

A CONTENT ANALYSIS OF THE NEW YORK TIMES AND ST. LOUIS
POST-DISPATCH COVERAGE OF THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT
FROM JUNE 6, 1982 - FEBRUARY 12, 1983

BY

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PREFACE

This study is concerned with coverage of the Arab-Israeli conflict in The New York Times and St. Louis Post-Dispatch. The goal was to determine if coverage was balanced and fair to both parties in the conflict, Arabs and Israelis.

I would like to take the opportunity to express my sincere appreciation to my dissertation adviser, Dr. William R. Steng, Associate Professor in the School of Journalism and Broadcasting. I have been associated with Dr. Steng since the time I was a Master's degree student in the School of Journalism and Broadcasting. All along he has been extremely helpful and has guided me with great understanding. Dr. Steng proved to be at his best in guiding me through this dissertation and I appreciate all that he has done for me.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Background of the Study

A wave of anti-Semitism is sweeping the world as a reaction against 1) Jewish control of news channels, 2) international Jewish banking, 3) atheistic communism, which was originally spawned in Jewish capitalism and Jewish intellectualism.¹

Rev. Gerald B. Winrod (1940)

"During your entire life have you felt that the Arabs (of Israel) were the enemies of the state?"

"Yes."

"You felt they were a potential fifth column?"

"Yes."²

Statement of a witness, cross-examined by the Defense in a 1957 massacre trial, Jerusalem.

Anti-Semitism did not perish with Adolf Hitler and the Third Reich. The persecution of Jews continued as it had for centuries. Churchmen spoke of the accursed Jews. Jews still are considered misers and clannish. In the 1950s, anti-Semitic incidents, such as desecration of Jewish synagogues, vandalism of Jewish homes and physical torture of Jews, occurred in Europe and the United States.

¹Charles Y. Glock and Rodney Stark, Christian Beliefs and Anti-Semitism (Harper and Row, Publishers, New York and London, 1966), p. 107.

²Walter Schwarz, The Arabs in Israel (Faber and Faber, London, 1959), p. 12.

In the 1980s a nation of Jews seems to engage in a type of persecution which their ancestors faced decades ago. The tables have turned and the Israelis seem to be engaging in some kind of persecution of the Arabs, especially those who are Palestinians.

Who are Arabs? The British geographer W. B. Fisher, in his book, The Middle East: A Physical Social and Regional Geography, states:

From the point of view of the anthropologist, it is impossible to speak with accuracy either of an Arab or of a Semitic people. Both terms connote a mixed population varying widely in physical character and in racial origin, and are best used purely as cultural and linguistic terms respectively. Thus the so-called "Arab countries are those which share a common culture.

Currently the Arab countries are: Egypt, Syria, Jordan, Iraq, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Yemen Arab Republic, South Yemen, Kuwait, a series of tiny sheikhdoms along the Persian Gulf, and the North African states known collectively as the Mehgreb-Algeria, Tunisia, Morocco and Libya. Islam is the predominant religion in all of these countries and strict adherence to Islam is an important element of the Arab world.³

This study focused on Palestinian Arabs.

The Palestinians have been subject to harassment by Jews since the establishment of the state of Israel in 1948. According to Rosemary Sagigh, a writer who interviewed a number of Palestinians, these oppressed people deserve as much world concern as other oppressed people of the world. She wrote:

Few people would now dispute that the greatest victims of the establishment of the state of Israel have been the Palestinians. As a people displaced from control of their resources by force, deprived of their national territory and identity, condemned to minority status in the countries of others, Palestinians claim the same right of concern from the world as other oppressed peoples.⁴

³Congressional Quarterly, The Middle East (Congressional Quarterly, Washington, DC., 1974), p. 36.

⁴Rosemary Sagigh, Palestinians: From Peasants to Revolutionaries (Zed Press, London, 1979), p. 5.

The world today seems to be concerned with the rights of the Palestine people. Maybe a tragedy in the form of massacres and exoduses of Palestine Arabs in the recent past has created this concern. Whatever may be the cause, the fact is that the Middle East nations and the United States are pursuing serious efforts to solve the issue of a Palestine homeland.

Statement of the Problem

This study is concerned with the coverage of the Arab-Israel conflict between June 1982 and February 1983 by The New York Times and the St. Louis Post Dispatch. The following questions were asked during the study of news stories published about the conflict: In what light did The New York Times and the St. Louis Post Dispatch portray the Arabs and the Israelis? To which did either newspaper direct more attention? The military side of the conflict or the causes of the conflict, such as the Palestinian quest for a homeland? Which aspect of the Arabs and the Israelis did either newspaper emphasize? Successes or failures? In what dimension were the Arabs and the Israelis portrayed by the two newspapers?

There is a great difference between discussing facts and dealing with them.⁵ The purpose of this study, basically, was to deal with facts and how they were presented in two U.S. newspapers.

The study examined "what" the two newspapers reported in their coverage of the Arab-Israeli conflict, and specifically in what light the Arabs and Israelis were portrayed before, during and after the Beirut

⁵Roger Fisher, Dear Israelis, Dear Arabs (Harper and Row, Publishers, New York, London, 1972), p. 1.

massacre. Content analysis was used to achieve this purpose. As Pool said:

Someone says something somehow to someone with some effect. The fundamental questions, therefore, are: who, says what, how, to whom, with what effect? When studies are focused upon "who," we speak of control analysis; when they deal primarily with "what", it is content analysis.⁶

To the knowledge of this writer, only a few content analysis studies on the Arab-Israeli conflict's news coverage have been conducted in the United States. By content analysis, this study has attempted to show that news coverage, which is supposed to be objective, may be affected by a major event of international consequence.

Limitations and Assumption of the Study

This writer believes that one major limitation of the study is its restricted scope. An examination of only a segment of the Arab-Israeli conflict is being made --the press side of the conflict. But what about the effect of the news coverage on the reader? Answers about the effect of news coverage on the reader can be provided by questionnaire surveys.

The study suffers from one major assumption. By selecting The New York Times and the St. Louis Post-Dispatch, this writer has assumed that some changes may have occurred in the coverage of the Arab-Israeli conflict by these two newspapers. In other words, these two newspapers were part of the study because this writer believed there was reasonable chance of finding changes in their news coverage.

⁶Ithiel de Sola Pool, The Prestige Press: A Comparative Study of Political Symbols (The M.I.T. Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1952), p. 11.

CHAPTER II

REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE

Ancient Israel

Get thee out of thy country and from thy kindred and from thy father's house onto a land that I will show thee; and I will make of thee a great nation; and I will bless thee and make thy name great, and thou shalt be a blessing.¹

With these words, known to have come from God, the migration of the patriarch Abraham to the land of Canaan was given a divine sanction. Abraham, the nomad chieftain, left Ur, a Persian Gulf city in southern Babylonia, and traveled in search of the "Promised Land" and arrived in the land of Canaan.

These "Hebrews," who entered Egypt, settled in the land of Gosha in the Nile Delta. After generations of peaceful existence they were enslaved by an overly zealous pharaoh, probably Ramses II. After Ramses' death, they were led out of bondage by Moses. Their deliverance from Egypt, the Exodus, was regarded in later Hebrew thought as an event of primary religious significance.²

Moses' successor, the mighty warrior Joshua, led his forces across the Jordan to besiege and capture Jericho and other Canaanite strongholds. He was a skillful leader. The invasion he began was continued by

¹Theodore Huebener and Carl Herman Voss, This is Israel (Philosophical Library, New York 1956), p. 1.

²Ibid, p. 3.

others through more than a century of bloody warfare. The Hebrews streamed into the land and settled it, driving out or subjugating the natives.

The land where the Hebrews settled later became known as Palestine. It was ruled by Persians until 333 B.C. when it was conquered by Alexander. Palestine was taken over in 636 by Omar, the second Mohammedan Caliph.

Palestine Under the Moslems

On September 20, 622, the Prophet Mohammed fled from Mecca to Medina. This flight, known as the Hegira, is a milestone in Islamic history, marking as it does the beginning of the prophet's power and of the Mohammedan era. During the eleven years from the Hegira to his death, Mohammed welded the scattered Arab tribes into one people. Palestine was ruled by several Caliphs after Mohammed and Islam spread during their reign, winning converts from Christianity and Judaism.

For two centuries following the Arab conquest, Palestine remained a prosperous country with blooming vineyards and busy towns. This prosperity was slowly but steadily undermined by the inefficient administration of the Caliphs, burdensome taxation, and a lack of protection from marauding adventurers. Palestine was not well protected; and in the ninth century insurrections broke out. The Bedouins made frequent raids. Towns were sacked; villages were burned; monasteries and churches were destroyed.

More and more the Caliphs in Baghdad began to rely on Turkish mercenaries to maintain order. This tactic weakened their power as they became little more than figureheads. Ambitious

local governors made themselves hereditary princes and completely disregarded Baghdad.³

What followed the weakening of Moslem rule in Palestine was the Turkish Conquest. A Turkish adventurer named Mohammed ibn-Tughj seized control of Egypt, Palestine and Syria. Palestine, in 1291, became a province of the realm of Sultan of Egypt and remained so until 1516 when the land became part of the Ottoman Empire.

Under the Ottoman Turks, the government of Palestine was organized along feudal lines. Local governors were appointed from Constantinople where the revenues were sent.

However, the Turkish government took no special interest in Palestine except to exploit it. Through misrule, corruption, burdensome taxation and wasteful use of land, the country's natural resources were destroyed. Palestine became barren, with an ignorant, poverty-stricken population eking out a miserable existence. The peasants were oppressed and suffered from the intermittent skirmishes of local sheiks.

Palestine by the 1830s had become mostly Islamic in population. This was one country which had experienced the influence of several religions over the centuries, domination by Jews, Christians and Moslems.

The Palestine Question

Dear Dr. Dunner:

I fear Palestine could never support all the Jews and the Arabs would start a constant war if all of them came. Why can't

³Heubener and Voss, p. 3.

Jews be members of a religious body but natives of the lands in which they live?

Very Sincerely Yours,
Eleanor Roosevelt
January 16, 1943⁴

Mrs. Roosevelt may have stated in one paragraph the still unanswered Palestine question. The homeland of the Palestinian people has been as elusive as a mirage in the desert. Historians, politicians and political analysts have taken sides on which party is right, whether the Jews drove the Palestinians from their homeland or whether the Jews have the legitimate right to the land they now call Israel.

By the early 1900s, Palestine was home for more than 700,000 Arabs. Their ancestors once had commanded a domain stretching from Spain to Siam. Now they were subjects of the Ottoman Empire ruled by fellow Moslem Turks.

There were a few more than 50,000 Jews living in Palestine in 1900. Many were descendants of families who had lived there for generations, with generally far less difficulties than their European cousins faced on the continent. Others came in the late nineteenth century trying to escape the vicious pogroms that spread through much of eastern Europe. Few of them arrived with any plans to reshape the political structure, but in the early part of the twentieth century many became converts to Zionism.

A definition of Zionism is imperative at this stage. Jacob Tsur wrote:

Zionism is the Jewish people's movement of national liberation.

⁴Joseph Dunner, The Republic of Israel (McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., New York, London, Toronto, 1950), p. ix.

As such, it constitutes an integral part of the historic process of the emancipation of nations which commenced in the first half of the nineteenth century with the outbreak of national revolutions in the Balkans and culminated in the emergence of independent states throughout Asia and Africa after World War II.⁵

A few Islamic nationalists in Palestine viewed the Zionists in their land as possible allies in fighting Ottoman domination. However, they also were aware that the growing Jewish population would eventually be able to gain control of government affairs in the country, excluding the Arabs from power. In this context, Kenneth Ray Bain wrote:

It took little political acumen to realize that Zionism's call for a state run by Jews made no sense unless the children of Israel planned wither to wrench political power from the Arab Palestinians or drive them from their homes.⁶

The Ottoman Empire, which was allied with Germany, broke up during World War I. The Jews and Moslems never did become allies to fight British domination. "Violent conflicts between Zionists and Moslems became a permanent feature of the Holy Land."⁷

After the cessation of hostilities in World War I, the British had occupied Palestine, and the Supreme Allied Council awarded to Britain a mandate for that country at the San Remo Conference in April 1920. In 1922, the League of Nations approved the mandate with the provisions that Britain should create a Jewish national state. This stipulation assumed that Britain would facilitate Jewish immigration to Palestine.

During the 1930s, with Jewish immigration on the rise, Arabs feared

⁵Jacob Tsur, Zionism (Transaction Books, New Brunswick, New Jersey, 1977), p. 9.

⁶Kenneth Ray Bain, The March to Zion (Texas A & M University Press, College Station and London, 1979), pp. 5-6.

⁷Ibid, p. 6.

Jews would overrun Palestine. In 1936 Arabs rioted to voice their displeasure, whereupon the British appointed an official investigating body, the Peal Commission, to look into the causes of unrest. In 1937, it recommended the partition of Palestine into two states, one Jewish, the other Arab. Continued Arab disturbances in 1938 compelled the British Foreign Office to issue in 1939 the famous White Paper, a document that aimed at appeasing the Arabs by repudiating the Balfour Declaration and restricting Jewish immigration to Palestine to 75,000 during the next five years.

In early 1947, Arab and Zionist representatives met in London to resolve the Palestine question but failed to do so. Britain then turned to the United Nations. The United Nations set up an inquiry committee which ultimately recommended that Palestine be divided into two separate states, Arab and Jewish, with Jerusalem and vicinity as an international zone under permanent United Nations trusteeship. "The United States and Soviet Union agreed on the partitioning of Palestine, and on Nov. 29, 1947, the United Nations General Assembly voted to divide Palestine".⁸

Civil war broke out shortly after the U.N. decision. In March 1948, the United States voiced opposition to the forcible partitioning of Palestine and called for suspension of the plan. The United States urged a special session of the General Assembly.

