

KOREAN RAPPROCHEMENT: A RESPONSE TO CHANGING  
ATTITUDES IN A MULTIPOLAR WORLD

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1969


Submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate College  
of the Oklahoma State University  
in partial fulfillment of the requirements  
for the Degree of  
MASTER OF ARTS  
July, 1975

Thesis  
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
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
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## ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The writer wishes to express his sincere appreciation to Professor Harold V. Sare, Professor Franz von Sauer, and Professor Raymond N. Habiby for their guidance and patient counsel in the development of this thesis.

Acknowledgement is also made to my grandfather, Alexander Romano, who instilled in the writer an interest in Political Science.

The writer also wishes to acknowledge his parents, Mr. and Mrs. Nicholas DelGrosso, and his wife, Barbara, for their encouragement and understanding which were a tremendous help in making this thesis a reality.

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## CHAPTER I

### PROBLEM DEFINITION

#### Introduction

The division of the Korean Peninsula was not a strictly Korean phenomenon; the partition was imposed on the Korean people mainly by the United States and the Soviet Union. The conflicting national interests of these two superpowers has perpetuated this division. However, historically the Soviet Union and the United States have not been the only powers concerned with the Korean Peninsula. As a strategic nexus of East Asia, Korea has served as a bridge and as an arena of competition and conflict for regional powers.

In Korea's history there have been few periods in which its foreign policy has not been influenced by China and Japan. In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries Tsarist Russia also had an impact on Korea's foreign policy formulation. Korea's nominal independence came to an end in 1910 when it was annexed by Japan. From 1910 until the closing months of 1945, Korea provided food and raw materials for Imperial Japan's expanding economy.

At the conclusion of World War II, Korea was divided at the 38th parallel to facilitate the surrender of Japanese troops to the Soviets in the north and the Americans in the south. As tensions increase between the two powers, this temporary division took on institutional permanence.

On September 17, 1947 the United States brought the problem of Korean partition before the United Nations General Assembly. Secretary of State Marshall explained to the General Assembly that bilateral negotiations between the Soviet Union and the United States concerning the question of a unified and independent Korea were at an impasse.

Washington believed that only action by the General Assembly could bring about an acceptable solution to the Korean problem.<sup>1</sup> In response, the General Assembly on November 14, 1947 established a Temporary Commission on Korea to observe elections, advise elected Korean representatives on the establishment of a National Government, and advise the National Government in making the necessary arrangements for Korean independence. Elections were to be held not later than March 31, 1948 on the basis of adult suffrage and by secret ballot.

From the first meeting in January 1948, the Commission had difficulty contacting the Soviet Military Command in the North. This situation was appealed to Secretary-General Lie, who confirmed the negative attitude of the Soviet Union toward cooperation with the Commission.<sup>2</sup> The situation continued to polarize, with the major powers supporting the governments within their occupation zones; each government claimed to be the legitimate government of all Korea and worked to expand its control over the entire peninsula. After almost five years of uneasy coexistence, the possibility for a diplomatic solution to the Korean problem was shattered when North Korean forces crossed the 38th

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<sup>1</sup>"Address Before the United Nations General Assembly by George Marshall," United States Department of State Bulletin, Vol. 17 (Washington, D.C., September 28, 1947), p. 620

<sup>2</sup>Leland Goodrich, Korea: A Study of United States Policy in the United Nations (New York, 1956), pp. 33-43.

parallel on June 25, 1950. This action precipitated the struggle between the United Nations forces, largely composed of American materials and men, and the North Korean and Communist Chinese forces equipped by the Soviet Union. After three years of fighting an armistice was signed in 1953 roughly preserving the pre-war boundaries.

The foreign policies of both Koreas have continued to be influenced by the changing international equilibrium and the interaction of this international environment with regional priorities. This study analyzes and documents the changes in South Korean foreign policy as it relates to the problem of rapprochement with North Korea.

Since a state's foreign policy is the product of external as well as internal conditions, the shifting policies of the great powers as they have influenced regional politics over the past decade will be analyzed. The time span will correspond roughly to the period of Park Chung-hee's leadership in South Korea (1962 to the present). During this decade major policy reorientations have occurred on both regional and extra-regional levels. The United States has modified containment as its major policy in Asia and diplomatic negotiations have been established with the People's Republic of China.<sup>3</sup> Japan and South Korea have normalized their relations after twenty years of mistrust and tension. Treaty arrangements between Japan and South Korea have facilitated the introduction of Japanese capital into South Korea in a new spirit of cooperation between these two countries.<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>3</sup>Park Chung-hee, To Build a Nation (Washington, D.C., 1971), p. 147

<sup>4</sup>"Korea, Japan Normalizes Relations," Korean Report, Vol. 5 (October - December 1965), p. 5.



Relations on the regional and international levels were rendered more complex by the Sino-Soviet rift, Soviet development of Siberia and the Maritime Province, and Communist China's increased involvement with non-communist states. By the early seventies, these events had precipitated a restructuring of relations in Northeast Asia which forced South Korea to reorient both its domestic and foreign policies in an attempt to reconcile itself to these new pressures on the international scene.

This study poses several fundamental questions which events of the past decade suggest. First, what is the extent of South Korea's interaction with regional and extra-regional powers? Second, what implications does a lessening of tensions on the international level have on South Korean domestic and foreign policies? Third, does the lessening of tensions between the great powers provide an atmosphere of rapprochement on the regional level strong enough to provide an impetus for a normalization of relations between North and South Korea?

The changing world situation influences the answers to these questions, and within a regional context, the Republic of Korea has to consider a number of external factors in formulating its policy decisions. The first factor is the emergence of new power concentrations in Northeast Asia. One aspect of this problem is China's massive conventional capability and its emerging nuclear arsenal especially within the Asian region. As a result of the Sino-Soviet rift, the Soviet Union has deployed forty-four divisions in this area to counterbalance China's massive conventional advantage and to protect the Soviet's interest in the development of resources in Siberia and the Maritime Province. In addition to this ground build-up, the Soviets have a world wide naval capability which increasingly has been seen in the waters off Siberia

and the Maritime Province.

On the economic plane, Japan has achieved economic dominance within the region. Japan has substantial investments in South Korea and accounts for over 50 percent of all South Korean trade. Japan's search for new markets has brought about increased diplomatic and trade contacts with both China and North Korea at the expense of Japanese investment in South Korea. The South Korean government has been upset over Japanese overtures in this direction because such actions have had a detrimental effect on the South Korean economy. As trade between communist and non-communist nations increase, South Korea must ultimately reevaluate its trade policy with communist countries or face the possibility of becoming isolated in a changing international environment.<sup>5</sup>

The second major factor is the United States' disengagement from the area as stated by President Nixon in his Guam pronouncement of July 1969. The Nixon Doctrine called for a reduction of United States forces in the Asian-Pacific region and implied that no further American forces were to be dispatched to that region. Moreover, Asians were expected to assume the responsibility for their own conventional defenses. Future military aid was to be determined by the United States on a case by case basis. Accordingly, the United States' military profile in the region was to be lowered and it was to reduce its aid to Asian governments in their struggles against insurgents. Finally, under the terms of the Nixon Doctrine, the United States was to maintain its commitments

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<sup>5</sup>Young C. Kim, Major Powers and Korea (Silver Springs, 1973), p. 50.

as defined by treaties and agreements in the region.<sup>6</sup>

South Korea's dilemma arises from the first set of factors, namely the increasing influence within the region of China and the Soviet Union. Both of these powers have been viewed as ideological enemies of South Korea and allies of North Korea. The second factor establishes a trend toward decreasing American power in the area and an increasing unwillingness to become militarily involved. This reduces the American credibility as a force capable of maintaining tranquility on the Korean peninsula.

This study will analyze South Korea's reactions to external pressures within the regional power structure and the effect on Korean rapprochement.

The following hypothesis will be used to formulate an analytical structure to aid in developing the research questions: A reduction of tensions between extra-regional powers on an international level reduces tensions between their respective client states on a regional level and allows them to divert their energies to furthering their national interest. Such a reduction of tensions also limits the extent to which extra-regional powers may determine the national interest of their respective client states.

Both North and South Korea have become increasingly suspicious of the detente policies of the major powers. The thawing of relations between the Soviet Union and the United States and the People's Republic of China and the United States has raised doubts about the viability of old commitments. Both North and South Korea are concerned about the possibility that their national interests might be sacrificed in the

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<sup>6</sup>Donald Hellmann, Japan and East Asia (New York, 1972), p. 25.

name of great power rapprochement. This concern about affairs on the dominant system level has led to the establishment of a dialogue on the subordinate system level between North and South Korea. In conjunction with this dialogue, both states have increased their cross bloc contacts in an effort to obtain security and bargaining power for their individual positions in regional and international negotiations. Korean rapprochement can be viewed as a strategy aimed at preventing decisions to resolve the Korean problem by the great powers at the expense of either Korean client state.

The key terms which will be used in this study are: international level, extra-regional power, bipolar world and national interest. International level can be defined as that level of interaction where activities extend beyond the boundaries of a single national political community. It can more precisely be described as international politics.<sup>7</sup> The study of international politics can be divided into three levels: first, the single core unit (nation-state or micro-analytical level). Second, the subordinate system level which focuses on the interaction of core units within a regional context,<sup>8</sup> and thirdly the dominant system level which would be synonymous with the international system. The dominant system level could be called the sum of relations in all subordinate systems and the effects these interactions have on the international system. Harold Sprout compares these interactions to the ripple effect produced by tossing a pebble into a still pond; policy reorientation on the dominant level causes policy shifts on

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<sup>7</sup>Harold Sprout, "Geopolitical Hypotheses in Technological Perspective," World Politics, Vol. 15 (October, 1962 - July, 1963) p. 188.

<sup>8</sup>For the purpose of this study Northeast Asia will be defined to include the Korean peninsula and those states in close proximity to this area (the Soviet Union, China, and Japan).

the subordinate systems levels which in turn require changes in foreign policy by the core units within the subordinate system. This reaction can also be caused by a shift in policy at the core unit level causing a reorientation at successive higher levels. Each action produces a reaction which is then reacted to by the initial actor, thus producing a ripple effect.<sup>9</sup>

South Korean attitudes toward rapprochement will be analyzed within a framework of international, regional, and nation-state policy interactions. Within such a framework, a power which exercises influence outside its subsystem will be termed an extra-regional power. In practice an extra-regional power could operate in a number of subordinate systems. The term extra-regional power implies the ability to operate in a global environment with a global foreign policy which influences subsequent subordinate system levels and core units within these levels.<sup>10</sup>

The term client state is descriptive of the relations which both Koreas maintain with their respective extra-regional powers. As a result of various kinds of conflicts which occur on the three levels of the international system, the interacting system of states tends to be polarized by alliances made by individual states. In today's system these alliances are dominated by a single power from whom these allies obtain military and economic benefits in return for support on general issues of policy direction.<sup>11</sup>

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<sup>9</sup>Sprout, p. 218.

<sup>10</sup>James Rosenau, Linkage Politics (New York, 1969), p. 29.

<sup>11</sup>J. R. Friedman, Christopher Bladen, and Steven Rosen, Alliance in International Politics (Boston, 1970), p. 105.

In the context of this study John Hertz's definition of a bipolar world is used in reference to a situation in which only two powers have a nuclear monopoly, and the development of weapons and delivery systems requires the establishment of spheres of influence with forward areas of troops stationed at or near their rim and bases lining their frontiers.<sup>12</sup> The division of Korea occurred under these circumstances. However, in terms of this strict definition today's world is in a state of flux. It can no longer be called a truly bipolar world, since a number of new powers have joined the nuclear club. It is true that these powers do not measure up to the vast power potential of the United States or the Soviet Union; however, they exercise enough influence to create a multipolar subordinate system in a regional context. Aside from the nuclear aspects of the definition, states are also influenced by independent powers and economic blocs who apply international pressures that are out of proportion to their true military capabilities. Both military and economic factors play a role in foreign policy formulation. Hertz attributes the demise of bipolarity to the joint effect of the spread of technological know-how and of nationalism. He hypothesizes that bipolarity has given way to multipolarity through nuclear proliferation.

National interest refers to those actions taken by a state to protect its geographic, political and cultural identity against encroachments by other nations. Hans Morgenthau states that the survival of a political unit, much as a state, is the irreducible minimum, the most necessary element of its interests vis-a-vis other nations. National

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<sup>12</sup>James Rosenau, International Politics and Foreign Policy (New York, 1969), p. 79.

interest assumes uninterputed conflict and the threat of war, to be minimized through the continuous adjustment of conflicting interests by diplomatic action. A state's national interest must be constantly defended against the national interests of other nations.<sup>13</sup> As the international environment changes, the tactics used by states to achieve their national interest also change. In the context of this study national interest will encompass all of the factors which determine a state's actions on the international scene in order to preserve that state's identity.

In the final analysis foreign policy can be viewed as a variable which is dependent on four pattern factors within the subordinate system. These pattern factors which determine foreign policy are cohesion, communication, political potential and the structure of relations. Cohesion can be broken down into four sub-factors on the social, economic, political and organizational levels. Cohesion would determine the degree of interaction between the units within the subordinate system. And the structure of relations would define which states are cooperating or in conflict.<sup>14</sup>

The assessment of these pattern factors will aid in the computation of data which will help determine the foreign policy direction of the core unit. Cohesion and communication are quantitative variables while

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<sup>13</sup>Hans Morgenthau, "Another Great Debate: The National Interest of the United States," in David McLellan, William Olsin, and Fred Sondermann (ed.), The Theory and Practice of International Relations (Englewood Cliffs, 1960), pp. 181-186.

<sup>14</sup>Louis Cantori, and Steven Spiegel, "International Regions: A Comparative Approach to Five Subordinate Systems," in David McLellan, William Olson, and Fred Sondermann (ed.), The Theory and Practice of International Relations, Fourth Edition (Englewood Cliffs, 1974), pp. 448-454.

political potential and structure of relations are normative variables. In this particular case the sum of these variables will determine the foreign policy outlook of a core unit.

The structural foundation for this study was extracted from a number of significant works relating to international relations. Thomas W. Robinson's article, "A National Interest Analysis of Sino-Soviet Relations," originally appearing in International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 11 (June, 1967), was particularly useful. It focused on national interest as it is used to interpret and explain the goals of foreign policy. A complementary essay by Hans Morgenthau entitled "Another Great Debate: The National Interest of the United States," appearing in the American Political Science Review, Vol. 46 (1952), helped to further clarify the precise meaning of the term national interest.

The essay written by Louis Cantori and Steven Spiegel, "International Regions: A Comparative Approach to Five Subordinate Systems," published in International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 13 (1969), provided the framework for the comparison of regional international relations. While the model to test these propositions about the interdependence of regional and international systems was gleaned from "The Global System and Its Subsystems: A Developmental View," by J. David Singer and "Toward the Study of National-International Linkages," by James Rosenau. Both of these essays were published in Linkage Politics (Free Press, 1969). While Karl Deutsch and J. David Singer's essay "Multipolar Power Systems and International Stability," appearing in World Politics, Vol. 16 (1964), aided in conceptualizing how the change in global politics, from a bipolar to a multipolar system, has effected



international relations. On the regional level the role of the small state was developed from the model presented in Small States in International Relations (Wiley Interscience Division, 1971), edited by August Schou. The function of a more specific small state within the international framework is presented in Major Powers and Korea (Research Institute on Korean Affairs, 1973), edited by Young C. Kim.

