THE RECONSTRUCTION OF FRANCE: MARSHAL PÉTAIN'S POLICIES, 1940-1942, AS EVALUATED BY AMERICAN JOURNALISTS AND SCHOLARS

By

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Henri Philippe Pétain was born on April 24, 1856, at Cauchy-À-La-Tour in the Pas-de-Calais. A farmer's son, he was educated at a Catholic high school, at the military academy of St. Cyr, and at the École Supérieure de Guerre, where he later taught. Pétain's unorthodox views, which stressed the effectiveness of artillery fire power and objected to the one-sided, offense-oriented doctrine of the time, caught the attention of the young instructor's superiors. However, his independent and bluntly forthright personality hampered his military career, and he was promoted to General only in 1914 when he was fifty-eight years old. His wartime achievements earned him the title "Victor of Verdun" and praise for his firm but humane suppression of the mutinies within the French Army in 1917; he succeeded in restoring French morale and the army's fighting capacity which it demonstrated during the spring offensives in 1918. In recognition of his leadership he was honored with the title "Marshal of France" after the Armistice of 1918. In 1920, he was appointed Vice-President of the High Council of War and Commander-in-Chief in case of war. Subsequent positions included: the office of General

Inspector of the Army in 1922, the assignment to command the French troops in Morocco against the uprising of Abd-el-Krim in the Rif in 1925, and, in 1931, the appointment as General Inspector of Air Defense.

Pétain was seventy-eight years old when he entered the field of politics for the first time, serving for eight months in 1934 as Minister of War in Doumergue's cabinet. From then on, until the outbreak of World War II, Pétain gave many lectures and wrote articles on French defense. They turned around one theme: Hitler's threat to France. As Minister of Defense, Pétain declared that a larger defense budget was imperative because of the German rearmament. In 1935, he wrote in the Revue des Deux Mondes that recent discoveries in the sciences and new technology in transportation had inspired a totally new concept of warfare: Blitzkrieg. Quoting a German military journal, he pointed out that the Germans considered it the preferred tactic of attack for the future. He then analyzed the state of French military capability and recommended changes to adapt it to the new challenge.

Pétain did not stop at military considerations. Known as a realist who had always taught that patriotism was no substitute for fire power, he was nonetheless acutely aware of the importance of morale and the power of strong motivation. In his opinion, France was still war-weary -- and with good reason after her heavy losses in World War I. The country was deeply shaken in its self-confidence: in

spite of the fact that France was better off materially than either Germany or Italy, she lacked their faith in the future and was content to accept the status quo. Such a mentality was no match for aggressive totalitarian adversaries, and this was no time for indulging in dreams of peace. Pétain therefore proposed a program to motivate the French people.

The school system was his first target. Since the end of World War I, the teachers had turned to pacifism and even anarchism, he charged, and there were those who did not hesitate to display open hostility toward the state. It was necessary to reorient the schools, since, as he put it, long before its armies meet on the battlefield, a nation's destiny has been decided in classrooms and lecture halls. Nationalism and civic duty were not only to be taught in schools. The war of the future would be total war, and every citizen would need the motivation which formerly had only been expected from soldiers. He went so far as to recommend intensive indoctrination by the media to reach citizens beyond the school age.

Pétain did not underestimate the seductive power of the totalitarian doctrines which appealed to all those who were suffering under the abuses of capitalism and longed for social justice. Fascism and Nazism, with their emphasis on Blut und Boden, on the individual's ties to native soil, to community, and country, also attracted those who felt lost in an urban, industrialized environment. French education

had neglected the social nature of man in favor of developing the potential of the individual. Again Pétain called for a change. Only a nation of citizens who felt secure in being members of their community, profession, and nation and were united in patriotism could stand up to the challenge of totalitarian aggression.

Pétain had recognized the strengths of the totalitarian systems and wanted to use similar methods to increase France's chances of survival in a confrontation which he considered inevitable. His views found an echo among many Frenchmen who watched Germany's power and national unity and resolve grow while France became more factionalized and torn by class hatred. The Third Republic proved incapable of providing strong leadership, and by 1935 Pétain's name became for some the symbol not only of past victory but also of a new France. Gustave Hervé, publisher of the newspaper La Victoire, wrote a series of articles which were later collected in a booklet entitled We need Pétain (C'est Pétain qu'il nous faut). The title caught on; other journals also called for him to save the nation. Regardless of political affiliation, many Frenchmen came to see in him the man who could unify France and galvanize her energies to stand up to German aggression. However, Pétain declined when he was asked to be a candidate for the Presidency in 1939.

The same year he accepted the ambassadorship to Spain, only to be recalled by Prime Minister Paul Reynaud on May 18, 1940, during the Battle of France. When Paul Reynaud

resigned on June 16, 1940, over the armistice issue, Pétain became his successor, and as President of the Council he requested the German government's armistice and peace conditions. The armistice was signed at Réthondes on June 22, 1940, and became effective three days later. Subsequently the French Government moved to Vichy. On July 10, still dazed by the trauma of the defeat, coaxed by Pierre Laval but also recognizing the need for leadership, the National Assembly voted full powers to Pétain and authorized him to promulgate a new constitution which was to be submitted to the nation. On July 11, Pétain arrogated almost all legislative and executive powers to himself as Head of State and adjourned the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies. The following day, he designated Pierre Laval as successor in case he should be unable to fulfill his functions as Head of State before the new constitution came in effect.

Pétain was convinced that France had lost the war because of her failure to prepare herself for the inevitable conflict with Germany. In his opinion, the reconstruction of the nation was now more urgent than ever. The country was divided, the Germans occupied two-thirds of the territory, and France was burdened with exorbitant payments for the upkeep of the German occupation army. For the duration of the war, living conditions would therefore remain harsh, and the population would be vulnerable to Communist propaganda and anarchy. To galvanize the nation's

energies into a powerful current of patriotism and common resolve, Pétain called for a National Revolution. During the following months his government streamlined the administration, reformed the educational system, and improved its relations with the Catholic Church. Steps were taken toward a corporate, state-directed economy. Through social legislation the government sought to improve living conditions for the French working classes and to encourage large families to stop the demographic decline of France.

