PLURALISTIC ATTITUDES IN TODAY'S ARMY

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PREFACE

This study is concerned with the measurement of attitudinal differences between combat and support soldiers of the Army in the areas of discipline, service incentives and ethos of service, for the purpose of determining if the differences are of sufficient magnitude to justify a reorganization of the Army.

I wish to thank my primary thesis adviser, Dr. Richard Teague, and my other committee members, Dr. Edgar Webster and Dr. Jack Bynum for their invaluable assistance throughout the process of this project.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Chapter		Page
I.	INTRODUCTION	1
	The Research Problem and Nature of the Study	1
	Objectives	2
II.	REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE	4
III.	CONCEPTUALIZATION	8
	Ethos	12
	Service Incentives	14
	Discipline	15
IV.	METHODOLOGY	18
	Sample and Sampling Procedure	18
	Method of Data Collection and Analysis	19
	Measurement of Variables	26
	Method of Analysis	30
V.	DATA ANALYSIS	33
	Combat Ethos	33
	Support Ethos	38
	Service Incentives	45
	Authoritarianism	53
VI.	LIMITATIONS AND DISCUSSION	59
	Limitations	59
	Discussion	60
VII.	FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS	67
	Findings	67
	Conclusions	70
	Recommendations	70
BIBLIOGRAPHY		72
APPENDIX		75

LIST OF TABLES

Table		Page
I.	Composition of the Research Sample	20
II.	Item Analysis of the Authoritarianism Scale	22
III.	Item Analysis of the Combat Ethos Scale	24
IV.	Item Analysis of the Support Ethos Scale	25
V.	Relationship Between Type of Unit and Preference for Combat Ethic	33
VI.	Relationship Between Type of Unit and Preference for Combat Ethic, Holding Constant on Rank	34
VII.	Relationship Between Type of Unit and Preference for Combat Ethic, Holding Marital Status of Respondents Constant	35
VIII.	Relationship Between Type of Unit and Preference for Combat Ethic, Holding Length of Time in Service Constant	36
IX.	Relationship Between Type of Unit and Preference for Combat Ethic, Holding Constant on Respondents' Education	38
X.	Relationship Between Type of Unit and Preference for a Support Ethic	39
XI.	Relationship Between Type of Unit and Preference for a Support Ethic Holding Constant on Rank	40
XII.	Relationship Between Type of Unit and Preference for a Support Ethic Holding Constant on Marital Status of Respondents	41
XIII.	Relationship Between Type of Unit and Preference for a Support Ethic Holding Constant on Length of Service	42

Table | Page

XIV. Relationship Between Type of Unit and Preference for a Support Ethic Holding Respondents' Education Constant 44

XV. Comparison of Service Incentive Priorities Between Combat and Support Personnel 46

XVI. Comparison of Service Incentive Priorities Between Combat and Support Personnel, Holding Rank of Respondent Constant 48

XVII. Comparison of Service Incentive Priorities Between Combat and Support Personnel, Holding Marital Status of Respondent Constant 49

XVIII. Comparison of Service Incentive Priorities Between Combat and Support Personnel, Holding Constant on Respondents' Length of Service 50

XIX. Comparison of Service Incentive Priorities Between Combat and Support Personnel, Holding Constant on Respondents' Civilian Education 52

XX. Relationship Between Type of Unit and Respondents' Level of Authoritarianism 54

XXI. Relationship Between Type of Unit and Respondents' Level of Authoritarianism, Holding Constant on Rank 55

XXII. Relationship Between Type of Unit and Respondents' Level of Authoritarianism, Holding Constant on Marital Status 56

XXIII. Relationship Between Type of Unit and Respondents' Authoritarianism Holding Constant on Length of Service 56

XXIV. Relationship Between Type of Unit and Respondents' Authoritarianism Holding Constant on Education 58

XXV. Tabulation of Data Regarding Combat Ethic, Support Ethic, and Authoritarianism 61

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure Page

1. Pluralistic Army Model 10

2. Service Incentive Abbreviations 46

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Since World War II, technological advances have lead to an increasing dichotomy between the role of the support soldier and the combat soldier. Sophisticated communications systems, computerized personnel management and high-speed air and ground transport have allowed the support soldier to become farther and farther removed from the battlefield. The result of this trend has been a large segment of today's Army (about 75%) that sees little resemblance between their job function and the traditional rigorous, physically demanding life of the combat soldier. Although this condition has been recognized in the past, its possible ramifications have largely been ignored. The All-Volunteer Army concept, however, has added a new dimension to current thinking along these lines. Among others, Bradford and Brown have advanced the notion that the Army should be re-organized into two types: A Combat Army and Support Army (Bradford and Brown, 1973: 193). This idea will be developed more fully later in the paper. At this point it should be mentioned that Bradford and Brown assume the existence of attitudinal differences between combat and support soldiers. Their model for a pluralistic Army is based on that assumption.

The Research Problem and Nature of the Study

This research was undertaken to answer the following question: Is

there a significant difference in attitudes between combat soldiers and support soldiers in the areas of discipline, service incentives, and ethic of service? During the process of answering the basic question, the influence of rank, marital status, education, and length of service was also taken into consideration.

The study was exploratory in nature, using Army personnel currently in service as subjects. It was designed to investigate the phenomenon of attitudinal differences, not to determine causality.

The author feels justified in saying that the national defense of the United States is at stake in this issue. If Bradford and Brown's assumptions are correct, we will find it increasingly difficult to meet our support-soldier enlistment requirements in a combat-soldier oriented Army under all-volunteer conditions. On the other hand, if the assumptions are erroneous, an arbitrary change in the organization of the Army would be unnecessary and could have extremely unfavorable results.

From a personal standpoint, having served in the Army for a number of years, the author finds it difficult to argue with Bradford and Brown's assumptions. In anticipation of others who may want to ask "why belabor the obvious?", Paul Lazarsfeld's article "What do Attitude Surveys Tell Us?" (Lazarsfeld, 1969: 378-380) should be mentioned. In this article Lazarsfeld gives examples of six "obvious" statements, each of which proved to be erroneous following research. Keeping Lazarfeld's article in mind, belavoring the obvious way may prove to be well worth the effort.

Objectives

1. To identify the propositions necessary to subject Bradford and

Brown's model for a pluralistic Army to empirical tests.

2. To develop a scale designed to determine preference of combat or support ethos.

3. To develop a paired comparison test that will reveal an ordering of priorities regarding service incentives.

4. To administer the questionnaire to about 800 Army personnel stationed at Fort Hood, Texas.

5. To analyze the data.

6. To report the findings and record conclusions drawn as a result of the data analysis.

CHAPTER II

REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE

Bradford and Brown's model for a pluralistic Army revolves around the notion that various technological innovations in recent years have changed the functions of combat and support soldiers to the point that concomitant changes in attitudes and life styles between these two groups of people lend justification to the re-organization of the Army with the specific goal of accommodating these new attitudes and life-styles. This issue will be discussed at length later in the paper. At this point it should suffice to say that while Bradford and Brown's proposal is peculiar to the Army, their theory of relating social change to material, industrial, or agricultural changes is not unique to the history of sociological theory. For example, in Social Change, Ogburn discusses the concept of "cultural lag", whereby social changes are brought about by material changes (Ogburn, 1950). This concept revolves around the relationship between material change and the corresponding behavioral changes of society. The study of this relationship was intensified when Ogburn collaborated with Nimkoff, who shared similar ideas. According to Martindale, Ogburn and Nimkoff described their study of society as "like the hub of a wheel, with the mechanical invention of scientific discovery at the hub and the influences upon society emanating outward like the spokes" (Martindale, 1960: 329). In Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft (Community and Society) Toennies is

concerned with the social changes brought about by agricultural and industrial advancement (Toennies, 1957).

Various other theories regarding social change deal with the relationship between economics, politics, industry, agriculture, and their individual or combined effects on society. Whatever theory one subscribes to, social change remains to be the common denominator for most sociological theories, and the fact that significant social changes have taken place within the civilian community over the past century is readily apparent and universally accepted. The Army has undergone numerous social changes, as well.

A few of the changes the author has seen during the past ten years of service are provided as examples: Civilian laborers have largely replaced the enlisted man in performing kitchen police (KP) chores. The strict pass policy and bedcheck have been replaced by a liberal off-duty policy whereby a soldier's time between 5 PM and 7 AM (these hours vary somewhat locally) is his own. On the distaff side we now have officers' and enlisted mens' "wives" rather than the previous officers' "ladies" and enlisted mens' "wives".

These changes (and there are many others) have undoutbtedly contributed to attitudinal changes within certain sectors of the Army. However, as important as these changes may have been in making the Army more attractive, other, maybe more significant issues, remain to be resolved.

The Army has long recognized that there is a certain segment of its forces which, by virtue of its placement on the battlefield, does most of the fighting, whereas other segments, primarily those engaged in supply and administrative duties, do very little fighting. Accordingly,

we call the former "combat units" and the latter "support units". However, while we have made great strides in meeting the technological needs peculiar to the various types of units, we have failed to take cognizance of the fact that the technological changes have produced great differences in work environments and job roles between the combat and support soldier, with a concomitant difference in lifestyles and attitudes. Hence, we have traditionally developed leaders who fit the often-quoted Harold Laswell's "manager of violence". According to Laswell, the military leader's peculiar skill lies in "the direction, operation, and control of human organization whose primary function is the application of violence" (Huntington, 1959:12). The assumption underlying this description is that a soldier is a soldier, and the same rules and regulations are equally applicable to all soldiers regardless of duty position. This assumption fails to recognize that the attitudes, needs, desires, and motivations of the combat soldier and the support soldier may be significantly different.

Within our society, the Army, with its own social organization, processes, and values, is a distinct social system. In spite of the differences between combat and support soldiers, the Army has continued to operate as a single social system. The adoption of a pluralistic Army concept as recommended by Bradford and Brown (Bradford and Brown, 1973) would not only lead to a reorganization of the Army, but would ultimately result in the creation of two social systems.

The Studies in Social Psychology in World War II series published in 1949 is the most comprehensive study regarding the American Soldier. These studies show a marked difference between attitudes of infantry men, Army Ground Forces, Army Service Forces, and Army Air Forces

(Stouffer, Suchman, Devinney, Star, Williams, 1949). Since World War II, technological advances have contributed to an ever-widening gap between the combat forces and the support forces. In 1971, Charles Moskos presented a paper entitled "The Emergent Military: Civilianized, Traditional, or Pluralistic?" at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association in Chicago. The only other references to a "Pluralistic" Army were made in 1973 by Hauser (Hauser, 1973), and in a separate book, by Bradford and Brown (Bradford and Brown, 1973). Hauser's treatment of the subject was rather limited. Bradford and Brown's detailed discussion provides the framework for the present study.

CHAPTER III

CONCEPTUALIZATION

> The diverse forces acting in post-industrial America combined with the new technological complexities of readiness for national defense make it increasingly difficult to maintain uniform policies and practices across the wide range of Army units and skills (Bradford and Brown, 1973: 189).