Aside from these sources, the present and recently suspended constitution will be analyzed to determine whether significant deviation within the structural framework are consistent with the goal of Korean rapprochement. Policy pronouncements appearing in the English language daily, the Korea Herald, and such journals as the Korean Research Center Bulletin and the Korean Quarterly will be also analyzed in order to explain government policy shifts. In combination with these sources published in South Korea, other secondary sources will be utilized. These secondary sources include such professional journals as the Far East Survey, Pacific Affairs, International Organization, Asian Survey and World Politics. The New York Times, Christian Science Monitor and the State Department Bulletin were examined for pertinent materials.

This study will utilize the case study method to focus on the core unit and its relationship to the subordinate and dominant system levels in foreign policy determination. The scope of this paper will be limited to those aspects of South Korean foreign policy which are concerned with the restructuring of relations on the Korean peninsula.

This study will utilize the historical-analytical method to understand the problem of Korean rapprochement. Content analysis of speeches, documents and meetings will be made and then analyzed to discover significant trends in this direction. Some quantitative data will be

utilized to support the interpretation of these trends in such areas as cohesion and communication.

Lovell's historic perspective will be used to provide an organizational model for this study. This perspective provides the following structural framework:

1. spatial relationships
2. patterns of supply and demand
3. patterns of authority
4. rules of the game.

Within this structure certain questions will be answered concerning South Korea's external orientation, her foreign policy autonomy, her objectives, status and role within the subordinate system, and levels of conflict and cohesion within the system.

Chapter II provides the setting for the structure of the subordinate system, and examines the effects of the changes of policy at the dominant level on the subordinate level and the core unit, South Korea.

Chapter III analyzes South Korea's responses to the policy reorientation within the subordinant system due to the influence of the extra-regional powers.

Chapter IV examines the possibility of Korean reunification. The changing international environment will be considered in terms of South Korea's national interest.

Chapter V assesses the prospects for rapprochement from the standpoint of regional and extra-regional interests and makes concluding observations.

The topic of Korean rapprochement is related to changes on the international scene. By taking a specific problem and examining the

interaction of pressures on the various levels of the international system a better understanding of the region might be accomplished. The subordinate system focus performs several functions: first a systems approach sets limits to the foreign policy choices of all actors within it. It points out the fact that a state's foreign policy is the product of external as well as internal conditions. Second, this approach helps to clarify actions taken by a state on a level lower than the dominant system focus. The international system is composed of individual states which act and re-act; the dominant system focus distorts these actions if they do not conform to the bloc system. Therefore, by studying the subordinate system it is hoped that a contribution can be made to the understanding of international relations on both a regional and an international level.

The current nature of events under discussion in this paper limit the availability of source material. This factor, in conjunction with the author's inability to read Korean, has presented difficulties in researching this topic. However, the unusually close relationship which exists between Korean and American intellectual communities have made English translations of major Korean policy pronouncements readily available through scholarly journals. A certain amount of rhetoric exists in these government sponsored translations; however a careful analysis of the documents in relation to events unfolding on the international scene should enable one to sort rhetoric from reality.

## CHAPTER II

### STRUCTURE OF RELATIONS ON THE INTERNATIONAL LEVEL

The Sino-Soviet conflict, great power rapprochement, the emergence of an increasingly independent Japanese foreign policy, and the trend toward a reduced American military role in Northeast Asia are important factors influencing the evolution of a new four-power balance on the dominant system level.<sup>1</sup> The scope of this study does not include an in depth analysis of the Sino-Soviet conflict or great power rapprochement. However, since both of these factors have had a major impact on the restructuring of relations on the international level, and therefore an indirect influence on the Korean situation, a brief synopsis is in order.

The Sino-Soviet dispute shattered the myth of a monolithic communist bloc. Harold Hinton states that the Soviet and Chinese peoples are as xenophobic as most and that each includes the other among the major objects of its dislike. His research shows that this feeling has been growing stronger rather than weaker since the early 1950's. On the Soviet side, there is a yellow peril mentality that has come to embrace the Chinese since 1949. This fear was substantiated by Dr. Wilhelm Starlinger, a German physicist, on the basis of extensive contacts with

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<sup>1</sup>This emerging balance of power in Northeast Asia includes China, Japan, The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States.

Soviet officials imprisoned in Stalin's concentration camps. He concluded that a fear of China and an apprehension of possible Chinese demographic pressures on Soviet territory were widespread in the Soviet Union. On the Chinese side, both Tsarist and Communist Russia have been seen as appropriators of Inner Asian territories that once belonged to China and as a power historically ready to take advantage of any weakness in China to make further demands. Hinton suggests that it was essentially to compensate for the embarrassing fact that it was a power with such an unfavorable image upon which the Chinese Communist regime was making itself dependent for support that Peking launched a pro-Soviet propaganda campaign of enormous proportions in 1950. It is very likely that the disengagement from Soviet influence after 1958 and the emergence of the Sino-Soviet dispute into the open shortly afterward were greeted with approval by the Chinese public and tended to increase Peking's popular support.

More important than popular attitudes is the fact that China, because of its size and peculiar history, is the only Communist state to have, or feel that it has, major unsatisfied claims for status, over and above its urge toward territorial unification. In addition, it is the only Communist state or party outside the Soviet Union to have a leader who, since Stalin's death, has thought of himself as the leading figure in the international Communist movement.

Beyond the profound cultural differences between them, the Soviet Union and China are at different stages of development. The Soviet Union is at least a generation ahead, more of a satisfied power, and more defensive and less revolutionary in its nationalism. China, on the other hand, is an emerging power still looking for its place in the sun.

To a large extent, as the result of Mao Tse-tung's great political influence in China, the two political systems have been moving in different directions. Even the trend in the Soviet Union, since Khrushchev's fall, away from his liberalizing tendencies toward partial re-Stalinization, in the shape of more stringent police and bureaucratic controls and less freedom of expression, has not tended to bring Moscow into political alignment with Peking. The trend in China in recent years has been away from bureaucratic controls and toward spontaneity.<sup>2</sup>

In the final analysis it can be said that three major factors brought about the Sino-Soviet dispute: first, the historical-psychological factor; second, a desire to regain lost territories; and finally a basic ideological dispute on how to achieve the ultimate ends of the communist revolution.

It has been generally accepted that the Sino-Soviet dispute expanded the pattern of great power interrelationships into a triangle. Within this triangle China views the Soviet Union as a newly established world power, while the United States is viewed as a declining power. The Soviet's seem to view the United States in the same light but they regard the People's Republic of China as a newly emerging power with great potential. This triangular view of great power relationships destroys the bipolar world concept. A loss of American prestige is no longer an automatic gain for Moscow. Peking now becomes a factor in the loss/gain analysis. It is this new environment which has brought about the rapprochement between the Soviet Union and the United States,

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<sup>2</sup>Harold Hinton, China's Turbulent Quest (New York, 1970), pp. 206-207.

and the People's Republic of China and the United States.<sup>3</sup>

In the past, systems of world order based on collaboration among the great powers have nearly always been based on an overriding fear of war. As in the past conflict is present in today's international system. However, it seems that the present rapprochement is more the result of the fear and mistrust that the Soviet Union and China have for one another. A second factor seems to be the crisis which exists in American foreign policy. For domestic support, if for no other reason, a fundamental adjustment of American policy objectives was seen as necessary in the aftermath of Vietnam. That adjustment was based in part upon the reduction of the American role abroad. For these reasons, a policy designed to persuade allies and adversaries to pursue goals and take actions which were in the American interest as well as their own evolved.<sup>4</sup> This concept was at the root of the Soviet-American and Sino-American contacts, and these contacts were facilitated by the Sino-Soviet dispute.

These same forces were at work influencing changes in Japanese foreign policy. As the United States increased contacts with the Soviet Union and China, Japan also began to reassess its relations with these countries. The resulting interactions created a quadrilateral pattern in Northeast Asia. Japan, the United States, China and the Soviet Union all had a stake in the continuing stability of that area.

This changing atmosphere in the international system has produced increased interactions among powers on the dominant and subordinate

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<sup>3</sup>Alan M. Jones (ed.), United States Foreign Policy in a Changing World (New York, 1973), p. 121.

<sup>4</sup>Ibid., p. 64.

levels.<sup>5</sup> The plenitude of interacting parties on the dominant and subordinate levels resemble a multipolar system structure. Individual states have associations with a variety of others, both regionally and internationally; there is a trend to cross-cut loyalties which results in reduced hostility expressed toward any particular state or against any particular cause. As this structure emerges, no one state within the system can afford to express hostility toward another state, because it may respond by consolidating its connections with other states equally as powerful as the first state.<sup>6</sup>

As a result of this new quadrilateral pattern, the Republic of Korea has been forced to reassess its situation, interests, and policies. Ironically, South Korea's chief benefactor, the United States, has been instrumental in bringing about these changes on the dominant system level. As the international environment begins to alter old relationships, South Korea must respond by reorienting its foreign policy to these new changes, or run the risk of isolating itself from the new world environment.

Seoul's first indication of a major American policy readjustment occurred in 1969, when President Nixon first enunciated the Guam or Nixon Doctrine. South Korea wasted no time attempting to clarify the impact of this policy pronouncement on American troop commitments in South Korea. In August, 1969, President Park Chung-hee arrived in San Francisco to consult with President Nixon on the implications of this

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<sup>5</sup>Doak Barnett, "The New Multi-polar Balance in East Asia: Implications for United States Policy," Annals, Vol. 390 (July, 1970), p. 73.

<sup>6</sup>J. R. Friedman et al. (eds.), Alliance in International Politics (Boston, 1970), pp. 49-50.



new policy. These meetings resulted in a pledge by both Presidents that their governments would live up to their mutual defense agreements. President Park was satisfied with President Nixon's sincerity, and apparently nothing was mentioned about possible American troop reductions in South Korea.<sup>7</sup>

In spite of President Nixon's assurances South Korea received two serious shocks in 1970, which telegraphed the message that the United States-Korean Alliance could no longer be unquestioningly relied on as the cornerstone of that nation's foreign policy. On the economic level it was learned that the United States was going to impose textile quotas; although the action was not specifically aimed at South Korea, it would cost it 100 million dollars annually. This figure would amount to more than Seoul had received from Washington in aid in any year since the introduction of the first five-year plan in 1962.<sup>8</sup> Coupled with this economic shock was the announcement that the United States intended to withdraw troops from South Korea. The United States made this announcement unilaterally, without prior discussion with the Seoul government. And finally, to add insult to injury, the United States Ambassador to Korea publicly announced that Koreans should shoulder more of their defense costs. The timing of Ambassador Porter's announcement could not have been worse. Not only did it fail to take into account the fact that Seoul had substantially increased its share of the defense burden

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<sup>7</sup>"Statements by Park Chung-hee on his visit to the United States," Department of State Bulletin, Vol. 61, pt. 1 (July-September, 1969), pp. 242-243.

<sup>8</sup>Park Chung-hee, To Build a Nation (Washington, D.C., 1971), p. 107.

on a graduated basis in proportion to its economic growth, but it also seemed somewhat ironical in view of the large costs South Korea was being forced to carry simultaneously with the American troop withdrawals and the imposition of textile quotas. The total cost of these two measures was estimated to be as much as one third to one half of the Korean National Budget.<sup>9</sup>

To demonstrate that a continuing American commitment to South Korea still existed, United States Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird visited Seoul in July, 1970. Laird's mission was to reassure the South Korean government that Washington had no intention of abandoning its ally on the Korean peninsula. In a joint communique issued at the end of the United States-Korean Security Consultative Meetings, Laird stressed the United States government's readiness and determination to render assistance to South Korea in the event of any future emergencies. The American government also promised substantial aid to help step-up the five-year modernization program of the South Korean armed forces following the reduction of United States forces in South Korea by 20,000 men. This formula left 43,000 American troops in South Korea. By June of 1971, the 7th Division had left South Korea and troops from the 2nd Division were in the process of being replaced by Republic of Korea forces along the demilitarized zone, leaving the entire 151 mile truce border manned by the South Korean Army.<sup>10</sup>

To underscore the American government's position on South Korea,

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<sup>9</sup>Joungwon Alexander Kim, "The Republic of Korea: A Quest for New Directions," Asian Survey, Vol. II, pt. II (1971), pp. 94-95.

<sup>10</sup>"South Korea," Far Eastern Economic Review, 1972 Yearbook (Hong Kong, 1972), p. 291.

Secretary of State Rogers announced before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations that Korea provided a good test case for the Nixon Doctrine's emphasis on local forces progressively taking over local defense. He particularly stressed the point that the United States was not going to abandon Korea and Rogers made reference to Laird's Korean visit during which he had assured Seoul that the United States would stand by its treaty commitments.<sup>11</sup>

Even Vice-President Agnew made a five day stop in South Korea in June of 1971 in an effort to make the Republic of Korea government feel less abandoned as events unfolded on the international scene.

Not long after Vice-President Agnew left South Korea, Seoul was surprised by the July, 1971 announcement of President Nixon's trip to China. The result of President Nixon's trip was the Shanghai Communique, which pledged both China and the United States to support efforts on the Korean peninsula aimed at a relaxation of tension and increased communication between the two Koreas.<sup>12</sup>

Again Washington's actions were a source of confusion to South Korean policy makers. Not only was Washington mending its fences with the Soviet Union, through increased dialogue and expanding trade relations, but it was also attempting to restructure its relations with the People's Republic of China. South Korean policy makers had received what they thought to be assurances of solid support for their positions. However, actions by the United States on the international level, aimed

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<sup>11</sup>"Sec. of State Rogers (Senate Committee on Foreign Relations Speech, Dec. 10, 1970)," Department of State Bulletin, Vol. 64 (January - March, 1971), p. 23.

<sup>12</sup>"America and Asia," Far Eastern Economic Review, Vol. 81 (July 9, 1973), p. 6.

at lessening tensions, seemed contradictory to American commitments at the regional level.

In addition to South Korea's close relationship with the United States, it had also established close ties with Japan. Seoul first normalized its relations with Tokyo in June of 1965 with the signing of the Treaty on Basic Relations. This treaty culminated fourteen years of negotiations and resolved most of the outstanding differences between these two countries. The main advantage derived from the Treaty on Basic Relations was the opening of South Korea to Japanese investments. Under this settlement Japanese government grants of goods and services worth 300 million dollars were to be made payable over a ten year period. In addition to these government grants and credits, Japan also agreed to expedite private deferred-payment loans at commercial rates to private enterprises in Korea up to a total of the yen equivalent of 300 million dollars. All this loan and investment activity was regarded by most observers in Seoul as the beginning of a much greater involvement of Japanese enterprise in Korea, on an equity or license-and-loan basis or some combination of such arrangements.<sup>13</sup>

This was the beginning of postwar Japanese economic entrenchment in South Korea. The military presence of the United States in South Korea relieved Japanese leaders from any serious concern with South Korea's security. Between 1965 and 1970 Japan's economic involvement in South Korea grew, while Japan's economic relations with North Korea and China were minimal.<sup>14</sup>

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<sup>13</sup>Lawrence Olson, Japan in Postwar Asia (New York, 1970), pp. 160-163.

