MEANING AND MOTIVES: THE SOCIAL

CONSTRUCTION OF DELINQUENT

IDENTITY

By

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Bachelor of Arts

Oklahoma Baptist University

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the requirements for
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MEANING AND MOTIVES: THE SOCIAL

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PREFACE

I assume that one of the most fundamental characteristics of humans and a social order is value commitment. I mean by this nothing more or less than the fact that a person who is capable of drawing or holding his breath would appear to be an individual with a value commitment, however strong or weak that commitment might be and however well or ill thought-out his decision might be. One might suppose that this statement would be well received amongst those who are committed to understanding something as unavoidably moral as "deviant behavior". Certainly it should be well received by those who are committed to such a morally laden enterprise as "helping" their fellow man. In fact, it does not seem to be well received by many in these circles. By a curious twist, many researchers and others who claim either to expand our knowledge about people or to be "helping" people, freely commit themselves to certain values in a context in which values are not discussed. Whatever values they are committed to or will admit to, these are presumably not allowed to enter the decision making processes of their work.

In this context, values are seen as the Pandora's box, which, if opened, may unleash the horrors of judgement. Visions of a crude Inquisition are conjured up and contrasted with a "scientific" or more "progressive" understanding which may lead to a more "humane" treatment of the "afflicted". The results are neither an increased understanding of people (the "phenomenon") nor humane treatment.

Indeed, one understands much more about the researcher or the one "helping" than he does about the ones researched or "helped". The researcher's or helper's values remain thinly veiled and in the attempt to veil them he becomes committed to listening to himself rather than the people he seeks to understand or "help". Here, the concept of humanity becomes the equivalent of narcissism.

In the present study, a major portion of which is devoted to looking at "helpers", I hope my values are readily apparent. It is not the commitment to values which leads to ignorance, but the prejudice of Truth. The world of the actors which I describe can be brought to the reader only through the filter of my own values. And, the understanding which may emerge from this study dissolves in any other context.

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CHAPTER I

STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

The general problem this research proposes to focus upon is the process whereby identity comes to be constructed in the interaction between actors. More specifically, we seek to analyze the process whereby impugned identity is established. It is not altogether too prosaic to state that between the areas of selves which are presented (Goffman, 1959) and identities which are spoiled (Goffman, 1963a), there exists an area in which impugned identity is a problematic subject and the outcome of social interaction.

Of course, identity is encompassed by a larger process which includes self and all symbolically designated objects. We will now turn to a consideration of this process in an attempt to delimit more clearly the area of our concern.

Identity as a Symbolic Process

The identification of objects, i.e., their symbolic designation, may be seen as one of the most important features of the interaction between actors. W. I. Thomas' famous dictum that situations which are defined as real are real in their consequences, may be taken as an indication of the importance we must accord definitions in any consideration of interaction. The definitions or symbolic designations which center upon the participants of the interaction must, of course,

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be of paramount importance inasmuch as <u>interaction</u> itself implies

that the crucial aspect of action is that directed toward others.

With respect to definitions which center upon actors we are talk-

ing about self and identity. Identity may be understood as a process

of situating an individual, much as we understand the process of

defining any object in terms of categorizing or placing it in a

meaningful relationship with other objects (the meaningfullness of

the relationship being decided by our purposes at hand, see: Louch,

1966: 44).

> To situate the person as a social object is to bring him
> together with other objects so situated, and, at the same
> time to set him apart from still other objects (Stone,
> 1975: 82).

It should be noted that this placement process is part of a larger

process of defining described by Mead (1932). According to Mead,

the "things" of reality are transformed into socially meaningful

"objects" by our acts toward them (see: McCall & Simmons, 1970 for

a brief description of this process). Placement in this context is

an act directed toward an individual and is part of a larger complex

of action directed toward both the individual and the objects he is

placed with and separated from.

Distinction Between Self and Identity

Closely associated with the concept of identity, the concept

of self also involves definitions of an actor. Mead (1970: 257)

states that, "The self arises in conduct when the individual becomes

a social object in experience to himself." This experience comes

about in the process of taking the role of the other, which links

self to interaction and saves Mead from a hopeless psychologistic reductionism which would lodge self in the consciousness of the actor. Thus, "The self of the human organism is established by the action of that organism and the action of others with respect to it" (Brissett & Edgley, 1975: 55).

Identity and self are seldom clearly distinguished in the literature. Becker speaks of the word creating us even as we create our identity by exercising our powers to act meaningfully. And he refers to the self as "...an identifiable locus of word possibilities" (E. Becker, 1975: 58). Goffman (1959) speaks of the presentation of self; of signs given and given off in acts of communication regarding self. It is also Goffman (1963a) who addresses himself to the "management of spoiled identity" in the same theoretical framework as the management of impressions which constitutes the presentation of self. Douglas (1970: 6-8) speaks of the self within the context of the social construction of moral meanings in which others are identified or not identified with self. Lofland (1969: 122-3; 306-7) speaks of identity as a phenomenological construct and self as a performance known only through the use of social (phenomenological) categories. Garfinkel (1956: 420) makes a distinction between "total" identities, which refers to the actor's identification in terms of a "motivational" type, and other identities in which the actor is identified as a "behavioral" type. The identification of the actor as a "motivational" type involves the identification of the "ultimate 'grounds' or 'reasons' for his performance" rather than his identification in terms of what he is expected to have done or to do as in "behavioral" typing. Klapp (1975) speaks of individuals gaining a sense of who they are

in terms of knowledge which identifies in a manner reminiscent of James' (1962: 189-226) material self. Cooley's (1922) classic formulation of the "looking glass self" would apparently lodge identity in the behavior of others. But Cooley is conerned primarily with self and not identity (also see: Sullivan, 1970 who speaks of the consensually validated self). Finally, Foote (1967: 347) speaks of identities of the self and analyzes this within the framework of identification.

> We mean by identification appropriation of and commitment to a particular identity or series of identities. As a process, it proceeds by naming; its products are ever-evolving self-conceptions—with the emphasis on the con-, that is, upon ratification by significant others.

And obviously, if we enter upon considerations of self-concept, as opposed to self, the list could go on indefinitely.

In the present study the central problem is one of identification. Specifically, as Stone (1975) has suggested, the very process by which we assume interaction takes place in any sense which has regard for meaning, i.e., in and through the process of role-taking, is, in fact, predicated upon a prior process of identification. In order to take the role of the other, we must first identify that role. Moreover, it is through this identification that self as conceived by Mead and Cooley emerges. It is in the identification of the other actor that identification with that actor may take place. When we enter the presence of others and present a self, we have done so through a process of taking the role of the other. Note, however, that in so doing we have identified that other. Furthermore, this process cannot be conceived as taking place in the mind of an Identifier, or without regard for the active participation of the Identified.

As Turner (1975) has observed, the very process of role-taking in-volves—not simply taking a role—but making a role. In this context, role-making involves improvising a performance on the basis of an imputed role. But of equal significance is the fact that this role-making also involves the creation of a role for the other as well as for the actor himself (on this point see: Davis, 1975). It is in this context that identification of the other must be seen. And it is in this process that identity comes to be constructed. The def-inition of the situation actors project in the presentation of self and upon entering the presence of others of which Goffman (1959) speaks, includes this identification of (placement of) others. And, by extension, this implies that, as Goffman (1959: 9) notes of pro-jected definitions, individuals who are so identified are themselves engaged in the process of identifying the actor and modifying the identity that has come to be constructed for them by the actor's placement of them and in the actor's presentation of self.

We may state then, that the identification of an individual is the essence of identity (cf.: Glasser & Strauss, 1970). And, fol-lowing Stone (1975: 82) we may state that:

> One's identity is established when others place him as a
> social object by assigning him the same words of identity
> that he appropriates for himself or announces. It is in the
> coincidence of placements and announcements that identity
> becomes a meaning of the self...

The essence of self lies in the process of an individual's becoming a social object unto himself, which takes place in and through the process of taking the role of the other. This process takes place only after identification of the other—what we have suggested as

definitive of identity.

Restricted Problem

Taking the aforementioned definition of identity, we seek to analyze the interaction between juveniles and social workers in which the juvenile delinquent identity comes to be established. Within the context of the welfare agency, juveniles and social workers are involved in all of the previously mentioned processes of presenting selves, taking roles, and mutual identification of the other. Moreover, with respect to at least one identity which must be constructed for the juvenile, this process of identification forms the major explicit purpose for the interaction. While juvenile and social worker may view the major objective of the interaction as establishing and working out a problem the juvenile has, in all cases the social worker, and in most cases the juvenile, realize that this also involves identification of the child (identity).

Definition of Delinquent Identity

In the context of the interactions we shall be concerned with there are several "linguistic routes" to a delinquent identity. Our attention shall be focused especially on one key element which is given in the social worker's affirmative response to the question, "Does this child require institutional confinement?" Here we are concerned with the treatment and placement of the juvenile as delinquent as much as the many terms which may be used descriptively by the social worker to depict this. Thus, we are not immediately concerned with the child described as "emotionally maladjusted" if the

social worker _places_ him primarily in terms of the issue of mental functioning and medicine; which is to say if the social worker feels the child requires "treatment" in a psychiatric hospital. We are concerned with the child described as "emotionally maladjusted", "sociopathic", "psychotic" or whatever, when he is placed in terms of the issue of morality and law; which is to say if the social worker feels the child requires "treatment" or "confinement" in a juvenile correctional facility.[1] In other words, we take the meaning of any label to be in its use and the meaning of any object to be in our action toward that object (re.: Wittgenstein, 1958; Mead, 1964: 105-13; McCall & Simmons, 1970). We should note, however, that this is not to deny the efficacy of the label delinquent, whether the child is to be institutionalized or not. Nor is this to say that the term delinquent will not be used.

Summary

Thus far we have attempted to specify our research problem by locating it in the field of a more general process. Our focus is upon the juvenile delinquent identity, which is to be understood as an instance of impugned identity; impugned identity being, in turn, an instance of identity. Identity is a symbolic process involving the placement or situating of an individual. It proceeds through the process of identification. Identification must be separated into identification _of_ and identification _with_. Identity, as distinguished from self, arises in the identification _of_ an individual. Following this, we have defined the juvenile delinquent identity in terms of the social worker's identification _of_ the

juvenile, i.e., his or her placement and treatment of the juvenile.

NOTES

[1]We should note that this definition is likely to correspond
more closely with the actors' concerns in the interaction also.
The ideological obfuscation involved in juvenile justice does not
change the realities of the situation for the juvenile. As one
juvenile told the author: "They call this a ranch, but it's a
jail. Everybody knows that; the people in town, they say somethin'
like, 'He's one of those Boy's Ranchers. He's a juvenile delin-
quent.'" Winslow and Winslow (1974: 42) relate a similar example.

CHAPTER II

MAJOR PERSPECTIVES: A CRITICAL OVERVIEW

A critical overview of some of the major perspectives which·
might be employed in an analysis of the juvenile delinquent identity
may serve as a format for the presentation of the theoretical
perspective which shall be used. This may also serve to under-
score the significance of the present research.

Traditional Theories

Traditional approaches to delinquency actually provide very
little basis for a study of juvenile delinquent identity. Their
focus is upon delinquency as a behavioral response to various
social forces. Moreover, inasmuch as identity can be viewed as
an outcome of these forces, they do not focus upon the interactions
between concretely existing people which bring this identity about.

Shaw and McKay (1942) clearly depict the individual as a
minor figure in the play of social forces in the slums that serve
to create delinquency (but not identity). Cohen (1955; 1965)
continues this tradition by making delinquency a function of a
deviant subculture, as does Miller (1958), who focuses on the more
general phenomenon of lower class culture as a "generating mileau"
for delinquency. Cloward and Ohlin (1960) reflect a more modern
variant in which the pressures of a supra-individual social structure

determine the course of action the individual will take with reference to a set of socially determined goals.

While these one sentence summaries cannot do justice to these theories (and many would not claim to be dealing with the phenomenon of identity directly), the point is that all have sought to focus upon 1) social, structural forces, rather than interaction; 2) delinquency as a predefined set of behaviors of juveniles labeled delinquent; 3) the juvenile delinquent identity as something assumed by the individual by virtue of his engaging in this predefined set of behaviors. The issue is not how an identity comes about, but what causes delinquency (which, of course, may be seen as leading to an identity).

Interactionist Theories

The Constraint Approach

A recent approach which places more emphasis upon the individual delinquent is that of Matza (1964). However, Matza's thesis that delinquents drift between control and delinquency—or in and out of a delinquent role—goes little beyond other traditional theories in answering the question of how identity is established. Presumably, the delinquent child, while not the "total victim" of uncontrollable social forces, is yet an "intermittent victim" of constraints which have broken down. In either case, delinquency becomes a status and the delinquent identity is a concommitant feature one acquires along with the status.

Some approaches have stressed the interaction of the delinquent with various others. Sykes and Matza (1957) have analyzed the

vocabulary of motives of delinquents in terms of "techniques of

neutralization" which "allow" the child to violate norms, i.e.,

engage in delinquent acts. This approach, while offering insights

into vocabularies of motives which might be applied to the social

construction of the delinquent identity, does not focus upon identity,

nor the interactions in which this identity is constructed. Indeed,

the delinquent identity is assumed.

The Career Approach

Many promising approaches to the study of delinquent identity

are suggested in related areas of deviance, although they are as

yet to receive direct application to delinquent identity. Becker

(1963) and Goffman (1961a) have separately put forth what might be

termed a career-role approach to the study of deviance. These

views emphasize the individual's assumption of the deviant role in

a sequential or developmental model. While these approaches may

serve as an overall framework within which the social construction

of a delinquent identity takes place (particularly at given stages

in which any particular construction may be viewed as a contingency),

the career-role approach focuses upon a developmental process in

which an actor gradually assumes a role. Of course, as Becker

(1963) notes, being identified as a deviant is an important part

of this sequence. But this does not answer the question as to how

the individual is so identified. Moreover, the introduction of an

organization whose purpose it is to construct identity, would

seriously call into question the implicit assumption of any role

theory, viz., that there is a certain uniformity of action which

serves to define the role.

Labeling Theory

Labeling theory, which is closely associated with career-role approaches, clearly has more to offer to an interactionist understanding of delinquent identity than any of the traditional approaches. Becker's (1963: 8) notion that, "The deviant is one to whom that label has successfully been applied" captures the significance of labeling theory's contributions to the study of deviant identity from Lemert (1951) to Schur (1971).

While the theoretical perspective to be employed owes much to labeling theory, and indeed, may draw upon certain writers who may be termed labeling theorists, "traditional" labeling theory as represented in Becker (1963) and Schur (1971) has its drawbacks with respect to the study of delinquent identity. Labeling theory contains two biases which have plagued the study of identity ever since Lemert laid their foundation in his term "tag" and in his concept of "secondary deviance". Labels, as all symbols, are not a cause of behavior, but an outcome of behavior. There is little problem with viewing identity in terms of a label (or a "tag") so long as this is conceived as a line of action. However, the moment one speaks of roles and identities in terms of "secondary deviance" (see: Schur, 1971: 10-1), the label becomes a cause in a culturalogical sense. Needless to say this criticism neither encompasses all of labeling theory nor many of the studies which have sought to focus upon only certain aspects of the labeling process which do not include "secondary deviance".

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In this context, we may cite studies of "rule-makers" which seek to analyze the development of the rules or the labels themselves which serve to define the deviant. Outside the area of delinquency, Gusfield (1963), Erikson (1966), and Smith (1966) have all contributed to this tradition. Within the area of delinquency the work of Platt (1969) stands out as the single most significant work, seeking as it does, to delienate the historical development of the delinquent label. Platt's work provides significant insights into the delinquent identity inasmuch as it delienates the "invention" of delinquency and thereby the development of the category which serves to set the delinquent child off from others. In brief, Platt convincingly demonstrates that the delinquent identity is a recent invention, which may be understood adequately only on the basis of an analysis of those who create it. At the same time, Platt's work is in the area of history and he does not address himself to how individual delinquent identities are currently constructed. Moreover, an analysis of how the category or label of delinquency came about tells us nothing about its use in concrete interactions between actors.

The recent work of Emerson (1969; 1973) provides excellent material on the concrete interactions in which the juvenile delinquent identity comes to be established in the courtroom, and Werthman (1972) has focused specifically upon how juveniles construct an identity out of the materials available to them (particularly in the school). Emerson has studied the contingencies involved in a successful denounciation of the juvenile in the courtroom, which has obvious implications for the study of delinquent

identity as it is constructed in that context (also see: Garfinkel, 1956). Werthman observes risk-taking and challenges to the authority which is assumed as a routine matter by many adults as these are used in the construction of an identity by juveniles, teachers, parents, and others. Juveniles use risk-taking situations as the material out of which an identity may be built, while their breaking of the implicit rules underlying authority relationships may be . the grounds for others' imputations of "troublemaker" and thus other identities.

<div align="center">Ethnomethodology</div>

Ethnomethodology is one of the most recent developments in theory which might be used in an analysis of delinquent identity. And, indeed, many of the ethnomethodological studies overlap with those which may be classified as studies of the rule makers in labeling theory. Douglas (1970), and more specifically Scott (1970), have studied the social construction of meaning in which labels and symbols are made problematic and essentially an outcome of inter-action. Indeed, Scott's (1970) treatment of blindness as a negoti-ated meaning and as a constructed stigma of professionals is, practically speaking, a study in the social construction of identity (although the study does not focus upon how the stigmatized builds his identity as much as how this is constructed for him).

Directly related to the study of delinquent identity is the work of Cicourel (1968), which may be regarded as nothing less than a tour de force in the area. Cicourel has analyzed the process in which the child comes to be transformed in the organizational

records of police and probation workers into a juvenile delinquent
or a child in need of the services of the agencies involved. In
this context, Cicourel examines interactions between juveniles
and probation officers and the translation of these in "face sheet"
data and recommendations to the court. This translation involves
the probation officer's interpretation of events according to
implicit assumptions or theories as to the content of the interaction,
i.e., as to the juvenile's problem and what happened in terms of
the events which brought the juvenile to the current situation.
This same analysis is briefly undertaken with respect to the court-
room interaction between judge, juvenile, and others.

Cicourel's work is, needless to say, highly relevant for our
own inasmuch as the interactions he examines involve the construction
of identity for the juvenile. The trouble with Cicourel's work
revolves around the peculiar problems connected with the theoretical
orientation of ethnomethodology and not primarily with many of the
specific analyses of interactions or the insights thereby gained
(re.: Garfinkel, 1967 for a definitive statement of the ethno-
methodological position).

While ethnomethodology avoids the pitfalls of a culturalogi-
cal perspective by making meaning problematic in interaction, and,
for the same reason, does not pose any problems in postulating a
cause and effect relationship between these meanings and subsequent
action or interaction; it has done so at the expense of a set of
reified rules which are seen as underlying interaction. The
researcher's task becomes that of recreating the consciousness of
actors, and consequently identity becomes a function of underlying

interpretative rules given in the consciousness of actors and the structure of grammar (on this point, see: Dreitzel, 1970: xv-xvi). Moreover, the study of grammar (as opposed to rhetoric) must ultimately lead to the same place as that of culturalogical perspectives which assume shared agreement to begin with (i.e., rules must be interpreted and used, and to make common understanding a function of a rule which assumes agreement over the use of the rule is only to delay the consequences of making it a function of an assumed agreement over terms and symbols; see: Perinbanayagam, 1974 on this point and for further comment).

Summary

In this chapter we have attempted to show that current perspectives on delinquency or delinquent identity are not adequate for an understanding of the phenomenon. Three broad groups of theories were dealt with in terms of their inadequacies. First, some of the more "traditional" approaches to delinquency do not deal directly with the phenomenon of identity, the implicit assumption being that the delinquent identity is an outgrowth of a predefined set of behaviors. Second, certain interactionist approaches were examined and felt to be lacking in terms of their assumptions of either one or both of the following: 1) a consistency of behavior which would serve to define a role; 2) a label as a cause of behavior in a culturalogical sense (as in secondary deviance). Finally, we questioned the theoretical adequacy of ethnomethodology in its assumption of a set of rules underlying interaction. By showing the inadequacies of the

perspectives currently in use, we have also attempted to provide

the background for the theoretical perspective which is to be

used in the present study. In this context, the theoretical per-

spective chosen is, of course, an attempt to surmount some of these

difficulties which plague other theories.