In April 1948, the Security Council adopted a U.S. resolution calling for a truce and a special session of the General Assembly. But it was too late to stop the division of Palestine. On May 14, the British high commissioner left Palestine and the state of Israel was proclaimed.

⁸Congressional Quarterly, p. 13.

After the state of Israel was proclaimed, a committee of legal experts was appointed to draft a constitution for the new state. The experts drafted a simple pattern of government combining certain aspects of the United States Constitution with some of the essentials of the Continental European parliamentary system.

The legislature consists of one house, the Chamber of Deputies, rather than two houses, as in the United States, Great Britain and other democratic countries. As in Great Britain, the Cabinet or Executive Council, headed by the Prime Minister, is chosen from and is responsible to the Chamber of Deputies. The President of the Republic is elected by the legislature for a fixed term of office and his functions are mainly of an honorary nature.⁹

Following is an excerpt from the draft constitution:

The official name of the state of Israel is Israel. It is the National Home of the whole Jewish people. All citizens of Israel, whether Jewish or non-Jewish, enjoy equal civic and political rights. No citizen shall be at a disadvantage as a candidate for public office or employment or in the matter of promotion, on account of his race, religion, language or sex.

While Hebrew is the official language, adequate facilities must be given to Arabic-speaking citizens for the use of their language in the legislature, before the Courts and before the executive authorities. Citizenship is conferred on all residents of Israel over the age of eighteen who were Palestinian citizens on May 15, 1948, as well as on Jews who were not citizens of Palestine on that date but are residents in the area of Israel "at the time of the enactment of this constitution" or residents of the non-Israeli portion of Palestine opting for citizenship of Israel within one year.¹⁰

After Israel was created, it became a focal point of Jews escaping religious persecution in Central and Eastern Europe, especially Russia and Germany. But peace did not reign in the land.

Ever since May 15, 1948, Israel and the Arabs have been technically at war. Seen from the perspective of the past 22 years,

⁹Dunner, p. 117.

¹⁰Ibid., pp. 117-118.

this state of affairs has been marked by three major clashes and innumerable smaller battles, centered on the Jordanian and Egyptian fronts.¹¹

War of Independence (1948-49)

The first Arab-Israeli war stemmed from Arab refusal to accept a United Nation Plan to partition Palestine into separate Arab and Jewish states. The armies of five Arab countries -- Egypt, TransJordan, Iraq, Syria and Lebanon -- invaded Israel one day after the state was established on May 15, 1948 (Figure 1). They were defeated.

Although the Arab states involved had 40 times as many people as the infant Jewish state, the Arabs, torn by dynastic rivalries, never placed their armies under effective joint command and were unable to agree on common objectives.

Harry B. Ellis, Christian Science Monitor correspondent, wrote:

Often Arab units in the line were given faulty equipment and had no sense of unified support from their governments at home. Most Arab soldiers involved never had seen Palestine and were far more concerned with scrabbling out a hard living at home than with the plight of Arabs in the Holy Land. Jewish soldiers by contrast, had their backs to the sea, with fresh memories of the Nazi terror in Europe. Furthermore, they had a military tradition dating back to 1920, when Haganah ("defense") was founded.¹²

Haganah was transformed into the Defense Army and had approximately 20,000 men and women. It became a tightly-disciplined fighting force, with a central authority to direct training and to purchase arms. Arms and ammunition were imported from abroad, chiefly from Czechoslovakia.

The war stopped on January 7, 1949, and by February 24 Egypt had

¹¹Harry B. Ellis, The Dilemma of Israel (American Enterprise Institute, 1970), p. 29.

¹²Ibid.

Arab-Israeli Wars - 2




Figure 1. Map of Arab-Israeli War

separately signed an armistice agreement with Israel, followed by Lebanon in March, Jordan in April and Syria in July. Iraq refused to sign an armistice and simply withdrew from Palestine. Although the Arabs withdrew troops from Israel, they never did admit defeat. Their attitude at the end of the 1948 war was to be a reflection of their attitude for years to come. The Arabs seemed to view Jews as their lifelong enemies, and statements by Arab leaders indicated a struggle was to continue with no apparent end. Azzam Pasha, First Secretary General of the Arab League, said in an interview:

We have a secret weapon which we can use better than guns and machine guns, and this is time. As long as we do not make peace with the Zionists, the war is not over; and as long as the war is not over there is neither victor nor vanquished. As soon as we recognize the existence of the state of Israel, we admit by this act that we are vanquished.¹³

Suez War (1956)

The nationalization of the Suez Canal on July 26, 1956, by Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser was a primary step because of several events in the previous year: the British had withdrawn their 80,000 troops from the Suez Canal Zone; the Soviet Union agreed to supply large quantities of arms to Egypt on advantageous terms, and the United States had cancelled its offer to help Egypt build the Aswan Dam. Diplomatic efforts to settle the Suez Canal Crisis failed. Britain and France, who were chief shareholders in the Suez Canal Company, tried to recapture the Canal by force and enlisted Israel's participation in this effort.

On October 26, 1956, the Israeli army invaded the Sinai Peninsula and in seven days had reached the Suez Canal. Egyptian troops were

¹³Congressional Quarterly, p. 42.

driven from the Gaza Strip and the Sinai. On October 31, French and British air forces began bombing Egypt prior to invading the country. The United Nations speedily achieved a cease-fire and demanded the withdrawal of troops invading Egypt.

Responding to intense international pressure from the United States, the Soviet Union, Britain and France withdrew the last of their forces from Egypt in December 1956.

The last Israeli units were not withdrawn from Sinai until March 1957 and then only under the threat that the United States would impose economic sanctions upon Israel if it failed to withdraw.¹⁴

The 1956 war did not solve the Arab-Israeli territorial conflict. According to Nadav Safran, author of From War to War, the conflict after the war became a "clash of destinies" following the merger of Egypt and Syria in the United Arab Republic in February 1958. Safran wrote:

Prior to the Union with Syria, Egypt, along with the rest of the Arab League, stood for the application of the United Nations resolutions on partition and the return of the refugees, which admitted the right of Israel to exist; after the union, this line was abandoned for one that clearly intimated the liquidation of Arab rights in Palestine or the liquidation of the Zionist aggression in Palestine.¹⁵

Six Day War (1967)

Egyptian President Nasser played a role in yet another Arab-Israeli conflict, when he declared the blockade of the Gulf of Agaba on May 23, 1967. Failure of diplomatic efforts to lift the blockade was the primary cause of the Six Day War of June 5-10, 1967 (Figure 2).

¹⁴Ibid., p. 43.

¹⁵Ibid.




Figure 2. Map of the Middle East After 1967 War

The Gulf had been opened to Israeli shipping by Israel's victory in the Suez war of 1956, and it had been kept open by the United Nations Emergency Force stationed since then at the Gulf's mouth on the Red Sea. Nasser's request on May 18 for removal of the U.N. force, from the Gaza Strip as well as from the gulf outpost, was accompanied by movement of substantial Egyptian forces into the Sinai Peninsula, raising Tel Aviv's fears of the long-threatened Arab attempt to terminate the existence of the Jewish state. When the United States and other Western nations failed to act promptly to break the blockade, the third Arab-Israeli war began.

After this war, Israel found itself in a strong position. During the war, Israeli forces had seized control of all Jordanian territory west of the Jordan River. It also had captured the Golan Heights. Israel continued to hold Arab territory it had occupied in 1967. This occupation was the cause of the next war between Arabs and Israelis.

Israel's seemingly inflexible determination to hang on to Arab territory occupied in 1967 weakened the country's position in the international community and finally led to the fourth Arab-Israeli war of 1973.¹⁶

Yom Kippur War (1973)

On October 6, 1973, in a surprise move, Egyptian and Syrian troops crossed into Israeli-occupied territory in the Sinai Peninsula and the Golan Heights (Figure 3). This day was Yom Kippur, the holiest day of the Jewish calendar. Initially, the invading forces succeeded in their strikes into Israeli-occupied territory. Later, Israeli forces succeeded in breaking through the Egyptian lines to the west bank of the Suez Canal

¹⁶Ibid, p.45.

Figure 3. (Title)

and advancing to within 20 miles of the Syrian capital of Damascus.

The United States and the Soviet Union then joined to seek a cease-fire through the auspices of the United Nations. Israel and Egypt on November 11 signed a six-point cease-fire agreement worked out by United States Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger. The agreement was signed at a United Nations tent on the Cairo-Suez road. The meeting resulted in an exchange of prisoners of war and the lifting of Israeli seige of the city of Suez and the Egyptian Third Army. The initial penetration by Arab forces into Israeli-occupied territory was proof to the Arab world that Israel was not invincible. The Arabs finally had destroyed the myth of Israeli invincibility and had succeeded in their primary objective of refocusing world attention on the Middle East.¹⁷

The 1973 war led to the first Arab-Israeli Peace Conference. U.S. diplomacy played a key role in ending the war and arranging a peace conference. In 1974, three military disengagement agreements were executed between Israel and Egypt with the aid of Kissinger. The same year, the Israelis made relatively modest withdrawals from the Sinai front in Egypt as well as the Golan area on the Syrian border. After a prolonged period of difficult negotiations, the important agreement known as Sinai II was signed in September 1975 by Egyptian and Israeli representatives. C. Paul Bradley of the University of Michigan at Flint wrote:

The key provision of Sinai II was Israeli withdrawal from the strategically important Gidi and Mitla Passes. The Aba Rudeis oil fields were restored to Egyptian control. Egypt agreed to a three-year period of non-belligerency with Israel.¹⁸

¹⁷Ibid., p. 46.

¹⁸C. Paul Bradley, The Camp David Peace Process (Tompson & Rutler, Grantham, New Hampshire, 1981), p. 4.

The Sinai II agreement was welcomed by the Syrians, Jordanians and Palestinians. The next important attempt in bringing a resolution to the Arab-Israeli conflict was the Camp David accords signed in September 1978. It was after the Camp David accords that some hope seemed to appear for Palestinian rights. President Jimmy Carter wrote about his thoughts in his memoirs.

The continued deprivation of Palestinian rights was contrary to the basic moral and ethical principles of both of our (Israel and the United States) countries. In my opinion, it was imperative that the U.S. work to obtain for these people the right to vote, to assemble and to debate issues that affected their lives, to own property without fear of it being confiscated and to be free of military rule. To deny these rights was indefensible for a free democratic society.¹⁹

The diplomatic agreements made at Camp David were the results of 13 days of intensive negotiations between September 5-17, 1978. Two accords were reached at Camp David.

The first provided a framework for dealing with the question of the West Bank and Gaza. Egypt and Israel would make overall arrangements for a five-year transitional regime for the West Bank and Gaza. After a self-governing authority had been freely elected by the local inhabitants, the Israeli military government and civilian administration would be withdrawn. The second of the Camp David accords set forth a framework for concluding an Egyptian-Israeli Peace treaty.²⁰

After the accords, the Egyptian-Israeli Peace treaty was signed in March 1979. The accords and the subsequent treaty each provided for a self-governing authority freely elected by the inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza. Egypt, Israel and Jordan were to agree on electoral

¹⁹"Keeping Faith," Time, October 11, 1982, p. 35.

²⁰Bradley, pp. 31-32.

modalities for the self-governing authority, referred to as an administrative council. However, in the Palestinian autonomy talks that followed the treaty in May 1979, negotiations did not take place as set forth in the accords and treaty. The parties involved had their own view of autonomy.

In Prime Minister Begin's formulation, Palestinian autonomy was to be not political, but administrative with only narrowly circumscribed functions being assigned to the proposed elective council. Autonomy was to be applied only to "inhabitants" and not to the land itself, a proviso designed to protect Israeli settlements. The Egyptians perceived autonomy in broader terms, envisioning a quasi-Parliamentary system that would lead logically to Palestinian statehood.²¹

The talks continued until October 1980 with no definite results. The last round of autonomy talks during the Carter Administration took place in Washington in October as the U.S. Presidential campaign entered its last weeks. As the brief sessions ended it was announced that the two sides would give further study to an American draft proposal. Following President Carter's defeat in the November elections, the once projected post-electoral summit of Carter, Begin and Sadat was cancelled.

Carter's electoral defeat ended an important phase in a multinational effort to resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict. "When Jimmy Carter assumed the Presidency in 1977, he had assigned high priority to seeking a breakthrough in the long-standing Arab-Israeli conflict."²² The Camp David accords had been one of the greatest achievements in Carter's presidency and as Bradley remarked, "In a drab Presidency, his performance at Camp David stands out."²³

²¹Ibid, p. 48.

²²Ibid, p. 6.

²³Ibid, p. 45.

Carter wrote in his memoirs about his efforts to achieve a Middle East peace during his presidency:

Looking back on the four years of my presidency, I realize that I spent more of my time working for possible solutions to the riddle of Middle East peace than on any other international problem ... only history will reveal if my hopes and prayers are to be answered, or if another round of bloody confrontations will ultimately lead to an international tragedy.²⁴.

History revealed what Carter had feared did happen, a round of bloody confrontations that led to an international tragedy -- the PLO-Israeli conflict and the massacre of Palestinian refugees in Beirut in 1982. Before examining the conflict and the massacre, a brief description of the PLO and its activities is essential.

The PLO was founded in 1964 at the first Palestinian National Congress and was endorsed by all the Arab states. At the head is the Palestine National Council. Parts of the framework are the PLO Central Committee, the Palestine Liberation Army, the Palestine National Planning Board and the Palestine Research Center. PLO has offices in all the Arab states, in the U.S., China, Yugoslavia and Switzerland. Yasser Arafat is the chairman of the PLO, a position he has had since 1970.

In 1982, there were more than 4 million Palestinians around the world. The majority are scattered throughout the Middle East, refugees from the Arab-Israeli wars of 1948 and 1967. Palestinians around the world are either refugees or are engaged in banking and business, civil service, oil field work, unskilled labor and various professions.