<sup>14</sup>Young C. Kim, Major Powers and Korea (Silver Springs, 1973), p. 55.

South Korea's dependence on exports from the United States and Japan increased rapidly during the period from 1969 to 1972. In these four years, as Chart 1 demonstrates, South Korea had critical balance of payment problems with both countries. This economic dependence created political dependence, in that South Korea deemed it necessary not to alienate Japan and the United States, because it was dependent on these two countries for a high percentage of its foreign credit and military aid. Percentages computed from Chart 1, revealed that the United States received 55.25 percent of South Korea's exports in the years from 1969 until 1972, while Japan received 31 percent of all of South Korea's exports during the same time span. These two figures amount to 86.25 percent of South Korea's export trade with all OECD countries (Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development Countries). On the debit side of the ledger South Korean trade statistics look even bleaker. Combined Japanese-United States exports to South Korea totaled about 89 percent of its total imports from all OECD countries.

From these figures one can make a reasonable assumption that South Korea has been dependent upon good trade relations with the United States and Japan. Therefore, it can be assumed that South Korea's policy orientation would be to maintain these relations because its economic stability is dependent upon them.

One result of the implementation of the Nixon Doctrine for Asia was the Okinawa Revision Treaty of 1969, which called for the return of Okinawa to Japan in 1972. To secure this agreement Japan apparently made some concessions concerning security interests. Mr. Sato (Japan's Prime Minister at that time) declared:

Chart 1 South Korean Trade Figures 1969-1972<sup>15</sup>  
(in millions of U.S. dollars)

South Korean Exports to OECD Countries.

	<u>1969</u>	<u>1970</u>	<u>1971</u>	<u>1972</u>
Total Exports	40.9	58.4	71.2	111.5

United States Imports From South Korea.

	<u>1969</u>	<u>1970</u>	<u>1971</u>	<u>1972</u>
	24.26	30.85	38.53	58.98

Japanese Imports From South Korea.

	<u>1969</u>	<u>1970</u>	<u>1971</u>	<u>1972</u>
	11.16	19.08	22.86	35.50

South Korean Imports From OECD Countries.

	<u>1969</u>	<u>1970</u>	<u>1971</u>	<u>1972</u>
Total Imports	141.1	138.2	152.6	168.1

United States Exports to South Korea.

	<u>1969</u>	<u>1970</u>	<u>1971</u>	<u>1972</u>
	58.28	53.06	56.78	61.28

Japanese Exports to South Korea.

	<u>1969</u>	<u>1970</u>	<u>1971</u>	<u>1972</u>
	63.93	68.18	71.29	81.65

<sup>15</sup>Statistics of Foreign Trade (Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development Countries), Series A, Overall Trade by Countries, United Nations Publications (1972-1973), pp. 8-9.

If an armed attack against the Republic of Korea were to occur, the security of Japan would be seriously affected. Therefore, should an occasion arise for United States forces in such an eventuality to use facilities and areas within Japan as bases for military combat operations to meet the armed attack, the policy would be to decide its position positively and promptly.<sup>16</sup>

In effect what Prime Minister Sato said was that an armed attack on the Republic of Korea would seriously affect Japan's security, and Japan would be prompt in allowing United States forces use of bases in Japan.

In 1969, when Japan made this statement, its sensitivity to Korean strategic considerations was chiefly motivated by the desire to retain South Korea as a market for Japanese goods and a source of much-needed farm commodities. Japan was relatively certain that it would not be called upon to live up to any vague declaration on Korean security. Japan's relaxed attitude toward the Korean situation was sustained by its assessment of a multiple set of interactions among the regional states. It felt that neither the Soviet Union nor the People's Republic of China desired war in Korea; North Korea was effectively restrained by these two countries. Meanwhile, South Korea was restrained by the United States' desire to prevent conflict on the peninsula. Neither the North or the South could wage a war on a sustained basis without assistance, and this assistance was unlikely to come from the major powers involved in the area. None of the major powers wanted to see the basic, emerging structure of multipolarity endangered by renewed hostilities on the peninsula. Armed conflict between North and South Korea could possibly draw two or more of the major powers into direct confrontation, thus destroying the entire concept of achieving long-range stability in

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<sup>16</sup>R. Storry, "Options for Japan in the 1970's," World Today, Vol. 26 (August, 1970), p. 328.

Northeast Asia through solidification of a multipolar balance of power system. Japan, therefore, concluded that a military balance already existed in Korea which would allow her to issue an official expression of solidarity with South Korea without risking any serious possibility of having to live up to such an agreement. This course of action would satisfy both the South Korean and United States governments of Japan's stand on the issue of South Korean security. In essence Japan's statement cost her very little, but it reaped maximum gain in terms of positive responses from both South Korea and the United States.<sup>17</sup>

The announcement of President Nixon's China trip and the resulting new China policy had many political repercussions in the world; among the most important was the Sino-Japanese rapprochement. As the international environment began to change in Northeast Asia, Japan rushed to establish economic and diplomatic ties with the People's Republic of China.<sup>18</sup>

Japan had carried on a limited trade with China prior to President Nixon's visit to Peking. The top business leaders of Japan had to keep their China trade on a low-priority basis, in an effort not to antagonize their most important trading partner, the United States. In addition to this, Chou En-lai's April, 1970 China trade policy had limited the number of Japanese businesses in Peking. Four classes of Japanese firms were prohibited from trading with China:

- (1) those assisting Taiwan's attempt to reconquer China, or South Korea's attempt to invade North Korea;

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<sup>17</sup>Young C. Kim, p. 55.

<sup>18</sup>Gene Msiao, "The Sino-Japanese Rapprochement: A Relationship of Ambivalence," China Quarterly, Vol. 57 (January - March, 1974), p. 101.



- (2) those with heavy investments in Taiwan and South Korea;
- (3) those supplying arms to the United States' war effort in Indochina;
- (4) and joint American-Japanese ventures and American subsidiaries.<sup>19</sup>

Manufacturers of products such as fertilizers, who had a huge market in China, and those with small economic interests in Taiwan and South Korea, accepted these conditions, but for over a year many large firms resisted the pressure to comply with them as the price for trading with China.

The unexpected announcement of President Nixon's decision to visit the Chinese capital changed the situation dramatically. President Nixon's trip revealed the willingness of the American government to attempt to negotiate an accommodation with the People's Republic of China. This diplomatic move by the United States was interpreted by Japan as a signal that the United States was changing its attitude about establishing relations with China. It was soon decided among the large Japanese companies that trade with China on a large scale would not result in retaliation from Washington. The Nippon Steel Corporation was among the first to give way. Other large trading firms, manufacturers of steel, machinery, transportation equipment, electronics, petro-chemicals, shipping firms, department stores and supermarkets, insurance companies, and banks followed suit. These firms were anxious not to miss out on the potentially huge China market. These new trade relations with China had an impact on Japanese-South Korean trade

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<sup>19</sup>Alexander Young, "Japan's Trade With China: Impact of the Nixon Visit," World Today, Vol. 28 (1972), p. 342.

relations. Many large Japanese firms began to reduce their investments in South Korea in accordance with Chou En-lai's conditions for expanding trade with China. Just how sensitive this topic had become was seen by the reluctance of Japanese businessmen to attend a private Joint Japan-South Korean Economic Committee meeting in Tokyo in March of 1972.<sup>20</sup>

Japan's developing relations with the People's Republic of China irritated South Korea, but its relations with China were not half as vexing as Japan's two-Koreas policy. According to South Korea, Article III of the Treaty on Basic Relations binds Japan to fully recognize the ROK's assertion of jurisdictional control over the entire area of the Korea peninsula. Article III specifically states that Japan: "confirms that the Government of the Republic of Korea is the only lawful Government in Korea as specified in Resolution 195 (III) of the United Nations General Assembly."<sup>21</sup> As a result of this recognition, the ROK maintains that Japan had admitted the illegality of the North Korean regime and was barred from establishing any official relations with North Korea.

Taking issue with the South Korean government's interpretation of Article III, Japan stated that as a member of the United Nations, it honors United Nations Resolution 195 (III) that the Republic of Korea is the only legitimate government and for that reason, not because of Article III, Japan would not establish diplomatic relations with North Korea.<sup>22</sup> However, Japan reserved the right to trade with North Korea,

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<sup>20</sup>Ibid., p. 344.

<sup>21</sup>Kwan Bong Kim, The Korean-Japan Treaty Crisis and the Instability of the Korean Political System (New York, 1971), p. 42.

<sup>22</sup>Ibid., pp. 42-54.

and in fact had developed limited trade relations with North Korea before the signing of the Treaty on Basic Relations (Japan-South Korea).<sup>23</sup>

Japan's North Korean trade policy has gone through a number of different stages over the years. When trade with North Korea was first initiated, the Japanese government did not allow direct trade between the two countries. All trade was transacted through the medium of a third nation, in most cases France. The majority of the transactions were executed through the North European Commercial Bank in Paris. They acted as an intermediary between Japan and North Korea, arranging for the purchase, shipment, and payment of goods. The practice of utilizing an intermediary was revoked in 1962, and thereafter it became Japanese policy to require government approval for commodities traded. Permission was granted to each company on the merit of each case. In this phase Japanese companies negotiated directly with the North Korean government; the Japanese government did not participate in any of these trade negotiations. For the next ten years this was the foundation of the North Korean-Japanese trade relationships. North Korea-Japanese trade relations have never approached the magnitude of South Korean-Japanese trade relations.<sup>24</sup> Chart 2 outlines the trade relations between Japan and North and South Korea between 1961 and 1965.

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<sup>23</sup>Japan has had some form of trade relationship with North Korea since April, 1961.

<sup>24</sup>Soon Sung Cho, "Japan's Two Korea Policy and the Problems of Korean Unification," Asian Survey, Vol. 7 (1967) p. 712.

Chart 2

Japan's Trade With the Republic of Korea and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (in millions of United States dollars)<sup>25</sup>

Exports to:	1960	1961	1962	1963	1964	1965
ROK	100	126	138	160	109	180
DPRK	1	4.5	4.9	5.3	11.2	16.5
Imports to:						
ROK	18.5	22	28	27	42	41
DPRK	0	3.5	4.6	9.4	20.2	14.7

The trade figures for 1971 show that Japan exported 100,000,000 dollars worth of goods to North Korea; export to South Korea was in the vicinity of 285,000,000 dollars. Japan has become one of North Korea's largest trading partners outside the communist bloc.<sup>26</sup> Most trade has been non-government sponsored. The marked growth in the number of Japanese visitors to North Korea in the past few years, particularly in 1972, reflected Pyongyang's mounting interest in improving relations with Tokyo. Most beneficial from Pyongyang's point of view, was the visit of a delegation of the Dietmen's League for Promotion of Japan-Korea Friendship in January of 1972. Led by Kuno Chuji, member of the House of Representatives from the Liberal Democratic Party, the delegation included eleven members of the Japanese Diet representing all political parties. On January 23, a trade agreement was signed between

<sup>25</sup>Ibid., p. 713.

<sup>26</sup>Statistics of Foreign Trade (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development Countries), Series A, Overall Trade by Countries, United Nations Publications (1972-1973), p. 199.

the League and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea Committee for Promotion of International Trade, under which North Korea was to export to Japan various machine tools, raw materials, and foodstuffs in exchange for Japanese capital equipment, chemical goods, bearings, automobiles, and steel. The joint communique expressed hope that there would be closer economic relations between the two countries and an early resumption of diplomatic relations. Both sides envisaged annual trade to rise to 500 million dollars by 1976.

This sudden bid to boost its trade with North Korea was in reality a defacto normalization of relations between Japan and North Korea. The agreement also entailed the opening of a North Korean trade office in Japan and the inauguration of regular shipping services between the two countries. One can compare this memorandum trade agreement to an earlier non-government trade agreement between Japan and China, which resulted in major Japanese corporations winding down their South Korean operations to shift their emphasis to the China market.<sup>27</sup>

Seoul has been reluctantly tolerant of the Sino-Japanese trade agreements. However, South Korean reaction to the North Korean-Japanese trade agreement was very negative. Governmental criticism surfaced in the guise of a futile warning from South Korean Culture and Information Minister Chu Yung Yun, stating that if the Japanese Government failed to take voluntary steps to prevent the implementation of the agreement the South Korean Government would take due counter measures. The issuing of this statement by the South Korean Culture and Information Minister instead of the foreign Minister demonstrated Seoul's

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<sup>27</sup>Kim Sam-O, "South Korea Eyes North," Far Eastern Economic Review, Vol. 75 (4 March 1972), pp. 65-66.

concern not to alienate the Japanese. South Korea's dependency on Japanese capital require that Japan not shift its trade emphasis to the North. The threat was harmless, but it does document South Korea's increasing agitation over Japanese ties to North Korea.<sup>28</sup>

The increasing Japanese-North Korean ties underlined three important assumptions about Japan's Korea policy. First, the Japanese government officially recognized the Government of South Korea as the only lawful government in Korea. However, the national interests of Japan dictated that Japan pursue a two-Koreas policy. Trade contacts with North Korea soothed some of the Japanese government's left-wing opposition, thus contributing to a degree to domestic stability for Japan on the Korean issue. Japan's concern also may have stemmed from its own security interests. Japan felt much safer with a divided Korea rather than a neutralized and unified one, as long as South Korea remained a free nation maintaining friendly relations with Japan. Japan was concerned with stability on the Korean peninsula and in the long run it could be expected to support a policy which would most likely achieve this objective. Presently, the rationale behind Japan's two-Koreas policy is that a renunciation of it would antagonize the Korean people and would increase tension in Northeast Asia which would destabilize the area. Second, the recognition of the South Korean government does not automatically preclude the future recognition of the North Korean government. Third, since Japan could not ignore the de facto existence of North Korea, it was desirable to maintain some relations, either formal or informal with

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<sup>28</sup>Kaji Nakamura, "Korean Rumble Over Japan," Far Eastern Economic Review, Vol. 75 (Feb. 12, 1972), pp. 33-34.

North Korea.<sup>29</sup> The maintenance of such relations enabled the construction of communication channels which aided in the resolution of conflicts between the two nations. No state can be a nation unto itself, and the pressures of finite resources gives rise to global enterprises that have been made possible by cheap communications and a changing value system.<sup>30</sup> Japan lives in an interdependent world, which has been continually reduced in size due to communication and transportation advances. In this type of environment, it was considered impractical not to maintain some type of relations with all nations.