CHAPTER III

THEORETICAL ORIENTATION

The theoretical orientation for the present work will be that
of the dramaturgical model. As a relatively new perspective in
sociology, the dramaturgical model has not as yet received formal
articulation comparable to other theories. There is no single
individual whose work may be taken as definitive of the dramaturgi-
cal model, although Brissett and Edgley (1975) have sought to set
out the essentials of the model and their work will be implicitly
relied on in the synopsis which follows. In this chapter, then,
all we shall attempt to do is provide the essential theoretical
orientation or background out of which a model for our study must
be developed. Having done this, we will be prepared to develop a
model grounded in concrete interactions, but with reference to a
set of explicit theoretical assumptions which link our model to
a perspective on all interaction.

Dramaturgy: An Overview

The great drama critic Kenneth Burke has been regarded as the
founder of the dramaturgical model. However, while his ideas and
work serve as the foundation as well as the imaginative inspiration
for various sociologists who call themselves dramaturgists, he did
not formulate a sociological theory.[1] Within the discipline of

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sociology, George Herbert Mead, more than any other single individual, articulated the theoretical basis and thus anticipated dramaturgy. But to label Mead's ideas, and more especially his theories, drama- turgical, would be open to question.[2] More recently, Erving Goffman has become by far the most popular of those who may be termed dramaturgists. On the other hand, it is clear that Goffman has not set out to articulate any formal statement which might serve to define the dramaturgical model. Most of Goffman's works are more or less devoted to specific problems at hand, and would require some synthesis to take on the characteristics of a coherent "theory" or model.[3]

This is not to say that the dramaturgical model cannot be articulated. It is only to say that what serves to define the dramaturgical model is not a formal statement analogous to that of Parsons and Merton in the case of structural-functionalism or Homans in the case of exchange theory. Rather, what has served to define the dramaturgical model has been a series of concerns which have been most appropriately expressed in and through the use of a theatrical metaphor. The dramaturgical model, then, finds it em- bodiment in various works, by various authors (many of whom do not consistently represent dramaturgy). In addition to those mentioned, other writers of the dramaturgical persuasion may be identified, such as Gregory P. Stone, Ernest Becker, and Anselm Strauss. But dramaturgical statements and works range as far as Peter Berger, C. Wright Mills and Eliot Friedson, to mention only a few. The central themes which begin an articulation of dramaturgy include some of the following concerns.

Concern with the Empirical

As implied in the name, dramaturgy is a model and not, properly speaking, a theory (following Hempel's, 1966 criteria for theory). The approach to phenomena is descriptive and it seeks to provide _verstehen_ as opposed to the traditional, scientific explanation and prediction. This does not mean that the dramaturgical model is not empirical. Indeed, while an analysis which employs the use of metaphor would seem to necessarily preclude the goal of prediction, a theatrical metaphor necessarily implies a most rigorous empirical approach. This is to say that observation, by use of the metaphor, is of necessity grounded in the occurrences which take place before an audience, i.e., what can only be known through the senses and not what may be inferred as existing outside of the interaction. This is the essence of empiricism (on this point, see: Louch, 1966: 45, and with reference to statistics and empiricism, see: Kituse & Cicourel, 1963). And this particular concern with empiricism is one of the central concerns of dramaturgy.

Concern with Action

From the dramaturgical perspective, man exists in a social world of others who view his behavior and act toward that behavior. Existence or being, in this context, is acting, and this action always has consequences, both anticipated and unanticipated. Furthermore, action (communication, behavior, being) is rooted in man's awareness that his behavior has consequences (as contrasted with reflexes which are not rooted in awareness, but stimuli). Indeed, this awareness is self awareness inasmuch as the self is social and

doing is being. From this standpoint, awareness does not refer to an internal, psychological state of consciousness, but to the process through which an actor orients his action with respect to another. Essentially this difference resolves itself into the difference between Mead's concept of mind (which arises in the interaction between actors) and that of the psychologist (see: Mead, 1964: 65-84; 115-98).

Concern with the Precarious Nature of Social Reality

While the consequences of behavior may be either anticipated or unanticipated, behavior becomes meaningful in the process of an actor's identification with the other, which takes place in an on-going interaction. While a meaningful act may be initiated by an actor, it requires its completion in the act of another. From the viewpoint of actors, interaction develops a routine and antici-pated dimension in any given case. But interaction can never be conforming in the sense of following laws or structural imperatives formulated prior to interaction. Structures are "realized" in interaction, and as such take on the problematic characteristic of a meaningful act.[4] They may be seen as providing a framework for interaction, but their importance is in their use and not in their capacity to determine. In other words, society and individual are twin born in interaction and their relationship is dialectical, not determinative (re.: Berger & Luckmann, 1966: 61; 129, and Cooley, 1967). In this sense, actors do not conform, they bring conformity into existence (see: Turner, 1975; Wrong, 1961).

Concern with Appearance as Reality

All the aforementioned concerns may be seen as culminating in
the overriding concern with the reality of appearances (see: Stone,
1975). And this concern is, in turn, best represented in the drama-
turgical approach to motivation. Motivation, like structure, is
established in interaction. Actors are seen as neither rational
nor irrational, but rather as rationalizing creatures (i.e., rational
versus irrational is seen as irrelevant, although these elements
in behavior would not necessarily be denied). The focus is upon
motives, and not, in the strictest sense, motivation (Lindesmith
& Strauss, 1956: 297 passim; Mills, 1967). The situations of
Thomas (1928: 584) are social reality. Appearance is the key as
behavior is neither an epiphenomenal outgrowth of internal states
(reductionism) nor supra-individual structures (reification).
Interaction must be taken sui generis, i.e., in its own right,
ahistorically.[5-6]

Assertions Spelling Out the
Dramaturgical Model

We may provide a summary of the dramaturgical model in a list
of twelve assertions (Edgley, unpublished paper):

1) Man is by nature an active creature.[7]
2) Meaning is plural in character.[8]
3) A meaningful act begun by one organism requires its com-
   pletion in the act of another organism.[9]
4) A meaningful act begun by one organism will in the course
   of its career set up further lines of action in that organ-
   ism as well as in the acts of others.
5) The meaning of the act is provided by the tendency of
   these lines of action to coincide, to move toward one

another and develop a coincidence.

6) When the coincidence of these lines of action is·
accomplished by the actor, then we can speak of that
act as the production of a significant symbol.[10]

7) Self-consciousness presumes or presupposes the exis-
tence of selves.[11]

8) The coincidence of these lines of action is secured
by the process of identification.

9) Identification as a process must be analyzed into
identification of one another and identification with
one another.[12]

10) To enable this process of identification of one another,
apparent symbols must be produced prior to and along
with the unfolding of the communication.[13]

11) Identification of one another can be conceived as a
line of action.[14]

12) The general meaning of the significant symbolic trans-
action is guaranteed by the meaning of the apparent
symbols that have been produced in the process.

NOTES

[1] The three major works here are Burke, 1950; 1954; 1969. It is in his Grammar of Motives that Burke suggests a paradigm for analysis of behavior in terms of scene, agent, act, agency, and purpose, which is the core of any dramaturgical perspective.

[2] The most pertinent of Mead's writing are, 1934; 1938. Although Mead provides much of the theoretical basis for dramaturgy, he never emphasized the essential importance of appearances which would have given his theories a dramaturgical dimension (see: Stone, 1975 on this point).

[3] Goffman, 1959; 1961b; 1963a; 1963b; 1967; 1971, are best representative of dramaturgy, but the threads of unity running throughout these are generally left for the reader to pick out.

[4] The reader is referred to Blumer (1967: 144), who states: "There is no observable activity in a human society that does not spring from some acting unit."

[5] This is the essential characteristic of Goffman's episode as the basic unit of analysis. The episode is primarily constituted by the actors' "co-presence". And, as Goffman (1967: 3) so aptly puts the matter, "Not, then, men and their moments. Rather moments and their men" (also see: Goffman, 1959). Glaser and Strauss (1970) have suggested a developmental model which might be employed within a dramaturgical framework, but the sui generis quality of interaction would be retained inasmuch as all "developments" develop within a specific interaction.

[6] Actually, dramaturgy has many roots extending far back into the mainstream of sociology, which makes it neither as new nor as "radical" as one might suppose. It was Pareto who first suggested (within the discipline) that man is basically a rationalizer, although he spent much of his life in search of the "true" causes of man's actions (see: Pareto, 1963, or Coser, 1971 for a brief synopsis). Simmel's formalism may well be taken as a forerunner of dramaturgy's emphasis on the forms of interaction—particularly those of Goffman (see: Simmel, 1950). And, there wouldn't even be any point in burdening the reader with some of the obvious links between dramaturgy and conflict theories or Weber's social action theory. Our only point here is that dramaturgy is, in fact, well grounded in a sociological tradition.

[7] See: Dewey, 1970. Moreover, Dewey (1960) states: "Experience occurs continuously, because the interaction of live creature and

environing conditions is involved in the very process of living."
This and the notes which follow are the author's own.

[8]The sources in Mead are obvious, but Burke tied this to motives
in his analysis of imagery and the process of transformation, i.e.,
the process through which motives may be made interchangeable:
"...we might think either of a poem which symbolized suicide by imagery
of murder, or one which symbolized murder by imagery of suicide....
You need to look for a <u>motive that can serve as ground for both these
choices</u>, a motive that, while not being exactly one or the other, can
ambiguously contain them both" (Burke, 1950: 10, emphasis in original).
The importance of this cannot be overemphasized.

[9]See: McCall and Simmons, 1970: 93-4.

[10]Mead (1970: 258) states: "When we find that we have adjusted
ourselves to a comprehensive set of reactions toward an object, we
feel that the meaning of the object is ours. But that the meaning of
the object is ours, it is necessary that we should be able to regard
ourselves as taking this attitude of adjustment to response. We must
indicate to ourselves not only the object but also the readiness to
respond in certain ways to the object, and this indication must be made
in the attitude or role of the other individual to whom it is pointed
out or to whom it may be pointed out. If this is not the case, it
has not that common property that is involved in significance. It is
through the ability to be the other at the same time that he is himself
that the symbol becomes significant." In this context, "significance"
develops through "coincidence".

[11]"The self arises in conduct when the individual becomes a social
object in experience to himself" (Mead, 1970: 257).

[12]"...the guarantee against non-sense in the social transaction is
heuristically better conceptualized as <u>identification</u>, not role-taking
or taking the other's attitude—at best a very partial explanation
of how meaning is established in social transactions. The term 'identi-
-fication' subsumes at least two processes: <u>identification of</u> and
<u>identification with</u>. Role taking is but one variant of the latter
process....Nevertheless, the point to be made is this: identification
<u>with</u> one another, in whatever mode, cannot be made without identifi-
cation <u>of</u> one another" (Stone, 1975: 79).

[13]"...identifications of one another are ordinarily facilitated
by appearance and are often accomplished silently or non-verbally.
This can be made crystal clear by observing the necessity for and
process of establishing gender in social transactions" (Stone, 1975:
80).

[14]This may be seen in Goffman's projected definitions of the situ-
ation: "When we allow that the individual projects a definition of the
situation when he appears before others, we must also see that the
others, however passive their role may seem to be, will themselves
effectively project a definition of the situation by virtue of their

response to the individual..." (Goffman, 1959: 9). The signs given
and given off, as well as the definitions of the situation the in-
dividual projects, clearly refer to action.

CHAPTER IV

METHODOLOGY

This paper is the outcome of two year's observations of juveniles
and social workers in the field. During this time the author collected
his data in what might be termed a "participant as observer" role
(re.: Lofland, 1971). This involved his employment in two distinct-
ly different type organizations dealing with juveniles.

Thirteen months were spent in a juvenile service type facility
in which juveniles were either briefly held pending ajudication by
the court (i.e., less than ninety days) or seen on an "outpatient"
basis while in the custody of their parents or guardians. Here, the
author was employed in the capacity of houseparent by the Department
of Institutions, Social and Rehabilitative Services. In this capacity
his duties included custodial care of the children and establishing
a relationship with them which might serve to locate any problems
they might have, although counseling was specifically excluded from
the list of duties. Juveniles in this facility were diagnosed by
social workers and evaluations for institutional treatment were made.
The author made first-hand observations of this process and established
a close working relationship with the social workers involved.

Ten months were spent in an institution which housed boys on a
long-term basis, after ajudication and disposition or upon private
placement by family. Here, the author was employed in the capacity

of counselor, which provided him with the opportunity to compliment
first-hand observations of interaction with extensive case files and
transcripts of similar interaction. Of course, there were no evalu-
ations of juveniles for institutional "treatment" made here, but the
author worked in close association with social workers, and all juve-
niles at the institution had been through this process (including those
privately placed, but not confined by court order). The author's
duties included counseling as well as evaluation of juveniles for
release.

Finally, the author directly participated in court proceedings
on two occasions and spent two months as an outside observer in the
courtroom. Taking all observations together, the types of juveniles
and cases covered an enormously wide range. Children's ages ranged
from two years (and thus well below adolescence or the juvenile age
range we are directly concerned with) to eighteen years of age. The
types of offenses covered everything from curfew violation to arson
and grand theft auto, as well as the traditional dependence and neg-
lect cases where violations are not involved. The most serious of the
adult criminal violations, such as homocide, extortion, or armed
robbery were not included, however. Both male and female social
workers and juveniles were observed. However, this information is
not given to indicate representativeness, but rather the extensive-
ness and depth with which the research was conducted. It should,
therefore, be regarded as an indication of the background out of which
we developed the description of a process and not the sample from which
a description of a population is developed (of this, more later).

Returning to the researcher's method of observation, we may

now more clearly specify this in terms of two types of observations or observational material collected.

Observations of juveniles and social workers outside of an interview situation, which contribute significantly to a general understanding of the phenomenon under study, were necessarily conducted while the author was _instrumentally_ involved in the interaction; which is to say while he was acting in an official capacity connected with the organization processing the juvenile and with which the social worker was also connected. Observations of juveniles and social workers engaged in an interview were conducted while the author was in this same capacity, but not instrumentally involved in the interview process. While we would not wish to make too much of this distinction, the opportunities to influence the nature and course of the interaction are greatly reduced under conditions where the observer is mute, if nonetheless a source of expressions given off in some role other than that of observer.

Nevertheless, the author must be considered as a participant in that which he observed. This means that the author can neither be regarded as "objective" nor "neutral" with respect to that which he observed. This warrants some attention inasmuch as this may be taken as the crucial methodological strength of the study. At the same time, we would not wish to deny some obvious limitations. Indeed, we regard the recognition of these as necessary to an understanding and appreciation of the strengths of the method used.

Limitations

Loss of Perspective

The most obvious limitation of any study in which the observer is a participant in that which he observes is that having to do with loss of "proper" perspective. We are referring here to the tendency of an observer to take the perspective of certain actors he seeks to describe <u>as his own</u> and confusing this with the perspective of his model. While a recreation of the consciousness of the actors may be valuable, the only reason for having a model is to set forth a different perspective (for different purposes, we might add) than that of the actors being described.

We should note immediately, however, that this problem is not concerned with the issue of objectivity. While we cannot here debate this issue, we should be cognizant of the fact that any claim—pro or con—is ultimately an assumption not open to empirical validation. In this context, any theory or model which rests upon Mead (1934), and seeks to remain consistent, must make the assumption that the observer and observed are inextricably tied to one another and move on from there.

Beyond objectivity then, there still remains the problem of an observer bias which may neglect or accentuate certain actors' perspectives. As houseparent, counselor, or simply fellow actor in close association with those he observed, the author developed likes and dislikes for certain social workers and juveniles. The same may be said of the practices and techniques of certain social workers as well as certain programs of the organizations employing the author.

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The author experienced open and covert conflict with various juveniles and social workers. Similarly sympathies developed for specific kinds of cases and for particular individuals. In brief, all the attitudes, feeling, beliefs, and biases usually connected with an individual's work and his close association with others were present as the author conducted his observations.

Inasmuch as this constitutes a problem, there is no really adequate reply to a charge that the observer was biased. This is a "problem" which is bound to plague any research where the observer and observed come into intimate association. However, we may cite some steps which were taken to guard against the observer losing his perspective.

In the first place, all observations were subjected to a "cooling off" period, after which they were reviewed. In other words, all observations had an element of time (in most cases, many months) in which the author developed some distance between himself and the often emotionally charged atmosphere in which they were necessarily conducted. Second, insofar as the author's feelings toward individuals or cases were allowed to enter his observations, these often had a "balancing" effect. If the author developed sympathies for the juvenile in any given case, he also developed sympathies for the social worker. Indeed, the depth of involvement which produced the possibility of biasing in favor of one perspective, also produced appreciation for the other perspective. Third, insofar as observations could become "lopsided" due to sympathies or antipathies toward specific individuals or types of cases, it was often possible to check these against other observations conducted without these biasing elements present. For example, observations of certain types of juveniles

which antagonized the researcher could be compared with similar cases
with different juveniles. The same may be said of social workers.

Once again, however, it must be kept in mind that the biasing
we are here attempting to eliminate is concerned with the observer
taking the perspective of juvenile or social worker as a complete
description of the interaction. Insofar as "subjective feelings"
entering the observations, this was not only bound to occur, but
necessary to an understanding of the interaction.

Recording of Observations

Another limitation of the method of observation employed is
concerned with the recording of observations and the reconstruction
of these. Although this will be elaborated later in the paper (see
Chapter VII), the main problem here was the fact that notes were often
not recorded during the time of the observation. Not only were there
certain legal difficulties involved, but notetaking became intrusive
in most cases. Therefore, most field notes were constructed from
memory shortly after the interview between juvenile and social worker
was completed. There could be very little check on the accuracy of
these beyond questioning the social worker as to his or her recol-
lection of the exchange, except in those cases where the social worker
used a tape recorder (the author did not use one for the same reasons
he did not take notes during the interview). Frequently, this check
was difficult inasmuch as the author and social worker had other duties
to perform after the interview and notes were not recorded until the
end of the day. In sum, the methodological procedures for collecting
and recording observations were far from the ideal in which "empirical"

accuracy may be limited only by the sophistication of equipment or the "subjective" interpretations of the observer.

Once again, inasmuch as this is regarded as a problem there is no adequate response to a charge that observations may not accurately reflect "empirical phenomenon". This and any other problem concerned with the correspondence of observation to "empirical" event must be answered in terms of the nature of the study, the uses to which the observations are put, and the relative virtues of these as opposed to those of another approach. In this context, use of the dramaturgical model commits one to a perspective on the phenomenon which contains its own methodology. Put otherwise, dramaturgy as a perspective is also a methodology. We will consider this methodology as we discuss some of the possible strengths of our "participant as observer" method of gathering data.

The Analytical Description of Dramaturgy

The methodological approach to data gathering and observation used in the present work must be understood within the context of what is sought and what may be expected from any research conducted within the theoretical framework employed. With regard to this, the dramaturgical approach to sociological analysis is descriptive, or what might be termed "analytical description". This is radically different from the description of statistics, which seeks to numerically recount "objective" events, presumably independent of the meaning given these by observer and observed. It is also different from the description of ethnography, which seeks to recount "undisturbed" the social world of the actors.

The "analytical description" of dramaturgy is concerned with identifying the interaction process—through the use of an explicitly recognized conceptual framework—in such a way that it may be understood in the context in which it is assigned meaning by the actors involved. It follows from this that the researcher employing such a perspective will set his methodological goals in somewhat different terms from that of researchers employing some other perspective. He must be concerned with gaining an "intimate" knowledge of the phenomenon he seeks to describe. In other words, the researcher should be able to understand the phenomenon from the perspective of the actors—a thumbnail test being provided by the extent to which the phenomenon becomes "familar" to the researcher and the extent to which this familarity and interpretation of events is in agreement with the actors'. This concern, of course, does not differ from that of the ethnographer. Indeed, it may differ little from that of the newspaper reporter, the biographer, or the novelist.

However, having acquired this knowledge—this relationship to the phenomenon—there remains the question of how it is to be used or what is to be done with it. The concern here is how to avoid doing violence to the meanings of the actors, while placing these within the researcher's framework for understanding. The framework the researcher uses and that of the actors is necessarily different insofar as he seeks to understand something "more" about the phenomenon than the actors themselves. The actors are concerned with building a social world; the researcher with how this is done. The researcher employs a framework which provides a baseline or reference point for meaning which cuts across many frameworks or baselines employed by actors.

