

STUDENT POLITICS AND
THE COMING OF THE
THIRD REICH

By

RENATE MARIA STEFFEN

Zeugnis der Reife

Abendgymnasium für

Berufstätige

Offenbach am Main, Germany

1971

Submitted to the Faculty of the
Graduate College of the
Oklahoma State University
in partial fulfillment of
the requirements
for the Degree of
MASTER OF ARTS
May, 1977

Thesis
1977
S817s
Cop. 2



STUDENT POLITICS AND
THE COMING OF THE
THIRD REICH

Thesis Approved:

Douglas Hale

Thesis Adviser

Walter H. H. H.

Alexander M. Asprent

John Paul Bischoff

Norman W. Durham

Dean of the Graduate College

975877

PREFACE

The importance of student groups in Hitler's accession to power and the earliness of their support for him are aspects of the rise of National Socialism in Germany which have received only superficial attention from historians. It has not been emphasized enough that especially in the days after World War I, students occupied a position of political influence generally respected by the German man in the street. Without their idealistic collaboration, the National Socialism of Hitler would have lacked an important base. The teaching and furtherance of ["]völkisch ideas by the educational institutions and their professors was important in building a spirit of support for Hitler even before he had any significant political organization to mobilize. Moreover, students eventually came to recognize Hitler as the only one whose leadership and actions could lead to the realization of German identity and unity. He provided an alternative to the hated Weimar Republic, with all its alien principles and neglect of the ["]völkisch ideals. The purpose of this thesis will be to examine the influence of students in politics with respect to the rise of Hitler.

I would like to express my thanks to those who helped me during this study. First, I am especially grateful to my major adviser, Dr. Douglas D. Hale. He encouraged me

toward the pursuit of a graduate degree and provided valuable academic support and patient counsel in the formulation of my thesis and the organization of my research. I also appreciate the corrections and suggestions of the members of my committee, by Dr. Neil Hackett, Dr. Alexander Ospovat, and Dr. Paul Bischoff. My thanks go also to Dr. Ralph Buckner, the affable "Head of the Beagle Kennel", for his human compassion and for making possible the completion of this paper in my "hobby" and "secret love" -- history. I owe also a debt of gratitude to the Bundesarchiv in Frankfurt, and to the private archives of the Bubenreuther at Erlangen, West Germany, for allowing me the use of their materials. I thank Barbara Stummer for her quite essential assistance in making sure I received the necessary materials.

Thanks are due also to all my friends who helped me sort out my ideas and encouraged me in the composing process. But most basic to my writing this paper is the motivation for it: the impression of my father on me through his personal notes about his experiences with the Nazi youth and Hitler's National Socialist regime.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Chapter	Page
I. INTRODUCTION	1
II. STUDENTS IN THE WEIMAR REPUBLIC	23
III. BUBENREUTHER AND BAVARIAN POLITICS, 1918-1933	52
IV. THE STUDENT MOVEMENT AND NAZI CONSOLIDATION .	81
V. CONCLUSION	98
BIBLIOGRAPHY	102

ABBREVIATIONS

ASTA	=	General German Students Committee
BBL	=	Burschenschaftliche Blätter ¹¹
BVP	=	Bavarian Peoples Party
DDP	=	German Democratic Party
DST	=	German Student Body
DVP	=	German Peoples Party
NSDAP	=	National Socialist German Workers Party
NSDSTB	=	National Socialist German Student League
SPD	=	Social Democratic Party
USPD	=	Independent Socialist Party of Germany

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Students have consistently played a significant role in the political and social development of Germany. They have been a prominent force in the course of German history and have maintained their influence to the present day. Student associations were very important in the past, as in the Revolution of 1848, and student groups currently provide the driving force behind educational reforms in Germany.

Time after time, the history of the student movement and the history of Germany itself converge. In 1833, for example, a group of students vainly attempted to liberate and unify their country through violent revolution. Fifteen years later, students provided much of the leadership and manpower for the Revolution of 1848. From 1848 to 1871, the student movement stood in general opposition to the conservative unification of Germany under Bismarck. But by 1890, the academic youth had become for the most part dedicated supporters of the Empire. They march enthusiastically into the War of 1914, ready to fight for Emperor and Fatherland.

The general economic and political malaise which characterized the postwar years affected the student movement as well. As the government of the Weimar Republic showed

its inability to deal with the problems of inflation, political instability, depression, unemployment, and respect from abroad during the 1920s, many students began to turn toward extremist solutions. For some this solution was personified by Adolf Hitler.

As early as 1924, when Hitler was still a prisoner at Landsberg Castle following his abortive Beerhall Putsch, the Deutsche Studentenschaft, a student organization, offered him an honorary membership. Two years later, a student wing of the Nazi Party was formed, the National Sozialistische deutsche Studentenbund (National Socialist German Student League). It is interesting to note that this group was politically active even before the full development of the NSDAP. Hitler himself observed with some surprise in 1931, "I wonder why the national student movement is developing so fast in comparison to the other National Socialist organizations."¹

There is no question that the National Socialist ideology was attractive to a large proportion of the academic youth. The distance between what the students expected of Germany and the reality of the Weimar Republic was too deep for compromise, and in working against what they considered to be the imperfections of the Republic, they sometimes inadvertently became tools of the Nazi movement. Moreover, the economic situation of the students was insecure at best; financial aid promised by the government was either nonexistent or inadequate. Some students consequently embraced

the Hitler movement because it made funds available to them. For the National Socialists, the youth were an indispensable element in the formation of the Third Reich.²

This problem--the mutual attraction and collaboration between German students and the National Socialist movement--is the focus of this study. I will attempt to examine in detail the importance of the student movement in Hitler's rise to power as well as the character of the transformation of academic groups under the influence of the Third Reich. This monograph will first survey the status, condition, and political tendencies of the student movement as a whole between 1920 and 1935. Then, as a case study, the Bubenreuther fraternity of Erlangen will be examined in detail during these critical years. This fraternity typified in many respects the character of the student movement as a whole.

Through this investigation, I hope to demonstrate that the academic youth groups were instrumental in the victory of Hitler in 1933. Moreover, I hope to clarify the sometimes confusing character of the youth movement itself by distinguishing among its various components. A central issue of my study concerns the reasons and motivations for student alienation from the Weimar Republic. Moreover, we must ask ourselves why this most educated element of the German population found the appeal of Hitler so attractive. Finally, it is my intention to demonstrate the means by which student associations and leaders helped undermine the Republic and pave the way for the Nazi takeover.

Before one can fully comprehend the developments in the tragic years between 1920 and 1935, however, one must examine in some detail the history of the student movement from its founding in 1815.³ Up to this time, the only student organizations which had existed were the Landmannschaften, associations which served as social centers and points of communication for those students who attended a university outside their home states or regions. Rowdy, addicted to dueling, and often drunk, the students did not always appear to be either industrious or dedicated.⁴ The Wars of Liberation and the destruction wrought by Napoleon brought these same students face to face with the nationalistic ideology propagated by the French and the compelling possibility of German unification. Many felt that the time had come for a change in Germany and that they could personally become a part of it. Two young men, Friedrich Friesen and Ludwig Jahn, proclaimed the need for the improvement of student life and the revival of the "German Mind". They worked for the spiritual and physical education of German students and developed methods for organizing student action and youth groups.⁵

Reverence for the Fatherland and the desire for a united Germany were ideals enthusiastically accepted by the academic youth. For the students at Jena, a step was taken toward further development of these goals by the foundation of the Deutsche Burschenschaft, or German Student Union, in 1815. Turning away from the more exclusive Landmannschaften, with their regional sympathies, the Burschenschaft was to be a

more general student association that would revitalize the rude and coarse life of the students and set forth a new pattern of involved and responsible student action which would be undertaken not only to improve themselves but also to serve as an example for the nation.⁶

From Jena, the spirit of the German Student Union, its goals, and its objectives spread very quickly to other universities, such as Heidelberg, Giessen, and Erlangen. Its leaders soon concerned themselves with the creation of a constitution for the organization which would provide for the consolidation of the separate fraternity chapters at each university into a single national union under a democratic structure. The enthusiasm of these young leaders for the ideals of freedom and unity culminated in the famous Wartburg Festival, held at Eisenach on October 17, 1817, an event which marked both the fourth anniversary of the Battle of Leipsig and the tricentenary of the Lutheran Reformation.⁷

At the Wartburg, patriotic speeches were made, hymns were sung, and some of the more repugnant symbols of the tyranny and disunity of the German States were burned. This action demonstrated a deep dissatisfaction with the division of Germany into thirty-nine separate states and a longing for liberal constitutions in those states. To the conservative authorities, among them the Austrian Chancellor, Prince Metternich, the effusions at Wartburg appeared as a subversive threat. The governments suddenly perceived the Student Union to be a source of disorder and revolution. Still,

no immediate action was taken to suppress the Union, which was consolidated into a single all-German organization by its Constitution of October 18, 1818.⁸

With this constitution, the students wanted to show everyone that they felt that what they were doing was not merely a dream but had relevance for all Germans. They wanted to end the rivalry between the North and the South; they wanted to eradicate the division between Catholic and Lutheran; and they wanted to erase the distinctions between the classes and promote brotherhood. By these and other methods they hoped to develop the purification of the German nation in custom, language, and culture.⁹

Less than five months later, however, a sensational crime gave the German governments a pretext for stern action against the Union. On March 23, 1819, Karl Ludwig Sand, who had been a very active member of the Burschenschaft, murdered the Russian agent and famous playwright, August von Kotzebue. To the more liberal and progressive students and intellectuals, Kotzebue's reports to the Russian government on German internal affairs and his determined opposition to German unification branded him as an enemy of the Fatherland. He was detested in many quarters, and Sand felt personally called to remove this barrier to German aspirations. His subsequent trial clearly proved that he acted on his own; nevertheless, Metternich and the governments decided to punish the Burschenschaft.¹⁰ The Karlsbad Decrees of 1819 not only prohibited the student association but also pre-

scribed punishment and prosecution for its members. On November 26, 1819, the Burschenschaft publicly solemnized its dissolution, but at the same time, the students promised each other that they would be true to the main tenets of their Union.¹¹

As early as 1820, new Burschenschaft chapters were being founded at different universities. Secret meetings were arranged to exchange ideas, but the close bond was no longer the same. Disagreements concerning the direction which the Burschenschaft should follow left the associations unable to cope with the difficulties of consolidation.¹²

Two of the most critical points of contention were concerned with the acceptance of Jews and foreigners into the organization and the retention of dueling. On one side were the Arminen, who represented a strong national consciousness but contained important religious elements. Their intense love for the Fatherland, their need to be "true Germans", and their Christian outlook prompted their demand that Jews and their "foreign" ways be excluded from the Burschenschaft. Indeed, this had been accepted as part of the Burschenschaft program in 1818, but it had not been strictly enforced and was later overridden by their opposition, the Germanen. Developing from the aristocratic elements of the student community, the Germanen represented a more liberal and progressive standpoint. That it also embraced those people resolved to action is clearly shown in their stand on the question of dueling. This custom had

been an important part of student life in the eighteenth century and continued as a tradition often pivotal in the preservation of personal honor. It was charged, especially by the Arminen, that the duel was nothing more than formalized manslaughter in which any ruffian could take part and in which honor was of less consequence than the number of duels one could boast of. The question of continuing or abolishing the custom of dueling continually plagued Burschenschaft meetings.¹³

The split into Arminen and Germanen began as points for argument among Burschenschaft members, and through the years these disagreements tended to form a dividing line within the association. The problem was recognized in the Burschenschaft meeting in 1831, in which it was proclaimed that the organization represented the sole liberal union of all German students at the universities. This was important for two reasons. First, it showed that the Burschenschaft members recognized the ideological problems within the organization, but did not acknowledge an official schism. Secondly, it indicated the ascendancy of the more politically oriented and more active Germanen over the more philosophical Arminen. Although the Burschenschaft had come to agree that an ideological split did exist in their ranks, they continued to act officially as one group.

The need for action became apparent as the dream of national freedom became more and more synonymous with the desire for unification. At the Stuttgart meeting in December,

1832, the Burschenschaft agreed that a revolution was necessary in order to achieve the freedom and unification of Germany.¹⁴ Acting upon this impulse, about fifty members of the Student Union staged the so-called Frankfurt Insurrection in April, 1833. This revolt failed, however, because it was so badly organized and because the government had been notified of the impending action. The students had planned to arrest the representatives to the German Confederation, take control of its treasury, and establish a provisional government. They believed that if the revolution in Frankfurt were successful, other cities would follow their example.¹⁵ Many of the students who had been involved in this action fled from the city and took refuge in foreign countries, but a large number were arrested and punished with long prison sentences. In June, 1833, the Central Investigation Commission was formed to investigate the origins of the rebellion, and the Burschenschaft was forbidden again. Prussia went even further and prohibited its subjects from attending universities which were tainted by the Burschenschaft. Another decree of December, 1834, subjected all members of the Student Union to harsh criminal punishment. Because of this onslaught, the Burschenschaft was forced to dissolve itself.

This resort to direct action and the resulting counter-attack by the governments show clearly that the Burschenschaft had undergone a period of deep change and development since the Karlsbad Decrees of 1819. The bolder spirits had turned their backs on intra-organizational struggles over

ideology and had taken steps that were not originally intended or outlined by their constitution. For some, this change bespoke a distortion of the original tenets of the Student Union; but for those who were ready to act--and in fact, felt an obligation to act--there were no other courses open to them. And yet, for all the Burschenschaft members, the Insurrection of Frankfurt was a tragic event. It signaled the lowest ebb of the Burschenschaft, as it changed from a movement for moral reform among the academic youth to a progressive society forbidden by the authorities, and finally to a subversive organization liable to criminal prosecution.¹⁶

At this critical point, however, the roots of the Burschenschaft were not destroyed. Secret associations remained in existence, and newly founded ones took innocuous names. They were aided in their struggle when in 1840 King Frederick William IV of Prussia proclaimed an amnesty for all those who had been arrested for their political activities. This meant freedom for numerous Burschenschafter who had been incarcerated since 1833. Although the prohibition against the Burschenschaft itself remained in effect, its character was maintained in the newly formed student associations.¹⁷

As the year 1848 approached, these associations were strongly influenced by the progressive movement of bourgeois liberalism. While the older Burschenschaft often conceived of freedom as their aristocratic right to accentric dress and the perpetuation of their duels, the newer "progressive Burschenschaft" wanted a more liberal organization that

would be open to the emerging proletariat and merchants as well as students. They wanted to abandon distinctive academic attire and special rights for students and to abolish dueling. They did not want to be separated from the people of Germany. Although the ideal of freedom had been an important tenet of the Burschenschaft from its first founding, it was given new dimensions of personal freedom through the influence of the progressive movement in the more active and political branches of the Burschenschaft societies.¹⁸

On February 22, 1848, the citizens of Paris rose up against Louis Philippe of France. The news of the February Revolution spread rapidly across Europe, igniting similar risings in Austria, Italy, and Germany, which were generally based on the demand for more popular control over the government. In Germany, this desire was connected to that of national unity; these two powerful impulses soon forced the governments of Baden, Hannover, Württemberg, and other states to grant concessions. With the news of Metternich's fall from power in the spring of 1848, Frederick William IV was forced to promise reforms for Prussia as well.¹⁹

At the second Wartburg Festival of June 12, 1848, to which all students were invited and at which members of the Frankfurt Assembly were in attendance, the Burschenschaft announced their reform program. Because a large number of delegates were former Burschenschaft members, the students felt that the Frankfurt National Assembly offered the best chance for their demands to be put into action. The influ-

ence of the Burschenschaft was so strong that the Assembly was referred to as the "Parliament of Professors".²⁰ Part of this student program was a petition addressed to the National Assembly which asked that the universities be made national institutions, completely free of cost to the students. It was accompanied by a plea for a constitutional form of government free of aristocratic control for all Germany, since anything less would be treason against the people's right to rule.²¹

Quick and decisive action was needed from the Assembly if a constitutional government was to be formed. Unfortunately, much precious time was wasted in debates among the various advocates of the viewpoints represented. By the time that a constitutional crown was offered to Frederick William of Prussia, the forces of reaction had gained the upper hand. After dismissing the Prussian National Assembly, Frederick William assisted other German governments in overcoming the republican forces. The students and populace of Germany had looked to the Frankfurt National Assembly with great hope and enthusiasm. Equally great was their frustration and despair when the liberal spirit of 1848 collapsed in the spring of the following year.²²

Subsequent years were characterized by disunion in the Burschenschaft, which was now regarded by the governments as a democratic, revolutionary faction which needed to be closely watched. For about two decades between 1849 and 1871, the Burschenschaft struggled to withstand the censure of the

reactionary German governments and to express their traditional freedom. In 1871, however, an event took place which was to alter fundamentally the Burschenschaft's drive for liberty and national unity. In this year Bismarck, through the Franco-Prussian War, established the united German Empire. At long last the hope and desire of Burschenschafter and the German populace alike were realized. Serving the Fatherland at peace and war became the overriding ideal. With the foundation of the Eisenacher Deputierten Convention (Eisenacher Convention of Delegates) in 1874, a new unification of the Burschenschaft was achieved which exemplified this change. The desire for progress turned to conservatism, while patriotism changed to nationalism.²³

In 1890 the Burschenschaft celebrated its seventy-fifth anniversary, and many of the former members attended. An association for former Burschenschaft members was founded. These "old boys" began to support the Student Union by providing financial aid as well as building houses for the organization.²⁴

By 1890, many other student organizations flourished as well. The old Landmannschaften had survived the competition of the more political unions, and they were joined by others with little or no political connections, such as student religious organizations, leagues of athletes, singers, scientists, and historians. They were generally organized around specific interest and continued to serve particular needs of the academic youth.²⁵ They were organized at the twenty-three

universities of the day as well as in the numerous technical colleges and schools of commerce, mining, forestry, and art.²⁶ Certainly the old Burschenschaft did not act in a vacuum; they moved within a flourishing academic environment peopled by many groups and movements. Their goal of unification of all students was often hampered by governmental restrictions; yet even had the situation been free of this interference, the struggle for student unification would still have been great.