While the combat soldier has been equipped with better, more accurate weapons and faster, more sophisticated means of transportation in which to get to the battlefield, his basic function remains that of seeking out and neutralizing or destroying the enemy. Accordingly, the type of soldier who fits the role of "combat soldier" is probably one who will subscribe to a life style that calls for physical hardships and authoritarian leadership traditionally associated with the Army.

On the other hand, as Bradford and Brown point out, the support soldier "finds little or no resemblance between his job function and the soldiering of yesteryear" (Bradford and Brown, 1973: 190). He will be more receptive to a life style that stresses participatory leadership instead of authoritarian leadership, and allows for maximum identification with his civilian counterparts.

In attempting to cater to the needs of people who play such different roles with a single traditional approach that stresses uniform policies and practices across its wide spectrum of functions, the Army finds itself faced with the following dilemma: If we insist on maintaining the traditional practices across the board, we will alienate the

type of personnel needed to fulfill the support requirements to the point where we will be unable to meet the Army's needs under an all-volunteer program. If, on the other hand, policies tasteful to the support soldier are applied uniformly, the type of discipline essential to the combat Army would be eroded.

In view of this dilemma, Bradford and Brown created the model shown in Figure 1. Bradford and Brown do not indicate at what time in history their model should be implemented. Hauser, on the other hand, points out that the time for change is now, but fears that advocating significant social changes during a period when the Army is already undergoing rapid, significant changes (transition from the Vietnam-era Army to a post-war force) will draw heavy criticism (Hauser, 1973). The author also feels that the Army needs a change. Although it has not been shown empirically, the dichotomy of some of the attitudes and values outlined in Figure 1 already seem to be extant in today's Army. The primary objective for this project was to investigate, through research findings, the following hypothesis: There is a significant difference in attitudes regarding ethos, service incentives, and discipline between the combat soldier and the support soldier.

As the hypothesis indicates, this research dealt with three of the five variables in Bradford and Brown's model. The issue of "equal opportunity" was not considered because the author feels that this is no longer an area in which the Army has a choice. Therefore, the idea of considering a dichotomous approach based on ethnic, religious, racial, or sexual differences makes little sense. Since this project dealt with "pluralistic" attitudes, the question of "common policies" discussed in the model clearly did not qualify for consideration.

UNITED STATES ARMY

Area of Concern	Combat Army	Support Army
Organization	Infantry Armor Field Artillery Air Defense Artillery Engineer Signal Corps Military Intelligence Military Police normally employed with the division	Adjutant General Corps Finance Transportation Ordnance Quartermaster Medical Services Legal Services
Ethos	Service to the country with unlimited liability to, and including, the risk of death. A challenging, personally dangerous service in a difficult, intensely physical environment.	Personal danger only under unusual circumstances. Satisfaction derived from technical competence in complex civilian-related skills.
Service Incentives	Combat army enlistment bonus "Second Career" vocational training upon retirement Accelerated retirement benefits (one year of service in the combat Army is equal to two years in the support Army) Accelerated promotions with early retirement	Development of increased competence in civilian-related skills Close affiliation with civilian unions Permit frequent "sabbaticals" with civilian industry Maintenance of technical competence equal to that of civilian contemporaries Slower promotions, but continual development of skills in a stable, financially secure environment

Source: Zeb B. Bradford and Frederic J. Brown, The United States Army in Transition, (Beverly Hills/London, 1973), pp. 193-202.

Figure 1. Pluralistic Army Model

Area of Concern	Combat Army	Support Army
Discipline	Stress traditional authoritarian patterns Strict obedience of lawful orders from a higher authority	Emphasis is on conventional industrial management techniques of participatory leadership and the development of group consensus
Equal Opportunity	No females. Otherwise, equal opportunity for all. This includes equal opportunity for dismissal or reduction.	Equal opportunity for all, including females
Common Policies	Uniform Code of Military Justice Uniform and personal appearance standard throughout All soldiers participate in Basic Training Care for dependents remains uniform	

Figure 1. (Continued)

After eliminating the two issues mentioned above, "ethos", "service incentives", and "discipline" remained as the primary variables considered in the hypothesis. To aid in the conceptualization of the hypothesis, and to facilitate the methodological handling of the issues involved, the variables were formulated into three propositional statements:

Proposition I: The combat soldier will more readily subscribe to an ethos calling for the traditional willingness to make the ultimate sacrifice than will the support soldier. Additionally, the combat soldier will take maximum pride in physical achievements, whereas the support soldier will take maximum pride in the development of technical competence.

Proposition II: When given a choice, the combat soldier will prefer monetary benefits and early retirement as an incentive for entering and staying in the Army more often than will the support soldier. The support soldier will prefer the development of civilian-related skills and close affilitation with the civilian community more often than will the combat soldier.

Proposition III: The combat soldier is more likely to show authoritarian traits than the support soldier.

A discussion of the three variables and their propositional statements follows.

Ethos

Proposition: The combat soldier will more readily subscribe to an ethos calling for the traditional willingness to make the ultimate sacrifice than will the support soldier. Additionally, the combat soldier will take maximum pride in physical achievements, whereas the support soldier will take maximum pride in the development of technical competence.

"Ethos" is a term which denotes "the meaning of duty", "guiding beliefs" (Webster); or "the spirit of an institution" (Funk and Wagnall). More common terminology for this concept is "ethic", such as in "work ethic" or "ethic of service". Most professional occupations have ethics of service, but the majority of these ethics are informal. Public service professions involving the risk of life, such as various police duties, seem to operate under more formal, definitive ethics. The Army falls into the latter category. The traditional ethos of the Army is one that has the "ultimate sacrifice" of laying one's life on the line as an underlying theme.

As Bradford and Brown point out, this traditional ethos should, and will, continue to apply to the combat soldier. The support soldier, however, presents a different problem. Why should the support soldier, who is so far removed from combat and whose job functions appear to be totally unrelated to combat, be required to subscribe to the traditional combat ethos? Maybe he should not. In the model, the recommended ethos for the support soldier stresses "technical competence in civilian-related skills" (Bradford and Brown, 1973: 194). Thus, the support soldier would get his satisfaction from knowing that he is doing the best possible job in his skill area.

Since two issues, combat ethos and support ethos, are at stake in the discussion of Proposition I, two null hypotheses were used to test the data regarding Proposition I.

Null hypothesis 1a (H_{o1a}): There is no relationship between whether a soldier is a combat or support soldier and his preference for a combat ethic of service.

Null hypothesis 1b (H_{o1b}): There is no relationship between whether a soldier is a combat or support soldier and his preference for a support ethic of service.

Details regarding the construction and use of the scale developed to test these null hypotheses will be presented in the chapter on methodology.

Service Incentives

Proposition: When given a choice, the combat soldier will prefer monetary benefits and early retirement as an incentive for entering and staying in the Army more often than will the support soldier. The support soldier will prefer the development of civilian-related skills and close affiliation with the civilian community more often than will the combat soldier.

While the danger and hardship associated with a combat career has been recognized for a number of years now, the Army has done little to provide lucrative incentives to people making the combat arms a career. The "Combat Arms Enlistment Bonus" offered to people enlisting in certain combat skills during the past few years has fallen short of its anticipated luring effect to the combat arms. Since this paper was begun, the Army has released information which indicates that prior to December 31, 1976, "more than 6000 NCO's with surplus Military Occupational Skills (MOS) will be retrained in combat arms skills--many of them involuntarily" (Army Times, October 29, 1975: 3). The cited reference further states that "the Army....is short 22,000 E-5's, mainly in the combat arms MOS's."

Bradford and Brown feel that a monetary enlistment bonus alone is not enough to make a career in a combat arm attractive. Recognizing the non-marketability of combat-related job skills in the civilian community, they recommended an accelerated retirement program for combat careerists. This would enable a combat careerist to retire early enough in life to train for and be competitive for a second career in the civilian job market. Considering the current MOS imbalance in the Army, one would be tempted to make no incentive changes for the support soldier. Nevertheless, the model to be tested indicates that the continued development of civilian-related job skills and the possibility of entering the service with an advanced rank after prior job-specific training are to be offered as incentives for the potential support soldier.

A paired comparison test was constructed to determine service incentive preferences of combat and support personnel. The chapter regarding Methodology will discuss this procedure in detail.

To test the data relevant to the preference of service incentives, Proposition II was restated in null hypothesis form.

Null hypothesis 2 (H_{o2}): There is no difference between whether a soldier is a combat or support soldier and his preference of incentives that would cause him to make the Army a career.

Discipline

Proposition: The combat soldier is more likely to show authoritarian traits than the support soldier.

To many people, the terms "discipline" and "authoritarianism" are synonymous when associated with the Army. The well known cartoon of a

sergeant yelling at a private "when I tell you to dig, you only ask 'how deep'", is a somewhat oversimplified, and yet somewhat appropriate portrayal of what Army discipline is thought to be all about. The need for an "act now and ask questions later" type of discipline in a combat unit where the time it takes to explain the reason for a given command may be paid for in lost lives is readily apparent. However, the reasoning for this type of authoritarian discipline loses its legitimacy when applied to a finance or personnel clerk where the price of explanation, or even participation in a decision is at most a short delay in processing a piece of paper. Assuming that the combat soldier will continue to subscribe to authoritarian discipline while the support soldier prefers less authoritarianism, Bradford and Brown propose that the type of discipline to be applied to the two types of Armies be dichotomous--authoritarianism for the combat Army and participatory leadership for the support Army.

Again, the primary task of the paper dealing with this issue is to test Bradford and Brown's allegation that there is a significant difference in the level of authoritarianism between combat and support soldiers.

Proposition III has been restated in null hypothesis form as follows.

Null hypothesis 3 (H_{o3}): There is no relationship between whether a soldier is a combat or support soldier and his level of authoritarianism.

Prior to entering the methodological issues involved in this project, the author finds it necessary to re-iterate a very important point: This research was designed to determine whether or not the

assumed attitudinal differences between combat and support soldiers do, in fact, exist; not to determine causality.

CHAPTER IV

METHODOLOGY

Sample and Sampling Procedure

Since this research problem was concerned with measuring attitudinal differences between combat and support soldiers, it followed that the sampling population consist of people currently serving in the Army. The research was conducted at Fort Hood, Texas, during the period of 20 October to 31 October, 1975.

Fort Hood proved to be an excellent location for this research. Its population of 45,000 Army personnel provided a representative sample of today's Army. Major units at Fort Hood consist of III Corps Headquarters, the 2nd Armored Division including Division Artillery, the 1st Cavalry Division including Division Artillery, the 6th Air Cavalry Brigade, and the 13th Corps Support Command.