However, from the dramaturgical perspective this framework is not

concerned with generalization. Rather it is a tool much like that

of the actors described; the difference being the uses to which it

is put, and the necessity of its explicit recognition by the researcher.

(It is of utmost importance that the researcher recognize his frame-

work as only one possibility, while an actor engaged in the business

of building a social world is unlikely to be able to afford this

luxury. So also the researcher, who attempts to keep his framework

in mind and afford such luxury during his research.)

Given this dramaturgical approach to the task of the researcher,

the question of "empirical facts" takes on a different dimension.

The researcher's focus is shifted from recounting or accounting for

these to specifying a framework in which they come to have meaning—

for the actors and for the researcher. The significant dimension of

"empirical facts" is not the specific details of an objective pheno-

menon, but a process in which, whatever specific details exist as a

"filler", it is their relationship to the process which determines

their significance.[1] To describe the process is to have at one's

disposal the key to the construction of a social world—not the social

world itself and not necessarily a complete picture of the social world

(especially if we mean by "picture", the way the actors themselves

view this world). This means that the crucial test of the perspective—

what is termed "validity" in other contexts—lies in the ability of

the researcher or others to take this model back to the social world

it is supposed to describe and, with the "filler" thus supplied, make

sense of it. The question then is, "Does the model work?"[2]

Strengths

Turning to the present study, the limitations of an observer submerged in the phenomenon he is called on to describe may be taken as an indice of the advantages one might expect in return. Subjects do not always tell the outside observer what they may matter-of-factly reveal to a member of the group. Even given their willingness to be open, they can only reveal what they believe to be relevant or what they are questioned about. Anything else must be ferreted out or stumbled across by the researcher, thus throwing him back into in-depth involvement or ignorance. Examples of this abound in the present research. Shouting at juveniles is a practice which is generally guarded and its use as a technique of control is even more carefully guarded. The fact that juveniles are often sent to an institution for delinquents because the institution may have a psychiatrist the juvenile is seen as needing is something which generally emerges be-hind closed doors. The fact that a social worker is simply disgusted "at the very thought" of certain juveniles or their parents—that political doctraines may enter a diagnostic or disciplinary procedure— are things which might be guessed on the grounds that a social worker is a human being. They become part of the researcher's observations and data through an in-depth involvement. Picayunish as these little pieces of information may seem, they begin to add up. Yet, they may not be as important as the relationship to the actors and phenomena required to obtain them. This yields a knowledge all its own.

While there would be little point in trumpeting solipism, it would seem from a Meadian standpoint that identification with the

other (being a foundation block of communication) would be necessary
to an understanding of that other. While we need not experience every-
thing in order to understand it perhaps, and while identification must
have its limits, the fact remains that a researcher who chooses to
cut himself off from this process has necessarily chosen to forgo
certain knowledge. For better or worse the present research would
have been greatly "depleted" without the benefit of this process of
"stepping into the shoes of another".

Yet the knowledge thereby gained is not always easy to specify.
Even if the researcher spends eight hours a day with his subjects,
a different facet of the phenomenon emerges when he is in the midst
of a social world which goes on twenty-four hours a day and from which
there is no withdrawal. A different facet of social work emerges
at 3:00 a.m. or when it becomes "bread on the table" as opposed to
a "phenomenon". A different understanding of the social worker emerges
as fears and hatreds, philosophy and politics are brought to bear
on his or her work. The same may be said of the juvenile who breaks
down and crys or runs after an interview. Tears of terror or smiles
of gratitude and love are the stuff of which an actor's social world
is fashioned no less than that of the researcher. A social worker's
report often takes on different meaning in such a context. More im-
portantly, a "delinquent" often takes on different meaning in such
a context.

NOTES

[1]This is not a form—content distinction in the sense of advocating their existence apart from one another. Rather, it is an analytical distinction in which from and content are recognized as always interdependent, but distinguishable for heuristic or analytical purposes. The Kantian distinction employed in science is for purposes of generalization.

[2]Goffman's The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life may be taken as a paradigm for what we have said with regard to the dramaturgical approach to research. The methodology in data gathering is essentially that of the ethnographer (indeed, the study was conducted in the Shetland Isles and developed in connection with the Department of Social Anthropology, University of Edinburgh). Taking Goffman's (1959: 13) "organizing principles of society" we see the dramaturgist's attempt to get at "the key" as opposed to this concrete instance of the social world. Actually, when one has finished reading Goffman's analysis, there is a sense in which he has been informed very little as to life in the Shetland Isles, but a great deal as to life in many places. Of course, this is Goffman's intention. In this context, Goffman's (1959: xi-xii) own words in regard to his approach are worth quoting: "The illustrative materials used in this study are of mixed status: some are taken from respectable researches where qualified generalizations are given concerning reliably recorded regularities; some are taken from informal memoirs written by colorful people; many fall in between. In addition, frequent use is made of a study of my own of a Shetland Island crofting (subsistence farming) community. The justification for this approach (as I take to be the justification for Simmel's also) is that the illustrations together fit into a coherent framework that ties together bits of experience the reader has already had and provides the student with a guide worth testing in case-studies of institutional social life."

CHAPTER V

A MODEL FOR THE INTERACTION

Having identified our theoretical orientation as that of the
dramaturgical model and our methodology as that of analytical des-
cription, we may now turn our attention to the interactions which are
of immediate concern to us. This chapter is concerned with construct-
ing a model for the interaction, which should be understood as the
first step in our analytical description. Here, our description
will be more abstract as we attempt to provide a framework for view-
ing the interaction and understanding the process. Subsequent chapters
will be concerned with elaborating the model and moving toward a less
abstract description.

From a dramaturgical perspective, the interactions between juve-
niles and social workers may be seen as a negotiation process.
Identity is a symbolic construction which is necessarily problematic
to the extent all meanings which arise in interaction are. The
identification of a juvenile delinquent is a process which involves
a judicious search for the proper symbolic identifiers. However, the
process of constructing an identity involves more than a search
inasmuch as the symbolic material out of which identity is fashioned
is only the grammar in an essentially rhetorical process.

Motives

When the juvenile comes before the social worker, one of the

first, and certainly the most important, of the questions to be dealt

with is that having to do with motives. This may involve a subtle

probing which the juvenile is only dimly aware of, or it may involve

a direct challenge such as, "Why did you do it?" or "What's the

problem?" Such questions are not merely, or even primarily, a request

for a diagnosis, but a request for motives which make the child's

behavior understandable within a rhetoric of problems (cf.: Emerson,

1969: 87). While our interest may be directed to motivation of some

sort when we seek the causes of delinquency, we must look to motives

for an understanding of identity (see especially: Garfinkel, 1956).

In this context, motives "...are the terms with which interpretation

of conduct by social actors proceeds" (Mills, 1967: 355).

Upon receiving a request for motives, it is then up to the child

to respond. This may take the form of presenting some type of "ex-

planation" of the events or circumstances which led up to the present

interaction, or it may involve some form of passing the responsibility

for constructing such an "explanation" to others. Often, at least

initially, it will involve nothing more than a noncommittal shrug

of the shoulders or a statement to the effect that the juvenile

doesn't know.

In any case, the important point is that some reconstruction of

the events (however near or remote in time to the present) which led

the child up to the current situation and which serve to establish

the nature of the problem must be presented. Motives must be estab-

lished which will make the child's behavior meaningful to the social

worker in the ongoing interaction. No social worker's report is submitted stating simply, "I don't know why he did it, what the problem is, or what to do about it."

Accounts

While motives may take many forms, certain highly stylized vocabularies which serve to reconstruct behavior do appear frequently in interaction. Scott and Lyman (1970: 490) refer to these as accounts, which they define as "...a statement made by a social actor to explain unanticipated or untoward behavior." Crucial to the definition is the fact that the account, as the behavior, is situated. Thus behaviors will call for an account only in relation to those situations in which the behavior is viewed as untoward and the account itself is an account only by virtue of audience validation.[1]

The concept of an account is extremely important as it points to a vital function of motives. Specifically, accounts are used by actors to restore disrupted lines of activity and to establish the terms of treatment to be accorded an actor (contrast this with Sykes and Matza, 1957, whose "techniques of neutralization" are a kind of motivator inasmuch as they allow action).

Acting On Accounts, Motives
and Identities

Accounts, motives and identities all involve a two part process of: 1) an actor's presentation, and 2) an audience's validation or rejection. Goffman (1959) describes this process in terms of the selves an actor <u>presents</u> and the definitions of situations he

projects. In this context, a distinction must be made between these
presentations of the actor and what comes to be acted upon by the
audience. To denote this distinction, we will speak of accounts,
motives, and identities as "presented", "claimed" or "avowed" on
the one hand, while those which are imputed or acted upon are simply
accounts, motives, and identities (if a distinction between imputed
and acted upon is required this will be duly noted). This is extreme-
ly important, as the account or motive the juvenile presents is not
an account or motive, but something else when it is not acted upon
by the social worker. This can be easily overlooked inasmuch as
an identity presented and not acted upon changes qualitatively, but
generally remains an identity. Generally, a motive or account which
is not acted upon becomes a "lie", "rationalization", or even "symptom".
Accounts and identities share more than the mechanics of presentation
however.

Inasmuch as the presentation of an identity is an ongoing process
which does not stop for the presentation of an account, to act or
not act upon the one is likely to involve acting or not acting on
the other either directly or by implication. However, whether this
is the case or not depends a great deal on the relationship between
identity and account. Indeed, while any given identity may be pre-
sented as a parallel line of activity to an account presented, the
presentation of any account necessarily involves the presentation of
an identity. Since an account is only called for in instances of
untoward behavior, to present an account is to, at one and the same
time, present some kind of identity. To present an account is to
take a moral stance in interaction and thereby make some claim to

moral character. To act or not act on an account presented is to unavoidably assess the moral character of the other. That this moral character is an identity of significant dimensions is nicely demonstrated in our practices of having "character witnesses" in court and "character references" on job applications.

In this context, it becomes apparent that the presentation of an account involves exerting a moral demand upon others to be treated in an appropriate way (see: Goffman, 1959: 13). Of course, part of this treatment the actor may have a moral right to expect may involve his being allowed to continue the line of activity disrupted by the request for an account (the nature of that line of activity being established in the account, i.e., an account of accident in the case of a death obliges us to allow the actor to pursue lines of activity which may have involved a death, but certainly not killing, whereas an account for killing would oblige us to allow the actor to pursue this line of activity, war being one instance of this). More broadly speaking, the treatment an actor may have a moral right to expect will certainly involve his being treated in accordance with the moral character he presents.

However, the other side of the coin in exerting demands for appropriate treatment is the treatment accorded the other. Indeed, the very act of presenting an identity may effectively serve to assign the other an identity (see: Goffman, 1959: 9-13, especially the discussion on projecting definitions of situations and assigning others their place). And, certainly if the presentation of an account involves a moral stance and the presentation of moral character, to act or not act upon these unavoidably entails the same.

For an actor to assess the moral character of the other, he must
also present a moral character for himself.

In terms of the juvenile and social worker, we can see that
both are engaged in a negotiation then. This negotiation involves
the treatment to be accorded one another, the material of which is
accounts, motives, and identities. However, the outcome of such
negotiations must be understood as a dynamic whole, and not in bits
and pieces. This outcome is meaning in the interaction.

Meaning in the Interaction

The identification of an actor requires the production of sym-
bols prior to and along with the unfolding of communication. And it
is in the link between these symbols and various lines of activity
that meaning arises (at least meaning in the pragmatic sense of actors
who are concerned primarily with the question of acting—of orienting
their action with respect to one another). Of course motives are one
of the most significant of these symbols. In this context, we may
see the relationship between lines of activity which call for an
account and those which do not. Thus certain lines of activity are
almost never disrupted with a request for motives as the motives are
"apparent" in the context in which the line of activity is being
conducted (re.: Brissett & Edgley, 1975: 151-4).[2]

Moreover, inasmuch as identity involves lines of activity, viz.,
presenting and exerting moral demands for appropriate treatment and
acting upon and according the appropriate treatment, we can clearly
see the relationship between identity and motives. Thus the police-
man's identity is his motive for questioning a juvenile as is the

case with the social worker interviewing the juvenile. If these identities are not apparent, the line of activity may be disrupted by a request for motives which may require an out of uniform policeman or an out of office social worker to establish their respective identities. And, as suggested earlier, a disruption of these lines of activity is tantamount to a rejection of the identity presented. Thus, if the policeman or social worker are still challenged after establishing their identities (something not uncommon in the literature of cross cultural experience), the terms of appropriate treatment must themselves be negotiated. Until such time as this has been done, there is no sense in which we may understand the identities of policeman or social worker. Indeed, the very possibility of meaning provides the possibility of meaninglessness.

If motives and identities can provide meaning, it is obvious that they may also provide no meaning at all (i.e., there is no reason for a symbol if it invariably refers to one single thing and if it can refer to more than one thing, or nothing at all, the possibility of confusion is built in). Furthermore, the possibility of an account mending a disrupted line of activity provides the possibility of an account presented which can disrupt a line of activity.

Following this we may see that meaning is an *ad hoc* construction formulated according to the actor's purposes at hand. The juvenile's mother may say to her daughter, "Yes dear, I understand as I was once young myself" in response to a plea for understanding a lack of punctuality. However, the plea, "Weren't you ever young once?" may not be met with the same response or understanding when it is

revealed that the daughter is pregnant. Or, the hurried father says
to his son, "Yes, of course I understand you needed new shoes for
the dance." Later, while attempting to balance the checkbook, the
father may express quite different feelings and a total lack of
comprehension. In each case, different lines of activity and differ-
ent purposes are involved such that interaction takes on a problematic
quality that can often confound the predictive capacity of the actors
themselves. At the same time, while actors do not live in static
worlds, they do not live in strange ones either.

Thus as the juvenile comes before the social worker, he or she
will be looking for the terms with which to deal with the juvenile
and his behavior. As the juvenile's parents may struggle with the
appropriate terms for behavior he designates as "political" or "being
in", so also the social worker. It is these terms which provide the
final link between the juvenile's presentation and the identity which
comes to be constructed in the interaction. To understand these
terms, however, one must understand something of the world they are
related to.

The Social Organization of Social Work

Since meaning is an ad hoc construction, it is obvious that there
is no a priori test to determine which accounts, motives, and identi-
ties presented by the juvenile will get acted upon. The key to
understanding an ad hoc construction is an understanding of how the
actors involved go about organizing the worlds in which they live.
The world of the juvenile and social worker we are concerned with is
the world of social work, which may be described in terms of how

various lines of activity are organized in interaction.

Helping

Although individual social workers will necessarily display
a great deal of variation in their orientation to their work, the
essential feature of any definition of social work is that it is a
"helping" profession (re.: Perlman, 1957; Stroup, 1960; Model Statute
Social Workers Licensing Act). While many social workers will un-
doubedly be somewhat skeptical with regard to this facet of their
work, we are not immediately concerned with goals and aspirations,
but an organization of doing which is meaningful to actors. In this
context, not just any organization of activity constitutes helping,
this being a particular organization which defines social work such
that to be engaged in these lines of activity is to be a social
worker and not to be so engaged is to be, at least first and foremost,
something else.

From this perspective, helping involves bringing the proper
resources of the agency the social worker represents to bear on a
particular kind of "problem" which confronts and is concretely embod-
ied in a client. Thus, helping is concerned with agency held and
defined resources such that lines of activity which do not include
these are not a part of helping, however we might otherwise view
these in terms of assistance, aid, relief, etc. Hence, the social
worker may "assist" the juvenile with a sprained ankle or "aid" him
in numerous activities he may be engaged in, but this is not helping
unless a link has been established with agency resources such as
"therapy" or "medical treatment", etc.

The Problem

Helping, in turn, is related to the "problem". Helping is given as a response to certain kinds of problems which are defined in terms of the agency resources, i.e., the kinds of problems which the agency possesses the resources to deal with. Once again, then, the social worker may "assist" the juvenile with some "difficulty" or "question". But this is neither helping or a problem unless related to agency resources. Furthermore, since the problem is related to resources it has little to do with what the juvenile or others might otherwise view in terms of a "difficulty", "question", "trouble", etc. The problem, then, is a key element in the organization of helping.

The Solution

The second key element in helping is the "solution". And, of course, what may be said of the definition of helping and problem applies to solution. A solution is constituted in bringing agency resources to bear on the problem. And we may view the relationship between helping, problem, and solution in terms of the fact that if helping is to take place there must be some problem which serves as the grounds for helping and some solution which serves as the grounds for asserting that helping is taking place.

The Interview

Finally, the key organizational elements in helping, i.e., problem and solution, are to be understood within the framework in which they come to be organized in terms of helping. The essential

organizational framework in which the problem and solution come to be developed is that of the "interview". If helping is to take place there will be an interview in which a problem and a solution are developed and from which helping will presumably emerge.

The interaction between juvenile and social worker is to be understood, then, in terms of an interview in which the juvenile's problem is sought out and a solution set forth in order that helping may be carried out. The terms which serve to define the juvenile and his behavior are a product of this particular set of organized lines of activity. More specifically, we may look at the problem and the solution as the images which transform the child into an object meaningful within this organization of activity. While helping, interview, problem, and solution are all means of transforming action into meaningful patterns and terms, problem and solution also serve to bridge the gap between the social worlds of juvenile and social worker. As such, they may be viewed as "transformation images".

Transformation Images

To say that the interaction between juvenile and social worker is the world of social work does not mean that this interaction is not subject to other methods of organization. Rather, it refers to the fact that, what other means that may have been available for organizing the interaction, this means (i.e., that of "social work") was employed. When the juvenile and social worker engage in interaction there are elements of two worlds distinguishable by both actors. The juvenile is constantly bringing the terms of one world into an interaction filled with the terms of another.

At the same time, to say that there are elements of two worlds in this interaction does not mean that these worlds can be construed as phenomenological constructs in the heads of the actors. Lines of activity are preminently a shared phenomenon. To understand this phenomenon of worlds which fuse and separate—where elements of one may impinge on or be absorbed by the other—requires a literary analogy (and not a mechanical or economic one as is so often used). Since these worlds are symbolic their life is more understandable in terms appropriate to symbols.

From this context, the notion of transformation images operating as the poet's images captures the sense in which these worlds are like transparent overlays in interaction. Literary images transform one scene into another by the application of ambiguous terms which may alternatively describe one or the other of two scenes (see: Burke, 1969). In this manner, similarities are brought to bear in the midst of distinctions (although we should note that distinctions are absolutely necessary for the maintenance and effectiveness of the image).

The common meeting ground for the juvenile and social worker, where meaning in the interaction is possible, involves the juvenile having a problem for which some solution can be arrived at. While the juvenile himself may not be viewed as the problem, there is no basis for the interview if there is no problem. And, it should come as no surprise, then, that in cases where the juvenile refuses to accept this definition of the situation, the social worker is likely to cite the juvenile's presence in the interaction as evidence that there is a problem. Equally significant is the widespread belief

among social workers that a juvenile cannot be helped by psycho-
therapy and counseling until he recognizes that he has a problem
(re.: Perlman, 1957: 185; of course, this does not mean that he
cannot be helped by other, primarily non-linguistic, means such as
institutionalization).[3] The juvenile and social worker can make little
headway in the interview until some agreement can be reached as to
the terms for the juvenile's behavior and circumstances. While these
terms could just as easily be supplied by the juvenile, they would
hardly be suited to the interview.

It is in this manner that the juvenile and social worker bring
unity to disparate symbolic material. The juvenile supplies material
which may be slung under another symbolic canopy by the social worker,
so to speak. The juvenile's mannerisms, biography, and all he may
relate to the social worker may be brought under a rubric of interest
to both himself and the social worker as they are transformed into
problematic terms. However, while transformation images do all this,
they are capable of doing much more.

