CUBA'S ATTITUDE TOWARD THE UNITED STATES

AS INDICATED BY ITS USE

OF PROPAGANDA SYMBOLS

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1968

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Submitted to the Faculty of the
Graduate College of the
Oklahoma State University
in partial fulfillment of
the requirements for
the Degree of
DOCTOR OF EDUCATION
December 1984

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PREFACE

The utility of studying the manifest content of communication in determining changes in usage of propaganda symbols characterizing an external stimulus was shown. Investigation of the speeches of Fidel Castro and of the content of the Cuban Communist Party's official newspaper indicated considerable differences in propaganda content over the period of the study--1966 to 1984--in relation to the United States. The two instruments of communication were seen as usually presenting somewhat different messages. Change in the use of aggressive and ideological symbols was shown in relation to the events taking place that might have some influence on policy and propaganda values.

I would like to express my gratitude to Dr. Harry E. Heath Jr. for his assistance in getting this dissertation under way and for his advice as the project was carried out. I also would like to thank Dr. Walter J. Ward for his help on the quantitative techniques used. I am grateful, too, for the helpful suggestions and encouragement of my other committee members, Dr. John J. Gardiner and Dr. Thomas A. Karman. Special thanks also should be given to Mr. Edward Shelby of the University of Evansville computer center and to the Oklahoma State University library.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Historical Background

Few events since the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor have so shaken the United States as did Fidel Castro's conversion to communism after taking power in Cuba. Cuba has been a special interest of this nation's foreign policy since the founding of the United States. The writings of Thomas Jefferson, John Adams, James Monroe, Henry Clay, John C. Calhoun, and John Quincy Adams mentioned the strategic and economic importance of the island. By the 1850s Americans were working with Cubans to overthrow Spanish colonial rule and toward annexation of the island by the United States.[1]

On April 19, 1898, Congress passed an authorization for President William McKinley to conduct war against Spain in Cuba. The resolution included a proposal by Senator Henry Teller of Colorado that the United States not annex Cuba but give control of the country to the Cubans when they were able to govern.[2] The end of Spanish rule was easily accomplished; but as the end of American occupation neared, the United States government enacted the Platt Amendment, which gave the United States the unilateral

right to intervene in Cuban affairs. Its main points concerning Cuba were:

> (1) a commitment not to sign any treaty that impaired Cuban independence or to grant foreign powers special concessions without American permission, (2) a pledge to keep the Cuban debt at a low level, (3) an extension of authority to the United States to intervene to protect Cuban independence and maintain stability, (4) ratification of the acts of the military occupation, and (5) a grant of sites for naval bases on the island.[3]

From 1902 until 1934 the United States government demonstrated its belief that it had the right through the Platt Amendment to intervene in Cuba's affairs at any time. According to Lester Langley, the "Cuban issue," which began as a humanitarian effort, became part of a broader United States Caribbean-security policy. While the Teller Amendment provided a moral commitment to Cuban independence, the Platt Amendment gave the United States the "legal" authority to keep Cuba independent, by intervention if necessary. Langley stated that for Cuba, however,

> ... the distinction between the Teller and Platt amendments was crucial: the Teller amendment constituted a moral obligation to secure Cuban independence; the Platt amendment was not only a spiritual violation of the 1898 pledge but a symbol of colonialism. The United States merely replaced Spain as the arbiter of Cuba's destiny.[4]

On September 3 and 4, 1933, in a dispute over pay reductions, Sergeant Fulgencio Batista and other non-commissioned officers gained the support of the Cuban army against its officers and overthrew the government of Dr. Carlos de Cespedes. President Franklin Roosevelt sent two warships into Cuban waters but did not intervene.

Batista continued to head the revolution and installed a succession of presidents, but did not personally take over the presidency until 1940. Roosevelt backed away from the interventionist policy of the United States, and in May of 1934 the two countries signed a new treaty that abolished the Platt Amendment. All that remained for the United States was the Guantanamo Naval Base lease.[5] However, the end of United States intervention did not mean the end of economic control. Langley stated that the "aim of this 'new' economic program was to sustain the search for markets in Cuba but within a different structure."[6] Cuba changed from a protectorate to what Langley called an "economic colony" of the United States.

When Batista lost a re-election bid in 1944, he stepped down from the presidency, but eight years later, on March 20, 1952, he returned to power in a coup. Under Batista, Langley stated,

> ... American investment received beneficial treatment. His periodic xenophobic statements and proclamations of widespread reform were passed over as political electioneering by an American people and government which equated Batistismo with stability, prosperity, and protection. Beneath the gilded shell of a wealthy and democratic Cuba loomed a revolutionary force that would proclaim social and economic reformation, political regeneration, and the termination of American influence in Cuba. That revolutionary force would be commanded by Fidel Castro.[7]

Castro's first military adventure was during his college days, when he participated in a raid to overthrow Dominican Republic dictator Rafael Truillo. Castro was influential in the Orthodox Party, which he saw as the

successor to the revolution and as a vehicle for him to gain an elective office, Langley stated. He became "an unremitting foe" of Batista after the 1952 coup.[8] On July 26, 1953, Castro led a raid against the Moncada barracks in Santiago de Cuba, during which 84 of his 126 men were killed.[9] It was at his trial for the attack that he quoted Thomas Paine and stated his now-famous words: "Condemn me. It does not matter. History will absolve me."[10] Castro was criticized by all the other foes of Batista, and the communists called him and his followers "petit bourgeois," adventurers and "putschists."[11] Castro was sentenced to prison for 15 years, but Batista released him and other political prisoners in 1955 and Castro left Cuba. In December, 1956, he led an "invasion" in Oriente Province. He and 82 other men left Mexico in the formerly American-owned boat "Granma," and in the fighting after the landing all but 12 of the group were killed or captured. Fidel Castro, his brother Raul, and Ernesto "Che" Guevara escaped with nine others into the Sierra Maestra mountains. From that mountainous hideaway, he undertook what became an effective guerrilla campaign.[12]

Batista's police methods brought him loss of popular support, Langley stated, and made Castro a national hero, which put the United States in a difficult position. An interview of Castro by Herbert Matthews of The New York Times did much to give Castro prestige in the United States.[13] United States ambassador Earl Smith said that a State

Department mission headed by William Pawley went to Cuba in December of 1958 to ask Batista to resign and exile himself in Daytona Beach, Florida, but the mission failed. Langley stated:

> As a private citizen, Smith wrote later that Castro came to power partially by the failure of the Department of State to act decisively. The Matthews interview gave Castro prestige in the United States; guerrilla terrorism was given little press coverage. Most damaging of all, in Smith's view, was the fact that Cuban policy was shaped by the lesser bureaucrats of the fourth floor of the Department of State. There labored men who longed for the triumph of Castro's rebellion.[14]

In 1958, the Eisenhower administration stopped selling arms to Batista, who also was trading with the Soviets, because he was using the weapons against Castro. Batista fled the country on January 1, 1961, and Castro set up a provisional government in Santiago de Cuba with Dr. Urrutia Lleo as president and Castro as commander-in-chief. Castro arrived in Havana on January 8 after a six-day victory march the length of the island.[15] When Castro, then 33, entered Havana, he was able to do so, Langley stated, because the middle class had abandoned Batista.[16]

The Eisenhower administration was quick to recognize the Castro government.[17] Castro was still popular in the United States when he visited the country, supposedly to seek a loan--though he probably wanted economic aid but did not want to ask for it.[18] Langley stated of the visit that the

> ... truth about his encounter with American officials will not be known for a long time. It

> seems reasonable to assume, however, that the April visit was the last real hope for friendly relations between Washington and Havana, and that hope was doomed because neither Castro nor the Eisenhower administration was willing to trust each other.[19]

Castro's treatment of Batista loyalists and his nationalization of foreign-owned businesses soon resulted in American hostility. First came the nationalization of mining and petroleum and then the American sugar mills.[20] The takeover of American properties was completed by mid-1960.[21] The diplomatic break came on January 3, 1961. The day before, Castro ordered the American embassy to reduce its staff in Havana to 11 people within two days. President Eisenhower then terminated diplomatic relations.[22] Eisenhower authorized plans for an invasion of Cuba, but it was John F. Kennedy who carried out the plans. Rebel forces supported by the United States landed at the Bay of Pigs on April 17, 1961, but were defeated. In December of 1961, Castro announced that he had converted to Marxist-Leninism.[23] Langley stated that by

> ... proclaiming communism, Castro has not only irritated the American government but denied a fundamental American assumption about Cuba. He has declared Cuba's problem to be one of distribution of wealth rather than the lack of democracy or unrestricted investment. He has not only taken Cuba into the Soviet orbit politically but he has transformed the Cuban economy along Marxist lines. It is not Castro's political dictatorship that is so reprehensible as his open denial of the Jacksonian credos of democracy, capitalism, and progress....[24]

In the spring of 1962, President Kennedy embargoed exports to Cuba except for medicines and imports of Cuban products as well as anything of Cuban origin. The United

States also restricted travel to Cuba by Americans except for a few journalists and scholars.[25] American reconnaissance flights over Cuba in September and early October of 1962 determined the existence of offensive nuclear missiles there. President Kennedy began a blockade of the island on October 22 and states the following American policy toward Cuba:

> The first step was a quarantine of offensive military supplies headed for Cuba; the second, constant surveillance of the island and directions to the armed forces to prepare for 'any eventualities'; and the third, an explicit statement that a missile launched from Cuba against any hemispheric country would be interpreted as an attack against the United States and would require a retaliatory nuclear response.... Finally, the President appealed to Krushchev to withdraw the missiles.[26]

The crisis ended on October 28, when Krushchev stated that the missiles would be removed. President Kennedy was able to regain some of his prestige lost after the chaotic and unsuccessful invasion at the Bay of Pigs, and war between the superpowers was averted. Langley added that the crisis

> ... demonstrated to the world, and most importantly, to Latin America, that Castro was responsive to Soviet command. And the danger of nuclear annihilation--the collision of Soviet-American power on the world stage--cast the confrontation as the climactic moment of the Cold War....[27]

The missile crisis and the Bay of Pigs invasion remained fresh in the minds of Cuba's leaders for years, as is evident in Granma, and they provide a backdrop for the study of Cuban attitudes toward the United States.

Focus of the Research

Purpose

The purpose of this study was to determine whether an externally circulated newspaper's manifest content might be used as an indicator of changing policy positions in an authoritarian country. The policy studied was that of Cuba toward the United States. The vehicle for the study was the English language edition of Granma Weekly Review, an official newspaper of the Cuban Communist Party. The study included both the regular articles in the newspaper and Fidel Castro's speeches published since 1966, when the newspaper began.

The study may be useful as an indicator of whether the official Cuban policy toward the United States changed during the period studied, 1966 to 1984, thus providing clues as to the opportunities for improved relations between the two countries. The study may also be useful to future researchers evaluating the decision-making trends reflected in Cuban propaganda.

The Problem and Hypotheses

The problem was to delineate more clearly the "official" Cuban policy toward the United States and to determine a way of quantifying that policy or attitude. The first null hypothesis posited was that propaganda language used in Granma would not be significantly similar to the

language used by Castro in his speeches. The other null hypothesis was that Cuba's attitude toward the United States had not changed over the period studied. The research method was a content analysis of official Cuban propaganda, as published in the English language edition of a Communist Party newspaper, Granma Weekly Review. Content studies have been made of Soviet newspapers,[28] Red Chinese newspapers,[29] communist cross-national propaganda,[30] North Korean newspapers,[31] and World War II German newspapers and propaganda.[32] Cuban newspapers, however, have been virtually ignored.

Sub-hypotheses

In propaganda, as in other types of communication, words can be seen as symbols.[33] Harold Lasswell wrote, "During a crisis, symbols on the whole increase."[34] Lasswell and Goldsen theorized that when the "self" is threatened, "attention concentrates on the part of the self which is most directly threatened."[35] Ole Holsti was even more specific:

> Perceptions of the United States should provide a useful and valid index of the level of agreement or disagreement with Chinese and Soviet decision makers....[36]

These three propositions suggest the value of studying changes in political symbols over time in cross-national situations.

The null hypothesis stating there would be no change in the use of propaganda symbols over time had two

sub-hypotheses:

> 1. During periods of increased tension in Cuban-United States relations, there would be an increased use of propaganda symbols.
> 2. During times of increased tension in Cuban-United States relations, there would be greater mention of the United States in Cuban propaganda.

Conversely, there would be fewer symbols referring to the United States in times of eased tensions, types of symbols used would change over time, and there would be fewer mentions of the United States when tensions lessened. In summary:

> There were periods during the 1970s when political statements that attacked the United States were fewer than normal during the study period, which would suggest that Cuban policy toward the United States moderated. Furthermore, during the Carter administration there would be the lowest level of such attacks.

Verification of such hypotheses might indicate that there was a time when United States-Cuban relations might have become normalized if the United States had responded to Cuban entrees. Furthermore, such data might underscore the value of on-going trend analyses in improving diplomatic relations, if acted upon.

Review of Literature

The author's search revealed few articles about Cuban newspapers in which content analysis was used. Likewise a computer search of social science articles and dissertations did not show any analysis of the newspaper Granma during the period 1973 through early 1984. Only a few books have touched upon the subject.[37] One

descriptive monograph, Cuban Mass Media, was published in 1982.[38]

Using content analysis, Ernesto Rodrigues in 1978 studied letters-to-the-editor published by the daily edition of Granma.[39] However, that research does not impinge upon the present study. John Nichols did a content analysis of five Cuban publications over three time periods.[40] He determined that these publications set different agendas in some categories, and suggested that the Cuban press is not monolithic, that major changes have occurred over the past decade, and that there is audience input on political issues.

Critical Events During the Study Period

Support for the assumption that Cuban policy toward the United States moderated during the late 1970s is derived from critical-events analysis. Critical-events analysis is used "to identify those events which will produce the most useful explanations and predictions of social change."[41] Several key events in the period under study had major impact on the relations between Cuba and the United States. The first area of potential conflict was in Latin America. In January, 1966, for example, the Cuban government organized the Latin American Solidarity Organization to foment revolutionary movements. George Volsky stated that by 1970, however, not only had the organization ceased to be effective, but guerrilla groups backed by Cuba were

disappearing and Che Guevara not only had failed in Bolivia but had been killed.

Another area of international revolutionary activity by Cuba was in Africa. William LeoGrande said of those activities that, with

> ... the security of the revolution virtually assured, Cuba was able to pursue much more vigorously a policy objective which during the 1960s had been of low priority relative to the aim of ensuring the revolution's survival. This objective was the expansion of Cuban influence in the Third World; it was pursued by an expansion of Cuban aid missions, a more vocal Cuban role in the Movement of Nonaligned Nations, and (eventually) by the deployment of Cuban combat troops in Africa.[42]

By 1965, Cuba was providing arms and training for the Movimiento Popular de Libertacao de Angola, the Partido Africano da Independencia da Guine e Cabo Verde (PAIGC), and the Frente de Libertacao de Mozambique (FRELIMO).[43] The Cuban involvement in Africa was minimal from 1968 to 1972, when most activity moved to the Middle East.[44] From 1974 to 1979, however, Cuban troops participated in the Angolan civil war, and from 1977 to 1979 they participated in the civil conflict in Ethiopia. Cuban involvement grew from 750 to 1,100 men in 1966 (the high point of the 1960s) to a high of around 39,000 in 1978.[45] Volsky stated about Angola, the location of the greatest Cuban military involvement:

> Cuba's participation in the Angola civil war ... raised momentarily the specter of bilateral U.S.-Cuban military conflict.... And yet the Carter administration refrained from military confrontation of Cuban activities in the Horn of Africa and did not threaten Cuba directly. In

> sum, the U.S. military threat to continued revolutionary rule in Cuba was negligible by the late 1970s--drastically different from what it had been in the previous decade.[46]

In contrast, the relationship between Cuba and the United States has become more tense during the past four years. The anti-communist rhetoric of President Reagan's administration, which was inaugurated in January of 1981, was bellicose. Reagan launched a Caribbean Basin Initiative to counter Cuban moves in the area. He began the build-up of military support to the government of El Salvador, which was fighting leftist rebels, and he provided funds for the support of reactionary forces in their fight to topple the Cuban-backed Nicaraguan Sandinista government. Then, in October of 1983, President Reagan sent an invasion force to the Caribbean island of Grenada, where Cuban construction workers were building an airfield; 24 Cuban workers were killed.[47] It is to be expected, then, that the Cuban government's attitude toward the United States changed for the worse in the early 1980s, worsening even moreso in late 1983.

George Volsky stated that Cuban "hostility toward the United States was inherent in the dynamics of the revolutionary process."[48] He pointed out that Castro was not interested in reconciliation with the United States in the early 1960s, which was one reason the United States did not relax its policy toward Cuba. By 1970 the threat of Castro's revolution seemed less a problem, while the United States had more urgent problems at home and overseas.

Nevertheless, Volsky saw the United States as being unbending in its opposition to Cuba under Castro, even when other nations in the hemisphere were becoming more conciliatory. He stated that in spite of

> ... signs in 1970 that many Caribbean and South American nations would favor a change in the United States' Cuban policy, Washington's posture toward the Castro government remained unchanged in its hostility. In broad terms, the American policy sought to isolate revolutionary Cuba ideologically, preventing her influence from spreading to other Latin American countries. Moreover, by applying the so-called policy of economic denial, Washington strove to make the island's development as difficult as possible and its support by the Soviet Union equally costly....[49]

That a change in attitude between the two countries was possible in the late 1970s is suggested by Jorge Dominguez, who stated in 1979:

> In the mid-1960s, the Cuban government was concerned that U.S. foreign policy had taken a virulently aggressive turn. The United States invaded the Dominican Republic and introduced large numbers of U.S. troops in South Vietnam. In Latin America the U.S. took a strong anti-communist position with a distinct anti-Cuban slant. But in the late 1970s, the Dominican invasion has faded in the past. The U.S. is out of Vietnam. And there seems to be little taste among the U.S. public or its leaders for foreign intervention or, indeed, any kind of foreign policy which might increase the level of U.S. involvement anywhere in the world.
>
> The United States Department of Defense does not consider Cuba a serious threat to the U.S. security, though it considers it some threat. ... As for possible use of Cuba by the Soviets, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff has testified that the 'Soviet Union does not currently possess the capability to embark on military aggression in the region.' ... U.S. military forces are no longer poised to pounce on Cuba, and this fact reflects the basic policy judgment that a military confrontation in the

> Caribbean, with Cuba or the Soviet Union, has become highly unlikely. Cuba, in turn, has derived security from this judgment.[50]

William LeoGrande also commented on the relaxing of hostile posturing. He stated that the

> ... easing of international tensions, together with the U.S. defeat in Vietnam, greatly reduced the threat of U.S. military action against Cuba. It also stimulated political pressures for an end to sanctions against Cuba both in the United States and in the OAS.... In the United States, the obvious failure of the 1960s policy of isolation and destabilization set in motion a low but clear process of normalizing relations. Portions of the economic embargo were lifted, an anti-hijacking treaty was signed, and in 1974 secret negotiations on normalization were begun.
>
> During this period Cuba pursued a conciliatory foreign policy which reinforced these developments.... With the U.S. threat sharply reduced, Cuba began to seriously pursue normalization of relations in hopes of establishing trade relations which would reduce its economic dependence on the USSR.[51]

Granma, Cuban Media, and Propaganda

Granma Weekly Review

The data base for the study is the English language version of the Cuban Communist weekly review, Granma. The 600,000 circulation Granma daily was begun in 1965 with the merger of two newspapers with divergent ideologies--Naticias de hoy, headed by Soviet-style communists, and Revolucion, headed by Che Guevara.[52] The weekly review started in 1966. It is printed in Spanish, French, and English. It is a broadsheet newspaper, usually 12 pages in length in two sections. It makes liberal use of red ink as spot color. The front page identifies it as the

"Official Organ of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Cuba." The front page often covers only one topic and consists of many large headlines as well as large photographs. The newspaper covers events in Latin America and the Caribbean mainly, though it also covers international events. It runs stories and features that have appeared in the daily edition and reprints some stories that have run in other Cuban newspapers and magazines as well as in American newspapers. It also uses the Prensa Latina news service, supposedly an organization independent of the Cuban government. All of Castro's speeches are printed in the weekly edition. It runs stories on the arts, health, sports and other subjects. It also runs advertising for such things as Cuban cigars and tourism.

A letter to the author from the United States Department of State commented on how the publication is delivered in the United States:

> U.S. regulations allow the entry of single copies of Cuban publications into the United States. Specific licenses are also granted to universities, libraries, and scientific institutions for the importation of Cuban publications provided those institutions are on a list approved by the Library of Congress or the National Science Foundation. In such cases, no restriction is put on the method in which payment is made to Cuba.
>
> Cuba may also sell commercial quantities of publications in the United States to organizations other than those mentioned above. In such cases, the proceeds of these sales go into a blocked account in the name of the Cuban seller.[53]

Postal treaties in effect are a postal money order convention, signed in Washington on June 29, 1908, and operative on July 1, 1908; and the parcel post convention,

signed in Washington on July 24, 1930, and entered into force on September 1, 1930. An agreement for the exchange of official publications took place in an exchange of notes at Havana on May 4 and 12, 1938, and entered into force May 12, 1938.[54]

The newspaper was caught in a struggle between the Treasury Department and the Department of State in 1981. Cuban mail sent to the United States is delivered to Montreal on Cubana de Aviacion. It is put into the Canadian mail system and is not inspected when it enters the United States. When, in mid-May of 1981, a postal strike in Canada seemed imminent, 30,000 copies of Granma and the magazine Bohemia were delivered at one time to the Boston post office. It was said to be the largest amount of Cuban literature at any one place in the country at any one time. Boston customs officials notified the Treasury Department's Foreign Assets Control Division, and the Cuban Assets Control Regulations of July 8, 1963, were put into effect and the newspapers impounded under the 1917 trading with the enemy act. The 1963 regulations had not previously been put into effect.[55] Under the regulations, American citizens had to have a license to receive such controlled publications.

Persons to whom the newspapers were addressed were notified they had to obtain a permit before they would be sent the publication. To obtain a permit, a person had to be a journalist, professor or researcher with a bona fide interest in the publications. According to an article by

Susan Breidenbach, many subscribers were afraid to apply for a permit for fear they would appear on a "list of suspicious characters."[56] Others objected because they thought the First Amendment did not allow the use of licenses, which would restrict the flow of information. On July 21, 1981, representatives from the American Civil Liberties Union, the National Lawyers' Guild, the Center for Constitutional Rights, and other organizations met with Treasury Department officials. The Treasury Department proposed new regulations to let people have a single copy of each publication and groups to purchase up to 50 copies with no license. Hal Mayerson of the National Lawyers Guild said of the situation:

> The government is basing the licensing requirement on the alleged goal of keeping Cuba from benefiting financially from the sale of literature. But the maximum Cuba could realize through this is minuscule compared with the $50 million a year it gets from American tourism. And it is nothing when balanced against the First Amendment rights of Americans.[57]

An article in The New York Times on July 6, 1981, stated that Dennis D. O'Connell, director of the Foreign Assets Control Office, said of the action: "Our primary interest is financial transactions." He said "enemy" did not apply to Cuba but related to a national emergency that had been in effect since the 1962 embargo was declared. He said the Treasury Department was concerned with the unusually large shipment and that licensing was a secondary concern.[58] On July 9, 1981, The New York Times ran the following editorial:

> The Government is using an inappropriate law for dubious purposes to block delivery of 30,000 Cuban publications to American citizens. No one can sanely argue that national security is jeopardized by the distribution of such Cuban publications as Granma, a clearly labeled and crudely written propaganda weekly. To the contrary, access to Cuban journals is an important resource for scholars.
>
> These publications are sent free, meaning that Cuba gets no economic benefit from sending its journals by way of Canada....
>
> Petty in itself, the restriction carries a worrisome implication--that in the guise of national security, the administration is prepared to embargo the import of ideas. That is Fidel Castro's way of dealing with inconvenient doctrines. How peculiar that Americans should follow his example.[59]

Jose Pertierra said in a letter to the editor of The New York Times on July 15, 1981, that

> ... my right to believe as I choose [should] be securely guaranteed by the First Amendment of the Constitution of the United States. That right is presumably what sets this country apart from the rest of the world. Similarly guaranteed by the First Amendment is the right to read magazines and journals from other countries....
>
> I suppose I should apply for that 'license' from the Treasury Department if I want to continue to receive news from Cuba. But that would amount to a request to the government for permission to read, a request that I believed an American would never have to make.[60]

In February of 1982 the Treasury Department released the 100,000 copies of the publications that had been collecting for the previous nine months. Faced with a law suit from the American Civil Liberties Union, the Reagan administration had agreed to allow Americans to subscribe to publications from Cuba, Cambodia, North Vietnam, and North Korea, and delivery of Granma resumed.[61]

Mass Media in Cuba

Control of mass media has been important to Fidel Castro. Herbert Matthews, who interviewed Castro during his days in the mountains and chronicled the revolution, called Castro's use of revolutionary slogans in communicating with the people as "government by television," a phrase which Matthews originated in 1959. Matthews wrote about the place of emotion as

> ... a religious faith which came pouring over the radio waves and through the television screens in the words and presence of Fidel Castro. I coined a phrase at the time: government by television. The Revolution came in a flood of talk, as Fidel exhorted, explained, reasoned with, and aroused Cuba's millions day after day, night after night, four, five, six hours at a time. The world was amused; Cubans listened enthralled.[62]

Swiss journalist Jean Ziegler explained "government by television" by stating:

> With his non-stop TV shows Fidel Castro has actually created a new form of government that is just as original and will perhaps prove no less significant in its historic effects than the Greek invention of government by ballot, better known under the name of Democracy.[63]

John Nichols commented about the term:

> 'Government by television' is an apt description, Castro and his lieutenants knew that the success of their government depended on their ability to integrate disparate sectors of the Cuban society and collectively mobilize them behind goals of the communist Revolution. The mass media became prime tools in this process. And although Castro's public appearances and television addresses are less frequent today, the importance of the media has not diminished but is actually greater because it serves additional functions for the maturing Cuban Revolution.[64]

Castro's view of propaganda was: "Propaganda cannot be abandoned for a single minute, because it is the soul of every struggle."[65] Nichols stated that since 1959 two factors have influenced Cuban media:

> First, mass communication is not only important to the Revolution, but Castro considers it the very soul of the process. Second, mass communication in a revolution must be flexible, able to adjust to changing circumstances. Accordingly, as the Cuban Revolution zigzagged through several phases during the past two decades, so too has the role of the Cuban media frequently changed.[66]

By late 1960 Castro had closed private newspapers and magazines and had taken over the broadcasting media. Soon he had installed a Soviet communist mass media system with the motto: "For those within the Revolution, complete freedom; for those against the Revolution, no freedom.[67] Che Guevara merged the two competing party newspapers in 1965 in favor of a new vehicle, Granma, to be an educational medium for the masses and a way to keep them following the Marxist ideological line. Since 1975 Cuban publications have served a "critical function in which they serve as channels for citizens' complaints about the tactical operation of the government."[68] The other of the dailies in Juventud Rebelde (Rebellious Youth), published by the Union of Young Communists. Los Trabajadores (Workers) is published by the Central Union of Cuban Workers three times a week. There are more than 50 magazines and journals, which have more latitude in commenting on political issues.[69]

Persons with important positions in communication also are among the top leadership of the party and

government. Nichols stated that

> ... the cooperation of the channel subsystem by the source subsystem is so complete that it may be said that, whereas Marxist-Leninist theory dictates that communicators must be servants of the state, Cuban media policy-makers and, to a large degree, practitioners, are not only servants of the state, they <u>are</u> the state.[70]

Nichols found that 71 percent (32) of the media policy-makers in Cuba had at least one position of significance within the power structure and--although information available is limited--the same may be said of many others. Jorge Enrique Mendoza, director of <u>Granma</u>, was one of Castro's main propagandists during his guerrilla war. He is a member of the Central Committee and a deputy to the National Assembly while formerly holding important positions in the Ministry of Education and the National Institute of Agrarian Reform. As Nichols put it, "It is, of course, unlikely that the Cuban government would find the need to censor such a member of the inner circle of power."[71] A study by Jorge I. Dominguez revealed that 25.2 percent of Cuban reporters are members of the Communist Party and another 16.4 percent members of the Communist Youth Union, as compared to 2.2 percent of the population.[72] That the mass media in Cuba are tightly controlled also can be seen by a statement made by Castro in 1964: "We have a goal, a program, an objective to fulfill, and that objective essentially controls the activity of the journalists."[73]

ENDNOTES

[1]Lester D. Langley, The Cuban Policy of the United States: A Brief History (New York, 1968), p. ix.

[2]Ibid., p. 109.

[3]Ibid., pp. 123-124.

[4]Ibid., p. 126.

[5]Ibid., pp. 156-161.

[6]Ibid., p. 162.

[7]Ibid., p. 169.

[8]Ibid., p. 170.