Foreign Minister Toshio Kimura recently handed Seoul yet another shock. In a statement made on August 30, 1974, Kimura virtually amended the Nixon-Sato communique of 1969, by broadening Japan's area of interest to the entire Korean peninsula. This statement indicated a change in Japan's one-sided commitment to South Korea and attempted to enlarge the opportunities for contacts with North Korea. There were two reasons for advocating a change in the Nixon-Sato reflections on Asian security; first, the relaxation of tensions on the Korean peninsula, and secondly, the detente the United States was enjoying with the Soviet Union and China.<sup>31</sup>

Increasing communication between North Korea and Japan was also tied to anti-Japanese feelings in South Korea. This anti-Japanese feeling was strongly demonstrated in Seoul due to the assassination attempt on President Park by a Japanese of Korean extraction, in August

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<sup>29</sup>Soon Sung Cho, pp. 703-704.

<sup>30</sup>Modelski, George, Principles of World Politics (New York, 1972), p. 244.

<sup>31</sup>The Christian Science Monitor (6 September 1974), p. 2.

of 1974. The continued political repression in South Korea was also placing a strain on Japanese-ROK relations. Japan seemed to be moving toward the establishment of diplomatic relations with North Korea. Japan entered into agreements with North Korea repatriating almost 100,000 Korean residents of Japan back to North Korea, much to Seoul's distress.<sup>32</sup>

The South denounced these transactions, but Tokyo was more intent on improving relations with Pyongyang than perpetuating the fiction of Seoul's control of the entire peninsula. Kim Il-Sung suggested an approach to Japan's dilemma. He implied that the abrogation of the Japanese-Republic of Korea Treaty, in which Japan recognized the ROK as the only legitimate government in Korea, would not be a pre-requisite for the normalization of relations between the two states. Kim said that if Japan would deal with North Korea in spite of the treaty, then it would signify a defacto nullification of the article dealing with the ROK's legitimacy. This indicates that North Korea was willing to make reasonable concessions to Japan in order to facilitate the normalization of relations.<sup>33</sup>

North Korea seemed to be in the process of changing its international image. The numerous border incidents which have been constant along the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) separating the two Koreas have been reduced to a negligible amount (see Chart 3).

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<sup>32</sup>Donald Hellmann, Japan and East Asia (New York, 1972), p. 74.

<sup>33</sup>The Christian Science Monitor (6 September 1974), p. 2.



Chart 3. North Korean Subversive Activity (1965-72).<sup>34</sup>

Incidents	1965	1966	1967	1968	1969	1970	1971	1972	1973
South of the DMZ	42	37	445	486	87	66	37	0	2
Inside ROK	17	13	121	143	24	47	10	0	0
Exchanges of fire in the DMZ	23	19	122	236	55	42	31	0	2
Exchanges of fire inside ROK	6	11	96	120	22	26	6	0	0

Subversive activities and incidents in the DMZ showed a decline in 1970 and continued to decline through 1973. This period coincides with major policy reorientations on the Dominant Level of the International Environment and increased communication between the two Koreas, as a result of these policy reorientations. During 1974, there was not any substantial increase in Armistice violations over 1973. Only four major incidents occurred south of the DMZ. On February 15, two North Korean gunboats sank a Republic of Korea fishing boat and captured another in the Yellow Sea about 40 miles off North Korea. An incident of this type in this area was nothing new, since the area had been a source of dispute since 1955. Another major incident took place on May 9, when two United States Army helicopters were fired on by North Korean artillery as they were flying a routine operational mission near the demilitarized

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<sup>34</sup>Rinn-sup Shinn, "Foreign and Reunification Policies," Problems of Communism, Vol. 22 (Jan. 1973), p. 61. (The 1973 figures come from the Report of the U.N. Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea, 28th Session, U.N., p. 14).

zone. The next incident occurred on May 20, when a North Korean infiltrator was discovered on a small island off South Korea (Namson). In the ensuing battle to capture him, a policeman and three other South Koreans were killed. The incident hardly illustrated new North Korean aggression; the culprit was simply a spy of the sort used by both Korea in unknown numbers.<sup>35</sup> North Korean and South Korean gunboats clashed again on June 28, when a ROK Patrol boat was sunk by three North Korean vessels in a sea battle off the east coast just south of the North Korean border. South Korea accused the North of an unprovoked attack, claiming that its ship was in international waters. The government of North Korea countered that the vessel had violated North Korean waters and was sunk in self-defense.<sup>36</sup>

United States intelligence authorities have not viewed these incidents as evidence that North Korea has again embarked on a policy of increased military activity. They believe that Pyongyang had come to the realization that its previous acts of bellicosity were counterproductive. South Korea made use of the North Korean threat to press the United States for substantial increases in arms aid. A review of the 1974 incidents reveals that they were all low key, and could not be considered a reversal of the low-incident trends set in 1971 - 1973.

The low-incident rate between North and South Korea from 1971 to 1973 was instrumental in bringing about the United Nations General Assembly vote on November 28, 1973 to dissolve the United Nation

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<sup>35</sup>"The Dividends of Fear," Far Eastern Economic Review, Vol. 85, No. 30 (August 2, 1974), pp. 23-24.

<sup>36</sup>"Armistice Violations," Facts on File, Vol. 34 (1974), p. 133, 542.

Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea. However, the United Nations Command in Korea remained intact, Ambassador Scali pointed out that United States' Military forces in South Korea were there on the basis of a bilateral agreement between the United States and the Republic of Korea in accordance with article 51 of the United Nations Charter. Ambassador Scali clarified the United States' position and said that these forces would not be withdrawn from South Korea without a request from the Republic of Korea.<sup>37</sup>

During the past four years, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea has been busy creating a new image in an attempt to gain international recognition at the expense of the Seoul government. The reduction of armistice violations since 1971 has been part of Pyongyang's strategy. These tactics began to pay off in March of 1973 when Sweden decided to recognize both Koreas. Sweden announced in early April that it would recognize North Korea, and Denmark, Finland, Norway, and Iceland followed suit.<sup>38</sup> Malaysia, India and others did so later. Seoul was seriously upset about the actions of these countries, and in protest it called home its ambassadors without rupturing relations. All had returned by January, 1974.

North Korea's efforts to seek recognition were not limited to the expansion of its diplomatic relations. On March 30, 1973, it applied for membership in the United Nation's World Health Organization. It seems to have been following the lead of the People's Republic of China

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<sup>37</sup>"Statements made by Ambassador John Scali before the United Nations General Assembly," Department of State Bulletin, Vol. 69 pt. 2 (October-December, 1973), pp. 773-776.

<sup>38</sup>B. D. Koh, "North Korea: Old Goals and New Realities," Asian Survey, Vol. 14 pt. 1 (January-June, 1974), p. 40.

by ending its boycott of the United Nations. Its application was processed by the General Assembly and it was given a seat on the World Health Organization in May. Soon after in June of 1973, Secretary General Kurt Waldheim granted North Korea observer status at United Nations Headquarters in New York. The United States, who does not maintain diplomatic relations with North Korea, issued the necessary visas to the North Korean delegation.<sup>39</sup> As the international environment changes, as a result of the thaw in cold-war alliances, more western states will recognize North Korea and it will attempt to become more active in world organizations in the hope of isolating South Korea from its allies. South Korea has already recognized the necessity of responding to North Korean actions on the international level. It also has been maneuvering on the international scene, expanding its relations with non-hostile communist bloc nations in Eastern Europe. This is a marked departure from its past foreign policy of not establishing or maintaining relations with those countries who recognize North Korea. This policy was based on the Hallstein Doctrine, a West German policy under Adenauer of breaking relations with any county recognizing East Germany.<sup>40</sup> South Korean policy makers adapted this policy to their needs, and they refused to engage in relations with any state that recognized North Korea. In line with the revision of their version of the Hallstein Doctrine in January of 1971, Seoul rewrote the trade laws banning dealings with communist nations and opened up all South Korean

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<sup>39</sup>"North Korea Gets Observer Status," Facts on File Yearbook, Vol. 33 (1973), p. 571.

<sup>40</sup>David S. Collier & Kurt Glaser, The Conditions for Peace in Europe (Washington, D.C., 1969), pp. 76-77.

ports to vessels flying communist flags, except North Korea, China, Cuba, and North Vietnam.

In April of 1973, South Korea even made an attempt to establish informal relations with the People's Republic of China (PRC). The South Korean government used a trade conference in Tokyo to offer trading opportunities to the PRC. South Korean government officials made it known to PRC trade delegates that their government would be receptive to any offer from Peking for trade. References in the government paper used the official title of People's Republic of China when referring to mainland China. In all probability this was a diplomatic sign indicating Seoul's willingness to establish certain relations with the PRC. However, the ROK initiative was ignored by the PRC.<sup>41</sup>

South Korea has not been as successful in coping with the changing international situation as North Korea. Pyongyang has made gains on the dominant system level at South Korea's expense. However, North Korea also has been experiencing an erosion of its position. It has been puzzled by the actions of both the Soviet Union and China. The Sino-Soviet border crisis of 1969 was a specific problem for Pyongyang, especially since it had a dispute of its own with China over a small mountainous area along a common border. There were some armed clashes along the Sino-Korean border in 1969 and the border was closed from the Chinese side. By 1970 Soviet influence was entrenched in North Korea. Russian trade with North Korea in 1970, according to Soviet sources, amounted to one-third of a billion dollars - that is about 70 percent of North Korea's foreign trade. It was estimated that by 1971, nearly all

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<sup>41</sup>The Korea Herald (12 April 1973), p. 1.

of North Korea's modern weapons were of Soviet design; Russian advisors were presumably available to provide instruction in the use of these weapons and North Korean officers received additional training in the Soviet Union.<sup>42</sup> In 1972 and 1973 Soviet influence declined as Kim tried to steer a more neutral course between China and the Soviet Union. The Chinese made major concessions to North Korea in settling the border dispute. Chou En-lai also visited Pyongyang and was received by Kim Il-Sung. It appears that North Korea's attempt to steer a more neutral course was prompted by the Soviet Union's increased contacts with Japan and the United States. This new diplomacy has not been limited just to these two states, but has been broadened to include contacts with other Asian nations beyond the sphere of its traditional allies in the region. Moscow even gave signs of its willingness to communicate with South Korea. Visits to the Soviet Union by a South Korean dramatist in May and by two leading businessmen in June of 1973 led to the South Korean participation in the Universaid games held in Moscow to the displeasure of North Korea.<sup>43</sup> Pyongyang has been balancing its relations with China and the Soviet Union in an attempt to play one power against the other to obtain what North Korea considers viable guarantees for its security.

China has also been a puzzle to North Korea's policy makers. Peking has been expanding its relations with Japan and the United States and to a lesser degree with other free Asian Nations. As these inter-bloc contacts took place, both Seoul and Pyongyang increasingly suspected that their larger allies would seek a fuller agreement concerning

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<sup>42</sup>Young C. Kim, p. 8-10.

<sup>43</sup>Sung Joo Han, "South Korea; The Political Economy of Dependency," Asian Survey, Vol. 14 (January, 1974), pp. 48-49.

their policies in Korea. The Soviet-American detente developed despite the Vietnam War. To this was added the Sino-American rapprochement at the beginning of the 1970's, and evidence of mutual large power interests in controlling the Vietnam conflict. The larger allies had already reached some tacit understanding on their respective roles in Korea. As this situation revealed itself to the two Korean governments, their fears began to focus on the general possibility that they might be excluded from any agreement on Korea in the interest of great power rapprochement. The essence of their mistrust was uncertainty - uncertainty as to whether they would be properly consulted and that they could make their views prevail over those of the larger powers.

The smaller allies responded in two ways. First, they tried to cut across the alliances and deal independently with the large powers. South Korea relaxed trade regulations in 1970 to permit trade with non-hostile communist countries, and the ROK spokesman expressed moderate views on China at the meeting of the Asian and Pacific Council in June of 1972. The Democratic People's Republic of Korea had promoted trade with Japan since the mid-1960's and had recently expanded this trade significantly; in 1972 it held out the prospect for similar developments in relations with the United States.

All of these moves have constituted a mile form of accommodation intended to blunt the sharp edges of previous adversary relationships and to prevent the other Korean government from monopolizing relations with a given large power on behalf of all of Korea.<sup>44</sup>

The present dialogue between the two Koreas and their subsequent

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<sup>44</sup>Astri Sukrke, "Gratuity of Tyranny: The Korean Alliances," World Politics, Vol. 25 (October, 1972 - July, 1973), pp. 529-530.

maneuvering for international recognition is a direct consequence of the general world political situation. As a multipolar pattern emerges in Asia among China, Japan, the Soviet Union, and the United States both Koreas have ample room to maneuver. The multipolar environment frees both nations from restrictive cold-war alliances; they are free to choose their own destiny according to their wishes. With this new freedom comes an increased interest in achieving international recognition in an attempt to legitimize their regimes and preclude the possibility of either Korea forcing its will upon the other. Increased international recognition and participation also helps protect both Koreas from the possibility of being sacrificed on the altar of great power rapprochement.



CHAPTER III -  
REGIONAL RESPONSES TO A NEW INTERNATIONAL  
ATMOSPHERE

The actions and behavior of the leaders of the two Koreas have been influenced by their assessment and perception of the international environment as it affected their own security interests. What makes the analysis of the two Koreas vis-a-vis the great powers in East Asia important and meaningful is the fact that the status of Korea in East Asia has been tied up with the pattern of the great power alliance systems. North and South Korea have been partners in competing alliance systems - South Korea with the United States and Japan, and North Korea with the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China.

Both Koreas perceived that an American - Chinese reconciliation and an American - Soviet detente would alter their roles and strategies in Asian politics. They realized that they would no longer be able to use the same degree of leverage they had in the past within their respective alliance systems. North and South Korea sensed the danger of being relegated to a position where the great powers would be indifferent to their activities or even consider them expendable.<sup>1</sup> None of the major powers involved in Northeast Asia wants to see the basic, fragile structure of multipolarity, thus far achieved, endangered by renewed

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<sup>1</sup>Lawrence Whetten, "The Military Balance," International Journal, Vol. XXIX (Summer, 1974), p. 482.

hostilities on the peninsula.<sup>2</sup> In May of 1969, N. V. Podgorny, Chairman of the Presidium of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics Supreme Soviet emphasized that: "We resolutely advocate reduction of tension in the Far East and peace and security in that area."<sup>3</sup>

North Korea's foreign policy in regard to South Korea has in the past responded to both internal and external pressures; and, South Korea's strategies concerning North Korea have been purely defensive. This is not to say that South Korea has not pursued a policy of reunification by force, but rather to illustrate that South Korean policies have been responses to North Korean initiatives.

The North's strategy between 1950 and 1953 can be characterized as attempted military conquest of the South. This theme was similar to Syngman Rhee's "March to the North Program."<sup>4</sup> North Korea was prompted to embark on this course of action due to a number of factors on the international level. The West had successfully checked the advance of the communists in Europe by 1950. This fact, coupled with the Berlin airlift, had represented a propaganda setback to the Soviets. Asia, however, had seen an impressive Communist advance resulting in the retreat of Chiang Kai-shek's government to Formosa in 1949. To Stalin, failure in the West may have been the cue for expansion in the East.

A second factor was probably the formal inauguration of the Republic of Korea in 1948. It was one thing to permit the Americans to

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<sup>2</sup>Soon Sung Cho, "The Changing Pattern of Asian International Affairs," Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 26-27 (1972-1973), p. 230.

