A CRITICAL EXAMINATION OF QUINTILIAN'S THEORY OF RHETORICAL EDUCATION

By

DOUGLAS WAYNE SIKES

Bachelor of Arts
Abilene Christian University
Abilene, Texas
1960

Master of Arts
Abilene Christian University
Abilene, Texas
1967

Master of Arts
Oklahoma State University
Stillwater, Oklahoma
1972

Submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate College
of the Oklahoma State University
in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the Degree of
DOCTOR OF EDUCATION
December, 1983

Thesis
1983D
S579c
cop.2

OKLAHOMA STATE UNIVERSITY LIBRARY

A CRITICAL EXAMINATION OF QUINTILIAN'S

THEORY OF RHETORICAL EDUCATION

Thesis Approved:

John E. Dooley
Chairman

Walter G. Scott
Thesis Adviser

Neil R. Luebke

Thomas A. Karman

Norman N. Durham
Dean of the Graduate College

1187126

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Grateful acknowledgment is made to the many people who have given generously of their time and advice. I should like to express my particular thanks to the members of my advisory committee: Dr. John Susky, Dr. Walter Scott, Dr. Neil Luebke, and Dr. Thomas Karman. I also appreciate greatly the constructive encouragement I have received from Dr. John Susky. However, this dissertation would never have been possible had it not been for the great deal of help that I have been fortunate enough to receive from Dr. Walter Scott. His guidance and inspiration sustained me and I thank him most warmly. Finally, I should like to extend my thanks to my children, Gaye and Ty, and I record with great gratitude the help my wife, Patricia, has given me at every stage and for her exemplary patience.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Statement of Problem

Marcus Fabius Quintilianus (c. 35 - c. 95 A.D.) taught rhetoric in the city of Rome and retired after 20 years of service. His retirement was interrupted when he was asked to write a treatise on the art of speaking. His friends desired such a work since ". . . previous writers on the subject had expressed different and at times contradictory opinions."[1] Therefore, Quintilian, after two years work, published his book Institutes of Oratory (c. 93 A.D.).[2] This treatise, though written especially for the education of Marcellus Victorius' son, Geta,[3] sets forth the basic educational philosophy of Quintilian. He says:

> My aim, then, is the education of the perfect orator. The first essential for such an one is that he should be a good man, and consequently we demand of him not merely the possession of exceptional gifts of speech, but of all the excellences of character as well . . . The man who can really play his part as a citizen and is capable of meeting the demands both of public and private business, the man who can guide a state by his counsels, give it a firm basis by his legislation and purge its vices by his decisions as a judge is assuredly no other than the orator of our quest.[4]

Also, "Perfect eloquence is assuredly a reality, which is not beyond the reach of human intellect."[5] Up to this point Quintilian had echoed the traditional goals of many educators, viz., Isocrates, Plato, Aristotle, and Cicero; but his next proclamation seems not only to set him apart

from the earlier schools of thought but expresses his major educational claim. He continues:

> The orator then, whom I am concerned to form, shall be the orator as defined by Marcus Cato, 'a good man, skilled in speaking.' But above all he must possess the quality which Cato places first and which is in the very nature of things the greatest and most important, that is, he must be a good man . . . For I do not merely asset that the ideal orator should be a good man, but I affirm that no man can be an orator unless he is a good man.[6]

Thus, for Quintilian, the greatest and most important quality that every orator should possess is moral virtue; and, though Quintilian is interested in the education of the orator, he claims that no man can be an orator unless he is a good man. Further, he contends, the goal of education should be the production of the good man skilled in the art of effective speech. One of the difficulties found in Quintilian's claim is whether educators can produce such orators. A second problem with his claim is whether Quintilian's rhetorical educational scheme is a viable pedagogical method for educators to follow. This study will attempt an evaluation of Quintilian's theory of rhetorical education.

A review of Quintilian's predecessors will help to understand his major claim by way of contrast. Concerning these writers he says, ". . . I was well aware that some of the most distinguished Greek and Roman writers had bequeathed to posterity a number of works dealing with this subject . . ."[7] (i.e., the study of rhetoric). Thus, his research began with Homer.[8] For the Athenians the poet, Homer, set forth the nature of the good man as being endowed with <u>areté</u>, i.e., ". . . that peculiar excellence that makes a thing, or a horse, or a soldier, or a hero, the best, the most effective, of their kind."[9] Homer had produced a transcendent ideal from which the Athenians had attempted

to construct the ideal man and society. Homer did not state that *areté* was a necessary condition for being a soldier or hero.

From the sixth century to the fifth century a transition of leadership took place in Athens, viz., from an aristocratic rule of those noble-born to the rule of a wealthy merchant class. At the same time, another significant change occurred in the thinking of the young men of Athens who chose not the life of subordination to the state but believed that political and personal power were the true aims of life.[10] Because of this new emphasis a more realistic and practical approach to education was needed. Also, adding to the conflict, due to the political conditions in Athens, was the continued rise in population of those unprepared to fulfill their duties as public men. Therefore, they needed a quick and effective educational system which could produce public men. Since the Athenian teachers refused to participate in such a venture, the needs of these new students were met by the Sophists. These "professional teachers" claimed to teach their students how to gain political and personal power through rhetoric. This emphasis on personal success made the Sophists popular teachers.[11]

However, rhetoric, conceived as persuasive oratory, was not born in Athens. The earliest writers of rhetorical textbooks were the Sicilians, Corax and his student Tisias in the early part of the fifth century B.C.[12] Corax viewed rhetoric, in his *Art of Rhetoric* (c. 470 B.C.), as the artificer of persuasion which could be used by citizens to plead their claims in the general assembly.[13] Thus, his emphasis centered on the development of judicial rhetoric. To this end Corax and Tisias compiled handbooks of rhetorical precepts (designed

to aid judicial oratory). But, neither writer advocated the necessity of moral virtue as a prerequisite for judicial oratory.

The influence of Corax and Tisias can be seen in Gorgias of Leotini who came from Sicily to Athens as an ambassador (c. 427 B.C.). Gorgias dazzled the Athenians with his speechmaking. His technique, which closely followed that of Corax, was to convince by words "the judges in court, the senators in Council, the people in the Assembly, or in any other gathering of a citizen body."[14] The object, then, of his oratory was persuasion.

Later, Isocrates (436 - 338 B.C.), a student of Gorgias, opened his rhetorical school in Athens (c. 392 B.C.). Education, for Isocrates, meant education for political activity, i.e., for the purpose of life.[15] He designed his school to achieve that purpose, viz., to train young men to be orators through the teaching of rhetoric. "Rhetoric," as viewed by Isocrates, ". . . is of use in the practical affairs of everyday life and aids us when we deliberate concerning public affairs."[16] However, Isocrates, in his rhetorical school, emphasized more than merely a technique of persuasion; his was a school where students developed moral character.[17] Thus, in the Panathenaicus, Isocrates says, ". . . I take more pleasure in those of my disciples who are distinguished for the character of their lives and deeds than in those who are reputed to be able speakers."[18] Hence, the primary object of instruction in the school of Isocrates was right conduct in the man and in the citizen. Though Isocrates stressed moral character, he did not make it a necessary condition for producing an orator.

Another forerunner to Quintilian was Plato. Plato's ideas on rhetoric are developed in the Gorgias and the Phaedrus. In the Gorgias,

Plato analyzes the so-called "art of impressive speech" and concludes that Gorgias is merely able to persuade, rejecting the notion of such persuasion as teaching and therefore should not be a part of education for political life.[20] For Plato, the rhetoric of Gorgias was an activity that was not very reputable since it was a kind of routine built on trickery, deceit, immorality, and superficiality: a knack for giving pleasure.[21] This idea of Plato is based on the admission of Gorgias that the art of rhetoric has to do only with words.[22] Hence, Plato regarded such rhetoric as worthless. For Plato, the aim of life and education is the improvement of the soul; yet, this improvement only comes through the cultivation of intellect and righteousness.[23] Plato denies that "rhetoric" should be limited to mere speech-making, since the student should learn what is good and honest as well as what is beautiful and eloquent.[24] Plato concludes that for one to be "a scientific practitioner of speech" he must know the truth about his subject and discover the type of speech appropriate for his audience.[25] Plato, like Isocrates, does not list moral character as one of the necessary requirements for the orator.

Where Plato saw traditional rhetoric as worthless, Aristotle, being somewhat practical himself, recognized the usefulness of rhetoric as a tool.[26] Again, unlike Plato, Aristotle was willing to compare rhetoric to dialectic, since both were within the field of knowledge of all men. The difference between the two, he pointed out, is not in nature but in subject and form.[27] Where dialectic is primarily philosophical, rhetoric is political, and, where dialectic consists of question and answer, rhetoric utilizes a prepared speech. Furthermore, since many subjects, which could be analyzed, are not capable of

absolute demonstration, all men need the art of rhetoric.[28] Because of this belief, Aristotle was willing to teach rhetoric in the afternoon as a kind of supplementary subject.[29] However, his idea of the nature of rhetoric was somewhat different from the traditional view. He says:

> It is clear, then, that rhetoric is not bound up with a single definite class of subjects, but is as universal as dialectic; it is clear, also, that it is useful. It is clear, further, that its function is not simply to succeed in persuading, but rather to discover the means of coming as near such success as the circumstances of each particular case allow. In this it resembles all other arts . . . Furthermore, it is plain that it is the function of one and the same art to discern the real and apparent means of persuasion, just as it is the function of dialectic to discern the real and the apparent syllogism.[30]

Aristotle then sets forth his formal definition of "rhetoric," which is: ". . . the faculty of observing in any given case the available means of persuasion."[31] His definition places the most importance on invention, i.e., observing or discovering the various methods of persuasion. He then names various "means of persuasion," such as: laws, witnesses, contracts, tortures, and oaths.[32] He states, however, that the most effective mode of persuasion is the use of the Enthymeme.[33] Finally, he turns his attention to another kind of persuasion, and says that ". . . character may almost be called the most effective means of persuasion . . ."[34] He stops short in declaring that good moral character is a necessary condition for becoming an orator. What Aristotle did was to join rhetoric and dialectical reasoning as faculties for providing arguments; and, both are needed to achieve persuasion.[35]

By the time of Cicero (106 - 43 B.C.) most of the Hellenistic rhetoricians stressed only the study of the rules of rhetoric. Since the majority of the schools offered rhetoric in the form of mere

persuasion with little regard for knowledge, Cicero denounced them. Viewing such a situation he says,

> . . . we have lost so many good orators, how few there remain of any promise, fewer still of real ability, but too many whose presumption outweighs their skill. Now one cannot expect any but a chosen few to combine legal expertise with eloquence.[36]

For Cicero, there was nothing more splendid than a complete orator; yet, this completeness depended on the acquisition of eloquence. Eloquence, then for Cicero, was significant and did exist but because it was so difficult to acquire, it could be reached only through mastery of philosophy.[37] Then and only then ". . . when one hears a real orator he believes what is said, thinks it true, assents and approves; the orator's words win conviction."[38] But, to win conviction the orator must be first and foremost a sound thinker.[39] Armed with good reasoning powers the orator persuades his audience. Thus, Cicero viewed "rhetoric" as a means of persuasion; however, his claim was that ". . . no man can be an orator complete in all points of merit, who has not attained a knowledge of all important subjects and arts."[40] Cicero admits that he is perhaps portraying the orator who has never existed; the reason being that eloquence, being such a high and noble goal, is seldom reached.[41] The difficulty, then, is that one must acquire a broad knowledge of all important subjects, and be eloquent.[42] Thus, to produce this <u>doctus orator</u> Cicero recommends a heavy emphasis upon literature, rhetoric, history, law, and philosophy because these areas constituted the basic intellectual guide for men.[43]

By Quintilian's day, "rhetoric" had been defined in various ways, viz., the power, practice, or science of persuading, which would include Aristotle's disregard for results and his emphasis on invention.[44]

Quintilian points out that there are many other things which have the "power of persuasion," e.g., money, influence, or even the authority and rank of the speaker.[45] He then concludes, "And if all these have power to persuade, the end of oratory, which we are discussing, cannot adequately be defined as persuasion."[46] As for Aristotle's definition, two faults are pointed out: first, others besides orators persuade by speaking, and there is ". . . the additional defect of including merely the power of invention, which without style cannot possibly constitute oratory."[47]

Plato, though condemning rhetoric as it was practiced in his day, held that true rhetoric is impossible for any save one who knows the truth of his subject.[48] This view of rhetoric is much closer to that held by Quintilian, since both agreed that speaking in a persuasive manner was too inclusive, i.e., even bad men could develop the power of persuasion. For Quintilian,

> The definition which best suits its real character is that which makes rhetoric the science of speaking well. For this definition includes all the virtues of oratory and the character of the orator as well, since no man can speak well who is not good himself.[49]

If "rhetoric" is the science of speaking well, the development of moral character would be a necessary condition for producing the orator. And bad men would not be called orators because they would not possess moral character which Quintilian identifies as a requirement for eloquence.[50] Thus, Quintilian's predecessors would recommend that the orator must know the truth of his subject matter, be persuasive in his speech, and have a broad knowledge of all important subjects. However, only Quintilian argues that for one to be an orator he must be a good man.[51]

Previous Work on This Topic

Though many able writers have contributed to the understanding of Quintilian's educational philosophy, very few have attempted to explain or analyze his major claim, i.e., that the development of moral character is a prerequisite for all other learning. However, there are writers who have expounded or inferred the importance of excellence, or moral character, in communication, such as: Brigance,[52] Murphy,[53] Wallace,[54] Oliver,[55] Brembeck and Howell,[56] and Haiman.[57] Two writers in particular who believe in the "good man" theory are Campbell[58] and Blair.[59] Campbell shows his preference for the "good man" theory when he states:

> Sympathy in the hearers to the speaker may be lessened several ways, chiefly by these two; by a low opinion of his intellectual abilities, and by a bad opinion of his morals. The latter is the more prejudicial of the two.[60]

Further on he says:

> . . . for promoting the success of the orator, (whatever be the kind of public speaking in which he is concerned), it is a matter of some consequence that, in the opinion of those whom he addresseth, he is both a wise and a good man.[61]

Blairs convictions are similar to those of Campbell and both are strong supporters of Quintilian. Blair contends that ". . . what stands highest in the order of means, is personal character and disposition . . . In order to be a truly eloquent or persuasive speaker, nothing is more necessary than to be a virtuous man."[62] He adds:

> Whereas, if we entertain a suspicion of craft and disingenuity, of a corrupt, or a base mind, in the speaker, his eloquence loses all its real effect. It may entertain and amuse; but it is viewed as artifice, as trick, as the play only of speech; and viewed in this light, whom can it persuade?[63]

Though Campbell and Blair stress that speakers should have high moral character and personal integrity, neither attempts an exegesis of Quintilian's hypothesis.

