own perceptual attributions but also his awareness of the perceptual attributions of those who observe his actions.

In conclusion, the present study has shown that role players who do not directly experience the experimental manipulation but instead rely on a written description of the situation can accurately match the attribution rating pattern of subjects in an actual deception study only when it is the general, dispositional factors of an actor which are considered. When investigators use scenario role playing methods, they are tapping only observer considerations, and therefore should not consider these methods for studies of an actor's attributions, impressions, or behaviors. If the situational factors typically experienced by actors are of importance, they should also be experienced by the role-playing subjects. Finally, future research which aims to explore the capabilities of role playing procedures should focus on the production of statistical interaction effects.

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APPENDIX

SEMANTIC DIFFERENTIAL

SEMANTIC DIFFERENTIAL

Hard	____	____	____	____	____	____	____	Soft
Cautious	____	____	____	____	____	____	____	Rash
Friendly	____	____	____	____	____	____	____	Unfriendly
Bad	____	____	____	____	____	____	____	Good
Active	____	____	____	____	____	____	____	Passive
Dishonest	____	____	____	____	____	____	____	Honest
Progressive	____	____	____	____	____	____	____	Regressive
Pleasant	____	____	____	____	____	____	____	Unpleasant
Stable	____	____	____	____	____	____	____	Changeable
Weak	____	____	____	____	____	____	____	Strong
Calm	____	____	____	____	____	____	____	Excitable
Harmful	____	____	____	____	____	____	____	Beneficial
Insincere	____	____	____	____	____	____	____	Sincere
Kind	____	____	____	____	____	____	____	Cruel
Competitive	____	____	____	____	____	____	____	Cooperative
Severe	____	____	____	____	____	____	____	Lenient
Exploitative	____	____	____	____	____	____	____	Accommodative
Trustworthy	____	____	____	____	____	____	____	Untrustworthy
Uninhibited	____	____	____	____	____	____	____	Inhibited

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