[9]George Volsky, "Cuba," The United States and the Caribbean, ed. Tad Szulc (Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1971), p. 99.

[10]On Trial: Fidel Castro/Regis Debray (London, 1968), p. 5.

[11]Volsky, p. 99.

[12]Ibid.

[13]Langley, pp. 171-172.

[14]Ibid., p. 172.

[15]Volsky, p. 100.

[16]Langley, p. 172.

[17]Volsky, p. 122.

[18]Ibid.; also Langley, p. 173.

[19]Langley, p. 173.

[20]Ibid., pp. 174-175.

[21]Volsky, p. 122.

[22]Ibid., p. 123.

[23]Langley, pp. 175-176.

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[25]Volsky, p. 123.

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CHAPTER II

RATIONALE FOR THE STUDY

Structure of the Communication Act

A model for the structure of communicative behavior was presented almost 40 years ago by Harold Lasswell when he posed this theoretical question: Who ... says what ... in which channel ... to whom ... and with what effect?[1] Since then many researchers have studied the various parts of that question, and there still is uncertainty about the way the links in the communication process are joined together. All that is known, as Bernard Berelson stated is that, "Some kinds of communication on some kinds of issues, brought to the attention of some kinds of people under some kinds of conditions, have some kinds of effects."[2] The question remains: How do the model's ingredients interact?

Early communication theory suggested communication was a passive activity for the receiver. The message was "injected" as with a hypodermic needle or "shot" as magic bullets into the listener or reader.[3] Later research led to the concept of communication not as a stimulus-response act but as an active process, with the receiver seen at times as being obstinate in rejecting media persuasion.[4] Communication research evolved from research in psychology,

sociology and political science in the 1930s because, first, advertisers were interested in finding out how to spend their money with more effectiveness and, second, because Americans were frightened about the propaganda activities of Hitler's Germany. Peter Sandman, David Rubin, and David Sachsman wrote:

> The research tradition that developed over the next 30 years was devoted to answering one basic question: What factors determine how much impact a particular piece of communication will have on the attitudes of its audience? ...[5]

Persuasion and propaganda, then, more than information or entertainment, were the first concern of communications researchers. At least six major findings came out of the early studies of propaganda and persuasion:

> 1. It is usually better to state your conclusions explicitly than to let your audience draw its own conclusions.
> 2. Arguments presented at the beginning or end of a communication are remembered better than arguments presented in the middle.
> 3. Emotional appeals are often more effective than strictly rational ones.
> 4. When dealing with an audience that disagrees with your position, it helps to acknowledge some validity to the opposing view.
> 5. Attitude change may be greater some time after a communication than right after it.
> 6. High-credibility sources ... provide more attitude change than low-credibility sources, even if the reason for the credibility has nothing to do with the topic of the communication.[6]

The findings proved useful in advertising and both in countering Nazi propaganda and in producing Allied propaganda, as well as in producing other types of persuasion in everyday life in a capitalistic, democratic society. Researchers, however, found that the principles did not

always work.[7] They found four things wrong with them:

> First, the majority of the early studies were conducted in the laboratories of academic social sciences, using students as subjects.... The complexities and counter-pressures of reality just couldn't be duplicated in controlled laboratory experiments.
>
> Second, most of the studies dealt with topics of some intellectual importance but practically no audience involvement.... The way attitudes are changed on these sorts of topics turned out to be almost irrelevant. Most propagandists were interested in gut-grabbing topics.... Audiences already had strong emotional commitments to those issues....
>
> Third, most attitude-change research was based on an over-simplified model of how attitudes are related to information and behavior. Most studies assumed that if the audience learned the message, its attitudes would be changed. Even more studies assumed that if attitudes (as expressed on a questionnaire) were changed, behavior would inevitably change, too....
>
> Fourth, the early research on attitude change virtually ignored the audience.... The audience was viewed as just being there, passive, receiving the message and then changing or not changing depending on the source's skill and know-how.
>
> ... It took communication researchers thirty years to acknowledge these truths fully, because for thirty years they concentrated on the source and the message and almost ignored the audience.[8]

Communication is more than a transfer of ideas, then. It is more than stimulus and response. Theory suggested the audience must be taken into account. In 1949 Wilbur Schramm used the terms "immediate reward" and "delayed reward" to account for audience response,[9] and Leon Festinger suggested a continuum of "consummatory purpose" (at the point of consumption) and "instrumental purpose" (as an instrument for future behavior) to explain the effects of different messages.[10] Schramm saw that, for communication to take place, the sender and receiver must take equal part. He stated:

> This concept of the equality of sender and receiver in the communication process is one building block for a newer model of process. Communication is not a process in which somebody does something to someone, or in which something flows unchanged through a channel from one person to another, but rather it is a relationship.... If one accepts this viewpoint, then he can make use of a number of social concepts that illuminate the communication relationship.... What function is communication performing for the different participants? (Is one expecting to be entertained, to be informed, to be instructed? Is one trying to persuade, to sell, to please, or to seek information?) What customs govern the behavior within the relationship?...[11]

Has the pendulum now swung too far from source to receiver, from the "magic bullet" to "obstinate audience"? Sandman, Rubin, and Sachsman stated that in the 1970s communication shifted toward the middle in the debate. They wrote, reminiscent of Berelson:

> ... The mass media do affect the audience. The nature of that effect is controlled jointly by individual sources, by individual members of the audience, by the social system surrounding both source and audience, and by the media themselves.[12]

Schramm also wrote that a synthesis might be helpful in understanding the communication process better. He stated:

> Thus, the building blocks of a new social model of communication are available, although no one as yet has put them together in a fully satisfying form. However, the readers of these volumes might be well advised to consider this kind of social model rather than the process model that typically has been used. It is interesting to note that whereas Harold Lasswell's distinguished essay of 1948 specified the catalogue headings that have long been used for examining the process in its minutiae, another part of that same essay may in the long run be more helpful to the understanding of communication in society. This is the passage in which he spoke of the functions of communication as surveillance, coordination, and transmission of the social heritage.[13]

W. Phillips Davison also suggested the utility of looking again at the three functions outlined by Lasswell.[14] He proposed looking at both closed and open systems. He wrote:

> Regardless of the manner in which channels are operated or controlled, they must perform a number of sociopolitical functions if the society in which they are located is to survive, and if they themselves are to survive. The three basic functions have been described by Lasswell as providing surveillance of the environment, linking the parts of a society together so that it can function as an organism, and transmitting the social inheritance from one generation to another. The surveillance function involves providing many varieties of social units, and the nation itself, with information about the external situation....
>
> Social linkage is provided by communication in social units of all sizes.... These internal communications enable decisions to be made and implemented, with each element of the organization doing its part. A similar process can be observed in whole nations....
>
> The nature of political and economic systems plays a large part in determining the kinds of differentiated channels that emerge and the efficiency with which these channels function helps to determine the nature of the political and economic systems....
>
> Transmission of the social inheritance is a third basic function that communication provides for society.... For a channel to exist it must be able to provide a service to the society; and if social needs change then the structure and/or content of the channel also will change.[15]

Even though source, channel, and audience are interrelated, they can be looked at separately, too. Davison stated that the communication channel has five dimensions:

> Diffusion: How widely is it available?
>
> Control: Who determines the content flowing through it?
>
> Social functions: What role does it play in the society?
>
> Individual functions: How does it serve the individual?
>
> Physical characteristics: What are its costs, capabilities, and so on?[16]

Davison added that:

> Just as the components of the total communications process are interrelated, so are the dimensions of the subsystems that constitute the channel. The degree of availability or dispersion of a channel has a bearing on its control, its functions, and its size or other physical aspects....[17]

The dimensions of the channel will differ in various types of societies, depending upon the amount of government regulation of the media, and for the type of consumption--internal or external.

Fred Siebert, Theodore Peterson, and Wilbur Schramm proposed four "theories of the press"--four forms of government interference or non-interference in mass media affairs.[18] They are the "authoritarian," "libertarian," "social responsibility" and "Soviet communist" theories. In the authoritarian system, the media are controlled by government patents, licensing or censorship. In the Soviet communist/totalitarian system, only orthodox party members are allowed to operate the media, which may not be adversely critical of the system or its objectives. In the libertarian system, the media are owned and run by anyone with the money, time, and desire to do so. Under social responsibility--more a theory than the others--the media are controlled by public opinion and professional ethics with the government prepared to keep the media in line if necessary.[19] Referring to those theories, Siebert, Peterson, and Schramm stated:

> Partly, of course, these differences reflect the ability of a country to pay for its press, the mechanical ingenuity and resources that can be put behind mass communication, and the relative degree of urbanization which makes the circulation of mass

> media at once easier and more necessary. Partly, the differences in the press of different countries reflect simply what people do in different places and what their experience leads them to want to read about.
>
> But there is a more basic and important reason for these differences. The thesis of this volume is that the press always takes on the form and coloration of the social and political structures within which it operates. Especially, it reflects the system of social control whereby the relation of individuals and institutions are adjusted. We believe that an understanding of these aspects of society is basic to any systematic understanding of the press.
>
> To see the differences between press systems in full perspective, then, one must look at the social systems in which the press functions. To see the social systems in their true relationship to the press, one has to look at certain basic beliefs and assumptions which the society holds: the nature of man, the nature of society and the state, the relation of man to the state, and the nature of knowledge and truth....[20]

Most of the components of a study of mass media are now in place. First, it is necessary to look at the source, message, channel, receiver, and the effect of the communication. Then, too, it is necessary to look at the political system and how it affects source, message, channel, and receiver and what its goals are in the determination of the effect. Davison addressed the problems of such a determination:

> Who determines what content flows through all these channels? Obviously, those who control or own the channels do so. But this answer is as unsatisfactory as it is equivocal. What we really are interested in is how decisions about content are made, and in specifying the forces that influence what is actually communicated. From the viewpoint of content determination, channels can be ordered within a spectrum: at one end are media whose content are determined entirely by the interests of the communicator; at the other end are those whose content is determined entirely by the audience....[21]

What are some of the interests of the communicator? Davison stated:

> All five dimensions of communication channels that have been mentioned can be used as a basis for categorizing them. They may be widely available or scarce; they may be 'free' or controlled; they may be vehicles for political propaganda or may serve other functions; people may use them for entertainment, information, or other purposes.[22]

Schramm wrote that knowledge from research on various process elements "is neither simple nor straightforward, and almost invariably it is interactive with other elements in the process.[23] He added:

> Furthermore, studies of this kind, which are as a group the most carefully designed and conducted example of communication research, typically have used attitudes and opinions as dependent variables, persuasion as the measured effect. This is all right except that it neglects the relation of attitudes to action; or, more precisely, the relation of expressed opinions to other behavior. Often these other actions are the effects one actually desired.[24]

He stated that reviews by A.W. Wicker[25] and Leon Festinger[26] determined that few studies had been able to show that behavior change has resulted from shown attitude change. Indeed,

> ...the relationship has proved as often to be the other way: attitudes have been changed to fall into line with behavior. This is not to say that attitudes are unimportant or that such research is not useful--only that this relationship, like most of the other relationships we have been discussing, is a complex one. No cookbook of infallible recipes for communication effect emerges from the research on elements of the communication process, as Hans Speier pointed out nearly twenty-five years ago in 'Psychological Warfare Re-examined.'[27]

Schramm stated that a model was proposed in 1949 that can "bridge the gap between research on process elements

and practical use of communication to achieve a result."[28]

The main points in the 1949 study were:

> 1. The 'message' (information, facts, etc.) must reach the sense organs of the persons who are to be influenced.
> 2. Having reached the sense organs, the 'message' must be accepted as a part of a person's cognitive structure.
> 3. To induce a given action by mass persuasion, this action must be seen by the person as a path to some goal that he had.
> 4. To induce a given action, an appropriate cognitive and motivational system must gain control of the person's behavior at a particular point in time.[29]

Schramm proposed that the model is not a simple one. It must consist of such information as:

> What categories does the person who is to be influenced use to 'characterize stimulus situations,' and what changes in his cognitive structure does he try to protect himself against? Under what circumstances will a message that is inconsistent with a person's cognitive structure produce a change in that structure rather than be rejected or distorted? What are the 'desired goals' that a message must be made to seem to lead toward?[30]

The simple stimulus-response psychological model, Schramm stated, should be replaced by a stimulus-organism-response model from cognitive psychology.[31] Based on such a model, the present status of research in the area of media effects is limited, both in its positive and negative effects. Schramm said what can be stated at this time is that

> ... whether the predominant influences are good or bad, the media clearly enter into the forming of character, values, ideas, and social behavior. Although we cannot say exactly what their influence is, we can hardly doubt that it is profound.[32]

Communication and Propaganda Research

Since communication research began as a means of studying persuasion and propaganda, those areas seem a logical place to begin in firming up the bridge Cartwright constructed in 1949 between research on process elements and a practical use of communication research. The Institute for Propaganda Analysis, which operated from 1937 until the United States entered into World War II, stated in its journal, Propaganda Analysis, that propaganda is

> ... the expression of opinion or action by individuals or groups deliberately designed to influence opinions or actions of other individuals or groups without reference to predetermined ends.[33]

It stated that

> ... propaganda analysis, viewed in its whole scope, becomes a method not only of detecting propaganda but of understanding the conflicting points of view that give rise to it....[34]

John Clews pointed out that the use in Europe of the word "propaganda" in the sense of an organized campaign goes back to 1622, when Pope Gregory XV founded the Sacre Congregatio de Fide for missionary work abroad. By 1842 its dictionary meaning was: "The spread of opinions and principles by secret associations, which are viewed by most governments with horror and aversion."[35] Clews noted that political connotations soon overcame the original positive meaning. He stated that, though the Penguin Political Dictionary of 1942 did not list the word, Penguin's 1957 edition of A Dictionary of Politics called propaganda: "Statements of policy or facts, usually of a political

nature, the real purpose of which is different from their apparent purpose."[36] The transformation of the word was complete.

Despite the late emergence of the political use of the word, the act has a long history. The history of what Clews calls "dynamic propaganda"--i.e., a "deliberately planned campaign aimed at influencing the minds, emotions and ultimately the actions of specific groups"--goes back as far as the spoken word.[37] A well-known 19th century example is that of Harriet Beecher Stowe's Uncle Tom's Cabin, which Clews called "an outstanding example of agitation literature."[38] He called a companion book, The Key to Uncle Tom's Cabin, "a documentary collection prepared by Mrs. Stowe for the use of what communists today would call propagandist cadres."[39] Clews stated that propaganda tactics became widely known because of the techniques perfected by Nazi Germany but that many of those techniques can be traced back to Napoleon.[40]

The details of propaganda technique were outlined in The Crowd by Gustave le Bon and were used by Lenin and later communist leaders as well as by Hitler. Clews wrote:

> A man alone, said le Bon, may be a cultivated individual, but put him in a crowd and he is a barbarian, a creature acting on instinct.... Crowds think in extremes, accepting or rejecting beliefs as a whole....[41]

The Institute of Propaganda Analysis identified seven common propaganda devices:

> 1. Name Calling is a device to make us form a judgment without examining the evidence on which

it is based. Here the propagandist appeals to our latent fear.

2. Glittering Generalities is a device by which the propagandist identifies his program with virtue by use of 'virtue words.' Here he appeals to our emotions of love, generosity, and brotherhood. He uses words like truth, freedom, honor, liberty, social justice, public service, the right to work, loyalty, progress, democracy....

3. Transfer is a device by which the propagandist carries over the authority, sanction, and prestige of something we respect and revere to something he would have us accept.

4. The Testimonial is a device to make us accept anything from a patent medicine or a cigarette to a program of national policy. In this device the propagandist makes use of testimonials; ... counter-testimonials may be employed.

5. Plain Folks is a device... [propagandists use] to win our confidence by appearing to be people like ourselves.

6. Card Stacking is a device in which the propagandist employs all the art of deception to win our support for himself, his group, nation, race, policy, practice, belief or ideal. He stacks the cards against the truth ... [by] red-herring, smoke screen, lies, censorship, distortion, half-truth....

7. Band Wagon is a device to make us follow the crowd, to accept the propagandist's program en masse. Here the theme is: Everybody's doing it.[42]

However, even the best propaganda techniques are not going to succeed unless the audience is receptive. The degree to which a propagandist is successful, Lasswell stated, depends a great deal on his method of organization.[43] Serge Chatotin in The Rape of the Masses stated that good propaganda campaigns must be planned and must list not only the groups to be influenced but also the way each is to be influenced.[44] John Clews stated that the definitions of groups "is most important, for to be successful propaganda must activate emotions and it can only do this when they are already in existence or lying dormant."[45] The Institute

of Propaganda Analysis listed the mental processes a successful propagandist must appeal to in influencing an audience as: 1. custom; 2. simplification; 3. frustration; 4. displacement; 5. anxiety; 6. reinforcement; 7. association; 8. universals; 9. projection; 10. identification; and 11. rationalization.[46]

The receptivity of an audience is improved by what Lasswell called "the holy phrase which crystallizes public aspirations about it."[47] The "holy phrase" is an example of the propagandist's use of what Lasswell called "significant symbols."[48] The Institute of Propaganda Analysis stated that

> ... symbols are substitutes for words. Like words, they stand for various ideas, things, actions, ideals, goals. Some stand for whole complexes of ideas, actions, ideals, goals....
> ... These meanings and our responses to them are implanted in our minds, through education and training. Finally, they get to our spinal cords. Our responses to them become automatic.... It is this factor of 'automatic response' that propagandists count on when they employ symbols. They seek our instant automatic approval or disapproval of the individual, group or goal they would have us approve or condemn.[49]

Communist Propaganda Techniques

The Institute of Propaganda Analysis differentiated between two types of propaganda: "ordinary propaganda" and "provocative propaganda." It suggested that the two types must be analyzed differently. One article stated:

> All propaganda is designed to influence our thinking. The propaganda of <u>provocation</u> is particularly effective because its unique form helps it to escape recognition and analysis when

> the usual rules of detection are applied. It obtains its effect in a backward, second-hand way. It seldom tries to tell us what to think; instead, it tries to create in us the belief that another person or group has certain beliefs or designs; and then relies on our own mental backgrounds to produce the desired reaction.[50]

Ordinary propaganda, on the other hand, is easier to analyze, because the propagandist is working "for predetermined ends." The propagandist

> ... may not tell the truth about anything else, but about one thing he will not lie: what he wants people to do or to believe. Hence a piece of ordinary propaganda can often be analyzed by asking first what the propagandist wants you to do or believe....
>
> Not so with provocative propaganda. The master of this technique does not try to influence your thinking directly; he goes in roundabout fashion....[51]

Provocative propaganda is more likely to anger a large segment of a population. It uses false or "planted" arguments as "straw men" that can be knocked down easily.[52]

The problem of the modern world, Clews stated, is that it is becoming more difficult to tell the difference between truth and lies. Because of the difficulty in discerning truth, many people see their side as having a "corner" on the truth and the other side on lies. In that situation

> ... the skilled operator of deliberate lies has a receptive audience, for where an accidental half-lie becomes accepted as fact, things are made easy for the complete and deliberate fabrication. Occasionally, as they mount up, so the lies will react on those who make them.[53]

Communist propaganda may be seen as not merely "provocative" with no substance. Even though non-communists may not understand communist propaganda, Clews noted, "they are

perfectly clear in their own minds."[54]

How is communist propaganda to be interpreted, then? Clews wrote:

> In assessing communist propaganda, we must first assess ourselves. We must be quite sure in our own minds what we mean when we use those words which flow so freely off the tongue--freedom, democracy, equality, fraternity, peace. We must be just as sure of ourselves when we resort to those equally glib adjectives reactionary, undemocratic, fascist, anti-popular, repressive. When weighing the communist use of such words, we must remember the esoteric double-talk meanings given to them in Party parlance. For the communist, freedom, democracy, equality, fraternity and, above all, peace can only come when communism is firmly established throughout the world. Whatever forces oppose communism, they are by their very nature reactionary, undemocratic, fascist, anti-popular and repressive. When we study the communist viewpoint, we must consider it in terms of these double values.[55]

A recent article tested the hypothesis that communists tell the truth--at least in some contexts. Robert Axelrod and William Zimmerman studied statements in the Soviet Communist Party newspapers Pravda and Izvestia that related to foreign policy action after 1945. They found that the

> ... Soviet leadership is ... careful about what appears in Pravda and Izvestia on Soviet foreign policy. The attention to words often results in a highly ambiguous style of discourse. It is an ambiguity that derives not from careless disregard for the facts, but that is carefully formulated.... (T)he formulations employed to describe Soviet policy rarely represent direct deceptions.[56]

John Martin listed international political propaganda as "nothing but purposive communication at the international level."[57] He stated that Soviet propaganda seeks to reach "the masses" (a term Levin said "changes in accordance with the character of the struggle").[58] Martin stated that

> ... the targets of communist propaganda are all those alienated elements of the public that are looking for an antipodal banner to which to rally so that they can work out their resentments against the establishment. This is considered to be the magnetic power of communist propaganda....
>
> ... (C)ommunist doctrine ... calls for a target or audience structure shaped like an inverted pyramid. All-encompassing at the top is the universe of disaffected individuals who, according to communist dogma, tend to be the downtrodden masses of 'toilers.' ... Conceptually lower but subsumed within this majority are the discriminated-against radical, ethnic, social, and other minorities.... Marxist-Leninist theory specifies three aditional groups,... the armed forces, young people, and intellectuals.... Communist propaganda generally works through the next level, which comprises a variety of importuning and denunciatory groups, in which the propaganda target is the leadership.... Finally, at the pyramid's nadir is the small nucleus of trained agitators, an audience of faithful party workers....[59]

Phillip J. Tichenor, George A. Donahue, and Clarice Olien have stated that all systems have some sort of press control.[60] Fred Siebert, Theodore Peterson, and Wilbur Schramm noted in their book that different political systems also have different types of controls over media. In communist countries, mass media not only are more strongly influenced by policies of the government, but they are an instrument of government. Phillips Davison stated that this

> ... influence can be seen in the degree of diffusion of the media, the extent of state or party control, the functions that the media serve for the society and the individual, and even in the physical characteristics of some of the media.[61]

He stated that the basic social responsibilities of the media in communist states are similar to those of mass media in industrialized democracies; however, "the communist media are concentrated to a far greater extent on advancing

purposes defined by the party and the state."[62] He wrote that all communication channels' function is

> ... to bring instructions from those in authority to the masses, to inform people how to do the jobs called for in economic or political plans, and to inculcate approved norms and values....[63]

Propaganda Analysis and Content Analysis

John Clews stated that the lessons of history "have shown repeatedly the vital strategic and tactical function of propaganda at decisive periods in the progress of civilization."[64] The analysis of propaganda, then, may be seen as an area where fruitful--and useful--information might be discerned. The Institute of Propaganda Analysis suggested such an undertaking in the final issue of its journal. It stated:

> Thus the analysis of any major propaganda gives an insight into the social forces which the propaganda represents. So propaganda analysis--the search behind the propagandist's words to see what he is trying to accomplish--becomes an approach to the study of current social issues. It is a method as old as Socrates, as has often been pointed out, but so many ideas have come to be taken for granted that the study of them has all the novelty of exploration.[65]

Harold Lasswell's 1927 study of World War I was a pioneering work in propaganda analysis. In it he determined four major objectives of propaganda: 1. to mobilize hatred against the enemy; 2. to preserve the friendship of allies; 3. to preserve the friendship and, if possible, to procure the cooperation of neutrals; and 4. to demoralize the enemy.[66] In 1935 Lasswell called for a continuous survey

of "world attention" by looking at symbolic behavior.[67] Lasswell proposed general categories of content and the development of some quantitative indicators to measure content. Lasswell conducted a "Wartime Communication Study" in 1940-41.[68] He and Paul Lazarsfeld performed a content analysis study of German newspapers during World War II--and later of Japanese newspapers--and were able to learn a great deal about the Axis war effort.[69] Ernst Kris and Hans Speier carried out a wartime study entitled "Research Project on Totalitarian Communication," and the Media Division of the Office of War Information conducted content studies of newspapers, magazines, radio, newsreels, and comics. The Federal Communications Commission prepared weekly reports and special reports on domestic newspaper content.[70]

Alexander George, who wrote about inferences made from the Nazi propaganda in World War II, stated that propaganda analysis has two purposes: "the summary, or selective description of what is being said by the propagandist"; and "the interpretation of the intentions, strategy, and calculations behind propaganda communications."[71] George stated that while two types of propaganda analysis--description and inference--were useful, inferences were possibly more valuable and more difficult. He suggested a distinction be made between "procedures followed to infer the <u>actions</u> taken by a political elite and its propagandists and those used to infer the speaker's <u>meaning</u>."[72]

He also noted the problem of estimating both the meaning of words and inferring the speaker's purpose or propaganda goal. He stated:

> An inference about the speaker's purpose (or propaganda goal) in turn may lead to inferences about their aspect of the action, such as the political policy or intention which that propaganda goal is designed to promote or the calculations and situational estimates on which that policy and that propaganda strategy is based.[73]

George stated that the attempt to clarify the means to the inference of meaning and action through propaganda analysis is part of a wider problem, that of "transforming inferential procedures and expert judgments which at the present time are largely in the nature of intuitive art into science."[74] The basic assumption of the World War II study was that changes in Nazi propaganda content reflected changes in "situational factors" and in German policy rather than changes in basic ideology or cultural factors affecting behavior.[75] George added that the propaganda analyst makes the assumption "that the elite and the propagandist are trying to achieve something they want." He also stated that the analyst assumes that, at least to some extent, propagandists use "rational calculation for this purpose."[76]

One technique of propaganda analysts is content analysis. Content analysis of non-propaganda aspects of communication began about the same time as propaganda analysis. The first major study of communication was The Country Newspaper, published in 1926 by Malcolm Willey.[77] The categories were subject ones previously used in

literature. Paul Lazarsfeld's work about public opinion, as well as propaganda, consisted of description of subject matter and measurement of the space given to each category.[78]

Bernard Berelson repeated a 1943 statement as to what the purpose of content analysis was:

> The content analyst aims at a quantitative classification of a given body of content, in terms of a system of categories devised to yield data relevant to specific hypotheses concerning that content.[79]

Ole Holsti stated the following definition:

> Content analysis is a multipurpose research method developed specifically for investigating a broad spectrum of problems in which the content of communication serves as the basis of inference.[80]

Fred Kerlinger stated: "Content analysis is a method of studying and analyzing communications in a systematic, objective, and quantitative manner to measure variables."[81] Berelson stated that of most concern in content analysis is "the extent to which the analytic categories appear in the content, that is, the relative emphases and omissions."[82] The assumption of content analysis, first, is that inferences can be made concerning the relationship of intent to content or of content to effect or that an actual relationship can be found. A second assumption is that research on "manifest meaning" is meaningful.[83]

Berelson said of content analysis: "In the classic sentence identifying the process of communication--'<u>who</u> says <u>what</u> to <u>whom</u>, <u>how</u>, with <u>what</u> <u>effect</u>'--communication content is the <u>what</u>."[84] Holsti, however, stated that content analysis can be used in each of the elements of

communication. Of the characteristics of content, he cited the following uses:

> 'What': to describe trends in communication content; to audit communication content against standards....
> 'How': to analyze techniques of persuasion; to analyze style....
> 'To Whom': to relate known characteristics of the audience to messages produced for them; to describe patterns of communication.[85]

Of the antecedents of content, he gave the following uses:

> 'Why': to secure military and political intelligence; to analyze psychological traits of individuals; to infer aspects of culture and cultural change; to provide legal evidence....
> 'Who': to determine who wrote a communication....[86]

He commented about the uses of the results of communication:

> 'With What Effect': to measure readability; to analyze the flow of information; to assess responses to communication.[87]

Though most authorities on the subject indicate that content analysis subsumes propaganda analysis, George gave several differences. He stated that content analysis is quantitative and not qualitative. Propaganda analysis makes use of quantitative procedure but also uses procedures not employed in content analysis. He stated that content analysis is used for "relatively precise, objective, and reliable observations about the frequency with which given content characteristics occur singly or in conjunction with another.[88]

George noted that sometimes frequency of word appearance is not so important as the fact that particular words appear in the communication, something he called

"qualitative analysis."[89] Holsti called it "contingency analysis," a term earlier used by Charles Osgood.[90] Berelson, considering the qualitative dimension, said frequency of appearance alone is not enough. He stressed the content of particular symbols.[91] Berelson stated that such "qualitative analysis is done in small or incomplete samples and that it is somewhat less concerned with content as such as with content as "a 'reflection' of 'deeper' phenomena."[92] He cautioned, however, that

> ... the question of counting has occasionally been considered in the literature as a matter of compromise between reliability of analysis and richness of categories, or as the sacrifice of one to the other. In this view only relatively simple or threadbare categories are amenable to reliable counting, and hence qualitative analysis is limited to them. If reliability is rigidly required, then ideas of a sophisticated, novel, or subtle nature are automatically excluded and must be analyzed qualitatively....[93]