Literature which describes the influence and characteristics of moral education abounds. A list of the more important writers who describe, identify, report, or evaluate moral education in public and private schools includes: Kay,[64] Barrow,[65] Lerner,[66] Hirst,[67] Forisha,[68] Fraenkel,[69] Purpel and Ryan,[70] and Simon and Kirschenbaum,[71] to name only a few. These writers agree that reasoning about moral issues is of prodigious importance, and their extended research and analysis would tend to prove it. However, they do not explain how one develops moral virtue in his own character. Further, the leading contemporary advocate of the development of moral reasoning in students of the public schools is Professor Lawrence Kohlberg of Harvard University. Kohlberg's theory attempts to explore the nature of morality and to develop more adequate modes of moral reasoning.[72] His theory, the cognitive-developmental theory of moralization, is more properly a "description" of the development of moral judgment in students. In fact, his main concern seems to be how moral judgment operates in people's lives.[73] Kohlberg, Kay, Barrow, and the rest either attempt to identify moral issues and test students to ascertain the development of their moral reasoning capabilities, or they describe the influence that moral education has or could have on public education. Their findings are somewhat summarized by Kohlberg when he says:

> The most common system of moral education in America is neither 'character education,' 'values clarification,' nor a cognitive-developmental just community approach, but no conscious system at all, the hidden curriculum.[74]

Finally, these writers, as stated above, research the moral atmosphere of various public and private schools and report student reaction to diverse moral issues such as civil rights, punishment, the value of life, truth, etc. They neither agree with nor deny the claim of Quintilian.

Three writers were discovered who challenge Quintilian's claim, viz., Whately,[75] Goodrich,[76] and Adams.[77] First, though he makes clear that he is discussing the impression produced in the minds of the hearers rather than the qualities of the speaker, Whately briefly attacks the position of Quintilian. For Whately, "rhetoric" is

> . . . the art of reasonsed discourse, as governing that sort of composition in which conclusions are inferred from premises according to the laws of logic . . . and more precisely, it is to be viewed as the art of argumentative composition generally and exclusively.[78]

What follows next is Whately's major criticism of Quintilian's claim.

> So judicious an author as Quintilian would not have failed to perceive, had he not been carried away by an inordinate veneration for his own art, that as the possession of building materials is not part of the art of Architecture, though it is impossible to build without materials, so, the knowledge of the subjects on which the orator is to speak, constitutes no part of the art of Rhetoric, though it be essential to its successful employment; and that though virtue, and the good reputation it procures, add materially to the speaker's influence, they are no more to be, for that reason considered as belonging to the orator, as such, than wealth, rank, or a good person, which manifestly have a tendency to produce the same effect.[79]

This statement from Whately's Elements of Rhetoric is the extent of his concern for the "good man" theory of Quintilian. Whately does not agree with Quintilian's definition that "rhetoric" is the science of speaking well, and therein lies the problem.

Goodrich claims that the most important element in rhetoric is eloquence. However, the eloquence he speaks of consists of one's emotional feelings regarding his subject matter.[80] Since what is

important is to speak from strong emotions he says, "A man's character may be bad, and yet his cause a good one, so that we can justly feel with him in the strong emotions which he feels."[81] He concludes, ". . . virtue is certainly not necessary to eloquence, though it is favorable to its most perfect exercise."[82] Goodrich had separated eloquence from good character, thus completely denying the claim of Quintilian.

The most serious accusation against the theory of Quintilian is raised by Adams. The difficulty, Adams declares, is that Quintilian has set out to form the orator who possesses moral perfection. ". . . if it be meant," Adams says, "that no man can be eloquent without being virtuous, the assertion is alike contradicted by the general constitution of human nature, and by the whole tenor of human experience."[83] Thus, man is incapable of acquiring moral perfection because this quality ". . . is incompatible with the uniform constitution of human nature."[84] However, Adams asserts that bad men have been eminently gifted with oratory,[85] yet none have achieved a state of moral perfection.

A second objection by Adams is directed against Quintilian's so-called "honest man." He states:

> An orator, says he, must be an honest man to enable him, whenever it may be necessary for the success of his cause, to impose upon the minds of his auditors falsehood for truth. And then follows a philosophical disquisition of the occasions, when an honest man may lie, for the good of his client . . . He insists, that his orator must be an honest man. But he allows his honest man to equivocate and lie, and abuse the confidence, acquired by honesty, to promote the success of the fraud.[86]

This is indeed a serious charge against the major position of Quintilian. If Quintilian's orator must be a good and honest man, why would he

permit him to lie? The conclusion that Adams draws is that the ability to speak well, which he calls eloquence, can only be the privilege of a few, and this ability can be demonstrated by men devoid of virtue.[87]

Proposed Methodology of the Study

The purpose of this study is to critically appraise Quintilian's theory of rhetorical education. Chapter I presents the statement of the problem and how certain writers have reacted to Quintilian's claim.

Chapter II is a critical study of the nature of rhetoric reflected in the educational writings of Isocrates, Plato, Aristotle and Cicero. This chapter will also explicate their major tenets regarding the role that moral virtue plays in the development of an orator.

Chapter III will attempt to delineate Quintilian's formation of the ideal orator. The topics of importance are: (1) his views of the nature of rhetoric; (2) the characteristics of the ideal teacher; and (3) how the teaching of moral virtue is to be accomplished.

Chapter IV will present Quintilian's evaluation of Greek and early Roman rhetorical education. The major topics are: (1) the Greek educational legacy and (2) the early Roman educational legacy.

Chapter V will attempt an appraisal of Quintilian's rhetorical education. The topics discussed will include: (1) an evaluation of Quintilian's view of rhetorical education and (2) appropriate conclusions and recommendations resulting from the study.

ENDNOTES

[1]Marcus Fabius Quintilian, Institutio Oratoria, translated by H. E. Butler (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1949), p. 5.

[2]Aubrey Gwynn, Roman Education (Oxford: Claredon Press, 1926), p. 195.

[3]Quintilian, op. cit., p. 7.

[4]Ibid., pp. 9-11.

[5]Ibid., p. 15.

[6]Ibid., p. 357.

[7]Ibid., p. 5.

[8]Ibid., p. 223.

[9]E. B. Castle, Ancient Education and Today (Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1961), p. 12.

[10]Ibid., p. 42.

[11]Lewis H. Drew, "The Greek Concept of Education and Its Implications for Today," Liberal Education, Vol. LXIV, Num. 3 (October, 1978), p. 307.

[12]Quintilian, op. cit., p. 7 and p. 375.

[13]Aristotle, Rhetorica, translated by W. Rhys Roberts, contained in The Basic Works of Aristotle, edited by Richard McKeon (New York: Random House, 1941), p. 1431.

[14]Plato, Gorgias, translated by W. D. Woodhead, contained in The Collected Dialogues of Plato, edited by Edith Hamilton and Huntington Cairns (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961), p. 235.

[15]Isocrates, Antiodosis, translated by George Norlin, Vol. II (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1929), p. 285.

[16]Isocrates, Letter to Alexander, translated by Larue Van Hook, Vol. III (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1945), p. 4.

[17]Isocrates, Letter to Demonicus, translated by George Norlin, Vol. I (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1928), p. 87.

[18]Isocrates, Panathenaicus, translated by George Norlin, Vol. II (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1929), p. 87.

[19]Isocrates, Antiodosis, op. cit., p. 284.

[20]Plato, Gorgias, op. cit., p. 306.

[21]Ibid., p. 245. Also: Plato, Phaedrus, op. cit., pp. 506-507.

[22]Ibid.. p. 235.

[23]Plato, Republic, translated by Paul Shorey, Ibid., p. 654. Also see: Plato, Laws, Ibid., p. 1243.

[24]Plato, Gorgias, Ibid., p. 307.

[25]Plato, Phaedrus, translated by R. Hackforth, Ibid., pp. 522-523.

[26]Aristotle, op. cit., p. 1327.

[27]Ibid., p. 1325.

[28]Ibid.

[29]Quintilian, op. cit., p. 377.

[30]Aristotle, op. cit., p. 1328.

[31]Ibid.

[32]Ibid., p. 1373.

[33]Ibid., p. 1327. For Aristotle, the Enthymeme was a type of Syllogism.

[34]Ibid., p. 1329.

[35]Ibid. Dialectical reasoning, according to Aristotle, is reasoning from opinions that are generally accepted. See: Aristotle, Topica, edited by Richard McKeon (New York: Random House, 1941), p. 188.

[36]Cicero, On Moral Obligation, translated by John Higginbotham (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967), p. 67.

[37]Cicero, De Oratore, translated by E. W. Sutton (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1942), p. 93.

[38]Cicero, Brutus, translated by G. L. Hendrickson (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1942), p. 187.

[39]Ibid., p. 23.

[40]Cicero, De Oratore, op. cit., p. 20.

[41] Ibid., p. 7.

[42] Cicero, On Moral Obligation, op. cit., p. 72.

[43] Cicero, De Oratore, op. cit., p. 5. See also: Cicero, De Partitione Oratoira, p. 140.

[44] Quintilian, op. cit., pp. 305-307.

[45] Ibid., p. 303.

[46] Ibid., p. 305.

[47] Ibid., p. 11.

[48] Plato, Phaedrus, op. cit., pp. 506-519.

[49] Quintilian, op. cit., p. 315.

[50] Ibid., p. 317.

[51] Ibid., p. 337.

[52] W. Norwood Brigance, Speech Composition (New York: 1947), pp. 7-8.

[53] Richard Murphy, "Preface to an Ethic of Rhetoric," In The Rhetorical Idiom, edited by Donald C. Bryant (Ithaca: 1968), pp. 125-143.

[54] Karl Wallace, "An Ethical Basis of Communication," Speech Teacher (January, 1955), p. 9. See also: Donald Bryant and Karl Wallace, Fundamentals of Public Speaking, p. 287ff.

[55] Robert Oliver, The Psychology of Persuasive Speech, 2nd ed. (New York: 1957), pp. 20-36.

[56] Winston L. Brembeck and William S. Howell, Persuasion: A Means of Social Control (Englewood Cliffs: 1952), pp. 443-466.

[57] Franklyn Haiman, "A Re-Examination of the Ethics of Persuasion," Central States Speech Journal (March, 1952), pp. 4-9.

[58] George Campbell, The Philosophy of Rhetoric (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1963), pp. 96-98.

[59] Hugh Blair, Lectures on Rhetoric and Belles Lettres, Vol. II (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1965), p. 227.

[60] Campbell, op. cit., p. 97.

[61] Ibid., p. 99.

[62] Blair, op. cit., p. 228.

[63] Ibid., p. 229.

[64]William Kay, Moral Education (Hamden: Linnet Books, 1975).

[65]Robin Barrow, Moral Philosophy for Education (Hamden: Linnet Books, 1975).

[66]Max Lerner, Values in Education (Bloomington: Phi Delta Kappa Educational Foundation, 1976).

[67]Paul Hirst, Moral Education in a Secular Society (London: University of London Press, 1974).

[68]Bill E. Forisha and Barbara E. Forisha, Moral Development and Education (Lincoln: Professional Educators Publications, 1976).

[69]Jack Fraenkel, How to Teach About Values (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1977).

[70]David Purpel and Kevin Ryan, Moral Education (Berkeley: McCutchan Publishing Corporation, 1976).

[71]Sidney Simon and Howard Kirschenbaun, Readings in Values Clarification (Minneapolis: Wintston Press, 1973).

[72]Lawrence Kohlberg, "Stages of Moral Development as a Basis for Moral Education," Moral Education, C. M. Beck, B. S. Crittenden and E. V. Sullivan, eds. (New York: Newman Press, 1971), p. 42.

[73]Lawrence Kohlberg, "The Cognitive-Developmental Approach to Moral Education," In Readings in Moral Education, Peter Scharf, ed. (Minneapolis: Winston Press, 1978), pp. 36-51. In that same book see: Kohlberg, "The Moral Atmosphere of the School," pp. 148-163.

[74]Ibid., Forward, p. 11.

[75]Richard Whately, Elements of Rhetoric (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1963), pp. 4-10.

[76]Chauncey A. Goodrich, "Lectures on Rhetoric and Public Speaking," In Speech Monographs, John P. Hoshor, ed. Vol. XIV (1947), pp. 1-37.

[77]John Quincy Adams, Lectures on Rhetoric and Oratory, Vol. I (New York: Russell & Russell, 1962), pp. 156-157.

[78]Whately, op. cit., p. 4.

[79]Ibid.

[80]Goodrich, op. cit., p. 5.

[81]Ibid., p. 11.

[82]Ibid.

[83]Adams, op. cit., p. 157.

[84] *Ibid.*, p. 345.

[85] *Ibid.*, p. 157.

[86] *Ibid.*, p. 158.

[87] *Ibid.*, p. 157. Also, pp. 348-354.

CHAPTER II

RHETORIC AS VIEWED BY QUINTILIAN'S PREDECESSORS

Much has been written regarding the importance of rhetorical education. In this chapter the rhetorical concepts of Isocrates, Plato, Aristotle, and Cicero will be presented. The purposes of this chapter are: (1) to show how Quintilian's predecessors viewed the role of rhetoric in their educational theories and (2) to demonstrate the similar rhetorical concepts held by the group.

The ancient Greek society gave no little accord to oratorical expression. The epic poems of Homer (the Iliad and the Odyssey) provided a primitive model for the advancement of eloquence. Thus long before a system of speechcraft had been developed, speakers like Achilles and Nestor were able to secure certain responses from their hearers. It is only natural that a systematic art of speaking would be developed. Therefore the Sicilians, Corax and his student Tisias, attempted to write the first rhetorical textbooks aiding judicial oratory.[1] A second influence, greater than the first, was the encouragement of public speaking due to the Athenian form of government. In the Popular Assembly, "Every man was his own pleader; consequently, each case provided a natural stimulus to effective oratorical presentation."[2] Finally, the Greeks began to examine the nature of education, i.e., how should men and children be educated? At first, a practical approach to education was attempted, viz., one that stressed service to the city;

however, by 450 B.C. the young men of Athens desired political power, wealth, and personal advancement. They simply desired a quick and abbreviated program of studies. Thus the eristic Sophists provided a narrow training in rhetoric that was designed to make men successful in politics. The students were trained to employ words as weapons in the law courts while using devious tactical tricks to win fame and fortune. Rhetoric, so conceived, flourished throughout the Athenian empire.

Isocrates

The first important forerunner to Quintilian to advance a contrasting view of rhetoric, rather than that held by the Sophists, was Isocrates. This son of Theodorus (a flute maker) composed a number of speeches, yet he never appeared as a public speaker (or pleader). He claimed his speaking tools were extremely weak, i.e., a lack of voice and extreme nervousness.[3] Since he thought he was unfitted for the role of orator

> He endeavoured to direct the affairs of Athens and of Greece without ever holding an office, and to mould public opinion without ever addressing a public assembly, by issuing from his study political pamphlets, or essays in oratorical form, in which he set forth the proper conduct of the Greeks in the light of broad ideas.[4]

So, the career of Isocrates the writer and teacher began with the opening of his rhetorical school in Athens (c. 392 B.C.). His educational plan laid great emphasis on the study of the literary classics; but his major purpose was to train orators through the teaching of rhetoric.