Although great plans were laid for the celebration of the centennial anniversary of the Burschenschaft, a huge festival was not possible because the majority of the students were away, fighting in World War I. The few that remained behind held quiet and dignified ceremonies in their local communities. Upon returning from battle in 1918, the German students found it necessary to channel their original high hopes for victory and the Fatherland into the rebuilding of a defeated nation. The Burschenschaft resumed its activities with the same enthusiasm but with a more mature political attitude. Many quickly became dissatisfied with the Weimar Republic and its lack of leadership. These students turned their energies toward the ousting of the existing republic and toward a search for a strong and vigorous leader for their country.²⁷

To understand more clearly the forces at work in this century of development of the student movement, it would be well to choose a single and in many ways typical fraternity

and follow its progress during the period in question. The Bubenreuther of Erlangen provides such an exemplary case. The University of Erlangen was founded in 1743 under the patronage of Friedrich Margrave of Bayreuth. In 1792 the University came under the domination of Prussia, and between 1806 and 1810 it was under the administration of France. After 1810, it was governed by Bavaria. Erlangen held special importance in the fields of philosophy and science, and professors such as Johann Gottlieb Fichte and Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph von Schelling transmitted their intellectual influence to both professors and students. In the first decades of its existence, Erlangen had already reached a remarkable position in the spiritual and intellectual life of Germany.²⁸

Following the Napoleonic Wars, Erlangen too experienced the desire for unification and reform, but these ideals were not so strongly proclaimed and advanced as they had been at Jena. Perhaps this was because of the different conditions at Erlangen: it belonged to Bavaria, and the King of Bavaria had been one of the most trusted and valuable allies of Napoleon.²⁹ Nevertheless, on August 27, 1816 the Burschenschaft founded a chapter at Erlangen, though the Landsmannschaften continued to exist there, as they did at other universities. On December 1, 1817, this chapter became affiliated with the unified Deutsche Burschenschaft. Near the university city lay a little town called Bubenreuth, which soon became a popular meeting place for the Burschenschaft

of Erlangen.³⁰ When the Student Union was prohibited by the Karlsbad Decrees, the Burschenschaft used Bubenreuth as their secret meeting place and began to call themselves "Bubenreuther". The Bubenreuther of Erlangen is therefore one of the oldest Burschenschaft chapters in Germany.³¹

But while most of the Burschenschaft drifted to the left--toward liberalism, reform, and even revolution--the Bubenreuther remained stubbornly conservative and intent upon what they considered to be the original tenets of the organization. They rejected political goals and programs and concentrated upon looking after the educational community for the students. They held true to the motto of the Burschenschaft, "Honor, Freedom, Fatherland", but felt that these goals and ideals had been perverted for political purposes. In 1850 they developed a distinct constitution for their own organization as a reendorsement of their ideals. Unlike many other student organizations during the days of repression, the Bubenreuther was well-liked by the professors. In addition, former members of the Bubenreuther were always welcome in the student meetings. As far as these students were concerned, when a student joined the Bubenreuther, he joined not merely for his educational career but for his entire life. It is no wonder that during the "progressive era" the Bubenreuther was considered by the other Burschenschaften to be conservative. On the other hand, these conservative convictions came to form an impor-

tant influence on the Burschenschaft itself.³²

This conservative program was characterized by its love for the Fatherland, sexual continence, and a high regard for scholastic pursuits and traditional objectives. Through connections with other universities, their ideals became well known as the "Bubenreuther Program".³³ By 1870, many Burschenschaft chapters were concentrating their efforts on local affairs, student needs, and moral and academic reform. This resurfacing of traditional objectives and the warm reception which the "Bubenreuther Program" encountered in many universities led the Bubenreuther of Erlangen to work toward the much cherished goal of unifying the student organizations. In order to achieve this goal, the Bubenreuther took part in the Eisenach Convention of 1870. The time may have seemed right for the formation of a united front; instead, however, the deliberations led only to arguments and dissension. The old controversy over the question of dueling and political involvement rose again to plague the Conference. Whereas many chapters felt the Bubenreuther and its program to be frustratingly unprogressive the Bubenreuther found its opponents to be obsessed with secondary objectives.³⁴

At the Allgemeine Deputierten Convention (General Convention of Deputies) in 1882, the Bubenreuther tried once again to effect a union. For two years they labored, but finally left in disappointment. It was not possible to form a union of all the Burschenschaft that would accept

the "Bubenreuther Program" as its own. This conflict was to some extent resolved by the formation of the Union of the Old Burschenschaften in 1890. This association of Bubenreuther and their advocates was renamed the "Red Union" in 1897. Within this group, the Bubenreuther was able to realize their program.³⁵

During World War I student life at Erlangen, as at other universities, was virtually suspended. By the beginning of 1917, only 157 students were enrolled. Those few who did not go to war tried to keep the Bubenreuther together, but experienced considerable difficulty in reviving its activity. Their house was used until December 31, 1918, as a military hospital. Despite these problems and differences in attitudes between veteran and non-veterans, the fraternity was still in existence when the Weimar Republic was formed.³⁶

Even though the Bubenreuther were forced to form a union that included only a part of the student organizations, it displayed many common traits with the other associations. The conflict within the Burschenschaft could not erase the long years of development and shared history of the different groups; student life had changed dramatically from its Landmannschaften days as a result of their efforts. Reform-ed ideas of how a student should live and what should be his concerns spread throughout Germany. Student associations had provided significant support for the national movement for unification. Even in their internal struggles, the Burschenschaft groups showed themselves to be vital organi-

zations which continued to capture the imagination of German students and to serve not only as their image of themselves, but as their means of taking action.

FOOTNOTES

¹Michael Kater, Studentenschaft und Rechtsradikalismus in Deutschland (1919-1933) (Hamburg, 1975), pp. 11-12.

²David Schoenbaum, Hitler's Social Revolution (London, 1967), pp. 71-76.

³The literature on this subject is enormous. Among the most useful general surveys are Werner Klose, Freiheit, Schreibt auf Eure Fahnen (Hamburg, 1967), and Friedrich Schulze and Paul Ssymank, Das Deutsche Studententum von den ältesten Zeiten bis zur Gegenwart-1931, 4th ed. (Munich, 1932). Eras of special historical significance are covered by such works as Kater's Studentenschaft und Rechtsradikalismus in Deutschland, Wolfgang Bleuel and Peter Klünnert, Deutsche Studenten auf dem Weg ins Dritte Reich (Güterslohe, 1967), and Anselm Faust, Der Nationalsozialistische Studenten Bund (2 vols., Düsseldorf, 1973). Though sometimes colored by the biases and prejudices of its authors, the collection of sources and monographs included in Georg Heer, et al., Quellen und Darstellungen zur Geschichte der Burschenschaft und der deutschen Einheitsbewegung (17 vols., Heidelberg, 1910-1940), is an indispensable work. The continuation of this collection, entitled Darstellungen und Quellen zur deutschen Einheitsbewegung (7 vols., Heidelberg, 1957-1965), and published under the auspices of the Gesellschaft für burschenschaftliche Geschichtsforschung, is also useful.

⁴Klose, Freiheit schreibt auf Eure Fahnen, pp. 73-110.

⁵Herman Haupt, "Die Jenaische Burschenschaft von der Zeit ihrer Gründung bis zum Wartburgfest", in Quellen und Darstellungen zur Geschichte der Burschenschaft und der deutschen Einheitsbewegung (Hereinafter cited as QDBG), Vol. I, p. 19.

⁶ibid., p. 33.

⁷Wilhelm Bruckmüller, Des deutsche Studententum von seinen Anfängen bis zur Gegenwart (Leipzig, 1922), p. 89.

⁸ibid., p. 90.

⁹Schulze and Ssymank, Das Deutsche Studententum 1st ed. (Leipzig, 1910), pp. 190-193.

- ¹⁰William Howitt, Life in Germany (London, 1849), pp. 61-95.
- ¹¹Bruckmüller, Das deutsche Studentum, p. 91.
- ¹²Georg Heer, "Von den Karlsbader Beschlüssen bis zum Frankfurter Wachensturm, 1820-1833", QDGB, Vol. X, pp. 1-20.
- ¹³*Ibid.*, pp. 154-239.
- ¹⁴*Ibid.*, pp. 274-283.
- ¹⁵*Ibid.*, pp. 291-302.
- ¹⁶*Ibid.*, pp. 302-306.
- ¹⁷Georg Heer, "Die Zeit des Progresses von 1833-1859", QDGB, Vol. XI, pp. 1-14.
- ¹⁸Schulze and Ssymank, Das deutsche Studententum, pp. 253-260.
- ¹⁹Robert Ergang, Europe Since Waterloo (Boston, 1967), pp. 48-68.
- ²⁰Hermann Kinder and Werner Hilgemann, Von der Französischen Revolution bis zur Gegenwart [Vol. II of the dtv Atlas zur Weltgeschichte: Karten und Chronologischer Abriss] (Munich, 1966), p. 57.
- ²¹Georg Heer, "Die Zeit des Progresses von 1833-1839", QDGB, Vol. XI, pp. 127-139.
- ²²*Ibid.*, pp. 139-151.
- ²³Georg Heer, "Die Burschenschaft in der Zeit der Vorbereitung des zweiten Reiches, im zweiten Reich und im Weltkrieg von 1859 bis 1919", QDGB, Vol. XVI, pp. 38-44.
- ²⁴*Ibid.*, pp. 60-65.
- ²⁵Schulze and Ssymank, Das deutsche Studententum, pp. 327-349.
- ²⁶A. Wolf, Higher Education in Nazi Germany (London, 1944), pp. 15-16.
- ²⁷Bruckmüller, Das deutsche Studentum, pp. 123-132.
- ²⁸Hans Lievrman, "Der Weg der Universität Erlangen: Zwei Jahrhunderte deutsche Geschichte", Address of November 4, 1943, Universitäts-Archiv, Erlangen.

²⁹ Julius Andreae and Fritz Griesbach, Burschenschaft der Bubenreuther (Erlangen, 1967), p. 14.

³⁰ Ibid., p. 15.

³¹ Ibid., p. 19.

³² Ernst Höhne, ["]Die Bubenreuther: Geschichte einer deutschen Burschenschaft (Erlangen, 1936), pp. 46-48.

³³ Ibid., pp. 49-51.

³⁴ Andreae and Griesbach, Burschenschaft der Bubenreuther, p. 27.

³⁵ Ibid., p. 28.

³⁶ Ibid., p. 36.

CHAPTER II

STUDENTS IN THE WEIMAR REPUBLIC

In order to understand and appreciate the attitude of the German students toward the Weimar Republic, it is necessary to review briefly the history of that period. The situation in Germany after World War I was marked by economic and social dislocation as well as internal strife and restlessness. The disagreements among the various political parties over national and international policies of the country caused great uncertainty and concern within the population at large. Germany after World War I lacked a political consensus. Instead, there were five major political parties, ranging from extreme communism to the most reactionary monarchism, vying for control of the state, as well as a host of minor splinter groups, each with its own panacea for the problems of the defeated nation.

On the left, the Social Democratic Party (SDD) was the strongest, with 165 representatives in the Constituent Assembly of 416 members which was elected in January, 1919. The SDD followed a policy of moderate democratic socialism; it was the cornerstone of the Republic.¹ Often allied with the Socialists were the 75 representatives of the Democratic Party, representing the ideology of western liberalism. The

Center Party, with 91 members in the Assembly, was chiefly concerned with questions of religion, but could usually be counted upon to support the newly established Republic. The Peoples Party, the party of big business and imperialism, held only 19 seats in the Assembly, while the National Party, largely conservative, anti-Republican, and highly nationalistic, counted 44. Still, at the beginning of its troubled life, the Republic could count upon the support of about three quarters of the German electorate. The gradual erosion of this support and the emergence of extremist and totalitarian movements on both the left and the right in the 1920s would spell the doom of the Republic.²

This political instability resulted in revolutionary attacks from both the right- and left-wing political factions. In December, 1918, the Spartacists, a Communist oriented group led by Rosa Luxemburg and Karl Liebknecht, staged a revolt in Berlin to protest against the supposed dictatorship of the working masses by the political parties. Founded during the war, the Spartacists were loosely associated with the Independent Socialists (USPD), but the revolution at Berlin was an independent political act. This revolt was marked by six days of bloody street fighting with the Free Corps Volunteers, a reactionary group drawn from the remnants of the Imperial Army, united mainly by their hatred of Communism. This internal fighting and civil disturbance, in addition to the question of the Treaty of Versailles, made it imperative that a government be established.³

An attempt to establish a provisional government had been made in November, 1918, but this collapsed in late December. On February 6, 1919, the National Assembly met at Weimar and completed a Constitution for the new Republic the following August. Under the chancellorship of Philippe Scheidemann, a Social Democrat, a coalition cabinet containing Social Democrats, Democrats and Catholic Center ministers met to face the birth pains of the Republic.⁴

It was indeed a difficult birth; the Republic had many problems to solve if it was to survive. Perhaps the most important was the question of signing the Treaty of Versailles. Should this new Republic sign such a document and assume sole blame for the war, or not? Should Germany make a restitution for the war by the payment of large sums in reparation, or not? These were the major problems facing this fledgling government. Besides the humiliating terms of the Treaty, other provisions restricted the size of the German Army and Navy, allowed the occupation of the Rhineland for 15 years or longer, and ceded the Saar district to the great advantage of France. These obviously debilitating dictates were accepted by the government, and the Treaty of Versailles was signed under protest by the Weimar Republic on June 28, 1919.⁵

This action by the government caused great consternation throughout the country, and by 1920 disillusionment ran rampant among the people. Revolution and rebellion were once more the order of the day. Much of this unrest showed

itself in a wave of assassinations of political figures. In February, 1919, Kurt Eisner, the Prime Minister of Bavaria, was murdered. His death, which caused much excitement at Munich, paved the way for the establishment of a Communist Soviet Republic of Bavaria in April, 1919.⁶ Even more important assassinations occurred between 1921 and 1922. On August 26, 1921, Mathias Erzberger, the Minister of Finance, was killed. Then, on June 14, 1922, Walther von Rathenau, the Foreign Minister, was assassinated. These assassinations can be considered as overt political expressions of dissatisfaction with the Weimar Republic.⁷

Another event which can be interpreted as direct action against the Republic took place during the chaotic years from 1919 to 1923. This was the "Kapp Putsch". On March 12, 1920, Wolfgang Kapp, a Prussian bureaucrat, along with General Walther von Luttwitz and his troops, occupied Berlin. The government fled from Berlin to Stuttgart, and Kapp declared himself Chancellor. However, the various government ministers, officials, and even the Reichswehr refused to work with him. This caused Kapp to resign on March 17, after a reign of only five days.⁸

Although the Putsch failed for Kapp, it provoked a general strike throughout the country. The Communists took advantage of this situation. At first, the Communists had supported the government, but after the Putsch, they expanded the general strike into a Communist insurrection in the Ruhr district. This strike was so dangerous that the government

was forced to send Reichswehr into the Ruhr area to crush the "Red Army".⁹

This Ruhr rebellion combined with the generally unsettled condition of the country, the rising prices, and currency inflation influenced the election of the Reichstag in June, 1920. In 1919, the Weimar Coalition had received over seventy-five percent of the votes, but after the trials and troubles of 1919 and 1920, it obtained less than half of the Reichstag seats. The government, under Konstantine Fehrenbach, no longer had majority support. Because of the instability of the government and the Allied demand for a reparation payment of 132 billion gold marks, Fehrenbach resigned in April, 1921. Josef Wirth then assumed leadership of the government and continued to lead the Republic down its long hard road to disaster.¹⁰

One crucial step on this road was the acceptance by Wirth of the ultimatum of London, which stipulated that upon default of reparations, the Allies would be allowed to occupy Germany's most important industrial district, the Ruhr. Germany was unable to pay the exorbitant reparation demands, so on January 11, 1923, a combined force of French and Belgian troops occupied the Ruhr. The government put into effect Chancellor Wilhelm Cuno's strategy of "passive resistance" to the army of occupation. In effect, the Ruhr district was boycotted so that the French and Belgian government would receive absolutely no advantage from their occupation. Trains were prevented from entering the district

and those already there were forbidden to leave. This was done primarily to stop the transportation of coal, one of the Ruhr's important exports. Because the Ruhr was shut down, the government had to support the unemployed Ruhr population. This proved to be a great financial burden for the German government, and the overall economic situation of Germany fell to pieces along with currency.¹¹

It became necessary for workmen to receive their wages several times during the day. This would enable them to exchange their marks for something of value before their money became worthless. In the country, the farmers refused to take the mark and would only work in exchange for commodities. Inflation was so pronounced that by November 15, 1923, the rate of exchange was 4,200,000,000,000 marks for one dollar.¹²

As things are always darkest before the dawn, the ailing Republic received a shot in the arm with the chancellorship of Gustav Stresemann. While Stresemann was trying to control the inflation, he was hit by new political insurrections. In October, 1923, the Communists staged rebellions in Munich and Berlin. In November, 1923, Adolf Hitler started his political activities in Bavaria with the so-called "Beer Hall Putsch". These two events will be discussed in detail later.