Andrew G. Walder stated that what ties the various content analysis methods together is: a) the development of typologies or scales for classification; b) the application of numerical coding for each category; and c) the statistical manipulation of the coding to discover relationships and the extent of change. He stated that content analysis makes the best use of limited information by using "strictly defined procedures", and rigorous statistical techniques allow the analyst to discover "relationships and patterns of variation that are not intuitively obvious."[94] As to the problems of content analysis, Berelson cautioned:

> If the study does not deal with a large and representative body of materials to be analyzed in terms of a set of highly specifiable categories which appear with substantial frequencies, in order to produce objective and precise results --if these conditions are not met, careful counting is probably not warranted....[95]

Content Analysis as a Research Tool

Andrew Walder stated that content analysis' strength is not just that of its technical advantages but that its use necessitates "careful thought and explicit enumeration of possible sources of bias, and strategies to circumvent or correct them." Furthermore, he commented:

> The strength of content analysis, therefore, is not so much that it eliminates the problems presented by the sources, but that it exposes to the critical reader the set of assumptions and decisions that lead to a particular conclusion--information that is not made explicit in other methods.[96]

Morris Janowitz stated: "Content analysis has been joined more and more with other methodologies to produce a more integrated research strategy."[97]

What, then, is the current status of content analysis as a research tool? Janowitz stated that he noticed an improvement of research from 1969 to 1976. He stated that it had become more of a "standard methodology of academic research and it has been used conspicuously in public policy investigations, such as that of the Kerner Commission."[98] He stated that the major problem in the use of content analysis has been the lack of "an extensive and accessible" data base.[99] The first significant attempt for such a data base came in 1969 with the "Trend Report of the Center

for Policy Process," under John Naisbitt.[100] The data base was used by Naisbitt for his recent best-seller, Megatrends.[101] The "revival" of content analysis has come about, to some extent, by problems inherent in the dominant technique in mass communication studies, public opinion surveying. Janowitz wrote about the resurgence of interest in content analysis:

> Rapidly--and almost unexpectedly--the importance of content analysis has been enhanced. Of course, survey research is certain to remain a dominant technique for the study of mass attitudes and the influence of the mass media. However, a variety of intellectual, professional, and technical observations has been made about sample surveys; not the least pressing is caused by the steep increase in costs as well as the escalation of nonresponse rates. On the other hand ... the procedures and the logic of content analysis as they relate to the study of socio-political change have improved and sharpened.[102]

Content analysis, then, has increased in usefulness as the problems of survey research have become better understood. Janowitz mentioned these reasons for the growing critical evaluation of surveying: increased costs and increased rate of non-response; questions of respondent rights; a growing intellectual criticism about how it charts change in social dynamics; and the narrow perspective it gives on the development of the social sciences.[103] Most telling may be that survey research has come to be thought of as "an instrument for mass manipulation rather than as an aid to collective problem solving."[104] Content analysis does not have those weaknesses, and it measures what people say or write in a non-laboratory, real-world

setting. It rests on "demonstrated results and not ad hoc arguments about potential developments."[105] Janowitz stated: "The revitalization of content analysis draws on a rich body of intellectual tradition and a growing level of methodological sophistication."[106]

Research by the Trend Report in one content field (urban affairs), using as a data base the country's top newspapers, has shown that the content of stories in one area can be seen as a "relatively closed system." Janowitz said of the trend that he saw:

> The data show a pattern of stability and change. Thus, for example, from the summer of 1973 to the summer of 1974, there was a discernible increase in attention paid to housing and urban development, while law and order, and welfare and poverty declined. Attention to the others remained constant.[107]

Content analysis's utility has been found to be directly proportional to the time span covered. Such cumulative aspects of the mass media is another area in which Janowitz has found survey research has fallen short. He noted that recent social research into the effect of the mass media confirms the cumulative effect of the media and is in line with the trend study approach to content analysis.[108]

Richard A. Peterson has developed a "non-exhaustive taxonomy" covering five types of content analysis: textual analysis, communication analysis, persuasion analysis, bias analysis, and production analysis. His definitions of the types are as follows:

> Textual analysis ... focuses on the text of the cultural products being studied (to relate it to texts of a similar theme, metaphor, linguistic structure; used in humanity areas such as music, literature) ....
>
> Communication analysis ... focuses on the process of communication, asking whether the sender encodes what he intends and whether the receiver decodes the same or a different message ....
>
> Persuasion analysis ... focuses on how communicators craft their messages in an effort to be most influential....
>
> Bias analysis ... asks whether a particular set of symbols accurately represents a known state of society or of a social institution....
>
> Reflection analysis ... asks in what ways the content of the symbols are [sic] shaped by the milieu in which they are produced (generally looking more closely at the dynamics of the symbol-producing organization itself).[109]

Peterson suggested a merging of American "positivist" and European Marxist or "philosophical" methods, which would

> ... combine the methodological rigor and care about generalizations characteristic of the positivist solving and concern about the political implications of research characteristic of the critical/theoretical continental tradition.[110]

What is in the future for content analysis, then? Peterson stated that it

> ... will most likely come not in the method and application of content analysis per se but through more systematically seeking out the social, political, and economic determinants of the symbolic content which has been analyzed.[111]

Janowitz had a similar opinion. He wrote that if

> ... content analysis is able to monitor and analyze the emerging efforts to cope with socio-political change, it serves to inform and has the potential to stimulate conflict resolution. In this way the academic interest of social science and the requirements of a great variety of organized groups are linked to the expanded interest in the systematic coding and analysis of the content of the mass media.[112]

ENDNOTES

[1]Harold Lasswell, "The Structure and Function of Communication in Society," The Communication of Ideas, ed. Lyman Bryson (New York, 1948).

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[3]Wilbur Schramm, "Mass Media in an Information Era," Propaganda and Communication in World History, Vol. III, A Pluralizing World in Formation (Honolulu, 1980), p. 309.

[4]Raymond Bauer, "The Obstinate Audience: The Influence Process from the Point of View of Social Communication," American Psychologist, XIX (1964), pp. 319-328, quoted in Schramm, "Mass Media in an Information Era," p. 309.

[5]Peter M. Sandman, David M. Rubin, and David B. Sachsman, Media: An Introductory Analysis of American Mass Communications (3rd ed., Englewood Cliffs., N.J., 1982), p. 13.

[6]Ibid.

[7]Schramm, pp. 298-302.

[8]Sandman, Rubin and Sachsman, pp. 14-15.

[9]Wilbur Schramm, "The Nature of News," Journalism Quarterly, XXVI (1949), pp. 259-269.

[10]Leon Festinger, "Informal Social Communication," Psychological Review, LVII (1950), pp. 271-292.

[11]Schramm, "Mass Media in an Information Era," p. 307.

[12]Sandman, Rubin and Sachsman, p. 17.

[13]Schramm, "Mass Media in an Information Era," p. 309.

[14]W. Phillips Davison, "The Media Kaleidoscope: General Trends in the Channels," Propaganda and Communication in World History, Vol. III, A Pluralizing World in Formation, p. 196.

[15]Ibid., pp. 196-198.

[16]Ibid., p. 191.

[17]Ibid.

[18]Fred S. Siebert, Theodore Peterson and Wilbur Schramm, Four Theories of the Press (9th ed., Chicago, 1974).

[19]Ibid., pp. 2-4.

[20]Ibid., p. 2.

[21]Davison, p. 193.

[22]Ibid., p. 199.

[23]Schramm, "Mass Media in an Information Era," p. 301.

[24]Ibid., p. 302.

[25]A.W. Wicker, "Attitudes Versus Actions: The Relationship of Verbal and Overt Behavioral Responses to Attitude Objects," Journal of Social Issues, XXV (1969), pp. 41-78.

[26]Leon Festinger, "Behavioral Support for Opinion Change," Public Opinion Quarterly, XXVIII (1964), pp. 400-414.

[27]Schramm, "Mass Media in an Information Era," p. 302.

[28]Ibid., p. 302.

[29]Ibid., pp. 302-304.

[30]Ibid., p. 304.

[31]Ibid., p. 306.

[32]Ibid., p. 334.

[33]Propaganda Analysis (December, 1941), p. 4.

[34]Ibid.

[35]John Clews, Communist Propaganda Techniques (New York, 1964), p. 3.

[36]Ibid.

[37]Ibid., p. 4 .

[38]Ibid., p. 6.

[39]Ibid.

[40]Ibid., p. 7.

[41]Ibid.

[42]Propaganda Analysis (October, 1937), pp. 2-3.

[43]Harold Lasswell, Propaganda Technique in the World War (New York, 1938), p. 192.

[44]Serge Chatotin, The Rape of the Masses (London, 1940), quoted in Clews, p. 10.

[45]Clews, p. 10.

[46]Propaganda Analysis (October 15, 1939), p. 1.

[47]Lasswell, Propaganda Technique in the World War, p. 66.

[48]Ibid., p. 9.

[49]Propaganda Analysis (n.d., 1941), p. 14.

[50]Propaganda Analysis (n.d., 1941), p. 3.

[51]Ibid., p. 4.

[52]Ibid., p. 5.

[53]Clews, p. 11.

[54]Ibid., p. 26.

[55]Ibid., p. 170.

[56]Axelrod and Zimmerman, p. 197.

[57]John Martin, "The Moving Target: General Trends in Audience Composition," Propaganda and Communication in World History, Vol. III, A Pluralizing World in Formation, p. 274.

[58]Ibid., pp. 276-277.

[59]Ibid., pp. 278-279.

[60]Phillip J. Tichenor, George A. Donahue and Clarice Olien, "Mass Communication Research: Evaluation of a Structural Model," Journalism Quarterly, L (1973), pp. 419-425.

[61]Davison, p. 220.

[62]Ibid., p. 227.

[63]Ibid., p. 228.

[64]Clews, p. 12.

[65]Propaganda Analysis (December, 1941), p. 4.

[66]Lasswell, Propaganda Technique in the World War, p. 195.

[67]Ibid., discussed by Morris Janowitz, "Content Analysis and the Study of Sociopolitical Change," Journal of Communication, XXVI (1976), p. 17.

[68]Janowitz, p. 11.

[69]Discussed by Bernard Berelson, Content Analysis in Communication Research (2nd ed., New York, 1971), p. 23.

[70]Ibid., pp. 23-24.

[71]Alexander George, Propaganda Analysis: A Study of Inferences Made from Nazi Propaganda in World War II (Evanston, Ill., 1959), p. vii.

[72]Ibid., p. xi.

[73]Ibid., p. x.

[74]Ibid., p. xiii.

[75]Ibid., p. 24.

[76]Ibid., p. 55.

[77]Mentioned by Berelson, Content Analysis in Communication Research, p. 22.

[78]Ibid., p. 23.

[79]Ibid.

[80]Ole Holsti, "Content Analysis," The Handbook of Social Psychology, Vol. 2, ed. Garner Lindzey (Cambridge, Mass., 1954), p. 596.

[81]Fred N. Kerlinger, Foundations of Behavioral Research (2nd ed., New York, 1973), p. 525.

[82]Berelson, Content Analysis in Communication Research, p. 17.

[83]Ibid., pp. 18-19.

[84]Ibid., p. 13.

[85]Holsti, "Content Analysis," pp. 610-624.

[86]Ibid., pp. 624-638.

[87]Ibid., pp. 639-643.

[88]George, pp. 76-77.

[89]Ibid., pp. 83-84.

[90]Holsti, "Content Analysis," p. 599.

[91]Berelson, Content Analysis in Communication Research, p. 119.

[92]Ibid., p. 123.

[93]Ibid., p. 132.

[94]Andrew G. Walder, "Methodological Note: Press Accounts and Study of Chinese Society," China Quarterly, LXXIX (1979), p. 569.

[95]Berelson, Content Analysis in Communication Research, p. 132.

[96]Walder, p. 570.

[97]Janowitz, p. 11.

[98]Ibid., p. 10.

[99]Ibid., p. 11.

[100]Ibid., pp. 11-12.

[101]John Naisbitt, Megatrends: Ten New Directions Transforming Our Lives (2nd ed., New York, 1984).

[102]Janowitz, p. 10.

[103]Ibid., pp. 15-16.

[104]Ibid., p. 17.

[105]Ibid., p. 18.

[106]Ibid., p. 17.

[107]Ibid., p. 16.

[108]Ibid., p. 20.

[109]Richard A. Peterson, "Advances in Content Analysis," Acta Sociologica, XXV (1982), pp. 196-197.

[110]Ibid., p. 198.

[111]Ibid.

[112]Janowitz, p. 20.

CHAPTER III

METHODOLOGY

Why is content analysis a reliable way to study social change? According to Megatrends author John Naisbitt, it is

> . . . because the news hole in a newspaper is a closed system. For economic reasons, the amount of space devoted to news in a newspaper does not change significantly over time. So, when something new is introduced, something else or a combination of things must be omitted. You cannot add unless you subtract. It is the principle of forced choice in a closed system.[1]

Another reason content analysis is reliable is that the methodology is free from "the effects of biased reporting because it is only the event or behavior that we are interested in."[2] It also is useful because it is the only way to obtain some types of information--because it happened in the past or because a particular source cannot be interviewed (as in the present study and in all trend studies).[3] In the current study trends over time are being sought. Thus, the increase, decrease or lack of symbols in certain categories all will have meaning and utility in the study.

There is a need to analyze propaganda for what it can tell us about policy--the manifest content of propaganda. In propaganda analysis broad thematic constructs with vague boundaries will be less useful than specific symbols and categories of symbols. In using specific words or word pairs (women's rights, secretary of state), the problem of category

construction is simplified and the necessity of using judges to categorize words is eliminated--both events improving reliability of the current study.

Some key terms in content analysis, as defined by Bernard Berelson, who provided the first major summary of content analysis research, are:

> Recording unit: smallest body of content in which the appearance of a reference is counted;
> Context unit: largest body of a content that may be examined in characterizing a recording unit;
> Unit of classification: basis [upon which] the item is analyzed (e.g., news item or word):
> Unit of enumeration: basis of tabulation (inches or times symbol appears).[4]

The major units of measurement are words (key symbols); themes (sentences); characters (persons); items (entire natural units: books, newspapers, stories, speeches); space and time measures (column-inch, page, line); and inter-relation of groups (more than one mentioned). In this study the space measure was the page for Granma and the column for Castro's speeches. Words, characters, and items (the entire newspaper, the entire speech) as well as inter-relation of groups were the major units of measure. The context unit was the entire page for the Granma study and the column for Castro's speeches. The recording unit for the Granma study was anything larger than a news brief, i.e., three paragraphs or more. For Castro's speeches it was any speech longer than half a newspaper page. The unit of classification was the word or word pair. The unit of enumeration in both cases was the number of times the symbol appeared.

Berelson stated that validity is not a problem if the categories are defined well.[5] For the study to have reliability, he stated, it must be objective. It rests upon consistency (a) among analysts and (b) through time. He stated: "The reliability of content analysis as an instrument for scientific research depends to a large extent upon the achivement of high reliability on both counts."[6] He added that complicated and sophisticated categories reduce reliability and that reliability is higher with (a) simpler categories and units; (b) more experienced coders; and (3) a precise and complete set of coding rules.[7] His criteria for reliability and validity appear to have been met in the present study.

As to the problem of sampling, Berelson stated:

> In the large majority of cases, it is possible to devise a representative and adequate sample which is economical of administration. For most purposes, analysis of a small, carefully chosen sample and the relevant content will produce just as valid results as the analysis of a great deal more.[8]

In sampling, three decisions are necessary: determination of (a) titles (e.g., editorial position, size or importance, ownership and control, time of issue; in this study time of issue was controlled and the other factors were reflected in the single publication being analyzed); (b) issues (seasonal variation, importance of events; a random selection of issues of Granma, one per month during the time span, was made in this study); (c) content (are parts representative of the whole? In this study articles of a feature nature as well as news articles were surveyed for references to the United

States).[9] Berelson noted that there can be samples for both extensive and intensive purposes.[10] In this study Castro's speeches were treated intensively (each one studied) and Granma articles extensively (sampling done).

The sampling plan was random and stratified. For each month, one issue was picked randomly for the extensive Granma sample. A page number was picked randomly. If a page containing a Castro speech was selected in the random selection of Granma pages for analysis, another page was randomly selected instead. If no mention to the United States larger than a brief was noted, then a notation of that absence was made and another random page was picked. The search continued until the first significant mention (larger than a brief) was found. If no mention of the United States was found in an issue, that fact was noted and another issue in the same month was selected randomly. For the intensive sample, each of Castro's speeches was studied. A column of each speech text was selected randomly and scanned for a mention of the United States (by any of the top-frequency symbols determined in the Granma study). If no mention was found, further columns were randomly selected until all columns were depleted or a mention was found.

Analysis was by chi square and the Pearson r correlation in order to determine if there was significant variation in the use of symbols (as categorized) over the period studied. It was expected that changes in symbol usage should parallel events inside Cuba and changes in Cuba's policy toward the

United States. Both increased numbers of references to the United States and increased aggressivity of the language were considered to be indicators of policy changes. The first was interpreted to indicate increased interest and the second increased hostility.

ENDNOTES

[1]Naisbitt, p. xxv.

[2]Ibid., p. xxvii.

[3]Discussed by Holsti, "External Conflict and Internal Consensus: The Sino-Soviet Case," p. 344: "(D)irect access to foreign policy leaders is always severely restricted in time and space. Even the scholar fortunate enough to gain access to decision makers of his own nation cannot do so at those times when much of the most theoretically relevant research might be undertaken, as, for example, during a crisis situation. Moreover, many of the leaders deemed important ... are never available. The best one can usually do under these circumstances is an ex post facto study of one party in the crisis situation."

[4]Berelson, Content Analysis in Communication Research, pp. 135-136.

[5]Ibid., p. 169.

[6]Ibid., p. 172.

[7]Ibid., pp. 173-174.

[8]Ibid., p. 174.

[9]Ibid., p. 176.

[10]Ibid., p. 182.

CHAPTER IV

ANALYSIS OF THE DATA--PART I

A Qualitative Comparison of Two Issues of Granma

The obvious changes in Granma over the period covered by the study have been few. The nameplate is the same--the same flag with a 36-point red rule above and a 24-point red rule below.[1] Headline type and style of heads are similar, and the number of pages has remained at 12 except for an occasional 16-page edition. Pages are of various column widths--four to six, but most often five. The departmental headings are the same, and the amount of space devoted to each category has changed little. No column-inch count was conducted to determine the extent of change. Such a count was not within the perimeters of the study. The researcher's reading of randomly selected pages from throughout the time span revealed little change in the tone of the propaganda symbols. The symbols themselves seemed to be fairly consistent throughout. Only such things as the name of the U.S. president or secretary of state were the obvious indicators of change. Terms used were remarkably consistent despite changes in U.S.

administrations.

The researcher had expected that a critique of two issues of widely separated dates would reveal any sweeping alteration in tone or format. As it had been determined that the format of the newspaper had not changed significantly, the dates of the two issues selected for the critique were chosen primarily to study possible differences in symbolic propaganda content. The period from 1966 to the end of the Vietnam War was eliminated because the language would have been expected to be particularly hard-lined toward the United States. The Carter years were thought to be less aggressive in tone and, in addition, did not allow a sufficient passage of time between the two issues to be compared. After careful consideration, the two dates selected were January 5, 1975, the week of the 16th anniversary of the revolution (Figure 1), and January 1, 1984, the day of the 25th anniversary (Figure 2). While the issues were not randomly selected nor was the analysis scientific, the critique was expected to reveal any major changes in format and any obvious shift in attitude.

Both issues have pictures of Castro approximately the same size, one vertical and the other horizontal. The 1975 issue has a single, short story on the front, and the 1984 issue has a "refer" box inviting the reader inside. The earlier issue has an "Articles and Commentaries" section on pages 2 and 7, "National News" on pages 3, 5,

Granma

Havana, January 5, 1975
Year 10 / Number 1

Year of the 1st Congress
Price: 10 cts.

OFFICIAL ORGAN OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF CUBA

Long live the 16th anniversary of the triumph of the Revolution!

1975: Year of the 1st Congress

● HAVANA (AIN). — 1975 will be the Year of the 1st Congress, as a result of the suggestions made by political and mass organizations to the leadership of the Party.

Our workers, peasants, intellectuals and students, men and women, fully identified with the Leninist idea that the Congress is "the most important, decisive and significant meeting of the Party and the Republic," will strive to create with their conscientious and enthusiastic work an appropriate spirit for the holding of the 1st Congress of the Party by fulfilling economic plans, increasing productivity — with special stress on the task of optimizing the sugar harvest — incorporating women into the active life of the country on an ever greater basis, obtaining higher promotion and lower dropout rates in schools, improving the quality of services and strengthening the combat readiness of the Revolutionary Armed Forces, the Ministry of the Interior and our reservists.

Fully aware of the historic importance of the Party Congress, our working masses and the people as a whole will participate in the discussion of its theses and of the guidelines for the Five-Year Plan. From an analysis of these documents will come the decisions that will govern the future course of the development of the Revolution.

The suggestion by the political and mass organizations that 1975 be named the Year of the 1st Congress was made with the following things in mind: improving ideological work and the cultural and technical education of workers, obtaining victories in the surpassing of goals and conclusion of shock-task projects, etc., as the highest tribute to the Party Congress and all those who, based on the examples of our ancestors who fought for independence and on Marxist-Leninist ideology, gave their lives for the cause of socialism.

PUBLISHED: 12/25/74

Figure 1. January 5, 1975, Granma

Figure 2. January 1, 1984, Granma

and 6, "Cultural News" on page 4, "Sports" on pages 8 and 9, and "International News" on pages 11 and 12. In the 1984 issue, pages 2, 3, 4, and 5 are classified as "National News." Page 6 has the section "Cultural News," page 7 "Sports," page 8 "General News," pages 9, 10, and 11 "International News," and page 11 a "Special Feature."

Two stories about the United States are on page 2 of the 1975 issue. The first is three columns wide with a two-line, 36-point medium weight headline in capital letters. It is entitled "Background and aftermath of the notorious Hay-Bunau Varilla Treaty" and discusses the treaty that authorized the construction of the Panama Canal. The other story is entitled "The industrialization of the mass media in capitalism: a new form of ideological and cultural subversion." The head is set three-columns wide with three lines of 36-point type in down style on a five-column page.

A subhead on the Panama story notes in 12-point sans serif: "The Isthmus of Panama, center of imperialist ambitions, conflict and plunder, now witnesses the unyielding determination of the Panamanian people to regain the sovereignty of the territory usurped by the Yankees." Accompanying is a map of Panama and a close-up map of the Canal Zone. The lead on the story about the mass media in capitalism reads:

> Monopoly concentration was one of World War II's aftereffects on the U.S. economy. Today the backbone of the capitalist system in the United States consists of about a hundred large

> corporations, which control banking, industry, transportation, energy resources, trade and insurance.[2]

The article is illustrated by an octopus (labeled Esso, ITT, Ford, TWA, etc.)--wrapping its tentacles around a photograph of an urban scene processed as a line conversion.

On page 7 of "Articles and Commentaries" is a story with a kicker head, "The world of raw materials," in 24-point bold capital letters and a main head, "An obsolete economic order," in three-column, two-line, 42-point boldface capitals. It features a 12-point subhead with a 12-point medium insert of a quote by Fidel Castro. The quote states:

> The underdeveloped and colonial world, which yesterday paid at the price of slavery, blood and rapacious exploitation, for the birth of the industrialized societies of Europe and North America, today sustains with its poverty and with the mortgage of the resources that could serve tomorrow as the base of its development, the absurd luxuries and criminal waste of a handful of consumer societies.[3]

The lead of the story reads:

> The underdeveloped world is the world of raw materials--but the raw materials do not belong to the underdeveloped world. They belong to a microcosm of industrialized capitalist countries which are voraciously gobbling up the resources of mankind.[4]

The article details the colonial system at work and discusses the "imperialistic" role played by the United States. A typical paragraph reads:

> The colonial system created monopoly. Takeover or control of the sources of raw materials, which were in short supply as of the mid-19th

> century, became the main objective of finance capital. From that moment on, every capitalist war, the U.S. aggression or CIA operation was in one way or another linked to a raw material or basic product in a poor country: tin, sugar, oil, cobalt or copper, to cite just a few examples.[5]

The article is supported graphically by a reproduction of "An account of sugar and coffee, exported from the island of Jamaica, in the following years; viz, 1772-1775."

Under "International News" on page 10 is an article with a hammer head in 72-point capitals, "Colonial crisis." The subhead is a bold upper- and lower-case streamer that reads: "Believe it or not ... this is Puerto Rico today." An early paragraph states:

> This is the Puerto Rico that can no longer conceal the bankruptcy of a colonial society in crisis where unemployment is a chronic disease.
>
> Puerto Rican society--colonial by definition --is seriously affected by the reverses of the capitalist crisis. While in the United States--the metropolis--inflation and unemployment make everyone feel the hardships of a new economic recession, in Puerto Rico its effects are making things even worse by shaking the colonialist structures imposed by Yankee masters since 1898.[6]

The illustration is a line conversion depicting American soldiers in combat gear with a Puerto Rican policeman behind stopping Puerto Rican men in the street (an obvious montage of several photographs) along with symbols of corporations such as PanAm, Holiday Inn, and Exxon, all superimposed on a map of Puerto Rico.

The two other stories on the page also are about Puerto Rico. One, in a down-style three-column, two-line

36-point bold head reads, "Construction--an industry on its death throes." It is accompanied by a photograph reportedly depicting Puerto Rican children in an urban slum. The lead paragraph reads:

> Puerto Rico's population runs to a little over 2 and a half million. There are 455,000 people in San Juan, the capital. Here, as in every other capital in the underdeveloped world, hunger, unemployment and poverty run rampant. Here, in the face of beautiful, modern buildings, the urban slums--the eyesores that are never within range of a tourist's camera--stand in mute challenge.[7]

The third story is headed "The kilowatt meter...." in three-column, 36-point bold down-style. Discussing the high cost of electricity for the average person, the article notes:

> The colonial governors, true lackeys of imperialism, have always tried to make investors feel right at home in Puerto Rico. Two of the investment incentives used are corporation tax exemption and low industrial electric power rates.
>
> The results have been excellent, but of course for the big Yankee corporations, Puerto Rico has been flooded with huge petrochemical, pharmaceutical and highly mechanized industries which consume a considerably high percentage of electrical energy and which, according to the laws of the so-called Associate Free State, pay low rates because supposedly they are contributing to the country's development.[8]

The "International News" section entitled "South of the Rio Grande" consists mainly of news briefs. Headlines are 12-point light face. Articles mentioning the United States have the following headlines: "Fascists agree to pay Anaconda Copper 12 million dollars in compensation" (Chile); "Decision to nationalize Yankee mining from

Marcona Mining is reaffirmed" (Peru); "Mexico's Secretary of National Property, Horacio Flores de la Pena, says there have been several attempts on his life, probably ordered by oil companies" (Mexico). Under "News in Brief," there are two articles in 12-point bold type that concern the United States--"Harry W. Shlaudeman named U.S. Ambassador to Venezuela" and a short article about Shlaudeman under "The man in the news." The only multi-column story is one headlined "Latin-American governments reject new trade law passed by U.S. Congress as discriminatory to oil-producing nations." It is set in 24-point medium type and has a straight news lead:

> Ecuador became the fourth Latin-American nation this week to reject the new foreign trade bill passed by the U.S. Congress.[9]

On page 12, under "International News," is a two-column, three-line, 24-point headline entitled "Ceremony in Hanoi in tribute to those killed in the bombing of the Kham Thien neighborhood by U.S. planes in 1971." This is surprinted on a screened red box. In columns two and three are stacked cartoons by Neuz running 14 inches deep entitled "The capitalist crisis." The first shows Uncle Sam standing on a crumbling block of stone labeled "crisis." The second shows Uncle Sam kicking a workman (a plumber), who leaves a rising trail behind labeled "unemployment." The third shows a skeleton labeled "crisis" walking behind Uncle Sam while standing in Uncle Sam's boots.

The 1984 edition shows Castro on the cover making his entrance into Havana in January 1959. Instead of the 18-point red rules used for boxes in 1975, it uses 24-point red rules to box the picture. Below it is a six-column, 5 1/4-inch "refer" box headlined "Cuban economy grows by five percent in 1983."