Isocrates, unlike the Sophists of his day, viewed the teaching of rhetoric not merely as a technique of persuasion, but as encompassing the development of moral character. This belief he attributed to one of his teachers, Socrates.[5] To this end Isocrates attempted to shun

the rhetorical teachings of the eristic Sophists while he introduced the idea that statesmanship can be linked to oratorical ability. First, he condemned the teachers of rhetoric who placed great emphasis upon mere techniques, i.e., relying on striking words and phrases as did Gorgias of Leontini. Isocrates demanded logical clearness and the proper definition of terms. Next, Isocrates addressed a more pressing problem--that is speculative philosophy. In the Antiodosis he says, ". . . I hold that men who want to do some good in the world must banish utterly from their interests all vain speculations and all activities which have no bearing on our lives."[6] Thus, he denied the pursuit of speculative philosophy in his school so that he could direct his instruction to the training of those students who desire the good and not the evil things of life.[7] Such instruction, according to Isocrates, would improve both the individual and the state. The aim of his rhetorical school then was to teach his students the ability to discuss subjects of permanent interest, viz., the production of a good man, acquiring moral virtue, piety, justice, and moderation.[8] That Isocrates desired to promote moral virtue in his students is most obvious from the following selections. He says in To Demonicus, ". . . I deem it fitting that those who strive for distinction and are ambitious for education should emulate the good and not the bad. . ."[9] Further, ". . . I am going to counsel you on the objects to which young men should aspire and with what sort of men they should associate and how they should regulate their own lives."[10] Finally, "With these examples before you, you should aspire to nobility of character, and not only abide by what I have said, but acquaint yourself with the best things in the poets as well, and learn from the other wise men also any useful lessons

they have taught."[11] In short, Isocrates directs the young men of his school to strive for distinction, abstain from bad actions, develop the soul, show devotion to the gods, treat parents with honor and respect, and resolve to be men of taste.[12] It seems obvious that in the rhetorical school of Isocrates the acquisition of moral virtue was more important than the ability or power to persuade. Perhaps the reason for the emphasis upon moral virtue is given by Isocrates in On The Peace: "I marvel that you cannot see at once that no class is so inimical to the people as our depraved orators and demogogues."[13] Thus the art of rhetoric for Isocrates offered not only a method of higher education but a way of life.[14]

A third important aspect of the teachings of Isocrates reveals his concern for the gleaning of true knowledge. He had condemned those who taught that the art of oratory could be acquired by anyone by rote regardless of his natural ability or practical experience. True knowledge, he insisted, would require strict discipline; otherwise the end result is that

> . . . they are themselves so stupid and conceive others to be so dull that, although the speeches which they compose are worse than those which some laymen improvise, nevertheless they promise to make their students such clever orators that they will not overlook any of the possibilities which a subject affords.[15]

Therefore to produce an orator of native ability and practical experience is essential. Formal training is good but ". . . it cannot fully fashion men who are without natural aptitude into good debaters or writers . . ."[16] Further, he says that much study is needed, coupled with "a vigorous and imaginative mind."[17] However, one cannot reach this high goal (true knowledge) apart from philosophy. "It follows,

then, that the power to speak well and think right will reward the man who approaches the art of discourse with love of wisdom and love of honour."[18]

From what has been said a few conclusions can be drawn. First, Isocrates stresses the importance of acquiring moral virtue; yet in the Antiodosis he states, ". . . let no one suppose that I claim that just living can be taught; for, in a word, I hold that there does not exist an art of the kind which can implant sobriety and justice in depraved natures."[19] Isocrates probably means that such "just living" cannot be taught merely by words; he does not say. The implication is that the development of good character belongs to the man who acts accordingly and that the development of such excellence involves native ability and the practice of right action.

Next, Isocrates was attempting to make men--not training men to make things; therefore, he used the study of the classical authors as a foundation for the higher study of rhetoric and philosophy. Thus, he linked the ideal of the cultivated mind with the training of the orator.

A final significant conclusion suggests that while Isocrates did in fact stress the acquisition of a good moral character and that properly trained orators would enhance any state, he never, in any of his writings, stated that the former is a necessary condition for producing the latter. As a matter of fact, Isocrates believed that having a good moral character was superior to oratorical excellence. He states in the Antiodosis that he took greater pleasure in his students for their good character than in their ability to speak well.[20]

As a pioneer in refining the techniques for oratorical expression while building strong character in his students, Isocrates emerged as

a professional writer and Athenian educator. Even Socrates prophesied his tremendous influence by saying,

> It seems to me that his natural powers give him a superiority over anything that Lysias has achieved in literature, and also that in point of character he is of a nobler composition; hence it would not surprise me if with advancing years he made all his literary predecessors look like very small-fry--that is, supposing him to persist in the actual type of writing in which he engages at present--still more so, if he should become dissatisfied with such work, and a sublimer impulse lead him to do greater things. For that mind of his, Phaedrus, contains an innate tincture of philosophy.[21]

The primary objective of the school of Isocrates then was the production of responsible public men and effective orators, i.e., civic efficiency through rhetoric.

Plato

Another precursor to Quintilian, though, viewed the role and purpose of rhetoric in a much harsher light. The teachers of rhetoric, according to Plato, were charlatans whose discourse was continually fallacious.[22] Thus he condemned the so-called art of rhetoric that was offered to the young men of Athens. His reasons for the condemnation are numerous, including: their practice of charging fees,[23] their reliance on mere opinion rather than philosophic knowledge,[24] and their speaking and writing in a bad and shameful way by extolling evil as being good.[25]

The Platonic conception of rhetoric is set forth in two of Plato's major dialogues: the Gorgias and the Phaedrus. What Plato attempted to prove was that rhetoricians who taught like Gorgias[26] were indeed false teachers, whereas good speaking derives from a speaker who knows the truth of the subject on which he is about to speak. That is, the orator must know the truth in order to be persuasive. Therefore it is crucial to understand the distinction between true and false rhetoric.

Thus, as the dialogues (Gorgias and Phaedrus) unfold, Plato insists that the true rhetorician must comply with the following standards: (1) he must define all terms adequately;[27] (2) he must possess the knowledge of which subjects are debatable and which are not;[28] (3) he must move from a concern with the material world to a concern for the world of ideas;[29] (4) he must understand that any discourse ought to be structured like a living creature, i.e., he must understand how to arrange the parts of the speech;[30] (5) he must know the nature of the soul;[31] (6) he must have a thorough knowledge of style and delivery;[32] and (7) he must know the truth regarding his subject if he is to expound or persuade.[33] From Plato's point of view such a rhetorician would be a philosopher and would know and speak what was pleasing to the gods.[34] So viewed, rhetoric would not be an instrument merely for persuasion, but rather for the cultivation of intellect and righteousness.

A problem still exists. Both Plato and the Sohpists debated the possibility of teaching virtue. Judging from the Gorgias, the Sophist position was that virtue can be produced in the student by direct teaching--at least that was their claim.[35] Protagoras also strongly insisted ". . . that virtue can be instilled by education. . ."[36] The teaching technique is to punish the wrongdoer so that in the future he will act in a more virtuous way.[37] In that same dialogue, Protagoras Socrates simply says, ". . . I do not believe that virtue can be taught."[38] The implication is that Socrates had not discovered or did not know what virtue was and therefore could not teach it. However, at the end of the Meno he suggests that ". . . whoever has virtue gets it by divine dispensation."[39] Isocrates also believed that virtue was a natural endowment and as such was not subject to any pedagogical technique.[40]

Thus, for Plato, knowledge must come first and then rhetoric with all of its rules and skills that must be mastered; and no one should be led to believe there is an easy or clear path to oratorical excellence.[41] So, where Isocrates stressed the importance of acquiring moral virtue, Plato emphasized the value of attaining knowledge. If anything, Plato attempted to prove that knowledge was a necessary condition for becoming an orator.

Aristotle

According to Thonssen, ". . . Aristotle is perhaps the most highly esteemed figure in ancient rhetoric."[42] The reason for this honor does not seem to lie in the number of orators produced by the school of Aristotle since only one orator of note was produced--Demetrius Phalereus.[43] Rather, the honor stems from Aristotle's scientific presentation of the topic of rhetoric. Therefore Aristotle's Rhetoric is somewhat detached from both morality and pedagogy. It is simply a scientific analysis of the means of persuasion. That is what makes his idea of the nature of rhetoric different from the traditional view. To Aristotle, rhetoric is not limited in subject matter, it is useful, and its function is the power to observe any and all of the various means of persuasion.[44] It follows that Aristotle would define "rhetoric" as ". . . the faculty of observing in any given case the available means of persuasion."[45] Rhetoric so conceived is neither a manual of rules nor a collection of injunctions. And that is why Aristotle says of rhetoric that ". . . in its technical character, it is not concerned with any special or definite class of subjects."[46]

The first task for Aristotle in his Rhetoric, then, was to define his notion of rhetoric. Next, he pointed out the various modes of persuasion and says there are three kinds. "The first kind depends on the personal character of the speaker; the second on putting the audience into a certain frame of mind; the third on the proof, or apparent proof, provided by the words of the speech itself."[47] Thus the orator may persuade with his own personal character or organize his speech so as to stir the emotions of his audience, or he may convince the audience by using logical, persuasive arguments. Aristotle's emphasis is upon invention and disposition, i.e., knowing what to say and how to arrange the speech so as to secure the greatest persuasion. The use of memory is not a vital part of the Aristotelian rhetoric. However, elocution (the matter of style) and delivery are to Aristotle just as important as invention and disposition.[48]

The role of rhetoric as conceived by Aristotle must achieve some purpose since ". . . every action and pursuit is thought to aim at some good."[49] Rhetoric must fulfill the purpose for which it was designed, viz., the power to persuade. That is why Aristotle spends much of his time discussing how that power is put to use. For example,

> The most important and effective qualification for success is persuading audiences and speaking well on public affairs is to understand all the forms of government and to discriminate their respective customs, institutions and interests.[50]

The persuader must know the various kinds of government so that he can mold the citizen to fit whatever form of government he lives under.[51] Next, the orator may persuade or convince his audience as (1) a political speaker urging acceptance or rejection regarding a particular action; (2) a speaker in a forensic way, either attacking or defending

somebody; or (3) heaping praise or censure on one as a ceremonial speaker.[52] Another way rhetoric fulfills its purpose is the strong persuasion that results from the orator's own character. Of the many remarks made by Aristotle regarding this point the following seems most appropriate.

> Persuasion is achieved by the speaker's personal character when the speech is so spoken as to make him credible. We believe good men more fully and more readily than others: this is true generally whatever the question is, and absolutely where exact certainty is impossible and opinions are divided.[53]

Later on in the Rhetoric he says, "There are three things which inspire confidence in the orator's own character--the three, namely, that induce us to believe a thing apart from any proof of it: good sense, good moral character, and goodwill."[54] The point that Aristotle is making is that the ". . . use of persuasive speech is to lead to decisions."[55] Aristotle is simply showing his preference for speaking in the law courts or during political debates, since in both cases issues arise and decisions must be rendered. Thus, to help the orator discover material for use during such discussions Aristotle introduced the "topics", i.e., a storehouse that one could resort to in order to discover how and what to say on any given subject. Specifically, ". . . a topic was a general head or line of argument which suggested material from which proofs could be made."[56] One of the common topics, he says, used by all orators is the possible and impossible, e.g., if it is possible for dogs to be fast runners then the contrary would demonstrate the impossibility. Next, orators could use the topic of the question of past fact," i.e., ". . . if the less likely of two things has occurred, the more likely must have occurred also."[57] And

". . . if a man has forgotten a thing, he has also once learnt it."[58] Finally, the orator can glean material for arguments by examining the greatness or smallness of things, i.e., the topic of size.

The rhetoric of Aristotle, as shown, is encased in the use of argumentation and the demonstration of moral character is to enhance the persuasiveness of the orator. And, like Plato, Aristotle emphasized the need for the orator to gain knowledge so that he could discuss his subjects intelligently. He warns,

> The first thing we have to remember is this. Whether our argument concerns public affairs or some other subject, we must know some, if not all, of the facts about the subject on which we are to speak and argue. Otherwise we can have no materials out of which to construct arguments.[59]

The orator then must know the facts of his subject, develop the available means for persuasion, decide the correct style[60] to use and arrange the various parts of the speech in the most logical fashion.

Thus far Aristotle has continually treated the role of moral virtue as part of the available means to secure persuasion; intellectual virtue, however, he treats as a necessary condition for speaking effectively. For without intellectual virtue (knowledge gained by and through teaching) the orator remains ignorant of his subject.[61] However, Aristotle's treatment of the acquisition of moral virtue is drastically different from that of Isocrates or Plato. First, Aristotle believes that ". . . moral virtue comes about as a result of habit . . ."[62] That is, moral virtue is not given to man by the gods, nor is it acquired through man's nature. Rather, men become morally excellent by participating in right action. Just as ". . . men become builders by building and lyre players by playing the lyre; so too we become just by doing just acts, temperate by doing temperate acts, brave by doing

brave acts."[63] If one is to have strong moral character he must not only engage in virtuous acts, according to Aristotle, he must also ". . . be in a certain condition when he does them; in the first place he must have knowledge, second he must choose the acts, and choose them for their own sakes, and thirdly his action must proceed from a firm and unchangeable character."[64] Moral virtue, then, is a state of character arrived at by making correct choices, i.e., each choice is a mean between two extremes.[65] Aristotle was not referring to an absolute mean but a relative one;[66] therefore, ". . . it is a mean between two vices, the one involving excess, the other deficiency . . ."[67] Is moral virtue a necessary condition for becoming an orator? Aristotle's answer suggests that only intellectual virtue is necessary for becoming an orator and moral virtue is but a part of the available means the orator uses to secure persuasion. This Aristotelian notion of rhetoric figures preeminently in Greek society and laid the foundation for the more pragmatic development of rhetoric by the Romans.

Cicero

From the founding of the Roman Republic (c. 509 B.C.) education, controlled and dominated by the family, emphasized the Roman virtues of piety, courage, and prudence.[68] Most, if not all of these early schools, were designed for wealthy families. Of note is the fact that teachers of these private schools stressed grammatical structure far more than oratorical excellence. In time the study of both Greek and Latin grammar gave way to the teaching of persuasive discourse, i.e., the goal of the schools was the production of eloquent citizens.

By the first century B.C. the most gifted of the eloquent citizens was Cicero (106 - 43 B.C.). Grant, the historian, describes this powerful orator by stating:

> Cicero owed his rise almost exclusively to one single quality. He was one of the most persuasive orators who has ever lived, in an age in which the very core of politics was oratory. The combination of his inborn talents with an elaborate education and training equipped him to speak and write that incomparably eloquent, rotund Latin that persuaded and overwhelmed his audience in Senate, Assembly, and lawcourts alike, and laid the foundations of the subsequent prose of all Europe. His speeches, of which 58 out of over a hundred survive, reflect all the stresses and strains of the crumbling republic, in which for three decades he lived and worked at the center of events.[69]

So, we normally think of Cicero as a lawyer, politician, philosopher and the greatest of the Roman orators. Yet, guided by the teachings of Isocrates, whom Cicero regarded as the "father of eloquence," he made a significant contribution to rhetorical theory by writing De Oratore.[70] In this famous work a discussion takes place between Crassus (mouthpiece of Cicero) and the practical Antonius. Crassus attempts to describe the orator of their quest by saying, ". . . since it is 'the orator' we are seeking, we have to picture to ourselves in our discourse an orator from whom every blemish has been taken away, and one who moreover is rich in every merit."[71] However, in the Orator Cicero insists that he was portraying ". . . such a one as perhaps has never existed."[72] Yet, one of the goals of Ciceronian rhetoric was the picturing of the ideal orator. "This ideal," however, "cannot be perceived by the eye or ear, nor by any of the senses, but we can nevertheless grasp it by the mind and the imagination."[73] Cicero tried to envision the "ideal orator," and his writings reflect the purpose, design, and character of such a one.