Palestinians have built lives throughout the Middle East -- as bankers, businessmen and farmers in Jordan, as bureaucrats and oil technicians in the Persian Gulf region. More than 100,000 Palestinians live in the United States where some have

²⁴"Keeping Faith," p. 60.

succeeded as teachers, doctors and lawyers.²⁵

The number of Palestinians throughout the world is reported in Figure 4.

The PLO-Israeli Conflict, 1982

"Death is always astonishing; nevertheless, in war, it is inevitable."⁶ And so it was for the Israelis and Palestinians. The PLO-Israeli conflict began June 6, when the Israeli army invaded Lebanon in an attempt to crush strongholds of the Palestine Liberation Organization. During the first seven weeks of the war, more than 300 Israeli soldiers were killed. On the Lebanese and PLO side, the casualties were high. In one attack alone, on August 5, 1982, the Palestine death toll was more than 125.

For more than 10 hours the Israelis blasted Palestinian positions in the southern area of the city (Beirut) as well as the once fashionable Harma Street neighborhood to the North. The complete death toll was impossible to estimate, but Lebanese officials said at least 128 people died.²⁷

The casualties were not confined to PLO soldiers. The Israeli army was attempting to attack PLO positions in and around Beirut. In the process, several hundred civilians were killed. "Only one in about 80 people is a Palestinian guerrilla," Lebanese authorities said in August 1982.²⁸ For every weapon or bomb that was aimed at PLO soldiers, several civilians in Beirut were killed, injured or forced to take shelter.

²⁵"Where Do They Go From Here," Newsweek, August 16, 1982, p. 16.

²⁶Jacobo Timerman, The Longest War: Israel In Lebanon (Vintage Books, A Division of Random House, New York, 1982), p. 7.

²⁷"The End Game in Beirut," Newsweek, August 23, 1982, p. 16.

²⁸*Ibid.*, p. 17.

Country	PLO Estimate	Israeli Estimate	State Dept. Estimate
Lebanon	600,000	347,000	400,000
Israel	531,000	653,000*	500,000
West Bank (Israeli-occupied)	818,000	725,000	700,000
Gaza Strip (Israeli-occupied)	477,000	450,000	450,000
Jordan	1,161,000	---	1,000,000
Syria	216,000	---	250,000
Egypt	49,000	---	60,000
Saudi Arabia	127,000	---	---
Iraq	20,000	---	120,000
Kuwait	279,000	---	320,000
Oman	48,000	---	500
United Arab Emirates	35,000	---	40,000
United States	102,000	---	---
Other	136,000	---	425,000
Total	4,559,000		4,265,500

The above are estimates of the number of Palestinians throughout the world. (Sources: Israeli government estimates, Newsweek magazine August 16, 1982, published August 8; State Department Palestinian Statistical Abstract, PLO estimates, New York Times August 12, 1982.)

*Including Golan Heights

Figure 4. Palestinian Population of Various Countries

Often during the attacks in the 1982 conflict, the 500,000 residents of West Beirut were affected by the Israeli efforts to drive out the 6,000 PLO soldiers among them. The scene in one attack, one Wednesday in August, is described by a Time magazine correspondent:

The Israelis claimed that they were making every effort to avoid civilian casualties. Nevertheless, the Wednesday assault was seemingly designed to intimidate the civilian population. Shells fell everywhere. People fled by the thousands to basement shelters. A few were bombed out twice in one day, first from their own homes and then from the homes of friends.²⁹

What made the Israelies invade Lebanon? Even before June 6, the invasion date, an Israeli military push into Lebanon long had been threatened. But the shooting of the Israeli ambassador in London on June 3 was the immediate cause of the invasion.

Shlomo Argov, the Israeli ambassador to Great Britain, was critically wounded in a shooting attack late June 3, as he was leaving a party in London. The attack, although disclaimed by the Palestine Liberation Organization, was cited by Israel as a factor in the decision to invade Lebanon.³⁰

Beirut was besieged by Israeli forces in mid-June. U.S. special envoy to the Middle East, Philip Habib, began his talks with PLO and Israeli officials to negotiate a cease-fire in Lebanon soon after the invasion.

The first big break in the talks came in early July when, on his own initiative, Habib urged President Reagan to offer U.S. troops to help monitor a PLO withdrawal. Reagan agreed, a gesture that reassured all sides that the United States was committed to a settlement.³¹

The final break in talks did not come until August, when the United

²⁹"Beirut Goes Up in Flames," Time, August 16, 1982, p. 16.

³⁰Facts on File, Volume 42, No. 216g, June 11, 1982 (Facts on File Inc., 1982, New York), p. 413.

³¹"Habib The Peacemaker," Newsweek, August 30, 1982, p. 36.

States negotiated the evacuation of PLO soldiers from Beirut after prolonged talks with PLO soldiers and Israeli leaders. A total of 8,882 PLO fighters were evacuated to the following destinations:

About 4,000 to Syria, 265 to Jordan, 132 to Iraq, 1,000 to Tunisia, 620 to South Yemen, 600 to North Yemen, 490 to the Sudan and 175 injured guerillas to Cyprus and Greece. Most left by ship, but about 1,500 traveled to Syria via the Beirut-Damascus Highway.³²

On August 21, 1982, the first group of PLO troops left Beirut under an agreement calling for the withdrawal of more than 12,000 Palestinians and Syrians in Lebanon with the supervision of American, French and Italian troops. The withdrawal was completed by September 1. The Beirut massacre occurred during the troop withdrawal. Bashir Gemayel, a leader of a right-wing Maronite Christian force, was elected president August 23. Gemayel was killed September 14, when a bomb exploded in a building where he was meeting with followers. The same day, Israel's Prime Minister Menachem Begin ordered the Israeli Army into West Beirut "to prevent the reorganization of the Palestine Liberation Organization."³³

Tragedy struck two days later.

In a rampage beginning late September 16, Christian militiamen stormed through two Palestinian refugee camps in West Beirut, machine-gunning hundreds of men, women and children to death.³⁴

As the gruesome cleanup continued, most estimates of the number dead were around 1,000 although the exact number would never be known.³⁵

Reports filed by newsmen, foreign observers and Western diplomats

³²"The U.S. Marines Go Ashore," Newsweek, September 6, 1982, p. 30.

³³"Crisis in Lebanon," The New York Times, September 21, 1982, p. 10.

³⁴Facts On File, Volume 42, No. 2184, September 24, 1982, p. 697.

³⁵"A Time of Reckoning," Newsweek, October 4, 1982, p. 4.

mentioned that two groups carried out the killings in the refugee camps of Sabra and Shatila.

One was the Christian Phalangist militia belonging to Bashir Gemayel, the President-elect who had been slain September 14 in a bomb blast. The other was the army of Major Saad Haddad, which had been trained and funded by Israel and which was closely allied with the Israeli military command.³⁶

Bashir Gemayel's assassination may have been the prime cause of the massacre. It took place at the headquarters of Gemayel's Christian Phalange Party in East Beirut around 4 a.m., Lebanese time, September 14. Gemayel was killed when a bomb estimated to weigh at least 200 pounds exploded in the headquarters. This was how Time magazine described the scene:

In the street outside, a Christian Phalangist member of the Lebanese parliament raised his hand to his mouth and cried, "Ya Allah! (my God!) That's the Kata'eb!" He was referring to the headquarters of Gemayel's Christian Phalange party. The explosion had smashed cars and scattered parts of bodies through the streets.³⁷

Who killed Gemayel? There was no shortage of suspects, according to Time magazine.

He was hated by the leftist Muslim militias and by the Syrians. The PLO had been his enemy for years. There was also a theory advanced by Arab leaders in Lebanon that Israel was behind the bombing because Gemayel was resisting pressure from the Begin government to sign a peace treaty.³⁸

While it is not clear who killed Gemayel, it is clear that the killing in the refugee camps were done by rightwing Lebanese Christian militiamen.

"Practically everybody agreed that gunmen were rightwing Lebanese

³⁶Facts on File, Volume 42, p. 697.

³⁷"The New Lebanon Crisis," Time, September 17, 1982, p. 22.

³⁸Ibid., p. 25.

Christian militiamen,"³⁹ wrote a Time magazine correspondent. The militiamen were either from the Lebanese forces led by the vengeance-bent Gemayel clan or from the militia run by Major Saad Haddad, which is based in Southern Lebanon and is allied closely with the Israelis. The Time magazine writer called the Lebanese forces more logical culprits than Haddad's army, "since they live in the region and were mourning for their fallen leader (Bashir Gemayel)." ⁴⁰

What about the Israeli role in the massacre? The two camps were under their control and they had checkpoints near the camps. Although the Israeli government condemned the massacre as soon as details became known, reports in the news media indicate that Israeli army officers were aware of the killings and did little to prevent them. Here are portions of news reports in The Christian Science Monitor which establish the Israeli role in the massacre:

The Israeli government knew on Thursday night of the massacre in progress at Shatila refugee camp but did nothing about it until Saturday morning, according to authoritative reports by Israeli journalists in the Hebrew press September 20.⁴¹

Israeli Defense Minister Ariel Sharon has admitted that the Israeli Army helped plan and coordinate the foray of Lebanese Christian militiamen into two Palestinian refugee camps that resulted in a massacre.⁴²

It is suggested that foresight on the part of the Israeli army officials in control of the two refugee camps could have prevented the

³⁹Ibid., p. 20.

⁴⁰Ibid., p. 20.

⁴¹"Beirut massacres touch off debate over Israeli role," The Christian Science Monitor, September 21, 1982, p. 9.

⁴²"Israel in uproar as details of massacre emerge," The Christian Science Monitor, September 23, 1982, p. 1

massacre. The Israeli officials stated that they had sent the Christian militiamen into the refugee camps to search for weapons and enemy gunmen. The Lebanese leader Bashir Gemayel had been killed only two days before and they could have expected that sending the Christian militiamen into Palestine refugee camps might result in harm to the refugees. A Newsweek writer wrote:

Although many questions remained unanswered about the massacre in West Beirut, it was clear that Begin's government and Army would have to bear a considerable share of the blame for the death of perhaps 1,000 Palestinians. Despite their stated goal of preventing bloodshed, the Israelis had actually sent the Christian militiamen into Beirut's Sabra and Shatila refugee camps to search for weapons and enemy gunmen. Israel had good reason to expect that atrocities might occur. Israel learned about the murder of civilians not long after it began. Israel stood by for a day or more before it finally intervened and stopped the killing.⁴³

The Massacre Probe and the Resignation of Sharon

After the massacre, there were daily disclosures about what the Israelis knew of the happenings inside the two refugee camps at the time of the massacre. To a great extent, the credibility of the Israeli army, known as Israeli Defense Forces, and Prime Minister Menachem Begin's government was damaged by the massacre.

An Israeli high commission of inquiry was set up in December by Begin to investigate the massacre and to find the parties responsible. After a two-month investigation and weeks of deliberation, the commission issued its report February 8, 1983. The commission's report was a complete analysis of the circumstances of the Beirut massacre. It heard testimony from, among others, Begin, Sharon and several other

⁴³"A Time of Reckoning," p. 20.

high-ranking officials.

The commission dismissed allegations of direct Israeli responsibility in the killings. However, varying measures of indirect responsibility were placed on several officials.

The Panel criticized Defense Minister Sharon for various "Blunders" tantamounting to a "nonfulfillment of a duty" and recommended his resignation or dismissal.... The Panel accepted Prime Minister Begin's contention that he had not learned of the operation until it was under way but said his "indifference" had allowed other officials to neglect "appropriate measure" to halt the killings.⁴⁴

In more detail, some of the commission's findings and recommendations were as follows:

Direct Responsibility -The actual killings had been carried out by the Phalangist militia alone, the commission found. The Panel rejected allegations that troops of Major Saad Haddad, the Israeli-backed militia commander in southern Lebanon, had been involved in the operation. The commission said such allegations had been based on coincidence and misinterpreted evidence.

Indirect Responsibility - The commission nevertheless found indirect responsibility, through ignorance or commission, to be widespread among high Israeli officials. The commission concluded firmly that there had been every reason to expect Phalangist reprisals against the Palestinians, given their life-long enmity and the assassination of the Phalangists' leader, President-elect Bashir Gemayel, just two days before the operation in the camps. The Panel rejected the contention of numerous government officials that excess bloodshed could not have been foreseen.⁴⁵

After two days of difficult debate, the Israeli cabinet voted February 10, 1983, to adopt the report of the Commission of Inquiry. The resignation of Sharon was announced the next day, February 11. Sharon remained in the Cabinet as minister without portfolio. on February 23,

⁴⁴Facts on File, Vol. 43, No. 2204, Feb. 11, 1983 (Facts on File Inc., New York, 1983), p. 81.

⁴⁵Ibid.

Morshed Arens, Israeli ambassador to the United States, was confirmed as defense minister.

Studies Related to the Arab-Israeli Conflict

Karen Ann Feste of the University of Denver wrote in a 1977 study about the Arab-Israeli conflict:

Studying Arab-Israeli relations provides an intriguing, fascinating introduction to international politics. Historical circumstances, policy commitment through time, entangling complexity in the issues that mark the conflict picture, all combine into currently held positions and emotionally charged views often expressed by interested parties. It is quite appropriate, therefore, to select a politically provocative, delicate issue for analysis.⁴⁶

Through the years, writers and researchers have studied several politically provocative, delicate issues pertaining to the Arab-Israeli conflict. Feste, in her study, reviewed the historical background of the conflict and examined the issues and constraints confronting the nations involved in the conflict. Writers before and after her have published studies on various issues of the conflict, including the Arab-Jewish wars and their aftermath since the creation of the state of Israel, the personalities and intentions of the Palestinian Arab movement, the Third World's and Eastern Europe's view of Israel and case studies of individual Palestinians and their life histories. Studies also have been published on the role of the United States in the Arab-Israeli conflict, suggestions for a lasting solution to the conflict, and views of Middle East experts, and the relation between the Arabic press and nationalism in Palestine, and American news coverage of the conflict. Some of these

⁴⁶Karen Ann Feste, The Arab-Israeli Conflict: A Decision making Game (The American Political Science Association, Washington, D.C., 1977), p. 1.

studies are similar to this writer's study.