Soon after arriving at Fort Hood, this researcher became aware of the fact that there would be a great difference between his idealized sampling process and how he would, in reality, determine his sample. The plan was to use unit organization charts and personnel rosters as sampling frames to facilitate the random selection of units and personnel. Unit commitments and individual commander's desires forced the abandonment of this plan. In reality, the researcher had to settle for units that could, and would honor his requests for survey support. Once

an accommodating unit was found, questionnaires were left with the battalion executive officer or operations officer for distribution to respondents. Distributors were left with instructions to insure representation of enlisted personnel as well as officers, young members as well as "old-timers", and some headquarters troops as well as combat troops (in combat units). A subsequent frequency count of data gathered indicates that the distributors complied with these instructions.

To insure a clear distinction between "combat" personnel and "support" personnel, only combat battalions (armor, infantry, artillery) within the 1st Cavalry Division were selected to provide "combat" respondents. "Support" respondents were selected from units organic to the 13th Corps Support Command. The 13th Corps Support Command clearly serves only a "support" function. Its organic units consist of a Personnel and Administration Battalion, a Transportation Battalion, a Maintenance Battalion, and a Supply and Services Battalion. Additionally, a number of respondents came from Fort Hood's Darnell Army Hospital staff.

Of the 880 questionnaires distributed, 551 "usable" questionnaires were returned. A questionnaire was considered "usable" if response to at least one of the three variable categories (ethos, incentives, discipline) was complete. There is no reason to think that the failure of 329 individuals to respond in any way biases the data gathered. The composition of the sample is shown in Table I.

Method of Data Collection and Analysis

Copies of the questionnaire shown in the Appendix were distributed as outlined in the section concerning the Sample and Sampling Method.

The questionnaire was organized in four parts as follows:

Part I: Demographic data,

Part II: Discipline and Ethos Scale,

Part III: Service incentive forced choice statements,

Part IV: Two open-ended questions requesting likes and dislikes about making the Army a career. Information gathered in this part was not included in the present analysis but will be stored for possible future use.

TABLE I

COMPOSITION OF THE RESEARCH SAMPLE

	Combat	Support
Total	219	332
By Rank:		
Enlisted	182	260
Officer	37	65
Warrant Officer		7
By Marital Status:		
Single	98	87
Married	110	225
Divorced, Separated, or Widowed	11	20
By Length of Time in the Army:		
Less than Two Years	106	117
Two Through Nine Years	82	135
Ten Years and Longer	31	80
By Education:		
High School or Less	163	228
More than High School	56	104

Part II of the questionnaire consisted of a series of Likert-type statements. Response to each question was made on a seven-point strongly disagree, strongly agree basis, with a score value of one (1) indicating strong disagreement and seven (7) indicating strong agreement. None of the questions had a reverse scoring scheme. A discussion of the questions in Part II follows.

Discipline

Determining whether there is a significant difference in authoritarianism between combat and support soldiers was the issue in this part of the questionnaire. To determine the degree of authoritarianism, the questions comprising the Authoritarian Aggression and Authoritarian Submission clusters from Adorno's Third F Scale (Adorno, 1950: 225) were used. As was done in Adorno's work, Authoritarian Aggression and Authoritarian Submission scores were added to compose an over-all authoritarian score. During the item analysis, each question was considered against the total of its own cluster category (aggression or submission), the other cluster category, and the total authoritarianism score. All items correlated beyond the .0001 level of statistical significance. Correlation coefficients for each item are shown in Table II.

Correlation coefficients for all items were considered acceptable. Therefore, none of the items in this scale were eliminated from consideration.

Ethos

Interspersed with the Authoritarianism questions were six items which were designed to measure the type of ehtos an individual will most

TABLE II

ITEM ANALYSIS OF THE AUTHORITARIANISM SCALE

Item*	Correlation Coefficients		
	Auth Sub[1]	Auth Agg[2]	Auth[3]
Authoritarian Submission	1.00	.60	.87
13. Obedience and respect for authority are the most important virtues children should learn.	.59	.39	.55
14. Science has its place, but there are many important things that can never possibly be understood by the human mind.	.56	.29	.46
15. Every person should have complete faith in some supernatural power whose decisions he obeys without question.	.61	.27	.48
16. Young people sometimes get rebellious ideas, but as they grow up they ought to get over them and settle down.	.56	.35	.51
18. What this country needs most, more than laws and political programs, is a few courageous, tireless, devoted leaders in whom the people can put their faith.	.53	.30	.48
19. No sane, normal, decent person could ever think of hurting a close friend or relative.	.54	.24	.43
20. Nobody ever learned anything really important except through suffering.	.49	.37	.48
Authoritarian Aggression	.60	1.00	.91
22. A person who had bad manners, habits, and breeding can hardly expect to get along with decent people.	.31	.49	.45
23. What the youth needs most is strict discipline, rugged determination, and the will to work and fight for family and country.	.42	.57	.57

TABLE II (Continued)

Item*	Correlation Coefficients Auth Sub[1]	Auth Agg[2]	Auth[3]
25. An insult to our honor should always be punished.	.27	.60	.51
26. Sex crimes, such as rape and attacks on children, deserve more than mere imprisonment; such criminals ought to be publicly whipped, or worse.	.27	.59	.50
27. There is hardly anything lower than a person who does not feel a great love, gratitude, and respect for his parents.	.42	.61	.59
29. Most of our social problems would be solved if we could somehow get rid of the immoral, crooked, and feebleminded people.	.35	.62	.56
30. If people would talk less and work more, everybody would be better off.	.35	.58	.54
31. Homosexuals are hardly better than criminals and ought to be severely punished.	.23	.56	.47

*Item numbers correspond to the numbers in the questionnaire.

[1]Authoritarian Submission
[2]Authoritarian Aggression
[3]Authoritarianism

readly subscribe to. The six items in this scale were created by the researcher. Three of the ethos questions correspond to the combat ethic proposed by Bradford and Brown. The other three items were to measure preference for Bradford and Brown's support ethic. Each respondent had equal access to each of the six ethos questions

mentioned. The assumption underlying the creation of this scale was that combat soldiers would score higher in their preference for a combat ethic than would support soldiers, and that support soldiers would score higher in preference for a support ethic than would combat soldiers.

Table III contains the questions used in the Combat Ethic Scale and their correlation coefficients. Realizing the influence of each item score on the total in a small scale such as the one used to measure this variable, inter-item correlations were computed for each item to eliminate the influence mentioned. All items in this scale correlated beyond the .0001 level of statistical significance.

TABLE III

ITEM ANALYSIS OF THE COMBAT ETHOS SCALE

Item*	Correlation Coefficients
12. I think that true commitment to the service of one's country requires the unqualified willingness to lose one's life in combat.	.30
20. I enjoy working in an environment that calls for frequent physical hardship and personal danger.	.36
28. I get the greatest satisfaction from successfully completing tasks that require physical strength and exertion.	.32

*Item numbers correspond to the numbers in the questionnaire.

Table IV contains the items used in the Support Ethos Scale. Again, inter-item correlation was used to eliminate single-item influence on the correlation coefficients. Items 17 and 32 correlated beyond the .0001 level of statistical significance. Item 24 correlated at a level of .0009.

TABLE IV

ITEM ANALYSIS OF THE SUPPORT ETHOS SCALE

Item*	Correlation Coefficients
17. My greatest job satisfaction comes from maintaining the highest level of competence in complex technical skills.	.25
24. I would subject myself to personal danger only under unusual circumstances.	.15
32. I think that the continuous development of support skills (clerk, medic, lawyer, mechanic, supply) is just as important to the service of one's country as the willingness to lose one's life in combat.	.27

*Item numbers correspond to the numbers in the questionnaire.

Service Incentives

A paired comparison test was used to determine service members' priorities regarding incentives for making the Army a career as suggested by Bradford and Brown. The procedure for solving the paired

comparison problem is outlined by Edwards (Edwards, 1957). Specifics regarding the procedure used in this research will be outlined in the section entitled "Method of Analysis".

The issue in this section of the questionnaire was to determine if combat personnel would prefer the "combat incentives" over "support incentives" and if support personnel would choose "support incentives" over "combat incentives".

Part III of the questionnaire contains the paired comparison questions. "Combat incentives" used were as follows:

1. I am prepared to face the hardship and danger associated with a combat unit as long as I can retire after 15 years of service.

2. I would choose a career in a combat unit for an enlistment bonus totaling one year's wages.

The following "support incentives" were used:

1. Knowing that my civilian-related job skills will continuously be updated and developed would make me join a support unit, even though I would have to serve for 30 years before I could retire.

2. I would choose a career in a support unit if my civilian-developed job skills enabled me to enter the service with an advanced rank (NCO for enlisted men, field grade for officers).

Each respondent was provided with six pairs of statements. The six statement-pairs exhausted all possible combinations of the four incentives mentioned above. The respondent was faced with a forced-choice situation on each pair of statements. A subsequent count of the number of times each incentive was chosen over the other incentives enabled the researcher to determine the respondents' ordering of priorities.

Measurement of Variables

The two groups of people under consideration were "combat" soldiers

and "support" soldiers. Primary variables under consideration were as follows:

Authoritarianism
Combat Ethos
Support Ethos
Service Incentives

Original relationships were held constant for the following third variables:

Rank (enlisted or officer)
Marital Status
Length of Service
Civilian Education

The locations of various cutting points and the rationale for their selection is presented below.

Authoritarianism

Minimum and maximum total scores possible on the authoritarianism scale were 15 and 105 points, respectively. The mean and median turned out to be identical for the data at hand--64. Thus, total authoritarianism scores of 15 to 64 were grouped into the low authoritarianism category, and 65 to 105 totals fell into the high authoritarianism category.

Combat Ethos

The minimum score possible for combat ethos was 3, and the maximum score possible was 21. Again, the mean and median were the same--11. The score of 11 became the cutting point, with scores of 3 to 11 in the low combat ethic category, and scores of 12 to 21 in the high combat ethic category.

Support Ethos

As was the case for the combat ethic variable, possible scores for the support ethic ranged from 3 to 21. The mean and median for this variable were 16. Accordingly, respondents with scores of 16 or less were grouped into the low support ethos category, and scores of 17 to 21 were classified as high support ethos.

Service Incentives

Paired comparison analysis was used to determine the ordering of preference for hypothetical service incentives. The ordering of priorities was assumed to be substantively significant by virtue of the fact that each incentive had an equal chance of being chosen above all other incentives offered.

Rank

Officers generally differ from enlisted personnel in the areas of education, social relationships, and job function. It was felt that these differences warranted a look to see if there were also attitudinal differences between officers and enlisted persons regarding the issues in question. Therefore, rank was treated as a third variable during the process of partialing the data for each of the basic variables under consideration.

During the process of holding constant on rank, responses provided by the seven warrant officers were not considered because the data derived from such a small sample are virtually meaningless from a

statistical standpoint. Warrant officer responses were, however, taken into consideration during all other procedures.

Marital Status

Since having a spouse and possibly a family may effect certain attitudes, particularly those dealing with careers, it was decided that marital status would be a good variable for which to hold constant.

While holding constant on marital status, only data for single and married persons were considered. Although divorced, spearated, and widowed were not large enough to quality for partialing, the data for these individuals were used during all other analysis procedures.

