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A COMPARISON OF SELECTED FOREIGN POLICY SPEECHES

OF SENATOR TOM CONNALLY

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A COMPARISON OF SELECTED FOREIGN POLICY SPEECHES
OF SENATOR TOM CONNALLY

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A COMPARISON OF SELECTED FOREIGN POLICY SPEECHES
OF SENATOR TOM CONNALLY

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

In some quarters of official Washington, D.C., 1950, Tom Connally was regarded as a shrewd, wily elder statesman, a chief architect of a bipartisan foreign policy which enabled America to preserve a unified front in a dangerous world, who, along with Republican Senator Arthur Vandenberg, served as an indispensable link between the President and the Senate. In other quarters, Tom Connally was regarded as an old-time politician, who, by the accident of seniority and the committee system, had been carried to a position of international importance beyond his shallow knowledge of the world.

To some, Connally's sharp wit was a charming weapon deflating diplomatic stuffed shirts, and his homely common sense held administrative policy within reasonable bounds

which the public would support. To others, he was irascible, indiscreet and unpredictable, a man whose sarcasm and irresponsible witticisms might someday upset the international applecart.

This provincial Senator who became the chief Congressional spokesman on foreign policy was Thomas Terry Connally, servant of the people of Texas in Congress from 1917 to 1952, years in which he served as ranking minority member of the House Foreign Affairs Committee and, later, as chairman of the powerful Senate Foreign Relations Committee during years in which the Senate moved from isolationism to internationalism in foreign affairs.

Who was Tom Connally?

He was one of the first in Congress to support an international peace organization. On May 7, 1924, he prophesied:

When this Republican elephant finds a league of nations with the name of Woodrow Wilson erased from it and sees that instead of being called a league, it is called an association of nations and gets used to that--he may trumpet a few times and switch his tail, but finally, he will probably encircle it with his rusty old trunk and say: "This thing, after all, is just what I've been looking for."¹

¹As cited in Beverly Smith, "The Senator Loves a Fight," The Saturday Evening Post, 223 (July 1, 1950), 72.

In 1939, he made the chief speech for the Administration in the Senate fight to repeal the Neutrality Act.

In 1943, the Connally Resolution committed this country to membership in a postwar international peace organization and became one of the landmarks of our new bipartisan foreign policy.

He was the choice of the Administration to hold the smaller countries in line as United States representative on the committee which wrote the "Big Five" veto power into the charter of the United Nations.

He was given the responsibility of gaining Senate approval for the United Nations Charter.

He led the postwar fight in the Senate for the North Atlantic Treaty and the Mutual Defense Assistance Program.

Life Magazine editorialized on May 22, 1950:

During Senate debate on the E.C.A. (Economic Co-operation Act) he [Connally] led the fight for an adequate authorization with skill, humor and a sure eye for the weak points of the opposition. He stood firm for essentials, and all in all, did a fine job for Paul Hoffman and good international sense. The Country and its Western Allies owe him a vote of thanks.²

In summarizing Connally's role in governmental affairs during the critical years from 1930 to 1950, Hodding

²"Senator Tamm," Life, 28 (May 22, 1950), 42.

Carter wrote:

As chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and a party stalwart, the country boy from Texas became one of the New Deal's, and the nation's, most important spokesmen in war and peace. He fought for TVA and lower tariffs, against pre-war isolationism and the opponents of the United Nations He was one of America's history makers of the twentieth century.³

Throughout these history-making years, Connally's oratory played an important role. Upon his election to the Senate in November, 1928, the New York Times commented that "Mr. Connally is rated as an orator and his favorite pastime as a member of Congress has been to 'bait' the Republican majority."⁴ His rhetoric was in the great Senate tradition that reached from Daniel Webster to William Borah. From his first days in the Senate he became known as its best rough and tumble debater.

Whereas many senators cleared the galleries and the floor in a few minutes by inept speaking, news that Connally was to speak actually could impel senators to cut short their lunches and hurry back to their desks.

Connally's oratory, in the opinion of most contemporary writers, did play a part in keeping isolationist senators

³Hodding Carter, "Ole Senator Tom," Saturday Review, 37 (October 2, 1954), 36.

⁴The New York Times, November 6, 1928, p. 16.

at bay during the war and postwar years when great foreign policy measures were being considered by Congress.⁵

Nevertheless, Connally has been virtually ignored by historians and speech critics alike. Today, he is primarily remembered as the author of the Connally Reservation restricting the jurisdiction of the World Court. Stanley Walker, writing in the Nation as early as 1954, indicated that "it is the custom in many respectable quarters today to smile condescendingly when the name of Tom Connally is mentioned."⁶

The explanation for this attitude could be in the philosophy which Connally brought to the office of chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee. He saw himself as a spokesman for Administration foreign policy, not as an innovator or molder of foreign policy. He tried to "get the bugs out of the bill"⁷ and put it in a common sense shape that could be guided through the Senate and ultimately accepted by the public.

Such a person is often dismissed as a "party hack" but in Connally's case, as Walker points out, "it would be

⁵[Gouverneur Paulding], "'The Mane' Remembers," Review of My Name Is Tom Connally, Reporter, 11 (October 7, 1954), 47.

⁶Stanley Walker, "A Solid Figure, Faintly Comic," The Nation, 179 (October 16, 1954), 336.

⁷As cited in Smith, 73.

unfair and untrue."⁸ The Reporter editorialized in October, 1954:

The amazing story to be read between the lines [of his autobiography] is how this stubborn, highly prejudiced Texan, when only a freshman Congressman, grasped the international idealism of President Wilson and managed to keep his vision clear through more than three decades of front line struggles.⁹

The speaking of such a person should provide an interesting and valuable study.

Purpose of the Study

Tom Connally's Senate career passed through four phases.¹⁰ (1) From election in 1928 until elevation to the chairmanship of the Foreign Relations Committee in July, 1941, he was regarded as a rather typical Southern senator, interested in the Democratic Party, the high price of cotton and the suppression of the Negro voter. During this period, he led filibusters against the anti-lynch and anti-poll tax bills. (2) From July, 1941, until November, 1943, he was regarded as a rather ineffective chairman of the prestige

⁸Walker, 336.

⁹[Paulding], 47.

¹⁰These generalizations of Connally's political prestige represent probable majority opinions of Senate colleagues and representatives of the press.

committee of the Senate, Foreign Relations, and was publicly accused of letting the Senate's important role of "advise and consent" die by default. (3) Following the passage of the Connally Resolution in late 1943 until January, 1949, Connally was regarded as the chief Administration spokesman on foreign affairs in the Senate, the originator of a working bipartisan foreign policy and the chief American troubleshooter in postwar international conferences. (4) During the final phase of his career from January, 1949, until retirement in January, 1953, he was regarded as a co-villain, with Secretary of State Dean Acheson and President Harry Truman, in formulating a give-away foreign policy that saved Europe at the expense of losing Asia. He became less popular with Senate colleagues and, at seventy-six, was a prime target for baiting by a restless Republican minority.

During each of the phases, Connally spoke on important foreign policy matters. In October, 1939, he spoke for the repeal of the Neutrality Act. In November, 1943, his resolution committed this country to participation in an international peace organization. In July, 1945, he spoke for United Nations Charter ratification and in September, 1949, he led the fight for a Mutual Aid Program to implement the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

This study compares Connally's Senate speaking during each of these critical periods. A comparison of speeches answers three questions: (1) Did Connally's speaking reflect his changing prestige in the Senate?

- (a) From fifth-ranked to chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee.
- (b) From provincial senator to internationally known governmental representative.
- (c) From an ignored to respected to distrusted Senate leader.
- (d) From a spokesman for FDR to a spokesman for Truman.

(2) Did Connally's speaking reflect the changing character of the Senate?

- (a) From pre-war isolationism to wartime internationalism to postwar moderation in foreign policy.
- (b) From heavily Democratic to Republican to slightly Democratic.

(3) Did Connally's approach to speaking reflect the changing speech situations?

- (a) Did style and method of delivery change?
- (b) Did developing material change?
- (c) Did tactics in debate change?

Previous Research

An investigation of Knower's "Index of Graduate Work in Speech," Auer's "Doctoral Dissertations, Work in Progress," H. W. Wilson Company's Doctoral Dissertations Accepted by American Universities and University Microfilms Inc., Dissertation Abstracts failed to reveal any studies of Tom Connally

in the fields of speech, history or political science.

Sources of Material

Material for this study fall into four categories:

(1) biographical material of Connally, (2) material describing the Senate and senators of the Connally Era, (3) background materials dealing with each of the speaking situations and (4) material providing the speech texts.

Certain material, such as the autobiographical My Name Is Tom Connally, periodicals such as Time, Life, Newsweek and U. S. News and World Reports, and newspapers such as The New York Times, The Fort Worth Star-Telegram, The Dallas Morning News and the Austin Statesman, served as sources in all areas of the study. The magazines and newspapers proved particularly helpful in providing background material for the speaking situations.

Other biographical material on Connally's career as an orator came from sources such as Public Men In and Out of Office, edited by J. T. Salter and profile sketches such as Robert Coughlan's in Life, March 23, 1942, and Beverly Smith's in The Saturday Evening Post, July 1, 1950.

Material describing the Senate and senators of Connally's time included Kenneth W. Colegrove's The American Senate and World Peace, Donald R. Matthew's U. S. Senators

and Their World, Allen Drury's A Senate Journal 1943-1945, James A. Robinson's Congress and Foreign Policy Making, William S. White's Citadel, The Story of the U.S. Senate, as well as the published memoirs of such key figures as Arthur H. Vandenberg, Jr., James F. Byrnes and Harry S. Truman.

Texts for Connally's four speeches were available in the Congressional Record, Volumes 85, 89, 91 and 95. The portions of the Tom Connally Papers, located in the Library of Congress, which dealt with texts of speeches delivered during the four periods studied were microfilmed for use in the dissertation.

Method of Organization

The following division of material represents the method of organizing this study.

II. Connally, The Speaker

Chapter II presents an examination of Connally as a speaker. Connally's non-Congressional speaking career and the general attributes of Connally's speaking are examined in an attempt to capture the mood and style of the speaker.

Each of the next four chapters is divided into four parts: (1) the make-up of the Senate audience; (2) the historical background for the speech; (3) the interaction between the Senate audience and Connally on the question and (4) an analysis of Connally's speaking.

III. The Neutrality Act Debate, 1939

Connally, fifth-ranked in seniority on the Foreign Relations Committee, little known outside the Senate and the South, spoke to an audience bitterly divided on the issue of intervention or isolation.

IV. The Connally Resolution Debate, 1943

Connally, an untested and rather lightly regarded chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, spoke to an audience generally friendly to the concept of a peace organization but undecided about the firmness of commitment to be made.

V. The United Nations Charter Ratification Debate, 1945

Connally, internationally recognized foreign policy spokesman for the Administration, spoke to an audience receptive to the ideas expressed in the charter and ready to commit this nation to those ideas.

VI. The Mutual Aid Program Debate, 1949

Connally, aging and declining in prestige, spoke to an audience growing disillusioned with foreign aid and one that was highly suspicious of commitment of United States military forces to an organization beyond the power of Congress.

VII. Conclusion

The concluding chapter compares Connally's speaking in the four legislative debates and answers the questions raised on page eight of this dissertation.

CHAPTER II

CONNALLY, THE SPEAKER

Upon retirement from national politics in January, 1953, Thomas Terry Connally reflected upon thirty-six years of Congressional battles, international conferences, tumultuous national conventions, election campaigns, army service, courtroom trials, college and country school elocution contests.

World-famous contemporaries--Franklin Roosevelt, Harry Truman, John Garner, Cordell Hull, Dean Acheson, George Marshall, Sam Rayburn, William Borah, Arthur Vandenberg, Woodrow Wilson, Jan C. Smuts, V. M. Molotov--felt the sting of the Texas Senator's tongue. For Tom Connally was an orator and oratory occupied a prominent niche in his career.

Connally's Non-Congressional Speaking Career

Connally's educational speaking.-- Connally participated in debate and oratorical competition throughout his educational career.

In grammar school at Eddy, Texas, Friday afternoon exercises in reciting and debating were held for parents and family. Connally's first political debates were held in the Eddy schoolroom.¹

In July, 1892, Connally entered Baylor University in Waco, Texas. During four undergraduate years, the extracurricular activity which he found most interesting was debating. In June, 1896, Connally, the youngest boy in his senior class, received three degrees--Bachelor of Arts, Bachelor of Oratory, and a diploma in Military Science.²

In late 1896, Connally's parents agreed to enter him in the law school of the University of Texas in Austin. As before, he was active in debate and oratory. Once, Connally was selected to debate a Baylor team arguing the annexation of Hawaii. Given the negative position, the Texas team was shocked to learn, shortly before traveling to Waco for the debate, that the United States had annexed Hawaii. Connally lost.³

¹Tom Connally, My Name Is Tom Connally, as told to Alfred Steinberg (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Company, 1954), p. 17.

²Ibid., p. 25.

³Ibid., p. 29.

Connally's legal speaking.-- Following graduation in 1898, Connally began law practice in Marlin, a central Texas town of 3500 people. Speaking helped Connally build his practice. A public relations campaign which included speaking at town picnics and joining a multitude of organizations, plus favorable publicity gained from work as a public defender in two locally notorious murder cases, helped the young lawyer establish a stable law business.⁴

Later, two terms as county prosecutor were hectic and marked by the successful prosecution of several sensational murder cases. During this period, Connally developed traits that followed him to Congress. He gained a reputation for being rough on hostile witnesses and for making dramatic speeches to juries. He developed a technique for cross-examining witnesses, leading them on and on, until their stories became ridiculous beyond belief. Finally, everyone except the squirming witness was laughing so heartily that the credulity of the witness was either destroyed or badly impaired.⁵

Connally's campaign speaking.-- Connally acquired experience in state politics prior to election to Congress, but

⁴Ibid., p. 45.

⁵Ibid., p. 58.

his two terms in the Texas House of Representatives failed to provide much experience in political speaking. Campaigning in 1900, Connally was unopposed for the flotorial seat representing three counties. On the last day of the legislative session Connally delivered an anti-monopoly speech that was well received.⁶ Election was won in 1902, also without a campaign.

Connally gained campaign speaking experience in 1906 when he ran for the office of County Attorney of Falls County. Running against George Carter, a good friend, Connally won by a four to one majority in a hard campaign.

In 1910, Connally returned to private law practice and during the next six years achieved eccnomic security.

In 1915, Robert L. Henry, representing the eleventh Texas congressional district, vacated his seat in the House of Representatives. Connally, forty years of age and a successful attorney, announced his candidacy. The campaign hinged more on the candidates' personalities than on issues. Connally was fortunate when one of the candidates, Tom L. McCullough, challenged his opponents to a series of eight public debates, apparently believing that they would not accept. Only Connally, the experienced debater, did accept and

⁶Ibid., p. 50.

the favorable exposure undoubtedly contributed to his 1,800 vote victory.

During six terms in the House of Representatives, Connally rarely was opposed for re-election. But when Congress was not in session he returned to Texas. Graduation exercises, picnics, barbecues, Jefferson-Jackson Club dinners, Armistice Day memorials, Fourth-of-July ceremonies--all provided opportunities for the novice legislator to speak and to meet constituents.⁷

Connally's most intensive schedule of campaign speaking occurred in 1928 in a campaign for Earle Mayfield's seat in the United States Senate. In a bitter campaign against Mayfield, the Ku Klux Klan candidate, and four other aspirants, Connally finally won a runoff election by 60,000 votes.

Only once later, in 1934, did Connally need to campaign actively for re-election. In 1940, he was unopposed by any serious contender, and in 1946, he was in Europe during primary election campaigning.

Connally's radio speaking.-- During his Congressional career, Connally made many radio speeches, often serving as an interpreter of Administration policy. His first radio

⁷Ibid., p. 115.

speech, "Government Economy," was broadcast May 12, 1932.⁸ During the next twenty years, Connally discussed "Take the Profits from War,"⁹ "Repeal the Neutrality Act,"¹⁰ "War Bonds"¹¹ and "The San Francisco Conference."¹²

General Attributes of Connally's Speaking

During his thirty-six Congressional years, Connally expressed himself on virtually every important issue in government. Hiram Johnson of California once told Connally: "You're not afraid of any man or issue."¹³

Connally's speaking on domestic issues.-- He was, by his own definition, a Southern-style liberal on most domestic matters.

Connally voted for most measures to relieve the cotton farmer and consistently favored the lowering of tariffs to

⁸U.S., Congressional Record, 72nd Cong., 1st Sess., 1932, 75, Part 9, 10201.

⁹Ibid., 74th Cong., 2nd Sess., 1936, 80, Part 4, 4374.

¹⁰Ibid., 76th Cong., 2nd Sess., 1939, 85, Part 2, 226.

¹¹Ibid., 78th Cong., 1st Sess., 1943, 89, Part 11, 3770.

¹²Ibid., 79th Cong., 1st Sess., 1945, 91, Part 11, 2341.

¹³As cited in Gerald Movins and Jack Beall, "Plush Covered Cactus," The Saturday Evening Post, 214 (April 4, 1942), 56.

benefit all areas of agriculture. In discussing one tariff bill, he said the bill did not benefit the farmers and forced the working man "to pay more to live."¹⁴

Like most Southerners in the thirties and forties Connally professed little interest in equal rights for the Negro. He led an anti-lynch law filibuster in 1937 and later explained his position saying, "I'm against lynching. It's murder. But I am also opposed to lynching the Constitution of the United States."¹⁵

He usually challenged organized labor. In 1941, he pressed for anti-strike legislation because "these strikes have got to stop."¹⁶ A year later he issued a warning to both capital and labor indicating that "if you cannot run your business and manufacture supplies for war, the government will take your business and run it for you."¹⁷ His convictions regarding organized labor's responsibility in time of war resulted in co-sponsorship of the Connally-Smith Anti-Strike Law in 1943.

¹⁴The New York Times, June 9, 1930, p. 3.

¹⁵As cited in Oliver Pilat, "That Senator from Texas," The U.N. World, 3 (April, 1949), 19.

¹⁶The New York Times, June 8, 1941, p. 36.

¹⁷Ibid., February 24, 1942, p. 13.

The Senator frequently expressed his belief in the conservative, traditional aspects of the Constitution. At the time of the "courtpacking" fight with Franklin Roosevelt, Connally opposed revision of the Supreme Court under the method and circumstances proposed by the President. His philosophy of the working of a constitutional republic was summarized in a lesson in fundamentals he delivered to Soviet Minister Andrei Vishinsky:

Democracy is not anarchy. Democracy does not mean rule by goon squads. Democracy means that an executive function shall be performed by executives, legislative functions shall be performed by legislatures and judicial functions shall be performed by the courts.¹⁸

Connally's speaking on foreign policy issues.-- The fierce partisanship that marked the Texan's speaking on domestic issues was usually absent in his statements on foreign affairs. He thought normal Democratic-Republican partisanship should cease "at the water's edge" and personally preferred the term "non-partisan foreign policy" to the more popular "bipartisan" because the former signified "one unit working at the job."¹⁹

¹⁸"Connally's Role," Newsweek, 28 (October 14, 1946), 60.

¹⁹"World Policy and Bipartisanship," U.S. News and World Report, 28 (May 5, 1950), 28.

Through the thirties he saw the need for preparedness and a strong armed force. In 1938, he advocated a "big navy," calling it "an insurance for peace." With the world's best navy, "no power would dare attack the shores of the United States."²⁰ Upon assuming the chairmanship of the Foreign Relations Committee in 1941, he called for a vigorous and firm foreign policy to secure respect abroad and security at home. "We don't desire war," he declared, "but the world might as well know that we have rights and possessions for which we are ready to fight, if it's necessary for their security."²¹

The Senator's attitudes toward our World War II allies varied from trust and friendship to outright animosity. He was consistently a friend of Great Britain. Russia was tolerated. Connally felt that cooperation with Stalin was a necessary evil. But the Texan never trusted the Chinese. He felt Chiang Kai-Shek could have helped more in the battle against Chinese Communist forces, and in 1949, he accused the generalissimo of absconding to Formosa "with several million dollars in gold."²²

²⁰The New York Times, November 9, 1938, p. 24.

²¹Ibid., July 31, 1941, p. 1.

²²As cited in Beverly Smith, "The Senator Loves a Fight," The Saturday Evening Post, 223 (July 1, 1950), 70.

Connally favored aid to Europe. He did not believe "in shopping for security at the bargain counter."²³ However, he felt each country receiving aid should get off the "dole" as quickly as possible. He indicated that he opposed "handouts": "We can't go on doing that forever; we can't pay off debts like that."²⁴

Connally regarded his contribution to the founding of the United Nations Organization as the chief accomplishment of his career. Twenty years after his first pronouncement for international cooperation, he reiterated: "If we are to secure preservation of world peace--and that includes our peace--we must pay the price. That price is our cooperation with other nations of the world."²⁵

Connally favored giving international organizations power to enforce disarmament. As early as 1921, he argued for naval disarmament.²⁶ Thirty years later, he favored an attempt at new negotiations with the Russians toward international control of atomic weapons. While admitting that

23"The Fin of the Shark," Time, 57 (January 22, 1951), 15.

24The New York Times, May 2, 1950, p. 17.

25As cited in Pilat, 20.

26The New York Times, February 15, 1921, p. 15.

chances were not good, the Texan thought it was "conceivable" that "the Russians, confronting this new turn in the potential power of the United States might modify their earlier tactics of obstructionism."²⁷

Connally's physical appearance.-- If Tom Connally had not existed, a movie scenarist would have invented him. Connally was pictured as big and broad, with "wise blue eyes," a nose weathered like "fine old oak burl," with naturally wavy, gray hair that curled luxuriously to meet his coat collar.²⁸ During his boyhood Connally suffered from the title of "doublebarreled shotgun," a reference to his proportions which a native recalls were "so darn long and straight up and down."²⁹ In adult life Connally approached the classic American proportions--six feet and two hundred pounds.

His physical appearance impressed both visitors and colleagues. Frequently, visitors inquired: "Who's that handsome man down there--the one who needs a haircut?"³⁰ Former United States Senator Joe Bailey of Texas, no Connally

²⁷Ibid., February 2, 1950, p. 7.

²⁸As cited in Robert Coughlan, "Tom Connally," Life, 12 (March 23, 1942), 100.

²⁹Ibid., p. 102.

³⁰As cited in Movins and Beall, 27.

admirer, once said of him: "Tom is the only man in the United States Senate who could wear a Roman Toga and not look like a fat man in a nightgown."³¹

Connally dressed to fill his role of Senator. As a youth he began patterning his clothes after William Jennings Bryan. Stiff, white shirts were held together with gold studs. A wide black ribbon bisected a gently parabolic front and held a pince-nez. Black ties, between a string and a bow, were made to specifications by a Baltimore tie maker. Connally's suits were generally black in winter, white in summer, with jackets cut low and billowy. He wore mirror-shiny black boots, and a black slouch hat sat high and square on the top of his head. The Texan's dress reminded some of an old-time Shakespearian actor.³²

Connally's voice and use of language.-- Connally's voice and style of language were assets to his speaking.

The Texan's voice was well suited to oratory, representative of the Southern dialect in American speech, carefully cultivated, well carrying, with a somewhat nasal twang. Connally had a wide range vocally with varying inflections--

³¹As cited in Coughlan, 100.

³²Ibid.

purring, gravelly, thundering. He could, by mere tone or inflection, make ordinary words absurd or reverse obvious meanings. While Connally served as chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, his vocal inflections became a barometer of United States foreign policy. While Marshal Tito was subservient to Moscow, Connally's pronunciation of Yugoslavia was magnificent. He threw back his head, wrinkled up his nose, and dragged out the third syllable in a scornful, bleating whinny: "Yugo-sla-a-a-a-a-av-ya." Later, Connally pronounced the name in an ordinary way.³³

Upon his retirement, Connally was referred to as a "phrase maker."³⁴ However, Connally preferred the use of simple language. As early as 1927, he rebelled against obscure language, protesting:

The pronouncements of the State Department lack pointedness. They pulsate with the cryptic language of diplomacy rather than the clear cut meaning our people prefer. The veneer obscures the substance. Let's have the real homespun talk the people can understand.³⁵

Connally's methods of delivery.-- The Senator could and did utilize all four modes of delivery.

³³As cited in Smith, 70.

³⁴James Reston, The New York Times, April 15, 1952, p. 12.

³⁵As cited in Smith, 72.

In most major Senate speeches and at the conferences formulating the United Nations Organization, Connally used a manuscript. However, the Texan usually wandered from the manuscript to develop ideas. On one occasion the New York Times reported:

Although his speech was elaborately prepared and in manuscript form before him, Senator Connally seldom referred to it. He wandered from the text time after time, both to illustrate his point and to escape the fetters a manuscript places on his old school style of oratory.³⁶

The Senator, like most first-rate politicians, had a phenomenal memory. In Laredo one day, Connally met a man he had not seen in twenty-five years, called him by his first name and reminded him that he used to wear a moustache.³⁷ The good memory was an aid in speaking although Connally seldom had occasion to memorize a speech.

In less formal debate Connally utilized the extemporaneous and impromptu methods of delivery. Reporters noted at the time of the Neutrality debates of 1941 that "Senator Connally did not read his speech but referred frequently to a paper which hung over his arm."³⁸

³⁶The New York Times, October 5, 1939, p. 1.

