

ANALYSIS OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE TRADITION OF
POLITICAL INTERVENTION BY THE
MILITARY CLASSES OF
COLONIAL BRAZIL
1500-1817

By

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PREFACE

Subscribing to the concept that historical research helps us understand today's world, I have examined five rebellions of colonial Brazil to demonstrate that the contemporary Brazilian army's political activity finds precedence in colonial reality. Not claiming to be exhaustive nor conclusive, the study purports merely to suggest that the much-heralded civilian tradition of Brazilian society presents a distorted and inadequate picture of Brazilian history.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

The Importance of the Brazilian Military

The present interest in the political role of the military is timely and relevant. In the past fifteen years military leaders in many of the developing countries--Brazil, Peru, Chile, Somalia, Ghana, Nigeria, Afghanistan and Portugal, to name only a few--have assumed the powers and responsibilities of civil government. Many scholars have examined the reasons and historical antecedents of this phenomenon. Their studies provide valuable information about the processes of modernization, industrialization and defense of developing societies. As the developing third world gains more confidence in itself and begins to assert itself more, the developed countries will have to readjust to the new reality and seek to understand it through historical study.

Brazil, the fifth largest country in size and population in the world, ranks as perhaps the most important Latin American country in relation to the defense of the Western Hemisphere, Africa and the South Atlantic. It is also vital to the economic development of Latin America as a region.¹ To understand what has made the army Brazil's politically dominant force, therefore, is very important.

Many scholars believe that the Brazilian coup of March 31, 1964, represented a change in the military's traditional role in politics from

one of moderation of power to one of active execution.² Alfred Stepan, in a report for the State Department, declared that, "The accession of military ... [government] ... in Brazil in 1964...marked the end of...a traditional [role] for the military in politics and the emergence of a new one."³

Stepan referred to the concept of the moderating power (poder moderador) that was embodied in the first Brazilian constitution of 1824. The poder moderador posited all real political power in the person of the Emperor who had the power to dissolve parliament, call new elections and form new cabinets at his discretion. Pedro I, the first emperor of Brazil, and his son, Pedro II, employed the moderating power to balance opposing political groups in their battles for legislative supremacy.

Colonial practice, however, reveals a different situation. The Portuguese military legacy and the exigencies of colonial Brazil's defensive requirements dictated that one man exercised both civil and military commands. Samuel da Costa, a Brazilian military historian, explains this tradition by stating that

the participation of the military in the political life of the country constitutes a phenomenon whose historical origins are intertwined with the very origins of nationality, in an interlocking relationship that, far from diminishing, has, with the time, grown stronger and stronger.⁴

Da Costa thus subscribes to the theory of continuity in the historical development of institutions and traditions. He believes that past events, antecedents, policies and realities form national institutions and determine their contemporary roles, even though the country may outwardly change its form of government and experience what some historians call "revolutions". The Brazilian military's predominant political role has roots in the colonial past--in the very beginning

of Brazilian history--not at some subsequent state. That idea expresses a basic assumption underlying this study--that evolutionary processes, not revolutionary ones, dominate the development of institutions.

Theory of Continuous Historical Development

Many American scholars of Brazil believe that when the military-civilian coalition deposed Pedro II in 1889 and founded the Brazilian Republic, the army fell heir to the poder moderador formerly reserved to the Emperor. The army did indeed function as the political power broker from 1889 to 1963, backing various civilian groups in their bids for political supremacy. Those who do recognize, however, the incompatibility between the popular concept of a dominant civilian tradition and Brazil's present political situation maintain that the Brazilian army's active participation in politics dates from the Paraguayan War period of 1864-1870⁵ or perhaps from the earlier struggles for independence and consolidation from 1822 to 1848.⁶

This placement of the origin of the army's interest and action in politics at a relatively late date⁷ does not satisfy those students of Brazilian history who subscribe to the concept of continuity of historical development. They would claim that the traditions of any national unit or institution originate, not in the immediate past, but during the period of national formation. It would seem reasonable, therefore, to conclude that the traditions, characteristics and attitudes that govern the contemporary Brazilian army's actions developed during the colonial period.

The American historian's subscription to the theory of historical

discontinuity stems from the work of Frederick Jackson Turner, late 19th century American historian. The philosophical concept of discontinuous historical development supports his hypothesis that the frontier, not European cultural heritage, determined American character. Criticizing Turner, revisionist historians such as Lewis Hanke claim that European antecedents influenced American development much more vitally than the new frontier element. Although Brazilian military and social historians⁸ recognize the colonial Brazilian martial tradition, American historians have treated Brazilian history a la Turner, ignoring the colonial antecedents of the military's political activity. The colonial antecedents constitute a legacy which historians cannot minimize without risking a serious distortion of Brazilian history.

Definitions

The Brazilian army, as any institution, reflects national realities. The military action of 1964 was not taken by the General Humberto Castello group without civilian support. These "hardliners", a circle within the top-ranking Brazilian officers, had ties to certain dominating civilian groups which approved and encouraged military intervention in politics. Ronald Schneider, American political scientist and student of the modern Brazilian army, interprets the actions of these groups as an attempt to protect the bureaucratic middle class against the incorporation of the Brazilian rural and urban proletariats into the political, social and economic life of the nation. The tie between the politically active Brazilian army and a civilian group which felt itself threatened was not a new situation. It was merely the latest in a long series of coalitions, begun at colonization, formed between military and civilian

groups in Brazil.

The Brazilian army of 1964 revealed another characteristic--regionalism--which has its roots in colonial times. The officers would like to think that the army is the only truly national institution in Brazil.⁹ They still employ, however, the traditional method of local recruitment and garrisoning which limits the nationalization of units. The traditional problem of regionalism, therefore, still limits the effectiveness of national programs.¹⁰

A third characteristic which helped politicize the Brazilian military classes in colonial times was their ethnic composition. It is difficult to ascertain the racial characteristics of the modern Brazilian army, since the existence of racial prejudice and the status of blacks and mulattoes is a subject not pleasing to Brazilians. Gilberto Freyre, the eminent Brazilian social historian, declares that for years the Brazilian army's officers have been largely mulatto and even black.¹¹ The mass of Brazilian soldiers probably reflects the general characteristics of the whole Brazilian population which, although by changing the racial definitions census-takers have made the population appear "whiter and whiter" each year, is predominantly mulatto. Freyre postulates that

the political activity, in the revolutionary sense, of the militias or the Brazilian army, so unquiet and intrepid... perhaps has been, in part, another expression of the mulatto, more intelligent and sensitive, still badly adjusted to the social milieu...¹²

Donald Pierson, a noted American Brazilianist, cites a racial study made in Bahia in 1936. Data concerning 5,943 persons revealed that mixed bloods were more numerous than whites among government

functionaries and retail clerks. They were also present in substantial numbers among priests, university professors, teachers, physicians, lawyers and politicians. This study perhaps clarifies somewhat the close contemporary relationship between the army officers and the middle classes in which mulattoes either dominate or appear in substantial numbers.¹³

With the preceeding considerations in mind, one might suspect that the Brazilian army's contemporary political dominance has antecedents in the colonial period. It is the thesis of this study that regional characteristics, a specific ethnic composition and alliances with disaffected middle groups politicized the colonial Brazilian military classes, giving rise to a tradition of political activity among them. The purpose of this study is to analyze the functional role of the colonial Brazilian military classes in five colonial rebellions in order to support the thesis statement.

The thesis statement uses four terms--colonial Brazilian military classes, regional characteristics, specific ethnic composition and disaffected middle groups--that perhaps require brief definition at the beginning. These definitions will be necessarily limited because the exposition of the thesis statement will provide the expanded definition and clarification of the individual terms.

Since Brazil remained a Portuguese colony until 1808 it would be improper to speak of a "colonial Brazilian army." This writer, therefore, has chosen the term colonial Brazilian military classes. Because of the scarcity of Portuguese men to complete the garrisons throughout the far-flung Portuguese Empire, Portuguese imperial officials in Brazil necessarily relied on natives or those born in Brazil to complement what was usually only a small detachment of Portuguese officers. A

dichotomy, therefore, developed early in Brazilian history--a Portuguese officer corps, basically white or European in composition, and a native or Brazilian soldiery which exhibited a mixed racial heritage. Portuguese policy barred native-born Brazilians from the officer rank until 1774. After that date discrimination based not only on color but also on nationality prevented the rise of Brazilians to the officer corps. The colonial Brazilian military classes thus included those non-commissioned officers and the mass of native-born soldiers serving under Portuguese officers. These groups were comprised of mixed bloods and Amerindians who, because of their special marginal status in a slave economy, had leisure time and hired themselves out as mercenaries.

The thesis statement also indicates that the colonial Brazilian military classes exhibited a certain regional characteristic that helped to politicize them. The native-born soldiers serving under Portuguese officers in colonial Brazil usually remained in the immediate geographical region from which they were recruited. This was especially true of the militias or second-line troops recruited locally by the area's big land owners. The first liners, or those serving under Portuguese officers, were somewhat more mobile, but the tradition of serving only in one's home area remained strong. The colonial Brazilian military classes, then, were interested in the politics of the area in which they were serving because that area was usually their native one. The practice of stationing soldiers in their native area continues in Brazil today.

The thesis statement claims that the ethnic composition of the colonial Brazilian military classes also contributed to their politicization. It is a contention of this study that most of the politically

active Brazilian military elements in colonial times were of mixed racial origin. They were men of color, not black, not Indian and not white, but "marginal men," whose integration into the higher social ranks was theoretically possible but in practice was blocked by discriminatory policies of white Portuguese officials, officers and administrators. The army provided the initial source of social mobility in colonial Brazil; it was the first Brazilian proto-institution outside the organized and integrated plantation economy which did not limit the status of the individual to two alternatives--master and slave. The mulatto or mixed blood had no place within this dichotomy and found that the military way of life offered an alternative, albeit not a very satisfactory one, to his marginal status on the fringes of the latifundia system. The mixed blood had no anchor; he was for hire. He first became the mercenary of colonial Brazil, then later a leader in rebellion and independence because he suffered discrimination from Portuguese prejudice which limited not only his rise in the army but his integration into Brazilian society.

The third politicizing element the thesis statement mentions is the alliance of the colonial Brazilian military classes with certain disaffected civilian middle groups who required power to implement their political goals. The first two incidents examined in this study, the Dutch expulsion and the Emboaba affair, involved mercenary military classes who were either hired by civilians or previously controlled by them. These mercenaries expelled a foreign power and consolidated Portuguese rule (some say Jewish commercial rule) in Minas Gerais, the area of gold production. At this time the Brazilian military classes had not developed a sense of racial, class or national consciousness,

although the civilian groups displayed much more organization and purpose. The last three incidents analyzed in this paper clearly demonstrate the advanced state of consciousness to which the free mulatto Brazilian soldier, tied to middle groups which were substantially mixed in ethnic composition, had risen. A highly developed sense of racial, class, economic and national consciousness, the result of Portuguese repression, were sharply delineated in the Inconfidência Mineira, the Conjuração de Bahia and the Revolução Pernambucana of 1817.

The chronological order employed in this study reveals a developing sense of nationality on the part of the Brazilian military classes. This identity increased as regional characteristics became more entrenched, as racial differences between the native military Brazilian classes and the Portuguese officers became more distinct and divisive and as certain free civilian groups, reacting to Portuguese oppression, created a national and class consciousness.

The Cultural Approach to History

The author of this study will utilize the cultural approach to support the thesis statement. In 1940 the American Historical Association formally recognized the cultural approach to explain historical processes by publishing papers read at its meeting of 1939. Introducing the volume, editor Caroline F. Ware wrote that

the pattern of culture conditions individuals, providing their basic assumptions and their tools of observation and thought...It determines the forms of institutions, the types of personality which will be developed and the types of conduct which will be sanctioned.¹¹

This statement implies the idea that if historians are to explain

man's development over time and space they must examine the cultural matrix, the milieu in which certain processes and institutions appeared. Louis Gottschalk, an eminent American historian, writes that, "...philosophical systems and sociological laws are the possible means of discovering the causal relations among historical phenomena."¹⁵ The development of institutions, therefore, cannot be explained or understood unless there is a broader reference to the state of society or culture in which those institutions appear. The colonial Brazilian military classes reflected the characteristics of colonial Brazilian society. This writer will utilize the cultural approach in discussing the genesis of the specific ethnic composition, regionalism and the growth of certain civilian groups to indicate how these elements influenced and politicized the colonial Brazilian military classes.

Certain difficulties are inherent in the cultural approach. Cultural history takes into account those groups of people who are not usually literate. Written accounts of their lives, sufferings, motives, attitudes and goals are not readily available. One must glean these from secondary accounts, from others whose class origin may differ from the aforementioned groups. From these meager gleanings one must then deduce the reality of past occurrences and times. The use of sociological and psychological approaches can give meaning to class and racial conflict.

A second difficulty of the cultural approach stems from the dearth of statistical information available as supporting evidence. Since this thesis involves the ethnic composition of colonial Brazilian military classes it would be most desirable to have statistical information regarding the members of those classes. Unfortunately, even figures

for the whole colonial Brazilian population are sparse and incomplete. Even if such statistics were available, the reliability of the racial criterion would remain doubtful because of the ambiguity of racial classification in Brazil. Pierson cites a study made in Bahia of 500 persons classified as white (branco). One third "showed quite evident African racial heritage...." The first Brazilian census in 1872 indicated that 39% of the population (3,801,722) were mixed blood. The census of 1890 showed a total of six and a half million mixed-blood Brazilians. The 1970 census-takers received orders to abandon all attempts to distinguish color and race.¹⁶

Method

The methodology of this study requires some explanation. It is inductive and analytical. It utilizes specifics to support a generalization. Single events will be analyzed and cited to explain the general development of the political tradition of a military institution.¹⁷ It will analyze functional relations in time and space, which, according to a Dutch philosopher of history, Folke Dovring, are causal relations. This paper, then, attempts to apply the concept of multiple causation to an observed phenomenon--the colonial Brazilian military classes' predilection for political activity.

The controversy about the purpose of history lies beyond the scope of this paper.¹⁸ Gottschalk's idea, "...to have some relation to the understanding of contemporary man and his problems..."¹⁹ partially satisfies this writer's criterion. Though this study is necessarily inconclusive and can merely indicate the directions further research could take, it does, however, relate relevantly to the criterion of

helping to understand contemporary man and his problems. It addresses itself to the problem of causation and antecedent that could help explain a modern human phenomenon--the contemporary Brazilian army's political dominance since 1964.

FOOTNOTES

¹On February 20, 1976, U.S. Sec. of State Henry Kissinger signed a treaty with Brazilian leaders in Brasília, the capital, making Brazil an ally of the United States with status equal to that of Japan.

²In 1964 the Brazilian army deposed labor leader and then President of Brazil, João Goulart, and took command of the nation's political machinery. It still holds political power today despite a promise unfulfilled to hold elections for President in 1974. Ronald Schneider, an American political scientist who made a detailed study of the action of 1964, considers the army as the protector of the bureaucratic middle class against the incorporation of the rural and urban working classes, the proletariats of Brazil, into the political system.

³Luigi R. Einaudi and Alfred C. Stepan, Latin American Development: Changing Perspectives in Peru and Brazil (Santa Monica, Ca.: RAND Corp., 1971), p. 73.

⁴Samuel Guimarães da Costa, Formação Democrática do Exército Brasileiro, Vol. 240 (Rio de Janeiro: Biblioteca do Exército, 1957), p. 3.

⁵E. Bradford Burns, A History of Brazil (N.Y.: Columbia Univ. Press, 1970), p. 67; June Hahner, Civilian-Military Relations in Brazil 1889-1898 (Columbia, S.C.: Univ. of S.C. Press, 1969), p. viii of Preface; John J. Johnson, The Military and Society in Latin America (Stanford, Ca.: Stanford Univ. Press, 1964), pp. 178-9; Donald Worcester, Brazil: From Colony to World Power (N.Y.: Charles Scribners' Sons, 1973), p. 67; Ronald Schneider, The Political System of Brazil (N.Y.: Columbia Univ. Press, 1971), p. 38.

⁶Alfred Stepan, The Military in Politics: Changing Patterns in Brazil (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton Univ. Press, 1971), p. 13.

⁷Pedro Álvares Cabral discovered Brazil in 1500 and claimed it for the Portuguese king.

⁸F. Martin Arrue, Gustavo Barroso, F. Paula de Cidade, Latino Coelho, Samuel Guimarães da Costa, Gilberto Freyre, João Magalhães, João Mirales, Nelson Werneck Sodré, João Ribeiro, Oliveira Vianna.

^{9A}Esse caracter fracionário, localista, federativa, no puro sentido, que está no base de política comtiana, repugnou ao meu modo de ser militar. Quem diz militar diz brasileiro. O soldado não é gaúcho, nem alagoano, nem amazonense. É brasileiro." Carta do General Pedro Aurélio de Góes Monteiro ao Dr. Sobral Pinto, April 1945, in As Forças Armadas e o Desafio da Revolução, Oliveiros S. Ferreira (Rio de Janeiro: Edições GRD, 1964), p. 113.

¹⁰See Stepan, The Military in Politics: Changing Patterns in Brazil, for the action of the Third Army in Rio Grande do Sul during the Vargas coup of 1930. Stepan says that there is no central national recruitment institution and that a few local government officials along with each local unit's officers draft the recruits for the immediate geographical area. Stepan further states that this has been the historical method for drafting men for the Brazilian army. (pp. 16-7.)

¹¹Gilberto Freyre, Sobrados e Mucambos Vol. 3, Brasiliana Vol. 66-B (São Paulo: José Olympio, 1945), p. 1087.

¹²Ibid.

¹³Donald Pierson, "Brazilians of Mixed Racial Descent," The Blending of Races: Marginality and Identity in World Perspective, eds. Noel P. Gist and Anthony Gary Swarkin (N.Y.: John Wiley & Sons, 1972), p. 251.

¹⁴Caroline F. Ware, ed., The Cultural Approach to History (N.Y.: Columbia Univ. Press, 1940, by the American Historical Association), p. 11.

¹⁵Louis Gottschalk, Understanding History, 2nd ed. (N.Y.: Alfred A. Knopf, 1969), pp. 236-7.

¹⁶Pierson, p. 244.

¹⁷This synthetic method answers the question, "Should history deal primarily with single events or with mass occurrences?", as posed by Folke Dovring in History as a Social Science (The Hague: Martins Nijhoff, 1969), p. 4.

¹⁸"Modern historical science has in principle been established as an objective discipline which should not advocate any moral teaching. The relativity and frailty of this recent independence arises in part from an uncertainty as to what is the real purpose of historical studies." Ibid., p. 2.

¹⁹Gottschalk, p. 283.

