

TWO REVERSALS IN PUBLIC OPINION TOWARD
THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY: THE ROLE OF
BRITISH NATIONAL DAILY NEWSPAPERS

By

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Background

Seventy-five years ago, James Bryce wrote that "to the great mass of mankind in all places, public questions come into the third and fourth rank among the interests of life, and obtain less than a third or a fourth of the leisure available for thinking."¹ This is probably still true, yet if government is to be democratic, it is frequently necessary--by definition--for government to discover and heed public opinion. Such an instance recently occurred in the United Kingdom's first referendum, held June 5, 1975. At issue was whether Britain's future would be spent with the European Community or whether she would "go it alone." The public's decision, expressed by a two to one majority, was for Great Britain to cast her lot with Europe.²

Bryce's observation pertained primarily to domestic public policy. If the public thinks little about domestic politics, it is even less

¹James Bryce, "The Nature of Public Opinion," Reader in Public Opinion and Communications, ed. Bernard Berelson and Morris Janowitz (2nd ed., New York, 1966), p. 16.

²But if the vote had been taken at a different time, the verdict might have been the opposite. Though the public opinion polls sometimes show wide margins against British membership in the Common Market, one cannot be certain that the phrasing of the referendum question could not have added a sufficient number of pro-Market votes to produce an affirmative vote. See Appendix A for variance between questions.

concerned with matters of foreign policy. Of American opinion formation, Campbell and Belknap wrote that many citizens simply adhere to their perception of their party's policy without attempting to fathom the rationale of foreign policy positions.³ Markel and Kriesberg were dismayed to find "Dark Areas of Ignorance" in foreign affairs knowledge possessed by democratic people.⁴ Almond is more sympathetic to the public:⁵

There are inherent limitations in modern society on the capacity of the public to understand the issues and grasp the significance of the most important problems of public policy. This is particularly the case with foreign policy where the issues are especially complex and remote.

Almond advised governments to heed the broader constraints of public opinion, but not to force the average voter to participate in foreign policy formulation.⁶ Nevertheless, "the democratic myth is that the people are inherently wise and just, and that they are the real rulers of the republic."⁷ And occasionally the "myth" becomes reality when, as in Britain this year, government must unify public support.

As might then be expected on a foreign policy issue, the British public has historically been ambivalent toward Common Market membership. In their broad examination of voter attitudes, Butler and Stokes classified the issue as one of "low potential," which is equivalent to

³Angus Campbell and George Belknap, "Political Party Identification and Attitudes Toward Foreign Policy," Public Opinion Quarterly, XV (1951), p. 623.

⁴Martin Kriesberg, "Dark Areas of Ignorance," Public Opinion and Foreign Policy, ed. Lester Markel et al. (New York, 1949), pp. 49-50. Also cf. Markel's comments on p. 9.

⁵Gabriel A. Almond, The American People and Foreign Policy (New York, 1950), p. 5.

⁶Ibid., pp. 5-6.

⁷Ibid., p. 4.

salience.⁸ Of all the issues included in their study, the proportion of the "don't know" responses on the Common Market membership was found to be higher than on any other issues.⁹ The low salience of this issue has given successive governments considerable latitude—and the salience has perhaps been manipulated on occasion. However, low salience is not normatively evaluated in this study. It is merely accepted as one of the characteristics of public opinion on the issue.

Two Turnarounds in Public Opinion

An eighteen year compilation of British attitudes toward the Common Market reveals two reversals: Between December, 1966 and the end of April, 1967 the majority of the public moved from support to opposition; between the same months of 1974 and 1975, the opposite movement took place.

In May, 1966, the 18 year peak in the ratio of affirmative to negative opinion on this issue was reached: Community membership was favored seven to one.¹⁰ At the end of 1966 the Wilson Government announced its intention to begin probing the prospects of Britain joining the Community. In December, cabinet ministers visited the European capitals. "Thereafter, as their visits to the Six progressed, there was . . . a steady fall in public support until in April, only 43 percent

⁸David Butler and Donald Stokes, Political Change in Britain: Forces Shaping Electoral Choice (New York, 1969), p. 356. The authors use the two terms interchangeably.

⁹Ibid.

¹⁰Definition of the figures is derived from Gallup Poll, Ltd., "British Attitudes Towards the Common Market," (Mimeographed data, June, 1975). The particular question is the same as the first used in Figure 1.

of the public were in favour against 67 percent in late November."¹¹ After deGaulle's second nix of British membership in mid-May, pro-Marketeer optimism further atrophied.

After deGaulle's retirement in April of 1969, speculation began to reappear on British prospects for entry into the European Community. In July, Pompidou expressed that France would not again block negotiations. But rather than positively responding to the radical growth of the chance that Britain could join, the British public seemed to be offended by the new conciliatory French approach. Negative responses gradually rose to around 60 percent while affirmative responses fell to about 20 percent. This aggregate response pattern held throughout the negotiations phase.

Under the Heath Government, Britain joined the EC (European Community) January 1, 1973. As price increases began to grow, so did resentment of membership terms. Subsequent to late 1973, the price increases resulting from membership were compounded by increasing worldwide inflation and the difficulties resulting from the Middle East oil embargo and price hikes. When Mr. Heath resigned as Prime Minister and was replaced by Mr. Wilson, the new Labour Government demanded renegotiation of membership terms. The demand was met by the Community member-states, and renegotiations commenced in April, 1974. As renegotiations approached completion in the early part of 1975, another turnaround appeared in public opinion on the issue. The shift was in the opposite direction of the turnaround exactly eight years earlier. By mid-April, 46 percent advocated continued membership while 36 percent

¹¹[Henry Durant,] "Public Opinion and the EEC," Journal of Common Market Studies, VI (1968), p. 234.

were still opposed.

Figure 1 is a graphic representation of the reversals on the issue. The British Institute of Public Opinion asked quota samples the following questions during the periods depicted:¹²

Oct 1966-Apr, 1967: If the British Government were to decide that Britain's interest would best be served by joining the European Common Market, would you approve or disapprove?

May, 1967: Do you approve or disapprove of the Government applying for membership of the European Common Market?

October, 1974-May 1975: Do you think that we were right or wrong to join the Common Market?

The Problem and its Plausible Causes



The preceding background discussion leads directly to the central question to be investigated: In such a situation where public opinion becomes critically important in foreign policy determination, what determines public opinion? In this specific case, the question is simply "Why did these two reversals go in opposite directions?" Theory offers three plausible explanations: that the public responds to changes in leadership views, to policy momentum, and/or to media influence.

Leadership and Party Influences

As noted above, Angus Campbell has said that many American voters gain their foreign policy attitudes "from a conscious or unconscious

¹²Gallup Poll, Ltd.: the non-probability sampling success of the organization is accepted in this study. For a fairly comprehensive debate on its merits, see R. L. Leonard, Elections in Britain (London, 1968), pp. 131, 137; H. J. Eysenck, "Are Opinion Polls Adequate?" Encounter (February, 1965), p. 54; and letters published in Encounter (1965): from Durant, March, pp. 93-94; Hyett, April, p. 90; Campbell, May, p. 92; Lipset, July, pp. 92-93; Leonard, August, pp. 92-95; and Eysenck, October, pp. 44-45.

Figure 1. Two Turnarounds in British Public Opinion Toward the European Community.



for  against  don't know 

adherence to a perceived party line, rather from influences independent of party identification."¹³ Studying the British public, Butler and Stokes found that the British similarly depend heavily on party stances for resolution of issue attitudes. An issue will never exercise "anything like its potential impact" unless the public can "differentiate the party positions."¹⁴

A cursory examination of the two turnarounds seems to indicate that the influence of the parties cannot account for much of the evidence, however. In both periods, the Conservative and Liberal Parties solidly supported Common Market membership while the Labour Party's stand was somewhat ambivalent. In 1967 and again in 1975, a Labour Government advocated membership toward the end of the turnaround. It would seem incongruous to suppose that such similarly structured influences could have caused both directions of opinion change.

Though in Britain, "attitudes towards the parties emerge as the stronger influence," attitudes toward individual nationally-known leaders are a distinct influence.¹⁵ Here again, one finds strikingly similar situations in 1967 and 1975, but a complete account would be unwieldy. The daily newspapers' handling of the leaders will be examined in Chapter IV. Although the data cannot lead to positive conclusions about the leadership influence, perhaps they will facilitate understanding of that factor.

¹³Campbell and Belknap, p. 623.

¹⁴Butler and Stokes, p. 350.

¹⁵Ibid., p. 384.

Policy Momentum

Professor Hennessy teaches that attitude objects may be placed on a continuum of "probability of agreement."¹⁶ From the least degree of agreement to the highest, are five attitude object classifications: Sacrilege coincides with the smallest probability of agreement, followed by private ideas, then proposals, then policies, and finally, tradition carries with it the highest probability of agreement. He explains why existing policy has an advantage (in public support) over proposals:¹⁷

Real or imagined advantages may be found in the policy, and as lives are adjusted to the demands and benefits of the policy, support for it increases. Or, at the very least, attention is reduced by the adoption of a better-the-known-evil perspective. At an even higher level of generalization, there is a presumption in favor of existing policy, a presumption compounded of the ease of the habit principle, the majesty of the law, and desire for social stability which can be achieved only when there is much agreement on many governmental policies.

This generalization can be readily applied to the turnarounds in this study. In January of 1967, not only was the Commonwealth established policy, but it was tradition. This clearly would give the Commonwealth relationship a higher "probability of agreement" rating than the proposal to join the EC. Since Community membership would tend to at least loosen Commonwealth ties, as the change in policy appeared to be nearing, the public apparently began to reconsider.

Conversely, by January of 1975, Britain had been in the European Community for two years: This correlated to Hennessy's "established policy." Again as the prospect of a policy change grew nearer, the

¹⁶Bernard C. Hennessy, Public Opinion (3rd ed., North Scituate, Ma., 1975), p. 325.

¹⁷Ibid., p. 327.

public began to reconsider.

Thus, the concept of policy momentum seems to provide at least a part of the answer to the question of turnaround causation. Indeed, it could possibly be the prime cause, but the concept presents empirical investigation difficulties that cannot be breached in this study. However, through investigating the remaining plausible influence, the policy momentum effect may at least approximate residual boundaries.

Media Influence

Because the media comprise the link through which all communications to the mass must pass, it preempts much of the credit for influence that should perhaps be attributed to the sway of political leaders. On the other hand, the great bulk of mass exposure of the leaders must, indeed, be carried through the media. Consequently, in America, the media as a whole are often referred to as "the fourth branch of government."¹⁸

The influence exerted by the media may be estimated by examining its output. Those who praise the media refer to that output as information; critics may type it as propaganda. But whether the output is information or propaganda is not critically important in assessing the direction of its influence—in either case, the same indicators apply.

Common usage of the term, media, implies both the electronic media and the press. But investigation will be limited, in this study, to the press. The electronic media are excluded for several reasons: First, tight regulation by the state tends to ameliorate any prejudicial impact that radio and television might convey in Britain. Second, the

¹⁸Raymond N. Habiby, lecture given at Oklahoma State University, Stillwater, Oklahoma, July 11, 1975.

radio has never been used for peacetime political purposes in the United Kingdom.¹⁹ Third, mundane impracticability derives from the inaccessibility of the British electronic media to an American researcher. Finally, Butler and Stokes found that the particular mode of information (or propaganda) transmission was irrelevant to its impact; media interdependence for data and topic duplication were so permeating that no difference was found in resulting opinion formation and changes.²⁰ Thus, the impact of the electronic media might be assumed to be similar to that of the press.

