LOVE, SYNERGY, AND THE MAGICAL -- THE

FOUNDATIONS OF HUMANISTIC SOCIOLOGY

By

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PREFACE

As with any creative project, this work would not have been possible without the help and support of family and friends. I would like to thank my family for their encouragement: to Mother who supported my dreams, to Dad who was kind, and to Kathy who became a friend.

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CHAPTER I

THE "CHANGE THE WORLD" CONVERSATION

Sociology originated in the "change the world" conversation of Comte (1842) and Marx (1848). Comte (1842, 1848), concerned with the abuses of the French Revolution, was interested in finding more stable ways of making social change. He sought the formation of an enlightened body of knowledge that would discover the true laws of society and then institute government that would rule according to such dynamics.

Marx (1846, 1848) approached social change directly. He is one of the few sociologists who repeatedly uses the word "love" in his writings (1844). His quest was to make a world in keeping with a vision of love: to somehow bring this love out into the world, and to have it make a difference to everyday life. We may not agree with his specific approaches and their application, but we cannot ignore the importance of his views: how to "change the world?" -- how to bring love into it in more ways.

The "behavioral" disciplines emerged at a time when a long line of philosophers, culminating in Hegel, reached precisely the same conclusion: that we needed to climb out of the armchair of social philosophy and into action. The conclusion was that even scientists were not merely describing the world, they were creating it. Therefore, we must move past philosophy and into making the world as it ought to be. As Marx has summarized, the philosophers have described the world; it is now up to us to transform it.

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Weber (1946) also acknowledged the "change the world" focus of the discipline. In his "On Science as a Vocation," he contended that the question of "who am I?" always takes place in the context of the question "what do I want to do?" Description and exploration of identity are tied to and initiated by the question of action. The conversation itself was one from which individual actors would come and go: develop strategies, experience "eurekas," and return to pool their wisdom. Conversations on strategies for living are always highly personal, but the broader context for any such conversation is: how do we change the world? Sociology is born in such a quest.

However, while holding out the "promise of sociology," twentieth century sociologists have shied away from such an awesome responsibility. Historically, sociology has used the umbrella of science to help shoulder the burden and has claimed the legitimacy of scientific status. A direct moral intervention into the world seemed too all encompassing.

Yet, somehow the focus of the old "change the world" conversation never quite dies. From time to time, cries and challenges emerge. They appear in the promise of sociology: among the young, entering the field eager for the quest, and with the old upon retirement, pointing to the vision once again. Research from the 1960's showed that the counter-culture movement on college campuses was largely a movement of aspiring sociology students (Lipset, 1965). The number of professors who have kept the dream alive as they approached retirement is perhaps too great to mention. From time to time, the torch has not just passed from old to young with mainstream Sociology circumvented: sometimes, the idea has re-surfaced in the normal mid-life business of sociology: Lynd (1939), after doing what might be regarded as the classic participant-

observation study, found himself asking, but <u>Knowledge for What?</u> After collecting voluminous amounts of data and information, Lynd returned to ask: but what are we <u>doing</u>?

Mills (1959) challenged sociology to imagine an action-oriented sociology. He invited us past a control-happy sociology into the hard work of envisioning a society based on freedom. Becker (1968) has asked pointedly: Whose side are we on? Gouldner (1970) viewed the crisis of sociology as a question of whom sociology serves: do sociologists really want to be the hand-maidens of government? Most recently, we found Sanford (1981), who worked on the classic Adorno studies of authoritarianism, posing the same questions to the field.

The historical occurrence of the popularity of Goffman's dramaturgy (Brissett and Edgley, 1974) might well has been linked to the abuses of sociology under Lyndon Johnson's "Great Society." Sociology had been granted a free hand in re-designing society. It responded with the functionalism of Parsons (1951) and the abstracted empiricism of the Lazarsfelds (1955), or worse. Dramaturgy represented a retreat from both scientific legitimacy <u>and</u> the responsibility for changing the world, to a stance of just describing. It desired to formulate a slow-motion journalism which would be content with just "watching." While correcting the abuses of scientific sociology, dramaturgy retreated from the traditional sociological quest of action.

While some sociologists may be content to merely observe, it is doubtful that this will be a popular approach that will rally many to the field. There is a latent hope that caused people to gravitate to sociology in the first place. There will always be people asking the questions and involved in the movement to create a better world.

Classically, this conversation has always been the proper domain of sociology. It is this conversation that I have followed others in terming "humanistic sociology."

A few sociologists have spoken formally of the possibility of a "humanistic sociology" that would depart from existing theoretical approaches. Berger and Luckman (1966) in The Social Construction of Reality, proposed a humanistic approach which would stress "man as man." Glass and Staude (1972) compiled the theoretical ground which might provide the starting point for a humanistic sociology. Lee (1973) argued that the best sociology has always been humanistic and that the paradigm included the works of Cooley, Thomas, Sorokin, and Mills.

In many ways, the promise of sociology and the "change the world" conversation is a dream. But it is a dream that constantly penetrates the field and its very effort. This theme can be found as an unaccentuated thread connecting seemingly diverse perspectives. Time and time again, while not actually formalized, the dream and the "change the world" conversation are repeated.

Becker (1971, p. x), after a thorough review of the literature in the social disciplines, summarized: "The science of man is, historically and by its very nature, a utopian science."

Humanistic sociology returns to the "change the world" conversation and questions of "the Good," love, values, and shaping the world. One is not far afield to conceive of sociology humanistically -- in fact, it has always been a latent undertone of the field.

The Beginnings of Humanistic Sociology

Historically, there are two basic foundations for humanistic sociology: the reaction within sociology against a value-free, scientific sociology, and the counterculture movement to create alternative social forms.

The formal development of a humanistic approach to sociology centered on a reaction against value-free, scientific sociology. Many sociologists (Mills, 1959; Horowitz, 1964; Phillips, 1971; Lee, 1973) had problems with neutral methods and the very idea of a classified expertise on living. At the same time, the credibility of the scientific bandwagon under which sociology had originally sought indulgence had developed clear philosophical problems. People had begun to ask if we really wanted to model sociology after physics.

Remember that Comte had even wanted at one time to call the field "social physics." But now even physics was developing epistemological problems. As Carpenter (1970) noted, modern physics reads like native myths, where each experience defines its own time and space.

The work of Meyerson (1902), Poincare (1952), Kuhn (1964), and Heisenberg (1977), among others, has shown that scientific laws are legislated like any other laws. Modern physics no longer appears to know what is going on. The world no longer confirms their theories; what they had thought was happening, was not. Newtonian physics is used when it works. Einstein's physics is used when it works, but neither paradigm can be used to account for much of what the other predicts (Hampden-Turner, 1970).

The physicist was not discovering a world, but selectively shaping a world to a certain image. This was the conclusion which shocked

Galileo centuries earlier. Galileo's work on primary and secondary properties of matter reads strangely like Goffman's (1974) Frame Analysis. Primary properties show us where to focus: the height and depth, i.e., what the frame looks like. Secondary properties discuss what we see within the frame. This carries over into Einstein's physics: the clear implication is that we are making choices, not just discovering what is there.

The work of Butterfield (1957), Polanyi (1958), Kuhn (1964), and Feyerbend (1970) showed that the intuitive has played a far greater role in science than has been previously recognized. At its best, science has always included art and exploration.

All of this has served to collapse the scientific canopy for doing sociology. However, this does not mean that we are forced back into social philosophy. What it does mean is that we are in a totally new dimension. We are back with the question of creating the world -- the old "change the world" conversation with all its subtle nuances, potential abuses, and complexities.

Curiously, at the same time that science as a system of meaning was being criticized, it had become firmly established in the world at large. Other ways of life were being dissipated. Anthropologists said that primitive cultures were rapidly being wiped from the face of the earth. By the end of the twentieth century, it was predicted that they would be gone. Within cultures, and between countries, differences crumbled under a scientific world view. Science had become reality.

Yet, it was at this time that the idea of a counterculture emerged. This was to become the second foundation of the movement toward a humanistic sociology. As cultural diversity becomes flattened into one

culture under a scientific-technological imperative, the idea of a counterculture becomes imperative. The visible counterculture movement may have gone the way of a fad, but the very real structural problems which fostered it remain.

In part, the counterculture movement in America in the late sixties and early seventies was a movement "sponsored" for and by sociology. Studies reveal that large percentages of those involved were in the field of sociology (Hampton-Turner, 1970). There were very real institutional connections between the counterculture and sociology, and with the newly developing humanistic psychology. It was an effort to envision a new world. It was a challenge to create new social forms and alternatives: an effort to move past growing up absurd in the lonely crowd and deal with the real alienating structural problems of technological society.

We had become estranged from community and from self. Psychology from Horney (1937) on had come to recognize that mental health depended upon the social context. The society which we had created on the basis of science had somehow deserted the needs of the person. Alienation and anomie had become commonplace in the modern world. New sources and ways of society seemed paramount if the human was to develop and grow. The movement to create alternative cultural forms -- to build a counterculture within the vast scientific culture -- became the task of humanistic sociology.

In many ways, it must be recognized that science _is_ Western culture. It is the decision-making processes: the systems of rational rules which we term bureaucracy and our whole way of thinking about the world. The counterculture revealed, and perhaps telegraphed, a potential major paradigm shift.

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While the reaction to value-free science developed a suitable epistemology for humanistic sociology and a departure from science, the counterculture sought to explore and develop new possibilities much as the artist might.

This movement to treating life as art is not new, but it has typically been encased within the scientific canopy. The idea that sociology is an art is not new to sociological literature, either. Probably the traditional statement of such a conception is Nesbit's (1962) article "Sociology as an Art Form." However, what Nesbit is really talking about is not so much sociology as art, but the role of the intuitive in hypothesis formation. Otherwise, his is a traditional scientific process.

We will, perhaps, have to return all the way to Comte (1842) to gain a view of Art framing Science instead of the other way around. It is only recently that a contemporary option has emerged. For a full-blown version of sociology as art, we must turn to the work of an anthropologist, Carpenter (1970). Carpenter did not really state his thesis in tight structural forms. Instead he strung lines through time and space much as an artist might do, but within his work can be found the beginnings of a humanistic sociology.

Originally trained as an anthropologist in such diverse settings as the South Pacific, South America, and Alaska of the American Eskimo, Carpenter has emerged on the contemporary scene to lend a fresh eye to our changing patterns. The vision he has woven is a golden bough for the sociologist wishing to conceive of sociology as an art.

Technology, Carpenter claimed, has circumscribed both culture and science rendering their original purposes obsolete. From this junkyard

of resources, every person is forced to create their own world. All cultures have bended to the technological imperative. However, we have not been left with just the directionlessness of anomie, but an opportunity to create our own lives and environments. Personhood, and the wane of cultural systems of meaning, demands that we all function as artists.

Roszak (1969) originally coined the term "counterculture" in a book entitled The Makings of a Counterculture: Technological Society and Its Youthful Opposition. Much of the work concerned the inadequacy of science as a basis for culture. Yet in this formal treatment is found a direction and a suggestion: the person as artist must find and develop new forms which enhance and further personal enrichment.

Carpenter's monumental work appeared about the same time, but it moves past a critique of science into an exploration of doing the art; of framing a conversation which moves past technological society and develops countercultural forms. Carpenter's (1970) book, They Became What They Beheld, may well be a summary of the crucial sociological insight. We become what we behold: we shape our environments and, thereafter, they shape us. If we wish to shape the world as artists, then we must become literate with our media, for these are our resources.

Media -- the McLuhan (1960) term -- refers not just to the popular conception of technological media, but to the social constructions of man. Media are "extensions of man" -- the attempt to enlarge upon the world of the senses. McLuhan originally co-authored an earlier version of They Became What They Beheld and compiled a reader with Carpenter on communications. However, it was Carpenter who brought the full

implications of the McLuhan view to sociology. It is a framework for doing sociology as art.

The similarity between the idea of "media" and Simmel's (1950) conception of "social forms" must be recognized. Carpenter's work is a continuation of formalism which places it directly in the sociological tradition. Media are social forms. For Simmel, sociology was the study of social forms. For Carpenter, it is the understanding of the grammar and application of media. It is in this consciousness that we must construct our lives. As cultural traditions become de-classified and secularized, they become available to the artist as resources for constructing a new mythos. This is the task that both Becker (1971) and Jung (1964) saw as the new work of the behavioral disciplines. Such is the work of the sociologist as artist.

Perhaps, the artistic vision cannot be articulated in scientific terms. Love and the magical may be academically illegitimate precisely because they do not lend themselves to scientific analysis. Columbus' maps were vague and sketchy, stated Carpenter (1970, n.p.), but they showed the right continent. If we opt for the wrong kind of conversation we may never get to the New World.

We must ask what kinds of conceptions are the most useful for the sociologist as artist. An artistic theory does not need to fulfill the criteria of science because it is designed for a different purpose. An artistic conception may require a different type of conversation than the clear and full statement of science. As Carpenter (1970, n.p.) noted: "Clear speaking is generally obsolete thinking . . . . The problem with full statement is that it does not involve: it is addressed to the consumer, not the co-producer."

Simmel's formalism was so radical because it retreated from an epistemological base. No longer seeking the source of life, it dealt with the resources that we use in shaping life. Such a strategy is by no means unheard of in sociology. It is similar to the tack taken by Parsons (1951) in formulating an ideal functionalism. It represents a utopian split with philosophy into the business of shaping the world.

When Roszak (1979, 1980) was asked what became of the counterculture movement, he claimed that it succeeded: that it became enfranchised in a historically new normative ethic of personhood. For the first time, self-exploration became a legitimate rhetoric of motive (Yankelovich, 1981).

Roszak was both right and wrong. The counterculture was routinized into American society by emphasizing the psychological and neglecting the sociological. The psychological focus on personal fulfillment became a part of American cultural mythos, but the movement to find alternative forms of society was negated. Perhaps it was a large chunk of the problem to bite off at one time. Yet, the structural problems which foster individual discontent remain. By institutionalizing only the psychological aspects, the routinized counterculture led to abuses of self-indulgence and the over-concern with self that led to a characterization as narcissism (Lasch, 1978).

Yet, psychology seems from time to time to recognize the need for a companion humanistic sociology. Several recent Humanistic Psychology conventions have focused upon the issue of community. Even Jungian psychologists (Hillman, 1975) -- whose emphasis on dreams would apparently be the farthest from a sociological connection -- have talked about the need for meaningful rituals. A leading social researcher has

predicted that the self-fulfillment movement will give rise to the quest for community (Yankelovich, 1981). An old question emerges: How do we re-vision society?

In psychology, a "humanistic psychology" has been institutionalized following the work of Fromm (1947, 1956), Maslow (1954, 1966, 1968), Rogers (1961, 1977), and May (1969, 1975). Their work would suggest the possibility of a companion humanistic sociology focusing on the social context and interaction of persons. The writings of historian Roszak (1969, 1972) provided an insightful departure from scientific sociology. Becker's (1964, 1968) review of sociology, anthropology, and psychology also formed a basis for humanistic sociology.

Through the counterculture movement, sociology once again returned to the "change the world" conversation and questions of "The Good," love, values, and the shaping of the world. The quest for alternative social forms was a natural bridge between sociology and the world -- although one that traditional sociology had not prepared itself to meet. Perhaps the counterculture offered a preview and a re-ordering of the directions that sociology might take. The questions for a humanistic sociology and sociology as art seem to have been pinpointed by the counterculture: How do we create social forms which enpower people? How do we create society for people instead of people for society? Our social constructions should function for the human -- not mold the human to some other purpose. This is the meaning of humanism as applied to sociology.

Social reality is quite different from physical reality. The task of the social disciplines is quite different from the scientific fact-finding mission. The social disciplines seek to create a new world: entering the realm of value and what "ought to be."

The Social Creation of Reality

Social reality is organized along the lines of the self-fulfilling prophecy and the definition of the situation (Thomas and Thomas, 1928; Merton, 1948). As Berger and Luckman (1966) have shown, social reality is constructed. Knowledge and belief are thus intimately connected with the actual construction of a reality. We create a world which mirrors our definitions of the situation. Society tends to be almost a "mass hypnosis" enacting those definitions as self-fulfilling prophecies.

The extent of this process must not be underestimated because it is the key sociological and anthropological insight. As Krishna (1971) argued, this is the central difference between social and physical realities: belief, values, and wishes are fundamental components of social reality. If the world could be reduced to objective consciousness, then there would be no need for psychology or sociology. If the world could be reduced to wishes, then all would be mind and the territory of psychology. The fact that the world is both necessitates a sociological approach to understanding it. Culture itself is a description which we learn to see: a self-fulfilling prophecy which becomes reality.

Science functions as a self-fulfilling prophecy which has become the basis of our culture. It has been an overwhelming success: scientific definitions of the situation and humanity have been implemented. Humanistic sociology would seek another definition of the situation and propose the accumulation of knowledge of a different type of self-fulfilling prophecy.

Defining Human Nature: The human form seems to be almost infinitely variable. Humanistic psychology has sought to treat human nature as a self-fulfilling prophecy and visualize toward the human potential.

Ortega y Gassett (1941) wrote that science could do no other than search for man's nature: treating man as a thing like other scientific things. Yet, "Man is no thing, but a drama . . . . Man, in a word, has no nature; what he has is . . . history" (p. 200). [Italics Original]

Humanistic psychology seeks to move beyond the past and into the present. From the present, it visualizes new possiblities for the human future. It attempts to create a new self-fulfilling prophecy embracing "the Good" and other humanistic values.

Humanistic psychology is an exercise in personal power: the self-creation of one's own life, reality, and meaning. In such can be found both its beauty and its naivety: reality is not created merely by individual charisma, but is socially created by the interaction of actors. A humanistic sociology is thus needed to further articulate and implement the work begun by humanistic psychology.

The Limits of Self-fulfilling Prophecies

To create a self-fulfilling prophecy is by nature a heroic strategy. Efforts to make the "Good" will always be interfaced with the problems of the Jungian "shadow" (Jung, 1964) and the critique of humanism which Becker (1975) characterized as "the escape from evil." The romantic quest must adequately deal with the full implications of these theorists if it is not merely to foster the seeds of its own undoing.

In many ways, the "change the world" conversation approaches absur-absurdity. If we interface psychology with sociology, we encounter the psychological concept of "projection." The concept of projection (Jung, 1964) maintains that in order to escape from personal problems, a person

"projects" these problems onto the world. Instead of changing one's
self, a person distances his/her defects onto other people and attempts
to change them accordingly. Under such a conception, the "change the
world" conversation could be seen as a neurotic attempt not to deal with
self.

It is no doubt true that many of even the greatest social theorists
were guilty of such a ploy. It is said that Marx's wife and children
were starving while he sat in an ivory tower writing of love for the
masses. Sadly, such examples have often been the rule rather than the
exception.

At the same time, we cannot discount the "change the world" con-
versation as merely psychological projection. Psychology cannot be
reduced to sociology, nor can sociology be reduced to psychology. Each
discipline in its very approach obscures part of what the other is try-
ing to say. What we have is a double-bind with which the "change the
world" conversation will be forever interlaced.

Evil in the world has been generated by the very attempt to do
good. People have sought the good by escaping from evil: we define the
evildoers and seek to eliminate them. Unfortunately, we do not have to
return in history as far as the Crusades to find plentiful examples of
such efforts.

Jungian psychologists refer to such phenomena as the "shadow side"
of personality (Jung, 1964). There will always be some evil cast by the
shadows of any good light that we may shine. Sociologists have dealt
with this under the conception of "manifest" and "latent" functions.
However, the notion of the "shadow" probably has more profound
implications.

The "shadow side" of our personalities tends to be hidden from ourselves. We do not see our most drastic faults, but instead project them onto others. Although such is a fool's game, given our inability to achieve total psychological insight, it is a fool's game to which we all are heir.

Even though they have often been translated to such a conclusion, Becker's "escape from evil" thesis and Jung's idea of the "shadow" do not mean that we need to abandon all efforts at social change. What they do mean is that we need to be more aware of the consequences of our social change strategies and less naive about our motives in formulating them.

Our motive in formulating a "change the world" conversation is often heroic. It is an effort to which we return, despite its ambiguities and despite what is often the feebleness of our effort. We must realize that we cannot change the world once and for all. We cannot save people. But we can make the world better. We can help people. If we seek to become literate with what is possible, we can strive to make the world better -- to see our lives clearly and apply our effort where it will help. This is the task to which sociology since its initial conception has aspired to. Humanistic sociology returns directly to this focus.

Yet in reformulating the old "change the world" effort, perhaps, we need to recognize the problems which are inherent in heroism itself. Perhaps we need a different paradigm (than that of the hero) for viewing social change. Perhaps heroism as a strategy has led us into science and the search for scientific techniques in a sort of "back door" fashion.

Another possibility emerges for organizing our conceptions of social change. The old conception of the magician as opposed to the hero offers us another way of approaching the problem. The ancient conception of magic emphasizes "relatedness" (Roszak, 1975). This is similar to Fromm's (1956) and others' (Tillich, Jourard) conception of love as "overcoming separateness." Perhaps, the magician and the lover offer a very real strategy for doing sociology and re-entering the "change the world" conversation. And although this paradigm may not be fully articulated in our lifetime, it offers a very real possibility for our lives. If we were to reduce humanism to a few words, those words could easily be the recovery of love and the magical.

The Humanistic Vision

Humanistic sociology would strive to bring values right through the "front door" of the discipline and envision society in such a way as to make a better self-fulfilling prophecy.

This brings us to the question sociologists and psychologists alike have habitually tried to avoid: What is human nature? It is here that humanists have usually been undone by the shadow side. However, we cannot avoid the question and must give at least a tentative orientation.

I would suggest that we could do a lot worse than follow the work of Fromm (1947, 1968). Fromm (1968, p. 96) suggested we begin our "science" with the value "that it is desirable that a living system should grow and produce the maximum of virtue and intrinsic harmony." The central value of humans would be "to become what we potentially are" (1947, p. 163).

Humanistic psychology following the direction of Fromm, Maslow (1954, 1962), Rogers (1961, 1977), and others sought to explore the human potential. Human nature may not be any more than a matter of potential: not a matter of "being", but a process that is "becoming." It is a departure from "what is" to what "might be."

Human nature seems to be extremely variable if we view the various forms and expressions that human experience has taken. Indeed, we may concur with Fromm (1968) who follows Walt Whitman in saying that "I contain multitudes." Or Goethe's comment that I can "conceive of no act so horrible that I cannot imagine myself to be the author."

Self is not contained, but has many faces. Human experience may vary, but we see a thread of possibilities from the best to the worse. Indeed, we recognize a familiarity in all the experiences. Once we understand the situation, we may see how we might have behaved similarly in the same situation.

This imagining and understanding of the other is perhaps a natural bridge between the disciplines of psychology and sociology. Cooley (1909) called the "imagining of the other" sympathic introspection and recommended it as the proper method for sociology. Mills (1959) in the Sociological Imagination asked us to see the common threads that connect the problems in our lives. Laing (1964) addressed the extent to which, as the song says, "there but for fortune go I." The human possibility seems exceedingly variable. We can cross and connect with other lives, seeing how we might be living those lives.

Humanistic psychology expands upon this idea to ask us to envision what we might become: the self-actualized self of Maslow; the self-realization of Rogers; the alive person of Fromm. These are ideal

types. They set the direction that this truely variable form --
humanity -- could possibly take. They are not so much realities that
can be grasped as they are potentialities that are possible.

All of this has lent an air of "make-believe" and unreality to
humanistic psychology: an aura of illegitimacy which does not seem
quite credible in traditional academic circles. But as the philosopher
and author Hesse (1969) noted:

> . . . although in a certain sense and for light-minded persons,
> non-existent things can be more easily and irresponsibly
> represented in words than existing things, for the serious and
> conscientious historian, it is just the reverse. Nothing is
> harder, yet nothing is more necessary than to speak of certain
> things whose existence is neither demonstrable nor probable.
> The very fact that serious and conscientious men treat them as
> existing things brings them a step closer to existence and the
> possibility of being born (Foreword).

Truly credible scholarship keeps the human possibility alive and
furthers its direction. To record "what is" is not enough. We must
report that "what is" suggests alternatives and possibilities that could
be followed. In some ways, the "change the world" conversation will
always be a dream. But it can also be a real movement in that direc-
tion. How we propose to move in this direction (towards "the Good,"
love, and the magical) is crucial, for it determines all that follows.
We must become literate with the grammar of social change strategies,
avoid the pitfalls that have traditionally befallen such efforts, and
develop viable new alternatives and social forms that enhance the
humanistic vision.

Key Concepts in Humanistic Sociology

Love

If we are going to conceive of sociology humanistically, then we must focus upon life-enhancing social processes rather than reduction-istic ones. The foundation of the humanistic vision is the experience and the power that has been called love. Indeed, love is the core humanistic value. If we follow love seriously, a different con-ception of sociology emerges.

Love provides a dialectic paradigm to the scientific paradigm and contains the basis for a different conceptualization of knowledge. A love paradigm could provide the basis for a new self-fulfilling prophecy and cultural system. Love is not objective but involved. It is not detached, but emphasizes respect and honesty. Love is not premised on doubt and testing, but is based on belief, trust, and faith: love is always a risk. Love is not a product of science, but is by invitation only: while science is based on prediction and control, love courts, invites, and influences, but does not force. Where science is experi-mental, love is an exploration in reality. It does not flourish in mock or artificial settings, but only when one opens with full commitment. Finally, while science seeks a value-free approach, love is the very heart of meaning. Love is the active component in the creation of meaning.

A love paradigm gives us a reasonable basis for a departure from the scientific paradigm. In addition to a different epistemology, the two paradigms involve different conceptions of power. The scientific power emphasizes force, prediction, and control; it is analogous to

social power which forces one to do something against one's will. The humanistic version of power derives from Nietzsche's "will to power." It is the actualizing power of being. It invites, courts, influences, but does not control. This idea of "power as being" has been used by Maslow, Fromm, Rogers, and Roszak and predicates the basis of humanistic psychology.

Yet sociology has neglected the subject of love. Sociology makes an introductory case for love but only to prove the need for social contact and community (i.e., society). It then moves off without ever returning to understand the process.

Love and human contact are shown to be essential for nurturing and even longevity; but all of this is used merely to make an argument for "proving" the need for society. Studies of attic children and hospitalism show that children either do not grow properly or die without human intimacy. Other studies show that significant relationships and involvement with others actually influence how long a person will live. The key element in these studies is not socialization and social interaction (as might be assumed from an examination of how these studies are used in introductory books). The key element is love and human intimacy.

Strangely, love itself remains still largely illegitimate as a topic for serious consideration in the traditional academic circles of sociology. Yet, it might be argued that love is the fundamental reason people desire social interaction in the first place: that love is the key sociological term, and that the quest for love is the fundamental human motivation (Bergson, 1935; Fromm, 1956). Love is "messy." It does not neatly fit our pre-arranged methods borrowed from science and

classical philosophy. Yet if we are truly interested in human proces-
ses, we cannot afford to quickly forget love after the first chapter
never to return.

It appears that every major sociological perspective has a dialec-
tic within the field (e.g., functionalism-conflict theory, symbolic
interactionism-formalism). The exception is exchange theory. I believe
that the development of an intimacy perspective would provide for the
appropriate counterbalancing of the exchange metaphor. An intimacy per-
spective might well serve to integrate our insights on community,
primary groups, love, and the whole nature of intimacy.

What should be obvious about the exchange metaphor has been
obscured by its very transparency: it premises separate individuals.
We have never explored clearly what the "we" dimensions are. What
occurs in the process we call "sharing?" What happens when the defini-
tion of the situation moves past one of scarcity to a feeling of
abundance?

In exchange theory, we have followed Gouldner (1973) in maintaining
the universalness of the "norm of reciprocity." However, what of the
idea of a "free gift?" Classical exchange theory would deny the possi-
bility of a free gift, while an intimacy perspective would maintain that
love is a free gift. Gouldner (1973) has modified his perspective to
include a "norm of benevolence". How do reciprocity and charity
interact?

Trust is also a phenomenon which collapses self-interest into "we"
definitions. Recent research has shown its application into even insti-
tutional settings (Gibb, 1978). Sociology may have barely scratched the
surface in examining the ability of trust to "transcend the very nature
of what is."

Homans' exchange theory contained a "liking" postulate which may correspond to trust. Homans (1974) maintained that positive interaction creates liking and friendships. Such liking facilitates further interaction and institutional dynamics. Drucker (1974) defined profit not as money but as the "lubricant" which makes an organization maintain itself. Friendships, liking, and trust represent not luxuries, but essential components of organizational interaction. These dimensions are an exception to strict exchange theory and contain the possibility of moving away and weaving an intimacy perspective.

Exchange theory stems from the application of economic metaphors to social life. An intimacy perspective would investigate different modes of survival. Artists, for example, have always survived with a different manner of commitment than advised by the traditional economy. Perhaps, in the past, it has been mainly artists who have created their own lives. With personhood becoming a norm, the artist offers clues not only to our own personal fulfillment, but for the conceptualization of society.

Certainly, one of the reasons why an intimacy perspective has not been articulated, aside from the fact that it forces us to deal with values and emotions, is that it places us squarely in the realm of having to deal with religion as social theory. It forces us to confront Jesus as social theorist. It makes us face Buddha as psychologist. Sociologists have not wanted to have their religions evaluated as policy. An intimacy perspective causes us to de-secularize the world and bring the things which matter most into our theories and work as sociologists.

An intimacy perspective also invites us to explore the difference

between "self" and "other" which we have used so precariously to seek a truce with psychology over discipline boundaries. Intimacy means not only intimacy with others, but ultimately, intimacy with self and with environment.

Intimacy is a way of knowing. It represents a different approach than the autopsy table of science. Instead of analysis and dissection, love is "knowing something in its integrity" (Fromm, 1956, pp. 24-26). This respectful way of knowledge may be the very essence of what a humanistic effort means.

Synergy

If we are going to conceive of sociology humanistically, then we must focus upon social processes which are life-enhancing rather than reductionistic. In what types of social arrangements are persons fuller; in what types of relationships are humans reduced to something smaller? Synergy is the idea that the whole is somehow greater than the sum of its parts: that combined action is greater than the run of individual actions.

In some types of relationships, combined action actually produces a sum which is less than individual actions: manipulation, power-dominated relationships, relationships of role-like efficiency. In such cases one might well argue that the person would be better off left alone by society. Yet, there is another possibility: a person being promoted by combined action: of coming to society by synergy.

Synergy means that 1 + 1 = more than 2. Despite the fact that we have not used the term "synergy," we have always "advertised" the necessity of "society" by this concept. We have argued as sociologists

that society cannot be reduced to individual actors. Psychological reductionism does not explain the "magic" which can occur from inter-action and literally produce something that is more than the sum of its parts. Indeed, we have defined society as "more than the sum of its parts" (Parsos, 1951; Weber, 1946; Durkheim, 1950; Comte, 1907). Yet we do not understand this process by which the person is made more by society. This process is synergy.

Sociologists have staked their claim to a discipline upon synergy without ever marveling about how the process occurs in the first place. The study of synergy should be a central focus for a humanistic sociol-ogy. It is in such a process that we find social forms which create society for people rather than reducing people to social forms.

The term synergy was originally introduced to the behavioral disci-plines by Benedict (1970; Mead, 1959). At the time of her writing, she was greatly concerned that her examination of synergy might be seen as undermining the core anthropological stance of cultural relativity (Maslow, 1971). Still, she could not avoid reaching the conclusion that some cultures produced paranoid individuals who might well be better left alone by society; while in other cultures, life was found to be abundant and individuals seemed to be promoted to synergy. Some social arrangements appeared to be "factually" better when viewed from any human standpoint.

Ruth Benedict's concern with cultural relativity is understandable. She had stumbled upon the first concept which emerges when we move past value neutrality and relativity as the supreme goal. She termed the magical process synergy.

It is interesting to note that a young graduate student of

Benedict's named Maslow (1971) was so impressed with her insights on synergy that he made a career out of identifying and studying people who reminded him of Ruth Benedict -- whose interaction with other people encouraged and created a synergistic involvement. He called such people "self-actualized." Synergy thus got smuggled into psychology through the back door as it were and sociology has still not gotten around to exploring the implications of Benedict's argument: the creation of social arrangements and forms which encourage synergy as a societal process. The self-actualization of a psychological viewpoint is incomplete without a companion sociology which focuses upon synergy.

Re-visioning Society

Sociology is precisely in the business of re-visioning society (Hillman, 1975). Whorf (1956) concluded his study of the nature of language by saying that if science is going to survive the impending darkness, we must find new ways of talking about the world -- a new language. The way we envision the world tends then to become the world. Humanistic sociology must find new ways of talking about the world which do not reduce human beings to lesser, impersonal versions. This was Mills' (1959) concern in the Sociological Imagination. He spoke of developing theories which do not whittle us into smaller "cheerful robot" versions.

How do we create a society which allows and enhances freedom and exploration -- those values which have been called personhood. Mills foresaw the very difficult problem of democracy in all its precarious-ness: the idea of freedom within society. How do we create a society which is capable of providing individual freedom, not reducing the

individual to societal demands, and still have society? Again, we confront the idea of synergy. Synergy is not an avant-garde idea or a luxury. It is crucial to the institutional fabric of a society which values democracy. Sociology must work to re-vision society in new ways.

Humanistic sociology takes a value stance. It strives for the sociologist to bring his/her values to work through the front door. As Boulding (1977) stated, the question for the behavioral disciplines is simply what is better, and how do we get there? Asking the right question is crucial. If we neglect to properly frame our exploration, we will not move in the direction of discovering an answer; nor will we recognize the answer should we stumble upon it. Our first step is crucial: it frames our task and predicts all that is to come. If we begin with the fact-finding mission of science and truth, we may never get around to "better" and questions of values. What is important? How do we create meaning?

Our beginning steps towards a humanistic sociology can be outlined now. The first concept which emerges after we leave behind the relative perspectivism of a neutral science is the idea of synergy -- that there is such a thing as a "good" culture (Benedict, 1970). Next, we find the myth-making function: Becker (1971) re-visions toward a culture which is an effective hero system and Jung (1964) sought the re-vitalization and creation of meaningful rituals. Subsequently, we may turn to Fromm's (1947, 1956, 1968) idea of embracing values which are life-enhancing. As Becker noted (1971, p. 152): ". . . the brilliant work of Erich Fromm is the best synthesis . . . to emerge in our epoch, and it is this we shall have to build."

Finally, in our haste to develop a science, we have abandoned our

folklore, etiquette, and ethical traditions. We must now search them for clues for envisioning society while retaining the mystical view of humanity. We have abandoned values and approaches which explore meaning. We need now to traverse such sacred ground. Sociology -- humanistic sociology -- must bring the whole of our knowledge of life to bear upon the task of living. To do such we must explore the limits that science has imposed on our thinking: the nature of our socially created reality and the human possibilities; and follow the efforts of the lovers, magicians, artists, and mystics to create a better world.

It is an old quest. Starry-eyed youths enter the field eager for the romance of changing the world. As we grow to maturity, we put aside the grandeur and begin the day-to-day task of living. But some of the old dreams remain. The questions and the desire will not go away. We can put the dream to sleep, but we cannot close its eyes. As people retire, we find them once again challenging youth with the same old hope. We cannot hold out the promise of sociology just at the beginning and the end of careers. The real mid-life crisis that nags us in our sleep and comes bursting through as we turn back to the world from peak experience is: how do we return the old question to the mainstream of the field? How do we build upon meaning, values, and the quest for better -- the "change the world" conversation -- and make it the work of sociology?

No generation will "solve" the questions of the "change the world" conversation. We are far too mortal for that. Most of the truths we know are actually rather existential in nature. We live with our confusing realities and frailties. Yet we strive to make life somehow better: somehow more happy. We stand on the earth. We know that we

are living and dying. Our imaginations reach to the stars. It is here
that we must build with the dream in mind.

CHAPTER II

SCIENCE -- THE RED HERRING

Questions of aesthetics and how to build a social world around humanistic values are, by no means, new. The quest to love and create a social world in the light of that vision is perhaps as old as consciousness itself. Throughout the ages, people have testified to love as the crux of experience, and what is important in life. Yet, a practical theory of love has not been mapped into reality. Indeed, questions of the "Good" have often been abandoned in favor of more realistic pursuits. At the same time, here we are entertaining the possibility of a humanistic sociology, and embracing Ruth Benedict's idea of synergy -- that there is such a thing as the "Good" culture.

Bateson (1979), in discussing similar questions, said

There has to be a reason why these questions have never been answered . . . . We might take that as our first clue to the answer -- the historical fact that so many . . . have tried and not succeeded. The answer must be somehow hidden. It must be so: That the very posing of these questions always gives off a false scent, leading the questioner off on a wild goose chase. A red herring (p. 234).

I would suggest that the red herring is none other than science.

It will be remembered that at the time that science was succeeding with technological breakthroughs and was enjoying new-found credibility with the public, the romantic poets warned against the abuses of its vision. Romantic poets openly declared war on "Newton's sleep" (Roszak, 1969). Having conceived of Christ as the Imagination, William Blake

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maintained that Science was the Anti-Christ and that only "dark Satanic mills" could come from it (Bateson, 1979, p. 241). In all, the romantic poets saw Science as destroying all that was holy and magical in life: they saw it negating the humanistic vision.

This division between the religious view and the scientific view of man had not always been the case. The fact that early scientific issues were also church issues illustrates that they were both operated in the same theater. Often the theologian was also the scientist. Science had begun as a quest to find the laws of God: since God had designed the universe according to laws, the early scientist sought to find a law so obvious that the heretic would be forced to admit that God did exist (Bosworth, 1977).

Science would thus find God's rulebook and prove His existence. It was conceived of as a Golden Ladder of Progress which would take us to knowledge and to God. Ego's quest for God's rulebook might be seen as already providing the basis for a formidable "red herring."

Science was thus conceived of as a Tower of Babel which would lead to heaven. It was Spinoza (1951) who first realized that something quite different was happening. His conclusion was gradually whispered all over Europe: "God or Nature." It did not make any difference whether the word God was used in scientific theories or whether the word Nature was used.

The ancients had sought to find the fundamental building blocks of the universe: what they termed "corpuscles." With the "finding" of atoms and the ordering of the physical world by atomic weight, it appeared that the fundamental building blocks had been found (Meyerson, 1930). However, Einstein's theory and its application in splitting the

atom did more than just produce the nuclear age -- it destroyed the philosophical basis of science. The atom was supposedly the fundamental building block and, therefore, unsplitable. It became apparent that atoms were not really there: they had been constructed by the mind. The weight definition which was an agreement to operate towards the world in a certain manner had proved to have practical applications. It had been shown that we can analyze the world by comparing the weights of various items, but we are constructing those items -- not finding the truth. The agreement to accept the weight definition for physical science was an agreement to operate by a chosen metaphor.

As Burke (1945) summarized,

Those who have criticized the use of metaphor have for the most part not realized how little removed such description is from the ordinary intellectual method of analysis . . . . When we describe in abstract terms, we are not sticking to the facts at all, we are substituting something else for them just as much as if we were using out and out metaphor . . . . Indeed, are we not coming to see that the whole works of scientific research, even entire schools, are hardly more than the patient repetition, in all its ramifications, of a fertile metaphor (p. 126)?

The Truth appeared not to be what we had thought. It suddenly began to look like we were not going to find an Absolute Truth. The Logical Positivists were mistaken: the Universe was not going to tell us how to act. It looked like Science was closer to art than had been suspected. Life could not be solved first on paper.

Before we live -- before we act -- we cannot fully know the plot. Science will not free us from the responsibility of acting. The "change the world" conversation cannot be solved on paper. We cannot wait to find the truth before we get around to acting toward the good. If we wait, we will never be finished in time.

It is strange that at the same time that Science was being

criticized for serious epistemological problems, it had become the pre-
dominant metaphor in society. In fact, currently, Science is Western
culture. It is the judicial decision-making processes, the extension of
science into rational rules and role descriptions which is bureaucracy,
and the very method of running government and business alike.

Primitive world views are being erased from the face of the earth.
The scientific world view has won out through technological magic. The
technology of cameras, television, automobiles, and even "Coca-Cola"
was no match for the primitive methods (Ogburn and Nimkoff, 1955;
Carpenter, 1970; McLuhan, 1971). We live in a world of technological
magic. The assumption is that surely the world view which gave us this
magic must be superior.

Cultural diversity is being flattened into one scientific-
technological culture. Primitive world views remain only as curiosi-
ties. The rational-scientific banner has become the official version
of reality.

It is at this point that a counterculture becomes imperative. It
was Jung who first sought to recover the irrational component from prim-
itive cultures (Jung, 1964). He saw the need to preserve the ancient
understandings of man's drama. It was meaning and relatedness which the
primitive world view expressed. It is alienation and separateness which
the scientific world view emphasizes (Fromm, 1968).

Perhaps, we do not see the significance of Benedict's idea of syn-
ergy and the choice between cultural arrangements because we see only
one culture. The scientific imperative has obscured choices between
cultures -- between the "good" culture and the unsatisfying. Culture
limits and structures the options which can occur to us. We see no

possibility except the scientific realism.

At the same time that science is being popularized as it colonizes culture, it is in trouble philosophically. Ancient philosophers had a debate over whether the first step should be to "find the truth" or to "make the good." The search for truth emerged victorious and the 2,000 year journey to science was launched. But now, even the physicists -- our most reified version of science -- do not know what is going on (Needleman, 1979; Hampden-Turner, 1970). Perhaps, it was not possible to depart from the difficulty of the "making the good" argument so easily.

In our search for the truth, it has been shown that all knowledge is "personal knowledge" (Polanyi, 1958); that major scientific "truths" were serendipitous discoveries (Butterfield, 1957); and that all major scientific discoveries occurred because somebody (either consciously or unconsciously) violated established methods and truths (Feyerbend, 1970). The truth appears not to be what we had thought it was at all.

The conclusion is slowly being reached that science is subject to the same dynamics as other human systems. The great success of the physical sciences occurred when the decision was made to ignore the fact that science is a human act. The physical scientist decided to ignore questions of human consciousness: to pretend that they weren't looking, that they were just seeing. The human act of looking became unavailable for inspection (Bosworth, 1977). This is precisely where the physical sciences separated from philosophy and made their great progress.

Later, we have the development of something called the "social" sciences taking place. This is a slippery maneuver, at best. The assumption is made that there are "mature" and "immature" sciences and

eventually the social sciences will "grow up." However, this obscures the basic epistemological problem. Having decided to ignore human action, we are now going to use the procedure we developed to sidestep human dynamics and consciousness <u>to study</u> human dynamics and conscious- ness. Science then could move merrily on its way up the ladder of its tower of Babel to God. It is such expedience which is immature.

Science as a Human Process

If we view science as a human process, some odd things begin to happen. We reach some interesting understandings.

Science is a Club

It is a group of "certified experts" who agree to play by the rules. The "weight definition" of material reality by which physical science staked its identity is an example of a prerequisite for club membership.

Poincare (1952), in his famous Phosphorus example, showed that even material elements must gain admission to such a club. He noted that we are only allowed to use "laboratory-certified" phosphorus in our experi- ments. Even though we may have a mountain of what in every manner appears to be phosphorus standing outside the laboratory, we are not allowed to call it phosphorus because we cannot be sure that it will react in the way that we have previously determined that phosphorus behaves. Therefore, we can call the mountain of apparent "phosphorus" absolutely nothing. We only include items in our "scientific" process which we have determined will obey our rules.

Similar procedures are used for weeding out uncooperative people

who would be scientists. Not only does the world view of each science make it difficult for people who do not share club views of reality to obtain membership, but graduate schools and professional associations are maintained to eliminate those who do not follow club policy.[1]

A personal anecdote might further illustrate the gate-keeping function of the scientific club. A friend of mine who was a graduate student in chemistry informed his advisor, while he was doing research on phosphates, that he thought that phosphates were mental constructs and that they did not really exist. The reply was: "If you cannot believe in phosphates, what can you believe in?" My friend was violating a domain assumption for club membership.

Science is a Method of Agreement

It is a group of people who agree on a certain version of the world and agree to act in a certain manner towards it. It is almost a contractual arrangement.[2] Kuhn (1964) showed that the scientific method is a way of agreement and settling arguments. It is not a matter of "truth", but of popularity and one side winning an argument. Paradigm shifts have not been made because one argument is necessarily better, but because one side has succeeded in obtaining the necessary power to enforce its agreement. Kuhn noted that the slow, orderly progress depicted in science textbooks was a myth: each generation rewrote its history much as a political party might.

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[1]It is true that professional associations do not usually ban or censor members, but they do reduce certain views (and people) to irrelevance.

[2]If masters' theses, Ph.D. dissertations, and professional journals are any proof, it _is_ a contractual agreement.

Scientific Laws are Legislated

Scientific laws are not found, they are subject to a process of
legislation just like any other law (Bosworth, 1977). They rely on the
methods of argument and politics for endorsement. As Kuhn (1964) showed,
often the change takes place by the old guard dying off, and with it the
opposition to a new paradigm and laws.

Science is Involved in Actively Shaping/Making
The Universe

Science is not finding the truth, but is shaping to an image. The
idea that scientific methods can be neutral is becoming increasingly
suspect. The Heisenberg (1977) principle of indeterminancy, in physics,
says that some particles in space cannot be seen without shining a light
upon them. The act of shining a light on them then forever changes
their velocity and direction. The act of seeing thus changes what we
see, and we will never be able to know the truth (of what happened
before we shined the light). The process of looking cannot be ignored.

This is the conclusion which bothered Galileo centuries earlier.
Galileo said that all matter has two types of properties: primary prop-
erties and secondary properties. However, the primary properties are
really not "properties" at all. The secondary properties tell us what
we see, but the primary properties tell us where to look in the first
place. They are the arbitrary descriptions, definitions, and focuses
without which we see nothing. Galileo realized that by telling us where
to look, the physical sciences were not finding the truth, but making
the world. Not only must the amateur looking through his telescope know
where to look in the first place, he must know what to expect to see.

This is all very similar to the recent work of Piaget (1954) in psychology. In discussing the role of seeing and vision in the child's conception of reality, Piaget noted that a child must learn what is <u>in</u> an environment in order to see it. Children must learn where and on what to focus: this is why we wave objects in front of them. Parents <u>show</u> them the environment. Cultural anthropology abounds with examples of how parents in different cultures have delineated the environment in different ways and socialized their children to see different realities (Benedict, 1934; Hoebel, 1949). <u>Culture is a description which we learn to see.</u>

Goffman's (1974) frame analysis in sociology, made a similar point in saying that how we frame something determines what we see. Goffman's phenomelogical approach also parallels Bateson's (1979) argument that a question frames the answer to it, and we must ask on what "surface" the answer to a particular question might be mapped. Science is not able to avoid the human component and attain objective truths. Our decisions on how and where to look, no matter how "objectively" we design our method of looking, will influence -- and to a large extent determine -- what we see. The question that science must now be asked is whether it has extracted virtually all that can be obtained or whether new methods can be incorporated for some new purpose other than the traditional scientific quest for truth, or whether we need to turn to new approaches.

Eddington said it quite nicely:

We have found that where science has progressed the farthest, the mind has but regained from nature that which the mind has put into nature. We have found a strange footprint on the shores of the unknown. We have devised profound theories, one after another, to account for its origin. At last we have succeeded in reconstructing the creature that made the footprint. And lo! it is our own (Matson, 1964, p. 125).

Our premises become our conclusions. Our domain assumptions

(Gouldner, 1970) become our structure. Where we start is where we end up.

Even Descartes (1912), who recommended a method of doubt, could not avoid such circularity. He began by thinking and doubting and he concluded with "I think, therefore I am." He started believing in the truth but chose the method of doubting all things and forcing the truth to reveal itself. Several times during his discourse, when he had worked his way into a philosophical corner, the "Angel of Truth" showed up to direct him on his way. If Descartes had not a priori subscribed to the theory of truth, we might expect him to be suspicious of the "Angel of Truth." His circular method of doubting proves only that he is doubting.

If where we start is where we end up and determines what we shall see on the journey, then where we start is of paramount importance. Once reified, perspectives tend to become self-perpetuating and very difficult to disengage. Perspectives can easily degenerate into name-calling where it is felt that simply because we have labeled a phenomenon, we have understood it. Even if refutations to a theory are found, this does not disprove the theory. The exceptions are noted, cast as "anomalies", and the theory then proceeds much as it did before. An example of an anomaly would be the "black hole" of physics. Black holes are defined as points in space where the "normal laws of physics are suspended." The points are then labeled as black holes and the normal mode of physics once again proceeds just as if black holes had never been discovered. It is only when the number of anomalies is too great, and a new theory is formed which incorporates more of them, that the reigning theory is displaced. In modern physics, some of the anomalies

of Newtonian physics can be explained by Einsteinian physics, but some of the things which must be treated as anomalies under the Einsteinian system were explainable through the Newtonian system (Hampden-Turner, 1970). We have not generated a new "truth," we have merely incorporated a new metaphor for organizing our information.

We do not switch perspectives for strictly logical reasons or replace the old with the new because it is closer to the truth. We develop a new perspective because the area it synthesizes is deemed to be more important -- i.e., valuable. One simply chooses to look in a different way because one is more interested in the focus that this view affords. We switch paradigms because of values, not because of reason (Kuhn, 1964).

Love and magic cannot be treated as anomalies to science, but require an entirely different method than traditional scholarship and analysis. They defy the normal categorization of thought and discipline boundaries. To understand them, we require an approach which is more ecological. If we are to explore the humanistic concerns, we must not start with the methods and values of science, but with our humanistic values themselves. They demand a different manner of movement. In thought, it appears that there is no difference between ends and means: that how we start is where we will end up. If we are to study love and magic, we must allow our understanding of them to dictate our method of exploration.