CHAPTER II

THE PORTUGUESE MILITARY LEGACY

The Portuguese Military Situation 1500

Colonial Brazilian military organization with its regional orientation and relationship with political leaders stemmed from the Portuguese military heritage and from Portugal's preoccupation with her Asian empire. When Pedro Álvares Cabral, a Portuguese noble and renowned navigator, discovered Brazil in 1500, Portugal could not field an army. It did not maintain a standing army nor any permanent, paid or professional fighting force. Even when the crusading Portuguese King, Sebastião I (1568-78), died in battle in Morocco on August 4, 1578, he fell amidst an army recruited for that specific African campaign which expected great booty from conquered Moorish cities.¹ At the beginning of the struggle for the Restoration in 1640² Joao, Duke of Bragança and later João III of Portugal, disposed of no army, no navy and no cavalry.³ It is most significant that the method to which the Côrtes, the representatives elected to aid the king as a type of proto-parliament, resorted for defense against Spanish retaliation followed the ancient and medieval tradition--the delegation of defensive responsibility to each province. The defense of each province was entrusted to its own recruits.⁴

The Portuguese had developed and practiced this concept of regional military defense during their lengthy struggle against the Moors during

the Reconquest. The fight between Christian Portuguese and Moslem Moors extended over time and space from 714 A.D. to 1250 when the Algarve (Al-Gharb or the West in Arabic) fell to Afonso III, and from Guimarães, Afonso III's capital in the north, to the Algarve in the south. Sometimes cities exchanged hands six or seven times in the 500 years of Moslem hegemony. During this time the regional system of organized military drafts appeared. Since the feudal system operated in Portugal, the king required the various lords to provide soldiers, who, along with the king's personal vassals, formed a more mobile national offensive group. The municipalities furnished not only contingents of cavalry, the knights and riders used for offensive purposes, but also the footmen which were drafted mainly for local defense.⁵ These local units, recruited to defend each home area, were, at times, joined to the offensively oriented groups to form the hostia. This enlarged, impermanent national army was sometimes transferred to distant areas that might be under strong Moorish attack.

The hostia, however, was always dispersed immediately after the specific battle for which it had been recruited had ended.⁶ No municipality could be left unguarded for any length of time because of the mobility and unpredictability of Moorish units. Portugal, therefore, developed no strong tradition of a national army because of the requirements of regional defense. Leaders regarded a national force as an impermanent device arranged to meet a stronger than usual attack by the Moors.

Other factors blocked the formation of a national Portuguese army and created public disdain for such an institution. The feudal organization of the Portuguese hinterland resisted the application of the hostia which required transfer to other regions. The mass of Portuguese

people developed an antipathy toward and hatred of military recruitment. Even in the midst of a struggle to maintain national existence in 1644 "conscription, billeting and requisitioning caused general discontent."⁷ The king, dependent upon merchants who begrudged war expenses, paid the national troops miserably.

The merchant class considered the officers their servants, since they paid the military's salaries. Padre Ernesto Sales, an historian of Portugal, states that recruitment in Portugal

...was made periodically by unholy levies in which poor, humble, unprotected people were selected, and from which the noble-born, the rich and the innumerable privileged groups escaped easily and quickly. Afterwards, those soldiers, badly clothed, poorly fed and miserably paid, were forced to remain in the army years and years...deserting always and forever...⁸

The Crown also offered alternative employment in lieu of military service. After 1640 the kings encouraged grain production and exempted farmers from military service upon payment of a fossadeira or military tax. Commerce beckoned enterprising adventurers who otherwise might have chosen the military. The impecunious Portuguese king's whims and empty treasury, not service and ability, governed military promotions. The Braganca kings favored those rich enough to buy commissions. João Magalhães, army officer and military historian, states that

there were no properly fixed rules to govern access to the military hierarchy; it all remained dependent upon the king's will. In principle, however, it was the officers' right to nominate his subordinates.⁹

The second characteristic of the Portuguese military legacy appeared in pre-Moslem Portugal. This characteristic embodied the concept of the unification of civil and military leadership in one man. This merger of civil and military command, according to Carlos Selvagem, a Portuguese

military historian, is Visigothic in origin. "The king, created by his barons to lead in war...was, then, the supreme leader who declared and executed the war."¹⁰ This practice mirrored Visigothic society "...in which military service constituted a general civic duty for all free men...."¹¹ Even in the charters granted to municipalities in 1279 by King Dinis (1279-1325) "...the responsibilities of the judges were not separated from the military and policial responsibilities so that the whole civil process had a military form...."¹²

Ordenanças Afonsinas

These two characteristics, regional recruitment and unification of civil and military duties found their way to Brazil by application of the law code which embodied them--the ordenanças afonsinas. The compilation of these ordinances required a long and involved process. In 1020 Afonso V, king of Castile, united two old law codes, the Forum Judicum (a combination of the Código Visigotico and the Juiz do Livro) and the Liber Judicum¹³ and renamed the synthesis the Fuero de Leão. In 1279 King Dinis of Portugal translated into Portuguese the Lei das Sete Partidas, the first law code ever written in Castillian (by Dinis' grandfather, Afonso X) to which he joined the Fuero de Leão. This combined law code served Portugal until 1446 when João I (1385-1433) of Portugal, at the request of the Côrtes, reformed and compiled the extant laws. Afonso V (1438-81) of Portugal published the reformed compilation in 1446 and called it the ordenanças afonsinas.

The ordenanças afonsinas, then, in their method of military organization, embodied two characteristics which determined not only the type of the Portuguese, but also the character of the colonial Brazilian

military organization--local recruitment of soldiers for mainly defensive purposes in their home areas and the unification of both civil and military command in one leader. Extending the concept to society, a citizen was both civilian and soldier. A leader was not only a civilian chief, but a military commander as well.

Hermes Vieira and Oswaldo Silva, Brazilian military historians, state unequivocally that "when Brazil was discovered the ordenançoas afonsinas were in full vigor in Portugal."¹⁴ Magalhães agrees that the charter (foral) of the capitancy (capitania) of Bahia granted on October 26, 1548, involved a direct application of the ordenançoas afonsinas.¹⁵ The strength and longevity of the ordenançoas afonsinas in Brazil, despite attempts to introduce new and modified codes (ordenançoas manuellinas 1496, ordenançoas sebastianas 1568, ordenançoas fillipinas 1592) were demonstrated in 1711. When the French attacked Rio de Janeiro the Portuguese governor requested help from Minas Gerais, another colonial Brazilian capitania to the northwest. From Minas came

...seven thousand men...which had been united in seven days, which certainly was accomplished by the prestige of the governor of Rio de Janeiro and also because there the ordenançoas afonsinas still were used....¹⁶

Genesis of Regionalism in Brazil

The nature of colonial Brazil's early position in the Portuguese Empire encouraged the application of the concepts embodied in the ordenançoas afonsinas. Portugal's world-wide empire included emporia in the Atlantic, on the west and east coasts of Africa, in the Persian Gulf, on the east and west coasts of India, in what is today Malaysia, Indonesia, China, Japan and in Micronesia. The lucrative trade of the East attracted the commercially-minded Portuguese much more than the

unoccupied, untilled lands and primitive Amerindians of Brazil. Only when the French demonstrated a growing interest in the Platine area did Portugal send a colonizer, Martin Afonso de Sousa, to begin a systematic defensive effort there. Magalhães dates Sousa's arriaval in Brazil as the beginning of the military and political organization of the colony.

Brazil's coast line, however, proved too extensive for Sousa to defend adequately. The French intensified their efforts to capture the northern area of Brazil. The Spanish continued to threaten Portuguese control in the Platine area and in 1624 the Dutch attacked the northeastern colony of Bahia. Not only Europeans threatened the tenuous Portuguese colonizing efforts. Certain Amerindian tribes attacked the small settlements and killed all inhabitants. The defense of Brazil's extensive coast line and vast interior required more money, men and energy than the Portuguese could produce. Basílio Magalhães, a Brazilian historian, explains in his Expansão Geográfica do Brasil Colonial that

...the Portuguese treasury, bled white by the Indies...could not support the cost of the system of colonization which consisted in occupying Brazil's coast with military-agriculture posts..17

With the traditions of regionalism and unification of civil and military responsibilities embodied in the ordenancoes afonsinas which still dominated Portugal, it is easy to understand why the king introduced a feudal practice into Brazil to defend its extensive coast line. Just as the English Puritan Civil War and Commonwealth from 1640 to 1649 and the subsequent English preoccupation with domestic affairs forced the New England colonies to create a defensive pact based on regional units, the Portuguese incapacity and unconcern with Brazilian affairs forced a

development of regional independence and feudal defensive structure. An excess of old-line nobility appeared in Portugal during the late 15th and early 16th centuries because of the transformation of the economy from a feudal to a commercial base. The Crown awarded large land grants (capitanias) in Brazil to certain members of this impecunious nobility who were invested with the responsibilities of defense and development of their capitanias. Theoretically the profit reaped from the grants were to improve the financial situation of the marginal nobility. The development and defense of the capitanias, however, required a substantial initial investment which most of these moneyless lords could not afford. Two of these capitanias--Pernambuco in the northeast and Sao Vicente in the south--did thrive. The owners (donatários) made grants of land to their colonists and a feudal structure soon evolved.

The feudal arrangement of land ownership facilitated the application of the ordenançoas afonsinas. The charter of the capitania of Bahia granted on October 26, 1548, obligated every colonist to lend military service in defense of the colony. Magalhães believes that this order constituted the direct application of the ordenançoas afonsinas and that the military obligation of every citizen was the basis of the Brazilian military institution.¹⁸ F. de Paula Cidade, Brazilian military officer and historian, declares that Brazil's military organization, as ordered by the Regimento de 1548, a royal order concerning military organization, was feudal. The order scattered small military units throughout the capitania, each one obeying the largest land owner. This system, Cidade claims, continued to dominate Brazil's imperial and republican military organization.¹⁹

The Portuguese king's primary concern about Brazil was defense. The

most important consideration, therefore, was military organization. It was based on the concept of a colony-in-arms which reflected the feudal arrangement of society. The whole colony was organized militarily.

Article 33 of the charter granted to Martim Afonso de Sousa clearly revealed the leader's military duty and the concept of a colony-in-arms;

The captains of the captaincies of said lands and the senhores of sugar plantations and the colonists of the land shall have the following artillery and arms...two falcoes, six berços and six meio-berços and twenty arcabuzes...the senhores of sugar plantations and ranches shall have at least four berços and ten espingardas with the necessary powder, and ten bestas, and twenty...etc. ...and every colonist of the said lands of Brazil will have at least bestas, espingardas, espadas, lanças or chuços...those who do not have artillery, powder and arms will acquire them...²⁰

Each land owner in colonial Brazil maintained a small private army for defense formed within the walls of his big house (casa grande).²¹

There were two kinds of colonial troops--regular paid troops (tropas da linha or first-liners) and auxiliary troops. The latter were divided into two types--the militia (milícias or second-liners) and the ordenances (ordenanças or third-liners or home guard). The second-liners included most of the able-bodied, free men of the colony who were not first-liners. The câmaras, the local municipal councils, recruited and paid the second-liners who were generally mustered to aid the regular troops in combat. The third-liners included every male from age 18 to 60 who was not included in the first or second lines. These men usually never received pay although they had to drill once a month. Rarely did they accompany the first liners in offensive actions. The local land owners directly controlled both the second and third lines and in colonial Brazil these lines maintained a prominent position. The câmaras garrisoned the first line locally and therefore maintained some degree

of control over them.²²

Most authors agree that the regular paid troops or the first line in Brazil were few and ineffective at least before 1654. Before the Dutch war (1645-54) the military force

...was constituted by the third line or ordenancas principally in which was enlisted all colonists, the richest being of the cavalry. There were very few first-liners or paid soldiers, and only after the Dutch war did they become more numerous than the second and third lines...²³

Even though the first line became more numerous after 1650, a letter from the King to Roque da Costa Barreto, governor-general in 1698, demonstrated the importance of the second and third lines. The King ordered the governor to drill these lines each month in every locality and to carry out capitania-wide musterings three times a year. The King ordered that each soldier of the second and third lines carry adequate arms and stipulated that the local câmaras, not the royal treasury, bear the cost.²⁴ In the southern provinces during the struggles over Rio Grande do Sul and Santa Catarina with the Spanish the second and third lines provided most of the combat troops, the royal forces entering as complementary forces only.²⁵ By the second half of the 18th century native Brazilians constituted about one-half of the first-line troops. In 1763 the first line of Rio de Janeiro included three European infantry regiments, two colonial infantry regiments and a locally formed artillery regiment totally 4,175 soldiers.²⁶ In 1768 Bahia boasted of two white infantry regiments, a regiment of mulattoes and several companies of Indian troops.²⁷

Unification of Civil and Military Command

The feudal and regional arrangement of land ownership in colonial

Brazil reinforced the concept of unification of civilian and military command embodied in the *ordenançoas afonsinas*. Samuel da Costa, a Brazilian military historian, explicitly states that the civil and military functions were united in one person.²⁸ Election of officers in the *militias* and the *ordenanças* further strengthened this tendency. Those elected as officers were the richest and most influential people of the locality and therefore had command positions over all male citizens who were obliged to serve in the second or third lines.²⁹ The *câmaras*, controlled by the land owners, elected the capitão-mor, the highest local military officer, and also the sargento-mor, the executive officer. The *capitão-mor* chose the adjutants and the captains, who in turn, chose the second lieutenants (álferes) and the sergeants.³⁰ A significant duty of the *capitão-mor* required him to uphold the authority of those civil officials in power.³¹ This responsibility further amplified the military-civilian relationship.

The tradition of unifying civil and military commands was even more clearly apparent in the provinces of Santa Catarina, Paraná and Rio Grande do Sul. As late as 1811 João VI, king of Portugal, who was residing in Brazil,

...ordered Uruguayan territory to be invaded by forces organized in Rio Grande do Sul under the command of Lieutenant-General Dom Diogo de Sousa, who also governed the capitania of Rio Grande do Sul.³²

The legacy of Sao Paulo, bandeirantismo³³, followed the tradition of uniting all power in one man. Nelson Sodré, an eminent Brazilian historian, describes the bandeira and its chief as military in character. The chief was at the same time patriarch, legislator, judge and military commander.³⁴ Magalhães states flatly that in pre-Independence Brazil the civil command in the *capitanias* and the military commands were

always united.

Not only did this tradition strongly tie the civil authorities to military power, but also allowed politicians to control military officers and troops. Although the Crown had encouraged this situation in early colonial Brazil, it soon recognized that the consequences of such practice were disastrous to Portuguese control of Brazil and attempted to combat the phenomenon. The Marquis de Pombal, chief minister of Portugal from 1750 to 1777, hired a Prussian general to rationalize Brazilian military affairs. The Prussian complained to Pombal that officers served civilian officials and he dismissed many such officers in his reform of Brazilian military.³⁵ The Prussian general referred to the long-established role of the military as tax gatherers for civilian officials. The Crown farmed out the duties of tax-collecting to certain powerful civilians who, in turn, delegated the duty to colleagues who disposed of troops. When the royal officials called for arrears the military officers, often in conspiracy with the civilian tax-farmers, rebelled. This happened in Pernambuco in 1645 and again in Minas Gerais in 1789.

After 1700, when the Portuguese established firmer authority over Brazil to control the gold production, the Brazilian military classes became further discontented because military promotions for Brazilians declined. A royal edict of 1727 ordered that all those born in Br. be blocked from promotion beyond the post of second lieutenant.³⁶ The restriction of Brazilian promotions dissatisfied the land owners, since their control of troops consequently decreased. F.J. Oliveira Vianna, a Brazilian social historian, states that "as the military posts, from captain up, were made the monopoly of Portuguese, the rural nobility became discontented, also, and made common cause with the military."³⁷

Reflecting the changing colonial Brazilian power structure and the growing complexity and pluralism of civilian groups, the alignment of military classes shifted during the course of colonial history. The colonial military classes in the first two rebellions this study will examine, the Dutch war and the Emboaba affair, were tied to a newly formed landed class that also had semi-commercial functions, such as tax-gathering and the sale of food. The last three conflicts analyzed in this study--the Inconfidência Mineira, the Conjuração de Bahia and the Revolução Pernambucana--revealed the development of Brazilian society, the growth of Brazilian nationalism and a consciousness on the part of the military classes of their marginality in the Portuguese imperial structure. The military classes' alignment shifted to new commercial, artesanal and intelligentsia groups which induced the military to utilize its growing power and organization to implement mutually-held goals.

The military traditions embodied in the *ordenanças afonsinas*, regional recruitment and unification of civil and military command in one person, so easily adaptable to the colonial Brazilian feudal organization, portended ill for Portuguese hegemony in Brazil. Local recruitment and garrisoning of troops assured that local issues and conditions vitally affected the troops. The unification of military and civil commands in one man and the close relationship between the politicians and the officers meant that any civil uprising would also become a military uprising. These traditions assured that military leaders would be vitally involved in the political life of the colony.

FOOTNOTES

¹H.V. Livermore, A New History of Portugal (Cambridge, Eng.: Univ. Press, 1967), pp. 156-7.

²In 1580 Phillip II of Spain, a maternal cousin of the deceased and heirless Sebastiao I of Portugal, claimed the Portuguese crown and invaded Portugal which remained dynastically united to Spain until 1640 when João, Duke of Bragança, led a successful rebellion to reestablish Portuguese independence. John, a descendant of the House of Aviz, became João III of Portugal and established the reign of the House of Bragança.

³Livermore, p. 173.

⁴Ibid.

⁵A.H. de Oliveira Marques, History of Portugal Vol. I (N.Y.: Columbia University Press, 1972), pp. 78-9.

⁶Coronel João Batista Magalhães, A Evolução Militar do Brasil (Rio de Janeiro: Biblioteca do Exército, 1958), p. 179.

⁷Livermore, p. 179.

⁸Magalhães, p. 77, quoting Padre Ernesto Augusto Sales from his O Conde Lippe em Portugal.

⁹Magalhães, p. 91.

¹⁰Magalhães, p. 74, quoting Carlos Selvagem from his Portugal Militar (Lisbôa: Imprensa Nacional, 1931), p. 43.

¹¹Magalhães, p. 71.

¹²Hermes Vieira e Oswaldo Silva, História da Polícia Civil de São Paulo, Brasiliana Vol. 283 (São Paulo: José Olympio, 1955), p. 30.

¹³Livermore, p. 30, calls this code the Liber Judiciorum, a Visigothic code dating from 654 which became the Fuero Juzgo, the code of medieval Galicia and Leon. Vieira and Silva call this Liber Judicum, an old Roman law code, p. 23.

¹⁴Vieira e Silva, p. 30.

¹⁵Magalhães, p. 114.

¹⁶Ibid., p. 179.

¹⁷Magalhães, p. 113.

¹⁸Ibid., p. 179.

¹⁹Capitão F. Paula de Cidade, "O Exército Brasileiro no Período Colonial," Revista do Instituto Histórico e Geográfico Brasileiro Vol. VII, 1922 (Rio de Janeiro: Instituto Histórico e Geográfico Brasileiro, 1928), p. 689.

²⁰da Costa, pp. 39-40, quoting Alitar Loreto from his Capítulos de História Militar do Brasil.

²¹F.J. Oliveira Vianna, Populações Meridionais do Brasil Vol. I, Brasiliana Vol. 8 (São Paulo: José Olympio, 1933), p. 91.