A review of some studies follows:

Dear Israelis, Dear Arabs by Roger Fisher

The most important task in the Middle East is to make it a better place tomorrow than it is today. The greatest need is to figure out some things that people should do to improve the situation, and to make it more likely that they will do them.⁴⁷

Fisher, in his study, presents a "refreshing" viewpoint about solutions to the Arab-Israeli conflict, one reason why his study is cited first.

Fisher, while a consultant member of a group exploring the prospects for peace in the Middle East in 1971, wrote letters to Israeli, Palestinian, Jordanian, American and United Nations officials. These letters were incorporated in his 1972 study suggesting solutions for peace. Fisher contends that a better question to ask while seeking an answer for peace would be what ought to happen rather than debating which party is right or wrong.

Everyone concerned with the Middle East necessarily makes an implicit or explicit judgment about the most useful questions to which he should devote his time and effort. Those who argue about historical facts, from one point of view or another, are making the common assertion that such debate is a wise and effective use of their time and talents. To engage in such debate is to diddle while Rome burns. It is to argue over navigational mistakes of the past while the ship goes on the rocks.⁴⁸

Fisher states the Middle East is not one problem but the culmination of many. Many Arabs and many Israelis like to think of the situation

⁴⁷Roger Fisher, Dear Israelis, Dear Arabs (Harper & Row Publishers, New York, 1972), p. 12.

⁴⁸Ibid.

as a simple struggle between two sides, between good and evil. A single solution cannot be reached, but a comprehensive settlement could be negotiated with a "package deal," according to Fisher. He suggested a package deal with 27 points, each of which dealt with specific issues in the Arab-Israeli conflict. His suggestions were published in 1972.

Points specifically dealing with the Palestinian problem are:

An agreement between Jordan and representatives of the Palestinian people accepting the sovereignty of Jordan over the West Bank and assuring their rights within Jordan.

An agreement between Israel and Jordan governing the boundaries of Gaza and establishing and governing the arrangements for freedom of access between Gaza and the West Bank.

An agreement between Jordan and Palestinian representatives in Gaza establishing and governing the relationship between Gaza and Jordan.

An agreement between Israel and Lebanon confirming their boundary and releasing claims with respect to all other matters outstanding between them.

Israeli legislation defining the rights of Palestinians who lived in 1948 in what has become Israel and who left in 1948 or thereafter, with respect to returning or not returning to Israel and with respect to compensation; legislation establishing procedures for processing claims.

An agreement between Israel and the leaders of Palestinian organizations accepting the state and boundaries of Israel and financial and immigration measures undertaken by Israel and renouncing all further claims against Israel beyond those provided in the new arrangements.⁴⁹

Decision-Making Game

The American Political Association organized in the Summer of 1975 the College Faculty Workshop in Ann Arbor, Michigan. Participants were political scientists and faculty members from universities around the

⁴⁹Ibid., p. 16.

country. Middle East Game, as it was called, was formulated in the workshop. The game focuses on how decision-makers put together and use information they acquire.

The Middle East Game is an operating model of the political aspects surrounding the Arab-Israeli dispute. The game consists of a simplified representation of a group of nations that includes Israel, several Arab states and the great powers. In addition, the United Nations, the rest of the world (ROW) and the press are constituted as game components.

Primary activity of the game concerns the enactment of policies of the respective parties, and national teams may engage in a variety of political actions such as forming coalitions, waging war or negotiating peaceful settlements on specific problems like their counterparts do in the real international community, in an attempt to achieve the objectives specified by the governmental policy leaders.

The intent of the game is to help the role players "acquire a richer sense of the complex and often confusing picture facing governmental leaders and understand how some psychological factors may guide or determine policy choices."⁵⁰

The game requires a minimum of 18 players and a director. The teams, and respective number of players, in this arrangement are: Israel-2, Egypt-2, Jordan-2, Syria-2, Palestinians-2, United States-2, Soviet Union-2, United Nations-1 and Press-2.

To play the game well, game participants should be aware of the background of the Arab-Israeli conflict and the military capabilities of nations involved. Game participants are evaluated on their sense of

⁵⁰Feste, pp. 6-7.

knowledge and sense of realism and on their ingenuity in manipulating the international or domestic environment.

In concluding Feste wrote:

Participants in numerous test runs of the Middle East Game have responded quite favorably to the experience. Some important factors emerged for predicting success, including game set-up, playing time and evaluation components.⁵¹

American Policy for Peace in the Middle East,

1967 - 1971

This study, sponsored by the American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, was conducted by Roger J. Pranger, a resident scholar of the institute. The study examined three topics:

First, the major decisions in American Middle East policy from early 1969 to late 1971.

Second, the field of forces in the Middle East in 1971, which was partly an outgrowth of decisions and events between 1968 and 1970; an assessment of the prospects for peace. And finally, in the light of the assessment for peace, proposal of recommendations for further American policy initiatives.⁵²

Pranger, in describing the purpose and approach of the study, wrote:

This is not an analysis of so-called "casualties" in the Middle East, of which the author is quite aware, but of peacemaking efforts by the United States in the region, or better put, this

⁵¹Ibid., p. 4.

⁵²Robert J. Pranger, American Policy for Peace in the Middle East (American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, Washington, 1971), p. 4.

(study) addresses the issue of how a policy of peace can be developed in the midst of contrary realities.⁵³

The Pranger study reviews critical decisions by the United States in Middle East policy between 1969-1971. He recommends that the United States continue its peace initiatives in a policy of balanced principle and manoeuver. He wrote:

Renewed fighting between the Arab States and Israel could only work adversely on American interests in the Middle East, especially if the United States were drawn into the conflict directly on Israel's behalf so that American forces engaged Arab and Soviet forces. One can only imagine the impact of such intervention on American fortunes in the Arab world for the next decades, to say nothing of the combined effect that U.S. - USSR hostilities would have on world peace.⁵⁴

In his recommendations, Pranger indicated the importance of using negotiations in resolving the Middle East conflict rather than measures of force, such as war.

When nations perceive their interests to lie in the direction of peace, as the United States does in the Middle East, then the total resources of the state, including military force, may become devoted to preventing war. For such a perception to develop, a special fascination with persuasion rather than force must be present.⁵⁵

This writer believes that Pranger's recommendation in 1971 regarding negotiation is evident in 1983. Today, the United States is pursuing a policy of peace through negotiation rather than peace through force in its attempts to end the Arab-Israeli conflict.

⁵³Ibid., p. 4.

⁵⁴Ibid., p. 57.

⁵⁵Ibid.,

Arabs, Israelis and U.S. Television Networks:
Content Analysis of How ABC, CBS and NBC
Reported the News Between 1970-1979

This study was conducted at Ohio University in 1981 by Moad Osman Asi, a doctoral student. Asi's basic contention was that only a small percentage of the American people are sympathetic toward the Arab nations, especially when that percentage is compared to that sympathetic to Israel. He stated that research has indicated the U.S. print media and mass entertainment convey rather negative coverage or messages about the Arabs, Arabism or Islam. By contrast, the messages conveyed about Israel and Israelis are more favorable.

According to Asi, American mass media carried images and stereotypes of the Arabs without serious and dispassionate attempts to verify these "facts" from close range.⁵⁶

Asi first collected hard data regarding television news about the Arab states and Israel between 1970-1979. Data included date, network, story time length and news category. Second, he selected a stratified random sample for directional coding purposes. Videotapes of the stories were obtained from Vanderbilt University's Television News Archives. The coding was done by five graduate students from the College of Communication at Ohio University. These students were born in the United States. A 5-point scale was developed with "very favorable," and "very unfavorable," at its extremes. Sources for all data collected for this study were Television News Index and Abstract, and Television News Archives, both of Vanderbilt University.

⁵⁶Dissertation Abstracts International, Vol. 42, No. 02, August 1981, p. 436 A.

Asi attempted to explain how the three U.S. television networks covered the Arab states and Israel during 1970s. The methodology employed in the study was content analysis, focusing on the presentational dimensions of the weekday evening network news.

Results indicated ABC, CBS and NBC were similar in their coverage of the Arab states and Israel. Israel received more attention and was portrayed more favorably than the Arab states. Among the Arab states, Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia and Syria accounted for 90 percent of the Arab world's coverage on the three television networks. Egypt and Lebanon accounted for more than two-thirds of news coverage from the Arab states.

Asi also found a significant increase in news coverage after the Arab-Israeli 1973 war. The directional coding indicated Israel emerged as the good side and the Palestine Liberation Organization as the bad side. Egypt was the most favored Arab state among the three networks. Stories about Israel tended to be more balanced than stories about the Arab world.⁵⁷

An Exploratory Analysis of National Perceptions
of the Arab-Israeli Conflict as Represented
Through World Newspapers: An International
Communication Study

Alan Jay Zareba of the State University of New York at Buffalo conducted this study in 1977.

The purpose of his research was to investigate national perceptions

⁵⁷Ibid.

regarding the 1973 Arab-Israeli conflict, as communicated through major newspapers. Additionally, this study sought to examine the effect that Arab economic actions taken after the 1973 outbreak had on the perceptions of various nations.

Content analysis methodology was utilized to assess newspaper attitudes toward key Mid-East issues in the conflict. The issues of Terrorism, Aggression, Imperialism, Land Legitimacy, Action Justification, Intransigence, Peace Seeking, Zionism, and Culpability were examined. Statements made vis-avis these issues, prior to the Arab economic actions, were juxtaposed with the statements made after these actions to assess an effect based on economics.

According to Zaremba, the results of the study "revealed at least, a dichotomy in attitudes among the newspapers,"⁵⁸ In discussing the results, he wrote:

The Straits Times, The New York Times, and The London Times, perceived the Arabs as the aggressor, The Moscow News and the Daily Graphic perceived the Israelis as the aggressor. The Asahi Evening News was noncommittal regarding the aggressor in conflict. The comparison of the statements before and after the economic actions revealed that economic actions did not affect the attitudes of the newspapers regarding crucial issues in the conflict.⁵⁹

In his recommendations, Zaremba said that the data base for such research could be expanded. He wrote that "it is precarious at best to generalize on the basis of six newspapers, despite the valuable data

⁵⁸Ibid.

⁵⁹Alan Zaremba, An Exploratory Analysis of National Perceptions of the Arab-Israeli Conflict as Represented through World Newspapers: An International Communication Study (State University of N.Y. at Buffalo, 1977), p. 289.

that the examination of these newspapers yielded".⁶⁰

Zaremba suggested the following categories under which future research could be based, consistent with the need to extend the data base:

An examination of different newspapers utilizing the same criteria.

An analysis of official government statements from the countries in which the six examined newspapers are published.

A comparison of the perceptions of the newspapers within a single country regarding the Arab-Israeli conflict.

An examination of the communist bloc nations to assess the degree of consistency within the bloc.

An examination of The New York Times perception with an Israeli newspaper: An examination of the Moscow News perceptions with those of an Arab newspaper.

An examination and comparison of the same six newspapers after each of the four major wars in the conflict.⁶¹

⁶⁰Ibid., p. 289-291.

⁶¹Ibid.

CHAPTER III

METHODOLOGY

American sympathies are now about equally divided between Israel and the Arab nations -- the first time ever that Israel has not been heavily favored. A Newsweek Poll conducted last week shows that large majorities of Jews and non-Jews believed that Israel is at least partly to blame for the massacre in West Beirut.¹

The Beirut massacre, an incident that began in Beirut's Palestine refugee camps on the evening of September 16 and ended the morning of September 18, 1982, cost more than 1,000 lives. Immediately after the massacre, much of the blame appeared to fall on the Israelis as the camps were under Israeli control. Criticism against Israel erupted in Western Europe, across the United States and was widespread in the media around the world. In France, Britain, West Germany and Italy, press criticism of Israel was severe, extending even to traditionally pro-Israeli publications.

London's Daily Telegraph, the staunchest supporter of Israel among the leading British newspapers asserted flatly that "the massacre took place as a result of Israel's policies." The conservative West German daily Die Welt said in an editorial Wednesday "unintentional as it may be, Israel's entanglement in this atrocious crime has cast a deep shadow on the reputation of the Jewish nation."²

What was the reaction to the massacre of national newspapers in the

¹"A Time of Reckoning," Newsweek, October 4, 1982, p. 23.

² A. D. Home, "Europeans Protest Massacre But Fear an Increase in Anti-Semitism," The Washington Post, September 25, 1982, p. A. 18.

United States? Did their news content reflect a change in attitude toward the Arab-Israeli conflict following the massacre?

In an attempt to answer these questions, this study examines the reporting of the Arab-Israeli conflict in two leading U.S. newspapers, The New York Times and the St. Louis Post-Dispatch. The New York Times is published each morning seven days a week. On week days, the circulation is 861,000 and on Sundays 1,421,000.³ The St. Louis Post-Dispatch is published in the evenings seven days a week. It has a circulation of 255,340 on week days and a Sunday circulation of 433,116.⁴

The study used content analysis to examine the news reports of the Arab-Israeli conflict published in The New York Times and St. Louis Post-Dispatch between June 6, 1982, the date of the Israeli advance into Lebanon, and February 11, 1983, the date of Israeli Defense Minister Ariel Sharon's resignation.

Budd, Thorp and Donohew describe content analysis as follows:

Content analysis is a systematic technique for analyzing message content and message handling - it is a tool for observing and analyzing the overt communication behavior of selected communicators.⁵

Content analysis has been used to determine the relative emphasis or frequency of various communication phenomena: propaganda, trends, styles, changes in content, readability. It is a method of observation and measurement. According to Budd, Thorp and Donohew, "Content analysis

³Working Press of the Nation 1981 Media Encyclopedia (National Research Bureau Inc., 1981), p. I-247.