Length of Time in Service

This variable was considered to determine how much influence not only Army life, but service in a combat or support branch has on a person's attitudes. A longitudinal study obviously would have been the best way to do this, but proved to be unfeasible for the present study.

Therefore, the respondents were grouped into three categories: those who have served for less than two years; those who have served two years or more, but less than ten years; and those who have served 10 or more years.

The selection of these cutting points was based on the following rationale: People with less than two years of service have generally not made a career commitment to the Army. People with two through nine years of service have shown an interest in making the Army a career, but may, for one reason or another, still back out in favor of

beginning some other career. People with ten or more years of service are generally considered as having made a solid commitment to making the Army a career. These seemingly logical cutting points in the career-decision continuum were considered to be logical cutting points for looking at attitudes as well.

Civilian Education

This variable was dichotomized with high school completion or less as one category, and more than high school as the other category.

Method of Analysis

For the discipline and ethos variables, Chi-Square (x^2) was used to determine the existence or non-existence of statistically significant relationships. The traditional acceptance/rejection criteria for H_o of .05 was used. Yule's Q served to measure the strength of association. It should be pointed out that Chi-Square is in no way used to imply a causal relationship; rather, the Chi-Square test is merely used to determine the existence or non-existence of a statistically significant relationship between two variables. Blalock provides justification for using Chi-Square to indicate the existence or non-existence of a statistically significant relationship between variables. Throughout the section on Chi-Square, Blalock uses the term relationship to restate hypotheses in the null form and in explanations of various examples. Following the sections dealing with Chi-Square and Fisher's Exact Test is a section entitled "Measures of Strength of Relationship" in which the terms relationship and association are used interchangeably (Blalock, 1972: 291-292). Recognizing potential semantic problems

concerning the terms relationship and association, Steger indicated: "The Chi-Square as a test of independence refers to the statistical test of the possiblity of a relationship between two variables. This is often called a test of association; . . ." (Steger, 1971: 53-54).

The Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS)--version 5.01--was used to solve the statistical problems mentioned above. All Chi-Square values shown in the tables have been corrected for continuity.

As mentioned previously, paired comparison testing was used to determine service incentive priorities. All interpretations and determinations using this procedure were substantive in nature.

The researcher established the following substantive criteria for dealing with the null hypothesis using the paired comparison method of analysis: In order for H_o to be rejected, the first and second choice in each "type unit" partial has to correspond to that type of unit's pre-established incentive, i.e., for combat personnel, choices one and two have to be combat incentives, and for support personnel, choices one and two have to be support incentives.

During third variable analysis, the following criteria were used to indicate specification:

1. Significant changes in the ordering of priorities had to take place within all partials of the table under consideration.

2. A mere reversal of the priority positions involving two incentives was insufficient to indicate a "significant" change. The percentage of preference of the new incentive had to show a substantial change as well. The following examples will serve to illustrate this point.

Example A:

	Basic Relationship	
	Incentive	Percentage of Preference (%)
	1	60
	2	40
Totals		100

Partialed Relationship

Incentive	Percentage of Preference (%)
2	60
1	40

Example B: Partialed Relationship

2	51
1	49

The change in priorities in the partialed relationship of Example A is considered significant because there was not only a reversal in priorities, but the percentage of preference of the new ordering corresponds to the requirements outlined in (2) above.

Although there is a reversal in the ordering of priorities in Example B, the change is not considered significant because the new percentage of preference fails to meet the established criteria.

CHAPTER III

DATA ANALYSIS

Combat Ethos

Table V presents the data to test the hypothesis that combat soldiers will prefer a combat ethic more often than will support soldiers. As Table V indicates, there is a statistically significant relationship ($p < .05$), requiring the rejection of H_{ola}. The relationship is positive and moderate in strength ($Q = .387$). As can be seen, 66% of the combat soldiers rated high in their preference for a combat ethic of service, while only 46% of the support soldiers rated high.

TABLE V

RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN TYPE OF UNIT AND PREFERENCE FOR COMBAT ETHIC

	Combat	Support
Low Combat Ethic	74(34)*	178(54)
High Combat Ethic	145(66)	154(46)
TOTALS	219	332

$X^2 = 20.105$; d.f. = 1; $p < .05$; $Q = .387$; $N = 551$.

*Numbers in parentheses are percentages.

Table VI shows what happens to the original relationship when the data are held constant for rank. As was the case in the original relationship, the null hypothesis is rejected for both partials ($p < .05$). The direction of relationship remains positive for both partials, but the interesting point lies in the strength of relationship. While Q for the enlisted persons slightly decreases ($Q = .335$), it increases considerably for officers ($Q = .560$), indicating that rank definitely specifies the relationship between type of unit and preference for a combat ethos. In the enlisted personnel partial, high scores for a combat ethos preference were 65% and 48% for combat personnel and support personnel, respectively. In the officer partial, the high percentages for a combat ethic were 70 and 40 for combat and support, respectively.

TABLE VI

RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN TYPE OF UNIT AND PREFERENCE FOR COMBAT ETHIC, HOLDING CONSTANT ON RANK*

	Enlisted		Officer	
	Combat	Support	Combat	Support
Low Combat Ethic	63(35)**	134(52)	11(30)	39(60)
High Combat Ethic	119(65)	126(48)	26(70)	26(40)
TOTALS	182	260	37	65

Enlisted: $X^2 = 11.735$; d.f. = 1; $p < .05$; $Q = .335$; $N = 442$.
Officer: $X^2 = 7.476$; d.f. = 1; $p < .05$; $Q = .560$; $N = 102$.

*Seven Warrant Officers were not considered in this analysis.
**Numbers in parentheses are percentages.

The effect of marital status on the original relationship is shown in Table VII. The null hypothesis is rejected for both partials. The strength of the relationship decreases for single personnel (Q = .339) and increases for married personnel (Q = .449), but the changes from the original Q value are not large enough to specify the relationship between type of unit and preference for a combat ethos. The direction of relationship remains positive for both partials.

TABLE VII

RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN TYPE OF UNIT AND PREFERENCE FOR COMBAT ETHIC, HOLDING MARITAL STATUS OF RESPONDENTS CONSTANT*

	Single		Married	
	Combat	Support	Combat	Support
Low Combat Ethic	36(37)**	47(54)	35(32)	124(55)
High Combat Ethic	62(63)	40(46)	75(68)	101(45)
TOTALS	98	87	110	225

Single: X^2 = 4.892; d.f. = 1; $p < .05$; Q = .339; N = 185.
Married: X^2 = 15.155; d.f. = 1; $p < .05$; Q = .449; N = 335.

*Twenty-one divorced and 10 separated personnel were not considered in this analysis.
**Numbers in parentheses are percentages.

The original relationship was further tested to determine the influence of length of service on attitudes regarding preference for a combat ethic. Data depicting this information are in Table VIII. For

people with less than two years in the Army the relationship remained statistically significant as hypothesized ($p < .05$), and the strength of relationship decreased slightly from the original ($Q = .367$).

TABLE VIII

RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN TYPE OF UNIT AND PREFERENCE FOR COMBAT ETHIC, HOLDING LENGTH OF TIME IN SERVICE CONSTANT

	< 2 Years Service		2 to 9 Years Service		10 or More Years Service	
	Combat	Support	Combat	Support	Combat	Support
Low Combat Ethic	38(36)*	64(55)	26(32)	73(54)	10(32)	41(51)
High Combat Ethic	68(64)	53(45)	56(68)	62(46)	21(68)	39(49)
TOTALS	106	117	82	135	31	80

< 2 Years: $X^2 = 7.222$; d.f. = 1; $p < .05$; $Q = .367$; $N = 223$.
2 to 9 Years: $X^2 = 9.405$; d.f. = 1; $p < .05$; $Q = .434$; $N = 217$.
10 or More Years: $X^2 = 2.525$; d.f. = 1; $p > .05$; $Q = .377$; $N = 111$.

*Numbers in parentheses are percentages.

In the two to nine year category, the relationship remains statistically significant ($p < .05$) and shows a slight increase in strength ($Q = .434$). As can be observed in the table, the high combat ethic scores in this category came from 68% of the combat people and only 46% of the support people.

A look at the category dealing with 10 or more years reveals that the relationship has become statistically insignificant ($p > .05$) while Q

is almost identical to the original data (Q = .377). Although this partial is not statistically significant, the loss of statistical significance is largely due to the small number of personnel (N) comprising this partial. A comparison of the Q values in this table with the Q of the basic relationship leads to the conclusion that length of time of service does not specify the attitudes of combat and support personnel regarding preference for a combat ethic of service.

Table IX indicates what happens to the original relationship when the data are held constant for the amount of civilian education completed by the respondents. The relationship remains statistically significant for both partials ($p < .05$). The strength of the relationship decreases for military personnel with high school or less (Q = .362) and increases for military personnel with more than a high school education (Q = .424), but the change in Q from the original relationship is not large enough to indicate a specification of the relationship. In the partial consisting of military personnel who have completed high school or less, 68% of combat personnel scored high in their preference for a combat ethos, and 50% of the support personnel scored high. In the second partial, the comparison of percentages changed to 61% and 38% for combat and support personnel, respectively. The direction of the relationship remains positive throughout the table.

Summary Regarding Combat Ethos

In summary, an overview of Tables V through IX supports the first part of Proposition I which states, in part: The combat soldier will more readily subscribe to an ethos calling for the traditional willingness to make the ultimate sacrifice than will the support soldier . . .

Additionally, the partialed tables indicate that only rank was influential in specifying the original relationship found in Table V.

TABLE IX

RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN TYPE OF UNIT AND PREFERENCE FOR COMBAT ETHIC, HOLDING CONSTANT ON RESPONDENTS' EDUCATION

	High School or Less		More than High School	
	Combat	Support	Combat	Support
Low Combat Ethic	52(32)*	114(50)	22(39)	64(62)
High Combat Ethic	111(68)	114(50)	34(61)	40(38)
TOTALS	163	228	56	104

High School or Less: $X^2 = 12.013$; d.f. = 1; $p < .05$; Q = .362; N = 391.
More than High School: $X^2 = 6.383$; d.f. = 1; $p < .05$; Q = .424; N = 160.

*Numbers in parentheses are percentages.

Support Ethos

The following null hypothesis was used to test preference for a support ethic of service: H_{o1b}: There is no relationship between whether a soldier is a combat or support soldier and his preference for a support ethic of service.

The data in Table X require that the null hypothesis of no relationship be rejected ($p < .05$). While the relationship between type of unit and preference for a support ethic is statistically significant,

it is a weak relationship (Q = -.262). As was originally hypothesized, support soldiers more often preferred a support ethic of service than did combat soldiers. Only 40% of the combat soldiers showed a high preference for a support ethic, while 53% of the support personnel scored high in this area.

TABLE X

RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN TYPE OF UNIT AND PREFERENCE FOR A SUPPORT ETHIC

	Combat	Support
Low Support Ethic	132(60)*	156(47)
High Support Ethic	87(40)	176(53)
TOTALS	219	332

X^2 = 8.811; d.f. = 1; p < .05; Q = -.262; N = 551.