²²Magalhães, p. 195.

²³Ibid., p. 152.

²⁴Ibid.

²⁵Coronel Nelson Werneck Sodré, Introdução a Revolução Brasileira, Coleção Documentos Brasileiros Vol. 98 (Rio de Janeiro: José Olympio, 1958), pp. 162-3.

²⁶Dauril Alden, Royal Government in Colonial Brazil (Berkeley: Univ. of Calif. Press, 1968), p. 53.

²⁷Ibid., pp. 20-21.

²⁸da Costa, p. 43.

²⁹da Costa, pp. 43-44, quoting Lima Figueiredo from his Brasil Militar, p. 24.

³⁰Ibid.

³¹Magalhães, p. 132.

³²Ibid., p. 245.

³³In the 16th, 17th and 18th centuries intrepid mamelucos (half Portuguese, half Amerindian) gathered expeditionary forces in and around São Paulo and explored the interior of Brazil, hunting for gold, jewels and Indians to enslave. These adventurers explored Brazil's interior and extended Brazil's frontiers beyond those set by the Treaty of Tordesilhas in 1494. They also discovered the fabulous gold mines of Minas Gerais in 1698. Their expeditionary forces were called bandeiras and the participants bandeirantes.

³⁴Sodré, p. 152.

³⁵Magalhães, p. 199.

³⁶da Costa, p. 63.

³⁷vianna, p. 40.

CHAPTER III

THE PORTUGUESE SOCIAL LEGACY: MISCEGENATION

The Moorish Occupation

The Portuguese social legacy in Brazil directly contributed to the politicization of the colonial Brazilian military classes. The Portuguese male's readiness, whether of necessity or preference, to mate with women of color created a mestizo population in colonial Brazil. This population represented a marginal element in colonial Brazil, one that found no place within the master-slave dichotomy which dominated colonial society. This marginal group's attempt at integration into Brazilian society helped politicize the military classes.

One logical and historical explanation of the Portuguese propensity to miscegenate states that the somatic norm of the Portuguese people was considerably darker than that of other Europeans. The somatic norm of a culture is that idealization of the perfect human phenotype or physical appearance.¹ The Moors, a dark people revealing previous miscegenation with Negro populations, conquered the Iberian Peninsula in 711 A.D. and ruled the lower two-thirds of what is today Portugal until 1250. They established an advanced civilization linked to the far-flung Moslem empire and stimulated a renaissance in education, science, art and mathematics on the peninsula. The Portuguese associated conquest, power, prestige and learning with the darker color. In Portugal the darker man had conquered and at times enslaved the whiter man. Color

therefore, carried less social stigma than elsewhere in Europe. The Portuguese somatic norm developed under conditions in which the man of color, because of his military conquest of Portugal and position of privilege and power, enjoyed high status.

Gilberto Freyre discusses the dual continentality of the Portuguese, referring to their intermediate geographical position between Africa and Europe. The Portuguese revival and subsequent conquest of the African and Asian coasts strengthened the tradition of miscegenation and further encouraged the development of a darker somatic norm-image. On August 21, 1415, Ceuta, the city which controlled the African side of the Straits of Gibraltar, fell to the Portuguese who began their march on Africa. Magazão fell, followed by West Africa, Moçambique and Ormuz in 1507, Goa in 1510, Bombay in 1534, Malacca in 1558, Macao in 1557 and Funay (Japan) in 1588. The Portuguese established emporia in China and beyond. In all these areas Portuguese men mixed with women of color. In each area, except Angola, where the women practiced infanticide, a mixed-blood population appeared. The Portuguese ideal of the morena, the most desirable and most beautiful of women, a brunette phenotype, not black and not white but rather the café com leite,² developed. The descriptive term morena, therefore, came to have sexual overtones and indicated a woman whose physical beauty and sexual prowess made her the most sought after woman. It further augmented the miscegenation and helped reinforce the darker somatic norm-image of the Portuguese.

Not only did contact with the Moors and the Moslem world in Africa and Asia affect the somatic norm of the Portuguese, but also modified their Christian marital traditions. The Islamic tradition of the Moors and the other African and Asian countries allowed polygamy. Men legally married as many wives as they could support. The conditions of

continuous warfare on the part of the expanding Moslems, including the Moors, and later on the part of the expanding Portuguese, created situations propitious to promiscuity. The Portuguese, consequently, developed a sexual lasciviousness and insatiety which disregarded marital bonds and color barriers and facilitated miscegenation.³

Another situation which facilitated miscegenation not only in Brazil but throughout the Portuguese Empire was the scarcity of white marriageable women. This condition was more acute and long-lasting in Brazil than in Spanish America.⁴ The need to populate and defend Brazil led some colonial officials to encourage miscegenation first with Amerindian women then with black slaves. Even as late as 1731 Minas Gerais, the area of gold production, had no European women of marriageable age. It is no wonder that the majority of the population of that province was mulatto or black.⁵

Miscegenation in Brazil

The circumstances in which the Portuguese discovered and colonized Brazil facilitated miscegenation and the rise of a substantial mulatto population. The creators of the Portuguese Empire were adventurers, soldiers and traders. They were men alone, who had no family for whom they would sink roots into foreign soil. Portugal considered Brazil a penal colony, the depository of undesirables from Portugal. A substantial number of these were sexual deviants and other heretics who had been convicted by the Inquisition.⁶ The Portuguese excluded women from the global expeditions sent to discover and settle new lands. The initial Portuguese colonist, the prisoner, the adventurer, the persecuted Jew or the run-away sailor, was single and unrestricted by such social considerations as family or religion. The scarcity of white women, the

previous Portuguese experience with dark-skinned peoples and the darker somatic norm facilitated miscegenation with the Amerindian women found on the litoral of Brazil.⁷ Freyre believes that most of the initial colonists were men from the southern part of Portugal, common men (plebíos) who perhaps carried a higher percentage of Moorish blood in their veins than their northern brothers. These men, called mozarabs, developed a somatic norm even darker than that of the northern Portuguese which came to Brazil later in the colonial period. Sérgio Buarque de Holanda, a social historian of Brazil, agrees with Freyre, declaring that "...the Portuguese, in great part, are, at the time of the discovery of Brazil, a people of mestiços...showing a big infusion of blood from Africa..."⁸

The Amerindian woman, long black tresses hanging loose, bathed frequently in forest streams. She compared favorably with the ideal of the Moorish woman, also a brown-skinned beauty who bathed frequently. The Amerindian woman encouraged the attentions of the Portuguese men, believing them to be gods. Freyre says that

the ambience in which Brazilian life began was one of almost total sexual intoxication. The European found himself freed in lands overflowing with nude Indian women...These women were the first to surrender themselves to the whites...They gave themselves to the Europeans for a comb or a piece of mirror.⁹

Miscegenation began years before the first formal colonizer, Martim Afonso de Sousa, received his charter to settle the southern part of Brazil in 1530. The first Portuguese colonists found Normans, Bretons, Spanish and even English living with the Tupiniquim, a tribe of the southern Brazilian litoral. These early settlers began the tradition of miscegenation which the Portuguese continued.¹⁰ The

mestizos resulting from the white-Amerindian liaisons were called mamelucos. Their ties to the white population helped attract native tribes to the Portuguese side and provided fierce soldiers in the battles against the French, Dutch and Spanish. The mamelucos appeared mainly in the Northeast, in the São Paulo area and in Rio Grande do Sul. That the importance of the mamelucos as fighters was great is revealed in the struggles against the French from 1520 to 1615 when the Portuguese and mamelucos, with their Indian relatives, forged a military defense against French aggression. The mamelucos played a vital role in the leadership of the Indian military forces because of their intermediary position between Indian and white. In the Dutch War from 1645 to 1654 this alliance between Portuguese and mameluco proved its strength.¹¹ Freyre describes the Indians' contribution, stating that

Indians and mamelucos formed the living, moving wall which pushed the colonial Brazilian frontiers to the West at the same time that they defended, in the sugar-growing areas, the agrarian establishments against attacks of foreign pirates. Each sugar plantation in the 16th and 17th centuries needed to maintain a standing army of tens and hundreds of men...these men were almost all Indians or cabo-clos (mamelucos) of the bow and arrow and of extreme military bravery...¹²

The documentary and statistical evidence of the mestizo population in the 16th and 17th centuries is contradictory and scarce. João Pandiá Calogeras, an eminent Brazilian historian, states that in 1583, 25,000 whites, 14,000 black slaves, 18,000 civilized Indians and 800,000 wild ones lived in Brazil.¹³ Euclides da Cunha, another Brazilian historian and the most celebrated Brazilian author, states that in 1615 Brazil had only 3,000 Portuguese colonists.¹⁴ Within the figures that Calogeras gives, therefore, must be the mamelucos who constituted a majority of the free population. Another source states that in 1650 Brazil

had 50,000 whites and 100,000 others.¹⁵ In any case, until 1650 the mamelucos played a dominant role in the defense and exploration of Brazil and "...the Brazilian society...came to be founded largely upon families in which Indian or part Indian women were the consorts or mothers...."¹⁶ After 1650 the rise of the second Brazilian mestiço, the mulatto, the cross between black and white, overshadowed the influence of the mame-luco.

Miscegenation with Africans

The mulatto became an important segment of colonial Brazilian society. He early demonstrated discontent with the marginal status the Portuguese assigned him. This marginal status and subsequent attempts to change it politicized the colonial Brazilian military classes and threatened Portuguese control of Brazil. Helio Vianna, a Brazilian social historian, states that

the importation of Africans, begun under the system of donatarios...did not take long to make itself felt, by the copious miscegenation the results of which constitute elements of the highest importance in the Brazilian social formation...¹⁷

The Portuguese had begun the practice of black slavery before the discovery of Brazil. In 1441 Antão Gonçalves, a navigator-explorer employed by Henry the Navigator of the Sagres School, returned to Lisbon from an expedition in the Agrium Gulf with several hundred Moorish slaves. In 1444 the first Portuguese slave company, the Companhia de Lagos, began to explore Africa and capture black slaves.¹⁸ Systematic slave trade began in 1445 when Dinis Dias, another explorer, discovered Cape Verde and the Senegal region, the first area inhabited by blacks the Portuguese had contacted. As adventures, crusades and the

colonization of an expanding empire drained Portugal of agricultural laborers, Negro slaves began to till Portuguese soil.¹⁹ By 1550 Negroes constituted 10% of Lisbon's population and black slaves performed a substantial part of the agricultural work.²⁰ The Portuguese colonizers, therefore, were familiar with the practice of black slavery.

The Portuguese control of both the African and American sides of the Atlantic Ocean created propitious conditions for the introduction of African slaves into Brazil. Martim Afonso de Sousa's fleet, which arrived in Salvador in 1531, probably brought black slaves to Brazil and was perhaps engaging in the slave trade.²¹ Pedro Calmon, an eminent Brazilian historian, believes, however, that the first African slaves arrived in Pernambuco in 1546 at the request of Duarte Coelho, the owner of that capitania. Calmon reports that the first African slave arrived in Bahia in 1551. In 1552 the captaincy of São Vicente in the south of Brazil near present-day Santos received 27 male and female slaves.²² Slave populations became concentrated in certain areas in colonial Brazil--at first in the sugar-growing regions of Pernambuco, Sergipe, Alagoas and Bahia and later in the gold-producing captaincies of Minas Gerais and Mato Grosso.

Controversy clouds slave trade statistics. Ascertaining correct figures was complicated further in 1889 when Ruy Barbosa burned all the Brazilian slave ownership documents to prevent government reimbursement to slave-holders after abolition. One of the most documented estimates is that of Roberto Simonsen, as Brazilian economist, who believes that 3,300,000 black slaves entered Brazil during colonial times.²³ Artur Ramos, a Brazilian sociologist, estimates that number to have been 5,000,000.²⁴ Renato Mendonça, a Brazilian linguist and anthropologist,

believes that 5,000,000 Africans entered Brazil legally as slaves from 1538 to 1830 while 2,000,000 more entered as contraband.²⁵ Another estimate claims that from 1550 to 1850 15 to 18 million slaves came to Brazil.²⁶ The majority of these Africans were readily incorporated into the plantation system. They brought from Africa a familiarity with the agricultural way of life, the slave tradition and sometimes even the slave status of their African cultures.²⁷ From the relationship between master and slave developed an illicit sexual liason between the Negress slaves and the white senhores, lords of the plantations, which lasted four centuries. Oliveira Vianna, early 20th century Brazilian historian, describes the role of the plantation, stating that "putting in immediate and local contact the three races, the latifundio created a splendid nucleus for the elaboration of the mestico."²⁸ The young sons of the senhor, enjoying a sexual licence on the plantation, impregnated young female slaves as soon as possible. These white fidalgos of the engenho proudly displayed their syphilitic sores much as soldiers display war wounds.²⁹ In this ambience the senzalas (slave quarters) and the roads of Brazil were soon filled with mulattoes. The senhor of the plantation often freed his lighter mulatto sons by the Negress slaves. These mulattoes lolled on the roads and in the small villages. They were, however, good soldiers and loved military service.³⁰

Miscegenation between white and black, however, did not limit itself to the plantation. The free population of Brazil, those white plebian immigrants from Portugal who did not have the money or political influence to get land grants also mixed with the blacks. These free whites congregated on small lots located on the perimeter of the plantation. They usually became cow-herders, pig-herders and renters.³¹ This class mixed readily with the freed blacks, with the over-flow of the

senzalas and with the mestiços of the ranches. Vianna states that

the white elements, localized on the marginal lands of the latifundia, sank into this absorvent riff-raff, which constituted a few years later the majority of the free citizens outside the latifundia system.³²

Even priests contributed to the process of miscegenation in colonial Brazil, as Calmon has so ably reported.

There are ecclesiastics, and not just a few, who...live in great disorder with mulattoes and Negroes of whom, by their death, leave sons as heirs of their goods and by these and other methods many of the most valuable and superb properties of Brazil come into the hands of presumptuous mulattoes who in short time destroy the value of these properties.³³

It is difficult to ascertain the number of mulattoes in colonial Brazil for two main reasons--the changing and complex social norms by which race was determined and the scarcity of reliable figures. From the colonial period to about 1870 Brazilians preferred to be called white, and those mulattoes who were associated with rich white families by marriage or blood were often termed white. At the fall of the Empire in 1889 the mulatto was considered the principal Brazilian racial type and more people allowed themselves to be classified as mestiços. From 1890 to the present the myth of the "Aryanization" or whitening of Brazilians ensured that light mulattoes were included within the white populations. The census of 1800 recorded that 84.2% of the population of Mato Grosso was non-white. The governor of that captaincy appended to the 1780 census report the observation that "...three-fourths or even more of the referred total number of inhabitants are blacks, mulattoes or other mestiços of the many different kinds which exist in this country."³⁴

Vianna gives some figures which demonstrate the fluctuation of racial classification in the census reports from 1835 to 1890.

TABLE I³⁵

BRAZILIAN POPULATION FOR THE YEARS
1835, 1872 and 1890
ACCORDING TO RACE

Year	Whites	Mestigos	Blacks
1835	845,000	648,000	1,987,000
1872	3,818,403	3,833,015	3,970,509
1890	6,302,198	4,638,495	2,097,426

A table compiled by Dauril Alden, professor of history at the University of Washington, Seattle, and historian of the Lavr dio period of colonial Brazil, illustrates more clearly the racial composition of colonial Brazil from 1772 to 1780. This table, Table II, is presented on page 40 of this study. The populations of Pernambuco and Bahia, two old sugar-producing areas and regions of black and mulatto concentrations, are missing from the information. Without a doubt, however, most of the population of Pernambuco and Bahia were slaves, both black and mulatto, from 1750 to 1800.³⁶ The census of 1776 revealed that one-half of the population of Sao Paulo was white and one-half Tup  (Indian). One-third of the population of Rio Grande do Sul was Negro slave while one-half of the populations of Minas Gerais was slave--one-fourth white and one-fourth pardo.³⁷


TABLE II³⁸

RACIAL COMPOSITION OR CIVIL STATUS OF THE POPULATION OF EIGHT CAPTAINCIES 1772-1780

Place	Whites	%	Pardos*	%	Blacks	%	Freemen	%	Slaves	%	Indians	%
Rio Negro							927	9.0	191	2.0	9,268	89.0
Pará							24,779	44.8	11,413	20.6	19,123	34.6
Maranhão	15,366	32.4	11,757	24.8	20,291	42.8						
Rio de Janiero							86,751	50.7	84,282	49.3		
Rio Grande de São Pedro							12,821	71.5	5,102	28.5		
São Paulo	65,974	56.4	22,459	19.2	28,542	24.4						
Minas Gerais	76,664	24.0	76,110	23.8	166,995	52.2						
Mato Grosso	3,313	15.8	5,703	27.2	11,154	53.2					797	3.8

*Pardo is a variation of the term mulatto. It literally means "brownskinned."

Thomas Skidmore, professor of history at the University of Wisconsin, presents a graph that illuminates the racial picture of Brazil. It shows that before 1890 the mixed population was greater than the white and that the black population was the lowest of all three from 1872 to 1950. Though it is beyond the scope of this paper to elaborate some statistically derived regressions using the Skidmore information, this writer has taken the liberty to augment Skidmore's graph with some extrapolations.



Graph 1. Brazilian Population by Color 1872-1950 with Extrapolations³⁹

Since Alden's information (See Table II, p. 40) indicates that a little less than one-half of colonial Brazilian population was black slave the extrapolation of the curve in Graph 1 representing the black population has been extended to approximately 40% in 1800. Conforming to Alden's estimates and other statistics presented above, the curves of the white and mixed blood populations have been extrapolated to 30% each for the year 1800. C.R. Boxer, an eminent English historian of Brazil, flatly states that in the last quarter of the 17th century, "the majority of the population already consisted of mixed bloods."⁴⁰

The writer, will therefore, attempt a broad generalization about the number of mulattoes in the colonial Brazilian population, utilizing the foregoing information. It appears that by 1800 the mulatto constituted approximately 30% of colonial Brazil's population which was one-half of the total of the free population. The whites comprised approximately 30% of the total population while black slaves made up the remaining 40%. The areas where the mulatto appeared in at least equal if not superior numbers to the whites--Minas Gerais, Pernambuco and Bahia--were areas in which the Portuguese severely restricted his legal, social and economic participation in colonial life. These oppressed mulatto populations of Minas Gerais, Pernambuco and Bahia, consequently, produced military and civilian rebellions which gravely threatened Portuguese hegemony over Brazil.

The Character of the Mulatto in Colonial Brazil

In order to provide further support for the hypothesis that areas of military rebellion represented areas of mulatto concentration it is necessary to clarify the character of the mulatto and his military role in colonial Brazilian society. During colonial times the mulatto found

himself in an anomalous situation. He was neither master nor slave, nor was he integrated into the latifundia system. He also encountered prejudice on the part of white Portuguese officials who barred his entry into any other organized sector of colonial Brazilian society. The mulatto was thus an individual without a place in colonial Brazil and without a future under Portuguese rule. He, therefore, represented a source of discontent and rebelliousness in the colony.