Stresemann was Chancellor for only one hundred days during the fall of 1923, but he continued to influence the government as Foreign Minister until 1929. He built a

coalition of Social Democrats, Center Party members, Democrats and representatives of his own party, and immediately took action to stabilize the currency. First, he halted the passive resistance in the Ruhr district and then established a new currency, the Rentenmark.¹³ By negotiating a revision of the reparation schedule under the "Dawes Plan" in 1924, Stresemann brought Germany the financial support of the United States. This fresh flow of currency helped to stabilize the Rentenmark and rationalized industry through necessary modernization.¹⁴

But the most significant of Stresemann's actions was in the realm of foreign policy. The Treaty of Versailles had placed Germany in political isolation, and Stresemann's primary goal was that of regaining the respect of the European powers and easing the hateful atmosphere between France and Germany. In 1925, he arranged the conference at Locarno where Germany and France mutually guaranteed the permanence of their frontiers.¹⁵ Without doubt, the strongest period of the Weimar Republic was from 1924 to 1929, under the guidance of Gustav Stresemann. In economics and especially in foreign affairs notable successes were achieved.¹⁶

From 1928 to 1930, Hermann Müller of the SPD led a government determined to build upon this success. But Müller inherited the Great Depression, and the hostilities and enmities of the past now emerged in this critical atmosphere to destroy the basis of parliamentary life.¹⁷ Müller's SPD government failed for a number of reasons.

The party had been unable to enlarge its image from that of a labor party to that of a broadly Republican one; it would not remove the barriers between itself and the rest of the German society. In addition, the Social Democrats had been unable to agree with the People's Party on an increase in the unemployment insurance contributions of workers and employers in order to cover the rising deficit in federal unemployment funds. An underlying cause of their failure was the growing lack of confidence in the parliamentary system itself, especially as the economic crisis worsened in the Depression.¹⁸

With the death of President Ebert in 1925, it became necessary to find a strong candidate with great popular appeal. They chose Field Marshal Paul von Hindenburg. He was not well suited for the job. An ex-monarchist, he had no understanding for democratic government. His major abilities were military in nature, and such problems as economics, politics, and financial crises were beyond his competency. Being seventy-eight, he was too old to control other younger and more ambitious politicians. Also, while he remained president until his death in August, 1934, he was merely a figurehead.¹⁹

Many "presidential decisions" were really those of General Kurt von Schleicher, whose official position was Chief of the Minister's Office. Schleicher was no friend of the Weimar democracy. He found it indecisive and divisive and felt that the development of an authoritarian government

was the only constructive step. He became the dominating force in German domestic politics and determined the appointment of the chancellors between 1930 and 1932. His great political power was a result of his influence over the aging von Hindenburg.²⁰

In 1930, Müller's government fell, and Schleicher supported Heinrich Brüning, a Catholic veteran of World War I, as Chancellor. Brüning went back to a more authoritarian form of government. During his administration the "presidential cabinet" became the actual ruling body. The government depended less and less on the support of a Reichstag majority and more and more on the influence and abilities of the President. In this case, because of Schleicher's power over Hindenburg, this meant that actual dictatorial powers were given to Schleicher and through him, to Brüning. This appeared formally lawful under Article Forty-Eight of the Constitution, which gave the President the right to issue emergency legislation. Brüning attempted to alleviate the Depression by means of deflation. He did this by cutting wages and inaugurating a program of austerity for the government. Under this policy, unemployment increased from 2.7 million in April, 1930, to 5.7 million in May, 1932. He had become increasingly unpopular with the urban working class, who objected strongly to his deflationary policy and his protection of agrarian interests through the use of high import tariffs. Finally, with unemployment so high and dissatisfaction so widespread, Brüning was ousted from

the chancellorship on May 5, 1932.²¹

Hindenburg then appointed Franz von Papen to the chancellorship. The struggle for power between Chancellor Papen and Schleicher was intense, as it was Schleicher's goal to bring about the fall of Papen's government. Thus, the political fate of Germany rested in the hands of these three men: one whose physical and mental capabilities were unsuited for his position, and two subordinates whose primary interests were personal rather than national. In order to meet the problems of the Depression, Papen wanted to establish a military dictatorship; however, this plan was vetoed by Schleicher, who argued that it would lead to both a Nazi and Communist rebellion. Papen was removed from office, and Schleicher tried his hand at the chancellorship. He too failed to deal effectively with the situation, and his cabinet collapsed on January 28, 1933.²²

The rise of the NSDAP and Hitler's accession to power paralleled the decline of the Weimar Republic. The NSDAP started out as a small party confined to Bavaria, as a reaction against the left-wing uprisings taking place there. The party was weak and poorly developed until after 1923, when it began to grow slowly outside the geographical boundaries of Bavaria. In May, 1924, the popularity of the NSDAP was seen in the Reichstag elections. The NSDAP and its fringe groups collected 2 million votes, probably as a result of the inflation. During the period of 1924-1928 the NSDAP suffered a slight setback. The situation in Ger-

many had stabilized, and the Weimar Republic retained the confidence of the voters.

In 1929, the Great Depression began, and the NSDAP began to expand. The party offered no coherent program of economic policies but blamed the existing conditions on the "Criminals of 1918", the Jews, and the Treaty of Versailles, rather than advocating new measures. But such was the dissatisfaction with the old policies that by 1930 the NSDAP was the second largest party in the Reichstag. Between 1930 and 1932, the NSDAP, with Hitler as its leader, gained many new members and voters, mostly from the disgruntled youth. These young people, eligible to vote for the first time, were totally disenchanted with the corrupt parliamentary system exemplified in the last days of the Republic. A change was needed, and the Nazi party offered such a change. It appeared as "a movement which promised everything and was responsible for nothing".²³ As the Republic fell apart between 1930 and 1932, Hitler's power grew, and the alternative he offered became more tempting until, finally in 1933, he was given command of the government, and the NSDAP's ascendancy towards political control became a reality.²⁴

Neither Papen or Schleicher had been effective. Their plans for an authoritarian government had achieved no more than the procession of coalitions that they had so abhorred in the Weimar Republic. In desperation, Papen had urged Hindenburg to appoint Hitler to the Chancellorship. Hinden-

burg was against the move, holding out for several months, because he was afraid that Hitler's cabinet would lead to a "party dictatorship". However, on January 30, 1933, Hindenburg gave Hitler the Chancellorship, thus beginning the Nazi reign in Germany.²⁵

As these tragic developments unfolded, the students of Germany were not only acutely conscious of political developments but often deeply and actively involved as well. Most were hostile to the Republic, largely as a consequence of their postwar situation. It was particularly difficult for the student veterans to adjust to the situation in the postwar years. With great enthusiasm they had gone to war, unconditionally willing to defend their country to the end. With almost childish trust they believed in the Kaiser and his country. How disappointing and painful must have been the sense of defeat for the student to return from the battlefield to find a torn Fatherland! Their common experience of the trenches resulted in a desire for togetherness, for a close comradeship among the student veterans.²⁶

The confusing situation in Germany after World War I was instrumental in developing the restlessness of the German students. The number of students enrolled in universities grew from 25,000 in 1918 to 112,000 in 1919, and continued to grow to 126,000 in 1923. Organized student groups that survived the First World War included the Landsmannschaft, the Burschenschaft, and the Christian Unions. The largest of these groups was the Deutsche Burschenschaft.

This organization had about 6,000 members in 1919, and grew to 11,600 members by 1931. The students who chose not to affiliate with the older organizations were called the Frei-studentenschaft (Free Student Body). They attempted to organize before the war, but chose to remain very loosely affiliated.²⁷ The war experience, the still existing desire for a united Fatherland, together with the desire to obtain a voice in the functioning of the universities gave these students the impetus they needed to organize.²⁸ The war experience was particularly influential, since 90% of the students were veterans of World War I. Because of the large percentage of students who had served, they were important in the leadership of the student movement until 1923, when many of these veterans began to leave the universities.²⁹ The younger students had less emotional involvement with the united fatherland question, and so it was left to the students who had been veterans to lead any drive for the political union of all German speaking people. These students went to war with the idea of a unified Germany. However, Germany under the Republic of Weimar did not appear to them as their dream about their Fatherland. The most militant of these veterans were willing to become members of the Free Corps, and thus participated in the armed clashes in the streets between the radicals and the government forces. The Free Corps came into existence because of the reluctance of the regular forces to shoot at the mobs in the streets, which included many women and children.³⁰

Generally, the students as a whole were opposed to the Weimar Republic as a republic per se and also hostile toward its specific policies. Because of political goals of the students and the goals of the political parties were different, the student factions of the political parties remained small and uninfluential. There were attempts to build up student membership in the major parties, but their numbers were too small to be an important factor.³¹ Most of the students tended to sympathize with the right-wing parties.³² The new Republic was inconsistent with the political sympathies of the students. As an institution the Republic was something with no historical precedent in Germany. The opposition to the Republic was intensified because of the Versailles Treaty and its acceptance by the government. The students were opposed to the Treaty because of the unreasonable demands of the Allies, and more importantly, the acceptance by Germany of the entire blame for the war.³³

The students who were interested in organizing in order to enhance their political influence were given encouragement by the Prussian Ministry of Culture, which recognized their right to organize. The Allgemeine Deutsche Studentenausschüsse (General German Students Committee or ASTA) already existed in a loosely organized form at some universities.³⁴ The ASTA was a type of student parliament, with representatives from individual student groups. As the ASTA was already in existence, it found itself in a leader-

ship role to promote a nationwide organization which would include students who had not previously been organized. The students decided that the best way to begin was to call a conference to which all students, including Austrian students, were invited, regardless of whether they were organized or not. Between July 17 and 19, 1919, 147 delegates representing student interests from all German universities met at Würzburg.³⁵

At this meeting, besides choosing the name of Deutsche Studentenschaft (German Student Body), the students tried primarily to define their roles and duties in the area of the cultural, socio-economic, and political future of the country.³⁶ At this meeting, it was decided that those eligible for membership would be students of German origin whose native language was German. There was among the students the agreement that the Austrians be included, even though this was against the provisions of the Treaty of Versailles. It was decided that the headquarters of the organization would be in Berlin. The delegates went back to their own universities with the assignment of establishing a chapter of the German Student Body at each and electing a new ASTA, or Student Parliament.³⁷ At Würzburg, the decision was made to have annual meetings with representatives from the ASTAs of the different universities.

While the Deutsche Studentenschaft was accepted by the government as a legitimate organization, the apparent unity of 1919 was illusory and did not last very long. Ideologi-

cal disputes soon tore the movement apart.³⁸ These disputes focussed on what has been called the "völkisch idea", a somewhat nebulous term which requires further explanation. The concept of the German "Volk" developed gradually from a somewhat vague appreciation that the Germanic peoples constituted a distinct and identifiable group based upon religion, culture and race. It culminated in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries with the notion that there existed a unity of the common will or spirit of the people. "Völkisch" thought came to emphasize the necessity for building a unified German nation around its common racial, Christian, and cultural background. Frequently, those who shared this notion called for a leader who symbolized the common national will to become the example and focal point for the crystallization of a universal community in which there is a union of all human wills and endeavors. Philosophers such as Hegel contributed the idea that the traditional characteristics of the German people as well as their national political constitution manifested world-spirit. Fichte contributed the idea that there should be a union of all human wills in a universal community, i.e., in the German nation.³⁹ Others suggested that the spirit of a particular nation could never be comprehended by a member of another, thus predisposing "Völkisch" thinkers toward anti-semitism. The philosophies of these and other men prevailed the educational institutions from the time of the wars of liberation. Often in distorted and simplistic

form, they contributed to a rather mystical cult stressing German self-identity and unity of spirit. "Völkisch" thinking was especially pervasive within the ranks of students and student organizations like the Burschenschaft during the period of the Empire.⁴⁰

The World War, the Treaty of Versailles and the re-birth of Romanticism gave impetus to the reassertion of the "volkisch" movement. The movement excluded the Jews, viewing them as foreigners and therefore not part of the "German landscape". This opinion became prevalent in the German youth and later among the students of the university. As the movement grew, anti-Semitism permeated the elementary schools. So far, in fact, that instead of child games of "cowboys and indians" there were games of "Aryans and Jews". Discrimination against the Jews became an intricate part of childhood, and as children matured and entered the universities it became a goal of the German students to exclude Jews from their environment. The Jews were forced to seek out those universities where they could study free from pressures of discrimination; they were also advised to learn self-defense to protect themselves from the "Aryans".⁴¹

Anti-Semitism was indeed strong among the student population in Germany. Many examples can be cited. Assassination of Jewish political figures such as Kurt Eisner and Walter von Rathenau were met by unconcern and remarks such as "Who cares, one Jew less", by the students. The students responded enthusiastically to the NSDAP demand that Jewish-

owned businesses be eliminated and only German industries be allowed to operate. Jewish students, those lucky enough to attend the universities, were excluded from the university sponsored celebrations and memorials.⁴² In 1926 National Socialist students were already demanding that the number of Jewish students be restricted, which meant that Jewish applicants must take and pass more difficult exams than the other students.⁴³ Many professors supported the anti-Semitic attitude of the students, being concerned that not too many Jewish students or professors enter the German universities.⁴⁴ All of these points clearly show that the "völkisch idea" and its corollary anti-Semitism, were well established notions among German students long before Adolf Hitler made it a national characteristic.