⁴Ibid., p. I-210.

⁵Richard Budd, Robert Thorp and Lewis Donohew, Content Analysis of Communications (The Macmillan Company, New York, 1967), p. 2.

allows the investigator to observe a communicator's public messages at times and places of the investigator's own choosing.

The procedure also allows the investigator to complete his observation without bias, something that would be more difficult if the analyst were trying to watch at the scene."⁶

Kerlinger states that content analysis is more than a method of analysis. It is a method of observation. He wrote:

Instead of observing people's behavior directly, or asking them to respond to scales, or interviewing them, the investigator takes the communications that people have produced and asks questions of the communications.⁷

This study involved symbol analysis. Forty key symbols pertaining to the Arab-Israeli conflict were chosen for the study. The symbols are words which stand for the attitudes of the user. According to Pool:

The symbol analyst works with words by selecting those which best stand for the attitudes whose presence or absence he wishes to detect and describe. Symbols, thus conceived, serve as his "operational indices" of attitude.⁸

Using symbols, the investigator attempted to determine the two news-papers' coverage of the Arabs and Israelis before, during and after the massacre. Expressions of attitude "are usually categorized as favorable, unfavorable, or neutral."⁹

While recording data, the symbols + (plus), - (minus), and 0 (zero) were assigned to the three categories -- favorable, unfavorable and

⁶Ibid.

⁷Fred N. Kerlinger, Foundations of Behavioral Research (Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., Chicago 1964), p. 525.

⁸Ithiel de Sola Pool, The Prestige Press: A Comparative Study of Political Symbols (The M.I.T. Press, Cambridge, 1970), p. 22.

⁹Harold D. Lasswell, "The Comparative Study of Symbols, "Hoover Institute Studies (Stanford, California, 1952), P. 10.

neutral, respectively.

Each of the categories favorable and unfavorable were further classified into the sub-categories of "strength" and "morality," depending upon which of these standards were indicated in the favorable or unfavorable assertion.

Strength refers to the position of the symbol as a cause of value changes. It includes military, diplomatic, economical, and ideological assets and effectiveness. The morality standard relates to conformity or non-conformity of a symbol to a norm. It includes the presentation of symbols in terms of beauty, goodness, consistency and the like.¹⁰

What kinds of references are favorable or unfavorable? This is generally a matter of definition, according to Budd, Thorp and Donohew. They state that "it is the responsibility of the analyst to formulate complete and logical definitions of favorable and unfavorable materials."¹¹

Operational Definition of Variables

1. Arabs: References to the Arab states and their leaders, the people of Arab states, the Palestine Liberation Organization, its members and representatives, Yasser Arafat, Palestinians and Palestinian refugees.

2. Israelis: References to the people of Israel, the Israeli government, Israeli army and Israeli media;

¹⁰Ibid., p. 12.

¹¹Budd, Thorp and Donohew, p. 63.

3. Favorable: References to the parties in the Arab-Israeli conflict in a positive light. These references will be in relation to the two sub-categories, strength and morality.

4. Unfavorable: References to the parties in the Arab-Israeli conflict in a negative light. This also will be in relation to the two sub-categories, strength and morality.

Research Questions

The following research questions were asked:

1. Was The New York Times' coverage of the Arab-Israeli conflict before the Beirut massacre favorable/unfavorable to Israelis?

2. Was The New York Times' coverage of the Arab-Israeli conflict during the Beirut massacre favorable/unfavorable to Israelis?

3. Was The New York Times' coverage of the Arab-Israeli conflict after the Beirut massacre favorable/unfavorable to Israelis?

4. Was The New York Times' coverage of the Arab-Israeli conflict before the Beirut massacre favorable/unfavorable to Arabs?

5. Was The New York Times' coverage of the Arab-Israeli conflict during the Beirut massacre favorable/unfavorable to Arabs?

6. Was The New York Times' coverage of the Arab-Israeli conflict after the Beirut massacre favorable/unfavorable to Arabs?

7. Was The St. Louis Post-Dispatch's coverage of the Arab-Israeli conflict before the Beirut massacre favorable/unfavorable to Israelis?

8. Was The St. Louis Post-Dispatch's coverage of the Arab-Israeli conflict during the Beirut massacre favorable/unfavorable to Israelis?

9. Was The St. Louis Post-Dispatch's coverage of the Arab-Israeli conflict after the Beirut massacre favorable/unfavorable to Israelis?

10. Was The St. Louis Post Dispatch's coverage of the Arab-Israeli conflict before the Beirut massacre favorable/unfavorable to Arabs?

11. Was The St. Louis Post-Dispatch's coverage of the Arab-Israeli conflict during the Beirut massacre favorable/unfavorable to Arabs?

12. Was The St. Louis Post-Disptach's coverage of the Arab-Israeli conflict after the Beirut massacre favorable/unfavorable to Arabs?

13. Taking the conflict from June 1982 to February 1983 as a whole, was The New York Times' coverage more favorable to the Israelis than Arabs?

14. Taking the conflict from June 1982 to February 1983 as a whole, was The St. Louis Post-Dispatch's coverage more favorable to the Israelis than Arabs?

Key Symbols

Pool states that the "choice of words (symbols) and techniques depends on what one wishes to find out."¹² Symbols frequently repeated in the literature were noted and the following forty were selected for analysis:

1. Menachem Begin
2. Yasser Arafat
3. Israel
4. Palestine Liberation Organization
5. Israeli Soldiers
6. Ariel Sharon
7. Major Saad Haddad

¹²Pool., p. 23.

8. Bashir Gemayel
9. Amin Gemayel
10. Lebanon
11. Palestinians
12. Sabra and Shatila
13. Jews
14. Moslems
15. Israeli Advance into Lebanon
16. PLO Fighters
17. Israeli Armed Forces
18. Israeli Public
19. Israeli Media
20. Beirut Seige
21. King Hussein
22. Yitzhak Shamir
23. Syria
24. Egypt
25. Jordan
26. Iraq
27. Israeli Knesset
28. Christian Phalangists
29. Hosni Mubarak
30. Palestinian Question
31. Morocco
32. Saudi Arabia
33. West Bank and Gaza
34. Massacre Probe

35. Begin Administration
36. Arab League
37. Anti-Semitism
38. PLO Pullout
39. Palestinian refugees
40. Israeli Bombardment of West Beirut

Coding Procedures

The smallest segment of content counted and scored in content analysis is the coding unit. The most common coding units are a word; a theme or assertion; a paragraph; an item; a character group, object, or institution; and space or time.¹³

The basic unit of measurement involved in content analysis is the coding unit. In this study, the coding unit was a word, or symbol.

While coding, the following rules were observed:

A city was coded as the country it is located in, unless the city was represented as a symbol by itself. For example, Tel Aviv or Jerusalem was coded as Israel, since they were not among the list of symbols. Any public figure, such as a minister or national leader, was coded as his or her country unless he or she was in the symbol code. References to supporters of Israel were coded under Israel. An example would be Lebanon's Christian Phalangist Party which was supported by the Israelis.

The following rules were followed for classifying strength and morality:

1. Strength Plus: Gain of, act, indication, promise, hope

¹³Ibid.

expectation, demands of: economic, military, diplomatic, social strength and/or gain. Diplomatic strength: envoy recall, demands for reparations, verbal attacks and offensives, belligerent stands, pro-war and anti-peace stands, threats.

2. Weakness Minus: Loss of, act, indication, expectancy of weakness or defeat in the military, economic, diplomatic, or social spheres. Economic weakness: lack of items constituting economic strengths described above; need for aid, shortages. Diplomatic weakness: yielding to pressure, conciliatory attitudes, pro-peace, anti-war in face of threats.

3. Morality Plus: Emotional evaluations of the symbol, endowing it with the following qualities: truth, mercy, glory, heroism, virtue, propriety, religiosity, honor, generosity, kindness, affection, sympathy, duty, justice, honesty, patriotism, loyalty, legality.

4. Immorality Minus: Emotional evaluation of the symbol, endowing it with the following: falsity, viciousness, ferocity, uncharitableness, cowardice, impropriety, paganism, dishonor, selfishness, cruelty, hatred, vanity, treachery, treason, subversiveness, unjust, dishonest, unpatriotism, disloyalty, illegality, aggressions, insanities, abnormalities.

Samples of coding sheets that were used while content analyzing each article are enclosed in the appendix.

The articles in The New York Times and the St. Louis Post-Dispatch were read for symbols listed earlier in the chapter. When a symbol was found, it was then coded, its predication was determined and classified. If the classification of the predication was + according to strength, the symbol was coded in the +S column under the symbol; if the predication was -S according to the strength, code number of the symbol was written

in the -S column under the symbol; and so on.

The coded sheets were then tabulated and the frequencies of each symbol in the code sheet was tabulated by a simple counting operation.

Three-way frequency analyses were completed, juxtaposing: 1) Parties of the Conflict, 2) The Two Newspapers and 3) Predication or Direction of Symbol Usage in News Columns.

A percentile table was prepared for The New York Times and the St. Louis Post-Dispatch. The percentile table for each newspaper shows the following during each phase of the conflict:

- a) Negative presentation of the Arabs and the Israelis.
- b) Positive presentation of the Arabs and the Israelis.

Pilot Study

When the analyst has drawn up a set of preliminary rules for classifying direction, his next step is to conduct a pilot study on the material to be analyzed.

The pilot study will also indicate whether the prescribed coding and recording system are functioning properly and may suggest changes or alterations in the initial plan.¹⁴

A pilot study was conducted to ensure only necessary symbols were included in the analysis and to ensure coder reliability. An article from each newspaper was chosen and given to two coders who were asked to content analyze the articles according to procedure described earlier. The investigator also content analyzed the same article and the extent of agreement among the three coders was compared to establish the reliability of the coding system, to indicate the reliability of the measuring devices, and to identify the necessary symbols.

¹⁴Ibid., p. 52.

It must be noted that the Arab-Israeli conflict has been going on for more than a century. In recent times, the conflict has become more intense than ever, and as the conflict has intensified political analysts and historians have presented their views.

It will not be the concern of this study to state or determine which side is right and which side is wrong. The study will restrict its scope and findings to the news coverage by The New York Times and St. Louis Post-Dispatch.

To date, the Beirut massacre ranks among the most significant events in the history of the Arab-Israeli conflict. How two of America's leading national newspapers covered the conflict before, during and after the massacre should provide insight into the impact of major international events on news content.

CHAPTER IV

FINDINGS

"Even now I don't understand about the Sects -- The Phalangists, the Moslems and everybody fighting," said Captain Dan Heller of Tel Aviv. "Why can't they get together and make one Lebanon?"¹

Captain Dan Heller, who was quoted in The New York Times, may have expressed the feelings of so many civilians and soldiers involved in the Arab-Israeli conflict when he wondered why the parties involved could not get together and unify Lebanon. Although very few understood the reasons for the conflict, they played their part, and the conflict has continued just as it has since 1948 when the Republic of Israel was formed. As the conflict continued, so did the coverage of its major events in American newspapers.

This study was concerned with reporting of the conflict between June 6, 1982, and February 12, 1983. The study was conducted on the basis of articles published in The New York Times and the St. Louis Post-Dispatch during the specified time period. A total of 175 stories were read in The New York Times and 187 stories were read in the St. Louis Post-Dispatch. It must be noted that only news articles were content analyzed by this writer; editorials were not part of this study. The stories were read for presence of forty key symbols mentioned earlier. A "plus" presentation of a symbol put it in a favorable light;

¹David K. Shipler, "Genial War for Israelis Near Beirut," The New York Times, June 20, 1982, p. 1.

a "minus" presentation put it in an unfavorable light.

Following are a few examples of how symbols were coded during analysis.

All night Thursday and into Friday morning Palestinians from the Sabra and Shatila Camps flocked to the Gaza Hospital hoping to find protection from the Christian militiamen combing the camps.²

In content analyzing the above sentence, we code thus: Sabra and Shatila morality plus; Christian militiamen morality minus.

Prime Minister Menachem Begin bowed to relentless political pressure within his governing coalition today and agreed to establish a full-fledged judicial commission to investigate the Beirut Massacre.³

Menachem Begin strength minus.

The Israeli government said today that its military objectives had been achieved.⁴

Strength plus for the symbol of Israel.

On Friday, Israeli Defense Minister Ariel Sharon visited his troops in Christian East Beirut.⁵

Neutral for Ariel Sharon.

This study was concerned with three phases of the Arab-Israeli conflict occurring between June 6, 1982 and February 12, 1983. The first

²"Militiamen Violent Act Becoming Clearer," The New York Times, Sept. 27, 1982, p. A6.

³"Begin Agrees to Establish a Panel to Investigate the Beirut Massacre," The New York Times, Sept. 30, 1982, p. 1.

⁴"Israeli-Syrian Cease-Fire Excludes PLO," St. Louis Post-Dispatch, June 11, 1982, p. 1.

⁵"Only Few Hours Left, Israeli Loud Speakers Warn Civilians," St. Louis Post-Dispatch, July 3, 1982, p. 2A.

phase dealt with events before the Beirut massacre, the second phase during the massacre and the third phase with events after the massacre until the resignation of Israeli Defense Minister Ariel Sharon in February. The classification of phases enabled the writer to detect changes in attitudes, if any, in news coverage by The New York Times and the St. Louis Post-Dispatch.

Table I shows the direction and dimension of symbols during each phase of the conflict in The New York Times and Table II shows the same for the St. Louis Post-Dispatch. The figures in the two tables express, in terms of percentages, the neutral symbols, symbols for positive and negative strength, and positive and negative morality. To take an example, in Table I, the Figure 18.2 in Phase I represents the sum of percentages under Arabs for positive strength and positive morality from a total of 1773 symbols, and 24.5 is the sum of percentages for negative strength and negative morality; 9.2 is the percentage figure under Arabs for neutral symbols. Tables I and II have each been broken down into three tables for clearer discourse. These tables are numbered III through VIII. This writer will now review figures in tables I and II with respect to each phase of the conflict.