Of prodigious importance to Cicero is the fact that ". . . no man can be an orator complete in all points of merit, who has not attained a knowledge of all important subjects and arts."[74] Otherwise, he says, ". . . oratory is but an empty and ridiculous swirl of verbiage . . ."[75] Cicero, like Aristotle, emphasized the necessity of persuasion because the duty of the orator is to arouse his hearers, win their favor, and cause them to make decisions.[76] Thus a thorough knowledge of his subject matter makes the orator more forceful in his persuasion. And, the orator cannot achieve such persuasion without an effective delivery.[77] Obviously, Cicero did not believe that just anyone could combine knowledge of various topics with the techniques of eloquence. In fact the whole life of the orator was open for investigation. How could one persuade with a weak and uninformed mind? What lasting glory can be attained by vain show and pretense? And finally, "Moral greatness and contempt for worldly things are, as I am constantly stressing, just as essential for the statesman as for the philosopher--perhaps even more essential."[78] As strong as Cicero's position is regarding the attainment of moral virtue, he stops short in declaring it a necessary condition for becoming an orator. Cicero merely urges the cultivation of moral excellence since it can be acquired by engaging in the proper studies,[79] i.e., like Aristotle, Cicero advocates that one acquires moral excellence by engaging in virtuous acts.[80] In conclusions, it is more important to Cicero for the orator to persuade his audience through his style of speaking (eloquence) coupled with knowledge of his topic than to spend much time in acquiring moral excellence. In this respect Cicero's teaching of rhetoric emphasized the functional aspects of the art, viz., the acquisition of exact knowledge, the ability of arouse

emotions and to possess true eloquence. In fact, it is the latter that Cicero deems most important; for the orator must convince his hearers so that they approve his proposals. According to Cicero, it is the orator's words that win conviction.[81] Thus to the end, the practical nature of rhetoric is stressed.

This review of Quintilian's predecessors (Isocrates, Plato, Aristotle, and Cicero) discloses the following: (1) Isocrates viewed the teaching of rhetoric as a means to produce responsible public men who could argue well in the lawcourts; (2) Plato, while denouncing the rhetorical teachers of his day, insisted that the path to oratorical excellence depended more on the acquisition of knowledge than on flowery speech; (3) for Aristotle, rhetoric involves the discovery of all the available means for securing persuasion, and the greatest means to that end is the display of intellectual virtue; and (4) Cicero saw rhetoric as the practical application of persuasion, i.e., if one is to win cases and direct the state, he must use persuasive speech.

These writers, for the most part, saw rhetoric as a tool to secure persuasion. None of them advanced the idea that the attainment of moral virtue was a necessary condition for becoming an orator. On the contrary, they demanded of the orator exact knowledge of all topics discussed and a display of eloquence. Then and only then could the orator be persuasive.

ENDNOTES

[1]Aristotle, Rhetorica, translated by W. Rhys Roberts, contained in The Basic Works of Aristotle, edited by Richard McKeon (New York: Random House, 1941), p. 1431.

[2]Lester Thonssen, A. Craig Baird, and Waldo W. Braden, Speech Criticism (New York: The Ronald Press Company, 1970), p. 37.

[3]Isocrates, To Philip, translated by George Norlin, Vol. I (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1928), p. 81.

[4]Ibid., Introduction, p. 18.

[5]Isocrates, Panathenaicus, translated by George Norlin, Vol. I (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1928), p. 18. The contempt of Isocrates for the Sophists can be seen in the following selections: Isocrates, On the Peace, translated by George Norlin, Vol. II (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1929), p. 18; Isocrates, Against the Sophists, p. 3; Isocrates, Antiodosis, p. 217.

[6]Isocrates, Antiodosis, op. cit., p. 269.

[7]Isocrates, Against the Sophists, translated by George Norlin, Vol. II (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1929), p. 171. See also: R. S. Johnson, "Isocratic Methods of Teaching," American Journal of Philosophy, LXXX (January, 1959), pp. 25-26.

[8]Isocrates, On the Peace, translated by George Norlin, Vol. II (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1929), p. 63.

[9]Isocrates, To Demonicus, translated by George Norlin, Vol. I (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1928), p. 2.

[10]Ibid., p. 5.

[11]Ibid., p. 40.

[12]Ibid., pp. 2, 5, 7, 12, 13, 27.

[13]Isocrates, On the Peace, op. cit., p. 129. See also: R. Johnson, "Isocrates' Method of Teaching," American Journal of Philology LXXX, I (January, 1959), pp. 297-300.

[14]Everett Lee Hunt, "Plato and Aristotle on Rhetoric and Rhetoricians," Studies in Rhetoric and Public Speaking (New York: 1925), p. 3. For a fuller discussion of the method of Isocrates, see:

Edward J. Power, "Class Size and Pedagogy in Isocrates' School," History of Education Quarterly IV (Winter, 1966), pp. 22-33. And: Edward J. Power, Evolution of Educational Doctrine: Major Educational Theorists of the Western World (New York: Appleton, Century, Crofts, 1969), p. 10ff.

[15]Isocrates, Against the Sophists, op. cit., p. 9.

[16]Ibid., p. 15.

[17]Ibid., p. 18.

[18]Isocrates, Antiodosis, op. cit., p. 277.

[19]Ibid., p. 274f.

[20]Ibid., p. 87.

[21]Plato, Phaedrus, translated by R. Hackforth, contained in The Collected Dialogues of Plato, edited by Edith Hamilton and Huntington Cairns (Princeton: Princeton University Pres, 1961), p. 524.

[22]Plato, Gorgias, Ibid., p. 264.

[23]Ibid., p. 300.

[24]Ibid., p. 238.

[25]Plato, Phaedrus, op. cit., p. 506.

[26]Other such Sophists would include Protagoras, Hippias, and Prodicus.

[27]Plato, Phaedrus, op. cit., pp. 508-509.

[28]Ibid., p. 511.

[29]Ibid.

[30]Ibid., p. 510.

[31]Ibid., p. 517.

[32]Ibid., pp. 516-517.

[33]Ibid., pp. 522-523.

[34]Ibid., p. 519.

[35]Plato, Gorgias, op. cit., pp. 242ff. See also: Plato, Protagoras, Ibid., p. 318.

[36]Plato, Protagoras, op. cit., p. 321.

[37]Ibid.

[38] Ibid., p. 318.

[39] Plato, Meno, op. cit., p. 384.

[40] Isocrates, Against the Sophists, op. cit., pp. 3-10; Also: To Nicocles, p. 12; and Antiodosis, pp. 190-192.

[41] Plato, Phaedrus, op. cit., p. 519.

[42] Thonssen, op. cit., p. 62.

[43] Ibid., p. 63.

[44] Aristotle, op. cit., p. 1328.

[45] Ibid., p. 1329.

[46] Ibid.

[47] Ibid.

[48] Ibid., pp. 1435-1436.

[49] Aristotle, Ethica Nicomachea, translated by W. D. Ross, op. cit., p. 935.

[50] Aristotle, Rhetorica, Ibid., p. 1352.

[51] Aristotle, Politica, translated by Benjamin Jowett, Ibid., p. 1305.

[52] Aristotle, Rhetorica, op. cit., p. 1335.

[53] Ibid., p. 1329.

[54] Ibid., p. 1380.

[55] Ibid., p. 1408.

[56] Edward P. J. Corbett, Classical Rhetoric for the Modern Student (New York: Oxford University Press, 1971), p. 35.

[57] Aristotle, Rhetorica, op. cit., p. 1410.

[58] Ibid., p. 1411.

[59] Ibid., p. 1417.

[60] Ibid., p. 1435. Aristotle uses the word "style" to refer to the volume of sound, modulation of pitch and rhythm used by the orator.

[61] Ibid., p. 1417.

[62] Aristotle, Ethica Nicomachea, op. cit., p. 952.

[63] Ibid.

[64] Ibid., p. 956.

[65] Ibid., p. 959.

[66] Ibid., p. 958ff.

[67] Ibid., p. 963.

[68] Ralph L. Pounds, The Development of Education in Western Culture (New York: Appleton, Century, Crofts, 1968), p. 64.

[69] Michael Grant, History of Rome (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1978), p. 203.

[70] Marcus Tullius Cicero, De Oratore, translated by E. W. Sutton (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1967).

[71] Ibid., p. 118.

[72] Marcus Tullius Cicero, Orator, translated by H. M. Hubbell (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1942), p. 7.

[73] Ibid., p. 8.

[74] Cicero, De Oratore, op. cit., p. 20.

[75] Ibid., p. 17.

[76] Ibid., p. 186.

[77] Ibid.

[78] Ibid., p. 72.

[79] Ibid., p. 80.

[80] Ibid., p. 78.

[81] Marcus Tullius Cicero, Brutus, translated by G. L. Hendrickson (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1942), p. 187.

CHAPTER III

QUINTILIAN'S FORMATION OF THE IDEAL ORATOR

Quintilian leaves little doubt as to the purpose of his writing the Institutes of Oratory. His goal was ". . . the education of the perfect orator."[1] However the work was originally intended as a pedagogical guide for his own son and Geta, the son of Marcellus Victorius.[2] Even Domitianus Augustus had requested the expertise of Quintilian in the training of his sister's grandsons.

This chapter will attempt to delineate Quintilian's formation of the ideal orator. The topics discussed will include: (1) his views of the nature of rhetoric; (2) the characteristic of the ideal teacher; and (3) how the teaching of moral virtue is to be accomplished.

The Nature of Rhetoric

The predecessors of Quintilian (Isocrates, Plato, Aristotle and Cicero) had defined "rhetoric" as the power, practice or science of persuading. Quintilian viewed this definition as totally inadequate because such things as money, influence, authority and rank, great deeds, appearance, beauty and pity have power to persuade.[3] Thus Quintilian defined "rhetoric" as bene dicendi scientia, i.e., the art or science of expressing oneself well.[4] For one to speak well means more than just what is grammatically correct; he must understand the nature of rhetoric.

Quintilian examines first the five parts of rhetoric, viz., invention, arrangement, expression, memory and delivery. Invention is the gathering of material on which the orator will speak. He should pay close attention to factual detail realizing that his audience will respond more favorably to a presentation that includes specific informational content. Further, after gleaning exact knowledge, he must discover arguments that will convince his audience that his conclusions are correct. A second part of rhetoric is arrangement. Here the orator decides which information or arguments should be presented. Information that is not precise is discarded along with those arguments that are fallacious. What remains--distinct facts and persuasive arguments--is organized into an outline of the discourse. Such a procedure insures that what the orator says will be presented in the most enlightening and logical fashion. "For not only what we say and how we say it is of importance, but also the circumstances under which we say it."[5] Thus the need to arrange ideas and arguments in the most clear and distinct fashion is of prodigious importance. Next, expression or elocution is a question of style, namely the wording of what is to be asserted. Here Quintilian, confessing that style presents the greatest difficulty for the speaker to master, says

> . . . it is this which is the chief object of our study, the goal of all our exercises and all our efforts at imitation, and it is to this that we devote the energies of a lifetime; it is this that makes one orator surpass his rivals, this that makes one style of speaking preferable to another.[6]

To begin, Quintilian regards clearness as the first essential of a good style.[7] What he means is that for the orator to speak clearly he must use intelligible words and phrases that his audience will understand and avoid all meaningless phrases that are intelligible

only to himself. He therefore must shun language that is obscure, such as the use of words which are familiar in certain districts though not in others and sentences that are so long that it is impossible to follow their drift. Clearness of thought can also be defeated by introducing useless words, as for example the use of a multitude of words to explain a simple idea. Rather what is needed is a direct and simple statement of the facts. However, Quintilian warns that orators must not be ". . . consumed with a passion for brevity and omit words which are actually necessary to the sense. . ."[8] The orator must use language that is not less nor more than is required so that ". . . the whole matter will be plain and obvious even to a not too attentive audience."[9]

The fourth part of rhetoric, according to Quintilian, is memory. He treats memory as the treasure-house of eloquence because he believes that

> . . . our whole education depends upon memory, and we shall receive instruction all in vain if all we hear slips from us, while it is the power of memory alone that brings before us all the store of precedents, laws, rulings, sayings, and facts which the orator must possess in abundance and which he must always hold ready for immediate use.[10]

So while invention (the gathering of material), arrangement (putting order into what has been discovered) and expression (the wording of what is to be asserted) are importnat, it is the use of memory that enables the orator to sustain the forward flow of his speech. Without a good memory the orator's language is halting and jerky causing awkward hesitations or even a tongue-tied silence.[11] To avoid these interruptions in speaking Quintilian offers the following recommendations. First, though memory to a great extent may be one of nature's gifts, he believes that memory may be improved by cultivation. That is, if there is one supreme method of memory it is practice and industry.[12]

The orator must daily learn by heart as much as he can because ". . . there is nothing that is more increased by practice or impaired by neglect than memory."[13] Next, memory can be enhanced by using certain mnemonic methods. One device would be to divide the speech into sections and then memorize each section separately. Another method would be the use of localities (public buildings, a long journey, parts of a city or pictures) so that when the orator recalls the place or event he will remember perhaps better the people who were there and what was said. Still another way would be the employment of symbols to jog the memory. As examples Quintilian uses symbols drawn from nagivation like an anchor or from warfare by referring to a particular weapon. Thus the association of one idea triggers another just like the simple device of changing a ring from one finger to another or of tying a string around a finger.[14] In short, any method that aids the power of recollection becomes a useful tool to enhance the orator's memory.

The final part of rhetoric is what Quintilian calls delivery or action. Thus the visual presentation of a speech should match the vocal endeavor of the orator. So delivery is concerned with both voice and gesture. To begin, the orator though not bound by any special garb should dress in a distinguished and manly fashion, i.e., he should desire to wear the appropriate outer garment, suitable shoes, and use an acceptable hair arrangement.[15] Now his initial impact on the audience will be one of poise, confidence and effectiveness. Visually the orator can now project the kind of enthusiasm that will arouse the audience before he speaks. Quintilian then addresses the major parts of delivery necessary to make the speech impressive, viz.,

believability--that power of delivery that drives the message home; facial involvement--that part of delivery that complements any physical gesture; and dramatization--the orator's artistic ability to illustrate to his audience his intended meaning. Thus believability, facial involvement and dramatization will help the audience relate to the orator's plan and make it easier for them to agree with his conclusions. However, the use of the orator's voice is just as important as his attire and physical gestures. The nature and quality of the voice must be agreeable and not harsh.[16] That is, Quintilian's ideal orator should develop a voice that ". . . is easy, strong, rich, flexible, firm, sweet, enduring, resonant, pure, carrying far and penetrating the ear."[17] And finally, the orator must be flexible enough to adapt his delivery for presentations to the emperor, the senate, the people, to magistrates and for public and private trials.