The second through fourth pages are mainly a report of a meeting of the National Assembly of People's Power described as the supreme organ of state power. The assembly is composed of 499 deputies representing the country's 169 municipalities, and it holds two regular sessions a year. There were two mentions of the United States in the report. One reads:

> Garcia Valls' report emphasizes the positive development of domestic finance, despite the damaging effect of the capitalist world crisis and U.S. imperialism's blockade of Cuba, and despite the expenditures for the defense and protection of the country, under direct threat by the United States, and the weather catastrophes which reduced sugar production by more than a million tons in comparison with the previous harvest.[10]

Another reference, seven paragraphs later, reads:

> He [Flavio Bravo] referred to a series of events of extraordinary importance to humanity and this region and Cuba in particular: the insane warmongering policy of the U.S. administration now bent on deploying 572 Cruise and Pershing missiles in Western Europe and whose policy of force endangers detente and brings us all closer to a holocaust that would eliminate humankind from the face of the planet; and the cowardly, ferocious aggression on tiny Grenada, which attests to the reactionary, fascist nature of the Reagan administration.
>
> 'The continuous imperialist threat,' he underscored, 'confirms to us the need to strengthen as much as possible our defense tasks and give

> them our greatest and immediate attention.'
>
> He emphasized the heroic stand taken by the Cuban internationalists who worked in Grenada carrying out various cooperation tasks for the country's economic and social development. He asked for a minute of silence to honor the memory of our 24 comrades who were killed on Grenadian soil....[11]

On page 5, under "National News," is an article entitled "Antares Castle in Colonial Havana's defense system." It contains a few historical references to the United States. One reads:

> That same year [1905], the Cuban government donated to the United States five of the six bronze cannon in Antares Castle, to be placed as landmarks on the scenes of the battles that preceded the siege and capture of Santiago de Cuba during the famous Spanish-Cuban-American war.
>
> A wooden-tile-roofed barracks built on the road leading to the fortress' main entrance during the second period of U.S. occupation later became the first School for Rural Guard NCOs....[12]

An article on page 7 "Sports" discussed the Los Angeles Olympics.[13] It carries an 18-point medium, all-capitals kicker, "An insult to sports circles," over a two-column, three-line, 36-point down-style head, "The contrast between Los Angeles and Sarajevo," in a box with a 2-point red rule. The lead reads:

> MOSCOW (TASS)--Many athletes are expressing concern about the organization of the 1984 Summer Olympics in Los Angeles, although the organizing committee claims that all is in order and that existing problems are insignificant and do not merit the attention they are being given.[14]

The headlines on that page and two on the preceding page of cultural news are printed over boxes screened in red. Instead of the heavy screen used on several stories (one

about the United States) in 1975, a light (15 to 20 percent) screen is used in 1984. No surprint is used on a story about the United States in this issue. On page 8, under "General News," is an article taken from the magazine Oclae that covers half a page horizontally. It has a three-column, two-line, 36-point bold headline entitled "Transnationals and war business." It is accompanied by a two-column line conversion of an aircraft carrier and a two-column photograph of U.S. Marines on which special screening is used. The second paragraph of the lead reads:

> The transnationals play a particularly macabre role in the 'business' of war, in the production of mass-extermination weapons, in the arms traffic and modern arms supplies to puppet governments. According to UN statistics, humanity spends more than one million dollars per minute on the arms race, 600,000 million dollars a year, that is, 30 times the aid to developing countries.[15]

Several articles on page 9 of "International News" mention the United States. One at the top of the page is surrounded by a two-point red rule with a three-column, one-line, 30-point down-style headline, "The great Nazifascist sanctuary." It is accompanied by a one-column, 3.5 inch drawing of a hairy-faced, unsavory-looking "angel" wearing a halo with a U.S. flag attached. The "angel" holds a short Nazi who has a swastika on his helmet and needs a shave. The lead states:

> The United States has gradually become the 'great sanctuary' for fascists and other kindred elements throughout the world as soon as their regimes are defeated. This is really nothing new. Part, although a small part, of the nobility, the bourgeoisie and officialdom

> removed from power by the October Revolution in old Russia ended up in the United States.
>
> And this has been the traditional practice of tyrants and their gangs of paid assassins and henchmen of dictatorships south of the Rio Bravo, once they have been deposed by popular and revolutionary movements.[16]

A story on Sun Myung Moon carries a three-column, one-line, 36-point bold capitals headline, "Moon's secret empire." It discusses his property acquisitions in the United States. Midway in the article is the following quote:

> In the 1979-80 period, with the likelihood of the Republican Party entering the White House --a party to which Moon has close ties--the sect embarked on the conquest of Latin America.
>
> They set their sights on Panama, Guatemala, El Salvador and Hondurus and poured large sums of money into these countries. Overtly anti-communist seminars and lectures were organized, and in some cases considerable backing was given to political organizations that oppose national liberation movements. Its newspapers were used to work out a carefully prepared propaganda campaign to defend U.S. regional policy.[17]

An article entitled "The dirty lie against Bulgaria" discusses the shooting of Pope John Paul II in 1982 and Italian efforts to link the suspect to Bulgaria. The article suggests that the CIA itself might be involved in the shooting. It notes:

> Kidnapping and murder of political figures, armed robberies of banks, etc. are commonplace in the capitalist system and proliferate in the United States.
>
> Terrorism and crime have always been instruments of imperialist policy. It is known that the CIA was directly linked to many killings, like those of Lumumba, Martin Luther King, Allende....[18]

Below that story is a two-column stand-alone photograph of demonstrators being drenched with water cannons. Under an 18-point all-capitals catchline "There will be no tranquility...." is a cutline that begins: "U.S. deployment of Pershing 2 and Cruise missiles in certain countries of Western Europe is meeting with action that is continuously growing in scope." It concludes: "As a peace movement leader noted not too long ago, it seems there will be no tranquility there until there are no U.S. nuclear missiles in Europe."[19]

On page 11, under "International News," is an article about the Portuguese Communist Party congresses. There were four references to the United States in the article. One mention was derived from a speech:

> In his speech, Perez Herrero condemned the United States' warmongering policy and its attacks on other peoples. He mentioned the invasion of Grenada, calling it 'the most recent and eloquent demonstration of the lack of scruples of the present U.S. administration, which did not hesitate to use its enormous military power to trample on the sovereignty of one of the smallest countries in the world.'[20]

There was a reference to the United States in an article about the Spanish Communist Party. It states:

> Contrary to the expectations of certain mass media and political observers who hoped that the Congress would be characterized by endless internal bickering, the delegates tackled the main international problems and voiced their support for the struggle for peace, and condemned the current U.S. policy ('which has been and still is a determining factor in the increase of world tension'), the U.S. invasion of Grenada and the U.S. pressure on the Caribbean area.

> Iglesias reiterated 'once again the Spanish Communists' solidarity with the Cuban people, now a target of the aggressive plans for the Caribbean devised by President Reagan and his adviser Henry Kissinger.' ...[21]

On page 11, under "International News," is an article with a three-column, three-line, all-capitals headline, "U.S. intervention in Central America is a fact: All five countries are subject to it--Commander Rolando Moran." One Moran quote reads as follows:

> 'Unfortunately, intervention by Yankee imperialism is a factor which all Central American revolutionaries must consider when planning our struggle for the national liberation of our peoples and the building of their future. We are all duty-bound to do whatever we can to prevent it, but if, regardless of our will, the forces of imperialism impose it on us, then we all have the sacred obligation of fighting until it has been repulsed victoriously.'[22]

The page contains an interview with Costa Rican President Luis Alberto Monge in which there are two mentions about the United States. One is a denial that 1,000 U.S. military engineers would go to Costa Rica. The other was as follows:

> When asked how he viewed the United States' economic blockade of Cuba in the context of his policy of neutrality, the president said, 'At first I supported the blockade. Those were the years of the feverish anti-Cuba wave. Then I felt it was an ineffective measure. Now I feel it would be better if the blockade was lifted and a direct dialogue established between Cuba and the United States.'[23]

The topics in the two issues ran the gamut of issues and ideological differences between the United States and Cuba: the Panama Canal, Puerto Rico, the blockade of Cuba, the role of the mass media, exploitation of the

underdeveloped world in general and Latin America in particular by U.S. corporations, the Vietnam War, the inhumanity of capitalism and its negative effect on the entire world economy, the U.S. military threat to Cuba and the U.S. threat to world peace, the past U.S. domination of Cuba, the United States as a fascist country and the heir to Nazi Germany, U.S. opposition to national liberation and its support of military dictators, the role of the Central Intelligence Agency in terrorism around the world and particularly in Cuba, the isolation of the United States in world affairs, and the refusal of the United States to negotiate its differences with Cuba.

Stories from 1975 appeared similar in tone to those in 1984. Some of the same political issues were mentioned in both years. Not only the language, but the cartoons were similar. The researcher's look at newspapers from throughout the 19-year period supports an assertion that the United States consistently is put in a bad light. The only positive comments about the United States noted were those of Castro, discussed later, that indicated he has no ill feelings toward the people of the United States and his remarks that Jimmy Carter (early in his term) and Jesse Jackson were honorable men. Photographs always show the worst side of the United States. All cartoons noted were anti-United States.

The caricature of Uncle Sam has changed little. He started out short and fat but thinned down somewhat over

the years, and he no longer wears glasses. Otherwise his uniform is about the same. He wears a stars-and-stripes top hat and has a dollar sign on his tie. He usually carries either a club (a "big stick"?) with a nail sticking out of it or a knife--both of them dripping blood. Sometimes he shoots missiles out of the top of his head, and sometimes he flies a jet and drops bombs. Other symbolic representations of the United States have been a snowman with a skull for a face, a vulture, and a snake with a dollar sign for a forked tongue--all wearing Uncle Sam hats. Another symbolic representation is the use of a swastika for the "x" in Nixon.

A Qualitative View of U.S. References in Castro's Rhetoric

An Associated Press article published July 27, 1984, reported that Fidel Castro in his speech marking the 31st anniversary of the 1954 attack on the Moncado garrison "made a new appeal for improvement in U.S.-Cuban relations." The speech, given July 26, was reported in the August 5 Granma (Figure 3). On the cover, along with a picture of Castro giving the speech, was a quotation, "Just as we are willing to fight and die, we have no fear of talks and discussion." The quote was given prominent display even though it was not the main focus of the speech. It was located in the text at the top of page 8. Its prominent display suggests its importance.

Granma

Havana, August 5, 1984
Year of the 25th Anniversary of the Triumph of the Revolution
Year 19 / Numbers 31 and 32

This REVIEW is published in English, French, Spanish and Portuguese

AS THOUGH DEATH DID NOT EXIST PAGE 12

FIDEL AT THE 31ST ANNIVERSARY OF THE ATTACK ON THE MONCADA GARRISON

SOME THINGS ARE SACRED: INDEPENDENCE, SOVEREIGNTY OF THE COUNTRY, ITS REVOLUTIONARY PRINCIPLES, ITS POLITICAL AND SOCIAL SYSTEM, AND ITS RIGHT TO BUILD A FUTURE. THESE ARE THINGS WE WILL NEVER GIVE UP AND THOSE WHO TRY TO DESTROY THEM WILL HAVE TO FIGHT US



JUST AS WE ARE WILLING TO FIGHT AND DIE, WE HAVE NO FEAR OF TALKS AND DISCUSSION

BY ALDO ISIDRON DEL VALLE (**Granma** daily reporter)

● OVER 100 000 gathered in Revolution Square, Cienfuegos, capital of the province of the same name in central Cuba, to celebrate the 31st anniversary of the attack on the Moncada Garrison.

On the rostrum with Fidel were Humberto Miguel Fernández, first secretary of the Party in Cienfuegos province; members of the Political Bureau, Secretariat and Central Committee, Party, state, Young Communist League and mass organization leaders; and Heroes and Heroines of Labor.

Also present were the delegation of the Republic of Ghana, headed by Flight Lieutenant Jerry John Rawlings, president of the Provisional National Defense Council, and the delegation of Nicaragua, headed by Commander of the Sandinista Revolution Tomás Borge.

Along with the people of Cienfuegos were other foreign delegations invited especially for the 26th of July celebrations, relatives of those who died in the attack on the Moncada Garrison; survivors of the attacks on the army garrisons of Santiago de Cuba and Bayamo; diplomats accredited in Cuba and representatives of political parties and national liberation movements.

Among the guests seated in front of the rostrum were the members of the Polish Carlos Roloff construction brigade; the 300 National Vanguards of the Student Work Brigades; and students and teachers of the Republica Popular de Bulgaria Junior High School in the Country-side, a National Vanguard school.

Red, white and blue banners were displayed throughout the square and the large billboards flanking the platform were of Lenin, Abel Santamaría, José Martí and the brothers Wilfredo and Horacio Matheu Orihuela, killed in the attack on the Moncada Garrison in 1953.

Prominently displayed on the rostrum were the national flag and the red and black 26th of July flag. Behind and above the rostrum was the legend "31st Aanniversary of the Attack on the Moncada Garrison." Immediately facing the rostrum were 20 000 outstanding Cienfuegos residents: workers and students; members of the Committees for the Defense of the Revolution, the National Association of Small Farmers and the Federation of Cuban Women; Pioneers; members of the National Militia, the Revolutionary Armed Forces and the Ministry of the Interior; and participants in underground activities in pseudorepublican days.

Also present at Revolution Square were the Cuban builders working on the nuclear power plant and the oil refinery; members of the Bulgarian Fidel Castro construction brigade; and Soviet specialists working on the two projects.

The rest of the Square was taken up by over 80 000 persons from all over the province with a revolutionary enthusiasm that for three hours made Cienfuegos the very heart of Cuba.

There were over 100 foreign journalists present, either accredited journalists in Cuba, guest journalists or participants in the Latin American and Caribbean Journalists' Seminar.

As the commander in chief concluded his speech and the 26th of July March played, thousands of waving straw hats, construction helmets and multicolored kerchiefs symbolized the optimism of a people marching unconquerably into the future.

SEE INSERT BETWEEN PAGES 10 AND 11

Fidel and Rawlings were given a warm welcome by the Ghanaian students

GHANAIAN PRESIDENT JERRY J. RAWLINGS VISITS CUBA

● Awarded José Martí Order by Fidel

PAGE 3

WHAT KIND OF CINEMA IS SEEN IN CUBA? PAGE 6

Harry Belafonte films a picture on Cuban music PAGE 3

MORALGATE?

Extravagance and corruption in Reagan's government

IMPROPER CONDUCT PAGE 7

COMICS AND IDEOLOGICAL MANIPULATION PAGE 6

Figure 3. August 5, 1984, Granma

The only thing "new" about the appeal was that it was another appeal. Castro has been making such appeals for several years. In the same story but earlier, near the end of page 5, is another quote that is pulled out and set in large type on page 4. It states, "When the imperialists say that if we want to live in peace we should break our ties with the socialist community, we say: those ties will never be broken." There is nothing new in that statement either. It is the same line that Castro consistently has presented as one of his non-negotiable demands. It may be the reason his earlier pleas for talks have not resulted in the action he seemingly desired. In the speech, Castro goes into the reason why he cannot bend on the question of Cuba's ties with the socialist world. He said:

> ... Not only because of our principles, that's the main reason, because of a question of elementary gratitude, but also because those ties have been fundamental to our socio-economic development over these years and they are decisive for our future development.[24]

Castro continued for most of three columns castigating United States policy. At the end of the first column on page 7, he discussed the visit of Jesse Jackson and suggested that it was the reason he was pushing for talks. Castro stated:

> In the case of Cuba there is something new, the Jackson visit to our country, which was well received by our people, who are hard to fool. ... As a result of that visit, and on the basis of a bipartisan consensus in the United States, talks have started between representatives of the Cuban and U.S. governments in New York on matters of migration and other related questions of interest to both sides.

> We are ready to continue these talks in a serious manner, with the gravity, maturity, valor and sense of responsibility that are characteristic of our Revolution....
>
> ... He brought a message of peace and we are responsive to that type of gesture. Nobody will ever get anything from our country by force; with gestures of peace, approaches can be made and talks can be held with our country.[25]

In seeking an ideological reason for the talks, Castro quoted Lenin: "Lenin, who was a realist, a man of convictions, a man of peace, was the first to proclaim as a basic principle the need for peaceful coexistence between different social systems."[26] Despite the talk of peaceful coexistence, Castro reiterated that Cuba has had to oppose "a powerful and aggressive neighbor":

> It isn't easy for a small country such as ours to oppose such a powerful and aggressive neighbor, but neither is it easy for the mighty neighbor to fight against a small but brave, intelligent, worthy and united people as ours.
>
> This senseless policy must cease and many conscientious people in the United States feel the same way.[27]

After mentioning that El Salvador, Nicaragua and Cuba are not and cannot be a threat to the United States, he made the statement that was quoted on the cover:

> ... All our effort is a defense effort and I repeat clearly that anyone who tries to destroy those values will have to fight us and we will know how to defend ourselves; the aggressor will have to pay a very high price and not reach his goal in the end....
>
> Just as we are willing to fight and die, we have no fear of talks and discussion.[28]

Castro spent the remainder of his speech confirming that the Cuban defense forces can meet any threat.

Was Castro's call for talks a result of the Grenada

invasion? Was Jackson's visit a Cuban version of "ping pong" diplomacy? Either may be accurate, but a look at Castro's past speeches shows that his remarks are nothing new. His call for talks go back at least a decade. Castro was not in any mood for reconciliation in the early 1970s because of the Vietnam War and his dislike of Nixon. In a press conference in May, 1972, reported on June 4, 1972, Castro stated his position:

> ... (W)e are not at all interested in such a meeting, and, moreover, we would refuse any meeting of that kind. What can we talk about with Nixon? What can we ask Nixon to do? To stop being an imperialist? To stop being an aggressor? What are our possibilities for demanding this?
>
> Nixon and the Government of the United States have clearly stated that they would be willing to improve relations with Cuba if Cuba broke her ties with the Soviet Union, if Cuba broke her ties with the Socialist camp, if Cuba stopped supporting the revolutionary movement. In a nutshell, Nixon wants Cuba to kneel, to become neutralized, to furl her revolutionary banners....
>
> ... We will not give in one iota in this respect. This is our position....
>
> Nixon's the one who has to do something. He's got to put an end to his gendarme policy, his acts of aggression and his intervention against Latin America, his war against Vietnam and his blockade of Cuba and get his Naval base out of our territory. And all this with no strings attached.
>
> The Yankees didn't talk things over with us when they organized the blockade and the invasion against our country. Therefore, we have nothing to talk about with Nixon.[29]

Castro's dislike for Nixon goes at least as far back as his trip to the United States the last two weeks of April, 1959. Eighteen years later, Castro told Barbara Walters in an interview reported in Granma July 24, 1977,

that after an interview with him, Nixon--in May, 1959--begged Eisenhower to intervene in Cuba. At that time, on May 17, 1959, Castro enacted the Agrarian Reform Law to break up holdings of American companies. Castro said in a speech reported May 26, 1974, about the law:

> And it was the Agrarian Reform Law that made the imperialists decide to set right about organizing the invasion of Giron; it was that law that made them decide to do it. It was the Agrarian Reform Law that made the imperialists decide to take away our sugar quota from us, to take the oil away from us and to set up the economic blockade of Cuba. This law, whose 15th anniversary we are now celebrating, was the law that brought imperialism into direct confrontation with Cuba.[30]

A year after rejecting any idea of talks with the United States, Castro again presented his non-negotiable demands. In a statement reported in the May 13, 1973, issue, he said:

> We clearly state that we won't discuss anything with the United States as long as the blockade exists. And if, someday, it wants to discuss things with us, it'll first have to end the blockade unconditionally. There will be no improvement in the relations between Cuba and the United States as long as the United States keeps trying to impose its sovereignty over Latin America, as long as it keeps trying to play the role of gendarme over our sister nations in this part of the world. That, to us, is the main problem.[31]

In the same speech--after talking about the uselessness of the Organization of American States as long as the United States is a member and about the imperialistic intentions of the United States toward Cuba from the beginning of the 19th century--he discussed the issue of Guantanamo. Asked if an earlier speech indicated any relaxation on the issue

of Guantanamo, he stated:

> What we were trying to say was that, in our opinion, the Guantanamo Base wasn't the main thing. Not being the main thing doesn't mean that we will give up reclaiming it, however--not by a long shot. Regardless of the situation, we will always demand the return of that part of our territory which was seized by force.[32]

The issue of Vietnam poisoned relationships between Cuba and the United States for years, moreso than these relationships would have been damaged otherwise. Even after the United States had extracted itself from the war, it was on Castro's mind, as this comment published April 7, 1974, indicates:

> Imperialism arrived in Vietnam in an arrogant, boastful and haughty manner, feeling itself to be superior to all and everything, and it left defeated and demoralized with an unforgettable lesson.
>
> Through their heroic struggle, the Vietnamese bound the claws of the imperialists. They prevented imperialism from committing crimes in many other parts of the world. We Cubans noticed that as the imperialists got bogged down up to their necks in Vietnam, the provocation at the Guantanamo base fell off, as did the crimes and other acts of aggression against our country.[33]

Conditions did not improve much after the end of the war, if Castro's language is any indication. In a speech reported December 1, 1974, Castro continued to present a hard line, even though he suggested the possibility of talks:

> ... And for how long will imperialism remain our enemy? As long as imperialism exists: Our relations with the imperialist Government of the United States are anything but good. But even if one day there should be economic and even diplomatic relations between us, that wouldn't give us the right to weaken our defense, because

> our defense can never depend on the imperialists' good faith.[34]

Other events were intervening to keep animosities high, among them Cuban troops in Africa. Cuban actions in Africa had a long-lasting effect on Cuba's relations with the United States, as a speech reported January 11, 1976, indicates:

> While this [First Party] Congress was being held, the President of the United States declared that, as a result of our aid to the sister people of Angola, any prospects or hopes or possibilities of improving relations between the United States and Cuba were--more or less--cancelled.
>
> ... (I)f we must renounce this country's principles in order to have relations with the United States, how can we possibly have relations with the United States?
>
> Apparently, according to the mentality of the United States leaders, the price for improving relations, or for having trade or economic relations is to give up the principles of the Revolution. And we shall never renounce our solidarity with Puerto Rico.[35]

Later in the same speech he once again put the blame on the United States:

> It is not we who are obstinately opposed to having normal relations. But if capitalism, mighty and authoritarian, doesn't want anything to do with us, not even speak with or look at this small nation, then we'll wait until capitalism is wiped out in the United States.[36]

It was not long until Castro became more optimistic about improved relations with the United States. In an interview published May 22, 1977, he gave a rundown of the attitudes of previous presidents concerning Cuba and gave the new president something different--praise:

President Carter is the first president in more than 16 years who hasn't committed himself to a policy of hostility against Cuba. Kennedy inherited Eisenhower's policy of premediated aggression, and, when Kennedy was killed, Johnson, who was involved in the Vietnam war, maintained that same policy. As for Nixon--who was vice-president in Eisenhower's administration--his complicity in the preparations for the 1961 attack on Cuba and his close ties with the counterrevolutionaries and several wealthy Cuban-born families in the United States made him a prisoner of the same policy of hostility. As far as the Ford-Kissinger administration is concerned, it should be pointed out that the latter felt very irritated with and hostile toward Cuba, especially when Cuba assumed her internationalist duty of giving concrete support to the Angolan people in their struggle against the racists and imperialist aggressors. Thus, the U.S. economic blockade of Cuba has been maintained, unchanged, for 16 years.

I was saying that Carter hasn't committed himself to this policy, but we might add that he has taken a number of steps, namely: 1. his public declarations in favor of discussions with Cuba, 2. the declarations made by U.S. Secretary of State Cyrus Vance to the effect ... that the United States was ready to hold talks with Cuba without setting any previous conditions and 3. the authorization granted U.S. citizens to visit Cuba (the prohibition of such visits has been constantly renewed and maintained throughout the last few years).

I might add two more things here: we have noted that, since Carter's inauguration as president, there have been no more flights by U.S. spy planes over our territory, and we have also discussed the setting of fishing rights within the 200-mile limit.

We haven't renewed the agreement on aircraft hijacking with the United States, because, after the sabotaging of the Cuban plane, we said that we were willing to discuss the matter with the United States only on the basis of its completely abandoning its policy of hostility against Cuba--and its economic blockade of Cuba is a very serious act of hostility.... Partial lifting isn't enough. The United States has trade with China, with the USSR and with the other socialist countries. Why, then, all this arbitrary discrimination against us? Now then, I repeat, fishing rights are the only things being discussed between us....[37]

Castro also discussed the first contact with the United States, at the end of the Nixon administration:

> Two years ago, the U.S. authorities sought to get in contact with us. This was after Nixon had resigned. Such contacts were established and served to show them that we weren't ready to hold talks as long as the blockade was in effect. These contacts were limited to this. Nothing more. We still maintain this position, and I'd like to tell you why. There's a basic reason for this. We haven't imposed any blockade against the United States. We don't practice subversion and espionage in the United States. This is why we believe that it is necessary for the economic blockade to be lifted before any talks can be held. We believe that this is a very just position--contacts, not talks.
>
> This means that we're ready to discuss our problems as soon as the blockade is lifted. Let me say one more thing here: I don't think that the problem of the contradictions that exist between socialism and capitalism is going to be solved through war, because we're not living in the age of the bow and arrow; this is a nuclear world, and a war could wipe out the whole world. One way or another, nations with different social regimes will have to learn to live with one another.[38]

Journalist Barbara Walters asked Castro in an interview reported in the July 17, 1977, issue when there would be normal relations between Cuba and the United States. He said:

> I can say for certainty that, for our part, we are willing to work in that direction and that we will be responsive to the United States' will in that respect. However, even from an optimistic standpoint, I don't think that relations will be reestablished in the near future; in fact, not even in Carter's present term of office. Maybe in the second, between 1980 and 1984--or perhaps even later. I believe Carter himself would have to remove internal obstacles in order to change his policy.[39]

About lifting the embargo, Castro stated:

> I think that it would be a decisive step. Then we could sit down, on an equal footing, to discuss the differences between the United States and us....
>
> We consider the economic blockade as a serious act of hostility against our country, one that encourages terrorism. You blockade Cuba. Why?
>
> ... I realize that we should think about what kind of gestures we can make--things that it is in our power to do....[40]

Castro went into even more detail about his desire to trade:

> This is what I think: the United States' policy of hostility toward Cuba is its worst policy. I am convinced that, in regard to Cuba, a policy of normal relations and a trade policy would be much more intelligent. I won't say... that we are going to change our way of thinking, our ideology or our political principles....
>
> However, experience--even our own--shows that, when economic ties are established between two countries, any responsible government, any government that is really concerned about its people, takes those economic ties and interests into account and, in one way or another, these ties and interests have a certain bearing on the attitude taken by governments....[41]

In spite of Castro's apparent desire for better relations with the United States, he continued his attacks on the country in his speeches. In the Walters interview, the American journalist asked Castro about the response given by his audiences when he attacked the United States--"hit the Yankees hard." Castro responded:

> An old slogan that has persisted for all these years.... [T]he United States acts as an enemy of Cuba and the United States maintains a severe economic blockade. They know this. These are slogans. Often, in many public meetings, these are slogans that catch on and then are repeated. ...[42]

In a portion of the Walters interview published July 24, 1977, Castro stated his friendship with Americans:

> I want to tell them clearly. I feel the best wishes for the people of the United States. Every time when I know a new American, I always have a reason to try to understand your people. And I think that every time I find, too, that the Americans, the newsmen, the workers, the technicians, are wonderful people. Really, I appreciate and admire the people of the United States for what they have achieved.... I hope in the future we will understand each other better and we will be friends.[43]

Such comments appear to reflect a conciliatory mood. It appears that at that time Castro wanted normalization of relations. Did the same barriers remain? Castro said they did, but he was optimistic for improvement in relations. In a press conference reported January 1, 1978, he went into detail not just on the problems that separated the United States and Cuba, but also the prospects for some type of agreement:

> How are our relations with the United States coming along? Well, they're progressing somewhat. Naturally, first of all, imperialism has been dealt a great number of blows of all kinds, such as Vietnam, Watergate and others. Its economic blockade and its attacks against us have been discredited and are untenable before the eyes of the world. The imperialists have no moral basis from which to defend that kind of policy against us.
>
> Truthfully speaking, we've emerged victorious from this struggle.... There's a new administration in power. As we've said before, there've been some positive gestures. It was not characterized by a hostile policy toward our country, it didn't commit itself during the electoral campaign to follow an aggressive policy against Cuba. It has made some gestures, and we, on our part, have made some small gestures as well. Ourshave been small gestures, for what other kind can we make?[44]

Castro then mentioned discussions being held on halting marijuana trafficking, settling the 200-mile boundary question, allowing tourists into Cuba, and establishing the

United States Interests Office. Castro added his concerns:

> But let's look at the essentials; what's the essential thing? The blockade. The blockade is still on. What's immoral about the United States' policy is that they're trying to use the blockade as a weapon for negotiation to deal with us....
>
> (T)hey want to use the blockade as a weapon for negotiation: I hold you in a strangle hold and we talk; one of us is in a strangle hold and the two of us are talking. That's profoundly immoral on the part of the United States government.
>
> We are ready to acknowledge the losses sustained by their corporations if they acknowledge damages to Cuba....[45]

Castro added something new--repayment to U.S. corporations. He also restated the other issues. About Puerto Rico, he said, "We're not promoting violence in Puerto Rico." About troops in Africa, he said, "We have made it very clear to them that Cuba's solidarity with the African people is not negotiable." About South America, he stated: "They used to talk about Latin America being subverted, but they no longer talk about that."[46]

In the same press conference Castro again defended his position of not bending on his matters of principle:

> This doesn't mean at all that we reject the possibility of improving the relations between Cuba and the United States, for us this is based on a matter of principle as we sincerely believe that the efforts of everybody are required to bring about international detente and peace....
>
> This means that whenever there's a possibility for improvement we're simply following a principle when we think we should go to work on that connection. But apparently the United States government doesn't understand that....
>
> Decisive are our relations with the Socialist community and the USSR, these are indeed decisive! And these relations could never be replaced by relations with the United States because the nature of imperialism prevents it. ... What moral basis can the United States have

> to speak about Cuban troops in Africa? What moral basis can a country have whose troops are on every continent...?
>
> If we're going to talk about troops stationed where they shouldn't be, and that indeed has a lot to do with the bilateral relations between Cuba and the United States, the only troops that should be talked about are those now stationed at the Guantanamo Naval base. It's the only point regarding troops in other countries we can talk about.
>
> ... It's all right for the imperialists to have troops and advisers everywhere in the world, but we can't have them anywhere....[47]

The continuing problem of Cuban troops in Africa worsened again in the summer of 1978 after a Carter attack on Castro concerning Cuban military activity there. Castro said that Carter misunderstood the situation. Castro discussed the matter in a statement published June 25, 1978:

> I'm not questioning President Carter's prestige and I'm not questioning his honesty. On other occasions I said, as I believe, that President Carter is a personally honest man and that he has his ethics, which spring from his religious beliefs. I have said so publicly and I don't mind saying so, because one thing has nothing to do with the other; but this does not rule out the possibility of his being deceived.... I don't think Carter is lying deliberately. I say this with all sincerity. He simply believes the information he was given.[48]

Castro was not so understanding two months later, however. In a statement published August 6, 1978, he stated:

> Every U.S. ruler has his own rhetorical phrase for Latin America or the world; one spoke of a 'Good Neighbor Policy'; another, of the 'Alliance for Progress.' Now the watchword is human rights. Nothing has changed in U.S. policy toward the hemisphere and the world; everything is just the same; gunboat and dollar diplomacy, the law of the might, has always prevailed. The phraseology is just as fleeting as the administrations. The only content in the Yankees' policy is the propensity to lie.[49]

That statement indicated a severe worsening of conditions between the two countries. However, some progress in the other direction was evident again with Castro's release of political prisoners on December 8, 1978. Castro talked about the planned release in the September 17, 1978, edition:

> The Government of the United States might have had some indirect influences on this, but not due to its verbal human rights policy, but rather because there's no question this administration put an end to the policy of supporting terrorist activities against Cuba, terrorist and counter-revolutionary activities regarding Cuba. And that policy created the conditions enabling us to take some of these steps.
>
> ... The blockade and other hostile acts continue, but we cannot say that at present the government of the United States is giving its support to terrorism or to armed counter-revolutionary activities against Cuba. And I believe this has had some influence.[50]

In a press conference reported in the December 3, 1978, issue, Castro was asked what he considered "the most basic, the minimum, the essential factor for there to be very serious dialogue between Cuba and the United States." He answered as he had answered before:

> What's essential is the lifting of the blockade, because the economic blockade is like a knife at Cuba's throat and under such conditions there can be no really fruitful negotations between the two countries....[51]

Despite the release of the prisoners, relations appeared to be as bad as they had been at any time so far during the Carter term. In a press conference held December 9, 1978, and reported December 17, Castro again was asked what he thought of the Carter administration. He responded:

> ... I must say that, in our opinion, the Carter administration was the best to come along so far with regard to Cuba--so far, but this has started to change.
>
> There are two important things: one of them, when the problem of Saba occurred, and they led Carter on a wild goose chase, fooled him and led him to making false charges against Cuba.... Another problem, when the United States unilaterally declared their 200-mile preferential waters, we had historically fished in those waters.... They imposed such requirements and conditions that it proved absolutely impossible to fish there.
>
> Now there is this irritating violation of our airspace with the SR-71. Very serious and grave things have happened.[52]

Further improvements in relations were not possible in 1979 because of another "misunderstanding." It was the incident of the "Red Brigade." In that incident Carter charged that Soviet troops had been stationed in Cuba recently. Castro replied to the charges in a press conference September 28, 1979, that was reported in the October 7 edition.