Phase I, June 5 - September 17, 1982

Israel invaded Lebanon June 4, 1982, and began a series of attacks on PLO positions in that country. The military side of the conflict was emphasized in the coverage of both newspapers.

Percentages of symbols reported in The New York Times during Phase I are shown separately in Table III. Percentages for the St. Louis Post-Dispatch for the same phase are shown in Table IV.

TABLE I

PERCENTAGES OF TOTAL SYMBOLS USED BY THE NEW YORK TIMES DURING THREE PHASES OF THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT: CODED BY DIRECTION AND DIMENSION

Phase	Arabs						Israelis						Total		
	S	+	M	0	S	-	M	S	+	M	0	S		-	M
I	9.6	18.2	8.6	9.2	15.7	24.5	8.8	20.9	29.47	8.57	6.7	6.5	12.1	5.6	100
II	1.4	40.2	38.08	8.3	0.0	2.8	2.8	2.8	4.2	1.4	15.27	1.4	29.2	27.8	100
III	4.1	15.7	11.63	5.8	4.1	5.3	1.2	8.7	17.4	8.7	10.7	9.9	44.8	34.9	100

S+ = Positive Strength

M+ = Positive Morality

0 = Neutral

M- = Negative Morality

S- = Negative Strength

N = 2486 Symbol Frequencies

TABLE II

PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL SYMBOLS USED BY ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH DURING THREE PHASES OF THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT: CODED BY DIRECTION AND DIMENSION

Phase	Arabs						Israelis						Total		
	S	+	M	0	S	-	M	S	+	M	0	S		-	M
I	4.3	8.5	4.2	35.96	9.26	13.38	4.12	13.7	15.9	2.8	19.5	2.8	6.7	4.9	100
II	0.0	20.2	20.2	23.6	2.2	2.2	0.0	8.98	19.00	10.1	19.10	1.12	15.73	14.61	100
III	1.84	9.38	7.54	16.38	2.19	3.38	1.19	4.75	12.11	7.36	32.40	5.16	26.35	21.19	100

S+ = Positive Strength

M+ = Positive Morality

0 = Neutral

M- = Negative Morality

S- = Negative Strength

N = 5827 Symbol Frequencies

TABLE III

DIRECTION AND DIMENSION OF CODED CONTENT OF THE NEW YORK TIMES
ON THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT DURING PHASE I

Phase	Arabs						Israelis						Total	
	S	+	M	0	S	-	M	S	+	M	0	S		-
I	9.6		8.6		15.7		8.8	20.9		8.57		6.5		5.6
Total		18.2		9.1		24.5		29.47		6.7		12.1		100

TABLE IV

DIRECTION AND DIMENSION OF CODED CONTENT OF THE ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH ON
THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT DURING PHASE I

Phase	Arabs						Israelis						Total	
	S	+	M	0	S	-	M	S	+	M	0	S		-
I	4.3		4.2		9.16		4.1	13.2		2.8		1.8		4.9
Total		8.5		35.96		13.38		16.0		19.5		6.7		100

In Phase I, The New York Times' percentage for positive strength for Israel was 20.9, while the positive strength under Arabs was only 9.6. The St. Louis Post-Dispatch's portrayal of Israeli strength was even more clearcut, with 4.3 percent for Arabs, and 13.2 percent for Israelis.

Paragraphs such as the following, reporting Israeli military gains and emphasizing Arab military weakness frequently were found in the two newspapers. The New York Times correspondent Thomas L. Friedman wrote on the second day of the Israeli invasion:

Israeli fighter bombers and artillery attacked Palestinian guerrillas in caves, underground bunkers and hillside gun posts around Nabatiye, Arnun, Wadi Al-Akhdar, Jarmaq and the Beaufort Crusader Castle, all about 10 miles north of the borders, according to United Nations spokesmen. It has been widely noted here that the Syrian Air Force has made no effort to engage the Israelis, who killed two Syrian soldiers in the air raid on February.⁶

The St. Louis Post-Dispatch, in a news article published June 8, 1982, stated, in part:

Inland, the Israelis on Monday captured ancient Beaufort Castle, the cliff-top fortress from which the Palestinians had shelled the Galilee Panhandle. The Israelis also overran the eastern mountain town of Hasbaya, capital of Aikoub province, nine miles north of the Panhandle, and Nabatiye, a forward PLO command post 10 miles from the Israeli border. Israel's announced goal is to push the Palestinians back at least 25 miles from the border so that their artillery and rockets could no longer hit northern Israel.⁷

The high percentages for Israelis' positive strength in both newspapers during Phase I may have been partly due to restrictions imposed by Israel on news correspondents in reporting military conflicts.

⁶Thomas L. Friedman, "Israel Pressing Attacks on PLO; 2 Sides Fire Across Lebanese Line," The New York Times, June 6, 1982, p. 1.

⁷"PLO Head Pleads For Soviet, Arab Aid," The St. Louis Post-Dispatch, June 8, 1982, p. 4.

This writer noted that some of the news articles in Phase I in The New York Times carried a statement in italics under the headline saying, "The following dispatch has been subjected to military censorship." The St. Louis Post-Dispatch did not carry such statements, but one can assume that its dispatches also were subjected to censorship since all foreign correspondents are subject to the same regulations.

This writer noted that the two newspapers dealt more with strength presentations for Arabs and Israelis than with morality presentations of symbols in Phase I. During this phase, there was not much difference between morality presentation of symbols in either side by both newspapers.

As shown later, the tables turned and morality became a major issue during and after the Beirut massacre in September.

Phase II, September 18-19, 1982

The lead paragraph in the September 19, 1982, issue of The New York Times summed up the first day of the Beirut massacre in one concise sentence, expressing all that happened in Sabra and Shatila. The lead read:

Beirut, Lebanon, September 18 -- Lebanese Christian militiamen massacred scores of Palestinian men, women and children in a refugee camp on the southern edge of west Beirut Friday night, according to witnesses and reporters who visited the camp.⁸

The lead in the St. Louis Post-Dispatch describing the events on Saturday, September 18, 1982, was grim:

⁸"Massacre Toll is at least 300," The New York Times, September 19, 1982, p. 1.

Beirut, Lebanon -- The bodies of hundreds of men, women and children, many of them apparently shot in the head or back were found inside two Palestinian refugee camps in West Beirut Saturday.⁹

An increased number of mortality symbols was noted in this Phase, which dealt with details of the massacre. Symbol percentages for the Phase are shown in Tables V and VI.

In Phase II, The New York Times had 27.8 percent morality minus for the Israelis and only 2.8 percent morality minus for the Arabs. Morality plus, on the other hand, was high for the Arabs and almost nil for the Israelis. The New York Times had 38.08 percent morality plus for Arabs and 1.4 percent morality plus for the Israelis. As described in an earlier chapter, one of the emotional values that constitutes morality plus is sympathy. Sympathy for Arabs in the refugee camps was expressed to a great extent in both newspapers.

Bodies lay piled in groups of 10 or more scattered through the ruins of the two refugee camps, which until recently housed tens of thousands of civilians. Bulldozers had been used to pile wreckage on many of the bodies in an attempt to conceal them, but arms and legs were sticking out of the rubble.¹⁰

Thomas L. Friedman, The New York Times correspondent, wrote:

Walking down the rubble-strewn streets of Shatila this morning, reporters found two old men shot through the head, several piles of women and children, their bodies covered with flies, and at least one line of middle-age men who had been lined up against a cinder-blocked wall and executed.¹¹

Reports in both newspapers attempted to present a picture of the death and destruction in the two refugee camps and also recreate for the

⁹"Hundreds Slain in Beirut refugee camps," St. Louis Post-Dispatch, September 19, 1982, p. 1.

¹⁰"Hundreds Slain in Beirut refugee camps," p. 8.

¹¹"Massacre Toll is at least 300," p. 1

TABLE V

DIRECTION AND DIMENSION OF CODED CONTENT OF THE NEW YORK TIMES ON THE
ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT DURING PHASE II

Phase	Arabs						Israelis						Total	
	S	+	M	0	S	-	M	S	+	M	0	S		-
II	1.4		38.08		0.0		2.8	2.8		1.4		1.4		27.8
Total		40.2		8.3		2.8		4.2		15.27		29.9		100

TABLE VI

DIRECTION AND DIMENSION OF CODED CONTENT OF THE ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH ON
THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT DURING PHASE II

Phase	Arabs						Israelis						Total	
	S	+	M	0	S	-	M	S	+	M	0	S		-
II	0.0		20.2		2.2		0.0	8.98		10.1		1.12		14.61
Total		20.2		23.6		2.2			19.00		19.10		15.73	100

reader the acts committed by Christian Phalangists. It was during such presentations that the symbol "Christian Phalangists" was endowed the emotional qualities of viciousness, ferocity, cruelty and hatred, which are described in an earlier chapter.

The New York Times correspondent Friedman wrote:

The Christian militiamen stormed the Palestinian Akka Hospital, from which the International Committee of the Red Cross was trying to remove some of the wounded patients. Reliable Western medical sources who were at the hospital said a Palestinian nurse was repeatedly raped and shot dead by Christian militiamen. A Red Cross spokesman later said, "Injured people were killed in their hospital beds, others were kidnapped."¹²

The portrayal of Christian Phalangists by the St. Louis Post-Dispatch was not as severe as The New York Times. The St. Louis Post-Dispatch did quote refugee camp residents as saying many refugees had been "killed by Lebanese Christian militiamen,"¹³ in the second paragraph of its September 19, 1982, story on the massacre, but later qualified its report in the same story by stating the following:

Some camp residents said the victims had been gunned down by the right-wing Phalangist militia. Others said the gunmen were from the forces of Saad Haddad, a renegade Lebanese army major who allied himself with Israel.¹⁴

Also, The St. Louis Post-Dispatch avoided any hint of an Israeli role in the massacre. A quote in the September 19, 1982, story seemed to clear Israel of any wrongdoing in the massacre.

'If any forces entered the camps it was not to our knowledge' said an Israeli military source in Beirut. 'The IDF (Israeli Defense Forces) have blocked entrance to the camps of Shatilia

¹²"Massacre Toll at least 300," p. 14

¹³"Hundreds Slain in Beirut refugee camps," p. 1

¹⁴Ibid.

and Sabra to all other forces until we are able to hand over the area to the authorities of the Lebanese army'.¹⁵

Therefore, because the St. Louis Post-Dispatch's treatment of the Israeli side was not severe, the Israelis did not receive as many morality minus symbols as they did in The New York Times. The Israelis received only 14.61 percent morality minus symbols in the St. Louis Post-Dispatch for Phase II but they received 27.8 percent in The New York Times. Percentages for Arabs in both newspapers under morality and strength minus were almost negligible, less than 3 percent. Neither newspaper portrayed Arabs as weak or immoral, at a time when hundreds of unarmed Arab refugees were being killed in their homes.

Phase III September 20, 1982 -- February 12, 1983

The word to describe events after the massacre is "soul-searching." After the massacre, everybody was asking questions, wondering why or how such a human tragedy took place. This soul-searching attitude was reflected in the American media which reported evidence each day indicating that the massacre could have been prevented by the Begin administration. The St. Louis Post-Dispatch, quoting Israeli newspapers, said:

Prime Minister Menachem Begin's government knew for at least 36 hours that Lebanese Christian Phalangists were killing Palestinians in refugee camps in West Beirut, but took no action to stop the slaughter.¹⁶

It appears the media became aware of what was happening in Beirut

¹⁵Ibid.

¹⁶"Begin Did not Stop Killings, Press Says," St. Louis Post-Dispatch, September 10, 1982, p. 2.

only after the Beirut massacre. Until then, the Arab-Israeli conflict was one more conflict to cover and all the media needed was the most daring and competent reporters in strife-torn Lebanon. After the massacre, the question of right and wrong was the main issue. Somehow Israel seemed no longer the champion of democracy in the Middle East. The New York Times correspondent David K. Shipler reflected this view when he wrote:

After the events of last week, Israel may never again be able to feel the same way about itself. Something snapped. The belief, the conviction that Israel was somehow different, somehow special amid the brutality and hypocrisy of the world's nations, was profoundly shaken if not swept away.¹⁷

Tables VII and VIII show symbol percentages in The New York Times and St. Louis Post-Dispatch respectively for Phase III.

The New York Times came down hard on Israel in the third phase. So much so, that Israel received the highest percentage of morality minus, with 34.9 percent in Phase III, compared to 17.8 percent in Phase II and 5.6 percent in Phase I. The reader can see how the morality minus evaluation for the Israelis in The New York Times, endowing them with the qualities of falsity, viciousness, cruelty and aggression, among other things, increased steadily from Phase I onwards. The same increase in morality minus for Israelis in the St. Louis Post-Dispatch can be observed, but to a lesser degree. The Israelis received a morality minus evaluation of 21.19 percent in Phase III, 14.67 in Phase II and 4.9 in Phase I. Also, in the third phase, statements made by the St. Louis Post-Dispatch reporters about Israel were not as severe as in The New

¹⁷"Massacre Brings on a Crisis of Faith For Israelis," The New York Times, September 16, 1982, IV, p. 1.