The "völkisch idea", including the Jewish question, split the German Student Body. This split was a result of differing priorities among German students rather than a fundamental difference in beliefs. On the one side there stood those who were most concerned about economic aid for students and their role in the universities; they remained within the Deutsche Studentenschaft. Those who considered the "völkisch idea" the most important student issue broke away from the organization. The students from Austria as well as those affiliated with the old Burschenschaft were particularly adamant against admitting Jewish students to the organization. At a meeting in Göttingen in 1920, a majority of German Student Body delegates founded a separate

organization called the Hochschulring deutscher Art (German Academic Circle), which became the collecting point for those students of pronounced "völkisch" sympathies. Many of these individuals who insisted upon the exclusion of Jews from student organizations continued to maintain their membership in various Bruschenschaft or Landsmannschaft chapters as well as in the German Student Body itself.⁴⁵

The German Academic Circle enjoyed increasing influence, and by 1924 it dominated most of the student parliaments. Activities of the Circle such as supporting Hitler in his Beer Hall Putsch helped increase membership as well as render their ideology acceptable to a growing number of students.⁴⁶

There was another controversy within the German Student Body which concerned the status of both Jewish and Austrian students. This controversy centered around the problem of who was a "German" and who was not; it was raised at each annual meeting of the Deutsche Studentenschaft by the German Academic Circle. Their position was that Jews were not German and therefore had no right to membership in the German Student Body, while Austrians were German and had this right. The Austrian chapters of the Deutsche Studentenschaft adhered to the "völkisch", anti-Semitic views of the German Academic Circle. The Academic Circle wanted to make this accepted policy at all German universities.⁴⁷

However, Karl Heinrich Becker, Prussian Minister of Culture, was against adopting this policy for Germany, and

refused to accept the Constitution of the German Student Body which included this policy. Each year a constitution was proposed, and each year he rejected it until finally in 1927, after seven years of argument, Becker issued an ultimatum. He demanded that the Student Body accept as members all German students, including Jews, without regard to racial or ethnic origins. "Foreign" students could be admitted to local chapters if that particular university approved of such action. If the Austrian chapters of the German Student Body would allow Jews to membership, then Becker would continue to consider them part of the German organization. If not, then by virtue of the Treaty of Versailles, which declared Austria a separate country, Becker would consider the Austrians as "foreigners" and thus ineligible to belong to the German Deutsche Studentenschaft. As a result of his policy against anti-Semitism, Becker was considered as a "Jew-lover" and a "November criminal" by the students.⁴⁸

The extent of anti-Semitism within the German Student Body can be gauged by the students' vote on this issue on November 30, 1927. Becker lost by a vast majority, 77% of the students voting against his proposal. Under his authority as culture minister, Becker declared the German Student Body to be unacceptable to the government as a formal organization and withdrew all government support. Since only those organizations recognized by the government could receive dues from their members, this left the association with no way to finance itself. It also lost the right to

be consulted about changes in policy at the universities, and though it continued to exist, it lost most of its power and importance. The völkisch group, the German Academic Circle, having now a clear majority of students on its side, rose in power to become the most important student organization.⁴⁹

Though the general conditions of the Republic began to improve after 1924, the völkisch movement continued to grow, and the opposition of students to the Republic became more active and vocal. In 1926, the Nazi Party founded a student auxiliary, the National Sozialistische deutsche Studenten Bund (National Socialist German Student League) or NSDSTB.⁵⁰ Working directly with the Party, the League joined the Burschenschaft and the Academic Circle in their support of right-wing policies.⁵¹ The goal of the NSDSTB was to gain control of the student parliaments and thus the universities.⁵² This objective was enormously facilitated by the effects of the Great Depression after 1929.⁵³ The Burschenschaft and other student organizations continued to retain their separate identity until 1935, when by Hitler's decree they were all absorbed into the NSDSTB.⁵⁴

To understand this rapid development of nationalistic tendencies among the students, several points of opposition to the Weimar Republic should be examined. The Treaty of Versailles was a crushing blow to the German population as a whole and caused a deep bitterness among the students. The terms of the Treaty were sharply criticized by the stu-

dents, and they appealed to the government not to sign it because it would rob Germany of both opportunities for future expansion and its honor. The Republic's acceptance of the Treaty created a critical attitude on the part of the students.⁵⁵ Especially they resented the imposition of full responsibility for the war on Germany. To demonstrate their hatred of the Treaty and all it stood for, students held annual demonstrations against it on the anniversary of its acceptance. In 1927, the demonstrators drew up a resolution which called for the revision of the Treaty to eliminate particularly its assertion of German war guilt.⁵⁶

It was but natural then for the students to welcome and actively support the National Socialist campaign against the Young Plan in 1929. The Young Plan prescribed a new program for German's reparation payments, but the students interpreted this new formula as slavery for the German people and their future generations. A petition was sent to President Hindenburg asking for his consent for a plebiscite on the Plan. It was asserted in the petition that Hindenburg's acceptance of the Young Plan would mean a permanent national disaster for Germany. The signing of this contract by the aging President was again proof to the students that the Weimar Republic could not be trusted. Hindenburg had been honored and admired greatly by the students; they expected him to help and support their position. His disappointing action caused the students to lose confidence in the President, and made him look like a helpless, powerless

old man.⁵⁷

Another issue which alienated the students from the Republic was the outcome of the Ruhr occupation. The government had asked the students for their cooperation in its passive resistance policy of 1923, and the students enthusiastically responded. This first appeal by the Republic to resist the constant pressures by the Allies restored somewhat the students' hope for political change. How disappointed they were when Stresemann decided to terminate passive resistance in 1924! This called for another resolution: The academic youth under no circumstances would tolerate slavery of the German people at any time in the future from this day forth! An urgent appeal was made to every German student to realize his duty to fight for the Fatherland movement.⁵⁸

Moreover, the students were seriously hurt by inflation, and this situation did not alter significantly when the economy showed a faint upswing after 1924.⁵⁹ This is best shown by a few comparisons. In 1921, the average monthly student income was 520 marks, compared to 896 marks earned by a common laborer. In 1925, after the inflation, students had an average income of only 75 marks per month, whereas the laborer averaged 264 marks. The student's living conditions were atrocious, worse than any other class of society. Germany's construction business was at a virtual standstill after the war, and it was almost impossible for the students to find living quarters. When con-

struction slowly resumed, the scarce housing was priced above the student's limit. It was not uncommon to find students sleeping in train stations or deserted army barracks.⁶⁰ In addition, the shortage of funds caused a health problem. The young men were undernourished; a general medical check-up in 1925 showed that 50% of them were suffering from malnutrition. In 1921, 1.7% of students suffered from tuberculosis, and an additional 8.7% were suspected of harboring the disease. The Weimar Republic promised but did not provide relief for these problems.⁶¹ This meant the students had to resort to their own initiative to ease their plight. In 1921, the German Student Body founded the "Wirtschaftshilfe", an economic aid program. Funded mainly through donations by industries and some foreign nations, the assistance came in the form of money, food, clothing, and housing.⁶²

The only recourse for most students, however, was to seek employment in addition to his studies. This created a new phenomenon, the "Werkstudent", or student laborer. Up to this time it was uncommon for a student to hold a job, since the majority of the students between 1918 and 1933 came from the middle class. But it was precisely this group which was hit hardest both by inflation and depression, and there was little financial help for the students from home. By the summer of 1923, approximately 43% of all students were working. The inflation put an end to this improvement, and until the economic situation had suf-

ficiently improved, jobs were scarce for students. Of course this shortlived security vanished entirely with the beginning of the world economic depression. By the summer of 1930 only about 7% of the students were employed.⁶³ The National Socialist Party saw its chance. Using the NSDSTB to distribute financial and employment aid to needy students, assistance from the Party persuaded many students to view Hitler as a savior and to join his movement as the only way to get out of their misery.⁶⁴ Thus, its ideology, the prospect of financial aid, the hatred of the Republic, and the charisma of Hitler himself were all reasons for the popularity of National Socialism among the students. It seemed that there were no political alternatives to the Nazi party. By examining a specific chapter of the old Burschenschaft--the Bubenreuther--each of these factors will be shown in greater detail.

FOOTNOTES

¹ Helmut Heiber, Die Republik von Weimar (Munich, 1966), pp. 7-26.

² Ibid., pp. 27-36.

³ F. A. Krummacher and A. Wucher, Die Weimarer Republik, ihre Geschichte in Texten, Bildern und Dokumenten (Wiesbaden, 1965), pp. 59-69.

⁴ Golo Mann, Deutsche Geschichte des 19 und 20. Jahrhunderts (Stuttgart, 1958), pp. 738-739.

⁵ Heiber, Die Republik von Weimar, pp. 55-60.

⁶ Erich Eyck, Geschichte der Weimarer Republik (2 vols., Stuttgart, 1962), Vol. 1, pp. 108-111.

⁷ Krummacher and Wucher, Die Weimarer Republik, pp. 124-137.

⁸ Heiber, Die Republik von Weimar, pp. 71-78.

⁹ Ibid., pp. 81-84.

¹⁰ Eyck, Geschichte der Weimarer Republik, Vol. 1, pp. 220-224.

¹¹ Krummacher, Die Weimarer Republik, pp. 142-148.

¹² Ergang, Europe Since Waterloo, p. 422.

¹³ Krummacher and Wucher, Die Weimarer Republik, pp. 160-165.

¹⁴ Eyck, Geschichte der Weimarer Republik, Vol. I, pp. 347-350.

¹⁵ Ibid., Vol. II, pp. 11-70.

¹⁶ Ibid., p. 274.

¹⁷ Ibid., pp. 247-259.

¹⁸ Heiber, Die Republik von Weimar, pp. 199-218.

- ¹⁹Ergang, Europe Since Waterloo, pp. 424-427.
- ²⁰Heiber, Die Republik von Weimar, pp. 219-232.
- ²¹Ibid., pp. 251-255.
- ²²Ergang, Europe Since Waterloo, pp. 427-428.
- ²³Robert Edwin Herzstein, Adolf Hitler and the German Trauma (New York, 1974), p. 75.
- ²⁴Ibid., pp. 73-83.
- ²⁵Heiber, Die Republik von Weimar, pp. 251-276.
- ²⁶Helmut Volkmann, Die Deutsche Studentenschaft in ihrer Entwicklung seit 1919 (Leipzig, 1925), pp. 2-4.
- ²⁷Schulze and Ssymank, Das deutsche Studententum, p. 465.
- ²⁸Kater, Studentenschaft und Rechtsradikalismus, p. 19.
- ²⁹Faust, Der Nationalsozialistische Studentenbund, Vol. I. p. 19.
- ³⁰Kater, Studentenschaft und Rechtsradikalismus, p. 20.
- ³¹Bleuel and Klinnert, Deutsche Studenten auf dem Weg ins Dritte Reich, p. 8.
- ³²Kater, Studentenschaft und Rechtsradikalismus, p. 23.
- ³³Wolfgang Zorn, "Die politische Entwicklung des Deutschen Studententums", Darstellungen und Quellen zur deutschen Einheitsbewegung (7 vols., Heidelberg, 1957-1965), Vol. V, pp. 245-246.
- ³⁴Ibid., p. 229.
- ³⁵Volkmann, Die deutsche Studentenschaft, pp. 4-5.
- ³⁶"Jürgen Schwarz, Studenten in der Weimarer Republik (Berlin, 1971), pp. 174-188.
- ³⁷Volkmann, Die deutsche Studentenschaft, pp. 14-18.
- ³⁸Schulze and Ssymank, Das deutsche Studententum, pp. 481-484.
- ³⁹Frederick Copleston, A History of Philosophy (8 vols., New York, 1965), Vol. 7, pp. 246-269.

⁴⁰Stuart Hughes, Consciousness and Society (New York, 1958), pp. 183-191.

⁴¹George Mosse, The Crisis of German Ideology (New York, 1969), pp. 268-279.

⁴²Bleuel and Klinnert, Deutsche Studenten, pp. 163-169.

⁴³Kater, Studentenschaft und Rechtsradikalismus, p. 146.

⁴⁴Bleuel and Klinnert, Deutsche Studenten, pp. 130-135.

⁴⁵Schwarz, Studenten in der Weimarer Republik, pp. 168-174.

⁴⁶Faust, Der National Sozialistische Studenten Bund, Vol. 1, p. 27.

⁴⁷Zorn, "Die politische Entwicklung", pp. 249-256.

⁴⁸*Ibid.*, pp. 263-267, 287-290.

⁴⁹*Ibid.*, pp. 293-294.

⁵⁰Faust, Der Nationalsozialistische Studenten Bund, Vol. 1, pp. 36-41.

⁵¹Kater, Studentenschaft und Rechtsradikalismus, p. 21.

⁵²Faust, Der Nationalsozialistische Studenten Bund, Vol. 1, pp. 76-100.

⁵³Kater, Studentenschaft und Rechtsradikalismus, pp. 56-62.

⁵⁴Wolfgang Zorn, "Student Politics in the Weimar Republic", Journal of Contemporary History, Vol. 1 (1970), pp. 137-138.

⁵⁵Schwarz, Studenten in der Weimarer Republik, p. 115.

⁵⁶Bleuel and Klinnert, Deutsche Studenten, p. 109.

⁵⁷Faust, Der National Sozialistische Studenten Bund, Vol. 1, pp. 97-103.

⁵⁸Zorn, "Die politische Entwicklung", pp. 277-280.

⁵⁹Kater, Studentenschaft und Rechtsradikalismus, pp. 11-12.

⁶⁰*Ibid.*, pp. 43-47.

⁶¹ Ibid., pp. 51-56.

⁶² Michael Doebler, Das Akademische Deutschland (4 vols., Berlin, 1930), Vol. III, pp. 458-474.

⁶³ Kater, Studentenschaft und Rechtsradikalismus, pp. 56-63.

⁶⁴ Ibid., pp. 115-117.

CHAPTER III

BUBENREUTHER AND BAVARIAN POLITICS, 1918-1933

The state of Bavaria held a unique position within the Weimar Republic. Considered the most politically active state, Bavaria was also the state most disrupted by internal political and social disorders and most prone to extremist movements of both the right and the left. On April 7, 1919, the proclamation of the Bavarian Soviet Republic signaled the high point of the extreme leftist phase of her postwar history. This regime, which lasted only until May 5, provoked a right-wing reaction which was to have a great influence on the German Reich as well as the Nazi movement. The early National Socialist Party had its origins in Bavaria and attracted nationwide attention as a result of the Beer Hall Putsch of 1923. These events significantly influenced the historical development and decline of the Republic.

Besides its proclivity toward extremism, Bavaria always tried to influence the federal government in Berlin with its own brand of provincial politics. One might characterize the Bavarian political attitude as that of "the mouse that roared": a small state within a larger political complex which sought to force its policies on the larger government.

This, of course, was easier to plan than to do. The political position of Bavaria and the other individual states was laid out in the Constitution of the Weimar Republic. The individual states enjoyed autonomy in certain areas: education, police, etc., but were required to maintain a republican form of government like the Reich. Moreover, the military, the judicial, and the financial systems were to be controlled by the Reich, not by the states themselves.¹ This situation, especially the financial aspect, caused great dissatisfaction with the Weimar Republic. Bavaria used financial problems, especially those arising out of the reparation payments due under the Treaty of Versailles, and tax-related problems as opportunities to work against the politics of the Reich.²

Bavarian opposition to the policies of the Weimar Republic went back to World War I and the Treaty of Versailles. On January 10, 1920, the enforcement of the conditions of the Treaty of Versailles began, and with it a series of economic crises for Bavaria. There were two main areas of stress caused by the Treaty. First, the Bavarian government lost control over the Saar District when the coal mines in that region were turned over to France. The Saar mines were Bavaria's only major industrial resource, and their loss caused severe economic problems. Secondly, the demand of the allies for payment in kind from Bavarian agriculture (which meant the loss of one million milk cows), knocked the already weakened economy into a shambles.³

Bavaria was primarily an agricultural area with very little industry. During the war, there had been severe nutritional problems and food shortages. This was caused mostly by the farmers and farm workers being called to the war. Thus, agrarian Bavaria was weakened by the war and unable to meet the demand for the reparation payments in the form of agricultural goods without hamstringing its own people. To add insult to injury, Bavaria was supposed to export food to the northern part of Germany. Combining these two problems, it is easy to see why the prevailing political mood in Bavaria would be that of depression, desperation, aggression and even revolution.⁴

Along with the population, the political parties themselves were restless. Before World War I, the SPD, National Liberals, and the Farmer's Union (Bauernbund) all demanded constitutional reforms for Bavaria. These demands, tabled during most of the war, reappeared again with the peace resolution of July, 1917. The major goal of the reformers had been to change the rather authoritarian state into a parliamentary monarchy in which church and state would be separate.⁵ Equality of representation for all classes and proportional representation for all parties was also part of the reform package. The passage of this reform was a long time in coming; it was not until November 2, 1918, that King Ludwig of Bavaria signed the proposal into law. By this time, however, these modest constitutional reforms were overtaken by events. On November 7, the Putsch of

Kurt Eisner launched a socialist revolution at Munich which climaxed with the proclamation of the Soviet Republic on April 7, 1919.⁶

How was this red revolution possible in Catholic Bavaria? The overthrow of the government was engineered by the radical and revolutionary wing of the independent Social Democrats (USPD). The USPD had seceded from the SPD over disagreements on major policies, such as whether to end the war or not. The Bavarian SPD had always been to the right at the national party, earning for itself the nickname "Royal Bavarian Social Democrats". But contained within the Bavarian SPD was a small but aggressive anti-war group, which broke away from the original party and joined the USPD, which had been founded in April, 1917, at Berlin. The leader of the Bavarian USPD was Kurt Eisner, a Berlin-born Jewish journalist who had come to Bavaria to work for the Social Democratic papers in Nuremberg and Munich in 1907.⁷

Under the stress of war, the situation of Bavaria continued to worsen, and the Independent Socialists gained support. In January, 1918, Eisner, acting in defiance of wartime emergency laws, was able to mobilize thousands of workers in Nuremberg and Munich. These workers came out on strike to demonstrate for a peace without annexation. The strike itself lasted but a few days, but it showed that the Independent Socialists were becoming an important political influence. As a result of the strike, Eisner was

arrested and sent to prison for eight and one-half months.⁸

Eisner was released from prison on October 14, 1918, and immediately began new political activities. His goal was the overthrow of the existing Bavarian government, and he applied two major tactics to achieve it. First of all, he held large mass meetings at which he tried to convince the bourgeoisie that a revolution was necessary. Secondly, he tried to reduce police and military resistance to his ideas. He had great success with both tactics and was applauded enthusiastically by the "masses", who had seen the existing monarchy unable to cope with the crisis situation existing in Bavaria. While the bourgeoisie were being won over at these mass meetings, the radical elements resorted to occasional acts of violence and intimidation. The police and the military took no action against the resulting disorder.⁹

Finally, on November 7, 1918, Eisner's revolution took place. In an election meeting, he demanded an immediate armistice and abdication of the Kaiser. Then a provisional workers' and soldiers' council was formed, and Eisner proclaimed the Free Republic of Bavaria. In the face of such opposition, King Ludwig III of Bavaria abdicated. All the duties of the ministers were transferred to the revolutionary government. With the release of all officers, administrators, and soldiers of the monarchy from their oath of allegiance, the revolution was completed on November 13.¹⁰

However, this new government showed itself equally as

incapable of establishing peace and order as the monarchy had been. Eisner found himself enmeshed in a series of contradictions, especially on questions concerning the future position of the workers. Eisner's inability to show strong and capable leadership led to strong demands from the opposition parties that new elections be held in order to obtain a "legal Bavarian government". Besides this lack of confidence of Eisner, there was also widespread mistrust of his revolutionary government throughout the general population.¹¹

On December 5, only a month after the revolution, Eisner's government announced that a general election for Bavaria would be held on January 12, 1919. Many of Eisner's fellow socialists regarded this action as a capitulation, and it served to further radicalize the left-wing parties. On December 6, a Munich chapter of the Spartacus League was founded, which soon renamed itself the German Communist Party. Max Levien, a Russian-born Leninist, was the man responsible for starting the Communist party in Bavaria. Levien had become a naturalized German citizen, had served in the army, and was chairman of the Munich Soldiers' Council during the November Revolution.¹²

Levien's group attempted a red revolution of their own. They "liberated" the newspapers in Munich and "gave" them to their printing staffs. They also captured Erhardt Auer, the leader of the SPD, and forced him to resign because he was considered to be an enemy of the USPD. It is interesting

to note that Eisner came to Auer's rescue and "recaptured" the newspapers but made no attempt whatsoever to punish the revolutionaries.¹³

This leftist uprising did not stop the election on January 12, in which the voters were confronted by a number of choices. First, there was the party in power, Eisner's USPD, which adopted a dual strategy for this election. Eisner tried to align himself with the Bauerbund, another radical group, since his personal hatred for party machines had left his party without any effective means of its own for turning out great numbers of voters. The other tactic which the USPD used in this election was an appeal to the voters' sense of justice based on the idea of allowing those who started the revolution to see it through to the end. With an election campaign based on these two ideas, it is no wonder that the USPD found itself on the bottom of the heap.