> What you call a brigade and we call a training center has been in Cuba for 17 years. That military installation was set up at the end of the 1962 October Crisis, within the spirit of the October agreement of that year....
>
> ... I think Carter's actions on this problem have been dishonest, insincere, immoral, and that he has been fooling world public opinion and U.S. public opinion....
>
> ... (I)n the first place there has been absolutely no change in the functions or the size of the installation....[53]

Though it continued to affect United States-Cuban relations, the issue soon died down in the United States when Carter discovered that the troops had been there for years, just as Castro had claimed. In a speech March 8, 1980, Castro brought up the incident again. In the speech, published

March 16, Castro stated that:

> ...they started a campaign and mounted a big scandal around this issue to justify their hostile policy toward Cuba, to combat Cuba's influence and also to justify interventionist moves in the area and to delay the ratification of SALT II.
>
> After that they renewed their spy flights over our country; they organized some landings in Guantanamo Bay....[54]

Elsewhere in the March 8 speech Castro commented upon the state of United States-Cuban relations:

> In the last few weeks, the international situation has become worse. There has been a significant step backward in the gains made in halting the arms race, promoting international detente and the search for peace as a result of imperialist policy, of the actions of the most reactionary imperialist elements that have made the situation worse as of a few months ago.[55]

Those comments came less than three months after Castro's speech on the 20th anniversary of the Cuban revolution in which he once again indicated his willingness for talks. In that speech, published January 14, 1980, Castro had said:

> Cuba is not opposed to trade or even normal diplomatic relations with the United States. We sincerely believe in the need for peace and coexistence between different social regimes, ... but it does not imply the imperialists' 'right' to intervene in and repress revolutionary movements of any country in the world....
>
> The very fact that the United States trades with the vast majority of the other socialist countries while trying to maintain this measure [blockade] constitutes a deep political immorality, resounding proof of its scorn for the right to self-determination of the peoples of this hemisphere....[56]

What Castro saw as a U.S. military build-up was another topic of the speech published March 16. He noted that the United States was building more military bases, stationing

naval squadrons in the Indian Ocean, planning to send missiles to Europe, intervening in Afghanistan, increasing the military budget. Castro seemed fearful of an American attack on Cuba. A comment by a Carter adviser that he took as a threat of such an attack produced the following Castro response:

> It was a clear threat to our country, implying that if conflict broke out in the Persian Gulf they would respond by attacking us....
>
> The United States' plans for intervention everywhere but especially in this area are evident, in the Caribbean and Central America. They are planning to intervene in Grenada, Nicaragua, El Salvador, the Caribbean and Central America. Their plans for intervention to contain the revolutionary movement are clear....
>
> We are not following a deliberate head-on policy as regards the United States. We're not even reluctant to talk; we are not against making any effort to improve relations, if this would in any way help bring about a climate of peace in this hemisphere or in the international arena.[57]

Castro continued to accuse the United States of not trying to improve relations. In a speech given May 1, 1980, and published May 11, Castro stated:

> We are not to blame for the lack of a climate of peace in the Caribbean; they are. Let them lift their blockade, dismantle their base at Guantanamo, stop making flights over Cuba, respect Nicaragua and respect Grenada. If, in addition, they stop interfering in the international affairs of other peoples of Latin America, then it might be possible to create a climate for peace and detente....[58]

Even though Castro now saw Carter as not being interested in improvement of relations, the alternative to Carter did not seem any better. Even before the election, Castro had strong words for Reagan and his hard-line policy. In an interview given July 26 and published August 3, 1980,

Castro commented that the Republican

> ... platform must be denounced and world opinion has to be aware of this.... (W)e don't care who becomes the President of the United States; ... But we are interested in a situation that derives from the existence of a U.S. party platform that threatens the world with war....[59]

Castro continued to say that the blockade of Cuba was the major hurdle to overcome. In an article published November 30, 1980, Carlos Rafael Rodriguez, vice president of the councils of State and of Ministers, reaffirmed: "Cuba stands firm in its principle that the blockade has to be eliminated for there to be official talks with the United States."[60] Castro said in an article published December 28, 1980, that Cuba would stand firm on its principles:

> On occasion, the imperialists speak condescendingly about their being willing to lift the blockade, willing to spare our lives, if we stopped being internationalists, if we withdrew our fighters from Angola and Ethopia, if we severed our close ties with the Soviet Union. Needless to say, for us it is neither a pleasure nor a whim to have thousands of our fighters in other lands. However, the day that we call back a single man--a single one--it will be because he's no longer needed or because of an agreement between the governments of those countries and us, but never as a concession to imperialism! And our ties with the Soviet Union will never be broken. Never....
>
> What right does the United States have to tell us who our friends should be?
>
> So they threaten us with maintaining the economic blockade? Let them maintain it for 100 years if they want to....[61]

Castro continued the same theme in a speech about the president-elect published December 28, 1980. He stated:

> Needless to say, we have made it clear to Mr. Reagan that we're not afraid of his threats. If there's something we dislike very much, it's being threatened by anyone. We don't like anyone trying to intimidate us....[62]

In a report to the Second Congress reported in the same issue, Castro made further statements about the implications of a Reagan presidency, noting that

> ... Reagan's electoral triumph is a right-wing victory that signifies a clear move in that direction by an important sector of U.S. public opinion. ... The apparent national backing that the election returns give Reagan opens up the possibility that he may throw caution to the wind and return to his earlier aggressiveness in supporting the most reactionary plans in the Republican Party platform.[63]

The problems inherent in a Reagan presidency were presented in a speech by Castro to the National Assembly of the People's Power reported January 11, 1981:

> We're facing a really exceptional period. The change in the U.S. administration unquestionably implies risks for our country, risks of all types; the risk that the blockade will be tightened, the risk implied by CIA activities, the risk that the hostility and counter-revolutionary activities against Cuba will be stepped up, the risk of sabotage....
>
> This doesn't mean we're bent on looking for confrontation, but rather that we're analyzing from a realistic situation and that we consider it a basic duty to be prepared for them.[64]

Castro was more conciliatory in a speech reported February 1, 1981, in which he stated:

> ... We wish to maintain the most friendly relations with the United States. We don't want any conflict to develop between Cuba and the United States that can't be solved through reason and the rights of nations....[65]

He continued on a conciliatory note but still firm in his principles in a speech made April 16 and reported April 26:

> Our ideas are very clear, our convictions are very deep, our decisions are very resolute; we don't want war, we are not in the habit of provoking conflicts and we don't want to do so, but they should beware of provoking us....[66]

He was tougher in a speech reported April 23, evidently in response to concerns that he had appeared weak in the earlier speech. Castro stated that

> ... we said on April 16 that we're not in favor of creating conflicts or tensions, but we also warned the United States that it was making a big mistake if it insisted on renewing its clumsy, archaic policy on Cuba, if it thought that its differences with Cuba could be solved through threats and aggression....[67]

Castro's concerns about Reagan were evident again that fall when he expressed his thought that the administration had swung too far to the right. In a speech published September 27, he differentiated between the U.S. system and its current administration. He stated:

> The U.S. system is not fascist, but I am deeply convinced that the group which constitutes the main core of the current U.S. administration is fascist; its thinking is fascist; its arrogant rejection of every human rights policy is fascist; its foreign policy is fascist, etc.
>
> ... Our hopes are founded on the certainty that fascism can succeed neither in the United States nor in the world, although it is true that, at present, a fascist leadership has established itself in the United States on the basis of a structure of an imperialist, bourgeois democracy.[68]

Elsewhere in the speech, he was even more forceful against the U.S. leaders:

> Since the days prior to the Munich Pact international forums have not rung with such unpolitic and threatening words as those U.S. leaders now repeat....[69]

That Castro felt that not only threatening words but physical threats had increased was evident elsewhere in the speech published November 1, 1981, in which Castro charged:

> The imperialists have illusions and they have stepped up their economic blockage against Cuba, obstructing our economic activity and credits. They have stepped up their espionage activity in our country and elsewhere, their contacts and efforts to bring about the dissertion of diplomatic personnel and technicians; in short, they have stepped up their activity, their subversion activity.[70]

Charges by U.S. columnists Robert Novak and Rowland Evans in an article they wrote October 19 stating that Cuba had sent between 500 and 600 troops to Nicaragua brought a response from Castro. His reaction was printed November 8, 1981. The Granma article noted:

> Fidel made it clear on October 24 that the article hadn't appeared by chance and that it was a result of new tactics employed by the Government of the United States, which had been placed in an embarrassing position by Cuba's vigorous rebuttals of a series of false statements made by some U.S. Government spokesmen, who, naturally, had no evidence to back them up, and was blatantly manipulating the U.S. press to spread these statements about. He also stressed that the imperialists' purpose was evidently to justify their intervention in El Salvador and their crass threats and aggressive measures against Cuba.[71]

That Castro perceived the United States might attack was even more apparent in a speech published April 18, 1982. He still said that he was willing to negotiate despite the threats:

> Faced by the threats of aggression we have taken many measures and made many plans; for example, on the most efficient way to resist a

> total blockade of the country.... We have increased our defensive potential to the utmost, as was our duty; we have been doing so since last year, since they began threatening us....
> ... (W)e do not refuse dialogue, discussion or negotiations.[72]

Conditions did not improve after that, however. One of the strongest statements against the United States was in an editorial published November 21, 1982, in reference to a statement by U.S. officials that four top Cuban officials were involved in drug trafficking between the United States and Columbia:

> For the last 24 years the Yankee imperialists have been inventing all sorts of lies and slander against Cuba, but never before have they made such a ridiculous claim or resorted to such wretched and cowardly tactics.
> Apparently the current U.S. administration's unique combination of lies, insolence and total hatred for our country is required for some senile brain to think up the idea of implicating Cuba in the international drug traffic.
> The Reagan administration and the CIA are clearly behind this campaign, carried out by the reactionary press of the hemisphere for more than a year.[73]

The ferocity of the attacks increased, however. A Granma editorial printed May 28, 1983, stated:

> Since that day in 1962 when another U.S. president was presented with what was not exactly the Cuban flag of glory by the defeated invaders of Playa Giron, promising to return it to them in Havana, the White House has perhaps never stooped to such ridiculous and simplistic levels as in this speech given by Ronald Reagan on May 20....[74]

In spite of his feelings about Reagan, Castro said he continued to have good feelings for the American people. In an interview with an unnamed U.S. journalist

published August 14, 1983, Castro commented:

> If I have anything to say to the American people, it is that I imagine they've received a lot of information about our country, and I can say that our feeling toward the U.S. people, in spite of the problems we've had with the U.S. administrations, has always been one of respect and admiration. Actually, I make a distinction between the U.S. people and the administration. These are my feelings toward the U.S. people. ... I admire the U.S. people .... And I sincerely wish one day circumstances can change and we can have broader contacts with the people of the United States. We're neighbors; we're very much obligated to be friends, even if there's a socialist system and a capitalist system. I believe that the Latin American peoples and the U.S. people have to live in conditions of equality, respect and friendship on the same continent ....
>
> I was saying that if we were enemies of the United States we would be wishing that a conflict break out between the United States and Latin America. Really we do not wish this to happen ....[75]

In case friendship did not work, Castro in the same interview stressed again Cuban preparedness for war:

> We're prepared to resist a military blockade. We're prepared to resist attacks and if they should choose to wage a war of attrition and bombing we're prepared for the worst, which would be an invasion of the country. We're even prepared to fight if the country should be occupied ....
>
> We're prepared for that, not because we're braver than anybody else but because we've been forced to by threats coming from the United States itself, especially from Reagan.... We're prepared for all eventualities; we have no choice. And I'm being serious, I'm saying these things because I'm convinced of them.[76]

Castro was still talking about a possible attack in an interview with a French journalist published August 21, 1983. Castro seemed to have perceived that his conciliatory tone may have been taken for weakness by

Reagan. He stated:

> And it's too bad that the United States government feels our statements respond to its policy of force. Following that course, it may arrive at the conclusion at some time that it is completely mistaken, that revolutionaries don't give up or surrender to a policy of force....[77]

The policy of force materialized in an attack, but not against Cuba itself. The attack came instead against Cubans on the island of Grenada.

Cuba and Grenada has had strong ties since the takeover by Maurice Bishop on March 13, 1979. An article published in Granma July 3, 1983, noted that the first group of 33 Cubans arrived to start building the intercontinental airport there on December 6, 1979. An article on July 12, 1981, had noted that Grenadians had been purchasing International Airport Bonds to help finance the project and that financial assistance had come from Cuba, Syria, Libya, Iraq, Algeria, and Venezuela. It noted that 250 Cuban workers had joined 300 Grenadians working on the project. It stated, "The airport will bring night landing facilities to Grenada for the first time, and represents a vital link for tourism and trade."[78] United States opposition to the project was noted at that time by Bishop, who stated in a Granma interview that

> ... in the recent airport struggle we had to fight when the Americans tried to block our funding possibilities from the European Economic Community. Our approach was to update the people fully on exactly what was happening, to give our appreciation of why America was seeking to block the construction of even one international airport in our country....[79]

Granma featured a lengthy article on Cuban construction projects in its February 27, 1983, issue, and there was a photo of the Grenada airport. The caption read: "The construction of an international airport in Grenada called for a complex piece of engineering, including cutting down on the size of a mountain and draining and filling a bay."[80] Granma reported on July 3, 1983, that as of late June the filling of the bay had been finished and a fourth layer of asphalt had been applied.[81] The attention that the United States started giving the airport in mid-1983 led Castro to speak out on the matter in the edition of August 14. In the article he said:

> At a press conference the other day they showed a picture of Grenada's airport. This is the height of absurdity as if they had discovered some mysterious thing....
>
> It's U.S. citizens who will benefit from the airport.... Anyway they want to make the U.S. people believe that that airport, which is going to be used precisely by U.S. citizens, is a threat to U.S. security![82]

The events in Grenada surrounding Bishop's death caused alarm among Cuban leaders. A statement by the Party and Revolutionary Government released October 20 and printed in Granma on October 30 noted:

> No doctrine, no principle or proclaimed revolutionary position and no internal division can justify atrocious acts such as the physical elimination of Bishop and the prominent group of honest and worthy leaders who died yesterday.
>
> The death of Bishop and his comrades must be cleared up. If they were executed in cold blood, the guilty should receive exemplary punishment.
>
> Now imperialism will try to use this tragedy and the serious mistakes made by the Grenadian revolutionaries to sweep away the revolutionary

> process in Grenada and place the country under imperial and neocolonialist rule once again.[83]

Before the statement was printed in Granma, U.S. troops invaded the island October 25. A statement by the party and government published in the same issue read:

> A large-scale Yankee aggression against us can take place at any moment in Grenada against our cooperation workers: in Nicaragua against our doctors, teachers, technicians, construction workers, etc.; in Angola against our troops, civilian personnel and others, or even in Cuba itself. We must always be ready and keep our morale high in the face of these painful possibilities....[84]

The article then quoted Castro:

> I believe that in the face of this new situation, we must strengthen our defense, keeping in mind the possibility of a surprise attack by the Yankees. The existing danger fully justifies our doing so. If the United States intervenes, we must vigorously defend ourselves as if we were in Cuba.[85]

In a press conference October 26 with foreign, including American, journalists, Castro did not speak of how the attack would affect future U.S.-Cuban relations. He did say that Reagan used American medical school students studying in Grenada as a pretext for the attack:

> There was no pretext for attacking us. We were even at our work posts. What could the United States gain in the world by attacking the Cuban workers there, who were helping a tiny Third World country? What could it gain? All it could do was to turn a tiny country into a martyr....[86]

The Castro press conference was reported in Granma November 6 (Figure 4). November 20 Granma reported a speech Castro made at a rally in which he refuted the "19 lies"

Granma

Havana, November 6, 1983
Year 18 Number 45

This REVIEW is published in English, French and Spanish

Year of the 30th Anniversary of the Moncada
Price in Cuba: 10 cts.

OFFICIAL ORGAN OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF CUBA

UNJUSTIFIED, PERFIDIOUS, CRIMINAL U.S. INVASION OF GRENADA

WORLD'S MOST POWERFUL IMPERIALIST POWER INVADES ONE OF SMALLEST COUNTRIES ON EARTH



THIS WAS THE CUBAN PERSONNEL IN GRENADA

● THE NUMBER of Cubans in Grenada at the time of the U.S. invasion totalled 784.

The breakdown is as follows:

636 from the Ministry of Construction
17 from public health
12 from education
6 from agriculture
6 from transport
6 from the State Committee for Cooperation
5 from fishing
5 from basic industry
3 from culture
2 from domestic trade
1 from communications
1 from foreign trade
1 from the National Institute of Sports, Physical Education and Recreation
1 from the Central Planning Board
43 from the Ministry of the Revolutionary Armed Forces (MINFAR): 22 officers and the rest translators and service personnel
9 from the Ministry of the Interior
12 comprising the twin crew and guards of an AN-26 plane that arrived at Grenville airport the day before the invasion
2 passengers on the plane, Colonel Pedro Tortoló, of MINFAR, who traveled to the island on a working visit, and Carlos Díaz, official of the Party Central Committee's America Department
18 from the diplomatic mission including women and children

Of the 784 Cubans, 44 were women.

[illegible] MORAL AND POLITICAL DEFEAT FOR U.S.

IN THIS ISSUE

STOP PRESS

U.S. NAVY TO CARRY OUT MANEUVERS OFF CUBA

● AT THE time of going to press (November 2) the Revolutionary Government of Cuba had reported that the Cuban embassy in Grenada was surrounded and under harassment by U.S. troops and that the action coincided with the 24 hours given to Cuban diplomatic personnel by Paul Scoon — the governor-general of Grenada now acting as puppet representative of the U.S. occupation forces — to leave the island.

In response to this illegal decision, Cuban diplomatic personnel, excepting the women and children, received instructions not to leave Grenada until all Cuban cooperation personnel were evacuated.

The Revolutionary Government, in a memorandum delivered to the U.S. Interests Section in Havana, holds the government of the United States fully responsible for anything that may happen to diplomatic personnel and the Cuban embassy in Grenada.

The Cuban government note also refutes the United States' charges to the effect that Cuba is giving instructions to carry out acts of terrorism against U.S. citizens abroad. It described the charges as "a figment of the imagination or mimic, the product of the U.S. government's guilty conscience over its crimes or of misleading information, or simply one more gross lie on the part of the government of that country."

In information to the people, the Cuban government denounced the great obstacles that have been placed in the path of the International Committee of the Red Cross in arranging for the evacuation of the Cuban dead and wounded from Grenada. It also reported that nothing is known about the situation of wounded Cubans who might be aboard U.S. ships or in hospitals in Barbados and Puerto Rico, the only information on this having filtered through leaks to the press or the Red Cross.

There was a last-minute announcement that the International Committee of the Red Cross had reported that 48 Cubans, including the wounded and the sick, would be evacuated on Wednesday, November 2 and that the Red Cross would report on the situation of other wounded Cubans. At the time when this report was made public, there was no exact information as to when the wounded and the sick would be arriving in Cuba.

In another communiqué, the Cuban government reported that Colonel Pedro Tortoló, who led the Cuban construction workers and cooperation personnel in their heroic resistance in their last defense position, was alive. Colonel Tortoló, who had not surrendered and had fulfilled his duty, was given instructions by the Cuban embassy in Grenada to seek diplomatic protection to save his life.

Other stop press news included international news agency reports that a U.S. State Department spokesman had announced the beginning of U.S. military maneuvers in the vicinity of Cuba.

According to EFE, the maneuvers were to be carried out with no prior notice so make them more realistic. The aircraft carrier **America** and eight other U.S. navy units from the base in Norfolk, Virginia, will be taking part in these maneuvers.

According to the U.S. State Department spokesman, the **America**, a conventional, non-nuclear aircraft carrier, has 5000 men aboard and there are some 300 on each of the other warships (cruisers, destroyers and frigates).

Figure 4. November 6, 1983, Granma

the United States government had told about the invasion (Figure 5). He compared the attack to the Japanese surprise attack on Pearl Harbor and the Nazi invasion of its neighbors before the start of World War II. He also noted that the CIA may have been involved in the murder of Bishop and in fomenting the turmoil that led up to the invasion. He said again that the U.S. government was looking for an excuse to invade:

> The U.S. government looked down on Grenada and hated Bishop. It wanted to destroy Grenada's process and obliterate its example. It had even prepared military plans for invading the island --as Bishop had charged nearly two years ago-- but it lacked a pretext.
>
> ... Reagan wants to make corpses of all our people, men, women, the elderly and the children; he wants to make corpses of all mankind...[87]

The anger over the invasion was evident into 1984. In a speech published January 8, 1984, Castro stated:

> Tension has increased throughout the world as a result of the adventuristic, irresponsible and warlike policies of the present United States administration...
>
> The imperialists are mistaken if they think they can get concessions from Cuba or bring it to its knees through threats and aggression....
>
> If, after its sad exploit in Grenada, imperialism thinks we Cubans are weaker, it is blinded by stupidity....[88]

After that speech, however, Castro was relatively quiet, both in number of speeches and in references to the United States, through the first half of 1984. On the occasion of the 25th anniversary of the Agrarian Reform Law, the enactment of which Castro had said was the turning point in United States-Cuban relations, he made only fleeting

WEEKLY REVIEW

Granma

Havana, November 20, 1983
Year 18 / Number 47

This REVIEW is published in English, French and Spanish

Year of the 30th Anniversary of the Moncada
Price in Cuba: 10 cts.

OFFICIAL ORGAN OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF CUBA

FIDEL, AT THE EULOGY FOR THOSE KILLED IN GRENADA

NOT JUST THE SMALL COUNTRIES, BUT ALL MANKIND IS THREATENED. THE BELLS TOLLING TODAY FOR GRENADA MAY TOLL TOMORROW FOR THE WHOLE WORLD

EVERY DAY, EVERY HOUR, EVERY MINUTE – AT WORK, AT OUR STUDY AND COMBAT POSITIONS – WE WILL REMEMBER OUR COMRADES WHO DIED IN GRENADA

OUR PEOPLE FELT SUCH DEEP FRIENDSHIP FOR BISHOP AND GRENADA

THE U.S. GOVERNMENT LOOKED DOWN ON GRENADA AND HATED BISHOP

LET US HOPE THAT THEIR PYRRHIC VICTORY IN GRENADA AND THEIR AIR OF TRIUMPH DON'T GO TO THEIR HEADS LEADING THEM TO COMMIT SERIOUS, IRREVERSIBLE ERRORS

The experiences of Grenada will be examined in detail to extract the utmost benefit from them for use in case of another attack against a country where there are Cuban cooperation personnel or on our own homeland

NOT A SINGLE ONE DESERTED HIS HOMELAND

SPEECH ON PAGES 2-3

● THE CUBAN people's patriotic and deeply moving tribute to the 24 Cuban internationalist workers who died in Grenada in an unequal battle against the forces of imperialism was expressed in the November 14 eulogy delivered by Commander in Chief Fidel Castro, first secretary of the Central Committee of the Party and president of the Council of State and the Council of Ministers.

More than a million packed Havana's Revolution Square to overflowing, spreading down nearby access roads, in what was an impressive anti-imperialist, internationalist and revolutionary demonstration.

Present on the rostrum were relatives of the dead heroes and their internationalist comrades.

At 4:00 p.m., the national anthem was sung by all those present, accompanied by a 21-gun salvo and followed by the playing of taps.

Hundreds of Cuban flags, as well as signs and posters condemning imperialism and reflecting patriotic slogans, were raised as the commander in chief began to speak and on many occasions during his speech.

BURIED WITH MILITARY HONORS

The remains of the Cuban internationalist workers were subsequently buried with military honors in the Armed Forces Pantheon at Colón Cemetery.

Accompanied by a cortege of relatives of the dead and Party, government and mass organizations leaders, the remains were taken to the cemetery on 12 double caissons, escorted by members of the Revolutionary Armed Forces (FAR) and the militia and preceded by the band of the General Staff of the FAR playing funeral marches.

At the graveside, in complete silence a bugler played the call to attention. This was followed by the national anthem, three rifle volleys and the sound of taps.

Those present included Commander of the Revolution Henry Ruiz, member of the national leadership of the Sandinista National Liberation Front of Nicaragua, and Guillermo Torriello, president of the Anti-Imperialist Tribunal of Our America.

ARRIVAL OF BODIES IN HAVANA

The Cubana Airlines plane that carried the remains of the 24 Cuban construction workers and cooperation personnel from Holguín, in eastern Cuba, to Havana, landed at José Martí International Airport at 5:00 p.m. on Sunday, November 13.

Fidel, Raúl and other members of the Party Political Bureau, Secretariat and Central Committee, presided over the ceremony marking the beginning of the honors being paid by the capital to the fallen heroes.

While six squads composed of members of the Revolutionary Armed Forces and the National Revolutionary Militia transferred the caskets draped with the Cuban flag from the airliner to ambulances to be taken to Revolution Square, the band of the FAR General Staff played a funeral march and a company composed of land, air, antiaircraft, navy and militia troops presented arms. The ceremony ended with the playing of the national anthem.