Thus by utilizing the five parts of rhetoric, the orator can now adapt his delivery to the three basic kinds of speeches, viz., panegyric (where praise is given to a local hero or to the gods); deliberative (the attempt to advise and recommend action to be taken); and forensic (the bringing and rebutting of charges). The forensic speech is treated by Quintilian in great length.[18] What is essential for the orator to remember is the basic format. To prepare the audience the orator must include an exordium, i.e., an introduction to the subject. Next, a statement of the facts of the case should be presented, followed by an attempt by the orator to prove his plea. The fourth section of a forensic speech involves the refutation. The orator here must prove an argument to be invalid, or statements made by his opponent to be false, by using evidence that refutes his opponent's charge. What

follows next is the peroration or a very brief recapitulation of the major points of the case.

The next concern of Quintilian regarding the nature of rhetoric was whether rhetoric is an art. For him rhetoric is an art, though he never claimed it to be a body of factual knowledge. There were those like Plato who viewed rhetoric simply as a knack derived from experience, i.e., rhetoric is a natural gift. Others, like Lysias, argued that oratory was practiced by uneducated men, barbarians and even slaves before Tisias and Corax advanced the teaching of rhetoric as art.[19] Quintilian's rebuttal was simple yet quite effective. First, he says, "it is sufficient to call attention to the fact that everything which art has brought to perfection originated in nature."[20] That is, ". . . wounds were bound up long before medicine developed into an art. . ."[21] Further, ". . . primitive man built himself a hut without the assistance of art."[22] In like fashion races indulged in singing and dancing long before music became as art. Therefore he concludes:

> . . . if any kind of speech is to be called eloquence, I will admit that it existed before it was an art. If on the other hand not every man that speaks is an orator and primitive man did not speak like an orator, my opponents must needs acknowledge that oratory is the product of art and did not exist before it.[23]

A final question resolved by Quintilian pertains to the material of rhetoric. Earlier writers, like Aristotle, had thought that the topic of politics was the approrpiate subject matter for oratory.[24] Plato insisted that oratory should include private and domestic affairs as well.[25] However Quintilian asserts ". . . the material of rhetoric is composed of everything that comes before the orator for treatment. . ."[26] What Quintilian means is that an orator should never be ignorant (or considered ignorant) of the subject on which he has to speak. That is,

an orator can only speak on those subjects he has studied. Does it follow then that a builder would speak better on the subject of building and a musician on music? While it is true that the builder or musician would know more about his art than the unlearned, it is not necessarily true that he could speak of his art in the most forceful way. As Quintilian points out, "Even an illiterate peasant who is a party to a suit will speak better on behalf of his case than an orator who does not know what the subject in dispute may be."[27] Quiltilian is driving home two points. First, an untrained person will never perform a task like the artist himself. For example, ". . . when an untrained person binds up a wound, he will not be a physician, but he will be acting as one."[28] Likewise the untrained builder or musician may attempt to speak like an orator but without the proper rhetorical training he would not have the ability to speak as a true orator. A second point (and perhaps the most important) is that the orator before he attempts to speak will always investigate the topic. So, as noted above, the material of rhetoric, according to Quintilian, is composed of everything that comes before the orator for treatment, and the only limitation is that the orator only speaks on the subjects he has studied.[29]

Characteristics of the Ideal Teacher

For Quintilian, in the development of an orator, "The nature of the individual boy and the care devoted to his education make all the difference."[30] That difference between success and failure begins when the child is born. Therefore to ensure success Quintilian urges that the parents should be as highly educated as possible.[31] Even in infancy it is desirable that the child be subjected to language spoken

correctly. Further, parents should conceive the highest hopes for their child, viz., that the child grow strong in body by regular physical exercise, that he come to enjoy speaking and writing correctly and that he sense the interest of his parents in all his educational activities.[32]

Another way parents may guarantee success for their child, according to Quintilian, is to hire a nurse who has the highest credentials. Thus the child's nurse should possess good moral character. Since it is the worst impressionsthat are most durable, and since it will be the nurse who the child hears first, it is imperative that the nurse use language correctly.[33] Quintilian's point is well taken for the child must not ". . . become accustomed even in infancy to a style of speech which he will subsequently have to unlearn."[34]

Still another way to ensure success for the young child is for the parents to pay attention to their child's choice of companions. Quintilian requires that all companions have the same high moral character and possess the ability to speak language accurately. In like fashion, the same qualities must prevail in the companion teacher, i.e., the "paedagogus" or slave-tutor. Since the role of the slave-tutor involves the general supervision of the child, including escorting him to school and seeing that he stays out of trouble, it would be best for such a teacher to have a thorough education.[35] Quintilian realized that he was describing the ideal nurse, the ideal companions, as well as the ideal "paedagogus." However, if such quality people are unavailable he insists that

> . . . there should be one person at any rate attached to the boy who has some knowledge of speaking and who will if any incorrect expression should be used by nurse or tutor in the presence of the child under their charge, at once correct the error and prevent its becoming a habit. But it must be

> clearly understood that this is only a remedy and that the ideal course is that indicated above.[36]

Once sufficient progress has been made by the young boy in his studies, the parents are now ready to place him under the direction of a rhetorician. Likewise the parents should inquire whether the teacher is of good character. It is interesting to note that Quintilian seems to be more concerned about the character of the teacher than the teacher's expertise in his subject matter or his pedagogical methods. It must be remembered that Quintilian's quest is the production of the ideal orator who is a good man skilled in the art of effective speech. Thus it is only natural that Quintilian would recommend that the young orator's teacher possess superior moral character, for,

> . . . as a rule boys are on the verge of manhood when transferred to the teacher of rhetoric and continue with him even when they are young men: consequently we must spare no effort to secure that the purity of the teacher's character should preserve those of tenderer years from corruption, while its authority should keep the bolder spirits from breaking out into license.[37]

Thus, the teacher of rhetoric, along with having high moral standards, should be a sensible man with a good knowledge of teaching. That is, he should be willing to communicate on a level that is understandable to his students. The teacher should not strive to exalt himself but present lessons that are clear and concise. Next, the teacher himself should be distinguished for his own eloquence. Quintilian's aim is to show that the teacher of rhetoric must be able and ready to demonstrate the correct techniques of effective speech. For if a teacher does not command excellent oratorical ability or will not condescend to teach the more elementary details of rhetoric, Quintilian regards such a one as unworthy of the name teacher.[38] Further, the good teacher will not attempt to teach too many students at one time. The intent here is to

demonstrate that each teacher must know and come to appreciate the individual differences of his students. Large classes make this task difficult, for though he might be friendly to his students he will be unable to establish the rapport necessary to attend to the needs of each student. Just as

> Vessels with narrow mouths will not receive liquids if too much be poured into them at one time, but are easily filled if the liquid is admitted in a gentle stream or, it may be, drop by drop; similarly you must consider how much a child's mind is capable of receiving.[39]

When a teacher adheres to the advice of Quintilian, his teaching will not be a duty but a labor of love. That is why the skillful teacher will make every attempt to ascertain the ability and character of his students. He should especially note the power of memory as well as the power of imitation in his students, for with these traits a child is teachable.[40] Quintilian's intent is to prove that every future orator must possess a keen memory and be able to imitate those actions of the teacher that will enhance his speaking ability, viz., mood projection, believability, facial involvement and dramatization.

Another trait of the good teacher is his ability to govern the behavior of his students by the strictness of his discipline.[41] Quintilian does not mean the regular custom of flogging prevalent in the schools of his day. In fact Quintilian argues that flogging is the worst method for maintaining discipline in the classroom. He suggests that flogging is a disgraceful form of punishment designed to control slaves. Such punishment may compel a child to work harder but ". . . what are you to do with him when he is a young man no longer amenable to such threats and confronted with tasks of far greater difficulty?"[42] The ideal teacher should know that children are helpless

and easily victimized and for that reason adopt a parental attitude toward his students.[43] Such an attitude of love, kindness and patience will help transform the young scholar into an effective speaker. For if undue severity in correcting faults is relied on, the student may easily become discouraged. Quintilian's plea is that the ideal teacher will continually support and encourage the student by making study a pleasure.[44] That is why Quintilian discourages a teacher from thinking he must occupy the whole day with work. On the contrary, students need some relaxation (though not unlimited) such as a holiday or the playing of games, and when they return they are ready to be ". . . spurred on by praise, delighted by success and ready to weep over failure."[45] Finally, Quintilian's central piece of advice warrants a lengthy quotation. In summarizing the effective teacher he says:

> Let him therefore adopt a parental attitude to his pupils, and regard himself as the representative of those who have committed their children to his charge. Let him be free from vice himself and refuse to tolerate it in others. Let him be strict but not austere, genial but not too familiar: for austerity will make him unpopular, while familiarity breeds contempt. Let his discourse continually turn on what is good and honourable; the more he admonishes, the less he will have to punish. He must control his temper without shutting his eyes to faults requiring correction: his instruction must be free from affectation, his industry great, his demands on his class continuous, but not extravagant. In correcting faults he must avoid sarcasm and above all abuse: for teachers whose rebukes seem to imply positive dislike discourage industry. It will still be found that fuller nourishment is provided by the living voice, more especially when it proceeds from the teacher himself, who, if his pupils are rightly instructed, should be the object of their affection and respect.[46]

The Moral Training of the Orator

Throughout the Institutes of Oratory Quintilian is intent on showing how best to nourish the powers of eloquence by teaching oratory.

Yet eloquence alone will not suffice, for the perfect orator, according to Quintilian, is not only an excellent speaker but should also be a worthy human being. "The first essential," he says, "for such as one is that he should be a good man . . ."[47] What follows are Quintilian's recommendations for producing good moral character.

It is important to cultivate proper inclinations in the young by exposing them to parents who have high moral character. Parents, then must help the child to develop the ability to distinguish between right and wrong action. For example, the child must be taught that it is right to be unselfish since this is a virtue prized and rewarded by sensible people. Even at an early age the parents must appeal to the reasoning powers of the child. Likewise, reason should dictate to the child that honesty and self-control are virtues that belong to the man of high character, viz., his father or one of the local heroes. On the other hand, Quintilian warns, parents must not spoil their offspring by a soft upbringing, by using vulgar speech or by singing foul soungs at dinner parties.[48] If moral character is not emphasized and practiced by the parents and all those associated with the child (e.g., his nurse, his companions, his slave-tutor), it will be impossible to produce a worthy human being.

Next, as the child matures, Quintilian recommends that he must acquire a complete knowledge of all that is just and honorable. For ". . . virtue, despite the fact that it is in part derived from certain natural impulses, will require to be perfected by instruction."[49] Thus the student, with the help of his teacher, should select those authors to imitate whose themes are directed toward the topics of courage, justice, loyalty and self-control. Quintilian urges the student to

read the works of writers and thinkers such as: Pindar, Menander, Thucydides, Herodotus, Isocrates, Demosthenes, Plato, Aristotle, Cicero, Virgil and Lucretius, to name only a few.[50] The teacher should further organize each lesson so that the impressions made by such writers and thinkers assist the student in discerning correct behavior, i.e., each lesson should convey some sound moral lesson.[51] And, if the student is to write out the various aphorisms, moral essays and the delineations of character, he should commit them to memory.[52] Thus the potential orator, according to Quintilian, should examine literature that presents virtuous action worthy of imitation. However the acquisition of moral virtue is the result of a long course of arduous study, i.e., the energies of a lifetime are needed not for the preparation of a single speech but for a life of excellence. Quintilian confesses that to possess good moral character depends mainly on the will to succeed. It is not enough just to read and emulate virtuous men. The aspiring orator must resolve that he truly and sincerely desires a life of virtue. The contention of Quintilian is that if the student will desire good moral character he will learn and manifest those principles that will lead to a life of virtue and happiness.[53] Further, the aim of Quintilian is to demonstrate that moral excellence (right thinking coupled with right action) should be regarded as logically meritorious, and the student who is gifted with intelligence will choose virtue instead of vice.[54] The reason for such action seems obvious to Quintilian. His standard, by which actions are deemed right or wrong, rests on the authority of Roman tradition which emphasized basic loyalties to family, duty, and nation. Thus, actions that would disgrace one's family, or failure to perform one's duty to country, he thought were wrong. The gifted student, he argued, would

come to know and appreciate the Roman virtues of justice, purity, prudence, temperance and honesty.[55] And assuredly the future orator will have much to say on such topics as justice, self-control and piety. For if the orator is to be worthy of trust, he must possess the moral character that befits that trust, i.e., a man of honor which greed cannot corrupt, influence seduce or fear dismay.

As outlined by Quintilian, the moral training of the orator should begin in the home. The parents must teach and demonstrate the value of moral excellence while correcting the child for inappropriate behavior. In like manner the nurse and slave-tutor must help the child continue to learn what is deemed acceptable behavior. At school it is imperative that the skillful teacher not corrupt the morals of the future orator but insist that the boy's actions be unselfish, honest and temperate. As soon as the boy can read and write effectively, the teacher should suggest authors who will help the young student discover and desire a life of virtue. Finally, the young student is instructed to honor his family and discharge his duty to his country. In order adequately to fulfill this last requirement, the student must acquire and lead a life of moral excellence.

ENDNOTES

[1]Marcus Fabius Quintilian, Institutio Oratoria, translated by H. E. Butler, Vol. I (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1949), p. 9.

[2]Ibid., p. 3.

[3]Ibid., p. 303.

[4]Ibid., p. 323.

[5]Ibid., p. 385.

[6]Ibid., Vol. III, p. 187.

[7]Ibid., p. 209.

[8]Ibid., p. 207.

[9]Ibid., p. 209.

[10]Ibid., Vol. IV, p. 213.

[11]Ibid., p. 241.

[12]Ibid., p. 235.

[13]Ibid.

[14]Ibid., p. 229.

[15]Ibid., p. 319.

[16]Ibid., p. 251.

[17]Ibid., p. 265.

[18]Ibid., Vol. I, pp. 515-537.

[19]Ibid., p. 329. See also the first section of Chapter II of this paper.

[20]Ibid., p. 329.

[21]Ibid.

[22]Ibid.

[23] Ibid., p. 331.

[24] Aristotle, Rhetorica, translated by W. Rhys Roberts, contained in The Basic Works of Aristotle, edited by Richard McKeon (New York: Random House, 1941), p. 1335.

[25] Plato, Phaedrus, translated by R. Hackforth, contained in The Collected Dialogues of Plato, edited by Edith Hamilton and Huntington Cairns (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961), p. 506.

[26] Quintilian, op. cit., Vol. I, p. 365.

[27] Ibid., p. 363.

[28] Ibid., pp. 363-365.

[29] Ibid.

[30] Ibid., p. 41.

[31] Ibid., p. 23.

[32] Ibid., p. 21.

[33] Ibid.

[34] Ibid., p. 23.

[35] Ibid.

[36] Ibid., p. 25.

[37] Ibid., pp. 211-213.

[38] Ibid., p. 221.

[39] Ibid., p. 53.

[40] Ibid., p. 55.