TABLE VII

DIRECTION AND DIMENSION OF CODED CONTENT OF THE NEW YORK TIMES
ON THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT DURING PHASE III

Phase	Arabs						Israelis						Total	
	S	+	M	0	S	-	M	S	+	M	0	S		-
III	4.1		11.63		4.1		1.2	8.7		8.7		9.9		34.9
Total		15.7		5.8		5.3		17.4		10.7		44.8		100

TABLE VIII

DIRECTION AND DIMENSION OF CODED CONTENT OF THE ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH
ON THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT DURING PHASE III

Phase	Arabs						Israelis						Total	
	S	+	M	0	S	-	M	S	+	M	0	S		-
III	1.84		7.54		2.19		1.19	4.75		7.36		5.16		21.19
Total		9.38		16.38		3.38			12.11		32.40		26.35	100

York Times. The St. Louis Post-Dispatch appeared conservative in its coverage in the third phase, with its correspondents refraining from passing judgment (in news articles) about Israeli actions. This conservative approach was noted especially during the days immediately after the massacre. For example, Bob Admas, a St. Louis Post-Dispatch correspondent, wrote in an article on September 16, 1982:

For the first time, Israelis -- with the memories of the Holocaust and anti-Jewish programs still vivid -- must face the possibility that they share a responsibility for a slaughter of the innocents.¹⁸

As noted earlier, morality, not strength, was the main issue in Phase III in both newspapers. A look at Table I shows that in The New York Times, the figures for Arab strength plus and minus were 4.1 percent in each case and for Israelis it was 8.7 and 9.9 percent respectively. In Table II, in the St. Louis Post Dispatch, the percentages for strength plus and minus under Arabs were 1.84 and 2.19 respectively; for Israelis 4.75 and 5.16 percent respectively.

In Phase III, the morality issue, rather than the immorality issue, gained increasing importance as time passed. Noteworthy is that Phase III began with the period immediately after the massacre and ended with the resignation of Defense Minister Ariel Sharon. During this period, there were frequent disclosures of Israeli role in the massacre, reports of the massacre probe, and finally, reports on the massacre inquiry commission's findings, which resulted in the defense minister's resignation.

¹⁸"Israel in Turmoil After Massacre," St. Louis Post-Dispatch, September 16, 1982, p. 1.

Symbol Direction in Each Phase

More than 8,000 symbols relating to the conflict were published in The New York Times and St. Louis Post-Dispatch between June 1982 and February 1983. Of these, around 3,500 were neutral symbols.

Three-way frequency analyses were completed juxtaposing: 1) Parties to the conflict; 2) The two newspapers and 3) Prediction or direction of symbol usage in news columns.

Analyses were completed on news stories appearing before, during and after the Beirut Massacre. Additionally the author analyzed symbol frequencies observed across all phases of the conflict.

These four analyses addressed all the research questions posed on page 46, though not in the same order.

Phase I

Before the Beirut Massacre, the newspapers printed nearly 6,000 symbols relevant to parties of the conflict -- the far greater number (4,038) appearing in the St. Louis Post-Dispatch, with 1,776 in The New York Times.

Heaviest used symbols were in the neutral context (2,521), followed by those in the favorable (1,834) and unfavorable contexts (1,459).

Unfavorable symbols about Arabs exceeded the favorable in both newspapers. Noteworthy, however, is the large number of neutral symbols used by the St. Louis Post-Dispatch -- far more than the number of favorable and unfavorable symbols combined. In The New York Times, neutral symbols regarding Arabs figured lowest in pre-Massacre coverage.

Favorable symbols about Israel, on the other hand, more than doubled those in the unfavorable context (1,168 favorable v. 485 unfavorable).

Again, the St. Louis Post-Dispatch stores were laden most heavily with neutral symbols, while the New York Times printed a significantly lesser number of symbols in neutral than other contexts.

If one compares alternating columns in Table IX, disparity in use of symbols about parties to the conflict become even more vivid.

For example, columns 1 and 3 show the New York Times publishing significantly more favorable than unfavorable symbols about Israel and more unfavorable than favorable symbols about Arabs. Columns 2 and 4 show the same trend in the St. Louis Post-Dispatch.

In summary, pre-Massacre news was more favorable to Israel than to the Arabs in both papers. However, the St. Louis Post-Dispatch news was more to the middle-of-the-road, in that the majority of its symbols lay in the neutral context. Neutral symbols in the New York Times comprised a distinct minority.

Phase II

The shorter period during the Beirut Massacre involved the use of only 161 relevant symbols, as shown in Table X. The majority portrayed favorable or neutral contexts.

Both papers carried more symbols in the favorable than unfavorable contexts regarding the Arabs (74 v. 4). Conversely, the New York Times carried more unfavorable than favorable Israeli-relevant symbols. The St. Louis Post-Dispatch, still heaviest in use of neutral symbols, over-all, carried only an insignificantly-larger number of favorably-set symbols about Israelis.

Viewed another way, from alternating columns in Table X, the New York Times carried more favorable symbols on Arabs than on Israelis

TABLE IX

SYMBOL FREQUENCIES PUBLISHED BEFORE THE BEIRUT MASSACRE
 BY THE NEW YORK TIMES AND ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH:
 BY DIRECTION AND PARTIES TO THE CONFLICT

Symbol Direction	Arabs		Israelis		Totals
	<u>New York Times</u>	<u>St. Louis Post- Dispatch</u>	<u>New York Times</u>	<u>St. Louis Post- Dispatch</u>	
Favorable	323 ^a	343 ^a	522 ^f	646 ⁱ	1834 ^l
Unfavorable	434 ^b	540 ^c	215 ^g	170 ^j	1459 ^m
Neutral	163 ^d	1452 ^e	119 ^h	787 ^k	2521 ⁿ
Totals	920 ^o	2335 ^p	856 ^q	1703 ^r	5814

$\chi^2 = 121.05$, $df=2$, $p.<.001$, New York Times, symbol direction (Arabs)

$\chi^2 = 310.60$, $df=3$, $p.<.001$, New York Times, symbol direction (Israelis).

$\chi^2 = 899.55$, $df=2$, $p.<.001$, Post-Dispatch, symbol direction (Arabs).

$\chi^2 = 251.64$, $df=2$, $p.<.001$, Post-Dispatch, symbol direction (Israel).

Note: Differing superscripts denote significantly different frequencies.

TABLE X
 SYMBOL FREQUENCIES PUBLISHED DURING THE BEIRUT MASSACRE
 BY THE NEW YORK TIMES AND ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH:
 BY DIRECTION AND PARTIES TO THE CONFLICT

Symbol Direction	Arabs		Israelis		Totals
	<u>New York Times</u>	<u>St. Louis Post- Dispatch</u>	<u>New York Times</u>	<u>St. Louis Post- Dispatch</u>	
Favorable	29 ^a	18 ^a	3 ^d	17 ^e	67 ^f
Unfavorable	2 ^b	2 ^b	21 ^e	14 ^e	39 ^g
Neutral	6 ^d	21 ^e	22 ^e	17 ^e	55 ^h
Totals	37 ⁱ	42 ⁱ	35 ⁱ	48 ⁱ	161

$\chi^2 = 34.55$, $df=2$, $p.<.001$, New York Times, symbol direction (Arabs)

$\chi^2 = 13.99$, $df=3$, $p.<.001$, New York Times, symbol direction (Israelis).

$\chi^2 = 15.26$, $df=2$, $p.<.001$, Post-Dispatch, symbol direction (Arabs).

$\chi^2 = .37$, $df=2$, $p.> .05$, Post-Dispatch, symbol direction (Israel).

Note: Differing superscripts denote significantly different frequencies.

(29 v. 3), while the St. Louis Post-Dispatch was "equally" favorable to the sides (18 v. 17). Both papers, however, printed more unfavorable symbols about the Israelis than about Arabs.

Summing up Massacre-period news, both papers carried more favorable than unfavorable news about Arabs. And Arabs, more so than Israelis, were portrayed favorably in the New York Times stories, but not in the St. Louis Post-Disptach articles. Also, the New York Times, unlike the St. Louis Post-Disptach, carried more unfavorable than favorable news about Israelis. News in both papers howed Israelis in a less favorable light than Arabs.

Phase III

News in the aftermath of the Beirut Massacre followed the trend of the symbol direction observed during the Massacre, in some cases, but not all.

Israelis continued to make the news in a more unfavorable context than did the Arabs. And the St. Louis Post-Dispatch, unlike the New York Times, continued its heavy use of symbols set in a neutral context, as shown in Table XI.

Adjacent columns in Table XI show both papers carried more favorable than unfavorable symbols regarding Arabs, while the symbol context regarding Israelis was heavily unfavorable, relative to that for Arabs.

Alternating columns, however, show that the New York Times carried news as favorable to Israelis as to Arabs (114 v. 103, $p > .05$), with the St. Louis Post-Disptach comprising more of the favorably-set symbols about Israelis than Arabs. But looking at unfavorable symbols, seven to eight times as many applied to Isarel as to Arabs.

TABLE XI
 SYMBOL FREQUENCIES PUBLISHED AFTER THE BEIRUT MASSACRE
 BY THE NEW YORK TIMES AND ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH:
 BY DIRECTION AND PARTIES TO THE CONFLICT

Symbol Direction	Arabs		Israelis		Totals
	<u>New York Times</u>	<u>St. Louis Post- Dispatch</u>	<u>New York Times</u>	<u>St. Louis Post- Dispatch</u>	
Favorable	103 ^a	158 ^a	114 ^e	204 ^a	579 ^k
Unfavorable	35 ^b	57 ^b	293 ^f	444 ⁱ	829 ^l
Neutral	38 ^b	276 ^d	70 ^g	546 ^j	930 ^m
Totals	176 ⁿ	491 ^o	477 ^o	1194 ^p	2338

$\chi^2 = 50.34$, $df=2$, $p.<.001$, New York Times, symbol direction (Arabs)

$\chi^2 = 175.49$, $df=3$, $p.<.001$, New York Times, symbol direction (Israelis).

$\chi^2 = 146.88$, $df=2$, $p.<.001$, Post-Dispatch, symbol direction (Arabs).

$\chi^2 = 105.67$, $df=2$, $p.<.001$, Post-Dispatch, symbol direction (Israel).

Note: Differing superscripts denote significantly different frequencies.

Essence of the post-Massacre period was that news in both papers comprised more symbols in context unfavorable to Israelis than to Arabs. At the same time, symbols in favorable contexts applied as much to Israelis as to Arabs in the New York Times, and significantly more so in the St. Louis Post-Dispatch.

All Phases

Tables IX through XI show a shift in direction of symbol use toward Arabs and Israelis. It would appear the shift was concomitant with the events. Before the Massacre, there were more favorable than unfavorable symbols about Israel, while unfavorable symbols were dominant in news about Arabs.

During the Massacre, both papers carried a greater number of positive symbols about Arabs, while more negatively - than positively - set symbols were attributed to Israelis by the New York Times. St. Louis Post-Dispatch news during the Massacre was "equally" positive and negative regarding direction of symbols relevant to Israel.

Following the Massacre, both newspapers' symbol usage clearly fell more and more into a positive context regarding Arabs and in the negative context regarding Israelis.

In Table XII, symbol frequencies spanning the entire period of study portray, to a great extent, the directional order shown before the Massacre (Table IX), with few exceptions.

For example, throughout the period, the New York Times' stories comprised a lesser number of favorable symbols toward Arabs than did the St. Louis Post-Dispatch (455 v. 519). This was due to the relatively lesser number of Arab-favorable symbols published by the New York Times

TABLE XII
 SYMBOL FREQUENCIES PUBLISHED DURING ALL PHASES
 BY THE NEW YORK TIMES AND ST. LOUIS
POST-DISPATCH: BY DIRECTION AND
 PARTIES TO THE CONFLICT

Symbol Direction	Arabs		Israelis		Totals
	<u>New York Times</u>	<u>St. Louis Post- Dispatch</u>	<u>New York Times</u>	<u>St. Louis Post- Dispatch</u>	
Favorable	455 ^a	519 ^c	639 ^f	867 ⁱ	2480 ^l
Unfavorable	471 ^a	599 ^d	529 ^g	728 ^j	2327 ^m
Neutral	207 ^b	1749 ^e	200 ^h	1350 ^k	3506 ⁿ
Totals	1133 ^o	2867 ^p	1368 ^q	2945 ^r	8313

$\chi^2 = 116.02$, $df=2$, $p.<.001$, New York Times, symbol direction (Arabs)

$\chi^2 = 228.84$, $df=3$, $p.<.001$, New York Times, symbol direction (Israelis).

$\chi^2 = 991.21$, $df=2$, $p.<.001$, Post-Dispatch, symbol direction (Arabs).

$\chi^2 = 217.14$, $df=2$, $p.<.001$, Post-Dispatch, symbol direction (Israel).

Note: Differing superscripts denote significantly different frequencies.

after the Massacre, as shown in Table XI (103 v. 158). Before the Massacre, however, the difference in number of favorable symbols attached to Arabs by the New York Times and by the St. Louis Post-Dispatch was insignificant (323 v. 343).

At the same time, however, the New York Times' stories, over the whole period, carried about as many favorable as unfavorable symbols regarding Arabs, whereas before the Massacre, symbol use fell heavily toward Arab-unfavorable. Accounting for this was the fact that the New York Times ran a few lesser ratio of unfavorable-to-favorable symbols about Arabs during and after the Massacre. The offsetting effect was that, over-all, the New York Times showed no significant difference in use of favorable and unfavorable symbols toward Arabs.

The Trends

Table XIII is focused on the issues of favorable and unfavorable directions for the two parties in The New York Times and Table XIV deals with the same in St. Louis Post Dispatch. In what light were the Arabs and Israelis portrayed by The New York Times and St. Louis Post-Dispatch?

In Table XIII, the figures for favorable were compiled from the presentations of either side in positive light; and those for unfavorable from presentations in negative light. A look at Table XIII indicates a shift in direction in The New York Times' coverage of Arabs and Israelis during the Arabs-Israeli conflict, June 1982 to February 1983. This proposition is supported significantly in all three phases and by expected frequency tests showing strong contingency coefficients (c) of magnitude of relations.