Since a transformation image is necessarily ambiguous, virtually
anything is suceptible to transformation (as is the case with the
poet and literary images where the only bounds appear to be the
requirements of taste imposed by the audience). In fact, they pro-
vide the possibility of avoiding any and all disruption to the lines
of activity which they transform an object in terms of. Hence, any
presentation by the juvenile is capable of being transformed and
helping is a line of activity which depends on the transformation
images and not directly on the presentation. This takes on added
significance when we recall that helping involves lines of activity

definitive to the social worker's identity. A disruption of these
lines of activity is a "disruption" of the identity, and a large
part of the social worker's training is concerned, not surprisingly,
with ways in which to avoid a disruption of these lines—to ensure
validation of his or her identity (introductory texts in the field
are a veritable sourcebook of these strategies, but much more is
learned on the job no doubt). The most significant means of avoiding
disruption to these lines is the simple expedient of making certain
that the transformation images of problem and solution cover any and
all circumstances, i.e., that they contain residual categories that
take care of the overspill after all other categories have been
exhausted.

Thus, while it is generally accepted that the juvenile must
recognize that he has a problem before it can be resolved, those
juveniles who do not accept this definition of themselves or their
behavior are still transformed into problems such that helping may
be continued. This cannot be properly understood as an inconsistency
inasmuch as from the social worker's perspective helping may also
include bringing the juvenile to see that he has a problem. Further-
more, the fact that the juvenile justice system and the legal res-
ponsibility it places on the social worker is a framework in which
"this is where the buck stops" figures in significantly. There is
a sense in which the juvenile comes to the social worker, not pre-
defined, but roughly sketched in terms of the fact that someone,
especially parents or legal authorities, have passed judgement on the
problematic nature of his behavior or other circumstances. As the
juvenile comes before the social worker, the announcement is clearly

made in his very entrance: "This is a problem. You find out what it is and do something about it."

In this framework—in the social organization of social work and in the exigencies of face-to-face parlay with identities—it becomes apparent that the causal forces which brought the juvenile to the present state of affairs is rendered quite irrelevant. At the least, they become only another element to be reckoned with in the parlay. For the terms which become significant in one place or time become insignificant or take on a different significance in another place or time. Hence, sociological and psychological causal theories and motivation become accounts and motives, while identity takes a corresponding shift as effect becomes managed outcome. It is in light of this that we may view the difficulties in understanding institutionalized juveniles in terms of personality, biography, or sociological variables of structure. Indeed, to take interaction as an independent variable and these other factors as a dependent variable sheds considerable light on the matter as we observe the social worker taking these into account in the decisions which may either confirm or disconfirm an hypothesis employing them as independent variables.

Summary

This chapter has been devoted to providing a basic model of the interaction between juvenile and social worker. We began by applying two important descriptive terms to the process of constructing identity. We stated that the process was <u>rhetorical</u> and involved <u>negotiation</u>. Our model in this chapter was concerned mainly with the negotiation process, which we specified in terms of four basic concepts:

1) motives and accounts; 2) identities; 3) meaning in the interaction; 4) transformation images. We stated that motives, accounts, and identities involve a presentation which is either acted upon or not acted upon by an audience. We tied this to the concept of meaning in the interaction by stating that motives (which includes accounts and may also include identity in any given case) provided meaning to action, although any given presentation need not. Meaning in this context was to be understood as an ad hoc construction formulated according to an actor's purposes at hand. Hence we went on to specify meaning in terms of how the interaction is organized between juvenile and social worker with reference to: 1) helping; 2) the problem; 3) the solution; 4) the interview (all of these being the terms of social work). Finally we noted that these terms for organized lines of activity could be understood as transformation images which: 1) served as a common meeting ground for disparate social worlds; 2) transformed the child into an object meaningful in terms of these lines of activity, i.e., in terms of the purposes for which meaning was constructed; 3) allowed for the possibility of avoiding disruption to the organized lines of activity which the images represented.

NOTES

[1]This is a departure from Scott and Lyman, at least strictly speaking. The reasons for this departure will become evident shortly.

[2]Meaning is not a generator of action as implied by Strauss (1967: 326), nor does a disrupted line of activity imply a hiatus in interaction, which as Foote (1975: 25) suggests is a popular theoretical misconception. A proper perspective on interaction, and one we have attempted to set forth in our use of lines of activity, is suggested by Goffman (1961b) in his essay on role distance. There he suggests that interaction may involve several roles as well as activities more properly connected with self and not role (thus self may be established through distance from a role). Interaction is comprised of many ongoing lines of activity and yet it is not reducible to any given line.

[3]This ideology is by no means confined to social work, the most popular example being that of Alcoholics Anonymous. Indeed since Alcoholics Anonymous is a voluntary organization a person is not accepted for membership until he has admitted before fellow members that he is an alcoholic, underscoring the significance of the transformation images for the life of the organization. The author has observed a similar phenomenon in a neuropsychiatric hospital, where the progress of the patient may be measured in terms of his acceptance of the doctors' definition of his behavior as problematic or sick.

CHAPTER VI

THE RHETORICAL PROCESS

We have outlined a model for the interaction between juvenile
and social worker. However, it should be regarded as only the bare
skeleton of a complex process. We should now like to turn our attent-
ion to putting some flesh on the skeleton. To do so will require that
we examine first of all the more general rhetorical process in which
negotiation takes place. In other words, we must examine the rhe-
torical dimensions of the situation in which negotiation is part of
a convincing context.

All features of interaction attain their reality through the
action of people. Thus, if rhetoric is concerned with persuasion,
and if the juvenile's identity is a socially constructed reality
which is a product of this rhetorical process; what we are examining
is the leap from the many possibilities of persuasion to the one of
reality. And all social realities involve the basic paradox that
while they may operate as a singular, they could have just as easily
been constructed in any number of alternative ways. Here we will
limit this ambitious undertaking to an examination of some of the
means the social worker may employ, mainly as a preliminary to ne-
gotiations over the account presented by the juvenile. Having done
this, we may turn our attention to the negotiations.

Strategy and Rhetoric[1]

First and foremost, rhetoric is concerned with style. Anything may be approached rhetorically, and the success or failure of rhetoric depends upon style and not, at least primarily, with content. This necessarily implies that rhetoric has a theatrical dimension to it (and vice-versa, see: Burns, 1974: 28-98). However, negotiation, which involves rhetoric, calls attention to a different dimension of the same interaction inasmuch as it is concerned primarily with "positions" (i.e., one bargains from a position which is central to the process of bargaining, especially its outcome). Negotiation, therefore, involves strategy which is the art of positioning some-thing (oneself, troops, or tokens in a game) to advantage vis-avis an opponent. We can see the link between strategy and rhetoric in the endeavor to establish an advantageous position in interaction. The rhetorician uses strategy as he seeks a position favorable to his argument, while the strategist uses rhetoric as he seeks a favorable position for whatever he seeks to position (i.e., a favorable position is likely to involve persuading others that it is favorable, while the infamous ruse or camoflauge is a clearcut case of gaining the advantage through the use of rhetoric).

For the social worker, the use of rhetoric and the devices we have described is bound up in the very nature of the enterprise in which he or she is engaged. His or her business is a value judge-ment enterprise which may immediately, and certainly ultimately, rests upon the ability of the social worker to convince others that certain values should be upheld over other values. The judgements he or she renders can be justified only in terms of these values,

and yet the very nature of a value is such that it invites challenge.
Indeed, it is one very important function of the transformation images
to minimize the value dimensions of these judgements by rendering them
in the ethically neutral terms of medicine (employing a psychiatric
vocabulary of motives). Of course, the social worker may feel that
his or her judgements rest upon a higher order of truth apart from
value, such as science. However, regardless of the social worker's
feeling about the matter, he or she is still faced with that basic
paradox of social realities; this time in guise of the fact that
"truth" competes in an open marketplace of ideas and possibilities.

Given this fact of social existence, the social worker can only
hope to amass all resources at his or her disposal and use these in
the best possible way. This involves rhetoric employed strategically.
Here we may identify two fundamental rhetorical devices: 1) the
appeal to authority, and 2) identification. Appeals to authority
need little elaboration from a sociological perspective inasmuch
as it is the cornerstone of all institutions. It is the most basic
element in religion, which Durkheim (1954) was pleased to identify
with society. Weber (1946) was compelled to identify its various
types from the most primitive society to the most advanced bureaucracy.
In brief, to establish one's authority is to hold say over the other.

The identification process is also well known to sociologists,
especially in the literature on socialization (see: Parsons & Bales,
1955; Mead, 1934). As a more purely rhetorical device, it is best
exemplified in the world of politics where, at least in the United
States, it has reached the status of a necessity in political campaign-
ing. The identification process (and here we are concerned primarily

with identification <u>with</u> the other) as a rhetorical device involves
empathy and the identification of interests between speaker and
audience. Its results may be emulation, as in the case of sociali-
zation, but more immediately to identify with the other is to hold
the active voice of a significant other in his decision making.

The Stragegy of a Setting

When the juvenile comes before the social worker, he enters a
place which has been prepared for him. The building he enters, the
offices and the furnishings therein, as well as the people, constitute
a social space or setting which has been put together to deal with
people of his kind and situations of this kind, whatever these
may be. Of course, this involves a paradox of sorts inasmuch
as neither the kind of person he is nor the situation are something
known about as yet. This whole environment he enters has, in fact,
been organized around a fictionalized character which does not exist;
one which can come into being only as he enters.

The juvenile who enters this setting is not likely to recognize
the effort or ingenuity which has gone into engineering this scene,
but if he has had the occasion to visit a courtroom, he may recognize
some of the origins of these feelings. Indeed, if he has been brought
in by the police, he has been brought fact-to-face with symbols in
badges, uniforms, guns, and police cars which may have aroused simi-
lar feelings, though their presence is markedly absent in the present
setting. And if his feelings are somewhat different it should come as
no surprise, as the social worker manages different symbols. He or
she relies on them no less than the robed judge or the uniformed

policeman, however.

The physical arrangements of the office itself are likely to be the first which impinges upon the juvenile. There, he may find the furniture arranged such that the appropriate amount of social distance is conveniently established between him and the social worker. The social worker's desk may be placed such that it serves as a barrier to intimacy and interaction among equals. On the other hand, many social workers do not like this arrangement because it suggests not only authority, but aloofness (it is also a bar to observing "body language"); in which case he may find the desk moved toward one wall so that interaction proceeds in a manner more appropriate to friends than business associates. When he is invited to sit, he may observe that the chair he is invited to take, whether comfortable or un-comfortable (which may depend upon other factors), appropriately contrasts with that of the social worker's—what the ingenuous manu-facturers of office furniture refer to as an "executive chair".

As the juvenile takes in the whole scene he is likely to feel a contrast which has marked his passage from another outside. This other office, inhabited by secretaries, is furnished in such a way that walls are hardly necessary to set it off from the social worker's, although the walls of the present office enclose only one, whereas the former enclosed perhaps four or five. There is a clear status differential in those whose job it is to select and screen out those who are not significant enough to enter the presence of this higher order, and those whose presence is guarded. Indeed, if he has addres-sed these secretaries in a manner appropriate to their social station, "m'am", "Miss", or "Mrs." as the case may be, and if they exerted

demands for such treatment, he now finds these secretaries addressing the social worker in a similar manner, although they may be older (and, unknown to the juvenile, although they may not address him or her as such outside his presence).

Turning his attention more closely to the office, the juvenile may notice that the desk is suggestive of one who is busy, but not disorderly. Piles of paper in disarray on a desk suggest disorder, while one containing nothing or only a few items precisely placed suggests inactivity and design. The juvenile is unlikely to find either of these two types of desks. This is substantially congruent with the account the secretary may have given him inasmuch as it is one of the duties of the secretary to see to it that anyone waiting for the social worker is waiting for a busy, active superior.

Directing his gaze around the room, the juvenile may take note of the decor. Official testimonies to the social worker's accomplishments in a system of legitimate authority may be framed and placed on the wall. In this context, he is not likely to have seen similar testimonies decorating the walls of the secretaries' office, although they may possess similar testimonies. In fact, unknown to the juvenile, the agency may provide such testimonies for social workers, but is unlikely to do so for similar accomplishments of secretaries.

If the juvenile is greeted by a female social worker, the decor of the office may be marked more by what is absent than what is present. Thus he may search in vain for anything which might be symbolically feminine, finding little else than a tissue box. While the office may or may not have a sterile appearance, the symbolic passiveness of the feminine is seldom allowed to tarnish this decor

of authority. As a matter of fact, the juvenile is unlikely to have found a sterile or totally impersonal office as is so characteristic of bureaucracies.

If the office he has entered is imbued with the symbols of authority, it is also littered with symbols of the personal. Along side the social worker's testimonies he may find a popular poster which suggests that this authority is one that is in touch with his generation. The busy, active desk may also have novelty items or cartoon clippings which let the juvenile know that beneath this authority is a person. Role distance, as Goffman (1961b: 124) suggests, is a powerful extension and elaboration on the basic authority of a role. Authority is a much better control device when it is tempered with affection; paternalism is more effective than despotism. However, offices and objects are not the best means of establishing an identification with someone.

In this context, the symbols of authority which surrounded the juvenile from the very beginning may have been progressively tempered by the conversation and behavior of secretaries, whose unofficial job description may include making the juvenile feel relaxed. The juvenile's encounter with the secretary, whether brief or extended, will definitely set a tone of authority and/or intimacy and the boundaries of each. The very manner in which he is addressed as well as the topic of conversation will inform him as to how seriously he must take this whole matter. More importantly, it is likely to be the first information he obtains regarding the self which he has established here—in the acts which have brought him here. The secretary will have a difficult and delicate task here, inasmuch

as making the juvenile feel relaxed cannot cross the boundaries into defining the situation as not serious, even if levity may be involved in relaxing him. And, whatever the juvenile has done, the secretary should avoid moral judgement, something seldom accomplished even by experienced secretaries (and something seldom practiced by some).

As the juvenile is greeted by the social worker, his or her attire is the first thing which is likely to strike the juvenile. Whether the more impersonal symbols of authority or the informality of identification will be stressed depends upon how well the social worker is able to work these respectively. Items of clothing which the juvenile himself is likely to wear are generally avoided, but even here this may depend upon the official policies of the local agency. Thus, given an extremely flexible dress code, a social worker may be attired in either business suit or "Levis". Often, items of current fashion are selected which neither make the social worker look older or younger than his or her chronological age, but it is not unknown for a social worker to don slightly worn bluejeans and the attire popular among the juenile's peer group. In a similar manner, the hairstyle of the social worker may be selected either to enhance the identification process, or to establish distance between juvenile and social worker. Personal cosmetic and jeweled adornment of the body is yet another dimension to be considered by the social worker, but here current taste among the "business" community is likely to serve as the standard.

While the management of personal appearance will show a great deal of variation, it should not be surmised that this is due to

haphazard "personal taste" any more than the furnishing of the office.
Of several institutions visited by the author, and of many second-
hand reports by social workers in other institutions, all had some
standards for personal attire, hygiene, and cosmetic adornment of the
body that were framed in terms of consequences to the relationship of
the social worker to the juvenile. Similarly, all social workers
the author talked to were able to formulate reasons for their attire
in the same terms (although, of course, other reasons were also given).
These terms were universally along the two dimensions of establishing
authority and/or identification with the juvenile.

Thus from the moment the juvenile enters the facility in which
his negotiation with the social worker will proceed, he is subject
to persuasive techniques. He is placed in a setting which exudes
information about the people he is to deal with; about his relation-
ship to these people; about what kind of place he is in; and what may
be expected of him with regard to place and inhabitants. This setting
is only an initial strategy, and a rough one at that, inasmuch as
it can be altered very little to meet the exigencies of the given
case. The fictionalized character it has been built around is soon
filled out in flesh as the juvenile enters however. And with this
additional information, the social worker may also refine his or
her strategies.

The social worker, upon receiving word of the juvenile's arrival
has an opportunity to glean what information he or she can from agency
reports, secretaries, and even from the appearance of the juvenile
himself should a brief reconnoitering seem feasible and possible.
In this time, he or she will have the opportunity to size up the

juvenile and make plans accordingly. The information obtained in this
time may be quite extensive, or it may, in fact, consist in little more
than an initial impression of a secretary. Indeed, it may often consist
in nothing more than what is contained on a police face sheet, which
itself may vary from a two or three sentence summary of the juvenile's
attitude to a simple legal description of the juvenile's offense.
However, regardless of the amount of information available, the social
worker is faced with the exigencies of any strategist in the field.
Namely, one must work with what one has, make a calculated choice
between practical alternatives, and move unhesitatingly so as not to
communicate doubt, weakness, or indecision. In the amount of time
available, practical alternatives means: 1) a limited number of
simple alternatives, that are 2) formulated according to the signifi-
cant features of this initial phase of the interaction, and are,
therefore 3) flexible enough that they do not commit the social worker
to any specific course of action. In other words, the social worker
is interested at this point in establishing the general orientation
to the juvenile which will work best with him. He or she does not,
at this point, wish to be committed to anything as specific as what
is to be done with him or even any final judgements of his action.
In this context, two broad strategies are open to the social worker:
1) taking a "hard line" approach in an attempt to coerce the juvenile
into being cooperative, and 2) taking a "soft line" approach in an
attempt to solicit the juvenile's cooperation.

The Hard Line

If the information at the social worker's disposal seems to

indicate that he or she is dealing with a juvenile who is not likely to be cooperative, he or she may feel that the best strategy is in the presentation of a self and situation which the juvenile cannot manipulate. If the juvenile is met with a display of firm authority, it is felt that he will be more likely to accept the social worker's definition of the situation. This is to say that the juvenile in one way or another, has presented some challenge to the social worker's authority and/or any identification strategy has failed. As we have suggested, this information may have been obtained from any number of sources, the most likely being that of a long agency record the juvenile has, the report of arresting officers and secretaries, and finally his actions in the facility before meeting the social worker (which may be surrepticiously observed under the auspices of conducting business).

Most immediately, taking a hard line may involve making the juvenile wait for relatively long periods of time before seeing him in the social worker's office. This time period may range from an hour to the greater part of the work day, and is generally dependent upon the juvenile's reaction. Since the idea is to physically and emotionally wear the juvenile down, the social worker generally has no set period of time, but rather waits for a breaking point to develop. This is arrived at when the juvenile has either become so physically agitated that he is becoming difficult to control or, on the other extreme, becomes exceedingly acquiescent (sometimes to the point of falling asleep). If he becomes agitated, the social worker still must make a judgement as to whether this constitutes a breaking point, in which case the juvenile is willing to talk or

do anything in order to relieve the tedium, or whether, in fact, the agitation is a form of further rebellion. In this case, time is important to the extent that something on the order of less than an hour is generally felt to constitute further rebellion. In any case, one of the most important factors will be the juvenile's willingness to talk with the social worker; best demonstrated in deferential treatment of him or her. The following exchange between a juvenile and social worker demonstrates this breaking point (from the author's observations):

Juvenile [sneeringly]: When am I going to see you. I been wait'n all day.

Social Worker: I don't think you're fit to see anyone. I want you to sit out here a while. It'll do you some good. You can think about your behavior for a while.

Juvenile: I have thought about it. I'm sorry. I just can't stand do'in nothin'. [The juvenile's eyes are damp] I didn't mean it. [The juvenile appears to be struggling not to cry]

Social Worker: Do you think you can shape up and conduct yourself like a human being?

Juvenile: Yea. I really can...I wanna talk.

[Social worker admits juvenile to the office]

Paradoxically, taking a hard line may involve just the opposite tactic, however. Thus a juvenile may be ushered in immediately, sometimes without even a preliminary intake sheet being filled out. While this may seem contradictory, it follows from the exigencies of particular cases and corresponding adjustment of the same basic strategy. In this case, however, the idea is not to allow the juvenile time to formulate his own strategy, especially in conjunction with comrades. Indeed, juveniles brought in together are likely to

be separated in any case and often are not allowed to talk with any
other juveniles who might be present. Moreover, the juvenile who
is admitted immediately may serve in the strategy for those who remain
waiting. If the social worker is heard shouting or speaking in loud,
ominous tones through the door of the office, the remaining juveniles
not only have tedium to deal with, but the forboding of things to
come.