[41] Ibid., p. 213.

[42] Ibid., p. 61.

[43] Ibid., p. 213.

[44] Ibid., p. 231.

[45] Ibid., p. 57.

[46] Ibid., pp. 213-215.

[47] Ibid., p. 9.

[48] *Ibid.*, p. 43.

[49] *Ibid.*, Vol. IV, p. 383.

[50] *Ibid.*, p. 35f.

[51] *Ibid.*, Vol. I, p. 37.

[52] *Ibid.*, Vol. IV, p. 151.

[53] *Ibid.*, p. 503.

[54] *Ibid.*, p. 357.

[55] *Ibid.*, p. 495.

CHAPTER IV

QUINTILIAN'S CRITICISM OF GREEK AND EARLY ROMAN RHETORICAL EDUCATION

Quintilian's quest for the ideal orator made him examine carefully the educational legacy he inherited. He was determined to seek out the strengths and weaknesses found in the traditional Greek and Roman educational scheme. In fact, his purpose was to examine the Greek and Roman rhetorical educational method to determine its suitability for producing the ideal orator. Earlier in Chapter II the nature of rhetoric was examined in the writings of Quintilian's predecessors (Isocrates, Plato, Aristotle, and Cicero). Their recommendations for educational excellence placed the teaching of rhetoric in a secondary position or omitted it completely. Quintilian, in contrast, viewed the teaching of rhetoric as the foundation for the education of his ideal orator. This chapter will present Quintilian's criticism of Greek and early Roman rhetorical education. The topics discussed will include: (1) the Greek educational legacy and (2) the Roman educational legacy.

The Greek Educational Legacy

In Greece, five centuries before Quintilian, educational emphasis centered upon the simple instrumental values of literacy and the use of writing to record literature for public recitation. Later, men like

Isocrates, Plato, and Aristotle addressed the problem of the training and schooling of the young, extended literacy, and constructed intellectual environments for achieving the end of education, viz., producing disposed men fit to assume the duties of life within the city-state.[1] Thus was born the notion that the ideally educated man was to be a well-rounded individual. That is, the ideal was an individual both beautiful and good, rooted in the _areté_ of political man, a servant of the polis. To this was added other ideal characteristics, such as that the educated man would possess esthetic sensitivity as well as physical prowess and that he would exhibit oratorical skill and display forensic proficiency in the public assembly. The difficulties in achieving such educational goals are numerous. The idea that men should be educated is not in question; however, the difficulty lies in how these educators would achieve their desired goals. Isocrates, Plato, nor Aristotle explained the pedagogical technique necessary to produce the ideal cultivated person. Their goals for education were strictly utopian. The Greeks desired well-rounded individuals but failed to see that most of their students did not have the intellectual and physical capacity to achieve such perfection. Also, the Grecians assumed that their students desired educational perfection, i.e., the acquisition of esthetic sensitivity, physical prowess, oratorical skill, forensic proficiency, and philosophical knowledge, while the vast majority of their students desired practical education that emphasized vocational skills, rhetoric that would make them successful in politics, and forensic proficiency that would produce wealth and personal advancement. In short, the educational goals of the Greeks were too idealistic in that the students could not achieve such goals. While it is true they did produce

students with some physical prowess and oratorical skill, they never were successful in forming the ideal cultivated individual.

Another weakness in the educational scope of the Grecians can be seen in their personification of "paideia." Paideia included both culture of the mind, or civilized life, and the influences, processes and techniques for the making of the educated man. As Lucas notes, "Paideia was an ideal of personal life enriched and nurtured by the values of classical culture, a precious possession imparted through education."[2] But again, this harmonious synthesis of the developed mind in a superb body was rarely attained by the Greeks. One of the reasons for the failure was that intellectual excellence, artistic harmony, and physical beauty encompassed more than students could attain. Another cause for failure is cited by Butts when he says,

> The fifth century goal of the all around development of an individual's body, mind and character as the road to good citizenship began to give way to a greater emphasis upon training of the individual's intellectual faculties, principally by means of literary and philosophical studies and a corresponding de-emphasis upon civic, artistic and physical development.[3]

According to Butts, then, the broad educational goal of the Greeks gave way to a much narrower goal, viz., the attainment of intellectual excellence. In fact, philosophers like Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle argued that the best educated person is one who has trained his intellectual capacities as highly as possible.[4] However, the new emphasis on the study of philosophy proved to have little application for service to the state, other than for the education of rulers.

A third reason for the shift away from paideia was the introduction of the Sophists to Athenian education. Generally the Sophistic lectures were given in the spirit of entertainment rather than education. Their

only claim was the promise of instilling in their students the ability to persuade and control an audience successfully. Their promise was rarely fulfilled because their students attempted to persuade audiences with fallacious arguments and inaccurate data. It should be noted that Plato viewed Sophistic rhetoric as defeating the systematic search for ultimate truth by means of shallow speech-making in promising social and political success.[5] Nevertheless, the Greeks were extremely proud of their language and of having perfect command of it. To the Athenian Greeks, those who could speak well were deemed powerful, while those who could not use persuasive speech were thought powerless. The Sophistic art of persuasion did not advance the Greek notion of paideia; on the contrary, it assured students that persuasive speech would lead to political and economic success in public life.

Though the Greeks rarely attained their educational goal of the developed mind in a superb body, it was still an aim worth pursuing. And the historic mission of schools in the Hellenistic period continued to preserve, perpetuate, and transmit that Greek paideia. However, the Hellenistic Greeks, like their predecessors, overlooked the aesthetic, moral and physical development, stressing instead intellectual and/or rhetorical training. The Hellensits, like the earlier Greeks, attended more to the production of the cultivated person than to the teaching process. In short, the demand of education was for intellectual activity that would take advantage of opportunities for personal aggrandizement and achievement, but such a system encouraged the survival of but a few wealthy students.

The Roman Educational Legacy

Roman educational influence may be viewed from two perspectives. The first perspective views it as an integral part of the history of Hellenic civilization. That is, before 500 B.C., Roman education, growing out of a peasant folk society, was directed by the family and guided by the aim to induct the children into the customs and traditions of the group in order to perpetuate its folkways. The educational goals were personal as well as practical, instilling in the children reverence for the gods, peity towards their parents, respect for laws and, especially for the boys, the skills of war. The Romans called this educational aim virtus. That is, virtus was identified as the Roman ideal of education. Virtus meant an individual both vigorous and virtuous who functioned as a contributing member of the state. As Kane views it,

> It resembled the ideal of Sparta, but with the very important difference that the individual did not exist for the state, but the state for the individual. This ideal emphasized character; it intelligently recognized that character is made up of habits, and it wanted these habits to be good.[6]

However, the Roman educational goal of achieving virtus has several flaws. First, the Romans had not perfected a teaching method that could form the vigorous and virtuous individual they envisioned. Likewise, there is no guarantee that when an individual acts according to the dictates of society his action is prompted by pure motives or whether his action is performed in order to receive some kind of positive reinforcement. Also, if an individual must be coerced to be virtuous, the result seems to be a denial of the true Roman ideal of virtus. Finally, the Romans seemed to think that only the vigorous

and virtuous individuals were capable of contributing to the welfare of the state. This idea contains the assumption that those who did contribute to the welfare of the state were vigorous and virtuous. A soldier, for example, could easily support and make significant contributions to the state and be neither vigorous nor virtuous.

Though the Romans did not achieve the educational aim of virtus, they continued to pursue it. That is why the basic aim in the early stage of Roman educational practice was moral (i.e., a patriotic respect for authority and tradition) rather than literary. For that reason one of the first virtues that went into the makeup of Roman education's virtuous citizen was piety, strict obedience to the command of the gods. That is, the good moral person would respect authority and tradition. Roman parents believed that obedience to the gods would ensure obedience in the home and to the state. Other virtues encouraged in the home included constantia, the manly courage of fortitude; honesty and prudence in the management of one's affairs; and finally, pudor or the practice of modesty in dress, speech and public deportment. Thus, the major Roman virtues included bravery, honor, self-discipline, reverence for the gods, and duty to country and family. The educational procedure used by the Romans for attaining such goals rested upon imitation. The Romans believed that by watching their elders, children would form strong moral character and a desire to serve the state. The awkwardness of this proposal was that too often what the children emulated was immoral character and a desire to attain wealth at the expense of the state. However, the Romans continued to stress that these virtues should be acquired and practiced. So in the Early Republic (509 - 265 B.C.) the basic purpose of education was to produce good fathers, contributing citizens, and capable soldiers.

During the middle Republican years (250- 30 B.C.) the Romans found themselves unable to resist Hellenizing influences. Since Greek slaves were readily obtainable, wealthy Romans used them as tutors or litteratores to teach elementary subjects such as reading and writing. The Greek influence on elementary schooling extended also to higher learning. This is not to suggest that the Grecian influence solved all of the problems within Roman education. The Romans implemented the Greek practice of educating the sons of wealthy parents. Also, it was during the late Republican times that the school of rhetor appeared. The rhetor or rhetorician opened private academies and attracted the wealthier Roman students who desired to learn the art of public speaking. Though some attention was given to geography, music, elementary mathematics, geometry and astronomy, the study of rhetoric (adopted from the Greeks) permitted the Romans to advance their basic educational goal, viz., the balanced adjustment of the individual to the social group. It should be noted that this goal, unlike earlier utopian goals, was actively pursued by the school of the rhetor. Since the Romans were doers rather than searchers (as some of the Greeks had been), the ability to speak correctly and forcefully was emphasized mainly as a weapon for offense and defense in the public forum and in the Senate.

The second perspective regarding Roman educational practice sees Roman education as developing its own identity. Though influenced by Greek education which stressed the ideal of the well-rounded individual, Roman education could be characterized as extremely practical. That is, Roman educators logically gave more emphasis to realizable purposes such as preparing students for careers in politics and public service. At this point in time the Romans realized the

futility of pursuing idealistic educational goals. They reasoned that such goals were impractical and contrary to Roman political and institutional life.

In Rome, three types of schools that stressed the practical aspect of education had developed. The first school, or elementary school, was taught by a free man of freed slave, known in Latin as the litterator, or teacher of letters. He gave instruction in reading and writing to children between the ages of seven and 12. He also taught his students the basic principles of counting. The elementary school, or ludus as it was called, constituted the first five years of formal training. The school day began at dawn and lasted until dusk. It was a school characterized by coercion and chastisement. A quote from Carcopino best describes the primary schools of the first century A.D. He says:

> On the whole we are compelled to admit that at the most glorious period of the empire the schools entirely failed to fulfill the duties which we expect of our schools today. They undermined instead of strengthened the children's morals; they mishandled the children's bodies instead of developing them; and if they succeeded in furnishing their minds with a certain amount of information, they were not calculated to perform any loftier or nobler task. The pupils left school with the heavy luggage of a few practical and commonplace notions laboriously acquired. Instead of happy memories, serious and fruitful ideas, any sort of intellectual curiosity vital to later life, school children carried away the gloomy recollection of years wasted in senseless, stumbling repetitions punctuated by savage punishments. Popular education then in Rome was a failure. . .[7]

Next, from the ludus school the student progressed to the school conducted by the grammaticus, or teacher of grammar. The purpose of the grammar school was to continue the emphasis on practical education by providing a modicum of general learning for all students. Also, the teacher of grammar prepared his students for advanced studies. A more exact picture of the curriculum in the school of the grammaticus was probably that described by Cicero:

> . . . in music, rhythms, sounds and measures; in geometry, lines, figures, dimensions and magnitudes; in astronomy, the revolution of the sky, the rising, setting and movement of heavenly bodies; in literature, the study of poets, the learning of histories, the explanation of words and proper intonation in speaking them; and the theory of oratory, invention, style, arrangement, memory and delivery.[8]

From Cicero's account most of the Greek Liberal arts were being taught in Rome. This does not mean that the liberal arts were taught well or that the students understood the significance and function of the arts. On the contrary, most of the students received only a surface knowledge in subjects like grammar, rhetoric, music, astronomy, logic, and geometry. The reason for the failure and ineffectiveness in the school of the grammaticus is not difficult to trace. The students were younger adolescents who usually hated both the teacher and the school. Oftentimes these students could not perform the tasks outlined by the teacher of grammar because the ludus school had also failed to prepare them properly for the grammar school. The students were frustrated because of their poor educational background, beaten when unable to perform for the grammatical teacher, and shamed by teacher and parents for low classroom performance. Also, students found the schoolday long and boring. It would seem that teachers viciously attacked more students than they ever helped to appreciate the quest for knowledge. The grammar school of Rome was a total failure.

The third type of school that had developed in Rome was the school of rhetoric which provided a course of instruction lasting two to five years. These schools, like previous Roman schools, had been established for the well-born Roman youth who was destined for a career in politics and public service. The rhetor or teacher of rhetoric delivered, ". . . theoretical lectures on the foundations of eloquence, thesis

writing, speech making, disputations and public declamations aimed ultimately at turning out skilled orators for the market place."[9] There was almost no pressure put on the student to develop his intellectual skills nor was it necessary for him to acquire moral excellence. Without these two major assets student declamations contained inaccurate information and lacked personal magnetism. The Roman rhetorical school did not stress the importance of pitch, force, duration, quality, and resonance in voice production. The students also lacked the fundamental knowledge of pronunciation, articulation, and enunciation of words expected of a proper orator. As a whole, the students could not introduce, organize, and effectively support the topic they discussed. Finally, the graduate of the Roman rhetrocial school was a clever manipulator of words instead of a broadly prepared statesman. Such was the educational legacy passed on to Quintilian.

ENDNOTES

[1]Isocrates, Antiodosis, translated by George Norlin, Vol. II (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1929), p. 285; Plato, Laws, translated by A. E. Taylor, contained in The Collected Dialogues of Plato, edited by Edith Hamilton and Huntington Cairns (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961), p. 1243; and, Aristotle, Politics, translated by Benjamin Jowett, contained in The Basic Works of Aristotle, edited by Richard McKeon (New York: Random House, 1941), p. 1298.

[2]Christopher J. Lucas, Our Western Educational Heritage (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1972), pp. 95-96.

[3]R. Freeman Butts, The Education of the West (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1973), pp. 107-108.

[4]Plato, Republic, translated by Paul Shorey, contained in The Collected Dialogues of Plato, edited by Edith Hamilton and Huntington Cairns (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961), p. 750; and, Aristotle, Politics, op. cit., pp. 1180-1181.

[5]Plato, Protagoras, translated by W. K. C. Guthrie, contained in The Collected Dialogues of Plato, edited by Edith Hamilton and Huntington Cairns (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961), p. 311ff.

[6]William T. Kane, History of Education (Chicago: Loyola University Press, 1954), p. 41.

[7]Jerome Carcopino, Daily Life in Ancient Rome (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1940), pp. 106-107.

[8]Marcus Tullius Cicero, De Oratore, translated by E. E. Sutton (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1942), p. 187.

CHAPTER V

AN APPRAISAL OF QUINTILIAN'S RHETORICAL EDUCATION

The burden of this chapter will be to present a critical examination of Quintilian's view of rhetorical education. The purposes of this chapter are (1) to show Quintilian's reaction to the rhetorical concepts held by Isocrates, Plato, Aristotle, and Cicero; (2) to present Quintilian's innovative rhetorical scheme taking moral virtue as a necessary condition for becoming an orator; and (3) to critically appraise Quintilian's rhetorical education scheme vis-a-vis those theories presented by his predecessors.