TABLE XIII
 FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION OF SYMBOLS DURING EACH OF THE THREE PHASES
 OF THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT IN THE NEW YORK TIMES

Phases	Arabs		Israelis		χ^2	df	C	Level of Significance
	Favorable	Unfavorable	Favorable	Unfavorable				
I	18.2	24.5	29.4	12.1	6.7	1	.8776	P < .05
II	40.3	2.8	4.2	29.2	50.4	1	.981	P < .001
III	15.7	5.3	17.4	44.8	14.26	1	.936	P < .001

TABLE XIV

FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION OF SYMBOLS DURING EACH OF THE THREE PHASES OF THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT IN THE ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH

Phases	Arabs		Israelis		χ^2	df	C	Level of Significance
	Favorable	Unfavorable	Favorable	Unfavorable				
I	8.5	13.38	15.9	6.7	4.45	1	.8306	P < .05
II	20.1	2.2	19.00	15.73	7.83	1	.8924	P < .01
III	9.38	3.38	12.11	26.35	6.98	1	.8812	P < .01

In Phase I of the conflict, figures for the Arabs are 18.2 percent favorable and 24.5 percent unfavorable and for Israelis 29.4 percent favorable and 12.1 percent unfavorable. With an observed chi-square of 6.7, the difference is significant. The observed chi-square of 6.7 can occur by chance less than 5 times in 100 such experiments. The coefficient of contingency of 0.8776 shows a strong relationship.

Evidence of the change in direction in The New York Times' coverage can be seen in figures for Phase II and III shown in Table XIII. In Phase II, the figure for favorable is 40.3 percent for Arabs as opposed to 18.2 in Phase I for Arabs. A similar shift can be seen in unfavorable figures for Israelis in The New York Times in Phase II. The Israelis received 29.2 unfavorable as opposed to 12.1 percent in Phase I, while the percentage for unfavorable increased, percentage for favorable for the Israelis dropped from 29.4 to 4.2 percent in The New York Times. The observed chi-square of 50.4 in this phase for The New York Times is significant. The observed chi-square of 50.4 can occur by chance less than five times in 100. The coefficient of contingency of 0.981 shows a strong relationship.

We must remember that the Phase II period refers to the days of the massacre and coverage of massacre-related events. Sympathy for the Arabs was overflowing at this time and the Israelis, on the other hand, received harsh treatment from The New York Times' correspondents.

Figures in Phase III for The New York Times shown in Table XIII also provide evidence of the change or shift in direction. The unfavorable figure for Israelis was 44.8 percent in Phase III compared with 29.2 percent in Phase II. However, the favorable percentage for Israelis increased from 4.2 percent in Phase II to 17.4 percent in Phase III.

Overall, in this phase, the difference is significant, with an observed chi-square of 14.26. The observed chi-square of 14.26 can occur by chance less than five times in 100. The coefficient of contingency of 0.936 shows a strong relationship.

Table XIV shows the favorable and unfavorable figures for Arabs and Israelis in the St. Louis Post-Dispatch for the three phases. Here also, like in The New York Times, a shift in direction after Phase I can be seen. In Phase I, the Arabs received 8.5 percent favorable symbols and 13.38 percent unfavorable symbols, and the Israelis received 15.9 percent favorable and 6.7 percent unfavorable symbols. With an observed chi-square of 4.45, the difference is significant. The observed chi-square of 4.45 can occur by chance less than five times in 100. The contingency coefficient of 0.8306 shows a strong relationship.

In Phase II, when the massacre was going on, the Arabs received favorable coverage, an increase from 8.5 percent in Phase I to 20.2 percent in Phase II, as shown in Table XIV. For the Israelis, the percentage of unfavorable symbols increased more than double, from 6.7 in Phase I to 15.73 in Phase II. This indicates a shift in coverage, from favorable to unfavorable for Israelis and from unfavorable to favorable for Arabs. Apparently the massacre events brought about the shift in coverage. In this phase, the observed chi-square of 7.83 is significant and can occur by chance less than five times in 100. The contingency of coefficient of 0.8924 shows a strong relationship.

Emphasis on coverage of Arabs decreased in the St. Louis Post-Dispatch during Phase III. The Arabs received only 12.76 percent of the favorable and unfavorable symbols in Phase III, which is lower than the percentage in any other phase. In this phase, the shift in

direction, which was observed in Phase II, continues. A look at Table XIV shows that the Israelis received 15.73 percent unfavorable symbols in Phase II; the percentage increased to 26.35 in Phase III. The observed chi-square in this phase is 6.95 and the difference is significant. It can occur by chance less than five times in 100. The contingency of coefficient of 0.8812 shows a strong relationship.

Individuals and Issues

Tables XV and XVI show the presentation of selected individuals and issues by The New York Times and St. Louis Post-Dispatch respectively for the three phases of the conflict. These were Prime Minister Begin, Defense Minister Sharon, PLO Chairman Arafat, Palestine Liberation Organization, Sabra and Shatila refugee camps and the Palestinian question. The presentations in Table XV and XVI refer only to positive and negative presentation in The New York Times and St. Louis Post-Dispatch. The object of considering key individuals and issues is to find out how these were treated, whether in positive light or negative light. Also, the object is to find out how much emphasis was placed in covering these individuals and issues.

Table XV indicates that Prime Minister Begin was highly favored by The New York Times with 125 positive symbols and 41 negative symbols over the three phases. Next ranks Sharon with 89 positive symbols. However, Sharon received 60 negative symbols too, almost all of which he received in Phase III when his indirect role in the massacre became known.

The table indicates that Arafat did not receive as much coverage as Begin or Sharon. Whatever coverage Arafat did receive was mostly positive with 44 favorable symbols and 17 negative symbols. The Palestine

TABLE XV

PRESENTATION OF INDIVIDUALS AND ISSUES IN THE NEW YORK TIMES
OVER THREE PHASES OF THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT

Phases	Begin		Sharon		Arafat		PLO		Sabra and Shatila		Palestinian Question	
	+	-	+	-	+	-	+	-	+	-	+	-
I	106	8	71		37	14	93	223	0	0	4	0
II	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	2	30	0	0	0
III	19	33	18	59	7	3	6	6	53	0	0	0
Total	125	41	89	60	44	17	99	231	83	0	4	0

TABLE XVI

PRESENTATION OF INDIVIDUALS AND ISSUES IN THE ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH
OVER THREE PHASES OF THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT

Phases	Begin		Sharon		Arafat		PLO		Sabra and Shatila		Palestinian Question	
	+	-	+	-	+	-	+	-	+	-	+	-
I	56	10	23	15	48	31	84	244	3	0	3	6
II	0	0	0	0	2	0	6	1	25	0	0	0
III	47	44	25	89	6	1	8	16	105	0	2	2
Total	103	54	48	104	56	32	98	261	123	0	5	8

Liberation Organization was portrayed negatively with 231 negative symbols and only 99 positive symbols. This is largely due to presentation of the PLO as a terrorist organization, especially in Phase I.

As for the refugee camps of Sabra and Shatila, they did not enter the news until Phase II. The reader will note that this symbol did not receive a single negative presentation. No reporter was portraying refugees in the two camps in negative light after they had been slaughtered in their homes.

The Palestine question, in this writer's opinion, is a major issue in the Arab-Israeli conflict. It is the question focusing on the future of Palestinians and the question unanswered for all these years. This question was referred to as a symbol by The New York Times, only four times during the entire conflict, all four in Phase I. The New York Times was so busy covering battle scenes and killings that it failed to address the question of the Palestinian homeland, which is the underlying question of the Arab-Israeli conflict.

Table XVI shows the presentation of selected individuals and issues in the St. Louis Post-Dispatch over the three phases of the conflict. Among individuals, Begin received the highest number of positive symbols, 103; he received 54 negative symbols. Sharon appears to be the individual least favored by the St. Louis Post-Dispatch, with 104 negative symbols and only 48 positive symbols. The writer noted that there were no articles in the St. Louis Post-Dispatch in which Sharon defended himself against negative coverage. Arafat received more positive coverage than Sharon, with 56 positive symbols and 32 negative symbols.

As in The New York Times, the PLO was portrayed in a negative light by the St. Louis Post-Dispatch. Table XVI shows that the PLO received

261 negative symbols of which 244 were in Phase I. Here too, the PLO received negative coverage because of the impression during the first phase that it is a terrorist organization. Sympathy for Sabra and Shatila refugee camps was more evident in the St. Louis Post-Dispatch than in The New York Times. The camps received 123 positive symbols, 60 in the St. Louis Post-Dispatch compared to 83 in The New York Times.

The St. Louis Post-Disptach did not place much emphasis on the Palestinian question. Like The New York Times, the issue received almost no consideration. The symbol "Palestinian question" received 5 positive symbols and 2 negative symbols in the St. Louis Post-Dispatch.

CHAPTER V

SUMMARY, RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS

Summary

This study's findings indicate that symbols were presented in the context of news as reported in the New York Times and St. Louis Post-Dispatch. The prediction of symbols seemed to parallel the occurrence of events before, during and after the Beirut Massacre.

During the massacre, the New York Times and St. Louis Post-Dispatch presented more favorable news symbols about Arabs. As for Israelis, more favorable symbols were found in the New York Times during this phase. The St. Louis Post-Dispatch carried 11 equally positive and negative symbols relevant to Israelis

In Phase III, the period after the Massacre, both newspapers carried stories with Arabs falling in a positive context and Israelis in a negative context.

As for presentation of individuals and issues, Prime Minister Begin was mentioned in favorable contexts by The New York Times over the three phases. Defense Minister Sharon ranked second in favorable news contexts in The New York Times; Sharon also received a considerable amount of unfavorable coverage, because of his indirect role in the Beirut massacre. Also, among noteworthy symbols in The New York Times, PLO Chairman Arafat received favorable coverage but the PLO itself ~~received negative coverage~~ and the symbol "Palestine Question" was

mentioned only four times during the entire conflict.

The St. Louis Post-Dispatch news columns carried Begin in favorable light, Arafat in favorable light and Sharon in unfavorable light. Like The New York Times, the St. Louis Post-Dispatch also carried news in which the PLO was in a negative light and gave almost no consideration to the symbol, "Palestine Question."

Prior to conducting this study, this writer made an effort to ensure objectivity in coding symbols in this analysis of content. A pilot study was conducted to ensure coder reliability. The pilot study showed that coding by two independent coders was highly similar to this writer's coding procedure, and indicates an absence of bias in coding symbols.

Recommendations and Conclusions

"You should not forget that this war (between Israel and the Arab States) has been going on for 40 years in this region, and the first enemy is distrust. We must restore confidence in the region."¹

King Hassan II of Morocco,
October 1982

Distrust is the word to note in the above paragraph. The Arab-Israeli conflict has been going on for many years and the distrust has increased with time. Between countries in the conflict and between political and religious factions, the atmosphere of distrust has to be removed for peace to result.

The media should try and understand better the parties involved in the Arab-Israeli conflict. One of the organizations that has not been

¹"Arab Leader Softens Stance On Israel," St. Louis Post-Dispatch, October 24, p. 1-4.

very well understood by the American media is the Palestine Liberation Organization. To take case of The New York Times and St. Louis Post-Dispatch, these two newspapers, through accounts of events, tend to portray the PLO in a negative light. But the newspapers should try and understand the goals of the PLO. The PLO is an organization working toward a homeland for the Palestine people and this goal should be explained intermittently.

In reading through The New York Times and St. Louis Post-Dispatch, this writer noted that news stories in both newspapers addressed Israel's right to exist but rarely addressed Palestine's right to exist as a nation. The writer hopes that in future news would include accounts of these who advocate that Palestine has a right to exist as a lawful nation.

The issue of Palestine's or Israel's right to exist can be treated in editorial pages of both newspapers. The writer recommends that the newspapers attempt to present a pro-con debate in their news articles regarding the right to exist.

The Palestine question, which is a central issue in the entire conflict, has been overlooked most of the time. A newspaper does not fulfill its duty to the readers simply by reporting the events in a conflict. The duty is better fulfilled by reporting why an event occurred. Not many people in the United States know of the deep-rooted reasons for the Arab-Israeli conflict or the history behind the Palestine question. In such a situation, the newspaper should provide an adequate background of the conflict to its readers. Interpretative reporting helps provide history and background on an issue. It is recommended that the two newspapers present interpretative articles on the Arab-Israeli conflict.

This writer's analysis dealt only with content gathered or provided for the two papers' news columns. She cannot draw conclusions regarding

balance of, or bias in, the news, since symbol analysis does not deal with quantitative measurements such as column inches pertaining to parties of the conflict.

One can say that prediction of symbols fell into the context of events. Had they not -- that is, if Israeli symbols had continued to override the Arab symbols in a favorable context during and after the massacre, one might suspect selective reporting. But this was not the case, at least as one could determine from the symbol analysis method.

Finally, this writer suggests that the Budd-Thorp symbol analysis technique is more tailored for "advocacy" content; i.e., editorial pages, opinion columns, speeches, etc. In short, for persuasive messages. Its function in the analysis of news columns, at least, can only serve to determine if the predication of symbols parallel the pattern of events, within reason as determined by reasonable persons.

In other words, symbol analysis, when applied to news columns, can detect only the boldest and unabashed bias of a newspaper. That would occur when a newspaper selectively gathers news in obvious defiance of what the events dictate, so to speak. And this rarely is the case, regardless of the newspaper's editorial stand.

For symbol analysis to address the question of bias, it must be applied to the editorial or opinion columns. As to the claim that news is not placed in adequate context, due to lack of background and interpretation, other content analysis techniques must be utilized.

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APPENDIX

VITA

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Doctor of Education

Thesis: A CONTENT ANALYSIS OF THE NEW YORK TIMES AND ST. LOUIS
POST-DISPATCH COVERAGE OF THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT
FROM JUNE 6, 1982 - FEBRUARY 12, 1983

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Personal Data: Born in Shiraz, Iran December 28, 1956, the daughter of Mr. and Mrs. Lalehparvaran.

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