³⁷Movins and Beall, 61.

³⁸The New York Times, October 28, 1941, p. 1.

Connally's bodily action and gesturing.-- Whatever the method of delivery, the Texan's bodily action was highly calisthenic, full of sweeping gestures and elaborate pantomime.

Mimicry and plastic facial expressions were helpful arts cultivated early while a lawyer and used constantly. A shrug of the shoulders, a wide gesture of the sinuous arms, an angular finger, a jutting cigar, a droop at the knee, the stance or prance of his small feet--each contributed to drama or ridicule. When he called some opponent "an old woman," his favorite epithet, he minced and pranced around his desk.³⁹ In defending the Mutual Security bill in 1952, he evoked "bursts of laughter as, with quavering voice, he thumped his chest in imitation of an old-time political orator and defied economy advocates to vote cuts."⁴⁰

Connally's speaking was physically exhausting. During a speech he sweated through a collar, and many of his muscles were sore after a major speech.

He carried a physical, violent caricature of a United States Senator to international conferences. In London,

³⁹Coughlan, 100.

⁴⁰The New York Times, May 27, 1952, p. 7.

during the first meeting of the United Nations General Assembly, Connally delivered an American electioneering-style of speech complete with arm waving and table pounding. At one point the Soviet representative, Andrei Gromyko, leaned over to a tablemate and whispered, "I hope the tables have been reinforced lately."⁴¹ Soviet Minister V. M. Molotov complimented Connally by saying that the Texan had spoken eloquently "and with the picturesque gestures which we have come to like so much." Connally replied that he regretted "that Mr. Molotov approves of my gestures, but disapproves of my words."⁴² Mr. Molotov could have found many sympathizers in the chamber of the United States Senate.

Connally's debate tactics.-- Carefully logical construction did not mark Connally's speeches in running floor debate. His lack of reliance on logic was not because of an inability to reason. His sharp mind and his clever tongue gave little incentive for deep study or closely reasoned thought. But in axehandle, meatcleaver, personal debate, Connally was unsurpassed. He was characterized as "the best rough and tumble debater in the Senate."⁴³

⁴¹Ibid., January 25, 1946, p. 3.

⁴²Ibid., November 27, 1946, p. 8.

⁴³"New Team," Time, 38 (August 11, 1941), 14.

His drawling, dripping sarcasm was the terror of Capitol Hill. In the anti-lynch filibuster of 1937, Connally's sarcastic tactics kept the crowded galleries laughing. At one point he attacked Senator Robert Wagner of New York:

Where are the sponsors of this bill? Why are they not in this chamber? Where's the Senator from New York? Why, he can't stand the gaff--he can't listen to the Senator from Florida tear the bill to pieces. He can't stay here and listen to the Supreme Court opinions being read.⁴⁴

In 1952, Connally combined scorn with ridicule to belittle amendments and their proponents while leading the Mutual Security bill through the Senate. No attempt was made to halt the laughter from the floor and gallery that greeted his brief, but pointed, blasts at the opposition.⁴⁵

Connally often used a barbed, brutal wit to ridicule opponents. Once, as the Texan debated Senator Robert Taft, he interrupted the Ohioan, whose head was shimmeringly bald, with the admonition: "Don't shake your gory locks at me!"⁴⁶ In the course of a floor battle with Styles Bridges, Connally wondered "if the Senator would approach these matters with an

⁴⁴The New York Times, November 23, 1937, p. 5.

⁴⁵Ibid., May 29, 1952, p. 4.

⁴⁶Ibid., October 29, 1963, p. 1.

open mind, instead of an open mouth"47 Edward Burke of Nebraska, a slow deliberate speaker, once intended to rebuke Connally for a seeming inconsistency. He began: "Am I correct . . . ?" Talking as he rose, Connally retorted: "I don't know, but I doubt it very much," and Burke, tipped off balance, never recovered.48

A talent for sarcasm and brutal humor often leads a speaker to engage in personal invective. Connally was skilled at employing invective in debate. Old friends regarded Connally's invective with affectionate indulgence, but many members of the Senate hardly saw Connally as a playful old kitten unaware of the sharpness of his claws. At one time or another most Republicans and some Democrats were slashed by his repartee. Connally's attacks usually had high entertainment value for all except the victim.

In 1936, Connally replied to an attack on President Roosevelt made by Senator Frederick Steiwer during a filibuster on the Guffey Coal Act. Noting Mr. Steiwer's keynote speech at the Republican convention, Connally administered a verbal whipping as severe as any heard in the Senate. Mr.

⁴⁷Connally, p. 312.

⁴⁸Ibid., p. 194.

Steiwer barely attempted to answer the Texan, who paused frequently and invited interruption.⁴⁹ Connally denounced Homer Ferguson, who would have headed a proposed inquiry to investigate Attorney General Tom Clark, in terms so violent that the Texan was forced by Senate rules to cease speaking. As Ferguson sat white with anger, Connally shouted that Ferguson "covered the whole case with his vomit of prejudice and ambition."⁵⁰ In a 1950 incident, during debate over United States intervention in Korea, Connally dealt almost solely in personalities. Observers conceded that seldom had debate generated heat so quickly.⁵¹

Connally was an effective master of Senate procedure and the use of parliamentary tactics in debate. During a 1937 filibuster, Senator James Byrnes passed floor responsibility to Connally. He held the floor for three hours by ordering the clerk to read a speech made by Senator Hugo Black. If opposing Senators had objected, the Texan would have been required to read it himself. Instead the clerk droned out the speech which, when made, took more than five

⁴⁹The New York Times, June 21, 1936, p. 30.

⁵⁰Ibid., July 27, 1947, p. 2.

⁵¹Ibid., May 24, 1950, p. 18.

hours to deliver.⁵² Two months later, the Senator used the strategy of quorum calls to interrupt business. After one of these demands for a quorum, Connally walked into the Senate lobby. "There comes Horatius at the point of quorum," someone in the lobby called, and the Texan joined in the laughter.⁵³

Conclusion

The political career of the Texas Senator was punctuated by historic speaking opportunities. Connally usually spoke effectively upon these occasions. Upon his retirement, the New York Times reported that Connally was seventy-five years old, "but the years seem to have made him a sharper foe in debate."⁵⁴ Even enemies and detractors of the Texan admitted that his oratory played an important part in keeping isolationist senators in line during the years when great postwar foreign policy measures were considered by the Congress.

⁵²Ibid., November 17, 1937, p. 1.

⁵³Ibid., January 12, 1938, p. 2.

⁵⁴Ibid., July 6, 1952, p. 39.

CHAPTER III

THE NEUTRALITY ACT DEBATE, 1939

Connally's Audience for the Neutrality Act Debate

From the Senate gallery, a visitor may see a crowded chamber, a scene of high drama, climactic debate and roll call. The scene may be a kaleidoscope of action: Senators moving on and off the floor going to the reception rooms, hurrying to telephones in party cloakrooms. Or the visitor may see an almost empty chamber, with a senator reading a dull speech to a few disinterested listeners.

The Senate chamber.--- The chamber is a large, cool, conservatively decorated rectangle on the second floor of the west side of the Capitol, overlooking Union Station, the Capitol plaza and some of the worst slums in Washington. The presiding officer sits upon a raised dais, flanked below by the Senate parliamentarian, the reading clerk and perhaps by a few blue-suited page boys. To the presiding officer's left is the Republican side of the Senate. To his right across a narrow aisle is the Democratic side. Directly ahead of the

presiding officer and in the far background is the back door to the chamber and, flanking it, doors leading to the two cloakrooms, or lounges.¹ The wall surfaces are treated with pilasters, and panels are enriched with gilded ornaments. Heavy beams support the ceiling, which consists of glass panels containing mid-Victorian symbolic decorations representing "War," "Peace," "Union," and "Progress."²

A post-World War II remodeling of the Chamber made it light beige, brightly lit, and handsome. Earlier, a kind of sickly, seagreen light prevailed with senators seemingly debating at the bottom of a tank where little pageboys darted like minnows.³ Speaking conditions are good, but the size of the chamber and the large galleries make a sizeable void for a voice to fill. For twenty-four years this physical speaking environment challenged Tom Connally.

The Senate as an "Institution."-- Senate means an assembly of old men or elders. In the United States these

¹William S. White, Citadel, The Story of the U.S. Senate (New York: Harper and Brothers, Publishers, 1956), p. 147.

²George H. Haynes, The Senate of the United States (New York: Russell and Russell, 1960), II, 918.

³Allen Drury, A Senate Journal 1943-1945 (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1963), p. 22.

elders form a legislative chamber of imposing power which is sometimes helpless; a group of wise men who are occasionally foolish; an organization with an opportunity to educate and lead, which at times has only oppressed. The Senate thrives on contrast:

It is hard and efficient and it is soft and dawdling. It is harsh and it is kind. It is dignity and it is disorder. It is arrogant and it is humble. It believes in a kind of democracy (though the precise kind is a tale in itself) but it is in some things majestically undemocratic. It halts usurpation and it usurps. It honors the system and it rejects the system.⁴

The Senate is probably the most powerful and independent legislative body in the world. The convention that created the national legislature gave the Senate several advantages over the House of Representatives. While the entire House membership is subject to election every two years, the Senate membership as a group can not be repudiated. Through the staggered-term principle, only a third of the total membership is elected every two years and so it becomes literally impossible for voters to condemn a majority of Senators at any time. The Senate can have extended debate while House debate is rigidly controlled. The Senate has exclusive power to approve treaties and to confirm the president's nominees. It sits as a court in impeachment trials.

⁴White, p. 2.

Thus, the convention created a body with mixed functions in executive and judicial as well as legislative and investigative fields. It is this quality, a never-ending possession of a limitless writ over American life, that makes the Senate unique.⁵

What personality traits identify members of "the most exclusive club in the world?" When Connally became a member of the Senate in early 1929, he observed that party regularity was not as consistent as it had been in the House where party whips often swayed votes.⁶ Senators are more often individualists unafraid of either majority or minority leaders. The opportunity for individualism allows senators to enhance personal reputations. The Senate has been a prolific breeding ground for presidential aspirants.

Not all members like one another. Long service in the Senate led one senator to conclude that about one-third of Senate voting is dictated by animosity toward either the president or fellow senators. But in the Senate there is usually a camaraderie that ignores the political aisle that

⁵William S. White, "The Natural Habitat of Compromise," Saturday Review, 39 (December 29, 1956), 7.

⁶Tom Connally, My Name Is Tom Connally, as told to Alfred Steinberg (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Company, 1954), p. 17.

divides the membership.⁷ Allen Drury believed personal amiability to be the one characteristic of most senators and thought that "on an average more backslapping and handshaking are done in the United States Senate than in any other comparable area or body of men in the world."⁸

The seventy-sixth Senate.-- Following the 1938 election, division of the Senate found sixty-nine Democrats, twenty-three Republicans, one Progressive, two Farmer-Laborites, and one Independent. A revolt of only twenty-two Democrats could break Administration control. The Senate was an unpredictable combination of eloquent isolationists and New Deal Democrats. Delightful characters in tail coats mingled with the more business-like young executives. Who were some of the "symbols of a people's erratic will?"⁹

Alben Barkley of Kentucky, future Vice President, was majority leader and "acting like a man who is working awfully

⁷Blair Moody, "The United States Senate," Holiday, 15 (February, 1954), 56.

⁸Drury, p. 12.

⁹Ibid., p. 27. The identifications in each chapter attempt to supply an insight into the personalities that compose each Senate. Wherever possible, the insight is Connally's. Drury was regarded as the most reliable secondary source. News magazines supply the remaining sketches.

hard and awfully earnestly at a job he doesn't particularly like."¹⁰

William E. Borah of Idaho, a man of "splendid courage and independence . . . , was a giant, able to hold his own with any other member in debate."¹¹ He was a warm personal friend of Connally.

Styles Bridges of New Hampshire was an "isolationist-- a man of fair ability, industrious, ambitious and a good speaker."¹²

James Byrnes of South Carolina was regarded as a White House messenger. He was "perfectly subservient to the President's will. Regardless of what he himself believed he would urge senators to support the President's position."¹³ He never tried electioneering with Connally.

Bennett Champ Clark of Missouri was the isolationist son of the former Speaker of the House of Representatives and a regular foe of Connally on most issues.¹⁴

John Danaher of Connecticut was "short, chubby and balding with a round, serious face and an obvious lisp." He

¹⁰Ibid., p. 11.

¹¹Connally, p. 215.

¹²Ibid., p. 315.

¹³Ibid., p. 188.

¹⁴Ibid., p. 214.

looked like "some intent little teddy bear" when he rose to speak.¹⁵ To Connally he was the "gentleman with the intellectual 'jimmy' outfit who pries into everything, everywhere, whether he is on a committee or not."¹⁶

Walter George of Georgia, second in seniority on both the Foreign Relations and the Finance Committees, was especially knowledgeable on financial and tax matters.¹⁷ Like Connally, he had opposed the courtpacking plan, and Roosevelt had unsuccessfully attempted to purge him in 1938.

Carter Glass of Virginia, the ailing dean of the Senate, was "not a queen bee, but he goes around with a stinger out all the time."¹⁸ He was a conservative anti-New Deal Democrat.

Hiram Johnson of California was the old isolationist foe of Woodrow Wilson. Connally called him "very valuable," and reported that "I hold him in the highest admiration and esteem."¹⁹

¹⁵Drury, p. 11.

¹⁶The New York Times, October 21, 1941, p. 4.

¹⁷Connally, p. 194.

¹⁸Tom Connally, as cited in The New York Times, July 21, 1935, p. 2.

¹⁹U.S., Congressional Record, 79th Cong., 1st Sess., 1945, 91, Part 6, 7275.

Kenneth McKellar of Tennessee shared a duplex apartment with Connally and while some thought him harsh and vitriolic, to Connally he was "always friendly and affable."²⁰

Charles McNary of Oregon, a good personal friend of Connally, was an "admirable" senator and a "capable minority leader."²¹

Gerald P. Nye of North Dakota was a "trouble maker and a rabid isolationist who hoped to create more isolationism and at the same time draw attention to himself."²²

John Overton of Louisiana was "a fine man," though he had served as Huey Long's counsel when the Louisiana legislature attempted to impeach Long.²³

Key Pittman of Nevada, the Foreign Relations Committee Chairman, was "hardly a strong voice for Wilson's principles." He opposed entry to the World Court in 1935 and was physically unable to act as a vigorous chairman.²⁴ "Pittman," said one of the contemporary periodicals, "has a serpent's wisdom, but he is also a light-hearted soul with little stomach for the drudgeries of leadership."²⁵

²⁰Connally, p. 181.

²¹Ibid., p. 166.

²²Ibid., p. 212.

²³Ibid., p. 167.

²⁴Ibid., p. 216.

²⁵T.R.B., "Washington Notes," The New Republic, 100 (October 18, 1939), 299.

Robert Taft of Ohio impressed Drury as "one of the strongest and ablest men in the Senate . . . quick in debate and quick in humor."²⁶ Connally accused Taft of "sitting in his office with one eye on the map of Ohio and the other on his pocket book."²⁷ In less heated moments Connally thought him an "industrious, tireless worker in behalf of measures he favored at the moment. He was a man of good ability, but not brilliant. He tried to assert his leadership on too many questions to be really effective on the important ones."²⁸

Harry Truman of Missouri was "a quiet senator who had not distinguished himself after one Senate term."²⁹ Connally and the future President were friendly.

Millard Tydings of Maryland was of "great help to the administration" on matters relating to the armed services.³⁰ He and Connally were on good terms.

Arthur Vandenberg of Michigan, although later of much help in formulating a bipartisan foreign policy, was written off in 1939 as "the most rabid of isolationists."³¹

²⁶Drury, p. 10.

²⁷The New York Times, May 6, 1950, p. 2.

²⁸Connally, p. 311.

²⁹Ibid., p. 274. ³⁰Ibid., p. 194. ³¹Ibid., p. 269.

Robert Wagner of New York was the chief proponent of anti-lynching legislation. He was "given to reading long, ghost-written speeches."³²

Burton K. Wheeler of Montana had been an ally in the court fight, but Connally was "never sure where he stood on most issues."³³

Wallace White of Maine was a "mild, friendly man" who told Connally he had once used one of the Texan's speeches in a Republican election campaign.³⁴

Alexander Wiley of Wisconsin was a "true internationalist Republican." Connally appreciated his help in foreign policy matters although they had many good natured fights on domestic issues.³⁵

Connally's position in the seventy-sixth Senate.--

Connally belonged to a favored Senate type. The Democratic Party, which since the end of the Reconstruction Era has held equivalent Senate power to that of the Republicans, had been dominated by the Southerner. Usually they were more powerful in committee than their Northern colleagues and, in the final

³²Ibid., p. 170.

³³Ibid., p. 189.

³⁴Ibid., p. 310.

³⁵Ibid., p. 312.

decisions of the Senate, nearly always the Southerner's influence was more pervasive and persuasive than others of his party. When the Democrats were out of power during the twenties, the Southerners were a listless opposition rarely driven to oratorical revolt. But usually the Southerner entered the Senate chamber with the quiet satisfaction of a man strolling contentedly into his sitting room. He loved the Senate as a center of unaltered tradition. He luxuriated in the splendor and power that rested there. He was usually more formally and more traditionally dressed than his colleagues and he was usually more archaically eloquent in debate.³⁶ Connally was a personification of the typical, old-time, tradition-steeped Southern senator.

Connally was not ashamed to be called a politician. He said: "When a successful politician is dead they call him a statesman. That's fine. But so long as he remains alive he'd better not forget his politics."³⁷ The Texan constantly mended his senatorial political fences. One device used was a Sunday breakfast with Texas sausage, accompanied

³⁶White, Citadel . . ., p. 72.

³⁷As cited in Beverly Smith, "The Senator Loves a Fight," The Saturday Evening Post, 223 (July 1, 1950), 18.

by Texas pink grapefruit, Texas peach preserves, smoked ham, eggs and hot biscuits. Most senators were invited to at least one Connally breakfast.

His temper was unpredictable and fellow senators walked warily, but fondly, around him. Occasionally, Republicans attacked him. Danaher, while a freshman senator, astounded members one day by observing that Connally was guilty of a "caustic, jeering, mocking type of approach which has been all too common for him." He thought that Connally's "gyrations and acting" were "all directed toward the gallery to elicit some present temporary applause." Danaher further charged that Connally's "kind of cheap, police-court lawyer tactics may have a certain appeal in some places, but this is not the place." The Connecticut Senator rebuked the Texan for his "japery" and suggested that "all we need to complete the performance is [Texas] Governor O'Daniel's hillbilly band."³⁸

But such attacks were rare. Carl Hayden called him "a good friend" and wrote that "there never was a time when he addressed the Senate that his colleagues did not pay close

³⁸As cited in Gerald Movins and Jack Beall, "Plush Covered Cactus," The Saturday Evening Post, 214 (April 4, 1942), 27.

attention to what he had to say."³⁹ Ellender thought him "a very colorful person . . . a great orator" and one who "commanded immediate attention whenever he rose to speak in the Senate."⁴⁰ Although he had attacked verbally a number of colleagues, Connally was amazingly well liked, both in the Senate and in Washington generally. White described the general Senate attitude: "Connally was--simply Connally--and who did not cherish the 'old man'?"⁴¹

The Quest for Neutrality

Probably the most effective medium for directing American public opinion into the path of isolation during the nineteen-thirties was the Nye Committee to investigate the munitions industry. The committee, chaired by the North Dakota isolationist, was formed in February, 1934. The committee probed the hypothesis that munitions makers, thirsty for profits, lured America into World War I. Committee pronouncements increased demands for action to prevent a second such occurrence. The full extent of pacifist feeling became clear in late January, 1935, as the Senate considered entry of this

³⁹Letter from Hon. Carl Hayden, United States Senator from Arizona, September 16, 1964.

⁴⁰Letter from Hon. Allen Ellender, United States Senator from Louisiana, September 16, 1964.

⁴¹White, Citadel . . ., p. 123.

country into the World Court. More than 70,000 anti-World Court telegrams, inspired by the Hearst press and by Father Charles Coughlin, a Roosevelt-hating radio priest, flooded Senate offices. The final Senate vote, fifty-two to thirty-six, was seven short of the necessary two-thirds majority.⁴²

The Pittman Act of 1935.-- In April, 1935, Nye and Clark introduced a series of resolutions providing for a mandatory embargo on arms, loans and credits during war time. After a summer of debate, the Pittman Neutrality Bill, a merger of two of the original resolutions, was favorably reported to the Senate on August 7th.

The bill passed in twenty-five minutes. Upon presidential proclamation that a state of war exist between two countries, the Act prohibited the export of arms, ammunition and implements of war to either belligerent. Transportation of such items to neutral ports for transshipment by American vessels was also forbidden. The Act established a Munitions Control Board to register and license persons engaged in war material traffic and gave the president authority to prohibit travel by American citizens on belligerents' ships during war time.⁴³ The Act was to last only until the new Congress

⁴²Connally, p. 211.

⁴³Ibid., p. 220.

could convene in January and write permanent legislation, but the experiment with legislated neutrality had begun.

The Neutrality Act of 1936.-- War between Italy and Ethiopia tested the new legislation and found it unsatisfactory. In a speech on November 6, 1935, Hull served notice that with the reassembling of Congress, the full power of the President would be devoted to abandoning the premise of the Pittman Act and to substituting an entirely different type of neutrality legislation.⁴⁴

However, six weeks of a new session passed before Congress approved a bill. On February 18, 1936, the Senate voted to continue the temporary Pittman Act, with three amendments, until May 1, 1937. One amendment extended the arms embargo to countries which entered an existing war. A second barred loans and grants to belligerents. The third exempted Latin-American countries if involved in war with countries outside the Western Hemisphere.

The Neutrality Act of 1937.-- A little more than a year later, March 3, 1937, the Pittman Act became permanent legislation. Excepting one major addition, a "cash and carry" provision slated to expire on May 1, 1939, the law would

⁴⁴"American Neutrality," The Christian Century, 52 (November 20, 1935), 1479.

stand unless changed by Congress. Because the "cash and carry" provision apparently compromised our freedom of the seas, Borah and Johnson opposed the bill, but when the vote came, only Lodge and three others agreed with them. The vote was sixty-three to six. On May 1, 1937, the President signed the bill and the New York Herald Tribune dismissed the action as an effort "to preserve the United States from intervention in the war of 1914-15."⁴⁵

The move for repeal of the Arms Embargo.-- The Neutrality Act of 1937 placed the United States in the position of being unable to halt the aggressive acts of Hitler against Austria and Czechoslovakia. President Roosevelt was ready for repeal of the Act. The President also wanted continuation of the "cash and carry" provision beyond the May expiration date. But the Senate adjourned in late summer, 1939, with the Neutrality Act, minus the "cash and carry" provision, still law.

Hitler's march into Poland on September 1, 1939, and the subsequent declaration of war by Great Britain and France forced the President to reconvene Congress in special session on September 21, 1939. The President asked Congress to (1)

⁴⁵As cited in "How to Be Neutral," Time, 34 (July 17, 1939), 18.

repeal the arms embargo; (2) restrict movements of American ships in danger zones delineated by the President; (3) bar travel by American citizens on belligerent ships or in danger zones; (4) require buyers of American goods to take title before leaving the United States; (5) put all purchases on a cash basis; (6) retain the portion of existing law regulating the collection in this country of funds for belligerents and (7) retain the portion of existing law requiring licensing of arms traffic.⁴⁶

Pittman asked Connally to lead the Arms Embargo repeal fight with Barkley, Claude Pepper of Florida and Elbert Thomas of Utah as his floor assistants.

The Senate, Connally and Neutrality

The seventy-sixth Senate was generally favorable to the Administration's domestic recovery program, but divided into several blocs of opposition to Administration foreign policy. The Nye-Vandenberg bloc regarded war as a profit-making device of bankers and munitions makers. The Clark-Wheeler bloc was consumed with anti-British feeling and permitted that bias to guide thinking on international issues. The Borah-Johnson bloc preached that the oceans were the

⁴⁶"'War or Peace for America?' Is Issue in Congress Battle," Newsweek, 14 (October 2, 1939), 25.

bulwark of our defenses, that we needed no other friends and that we should not entangle ourselves in the affairs of other nations.⁴⁷

At this critical period internationalist Senate leadership was weak. Pittman was ill and had a mild isolationist background. The next two Democratic members in seniority on the Foreign Relations Committee were Pat Harrison and George, both primarily interested in economics and finance. Wagner, whose main interests were labor and civil rights, preceded Connally.

In 1939, Connally was regarded as an admirer of Woodrow Wilson's principles, a foe of the Nye Munitions Committee, the instigator of legislation to take the profits out of war, an advocate of a big navy, the defender of the cotton farmer, a believer in the poll tax and, most recently, a leader in the battle against the courtpacking scheme of President Roosevelt. To some, his chief recommendation was an ability to trade insults with Vandenberg and other Republicans, but Connally had the confidence of anti-New Deal Southern Democrats such as Glass and Harry Byrd and he was regarded as a quasi-expert on foreign policy. He had served on the twenty-three

⁴⁷Connally, pp. 214-15.

man Foreign Relations Committee since December 14, 1931, and was the fifth-ranked Democratic member.