Some of the government's measures were discriminatory: secret societies were prohibited; the children of immigrant fathers could no longer work for the civil service; and a special statute excluded Jews from work in the media, education, and high governmental positions. These decrees were officially justified as necessary for the security of the state and for the elimination of influences that were harmful to French unity and resolve. In the fall of 1940, high officials of the Third Republic were arrested and brought to trial in the spring of 1942 for neglect of duty which had contributed to the French defeat.

While Pétain tried to beat the Fascists at their own game, he never went so far as to adopt a single-party system; in fact, he excluded political parties from government, and in August, 1941, he prohibited them from meeting even in private. Though the influential Legion of Veterans played an important role as a link between the government and the population, Pétain insisted that its

departmental associations remain subordinate to the prefects.

In spite of his powerful position, Pétain was unable to form a stable cabinet, and Vichy had a dizzying turnover of ministers. Most spectacular was Pétain's dismissal of Laval on December 13, 1940. Pétain had lost confidence in him because he was secretive and dealt too much with the Germans. He subsequently defied German pressure to take Laval back, and a few months later he appointed Admiral Jean Darlan in his stead.

In foreign relations, the government was handicapped by the armistice agreements which were never replaced by a peace treaty. Relations with Great Britain were irreparably damaged when the British Navy attacked a part of the French fleet at Oran on July 3, 1940, causing the deaths of 1297 sailors and marines. During the following spring, French and British forces clashed in Syria, ending in a defeat for France. France also had to accept Japanese intrusion into Indochina, since the French forces stationed there were hopelessly outnumbered. The Pétain government defended Algeria and the French colonies with obstinacy against any intruder, as the Allies found out during the invasion of North Africa on November 8, 1942. Only Admiral Darlan's presence and his constant references to Marshal Pétain's support for his actions persuaded the French Army to agree to a cease-fire and made possible the collaboration of the French in North Africa with the Allies. The Allied invasion

was the immediate cause for the German and Italian occupation of the Free Zone. Rather than delivering the French fleet in the harbor of Toulon to the Germans, Admiral de Laborde ordered the fleet to scuttle itself on November 27, 1942.

Relations with Germany were always strained for a number of reasons. First, the daily payments of 400 million francs for the upkeep of the occupying troops were blatantly excessive. Secondly, the Germans refused to release 1.5 million French prisoners of war from German prison camps, where they suffered not only under the long internment but were in constant danger from Allied bombings. Thirdly, the demarcation line separating the occupied territory from the Free Zone alienated the French government in Vichy from the larger part of the French population, disrupted the economy, and made it very difficult to provide the Free Zone with sufficient foodstuffs.

The meeting between Hitler, Pétain, and Laval at Montoire on October 24, 1940, which raised the French government's hopes for easier peace conditions in return for collaboration with the Germans, produced no results. After the German invasion of the Soviet Union on June 22, 1941, the government had to stop guerrilla attacks against the German occupying forces by French Communists. Sabotage and terrorism complicated Franco-German relations, as the armistice agreement provided for the cessation of all hostile acts against Germany. Pétain could no longer

concentrate on the reconstruction of France through the National Revolution but had to counteract growing opposition and dissidence from many quarters. Gaullists, Communists, and Popular Front liberals condemned the government for its authoritarianism and its collaboration with Germany. Ultra-collaborationists like Jacques Doriot and Marcel Déat in Paris, on the other hand, accused Pétain of playing a double game favoring the Allies. The economic misery and the hardships caused by the division of the country also worked against him.

By the summer of 1941, Pétain's hopes that the National Revolution would prove beneficial were dashed. Most of the planned reforms had not yet been applied. For their success, national consensus and resolve were imperative. Clearly these were lacking, and Pétain tried in vain to impose the reforms against his own better insight. By April 1942, he rarely mentioned the National Revolution.

Pétain's hopes for a compromise peace between Allied and Axis powers also remained unfulfilled. Germany's shortage of manpower led Hitler to requisition workers in the occupied countries. At first, French workers were induced to work in Germany by generous working conditions and special benefits. Later the Germans ordered the French government to impress workers for them. Opposition to the deportations became so strong that Premier Laval refused to collaborate after 500,000 French workers had left France. When the Germans began to use French production facilities

and workers in France for German manufacturing, Allied bombers began to fly raids on French plants and airports to disrupt production and transfer of war materials to Germany. By 1943, many young Frenchmen had joined the Maquis (the Resistance). To stem the growing number of guerrilla attacks, the French government established a special police force, the Milice. Its persecution of Frenchmen and its collaboration with the German Gestapo compromised the French government irreparably in the eyes of the people.

In December, 1943, the Germans pressured Pétain into accepting the ultra-collaborationists Darnand and Déat into his cabinet. By the time of the Allied Invasion of France on June 6, 1944, the French government had lost the support of the population and was no longer functioning. On August 20, 1944, the Germans arrested Pétain and deported him and the members of his cabinet to the Hohenzollern castle at Sigmaringen in Germany, where he refused any political activity or function. In April, 1945, German officers allowed Pétain to return to France to stand trial before the High Court of Justice which had been created by the Provisional Government of de Gaulle.

Pétain's voluntary return to defend his honor as French Chef and to protect by his presence those who had followed him was a unique and memorable act which has not yet been recognized by historians in its full significance. Only in comparison with other defeated leaders do his courage and stature as a statesman become evident. For example, within

two weeks after the meeting of Russian and American troops on the banks of the Elbe on April 25, 1945, Adolf Hitler and Josef Goebbels had committed suicide. Mussolini fled in the direction of Switzerland to find asylum but was caught and assassinated by Italian partisans. Pierre Laval took flight to Spain only to be extradicted to the Allies after three months. In comparison to those who thus evaded responsibility and their people's wrath, Pétain was truly an exception. His action was consistent with his sense of responsibility as a Chef and with his independence of mind which had characterized his life and career.