When the juvenile enters the office with the social worker,
the strategy must be, once again, reassessed. Here, the social worker
has the opportunity to make a one-hundred and eighty degree turn
to a soft line. This we will consider later, however. More likely,
the social worker will make some decision as to how aggressive the
hard line he or she maintains is to be. The proper adjectives to
describe this continuum of aggressiveness might be something on the
order of from firm, stern, and cold to hostile and openly threatening.
The strategy in the first case is to not lose the ground the social
worker has gained, while in the second it is a continuation of break-
ing the juvenile. If the social worker takes the less aggressive
tact, the juvenile is likely to be faced with discomfort as a central
feature of the interaction. Indeed, he may be asked to sit in a chair
which serves this purpose instrumentally, while also symbolizing it.
However, this particular tactic is rapidly falling into disuse, in-
asmuch as it involves a commitment to its use in other cases (arrang-
ing furniture to suit the individual case becomes too involved).
Of this, more later however. The arrangements of discomfort are
much more effectively employed by other means. The juvenile may not
be allowed to smoke. He may be prompted to sit erect in a position

of deference to the situation, but one which is likely to be foreign to the juvenile in any circumstances. The most effective means of maintaining a cold atomsphere and firm authority remains in the facial expression of the social worker. Unfortunately, this is all but impossible to communicate in a written format. However, certain mannerisms employed with these facial expressions may give some idea as to the framework within which a substantive content is being negotiated. In this context, the social worker may flip through pages of written material lying on his or her desk, leaving the interaction in an awkward state of silence. Or this may be done while the juvenile is talking which quickly communicates to him the importance the social worker has allotted to him and his case. Similarly, the social worker may thumb through the juvenile's file, the secrecy of which is likely to make the juvenile extremely uncomfortable.

At this point, the social worker may indeed make explicit what is being communicated in gesture. He or she may tell the juvenile that, quite frankly, he or she "doesn't give a damn", or a rhetorical question may be posed, "Give me one good reason I should be wasting my time with you?" At this point, the social worker may pointedly stare into the eyes of the juvenile. In moving to this explicit statement approach, the social worker has effectively placed the juvenile in terms of status, and at the same time he or she may play on his fears. The juvenile is likely to realize the potential power the social worker holds and he is likely to be afraid of the consequences of his or her anger when "pushed too far". From the social worker's standpoint, the idea is to convince the juvenile that he or she has been pushed too far, although this is not necessarily the case.

Indeed, what the juvenile is unlikely to know is that being pushed
too far is an occupational hazard that, by and large, the social worker
learns to cope with. Convincing the juvenile that he or she has al-
ready been pushed too far is one technique for avoiding being pushed
too far, which can and does get the social worker in difficulties on
occasion. In this context, the use of occasional profanity may be
used to establish just how far the social worker has been pushed,
the major drawback being the fact that it is officially banned and
that it also may be an effective means of establishing identification
with the juvenile.[2]

Moving on into the interaction, it will be important for the
social worker to keep the upper hand in knowledge also. To main-
tain authority necessitates being superior not only in the possession
of power, but also that of knowledge. This may be directly emphasized
by way of telling the juvenile that the social worker "knows all the
tricks" or has "seen all kinds". And this may be bolstered by chal-
lenging the juvenile's statements as a matter of course, rather than
a matter of actual knowledge of facts to the contrary. Similarly,
the social worker may demonstrate intimate knowledge regarding the
juvenile and his family taken from his case file should he have one.
Any references to the social worker's personal life or his or her
behavior, circumstances, or relationships outside of the confines
of the immediate interaction may be carefully avoided inasmuch as
the possession of information is power and status.[3] The social worker
may also cast doubtful reflections on the intelligence of the juvenile
insofar as his socially disapproved behavior is concerned.

With reference to attacks upon the character of the juvenile

as well as the other aforementioned derogatory techniques, it should not be supposed that we are describing a social worker venting his or her hostility on the juvenile. What we have described is a strategy which loses in effectiveness proportionate to the extent that the social worker is not in control of his or her rational faculties. Personal antipathy may be a significant feature of any given interaction, but has nothing to do with the strategy employed. Indeed, what we have described deliberately omits the extreme range of possibilities, which may move over into atrocity tales which do happen, but are not typical. This will be important to bear in mind as we consider the more aggressive tack the social worker may take.

To understand the more aggressive tack of the social worker employing a hard line, one must understand the reasoning process which goes into its makeup. Here we may elaborate on some of our terminology. When a social worker takes a hard line, there is an implicit analogy or metaphor involved in "breaking the juvenile". While the nomenclature we have chosen may or may not be employed by the social worker, the analogy of the juvenile to a type of shelled creature is a pervasive one throughout the field (the term "breaking" was used at one institution and is not of the author's invention; "hard line" and "soft line" are the author's terms). In this analogy, a juvenile may come to develop a hard shell which envelops an emotionally injured self. The idea thus becomes one of breaking this hard shell in order to penetrate to the feeling and injured self which resides therein. Expanding on this analogy (not facetiously, we might add), a juvenile may be assessed in terms of the thickness or hardness of this shell which has come to protect him like a turtle,

but necessarily desensitizes him as a human being. Thus the juvenile who is on the receiving end of the less agressive tack is one who has only the thin veneer of a shell; one whose shell has not come to be hardened by the onslaught of time and other circumstances. Indeed, his whole behavior may be described more in terms of an "act" tenuously put on by a frightened child. The juvenile who possesses a truly hard shell is in a different category however. As a matter of fact, the social worker is likely to express doubt as to whether the juvenile has any feeling left beneath this shell and even more likely to express doubt as to the ability of anyone to penetrate it if there is something there. The paradigm of the hard shell case is the child who has been repeatedly, or for a significant portion of his life, institutionalized or shuffled from one foster home to another.

The hard shell case is, therefore, one which calls for a last ditch effort; for the extremes of action and strategy at the social worker's disposal. With regard to this last ditch effort, we must now call into question our distinction between the rational control involved in strategy as opposed to other action. Our point in making such a distinction was to emphasize the composed nature of the social worker's action. In the case of a last ditch effort we are likely to see a different dimension of composure, however. What is involved is a preparedness for a situation in terms of a commitment to a general state of the action which will take place. This is best captured in the phrase "psyching yourself up", known to men preparing for combat as well as football players and even fans. One social worker described this in terms of deliberately generating anger in himself, such that what followed was neither "an act" or "the real

thing", but more a measure of involvement or commitment to the action. In this context, we must finally point out that strategy, if more effective when employed by a "rational" player, is not primarily concerned with intentions, but pragmatic results. Thus the fool may be thought by some to be sly, but this judgement can be made only in the midst of beliefs to the contrary and only in terms of results which admittedly may come his way by accident rather than design.

In an aggressive hard line, the social worker may use any number of the techniques of a less aggressive approach. However, the aggressive hard line requires an added dimension of attack whereby the juvenile is not simply kept on guard or uncomfortable in the interaction, but actually off balance. He is not allowed time to think or rationally organize a strategy himself. Thus as he enters the office with the social worker, he or she is likely to begin an attack even before the juvenile has been seated. The social worker lets him know right from the beginning that he or she is mad, by a direct statement to that effect perhaps, but principally by way of gesture. He or she may yell or even pound the desk in a sudden staccato emphasis.

An all out attack on the self of the juvenile may be launched in which the juvenile is systematically stripped of any and all defenses of what the social worker regards as an untenable and superficial self; a syndrome which must be destroyed if a healthy self is to be found. The displays of anger thus frighten the juvenile, keep him off balance, and provoke emotion in him. If the social worker can evoke emotion in the juvenile he or she is likely to feel that half the battle is won, as indeed it may be. As the juvenile becomes more

emotional he is in a defensive position; he is responding, often

reflexively, but always in a parry against a thrust.

The following exchange between a juvenile and a social worker

illustrate the use of an aggressive hard line:

Social Worker: I've had it with your type mister. You
go strutin' around here like you own the place. [Shouting]
Look at me when I talk to you mister! You're nothin' but a
punk. You hear me! I don't like punks. Nobody likes punks.

Juvenile: I'm not a punk. I just don't like be'in
pushed around.

Social Worker: Sure you're a punk. You're gonna show
everybody what a big man you are. Well I've seen tougher
cases than you. And I've seen 'em break down right in this
office and cry. Big men! Well they're not so big now. And
neither are you.

Juvenile [almost inaudibly]: I don't think I'm a big
man. [This is an approximation of what he said as it is all
but inaudible]

Social Worker: Don't mumble like a snot-nosed brat.
Speak up! [Social worker is shouting 'at the top of his lungs']

Juvenile: Nothin' [rolling his eyes toward the ceiling
now]

Social Worker: That's what I thought—'nothin'. What
makes you think you got the right to do anything. You and
that goddamn pack you run with are a bunch of animals. Look
at me when I talk mister! [Juvenile has his head bowed toward
the floor] Look at me! [The social worker is yelling and
pounds his fist on the desk]

The juvenile looks up, but does not allow his eyes to engage
the social worker's. There is a 'lump' in his throat, although
he is not crying. He says nothing but appears to be attempting
to avoid the social worker's eyes. The social worker prompts
him once more to look at him and the juvenile attempts to hold
the gaze of the social worker, but his manner suggests that
considerable effort is required to do so.

Social Worker: You and the rest of the punks. You go
around terrorizing houseparents and kids. That's your style.
Well let me tell you I don't go so easy. You wanna' terrorize
somebody now. That make you feel like a big man. If there's
going to be any terror around here I'll be the one to do it.

You feel like do'in something—come on, go right ahead and
do something. [Shouting]

Juvenile: I don't wanna do nothin'.

Social Worker: Sure you do. You're a big man. [Social
worker makes reference to one incident the juvenile was involved
in during the time he waited to see the social worker] You
make me sick. You're nothin' but trouble. Your file tells
the whole story and by God everything you did this afternoon
is going in there right along with the rest. You proud of
that? You think your parents are gonna be proud of it?

Juvenile: No. [Juvenile is beginning to cry]

Social Worker: What do you think they [the boy's parents]
are gonna say?

Juvenile: I dunno. [Juvenile is crying more profusely
now]

Social Worker: You want me to tell them what you did?

Juvenile: No.

The juvenile was sent out of the office shortly thereafter.

Later, he was called back in, inasmuch as the interaction described

was not for purposes of reaching any decisions as to instrumental

action. This session was, in fact, only in preparation for what the

social worker regards as the important part of his work—the diagnostic

and therapeutic work. The repeated reference to one incident is not,

in fact, an issue, but rather a tool in that the social worker dis-

covered that it was embarrassing to the juvenile removed from the

context of its occurrence. The point is then further developed in

threats of exposure to parents and others, including any judge who

might view his record in disposing of his case. In fact, the juvenile's

parents were never told of the incident and the judge never viewed

the record in which the incident was recorded. The social worker

told the author that he never intended to inform either of the incident

(many social workers will not, in fact, reveal incidents or information

to parents or others they believe cannot "handle" it, i.e., not make an embarrassing or emotional point of it with the juvenile).

It would be difficult to assess the extent of the use of this very aggressive hard line strategy. The strategy seems more suited to males and in the case cited the social worker was a male. However, female social workers do use the strategy with female juveniles, if not also with males.[4] Our caution here does not concern the limitations of its use due to sex though. More specifically, it appears that the decline in its use (if such is the case) is connected with a refinement in technique associated with the rise in more "enlightened" psychotherapeutic approaches. To put the matter straight forward, the aggressive hard line strategy appears crude. It cannot be employed when visitors or other outsiders to the institution or agency are present and it can lead to trouble if the juvenile obtains a lawyer. However, a totally impressionistic observation may be ventured. Certain psychotherapeutic techniques employ a strategy which is aimed at provoking the juvenile emotionally and these techniques (including those which employ "role-playing" and "encounter sessions" among others) offer an excellent format for an old strategy in new dress. In any case, however, soliciting cooperation which is "voluntarily" rendered is far preferable and prevalent. This involves what we have chosen to call a soft line approach.

The Soft Line

As the information the social worker obtains may indicate that the juvenile will be tough to deal with, it may also indicate that the juvenile is open to suggestions; one whose problems may be tough,

but one who could be cooperative in working through these problems. For the social worker, as any strategist, this is a crucial distinction. The individual who is not willing to negotiate requires some strategy to get him to the negotiation table. The individual who is willing to negotiate may excell in bargaining and in fact this may be one reason he wishes to negotiate. But even though he may be tough to bargain with, the situation calls for a different strategy from that of the individual who refuses to negotiate at all. Note that this implies that the soft line may be a logical sequel to a successful hard line. Thus, the soft line comes into play when an indication, in whatever form, has been given that there is a willingness to negotiate, the soft line being a strategy to develop this willingness into active cooperation. If the juvenile is willing to negotiate, his cooperation on behalf of the social worker's effort in the negotiation may be solicited.

Since the social worker employing a soft line is attempting to solicit cooperation, a juvenile who is relaxed, who does not feel under pressure or intimidated is much more likely to cooperate with a minimum of effort. That the juvenile may appear open to suggestions, that he is not openly hostile, does not mean that he may not have fears or suspicions regarding this experience with the social worker. In consequence, it behooves the social worker to allay any possible fears or suspicions and give the juvenile a relaxed feeling regarding his situation. The juvenile may be offered a cigarette and a comfortable chair. He is not likely to be kept waiting any longer than is absolutely necessary. If he is kept waiting, he may be invited to engage in some activity designed to alleviate tedium and avoid

nervous tension.

When the juvenile enters the social worker's office, a polite conversation may be embarked upon. The social worker is likely to show interest in any activities he mentions and this may even be interspersed with personal accounts from the social worker's life. If the juvenile mentions he is interested in building model airplanes, the social worker may show interest in his hobby or even make personal recollections about his boyhood experiences with model airplanes (and so on, as the case may be). Whatever has brought him to the attention of authorities or whatever his reason for being there before the social worker may be gradually worked into this casual exchange or approached more directly after a few minutes.

The social worker may also take a more direct approach to any possible fears the juvenile may have. He or she is likely to explain something of the role of social worker in terms of helping the juvenile. The social worker may directly state that the conversation between he or she and the juvenile is confidential (which is not, strictly speaking, correct) or even provide some guidelines to this statement, e.g., by making it clear that the social worker cannot withold information from a judge or prosecuting attorney when it involves criminal acts. (The exact legal and extra-legal nature of confidentiality in the relationship, if known by the social worker, is seldom if ever explained fully, however. Thus, as far as is known to the author, the judge or prosecuting attorney in a juvenile case could demand any and all information divulged to the social worker and most likely the same would hold true of a defense attorney. This latter point is significant inasmuch as it is often the parents the

juvenile does not want information divulged to. Finally, the fact
that all information divulged to the social worker is almost certain
to be placed in an agency record is seldom, if ever, told to the
juvenile.) This means of allaying the fears of the juvenile is also
directly concerned with gaining his confidence, another important
step in gaining his cooperation.

Indeed, gaining the juvenile's confidence also moves into the
important area of maintaining authority. For while the social worker
will be concerned with establishing an identification with the juvenile
in order to solicit cooperation, he or she will not want to lose the
advantages which accrue to authority. Thus gaining the juvenile's
confidence may also include practical demonstrations of knowledge
and professionalism. The social worker, at this point, will wish to
appear confident in the statements he or she makes, uncertainty being
the chief villian of confidence, knowledge, and professionalism.
If the social worker, for example, can "read" the juvenile's feelings
he or she may indicate this, as "I know exactly how you feel", fol-
lowed by some description of these feelings. Indications of the social
worker's experience with numbers of similar situations, cases, or
feelings may be cited. Finally, the social worker may be attuned
to and attempt to anticipate subjects embarrassing or difficult for
the juvenile to discuss. He or she may then give the juvenile license
to discuss such matters by way of indicating that these are in no
way bizzarre or shameful. This, at once, accomplishes two things.

First, the social worker takes the position of one who grants
license in the area of morality, an important position in any social
system, however great or small. Second, the social worker, if

successful in his or her bid for what the juvenile may regard as the most intimate knowledge of self, will possess knowledge of the juvenile capable of literally destroying his self. This is one reason that the social worker is likely to avoid references to his or her personal life as, for example, not wishing the juvenile or his parents to bring up such matters as the social worker's marital status or children (many social workers do not wish their clients to know they are child- less). Knowledge about certain matters regarding the self may be detrimental in other areas of an individual's life such as the fact that a juvenile is enuretic or has cried during a session with the social worker. Should the juvenile ever change his position vis-a- vis the social worker this information can and does serve as either an implicit or explicit threat that may be employed by the social worker.

Coupled with encouraging the juvenile to talk about matters considered private or intimate, the social worker is also likely to employ euphenism to avoid arousing the suspicions of the juvenile or allowing him to gain information which could make him hostile. This may also be used along with "hedging" or the use of vague ref- erences which do not allow the juvenile to properly assess his own position. Thus the juvenile whom the social worker regards as disturb- ed enough to warrant institutionalization may be told that he has "problems" like a great deal of juveniles his age, but not that these "problems" are regarded as severe or disturbed enough to warrant the social worker's label of pathological or sick. Similarly, if the social worker has determined, or is in the process of making a determination, that the juvenile's parents are pathologically

disturbed or that the juvenile's home is unsuitable, he or she may avoid making such references while encouraging the juvenile to talk about such matters. Thus, situations which may arouse disgust or outrage in the social worker may not be communicated to the juvenile; indeed the opposite may be communicated, the juvenile being more inclined to divulge information under this atmosphere of license (see: Goffman's 1961a discussion of the "betrayal funnel" in connection with mental patients, which has direct application to this section).

While from some points of view these maneuvers constitute an etiquette or ethos which it is felt should govern any "polite" social exchange, we must remember that it is in the context of these maneuvers that the social worker will present his or her argument for the "facts of the case". It is in this context that the juvenile's identity will come to be negotiated. The soft line approach becomes especially significant inasmuch as the social worker's opinions and judgements come to be those of a friend or benevolent authority and the relationship itself may come to be a rhetorical "bank account" which can be drawn on if the situation demands it.

Therefore, as the social worker presents a particular construction of events, however it may differ from what the juvenile has presented, it becomes increasingly unlikely that the juvenile will seriously challenge the social worker. When and if he does, he may be reminded of the social worker's mission to help him and this may be presented in conjunction with an appeal to the relationship of friends. Implicitly the social worker may threaten to break the relationship by telling the juvenile that he or she cannot help him until he faces "reality" or the fact that he has a "problem" as espoused by the social worker.

This becomes a particularly powerful tool if the soft line approach has been effective inasmuch as the social worker may be the only "friend" the juvenile has within the agency or the entire juvenile justice system.

The soft line approach, then, becomes the strategy par excellence and the climax of the strategies we have examined. We have not attempted any kind of exhaustive catalogue of the strategies involved in the interaction between juvenile and social worker. We have not examined those available to the juvenile, nor have we examined all those which may be employed by the social worker. While we would not want to minimize the capabilities of the juvenile, the strategies available to him do become limited as a function of the time and equipment he may have at his disposal. Thus we have sought to focus upon the relatively rich field available to the social worker.

In so doing, we have attempted to show how a situation is brought to life by actors with a purpose. From the moment the juvenile enters the door and an encounter has been embarked upon until the time it is terminated, the rhetorical process of a social reality is in motion. We have not directly examined this process at all stages of the encounter, but we have examined some easily neglected areas. As the juvenile and social worker get down to the business of accounts it is obvious that strategies will be involved. Transcripts of these transactions are filled with examples of these. What is seldom seen is the subtlities of impression management which is necessary to even arrive at this stage. These are the most fundamental strategies whereby two actors become convinced of the "reality of social reality"; indeed, become convinced enough to take this

for granted and embark upon the finer points of play. The setting

and the relationships of authority and identification become for

juvenile and social worker the field upon which negotiation will be

played. And it is to this process that we must now turn our attention.

NOTES

[1]This section has benefitted from Goffman (1969), who offers
a game model for interaction employing the concept of strategy.
From the perspective of Goffman's (1969) model, we focus primarily
on one side of the game-strategy.

[2]Indeed, this presents difficulty for some social workers in-
asmuch as profanity may be such a highly effective means for establish-
ing an identification with the juvenile and yet it may also open the
social worker up for blackmail. Still, many social workers in the
present study used profanity strategically and an incidence involving
the researcher might be cited as evidence of its effectiveness in
terms of the identification process:

> Researcher [slipping on a ladder upon which he is standing]:
> Son-of-a-Bitch!
> Juvenile [smiling broadly]: So you do it too!
> Researcher: What do you mean?
> Juvenile: You cuss too.
> Researcher: Yea—well, occasionally.
> Juvenile: That's O.K. I won't tell anybody. It's just
> good to know that you're like everybody else. The teachers
> at school, they don't cuss except for Mr. _____ . He's alright.
> He don't let us cuss all the time, but he knows how it is.