In April, 1939, only thirty-three senators were prepared to give a categorical answer to the question: "Do you favor broadening the President's discretionary powers under the Neutrality Act?" Ten Democrats and one Republican were certain they did. Ten Republicans, nine Democrats, two Farmer-Laborites and one Progressive were certain they did not.⁴⁸ Nye shouted that "any effort to repeal or emasculate the Neutrality Act will keep the Senate here all summer."⁴⁹ McNary, the Senate minority leader, after talking with Hull and Pittman, stated flatly that the Senate would act on no neutrality legislation at its first session.⁵⁰ It did not.

In September, after news that Congress would reconvene, Vandenberg asserted that the isolationists in Congress would resist efforts to lift the arms embargo.⁵¹ Borah was quoted as saying: "We hear and read rather strange things

⁴⁸"Bewildered Congress Groping for Sound Neutrality Policy," Newsweek, 13 (April 17, 1939), 14.

⁴⁹"Neutrality Ruckus," Newsweek, 13 (March 20, 1939), 16.

⁵⁰"Neutrality Fight," Newsweek, 13 (June 26, 1939), 17.

⁵¹"Trial and Error," Newsweek, 14 (September 18, 1939), 27.

these days. There is constant suggestion of shutting off debate."⁵² On the other hand, two Republicans, Taft and Warren Austin of Vermont, came out for embargo repeal. Many senators said they needed to "hear both sides before making up their minds."⁵³

In a meeting with Congressional leaders in early September, the President intimated that he wanted to repeal all neutrality legislation and depend upon the international law that was Wilson's guide in 1914-17. The surprised Congressmen warned Roosevelt that the people would not support such action.⁵⁴ In March, seventy-six percent of the people had favored selling food to Great Britain and France even if they entered a war and fifty-two percent had favored selling them munitions as well. But an overwhelming eighty-three percent were opposed to sending United States troops or ships overseas to aid any country.⁵⁵ Now, tens of thousands of letters and telegrams were overwhelmingly for retention of the arms embargo. In a single day, 200,000 pieces of mail, including

⁵²"U.S. Neutrality Fight Turns on What Is Best for Country," Newsweek, 14 (September 25, 1939), 25.

⁵³Ibid., p. 26.

⁵⁴Newsweek, 14 (October 2, 1939), 25.

⁵⁵Newsweek, 13 (March 20, 1939), 16.

10,000 telegrams, reached the Senate post office. Thousands of the letters were traced to followers of Father Coughlin and to members of other pressure groups.⁵⁶

Nevertheless, four days after the President's message to Congress, a bill drafted by Pittman, Thomas and Connally was submitted to the Foreign Relations Committee. The Republican committee members and Clark, the lone dissident Democrat, were not invited to express their views as the bill was reported out by a sixteen to seven vote. Twenty-four senators had met daily in Johnson's office while the new bill was being drafted; although forecasts of "sure" Administration votes ranged from forty-four to seventy-two, Johnson claimed twenty-four "die-hards" that would not be swayed.

On October 2nd, over 1,000 people attempted to jam into the Senate gallery seating 450 for the opening day of debate.⁵⁷ As debate started, Barkley said:

I think I am not exaggerating when I say that the discussion of the pending joint resolution during its consideration by the Senate may go down in history as one of the historic discussions of the Senate of the United States.⁵⁸

⁵⁶"Peace Blizzard," Newsweek, 14 (October 2, 1939), 29.

⁵⁷"Question Marks," Time, 34 (October 16, 1939), 25.

⁵⁸U.S., Congressional Record, 76th Cong., 2nd Sess., 1939, 85, Part 1, 50.

Pittman, who would be dead in a year, opened the debate for the Administration in a speech that lasted more than an hour. For two hours, Borah, who would be dead in three months, stated with cool, withering clearness the case for isolationism, the case against "cash and carry."

The next day, Senator M. M. Logan of Kentucky died, and the Senate adjourned in respect; but on October 4th, Connally rose to speak for repeal of the Arms Embargo.

Connally's Speaking for Embargo Repeal

Connally's speaking on Arms Embargo Repeal consisted of a two-hour formal speech and several impromptu efforts scattered throughout the remainder of the twenty-six day debate. He emphasized three ideas: (1) Most Americans wish to stay out of war. (2) Most Americans', and senators', sympathies lay with the Allies in the European war. (3) Principal isolationist arguments were historically inaccurate. Connally stated his thesis immediately: "We are all sincere and earnest and honest and patriotic in our endeavors to keep out of the European war."⁵⁹

Arguments used by Connally.-- Connally knew that despite Hiram Johnson's claims of voting strength, the deluge of

⁵⁹Ibid., p. 83.

pressure group mail and the packed galleries that had cheered Borah, embargo repeal strength numbered at least forty-four senators. Connally indicated that he was not misled by the galleries' applause for Borah. He said:

Many professional people come to these galleries, not professional people in the sense of being doctors or lawyers or ministers, but professional listeners, who come here frequently with propaganda in their minds and applause in their hands to try to influence the Senate.⁶⁰

Connally also knew that all senators were aware of the Gallup polls which indicated that fifty-two to sixty-six percent of the American people favored selling arms and munitions to Great Britain and France. Near the end of debate he suggested the people's influence on senatorial opinions:

I have respect for the people and every time they go to the ballot box and express themselves, every time they elect a Representative or a Senator, they are electing something more than a suit of clothes and a hard-boiled shirt; they are electing someone they think at least has brains and courage and integrity and is willing to discuss and consider the question of war and peace.⁶¹

If American opinion favored the Allies, senators should, by their actions, reflect public opinion. Since only twenty-four senators, by Johnson's estimate, were hard-core opponents of repeal, Connally's emphasis on public opinion, with its ever-present veto of political careers, was valuable.

⁶⁰Ibid., p. 89.

⁶¹Ibid., p. 993.

Expecting favorable support from the majority of senators and the general public, Connally's primary argument was aimed at showing that an arms embargo aided Germany while harming Great Britain and France.

In developing the argument, Connally did little to disguise his personal feelings. He was an old friend of Great Britain, as his fellow senators knew, and early in the debate he revealed his prejudice: "The Siegfried Line [Germany's defense line], if it is broken, will not be broken by oratory."⁶² The Texan obviously hoped that the Allies would break the Siegfried Line with United States arms aid. He was hoping that most senators shared his prejudice.

The Texan further developed the main argument by the use of three extended hypothetical illustrations. In the first of these Connally said:

The Embargo Act applied to our citizens would mean that the highwayman who is meditating holding up the Senator from Maryland [Tydings] on his way home tonight can get all the arms, all the blackjacks, he may desire But if the Senator wants . . . to borrow a weapon . . . in order that he might defend himself, the law says, "No, you cannot do it." This aggressor has a vested right to say to the United States, "You cannot sell anybody else, in time of war, arms with which to protect himself from aggression."⁶³

⁶²Ibid., p. 83.

⁶³Ibid., p. 84.

The other illustrations, like the first, presented innocent victims beset by gangsters. They were arguments designed to appeal to Americans' sympathy for an underdog. Connally presented Great Britain and France as innocent victims of German aggression and hoped that the senators would accept this picture of outraged justice.

Connally developed the basic argument further as he pointed to a colored war map on the wall behind him to show countries adjacent to Germany who sold war materials. On the other hand, Great Britain and France, with sea power permitting trade with the United States, were prohibited from using their advantage by the Arms Embargo.

Throughout the development of the main argument Germany was called an "aggressor" who had launched a "Niagara of Terror."⁶⁴ Germany was a "highwayman,"⁶⁵ a "safecracker,"⁶⁶ a "poised rattler."⁶⁷ They were "lurking assassins"⁶⁸ who had created a "tomb of Poland"⁶⁹ and a "corpse of Austria."⁷⁰ These were unfavorable images designed to reinforce sympathy for the Allies. They were wise picture images to

⁶⁴Ibid., p. 83. ⁶⁵Ibid., p. 84. ⁶⁶Ibid., p. 85.

⁶⁷Ibid., p. 93. ⁶⁸Ibid., p. 88. ⁶⁹Ibid., p. 87.

⁷⁰Ibid., p. 88.

project to an audience that was believed to be sympathetic to Great Britain and France.

But Connally did not ignore the isolationist minority in the Senate. The principal argument of the Nye-Vandenberg bloc was the charge that munitions makers encouraged United States' entry into World War I. Connally felt that this charge could not be proved historically. In refutation of the argument, Connally read a lengthy list of ships and cargos sunk by Germany in 1914-1916.⁷¹ These sinkings, the Texan felt, were the true cause of American entry into the war. Later, he reminded Senators Nye, Clark, Lynn Frazier and Ernest Lundeen that "the propaganda that got us into the World War was the German Submarine," and declared in summary: "The munitions makers and the bankers did not drag us into the World War."⁷²

In another secondary argument, Connally refuted the Borah-Johnson bloc that argued for international law and "freedom of the seas." Connally first reminded the senators that "under international law from historic times every neutral nation has had a right to sell arms and ammunition to warring nations."⁷³ He warned that determination to sail in

⁷¹Ibid., p. 90. ⁷²Ibid., p. 435. ⁷³Ibid., p. 86.

war zones could lead to war again because "German submarines . . . wait unseen to destroy the lives of innocent American citizens if they go to sea now."⁷⁴ On October 24th, Connally attempted a compromise with the "freedom of the seas" advocates. He sponsored an amendment which relieved Pacific trade from the stringent requirements of "cash and carry" and permitted ships to go to belligerent zones where there was relatively little danger of attack.⁷⁵ Connally's compromise was wise because a few undecided senators, such as Josiah Bailey of North Carolina, announced support for repeal.

Connally also appealed to the isolationist bloc through the ethos of Borah. He readily agreed with an argument Borah had developed in the opening day. Borah had called the arms embargo "domestic legislation," unaffected by European events. Connally agreed: "It is a piece of domestic legislation relating to what our ships shall do and what they shall not do, relating to what our citizens may do and what they may not do."⁷⁶ In all, Connally used Borah as an authority twelve times. He also referred to Johnson in directing his appeal to the isolationist. Recognizing his own lack of prestige with this isolationist bloc, the Texan used personal authority only once.

⁷⁴Ibid., p. 88. ⁷⁵Ibid., p. 781. ⁷⁶Ibid., p. 836.

Connally's tactics in debate.-- The give and take of floor debate permitted Connally to use his sarcastic humor. Most of his barbs were reserved for the isolationists.

On October 24th, Connally revealed his Southern prejudice as he refuted Lundeen's argument that the United States should seize British and French bases in the Western Hemisphere in payment for World War I debts. Connally suggested: "Why not go over and take Ethiopia and repopulate it with some of our own citizens here at home?"⁷⁷

Connally's humor was usually more pertinent. The isolationists, with outside support from Herbert Hoover and Charles Lindbergh, offered to compromise by selling the Allies defensive weapons only. Connally contended: "The only way in which we could make a distinction would be to write on one [of the tanks], 'This is for offense,' and write on the other [tank], 'This is for defense.'"⁷⁸ While arguing against the "defensive weapon" amendment, Connally told a story concerning Robert Toombs, the Georgian. Just prior to the Civil War, Toombs was making wild speeches on the stump and said, "Why, we in the South can whip the Yankees with cornstalks." After the war someone who had heard him say this asked him what had happened. "Well," said Toombs, "I did say that, but

⁷⁷Ibid., p. 437.

⁷⁸Ibid., p. 440.

the trouble was the damnyankees would not fight us with cornstalks."⁷⁹ The story was appropriate. No one could forecast the defensive weapons needed in a war because no one could determine the type of weapons to be used by an enemy. The "defensive weapon" amendment was defeated.

The floor debate also resulted in personal exchanges between Connally and other senators. The Texan concentrated on three isolationists who were particularly active during the embargo debate--Lundeen, Clark and Wheeler.

When Lundeen advocated confiscation of British and French territories in the Western Hemisphere, Connally charged that Lundeen "covers our position . . . with slime and abuse."⁸⁰ And to Lundeen's suggestion that Connally might possibly be wrong, the Texan admitted:

That would not be the first time the Senator from Texas made a mistake. He makes many of them. But when he has found that he has made a mistake, he tries to correct it. Some people never do. There are those who, like the Hapsburgs, "never learn anything and never forget anything."⁸¹

At one point, Clark, who was at constant odds with Connally, rose to say, "I am astonished" "It is not the first time the Senator has been astonished," Connally interrupted.⁸² Connally pressed the attack on Clark further by

⁷⁹Ibid., p. 903.

⁸⁰Ibid., p. 436.

⁸¹Ibid., p. 437.

⁸²Ibid., p. 436.

analyzing the Missourian: "That is the trouble with the Senator. He wants to insulate himself in a sublimated atmosphere of isolation and self-consideration."⁸³

But Connally's best sample of personal invective occurred after the final vote on the Resolution had been announced. Wheeler objected, calling the preamble a "stump speech." Several Democratic senators rose to question the fact that a "stump speech" existed in the wording of the preamble. But Connally, red of face, glasses on the tip of his nose, answered Wheeler:

The Senator . . . says it is a stump speech. Just because you are licked [on the Resolution] you cannot take it. You have not the courage to take it. I knew what the Senator's answer [to the preamble] would be. It would be just a lot of flub-dub, just a lot of "hooley." If the Senator would make more stump speeches like that preamble, he would be in better favor with the American people.⁸⁴

By now, most of the gallery had forgotten the congratulations of Barkley on a calm and courteous debate. The arms embargo was repealed sixty-three to thirty, and at 9:45 p.m., October 27, 1939, the Senate adjourned.

Aftermath

The debate was over after twenty-six days and approximately a million words from seventy senators.

⁸³Ibid., p. 438.

⁸⁴Ibid., p. 1030.

Connally's speaking during the debate was typical of what the Senate expected of him in 1939. His formal address of October 4 was elaborately prepared, in manuscript form before him, but he seldom referred to it. Indeed, two days earlier, as the Senate considered whether to adjourn for the day or to continue, Connally said: "I have just completed the remarks which I desire to make . . . but they have not yet been typed in full I can go ahead without any copy."⁸⁵ His speaking after the major address on October 4 was all impromptu, with no indication of advance preparation.

On the third day of debate, the proceedings dropped sharply in senatorial and public interest. Many thought interest dropped because both sides were reluctant to discuss basic issues.⁸⁶ Connally met the challenge of issues. He built his speech around the premise that Great Britain and France must have aid. Most senators seemed afraid to reveal their partiality for Great Britain and France. The isolationists viewed arms embargo repeal as an act to benefit munitions manufacturers and a sacrifice of traditional "freedom of the seas." Connally recognized these arguments,

⁸⁵Ibid., p. 75.

⁸⁶Kenneth G. Crawford, "Shadow-boxing in Washington," The Nation, 149 (October 14, 1939), 403.

refuted them historically and often used the isolationists' leaders as authorities.

Connally's formal speech did not reflect his wit or his talent for sarcasm, perhaps because of the solemnity of the occasion and his unaccustomed place of honor in a foreign-policy debate. As debate proceeded and public interest waned, and as repeal became virtually certain, Connally used his personal weapons more frequently. He picked the isolationists as targets. No undecided senator felt Connally's sting. As the isolationists fought a delaying battle, offering over two dozen amendments, Connally's personal examination of the amendments became more sarcastic.

Connally's speaking seemed effective. The Arms Embargo section of the Neutrality Act was repealed. Connally's work was noted. Franklin Roosevelt, who had not spoken to Connally socially since the Supreme Court battle, telephoned him offering congratulations on his speech of October 4. Roosevelt later called the repeal of the arms embargo "the most important action that has taken place in our foreign policy during my administration."⁸⁷ He signed the repeal November 4, 1939, and the United States took the first step away from isolation.

⁸⁷Connally, p. 231.

CHAPTER IV

THE CONNALLY RESOLUTION DEBATE, 1943

Connally's Audience for the Connally Resolution Debate

The seventy-eighth Congress that convened in January, 1943, was less friendly to the Roosevelt Administration than any of its five predecessors. On November 3, 1942, American voters had rejected two of every nine Congressmen. Thirteen freshmen were elected to the Senate.¹

The seventy-eighth Senate.-- The comfortable majority the New Deal enjoyed in 1939 was gone. The Senate that repealed the Arms Embargo contained sixty-nine Democrats, twenty-three Republicans, two Farmer-Laborites, one Progressive and one Independent. The seventy-eighth Senate contained fifty-seven Democrats, thirty-eight Republicans and one Progressive.

Some familiar names were gone. Borah, Lundeen, Pittman, Harrison, Ernest Gibson of Vermont, Alva Adams of Colorado and Morris Sheppard of Texas were dead. Byrnes, Louis

¹ "New Faces," Newsweek, 21 (January 18, 1943), 24.

Schwellenbach of Washington and John Miller of Arkansas had resigned their Senate seats. Seven of the thirty who had voted against Arms Embargo repeal were gone. In all, thirty men were in the Senate who were not senators in January, 1939.

Joseph H. Ball of Minnesota was a "huge young man, slow spoken and slow moving with pre-maturely gray hair and a good natured scowl."² He was a liberal Republican.

Ralph O. Brewster of Maine was "bald and friendly, intelligent and perceptive with a quick, dry, rather ironic humor and a pleasant manner."³ Brewster was a conservative Republican.

Harold H. Burton of Ohio was "frank and forthright," and his ideas, while not "startling in originality," were "sincere and honest."⁴ A pre-war isolationist, Burton had become liberal in foreign affairs.

Harlan J. Bushfield of South Dakota, "a tall spare fellow with a long face and a mop of white hair, who strongly resembled Andrew Jackson,"⁵ was a "conservative machine politician."⁶ Connally lectured him during a Senate debate:

²Allen Drury, A Senate Journal 1943-1945 (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1963), p. 26.

³Ibid., p. 38. ⁴Ibid., p. 32. ⁵Ibid., p. 42.

⁶"Senate's New Faces," Time, 40 (November 16, 1942), 16.

I know of his zeal and his daily attendance here and his study of all these measures, but I suggest to him that the most effective way to legislate is to deal with one particular angle of a matter, and take action on it, without seeking to cover the whole earth.⁷

Albert B. Chandler of Kentucky, "overwhelmingly friendly and impulsive," spoke with an "excitable good humor."⁸ Connally said Chandler's "head will not have any cause to ache, because he does not worry about anything."⁹

James O. Eastland of Mississippi was a "youthful, round-faced, slow-talking gentleman with a deep devotion to the Constitution and States' Rights."¹⁰

Homer Ferguson of Michigan was a "jurist investigator . . . Detroit's symbol of civic virtue,"¹¹ with an "outstanding talent for cross-examination."¹² He and Connally battled many times. The Texan said Ferguson might "be junior [Senator] in some respects, of course, but he is senior in vilification and abuse and insinuation. I award him the

⁷U.S., Congressional Record, 78th Cong., 1st Sess., 1943, 89, Part 3, 3886.

⁸Drury, p. 64.

⁹U.S., Congressional Record, 78th Cong., 2nd Sess., 1944, 90, Part 7, 8906.

¹⁰Drury, p. 44.

¹¹Time, 40 (November 16, 1942), 16.

¹²Drury, p. 21.

doctor of philosophy degree with regard to those things."¹³

Albert W. Hawkes of New Jersey was former president of Congoleum-Nairn, Incorporated.¹⁴ Connally had "the highest regard and respect" for Hawkes.¹⁵

William Langer of North Dakota, "a man of great violence and great anger," was the "maverick of the Senate,"¹⁶ and saw himself as the "champion of the underprivileged."¹⁷ He was one of the last isolationists.

John L. McClellan of Arkansas, "sound, reasonable, intelligent,"¹⁸ was a "New Dealer, but no rubber stamp."¹⁹

Ernest W. McFarland of Arizona was "honest and decent. His instincts are right and he follows them with considerable diligence."²⁰ According to McFarland, when he was a freshman senator he "turned to Connally for advice, which was always willingly given."²¹

¹³U.S., Congressional Record, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., 1947, 93, Part 8, 10404.

¹⁴Time, 40 (November 16, 1942), 16.

¹⁵U.S., Congressional Record, 79th Cong., 1st Sess., 1945, 91, Part 3, 3401.

¹⁶Drury, p. 27.

¹⁷"New Faces," Time, 36 (November 18, 1940), 19.

¹⁸Drury, p. 40. ¹⁹Time, 40 (November 16, 1942), 16.

²⁰Drury, p. 21.

²¹U.S., Congressional Record, 82nd Cong., 2nd Sess., 1952, 98, Part 3, 4050.

Eugene D. Millikin of Colorado was "a very bald, plain man with prominent dark eyes, a wide, generous mouth and a lot of intelligence."²² Connally said Millikin was one of several Republicans of whom he was "fond."²³

E. H. Moore of Oklahoma, seventy-one years old, was an oil millionaire who had changed his party affiliation to Republican.²⁴ Once, when Moore was being quizzed about slant drilling for oil, Connally said, "Under the circumstances under which he got here [by switching parties], I think he has a slant on the whole State, or the State has a slant on him, one way or the other."²⁵

Kenneth S. Wherry of Nebraska--"lawyer, funeral director, farmer, owner of three automobile agencies"²⁶--"had a blustering, impatient, didactic manner."²⁷ Connally said that he and Wherry "often chatted. But we never allowed our mutual goodwill to affect our political views. Wherry

²²Drury, p. 36.

²³Tom Connally, My Name Is Tom Connally, as told to Alfred Steinberg (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Company, 1954), p. 312.

²⁴Time, 40 (November 16, 1942), 16.

²⁵U.S., Congressional Record, 78th Cong., 2nd Sess., 1944, 90, Part 4, 5629.

²⁶Time, 40 (November 16, 1942), 16. ²⁷Drury, p. 41.

was most positive, given to discursiveness and superficiality and addicted to name-calling."²⁸

Connally's position in the seventy-eighth Senate.--

Connally's task was to guide a postwar resolution through the rather confused seventy-eighth Senate. In domestic matters, Connally was still regarded as one of the Southern-bloc leaders. Since 1939, he had helped to block anti-lynching legislation, had fought an anti-poll tax bill and, in 1943, had co-sponsored the Smith-Connally Act, which prohibited strikes in defense industries.

More importantly, Connally succeeded to the Foreign Relations Committee chairmanship on July 31, 1941. The Texan was, by committee position, the chief Administration foreign policy spokesman in the Senate, but by January, 1943, Connally had led only one major foreign policy debate: the further repeal of certain sections of the Neutrality Act in late 1941. Because of his lack of aggressive leadership in reporting a postwar cooperation resolution, Time called him "an old political gasburner,"²⁹ and more than once referred to him as a "minor statesman."

²⁸Connally, p. 311.

²⁹"Default," Time, 42 (October 4, 1943), 22.

But though the press was often critical, Connally's personal popularity among colleagues remained high. Sheridan Downey of California called Connally "a distinguished leader of the Senate, the man who may very greatly guide us in the stormy postwar era."³⁰ Lister Hill of Alabama called Connally "a good friend."³¹ John McClellan of Arkansas wrote:

When he [Connally] addressed the Senate, his fellow colleagues on both sides of the aisle gave him their fullest attention. He always knew his subject well and was able to impress and influence others. Few men, if any, that I have known could be more persuasive and convincing.³²

And even though little concrete legislation had been passed, Connally's chairmanship of the prestige committee of the Senate gave him a degree of authority not enjoyed during the Arms Embargo debate.

The Search for Peace

Even during the early stages of World War II, the government of the United States started planning for a postwar organization dedicated to peace and international justice.

³⁰U.S., Congressional Record, 78th Cong., 1st Sess., 1943, 89, Part 6, 7907.

³¹Ibid., p. 8016.

³²Letter from Hon. John McClellan, United States Senator from Arkansas, September 1, 1964.

The Declaration of the United Nations.-- In late December, 1941, Winston Churchill came to the United States for meetings with President Roosevelt. The meetings were designed to draft a declaration of intention for the twenty-six nations at war with Germany, Italy and Japan. Connally and other Congressional leaders met with the two leaders to work on the drafting of a declaration. The Declaration of the United Nations was ready for signatures by January 1, 1942.

The Declaration contained two points: (1) each government pledged employment of full resources against the enemy and (2) each government pledged cooperation with the other United Nations in not negotiating a separate armistice with any Axis power. The document was the first step in creation of the United Nations Organization. Connally called the document "an historic and significant declaration."³³

The B2H2 Resolution.-- In Spring, 1942, the State Department organized an Advisory Committee on Post-War Foreign Policy. The committee--composed of State Department officials, Congressional members and a few private citizens--was to plan an effective postwar organization to replace the

³³Connally, p. 225.

League of Nations. Hull appointed Connally and Warren Austin to represent the Senate.

In March, 1943, two Democrats, Lister Hill of Alabama and Carl Hatch of New Mexico, and two Republicans, Ball and Burton, submitted the "B₂H₂ Resolution" to the Senate. The Resolution encouraged United States initiative in forming an organization to (1) finish the war; (2) establish temporary governments in Axis-controlled countries; (3) administer postwar rehabilitation; (4) set up machinery for settlement of future disputes between the nations and (5) provide for a United Nations world police force.³⁴ The Resolution, on a parliamentary technicality, was not debated and was pigeonholed by the Foreign Relations Committee.