On his way to France, the eighty-nine year old Marshal spurned an offer of asylum in Switzerland and rode on to Paris. The trial began on July 23, 1945, and judgment was pronounced on August 15, 1945. Pétain was condemned to death for collaborating with the enemy. However, following the High Court's recommendation, de Gaulle commuted the sentence to life imprisonment. After six years of solitary confinement at the Ile-d'Yeu, Pétain died on July 23, 1951, at the age of ninety-five. He was buried on the Ile-d'Yeu.

Marshal Pétain's life and career as a military leader and statesman have aroused an extraordinary amount of attention, controversy, and scholarly study in the United States. Foreign correspondents reported from France during the war; editors pondered the consequences of his actions for the Allied cause; political scientists examined the legitimacy of his authoritarian regime and analyzed its

structure; and historians tried to fit Vichy and its ideology into the pattern of French political, social, and economic history.

For a historian, the study of Pétain's career is fascinating since it contained elements of high drama, and since he was confronted with fundamental problems of leadership: the dilemma of forming a government - in exile or of accepting limited sovereignty in a partially occupied country; the handling of dissent and terrorism; and the strengthening of the nation's morale and its determination to preserve its culture and values from the conqueror's encroachment.

This dissertation focuses on those of Marshal Pétain's policies which were designed to reconstruct France. They were a combination of reforms which he had advocated as early as 1934, and of measures which were directly related to the defeat. His decision to conclude an armistice with the German government in order to end the bloodshed and to preserve French sovereignty over a part of the national territory mirrored Pétain's conviction that France was militarily defeated and unable to carry on the battle from its overseas Empire. The armistice agreement assured the survival of the French state and forced the German government to negotiate with its French counterpart instead of treating France as conquered territory bereft of a functioning government. Pétain's establishment of an authoritarian government and his arrest of former leaders

proved that he considered the Third Republic a failure. The reform programs of his National Revolution were designed to neutralize the lures of Communism and National Socialism by promises of social justice and of a modernized economy.

This dissertation examines how the foreign correspondents for American newspapers in France, their editors in the United States, and contemporary American scholars reacted to these measures. Their views are then compared to the findings of the American historians and an evaluation is made.

American sources on Vichy France are abundant for both the war period and the years after 1945. Foreign correspondents, radio news analysts, editors, and political scientists wrote widely on French affairs during the Second World War. Since Pétain's trial, a great number of dissertations, monographs, and articles on various aspects of his regime have been published.

The fate of France was of great interest to Americans because France remained one of the last bastions of democracy during the 1930s. One after the other, the eastern European nations, with the exception of Czechoslovakia, had turned to military dictatorships in times of crisis. France and Great Britain were the only great democracies left in Europe. Yet neither of the two, nor the United States for that matter, had been able to shake off the Great Depression. Unemployment remained high, and the United States was entering a new recession.

Hitler's Germany, on the other hand, was providing full employment for her working population, and her factory workers' living conditions were approaching middle class standards. More importantly, German morale was high. The hopelessness and despair of 1933 had been transformed into common purpose, optimism, and vitality. Hitler's success in shaping Germany into a world power in the extraordinarily short time of five years showed what charismatic leadership was able to achieve. The venerable theory that democracies were better because they were more successful than other systems was shaken.

Americans saw the French declaration of war on September 3, 1939, as the democratic riposte to totalitarian challenge and watched the military developments carefully. The swift German victory over the highly regarded French Army was a traumatic event and had deep repercussions on public opinion in the United States. Many American editors began to advocate massive rearmament at home because Hitler's defeat of France revealed that the Germans had become the greatest military power of the time.

The fall of France was well covered by the correspondents of American newspapers and broadcasting systems. At the time of the armistice, however, a number of correspondents left France. Only The New York Times, The New York Herald Tribune, The Chicago Daily Tribune, The Chicago Daily News, and the Associated Press as well as the United Press organizations kept permanent staffs in Paris or

Vichy after the armistice. Among the byline correspondents, G. H. Archambault and Lansing Warren of The New York Times, and Paul Ghali of The Chicago Daily News were the most prolific writers.

In December 1941, the American correspondents in Paris were interned by the Germans when the United States joined the belligerents. Those still residing in the Unoccupied Zone in November, 1942 were stripped of their press rights on November 9, and subsequently interned in Baden-Baden in the Black Forest.

The number of foreign correspondents who were accredited to American papers declined steadily between 1940 and 1942. The gap in information on France was filled only to a degree by the Office of Strategic Services (O.S.S.) which wrote research and intelligence reports for the United States Government.

For the dissertation, the author examined the correspondents' dispatches as they were published in the newspapers, as well as the original typescripts of Paul Ghali, the reporter for The Chicago Daily News. Both The New York Times and The Chicago Daily News allowed their foreign correspondents to interpret the news and to reveal their opinions on political issues. French censorship restricted the reporters' freedom considerably, however. Theoretically, this censorship was lifted in January, 1941, but Ghali's typescripts bore again the censor's stamp in July, 1941. Negative remarks about the person of the

Marshal and information which might endanger the security of the state were always prohibited. The dispatches were not only subject to French supervision, however. A comparison between Ghali's typescripts and their published version showed that the office of the foreign editor of the The Chicago Daily News deleted or altered the dispatches without indicating the changes to its readers. Since only Ghali's typescripts are available at this time, it is not possible to determine whether such home-front censorship was the rule or the exception.

As to the correspondents themselves, it should be noted that they were an international group of exceptionally well educated and capable men, as can be readily seen from their biographies (see Appendix A). Unfortunately, the biographies of three important correspondents could not be included for lack of data -- those of Mallory Browne, Ralph Heinzen, and Lansing Warren.

The views expressed in the reporters' dispatches were compared to those in editorials published in American newspapers and magazines. While weeks would pass without any editorial comment on France even in The New York Times, during certain periods French problems aroused such high interest that editorials on France became a daily fare. The vast collection of American editorials on World War II, 1940-1941, in What America Thinks, was therefore very useful for views on the fall of France, on the armistice, and on the abolition of the Third Republic. To widen the scope of

opinions, editorials and feature articles were utilized from the following newspapers and magazines: The Christian Science Monitor, the German-language Jewish Aufbau, the Catholic magazines America and The Commonweal, the protestant journal The Christian Century, Time, as representative for the news magazines, and The Nation and The New Republic as representative for the liberal journals.