<sup>3</sup>J. A. Kim, "Divided Korea 1969; Consolidating for Transition," Asian Survey, Vol. 11, pt. 1 (1971), pp. 94-95.

<sup>4</sup>Richard C. Allen, Korea's Syngman Rhee (Rutland, 1960), p. 106.

accept the surrender of Japanese troops in Korea; it was another to have to endure the threats of an anti-Communist regime which proclaimed itself the legitimate government of all Korea.

Finally, the military situation in Korea seemingly encouraged exploitation by the Communists. Syngman Rhee's threats from the South had resulted in further strengthening of the People's Army. While the exaggerated South Korean reports of Northern troop concentrations were discounted by the United States, thus weakening South Korea's position. The North felt that Rhee's bellicosity made it seem possible that responsibility for initiating hostilities could be attributed to South Korea.

The one imponderable was the attitude of the United States. The Americans had been virtual sponsors of the Syngman Rhee government, and still had a large advisory group working with the South Korean Army. But the Communists received reassurances from an unexpected source. In a speech before the National Press Club on January 12, 1950, Secretary of Defense Dean Acheson clarified America's "defense perimeter" in Asia: the Aleutians, Japan, Okinawa, and the Phillipines. As for other areas in the Pacific, initial reliance in case of attack "must be on the people attacked . . . and then upon the commitments of the entire civilized world under the charter of the United Nations."<sup>5</sup> This statement seemed to place South Korea and Formosa outside that belt of nations against whom aggression would automatically be resisted by the United States.

This aggressive unification policy of the North was gradually toned down after the failure of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea's

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<sup>5</sup>Ibid., pp. 115-116.

military campaign in the South. With the intervention of United Nations troops, Kim Il-Sung's dream for military unification became untenable. The advent of the cease-fire agreement saw the implementation of the peaceful approach. From 1953 to 1961 domestic policies were dominant in both Korean governments. This period represented a time of transition in which reunification was eclipsed by the more urgent goals of political consolidation and economic modernization. The new approach witnessed not only a bitter intra-party struggle in Pyongyang, but also mounting external pressures for peace from Moscow and Peking. The death of Stalin in March 1953 had left the Soviet Communist Party temporarily without a leader. The Beria - Malenkov - Bulganin - Khrushchev struggle behind the scenes resulted in less attention to foreign troubles. No member of the collective leadership could advocate adventurism abroad before his political position had been consolidated at home. Communist China was equally anxious to avoid a more direct confrontation with the United States. After almost twenty years of continuous civil and foreign wars, China could no longer afford to wage war. It is also likely that Kim Il-Sung was induced to follow a peace policy by offers of post war economic aid from his allies.

North Korea was also faced with internal economic difficulties. Three years of war had not only dislocated its industry but had also hopelessly displaced its people. The war had cost North Korea 3.5 billion dollars (420 billion won)<sup>6</sup>, not including the cost of rebuilding and repairing the 8,700 factories that had been destroyed. The mining industry lost 80 percent of its productive ability: 600,000 houses,

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<sup>6</sup>1953 exchange rate 120 won to one U.S. dollar. A won is a Korean monetary unit.

5,000 schools, and 1,000 hospitals were destroyed. Industrial production decreased to 40 percent of the 1949 level. In the metal, chemical, electrical, fishing, and construction - goods sectors of the economy, the drop in production varied from 60 percent to 93 percent. Destruction was almost complete in the fields of pig iron, copper, aluminum, alkali, and chemical fertilizers production.<sup>7</sup> It is not difficult to see why Kim Il-Song needed a cease-fire and why he advocated the new peaceful approach. South Korea was in the same situation. Its industries had been devastated during the war and the large influx of refugees from the North strained the agrarian economy of South Korea.

As North Korea's political and economic situation improved, its policies became increasingly militaristic. By 1961 North Korea's economy overshadowed the South's as Chart 4 illustrates.

Chart 4 Economic Output of South Korea and North Korea (1961)<sup>8</sup>

	South Korea	North Korea
Population	24,990,000	10,780,000
Area, sq. km.	96,000	124,000
Coal, tons	5,888,000	11,788,000
Electricity, kwh	1,770,000,000	10,418,000,000
Steel, tons	46,000	776,000
Cement, tons	522,000	2,253,000
Fertilizers, tons	64,000	662,000
Tractors	0	3,996
Textiles, meters	133,000,000	256,000,000
Rice - Wheat, tons	4,534,000	4,830,000
Fishing, tons	434,000	620,000

<sup>7</sup>Soon Sung Cho, "The Politics of North Korean Unification Policies," World Politics, Vol. 19 (Oct., 1966 - July, 1967), p. 222.

<sup>8</sup>Ibid., pp. 218 - 241.

As North Korea regained new economic stability, it began to reassert itself more in foreign policy areas. At first, North Korea had attempted to remain neutral in the Sino-Soviet conflict, but by December, 1962, North Korea had rejected the polemics of the Soviet Union's policy of peaceful co-existence and found itself supporting the Chinese in their dispute with the Soviets. During this time period, Pyongyang's policies toward South Korea were reevaluated. North Korea's new policy encompassed: 1. intensifying the ideological and technical training of the Korean People's Army; 2. modernizing the Korean People's Army; 3. strengthening the militia force organized in January, 1959, and placing the entire country, particularly the industrial complex, on a war footing. The foundation of this strategy was the reunification of Korea through revolutionary efforts. This policy consisted of redoubling revolutionary efforts in the South through continuous propaganda, organization, and guerrilla activities, and concerted campaigns against United States imperialism.<sup>9</sup> Pyongyang utilized the carrot and the stick. From time to time this policy would place emphasis on immediate economic and cultural exchanges ultimately leading to the formation of an all-Korean Confederation by peaceful means.

This new revolutionary line was reflected in such major incidents as the abortive commando raid on the presidential mansion in Seoul in January, 1968, the seizure of the U.S.S. Pueblo with 82 surviving crew in Wonsan Bay in the same month, and the downing of an E.C.-121 U.S. Navy Reconnaissance plane with a 31 man crew in the Sea of Japan in

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<sup>9</sup>B. C. Koh, "Dilemmas of Korean Reunification," Asian Survey, Vol. 11 pt. 1 (1971), pp. 481-484.

April, 1969.<sup>10</sup>

The revolutionary line of North Korea did not result in any positive actions coming from the South. In fact it strengthened the South behind one man, Park Chung-hee, in his effort to modernize South Korea to meet the North's threat. Bellicosity on the part of the North also prompted the United States to send vast amounts of economic and military aid to South Korea. Economic assistance from the United States alone totaled four billion dollars from 1953 to 1969, with the greatest amounts being appropriated after 1963. Military assistance from the United States totaled an additional 2.9 billion dollars during this time span. South Korea was being heavily subsidized by the United States, while North Korea was becoming increasingly dependent on its own resources. Chart 5 depicts the size of defense appropriations in relation to Gross National Product. It reveals that North Korea, with a lower gross national product, had substantially higher defense costs.

#### Chart 5

#### Republic of Korea and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea Defense Costs for 1969 (in United States dollars).<sup>11</sup>

	<u>R.O.K.</u>	<u>D.P.R.K.</u>
1. Gross National Product	6.7 billion	3.0 billion
2. Percentages of G.N.P. used for defense	4.3 percent	20.0 percent
3. National Budget	1.3 billion	2.3 billion
4. Percentage of National Budget used for defense	22.3 percent	30.0 percent
5. Defense Budget	288.1 million	700.0 million

<sup>10</sup>Ibid., p. 485.

<sup>11</sup>United States Security Agreements and Commitments Abroad, Hearing before the United States Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Part 6, U.S. Government Printing Office (1970), pp. 1584-1592.

In June of 1970 Pyongyang came to the realization that its revolutionary efforts were not achieving the desired results in South Korea. North Korea was also overburdened with excessive defense budgets, which were hurting its economy. Instead of driving a wedge between South Korea and the United States, Pyongyang's policies were alienating its allies who were in the process of normalizing relations with the west. These factors influenced North Korean policy-makers to abandon their military line and publicize a peaceful policy based on a mutual reduction of armed forces, economic, cultural, and postal exchanges, and all-Korean elections on a democratic basis.<sup>12</sup>

Defense costs for the Democratic People's Republic of Korea have been as high as 850 million dollars, 31 to 35 percent of its budget (25 percent of the North's gross national product) though the 1972 expenditures were sharply reduced to 17 percent of the budget and those for 1973 were down to 15 percent of the total budgetary expenditures. The Republic of Korea, however was subsidized by the United States by hundreds of millions of dollars annually in United States military aid. Communist military aid has been much less and North Korea's expenditure of 15 percent of its budget on defense burdened its economy. The inability of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to make adequate economic headway and still remain reasonably independent in the face of the South Korean threat perhaps was a major factor in North Korea's policy shift.<sup>13</sup>

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<sup>12</sup>Gregory Henderson, R. Lebow and J. Stoessinger (ed.), Divided Nations in a Divided World (New York, 1974), p. 80.

<sup>13</sup>B. C. Koh, "Dilemmas of Korean Reunification," Asian Survey, Vol. 11 pt. 1 (1971), p. 485.



In the past the isolation of North Korea led to reliance on the Soviet Union and China. However, since 1970 it had become increasingly apparent that the Chinese and the Soviets did not have enough advanced technological expertise to meet the needs of North Korea. This lack of technology has been dramatically underscored by both Soviet and Chinese attempts to increase contacts with the United States and Japan, Moscow and Peking have not limited these initiatives to these two states, but have broadened them to include other Asian nations beyond the sphere of their traditional influence. China also has been pursuing a change in its international image and has become less visibly bellicose in the region. It has obtained a seat in the United Nations and has been diligently working to become an accepted member of the international community.<sup>14</sup> As North Korea's benefactors turn to the West for technology, Pyongyang has been increasingly turning to Japan and the West for the newest electronic and computerized techniques. Precise trading figures are not published in Pyongyang, but Japan has been becoming North Korea's biggest trading partner with a total turnover in excess of 450 million dollars a year, as shown in the previous chapter.

During the past year, more than 40 North Korean trade delegations have visited Europe, the Middle East, Africa and Asia. Their objectives have not always been purely commercial. North Korea has been seeking wider diplomatic recognition since the old bipolar patterns of exclusive trade with socialist countries has been changing.

Nothing has been done in North Korea without one eye on the South;

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<sup>14</sup>Doak Barnett, "The New Multipolar Balance in East Asia: Implications for United States Policy," Annals, Vol. 390 (July, 1970), p. 86.

the sight of the South Koreans expanding their exports (and indirectly their influence) has not gone unnoticed in Pyongyang. The development of new industries in the South (using the latest imported foreign techniques) has been viewed with some concern. These two factors, plus the insoluble shortage of manpower, have been prodding the North into a new intercourse with the capitalist world which has made it more responsive to international economic and political pressures.<sup>15</sup>

Until August of 1970, Seoul had been completely cool to North Korean suggestions that the two countries engage in cultural and diplomatic exchanges. Park had previously stated that any exchanges with North Korea on a one-to-one basis had to be postponed until the goal of internal economic development had been accomplished. In his view, when South Korea's national power became superior to North Korea's, then South Korea would be able to negotiate from a position of strength. Seoul's basic policy in the 1960's was to enhance its economic and military power with a view toward deterring North Korean aggression.<sup>16</sup>

By 1971, South Korea had stimulated its economy to the point where its gross national product was 5.20 billion dollars. During this same eleven year time span, economic growth had slowed down in the North. The Northern slow down was partly due to a period of difficult relations with the Soviet Union, its major trading partner and supplier, and partly because of the heavy emphasis on defense spending (up to 25 percent of the GNP). South Korea, on the other hand, implemented two

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<sup>15</sup>Russell Spurr, "Emerging From Isolation," Far Eastern Economic Review (July 8, 1974) p. 49.

<sup>16</sup>B. C. Koh, "Dilemmas of Korean Reunification," Asian Survey, Vol. 2 pt. 1 (1971), pp. 487-491.

successful five-year plans which contributed to the upward spiral of South Korea's gross national product. From an annual rate of growth of GNP of 7 percent between 1962 and 1964, the increase rose to about 10 percent per year between 1965 and 1967. Between 1968 and 1971 the rate was 12 percent a year increase with a steady rise of exports and foreign exchange reserves.<sup>17</sup> Its economic growth was aided by the normalization of diplomatic relations with Japan in 1965, which led to increased Japanese and foreign assistance. In contrast, North Korea's gross national product had only reached 2.80 billion dollars.<sup>18</sup> South Korea's economic situation today puts it in a superior position vis-a-vis the North.

South Korea has not only become better off in economic conditions than the North, it has also taken the lead in the military sphere. A brief survey of the Republic of Korea's Armed Forces shows that, as of January 1973, they number 650,000 men, the sixth largest in the world. In addition it had a home guard of some 2,000,000. The North on the other hand has had some 438,000 in its armed forces, ranking twelfth in the world. It has had in addition a people's militia of 1,300,000. On the surface these figures would seem to indicate that the Republic of Korea had the capability of defending itself against the North. It's true that both the North and the South have modern equipment, however the Democratic People's Republic of Korea has had somewhat more than the Republic of Korea. It has 500 modern fighter planes which provide air

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<sup>17</sup>J. A. Kim, "Divided Korea 1969; Consolidating for Transition," Asian Survey, Vol. 10 (1970), p. 33.

<sup>18</sup>August Schou and Arne Brundtland, Small States in International Relations (New York, 1971), p. 53.

support for its 100 bombers, while South Korea has only 200 fighters to counter the North's air threat. Pyongyang also has a marked advantage in heavy artillery. The advantages that the North holds in artillery and air power more than compensate for its numerical inferiority.<sup>19</sup> North Korea's aircraft represent a real threat to South Korea. They are not vulnerable to the kind of limited attack that South Korea is capable of mounting against the North because the North's aircraft are stationed at dispersed, jet-capable airfields throughout the country, and are housed in underground shelters for protection. The South has been extremely vulnerable to attack from the North, because it has been tactically possible for North Korean jet aircraft to be over Seoul in three minutes after crossing the D.M.Z. and on down to Pusan in less than twenty-five minutes. The reality of the North Korean air threat has been emphasized by the type of American units stationed in Korea and the mission they have performed. The Fourth United States Missile Command provided modern, nuclear capable, long range surface-to-surface Honest John artillery support for the 250,000 man First ROK Army. The 38th Air Defense Brigade provides air defense for the entire Republic of Korea. This Brigade has been structured into three Hawk Missile Battalions, composed of four firing batteries apiece, dispersed geographically to provide protection for strategic points in South Korea. One nuclear capable Hercules Missile Battalion, composed of six firing batteries, dispersed throughout the country rounded out the Brigade. The Korean Support Command (KORSCOM) provided logistical support services for these American forces, while the 2nd Infantry Division

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<sup>19</sup>Gregory Henderson, R. Lebow, and J. Stoessinger, p. 80.

provided security for the Armistice Commission at Panmunjom from its base at Camp Casey. The United States Airforce also provided modern jet fighter support from large American bases located at Osan, Taegue, and Kunson. This fighter support has taken up the slack in the ROK air defense picture.