The teacher referred to by the juvenile was a shop teacher who pre-
ferred coveralls for class, which is no accident in terms of the
identification process either.

[3]Hence, Goffman's (1969) model for interaction revolves around
information control as the nexus of social intercourse.

[4]This statement might be read in light of Goffman's (1967: 209)
observation regarding the exclusion of women from "action" as the
generator of character.

CHAPTER VII

ILLUSTRATIVE CASES

Having examined the rhetorical process, we may continue the task of putting flesh on our skeletal model by examining the negotiation process more closely. This is most important, for the terms we have used cannot be adequately defined in the abstract. Helping, interview, and the social worker's identity take on meaning in the context of specific interactions. And it is the context of these specific interactions that we see the social worker often struggling to maintain these lines of activity. Equally important are the many intricacies of the process which can be dealt with only be observing their actual operation.

What follows, then, are some illustrative cases taken from the author's observations. All cases are truncated versions, reconstructed from field notes in most cases, but sometimes only from memory. This latter procedure was necessary because notetaking was often impossible. In many cases the author was privy to interactions in which the legal status of his presence was in question (actually no one knew the exact legal status and most probably no one could make this determination until after the interaction and the nature of the communication unfolded).[1] Furthermore, the author's presence in many interactions was definitely contrary to the wishes of certain officials and only through the good graces of the social worker conducting the interview. Under

these circumstances the author felt it was wise to keep notetaking to
a minimum. Cases in which it is stated that the child was of a certain
socioeconomic class or presented some identity attendent to this gen-
erally involved highly subjective evaluations of the child's appearance.
However, how this or any other identity or account came to be acted
upon by the social worker was established in one or more of three
ways: 1) by direct statement of the social worker during the course
of the interaction with the juvenile, 2) by talking to the social worker
immediately after the interaction with the juvenile, and 3) by viewing
the written report of the social worker regarding the interaction.
These latter two procedures were especially significant in those cases
where the social worker intended to recommend institutionalization.
In these cases, the social worker's task was essentially completed
upon diagnosis, and he or she was likely to feel that there was no
purpose in going into the juvenile's problem in any great depth in the
interaction when another social worker would be taking over the case
shortly. In all of the cases cited, the social worker was female and
references to "she" or "her" should be read in this context. What
constitutes a social worker in the cases cited is that of anyone hired
by the Department of Institutions, Social and Rehabilitative Services
in such capacity designated "social worker". At that time, the main
criteria for such position was a college degree, and in all cases cited
the social worker had a Bachelor's degree. This should not be taken
to mean that the social worker had special training such as that re-
quired in some agencies (as, for example, the M. S. W. for federally
employed social workers). The major areas of study for these social
workers varied from home economics, business, history, and philosophy

to drama. One of these had some special training in work with children; none had majored in anything involving social work in the curricula. Only two had had any plans of becoming a social worker prior to graduating from college and at least two definitely did not plan on social work as a career. Two, which were not involved in any of the cases cited, either had, or was in the process of obtaining, their M. S. W. One of these was the director of the institution and therefore did little of the diagnostic or therapeutic work.

Finally, these truncated versions are not intended to convey the sense in which a delinquent identity is established in the interaction within the span of a few words which "sets off" a split second reaction on the part of the social worker. However, the sequence we describe is properly understood within a context largely alien to an analysis of delinquency. This context is that of the encounter (see: Goffman, 1961b), which is necessarily ahistorical in the sense that identity comes to be established or "established anew" in each interaction. A four hour session with the social worker is no more meaningful than another ten minute session. In either case an identity must be established and what was established in the one case can be related to the other only in the present interaction. This can be conveniently overlooked only at the expense of understanding the process of interaction in favor of some other goal such as prediction or generalization. In this context, as anyone familar with court procedures knows, the identity established between juvenile and social worker may bear little resemblance to the identity established in the courtroom. Eventually, what will be required for a fuller understanding of delinquency is a sequential model such as that suggested by Becker (1963) encompassing police,

social work, court, and institutional encounters. In the meantime, a clear understanding of the interaction process at each stage seems needed.

Non-delinquent Identities

Since identity hinges on the issue of placement, of situating the individual, no given identity can be defined without some specification of the field in which the individual is placed. While an actor's role may or may not imply the existence of a complimentary or contrasting role, the identification of an individual requires a sorting out which demands the existence of other specifically contrasting possibilities. Without these contrasts there can be no sorting and there can be no placement or situating of the individual.

As we look at non-delinquent identities we should take note of how lines of activity are organized around the presentation of the juvenile. Generally speaking, both juvenile and social worker are accorded the treatment they exert a demand for. The identities the juvenile presents are acted upon and the social worker is treated as a "social worker" as opposed to something else (a threat, a "heavy" or a fool). The account the juvenile presents is acted upon; it provides meaning in the interaction. More importantly, the account presented can be and is organized in terms of problems and solutions which do not involve institutionalization in order to avoid a disruption to helping lines of activity (i.e., helping is organized along other lines).

Deprived Kids

The notion than individual's social mileau may lead him to engage in untoward behavior is an old and widespread one even in this society with its emphasis on individualism. It is also a notion popular among many social workers, having a rich historical development in the literature (see: Ellwood, 1910, who even manages to blend this with forms of Social Darwinism; Hirschi, 1969). We should suspect that social workers will have little or no trouble finding meaning in a presentation which employs this familar rhetoric insofar as the link between motives and action will be apparent (i.e., involve a familar vocabulary of motives).[2] However, making one's action understandable is only one step in the process of constructing identity.[3]

A fourteen year old boy accused of shoplifting was brought in. Information on an intake sheet taken by a secretary included the following (among other things): the child lived with four other siblings and his parents in a low income housing project; the father was currently employed as a carpenter; the mother's employment was given as housewife. This information had been obtained from the child directly, although the intake sheet also contained a sketchy outline of the shoplifting incident which had been obtained from the police.

After engaging in a few perfunctory words (in order to relax the child), the juvenile presented the following account for the theft, which included a "zodiac necklace", a piece of costume jewelry popular among teenagers: "You know, all the 'dudes' I know got one. I guess I wanted it. Yea, I just wanted it." The social worker then questioned the juvenile about the possible involvement of other boys

in the incident. The juvenile responded: "Na, we sometimes hang around places you know. You know there ain't nothin' to do in this town. But, the store people, they watch you and chase you off if a bunch of ya' starts messin' around. They always on your case 'bout somethin'."

Upon the basis of this presentation, the social worker imputed the following motives and identities. The juvenile was obviously not a delinquent as his behavior involved an understandable response to the temptation of a child who was both bored and frustrated. The basis for this imputation was cited in the following items drawn from the account: 1) the theft of the necklace, an item of high utilitarian value among teens and an item not immediately marketable in terms of any large sum of money; 2) the child's identity as a lower socioeconomic level child, which was taken to mean that in all liklihood he did not have the money to purchase the items he stole; 3) the reference to nothing to do in this town, something to which the social worker agreed; 4) the reference to businessmen being impatient with children hanging around, which the social worker not only agreed to, but felt was at once an outgrowth of three and an incentive to steal inasmuch as it added to the child's frustration and resentment and offered an appropriate object for the venting of this frustration; and finally 5) there were no others involved in the theft, which the social worker took to mean that there was no evidence of gang activity, i.e., organized delinquency as opposed to an individual emotional response.[4]

Equally important, however, is how this presentation could be organized in terms of helping. In other words, all the aforementioned would be quite meaningless in terms of a non-delinquent identity if

a problem could not be established for which some solution other than institutionalization could be acted upon. In this case, the child's problem was seen as one of social and economic deprivation, and the solution was to seek part-time employment for the child and have him attend group therapy sessions organized at the center. The social worker explained that the group therapy sessions had been organized for just such cases, i.e., those in which the child was not perceived to be seriously distrubed, but needed control and support in order to sustain normal behavior and avoid further delinquency.

Poor Little Rich Kids

One of the most consistent features associated with delinquents in the literature is that of a lower socioeconomic position in society (see especially, West, 1969: 141-2). While the meaning of this fact is still hotly debated among sociologists, delinquency research might gain much by studying the notion that higher socioeconomic level positions in society may somehow act as a prophylactic to delinquency inasmuch as it seems to be a popular notion among social workers.

During the course of a session with a social worker a middle class child (i.e., the child had identified himself as the son of a businessman, who lived in a certain section of town popularly identified as a "respectable middle class neighborhood"), presented this account for his petty theft: "They [the boy's parents] don't care what I do. They're too busy with their own stuff." Although the child had presented several other accounts the social worker had remained very noncommittal up to this point, whereupon she began questioning the child about his relationship with his parents. During the course of

another half-hour with the juvenile, the picture which emerged changed
little beyond that given initially, i.e., the father spent most of his
time in connection with business activities, while the mother spent
most of her time either in a small business she ran independently of
the husband's or in various civic affairs which she was highly active
in.

The social worker made the following comments regarding the case
immediately afterward. "It's really a very typical case. Parents
think they give the kid everything he wants with money. They forget
what he needs. Kids are sharp you know. They know the difference
between love and a new bicycle." The social worker imputed the motive
that the child was attempting to gain the attention of his parents
inasmuch as she identified him as a rejected child. However, the most
revealing part of the process involved the solution to the problem,
which was, of course, the rejection of the parents. The social worker
explained that the solution to the problem was counseling with parents
and juvenile, which would be conducted either by the social worker
or a private counselor. The social worker, at that time, could not
tell me whether the counseling would be conducted by her or a private
therapist inasmuch as she felt the parents would most likely not want
the Department with its attendant stigma involved. This is, in itself,
significant inasmuch as a child involved in private counseling is auto-
matically outside the processes of helping which might, at some future
date, involve institutionalization. As long as a child is involved in
counseling within the confines of the agency, i.e., with the social
worker, his behavior and identity is subject to constant re-evaluation,
which can and does often mean a re-evaluation in terms of

institutionalization.

Of course, many of the forces which operate to keep middle class children out of correctional instituions involve negotiation which takes place in interactions other than those between the juvenile and the social worker. Indeed, what gets established between the juvenile and social worker is often diametrically opposed to what later gets established between him or her and a set of parents "with connections". However, this is only to say that the interaction is always the crucial independent variable in identity. More importantly, this should not be allowed to obscure our vision of how influence or a middle class identity may be brought to bear in the interactions between juveniles and social workers.

Since the presentation of an identity is a claim to a certain type of treatment, it follows that the presentation of certain identities by the juvenile may be all that is relevant or necessary to establish a non-delinquent identity. Thus, according to several police officers, the presentation of the identity of "mayor's son" to the police was all that was required of one juvenile in order to insure his release on such charges as vandalism, theft, and public drunkeness (this child was never brought to the facility and according to the officers no record was kept by the police such that substantiating the story was impossible). Not infrequently, a juvenile may let the social worker know in no uncertain terms that he has connections which could place the social worker's job in jeopardy were he or she to act in terms of what was felt to be the "actual case". However, such gross peddling of influence belies the significance of a much more widespread and subtle phenomenon.

A fifteen year old girl was brought in to the social worker,
along with an intake sheet which established her identity as the daughter
of an extremely influential member of the community. The girl was
a runaway and had been living with several older boys for the past
week. A brief exchange took place between the social worker and the
juvenile regarding some of the details of her stay with the boys.
Each time the girl is questioned about possible sexual relations with
the boys, she answers evasively. The social worker changes the topic
of conversation. It is 2:00 a.m. and she has been called out due to
the fact that a large number of juveniles had been brought out and
were to be released in the custody of their parents pending an investi-
gation of their activities. It is obvious that she does not want to
pursue the point in any detail right now.

> Social Worker: The police have notified your parents.
> Your father will be coming right out. [Pause] Your parents
> must care a great deal about you. [Probably a reference to
> the father coming out at 2:00 a.m. which, despite the current
> circumstances, is unusual]
>
> Juvenile: I suppose so. They try I guess. They don't
> understand me. They're always trying to pick my friends for
> me and saying how I shouldn't hang around with the wrong crowd.

The social worker proceeded to discuss the juvenile's relation-
ship with her parents until the father arrived and the interaction
was terminated.

Needless to say the social worker recognized the significance
of the child's identity and her validation of this identity was
tantamount to the child's release. However, inasmuch as the author
had observed similar cases in which a child was institutionalized and
another held pending a hearing, the social worker was questioned

about the child's release. This involved a chain of imputations of

motives and identities such as an emotional family conflict, identity

crisis, and the child's rebellion against authoritarian parents.

However, the all important solution to the child's problem involved

the parents seeking private counseling for the family. The social

worker explained that this was not simply a whitewash for a political

power game inasmuch as a family of this kind obviously possessed both

the intellectual and financial resources to deal with the problem,

while another family of a lower socioeconomic level in all liklihood

would possess neither. Moreover, the child's parents demonstrated

an essential characteristic needed to deal with any problem; specifi-

cally, concern for the child and her problem. Significantly, in

the author's observations, lower socioeconomic parents typically do

not demonstrate this concern in terms recognized by the social worker;

picking their children up immediately when they are brought to the

facility; keeping appointments with the social worker; expressing a

willingness to view the child's behavior problematically, or in the

event this is expressed; expressing a willingness to engage in pro-

grams directed to solving the problem. Moreover, the lower socio-

economic parents observed by the author frequently felt their concern

might be appropriately expressed in "a taste of leather", which did

not convince any of the social workers I observed that this was an

expression of concern (sometimes to the contrary).

Routine Time-Outs

One of the most significant features of any social world is how

time comes to be organized by the actors. Most of us become involved

to some extent in the familar organizations of time known as "coffee break", "lunch break", "bedtime", and "vacation". Time comes to be organized in terms of significant lines of activity and to understand the behavior of the actors it is necessary to understand time in these terms as opposed to the mechanical dimensions of a calendar or a clock.

In the interactions between juveniles and social workers the organization of time may beomce significant in many different ways. Often the juvenile's biography will come to be organized along dimensions of time. Thus early childhood experiences may be seen as relevant material out of which a delinquent identity may be constructed (largely under the influence of psychoanalytic theory). Similarly, later times or periods in the juvenile's life may be seen as characteristically traumatic for adolescents and the relevant material out of which some non-delinquent identity may be constructed. Or, the way the juvenile himself organizes his time may be reconstructed in terms of "time spent with peers", "time spent doing 'nothing'", "time spent doing studies", or "time spent in adult or parent supervised activities", all of which may become the material for either delinquent or non-delinquent identity depending upon the given organization.

However, relevant as these definitions of time may be, the organization of time may be involved in yet another way which may be more revealing of the process of constructing identity in the interactions between juveniles and social workers. Specifically, the social worker, as any business person, is likely to find that time may be usefully organized around the demand for services. In this context, certain rush periods and rush seasons come to be defined in terms of specific lines of activity such that, for instance,

a ranking of priorities is developed for these times. During these times all but the most serious of cases are likely to be terminated with all possible facility. A common instance of this is the rush periods connected with various activities of juveniles, such as Halloween, school holidays and the period just following the release of report cards. Moreover, these times are also likely to be organized in terms of motives, such that certain behavior may be accounted for in terms of this organization of time (e.g., fighting at football games as an outgrowth of the boisterous nature of the occasion and nightime). Another instance of the organization of time involves the social worker organizing lines of activity in terms of certain seasonal activities of correctional facilities. Thus the social worker knows that around Christmas and generally all during summer most correctional facilities have extra bedspace not available at other times.

It should be emphasized that these organizations of time are a product of interaction and not a determinant of interaction. They are possibilities which can only be realized in interaction. And, interestingly enough, quite often these are not realized with social workers new to the job (the author has even observed juveniles negotiate the meaning of a time with new social workers). Moreover, the organization of time is interwoven with numerous other processes of the interaction. The interplay of time and identity is illustrated in the following.

During a certain time each year a particular Indian tribe held a "pow-wow". Among officials of the community a set of prevailing definitions had developed which set the activities of the pow-wow

off as an Indian affair in which intrusion by police or other authorities was to be avoided. This extended to the activities of the children during this time such that those who were intoxicated or younger ones who were unsupervised late at night were seldom, if ever questioned as to their behavior as long as they stayed within the general geographical area of the festivities. Often, however, the police deemed it necessary to bring these children in either because they had left the area or because it was deemed necessary for their own protection.

In terms of helping these children were handled on a similar basis to the lost child, i.e., they were held until the next day when the parents would come in to claim them (indeed, a lost child would have to be claimed within a few hours in order to avoid rather extensive questioning). For the juvenile, to present one's identity as an Indian was to present a motive for conduct (at least in all cases observed, which involved intoxication and occasionally some form of disorderly conduct). However, this presentation of identity also involved a presentation of time. In effect, what was established in these interactions was a sense of time. Thus at other times these juveniles did not present an Indian identity (at least in and of itself) as a motive for conduct similar to that which took place during this "time-out" period. Likewise, if the social worker did act upon an Indian identity as motive for untoward behavior at other times, it was not without calling for some other account.[5]

Redemptive Stigmas

As we have seen, identity often comes to be motive. An interesting

facet of this phenomenon is the fact that it is not only valued
identities which may perform this function, but also certain morally
blemished or spoiled identities, as Goffman (1963a) refers to them.
All of these identities are similar in at least two respects: 1)
the one who possesses the identity cannot be held morally responsible
for acquiring it, and 2) the identity is nonetheless morally stig-
matized. While these identities may serve as motives for conduct
much as the policeman's or social worker's identity, they typically
involve lines of activity which are seen as outcomes of the possession
of the identity rather than definitive characteristics of the identity.
Indeed, stereotyping is often involved such that the individual who
possesses the stigma often finds himself in a moral dilemna. He may
know that his actions have little or nothing to do with the facts
surrounding his stigma, yet this socially constructed reality is a
polite fiction which has been offered him in good faith. To deny this
would involve him in piecing together another reality out of the
wreckage of another's face (see: Goffman, 1963a for many excellent
examples of this). It is no wonder then that some of these individuals
so give in to the temptations of such an arrangement that even those
who have seduced them may come to suspect that debilitation has become
convenience and motive has become "crutch", to use a term favored by
many social workers. This is not an uncommon phenomenon among juve-
niles who are shifted from one social worker to another, such that
a presentation of a stigma which heretofore was acted upon as motive
is now acted upon as symptom, "crutch". What heretofore served to
redeem him may now serve to throw him even deeper into stigma. For
the most part, however, juveniles find the less said the better.

For the one whose idea it is will better defend the position they have invested with a great deal of self, than the position invested with a great deal of another's.

Generally speaking, physical handicaps provide the best material for carving out a motive. A club foot, myopia, speech defect, or simple physical unattractiveness often provide the juvenile with a motive for untoward behavior in the school and from thence to further misconduct which might constitute delinquent behavior (particularly that of truancy). The classic redemptive stigma of mental illness (particularly as used in the courts) is not nearly so effective as is the case with adults, however. The reasons for this are complex and involve both the ideological-legal framework of the juvenile justice system and the notion popular among many social workers that all delinquency is rooted in mental disorder of some kind. Under these circumstances, the stigma of mental illness is not likely to set one off from other delinquents who remain in a limbo of treatment somewhere between patient and prisoner.

The following case illustrates some of the dynamics of the redemptive process. Although the case is exceptional, it is exemplary of the process and indicative of the wide range of redemptive stigmas— in this case in the borderlands between mental illness and physical handicap.