A week later, on March 24th, the Foreign Relations Committee agreed unanimously to submit all pending and impending postwar resolutions to a sub-committee of eight members--La Follette, Vandenberg, Elbert Thomas, White, George, Gillette, Barkley, and Connally. Seven resolutions were immediately sent to the new group. Connally emphasized that discussions were to be "general," that the "whole field" would receive "the very closest and best" consideration.³⁵

³⁴"Declaration to the World," Time, 41 (March 22, 1943), 11.

³⁵The New York Times, April 1, 1943, p. 8.

Action in other postwar fields.-- Some action in postwar planning had begun. A forty-four nation meeting on postwar food problems was held in Hot Springs, Virginia. In May, the United States and Great Britain sent representatives to Bermuda to discuss the refugee problem. Other conferences with the remaining United Nations were planned to discuss problems of monetary policy, health and transportation.

Further, the United Nations acting together organized the first international executive agency to function in World War II: a United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration to feed and clothe liberated peoples.³⁶

The Fulbright Resolution.-- In June, a freshman Congressman, James William Fulbright of Arkansas, introduced the following resolution:

Resolved by the House of Representatives (the Senate concurring) that the Congress hereby expresses itself as favoring the creation of appropriate international machinery with power adequate to establish and maintain a just and lasting peace among the nations of the world, and as favoring participation by the United States therein.³⁷

The Fulbright Resolution served as a catalytic agent that drew together internationalist Congressmen of varying political and economic philosophy. Even Representatives Hamilton

³⁶"The Job Starts," Time, 41 (June 21, 1943), 17.

³⁷"Post-war Catalyst," Time, 41 (June 28, 1943), 15.

Fish of New York and John M. Vorys of Ohio, two pre-Pearl Harbor isolationists, favored the Resolution and its rapid acceptance indicated substantial bipartisan agreement on basic elements of postwar foreign policy. Connally emphasized that any postwar planning resolution approved by the Senate would be "one of our own making."³⁸ The Fulbright Resolution was pigeonholed.

The Mackinac Resolution.-- During the Congressional recess in August, Republican leaders assembled at Mackinac Island, Michigan, to draft certain planks of the 1944 party platform. One was a plank on postwar cooperation, and the Republicans went much further than critics predicted. The Republicans now favored "responsible participation by the United States in postwar cooperative organizations among sovereign nations to prevent military aggression and to attain permanent peace with organized justice in a free world."³⁹

The Mackinac Declaration accomplished two purposes:

- (1) it permitted Democrats and Republicans to collaborate thereafter in the pursuit of a commonly-shared objective and
- (2) it effectively averted a threatened split within the

³⁸The New York Times, June 18, 1943, p. 5.

³⁹"Battle of Mackinac," Time, 42 (September 20, 1943), 20.

Republican party over the issue of international peace and American security after World War II. The Declaration, with precise meaning deliberately left vague, united the major factions within the party since both internationalist-inclined and isolationist-trained Republicans interpreted the Declaration as a statement of their own position.

The Connally Resolution.-- Congress reconvened September 14, 1943. As the House passed the Fulbright Resolution, 360-29, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee studied twelve proposals. They were:

1. SR 22, by Mr. Wiley, inviting the President to join with the Senate in the creation of a Foreign Relations Advisory Council.
2. SR 76, by Mr. Pepper, authorizing the appointment of a sub-committee of the Committee on Foreign Relations to be known as the Committee on Reoccupation and Reconstruction.
3. SR 91, by Mr. Gillette, approving the basic principles of the Atlantic Charter.
4. SR 99, by Mr. Thomas, favoring the calling of a conference to formulate a program in international economic cooperation.
5. SR 114, the B₂H₂ Resolution.
6. SCR 10, by Mr. Kilgore, requesting the President to invite foreign governments to participate in an international constitutional convention to draft a constitution providing for an international government.
7. SR 135, by Mr. Pepper, relating to membership of the United States in the United Nations in order to implement the Atlantic Charter.
8. SJR 56, by Mr. Thomas, relating to the participation of the United States in the establishment of a just and lasting peace.
9. SJR 60 by Mr. La Follette, establishing a committee to provide for the formation of a pan-American Legislative Union.

10. SCR 16, by Mr. Vandenberg and Mr. White, relating to America's postwar plans.
11. HCR 25, the Fulbright Resolution.
12. JR 84, by Mr. Wilson, requesting the President to invite friendly nations to enter upon consultation with delegates of the United States with a view to the promotion of permanent international peace.⁴⁰

On October 13, 1943, by a vote of seven to one, with La Follette dissenting, the sub-committee reported a resolution to the full committee. The full committee reported it out by a vote of twenty to two after strong opposition from Pepper, who favored a less vague statement. Connally reported the seventy-five word Resolution to the Senate:

Resolved, by the Senate of the United States: That the war against all our enemies be waged until complete victory is achieved: That the United States cooperate with its comrades-in-arms in securing a just and honorable peace: That the United States acting through its constitutional processes join with free and sovereign nations in the establishment and maintenance of international authority with power to prevent aggression and to preserve the peace of the world.⁴¹

Controversy started immediately over the merits of the resolution which Connally called "the best possible . . . that could be secured."⁴² The New Republic called it a "practically meaningless compromise proposal,"⁴³ but Newsweek

⁴⁰U.S., Congressional Record, 78th Cong., 1st Sess., 1943, 89, Part 7, 8663.

⁴¹The New York Times, October 14, 1943, p. 1.

⁴²Ibid., October 15, 1943, p. 1.

⁴³"The Senate and the Peace," The New Republic, 109 (October 25, 1943), 555.

reported that it "promised to be a momentous document in American and world history."⁴⁴

The Senate, Connally and Postwar Collaboration

The essential characteristics of the new Congress were not pleasant for the Administration to contemplate. The New Deal's emotional opposition, conservative Republicans and reactionary Democrats, had a firm majority in both branches of Congress. By March, the seventy-eighth Congress was in revolt against Franklin Roosevelt.⁴⁵ Legislation favored by Roosevelt did not face an encouraging future, and the President favored legislation pledging United States participation in a postwar international organization. Did the Senate favor such legislation?

In late January, 1943, Senator Wagner, an Administration supporter, declared that he would introduce a resolution calling for a joint planning committee--three members to be appointed from the Senate, three from the House and six by the President. However, Wagner never introduced his resolution although a similar resolution was re-introduced by Senator Wiley.

⁴⁴"We'll Cooperate with World, But Question Is, How?" Newsweek, 22 (October 25, 1943), 42.

⁴⁵T.R.B., "Washington Notes," The New Republic, 108 (March 8, 1943), 316.

Senator Wiley was not happy with the consideration Connally gave his resolution. On February 25, in a Senate speech, he said:

For eight months last year the resolution . . . lay in the dusty, musty pigeonholes of the Committee on Foreign Relations without consideration, and it is there now, to be resurrected, I hope, if my remarks have any effect There has been no mediation on the resolution. No study or analysis of it has been made by the committee. The resolution has been frozen in the committee.⁴⁶

Introduction of the B₂H₂ Resolution in March was encouraging for several reasons: (1) it was introduced by senators not in the mainstream of Senate foreign policy planning; (2) it committed the Senate to postwar world cooperation and (3) two of the sponsors were members of the opposition party.⁴⁷

The four sponsors of the B₂H₂ Resolution, with Connally and Wagner, met with Secretary Hull and the President. Ball explained that the Resolution represented a "minimum as to what the United States and other United Nations might agree upon."⁴⁸ Connally promised that the legislation would receive "due" consideration and study from his committee, but

⁴⁶U.S., Congressional Record, 78th Cong., 1st Sess., 1943, 89, Part 1, 1297.

⁴⁷[Potomac], "The Senator from Minnesota," The New Republic, 108 (May 31, 1943), 728.

⁴⁸Time, 41 (March 22, 1943), 11.

he indicated that before acceptance it would undergo material redrafting.⁴⁹ Connally reported later that the B₂H₂ Senators were unaware of the joint study occurring between the Foreign Relations Committee and the State Department. Although the President publicly approved the Resolution in theory, Connally reported that Roosevelt said: "Those Senators are hurting our efforts for a workable international organization."⁵⁰

Roosevelt's statement seemed accurate. In late April the Associated Press informally polled the Senate asking: "Do you favor committing the Senate and country now to a post-war course of preserving the peace through an international police force?" Only twenty-four senators answered "yes," thirty-two answered "no" and forty declined to comment.⁵¹

But in mid-July, Vandenberg, once solidly isolationist, co-sponsored with White a resolution for postwar cooperation which avoided specific commitments.⁵²

Further, Henry Cabot Lodge, in an impressive Senate speech, stressed national self-interest as dependent upon international cooperation. The applause which greeted the

⁴⁹The New York Times, March 16, 1943, p. 1.

⁵⁰Connally, p. 263.

⁵¹"First Roll Call," Time, 41 (April 26, 1943), 17.

⁵²"The Great Debate," Time, 42 (July 12, 1943), 24.

speech suggested that isolation as a foreign policy approach was becoming outmoded.⁵³

However, Connally was under pressure from the Administration to delay action on a postwar resolution. In August, he was overheard saying, "We'd better hurry up and adjourn or some damn fool will be bringing up a postwar resolution or the poll-tax."⁵⁴

Connally cited sound reasons for delay in formulating a postwar resolution. Unlimited and unrestricted debate over such a resolution should be held only when the positions of our allies were understood more fully. He said:

The United States cannot alone provide a pattern of international peace machinery and impose it upon the will of the allies. The United Nations must be consulted and issues involved in the war must be considered.⁵⁵

Another hazard of early debate on delicate international issues, Connally brought out, was the danger of partisan politics dominating the discussions. The Texan felt there should be "no partisan debate." He thought that "the disposition of some parties to drag in political considerations is already apparent."⁵⁶ In short, Connally wanted to report a resolution

⁵³"Post-war Realist," Time, 41 (June 28, 1943), 15.

⁵⁴"Post-War Gold Brick," The Nation, 157 (November 6, 1943), 519.

⁵⁵The New York Times, September 25, 1943, p. 8.

⁵⁶Ibid.

out of committee when he was sure that it would pass with a big majority and a minimum of debate that could damage United States-Allied relations.

As Congress adjourned in August, the B₂H₂ sponsors reported that they would demand debate on the Resolution when Congress reconvened. Throughout August, eight teams of Congressmen--one Democrat and one Republican to a team--toured twenty-six states, speaking in favor of B₂H₂. Touring senators included, besides the four sponsors, Truman, Ferguson and Burnet Maybank.

Congressmen returned to Washington in September and reported that public opinion favored United States participation in postwar international agencies. But public opinion had not agreed on details. An international police force was favored by fifty-seven percent. Fifty percent wanted a new League of Nations.⁵⁷

Still, the Foreign Relations Committee refused to report any resolution. Ball threatened to attach the B₂H₂ Resolution to another bill unless the Committee acted "in a reasonable time."⁵⁸ Newspapers scolded the Committee, and

⁵⁷"What Congressmen Found Out When They Went Back Home," Newsweek, 22 (September 13, 1943), 18.

⁵⁸"The Awakening," Time, 42 (October 11, 1943), 17.

Committee members received stacks of letters from angry constituents.

The Foreign Relations Committee represented the varied viewpoints on postwar planning in the Senate. Elbert Thomas, White, Barkley, Robert Reynolds, McClellan, John Tunnell, Wagner, James Murray, Claude Pepper and Theodore Green favored a strong resolution. Robert La Follette, Vandenberg, George, Guy Gillette, Arthur Capper and James Davis favored a vague statement. Clark, Nye, Johnson and Henrik Shipstead were in opposition to any resolution.⁵⁹

Finally, the Committee drafted the seventy-five word Connally Resolution, and senators quickly condemned and praised the committee's work. Ball said, "The Resolution merely would place the Senate on record as having caught up to the will of the American people."⁶⁰ Pepper felt that the resolution was one of "appeasement to some opposition they dare not arouse. All it will do is to afford a political umbrella to those who might like to get out of the rain of public indignation next year."⁶¹ To White, the Resolution meant

⁵⁹Blair Bolles, "Senators and the Peace," The Nation, 157 (October 16, 1943), 426-28.

⁶⁰"Quibbling," Time, 42 (November 8, 1943), 17.

⁶¹Ibid.

endorsement of a world police force; to Vandenberg and Austin, approval of a world court. But George, who opposed a police force, favored the Resolution, as did Nye.

On October 22, 1943, Connally reported that the committee Resolution recognized the impossibility of blue-printing "a plan for curing all the ills of the world." He urged that the Connally Resolution be accepted as a forward step toward the objectives of "all who believe in peace" and as "a contribution to cooperation among the nations of the earth" in the postwar period.⁶² However, the B₂H₂ Senators warned that unless the full Foreign Relations Committee made the Resolution more definite, they would take their fight for "strengthening and clarifying" amendments to the Senate floor.⁶³

So, praised by supporters and condemned by critics for substantially the same reason, the Connally Resolution faced what many believed to be the most important Senate debate on international affairs since the rejection of the Versailles treaty and the League of Nations covenant twenty-four years earlier. In October, Connally intimated to friends that he faced an opportunity that could preserve his name for

⁶²The New York Times, October 23, 1943, p. 5.

⁶³"Accouchement," Time, 42 (October 25, 1943), 19.

history, and he took this attitude into the postwar cooperation debate.

Connally's Speaking During the Connally Resolution Debate

Seventy-seven senators answered roll call on October 25, 1943. Connally rose to open the "great debate," defending Senate Resolution 192, which pledged the United States to participate in a postwar international organization.

Connally's formal speech--October 25, 1943.-- Connally was in a humorous mood before debate began. Just before the Texan spoke, Danaher submitted an amendment precisely defining almost every word of the resolution. As the clerk read the long, clarifying statement, Connally asked: "Is Webster's Unabridged Dictionary offered as an exhibit or appendix to the pending resolution?"⁶⁴

Connally's opening speech, the only prepared address he made during the debate, was a studied attempt to appeal to all factions of the Senate. The Texan, anxious to avoid extended debate, gave the senators nothing with which to disagree and devoted much of his time to tracing the development of international peace movements. Citing historical peace

⁶⁴U.S., Congressional Record, 78th Cong., 1st Sess., 1943, 89, Part 7, 8662.

plans of Abbe' de Saint-Pierre, Immanuel Kant and Jeremy Bentham, Connally declared that "the ideal of international peace . . . has thrilled the imagination of men for more than a century.⁶⁵ Connally traced the evolution of peace machinery from the "establishment of agencies to settle disputes between individuals," and the assumption of authority over feudal barons by the crown," to the establishment of the United States Constitution and the formulation of a League of Nations.⁶⁶ Such development was designed to assure senators of the historic naturalness of the step before them.

Connally utilized the remaining time in directing appeals to the most widely separated factions in the Senate: the bitter-end isolationists and the liberal B₂H₂ internationalists.

Aware that the isolationists numbered less than ten, Connally felt secure in reminding them that they had been wrong twice in the past. First, they had defeated the League of Nations in 1919, but the League had not failed. Connally indicated the League's usefulness:

It has demonstrated where the pitfalls may lie and where any international organization for peace must be strengthened or buttressed The history of the League

⁶⁵Ibid., p. 8663.

⁶⁶Ibid.

ought to lighten the pathway along which nations may travel in the years to come.⁶⁷

Second, the isolationists had sought neutrality as the guarantee of peace while Hitler was "secretly arming and marching and drilling a mighty army" and on the other side of the world "the crafty Japanese for twenty years had been preparing for the hour they could strike the United States."⁶⁸

Only through the joint action of nations could aggressors be brought to justice. Nations needed to work together for peace as well as war. "Isolation has failed. Let us try collective security," Connally concluded.⁶⁹

Connally recognized that many of the liberal internationalists opposed the vagueness of the Connally Resolution. To them, he defended generality:

It is broad in its terms for the reason that it is advanced as a framework within which the makers of the treaty may provide the detailed structure and the particular delineation and affirmative provisions that may be necessary to accomplish the desired ends.⁷⁰

The duty of the Senate was first to advise and finally to consent, but Connally warned that they could not "expect all other nations to accept it [the Resolution] in detail." The Senate could not "blueprint in advance the action of the

⁶⁷Ibid., p. 8664.

⁶⁸Ibid., p. 8665.

⁶⁹Ibid.

⁷⁰Ibid., p. 8664.

nations whose influence, power and arms must secure the desired results."⁷¹

Connally tried to unite the widely divergent groups with an appeal that stressed the greatness of America. The United States, he said, could be powerful in world peace councils, as it was powerful in war. He concluded:

From our commanding point of vantage we must declare to the world that our influence and our might will be dedicated to the maintenance of world peace and the suppression of military aggression whenever it may lift its venomous head.⁷²

The speech was over. It was short and general, composed of many ideas designed to find general acceptance. Senate inaction might permit future wars and war brought "sacrifice, misery and tragedy,"⁷³ to the world; war was "cruel and barbaric;"⁷⁴ war had "sorrowed thousands of homes . . . orphaned many thousands of children . . . wasted the national wealth . . . injured our commerce . . . and forced staggering sacrifices on all our people."⁷⁵ Senate action could secure peace and peace was a "hope,"⁷⁶ an "ideal,"⁷⁷ a "hunger,"⁷⁸ a "dream,"⁷⁹ a "sublime objective"⁸⁰ that

⁷¹Ibid. ⁷²Ibid., p. 8665. ⁷³Ibid., p. 8663.

⁷⁴Ibid. ⁷⁵Ibid., p. 8664. ⁷⁶Ibid.

⁷⁷Ibid., p. 8663. ⁷⁸Ibid., p. 8664.

⁷⁹Ibid., p. 8663. ⁸⁰Ibid., p. 8665.

combined our "highest hopes and best aspirations."⁸¹

Clearly, Connally's attitude indicated that he wanted and expected little debate. He had not refuted any of the twelve resolutions nor compared them with the Connally Resolution. He read the Resolution, commented favorably on its general terminology and appealed for American leadership in the postwar world.

Connally's speaking during debate.-- During the two-week debate, Connally's speaking reflected three different moods.

For two days, the Texan's speaking was tinged with truculence, bitterness and sarcasm, apparently triggered by his realization that the B₂H₂ Senators, arguing for a stronger resolution, were going to prolong debate. On the opening day of debate, Senators Pepper, Ball, Burton, Hatch, Hill, Bridges, Downey, Maybank, Guffey, Green, Murray, Truman, Kilgore and Ferguson submitted an amendment to Senate Resolution 192 which guaranteed United States membership in an international organization. These were the Senators who provoked Connally's wrath.

Early in debate, Connally admitted he did not possess the powers with which the B₂H₂ group apparently predicted

⁸¹Ibid.

Allies' views toward a postwar cooperation resolution. He said:

If I had the intellectual, astronomical ability simply to look across the earth and see the leading powers among all the nations that are going to sit in on the peace treaty and if I could place the microscope of intellectual inspection upon them to examine what they are going to do, even then I could not tell the Senate what these nations will do when they get together and argue and construct the treaty and the instrumentality about which we are speaking.⁸²

Connally called the resolution an "authorization" with "appropriation" coming later. However, the B₂H₂ Senators disagreed, and the Texan battled them for two days.

Pepper initiated action by asking if he could "attract the attention" of Connally. "The Senator from Florida always attracts the attention of the Senator from Texas,"⁸³ Connally snapped. Pepper wondered about the phrase "free and sovereign" nations. Who was "free and sovereign?" Would France be eligible? Connally exploded:

The Senator from Florida is a cultured gentleman. He was schooled at Harvard. I do not know whether he ever went to Groton, but he is from Harvard. If he does not know what "free" means, I cannot tell him, and I decline to be interrogated on a fundamental question of what the word "free" means.⁸⁴

⁸²Ibid., p. 8672.

⁸³Ibid., p. 8671.

⁸⁴Ibid., p. 8672.

Pepper wished to submit an invitation to the French government in exile. Connally found it hard to believe that Pepper wanted "to create this international agency tomorrow and the day after tomorrow admit France under the leadership of Laval and with Hitler's bayonets sticking in the ribs."⁸⁵

Connally complained to the other B₂H₂ Senators that he was "not here to be heckled and browbeaten."⁸⁶ He reminded Ball of his words of early September: "For months . . . [Ball] had threatened that if we did not report the resolution promptly he would move to discharge the committee and get action. Now we have it here and we cannot get action."⁸⁷ Ball protested that he was delighted a resolution had been reported. Connally was unconvinced:

Yes, the Senator got action, which he did not want, and because he got it he is sore, and mad, and is trying to smear and emasculate the resolution and tell the rest of the world that it is not any good and does not amount to anything--helping us a good deal with foreign nations, and in the war effort.⁸⁸

Hatch entered the word battle to comment that a group of Washington ministers had communicated to him a desire to address the Foreign Relations Committee but were refused. Connally reminded the B₂H₂ group that they had little prestige. "If the ministers wanted to get in contact with the Foreign

⁸⁵Ibid. ⁸⁶Ibid. ⁸⁷Ibid., p. 8732. ⁸⁸Ibid.

Relations Committee and . . . went to the Senator from New Mexico [Hatch], they went to the wrong place,"⁸⁹ Connally asserted. Pepper rejoined the battle and suggested that Connally was disagreeing with an interpretation of the Resolution made by the ministerial committee chairman. The Texan bitterly corrected Pepper: "I do not disagree with someone who is not here. I disagree with the Senator from Florida, who is here, looking me in the eye. Is that plain? Does the Senator understand that?"⁹⁰

The Pepper-Connally feud, simmering since Pepper's opposition to the Resolution in committee, exploded the next day in one last bitter exchange. Pepper said a Connally statement had "an element of correctness" in it. Connally indignantly said:

The Senator says "an element of correctness." I was either correct or not correct The Senator from Texas wants other Senators to respect his integrity and his sincerity, that is all he wants. When the Senator from Florida says that . . . he is insulting.⁹¹

Pepper had taken enough abuse for his relatively inoffensive statements. He gave Connally a rare verbal lashing. Pepper said:

First, when he had answered questions not more than fifteen minutes yesterday, he advised the Senate in a moment of noticeable impatience, that the debate had degenerated into a heckling; and he was the chairman of the committee

⁸⁹Ibid. ⁹⁰Ibid., p. 8733. ⁹¹Ibid., p. 8735.

who should have been the authentic voice telling his fellow Senators what this resolution meant He has been impatient with debate. He did not desire debate and now every time a remark is made here he seems to take it as a personal affront I do not like to have the Senator not give me opportunity to correct my statement without making a spectacle of an offense upon the floor of the Senate.⁹²

The battle was over. It was an unnecessarily rude affair on both sides. The B2H2 group, particularly Pepper, had asked a number of unnecessary and obvious questions attempting to make Connally admit that terminology was vague. On the other hand, Connally's answers were usually brusque to the point of rudeness. The Texan's attacks on Ball and Hatch were unprovoked, and constituted poor strategy in view of the popularity of the two Senators.

The scolding by Pepper changed Connally's attitude. For the next three days, he adopted a pose of bored indifference to all speeches and read newspapers in the Senate chamber. His guise of indifference merely concealed frustration. The guise was broken twice.

First, he upbraided the Senate for delay. Secretary Hull was in Moscow at a Foreign Ministers conference and Connally felt that passage of the resolution would aid Hull. He worried that "while that conference is under way, we are

⁹²Ibid., p. 8736.

here wrangling over whether an 'an' should be inserted somewhere in the Resolution and whether 'organization' and 'authority' are of equal dignity."⁹³ Later in the week, the Texan dropped his indifferent pose again when his sincerity toward international cooperation was questioned. Connally, remembering that Ball, Burton, Maybank, Kilgore and Ferguson were freshman senators, reminded the Senate of his record.

Those have been my views for twenty-five years or longer. I am not a new convert I have surrendered nothing of principle. I may have surrendered phraseology. Are the Senators so afraid . . . that they must instruct . . . in minutiae? Must we tell . . . where to put a comma and where to put a period?⁹⁴

During the last week Connally ceased to pretend indifference and became a long-suffering martyr striving for action. Every day of the last week he asked for debate restrictions which forced the B₂H₂ Senators to object, a practice they preferred not to employ because of the accepted practice of Senatorial courtesy and the sure knowledge that Connally would retaliate in some future debate.

The Texan emphasized the stalling tactics of the liberal bloc and the overall lack of genuine interest in prolonging debate. He again complained that the group "prodded and harassed" the Foreign Relations Committee and then delayed

⁹³Ibid., p. 8804.

⁹⁴Ibid., p. 8858.

debate. Connally reported the difficulty in obtaining a quorum. There were twenty-nine calls during the fourteen-day debate.

Connally made pointed references to the obvious fact that the senators were not working. Of Danaher, an old foe, he said: "The Senator cannot explain [his amendment] very well if he is going to stay in an adjoining room."⁹⁵ Later, Connally said he was "not responsible for the fact . . . that debate has been going along with empty benches for days. I have no power to compel Senators to attend" ⁹⁶ Finally, he lectured the old isolationist Shipstead: "It has been said that he wishes to speak for about an hour. He cannot speak in his office. He must speak here."⁹⁷

Connally received assistance in his battle for speed when the Foreign Ministers signed the Moscow Pact on November 1, 1943. Article four of the Pact called for establishment of a "general international organization." Fast Senate action became necessary if the United States wished to present a cooperative image to other Allied powers.

⁹⁵Ibid., p. 8869.