In colonial Brazil the only organized and productive sector of the society was the slave sector, the large land unit called the engenho that provided the geographical nucleus for the organization necessary for sugar production. The engenho effectively organized the means of production--labor, land and capital--to provide an exportable product. The engenho, therefore, became the most important economic element in the 16th and 17th centuries because it provided regular and substantial taxes for the royal treasury and a financial base for the colonial aristocracy. Within the confines of the engenho lived the three social classes of colonial Brazil--the white land-owning senhor and his family who lived in the casa grande; the slaves who lived in the senzalas; and a mixed and white free population who congregated in and around the engenho as squatters, hangers-on and mercenaries. The white land-owner controlled the system in which he allocated a place for the black as the laboring element and the Indian as idealized by the Catholic Church. Outside this realm chaos reigned.⁴¹

The dominance of the slave sector stunted the development of the middle class--the artisans and the professional classes--because slaves performed most of the needed services. Certain slaves received training as cobblers, metal workers, leather workers, cooks, tailors, carpenters and even teachers. Many owners, especially in the 18th century

when the towns began to grow more populous and important, hired out their skilled slaves (escravos de ganho) and expropriated the wages the slaves earned. This practice of labor exploitation helped precipitate the Bahian uprising of 1798. As can be readily understood, such practices prevented the appearance of a substantial, significant group of free artisans and skilled workers.⁴² The predominance of the latifundia also prevented the formation of a peasant proprietor class.⁴³

The mulatto found no outlet in commercial activity or in the bureaucracy. The Portuguese Crown maintained a monopoly on all external and internal trading of the colony. The Portuguese Crown often sold this monopoly to companies, usually owned by New Christians (recently converted Jews who kept their beliefs and practices intact secretly.)⁴⁴ The extended Brazilian family controlled bureaucratic, political and religious sectors of the colony. The mulatto, in most instances born outside the bonds of matrimony, did not, therefore, enjoy access to any positions in politics, the bureaucracy or the Church.⁴⁵ Magnus Mörner, a historian of Latin American, quotes Sergio Bagú, comparative historian of Spanish and Portuguese American, who declares that

...the mestizo of the colonial period...was not allocated any place within the economic structure and also lacked an allocation in the social structure because, not being Negro or Indian he tried to be white without success. Colonial society placed him between two fires, creating resentment in him. In addition, he received neither work nor education...⁴⁶

The anomie, disorganization and scarcity of opportunity outside the dominant master-slave matrix condemned a substantial portion of the population to vagrancy, unemployment and marginality. As early as the 16th century vagrancy caused problems. The vagrants (vadios) were

comprised mainly of mulattoes and other mesticos. The mulattoes, living by begging, performing odd jobs and providing mercenary military service, filled the roads of the countryside and the dirt streets of the small villages. C.R. Boxer blames the Portuguese policy for this situation, declaring that "the laws forbidding the employment of mulattoes in government positions were, of course, largely responsible for the perennial problem of unemployed or underemployed half-breeds..."⁴⁸

The dominance of the master-slave sector, the scarcity of opportunity outside the sector and the Crown's official policy regarding government employment of mulattoes, therefore, doomed the mulatto to marginal status.

In 1937 American sociologist Everett Stonequist developed the concept of marginality. Marginal men are not necessarily those of a lower socio-economic class, such as the slaves in colonial Brazil. Marginality occurs when a relatively free class partakes of the culture and aspirations of the dominant class of the society but does not dispose of the means to attain acceptance within that class. The individual who most intimately imbibes the dominant group's norms and culture becomes a marginal person when rejection occurs. The use of race as the criterion for rejection of the individual drives him into an even more marginal situation because he cannot control or modify rejection by any personal quality or achievement. He cannot control his birth or ancestry. In reaction to the feelings of inferiority the dominant group's rejection creates in him, the marginal person may develop, in compensation, an external attitude of superiority and, because of his unsatisfactory position in society, may become a provocative and dangerous critic of the dominant group and its culture.⁴⁹ Donald Pierson characterizes the

colonial Brazilian mulatto as marginal by explaining that

...the rise [of the mulatto] was accompanied by the personal stresses and strains which an individual in the process of moving from one class to another ordinarily experiences. The first mulattoes to penetrate the upper tiers reflected in their personal lives participation in two different and to some extent antagonistic worlds which met and fused, so to speak, in their own personalities. They were... marginal men.⁵⁰

The character of the mulatto reflected his marginal position in colonial Brazil. The mulattoes "...were the proudest and most restless group in the whole country, presumptuous, violent, libertarian... rebellious of all subjection, arrogant in their liberty."⁵¹ The mulattoes were reputedly more aggressive, cunning and intelligent than the black. Freyre believes that the mulatto may have even surpassed the white in capacities of leadership and adaptation to the Brazilian milieu.⁵² The white senhores described the mulatto's mind as incoherent, uneven, turbulent, dissolvent, restless and unstable, although brilliant at times. Sensitive and unreconciled to their low status and prestige, the mulattoes exhibited a rebellious attitude in colonial Brazil. In Bahia the insolence became more noticeable after 1750; in 1803 the first line troop commander there cursed the troops of pardos (darker-skinned mulattoes) as the most rebellious and disorderly in Brazil.

Although colonial Brazilian whites sometimes acknowledged the intelligence of the mulatto, they resented the aggressiveness he developed in the struggle to ascend socially and professionally. Adjectives used by Pernambucan whites to describe mulattoes include forward, envious, jealous, disrespectful, pretentious, unconstant, unreliable, arrogant, boastful, cocksure and cheeky.⁵³ To separate himself as much as possible from the stigmatized source of his racial heritage--the black--the

mulatto copied the ideas, clothes, manners and education of the white as much as possible.⁵⁴ The latifundia system, however, incorporated few of the mulattoes into the plantation organization. Those few, chosen on the basis of character, conduct and principally on color, enjoyed acceptance into the white society by gaining land or by marrying into a senhorial family. The rest of the mesticos, those easily recognized as having African blood, the stigmatized ones, the cabras (cross of mulatto and black), the pardos, the fulos (sallow blacks), the cafusos (cross of Indian and black), found the doors of the white society closed against them.⁵⁵

The mulatto, however, by attrition, began to attend schools. The education of a small mulatto group by the 18th century made that colored elite acutely sensitive to prejudicial attitudes and actions. The educated mulattoes or those who pretended to enter the intelligentsia class (such as Tiradentes who will be discussed later) became doubly sensitive and frustrated. Ability, education and intelligence did not provide the mulatto with the adequate and effective means to rise socially and economically as long as Portuguese imperial officials refused to promote mulattoes on solely racial grounds. The Portuguese refusal sprang from two sources--color prejudice and nationality prejudice. Not only were the mulattoes men of color but they were natives, Brazilians who threatened continued Portuguese rule.⁵⁶

The sensitive marginal man elsewhere in the past often adjusted to the contradictory position in which he found himself by identifying with the subordinate or oppressed group, assuming leadership of that group and uniting it by appeals to nationalism. The marginal individual acquired prestige and self-respect in the new position he created.⁵⁷ This process occurred in colonial Brazil. Nationalism became a refuge

for the mulatto, providing the vehicle with which to escape his marginal condition withing white Portuguese hegemony.

Colonial Brazilian society permanently alienated and rejected the mulatto. The white classes rejected him just as he had rejected the slave classes. He lived in a perpetually unstable social situation under constant contradictory pressures. The sensitive and self-conscious mulatto felt humiliated and wounded by his social stigmatization and his irritability and sensitivity grew into enmity and rancor. His arrogance, aggressiveness and insolence bred sarcasm, turbulence and rebellion. His nationality and color invited the prejudice of Portuguese imperial officials; he therefore espoused nationalism as social, economic and psychological salvation.

Authorities disagree about the existence and extent of Portuguese prejudice based on race and color. Pierson states that in colonial Brazil marriage into upper class white families was zealously restricted to individuals of European descent.⁵⁸ Tiradentes, the hero of the Inconfidência Mineira, wanted to marry a white girl of Sao Joao del Rei in Minas Gerais. Her father refused to give permission, however, because Tiradentes was a mulatto.⁵⁹

The military organization of the colony reflected racial and color attitudes. There were battalions for whites, others for men of color and still others for blacks.⁶⁰ The policies of the first and second lines reflected racial considerations. Boxer writes that

...soldiers of the regular garrisons in Brazil served alongside each other without distinction of color, though the European-born were apt to be favored when it came to a question of promotion or one of compassionate discharge. The militia regiments, on the other hand, were organized on a class and color basis...the free Negro, however, and the dark-hued mulatto had little or no hope of ascending, whatever their aptitudes or qualifications.⁶¹

Only European whites advanced beyond second lieutenant, and they were promoted only if they were married to white women. The Marquis de Lavrádio, Vice-Roy of Brazil from 1768 to 1777, did not allow colored militia officers to attend his formal receptions. He merely allowed them to bow to him from the doorway and then required that they return to their homes. The same Lavrádio dismissed an Indian military officer for marrying a Negro woman and thus blemishing his blood by this alliance.⁶²

Whenever possible white Portuguese received the highest military and government posts while mestiços suffered second-rate status.⁶³ Mulattoes and men of any color, including whites married to mulattoes, could not hold any public offices.⁶⁴ The wording of colonial legislation classed the free mulatto with the Negro slave. Law forbade both to carry weapons, wear expensive clothing or use any other mark which might equate them with whites. In 1731 the governor of Pernambuco refused to allow a qualified mulatto lawyer to practice as the King's attorney-general (Procurador) because of color.⁶⁵ Separate courts of justice processed those pardos or mulattoes who transgressed colonial law. In addition, these groups received stricter and more severe punishment than whites.⁶⁶ Even the religious schools rejected the mulattoes. In 1680 the mulattoes of Bahia protested to the Crown in Lisbon and to the Jesuit General in Rome that the Jesuit schools in Salvador excluded them. Padre Antônio Vieira, head Jesuit school-master in Bahia, said that the upper class whites would not tolerate pardos of "vile and obscure origin" to sit beside their sons.⁶⁷

The white Portuguese male did mate freely with blacks and mulattoes. But this propensity to sexual license, however, did not produce a tolerant racial attitude. A conscious attitude of white superiority prevailed

in colonial times. The white upper classes of colonial Brazil inherited this attitude, which was further compounded by the low status of blacks in Brazil. The men of color were slaves, a conquered and controlled people. The toleration therefore extended to blacks and mulattoes in personal relations became blunted and distorted into a hypocritical official policy by much legal and social discrimination. Caio Prado, Jr., an eminent Brazilian historian, states that this official prejudice against any dark-skinned person, the result of the degraded position of the black slave and the native, excluded him from the good things of life in colonial Brazil. He continues that the political role of this racial antagonism, not yet fully estimated, was considerable.⁶⁸ By 1847, twenty-five years after Brazil won independence from Portugal, the situation had so changed that a French visitor observed that

in Brazil, in all social classes, among judges, and even among doctors, among those who direct the politics of the country as well as among the men of letters, one notices mulattoes of a talent, a spirit, of a wisdom and of such instruction that give them much importance and ascendancy...⁶⁹

The Military Role of the Mulatto in Colonial Brazil

The function and character of the colonial Brazilian soldier helped determine those of his heir, the soldier of the Brazilian Empire and Republic, who played such important political roles from 1822 to 1898. A description of this soldier would help us understand the importance of his colonial antecedent. The hero of 1889, the army officer, was

the type of sly and suspicious caboclo, celebrated for his rustic, almost hick (amatutado) way of dressing and for his hayseed habit of kicking off his military boots and resting his big feet (a sign of African heritage) in slippers; it was he who incarnated the new political order established by bacharéis (university graduates) and doutores (literally doctors, but referring to men of letters and advanced studies),

united to the majors and captains, there being not a few hybrids in this revolutionary group, not only of blood but of vocation: the captain-doutores, the majors-doutores, the colonels-doutores. The military-bacharéis.⁷⁰

The dominance of the mulatto in the Imperial and later in the Republican Brazilian army did not obtain without a slow process of development. Its roots lie in the beginning of the colonial period. The mameluco and later the mulatto did find a makeshift method of integration to the master-slave structure of colonial Brazil, although the Portuguese and white Brazilians restricted him in the process. The agrarian sugar plantations and to a lesser extent the cattle ranches faced two fierce and determined enemies in colonial times--Indians and foreign pirates. The great agricultural institutions, therefore, established military forces for defense. They became as much military institutions as economic and social units. Each senhor maintained a mercenary force to defend his engenho. Usually these forces had ties other than employment with the land-owning family, especially during the 16th and 17th centuries. Sometimes they were sons or grandsons of the senhor or enjoyed another degree of kin. These forces made up the warrior clans of the engenho.⁷¹ The very vagrancy of the mulatto freed him from labor but made him liable for military service. Vianna states that

...the mestico in colonial society was a nomad...uprooted, dislocated, unfixed...his nomadism of hunting and wandering transformed easily into a military nomadism...in the gangs of the caudilhos or in the bandeiras...the rural senhor had every reason in keeping the mulatto so nomadic and unemployed, for he was the one who defended the country...⁷²

The mass of idle and unemployed mulattoes became the combative forces of the colony. The mulatto vagrant of the small villages, of the senzalas and of the roads became a soldier. Given the

disorganization and feudal structure of 16th and 17th centuries, the mulatto combatant appeared in the employ of the rural senhor to whom he often had blood. After 1650, the first and second lines increased numerically and service in the second line provided the perennially unemployed and vagrant mulattoes an outlet for their "superabundant energy."⁷³ The first line invariably included Portuguese regiments. The scarcity of Portuguese man-power, however, ensured that Brazilians would enter the ranks of the first line on a large scale. Theoretically only whites entered the first line, but in Brazil, with the mixed population being so numerous, this rule proved unenforceable. Blacks and dark-skinned mulattoes, however, found themselves excluded; the specific instructions for first-line enlistment allowed entrance of mulattoes "when color is not too dusky."⁷⁴

The military sector, although at first not separate from the export or slave sector, did provide an alternative source of social integration, albeit a weak and unsatisfactory one. Military life attracted the mulatto for several reasons. Portuguese officials forbade free Negroes, mulattoes and Amerindian half-breeds to carry lethal weapons. Enlistment in the first or second lines, however, cancelled the restriction even though colonial authorities continued to regard "the proletarian members of this class with dislike and suspicion."⁷⁵ The army uniform increased the prestige of mulattoes; it whitened or Ary-anized them to a certain degree and made them more acceptable to the colonial aristocrats.⁷⁶ The few mulattoes who, in colonial times, came to exercise certain military or civil authority became officially white because it was theoretically impossible for a man of color to hold posts usually reserved for whites. An English visitor as late as 1837 asked if the capitão-mor of Pernambuco were mulatto. The visitor's informant

was reluctant to admit that such an elevated Brazilian Imperial military officer were mulatto, although in reality he was. The poor informant resolved his dilemma by merely rolling his eyes and asking the visitor rhetorically if it were possible for a capitão-mor to be mulatto.⁷⁷

It is difficult to quantify the data presented above. The writer has been unable to find statistics on the number of racial composition of colonial Brazilian troops. The information perhaps does exist in the archives of state and local governments in Brazil or perhaps in the Portuguese colonial archives. Unfortunately the writer had no opportunity to do extended research on the ethnic composition of the colonial Brazilian military classes. The Portuguese imperial charters, however, organized colonial Brazil militarily. Every free male citizen enlisted in one of the three lines. Since by at least 1750 the mulatto population constituted about one-half of the free population, it seems reasonable to suppose that at least one-half of those enlisted in the military classes were mulatto. It further appears reasonable to assume that mulattoes, given their vagrancy and alienation from the plantation system, constituted more than one-half of the first and second lines. Since colonial authorities did not promote mulattoes beyond the post of second lieutenant in the first line, those competent mulattoes, whose other alternatives for employment and subsequent social and economic ascendancy were restricted, probably constituted a discontented and dangerous lot.

The military structures of colonial Brazil--the first and second lines--united these mulattoes in an organization that met frequently and that could be readily used for purposes other than defense of the nation such as political rebellion. The mulattoes, therefore, with their allies of 18th century Brazil, the disaffected middle groups,

disposed of an advantageous organization, a military one, to implement certain civilian and military objectives.

FOOTNOTES

¹Donald Pierson, "Brazilians of Mixed Racial Descent," The Blending of Races: Marginality and Identity in World Perspective, Noel P. Gist and Anthony Gary Dworkin, eds. (N.Y.: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1972), p. 240.

²Gilberto Freyre, Casa Grande e Senzala Vol. I, Coleção Documentos Brasileiros Vol. (Rio de Janeiro: José Olympio, 1943), pp. 77-125.

³Gilberto Freyre, O mundo que o Português criou, Coleção Documentos Brasileiros Vol. 28 (Rio de Janeiro: José Olympio, 1940), p. 44; Caio Prado, Jr., The Colonial Background of Modern Brazil, trans. by Suzette Macedo (Berkeley, Univ. of Ca. Press, 1967), p. 119; F.J. Oliveira Vianna, Populações Meridionaes do Brasil Vol. I, 3a ed., Brasiliana Vol. 8 (São Paulo: José Olympio, 1933), p. 87.

⁴Magnus Mörner, Race Mixture in the History of Latin America (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1967), p. 72.

⁵Pierson, "Brazilians...", pp. 239-40.

⁶João Pandiá Calogeras, A History of Brasil (N.Y.: Russell and Russell, Inc., 1963), p. 9; Freyre, Casa Grande e Senzala, p. 235; Oliveira Lima, Formação Histórica da Nacionalidade Brasileira, tradução do francês de Aurélio Domingues (Rio de Janeiro: Cia. Editora Leitura, 1944), pp. 8-9.

⁷E. Bradford Burns, A History of Brazil (N.Y.: Columbia University Press, 1970), p. 33; Freyre, Casa Grande e Senzala, pp. 111-2.

⁸Sergio Buarque de Holanda, Raizes do Brazil, Coleção Documentos Brasileiros Vol. 1 (Rio de Janeiro: José Olympio, 1936), pp. 27-8.

⁹Freyre, Casa Grande e Senzala, p. 185.

¹⁰J.F. de Almeida Prado, A Bahia e as Capitanias do Centro do Brasil 1530-1625 Tomo I, Brasiliana Vol. 247 (São Paulo: José Olympio, 1945), p. 158.

¹¹Calogeras, p. 13.

¹²Freyre, Casa Grande e Senzala, p. 188.

¹³Calogeras, p. 26.

¹⁴Euclides da Cunha, Rebellion in the Backland, trans. by Samuel Putnam (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1944), p. 68.

¹⁵A.H. de Oliveira Marquês, History of Portugal Vol. I (N.Y.: Columbia Univ. Press, 1972), p. 435.

¹⁶Donald Pierson, Negroes in Brazil (Carbondale: S. Ill. Univ. Press, 1967), p. 115.

¹⁷Helio Vianna, Estudos de História Colonial, Brasiliana Vol. 261 (São Paulo: José Olympio, 1948), p. 83.