Besides Eisner's party, the SPD of course had a stake in the elections. Like the USPD, the SPD used the revolution as a main issue. Auer, the main spokesman for the SPD, claimed that his party was originally responsible for the bloodless revolution and that the success of the government depended upon the close contact of workers and union members with the party officials, which the SPD offered.¹⁴

Another party stood in opposition to the SPD: the traditional Catholic Center. Because of its rightist, pro-war position, it needed to change its image in Bavaria. To

do this, it was given a new name, the Bavarian Peoples' Party (BVP), and Protestants were admitted to membership. It nevertheless retained close ties with the Catholic Church and enjoyed a large following among the rural population. Because the BVP was a "Bavaria for Bavarians" type of organization, it tended to be anti-Prussian as well as anti-Semitic. Its election strategy was thus fairly simple: Eisner, being both Prussian and Jewish, was a "tailor-made hate object" for this party.¹⁵

In opposition to the BVP, stood the Bavarian wing of the Democratic Party (DDP). This group stressed a national point of view, putting its faith in the Reich and looking to Berlin for leadership.¹⁶

The ideological battle lines were not so simply drawn, however. Parties at odds on every other issue could find themselves in agreement on certain points. For example, the BVP and the USPD both were zealous in their insistence upon Bavarian autonomy. The SPD and the DDP both looked to Berlin for guidance and also agreed on strict opposition to the traditional influence found in other parties. On the other hand, the DDP and the BVP found themselves allied in the battle against socialism. The USPD and the SPD both accepted theoretical socialism, the SPD perhaps hedging a bit with semantic qualifications.¹⁷

However, all parties agreed on one issue: no more monarchy in Bavaria. Although Ludwig had returned to Bavaria and was living near Königssee no move was made to

put him back in power. In fact, he was held in such low regard that an elderly ministry messenger, upon hearing that the King's made requested from Eisner's secretary personal items left behind during the King's flight, remarked, "Oh well, the King has had such a fright--no wonder he needs fresh underpants".¹⁸

Yet the results of the January election showed clearly that the Bavarians were dissatisfied with the revolution; clearly, left radicalism was not an ideology for this part of Germany. The right-wing forces showed gains in this election, and Eisner's red revolution fell to the bottom of the political barrel. The actual results were as follows:¹⁹

Party	Reps. in Diet	% of Total Votes
Bavarian People's Party (BVP)	66	35%
Social Democratic Party (SPD)	61	33%
German Democratic Party (DDP)	25	14%
Peasants League (<u>Bauerbund</u>)	16	9%
Independent Socialist Party (USPD)	3	2.5%
Others	9	6.5%

After the election, a meeting was planned for February 21, 1919, at which the new government would be established and Eisner forced to resign. However, the formality of resignation never took place. On his way to the meeting, Eisner was assassinated by Anton von Arco-Valley, a student at the University of Munich. Though the meeting proceeded on schedule, more assassinations were attempted. Erhard Auer, the SPD leader and two other delegates were wounded.²⁰

These assassinations and the general disorder at the meeting caused great fear the excitement among the people of

Bavaria and gave the radicals new reasons to push forward their propaganda for revolution.²¹ To respond to the terror from the right, the USPD called for a three-day general strike. The Spartacists and the Communists decided to arm the workers, and on February 22, the Workers' Council of Munich decided to establish a Bavarian Soviet Republic. The situation in Bavaria was one of utter chaos. The SPD, BVP, and DDP tried to control the population, but on April 7, the Communists in Munich officially proclaimed the establishment of a Bavarian Soviet Republic.²²

The spirit of revolution spread to other Bavarian cities, and also to cities outside Bavaria. A general state of crisis existed throughout the state, but Munich remained the major source of trouble. There were street fights on the thirteenth and fourteenth of April. The Communists gained strength when the bourgeoisie failed in its attempt to use part of the garrison at Munich to control the revolution. The bourgeoisie lost their weapons, the proletariat gained theirs, and the "Red Army" began to form.²³

Meanwhile, by the middle of March a legal government was formed under the leadership of Johannes Hoffmann, a social Democrat. With the spread of violent revolution throughout Bavaria, the government was exiled to Bamberg, where it played its last card. Out of desperation, this government asked for help from the Reich and the neighboring states. Troops were sent from Prussia and Württemberg to Munich. These troops were formed largely from the Free

Corps comprised mostly of former soldiers and students and were led by Colonel Ritter von Epp, ex-commander of the Bavarian Life Guards. One of their officers, Captain Ernst "Röhm, later became the head of the Nazi Storm Troops (SA). These Free Corps troops took control of the situation, and by May 1, 1919, the Soviet Republic was no more.²⁴

The forces involved in the overthrow of the Soviet Republic were supported by students, and those of Erlangen were prominent in this role. While their peers in the rest of Germany were still debating the relative merits of re-organizing student life, the academic youth of Bavaria were actively involved in politics and counter-revolution. They had made little progress toward the creation of a united German Student Body when the events of November, 1918, overtook them.

Erlangen student life was mostly confined to the traditional organizations which had existed before World War I, such as the Burschenschaft chapters and the Landsmannschaften. In Erlangen, more than at any other university, the students showed a strong preference for joining the already existing student organizations rather than organizing the unaffiliated students or launching nationwide unions.²⁵ The Bubenreuther wanted to wait for the return of normal political conditions in Bavaria before discussing the merits of a general association, while the possibility of organizing the unaffiliated students was brought up by representatives of the Soviet regime, rather than by the students themselves.

On the morning of November 9, 1918, it was announced that the People of Erlangen would join Eisner's Bavarian Free Republic, and that their city administration would be replaced by a workers' and soldiers' council. But Erlangen was distant from the focus of political power at Munich, and the leaders of the Erlangen council feared that students and professors might oppose their announced action.²⁶ Consequently, these leaders warned the professors against making any speeches or announcements that might incite the students to action against the new government.²⁷ However, the students at Erlangen were resistant; they were neither frightened nor fooled by the new government's attempted deprivation of their political expression. The university students reacted by forming a united front against this new government and immediately announce their intention to support peace and order in all Bavaria as well as in Erlangen. The students did not believe that the Eisner's Bavaria Free Republic with its rapid changes could restore normality from the post-war confusion.²⁸

Following the creation of the Bavarian Republic, the Rector of the University immediately called for a general meeting for November 11 to advise the students as to how they should behave. The Rector desired that the students should remain aloof from Eisner's government but take no direct action to oppose it.²⁹ On the other hand, Dr. Helmut Plessner, a university administrator, wanted to organize the students in their own Rat, or Council, in

support of the Eisner revolution. But at meetings on November 11, the students refused to take this action.³⁰ On the following day, the Rector had no trouble convincing the students neither to form a students' council nor to take any direct action against the developing Communist movement. At this meeting, the students demanded that the Reich government in Berlin help restore order to Bavaria. The students also voted against the secession of Bavaria from the Reich and demanded freedom of political action for themselves.³¹

As the situation in Bavaria continued to deteriorate, the students called another mass meeting in the middle of December to demand the resignation of Kurt Eisner, since he could no longer control the political crisis in Bavaria. At this meeting the students also called upon all their German comrades to fight against the threat of Bolshevism.³²

In January, 1919, the Provisional Government in Berlin advised the students to join the Free Corps pledged to fight against Communism. The students at Erlangen were enthusiastic about such measures and eagerly set out to arm themselves so that there would be a prepared and organized force in case of a Communist Putsch. Though the Bavarian government had outlawed the activities of the Free Corps and forbidden the students to participate in it, the Minister of Defense in Berlin had already mobilized the Free Corps in other states in Germany and encouraged the students to join. He ordered Colonel von Epp to build up the Free

Corps in Bavaria, even if the government was officially against it.³³

At a meeting of more than a thousand students on March 27, Edgar Stelzner of the Bubenreuther exhorted the students at Erlangen to enter the Free Corps as a united body. Stelzner was working with Epp and Gustav Noske, the Reich Minister of Defense, in an effort to mobilize the students. About nine hundred of the students were willing to join the Free Corps, but only under certain conditions. They demanded that classwork be suspended, so that those willing to interrupt their studies would not suffer the disadvantage of being left behind by other students. The next day, the University of Erlangen shut down. This formal closure lasted only a short time, since the Educational Office in Munich ordered the University to reopen. But since most of the professors supported the student in the fight against Bolshevism, nothing was taught.³⁴

In an effort to stamp out Free Corps recruiting activity, Eisner's Bavarian government announced that all students participating in Corps activities would be denied government jobs in the future. In spite of this, the students entered the Free Corps with enthusiasm, the Bubenreuther most of all. Though their initial goal was to save Bavaria from Bolshevism, members of the fraternity could also be found fighting against the Reds in the Ruhr District, Hamburg, and Thuringia under the flags of the Free Corps. On April 16, 1919, the Hoffman government in

Bamberg called upon the previously outlawed Free Corps to restore order to Bavaria. Two days later, the Free Corps marched on Munich, the students of Erlangen marching with them, to establish power firmly in the hands of the Hoffman government. The students thereby disallowed Communism and held to their idea of supporting "peace and order".³⁵

This unified student front at Erlangen was not typical of the rest of Bavaria. At Munich, for instance, student opinion was divided: some students wanted to stay out of the political conflict, while others offered to support the public security and administrative services of Eisner's government. This provisional government accepted this offer and established untrained student guard units. These auxiliary units were shortlived, however, because some of the organized students were arrested as hostages after the Eisner assassination, and the rest withdrew from the guard units for that reason. As the conflict in Munich escalated, the University was notified that the students should follow the new government, and that if this was not done immediately, the Soviet Republic would close the University. Bowing to this order, Munich University formed two councils: one, a student council, and the other, a Rat (council) composed of Socialist-oriented academicians. On April 7, the red flag of Communism was raised over the University. It seemed that the Munich students were at last unified. However, the next day, April 8, a student meeting was held at which most of the students renounced the actions of April 7,

and demanded a return to former conditions, including the revival of the Academic Senate. When the Free Corps arrived in Munich, many of the university students joined with the Corps to oust the Soviet Republic.³⁶

In the spring of 1919, then, the students at Erlangen supported the Weimar Republic in its effort to suppress the Communist revolution in Germany. After the Red Putsch had been defeated in May, 1919, they turned to the task of reorganizing their own student life. As elsewhere in Germany, the initial steps involved the creation of the German Student Body.

In the process of the reorganization of their student life, Erlangen students reveal certain attributes which show that the rightist tendencies at work at other universities were intensified at the Franconian institution. In the first place, the traditional student groups almost completely dominated academic life. In 1919, a new Student Parliament, or ASTA, was elected. Of the 1474 students enrolled, 1292 were qualified to vote. Of those so qualified, 51.7% actually participated in the election. A large majority (557) supported the old traditional organizations, while only 111 cast their vote in favor of the new German Student Body.³⁷ Moreover, the volkisch faith was more popular and influential at Erlangen than at any other university, and its students were more receptive to Nazi ideology.³⁸

This fact is primarily attributable to the extremely influential position enjoyed by the Bubenreuther, the local

chapter of the Burschenschaft. Already in January, 1919, the Burschenschaft had adopted a program of political action, designed to give students a greater voice in national affairs. It further took the position that Austrian students be fully admitted into German student life and that students exercise their influence on behalf of those parties which opposed "internationalist" tendencies. Hence, the Burschenschaft objectives largely paralleled those pursued by the Nationalist Socialist Party. When the Bubenreuther of Erlangen faithfully carried out the policy of "educating students politically" they were, in a sense, rendering them more receptive to Nazi propaganda.³⁹

While the students were busy with their postwar revival of student life at Erlangen, Adolf Hitler was engaged in organizing the Nazi Party in Munich. Shortly after joining Anton Drexler's German Workers' Party in 1919, Hitler began to transform the group into a political force. After his release from the Army in April, 1920, he became a full-time agitator for the new party, now called the National Socialist German Workers Party, and used his oratorical talents to their maximum.

Though the party remained small and undistinguished from many other radical splinter groups, Bavaria provided fertile soil for its growth. The Bavarian government of Gustav von Kahr, a Bavarian Peoples' Party politician who took over after the fall of the Soviet Republic, was itself highly reactionary. Moreover, the repeated shocks resulting

from the Treaty of Versailles, the shattered economy, and the Ruhr Occupation of 1923 kept the population in a state of unrest and suspicion.

Left-wing revolutions ensued, and Saxony and Thuringia saw the beginnings of a leftist-orientation in their Social Democratic governments. Stresemann, the Chancellor of Germany, was seeking to keep the peace by suppressing radical political groups.⁴⁰ With the prevalent anti-French feelings, the adverse reaction to the Ruhr Occupation, and the anti-Bolshevik mood, the Nazi thought they saw their opportunity to seize power. Though Hitler was uncertain about the timing, he decided to act on November 8, 1923. He attended a major patriotic meeting in the "Bürgerbraukeller" at Munich, at which Lossow, the local commander of the Reichswehr, Gustav von Kahr, the Minister President of Bavaria, and Gustav Seisser, the director of the Bavarian police, were present. Hitler directed his troops to surround the building, broke into the meeting, jumped upon a table, and announced that the Bavarian and Reich governments were dissolved. Hitler then declared that a new government would be installed with himself as its leader and that the "Criminals of 1918" would be brought to justice. Hitler issued an ultimatum to Kahr, Seisser and Lossow: either support his overthrow of the Bavarian government or die. They submitted under pressure.⁴¹

It appeared that Hitler had won. However, as soon as Kahr, Seisser and Lossow escaped from the building, they

turned against Hitler and his revolution. Kahr outlawed the Nazi Party and sent the army to stop the demonstration in November, 1923. The army clashed with Hitler's men and overcame them, but Hitler escaped. Later, however, he was caught, tried and jailed in Landsberg Fortress. The Beer-Hall Putsch had failed.⁴²

One contingent in Hitler's little force in the ill-fated Putsch consisted of students from the University of Munich. In 1922, Rudolf Hess, at that time a twenty-eight-year-old student at Munich, has organized an SA Student Company at the University of students affiliated with the Academic Circle or the Burschenschaft. Prior to the Putsch, the Party had provided the company with weapons. After the failure of the plot, the students continued to hold meetings and demonstrations in support of Hitler, and some were broken up by the police. That members of the Academic Circle were still loyal to Hitler even after his failure is shown by a straw-vote taken at its meeting on November 12: 70% of those present supported Hitler as opposed to only 20% for Kahr. Because of the violent hostility of the Munich students, Kahr ordered the University closed on November 13. When it reopened a few days later, things had become quieter.⁴³

While some Munich students actively marched with Hitler on November 9, the academic youth of Erlangen observed the event with sympathy and interest but did not participate. Nevertheless, it is clear that the Nazi

appeal was stronger here perhaps than at any other university. This is partially attributable to the enormous influence of the Bubenreuther at the Franconian University. Conservative, traditional, experienced and astute in student politics, the Bubenreuther had a powerful influence in shaping student opinion.