Quintilian records the traditional belief that Marcus Cato (234 - 149 B.C.) was the first Roman to attempt to write a serious educational work.[1] However, Cato had not concerned himself with the role of the teacher nor did he examine the nature of children. When Quintilian was asked to write a treatise on the art of speaking he determined that his educational goal would be somewhat different. He states:

> For almost all others who have written on the art of oratory have started with the assumption that their readers were perfect in all other branches of education and that their task was merely to put the finishing touches to their rhetorical training; . . . I on the other hand hold that the art of oratory includes all that is essential for the training of an orator, and . . . I propose to mould the studies of my orator from infancy.[2]

The genuine interest of the Institutio Oratoria is not in the general information it provides, valuable as that is, but in the fact that it

is a candid description and discussion of the educational proposals made by Quintilian. This chapter will explore Quintilian's contribution to educational theory. The topics discussed will include: (1) an appraisal of Quintilian's view of rhetorical education and (2) appropriate conclusions and recommendations resulting from the study.

An Appraisal of Quintilian's Educational Scheme

When Quintilian was asked by his friends to write something on the art of speaking, he resisted their entreaties by saying that several distinguished Greek and Roman writers had already addressed the subject. They finally convinced him to attempt the task by urging that previous writers on the subject had expressed different and at times contradictory opinions. Though Quintilian may have had reservations about beginning his writing, he had no restraint in addressing the weaknesses in Greek and Roman educational thought.

The goal of education for Quintilian is related to the Greek goal of the ideal cultivated individual. He believed, like the early Greeks, that education should produce men who would serve the state. Unlike the Greeks, he de-emphasized the notion that the ideally educated man must be a well-rounded individual. He especially attacked the Greek notion of physical prowess. He objected to the practice of individuals who rub themselves with oil and kill the mind by over-attention to the body; but did not object to the teaching of gymnastics that stressed the importance of the proper management of the hands, arms, and feet as a part of the art of delivery. Quintilian further believed that the Greeks were too preoccupied with the study of philosophy. He reasoned that philosophers had never won fame in the public assemblies, nor had

they ever taken a prominent part in the government of the state. However, Quintilian did recommend that philosophy and all the other liberal arts would be thoroughly studied so that the orator would be recognized as wise. Without adequate knowledge gained from the study of the liberal arts, the orator's speech would lack the element of conviction. Here Quintilian showed his disdain for Sophistic rhetoric that stressed the value of speechmaking in terms of political or economic success. What Quintilian favored was rhetoric that resulted in the speaker's ability to speak well. He argued that the orator, without a proper knowledge of his subject matter, could not make a presentation worthy of acceptance. In like manner, Quintilian rejected the Hellenistic Greek practice of stressing the acquisition of intellectual virtue without affirming the need for individual moral development. To Quintilian, both intellectual virtue and moral virtue must be emphasized in order to produce the ideal orator. If the teacher must stress one over the other, it would be better to require of the students moral virtue, for without moral virtue, he argued, an individual by his actions would corrupt the state. Also, what words of an orator would be accepted if his reputation is that of a liar, a thief, or a murderer? Thus, Quintilian insisted that both intellectual virtue and moral virtue should be included in the school curriculum.

The Roman educational legacy, passed on to Quintilian, accented the need for vigorous and virtuous citizens. Quintilian endorsed such goals but rejected the attempt made by the Romans to achieve them. That is why much of the writing of Quintilian is a strong criticism of the pedagogical techniques used in the Roman schools. Though he favored any attempt by educators to advance the importance of moral education,

he viewed the teaching methods employed in the Roman school as totally inadequate, even barbaric. He opposed the harsh and brutal treatment of students by Roman teachers. He argued that the cruel treatment of students leads to poor scholarship and undermined the teacher-student relationship necessary for learning. Thus, Quintilian recommended that teachers treat students as their own children and instruct them in a firm but loving way. Also, the Roman practice of teaching students by the same method, regardless of the difference in age, was rejected by Quintilian. He believed that the teacher should be aware of the maturational differences in students and adapt his instruction to individual needs. The reason is that the effective teacher will not burden his students with tasks beyond their ability. That is, the teacher must discern how much material a student's mind is capable of receiving. The teacher, he argues, must choose tasks appropriate to the student's age and relate the size and difficulty of the task to his attention span and capacity. This simple yet humane advice of Quintilian has certainly stood the test of time, i.e., different ages demand different methods of instruction.

Finally, Roman education had adopted the procedure of having the student study one subject at a time. Quintilian holds that students should carry a variety of subjects simultaneously instead of taking grammar, geometry, music, and so on in succession. He argues that the mind is not confused and made tired by studying various subjects throughout the school day. In fact, the study of a variety of subjects would serve to refresh and restore the mind since it is considerably harder to work at one subject without intermission.

A review of Quintilian's educational scheme reveals that he identified the ineffective Roman educational practice of mistreating students and suggested ways for improvement. His recommendation for adapting instruction to fit the individual needs of students is unique and praisworthy. His idea that students study a variety of subjects simultaneously is considered today a sound pedagogical technique. Also, Quintilian believed that the most good in education is done when children are young. This idea reinforced future educators to stress the need for elementary education where students would learn by precept and example. Finally, according to Quintilian, the best teaching technique is to instill in students a desire to do well so that in time they have no need for a teacher. Such admonition deserves the respect of all educators since the learning process does not stop with formal education.

Quintilian's educational scheme was designed to produce the perfect orator, i.e., an individual who was liberally educated, skilled in considering, juding, and was capable of speaking on the prominent issues in public life. Moreover, he claimed that moral virtue is a necessary condition for becoming an orator. To support his hypothesis, he argues that men of intelligence will always choose virtue.[3] While it may be true that intelligent men are better informed as to the various moral choices available, it is false to assume that intelligent men will always choose virtue instead of vice. Quintilian seems to think that just because one knows the right thing to do, he will do it. In theory Quintilian's idea is perhaps correct; yet, men of intelligence may certainly know the right action that should be performed and still be unable to complete the action successfully. The difficulty in

Quintilian's position is that he does not say that "some intelligent men will at times choose virtue;" on the contrary, he says that "all intelligent men will always choose virtue." All that is necessary to prove his statement false is to produce one example of an intelligent man who does not choose virtue. The perfect example would be Cicero, described by Quintilian as an intelligent man who, on occasions, chose wrongdoing in favor of virtue.[4] Quintilian's statement implies also that intelligent men do not decide to choose some virtuous acts but resolve to choose a life of continuous virtue. The error of this proposal is that though men may desire a life of virtue, there is no guarantee that some of their actions will not be deemed vicious, evil, or wicked. Thus, Quintilian's idea that "all intelligent men will always choose virtue" is a false statement.

Quintilian argues further that an individual cannot learn (i.e., gain knowledge from a particular subject) unless he is free from vice.[5] He believes that vileness and virtue cannot jointly inhabit the same person. If this statement were true, then no one could ever gain knowledge because the character of man is composed of not only good traits but evil traits as well. There is always a little bad or wrongdoing in the lives of the best of men. Likewise, the mind of an individual may harbour both good and evil thoughts. The awkwardness in Quintilian's notion is that he assumed that every man is wholly good or wholly evil. The truth of the matter is that the most wicked individual might choose to engage in at least one virtuous act. It is not within the realm of human possibility for men to live completely devoid of vice. If Quintilian's perfect orator is to become a reality, he must produce an example of a perfect, virtuous individual, which he

did not nor could he do. Quintilian's failure to produce even one example of a wholly good individual should have convinced him that such an individual had not lived before, but he continued to think that such an individual might arise some time in the future. The problem is that Quintilian was looking not for just a good man, but a man perfect in all his actions. Such a person could never exist, and the reason should be obvious. It is not within the realm of human possibility. For example, it is not within the realm of human possibility to produce the perfect baseball player, i.e., an individual who always catches and throws the ball correctly and who always hits a home run. We can no more produce the perfect baseball player than Quintilian's scheme can produce the perfect moral individual. Quintilian is not content to accept an individual who is less than perfect, and therein lies the weakness of his argument.

Quintilian further attempts to support his position by stating that the aim of every speech is to convince the judge that the case put forward is true and honorable; and, that if a good man and a bad man with the same talent, industry, and learning were engaged in battle, the better orator will be the better man (i.e., the man who is perfect in virtue). The grave mistake made by Quintilian is that if the good man should be losing the case, it is permissible for him, according to Quintilian, to use fraud or make false statements to the judge in order to win the case. Quintilian tries to justify his position on the ground that lies can be used if the accused man promises to be a good citizen.[6] Quintilian insists that his orator must be an honest man; yet, he allows his honest man to lie for the good of his client. At this point it is difficult to tell the difference between Quintilian's

perfect orator and any corrupt lawyer attempting to win a case. To be consistent, Quintilian should have argued that the good orator would never lie in order to convince the judge. This example of Quintilian's ideal orator, who lies to benefit his client, certainly weakens his major claim that moral virtue is a necessary condition for becoming an orator. Surely man devoid of virtue could, by their persuasive speech, convince a judge with or without resorting to lies.

Just as Quintilian argued that the orator must be wholly virtuous, he also argued that the orator must have perfect knowledge of all subjects. Even if this task could be accomplished, which is cannot as will be shown, it would take the time and patience of one's lifetime to accomplish. Quintilian had in mind an individual who has "perfect knowledge of all subjects," not just the knowledge of one or two subjects. Even in Quintilian's day, the field of subjects was vast. Yet he demands of the orator a thorough knowledge of history, philosophy, literature, civil law, and religion, to name only a few. Quintilian admits that no person in history, including men like Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, and Cicero, had acquired such perfect knowledge. However, he assumed that because no one had acquired perfect knowledge of all subjects in the past that it could not be achieved in the future. Is there anyone, after the time of Quintilian, who could be cited as having perfect knowledge of all subjects? Is there anyone today who would be so bold as to declare his proficiency in all subject areas? The conclusion is that Quintilian's educational scheme did not produce such an orator in his lifetime, nor is there any evidence from history to support his notion that such a person could be found who had perfect knowledge of all subjects. Thus, Quintilian's recommendation that an

orator must have perfect knowledge in all subjects is erroneous because the acquisition of "perfect knowledge" is beyond the realm of human possibility. To require an individual to possess "perfect virtue" and "perfect knowledge" in order to wear the name orator is totally unrealistic. Likewise, though superior character and excellent scholarship are useful tools in oration, they are certainly not necessary for a speaker to be eloquent. For example, if a speaker, regardless of his moral character, has knowledge of only one subject area, he may still speak well, i.e., if he convinces his audience that his ideas are true and worthy of acceptance.

A final argument that Quintilian makes, regarding the role of moral virtue in the formation of the orator, is that the virtuous man can be perfected by instruction.[7] Quintilian believed that good moral character would be produced in an individual if his educational formula were followed. His method was to begin when a child is born to intelligent parents who possess the ability to teach the child to read. Further, these parents must see that the child speaks and acts correctly according to their dictates. Next, when the child was ready for formal training, the parents must select a teacher of high moral character. The teacher will recommend to the student the best literature that emphasizes those principles of right living. Finally, the student engaged in the study of rhetoric to learn to speak and act in the most correct and proper manner. Quintilian believed that the produce of the educator's art would produce the individual who possessed perfect virtue in addition to perfect knowledge. Such an individual could wear the name orator.

The contention of Quintilian is unsound. His first premise, that a child should have intelligent parents, rests on the assumption that the child has a choice. Obviously the child has no choice and could easily acquire parents devoid of knowledge and virtue. Such parents might not have the ability to teach reading nor instill virtue in the child. His next premise presumes that by selecting a teacher of high moral character the student would emulate the moral action of the teacher. Though this idea appears to have merit, there is no guarantee that the student's attitude or behavior would be changed from vice to virtue simply by associating with such a teacher. Also, Quintilian does not say how the teacher will induce such a change in the student's character. He believed that the teacher would present to the student the best moral literature and that those moral lessons would cause the student to choose virtue instead of vice. This idea of Quintilian is at best only wishful thinking. Even if a person read the best moral literature and decided to choose virtue over vice, it would be difficult to determine precisely if it were the literature or some other factor responsible for the change in behavior. Again, Quintilian's postulation rests on the assumption that by reading moral literature one will act accordingly. Countless examples abound of individuals who have read good moral literature and yet chose vice instead of virtue. It may be that many criminals in prison were at one time or another introduced to moral literatuer which obviously did not cause them to choose the virtuous life. Thus, Quintilian's claim that reading moral literature produces good moral character is false.

Quintilian's final comment, that by studying rhetoric the student will come to speak with eloquence and acquire moral excellence, is also

misleading. By studying rhetoric, as outlined by Quintilian in the Institutes of Oratory, a few gifted students could gain the ability to speak eloquently. However, the study of rhetoric will not produce moral excellence in an individual. First, it is possible for an individual to speak eloquently without having high moral standards. Quintilian declared that Demosthenes and Cicero were great men who deserve veneration because of their eloquent speech; yet later he condemns them for not having attained moral perfection. Also, Quintilian never states exactly how the student will acquire moral excellence by studying rhetoric. This oversight by Quintilian destroys his entire argument. It is as unreasonable to argue that the study of rhetoric will produce moral virtue in an individual, as it is to argue that the study of music will produce a knowledge of epiphenomenalism in an individual.

Finally, Quintilian's hypothesis that moral virtue is a necessary condition for becoming an orator must be rejected since his argument is unsound. It is impossible for an individual to acquire "perfect virtue" and "perfect knowledge" of all subjects. Likewise, Quintilian failed to demonstrate how moral virtue is acquired by an individual following his educational scheme. And, Quintilian admitted that he had never discovered the perfect orator except in his own mind.

In conclusion, Quintilian set out to describe the education of the perfect orator whose life would personify the highest moral character. He pictured such a one as perfect in every phase of his development, i.e., ideal parents and ideal teachers would shape the future orator so that he could speak on such topics as justice, fortitude, abstinence, self-control, and piety with great persuasion and knowledge. Such a

dream as that of Quintilian is appreciated because it involves man's search for better schools, a better society, and a more noble person. Can the ideal orator be produced? We can no more produce the ideal orator than we can the ideal teacher. However, few educational writers have advanced the teaching of oratory beyond Quintilian's massive work. He raised all the educational issues demanding attention in his day and many of today. And finally, the ideas of Quintilian are still worthy of serious study in our time.

ENDNOTES

[1]Marcus Fabius Quintilian, Institutio Oratoria, translated by H. E. Butler, Vol. I (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1949), p. 379.

[2]Ibid., p. 7.

[3]Quintilian, op. cit., Vol. IV, p. 357.

[4]Ibid., p. 363f.

[5]Ibid., p. 357.

[6]Ibid., p. 379.

[7]Ibid., p. 387.

SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY

I. Translations of Primary Sources

Aristotle. The Basic Works of Aristotle, edited by Richard McKeon, Random House, 1941.