"The output of the press" generally connotes any written matter which is available to a mass readership. In Britain, there are over four thousand magazines available,²¹ but few of these have sufficient readership to exert a significant influence on national issues.²² They will be assumed to parallel the predominant influence in the press, as suggested by Butler and Stokes.²³ The same assumption must necessarily extend to most newspapers: About 140 daily and Sunday papers, and over 1200 weeklies are published in Britain.²⁴ This useful assumption permits the press to be operationally defined as the eight major national daily newspapers.

¹⁹Butler and Stokes, p. 227.

²⁰Ibid., pp. 227-228.

²¹Marjorie Wilkerson, News and Newspapers (London, 1970), p. 92.

²²John C. Merrill, Carter R. Bryan, and Marvin Alisky, The Foreign Press: A Survey of the World's Journalism (2nd ed., Baton Rouge, 1972), p. 59.

²³Butler and Stokes, pp. 227-228.

²⁴Wilkerson, p. 92.

The national papers are unusually important in the United Kingdom. Of all nations, Britain was until recently the one "whose proportion of newspaper readers is the highest in the world."²⁵ The geography of the nation "allows for a system of rapid distribution; a gigantic population close to London makes it possible for nearly everyone in the United Kingdom who wants to read a 'national' paper to do so."²⁶ The national daily newspaper will form the empirical base for the hypotheses.

Hypotheses

The role of the media in these two foreign policy opinion reversals will be assessed through the general hypothesis implicit in the preceding survey of plausible influences: Public opinion on foreign affairs is determined by the combined influences of leadership, policy momentum, and the media. In this study the first two potential sources of influence are largely controlled as in a field experiment: The "policy momentum" factor, though differing between the two periods, was held constant throughout each—with no change in the temporal proximity of the public opinion reversals. More tenuous is the control of "leadership and political party" influence: Though controlled at the national level, an assumption is required that the local leader influence would be either similar or negligible.

Limitations

This general hypothesis (even with the above assumption concerning

²⁵Butler and Stokes, p. 219. Cf. Merrill, Bryan, and Alisky, p. 59: By 1972, Britain was surpassed in readership by Norway and Sweden.

²⁶Berrill, Bryan, and Alisky, p. 59.

leadership and the earlier assumption of media interdependence) is not subject to "proof" for three reasons: First, this is a comparative study of two selected cases. No basis will exist for inference to the universe of media influence on foreign policy public opinion. Second, because the other two potential causes are "controlled," no data will be generated about their influence. Third, final causality cannot be proved. Lazarfeld's first two criteria for causality (time and correlation), as adapted by Babbie, may be met, but the third is unattainable: Beyond the "experimental controls," it cannot be demonstrated "that the observed empirical relationship cannot be 'explained away' as being due to the influence of some third variable" external to media content and public opinion change.²⁷ As indicated on page nine, delayed reaction to "policy momentum" could conceivably be responsible for the attitude changes. Nevertheless the general hypothesis may be tentatively accepted if the data are found to support it within these stated limits.

Specific Hypotheses

The general hypothesis will be empirically tested through four specific hypotheses: mere exposure, directional bias, content relevancy, and treatment of leaders. Each of these four will tap a different mode of media influence, and collectively, they might be viewed as a potential composite index of media bias.

Mere Exposure. Gallup polls probing for dimensional definition of the Common Market issue show that there is a high degree of correlation

²⁷Earl R. Babbie, The Practice of Social Research (Belmont, Ca., 1975), pp. 370-371.

between knowledge of the EC and support for British membership.²⁸ Butler and Stokes found that between 1964 and 1966, British public support for the Common Market increased with the rate of exposure to information on the issue.²⁹ These findings could be explained with the suggestion that the pro-Marketeer will want to read and retain more about the Community as a matter of preference—not that the amount of knowledge determines the preference. Yet psychological studies indicate that "mere repeated exposure to a stimulus is a sufficient condition for the enhancement of [the subject's] attitude toward it."³⁰ This phenomenon is the corollary of the avoidance reflex characteristically exhibited by animals (including man) toward the unfamiliar.³¹

Whatever directional bias may be found in attempts at persuasive communication, the "attitude object" must be mentioned repeatedly, whether the attempt is directed toward molding favorable or unfavorable opinion. "Making attitudes more favorable should, therefore, be easier than making them less favorable."³²

If this "mere exposure" phenomenon played a significant part in the turnarounds, the communication to be examined may be expected to differ in frequency of stimulus presentation: The 1967 papers would be found to contain less coverage of the issue than would those of 1975. Thus,

²⁸Gallup Poll, pp. 52-53.

²⁹Butler and Stokes, p. 226.

³⁰Robert B. Zajonc, "Attitudinal Effects of Mere Exposure," Readings in Attitude Change, ed. Samuel Himmelfarb and Alice H. Eagly (New York, 1974), p. 52.

³¹Ibid., p. 75.

³²Ibid., p. 80.

the first empirical hypothesis is posed:

H₁ Strength of support for Common Market membership is directly related to the quantity of national newspaper coverage of the issue.

If the data support this hypothesis, then the proposition that mere exposure causes increased support would be more plausible, but should not be considered proved. There are too many uncontrolled variables to derive an unqualified causal relationship in the present study.

Another limitation of the mere exposure effect is noted by Zajonc: When reward and punishment are associated with the stimulus, they take precedence over frequency of exposure consequences.³³ In political communication, reward and punishment take the form of directional statements about the effects of the stimulus (the European Community, in this case). Such directional statements are measured in the second hypothesis.

Manifest Bias. This mode of influence is what Lipmann and others have in mind when referring to "the power of the press." A directional bias from a trusted source may be directly transferred to the reader.

Lipmann explained that we retain from our childhood the need to

make our connections with the outer world through certain beloved and authoritative persons. They are the first bridge to the invisible world. And though we may gradually master for ourselves many phases of that larger environment, there always remains a vaster one that is unknown. To that we still relate ourselves through authorities. Where all the facts are out of sight a true report and a plausible error read alike, feel alike, sound alike. Except on a few subjects where our own knowledge is great, we cannot choose between trustworthy and untrustworthy reporters.³⁴

In Britain, the newspapers are, indeed, perceived by their readers as

³³Ibid., p. 75.

³⁴Walter Lippmann, Public Opinion (New York, 1965), pp. 142-143.

trustworthy sources.³⁵

As previously noted, in foreign affairs the public is especially dependent on the media for opinion formation. If directional bias in the media was significant in the turnarounds, the coverage found in the 1966-67 papers will be less favorable to the European Community than will be the 1974-75 coverage.

H₂ Growth of support for the Common Market is related to the pro-Market bias in 1974-75 newspaper coverage; diminution of support is related to the anti-Market bias in the 1966-67 coverage.

Directional bias can be effective, but particular circumstances determine the limits of its potential impact. Lazarsfeld and Merton found that monopolization is requisite to optimum effectiveness—only then can the media "exhibit the degree of social power commonly attributed to them."³⁶

Content Relevancy. Opinions often come more from association of ideas than by reasoned deliberation.³⁷ The most effective persuasive communication will therefore be very relevant to the attitudes of the recipient.³⁸ After each of the two turnarounds, the Gallup organization probed to find the attitudes of the public contributing to opinions on the Common Market issue. The attitudes exposed by Gallup will be used

³⁵Merrill, Bryan, and Alisky, p. 59.

³⁶Paul F. Lazarsfeld and Robert K. Merton, "Requisite Conditions for Propaganda Success," Voice of the People: Readings in Public Opinion and Propaganda, ed. Reo M. Christenson and Robert O. McWilliams (2nd ed., New York, 1967), pp. 340, 343.

³⁷Charles A. Siepmann, "Propaganda Techniques," Voice of the People: Readings in Public Opinion and Propaganda, ed. Reo M. Christenson and Robert O. McWilliams (2nd ed., New York, 1967), p. 335.

³⁸Ibid., p. 339.

to investigate this third hypothesis:

- H₃ The direction of opinion at the end of each period corresponds to the direction of relevant arguments relayed by the press during the turnaround.

There is an inescapable element of overlap here with the concept of manifest directional bias; i.e., the underlying attitudes used to test H₃ may have been implanted by media influence. The probable degree of tautology in H₃ will increase with the strength of support to be found for H₂. If the reader desires, he may simply view the content relevancy testing as a further dimension of the manifest bias test.

Treatment of Leaders. The leadership influence posited above is effective at the mass level only through the image which the media transmit to the public; the press can potentially modify the leadership influence.

Tannenbaum demonstrated that lowering the subject's evaluation of a source produced a corresponding change in attitude toward a concept associated with the source.³⁹ In this analysis, the "source" is the individual leader advocating a position on the issue; the "concept" is the Common Market. The following hypothesis will be tested:

- H₄ The drop in Common Market support in 1967 is related to more favorable press coverage given to anti-Market leaders; the growth in Community support in 1975 is related to more favorable coverage of pro-Market leaders.

Together, these four hypotheses provide a means of assessing the total role of the press in these two critical periods of British public opinion toward the European Community.

³⁹Percy H. Tannenbaum, "Mediated Generalization of Attitude Change via the Principle of Congruity," Readings in Attitude Change, ed. Samuel Himmelfarb and Alice H. Eagly (New York, 1974), pp. 210-217.

Methodology

The operational frame of the specific hypotheses consists of all issues of the eight national dailies from December 1, 1966 through April 30, 1967; and from December 1, 1974 through April 30, 1975. The following newspapers were invariably designated as the eight major daily British papers by Merrill, Bryan, and Alisky; by Wilkerson; by UNESCO; and by Butler and Stokes. They are, in order of circulation volume (highest to lowest):

Daily Mirror
Daily Express
Daily Mail
Daily Telegraph
Sun
Daily Sketch
Times
Guardian

The Daily Mail is unavailable for examination, and the Daily Sketch was discontinued in 1974. For these reasons, the sample frame will be limited to the remaining six dailies.

Data for the hypotheses analyses will be obtained from stratified random samples of each paper: The sample frame of 1536 issues will be stratified into months. Then a random number table will determine two dates within each month for each of the six dailies. This procedure will yield a total of 120 issues as a sample of the frame.

Hypothesis One, the mere exposure hypothesis, posits a correlation between the amount of coverage and the direction of turnaround. This relationship will be tested by comparing the number of lines devoted to the issue during the two periods. If the number of lines expended in 1974-1975 is 50 percent greater than in 1966-1967, the hypothesis will be considered to be supported.

The second hypothesis concerns the correlation between directional bias found in the press and the direction of turnaround. Articles in the sample will be coded as follows:

- +1 for each article favorable to the EC,
- 0 for each neutral article, and
- 1 for each article deleterious to the EC.

The hypothesis will be supported if the total weighted score for the earlier (negative) period is significantly less than that of the later (affirmative) period.

The testing for the next hypothesis, content relevancy, will rest on attitudes related to the issue. Structure of the coding will be determined by the Gallup findings of attitude factors (referred to in the hypothesis discussion above):

- +1 for an explicit argument favorable to the advocated position, and
- 1 for an explicit admission that a factor is prejudicial to the advocated position.