In spite of the fact that editors had a vast amount of information at their fingertips and were sought out by refugees from France and French visitors to the United States, editorials often reflected less an understanding of French concerns than the editor's ideological stance and his perception of the interests of the United States. The majority of the correspondents on the other hand, had lived in France for many years, and several among them -- like Philip Whitcomb and David Darrah -- were married to Frenchwomen. Others were French by birth or education, and most had developed close ties to France. Even though they wrote as "American" correspondents for the American public, their sympathy and concern for France was evident in their reports. The contrast between the correspondents' opinions and those of their editors is therefore understandable but nonetheless striking.

Scholarly contemporary views were found in political science journals such as Foreign Affairs, Political Science Quarterly, The American Political Science Review, and Public Opinion Quarterly; in journals of contemporary history, such

as Current History and Living Age, and in military journals like Military Review and Quarterly Review of Military Literature. Not all of the scholars were Americans since the journals attracted authors from all over the world. Their writings were noteworthy for their emphasis on analysis and accuracy. Personal opinions were usually clearly identified as such.

The émigré literature represents a different genre and has been deliberately avoided in this dissertation with the exception of a debate in The Commonweal (Chapter IV) which did involve émigré writers. The debate was included because it illustrated the dilemma which confronted the French with regard to structural reforms during foreign occupation. Articles in Foreign Affairs by famous French writers like Pertinax (André Géraud), Raoul de Roussy de Sales, Julien Benda, René Cassin, André Siegfried, Jacques Maritain, and Pierre Cot had to be excluded since the authors were Frenchmen who were deeply involved in the Pétain - de Gaulle controversy. Without any doubt, however, they were influential with regard to American foreign policy and public opinion.

Given the different vantage points of foreign correspondents, editors, and contemporary scholars, the original goal of the dissertation -- to compare "the" contemporary view with the historians' judgment -- had to be modified to show how differently French policies were perceived by each of these groups.

The work of American historians was analyzed in the same manner as the contemporary literature, but interviews with American specialists on modern France were of great importance and help in this endeavor. Besides articles and books, the published proceedings of the conference on "The Fall of France: Causes and Results," at the Center for European Studies at Harvard in 1980 (under the direction of Stanley Hoffmann), were much utilized. On several occasions the historians' views were evaluated; most often by comparison with recent research findings. But occasionally the author used her own experience of World War II and its aftermath as a gauge.

CHAPTER II

THE ARMISTICE

Events Leading to the Armistice

On September 3, 1939, Great Britain and France fulfilled the first stage of their commitment to support Poland in the event of German aggression by declaring war against Germany. It turned out to be the only action they undertook on Poland's behalf. Passively they watched the first application of Hitler's Blitzkrieg strategy by the German army without realizing that they were witnessing a revolution in warfare. They attributed the surprising ease with which the German forces conquered Poland to the backwardness and weakness of the Polish Army. General Maxime Weygand, the Commander-in-Chief of the French forces in the Orient, who followed the invasion of Poland from Syria, admitted eight months later, after the German armored corps had broken through the Ardennes:

> We are definitely in the presence of completely different means and of a completely different tactic than in 1918. The breakthrough was possible and its exploitation instantaneous. We have judged the Polish army harshly and without perhaps having learned the lesson the campaign entailed.[1]

Weygand's blindness to the revolutionary warfare employed by Hitler's armies was all the more surprising, as

the concept of Blitzkrieg was well known among French military specialists. For instance in 1935, Marshal Pétain, then a member of the Superior Council of National Defense, had written in the current affairs journal, Revue des Deux Mondes, on the war of the future. Basing his views on recent studies by theoreticians of military science, Pétain expected the next war to be a war of "brutal and unexpected aggression." Conventional, slow-moving wars exhausted both sides, but only very recently had technological advances made an attack possible which could destroy the first-line forces of the enemy, disorganize his mobilization, and smash his vital power center. This new form of warfare would take advantage of new discoveries in the sciences, new methods of transportation, armored vehicles, and most of all the progress in aviation technology. Airplanes could demolish vulnerable railway installations and airports, paralyze economic activities, and spread terror by heavy attacks on the capital and the large metropolitan areas. The Marshal stressed that the Blitzkrieg concept was very popular in German military circles.[2]

Despite the fact that French military experts expected Hitler to use a Blitzkrieg strategy, the French leaders were not prepared for his ingenious use of parachutists, and Panzerkorps in the German offensive on May 10, 1940. Vexed by Hitler's simultaneous attack on the Netherlands, Belgium, and Luxembourg, the French Commander-in-Chief, General Maurice Gamelin, ordered three armies into Belgium to stop

the German advance. Meanwhile, the main thrust of the Panzerkorps through Luxembourg and the Ardennes remained almost unnoticed until they reached the Meuse on May 13. Racing toward the Atlantic, the Panzerkorps reached the sea a week later. Turning northward, they cut off the main French forces in that sector. The Dutch Army under General Winckelmann capitulated on May 14, and the Belgian Army followed with the unconditional surrender of King Leopold III on May 28. The British Expeditionary Corps was forced to retreat toward Dunkirk on May 26, and approximately 338,000 French and British troops were evacuated from France between May 26 and June 4.[3]

In view of the desperate military situation, the French Premier Paul Reynaud recalled General Weygand from Syria on May 19 and appointed him Chief-of-Staff of National Defense. He succeeded General Gamelin, who had proven incapable of stopping the German drive to the sea. At the same time Reynaud recalled the French Ambassador to Spain, Marshal Pétain, to serve as Vice Premier to bolster the morale of the French military forces. Even though General Weygand set up a defense on the Somme to stem the German drive south after the evacuation of Allied troops at Dunkirk, he failed to achieve his goal. On June 5, 1940, the Germans opened the offensive, and three days later Weygand declared the Battle of the Somme to be lost.[4]

On June 9, the French government left Paris, moved to Tours, and installed itself at Bordeaux on the fifteenth.