A young teenage girl was brought in by the police who stated that they had observed her just wandering about. She appeared lost, would not or could not answer the officers' questions as to her identity, and the police felt that on the basis of this behavior she was most likely a runaway on drugs of some kind. Before the social worker

had an opportunity to question the girl and check the police imputations
against her own, the girl began screaming and kicking the walls to
the point that a houseparent had to restrain her. Although she made
no "serious" moves to harm the houseparent who was restraining her,
she focused her attention on another nearby and began shouting,
"You silly goose. You're nothing but a goose. I hate you." At this
point, the female houseparent who was restraining her ordered everyone
away and moved the child to an unoccupied room. The social worker
did not attempt to pursue the matter, but rather went to her office
to see if she could locate a local psychiatrist. The social worker
explained that she did not believe that this was "simply" a drug
episode, if indeed it involved drugs at all. The basis for this
imputation was not clearly explained, nor did there appear to be
any clearcut criteria except that the child's eyes "didn't appear
glassy." Significantly, no attempts were made to obtain any account
for the actions which had brought the girl to the attention of the
police. Indeed, no attempts were made to ascertain motives for the
child's present conduct (other than attempting to locate a psychiatrist
who, presumably, might provide such motives). All efforts were direct-
ed to ascertaining an identity for the child which would give the
social worker some legal basis for action, i.e., name of the child
and parents or guardian, residence, etc. However, in the meantime,
and before the psychiatrist could arrive, officials from a local
school for the mentally retarded called and identified the child as
a student who had been lost earlier in the day. Once again, without
questioning the child or otherwise requiring any other motive for
any of her actions, imputations were rearranged to fit the new data

and the child was released in the custody of officials from the school.
Thus within the span of approximately three hours, from the time
the child was first picked up by police until the time of her release,
three different identities, viz., "drug user", "mentally ill", and
"mentally retarded" had provided the child with all the motives neces-
sary for her conduct. We should note that while "just wandering
about" is not considered a grevious offense, it is one that, in con-
junction with running away, is not to be taken lightly in the world
of juvenile justice, especially if one is female.

Delinquent Identities

The delinquent identity stands in stark contrast to all the
various non-delinquent possibilities which provide a background in
which delinquent identity comes out in relief. However, it is pos-
sible to forget that delinquent and non-delinquent identity are
both tied to the same process involved in constructing identity,
whatever the differences in outcome may be. The juvenile must be
placed in terms of certain lines of activity and it is the difference
in this location, not in the fact of placement, which separates him
from the non-delinquent. The stark contrast between delinquent and
non-delinquent is an outcome of the contrast in the lines of activity
which come to be organized around their respective presentations.
Consequently, an understanding of how it is that these, rather than
others we have considered, came to be organized around the juvenile
will be essential to an understanding of the delinquent identity.

In all cases, one key element of this difference is how the
delinquent's presentation disrupts the significant lines of activity

which the non-delinquent's presentation avoided. In this context, a great deal of the social worker's task is concerned with a systematic elimination of possibilities for helping, such that the delinquent is often one for whom all the possibilities of non-delinquent identity have been exhausted. Thus the delinquent can often be understood more in terms of what could or could not be done with him, than in terms of what he did or did not do.

However, of the cases which follow, one significant class in which the juvenile may in fact cooperate in establishing a delinquent identity is not considered and this may tend to exaggerate the significance of residual categories in the construction of a delinquent identity. Indeed, Lofland's (1969: 154) suggestion that the deviant label may be viewed positively, or at least something to which the deviant is not wholly adverse to, seems to be aptly applicable to many juveniles. However, what is often taken to be a liking of the delinquent identity is a product of the social worker's or observer's definitions rather than the juvenile's. Most juveniles the author observed were, in fact, quite adverse to the idea of being delinquent, although they often sought identities which necessarily entailed a delinquent identity in the context of courts and social workers.[6] Moreover, from preliminary observations of the phenomenon, we would suggest that the juvenile presenting a delinquent identity is, in fact, faced with the same "problem" of getting the social worker to act upon this as the juvenile presenting any other identity is. Thus one juvenile found it necessary to run away from home repeatedly, each time phoning the judge and social worker to let them know what he had done and where he could be found, before he could get them to

act upon this presentation of identity. It was not until the sixth

time he had offered the account that he wanted to be "sent off" that

the dismayed social worker acted upon what the author regarded as a

case of presenting a delinquent identity (as opposed to presenting

a "tough" reputation or "coolness" which could be transformed into

delinquent identity).

Kicks

Obviously, any motive may be avowed and acted upon. And any

given motive may be quite arbitrarily used with any frequency covering

anything from one activity to all activity in the interaction. However,

much of our interaction is characterized by a flow of diverse lines

of activity such that defining all of these in terms of a single

motive places a considerable strain on the interaction. When an

actor attempts to do this sort of thing we are likely to feel that the

interaction with him has become burdened to the point of not being

worth pursuing. And our feelings about this actor are likely to be

something of the sort that he exists in a world outside our own and

that of the interaction (see: Goffman, 1967: 113-37, who refers to

this as alienation from interaction). The actor and his world have

become so "permeated" with a single motive that both may be character-

ized by it. Of course, we identify many actors by the frequency and

type of motive they employ and, indeed, we may come to expect and

demand that they employ this motive more frequently than others.

But the priest or the devout person walks a thin line between these

identities and those of the religious zealot or the meglamaniac.

Similarly, the businessman may easily become greedy, the socialite

a playboy, and the outgoing or extraverted party type, superficial or vain at best or a drunk or alcoholic at worst.

Needless to say, this process becomes more complicated as we consider the specific type of motive avowed. Certain avowed motives will not be acted upon even in the initial presentation, much less on numerous occasions in the interaction. And what constitutes a motive is intimately tied to the situation such that we cannot speak of "good" or any other kind of motives in the abstract. The religious zealot attempts to transform rhetorics of play or business into the rhetoric of religion (re.: Burke, 1969). Occasions for play become occasions for eschatological discussion or occasions for work become occasions for religious conversion. Various lines of activity become disrupted as fun becomes sin, work becomes redemption, significant activities become insignificant, and burdensome ones become duty.

Certain juveniles, then, may commit two cardinal sins of interaction. First, they may present a motive which is disruptive to certain lines of activity (whether this is a simple conversation or helping). Second, they may persist in this presentation which further burdens the interaction. This is, of course, likely to make the social worker feel that the juvenile is even more "bizarre" inasmuch as he appears alienated from the interaction and from the world which surrounds him.

Two policemen were rather hurriedly attempting to relate to a social worker some of the details surrounding the arrest of two juvenile boys who accompanied them. The boys were off to one side, but in clear hearing distance of the exchange. As the story began to unfold, event by event, the boys broke out in laughter, each event

becoming the occasion for increased merriment. Finally, the laughter
became such a distraction to the interaction between the policemen
and social worker, that one officer turned to the boys and told them
to "shut up" and "just wait and see how funny this is all going to
be." The boys responded with a mock compliance with the order,
holding their hands over their mouths and seeming to explode in this
over-dramatized effort to contain a definition of the situation which
obviously could not be contained.

The second officer then took another tack toward this contempt,
by informing the social worker that "punks" like these two juveniles
were just "spoiled brats" who needed a taste of the "razor strap".
The social worker attempted to bring the topic of conversation back
to the details of the juvenile's arrest. However, by now both officers
were glaring at the boys such that the interaction between them and
the social worker was all but impossible. Comments were being directed
to the boys via the social worker, giving the boys what is known
in theatre as "upstaging". This continued no longer than two or three
minutes before the social worker invited the officers into an adjoin-
ing office where the focus of interaction could be changed.

The observer remained with the boys who continued "cutting up"
and teasing one another with regard to various events of the incident
which led to their arrest. The details of the incident were still
unknown to the observer, but the nature of the interaction between
the boys was clear, if nonetheless obscure in its references: "Did
you see that old man's face!" , one stated. The other replied,
"Yea, I thought he was gonna' shit right there!" This was followed
by outbursts of hilarity. The observer then attempted to engage

in interaction with the boys, but each time the proffer was ignored in favor of some exchange between the two which had the effect of excluding the observer while acknowledging his existence in the inter- action. Thus an offer of a cigarette became the material for alienat- ing the observer by the simple expedient of the boys glancing at one another and, rather than "answering", simply laughing in that which could appear as a private joke.

After about twenty minutes, the officers left and the juveniles were called into the social worker's office, followed by the observer. The following exchange took place:

Social Worker: You think you're pretty goddamn cute, don't you? [The boys smile at one another and give a subdued chuckle] It's not funny. It's not funny when people get hurt.

First Juvenile [looking up at the ceiling]: No one was hurt. We were just having some kicks. [The juvenile glances out of the side of his head at the other and smiles]

Social Worker: You call driving around drinking, throwing beer cans at people 'kicks'. The police chased you all over... you were clocked at seventy miles an hour. If you'd hit that guy you would've killed him.

Second Juvenile [looking to the first juvenile]: Oh man, lecture time. Loosen up.

Social Worker: I will not 'loosen up'. [The observer could not tell whether the juvenile's statement had, in fact, been directed to the social worker, but she obviously took it to be] This is goddamn serious business and you better under- stand it.

[The second juvenile makes an 'oohing' sound and both break into laughter]

At this point the social worker summoned the houseparent and instructed him to take the boys to a special security area of the facility. This special security area was generally reserved only for juveniles regarded as high security risks or those likely to harm

themselves, neither of which was strictly applicable to these juveniles.

Several things should be noted about this brief episode. The juveniles effectively projected a definition of the situation long before any words were exchanged between them and either police or social worker. And in this context, we are reminded of Burke's (1954: 31) statement about motives being shorthand terms for situation. Indeed, here we clearly have the unified moral theme of interaction wherein actor, act, and scene unfold in a single all inclusive motive. Moreover, when the social worker finally questions the boys herself, note that the central theme of the interaction revolves around the definition of the situation the boys have projected. The boys are questioned as to this definition even before they are called to account for their action. Indeed, the social worker seems to assume some account has been presented and has already begun to act upon that basis. Significantly, the boys do not deny this, but rather go on to reiterate it with the stipulation that no one was hurt.

The following day the boys were once again interviewed. Their behavior was changed significantly as they were seen separately by the social worker. However, both boys presented essentially the same account for their action, i.e., no one was hurt; it was only kicks. Insofar as the social worker was concerned we can see that this disrupted lines of activity as surely as it had earlier in the interaction with the policemen. As long as the boys persisted in presenting this account there was no basis for the interview. There is no way you can "counsel" nor any sense in which you can "diagnose" an individual who is doing no harm and just having fun. Significantly, the social worker was rather vague in her imputations of motives and

identities. The boys seemed to be "acting out" (this was not at all clearly specified) and both definitely had "character disorders" (the nature of which was unclear). On this basis, the boys' problems of "character disorders" and solutions of institutionalization emerged.

"Where the Action Is"

Goffman (1967: 149-270) speaks of situations created by actors to carve out identity, especially that which we refer to as "character", in terms of "where the action is".[7] Here Goffman emphasizes the wide range of materials which may be used—everything from roulette wheels to burning cigarettes placed between the arms of two boys. Indeed, any material may be used so long as it provides the basic ingredient of a risk involving the possibility of some "significant" loss. Elsewhere, Werthman (1972) has elaborated on this idea as it relates to juveniles on the streets and in the schools. In our use of the term we wish only to emphasize another dimension of this phenomenon as it comes to involve social workers and their assessments of juvenile's motives and identities.

Specifically, while the social worker may come to view the juvenile's problem as consisting in the kind of action he seeks (as in the previous case of "kicks"), he or she may also view the problem as consisting in where this action is sought. Where in this sense may refer to a geographical location, but as in the case of the Casinos Goffman speaks of as places where action is generated, it can never be reduced entirely to geography. Indeed, since action can be generated by anything involving risk, where is not easily separated out from who the action is with or when the action takes

place (e.g., juveniles can use other juveniles of a "notorious"
reputation or exotic hours of the night as generators of action).
Finally, where the action is may take on different significances in
terms of how this particular action is defined within the social
context of its occurrence, such that where is also tied to how or
what kind of action is sought (e.g., juveniles may seek certain
forms of action at school, but not others without incurring the
wrath of authorities who may feel that school is the right place,
but not for this kind of action). Our emphasis then should not be
taken as a separating out of where from the action, but rather a
point to focus our attention. In this manner, "where the action
is" may remain as a uniform point of departure for the analysis of
many cases of delinquent identity, although we must necessarily
limit ourselves here to the consideration of but a few. In this
context, rather than detail one or two cases, it would seem more
fruitful to provide characteristic versions of two different types,
which represent a wider range in detail.

One version involves a female accused of promiscuous behavior
and being out of the control of her parents. Often, at least initially,
the juvenile denies any promiscuous behavior, but in any case pre-
sents an account for her "wild partying" or mysterious all-night
absences from home. The account presented takes the form of look-
ing for excitement or thrills and "being in" with her peer group.
The risk taking of action is involved in loud, late-night parties
and activities where the intervention of police is a constant and
eminent threat generated by the boisterous nature of the participants
(the author has talked to juveniles who recognize the action nature

of these parties as opposed to others which are, as a result, raided less often). Action is frequently involved in sexual teasing of the boys or testing "how far they will go." Occasionally, action is generated in this context, by engaging in sexual intercourse without the use of contraceptive devices (when they are available and knowledge of their use possessed). Frequently, action is generated among girls in a "one upmanship" game in which "how far one goes" or whether one stays beyond the limits of curfew or the entire night become character contests.

In these cases, we should note that action, like kicks, is not a motive avowal which fares well within a psychiatric universe of discourse. The juvenile is likely to begin negotiations with a pathological diagnosis of his behavior. Yet, our focus is on <u>where</u> the action is inasmuch as the action alone seldom gets a juvenile institutionalized. In these cases the social worker is likely to be concerned with where in two senses. In the first sense, a stable peer group constitutes where the action is. In the second sense, abandoned houses, pastures, homes without parents present or apartments of older kids constitute where the action is. Both of these social places of action constitute significant problems inasmuch as the social worker finds it difficult to maintain helping in competition with this action, and yet these places of action are difficult to remove. If the action a juvenile seeks is taken as manifestation of a psychological problem, help can be administered by counseling. However, if the action is taken as residing in the juvenile's environment, only so much counseling can be done. By the time the juvenile has returned several times it can be asserted only

so long that helping is taking place. Then the only solution is to remove her from all possible contact with where the action is; which is to say institutionalization.

A second version of where the action is involves a male accused of any one or more of a vast array of petty offenses. These will often include such activities as curfew violations, public drunkeness, disorderly conduct, petty theft, fighting and less serious forms of vandalism such as defacing public property (more serious forms of vandalism shift the focus to the question of the juvenile's patho-logical conduct or actual sanity and therefore constitute a class unto themselves). Once again, the common denominator in these variety of offenses is their action generating quality for the juvenile. Thus petty theft may involve the dares of comrades as well as stipu-lations as to how the theft is to be carried out so as to maximize the action generating possibilities of the act, e.g., in a store well protected with devices to detect shoplifting, items located "under the noses" of the clerks, large items, etc. Encounters with police become the occasion for displays of bravado such that dis-orderly conduct is more than a case of disrupting the established order.

Once again, the account presented is one of looking for the action or "kicks". Indeed, the kicks account shows the link to action inasmuch as action is pursued as an end in itself. Moreover, the social worker is likely to respond to it in the same manner as the kicks case cited earlier. However, in these cases another common denominator emerges as did in the first version. Specific-ally, these juveniles are most likely to all come from a lower

socioeconomic mileau which is apparently a mileau of action for the
juvenile. Thus whether kicks in these cases is taken as a manifestation
of a twisted psyche or not (and this may be the case also), these
kicks are taken as foremost a product of place and not actor.

Tough Reps

Briefly we suggested earlier that by shifting our emphasis on
"where the action is" we might utilize this concept to analyze many
delinquent identities. Indeed, in looking at the juvenile whose
problem was taken as residing in the where of his action, we noted
a link between kicks and "where the action is". In this context,
we noted that kicks may be taken by the social worker as an indicator
of the wrong type of action, and thus a manifestation of pathology
in the child. The problem imputed in the kicks case we cited was,
indeed, that having to do with disturbed character. Thus if the ques-
tion of a child's character may be taken as subsidiary to his social
location in the diagnosis of problem, it may also be that the reverse
is true. However, whereas in the case of kicks we saw this more
in terms of direct motive avowals where character became a product
of this motive avowal, we may shift our emphasis to character (ident-
ity) avowal where motive becomes a product of this character avowal.
To do so we shall shift our emphasis on where the action is to the
present interaction between juvenile and social worker. Our concern
here is the juvenile who seizes the interaction itself as the material
for carving out character. The following case illustrates this nicely,
as well as how the past comes to enter the interaction.

A sixteen year old boy is brought in by the police. He had

been picked up along with four other juveniles who had been riding around in a stolen car. The boy is not accused of stealing the car himself, as another juvenile has admitted to this. The boy enters the room with a contemptuous sneer on his face (the description at this point can only be highly subjective and impressionistic or else lose all sense of what took place). He swaggers across the room and falls into a chair crossways with his legs resting up and over one arm of the chair and his back against the other. The social worker visibly grimaces at this point.

Social Worker: So, what did you manage to get yourself into this time Sandoval? [This is a pseudoym of course, but the juvenile's last name was what was used]

Juvenile: Nothin' man. The pigs get all uptight about nothin' man.

Social Worker: Where did you get the car?

Juvenile [grinning]: What you talkin' about. I didn't get no car.

Social Worker: You know what I mean.

Juvenile: Hey don't try to give me no shit. I tell you to fuck yourself. You not going to lay this rap on me. [The juvenile knows about his companion's confession and knows the social worker knows]

Social Worker: I'm not trying to lay any rap on you. I just asked you where the car came from.

Juvenile: You—the pigs—you all alike. You know where the car was.

Social Worker: O.K. Let's talk about what you were doing.

Juvenile: We were doing nothin' man—just ridin' around. Don't you ever just ride around to see things.

Social Worker: Not in a stolen car I don't.

Juvenile: That's cause you're a shitkicker.

> Social Worker: Yea, and you're real smart and real tough.
> You're so smart you're gonna spend most of your time behind
> bars. You just got out of that didn't you? [This is a reference
> to the juvenile's recent release from an institution] And now
> you're so smart you're looking to go back.

The juvenile sets silently smiling all the while, "nonchalantly"
picking threads from his shirt. The social worker proceeds with
several questions, but the juvenile begins to stare out the window
and finally gets up and goes over to the window, yawning and stretch-
ing. The social worker "explodes" in anger and tells the juvenile
to get out.

It goes without saying that a great deal of the significant
subtlities of the interaction are lost in our translation. The
social worker's use of the juvenile's last name is significant as
it at once serves to establish distance between her and the juvenile
and as an assessment of the juvenile's character inasmuch as it is
a measure of the respect to be accorded him. Generally a juvenile's
first name is used, but even in cases where the last name is used
the tone of voice has a great deal to do with the meaning in its use.
Similarly, the juvenile's tone of voice, mannerisms, and slurring
of words greatly added to the effect of what was being established
in the interaction. Nonetheless it is not difficult to see that
the identity imputed by the social worker was that of a "sociopathic
personality". Indeed, the juvenile's problem was seen in much the
same terms, i.e., as one of irretrievable character. In fact, we
should note that the juvenile is not, strictly speaking, called to
account for his actions. Rather, as was the case with the two juveniles
who presented a kicks account, the interaction develops a central
theme surrounding the definition of the situation the juvenile

projects. However, while in the former case motive became central to character assessment, in the present case character seems central to motive assessment. The solution, of course, was institutionalization. Indeed, the social worker stated openly (although not in her official report) that the only thing that could be done with this juvenile was to lock him up until he became of age and the adult criminal justice system could take over.

At this point, we may recall our model and the disruption of lines of activity inasmuch as we can clearly see the most comprehensive disruption of these lines here. Not only is interview and helping disrupted, but the social worker's presentation of identity is openly challenged such that the interaction itself breaks down. Clearly, the only means of helping in this case involve a comprehensive transformation of the juvenile, such that the identity presented bears little resemblance to that which comes to be established for him. This should be contrasted with the cases of non-delinquent identity.

The Sins of the Parents

As we have seen, because of the close link between motives and identity, a juvenile may have a motive for his conduct established in an assessment of his character. An interesting variation of this is the case where a juvenile may have a motive established in an assessment of the character of his parents. Even more interesting is the fact that insofar as the juvenile's character comes to be assessed in these cases, it is likely to be radically different from the juvenile with irretrievable character—despite the fact that both

result in synonymous identities. Part of the reason for this disparity involves the philosophy of social workers in the juvenile justice system. Generally, great emphasis is placed on locating the potential or so-called "pre-delinquent" (see: Stott, 1953; Geismar, 1969, for example).[8] However, this philosophy must be recognized as only a possibility of interaction, not a determinant of that interaction. Thus, in stark contrast to the two cases we are about to cite, other juveniles (particularly those who were more articulate) avoided the dire consequences of motives for their conduct being established in negative character assessments of their parents.