*Numbers in parentheses are percentages.

The influence of rank on the basic relationship is shown in Table XI. Statistical significance remains in both partials (p < .05). The relationship becomes very weak for enlisted persons (Q = -.199) while it shows a considerable increase in strength for officers (Q = -.540), indicating that rank certainly specifies the relationship between combat and support soldiers and their preference for a support ethic of service. Forty-two percent of the enlisted combat personnel showed high

preference for a support ethic, with 52% of the enlisted support personnel scoring high in preference for a support ethic. The specification of this relationship is largely due to the combat officers' lack of preference for a support ethic (only 27% showed a high preference).

TABLE XI

RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN TYPE OF UNIT AND PREFERENCE FOR A SUPPORT ETHIC HOLDING CONSTANT ON RANK*

	Enlisted		Officer	
	Combat	Support	Combat	Support
Low Support Ethic	105(58)**	124(48)	27(73)	29(45)
High Support Ethic	77(42)	136(52)	10(27)	36(55)
TOTALS	182	260	37	65

Enlisted: $X^2 = 3.897$; d.f. = 1; $p < .05$; Q = -.199; N = 442.
Officer: $X^2 = 6.555$; d.f. = 1; $p < .05$; Q = -.540; N = 102.

*Seven Warrant Officers were not considered in this analysis.
**Numbers in parentheses are percentages.

Table XII presents the influence of marital status on preference for a support ethic. The null hypothesis of no relationship has to be accepted for single personnel ($p > .05$). Q indicates that there is no relationship within this partial (Q = -.103). Still, it should be mentioned that more single support people showed a high preference for a support ethic than did single combat personnel (45% and 40%, respectively).

TABLE XII

RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN TYPE OF UNIT AND PREFERENCE FOR A SUPPORT ETHIC HOLDING CONSTANT ON MARITAL STATUS OF RESPONDENTS*

	Single		Married	
	Combat	Support	Combat	Support
Low Support Ethic	59(60)**	48(55)	67(61)	97(43)
High Support Ethic	39(40)	39(45)	43(39)	128(57)
TOTALS	98	87	110	225

Single: $X^2 = 0.294$; d.f. = 1; $p > .05$; Q = -.103; N = 185.
Married: $X^2 = 8.667$; d.f. = 1; $p < .05$; Q = -.346; N = 335.

*Twenty-one divorced and 10 separated personnel were not considered in this analysis.
**Numbers in parentheses are percentages.

The null hypothesis for the partial dealing with married people has to be rejected ($p < .05$). The relationship is weak (Q = -.346) and the direction is as hypothesized in that more support personnel showed a high preference for a support ethic (57%) than did combat personnel (39%). Furthermore, it should be pointed out that the most striking change in attitudes regarding preference for a support ethic takes place among married support personnel, where the high preference percentage increases from 45% to 57%.

A decrease in Q from the original relationship (from -.262 to -.103) and an increase in Q for married people (from -.262 to -.346) indicates that marital status specifies preference for a support ethos between combat and support personnel.

Table XIII shows that happens to the original relationship when

length of time in the Army is held constant. In the length of time in the Army partial, the data dealing with people who have <2 years of service is statistically significant and as hypothesized ($p < .05$) calling for rejection of the null hypothesis for this partial. The relationship is still weak but shows an increase from the original to a Q of -.282.

TABLE XIII

RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN TYPE OF UNIT AND PREFERENCE FOR A SUPPORT ETHIC HOLDING CONSTANT ON LENGTH OF SERVICE

	<2 Years Service		2 to 9 Years Service		10 or More Years Service	
	Combat	Support	Combat	Support	Combat	Support
Low Support Ethic	70(66)*	61(52)	44(54)	63(47)	18(58)	32(40)
High Support Ethic	36(34)	56(48)	38(46)	72(53)	13(42)	48(60)
TOTALS	106	117	82	135	31	80

<2 Years Service: $X^2 = 3.879$; d.f. = 1; $p < .05$; Q = -.282; N = 223.
2 to 9 Years Service; $X^2 = 0.738$; d.f. = 1; $p > .05$; Q = -.139; N = 217.
10 or More Years: $X^2 = 2.260$; d.f. = 1; $p > .05$; Q = -.350; N = 111.

*Numbers in parentheses are percentages.

The data dealing with people having 2 to 9 years of service and 10 or more years of service both require acceptance of the null hypothesis ($p > .05$). For people with 2 to 9 years of service, strength of association virtually disappears (Q = -.139) while it takes a sizeable increase for people with 10 or more years of service (Q = -.350).

Although the Chi-Square values in two of the three categories of length of time in the Army fail to pass the test of statistical significance, the direction in each case is as hypothesized. In the <2 years service category, 34% of the combat personnel showed a high preference for a support ethic while the percentage for support personnel was 48%. In the 2 to 9 years service category the high-preference percentages are 46% and 53% for combat and support personnel, respectively. And, in the 10 or more years category, only 42% of the combat personnel showed a high preference for a support ethic while 60% of the support personnel showed a high preference. Thus, there is evidence to suggest that length of time in service specifies the relationship between type of unit and preference for a support ethic of service.

When the original relationship is held constant for years of civilian education completed, the Chi-Square value for Army personnel with high school or less education requires acceptance of the null hypothesis ($p > .05$). Table XIV shows the data regarding the influence of civilian education on the original relationship. While H_o had to be accepted for this partial and the association between type of unit and preference for a support ethic is weak ($Q = -.204$), the direction of the relationship is as hypothesized in that 42% of the combat people showed a high preference for a support ethic and 53% of the support people scored high.

For Army personnel with more than a high school education the null hypothesis has to be rejected ($p < .05$). The relationship between type of unit and preference for a support ethic within this partial is moderate in strength ($Q = -.422$) and the direction of the relationship is as hypothesized. Only 32% of the combat personnel scored high in

their preference for a support ethic while 54% of support personnel scored high.

TABLE XIV

RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN TYPE OF UNIT AND PREFERENCE FOR A SUPPORT ETHIC HOLDING RESPONDENTS' EDUCATION CONSTANT

	High School or Less		More Than High School	
	Combat	Support	Combat	Support
Low Support Ethic	94(58)*	108(47)	38(68)	48(46)
High Support Ethic	69(42)	120(53)	18(32)	56(54)
TOTALS	163	228	56	104

High School or Less: $X^2 = 3.636$; d.f. = 1; $p > .05$; Q = -.204; N = 391.
More Than High School: $X^2 = 6.052$; d.f. = 1; $p < .05$; Q = -.422; N = 160.

*Numbers in parentheses are percentages.

The decrease in the value of Q for the "high school or less" partial and the increase of Q in the other partial indicate that amount of civilian education specifies the relationship between whether a person is a combat or support soldier, and his preference for a support ethic of service.

Summary Regarding Support Ethos

As the data used to test H_{olb} indicate, support personnel more readily show preference for a support ethos of service than do combat personnel in the Army. An overview of the data regarding the effect of

third variables on the basic relationship indicates that rank (enlisted or officer) is the most influential factor effecting attitudes about preference for a support ethos. Other third variables effecting the basic relationship between type of unit and preference for a support ethos are marital status, length of time in service, and amount of civilian education. The influence of all third variables on the basic relationship is discussed in detail in Chapter VII of this paper.

Service Incentives

This section provides information relevant to the investigation of H_{o2}: There is no difference between whether a soldier is a combat or support soldier and his preference of service incentives that would cause him to make the Army a career.

The abbreviations shown in Figure 2 will be used in the analysis of the data in this section.

As Table XV indicates, the ordering of priorities is as hypothesized for support soldiers, but not for combat soldiers. The first two choices of support soldiers were support-type incentives with 40% of all support soldiers preferring Support Advanced Rank over all other choices and Support Job Skills being preferred over all others by 25% of support personnel. The top choices of combat personnel were Support Advanced Rank (35%) and Combat Retirement (28%). The incentive Combat Enlistment Bonus received least preference by both groups (18% for combat and 15% for support personnel).

When the comparison of order is held constant for rank of respondents (enlisted or officer) some changes in the ordering of priorities can be observed. This information is contained in

Abbreviation	Meaning
Combat Retirement	I am prepared to face the hardship and danger associated with a combat unit as long as I can retire after 15 years of service.
Combat Enlistment Bonus	I would choose a career in a combat unit for an enlistment bonus totaling one year's wages.
Support Advanced Rank	I would choose a career in a support unit if my civilian-developed job skills enabled me to enter the service with an advanced rank (NCO for enlisted men, field grade for officers).
Support Job Skills	Knowing that my civilian-related job skills will continuously be updated and developed could make me join a support unit, even though I would have to serve for 30 years before I could retire.

Figure 2. Service Incentive Abbreviations

TABLE XV

COMPARISON OF SERVICE INCENTIVE PRIORITIES
BETWEEN COMBAT AND SUPPORT PERSONNEL

Combat Personnel	%	Support Personnel	%
Support Advanced Rank	35	Support Advanced Rank	40
Combat Retirement	28	Support Job Skills	25
Support Job Skills	19	Combat Retirement	20
Combat Enlistment Bonus	18	Combat Enlistment Bonus	15
TOTALS	100	TOTALS	100

Table XVI. A look at the data dealing with enlisted personnel reveals no change in the ordering of priorities for support personnel. The strengths of preference basically remain constant as well. Combat enlisted personnel show no change in preference of their first and second choices. Third choice, however, changes from Support Job Skills to Combat Enlistment Bonus, with 20% of the choices going to this incentive and only 17% going to Support Job Skills.

A first choice change takes place when the officers' preferences are examined. First choice for combat officers has changed to Combat Retirement (32%) while it remains the same for support officers (Support Advanced Rank at 44% preference). Support Advanced Rank drops to second place for combat officers (31%) and Support Job Skills retains its second place position for support officers (30%). In the area of third and fourth choice there is no change in the ordering of priorities for combat or support officers, with only slight changes in the strengths of preference.

Finally, it should be pointed out that while there was a reversal in first choice of the combat officers' ordering, there is only a one percentage point (1%) difference in the strength of preference between first and second choice (32% and 31%, respectively). Therefore, while Table XVI produced some changes in preference from the original, the changes are not of sufficient magnitude to suggest that rank determines the original ordering of priorities between combat and support soldiers.

The data in Table XVII show what happens to the original ordering of priorities when marital status is held constant. With the exception of some minor changes in percentages indicating strength of preference, the only change in priorities from the original ordering is to be found

on the combat side of the partial dealing with single personnel. The change mentioned only takes place in the third and fourth choice, where Combat Enlistment Bonus was chosen by 22% of the respondents in this category, and only 16% went to Support Job Skills. Support Advanced Rank remains the first choice for all categories.