⁹⁶Ibid., p. 8944.

⁹⁷Ibid., p. 9107.

On November 3rd, in an effort to expedite passage of the resolution, Connally submitted two amending paragraphs.

The amendments provided:

- (1) That the Senate recognize the necessity of there being established at the earliest practicable date a general international organization, based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all peace-loving states and open to membership by all such states, large and small, for the maintenance of international peace and security.
- (2) That, pursuant to the Constitution of the United States, any treaty made to effect the purposes of this resolution, on behalf of the government of the United States with any other nation or any association of nations, shall be made only by and with the advice and consent of the Senate of the United States provided two-thirds of the Senators present concur.⁹⁸

The first paragraph, with the exception of the first three words, was the text of article four of the Moscow Pact and obviously was included to satisfy the B₂H₂ adherents. The second paragraph was added to satisfy conservative senators that passage of the resolution did not constitute their prior "consent" to a future treaty.

On November 5, 1943, with the two amendments, Senate Resolution 192 passed, eighty-five to five. The five opponents were the last of the isolationists--Johnson, Langer, Reynolds, Shipstead and Wheeler.

⁹⁸Ibid., p. 9066.

Aftermath

The "great debate" became a quibble. The failure of debate to materialize was probably attributable to the Administration's (and Connally's) analysis of the expected opposition to a postwar resolution. Connally wanted a big majority and little debate because he feared the isolationists with their anti-Allies propaganda. To achieve his twofold objective, Connally's strategy was to speak little (and then generally), avoid discussion and yet pass a resolution which later could be taken as a mandate for membership in a future international organization.

Opposition came, instead, from internationalist senators. This unexpected obstacle undoubtedly contributed to Connally's truculence in the first hours of debate. It must have been difficult for the long-time advocate of international organization to discover himself suddenly defending a resolution accused of a lack of teeth. Connally chose to assume that the resolution's general wording was wise and proper. As the Senate prepared to vote, Connally said: "I leave it to the judgment of the future as to whether, in view of the developments and the situation, the course of the committee was not a wise one, and justified and vindicated by events."⁹⁹

⁹⁹Ibid., p. 9221.

Later, Connally chose to salve the wounds opened by the rather crude debate. He thanked the Foreign Relations Committee in general and Senators George, Elbert Thomas, Barkley, Gillette, Vandenberg, White and McNary in particular. The latter senators had served on a sub-committee with Connally.

Wallace White replied:

My observation is that a committee never rises above its chairman. [Connally]. . . from the very beginning of the controversy and of this study, has manifested zeal, patience, and tolerance for the opinions of others. In the parliamentary sense he managed the progress of the Resolution with infinite skill, and he spoke in its behalf with that eloquence which always distinguishes him.¹⁰⁰

Connally's summation before the vote was probably correct. The resolution drafted by the committee was adequate. In November, 1943, blueprints for an international organization could not have been drawn. The Senate's task was to erase the record of isolation to which it had been committed for twenty-four years. The resolution accomplished that purpose. Connally had said: "In foreign relations it is of the highest importance that our country present a united front."¹⁰¹ Senate Resolution 192 was the landmark of a bipartisan foreign policy.

¹⁰⁰Ibid., p. 9313.

¹⁰¹As cited in Beverly Smith, "The Senator Loves a Fight," The Saturday Evening Post, 223 (July 1, 1950), 72.

CHAPTER V

THE UNITED NATIONS CHARTER RATIFICATION DEBATE, 1945

The Audience for the Charter Debate

The United States Constitution states: "He [the President] shall have power, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, to make treaties, provided two-thirds of the Senators present concur."¹

The Senate and treaty ratification.-- When the Senate rejected the League of Nations at the close of World War I, it solidified its image as an obstructionist body. Former United States Attorney General Wickersham said that "a body of ninety-six men of such diverse characteristics and opinions as members of the Senate is almost hopeless as an executive force but it is ideal for the purposes of obstruction,"² and John Hay wrote: "A treaty entering the Senate is like a bull going into the arena. No one can say just

¹U.S., Constitution, Art. 2, Sec. 2.

²As cited in Kenneth W. Colegrove, The American Senate and World Peace (New York: The Vanguard Press, 1944), p. 23.

how or when the final blow will fall. But one thing is certain. It will never leave the arena alive."³ In fact, however, the Senate is not a "graveyard of treaties." About two-thirds of treaties negotiated between the President and foreign powers have been accepted by the Senate.

Senator Connally was a strong defender of the Senate's role of "advice and consent." He felt that the Senate rule which required a two-thirds vote for treaty ratification was essential to a stable foreign policy, and he fought all attempts to abolish it. Senator Gillette said, and Connally agreed, that "to make treaties subject to the ratification of . . . both [the House and the Senate] . . . would almost assuredly project those treaties into turmoil and the tender mercies of a political campaign."⁴ And despite a resolution before the Senate Judiciary Committee proposing that treaties be ratified by a simple majority of both the House and Senate, both Connally and Vandenberg reminded delegates at San Francisco that the Senate had the final word in United States ratification of the United Nations Charter.

The seventy-ninth Senate.-- Isolationists--Wheeler, Johnson, Nye, La Follette, Taft and Vandenberg--suffered a

³As cited in ibid., p. 9.

⁴As cited in ibid., p. 22.

loss in prestige when the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor. But the isolationist senators had not abandoned the hope of limiting active United States participation in an international organization. They expected a strong public reaction away from internationalism at the end of World War II. But in November, 1944, with the election of the seventy-ninth Senate, the voters revealed strong internationalist sympathies by defeating most isolationist candidates. Nye, Reynolds, Danaher, Clark of Missouri, Worth Clark of Idaho, Davis of Pennsylvania and Rufus Holman of Oregon were replaced by men who pledged United States cooperation in postwar affairs.⁵ The only isolationists who won re-election, both more narrowly than expected, were Alexander Wiley and Charles Tobey. The voters expected the new senators to ratify a postwar cooperation treaty.

Homer E. Capehart of Indiana was a farmer, a radio-phono-television manufacturer and a Republican conservative.⁶

Forrest C. Donnell of Missouri was an isolationist who had defeated the isolationist Bennett Clark. Connally called Donnell "the man with the F.B.I. intellect. He probes

⁵"The New Senate," Time, 44 (November 13, 1944), 21.

⁶Allen Drury, A Senate Journal 1943-1945 (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1963), p. 485.

into these matters and imagines 'boogers' in every bush."⁷

J. William Fulbright of Arkansas was thirty-nine years old, a former Rhodes scholar, former president of the University of Arkansas and author of the Fulbright Resolution for postwar peace.⁸

Bourke B. Hickenlooper of Iowa was an able, popular ex-governor with international leanings.⁹

Clyde R. Hoey of North Carolina, sixty-seven, with a cutaway coat, bow tie and flowing hair, was a sensible man of quiet and obvious ability and an internationalist.¹⁰

Brien McMahon of Connecticut, a former United States Assistant Attorney General, had defeated the isolationist Danaher. Connally reported that he had "at all times found him [McMahon] to be honorable and able, and possessing a fine conception of public service."¹¹

Warren G. Magnuson of Washington was a "1,000% New Dealer," and a liberal veteran of four years in the House of Representatives.¹²

⁷"Texas Tom in the Bush," Time, 55 (June 5, 1950), 16.

⁸Drury, p. 224.

⁹Time, 44 (November 13, 1944), 21. ¹⁰Drury, p. 326.

¹¹U.S., Congressional Record, 81st Cong., 2nd Sess., 1950, 96, Part 11, 15513.

¹²Drury, p. 326.

Wayne Morse of Oregon was a former speech teacher, former dean of the University of Oregon law school and former public member of the War Labor Board. He promised to be a liberal Republican.¹³

Glen J. Taylor of Idaho had defeated the isolationist Clark. The former manager of a dramatic stock company, he was a liberal who won in his third political campaign.¹⁴ Taylor's liberal leanings often led him to trouble. Connally once answered him by saying that Taylor dealt in "speculation on which I do not dare to venture an opinion, because the Senator is so much better advised than I am as to what the Communists have in mind."¹⁵

Milton R. Young of North Dakota, appointed to serve John Moses' term, quiet, decent, diligent, was typified as a "little right of center."¹⁶

Connally's position in the seventy-ninth Senate.--

In the period from November, 1943, to July, 1945, Senator Connally emerged as the leading Administration spokesman on foreign policy in the Senate. He believed the Senate to be

¹³Ibid., p. 322.

¹⁴Ibid., p. 484.

¹⁵U.S., Congressional Record, 80th Cong., 2nd Sess., 1948, 94, Part 2, 2384.

¹⁶"Majority Pared," Time, 45 (March 19, 1945), 18.

an important segment of the foreign policy team. In March, 1944, when Roosevelt indicated that the Senate might be bypassed in the formulation of a peace treaty, Connally defended the right of senators to be heard. However, he viewed the senators' role in treaty making in literal terms of "advice and consent," not in terms of leadership, and he was criticized by some because his chairmanship of the Foreign Relations Committee had not "caught the vision of the way great Senate debate might inform and inspire the nation."¹⁷

In February, 1945, Roosevelt asked Connally to serve as a member of the United States delegation at the United Nations Conference in San Francisco. Connally discussed with the President the desirability of sending a bipartisan delegation. Since the Charter had to be passed as a treaty, Republican support was necessary to achieve a two-thirds majority. Upon the appointment of Republicans Vandenberg, Charles Eaton and Harold Stassen, Connally said:

The President recognized the functions of the Senate and his action indicates his desire to have the utmost cooperation I feel that the members of the Senate designated by the President as members of the delegation to the United Nations Conference will cooperate with the Executive Department in striving to secure the best possible organization for world peace and security.¹⁸

¹⁷"The Senate and the Peace," Time, 43 (March 13, 1944), 16.

¹⁸The New York Times, February 14, 1945, p. 8.

Connally's personal prestige with colleagues was at its apex during the period of Charter ratification. A fellow Southern senator, Theodore Bilbo, said: "This body was represented [at San Francisco] by one of the most intellectual and keenest brains on the floor of the Senate, a man whose patriotism has never been questioned."¹⁹

Before he left the Senate, the isolationist James Davis of Pennsylvania said: "In these trying times . . . [Connally] . . . has approached his tasks . . . with competence and determination. He has rendered a magnificent and unselfish service to the people."²⁰

The freshman senator, Fulbright, said: "I wish to pay tribute to the wisdom and foresight with which . . . [Connally] . . . so ably assisted by the members of his committee has laid the background for the adoption of this Charter."²¹ Fulbright later wrote that "the Senator was extremely effective in extemporaneous debate . . . with a great talent for attracting the attention of the Senators"

¹⁹U.S., Congressional Record, 79th Cong., 1st Sess., 1945, 91, Part 6, 8158.

²⁰Ibid., 78th Cong., 2nd Sess., 1944, 90, Part 7, 9715.

²¹Ibid., 79th Cong., 1st Sess., 1945, 91, Part 6, 7962.

He was one of the most colorful characters I have known."²²

Pepper, often a critic, said Connally "has carried on with patience, consideration and generosity to all. He enjoys the esteem and respect of the Members of the Senate."²³

Another freshman, Saltonstall, wrote:

As a whole, I liked Tom Connally and generally listened to him . . . particularly because he was the spokesman for the Administration on vitally important foreign policy questions. He was also very courteous to people who he respected . . . and he was always very friendly to me on and off the floor.²⁴

Connally had the respect of the isolationists. Shipstead of Minnesota said: "He is a great orator. He is a great statesman. I am very fond of him While we may disagree, I know that he is a great patriot . . . and that he is very conscientious in his concern for the United States."²⁵

Vandenberg, upon his return from San Francisco, said:

I want also to pay my particular tribute of affection and appreciation [to Connally] Without the faintest hint of partisanship at any time, he made it constantly

²²Letter from Hon. J. William Fulbright, United States Senator from Arkansas, September 1, 1964.

²³U.S., Congressional Record, 79th Cong., 1st Sess., 1945, 91, Part 3, 3485.

²⁴Letter from Hon. Leverett Saltonstall, United States Senator from Massachusetts, September 11, 1964.

²⁵U.S., Congressional Record, 78th Cong., 2nd Sess., 1944, 90, Part 5, 6179.

possible for each one of us representing the minority to play our full role in these deliberations. He carried some of the heaviest burdens of the conference with patience, fidelity and imminent success. He was a tower of strength to this great undertaking in every respect of its labors. He has put the nation greatly in his debt.²⁶

This statement, from the leading member of the opposition party, may have influenced greatly the Republican senators' acceptance of Connally.

The Road to Internationalism

The United States Senate moved toward international cooperation with passage of the Connally Resolution in November, 1943.

The "committee of eight."-- On March 22, 1944, Secretary of State Hull appeared before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and expressed a desire to work closely with a Senate sub-committee on the steps needed to establish a specific international organization. Connally, departing from the usual committee assignment method, which allocated a majority of seats to the majority party, chose a "committee of eight," composed of four Democrats--George, Barkley, Gillette and himself--and four Republicans--Austin, La Follette, Vandenberg and White.²⁷ Connally, by his choice of a

²⁶Ibid., 79th Cong., 1st Sess., 1945, 91, Part 5, 6981.

²⁷Tom Connally, My Name Is Tom Connally, as told to Alfred Steinberg (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell, 1954), p. 165.

bipartisan committee, got the opposition to agree with important principles of postwar cooperation. The Republicans on the "committee of eight" influenced their party colleagues in the Senate; thus the committee served to eliminate much partisan debate, which otherwise would have been inevitable, on a postwar organization.

Dumbarton Oaks.-- In an atmosphere of working bipartisanship between the Senate and the Executive, a once-delayed world security conference began in August, 1944, at Dumbarton Oaks, a sixteen acre estate in Washington's Georgetown section. Connally emphasized in a pre-conference interview that "we aim to have a League of Nations that is a going concern before the end of the war," and he described Dumbarton Oaks as "exploratory talks on an almost clerical basis."²⁸

Thirty-nine delegates represented the United States, Great Britain and Russia at the meeting. The purpose of the conference, Washington's largest international meeting since the 1921 Disarmament Conference, was to prepare a memorandum on the possible creation of a world organization to preserve the peace. The United States plan, based on Franklin Roosevelt's "Great Blueprint," called for a world assembly of all peace-loving nations, a world council dominated by the Big

²⁸The New York Times, August 17, 1944, p. 11.

Four with some representation to smaller nations, and a world court.²⁹ The Conference concluded in late September with a plan, similar to the "Great Blueprint," which called for a world organization consisting of an assembly, a council and a court of international justice.

The Mexico City Conference.-- In late February, 1945, Senate-State Department relations were maintained with the appointment of Senators Connally and Austin to represent the Senate at the Mexico City Conference. The Conference approved sixty-one resolutions, including the important adoption of the Act of Chapultepec. In Connally's words, Republican Austin and himself were instrumental in the Act's passage.³⁰ Austin paid tribute to Connally's work during the Conference. He said:

The respect and honor for the judgment of . . . [Connally] . . . which was entertained by our Latin American friends . . . paved the way for the ultimate acceptance of the very important amendments which finally were made in the Act of Chapultepec.³¹

The Act converted the unilateral Monroe Doctrine of 1823 into a multilateral hemispheric agreement and, with this

²⁹"At Dumbarton Oaks," Time, 44 (August 28, 1944), 14.

³⁰Connally, p. 270.

³¹U.S., Congressional Record, 79th Cong., 1st Sess., 1945, 91, Part 2, 2024.

declaration, the United States and Latin America abandoned an ancient Pan-American principle: that American nations should not intervene, singly or together, in each others' external affairs.

The Crimea Conference.-- Earlier in February, the principles of Dumbarton Oaks were reaffirmed at an eight-day meeting of the Big Three leaders at Yalta. A disagreement over voting rights of the big members was solved. The United Nations Conference was to convene in San Francisco, April 25th.

The San Francisco Conference.-- Roosevelt did not live to see the beginning of the San Francisco Conference but the need for international cooperation was emphasized by President Truman. The former Senator assured old congressional friends of his "intense desire" for cooperation. To Senators Connally and Vandenberg, the new chief executive said: "I'm expecting you men to do a good job at San Francisco. I'm counting on you for that."³²

Immediately before the opening of the conference, however, San Francisco became shrouded in pessimism. Some doubted that the conference would open on schedule and predictions for the ultimate success of the conference dwindled.

³²"The Thirty-Second," Time, 45 (April 23, 1945), 22.

News that the Russians were sending a second-rate delegation, and that the Big Three at Yalta had altered the voting rules of the proposed world assembly, was discouraging to small power delegations. The crowding of belated neutrals and unsavory regimes, typified by Argentina, to San Francisco heightened the pessimistic mood.³³

But the Conference began on time. The big-power draft of a world charter was based on the premise that the method of maintaining peace was to let major powers make and administer rules with a minimum of interference and assistance from lesser powers. After three weeks of debate, the premise remained intact but it had survived severe strain. The Latin American bloc, with twenty conference votes, un-animously demanded complete freedom from any checks or supervision by the Security Council. Connally and Vandenberg, aware of the Monroe Doctrine's appeal to the Senate, agreed that some concession to the Latin bloc was necessary if the Charter was to be ratified.³⁴

Connally worked under a handicap at the Conference because in late April an Associated Press release, attributed to Connally, prematurely announced the surrender of Germany.

³³"Too Soon," Time, 45 (April 9, 1945), 23.

³⁴"Peace," Time, 45 (May 21, 1945), 23.

Whatever the cause, Connally was in the background during part of the San Francisco Conference. But near the end of the Conference, when the small powers fought for recognition by reorganizing the veto authority in the Security Council, Connally defended the big-power position. Later, the small-power spokesman, Herbert Evatt of Australia, praised Connally for his eloquence in presenting the big-power stand.³⁵

The Foreign Relations Committee hearings.-- The San Francisco Conference concluded with more agreement than disagreement, and Connally and Vandenberg returned to the Senate with the United Nations Charter. Connally estimated that Foreign Relations Committee hearings would begin in early July. They would be pushed "with the greatest dispatch," and he predicted fast action on the Senate floor, but he warned a reporter:

Don't get this wrong and give the impression that I propose to railroad this measure through the Senate. I wish the debate to be conducted with every opportunity for anyone to speak who has legitimate cause. But what I do not wish to see is a session that will drag out through July and August in order to give every Senator a chance to talk indefinitely just to make an impression upon the folks back home.³⁶

³⁵The New York Times, June 15, 1945, p. 8.

³⁶Ibid., June 28, 1945, p. 12.

The hearings began and ended in five days. Representatives of scores of national organizations, leaders of church, education and women's groups, leaders of the thinning ranks of isolationists came to the caucus room on the Senate Office Building's third floor. Very little substantial argument was made against the Charter. Charter opponents had no apparent strategy for concerted attack. Many powerful national organizations went on the committee record in support of the Charter. After five days, Connally halted the hearings and called for a vote. The Charter passed by a twenty-one to one vote. Johnson voted against approval and Shipstead did not vote.³⁷ The Charter was unchanged by one reservation or one amendment. At a comparable point, the Senate had altered the League of Nations Covenant by four reservations and thirty-eight amendments.

The Senate, Connally and the United Nations

The Democratic majority in the Senate, fifty-five to forty-one, was a new low for Roosevelt's Administration. The Republican party was a full partner in the Senate and the Republican minority could no longer protest for the record and leave policy-making to the New Deal. The strong minority was

³⁷"Negative Test," Time, 46 (July 23, 1945), 22.

forced to assume partial responsibility for policy and could no longer capitalize fully on Administration errors.

The senators quickly announced their international sympathies. In January, under the direction of Fulbright and H. Alexander Smith, the new senators wrote a public letter to the President. The senators felt that the United States should take an active role in an effective peace organization if Great Britain and Russia were also willing to join. The letter, approved by Senate leaders of both parties, was signed by all freshmen senators.³⁸ Connally praised the senators' action. He said:

I feel sure that the action of these senators will be of very great help and will give impetus to what many of us have been undertaking to accomplish in the past I regard it as particularly appropriate and particularly helpful that the new Senators have addressed to the President this great letter setting forth their views.³⁹

But most important, shifts of principle occurred among the older senators. In January, during the first foreign policy debate of the session, Vandenberg, long an isolationist, said that the United States must stop discussing and act to achieve collective security. The top Republican

³⁸"The Freshmen Assist," Time, 45 (February 5, 1945), 26.

³⁹U.S., Congressional Record, 79th Cong., 1st Sess., 1945, 91, Part 1, 467.

foreign policy spokesman offered a concrete solution pledging the use of force to keep Germany and Japan disarmed forever.⁴⁰ The Administration was pleased, and Roosevelt invited Connally and the Foreign Relations sub-committee to the White House for conferences. Connally felt that Vandenberg, classified as "the most rabid of isolationists," labored hard and somewhat unsuccessfully in his speech to justify his change of heart. "Most of the issues mentioned by Vandenberg cannot be settled at the moment, but must wait the definitive treaty of peace," Connally stated.⁴¹

Other pre-war isolationists also had changes of heart. In early June, Robert La Follette of Wisconsin, who was bitterly isolationist before Pearl Harbor, indicated support for a world organization that operated on majority rule and entailed a partial sacrifice of national sovereignty by member nations.⁴² Bushfield said that he would vote for a United Nations organization if the power of the American delegate were limited. A few senators, like Taft, wanted to limit

⁴⁰"Force Without Recourse," Time, 45 (January 22, 1945), 15.

⁴¹"U.S. Hand Abroad Strengthened by Vandenberg's Call for Action," Newsweek, 25 (January 22, 1945), 36.

⁴²"Historic Test of Foreign Policy Holds Chief Interest of the Senate," Newsweek, 25 (June 25, 1945), 29.

United States economic cooperation.⁴³

But Wheeler was a chief source of worry for supporters of an international peace organization. In January, he spoke for three hours against internationalism. Some sources felt his speech fell "flounder flat,"⁴⁴ but in June, returning from a trip to European and Mediterranean theatres of war, the staunch isolation leader still thought that "it would be a mistake for the Senate to vote . . . for a United Nations organization . . . until after the peace conference has been held."⁴⁵

General Senate opposition to ratification of the United Nations Charter was gradually overcome. In February, 1945, The New Republic stated:

Applying past Senate tests to the Dumbarton Oaks formula a reasonable guess would be that there are now about fifty-five senators for ratification (forty-one Democrats, fourteen Republicans), twenty-one are doubtful (eleven Democrats, ten Republicans), and twenty are isolationists and opposed (five Democrats, fifteen Republicans).⁴⁶

⁴³T.R.B., "Washington Notes," The New Republic, 113 (July 16, 1945), 77.

⁴⁴"This Above All," Time, 45 (January 29, 1945), 17.

⁴⁵Newsweek, 25 (June 25, 1945), 29.

⁴⁶T.R.B., "Washington Notes," The New Republic, 112 (February 5, 1945), 174.

In March, a New York newspaper, PM, polled the Senate asking: "Would you, on the basis of information now available, vote for United States entrance into the world security council to be established at the San Francisco Conferences?" Eighty-seven senators replied: forty-nine said unequivocally "yes"; four "probably yes"; none said "no"; thirty-four said "yes, with reservations." PM concluded that the survey gave evidence that the battle of the peace was not yet won.⁴⁷

However, when Connally and Vandenberg left the Senate in late April to attend the San Francisco Conference, the senators honored them with a standing demonstration of bipartisan approval. Connally, brushing tears from his eyes, was obviously moved deeply as he spoke of the solemnity of the conference. As he concluded, the line normally dividing Democrats from Republicans momentarily dissolved and the senators embraced Connally in a display of confidence and affection.⁴⁸ A Senate reporter wrote:

Senators Connally and Vandenberg . . . showed how wise President Roosevelt was in naming these men as members of the American delegation. Their influence on their colleagues has been an important factor in developing

⁴⁷"Battle of the Peace," Newsweek, 25 (March 26, 1945), 46.

⁴⁸The New York Times, April 21, 1945, p. 1.

the practical certainty that the Charter will be ratified without too much delay.⁴⁹

As he departed for San Francisco, Connally assured fellow senators that the American delegates would do their best to return with a document that would preserve international peace. Connally emphasized two things: (1) San Francisco would be a non-partisan conference and (2) the principles of Dumbarton Oaks would be liberalized.⁵⁰

In late June, as the treaty went to the Senate, President Truman's wishes for speedy ratification were seconded by Majority Leader Barkley, who thought "it would be a splendid thing if the United States was first of the fifty United Nations to ratify the charter."⁵¹ Minority Leader Wallace White of Maine joined Barkley in expressing hope that the Senate would pass the treaty before the summer recess. White declared:

Everything in the Charter has been a subject of study for a long time and we have known the objective ever since the introduction of the Connally Resolution. There would be a great advantage if the Senate moved with all proper celerity to consideration and ratification.⁵²

⁴⁹"The Charter Goes to the Senate," The New Republic, 113 (July 9, 1945), 35.

⁵⁰"To the World," Time, 45 (April 30, 1945), 20.

⁵¹Newsweek, 25 (June 25, 1945), 29.

⁵²Ibid.

Senators who were expected to make an attack on the Charter denied such intentions. Wheeler declared that he would lead no "speakhead," and Johnson, a prime force in the League of Nations battle, said that he might "possibly" vote aye.⁵³ Senate reporters wrote that the only remaining element of suspense was the length of debate. So successfully was groundwork laid for Senate approval of the Charter that pessimists predicted no more than fifteen negative votes. Some observers predicted unanimous approval.