¹⁸Renato Mendonça, A Influência Africana no Português do Brasil, Brasiliana Vol. 46 (São Paulo: Cia. Editora Nacional, 1935), pp. 51-2.

¹⁹Charles E. Nowell, A History of Portugal (N.Y.: D. Van Nostrand Co., Inc., 1952), p. 37. However, Donald Pierson (Negroes in Brazil, p. 31) quoting J.F. de Almeida Prado from his Pernambuco e as Capitâneas do Norte do Brasil Vol. 1 (São Paulo, 1939-41), p. 250, says that as early as 1433 Negroes were working on large estates in the Algarve.

²⁰Nowell, p. 106.

²¹Pierson, Negroes in Brazil, p. 31.

²²Pedro Calmon, História do Brasil Vol. 1: As Origens 1500-1600, Brasiliana Vol. 176 (São Paulo: Cia. Ed. Nac., 1939), p. 340.

²³Calmon, História do Brasil Vol. 1, p. 344.

²⁴Pierson, Negroes in Brazil, p. 33.

²⁵Mendonça, p. 72.

²⁶Ibid., p. 69, quoting Calogeras.

²⁷Pierson, Negroes in Brazil, p. 38.

²⁸Vianna, Populações Meridionais..., p. 86.

²⁹Freyre, Casa Grande e Senzala, pp. 164-5; Pedro Calmon, História Social do Brasil Tomo 1: Espírito da Sociedade Colonial, 2a ed., Brasiliana Vol. 40 (São Paulo: Cia. Ed. Nac., 1937), p. 161, "...os clérigos desta terra...dizem publicamente aos homens que lhes é lícito estarem em pecado com suas negras, pois que são suas escravas..." from Padre Manoel da Nóbrega's Cartas do Brasil, Edição da Academia, p. 116.

³⁰Vianna, Populações Meridionais..., p. 86.

³¹Ibid., pp. 80-1.

³²Ibid., pp. 85-6.

³³Calmon, História do Brasil Vol. 1, p. 166.

³⁴Dauril Alden, "The Population of Brazil in the Late Eighteenth Century: A Preliminary Study," The Hispanic American Historical Review Vol. 43, 1963, p. 197 footnote 69.

³⁵Oliveira Vianna, Evolução do Povo Brasileiro, 2a ed., Brasiliense Vol. 10 (São Paulo: Cia. Ed. Nac., 1933), p. 172.

³⁶Alden, p. 197 footnote 69.

³⁷Mörner, p. 72.

³⁸Alden, p. 196.

³⁹Thomas E. Skidmore, Black Into White: Race and Nationality in Brazilian Thought (N.Y.: Oxford Univ. Press, 1974), p. 45.

⁴⁰C.R. Boxer, The Golden Age of Brazil 1695-1750 (Berkeley: Univ. of Ca. Press, 1967), p. 23.

⁴¹Mörner, p. 71; Prado, Jr., pp. 400-3; Holanda, p. 48.

⁴²Pierson, Negroes in Brazil, pp. 38-9.

⁴³Boxer, The Golden Age of Brazil, p. 11.

⁴⁴Holanda, p. 48.

⁴⁵Ibid., pp. 93-110; Prado, Jr., p. 117.

⁴⁶Mörner, p. 75, quoting Sergio Bagú from his Estructura Social de la Colonia: Ensayo de História Comparada de America Latina (Buenos Aires, 1953).

⁴⁷Mörner, p. 75; Prado, Jr., p. 419; Boxer, pp. 170-1.

⁴⁸Boxer, pp. 170-1.

⁴⁹Everett V. Stonequist, The Marginal Man: A Study in Personality and Culture Conflict (N.Y.: Charles Scribners' Sons, 1937), p. 4, p. 78 and pp. 148-155.

⁵⁰Pierson, "Brazilians of Mixed...", pp. 174-5.

⁵¹Calmon, História Social do Brasil Tomo 1, p. 168.

⁵²Freyre, Sobrados e Mucambos Vol. 3, p. 1087; "...no sentido de melhor correspondência com o meio brasileiro e de adaptação mais fácil e talvez mais profunda...o mestiço, o mula'to, digamos delicadamente, o moreno...parece vir revelando maior inteligência de líder que o branco..."

⁵³Pierson, Negroes in Brazil, p. 160 and p. 230; da Cunha, pp. 85-7; Freyre, Sobrados e Mucambos Vol. 3, p. 1088; Calmon, História Social do Brasil Tomo 1, p. 262; Skidmore, p. 40.

⁵⁴Calmon, História Social do Brasil Tomo 1, p. 193; Stonequist, p. 46.

⁵⁵Vianna, Populações Meridionaes..., p. 145.

⁵⁶Boxer, pp. 170-1; Calmon, História Social do Brasil, p. 267; "Os mestiços--a parte maior da população colonial--eram insolentemente nativistas; seguiam a parcialidade dos agricultores e nos centros populosos se lançavam contra os monopolistas reinões."

⁵⁷Stonequist, p. 160.

⁵⁸Pierson, Negroes in Brazil, p. 70.

⁵⁹Freyre, Sobrados e Mucambos Vol. 3, p. 960.

⁶⁰Vianna, Evolução..., p. 163; Pierson, p. 164.

⁶¹C.R. Boxer, Race Relations in the Portuguese Colonial Empire 1415-1825 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1963), pp. 119-21.

⁶²Ibid., p. 33; Mörner, p. 50.

⁶³Boxer, Race Relations..., p. 71.

⁶⁴Freyre, O mundo que o Português criou, p. 59, quoting José Venâncio de Seixas who wrote to Rodrigo de Sousa Coutinho in Lisbon in 1798; Holanda, p. 29; Mörner, p. 50; Boxer, Race Relations..., pp. 116-7.

⁶⁵Boxer, Race Relations..., pp. 116-8.

⁶⁶Vianna, Populações Meridionaes..., p. 140; Morner, p. 52.

⁶⁷Boxer, Race Relations..., p. 117.

⁶⁸Prado, Jr., pp. 127-8.

⁶⁹Freyre, Sobrados e Mucambos, pp. 1026-7, quoting Vivien de Saint-Martin from his Nouvelles Annales des Voyages et des Sciences Geographiques, 1947; "Au Bresil, dans toutes les classes de la société, parmi les jurisconsultes, ainsi que parmi les medecins, chez les hommes que s'occupent de la politique du pays comme chez les hommes de lettres, on remarque des mulâtres d'un talent, d'un esprit, d'une perspicacité e d'une instruction que leur donnent beaucoup d'importance et d'ascendant."

⁷⁰Freyre, Sobrados e Mucambos Vol. 3, p. 973.

⁷¹Vianna, Evolução do Povo Brasileiro, pp. 74-8.

⁷²Vianna, Populações Meridionaes..., p. 90; Freyre, Sobrados e Mucambos, p. 1005; Pierson, Negroes in Brazil, p. 163.

⁷³Boxer, The Golden Age..., p. 170-1.

⁷⁴Prado, Jr., p. 362.

⁷⁵Boxer, The Golden Age..., p. 170.

⁷⁶Pierson, Negroes in Brazil, p. 170; Freyre, Sobrados e Mucambos Vol. 1, p. 318.

⁷⁷Freyre, Sobrados e Mucambos, p. 974.

CHAPTER IV

THE ERA OF INCIPIENT NATIONALISM 1624-1711

The Dutch Expulsion 1648-1654

In 1580 the Spanish King, Phillip II (1556-98), incorporated Portugal into his kingdoms. Portugal and her colonies inherited from the Spanish a host of enemies, including the determined Dutch. In 1581 Holland and Zealand, at this time called the Spanish Netherlands, initiated a struggle against Spain to gain their religious and economic freedom. The fight continued for seventy years. In 1621 Holland's States-General, following the English example, chartered the first Dutch commercial company, the Dutch West Indies Company to establish trading centers and colonies for Holland. To harass Spain, to capture a rich sugar-producing area and to combat the commercial monopoly Phillip II imposed on Brazil the Dutch, in 1624, attacked Salvador, Bahia, the capital of colonial Brazil. The Portuguese, however, with the help of Indians, defeated them. In 1630 the Dutch West Indies Company again invaded Brazil under the command of John Maurice Nassau, a brilliant soldier and enlightened administrator who had introduced new methods into the Dutch military organization. This time the Dutch chose to invade Recife, the center of the capitania of Pernambuco, because it was more vulnerable than Salvador and because it was the export center of the rich sugar-producing area of Pernambuco. By 1635 all the Portuguese centers of resistance had fallen to the invading Dutch, who had hired many

Brazilians and Indians as mercenaries.¹

The Brazilians liked Nassau. He reinvested the profit which the Dutch West Indies Company realized in Pernambuco to improve the region with roads, gardens, schools and other urban improvement schemes. He reduced taxes and provided liberal credit to sugar planters to rebuild their plantations after the struggle. He created municipal and rural councils composed of the planters from Pernambuco and Paraiba to combat the corruption that was rife among the middle government officials.²

A number of Jews accompanied the Dutch in their occupation of Recife. During the Middle Ages the Jews had gained control of much capital through their money-lending and trading activities. Jewish populations throughout West Europe disposed of a great amount of liquid capital that they loaned to kings and also which they invested in the newly forming commercial companies. The Dutch West Indies Company had been no exception and the Jews, in return for liquid capital investment, received the right to monopolize the food trade in Recife. The Company also farmed out its tax-gathering responsibilities to the Jews, who in turn delegated the chore to those Brazilians disposing of the necessary military forces. Many Brazilians who had been poor before the Dutch came made fortunes by cooperating with their conquerors. These newly rich men with semi-commercial functions such as tax-collecting, constituted a new middle group which disposed of military forces. It is this group that in 1645 would begin the struggle against the Dutch.

The process by which the Dutch levied taxes invited much procrastination. The Company, always short of cash and planning ventures in Asia, disapproved of Nassau's lenient credit and tax policies. In 1643, against Nassau's advice, the Company's board of governors called in all

the debts of the Brazilian tax-gatherers and planters who had, in the past eight years, made heavy investments in new slaves and improvements by borrowing money from the Jewish creditors of the Company in Recife. The Company probably judged the political and economic situation correctly. In 1640 Portugal had freed herself from Spain and planned to make an alliance with England and Holland against her former master. This alliance with free Brazil from Dutch rule.

Antônio Telles da Silva, governor-general in Bahia, sent André Vidal de Negreiros, the Brazilian commander of the royal troops in Bahia, to Pernambuco and Paraíba to confer with the Portuguese planters indebted to the merchants of the Dutch company. Vidal, an ambitious man, knew that if he helped to free Pernambuco from the Dutch, the grateful Bahian governor would reward him. Indeed, in 1654 da Silva appointed him Governor of Maranhão, part of the area the Dutch had controlled.

In Paraíba during August and September Vidal contacted the leading planters and ranchers, among whom was José Fernandes Vieira, eulogized by many Brazilian historians as the creator of Brazilian nationalism. Vieira, a member of the **newly-rich** class, had profited by cooperating with the Dutch. He was a mulatto, the son of a mulatta prostitute in Madeira, a Portuguese island in the Atlantic.³ The older planters called him an ambitious mulatto ("ambicioso mulato") and criticized him for his methods of economic and social advancement.⁴

In 1638 Vieira had obtained a tax-farming contract and by 1641 had so prospered that he owned sixteen sugar plantations and two huge cattle ranches in Paraíba. He also, however, owed the second biggest debt in the capitania of Pernambuco to the Dutch in Recife. In 1641 his request for a reduction in his account had been refused. He owed a total of

38,000 florins.⁵ The Company, in the meantime, had recalled Nassau from his post in Recife for insubordination. Nassau had refused to implement the orders he had received in 1643 from the Company's board of governors to foreclose on the tax-gatherers and planters. The Company also feared that Nassau would attempt to establish a personal domain in Brazil. His successor immediately executed the order to collect all back taxes and loans. The financial pressure put on the indebted planters drove them to join Vieira in planning a rebellion against the Dutch although many of the old planters hated him.⁶ A contemporary report observes that "the Portuguese in this country because they are so deeply indebted, indeed most of them much more than they can hope to pay in their lifetime...scheme night and day to revolt..."⁷

On June 13, 1645, after much consultation among the big plantations' owners and the rangers of Paraíba and Pernambuco, Vieira led a revolt against the Dutch. Only about 150 men, mostly mulattoes and African slaves to whom he had promised freedom, joined him in his refuge in the Pernambucan interior.⁸ On August 3, 1645, he and his motley troops won the hard-fought Battle of Tabocas outside of Recife in the Pernambucan agreste. A few days later Henrique Dias, a free black leader of a battalion of black mercenaries, and Felipe Camarão, the leader of a battalion of Indian mercenaries, joined Vieira. On August 16, 1645, Vidal, commanding a royal regiment from Bahia, and Martim Soares Moreno, an old Indian fighter and commander of another first line regiment from Bahia, increased the number of rebellious troops. The majority of the Portuguese and Brazilian planters, however, refused to join the struggle, preferring to procrastinate until they were sure Vieira would succeed.

The revolt was not a popular uprising. Vieira had been able to

hire a small mercenary force of mulattoes, win an initial battle and attract the larger professional black and Indian mercenary troops under Henrique Dias and Felipe Camarão. The governor-general of Bahia, under orders from the Portuguese Crown, also aided Vieira by releasing first line troops under Vidal and Moreno. The older, more established planters such as Sebastião Carvalho and Jorge Homem Pinto wrote to the Bishop of Bahia on July 8, 1645, protesting the arrival of Dias and Camarão to help Vieira. In 1646 other planters and colonists of Pernambuco requested that da Silva remove Vieira from command. They accused Vieira of starting the rebellion solely on account of his great indebtedness to the Dutch and alleged that he and his cronies, the senior officers of the first lines from Bahia, were amassing fortunes from the war. They charged that Vieira had levied forced taxes on the colonists for prosecution of the war and had kept the slaves, oxen and other booty taken from the Dutch. He was, the citizens accused, "...waging the war with the blood of the poor...."¹⁰ João IV told da Silva to file the planters' letter where nobody could see it.

The Brazilians proved to be fierce fighters. Michiel van Goch who witnessed the second battle of Guararapes on February 19, 1649, declared that "the enemy's men...are...formidable from their natural ferocity, consisting as they do of Brazilians, Tapuyas, Negroes, mamelucos and... also Portuguese and Italians...."¹¹ The leaders and troops who waged the Dutch war were the following:

1. Antônio Dias Cardoso--sent to Vieira with forty men by the Bahian governor-general
2. Felipe Camarão--leader of Petiguan Indian mercenary regiment
3. Martim Soares Moreno--first line commander from Bahia; his regiment dispersed among the others when he returned to Bahia in 1647
4. Henrique Dias--leader of a regiment of free black and mulatto mercenaries

5. Francisco Barreto--field marshal with 3,000 volunteers from Bahia (probably second liners from the militia and probably mostly mulattoes)
6. José Fernandes Vieira--joint commander of the rebellion and leader of mostly mulatto troops recruited locally in Pernambuco
7. André Vidal de Negreiros--joint commander of the rebellion and commander of a regiment of Portuguese infantry from Bahia.

The Brazilians fought the Dutch for nine years after Nassau returned to Europe. In 1649 they won the second battle of Guararapes, killing the Dutch commander Van den Bruncke and capturing many prisoners and weapons. Preoccupied with a war against the English, Holland abandoned her soldiers in Brazil. In 1654 the weakened Dutch garrison of Recife capitulated and boarded the Taborda for Europe. The victory, more apparent than real, was a Brazilian triumph, however, because a feeling of Brazilian nationalism began to grow there in the Northeast. Holland, however, maintained her supremacy in the West Indies and the Atlantic and received restitution for her improvements in Recife in 1661 by the Treaty of the Hague with Portugal. The Dutch also retained the privilege to trade with Brazil.

The first outlines of the alignment of the colonial military classes appear in the Dutch war. Vieira represented two elements which played important roles later in the struggle against Portuguese dominance of Brazil and which employed the military classes in their political struggle. He belonged to a new middle group, one with semi-commercial functions, created by the Dutch bureaucracy. His success, resented by the old guard which expressed disapproval of his tactics and position, and his methods of switching sides and availing himself of every opportunity to ascend, indicated the instability of his position. He was a mulatto, one of the group whose increasing restlessness later so threatened the

hegemony of white Portuguese and Brazilian rule. He also attracted local mercenary forces, later joined by Dias and Camarão whose professional black and Indian mercenaries were paid with captured Dutch booty.

The Emboaba Affair

In the fifty years that followed the Dutch expulsion Brazil grew and changed, pushing her frontiers to the North, South and West. The discovery of gold in Minas Gerais, which at that time was considered the hinterland of the capitania of Rio de Janeiro, initiated a process by which the focus of colonial life moved from the sugar-producing Northeast and its capital of Salvador to the gold-mining southern regions of Minas Gerais and São Paulo.

The paulistas, those intrepid adventurers of Sao Paulo, many of them mamelucos, had always enjoyed renown for their restlessness and adventurous expeditions (bandeiras) into the interior of Brazil. Indian tales of fabulous riches in the interior fascinated the paulistas and lured them farther and farther into the sertão (hinterland) to the north and west of São Paulo. They suffered incredible hardships and privations in their search for gold and Indian slaves. They did not suffer in vain. In 1698 an old paulista, Manuel Borba Gato, discovered gold in a stream near present-day Ouro Preto, Minas Gerais. Estimates of the value of the gold that left Minas Gerais legally and illegally during the 18th century vary, but all agree that it rivalled the American production from California.

The Portuguese attitude toward the acquisition of wealth, so diametrically opposed to the Anglo-Saxon tradition, governed the exploitation of the Brazilian gold mines. During the Reconquest the

Portuguese developed the idea that conquest and exploitation of others' labor constituted a legitimate method of acquiring wealth. The Portuguese fidalgo (noble) did not have to be productive economically. He was intrinsically valuable and did not have to prove his worth by producing anything. Indeed, if he did produce economically then his status and prestige diminished because he would be measured by the product of his being, not by his being or entity alone. He preferred the condition in which he received wealth from land or conquest and spent it on imported goods. He favored quick, short-term ventures, preferably military conquest, that brought immediate return in the form of disposable wealth. Gold-mining, a venture based on slave labor and one that brought quick wealth, appealed to the Portuguese of the early 18th century. In the particular case of Minas Gerais conquest involved defeating only a handful of paulistas, expropriating their gold-panning sites and bringing in slaves to mine the gold.

The paulistas tried to keep their gold discoveries a secret, but by 1702 rumors had reached Portugal of the fabulous gold finds in Minas Gerais. About 8,000 Portuguese settlers called forasteiros who lived on the Brazilian coast, infiltrated the Minas Gerais sertão. Another 80,000 adventurers from Portugal, called reinos, followed.¹³ These forasteiros and reinos, forming a new middle group between the old paulistas and the royal officials, had commercial functions and disposed of enough liquid capital to not only exploit the mines more fully than the paulistas but also to hire mercenaries to carry out the conquest of the gold fields. Gustavo Barroso, a Brazilian military historian, states that

...emboabas, enriched by commercial activities, possessed the

superior capacity to cooperate among each other and with their money were able to buy more slaves for work in the mines and to pay the mercenaries of mamelucos and Indians...¹¹

The paulistas called the invaders emboabas because they wore fringed boots which reminded the paulistas of the feather-covered legs of a type of sertão bird called the emboaba. The paulistas panned the streams for gold with no shoes while the emboabas mainly worked the mines with boots protecting their feet.