IDENTIFICATION

On Saturday November 12 the remains of 37 Cuban and Grenadian fighters killed near the area where the Cuban construction workers and cooperation personnel had offered resistance to the Yankee attackers arrived in Holguín from Barbados. The bodies had been exhumed by Red Cross personnel in Grenada for the purpose of identification and transfer to Cuba.

Identification should have been carried out in Grenada, but the United States refused to grant Cuban technicians permission to travel to the island. It was then decided to have it done in Barbados, but the government of that country, which had previously given its consent, ignored the agreement between the United States, the Red Cross and Cuba and also objected.

This made it necessary to transfer to Holguín the 37 bodies that had been buried in the same area in order to proceed with their identification. A large number of specialists and technicians worked arduously to establish the national and personal identification of the Cubans killed in Grenada.

The bodies of the 13 Grenadians that were taken to Holguín were returned to Grenada following funeral rites in Holguín.

THE PEOPLE'S TRIBUTE

Hundreds of thousands filed past the remains lying in state at the foot of the monument to José Martí at Revolution Square, from 9:00 p.m. November 13 through 4:00 p.m. November 14, to pay their last respects to the fallen heroes, and a permanent honor guard was mounted throughout.

The Council of State issued a decree declaring a period of national mourning from 5:00 p.m. November 13 through midnight November 14, and a three-day period of official mourning.

Figure 5. November 20, 1983, Granma

reference to the United States. In the speech, reported in the May 27, 1984, issue, he noted that the law was "the first really profound measure of the Revolution and, as we have said on other occasions, that which pitted us directly against U.S. imperialism."[89] He then spent the rest of the speech talking about the good that had come from the law. Castro next spoke on July 26 during the visit by Jesse Jackson, at which time he renewed his position concerning his willingness for talks.

What does the record presented by Castro's speeches and the pages of Granma show? First, it is apparent that Castro has been saying for more than a decade that he is open to talks if he does not have to violate his principles. His preconditions are that Cuban's foreign policy and its links to the socialist system are not negotiable and that the embargo against Cuba must be halted. It also is apparent that his foreign policy adventures stood in the way of the desired "normalcy." Was his desire for negotiations reflected in his propaganda statements in other ways than overt statements? Castro's attitude toward the United States appeared less hard-line during the early Carter days while, at the same time, his language appeared to be stridently anti-American overall. Castro had praise for Carter's motives and indicated that some accord would have been possible during Carter's first term except for potential political consequences for Carter. However, later in Carter's term, the situation worsened.

The presence of Cuban troops in Africa during the period was a point of concern for the United States. Maurice Bishop's takeover in Grenada was viewed with alarm in Washington, as was Cuba's role in helping Bishop. The Panama Canal treaty was one of few events during that time that had a positive effect on United States relations with Cuba. On the negative side was the conducting of Operation Solid Shield by the United States in the Caribbean at the time. The Mariel boatlift began April 23, 1980, and was seen by some people at the time as a sign of closer cooperation between the two countries. The refugees were depicted in the pages of Granma as degenerates, antisocial elements and criminals, which is what the United States found out to be the case in many instances. The problem of dealing with those people continued throughout Reagan's first term. Carter's reaction to the Red Brigade also caused a setback in relations.

Those major incidents and other lesser ones appeared to have cooled the prospects for negotiations and were reflected both in articles in Granma and in Castro's speeches. Reagan's election in November, 1980, was another major concern for Castro. Prospects for accord, then, appeared poor during Reagan's tenure with a low point coming with the Grenada invasion. The most obvious thing the qualitative analysis shows is that every time prospects for improved relations looked good or talks were held some event took place that set negotiations back. It

appeared that principles and non-negotiable demands tended to get in the way of any real progress toward normal relations. Whether Castro was serious about negotiations, or merely was using the long-standing Soviet tactic of shifting from conciliation to bluster is not known. Whatever the case, Castro continued to talk of negotiations at regular intervals.

ENDNOTES

[1]For definitions and examples of the journalistic terms used in this chapter, the reader is referred to The Art of Editing by Floyd K. Baskette and others (3rd ed.) Macmillan Publishing Co., New York, N.Y., 1982.

[2]Granma Weekly Review (January 5, 1975), p. 2.

[3]Ibid., p. 7.

[4]Ibid.

[5]Ibid.

[6]Ibid., p. 10.

[7]Ibid.

[8]Ibid.

[9]Ibid.

[10]Granma (January 1, 1984), p. 4.

[11]Ibid.

[12]Ibid., p. 5.

[13]The Cubans were later to boycott the Olympics, following the lead of the Soviet Union.

[14]Granma (January 1, 1984), p. 7.

[15]Ibid., p. 8.

[16]Ibid., p. 9.

[17]Ibid.

[18]Ibid.

[19]Ibid.

[20]Ibid., p. 11.

[21]Ibid.

[22]Ibid.

[23]Ibid.

[24]Granma (August 5, 1984), p. 5.

[25]Ibid., p. 7.

[26]Ibid.

[27]Ibid.

[28]Ibid., p. 8.

[29]Granma (June 4, 1972), p. 6.

[30]Granma (May 26, 1974), p. 3.

[31]Granma (May 13, 1973), p. 1.

[32]Ibid.

[33]Granma (April 7, 1974), p. 3.

[34]Granma (December 1, 1974), p. 7.

[35]Granma (January 11, 1976), p. 4.

[36]Ibid., p. 7.

[37]Granma (May 22, 1977), p. 3.

[38]Ibid.

[39]Granma (July 17, 1977), p. 3.

[40]Ibid., pp. 3-4.

[41]Ibid., p. 4.

[42]Ibid.

[43]Granma (July 24, 1977), p. 5,

[44]Granma (January 1, 1978), p. 3.

[45]Ibid., pp. 3-4.

[46]Ibid., p. 4.

[47]Ibid.

[48]Granma (June 25, 1978), p. 2.

[49]*Granma* (August 6, 1978), p. 3.

[50]*Granma* (September 17, 1978), p. 5.

[51]*Granma* (December 3, 1978), p. 3.

[52]*Granma* (December 17, 1978), p. 3.

[53]*Granma* (October 7, 1979), p. 2.

[54]*Granma* (March 16, 1980), p. 4.

[55]Ibid.

[56]*Granma* (January 14, 1980), p. 3.

[57]*Granma* (March 16, 1980), p. 4.

[58]*Granma* (May 11, 1980), p. 3.

[59]*Granma* (August 3, 1980), p. 3.

[60]*Granma* (November 30, 1980), p. 3.

[61]*Granma* (December 28, 1980), p. 2.

[62]Ibid., p. 2.

[63]Ibid.

[64]*Granma* (January 11, 1981), p. 2.

[65]*Granma* (February 1, 1981), p. 3.

[66]*Granma* (April 26, 1981), p. 3.

[67]*Granma* (April 23, 1981), p. 3.

[68]*Granma* (September 27, 1981), p. 4.

[69]Ibid., p. 3.

[70]*Granma* (November 1, 1981), p. 5.

[71]*Granma* (November 8, 1981), p. 13.

[72]*Granma* (April 18, 1982), p. 5.

[73]*Granma* (November 21, 1982), p. 1.

[74]*Granma* (May 28, 1973), p. 1.

[75]*Granma* (August 14, 1983), p. 2.

[76]Ibid., p. 3.

[77]Granma (August 21, 1983), p. 3.

[78]Granma (July 12, 1981), p. 11.

[79]Ibid., p. 4.

[80]Granma (February 27, 1983), p. 9.

[81]Granma (July 3, 1983), p. 12.

[82]Granma (August 14, 1983), p. 6.

[83]Granma (October 30, 1983), p. 3.

[84]Ibid., p. 1.

[85]Ibid.

[86]Granma (November 6, 1983), p. 2.

[87]Granma (November 20, 1983), pp. 2-3.

[88]Granma (January 8, 1984), p. 3.

[89]Granma (May 27, 1984), p. 2.

CHAPTER V

ANALYSIS OF THE DATA--PART II

Quantitative Content Analysis Methods

Factor analysis and the chi square test were used to interpret the data derived from word counts of selected issues of Granma and of all of Castro's speeches over the period February 1966 to July 1984. McQuitty's elementary linkage was used to compare language usage in various years of the study. Linkage can be seen as an index of agreement. O, P, Q, and R factor analyses were used in the study.

O and P factor analyses are the reverse of each other. In O factor analysis, linkages were sought between the various years of the study when comparing categories of words. In P factor analysis, linkage was used to determine agreement between the categories of symbols when comparing the yearly data. Categories were developed through analysis of the 100 most-used propaganda symbols referring to the United States government or its policies. Words with similar roots were collapsed into one entry. The frequency of the same 100 words was determined for Castro's speeches, and O and P factor analyses were made of those data. Q factor analysis was used to determine how clusters of years

intercorrelated when compared to categories, and R factor analysis was used to determine how the categories intercorrelated when compared to clusters, the two being the reverse of each other. The chi square test was used to compare the frequency of the different categories of words found in issues of Granma with their frequency in Castro's speeches. It also was used to compare the language used during the term of Jimmy Carter and the term of Ronald Reagan. It was expected that the change in frequency of different types of words would be useful in determining shifts in policy or, at least, propaganda values. No attempt was made to code direction of symbolic language, because all symbols were determined to be anti-America. Intensity was not measured, because of the lack of utility of such a measure and because of the problems inherent in scaling words to reflect intensity of feeling. A weak scale of intensity was seen as less useful than comparing the use of such aggressive words in relation to the other categories of words used.

Counts of the most frequently used words in Granma were obtained by a random selection of issues, one per month. The page of each particular issue was also selected with a table of random numbers. The entire page was used as a context unit. If no story of more than three paragraphs (a brief) about the United States was found, then another page was selected randomly. If on the third attempt no mention of the United States was found, the newspaper was

scanned until an article about the United States larger than a brief was located. If that attempt was unsuccessful, another issue was picked randomly, and an attempt was made to select a page for study in the same random manner. If that was unsuccessful, the paper was then scanned for a story concerning the United States. If that was unsuccessful, zeros were to be entered. However, that step was never necessary. A lengthy attempt was made to locate a mention of the United States because the language used was of more importance than the frequency of mentions about the United States. Such presence or absence of a reference was determined, however, because it also had a bearing on the type of results to be gained by the study. An average of the number of attempts necessary to find a reference was used as an index of the frequency of occurrence.

In analyzing Castro's speeches, each paper during the period under study was scanned for presence of a "major" speech by Castro--anything longer than half of a page. It was determined that anything less than half a page would not provide sufficient material to continue to the next step, which was the random selection of one column of that speech for analysis. If the randomly selected column had no mention of the United States, another column was selected randomly. If after the third attempt no mention was found, the rest of the speech was scanned until a column was found with a reference to the United States, and that column was used as the context unit. If nothing

was found, a zero was posted.

Table I lists the 100 most-frequently used U.S. referents in Granma during the period. After the 100 words were determined, they were grouped into five categories or types of words. The five subject categories decided upon were: ideological words, aggressive words, organizations, locations, and people. Each word seemed to the researcher to fit into one of these categories. That method of placement was undertaken instead of the use of judges because the researcher was familiar with the words used and the context in which they were found. Even though a best-fit was desired, it was at least as important that the categories be consistent over the time period studied. Table II lists the top 100 words in the categories along with the percentage of the category to the total number of words counted (9,997). The ideological and aggressive word categories appeared to be the most useful in determining propaganda values that related to political attitudes. For the categories representing organizations, locations and people, the categories as such were less useful than the individual words used. The frequency of mention of the Panama Canal, Guantanamo or the Organization of American States over time, for example, would show important changes in the focus of policy more than would the specific number of mentions in that category. The individual words making up the ideological and aggressive word categories did not seem as important as the categories themselves.

TABLE I

FREQUENCY OF THE 100 MOST-USED WORDS IN GRANMA REFERRING TO THE UNITED STATES

Word	Frequency	Word	Frequency
United States	3,322	army	30
imperialism	1,046	oppression	30
Yankees	711	provocation	29
Puerto Rico	419	murder	28
aggression	368	Guantanamo Navy Base	28
CIA	341	Secretary of State	26
Reagan	205	Inter-American Police Force	25
Nixon	152	America	25
blacks/Negroes	149	embassy	24
OAS	140	sabotage	24
Panama Canal	128	bourgeois	24
criminal	127	bomber	23
Washington	107	air force	23
capitalism	102	forces	22
Carter	96	Senate	22
intervention	93	violent	21
monopoly	92	press	21
Giron/Bay of Pigs	84	espionage	21
troops	78	repression	21
N. Rockefeller	72	lies	20
administration	69	subversion	20
colonial	68	Gulf Oil	20
planes	67	domination	20
Johnson	64	occupation	20
invasion	61	kill	19
State Department	60	advisers	19
Pentagon	58	NATO	18
military	55	massacre	18
exploitation	55	genocide	18
bases	52	Malcolm X	17
bomb	49	FBI	16
enemy	49	ambassador	16
blockade	47	brutality	16
Haig	46	savage	15
Congress	42	ships	15
attacks	39	House	15
soldiers	39	Ford	15
Navy	38	annexation	14
Marines	36	women's rights	14
companies	34	reactionary	14
Angela Davis	34	propaganda	14
White House	34	treaty	14
racist	33	trusts	14
threat	32		

Word	Frequency	Word	Frequency
cynicism	13	International Monetary Fund	10
assassination	13	Kissinger	10
Foreign Trade Law	12	destruction	9
hegemony	11	warmongers	8
manuevers	11	missiles	7
slander	11		
M.L. King	11		
W. Colby	10		9,997

TABLE II

TOP-FREQUENCY WORDS IN GRANMA REFERRING TO THE UNITED STATES DISTRIBUTED BY CATEGORIES

Ideological	Aggressive	Organizations
bourgeois	aggression	administration
capitalist	annexation	air force
colonial	assassination	army
criminal	attacks	bases
cynicism	blockade	CIA
enemy	bomb	companies
espionage	bomber	Congress
exploitation	brutality	embassy
hegemony	destruction	FBI
imperialism	domination	Foreign Trade Law
lies	forces	Gulf Oil
manuevers	genocide	House
monopoly	intervention	IMF
oppression	invasion	IAPF
propaganda	kill	Marines
provocation	massacre	military
racist	missile	NATO
reactionary	murder	navy
repression	occupation	OAS
slander	planes	Pentagon
subversion	sabotage	press
warmongers	savage	Senate
women's rights	ships	State Dept.
Total: 1,833	soldiers	treaty
	threats	trusts
	troops	Washington
	violent	White House
	Total: 1,175	Total: 1,330

TABLE II (Continued)

Locations	People	
America	advisers	Kissinger
Panama Canal	ambassador	Malcolm X
Giron/Bay of Pigs	blacks/Negroes	Nixon
Guantanamo Naval Base	Carter	Reagan
Puerto Rico	W. Colby	Rockefeller
United States	A. Davis	Secretary of State
Total: 4,006	G. Ford	Yankees
	Haig	Total: 1,653
	Johnson	
	M.L. King	Grand Total: 9,997

The most important variables used in the study, then, were the word categories and the time at which the words were published. As noted above, the primary means for analyzing the raw data was factor analysis. The utility of O and P factor analyses in a study such as the present one was suggested in a 1965 article by Malcolm S. MacLean Jr.[1] Two commonly used types of factor analysis are R, which correlates tests of a sample of "people," and Q, which compares "people" taking a sample of tests. In both the time is held constant. On the other hand, O and P factor analyses are useful because time is not held constant. MacLean wrote:

> P factor analysis factors tests on a sample of times and O analysis factors times on a sample of tests, with person held constant. That is, we can give only one person a whole battery of tests --or a Q sample of items--this week, next week, the week after and so on....[2]

What MacLean noted about R and Q factor analyses also is applicable to O and P. In the place of "persons," the researcher might use

> ... any units for which we can obtain systematic, codable descriptive data. In place of tests, we might use statements, test items, concepts, pictures, news items--in fact anything of a symbolic nature which might elicit responses of theoretical interest to us, any way of describing the "person."[3]

O and P factor analyses are the main tools for the study being undertaken because, as MacLean noted,

> ... P factoring essentially reveals clusters of similar trend profiles, those variables which go up and down together.
>
> This kind of analysis might well be used in the historical study of a person, a community, a nation, a magazine, a television network, a newspaper. From such analysis of many variables, you could construct a few, relatively basic factor trend lines.
>
> Cattell's O factor analysis highlights occasions, times or situations in which the patterns of responses to a sample of tests are similar. How much is a person like himself from one time to another, in terms of the characteristics assessed by the tests?[4]

As to the means of analyzing the factor scores, MacLean noted:

> ... In some cases, agreement scores may prove more appropriate than correlations; there are many different indices of relationship which might prove suitable. There are also various kinds of factor analysis and various analogs to factor analysis--McQuitty's elementary linkage analysis, elementary factor analysis, hierarchical syndrome analysis, etc....[5]

The Granma Findings

Frequency of Symbols

Table III indicates the overall propaganda symbols

by year, and Table IV ranks years by the number of propaganda symbols. The highest number of such symbols came during the first four years of the study--1968, 1969, 1967, and 1966. The rate of propaganda symbols aimed at the United States was the next highest in 1983, followed by 1977, 1981, 1984, and 1980--all years with a number of mentions above the median and, except for 1980, above the mean. The year 1982 is the only one among the last five that is not at the median or above, and it is fifth from the bottom.

TABLE III

OVERALL PROPAGANDA SYMBOLS PER YEAR IN GRANMA REFERRING TO THE UNITED STATES

1966	671*	1971	371	1976	332	1981	583
1967	855	1972	479	1977	585	1982	432
1968	941	1973	473	1978	442	1983	614
1969	858	1974	362	1979	446	1984	282**
1970	445	1975	396	1980	507		

*10 1/2 months
**6 months

TABLE IV

RANKING BY YEAR OF PROPAGANDA SYMBOLS IN GRANMA REFERRING TO THE UNITED STATES

1968	941	1977	585	1973	473	1975	396
1969	858	1981	583	1979	446	1971	371
1967	855	1984	(564)*	1970	445	1974	362
1966	(767)*	1980	507	1978	442	1976	332
1983	614	1972	479	1982	432		

Mean: 550.1 Median: 1980
*Expected yearly frequency

Increased mentions mean increased attention, but that does not indicate the type of attention. Table V reflects the frequency of occurrence. It is an index of the number of attempts that were necessary before a page was found with sufficient number of mentions of the United States to conduct a count. Table VI ranks years for the frequency of occurrence. The list is somewhat different from the list of years ranked by the number of propaganda symbols. Only two of the years at or above the median made both lists, 1983 and 1980. The correlation between the frequency of occurrence and the frequency of propaganda symbols is .3385 (r^2 is .1146), a minimal agreement. That seems to suggest that an increase or decrease of symbols does not translate into a wider distribution of stories throughout the paper but more symbols of the United States per story.

TABLE V

FREQUENCY BY YEAR OF PROPAGANDA SYMBOLS IN GRANMA REFERRING TO THE UNITED STATES

1966	3.36	1971	2.42	1976	1.75	1981	2.50
1967	2.75	1972	2.42	1977	2.83	1982	2.41
1968	2.92	1973	2.33	1978	2.92	1983	1.92
1969	3.17	1974	2.92	1979	3.33	1984	2.17
1970	3.58	1975	2.00	1980	2.08		

TABLE VI

RANKING BY FREQUENCY OF OCCURRENCE OF PROPAGANDA SYMBOLS IN GRANMA REFERRING TO THE UNITED STATES

1976	1.75	1973	2.33	1967	2.75	1969	3.17
1983	1.92	1982	2.42	1977	2.83	1979	3.33
1975	2.00	1971	2.42	1974	2.92	1966	3.36
1980	2.08	1972	2.42	1978	2.92	1970	3.58
1984	2.17	1981	2.50	1968	2.92		

Mean: 2.62 Median: 2.50

No column-inch count of stories about the United States was attempted because no acceptable means could be found to determine if a particular story was "about the United States" or not. Many stories contained references to the United States even though the main topic of the article was some other country. There were other stories predominantly about the United States, which involved social problems and did

not contain many propaganda symbols. It would have been possible to measure the amount of news in various categories. The column-inch count of stories, though, was not the intention of the study, which concentrated only upon propaganda symbols and their relationship to each other.

The Clusters

The linkage technique in factor analysis is similar to that of determining factors themselves. Linkage draws out clusters, about which Fred Kerlinger stated:

> A cluster is a subset of a set of "objects"--persons, tests, concepts, and so on--the members of which are more similar or closer to each other than they are to members outside the cluster. The key question is how to define and identify clusters and their members....[6]

In this study, clusters are groups of years being studied. Years falling in the same cluster tend to be alike in the respects being investigated--in this case, the percentage of category frequencies. One of the analysis techniques suggested by both Kerlinger and MacLean is McQuitty's elementary linkage analysis.[7] Clusters were determined in this study through linkage of the factor scores in the O factor analysis matrix. The O score matrix consists of the five categories as the independent variable and the 19 time frames as the dependent variable. The correlation matrix consists of a grid of 19 columns and rows.

The linkage analysis drew out five clusters of years. Cluster V (Figure 10)--1982 and 1983--has the highest average correlation, .9604. Cluster I (Figure 6) has the second-highest average correlation of any cluster, .9231. It consists of years 1975 through 1980. The years 1979 and 1977 have the highest correlation of any two years in the cluster, .9989, and are the cluster's reciprocal pair. The third most closely related cluster is Cluster III (Figure 8) with an average correlation of .9202. It consists of 1966, 1967, and 1974. Its reciprocal pair is 1966 and 1974 with a correlation of .9742. Cluster IV (Figure 9) has the second-lowest correlation for its cluster average, .8532. It consists of 1970, 1972, and 1973, and its reciprocal pair is 1970 and 1973 at .9612. The lowest-correlation is for Cluster II (Figure 7), .8183. It is composed of 1968, 1969, 1971, 1981, and 1984. Its reciprocal pair is 1981 and 1984 with a correlation of .9751. The typal representative (the year most like the cluster average) for Cluster I is 1980. For Cluster II it is 1984, for Cluster III 1974, for Cluster IV 1970, and for Cluster V both 1983 and 1984.

	75	76	77	78	79	80
75	----	.8509	.9729	.9772	.9698	.9888
76	.8509	----	.7597	.7756	.7733	.8377
77	.9729	.7597	----	.9892	.9989	.9912
78	.9772	.7756	.9892	----	.9847	.9837
79	.9698	.7733	.9989	.9847	----	.9929
80	.9888	.8377	.9912	.9837	.9929	----
	4.7586	3.9972	4.7119	4.7104	4.7196	4.7943

Figure 6. O Data Matrix for Cluster I Years, Granma Data

	68	69	71	81	84
68	----	.8681	.6687	.6692	.7697
69	.8681	----	.6932	.8546	.9281
71	.6687	.6932	----	.9122	.8442
81	.6692	.8546	.9122	----	.9751
84	.7697	.9281	.8442	.9751	----
	2.9757	3.3440	3.1183	3.4111	3.5171

Figure 7. O Data Matrix for Cluster II Years, Granma Data

	66	67	74
66	----	.8759	.9742
67	.8759	----	.9106
74	.9742	.9106	----
	1.8501	1.7865	1.8848

Figure 8. O Data Matrix for Cluster III Years, Granma Data

	70	72	73
70	----	.8647	.9612
72	.8647	----	.7338
73	.9612	.7338	----
	1.8259	1.5985	1.6950

Figure 9. O Data Matrix for Cluster IV Years, Granma Data

	82	83
82	----	.9604
83	.9604	----
	.9604	.9604

Figure 10. O Data Matrix for Cluster V Years, Granma Data

Each cluster's dominant category is "location," and that category's highest-frequency symbol is "United States." In Clusters I and III, the second most-frequent category is "ideological words." Clusters II and IV have "people" as their second most-frequent category, while it is "organizations" for Cluster V. Cluster III is highest among the clusters for ideological and aggressive symbols, Cluster V for organizations, Cluster I for locations and Cluster IV for people. Figure 11 is a Q factor matrix that shows how the clusters intercorrelate as to number of symbols in each category. Cluster II is the typal representative. It is the most closely related to all other clusters. The ranking of intercluster correlations is shown in Table VII. Clusters II and IV are the most closely related, followed by I and V, II and V, I and II, and so on.

	I	II	III	IV	V
I	----	.8121	.7724	.7839	.8845
II	.8121	----	.6719	.9321	.8605
III	.7724	.6719	----	.7602	.4756
IV	.7839	.9321	.7602	----	.6978
V	.8845	.8605	.4756	.6978	----
	3.2529	3.2766	2.6801	3.1740	2.9184

Figure 11. Q Correlation Matrix for Clusters, Granma Data

TABLE VII

RANKING OF INTERCLUSTER CORRELATIONS
FOR GRANMA DATA

Clusters	Correlations
II - IV	.9321
I - V	.8845
II - V	.8605
I - II	.8121
I - IV	.7839
I - III	.7724
III - IV	.7602
IV - V	.6978
II - III	.6719
III - V	.4756

A comparison of the clusters to each other through Q factor analysis and linkage resulted in two "clusters of clusters." The first of these "superclusters" consists of Clusters II and IV with a correlation of .9321. Thus, Supercluster A consists of years 1968, 1969, 1970, 1971, 1972, 1973, 1981, and 1984. Supercluster B consists of Clusters I, III, and V. Clusters I and V have a correlation of .8845, and I and III have a correlation of .7724. That supercluster consists of 1966, 1967, 1974, 1975, 1976, 1977, 1978, 1979, 1980, 1982, and 1983.

A comparison of the percentages of each supercluster's symbols in each category is shown in Table VIII, followed by the level of significance obtained in a chi square test.

The test shows that there is no significant difference between the two superclusters as to the frequency of ideological symbols, but there is a statistically significant difference for the other categories. Supercluster A has more aggressive symbols and has more mentions of people. Supercluster B has more mentions of organizations and locations. All four relationships are significant at the .001 level. Overall then, the years 1968, 1969, 1970, 1971, 1972, 1973, 1981, and 1984--when taken as a type--have more aggressive language and more people symbols, while 1966, 1967, 1974, 1975, 1976, 1977, 1978, 1979, 1980, 1982, and 1983 have more organizations and locations.

TABLE VIII

COMPARING SUPERCLUSTERS BY SYMBOL CATEGORY FOR GRANMA DATA

Category	Cluster A Freq.	N	Cluster B Freq.	N	Expected Frequency	Sign. Level
Ideological	.1754	772	.1896	1061	.1834	--
Aggressive	.1316	579	.1065	596	.1175	.001
Organizations	.1023	450	.1572	880	.1337	.001
Location	.3650	1606	.4288	2400	.4007	.001
People	.2257	993	.1179	660	.1653	.001

The P correlation matrix depicting the intercorrelations of the categories is shown in Figure 12. Only one cluster emerged from linkage analysis of the five categories over the 19 years. The highest correlation was between use of aggressive and ideological symbols (.7795). The next highest correlation was between aggressive symbols and people (.7228). It was followed by the correlation between aggressive symbols and organizations (.4811) and by the correlation between organizations and locations (.4806). The aggressive symbol category is the typal representative, the most like all the others.

	P	L	O	A	I
P	----	.2321	.1448	.7228	.4405
L	.2321	----	.4806	.3648	.2582
O	.1448	.4806	----	.4811	.2147
A	.7228	.3648	.4811	----	.7795
I	.4405	.2582	.2147	.7795	----
	1.5295	1.3504	1.3467	2.3482	1.5568

Figure 12. P Correlation Matrix for Categories, Granma Data

Individual Categories

Though factor analysis is useful in determining the overall relationship among categories over time, it does not show how closely individual categories in each cluster compare to what would be expected if they were not significantly different. Chi square is the tool for making that determination. Since aggressive and ideological categories had the highest correlations with each other (.7795), each cluster as a unit was compared to those two categories. As noted earlier, those two categories were seen as most useful in answering the questions presented in the hypotheses to be tested. Table IX shows how clusters ranked for frequency of aggressive symbols. Cluster III has the most aggressive terms (17.37 percent); Cluster II is second (15.32 percent) and Cluster V third (10.13 percent), Cluster IV fourth (8.52 percent) and Cluster I fifth (6.08 percent).

Table X shows the result of the chi square analysis to determine if the clusters differ significantly as to level of aggressive terms. The table indicates that Clusters II and III are not significantly different as to aggressive symbols. That is, as a group, the totals for the years 1966, 1967, and 1974 are similar to years 1968, 1969, 1971, 1981, and 1984 as to numbers of aggressive symbols compared to the total number of symbols. The totals for Cluster IV (1970, 1972, and 1973) and Cluster V (1982 and 1983) are not significantly different. It can

be stated that Cluster I has significantly fewer aggressive symbols than any other cluster. Clusters IV and V have fewer such symbols than do Clusters II and III. All but one of the significant relationships are significant at the .001 level.