Moreover, in Edgar Stelzner, the Bubenreuther had a leader of considerable talent. Stelzner was born in 1892 in Nuremberg, had served in the army during the War, and was elected in 1919 as the head of the Erlangen Student Body. He was influential in recruiting students for the Free Corps and in 1920 became the head of the German Academic Circle. Stelzner also played an important role in the leadership of the Burschenschaft, and was responsible for the organization of the Burschenschaftliche Blätter, a magazine for Burschenschaft members. He maintained his influence in this organization as chairman of the committee concerned with the völkisch idea and keeping a close relationship with the student bodies in Austria. He was an ardent and effective proponent of anti-Semitism and the völkisch idea, and through him, the attitudes of the Bubenreuther were disseminated to the other larger student associations. He later became a member of the "Völkisch Bloc" in the Bavarian Diet from 1924 to 1928 and in 1934 was named the head of the district court at Würzburg.⁴⁴

That the anti-Semitic notions of Stelzner and others was in the ascendent at Erlangen is clearly demonstrated

by the results of the ASTA election of June, 1920, 986 of the 1449 students voted. Of these, 458 supported the Academic Circle and its platform of excluding Jews from student organizations, while only 198 supported the more moderate German Student Body. The rest of the votes were distributed among other smaller groups, such as religious bodies and women's clubs. Stelzner and his ideas dominated student life at Erlangen until 1929, when the NSDSTB took over.⁴⁵

The professors of Erlangen were also instrumental in shaping student opinion.⁴⁶ Many of the professors belonged to the German National Peoples Party (DNVP), an amalgamation of several ideologies. The old monarchist supporters with "volkisch" tendencies and those wanting a replacement for the radical nationalism of the former Fatherland Party found themselves united in this party. The professors shaped the opinion of the students through magazine articles promoting the "volkisch" idea, gave speeches on this subject at the university, and urged limitations on the enrollment of Jewish students.⁴⁷ Professorial influence on student political attitudes is well illustrated by their performance at the Empire Day Celebration on January 18, 1922. The professors delivered speeches against the "crime" of Versailles, condemning the treaty as incompatible with their idea of the German nation.⁴⁸

Oddly enough, the Academic Circle boycotted this celebration because its members believed that such a patriotic expression might imply that they supported the

Weimar Republic. The students were offended by the fact that the colors of the Republic's flag had been the traditional colors of the Burschenschaft since 1817. Even to honor soldiers who had died in World War I was difficult for them because they were afraid that this would suggest that they died for the Republic.⁴⁹

In their propaganda campaigns, the NSDAP made good use of the students' refusal to attend this meeting. In 1921, a pamphlet was sent to Erlangen inviting the students to attend a Munich speech by Hitler on the topic, "German Youth, German Future".⁵⁰ A year later, the NSDAP tried to get the students to leave the University and become members of the Storm Troopers (SA) in order to help save Germany; later, when the national was secure, the students could go back to their studies. Although the NSDAP was most active in its propaganda campaign in Bavaria, there was also activity at other universities in other German states. At the university of Göttingen, for example, there were already "thousands" of Hitler supporters by 1923.⁵¹

Under the influence of the Bubenreuther, the students of Erlangen were looking for a strong political leader who would embrace the völkisch mystique and incorporate their anti-Semitic tendencies into national policy. At first they looked to Ludendorff for leadership, hoping that he could deal with the problems of the Ruhr Occupation, inflation, and internal political instability.⁵² Then, in the summer of 1923, Adolf Hitler came to Erlangen to make

a speech. This had been arranged by the Bubenreuther, and all members were required to attend. Hitler was enthusiastically received by the students, and his ideas fit in well with their volkisch and anti-Semitic views. Hitler blamed German's chaotic economic situation on the Jews, saying that they held the reins on world capital. He also asserted that the Weimar Republic had been spoiled by the Jews, who were unfit to govern. Such expression as these, plus Hitler's abilities as a speaker, made him the Erlangen students' favorite and the man they would choose as their political leader.⁵³

Many of the students had been convinced Nazi supporters before Hitler's visit, and after the speech, their ranks began to swell. The NSDSTB could boast 120 members, with more joining all the time. Thus in 1923 Erlangen became the first German university to establish a formal National Socialist student group. It was inevitable that such a group should develop, but it is still somewhat surprising that Erlangen developed the first. Erlangen was considered a conservative university which did not encourage the formation of new student associations. However, pressure from the Bubenreuther to show sympathy for the NSDAP spurred the students on to become formally organized. The students at Erlangen were now able to show public and officially organized support for Hitler and the volkisch idea.⁵⁴

Opportunity for such display came on September 2, 1923,

when the Bubenreuther, which included most of the Erlangen student body, attended the Nuremberg Convention to demonstrate support for the völkisch national ideology. Students came from all parts of Germany in order to take part in the ceremony. A church service was first held before an altar decorated with flags, dominated by the swastika banner of the NSDAP. Speeches from Hitler and Ludendorff followed, in which both glorified the National Movement. Hitler and Ludendorff saw themselves accepted enthusiastically when at noon about seventy thousand people marched past in review. The students present at this event seemed convinced that the revival of Germany only could be achieved through Hitler and Ludendorff.⁵⁵

Enthusiasm at Erlangen for the National Socialist Movement was increasing rapidly during the fall of 1923. The students reported daily from Munich about Hitler's plans to march to Berlin. They were so inspired and impressed with this idea that they could hardly wait for something to happen. The Bubenreuther even undertook military training to be ready to support Hitler in case of resistance. Finally, on November 9, while the Bubenreuther was having a private meeting, a telegram arrived with the news they had been hoping to hear: "Establishment of the National Government of Hitler, Ludendorff, and Kahr".⁵⁶ The happiness and excitement among the Bubenreuther was so great that they at first refused to accept the news which followed shortly thereafter: the Putsch had failed. While

the Bubenreuther and most of the students at Erlangen remained prepared to defend Hitler in case of resistance, they gradually and reluctantly accepted the reality of Hitler's failure.⁵⁷

In order to express their frustration, they called a meeting on November 12 in defiance of Kahr's admonition from Munich. From this meeting they sent a protest telegram to Kahr in which they pledged their allegiance to the leader of the "völkisch freedom movement".⁵⁸

The failure of the Putsch meant that the NSDAP was forbidden and the students would have to keep quiet about Hitler. The Nazi Student League was formally dissolved, but found a way to continue its existence by changing its name to "radical völkisch". But the enthusiasm was not as evident as it had been. Part of this may have been due to the reaction of the Bubenreuther, who were so disappointed over the failure that for three years they seemed almost resigned. Of course, the annual yearly demonstration against the Treaty of Versailles took place. At the 1924 demonstration, the signers of the Treaty were called "international-pacifistic people-destroyers", and the SPD and Center Party were branded enemies of the fatherland. However, the old enthusiasm was not there anymore.⁵⁹

By 1926, the Bubenreuther decided to become active again, after the NSDSTB at Munich was revived. Now they began to hold meetings at which speeches concerning Marxism, the Jewish Question, etc., were made. When the prohibition

against speeches about Hitler lapsed in 1927, the National Socialist movement experienced a rebirth. Many Bubenreuther entered the NSDAP during that year and worked actively in the development of the SA and political propaganda, and many of the Bubenreuther even left Erlangen to help establish and develop NSDSTB groups at other universities.⁶⁰

Of course, the Bubenreuther put their best efforts into reviving a strong NSDSTB at Erlangen. Attempts were made in 1926 and 1927 but they were not permanent. This was not because of opposition to the NSDSTB, but rather because Nazi ideas were so generally accepted that there seemed little point in further efforts to strengthen them. In 1928, however, the NSDSTB established a strong foundation and soon came to dominate the student parliament. By 1929, the rival Academic Circle was eclipsed in influence, and the ASTA was dominated by the NSDSTB the following year. Though the traditional groups kept their names, they all affiliated with the NSDSTB.

The students at Erlangen were early and strong supporters of the Hitler movement. Hitler appeared before the student body there no less than five times between 1923 and 1933. And when the swastika banner were raised over the university on January 31, 1933, many students believed that Hitler's assumption of power represented the triumph of their own traditional aims.⁶¹

FOOTNOTES

¹Max Spindler, Handbuch der Bayerischen Geschichte (4 vols., Munich, 1968-1974), Vol. IV, pp. 379-383.

²ibid., p. 377.

³ibid., pp. 446-449.

⁴ibid., pp. 374-380.

⁵ibid., p. 381.

⁶ibid., pp. 382-383.

⁷Richard Grünberger, Red Rising in Bavaria (New York, 1973), pp. 27-28.

⁸Spindler, Handbuch, Vol. I, pp. 383-386.

⁹ibid., pp. 390-392.

¹⁰"Grünberger, Red Rising, pp. 28-35.

¹¹Spindler, Handbuch, Vol. 4, pp. 414-420.

¹²"Grünberger, Red Rising, p. 55.

¹³ibid., p. 56.

¹⁴Hans Fenske, Konservatismus and Rechtsradikalismus in Bayern nach, 1918 (Bad Homburg, 1969), pp. 29-34.

¹⁵"Grünberger, Red Rising, p. 58.

¹⁶Fenske, Konservatismus, pp. 73-75.

¹⁷"Grünberger, Red Rising, pp. 58-59.

¹⁸ibid., p. 59.

¹⁹ibid., p. 65.

²⁰Heiber, Die Republik von Weimar, p. 45.

²¹Spindler, Handbuch, Vol. 4, pp. 434-435.

- ²²Heiber, Die Republik von Weimar, p. 45-46.
- ²³Ibid., p. 112.
- ²⁴Ibid., p. 139-147.
- ²⁵Ernst Höhne, Die Bubenreuther, (Erlangen, 1936), p. 88.
- ²⁶E. Mehl, "Hochschulbericht über Erlangen", Die Schwarzburg (March/April, 1919), p. 63.
- ²⁷Manfred Franze, Die Erlanger Studentenschaft, 1918-1945 (Würzburg, 1972), p. 8.
- ²⁸Johannes Kubel, 100 Jahre Uttenruthia (Erlangen, 1951), p. 184.
- ²⁹Franze, Die Erlanger Studentenschaft, p. 9-10.
- ³⁰Ibid., p. 10.
- ³¹Mehl, "Hochschulbericht", p. 63.
- ³²"Die Erlanger Studenten gegen Kurt Eisner", Erlanger Tagblatt (December 12, 1918), p. 10.
- ³³Franze, Die Erlanger Studentenschaft, p. 22.
- ³⁴Höhne, Die Bubenreuther, p. 90.
- ³⁵Ibid., pp. 90-91.
- ³⁶Zorn, "Die politische Entwicklung", pp. 231-242.
- ³⁷"Bericht über die Asta-Wahlen", Erlanger Tagblatt (December 6, 1921), n.p.
- ³⁸Höhne, Die Bubenreuther, p. 103.
- ³⁹Franze, Die Erlanger Studentenschaft, p. 34-36.
- ⁴⁰Spindler, Handbuch, pp. 471-473.
- ⁴¹Herzstein, Adolf Hitler, p. 45-46.
- ⁴²Ibid., pp. 47-48.
- ⁴³Zorn, "Die politische Entwicklung", pp. 279-282.
- ⁴⁴Höhne, Die Bubenreuther, p. 332.
- ⁴⁵Erlanger Tagblatt (January 19, 1922), n.p.

- ⁴⁶ Franze, Die Erlanger Studentenschaft, pp. 49-56.
- ⁴⁷ Erlanger Tagblatt (January 19, 1922), n.p.
- ⁴⁸ Franze, Die Erlanger Studentenschaft, p. 53.
- ⁴⁹ "Keine Teilnahme an der Reichsgründungsfeier", Onolden-Zeitung, Vol. III, No. 4 (March, 1922), p. 124.
- ⁵⁰ Faust, Der Nationalsozialistische deutsche Studentenbund, Vol. I, p. 26.
- ⁵¹ Ibid., p. 27.
- ⁵² "Höhne, Die Bubenreuther, p. 92.
- ⁵³ Erlanger Tagblatt (May 18, 1923), n.p.
- ⁵⁴ Franze, Die Erlanger Studentenschaft, p. 81.
- ⁵⁵ "Höhne, Die Bubenreuther, p. 92.
- ⁵⁶ Ibid., p. 93.
- ⁵⁷ Ibid., p. 93.
- ⁵⁸ Faust, Der Nationalsozialistische deutsche Studentenbund, Vol. I., p. 28.
- ⁵⁹ "Ansprache Genglers in der Kundgebung der Erlanger Studentenschaft gegen Versailles", Bayerische Hochschulzeitung (July 12, 1924), pp. 17-18.
- ⁶⁰ Franze, Die Erlanger Studentenschaft, pp. 101-102.
- ⁶¹ Ibid., pp. 106-110.

CHAPTER IV

THE STUDENT MOVEMENT AND NAZI CONSOLIDATION

The Third Reich began on January 30, 1933, when the Reich President appointed Hitler to the Chancellorship at the head of a cabinet of "National Concentration". Only three of the eleven members of this cabinet were National Socialists: Hitler, Dr. Frick, Minister of the Interior, and Hermann Goering, Commissioner for Air Communications and Minister without Portfolio. Of the remaining eight ministers, six were members of, or sympathizers with, the Nationalist Party. Two were without official party affiliation, but were counted as Nationalists.¹

This scheme of organization did not recognize the political genius of Hitler or the ruthlessness of Goering, who held in readiness elaborate Nazi plans. In keeping with German parliamentary practice, the Reich President dissolved the Reichstag on March 5, 1933, in order to let the electorate decide upon its tenure of office, since the Cabinet did not have a majority in the Reichstag. The bourgeois parties and the socialists were not at first disheartened, because they believed that the Nazis could not expect to attract more than about 40% of the voters.²

The emergency decrees of February 4 and February 28,

however, marked Hitler's first assault on the constitutional barriers against dictatorship. The first of these decrees empowered the government to ban newspapers and public assemblies. The second, entitled "Ordinance for the Protection of Nation and State", suspended for an indefinite period the constitutionally guaranteed civil liberties. The latter decree was a decisive development in the transformation of Germany from a liberal democracy to a police state. The suspension of the civil liberties of Weimar Germany ended not only individual freedoms but the chance for free competition among the various political forces. The decree of February 28 was a cornerstone of the Nazi political structure and remained in force until Hitler's end in 1945.³

President Hindenburg had sanctioned this decree on the basis of Nazi allegations that the burning of the Reichstag Building on February 27 had been plotted by the Communist Party and was to have been the signal for a nationwide Communist uprising. Although the Nazis have been blamed for starting the fire as a pretext to justify their persecution, the true origins of the fire are still unknown. Whatever its origins, Hitler exploited the fire as both a justification of the suspension of civil liberties and as an issue in the March 5, 1933, Reichstag elections.⁴

Despite a virtual Nazi monopoly on the means of mass communications and political propaganda, the elections of March 5 did not produce the Nazi landslide that Hitler had expected. In spite of the emergency decree of February 4,

Socialist, Communist and Catholic Center Party voters remained surprisingly impervious to Nazi urgings and threats. To be sure, SPD strength declined from 20.7% to 18.3%, KPD strength declined from 16.4% to 12.3%, and the Center Party vote decreased from 15% to 14% from the election of November, 1932. While the Nazi strength increased from 33.1% to 43%, this was due more to the support of newly registered voters and previous non-voters than to defections from other parties. Voter participation was at an unusually high 89 percent. The Nazi Party, though it fell short of a majority, nonetheless secured control over the new Reichstag with the support of its Nationalist allies, who polled 8 percent of the vote. Germany had for the first time since 1930 a government supported by a parliamentary majority, which made Hitler less dependent upon President Hindenburg's confidence than his predecessors, Brüning, Papen, and Schleicher had ever been.⁵

Hitler carefully staged the opening of the newly elected Reichstag on March 21, 1933, in a great ceremony in the Potsdam Garrison Church over the tombs of Frederick William I and Frederick the Great. The symbolic bringing together of Hindenburg, the Crown Prince, the army leadership, the Nazi bosses, and the Reichstag in a shrine of Prussian history was to dramatize the union between aristocratic Prussia and dynamic Nazism. Thus the speeches and ceremonies of the "Day of Potsdam" served the Nazi purpose of claiming the succession to the grandeur of Imperial

Germany as well as attaching the Hindenburg mystique to the Nazi course of action.⁶

After the rites of Potsdam, Hitler proceeded to deprive the Reichstag of its legislative function and thereby eliminated the second obstacle in his path toward personal dictatorship. The Enabling Act ("Law for Terminating the Suffering of People and Nation"), passed by the Reichstag on March 24, 1933, gave over the legislative powers of the Reichstag to the Chancellor for a four-year period. This act was not a simple law but a constitutional change and thus required a two-thirds majority for passage.