At first the emboabas and paulistas cooperated to elude the royal tax-gatherers who attempted to tax the gold production of Minas Gerais. Conflict between the two former groups, however, soon erupted for two reasons. The emboabas either already possessed slaves or had the money to buy them in large numbers for profitable work in the mines. They soon outstripped the slaveless paulistas in production and exploration for new mines. The paulistas complained bitterly to the Crown, which, although it did not favor the movement of slaves from the coastal areas into Minas Gerais because sugar production dropped, could not prevent the clandestine slave smuggling.

The emboabas, many of them of New Christian origin, managed to negotiate contracts with the royal officials concerning the supply of beef and other foodstuffs for Minas Gerais. Food production in Minas Gerais fell dramatically after the gold discoveries because the mines drained men from agriculture. Food had to be imported and a certain group of emboabas obtained a food supply monopoly and charged exorbitant prices.

In 1708 paulista resentment against the emboabas exploded into overt action. Manuel Borba Gato demanded that the emboabas' elected leader, Manuel Nunes Vianna, leave Minas Gerais and return to his cattle ranches on the São Francisco River in Bahia. Vianna refused to leave,

declaring that he was keeping the King's peace in Minas Gerais.¹⁵ Gathering a mercenary army of 3,000 men Vianna declared himself Regent and Governor of the Mines and moved to expel the paulistas. On December 20, 1708, Bento do Amaral, Vianna's executive officer, trapped a paulista force at Rio das Mortes. The paulistas surrendered their arms after accepting Amaral's promise of leniency. After receiving the arms, however, Amaral and his emboaba mercenaries "...ran over the paulistas and killed them all in a most cowardly manner..."¹⁶

A citizen junta (open meeting) met in Rio de Janeiro and demanded that Governor-General Fernando Martins Mascarenhas de Lencastro go to Minas Gerais to restore order, even though a royal letter of January 31, 1702, had forbade governors of Rio to enter Minas.¹⁷ Lencastro, taking only 14 soldiers with him, journeyed to Minas Gerais. Vianna, in the meantime, had increased his army of mercenaries to 4,000. Quickly recognizing the futility of his mission, Lencastro returned to Rio. Vianna's power over Minas Gerais was broken only in 1710 when the first governor-general of the newly-formed capitania of Minas Gerais, Antônio de Albuquerque Coelho de Carvalho, arrived with authorization to raise a large army to combat any other force.

The emboabas had controlled the commercial life of Minas Gerais, including the vital food-stuffs trade. Lencastro had ceded the meat trade monopoly to Francisco do Amaral Gurgel, a large cattle rancher, who gouged the paulistas with exorbitant prices for beef. Vianna and Gurgel were partners, and

...Vianna participated in the odious meat monopoly, which generated rivers of money for him. This monopoly of meat trades, as those who know how commerce worked in those times understand, was the property of the Jews...¹⁸

The paulistas indeed had cause to complain. Vianna sold one beef carcass for 70 to 90 mil-réis in the towns of Minas Gerais while the market price elsewhere was 3 to 9 oitavos de ouro (about 10 mil-réis).¹⁹ Not only did Gurgel control the meat trade, but he also held the monopoly for tobacco and brandy.²⁰

The emboabas effectively controlled the military classes of the mining areas. Vianna has hired his own military forces. The executive officer was Antônio da Silva, an adventurer of the first line who led the mercenary force of mamelucos and Indians.²¹ The armed slaves of Pascoal da Silva Guimarães, a large land and mine owner and partner of Vianna, constituted a second source of military power. Frei Francisco Menezes, an enterprising priest involved in slave smuggling with Vianna, also lent his armed slaves and Indians to the emboaba force.²²

The emboabas, a new middle group with commercial functions such as selling slaves and controlling the vital food-stuffs trade in Minas Gerais, attracted the military classes, the mameluco and Indian mercenaries. The third element of the military classes, the armed slaves, were tied to leaders of this middle group which included land and mine owners. The monopolists, therefore, had the money to pay the mercenary military classes and the fazendeiros, including clerics, commanded armed slaves.

The analysis of these two conflicts in the era of incipient Brazilian nationalism illustrates the concepts introduced in the first three chapters. In both the Dutch war and the Emboaba affair the soldiers recruited on all sides were local forces. José Fernandes Vieira, leader of the Brazilians against the Dutch, led African, Indian and mulatto troops recruited in Pernambuco and Paraíba. André Vidal de Negreiros, the first

line commander from Bahia, was born in Paraíba and led soldiers from that area even though they were first-liners stationed in Bahia.

In the Emboaba conflict Manuel Nunes Vianna led mamelucos and Indian mercenaries recruited by the old soldier of the first line, Antônio da Silva. The priest Frei Francisco, a rancher and miner, along with Pascoal Guimarães, the other prominent rancher involved with Vianna's commercial ventures, provided armed slaves to augment the mercenary forces. All these emboaba military forces were recruited locally as were the forces recruited for the paulista defense.²³

Not only were the military classes involved in these two conflicts locally recruited but they were also controlled by new middle groups which profited by confiscation of previous owners' properties. These new middle groups performed semi-commercial or full commercial functions from which they amassed fortunes and from which they were able to pay mercenary military forces. The Brazilian leader in the Dutch war was a mulatto whose Dutch-granted tax-gathering contracts had brought him a large personal fortune. This fortune became endangered when the Dutch recalled all debts and tax levies. Vieira attracted mercenary military forces and, reinforced by mercenaries and first lines from Bahia, expropriated Dutch properties and escaped the threatened Dutch foreclosures. He and the first line leaders, ingratiating themselves with the Portuguese king, later received lucrative appointments in the Empire.

During the Dutch occupation of Pernambuco the Brazilians came into close contact with a people of different race, religion, language and culture. It provided the first opportunity for the Brazilians to assess their own way of life. There were few intermarriages between the Dutch and Brazilians. Neither the Dutch or the Brazilians learned each other's language, relying on Jewish interpreters. During this time of assessment

the Brazilians began to develop a feeling of nationalism. They began to realize that they liked their culture, although as long as Nassau ruled them gently they remained relatively compliant.

During this era of incipient Brazilian nationalism the military classes constituted an amorphous, fluid, unstable mass of mamelucos, Indians, mulattoes and freed and slave blacks. This group, as mercenaries, revealed little corporate consciousness and little indication that they had common interests as soldiers. They did not act as a consolidated class with class interests. The middle groups completely controlled their actions. The faint outlines of a tradition, however, did appear--a tradition of utilization by or alliance with civilian groups whose political and economic objectives required military force for implementation. In later colonial times, from 1789 to 1817, a qualitative change appeared in the military-civilian relationships. The military classes became more organized and more compact and developed a sense of corporate identity, although civilian objectives still dominated the orientation of the rebellions in which they participated. The military classes, however, developed objectives which happened to coincide with the civilian goals. Racial conflict also played a greater role, due to the growth of the mulatto population, whose integration in Brazilian colonial society was blocked by the prejudicial policies of the Portuguese imperial officials.

FOOTNOTES

¹João Ribeiro, História do Brasil, 13a ed. (Rio de Janeiro: Livraria Francisco Alves, 1935), pp. 178-9.

²C.R. Boxer, The Dutch in Brazil 1624-1654 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1957), pp. 113-9.

³Pieter M. Netscher, Os Holandeses no Brasil, Brasiliana Vol. 220 (São Paulo: Cia. Ed. Nac., 1942), p. 248.

⁴Hermann Wätjen, O Domínio Colonial Holandês no Brasil, Brasiliana Vol. 123 (São Paulo: Cia. Ed. Nac., 1938), p. 229.

⁵Pedro Calmon, A História do Brasil Vol. 2, Brasiliana Vol. 176-A (São Paulo: Cia. Ed. Nac., 1941), p. 212, quoting Brasilische-Gelt Sack, a Dutch book printed in 1647.

⁶Ribeiro, pp. 188-90.

⁷Boxer, p. 164.

⁸Ibid., p. 166.

⁹Ibid., pp. 171-2.

¹⁰Wätjen, pp. 234-5; Boxer, pp. 181-2.

¹¹Boxer, pp. 215-6.

¹²Stanley G. Payne, A History of Spain and Portugal Vol. 1 (Madison: Univ. of Wisconsin Press, 1973), pp. 2-5.

¹³Alfredo Ellis Júnior, Capítulos da História Social de São Paulo, Brasiliana Vol. 235 (São Paulo: Cia. Ed. Nac., 1944), p. 544 map.

¹⁴Gustavo Barroso, Historia Secreta do Brasil Tomo 1, Brasiliana Vol. 76 (São Paulo: Cia. Ed. Nac., 1937), pp. 104-5.

¹⁵In a letter to Rio de Janeiro Gato criticized Vianna, saying that "...não tem mais exercício no Rio São Francisco...espera combois da Baía de uma grossa sociedade que tem naquela cidade e tanto que lhe chegam não se contenta com marchar com estes para as Minas senão com vir servindo de capitania aos mais combois para que nenhum seja tomado do inimigo que nesta conta tem a quem trata de arrecadação de Fazenda de Sua Magestade que Deus guarde...." Calmon, p. 27.

¹⁶*Ibid.*, p. 29.

¹⁷*Ibid.*, p. 30.

¹⁸Barroso, p. 106.

¹⁹*Ibid.*; Boxer corroborates Barroso's price estimation of cattle, stating that in 1703 one ox brought 100 drams of gold (one dram equals one oitavo). Therefore, a head of cattle costing three to nine drams on the coast brought 100 in Minas Gerais, a tenfold increase. (C.R. Boxer, Golden Age in Brazil, Appendix I Commodity Prices in Weights of Gold in Minas Gerais 1703, p. 330 and p. 356.

²¹*Ibid.*, p. 108.

²²Jose Ferreira, As Minas Gerais e os Primórdios de Caraca, Brasiliana Vol. 317 (São Paulo: Cia. Ed. Nac., 1963) p. 120; Calmon, p. 28, (Source: J. Soares de Mello, A Guerra does Emboabas, p. 74). Barroso says that Antônio da Silva commanded all the emboaba forces while Calmon says that the diligent Frei Francisco was the chief. Boxer states that Menezes was a partner of Vianna in the meat monopoly.

²³Calmon, pp. 32-3.

CHAPTER V

THE ERA OF DEVELOPING BRAZILIAN NATIONALISM

The Inconfidência Mineira

During the eighty-one years from the Emboaba affair to the Inconfidência Mineira in 1789, Brazil changed and grew from a marginal and neglected colony to Portugal's most prized and lucrative possession. Though no formal act by the king raised Brazil to vice-royal status, after 1720 Brazil's highest colonial officials carried the title vice-roy. The gold discoveries in Minas Gerais and the need to defend southern Brazil from Spanish incursions transferred the seat of power and importance from Bahia to Rio de Janeiro which became the capital in 1763. The Portuguese also initiated a stricter, more centralized control over Brazil, especially in Minas Gerais, to tax the gold production and control the population. The local autonomy enjoyed by the câmaras municipais (municipal councils) almost disappeared. Their powers were absorbed by the governor-general, who was also the capitania's commanding officer, capitão-mor, and the Intendant of Mines who was directly responsible to the Crown. Laws forbade mulattoes and blacks to carry arms and to wear clothes comparable to those of whites. Men of color and those married to women of color could not hold public office.

Portuguese law and policy oppressed Brazilians not only socially but also economically. During the time of the Portuguese Restoration (1640) Portugal tied herself commercially to England under grossly unfavorable

terms. The alliance solidified during the time of Cromwell and especially the English Restoration, when Charles II of England married Catherine, daughter of João IV of Portugal. This dependant relationship with England ruined Portuguese agriculture and industry. On December 27, 1703, John Methuen, the English ambassador in Lisbon, and Pedro II ratified the Methuen Treaty which opened Portuguese ports to English commerce and granted special terms to English cloth merchants.¹ The clothes of Brazilian slaves came from England. The wheat of Brazilian bread passed through English hands first.² From 1703 Brazilian gold bought Portugal's food and clothes, built her lavish royal and religious houses, maintained her sumptuous embassies in Europe and married her infantas into the richest and most prestigious European royal families. To ensure control of this most valuable colony Portugal instituted a regime of strict and severe taxation and control.

Revolts exploded in various parts of Minas Gerais throughout the 18th century in response to Portuguese repression. In 1715 the Revolt of Morro-Vermelho shook the capitania. In 1719 a group of paulistas, led by Domingos Rodrigues do Prado, killed the judge and expelled the capitão-mor of the city of Pitangui. The governor-general of Minas, however, soon restored his authority. The revolt of 1720 involved a prestigious group of men in Vila Rica, the capital. The leader, José Felipe dos Santos, hanged on the gallows and was quartered. The military leader, Field Marshal Pascoal da Silva, merely received a reprimand. The Crown forbade construction of hat and cotton cloth factories and prohibited construction of sugar and wheat farms in Minas Gerais, fearing the agricultural and industrial projects would drain manpower from the mines. It also attempted to raise taxes on the already much reduced gold production. In response to this repression the Conjuração

de Curvelo of 1755 agitated the whole area.³

International influences had created an acute sensitivity to the Portuguese injustices and tyranny. A numerically small but important class of intelligentsia had developed in Brazil. This class included young sons, many of them mulatto, of the Brazilian aristocracy who had studied in London, Paris and Coimbra. The word "freedom", based on the concepts and ideas of the European propertied middle class, echoed throughout Brazil as it did in the United States and Europe. The success of the English colonies of North America in 1783 heartened Brazilians who longed to free their country from imperial Portuguese rule. On October 21, 1786, a young mineiro (from Minas Gerais) expressed his frustration and agony to Thomas Jefferson:

I am a Brazilian and you, sir, know that my disgraced country groans beneath a terrible enslavement that becomes more insupportable since your glorious independence, because the barbarous Portuguese leave nothing undone to make us more unhappy each day, fearful that your example might be imitated.⁴

The ideas of the French Revolution, especially those of the Encyclopedists of pre-Revolutionary France, influenced Bahian intellectuals and working classes as well as the mineiro intelligentsia. Freemasonry spread rapidly in pre-Independence Brazil (1750-1822). Lodges were established first in Bahia, then in Minas Gerais, Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo. The leaders of all three rebellions analyzed in this chapter were masons (pedreiros livres) whose ideas of freedom and political emancipation linked them to an international movement which culminated, not in the French Revolution of 1789 nor in the 1848 revolutions, but in the Versailles treaties of 1919-21.

One of the main reasons for the failure of the rebellions of 1789, 1798 and 1817 would lie in the illiteracy and unpreparedness of the

Brazilian people to follow their more enlightened and bolder leaders. The first printing press entered Brazil with João, Prince Regent of Portugal in 1808. A royal letter of April 26, 1730, prohibited the delivery of mail by land in Brazil to prevent communication among the capitanias and villages. The Crown allowed the use of only two highways in and out of Minas Gerais to control taxation more effectively. Public schools did not exist in Brazil and a strict censorship of imported literature maintained the colony in a state of illiteracy and ignorance. The illiteracy of the population reflected the oppression of at least half of the population which lived in slavery.⁵ Portuguese officials distrusted Brazilians, especially mulattoes, whom they refused to promote beyond the post of second lieutenant. The governor of Minas Gerais, by controlling the municipal câmaras, prevented nationalist political expression.

Economic oppression increased between 1750 and 1789. The taxes paid by gold producers and others in Minas Gerais grew proportionally heavier. Although the tax was 20% of all gold production, a minimum of 100 arrobas had to be paid each year. It became harder to pay the minimum because the production of the mines declined annually. This situation led the governor of Minas Gerais to institute a practice known as the derrama, a forced collection of all back taxes. Between 1774 and 1785 the average annual tax paid on gold production was only 68 arrobas. In 1789 the governor of Minas Gerais, therefore, planned a derrama to collect the arrobas of gold he and the royal officials determined that the Brazilians owed the royal treasury.

In 1788 a group of mineiros, therefore, began planning the Inconfidência Mineira, a rebellion against the Portuguese officials in Minas Gerais and Rio de Janeiro. They envisioned not only freedom for Brazil

but the establishment of a republic as well. The conspirators of this rebellion hoped to initiate their revolt on the day the governor-general had set for the derrama, March 23, 1789. They expected the oppressed people to join them in an uprising against the officials to free Brazil from Portuguese rule. The revolution, however, never surpassed the planning state, for the governor-general, warned of the sedition, suspended the derrama and on May 7, 1789 arrested those named by his informant, Joaquim Silverio dos Reis.

Both civilians and military officers were arrested. Eight first-line officers with the rank of captain to colonel, including the commander of the royal cavalry who was also second in command of all military troops in Minas Gerais, suffered arrest and questioning. Four second lieutenants were also apprehended and tried for planning the revolt. Five priests and six university graduates (bachareis) who held various posts of authority in the capitania also were convicted of treason and sedition.⁶ All the conspirators were initiates in the masonic lodge in Vila Rica. Although the rebels did not know all of the other collaborators, there were several pivotal figures. It was difficult, therefore, to prove who the leaders really were when the Vice-Roy began the prosecution.

On March 15, 1789 dos Reis, a Portuguese-born colonel of the cavalry of Campos Gerais, had informed the Visconde de Barbacena, governor of Minas Gerais, of the planned insurrection and for one month continued to spy on the rest of the conspirators. On April 19, 1789, dos Reis formally signed a letter of denunciation revealing all he knew about the planned rebellion. Dos Reis had returned to his regiment at Campos Gerai in February only to find that it had been disbanded. He uttered some bitter and traitorous words which his sargeant-mor (executive

officer), Luiz Vaz de Toledo, over-heard. Vaz invited Silvério to join in the rebellion planned by a group of prestigious men, including Tomas Antônio Gonzaga, the royal judge of Minas Gerais, and the commander of the cavalry in Vila Rica and second military commander of the capitania, Lieutenant Colonel Francisco de Paula Freire de Andrada.

Besides the disbandment of his regiment, Silvério had another motive for being interested in a rebellion against the Portuguese officials. Not only did the Portuguese tax the gold production of the mines, but they taxed travellers who used the two highways of the capitania and also charged tolls on river bridges.⁸ The governor left the collection of these tolls to the various first-line military units, usually the cavalry. In his derrama the governor had called for all back taxes owed by his first-line officers. Silvério, who had held what was called a Road Contract (Contrato das Estradas), owed a large amount from his tax-gathering activities on the roads and bridges of Minas Gerais. He did not have the necessary sum nor did all his property and good value the amount required.⁹ By the services rendered to Barbacena, however, Silverio escaped prosecution and was relieved of his debt.