The next testing step is weighting: The components of each argument will be converted into percentages proportionate to the response frequency in the Gallup findings. The final step consists of combining the weighted factor codes and comparing the two arguments for each period. The hypothesis will be supported if the 1966-1967 anti-Market score is greater than that of the pro-Market, while the opposite case in the later period is expected.

The fourth hypothesis, treatment of leaders, will be tested as follows: All articles referring directly to leaders taking a definite stand on the issue will be scored:

- +1 for a positive comment on a pro-Marketeer,
- 1 for a negative comment on a pro-Marketeer,
- 1 for a positive comment on an anti-Marketeer, and
- +1 for a negative comment on an anti-Marketeer.

The results for each period will be determined by adding the total scores for each period. The hypothesis will be supported by a negative sum from the 1966-1967 sample and a positive sum from the 1974-1975 sample.

Level of Significance and Circulation Weighting

Acceptance of the last three hypotheses is contingent on one-tailed Chi² tests.

No statistical test can be conducted on the mere exposure hypothesis (H_1). As stated above, this hypothesis will be accepted if the number of lines in the second period exceeds that of the first by 50 percent. However, due to the arbitrary nature of this criterion, a conservative approach will be taken: Both unweighted and weighted data will be required to meet the 50 percent increase criterion.

Once the hypotheses are accepted or rejected (with the exception of H_1), the data will be weighted by relative circulation to more accurately reflect the dailies' probable impact on the British public. (See Appendix B.)

Structure of the Study

In order to assess the role of the national dailies in the changes of British public opinion toward the European Community, it is necessary to examine attitudinal trends on the membership issue. That is the subject of Chapter II. Chapter III will provide insight into the nature of the national dailies. In Chapter IV the hypotheses testing will provide objective insight into the role of the dailies in public opinion

toward the Common Market. Finally, Chapter V will assess that role and evaluate the methodology used in the investigation.

CHAPTER II

BRITISH PUBLIC OPINION TOWARD THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY

This chapter consists of a composite trend history of public opinion on the issue, a discussion of latency as a major characteristic, and an examination of the major attitudinal factors in British public opinion toward the Community.

Public Opinion Trends

The earliest public opinion poll data on the issue consists of isolated polls in 1957, 1959, and 1960. During this early period, the issue was insufficiently known even to qualify as an issue under Hennessy's definitional criteria.¹ Because of the British tendency to respond with a definite answer, public ambivalence is probably underestimated even by the high "don't know" (DK) response rates.²

¹Bernard C. Hennessy, Public Opinion (3rd ed., North Scituate, Ma., 1975), pp. 5-6, 8-9.

²See Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba, The Civic Culture (Princeton, 1963), pp. 96-98: "Almost all of the poorly informed Americans, British, and Germans gave some answer . . . [E]ven the cognitively incompetent feel free to express opinions." This point is graphically illustrated in the September, 1961 Gallup poll: While 52 percent expressed support for the proposition that Britain join the EEC, 51 percent did not know that she was not a member; and 70 percent did not know that Britain was a member of EFTA. Gallup Poll, Ltd., "British Attitudes to the EEC 1960-1963," Journal of Common Market Studies, V (1966), pp. 52-53.

The British citizens were adjusting to the relatively new situation of being dwarfed by the two superpowers while in the final stages of colonialism's termination. In such a milieu, large numbers of the respondents were willing to try a variety of alternatives to "going it alone."³ Yet toward the end of this initial period of extreme ambivalence, of four alternatives offered by the poll, only two percent chose the alternative of abandoning the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) plan for "membership of the European Common Market."⁴ This seems to indicate that the affirmative rates in the first polls imply far greater than was the actual positive support for EC membership.

After the Macmillan Government decided to apply for Community membership in late August, 1961, the issue began to receive more attention. Following the Conservative Government, Conservative supporters became increasingly in favor of membership. The loyal opposition's more skeptical view resulted in Labour voters beginning to respond negatively to the question. The negotiations were difficult for the Government, and public opinion on the issue throughout 1962 generally followed the vicissitudes of the bargaining. By the end of the year, ambivalence on the issue had receded to the extent that the numbers responding negatively were generally equivalent to the DK percentages.⁵ In spite of the difficulties encountered during negotiations, 62 percent of Gallup's re-

³[Henry Durant,] "Public Opinion and the EEC," Journal of Common Market Studies, VI (1968), pp. 238-239.

⁴Gallup Poll, ". . . 1960-1963," p. 56.

⁵As previously noted (page 22, footnote 2), the DK responses understate the aggregate attitudinal ambivalence. Nevertheless, the vertical trends of the DK responses in relation to the alternative answers may be assumed indicative of valid changes in public opinion.

spondents in the December poll thought there was a "good chance" that Britain would join the Community; only nine percent responded that her chances were poor.⁶

When in January, 1963 deGaulle announced that Britain would not be permitted to join the Common Market, the anti-Market position received an unexpected boost in public support. But the support apparently came from the DK group, for the pro-Marketeters maintained their strength through the succeeding two years—despite deGaulle's veto.

After the October, 1964 general election, the new Labour Government began to view the European Community with increasing favor—this probably accounts for the attenuation of negative responses and the accompanying growth of affirmative support.⁷ This trend was magnified by the general election of March, 1966, when all three major parties favored membership.⁸ In May, 1966, the 18 year peak in the ratio of affirmative to negative public opinion on this issue was reached: Community membership was favored seven to one.

At the end of 1966 the Wilson Government announced its intentions to begin probing the prospects of Britain joining the Community. In December, cabinet ministers visited the European capitals. "Thereafter, as their visits to the Six progressed, there was a considerable exposure of the issue both on television and in the press. This was accompanied by a steady fall in public support until in April [1967] only 43 percent of the public were in favour against 67 percent in late November."⁹




⁶Gallup Poll, ". . . 1960-1963," p. 51.

⁷[Durant,] p. 233.

⁸Ibid.

⁹Ibid., p. 234.




Figure 2. British Public Opinion Toward Common Market Membership:
September, 1967 Through May, 1965.



for ——— against ——— don't know ———

Sources: See Appendix A.




Figure 3. British Public Opinion Toward Common Market Membership:
June, 1965 Through December, 1970.



for against don't know

Sources: See Appendix A.

Figure 4. British Public Opinion Toward Common Market Membership:
January, 1971 Through June, 1975.



for against don't know

Sources: See Appendix A.

After deGaulle's second veto of British membership in mid-May, pro-Marketeer optimism further atrophied; and unlike four years earlier, the consequent rise of anti-Market sentiment was matched by a fall in pro-Market support. Even the pollsters lost interest in the issue. Only once during 1968 did the Gallup organization probe public opinion on the issue.

After deGaulle's retirement in April of 1969, speculation began to reappear on British prospects for entry into the European Community. In July, Pompidou expressed that France would not again block negotiations. But rather than positively responding to the radical growth of the chance that Britain could join, the British public seemed to be offended by the now conciliatory French approach. Negative responses gradually rose to around 60 percent while affirmative responses fell to about 20 percent. This aggregate response pattern held throughout the negotiations phase.

After the main points of British membership were settled in the negotiations in June, the Conservative Government advocated acceptance of the terms. The public initially responded favorably to the recommendation, but wavered as reports of expected food price increases became widespread. However, after the House of Commons, in a free vote, passed the European Communities Bill without amendment, public support again increased. Except for a brief interlude when the pro-Marketeers saw their former EFTA partners win a favorable trade agreement with the EC in the summer of 1972, the two sides were equally balanced until after the expanded Community came into being on January 1, 1973.

As price increases began to grow, so did resentment of the membership terms. Subsequent to late 1973, the price increases resulting from

membership were compounded by increasing worldwide inflation and the difficulties resulting from the Middle-East oil embargo and price hikes. When Mr. Heath was replaced by Mr. Wilson as Prime Minister, the new Labour Government demanded renegotiation of membership terms. The demand was met by the Community states, and renegotiations commenced in April, 1974.

By this time a schism had crystallized within the Labour Party over the issue. As an apparent attempt to reunite, the Labour Party Manifesto for the October general election included a pledge for a referendum on the question of continued EC membership. Though this compromise did not completely mend the division, it did succeed in preventing further deterioration of Labour unity. The party's mass supporters did not receive any clear indication of the party's stand, and public opinion on the issue exhibited no change. As the renegotiations approached completion in the early part of 1975, another turnaround appeared in public opinion on the issue. This time the shift was in the opposite direction of the turnaround exactly eight years earlier. By mid-April, 46 percent advocated continued membership while 36 percent were still opposed. After this time, public opinion on the issue did not change until the referendum, when the voters supported British membership in the European Community by a two to one margin.¹⁰

Latency and its Consequences

Of the fairly restricted number of issues that are brought

¹⁰It is unlikely that the referendum vote reflects a change in actual opinions held. The difference in question phrasing accounts for between 12 and 17 percent of the increased support, and distribution of the DK responses explains the remaining increase. See Appendix A.

before the public by political debate and the mass media we may conclude that only a few become matters that excite genuine and strong attitudes in significant parts of the electorate. . . . Most never achieve any significance at all.¹¹

For the majority of its history, the European Community issue was not even brought before the public. The characteristic disinterest for most foreign policy matters applied in the fullest degree. The toleration traditionally attributed to the British, observed by Mandeville 300 years ago, correlated with what Eagly and Telaak refer to as a "wide latitude of acceptance." This wide latitude of acceptance is amplified on a latent issue—and this leads to unpredictability.¹² The chameleon-like nature of this issue was demonstrated in a series of three surveys from 1963 to 1966: Of the eight issues examined, only Common Market entry exhibited a net negative correlation. It was less a part of party-related clusters than any of the other issues checked.¹³

<u>Issue</u>	<u>Correlation</u>	
	<u>Average</u>	<u>Cumulative</u>
Nationalization of industry	+0.25	+1.76
Retention of nuclear weapons	+0.08	+0.59
Common Market entry	-0.01	-0.06
Immigration restrictions	+0.09	+0.61
Capital punishment	+0.19	+1.32
Big business restrictions	+0.11	+0.76
Royal family status	+0.14	+1.00
Trade union power	+0.21	+1.46

Of all the issues, the proportion of the sample declaring themselves as "don't know" was consistently highest on Common Market membership.

¹¹David E. Butler and Donald Stokes, Political Change in Britain: Forces Shaping Electoral Choice (New York, 1969), p. 341.

¹²Alice H. Eagly and Kathleen Telaak, "Width of the Latitude of Acceptance as a Determinant of Attitude Change," Readings in Attitude Change, ed. Samuel Himmelfarb and Alice H. Eagly (New York, 1974), p. 459.

¹³Butler and Stokes, p. 199.

Allott characterizes the issue well: The Common Market, he says,

has earned a place in that notorious series of troublesome foreign policy issues which are interesting enough to engage the specialist, political enough to inspire strong feelings in those [few] who care, but esoteric enough to prevent their integration into the mainstream of domestic politics.¹⁴

Consequently, political behavior in relation to the issue "has been exceptionally reflexive, responding mechanically to short-term developments in Britain and Europe." Its isolation from the mainstream of politics left the question "under-explored." "This has, in turn, led to exaggerated shock at such implications as have become apparent—the implications of joining . . . and the implications of standing aside."¹⁵

The exaggerated shock effect, when it came, served to activate latency. Throughout 1966 the issue had received increasing attention from the British leadership. In the 1966 general election, Mr. Heath made Common Market membership a prime campaign issue; after defeating Mr. Heath, Prime Minister Wilson initiated his own probe of the prospects of joining the organization; and in December, even more interest was demonstrated as ministers visited the national capitols of the Six. Political leadership was interested in the Common Market, yet public opinion on the issue showed no appreciable change. But in early 1967, Allott's "exaggerated shock" materialized within the public's attitude: The British realized that the price for entry included an increase in food prices.