The Scientific World View

I would contend that the very premises of the scientific method become the scientific world view. The reason humanistic concerns, and

love and magic, have not been studied is that they do not fit the scientific world view. If we are going to understand why this is so, we must understand the scientific world view. To do this, it is necessary to study the method of science.

Maslow (1966), in the <u>Psychology of Science</u> said that the one overwhelming finding of experiments in behavioral science was that subjects resent being experimented upon: that they felt that something crucial was being lost. If we were going to be truly empirical, then we must have taken such humanistic findings into account.

That the methods of scientific experimentation do not lend themselves to humanistic efforts should be made obvious from a list of scientific methods:

1. Objectivity and Detachment
2. Doubt, Null Hypothesis, Testing
3. Prediction and Control
4. Experiment, Artificial Settings
5. Value Free

Objectivity and Detachment

With objectivity and detachment, the purpose is to not contaminate our "data." A distinction is made between the knower and the known along the lines of a mind-body split. The objective scientist is not allowed to "take the role of the other" (Mead, 1934) or experience "sympathic introspection" (Cooley, 1902). People are reduced to objects for our inquiry. The observer must refrain from being a part of the process being studied.

Objectivity would have us pretend that we are not doing the looking:

it thus avoids problems of human consciousness. It demands an aliena-
tion between the "In-Here" and the "Out-There": between the self and
its object of study.

> Objective consciousness is alienated life promoted to its most
> honorific status as scientific method. Under its auspices, we
> subordinate nature of our command only by estranging ourselves
> from more and more of what we experience . . . (Roszak, 1969,
> p. 232).

> . . . whatever its epistemological status . . . objectivity as
> a state of being fills the very air we breathe in a scientific
> culture . . . the mentality of the ideal scientist becomes the
> very soul of the society (Roszak, 1969, p. 216).

> Roszak (1969) continued:

> When we challenge the finality of objective consciousness as a
> basis for culture, what is at issue is the size of man's life.
> We must insist that a culture which negates or subordinates or
> degrades visionary experience commits the sin of diminishing
> our existence. Which is precisely what happens when we insist
> that reality is limited to what objective consciousness can
> turn into the stuff of science . . . (p. 234).

Objectivity would alienate us from the very concerns which a human-
istic sociology would wish to study. "The essence of magic," noted
Roszak (1969, p. 245), "lies in the sense that man and not-man stand on
communicable terms with one another. The relationship is not that of
In-Here impassively observing Out-There . . . ."

Love is an active entering into another person, moving past bound-
aries of In-Here and Out-There (Fromm, 1956). It appears problematical
to know love from an objective standpoint. Humanistic pursuits all
emphasize involvement. It seems impossible to attain understanding of
them from a method of objectivity and detachment. It is the caring for
the not-I that is the very basis for the humanistic ethic.

Doubt, Null Hypothesis, Testing

Humanistic enterprises might well follow Coleridge's method of the

"willing suspension of disbelief." The emphasis might be placed upon trust rather than making things "prove" their existence. It is very possible that some things only exist if one is willing to participate and entertain their existence. By accepting at the outset a method of null hypothesis and doubt, we exclude such phenomena from study.

Love and magic, as well as other humanistic visions, may well be such phenomena. Doubt and testing causes us to treat the magician as a charlatan and the lover as a con artist. Repeated testing may drive love and magic from our view. Because "they" won't adhere to our standards of testing, the scientist is apt to conclude that they don't exist. Love gets relegated to the realm of reciprocity and fair exchange, and magic gets routinized as hypnosis or mood.

The "Reality" of the scientific world view treats as real only such phenomena as can be presented publically for inspection. The "knowledge" gained from intimate spaces is not subject to the scrutiny of such testing and is thus suspect or totally disregarded.

The experiment of the laboratory is the ideal model for scientific truth. Syncronicity, for example, by its very nature is not tailored to artificial, mock settings. Contriving conditions for its occurrence greatly reduces it as a phenomenon. Love cannot be adequately operationalized by role-playing. If we want to get to the core of meaning, then an artificial setting is not the place.

The stance of the scientist is that of skeptic. Humanistic values emphasize an involvement, a trust -- a commitment. The scientific method of doubt is the anti-thesis of the humanistic ethic of love. The scientific world view produces the rational man who seeks to have reality prove itself. The humanistic vision produces the artist who creates and participates in a vision which he/she feels is real.

Prediction and Control

The scientific view assumes a mechanistic universe which can be reduced to cause and effect phenomena. The emphasis is upon power: obtaining predictable relationships which can then be controlled. Phenomena which "cannot be foreseen or reproduced at will . . . are essentially beyond the control of science" (Meyerson, 1930, p. 28). Science demands manipulable knowledge. It seeks reduction of the world into variables which can then be controlled. It follows Bacon in conceiving of knowledge as power.

The emphasis upon power is quite different from a humanistic epistemology. Humanism would treat life more as a miraculous occurrence than as a machine which is reducable to cause and effect parts. It is not power, but knowledge which is central to the humanistic perspective. It is only the "black magician" who would force knowledge into power (Roszak, 1969, p. 261). The humanistic conception resembles more the intimacy of love (Fromm, 1956).

If knowledge is but manipulatable information for power, then we have replaced understanding with explanation. Explanatory theories, the crux of science, require only that we map one variable to another for purposes of control; not that we appreciate the interrelationship. The effort of explanatory theory is to "explain away" the variance in a system: the analysis of variance would reduce all variance to identity (Meyerson, 1930). The unacknowledged assumption is that variance is deviance, and must be accounted for: reduced to identity.

The cause and effect model of the mechanistic metaphor stands in flagrant contrast to the humanistic view of the world and its beauty. The implications of such a metaphor for ecology and for human beings in

general (Merchant, 1980) call into question how far we can push the mechanical metaphor and still retain both the person and the planet (Roszak, 1979). The humanistic consciousness desires a different kind of relationship with life. Love may be the choice to forego power for higher motivations. A method which premises prediction and control violates the very spirit of an exploration into humanism.

The cause and effect metaphor also has another consequence: in order to manipulate a subject, we must first have that subject in a manipulatable environment, i.e., under our control (Carpenter, 1970). This poses severe problems for freedom as well as for our conception of a fuller vision of humanity (Mills, 1959).

With the mechanistic model, it is presumed that the universe is "made" according to laws and science will find those laws. The status of laws in physics is under great debate (Polanyi, 1958; Kuhn, 1964). It has been noted earlier that scientific laws are not discovered, but are legislated. For the human "sciences," the question might be asked: if laws of human behavior were "discovered," would they still work after they were made public or would people learn to "work the system?" Or if these laws were kept secret and available only for government use, would they not be the basis for the classified expertise which Mills (1959) and Gouldner (1970) so feared? And, if they did not work, would there not be a tendency to enforce them?

The mechanistic metaphor, thus, poses severe problems for freedom and is political in nature. Humanism would seek a different model of knowledge.

Value Free

Science claims value neutrality. It has been argued previously that such neutrality is impossible: that the very act of framing a question and a method of inquiry is a value stance. What is critical here, though, is the fact that the Scientific world view would desire the pretense of ethical neutrality.

The implication is that values are somehow illegitimate; that they will taint the work of building a secular science. Humanism underscores the point that values are the very basis of meaning and that if we must shape our work, we should do so in directions we intend -- not by unspoken and unconscious assumptions from unexamined metaphors. Humanism seeks a sacred enactment of values held to be the most important for living, not a secular alienation from all systems of meaning.

The essence of a humanistic epistemology is that over the ages, people have testified that there are better ways to live. These testimonials over experience must then be regarded as knowledge claims and examined as strategies. Benedict's (1970) idea of synergy reintroduced the idea of the "good" to the behavioral disciplines. It implied that there were choices over systems of meaning and that our choice of cultural arrangements had directional consequences.

The classified expertise claim of the scientific world view does not eliminate the need for choices and values, but it does limit the number of people involved in the decision-making process. It must be asked if any human being can be trusted with the type of knowledge that science aspires to: even if it were attainable, would it not be too great a temptation? We must structure our knowledge-finding process to the types of knowledge we wish to attain.

To study human processes, we cannot afford to neglect values. If we seek a humanistic sociology, we must formulate methods of movement and exploration which address the values we wish to promote. This requires leaving the scientific culture with all its subtle nuances and seeking methods which are congruent with our subject matter. We must return to the ancient problem of the Good and seek to build toward our values.

A Humanistic Epistemology

Fromm (1968) made the critical distinction between "living" human beings and "dead" ones: between life-enhancing social processes and life-strangling processes. The value which he embraced was productiveness of the human capacity (1947): the growth and the unfolding of the individual through love (1956) -- all that contributes to the unfolding of life (1968).

Fromm maintained that there are two ways of knowing. The first is the autopsy table of science with its method of dissection and analysis.

> In children we often see this path to knowledge quite overtly.
> The child takes something apart, breaks it up in order to know
> it; or it takes an animal apart; cruelly tears off the wings
> of a butterfly in order to know it, to force its secret. The
> cruelty itself is motivated by something deeper: the wish to
> know the secret of things and of life (Fromm, 1956, p. 25).

This is the normal scientific mode of analysis: we take something apart to know its secret. We dissect the whole and then seek according to our mechanistic model to put it back together. Our cruelty is masked by the fact that we are using laboratory animals, but our method is clear: we must render things dead to know their secret. Even in biology, we know more of cadavers than we know of living bodies. Science by its method does not allow for change, or growth. It prefers the

immobile: the fixed moment in time: the dead.

That the reader may be shocked by the extremity of such an argument and this portrayal of science does not mute its logical consequences. Even the experiments in the Nazi concentration camps can be seen as an extension of the power to know (Griffin, 1981) -- to reduce life and find its pulse and soul.

"The other path to knowing 'the secret,'" said Fromm (1956, p. 25), "is love." "Love is . . . knowledge . . . under the condition of the preservation of . . . integrity" (Fromm, 1947, p. 116). It is an entering into. It is an active participation and understanding. This is similar to Cooley's idea of "sympathic introspection" and has links with Weber's verstheen approach (Matson, 1964).

The philosopher Bergson (1949, p. 21) said, "there are two profoundly different ways of knowing a thing. The first implies that we move round the object; the second, that we enter into it." The first, Bergson called analysis; the second he called intuition. Intuition is a "kind of intellectual sympathy." It is an attempt to grasp the whole. Bergson maintained that it is only by intuition that we grasp the whole; it is never understandable only by the elements of analysis. This leap of faith is necessary for our understanding.

Hocking (1959) in Types of Philosophy concurred:

> . . . our experience of love and beauty have a decisive word
> to say. We speak of them as 'feelings'; what if they are also
> knowings? I suggest that they are such . . . they are. . .
> not only emotions, but moments of metaphysical insight
> p. 309).

This method of intuition is very similar to Fromm's "knowing something under conditions of its integrity" which he called love. Analysis does not seem to fit our understanding of love. As the poet Wordsworth said,

> Sweet is the lore that Nature brings;
> Our meddling instinct
> Mis-shapes the beauteous forms of things
> We murder to dissect

The artist and the poet seek a different form of understanding which preserves and respects life and growth. The intuitive role of the artist and the analytical role of the scientist have been often recognized, but the artist is usually subjugated in the scientific purpose and economic "reality." Intuition is "credited" as the source of ideas/hypotheses, but must then be translated into knowledge by the process of science and its methods.

As Roszak (1969) argued,

> One cliched argument suggests that the work of the scientist begins with the poet's sense of wonder (a dubious hypothesis at best) but then goes beyond it armed with spectroscope and light meter. The argument misses the key point: the poet's experience is defined precisely by the fact that the poet does not go beyond it . . . . Or are we to believe it was by failure of intelligence that Wordsworth never graduated into the status of weatherman (p. 253)?

C. P. Snow spoke of two cultures, one scientific and one humanistic, but "scarcely grasped the terrible pathos that divides these two cultures" (Roszak, 1969, p. 232). We cannot rely on science for methods of running the world and criteria for reality without becoming a scientific culture and subverting the humanistic vision. It is Roszak (1969) who concluded:

> We must be prepared to entertain the astonishing claim men like Blake lay before us: that here are eyes which see the world not as a commonplace sight or as scientific scrutiny sees it, but see it transformed, made lustrous beyond measure, and in seeing the world so, see it as it really is (p. 240).
> [Italics Mine]

"The legitimate use of images is to express the truth, not to possess it," wrote Watts (1951, p. 26).

> . . . you cannot understand life and its mysteries as long as
> you try to grasp it. You cannot grasp it just as you cannot
> walk off with a river in a bucket. If you try to capture
> running water in a bucket, it is clear that you do not
> understand it and that you will always be disappointed, for in
> the bucket the water does not run (Watts, 1951, p. 24).

We find that Blake was right: The Scientific culture is in danger of torturing the insight out of life; it is the "Anti-Christ" of the imagination and fundamentally antagonistic to the humanistic vision. Science would take the beauty and grandeur out of life and reduce us to a lesser version of humanity -- the "cheerful robot" of Mills (1959, p. 175). Science means the submission of awe and wonder, of imagination and reverence for life to a secondary status.

It was Blake who wrote:

> To see eternity in a grain of sand
> To hold infinity in your hand

This is hardly the scientific method. Blake and the romantic poets saw science destroying religion: the mystical view of human nature. And ultimately, unless we are willing to believe in a Procrustean bed where our legs are stretched if we are too short and our head cut off if we are too tall, science renders us into something less than fully human. It means death.

We are a long way from the original scientific Tower of Babel which would take us to God. Science has gotten all of life on its table, but at a terrible cost.

Knowledge is power, wrote Francis Bacon. Science has followed Bacon in concluding that power is manipulatable knowledge. Humanism would recommend a different epistemology. As Omar Khayyam said: "To each must come the time to decide between truth and wisdom." It is wisdom for living which humanistic efforts seek, not information for manipulation (Merchant, 1980).

It is not the focus of this paper to develop a new epistemology: only to argue that such an epistemology exists, and to suggest its outline. The actual articulation of such an epistemology may well be the critical philosophical issue of our times. The general outline of this humanistic epistemology can be found developing throughout the culture.

The scientific assumptions for knowledge revolve around the idea of territorializing the unknown. This is the frontier version of the explorer searching enchanted lands and bringing back riches for the king's table. Nature is gradually tamed and her resources made available for the building blocks of society. The wild becomes charted, homesteaded, and gradually made "civilized." It is the idea of Manifest Destiny which would march us across the frontier sure of our purpose -- and its path to knowledge.

If we were to illustrate this epistemology, we would have an endless series of lines as the boundaries of knowledge gradually were stretched and the area of the unknown became colored in by the known.

The Frontiers Of Knowledge

Known $\int\int\int\int\int$ Unknown

Figure 1. The Scientific Epistemology

This is also the strategy of Freud's famous dictum for psychology: "where id was, let ego be." The unconscious becomes conscious; the

unknown, known. It is both the tactic of our science and the history of Western culture. It is our ground-rule assumption to the irrational and mystery.

The limits of such an epistemology have been amply challenged in the twentieth century. Jung (1964) noted that the rational, "masculine" elements of culture have been over-emphasized and the irrational "feminine" aspects now need to be recovered and developed before we can further progress as a culture. The recovery and articulation of primitive mythology is an important task which holds continued relevance for the psyche if we are going to build a culture which is in tune with the needs of the person. Jungian psychology permits the irrational free space to play between the lines of thought.

Ernest Becker, working out of the rational Western tradition, evolved two themes -- the denial of death (1973) and cultures as hero systems (1962) -- which present limits -- propositions to such rationality. Hero systems are methods of denying and transcending death while questing for a solution to life's problem of meaning. Given our human frailty, our hero systems remain imperfect --admitting to something less than a total map of reality. Fromm (1956), among other humanists, suggested an alternative epistemology which strives not to grasp life and analyze it in strict Aristotlean terms, but to allow it to flow and know it through love. The ecology movement has presented us with an accumulated wisdom that perhaps the mechanistic metaphor of our science has run its course, and that we cannot press the metaphor farther without endangering the very existence of life (Merchant, 1980; Commoner, 1971; Roszak, 1979).

The eminent domain/manifest destiny of the scientific-technological

imperative appear daunted by an ecological perspective which emphasizes balance as opposed to final solutions or methods toward progress. The sanity of mining and abstracting all of the world's resources is being reviewed in balance against the natural beauty and our conception of what is contained in a "better" world. From the ecology movement may emerge a new epistemology which redefines the whole relationship between man and environment, between the knower and the known.

Merchant (1980) documented how our whole conception of nature and of women (and the intuitive) stems from the scientific revolution and its metaphors on nature and mechanism. Griffin (1978) showed how the metaphors which we have used to obtain control and certainty over nature are the same metaphors which we have used to tame and still our very conception of human nature.

The way that we have explored and territorialized the earth; mined its resources and laid bare its timber; carved its mountains and built blocks for houses according to our geometrical designs -- this is the same way that we have approached and shaped knowledge under our scientific world view. The frontier is gradually colonized, known, and made tame. The scientific scrutiny misses the fact that we may be missing the opportunity to know beauty as we push the boundaries of our civilization to their limits.

It is said that Francis Bacon, as attorney general of England, modeled his scientific method much after a witch-hunt (Merchant, 1980). The method of truth was the method of the Inquisition. Nature must be forced to reveal her secrets. Bacon says that science should "hound nature in her wandering" and "make no scruple of entering and penetrating into these holes and corners, when the inquisition of truth is the whole

object" (Merchant, 1980, p. 165). Morality and values must take a secondary place to the pursuit of truth. Such an approach shows no concern for the subject under study, but only seeks to extract the truth by whatever means necessary and then use such "knowledge" for manipulation and power. Even if the witch is to die in the process or end up seriously deformed, this is of no consequence. Such a metaphor can only leave us with a terrible latent cost when we apply it to nature. It takes on even more graphic proportions when human nature is studied by the methods of such an epistemological inquisition.

The language of the historical scientist is only slightly removed from its actual historical impact. Its metaphors have tended to become our common-sense assumptions for our methods and our epistemology (Merchant, 1980). We must carve back the great wilderness. We must territorialize the unknown. We must cage and domesticate the wild beast. We must mine the earth. We must explore uncharted lands and bring back riches for the king's table. We must cut back the frontier and erect civilization upon the wilderness.

Order has prevailed in this twentieth century. The frontier has been pushed back and civilization erected so "completely" that the ecologist and the humanist now must question the wisdom of the scientific-technological imperative which brought us this world view and this world. We appear no closer to capturing the truth. We are left to wonder if we should await the next scientific-technological breakthrough patiently or whether it is now time to question its very assumptions and limits. Is the epistemology of science bringing us closer to "knowing," or are we in danger of limiting, deforming, and ultimately destroying the very life which we would study?

It must be recognized that the core assumption of a scientific epistemology revolves around the idea of power. "Knowledge is power"; "human knowledge and power meet as one" (Merchant, 1980, p. 247). Knowledge becomes explanatory theories which can be used for prediction and control. Power becomes the key element.

"Bacon transformed the magical tradition by calling upon the need to dominate nature not for the sole benefit of the individual magician but for the good of the entire human race" (Merchant, 1980, p. 169). This is in direct contradiction to the earlier folklore of the Western tradition which held that the truth could not be captured -- and to place the life force upon the rack and seek to torture its secrets from it was not only foolhardy, but imminently dangerous and always self-destructive.

Two examples of such folklore might suffice for illustration here. The first is the legend fo the Holy Grail and the "Rhine Gold." Whoever may after endless quests eventually find the Grail and the Rhine Gold must immediately ask two questions ("What is the purpose of the Grail?" and "Who does it serve?") or forever perish. The power of the Grail can only be attained without perishing by asking those essential questions of life and value; the power can only be dealt with by understanding questions of knowledge and the implications of such power. The Grail is not captured; it is part of a larger quest. This is not the value-free power and knowledge of science, but the power born from the understanding of the knowledge and meaning of a deeper secret. This is the knowledge to which the magician alludes. While science offers a secular, technique for power, the epistemology of the magician maintains a sacred version of knowledge which involves the whole self.

The second folklore example of an alternative epistemology is the

first great novel to emerge from the American frontier: Moby Dick.
Although Ahab seemed in some ways to have a humanistic consciousness (he
stared into Starbuck's eye and said that "there is nothing finer than to
look into a human eye"; that this was as far as infinity went), he could
not give up the quest for his power -- he could not let go of his other
desire (science?) to "know" what is greater than he, to have his power
know no bounds, and capture and conquer that force. His vengence was
not upon the past but upon not knowing thoroughly; of having vast power
and finding an exception to it. When Starbuck tried to dissuade him
from his path, Ahab noted that "we have been having this conversation
before the oceans rolled and we will be having it after they cease:"
that eventually man must seize the veil and grasp its secrets. In the
end, Ahab's inability to live without this final information led him to
his destruction. Again, the theme: power only goes so far, it must be
tempered with knowledge.

Both the Holy Grail legend and Melville's (1981) Moby Dick suggest
a different epistemology from the scientific "knowledge is power"
rendition. The creative power which is the center of the life force is
treated as irreducible -- uncapturable.

The unreducibleness of the life force is dealt with scientifically
through the philosophy of Immanuel Kant and his distinction between nou-
menon and phenomenon. Noumena are the metaphysical underpinnings which
cannot be known by the "sense." Phenomena are the real of appearances.
Science is thus the study of phenomena and not metaphysical intuitions.
The world of science is thereafter "rescued" from philosophical criti-
cisms and can advance without further protest. However, what such a
_"rescue operation" does is equate the world with phenomena. Noumena

become virtually "unknowable" and the world is built around the appearances that are phenomena. Soon, the analysis of phenomena is treated as "approximating" the world of noumena (Homans, 1977) and we abuse our method to the point of claiming the whole world as phenomena and forgetting the world of noumena except as a first-principle concession for the beginning of our analysis.

Kant's distinction between noumena and phenomena was to have saved western thought from the crisis spawned by the philosophy of David Hume. While Hume is normally interpreted as meaning the death of thought, he he actually had provided the basis for a humanistic epistemology and the very beginning of a relevant dialog. Hume's idea of the "secret springs"[3] is the basis of this humanistic epistemology. The life force cannot be grasped and placed upon the table of analysis. It cannot be known through our methods of science. Instead, we must accept the "secretness" of the core. We must find methods of moving "around" it given the nature of its being secret. Epistemology is, then, not a straight-line journey to truth and the shading in of unknown areas until we achieve total knowledge, but a journey of wisdom where we achieve more and more understanding without ever exhausting and reducing the core. (See Figure 2 on the following page.)

The phrase "the secret springs" can be translated as several other conceptions without losing its meaning: the life force, the spring of creativity, the "muse", the creative power which generates the evolutionary time bomb, and so forth . . . . It is comparable, of course, to Kant's noumena but makes an opposite contention. The "secret springs"

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[3]The idea of the "secret springs" and not necessarily the edifice which is often constructed upon this idea.

may be the Rhine Gold or the Holy Grail or the illusive white whale
. . . . The secret springs are magic.

Movement of Philosophy

Dialog/Knowing

Figure 2.   The Humanistic Epistemology

Castenada's[4] attribution to Don Juan of the "tonal" and the "nagual"
serves to further illuminate the idea of the secret springs and of the
distinction between noumena and phenomena. The tonal is everything
"which can be placed upon the table." The nagual is everything else.
The tonal is, then, propertly, phenomena -- the world of appearances,
what can be named, and the process of talking (philosophizing) about what
is named, in short -- analysis. The nagual is noumena. Don Juan adds
that it is where "power hovers." This is quite the same, then, as the
"secret springs."

_____

[4]The authenticness of Castenada's work is irrelevant. I personally
might contend that the first two books are historical, the third
Castenada's dissertation, the fourth Garfinkel's disguised lecture notes
(and the fifth masculine-intuitive karma, with the sixth being only pure
insanity).

However, Don Juan's discussion makes clear that the nagual is not an irrelevant-premised first principle of philosophy (a la Kant), but an intimate part of life. It can be experienced and witnessed. Don Juan also makes a clear distinction between knowledge and power. A "man of knowledge" is one who has traveled and traversed the paths of power -- who knows how far power goes. The trap of knowledge is old age and it is an old man's question whether a "path has heart?" The only question that matters to a man of knowledge who knows that all paths lead no-where is whether a path has heart: will it make you strong, productive, happy? The question of knowledge is one of value. Having experienced power, what is left now is wisdom, beauty, and happiness: following the path of the heart where one can relax.

If the secret springs can be experienced and witnessed, then they can also be testified to. It is indeed the testimony of people across their lives which might be worthy of being called knowledge claims. And throughout the ages, we have had people testifying that there are "better" ways to live. We have had people talking about and testifying to an experience which they termed love and held to be the core of meaning: talking of a magic as an experience which transforms their vision. While this experience is not dissectable on the analytic table, it can be experienced, it can be testified to, and we can return to visit such an experience. It is this experience to which the humanist would wish to talk and testify.

Life is not explainable. Explanatory theories do not fit the exper-ience. It is unreducible. Life is closer to a miracle. We can know it only through intuition -- a leap of vision. As Bergson (1949) argued, even the duration and experience of our own lives is only known by

intuition. This is the only way that we "sense" the whole: by the leap

of intuition. <u>Kantian theory leaves intuition as the troubled source of</u>

<u>first principles.</u> <u>Hume's idea of "secret springs" provides the perfect</u>

<u>canopy for encompassing a different view!</u>

    We might desire still another metaphor to illustrate the humanistic

conception of knowledge. We can compare love and magic to unicorns.

They flee from our grasp. But beckon to be allowed free play in our

lives. Such a metaphor may seem like sheer fantasy. But it is far from

fantasy.

    In <u>The Last Unicorn</u>, Beagle (1968) wove a tale which in many ways is

the "sequel" to the "Don Juan" books and the bottom line on magic. The

would-be magician follows the unicorn seeking to know her magic and

mystery. But unicorns have become rare in a world of science. We see

few wonders. Beauty no longer mystifies us as much now that things are

explainable. Yet, love and the magical still appear in our lives much as

unicorns. We cannot capture them. We cannot own them. We can only know

them and come to follow them.

    Love and magic cannot be harnessed. They can only be followed. One

does not chain magic to their efforts, but one can take steps to follow.

Science reduces the world to neutrality. Love and magic are steps we

make to willingly follow something that we value. Humanistic epistemol-

ogy begins with values, with choice. It is the step to following this

illusive unicorn of love and magic. One recognizes fully well that s/he

will not own or capture it. But one delights in coming to know it and

learn its secrets.

    Knowledge, then, becomes wisdom -- knowing life; having walked the

paths of power. Knowledge becomes a discussion of value; what is better,

and how do we take the wisdom that we have learned from the "secret" and construct from it?

The experience of such wisdom most have called love. A humanistic epistemology would, I believe, contain this assumption: that <u>knowledge is love</u>. Love is the ability to move past power -- to share it: to take the risk of allowing someone else enough respect to let them be and grow. It is moving past individual ego-stakes, collapsing the walls of self and other, and taking the time to know another self, environment, and others. It is declassifying power -- no longer keeping it as an obsession for personal victory. Love is the ability to know someone else. <u>It is the step to knowledge.</u>

The <u>truth</u> of which we have always spoken <u>is an experience</u> to which we wish to testify. It is the experience which we have called love and magic. The wisdom that we seek is that we know knowledge (love) -- having come through power we move back down to play, to share, and to know.

We can only know the center with our heart. We can only know the secret springs through love. The reducible truth of science will forever be beyond our grasp. But we can talk and testify, and experience what we know: the light that is within us. This is the humanistic epistemology.

The center may be a "secret," but this does not mean the death of philosophy (and talking), nor does it mean the death of movement or life. It means recognizing our condition. We know little of final truths: what we can claim is by nature existential. We are living. We are dying. We stand on the earth. Our imagination reaches to the stars.

The secret springs do not prevent us from moving. They merely recommend a different method and purpose for talking and philosophizing.

As Watts (1951, p. 23) said, "The common error . . . is to mistake the symbol for the reality, to look at the finger pointing the way and then suck it for comfort rather than follow it." We must leave behind the desired easy road maps of science. We are left with <u>questions of values</u>: what matters? -- <u>this is the quest of our knowledge.</u>

> . . . the only way we shall ever recapture the sort of know-
> ledge Lao-tzu referred to in his dictum 'those who know do not
> speak,' is by subordinating the question 'how shall we know?'
> to the more existentially vital question 'how shall we live'
> (Roszak, 1969, p. 233)?
>
> To ask this question is to insist that the primary purpose of
> human existence is not to devise ways of piling up ever greater
> heaps of knowledge, but to discover ways to live from day to
> day that integrate the whole of our nature by way of yielding
> nobility of conduct, honest fellowship, and joy . . . .
> Were we prepared to accept the beauty of the fully illuminated
> personality as our standard of truth -- or of ultimate meaning-
> fulness -- then we should be done with the idiocy of making
> fractional evaluations of men and ourselves (Roszak, 1969,
> p. 237).

As Whithead noted, "The function of reason is to promote the art of living," Hume concurred years earlier: "Be a philosopher, but above all, be a man." Our philosophical maps will not replace living, nor should it be desired that they do. We are left with knowledge as an experience and theory: as a way of talking about that experience, of re-creating them, and of seeking to construct a world around those experiences which we have deemed to be meaningful and better.

If we follow sociologist Simmel's (1950) work on secrets and dyad-striads, some interesting things begin to emerge. Science has always desired public truths. But Simmel's work maintained that intimacy takes place in secret spaces away from public scrutiny. It is the dyadic unit closing itself off from the public that is the basis of our intimacy. Those experiences which we value most take place "behind closed doors" -- away from the larger social context.

If our most meaningful experiences occur in "secret," then we cannot present them for public inspection in front of an open forum. We can testify to such experiences publically, but the experience itself belongs to a more private sector. It is a tapping of the "secret springs" -- a collapsing of the boundaries between self and other that the larger common denominator reality of the group does not allow. The humanistic "truths"/values do not lend themselves to public enactments. They require space away from the larger conceptual reality. We may testify to them, bringing our knowledge of them to the conference table, and legislate from their values, but the experiences themselves belong to a "secret," intimate sphere. The humanistic epistemology demands that we operate with a philosophical basis that can be known, but not reduced and dissected.

The question we are asking is how to find a way of moving which does not dissect life to science. However, if we are going to develop an epistemology which is humanistic and is also successful, we must be wary of two of the more popular current retreats from this question.

The first is anti-intellectualism. This is the command to "get out of your head and into your feelings." It is the trap that humanistic psychology often embraces. Rationalism has skewed the world to an extent where feeling and intuitions have been treated as illegitimate sources of knowledge. The entire humanistic effort is to correct this. However, abandoning the intellectual mode -- thinking and talking -- is an over-compensation. There is a very real sense in which something does not exist unless we are able to talk about it. The feeling goes unrecognized or is irrelevant unless we can verbalize it. Finding a way of talking about the intuitive/feeling sphere is essential if we are not going to neglect it.

The Gestalt approach of trusting the process -- "getting into the moment" -- is incomplete without a way of visualizing the future and understanding the past. If we merely reify feelings and the moment without also utilizing intellectual constructs, we may be in the moment while others who are not in the moment may be manipulating us.

The second popular retreat, relativism-perspectivism, is more characteristic of the field of sociology. Humanistic efforts seek not value-free, relative knowledge but value-full perspective on humanity. If all knowledge claims are treated merely as a perspective (or "just your opinion"), it becomes impossible to talk except as an amusement -- we become incapable of agreements and participation. Perspectivism allows us to have only viewpoints and not a vision. We are undergoing the "common" experience of being human and from this experience humanism would seek common knowledge of what we know: from this dialog, we agree upon the direction of our world and our commitments.

The Lessons of Science

For science to have remained for over 2,000 years, we must assume that it had much going for it. The anthropological-sociological school of functionalism (Radcliffe-Brown, 1952; Malinowski, 1945; Parsons, 1951) has taught us that we must understand how a component functions within a social system. Science has certainly demonstrated a remarkable survival value. We must become aware of how science has actually been functioning. Its longevity certainly must be due to underscoring some crucial components of decision making and social functioning. If we are going to depart froma scientific vision, then we must seriously ask: "what if the original scientific action was valuable?" and "what aspects do we need to retain?"

Carpenter (1970) taught us that much of the scientific, rational world view has been rendered obsolete. It no longer fulfills its original purpose. Science was formulated as an effort to find the truth -- an effort which the emerging paradigm has clearly declassified:

> Everytime you put a new technology around a society, the old technology becomes a junkyard. But from junkyards come new art. New art can be made by retrieving and reshaping junk. It is from the trash heap that you can see true forms because everything there is declassified (n.p.).

It is clear that we must de-classify and de-mystify science, but what aspects should be salvaged and what aspects should be allowed merely to decompose? If truth is not the key, then what parts of the scientific method actually are functioning in a different manner to enhance the human process?

Objectivity--Honesty/Respect

The scientific value of objectivity might readily be translated to read honesty and respect. It represents an important technique for opening up a dialog and discussion. At times, one must get away from the process in order to see it. Sociologically, one must "take the role of the other." Objectivity stresses an effort to see what would happen if one did not assert his will.

Fromm (1947) wrote that objectivity really means respect.

> Objectivity is not, as it is often implied in a false idea of 'scientific' objectivity, synonymous with detachment, with the absence of interest and care. Objectivity does not mean detachment, it means respect: that is, the ability not to distort and falsify things, persons, and oneself (p. 111).

Objectivity is a distancing that allows one to "look at" (the literal meaning of the word "respect"). It means to respect the integrity and dynamics of what one is looking at. Objectivity, thus, does

not mean to do away with values; but rather, not be trapped by biases that prevents one from seeing "other" as it really is.

Objectivity is a distancing to obtain dialog and perspective. It is part of a process to open honest communication which respects and allows the articulation of each integrity.

The scientific objectivity asks: what would the world be like without our involvement? Yet, we know on another level that such a perspective doesn't exist. The world does not exist separate from the human. Human purpose and consciousness are intertwined with everything.

Objectivity is a distancing mechanism to understand the not-I and the non-human. We abstract -- pull away -- to gain new perspective and understanding.

But in "truth," the abstracting is part of the process that then must be re-united in dialog.

Sometimes one must get away -- become uninvolved -- to see. Culkin (Carpenter, 1970, n.p.) wrote, "We don't know who discovered water, but it certainly wasn't a fish." We become immersed in our environment and can see only by abstracting. But we can no more live in our abstracted, objective world than a fish can live out of water. We abstract to see, gain new perspective, and re-enter the conversation.

It is a twofold process. Buber (1957) wrote:

The principle of human life is not simple, but twofold, being built up in a twofold movement which is of such a kind that the one movement is the presupposition of the other. I propose to call the first movement 'the primal setting at a distance' and the second 'entering into relation . . . . It must be firmly maintained that the first creates the presupposition for the second -- not its source, but its presupposition. With the appearance of the first, therefore, nothing more than room for the second is given. It is only at this point that the real history of the spirit begins (p. 97).

Objectivity is dialectic. If we do not realize that objectivity is

a prelude to re-entering dialog, then we reify one pole of a twin-process. Objectivity is but a step to re-entering the process. We cannot live in our objectified world. Objectivity does not mean this any more than respect means leaving a person alone forever. It is the ability to subordinate biases to the perspective of "from where I stand . . . I see--." It is the honest testimony to our perspective, and the ability to entertain and understand the other perspective which is valued. It is this honesty which allows for dialog and the reaching of mutual conclusions.

This is akin to Aristole's idea of friendship: that scholarship was a way of functioning as friends when ordinary circumstances of time and space might have prevented it. Aristotle saw scholarship as a way of approximating the honest dialog of friendship: of seeing how the Other felt and perceived, and how indeed one might have functioned in the same way given a similar perspective. Aristotle maintained that this way of knowing together (Aristotlean friendship) was the core and that the scientific effort must always take a back-seat.

This is also similar to Jourard's (1971) notion of The Transparent Self which he saw as a precondition to intimacy. It is the ability to reveal which is important. This is what is really valued by the so-called objectivity: the willingness to disclose and allow that disclosure to enter into process with another human being. "Objectivity" allows us to take off our values for a moment. However, it is not so it is not so much an attempt to remove ourselves from values as it is an attempt to see past them.

It is not value-relativity which is desired, but an ability to look at our own values (i.e., an attempt to be "objective" about our own

values/perspectives) -- put them in a larger perspective. "Objectivity" represents a step towards trust -- and a willingness to open up the process of our own conclusion-formation.

Cultural relativity does not mean objectivity as is so often translated. It does not mean that one should function without values. Instead, it is the insight that our own perspectives arise from our (cultural) values, and the invitation to see past them: a call to an awareness and an honesty about our own perspective. Cultural relativity might be interpreted to mean not the value-neutrality of science, but a commitment to understand and appreciate, i.e., to suspend judgement long enough to see. Such cultural relativity frees us from socialized cultural biases and allows us to see what is occurring. It need not be a prohibition from making decisions and forming opinions after one has understood the situation.

Honesty is the key here. It allows us to retain the crucial aspects of the value of objectivity without forcing us into a prison of neutrality. It allows us to make our value perspectives transparent and enter into dialog without hedging our ability to make fully human decisions.

Agreement, Argument

Science and its method have proven to be an effective way of settling arguments: of foregoing the sword in favor of the pen. What is at work here is the trusting and commitment to a process of negotiation. It is the decision to commit disputes to arbitration and the agreement to follow a particular method that is critical, not that the particular arbitrator has been the scientific method. A commitment to arbitration and an agreement of a different nature (e.g., humanistic) would be just as effective.

Becker (1968) summarized the problem of the social disciplines quite nicely:

> The founding of a science is never a cognitive problem alone: it is always inseparably a moral problem, a problem of gaining broad agreement to act on the basis of a theory . . . .
>
> In the human sciences the problem of gaining wide loyalty to a paradigm is no different than in any other science . . . . Only, a subtle new factor magnifies the problem immensely, and gives it entirely new proportions: in the human sciences it is sharpened to an extreme degree, because the agreement cannot be disguised as an objective scientific problem . . . in the natural and physical sciences, paradigm agreement looks like a matter of option for an objectively compelling theory . . . . In the human sciences, the same kind of option for a compelling theory looks unashamedly like a wholly moral option, because of the frankly moral nature of its subject matter . . . .
>
> Paradigm choice, in sum, in the human sciences, differs in no way from that of the other sciences except that the willful, moral nature of the option cannot be disguised . . . (p. 362). [Italics Original]

It is here that the work of Erich Fromm is crucial. Fromm squarely addresses the question of where to begin our agreements. What is so remarkable about his thesis is that he brings the moral question of values to center stage. In a time when most in the social "sciences" were treating values as somehow illegitimate and striving to keep them closeted, Fromm comes right through the front door asking where we want to rally our values and choices.

Throughout Fromm's career, the exact wording of his recommended value options change from individual productiveness (1947) to aliveness (1957) to the unfolding of potentials (1968), but there is always the same basic theme: the emphasis that since our initial values determine our future steps, we should begin by embracing those components which make man human. Perhaps, Fromm's work was premature for the age in which he lived, but it is a mark of his sophistication and genius that he asks us directly: where do we wish to begin our agreement? and then proceeds to address the answer.

The commitment to begin our agreements is critical. Becker (1968, p. 361), in summarizing the work of Thomas Kuhn, stated that "the theory that finally wins support is the one that is most compelling. In other words, a theory is a persuasive, propagandistic symbolic device that wins loyalty in the field." Yet, with the social disciplines,

> . . . laws of human nature can never be complete . . . . The problem for morality is always this: how much of the picture is necessary to command agreed action? . . . Sociologists should no longer imagine that it suffices 'to do' science; that in order to have a science of man, they need only work piling up data, and trying to 'tease out' social laws for eventual use. They may turn their backs on a paradigm . . . but they cannot shun an active option for man as an end. If they continue to do so, they will not have any science. The reason is simply that the science of man is an ideal-typical science, or -- there is no science of man (Becker, 1968, p. 361).

Fromm enters the picture by asking us to address ourselves to the question of ideals and which values we hold central to our agreement. Physical science has merely masked the problem and smuggled in values under the rhetoric of a method while pretending value neutrality. Yet their method of agreement, and accountable arbitration to that agreement, has proven to be a powerful tool which we can readily recycle from the scientific wasteland.

(At a later point in this work, I will argue that the concept of synergy provides an ideal framework for the basis of such an agreement within the social disciplines . . . and that Ruth Benedict was right in intuitively choosing synergy as the first concept to emerge after cultural relativity.)

Practical-Survival

Above all, the scientific world view and method have proven to have practical applications. Unrelated to questions of their legitimacy or

accuracy, the technology which has been produced has proven powerful in its scope and effect. The method of agreement within science and the meanings generated from such an attempt gave us a range of technologies which did not find the truth but actually altered the nature of the world that science proposed to study.

The "weight definition" (Poincare) under which science first split with philosophy and generated techniques, proved to have far reaching practical implications. By agreeing to all operate toward the world according to weight definitions (i.e., the "atomic" weight of "atoms") scientists were able to accomplish practical tasks. As Wittgenstein has said, this in no way says that the world is really such and such a way, but "only that it can be described in a certain way." That this strategy would actually prove to have practical applications was a boon that the early scientists had not anticipated.

There is, however, no reason why the technology gained from science cannot be incorporated into a humanistic vision. Indeed, this was Comte's (Becker, 1968) vision: that art would reign over science. Scientific metaphors need not be taken as truth any more than any other mnemonic device for remembering. They are no more intrinsic to the nature of reality than "every good boy does fine" is intrinsic to music (e.g., the mnemonic device for the lines of the musical staff: E-G-B-D-F). They are tools, but they are no more all-purpose tools than any other tool. To use them outside very limited frames of reference would be like using a chain saw to carve a turkey . . . or fix the plumbing.

Scientific assumptions do not need to be mass reality. Techniques can be used for information and starting points as opposed to knowledge and finale. To deal with the world mechanistically has practical advantage at times. This need not then become world view.

We must be aware of the grammar and consequences of our techniques. The techniques of science should be applied appropriately. The mechanistic metaphor has proven its worth, but we are undoubtedly living in an age where it has run its course. There is no need to crush any more areas down its jaws. Human beings are not machines, and to further expand the scientific vision endangers life itself.

Even in areas of medicine and chemistry, the human elements are beginning to be recognized as categorically different from the scientific apparatus. Holistic medicine and the role of circumstance and the mind in illness are being recognized. The chemist is also reconsidering the human import of research and asking if perhaps some "discoveries" should not be pursued.

There is no reason we cannot retain the practical advantage given to us from the past centuries of scientific research. The development of techniques in itself is perfectly appropriate -- but a humanistic approach would seek to place these techniques in perspective.

The perspective is simply that material techniques are a means rather than ends. They are resources which can be used to create the better life. But we must not lose sight of the ends.

Doubt-Testing

Viewed at its most fundamental level, the criteria of doubt and testing are simply a call for awareness, or if you will, a mandate that the scientist be "street-wise." It is a response to the problem of the "con-artist" or the "trickster." It is an effort to make our theories "non-naive." However, the invitation to such honest suspicion need not destroy our ability to trust.

There are always two possible uses of language. The first is to say something. The second is symbolic manipulation for control -- i.e., ideology. As Simmel has taught us, with the invention of language it is possible to make a statement, but it also becomes possible to lie (i.e., a misstatement). To admit the possibility of the second need not destroy the possibility of the former.

If we only construct our methods to detect the lie, we drastically alter the possibility of sincerity. Where are we capable of then letting our guard down? In social relations, we often make the distinction between enemies and friends for such purposes. Despite the advantages of knowledge that comes from guardedly competing with enemies, there is also a type of knowledge which comes through intimacy and friendship. If we construct our methods only with the image of the insincere stranger in mind, we destroy our ability to understand and experience the knowledge and insights of intimacy. Modern science finds itself in a corollary situation. Doubt and testing might easily be changed to read criteria of non-naive awareness and periodic accounting. Continual doubt and testing is in itself paranoid and represents an inability to trust. It also eliminates much of what is important in a humanistic perspective from our view.

Experiment--Exploration

The scientific method of experimentation might be more aptly recycled as exploration. The alienation of artificialness is useful as a means of "play" -- the creation of mock settings, free from more serious consequences, where we can discover.

The exploration of such safe places where we can call "time-out"

from the world are essential for creativity. They allow us to try out new things, replay particularly interesting phenomena, and further develop our ideas. It is the artificial, playful nature of the experiment as exploration which is its most important feature.

The carefully controlled experiment where we rigorously manipulate one variable and then another, is not the only type of experiment. The call to "experiment with out lives" is a challenge . . . to explore. The so-called human experiment is not an attempt to resign ourselves to carefully trying out every conceivable Skinner Box for the rest of our duration. It is a commitment to support exploration.

The most significant experiments of mankind were by no means the contrived carefully controlled variety that we read about in reasearch design textbooks. They were filled with intuition and playfulness. There is doubtlessly a place for the rigorously controlled experiment, but it is not the pinnacle at the end of the line of research as is so often claimed. This is the stuff of routine science (Kuhn, 1964) where wonder has been replaced by drugery. The most significant "experiments" will always take place simply from a commitment of the society to support exploration and play.

Common Purpose

The banner of science has allowed us to form agreements about what the world was like and then enact that vision. The commitment to an idea was always rapidly converted into a commitment to an ideal. Our assumptions about the nature of truth have then been followed in such a way that we have envisioned a society and world in keeping with those agreements. The banner of "finding the truth" gave us a common direction.

What if instead of choosing the value of "the truth," we had chosen to build upon the value of "the good?" What would the world have looked like 2,000 years later if we had chosen a banner of agreement which focused upon synergy, love and magic -- the humanistic ethos? Two thousand years ago, it was deemed that questions of how to "make the good" were too sticky. However, the pursuit of "the truth" has not only proven sticky -- when finally pinned down 2,000 years later -- but also a dead end. Synergy perhaps forms an ideal way to talk about the idea of the good and bring it to the pinnacle of our twentieth century conversations. The decision of our commitment and our shared vision revolves around where we start. This is what the journey to find the truth has revealed to us. The premise becomes the conclusion. What would happen if we started with love and magic and what we know of them?

We Shape The World

You become what you behold, penned William Blake. Centuries later, the anthropologist Edmund Carpenter summarized the power of culture they became what they beheld. Science tells us that we shape the world: that the truth depends upon where we look.

> To opt for a theory of human ills is not only to opt for the kind of person one is going to have to pay deference to professionally; it is also to opt potentially for the kind of world one is going to wake up in, the kinds of human beings that one will have to come across in the street. To opt for a particular theory of human ills is very much like falling in love in the strictest sense: it is to opt for the presence of a certain kind of being in the world, and hence for a certain kind of world (Becker, 1968, p. 364). [Italics Original]

It is our choice, as Fromm so repeatedly told us. There are limits to our power, but we choose our directions. Do we choose limited, fixed, "dead" version of humanity contained by science or do we choose the

alive, active, productive version of humanism?

Perhaps the following story illustrates the point and the differences between science and humanism:

> This old man was very wise, and he could answer questions which were almost impossible for people to answer, so some people went to him one day, two young people, and said, 'We're going to trick this guy today. We're going to catch a bird, and we're going to carry it to this old man. And we're going to ask him 'This that we hold in our hands today, is it alive or is it dead?' If he says 'dead,' we're going to turn it loose and let it fly away. But if he says 'Alive,' we're going to crush it.' So they walked up to the old man, and they said 'This that we hold in our hands today, is it alive or is it dead?' He looked at the young people and smiled. And he said, 'It's in your hands' (Hammer, 1971, n.p.).

Humanism seeks to find a framework in which life can move. Science merely constructs a framework irrespective of the human.

CHAPTER III

DEFINITION OF THE SITUATION, SELF-FULFILLING
PROPHECIES, THE HERO, AND THE "CHANGE
THE WORLD" CONVERSATION

From the review of science in the previous chapter, the following
conclusions become apparent:

1. Where we focus, determines what we see.

2. What we have assumed a priori to exist and to be important
    determines our methods of study.

3. The domain assumptions which are inherent in our premises
    organize, and often become, our conclusions.

If we move to the social realm, we find Thomas' (1928, p. 572) famous
dictum for definition of the situation immediately echoing in our ear:
"If men define a situation as real, it is real in its consequences" We
will immediately be corrected by the social scientist who reminds us that
when Merton (1968, p. 195) termed Thomas' theorem the "self-fulfilling
prophecy," he was referring to a definition which is "in the beginning, a
false definition of the situation evoking a new behavior which makes the
originally false conception come true." [Italics Original] The examples
Merton cited include a bank being defined as insolvent and its customers
demanding their money back which in turn forces its closure. Various
cases of people being defined as racially inferior and . . . such preju-
dice normatively translated into actuality.

Even Thomas and Thomas' (1928, p. 572) original mention of the statement related to a false definition: a man who killed several people who had the habit of talking to themselves because he "imagined that they were calling him vile names."

The idea of the self-fulfilling prophecy probably stems from the work of Moll (1898). In writing Hypnotism, he noted that subjects often enacted the wishes and preconceptions of the hypnotist and referred to the phenomenon as "the prophecy which causes its own fulfillment" (p. 244).

Self-fulfilling prophecy has long been a favorite of those who would discount research findings on the basis of experimenter bias Recently, even the famous Milgram experiments on conformity have been challenged on the basis that subjects were merely fulfilling the experimenters' expectations.