Connally hazarded a prediction that not more than ten senators would vote against the Charter in the final vote. He said: "Those senators who believe we should tread our path alone will vote against the Charter. But those who realize that this can't be done, and that the United States cannot live in a cellophane wrapper will favor the charter."⁵⁴

When the United States Senate received the Charter in late July, Washington observers saw evidence of a popular groundswell favoring international cooperation that would overcome all legislative opposition. Connally changed his prediction of ten opposition votes downward to no more than

⁵³"Senate Rallies to World Charter in Historic Reversal of Attitude," Newsweek, 26 (July 9, 1945), 27.

⁵⁴The New York Times, June 28, 1945, p. 12.

six.⁵⁵ On July 23, the second so-called "great debate" in the United States Senate over American participation in a world security league began. However it was not great, nor was it really a debate.

Connally's Speaking in Behalf of the Charter

Connally's speaking during the Charter debate emphasized his thought that gaining acceptance in the Senate for the United Nations Charter would be the foremost achievement of his career. The Charter was a "great instrument in the history of the world . . . in the field of international relations."⁵⁶ The principles of the Charter could "lead the nations of earth away from the cruel wages of battle into the ways of peace."⁵⁷ For him, the issue was clear. He declared:

Senators who object to international cooperation for any purpose will vote "no." Those who prefer that we go alone will reject the charter. It is my sincere belief that those who believe in cooperation with other nations in an effort to avert the horrors and miseries of war, to suppress aggression and conquest, and to enthrone the rule of law and reason and justice in international relations will vote to ratify the treaty.⁵⁸

⁵⁵Ibid., July 15, 1945, p. 18.

⁵⁶U.S., Congressional Record, 79th Cong., 1st Sess., 1945, 91, Part 6, 7953.

⁵⁷Ibid., Part 5, p. 6878. ⁵⁸Ibid.

Connally was a student of history. As a young Congressman, he watched the Senate debate ratification of the League of Nations Covenant. He knew why ratification had failed in 1919, and he was determined that those reasons would not halt ratification in 1945. In two major addresses to the Senate on June 28th and July 23rd, he was careful to reassure Senators that the errors of 1919 had been corrected.

Connally's June 28th Speech.-- In 1919, senators felt that Senate prestige was abused. Prior to the League debate, the senators were made to feel unimportant to the process of ratification. In 1945, Connally appealed to fellow senators' pride as he spoke of the life or death power which the Senate possesses in all treaty ratifications. He admitted that "the charter cannot have vitality, it cannot breathe, it cannot act until ratified by the Senate No treaty can attain the force of law for our people until it passes the scrutiny and receives the sanction of this body."⁵⁹ He developed the prestige argument by inferring that the Senate vote would influence world acceptance of the Charter. He professed a "confident belief" that Senate ratification of the Charter would gain it "overwhelming approval by the United Nations."⁶⁰ Connally appealed to senators of both parties to

⁵⁹Ibid., p. 6877.

⁶⁰Ibid., p. 6874.

consider their "high and solemn responsibility."⁶¹ Senate prestige and power had been recognized.

In 1919, the Republicans felt that they were overlooked in treaty negotiations. In 1945, Connally proved that the Charter was the work of all parties and all branches of government. "This time," Connally said, "the charter was not struck off by the brain of a single individual."⁶² He was happy to report that there was "splendid unity and harmony"⁶³ within the bipartisan delegation at San Francisco. He assured the senators that the delegation received "inspiration and assistance" from all the advisors and consultants and that "we had constantly sitting at our sides, admirals and generals from the Army and Navy, counseling with us."⁶⁴ The Texan built a picture of a bipartisan, bi-departmental team that formulated a Charter, and he was reasonably sure that no Republican vote would be lost because of partisan politics.

Having dealt with two errors that defeated the League of Nations, abused prestige and partisanism, Connally introduced a factor that always interests vote-seekers. In 1919, the American people, though favoring the League, kept their

⁶¹Ibid., p. 6877.

⁶²Ibid., p. 6874.

⁶³Ibid., p. 6877.

⁶⁴Ibid., p. 6876.

wishes relatively unknown. In 1945, the people spoke out loudly for Charter ratification. He was "confident that the people overwhelmingly support the new charter."⁶⁵ The implication was clear. Only a year earlier, the Senate had several members who had voiced opposition to postwar cooperation. The voters had altered the Senate and expected the new Senate to act constructively toward the Charter. The argument was particularly appropriate for the freshmen senators.

During the month preceding debate, many Charter proponents strategically avoided discussing the power of the Charter. They discussed, rather, what the Charter could not do.⁶⁶ Connally also recognized in conclusion that "the rights and sovereignty of the United States are not imperiled."⁶⁷ Connally did not develop this theme. As the Charter went to public hearings, he preferred to let senators draw their individual interpretations.

Connally's July 23rd Speech.-- On July 23, as the Charter returned to the Senate, Connally returned to the themes he had introduced a month earlier. Building Senate prestige, the Texan indicated that he believed that "the fate

⁶⁵Ibid., p. 6875. ⁶⁶Time, 46 (July 23, 1945), 22.

⁶⁷U.S., Congressional Record, 79th Cong., 1st Sess., 1945, Part 5, 6878.

of world peace" hinged on Senate action and he described the picture of a powerful Senate and a watching world:

Ratification of the Charter by the Senate may well give a tremendous impulse to its ratification by the other nations of the earth. They know how the League of Nations was slaughtered here on the floor. Can you not still see the blood on the floor? Can you not see upon the walls the marks of the conflict that raged here in the chamber where the League of Nations was done to death?⁶⁸

The Senate had the power of life or death over the treaty.

The picture was satisfying to senatorial egos.

Connally again reminded the Senate of the country's bipartisan foreign policy. In defending Foreign Relations Committee action, he said:

I do not recall that there was ever a time when partisan political considerations were entertained or advanced. We took the position which we thought was the proper one and which we think the Senate position is, that in foreign relations there was no place for party politics or for the various activities along those lines, but that in our dealing with foreign nations we should present a united front.⁶⁹

The treaty was not the work of one party.

Connally introduced a third theme in the July 23rd speech. In 1919, senators of both parties had felt they were uninformed during formulation of the League Covenant. Connally reminded the senators that this error was corrected in 1945.

⁶⁸Ibid., Part 6, p. 7954. ⁶⁹Ibid., p. 7950.

He gave the audience a complete review of the step-by-step negotiations demonstrating that in the role of "advice" the Senate was often consulted. Connally reviewed:

We [the committee of eight] carried on consultations with Secretary Hull, with his staff, and through him, with the White House, over an extended period of time. I wish to say that the State Department in those consultations gave us access to all the documents which were available, and kept us advised as to all the angles and aspects of the foreign situation.⁷⁰

The bipartisan committee, and through it the Senate, had shared deliberations in United States foreign policy. Connally examined Dumbarton Oaks:

The widest publicity was given to the sessions. They were held in Washington, and covered a period of several weeks Through that medium the public and the Senate were made generally acquainted with the objectives which were in mind.⁷¹

The hearings on the completed Charter were also open to the senators. Connally reminded the audience that his committee had "arranged for printing and publication of the hearings, and undertook each morning to place in the office of each Senator copies of the hearings which were held on the day previous."⁷² No senator could vote against the Charter because of a lack of knowledge of its formulation.

⁷⁰Ibid.

⁷¹Ibid.

⁷²Ibid., p. 7953.

Connally reminded the senators of American public opinion. He professed minor interest in polls "since the Literary Digest passed out of existence . . . but still the result of the [Gallup] poll is an indication of the overwhelming sentiment of the American people in favor of the ratification of the treaty."⁷³

But with assurance that the Charter had a large safe vote, the Texan emphasized for the first time that the United States might be committed to obligations under the treaty. In answer to a question advanced after the conclusion of his prepared speech, he said:

I have faith in the Senate. I believe that if we adopt the Charter and make a promise to furnish troops according to these agreements the United States Senate, whether it be Republican or Democratic, will rise to its duty and respond to its obligations, and by a two-thirds majority will keep the faith which we have pledged to the other nations of the world and live up to the obligations which we have assumed.⁷⁴

Connally's prepared speeches were designed to reinforce a friendly Senate attitude toward the Charter. The Texan wasted no time refuting the Charter's few opponents. The isolationists--Langer, Shipstead, Wheeler and Johnson--were ignored. Connally reminded veteran senators that the errors of 1919 had not been repeated in 1945. He reminded the freshmen

⁷³Ibid., p. 7951.

⁷⁴Ibid., p. 7990.

senators that most of them were there because the public desired United States participation in a postwar union. He reminded all senators that world action waited on their vote. The first speech introduced the Charter to the public. The second opened the Charter to debate by the Senate. In both cases, Connally expected overwhelming approval.

Connally's speaking during floor debate.-- The Connally of 1945 presented a strong contrast to the Connally of 1943. Self-assured, confident of Charter passage, satisfied with his role in Charter formulation, the Texan was unlike the hesitant leader of the Connally Resolution debate. The rather frantic, self-conscious, petulant attitude was gone. He was an international figure and he perpetuated that image throughout the short debate.

He indicated only twice that he desired speed in passage of the Charter. On June 28th, he expressed hope that "the Senate will proceed to the consideration of the treaty at the earliest possible moment,"⁷⁵ and later, on July 23rd, after debate had begun, he hoped that senators would be ready to speak because "the Senate cannot afford to wait on Senators to prepare speeches."⁷⁶

⁷⁵Ibid., Part 5, p. 6877. ⁷⁶Ibid., Part 6, p. 7959.

Connally engaged in personalities with a fellow senator only once during the five-day debate. After a few hot words with Senator Scott Lucas, Connally said: "I certainly am unable to fathom the Senator from Illinois. Anything I say which is kind about him he questions, and with respect to other things I say, he seems to think I am reflecting on him. I have no such idea."⁷⁷

Connally made maximum use of his association with the writing of the Charter in San Francisco. On June 28th, after paying tribute to the American delegation, particularly Vandenberg, he had added: "Of course, I also took part in the Conference from time to time."⁷⁸ Connally used this prestige device to answer questions and advance agreement during the debate. He told McKellar that "you would have been stirred, I am sure, had you been on the steering committee representing all fifty of the nations, when the roll was called and every nation responded 'yea.'"⁷⁹ "We heard it constantly at San Francisco"⁸⁰ that Charter ratification would inspire the world to peace. He reassured Taft of the correctness of an interpretation because "I have had close contact with this

⁷⁷Ibid., p. 8029. ⁷⁸Ibid., Part 5, p. 6877.

⁷⁹Ibid., Part 6, p. 7954. ⁸⁰Ibid.

question because I happened to be a member of the committee which dealt with the subject of the veto."⁸¹

Twice more the Texan interrupted floor debate to serve as an interpreting authority. Once, Connally said: "As members of the American delegation, the Senator from Michigan and I advanced the word [a wording in the Charter] and it immediately received confirmation and adoption by the Conference."⁸² Again, in elaborating upon an interpretation, he utilized his personal experience:

I had the honor of being a member of the committee of the San Francisco Conference which dealt with the Security Council. I gave a great deal of attention to trying to preserve the strength, dignity and influence of the Security Council because I regarded it as being one of the cardinal agencies of influences of the entire organization.⁸³

Connally used his prestige as a member of the delegation to great advantage during the Charter debate.

Connally had predicted that not more than six senators would reject the Charter. On July 28, 1945, the Senate ratified the United Nations Charter by a vote of eighty-nine to two. Langer and Shipstead voted against United States participation.⁸⁴ Old Hiram Johnson, the League foe, lay

⁸¹Ibid., p. 8017.

⁸²Ibid., p. 8063.

⁸³Ibid., p. 8114.

⁸⁴Ibid., p. 8158.

dying at Bethesda Naval Hospital, unable to vote his protest against United States entry into an international peace organization.

Aftermath

The "Great Debate" was over. There was no debate. Quorum calls were used as time killers when no speaker was prepared to speak on the Charter. Once, the Charter was laid aside while Harley Kilgore, Edwin Johnson and Pepper spoke at length on a bill to establish a national research foundation.

Against a background of apparent disinterest, Connally did his job as Charter advocate adequately. He could not adapt to meet opponents' arguments because there were no active opponents. Thus, he adapted to meet arguments that had been used in the old League fight. Unable to find living opponents, he fought the ghosts of Henry Cabot Lodge and William Borah. He reminded senators of their power and responsibility, of their share in the writing of the Charter, and of the need for a non-partisan expression of internationalism.

To the younger senators, aware that all had expressed internationalist sympathies, he directed responsibility for fulfilling the wishes of the American public.

He gave the minority party full credit for its efforts and studiously avoided any clashes with old enemies. Even a cynical three-hour diatribe by Wheeler, his old opponent of the Neutrality battle, failed to draw comment. Connally gave no senator the opportunity to use personal animosity as an excuse for vetoing the Charter.

Furthermore, realizing that his own popularity was unusually high, he drew repeatedly from personal experience to explain the Charter. In this aura of good feeling, no senator challenged him personally, as they had in the Resolution debate.

The Texan enjoyed the debate. He simply listened to speakers, occasionally interpreted Charter wording and won his decision. A few minimized his role in debate, but they forgot that only a year earlier there were rumors that Roosevelt might bypass the Senate completely to join a postwar organization. Connally had then said that the Senate would not be bypassed. The Senator kept his word.

CHAPTER VI

THE MUTUAL AID PROGRAM DEBATE, 1949

On July 5, 1949, the eighty-first Senate convened in an old room, last occupied by the Senate in 1859, while the regular Senate chamber underwent needed repairs. The old, semi-circular chamber, where the Monroe Doctrine was first pronounced, served as the arena for debate over ratification of the North Atlantic Treaty and implementation of the Mutual Aid Program.

The Eighty-First Senate

The "new" Senate chamber.-- Conditions were crowded. There were no galleries. Democratic senators were assigned chairs on the left of the chamber, and Republican senators were assigned chairs on the right. Because of limited space, individual desks for all senators were not placed in the chamber and, except for the majority and minority leaders, no senator was assigned a desk or a particular chair. Senators were seated on a "first come, first served" basis, with the chairs wedged uncomfortably close together. Deprived of

desks, most speakers addressed their colleagues from the front of the room. Two desks were placed on each side of the chamber and these were used by senators who desired to speak from a prepared manuscript.¹

Vice President Barkley testified to one improvement over the regular chamber: "The chair would like to say that it is obvious that the acoustics of the chamber are very excellent The chair can hear even a whisper coming from any point in this chamber."²

Members of the eighty-first Senate.-- The Senate that convened in January, 1949, was only vaguely similar to the Senate that had adjourned in late 1945. Forty-three men in the chamber in 1949 were not senators in 1945.

Many Democrats were upset in the election of November, 1946. The Democrats were a fifty-five to forty-one majority when the Senate ratified the United Nations Charter, but in January, 1947, the Republicans held a fifty-one to forty-five majority. The Republicans had won twelve new Senate seats and lost only two. Among the Democrats caught in the flood of Republican ballots were David Walsh of Massachusetts,

¹U.S., Congressional Record, 81st Cong., 1st Sess., 1949, 95, Part 7, 8809.

²Ibid.

Guffey of Pennsylvania, Tunnell of Delaware, Hoffman of Ohio, Murdock of Utah and Mitchell of Washington.³ Nineteen members of the eighty-first Senate were first elected in 1946.

Raymond Baldwin of Connecticut was a three-term Republican governor who classified himself as "an international Willkieite."⁴

John W. Bricker of Ohio was a conservative, a three-term governor who had been the Republican Vice Presidential nominee in 1944.⁵

Ralph Flanders of Vermont was a Republican, liberal-minded businessman, who had the support of the labor vote in Vermont.⁶

William Jenner of Indiana was thirty-eight, an air force veteran and the leader of a Midwestern bloc of conservative Republicans.⁷

James P. Kem of Missouri was an oil company lawyer, an isolationist and a crusader against Kansas City boss Tom Pendergast.⁸

³"An Era Begins," Newsweek, 28 (November 18, 1946), 33.

⁴"The Standouts," Newsweek, 28 (November 18, 1946), 37.

⁵Ibid.

⁶"New Faces in the Senate," Time, 48 (November 18, 1946), 25.

⁷Ibid. ⁸Newsweek, 28 (November 18, 1946), 37.

Joseph McCarthy of Wisconsin was a thirty-six year-old Republican, an ex-marine aviation intelligence officer.⁹

George Malone of Nevada, Republican, was an avid booster of the industrial future of the West, an engineer and the publisher of the encyclopedic Western Economic Empire.¹⁰

A. Willis Robertson of Virginia was a conservative Democrat, a veteran Congressman and a disciple of economy-minded Harry Flood Byrd.¹¹

John J. Sparkman of Alabama was the former Democratic whip of the House of Representatives.¹²

Arthur Watkins of Utah was a gray-haired isolationist lawyer who ran two weekly newspapers as a hobby.¹³

William Knowland of California had been appointed in 1945 to serve the unfinished term of the late Hiram Johnson. Knowland and Connally had many battles over the Far Eastern policy of the Administration. Connally said of Knowland: "I have observed him here in the Senate [Progress could be made] if the Senator and his group would exercise

⁹Time, 48 (November 18, 1946), 25.

¹⁰Newsweek, 28 (November 18, 1946), 37.

¹¹Time, 48 (November 18, 1946), 25.

¹²Ibid.

¹³Ibid.

the same ingenuity in getting action which they exhibit in trying to embarrass someone."¹⁴

But the members of the Eightieth Congress were condemned by the President and the public in November, 1948. The Democrats, regaining control of the Senate, did not lose a single seat already held and won nine Republican seats. The Democratic majority was fifty-four to forty-two. Thirteen members of the eighty-first Senate were elected for the first time in 1948.

Clinton P. Anderson of New Mexico was a former Secretary of Agriculture in the Truman Cabinet. He had replaced Carl Hatch, who had announced his retirement. As Connally paid tribute to Hatch, he welcomed Anderson: "I may say, of course, we are all pleased to have him here with us. We are sure he will have a career of usefulness and efficiency."¹⁵

Virgil Chapman of Kentucky was a Democrat with twenty-one years experience in the House of Representatives.¹⁶ Connally "knew him intimately and was associated with him in very cordial relationships. Added to his ability, his

¹⁴U.S., Congressional Record, 81st Cong., 1st Sess., 1949, 95, Part 2, 1635.

¹⁵Ibid., Part 1, p. 314.

¹⁶"The New Senate," Newsweek, 32 (November 8, 1948), 9.

capacity and his learning, he had an outstanding trait of courage."¹⁷

Paul Douglas of Illinois, a liberal Democrat, was a former economics professor at the University of Chicago.¹⁸

Hubert Humphrey of Minnesota was a Democratic New-Dealer, a former mayor of Minneapolis, sparkplug of the newly-formed liberal Americans for Democratic Action and a civil rights leader.¹⁹

Lyndon B. Johnson of Texas was a Roosevelt New-Dealer who had served six terms in the House of Representatives.²⁰

Estes Kefauver of Tennessee was a liberal Southern Democrat and a veteran of five terms in the House of Representatives.²¹

Robert Kerr of Oklahoma was a wealthy oil man, an ex-governor who had served as the keynote speaker at the Democratic Convention in 1944.²²

¹⁷U.S., Congressional Record, 82nd Cong., 1st Sess., 1951, 97, Part 2, 2123.

¹⁸Newsweek, 32 (November 8, 1948), 9.

¹⁹Ibid.

²⁰"Education of a Senator," Time, 53 (January 17, 1949), 13.

²¹"Senate Sweep," Time, 52 (November 8, 1948), 23.

²²Newsweek, 32 (November 8, 1948), 9.

Russell Long of Louisiana, only thirty, was the Senate's youngest member and the son of the former "Kingfish" of Louisiana.²³

Three new senators--Henry Cabot Lodge of Massachusetts, Guy Gillette of Iowa and Matthew Neely of West Virginia--had formerly served in the Senate prior to the Mutual Aid Program debate. Four additional changes were made in the Senate before September. Karl Mundt of South Dakota, a former college debate coach and veteran of the House of Representatives, was named to replace the late Harlan Bushfield. Garrett L. Withers of Kentucky, an ex-school teacher, was appointed to the seat vacated by newly-elected Vice President Alben Barkley.²⁴ In April, Frank P. Graham of North Carolina, President of the University of North Carolina and former President of the Oak Ridge Institute of Nuclear Studies, was appointed to the seat of the late J. Melville Broughton.²⁵ The formation of the eighty-first Senate was completed with the appointment of John Foster Dulles of New York, top-flight international lawyer, official Republican party foreign policy

²³"Ringling in the New," Time, 53 (January 10, 1949), 13.

²⁴"Reluctant Senator," Newsweek, 33 (January 24, 1949), 23.

²⁵"The Graham Appointment," Newsweek, 33 (April 4, 1949), 25.

advisor and member of the United States delegation to the United Nations, to the seat vacated by the ailing Robert Wagner.²⁶ The appointment of Republican Dulles to Democrat Wagner's post left the Democrats a fifty-three to forty-three voting margin.

Connally's place in the eighty-first Senate.-- What was Connally's role in the eighty-first Senate? The Democratic victory had returned him to the chairmanship of the Foreign Relations Committee. Connally seemingly retained the same view of the committee's function that he had held during his earlier chairmanship. But Connally's second tenure as Foreign Relations Committee Chairman was not as happy as his first. James Reston, Washington correspondent for the New York Times, summarized the situation:

In Mr. Connally's second term as Chairman the theory that the Foreign Relations Committee is the most orderly and sedate committee is rapidly vanishing. In 1943 he took the lead . . . for a postwar international security organization and was at that time one of the most effective debaters in the upper chamber. Ever since he resumed the Chairmanship of the committee at the beginning of this year, however, he has been a center of controversy In the debate on the North Atlantic Treaty the feeling here is that Senator Connally has not always encouraged incisive constructive debate.²⁷

²⁶"Freshman with a Reputation," Time, 54 (July 18, 1949), 17.

²⁷The New York Times, May 10, 1949, p. 3.

Connally was not well. Suffering from a nervous disorder, popularly termed shingles, he was more irascible than usual. On several occasions he clashed with Homer Ferguson and declared publicly that "the only way the Senator can possibly embarrass me is by agreeing with me."²⁸

He charged the freshman Kefauver with missing committee meetings to go "out chasing crapshooters somewhere"²⁹ and had numerous arguments with Knowland over the Administration policy in China.

The Texan's two chief antagonists during the treaty and arms debates were Watkins, a man "who has had his south-bound parts worn off by arguments he cannot meet,"³⁰ and Forrest Donnell. During treaty hearings, Connally invited them to sit with the committee to hear testimony. The two accepted but accused Connally of being very slow about extending an invitation to them. Connally in turn cried out: "Everyone knows that you are not for the treaty and are here to impede it, to obstruct it, and to filibuster"³¹

²⁸As cited in Beverly Smith, "The Senator Loves a Fight," The Saturday Evening Post, 223 (July 1, 1950), 19.

²⁹The New York Times, February 17, 1950, p. 4.

³⁰Ibid., February 8, 1952, p. 1.

³¹Ibid., April 28, 1949, p. 13.

Watkins created confusion by excessive badgering of witnesses. After being halted on one occasion by Connally, Watkins protested that he was being "chided" and Connally retorted, "I am not complaining about your trying to find out what the witnesses think, but the Senator spends a great deal of time explaining his own views." Watkins stalked from the room.³² Connally reported later that "I had to do it. He was wartin' us to death."³³

However, Connally, at seventy-three, was still personally liked and respected by the majority of his colleagues.

Clinton P. Anderson of New Mexico remembered that Connally was an "effective speaker" with "a very sharp tongue for anyone who crossed him." Anderson indicated that he "used" Connally in his 1928 campaign for the House of Representatives and "thought he was most effective and a very interesting speaker."³⁴

John Sherman Cooper of Kentucky, who served an interim term in the Senate in 1947-48, found Connally "always

³²Ibid., May 10, 1949, p. 3.

³³Tom Connally, My Name Is Tom Connally, as told to Alfred Steinberg (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Company, 1954), p. 335.

³⁴Letter from Hon. Clinton P. Anderson, United States Senator from New Mexico, August 31, 1964.

ready in debate, very articulate, and . . . quite caustic and biting." Cooper thought Connally's "appearance made him an impressive figure and contributed to the command of his audience when he spoke in the Senate." Cooper wrote that Connally "was always very kind and courteous and helpful to me, and I enjoyed his friendship very much. I consider him one of the most interesting men I have served with in the Senate."³⁵

Paul Douglas of Illinois thought it "correct to say that he was very sarcastic and used ridicule rather than argument." He did not find Connally "as effective in his later years as he had been before."³⁶

Karl Mundt of South Dakota, the former college speech teacher, wrote that the Texan "seemed to demonstrate what you and I heard called 'the old style Southern oratory.'" Mundt indicated that Connally "manifested a quick wit and a capacity for ready retort."³⁷

³⁵Letter from Hon. John Sherman Cooper, United States Senator from Kentucky, November 10, 1964.

³⁶Letter from Hon. Paul Douglas, United States Senator from Illinois, August 31, 1964.