¹⁴Philip Allott, "Britain and Europe," Journal of Common Market Studies, XIII (1975), p. 203.

¹⁵Ibid., p. 204.

Major Attitudinal Factors

The 1966-1967 Turnaround

In his analysis of British objections to EC membership, Durant concluded that "fear of rising food prices" was "the main reason" for this turnaround in public opinion.¹⁶ Dr. Durant bases his conclusion on survey results showing that 65 percent of those interviewed in February, 1967, and 76 percent in April said that Common Market membership would cause food prices to rise. Yet as early as October, 1962, 58 percent had been aware of this price of membership. The percentage increase is significant, but other attitudinal factors need to be explored. A change of lesser magnitude (but of similar proportions) materialized in the public's perception of Britain's potential role in the organization:¹⁷

If Britain joined the Common Market, do you think she would become the leader, would she have to take a back seat to some other country, or do you see the Common Market as a group in which all countries are equal?

	<u>Sep</u> <u>1961</u>	<u>Apr</u> <u>1967</u>
Britain the leader	12	9
All equal	55	49
Britain take back seat	33	42
Don't know	16	14

While a wide majority (80 to 7) supported the idea of "pooling our resources to develop atomic energy for peaceful uses," the public was not amenable to trading nuclear weapons technology for EC entry.¹⁸

¹⁶[Durant,] p. 248.

¹⁷Gallup Poll, Ltd., "British Attitudes Towards the Common Market," (Mimeographed, June, 1975), question 68.

¹⁸[Durant,] p. 240.

France might agree to our entry into the Common Market if we, in exchange, would agree to sharing with her our nuclear weapons and "know-how." Would you approve of such an agreement or not? (November, 1966)

Approve	30
Disapprove	51
Don't know	19

During the early years of the Common Market the British were willing to accept a wide variety of alternatives to "going it alone." This latitude had steadily narrowed until the beginning of the first turnaround period. But during the turnaround, at least one alternative gained strength at Community expense:¹⁹

If Britain has to join in with other countries in order that she may hold her place in the world, would you rather see her join with America or with Europe?

	<u>Sep</u> <u>1961</u>	<u>Aug</u> <u>1966</u>	<u>Dec</u> <u>1966</u>	<u>Apr</u> <u>1967</u>
America	36	29	25	29
Europe	42	55	53	46
Don't know	22	26	22	25

The Gallup organization measured 12 attitudinal dimensions in February and again in May, 1967. Between the two surveys public support for British membership in the EC deteriorated within every dimension:²⁰

If Britain does join the European Common Market, which of these effects do you think it will have?

	<u>Feb</u> <u>1967</u>	<u>May</u> <u>1967</u>
Good effects:		
Give us a wider choice of goods in the shops	46	38
Raise our exports	42	39
Increase the efficiency of our industries	32	28
Make Britain's voice more powerful in international affairs	28	26

¹⁹Gallup Poll, (Mimeographed), question 65.

²⁰[Durant,] p. 235.

Raise our standard of living	22	19
Give a chance of going abroad for a job	20	20
Bad effects:		
Raise prices of food	65	76
Take away our political independence	20	22
Cause unemployment	17	21
The Commonwealth will collapse	14	22
Restrict the power of the trade unions in wage negotiations	13	18
Reduce the power of Parliament	10	18

The turnaround trend toward negative opinion on British membership continued past April 30, 1967; but that date is used for analysis period definition because the probable influence of deGaulle's May 16 press conference introduces a significant variable extraneous to the purpose of this study. Such a disproportionate unknown would result in unacceptable distortion in the outcome of the analysis.

Subsequent to deGaulle's second veto of the British efforts, the issue again lapsed into latency. Though the distribution of opinion remained unfavorable, the return of low salience allowed Prime Minister Heath's Government to (successfully) negotiate entry on the third British attempt. Once the Government and Parliament had approved entry, Community support temporarily grew to within competitive range of opposition; but after the Community of Nine came into being in January, 1973, the compound effects of worldwide inflation and Market support prices were probably responsible for returning opinion distribution to the pattern of 1968-1971.

The 1974-1975 Turnaround

Increasing inflation, industrial strikes, and worsening unemployment dominated the economic characteristics of the milieu during Britain's initial transition period into the European Community. For most Britons,

the Common Market was associated with these economic conditions.²¹

Of all the outputs of government, good times and bad must be among those most strongly valued by the mass of the people. The material and psychic deprivations of being out of work are vivid to those who experience them—as well as to many who only observe them in others. Similarly, the consequences of having a fatter pay packet or of being on short time or of having to contend with higher prices in the market are directly felt by those whose lives are touched. Changes of personal economic condition are overwhelmingly salient²² to the mass and evoke in them strong and definite attitudes.

After the Conservative Government's resignation, the Labour successors responded to the public's increased salience on the Common Market issue with a demand for renegotiation of membership terms. In the Labour manifesto for the October, 1974 general election was a pledge for a referendum on the issue. The campaigning for both the general election and for the referendum further increased the issue's salience.

As was the case with the first turnaround, the price of food was a dominant factor, but its influence was complicated by numerous other attitudinal dimensions. Data for the proximate pre-turnaround period are not available, but earlier data (October, 1972) showed that 92 percent of the respondents thought EC membership increased the price of food. For "other goods" the measure was 69 percent. A plurality of 44 percent thought the EC would cause taxes to rise.²³

On the positive side, pluralities felt that membership would be beneficial in two economic areas. Fifty-nine percent expected wages

²¹Roger Jewel and James Spence, The Grudging Europeans. A Study of British Attitudes Towards the EEC (London, 1975), p. 22.

²²Butler and Stokes, p. 390.

²³Gallup Poll (Mimeographed), question 117.

to increase; 38 percent anticipated an increase in available jobs.²⁴

Non-economic attitudes also were significant in this later turnaround: Most noteworthy were the more intense feelings associated with the Commonwealth and with national sovereignty. Whereas in 1967 only 14 to 22 percent expressed concern over the Commonwealth status, as late as March, 1975, 41 percent indicated that affection for the Commonwealth tended to reduce their support of the EC.²⁵ Many people felt that their nation was in danger of being absorbed by the Community, with a consequent loss of British sovereignty. Yet at the same time, they perceived a need for such an organization in a superpower-dominated world.

On the one hand, there is a strong feeling of identity among the public with the British ethos and with British institutions; on the other hand, there is a widespread recognition that Britain depends on other nations for her prosperity and (to a lesser extent) her survival. . . . Most people felt that being part of the Common Market would diminish Britain's capacity for self-determination, and reacted negatively to the prospect. But they also felt that, unless she was associated with a potential world power of the status of the EEC, Britain would have less influence in the world than she ought to have.²⁶

By the end of the turnaround most of the fears had been rationalized; Only six percent remained opposed to membership for reasons based on sovereignty.²⁷ A 39 percent plurality said that the Commonwealth relation-

²⁴Ibid.

²⁵Ibid., questions 54, 11 (h). The two questions differed, but the contrast still seems valid; in the earlier period the Commonwealth was not so highly valued by the public. Six reasons for this relative lack of affection were detailed by Roy Lewis, "Commonwealth as Britain's Dowry for Europe," The Times (London), February 11, 1967, p. 11.

²⁶Jewell and Spence, p. 33.

²⁷Gallup Poll (Mimeographed), question 3.

ship would be better with Britain in the EC.²⁸ And on the economic attitudinal factors, the overall balance of opinion favored continued membership.²⁹

I am going to read out a number of things and I would like you to tell me whether you think they would be better if we stay in the Common Market or better if we leave the Common Market.

	<u>Same</u>	<u>Better out</u>	<u>Better in</u>	<u>Don't know</u>
The price we pay for food?	21	34	32	12
The price we pay for other goods?	19	27	35	19
The level of wages?	19	18	42	21
The level of employment— that is, the number of jobs available?	17	24	41	18
The general standard of living?	17	26	43	14
The level of taxation?	25	22	23	30

After the referendum, the Gallup organization used an open-ended question to determine the attitudes that structures public opinion at the point of issue resolution, the referendum vote.³⁰

What were the main issues or reasons for you voting in the way you did?

	<u>%</u>
"Yes" voters:	
Britain cannot stand alone; unity	27
Britain's future	20
No point in leaving	17
Other economic reasons	13
More jobs	5
Prices	3
Party leaders were for it	3
Best alternative available	3
Better food supplies	2
Political (unity) reasons	2
Stabilize the situation	2

²⁸Ibid., question 2 (a).

²⁹Ibid., question 1.

³⁰Ibid., question 3.

Support against Communism	2
Other reasons	10
"No" voters:	
Prices	38
Independence	18
Britain better on her own	12
General economic reasons	10
More jobs	8
Trade	5
Anti-European	5
Other reasons	13

Summary

Though by 1975 the issue had an 18 year history, latency was its predominant characteristic for most of that time. During the two periods of the public opinion reversals—in the process of latency activation—several factors became increasingly important: The perceived or anticipated effect on food prices, variety of goods, balance of payments, unemployment, national sovereignty, and Commonwealth relationships were found to be the most salient aspects of British public opinion toward the Common Market.

CHAPTER III

THE BRITISH NATIONAL DAILIES

The Influence Potential of the Press

Typical of the statements quoted by Prins in her detailed psychological study of British attitudes toward the EC is "The press has long influenced the affairs in Britain to the point where entry into the EEC appears as the only hope to national salvation."¹ If the six national dailies samples are typical of the whole press, the statement may be somewhat true—though it is an exaggeration of the demonstrable evidence. Similarly adding to the partial truth, "Mr. Roy Hughes said that every mass circulation newspaper had been very much in favor of staying in the EEC and they had been using 'distortion and censorship' in pointing out the merits of staying in."²

Even if the press had been totally saturated with pro-Marketeer material, its influence would have been appreciably less than that posited by the disgruntled anti-Marketees. According to Lazarsfeld and Merton, monopolization is a requisite condition to optimum media influence—only then can the media "exhibit the degree of social power commonly attributed

¹Miriam Borop Prins, "British Attitudes to the European Economic Community," Commission of the European Communities Report X/B/5/165/74-E (Bristol, 1972), p. 65.

²"Why Labour Changed Its Mind," Times (London), 12 March 1975, p. 10.

to them."³ As will be seen in Chapter IV, monopolization by one side was characteristic of neither period.

That the EC membership issue was foreign policy might seem to be a limitation on the potential influence of Fleet Street (the self-designation of the British press), for "the volume of international news is a small proportion of total news space in most newspapers, and small in absolute terms as well. If little foreign affairs news is published, even less is read."⁴ However, when the issue was activated as a largely domestic issue, coverage (and presumably readership) increased. In such a situation the influence potential may well have been enhanced by the fact that the issue was one of foreign affairs: "Propaganda will be more effective . . . as it related to matters beyond people's immediate ken, though seemingly relevant to their main interests or convictions."⁵ As a problem of foreign policy, EC membership was clearly "beyond peoples' immediate ken," but each time the issue became activated, it likely seemed "relevant to their main interests or convictions" (e.g., the price of food, prospects for job security and advancement, and social services). The data in the following chapter should lend more confidence to an assertion about the nature of the role of the press in this issue, but first, the nature of the British press itself demands consideration.