TABLE XVI

COMPARISON OF SERVICE INCENTIVE PRIORITIES BETWEEN COMBAT AND SUPPORT PERSONNEL, HOLDING RANK OF RESPONDENT CONSTANT*

Enlisted			
Combat Personnel	%	Support Personnel	%
Support Advanced Rank	36	Support Advanced Rank	40
Combat Retirement	27	Support Job Skills	23
Combat Enlistment Bonus	20	Combat Retirement	21
Support Job Skills	17	Combat Enlistment Bonus	16
TOTALS	100	TOTALS	99
N = 156		N = 229	
Officer			
Combat Personnel	%	Support Personnel	%
Combat Retirement	32	Support Advanced Rank	44
Support Advanced Rank	31	Support Job Skills	30
Support Job Skills	23	Combat Retirement	18
Combat Enlistment Bonus	13	Combat Enlistment Bonus	08
TOTALS	99	TOTALS	100
N = 36		N = 62	

*Responses from six Warrant Officers were not considered in this analysis.

TABLE XVII

COMPARISON OF SERVICE INCENTIVE PRIORITIES BETWEEN COMBAT AND SUPPORT PERSONNEL, HOLDING MARITAL STATUS OF RESPONDENT CONSTANT*

Single			
Combat Personnel	%	Support Personnel	%
Support Advanced Rank	38	Support Advanced Rank	44
Combat Retirement	25	Support Job Skills	24
Combat Enlistment Bonus	22	Combat Retirement	17
Support Job Skills	16	Combat Enlistment Bonus	15
TOTALS	101	TOTALS	100
N = 82		N = 75	
Married			
Combat Personnel	%	Support Personnel	%
Support Advanced Rank	32	Support Advanced Rank	39
Combat Retirement	31	Support Job Skills	26
Support Job Skills	21	Combat Retirement	21
Combat Enlistment Bonus	17	Combat Enlistment Bonus	15
TOTALS	101	TOTALS	101
N = 100		N = 204	

*Data from 18 divorced and 10 separated personnel were not considered in this analysis.

Thus, as the data in Table XVII indicate, marital status of the respondents has little influence on the original ordering of priorities.

An overview of Table XVIII shows that length of time in service has

TABLE XVIII

COMPARISONS OF SERVICE INCENTIVE PRIORITIES BETWEEN COMBAT AND SUPPORT PERSONNEL, HOLDING CONSTANT ON RESPONDENTS' LENGTH OF SERVICE

Combat Personnel	%	Support Personnel	%
<2 Years			
Support Advanced Rank	38	Support Advanced Rank	42
Combat Retirement	24	Support Job Skills	25
Combat Enlistment Bonus	21	Combat Retirement	17
Support Job Skills	17	Combat Enlistment Bonus	16
TOTALS	100	TOTALS	100
N = 91		N = 105	
2 to 9 Years			
Combat Personnel	%	Support Personnel	%
Support Advanced Rank	33	Support Advanced Rank	42
Combat Retirement	29	Support Job Skills	25
Support Job Skills	20	Combat Retirement	19
Combat Enlistment Bonus	17	Combat Enlistment Bonus	15
TOTALS	99	TOTALS	101
N = 71		N = 117	
10 or More Years			
Combat Personnel	%	Support Personnel	%
Combat Retirement	36	Support Advanced Rank	35
Support Advanced Rank	29	Support Job Skills	27
Support Job Skills	18	Combat Retirement	26
Combat Enlistment Bonus	17	Combat Enlistment Bonus	13
TOTALS	100	TOTALS	101
N = 30		N = 75	

no great effect on the original ordering between type of unit and preference for service incentives as shown in Table XV. Only two minor changes can be found throughout the partialed table. First, as was the case with single combat personnel and combat enlisted personnel, combat personnel with less than two years of service show a change from the original ordering of priorities in that Combat Enlistment Bonus is the third choice and Support Job Skills is fourth, with 21% and 17% preference, respectively.

The other change takes place in the data dealing with combat personnel having 10 or more years of service, where Support Advanced Rank gives way to Combat Retirement as the first choice. Combat Retirement received 36% preference while Support Advanced Rank had 29%.

Throughout the remainder of Table XVIII there is no change in the ordering of priorities, and strengths of preference remain relatively unchanged.

The influence of civilian education on the basic ordering is shown in Table XIX. Combat personnel who had completed high school or less show a change from the original ordering in their third and fourth choices. Combat Enlistment Bonus becomes the third choice with 20% preference, and Support Job Skills becomes fourth choice with 18% preference.

The ordering of priorities for the remainder of Table XIX is the same as that found in the basic ordering (Table XV). Again, there is not sufficient change in Table XIX to say that civilian education determines the ordering of service incentive priorities between combat and support soldiers.

TABLE XIX

COMPARISON OF SERVICE INCENTIVE PRIORITIES BETWEEN COMBAT AND SUPPORT PERSONNEL, HOLDING CONSTANT ON RESPONDENTS' CIVILIAN EDUCATION

High School or Less			
Combat Personnel	%	Support Personnel	%
Support Advanced Rank	35	Support Advanced Rank	40
Combat Retirement	27	Support Job Skills	23
Combat Enlistment Bonus	20	Combat Retirement	20
Support Job Skills	18	Combat Enlistment Bonus	17
TOTALS	100	TOTALS	100
N = 140		N = 201	
More Than High School			
Combat Personnel	%	Support Personnel	%
Support Advanced Rank	34	Support Advanced Rank	40
Combat Retirement	29	Support Job Skills	29
Support Job Skills	22	Combat Retirement	20
Combat Enlistment Bonus	15	Combat Enlistment Bonus	10
TOTALS	100	TOTALS	99
N = 52		N = 96	

Conclusions Regarding Service Incentives

While the author feels obligated to make the deicision to substantively accept the null hypothesis of no relationship between whether a person is a combat or support soldier and his preference for career-inducing service incentives, several statements can be made based on the

data made available as a result of this research:

1. Support personnel clearly prefer the support-type incentives offered over either of the offered combat incentives.

2. There appears to be more unity among support personnel regarding preferences for service incentives. This was evidenced by the fact that there was no change in the ordering of priorities of support personnel throughout the entire process of third-variable analysis. During this process, there were six instances in which the ordering of priorities changed for combat personnel.

3. Entering the Army with an advanced rank based on job-related civilian experience appears to be the most popular of the incentives offered. Only combat officers and combat people with 10 or more years of service showed a somewhat higher preference for serving in a combat army with early retirement as an incentive.

4. Making a combat army a career with a sizeable enlistment bonus as an incentive proved to be the least popular of all choices offered. This is a most interesting finding considering that, at present, a combat enlistment bonus is the only incentive offered to get enlisted personnel to join combat arms branches in today's Army. Furthermore, this finding takes on additional meaning when coupled with a statement made earlier in this paper regarding the shortages of combat arms personnel in today's Army.

Authoritarianism

Table XX presents the data used to test the hypothesis that combat soldiers are more likely to score high on authoritarianism than are support soldiers. As the data in Table XX indicate, the Chi-Square value derived requires acceptance of the null hypothesis (H_{03}). The relationship between whether a person is a combat or support soldier and his level of authoritarianism was found to be statistically insignificant ($p > .05$) and the strength of association was very weak ($Q = .165$). However, it should be pointed out that in spite of its statistical weakness, the direction of the relationship is as was hypothesized in that 57% of the combat soldiers had high authoritarianism whereas 49% of the

support soldiers scored high.

TABLE XX

RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN TYPE OF UNIT AND RESPONDENTS' LEVEL OF AUTHORITARIANISM

	Combat	Support
Low Authoritarianism	94(43)*	170(51)
High Authoritarianism	125(57)	162(49)
TOTALS	219	332

$X^2 = 3.302$; d.f. = 1; $p > .05$; Q = .165; N = 551.

*Numbers in parentheses are percentages.

The null hypothesis continues to be accepted ($p > .05$) when the original data are held constant for rank of the respondent. These data are reported in Table XXI. The strength of association for the data dealing with enlisted personnel remains very weak (Q = .171), and virtually disappears for the officers (Q = .049). The direction of relationship remains positive within both partials. As the data indicate, not only is the dichotomy of attitudes regarding this variable greater among enlisted persons than officers, but enlisted personnel appear to be considerably more authoritarian than are officers (high authoritarian scores for combat and support enlisted were 63% and 52%, respectively, while they were 30% and 28% for combat and support

officers). The change in Q values from the original indicates a specification of the relationship.

TABLE XXI

RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN TYPE OF UNIT AND RESPONDENTS' LEVEL OF AUTHORITARIANISM, HOLDING CONSTANT ON RANK*

	Enlisted		Officer	
	Combat	Support	Combat	Support
Low Authoritarianism	63(37)**	119(48)	26(70)	47(72)
High Authoritarianism	114(63)	141(52)	11(30)	18(28)
TOTALS	182	260	37	65

Enlisted: $X^2 = 2.764$; d.f. = 1; $p > .05$; Q = .171; N = 442.
Officer: $X^2 = .00008$; d.f. = 1; $p > .05$; Q = .049; N = 102.

*Seven Warrant Officers were not considered in this analysis.
**Numbers in parentheses are percentages.

Table XXII presents the data that result from an investigation of the original relationship, holding marital status of the respondents constant. The null hypothesis is accepted for both marital categories ($p > .05$) and relatively unchanged (Q = .215 for single and .103 for married personnel). The direction of relationship remains positive as was predicted.

The influence of length of time in the Army on the original relationship is reported in Table XXIII. The null hypothesis is rejected ($p < .05$) for the data dealing with persons who have served for less than

TABLE XXII

RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN TYPE OF UNIT AND RESPONDENTS' LEVEL OF AUTHORITARIANISM, HOLDING CONSTANT ON MARTIAL STATUS*

	Single		Married	
	Combat	Support	Combat	Support
Low Authoritarianism	39(40)**	44(51)	52(47)	118(52)
High Authoritarianism	59(60)	43(49)	58(53)	107(48)
TOTALS	98	87	110	225

Single: $X^2 = 1.750$; d.f. = 1; $p > .05$; Q = .215; N = 185.
Married: $X^2 = .597$; d.f. = 1; $p > .05$; Q = .103; N = 335.

*Twenty-one divorced and 10 separated personnel were not considered in this analysis.
**Numbers in parentheses are percentages.

TABLE XXIII

RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN TYPE OF UNIT AND RESPONDENTS' AUTHORITARIANISM HOLDING CONSTANT ON LENGTH OF SERVICE*

	<2 Years		2 to 9 Years		10 or More Years	
	Combat	Support	Combat	Support	Combat	Support
Low Authoritarianism	37(35)*	58(50)	45(55)	74(55)	12(39)	38(48)
High Authoritarianism	69(65)	59(50)	37(45)	61(45)	19(61)	42(52)
TOTALS	106	117	82	135	31	80

<2 Years: $X^2 = 4.311$; d.f. = 1; $p < .05$; Q = .294; N = 223.
2 to 9 Years: $X^2 = .017$; d.f. = 1; $p > .05$; Q = .001; N = 217.
10 or More Years: $X^2 = .387$; d.f. = 1; $p > .05$; Q = .177; N = 111.