Four other conspirators, all of them commanders of cavalry troops, cooperated with the royal officials during the investigations. These were Field Marshal Inácio Corrêa Pamplona, Colonel Francisco Antônio de Oliveira Lopes, Colonel Domingos de Abreu Vieira and Lt. Colonel Basílio de Brito Malheiro de Lago. All were probably involved in tax-gathering activities and probably owed back taxes to the government. Freire de Andrada, the second in military command of the capitania, had probably entered into the tax-gathering business also, disposing as he did of cavalry troops. The Vice-Roy of Rio de Janeiro, Dom Luis de

Vasconcelos e Sousa, and his legal staff condemned 11 of the 21 prisoners to death, among them Freire de Andrada. In a letter dated October 15, 1790, Queen Maria I of Portugal, however, commuted the death sentences to exile.¹⁰

Cláudio Manuel da Costa, one of the poets involved in the rebellion, committed suicide in his prison cell in Vila Rica. Some historians believe that the governor of Minas Gerais had been involved in the revolt through da Costa and had him killed.

The alleged leader of the planned revolt was Second Lieutenant (alferes) Joaquim José da Silva Xavier, nicknamed Tiradentes (Tooth-Puller). He was the only conspirator who confessed to having planned sedition and who suffered the death sentence. Having excused his colleagues from blame and having claimed all responsibility for the planned rebellion, he was beheaded and quartered on April 21, 1792.

His life and fate vividly illustrated the conditions which induced Brazilian-born military men, especially mulattoes, to participate in civilian-military rebellions. Orphaned at the age of seven Xavier earned the nickname Tiradentes during the time he wandered over Bahia, Minas Gerais and Rio de Janeiro selling cloth, cheap jewelry and pots and pans. He also pulled teeth and, aspiring to the title of Doctor, liked to think of himself as a dentist. He also tried mining, but failed since he disposed of too little capital for deepmining. He was a mulatto, one of that displaced and discriminated group whose position in Brazil became increasingly marginal toward the end of the 18th century. His lover's father, citing Tiradentes' mulatto color, denied his request for marriage.¹¹ Through his brother who was a priest Tiradentes became acquainted with books and aspired to join the intellectual circles of Vila Rica. In 1781 Tiradentes enlisted in the cavalry regiment at Vila Rica. His record

revealed excellent service, although he had never been rewarded for his competency by promotion. He remained at the rank of second lieutenant. Almir de Oliveira, historian of the Inconfidência Mineira, quotes an excerpt from the interrogation of Tiradentes;

Ever since Tiradentes entered into the army, he has given valuable and dauntless service in the face of much danger, but has always been forgotten in promotions...while others ...who had been his subordinates reached the post of Lieutenant and beyond...¹²

Tiradentes had a vision of Brazil's future, emancipated and progressive, which illuminated the objectives of the Inconfidência:

- To establish a University at Vila Rica
- To establish a Republic with parliamentary government
- To construct factories
- To give personal freedom to all citizens regardless of color
- To disband the paid troops since every citizen had the obligation to defend his country
- To free commerce and mining from excessive taxation.¹³

He spread his ideas freely, openly discussing "Republican" Brazil and the imminent destruction of royal tyranny. Although a sertanejo (one from the backlands) he had made several suggestions concerning the urban development of Rio de Janeiro to the Vice-Roy who ridiculed them. João VI began those projects when he arrived in Rio. By assuming responsibility for the planning of the rebellion, Tiradentes revealed his marginal status and his desire for recognition and prestige.

P. Pereira dos Reis, a historian of colonial Brazil, assessed Tiradentes, saying that

...the alferes Joaquim Jose attributed to himself all responsibility for the rebellion, exempting all the rest of his companions of whatever fault...and besides confronting adversity, injustice and death with stoicism, spilled his blood as a martyr for Brazil's independence....¹⁴

The Inconfidência Mineira revealed some major characteristics of the colonial Brazilian military classes. Twelve of the 21 arrested and convicted were military men, eight of which held the rank of captain or above including the second-ranking military commander in the capitania, the first being the governor-general. The paid military troops (first liners) performed certain semi-commercial functions--tax-gathering--which involved their commanders in political and fiscal matters. The governor-general of Minas Gerais was also the commanding officer of the capitania. The planned rebellion against the royal officials, therefore, was not only a civilian uprising but also a military insurrection because of the dual nature of the governorship. The lower-ranking officers involved were *álferes*, among whom was Joaquim José da Silva Xavier, a competent mulatto who had been denied promotion. His conduct was characteristic of individuals of marginal status. He attempted to create a new, more prestigious role for himself by espousing nationalism and becoming a leader of the oppressed group. Brazilians glorify his sacrifice and honor it as the peerless Independence story.

The Conjuração de Bahia 1798

The population of Minas Gerais revealed little sympathy with the conspirators of the Inconfidência Mineira. The majority had not been born in Minas Gerais and had little interest in the political future of Brazil. The difficulties of communication at the time and the great distances prevented the unification and synchronization of action. The Conjuração de Bahia, a planned but never executed rebellion, occurred in 1798. It revealed that the mulatto tailors and soldiers of Salvador, Bahia, had made progress in uniting for a common political

purpose.

The events of the Conjuração Baiana of 1798 clearly revealed colonial Brazil's social, economic and political limitations. They also clearly exposed the complexity of the relationship between civilian and soldier. The marginal mulatto soldier made common cause with an intelligentsia and a mulatto middle class. This middle class, whose advancement the Portuguese rule blocked, performed commercial and artesanal functions.

Throughout colonial Brazil Portuguese taxation stunted Brazilian economic development. The major levies were the following:

- Vintena--20% of value of the exportation of brazil-wood paid in cash to Crown
- Quinto--20% of value of pearls, precious stones, gold and other metals, paid in kind to Crown
- Dízima--10% of the value of fishing catches, paid in cash to Crown
- Síza--7% of the sale of all merchandise, paid to Crown
- Dízima--10% of value of goods brought to Brazil by foreign merchants, even if taxes had been paid in Lisbon
- Dízima--10% of value of all merchandise exported to Portugal from Brazil, paid to Crown in cash
- Redízima--10% of all value of merchandise exported to Portugal from Brazil, paid to the captain of the ship
- Iniciais--local taxes collected by the alcaldes-mores (military officers) at their discretion
- Consulado--10% of all merchandise imported into Brazil, paid to Crown in cash
- Ad Valorem--10% on all sale of goods
- Voluntários--forced collections for certain special occasions such as royal marriages or construction in Portugal (to rebuild Lisbon the city of Salvador alone had to pay 3,000,000 cruzados over a period of 30 years.)¹⁵

The Portuguese practice of granting commercial monopolies to certain Portuguese merchants, mostly of New Christian origin, limited Brazilian commerce and condemned the mass of Bahian to penury. Food prices skyrocketed during the second half of the 18th century. Monopolists controlled the salt, cooking oil and meat supplies. In the 1790's meat rose

to 600 réis per arrôba, inciting the people and soldiers, states Af. Fuy, historian of the Conjuração de Bahia,

...to invade the slaughter-houses of Salvador, Bahia, taking by force the meat stored there and even stealing it from the hands of the slaves of the royal officials in the streets, ¹⁶ alleging that the "ricos" were no better than the people...

Portuguese royal officials burdened the people with multiple taxation. Portuguese merchants harassed them with monopoly prices and maintained the sugar planters of Bahia in debt. The planters required imported goods whose value perennially exceeded that of their sugar crops. By 1798 the merchants and royal officials in Bahia maintained a severe political and economic regime.

The ideas of the French Revolution influenced Bahia much more in 1798 than they had Minas Gerais in 1789. The intelligentsia, including many powerful individuals, meeting in literary and secret organizations, discussed the economic potential of a free, independent and politically liberal Brazil. Evidence indicates that the French participated in seditious activities in 1797 in Bahia. In July of that year Commodore Larcher of the French frigate La Preneuse arrived in Bahia and ingratiated himself by his charm and intellectual attainment with the most prominent figures of Salvador. Among these were Padre Francisco Agostinho Gomes, José da Silva Lisboa (economist), Cipriano de Almeida Barata, popular surgeon and advocate of equality and freedom, and Francisco Moniz Barreto, Latin grammar teacher. Both Barata and Barreto became leaders in the Conjuração de Bahia. The governor-general assigned Lieutenant Hermógenes de Aguilar Pantoja of the second regiment of the first line to accompany the Frenchman and watch his movements. Pantoja also was a leader of the Conjuração.¹⁷ An English officer arrived in Salvador,

boarding at the house of Sargento Joaquim Antônio da Silva, one of the conspirators of the Conjuração. He frequented the house of João de Deos Nascimento, one of the rebellion's four leaders, and discussed with visitors the military and political situation of Europe. He also advised them about the formation of a revolutionary army.¹⁸

The pardos of Salvador, representing two-thirds of the city's population, chafed under oppressive Portuguese rule.¹⁹ Though Portuguese officials opened municipal posts to mulattoes in Bahia in 1774, prejudice still effectively blocked pardos from social and political integration. The goals of the Conjuração clearly revealed the situation:

...to erect the continent of Brazil into a Republican government, free and independent, attempting a rebellion of the people, calling the slaves with a voice of freedom...with the viewpoint to open all posts, public offices and honors to pardos and pretos of ability without distinction according to color...and to augment the pay of the military classes...and to open all ports to all commerce of the world...and to establish factories and manufacturing without depending on Portugal....²⁰

Manoel Faustino dos Santos Lira, a freed pardo slave vitally involved in the planned uprising, expressed the goals of the conspirators succinctly during the formal inquiry:

...to reduce Brazil to a government of equality participating in it whites, pardos and blacks without distinction of color, only of capacity to serve, expending the public treasury...to pay the military troops and execute the necessary transactions of the State....²¹

On August 12, 1798, posters appeared fixed in various places throughout the city of Salvador. The words on the posters were inflammatory and seditious. Ruy quotes one of these documents: "Arise, illustrious and powerful people of Bahia; it is the time of our liberty and equality...

you must proclaim your revolution and free yourselves of royal tyranny...²²

The governor-general, Fernando José de Portugal, examined these posters and found them full of spelling errors and written in unpracticed script. On August 12, the same day, the first suspect, Luiz Gonzaga das Virgens, soldier of the second regiment of the first line of Salvador, was arrested. The arrest panicked the other conspirators who desperately joined their forces to rescue Gonzaga from prison. On the night of August 25 João de Deos and Lt. Aguilar, both with their colleagues, met at Dique Field outside Salvador to initiate the revolt. Three conspirators, Joaquim José de Sant'Ana, captain of the black militia regiment, Joaquim José da Veiga, and José Joaquim de Siqueira, soldier of the First Regiment of the paid troops, betrayed their colleagues and informed the governor of the meeting. Colonel Alexandre Teotônio de Sousa united 40 soldiers and 100 armed slaves and captured the rebels as they arrived at the field.

Of the 34 Bahians arrested and prosecuted 24 were pardos, five of whom were members of the first line and three of the militia. These pardo soldiers clearly manifested characteristics of marginal personalities. They complained that pardos received few military and public office promotions and even fewer pay raises. Five of the pardos of the first and second lines were tailors and artisans. The Portuguese system of commercial control and the practice of hiring out skilled slaves severely limited the artisans' possibilities for economic advancement. Ten of the conspirators were skilled pardo slaves whose masters expropriated their earnings. Five white soldiers of the first line joined the conspiracy. They were joined by five white bureaucrats and artesans and two surgeons, one of whom was a pardo. These white members of the conspiracy served as the intellectual base of the uprising. They

performed the functions of an intelligentsia struggling for national liberation. The classification of the 34 prosecuted conspirators were:

- 5 pardo tailor-soldiers (three of the first line and two of the second line)
- 3 pardo soldiers of the first line
- 5 white soldiers of the first line
- 10 pardo slaves (five tailors)
- 1 pardo surgeon
- 1 white surgeon
- 2 pardo bureaucrats
- 2 white bureaucrats
- 4 pardo tailors
- 1 white tailor ²³

The military leader of the sedition was Lt. Aguilar, a white member of the Second Regiment of the first line. The civil leader was Francisco Moniz Barreto de Aragã~o, a white professor of Latin grammar in Jacobina, the most populous town of the Bahian interior. The Portuguese officials, however, never discovered the supreme leader. According to Ruy,

As far as the chief of the rebellion was concerned, the one from whom the civilian and military leaders received orders, nothing was known, nothing transpired, nor was information sought in the inquiry or the investigation. It was enough for the authorities to punish the poor mulatto soldiers and tailors....²⁴

The Portuguese officials of Salvador hanged four conspirators-- João de Deos do Nascimento, a 24 year-old pardo tailor and squad leader of the Second Militia Regiment; Lucas Dantas de Amorim Torres, a 24 year-old dark pardo and member of the Second Regiment of the Infantry; Luiz Gonzaga das Virgens, a 36 year-old pardo in the Second Regiment of the Infantry; and Manoel Faustino dos Santos Lira, a 22 year-old freed pardo who was a tailor and close friend of João de Deos. Aguilar, the military leader of the planned insurrection, received a six-month prison sentence and Francisco Barreto, the civilian leader, was sentenced to only one year in prison.

The method by which Portuguese officials had organized Bahia militarily--given the social and economic prejudice against pardos--created conditions favorable to organized rebellions. The second-line units were homogeneous; each regiment contained men of the same color and trade. The pardo tailors of Salvador, therefore, enlisted in the militia's second regiment and formed a nucleus for organized action.²⁵ Every free man between the ages of 18 and 60 belonged to one of the three military lines. The uprising was planned as a military rebellion; Joao de Deos and Lt. Aguilar hoped to unite the first and second lines to expropriate power from the Portuguese officials. Sant'Ana, captain of the black militia regiment, had also promised help. He was discontented with the captain-general's decision to nominate a white sargeant-mor to command his regiment, for he had aspired to the post.

The other soldiers of the first and second lines demonstrated clearly their marginal status within Portuguese-ruled Bahia. Lucas Dantas and Gonzaga, the two soldiers who were ultimately hanged, had been refused promotion because they were mulattoes.²⁶ Joao de Deos, the squad leader of the second regiment militia, was impatient for advancement. He had fearlessly and provocatively propagated ideas of equality for all men regardless of color. These three men had close relationships with a rising middle class which performed commercial and artesanal functions--the tailors--whose social and economic advancement the Portuguese blocked by prejudicial political and economic measures.

All the 34 conspirators, including all the first-line soldiers, were born in Salvador or in adjacent villages. They were, then vitally interested in the local conditions and ready to risk their lives to alter their marginal status. In this Bahian revolt, therefore, the relationship between soldier and citizen, especially between pardo soldier and

citizen was clearly evident. A civilian rebellion necessarily entailed military insubordination because all free male citizens were members of the first, second or third lines and because the governor was also the capitania's military commander. Not until 1822, however, did Brazil gain her long-desired freedom from Portugal.

The Revolução Pernambucana of 1817

None of the conspirators of the previously analyzed rebellions, the Inconfidência and the Conjuração, had been able to implement their objectives. In 1817 a group of Pernambucans, however, planned and coordinated their activities so effectively that they were able to institute for a short time a republic in Pernambuco. As the native Brazilian commercial classes (merchants and artisans) grew numerically their power to initiate successful rebellions and institute alternative governments increased proportionately. In 1817, five years before Brazilians began their struggle for independence, Pernambucan merchants, soldiers and intellectuals launched a revolt against the royal officials in Recife. They defeated the forces remaining loyal to the governor-general and captain-general, Caetano Pinto de Miranda Montenegro, and instituted a republican form of government, albeit immature and weak.

Recife, the capital of the Pernambucan captaincy, had always harbored commercial populations. The city commercially controlled the neighboring agricultural sugar and cotton-growing regions of the Varzea, Paraíba, Rio Grande do Norte and Alagoas. Frequent disagreements and incidents between the commercial sector and other interests marred the city's life.

As a result of the political and economic programs of the Marques de Pombal, by 1817 revolutionary propaganda and ideas spread throughout

Recife. Pombal's policies reflected Enlightenment concepts including the bourgeois liberal attitudes toward property and commerce. He had expelled the Jesuits from Brazil, chartered monopolist companies which strangled Brazil economically, aborted the embryonic industries of Brazil, encouraged masonry, and destroyed the aristocracy which had steadied the Portuguese throne by replacing it with a New Christian nobility of bourgeois capitalists. His second wife, Leonor Ernestina Daun, of an old noble German family, brought him the influence of German Protestantism--individualism, democracy, commercial freedom. These ideas were added to his liberal-capitalist orientation which he had obtained in London from 1739 to 1745 when he served as part of a diplomatic mission.²⁷

The Pombal reforms shoved Pernambuco into an economic abyss. The French, English and Dutch textile industries demanded vast amounts of raw cotton which Pernambuco provided with an increasingly greater annual production. Since the agricultural resources of Pernambuco poured into the production of cotton as an export crop, food production dropped and the people suffered. Trade with Rio Grande do Sul, which produced a surplus of wheat, would have solved the problem, but Pombal prohibited all such interaction. He preferred to grant commercial monopolies to restrict further the food supply. Excessive taxation harrassed the people and the native Brazilian merchants and incited dissatisfaction and the revolutionary spirit so prevalent in this era of social, economic and political upheaval.

On February 22, 1800, the enlightened bishop of Pernambuco, Azeredo Coutinho, reopened the Olinda Seminary which had closed when Pombal expelled its Jesuit masters. The opening transformed the intellectual climate of Recife. The school allowed the sons of everyone, including New Christian merchants, to study there and abolished the requirement that

the students become priests. A new curriculum imbued with liberal economic and political ideas created a climate propitious for the development of revolutionary aspirations.

In this seminary young men studied under Padre João Ribeiro Pessôa, one of the three leaders of the Revolução Pernambucana of 1817. Ribeiro had been a student and follower of Arrúda Câmara, a native of Goiana, who studied philosophy at the University of Coimbra and received his medical degree at the University of Montpellier in France. After being elected to the Lisbon Academy of Science in 1796, Camara had returned to Pernambuco where he gathered around him a circle of intellectuals which came to be known as the Areópagus of Itambé. From this group, which included Ribeiro, radiated the revolutionary propaganda that incited the city of Recife and its commercial and military leaders to rebellion on March 6, 1817. Upon retiring Câmara requested that his disciple Ribeiro

...end this ignorance and oppression of men of color...it must cease in order that soon they may be called to assume public office because Brazil will never progress if these natives are not integrated fully into the country's life...do not bend to the absurd and obscene aristocracy which will always throw obstacles into the road of progress...with the monarchy or without her men of color must gain entry into the prosperity of Brazil....²⁸

A Portuguese, writing after the Revolution had been defeated and its leaders arrested and executed, revealed the status of the marginal mulattoes of Recife who were wooed by the Revolution's leaders;

...the cabras, mulattoes and crioulos used to say that they were all equal to whites and they would not marry anyone except the noblest of white ladies...now the prison of Recife contains mulattoes, freed slaves and crioulos whom the provisional government had made bureaucrats and military officers...these have received three to five hundred lashes, some fainting, others dying, few of them groaning or screaming...They walk very quietly now, tipping their hats to whites and in the narrow streets constrain themselves to pass whites most respectfully without touching them...²⁹

The condition of the marginal mulattoes and native Brazilians worsened in 1808 when Prince Regent of Portugal, João, along with a coterie of 10,000 courtiers sailed into Salvador, Bahia, fleeing from Napoleon's invading armies. João rewarded his followers with government and military posts expropriated from Brazilians. The influx of impecunious but haughty and sneering Portuguese fidalgos alienated Brazilians. The Portuguese officers especially conducted themselves in an atrocious manner. A.J. Barrosa Lima, historian of the Revolução Pernambucana, quotes a contemporary observation of the situation.