³Paul F. Lazarfeld and Robert K. Merton, "Requisite Conditions for Propaganda Success," Voice of the People: Readings in Public Opinion and Propaganda, ed. Reo M. Christenson and Robert O. McWilliams (New York, 1967), pp. 339-340, 343.

⁴Bernard C. Cohen, "The Press, The Public and Foreign Policy," Reader in Public Opinion and Communications (2nd ed., New York, 1966), p. 134.

⁵Charles A. Siepmann, "Propaganda Techniques," Voice of the People: Readings in Public Opinion and Propaganda, ed. Reo M. Christenson and Robert O. McWilliams (New York, 1967), p. 339.

The Dailies

UNESCO in 1964, Manvell in 1966, and Merrill in 1970 all observed that large chains dominated Fleet Street.⁶ But during the first turnaround, of the major dailies, only the Daily Mail and Daily Sketch had common proprietorship or management.⁷ During the more recent turnaround—after the demise of the Sketch—none of the major national dailies were associated with one another.⁸

Discussions of Fleet Street typically classify the publications according to two criteria: political leaning and style. Though British papers are not formally affiliated with political parties (with the exceptions of the Communist Morning Star and Labour's Sunday Citizen), they are generally consistent in their respective political positions.⁹ As might be expected, private ownership lends a slight conservative political predominance to Fleet Street. Four of the eight major national dailies exhibit a definite Conservative bias: The Daily Telegraph, Daily Express, Daily Mail, and Daily Sketch (now out of publication); the Daily Mirror and the Sun are Labour supporters; the Guardian's position is between the Labour and Liberal Parties; and the Times is

⁶United Nations, UNESCO, World Press Newspapers and News Agencies (Amsterdam, 1964), p. 23; Roger Manvell, This Age of Communication (Glasgow, 1966), pp. 20-21; John C. Merrill, Carter R. Bryan, and Marvin Alisky, The Foreign Press: A Survey of the World's Journalism (2nd ed., Baton Rouge, 1972), p. 59.

⁷See "Daily Newspapers of Great Britain and Ireland—Personnel, Circulation, Advertising Rates, etc.," Editor and Publisher Yearbook—1968, ed. Albert E. Weis et al. (New York, 1968), p. 469.

⁸See "Daily Newspapers of Great Britain and Ireland: Newspapers, Circulation, Advertising Rates, etc.," Editor and Publisher International Yearbook—1975, ed. Albert E. Weis et al. (New York, 1975), p. 419.

⁹Merrill, Bryan and Alisky, p. 62.

"less committed" to any party.¹⁰ Though the less ambivalently classified papers have definite informal alignments, they are frequently critical of their professed party when it is in power.

When classified according to style, the Times, Guardian, and Daily Telegraph are typed as "quality" papers; the remaining national dailies are designated "mass-appeal," or "popular" papers.¹¹ A natural presumption would perhaps hold that the more educated higher classes would read the quality papers while the working classes would patronize the popular press. But Manvell, though admitting that this is generally the case, feels that the class correlation is spurious: "The difference lies solely in the attitude of the reader to his newspaper, not in his class, social background, or level of education."¹² The reader of a quality paper does not "merely read"—he studies and reflects on what he has read. "The popular papers, on the other hand, are mainly glance-read for fun and for the more casual collection of passing information."¹³

¹⁰David E. Butler and Donald Stokes, Political Change in Britain: Forces Shaping Electoral Choice (New York, 1969), pp. 230-231.

¹¹Allan Delafons, "1967 Difficult Year for Britain's Press," Editor and Publisher International Yearbook—1968, ed. Albert E. Weis et al. (New York, 1968), p. 466; Merrill, Bryan and Alisky, pp. 61-62; Manvell, pp. 20-21.

¹²Manvell, p. 21

¹³Ibid., pp. 20-21.

TABLE I
 STYLE AND PARTISANSHIP OF
 BRITISH NATIONAL DAILIES

<u>Daily</u>	<u>Partisanship</u>			
	<u>Conservative</u>	<u>Liberal</u>	<u>Labour</u>	<u>Non-Comitted</u>
<u>Quality Papers</u>				
The Times				x
The Daily Telegraph	x			
The Guardian		----- x -----		
<u>Popular Papers</u>				
The Daily Express	x			
The Daily Mail	x			
The Daily Sketch	x			
The Daily Mirror			x	
The Sun			x	

The Quality Papers

Of these papers, "the Times is the soberest and the Daily Telegraph is the liveliest."¹⁴ Though probably the best-known newspaper in the world, the Times encountered fiscal troubles in the early 1960's. Two steps were taken to increase circulation (and thus, advertising revenue):

¹⁴Merrill, Bryan, and Alisky, p. 61.

In 1965 the traditionally staid front-page format was replaced by head-lined news, and in 1966 the Sunday Times and daily Times were merged. These steps were apparently effective: Circulation immediately increased by over 30 percent, and continued to increase over the next six years.¹⁵ The Daily Telegraph has by far the largest circulation of the quality papers.¹⁶ Its most noticeable characteristic is an extensive (two to six page) business and stock market section usually beginning on page two.

The Guardian (formerly Manchester Guardian) has exhibited the most consistent growth of all the major national dailies over the past few years.¹⁷ Its growth may be explained through its uniquely reflective support of moderately leftist policies and by the addition of a remote printing facility for the London edition.

The Popular Papers

Because the reader of this study is assumed to be less familiar with London's "popular press," a brief description of format is deemed appropriate.

The three popular dailies included in the sample share generally the same arrangement of material: The front-page headlines of the Sun and the Daily Mirror are bold and sensational, usually proclaiming either scandal, tragedy, or crime. (Only rarely does pure politics receive such prominent coverage.) The Daily Express usually presents

¹⁵Computed from circulation figures given in Editor and Publisher Yearbook editions 1963 through 1974.

¹⁶Ibid.

¹⁷Ibid.

a politically relevant front-page story; but typically, a crime headline competes for the readers' attention. And in all three of the popular papers surveyed, attention is further diluted by front-page pictures highlighting non-political feature stories contained inside the issue. The interior pages, in which rather sketchy political news is presented, are dominated by human-interest and glamour stories. The 1975-1975 samples of the Sun boldly appeal to the prurient interests with a daily picture of a nude or near-nude girl on page 3; occasionally, page 7 presents a similarly clad "Daily Male." The remainder of the shared format consists of radio and television programming, classified advertisements, and a large sports section.

Though these papers "provide daily . . . diets of scandal, gossip, and sex-interest to their millions of readers," they do dispense political news—and they gain the opportunity to influence public opinion on political issues, including the one central to the present study.¹⁸ The amount of this influence will be directly affected by several factors, one of which is the extent of circulation.

Three of the popular papers have experienced a gradual decline since 1967. The Daily Mirror maintains the largest circulation of any of the British dailies. Even after a decrease of over 800,000 during the seven years separating the two turnarounds, the Mirror sold over four million copies per day during 1974. The Daily Express and the Daily Mail experienced similar drops, but averaged respectively 3.2 and 1.7 million copies in 1975. (See Table II.)

More extreme circulation changes, in opposite directions, were ex-

¹⁸Merrill, Bryan, and Alisky, p. 61.

hibited by the remaining two major national dailies. The Daily Sketch's circulation was almost one million copies in 1967; in 1974 that paper ceased operations. A similar fate was forecast for the Sun: In late July, 1969, the Sun was "expected to set, never to rise again."¹⁹ Metaphorically extended, however, the clouds dissipated and the Sun shines more brightly than ever. Circulation was tripled. By 1974, 3.5 million copies per day were publishes.

TABLE II
AVERAGE DAILY CIRCULATIONS

<u>Daily</u>	<u>1967</u>	<u>1974</u>
<u>Quality Papers</u>		
Daily Telegraph	1,411,925	1,406,699
Times	334,142	339,594
Guardian	288,000	358,895
<u>Popular Papers</u>		
Daily Mirror	5,077,548	4,228,746
Daily Express	3,963,189	3,163,053
Daily Mail	2,190,548	1,738,332
Sun	1,160,686	3,446,795
Daily Sketch	870,906	0

Source: "Daily Newspapers of Great Britain and Ireland—Personnel, Circulations, Rates," Editor and Publisher International Yearbook—1968, ed. Albert E. Weis et al. (New York, 1968), p. 469; "Daily Newspapers of Great Britain and Ireland: Newspapers, Personnel, Circulation, Advertising Rates, etc.," Editor and Publisher International Yearbook—1975, ed. Albert E. Weis et al. (New York, 1975), p. 419.

¹⁹Ibid., p. 67.

CHAPTER IV

THE APPARENT RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN PUBLIC OPINION TOWARD THE EC AND BRITISH NATIONAL DAILIES

While Chapter II was a discussion of British public opinion toward the European Community and Chapter III acquainted the reader with the British national dailies, this chapter provides a structured investigation of the relationships between the two. The general hypothesis (that public opinion on foreign affairs is determined by the combined influences of leadership, policy momentum, and the media) will be indirectly approached through four specific hypotheses: mere exposure, directional bias, content relevancy, and treatment of leaders.

Mere Exposure

H₁ Strength of support for Common Market membership is directly related to the quantity of national daily newspaper coverage of the issue.

Operationalization

"Strength of support for Common Market membership" is indicated by the Gallup findings at the end of each turnaround period.¹ By May, 1967, a majority of those responding were against Common Market membership; by May of 1975, a similar majority favored British membership.

¹See Figures 2-4, pp. 26-30; also see Appendix A.

The "quantity of national daily newspaper coverage of the issue" will be measured by the weighted number of lines on the EC or on British membership in the organization.²

Testing

As shown in Table III, the data indicate that the readership of the British national dailies was exposed to considerably more material during the turnaround toward favorable opinion toward Common Market membership. Thus, the strength of support for membership and the quantity of coverage are both lower in the earlier period than in the later period; however, the increase is probably insufficient for conclusive support of the hypothesis of mere exposure. The majority of the increase was found in the least circulated papers. Consequently, the weighted factor increase was less than the 50 percent increase specified for hypothesis acceptance. The potential for influence through mere exposure was viable, but only the "quality paper" portions of the sample demonstrated any noticeable increase in the amount of coverage in the latter period. Perhaps the limited amount of space devoted to politics in the formats of the "popular papers" places a physical barrier that would severely limit this mode of influence on any public issue.

²Weighting computations based on proportionate circulation are presented in Appendix B.

TABLE III
PRESS EXPOSURE OF THE COMMON MARKET

<u>Paper</u>	<u>1966-1967 Turnaround</u>			<u>1974-1975 Turnaround</u>		
	<u>No. Lines</u>	<u>Weight</u>	<u>Factor</u>	<u>No. Lines</u>	<u>Weight</u>	<u>Factor</u>
<u>Quality Papers</u>						
Daily Telegraph	2115	.115	243.3	2764	.108	298.5
Times	1500	.027	40.5	4522	.026	117.6
Guardian	591	.024	14.2	2118	.028	59.3
<u>Popular Papers</u>						
Daily Mirror	332	.415	137.8	351	.330	115.8
Daily Express	814	.324	263.7	1003	.243	243.7
Sun	497	.095	47.2	386	.265	102.3
<u>Total</u>	5849		746.7	11144		998.0

Manifest Bias

H₂ Growth of support for the Common Market is related to the pro-Market bias in 1975 newspaper coverage; diminution of support is related to the anti-Market bias in the 1967 coverage.