The 43,000 American men stationed in South Korea have acted as a force balancer between the North and the South. No foreign troops have been in North Korea since the withdrawal of the last Chinese Communist forces in October 1958.<sup>20</sup> The presence of this large contingent of American forces in South Korea has given visible proof to both South Korea and North Korea that the 1954 United States-South Korean Mutual Defense Treaty has been viable. The main purpose of President Ford's November 1974 visit to South Korea was to discuss the present security arrangements in that country. At the conclusion of these talks President Ford and President Park issued a joint communique reaffirming the determination of the United States to render prompt and effective assistance to repel armed attack against South Korea in accordance with the United States-South Korean Mutual Defense Treaty. He further assured South Koreans that the United States had no plan to reduce the present level of United States forces in Korea. President Park also received a promise from President Ford that the United States would continue to assist South Korea in the modernization of its armed forces.<sup>21</sup>

These promises made by President Ford to South Korea in the past

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<sup>20</sup>Gerald Morse, "United States Forces in Korea - Can We Cut?" (Carlisle Barracks, Penn., 1972), pp. 6-9.

<sup>21</sup>"President Ford's Trip to South Korea," Keesing's Contemporary Archives, Vol. 20 (1974), p. 26868.

have been backed up by military aid and sales to South Korea which have totaled 244,928,000 dollars in aid and 49,200,000 dollars in sales credit for fiscal years 1973 and 1974 alone. From 1950 to 1973 South Korea also had a total of 31,530 officers trained in the United States. The following charts provides a breakdown of United States foreign military sales credit and military assistance programs from 1973 to 1974, and proposed figures for 1975. Sales and aid deliveries are listed by year from 1950 to 1973 to demonstrate a continuing commitment by the United States to the government of South Korea.<sup>22</sup> The years 1968, 1969, and 1970 show a sharp increase in sales and aid deliveries; these years also coincide with increased military activity by the North Koreans. Nineteen sixty-eight was the year of the Pueblo incident and the attempted assassination of President Park by North Korean agents. These incidents occurred after a substantial increase in incidents on the DMZ in 1967.<sup>23</sup> The aid figures for the years 1968, 1969, and 1970 average out to 207,902,666 dollars a year. After the announcement of the Guam Doctrine and President Nixon's China trip, the three subsequent years (1971, 1972 and 1973) show a drop to an average of 133,622,000 dollars. United States military policy toward South Korea changed in relation to its world strategy and its own convenience as these figures exemplify. The recent United States military posture in South Korea was summed up by General James Michalis before the Committee on Asian and Pacific Affairs of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs in the latter

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<sup>22</sup>Military Aid and Sales Statistics for ROK, Department of Defense, Security Assistance Agency (Washington, 1974), pp. 7-18.

<sup>23</sup>David Steinberg, Korea: Nexus of East Asia (New York, 1968), p. 67.

Chart 6<sup>24</sup>

United States Military Aid and Sales Statistics for the Republic of Korea (in United States Dollars)

Foreign Military Sales Credit Program.

<u>1973</u>	<u>1974</u>	<u>1975 (proposed)</u>
24,200,000	25,000,000	52,000,000

Military Assistance Program.

<u>1973</u>	<u>1974</u>	<u>1975 (proposed)</u>
132,628,000	112,300,000	161,500,000

Foreign Military Sales Deliveries.

<u>1950 - 1963</u>	<u>1964 - 1967</u>	<u>1968</u>	<u>1969</u>	<u>1970</u>
285,000	0	1,496,000	731,000	1,944,000

<u>1971</u>	<u>1972</u>	<u>1973</u>	<u>1950 - 1970 total</u>
416,000	414,000	1,263,000	6,549,000

United States Military Assistance Deliveries.

<u>1950 - 1963</u>	<u>1964</u>	<u>1965</u>	<u>1966</u>
1,704,873	125,698,000	171,698,000	153,090,000

<u>1967</u>	<u>1968</u>	<u>1969</u>	<u>1970</u>
149,787,000	197,370,000	210,008,000	216,330,000

<u>1971</u>	<u>1972</u>	<u>1973</u>
140,471,000	164,000,000	96,395,000

TOTAL 1953 - 1973

3,330,101,000

<sup>24</sup>Ibid., p. 7-18.

part of 1971. His statements indicated coming troop cuts and aid reductions for South Korea. Michalis said these cuts were justified because:

the likelihood of an overt attack from the North has been increasingly reduced in view of the political implications that would necessarily involve China and the Soviet Union and thereby endanger newly developed relations with the United States and Japan.<sup>25</sup>

The presence of the United States forces in Korea, under the name of United Nations Forces (thereby retaining operational command of all forces in the Korean area), in addition to defending South Korea from North Korea, has restrained the Republic of Korea from establishing and initiating independent strategical plans against North Korea. Therefore, the role of the United States forces in Korea has been that of a balancer of forces.

Just as the United States has become the chief supporter of the South Korean government, the Soviet Union's assistance to North Korea was aimed at economic rehabilitation and the modernization of the Korean People's Republic Armed Forces. Between 1954 and 1970, the Soviet Union promised a total of 635,000,000 dollars in assistance to North Korea, and it presumably had contributed over 580 million dollars by the end of 1968. In addition to these funds Moscow committed another 250,000,000 dollars in grant type assistance to North Korea. The Mutual Defense and Assistance Treaty concluded between North Korea and the Soviet Union in 1961 became the bulwark of the Pyongyang regime. In 1965 the Soviet Union and North Korea concluded military assistance agreements, the terms

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<sup>25</sup> General James Michalis, Statement of the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command; Commander, United States Forces, Korea before the Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, House Committee on Foreign Affairs (June 9, 1971), p. 43.



of which were not disclosed but they resulted in increased shipments of modern anti-aircraft weapons (SA-2), late-model jet fighters, and heavy field artillery to North Korea.<sup>26</sup>

A constant theme in the negotiations between the Soviet Union and North Korea has been the Kremlin line of peaceful coexistence. In a February 1965 speech, Kosygin stated:

The march of the Soviet Union and all other socialist countries on the path of socialist and Communist construction is inseparably linked to the struggle to maintain a lasting peace in the world. Not only does the Soviet Union unswervingly and thoroughly defend the cause of peace, but it also advocates the peaceful co-existence of nations with different social systems. ... This the Soviet Union regards as its internationalist duty. Experience demonstrates that peaceful co-existence is wholly compatible with revolutionary struggle  
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This speech foretold coming events. Policy shifts in the Soviet Union have come primarily on the basis of one of two criteria or a combination of the two: (1) through the failure of existing policy to achieve the results expected by policy-makers, or (2) through a change in the composition of the dominant coalition on the international level that can only be accomplished by the adoption of new policies.<sup>28</sup>

Since 1945 the Soviet Union has engaged in a policy of diplomatic and military confrontation with the United States. Moscow has not realized many substantial benefits from this policy. As the decade of the 1970's approached Moscow attempted to break the American policy of

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<sup>26</sup>C. I. Kim, Korean Unification (Kalamazoo, Michigan, 1973), pp. 80-81.

<sup>27</sup>Byung Chul Koh, The Foreign Policy of North Korea (New York, New York, 1969), p. 86.

<sup>28</sup>Michael Gehlen, The Politics of Co-existence (Bloomington, Indiana, 1967), p. 294.

containment through disarmament negotiations, trade expansion and personal diplomacy. This strategy was aimed at changing the composition of the dominant system. The Soviet Union felt that it would receive benefits economically and technologically from this policy shift that would place it in the dominant position in the international environment. The underlying concept of Soviet strategy was the relaxation of tensions based on the theory of co-existence. It has been the general practice that, when any party challenges this basic strategy it is subjected to direct or indirect diplomatic or military pressure, or some form of sanction. This general rule has been true with regard to the Soviet attitude toward North Korea. A specific instance to illustrate this was Soviet pressure against North Korea to gain the release of the Pueblo crew. The Soviet's also expressed their dissatisfaction with Pyongyang's behavior when North Korea shot down an American E. C.- 121, by helping the United States ships search for survivors.<sup>29</sup>

North Korea also has a military alliance treaty with the People's Republic of China. This treaty was concluded in 1961 and is similar to the treaty concluded with the Soviet Union. However, in view of the fact that China, since the Cultural Revolution, has been endeavoring to readjust its relations with the United States and the West, its commitment to North Korea has been increasingly questioned by Pyongyang's decision-makers.

Neither the Soviet Union or the People's Republic of China have advanced the same magnitude of aid to North Korea that the United States has advanced to South Korea. In 1973 alone the United States allocated

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<sup>29</sup>C. I. Kim, pp. 80-81.

261 million dollars to the Republic of Korea to complete its program of modernizing its armed forces. United States military aid to South Korea has placed a strain on the North's human and capital resources, since the North's allies expect it to pay for its defense needs. This strain on the economy of the North gives South Korea an advantage, allowing it to negotiate from a position of relative strength economically.<sup>30</sup>

A government's foreign policy is the range of external actions pursued to achieve certain defined objectives or goals.<sup>31</sup> Analyzing South Korea's actions on the subordinate level reveals that Seoul's primary objective in the past has been to manipulate events and actors to detract from Pyongyang's power position. In this context the United States has aided South Korea for the past twenty-four years. Today, South Korea appears to be in a dominant position both economically and militarily vis-a-vis North Korea, but this dominance is largely contingent on Japanese and American support. If the South hopes to resolve its differences with Pyongyang, it must negotiate now while it is still in the position to do so. The international situation has been changing, the United States has been disengaging its forces from Asia, and economic conditions are such in the United States that military aid to the Seoul government will likely be reduced in the next few years. The uncertain international situation and increased international recognition that North Korea received has strengthened the North's position. All of these circumstances have influenced the South in its effort to

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<sup>30</sup>Ibid., p. 83.

<sup>31</sup>August Schou, and Arne Brundtland, Small States in International Relations (New York, 1971), p. 53.

establish a dialogue with the North. In essence, South Korea has decided that the isolation which existed between the North and the South must come to an end. The North's attempts to undermine the South's stability through force of arms have failed. Both sides are beginning to realize the tremendous cost of confrontation as they increasingly shoulder the costs militarily and economically. These costs and the changing international environment have been prime factors in influencing Seoul and Pyongyang to make some effort to resolve their differences before the great powers resolve them for them.<sup>32</sup>

With this analysis in mind two observations are in order. First, the recent dialogue in Korea was stimulated by international developments in the larger region of East Asia. President Nixon's trip to China symbolized the end of the cold war confrontation and the beginning of a new era of more stable and peaceful relationships among the nations in the region. Second, both North Korea and South Korea have attained a certain level of economic development and social stability that gives them greater confidence in charting a new course in response to the changes in their international environment. The following chapter will analyze the events leading up to the Korean dialogue and assess the probable results of North and South Korea's attempt to normalize relations in response to changes on the international and regional levels.

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<sup>32</sup>Byung Chul Koh, The Foreign Policy of North Korea (New York, 1969), p. 119.

## CHAPTER IV

### GRADUATED RECIPROCATION IN TENSION REDUCTION

North and South Korea have become increasingly aware of the emerging political, economic and military balance between them. It is this balance which makes the resolution of differences by force an extremely costly option. This factor, coupled with the changing international environment, has been responsible for precipitating the dialogue between both Koreas. Keeping these variables in mind, Charles Osgood's theory of graduated reciprocity in tension reduction would account for the actions of both Koreas. The theory posits that one of the antagonists in a conflict must take a first step that signals its desire to reduce tensions. This first step must be one of many links in an unbroken chain of logical tension reduction moves. The initial moves should be peripheral to national security, since they could be abused by the adversary. Each successive move would be in the direction of reducing the real threat posed to the other side and building interdependent linkages. If the adversary responds to the first one or two steps, a chain of graduated reciprocity in tension (GRIT) would result.<sup>1</sup>

Within this context the prime movers were events on the international level. The major powers were engaged in actions designed to

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<sup>1</sup>W. C. Clemens, Jr., "Grit at Panmunjom; Conflict and Cooperation in a Divided Korea," Asian Survey, Vol. 13 (June, 1973), pp. 547-549.

reduce tensions on the international level. In the light of the Nixon Doctrine and Nixon's trips to Moscow and Peking, South Korea's self-confidence became strained. Faced with the apparent inevitability of a less visible American alliance and of great power rapprochement, the South became increasingly concerned with its own security.<sup>2</sup> In view of these developments, South Korea desperately began to search for a new policy that would ensure its security as well as establish a new identity in the rapidly changing international environment.<sup>3</sup>

North Korea presented the largest and most immediate threat to South Korea's security. Therefore, North Korea was the first problem that South Korean policy-makers attempted to confront. The two Koreas are incompatible because of a number of deep-seated contradictory interests which fuel the confrontation. Both governments claim each other's territory; they have had no direct positive contact with each other; and they are members of military alliances which have sustained their mutual antagonisms.<sup>4</sup> Their antagonisms have been fueled by ideological clashes which help to magnify their differences. Each side is highly indoctrinated and portrays the other's system as morally repugnant and doomed to failure. Both Seoul and Pyongyang have used the existence of the other as a useful instrument for mobilizing support, justifying economic sacrifices and explaining the need for political repression.<sup>5</sup>

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<sup>2</sup>Astri Suhrke, and Charles Morrison, "The Koreas: Negotiating from Balanced Strength," World Today, Vol. 28 (November, 1972), p. 496.

<sup>3</sup>Soon Sung Cho, "The Changing Pattern of Asian International Affairs; Prospects for the Unification of Korea," Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 26-27 (1972-1973), p. 215.

<sup>4</sup>Astri Suhrke, p. 493.

<sup>5</sup>W. C. Clements, Jr., p. 541.

The Liberation Day speech by President Park, in August 1970, seemed to augur a departure from South Korea's traditional policy of staunch anti-communism. This first step in reducing tensions unveiled by Park marked a significant change in Seoul's policy by indicating a willingness to propose and implement innovative measures aimed at removing in stages various artificial barriers between South and North Korea provided that North Korea ceased all hostile acts and publicly renounced her goals of aggression toward and forcible overthrow of the Seoul government.<sup>6</sup>

By March 1971, the Republic of Korea was faced with the apparent inevitability of a less visible American alliance. American authorized troop strength had been reduced by 20,000 men, and the remaining American division was moved south, away from the DMZ, so that all border-line duty would be handled by Korean soldiers. Confronted with the reduction of an American presence in South Korea, the South began to consider the alternative of exploring accommodation with the North.