³⁷Letter from Hon. Karl Mundt, United States Senator from South Dakota, September 1, 1964.

A. Willis Robertson of Virginia called Connally "my good friend," having met the Texan in 1924 and "formed a strong liking for him." Robertson felt "Senator Connally was the most effective debater we had during his service in the Senate." Robertson remembered "the wonderful quality of his Irish wit, which would often make his opponents smile even when he was thrusting a harpoon into them."³⁸

Margaret Chase Smith of Maine wrote that she "did not have too great an opportunity to watch and listen to Senator Connally," but, "he was impressive and [audience] reactions were most favorable." She added, "There were times when he was not taken seriously because he did not want to be taken seriously."³⁹

John Sparkman of Alabama called Connally "an easy and ready speaker." Sparkman wrote that "he [Connally] always did such a work [handling a bill] in a masterful manner." The Alabaman recalled a Connally speech defending Attorney General Tom Clark in 1947 and wrote that "I can assure you

³⁸Letter from Hon. A. Willis Robertson, United States Senator from Virginia, September 4, 1964.

³⁹Letter from Hon. Margaret Chase Smith, United States Senator from Maine, August 31, 1964.

it was a masterpiece which held the Senate spellbound for over an hour."⁴⁰

Connally was still respected as the chief Congressional representative of United States foreign policy. But it was a foreign policy of Harry Truman, not a wartime Franklin Roosevelt, and the Texan's prestige, while still high, was considerably less than when he returned from San Francisco in June, 1945.

An Alliance for Defense

On March 17, 1948, Belgium, Holland, Luxembourg, the United Kingdom and France signed the Brussels Alliance. Although the idea of a security pact for Western Europe seemed practical, the potential of such an alliance was limited without moral and military support from the United States.

The Vandenberg Resolution.-- In mid-1948, the Vandenberg Resolution 239, was reported out of the Foreign Relations Committee. The resolution recommended six objectives, of which three were intended to strengthen the United Nations and three were designed to encourage regional mutual self-defense arrangements. The Resolution passed the Senate on

⁴⁰Letter from Hon. John Sparkman, United States Senator from Alabama, October 8, 1964.

June 11, 1948, by a vote of sixty-four to four.⁴¹ However, work was delayed until January, 1949, on an alliance linking the United States, Canada, Great Britain, France, Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg against aggression by the Soviet Union.

The North Atlantic Treaty.-- The final draft of the North Atlantic Treaty pledged the United States to defend Western Europe with armed force if "necessary." The treaty was modeled after the Rio Treaty of 1947 which contained similar mutual defense pledges from Western Hemisphere nations. Essentially, the North Atlantic countries agreed that they believed in the United Nations but invoked their right under the Charter to form regional defense alliances. The countries promised to establish adequate armed forces but refrained "from the threat or use of force in any manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations." They considered an armed attack on one as an attack on all.⁴²

The treaty was greeted in the United States by what, considering the immensity of commitment, seemed almost disinterested silence. In the fourteen weeks of pact negotiations only a trickle of mail reached the State Department.

⁴¹Connally, p. 328.

⁴²"Lesson Learned," Time, 53 (March 28, 1949), 17.

Apparently, the public accepted the principles enunciated in the treaty.

The treaty was signed in early April by the Ministers of Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, United Kingdom and the United States. Ratification was required by the Senate and by the Parliaments of the six original sponsors.⁴³

While Secretary of State Dean Acheson felt the pact did not "bind the United States to any arms program," he added, "We expect to ask Congress to supply our European partners some of the weapons and equipment they need to be able to resist aggression."⁴⁴ Acheson feared that linking the treaty with the Mutual Aid Program might cause Congress to reject both, so in committee hearings the Secretary attempted to prove that arms aid and the treaty logically belonged together but, in reality, were separate. The Mutual Aid Program, he explained, was a logical extension of the treaty, but arms assistance was not directly "a product of the pact--an instrument which is not yet in effect."⁴⁵ On the contrary,

⁴³"A Simple Document," Time, 53 (April 11, 1949), 21.

⁴⁴"What It Means," Newsweek, 33 (March 28, 1949), 18.

⁴⁵"Bound Together," Time, 53 (April 18, 1949), 21.

"even without the existence of the North Atlantic Treaty, the need for assistance and the recommended response of this government would be the same." So, he concluded emphatically, "these requests and our replies therefore, in no sense represent a price tag to be placed upon the pact."⁴⁶

Later, the Secretary told the Foreign Relations Committee that the United States planned to provide the treaty nations of Western Europe with \$1.13 billions of military supplies plus an additional \$320 millions primarily for Greece and Turkey.⁴⁷ When Acheson finished, Connally asked a question bothering many senators: If a senator voted for the treaty, was he committed to vote later for the arms program augmenting the treaty? Acheson answered:

There is something in this treaty that requires every member of the Senate, if you ratify it, when he comes to vote on military assistance, to exercise his judgment less freely than he would have exercised it if there had not been this treaty.⁴⁸

On June 6, the Foreign Relations Committee favorably reported the treaty by a vote of thirteen to nothing. The report stipulated, at Senator George's insistence, that the

⁴⁶Ibid.

⁴⁷"The Tab," Time, 53 (May 2, 1949), 20.

⁴⁸"The Answer is 'Yes,'" Time, 53 (May 9, 1949), 23.

treaty gave the United States President no new powers to send troops into combat without consent of Congress.⁴⁹

On July 21, with every senator except Ellender present, the Senate ratified the North Atlantic Treaty. The first critical vote rejected a reservation proposed by Wherry which specified that the United States had no obligation to furnish arms to its new partners. The Senate then approved the treaty by a vote of eighty-two to thirteen.⁵⁰

The Mutual Aid Program.-- Connally told the President not to introduce the Mutual Aid Program while the treaty was being debated. "The pact and arms aid to implement the pact aren't Siamese twins," the Texan said.⁵¹ Truman signed the instrument of treaty ratification and declared: "This treaty is an historic step toward a world of peace . . . but it is only one step." One hour later, he submitted an arms program to Congress asking for \$1.45 billions in military aid.⁵² The Mutual Aid Program faced a more difficult fight and a closer vote than had the North Atlantic Treaty.

⁴⁹"Congress' Week," Time, 53 (June 13, 1949), 18.

⁵⁰"Far-off Frontier," Time, 54 (August 1, 1949), 9.

⁵¹Connally, p. 337.

⁵²Time, 54 (August 1, 1949), 9.

The Administration bill was vague on presidential powers earmarking funds for specific countries. In joint session behind closed doors, the Senate Armed Services and Foreign Relations Committees informed the State Department that the bill must be redrafted. The Administration withdrew the bill and produced a new measure carefully specifying the destination of all United States arms. The Atlantic Treaty countries were allocated \$1.16 billions, Greece and Turkey \$211 millions and \$27.6 millions were divided among Iran, Korea and the Philippines. The new bill was favorably reported to the House of Representatives.⁵³

The revised bill was found unsatisfactory. Voting 209-151, the House passed the small allocations to Greece, Turkey, Iran, Korea and the Philippines, but cut the allocation to the North Atlantic Treaty countries by nearly half. A growing sentiment for economy, an easing of tension in East-West relations, a spreading skepticism about Europe's willingness and ability to organize for a common defense and an enthusiasm for air power and the atomic bomb as the really reliable instruments of defense against Soviet aggression--all contributed to the House revolt.⁵⁴

⁵³"To Do the Needful," Time, 54 (August 15, 1949), 13.

⁵⁴"The Bi-Partisan Honeymoon Is Over," Newsweek, 34 (August 29, 1949), 13.

Against this unfavorable background, Administration leaders in the Senate moved toward restoring most, if not all, of the House cut. Connally later called it a "hard four-day fight."⁵⁵

The Senate, Connally and Mutual Aid

The general attitude of the eighty-first Senate.--

The eighty-first, heralded as a Truman Congress, was more typically a Democratic Congress--fragmented, split into many factions. The loyalty of Administration Democrats was unpredictable. Democratic senators ranged from Glen Taylor, who had left the party to campaign with Henry Wallace's Progressives, to Harry F. Byrd, who had left the party to campaign with Strom Thurmond's Dixiecrats.

Republicans also quarreled. In the initial party caucus, thirteen liberals--Saltonstall, Lodge, Raymond Baldwin, Aiken, Flanders, Smith, Morse, Knowland, Edward Thye, Young, Gurney, Tobey and Irving Ives--challenged the leadership of Taft and Wherry. The liberals, who finally polled a fourteenth vote, were defeated by a two to one ratio, but fourteen votes represented a powerful balance of power in an unpredictable Senate.⁵⁶

⁵⁵Connally, p. 339.

⁵⁶"Divided Republicans," Time, 53 (January 10, 1949), 14.

By early February, Truman and the so-called "cooperative" Congress no longer cooperated. The historic schisms between Northern and Southern Democrats emerged and made coalition between Southern Democrats and Republicans distinctly probable on many issues. After only sixty-nine days the coalition halted the President in his attempt for labor-law revision.⁵⁷ Republicans mocked the "do-nothing Eighty-First" Congress. "The accomplishments of this Congress," said Taft, "will not be zero, though they will look like zero to Mr. Truman."⁵⁸ Majority leader Scott Lucas declared, "I am not ashamed of the record."⁵⁹

In late May, Ernest K. Lindley characterized the Congress. He wrote:

This is a Congress which nobody controls--no individual, no clique, and no fixed combination of interests. It is a Congress in which party discipline is weak--one of shifting alignments, nearly all of which cut across party lines. Perhaps it is so striking in this one only because somewhat more cohesion, somewhat more amenability to White House leadership, might have been anticipated on the Democratic side during the first session after victory in a national election. The fact is, however,

⁵⁷"Freedom to Filibuster," Newsweek, 33 (March 21, 1949), 21.

⁵⁸"Old Friends, Old Enemies," Time, 53 (March 28, 1949), 21.

⁵⁹"Do-Something 81st?", Newsweek, 33 (March 7, 1949), 23.

that most of the Democratic members are deciding for themselves how to vote. No less important is the fact that most of the Republicans also are making their own individual decisions.⁶⁰

Independence made the Congress slow at times and it also produced a middle-of-the-road Congress which never fully satisfied either "Fair Dealers" or conservatives.

The foreign policy of the eighty-first Senate.-- The split on domestic issues did not necessarily affect the North Atlantic Treaty and the implementing Mutual Aid Program. The State Department, remembering the passage of the Vandenberg Resolution, hoped that the new Senate would reflect the views held by the old.

However, the concept of bipartisanship was weakened. Connally seemingly retained the same views toward a two-party foreign policy that he had maintained during his earlier tenure as Foreign Relations Committee chairman. In an interview in January, he indicated that he would dedicate his efforts to strengthening the bipartisan foreign policy which he and Vandenberg had helped to put into operation. He said, "I hope and expect that the bipartisan foreign policy will be continued. During these days of world strife and uncertainty it is essential that we have an American foreign policy,

⁶⁰Ernest K. Lindley, "Tides in the 81st Congress," Newsweek, 33 (May 23, 1949), 26.

rather than a Republican or Democratic policy."⁶¹ But the Texan restored the normal eight-five majority party ratio to the committee rather than maintaining the seven-six ratio that had been in effect since 1946. Further, a Vandenberg speech reflected changes wrought by the election. On major programs, Vandenberg could be expected to cooperate, but he would not support an "impromptu and unpredictable" foreign policy of President Truman.⁶²

North Atlantic Treaty chances were bolstered in mid-February when Taft issued a statement favoring support, and fifty senators, in reply to a Washington Post poll, said they would favor war if Russia attacked a Western European government.⁶³ By late March, only one senator, George Malone, had publicly announced opposition.

Connally, as Administration spokesman on foreign affairs in the Senate, had called the pact "a covenant in behalf of security," and a "stern warning against aggression and armed attack," but, he said, "it does not contain any

⁶¹The New York Times, January 3, 1949, p. 3.

⁶²"Secondary Responsibility," Time, 53 (January 31, 1949), 19.

⁶³"Scraps over Paper," Newsweek, 33 (February 28, 1949), 16.

agreement to automatically go to war."⁶⁴ Connally was aware that the Congressional right to declare war was sacred to most senators. The Texan further defined as his "horseback attitude" that "we cannot be Sir Galahads, and every time we hear a gun fired, plunge into war and take sides, without knowing what we are doing and without knowing the issues involved."⁶⁵

Washington observers felt that most senators favored, and would vote for, the treaty. However, concern mounted over the Administration plan to implement the treaty with legislation authorizing arms for Western Europe. Jenner observed, "Spending in Europe is no longer needed. This so-called bipartisan foreign policy leaves the Republican Party and the American taxpayer holding the bag."⁶⁶ But, in early May, support for both programs seemed secure. Lindley wrote:

During the past year, the condition of Western Europe has greatly improved--economically, politically and psychologically. Already one can see in some members of Congress the relaxing influence of these developments. The Atlantic Pact will be ratified, and the shipment of some arms to Europe almost certainly will be approved.⁶⁷

⁶⁴The New York Times, March 19, 1949, p. 4.

⁶⁵Newsweek, 33 (February 28, 1949), 16.

⁶⁶"Chipping and Chiseling," Time, 53 (April 11, 1949), 21.

⁶⁷Ernest K. Lindley, "Fair-Weather Test of Congress," Newsweek, 33 (May 9, 1949), 24.

There was reason for optimism. Walter George, chairman of the Senate Finance Committee, seemed to support the treaty with an arms program. In his first senatorial statement, the newly-appointed Dulles announced support for the pact and an arms program, but reserved decision on the extent of the arms program.

However, when Secretary Acheson announced that support of the North Atlantic Treaty implied support for the Mutual Aid Program the facade of unanimity vanished. Byrd supported the treaty but was unwilling to provide arms. Vandenberg expressed fear that senators had their "eyes glued on a few million dollars worth of rifles and knapsacks" instead of the treaty.⁶⁸

Connally had quarreled with the State Department over the timing of the presentation of the two programs to the Senate. Other senators were aware of these disagreements. Jenner said:

Of course, we all know that the . . . Senator . . . had a run-in with the State Department . . . because the Department then wanted to bring the arms implementation measure up in the Senate, and . . . he . . . thought it would jeopardize ratification of the treaty. I say . . . there is nothing wrong with this country that a little honesty and integrity in higher altitudes will not remedy.⁶⁹

⁶⁸Time, 53 (May 9, 1949), 23.

⁶⁹U.S., Congressional Record, 81st Cong., 1st Sess., 1949, 95, Part 8, 13103.

Connally tried to convince senators that the two programs were not connected. He reassured doubting colleagues that they could logically vote for ratification of the treaty without obligating themselves to support military aid to co-signatories of the pact. Only four days later, denying that he said there was "no obligation" to give military aid, Connally added, "There is an obligation of mutual aid. It may mean anything according to the particular needs of the particular situation. The obligation might or might not be physical military support."⁷⁰

Senators opposing the treaty were categorized in one of three groups. The first group contained isolationists such as Jenner and Langer who opposed all international alliances. The second was composed of men like Flanders, who, as a long-time internationalist, felt that the treaty did not promise enough. The third, including Taft, felt that the treaty committed the United States to arms assistance and, if it did, Taft said, "I believe it will promote war in the world rather than peace."⁷¹

In the closing hours of debate, Senate speaking revealed confused soul-searching and stubborn reservations.

⁷⁰The New York Times, July 14, 1949, p. 7.

⁷¹"Fraternity of Peace," Time, 54 (July 18, 1949), 13.

Gillette announced support "with the deepest reluctance, with deep misgivings, with grave doubts and qualms." Taft, announcing opposition, suggested extension of the Monroe Doctrine to Western Europe in lieu of a new treaty.⁷² But only a handful of senators ever expressed doubt about the passage of the treaty. Connally never publicly doubted passage. In March, he had predicted that the treaty would be overwhelmingly passed and as the ratification debate began, he was confident that no more than eight would vote in opposition. The only purpose of debate, according to the Texan, was to let the opposition talk itself out.⁷³

The Mutual Aid Program faced a more difficult fight despite the support of Secretary Acheson, George Marshall and respected army officials. Congress became more economy-minded. Appropriating an additional \$1.4 billions offended many Congressmen. Others felt that the President asked for too much power. Republicans felt that Acheson had ignored the policy of bipartisanism in making an arms commitment to Europe.

Connally was not confident as the arms debate approached. Taking advantage of his position as Congressional

⁷²"Last Thoughts," Time, 54 (July 25, 1949), 11.

⁷³"The Senate and the Pact," Newsweek, 34 (July 18, 1949), 14.

leader and giving views of the State Department, he issued a formal statement calling for "prompt" action on the arms plan "in the interests of world security."⁷⁴

Later, describing Administration efforts to reestablish bipartisanism, Connally said: "We are trying, in so far as is possible, to meet all objections,"⁷⁵ but with many senatorial factions he admitted that "there will be a lot of kicking and snorting."⁷⁶

Still, most observers believed that Congress would approve the arms plan in principle. But the amount of the appropriation was doubtful. As debate approached, the Senate was in an unruly mood. Connally conceded that the Administration faced "a hell of a fight."⁷⁷

Connally's Speaking for Mutual Aid

The Mutual Defense Assistance Bill of 1949 was first introduced by Connally on July 27, 1949, and debate began on September 19th. Only twenty-eight members answered to the first calling of the roll but, shortly, seventy-two members

⁷⁴The New York Times, June 16, 1949, p. 1.

⁷⁵Ibid., August 3, 1949, p. 2.

⁷⁶"Tom Connally," U.S. News and World Report, 26 (April 1, 1949), 37.

⁷⁷"Money for MAP," Newsweek, 34 (August 8, 1949), 15.

were crowded into the small chamber, sitting uncomfortably on the individual chairs that had been provided.

Connally's formal speaking for Mutual Aid.-- Connally made one major address on the bill and thereafter was content to handle debate and deliver a short closing statement.

As he introduced the measure on September 19th, Connally reminded colleagues of the favorable vote, twenty-two to three, of the joint Armed Services-Foreign Relations Committee which reported the Mutual Aid Bill to the Senate and thought their vote "should be persuasive."⁷⁸

Connally directed his first appeal to senators who he felt would support the administration program. He based his appeal on three ideas: (1) The United States must lead the free world. (2) The United States Senate has fulfilled past obligations. (3) The United States has incurred obligations under the North Atlantic Treaty.

The Texan turned first to an argument that had been effective in past debates. He appealed to the senators' sense of national pride. He argued, "Destiny has placed in our hands the leadership of the nations of the earth who want freedom and democracy under constitutional and parliamentary

⁷⁸U.S., Congressional Record, 81st Cong., 1st Sess., 1949, 95, Part 8, 13019.

government,"⁷⁹ and further warned that "we must never permit this encouraging momentum toward peace which is building up in the free world to subside."⁸⁰ The Texan recognized that many members of the present Senate were hesitant to extend further United States foreign aid. He admitted that an arms program was not appealing to many citizens but argued that it was "another vitally important step . . . on the road to world peace." "Unfortunately," he added, "it is a long, bitter road, full of steep hills and unpleasant detours."⁸¹ The appeal to the senators' pride as leaders of the free world was probably effective in 1949 as the United States reacted to the relatively new "cold war."

Next, Connally reviewed for the audience the past actions of the Senate in the pursuit of mutual security and international defense. The policy of mutual help began, said the Senator, with the "program of aid to Greece and Turkey." Connally continued:

We have further shown our steadiness and our firmness, by undertaking the interim aid program, the Rio Treaty, the magnificent concept of the Marshall Plan, Senate Resolution 239, and the North Atlantic Treaty--all approved by overwhelming votes in the United States Senate.⁸²

⁷⁹Ibid., p. 13025.

⁸⁰Ibid., p. 13019.

⁸¹Ibid., p. 13018.

⁸²Ibid., p. 13019.

This argument appealed to two groups of senators. The argument appealed to the veteran senators by reminding them that in the past they had met the challenges to world peace. The argument appealed to newcomers in the Senate by reminding them that the Senate was building a tradition of foreign aid. They, as freshmen, should add to that tradition.

Finally, Connally moved to the controversial point of prior United States obligation incurred by signing the North Atlantic Treaty. The Texan recognized the issue as the most dangerous to the Administration.

First, Connally did attempt to pacify reluctant "go-alongs" such as Gillette, who had voted for the treaty with "misgivings." He pointed out the lack of long entangling obligations: "Whether we continue the aid another year or any future time beyond the year will depend upon the action of the Senate and the House of Representatives." He emphasized for the doubters that "there are no commitments, there are no pledges, there are no agreements, there are no promises in the bill for a longer program."⁸³ Connally knew the danger of attempting to oversell the senators because he knew that his audience contained knowledgeable politicians who

⁸³Ibid., p. 13021.

were not naive in the ways of foreign aid. He admitted, "I would be less than frank, however, if I encourage the hope that the recipient countries would not need further assistance from the United States at the conclusion of this one year program."⁸⁴

Next, for the first time since North Atlantic Treaty negotiations started, he became definite on the point of the United States commitment under the treaty. He said, "We are obligated by the clause within it [the treaty] relating to self-help and mutual aid."⁸⁵ It must have been difficult for the Senator, who had earlier said that Secretary Acheson has gone "too far" in describing United States involvement in the treaty,⁸⁶ to say now that "we have solemnly agreed to work with the other parties to the treaty in building up the capacity of the member states to defend themselves against attack."⁸⁷ But Connally expressed hope that all senators would "move speedily to fulfill our obligations under the Atlantic pact,"⁸⁸ and concluded with specific treaty citations proving

⁸⁴Ibid.

⁸⁵Ibid., p. 13019.

⁸⁶The New York Times, April 28, 1949, p. 1.

⁸⁷U.S., Congressional Record, 81st Cong., 1st Sess., 1949, 95, Part 8, 13020.

⁸⁸Ibid., p. 13025.

United States obligation. "We are bound," Connally said later, "by article five and by article three to extend mutual aid and self-help. This bill is mutual aid. We are helping the other nations and they are helping us."⁸⁹

Since February, Connally had, for the sake of the North Atlantic Treaty, maintained that the treaty did not obligate the United States to furnish "arms" to participating countries. But he now directed senatorial attention to the wording of "mutual aid and self-help." "Mutual aid" could mean "arms." Therefore the arms program was fulfilling a legitimate obligation incurred under the accepted treaty. The Texan could only hope that friendly senators would forget their possible anger over his word-play and vote to honor their obligation. Admittedly, the third idea was the least appealing of Connally's argument.

From this beginning, designed to appeal to friendly senators, Connally turned to the announced opponents of the legislation. The Senator declared that "a number of arguments have been made against the military assistance program which the Senate should consider carefully. I am prepared to meet those arguments and to negate them."⁹⁰

⁸⁹Ibid., p. 13162.

⁹⁰Ibid., p. 13023.

Connally first turned his attention to the isolationist bloc led by Wherry, Jenner and Langer. He said, "Some try to minimize the advantage which the United States will obtain from the enactment of the bill. The bill is to the distinct advantage of the United States in carrying out the purposes of the North Atlantic Treaty."⁹¹

First, the Texan attempted to show the isolationists the importance of the treaty countries to United States security. "As in World War I and World War II," Connally said, "the countries of Western Europe, both physically and psychologically remain our front line of defense."⁹² Connally hoped that "the Senate and the American people thoroughly realize what the principle of common defense means with respect to our future security plans."⁹³ His implication was clear. Twice in the recent past the United States had ignored European politics. Twice the United States had gone to war because of its error in judgment.

Second, Connally addressed himself to a 1935 isolationist argument, recently revived, which argued that legislation-encouraged armaments races cause war. Connally maintained that "we have not created a world armaments race."

⁹¹Ibid., p. 13024.

⁹²Ibid., p. 13019.

⁹³Ibid., p. 13021.

What does the Soviet Union intend to do with its army of 5,000,000 men?"⁹⁴ He further argued that "we are not sending a single soldier to any of those countries for combat purposes, nor are we insisting that they increase the size of their armed forces."⁹⁵ The argument did not deny that armaments races cause war, but it did deny that United States legislation was the cause of the arms race.

Third, Connally insisted that arms aid to Europe was necessary to discourage Russian aggression. "Weakness invites aggression," Connally said, "and aggression, if allowed to continue, inevitably brings war in its wake."⁹⁶ Connally tried to introduce the isolationists to the realities of an air age. He said, "In the shrunken world in which we now live we cannot afford to permit our friends to remain so weak that they will invite aggression and be picked off one by one like pigeons in a shooting gallery."⁹⁷ Connally's refutation of the isolationists was probably adequate. The true isolationists were few in number and had suffered severe losses in prestige since Pearl Harbor. The people had repudiated them at the polls in 1944 and 1948. Knowing that he occupied a

⁹⁴Ibid.

⁹⁵Ibid., p. 13020.

⁹⁶Ibid., p. 13019.

⁹⁷Ibid.

relatively strong position comparatively, the Texan made his refutation lengthy and hard-hitting.