Operationalization

Direction of bias in manifest content was assessed for each article in the sample, using five of Doob's seven bias criteria:³

³Leonard W. Doob, Public Opinion and Propaganda (2nd ed., Hamden, Conn., 1966), p. 433.

1. On what page and in which position does the story appear?
2. What is the size of the headline and what impression does it give?
3. What impression does the lead—the first sentence or paragraph—give?
4. What statements are presented as though they were uncontested facts?
5. From what phrases, if any, is it possible to deduce the bias . . . of the reporter or editor?

The two excluded criteria would have duplicated aspects examined in another of the hypotheses.

The preponderance of manifest bias was found through application of the second, third, and fifth criteria; only the Daily Express demonstrated the fourth criterion; and no use of the first technique was noted in the sample. The articles were coded as follows:

+1 for each article favorable to the EC,
0 for each neutral article, and
-1 for each article deleterious to the EC.

Testing

The unweighted data were arranged in a two by three table for the Chi square test. The pro-Market bias exhibited during the more recent turnaround was shown to be significantly greater ($df = 2, N = 184, p < .001$). As shown in Table IV, the summated score for each newspaper was weighted by relative circulation, and the total weighted scores were compared for each turnaround. Gamma was computed and found to be +.57, which indicates an increase of 57 percent in the pro-Market bias in the later period.

TABLE IV
MANIFEST BIAS IN THE PRESS

Paper	1966-1967 Turnaround						1974-1975 Turnaround					
	(+) <u>Pro</u>	(0) <u>Neutral</u>	(-) <u>Anti</u>	<u>Sum</u>	<u>Wt.</u>	<u>Factor</u>	(+) <u>Pro</u>	(0) <u>Neutral</u>	(-) <u>Anti</u>	<u>Sum</u>	<u>Wt.</u>	<u>Factor</u>
<u>Quality Papers</u>												
Daily Telegraph	8	10	3	+5	.115	+0.575	11	14	4	+7	.108	+0.756
Times	2	10	4	-2	.027	-0.054	12	18	3	+9	.026	+0.234
Guardian	2	5	2	0	.024	0	8	14	3	+5	.028	+0.140
<u>Popular Papers</u>												
Daily Mirror	2	3	1	+1	.415	+0.415	1	5	0	+1	.330	+0.330
Daily Express	0	3	7	-7	.324	-2.268	11	3	1	+10	.243	+2.430
Sun	6	1	0	+6	.095	+0.570	6	1	0	+6	.265	+1.590
Total	20	32	17			-0.762	49	55	11			+5.480

Content Relevancy

- H₃ The direction of opinion at the end of each period corresponds to the direction of relevant arguments relayed by the press during the turnaround; i.e., of the arguments relayed by the press, the anti-Market rationale will be found more predominant in 1966-67; the pro-Market rationale will be found more predominant in 1974-75.

Operationalization

Relevant arguments are those which correspond to the attitudes found in the Gallup probes at the end of each turnaround. All articles explicitly relaying a relevant argument factor were included, whether editorial or news report.

Testing

Four separate arguments are formed by the Gallup response groups. These constitute the pro and anti-Market arguments for each period scored in this hypothesis. Each press relay of an argument factor was coded:

- +1 for support of the factor's contention, and
- 1 for argument against the factor's contention.

There were, of course, varying degrees of assertion intensity and credibility encountered in the articles; but to better preserve the intersubjectivity of the coding process, simply nominal classifications were used.

Table V shows the relevancy contributions found in the sample. The two by two Chi square test indicates that the move toward pro-Market bias in the second turnaround was statistically significant (df = 1, N = 103, p < .001).

For each factor, the sum of each paper's code score was first

weighted by circulation. Next, the sum of these initially weighted scores was weighted by relevancy degree. The relevancy degree weights were derived from the percentages of respondents designating each factor as a main determinant in their directional opinion on the issue. Gallup permitted multiple and DK ("don't know") responses, but for comparisons, conversion was made to 100 percent:⁴

<u>1966-1967:</u>	<u>Gallup</u> <u>Percentage</u>	<u>Converted</u> <u>Percentage</u>
Membership Support Factors		
Raise our exports	39	23
Wider choice of goods in shops	38	22
Increase efficiency of industries	28	17
Make Britain's voice more powerful in international affairs	26	15
Chance to go abroad for a job	20	12
Raise our standard of living	19	11
	<u>170</u>	<u>100</u>
Membership Opposition Factors		
Raise prices of food	76	43
Take away our political independence	22	12½
The Commonwealth will collapse	22	12½
Cause unemployment	21	12
Restrict power of trade unions in wage negotiations	18	10
Reduce power of Parliament	18	10
	<u>177</u>	<u>100</u>

1974-1975:

Membership Support Factors

Britain cannot stand alone; [international] unity	27	28
Britain's future	20	20
No point in leaving	17	17
Other [general] economic reasons	13	13
More jobs	5	5

⁴The question stems used by Gallup may be found in Chapter II. The 1967 and 1975 questions are quite different, but they do elicit similar information: Expressed are the attitude-set components that contributed to (or resulted from rationalization of) pro or anti-Market opinions on the membership issue.

Prices	3	3
Party leaders were for it	3	3
Best alternative available	3	3
Better food supplies	2	2
[Domestic] political (unity) reasons	2	2
Stabilize the situation	2	2
Support against Communism	2	2
	<u>99</u>	<u>100</u>
Membership Opposition Factors		
Prices	38	40
Independence, sovereignty	18	19
Britain better on her own	12	18
General economic reasons	10	10
More jobs	8	8
Trade	5	5
Anti-European	5	5
	<u>96</u>	<u>100</u>

The data presented in Table V support the hypothesis for both periods: During the 1966-1967 turnaround, which culminated in public opposition to Common Market membership, the papers sampled relayed more relevant arguments prejudicial to than supportive of the organization; during the later turnaround, the samples showed more favorable than deleterious arguments. Yule's Q as computed from the weighted data is .92. This means that 92 percent of the difference in bias may be statistically attributable to the hypothesized bias change between the two time periods.

TABLE V
CONTENT RELEVANCY

Paper	1966-67 Argument Factors				1974-75 Argument Factors			
	Pro-Market ₁		Anti-Market ₁		Pro-Market ₁		Anti-Market ₁	
	No.	Score	No.	Score	No.	Score	No.	Score
Daily Telegraph	1	2.645	5	14.203	7	10.368	4	5.724
Times	2	0.932	0	0	21	5.226	7	3.926
Guardian	2	0.852	2	0.600	11	4.900	11	4.900

TABLE V (CONTINUED)

Paper	1966-67 Argument Factors				1974-75 Argument Factors			
	Pro-Market ¹		Anti-Market ¹		Pro-Market ¹		Anti-Market ¹	
	No.	Score	No.	Score	No.	Score	No.	Score
Daily Mirror	0	0	0	0	2	10.560	0	0
Daily Express	1	3.340	9	62.792	9	33.777	2	7.100
Sun	0	0	1	1.187	5	10.865	1	10.600
	<u>6</u>	<u>7.769</u>	<u>17</u>	<u>78.782</u>	<u>55</u>	<u>75.695</u>	<u>25</u>	<u>32.250</u>

¹Weighted by circulation and converted Gallup percentages. See text.

Treatment of Leaders

H₄ The drop in Common Market support in 1966-67 is related to more favorable press coverage given to anti-Market leaders; the growth in Community support in 1974-75 is related to more favorable coverage of pro-Market leaders.

Operationalization

Those well-known leaders who professed a definite, unqualified position on the issue are considered as the anti-Marketeer and pro-Marketeer leaders in the context of this hypothesis. For 1966-1967, the designated pro-Marketeers are Heath, Thorpe, Callaghan, and Brown; the anti-Marketeer leaders are Perkins, Powell, Jay, Peart, Crossman, and Shinwell. For the 1974-1975 period, the designated pro-Marketeers are R. Jenkins, S. Williams, Thatcher, Thorpe, Whitelaw, and Short; the anti-Marketeers are Benn, Powell, Shore, and Foot.

The "press coverage given to" the leaders includes all the press communications included in the papers, whether related to the Common

market issue or not. This broad field of evidence is demanded by Tannenbaum's "Mediated Generalization" theory on which the hypothesis is based.⁵ However, a caveat is necessary: Only when the leader's name appeared in an article title, or when the subject was the EC, or in an editorial was the comment coded.

Testing

All comments referring directly to the leaders were scored:

- +1 for a positive comment on a pro-Marketeer,
- 1 for a negative comment on a pro-Marketeer,
- 1 for a positive comment on an anti-Marketeer, and
- +1 for a negative comment on an anti-Marketeer.

The two by two Chi square test showed that the shift to pro-Market support in this dimension was statistically significant. The hypothesis is supported ($df = 1, N = 55, p < .001$). Each paper's scores were weighted for circulation. Yule's Q showed 96 percent of the dimensional difference to be explained by the hypothesis.

⁵Percy H. Tannenbaum, "Mediated Generalization of Attitude Change via the Principle of Congruity," Readings in Attitude Change, ed. Samuel Himmelfarb and Alice H. Eagly (New York, 1974), pp. 210-217.

TABLE VI
TREATMENT OF LEADERS BY NATIONAL DAILIES

<u>Paper</u>	<u>1966-1967</u>						<u>1974-1975</u>							
	<u>+P</u>	<u>-P</u>	<u>+A</u>	<u>-A</u>	<u>Score</u>	<u>Weight</u>	<u>Product</u>	<u>+P</u>	<u>-P</u>	<u>+A</u>	<u>-A</u>	<u>Score</u>	<u>Weight</u>	<u>Product</u>
Daily Telegraph	0	1	0	1	0	.115	0	2	0	1	8	+9	.108	+0.972
Times	1	0	0	0	+1	.027	+0.027	2	2	0	1	+1	.026	+0.026
Guardian	1	0	0	1	+2	.024	+0.048	2	1	1	4	+4	.028	+0.112
Daily Mirror	0	0	0	0	0	.415	0	3	2	0	3	+4	.330	+1.320
Daily Express	0	5	1	0	-6	.324	-1.944	1	0	0	4	+5	.243	+1.215
Sun	0	0	0	1	+1	.095	+0.095	1	0	0	5	+6	.265	+1.590
Total	2	6	1	3			-1.774	11	5	2	25			+5.235

Legend: +P = positive comments on pro-Marketeers
 -P = negative comments on pro-Marketeers
 +A = positive comments on anti-Marketeers
 -A = negative comments on anti-Marketeers

CHAPTER V

CONCLUSION

Press Bias

The measures of bias showed the British national dailies to be divided in the earlier turnaround period. However, the widely read "popular papers" (particularly the Daily Express) were generally indicated to be more anti-Market while the "quality press" was largely pro-Market. Consequently, the press bias for the 1966-1967 turnaround weighs in the anti-Market direction. In the later period, the evidence is overwhelmingly that the papers were strongly supportive of British membership. Table VII shows that though the measures are more often in agreement than not, they are not interchangeable.