And yet, we must not discount the "self-fulfilling prophecy" as merely concerning issues that are true or false. The Indian sociologist Krishna (1971) argued that by reducing the self-fulfilling prophecy to a false definition of the situation, we have relegated it into the realm of name-calling and missed something quite crucial.

Although Thomas' original formulation of the self-fulfilling prophecy concerns a false definition of the situation, he uses both definition of the situation and self-fulfilling prophecy in a much broader scope. It is a theme which runs throughout The Polish Peasant in Europe and America (Thomas and Znaniecki, 1918), The Unadjusted Girl (Thomas, 1967), and The Child in America (Thomas and Thomas, 1928).

To limit the self-fulfilling prophecy to truth or falsehood is to considerably narrow its scope and relevance. In the social world, many

definitions are not subject to the determination or the arbitration of such "objectivity." Social "truth" is often much more precarious and situational than the "truth" of science. Expectations and their fulfillment are the very fabric of social structure itself (Berger and Luckman, 1966).

Thomas (1967) wrote that

Preliminary to any self-determined act of behavior there is always a stage of examination and deliberation which we may call the definition of the situation. And actually not only concrete acts are dependent on the definition of the situation, but gradually a whole life-policy and the personality of the individual himself follow from a series of such definitions (p. 42). [Italics Original]

The relationship between what is "real" and "not real" in a life policy is often somewhat fragile. Thomas is writing, here, of the "regulation of wishes" -- the four wishes he sees as essential to humans are: security, response, recognition, and new experience. The definition of the situation is the crucial mitigation between the individual and the social. Our expectations become self-fulfilling prophecies that we then act upon. This is the normal course of social process.

Allport (1950) went so far as to study how nations which expect to go to war, do go to war. Zimbardo, in a mock prison experiment, found subjects acting the "pretended" roles of prisoners and guards with such intensity that he was forced to call off the experiment.

In the Asch and Sheriff studies, people expected the larger group to accurately report their cognitions to such extent that the subjects actually altered their own perceptions. This may indicate the pervasiveness of conformity and group pressure or it may point to something more subtle.

Experimental work with "shils" (experimental confederates) shows more than just experimenters lying to their subjects. People respond to feinted activity in much the same way they would respond to activity that is not feinted. It is only the outside observer and the "shil" who know that the activity is not authentic. Individuals operate by expectations and beliefs normally.

Rosenthal and Jacobson (1968) have illustrated the extent teacher expectations influence and actually shape student performance. The expectation -- the belief -- becomes actuality. It is almost as if our expectations had a life of their own; that by believing, we create a different reality.

Of course, our common sense argument is these examples were false renditions while our actual conception of reality is based upon our knowledge. But this is precisely the problem. Berger and Luckman (1966, p. 1) defined "reality" as "a quality appertaining to phenomena that we recognize as having a being independent of our own volition" (we cannot 'wish them away'). They defined knowledge as "the certainty that phenomena are real and that they possess specific characteristics." Reality, then, is intimately related to knowledge. Berger and Luckman argued that reality is "socially constructed." Knowledge is a series of social agreements; i.e., definitions of the situation.

Gould and Kolb (1964) in their Dictionary of the Social Sciences understood the phrase "definition of the situation" to mean

> . . . (a) the individual agent's or actor's perception and interpretation of any situation in which he may find himself (the actor's definition of the situation) or (b) culturally formulated, embodied, and shared perceptions . . . (cultural or social definitions of the situation) (p. 182).

What is often neglected is that the formulation works just as well to explain the new appropriate behavior as it did to explain the previous inappropriate (non-real) behavior. It may be a true definition becoming true as well as false definition becoming true.

The self-fulfilling prophecy is a part of the normal construction of reality. It is quite literally how we "spin the lines" of the world.

Anthropologists have long defined culture as "a description of the world which we learn to see. Culture is a series of resources which we bring to the situation.

If we examine any sociology book, we find that all definitions of society revolve around action. Society is something that you do. It is re-created daily by action. In the theater of life our participation literally creates the world.

"If men believe a situation is real . . . ." The type of belief Thomas was referring to was not the idle armchair variety, nor was it the mind construct which we refer to as attitude. This type of belief might be closer to what others have characterized as "faith" (Fromm, 1956). It is a "belief" that one "believes" so much that they place themself on their feet in the world -- into action. It is a construct by which people operate and enact society.

The relation between belief, self-fulfilling prophecy, expectation and society is much more subtle than previously anticipated. Perhaps, society itself is mass hypnosis and we have glossed over the power of suggestion and belief by rendering it to a word -- hypnosis -- and then moved on without understanding the process.

Black (1977) wrote in a popular account that

Hypnosis is the unconscious agreement to share the assumptions about the world that underlie any society. It is also the

ability to break through those assumptions. Hypnosis . . .
forget that word. There is no hypnosis. Hypnosis is whatever
concentration, imagination and suggestion can create. Hypnosis
is reality (n.p.).

Perhaps such a characterization is too severe. But it does suggest
interesting possibilities. Our inclination to discount hypnosis as
illusion and embrace reality as "real" may have been too expedient. It
is only when we examine other cultures that behavior appears "as if" it
were hypnotic. If we must also perceive our own culture as a self-
fulfilling prophecy, then the relation between expectation and behavior
must be cast in a new light. And if our own knowledge too is a self-
fulfilling prophecy, we must carefully re-examine the basis we have used
for categorizing the "real" and the "non-real." If reality is "socially
constructed," what implications does this hold? This is the problem
which Berger and Luckman's work presents.

The Physical Sciences and the Social Disciplines

The "reality" of the physical sciences is quite different from the
"reality" of the social disciplines; it is as if each has thrown a dif-
ferent "net" over the world. Each net is designed to catch certain
things. Things that are not relevant for its purposes simply disappear
through the holes (Van Den Berg, 1961). The nets of the physical
sciences and the social disciplines are intrinsically different. Per-
haps, they even reflect the mind-body distinction which gave rise to the
birth of physical "science." At the very least, their processes of
understanding are inherently different.

In the physical sciences, the world is much more solid and unsubject
to change by our will. However, even the philosophy of the physical
sciences must conclude they are subject to such "social" considerations

as framing, domain assumption, and the phenomenology of focus. The
"knowledge" of the physical sciences also takes shape by the process of
social agreement as discussed in the previous chapter.

Both the physical sciences and the social disciplines frame a ques-
tion with a given purpose in mind. They reflect our values (i.e.,
what is important) and our valuing processes. Each is constructed with
a purpose in mind. Yet questions of the nature of matter are much dif-
ferent from questions of the nature of man (Warmoth, 1982).

Physical science would prefer to deal with mind and belief as some-
thing "tacked on" or extra to the system. However, if we have even the
crudest idea of psychology as "the study of mind," then we should be
aware that something quite different is going on between the physical
sciences and the social disciplines.

Bateson (1979) noted that a system (any system) can never adequately
understand itself. Thus, understanding of a system must always be
something added to that system. Consciousness confronts us with an
added dimension. The understanding of reality is a much different pro-
cess for the social disciplines than for the physical sciences. For
the social disciplines, reality is an inherently more creative process.
The closer we approach social reality, the more we are forced to create
and improvise (Warmoth, 1982).

Berger and Luckman (1966) concluded their work on the Social
Construction of Reality with the following statement:

> In sum, our conception of the sociology of knowledge implies a
> specific conception of sociology in general . . . that
> sociology . . . deal with man as man; that it is, in that
> specific sense, a humanistic discipline . . . . its proper
> object of inquiry is society as a part of a human world, made
> by men, inhabited by men, and in turn, making men, in an
> ongoing historical process. It is not the least the fruit of

humanistic sociology that it reawakens our wonder at this astonishing phenomenon (p. 189).

It is precisely the nature of the physical sciences that they ignore quesions of consciousness, belief, and (if you will) the social construction of reality. Mind and man are the added elements to their system. They ignore the human. The focus of the net of physical science is upon matter not upon mind or upon the human. It is small wonder that they do not neatly fit the study of man. Ortega y Gasset (1941) illuminated this discussion with an interesting conclusion:

> Today we know that all the marvels of the natural sciences, inexhaustible though they be in principle, must always come to a full stop before the strange reality of human life. Why? If all things have given up a large part of their secret to physical science, why does this alone hold out so stoutly? The explanation must go deep, down to the roots. Perchance it is no less than this: that man is not a thing, that man has no nature (p. 185).

He continued

> . . . human life, it would appear then, is not a thing, has not a nature, and in consequence we must make up our minds to think of it in terms of categories and concepts that will be radically different from such as shed light on the phenomenon of matter (Ortega y Gasset, 1941, p. 186). [Italics Original]

Reality is not just "in our minds": that would be a projection and a discounting of the physical world. However, there is an overlapping between the physical and the social. Berger and Luckman argued that reality (that which we can not wish away) is social constructed. It is here that the challenge of the social disciplines begins. A self-fulfilling prophecy in the physical realm of matter operates with different limiting parameters than a self-fulfilling prophecy in the theater of the social. They are different orders of reality. There is a difference in kind between "making a chair fly" and "creating a

friendly neighborhood." The world is not entirely in our minds and not everything bends to our expectation. Yet, for the most part, we do not normally live in the "world" of the physical sciences. The world we experience is usually quite different from the physicist's description. We may never know the exact line between the reality of matter and the reality of the mind, but suffice to say there is a social reality which is more changeable than the "stable" world of physical matter.

The hard "realist" may wish to write most of this off as only belief, or hypnosis, or mood. But the student of the social disciplines must dwell upon the profound interplay between belief and the "world." As Van Den Berg (1961) wrote,

> The shape in which things appear to us is remarkably variable. Not only do things have a tendency to meet us half way as far as our changing moods are concerned, but we can influence them, too; we are able, to a certain extent, to change things just by observing them differently . . . This ability to change the appearance of things is certainly not possible under all conditions. There is a mood which soaks everything in a somber gloom, when the flowers have less color, and the light from the sun is nothing more than the extrapolation of a lightbulb. I cannot succeed in changing this state of affairs very much. This is a bad day . . . but there are also days when everything appears to be possessed of a new persisting light. The sun is brilliant, the colors of the flowers are unexpectedly deep, and even the smallest thing gives me its own bit of happiness . . . I cannot change this state of affairs, either . . . . But as a rule, things wait for our intention; they are willing. We have the freedom to make them what we wish, even if we do not often use this freedom (pp. 191-192).

It is this power of perspective -- this uniquely human power -- which forms a crucial difference between the physical and the social realms and invites our participation. It is consciousness and our awareness of consciousness that implies the possibility of choice.

Defining the Situation: Human Nature

It is this possibility of choice that has prompted some of the more recent humanists to seek to define human nature and envision a world in that image. Simpson (1977, p. 75) in "Humanistic Psychology: An Attempt to Define Human Nature," quoted Nietzsche as saying that: "Value is creating . . . . Without valuation the nut of existence is hollow."

This valuing process creates our desire for something "better" and enters us into the "change the world" conversation. It is the desire for a "Good" that transcends the "good" of the "good" or "evil" debate of classical philosophy (Nietzsche). Valuing and meaning are inherent in the nature of the human process. The task is seen as an attempt to create a direction of valuation that is not subject to the zero-sum game of projection in which every "good" must be immediately canceled out by the shadow-side equivalent of "evil" (Jung, 1964). This represents an attempt to create values that do not represent a flight from evil, but begin with a realism which is not immediately subject to the traps which Becker (1975) outlined as The Escape From Evil. "The Escape From Evil" strategy and the strategy of projection repress what we do not like and wills the world to be in a certain way. However, what we would escape from "creeps back" to us through our very strategies of negating them. By failing to take into consideration the "evil" as well as the "good" potentialities of human nature, we perpetuate a dynamic between the two.

Fromm (1968) argued that human nature may be more of a potentiality than an actuality; an issue of becoming rather than a matter of being. ter of being. He quoted Goethe: "I can conceive of no act so horrible that I cannot imagine myself to be the author; . . . I am human and

nothing that is human is foreign to me" (p. 58). Fromm concurred with the poet Walt Whitman that "I contain multitudes."

It is Fromm's (1947) work on The Fear of Freedom and Escape From Freedom (1941) that Becker (1975) used to develop his "escape from evil" critique. Fromm's crucial argument is that with consciousness and our recognition of the need for valuation and meaning in human affairs, we have generated a dialog with history in which the need for a potentiality of choice is clear. The awesomeness of such choice can send us running. Often we prefer to buy into the readily available cultural prescriptions rather than attempt to transcend cultural directives and enter the theater of choice.

According to Fromm, human nature is something we create. The essence of his perspective on the human potential focus on what we might become; it is more of a creative vision of humanity than it is a philosophy lesson: more of a challenge than a doctrine. We cannot get a fix on human nature and declare for all time that man is either basically good or basically evil. What we have is a social process which is ongoing.

Identity and social life are created as well as found. Ortega y Gasset (1941) furthered the argument. He stated that the reason we have not been able to settle upon the nature of man is that there is no such thing as human nature:

> Physico-mathematical reason . . . was in no state to confront human problems. By its very constitution it could do no other than search for man's nature. And naturally, it did not find it. For man has no nature. Man is not his body, which is a thing, nor his soul, psyche, conscience, or spirit which are also things. Man is no thing, but a drama -- his life, a pure and universal happening which each one in his turn is nothing but happening (pp. 199-200).

We go astray if we search for man's human nature, for it cannot be found. "Man, in a word, has no nature; what he has is . . . history" (Ortega y Gasset, 1941, p. 217). [Italics Original]

Humans have no human nature. Instead, what we have is a past.

Personal Power: Humanistic Psychology

The merit of humanistic psychology is that it moves us away from the past and invites us into the present. While traditional psychology has sought to explain the present in terms of the past, humanistic psychology seeks to bring the person into the present: it is in the "now" at transformation is possible. The past cannot be unwoven. But today is a different day. And it is from the present that we can visualize a new future.

Humanistic psychology has followed a strategy of trying to find and develop ways of highlighting and facilitating the "positive" aspects of humanity. Strategies of individual psychologies have ranged from the "unqualified positive regard" of Rogers (1977) to the "self-actualization" of Maslow (1962). The emphasis has been upon the power of the individual to create and transform both environment and self. Fromm (1947) argued for the unfolding of man's specific capacities and productiveness. He stated that we should strive for structures and values which enhance our "aliveness" (Fromm, 1968).

Fritz Pearls offers us a clue to the strategy of much of humanistic psychology. The "trick" of humanistic psychology is to hold expectations lightly. Since expectations are the first step in the formation of social structure (i.e., expectations, norms, values), this increases the importance of personal factors such as personal power and charisma

to define and influence the situation. It is an attempt to prevent the crystalization of social processes such as institution alization and reification. The dynamic of personal influence and the relevance of situations to the "feelings" of actors is thus kept open.

Institutionalization is the step between expectations and norms. It is the addition of sanctions and social control to expectations. Reification represents the step between norms and values, while the process of expectation itself represents what might be termed generalization and stereotyping. The sociologist will readily recognize that without generalization and expectation, we are left with "random, blundering acts" characterized by Sumner and can never move to social arrangements with enough predictability to act. Nevertheless, the "trick" of holding expectations lightly is a novel approach because it emphasizes the creative act and seeks a way out of the "binding" nature of social structure. <u>Its naivete lies in its failure to recognize that values represent expectations which are important (i.e., valuable)</u>.

The emphasis of humanistic psychology is exploring and enhancing the personal: the power of intuitive recognitions of the situation ("feeling") and the personal power of individuals to construct the situation. Personal power is the "ability to define the situation." It is perhaps what Maslow referred to as "self-actualization" -- the creation/construction of self and influencing reality construction. It resembles that sociological term which we have so lightly glossed over: charisma.

Max Weber had characterized the formation of modern society as the flight from the frivolity and possible abuses of personal power. He saw the formation of bureaucracy in the "routinization of charisma" --

the attempt to normalize the transference of authority and power. Iron-ically, in modern society, it has been the creativeness of personal power and charisma that humanistic psychologists have returned in an attempt to compensate for the abuses of bureaucracy. The power of the individual is the "power to believe." But as with the "self-fulfilling prophecy," this is not the idle armchair-type of belief. It is a "belief" that is acted upon. At its best it is contagious -- the actor by his "charisma" carries people with him (i.e., defines the situation).

Humanistic psychology is a romantic venture to actualize a definition of the situation. It challenges us away from our previous understandings of reality to a new adventure. As such, its methods and credo's have been suspect in more "realistic" circles. The challenge is to switch perspectives: to recognize our power of intention and the "willingness" of things to change with our "attitude" and use this power of consciousness to transform our vision and ultimately re-define the world. Its strategies and formularizations have resembled more an attempt to change the "mood" more than they resemble traditional academic scholarship.

This accounts for the seeming triviality of humanistic formular-izations. They invite us to switch perspectives, but they do not pro-ceed in a step-by-step rational tradition. The serious realism of Freudian psychology may well be countered by a "catch phrase," or worse, an anecdote or song or even nonsense ploy, such as a Zen koan. For example, Becker (1975) in Escape From Evil wrote:

> At its most elemental level the human organism, like crawling
> life, has a mouth, digestive tract, and anus, a skin to keep it
> intact, and appendages with which to acquire food. Existence,
> for all organismic life, is a constant struggle to feed -- a

> struggle to incorporate whatever other organisms they can fit
> into their mouths and press down their gullets without choking
> . . . . If at the end of each person's life he were presented
> with the living spectacle of all that he had organismically
> incorporated in order to stay alive, he might well be horri-
> fied by the living energy he had ingested. The horizon of a
> gourmet, or even the average person, would be taken up with
> hundreds of chickens, flocks of lambs and sheep, a small herd
> of steers, sties of pigs, and rivers of fish. The din alone
> would be deafening. To paraphrase Elisas Canetti, each organ-
> ism raises its head over a field of corpses, smiles into the
> sun, and declares life good (pp. 1-2).

It may indeed seem frivolous to counter this "argument" with Paul
Williams' phrase: Vote with your life. Vote yes. But, this is pre-
cisely what the humanistic psychologist does. We are invited to switch
our <u>attention</u>. All the wages of war, poverty, crime, and depression may
be countered by: "Yes, but isn't the sky pretty." The strategy is not
to be "defeated" by life, and that it is only from another "mood" that
we will be able to obtain an "answer." The humanistic approaches invite
us to switch our mood immediately and then return with a new perspective
on what troubled us. Then we can develop a strategy for dealing with
it.

Again, as Van Den Berg (1961, pp. 191-192) noted: the "ability to
change the appearance of things is certainly not possible under all con-
ditions." Sometimes, we must conclude that "I cannot succeed in chang-
ing this state of affairs very much . . . . This is a bad day . . . ."
But often "things wait for our intention; they are willing. We have the
freedom to make of them what we wish . . . ."

This ability to switch our attention must be balanced by a thorough
understanding of the "shadow side" or we are merely spinning ourselves
in circles tangled by the "tentacles of projection" (Van Den Berg, 1961,
p. 191). We must not ignore the "evil" of the world, but neither must
we cancel out or ignore the human ability to re-define the situation:

to change the "mood." This ability to change the mood may sometimes be only projection or inept "wishing"; it may at times be the product of real delusion. But there is also an ability to change the mood and "carry" others with us: actualizing human capacities we have left unexplored.

This approach is by no means new to the human disciplines. In the realm of "pop" psychology, each generation has had its renditions: the Dale Carnegie program of "influence"; the "positive thinking" of Norman Vincent Peale; and lately, an approach of humanistic psychology popularly characterized as creative visualization (Gawair, 1978).

The notion of personal power is indeed circular: if a person succeeds in influencing a situation, it is because of "personal power"; a person's inability to influence a situation is treated as evidence of a lack of personal power. Lasch (1978) in The Culture of Narcissism, noted how much of the "human potential movement" camouflaged the traditional American ethic of "pulling yourself up by your own bootstraps." There is a tendency for it to take on an elitism of the "haves" toward the "have-nots." Yet, the "personal power" renditions of the humanistic movement underlie something more than just the trimings of an affluent ethos. They speak to the power of the individual, but they also speak to the power of belief, of mind, and the power to create our own realities.

Roszak (1979) noted that something very drastic has occurred in the "pursuit of happiness" ethic. We have historically moved from a focus upon individual freedom to a focus upon the right to personal fulfillment. This new focus transforms the nature of traditional ethics and calls into question issues of consciousness, human fulfillment, and

desire (even the right) to create a better life -- and by implication -- a better world.

The new quest for personhood is not limited to only the affluent, but permeates the culture: the factory worker who is no longer satisfied with just a job, but says "take this job and shove it, I want to be treated as a person"; or the grandparents who are no longer satisfied with just being "grandma and grandpa" anymore but want to be treated as persons too, not just roles (Roszak, 1980).

Ferguson (1981) outlined how the quest for personal meaning and influence is leading to a personal and social transformation. We are beginning to recognize in almost all fields the great extent to which outcomes are influenced by those things which we group together as "personal power" or "mind/emotions." This influence extends from the physicist's experiments to holistic medicine to the realm of intuitive/ right brain training for local businessmen. The frontiers of consciousness seem to be brought into play as part of an ethic emphasizing personal fulfillment.

What is central to all of this is the human ability to transform the nature of a situation despite the possibility of manipulation and false consciousness. There remains an underlying conviction that we are referring to a real ability: an ability to define the situation.

To say that personal power is the ability to believe, might be too much a shorthand version of a deeper and more subtle process. Yet, personal power does seem to be tied to this ability to believe and create on the basis of that belief.

Physics and the other sciences posited laws of a world which was dependent upon non-human involvement. The observer was outside an

otherwise closed system. And yet we do not live in such a world which is devoid of our participation. Belief and the other human "variables" make up a substantial part of our lives, perceptions and actions. The "personal power" and humanistic movements provide testimony to the reaches and frontiers of human experience. They seek to heal the mind-body split on which science predicated its very base:

> There can hardly be any social situation where belief does not play a significant role in constituting it to some extent or other. If it were not so, the situation, by definition, would collapse into the sort of situation studied in the natural sciences. This may be welcome to those who do not want to accept any basic distinction between the natural and the social sciences. But then they would also not accept the sort of phenomena described by Merton as 'self-fulfilling' prophecies . . . . On the other hand, if belief or consciousness were to play such a role as to completely constitute the situation, we could not in any significant sense study them either. Between these two poles, then, would lie the world studied by the social sciences either. Between these two poles, then, would lie the world studied by the social sciences (Krishna, 1971, pp. 1105-1106).

The power of "faith to move mountains" certainly upsets the physicist's view of reality. And yet are not total findings of the research in sociology, anthropology, and psychology an overwhelming and compelling body of evidence concurring in the truth of that ancient adage? However, at the same time, there seems to be a limit to the "personal" power of faith -- of the ability to believe. But that limit is certainly far different than the science-constructed "reality" of human non-involvement.

Historically, science supplanted religion and the world of belief/faith. Psychology and sociology are now calling that world of belief back into existence and questioning where indeed do we draw the line. And that line changes daily.

Much of the earlier work on "positive thinking" and belief came

from a religious framework that emphasized the "power of love." Hesitantly, a few sociologists and psychologists also had begun an moving into this area. The work of Erich Fromm has already been mentioned. However, it was Pitrium Sorokin who systematically began an exploration of the power of love.

To many, Sorokin's later work on love was the mark of an old man preparing to die; it was "hopelessly" contaminated by religious "leanings," and represented an embarrassment to scientific sociology -- distracting from what was otherwise a brilliant career. But this entirely misses the point. Those who would negate this work fail to see that it is a logical outgrowth of Sorokin's previous sociology, as much as those who would delete Comte's later work on love in favor of positivism failed to understand that the earlier work was merely a meticulous foundation.

Sorokin had been one of the leading rural sociologists. In an age when the organic bond-gameinscaft community was rapidly being destroyed by the secular city, what was more natural than for him to approach a study of the very nature of this organic solidarity? It is natural that his work moves from the study of community to the study of love. He spent the last portion of his career founding the "Harvard Center for the Study of Creative Altruism." During this period, he wrote several major volumes and conducted intensive surveys on the subject. So exhaustive were his efforts that he predated and anticipated much of what would later be called "humanistic psychology."

In a lengthy essay entitled, "The Power of Creative Love," Sorokin and Hanson (1953) dealt extensively with the "power of love" to define the situation. In case history after case history, and anecdote after

anecdote, they showed how previous definitions are supplanted and changed to "love." The following example is representative of their research:

> In the 1905 Russian Revolution in Southern Russia, a small Mennonite community was threatened by the rebels, who were destroying everything in their path. One family met the situation by preparing a good rich supper the day of the expected raid. The husband asked his wife to set the table for the guests and sent the children to bed. When the band appeared and asked the father to surrender, he invited them in to the prepared dinner, saying that anything of his was theirs, but that they must want refreshment first. They hesitated, then sat down to eat. After the supper the father showed them beds he had prepared in the next room. After their sleep the leader appeared again, this time smiling and said: 'We have to go. We came to kill you, but we can't' (Sorokin and Hanson, 1953, pp. 117-118).

The researchers summarized their findings by saying that "love begets love; hate begets hate . . . unselfish love is at least as 'contagious' as hate, and influences human behavior as tangibly as hate does" (Sorokin and Hanson, 1953, p. 119).

The religious literature abounds with examples of love, enthusiasm and faith re-defining situations into "love." It is only rarely that such stories get consistent play in academic circles, but when they do, their credibility is well documented. This power of love seems to be more than we had expected and pushes our conceptions to the very frontiers of knowledge. Maslow (1968) had studied how "self-actualized" persons have actually been able to re-define situations. This is akin to what Bergson (1935) had previously spoken of as the second source of society: that beside the conventional society founded on social pressure, there was also society founded upon aspiration -- that an idea, a way of being, a definition of the situation was so inviting people would convert to it readily.

Folklore of the various religions throughout the ages contain many

examples of personal experiences of the power of faith, belief, and love. As we shall discuss extensively in the fourth section, much of our inability to deal with love except in a scientific, technique-oriented fashion has been diffused. We need a new framework to discuss it. This is because belief and faith run counter to the scientific, technological paradigm through which we have been seeing the world.

The larger culture has a tendency to borrow the findings of investigations of belief, faith, and love to serve prevailing goals. Thus, the human potential and positive thinking movements have abounded with seminars and books on "how to use faith to be a better businessman" or "how to sell more life insurance through positive thinking." Such efforts were bound to be limited to further the goals of the prevailing competitive ideology.

More importantly, there has been the tendency to treat love, faith, and belief -- in fact all items dealing with emotions and sentiments -- as purely psychological items. All humanistic and value/belief components are treated as being merely in the actor's head. Thus the mind-body split of science was preserved: science could continue creating the world as before but without opposition.

If we admit that these components are essential to the creation of the world, then a vastly different paradigm is demanded. This is precisely the thesis of this work: these "humanistic items" are not merely products of individualist mechanisms, they are part of the ongoing creation of the world. If humanistic psychology is to be more than minimally effective, it needs a companion humanistic sociology. Much more is involved than the mere mind-set of the actor. We are discussing social process when we deal with love, faith/belief, and the so-called

"personal" power. To relegate the humanistic components to the realm of mere internal mood inside the head of the actor is to miss the entire point. Modern human beings are alone, separate, and alienated precisely because we have relegated all humanistic sentiments to the internal "self", while proceeding to make the world in the scientific, mechanistic image.

The Social Creation of Reality

By overloading the "self" with all the emotional, values, and human sentiments that we cannot manage to unload anywhere else, we have a "self" which is literally ready to explode. It is small wonder that personalities "split" and fall apart, for there is no place in the modern world to map these humanistic "things" --the things that matter most. As Horney (1937) in The Neurotic Personality of Our Time was the first to argue it is society who has dropped out; it is not a matter of neurosis, but of sociosis and anomie. And to bridge our way out, we must bring the humanistic elements back to center play in society. The first step is realization that these so-called "internal" components -- belief, faith, emotions, mood -- are not internal at all. The so-called "personal" power is not an individualistic "will power" but something much different: the creation of reality.

As Heidegger wrote in Nietzsche: The Will to Power as Art, we are talking of creating the world and shaping it as an artist might. This is not a new mechanistic technique, but a new way of being, seeing, perceiving, and creating.

> It is essential to observe that feeling is not something that
> runs its course in our 'inner lives.' It is rather the basic
> mode . . . of which and in accordance to which we are always
> already lifted beyond ourselves . . . . Mood is never a way
> of being determined in our inner being for ouselves. It is

> above all a way of being attuned, and letting ourselves be
> attuned, in this or that way in mood. Mood is precisely the
> basic way in which we are outside ourselves (Heidegger, 1961,
> p. 99). [Italics Original]

Mood is a way through which the rest of the world can come in. It is
here that we might firmly grasp the way social nature of these supposed
"internal" states.

"Self-actualization" is not so much an internal state as it is a
way of interrelating with the world. It will be remembered that Maslow
(1971) himself in tracing the origin of his concept of self-
actualization gave away the fact that it began as a social concept.
His model for a self-actualized person was Ruth Benedict. He then pro-
ceeded to find others who reminded him of Benedict and began the forma-
tion of his theories. But it must be recalled that Benedict herself was
not interested in promoting her own self-actualization: she was much
more interested in other things -- and it was this interest, this
outside-herself quality that was contagious. One of the things that
Ruth Benedict was most interested in was synergy.

Self-actualization, then, has the very roots of its origin in
unison with the very social concept of synergy. "One plus one is more
than two" suggests that the people involved are both involved in
something bigger and outside of themselves.

If we examine the examples that Sorokin used for the power of love,
we find that they are not examples of personal power at all. The
Mennonite farmer did not manage to "con" the Russian soldiers through
his superior acting ability and personal charisma. Instead, he
committed himself to a process in full faith. It was a belief and faith
in the power of love that pulled him through.

This is not the mechanistic power of science or some mere internal state. It is a process which is constructed. The process is initiated by commitment and faith. It should be obvious that this belief had to strike a familiar chord with the soldiers in order to be successful. It is not personal charisma of the performance of the belief which is so crucial, but the inviting nature of an invitation in which he is sincere. This is Bergson's "society by aspiration" again.

There is a fundamental difference between the mechanistic power of science and what is referred to by the humanists as "personal power." Rogers (1977) in his book, On Personal Power, said that it took him a long time to realize that he was talking about power. The reason for this is that he was not -- not in the traditional sense. What he was said just happened to have political implications. Rogers wrote about a way of being which is strong, which is influencing, and which participates in a process.

The typical scientific view of power is cause and effect. It is literally manipulation -- meaning "in hand" -- forcing power. The humanistic version of power is closer to the word "influence" which means literally "to flow in." It is part of a process. Manipulative, scientific power assumes that one must first have the situation "in hand" and then control the variables. Humanistic "influence" is a commitment to a process that is above and beyond you. It is not a "personal" power at all, but a socially constructed dynamic.

Charisma itself is more of an invitation than a mechanism. As Whitman wrote: "To believe what is true in your innermost heart is true for all men, that is genius." It was the anthropologist Carpenter (1970, p. 1) who later added: "The artist talks to himself out loud.

If what he has to say is significant, others hear and are affected."
It is a matter of these "internal" themes striking a common chord. The
artist through his art brings these into play so that they may be acted
upon. It is not that these matters of belief and faith have been inter-
nal but that they had previously been only latent.

Mills' (1959) sociological imagination of turning private problems
into public issues was none other than the artist's attempt to turn those
private, "internal" problems into a dialog concerning cultural strains
that will make sense to those around him. It was a networking strategy:
what Carpenter would refer to as "finding an audience."

This process of creating the definition of the situation is then a
social-mapping of individuals around core themes. It is not just the
internal ability of the actor to "bring off his performance," but the
fact that his faith invites participation. It is believable. The char-
ismatic individual gives us permission for what we have been yearning to
enact. That some individuals act as catalysts for our humanistic
values/beliefs in no way makes them internal factors.

The psychologist Jung (1964) reduced the contents of consciousness
to a series of archetypes or themes. They await enactment. Such a psy-
chology provides for a tailor-made base for a social dramaturgy for man
as the creator for enacting those themes. The themes themselves are not
strictly internal. They are foundations -- of both consciousness and
the drama of social life.

Faith (and belief) implies not just a concentration of energy and
convincing role performance, but implies a belief in something -- a
content. If we overload the self by claiming that beliefs are only
internal mechanisms (e.g., personal opinions) then we have succeeded in

reifying psychology at one pole only to leave science (and its "real world") intact at the other pole. We have obscured the social task and the real possibility of making the world.

As Horney (1937) taught us, neurosis tends to occur along lines of cultural strain. By overloading the "self" with all the "material" that science has not been able to deal with -- with belief, faith, values, human longings -- we have made psychology into a dumping ground which is neither satisfactory nor effective. We have relegated psychology to the role of "band-aid" on cultural wound.

If we treat love, magic, and the other humanistic concerns as only internal, we do them a real disservice. To treat belief and faith as mere mechanisms of the individual, we miss the scope and impact of the entire humanistic thesis. Those who have testified to and experienced humanistic experiences -- the "magic" of faith and belief -- testified to forces in their lives -- not opinions. Reality construction is partici- patory. Definition of the situation and faith testify to the possiblity of visualizing and creating another world. Belief and faith are not internal aspects of self, but the very wind in the sails of humanism.

The faith which has been called the power of love is a real entity that is capable of transforming consciousness and situations. This belief flies in the face of the scientific reality. But love has shown its ability to transform experience and the outcomes of events.

The Romantic Quest: The Hero

The effort to effect a new definition of the situation against the ongoing "reality" is by its very nature romantic. It is the quest of the hero. The core of the social disciplines is tied to this romantic

tradition. They were born in the "change the world" conversation -- the quest for better. Becker (1971) summarized:

> . . . let me address a comment to the hardheaded realist, who may smirk at the Quixotic lance splitting and utopianism. I don't see how it can be denied that the science of man is, historically and by its very nature, a utopian science (p. x).

The human disciplines seek to implement a new vision; to make an ideal into reality. Returning to Marx's statement quoted earlier: philosophers have described the world; it is now up to us to transform it . . . . To somehow dream a dream of the good society and then to create that society. This represents initially an attempt to "save the world" pure and simple: for Marx, from the abuses of capitalism that produced alienated man; for Comte, from the excesses of the French Revolution and such violent change.

Each of the early sociologists offered up their dream in hope that it would be taken as the basis for a new society -- for a new definition of the situation. The reality of "what is" was replaced with the mission of creating a new world -- a romantic adventure in its very essence.

Sociology and social change strategies have thus always been associated with the theater of the heroic. Even the strict scientist toiling with his data and variables has been doing this for a greater cause: the progress of mankind -- the betterment of the world. We have not been sufficiently aware of the extent that the very enterprise itself is heroic. The effort is to create the Good: to fly in the face of what is -- "reality" -- and create a new definition of the situation and a new world. Sociology and psychology might be seen as attempts to create a new self-fulfilling prophecy. The hero toils to change the world.

Most of us, however, have become sophisticated with our efforts. The sociologist does not want to "save" the world but provide some understanding which will effect change and make it somewhat <u>better</u>. The psychologist does not feel confident any longer that people can be changed, but s/he strives to <u>help</u>. Yet despite our mature sensitivity to the problems of change, we must not lose sight of the heroic intent inherent in sociology or a psychology. This heroic effort provides the very structure and the grammar of the disciplines themselves.

If we seek to create a better self-fulfilling prophecy, then we gain a different understanding of "truth" and "reality." "Truth" becomes what we cannot readily change -- the limits of our efforts to visualize a new world. Yet these "truths" themselves are subject to change almost daily. Thus the social disciplines are framed, in principle, by the idea that the potential for new visualization is inexhaustible. It is an effort in full opposition to any limits on our ability to change things: a heroic quest of the highest order.

It was Ernest Becker who sought to analyze the nature of this heroic quest and the implications of the hero on social change strategies. In <u>The Birth and Death of Meaning</u> (1962), <u>Escape From Evil</u> (1975), and and <u>The Denial of Death</u> (1973) he examined cultures as hero systems: symbolic attempts to deny death and create the Good. It was an effort which in trying to deny death and escape from evil also implied a more complex denial of mystery and the miraculous (Becker, 1971). Denial is a strategy which purchases security at a terrible price and furthermore does not prove to be effective.

The extent to which we can change the basic "realities" and stretch the parameters of existence is always a difficult question. How much can the self-fulfilling prophecy create a new world?

> . . . here is where religion enters in as mankind's age-old
> question for the ideal heroism . . . . As the noted socio-
> logist Peter Berger reminded us, religion and social science
> meet in their judgement of the social fictions. The scientific
> analysis of the social structure and the psychology of society
> would tell us why it is strangling itself with the best of
> intentions (Becker, 1971, p. 181).

The quest to make the Good must contain elements which have signif-
icantly contributed to its own unsuccessfulness. Indeed, Becker went
so far as to contribute much of the social evil in the world to immature
efforts to create the Good. Becker (1975) quoted the psychologist Otto
Rank:

> All our human problems, with their intolerable sufferings,
> arise from man's ceaseless attempts to make this material world
> into a man-made reality . . . Aiming to achieve on each a
> "perfection" which is only to be found in the beyond . . .
> thereby confusing the values of both spheres (p. 91).

The ideal world becomes a sanctuary against the terror of life.
Man's psychology seeks to deny mortality and impermanence, while society
seeks to reify this into an ongoing system transcending death. Each
culture offers prescribed ways of overcoming death and evil. This
"ensures the future" and keeps us from confronting the things that we
fear most.

> Roheim said that culture, the marvelous pagentry of the human
> drama, was the fabrication of a child afraid to be alone in
> the dark. The ideal question for religion has always been a
> derivative of this. 'What kind of fabrication would be proper
> to an adult who realized that he was afraid' (Becker, 1971,
> p. 195)? [Italics Original]

We have sought to deny the animal nature of human beings and the
transitoriness of life. How can we recast our view in such a way as to
celebrate life?

The heroic task is caught up in the art of how to make sense out of
life. We may see that meaning has been socially constructed, but
although we may lift the masks from the cultural drama, we cannot do

away with human need for meaning construction. Becker argued that the hero system -- which is an attempt to create a self-fulfilling prophecy against the impermanence of life -- is the very foundation of meaning. It is through identification with heroes that children are first socialized into the ongoing culture; the child learns societally pre- scribed strategies of transcendence and creating meaning. It is pre- cisely through the hero system that a child learns the culture.

Becker (1971) saw the heroic process intrinsically related to the very birth of meaning. Even for one who has seen through the learned social fiction, it is still necessary to retain and create some system of meaning. It is necessary to create a new construction or re-enact the old, for this is tightly interwoven with our sense of security and continuity. It is how we construct our interactions.

When we become aware of the socially created nature of our hero systems, we are immediately confronted with a nagging doubt. The ability of the hero to implement a new self-fulfilling prophecy by shear will becomes transparently fragile.

> When we look at the lives of the greatest, the most daring
> innovators, one fact shines out: that no matter how compelling
> is the edifice he creates, man simply cannot feel that
> he has the authority to offer up his own meanings (Becker,
> 1968, p. 192). [Italics Original]

The problem of the hero suspended in thin air by only his will and vision becomes paramount. It is easy to fall, and the higher the vision, the steeper the fall. When the shadow of doubt creeps in, it too, like the dragons of evil and the tentacles of fear, must be slayed.

The hero strives to transcend death: to deny its impact and create a quest that will be meaningful in the face of the fire: a haven and a vision against the dust. It is an attempt to quell the darkness and

escape from evil. Yet, any light we cast leaves behind a shadow from which we would like to escape responsibility. We seek to deny death and evil, and also to escape from the latent consequences, to abate the darkness.

The heroic effort, Becker (1975) noted in the Escape From Evil, has often itself been responsible for the creation of social evil. By denying what we fear and rushing to eliminate it in others rather than ourselves, we have often polluted the situation more than helped. The strategy of heroically making the good has often been to stamp out evil without owning up to the part that our own denial has played in the process.

Becker (1975, p. 94) quoted the psychologist Erich Neumann: "The shadow is the other side. It is the expression of our own imperfection and earthliness, the negative which is incompatible with the absolute values."

Becker commented that it is "the horror of passing life and the knowledge of death" from which we wish to escape. It is also, as Jung noted, our feelings of inferiority that we wish to feel. To "jump over our own shadow." We try to do this by "looking for everything dark, inferior, and culpable in others" (Jung, 1970, p. 203).

> The shadow, which is in conflict with the acknowledged values
> cannot be accepted as a negative part of one's own psyche and
> is therefore projected -- that is, it is transferred to the out-
> side world and experienced as an outside object. It is com-
> bated, punished, and exterminated as 'the alien out there'
> instead of being dealt with as one's own . . . problem
> (Neumann, 1969, p. 50).

Sociologists have made a meager attempt to analyze this dynamic through the concepts of "manifest" and "latent" functions (Merton, 1949). While manifest functions are intended, latent functions "are

consequences which are neither intended nor recognized" (Martindale, 1960, p. 472). Latent functions may be as neutral as colleges functioning as marriage markets, or they may subvert and destroy the entire system as anthropological accounts of the "crimes" of missionaries testify. Yet, for the most part, sociologists have not undertaken a thorough study of how acts in social-psychological settings create and maintain those very structures in the marco-society which we deplore the most.

This may well have been the intent of Mills' (1959) <u>Sociological Imagination</u>: to ask us to see how individual problems relate to social issues, not just as a way of networking from personal problems to a larger context, but as a means of integrating and emphasizing the extent to which social problems are generated by personal strategies.

It is distancing ourselves from our fears that Becker saw as the fundamental dynamic for the creation of social evil. By projecting evil onto other people, we scapegoat our problems and then fight wars against this "foreign other" without realizing the extent our own participation plays in the creation of evil. Crusade strategies for creating the Good remain essentially ineffective. Such heroic strategies generate the very evil that they were designed to eliminate.

This is all the more crucial because attempts to make the Good often carry with them the conviction of religious zeal. The "do-gooder" enters into a strategy with full force and indignation. Having identified the "culprit," we seek to erase "him" while denying our own part.

Hero systems carry with then an innate weakness and vulnerability -- a fatal flaw, if you will. In dreaming the good dream, we wish to escape from the doubts of disbelief, deny the frailty of our myth construction, and reach for sure-fire salvation. We seek to deny the

fragileness of our self-fulfilling prophecies. For when the hero falls from the wings of vision, we are left alienated in the world.

Both Becker and Jung saw that in order to overcome the shadow of evil, we must come to grips with the very shadow that we would deny. We cannot escape from evil, nor can we avoid our shadow side. This was Becker's reason for focusing upon the denial of death, the structure of evil, and our escape-from-evil mechanisms. We must acknowledge and even embrace its existence.

Jungian psychology also focuses upon the impossibility of suppressing the shadow. If we consciously deny its existence, it re-surfaces in the unconscious -- both in dreams and as a source of our actions. The individuals must learn to "own their shadow" in order to achieve psychological health. "The hero must realize that the shadow side exists and that he can draw strength from it. He must come to terms with its destructive powers . . . must master and assimilate the shadow" (Jung, 1964, p. 121). Not only must the shadow be assimilated for psychological health, but incorporation of it is often a source of creativity. By dealing with this other side, new strategies and strengths can be achieved. For, as Becker (1968, p. 258) noted, "For man, strength means understanding."

Strength can be gained from dealing with those very things which we would like most to deny. Instead of abandoning heroism, Becker (1971) pressed the ideal heroism farther in an attempt to make it effective:

> When the new emergent symbolic man sense despair and the burden of the miraculous, he wove tight the denial of the Oedipus and reached for sure religious power. For a long time, evolution seems to have allowed the creature to relax somewhat, to take possession of itself and its world. But whether or not these musings are so, it seems clear that the comfortable illusion is now a danger to human survival; and closedness to the miraculous is an evasion of human sensibility; man now

seems to have to move ahead with his own strength to the frontiers of anxiety. And who knows what would come of that (Becker, 1971, pp. 198-199).

What kind of world could we then make and live in? And what would life be like? The heroic quest has come a long way since the first creature huddled by the fire in the cave, sensed death, and launched a romantic adventure to achieve meaning. The romantic quest proceeded through the early religious mystics, to the knights and their ladies, to the social reformer, and to the modern effort to build a science of humanity.

Bergson (1935) noted the similarity between romantic love and mysticism:

> . . . romantic love has a definite date: it sprang up during the Middle Ages on the day that some person conceived the idea of absorbing love into a kind of supernatural feeling, into religious emotion as created by Christianity and launched by the new religion into the world. When critics reproach mysticism with expressing itself in the same terms as passionate love, they forget that it was love which began by plagiarizing mysticism . . . (p. 42).

Bergson continued:

> We may add that the nearer love is to adoration, the greater the disproportion between the emotion and the object, the deeper therefore the disappointment to which the lover is exposed -- unless he decides that he will ever look at the object through the mist of the emotion and never touch it, that he will, in a word, treat it religiously . . . . The margin left for disappointment is now enormous, for it is the gap between the divine and the human (p. 43).

Bergson (1935, p. 53) concluded that "the truth is that heroism may be the only way to love." If we cast our heroism to the realm of the ideal, the gap can prove staggering. Lucka (1922) writing in

The Evolution of Love said that:

> Not only the great thinker's thirst for knowledge, the mystics religious yearnings, the aesthetic of the rare artist, but also the love and longing of the passionate lover must reach beyond the attainable to the infinite. This earth is the kingdom of

> 'mean' emotions and 'mean' men. And the lover, unable to bear
> its limits, creates for himself a new world -- the world of
> metaphysical love (p. 303).

Yet, this world is unobtainable on the day-to-day physical level --
at least for very long. Still, the hero strives: "To dream the impos-
sible dream . . . to reach the unreachable star." Yet often falling
to earth to realize that we have only been "flogging windmills." Like
Don Quixote, it is necessary to pick oneself up and launch the vision
again. However, we must realize that the process of "picking oneself up
again" is intimately related to the whole process of dreaming and the
very dynamic of the hero.

When romance comes crashing to the ground, it often reveals itself
as just another fantasy -- a part of the myth-making function at the
carnival of life. Yet, when we climb on the wings of vision again, it
often becomes easy to forget the fall. It is a lot like fear and pain:
when they are gone, we have only the dimmest memory of what they were
like. When someone invites us to smell the flowers, we try the vision
again pretending that previous falls have made us immune from falling.

Yet, the world is often not secure for our dreams. Not everyone will
love us. Often our dance of love is only a pretense which no one else
will support. It is hard to find someone to make a vision with and even
harder to find someone who shares the same vision. Often the nature of
the particular vision is such that it gets rapidly chased from view by
its own shadow. Many have given up the dream and many cannot give up
trying.

There are at times very real forces outside ourselves which mean us
harm. At times the world can be a very dangerous place. Sometimes,
faith and the power of self-fulfilling prophecy to spin a better world

can keep us safe. And at times, other realities intrude.

We can visualize and often create another world. The power of the dreamers can transform the world as it is, down to our very perceptions. But sometimes it makes little difference whether our heads are in the clouds or buried like the ostrich in the ground -- the world can deal us a blow when we are not looking.

For dreams to come to fruit in the world, they must be nurtured and allowed to ripen. Sometimes they are not ready. Sometimes they have been planted on barren ground. Sometimes they are inadequate.

Evil must be admitted to exist. The attempt to deny it only strengthens its existence. We must learn to own our shadow and face our projections. We must strive to understand what we would deny. As Fromm (1968) wrote:

> To be fully aware of one's humanity means to be aware that, as Terence said, 'Homo sum, nil humani a me alienum puto' (I am man and nothing human is alien to me); that each one carries all of humanity within himself -- the saint as well as the criminal; as Goethe put it, that there is no crime of which one cannot imagine oneself to be the author (p. 61).

The core of Fromm's work concerned love and creativeness, but he also dealt with destructiveness (1975) and the escape mechanisms of distancing (1943, 1945), without which his philosophy would have been incomplete.

We may assume that destructiveness, if we do not fixate it by our strategies to combat it, carries the seeds of its own destruction. We must be careful not to dwell only on evil and dismiss all attempts to create the Good a priori. We may use as our philosophical point of departure the fact that most people desire good. Good and evil are not necessarily co-balanced in a zero-sum game. Our questions become ones

of strategy: what will work?; and for what structural reasons does the good negate itself? We reach for an understanding of the "Good" which Nietzsche (1955) characterized as "beyond good and evil" -- a "Good" that was not subject to the zero-sum game of the "good" vs. "evil" controversy.

The hero's task is always incomplete. It is never a total victory for very long. In some ways, it is not so much a religious quest as a profession. <u>Oddly enough, we must come to see that the hero represents the last vestiges of science.</u>

The hero mounts on wings of vision to steal fire from the gods and slay dragons on earth. This is very similar to the scientist's inquiry to find "God's rulebook": to discover the truth and mount a movement. The hero is the would-be savior: from excursions into the frontier of the unknown, he will return with new techniques and materials for making the world. Like the scientist, the hero carries the banner of a cause. Often it is the same banner -- the service of humanity. In fact, science, especially the human sciences, has cast itself very much into the role of the hero.

Finally, the power of the hero is the scientific power: it is <u>force</u>, not influence. To rely upon the involvedness of influence cripples the heroic achievement of meaning. The hero seeks potions, amulets, and treasures that will function as techniques for changing the world. Even when it may appear that the hero is using influence, later we find him circumventing the process and claiming credit for that influence, just as if it had been out-and-out manipulation. Heroes are interested in salvation. In relating meaning to such a quest, the humanistic power of influence often appears too subtle.