Cicero, Marcus Tullius. De Oratore, translated by E. W. Sutton, Harvard University Press, 1967.

_____. Orator, translated by H. M. Hubbell, Harvard University Press, 1942.

_____. Brutus, translated by G. L. Hendrickson, Harvard University Press, 1942.

_____. On Moral Obligation, translated by John Higginbotham, University of California Press, 1967.

Isocrates. Antiodosis, translated by George Norlin, G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1929.

_____. Letter to Alexander, translated by Larue Van Hook, Harvard University Press, 1945.

_____. Letter to Demonicus, translated by George Norlin, G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1927.

_____. Panathenaicus, translated by George Norlin, G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1929.

Little, Charles Edgar. Quintilian The School Master, (2 Vols.) George Peabody College for Teachers, 1951.

Plato. The Collected Dialogues of Plato, edited by Edith Hamilton and Huntington Cairns, Princeton University Press, 1961.

Quintilian, Marcus Fabius. Institutio Oratoria, an English translation by H. E. Butler in four volumes, G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1920.

Smail, William M. Quintilian On Education, Claredon Press, 1938.

Ulich, R. Three Thousand Years of Educational Wisdom, Harvard University Press, 1947.

Watson, J. S. Quintilian's Institutio Oratoria, George Bell and Son, 1875.

II. General Histories of the Period

Adams, John Quincy. Lectures on Rhetoric and Oratory, (2 Vols.), Hilliard and Metcalf, 1810; Reprint by Russell and Russell, 1962.

Blair, Hugh. Lectures on Rhetoric and Belles Lettres, Southern Illinois University Press, 1965.

Boissier, Gaston. Tacitus and Other Roman Studies, Constable, 1906.

Brembeck, Winston L. and William S. Howell. Persuasion: A Means of Social Control, Englewood Cliffs, 1952.

Brigance, W. Norwood. Speech Composition, Clarendon Press, 1947.

Butts, R. Freeman and Lawrence A. Cremin. A History of Education, Holt, 1953.

Campbell, George. The Philosophy of Rhetoric, Southern Illinois University Press, 1963.

Castle, E. B. Ancient Education and Today, Penguin Books, 1961.

Corbett, Edward P. J. Classical Rhetoric for the Modern Student, Oxford University Press, 1971.

Cory, M. History of Rome Down to the Reign of Constantine, Macmillan Company, 1935.

Crutwell, Charles Thomas. A History of Roman Literature, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1893.

Cubberly, Ellwood P. Readings in the History of Education, Houghton Mifflin Company, 1925.

Dill, Samuel. Roman Society from Nero to Marcus Aurelius, Macmillan, 1905.

Fowler, Harold N. A History of Roman Literature, Macmillan Company, 1927.

Grant, Michael. History of Rome, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1978.

Gwynn, Aubrey. Roman Education from Cicero to Quintilian, Oxford University Press, 1926.

Johnstone, Harold Whetstone. The Private Life of the Romans, Scott, Foresman and Company, 1903.

Laurie, S. S. Historical Survey of Pre-Christian Education, Longmans, 1895.

Mackail, J. W. Latin Literature, Murray, 1899.

Marrou, H. I. A History of Education in Antiquity, Sheed, and Ward, 1956.

Moore, F. G. The Roman's World, Columbia University Press, 1936.

Robinson, C. E. A History of Rome from 735 B.C. to A.D. 410, Thomas Y. Croweel, 1935.

Rostovtzeff, M. The Social and Economic History of the Roman Empire, Oxford University Press, 1926.

Sandys, J. A History of Classical Scholarship, Cambridge University Press, 1906.

Showerman, G. Rome and the Romans, Macmillan Company, 1931.

Smith, William A. Ancient Education, Philosophical Library, 1963.

Tucker, T. G. Life in the Roman World of Nero and St. Paul, Macmillan Company, 1911.

Wells, J. and R. H. Barrow. A Short History of the Roman Empire, Methuen, 1935.

Whately, Richard. Elements of Rhetoric, Southern Illinois University Press, 1963.

Wilkins, A. S. Roman Education, Cambridge University Press, 1905.

_____. Roman Literature, Macmillan Company, 1898.

III. Journal Articles

Auer, J. Jeffrey and Jerald Banninga. "The Genesis of John Quincy Adams' Lectures on Rhetoric and Oratory," Quarterly Journal of Speech, Vol. XLIX (April, 1963), pp. 119-132.

Bahn, Eugene. "Interpretative Reading in Contemporary Greece," Quarterly Journal of Speech, Vol. XLVIII (October, 1962), pp. 271-276.

Bennett, A. "An Ancient Schoolmaster's Message," Classical Journal, Vol. IV (February, 1909), pp. 149-164.

Bevililacqua, Vincent M. "Philosophical Origins of George Campbell's Philosophy of Rhetoric," Speech Monographs, Vol. XXXII (March, 1965), pp. 1-12.

Bosmajian, Haig. "The Nazi Speaker's Rhetoric," Quarterly Journal of Speech, Vol. XLVI (December, 1960), pp. 365-371.

Bowers, John. "Delivery and Attitudes Toward Concepts and Speakers," Speech Monographs, Vol. XXXII (June, 1965), pp. 154-158.

Brake, Robert J. "The Substance of Rhetoric: Good Reasons for Aristotle Re-Examined," Quarterly Journal of Speech, Vol. L (April, 1964), pp. 184-185.

Brembeck, Winston L. "The Content of the College Course in Persuasion," Speech Teacher, Vol. XIII (November, 1964), pp. 277-282.

Brockriede, Wayne E. "Toward a Contemporary Aristotelian Theory of Rhetoric," Quarterly Journal of Speech, Vol. LII (February, 1966), pp. 33-40.

Brownstein, Oscar. "Plato's Phaedrus: Dialecticas the Genuine Art of Speaking," Quarterly Journal of Speech, Vol. LI (December, 1965), pp. 392-398.

Casmir, Fred. "The Hitler I Heard," Quarterly Journal of Speech, Vol. XLIX (February, 1963), pp. 8-16.

Cobin, Martin. "An Oral Interpreter's Index to Quintilian," Quarterly Journal of Speech, Vol. XLIV (February, 1958), pp. 61-66.

Cronkhite, Gary Lynn. "Logic, Emotion, and the Paradigm of Persuasion," Quarterly Journal of Speech, Vol. L (February, 1964), pp. 13-18.

Day, Dennis G. "Persuasion and the Concepts of Identification," Quarterly Journal of Speech, Vol. XLVI (October, 1960), pp. 270-275.

Drew, Lewis H. "The Greek Concept of Education and Its Implications for Today," Liberal Education, Vol. LXIV, Num. 3 (October, 1978), pp. 1-15.

Edwards, P. "Quintilian on Extemporaneous Speaking," School Review, Vol. X (May, 1902), pp. 396-398.

Ellingsworth, Huber. "John P. Altgeld on Oratory," Quarterly Journal of Speech, Vol. XLV (October, 1959), pp. 304-308.

Goodrich, Chauncey. "Lectures on Rhetoric and Public Speaking," Speech Monographs, Vol. XIV (February, 1947), pp. 1-12.

Haiman, Franklyn. "A Re-Examination of the Ethics of Persuasion," Central States Speech Journal, Vol. III (March, 1952), pp. 4-9.

Hunt, Evertt Lee. "Plato and Aristotle on Rhetoric and Rhetoricians," Studies in Rhetoric and Public Speaking, Vol. VII, Num. 5 (November, 1925), pp. 1-6.

Irwin, Ramon. "The Classical Speech Divisions," Quarterly Journal of Speech, Vol. XXV (April, 1939), pp. 212-213.

Johnston, Henry W., Jr. "The Relevance of Rhetoric to Philosophy and of Philosophy to Rhetoric," Quarterly Journal of Speech, Vol. LII (February, 1966), pp. 41-46.

Kauffman, Charles. "Enactment as Argument in the Gorgias," Philosophy and Rhetoric, Vol. XII (Spring, 1979), pp. 114-129.

Kohlberg, Lawrence. "Stages of Moral Development as a Basis for Moral Education," Moral Education (1971), pp. 41-45.

_____. "The Cognitive-Developmental Approach to Moral Education," Readings in Moral Education (1978), pp. 36-51.

Lambertson, F. W. "Hitler, the Orator," Quarterly Journal of Speech, Vol. XXVIII (April, 1942), pp. 123-130.

Lomas, Charles. "Orator Hunt at Peterloo and Smithfield," Quarterly Journal of Speech, VOl. XLVIII (December, 1962), pp. 400-405.

Long, Chester C. "The Substance of Rhetoric: Reason vs. Substance," Quarterly Journal of Speech, Vol. L (April, 1964), pp. 182-183.

Mierow, C. C. "Some Latin Writers of Spain," Classical Journal (April, 1929), pp. 498-508.

Murphy, James. "Aristotle's Rhetoric in the Middle Ages," Quarterly Journal of Speech, Vol. LII (April, 1966), pp. 109-115.

Murhpy, Richard. "Preface to an Ethic of Rhetoric," The Rhetorical Idiom (1958), pp. 125-143.

Nadeau, Ray. "Delivery in Ancient Times: Homer to Quintilian," Quarterly Journal of Speech, Vol. L (February, 1964), pp. 53-60.

Oliver, Robert T. "Syngman Rhee: A Case Study in Transnational Oratory," Quarterly Journal of Speech, Vol. XLVIII (April, 1962), pp. 115-127.

Pellegrini, Angelo. "Renaissance and Medieval Antecedents of Debate," Quarterly Journal of Speech, Vol. XXVIII (February, 1942), pp. 14-18.

Pomeroy, Ralph. "Whately's Historic Debate: Argument and Origin," Quarterly Journal of Speech, Vol. XLIX (February, 1963), pp. 62-74.

Rosenthal, Paul. "The Concept of the Paramessage in Persuasive Communication," Quarterly Journal of Speech, Vol. LVIII (February, 1972), pp. 15-30.

Ryan, G. "Quintilian's Message," Quarterly Journal of Speech, Vol. XV (April, 1929), pp. 171-180.

Self, Lois. "Rhetoric and Phronesis: The Aristotelian Ideal," Philosophy and Rhetoric, Vol. XII (Spring, 1979), pp. 130-145.

Smith, Donald. "The Field of Speech: Its Purposes and Scope in Education," Quarterly Journal of Speech, Vol. L (February, 1964), pp. 66-68.

Wallace, Karl. "An Ethical Basis of Communication," Speech Teacher (January, 1955), pp. 9-12.

IV. Books of Education and Rhetoric

Boyd, William. The History of Western Education, Barnes and Noble, Inc., 1921.

Broudy, Harry S. and John R. Palmer. Exemplars of Teaching Method, Rand McNally and Company, 1965.

Brubacher, John S. A History of the Problems of Education, McGraw-Hill, 1947.

Carcopino, Jerome. Daily Life in Ancient Rome, Yale University Press, 1940.

Charters, W. W. Methods of Teaching, Rov, Peterson and Company, 1909.

Cole, Luella. A History of Education, Rinehart and Company, 1950.

Curtis, S. J. and M. E. A. Boultwood. A Short History of Educational Ideas, University Tutorial Press, 1965.

Demiashkevich, Michael. An Introduction to the Philosophy of Education, American Book Company, 1935.

Eby, Frederick and C. F. Arrowood. The History and Philosophy of Education Ancient and Medieval, Prentice-Hall, 1940.

Ehlers, Henry. Crucial Issues in Education, Holt, 1977.

Forisha, Bill E. and Barbara E. Forisha. Moral Development and Education, Professional Educators Publications, 1976.

Fraenkel, Jack. How to Teach About Values, Prentice-Hall, 1977.

Frost, S. E. Historical and Philosophical Foundations of Western Education, Charles E. Merrill, 1966.

Goodrich, Chauncey A. Essays in Select British Eloquence, Southern Illinois University Press, 1963.

Graves, F. P. A History of Education Before the Middle Ages, The Macmillan Company, 1915.

Hirst, Paul. Moral Education in a Secular Society, University of London Press, 1974.

Huxley, T. H. Science and Education, P. F. Collier and Son, 1901.

Ijsseling, Samuel. Rhetoric and Philosophy in Conflict, Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, 1976.

Kane, William T. History of Education, Loyola University Press, 1954.

Lucas, Christopher J. Our Western Educational Heritage, The Macmillan Company, 1972.

Kirschenbaum, Howard and Sidney Simon. Readings in Values Clarification, Winston Press, 1973.

Lerner, Max. Values in Education, Phi Delta Kappa Educational Foundation, 1976.

Lessinger, Leon. Every Kid A Winner: Accountability in Education, SRA, 1970.

Monroe, Paul. Source Book of the History of Education for the Greek and Roman Period, The Macmillan Company, 1913.

Nye, Robert. Three Views of Man, Brooks-Cole, 1975.

Oliver, Robert. The Psychology of Persuasive Speech, Holt, 1957.

Ozmon, Howard and Sam Craver. Philosophical Foundations of Education, Merrill, 1976.

Pounds, Ralph L. The Development of Education in Western Culture, Appleton, Century and Crofts, 1968.

Purpel, David and Kevin Ryan. Moral Education, McCutchan Publishing Corporation, 1976.

Quick, R. H. Essays of Educational Reformers, D. Appleton and Company, 1890.

Rusk, Robert R. The Doctrines of the Great Educators, The Macmillan Company, 1957.

Simon, Sidney and Howard Kirschenbaum. Readings in Values Clarification, Winston Press, 1973.

Spencer, H. Education: Intellectual, Moral and Physical, D. Appleton and Company, 1860.

Strayer, G. E., W. W. Frazier, and W. D. Armentrout. Principles of Teaching, American Book Company, 1936.

Thonssen, Lester, A. Craig Baird, and Waldo W. Braden. Speech Criticism, The Ronald Press Company, 1970.

Wilds, E. H. and Kenneth V. Lottich. The Foundations of Modern Education, Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1961.

2

VITA

Douglas Wayne Sikes

Candidate for the Degree of

Doctor of Education

Thesis: A CRITICAL EXAMINATION OF QUINTILIAN'S THEORY OF RHETORICAL EDUCATION

Major Field: Higher Education

Minor Field: Philosophy

Biographical:

Personal Data: Born in Antlers, Oklahoma, June 21, 1937, the son of Mr. and Mrs. B. R. Sikes.

Education: Graduated from Apache High School, Apache, Oklahoma, in May, 1956; attended Harding College in 1956; attended Cameron University, 1957-1958; received the Bachelor of Arts degree from Abilene Christian University, Abilene, Texas, in 1960, with a double major in Greek and Bible; received the Master of Arts degree from Abilene Christian University, Abilene, Texas, in 1967, with a major in New Testament History, with a minor in Hebrew; received the Master of Arts degree from Oklahoma State University, Stillwater, Oklahoma, in 1972, with a major in Philosophy; completed the requirements for the Doctor of Education degree at Oklahoma State University, Stillwater, Oklahoma, in December, 1983.

Professional Experience: Public School Teacher, 1962-1968; Graduate Teaching Assistant, Oklahoma State University, 1971-1972; Instructor of Philosophy, University of Science and Arts of Oklahoma, 1972-present.