More precise examination of the compatibility of measures is derived through application of "Kendall's Coefficient of Concordance: W." This test of multiple rankings was applied to the papers of each period to determine both the significance of and degree of correlation between measures.

The rankings from which the coefficient was computed are detailed in Table VIII. Each paper is ranked for each period. A rank of one indicates the most pro-Market paper and a rank of twelve indicates the most anti-Market one.

Kendall's test was applied in two ways: First, all four hypotheses' rankings were included. The findings were statistically significant at

the .05 level. Next, the unaccepted hypothesis, H_1 (mere exposure) was excluded. This raised the level of significance to .02.

As is shown in the "average rank" column, six of the seven most pro-Market papers were from the period of turnaround toward favorable public opinion, while the opposite is the case with the remaining papers. In comparing the two turnaround periods, one finds the later period to have more press exposure of the EC (though not at the specified levels), more positive manifest bias, more relevant pro-Market rationale, and more favorable treatment accorded to pro-Market leaders. The data thus demonstrate the posited correlation between newspaper bias and public opinion toward British membership in the European Community.

TABLE VII
NOMINAL BIAS DISTRIBUTION

Paper	1966-1967			1974-1975		
	H_2	H_3	H_4	H_2	H_3	H_4
Daily Telegraph	Pro	Anti	Neutral	Pro	Pro	Pro
Times	Anti	Pro	Pro	Pro	Pro	Pro
Guardian	Neutral	Neutral	Pro	Pro	Neutral	Pro
Daily Mirror	Pro	Neutral	Neutral	Pro	Pro	Pro
Daily Express	Anti	Anti	Anti	Pro	Pro	Pro
Sun	Pro	Anti	Pro	Pro	Pro	Pro

TABLE VIII
CORRELATION OF MEASURES

<u>Paper</u>	<u>Issues</u>	H ₁	H ₂	H ₃	H ₄	<u>Average Rank</u>
Daily Telegraph	1966-67	3	6.5	11	10.5	7.5
	1974-75	2	3	3	1	2.3
Times	1966-67	4	11	4	8	6.8
	1974-75	1	2	2	8	3.3
Guardian	1966-67	8	10	6	6	7.5
	1974-75	6	6.5	8.5	4.5	6.3
Daily Mirror	1966-67	12	8.5	8.5	10.5	9.9
	1974-75	11	8.5	5	4.5	7.3
Daily Express	1966-67	7	12	12	12	10.8
	1974-75	5	1	3	3	2.5
Sun	1966-67	9	4.5	8	8	7.9
	1974-75	10	4.5	2	2	5.9

The Effect of the Bias

In testing the specific hypotheses, only correlations were sought. Yet that does not satisfy the three conditions of causality.¹ Beyond covariation, a causal inference requires that the proposed explanation must not be illogical. The "power of the press" has been widely debated: T. S. Matthews, a former editor of Time, has said that "there is no tangible evidence" of the press's power to mold public opinion; "It's

¹Earl R. Babbie, The Practice of Social Research (Belmont, Ca., 1975), pp. 370-371.

vaunted might is a gigantic spoof."² Yet the opposite viewpoint is often convincingly set forth.³ That press bias may change public opinion is not illogical. The first prerequisite for a causal relationship is met.

The second requirement for causality is that of temporality; i.e., the posited cause must precede the effect. The first halves of each paper's samples for each turnaround period were published prior to the public opinion changes. If these portions support the directional hypotheses, then the time relationship is established. As shown in Table IX, such is the case. The second prerequisite of causality is met.

"The third requirement is that the observed empirical relationship cannot be 'explained away' as being due to the influence of some third variable that causes both of them."⁴ This criterion cannot be fully satisfied in the present study. Recall that the general hypothesis posits that public opinion on foreign affairs is determined by the combined influences of leadership, policy momentum, and media bias. Further elaboration of this hypothesis in the context of this particular issue, British membership in the Community, will serve to determine the limits that the third causality criterion places on the findings of this study.

There are 25 possible combinations of contributing, sufficient, and intervening causes under the hypothesis; but logical refinement of

²Quoted in Reo M. Christenson and Robert O. McWilliams, eds., Voice of the People: Readings in Public Opinion and Propaganda, 2nd ed. (New York, 1967), p. 116.

³Walter Lippmann, Public Opinion, Free Press Paperback ed., (New York, 1965), pp. 139 ff.; Charles A. Siepmann, "Propaganda Techniques," Voice of the People: Readings in Public Opinion and Propaganda, ed. Reo M. Christenson and Robert O. McWilliams (New York, 1967), pp. 332-333.

⁴Babbie, p. 370.

"policy momentum" will reduce the number of possible combinations to 16: The concept of policy momentum refers exclusively to the strength acquired by a given policy over time. Media and leadership variables can influence (and conceivably even make) policy, but they cannot cause policy momentum. Thus, policy momentum cannot serve as an intervening variable.

TABLE IX
EARLY PORTIONS OF THE SAMPLE

		<u>Anti</u>	<u>Neutral</u>	<u>Pro</u>	
H ₂	1966-67	5	20	8	X ² = 11.55, p < .01
	1974-75	2	29	21	
H ₃	1966-67	6		2	X ² = 18.86, p < .001
	1974-75	3		17	
H ₄	1966-67	3		1	X ² = 12.33, p < .001
	1974-75	1		20	

Fourteen of the remaining sixteen sequential combinations of influences can be discounted in the present study for two reasons: First, the policy momentum influence was opposite to the direction of public opinion for ten of the eighteen years covered by the trend history in Chapter II. In this case, policy momentum cannot be considered a suf-

ficient cause. Secondly, the leadership factor has been shown constant; it cannot be a cause.

The two remaining plausible sequences are:

- (1) media bias → opinion change
- (2) media bias → opinion change
policy momentum →

The data produced in this study cannot further narrow the causal plausibilities, but the preceding elaboration of the general hypothesis indicates that media bias must have contributed significantly—as either a sufficient, an intervening, or a partial cause—to the two changes in British public opinion toward the European Community.

Limitations

Note that the preceding analysis did not constitute a test of the general hypothesis. Because of the credibility of the sources from which it was compiled—and its consequent face validity—it was accepted as a reasonable basis from which to work in defining the role of the media in the turnarounds. The correlations found in Chapter IV and the elaboration above infer support for the general hypothesis, but only in one of its three independent variables. And that support rests on the assumption of media interdependence. This assumption furnishes the sole available method to (1) assess the media influence as a whole, and (2) to infer any degree of causality to the British national dailies in the context of this study.

The general hypothesis itself rests on the assumption that though objective external events may influence public opinion on foreign affairs as on other issues, such events are sufficiently remote from the public

consciousness that they can only stimulate opinion changes through the hypothesized variables. Nevertheless, it is conceivable that catastrophic events could directly affect public opinion.

Finally, though three of the specific correlational hypotheses were supported at a high level of confidence, in the larger context, this study must be viewed as no more than a comparative analysis of two isolated instances. From such a perspective, two cases would be sufficient neither to accept nor to reject the general hypothesis.

Suggested Future Study

The rather extensive limitations on acceptance of the general hypothesis emphatically indicate the need for further research in this area. Simultaneous observation of the three posited independent variables (policy momentum, leadership, and media) should be correlated to the dependent variable (foreign affairs public opinion) to study their relative effects.

Such a study would be feasible with an issue opinion trend history similar to that compiled in the present study. Types of changes in the independent variables could then be observed in one period of the trend history, noting the response of public opinion to varying combinations of influence. Categories of change and relative weighting might be induced from the initial observation period. The categories and weights could then be tested through postdiction in the remainder of the trend history. This procedure would provide a valuable test of the general hypothesis; and if several such tests were to be conducted on foreign affairs issues of varying natures and in different cultures, the general hypothesis could be developed into a valuable tool in understanding and predicting changes in public opinion on questions of foreign affairs.

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APPENDIX A

SINGLE CURVE SOURCES

APPENDIX A

SINGLE CURVE SOURCES

Since public discussion of British membership in the Common Market began, there has been a staggering number of opinion surveys on the issue. Widely varied questions—each of which elicits a slightly different response—have been used to probe the issue. The absence of a single instrument's history over the 18 year period complicates the task of recounting the overall trend on the issue.

Only two isolated questions prior to 1960 are deemed pertinent to a summary of views on British membership in the Common Market. However, a set of five questions was found to span the entire period subsequent to July, 1960. While these questions do measure different shades of opinion, the composite series is accepted as adequately representative of the overall vicissitudes of the issue. The composition of the curve is detailed below.¹

Isolated Questions

Taking everything into account, do you think that Britain should or should not join the European Common Market scheme?

	<u>Should</u>	<u>Should not</u>	<u>Don't know</u>
September, 1957	38	20	42

¹Except as otherwise noted, source is Gallup Poll, Ltd., "British Attitudes Towards the Common Market" (unpublished data, June, 1975).

Six countries on the Continent are joining together for the purposes of trade. Do you think it would be a good idea or a bad idea for Britain to try to join the Common Market?

	<u>Good idea</u>	<u>Bad idea</u>	<u>Don't know</u>
March, 1959	54	12	34

Recurring Questions

If the British Government were to decide that Britain's interest would best be served by joining the European Common Market, would you approve or disapprove?

	<u>Approve</u>	<u>Disapprove</u>	<u>Don't know</u>
July, 1960	49	13	38
June, 1961	46	20	34
June, 1961	44	20	36
July, 1961	38	22	40
July, 1961	36	22	44
July, 1961	38	23	39
July, 1961	40	24	36
August, 1961	44	22	34
August, 1961	48	20	32
August, 1961	46	20	34
August, 1961	45	20	35
August, 1961	49	19	32
September, 1961	52	18	30
September, 1961	51	18	31
October, 1961	48	18	34
October, 1961	48	18	34
November, 1961	52	19	29
December, 1961	53	19	28
January/February, 1962	47	22	31
March, 1962	49	23	28
April, 1962	47	27	26
May, 1962	47	21	32
June, 1962	37	31	32
June, 1962	36	30	34
July, 1962	42	25	33
August, 1962	39	29	32
August, 1962	40	34	26
September, 1962	44	32	24
September, 1962	46	30	24
October, 1962	44	27	29
October, 1962	41	26	33
October, 1962	49	27	24
October, 1962	58	22	20
November, 1962	45	27	28
November, 1962	42	31	27
November, 1962	50	23	27

December, 1962	48	26	26
December, 1962	37	29	34
January, 1963	41	30	29

The preceding question was again used after February, 1965, but until that time, the following question was asked:

If an opportunity occurs for Britain to join the Common Market, would you like to see us try or drop the idea altogether?

	<u>Try to join</u>	<u>Drop the idea</u>	<u>Don't know</u>
February/March, 1963	42	37	21
June, 1963	46	25	29
July, 1963	46	29	25
September, 1963	46	36	18
November, 1963	49	32	19
December, 1963	42	34	24
January, 1964	40	36	24
February, 1964	42	33	25
July, 1964	41	37	22
November, 1964	44	28	28
January, 1965	48	30	22

If the British Government were to decide that Britain's interest would best be served by joining the European Common Market, would you approve or disapprove?