*Numbers in parentheses are percentages.

two years, and accepted ($p > .05$) for the other two categories of length of service. Strength of association shows a relative increase for the <2 years service category ($Q = .294$), disappears for the category of 2 to 9 years ($Q = .001$) and remains relatively unchanged for the category of people who have served for 10 years or longer ($Q = .177$).

The direction of the relationship is as hypothesized for the first and third categories. Since there is no relationship within the 2 to 9 year category, it follows that there is no direction. Although the second and third partial lack statistical significance, the changes in the strengths of relationship indicate that length of time in service specifies the original relationship between type of unit and degree of authoritarianism.

Chi-Square data relative to the influence of amount of civilian education on the original relationship calls for the acceptance ($p > .05$) of the null hypothesis for both partials. This information is in Table XXIV. There is no significant change in the strength of association ($Q = .136$ and $.163$ for people with high school or less and people with more than high school, respectively). The relationship is positive for both education levels. Finally, Table XXIV indicates that regardless of whether a person is a combat or support soldier, the less educated are considerably more authoritarian than those who have more than a high school education.

Summary of Authoritarianism

As was shown in Table XX, the data resulting from this research did not substantiate the hypothesis that combat soldiers are more authoritarian than support soldiers. In addition to this basic finding, three

important observations can be made on the basis of the information at hand:

1. Enlisted people are more authoritarian than officers.

2. Army personnel who have served for less than two years, or ten years or longer are more authoritarian than those who have been in the service from two to nine years. This is especially true for combat soldiers, where the partial percentages for high authoritarianism are 65%, 45%, and 61% for soldiers with less than two years, two to nine years, and ten or more years of service, respectively.

3. Respondents who have completed high school or less education were considerably more authoritarian than those who have more than a high school education.

TABLE XXIV

RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN TYPE OF UNIT AND RESPONDENTS' AUTHORITARIANISM HOLDING CONSTANT ON EDUCATION

	High School or Less		More Than High School	
	Combat	Support	Combat	Support
Low Authoritarianism	60(37)*	99(43)	34(61)	71(68)
High Authoritarianism	103(63)	129(57)	22(39)	33(32)
TOTALS	163	228	56	104

High School or Less: $X^2 = 1.458$; d.f. = 1; $p > .05$; Q = .136; N = 391.
More Than High School: $X^2 = 0.616$; d.f. = 1; $p > .05$; Q = .163; N = 160.

*Numbers in parentheses are percentages.

CHAPTER VI

LIMITATIONS AND DISCUSSION

Limitations

The problems encountered in administering the questionnaire have already been mentioned. A failure to carry out the idealized sampling process must clearly qualify as a limitation to a study in which the results are to be generalized from the sample to the population as a whole. While this shortcoming is recognized, the author feels that the results of the research are valid and reliable because there is no reason to think that the attitudes of the personnel used in this study are not similar to the attitudes of personnel within the Army in general. Therefore, while the sampling procedure used is considered a limitation, it is not a serious limitation.

The scale used to measure combat and support ethos is another limiting factor. Although the scales used were considered acceptable in their ability to measure the attitudes they were designed to measure, the low correlation coefficients (especially the correlation coefficient for item #24 which was .15) would suggest the desirability of a better developed ethos scale.

A third limitation lies within the research sample. As was mentioned earlier in this paper, a clear distinction between combat soldiers and support soldiers was required in order to carry out this

study. However, it must be remembered that there are many people in today's Army who do not fit into either of the clearly defined categories established in this paper. The great number of people who fall into the "gray" area possibly have distinct attitudes regarding the variables measured in this study, and these attitudes would certainly have to be investigated prior to instituting any wide-scale reorganization of the Army.

Finally, one must bear in mind that this study was basically a test of Bradford and Brown's (1973) model. Therefore, the study itself, the findings and the conclusions can only be applied to the variables and their parameters as outlined in Figure 1. Obviously, the establishment of new parameters on the number and type of incentives, or a different approach to the ethos issue may well yield different results. In several instances the established parameters presented problems for the researcher. This issue will be addressed in further detail under the heading "recommendations".

Discussion

Table XXV should provide a useful reference in the interpretive discussion of the data at hand. The Service Incentive variable was not included in this table because paired comparison data do not provide easy comparison with the procedures used throughout the remainder of the analysis. Therefore, an interpretation of paired comparison findings will follow the discussion of the ethic and authoritarianism issues.

Rank was the only third variable that specified relationships throughout Table XXV. Regarding combat ethic and support ethic, the

TABLE XXV

TABULATION OF DATA REGARDING COMBAT ETHIC, SUPPORT ETHIC, AND AUTHORITARIANISM

Variable	Combat		Support		Statistically Significant (.05)	Q	Relationship	Effect of Control Variable
	Low %	High %	Low %	High %				
Combat Ethic	34	66	54	46	Yes	.387	Moderate	
By Rank:								Specification
Enlisted	35	65	52	48	Yes	.335	Weak	
Officer	30	70	60	40	Yes	.560	Moderate/Strong	
By Marital Status:								None
Single	37	63	54	46	Yes	.339	Weak	
Married	32	68	55	45	Yes	.449	Moderate	
By Length in Service:								None
<2 Years	36	64	55	45	Yes	.367	Weak	
2 to 9 Years	32	68	54	46	Yes	.434	Moderate	
10 or More Years	32	68	51	49	No	.377	Weak/Moderate	
By Education:								None
High School or Less	32	68	50	50	Yes	.362	Weak	
More than High School	39	61	62	38	Yes	.424	Moderate	
Support Ethic	60	40	47	53	Yes	-.262	Weak	
By Rank:								Specification
Enlisted	58	42	48	52	Yes	-.199	Weak	
Officer	73	27	45	55	Yes	-.540	Moderate/Strong	

TABLE XXV (Continued)

Variable	Combat Low %	Combat High %	Support Low %	Support High %	Statistically Significant (.05)	Q	Relationship	Effect of Control Variable
By Marital Status:								Specification
Single	60	40	55	45	No	-.103	None	
Married	61	39	43	57	Yes	-.346	Weak	
By Length in Service:								Specification
<2 Years	66	34	52	48	Yes	-.282	Weak	
2 to 9 Years	54	46	47	53	No	-.139	None/Weak	
10 or More Years	58	42	40	60	No	-.350	Weak	
By Education:								Specification
High School or Less	58	42	47	53	No	-.204	Weak	
More than High School	68	32	46	54	Yes	-.422	Moderate	
Authoritarianism	43	57	51	49	No	.165	Weak	
By Rank:								Specification
Enlisted	37	63	48	52	No	.171	Weak	
Officer	70	30	72	28	No	.049	None	
By Marital Status:								None
Single	40	60	51	49	No	.215	Weak	
Married	47	53	52	48	No	.103	None	
By Length of Service:								Specification
<2 Years	35	65	50	50	Yes	.294	Weak	
2 to 9 Years	55	45	55	45	No	.001	None	
10 or More Years	39	61	48	52	No	.177	Weak	

TABLE XXV (Continued)

Variable	Combat		Support		Statistically Significant (.05)	Q	Relationship	Effect of Control Variable
	Low %	High %	Low %	High %				
By Education:								None
High School or Less	37	63	43	57	No	.136	None/Weak	
More than High School	61	39	68	32	No	.163	Weak	

combat officers seem to be the most decisive in determining the relationships. For example, 70% of the combat officers showed high preference for a combat ethic, and only 27% of the combat officers showed a high preference for a support ethic. Although the support officers preferred a support ethic over a combat ethic, their feelings on the subject were not nearly as extreme as was the case for combat officers. This strong feeling on the part of combat officers may well be explained by the pride and espirit de corps that the combat arms branches try to engender in their personnel. That is not to say that the support branches do not have pride, but support slogans such as "We Support" cannot easily compete with such combat slogans as "Follow Me", "Infantry, the Queen of Battle", "Artillery, the King of Battle", "Armor Provides Shock Action". In addition to the emotional impact of the combat arms spirit, there is another factor which may influence the disparity of views between combat and support officers. It may well be that the support officer is more conscious of the Army team concept than is the combat officer. The support officer probably feels that his services are critical to the efficient operation of the combat team and, as such, somewhat identifies with some of the views shared by combat arms officers. The combat officer, on the other hand, is probably more selfish of his branch. He has a tendency to over-estimate the value of his branch and underestimate the value of other branches within the team. The Army constantly tries to remind each combat branch that it is part of a team and must train and think as such. The combat officers' jealousy of their branches may well account for the high combat ethic and low support ethic scores by combat officers.

The relationship between rank and degree of authoritarianism was an interesting finding. As Table XXV indicates, enlisted personnel are considerably more authoritarian than officers. A look further down the table reveals that there is a close relationship in authoritarianism percentiles between rank and education. The fact that the majority of Army officers have in excess of a high school education not only adds credibility to the commonly accepted notion that the more educated are less extreme in their views regarding such issues as authoritarianism, but also explains the apparent relationship of rank and education scores regarding authoritarianism.

Another interesting phenomenon in Table XXV is the relationship between length of time in service and authoritarianism. The 2 to 9 year groups (combat and support) appear to be considerably less authoritarian than the <2 years and the 10 or more years partials. The only plausible explanation for this strange relationship lies in the career status of these three groups. The <2 years group consists exclusively of volunteers. Furthermore, the 10 or more years in service group can be considered an all-volunteer group since they have voluntarily committed themselves to making the army a career. The 2 to 9 year group, however, is unique in the sense that many of the personnel comprising this category are draftees who, for one reason or another have re-enlisted, but probably have not yet committed themselves to making the Army a career.

A final relationship worth mentioning is the effect of marital status on the support soldiers' preference for a support ethic. While single support personnel actually scored low regarding their preference for a support ethic (55% scored low), married support personnel showed

a 12% increase in preference for a support ethic. This may well be due to an increased sense of self preservation resulting from the marriage experience.

In the area of service incentives, the reasons for changes from the basic ordering of priorities are relatively easily explained. No changes took place on the support side. On the combat personnel side, Combat Retirement found the first choice position in two cases. In the first case, combat officers gave highest priority to combat retirement, which indicates that officers tend to plan ahead a little more than do enlisted personnel. In the second case, combat personnel with 10 or more years in service chose Combat Retirement. This makes sense since a 15-year retirement plan would make the personnel in the 10 years or more partial either eligible for retirement, or close thereto.

Third place preference was given to Combat Enlistment Bonus by personnel who were interested in a fast, money-in-the-hand incentive. This group consisted of single, enlisted, combat personnel who had less than two years in service and whose educational level was high school or less. At that, this is not a real interesting finding since these changes in relative priority from fourth to third place did little to influence the over-all service incentives picture.

CHAPTER VII

FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Findings

The following propositional statement provided the framework for this study: "There is a significant difference in attitudes between combat and support soldiers in the areas of discipline, service incentives, and ethic of service." Analysis of the data pertinent to this issue reveals that only certain parts of the theory are substantiated by the findings.