The second bloc of senators refuted by Connally were the liberal internationalists, led by Flanders, Kefauver and Pepper, who wanted the bill to promise more. His line of argument was to emphasize the number of countries that would be helped by the program. He noted the promise of additional aid to Greece and Turkey, commended the aid that had been given those two countries and indicated that "we must see this program through to its finish."⁹⁸

Connally touched upon what the bill promised for Iran, Korea and the Philippines. This argument also appealed to conservative senators such as Knowland, who daily condemned the Administration's Far East policy. Connally did not want the Mutual Aid Program to fail because of resentment over a lack of aid to the Far East. He said:

I have always had the deepest sympathy and regard for the people of China and I am confident that feeling is shared by the whole American people. Traditionally, our two countries have been on the friendliest of terms. We regret exceedingly that today China is threatened with totalitarian conquest. However, I do not think there is much to be gained by rehearsing now all of the things which were done or might have been done by us to help the Chinese people.⁹⁹

⁹⁸Ibid., p. 13022.

⁹⁹Ibid.

Connally told the liberals that the bill was so adequate that the countries would be aided economically as well as militarily. He added, however, that the task would be "difficult to achieve, as we well know in this country."¹⁰⁰ Connally had to use more care in his refutation to the second bloc of senators. They were, for the most part, Administration senators and international Republicans. Their help was essential in passing the arms program. Rather than disagree with their premise that the United States should give more aid, the Texan simply tried to persuade them that the Mutual Aid Program did aid more than just the North Atlantic countries.

Finally, Connally addressed the third opposing bloc of senators, the economizers, led by George and Byrd, who worried about the program's cost. The Texan admitted, "The financial argument is, of course, particularly appealing to a great many people because we are all anxious to keep our budget balanced and our economy on a sound and healthy basis. Yet I find it extremely difficult to put a price tag on world peace."¹⁰¹

He attacked those who were suggesting drastic cuts similar to the House action. Connally made his argument as

¹⁰⁰Ibid., p. 13025.

¹⁰¹Ibid., p. 13023.

an analogy. "If a man needs a square meal," he said, "we would not simply give him a ten cent sandwich, which will merely whet his appetite, but will not satisfy the needs of his body at all."¹⁰² In effect, he was challenging the senators to defeat or pass the bill but not to reduce it to an ineffective pittance.

The third bloc of senators, led by Connally's Southern friends, Walter George and Harry Byrd, were potentially the most dangerous to Connally's position. He had no easy alternatives. He met the appealing economy argument with an appeal for self-preservation: economy in defense spending is false economy. Connally hoped that, faced with the decision to pass the full appropriation or kill the entire appropriation, the economizers would vote favorably for the Administration.

Connally's speaking during floor debate.-- Connally's objective during floor debate was "to keep my supporters on their toes. I wanted swift action and no slip-ups."¹⁰³ On two occasions he indicated his desire for speed by accepting amendments without debate. He said, "I am going to accept . . . [the amendment] I do not want to kill time

¹⁰²Ibid.

¹⁰³Connally, p. 339.

chewing on it when we are going to accept it."¹⁰⁴

Connally was irritable but controlled during debate. He lost his temper only twice during the four days. Once he charged that "I do not think we are going to be able to fix it so as to satisfy . . . [Ferguson] . . . because when we fix this, he will break out in a new place."¹⁰⁵ In the final moments of debate, he lost an argument over the allocation of time for debate. Connally snapped, "I had twenty minutes. I had forty minutes originally, and gave . . . Vandenberg . . . twenty minutes, and that left me twenty minutes as I view it. I do not want to be flim-flammed by both the chair and the Senator from Georgia."¹⁰⁶ Connally lost the argument and took sixteen minutes.

Perhaps because of his illness and his desire to avoid needless talk, the Connally humor was present only once in the debate. Senator Thye had spoken on the value psychologically of a small permanent peace force as an international policeman. The Texan bragged:

What he said reminds me of an incident which occurred in my state some years ago. We had a famous police force called the Texas Rangers. They had a reputation for quickly restoring order in any community when turmoil or

¹⁰⁴U.S., Congressional Record, 81st Cong., 1st Sess., 1949, 95, Part 8, 13154.

¹⁰⁵Ibid., p. 13082.

¹⁰⁶Ibid., p. 13161.

mob action might exist or be threatened. The mere presence of the Texas Rangers restored order. On one occasion, old Captain Bill McDonald, who was a famous Texas Ranger, was instructed by the Governor to send a group of Rangers to a place where a riot was occurring. Captain McDonald went there alone When he got there, the sheriff and the committee approached him and said, "Just one Ranger?" He said, "Well, there's just one riot, ain't there?"¹⁰⁷

Because he had used questionable tactics to assure passage of the North Atlantic Treaty, the Texan may have felt his personal prestige was weak. Instead, throughout his speaking on the bill, Connally made use of the authority of other government and military leaders. In his short concluding speech, just prior to voting, he reminded the audience that "the military aspects of the bill were recommended by all three of the Joint Chiefs of Staff." Further, "they are recommended not alone by the Secretary of Defense, but by the Secretary of State. They are recommended by the President of the United States."¹⁰⁸ He specifically quoted General Omar Bradley. The Texan also had used the highly popular Bradley as an authority twice in his main address. Bradley was an excellent choice of authority because he was a highly popular war leader and was free of ties to the Truman Administration. He was respected by both Democrats and Republicans.

¹⁰⁷Ibid., p. 13113.

¹⁰⁸Ibid., p. 13162.

Connally referred to himself only once in debate. In describing his dissatisfaction with the first vague bill that had been written, he said, "All the members of the committee know that the chairman of the committee . . . as soon as he examined the bill said 'No, that will not do.'" Why had he introduced the bill? Connally replied, "The chairman . . . usually introduces a bill of this kind. I introduced the bill as a working paper, something to go on, because we had pressure from the department."¹⁰⁹ But Connally did not rely heavily on his prestige in the debate.

Aftermath

The George Amendment to cut the Mutual Aid Program in half was defeated in a key vote, forty-six to thirty-two. Just eighteen hours before news of Russia's advance to an atomic power, the Senate approved the arms bill, fifty-five to twenty-four. The bill allocated one billion dollars to the Atlantic Treaty countries, 211 millions to Greece and Turkey, twenty-seven millions to Korea, Iran and the Philippines and seventy-five millions for aid to China, to be spent at the discretion of the President. The House of Representatives, which had cut the program so drastically, accepted the

¹⁰⁹Ibid., p. 13084.

Senate proposal and the Mutual Aid Program became law.

Connally's appeals to the Administration senators had been correct. Most senators recognized that an obligation had been made in the North Atlantic Treaty. That obligation had to be fulfilled if the United States were to maintain leadership in the free world.

Opposition came from the isolationists, the liberal internationalists and the economizers. Only the liberals accepted Connally's arguments. The isolationists, of course, voted against the arms program. Probably no argument could have secured their vote. The remainder of the negative votes came almost entirely from the economy-minded Southern senators. Many had bolted the Democratic Party in 1948 and now they elected to vote against the arms program rather than increase national expenditures. Again, probably no argument could have convinced them to vote for the program.

Afterwards, sitting wearily on a bench outside the Senate chamber, Connally asserted that no evolution in American foreign policy since lend lease had been so difficult to achieve.¹¹⁰

¹¹⁰The New York Times, September 29, 1949, p. 14.

CHAPTER VII

CONCLUSION

Tom Connally's Senate career passed through four stages. In the period from his first election in November, 1928, until July, 1941, when he assumed the chairmanship of the Foreign Relations Committee, Connally was regarded by the public as a rather typical Southern senator. Although he had been a member of the Foreign Relations Committee since 1931, the Texan had participated in only one major foreign policy debate in the Senate. Other senators recognized him as perhaps the best "rough and tumble" debater in the Senate, and Connally was regarded more highly for his ability to censure Republicans than for his statesmanship in foreign affairs. During this phase of his career, the Senate saw Connally take an active part in domestic debates over Supreme Court reorganization, the poll tax and a federal anti-lynch law.

The death of Pat Harrison of Mississippi in June, 1941, elevated Walter George to the chairmanship of the Senate Finance Committee. Connally replaced George as the Foreign Relations Committee chairman. The entry of the United

States into World War II made Connally's committee the prestige body of the Senate. Until November, 1943, the Texan was regarded as an ineffective leader who was permitting the Senate's traditional role of "advise and consent" to die by default.

In the period from the passage of the Connally Resolution in November, 1943, until January, 1949, Connally became respected as the chief Administration spokesman on foreign affairs in the Senate. The Senator had originated a unique spirit of bipartisanism in foreign affairs by the formulation of the "committee of eight" in early 1944. Connally's prestige was further enhanced by his participation in international conferences at Mexico City and San Francisco, the General Assembly meetings of the United Nations, and two Foreign Ministers conferences in Paris. The Texan's prestige probably peaked in 1945 but he was still highly respected even after the Republican Congressional victory in November, 1946, reduced him to the ranking minority member of the Foreign Relations Committee.

During the final four years of his Senate career, Connally found himself in the difficult position of serving as Congressional leader during a time of enormous overseas expenditures and diminishing American prestige in the cold

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war. Connally, restored to the committee chairmanship, became identified as a co-villain, with Secretary of State Dean Acheson and President Harry Truman, in formulating a giveaway foreign policy that aided Europe at the expense of losing Asia. The growing Republican minority, with the double incentive of a vulnerable Truman domestic policy and a prospective Republican victory in 1952, became increasingly aggressive toward Connally.

During each of these career phases, Connally spoke on important foreign policy matters. In October, 1939, he spoke for repeal of the Neutrality Act. In November, 1943, his resolution committed the United States to postwar participation in an international peace organization. In July, 1945, he introduced the United Nations Charter to the Senate, and in September, 1949, the Texan led the fight for a Mutual Aid Program to implement the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. The purpose of this study has been to determine whether Connally's speaking on these selected occasions reflected the changing conditions of his Senatorial career.

Connally's Changing Prestige

Connally's speaking during the period of the four debates studied did reflect his changing prestige in the Senate.

From fifth-ranked to chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee.-- Connally was chosen to lead the floor fight in the Neutrality Act debate almost by default. Key Pittman was ailing, Pat Harrison and Walter George were primarily interested in the Finance Committee and Robert Wagner was involved in labor legislation. Connally accepted the assignment because he was interested in the repeal of the Arms Embargo clause.

Connally was probably aware of his lack of prestige in a foreign policy debate. In contrast, the leaders of the opposition, William Borah and Hiram Johnson, were veteran, nationally-known figures in the foreign policy area. Even Gerald P. Nye was better known than the Texan. In the debate, Connally did not attempt to support arguments by his own authority. He mentioned a personal experience only once, an unimportant reference to his past service in the House of Representatives. In fact, Connally used Borah as his principal authority in the debate. He referred to the Idaho senator twelve times and, in the course of the floor debate, also quoted Johnson to strengthen his own position. Connally attempted to utilize the prestige of his opponents to prove his argument.

In 1943, Connally, the Foreign Relations Chairman, implied that he should be shown more respect by senators as

he snapped that he had not come to the debate to be "heckled and browbeaten," but actually, the committee and the chairman were on the defensive throughout the debate. Once, during an exchange with the B₂H₂ bloc of senators he defended his twenty-five year record of internationalism but generally the Senator did not orally capitalize on his added prestige.

However, in 1945, Connally effectively emphasized his important committee chairmanship. He reviewed his part in instituting bipartisanism on "the committee of eight," proudly praised the individuals who had served with him on the Foreign Relations Committee and reminded senators that the committee had taken steps to fully inform them on the progress of committee hearings.

In 1949, Connally referred to his position as committee chairman only once. He indicated that, as chairman of the joint Foreign Relations-Armed Services Committee studying the bill, he had protected senators' interests by expressing dissatisfaction with the bill's vague wording. However, he found it difficult to explain why he then had introduced the unsatisfactory bill. Connally probably knew that several factors--his return of a political division to the membership of the Foreign Relations Committee, senators' displeasure over some methods used in passing the North Atlantic Treaty,

and growing dissatisfaction over the Administration's foreign policy--all worked to hamper his personal prestige. Whatever his reasons, Connally did not attempt to capitalize upon his committee position.

From provincial senator to internationally known governmental representative.-- The Senator's speaking reflected a change in the Connally image during the four debates studied. In 1939, as a relatively inexperienced senator in foreign policy debates, Connally had no international stature. His speaking was that of a provincial senator. The use of Southerners to illustrate hypothetical stories, the reliance on rather crude Southern humor in the retort concerning the repopulation of Ethiopia, and the Toombs anecdote build the provincial image. Further, Connally seemed to examine the problem solely in terms of national self-interest. While the desire to aid Great Britain and France was expressed, and was sincere, the Texan's primary thought in 1939 was to maintain and protect United States neutrality.

In 1943, Connally's image was in a process of change. He was not the rather obvious provincial of 1939. There was no reference to Texas or the South and the Senator attempted to project to the Senate his desire for international cooperation. Unfortunately, the absence of experience or personal

authority made creation of an international image difficult. Consequently, in 1943, Connally projected neither a provincial or international image.

Twenty months later, the Texan's speeches clearly mirrored the image of an internationally known governmental figure. The entire approach was international. Provincial factors that led to the defeat of the League Covenant were condemned. The Senator spoke with an assurance gained by participation in international conferences at Mexico City and San Francisco. Connally frequently reminded the senators of his work at San Francisco and of the contributions he made in committee work on the Security Council.

The Senator maintained his international outlook in the 1949 debate. He emphasized the need for strong United States leadership to help preserve peace in a "shrunk world." Citations of past Senate foreign policy action and an explanation of the bill's purpose in countries from Iran to China gave the speech an international flavor. His Texas pride permitted a comparison of the Texas Rangers to a small international police force, but the Senator's speech generally was that of an internationally-wise governmental figure.

From an ignored to respected to distrusted Senate leader.-- The first important Senate foreign policy debate

under Connally's leadership was the Connally Resolution debate of 1943. Connally, of course, was aware of the criticism over the committee's delay in reporting a postwar resolution. He recognized several valid reasons for the delay and apparently did not fully realize that others were blaming the committee inaction upon his ineffective leadership. In any case, his 1943 speech was that of a chairman who expected to be obeyed. He spent no time refuting the counter-resolutions that had been proposed. He simply generalized the need for international cooperation and requested passage of the Resolution. This was not the action of a man who expected to be ignored or charged with ineffectiveness. His bitter reaction to the realization that the committee recommendation was to be debated indicated that Connally apparently did not fully appreciate the dissatisfaction expressed about his leadership.

By 1945, the Senator could accurately forecast Senate opinion of his leadership. He was aware of the general satisfaction of the Senate over the bipartisan aspects of the Foreign Relations Committee. Fellow senators had displayed their warmth and affection for him upon his departure and return from San Francisco. Connally's speeches on behalf of the Charter acknowledged an awareness of the Senate respect

for him. He indulged in an almost paternal interpretation of the Charter and seemed to be confident that his interpretations would be accepted. Unlike 1943, the Senate was willing to accept Connally's explanations.

In 1949, the Senator's speeches indicate no realization of a change in Senate attitude toward his leadership. Only once in debate did Connally seem to apologize for committee action. As he read the provisions of the Mutual Aid Program, he took considerable time to explain the reasons for opposing future aid to China. The Connally of 1945 probably would not have felt compelled to unduly explain his position. But generally the Senator's speech is not that of a man who knows he is distrusted. However, the Mutual Aid Program debate occurred relatively early in the fourth phase of Connally's Senate career, and the distrust which was clearly apparent in 1952 might not have been obvious to him in 1949.

From a spokesman for FDR to a spokesman for Truman.--

Connally's speaking did not appear to change with the change in national Administrations. Only once, in 1949, did Connally specifically cite the President as favoring the pending legislation. The Texan usually emphasized the responsibility and the right of the Senate to advise the President rather than indicating that passage of legislation was fulfilling the wish of the Executive.

In 1939, Connally was independent of Franklin Roosevelt. Roosevelt had not spoken to Connally socially for over a year. Indeed, Connally chose to use Roosevelt's authority negatively in the debate indicating that a mere repeal of the Arms Embargo "might not be all the President would have desired."

In 1943, Connally did not refer to Roosevelt's wishes for passage of a postwar resolution.

In 1945, Connally made no reference to the late President Roosevelt or to his ex-Senate colleague, Truman. In fact, Connally stressed that the San Francisco Charter was not the work of "one individual."

In 1949, although Connally used the President as an authority for passage of the program, he also was careful to remind Senators that the committee had rejected the first vague bill which gave the President discretionary powers in allocating funds to foreign countries.

Connally's Changing Audience

The United States Senate underwent many changes in the years from 1939 to 1949. Did Connally's speaking reflect the changes that occurred in the Senate?

From pre-war isolationism to wartime internationalism to postwar moderation in foreign policy.-- Connally was

acutely conscious of isolationists in the Senate. In three of the four debates studied, he devoted lengthy refutation to isolationism as a foreign policy.

In 1939, Connally made a lengthy attack on the isolationist position. He spent considerable time refuting the argument that munitions makers, in league with Wilson, had led us to war. He also indicated that a repeal of the Neutrality Act did not imply a surrender of the "freedom of the seas" concept. Both arguments were favorites of the isolationist bloc led by Borah, Nye and Vandenberg. In 1939, Connally's long refutation was probably accurate audience analysis. The isolationists were a powerful bloc, and, if Hiram Johnson was accurate in his pre-debate prediction, they controlled twenty-four votes.

In 1943, Connally continued to direct arguments against the isolationists. He reminded them that they had opposed the League of Nations when United States support might have saved it and that they had preached neutrality and disarmament while Germany and Japan were arming. Connally was probably correct in directing some refutation to the isolationist bloc, but his speech did not accurately recognize the strength of the liberal internationalists led by Pepper and Ball. They had become a sizeable minority, numbering at least

fourteen, compared to a maximum of ten in the isolationist group. In view of the growing internationalism in the Senate and considering the time spent refuting the isolationists, Connally's short explanation to the liberals defending the need for a general resolution demonstrated inadequate audience analysis.

In 1945, Connally did not seem to consider the possibility that any bloc in the Senate could affect passage. The speeches seemed to capture accurately the mood of international good feeling present in the Senate.

In 1949, Connally recognized the presence of three groups in the Senate. Again, the bulk of his refutation, a lengthy three-part argument, was directed toward the isolationists. But, while Connally's speaking would seem to suggest otherwise, the isolationists were no real danger in 1949. His speech magnified their influence. The Senator's refutation directed toward the liberal internationalists would seem to have been satisfactory since, almost without exception, they later supported the Mutual Aid Program. But the Texan does not seem to understand the growing strength of the moderates in the Senate. The group, composed of Republicans and Southern Democrats, were becoming increasingly reluctant to engage in large foreign spending programs. Connally's meager

refutation of the moderate viewpoint was not adequate.

From heavily Democratic to Republican to slightly Democratic.-- From 1939 to 1949, Senate control shifted from Democratic to Republican to Democratic. During the four debates studied, the Democrats were in the majority with the margin of control decreasing from forty-seven in 1939 to sixteen in 1943 to fourteen in 1945 to twelve in 1949.

Connally did not seem to adapt or react to the changing currents in party control in the Senate. There are at least two possible reasons why Connally's speeches failed to reflect party control.

First, party labels were, and are, deceiving in the area of foreign policy. William Borah, Republican, was allied with Bennett Champ Clark, Democrat, in 1939. Kenneth Wherry, Republican, was allied with Harry Flood Byrd, Democrat, in 1949. While most isolationists were Republicans, the addition of a massive economic aid program to our foreign policy made many Southern Democrats "economic" isolationists. Party labels no longer accurately typed an attitude concerning the conduct of foreign policy.

Second, more than any other senator, with the possible exception of Vandenberg, Connally was identified with the concept of bipartisanism in conducting foreign affairs. Any

attempt by Connally to inject party labels into foreign policy debate would have been entirely out of character and would have violated his sincere belief that politics should end "at the water's edge." Even in 1949, when the political reportioning of the Foreign Relations Committee had severely strained the bipartisan concept, the Texan made no appeals on the basis of party affiliation.

Connally's Changing Speech Approach

As Connally's personal prestige waxed and waned, and while the Senate was in a constant and rather rapid transition, were changes reflected in the Senator's approach to the speech situation?

Changes in style and method of delivery.-- Connally was sixty-two when the Neutrality Act was debated and had been speaking in public, usually successfully, for forty-six years. It is not surprising, in view of his past successful experiences, that his style and method of delivery did not change after 1939.

There is no evidence in contemporary magazine or newspaper articles, the Connally Papers or the Congressional Record to indicate that the Texan ever departed from his highly calisthenic, colorful style of speaking.

The method of delivery remained constant through the four debates examined. In all debates, Connally carried a manuscript, either in one hand, or hung over one arm. But it is not accurate to term the Senator's delivery as manuscript reading. In all debates, textual evidence indicates that he departed from his script often to supply additional supporting material or to respond to a questioning senator. Unlike most senators making a major address, Connally welcomed interruptions and the formal speeches examined in this study are actually combinations of a prepared manuscript and running debate. Connally's delivery was more nearly extemporaneous speaking than manuscript reading.

Changes in developing material.-- The Texan's speeches generally show no great changes in the types of developing material used in his foreign policy speeches; however, there were changes in the emphasis placed on some types of developing material.

In 1939, Connally made extensive use of hypothetical illustrations to communicate the image of an aggressive Germany and a helpless Great Britain. Visual aids were used to show the location of countries aiding Germany and the easy access of Great Britain to the United States. These were devices that the Senator tended to ignore in the later debates.

As his personal prestige increased and as the Senate audience became more conditioned to making international commitments, the Texan's developing material tended to become a rather predictable combination of testimony and example.

Testimony usually played a major part in the support of Connally's arguments. The authorities used by Connally were usually known and respected by his listening audience. In 1939, Borah and Johnson were primary authorities. In the Charter debate, the Senator made use of testimony by members of the United States delegation to San Francisco as well as that of high echelon military advisors who had accompanied the delegation to San Francisco. In the 1949 debate, authorities included President Truman and cabinet members Dean Acheson and Louis Johnson. However, principal testimony was given by General Omar Bradley, a man highly respected by the Senate audience.

The historical example was used extensively by Connally. In 1939, he traced the development of German submarine warfare against the United States and read lengthy lists of torpedoed ships and their cargos. In 1943, he cited attempts made for early international peace movements and described the evolution of world peace machinery. Further time was spent citing examples of the partial success of the League

of Nations and the development of German and Japanese power during the nineteen-thirties. In 1945, his entire speech seems built around the historical reasons for the failure of the United States Senate to ratify the League of Nations. In 1949, Connally attempted to show the historic naturalness of the Mutual Aid Program by tracing Senate acceptance of the Marshall Plan, the Rio Treaty, and the Vandenberg Resolution. The Senator concluded by indicating examples of the folly of ignoring past aggressions.

The historical example and testimony were Connally's favorite types of developing material and his speeches did not reflect major changes after 1939.

Changes in debate tactics.-- Connally was known throughout his career as the best "rough and tumble" debater in the Senate. The Senate was filled with men of both parties who had felt the lash of Connally's tongue.

In 1939, Connally was a "rough and tumble" debater. In the twenty-six day debate, he was bitingly sarcastic in debate with the isolationists. He verbally abused Lundeen and Clark. In the final minutes of the debate, when Wheeler objected to Connally's preamble, Connally attacked the Montana "spouting geyser." He also used humor extensively to ridicule the numerous amendments which the isolationists attempted to apply to the Neutrality Act.

In 1943, the Senator also used sarcasm to answer the B₂H₂ Senators. However, his abuse never reached the personal intensity of the 1939 attack on Lundeen or Wheeler. When Pepper replied in similar fashion, Connally retreated and did not use invective in the debate again.

The combination of humor, sarcasm, and invective that had characterized the Senator's earlier speaking were not substantially present in the 1945 and 1949 debates. He engaged in a personality fight only once in 1945 and that was a colloquy with Scott Lucas which went much further than Connally intended. In 1949, while Connally was obviously irked occasionally by Donnell, Watkins and Ferguson, he never indulged in any old-style verbal sparring with them.

In 1943, the Texan made his only use of parliamentary tactics in debate. During the final week of debate he instigated the practice of requesting unanimous consent to end debate and bring the Resolution to a vote. The B₂H₂ Senators were forced to object. Senators prefer not to use an objection because it violates an unwritten rule of senatorial courtesy, so the unanimous consent device was a valuable one for Connally to use because it placed the objecting senators in an embarrassing position.

Connally's debate tactics did change as the Texan's

career progressed. As he developed an international image, Connally tended to cease his "rough and tumble" tactics.

Summary

On the basis of the four debates examined in this study, Connally's foreign policy speeches did reflect his increased Foreign Relations Committee prestige, his evolution from a provincial Southern senator to an internationally known governmental leader, a change of emphasis placed on certain types of developing material and a change in debate tactics.

Connally's foreign policy speeches did not reflect his changing leadership image, the change in national Administrations, the changing foreign policy attitude of the Senate, or a change in style or method of delivery.

Tom Connally retired from the Senate in January, 1953, after thirty-six years service in Congress. Over thirty Senate colleagues paid tributes to him in the Senate chamber. The final tribute came from Connally's Texas colleague, Lyndon Johnson. The Junior Senator from Texas said:

We will remember his command of the English language, his flashing wit, his uncanny ability to explain the intricate and complicated problems of modern life in the homely terms of the average American. We will also remember his

patriotism, his courage, his sense of responsibility that led him to fight for what we believed to be right.¹

¹U.S., Congressional Record, 82nd Cong., 2nd Sess., 1952, 98, Part 7, 9497.

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