As events unfolded, the international situation not only placed stress on the Korean foreign policy position, but is also became a factor in domestic politics. Nineteen seventy-one was an election year for South Korea, and the international situation caused the campaign to be waged on the basis of issues rather than personalities. The major candidates in the campaign were Kim Dae-jung and incumbent President Park Chung-hee, who was fresh from a victorious campaign to amend the Korean Constitution allowing him to run for a third term. The underlying issue was North Korea and the South's response. Internationally, Kim

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<sup>6</sup>Y. C. Han, "1969 Constitutional Revision and Party Politics in South Korea," Pacific Affairs, Vol. 44 (1971), p. 257.

suggested that the South expand relations with the North. He proposed that the four powers (the United States, the Soviet Union, the People's Republic of China, and Japan) should guarantee the security of both North and South Korea. Kim suggested postal, press, and sport exchanges with the North as a possible first step toward improving ties between the two Koreas. Domestically, Kim's programs included disbandment of the two-million-man Home Guard, elimination of compulsory military training for college students, and the abolition of the Korean CIA. All of these proposed measures were aimed at presenting a lower military profile to the North in hopes of improving relations. In response to these issues, Park continued to stress the potential danger of military attack by the North. His chief argument was that a transfer of power in the South would cause political and social unrest which would only benefit the North.

When the vote was cast on April 27, Park won 51.2 percent of the vote (6,342,838) while Kim polled 43.6 percent (5,395,900) with the remainder being divided among the three minor-party candidates. The campaign waged by Kim gave Park the most significant challenge that he had faced since his 1961 coup. The main issues revolved around the merits of increased contacts with the North.

North Korea responded to the political campaign in the South by unveiling an eight point program, in April 1971, aimed at facilitating contacts between the two Koreas. The North Korean program included a proposal to negotiate with all political parties and patriotic persons in South Korea at any mutually agreeable time and place. Another sign of the North's willingness to open a dialogue was the drop in significant incidents within the DMZ. Figures for the year 1970 indicate that



181 incidents were reported while 1971 listed only 84 incidents. Noticeably absent from Pyongyang's new program was its customary insistence on the withdrawal of all foreign (i.e. United States) troops as a precondition for negotiation.<sup>7</sup>

What accounts for this interest on both sides to establish a dialogue? Why did this interest emerge in 1971? In answer to both these questions, the importance of external stimuli cannot be stressed enough. The Nixon Doctrine, the subsequent reductions of American authorized troop strength, the pull-back of the remaining American division from the DMZ leaving only South Korean soldiers to guard the borderline, and the emerging Sino-American detente in the Spring and Summer of 1971 all had an influence on Korean policy-makers.<sup>8</sup> Korean leaders were particularly unprepared for Henry Kissinger's announcement in July 1971 that he had made a secret visit to Peking to arrange for President Nixon's China trip. Less than a month after the announcement of the China trip, Park Chung-hee and Kim Il Sung started to explore opportunities for a mutual accommodation.<sup>9</sup> It would seem that Nixon's decision to visit the People's Republic of China, and the significant change in the international environment that this heralded, prompted both Pyongyang and Seoul to re-evaluate their strategic calculations. With the initiation of detente among the major patron states, the Korean policy-makers believed that detente would not be risked by the great

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<sup>7</sup>B. C. Koh, "Korea-Convergence and Conflict in the Two Koreas," Current History, Vol. 65 (November, 1973), p. 206.

<sup>8</sup>Astri Suhrke, and Charles Morrison, p. 496.

<sup>9</sup>Astri Suhrke, "Gratuity or Tyranny: The Korean Alliances," World Politics, Vol. 25 (October, 1972 - July, 1973), p. 530.

powers over regional strategic goals which were important only to Koreans.

This series of moves and countermoves finally culminated in the initiation of Red Cross meetings in December 1971. These meetings were officially sanctioned and they represented the first contact either side has had with the other, outside of the Armistice Commission Meetings at Panmunjom. Representatives from each country met and discussed the unification of divided families and related subjects. This initial contact was expanded in 1972 to establish a North-South Coordinating Committee to continue the Red Cross discussions initiated in 1971.<sup>10</sup> These meetings helped to establish the first formal communication link between the divided portions of the peninsula, and it precipitated the exchange of delegations and accompanying newsmen that allowed both North and South Koreans to view each other for the first time in 25 years. Delegates and newsmen from both sides of the DMZ viewed alien surroundings and discovered that North and South Korea still had much in common.

Park Chung-hee responded to these first attempts to establish a meaningful dialogue in his 1972 New Year's Address. He stressed the need for the government to explore practical and self-reliant diplomacy in order to promote national interests to the maximum extent by coping with the rapid change in the international situation. Park said that it was necessary to establish an emergency structure so that South Korea's potential energy could be mobilized with a view toward maintaining total security. According to Park, the maintenance of security was

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<sup>10</sup>Rew Joung Yale, "Korea's New Foreign Policy: An Appraisal," Korean Quarterly, Vol. 15 (Spring - Summer, 1973), pp. 49-51.

a multilevel task calling not only for improvements in military and civil defenses, but also for substantial economic development which would increase the South's bargaining position with the North.

President Park continually stressed the need for a self-reliant defense posture upon which an independent foreign policy could rest. He discounted the security guarantees of major powers in view of the thawing trend on the dominant system level. He supported his position in favor of an independent defense posture and foreign policy by pointing to the limitations of big powers in preventing regional conflicts, citing the Indo-Pakistani wars and the recurring Arab-Israeli conflicts as examples. The peace efforts of the United Nations and the major powers in reference to these conflicts also resulted in the weaker side losing something. It seemed to him that the general world trend toward peace was only an aspect of big powers trying to maintain the status quo in a stalemate of the nuclear arms race.

In order to preserve its national security in a changing world environment, South Korea attempted to shift its foreign policy emphasis. It continued firm diplomatic ties with friendly and neutral countries, yet at the same time strengthened its efforts to establish trade and diplomatic relations with non-hostile communist countries. It also embarked on a course to reduce tensions with hostile communist countries.<sup>11</sup>

The principal basis of this new foreign policy was to cope positively with the international situation by strengthening the inner system of

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<sup>11</sup>The Korea Herald (January 1, 1972), pp. 1 & 5.

the nation to present a united front to deal with foreign problems.<sup>12</sup>

In line with this new foreign policy approach were a series of secret political talks with North Korea which were conducted in June 1972.<sup>13</sup> These secret talks began between Lee Hu-rak, the South Korean negotiator, and leading personalities in the North from May 2 to 5, and continued in the South from May 29 to June 1, 1972 between Park Sung-chul the North Korean negotiator and officials in the South. These talks produced the Joint Communique of July 4, 1972 which was issued simultaneously in both Seoul and Pyongyang. The communique basically proclaimed that unification was a Korean question to be settled peacefully by the entire Korean people. It proclaimed a defacto non-aggression pledge and announced the regular machinery for continued bilateral talks between the two Korean governments.<sup>14</sup> This communique contained seven items on which full agreement by both parties had been reached: (1) three principles for reunification (independence and non-interference by outside forces, peaceful means, and national unity transcending ideological and system differences); (2) disavowal of slander or any armed provocation against each other; (3) various exchanges in many fields (cultural, medical, and journalistic); (4) support for the Red Cross talks; (5) a direct telephone line between Seoul and Pyongyang; (6) establishment of a North-South Coordinating Committee co-chaired by Director Lee and Director Kim; and (7) a solemn pledge to carry out the agreement faithfully.<sup>15</sup>

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<sup>12</sup>The Korea Herald (January 12, 1972), p. 2.

<sup>13</sup>Astri Suhrke, p. 530.

<sup>14</sup>Rew Joung Yale, p. 51.

<sup>15</sup>Young C. Kim, Major Powers and Korea (Silver Springs, 1972), p. 124.

An assessment of the implementation of these seven principles shows that they have not been faithfully adhered to by either side. Item one concerning peaceful reunification is unrealistic since both sides have a vested interest in preserving the status quo. Theoretically, the question of reunification can be approached from two perspectives. The first approach emphasizes that Korea could be reunified if certain international conditions existed. The strategy suggested by this approach is to remove the international obstacles to reunification. As cold war tensions are reduced these obstacles dissolve. However, there is a certain minimum amount of security which China, the Soviet Union, and Japan will demand before a viable reunification strategy can be implemented. Traditionally, Korea has been the invasion route to these three countries. Control of the Korean Peninsula has led to control of Northeast Asia. It is difficult to visualize these three powers allowing Korea to reunify without some sort of major power agreement to neutralize the Korean Peninsula. The second approach focuses upon conditions that impede reunification within the divided nation. Internal obstacles seem to have constituted a greater impediment to reunification than the international obstacles. As the great powers increase their cross bloc contacts, they become increasingly interested in resolving situations which might lead to conflict. Therefore, it is possible that if the two Koreas were willing an agreement of some sort could be negotiated that would satisfy the great powers. However, differences between the two Koreas prevent this from happening. Each fragment has developed not only its own military capabilities but also sizeable leadership groups who now have a vested interest in maintaining partition. The longer the physical division has existed, the less

likely reunification has become, because the opposing domestic elites have become more firmly entrenched.<sup>16</sup> This assumption is supported by the breakdown of the implementation of other sections of the Communique. Those sections dealing with slander and increased contacts were the first to breakdown. The Red Cross talks have achieved nothing of substance, and the North-South Coordinating Committee has become a platform for hurling charges and counter-charges at each other.

The dialogue began to falter between the two Koreas in late 1972 and early 1973. In an effort to stimulate the dialogue again, Park declared in a nationally televised special statement that South Korea would be willing to accept membership simultaneously in the United Nations with North Korea. In this foreign policy statement Park also chastised the North for insisting that military and political problems be dealt with first before progress could be made in other areas.<sup>17</sup> Park charged that the Communists introduced these difficult issues into the agenda intentionally in order to hinder the smooth progress of the dialogue. Further, he charged that the North had launched a strong diplomatic offensive aimed at expanding recognition in an attempt to undermine the South's position in the international community. The South had continually proposed exchanges in economic, social and cultural fields as essential steps for the restoration of mutual trust with the North. Pyongyang continually rejected these proposals in favor of reductions in armed forces, suspension of importation of military equipment, withdrawal of United States forces and the conclusion of a peace

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<sup>16</sup>Yung-hwan Jo and Steven Walker, "Divided Nations and Reunification Strategies," Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 9 (1972), pp. 247-251.

<sup>17</sup>"President Park's June 23rd Special Statement," Korea Quarterly, Vol. 15 (Spring - Summer, 1973), pp. 60-63.

treaty. The North's insistence on solving these difficult questions relating to its national security, without first establishing some base for mutual trust has hindered the dialogue.<sup>18</sup> Looking at this situation in the context of occurring events each side feared that the other's proposal would weaken its own ideological, political, and military position at home.

By participating in the North-South talks, perhaps North Korea hoped to weaken the United States' justification for keeping troops in Korea. It also hoped to secure a new respectability and status as a peaceful member of the international community. On the assumption that world opinion was turning in its favor, the Kim Il Sung government shifted its attention to the United Nations. North Korea suspended all North-South talks in July 1973, renewed anti-South propaganda activities and attempted to obtain a United Nations resolution calling for the disbanding of the United Nations Command (UNC) in Korea. North Korea rejected Park's June 23rd plan, proposing instead the admission of one Korea under its formula of a Confederate Republic of Koryo. For a while it appeared that a major confrontation was unavoidable at the United Nations over the two proposals. However, under a plan negotiated in Peking between Henry Kissinger and Chou En-lai, a showdown vote was avoided. An accord was reached in the United Nations Political Committee on November 21 which called for continued dialogue between North and South Korea. By ignoring North Korea's demand for the disbandment of the United Nations Command, and in effect endorsing the military status quo on the peninsula, the accord represented essentially what South

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<sup>18</sup>"Prime Minister Kim's Press Conference," Korea Quarterly, Vol. 15 (Spring - Summer, 1973) p. 72.

Korea had wanted - non-involvement of the United Nations in the Korea issue for another year. The way in which the accord was reached dramatized the extreme dependence of both North and South Korea on the major powers. The United States and China seem to have dictated the accord as if no independent positions by the two Korean governments had ever existed.

Park's June 23rd statement also announced South Korea's new position on joint North-South Korean participation in international organizations. Seoul stated that it was willing to withdraw its objections to North Korean participation in international agencies if it was conducive to the easing of tensions and to the furtherance of international cooperation. Rather than charting new areas, Seoul was just confirming international realities.<sup>19</sup> Two months before Park's June statement, North Korea was voted in as a member of the Interparliamentary Union (IPU), an organization having consultative status with the United Nations Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) and the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO). Twenty days later Pyongyang won its greatest single diplomatic victory up to that time in becoming a member of the World Health Organization (WHO) by a substantial vote of 66-41 with 22 abstentions. Faced with these North Korean triumphs, Seoul realized that it was just a matter of time before North Korea would achieve observer status at the United Nations equal to that of South Korea's. Rather than waiting for that eventuality and the possible confrontation involved in losing face, Seoul decided to shift its foreign policy in order to prepare for North Korea's seating in the

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<sup>19</sup>Sungjoo Han, "South Korea: The Political Economy of Dependency," Asian Survey, Vol. 14 (1974), pp. 48-49.



United Nations with observer status. Seoul correctly interpreted international events because Pyongyang was granted observer status and arrived there in September 1973. Park's prior policy announcement avoided a confrontation in the United Nations and saved South Korea from losing face in the world organization.<sup>20</sup>

Soon after the delegation from Pyongyang arrived at the United Nations, it scored another diplomatic victory. The November 1973 debate on Korea, with both Koreas participating, produced a consensus statement urging both Koreas to continue their dialogue for a peaceful unification without reliance upon outside force and agreeing to UNCURK's abolition (United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea). This action benefited North Korea, who emerged as a widely accepted state in international affairs.<sup>21</sup> This United Nations Resolution was particularly satisfying to Pyongyang because it laid particular stress on the theme of national self-determination, emphasizing that Korean problems should be resolved by Koreans without any external interference. This thesis has been one of the dominant themes in North Korean foreign policy and the dissolution of UNCURK had been one of North Korea's long standing policy goals. After attempting to bring an end to UNCURK for twenty years outside of the United Nations, North Korea was successful in achieving its objective within twenty days of being granted observer status.<sup>22</sup>

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<sup>20</sup>Gregory Henderson, R. Lebow, and J. Stoessinger, editors, Divided Nations in a Divided World (New York, 1974), p. 85.

<sup>21</sup>Ibid., p. 87.

<sup>22</sup>Byung Chul Koh, The Foreign Policy of North Korea (New York, 1969), p. 118.

North Korea was not only making headway on the international level, it was also achieving a limited amount of success on the regional level. A statement made by South Korean Prime Minister Kim Jong Pil characterizes the type of advances that North Korea was making on the regional level. He told a press conference that: "we are cognizant of the fact that there exists a communist regime which exercises defacto control over the area north of the armistice line ...<sup>23</sup> This statement was truly indicative of South Korea's new foreign policy. It accepted the reality of North Korea's existence and attempted to structure new methods for dealing with it on both the regional and international levels. Park's June 23rd statement marked a transition from an essentially negative policy to a positive one toward North Korea. Until the 1970's the South Korean government followed a policy of containment against the North Korean government. By contrast, this new policy line follows the principles of possible contact and peaceful coexistence.<sup>24</sup> The United States responded favorably to South Korea's new policies. Secretary of State Rogers indicated that the United States government viewed the South Korean proposals as an effort to improve communications between the Koreas. Rogers went on to say that simultaneous admission of the Koreas to the United Nations would be a constructive step that the United States would support. Dual membership in the United Nations would realistically acknowledge the profound differences which exist between North and South Korea. These statements indicate that the United States was encouraging South Korea to continue its dialogue with

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<sup>23</sup>"Prime Minister Kim's Press Conference," Korea Quarterly, Vol. 15 (Spring-Summer, 1973), p. 72.