The Catholic Center, through threats and false promises, was led to believe that the Emergency Decree of February 4 would be revoked in return for its vote. Hitler in like manner secured the support of all parties except the Social Democrats. The Communists, since their deputies had not been seated in the new Reichstag, posed no problem. Social Democratic opposition to the Enabling Act, though futile, was nevertheless a demonstration of moral and physical courage, all the more so because Nazi storm troopers were placed conspicuously among the voting deputies.⁷

The dissolution of the political parties, either by order of the government or by their own decisions, followed as a natural corollary the self-immolation of the Reichstag. After the SPD was banned on June 22, 1933, the other parties announced their dissolution in July. On July 14, 1933, a law against the formation of new parties declared the Nazi

party the sole political party of Germany.⁸

Once the civil liberties and the powers of the Reichstag were eliminated, Hitler proceeded to dismantle the federal structure of Germany. The Emergency Decree of February 28, which authorized the national government to take over the police powers of the federal states, was the first step. After the Enabling Act, Hitler dissolved all state legislatures and reorganized them on the basis of the results of the national election of March 5. In April, 1933, Nazi governors were appointed to all federal states. In January, 1934, all state legislatures were dissolved. A month later, the Reichsrat, the upper chamber and representative body of the states, was abolished. The Nazi governors became solely responsible to the Ministry of the Interior, and the federal states were reduced to administrative districts. Germany had become a unitary state.⁹ Ironically, the abolition of the federal structure of Germany has been a goal strongly advocated by many Social Democrats during the Revolution of 1918-1919. The Nazi revolution accomplished without opposition and in short order what the Socialist Revolution of 1918 had failed to do.

A law of April 7, 1933, established the Nazi control over the civil service. This law, "For the Restoration of the Career Civil Service", empowered the regime to dismiss civil servants for reasons of past political activity or racial origin.¹⁰ Except for the institution of the presidency and the armed forces, all obstacles to his absolute

dictatorship had been removed by Hitler within a year of his rise to power. Fearing a full blown Nazi dictatorship, Hindenburg and his allies tried to sway Hitler to restore the monarchy, but after the President's death in August, 1934, Hitler simply combined the offices of President and Chancellor under the title "Fuehrer and Reich-Chancellor".¹¹

His last concern had been the army. The escalation of tension between the regular army and Hitler's SA formations was due to the contempt that the largely aristocratic regular army felt toward the proletarian element in the Nazi movement.¹² Though Hitler showed particlity toward his SA because its views were closed to his own, the army leadership believed that he would end the political quarreling of the Weimar Republic and a new and more hopeful era would begin. Because of the friction between the SA and Reich-wehr, the SA, numbering one million under the leadership of Ernst Roehm, favored merging their forces with the army.¹³ Roehm and the SA became impatient with Hitler's "legal" revolution and favored instead a second social revolution. This problem was solved when Hitler's elite guard, the SS, conducted a surprise attack on June 30, 1934, known as the "Blood Purge". Those executed included Gregor Strasser, ex-Chancellor, General von Schleicher and his wife, Gustav Kahr, who had crushed Hitler's Beerhall Putsch of 1923, and others unrelated to his quarrel with the SA.¹⁴ Hitler used the law of July 3, 1934, to sanctify his murders as protection of the state against a treasonable conspiracy. The

army submission to Hitler beginning on June 30, 1934, paved the way for Hitler's using the swastika eagle on the German army uniform as well as the new loyalty oath.¹⁵

Hitler consolidated his power very quickly, and was thus free to establish a totalitarian regime with every phase of German life under his thumb. In the domains of education and culture, Nazi policies for reform of the universities had three goals; to force these institutions to serve the party, to insure that the faculty promulgate the ideology of National Socialism, and to find a "new direction" for the sciences. Consistent with the program, the universities became wards of the state. The political education of the students was to be directed toward fulfilling their duties toward the Third Reich, which originated in race-based völkisch policies.¹⁶

Their purpose in the field of education was above all to mold the minds of the young, for Hitler firmly believed that "whoever controlled the youth, held the future in his hands". The schools were converted into propaganda mills to turn out "good Nazis". Besides reorganizing the curriculum to include racial studies, genetics, and race hygiene, the Nazi regime also introduced textbooks which properly glorified the National Socialist movement.¹⁷ Outside the school, other agencies were organized to inculcate the Nazi doctrines into German youth. The various Hitler organizations enrolled boys and girls from ten to eighteen.¹⁸ After 1936, membership was made obligatory for all boys and

girls of Aryan stock.¹⁹ Control over the universities was achieved with little difficulty. The new civil service law of April 7, 1933, eliminated Jews and opponents of the regime from the faculties.²⁰ Next, on the twenty-fifth of April, the number of students at the universities was reduced and limits were placed on Jewish enrollment. Of all entering students, only 1.5 percent were to be Jews. In all universities there were to be no more than a total of 5 percent with Jewish blood.²¹ The students generally welcomed the decision to reduce the number of Jewish students, and Burschenschaft magazine articles enthusiastically supported a government policy committed to war against the Jews.²² The opinion of the majority of the German student body was that universities must be cleaned of both Jews and Jewish influence. Hitler's pronouncements and acts against the "un-German mind" met with their agreement. In order to destroy Jewish influence at the universities, all "un-German" literature must be eradicated. This became a reality on March 10, 1933, when all German universities burned "contaminated" literature. Some authors, such as Erich "Kästner, Heinrich Mann or Eric Remarque, who helped to give Germany international recognition, were symbolically burned in effigy.²³

Besides this, the students even demanded that Jewish works had to be published in the Hebrew language. When published in German they were to be designated as translations since it was thought a Jew using the German language

lied in the process. In addition, the students demanded that Jewish professors be forced to resign. This demand was of course supported by the government. Immediately Jewish professors were ejected from their jobs.²⁴

Now what to do with the students themselves was another question that the Nazis had to consider. The NSDSTB had controlled the German student body since 1931, and in that year introduced the idea of the "strong leader". This meant that the student parliaments at each university were to be subject to the authority of a single elected national leader. It meant also that the student groups would lose their autonomy and be consolidated under a single authority.²⁵

At the annual meeting of the German Student Body in Königsberg in 1932, Gerhard Krüger, head of the NSDSTB, moved that this hierarchical organization be adopted for all students.

Even the majority of the committee of the parliament heads voted for Krüger's proposal, but nothing came of it immediately because of the resistance by the traditional organizations in the Student Body, especially the Burschenschaft.²⁶ The Burschenschaft saw the potential danger of an unrestrainable dictatorship of the NSDSTB and refused to go along with the parliament plan.²⁷ Too late, the Burschenschaft leaders recognized the threat to their leadership, traditions, and independence.²⁸ To be sure, they had been strong supporters of Nazi ideologies, but now they became anxious to retain their influence over the NSDSTB, rather than being absorbed by it. Consequently, they argued in

1933 that students should not yield to "irresponsible speeches and fraternal strife", and urged that they uphold a "sense of responsibility" and logical thinking. The Burschenschaft was afraid of the new fanaticism, but they offered nothing to oppose it but the habitual caution of a traditionally minded older generation.²⁹

With Hitler's coming to power in January 31, 1933, the power struggle behind the scenes between the Burschenschaft and the NSDSTB came into the open. On the same day, Krüger sent a letter to Rudolf Hess, head of the Central Commission of the Nazi Party, in which he demanded the abolition of the student parliamentary elections. He argued that the results of such elections might result in propaganda unfavorable to the Nazis. At the same time, however, Krüger guaranteed the Burschenschaft and other traditional groups their existence.³⁰

But it was not so simple to win the full support of that remarkable and proud organization. Differences within the Burschenschaft prevented this. Its magazines were flooded with articles which differed in suggestions about how the Burschenschaft should align themselves with the new Reich in order to survive. There were two main factions within the Burschenschaft: the hyper-politically oriented one and the super-traditionalists.³¹ These two groups agreed in their unquestionable allegiance to the Nazi ideology and their adoration of Adolf Hitler.³² But the more politically oriented faction thought that the Burschenschaft

should provide the training grounds for educational preparation of the idealists of National Socialism.³³ The "traditional" faction on the other hand, held that the Burschenschaft should work for political ends but not be completely controlled in his individual life by the Nazi Party.³⁴

This dispute necessitated a meeting in June, 1933, at the traditional shrine of the Wartburg. This meeting was the political and organizational turning point within the Burschenschaft: the "leadership principle" replaced the parliamentary system within the organization, and the decisive step was taken toward Nazi coordination.³⁵ The new leader was Otto Schwab, who was also the leader of a SA troop as well as a Party member.³⁶ The meeting was solemnly concluded with a symbolic gesture to proclaim loyalty to Hitler and his movement. As they confessed their faith, the Burschenschaft felt at that moment that the spirit of the German nation was with them.³⁷

After this meeting, Schwab immediately began to use his new position to take action. He introduced the policy that the freshmen be trained en mass in military exercises, sports, and political activities in line with Nazi ideology. As a result of the reorganization, the structure of the Burschenschaft became identical to that of the NSDSTB. Each Burschenschaft chapter had a leader controlled by the nationwide leader, Schwab.³⁸ Though his subsequent actions created dissatisfaction among a few, they had little recourse. The direction was clear: Schwab's actions con-

curred with Nazi policies and spelled the beginning of the end for the Burschenschaft.³⁹

The effects of this reorganization can be seen in the fate of the Bubenreuther of Erlangen. Though this fraternity was among the most traditional in Germany, it had identified itself early with the National Socialist movement. By 1930, when the NSDSTB obtained a majority in the Erlangen student parliament, the majority of the Bubenreuther had already become members of the NSDSTB. Generally speaking, when a student representative voted Bubenreuther, he was in effect voting NSDSTB. Unlike the national situation in 1931, when the Burschenschaft competed against the NSDSTB, there was no competition at Erlangen between the Bubenreuther and the Nazi Group; they were virtually identical.⁴⁰ The Bubenreuthers' Nazi sympathies were quite well known; the members of the fraternity proudly attended Nazi mass meetings in their distinctive uniforms and distributed announcements for the Party.⁴¹ They appeared to be strong and united supporters of Nazism.

Yet they soon learned that one could not merely support the Nazis: ultimately, all would be swallowed up and absorbed by the Party. The first realization of this unpleasant fact occurred in 1933, when the national Burschenschaft adopted the "leadership principle". The Bubenreuther opposed this reorganization, holding instead that the Burschenschaft should retain its autonomy, free of identification with the Nazi movement.⁴² The Bubenreuther objected to the

mass character of Nazism, and feared that the distinctiveness and exclusivity of their organization would be swallowed up in the "numbers, masses, equality, and mediocrity" of the Nazi movement. Thus the Bubenreuther strenuously objected to the directive by the National Burschenschaft headquarters which would turn fraternity houses into barracks for the training of young Party members.⁴³ They further fulminated against the rumor that Schwab, the national Burschenschaft leader, wanted to abolish all fraternity colors, symbols, and passwords.⁴⁴

The Bubenreuther of Erlangen came into direct conflict with the national Burschenschaft in June, 1933, over the question of admitting "non-Aryans" into membership. The national office had decreed that no one who had even a remote relationship to Jews could be a member. Now it so happened that a highly placed, prominent, and highly regarded "old boy" of the Bubenreuther fraternity was married to a woman whose grandfather had been "non-Aryan".⁴⁵ The Bubenreuther kept the gentleman on their rolls and tried to cover up his less than impeccable racial purity. After a long and vituperous dispute, the national Burschenschaft finally voted on April 8, 1934, to expel the Bubenreuther.⁴⁶ Thus, the national organization and the local chapter at Erlangen went their own ways to destruction at the hands of the Nazi "coordinators". On October 18, 1935, the entire Burschenschaft met at the Wartburg and dissolved their organization. The membership announced that they were now

openly and completely integrating into the Third Reich. This act was symbolized by their relinquishing of the Burschenschaft flag to the leader of the NSDSTB, who welcomed them as comrades.⁴⁷

After the abdication of the Burschenschaft, it was but three months until the Bubenreuther followed suit. Only the manner of their demise was different. On January 26, 1936, Hess announced at an annual student body meeting that henceforth anyone belonging to a traditional organization would be considered un-German in Hitler's eyes. Four days later at a university celebration at Erlangen, the Bubenreuther and other traditional groups were requested to remove their distinguishing colors and symbols or leave the banquet hall. They left the hall, went to their house, and along with the other traditional groups officially dissolved themselves.⁴⁸ The Nazis had attained their goal: to unify all students into one mass of mediocrity.

FOOTNOTES

¹ Frederick L. Schuman, The Nazi Dictatorship (New York, 1935), pp. 193-194.

² *Ibid.*, p. 194.

³ Martin Broszat, Der Staat Hitlers (Munich, 1969), pp. 82-101.

⁴ Schuman, The Nazi Dictatorship, pp. 201-207.

⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 212-215.

⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 215-220.

⁷ Karl Loewenstein, Hitler's Germany (New York, 1944), p. 13.

⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 25-30.

⁹ Schuman, The Nazi Dictatorship, pp. 244-250.

¹⁰ Loewenstein, Hitler's Germany, pp. 26-27.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 30-31.

¹² Schuman, The Nazi Dictatorship, p. 268.

¹³ *Ibid.*, pp. 268-269.

¹⁴ Loewenstein, Hitler's Germany, pp. 27-29.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 29-30.

¹⁶ A. Wolf, Higher Education in Nazi Germany (London, 1944), pp. 22-26.

¹⁷ William Ebenstein, The Nazi State (New York, 1943), pp. 180-194.

¹⁸ David Schoenbaum, Hitler's Social Revolution (London, 1967), pp. 46-47.

¹⁹ Wolf, Higher Education, pp. 27-32.

- ²⁰ Faust, Der Nationalsozialistische Studentenbund, p. 122.
- ²¹ Wolf, Higher Education, pp. 33-37.
- ²² "Lösung der Judenfrage", Burschenschaftliche Blätter, Vol. 44 (1932-33), p. 162. (Hereinafter cited as B.B.L.).
- ²³ Faust, Der Nationalsozialistische Studentenbund, pp. 121-122.
- ²⁴ Bleuel and Klinnert, Deutsche Studenten, pp. 246-247.
- ²⁵ Faust, Der Nationalsozialistische Studentenbund, pp. 88-91.
- ²⁶ Bleuel and Klinnert, Deutsche Studenten, pp. 226-227.
- ²⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 228-229.
- ²⁸ Zorn, "Die Politische Entwicklung", pp. 233-307.
- ²⁹ Mosse, The Crisis of German Ideology, pp. 271-275.
- ³⁰ Bleuel and Klinnert, Deutsche Studenten, pp. 228-241.
- ³¹ Karl-Heinz Hederich, "Aufbau der deutschen Burschenschaft", B.B.L., Vol. 47 (1933), pp. 257-258.
- ³² Carl Walbrach, "Die Bedeutung der Burschenschaft im Dritten Reich", B.B.L., Vol. 47 (1933), pp. 37-39.
- ³³ Rolf Grunow, "Neuer Zwiespalt", B.B.L., Vol. 47 (1933), pp. 212-213.
- ³⁴ H. Kirstein, "Urburschenschaft and Nationalsozialismus", B.B.L., Vol. 47 (1934), pp. 250-251.
- ³⁵ Bleuel and Klinnert, Deutsche Studenten, pp. 250-251.
- ³⁶ Faust, Der Nationalsozialistische Studentenbund, pp. 124-125.
- ³⁷ Hederich, "Burschentag 1933", B.B.L., Vol. 47 (1933), p. 233.
- ³⁸ Hederich, "Aufbau der Deutschen Burschenschaft", pp. 257-259.
- ³⁹ Bleuel and Klinnert, Deutsche Studenten, p. 251.
- ⁴⁰ "Höhne, Die Bubenreuther, p. 104.

- ⁴¹ "Höhne, Die Bubenreuther, p. 104.
- ⁴² "Burschenschaft und Wir", Bubenreuther Zeitung, Vol. XV (1933), p. 45.
- ⁴³ *Ibid.*, p. 45.
- ⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 49.
- ⁴⁵ Andreae and Griesbach, Die Bubenreuther, pp. 53-54.
- ⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 54-55.
- ⁴⁷ Hans Glauning, "18. October 1817 und 1935", B.BL., Vol. 50 (1935), pp. 1-7.
- ⁴⁸ Andreae and Griesbach, Die Bubenreuther, pp. 59-60.