...the Portuguese military officers and soldiers are the ones who create and inflame the hatred of the Brazilians, insulting, arrogant and pompous, in all places they plant the seeds of hatred and rancor. The state of penury to which Portugal sank when she removed the commercial monopoly on Brazil, swept from her lands to Brazilian soil the illiterate, the parasites and the unemployed, who claimed to have accompanied the king, because of loyalty and not because of their poverty....³⁰

The Brazilian soldiers had more to complain about than just the arrogance of their officers. They did not receive their pay regularly.

The French ambassador in Rio de Janeiro, informing his government of the Revolution, wrote that

for one year the first line garrison of Pernambuco had been infrequently and badly paid and poorly fed by the government officials...the Brigadier Salazar appointed by Montenegro to take care of the business...committed the stupid injustice of proposing to give to the troops their rations in money value and not in kind, planning to pay each soldier sixteen soldos for each sack of mandioc allotted to them when the market price of the mandioc was 50 soldos for each sack.³¹

Masonic activity influenced the course of the Revolução Pernambucana. From 1810 when the first lodges appeared in Recife to 1817 the number of masonic lodges multiplied rapidly. All lodges were imbued with the exciting idea of the emancipation of Brazil.³² A

majority of the members of the military were masons, especially the officer corps of the Second Regiment of Artillery based in Olinda whose members maintained contact with the intellectuals of the Olinda Seminary. The Second Artillery Regiment under the leadership of Captain Domingos Teotônio Jorge Martins Pessôa adhered to the Revolution and became the nucleus to which other military and civilian elements gravitated.³³

Masonry infiltrated not only the Second Artillery Regiment of Olinda but also the embryonic nativist commercial class which was oppressed by the Portuguese imperial system. Domingos José Martins, archetype of the Brazilian merchant whose economic advancement the Portuguese prevented, was, along with Padre Ribeiro and Captain Teotônio, a leading figure in the Revolution. Born in Espírito Santo, Martins was the son of a merchant who claimed English descent (his family had fled in 1640 at the decapitation of Charles II) and a baiana. The young Domingos, who aspired to study in Europe, had journeyed to Lisbon. Disillusioned with the city's anachronistic social structure, spiritual and economic bankruptcy and decadence, he soon went to London. There Portuguese firm of Dourado, Dias e Carvalho hired him as a clerk. Domingos showed so much enthusiasm and astuteness that the Portuguese merchants soon made him a partner. The firm prospered under his tutelage.

Domingos did not neglect the social and intellectual opportunities which London offered. He met the members of the elegant clubs and literary associations that abounded in London. Domingos met the Venezuelan exile, General Francisco Miranda, whose great vision of freedom for Latin America inflamed the youthful and ambitious Brazilian. Domingos became a mason in London and through him the lodges of Recife received

encouragement and support from English masons. Martins maintained a home in Recife and commuted between there and London. After an unfortunate event involving Martins' financial transactions in London, Martins returned permanently to Recife. He attracted the leading intellectuals of the city who planned a revolution throughout Brazil. Each capitania would be linked by masonic leaders who would consider Recife the center.³⁴

The Portuguese merchants of Recife, alarmed at the rumors of rebellion which circulated throughout the city, sent a letter to Montenegro, the governor-general of Pernambuco demanding that he take measures against an imminent Brazilian uprising. As was the case in Minas Gerais in 1789 and in Bahia in 1798 military considerations overshadowed the whole movement. The highest Portuguese official in Pernambuco, Montenegro, was both governor and commanding military officer. The Second Artillery Regiment of Olinda played such a dominant role in the execution of the rebellion that it must be considered the source of power in the Revolution. Pressured by the Portuguese merchants, Montenegro called a meeting of all the generals of Pernambuco for March 6, 1817. He excluded the only Brazilian-born officer, Pernambucan Brigadier João Peres Campello. The Brazilian officers rose in anger at this insult. They protested the action in a joint letter signed by leading civilian patriots, including Martins.

The Portuguese generals immediately imprisoned the military and civilian leaders in Fort Cinco Pontas, though they had as yet taken no overt or seditious action. The Portuguese Brigadier Manoel Joaquim Barbosa do Castro, commander of the Second Artillery Regiment, arrested his subordinate officer Captain Teotônio for seditious activities. Captain José de Barros Lima, colleague of Teotônio, speared Castro in

the heart. The whole regiment rebelled and marched on Fort Cinco Pontas to free their military and civilian colleagues. An eyewitness describes the scene, declaring that

the Brazilian officers and soldiers took the side of the patriots and seditious screams and shouts escaped from every mouth. The revolution has started...The people fraternized with the armed forces and...the revolutionary movement assumed a general character, raising the masses to delirious freedom. Within a short time all of Recife was infested with this revolutionary ecstasy and the prisons were raided and opened and all prisoners freed.³⁵

Martins, freed from prison, was acknowledged as the supreme leader and immediately assumed command of the troops. On March 7 Martins led a great mass of people and soldiers to the governor's palace and entered unmolested. The governor and his Portuguese officer corps had fled to Fort Brum. Within the palace a small group of patriots elected the members of a provisional government based on a corporate structure. Padre Ribeiro represented the clergy; Captain Teotônico, the military; Dr. Jose Luiz de Mendonça, judiciary; Colonel Manoel Corrêa de Araújo, agriculture; and Martins, commerce. The three most important acts instituted by the provisional government clearly revealed the power bases upon which it rested--the masses, the military classes and the commercial elements. Marcílio Teixeira de Lacerda, historian of the Revolution, reports that

the major preoccupation of the patriots was to give to the new institution a profound democratic character in order to captivate and hold the sympathies and trust of the people...taxes were diminished, salaries of soldiers were increased, freedom of religion declared and the use of vos [second person formal] prohibited....³⁶

The revolution revealed the weakness of the Portuguese government, the growing strength of the Brazilian leaders and masses and the

clear-cut coalition between dissatisfied military classes and the nascent commercial and intelligentsia groups. The insurgents numbered 3,000 first- and second-line soldiers. Only 120 of the Artillery, less than one-half of the contingent that guarded Montenegro at Fort Brum, captured Recife and forced Montenegro to embark on La Félicité on March 12 for Rio de Janeiro.³⁷

On July 1, 1817, however, the new governor-general of Pernambuco, Luiz do Rego Barreto, took command of the royal forces. The short-lived republic and its leaders were crushed by outraged Portuguese forces from Bahia and Rio de Janeiro. The insurgents had expected help from the masons of Bahia, but the latter reneged on their promise. Uprisings agitated the whole Northeast, but royal forces proved too strong and the patriot forces too disunited and weak for any successful movement for independence. An insurrection simultaneously exploded in Portugal, but the military and masonic leaders, including Gomes Freire de Andrade, grand-master of Portuguese masonry, were beheaded. Sebastião Pagano, Brazilian historian, hints that the Portuguese and Brazilian movements were planned by the same leaders against the Crown.

In Brazil Padre Ribeiro committed suicide in the sugar plantation "Paulista, about 30 miles west of Recife, where the Revolution's army made its last stand. At this time Captain Teotônio had taken command of the movement, acting as both civilian and military leader.³⁹ Martins, Mendonça, Padre Miguelinho, who had been appointed Secretary of the Interior, Captain Teotônio and Barros Lima were shot on June 12, 1817. Addressing his last words to his executioner, Martins declared, "Come, execute the orders of your sultan; I die for liber...."⁴⁰ The priest accompanying Martins clapped his hands over Martins' mouth, not allowing the intrepid Brazilian to utter that most fearful of all words--liberty.

Before the Revolution the Portuguese merchants had fought fiercely against opening Pernambucan commerce even to Brazilians. The Brazilian merchants had bitterly resented this tyranny. Masonic ideas of liberty and free commerce appealed to them. The Portuguese merchants of Recife demanded that the Crown punish the conspirators of the Revolution severely. They feared that the Pernambucans, having tasted liberty, would rebel when commercial monopoly was restored to the Portuguese. These merchants, jubilant at the victory of the royal army, donated much money to the troops and financed city-wide celebrations for three days. They also offered two masses and benedictions each day in the cathedral of Corpo Cancto in Recife.⁴¹

The drama of the Revolution clearly delineated a powerful coalition among the military classes of the first line, a disaffected middle class and an intelligentsia. The military elements were all Brazilians who suffered economic and professional repression at the hands of Portuguese commanding officers. The middle class, composed of Brazilian merchants, performed commercial functions which threatened the commercial monopoly of the Portuguese merchants. The intelligentsia educated the elite of the city and disseminated the nationalist ideas so vital to the formation of a revolutionary program.

FOOTNOTES

¹P. Pereira dos Reis, O Colonialismo Português e a Conjuração Mineira, Brasiliiana Vol. 319 (São Paulo: Cia. Ed. Nac., 1964), pp. 39-40.

²Ibid., p. 40.

³Almir de Oliveira, Gonzaga e a Inconfidência Mineira, Brasiliiana Vol. 260 (São Paulo: Cia. Ed. Nac., 1948), pp. 38-41; dos Reis, pp. 88-9.

⁴dos Reis, pp. 99-101.

⁵Ibid., p. 103.

⁶Oliveira, pp. 87-114.

⁷Pedro Calmon, História do Brasil Vol. 3: A Organização 1700-1800, Brasiliiana Vol. 176-B (São Paulo: Cia Ed. Nac., 1943), pp. 406-7.

⁸C. R. Boxer, The Golden Age of Brazil 1695-1750 (Berkeley: Univ. of Ca. Press, 1967), Appendices.

⁹Calmon, pp. 406-7; João Ribeiro, História do Brasil, 13a ed. (Rio de Janeiro: Livraria Francisco Alves, 1935), p. 387; Oliveira, p. 180.

¹⁰dos Reis, p. 109.

¹¹Gilberto Freyre, Sobrados e Mucambos Vol. 3, Brasiliiana Vol. 66-B (São Paulo: Cia. Ed. Nac., 1945), p. 960.

¹²Oliveira, p. 105.

¹³Ibid., p. 108.

¹⁴dos Reis, pp. 106-7.

¹⁵Affonso Ruy, A Primeira Revolução Social Brasileira, Brasiliiana Vol. 217 (São Paulo: Cia. Ed. Nac., 1942), pp. 16-8.

¹⁶Ibid., p. 53.

¹⁷Ibid., p. 65.

¹⁸Ibid., p. 72.

¹⁹Ibid., p. 34.

²⁰Ruy, p. 108, quoting Inácio da Silva Pimental, one of the important conspirators of the rebellion.

²¹Ruy, pp. 108-9.

²²Ibid., p. 81.

²³Ibid., p. 111.

²⁴Ibid., pp. 111-2.

²⁵Caio Prado, Jr., The Colonial Background of Modern Brazil, trans. from the Portuguese by Suzette Macedo (Berkeley: Univ. of Ca. Press, 1967), p. 363.

²⁶Ruy, pp. 88-91.

²⁷Sebastião Pagano, O Conde dos Arcos e a Revolução de 1817, Brasiliana Vol. 132 (São Paulo: Cia. Ed. Nac., 1938), pp. 20-78.

²⁸A. J. Barboas Lima, "Conferência Comemorativa do Centenário da Revolução de 1817," Instituto Histórico e Geográfico Brasileiro Revista Vol. 82, 1917 (Rio de Janeiro: Instituto Histórico e Geográfico Brasileiro, 1917). In the Revolução de 1817 Vol. CI, Parte VI, Documentos Historicos, Biblioteca Nacional (Rio de Janeiro: Ministério de Educação, 1953), pp. 624-675.

²⁹Barbosa Lima, pp. 646-7; Jonatas Serrano, "Um Vulto de 1817," Instituto Histórico e Geográfico Brasileiro Revista Tomo Especial Parte 1 (Rio de Janeiro: Congresso de História Nacional, 1915). In the Revolução de 1817 Vol. CI, Parte VI, Documentos Historicos, Biblioteca Nacional (Rio de Janeiro: Ministério da Educação, 1953), pp. 519-51.

³⁰Barrosa Lima, p. 644.

³¹Ibid., p. 642.

³²Pagano, p. 138.

³³Pagano, pp. 115-6; Barbosa Lima, p. 630; Pedro Calmon, História de Brasil 1800-1889: O Império Vol. 4, Brasiliana Vol. 176-C (São Paulo: Cia. Ed. Nac., 1947), pp. 105-7.

³⁴Marcílio Teixeira de Lacerda, "Domingos José Martins," Instituto Histórico e Geográfico Brasileiro Revista Tomo Especial Parte 1 1915 (Rio de Janeiro: Instituto Histórico e Geográfico Brasileiro, 1915). In Revolução de 1817 Vol. CI, Parte VI, Documentos Historicos, Biblioteca Nacional (Rio de Janeiro: Ministério da Educação e Saúde, 1953), p. 570; Calmon, p. 107-11.

³⁵Lacerda, p. 567.

³⁶Ibid., pp. 570-1.

³⁷Pagano, p. 114.

³⁸Calmon, p. 112.

³⁹Lacerda, p. 575.

⁴⁰Ibid., p. 576.

⁴¹Ibid., p. 643.

CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSION

As Frederick J. Teggart pointed out in 1925, classical historical writings closely resembled the structure of classic Greek tragedy in which the interest focused, not on the outcome, but on the processes of fate or character which determined the outcome.¹ The tragedian presented the contemporary situation and then retrogressed in time, analyzing the elements which created the condition presented at the beginning. In Oedipus Rex, for example, Sophocles presented the prophecy of the blinded king and then proceeded to narrate the tragic story chronologically. Herodotus, Greek historian of the Periclean Age and honored as the father of history, presented his readers with the reality of Athens' ascendancy over the Persians and then returned to the past to search for explanations of that dominance. Thucydides, the brilliant Greek historian of the Peloponnesian Wars, likewise pondered the processes by which two Greek city-states ferociously destroyed each other in fratricidal war and returned to the origins of both peoples to trace the tragic events.

This thesis utilizes the same formula, presenting the contemporary political structure in Brazil and then returning to the colonial past to examine the development of the characteristics of the military classes from 1500 to 1817. The objective is to uncover the roots or the processes by which the Brazilian army developed into the politically dominant power

it is today.

The classical Greek tragedians, especially Euripides, implied that the human personality and its flaws and weaknesses drove man to his own tragic end. He, therefore, sought to understand the processes by which they developed. The writer of this thesis believes that the characteristics of the Brazilian army determined their own political interests and activities. It appeared logical, therefore, to seek explanations for the contemporary Brazilian army's political dominance in an analysis of those characteristics that politicized the army and in an inquiry into the development of those characteristics.

The writer believes that the development of institutions is a continuous, cultural process. The past vitally influences how the institution reacts to new situations. This idea is the basis upon which the writer justifies linking the political dominance of the Brazilians' army of today with colonial developments. The processes and characteristics developed in colonial times vitally shaped the orientation of the growth of the Brazilian army as an institution.

To effect this analysis the writer has examined the contemporary Brazilian army's action in the coup of 1964 and has discovered three characteristics which appeared to have politicized it. These factors are its regional characteristics, ethnic composition and its relationship to a threatened, marginal or otherwise disaffected middle class. The underlying theory of the thesis, that historical development of institutions is continuous and unbroken, dictates that the origin and development of these characteristics lie in the colonial past. Since social, economic, political and military crises usually reveal the characteristics and functions of different components of a society, the writer chose five rebellions involving military classes in colonial Brazil for

analysis. Each analysis attempted to indicate the relationship of the military classes to their civilian colleagues and to outline those characteristics which politicized the military groups.

Brazilian-born soldiers, mostly mulattoes and other kins of mestico, composed the colonial Brazilian military classes. They functioned at first as mercenaries for the rural senhores and later, as they increased in numbers, enlisted in the military first line. The Portuguese social legacy of miscegenation created a Brazilian mestico population. Portuguese prejudice and fear of the native-born, however, prevented the integration of these mesticos into the imperial system. Portuguese policy officially barred the Brazilians from the officer corps until 1774; after that unofficial Portuguese prejudice functioned as effectively as the pre-1774 policy and created an immense reservoir of resentment by condemning the majority of Brazilian mulattoes to marginal status. This resentment helped politicize those mulatto soldiers and created conditions and attitudes propitious for subversive action.

The regionalism so predominant in colonial Brazil helped politicize the military classes. The defense of Brazil overwhelmed the capacity of the Portuguese imperial government. The Crown, therefore, introduced a feudal structure into colonial Brazil by granting huge tracts of land to certain men who executed both civil and military command in their areas. This practice continued into the captaincy era; the governor-general of a capitania also held the title of captain-general. This unification of civilian and military leadership in one man sprang not only from the peculiar structure of colonial Brazil but also from the Portuguese military legacy embodied in the ordenações afonsinas, the Portuguese code of law applied to Brazilian colonization. The unification of civilian and

military leadership assured that every civil uprising against the government would also entail military insubordination. All able-bodied free men in colonial Brazil served in the first, second or third lines. The structure of any organized uprising would, therefore, necessarily be military.

The method of recruitment in colonial Brazil strengthened the regional orientation of the military classes. In Portugal during the centuries-long struggle against the Moors, a system of local recruitment for local defense developed and was embodied in the *ordenações afonsinas*. In Brazil the garrisons of the cities included soldiers from the local area who, of course, maintained an interest in local political affairs.

The third characteristic which helped politicize the colonial Brazilian military classes was their relationship with certain disaffected middle classes whose status or position at one time or another was threatened by Portuguese policies. These groups believed they needed military force to protect themselves and implement their political goals. These middle classes performed commercial or semi-commercial functions and included, in later colonial times, members of an embryonic intelligentsia. Often certain military officers who disposed of cavalry troops performed fiscal duties such as tax-gathering. When civil officials required payment of these back taxes, the indebted officers often rebelled and were joined by certain disaffected civilian middle classes, either merchants or intellectual or both.

This thesis suggests that the emphasis on the Brazilian civilian tradition, so lauded in contrast to the Spanish American military dominance, has distorted Brazilian historiography and obscured the roots

of the contemporary Brazilian political-military crisis. A close scrutiny of the functional relationships among colonial Brazil's various classes reveals that civilian-military alliances, so dominant in contemporary Brazilian politics, germinated and developed in colonial times.

FOOTNOTES

¹Frederick J. Teggart, Theory and Processes of History (Berkeley: Univ. of Calif. Press, 1960), pp. 11-67.

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