The data clearly indicate that combat soldiers show stronger preference for a combat ethic than do support soldiers. Third variable analysis reveals the following specified influences on the basic relationship: Of the third variables considered, only rank specified the original relationship. It was found that 70% of the combat officers showed a high preference for a combat ethic, while only 40% of the support officers showed a high preference. Within the enlisted ranks there was very little change from the original relationship.

Regarding preference for a support ethic of service, the data indicate that support soldiers do, in fact, prefer a support ethic more often than do combat soldiers. During third variable analysis it was found that rank specifies the original relationship. The influencing factor in this relationship was the combat officer category, where only

27% showed high preference for a support ethic. Fifty-five percent of the support officers showed high preference for a support ethic.

Marital status also specified the relationship between type of unit and preference for a support ethic of service. Within the married category, only 39% of the combat personnel scored high, while 57% of the support people showed high preference for a support ethic of service.

Further specification was shown by length of time in service, where high preference scores for a support ethic between combat and support personnel were 34%, 46%, and 42% for combat soldiers and 48%, 53%, and 60% for support soldiers with less than two years, 2 to 9 years, and 10 or more years, respectively. As can be seen from these percentages, the largest percentile difference between combat and support soldiers in the high preference category is shown in the category dealing with personnel who have served for ten years or longer (a difference of 18%) while the category dealing with those who have served 2 to 9 years shows the smallest difference (7%).

Finally, education specified the relationship between type of unit and preference for a support ethic of service. In the category dealing with respondents who have more than a high school education, 32% of the combat personnel showed a high preference for a support ethic, and 54% of the support personnel scored high.

Statistical analysis of data regarding authoritarianism reveals no statistically significant difference in degree of authoritarianism between combat and support personnel. While third variable influence on the basic relationship was either nonexistent or weak, data indicate that rank and time in service did, to a limited degree, specify the original relationship. Sixty-three percent of the enlisted combat

personnel scored high in authoritarianism, while 52% of the support personnel scored high. Within the officer category there was virtually no difference between combat and support officers regarding authoritarianism, with both categories scoring very low (high scores in authoritarianism were 30% and 28% for combat and support officers, respectively).

As was mentioned, the other third variable that specified the original relationship was length of time in service. Of the combat personnel with <2 years in service, 65% scored high on authoritarianism, while 50% of the support personnel scored high. High scores for personnel with 10 or more years in service were 61% and 52% for combat and support personnel, respectively. In the 2 to 9 years service category there was no difference in authoritarianism between combat and support personnel (both had high scores of 45%).

Regarding service incentives, the data indicate that support personnel show a strong preference for the support-type incentive offered. The basic ordering of priorities on the part of support personnel remains stable throughout the entire process of third variable analysis. Among combat soldiers, the incentive of joining a support army with an advanced rank based on civilian experience generally was the favorite choice, followed by joining a combat army with early retirement. The incentive of joining a combat army with a sizeable enlistment bonus was the least favorite with the following curious exception: When holding constant for rank, marital status, length of time in service, and education, combat soldiers who were enlisted personnel, single, had less than two years in service and had a high school education or less reversed the ordering of third and fourth

choice by selecting Combat Enlistment Bonus over Support Job Skills.

Conclusions

Despite the "obviousness" of the differences in attitudes between combat and support soldiers in the areas of discipline, service incentives, and ethic of service, the data resulting from this research generally fail to support the obvious. Ethos was the only one of the three primary variables involved in which a statistically significant difference was found between combat and support soldiers.

Two of the three propositions used in this research had to be rejected based on the data at hand. Although there are differences in attitudes between combat and support soldiers, the differences do not appear to be as strong as Bradford and Brown (1973) or the author of this paper, thought they were. Data resulting from this research would suggest that substantial changes in the organization of today's Army, based on the assumed differences in attitudes between combat and support soldiers, are premature.

A failure to substantiate one's theory certainly is somewhat demoralizing and frustrating. Nevertheless, as was pointed out in the introduction of this paper, an arbitrary change in the organization of the Army could have extremely unfavorable results. Based on the results of this research, the author would certainly recommend considerable additional research prior to advocating organizational changes in today's Army.

Recommendations

Results of this study suggest further research of the topic at

hand. Present data do not warrant the organizational changes suggested by Bradford and Brown, but the results of this investigation show that, following additional research, some changes in the Army may be desirable.

Prior to establishing variable parameters, a detailed survey should be conducted to determine the likes and dislikes, and suggested service incentives of personnel currently in the Army. Based on the results of such a survey, a set of reasonable, acceptable incentives could be provided in a paired comparison test. Hopefully, such a process would eliminate a clearly unacceptable alternative, as Combat Enlistment Bonus appeared to be in the present study.

The low correlation coefficients in the Ethos scales indicate that additional work in the development of a sophisticated scale to measure this variable is called for.

Finally, this researcher is of the opinion that the Army should take an immediate, hard look at the current policy of offering a monetary bonus to entice soldiers into joining a combat arms branch. Current combat arms personnel shortages, coupled with the unpopularity of a combat enlistment bonus found in this study, would indicate that the Army may be able to eliminate the combat enlistment bonus with insignificant unfavorable consequences.

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APPENDIX

THE RESEARCH INSTRUMENT

DIRECTIONS

1. Please DO NOT write your name on the questionnaire.

2. Please answer all items

3. Please mark the space preceding the response that applies to you with an X.

PART I

5. What is your sex?
   _____1. Male
   _____2. Female

6. You are an:
   _____1. Enlisted Person
   _____2. Officer
   _____3. Warrant Officer

7. Marital status:
   _____1. Single
   _____2. Married
   _____3. Divorced
   _____4. Separated
   _____5. Widowed

8. How long have you been in the Army?
   _____1. Less than 6 months
   _____2. At least 6 months but less than 1 year
   _____3. At least 1 year but less than 2 years
   _____4. At least 2 years but less than 5 years
   _____5. At least 5 years but less than 10 years
   _____6. At least 10 years but less than 20 years
   _____7. 20 years or longer

9. How much civilian education have you completed?
   _____1. 8 years or less
   _____2. More than 8 years, but did not finish high school
   _____3. Completed high school (or obtained equivalent GED Certificate)
   _____4. Completed 2 years of college
   _____5. Obtained Bachelor's Degree
   _____6. Obtained Master's Degree
   _____7. Obtained Doctor's Degree

10. Please indicate the type of unit you are currently assigned to:

_____Infantry	_____AG
_____Armor	_____Finance
_____Field Artillery	_____Transportation
_____Air Defense Artillery	_____Ordnance
_____Engineer	_____Quartermaster
_____Signal	_____Medical
_____Military Intelligence	_____Legal
_____Divisional MP	

_____Other (Please Specify) _____

_____

11. Within your unit, what is your specific job assignment?

_____1. Mechanic
_____2. Medic
_____3. Supply
_____4. Clerk
_____5. Cook
_____6. Other (Please Specify) _____

_____

PART II

Please respond by indicating your degree of agreement or disagreement to each question by circling the appropriate number.

12. I think that true commitment to the service of one's country requires the unqualified willingness to lose one's life in combat.

Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly agree

13. Obedience and respect for authority are the most important virtues children should learn.

Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly agree

14. Science has its place, but there are many important things that can never possibly be understood by the human mind.

Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly agree

15. Every person should have complete faith in some supernatural power whose decisions he obeys without question.

Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly agree

16. Young people sometimes get rebellious ideas, but as they grow up they ought to get over them and settle down.

Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly agree

17. My greatest job satisfaction comes from maintaining the highest level of competence in complex technical skills.

Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly agree

18. What this country needs most, more than laws and political programs, is a few courageous, tireless, devoted leaders in whom the people can put their faith.

Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly agree

19. No sane, normal, decent person could ever think of hurting a close friend or relative.

Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly agree

20. I enjoy working in an environment that calls for frequent physical hardships and personal danger.

Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly agree

21. Nobody ever learned anything really important except through suffering.

Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly agree

22. A person who has bad manners, habits, and breeding can hardly expect to get along with decent people.

Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly agree

23. What the youth needs most is strict discipline, rugged determination, and the will to work and fight for family and country.

Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly agree

24. I would subject myself to personal danger only under unusual circumstances.

Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly agree

25. An insult to our honor should always be punished.

Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly agree

26. Sex crimes, such as rape and attacks on children, deserve more than mere imprisonment; such criminals ought to be publicly whipped, or worse.

Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly agree

27. There is hardly anything lower than a person who does not feel a great love, gratitude, and respect for his parents.

Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly agree

28. I get the greatest satisfaction from successfully completing tasks that require physical strength and exertion.

Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly agree

29. Most of our social problems would be solved if we could somehow get rid of the immoral, crooked, and feebleminded people.

Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly agree

30. If people would talk less and work more, everybody would be better off.

Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly agree

31. Homosexuals are hardly better than criminals and ought to be severely punished.

Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly agree

32. I think that the continuous development of support skills (clerk, medic, lawyer, mechanic, supply) is just as important to the service of one's country as the willingness to lose one's life in combat.

Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly agree

PART III

The following set of questions provides a number of hypothetical reasons for making the army a career. Consider each of the following sets of responses. From <u>each set</u> select the response you would favor most. Mark your choice from each set of responses in the space provided.

41. _____1. I am prepared to face the hardship and danger associated with a combat unit as long as I can retire after 15 years of service.
_____2. I would choose a career in a combat unit for an enlistment bonus totaling one year's wages.

42. _____1. I would choose a career in a combat unit for an enlistment bonus totaling one year's wages.
_____2. I would choose a career in a support unit if my civilian-developed job skills enabled me to enter the service with an advanced rank (NCO for enlisted men, field grade for officers).

43. _____1. Knowing that my civilian-related job skills will continuously be updated and developed would make me join a support unit, even though I would have to serve for 30 years before I could retire.
_____2. I am prepared to face the hardship and danger associated with a combat unit as long as I can retire after 15 years of service.

44. _____1. I would choose a career in a support unit if my civilian-developed job skills enabled me to enter the service with an advanced rank (NCO for enlisted men, field grade for officers).
_____2. Knowing that my civilian-related job skills will continuously be updated and developed would make me join a support unit, even though I would have to serve for 30 years before I could retire.

45. _____1. I am prepared to face the hardship and danger associated with a combat unit as long as I can retire after 15 years of service.
_____2. I would choose a career in a support unit if my civilian-developed job skills enabled me to enter the service with an advanced rank (NCO for enlisted men, field grade for officers).

46. _____1. Knowing that my civilian-related job skills will continuously be updated and developed would make me join a support unit, even though I would have to serve for 30 years before I could retire.
_____2. I would choose a career in a combat unit for an enlistment bonus totaling one year's wages.

PART IV

Please list the three things you like most about making the Army a career.

1. _____
_____
2. _____
_____
3. _____
_____

Please list the three things you dislike most (or like least) about making the Army a career.

1. _____
_____
2. _____
_____
3. _____
_____

VITA

George John McRae

Candidate for the Degree of

Master of Science

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Biographical:

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