A thirteen year old girl was brought in by police. Although no formal charges had been filed, the child was accused of procuring (for her mother). Her mother was mentally retarded and a prostitute known to the social worker through previous contacts with the welfare department. During the interaction with the social worker the child was never questioned as to whether she had actually engaged in sexual intercourse with any men, nor was she <u>directly</u> questioned as to her procuring activities. During two one hour sessions, much time was spent talking to the girl about activities she enjoyed, friends, etc. This was interspersed with questions as to what the girl did while her mother frequented the bars of a well-known "rough district" of town. The girl stated that she generally played on the streets outside, looked in stores, or occasionally went in the bar with her mother. The girl is then questioned about the activities of her mother and the child responded by telling the social worker about one particular man she obviously liked. The child is then questioned as to the activities of the day in which the police picked her up.

In twenty minutes of questioning, the child's only account is "nothin",
"messin' around", "playing", "talking to J___" (an old man known to
the girl). The girl was never asked why she was doing anything, but
the question of what she was doing clearly involved a request for
motives which the girl seemed to perceive, but did not know how to
answer other than the way she did.

As the observer talked with the social worker, she emphasized
that the girl was really "a sweet kid", but one headed for trouble.
She also stated that the child was probably retarded like her mother
(although there were no I.Q. tests available to confirm this). This
was extremely significant as the social worker stated that this was
the reason that the child was not directly questioned regarding the
matters of sex or the unofficial accusations of procuring. I questioned
the social worker further about her assessment of the mental capacity
of the child and she replied that her assessments were based on highly
subjective factors in the interaction as well as the fact of the
mother's mental retardation which was felt to make the child a likely
candidate for the same debility.

Then, the researcher directly questioned the social worker as
to the motives for the child's behavior. The social worker found
the question confusing, stating that the child probably didn't even
know exactly what she was doing and that the problem was the mother.
Indeed, the motive imputed to the child could only be phrased in terms
of imitating her mother. On the basis of this the social worker stated
that the problem was an "inadequate home", which included a rather
lengthly description of the mother as "mentally retarded", "totally
inadequate to provide for the needs of the child" and a "known prostitute",

among other things. The solution was institutionalization of the
child as a Child In Need of Supervision (CHINS). This was in itself
significant as the child could have easily been declared Dependent and
Neglected, such that, "sweet kid" or not, the negative character
assessment of the mother involved a negative assessment of motives
for the child. Furthermore, a CHINS order does not necessarily in-
volve institutionalization (a foster home placement or return home
is frequent), but the social worker intended to specifically recom-
mend institutionalization. This was deemed necessary in terms of help-
ing inasmuch as the child needed a controlled environment where limits
would be set, influences proper, and the child would be beyond the
reach of the mother.

A case similar to this involved a fourteen year old boy charged
with runaway. Once again, the boy's family is known to the social
worker. The boy's father deserted the family and the child is raised
by his mother. The boy has one set of grandparents living and they
are the ones who have filed the complaint alleging that they are
unable to control the boy and that the mother is unwilling. The
following exchange between the juvenile and the social worker takes
place:

Social Worker: Don't you like it at home, Jimmy?

Juvenile: Yea, it's O.K.

Social Worker: Why you running away then?

Juvenile: I don't know. Just 'cause.

Social Worker: That's not a very good reason, do you
think?

Juvenile [smiling 'sheepishly' and looking down]: I dunno.

Social Worker: You like your mother don't you?

Juvenile: Yea, she's O.K.

Social Worker: How do you and she get along?

Juvenile: O.K. I guess. She lets me do a lot, but [brief pause] But sometimes she treats me like a kid and I don't like that.

Social Worker: Well sometimes mothers can do that, but that's probably because she loves you, don't you think?

Juvenile: I guess. [The juvenile's voice is almost inaudible] But she sometimes does it in front of the guys.

Social Worker: I see. [Pause] Tell me about the guys.

Juvenile: Oh, they're O.K. Most of them. I don't think they like me though.

Social Worker: Now what makes you say that.

Juvenile: I dunno.

Social Worker: Well there must be some reason you think that.

Juvenile: I guess. [The juvenile is still looking down and his voice is still almost inaudible]

Social Worker: Hey, you can look up at me you know. I'm over here. [The social worker is smiling and this is said in a friendly, 'joking' sort of way]

Juvenile [smiling broadly, almost laughing]: I know. [He looks up at the social worker]

The interaction continues over the course of an hour and a half in which the social worker takes the juvenile out of the office to get him a soft drink; introduces him to other juveniles at the facility and finally ends the session back at the office. The trips outside the office are definitely part of the interview. During this time the juvenile keeps his head bowed toward the floor; is shy in meeting the other juveniles; and chooses to sit with the social worker,

an older female houseparent and the researcher, although the social

worker suggests that he might want to get to know the other juveniles.

On the basis of this interaction, the social worker imputed the

following motives and identities. The juvenile was rebelling against

an overprotective mother who was smothering the child's development

in a guilt-ridden, reaction formation (the diagnosis of the mother

was stated in probablistic terms, although the child's motives were

not). The child was seen as being slightly effeminate and the social

worker earnestly feared (privately) for his sexual development. On

this basis she stated that his problem was lack of proper identification

with an older male and a mother who was too weak to give him the

support and supervision he required. However, the recommendation

to institutionalize the child requires some understanding of the

organization of helping within the practical routine of a bureaucracy.

More specifically, this has to do with the role of foster parents

in the organization of helping. Foster parents are, first of all,

difficult to find and even more difficult to keep. Understandably

they may be scared off after two or three bad experiences with juve-

niles. To make matters worse, most of them prefer younger children;

most have more difficulty working with older children; and many have

children of their own which can produce problems with the introduction

of an older child. Finally, insofar as they are known to the social

worker (and this was almost always the case within the agencies

observed, whether directly or by word of mouth), each of them have

a reputation involving their ability or lack of it to work with certain

kinds of children. In fact, many social workers have mixed emotions

about foster parents in general. Although they may like the idea,

foster parents quite frequently have their own motives in becoming
such, which, for the social worker, can actually interfere with
helping. In the present case, although foster homes were considered
as a possibility, there simply were none available either conducive
to helping the juvenile or which the social worker was willing to
risk losing.

NOTES

[1]Throughout this paper the author has relied primarily on three
sources as authority for any statements regarding legal procedure
in the juvenile justice system: Sussman, 1959; Kittrie, 1971; Neigher,
1967. The juvenile justice system is confused enough, however, .that
all statements must be regarded as either broad generalizations or
applying only to the given instances cited under the system operative
in that area (see: Younghusband, 1958, who describes the status of
the juvenile court system as more of a diversity of orientations
within a broad legal framework).

[2]We have generally assumed that the reader has some familarity
with the orientation of social work. The vocabulary of motives
employed by social workers may be described in very broad terms as
psychiatric in nature, employing a medical model in its orientation
to behavior (see: N. E. Cohen, 1958: 333). Although any introductory
text in the field will bear this out, we may cite some references
which may indicate the range and extent to which this vocabulary
of motives is embedded in social work. Healey and Bronner (1936)
present an historical paradigm which still exerts a great influence
on therapy and work with children (Healey was the founder of the
influential Child Guidance Center Movement of the 1930's and 1940's).
Turner (1968) is exemplary of up-to-date extensions of psychiatry
in social work, which has made significant inroads in work with children
since Healey and Bronner. Perlman (1957: 173) in her basic text on
the field of social work gives us some idea of the breadth of the
phenomenon:

>...whether the caseworker is working in medical social work,
>child welfare, family welfare, old age assistance, or elsewhere,
>he should be able to recognize the signs and indicators of
>psychosis, of neurosis, and of disorders of character and behavior.

Konopka (1949: 4) similarly recommends psychiatry as a model for
group work with children. And Shields (1962: 43) actively promotes
the psychiatric orientation in institutional care of children:

>Once each member of the staff is able to accept the psychiatric
>point of view and regards his task as therapeutic rather than
>punitive or mere charitable concern, the whole nature of the
>institution changes dramatically and fundamentally.

Finally, Diana (1960) has critiqued the pervasive use of the psychiatric
vocabulary in probation work and gives an excellent overview of the
dimensions of its use in social work.

[3]While the issue of deceit or whether the juvenile's statements
are "self-believed" ones or not is irrelevant to our perspective,
it cannot be assumed that juveniles are naive with regard to the
possible uses of sociological or psychological vocabularies of motives
contained in the professional literature. A recent article in a
popular teen magazine quite clearly demonstrates that juveniles are
aware of these vocabularies of motives (see: Carlinsk, 1975). The
song "Officer Krupke" in West Side Story is another popular example.
Dunham (1972: 375) and Hartung (1969) have made observations on this
phenomenon which would indicate that "Officer Krupke" is not far
fetched off stage and in the streets. This added dimension of the
interaction might be kept in mind.

[4]It must be kept in mind that it is totally irrelevant how sound
or unsound the social worker's assumptions or imputations may be.
Hence, the author knew of a cigarette theft ring which would have
made all the social worker's assumptions as to what constitutes a
lucrative theft item for profit unsound. The juveniles stole one
carton at a time and when caught would say that it was merely for
their nicotine habit. Although this did not arouse any great deal
of sympathy, it was an immeasurably better account than the juveniles
could manage when caught with a stash of forty cartons of cigarettes.

[5]Indeed, many Indian children and their parents did not have
the prevailing community definitions regarding play time. Despite
the fact that Indian children were frequently brought in on a curfew
violation "perplexed" to the extent that they had been doing nothing
wrong, the social workers demanded some account that, invariably,
neither parents nor children were able to give.

[6]Interestingly enough, from the author's own observations,
juveniles in institutions have their own definition of the delinquent.
The presentation of other identities acted upon in terms of a delinquent
identity is not, therefore, due to the fact that juveniles do not
have a concept of delinquent identity. Moreover, the delinquent
identity is one that is, generally speaking, not relished by the
institutionalized juveniles.

[7]Assessment of character is important at all stages in the
juvenile justice system, as suggested in the following: "...the
court is almost never interested in just particular isolated offenses.
What interests it is to determine what type of child this is...(Carr,
1940: 234). Thus our focus on the account the juvenile gives and
especially the transformation of this in terms of problem and solution,
which is to say identity.

[8]The concept of the pre-delinquent forces the social worker to
look not only at the juvenile and his behavior, but necessarily to
parents and even the community at large, since, by definition the
juvenile has committed no offense:

> Once a juvenile is apprehended by the police and referred
> to a juvenile court, the community has failed. Subsequent

rehabilitative services, no matter how skilled, have far less potential for success than treatment applied <u>before any offense occurs</u> (Haskell & Yablonsky, 1970: 441; emphasis mine).

CHAPTER VIII

CONCLUSION

What we have attempted to do in this paper is provide a description of the process of constructing a juvenile delinquent identity. We have attempted to do this in a manner which is significant beyond the particular situations we described. Indeed, the limitations of the present research are such that the significance of the present work cannot be conceived along the lines of even an "accurate" description of constructing a delinquent identity. This is necessarily the case inasmuch as random samples from the juvenile justice or welfare system were not taken. Indeed, it would be doubtful that such an undertaking would be practical, feasible, or even necessarily significant, when it is recalled that these systems are in continual flux and vary so widely even within relatively small geographical ranges. Therefore, our approach has been one of providing an understanding of a general process and then exploring its ramifications in terms of concrete instances. With regard to this we may cite both some general and more specific conclusions, "findings", and possible directions for further research we have attempted to bring to light.

With regard to the general, one of the most important phenomena we have attempted to explicate has to do with the transformation process. While our concern in this paper was the juvenile delinquent

identity, we found that this could neither be described nor understood without reference to this process. As social worlds are built up and systems of meaning set in motion it is necessary to understand how actors move between and set these worlds in motion tete-a-tete. In this context, we observed how the social worker transformed the juvenile into an object meaningful within the world of social work. Implicit in this transformation process was the fact that this also had consequences in terms of other worlds, such that the social worker's "solution" was the juvenile's identity.

Furthermore, we attempted to describe this system of meaning in terms of action or more specifically purposeful action, i.e., lines of activity. In so doing we attempted to link identity and the transformation process to lines of activity which come to be organized around the actor. Thus the delinquent identity was to be understood in terms of how lines of activity came to be organized around him; these lines of activity having reference to a particular social world in a particular interaction. While our analysis was focused upon the juvenile and the social worker, this was not done without an eye for the broader perspective.

In this context, our analysis of the transformation process has implications for the study of any organization or bureaucracy which is set up in terms of lines of activity that may be organized around people. Thus, employing our basic framework, we might look at the identities generated between teacher and student, judge and defendent, or those within religion, government, politics, or business. This should not be taken to mean that we feel the present work constitutes "grand theory." It does not and it cannot. What

it suggests is that neither bureaucracies or the phenomenon of identity can be approached within a framework which only applies to one particular bureaucracy or identity. Thus, the sad theoretical state of affairs in deviance is due at least in part to explaining deviance at the expense of "normality"; of explaining deviance by reference to an ideologically based set of assumptions marking it off from the rest of behavior (see: Cohen, 1959; Dentler & Erikson, 1959).

At the same time, we attempted to show in our work that "generalization" in terms other than the forms of interaction may also result in a futile state of affairs (and, strictly speaking, this would not be generalization). The lines of activity we described thus encompassed more than structural generalizations such as role or the rules of bureaucracy. The juvenile can and does find himself with a delinquent identity by way of disruption of a line of activity that is nowhere specified in formal or informal rules or role prescriptions. Indeed, within the institutions that were the basis of this study, juveniles routinely recognized the mood of the social worker as a significant line of activity which must be reckoned with. Although a mood may be an ephemeral, difficult sort of thing to get a hold on empirically, it is a sociological phenomenon, necessarily empirical to the extent actors recognize it and take it into account in their actions. Although it was beyond the scope of the present analysis to explore many of these more minute aspects of the interaction, we attempted to provide a sense of the tenuous nature these aspects of the interaction generate and the ongoing adjustments and assessments thereby necessitated by actors. We did this mainly by exploring some lines of activity such as the organization of time which are

not to be found in any formal role requirements nor in any formal specifications as to what may figure in the assessment of a juvenile's identity, but which nonetheless are significant in such assessments.

Moving to more specific points, we have examined the juvenile delinquent identity as a product of the juvenile's presentation, which has been transformed into organizationally meaningful terms. Here, we emphasized significant lines of activity such as helping and the interview and showed how these were organized around various accounts in order to produce both delinquent and non-delinquent identity. We suggested, in this context, that the significant feature of the interaction was the attempt of juvenile and social worker to provide meaning in the interaction, which, for the social worker, means organizing the juvenile's presentation in terms of helping. Indeed, this may be the most significant contribution the present work has to offer. We will briefly consider this possibility along with some of the ramifications the present work may have in terms of the literature of the field.

Most of the work in the field of delinquency has been carried out with juveniles who have been processed through the legal and bureaucratic machinery, some of which we have described. These juveniles, with some manipulation of the definition of delinquency, are then taken as the data which forms the basis of the research (Glueck & Glueck, 1950; Sellin & Wolfgang, 1964 are two prominent examples). Sometimes sociologists have been more sympathetic in going to the field rather than an institution or court statistics for their data, but in so doing they leave an enormous gap between their definition of delinquency and the delinquents who come to reside

in institutions. Our research indicates that many variables clas-
sically associated with delinquency must be seen in terms of concrete
interactions where they come to be employed. In short, the "causal"
variable in human action is one that may be taken into account by
the actors (which is not true of inanimate objects or organisms which
do not possess a reflective consciousness) such that it becomes
spurious. Thus, as we have seen, a lower socioeconomic neighborhood
may indeed produce more delinquents inasmuch as the social worker
takes this "cause" of "delinquency" into account in his or her asses-
sment of the juvenile's presentation—or inasmuch as he or she must
take this into account in terms of helping. The same may be said of
many variables not covered by the research, such as the infamous
broken home.

Our explorations into the process of identity led us to view
actors in terms of situations which they piece together and then
act upon. Identities, roles, structures, and other sociological
variables are built up in an interaction and then employed by the
actors. This stands in stark contrast to Shaw and McKay (1942),
Cohen (1955; 1965), and Cloward and Ohlin (1960). The social struc-
ture these individuals speak of as an independent variable we have
viewed as the dependent variable in the interaction between juvenile
and social worker. The same may be said of Miller's (1958) "gene-
rating mileau". Both it and the delinquency it presumably generates
are themselves generated within a specific situation, whether that
of Miller's interaction in his observations or that of the interaction
between juvenile and social worker.

Viewing identity as an act of placement understood by reference

to a situation in which actors come to place one another, our re-
search must also obviously stand in stark contrast to Matza (1964)
and Sykes and Matza (1957). In addition to the questions we raised
with regard to structural theories, however, our research must raise
the question of motivation with regard to these theories. Whether
it is constraints which have broken down or neutralizing techniques
which overcome these restraints, the material for identity is motives
and not motivation. A vocabulary of motives does not <u>allow</u> any kind
of behavior, conforming or otherwise; <u>it creates it.</u> A role is not
something one drifts into because constraints have broken down; it
is something one creates as accounts "break down" (in the case of
the delinquent).

It is in this context that we must view any theory employing the
concept of role—including the career approaches of Becker (1963) and
Goffman (1961a). While we focused only upon one stage of what might
be termed a career from these perspectives, our investigations would,
at the very least, imply that the career is something retrospectively
constructed and not assumed or pursued. Implicit in our study is the
fact that the social worker questioning the juvenile with regard to
his biography is for purposes of <u>constructing it</u>, and not simply
for purposes of <u>revealing it.</u> Moreover, implied in the concept of an
account is the idea that the consistency of behavior necessary for a
role cannot be understood by reference solely to that behavior. Since
a role or identity has a moral dimension, any consistency flows from
a negotiated position and not from an "empirical", value-free position
of "what actually took place". Thus the juvenile who steals and the
one who has not violated any laws can be lumped together in one role

as "consistent", providing the juvenile who steals has the proper account.

Labeling theory (Becker, 1963; Lemert, 1951; Schur, 1971) must be considered in this same light insofar as secondary deviance is concerned. Looking at our illustrative cases we can see that juveniles coming before the social worker were labeled in any number of different ways before they were labeled as either delinquent or non-delinquent. Following the implications of the concept of secondary deviance, we would expect these labels to generate a similar phenomenon, i.e., a set of predefined responses on the part of the juvenile to the label. As an example, the label of lower socioeconomic would presumably generate responses defined as "lower socioeconomic", secondary to the "fact" of being lower socioeconomic. However, the label of lower socioeconomic did not lead to a set of predefined responses, but rather to radically different responses, depending on how the meaning of the label was negotiated—in terms of a delinquent identity or in terms of a non-delinquent identity. This is highly significant despite the fact that we did not pursue the juvenile's behavior past the point of his encounter with the social worker. The implication is still quite clear that whatever label he is given, its meaning must be negotiated. If "lower socioeconomic" meant anything prior to the interaction, one would not have negotiations in which this label could lead to two polar opposites. However, our objective in the research was not to test the concept of secondary deviance. Therefore, our statements should be regarded as suggestive and not disconfirming evidence.

Finally, our research has implications in terms of Cicourel's

(1968) work. Our study focused upon the social worker's search for meaning in a manner suggestive of the ethnomethodological approach. However, the juvenile entered this "search" on a level that would seemingly betray the notion that the social worker has an implicit, commonsense theory which involves nothing more than a search for confirming evidence. While our observations conveyed a sense in which the social worker searches for categories for the juvenile and his behavior, we saw little or nothing to indicate that these are an a priori phenomenon which the juvenile comes to fill as he enters the interaction. More importantly, we saw the delinquent identity as an outcome of the process of placement, which involved organizing accounts, motives, and identities in terms of various lines of activity such as helping. Thus, if juveniles do become categorized as delinquents in terms of social workers' a priori, commonsense notions about delinquency and types of juveniles, they also acquire delinquent identities in terms of such problematic criteria as limited bedspace in an institution.

Closing Remark

In closing, it seems appropriate to characterize the present analysis as a study in the sociology of spaces. The delinquent identity, or any other identity for that matter, is part of the situation that only actors can create. And it is in these actor created situations that places come to be similarly created and set aside for these actors. Thus, it is in the building of situations and places for actors that social worlds come into being. What we have attempted to do is shed some light on a few of these spaces.

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