Italy had declared war on France on June 10, crushing French hopes that Mussolini would remain neutral in the conflict. On June 13, General Weygand explained to the French cabinet that France had lost the war and that it was absolutely necessary to open negotiations with Hitler. He also warned of the danger of internal disorders in case the government did not call an end to the fighting before there was no army left to establish and maintain order. He opted for an armistice as early as possible while France was still in a bargaining position and not yet fully occupied by German troops.[5]

Time was running out: Paris, declared an open city to prevent its defense and probable destruction, was taken by the Germans on June 14. Two days later Premier Reynaud resigned, recommending Marshal Pétain to President Albert Lebrun as his successor. Pétain requested armistice and peace conditions from the German government the same day through the good offices of the Spanish Ambassador, Jose Lequerica.

French Considerations

The resignation of Paul Reynaud was the result of a heated debate within the French cabinet concerning the alternatives they had left. The dispute revolved around the obvious defeat of the French forces and its military and political consequences. The French cabinet and the Chief-of-Staff of National Defense, General Maxime Weygand, agreed

that there was no longer any hope for a French military success in metropolitan France; the fighting had to be stopped to prevent a senseless sacrifice of Frenchmen.

Disagreement, however, was sharp as far as the method of obtaining the cease-fire was concerned. Should the French Army capitulate in the field, or should the French government try to negotiate an armistice agreement with the German government? Capitulation, being strictly a military decision, did not involve the French government politically, and therefore it did not entail a change in the relations between France and Germany. The French government could leave the country to find asylum in London, or it could continue the war from one of the French territories overseas. However, such an exodus would deliver France to the invader, who would be free to impose his will on the country, unrestricted by any binding agreements. Moreover, capitulation in the field was prohibited by the French military judicial code. General Weygand therefore rejected a capitulation as being contrary to the honor of the French Army. Premier Reynaud favored capitulation but did not dare to dismiss General Weygand for his insubordination and replace him with a commander who would surrender.[6] Reynaud, who had in vain called on the President of the United States, Franklin D. Roosevelt, to bring the United States into the war, chose a solution which let him appear to have opposed an armistice to the very end, yet at the same time guaranteed that the French government would request one. He

resigned, recommending Marshal Pétain, an avowed advocate of an armistice, as his successor. It is unclear why Reynaud chose Pétain as his successor, but members of his staff as well as his mistress, Madame Hélène de Portes, had been trying to persuade him to conclude an armistice since May 25.[7]

For instance, the director of his staff for National Defense, Colonel Paul de Villelume, had presented a memorandum to Reynaud on June 12, outlining the foreseeable consequences of both a capitulation and an armistice on the future of the country. A capitulation of the French Army would entail the country's total occupation by German troops. In de Villelume's view this would have potentially far-reaching and uncontrollable consequences. The German occupation and administration might last for years, and no one could predict the extent of the Germans' interference in French affairs. One could envision a nazification of France, which might be achieved by the elimination of the French elite. Even if France were spared such a fate, a prolonged occupation might permanently alter French life and culture. Would France still be "France" after a lengthy subjection to Hitler's Germany?

De Villelume was rather skeptical as far as the eventual liberation of France through an Allied victory was concerned. Only the entry of the United States into the war would make such a victory probable; even then, success was not assured. But there was no sign that the United States

would join the Allies soon; rather, de Villelume thought their involvement might still be years away. Also, the German non-aggression treaty with the Soviet Union and Soviet-German trade agreements substantially strengthened the case for the Axis powers.

One of the problems which would arise in the case of a French capitulation concerned the attitude of the French people toward the government if it left France to continue its functions in North Africa. De Villelume wondered if the government would be able to retain and exert its moral authority over the occupied motherland from North Africa. He also raised the issue of international recognition: Would the international community recognize the French government as legitimate under these circumstances?[8]

De Villelume's question was by no means academic. Just a few months before, a British court of appeal had rejected Haile Selassie's claim as de jure Emperor of Ethiopia. In spite of the fact that Ethiopia had been a member of the League of Nations, and even though its invasion and conquest by Mussolini's forces in 1935 and 1936 had been condemned by the international community, the British government had already recognized the King of Italy as de jure Emperor of Ethiopia on November 30, 1938. Thus Great Britain had accepted the invader as the legitimate government, and Haile Selassie had lost his claim to represent his nation after less than three years. Even though international law considered the acquisition of a nation's territory by force

illicit, "long-term" occupation and possession erased the illegality of the conquest. For France this obviously meant that an exile government could not depend on the continued recognition by other countries.[9]

Another grave danger involved the existence of the French State itself. According to international law, the existence of a state presupposes three essential elements: a territory; a population which is organized in a society, and a government capable of assuming its internal and external functions and of assuring law and order. In the case of a total conquest of the territory by the invader, and in the absence or destruction of the public powers, the conqueror could claim Debellatio. Debellatio implied that the defeated state had ceased to exist and that the conquering state acquired sovereignty over the territory. Again, the question of the continued existence of France as a state was by no means a rhetorical one. The invasion, conquest, and dismembering of Poland was an all too vivid example of Debellatio: the Polish State had ceased to exist. Its government had fled, and its territory had been either annexed by Hitler or Stalin or was now under German administration.[10]

Clearly, such a "polonization" of France had to be prevented under all circumstances, since it destroyed the state and allowed the invader total control over the country. The most dreaded consequence of a long-term occupation of France by the Germans, in the absence of a

resident French government, would be the conversion of the population to Hitler's National Socialism. De Villelume remembered the "astonishing success of national-socialist propaganda in several countries" prior to World War II, on account of its emphasis on socialism. He also recalled Hitler's proclamation before the western campaign as "a veritable social gospel." He saw at once its similarity to the programs of the Popular Front in 1936, which had been so enthusiastically received by the masses.