The rational effort of mind over matter is not only scientific, but heroic. The psychologist Fricker (1981, 1982) has given us an interesting insight into the hero. Fricker, a war hero who has received most of the medals awarded by the American government, began counseling the wounded in V. A. hospitals concerning the hero mythology. Later, he linked child abuse with the failed would-be hero.

The image of the hero is basic throughout society and achievement of the heroic is the very measure of success. It is this basic hero-mechanism that Fricker saw as the problem. He claimed that for psychological maturity, one must "let their hero die." By giving up the hero archetype, ironically enough, one is then often capable of functioning in effective ways which from the outside look heroic. However, allegiance to the hero archetype perverts, pollutes, and renders would-be heroic efforts ineffective.

The hero may to some extent thrive on the existence of evil much as the policeman thrives on crime for a living wage. We are speaking here of the rescuer who needs someone to save. He may unconsciously create his "dependents." He may inadvertently identify with the hero image and need to be recognized as a hero to the extent that his "public" is enslaved by the deference demanded of them by reciprocity. Or the hero's ineffective attempts to create the Good may actually pollute the situation and make it worse.

Self-esteem is a normal human need. However, the hero image can easily be carried to a demand for abnormal deference. Social scientists, like others, may demand allegiance to the expert role out of all proportion to the contribution they are actually making to society.

The thesis being presented here is that Becker was quite right about the limits, abuses, and ineffectiveness of the hero's attempt to rescue us from evil or escape. Unwittingly, the social disciplines embraced the archetype of the hero as a social change strategy. However, the hero strategy was hopelessly entangled with the scientific paradigm --a paradigm which we have already seen negates the humanistic vision.

Becker took the matter as far as his Western rationalism and reliance on Freudian psychology would allow him. Freud was a "grit your teeth and stare at the fire" realist. Jung, on the other hand, acknowledged the reality of the fire, but also focused upon other things. He focused on the recovery of ancient cultural rituals for the creation of meaning in life.[1] And he developed the idea of archetypes as the underlying themes of that meaning.

In studying the archetypes, Jung found two encompassing patterns in which they could be grouped. He proceeded to employ this type of organization for analysis of the archetypes. The first was the archetype of the Hero. The second was that of the Magician. Jung then proceeded to analyze the Hero and the Magician psychologically. As demonstrated in this section, Becker examined the Hero as a social change strategy, noting its interrelation with the idea of a "social science." However, the implications of the Magician as a social change strategy have not been examined.

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[1]This is not to say that Becker (1968, p. 381) was not aware of this level of meaning, only to say that he did not stake his vision on developing the contents of that view; for example, he writes, "We needed a science which would help us 'live the dream' better than it was lived in the Middle Ages, or in 'primitive' society -- a science that would seek to develop the conditions of life enhancement." However, Becker's focus is upon the resurfacing of those things we had relegated to denial, not upon the active creation of celebration, although he advocated such efforts.

Indeed, much of the material which Becker used will be incorporated in the next section as a foundation. He pointed the way, although he did not take it. We must look to ways in which celebration and incorporation of the mysterious can be used as a basis for a social change strategy.

In the next section, we will focus upon love, synergy, and the role of the magician as social change strategies, and attempt to develop their implications for a humanistic sociology. In doing so, we will attempt to avoid the traps which Becker characterized as intertwined with the romantic, heroic quest.

CHAPTER IV

LOVE, SYNERGY, AND THE MAGIC

Humanistic Sociology focuses specifically upon the recovery of
love, magic, and the "Good" and the application of these values to the
social world. We return to the age-old question: "How do we make the
Good?" The answer must be formed in the light of humanistic values
themselves. We must develop ways of framing our questions that avoid
the traps outlined by Becker as "the escape from evil" and the denial-
approaches of the shadow and the hero. We must seek answers which leave
the humanistic experience intact and therefore, do not violate its basic
grammar or spirit. To do this, we must focus on the nature of the
humanistic values of love, synergy, and the magical.

Unfortunately, we find little serious scholarship to guide us:

It is amazing how little the empirical sciences have to offer
on the subject of love. Particularly strange is the silence
of the psychologists, for one might think that this is their
particular obligation.

Sometimes this is merely sad or irritating, as in the case of
the textbooks of psychology and sociology . . . . More often,
the situation becomes completely ludicrous. One might reason-
ably expect that writers of serious treatises . . . should
consider the subject of love to be a proper, even basic, part
of their self-imposed task. But I must report that no single
one of the volumes on these subjects in the library where I
work has any serious mention of the subject. More often, the
word 'love' is not even indexed.

I must confess that I understand this better now that I have
undertaken the task myself. It is an extraordinarily diffi-
cult subject to handle in any tradition. And it is triply
so in the scientific tradition. It is as if we were at
the most advanced position in no-man's land, at a point where

the conventional techniques of orthodox psychological science
are of very little use.

And yet our duty is clear. We <u>must</u> understand love: we must
be able to teach it, to create <u>it</u> . . . or else the world is
lost to hostility and suspicion (Maslow, 1953, pp. 57-58).
[Italics Original]

And yet, with the exception of the work of Erich Fromm, little has changed since Maslow wrote these words. Serious writers have chosen to study those things that fit easily into the scientific tradition. They have not chosen to study love. Knowledge has not been pressed to this frontier, partly because it challenges the very parameters of our present paradigm.

Love and magic are not amenable to the scientific method. Becker (1973) argued that our whole culture and lifestyle has been constructed to provide a denial of death. But the "denial of death" of which Becker spoke is but the tip of the iceberg. <u>The real taboo in our society is not the "denial of death" but the denial of mystery.</u> Most have systematically sought to eliminate anything which would suggest life to be miraculous or magical. Love has been neglected as a subject for study because it subtly undermines the scientific tradition that has become our very world view. In order to undertake a serious study of love, it was first necessary to unravel the nuances of that scientific world view.

However, even in Western culture, the magical has not completely disappeared. Utopian visions seem to re-open the child-like eyes of awe and wonder in all of us from time to time. It may be a vision we have in the forest when time stands still and we realize that we have always had this dream -- as thoughts bubble to the surface and then are gone just as clouds passing by. We talk of never going back, of making a

change. It may be the insight of the poet who touches us in a way we had almost forgotten.

From time to time, the magic gets rekindled and we see life more as a miracle than as the cause and effect of science: we go through major life transitions and reach back for understanding and meaning. Children are born and life awakens itself with fresh possibilities. People we loved die and life again becomes such a fragile construction on this side of the veil. Our lives change and who we thought we were are also changes. We fall in love and the world is transformed down to our very perceptions. We undergo a career change or a divorce or a cross-country move . . . and the world seems so different before we manage to snap it back in place.

. . . There are the experiences that Maslow might term "peak": the "eurekas," the magical moments between new lovers or old friends, the milestones in our lives, and the experiences where the walls of the world fall before us and we are left with a moment of recognition as our life passes before us. There are those sparks of inspiration which can only be called magical -- when we draw from that spring we term creativity. And the times we find ourselves at the shoreline and pass beyond ourself.

Even in our very linear, scientific culture, the magic has not disappeared. These experiences are the very foundation of meaning in our lives. We seek to bring these experiences that we have in private spaces back to the larger world -- to somehow use them to change and remake that world. Love and the magical exepriences are the very essence of the humanistic vision. It is from these experiences that we wish to create. Yet the larger culture, in its day-to-day activity,

remains almost blind to the very existence of these humanistic values. They are on the fringes of our culture, waiting to haunt us in our dreams and confront us in our crises. Still, it seems the larger world does not listen. Yet an articulation is crucial. Unless we can testify to them in public, they go unnoticed in the legislation of reality. How do we make these experiences public and use them as a basis for shaping a common vision? This is the focus of a humanistic sociology.

Ornstein (1968) told an interesting story to justify intuitive knowledge to rational scientists. It works equally well here to illustrate this discussion of love and the magical. Suppose, he said, there are two groups of scientists: one working during the day and the other during the night. The ones at night keep reporting to the day shift about the stars that they have seen. The day scientists refuse to leave the confines of their daily world, but they do agree to explore the possibility. Using all their equipment and systems, they search the sky. At times, they even look through the same telescopes and in the same places -- but in the daytime. Finally, they conclude that those seeing the stars are fools.

But the long legion of dreamers from Christ to William Blake are not fools. They are looking at a different time of day. The current scientific apparatus does not fit their vision. Love and magic cannot be proven -- they do not do well when doubted, and repeated testing only tests them out of existence. They do not appear in mock or artificial settings. And it seems that they only occur when we are involved in life, not as armchair speculations or outgrowths of contrived settings. The time of day the mystics do their seeing is that hour when

you feel your own mortality and at the same time see the beauty and wonder of the world.

Love and magic are not instruments. They do not lend themselves to prediction and control which is the basis of scientific power. They do not come with "handles" that allow them to be turned into technologies. Fromm (1956) noted in The Art of Loving that most of what we say we know about life has been achieved by rendering things dead and then performing autopsies on them. We know much less about living bodies because they do not fit our analytical dissection. Love and magic cannot be laid bare by the analysis of the structure and function of organs and skeletal frames. They resemble more the breath of life itself.

Science was supposed to be a salvation: a Tower of Babel up to the heavens. Knowledge is power, maintained Francis Bacon. Knowledge has to be tamed into power; but in its would-be heroic quest, science's methods resemble more the harpoon of Captain Ahab than the light of truth. We are in danger of stabbing life to death in order to grasp it. Love and magic speak of a different kind of power that does not need to be tamed or framed by analysis. And yet it is crucial we develop a way of talking about love and magic that affords their public recognition in the construction of the world. Just because love and the magical cannot be framed by the scientific approach, it does not mean that we cannot talk about them. Such a dialog is essential if we are going to develop a paradigm that will supplant the normal scientific order of things.

It was Whorf (1956) who argued we must develop ways of communicating that overcome the strict scientific assumptions contained in our very conceptions of what "thought" is. He felt that science had mistaken the grammar and syntax of Western language, with its subject-predicate/

actor-object/cause-effect bias, for the world. He envisioned a new lan-
guage which might transpose the confines of Aristotlean logic to the
multiplicities of the dreamer.

This is also the basis of much of Jungian psychology (Jung, 1964).
Jung said that the crucial problem of our age is the recovery of the
intuitive, "feminine" aspects of self and culture. Rationality and our
"Tower of Babel" word-abstractions have advanced so far that we
neglected and left behind the intuitive, non-rational aspects of self.
The intuitive and the "feminine" must now advance and "catch up" with
the rational, scientific world we have created. The advance and devel-
opment of the intuitive must then supplant our description and way of
talking about the world. If Science and Western culture at this stage
were to advance without recovering the intuitive, then it would leave
behind the person and the self.

Mills (1959) in The Sociological Imagination made the distinction
between "rationality" and "reason." Rationality is mistaking a method
of thinking (i.e., the scientific method) for thinking itself. It is
categorical but does not produce reason. Reason is the ability to
think; it is not dependent on an a priori method of thought. Freedom
involves the self's capacity to make judgments based on experience. It
is not a pre-determined pattern, but the emergence of insight. In our
age, we have mistakenly assumed a parallel between rationality and
reason, when in fact they are opposite poles. To forego allegiance to
the scientific method does not mean that we have abandoned thinking and
reason.

If we are to develop a paradigm of humanistic values, we must not
allow a method of thought to dictate our thinking. To study love and

the magical -- which is the essence of the humanistic conception of man -- we must find ways of approaching our task that are consistent with our subject. To re-vision society in ways that will promote humanistic values, we must re-order our theory of the social world. We must not make love and the magical fit our methods, but construct methods that accommodate love and magic. Our knowledge of love and the magical is in such a poor state of affairs precisely because the human disciplines have chosen to model themselves after science. We have forgotten that science is opposed to these values at its very core.

As was argued in the second chapter, the history of Western thought has been a movement away from knowledge strategies that embrace "the Good" and towards strategies which seek to find "the truth." The scientific approach has gradually obscured love from view -- especially as a practical path in the world. Intuitively it makes a great deal of sense to talk about love as a "reverse image" of science. While it is probably important not to carry this metaphor too far, it does provide an interesting starting point for an articulation of a love paradigm.

As discussed, science has five major characteristics:

1. Objectivity, Detachment
2. Doubt, Testing
3. Power, Prediction, Control
4. Experimental, Artificial
5. Value free.

One can begin to develop a love paradigm by extrapolating a dialectic with science:

Objectivity, Detachment -- Love is a collapse of boundaries; an "entering into." It is an involvement: an interaction where "I" and

"not-I" intermingle and meet. Love takes place on this shifting boundary back and forth.

Doubt, Testing -- Love is based on trust, belief, and faith. It is not satisfied with what "is," it is a commitment that even if love is found lacking, to create it.

Power, Prediction, Control -- Love involves "letting go" and surrendering to an outcome. It hopes and seeks to influence, and yet it is unexpectable, unobligated, and uncontrolled. It resembles the "free gift" of grace. For love to enter, ego must recede.

Experimental, Artificial -- While love is playful, it is not artificial or experimental. It involves entering into the moment in full reality.

Value-free -- We are as far from the value free approach as possible. Love is the heart of meaning.

Love does not fit the scientific dynamic. It is magical. Love at its core is akin to the earlier tradition of magic. Love is not part of the scientific paradigm, but of the magical view of reality. The use of the work "magic" might be criticized by those who feel that it might threaten the credibility of the humanistic enterprise. Yet I have not chosen the word "magic" lightly. Despite the false allusions and the difficulties it encounters, magic is precisely the right word. Science declared war against magic; and it was precisely the "magical view" of reality that science has historically sought to replace.

Roszak (1975) showed how science specifically sought to move from a sacred basis of culture to a secular one. This moved culture from a foundation of myth, magic, and mystery to one emphasizing history, technology, and reason. With scientific reality,

> . . . in place of myth, we have history. In place of magic,
> technology. In place of mystery, reason. Here, then, we have
> a second, inverted triangle -- a profane triangle whose orien-
> tation is toward the Earth and away from transcendent exper-
> ience . . . . The transformation is blunt and bold: one
> Reality Principle knocking its predecessor for a loop . . .
> the great reversal has been the total secularization of cul-
> ture in mind and deed -- certainly the most potent, daring,
> and original project of modern times, as well as the most dis-
> tinctive historical contribution of Western society (Rozak,
> 1975, pp. 159-160). [Italics Original]

It was the mystical conception of reality that science wished to
sweep from view. If we want to view love and magic as more than just
curious appendages to the scientific reality, then it is necessary to
re-open the old schism between science and humanistic values. This is
particularly true because science has a tendency to circumscribe our
humanistic efforts: re-package them to use as technologies for its own
advance. There is no appreciation for the fact that by such a process
something crucial is lost. What is lost is the humanistic ethos!

This is nowhere more evident than with many of the new techniques
for personal and social transformation that have emerged from popular
psychology. Suddenly, we have a science interested in the functions of
the "right side of the brain." It is as if science had suddenly real-
ized it had forgotten to appropriate a number of items to its vision.
We have what might be called the territorialization of the right side
of the brain. The traditional sciences now move in haste to quicken the
maturity of the "immature" social sciences. Science seeks to circum-
scribe these right brain (i.e., intuitive) functions and turn them into
technologies. The scientific strategy has been merely to enscribe the
new "right-brain" technologies into the scientific vision and then
return to business as usual. The realization that these "technologies"
contain a grammar and syntax drastically different from the scientific

paradigm goes unnoticed. Much of the impetus behind each particular technique is quickly diffused and routinized. The skin of science grows over the schism leaving a scar. And in our day, little of the scientific covering remains unscared.

Technologies of Love and Magic

The conversion of attempts to address love and the magical into technologies has become the major way of dealing with humanistic efforts. Science can then return to the business of making the world as if nothing happened. Love and magic are routinized as new techniques within the system. To complicate matters, many humanists have played into this game and even encouraged it. Eager for status and credibility within the scientific community, they have sought to "package" their views in ways that scientists might easily understand and incorporate in their framework. They have argued for their humanistic views in ways that would be marketable to the larger audience -- Western culture. Indeed, for example, we find McGregor (1960)[1] seeking to sell humanistic values to management by referring to love as a "hygiene factor."

Such is an understandable metaphor: just like failure to have breakfast, if one does not get their love "needs" met before going to work, it will interfere with the day's work. Despite the attractiveness of such expedient marketing approaches for encouraging executives to pay attention to the human side of enterprise, such an approach seriously diminishes our understanding. Love is not a hygiene factor -- it is the

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[1]McGregor's work is frontier breaking for management theory; Maslow uses his work extensively; there is a humanistic tone to his effort. haps if we were but initiated into the secret, we would be able to read

active component in the creation of meaning.

Even for those who would wish to avoid the scientific approach, the traps which are inherent in any effort to avoid the scientific method are subtle. And it is difficult to outgrow the scientific mind set. The popular culture is always clammering for some new way of remedying our situations. It becomes easy to technologize love. Love becomes translated into power in the scientific mode. And if the humanist does not turn the effort into a technology, then often the media does.

We are a culture craving instant techniques for love and meaning. We seek techniques in the cause and effect mode. Have not we been raised to expect that Science will provide us with "push-button" techniques for love? In high school, we can all remember our eagerness to learn techniques which would make us lovable. If only we had the right clothes or memorized the right phrases, then love would surely come our way. Unfortunately, as we have matured to adulthood, most of us have not given up the desire to find such a formula. We have changed our "outfits" -- down to even the houses and the cars we "wear" and the club we join. We have a new rendition of catch phrases, ways of "being," and emotional recipes that will solve our problems. Yet, there appears to be no shortcut to intimacy. The "horrible" truth is there are no quick psychological techniques that will return us to wholeness. As Fromm (1968, p. 88) wrote: "There are no psychological shortcuts to the solution of the identity crisis except the fundamental transformation of alienated man into living man."

When it comes to relationship, we are all novices. We are breaking new ground each time. Yet the "little scientist" in all of us wonders from time to time if perhaps the world is not "color-coded" -- that

perhaps if we were but initiated into the secret, we would be able to read situations and operate in them masterfully. We have demanded such techniques from our social science and rushed towards each new gimmick for intimacy much as we would try a new fad. But this all belies and covers up the real problem. Love cannot be technologized. Even with those insights which do work, if we turn them into techniques and ready-made steps/programs, they become but parodies of themselves.

A technique is foolproof. You step into it. It makes no difference who the user is, what their motivations are or their level of understanding. A light-switch is operated equally well by a genius, a moron, a saint, or a criminal. You turn it on and turn it off. We have come to expect such devices. Science has courted the inception of such fool-proof techniques. But there are no foolproof solutions to the major problems of existence. If, indeed, we are fools, then nothing will save us.

However, encouraged by science, we have shunned such wisdom and sought a type of "knowledge" which allows us the knower to remain essentially unchanged. We would like merely to "plug into" techniques without ever having to change ourselves. "Indeed," as Fromm (1968, p. 95) said, "what most people would like is to be aggressive, competitive, maximally successful in the market, liked by everybody and at the same time tender, loving, and a person of integrity." We neglect to observe that the problems may stem from our own value structures, wishes, and desires.

"This lack of ethical engagement reflects a corresponding lack of knowledge of those truths which most profoundly change the knower and thus cause life to transcend itself" (Roberts, 1982, p. 189). By searching for push-button techniques for love, we have once again

aligned ourselves to the mechanistic approach of the scientific world view. Such techniques (and the separation of the knower and what is known) are luxuries that we can ill afford. Such a strategy obscures and further postpones our understanding of love. This eagerness to cast any insights which we may have upon intimacy into scientific techniques tend to obscure and pollute the understanding of love that we do have. Fad-like techniques of intimacy then become a mock theater of the intimate.

For example, humanistic psychology has found that authenticity is a crucial component for meaningful interaction -- a prelude to synergy and significant involvement. Popularized, however, we find this insight translated into almost a normative compulsion "to be real." It is carried to its logical extreme in the status-like charade of "I'm more real than you." Such a reaction completely misses the point. Authenticity emphasizes that if one is secure and open, such transparency actually works itself out in meaningful relationship. One does not have to mechanistically play the "game" to achieve interpersonally.

The above is by no means a random example. It represents in a very crucial sense how humanistic psychology and the counterculture movement were routinized into popular fads that could then be dissipated by the larger marketplace mentality. The larger culture responded to the counterculture by mass producing its symbols and packaging its techniques. The human potential movement was safely relegated to weekend retreats for affluent business people -- addressing problems of individual consciousness but leaving intact the social structure which had produced these problems. The Scientific culture technologizes and then moves on looking for new worlds to conquer. Humanistic efforts are thus

routinized to the world of Science with its neutral values and foolproof
technologies. Unless we realize the pervasiveness of this process,
humanistic efforts to base culture on love and the magical are doomed to
failure. They become but adjacent commodities marketed like any other.

Treated in this manner, love becomes but another item in the bag of
tricks which we acquire and use to manipulate people. The magical
becomes only something we stage to overpower people and get something
that we want. We have exchanged "love as world view" for "love as a
scientific, mechanistic technique." Such mechanization of love further
estranges us from the world and those very ways that could heal the
split. By subverting the sacred world of humanistic values to a secular
scientific technology, we are changing not only the "internal" world of
the human heart, but the world itself.

> The alarming thing is, he said, that this time it isn't
> the changeable things that are changing, but the unchange-
> able as well. Anyhow, that's the danger -- even for me. Not
> only dress and manners and bank balances and the social order,
> but the sea and the sky.
>
> The sea, the sky . . . not only the sky and the sea are in
> question. The song of birds, firelight and sunlight, the
> woods, the turn of the season, the earth itself and the smell
> of it, the whole natural magic going on behind our little
> journey from the cradle to the grave. Well, you have to
> choose. What are they? Are they still what they have always
> been: the perspective of our mortality and, for some of us,
> an emblem or at least an analogy of our immortality? Or have
> they become, as it were, infected by our impermanence? Are
> they little more than a stage-setting to our personal and
> social drama? It's a question of relationship and our view of
> that relationship. Are we related to them at all, as mankind
> has always supposed? Is the earth that we touch a part of
> ourselves, or has it become just a thing we walk on, like
> pavement? Are we becoming, in our consciousness, separated
> from the stars -- as indifferent to them as we are to electric
> chandeliers in the lounge of a hotel? Are we being driven, or
> driving ourselves, into exile from the unity of nature? It is
> a simple question (Van Den Berg, 1961, pp. 235-236).

Van Den Berg (1961) commented:

> The answer to this 'simple question' is less simple . . .
> primarily because the answer from the present, the answer from
> the middle of the twentieth century, is lacking. The answer
> is important; it inaugurates the recovery of a fatal
> separation (p. 236).

The scientific vision has pushed to the edge of its frontier and is now standing on the pinnacle of its success. By ignoring the difficult questions of values and human consciousness, science has been able to shape a world by separating mind from matter. The scientific self-fulfilling prophecy has been an overwhelming success: it declared the world to be an object separate from the realm of the human and proceeded to study this world apart from human values, purposes, and participation. Any attempt to include human involvement was accused of being anthropomorphic. The world was gradually shaped and carved to this vision. With such objectification, few noticed that magic and wonder had been chased from view.

With the scientific consciousness, the world itself changed. The mechanical scientific metaphors gradually replaced the metaphors of Nature -- and the world was shaped to this new artificial image. A walk in the woods no longer meant what it once had: children marched out from the classroom not to smell a flower but to count its petals; the trees became timber; the rocks became mineral resources, and the forest itself changed. It was logged and paved and cities with factories were erected on the most scenic spots. The world was made manageable and fitted to the scientific vision. All that did not fit into the scientific view was minimized or trivialized. Gradually, also the human elements were also changed. There was no longer a place for them in this scientific world. Religion became a soothing opiate and love was deemed expedient.

Perhaps none were more graphic in describing this change than the American Indians. They saw the approaching scientific civilization changing both the landscape and their world. Ohiyesa, an Indian writer, said:

> As a child I understood how to give; I have forgotten this grace since I became civilized. I lived the natural life, whereas I now live the artificial. Any pretty pebble was valuable to me then; every growing tree an object of reverence. Now I worship with the white man before a painted landscape whose only value is estimated in dollars! Thus the Indian is reconstructed, as the natural rocks are ground to powder and made into artificial blocks which may be built into the walls of modern society (McLuhan, 1971, n.p.).

The scientific view of the human as separate from nature was not only taught in this new frontier, but its view was implemented. Things which did not fit into the scientific vision were relegated to the "interior" nature of man. Van Den Berg (1961) argues that the consciousness of the "individiual" was changed when all that did not confirm the scientific reality was swept into the interior regions. We are fascinated by those "psychological" regions -- belief, feelings, perceptions -- because they are so vastly different from the physical reality. Yet, while we were fascinated by those things of the "psyche" that had not yet been tamed by science, the landscape itself -- the world -- changed. They became things of science -- separate from the human.

Human beings were left alienated from the world, and lacking any "realistic" canopy which would cover the human, were soon alienated from each other. Not only did we think and deal with the world in scientific terms, but the world was deemed identical with these scientific terms. A value-neutral science was incapable of providing us with a world which contained meaning. Value-free techniques framed a world where human purpose and values were seen as separate from the natural process.

Alienated from the world and from life itself, we were somehow strangers to the whole process.

Science sought a "knowledge" of nature separate from the human "observer." It achieved such a vision and legislated such a world. There was no place for the human except as a consumer for the playthings of technology. Humans were left alienated -- a consumer and not a producer -- separate from the means of production and not able to feel involved in the process at all. The self-fulfilling prophecy of science had been realized at a terrible cost. This separation of the human from nature was worse than even the earlier mind-body split. Now, not only did the spirit have no place to dwell, but it was a "freak" of the universe -- an anomaly: a "psychological" curiosity.

The world had changed and we did not feel at home in it. Our way of viewing each other became colored by the scientific lens. The scientific view was translated into reality. Reason had replaced mystery, history had replaced myth, and technology had replaced magic. Science had succeeded in constructing a world without regard to human values or purpose. With such an objectivity, the human element could only appear as an anomaly: a "freak" exception in an otherwise natural process.

Scientific rationality prevails in our world. Science has not taken us on wings to heaven, but has left us estranged. Mills (1969, p. 165) wrote that "We are at the ending of what is called The Modern Age." We have learned from the Enlightenment that "increased rationality may not be assumed to make for increased freedom."

> Science, it turns out, is not a technological Second Coming.
> That its techniques and its rationality are given a central
> place in a society does not mean that men live reasonably and
> without myth, fraud and superstition . . . The increasing
> rationalization of society, the contradiction between such

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rationality and reason, the collapse of the assumed
coincidence of reason and freedom -- these developments lie
back of the rise into view of the man who is 'with'
rationality but without reason, who is increasingly self-
rationalized and also increasingly uneasy. It is in terms of
this type of man that the contemporary problem of freedom is
best stated . . . .

From the individual's standpoint, much that happens seems the
result of manipulation, of management, of blind drift . . .
Given these effects of the ascendant rationalization, the
individual 'does the best he can.' He gears his aspirations
and his work to the situation he is in, and from which he can
find no way out. In due course, he does not seek a way out:
he adapts. That part of his life which is left over from
work, he uses to play, to consume, 'to have fun.' Yet this
sphere of consumption is also being rationalized. Alienated
from production, from work, he is also alienated from
consumption, from genuine leisure (Mills, 1959, p. 168).

Man becomes alienated from life. Mills (1959) continued his

indictment:

In our time, what is at issue is the very nature of man, the
image we have of his limits and possibilities as man. History
is not yet done with its exploration of the limits and mean-
ings of 'human nature.' We do not know how profound man's
psychological transformation from the Modern Age to the con-
temporary epoch may be. But we must now raise the question in
an ultimate form: Among contemporary men will there come to
prevail, or even to flourish, what may be called The Cheerful
Robot? . . . Back of all this . . . there lies the simple
and decisive fact that the alienated man is the antithesis of
the Western image of the free man. The society in which this
man, this cheerful robot, flourishes is the antithesis of the
free society (p. 171).

We must not underestimate the role that technology played in this

process of alienation. It often seems that the humanistic vision just

short-circuited even at its highest peaks. This will remain the case as

long as we approach humanism from a scientific, technological framework.

The technological approach contains an internal grammar that is funda-

mentally at odds with the spirit of humanism.

Science assumes we need to be in control of our environment. We

can then manipulate one variable or another to produce the "desired"

effects. Unless we can eliminate outside variables and standardize

internal variables, phenomena are not amenable to study using the scientific method. To produce scientific techniques, we must first assume control. A technique can then function as a mechanism much as a light switch. A technique is at our command. As long as it is in working order, we need not concern ourselves with understanding its internal mechanism. If we seek techniques of love and magic, then we are seeking techniques that we can command without having to understand the process of love or the magical. We can then turn them "off" or "on" with no more regard for understanding the workings of love than we have for understanding the workings of a light switch.

This is not to say that benefits do not accrue from love. However, these are benefits from a way of living and are not to be cast in the vein of scientific techniques. They are not mechanisms where one presses a lever to get a desired result, but integrated structural components of a way of life. The benefits of love do not occur on command or by manipulation. They are more like "free gifts" -- related to a way of being -- closer in kind to the religious idea of a "gift of grace" than to cause and effect. Indeed, if love is manipulated or obligated, we say that that isn't love. The complicating aspect of the technological conversion of love and magic is that, having been raised in a scientific culture, our minds have been indoctrinated to think in this way. We want to find the switch.

The use of love and the magical as techniques -- as means rather than ends -- changes them considerably. It is the conversion of love and magic into neutral technologies that invites the con artist, the evil magician, and the manipulative lover. If love and the magical were techniques, then the strategy of "loving a little to get what you want"

becomes reasonable. However, it is a question here of commitment. Is a
person committed to love as a technique for getting what they want or as
a way of knowing life? Love works in strange ways. We will never know
for sure beforehand whether the person we are relating to is using love
as an attitude, or employing it as a technique. Thus, love and the
magical -- and attempts to create the Good -- will always be interfaced
with the possibility of the con artist.

It is in such a discussion of technology that the problem of "good
vs. evil" might be focused upon most effectively. For it is precisely
at the moment when we are the most trusting, open and loving that we are
the most vulnerable to the con artist's "switch." Love is always a
risk. To seek techniques that eliminate the possibility of risk, mis-
understands love.

We might do well here to follow the classic legends and make a dis-
tinction between the "good magician" and the "bad magician." Roszak
(1969) wrote:

> . . . what significant difference is there between cultures
> based on scientific and visionary experience? The difference
> is real and it is critical. It requires that we make a dis-
> tinction between good and bad magic -- a line that can be
> crossed in any culture . . . and which has been crossed in
> ours with the advent of technology.
>
> Good magic opens the mysteries to all; bad magic seeks simply
> to mystify. The object of the bad magician is to monopolize
> knowledge of the hidden reality (or simply to counterfeit it)
> and to use the monopoly to befuddle or cow. The bad magician
> -- in the form of the priest or the expert -- strives to
> achieve the selfish advantage of status or reward precisely by
> restricting access to the great powers he purports to
> control. Something of the distinction that I am making
> survives in the Catholic Church's concept of simony, the sin
> against the Holy Ghost. The simoniac priest who uses his
> privileged control of the sacraments for personal gain is, by
> the teachings of the Church, committing the blackest of
> sins (pp. 260-261).

The doctrine of cause and effect restricts experience: it does not require understanding or exploring the mysteries. An "expert" who has mastered a body of knowledge can always pull a "switch", turn it into technique, and use it for fair or foul.

The religious leader Ram Dass (1977) told a story that further illustrates this distinction. He compares "enlightenment" to a roulette wheel where one accumulates more and more "winnings." As the stakes become higher and higher, there is always the temptation to pick up your chips and go somewhere else. Love and affection are always readily exchangeable in the surrounding marketplace for power, for status, or for personal gain.

It is a question of commitment: a trust that one has placed their stakes in the right place, and a faith that love is the right path. Without trust and a commitment to the process of love, even the highest saint can always convert "winnings" into technologies to exchange for something else. The problem of the con artist and the good and bad magician thus remains forever unsolvable. In a Hindu legend, the "Devil" and "God" were once partners, but the "Devil" did not trust the process and pulled out at the last moment: evil originates from an inability to maintain commitment to the process.

We have even sought to technologize God and turn prayer into a push-button technology for achieving what we want. Fromm (1956) concluded a chapter on "Love and Its Disintegration in Contemporary Western Society" with the following comments:

> In the religious revival of recent times, the belief in God has been transformed into a psychological device to make one better fitted for the competitive struggle . . . . The best-seller in the year 1938, Dale Carnegie's How to Win Friends and Influence People, remained on a strictly secular level.

What was the function of Carnegie's book at that time is the function of our greatest best-seller today, The Power of Positive Thinking by the Reverend N. V. Peale. In this religious book it is not even questioned whether our dominant concern with success is in itself in accordance with the spirit of religion. On the contrary, this supreme aim is never doubted, but belief in God and prayer is recommended as a means to increase one's ability to be successful. Just as modern psychiatrists recommend happiness of the employee, in order to be more appealing to customers, some ministers recommend love of God in order to be more successful. 'Make God your partner' means to make God a partner in business, rather than to become one with Him in love, justice, and truth (pp. 88-89).

Religion and prayer can then be readily circumscribed by the prevailing scientific culture and turned into technologies. This is the strategy of the black magician. Love becomes a technique and prayers become commands. God is harnessed to technology just like any other resource. Such strategy thoroughly implies a misunderstanding of the humanistic spirit. Yet this tendency to deal with the humanistic vision in technological terms is precisely what we see occurring time and time again. Humanistic efforts were thus short-circuited. If we convert the humanistic ethos into technologies, we have hedged our bets, manipulated our commitment and once again enthroned science.

We must acknowledge that love is not a mechanism that can be repaired when defective so that rewards will come on cue. We can never be sure about the course of love. The poet Gibran (1923) wrote:

> . . . think not you can direct the course of love, for love, if it finds you worthy, directs your course . . . .

> When love beckons to you, following him, though his ways are hard and steep . . . . For even as love crowns you so shall he crucify you. Even as he is for your growth so is he for your pruning. Even as he ascends to your height and caresses your tenderest branches that quiver in the sun, so shall he descend to your roots and shake them in their clinging to the earth . . . .

> . . . But if in your fear you would seek only love's peace and love's pleasure, then it is better for you that you cover your nakedness and pass out of love's threshing-floor, into the

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seasonless world where you shall laugh, but not all of your
laughter, and weep, but not all of your tears (p. 11).

Love is an "entering into" -- it is a "letting go." Love is a com-
mitment to a process. One is over "one's head," and never quite in
control. With love, one risks vulnerability. If a person touches
another deeply, they both are touched. To reach a person at their core,
you must allow that person to also reach your core. It is not a matter
of one person controlling and manipulating the other: both are involved
in an experience of great depth. One person can always withdraw -- you
have allowed them that power. There are no guarantees.

It is the miracle of love that authenticity, openness, and vulner-
ability can lead to response. The benefits which can be related to
love, trust, and the magical are part of a larger structural complex.
They cannot be readily abstracted or turned into tools. They occur
together as components of a process. If we convert them into "means" to
obtain an end, they loose their depth. Indeed, following Kant, much of
humanism might be summarized in the idea that people should be treated
as ends in themselves rather than merely means to an end. If we seek
technologies that control people, then we have significantly diminished
our idea of the human. Humanism implies that we emphasize the full
human potential rather than reduce others to smaller role-like versions
for our use.

Love is always a risk because if we allow people their full human-
ness, we cannot predict and control the outcomes. Here, Becker (1968)
made a distinction similar to Roszak's concept of the good and the bad
magician.

> . . . mostly people approach each other from the point of view
> of their roles, rather than as whole beings . . . . They have,
> in effect, subverted the possibilities of their total being to
> the narrow interest of action and uncritical survival . . . .

The question posed by any cultural game is the question about higher and lower esthetics -- about 'good' art and 'bad' art . . . whereas true esthetics should liberate man, develop his freedom, and further his whole self, 'everyday' esthetics sacrifices most of the total man to a mere part, to the part that must convey the sliver of conviction necessary to sustain the ongoing cultural game . . . .

. . . But 'higher' esthetics is precisely that; it calls more of man's spirit into play, releases more of the inner personality and brings it to bear upon the world.

. . . The problem, inescapably, is a social one. We have destroyed the interhuman in our time simply because we have refused to implement social forms which would liberate man . . . (p. 273).

"When science opted out of life and objectivized man, scientists of course lost the possibility of seeing any mystery at all in man, of seeing any heightening being, even in secular terms" (p. 267).

Such reduction of man destroys the spirit of humanism. If we reduce man to a "means" and deal only with the version we can manipulate, then we have lost our humanistic intent. We have substituted bad art for good -- the bad magician for the good.

The Difference Between the Humanistic
and Scientific Power

The distinction between the paradigm of technology/science and the paradigm of love and the magical brings us to a discussion of the difference between scientific power and the humanistic version. Perhaps in no other respect is the difference between the paradigms so flagrant.

Technology does not require that we enter into a process and understand it: only that we withdraw and manipulate. Conversely, love is a commitment to a process in hope that we will gain a sense of oneness with love and life. It is this "security of harmonious partnership with nature [that] . . . is a glimmer of the good old magic"

(Roszak, 1975, p. 168). As a recent poet expressed it, "magic is no instrument, magic is the end." It is "aliveness" which the humanistic vision wishes to embrace.

<div style="text-align:center">

God is Alive, Magic is Afoot.
God is Afoot, Magic is Alive.
Alive is Afoot. Magic never died . . .
Though His death was published
Round and round the world,
The heart did not believe . . .
Magic is Afoot. God moves.
Alive is Afoot. Alive is in command.

Many weak men hungered,
Many strong men thrived;
Though they boast of solitude,
God was at their side . . .

Magic is Afoot. It cannot come to harm.
It rests in an empty palm.
It spawns in an empty mind.
But Magic is no instrument.
Magic is the end.

Many men drove magic, but magic stayed behind.
Many strong men lied;
They only passed through magic and out the
other side.
Many weak men lied;
They came to God in secret and though
they left Him nourished,
They would not say Who healed.
Though mountains danced before them,
They said that God was dead.
Though His shrouds were hoisted,
The naked God did live . . .

This I mean to laugh with in my mind.
This I mean my mind to serve
'til service is but Magic moving
through the world,
And mind itself is Magic coarsing through
the flesh,
And flesh itself is Magic dancing on a clock,
And time itself, the Magic length of God.[2]

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The magical version of love seeks to embrace the Magic. Love is not technology, love is magic. Humanism seeks to move past role-like

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[2]Excerpts from a poem by Leonard Cohen.

theories of man to embrace instead the creature who is moving on the hands of time itself.

This is a different system of meaning than the scientific heroism which would rule and control. The humanist seeks to become part of knowledge. Roszak (1975, p. 165) wrote that while the word "magic" might give "the phrase a more unorthodox turn than Martin Buber would have approved, his I-Thou relationship is the essential quality of the magical vision."

> Since magic frequently takes the form of a petition for favor or a rite towards some natural force, it is easy to mistake its aim as power . . . . What authentic magic seeks, however, is not power, but security -- the security of being at one with nature, of moving receptively with its grain and sharing its purposes. What is it that true magicians are after? A state of being, not a method of manipulation . . . But besides the security that comes of trust and cooperation, there is also the security that comes -- or seems to come -- of domination, provided our ability to dominate can be made absolute. This is the image of security that seduces us into wanting another sort of power -- forcing-power. Here again the demonic has a shrewd trick to play us. It convinces us that security can be gained sooner through force than trust. Especially when we become afraid in crisis, grow rigid and lose our adaptability, the appeal of forcing-power can be irresistible. Once our connection with nature ceases to be a respectful relationship between person and person and becomes the relationship of human master to alien thing, then we have a very different kind of magic: black magic, the magic of evil sorcerers who have no wish to know the nature of things; they only use it for selfish advantage (Roszak, 1975, pp. 166-167). [Italics Original]

The benefits of love occur "as if by magic." They are outcomes of a shared purpose. At times, these gifts may even be asked for, but such invitations are categorically different from a technique which commands a given effect. The magician, as the lover, asks, invites, courts. The technological scientist commands, manipulates, and seeks to control.

The difference between a humanistic version and a scientific version of power might be truly illustrative here. The scientist seeks

to control, force, and eliminate risk. The humanist emphasizes respect and invitation. The humanist treats love as a gift that cannot be commanded, but which "magically" is given. Love and compassion cannot be obligated or expected -- they border on the miraculous. The scientist attempts to grasp the process. The humanist knows not from where love comes or where it goes, but that it is a spring from which we have drawn. Unlike the scientist who may initially begin with such data collection before converting it into technique, the humanist desires to know the process without turning it into shorthand. Scientists followed Bacon's attempt to temper knowledge into power. The humanist sees power as useless unless it promotes us to knowledge.

Here, we encounter an odd paradox. A humanist might well define power as the ability to let go: to enter into the situation and allow one's full self to come into play. Power would then be more closely related to strength: the security to let the lines of self drop without worrying about losing one's self. Power could then be construed as the ability to enter fully into the moment -- a capacity to bear risks. Humanistic power is akin to the ability to be vulnerable and transparent: to let yourself go. In such a relaxed atmosphere, one draws more fully on creative powers. One is capable of influencing a situation with much more "power" than afforded by manipulation. It is this entering into the present while suspending determination of outcomes which is the prerequisite of influence.

Influence is always potentially mutual and thus involves a risk. By entering fully into the present, we allow the future to escape from our predetermined mold. It is only by letting go of a predetermined future that we can hope to attain influence. This is a difficult task

for the mind. And yet, if we are to desire humanism, then we must allow for a plurality of actors. We cannot reduce human beings to prescribed futures. And this pluralism cannot be circumscribed and controlled. Humanism refuses to conceive of human beings as smaller role-like versions which can then be manipulated. This, as Becker (1968, p. 364) notes, "takes a strong person because it means opting for man as an end, and this means introducing indeterminancy into the world." It is only by such faith in the human spirit and refusal to violate the fundamental human components that we can hope to speak of humanism. The humanist trusts in the power of love to transform situations and understandings.

This power of love cannot be "scripted" in advance -- at least not in a scientific version of controlled outcomes. It requires moving past a symbolic, abstracted version of love and allowing love to occur on its own. The humanist foregoes manipulation trusting in a larger direction and power. The humanistic power does not seek to force, but seeks to court and invite. It is compelling in the sense of an aspiration of the heart, yet one may refuse its invitation.

The humanistic power is close to the child-like sense of playing where one's power is discovered and created in action. As with play, discovery is often greater than what would have been expected. While scientific power must rely upon the rationally preconceived, play allows the creative an opportunity to blossom. In this spirit of openness, one finds solutions and influence which could not have been predicted. Influence invokes a sense of play which then shapes the world. This deeper awareness is powerful because it embraces a way of being which seems preferable. It is this open invitation that people aspire to follow.

One courts by bringing joy, aliveness, and understanding into the moment. With a sense of awe and quiet wonder, one invites the other into the gentleness of laughter and the security of joy. Through respect, one courts social arrangements which will be beneficial to all. This concern for the human is paramount to motives and goals. The humanistic power is a faith which hopes the magic will appear: that a creative power will be released bringing the situation into focus and influencing it in the desired direction. Sometimes this happens. Sometimes it does not. Yet even when the humanistic power does not work, the humanist cannot retreat to another strategy. The humanist can only set the stage, court the "muse", and extend an invitation. He or she may emphasize and confront, but the humanist will not take by force.

The scientific power will seek to force an outcome at any cost with no regard for the pollution created by such coercion. However, if the humanist tries to take the Other by force, the very essence of the humanistic vision is lost. To court by force is closer to rape than to love. The secrets we wished to unfold remain unfulfilled. If we must force love, then it is not love. If we must trick or swindle or in other ways try to coerce love to render its fruits, then we will never be quite satisfied with their sweetness.

Perhaps it is because we have conceived of love as a gift and thus outside of our control that we find it so valuable. Love that can be bought or forced is only a pretense. Real love is similar to a free gift. Those seeking scientific and technological ways of controlling and predicting love will never be satisfied with their results for love will slip through their grasp. Love is not a force which we can chain to our intentions. We must all remember that at times there has been nothing

that we could do to "win" a love. And at other times, we have been loved

far beyond anything we could have ever predicted.

Humanistic Power

The power of love is vastly different from the power of science and

technology. This is the key to our understanding of love and the prob-

lems that have been encountered trying to fit it to a scientific

framework.

Love is related to growth. But we cannot force love or successfully

barter, steal, or manipulate it. Buscaglia in his popular account <u>Love</u>

shows a clear understanding. He illustrates the relation of love to a

different view of power. It cannot be framed as science and technology

yet still remain love:

> Love is . . . not a thing in the sense that it cannot be
> bought or sold or weighed or measured. Love can only be
> given, expressed freely. It can't be captured or held, for
> its neither there to tie nor to hold (Buscaglia, 1972, p. 107).
>
> . . . There are people available for purchase, the body and
> mind in the name of love. But it's only a self-deceiver who
> believes that love can truly be bought. He may buy another's
> body, his time, his earthly possessions, but he will never buy
> his love. One may choose to pretend love for a price. This
> is a dramatic art which has been perfected by many to the
> extent to which it is impossible for anyone to discern the
> deceit. But this game of playing love is not easy. The cost
> is great and never worth the price.
>
> Love cannot be captured or tied to a wall. Love only slips
> through the chains. If love wills to take another course, it
> goes; and all the prisons, guards, chains or obstructions in
> the world aren't strong enough to detain it for a second. If
> one human being ceases to will to grow in love with another,
> the other may play several parts to hold him. He may become a
> villain and threaten him; he may become generous and offer him
> gifts; he may become crafty and trick him into remaining, or
> he may change his own 'self' to meet the other's needs. But
> whatever he does, the other's love is gone and he will
> receive, for all his energies, only an empty body, devoid of
> love -- all but dead. So the price for his efforts will be to
> live out his life holding on desperately and giving his love

to a lifeless, loveless human frame. This, though it may seem revolting, is common practice, often performed for security, fame or fortune. The dynamics become even more grotesque when one considers that this dead-ended relationship forfeits all possibilities of the lover's continued growth. Love is always open arms. With arms open you allow love to come and go as it wills, freely, for it'll do so anyway. If you close your arms about love, you'll find you are only left holding yourself (Buscaglia, 1972, pp. 93-94).

Love invites and helps to us make grow in love, but it cannot be controlled. Jourard (1971, p. 57) made this point quite forcefully as he concludes a discussion of love with the following words: "There is no end to this chapter, or to loving. Unless, afraid of possible hurt, we decide, not to love, but to control and use."

Love seeks to encourage love; to facilitate it. Yet, we cannot force a person to grow in love with us. At times a person seeks love elsewhere. There are times when one is too defensive to risk love. The limits of the power of love are that we cannot force a person to attend to our love; we can only offer the opportunity, get their attention, and court and invite.

Love must always be an aspiration that the other person either has or is willing to entertain. One cannot move past a person's defenses into a communion of love unless that person allows us. Maslow's (1962) discussion of growth shows this aspect of the humanistic power quite clearly:

Defensiveness can be as wise as daring; it depends on the particular person, his particular status and the particular situation in which he has to choose. The choice of safety is wise when it avoids pain that may be more than the person can bear at the moment. If we wish to help him grow, then all we can do is help if he asks for help out of suffering, or else simultaneously allow him to feel safe and beckon him onward to try the new experience like the mother whose arms invite the baby to try to walk. We can't force him to grow, we can only coax him to, make it possible for him, in the trust that simply experiencing the new experience will make him prefer it; no one can prefer it for him. If it is to become part of

him, he must like it. If he doesn't, we must gracefully
concede that it is not for him at this moment (p. 54).
[Italics Original]

The humanistic power is not force and compulsion. It is the power
of being actualizing itself. This is what Nietzsche spoke of as "the
will to power." Tillich (1954) wrote:

. . . basically the will to power in Nietzsche is . . . a
designation of the dynamic self-affirmation of life. It is,
like all concepts describing ultimate reality, both literal and
metaphorical. The same is true of the meaning of power in the
concept the 'will to power.' It is not the sociological func-
tion of power which is meant . . . enforcing one's will against
social resistance, is not the content of the will to power.
The latter is the drive of everything living to realize itself
with increasing intensity and extensity. The will to power is
not the will of men to attain power over men, but it is the
self-affirmation of life in its self-transcending dynamics,
overcoming internal and external resistance. This interpreta-
tion of Nietzsche's 'will to power' easily leads to a systema-
tic ontology of power (p. 36).

This is why Nietzsche is sometimes referred to as the "Father of
Humanistic Psychology." He gives us a different ontology of power --
the humanistic power. Power in this sense is the will to life; it is
the power of love.

Humanistic conceptions of power differ radically from the scientific
power of cause and effect. We cannot successfully treat the human with
the same mechanical tools we have used in the physical sciences:

That which is forced must preserve its identity. Otherwise,
it is not forced but destroyed . . . . One cannot transform a
living being into a complete mechanism, without removing its
centre and this means without destroying it as a living
unity (Tillich, 1954, p. 46).

Nietzsche spoke of freedom _for_ things as opposed to freedom _from_
things. He noted that when most people use the word freedom, they are
speaking as if they meant freedom _from_, but what they really desire is
freedom _for_: the ability, the opportunity to accomplish some purpose.
Power can also be conceived of in this way. Power _for_ is the humanistic

power and relates to actualization. Power <u>from</u> or power <u>over</u> is the scientific power which needs control and domination. Fromm (1947) used this same distinction to develop his conceptions. He termed them power of and power <u>over</u>:

> Power of = capacity, and power over = domination. This contradiction, however is of a particular kind. Power = domination results from a paralysis of power = capacity. 'Power over' is the perversion of 'power to.' . . . Domination is coupled with death, potency with life (p. 994).