<sup>24</sup>"The Making of Detente," Far Eastern Economic Review, Vol. 81 (July - September 1973), p. 14.

the North. In fact the United States was prompting South Korea to bring its foreign policy more in line with international reality.<sup>25</sup>

Another major shift in the foreign policy of the Republic of Korea has been its movement to broaden the Asian and Pacific Council to embrace all the nations of Asia. South Korea hoped that this new expanded ASPAC would serve as a major forum for all Asian nations, democratic as well as communist, to discuss their common problems and diffuse their differences.<sup>26</sup> North Korea ignored South Korea's obvious invitation to join ASPAC. South Korea's concessions to the North have been forced by the highly successful North Korean diplomatic initiative, which had established North Korea as a widely accepted state in international affairs. North Korea has shown an eagerness to improve its image abroad. Even United States Secretary of State Rogers commented during his news conference on March 7, 1972 that North Korea seemed to be interested in improving relations with the United States and South Korea.

South Korea's reaction to the changes surrounding it was to tighten its internal security on the one hand, and to move toward an understanding with North Korea on the other. As Park tightened internal security, the Republic of Korea became increasingly authoritarian. This in turn diminished South Korea's international image in the West which perhaps is reflected in a number of western states establishing relations

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<sup>25</sup>"Press Conference, Secretary of State Rogers, July 18, 1973," Department of State Bulletin, Vol. 69 pt. 1 (July - September, 1973), p. 254.

<sup>26</sup>Kong Byung-kyu, "The vision of the Asian and Pacific Peace System in the 1970's," Korean Quarterly, Vol. 14 (Spring - Summer, 1972), p. 73.

with North Korea.<sup>27</sup>

By September 1973 a full year had passed since the North-South dialogue had been initiated. Three sessions of full dress talks in the politically oriented Coordinating Committee, and six sessions of Red Cross talks produced no tangible results beyond a change in atmosphere. Kim Il Sung expressed the belief that the North-South talks would not yield anything as long as Park Chung-hee remained at the helm in Seoul. Kim stressed the point that the North was not contemplating any takeover of the South and was prepared to respect the autonomy of South Korea, even if that entailed coexistence between two very different social and economic regimes. This would involve mutually non-hostile relations, with all the economic benefits that a balanced reduction of the enormous armed forces that each side supported would entail.<sup>28</sup> At this point (1975) the talks between the North and the South have become deadlocked. The South does not believe that a strong mutual base of trust has been established. Negotiations have dealt with areas vital to national security that the South has been unwilling to compromise. The South has been more interested in establishing social and economic exchanges before reducing military forces. This strategy has worked against the North whose economy could not compete against the South's. The North has needed reductions in military expenditures to enable it to strengthen its economy in order to compete with the South, this assumption was discussed in the previous chapter. The unwillingness of either

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<sup>27</sup>C. I. Kim, "Korea at the Crossroads," Pacific Affairs, Vol. 46 (1973), p. 226.

<sup>28</sup>"Interview with Kim Il Sung," Far Eastern Economic Review, Vol. 81 (July - September, 1973), p. 27.

side to compromise broke the chain of graduated reciprocation. Until each side feels confident enough to make major concessions to the other side the dialogue will continue to be stalemated.

The dialogue between North and South Korea can be traced back to forces which emerged in the late sixties, which had long been pent up by both sides. The desire to remove the threat of renewed warfare, the desire for economic development and worries concerning the behavior of major allies led Seoul and Pyongyang into direct negotiations. The large powers have tended to support these negotiations, and they have made attempts to urge both sides to continue the dialogue.<sup>29</sup>

Seoul has characterized the present talks as a confrontation with dialogue. As each side gains a better understanding of the other's capabilities and limitations through continued dialogue and intercourse, they may be able to resolve common problems and learn to accept each other. Both Koreas have been attempting to use the dialogue to solve external and internal problems. President Park has used the North-South negotiations as an excuse for establishing a new constitution. A vast repression of the entire apparatus of democracy has been justified by the need to have a firm base in the negotiations with Pyongyang. South Korea has seen how American policy-makers have left Taiwan and South Vietnam in weak positions. They point to these examples and maintain that the same could happen to them. This argument underlined the need for a flexible foreign policy and Park felt that a strong internal regime was a necessary precondition for this type of foreign policy. In essence, Park has been strengthening his position in South Korea at

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<sup>29</sup>W. C. Clemens, Jr., pp. 547-548.

the expense of democratic institutions; he maintains that this will better enable him to deal with the North.

Meanwhile, Premier Kim has hardly needed to strengthen his own power position in the North. However, he too has been using the dialogue for domestic purposes. His main objective has been to transfer resources from the military to the civilian economy. Some kind of resolution of the differences between the North and the South would permit him to reduce North Korea's high per capita expenditure on the military. It would also help him to open the doors to freer commercial flows with the capitalist world.<sup>30</sup>

Both North and South Korea have increased their cross-bloc contacts in an effort to widen their international image of legitimacy. They have both made it a matter of policy to join international organizations (the North has adopted this strategy only recently), in an effort to mobilize support for their policies by widening the arena of debate and criticism.<sup>31</sup>

The efforts of the two Koreas to expand international contacts and enter into bilateral negotiations with each other to solve differences seems to indicate that both Koreas are dissatisfied with their patron states and are alarmed that the great powers may sacrifice the entrenched Korean cold war interests. This client-patron strain explains the Korean efforts to negotiate and provides the basic ingredient of whatever success has been achieved. There seems to be a relationship between increased East-West talks and the North-South dialogue.

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<sup>30</sup>Ibid., p. 557.

<sup>31</sup>August Schou and Arne Brundtland, Small States in International Relations (New York, 1971), p. 48.

From 1970 to 1973 the international environment underwent drastic change; a restructuring of relations took place among the major powers that created uncertainty in their client states. Both North and South Korea were faced with a security problem. Pyongyang's peace initiatives were probably related to the fact that it was backed by two deeply feuding powers. While South Korea was unsure about a continued American commitment. Both Koreas seemed to view the dialogue as a means of compensating for apparent reduced security guarantees by modifying the security threat through accommodation. Pyongyang and Seoul felt that only through a relaxation of tension, and a more flexible foreign policy could arms expenditures be reduced. A reduction in the security threat would reduce the need for large arms expenditures, thereby lessening both North and South Korea dependence on their respective allies.

Events on the international level during 1974 and 1975 in the Middle East and Southeast Asia demonstrated that detente had not replaced the previous adversary relationship which had existed among the major powers. As tensions increased on the international level the Korean dialogue became stalemated. This seems to suggest that a relationship exists between the major powers detente and the productivity of the Korean talks. As the major powers reduce tension, their Korean client states feel insecure and seek accommodation. However, as tensions increase among the major powers their client states feel secure in their ideological positions and refuse to make the necessary concessions needed for the continuation of graduated reciprocation in tension reduction.

## CHAPTER V

### SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

The basic guidelines for this study were provided by the hypothesis introduced in the first chapter. In researching this paper it became necessary to divide the original hypothesis into two sections since the research did not fully substantiate the entire hypothesis. The first sub-hypothesis stated that a reduction of tension between extra-regional powers on the international level reduces tensions between their respective client states on a regional level. The research supported the general contention that actions of the extra-regional powers produced subsequent reactions at lower levels in the international environment. In the case of South Korea, Japanese and American actions on the dominate and subordinate system levels forced a reorientation of South Korean attitudes towards North Korea. Similar policy shifts by the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China resulted in the change of attitude that North Korea expressed to South Korea. Both Koreas saw an opportunity in the East-West thaw to attempt to resolve long standing differences, and structure new relations that would be beneficial to both.

North Korea viewed the thaw as an opportunity to negotiate arms reduction with South Korea. Such an action would enable North Korea to divert manpower and financial resources to other sections of the economy that had been ignored due to the North-South arms race. The thaw in



in East-West relations also provided North Korea with an opportunity to gain from increased contacts with advanced Western technology through expanded trade relations. Kim understood that these contacts would only come if he gave up his policy of Korean unification by force and became an accepted member of the international community.

South Korea also had specific policy objectives in mind when it engaged in bilateral talks with the North. Seoul was also concerned with the costs of maintaining its security, especially in the light of recent American actions in other parts of the world. South Korea realized that the military balance was tipped in its favor on the Korean peninsula only because American troops were present in South Korea. The thaw in relations on the international level and subsequent American troop reductions in Korea and Southeast Asia left policy-makers in Seoul with an increased feeling of insecurity. South Korea responded to this situation by attempting to reduce the North-South confrontation through political negotiation. The North-South negotiations can be considered the result of a convergence of interests between these two political systems. The leadership of both North and South Korea came to realize the inadequacies of their existing strategies for dealing with each other and also for dealing with the changing international situation. Neither North nor South Korea could say that their foreign policy toward the other had achieved its desired objectives.

The North Korean revolutionary strategy had encountered resistance in the South, a resistance which resulted from the antipathy of the South Koreans toward communism, and the strengthening of the South Korean-United States Defense Treaty entrenching American troops firmly in South Korea. The South Korean policy of containment was equally

bankrupt because it depended on continuous American assistance which was doubtful in the light of international events. Both Koreas viewed the thaw in relations on the international level as a face-saving device to abandon previous unsuccessful policies and initiate new policies more in keeping with the present international situation.<sup>1</sup>

The second part of the hypothesis stated that reduced tensions on the international and regional levels affords the client states an opportunity to divert their energies to furthering their national interests and prevents the extra-regional powers from determining that interest for them.

The research indicated that the client states attempted to readjust their foreign policies in response to the foreign policy changes of the extra-regional powers only in-so-far as that adjustment did not conflict with the continued existence of the policy. In the case of North and South Korea the structure of relations was such that a policy shift by the PRC, the Soviet Union, Japan or the United States created a sense of insecurity in Pyongyang or Seoul. In this sense extra-regional powers did influence regional policy decisions. However this influence did not extend to the point where foreign policy autonomy and security were sacrificed by the client states in order to conform with great power policy shifts.

As an atmosphere of detente created a thawing in cold war attitudes among the extra-regional powers, the regional powers began to respond by seeking cross-bloc contacts and a reduction in confrontation at the regional level in an attempt to enhance their own security. Both North

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<sup>1</sup>Young C. Kim, Major Powers and Korea (Silver Springs, 1973), pp. 160-161.

Korea and South Korea attempted to expand communication outside of their respective blocs. South Korea tried to increase both diplomatic and trade relations with non-hostile communist countries. North Korea expanded its contacts with western nations in an attempt to stimulate its economy with new western technology and decrease its reliance on the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China as the only source of new technology.

Increased North-South communication took place on a governmental level in an effort to reduce confrontation. South Korea was looking toward the future, in which it saw a decreased American role on the Korean peninsula. North Korea was attempting to cope with economic and security problems which already existed as the result of the Sino-Soviet rift and the thawing of attitudes on the international level. In the past, both Kim and Park had looked on as the great powers sought to resolve regional conflicts without showing any concern for the regional interests of the parties involved. The Indochina situation, the Arab-Israeli conflict, and the Indo-Pak conflict were all situations where one or the other major power decided that it was no longer in its national interest to support its client state. This non-support resulted in that client state having an unfavorable decision imposed upon it.

In retrospect, both North and South Korean policy-makers decided to change their structure of relations in an attempt to increase their political potential in the international environment. In conjunction with this strategy both Koreas decided that their prior policies of confrontation were detrimental to their national interests. An atmosphere of coexistence emerged that could later expand into acceptance of the idea that two Koreas can exist. As confrontation diminishes

between North and South Korea and as trade and diplomatic contacts are increased by both states, reliance on the extra-regional powers for total economic and military security will decrease. As cohesion in these two areas decrease, North and South Korea will become increasingly free from great power pressure to conform to bloc policies.

It is anticipated that if these trends continue a solution to the Korean problem similar to the German solution will be worked out by Seoul and Pyongyang. Such a solution would probably be acceptable to the extra-regional powers. The present breakdown in the dialogue is not a result of international pressure, rather it stems from the clash of two dictatorships. As soon as one or the other of the Koreas again perceives danger from the restructuring of the international environment, and as a result makes the necessary concessions, the dialogue will continue.

Both Koreas have had to increasingly fend for themselves, because the present international climate tends largely to favor perpetuation of the status quo. Each of the four powers directly interested in what is happening in the peninsula - the Soviet Union, China, Japan and the United States - theoretically backs one or the other of the two Korean regimes, but hopes even more ardently that its immediate rival doesn't benefit from a change in the present system.<sup>2</sup> A resolution of the Korean problem with both North and South Korea accepting each other as separate states will not alter the status quo, therefore, it would most likely be supported by the major powers.

The main stumbling bloc in this regard is the Korean nationalism of

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<sup>2</sup>The Manchester Guardian (September 28, 1974), p. 6.

both regimes. As both Koreas rule out political and military solutions to the reunification problem, they will become increasingly receptive to the reality of the continued existence of two Koreas in the international environment.

Certain aspects in the conduct of foreign policy are by necessity secret, so that the study of foreign policy interactions often presents problems to the investigator. The fact that all the variables influencing the formulation and implementation of foreign policy are not readily discernible makes it difficult to analyze the precipitant force in the restructuring of a state's relations with other political systems. This circumstance made it difficult for the investigator to accumulate more than cause and effect documentation in support of the hypothesis. As a result of the secrecy aspects of certain foreign policy decisions it is difficult to determine whether the actions of client states reflect independent policy initiatives on their part, or pressures which the extra-regional powers applied behind the scenes on their respective client states.

Furthermore, the single case study method also presents a problem in that it limits the universal applicability of a hypothesis. Generally a single case study confirms or nullifies a hypothesis only for a specific situation. This study confirmed the first sub-hypothesis, namely a reduction of tension between extra-regional powers on the international level reduces tensions between their respective client states on a regional level. However, for reasons already suggested, it did not substantiate the second sub-hypothesis, that is, reduced tensions on the international and regional levels affords the client states an opportunity to divert their energies to furthering their national interests and

prevents the extra-regional powers from determining that interest for them. Therefore, in order for the hypothesis to have broader applicability, it should be tested for several other similar situations. It should also be noted that the recent nature of events under discussion in this paper limited the availability of research materials.

In defense of this study, however, it can be said that the use of the single case study method facilitated the analysis of the problems in question. In this case study, the subordinate system focus performed at least two basic functions: first, a systems approach set limits on the foreign policy choices of all actors within it. It points to the fact that a state's foreign policy is the product of external as well as internal conditions. Second, this approach helps to clarify actions taken by a state on a level lower than the dominant system focus. The international system is composed of individual states who act and re-act; the dominant system focus distorts these actions and makes it difficult to determine how states on the subordinate level react to changes in the surrounding international environment.

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