French leaders knew that irreversible, profound changes of a nation's basic beliefs and principles could be wrought by a charismatic conqueror within an extremely short time span. They had before their eyes those revolutionary and enduring innovations in law, education, and government, and their effects on national consciousness, which were the result of less than a dozen years of Napoleon's rule over western Europe. They had also watched the radical changes Communism had effected in Russia during the past twenty years, and they had seen how Hitler's National Socialism had transformed a foundering Germany within the incredibly short time of five years, giving the Germans a new sense of identity and destiny and molding the nation into the greatest power in Europe. Obviously, the impact of a long-term German occupation on France, if unchecked by countervailing influences, could be devastating. France might indeed "lose her soul," as Pétain and Weygand warned.

However, de Villelume knew that in the long run an

armistice might also raise problems of the same nature. In the event of a partial occupation of France, the French government might not remain strong enough to control the country, and France still could end up as a prey of the Germans. Therefore, he hoped that the French government would not have to choose between capitulation and armistice. Even on June 12, he still clung to his hope that the United States would rescue France at the last minute. That hope broke down when President Roosevelt made it clear that the United States would not enter the war. The French defeat was now inevitable.[11]

What kind of treatment could France expect after the armies had ceased fighting? Since France was the seventh country conquered by Hitler since the beginning of World War II, the French could refer to a number of precedents regarding the method of surrender which had been adopted and the treatment which Hitler had so far accorded to these earlier victims. While the French could not deduce from this record what the German government had in store for them, at least an analysis could be made of the range of German initial responses to these nations' acceptance of military defeat.

The first victim of Hitler's aggression had been Poland. On September 17, 1939, ten days before the fall of Warsaw, the Polish government had fled to Rumania, exhorting at the same time the Polish forces to continue fighting. Eventually, the Polish government found asylum in London,

where it formed a government in exile and remained in a state of war against Germany. In the meantime, Hitler and Stalin split Poland into three parts. The German area of influence comprised the western half of Poland to the Curzon Line. Areas lost by Germany in the treaty of Versailles were annexed to Germany, and the center of Poland up to the Curzon Line became the Generalgouvernement under the German Governor-General, Hans Frank.[12] Within the annexed area the Germans systematically either jailed or deported the native Polish elite. Also, about a million Poles and Jews were expropriated, expelled, and resettled in the Generalgouvernement, to make room for German settlers elsewhere.[13]

Denmark, Hitler's next target, surrendered on April 9, 1940, without putting up a fight. The country was occupied by German armed forces, but King Christian X and his cabinet continued to govern. The King of Norway, Haakon VII, stayed in his country until June 9, 1940, when he ordered his defeated troops to capitulate and left for England to set up a government in exile. A German Reichskommissar took over the government and was supported by the former minister Vidkun Quisling, an avowed Norwegian Nazi.

The same procedure was adopted in The Netherlands, where a German Reichskommissar also took over the administration after the Dutch Army capitulated on May 15, 1940. He governed with the aid of Dutch secretaries of state. Queen Wilhelmina, her family, and her cabinet had left the country before the capitulation to avoid being

taken hostage by the Germans. Luxembourg had already fallen on May 11, and Grandduchess Charlotte had sought shelter in France. Before the Treaty of Versailles, Germany and Luxembourg had enjoyed the close ties of a monetary and customs union. While Hitler did not dare to annex Luxembourg de jure, he quietly incorporated the duchy de facto.

Less than two weeks later, on May 28, King Leopold III of Belgium, the Commander-in-Chief of the Belgian Army, was forced to surrender unconditionally after Hitler had rejected his request for an armistice. The King let himself be arrested as a prisoner of war and refused subsequently to exercise any of his royal prerogatives. The King's cabinet, which condemned his refusal to go into exile, sought asylum in France and shortly thereafter in England. Belgium was administered by a German military government.[14]

Interestingly enough, popular opinion in the defeated nations was hostile to their governments in exile. Gordon Wright later noted that

> In Norway and in the Netherlands there was especially bitter resentment toward the sovereigns and their governments who had scuttled off to London leaving their peoples to face the conqueror alone. The Kings of Denmark and Belgium, on the other hand, enjoyed a sudden outburst of public affection because they had stayed to share the uncertainties of the occupation.[15]

Not only did the populations of the occupied countries resent their governments' flight; American observers too expressed contempt at the exodus of European royalty and high administration officials. Time magazine captioned the

picture of Queen Wilhelmina of The Netherlands in its issue of May 20, 1940, with "Wilhelmina--London was Safer."[16] One week later Time reported with undisguised sarcasm: "Safe in London, Dutch Foreign Minister van Kleffens announced that one in four of his country's 400,000 soldiers was killed."[17] The editor of the Long Beach Press-Telegram wrote on June 4:

> Queen Wilhelmina's flight to England after the Nazi invasion of Holland did not make an altogether favorable impression on Dutch and neutral opinion. Although the reason given--that she left the country to avoid capture by the invader, and being held as a hostage--was convincing, nevertheless there was an instinctive feeling that the head of a state should remain with the people in a time of great suffering and peril--a feeling that was only partly cancelled by the fact that in this instance the ruler was a woman.

The editor went on to state that he had changed his mind upon reading in Life magazine the Queen's defense of her action. She had not fled her country out of personal fear but because "duty, responsibility, and farsighted statesmanship" demanded it. From abroad she could govern the 65,000,000 inhabitants of the Dutch Empire free from German coercion, and in exile she could "keep the voice and the symbol of Holland alive."[18] It is clear, however, that the editor's "gut" reaction of contempt for governments who left their peoples at the mercy of the invader was widespread at the time.

While the circumstances of defeat varied in each of these countries, two important facts stand out. First, none of them had signed an armistice with Hitler. This does not

mean that they refused to deal with him, but rather that they had no opportunity to reach an armistice agreement. The governments of Poland, Norway, The Netherlands, and Luxembourg fled their countries before their armies were defeated and had to surrender. Denmark surrendered without having fought; thus, an armistice was unnecessary. Belgium's request for an armistice was rejected by Hitler. Therefore it would be incorrect to attribute the lack of armistice agreements to the desire of these governments to continue the war against Hitler from exile; rather, their exodus must be seen as a flight in the face of impending total defeat.