Fromm (1947, p. 98) noted that this conception was also not foreign to the thinking of Spinoza (Ethics IV, Def. 8) who wrote that "by virtue and power, I understand the same thing." <u>The humanistic power is the power of actualized being. It is the power of love. Charisma is the personal power: it is an attraction to realized living.</u> "Love is an action, the practice of a human power, which can be practiced only in freedom and never as the result of a compulsion" (Fromm, 1956, p. 18).

Charisma awakes in us a participation in a larger feeling which is alive. The person who displays charisma may not always be the saint that we had hoped, but the personal power that we sense awakens an aliveness in us. We are attracted towards the humanistic power. We do not need to be forced, but willingly join the dance.

The idea of the humanistic power well illustrates the energy of love. Fromm (1947, p. 106) wrote that: "One's own power to love produces love -- just as being interested makes one interesting".

> If I am interested, I must transcend my ego, be open to the world, and jump into it. Interest is based on activeness . . . . The interested person becomes interesting to others because interest has an infectious quality (Fromm, 1968, p. 85).

This is similar to giving:

> In the act of giving something is born, and both persons involved are grateful for the life that is born for both of them. Specifically with regard to love this means: love is a power which produces love . . . (Fromm, 1956, p. 21).

> . . . not only in love does giving mean receiving. The teacher
> is taught by his students, the actor is stimulated by his aud-
> ience, the psychoanalyst is cured by his patient -- provided
> they do not treat each other as objects, but are related to
> each other genuinely and productively (Fromm, 1956, p. 21)

Humanistic power is akin to magic; love produces love -- something
is born. Somehow one is larger. By giving and letting go, some larger
power is awakened. The scientific power must manage all variables;
humanistic power taps another type of force. A psychologist might refer
to this as the power of the developed personality. Religious sources
might say it is a gift of God. Sorokin (1950, p. 1) referred to it as
"the mysterious energy of love" and notes that "man's freedom lies in his
ability to cultivate his greatest source of creative and regenerative
power."

This requires that we develop a different stance towards power than
we are normally accustomed to taking. In principle, the scientific
power is infinite. On the other hand, the humanistic power admits to
limits. Magic only goes so far. Outside of the Self is always Other.
No matter how much power one may have, one never has all the power.
There is always someone else. There is the limit of power: we always
know it is impossible to have it all. No matter how magical we become,
we do not control it. On the distant shore, there is always another who
we must recognize as also having power.

The humanistic power is based on hope and the strength of the person
who can love. It is perhaps this attitude that best characterizes the
humanistic power. Fromm (1968) wrote of this movement toward actuali-
zation of love in The Revolution of Hope. It is the attitude of court-
ing, inviting, and hoping that is the humanistic power. It is the
movement toward life and fuller realization; the attractiveness which

springs from the human breast; the patience which permits growth; and the
knowledge that only through the humanistic power can we approach that
which the heart desires.

> Hope is paradoxical. It is neither passive waiting nor is it
> unrealistic forcing of circumstances that cannot occur. It is
> like the crouched tiger, which will jump only when the moment
> for jumping has come. . . . To hope means to be ready at every
> moment for that which is not yet born, and yet not become des-
> perate if there is no birth in our lifetime. There is no sense
> in hoping for that which already exists or for that which can-
> not be. Those whose hope is weak settle down for comfort or
> for violence; those who hope is strong see and cherish all
> signs of new life and are ready every moment to help the birth
> of that which is ready to be born . . . . Faith, like hope, is
> not prediction of the future; it is the vision of the present
> in a state of pregnancy (Fromm, 1968, p. 1).

Love is hope in action. It is the humanistic power.

Humanistic power is a different type of "ego-management." Ego seeks
to maintain control, yet control which does not allow an opening is over-
management. We must arrange our power in such a way as not to cancel out
the life we wish to experience. We must find ways of participating in
other selves while leaving the boundaries porous enough that we do not
destroy what we touch.

Everyone feels that in many ways they are not deserving of love. We
feel that we must manipulate it, earn, or exchange for it. But love is
always beyond our control. It is never scientific. When love is given
to us, it is never because we have discovered the right prescription.
Love is outside the cause and effect perspective. It is always a gift.
Perhaps the world goes together in a way that we are only beginning to
suspect. This is the humanistic power.

No one really wants to live in a world strictly of their own making.
If one does, then often when we get exactly what we thought we wanted, we
do not want it anymore. For as humans, we desire life sometwhat larger

than the rational dictates of our fantasy. We desire something new to press us past our contrived projections. We desire Other to add to our presence, to come into our lives, and shape the living somewhat differently than we had planned. The scientific power of instituting a plan and literally carrying through, loses creativity and, above all, it loses and, above all, it loses our full participation. We do not want the world as thought would dictate it on the blackboard. We want the full hand of life.

This difference between the humanistic and the scientific power is what Roszak (1975, p. 166) referred to as "being-power" and "forcing-power." Humanistic psychology has sought to advocate and document the transforming nature of "being power." Perls (1969, p. 1) wrote that "if by chance we find each other, it's beautiful; but if not, it can't be helped." Maslow (1962) wrote of a "psychology of being" that transforms a person's life and the world around them. Rogers (1961, 1977) wrote of a non-possessive type power. Jourard (1968, 1971) emphasized transparency and openness as preconditions to transforming experience and relationships. Fromm (1976) summarized his thesis of scientific materialism and the world of spirit with the question: "to be or to have?"

Love cannot be understood through the scientific-technological frame of reference which is the mainspring of Western culture. This may well require us to bridge sacred ground and re-vitalize some of the old religious concepts which Science sought to supplant. One of these concepts is the Christian notion of "grace." Grace is a gift of God. It is a free gift: "the unmerited love and favor of God" (Webster, 1966, p. 627). It is a miracle not subject to our rational dynamics. Even the mystics

write with some consistency about the "dark night of the soul" (Roszak, 1980). It always occurs "as if by magic." The light transforms the darkness only when man has given up the attempt to fight back the night. And while there may be ways to seek love, we must realize that we are over our head and not in control. Grace, like love, cannot be obligated. It always appears as a miracle after one has relinquished control.

We might wonder here at the fact that "charisma" means literally (from the Greek) "a gift of grace." It is a personal power springing "as if" by magic. We might also note that the most significant experiences in our lives appeared almost "miraculously." They were not things of science. They are better understood from a quite different paradigm.

Sociology might also borrow another concept from the religion of the East. This is the idea of "karma." Karma means literally "to do." It represents the "totality of a person's actions" (Webster, 1966, p. 798). It expresses the idea that a person's way of life is associated with certain consequences. Karmas cannot be manipulated. Such a conception of it would miss the point. Karma is not a technique; it is the associated consequences of a way of living. Benefits do not accrue as causes and effects but as integrated structural components characteristic of a given way of life. Similarly, the benefits from love and the magical are part of a whole and do not lend themselves to technology. Joy is associated with trust. Faith is related to love. Laughter may be correlated with hope. Being is associated with the magical. But these are not dependent and independent variables. They are part of a different paradigm. They are components of a way of life that interact and nourish each other. We must not expect to plug them into a technological framework.

We must seek a different paradigm in order to understand and explore

love. But although we conceive of love as akin to a gift of grace, this does not mean that we must surrender all desire, follow love, and resign ourselves to despair until it occurs. Just because love cannot be analyzed scientifically, does not mean that we cannot approach it as an art (Fromm, 1956). Even though we cannot control and predict results in a scientific fashion, does not mean that our efforts at invitation and courtship might not be more successful than we ever dreamed. We must learn to court the "Muse of Love" on love's own terms. We can learn to free ourselves from structures and arrangements which prevent love's magic. And we can discover and explore ways to encourage and facilitate love's coming more fully into play in our lives.

To understand love, we must move beyond the scientific world view of Western culture and beyond the expediency of technology. This means moving directly into a dialog with love and the magical. Many have said that we cannot talk about love, but what they mean is that we cannot capture it or chain it to a scientific framework. However, we must not surrender love and the magical to a strictly irrational framework that has no implications for the rational ordering of the world. Love is irrational only in the sense that it cannot be controlled. It is not a product of cause and effect dynamics, yet we can still talk about it in a coherent manner. We can approach an understanding of love and allow that understanding to direct the course of our inquiry and the nature of our social change strategies. Having spent all of this time orienting toward a discussion of love, it is now time to open the door and approach the subject directly. We must place love front and center stage.

Developing an Understanding of Love

Nothing is harder than to write about love. We know that love
exists, yet we're afraid that if we go beyond the briefest of poetic
insights, we'll send it fleeing. It alludes our grasp. And yet, it
beckons for our lives.

> If one wishes to know love, one must live love, in action.
> . . . One will learn love only with fresh insight, with each
> new bit of knowledge, which he acts out, and which is reacted
> to, or his knowledge is valueless (Buscaglia, 1972, p. 91).
> [Italics Original]

Any discussion of love challenges us at the very core where we have
staked our lives. Throughout the ages, people have testified to love as
the largest experience in life. Yet, it is hard to recognize what we
have not known. As Kieffer (1977) wrote:

> One of the difficulties of developing a consistent definition
> of intimacy is its subjective character. . . . One can only
> understand aspects of intimacy to the extent that he or she
> has been privileged to experience them (p. 275).

Asking a person to write on love is like granting free license to
explore one's own personal life. Just as marriage provides a magnifying
glass for viewing the nature of social relationship, writing on love
highlights one's own maladjustment. The literature on love is plagued
by the fact that too often we learn more about the author's individual
pathology than we do about love. As Ortega y Gasset (1957, p. 25) once
commented on Stendhal's famous discourse De l'Amour (1822): "Stendal's
case is pretty obvious: we are dealing with a man who never truly loved,
nor, above all, was every truly loved."

Yet we must begin to write fully threatened by the fact that we
might learn something. We must bridge our vulnerability, realizing that
any discussion we have, given the very nature of love, will always be
partial and incomplete.

It is difficult to define love. The word has been used to describe almost everything from human bondage to the Holy Spirit. We even have a variety of words and types of love: Agape, Eros, Love of God, Romantic Love, Infatuation . . . . Love seems to have almost as many faces as there are ways of meeting: there is the erotic love which sends us soaring and then reduces us to a fearful quiver awaiting a sign. There is the Christian love which defines neighbor as self. There is the romantic love of knights and their quests. And there is the bridge of married love embracing a quiet solitude based on years of familiarity and common experience.

There is also the oneness and communion with nature where all is experienced as related and at peace. There is the love of country where all is dedicated to furthering and preserving a noble cause. And altruism which through one more good act once again seeks to make the world better.

And there are still other loves. Maternal love which is the eternal permission of the mother for the child to be. There is the paternal love of justice. And there are the fleeting moments of infatuation which afterward leave us wondering what possessed us. Indeed, we find almost everything classified as love: from God to sweethearts to ice cream. Under the word "love," we find almost everything from the excesses of passion to the tenderness of knowledge lumped together. How do we sort through the maze of all that has been called love?

Often, we are a far cry from the majesty depicted by the poets. Some "loves" even look more like hate: couples who seem to stay together simply because they could not bear to forego the "joy" of making the other miserable. We find countless battered people living well past the

boundaries of sadism, brutalized but addicted. All for love . . . . For many it seems hard to separate love from obsession.

There are loves which seem merely recreational in nature and, there are loves which consume us whole. There is the love which is as soft as joy. And there is the love that awakens our growth and happiness.

There is the love of God and the oneness and harmony of the spirit. And there is self-love: respect and caring for our own lives.

Out of all of this, how can we ever presume to talk of love? How do we make sense out of this diversity? How do we get lost in our own efforts to love? And how do we avoid mistaking some writer's personal pathology for an insight? For we must recognize that across all of this there is a common grain. There must be something. There must be something that all these "kinds" of love have in common: that they share. In truth, it must be so that: ". . . there are not 'kinds' of love. Love is only of one kind. Love is love. One knows and expresses and acts out what he knows of love. He does this at each stage of growth" (Buscaglia, 1972, p. 96).

We are stranded at different way stations. Yet the heart seeks love. Divided across a disjointed existence, we cry out for meaning. What is this love that we seek? It has so many faces.

Love is both the heights and the solitude; the times we see infinity in the twinkling of any eye, and the day-to-day existence. It is the peaks the "soul can reach, when feeling out of sight for the ends of Being and ideal Grace." Love is also where we can relax.

> How do I love thee? Let me count the ways.
> I love thee to the depth and breadth
> and height
> My soul can reach.
> I love thee to the level of everyday's

                    most quiet need,
                  By sun and candle-light
                 (Browning, 1845, p. xliii).

Love is our freedom song. It is a communion of spirits. And it is
a quiet relatedness.

Love is trust and faith; innocence put to risk once again. "Only as
a child shall you enter the kingdom of heaven." Love is play that
awakens the eyes of awe and wonder looking fresh once again. It takes
another chance on birth:

                  I love thee with the passion
                  put to use in my old griefs,
                And with my childhood's faith.
                I love thee with a love I seemed
                  to lose with my lost saints.
                I love thee with the breadth, smiles,
                    tears, of all my life
                 (Browning, 1845, p. xliii).

Love is also a way of knowing. Not only does one come to know the
other, but also oneself, and ultimately life.

Love is an active creation of meaning based on faith. Love stands
and creates. It is a saying "yes" to life. To follow the poet William
Blake (1800):

              The Angel that presided o'er my birth
              Said, "Little creature, form'd of Joy
                        and Mirth,
                Go love withou the help of any
                  Thing on Earth (p. 141).

Love cannot be proven. Or sometimes even justified. But it is a
step that humans take.

This will to love does not lend itself to the normal masculine,
rational mode of scientific inspection of philosophical analysis. It is
not something which we can readily define and categorize. As Nietzsche
(1846) suspected we needed a new approach to court an understanding of
love:

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Supposing the truth is a woman -- what then? Are there not
grounds or the suspicion that all philosophers . . . have been
very inexpert about women? That the gruesome seriousness, the
clumsy obtrusiveness with which they have usually approached
truth so far have been awkward and very improper methods for
winning a woman's heart (p. 2)?

Love does not open its secrets to the philosopher's dissection, and

it flees from the scientist's grasp. Supposing that the truth is love

. . . ? Love is something that we know is there, but trying to reduce

it to words and capture it on paper represents a serious misunder-

standing. It is more caught by the spirit as the minstrel sings:

                Well, then what's to be the reason for
                        for becoming man and wife?
                Is it love that brings you here, or love
                        that brings you life?
                For if loving is the answer, then who's
                        the giving for?
                Do you believe in something that you've
                        never seen before?
                        There is love.

                He is now to be among you at the
                        calling of your hearts,
                rest assured this troubadour is acting
                        on His part.
                The union of your spirits has caused Him
                        to remain,
                for whenever two or more of your are
                        gathered in his name
                        There is love.

                A man shall leave his mother and a woman
                        leave her home,
                They shall travel on to where the two
                        shall be as one.
                As it was in the beginning is now and
                        'till the end,
                woman draws her life from man and gives
                        it back again
                and there is love (Stookey, 1971, n.p.).

Love is more of a mystical force: a spirit -- the active component

in meaning. We make and create love in our meaning. And yet, after we

have succeeded in "awaking" love, it seems that love was there all the

time and we were just missing the dance. Love is not passive; it

requires our active stance toward the world. It requires the participation of our lives.

Love is a commitment and a choice: a saying "yes" to love. "It is believed that to fall in love is already the culmination of love, while actually it is the beginning and only an opportunity for the achievement of love" (Fromm, 1947, p. 106).

Love is an opportunity to create another world -- an invitation to the spirit to glimpse another reality. It is an invitation to meaning. "Love is an activity, not a passive affect; it is a 'standing in,' and not a 'falling for'" (Fromm, 1956, p. 18). Love is defined: it is where we choose to face life and unveil its meaning. It is difficult to define love beforehand because <u>love</u> is <u>the active component in the creation</u> of meaning. It is through love that people reach, transcend their boundaries, and allow meaning to come into play.

Love thus offers a different paradigm and source of meaning than the heroic. Love is certainly as strong or stronger than death. It makes one feel in place in the universe. Love offers a different kind of drama and relatedness than that of the hero. Love is the attunement which the which the magical tradition emphasized: it is relatedness -- an over-coming of separateness and feeling a part of "something" else. Love provides meaning and makes sense of one's existence: "Genuine love is rooted in productiveness . . . to be alive means to be productive, to use one's powers not for any purpose transcending man, but for oneself, to make sense of one's existence, to be human" (Fromm, 1947, p. 103)

Yet, no matter how much we think we know of love, from time to time, we are all left with our faces pressed to the glass. So much of

what we say we know of love is based in faith on glimpses that we have seen.

> If I speak in the tongues of men and of angels, but have not love, I am a noisy gong or a clanging cymbal. And if I have prophetic powers, and understand all mysteries and all knowledge, and if I have all faith, so as to move mountains, but have not love, I gain nothing. If I give away all I have . . . . but have not love, I gain nothing . . . . Love is patient and kind . . . . Love does not insist on its own way . . . . Love bears all things, believes all things, hopes all things, endures all things. Love never ends; as for prophecy, it will pass away; as for tongues, they will cease; as for knowledge, it will pass away . . . . For now we see in a mirror dimly, but then face to face. So faith, hope, love abide, these three; but the greatest of these is love (Holy Bible, I Corinthians: 13).

There is the faith as a self-fulfilling prophecy which transforms visions as hopes become real. But the power of faith and the future vision of hope are nothing without the experience of love. Love is where we choose to celebrate life. It is our experience of meaning.

This is why love is such a difficult subject. We are dealing not with just subjectivity, but with meaning itself. Love is where people have allowed themselves to face life. It is where they have allowed themselves to be touched to the core. Meaning is thus the thread that runs through the various forms of love. Yet to conceive of love as the active component in the creating of meaning, perhaps, obscures as much as it clarifies.

So far in approaching love directly, I have been content to cite my favorite understandings of love. To approach love in a systematic manner, we need a more thorough understanding of other treatments of the subject. We need to explore what others have said of love throughout history.

Plato's Approach to Love

Like most historical reviews, this will return us immediately to
Plato. Plato's views place us squarely in the humanistic tradition.
Love is seen as intertwined with the Good and the Beautiful. For Plato
(416 BC, p. 86f), love is generation and birth in beauty: "Love is
desire for the perpetual possession of the good . . . . Its object is
to procreate and bring forth in beauty."

Plato is not speaking of the birth of children, per se, but of the
generation of ideas and the movement of history. According to Plato,
love belongs neither to the human world nor the divine. It is the
bridge between the two. It is neither part of the real world nor part
of the ideal world, but a "spirit" transiting the passage. Between the
dream and the real, love is "A being of intermediate nature, a spirit
that bridges the gap between them and prevents the universe from falling
into two separate halves" (Plato, 416 BC, p. 81).

It is a movement towards the ideal, yet it is an experience in the
real. Love is an experience in this moment, but it also seeks for
future moments. The spirit of love -- the desire for generation and
birth in beauty while moving toward the Good -- is what has sown the
seeds of most of the progress of man and the art and religion which we
have surrounded our lives. It is a desire for progeny either physical
or spiritual: to leave behind a legacy of love.

Love represents a passage from the mundane toward the Good and the
Beautiful. It is the relation of the dreamer to the real in a gentle
evolution across time.

Romantic Love

    We may also gain significant insight by reviewing the historical origins of romantic love. Perhaps when romantic love was new, it was more transparent and revealed more of its intrinsic nature. The roots of romantic love can be found in the twelfth century as practiced by the knights and ladies of the courts of Europe. Romantic love burst upon the scene seemingly out of nowhere and spread throughout the countryside in the songs of the wandering troubadours. This new feeling did not go unnoticed. It was discussed at great length by the ladies of court. Gradually, the popular insights into the nature of love were formulated into a series of statements which became known as the "Rules of Love" (Capellanus, 1184).

    Love as practiced in this age was an attempt to reify feelings and heighten desire. As enacted by lovers on the heights of passion, it was an attempt to deify desire. It was romance founded upon impossibility. It represented an all-consuming passion. It did not provide the basis for marriage, but was a banner for bravery on a knight's quests. He dedicated his life and his deeds to his lady. She followed him with her attention and thoughts. He lived now not for himself, but for her. He braved deeds and fought in battles and tournaments for her glory. The nobility of love gave meaning to his adventures and his routine.

    Romance was an exalted state: a love potion brewed by destiny. As Kephart (1972, p. 109) wrote, "It was the destiny of every lady to meet the knight of her dreams; and for every knight there was one fair lady." All nobles wanted to experience this new feeling called "love." Indeed, the "Rules of Love" even made experiencing love into a norm (Capellanus, 1184).

The "Rules of Love" were formulated by the ladies of court so as to present the nature of this new feeling. Love was defined as "a certain inborn suffering derived from the sight of and excessive meditation upon" the beloved (Capellanus, 1184, p. 28). The nature of love was codified by a series of rules which were agreed upon as expressing the essence of love. I believe that we can detect four basic themes running throughout the 31 "Rules of Love."

First, love was felt to be sporadic: an emotion of constantly varying intensity. "It is well known that love is always increasing or decreasing. If love diminishes, it quickly fails and rarely revives. The difficulty of attainment makes it prized" (Capellanus, 1184, p. 184).

Secondly, as depicted by the code, love is exclusive. No less than three of the 31 rules expressly mention jealousy as increasing love. A fourth rule says that "No one can be bound by a double love," and a fifth that "A new love puts to flight an old one."

The "Rules of Love" also institutionalizes courtship. There is an emphasis on inviting, courting, and hoping.

> Love is 'impelled by the persuasion of love.'
> It is 'a stranger to avarice.'
> 'That which the lover takes against the will
> of his beloved is without relish.'
> Love is based on the 'giving of hope.'

Finally, romantic love of the twelfth century is all-consuming. It concentrates one emotionally and psychologically, occupying one's full attention.

> One regularly turns pale in the presence
> of the beloved.
> The heart palpitates.
> He eats and sleeps very little.
> Love can deny nothing to love.
> Every act ends in the thought of the beloved.

Thinks of nothing except what he thinks
will please his beloved.
Is constantly and without intermission
possessed by the thought of his beloved
(Capellanus, 1184, p. 35).

Much of this romantic love consists of a focused attention on the other. This is why jealousy is so threatening to the conception. Whenever the knight might roam, the lady was always with him. It was a love maintained in the mind's eye.

It was a love which insisted upon hope rather than force. Yet it was a romance which kept its distance; a romance which circumstances and convention would never permit fully. It was a romance which fed "on obstacles, short excitations, and partings . . ." (De Rougemont, 1956, p. 292). Although courtly love might be consummated sexually, it was never consummated in desire and allowed to routinize as a basis for society. It was kept on a pinnacle of intense infatuation: never allowed to fully bloom, but cultivated nonetheless.

Despire this romantic love's sporadic and fleeting nature, the knights and the ladies of court sought to intensify and prolong its passion. Perhaps this is why they defined love as a kind of "inborn suffering."

> Passion means suffering, something undergone, the mastery of fate over a free and responsible person. To love love more than the object of love, to love passion for its own sake, has meant to suffer and to court suffering . . . there is the secret which Europe has never allowed to be given away; a secret which it was always repressed (De Rougemont, 1956, p. 50).

This is a conclusion which clearly shocks our sensibilities, for Romantic Love is clearly part of our emotional heritage. Eros is in legend the god of desire, but is it passion that we crave? De Rougemont (1956) in Love in the Western World wrote:

It is probably that for most of those at court, love originated as a diversion. Yet passion soon got out of hand. The more intense romantics soon moved beyond the routinized flirtation of the Rules of Court and took the myth more seriously. They saw it as more than just a "Game of Love" -- they found in it a patch to meaning. For in this love and this longing, they found something finer: a desire, an image of themselves . . . and of life.

The one essential trait to be desired in a lover (Capellanus, 1184) which was a prerequisite to the experience of love, was a "good character" -- someone one could aspire to, or more accurately, someone one could aspire with. One then sought to turn the world into something befitting the image of the beloved. Love went beyond the day-to-day and testified to an infinity of perfection. While love was not allowed to become the basis for normal life, this love somehow seemed stronger than death: a different system of meaning. In the challenges of the quest, the knights braved death and experienced an awareness they had never sensed before -- they were doing it for her. In their tales, the ladies glimpsed a vision they had kept tucked in their hearts.

Romantics chose a vision which flew in the face of reality. No matter how impossible the task, it was but another challenge to which one must rise. Yet, they sought to create a vision which was more real than real. At its peaks, romantic love developed the fever of mysticism. Still, it was a very real road fraught with challenges, death, and sufferings. It is a path which is most curious for "love" to have taken.

> Why does Western Man wish to suffer this passion which lacerates him and which all his common sense rejects? . . . The answer is that he reaches self awareness and tests himself only by risking his life -- in suffering and on the verge of

death . . . . European romanticism may be compared to a man for whom suffering, and especially the sufferings of love, are a privileged mode of understanding (De Rougemont, 1956, p. 51).

Such an analysis reads like a summation of Freud's insights upon Eros and the whole of the human (Western) psyche. De Rougemont (1956) continued:

> Of course, this is only true of the best romantics among us. Most people do not bother about understanding about self-awareness; they merely go after the kind of love which promises the most feeling. But even this has to be a love delayed in its happy fulfillment by some obstruction. Hence, whether our desire is for the most self-conscious or simply the most intense love, secretly we desire obstruction . . . . Happy love has no history -- in European literature (p. 52).

When we unleash feelings, we unleash more than just love. As May (1969) has noted, we open the gates also to the daimonic and the shadow side. As De Rougemont said, "Eros ceases to be a demon only when it ceases to be a god" (Lewis, 1960, p. 17). By deifying Eros, romantic love immediateley creates problems because passion has two sides. There are the heights of desire and there is also tragedy.

It is romance based upon the intangible. In the Western romantic tradition, it is the impossibility or the obstruction which gives our accounts of love their "romance." Romeo and Juliet would not be remembered if it were not for their tragedy. There is Don Quixote who sought to love Dulcena past all flaws. And in Tristan and Iseult which became the base for the Wagner opera, we find that "the myth of passionate love is all contained in the legend as set down by the 12th century poets" (De Rougemont, 1956, p. 20). De Rougemont considers the Tristan myth as the representative myth of romantic love. Again, it is a tale of love potions, destiny and fatal love. De Rougemont (1956) made a startling conclusion which holds true not just for Tristan and Iseult but for many who have followed the romantic heritage:

> Tristan and Iseult do not love one another . . . . <u>What they</u>
> <u>love is love and being in love.</u> They behave as if <u>aware that</u>
> <u>whatever obstructs love must ensure and consolidate it</u> in the
> heart of each and intensify it infinitely in the moment they
> reach the absolute obstacle, which is death. Tristan loves
> the awareness that he is loving far more than he loves Iseult
> the Fair. And Iseult does nothing to hold Tristan. All she
> needs is her passionate dream. Their need of one another is
> in order to be aflame, and they do not need one another as
> they are. What they need is not one another's presence, but
> one another's absence. [Italics Original]

> The love is <u>mutual</u> in the sense that Tristan and Iseult 'love
> one another', or, at least, they believe that they do.
> Certainly their mutual fidelity is exemplary. But the
> <u>unhappiness</u> comes in, because the love which 'dominates' them
> <u>is not a love of each for the other as that other really is.</u>
> They love one another, but each loves the other <u>from the</u>
> <u>standpoint of self and not from the other's standpoint.</u> Their
> <u>unhappiness thus originates in a false reciprocity,</u> which
> disguises a twin narcissism (p. 41). [Italics Original]

Such a "twin narcissism" is far from uncommon. Romantic love as

generated in feudal Europe was based on absence, an image in the mind, a

passion for passion. It is small wonder that later observers including

Stendhl, 1822, would discount romantic love as only a projection (Ortega

y Gasset, 1957).

Much of our romantic love is the disguised "twin narcissism." It

is the "love of love" and romance where the person is merely incidental.

As Buber (1947, p. 21) wrote, "Many celebrated ecstasies of love are

nothing but the lover's delight in the possibilities of his own person

which are actualized in an unexpected fullness."

It is the love of love as an actualizing force which overshadows the

person being loved. In this way, love is self-love fulfilled by proxy.

Love gives one the security in which to bloom. Love never really moves

past a self-orientation into a "we." The actualizing force is never

really discovered to contain self, other, and all of life, but is

treated as only a means. Love and Other remain projections of Self.

But as Browning ("the ends of Being and ideal Grace") noted, love is moving into a different realm than just what self "wants."

Don Quixote is an example which might easily support the idea of love as projection. Surely there is nothing which Dulcena could ever say or do to make him a disbeliever. His love is untainted by reality. In such lies its beauty . . . and its fatal flaw.

Yet the matter might have turned out quite differently if Don Quixote had but fallen in love with someone else who shared his vision. Perhaps their's would have been a love

> Where each asks from each
> What each most wants to give
> And each awakes in each
> What else would never be
> (Muir, 1960, p. 117).

Don Quixote's love is a total commitment of faith. We must wonder at the power of such love to awaken grandeur in even the humblest. Love at its best is mutual support and growth: where "each awakes in each . . . ."

Yet, so often it is our experience that love awakens life in the loved only to crucify the lover. One can easily see why so many have regarded romantic love as only projection: a matter of simply waiting for someone to unleash one's dream upon. However, not all love is tragic.

The problem with dealing with romantic love only as a projection is that the theory of projection is essentially a discounting mechanism. We use the term "projection" only when the attempt to create a self-fulfilling prophecy is unsuccessful. Only when love fails or proves to be ridiculous do we refer to it as "projection." If the same process of casting our dreams and hopes is succesfsful, we don't call it "projection." We call it the mutual creation of meaning.

Guggenbuhl-Craig (1979), in a chapter entitled "Romance as Fantasy," noted that much of romance hinges on the enactment and realization of latent abilities. Their fulfillment and growth is not a matter of projecting one's wishes onto another, but of realizing and cultivating real aspects of a person which have not been given a chance to bloom. Romance is thus an exercise in mutual realization of fantasy. It does not simply reduce one to another's projections.

He used the example of a child whose parents may sense a talent in the child. They then give the child an opportunity to develop and explore that ability. This is different from projection where the parents force their hopes on the child. It is the recognition of a real ability in the child which is encouraged and loved into fruition. Creative fantasy emphasizes "becoming" and the creation which is loved and supported to realization.

Van Den Berg (1961) argued that we retain this fragile theory of projection because it allows us to maintain the common denominator of our cultural meanings and at the same time discount all alternative meanings. Despite the poverty of such an approach, this allows us to act while keeping our world intact and unchallenged by extra-individual meanings. Yet it is precisely the nature of romantics and lovers to offer and even want to celebrate these altenrative meanings: to seek sources of inspiration and meaning outside our agreed upon common denominators.

Warmoth (1981) suggested that we might better understand "peak experiences" as the creation of a personal myth. Romantic love is certainly a peak experience providing an outlet for the personal mythos and the creation of meaning. If there is too great a discrepancy between

each individual's myth and the Other's and they are not capable of arriving at a larger understanding or a new synthesis, then the relationship is going to have problems.

In many ways, romantic love turns away from the world and offers us new meanings from the inside out. It is an attempt to make dreams real. From the depths of each individual, an effort is made to touch the "real" world and enact a meaningful creation.

This is the heart of romantic love: sharing of meanings which have laid dormant awaiting an opportunity for life in the light of day. This is the reason that romantic love shakes us to the roots of our souls. This is why a lover becomes such a part of self. This also accounts for the pathological nature of some loves, as well as other loves which are our birth in beauty.

Many of the characteristics of Romantic love noted in the "Rules of Love" can be accounted for by noting Romantic love's relation to the mutual creation of meaning. It is the spinning of another world. Romantic love withdraws from the world at large; focuses its attention inward; and then seeks to shape the outer world in the image of the newly perceived reality. It is a phenomenon of attention and the focus of will.

As Romantic love is a matter of attention, as Ortega y Gasset (1957) noted, there is a definite relation between love and the phenomenon of hypnosis. "Falling in love" is a hypnotic magic. It creates a new reality more real than the life to which one had been accustomed to previously.

But "Is love blind" or is it a matter of "each awaking in each"? Maslow (1962) addressed this question directly:

. . . the lover perceives in the beloved what no one else can,
and there is no question about the intrinsic value of his
inner experience and of the many good consequences for him,
for his beloved, and for the world. If we take as an example
the mother loving her baby, the case is even more obvious.
Not only does love perceive potentialities but it also actual-
izes them. The absence of love stifles potentialities and
even kills them . . . . All personalogical and psychothera-
peutic experience is testimonial to this fact that love
actualizes and non-love stultifies, where deserved or not.

The complex and circular question then arises here, 'To what
extent is this phenomenon a self-fulfilling prophecy?' as
Merton has called it. A husband's conviction that his wife is
beautiful, or a wife's firm belief that her husband is coura-
geous, to some extent creates the beauty or the courage. This
is not so much a perception of something that already exists
as a bringing into existence by belief.

And yet, even beyond all this complexity, the lurking doubts
remain to those who hope ultimately to drag all these problems
into the domain of public science. Frequently enough, love
for another brings illusions, the perceptions of qualities and
potentialities that don't exist, that are not therefore truly
perceived but created in the mind of the beholder and which
then rest on a system of needs, repressions, denials, projec-
tions, and rationalizations. If love can be more perceptive
than non-love, it can also be blinder. And the research
problem remains to nag us, when is which (pp. 98-99)? [First
Two Italics Mine]

Being loved or loving creates another reality. Beyond projection

and illusion, bringing into existence by belief must involve a path that

one is yearning or at least willing to walk. The potentiality must be

capable of realization . . . of being acted upon. Not only must the

potential exist, but it must be one which both are willing to choose to

enhance.

The lover withdraws from the ordinary world and creates/actualizes

a world of love held in the mind's eye. Romance is thus always floating

between the real and the dream: between becoming and the heights of

vision.

Agape

If we follow the heart's desire, we seek to move closer to the magic that we glimpse in love. Bergson (1935, p. 168) wrote: "Magic is then innate in man, being but the outward projection of a desire which fills the heart."

Besides the turning inward -- away from the world -- of Romantic Love, there is another strategy of loving which has characterized our cultural traditions. This is the Christian love: the brotherly love which has been termed "agape." It originates from the Scripture of "Love your neighbor as yourself" and the golden rule of "do unto others as you would have them do unto you."

This love seeks to move outward into the world and trying there to shape it and change it through love. This concern for the world, and moving into the world because of love, is the very basis of the distinction between Western and Eastern thought.

Agape also provides an interesting contrast to the romantic love of Eros. Agape and Eros have been used as a basic distinction for styles of loving by a sufficient number of writers to warrant specific attention in any serious discussion towards a definition of love (Singer, 1966; De Rougemont, 1956; Lewis, 1960; Williams, 1973).

Whereas romantic love is "particularistic," focusing on one person and taking a journey inside, away from the world; the love of Agape is "universalistic" and attempts to move outward into the world toward all people. The romantic love confronts the world on the shoreline of one type of boundary: one cannot retreat completely from the world. It is confronted in our economic exchanges for survival if nothing else. The universal love of Agape confronts another boundary: the extent to which

we can love and touch humanity and the extent any love of humanity must be mediated by some type of facilitating structure: a moral code, an organization, a social movement.

Many writers have concluded that ultimately, though Agape and Eros confront different boundaries and embrace different strategies, they dove-tail into one another: that if either path is reached fully, they become the same Love (D'Arcy, 1957; Harper, 1966). Other writers have argued for the supremacy of one type of love over the other (Lewis, 1960; De Rougemont, 1956). Yet, if we sociologically seek one defini-tion or understanding of the nature and process of love, we must search for common strains which are present in each. What allows us to speak of both romantic love and the Christian love as love?

Surely the fire and the zeal of the Christian mystics equals that of any romantic knight. We find Christianity giving love a central place in the universe and the calling of man. "God is Love" proclaims the New Testament. Lewis (1960) makes the important distinction that there is a difference between saying that "God is Love" and saying that "Love is God." The correct interpretation, he claims, of Scripture is that God is perfect Love and all human loves are much smaller approximations and glimpses.

It is moving with the grain and purpose of this perfect love -- "on earth as it is in heaven" -- which gives meaning and relatedness to life. The mystics and various branches of Christian theology give dif-ferent renditions of how this path is to be approached, yet they all agree that God's Love is the center. As St. Augustine (Ortega y Gasset, 1957, p. 49) wrote: "My love is my weight: because of it I move."

Christian theology goes even further. Not only is love the central basis for meaning and life, but it is living amongst us. It is our direct link with God.

According to Christian theology, as Christ prepared to ascend into heaven, He told his followers that a Holy Spirit would appear; that "whenever two or more are gathered in My Name," there he would be also. This Holy Ghost would dwell whenever two or more came together to share a higher purpose. As Thomas Aquinas wrote, "Love . . . is the proper name for the Holy Ghost" (Singer, 1966, p. 298).

The love of Agape is this outpouring of faith in a way of living in which the Holy Spirit (Love) can dwell. It is here that we find the strength for altruism and charity: a connectedness with all human beings. There is a faith that behind our human masks we participate in a larger spirit.

According to Christian theology, this love is a gift of grace. It is love given out of abundance, not reciprocity. The emphasis is upon giving, not on exchange "Love is a phenomenon of abundance; its premise is the strength of the individual who can give" (Fromm, 1947, p. 131).

In theology, man and life are but a dream in the mind of God. Love is not contained by man, but experienced as something outside man's parameters that calls one to something larger than self. As the poet wrote: "When you love you should not say, 'God is in my heart,' but rather, 'I am in the heart of God'." . . . think not you can direct the course of love, for love, if it finds you worthy, directs your course (Gibran, 1923, p. 13).

Love is thus not a human phenomenon subject to the normal laws of sociology and psychology. It is not a phenomenon of reciprocity and

subject to the fair exchange of distributive justice. It is closer to the qualification in reciprocity which Gouldner (1970) made: what he termed these as "norms of benevolence". It is clear that these spring from a different source than reciprocity. They are an aspiration to an ideal and an intimation of something higher: a contribution to the spirit of man. It is a free gift made because of belief in something higher.

Love as a Spirit

Love is also not merely a feeling. In early Christian Europe, the tarot deck was used by Gnostic sects, who found exceptions to the organized theology, sought to smuggle their secrets across Europe. The "Lovers" card in the tarot deck is most instructive. It is only the woman in the card -- the intuitive, feeling side -- which looks up at the archangel. The rational, masculine side can only look to the woman. It is only through "feelings" -- the intuitive -- that we can glimpse the secret. Love is a spirit which cannot be grasped by the intellect alone.

Yet, when we speak of love as related to feelings and the intuitive side, we must clarify. Love strictly speaking is not a feeling and subject to psychological analysis. It is just that feelings are capable of taking us to love. As Bergson (1935) noted, when we assign a supremacy to feelings, there is really only one feeling that we have in mind: that is love -- the rest is simply excess baggage. This path of feelings to love is why we reify "feelings." Feelings and the intuitive are but a door. Unless we realize this, we become lost in a reification of anger, jealousy, and personal greed.

As Buber (1957) argued, love stems not from the social or the psychological: it demands study of a different realm which he termed the "interhuman" -- the space between individuals: between the psychological world of the individual and the social realm of the group.

> The fundamental fact of human existence is neither the individual as such nor the aggregate as such. Each, considered by itself, is a mighty abstraction . . . . The fundamental fact of human existence is man with man. What is peculiarly characteristic of the human world is above all that something takes place between one being and another the like of which can be found nowhere in nature. . . . All achievement of the spirit has been incited by it. Man is made man by it . . . . It is rooted in one being turning to another as another . . . . I call this sphere, which is established with the existence of man as man but which is conceptually still uncomprehended, the sphere of 'between' (Buber, 1947, p. 244).

This is further reason why the subject of love has been so problematical for sociology and psychology: because love is neither a group phenomena or an individual phenomena. It belongs to the realm of "between." There is little room for spirits in traditional psychological and sociological circles. Sociological analysis focuses on group phenomena: the reciprocity of social exchange and the presentation of the experience of love to the social drama. It does not focus on the "inbetween" space of person with person because that space is precisely the discipline boundary between psychology and sociology.

The idea that love is a spirit that plays between individuals becomes a most satisfactory way of speaking of love. It does not fit our discipline boundaries for psychology and sociology, and yet it clarifies a lot of problems. Buber (1970) was most insistent that love is not a feeling:

> Feelings accompany the metaphysical and metapsychical fact of love, but they do not constitute it; and the feelings that accompany it can be very different...but the love is one. Feelings one 'has'; love occurs. Feelings dwell in man, but man dwells in his love. This is no metaphor but actuality:

> love does not cling to an I, as if the You were merely its
> 'content' or object; it is between I and You. Whoever does
> not know this, know this with his being, does not know love,
> even if he should ascribe to it the feelings that he lives
> through, experiences, enjoys, and expresses (p. 66).

Love is not an attribute of the psyche. It is beyond the individual and while we may develop a mind-set and way of being which enhances the possibility of our participation in love, love is not personally owned. "Feelings dwell in man, but man dwells in his love." This is consistent with the conception of love as the Holy Spirit. Love is outside of man; one participates in love, becomes "larger." Love is not the property of an individual but is experienced in the interplay of Self with Other. Neither is love a social force. It occurs between Self and Other. If we are theological, it occurs when the boundary between I and You blurs: whenever two or more are gathered in a higher purpose that allows the Spirit to enter. If we wish to be secular, then love is a magical creation of interaction which can be reduced to neither individual nor group phenomena. Love is not Me and it is not You. It is not even Ours in the sense that it can be attributed to our relationship. It happens when we allow the nature of our relation to be such that love can play between us. This is the nature of love: that we dwell in love foregoing other ways of relating. "Whoever does not know this . . . does not know love." The nature of love is a sharing outside of ourselves and is not attributable to either the power of our personalities or to social forces.

Love is a "small bird" which only "shows up" when it is safe; when the other possible social games (power, status, exchange) are dropped and when ego needs have been safely managed in such a way as to allow the sharp boundaries of ego to give way to openness. It is only then

that love comes to play. There must be room and opportunity for the Spirit to come into play transforming our selves and the nature of our interaction. Love is found on this boundary between self and society: when we have somehow stepped out of the social drama and out of the narrowness of self.

The Christian idea of Agape in many ways approaches an understanding of this process. The writings of theologians and mystics give us a feeling for this process. The mystics speak of the "dark night of the soul" -- the light that comes in after we have surrendered all effort. God is encountered after we have dropped all social games and ego attempts, and realized that life is caused by neither social forces or by ego. After we have dropped cultural renditions, social games and ego attempts, we come to realize that life does not go away. It remains as a miracle: uncaused in any normal and explainable sense. Life is not accountable in terms of the psyche or the social, yet it continues to pulsate. It is much larger than either our individual renditions or our social dramas.

Agape as Inclusion

The vision of Agape rests upon the premise of "opening one's heart." In this opening, one participates in a greater spirit of life to which all have access. Both the mystics and the Christian theologians speak of such a path. In following one's heart, one is related to God and the greater Love which is the heart of the universe. Agape expands outward opening to hopefully embrace all of mankind in a vision of "peace on earth, goodwill" towards all. Through charity and altruism we seek to transcend the narrowness of ego boundaries and participate in

a common spirit. The neighborly love of Agape represents an attitude

towards the world: a stance which greets all people in a loving manner.

It is not exclusive. While romantic love is particularistic focusing on

one person in particular, Christian love is universal and non-

particularistic, embracing all people.

In romantic love, a couple desires to withdraw from the world and

focus upon each other. The world thus remains only as a theater or a

stage for the exploits of their romance. In the Christian love, all

people are part of the vision. In Agape, love is both the principle and

the ethos for relation of Self to all Others. "If you have done it in

the least of men, you have done it unto me." Love becomes a way of mov-

ing in the world cognizant of our common humanity. The heart seeks to

expand outward leaving none out of a shared vision.

Romantic love, as we have discussed, functions about the social

process of exclusion and limited focus. The Christian love functions by

a social process of inclusion. It is the love of all mankind. To

embrace such a stance requires that we develop a certain sophistication

concerning the social dynamics of inclusion. Bergson (1935) was most

helpful here. In The Two Sources of Morality and Religion, he differen-

tiated between the closed society based on social pressure and social

obligation, and the expansive or open society. In the closed society,

one obeys out of force: "You must because you must." In the open

society, the basis of social integration is "aspiration": people follow

because they have been swept away by enthusiasm -- the "impetus to

love." This impetus to love is the second basis or source of society.

In Bergson's views, we find a way of dealing with the Christian

love adequately. He wrote that:

> Social obligation always has in view . . . a closed society.
> . . . . It is not concerned with humanity . . . . Who can
> help seeing that social cohesion is largely due to the neces-
> sity for a community to protect itself against others, and
> that it is primarily as against all other men that we love the
> men with whom we live? . . . We love naturally and directly
> our parents and our fellow countrymen, whereas love of mankind
> is indirect and acquired . . . . We come only by roundabout
> ways, for it is only through God, in God, that religion bids
> man love mankind . . . (Bergson, 1935, p. 32).

Bergson (1935, p. 35) said that "it is not by widening the bounds
of the city that you reach humanity; . . . the difference is not one of
degree but of kind." The difference in kind is between the closed soul
and the open soul. On the one hand, we have the "attitude . . . of an
individual and a community concentrated on themselves. At once indivi-
dual and social, the soul here moves round in a circle. It is closed."
"The other attitude is that of the open soul . . . [if] we say that it
embraces all humanity; we should not be going too far, we should hardly
be going far enough, since its love may extend to animals, to plants, to
all nature" (Bergson, 1935, p. 38).

> . . . it is not by process of expansion of the self that we
> can pass from the first state to the second. A psychology
> which is purely intellectual, following the indications of
> speech, will doubtless define feelings by the things with
> which they are associated; love of one's family, love of one's
> country, love of mankind; it will see in these three inclina-
> tions one single feeling, growing larger to embrace an
> increasing number of persons . . . .
>
> The first [two] imply a choice, therefore an exclusion. . . .
> The latter is all love. The former light directly on an
> object which attracts them. The latter does not yield to the
> attraction of its object; it has not aimed at this object; it
> has shot beyond and reached humanity only by passing through
> humanity (Bergson, 1935, pp. 38-39) .

The desire of the open soul is simply to open to love. It is thus
a different principle than the more familiar loves. It has no object
other than love. This leap of faith cannot be justified by strictly
experiential grounds. The love of particular people -- even larger

numbers of people -- is subject to a different dynamic than all-embracing love. In some ways this Christian love has everything to do with people in general and little to do with particular persons. It is an <u>attitude</u> or a way of approaching life: a fundamental way in which we are outside ourselves.

Others have noted this inclusive-exclusive nature of love and how much social dynamics differ from ideal of Agape. In the classical sociological concept of the "in-group and the out-group," people develop feelings of love and inclusion by excluding from the group (Sumner, 1906, p. 12). A "we" which is intimate and loving is formed in reaction to a "they" which is non-intimate and threatening. We know who we love by excluding those we do not love. Becker (1968, p. 379) followed Whitehead in noting that one of the basic sources of evil is that "alternatives exclude." The choice of one direction in some ways deprives us of time and energy for exploration in other directions.

In the last chapter of <u>The Ways and Power of Love</u>, Sorokin (1951) also saw this exclusion dynamic as the fundamental problem that must be dealt with by any humanitarian effort. If there is no leap beyond the natural process of exclusion-inclusion, then we will love those close to us and dislike those foreign.

Agape seeks to embrace all in a collective vision of humanity. Yet as Carpenter (1970) noted, sometimes the last thing we want to do is love and touch everyone. This would dissipate our energy and destroy the very content of our love. We give ourselves very intensely to a few, but to try to love every person in this way would destroy us. We have only so much time and energy. The number of intimate, intense

relationships that any one person can have is finite in number and quite probably small. We cannot love everybody in a direct, personal manner than we could attempt to make love with everyone in the world. There is not enough time or energy . . . but this also misses the point.

As Johnson (1972) argued, we desire not a full merger with each and every being, but a feeling of relatedness and integration, i.e., a feeling of participation in humanity. Then, we are content just to be part of this humanity. This need not take the form or pattern of our other or pattern of our other intimate relations. The neighborly love is a friendliness: a way of approaching the world.

As Bergson (1935) argued so successfully, the love of humanity is a direct leap of intuition, but to live this love requires some type of intervening and mediating structure. We cannot simply reach out and touch each person directly in face-to-face interaction. There must be some type of buffer or intervening way to map the self to all of humanity. To love all of humanity requires a social form: a code, an organization . . . some type of structural component to relate self to all.

In many ways, Christianity is a set of attitudes and codes for dealing with others. This is why it is often so dogmatic: it is not concerned with people per se, but with one's approach toward them. Agape requires that we immediately find ways of opening to love. These are usually quickly translated and reified into moral codes. The successful moral code becomes a way which others imitate: it allows them to feel further related to humanity and the heart of life; we enter in and participate, readily following aspiration:

> This is what occurs in musical emotion, for example . . . .
> In point of fact, it does not introduce these feelings into

us; it introduces us into them, as passersby are forced into a street dance. Thus do pioneers in morality proceed (Bergson, 1935, p. 40).

Bergson portrayed a sweeping vision of love across human history. He felt evolutionary theories were wrong in that they did not go far enough: they did not explain why a man -- the product of evolution -- could theorize the theory of evolution: they did not explain consciousness. Bergson saw the force behind evolution as the desire for consciousness and greater awareness: an "impetus to love" which is the primary force behind society. Great moral leaders who from time to have shown us practical ways of opening our heart and loving. We have willingly followed hoping to feel related and at home with life.