	<u>Approve</u>	<u>Disapprove</u>	<u>Don't know</u>
February, 1965	59	19	22
March, 1965	65	14	21
April, 1965	51	25	24
May, 1965	60	19	21
May/June, 1965	55	21	24
June, 1965	56	20	24
July, 1965	56	22	22
August, 1965	47	18	35
September, 1965	55	15	30
October, 1965	54	18	28
November, 1965	60	17	23
December, 1965	66	15	19
January, 1966	60	15	25
February, 1966	59	18	23
March, 1966	68	14	18
May, 1966	70	10	20
June, 1966	61	16	23
July, 1966	71	12	17
August, 1966	70	12	18
September, 1966	67	13	20
October, 1966	68	14	18
November, 1966	65	14	21
November, 1966	67	17	16

December, 1966	66	16	18
January, 1967	65	18	17
February, 1967	61	20	19
March, 1967	57	27	16
April, 1967	43	30	27

Do you approve or disapprove of the Government applying for membership of the European Common Market?

	<u>Approve</u>	<u>Disapprove</u>	<u>Don't know</u>
May, 1967	36	41	23
May, 1967	36	41	23
June, 1967	40	39	21
June, 1967	40	45	15
September, 1967	40	41	19
October, 1967	46	34	20
November, 1967	37	44	19
November, 1967	44	37	19
December, 1967	43	40	17
June, 1968	36	43	21

In the following year, a previously used question was again used before returning to the above question:

If an opportunity occurs for Britain to join the Common Market, would you like to see us try or drop the idea altogether?

	<u>Try to join</u>	<u>Drop the idea</u>	<u>Don't know</u>
May, 1969	41	44	15
June, 1969	34	45	21
September, 1969	26	57	16

Do you approve or disapprove of the Government applying for membership of the European Common Market?

	<u>Approve</u>	<u>Disapprove</u>	<u>Don't know</u>
November, 1969	36	45	19
February, 1970	22	57	21
April, 1970	19	59	22
July, 1970	24	55	21
July, 1970	22	57	20
September, 1970	21	56	23
October, 1970	22	56	22
November, 1970	16	66	18
January, 1971	22	58	20
March, 1971	19	60	22
April, 1971	22	60	19
May, 1971	23	59	18
May, 1971	20	57	22
June, 1971	27	58	15

June, 1971	21	58	21
June, 1971	24	60	16

On the facts as you know them, are you for or against Britain joining the Common Market?²

	<u>For</u>	<u>Against</u>	<u>Don't know</u>
July, 1971	25	57	18
July, 1971	33	49	17
July, 1971	33	46	20
July, 1971	35	44	20
August, 1971	39	43	17
September, 1971	35	47	18
September, 1971	31	52	17
October, 1971	32	51	17
November, 1971	38	45	17
November, 1971	44	41	16
December, 1971	38	47	15
January, 1972	42	41	17
February, 1972	42	41	17
March/April, 1972	43	43	14
April/May, 1972	41	45	14
June/July, 1972	36	51	13
August, 1972	40	42	18
September, 1972	40	46	14
October, 1972	35	44	20
October, 1972	39	41	20
November/December, 1972	39	45	16

The final source used in the single curve is simply,

Do you think that we were right or wrong to join the Common Market?

	<u>Right</u>	<u>Wrong</u>	<u>Don't know</u>
January, 1973	38	36	26
March/April, 1973	40	42	19
April/May, 1973	36	45	19
June, 1973	39	44	17
August, 1973	32	52	16
September, 1973	35	49	17
October, 1973	34	49	17
November, 1973	34	48	18
February, 1974	28	58	14
March/April, 1974	36	51	14
April, 1974	33	51	17

² Responses for July through October, 1971, and for February, 1972 are from Dov S. Zakheim, "Britain and the EEC—Opinion Poll Data 1970-72," Journal of Common Market Studies, XI (1973), p. 192.

May, 1974	32	53	15
July, 1974	37	50	13
August, 1974	31	53	16
October, 1974	34	46	20
January, 1975	31	50	19
February/March, 1975	39	45	16
March, 1975	37	42	21
March, 1975	44	38	18
April, 1975	43	38	18
April, 1975	46	36	18
April, 1975	42	38	19
April, 1975	42	38	20
April/May, 1975	42	42	16
May, 1975	45	37	18
May, 1975	46	39	15
May, 1975	44	40	16
May/June, 1975	44	36	20

The Referendum Question

After the referendum question phrasing was decided, the following question was asked in addition to the one above. The difference in the wording of the query apparently elicited a stronger pro-Marketeer response: The figures given in parentheses indicate the amount of increase.

If the question in the referendum were "Do you think that the United Kingdom should stay in the European Community (the Common Market?"—how would you vote?

	<u>Yes, stay in</u>	<u>No, leave</u>	<u>Don't know</u>
April, 1975	57(+15)	28(-10)	15(-4)
April, 1975	58(+16)	30(-8)	12(-8)
April/May, 1975	57(+15)	33(-9)	10(-6)
May, 1975	60(+15)	29(-8)	11(-7)
May, 1975	61(+15)	29(-10)	10(-5)
May, 1975	59(+15)	31(-9)	10(-6)
May/June, 1975	61(+17)	29(-7)	10(-10)

Since the referendum did not allow "don't know" as a response, the "yes" and "no" responses alone should be considered to evaluate the accuracy of the Gallup data. Excluding the DKs, 67.8 percent in the last poll (three days prior to the referendum) indicated an affirmative response. The actual pro-Market vote was 67.2 percent.

APPENDIX B

CIRCULATION WEIGHTING

APPENDIX B

CIRCULATION WEIGHTING

Because the purpose of this study is (as is implied in the title) to assess the impact of the national daily newspapers on the British public in the context of the Common Market issue, the relative numbers of readers for each paper must necessarily be considered in each phase. However, no objective figures on readerships were found. The second-best consideration selected was relative circulation.

The Editor and Publisher Company annually furnishes average daily circulation figures of the world's major newspapers. Though some of the circulation figures are certified counts, others are estimates. Still, no better figures were found. For the source of the December, 1966 through April, 1967 circulation weights, the figures for 1967 were used (1968 edition); for the December, 1974 through April, 1975 weights, it was necessary to use 1974 figures (1975 edition) because the 1975 figures will not be available until February, 1976.

The circulation weighting used in testing all four hypotheses may be examined in Table X.

TABLE X
CIRCULATION WEIGHTING, 1967 AND 1974

Paper	1967		1974	
	Circulation	Weight	Circulation	Weight
Daily Mirror	5,077,548	.415	4,288,746	.330
Daily Express	3,963,189	.324	3,163,053	.243
Daily Telegraph	1,411,925	.115	1,406,699	.108
Sun	1,160,686	.095	3,446,795	.265
Times	334,142	.027	339,594	.026
Guardian	288,000	.024	358,895	.028
Totals	12,235,490	1.000	13,003,782	1.000

Source: 1967—"Daily Newspapers of Great Britain and Ireland—Personnel, Circulations, Rates," Editor and Publisher International Yearbook—1968 (New York, 1968), p. 468; 1974—"Daily Newspapers of Great Britain and Ireland—Personnel, Circulations, Advertising Rates, etc.," Editor and Publisher International Yearbook—1975 (New York, 1975), p. 420.

APPENDIX C

SAMPLING PROCEDURES

APPENDIX C

SAMPLING PROCEDURES

In 1966 and 1967, at the time of the first public opinion turnaround on Common Market membership, there were eight major British National dailies. Before the second turnaround, in 1974 and 1975, the Daily Sketch was discontinued, leaving only seven national dailies. And because the Daily Mail was unavailable for examination, only six of the remaining seven papers were included in the sampling frame.

Because the British daily papers do not publish issues for Sundays, New Year's Day, nor on Christmas Day, the sampling frame consisted of 774 issues from December, 1966 through April, 1967; and of 762 issues from December, 1974 through April, 1975. The frames differ in number because in the earlier period, Christmas and New Year's Day fell on Sunday. The total sample frame consisted of 1536 issues.

The sample frame was stratified into months. Levine and Elzey's table of random numbers determined two dates within each month for each of the six dailies.¹ From October, 1975 through February, 1976, the samples were sought. Most were obtained through the interlibrary loan system. However, 1975 issues for the Guardian and the Daily Express will not be available until December, 1976. The publishers of those papers were contacted in an effort to obtain the samples, but they

¹Samuel Levine and Freeman F. Elzey, A Programmed Introduction to Research (Belmont, Ca., 1968), p. 83.

could not furnish the copies. On March 2, 1976, the remaining 16 issues were found to be available in electrostatic copies through Zerox University Microfilms (Ann Arbor, Michigan), but only at a cost of \$10 per issue. Because this expense was not felt to be reasonable, the unavailable 1975 samples were re-drawn from December, 1974, using random numbers from Babbie.² Selection results are shown in Figure 5, and the sample is detailed in Table XI.

				31				
				22				
			28	21				
			27	20				
			26	16				
			23	13		30		
		25	15	6	8	12		
	29	24	9	2	4	11		
19	5	18	7	1	3	10	14	17
0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8

Selection Frequency

Figure 5. Results of Random Date Selection.

²Earl R. Babbie, The Practice of Social Research (Belmont, Ca., 1975), pp. 472-475.

TABLE XI
THE SAMPLE

Month	<u>Daily Mirror</u> Day ID		<u>Daily Express</u> Day ID		<u>Daily Telegraph</u> Day ID		<u>Sun</u> Day ID		<u>Times</u> Day ID		<u>Guardian</u> Day ID	
1966 Dec	06	01	17	21	06	41	30	61	02	81	28	101
	12	02	31	22	10	42	31	62	30	82	17	102
1967 Jan	05	03	23	23	12	43	14	63	03	83	10	103
	23	04	31	24	27	44	16	64	11	84	30	104
1967 Feb	11	05	04	25	24	45	16	65	14	85	06	105
	14	06	09	26	11	46	22	66	21	86	08	106
1967 Mar	07	07	02	27	02	47	08	67	01	87	03	107
	31	08	24	28	29	48	20	68	07	88	15	108
1967 Apr	07	09	26	29	03	49	13	69	18	89	04	109
	25	10	27	30	26	50	20	70	10	90	17	110
1974 Dec	10	11	04	31	12	51	20	71	04	91	11	111
	11	12	09	32	30	52	27	72	28	92	23	112
1975 Jan	03	13	08*	33	18	53	14	73	16	93	21*	113
	10	14	30*	34	11	54	20	74	17	94	28*	114
1975 Feb	13	15	12*	35	12	55	22	75	01	95	04*	115
	14	16	17*	36	14	56	25	76	14	96	21*	116
1975 Mar	10	17	01*	37	12	57	01	77	09	97	06*	117
	26	18	22*	38	22	58	13	78	30	98	08*	118
1975 Apr	15	19	02*	39	15	59	03	79	13	99	08*	119
	16	20	21*	40	17	60	15	80	17	100	17*	120

*These 1975 issues of the Daily Express and the Guardian will be unavailable until late 1976. The following random dates from December, 1974 were substituted: Daily Express: 2, 6, 7, 10, 24, 28, 30, 31; for the Guardian: 2, 6, 7, 10, 12, 14, 16, 21.

VITA

Gerald Austin Martin

Candidate for the Degree of
Master of Arts

Thesis: TWO REVERSALS IN PUBLIC OPINION TOWARD THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY:
THE ROLE OF BRITISH NATIONAL DAILY NEWSPAPERS

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