After all, an armistice agreement meant that the defeated nation still had some bargaining power. This was generally recognized at the time, as the attitude of the Finnish government in 1940 shows. The Finnish foreign minister wanted to reach a "bearable agreement" with the Russians "before the Finnish forces were forced to capitulate in the field." An even more forceful example is the Allies' "Unconditional Surrender" policy adopted toward Germany later in the war, by which they sought to foreclose any possibility of a negotiated peace.[19] Secondly, in all cases where the government had fled the country, German officials took over the administration. In contrast, Denmark's regular government, presided over by King Christian X, continued its work in the presence of German occupying forces.

At the time of the French defeat, too short a time had elapsed since the beginning of the war for a general assessment to develop regarding German occupation patterns or to predict the effects of the German occupation on the conquered states; only from the case of Poland could conclusions be drawn. In some respects, the situation of Poland bore similarities to that of France. Both countries had German minorities and had received territories from Germany in the Treaty of Versailles which were by culture and language German. Poland therefore could serve as a precedent for the French government as it groped for clues regarding German policies after conquest. While Germany's annexation of its pre-World War I territory in Poland had been expected, nobody anticipated the destruction of the Polish elite and the expropriation, expulsion, and resettlement of one million Poles. International law was violated. While annexation in the case of total conquest and in the absence of a functioning government was permissible, the expropriation of private property was not.[20]

The French leaders had to consider the possibility that Hitler might deal with France as he had dealt with Poland. He might expel the French-speaking population of Alsace-Lorraine unless the French government could prevent the nation's "Polonization" by requesting an armistice at a time when France still had important assets: control over part of her metropolitan territory, the fleet, and the vast

French Empire. In order to keep the French fleet from joining the British Navy, Hitler might agree to an armistice with favorable terms for France. The French government could then retain sovereignty over part of its territory at least and would be able to keep Hitler from imposing German administration and legislation on the country. The purpose of the armistice was therefore much more than merely to achieve a cessation of hostilities. It must insure the survival of France as a state and minimize the danger of a systematic despoliation of the population. For these reasons Pétain and Weygand refused categorically to leave the country for an exile abroad.

Moreover, the resentment expressed by the Norwegian and Dutch populations over the flight of their governments to London proved that citizens everywhere expected their leaders to share the nation's fate, to protect them from the invader's rapacity and violence, and to assure the population's basic needs. The continued presence of the government was in Pétain's and Weygand's opinions indispensable: Even though international law did contain rules regarding warfare and the treatment of civilians in wartime, no invader could be expected to count the welfare of a defeated nation among its priorities.[21]

Pétain and Weygand were further concerned with the danger of anarchy in case the government left France for an exile overseas. The French Communists, with their well-disciplined membership, might emerge from the general

dissolution and absence of authority as the new leaders. The recent friendship between Germany and the Soviet Union might allow them to come out of hiding under German protection and openly exert the subversive influence which had been so damaging to the war effort during the Phony War.[22] Leon Trotsky's predictions may also have haunted the two leaders, as he had contended since 1934 that France would be forced to choose between Fascism and Communism. Trotsky foresaw only one possibility to avoid the dilemma: by setting up a bureaucratic military dictatorship, Bonapartists might try "to save the nation" from both totalitarian systems.[23]

While Marshal Pétain and General Weygand advocated an armistice with the German government, Premier Reynaud tried to convince the British that such a move did not pose a threat to their war effort and security. He had signed a Franco-British agreement on March 28, 1940, which stipulated that neither of the two nations would engage in separate armistice and peace negotiations.[24] Churchill was apparently ready to release the French government from this obligation, but he made his approval contingent upon French compliance with his demand that the French Navy be sent to British ports. However, this would have deprived the French of one of their two remaining bargaining assets--the fleet. The still intact French fleet surpassed the German Kriegsmarine in strength. It was therefore of great importance in any armistice negotiation that the fleet

remain under French control.[25]

It is revealing that de Gaulle claimed to have encouraged and even provoked Churchill's hardening attitude regarding the French demand for release from the Franco-British agreement. It was also de Gaulle who convinced Churchill that the Anglo-French union proposal authored by Jean Monnet and Charles Corbin would be a strong morale booster for the French government. This plan, which was accepted by the British cabinet, called for an immediate fusion of the two nations: Great Britain and France would be united under one constitution with common defense, foreign policy, finance, and economy. Only one cabinet would administer both countries during the war; both parliaments would merge immediately. Citizens of both nations would hold dual citizenship.

The proposal was conceived in London, far from the reality of the French chaos and military rout. The French cabinet did not consider the plan a viable possibility. It was seen as empty rhetoric in a situation of genuine despair, and seemed fantastic and ridiculous. Even de Gaulle admitted in his memoirs that it was meant merely to symbolize the solidarity between the Allies.[26]

By June 16, Reynaud was faltering under the pressure of the military leaders: Weygand had already pointed out on June 12, that the troops could no longer go on fighting, that men and officers were exhausted. On the sixteenth, the Germans had reached Dijon and the Saône front. The streets

were clogged with troops and refugees. Their provisioning with food posed serious problems. Still, the decision to request an armistice was taken very reluctantly. Only the sophisticated proposition by Camille Chautemps to request armistice conditions instead of asking for an armistice itself seemed to provide a means to "save face" for the French cabinet. It implied that the French still had a freedom of choice, that they were not yet beaten into total submission. If the German conditions proved to be too harsh and injurious to French honor, the French might still continue to fight. However, Pétain's radio message to the country on June 17 made it clear that the French government wanted to end the fighting: "With a heavy heart I tell you that we have to stop the battle."[27]

On June 21, 1940, a French delegation consisting of General Huntziger, Ambassador Noël, Rear Admiral Le Luc, and the Generals Parisot and Bergeret, received the armistice conditions from a German delegation at Compiègne. (For the text, see Appendix C).[28]

The twenty-four articles of the document contained provisions which were designed to make it impossible for France to resume hostilities. German troops were to occupy northern France and the Atlantic coast. Within the Occupied Zone the French government had to enforce the regulations imposed by the German Reich. All French forces except those required for the maintenance of public order were to be immediately disarmed and demobilized. All war production

was to cease immediately, and all materials of war were to be surrendered to the German or Italian authorities upon demand or stored under their control. France was required to pay for the maintenance of German troops on French soil, an especially onerous clause, since no amount was mentioned. The provisions regarding the French fleet were among the most significant, since the fleet was considered a major asset. Under the agreement, the fleet was to be demobilized and laid up under German or Italian control, with the exception of ships needed for the protection of French interests in the Empire. The German government "solemnly and expressly" declared that it did not intend "to bring up any demands" regarding the fleet during peace negotiations.