Religion and morality have both an open dynamic form which is new and fresh, and a static form which loses the original aspiration and must then rely upon social pressure. The static form is what Ortega y Gasset (1957) referred to as social usage. Usages lag behind the creative impetus and tend to be outmoded at the very time they become conventions. Yet there is the tension between the old and the new.

The force of human evolution and the desire of the human heart is toward the open, toward relatedness, toward an aspiration:

> In all times there have arisen exceptional men, incarnating this morality. Before the saints of Christianity, mankind had known the sages of Greece, the prophets of Israel, and Arahants of Buddhism, and others besides. It is to them that men have always turned for that complete morality which we had best call absolute morality . . . (Bergson, 1935, p. 34).

> . . . exceptional souls have appeared who sensed their kinship with the soul of Everyman . . . . The appearance of each one of them was like the creation of a new species . . . . Each of these souls marked a certain point . . . of a love which seems to be the very essence of the creative effort (Bergson, 1935, p. 95).

"It is these men who draw us toward an ideal society, while we

yield to the pressure of the real one" (Bergson, 1935, p. 68). This impetus to love is the dynamic of social movements: to include more and more in the dream. It is a synthesizing process of opening and closing, and trying to become more open. The love of Agape rushes in and transforms us. It is a dialectic as we try to learn how to love. But we must remember that it represents a fundamentally different form of loving.

> Never shall we pass from the closed society to the open
> society, from the city to humanity, by any mere broadening
> out. The two things are not of the same essence. The open
> society is the society which is deemed in principle to embrace
> all humanity. A dream dreamt, now and again, by chosen souls,
> it embodies on every occasion something of itself in crea-
> tions, each of which . . . conquers difficulties hitherto
> unconquerable. But after each occasion the circle that has
> momentarily opened closes again. Part of the new has flowed
> into the mould of the old . . . (Bergson, 1935, p. 267).

The force of Agape is a dream -- a dream of God according to Christian theology -- it is a dream of gradually growing to heaven on earth. In our lifetimes, we will not achieve it. But that is the direction in which we desire to move . . . . "Between the closed soul and the open soul there is the soul in process of opening. Between the immobility of a man seated and the motion of the same man running there is the act of getting up" (Bergson, 1935, p. 63).

In the Jewish version of the Old Testament, we must remember that when Moses asked God what his name is he replied "I am becoming that which I am becoming" (Fromm, 1956, p. 58).

Love and the Study of Man.

One can well see why the "Human Potential" movement turned to what was previously strictly religious sources; and why Humanistic Psychology and Sociology rapidly become "cluttered" by religious and value

considerations. Any attempt to deal with man as man -- to conceive of psychology and sociology humanistically -- must enter the field of practical religion.

This is not a new approach. It was the genius of August Comte that he insisted that a Science of Man meant a Religion of Humanity. If we explore love seriously, then we must also come to this startling realization. Love is related to the effort to change the world the very cornerstone on which Comte wished to found Sociology. Following Agape, he sought to move outward to all of humanity. As Becker (1968) wrote, Comte's

> . . . life's work is normally considered to fall into two dis-
> tinct phases: . . . the first work was a treatise on all the
> sciences, putting forth the striking proposal that sociology
> followed logically in the history of the development of the
> sciences . . . . The second work enunciated the 'Religion of
> Humanity' based on love: in the new community sociology would
> subserve social order and be used to promote social interest
> instead of the private selfish interest that was rampant . . .
> admirers of Comte based their admiration on the first work,
> and considered that the second work was done in the grip of
> some kind of dementia or senility . . . We shall return later
> to the reasoned and necesary unity of Comte's system; suffice
> it to say that for now that, contrary to the opinion of many
> superficial commentators, Comte was well aware of what he was
> doing -- the two 'phases' of his work were an integrated
> whole. The first period was a systematization that he under-
> took on a positivistic, scientific basis to avoid charges of
> mysticism which he knew might be leveled against his guiding
> ideas. The second period was a frank predication of his life
> work on feeling, love, and morality, which he felt were the
> basis for his whole position (p. 44).

If we study man as man and refuse to relegate the humanistic vision to some smaller system, some interesting things emerge. If we begin to formulate a Humanistic Sociology by focusing on love as the central force in the creation of meaning in man's existence, we find the going difficult for we are forced to the boundaries of our normal way of perceiving.

In <u>The Phenomenon of Man</u>, Teilhard de Chardin (1959) began with the following statement:

> . . . what conclusions are forced upon us, when [man] is
> placed fairly and squarely within the framework of phenomenon
> and appearance . . . <u>Seeing</u>. We might say that the whole of
> life is in that verb -- if not in end, at least in essence.
> Fuller being is closer union; such is the kernel and conclu-
> sion of this book. But let us emphasize the point: union can
> only increase through an increase in consciousness, that is to
> say in vision . . . . To try to see more and better is not a
> matter of whim or curiosity or self-indulgence. <u>To see or to</u>
> <u>perish</u> is the very condition laid upon everything that makes
> up the universe, by reason of the mysterious gift of
> existence. And this, in superior measure, is man's
> condition.
>
> But if it is true that it is so vital and so blessed to know,
> let us ask again why we are turning our attention particularly
> to man . . . Is it not precisely one of the attractions of
> science that it rests our eyes by turning them away from man
> (p. 31)? [Italics Original]

Yet, if we wish to understand love and humanistic efforts, we can-not rest our eyes for long. If we desire love and closer, fuller union then we must turn back to those hazy regions where Self faces Other and confronts life. For "Man, the centre of perspective, is at the same time the <u>centre of construction</u> of the universe. And by expediency no less than by necessity, all science must be referred back to him" (Teilhard de Chardin, 1959, p. 33). [Italics Original]

In many ways love is an intimacy with Self, with Other, and ultimately with Life: a way of Knowing. We must bridge the distance.

Psychological and Sociological Approaches to Love

Although organized sociology and psychology have not followed Comte nor Chardin's vision on a discipline-wide basis, there have been some important exceptions. These attempts allow us to expand our knowledge as we explore a definition of love. Other attempts have not dealt

explicitly with love but contribute to our understanding of love. Warmoth (1981) commented that three of the major theories in psychology have really concerned love: Freud was the master of the study of Eros; Adler's writings on will actually framed a theory of narcissism or self-love; and Carl Rogers presented the stance of the unconditional love of Agape.

We might approach a definition of love by noting the various components which the social disciplines have associated with love. Often writers will find that approaching love directly is too hazy and will switch their terms. Thus instead of studying love, they will write about something they feel is correlated with love but less difficult to understand. They will write on growth, trust, or self-actualization. Others will explore primary groups, successful marriage, or the nature of the sacred. Some of these ideas and insights we can use directly. Others must be revised, extrapolating the kernal of truth for our purposes. Through such an approach, it is possible to discover a basis for a theory and definition of love.

Freud's theory of the "libido" has been narrowly interpreted as sexual energy. It is the desire to unite; to become part of something larger. Libido moves to decrease distance and to incorporate within self. Fromm (1956) wrote:

> Freud's error in seeing love exclusively as the expression --
> or a sublimination -- of the sexual instinct, rather than rec-
> ognizing that sexual desire is one manifestation of the need
> for love and union . . . . Freud has been criticized for his
> overevaluation of sex. This criticism was often prompted by
> the wish to remove an element from Freud's system which aroused
> criticism and hostility among conventionally minded people
> . . . . My criticism of Freud's theory is not that he over-
> emphasized sex, but his failure to understand sex deeply
> enough. He took the first step in discovering the signifi-
> cance of interpersonal passions . . . . In the further devel-
> opment of psychoanalysis it is necessary to correct and deepen

Freud's concept by translating Freud's insights from the physiological into the biological and existential dimension (p. 30).

What is the key to Freud's concept of which Fromm speaks? Fromme (1963) in The Ability to Love followed Freud in noting that love is an attachment. "Love is an attachment influenced by previous and other attachments . . . . Love exists only in the context of our total experience" (Fromme, 1963, p. 209).

Following Freud, he argued that love is an attachment primarily and that the emotional components are secondary (Fromme, 1963). Emotional aspects come later; it is the attachment which is the primary aspect of love. As Fromme (1963, p. 354) wrote, "Love is something we learn." The formation of our attachments teach us a pattern of loving. It is our way of growing in love.

Menninger (1942, p. 261) said that "What Freud really showed was that one does not 'fall' in love: one grows into love and love grows in him."

Would we be pressing too far to say that love is the life force: the desire to attach our self to something outside of ourselves? Viewed existentially, could we not claim that this is the force which holds both the individual and the social together? Could we not say that love and attachment are the very fabric of the creation of meaning? If we press an understanding of Freud, it appears that this becomes our answer.

Freud (1915) stated his views in the following words:

We assume that the human being has a certain amount of love, called libido, which, at the beginning, while remaining within the borders of its own self, is directed at its own self. Later on in the development, actually from a very early state on, this love detaches itself from the self, it aims itself on things outside, which are therefore, in a way, incorporated within us (p. 360).

Freud continued:

If the things get lost or if they are destroyed, the love or
libido which we had attached to those things, will become free
again. This love can then aim itself on the things that took
the place of the first things, but it can equally well return
to self. It appears that the latter is painful. Why it
should be painful, why the detachment of things causes
suffering, we do not understand...What we see is that the
libido clings to things, and that it does not want to give up
things even if good substitutes are ready for it (p. 360).

Van Den Berg (1961), whose translation this is, commented:

What prompts the libido to leave the inner self? In 1914
Freud asked himself this question -- the essential question of
his psychology, and the essential question of the psychology
of the twentieth century. His answer ended the process of
interiorization. It is: the libido leaves the inner self
when the inner self has become too full. In order to prevent
it from being torn, the I has to aim itself on objects outside
the self; . . . ultimately man must begin to love in order not
to get ill (p. 235).

One must attach one's self to something larger in order to not

become ill; in order to create meaning. It will be noted later that

Fromm uses this in the formation of his definition of love. Fromm

(1956) saw love as overcoming separateness. Meaning is achieved

in relation to something larger than self. Love is a way of achieving

relation and meaning.

The work of other psychologists and sociologists may also provide

us with a basis for understanding love. Sociological and psychological

frameworks have related love to giving (Sorokin, 1950; Fromm, 1947,

1956), care (Mayeroff, 1971), growth (Maslow, 1962), and creativity

(May, 1975; Menninger, 1942). Love is seen as a nourishing force which

expands and is essentially productive. It is given freely and is self-

generative. It provides an atmosphere for personal growth and the

safety in which giving becomes receiving.

Love has also been correlated with the willingness to trust

(Biddle, 1966; Gibb, 1978), the release from fear (Jampolsky, 1979),
courage (Moustakas, 1972; May, 1975) and self-disclosure (Jourard, 1968;
1971). It seems that I can only know as much of myself as I am willing
to reveal to You. Trust is needed if I am going to allow You to see Me
as I really am. If love is to occur, I must allow you a space where
you can be as you are. As one feels more and more free to relax and
open, the other can do the same.

> I love her. What does this mean? . . . As she discloses her
> being to me or before my gaze, my existence is enriched. I am
> more alive. I experience myself in dimensions that she
> evokes, such that life is more meaningful and livable. My
> beloved is a mystery that I want to make transparent. But the
> paradox is that I cannot make my beloved do anything. I can
> only invite and earn the disclosure that makes her transpar-
> ent. I want to know my beloved. But for me to know, she must
> show. And for her to show her mysteries to me, she must be
> assured I will respect them, take delight in them (Jourard,
> 1971, p. 52).

This is why the humanistic power cannot control but must invite,
wait, and court. Love requires an atmosphere of trust for it to show
itself. One must move past fear with the courage it takes to be one's
self. Trust is the prerequisite for self-disclosure and love.

Love also has been related to knowledge and to intimacy. Kieffer
(1977, p. 267) defined intimacy as "the experiencing of the essence of
one's self in intense intellectual, physical, and/or emotional communion
with another human being." It is the central human experience where one
must focus any effort at a humanistic discipline. "As Angyal (1965) has
contended, the maintenance of closeness with another human being is the
center of one's existence until the very end of life" (Kieffer, 1977,
p. 268).

Kieffer followed Biddle (1976) in analyzing intimate relationships
along the dimensions of breadth, openness, and depth. "Breadth. . . is

the range of activities shared by the partners. The openness dimension

includes facets of disclosure of 'self' in the Jourardian sense . . .

(Kieffer, 1977, p. 271).

> Openness . . . is the mutual disclosure of the intellectual,
> physical, and/or emotional identities of each partner in the
> process of their interaction . . . . Disclosure is an essen-
> tial element in the escalation of intimacy . . . (Kieffer,
> 1977, p. 274).

> "Depth . . . is the degree to which an intimate relationship incor-

porates identities that are central to the partners" (Kieffer, 1977,

p. 275).

Trying to define intimacy conceptually is an exceedingly difficult

task because, as Kieffer noted, as anyone experiencing love knows, not

only do people melt and blend, but so do our concepts: "Within the

experience of intimacy he or she may discover once again, at least for a

few moments, that intimacy is a mystery that defies explanation"

(Kieffer, 1977, p. 277).

Yet, we must find ways to point to the experience. As Bergson

(1935) noted, it should not bother us that we must speak of love in

abstract terms: we should remember the experience.

> Loyalty, sacrifice of self . . . charity, such are the words
> we use when we think of these things. But have we, generally
> speaking, in mind at such times anything more than words?
> Probably not, and we fully realize this. It is sufficient, we
> say, that the formula is there; it will take on its full mean-
> ing; the idea which is to fill it out will become operative,
> when the occasion arises (p. 36).

It is important that we talk about the things which we have found

vital even if we are no longer immediately in contact with that

experience. Just the act of a collective and public remembering --

taking them into account; making space for their existence -- brings us

all a step closer to remembering. Love is a rare and very special

experience. Much of the magic of life is remembering what we know: the trust, the child-like space of awe and wonder, the dislcosure and the openness where love can find us once again.

Reiss (1960, 1971) spoke of the "Wheel Theory of Love" as depicting the process of increased intimacy. The spokes of the wheel are rapport, self-revelation, need-fulfillment, and mutual dependency. As each spoke moves, the wheel turns and love increases. Each movement also increases each of the component spokes.

By far the major contribution to an understanding of love is the work of Erich Fromm. He is perhaps the only psychologist or sociologist who has dealt explicitly and extensively with love throughout his life's work. Fromm's full significance has not been adequately understood precisely because his thesis is situated at the juncture between sociology and psychology.

Fromm's contribution contains the seeds of a genuine understanding of love and a conceptual framework for enacting those insights in the social world. His understanding invites us toward envisioning a humanistic sociology. That he moves so quickly from the psychological to the macro-sociological has led many to discount his views as superficial. He does move rapidly between micro-psychological and macro-sociological levels, but his is an initial effort. The boldness of this scope is demanded by the very thesis that he is posits. Although, the outline which he conceptualizes is not filled in any great detail, within his writings can be found the basic parameters of a Love Paradigm.

The precise component addressed in Fromm's work shifts over the course of his career, yet his argument and emphasis on love remains the same. In Man for Himself (1947), the focus was upon productivity and

the potent power of love. In it, we find the genesis of much of Fromm's theory of love. The Art of Loving (1956) was a direct effort to formulate a "Theory of Love" and note the implications for the practice of love in a decaying Western culture. The Revolution of Hope (1968) focused on one crucial aspect of love and embraced the key component of "aliveness." The Anatomy of Human Destructiveness (1973) dealt with the reverse side of creativity and love: it is a study of what happens when the will to life and love is blocked. In To Have Or to Be? (1976), he argued that the crucial question in ethics is the difference between ethical systems based on acquisition and those in the humanitarian tradition emphasizing "Being" and love. In other works, Fromm confronted our refusal to create meaning and embrace our own freedom (1941); the relation of the healthy person to social arrangements (1955); psychological problems as a form of the alienation depicted by Marx; and the integration of religious values and psychological insight (1950, 1966). Throughout, he spoke of creating value and meaning: facilitating the growth of healthy personalities that can love and also providing a social context in which love can flourish.

His "Theory of Love" was formally contained in The Art of Loving (1956) and was an expansion of specific ideas expressed in Man For Himself (1947). Fromm began his theory with the fact of human separateness.

> Man . . . is life being aware of itself. This awarenss of
> himself as a separate entity, the awareness of his own short
> life-span, of the fact that without his will he is born and
> against his will he dies, that he will die before those whom
> he loves, or they before him, the awareness . . . of his help-
> lessness before the forces of nature and society, all this
> makes his separate, disunited existence an unbearable prison.
> He would become insane could he not liberate himself from this
> prison and reach out, unite himself in some form or other with

men, with the world outside. The experience of separateness
arouses anxiety; it is, indeed, the source of all anxiety
(Fromm, 1956, p. 6). [Italics Original]

Man must seek for a manner of relatedness with the whole of life.
It is through relatedness -- overcoming separateness -- that one finds
meaning in life.

> Human existence is characterized by the fact that man is alone
> and separated from the world; not being able to stand the sep-
> aration, he is impelled to seek relatedness and oneness . . . .
> It is the paradox of human existence that man must simulta-
> neously seek for closeness and for independence; for oneness
> with others and at the same time for the preservation of his
> uniqueness and particularity . . . . The answer to this para-
> dox -- and to the moral problem of man -- is productiveness.
> One can be productively related to the world by acting and by
> comprehending . . . [The] power of love enables him to break
> through the wall which separates him from another person and
> to comprehend him (Fromm, 1947, pp. 102-103). [Italics
> Original]

> Man, set apart by his self-awareness and the capacity to feel
> lonely, would be a helpless bit of dust driven by the winds if
> he did not find emotional ties which satisfied his need to be
> related and unified with the world beyond his own person
> (Fromm, 1968, p. 68).

Fromm (1956) outlined several paths to overcoming our separateness.
There are "orgiastic states" -- trances, drug experiences, sexual orgasm
-- which integrate mind and body, but are episodic in nature. "Conform-
ity" offers a chance to feel at one with the group and is relatively
permanent despite the fact that it lacks intensity. One may also over-
come separateness by "creative activity" in which the artist merges with
the creation. However, none of these customary ways are entirely
satisfactory.

> The unity achieved in productive work is not interpersonal;
> the unity achieved in orgiastic fusion is transitory; the unit
> achieved by conformity is only pseudo-unity. Hence, they are
> only partial answers to the problem of existence. The full
> answer lies in the achievement of interpersonal union, of
> fusion with another person, in love (Fromm, 1956, p. 15).
> [Italics Original]

Fromm's (1947) definition of genuine love was that

Love is the productive form of relatedness to others and to
oneself. It implies responsibility, care, respect, and know-
ledge, and the wish for the other person to grow and develop.
It is the expression of intimacy between two human beings
under the condition of the preservation of each other's
integrity (p. 116). [Italics Original]

Care implies that "Love is the active concern for the life and the

growth of that which we love" (Fromm, 1956, p. 22). Responsibility is

related to faith (Fromm, 1947). Love takes the opportunity offered by

"falling in love" to expand and enter into a dialog of response to

another person. Respect is the ability to see another as he or she

really is. Fromm (1956, p. 23) noted that "respect is not fear or

awe," but is akin to the root of the word, which means literally "to

look at."

Love is a way of knowledge: of feeling related and at home in the

world. It is both a path to knowledge and a path to meaning. Love is a

different path to knowledge than the scientific power of analysis,

dissection, and control.

The basic need to fuse with another person as to transcend the
prison of one's separateness is closely related to another
specifically human desire: to know the 'secret of man.' . .
. There is one way, a desperate one, to know the secret: it
is that of complete power over another person; the power which
makes him do what we want, feel what we want, think what we
want; which transforms him into a thing . . . .

The other path to knowing 'the secret' is love. Love is the
active penetration of the other person, in which my desire to
know is stilled by union. . . . Sadism is motivated by the
wish to know the secret, yet I remain as ignorant as I was
before. I have torn the other being apart limb by limb, yet
all I have done is to destroy him. Love is the only way of
knowledge, which in the act of union answers my quest. In the
act of loving, of giving myself, I discover myself, I discover
us both, I discover man (Fromm, 1956, p. 24).

We must now explore a crucial distinction which Fromm uses for a

conceptualization of love. He wrote:

> . . . if we call the achievement of interpersonal union 'love,'
> we find ourselves in serious difficulty . . . . Should we reserve
> the word "love" only for a specific kind of union, one which
> has been the ideal virtue in all great humanistic religions
> and philosophical systems of the last four thousand years of
> Western and Eastern history? . . . Do we refer to love as the
> mature answer to the problem of existence, or do we speak of
> those immature forms of love which may be called symbiotic
> union (Fromm, 1956, p. 15)?

In symbiotic union, there is attachment based on need but without

preserving each other's integrity. The individual integrity of at least

one member is surrendered to preserve union. This "love" is dependence

based on reciprocal need. "Two become One" but at a price. It is not a

matter of two whole persons coming together in relationship, but of two

partial persons uniting: two halves who make a whole. In some ways, it

becomes a matter of addition. "Immature love says: 'I love you because

I need you.' Mature love says: 'I need you because I love you'"

(Fromm, 1956, p. 34).

> In the symbiotic relatedness the person is related to others
> but loses or never attains his independence; he avoids the
> danger of aloneness by becoming part of another person, either
> by being 'swallowed' by that person or by 'swallowing' him
> (Fromm, 1947, p. 113).

Archetypically or as ideal types, Fromm differentiated two forms of

symbiotic union. Curiously, he treats them as masochistic (submissive)

or sadistic (domination).

> The masochistic person does not have to make decisions, does
> not have to take any risks; he is never alone -- but he is not
> independent; he has no integrity; he is not yet fully born.
> The person renounces his integrity, makes himself the
> instrument of somebody or something outside himself; he does
> not solve the problem of living by productive activity.

> The sadistic person wants to escape from his aloneness by
> making another person part and parcel of himself. He inflates
> and enhances himself by incorporating another person, who
> worships him (Fromm, 1956, p. 6).

Yet, despite the fact that between sadism and masochism, there is

"a considerable difference in a realistic sense; in a deeper emotional sense, the difference is not so great as that which they both have in common: fusion without integrity" (Fromm, 1956, p. 17).

In both instances, there is a fundamental inability to handle power. One person must lose in order for another person to win. This inability to deal with power is the distinction which Fromm has drawn between mature and immature love.

I will argue that in a relationship, interpersonal magic is the ability to share power. It is important to note that Fromm's conception of love revolved around the ability to resolve the power issue!

> In contrast to symbiotic union, mature love is union under the condition of preserving one's integrity -- one's individuality. Love is an active power in man: a power which breaks through the walls which separate man from his fellow men, which unites him with others; love makes him overcome the sense of isolation and separateness, yet it permits him to be himself, to retain his integrity. In love the paradox occurs that two beings become one and yet remain two (Fromm, 1956, p. 17). [Italics Original]

Love is an exploration of the possibilities of human life. It finds its fulfillment in mystery, awe, and an overflowing joy. At times, it attains its depth in a tearful understanding. It is an active exploration of all that life can be.

On the other hand, symbiotic attachment -- even at its best -- is never more than just a matter of "keeping each other warm." With the symbiotic union,

> . . . man indeed succeeds in feeling at home in the world, but he pays a tremendous price for this security, that of submission, dependence, and a blockage to the full development of his reason and of his capacity to love. He remains a child when he should have become an adult. The . . . ties . . . of benign and of malignant ecstasies can disappear only if man finds a higher form of feeling at home in the world, if not only his intellect develops, but also his capacity to feel

related without submitting, at home without being imprisoned, intimate without being stifled (Fromm, 1968, p. 69). [Italics Mine]

Love involves touching without grasping, feeling the power but not claiming it, holding but not owning. It demands respect and faith in love. "Without respect for and knowledge of the beloved person, love deteriorates into domination and possessiveness" (Fromm, 1947, p. 107). One must realize the impossibility of a fulfilling love by control and domination.

> When love is experienced in the mode of having it implies confining, imprisoning, or controlling the object one 'loves.' It is strangling, deadening, suffocating, killing, not life-giving. What people call love is mostly a misuse of the word, in order to hide the reality of not loving (Fromm, 1973, p. 33). [Italics Original]

Love demands a psychological maturity and a sociological awareness of power. With such a valuable experience, if one does not have a mature insight, one will try to force it as a matter of will. Yet, the nature of love is such that it is alien to the world of force and control. However, this is very difficult because in love we are at the very core of the essence of our meaning. It demands that people be in touch with themselves.

> Love is possible only if two persons communicate with each other from the center of their existence, hence if each one of them experiences himself from the center of his existence. Only in this 'central experience' is human reality, only here is aliveness, only here is the basis for love. Love, experienced thus, is a constant challenge; it is not a resting place . . . . Two people experience themselves from the essence of their existence, that they are one with each other by being with themselves, rather than by fleeing from themselves. There is only one proof for the presence of love: the depth of the relationship, and the aliveness and strength in each person concerned; this is the fruit by which love is recognized (Fromm, 1956, pp. 86-87).

Love demands a faith: to disclose myself as who I am and to experience myself as who I am. It is a faith that will be enough. Rather

than having to fashion myself to another's expectations, I avoid the personality market and explore the depths. "What matters in relation to love is the faith in one's own love; in its ability to produce love in others, and in its reliability" (Fromm, 1956, p. 104).

Love recognizes that there is another way of life than force and control. It is a trust in the power of love. It is the trust that love, as if by magic, will awaken love. It is a faith that love will take us where we need to go.

Love is an act of strength: an openness which leaves one vulnerable to an attack of power. Any betrayal of love shakes us to the roots of our being and challenges our creation of self. Fromm (1956) wrote:

> . . . to have faith requires courage, the ability to take a
> risk. To be loved, and to love, one needs . . . the courage
> to judge certain values as of ultimate concern -- and to take
> the jump and stake everything on these values. This courage
> is very different from the . . . slogan 'to live dangerously.'
> . . . [That] is rooted in a destructive attitude toward life,
> in the willingness to throw life away because one is incapable
> of loving it. The courage of despair is the opposite of the
> courage of love, just as the faith in power is the opposite of
> the faith in life.

> The practice of faith and courage . . . is to notice where and
> when one loses faith; . . . to recognize how every betrayal of
> faith weakens one, and how increased weakness leads to new
> betrayal, and so on in a vicious circle. Then one will also
> recognize that while one is consciously afraid of not being
> loved, the real, though usually unconscious fear is that of lov-
> ing. To love means to commit oneself without guarantee, to give
> oneself completely in the hope that our love will produce love in
> the loved person. Love is an act of faith and whoever is of
> little faith is also of little love (pp. 106-107).

Yet, some have asked if such a commitment without guarantee is not, perhaps, out of date. Kieffer (1977) commented that

> Many modern individuals tend to approach love as a process of
> mutual exchange in which each of the partners attempts to
> derive affective rewards for minimal costs. For many of us,
> this description of love is an accurate portrayal of our abil-
> ity to love . . . . We fail to arrive at a depth in intimacy
> which would enable us to transcend self and to say with all

> sincerity that 'I am as concerned about you as I am about me.'
> As Fromm has reminded us, most of us who attempt to love are
> incapable of committing ourselves without any guarantees in
> the hope that love will be returned. We say in our actions
> and perhaps in so many words, 'I will be as concerned about
> you as you are about me.' Perhaps we as individuals are so
> much a product of capitalistic society that we cannot tran-
> scend the utilitarian 'self' of exchange theory (p. 276).

This is why Fromm indited the capitalistic assumptions of self and

exchange theory.

> While a great deal of lip service is paid to the religious
> ideal of love of one's neighbor, our relations are actually
> determined, at their best, by the principle of fairness.
> Fairness meaning not to use fraud and trickery in the exchange
> of commodities and services, and in the exchange of feelings.
> 'I give you as much as you give me,' in material goods as well
> as in love, is the prevalent ethical maxim in capitalistic
> society. It may even be said that the development of fairness
> ethics is the particular ethical contribution of capitalistic
> society . . . .
>
> Fairness ethics lend themselves to confusion with the ethics
> of the Golden Rule. The maxim 'to do unto others as you would
> like them to do unto you' can be interpreted as meaning 'be
> fair in your exchange with others.' But actually, it was for-
> mulated originally as a more popular version of the Biblical
> 'Love thy neighbor as thyself.' Indeed, the Jewish-Christian
> norm of brotherly love is entirely different from fairness
> ethics . . . . The practice of love must begin with recog-
> nizing the difference between fairness and love (Fromm, 1956,
> pp. 108-109). [Italics Mine]

In exchange, affective rewards are being exchanged across the

boundaries of self: there is no collapse of boundaries; no merging.

Indeed, the fundamental assumption of exchange theory is the positing of

separate selves which then trade back and forth. There is no merging or

overcoming of separateness here: only goods and rewards to be exchanged

according to a rational calculus. There is no miracle; no human mystery

of merging and creation: only a predetermined set of societal roles --

rights and obligations. There is no mystery of love and faith; no

exploration of the depth of the human possibility. The "rewards" of

love are much different than the rewards of goods or services. Love

overcomes separateness. The distance between selves is bridged in an experience of intimacy.

The exchange assumptions of the nature of self prevent a full intimacy. By constantly withdrawing to "keep score," individuals have difficulty merging. A paragraph after her comments on Fromm, Kieffer (1977) wrote:

> It is essentially within the depths of intimacy that the greatest rewards are to be found. It is perhaps in the emotional component of depth that we find love and the other aspects that are so highly prized by individuals and so difficult to achieve. Within the experience of intimacy, he or she may discover once again, at least for a few moments, that intimacy is a mystery that defies explanation (p. 276).

It is also a mystery which defies calculation. Love is a creative, generative force which overcomes separateness. The creation of meaning through love is totally distinct from the parameters of exchange theory. This is why love is so rare: it differs from the prevailing world view afforded by science, technology, and exchange theory. It is a different paradigm which demands a re-visioning of society. A love paradigm provides us with the basis for a necessary re-thinking of societal arrangements. Love requires a compatible social context in which to flourish.

This is why Fromm's work, of necessity, bridges both the psychological (individual) and the societal: love requires us to re-explore the nature of self and other; it requires us to re-examine the nature of social relation; and it demands that we re-formulate society.

Fromm (1956) concluded The Art of Loving with the following words:

> The discussion of the art of loving cannot be restricted to the personal realm of acquiring and developing those characteristics and attitudes which have been described in this chapter. It is inseparably connected with the social realm . . . . Those who are seriously concerned with love as the only rational answer to the problem of human existence must

arrive at the conclusion that important and radical changes in
our social structure are necessary if love is to become a
social and not a highly individualistic marginal phenomenon.
. . . If man is to be able to love, he must be put in his
supreme place. The economic machine must serve him, rather
than he serve it . . . . Society must be organized in such a
way that man's social, loving nature is not separated from his
social existence, but becomes one with it (p. 108).

If it is true, as I have tried to show, that love is the only
sane and satisfactory answer to the problem of human exist-
ence, then any society which excludes, relatively, the devel-
opment of love, must in the long run perish of its own
contradiction with the basic necessities of human nature.
Indeed, to speak of love is not 'preaching,' for the simple
reason that it means to speak of the ultimate and real need in
every human being. That this need has been obscured does not
mean that it does not exist. To analyze the nature of love is
to discover its general absence today and to criticize the
social conditions which are responsible for this absence. To
have faith in the possibility of love as a social and not only
exceptional-individual phenomenon, is a rational faith based
on the insight into the very nature of man (p. 111).

We must provide social arrangements and social structures which

facilitate and encourage the occurrence of love. We must rethink the

parameters of exchange theory, science, and technology which effectively

obscure or prevent love from having any wide impact on society. We must

come to a new understanding of the social bond which does not render

love to a separate realm. We must strive for a humanistic image of man

which are crucial experiences of intimacy and meaning. We must embrace

the fullness of the movement of life in theories of knowledge and

society.

Love is a creative joy which generates a security of meaning. Love

moves as a human mystery, and experiencing love awakens a celebration in

life. The experience of its depth gives faith: the willingness to

stake value in love. Joy and the heart's desire to expand outward --

because of love -- must not be underrated. Jourard commented that in

our efforts to develop an accurate epistemology of love, we must be

careful not to forget that love is a joy in life. In speaking of sexual

joy and the intimacy of married love, he says some things which also
apply to the joy found in all love:

> Let us talk about something altogether rare -- a married
> couple who love one another, not in the sober sense of loving
> as Erich Fromm portrays it, but also in the sense of enjoying
> each other, delighting in one another's company. Each knows
> and cares for the other, responds to the other's needs, and
> respects the other's idiosyncrasies. Neither lover seeks to
> sculpt the other to conform to some idealized image. This is
> love according to Fromm, and, for that matter, it is love even
> according to my own unromantic treatment of the theme. In an
> earlier book I defined love not so much as emotion as action
> undertaken with the aim of fostering happiness and growth in
> the person loved. But there is something grim, even a sense
> of hard work implicit in that conception of love. I would
> like to spice this conception with laughter and wholesome,
> lusty, mischievous, saucy sex. Not sex as mere coupling, but
> sex as an expression of joie-de vivre, of a sharing of the
> good things in life. Sex that is deeply enjoyed . . . the
> kind that makes a well-married couple look at each other from
> time to time and wink or grin or become humble at the remem-
> brance of joys past and expectant of those yet to be enjoyed
> (Jourard, 1971, pp. 42-43).

Love is a joy whether it be the intimacies of lovers or the close-
ness of friendship. Love is an obligation and a responsibility which is
serious work. But, we must not forget that it is also play. It merges
the realms of the serious and the recreational. It returns us to the
wide-eyed sense of wonder and mystery, as we enter into a "child-like"
world of play. "Only as a child will you enter the kingdom of heaven."
Joy provides a freedom which cannot be experienced elsewhere. It is
aliveness: a celebration of life.

The impetus which draws people toward love is joy. While love is a
serious exploration of meaning, it is the joy which gives the explora-
tion its depth and its freedom. Joy gives us a fresh birth: it is the
playful joy which the romantics claim transforms the world. This joy
can become the basis of creativity and depth.

Fromm spoke of aliveness and the joy of love as the foundation of

all humanistic ethics. In seeking to place love at the center of knowledge, we must remember to recreate the experience. Love is a mystery which gives us strength and understanding. It is the experience of love's joy which reduces our answers to simplicity.

Here, we come full circle back to the ancient understandings of Plato. Asked what the purpose of love might be, his response was that it seeks to attain "the Good." When asked what happens when a man attains the good, Plato responded, he will be happy. The experience of love takes us to the good, and experiencing this good brings us happiness. Love produces an outpouring of joy which releases us into play. It is joy which is the basis of humanistic ethics. It is around joy that we must conceive of a humanistic theory of action. Science and economic cost-benefit calculations separate the world into realms of work and play. Love reunites work with re-creation; the sacred with the profane. If love has a method, it is happiness.

Love is a celebration of life. Its kinship with the soul gives us the impetus to join the dance. Jourard reminded us that in developing an epistemology of love, we must not forget to join the dance: returning to the experience for fresh impetus. Love is like a spring from which we draw and come away refreshed. Joy re-creates our spirit. The more romantic of us might claim with Bergson (and Plato) that love is the life spring: the creative power -- the force behind our strivings which, when experienced, satisfies our longings for a time and makes us whole. The "power" of love is, in many ways, found in its joy -- a joy which we would not want to resist.

Continuing Jourard's insight, we might use sex as a metaphor for understanding power in social relations. This is different than Freud's

sexual metaphor. One may masochistically submit to power or sadistically impose his or her own will. Yet, we can graduate to love only when the power is shared; love consists of experiencing the sharing of the power. This is precisely Fromm's point. Maturity is learning to move past family ties to which we must submit as a child and not in turn needing to force others to submit to a recreation in order to create self.

Learning to love is learning to balance power. Magically, when we have moved past exploitation and into sharing the experience, something happens: love springs from us. The world transforms. Life becomes an intimacy: a relatedness in which we can relax and let go. We can sing, dance, laugh, create, and bubble forth into the world. One achieves a degree of composure with the power of life. This is the psychological insight. Sociologically we may say: The magic of love occurs when each does not need to keep the power for self but can share it.

If we explore the epistemology of love as the basis for social relation, we find that the effort is advanced by the work of the theologian Paul Tillich. In Love, Power, and Justice (Tillich, 1954), he emphasized a framework which stresses and supplements Fromm's theory of love as overcoming separateness. He added an important understanding. He wrote:

> Life is being in actuality and love is the moving power of life. In these two sentences the ontological nature of love is expressed. They say that being is not actual without the love which drives everything that is toward everything else that is. In man's experience of love the nature of life becomes manifest. Love is the drive toward the unity of the separated (Tillich, 1954, p. 25).

Tillich (1954) proceeded to argue that conceiving of love as overcoming separateness implied that relationships, such as symbiotic

unions, which dilute individuals into partial persons cannot, by defini-
tion, be love.

> Love is the drive for reunion of the separated. It presup-
> poses that there is something to be reunited, something rela-
> tively independent that stands upon itself. Sometimes the
> love of complete self-surrender has been praised and called
> the fulfillment of love. But the question is: What kind of
> self-surrender is it and what is it that it surrenders? If a
> self whose power of being is weakened or vanishing surrenders,
> his surrender is worth nothing. . . . The surrender of such
> an emaciated self is not genuine love because it extinguishes
> and does not unite what is estranged. The love of this kind
> is the desire to annihilate one's responsible and creative
> self for the sake of the participation in another self which
> by the assumed act of love is made responsible for himself and
> oneself. The chaotic self-surrender does not give justice to
> one's own power of being and to accept the claim for justice
> which is implied in this power. Without this justice there is
> no reunitive love, because there is nothing to unite (Tillich,
> 1954, pp. 68-69). [Italics Original]

A sense of justice for the integrity of each individual is essen-
tial if love is not to be extinguished in its own desire for union.
Love seeks the reunion of the separated. Power seeks fulfillment and
actualization of being. Justice demands integrity. Without love, there
is only isolation. Without power, there is no growth. Without justice,
there is nothing to unite in love. Tillich demanded that we consider
these three together as part of the same process.

Martin Buber's work on the "I" and "Thou" also is a complementary
conception of love as overcoming separateness. He wrote: "The princi-
ple of human life is not simple, but twofold . . . . I propose to call
the first movement 'the primal setting at a distance' and the second
'entering into relation'" (Buber, 1957, p. 97).

When "I" is too far away from "You," we distance Self and Other,
objectifying them in such a manner that overcoming separateness becomes
almost impossible. We need a perspective which allows both "I" and

"You" to stand out as a distinct, but does not, at the same time, reify self in such a manner that reuniting person with person is not possible. The fundamental relation of Self and Other must be recognized in any conception of "I." Buber (1970) wrote that there are two basic frameworks or "words" which one can use in formulating conceptions of the world:

> The attitude of man is twofold in accordance with the two basic words he can speak. . . . One basic word is the word pair I-You. The other basic word is the word pair I-It; but this basic word is not changed when He or She takes the place of It (p. 53).

Self can objectify Other and treat He or She as an object, as an It. Or Self can treat Other as a You. "There is no I as such but only the I of the basic word I-You and the I of the basic word I-It. When a man says I, he means one or the other" (Buber, 1970, p. 54).

"I-You" compares to seeing the world (and Other) as interwoven; as two elements in a process of relationship. "I-It" renders all to the realm of Self and its object.

> Whoever says You does not have something for his object . . . . It borders on other Its; It is only by virtue of bordering on others. But where You is aided there is no something. You has no borders. Whoever says You does not have something. But he stands in relation. . . . The basic word I-You establishes the world of relation (Buber, 1970, p. 55).

"You" is not a thing. "I-You" is the realm of relation where there are no boundaries between Self and Other. With "I-You," I intermingles with You; there is no object but a process of relationship and a fluctuating boundary.

With the conception of Self as "I-It," one treats the world (or Other) as an object setting it at a distance. "I-You" is a process; "I-It", an abtraction -- a separation of one from the other. "The basic word I-You can only be spoken with one's whole being. The basic word

I-It can never be spoken with one's whole being" (Buber, 1970, p. 54).

With "I-It", the world has been objectified. "I-It" is the realm of the scientific Cause and Effect; the "Mover" and its "Object" as posited by Aristotelean logic. "It has erected the crucial barrier between subject and object; the basic word I-It, the word of separation . . ." (Buber, 1970, p. 75).

However, with "I-You," You cannot be objectified; I and You are part of a mutual creation of each other and are not fundamentally separated:

> The form that confronts me I cannot experience nor describe; I can only actualize it . . . . The concentration and fusion into a whole being can never be accomplished by me, can never be accomplished without me. I require a You to become; becoming I, I say You. All actual life is encounter (Buber, 1970, p. 62).

Buber's distinction of the "I-You" offers a different paradigm to Science. It provides a framework where overcoming separateness and love can take place. As long as the world and others are frozen as objects, such reunion cannot be achieved.

"Setting at a distance" is essential: for thought, for movement, for perception, and for speaking. In order to see and frame in langauge, we must distance -- abstract. This is the nature of thought. And yet our abstractions from whole -- from process -- must not be such that they are reified and become treated as the thing-in-itself. "Setting at a distance" must not be allowed to cement into objects; our framework of thought must not estrange Self from Other. It is essential that we frame our conceptions in a way that we can overcome the separateness which is implicit in our distancing and thus preserve a dialog (Buber, 1957, p. 105).

Self-Love and Humanistic Psychology

A discussion of love would be incomplete without focusing upon self-love and the humanistic psychology which has embraced it.

Humanistic psychology emphasizes growth, aliveness, and the fulfillment of the person. Jourard (1971, p. 42) defined love as "action undertaken with the aim of fostering happiness and growth in the person loved." Humanistic psychology applies this attitude toward the happiness and growth of the person: seeking to teach individuals to cultivate this nurturing love toward self. It promotes the person's capacity to grow and unfold as a fully human potentiality: to be fully alive.

Humanistic psychology maintains that the person is in some way in contact with the principles of his or her own fulfillment. Fromm (1947, wrote

> Humanistic ethics . . . is formally based on the principle that only man himself can determine the criteria for virtue . . . 'good' is what is good for man and 'evil' is what is detrimental to man: the sole criterion of ethical value being man's welfare (p. 22).

This idea is at least as old as Spinoza. As related by Fromm (1947):

> Spinoza arrives at a concept of virtue: . . . 'To act absolutely in conformity with virtue is, in us, nothing but acting, living and preserving our being . . . .' Preserving one's being means to Spinoza to become that which one potentially is . . . . By good, consequently, Spinoza understands everthing 'which we are certain is a means by which we may approach nearer and nearer to the model of human nature he set before us.' By evil he understands 'everything which we are certain hinders us from reaching that model' (p. 35). [Italics Original]

Fromm (1947) wrote that

> All . . . have an inherent tendency to actualize their specific potentialities. The aim of man's life, therefore, is to

be understood as the unfolding of his powers according to the
laws of his nature . . . . To sum up, good in humanistic -
ethics is the affirmation of life, the unfolding of man's
powers. Virtue is responsiblity towards one's own existence.
Evil constitutes the crippling of mans powers; vice is irres-
ponsiblity towards himself (p. 29). [Italics Original]

The actualization of self and the realization of life is a common
theme in humanistic psychology. Life is seen as reaching for its
potentials; the striving for the creation of self. This attempt may go
uncultivated when the demands of survival are such that just staying
alive dominates one's energy. The person's effort at self-actualization
may be so feeble and misguided that its existence is obscured by its
insanity. Yet, given an opportunity of time or an outlet, humans strive
to be more.

Maslow (1962) spoke of "self-actualization." Rogers (1977) empha-
sized a "directional tendency" in self. Fromm (1947, 1968) spoke of
aliveness and becoming one's self. May (1975) and Allport (1950)
phrased it as "becoming." It is the human desire for fuller being; for
fulfillment of life.

Humanistic Psychology insists upon the Self's right to be, grow,
and develop into what one potentially is. This "person-centered"
approach to nurturing and growth represents a new and bold development.
Humanistic psychology maintains a faith that each individual is somehow
attuned to the larger principle of life. A person can "tap" this reser-
voir of "personal knowledge" as a basis for action and decision making.

The knowledge and the striving toward life can be trusted. In the
social realm, Laing (1964) argued that self is an accurate reflection of
the pressures, parameters, and opportunities of the social context in
which a person seeks to create his or her life. Rogers (1977, p. 8)
spoke of "dealing with clients whose lives . . . often seem abnormal,

twisted, scarcely human. Yet the directional tendency in them is to be trusted." Maslow (1962) formulated the desire to bring to life what the self can be as the process of "self-actualization." Rogers (1961) also spoke of the movement of self towards actualization:

> The organism has one basic tendency and striving -- to actualize, maintain, and enhance the experiencing organism.

> Rather than many needs and motives, it seems entirely possible that all organic and psychological needs may be described as partial aspects of this one fundamental need (p. 487).

Maslow (1962) wrote that:

> We can certainly now assert that at least a reasonable theoretical, and empirical case has been made for the presence within the human being of a tendency toward, or a need for growing in a direction that can be summarized in general as self-actualization, or psychological health. . . . That is, the human being is so constructed that he presses toward fuller and fuller being and this means pressing toward what most people would call good values, towards serenity, kindness, courage, honesty, love, unselfishness, and goodness (p. 155).

Harkening back to the Old Testament "I am becoming what I am becoming," humanistic psychology posits a potential for an unfolding of life. This is not a realized state of being, but a process of becoming. There are also echoes of Plato here and a kinship with Christian theology.

Love is Now. It is the recognition of the present that transforms. Eastern philosophy, recent Western theology and existential philosophy, and the emerging Humanistic Psychology all state this: that in coming fully into the present -- the Now -- there is a transition. Self is transformed in a realization of the present: an emphasis on fuller being. This is not a passive mediation, but an active present which ignites like the light of day and transforms self, personal perception, and the world. The Vision is but for tomorrow, the Feeling's here today, and Love is just the moment growing on the way. Humanistic

psychology contains such an understated epistemology. Within the person is hypothesized the possibility of a larger experience. This was Perls (1969) emphasis on "Now" and the realization of the presence of self.

Frankl (1965) argued that central to man is the "will to meaning." This is not a drive, but an aspiration in the Bergsonian sense. Man aspires to meaning: to make sense out of his existence. Following Frankl, we might speak of the actualization of meaning. With consciousness comes the will to meaning; with self-awareness is coupled the desire to create a meaningful self-existence. This "will to meaning" is the central purpose of human beings.

The desire for fuller life and fuller value demands a measure of self-determination to enact the knowledge gleamed from self-awareness. This idea of actualizing one's awareness into a meaningful world, is crucial to a humanistic conception of man.

> Upon close examination, Rogers' 'fully functioning person' and Maslow's 'self-actualized person' appear to be the natural outcomes of the unobstructed development of the process of self-realization. Under ideal conditions of growth, Perls has often stated, the human organism can be trusted to regulate itself toward optimal integration and interaction with its physical and social environment (Tageson, 1982, p. 43).

This was May's reason for stressing what he terms "intentionality" -- the need to give meaning to experience. A person acts because of purpose and must be free to discover that purpose and meaning. May (1969) wrote of

> . . . human beings given motivation by the new possibilities, the goals and ideals, which attract and pull them toward the future. This does not omit the fact that we are all partially pushed from behind and determined by the past, but it unites this force with its other half . . . . Purpose, which comes into the process when the individual becomes conscious of what he is doing, opens him to new and different possibilities in the future and introduces the element of personal responsibility and freedom (p. 93).

This follows Jung's earlier statement that "the mind lives by aims as well as causes" (Matson, 1964, p. 208). Human beings are not determined by causes or drives but seek for purpose and actualized meanings. Love is care for the growth of that which we love. Humanistic psychology applies attitude to personal meaning and purpose. Perhaps the ideal of this is expressed in the philosophy of Rogers (1977, p. 15) with its emphasis on facilitating, "positive regard," and providing an atmosphere of nonpossessive caring and love.

Self-Love vs. Hedonism

Many have criticized the humanistic movement as being nothing but a new branch of hedonism. However, it is not an operation of the pleasure principle. Pleasure is not the basis for value in humanistic ethics. Fromm (1947) wrote:

> Pleasure is not the aim of life but it inevitably accompanies man's productive activity . . . Goethe, Guyau, Nietzsche, to name only some important names, have built their ethical theories on the same thought (p. 180).

He quoted Spinoza: "Happiness is not the reward of virtue, but virtue itself" (Fromm, 1947, p. 176).

Fromm (1947, p. 182) continued: "The concepts of Plato, Aristotle, Spinoza, and Spencer have in common the idea . . . that happiness is conjunctive with the good."

> Master Eckhart taught that aliveness is conducive to joy . . . the distinction between joy and pleasure is crucial. Joy is the glow that accompanies being. Pleasure and thrill are conducive to sadness after the so-called peak has been reached; for the thrill has been experienced and the vessel has not grown (Fromm, 1976, p. 102).

Joy and pleasure are different principles. Pleasure is an end in itself: joy is related to fulfilled living and the happiness of a well-lived life. It is a fundamental part of the healthy personality. We

must be very careful to differentiate between happiness and hedonism. Hedonism seeks only pleasure for self. Happiness is related to success in the art of living and the healthy personality.