TABLE IX

RANKING OF AGGRESSIVE SYMBOLS BY CLUSTER FOR GRANMA DATA

Cluster	Frequency of Aggressive Terms
III	.1737
II	.1532
V	.1013
IV	.0852
I	.0608

TABLE X

COMPARING CLUSTERS IN GRANMA DATA FOR FREQUENCIES OF AGGRESSIVE SYMBOLS

Clusters Compared	Obtained Frequencies				Expected Frequency	Sign. Level
I - II	I	.0608	II	.1532	.1098	.001
I - III	I	.0608	III	.1737	.1077	.001

TABLE X (Continued)

Clusters Compared	Obtained Frequencies				Expected Frequency	Sign. Level
I - IV	I	.0608	IV	.0852	.0692	.01
I - V	I	.0608	V	.1013	.0723	.001
II - III	II	.1532	III	.1737	.1611	--
II - IV	II	.1532	IV	.0852	.1316	.001
II - V	II	.1532	V	.1013	.1398	.001
III - IV	III	.1737	IV	.0852	.1361	.001
III - V	III	.1737	V	.1013	.1479	.001
IV - V	IV	.0852	V	.1013	.0921	--

Table XI ranks clusters for frequency of ideological terms. Cluster III has the highest percentage of ideological terms (26.80 percent). It is followed by Cluster IV (21.62 percent), Cluster I (18.70 percent), Cluster II (15.65 percent), and Cluster V (5.45 percent). Table XII shows the result of the chi square analysis to determine if the clusters differed significantly for ideological terms used. The table shows that all clusters differed significantly, and eight of the relationships were significantly different at the .001 level.

TABLE XI

RANKING CLUSTERS IN GRANMA DATA FOR FREQUENCY OF IDEOLOGICAL SYMBOLS

Cluster	Frequency of Ideological Terms
III	.2680
IV	.2162
I	.1870
II	.1565
V	.0545

TABLE XII

COMPARING CLUSTERS IN GRANMA DATA FOR FREQUENCY OF IDEOLOGICAL SYMBOLS USED

Clusters Compared	Obtained Frequencies				Expected Frequency	Sign. Level
I - II	I	.1870	II	.1565	.1708	.01
I - III	I	.1870	III	.2680	.2187	.001
I - IV	I	.1870	IV	.2162	.1970	.05
I - V	I	.1870	V	.0544	.1496	.001
II - III	II	.1565	III	.2680	.1996	.001
II - IV	II	.1565	IV	.2162	.1755	.001
II - V	II	.1565	V	.0544	.1098	.001
III - IV	III	.2680	IV	.2162	.2460	.001

TABLE XII (Continued)

Clusters Compared	Obtained Frequencies				Obtained Frequency	Sign. Level
III - V	III	.2680	V	.0544	.1919	.001
IV - V	IV	.2162	V	.0544	.1470	.001

Intracluster Relationships

Clusters can have significant differences between category frequencies and have significant differences between various years in a particular category as well. Thus, some years may be more like years in another cluster for use of symbols in a particular category. To determine such relationships, chi square tests were performed. The first comparison is for aggressive terms. Table XIII ranks years for percent of aggressive symbols, with 1968 heading the list and 1979 at the bottom. The ranking does not exactly follow cluster boundaries.

Table XIV shows how each year in Cluster I compares to the cluster as a whole as to aggressive symbols. It indicates that the years 1975, 1976, 1977, and 1978 do not vary significantly from the cluster frequency. The year 1979 had a significantly smaller percentage of aggressive symbols than did the cluster mean, and 1980 had significantly more, which indicates a significant change in symbolic usage

at that time. Table XV shows the comparison for individual years in Cluster II with the average for the cluster, It can be seen that the cluster is a divergent one as far as aggressive symbols are concerned. The only year that is not significantly different from the cluster average is 1984.

TABLE XIII

RANKING YEARS OF GRANMA DATA FOR USE OF AGGRESSIVE SYMBOLS

1968	.211	1984	.135	1978	.077	1973	.051
1967	.202	1974	.122	1981	.073	1982	.051
1969	.196	1972	.106	1976	.063	1971	.040
1966	.165	1970	.099	1975	.053	1979	.034
1983	.137	1980	.087	1977	.053		

Mean: .104 Median: 1980

TABLE XIV

FREQUENCIES FOR AGGRESSIVE SYMBOLS USED IN CLUSTER I YEARS, GRANMA DATA

Year	Obtained Frequency Year	Obtained Frequency Cluster	Expected Frequency	Sign. Level
1975	.0530	.0608	.0598	--
1976	.0632	.0608	.0611	--
1977	.0530	.0608	.0594	--
1978	.0769	.0608	.0674	--
1979	.0336	.0608	.0569	.05
1980	.0866	.0608	.0646	.05

TABLE XV

FREQUENCIES FOR AGGRESSIVE SYMBOLS USED IN CLUSTER II YEARS, GRANMA DATA

Year	Obtained Frequency Year	Obtained Frequency Cluster	Expected Frequency	Sign. Level
1968	.2115	.1532	.1671	.001
1969	.1958	.1532	.1627	.01
1971	.0404	.1532	.1408	.001
1981	.0726	.1532	.1407	.001
1984	.1348	.1532	.1516	--

Table XVI compares the individual years in the cluster to the mean for Cluster III. It shows that 1974 is significantly different from the cluster average for aggressive terms. Table XVII compares the individual years in Cluster IV to the cluster average. It indicates that only 1973 is significantly different from the cluster average. Table XVIII shows how years in Cluster V compare with the average for that cluster. It indicates that 1982 is significantly lower and 1983 significantly higher than the cluster average.

TABLE XVI

FREQUENCIES FOR AGGRESSIVE SYMBOLS USED IN CLUSTER III YEARS, GRANMA DATA

Year	Obtained Frequency		Expected Frequency	Sign. Level
	Year	Cluster		
1966	.1654	.1737	.1715	--
1967	.2023	.1737	.1826	--
1974	.1215	.1737	.1653	.01

TABLE XVII

FREQUENCIES FOR AGGRESSIVE SYMBOLS USED IN CLUSTER IV YEARS, GRANMA DATA

Year	Obtained Frequency		Expected Frequency	Sign. Level
	Year	Cluster		
1970	.0989	.0852	.0885	--
1972	.1065	.0852	.0906	--
1973	.0507	.0852	.0765	.05

TABLE XVIII

FREQUENCIES FOR AGGRESSIVE SYMBOLS USED IN CLUSTER V YEARS, GRANMA DATA

Year	Obtained Frequency		Expected Frequency	Sign. Level
	Year	Cluster		
1982	.0509	.1013	.0866	.01
1983	.1368	.1013	.1145	.05

Table XIX ranks years according to percent of ideological symbols, with 1974 the highest and 1983 the lowest. Once again the ranking does not fit exactly into clusters. Table XX details how each year in Cluster I compares with the cluster average. No year in the cluster is significantly

different from the cluster average. Table XXI compares yearly frequencies as to ideological terms in Cluster II with the cluster average. The table shows that three of the five years in the cluster are significantly different from the cluster average. The years 1981 and 1984 have fewer ideological symbols, while 1969 has more such symbols than the cluster average.

TABLE XIX

RANKING YEARS BY FREQUENCY OF USE OF IDEOLOGICAL SYMBOLS, GRANMA DATA

1974	.301	1978	.222	1980	.182	1981	.116
1967	.280	1975	.202	1977	.178	1984	.103
1966	.235	1970	.198	1968	.175	1982	.056
1973	.226	1969	.190	1979	.159	1983	.054
1972	.223	1976	.184	1971	.132		

TABLE XX

FREQUENCIES FOR IDEOLOGICAL SYMBOLS USED IN CLUSTER I YEARS, GRANMA DATA

Year	Obtained Frequency		Expected Frequency	Sign. Level
	Year	Cluster		
1975	.2020	.1870	.1889	--
1976	.1837	.1870	.1867	--
1977	.1778	.1870	.1853	--
1978	.2217	.1870	.1919	--
1979	.1592	.1870	.1830	--
1980	.1818	.1870	.1862	--

TABLE XXI

FREQUENCIES FOR IDEOLOGICAL SYMBOLS USED IN CLUSTER II YEARS, GRANMA DATA

Year	Obtained Frequency		Expected Frequency	Sign. Level
	Year	Cluster		
1968	.1753	.1565	.1614	--
1969	.1900	.1565	.1640	.05
1971	.1321	.1565	.1538	--
1981	.1162	.1565	.1503	.05
1984	.1028	.1565	.1519	.05

Table XXII compares the years of Cluster III for ideological symbols. The table indicates that no year in the cluster is significantly different from the yearly average frequency for the cluster. Table XXIII indicates how the years of Cluster IV compare with the cluster average for ideological symbols. It shows that no year in the cluster is significantly different from any other as to frequency of ideological terms. Table XXIV compares the years in Cluster V for ideological symbols. It shows that the two years in the cluster are not significantly different from the cluster average. Nor do they differ from each other.

TABLE XXII

FREQUENCIES FOR IDEOLOGICAL SYMBOLS USED IN CLUSTER III YEARS, GRANMA DATA

Year	Obtained Frequency		Expected Frequency	Sign. Level
	Year	Cluster		
1966	.2355	.2680	.2360	--
1967	.2795	.2680	.2716	--
1974	.3011	.2680	.2733	--

TABLE XXIII

FREQUENCIES FOR IDEOLOGICAL SYMBOLS USED IN CLUSTER IV YEARS, GRANMA DATA

Year	Obtained Frequency		Expected Frequency	Sign. Level
	Year	Cluster		
1970	.1978	.2162	.2117	--
1972	.2234	.2162	.2180	--
1973	.2262	.2162	.2187	--

TABLE XXIV

FREQUENCIES FOR IDEOLOGICAL SYMBOLS USED IN CLUSTER V YEARS, GRANMA DATA

Year	Obtained Frequency		Expected Frequency	Sign. Level
	Year	Cluster		
1982	.0556	.0545	.0548	--
1983	.0537	.0545	.0544	--

Castro's Speeches: The Findings

Frequency of Symbols

The analysis of Castro's speeches for frequency of symbolic usage differed from the analysis of Granma in that each speech of a predetermined length was analyzed. Table XXV indicates how the number of speeches reported in the English-language edition of Granma varied for each year studied. The table shows that Castro reached a peak as to number of speeches reported in 1971 and, except for 1977 and 1981, the reports declined consistently until 1984. The same 100 words identified in Granma as the top-frequency symbols were used in analyzing the symbol frequency of Castro's speeches because it would allow comparisons between the two sets of data. Though no tally was made of frequency of other words about the United States used by Castro, the use of symbolic words seemed remarkably consistent between the two sets of data. Table XXVI indicates the number of overall propaganda symbols per year, and Table XXVII ranks the years for average number of symbols per column analyzed, an index of frequency. No overall trend is readily apparent in the figures.

TABLE XXV

NUMBER OF SPEECHES BY FIDEL CASTRO
REPORTED IN GRANMA BY YEARS

1966	17*	1971	39	1976	14	1981	15
1967	15	1972	22	1977	20	1982	8
1968	21	1973	18	1978	11	1983	4
1969	13	1974	14	1979	11	1984	6**
1970	12	1975	14	1980	11		

*There were 15 speeches for the 10 1/2 months of the study. To have the time frame the same for each year, the number expected for a 12-month period was calculated.

**There were three in the six-month time frame of the study. The number expected in a 12-month period was calculated.

TABLE XXVI

OVERALL PROPAGANDA SYMBOLS IN CASTRO'S
SPEECHES REPORTED BY YEAR

Year	Number of Symbols	Number of Speeches	Av.
1966	224	15	14.93
1967	229	15	15.27
1968	232	21	11.05
1969	97	13	7.46
1970	149	12	12.42
1971	217	39	5.56
1972	212	22	9.64
1973	177	18	8.83
1974	249	14	17.79
1975	159	14	11.36
1976	252	14	18.00
1977	191	20	9.55

TABLE XXVI (Continued)

Year	Number of Symbols	Number of Speeches	Av.
1978	114	11	10.36
1979	58	11	5.27
1980	181	11	16.45
1981	198	15	13.20
1982	169	8	21.12
1983	61	4	15.25
1984	44	3	14.67

TABLE XXVII

RANKING YEARS FOR FREQUENCY OF USE OF PROPAGANDA SYMBOLS IN CASTRO'S SPEECHES

1982	21.12	1983	15.25	1975	11.36	1973	8.83
1976	18.00	1966	14.93	1968	11.05	1969	7.46
1974	17.79	1984	14.67	1978	10.36	1971	5.56
1980	16.45	1981	13.20	1972	9.64	1979	5.27
1967	15.27	1970	12.42	1977	9.55		

Mean: 12.54 Median: 1970

The Clusters

Four clusters were derived through O factor analysis of Castro's speeches in relation to the five categories

of symbols used in the Granma analysis--ideological symbols, aggressive symbols, organizations, locations, and people. The cluster with the highest correlation average is Cluster I (Figure 13) at .9775. The year most like all the others in that cluster--the typal representative --is 1968. The second-highest average correlation is for Cluster II (Figure 14), .9326. Its typal representative is 1972. Cluster III (Figure 15) is the third-highest cluster for average correlation at .9254. Its most representative year is 1966. Cluster IV (Figure 16) is the least correlated at .7225. Its most typical year is 1969. Table XXVIII shows the top-frequency categories for the Castro data. Ideology is ranked first with 42.83 percent of the symbols. It is followed by location, 23.00 percent; aggression, 16.40 percent; people, 11.45 percent; and organizations, 6.32 percent. Clusters I, II and III each have ideology as the category with the greatest percentage of symbols. Cluster IV is ranked highest for all categories except for ideology. The ranking of the intercorrelations for clusters is shown in Table XXIX, which indicates that Clusters I and II are the most highly correlated and Clusters II and III the next most highly correlated. They are followed by Clusters I and IV, Clusters I and III, Clusters II and IV, and Clusters III and IV.

	68	70	71
68	----	.9726	.9951
70	.9726	----	.9647
71	.9951	.9647	----
	1.9677	1.8907	1.9598

Figure 13. O Data Matrix for Cluster I Years, Castro Data

	72	73	78
72	----	.9891	.9353
73	.9891	----	.8734
78	.9353	.8734	----
	1.9244	1.8625	1.8087

Figure 14. O Data Matrix for Cluster II Years, Castro Data

	66	67	74	75	76	77	82
66	----	.9498	.9861	.9651	.9192	.9650	.9787
67	.9498	----	.9601	.9420	.8708	.9716	.7388
74	.9861	.9601	----	.9751	.8780	.9360	.9318
75	.9651	.9420	.9751	----	.7883	.9196	.9163
76	.9192	.8708	.8780	.7883	----	.9271	.9385
77	.9650	.9716	.9360	.9196	.9271	----	.9745
82	.9787	.7388	.9318	.9164	.9385	.9745	----
	5.7639	5.4331	5.6671	5.5065	5.3219	5.6938	5.4787

Figure 15. O Data Matrix for Cluster III Years, Castro Data

	69	79	80	81	83	84
69	----	.9160	.8812	.8893	.8071	.6558
79	.9160	----	.7826	.9166	.7872	.5303
80	.8812	.7826	----	.7855	.4416	.9279
81	.8893	.9166	.7855	----	.7822	.6123
83	.8071	.7872	.4416	.7822	----	.1212
84	.6558	.5303	.9279	.6123	.1212	----
	4.1494	3.9327	3.8188	3.9859	2.9393	2.8475

Figure 16. O Data Matrix for Cluster IV Years, Castro Data

TABLE XXVIII

TOP-FREQUENCY WORDS USED IN CASTRO'S SPEECHES BY CATEGORY

Category	Total	Frequency
Ideology	1376	.4283
Location	739	.2300
Aggression	527	.1640

TABLE XXVIII (Continued)

Category	Total	Frequency
People	368	.1145
Organizations	203	.0632

TABLE XXIX

RANKING OF CLUSTER INTERCORRELATIONS IN CASTRO DATA

Clusters	Intercorrelations
I - II	.9738
II - III	.9406
I - IV	.8899
I - III	.8769
II - IV	.6377
III - IV	.4503

Figure 17 is a Q factor analysis correlation matrix that shows how the clusters are intercorrelated as to number of symbols in each category. Cluster I is the typal representative, i.e., the cluster most like the typical cluster. Linkage shows that the four clusters form only one

supercluster. Thus, they may be said to be of the same type. The correlation matrix for P factor analysis of the five categories is shown in Figure 18. Location is the typal representative. Linkage determined two clusters of categories. The first cluster consists of the organization, location, and people categories. Location and people were the two most-highly correlated categories, at .5629. Location is the typal representative for the cluster. The second cluster consists of aggression and ideology, correlated at .3984.

	I	II	III	IV
I	----	.9738	.8769	.8899
II	.9738	----	.9406	.6377
III	.8769	.9406	----	.4503
IV	.8899	.6377	.4503	----
	2.7406	2.5521	2.2678	1.9779

Figure 17. Q Correlation Matrix for Clusters, Castro Data

	P	L	O	A	I
P	----	.5629	.1689	.0201	.3801
L	.5629	----	.4293	.2634	.3408
O	.1689	.4293	----	.3476	.3441
A	.0201	.2634	.3476	----	.3984
I	.3801	.3408	.3441	.3984	----
	1.1320	1.5964	1.2899	1.0295	1.4634

Figure 18. P Correlation Matrix for Categories, Castro Data

Individual Categories

Each category was compared with all others through a chi square test to determine how clusters were related as to frequency of aggressive terms. Table XXX indicates how clusters are ranked for aggression. Cluster IV ranks first at 23.79 percent. Cluster III is second at 17.99, Cluster II third at 14.31 percent, and Cluster I fourth at 6.35 percent. Table XXXI shows the result of the chi square analysis to determine if the clusters differ significantly for aggression. The table shows that only Clusters II and III are not significantly different as to use of aggressive symbols. Cluster IV has significantly more aggressive terms than the other clusters. Clusters II and III have significiantly more aggressive terms than Cluster I.

TABLE XXX

FREQUENCY OF AGGRESSIVE SYMBOLS USED IN CASTRO'S SPEECHES BY CLUSTER

Cluster	Frequency of Aggressive Terms
IV	.2379
III	.1799
II	.1431
I	.0635

TABLE XXXI

COMPARING CLUSTERS FOR FREQUENCY OF AGGRESSIVE SYMBOLS USED IN CASTRO'S SPEECHES

Clusters Compared	Obtained Frequencies				Expected Frequency	Sign. Level
I - II	I	.0635	II	.1431	.0999	.001
I - III	I	.0635	III	.1799	.1463	.001
I - IV	I	.0635	IV	.2379	.1536	.001
II - III	II	.1431	III	.1799	.1705	--
II - IV	II	.1431	IV	.2379	.1961	.001
III - IV	III	.1799	IV	.2379	.1974	.01

Table XXXII shows the results of the chi square analysis to determine if the clusters differ significantly for ideology. The table shows that four of the six comparisons result in a significant difference in frequency for ideological terms. Only Clusters I and II and Clusters I and III are not significantly different. Clusters I, II, and III are significantly greater than Cluster IV in number of mentions. Cluster III has significantly more mentions of ideological terms than does Cluster II.

Intracluster Relationships

Individual years in clusters were compared with the average for the cluster to determine if some years were more closely related to years in other clusters as to use of aggressive terms. Table XXXIII ranks years for percentage of aggressive symbols reported in Castro's speeches. Ranked first is 1984 with 29.55 percent, with 1980 second at 29.28 percent. Several of the early years were ranked lowest--1968, 1970, and 1971. Table XXXIV details how each year in Cluster I compares with the average of the cluster for aggressive symbols. It shows that there is no significant difference between any year of the cluster and the cluster average. Table XXXV shows the comparison for the individual members in Cluster II with the average for the cluster. The table shows that no year in Type II is significantly different from the cluster average as to use of aggressive terms. Table XXXVI shows the comparison of the individual years in the cluster to the average of

Cluster III. Once again, there is no significant difference in any year in the cluster from the cluster average. Table XXXVII compares the aggressive symbols of Cluster IV years with the cluster average. None of the years is significantly different from the cluster average for the frequency of aggressive symbols.

TABLE XXXII

COMPARING CLUSTERS FOR FREQUENCY OF IDEOLOGICAL SYMBOLS USED IN CASTRO'S SPEECHES

Clusters Compared	Obtained Frequencies				Expected Frequency	Sign. Level
I - II	I	.4649	II	.4195	.4441	--
I - III	I	.4649	III	.4990	.4891	--
I - IV	I	.4649	IV	.2379	.3476	.001
II - III	II	.4195	III	.4990	.4787	.001
II - IV	II	.4195	IV	.2379	.3179	.001
III - IV	III	.4990	IV	.2379	.4200	.001

TABLE XXXIII

RANKING YEARS FOR USE OF AGGRESSIVE SYMBOLS IN CASTRO'S SPEECHES

1984	.2955	1981	.2020	1979	.1724	1973	.1073
1980	.2928	1978	.2018	1976	.1667	1968	.0776
1969	.2474	1975	.2013	1974	.1526	1970	.0604
1982	.2308	1983	.1967	1967	.1441	1971	.0507
1977	.2042	1966	.1875	1972	.1415		

Mean: .1711 Median: 1966

TABLE XXXIV

FREQUENCIES FOR AGGRESSIVE SYMBOLS USED IN CLUSTER I YEARS, CASTRO DATA

Year	Obtained Frequency		Expected Frequency	Sign. Level
	Year	Cluster		
1968	.0776	.0635	.0675	--
1970	.0604	.0635	.0629	--
1971	.0507	.0635	.0631	--

TABLE XXXV

FREQUENCIES FOR AGGRESSIVE SYMBOLS USED IN CLUSTER II YEARS, CASTRO DATA

Year	Obtained Frequency		Expected Frequency	Sign. Level
	Year	Cluster		
1972	.1415	.1431	.1426	--
1973	.1073	.1431	.1338	--
1978	.2018	.1431	.1539	--

TABLE XXXVI

FREQUENCIES FOR AGGRESSIVE SYMBOLS USED IN CLUSTER III YEARS, CASTRO DATA

Year	Obtained Frequency		Expected Frequency	Sign. Level
	Year	Cluster		
1966	.1875	.1799	.1809	--
1967	.1441	.1799	.1751	--
1974	.1526	.1799	.1759	--
1975	.2013	.1799	.1820	--
1976	.1667	.1799	.1780	--
1977	.2042	.1799	.1827	--
1978	.2308	.1799	.1851	--

TABLE XXXVII

FREQUENCIES FOR AGGRESSIVE SYMBOLS USED IN CLUSTER IV YEARS, CASTRO DATA

Year	Obtained Frequency		Expected Frequency	Sign. Level
	Year	Cluster		
1969	.2474	.2379	.2392	--
1979	.1724	.2379	.2324	--
1980	.2928	.2379	.2379	--
1981	.2020	.2379	.2294	--
1983	.1967	.2379	.2343	--
1984	.2954	.2379	.2416	--

Table XXXVIII ranks years according to percent of ideological symbols. It shows that 1977 is the highest and 1983 the lowest. Table XXXIX shows how each year in Cluster I compares with the cluster average for ideological references. It shows that no year in the cluster is significantly different from the cluster average. Table XL compares the yearly frequencies as to ideology in Cluster II with the cluster average. The table indicates that none of the years is significantly different from the cluster average. Table XLI compares the years of Cluster II with the cluster average for ideological terms. The year 1976 is significantly lower in the percentage of ideological mentions and 1977 significantly higher. The other years are not significantly

different from the average. Table XLII compares the years in Cluster IV with the cluster average for ideological symbols. It shows that there are no significant differences in yearly frequencies as compared with the cluster average.

TABLE XXXVIII

RANKING YEARS FOR FREQUENCY OF USE OF IDEOLOGICAL SYMBOLS, CASTRO DATA

1977	.6492	1973	.4576	1976	.4127	1984	.2500
1967	.5502	1982	.4556	1970	.3960	1969	.2371
1971	.5392	1968	.4397	1978	.3421	1981	.2020
1966	.5179	1975	.4340	1980	.2818	1983	.1803
1974	.4779	1972	.4292	1979	.2759		

Mean: .428 Median: 1972

TABLE XXXIX

FREQUENCIES FOR IDEOLOGICAL SYMBOLS USED IN CLUSTER I YEARS, CASTRO DATA

Year	Obtained Frequency		Expected Frequency	Sign. Level
	Year	Cluster		
1968	.4397	.4649	.4578	--
1970	.3960	.4649	.4511	--
1971	.5392	.4649	.4847	--

TABLE XL

FREQUENCIES FOR IDEOLOGICAL SYMBOLS USED IN CLUSTER II YEARS, CASTRO DATA

Year	Obtained Frequency		Expected Frequency	Sign. Level
	Year	Cluster		
1972	.4292	.4195	.4224	--
1973	.4576	.4195	.4294	--
1978	.3421	.4195	.4052	--

TABLE XLI

FREQUENCIES FOR IDEOLOGICAL SYMBOLS USED IN CLUSTER III YEARS, CASTRO DATA

Year	Obtained Frequency		Expected Frequency	Sign. Level
	Year	Cluster		
1966	.5179	.4990	.4942	--
1967	.5502	.4990	.5059	--
1974	.4779	.4990	.4959	--
1975	.4340	.4990	.4942	--
1976	.4127	.4990	.4864	.05
1977	.6492	.4990	.5132	.001
1982	.4556	.4990	.4945	--

TABLE XLII

FREQUENCIES FOR IDEOLOGICAL SYMBOLS USED IN CLUSTER IV YEARS, CASTRO DATA

Year	Obtained Frequency		Expected Frequency	Sign. Level
	Year	Cluster		
1969	.2371	.2379	.2377	--
1979	.2759	.2379	.2410	--
1980	.2818	.2379	.2476	--
1981	.2020	.2379	.2294	--
1983	.1803	.2379	.2328	--
1984	.2500	.2379	.2386	--

ENDNOTES

[1]Malcolm S. MacLean Jr., "Some Multivariate Designs for Communications Research," Journalism Quarterly, XLII (1965), pp. 614-622.

[2]Ibid., p. 618.

[3]Ibid., p. 614.

[4]Ibid., p. 618.

[5]Ibid., p. 620.

[6]Kerlinger, p. 576.

[7]L. McQuitty, "Elementary Linkage Analysis for Isolating Orthogonal and Oblique Types and Typal Relevancies," Educational and Psychological Measurement, XVII (1956), pp. 207-229.

CHAPTER VI

ANALYSIS OF THE DATA--PART III

Comparing Symbols in Castro's Speeches With Those in Granma

The preceding two chapters detailed the relationships between the propaganda symbols in weekly issues of the English-language edition of the Cuban Communist Party newspaper, Granma, and the relationships between the same symbols in the speeches of Fidel Castro. This chapter compares and contrasts the use of propaganda symbols in Castro's speeches and in Granma. Chi square analysis was used to compare frequency of word usage in each of the five categories over the 19 years covered by the study. Table XLIII shows the relationship for ideological symbols. Only one of the relationships is not significantly different, that for 1969. In the other years, the frequency of symbols in the ideological category was different in Granma and Castro's speeches. Table XLIV shows the relationship between Granma articles and Castro's speeches for use of aggressive symbols. It indicates that in six of 19 years there was no significant difference in the use of aggressive terms by Granma and Castro with reference to the United States. Table XLV compares Castro's speeches and Granma

TABLE XLIII

COMPARING CASTRO'S AND GRANMA'S USE OF IDEOLOGICAL SYMBOLS

Year	Granma Observed	Castro Observed	Expected Frequency	Sign. Level
1966	.235	.518	.306	.001
1967	.280	.550	.337	.001
1968	.175	.440	.228	.001
1969	.190	.195	.193	--
1970	.233	.396	.279	.001
1971	.132	.539	.282	.001
1972	.223	.429	.287	.001
1973	.226	.458	.289	.001
1974	.301	.478	.373	.001
1975	.202	.434	.268	.001
1976	.184	.413	.283	.001
1977	.178	.649	.294	.001
1978	.222	.342	.246	.01
1979	.159	.276	.173	.05
1980	.182	.282	.320	.01
1981	.116	.202	.139	.01
1982	.056	.456	.168	.001
1983	.054	.180	.065	.001
1984	.103	.250	.123	.01

TABLE XLIV

COMPARING CASTRO'S AND GRANMA'S USE OF AGGRESSIVE SYMBOLS

Year	Granma Observed	Castro Observed	Expected Frequency	Sign. Level
1966	.166	.188	.171	--
1967	.202	.144	.190	.05
1968	.211	.078	.185	.001
1969	.196	.247	.201	--
1970	.117	.060	.101	--
1971	.040	.051	.044	--
1972	.106	.142	.117	--
1973	.051	.107	.066	.01
1974	.122	.153	.134	--
1975	.053	.201	.096	.001
1976	.063	.167	.108	.001
1977	.053	.204	.090	.001
1978	.077	.202	.103	.001
1979	.034	.172	.050	.001
1980	.087	.293	.145	.001
1981	.073	.202	.105	.001
1982	.051	.231	.102	.001
1983	.054	.180	.065	.001
1984	.135	.295	.156	.01

TABLE XLV

COMPARING CASTRO'S AND GRANMA'S USE OF SYMBOLS REFERRING TO ORGANIZATIONS

Year	Granma Observed	Castro Observed	Expected Frequency	Sign. Level
1966	.115	.022	.092	.001
1967	.117	.066	.106	.05
1968	.099	.082	.095	--
1969	.139	.041	.129	.01
1970	.077	.074	.976	--
1971	.127	.028	.090	.001
1972	.038	.157	.043	--
1973	.093	.051	.082	--
1974	.077	.149	.061	.05
1975	.192	.025	.144	.001
1976	.319	.159	.250	.001
1977	.130	.042	.108	.001
1978	.147	.088	.135	--
1979	.128	.034	.117	.05
1980	.184	.050	.146	.001
1981	.131	.086	.119	--
1982	.222	.077	.194	.001
1983	.186	.066	.175	.05
1984	.099	.136	.104	--

for their use of terms referring to organizations. In six of the 19 years, there was no significant difference between the frequency of organization symbols used by Castro and Granma. Table XLVI compares the use of symbols representing locations by Granma and Castro. In only three years was there no significant difference between the two. Table XLVII compares the use of people symbols by Castro and Granma. In nine of the 19 years there was not a significant difference in people symbols. Overall, there was no category in which a majority of the years had no significant difference in symbolic usage.