CHAPTER V

CONCLUSION

It is often asked how the National Socialists were able to take control of Germany. The simplest answer to this question is that the state of mind of the German people was propitious for acceptance of Nazism. Many factors helped to prepare for the Nazi victory. First among these was the defeat of Germany in World War I, which bitterly hurt the pride of the strongest continental power. Since the Weimar system was associated with the defeat, there was never much zeal for the Republic. Second, the inflation of 1922-1923 was a contributing factor. By impoverishing the lower middle class, it caused the members of this class to seize upon the extravagant promises of Hitler and the Nazis. Third, the resentment against the Treaty of Versailles must not be overlooked. Most Germans regarded this treaty as a humiliation and were willing to listen when Hitler and the Nazis promised to free Germany from its shackles. Fourth, the economic blizzard which hit Germany in 1930, leaving widespread unemployment and bankruptcies in its wake, prepared millions of Germans to follow anyone who promised them jobs and bread. Finally, the power of Hitler's oratory convinced the German people that he was their man of destiny.

Though these five factors help explain the fact that students also supported Hitler, their susceptibility to the Nazi appeal had a different and more basic origin as well. To be sure, the economic conditions of the country affected the students to a more intense degree than the general population at large. But in truth, the attraction which National Socialism had for students was based more on ideological considerations than on economic concerns. Instead of concerning themselves with the economic plight of the nation in their postwar meetings, the student body debated ideological or racial issues, such as how to keep the Jews from polluting German culture and how to unify German speaking students and countries. These questions which preoccupied the students' minds came mainly from the "völkisch" nations of the traditionalist Burschenschaften and their compatriots in Austria. It was this "völkisch" dogma, already strong among student organizations, which made them easy victims for Nazi propaganda.

The "völkisch" persuasion implied a desire to unify all German-speaking people under one leadership. The Treaty of Versailles divided the German-speaking people; hence it became anathema. Because the students identified the Treaty with the new Republic, they would not support or identify with the Republic. The Republic was not of "German" origin and it had no precedent in German thinking. The "völkisch" thinkers also saw the presence of Jews in their culture as an additional barrier in their efforts to

complete the unification of pure Germans. The students were especially hostile toward the presence of Jewish influence or intellectual leadership. Therefore, they were receptive to speechmakers like Hitler who pointed to the Jews as the source of many of Germany's national problems.

The students thought that they would lead the way toward the achievement of völkisch goals by first unifying all German Students into one student body. Their attempt at unification started well in 1919 with the foundation of the Deutsche Studentenschaft. However, the Burschenschaft split from the Deutsche Studentenschaft after only one year because the Studentenschaft did not sufficiently emphasize völkisch thinking. In 1920 the Burschenschaft, together with other völkisch-oriented students, founded their own organization, the German Academic Circle. By 1924 the German Academic Circle controlled the majority of the student parliaments in Germany. This indicates that the interest of students was directed more toward the accumulation of power for the purpose of advancing than toward finding solutions to their own economic plight. The students had already set a national stage for the development of National Socialism before the Nazis came to power. The Burschenschaft had long sought to unify all German students into a single organization. This made it difficult for them to complete successfully against the Nazi Student League between 1931 and 1933, for the League espoused the same goal. Ultimately, the Burschenschaft was absorbed into the Nazi

Student League. In 1935 they threw away 128 years of Bur-
schenschaft heritage voluntarily. The example of the
Bubenreuther demonstrates how this surrender took place.
The German students helped to build an ideological base for
National Socialism, were duped into supporting the Nazis,
and then were engulfed by the political monster they helped
bring to prominence.

SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY

I. Primary Sources

A. Memoirs and Documents.

Bergsträsser, A. and H. Platz, Jugendbewegung und Universitäts Vorträge auf der Tagung deutscher Hochschullehrer in Weimar 1927. Karlsruhe: Verlag G, Braun, 1927.

"Die ehemaligen Erlanger Verbindungen. Die Entwicklung der Erlanger Verbindungen in den letzten Monaten bis zu deren Auflösung am 31, Januar, 1936". Unpublished MS, Erlangen, February, 1936.

Heer, G., et al., Quellen und Darstellungen zur Geschichte der Burschenschaft und der deutschen Einheitsbewegung. 17 vols., Heidelberg: Carl Winters Verlag, 1910-1940.

Pagenstecher, A., Aus gärender Zeit: Lebenserinnerung 1816-1850. Leipzig: Voigtländer Verlag, 1913.

Rothfels, H., "Die Universitäten und der Schuldspruch von Versailles zum 28, Juni 1921: Eine ungehaltene Akademische Reda". Königsberg: Grafe and Unzer Verlag, 1929.

"Zweihundert Jahre Universität Erlangen", Deutschlands Erneuerung, Vol. 27 (1943).

B. Newspapers and Journals.

Academia: Monatsschrift des CV der katholischen deutschen Studentenverbindungen, Vol. 45 (1932-33) and Vol. 46 (1933-34).

Bayrische Hochschulzeitung, 1920-1934.

Bubenreuther Zeitung, Vol. 1 (1918-19) - Vol. 18 (1936).

Burschenschaftliche Blätter, Vol. 36 (1921) - Vol. 50 (1935).

Der deutsche Student: Zeitschrift der Deutschen Studentenschaft, 1933-1936.

Die Schwarzburg: Deutsche Hochschulmonatsschrift, 1918-1935.

Erlanger Tagblatt, 1918-1936.

Erlanger Universitäts-Kalender, 1920/21-1934/35.

Feldpostbriefe der medizinischen Fakultät der Friedrich-Alexander-Universität, 1944.

Fränkische Hochschulzeitung: Monatsschrift für akademisches Leben, 1927/28-1932/33.

Onolden Zeitung, 1919-1930.

II. Secondary Sources

A. Books and Monographs.

Andrae, J. and Griesbach, F., Die Burschenschaft der Bubenreuther. Erlangen: Selbstverlag des Vereins der Bubenreuther Philister, 1967.

Bleuel, H. P., Deutschlands Bekenner. Munich and Vienna: Scherzverlag, 1968.

_____ and E. Klinnert, Deutsche Studenten auf dem Weg ins dritte Reich. Gütersloh: Sigbert Mohn Verlag, 1967.

Bracher, K. D., Die deutsche Diktatur: Entstehung, Struktur, Folgen. 3rd ed., Cologne and Berlin: Kiepenhauer und Witsch, 1969.

_____, W. Sauer, and G. Schulz, Die nationalsozialistische Machtergreifung. 2nd ed., Cologne and Opladen: West Deutscher Verlag, 1962.

Broszat, M., Der Staat Hitlers (Weltgeschichte des 20 Jahrhunderts, Vol. 9). Munich: Deutscher Taschenbuchverlag, 1969.

Bruchmüller, W., Das deutsche Studententum von seinen Anfängen bis zur Gegenwart. Leipzig: B. F. Teubner-Verlag, 1922.

Copleston, F., A History of Philosophy. 8 vols., New York, 1962-1967.

Darstellungen and Quellen zur deutschen Einheitsbewegung. 7 vols., Heidelberg: Carl Winter Verlag, 1957-1965.

Doebler, M., Das Akademische Deutschland. Vol. III, Berlin: n.p., 1930.

- Ebenstein, W., The Nazi State. New York: Farrar and Rinehart, 1943.
- Eppstein, K., Mathias Erzberger and the Dilemma of German Democracy. New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1959.
- Ergang, R., Europe Since Waterloo. 3rd ed., Boston: D. C. Heath and Company, 1967.
- Euler, H., Die Aussenpolitik der Weimarer Republic 1918-23. Aschaffenburg: Paul Pattloch, 1957.
- Eyck, E., Geschichte der Weimarer Republic. 2 vols., Erlenbach and Zürich: Eugen Rentsch, 1956-62.
- Eyck, F., The Frankfurt Parliament 1848-1849. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1968.
- Faust, A., Der Nationalsozialistische Studentenbund. 2 vols., Düsseldorf: Pädagogischer Verlag Schwan, 1973.
- Fick, L., Die deutsche Jugend Bewegung. Jena: Diederichs Verlag, 1939.
- Fenske, H., Konservatismus und Rechtsradikalismus in Bayern nach 1918. Bad Homburg: Verlag Gehlen, 1969.
- Franze, M., Der Erlanger Studentenschaft 1918-1945. Würzburg: Schöningh-Verlag, 1972.
- Geschichte Der Universität Jena 1948-1958. 2 vols., Jena: Gustav Filher Verlag, 1958.
- Gordon, H. J., Hitler and the Beerhall Putsch. New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1972.
- Grebing, H., Der Nationalsozialismus Ursprung and Wesen. Munich: Gunter Olzog Verlag, 1961.
- Grunberger, R., Red Rising in Bavaria. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1973.
- Hamilton, F. A., Hitler's Reich, The First Phase. New York: MacMillan Company, 1933.
- Heiber, H., Die Republik von Weimar (Weltgeschichte des 20. Jahrhunderts, Vol. 3). Munich: Deutscher Taschenbuch Verlag, 1969.
- Herzstein, R. E., Adolf Hitler and the German Trauma. New York: Putnam, 1974.

- Hofer, W., Die Diktatur Hitlers bis zum Beginn des zweiten Weltkrieges 1933-1939. Konstanz: Akademische Verlags Gesellschaft Athenaion, 1971.
- Höhne, E., Die Bubenreuther, Geschichte einer deutschen Burschenschaft. Erlangen: Selbstverlag des Vereins der Bubenreuther Philister, 1936.
- Hughes, H. S., Consciousness and Society, The Reorientation of European Social Thought, 1890-1930. New York: Ft. Knopf, Inc., 1958.
- Jackel, E., Hitlers Weltanschauung. Tübingen: Rainer Wunderlich Verlag, 1969.
- Kater, M., Studententenschaft und Rechtsradikalismus in Deutschland 1918-1933. Hamburg: Hoffmann und Campe, 1975.
- Kaufman, G., Geschichte der deutschen Universitäten. 2 vols., Graz: Akademische Druck und Verlagsanstalt, 1958.
- Kinder, H. and W. Hilgermann, Von der Französischen Revolution bis zur Gegenwart. Vol. 2, Munich: Deutscher Taschenbuchverlag, 1968.
- Klose, W., Freiheit Schreibt auf Eure Fahnen: 800 Jahre Deutsche Studenten. Hamburg: Gerhard Stalling Verlag, 1967.
- Kolde, T., Die Universität Erlangen unter dem Hause Wittelsbach 1810-1910. Erlangen u. Leipzig: n. p. 1910.
- Kübel, J., 100 Jahre Uttenruthia 1836-1936. Erlangen: Selbstverlag des Philister Vereins der Uttenruthia, 1951.
- Krummacher, F. A. and A. Wucher, Die Weimarer Republik, Ihre Geschichte in Texten, Bildern und Documenten 1918-1933. Munich: Verlag Kurt Desch, 1965.
- Laqueur, Q., Young Germany. New York: Basic Books Publishing Co., Inc., 1962.
- Loewenstein, K., Hitler's Germany. 3rd ed., New York: MacMillan Company, 1944.
- Mann, G., Deutsche Geschichte des 19 und 20 Jahrhunderts. Stuttgart-Hamburg: Deutscher Bücherbund, 1958.

- Meinecke, F., Die deutsche Katastrophe. Zürich: Nera Verlag, 1946.
- Minzen, M. E., Der Werkstudent: Ein Berufsproblem. Stuttgart: Jung and Sohn, 1926.
- Mosse, G. L., The Crisis of German Ideology. New York: The Universal Library, 1964.
- Mosse, W. E., Entscheidungsjahr 1932: Zur Judenfrage in der Endphase der Weimarer Republik. Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr, 1965.
- Parker, R. A., Das Zwanzigste Jahrhundert 1918-1945 (Fischer Weltgeschichte, Vol. 34). Frankfurt and Main: Fischer Bücherei, 1967.
- Paulsen, F., Die Deutschen Universitäten und das Universitätsstudium. Hildesheim: Georg Olms Verlag, 1966.
- Rauschnig, H., Die Revolution des Nihilismus. 4th ed., Zürich and New York: Europa-Verlag AG, 1938.
- Reuter, F., Die Erlanger Burschenschaft 1816-1833. Erlangen, M. Menche, 1896.
- Ringer, F. K., The Decline of the German Mandarins, The German Academic Community, 1890-1933. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1969.
- Scheuer, O., Burschenschaft und Judenfrage, Der Rassenantisemitismus in der deutschen Studentenschaft. Berlin: Verlag Berlin-Vienna, 1927.
- Schmolze, G., Revolution und Räterepublik in München 1918-19 in Augenzeugenberichten. Düsseldorf: Karl Rauch Verlag, 1969.
- Schoenbaum, D., Hitler's Social Revolution: Class and Status in Nazi Germany, 1933-1939. London: Loweg Brydone, 1967.
- Schoeps, H. J., Zeitgeist im Wandel: Zeitgeist der Weimarer Republik. Stuttgart: Ernst Klett Verlag, 1968.
- Schulze, F., and P. Ssymank, Das deutschen Studententum von den ältesten Zeiten bis zur Gegenwart-1931. 4th ed., Munich: Verlag für Hochschulkunde, 1932.
- _____, Das deutschen Studententum von den ältesten Zeiten bis zum Weltkrieg. Leipzig: Voigtlanders, Verlag, 1910.

- Schumann, F., The Nazi Dictatorship. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1935.
- Schwarz, J., Studenten in der Weimarer Republik. Berlin: Verlag Duncker and Humblot, 1971.
- Spindler, M. Handbuch der Bayrischen Geschichte. Munich: C. H. Beck'sche Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1974.
- Stein., F., Geschichte Frankens. Aalen: Scienta Verlag, 1966.
- Stern, J. P., Hitler: The Führer and the People. Glasgow: William Collins Sons and Company, 1975.
- Stoltenberg, G., Der Deutsche Reichstag 1871-1873. Düsseldorf: Droste Verlag, 1955.
- Volkman, H., Die deutsche Studentenschaft in ihrer Entwicklung seit 1919. Leipzig: Verlag Quelle and Grieyer, 1925.
- Wolf, A., Higher Education in Nazi Germany. London: Methuen and Co., 1944.

B. Journal Articles.

- Broszat, M., "Soziale Motivation und Führer Bindung des Nationalsozialismus", Vierteljahreshefte für Zeitgeschichte, Vol. 18 (1970), pp. 392-409.
- Düwell, K., "Zur Kulturpolitik des Ministers C. H. Becker", Historische Zeitschrift, Beiheft 1, (1971), pp. 37-74.
- Kater, M. H., "Der NS-Studentenbund von 1926 bis 1928", Vierteljahreshefte für Zeitgeschichte, Vol. 22 (1974), pp. 148-190.
- _____, "Die Artamanen-Völkische Jugend in der Weimarer Republik", Historische Zeitschrift, Vol. 213 (1971), pp. 577-638.
- _____, "The Reich Vocational Contest and Students of Higher Learning in Nazi Germany", Central European History, Vol. 7 (1974), pp. 225-261.
- _____, "The Work Student", Journal of Contemporary History, Vol. 10 (1977), pp. 71-94.
- _____, "Zur Soziographie der frühen NSDAP", Vierteljahreshefte für Zeitgeschichte, Vol. 19 (1971), pp. 124-159.

- Loewenberg, P., "The Psychohistorical Origins of the Nazi Youth Cohort", American Historical Review, Vol. 76 (1971), pp. 1457-1502.
- Olenhausen, A., "Die Nichtarischen Studenten an den deutschen Hochschulen: Zur nationalsozialistischen Rassenpolitik, 1933-1945", Vierteljahreshefte für Zeitgeschichte, Vol. 14 (1966), pp. 175-206.
- Silvermann, P., "A Pledge Unredeemed: The Crisis in Weimar Germany", Central European History, Vol. 3 (1970), pp. 112-139.
- Strätz, H. W., "Die Studentische Aktion wider den undeutschen Geist im Frühjahr, 1933", Vierteljahreshefte für Zeitgeschichte, Vol. 16 (1968), pp. 347-372.
- Zorn, W., "Student Politics in the Weimar Republic", Journal of Contemporary History, Vol. 1 (1970); pp. 128-143.

C. Newspaper or Magazine Articles.

- Aretin, K. O. von, "Die deutsche Universität im Dritten Reich", Frankfurter Hefte: Zeitschrift für Kultur und Politik, Vol. 23 (1968), pp. 689-696.
- Diehl-Thiele, P., "Revolte gegen die Republik: Politische Aktionen an deutschen Universitäten während der letzten Jahre der Weimarer Republik", Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, March 6, 1972, p. 613.
- Popp, W., "Die Deutsche Studentenschaft in der Weimarer Republik", Akademische Monatsblätter, Vol. 68 (1955-56), pp. 33-105.

2
VITA

Renate Maria Steffen

Candidate for the Degree of
Master of Arts

Thesis: STUDENT POLITICS AND THE COMING OF THE THIRD REICH

Major Field: History

Biographical:

Personal Data: Born in Halle, Germany, July 21, 1943,
the daughter of Alois and Elfriede Steffen.

Education: Graduated from Abendgymnasium in Offenbach
in April, 1971, with Zeugnis der Reife; graduate
study in History, Political Sciences and German
at the University of Würzburg from 1971-1974;
enrolled in Master's program at Oklahoma State
University in 1976 and completed the requirements
for the Master of Arts degree in May, 1976.