Self-Love and the Healthy Personality

Following Freud's direction, traditional psychology has had very little to say concerning the healthy person. When pressed, Freud defined the healthy individual in terms of the ability to "work and to love." His theory itself posited a "genital" or healthy phase of development. Yet, Freud did not explore this ground. His work concerned how people become fixated in previous stages never to arrive at full growth. It is the study of pathology and not healthy functioning. It remained for humanistic psychology, following Fromm and Maslow in particular, to break this ground. In fact, the work of Fromm and Maslow might be summarized as twofold: an exploration of love and an articulation of the healthy personality.

Maslow (1968) studied people who appeared successful in living. This is not success in the economic sense, but a healthy, fully functioning personality which could be identified as a model of psychological health. In these people, self had come to realization. He termed this "self-actualization."

Fromm's (1947) work on productiveness in the creation of self was an attempt to articulate Freud's hypothesized genital or healthy personality. He wrote that "If we do not use Freud's term literally [genital character] in the context of his libido theory but _symbolically_, it denotes quite accurately the meaning of productiveness" (Fromm, 1947, p. 90). [Italics Original]

It is from this framework that Fromm was led to discuss spontaneity (1941), relatedness (1956), aliveness (1968), and joy (1973). As Tageson (1982, p. 43) wrote, "Humanistic psychology seems to have set its sights squarely on the understanding of the parameters of healthy psychological functioning." Concepts such as self-love or affirmation, growth, self-determination, and the creation of a meaningful personal existence are essential for nurturing the self into fulfillment.

Humanistic psychology moved from an emphasis on pathology to an exploration of a model of psychological health. At the same time, though, it laid the implications for a new theory of pathology. As a theory of well-being developed, it became more and more important to explain why everyone did not by nature achieve such health. If the "good" is obviously better, then why do so many choose ways of living that are non-productive and unfulfilling? Why does not healthy functioning predominate? If aliveness, creativity, growth and a meaningful personal existence are better ways of living, then why would anyone desire to continue a stagnating, destructive approach to living which is literally death in life? The posing of a model of psychological well-being made the existence of evil problematic. Humanists needed to account for the existence of evil.

Fromm (1947) emphasized the humanist view:

Life destructive forces in a person occur in a an inverse relation to the life-furthering ones. It would seem that the degree of destructiveness is proportionate to the degree to which the unfolding of a person's capacity is blocked. Destructiveness is the outcome of unlived life (p. 218). [Italics Original]

Ernest Becker made a similar argument. In The Structure of Evil, he argued that those positing the "good" must explain evil. In reviewing the history of social thought since the Enlightenment, he noted that

we have actually made considerable progress toward an understanding of
this dynamic. Marx's theory of alienation and Freud's understanding of
self combined with the work of the early sociologists Ward, Small, and
Comte provided the basis for an understanding of evil. Becker (1974)
wrote that if we review a history of this thought, we learn that:

> Recurrent evils like sadism, militant hate, competitive greed,
> narrow pride, calculating self-interest that takes a non-
> chalant view of others' lives, mental illness in the extreme
> forms -- all stem from constrictions on behavior and from
> shallowness of meanings; and these could be laid in the lap of
> society, specifically, in the nature and type of education to
> which it submits its young; and to the kinds of choices and
> cognition which its institutions encourage and permit. Man
> could only be ethical if he was strong, and he could only be
> strong if he was given fullest possible cognition, and respon-
> sible control over his own powers. The only possible ethics
> was one which took man as a center, and which provided him
> with the conditions that permitted him to try to be moral.
> The antidote to evil was not to impose a crushing sense of
> supernatural sanction, or unthinking obligation, or automatic
> beliefs of any kind -- no matter how 'cheerful' they seem.
> For the first time in history it had become transparently
> clear that the real antidote to evil in society was to supply
> the possiblity of depth and wholeness of experience. Evil was
> a problem of esthetics -- that is, esthetics understood in
> its broad sense as the free creation of human meanings, and
> the acceptance of responsibility for them. It had never been
> so well understood that goodness and human nature were
> potentially synonymous terms; and evil was a complex reflex
> of the coercion of human powers (p. 168).

This was the humanistic epistemology of good and evil. God was a
product of the natural tendency for fulfillment of life. Evil resulted
from blocked life and the struggle to still live.

The Emphasis on Self

Self-love became the keystone of humanistic psychology. It was
here that one must begin to unravel the puzzle. All too often, we run
away from self as if self were unimportant. If we begin with the bibli-
cal "Love your neighbor as yourself," a different conception emerges
(Holy Bible, Mark 12: 31; Luke 10: 27).

Fromm (1947) wrote that there is a relation between the way we love ourselves and the way we love others. If we treat ourselves lightly, then our love of others is apt to be symbiotic union instead of mature love. Fusion under the condition of integrity demands that neither partner surrender self as a condition for the union. Self-love is an affirmation towards self. It stresses the right of the person to be, grow and develop. "You are a child of the universe no less than the moon and the stars; you have a right to be here" (Anonymous).

The person is central to purpose and meaning. If we blindly sacrifice the person for the sake of union, then it is impossible to preserve the human as the prime interest of humanism. It is the person who loves, who creates, and who bridges towards meaning. We cannot successfully compromise the person by granting eminent domain to the relationship and still preserve the possiblity of a full, dynamic union. Humanistic psychology approaches the self with an attitude of nurturing approval. This is a radical experiment. To treat the self and the person as the central term in our system of meaning implies a faith that we are somehow connected to something larger which will work itself out. It is an implied sociology, which needs to be articulated.

The psychotherapy of Rogers (1977, 1961) sought to facilitate the realization of self by providing an atmosphere of nonpossessive caring and love. Rogers developed this idea of positive regard for the self from the influence of Charles Horton Cooley's conception of the "looking-glass self" (Tageson, 1982, p. 137). Cooley maintained that we create our self-image by looking into the "mirror" of others; by obtaining their reaction, we create our own image of our self and who we are. By providing a nurturing, growth-oriented context which supports the

right of the person to be, Rogers hoped to achieve maximum personal growth. It is a strategy of love applied to social psychology. It attempts to create self-love which will then see the person through future trials and circumstances. Rogers was perhaps naive in his understanding of social dynamics, but he offered us a first step.

Attitude toward self and other is part of the same process. Fromm (1947) wrote that self-love is the same as love toward others: it implies the same kind of attitudes regardless of the object of one's love:

> The affirmation of one's own life, happiness, growth, freedom, is rooted in one's capacity to love, i.e., in care, respect, responsibility, and knowledge. If an individual is able to love productively, he loves himself too; if he can love only others, he cannot love at all (p. 135).

> Selfishness and self-love, far from being identical, are actually opposites. It is true that selfish persons are incapable of loving others, but they are not capable of loving themselves either (p. 136).

Nietzsche (1968, p. 99) on The Will to Power (Stanza 785) wrote that: "Your neighbor-love is your bad love of yourselves . . . Your flee unto your neighbor from yourselves. You cannot stand yourselves and you do not love yourselves sufficiently."

This echoes the biblical "Take the log out of your own eye and then you will be able to see clearly to take the speck out of your neighbor's eye" (Luke 6: 39-42).

> Nietzsche believed that there is a contradiction between love for others and love for oneself; yet his views contain the nucleus from which this false dichotomy can be overcome. The 'love' which he attacks is rooted not in one's own strength, but in one's own weakness (Fromm, 1947, p. 130).

Much of the love throughout history has represented the immature "flight from self." For if we do not respect self and personhood, then who is the giving for? We merely have unions of partial selves which

each feel insufficient and unworthy, and must flee to other for support. Self-love teaches that we must begin with our own awarenss in order to fully be capable of loving others. Otherwise our love is projection; our own self-abuse and the accompanying needliness pollutes our intimate relationships.

Love must move beyond the manipulation which passes for love and the debilitating altruism which makes Other a prisoner. The strategy of humanistic psychology is to nurture self-love in a way that mature love between whole persons can become a possibility. Love demands strength and self-knowledge. This self-knowledge and strength can only be achieved in an atmosphere which nourishes and supports the self's right to be.

> The essence of this view is this: Love is a phenomenon of abundance; its premise is the strength of the individual who can give. Love is affirmation and productiveness, 'It seeketh to create what is loved!' To love another person is only a virtue if its springs from his inner strength, but it is a vice if it is the expression of the basic inability to be oneself (Fromm, 1947, p. 131).

This is the true meaning -- despite other confusions -- of Maslow's (1962) hierarchy of needs. If one is too needy, then their outstretched arms are but a gesture polluted by unfinished needs. One tends to manipulate for these needs or be just plain masochistic. It is often simpler to take care of one's own needs rather than manipulatively enter into a relationship in the hope that the Other will then fulfill that need. It is after one has moved past the immediate priority of these survival needs that one can creatively love and reach out. Tageson (1982, p. 189) wrote only then can we approach "transcendent values of beauty, truth, and justice." . . . "Such values exist, Maslow claimed, and are discoverable when we are psychologically free to contemplate the

world revealed by experience rather than having to act upon it for our own needy purposes" (p. 190).

Maslow's hierarchy is a recognition that love normally takes place above the level of need because need makes fools of all of us from time to time. This does not mean -- as some have interpreted -- that love is a luxury item. It does mean that unless we address our own needs, we are forced to selfishly manipulate others to fulfill them.

The exploration of Self is relatively new territory. As Watts (1951) has shown, in most primitive cultures the concept of "self" as we know it does not exist. A concern of the American dream is that we do not subsume our freedom into quick conformity -- that the individual is important. Ultimately the American dream must mean more than just the rights of the individual; it must mean a full exploration of the fulfillment of the human potential: life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. This was Roszak's (1979) argument. The credo of self invites us not to melt back into One (or the dream) too soon without first knowing and experiencing self and our own sense of aliveness.

The concern with self should not be viewed as an end, but as a means. The awareness of self provides -- for perhaps the first time in history -- the possibility of meeting: of true relationship and love. The self-effacing altruism which Nietzsche criticized simply does not function as altruism. The "will to be" can be compromised or destroyed by obligation, expectation, and the whole process of conformity. Humanistic psychology teaches that we should take our own lives seriously, that we are important and valuable. If life goes on always for some other person or some outside cause, then where is this human that we say we prize so highly?

The nagging doubt and guilt at having become something less than ourselves is at the root of the neurosis which permeates our culture (May, 1975; Horney, 1937). Sociologically, we must recognize that this is no longer the only source of guilt. Obligation toward oneself is no more just an internal guilt for an unlived life -- of being less than self. With the advent of humanistic psychology, it has also turned into an external norm. One now has an externally imposed duty to self as duty to self as well as other social obligations. We will return to the implications of this later. They imply the need for a humanistic sociology.

For now, we must be concerned with the growing evidence in sociology and psychology that one cannot deny one's dreams -- we cannot run away from self without consequences. As Fromm (1968) wrote:

> The social order can do almost anything to man. The 'almost' is important. Even if the social order can do everything to man . . . this cannot be done without certain consequences which follow from the very conditions of human existence (p. 54).

Freud and all of the psychology which followed is nothing more than a compounded body of evidence that if we deny self in one form, it reappears in another. The person needs community and social relationship but this cannot be successfully bought at the price of too much conformity, obligation, and restriction. If we destroy or maim the person for the sake of the community, then who is the community for? The human will have vanished.

The classic argument in favor of societal eminent domain is but a freak example of society versus individual difference. We must be very careful in imposing and granting eminent domain to society once and for all. It is the person who is supposed to be enhanced by society. Becker (1968, p. 251) notes that "the idea held up by the Englightenment

itself . . . is the ideal for overcoming historical alienation: man must try to achieve maximum individuality _within_ maximum community." [Italics Original]

This is why Roszak (1979) stressed the historical movement past individual freedom and rights. Pluralism means a conception of the person and of personal fulfillment: the expression of meaning and potential. We can't compromise our _selves_ for the community -- this is the lesson of modern psychology and sociology.

Yet, humanistic psychology has placed us in a double-bind as far as norms are concerned. There is a dichotomy between personal needs for closeness and needs for expression/independence. Dowling (1981) in _The Cinderella Complex: Women's Hidden Fear of Independence_, documented the pushes and the pulls between the need for security/relatedness and the nagging need to be self and under one's own power. She is speaking in terms of the "Women's Movement," but this is far from only a woman's dilemma. It is accentuated for women because the development of a self for women -- apart from role identities in relation to man or children -- is a fairly recent issue. The push and pull between duty to self and desire for the security of Other is synonymous with the problems involved in the creation of self. It is central to being authentically human living past role definitions of relatedness and identity.

If we surrender self for relationship, we cast ourselves as strangers. We cannot fluctuate between trading self for security and then fleeing that shelter, without feeling that we are trapped in a maze which refuses to reveal our own identity. Any escape from self is only a reprieve. We begin to desire the values of self as soon as we have warmed ourselves by the fire of "love." As soon as we have been

re-valued as humans, the dreams of an unlived life will begin to haunt us. Cohen (1967) has accurately depicted this dilemma in the "Stranger Song":

And then leaning on your window sill
He'll say one day you caused his will
to weaken with your love and warmth and shelter,
And taking from his wallet
An old schedule of trains, he'll say,
'I told you when I came I was a stranger,'
'I told you when I came I was a stranger,'

But now another stranger seems
To want you to ignore his dreams
As though they were the burden of some other . . .
And while he talks his dreams to sleep
You'll notice there's a highway
Curling up like smoke above his shoulder
(n.p.).

There is no exit from our dreams and our values of self. In the end, our dreams possess us either as roads that we must take or guilts which haunt our familiar security. The Women's Movement, as well as the whole movement toward self, offers the opportunity, for perhaps the first time in history, to come together as full human beings and explore the human potential. That human possibility is love.

Self and the Social

The concern with the healthy personality and the actualized self pushes humanistic psychology to its discipline boundary. For now we must view the shoreline of self. We must consider the social context of self and formulate the relation of Self to Other. The self is not a "self"-contained unit. Its boundary and very creation is involved with other people. Maslow (1962) wrote:

We are confronted with a difficult paradox when we attempt to describe the complex attitude toward the self or ego of the growth-oriented, self-actualized person. It is just this person, in whom ego-strength is at its height, who most easily

> forgets or transcends the ego, who can be most problem-
> centered, most self-forgetful, most spontaneous in his activi-
> ties . . . In such people, absorption in perceiving, in
> doing, in enjoying, in creating can be very complete, very
> integrated and very pure (p. 37).

It is precisely the "self" actualized person who can become involved with other people, who can share the boundary of self and create in the moment, who can "lose" oneself. It is the unactualized person who must cling to ego as if it were made of gold. The actualized "self" allows the boundary between Self and Other to become porous: he or she can transcend self and participate in another.

Humanistic psychology originates in the need for self-love. The full "self" can extend and stretch its boundaries -- can move in and participate in another's space without then destroying Other. Love allows a shifting, moving boundary between Self and Other without having to claim all for self. Self-love includes a reverence for Other and is a stance toward life. Humanistic psychology seeks to avoid the debili-tatiing altruism which turns Other into a prisoner. It also seeks to prevent Self from fusing too quickly: of giving up self to merge with other. For if we too quickly negate the human in order to fit ourselves to relationship, then we will never know the possiblities of life.

As the poet McWilliams (n.d.) wrote:

> Yes, two halves do make a whole.
> But when two wholes coincide,
> That is beauty.
> That is love.
> (Poster, n.p.)

Humanistic psychology begins as an attempt to move beyond symbiotic relationship to a full human encounter. Seeing the abuses of the self-effacing altruism and self-denial, humanistic psychology advanced an

effort to correct these defects. However, such strategies must be kept in context. It began as an attempt to create whole selves because only full selves can come together and meet in love. It was not an end in itself. If we view the self-love psychology as the climax and the pinnacle of the movement, then we miss the point. It was part of a process and the implementation of a strategy to love: an attempt to create self in a way that would further meeting, greeting, and sharing. It sought to create a "self" that wasn't compromised. Relationship is not founded on one person giving away self to another, but on the mutual creation of both partners. The flight from self is the key to our inability to fully relate. Humanistic psychology sought to create true relationship without swindling the individual for the sake of the community. It was an exploration of the real human potential which is meeting, relationship, and community: of ways to come together in the fullness of our selves.

Humanistic psychology desired to move beyond the denial of self which has characterized history. It sought the true possibility of the blossoming of self in relationship. This was the cornerstone of the movement: that self need not be negated for relationship or society to be possible. Self-denial was deemed not a virtue, but a mechanism which prevented fuller love.

Yet, self-love and the psychological approach met the sociological shoreline of other. The embrace of self was not without its problems: "the message of duty to self seemed like the perfect alternative. Fromm, Rogers, May and Maslow had all effectively criticized the restrictive effects of self-denial" (Yankelovich, 1981, p. 242).

With the doors to self-actualization and human potential open, it

often became difficult to distinguish between self-fulfillment and hedonism. When were they "following their heart" and when were they simply "following their greed?" The duty to self-philosophy had a tendency to be reified as a private movement not concerning others. The line between effective strategies for a fuller self capable of entering into meaningful relationships became confused with the self that merely wants to horde. Yankelovich (1981) wrote:

> The self is not confined to private consciousness in the sense of feelings and potentials unique to you and somehow impri- soned within your skull or skin. That is one aspect of self. But the self is also part and parcel of the world.

> You are not the sum of your desires. You do not consist of an aggregate of needs, and your inner growth is not a matter of fulfilling all your potentials. By concentrating day and night on your feelings, potentials, needs, wants and desires, and by learning to assert them more freely, you do not become a freer, more spontaneous, more creative self; you become a narrower, more self-centered, more isolated one. You do not grow, you shrink.

> The search for self-fulfillment cannot succeed unless its seekers discard the assumption of the self as private con- sciousness. Only when one understands that self must be ful- filled with the shared meanings of the psychoculture is one pursuing self-fulfillment realistically (p. 242).

We cannot isolate Self from Other; we cannot separate self from cultural meanings and resources. No matter how neglected the search for self-fulfillment has been, we must not forget to also understand human beings in relation. "Love is between an I and a You," Buber wrote. "Whoever does not know this with his being, does not know love" (Buber, 1957, p. 66). It is the experience between Self and Other which is critical. The individual potential is not the human potential because it merely cultivates the individual for marketplace success. The human potential is the human possibility.

Perhaps this is no better illustrated than by the "God is inside

You" rhetoric. We must be careful to recognize that the individual person is not God, even though he or she participates in this larger spirit of God. God is contained in humanity: between us in our interaction. It is a consciousness that we <u>share</u>. This is why Buber was so insistent that love is an "inbetween" space belonging neither to psychology nor to traditional sociology.

We must understand the play of the spirit between people if we are to understand love. Love is a spirit which shows up when other games have been dropped. We must understand that the nature of self is such that I and You are a mutual creation. The "self" is socially created in the relationship between "Self" and "Other". This is the key of the sociological view and the only way we can approach a fuller understanding of love. A humanistic psychology is incomplete without a companion humanistic sociology. As Cooley (1902, n.p.) wrote: "The individual and the group are but two sides of the same coin."

Self is fundamentally and inseparably related to Other. This was also Mead's social psychology of the formation of the self. Mead argued that self was created in a process of the moment: that it was fundamentally social (Mead, 1934). The self is a social process.

We must reflect back to what we mean when we use the word "self." It does not mean that the Self is self-sufficient; or a person unto oneself who does not need other people. Self is an experiencer -- a boundary with the world and others. In many ways, the term "Self" is a paradox: "I can only know that much of myself as I am willing to confide in you." "I know myself most when I am in relation with another." "I am most myself when I experience myself through love with another." At times, I lose myself in relationships, and I must withdraw to

solitude. But too much solitude is loneliness and I also lose myself. I can only regain myself when I find a "you" with whom I can share. And I can only retain myself when I don't just become that "You."

What does "self" mean? What is a whole "self"? The answer can only be that it means an <u>integrity</u>: not giving up one's identity or violating one's "self". Self-love is refusal to compromise aspects of self which are crucial to one's own sense of well being. It is allowing time and space for development of those aspects of self which provide one with a sense of joy and accomplishment. One does not finish the creation of self and then become ready for relationship. Self is not an accomplishment that can be completed. Self is a process. A whole self does not mean that self-creation has now been completed. A whole self means a sense of integrity.

The boundary of Self is Other. And that boundary changes from interaction to interaction; from thought to thought; from moment to moment. At times we are so close that the boundaries of consciousness blur. Consciousness becomes a thing that we share: that we both participate in. To understand love, we must understand that boundary between Self and Other: where touching, greeting, and meeting become magic. As Rilke (1975, n.p.) wrote: "Love consists in this: that two solitudes touch, and meet, and greet one another."

We know ourselves best when we have comfortably set the boundary between our self and the world. Too much self is loneliness. The ideal amount is called solitude: time to reflect, remember, and regroup. Some accomplishments of self require some amount of isolation: where we are forced back on the resources of self to gain new knowledge. Self is a balancing act between too much and too little.

Our sense of identity is established by communicating and meeting. Self is a relatedness toward the world which feels comfortable. If we push for our rights too strongly, sometimes we abuse another's integrity. We also lose our power of self-creation. The facility with which our wishes are catered too often leads to self-indulgence where we attempt to institutionalize the "free lunch". But to touch and greet requires a sense of self: an authenticity which strikes us as "us." It is only through such integrity that we can approach true communication and relationship. Self and relation are intertwined: a part of the same process. We will not be finished with either until death.

Cooley (1929) formulated the concept of the "looking-glass self." We see ourselves in the mirror of others. It is through interaction and relation that we are able to attain a sense of who we are. Rogers (1961, p. 1977) used this concept of the "looking-glass self" to develop a strategy of love. He attempted to create a social context of "positive self-regard" (Tageson, 1982). Roger's strategy was to positively reinforce the creation of self thus teaching self-love and nurturance. Yet such a strategy is sociologically naive because except in rare instances, we have neither the self or the social context in hand. In psychotherapy and institutional settings, positive nurturance can bring the person to life. But in normal interaction, the dynamics between Self and Other are a much more complicated process.

In some ways, humanistic psychology creates a false "self." Popular humanistic psychology spin-offs miss the point. They can only be adapted as far as current capitalistic goals allow. Utlimately, we must change the system: the way people live their lives, relate and conceive of self. Otherwise, techniques of mediation, stress reduction, and

self-formation merely funnel back into the main cultural scenarios.
They dissipate and are only momentary "shots in the arm"; leaving one
even more "burnt" and alienated from self and others. What is required
are effective social arrangements, goals and ways of living that are
brought to bear upon one's whole life.

In many ways, the term "self" has been abused. Freud wrote in the
time when the approaching industrial society was watching the extended
family give way to the nuclear family. The individual no longer felt a
kinship outside of the mobile, self-sufficient unit of husband-wife-
children. Moving past extended family ties that saw one generation
bound to another was the whole core of Freud's theory of the development
of self. Popularizing Freud and his version of self as breaking away,
it now seems that we have come to an ideal version of self as a self-
sufficient unit: a nuclear self -- which moves encapsulated without
relatedness. But Self doesn't mean that.

Part of this is confused by the issue of the freedom mythos of the
American dream. In myth and legend, we have all heard testimony to a
rare human possiblity: relatedness, of living as a part of all with a
sense of freedom. This freedom represents a call of the spirit -- and
is psychological in nature: the heart's desire. But it is not an acci-
dent that the humanistic psychology movement sprang upon the cultural
scene the same time the latest experiement with freedom -- the American
Counterculture -- flourished. Roszak (1979) was right about what
historically happened to the counterculture -- it become enculturated in
the personhood movement of humanistic psychology. However, he was very
wrong about its possiblities. Routinized, the personhood movement
implied that others become but a support group for the creation of Self.

But self is not fitted to such a conception. The capitalistic ideal of the nuclear self must give way to another conception: self in relationship.

We must realize that life is not a possession of Self. It does not mean that I have contained myself but that I have experienced life.

> He: 'I can't believe how you make love: You totally give yourself.'
>
> She: 'Well of course, that's the only way it's ever worth while.'[6]

The human possibility: to flow with the grain and purpose of life: to feel related; a part of something larger. To share and participate in the birth/creation of Self and Other. To know life. This is the true freedom. To feel at one with life. It is not a matter of individual freedom but the right of the person to know life's fulfillment. Things become muddled if we confuse "freedom from" with "freedom to"; if we confuse ego maintenance with satisfaction. As the poet Gibran wrote, "Love is the only freedom."

The counterculture and humanistic psychology became confused about this issue of relatedness in much the same manner that they were con- fused about the American dream and its historical movement toward free- dom: both have taken relatedness for granted. As the counterculture's Whole Earth Catalog summarized, you cannot put it together, it is together. But such statements miss the point. Releatedness is knowing the freedom of being part of all while celebrating that knowledge.

Melville, the first great American novelist, wrote to Nathaniel Hawthorne:

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[6]Dialog from the movie Secrets.

> Whence come you, Hawthorne? By what right do you drink from
> my flagon of life? And when I put it to my lips --lo, they
> are yours and not mine. I feel that the Godhead is broken up
> like bread at the Supper, and that we are the pieces. Hence
> this infinite fraternity of feelings (Baird, 1979, p. 222).

It was as if Melville was saying, "is it a dream or has God been dissected into parts, and we the parts, now sailors on the sea of His dream?" The American dream of self provided the real frontier.

Melville's Captain Ahab sailed the sea of this dream on a quest for power and glory. And though he saw "infinity in the twinkling of an eye" he did not explore it. Instead, he set sail alone on a dream of self. Unless we explore how far this potential identity for soul-with-soul actually goes, then we abandon ourselves to self with the full possibilities of life unshared. The vision will remain unexplored. In some ways, self does not exist but is a "summons to be created." If we cast off the grander aspects that we discover in life to self, then creativity -- the life spring -- is only recreation. Creativity means moving past what we though was self and embracing a relatedness with other. It means allowing our experience of love and the magical to re-structure our lives. Recreation is merely the experience we have before we return to the regular world. It leaves common reality unaltered and intact.

In true magical experiences of love, the self meets, merges, and interplays with other. If we define Self as a fixed unit, then we return to the normal world as if nothing had happened. Love becomes merely recreational rather than re-shaping and re-structuring our lives and social arrangements. We must come together for more than a brief recollection of the dream. We must experience ourselves as part of another self that is beyond our intents and purposes. Only on the

shoreline do we find the dream. Only at the boundary between Self and
Other do we experience our creation. It is only on this shifting shore
that we find our freedom. Commitment to something larger: our birth in
daylight. A celebration in joy and laughter of this quiet relatedness
is this gentle dream. We only become whole in love. We only glimpse
the stairway and taste truth out beyond the confines of ourself.

> Each soul is a summons to be created
> And none fulfilled
> Till two can see
> then dancing
> Greet with thee
> We create eternity.
>
> But meeting is our only door
> Not recreation, something more
> the patterns of our lives
>
> To meet and greet
> And finally come
> To fulfill the dance
> As One
> (Writer Original).

There is another way in which we might frame an understanding of
self-love. This becomes apparent if we consider Neill's (1960, 1966)
experiment in freedom at Summerhill. Summerhill was an exploration of
growth and the abolition of rules. It was the concept of democracy
applied to an educational setting. Yet through this process of freedom
and self-expression, one norm developed. It was this: "If someone is
standing on your toes, it is your responsibility to yell 'ouch.'" In a
society of freedom, one may not be aware that he/she is treading on
another. It becomes the self's responsibility to complain when it
hurts. This is a version of self-love; the simple articulation that
self exists and yes, "you are stepping on my toes." Such demonstration
does not reduce self to a power struggle, but opens the process up to
dialog. It allows the recognition that freedom and self-exploration

involve other. We can never successfully conceive of the development of
self except in relation to other.

Self-love is affirmation of self. It is being nice to self in the
sense of not setting oneself up for needless pain and suffering: an
affirmation that self deserves more of happiness and less of
unhappiness. It is an acceptance that one is indeed worthy of the
blessings of life.

There is also a sense in which Self can dissipate into something
smaller and more petty. This is what we might term self-indulgence.
This is not a part of self-love, but its opposite. Over-indulgence
destroys self. If we try to actualize all potential experiences, we
lose our identity and end up like leaves in the wind. What self-
actualization really means is to create a viable self; it is the experi-
ence of self as an integrity and an identity. Self-love is the feeling
of having funneled one's energies into the construction of a life which
is authentic and meaningful: to be able to say on one's deathbed "Yes,
I have lived."

In relation to the difference between self-love and self-
indulgence, we might ask rhetorically, "Is the self a fleeting passion,
a series of wants that demand immediate satisfaction; or is the self an
ongoing integrity -- an identity?" The answer should be obvious.

Paul Tillich added some clarity to the discussion of self-love and
self-indulgence. The cutting line is the idea of justice.

> There is a definite sense in which one can speak of justice
> towards oneself, namely in the sense that the deciding centre
> is just towards the elements of which it is the centre.
> Justice towards oneself in this sense decides, e.g., that the
> puritan form of self-control is unjust because it excludes
> elements of the self which have a just claim to be admitted to
> the general balance of strivings. Repression is injustice to
> oneself and it has the consequence of all injustice: it is

self-destructive because of the resistance of the elements
excluded. This, however, does not mean that the chaotic
admittance of all strivintgs to the central decision is a
demand of the justice towards oneself. It may be highly
unjust, insofar as it makes a balanced center impossible and
dissolves the self into a process of disconnected impulses.
This is the danger of the romantic or open type of self-
control. It can become as unjust towards oneself as the
puritan or closed type of self control. To be just towards
oneself means to actualize as many potentialities as possible
without losing oneself in disruption and chaos.

This is a warning not to be unjust toward oneself in the
relation of love. For this is always also an injustice
towards him who accepts the injustice which we exercise
towards ourselves. He is prevented from being just because he
is forced to abuse by being abused (Tillich, 1954, p. 70).

This cuts both ways. It refers to the puritan types of justice

where one surrenders self-identity only to have it resurface in a mani-

pulating altruism. It also refers to the open type of self "control"

which causes the flurry of the moment "to dissipate any ongoing contin-

uity." This second type of attitude forces us to abuse ourselves in

just the processes which we believe will bring us self-fulfillment.

Striving after too many potentials may leave us drained, tired and

unable to really experience happiness in the attainment of any of them.

Yankelovich (1981) wrote that we have basically institutionalized two

types of self-control: one is the self-denial which has characterized

normative structures throughout the ages. The other is relatively new and

is the "duty to self" philosophy: that there is plenty of everything and

one can have anything that they want. He argued that the "abundance of

everything" scenario will not work, but at the same time, it will be

impossible for selves raised on self-fulfillment to return to self-denial

as a practical strategy. The revolution of consciousness and the fulfill-

ment of the human potential will have to take the form of advances in

meanings, community, and the whole nature of the social bond. This will

require an ethic of commitment which transcends the narrowness of self but at the same time furthers all selves.

The duty to self ethic itself has taken a peculiar form. For at first, it did not appear that the credo "Be yourself" or "Do your own thing" is a social norm -- and imposed from the outside. Yet, as humanistic psychology became popularized, guilt over not having fully lived became institutionalized into a "duty to self" ethic. This led to more guilt at not having actualized all of one's potentials; it became an additional pressure when in fact it had been designed to free the individual: a psychological device (self-actualization) had slipped over into the realm of social consequences. It may be hard for some to recognize that the personhood movement -- which decries expectations, norms and the like -- has translated into expectations and norms. Yankelovich (1981) illustrated this perfectly:

> A psychologist friend told me an anecdote which had amused -- and bemused -- her. A patient in psychotherapy with her, a woman in her mid-twenties, complained that she had become nervous and fretful because life had grown so hectic -- too many big weekends, too many discos, too many late hours, too much talk, too much wine, too much pot, too much love-making.
>
> 'Why don't you stop?' asked the therapist mildly. Her patient stared blankly for a moment, and then her face lit up, dazzled by an illumination. 'You mean I really don't have to do what I want to do?' she burst out with amazement.
>
> Ordinarily we think of norms in opposition to desires -- dictating what we should do (wake-up, work hard, buckle down, use moderation), as distinct from what we would like to do. It had never occurred to her, my friend admitted, that norms could support desires and that people could come to feel it was their moral duty to yield to their impulses. Her psychological thinking had been influenced by Freud, and she had come to think of social norms as the outgrowths of the parental do's and don'ts people internalize in early stages of development. She made no clear distinction between individual conscience and social norms, or rules (pp. 83-84).

The norm of "duty to self" can send one fleeing from self-identity just as self-denial might. If self-actualization is translated into a

norm, its original meaning is dissipated. It becomes but another in the long list of social obligations. Authenticity, at this level, becomes a charade. The power of self-actualization becomes confused with the power to assert one's will over another to get one's whim. Self-actualization thus becomes routinized into the normal societal order.

Now we can understand more fully the inter-relation between self and other. De Rougemont wrote that relationship is a process of mutual commitment where each self creates the other. Commitment

> . . . thus understood sets up the person. For the person is manifested like something made, in the widest sense of making . . . . Its first condition is a fidelity to something that before was not, but now is in process of being created . . . . It is by this roundabout way through the other that self arises into being a person. . . . What denies both the individual and his natural egotism is what constructs a person (De Rougemont, 1956, p. 307).

But the cult of self would deny such parameters. Self and other must then be reduced to a symbiotic relationship. Others become simply pawns in our game, or we in theirs. The denial of the existence of the other is essential in such a strategy. Other can be a face in the sunset or a star to guide our projections, but can never be allowed to be more than an extended appendage of self. Other must become unreal. We are reminded of the earlier romanticism.

> When the love in the Manichaean legend had undergone the great ordeals of initiation, he is met, you remember, by a 'dazzling maiden' who welcomes him with the words: 'I am thyself.' . . . Fidelity is then a mystic narcissism -- usually unconscious of course, and imagining itself to be true love for the other.

> The love of Tristan and Iseult was the anguish of being two; and its culmination was a headlong fall into the limitless bossom of Night, there where individual shapes, faces, and destinies all vanish . . . . The other has to cease to be the other, and therefore to cease to be altogether, in order that he or she shall cease to make me suffer and that there may be only 'I myself am the world!' But married love is the end of

anguish, the acceptance of a limited being whom I love because
he or she is a summons to be created, and that in order to
witness to our allegiance this being turns with me towards
day. . . . But few people now seem to be able to distinguish
between an obsession which is undergone and a destiny that we
shoulder (De Rougemont, 1956, p. 308).

De Rougemont (1956) argued it is uncontrolled passion that

destroys the self.

It is Eros, passionate love . . . that spread through the
European world the poison . . . that Nietzsche unjustly lays
at the door of Christianity. And it is Eros, not Agape, that
glorified our death instinct and sought to idealize it . . . .
The god Eros is the slave of death because he wishes to ele-
vate life above our finite and limited creature state
(p. 311).

It is the reckless passion which refuses to recognize the other as

a person, which in turn, destroys ourselves as a person. This is the

flight from self. Self is not a fleeting desire, but a created contin-

uity. The inability to recognize the inseparable relationship between

self and other encourages us to flee in the hope that another will save

us. Heroes and princesses dies hard. But without ever moving past the

myth of self, it is not possible to arrive at the actual self. Indul-

gence must give way to a faith in an active self which we are creating.

In some ways, it is only by "virtue of the absurd" -- that is, by

"faith" -- that we maintain and create our chosen integrity.

On the analogy of faith, passion, born of a fatal desire for
mystical union, may be regarded as open to being surpassed and
fulfilled only thanks to the meeting with some other, and the
admission fo this other's alien life and ever distinct person,
which although distinct, holds the promise of unending alli-
ance and begins a real dialog.

Then dread having been banished by response and nostalgia by
response, we both cease . . . to suffer, and accept our day-
light. It is then that marriage is possible. We are two in
contentment. . . . However, . . . married couples are not
saints . . . . We are unendingly and incessantly in the thick
of the struggle between nature and grace; unendingly and inces-
santly happy and then happy. But the horizon has not remained

the same. A fidelity maintained in the Name of what does not change as we change will gradually disclose some of its mystery; beyond tragedy another happiness awaits. A happiness resembling the old, but no longer belonging to the form of the world, for this new happiness transforms the world (De Rougemont, 1956, pp. 322-323). [Italics Original]

This is the true romance: the creation of self and other.

If self expands without considering the other, then self is misunderstood. If one flees from self, then one must abuse other. There is no integrity or continuity from which to meet. Self can only meet other if both are allowed to exist.

If one person simply subsumes another, then there is no distance over which to communicate; there is no separateness for love to bridge. One person has simply become an appendage of the other. To echo Buber, love is between self and other. Without both, there is no dialog and there is no love.

Other is not simply a projection of self. Even though self may be ultimately connected to Consciousness itself and intuitively a part of all the world, there is a separate other who is also connected with this same larger awareness. We can only explore other if we realize that he or she is other. Only then are we capable of meeting. Only then can we explore the magic of two souls put to purpose.

It is not a historical accident that "self psychology" and the "women's movement" appeared at the same time. This is the mystery which the ideal of self and the feminist movement seeks to disclose. It was Kant who maintained that humanism is the refusal to treat the other as merely a "means." Other is not a means for the self, but an end. Other is separate and real. Only then can we move back and forth across the boundary in the experience of love.

. . . A man gives evidence of his love for a woman by treating
her as a completely human person, not as if she were spirit of
the legend -- half-goddess, half-bacchante, a compound of
dreams and sex . . . .

Women turn into persons instead of being reflections or means
. . . . A man . . . feels the difficult and serious mystery
of an independent, alien existence: he realizes that he has
been desiring only an illusory or fleeting aspect of what is
actually a complete life, and that this aspect has been but a
projection of his own reverie. . . . The sway of the myth is
by so much weakened, and although this sway is unlikely ever
to be entirely abolished without leaving traces in hearts
drugged by images, hearts such as men harbor today, at least
it loses its efficacy. The myth no longer determines the per-
son (De Rougemont, 1956, pp. 312-313).

Such a conception fo the other as person, and not as convenient

indulgence for self, is accomplished

. . . by becoming accustomed not to separate desire from love.
For if desire travels swiftly and anywhere, love is slow and
difficult. Love . . . exacts nothing less than this pledge in
order to disclose its real nature. . . . Neither the excuse
nor the alibi can deceive any one who does not wish to be
deceived because he thinks deception will be to his advantage;
they are [part] of a romantic rhetoric, and allowable in that
form, but only become ridiculous if confused with psycholog-
ical truth (De Rougemont, 1956, p. 313).

Love needs a commitment to love to reveal its secrets. It is a

commitment to "I" and to "You". One will know self with a maturity.

Only then can one come to other "whole" and undeceived. There is a twin

frontier on the human potential exploration. It is self. And it is

other. It is I. And it is you.

Synergy

Humanistic sociology explores the space between self and other

where both self and other are created. It is here that the frontier of

love appears: as the boundary moves back and forth from self to the

other. This boundary is constantly changing and collapsing. It is in

sharing this flow that love is discovered.

Love appears as if by magic: a spirit which shows up when we share the space; it is a spirit that plays between our lives. Perhaps a muse or perhaps a creation of the pooling of human power, it moves from one to the other, belonging to neither. A mystery: shared by both; and whence it comes, and where it goes, we do not know. The mystery moves from shore to shore. We know the experience, but how do we build a world in keeping with this experience? So many ways of framing the conversation drives love from our midst. Love is not a product of science. It is by invitation only.

How do we develop social structures and social arrangements which encourage and facilitate the invitation? Our theories tend to become plots for our lives: how do we develop a manner of speaking that does not violate the fullness of love? How do we create conditions where love can come into play? Precisely, how do we court the muse? Humanistic psychology arrives at this point and stops with the answer of pluralism. Each individual is separate; there can be no canopy which does not reduce the human spirit. Each individual perspective is distinct. We must respect the distance and not try to move beyond it.

> I am I and You are You.
> If by chance we find each other,
> It's beautiful
> If not, it can't be helped
> (Perls, 1969, p. 1).

I am I and You are You. We move back and forth. Sometimes love happens to us. If not, we move on. To attempt more brings us to reducing and negating the human. I am I and You are You -- and never the twain shall meet; except sometimes, by chance. The conclusion is that there is no way to deal with love and humanism except to recognize the fundamental pluralism of persons.

It was the genius of Ruth Benedict who provided us with a way out of this dilemma. With one stroke, she simultaneously solved two major philosophical questions that have been outstanding for nearly two thousand years; she gives us a cornerstone for humanistic sociology and theoretical way through the maze of perspectivism.

Benedict devoted her entire career arguing for the anthropological stance of cultural relativity. Cultural relativity was both foundation for anthropological and banner of its academic credibility. Ruth Benedict's lifework was to institute cultural relativity firmly within the profession of anthropology. Only in her later years did she begin talking publically about another concept. This concept had been haunting her for years because at first glance it seemed to undermine the core stance of cultural relativity. And yet, it was not the opposite of cultural relativity, but the first concept that emerges when we move beyond scientific neutrality. The concept she introduced was synergy.

She provided the social disciplines a way of finally moving within the structures of the ancient "good" vs. "Truth" debate. Of her concept, Maslow (1962) wrote:

> From this point of view, a society or a culture can be either
> growth-fostering or growth-inhibiting. . . . This makes
> theoretically possible a comparative sociology, transcending
> and including cultural relativity. The 'better' culture grat-
> ifies all basic human needs and permits self-actualization.
> The 'poorer' cultures do not (p. 211).

Benedict found a way of talking of values -- of "better" -- without negating a scientific framework. The armchair anthropologist and the zealous missionary had approached primitive cultures wielding values like a sword. Cultural relativity demanded that anthropologists take the time to understand what a value meant to the actor involved and to

appreciate how the act integrated into the cultural way of life and rendition of meaning. In her travels and studies, though, Benedict found one thought that she simply could not deny: some cultures -- some ways of life -- from any human standpoint, seemed preferable to others. Some cultures seemed to make life miserable for all of those involved. Other cultures made social arrangements such that the person was promoted to joy and fulfillment. These cultures appeared "objectively" to be "better" if we take into account that a society functions for the human actors in its system. Culture is not just a self-perpetuating end-in-itself, but a way of life for a given number of people. Benedict found herself forced to conclude that in some cultures life was -- and she was not comfortable with the word -- "good."

Benedict had studied the relation between individual character types and the social arrangements in which they lived. In some cultures, acts undertaken for the individual good also created a mutual good for others. In other systems, personal advancement could only be achieved at "the expense of others." In the former instances, personality types shared values similar to the values all systems of universal ethics recommend. In the later cases, individuals were greedy, selfish, and often paranoid. Benedict postulated and offered evidence that the component that accounted for this was the degree of convergence between the individual good and the good of others. This collaboration of group and individual good she called synergy. "Synergy, the old term used in medicine and theology to mean combined action . . . greater than the sum of their separate actions" (Benedict, 1970, p. 321).

In the synergistic social arrangement, the person comes out larger in social relationships. In the non-synergistic arrangement, the person

is reduced for the sake of these relationships. The synergistic society manages to promote the individual. The non-synergistic society must deplete the person in order to create its system of meaning.

Actually, Benedict was not the first to bring the concept of synergy into sociological and anthropological circles. She was reintroducing the term at a particularly crucial juncture; but whether she was aware of the previous usage is not known. The early sociologist Ward (1907) had used the word synergy to mean a creative synthesis. For Ward, it was the integrative principle of all social evolution.

> Creative synthesis is a principle of far-reaching application. All the products of natural genesis involve appropriate principles . . . There is a principle, operating in every department of nature and at every stage of evolution, which is conservative, creative, and constructive . . . I have at last fixed upon the word synergy as the term best adapted to express its twofold character of energy and mutuality, or the systematic and organic working together of the antithetical forces of nature . . . Synergy is a synthesis of work, or synthetic work, and this is what is everywhere taking place (Ward, 1907, p. 170). [Italics Original]

Creative synthesis thus brings together seemingly diverse elements, arriving at an arrangement for mutual advantage. The influence of Hegel's "dialectic" must be noticed here. There is also a correlation with Bergson's later theories of social evolution. If synergy is a better arrangement, then people will aspire to such arrangements if given the proper cultural context. To Ward, synergy is "the balancing of forces" (Chugerman, 1939, p. 151).

> The human race began as an undifferentiated group, the horder containing all the elements of the most developed society. At length, a process of integration began, according to the principle by which all organization takes place, vix., synergy (Ward, 1907, p. 203).

> Everything in nature goes through the stages of thesis, antithesis, and synthesis -- conflict, assimilation, decay, and rebirth. Taking the two words synthesis and energy, he coined

> the word <u>synergy</u> to denote the universal teamwork of natural
> forces . . . To describe the use of synergy by the human mind,
> Ward borrowed the term <u>creative synthesis</u> from Wundt
> (Chugerman, 1965, p. 104). [Italics Original]

To Ward, synergy is the process that advances human evolution. It is likely, however, that the world filtered through modern medicine before it reached Ruth Benedict's ear.

In medicine, synergy means substances that when acting together produce a result greater than the sum of their individual actions. The textbook example is the interaction between codeine and aspirin. Taken together, they enhance each other and produce a result greater than could have been predicted by simply adding together their individual actions. There is an interaction bonus so that 1 + 1 = more than 2. The sum of their combined action is greater than the sum of their individual actions.

Benedict dealt with synergy in terms of cultural arrangements but the application of the concept can be applied to smaller social arrangements. Indeed, if we apply the concept to interpersonal relations, it supplies an accurate operational definition of love.

Benedict's only published insights on synergy involved the relation between the macro-societal and the individual; however, they throw a light on the problem of relation and the conceptualization of love. She had sought for years to develop, as Harris (1970) put it, a concept that would organize anthropological data around humanistic values.

Benedict had spent her life destroying ethnocentrism. To bridge the topic of "the good" culture meant to open oneself to charges of value-bias. Benedict's lectures at Bryn Mawr on synergy never were published in original form. The only copy was lost when Maslow became convinced that he was a poor custodian because the elderly Benedict would

outlive him. He sent the manuscript back to her -- shortly before her final heart attack. The synergy papers never turned up (Harris, 1970). It remained for Maslow to later publish excerpts that had been hand transcribed by another professor (Benedict, 1970). We only have scattered hints of the fullness of her views: the reproduced parts from the original lectures and recollections from various private conversations. Why she did not publish them in her lifetime will probably remain a mystery. As Harris (1970) noted, one could certainly understand her hesitancy, for she had come upon the concept that emerges after cultural relativity; the concept that surpasses scientific neutrality. She probably knew that in her time she would be misunderstood.

> Maybe she was afraid. Among the professionals of anthropology, anything but neutral categories might have been attacked as 'unscientific' -- the sin of sins . . . . When she died in 1948 from overworking a damaged heart, she had still not done the book beyond Patterns, the one committing herself to a notion of social good and evil . . . (Harris, 1970, p. 51).

> Such fear would have been justified.

> The new weapon at hand was the dream of a science of man, to be as pure and objective as physics. Unproved moral assertions looked like ethnocentric evil, but cultural relativism looked like a scientific ethic (Harris, 1970, p. 51).

Her work as an anthropologist had been interpreted as proof of cultural relativity; however, this was missing the crucial insight that she felt she was discovering. As Harris (1970) told the story:

> Benedict was deeply distressed by this interpretation of her work. To Maslow . . . she confessed an unstylish doubt about relativism . . . She showed him the huge sheets of newsprint on which she was listing the cultural characteristics of eight

> eight primitive peoples. She had them divided in two groups. When she talked of the first four -- the Dobu, the Chukehee, the Ojibwa, and the Kwakiutl -- her lean frame would shudder. When she talked of the others -- the Zuni, the Arapesh, the

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Dakota and one of the Eskimo groups -- her cameo face came alive with pleasure. She was hunting for concepts that would explain her inner sense of what made a culture 'nice.'

In the end, Benedict came up with the concept of synergy . . . . The deeply humanistic idea of synergy sounded sentimental and unscientific, of course, and Benedict never risked publishing it in professional journals . . . . The beauty of synergy haunted Maslow for years . . . . It offered anthropology a chance to build a humanistic study of comparative culture, to escape narrow scientism . . . . Maslow believes that synergy offers the first viable, post Marxian theory of the good society (pp. 51-52).

With science no longer the sacred calf that it was in Benedict's time, we can now explore her insights. They must be pieced together from the sketchy lectures reprinted by Maslow and from Maslow's (1971) own writings.

Benedict wrote:

In a study of personality and culture, therefore, we have to ask, is there any sociological condition common to all these typical social structures that correlates with character types? . . . Is there any sociological condition that correlates with strong aggression and any that correlate with low aggression? . . . From all comparative material the conclusion that emerges is that societies where non-aggression is conspicuous have social orders in which the individual by the same act and at the same time serves his own advantage and that of the group. The problem is one of social engineering and depends upon how large the areas of mutual advantage are in any society. Non-aggression occurs not because people are unselfish and pursue social obligations above personal desire, but when social arrangements makes these two identical (Maslow, 1971, p. 40).

The synergetic culture equates the "individual good" with the "societal good." Such a social arrangement enhances the functioning of a culture: creating a lifestyle or culture ethos enhances those social arrangements that we call "good."

When social arrangements equate individual good and societal good, life appears to be full, joyful, and -- we must conclude -- good. When social arrangements make life a zero-sum game, one can only succeed at

the expense of others. In such cultures, life is fearful, aggressive, and generally not as good.

Some cultures nourish the person:

> People are apt to wait patiently for his growth in wisdom and discretion. The whole course of his experience has inculcated in him a faith in the rewards of acting with his fellows. He sees life as an area of mutual advantage where by joint activity he attains his own personal desires . . . . Our theories of human nature must be wide enough to include the kind of behavior that occurs in such sociological settings (Benedict, 1970, p. 55).