C scores were used to compare the chi square test results over the length of the study. Table XLVIII shows how the C scores compare. The lower the C score the more similar are the use of symbols by Castro and Granma during that year. Table XLIX ranks years by C scores, from most similar to most divergent. The two were the most similar in 1969 and most divergent in 1982. In three Reagan years (1983, 1984, and 1981), the two data sources were above the mean and median for their similarity. In three Carter years and one Reagan year, Castro and Granma were below the median year as to their similarity.

Table L compares the four years of the Carter administration to the four years of the Reagan administration to July 1984 as to symbols used by Castro. Castro's speeches had more mentions of organizations and people in the Reagan years and more frequent use of ideological

TABLE XLVI

COMPARING CASTRO'S AND GRANMA'S USE OF SYMBOLS REFERRING TO LOCATIONS

Year	Granma Observed	Castro Observed	Expected Frequency	Sign. Level
1966	.344	.192	.306	.001
1967	.278	.105	.242	.001
1968	.278	.254	.274	--
1969	.289	.271	.387	--
1970	.485	.302	.433	.001
1971	.399	.290	.359	.01
1972	.315	.250	.295	--
1973	.457	.237	.397	.001
1974	.387	.197	.309	.001
1975	.429	.170	.353	.001
1976	.319	.159	.250	.001
1977	.130	.042	.108	.001
1978	.457	.272	.419	.001
1979	.621	.345	.589	.001
1980	.433	.309	.398	.01
1981	.479	.354	.446	.01
1982	.484	.178	.398	.001
1983	.471	.295	.455	.01
1984	.475	.273	.448	.01

TABLE XLVII

COMPARING CASTRO'S AND GRANMA'S USE OF SYMBOLS REFERRING TO PEOPLE

Year	Granma Observed	Castro Observed	Expected Frequency	Sign. Level
1966	.140	.080	.125	.05
1967	.123	.135	.125	--
1968	.236	.147	.218	.01
1969	.186	.175	.183	--
1970	.268	.168	.240	.05
1971	.302	.092	.225	.001
1972	.317	.123	.358	.001
1973	.173	.147	.166	--
1974	.113	.137	.123	--
1975	.126	.170	.139	--
1976	.063	.056	.060	--
1977	.089	.021	.072	.01
1978	.097	.097	.097	--
1979	.058	.172	.071	.01
1980	.115	.066	.101	--
1981	.201	.157	.190	--
1982	.188	.059	.151	.001
1983	.153	.262	.163	.05
1984	.188	.045	.169	.05

TABLE XLVIII

COMPARING MEAN C SCORES FOR USE OF SYMBOLS BY CASTRO AND GRANMA

1966	.128	1971	.187	1976	.156	1981	.103
1967	.107	1972	.110	1977	.213	1982	.258
1968	.102	1973	.124	1978	.099	1983	.094
1969	.036	1974	.108	1979	.141	1984	.100
1970	.106	1975	.185	1980	.144		

TABLE XLIX

RANKING YEARS BY C SCORES FOR USE OF SYMBOLS BY CASTRO AND GRANMA

1969	.036	1981	.103	1973	.124	1975	.185
1983	.094	1970	.106	1966	.128	1971	.187
1978	.099	1966	.107	1979	.141	1977	.213
1984	.100	1974	.108	1980	.144	1982	.258
1968	.102	1972	.110	1976	.156		

TABLE L

COMPARING CARTER'S AND REAGAN'S TERMS OF OFFICE FOR SYMBOL FREQUENCY IN CASTRO'S SPEECHES

Category	Carter's Obtained Frequencies	Reagan's Obtained Frequencies	Expected Frequencies	Sign. Level
Ideology	.4228	.2945	.3632	.001
Aggression	.2298	.2203	.2254	--
Organizations	.0533	.0847	.0679	.05
Locations	.2261	.2754	.2490	--
People	.0680	.1250	.0945	.01

symbols in the Carter years. There was no difference as to use of aggressive symbols or locations. Table LI compares the four years of the Carter administration to the four years of the Reagan administration as to the frequency of symbols used in Granma. It shows that during the Reagan years Granma used significantly more aggressive terms and more people symbols. During the Carter years Granma used significantly more ideological terms and more locations. Both presidents' tenures were equal in frequency of organization symbols used.

TABLE LI

COMPARING CARTER'S AND REAGAN'S TERMS OF OFFICE FOR SYMBOL FREQUENCY IN GRANMA

Category	Carter's Obtained Frequencies	Reagan's Obtained Frequencies	Expected Frequencies	Sign. Level
Ideology	.1845	.0798	.1329	.001
Aggression	.0620	.0979	.0797	.001
Organizations	.1463	.1650	.1555	--
Locations	.5173	.4768	.4974	.05
People	.0899	.1804	.1345	.001

CHAPTER VII

ANALYSIS OF THE DATA--PART IV

Important Findings Affecting the Hypotheses

Granma

There were several important findings with reference to propaganda symbols in Granma and in Castro's speeches. The first point of interest in Granma itself is that two of the four Reagan years ranked among the top half (including the median year) in the number of symbols used, as did two Carter years. The four earliest years, 1966 through 1969, produced the largest number of symbols relating to the United States. They were followed by 1983 (Reagan), 1977 (Carter), 1981 and 1984 (Reagan), and 1980 (Carter). Reagan had the edge in number of symbols overall, however-- 2,161 to 1,935--if the rate of symbols for the first half of 1984 is assumed for the last half in determining the 1984 12-month total.

Second, three Reagan years and only one Carter year scored at or above the median in ranked frequencies of symbol occurrence. The Reagan years 1983 (second), 1982, (sixth), and 1981 (ninth) were in the top half as is Carter year 1980 (fourth). Thus, the likelihood of there

being a reference to the United States on any particular page is more closely related to Ronald Reagan than to Jimmy Carter.

Third, location symbols were by far the most dominant category in Granma, accounting for 40.07 percent of the symbols. Ideological words were next at 18.34 percent, people at 16.54 percent, organizations at 13.30 percent, and then aggressive terms at 11.75 percent.

Fourth, some clusters were more similar than others. Years 1982 and 1983 were the most closely correlated in their cluster, followed by the cluster 1975-1980, which includes all the Carter years plus the Ford years. The Reagan years 1981 and 1984 were in the least-correlated cluster and--as shown again--were closely related to the other two Reagan years when comparing those symbols most related to the hypotheses. All correlations are high, ranging between .9130 and .9618.

Fifth, location symbols were the most frequent category for all clusters; however, clusters differed as to the second-ranked category. Clusters I (1975-1980) and III (1966, 1967, 1974) had ideology as to the next most-frequent symbol category, while Cluster II (1968, 1969, 1971, 1981, 1984) and Cluster IV (1970, 1972, 1973) had people as the second-highest-frequency symbol. In Cluster V, organizations ranked second. Thus, there is considerable difference between clusters as to frequency of symbols in the No. 2 spot, though not at No. 1.

Sixth, Cluster III (1966, 1967, 1974) was the highest-ranked cluster as to ideological and aggressive words. The second-most-aggressive cluster was Cluster II (1968, 1969, 1971, 1981, 1984). Cluster IV (1970, 1972, 1973) was the next most ideological. The clusters formed two superclusters. The supercluster composed of Clusters II and IV consists of years 1968, 1969, 1970, 1971, 1972, 1973, 1981, and 1984. That supercluster is significantly higher in use of aggressive symbols and has a higher frequency of mentions of people than the other supercluster. It consists of two Reagan years along with six early years but not the two earliest studied. The other supercluster has significantly more mentions of organizations and locations. However, the two superclusters do not vary in their use of ideological terms. The first supercluster is more highly correlated than the second. An interesting finding is that the two Reagan years 1982 and 1983 fit in better overall with the Carter years than with the other two Reagan years.

Seventh, all the categories formed one cluster, and the aggressive symbol category had the strongest correlation with ideology (.7795), people (.7228), and organizations (.4811). It is important to note that aggressive symbols comprise the most cohesive element among all categories, even though these symbols are lower in frequency of mention.

Eighth--and important in relation to the hypotheses--

when clusters were looked at in terms of aggression, Clusters II and III did not vary significantly. Thus, 1966, 1967, 1968, 1969, 1971, 1974, 1981, and 1984 are the most closely related years in terms of aggressive mentions. That clustering again includes only two of the four Reagan years. The other two, 1982 and 1983, are in Cluster V. Those two Reagan years are on the second tier of years as to aggression, ahead of the least-aggressive years. Cluster I years, which are all the Carter years plus 1975 and 1976, stand by themselves as a third tier and are significantly lower in aggressive terms.

Because the researcher expected that the frequency of aggressive words would have increased during the second half of 1983 following the invasion of Grenada, the year was broken down first by halves and then quarters. Comparing halves, the first and second halves were not significantly different. When comparing the third to the fourth quarter, however, it is evident that a change in the level of the aggressive language took place. The frequency increased to 22.8 percent in the fourth quarter from 5.7 percent in the third, statistically significant at the .001 level. The third quarter was a 10 percent decrease from 15.6 percent aggressive terms in the second quarter, also significant at the .001 level. The second quarter followed a 13.7 percent level in the first quarter, not a statistically significant change. The qualitative critique of Castro's language in the third quarter of 1983 also indicated his

language had moderated.

Ninth, a look at intracluster relationships for aggression revealed some situations that merit special attention. An evaluation of Cluster I showed 1979 had significantly fewer aggressive symbols than did the overall cluster, while 1980 had significantly more aggressive symbols. Overall, 1979 was the least aggressive year of the study, and all years in the cluster composed of 1975 through 1980 were at the median or below, 1980 being the median year and the highest of the cluster. This indicates that a change in Granma's propaganda level with reference to the United States began during the last year of the Carter administration. Breaking the year down by quarters, it was found that there was no statistically significant difference among the first, second and fourth quarters. However, there was a significant difference between the second and third and between the third and fourth quarters at the .001 level. The third quarter had significantly less aggressive language, possibly due to the election campaign being waged in the United States between Carter and Reagan. In fact, there were no aggressive terms found in the three samples for the third quarter.

Cluster II (1968, 1969, 1971, 1981, 1984) was particularly divergent, all years except 1984 being significantly different as to aggression from the cluster mean. The year 1984 is almost identical in percentage of aggressive words to 1983 (.135 to .137), and both are above

the median in aggression. However, the other two Reagan years, 1981 and 1982, are below the median. The level of aggressive language decreased during the first two years of Reagan's term. It fell from a high in 1980 to the range it had been during the other years of Carter's term. It then rose in late 1983 and remained constant into 1984.

Cluster III is somewhat divergent as to aggression, 1974 being significantly lower in aggressive language than the other two years, which are among the top half of the years as to frequency of aggressive symbols. In Cluster IV, 1973 is significantly lower in aggression than 1970 and 1972, which are in the top half of the rankings. Thus, overall only two Reagan years--1983 and 1984--are in the top half of the most-aggressive years. Also in the top half are the early years of the study--1966 through 1970, 1972 and 1974, plus 1980 as the median year. Thus, Reagan holds an edge over Carter for the frequency of aggressive language directed against the United States during his term. Two of Reagan's years are among the ones with the most aggressive symbols. But somewhat surprisingly Reagan had a period in which the frequency of Granma's aggressive language was lower than during the Carter year 1980.

As for ideology, intracluster comparisons indicated that each cluster was significantly different from the others. Clusters I, II, IV, and V all are homogeneous ideologically. In Cluster II, 1969 is higher than expected in ideological terms and 1981 and 1984 less

ideological. Because of the lack of many significant differences within clusters, ideology can be said to be more important to determining the shape of clusters than is aggression. Looking at the rankings as to ideology, the Reagan years (1981 through 1984) are the least ideological years. However, two of the Carter years (1978 and 1980) are at the median or above in Granma's use of ideological terms, a somewhat unexpected finding.

Castro

The first point to be made about the Castro data is that four Reagan years but only one Carter year (1980) scored at the median or above for frequency of symbols. Other high-frequency years are 1976, 1974, 1967, and 1966.

Second, ideology is the top-frequency category. Aggressive language was the third-highest-frequency category for Castro's speeches, while it was the lowest-frequency category for Granma. The percentage of mentions, however, differed relatively little--11.8 percent for Granma and 16.4 percent for Castro's speeches.

A third point is that all clusters except Cluster IV were highly correlated, but they were not as compact as to the spread of years that comprise the clusters. It also should be noted that three Reagan years and two Carter years were in the least-correlated cluster, Cluster IV (.7225).

Fourth, location symbols were the most frequent in

all categories for Granma, but they were second-most-frequent in Castro's speeches. For Castro's speeches, location was highest only in Cluster IV. Ideology was highest in the other three clusters. Location was the second highest in frequency in Clusters I and II and aggression the second highest in Cluster III. Therefore, more diversity in clusters was apparent in the Castro data.

Fifth, Cluster IV was the most aggressive cluster. It includes three Reagan years (1981, 1983, and 1984) and two Carter years (1979 and 1980) plus 1969. Cluster III is the second-most-aggressive cluster. It includes the fourth Reagan year and one Carter year (1977).

Sixth, there was only one supercluster in the data, as compared to two for the Granma data. Comparing clusters, Cluster I (1968, 1970, and 1971) and Cluster II (1972, 1973, and 1978) were the most-highly correlated, at .9738, but Cluster II and Cluster III were highly correlated, too (.9406).

Seventh, categories formed two clusters--though they were not highly correlated--while they formed one for the Granma data. The first such cluster was locations and people (.5629) and locations and organizations (.4293). The second was aggression and ideology (.3984). Thus, the categories in the Castro data were less highly related than are those in Granma data and co-varied differently, possibly because of more-spontaneous or less-well-planned content in Castro's speeches.

Eighth--and an important finding--was that Cluster IV was significantly more aggressive than the others. It consists of three Reagan years (1981, 1983, and 1984) and two Carter years (1979 and 1980) plus 1969. Clusters II and III, which consist of one Reagan year and two Carter years, did not differ significantly from each other as to aggression symbols. They ranked next highest as to use of aggressive terms. However, as discussed below, the year 1978 had its best fit elsewhere as to use of aggressive symbols. The level of aggression for the Carter years differed considerably from the Granma data, in which the Carter years were in one cluster at the bottom of the rankings for aggression. The year 1982 ranked lower than the other three Reagan years, which partially paralleled the Granma data, in which 1981 and 1982 showed a decline in use of aggressive symbols. Somewhat unexpectedly, Cluster I (1968, 1970, and 1971) had significantly fewer aggressive mentions than the other clusters. The findings on aggression seem even more important when one notes that intracluster relationships showed no statistically significant difference as to use of aggressive language in any of the four clusters between yearly totals and cluster means. To that extent, all were homogeneous.

Looking at the overall frequency rankings, all four of the Reagan years were at or above the median as to aggressive words, as were three Carter years (1977, 1978, and 1980), along with the years 1966, 1969, and 1975. It

should be noted that 1980, Carter's last year, was the second-most-aggressive year as to frequency (.2928), just behind Reagan year 1984 (.2955). Also, 1983, which might have been expected to rank higher, was slightly above the median. It also is noteworthy that, while 1983 ranked above the median in frequency of symbols, it ranked last as to number of speeches made.

Next, Cluster I, Cluster II, and Cluster IV all were homogeneous ideologically. In Cluster II, 1967 was higher, 1976 lower, and 1977 higher than the cluster average. Thus, aggression is a better determinant of cluster structure, though ideology is not a poor one. Ranking the clusters according to frequency of ideological terms, Cluster III ranked highest (.4990). It consists of one Reagan year (1982) and one Carter year (1977). Cluster I was next at .4649. It has no Carter or Reagan years. One Carter year is in the third-ranked cluster, Cluster II (1978), and three Reagan years and two Carter years are in the bottom-ranked cluster, Cluster IV (.2379).

Looking at the ideological data overall, one Carter year (1977, at No. 1) was in the top half of the ideological rankings as was one Reagan year (1982 at No. 7). Three Reagan years ranked among the lowest four with three Carter years just above that. The period of Carter's and Reagan's terms of office, then, had low frequency of ideological language in Granma and the Castro data when compared with the other years of the study. Exceptions

were the years 1977 and 1982.

Castro and Granma Data Compared

Ideological language for the Castro and Granma data was significantly different, as determined by chi square tests, for every year but 1969. For only six of the 19 years was the aggressive language not significantly different. In only six of the years was there no significant difference between the two sets of data in organization symbols, and in only three years was there no difference in use of location symbols. The greatest similarity was in use of people symbols. In only nine years were the two sets of data significantly similar. Castro and Granma data overall were most alike as to people terms, as shown by C scores. The C score for people term usage similarity was .081, followed by organizations (.092), aggression (.111), locations (.151), and ideology (.195).

Three Reagan years (1981, 1983, and 1984) were above the median in the ranking of C scores comparing the similarity of the two types of data, as was one Carter year (1978). Thus, they were among the only years seen as most similar. The years 1982 and 1977 were the most divergent. For Castro's speeches during the Carter and Reagan administrations, the number of aggressive terms, the number of locations and the number of people mentions did not vary significantly. Carter's term elicited significantly more ideological terms. For Granma, the only significantly similar category was organization. Language references to

the United States in Reagan's term of office was significantly more aggressive and Carter's significantly more ideological. However, the level of aggression by Castro in both terms of office was significantly higher than it was in Granma.

During the Reagan years, the data were more alike than during Carter's tenure (.181 versus .198). During Reagan's years they were most alike on organizations (.087) and then people (.106), aggression and locations (.160 for each), and ideology (.211). During Carter's tenure, Castro and Granma were most alike on people (.081), then organizations (.113), ideology (.182), locations (.204), and aggression (.210). Aggressive terms were not a good means of determining similarities in Castro's speeches and stories in Granma during the Carter and Reagan year.

CHAPTER VIII

SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Purpose of the Study

The purpose of the study was to determine if there had been any change in the Cuban propaganda language in Granma Weekly Review or in the speeches of Fidel Castro since Granma was first published in 1966. It was predicted that there would be evidence of any change in propaganda and that the change could be measured. It was expected that the official newspaper of the Communist Party Central Committee and the speeches of Castro would be good sources for a study of the propaganda symbols and that 1966 to 1984 would offer sufficient time for a trend analysis of symbolic content.

The study plan involved two major parts: one, an analysis of historical antecedents to the current status of relations between the United States and Cuba and the other a comparison of language used in propaganda statements. A qualitative comparison was made of two widely separated issues of Granma to determine if this propaganda organ had changed in any major way, and a quantitative study was made to determine in what ways the use of particular key symbols changed over time. The literature

suggests the need to study changes in political-symbol usage over time. The null hypothesis was that there would be no change in the use of propaganda symbols over time. The first sub-hypothesis was: "During periods of increased tension in Cuban-United States relations, there will be an increased use of propaganda symbols." The second sub-hypothesis was: "During times of increased tension in Cuban-United States relations, there will be greater mention of the United States in Cuban propaganda." The major hypothesis was:

> There were periods during the 1970s when political statements that attacked the United States were fewer than normal during the study period, which would suggest that Cuban policy toward the United States moderated. Furthermore, during the Carter administration there would be the lowest level of such attacks.

A review of the literature indicated that content analysis would be a fruitful procedure to use in the study. It was shown that trend analysis, looking at issues over time, also would be appropriate in studying propaganda. The use of key words or word pairs in the analysis was shown to simplify category construction and improve reliability of the data. Each of Castro's speeches during the period of study (1966 to 1984) was analyzed, and one page of one issue per month of Granma was examined. It was determined that one column from each of Castro's speeches would be analyzed. In each case, the number of times a symbol appeared became the unit of enumeration. The sampling plan was random and stratified. If no mention

of the United States was found in the context unit, then an appropriate alternative procedure was followed to select another context unit.

The propaganda symbols were put into five categories: ideological, aggressive, organizations, locations, and people. Analysis was by chi square and the Pearson r correlation. Both increased numbers of references to the United States and increased aggressivity of the language (a larger percentage of aggressive words) were seen as indicators of policy change, the first indicating increased interest in the United States and the other increased hostility. The change in the use of ideological words also was of particular interest. McQuitty's elementary linkage analysis was the method chosen to compare language used in various years of the study. O, P, Q, and R factor analyses were used.

Results of the Study

The null hypothesis that the speeches of Castro and the articles in Granma would not be similar was not rejected. It was shown that the two sets of data varied considerably over the time period studied, but there were several years in which their use of propaganda was similar. The years when their use of aggressive symbols were most similar (above the median year) were 1966, 1967, 1969, 1970, 1971, 1972, 1973, 1974, and 1983. Since 1974 there has been a trend toward more aggressive language in Castro's speeches than in the language of Granma. In three of the first

six years of the study, the language in Granma was more aggressive than it was in Castro's speeches. From that point on, however, Castro's language had more aggressive symbols than did Granma. Throughout the 19 years, Castro's speeches had more ideological symbols than did Granma.

The null hypothesis that there would be no change in propaganda symbols over time in Castro's speeches was rejected. There were major fluctuations. Except for a major increase in aggressive symbols in 1969, Castro's use of aggressive symbols moderated to a low point in 1971 before increasing fairly steadily, with highs in 1980 and 1984. All three peaks (1969, 1980, and 1984) were preceded by years that showed decreases in propaganda symbols for aggression from the previous year. The 1969 peak of 24.74 percent ideological terms followed a 7.76 percent year. The 1980 peak of 29.28 percent followed a low point of 17.24 percent the previous year. The 1984 peak of 29.55 percent followed a year with a frequency of 19.67 percent. Two other points of relatively large increases in aggressive symbols were between 1971 and 1972 (from 5.7 percent to 14.15 percent) and between 1973 and the two years from 1973 to 1975 (10.73 percent, to 15.26 percent, to 20.13 percent). One also could say that the drop in aggressive language from 1980 to 1981 (29.28 percent to 20.20 percent) was a noteworthy development. Changes in other categories of symbols were as apparent but not as useful to the study.

The null hypothesis that there would be no change in

the language used in Granma over time also was rejected. Granma's use of aggressive language reached a low point in 1971 and rose to small peaks in 1972 and in 1974. The qualitative analysis indicated that 1975 was a key year in the relations between the United States and Cuba because of the talks being held. Linkage analysis showed that 1975 was more like the Carter years than it was previous years. A minor peak occurred in 1980, which had the highest level of aggressive symbols since the 1974 peak. The use of aggressive symbols hit a high peak in 1983, where it stayed into 1984. The 1983 peak came despite a low third quarter and took place because of the increase in aggressive symbols following the Grenada invasion during the fourth quarter. That each peak followed at least two years of declining aggressive symbols indicates a major shift in the propaganda flow and, possibly, in policy.

It should be asked at this point which of the two sets of data is more useful in determining the attitude of Cuba toward the United States. Both have their utility, but the Castro data seem a better indicator of the level of symbolic language that most realistically depicts Cuba's foreign-policy line. Granma is a political newspaper closely tied to the government and presents the official party line, but it attempts to provide information on a wide range of subjects: culture, sports, foreign and domestic affairs, etc. It does publish official statements that, like Castro's speeches, offer fruitful areas of research. In

essence, however, Castro's view is the Cuban government's view. If his words are to be believed, they are valuable indicators of change in policy and can, at least, show overt trends in the party line. Previous studies have shown that propaganda is purposeful. The Institute for Propaganda Analysis in 1941 succinctly stated the purpose of propaganda:

> ... Propaganda is a method of rationalizing the facts so as to make the propagandist's cause seem well-sanctioned, customary, or in accord with prevailing moral views--or so as to make a rival cause seem the opposite, if the propagandist's aim is to kill it.[1]

One reason for a difference in symbolic content in Granma and in Castro's speeches is the audience. Granma's articles are compiled to present a particular image of the country to the outside world and to put its enemies in the most unfavorable light possible. It is mainly for international and not domestic consumption. Castro may be considering the impact of his speeches on the outside world, but he is aiming them at the citizens of Cuba. His audience wants and expects him to attack the United States. The slogan the crowds often yell at Castro's carefully staged speeches, "Hit the Yankees Hard," is one they no doubt are eager to use. Castro must put in something to please the crowds while also considering foreign reactions. Such considerations taken into account, the researcher must be careful in drawing his conclusions.

The addition of conclusions drawn from the qualitative critique of Granma and Castro's speeches should strengthen

any conclusions drawn from the quantitative data. In both cases, the researcher to some extent must take words at their face value. When Castro states his conditions for peace, his words might well be given some consideration as an accurate representative of his thinking. He may, in fact, be making such a statement for political or propaganda reasons, but such a determination cannot be made through quantitative content analysis. It seems obvious that Castro has been consistent in his statements concerning his minimum requirements for serious negotiation: ending the blockade and allowing Cuba to conduct its foreign policy its own way while continuing its firmly established contacts with the socialist world.

The data show that as late as June 1972 Castro was opposed to talks with the United States. The Vietnam War ended for the United States in January 1973, and in May 1973 Castro set out his requirements for talks. After Richard Nixon left the presidency in August 1974, secret negotiations began under President Ford. The concessions required by the United States for an end to the blockade were stated in Castro's speeches. More than once he noted that the United States had its own demands--that Cuba give up what Castro saw as the principles of his revolution. Many times Castro also said that it was the United States that did not want normalization of relations. The Institute of Propaganda Analysis proposed a general principle of propaganda analysis that seems to relate to the

situation:

> ...Propaganda is part of an individual's or group's drive to advance its own interests, and the common sense attitude is to judge the drive by how it affects our own interests.[2]

Evidently such a determination by the United States has resulted in a steadfast position throughout the past decade.

It is not the purpose of this dissertation to ascribe blame to one side or another, if "blame" is an accurate term. Talks have taken place at various times during the past decade, and there has been some improvement of relations evident. Castro has continued to ask for improved relations with the United States, but he has not wanted improved relations enough to give up his revolutionary principles. The United States, apparently, has not been willing to accept Cuba's basic demands or to allow talks to progress further while Cuban troops remain in Africa or Nicaragua. Castro has been serious enough to restate his desire for normalization and also to decrease his level of aggressive propaganda language. Each time, however, either the United States has been unwilling to take the necessary steps or some event has intervened. Once again, in July 1984, Castro put forward a plea for normalization. Whether it will be accepted will depend on how much, if any, the sides display flexibility.

Recommendations for Future Study

The possibilities for content analysis research into propaganda are nearly endless. The data collected for this study alone could provide the basis for several other analyses. Numerous trends in language, such as the emphasis on one particular foreign-policy area, also are fruitful possibilities for research. Other aspects of Granma itself could be studied, such as changes in Cuban policy toward China or shifts in emphasis over time. It could be studied for the way it represents Cuban life. Likewise, Castro's speeches could be analyzed for his stress on numerous policy areas. It also would be a fruitful study to analyze American foreign policy pronouncements concerning Cuba to compare them with trends seen in Cuban propaganda.

The drawback to a study such as this one is the amount of time necessary for word counts. Of course, the computer can be an appropriate tool for such a study, but first the data base must be available. The efforts of John Naisbitt and his Center for Policy Process is a positive step in that direction. Paradoxically, the strength of a computer-counting method is also a drawback. It counts everything it is told to count. Since the study at hand was designed to investigate only those propaganda symbols referring to the United States, a non-computer search was necessary. Even if the hand search misses some such references, it will still be more accurate than a computer search because the computer

cannot differentiate the context and the referent of a particular word. It is expected that any error in word counts in the current study would be random error and, thus, not affect the outcome of the study. It is hoped that the study is an indication that content analysis remains a tool with considerable potential for studying who says what to whom and with what result.

ENDNOTES

[1]*Propaganda Analysis*, IV (1941), p. 1.

[2]Ibid.

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