Other cultures define the situation differently. Just as the cultures whose arrangements emphasize synergy become self-fulfilling prophecies, so cultures that conceive of life as a competitive struggle enact such a world. In many ways, synergy is a matter of definition of the situation. We set a tone and create a world around it. If we conceive of self too narrowly, then mutual enhancement is apt to go unnoticed as a crucial aspect of self. We create instead a battleground of self vs. other and self vs. group.

Benedict's argument was such cultural arrangements are always unsuccessful. When self is subverted to a meaningless conformity to society, polluting side-effects are the result. If society serves self, then self serves society and we create a synergistic culture. The "Good" society furthers the lives of the persons in that society. Otherwise, one cannot help but ask: then who is the society for? The answer to that question invariably appears as crime, violence, unhappiness, and a less than satisfying life.

Benedict wrote that the conditions of aggression appear the same everywhere.

> I believe we are misled by mere scale and too easily believe that we are faced by a condition civilizations have not met

before. Small-scale or large, the fundamental condition of peace is federation for mutual advantage (Benedict, 1970, p. 55).

Other cultures have felt similar strains. This is true even if we apply it to the Second World War when she wrote:

The state may seek its own advantage at the expense of its citizens . . . . We are wrong to think dictators are a new invention. Some African states have dictators who could give pointers to Hitler . . . (Benedict, 1970, p. 74).

From the micro to the macro level of society, the balancing of the individual and societal good predicts the movement to synergy; it is a commitment to a creative possibility. Synergy is, first of all, a commitment. Only then does synergy become a self-fulfilling prophecy. In this way, synergy is much like the "Prisoner's Dilemma" game.[7] It requires a commitment to see the process through. This type of commitment seems to occur by realizing the interrelation of self with other; people transcend narrow self-interest to mutual advantage only by understanding the larger parameters of the situation.

In Unselfishness: The Role of the Vicarious Affects in Moral Philosophy and Social Theory, Rescher (1975) showed how the small group experimental game, the "Prisoner's Dilemma," relates to synergy. In a mock setting, two people are both accused of committing a crime together. The experimenter seeks to get them to "confess." If both subjects "confess," they are immediately "executed." If only one of the prisoners confesses, then both are still executed. The only way out of the experimental dilemma is if both prisoners refuse to inform on the other. Then, eventually, they will both be set free.

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[7]I am grateful to Dr. Arthur Warmoth of the Sonoma State University Humanistic Psychology department for this insight.

It is obvious that action in such a dilemma for individual advantage will not necessarily make the right choice unless one understands the higher order parameters of the situation. Only by understanding the nature of the situation -- that the fates of self and other are interwined -- is there a way out. Synergy is a similar process. It requires greater understanding of the interrelation between self and other. In order to achieve synergy, there must be a commitment to synergy itself. Both self and other must be committed to the process and understand it is the only available option.

If self is reified and viewed as separate from other, the individual might seek advantage by making the other expendable. It the individual good is placed in preference to the societal good, then the societal arrangements on which the person depends may fail. If the societal good is given eminent domain over the person, then society is not for the people who live in it. Society will pay the price in crime, aggression, and general malfunctioning.

This was Fromm's insight on intimacy. If we do not have two full integrities, then it is impossible for the individual to experience love. The only practical and available way of achieving a relationship of love is for the individual to allow fullness of both self and other to exist. Any negation of either self or other prohibits an exploration of love. The only way out is a commitment to synergy.

Love is not a product of self. It is not just an attitude with which one faces the world. Such attitudes are like moods: they come and go; and without response, they soon dissipate. Love is not the gift of other -- crucial as other is to the process. If self just goes along for the ride, then other will soon recognize the burden for what

it is. Love demands a meeting of self and other. Love is a mutual com-
mitment and invitation to create in love. It is a commitment to
synergy: a commitment to forego other ways of relationship and hold out
for synergy until the prison walls crumble at our feet.

It is only be recognition of the existential dilemma between self
and other that the individual can be convinced to commit to synergy.
Self cannot obtain what it wants through any other process. Forcing and
the scientific power will simply never bring us the heart's desire.

Love demands both a self and other, because love takes place <u>between</u>
"I" and "you." If other is simply an enlarged appendage of self, there
is no place that love can occur. Love requires a space in which to
enter: it is an exploration of the mystery of boundary between "I" and
"You." No other strategy will suffice. It is either commitment to syn-
ergy or to something less than love.

There are many games self and other can play: power, status, trad-
ing, dependence . . . . Only by moving past the prison of aloneness of
<u>both</u> self and other is love and freedom possible. Synergy is a commit-
ment that both hold out for love and not pull out of the process for more
expedient rewards.

This is the dilemma of self; it is also the dilemma of the societal
good versus individual good. Expedient granting of eminent domain to
none or the other simply will not work in the long run. <u>Synergy's prime
condition is a commitment to more.</u> It is a small wonder that when love
fails, one feels they have been condemned to death. Love is "social":
it requires two (or more) to do its miracle.

Sociological Theories of Relationship

If we outline the ways that people can relate, several possibilities emerge. Sociology has analyzed several of these possibilities under its major schools of thought. The prime types of relationship have been amply studied with one exception. That exception is love and synergy. Such relationships are gaps in sociological understanding.

Traditionally, sociology has articulated three different possibilities. One possibility is to simply put the relationship above self. "We" definitions are given eminent domain over "I" definitions. The relationship is given priority over the participants. The preservation and functioning of the society -- the societal good -- is seen as more important than the individual. The person too readily compromises self for the sake of relation. Examples of such arrangements abound: from business relations at the office to intimate dyads that compromise integrity for union. This pattern of social arrangement has been amply explored and articulated by the sociological perspective of functionalism.

Functionalism begins with the biological analogy that the body is more than just a composite of organs and bones. Society is thus "greater than the sum of its parts." However, functionalism is not synergy; it quickly forgets individual elements and moves exclusively to consider society as all important. The whole individual is reduced to a "role" in society.

By reducing people to roles for the sake of relationship, function- alism afford us not synergy but its opposite. Bernard (1972, p. 42) speaks of the way a woman "dwindles" into being a wife. Adjustments are certainly necessary in marriage, but there is a sense that the person is

too quickly "dwindled" into the role. Personhood is lopped-off; self is reduced to a role-like version: a wife , a mother, etc. We forget that the relationship is to enhance the person; it becomes all too easy to whittle the human down to size to fit ourselves to a preconceived idea of relationship. This functionist relationship of persons as role-players is one of the typical ways of relating in society; it sacrifices the individual for the group. The individual is viewed secondary to the needs of society. This is a symbiotic possibility, but it is not synergy.

Another possible way of relating one person to another is through domination and exploitation. This social arrangement pattern has been analyzed in sociology by Conflict Theory; it is the symbiosis of masochism and sadism. It is simply the possibility of getting what one wants not by creativity but by simple force. It foregoes the possibility of true intimacy for the expediency of a power game. Here $1 + 1 =$ less than 2. In fact, $1 + 1 = 1$: the one who wins.

The third approach to relationship that sociology has explored is separate individuals who trade interpersonal rewards and punishments, and goods and services; this is the socoiology of exchange theory. At first glance, the notion of reciprocity might be mistaken for synergy. But as Fromm has argued in the final pages of The Art of Loving, synergy is vastly different from the idea of fair exchange: "The practice of love must begin with recognizing the difference between fairness and love" (Fromm, 1956, p. 109).

The fundamental assumption of exchange theory somehow usually goes unnoticed; it premises separate individuals who exchange across their boundaries. Separateness is never overcome; we have a perpetual society of strangers. In exchange theory, self is never transcended by a "we," but remains intact and separated.

Exchange arrangements never explore the creative possibility of giving. The idea that giving -- which should be a cost -- is a creative act that actually enhances the giver makes little sense in exchange theory unless it is viewed as an investment or altruistic mechanism for enhancing self-esteem. Love implies a different form of relation. In love, self and other do not remain separate entities who merely trade interpersonal products.

In exhange theory literature, the notion of the "free fight" is negated. Yet from an intimacy perspective, one might well define love as a free gift. Exchange trades involve constantly keeping score: a rational calculus of costs vs. benefits that must be periodically audited. The norm of reciprocity maintains that "if I give to you, then you must give to me." It is a trading obligation. Yet one might conceive of another process (karma?) where a person gives and things just come back on their own accord. Value among intimates tends to come to the top; among strangers, we must be constantly street-wise.

George Simmell had the habit of illustrating a point with precisely the right example. In asking what are the effects on a relationship when it is converted to a calculus of units of exchange, he is inquired into the nature of money. Money is a method of keeping score: of balancing rewards with costs. The example he used to illustrate the effects of keeping score clearly showed the quantum leap between an intimacy perspective and an exchange perspective. His example is the difference difference between an intimate relationship and prostitution. In prostitution, intimacy is structured within the parameters of exchange. Love is a product and one is given a bill at the door. One never transcends the calculus of separateness.

Exchange never deals with the question of meaning. A fair exchange never approaches the fundamental need to transcend individual separateness; trading never gives us security or the intimacy of merging boundaries. The exchange perspective may give an accurate picture of when a relationship is not working -- when persons are withdrawing from relation to become separate individuals. But it can never give understanding of the nature and dynamics of intimacy. Intimacy is not economic. We devised those systems for strangers.

Synergy or love is the fourth possible way of creating social relationship. This possibility has remained unexplored in sociology and forms the new ground for a humanistic sociology. The dynamics of magical synthesis have not been articulated. It is now possible to begin to speak meaningfully about synergy. How is it facilitated? What prevents its occurrence? What prerequisites encourage it? How do we move from "I" to "We" without losing one or the other?

We have seen that the normal sociologically articulated types of interaction foreshadow the possibility of love and synergy: the idea of 1 + 1 = more than 2 is circumscribed. In functionalism, "I" and "you" are lost to a "We." In the arrangements described by conflict theory, a "We" is gained only by "I" dominating "You" or "You" dominating "I". There is no "I" and "You," but only an enlarged "I" or "You" that pretends to be "We." In exchange theory, a "We" never happens; it is only a code word for a mutually satisfying trade. "I" and "You" remain distinct. "We" is not explored.

Synergy and its Pretenders

Laissez-faire Approaches. Most attempts at sociological theory
quickly obscure self to a partial aspect in trying to reach too soon for
a larger conceptual reality. Humanistic psychology seeks to ensure the
fundamental aspects of synergy -- self and other -- remain intact; and
ensure that love is possible. Although love does not allow one to force
its emergence, there is a very real sense that one can prevent it from
occurring. Most sociological theories structure love in a way that there
is not sufficient space in which it can occur. Humanistic psychology
declares sociology the culprit and develops its own theory of society
that is equivalent to "laissez faire."

It is unfortunate that most of the literature on synergy has fol-
lowed Maslow's approach. Maslow's idea of enacting synergy was largely
one of laissez faire and pluralism. In opening up existing social struc-
tures that prevent synergy, humanistic approaches have emphasized anarch-
istic, non-structuring arrangements in hopes it will facilitate synergy.

There is certainly a need for freedom if synergy is to occur. There
is certainly the need to provide space within social structures and
arrangements for a creative synthesis to happen. Pluralism is central to
understanding self and other -- but more is needed. We must open up
destructive social structures, yet we must provide new social forms or
pluralism simply degenerates into non-freedom. We must create, re-think,
and articulate social forms that facilitate the person. Simply foregoing
destructive forms will not be enough.

Maslow's (1971) approach emphasized the mistake that most of human-
istic psychology (and psychology in general) make in relation to the

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sociological. We cannot just blame society. We cannot cast the roman-
tic, free person against a dialectic of the chained person in society.
For society is what we do: it is a re-enactment that involves our part-
icipation. If we should take the most extreme and adventurous mystics,
romantics, and artists and give then a new kingdom, we would not have
escaped from the social and its problems: they would re-create society
in a day.

Society means expectations, norms, and values. Society means try-
ing to re-create what matters; it means a method toward a purpose. We
cannot give up goals, planning, and thinking. Society means self-
conscious action. It is our reflection upon now and envisioning the
future that creates the social.

It was "random, blundering acts" that William Graham Sumner set
against the social. It is the spontaneous, creative act that humanistic
psychology sets against society. But we must realize that what human-
istic psychology values is not the self (as it would claim), but the "I"
in George Herbert Mead's sense. The "I" is the creative, spontaneous
aspect of self. The times when I feel it is "I" who is doing. The "I"
is alive. It is what we call the human. But the "I" can also reflect
upon itself and in doing so casts itself in the role of object: to the
realm of "me." It is this "me" that is sociological. The "I" cannot be
permanently separated from the "me." Such is the fallacy of humanistic
psychology. Finding a way of looking at "me" that allows "I": this is
the task of humanistic sociology.

We could recast this argument in different terms. We could talk
about reification: how do we make a statement or emphasize a value
without in turn setting in motion a social process that ceases to see?

Or we could speak of institutionalization: how do we generate a means of action without turning it into method and technique that demand rules for its operation? We could use Bergson's distinction: how do we follow an aspiration of the heart without converting it into social pressure when it is not working?

We must retain the social and realize this is where are arguments must come to grips with life. We cannot successfully embrace the creative and spontaneous while abdicating the social. Laissez-faire approaches to synergy will not work.

In fact, after the initial shot-in-the-arm, they contain an underlying authoritarianism and conservativism. If we simply relegate synergy to a social process, then it will appear by chance, but its occurrence is probably no more likely. Group process itself contains a "cooling-out" mechanism that humanistic psychology has seemingly failed to notice. We are left with functionalism and its pseudo-synergy. The group pressured toward conformity. The issue is how to create full human beings <u>within</u> society. Only then can synergy happen.

<u>Agreement and Compromise.</u> Synergy cannot be achieved through compromise. If consensus arises through an actual change of mind, synergy might at times appear to be similar to agreement. However, it is much different. If two individuals both compromise, then it is unlikely that 1 + 1 will equal more than 2 because both persons have been reduced. Synergy is a pooled knowledge involving a bonus.

Dreikurs (1946) offers insight into the humanistic power of influence and process of synergy.

> . . . improvement cannot be accomplished without acceptance
> . . . . Acceptance is not identical with agreement. If we
> accepted only when we fully approved, there would remain
> very little for us to accept . . . . Acceptance includes more

than concord. It is the expression of a positive attitude
towards something or someone, regardless of existing short-
comings and deficiencies. Our ability to influence requires
a friendly and understanding attitude (p. 104).

Synergy is something different than compromise. And it doesn't
always necessarily mean agreement. One might compare synergy with
cooper-ation, but perhaps a better word would be to call it an inter-
play. Perhaps much of the literature that functionalism has embraced as
cooperation might be separated and better understood as synergy.

Functionalism: Synergy as a Norm. In many ways, functionalism is
the metaphor that life is a party. It is business as usual. Everyone
tries to cooperate. The obligation is to "have a good time." But we
must ask in a very real sense: to what extent can synergy be a norm?
If we are obligated to have a good time; if we are obligated to
cooperate, have we not somewhat lessened synergy to compromise? Does 1
+ 1 = more than 2 or have we not made it into 1-1/2 or 1-1/4, or less?
Functionalism uses many metaphors that would remind us of synergy; yet,
we need only take a few criticisms of conflict theorists seriously to
see functionalism means reduction of the human: synergy by prescrip-
tion; or synergy fitted to a predetermined mold can hardly be synergy.

This is a plight that all attempts at humanistic sociology must be
interfaced with. When we describe an ideal relationship, it has a
tendency to be translated into a norm. As Krishna noted, even Max
Weber's ideal-type construct tends to become an ideal in the hands of
the layman. When we postulate an ideal relationship, the role-player
can manipulate toward it. This is also the problem of Mead's "I" and
"me."

If we reflect upon Mead's distinction, we note the "I" is the spon-
taneous, the alive, the creative, the active part of self. It is not

reflective, but actively moving. It feels alive. It is when self feels empowered by life. This "I" part of self is precisely the component of self that is valued by humanistic psychology. In fact, often it seems humanistic psychology mistakes the total self for only the "I."

The "me", on the other hand is the reflective part of self -- it treats self as object: picturing what happened to "me." When one reflects upon "I" that turns it into a "me." The role player is the "me." The most glorious parts of the past and most promising parts of the future slip away when translated as "me's." It is the "I" that we crave.

Here is the problem of reification, of institutionalization, and society in a nutshell: the problem of the "I" and the "me." It is nowhere more apparent than when we conceive of synergy. 1 + 1 = more than 2 implies that "I" + another "I" = more than 2. A "me" plus another "me" would probably equal less than 2. In fact, does not synergy mean that both persons in a relationship experience themselves predominately as I's?

If we translate synergy to norm as functionalism does, then it is obligated. We can strive toward a commitment and an ideal. But is synergy enforceable as a norm? Role theory has something to say here. Often roles are defined as a series of rights and obligations. One person's right is another person's obligation and vice versa. Synergy cannot be a right and an obligation in such a sense because we're not talking about a zero-sum game. I cannot get a right only at the expense of your obligation. Synergy means more for both.

Functionalism's mandated cooperation destroys synergy. Individual creativity is eroded by such a group process. Synergy can't be required

or it only parodies itself; it loses its creative force.

One can also allude here to Goffman's dramaturgy which has often been called a microfunctionalism. Goffman spoke of a standard social process that is very similar to what has been termed synergy. It is the ritual of "saving face." "Saving face" is commitment on the part of both participants that both will "come out ahead." It is on one level a commitment to synergy; yet, as a social process, it becomes a norm and loses much of its power. "Saving face" is more often a ritual than true synergistic process. But normatively, it appears at least verbally to do a very good job of translating synergy to a norm. It must be concluded that it is the process of institutionalizing synergy into a norm that is awry.

Synergy cannot thus be a norm and subject to the typical dynamics of social control. Here we may have a way of weaving B. F. Skinner's odd statement that "love is the use of positive reinforcement" into the fabric of humanism. However, if such a conception is taken seriously, it totally changes the idea of what "control" is. Authentic rewards are opportunities; they are inviting; they are creative alternatives and meaningful interactions. They resemble the humanistic power. It is here that one might begin to re-vision society and what it would look like without obligation, social pressure, and the rest of negative reinforcement. A positive social control would be a series of invitations to synergy. Synergy cannot be forced as a norm can be -- it cannot be required. It takes two or more in freedom for its commitment; the key to synergy is a commitment to this value. In some ways, it seems that a full commitment to freedom is all that is necessary for synergy to do its magic.

Synergy provides us with an operational definition of love and a strategy we can explore. The primary ingredient appears to be that we will fully commit ourselves to synergy as opposed to withdrawing into other games and expediencies. But other dynamics need to be explored and articulated: we need to separate out the differences between synergy and cooperation; we need to explore the conditions and societal arrangements that make synergy likely; and we need to understand how we can re-structure society around humanistic values.

Humanistic psychology has taken the first step: the prerequisite to synergy is the fully functioning person. We cannot diminish the person and achieve a synergetic society. Beyond this initial understanding lies new articulations and exploratons.

CHAPTER V

RE-VISIONING SOCIETY -- SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

The concept of synergy gives us a reasonable framework for re-visioning society and beginning the work of humanistic sociology without losing intellectual respectability. Synergy is related to love -- it is the experience in which all participants are enhanced. It is a valid conceptualization of a humanistic process. Although precise formulations for synergy are lacking at this time -- 1983 America -- the exploration of synergy does show a hopeful direction. It is clear there are a number of approaches to achieve synergy that cannot work: we cannot have synergy by compromise. We cannot have synergy by norm. We cannot have synergy by reducing the human or by subjecting one person's will to another's. The forceful version of power will not bring us closer to our goal. Yet conceptions of synergy do suggest possible avenues of research and exploration.

Throughout this dissertation, a case has been made concerning the nature of the social disciplines. To embrace humanistic values requires an approach much different than what has typically been mistaken for academic respectability. The social disciplines are an attempt to envision a world and create it in that ideal image. It has been demonstrated that the physical sciences, while claiming to explore the truth, have actually functioned in much this same manner. The self-fulfilling prophecy of science has been reified far past any practical necessity

for doing so. Synergy provides the opportunity for visualizing a different level of self-fulfilling prophecy.

Humanistic psychology has laid the groundwork by exploring the nature of the healthy personality. The fully functioning human being operates by a different criteria than the tightly manipulative, fearful person. At base level, we cannot have synergy by compromising or reducing the healthy person to some lesser role. At this level, humanistic sociology must take seriously the contributions of humanistic psychology.

Although it does not articulate it, humanistic psychology implies another type of social world exists. When a person is fully functioning, things work themselves out and "accrue" to the individual "as if by magic." This implies a different theater of the social than sociology has thus far imaged.

Kant made the criticial distinction (which has been noted several times) between noumenon and phenomenon. Noumenon is reality-in-itself. Phenomenon is the appearance or the expression. As was briefly explored in the "Science" section, this is the same distinction that Castenada's Don Juan makes and illustrates as the core of the magician's vision. Don Juan calls noumenon the Nagual and phenomenon the Tonal. The tonal is everything that can be named, placed on the table, etc. It is treating the world as an object. The Nagual is everything else -- it is the creative force where "power hovers."

One should not neglect the fact that Mead (1934) makes this very same distinction in talking about the self and refers to it as the "I" and the "me." After the self is creative and spontaneous, reflecting on that act turns the act of an "I" into a "me" -- an object.

Kant's distinction could have held the key to a different vision of reality instead of merely reinstating science. As Bosworth (1977) noted, the word "phenomenon" has two possible root meanings: one is the traditional interpretation: "to appear" which places us in the scientific reality and the world of appearances. The other possible reading is "to show." To treat reality as "shown" would have opened up the realm of the magician; it would have suggested that reality is <u>framed</u> -- and pointed out; it would have launched Western thought into developing a totally different epistemology. However, in Kant's time, such was too threatening. Science had only recently succeeded in putting the shadow of the magician to sleep. Embracing a world that is in essence "shown" would have released the old insecurities. And yet, from the late twentieth century, this is precisely what is needed: a world view and epistemology that embraces the magician, the artist, and the lover. Perhaps this is nowhere better demonstrated that in Jung's discussion of syncronicity. If love can be operationalized as synergy, then syncronicity can be treated as an academic canopy for discussing magic.

It is amazing that J. B. Rhine's work on extra-sensory perception has been so totally shunned by the scientific community. It represents perhaps some of the most rigorous, tightly controlled scientific experiments ever done. Yet, they are an anomaly to the scientific world view; and science as it is today cannot afford to accept them. There is something much different going on in the world than just the things explained by science.

Jung (1973) originally posited syncronicity as an alternative to cause and effect explanations; it is the idea of meaningful coincidences and chance happenings. Throughout our lives, we go through relatively

few major life transitions: a death here, a marriage there, and possibly a major career change. We are "outside" our patterns so seldom we have little opportunity to examine the forces and the very winds that blow our lives. The causes of transitions in our lives may not be seeable. They are experienced so infrequently that we have not been able to build a full sociology around a cause and effect model. Syncronicity offers the possibility for a different method of exploration.

We would be quite mistaken if we think that syncronicity can ever be diagrammed on the blackboard. Syncronicity posits that the life force will not be explained by our science, and despite Jung's stated allegiance to the umbrella of science, I would suggest that the idea of syncronicity poses the possibility of not only an acausal, but an ascientific understanding.

We must be prepared to admit that between the unconsciousness of the dream and the reality of day-to-day existence, there is another world different in all its subtle shades and hues. We cannot attempt full explanation of this. Final causes will not be the culmination of our efforts in social science. True "scientific" discoveries have not taken place because of our established methods (Phillips, 1973) and we must be suspicious of methods that promise such final conclusions.

In introducing syncronicity, Jung (1973) wrote it was amazing how the individual fates and the dramas of individual actors were all interwoven into one world. Somehow destiny stretched out before us separate, but connected. Connections that could not in any way be casually influenced often became meaningful beyond anything coincidence could suggest. A method different from causation must be articulated if we are to do more than just allude to such occurrences.

We cannot grasp the life force and coerce it into revealing its secrets just as syncronicity cannot be forced. Syncronicity takes place at the very edge of our lives, beyond the boundary of self and our understanding. We can be aware of syncronicity, but we cannot make it happen. Similarly, syncronicity cannot be "followed." We cannot wait for it to happen because it occurs concurrently with our actions. The necessities of our Aristotelean logic which we have taken to be the very basis of thought itself (Whorf, 1956) make it most difficult to talk about syncronicity. We are forever wanting to declare it a mysterious "black box," circumscribe it, and deal with it in a cause and effect manner. Such an approach is not only absurd, but dangerous. We are dealing with what the occult might refer to as the "cosmic trigger" (Wilson) -- the detonating device behind the evolutionary time bomb. This is perhaps why David Hume introduced the idea of the "secret springs."

As previously noted, the classic Western way of dealing with the "secret springs" was Kant's distinction of noumenon and phenomenon; noumenon can only be grasped intuitively while phenomena can be studied scientifically. Phenomena can be used as approximations of noumena. However, as Meeker (1977) pointed out, if we are making approximations of the truth, we are interested in getting closer and closer. It is as if we were on the road to Canterbury and each night we ask "how far is it to Canterbury?" We are assuming our journey is taking us closer to our destination. Syncronicity would suggest that Canterbury is in our very midst. We must find a different mode of movement than a journey toward it.

Syncronicity cannot be captured, territorized, or capitalized upon;

it cannot be dealt with heroically; it is not a matter of stealing fire from the gods. The scientific task of charting the unknown does not fit syncronicity. Freud's mandate of "where id was let ego be" is responded to by Jung's notion of syncronicity. It is not knowable in a rational, causal manner; it can be recognized and lived with. We can take it into account in envisioning society. But it cannot be reduced. Syncronicity cannot be "claimed" by a science of man.

We cannot afford to reduce man to the small reified image that normally passes for human in most social theories. The task of sociology is to consider the creature who is dancing on the very hands of time itself.

Humanistic psychology has embraced this larger version of human nature. Yet, we have not managed a sociological articulation of the fully human and the social structures and processes that enhance such creativity precisely because we have held out for a scientific understanding. Syncronicity and "magic" provides such an ascientific understanding. Yet the respectable sociologist has been frightened to use such words. It must be recognized here that humanistic psychology has been reticent to fully advance into this area. Still, we must fully fully recognize that <u>syncronicity is the latent assumptions of</u> human psychology -- that if one gets "in tune" with one's self, one will find relation, meaning, and opportunity. This implies a much different conception of the social than we have pretended. Such is not psychological reductionism, but positing the social to be of a particular nature, but not exploring or articulating that nature.

It will be remembered that Castenada's Don Juan claimed that all one needed for "power" was "impeccability" -- the ability to be at the

right place at the right time. Syncronistically, then, everything would fall into place. We must note here the connections with religious theories of realization. The word "impeccability" means literally "sinless." Religious postulates become insights of a much different order than normally attributed.

This all implies a dramaturgy of a totally different origin and nature. The magician frames, shows. The self-realized person is magical: not just in charisma, but in the world that s/he creates -- lives in. In terms of opportunities, the self-actualized person lives in a different world: a new world with a self-fulfilling prophecy that creates another reality. The lover creates a different reality because something else is being shown, acted upon, and envisioned. And this new world comes into being. The artist springs from creativity and points out a deeper, better world. Sociologically, they bring us into a different theater and the dynamics of this drama must be articulated under a different canopy than science. The magician's art -- framing, showing, celebrating a particular view -- provides us with our first step in articulating this reality and this epistemology. Syncronicity provides us with a way of spinning our anomaly with science into a different reality.

The magician as a social change strategy will not probably be fully articulated in our lifetime. But is is an idea whose time has come and we can begin sketching the dimensions here. Magic is by its very nature private and limited. It takes place behind "closed doors" away from the larger reality. As Suttles (1970) noted, even the magic of friendship in a bureaucracy is private: it takes care of organizational problems that cannot be dealt with rationally. In fact, we spin a work "behind

the back" of the rational world that we postulate; and this informal, friendship/love-oriented world actually keeps our articulated, formal world functioning.

Magic can never be brought onto the conference table -- it is off the table. It is private, outside the room. We can bring testimony of its presence and importance to our lives to the table -- this is the task of humanistic sociology. We can seek to articulate social theories that respect its dynamics. But we can never bring magic itself onto the table nor chart its flow on the blackboard.

Simmel (1902) spoke of the dynamics of the dyad and the triad. The dyad which is the basis for most of the intimacy that occurs in society is founded on the "secret." Its intimacy occurs precisely because it is not public; because it is private and away from the world. With the triad, we have the addition of a third party -- an audience that makes the dyad self-reflective. It is with the triad that we have the step to society proper. The dyad itself is not really social in so many typical senses.

I argued in my master's thesis (Du Bois, 1975) that society and its processes could only be viewed with the step to the triad. With the dyad, so much of what we conceive as elementary social processes simply cannot be viewed or do not exist.

Social reality has no meaning in a dyad. Reality is either agreed upon or we are at a hiatus. There is only minimal negotiation of reality because there is no judge of reality aside from each person; there is no social pressure or judge. "When it comes down to just two, I ain't no crazier than you." Reality is democractized. If two disagree, we have a tie. Social reality is simply suspended.

Social power is also not evidenced in a dyad. Power distinctions are usually quite evident to both parties. The principle of least interest says that in a dyad the person who has power maintains that power by the virtue of threatening to go elsewhere, thus terminating the relationship. Such power discrepancy (as an ongoing source of acknowledgement and basis for communication) would simply be too blatant. In dyads, power discrepancies are acknowledged and deference given. But for daily interaction, social power is not an issue. It is a given. It is only with the triad that social power becomes an ongoing, active dynamic.

The dyad is a special case. The intimate spaces spin a different reality through different processes. They are private and away from the world. Carpenter (1970) noted that if we increase the size of an audience, we often dissipate and destroy the message of intimacy. Mass-produced intimacy is simply pseudo-intimacy. Love and magic normally are private. Moving them to a public space changes their nature. To re-vision society, respecting the nature of love and the magical, we must realize this.

Magic is not only private, it is limited. An old Zen story said that before one is "enlightened they chop wood and carry water." After one is enlightened they also "chop wood and carry water." Magic is not a free lunch. It can only do so much. It leaves the rest of the world intact. The magician or the lover can only show, visit, point out. The magic cannot be tied to a technological wheel. It loses much of its power and changes its nature if we try.

Since magic is limited and private, it can shake us to our very roots as the rest of the world goes untouched. We can go through the

most profound changes -- we fall in love, we lose a loved one, we have a
realization to the depth of our being -- and yet the world outside, even
our next door neighbor and the passerby on the street, remain the same.
Love is essentially private. The world goes on much the same way as
before; it sells us wedding rings, coffins, and sends us sympathy cards.
As a line from a fairy tale that I once wrote says: "If magic could
change the world or last for more than a little while, then the smallest
child playing in the forest would have changed it long ago" (Author,
n.p). What about the changes that lovers would have brought? The magi-
cian, the lover can only go so far. This is the nature of love and
magic. Otherwise, long ago the world would have been made much
different.

Love and magic wait and seek and hide in our private regions.
There they play and spin their own world. But the public forum can only
view them as phenomena, as tonal, as an object -- as a "me" in Mead's
sense. The creative, the "I", the creative power of the nagual and the
experiences of the secret springs are by nature private. The magician
seeks to visit, to testify, and to point out.

Each man or woman can do little to change the world. Life is
short. Time is long. Even the most profound historical actors seldom
leave behind changes that last more than a few hundred years. What is a
few hundred years? Or a few thousand? In folklore, the magician knows
that "nothing can make a difference." Mortal humanity can do little to
change time. But one must still act. One creates the day. Magic takes
place in the present -- in the now.

This is where humanistic psychology emphasizes process models. It
is in the now that we experience enlightenment, realization, and it is

in the now that we live. Here we must make a further distinction that illustrates and further elaborates why humanistic psychologists have found sociology so foreign and not articulated a humanistic sociology.

Carpenter (1970) discussed the difference between art and artifact. In Western culture, we have a tendency to value artifact and de-value art. It is the finished painting, not the swirl of the brush touching canvas that is important. This is not the case in many primitive cultures; the play -- the art -- is what is important. It is the process of creating that is valued. The finished product is only an afterlife of what was a creative process. It is only artifact. Many natives will spend months or even years carving a figure only to discard it upon the ground when finished. Natives were originally greatly amused that the white man would pay money for such artifacts. But in our culture -- and the whole scientific ethos -- it is artifact that is valued and the process of creating art which is tolerated but not cultivated. In primitive culture, play was important. In our society, we seek to capitalize upon the smallest creative insight and turn it into product. The artist becomes distrustful of all that is practical and the line between the sacred and the profane is ignored. The slightest flurry of magic while ignored by the academic community is readily marketed by the accompanying technological economy. At the same time that magic is formally ignored, it is being dissipated by the artifact-technological mentality. The actual creativity, magic and process is relegated to an insignificant role because it does not fit our cultural framework.

Science has sought sources of power that were all purpose and without limits. Magic does not fit that view. Not only does magic change and dissipate when routinized in the public sector, but magic requires

participation of the aduience. It is not a matter of "prove it to me,"
but the audience entering into willing participation. This is the
"Ancient Mariner's" "willing suspension of disbelief." Magic only goes
so far. The magician may show the audience anything, but if they do not
choose to look and see -- to willingly enter into dialog -- they see
nothing.

This is what every lover knows; this is what the true magician
knows. And this is why historically magic was no match for science.
Science could offer power to self; magic depended upon the participation
of self and some "other" -- be it person, cosmos, animal, or nature.
Science offered a brief reprieve from relatedness -- from the mortality
of a closed circle. Science promised power in abstraction; that, theo-
retically, was all powerful and knew no limits. Magic was more subtle.
Science and its power could become "ego's" tool -- a rational approach.
Magic combined the rational and the irrational, demanding one recognize
the boundary of other and establish relatedness.

The magician requires participation of other, be it the "whenever
two or more are gathered" of religion or the more familiar example of
the stage magician needing an audience. Without the audience's atten-
tion, there is no magic. The magician shows, points out, reframes. The
scientist awaits appearances. Magic takes you there, creates a vision,
another world. As one author wrote, "the function of poetry is to
invoke the muse" (Graves, 1952, p. 7). The magician invites one into an
experience.

The scientist can be separated from his world; his truth remains
without an audience. The art of the magician requires an audience.
Without the co-participation of other, there is no show. Indeed, there

is no magic. Magic awaits participation. Otherwise, we see nothing. There is nothing to see, for nothing happens.

In many ways, culture is a shelter against the "world." Magic beckons all the time. Culture prevents it from shattering the walls of our constructed lives. The Nagual. The Noumenon. The Creative Power. The Life Force. They are there all the time. Our cultural description of reality protects us from chaos and the intensity of the fire. As long as we keep the walls of our self-fulfilling prophecies intact, magic has no power; it cannot touch us.

This is akin to the humanistic power. Van Den Berg (1961) illuminated this discussion. He wrote:

> When Jesus Christ came to Nazareth, He 'could there do no mighty work.' Jesus was not surprised about His lack of power, not about nature in Nazareth, which, like a modern landscape, left Him no opening for His supernatural inter-ference; but 'He marvelled because of their unbelief.' Our belief is the condition of the miracle. Without our belief, apparently, no miracle can happen; the miracle is present in our belief, it is the habitual state of things.
>
> Actually, it is strange that the Evangelist was so honest. He says that Jesus, who is God, could do there no mighty work, although he is omnipotent. Does this mean his power can be compared with the power of the hypnotist, who makes a whole audience shudder with cold while actually it is rather warm? The hypnotist can only do this because the audi-ence believes in him. Why does Mark make this comparison so easy? . . .
>
> It could only have been his honesty that made him write this. Mark was an honest man. He was honest and because of his honesty he stayed out of trouble; while we stare at one of the most amazing texts in the Bible, he writes on as if there were nothing wrong.
>
> And there was nothing wrong; that can be the only explan-ation for the serenity of Mark's words. The reality of the miracle was so beyond all question -- for those who believed, as well as for those who did not -- that this text could not be misunderstood.

It is as if today someone says, 'Last year I was in Spain and I was very thirsty; I asked everybody I met for water, but nobody understood. I couldn't make them understand.' No one would, as a result of this story doubt the reality of words as a means to convey understanding. For the thirsty man the means was unsound because he did not speak Spanish . . . . The Spaniards must have looked at him with bewildered expressions. So, more or less, must the people of Nazareth have looked. They did not understand Jesus; that was their disbelief, and that is why nothing happened. The reality of the miracle is not affected by it (Van Den Berg, 1961, p. 204).

To create a reality, an experience, we must understand and enter into a self-fulfilling prophecy -- a reciprocal dialog. Without participation, there is no miracle. No magic. We are safe from the poet's spell; the touch of a hand no longer transforms the world; to look into your eyes no longer makes my soul flow; a word no longer changes my world. We see nothing; only the random appearances of sciences remain.

Castenada's Don Juan discusses magicians flying through the tops of trees and how this would scare the life out of the Indians who saw it. But the white men were not frightened: "They see nothing." The truth of such a story makes no difference. Metaphorically, it illustrates the nature of magic. Unless we are open to the possibility, it can be in our very midst and we see nothing. Our culture is a buffer from other realities. Unfortunately, our current scientific culture has done more than keep us safe. It has blinded us to love and the magical.

Outside these safe cultural regions lies possible insanity. As Becker (1968) saw the problem of the artist so well: no one feels they have the authority to offer up new cultural meanings. From the wings of vision, self falls needing support from other. Yankelovich (1981) noted, one cannot be the artist for one's own life; it requires other. There is not enough self-confidence and self-affirmation in anyone to

sustain vision without context. The magician requires other; the artist requires an audience. Otherwise, it is a vacuum of self and the magic dwindles when unnoticed.

By oneself, a vision may be a poem; but it begs to be celebrated in life. We must not mistake the strength of the cry (for relatedness) or the convincingness of the new vision _for_ a self-containment that does not need other. As Becker noted, not even our greatest, most compelling artists and thinkers have been able to sustain themselves. One need only read their biographies to confirm this. This is why the counter-culture's culmination into humanistic psychology's "self as your own artwork" was doomed to failure. Self without a meaningful, participating audience is left to fluctuate between vision and doubt; between heights and folly. To create new meanings and enact them in life requires co-participation. To create culture is not an individual act; it is a co-production.

Love and magic are invitations. They require participation to come into full being. The lover's art like the magician's art may go unnoticed. Unless love is an opportunity taken, it is but a light in the window at night, a possibility that could have met the light of day. Without participation, the lover may appear like a fool or an idiot. The paranoid Dobuan will never trust the generous Zuni. The con artist delights in the willing "do-gooder." Love is never more than an opportunity until it is explored.

Love is a pooling of lives. "I" and "you" become "we." While there remains an I and a you, we have substantially changed. I and you are not quite the same either.

The lover, the magician, the artist returns from vision to a larger

world essentially unchanged. Perhaps this is why so many magicians in folklore say that "magic makes no difference." Magic only goes so far -- and yet from the private spaces, the world has been transformed totally.

The magician points out an experience and beckons us to join. Magic is shown. The scientist opts to find the truth. The magician realizes there are many truths -- that indeed there is truth everywhere. Magicians throughout folklore emphasize that "all is the same" -- that "it makes no difference". There are innumerable perspectives on every-thing. Omar Khayham expressed it that "to each must come the time to decide between truth and wisdom."

Becker (1973) wrote that we live in a world filled with an over-abundance of truth. There are truths and truth systems everywhere we look. But it is Omar Khayham's insight that must serve us well. For it is the magician that returns us to wisdom. The magical incantation may be no more than the proper words at the right time: the proper truth at the proper time. The spell/truth that is capable of restoring us to magical vision where we tap our creativity is what the magician seeks.

Under such an epistemology, truth is not an abstraction that can be built into a system of truth; that is not its nature. A humanistic epistemology emphasizes that truth is an experience. The magician invites us to participate. Truth is an experience that suggests a feel-ing; the words that initiate it may differ; but it is this experience we allude to when using the word "truth."

This "truth" may well be very similar to what most have called love. It is an experience of source, of meaning. This is why Norman Brown said that "the truth is either new or not at all." The words that

return us to wholeness must always be new -- fresh. They must re-awaken
an experience of awe and wonder. What worked the last time will not
work the next. The spell must be woven afresh. It must hit us where we
are in our lives at the time. But it is the experience that we wish to
enter. It is not a new experience. We have had it before. This is
what Henry Miller referred to when he advised "remember to remember."
We must go again to that place where mystery and awe make us feel a part
and in tune. Perhaps this is why it was written in the Bible that "only
as a little child will you enter the kingdom of heaven." We must go
fresh with child-like eyes.

The humanistic vision is based on such peak experience. Its ver-
sion of truth is based on the love and magic that we have known in our
lifetimes. It is this experience the magician wishes to put us in
contact with again. One set of words may be no better than another for
re-creating this experience. It varies from person to person. Some
sets of words will not work, but many others depend on the time and the
place. Particular truths make no difference.

The magician's "trick" is phenomenological in nature. It is fram-
ing, bracketing. The story is told that Don Juan visited Castenada's
office at one time. In the office were stone busts of the great figures
in Western thought: Freud, Marx, etc. Don Juan picked up a bust of
Husserl, rubbed its head and said, "Now this is a power object." The
implication is clear. Husserl was the philosopher who stressed bracket-
ing -- that reality is bracketed; i.e., framed. The magician knows in
the end all realities are the same. One view is just one view and there
are many views. "Nothing matters." It all is "the same."

Yet it is precisely here that humanism can take its major departure

and claim its humanistic epistemology. Past power, one may move to knowledge. If reality is shown, bracketed -- then there is no way to claim one frame is more true than another. All is equal. There is no way to say that one view is more true than another. It is a matter of choice. One view is simply preferred -- i.e., valued. What is shown -- what is framed -- depends on which is valued. What is shown then makes all the difference in the world. Values are then the prime discussion of knowledge. What is valuable? Where does the heart lie? What paths are worth taking? Where does the heart feel good? Where does happiness abound?

If humanistic sociology has a methodology, then perhaps it is happiness. Love is difficult to define, but at its best it borders and includes happiness. Magic without joy is too threatening for us to ever allow ourselves under its spell. If we were to seek to operationalize happiness, could love and magic be far behind?

There is another limit to magic. It is our mortality and fundamental inability of the human being to make a permanent dent in time. The human life span compared to geological time is small indeed. We seek to deny death and claim our own heroism. Yet we know the absurdity of such denial.

In life, most of us have come to realize there are no final solutions. We cannot make a large contribution to changing the world. The heroism fades. We realize we are just living and the larger world goes on without us. Our mark in time will not be great, but our experience of life can be full. As we mature, we leave behind the "change the world" conversation. We begin living. The childish heroism is replaced by a recognition of our own mortality and needs. We enter into life and

spend little time filing notes with the "change the world" conversation. Yet it is precisely with those who have realized that change the world strategies are limited and the heart of life belongs to the living who have the crucial contribution to make to an effective articulation of a viable "change the world" strategy.

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Sociological and Psychological Reflections:

The Art of Writing Home

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It was David Hume who reminded us that philosophy can never replace living. Serious things have since been loathe to forgive him for such an insight. But we must remember that sociology and psychology are not life; they are reflections upon it. They are what Gregory Bateson referred to as the meta-conversation. A conversation above or across life: who we are and what we might be doing, and where we are going. The human animal has been huddled by the fire for a long time. From time to time we reflect on this experience of living. From time to time we leave the familiar fire on new explorations. Later we return to discuss our journeys, insights and new destinations.

Legend tells that when Lao Tzu became enlightened, he packed his things and headed out of China. The Emperor, hearing the wisest of his subects was leaving, immediately sent word to stop him at the border. He was not allowed to leave the country until he first wrote down what he knew. The Tao The King was thus written at "gunpoint." Those who have been actively involved in living have not usually appeared in the philosophical literature except as footnotes or brief references. A full articulation does not seem possible or at least those with the knowledge have better things to do. We should remember there are four

gospels and numerous gnostic contenders, but nowhere do we hear of a "Gospel According to Jesus."

For the most part, those who have experienced the magical vision of love have not sought to write about it or leave behind a detailed map. They have simply entered into life. From time to time, we receive "postcards" or brief clues to their journey. But their attention is occupied with the present: they have passed through the door and into life.

Psychology and sociology represent the peculiar attempt to have a conversation at the crossroads. They are in the realm of what might be classified as "writing home." They are a reflection upon life and the human experience. It is through such a conception of the behavioral disciplines as "writing home" that we might understand their intrinsic nature.

One cannot spend all of their time writing home and expect to have an experience. The activity of writing home can never replace living. One may send accounts, maps or even tickets home, but the experience itself cannot be tucked in an envelop and mailed home to the larger reality. The experience of love will always remain separate from the wider public sphere.

The intimate experiences where we find value cannot be brought in full essence to the public conference table. We cannot lay them on the table, dissect them, and expect them to retain their nature and dynamics. They take place in the private spaces away from the public conversation and understandings. Yet, if we seek a full understanding of life, it is these private spaces of love and the magical that we wish to bring to bear upon our public construction of the world. We wish to envision a society in keeping with their nature.

Sociology and psychology cannot replace living. Yet it is the private experience of love and the magical that we find most crucial to a public articulation of a humanistic effort. How do we construct a world view that respects the nature of love and the magical? How do we envision society in such a way that people are transported to the magical experience? How do we construct social structures and forms that serve as resources in the construction of meaningful lives? This is the task of humanistic sociology. This work has focused upon an articulation of some of the groundwork necessary to prepare the way for a rendition of sociology as art. This articulation is crucial, because we cannot just move into the world without also writing home: for we bump into the world reassembled in another place. We need the canopy of a public conversation which recognizes and encourages love and the magical. The professional task of writing home is essential to support the artistic exploration of living. Without a public awareness, the individual artist is left to flounder alone.

There are two possible paths that can be taken when one realizes a new reality and vision. One is to bring this experience back to the public forum and enter into dialog with "what is." This is the traditional approach of our rationalism: to bring all the world to the "conference table" and get everyone to agree on how the world is. Yet, we must realize that will never thoroughly happen. Individual efforts may well be dissipated by public testimony. The group reality may serve as a "cooling-out" mechanism for the individual vision. Some ideas are too new for public disclosure; some pale when placed in public display and subjected to public scrutiny while undergoing a fragile birth; some may be routinized by the public marketplace if presented before they are

full grown. Our public conceptions must respect such dynamics. We must recognize the existence of a world outside our public conversation at the conference table. Our effort at writing home must allude to the other experience.

The other path which one might follow is to simply leave the larger reality: find one or two or a few who share the same vision and weave one's way away from the larger reality. This is the effort of the counterculture exploration. By itself, it will never be complete: it needs the support of the public conversation. It needs to be encouraged by a larger world that supports the private exploration of viable alternatives. It needs to find viable resources available to construct meaningful options. The formal effort of "writing home" must always be coupled with the individual exploration. We cannot escape this world for the next; and yet we cannot abandon our vision for a dialog with the past. Mankind is in a state of becoming. Sociology and psychology represent reflection in the mind's eye upon our journey. We cannot desert our explorations to return to writing home full time. Yet we cannot desert the past for the future or the present has no continuity or chance of becoming a viable new direction. Sociology is at this crossroad.

This public conversation is at the heart of our social constructions. The public question of how to re-create the values and the peaks, and how to improve upon the unhappy is central to create new social forms. A politician travels through a land of poverty, hunger and despair and returns with a new political platform. Lovers experience a touching and the depths of their souls and seek to make a public statement of their state: to find a way to daily re-enact the joy of

their delight. A mother gives birth and seeks new patterns of "do's" and "don'ts" that somehow make this life better than the last. We seek new forms which some make our struggle for survival less harsh and more related to our needs for relatedness.

Out public conversations echo our ways to find new social forms to re-create the meaningful. All our thought-devices -- all our predilections toward the future -- are attempts to institute a way into the future. They are artificial, man-made forms to construct a way into a new reality. For envisioning and making the future, these social forms are the main resources that we bring to creating a new situation. The artist needs paints which will flow with the water of life; and he needs a palette that he can carry. Our palettes do not need to contain all of the great art works of the past and the future -- such would be unmanageable and impossible; they need only contain the paints.

Questions and directions for humanistic sociology abound, but they need to contain different parameters than those of scientific sociology. In this dissertation, I have sought to sketch the parameters of this new effort. Along the way, I have suggested some possibilities for exploration. Some of the fundamental new efforts that need to be addressed include: (1) we need to come up with new economic theories and modes which bridge the sacred and the profane; which bring the ethic of fairness into dialog with the paradigm of love. (2) We need to develop new theories of social control and take seriously the documented insight that reward is more effective than punishment. The primary human motivation seems to be for meaning. If we take the concept of reward and positive reinforcement seriously, then it is not just the converse of converse of negative reinforcement: it is the availability of

meaningful alternatives and directions. It is a creative effort which follows the fundamental human impetus towards love and self-fulfillment and seeks to provide resources and opportunity for such direction. (3) We need to respect the internal dynamics of love and the magical and seek ways which convert the humanistic power into a path of action. We need to develop the art of courtship, invitation, and gaining the attention of those we would wish to introduce to another world. (4) We need to provide resources and opportunities for the person as artist and life as artwork. This moves past the mere provision of support networks into the full conception of society as a series for human fulfillment. (5) We need to bridge "I" and "You" into a "We" and explore the depths of such operation. (6) Using synergy as our parameter, we need modes of relating which retain the full person in fundamental and fulfilling interaction.

Such tasks are merely the beginning. The hard work is becoming literate with the dynamics of our social constructions. We must seek ways which retain our original directions. We must follow that direction's own subtle nuances and mannerisms. In our visions, another world awaits.

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