Further stipulations were designed to prevent continued resistance by Frenchmen after the Armistice, either at home or abroad. No Frenchman was permitted to fight against Germany in the service of a nation still at war with the Reich; violators were treated as insurgents by the German government. French prisoners of war in German prison camps were to remain there until the conclusion of a peace treaty. German prisoners were to be released immediately, and upon demand, the French government had to surrender "any German named by the German government." This provision frightened political refugees from Germany and Austria who had found a haven in France. The French government was free to choose its seat either in Paris or in the Unoccupied Zone.

The French delegation at Compiègne transmitted the

armistice conditions by telephone to the French government at Bordeaux, which considered the terms severe but not inconsistent with French honor. However, the government proposed several amendments. It objected to the provision which prohibited any transfer of economic securities and stocks from the Occupied Zone to the Unoccupied Zone. Secondly, it rejected the article which required the extradition of all German nationals on French territory upon German demand. Finally, the French government protested against Article XXIII, which made the armistice agreement dependent upon the signing of a parallel armistice between the French and Italian governments. The Germans rejected the first French amendment, but with regard to the second, General Keitel assured the French delegation orally that the German Reich would only demand the extradition of warmongers among the German refugees in France. The Germans were intransigent with regard to the linking of the two armistice agreements. General Huntziger, therefore, made it clear that France would renounce the armistice with Germany if the Italian conditions were unacceptable to his government.

On June 22 the French delegation signed the armistice agreement with Germany, and two days later a second agreement with Italy was signed in Rome. The armistice took effect on June 25.[29] On July 1, the French government settled at Vichy, in the Free Zone, thirty miles south of the Demarcation Line.

While the Pétain government at Bordeaux had been

waiting for the German armistice conditions, Pétain's decision to negotiate with Hitler for an end to the hostilities had already been fiercely denounced. The former Undersecretary of War and National Defense in Reynaud's cabinet, Brigadier General Charles de Gaulle, had vainly tried to persuade his colleagues of the merits of the Anglo-French union for the duration of the war. After Reynaud had resigned on June 16 to be succeeded by the Pétain government, de Gaulle decided to leave France. He flew to London on the following day. On June 18 he called on all French soldiers, officers, engineers, and skilled armament workers to contact him. In the following days he emphasized the worldwide scope of the war and the duty of every French soldier to continue to fight if he was able to do so. In addition, he contacted the French generals and high administrators in North Africa, the Middle East, and Indochina to form an organization for the defense of the Empire. De Gaulle's efforts were supported by the British government, which recognized him on June 28 as the head of the "Free French." Even though de Gaulle was practically unknown in the United States, his extraordinary call for continued French resistance was heard and commented upon by American correspondents in France, as well as by news analysts at home.[30]

The American Reaction

From its beginning, the war in Europe had aroused a

passionate interest in the American press. A large number of editorials expressed the view that not only a European conflict but another World War had begun. Many writers felt deeply troubled with regard to the position of the United States to the conflict. Hitler was seen as bent on destroying Western Civilization in Europe in order to replace it with his "New Order." Morally, they felt that the people of the United States could not stand by as passive spectators when the sources of their own culture and their own values were threatened. Yet, all their instincts recoiled from being drawn into a war which the United States had not provoked in any way. Therefore, a deep hatred toward Hitler, coupled with a profound uneasiness regarding the United States' role in the war, characterized many editorials. One writer put it bluntly. Referring to the lonely battle of France and Britain against Hitler, he wrote:

> In effect we are saying that Hitler must be stopped, that he must be fought to the last drop of English and French blood. Meanwhile we shall remain in splendid isolation and wish our defenders well.[31]

Even he tried to justify "this not altogether noble attitude" by declaring that the United States could help the world best by pursuing their own "enlightened self-interest."

Perhaps it was this uneasiness about the American position which compelled the editors to refrain for several months from criticizing Great Britain or France. The mere

fact that these countries had declared war on Hitler seemed to them already a show of courage--a feat which would not be matched by the United States in the near future. Therefore, an unusual restraint characterized American editorials throughout the Polish campaign and during the Phony War. This became glaringly evident during the invasion of Poland, when the lack of action by Great Britain and France on Poland's behalf was quietly ignored in the American press. The writers heaped praise on Poland's bravery and courage but refrained carefully from raising their voices to rally support for the Poles in their struggle for survival. Astonishingly, French and British military reputations were not tarnished on account of their failure to act, and Hitler's swift victory over Poland was not sufficiently impressive or close enough to home to provoke a reappraisal of Allied and Axis strengths.[32]

The longer the Phony War dragged on, the less dangerous Hitler appeared, and by the spring of 1940 the threat of a Blitzkrieg in the West had lost much of its terror. On March 16, 1940, a cartoon in The Nation ridiculed Hitler for the "interminable overture" to his "opera" Blitzkrieg.[33] But the sudden German attack on Denmark and Norway on April 9, 1940, and the swift German victory over the British and Norwegian forces altered the writers' views. British prestige suffered a terrible blow, and several writers noted that neutral countries obviously could not rely on Allied pledges of help. They also worried that Italy might

definitely choose Germany as its ally in view of Germany's record of success since September, 1939.[34]

In spite of the embarrassing failure of the Allies in the Norwegian campaign, their terrible rout in the western campaign was not expected, and it stunned the American editors. Frantically, they tried to rationalize Hitler's easy conquest of The Netherlands and to attribute the early surrender of the Belgiam Army to the King's defeatism. Yet they could not hide their anxiety over the fall of France. Hitler's previous conquests had involved small countries, which were, with the exception of Poland, unprepared for war and in all regards no match for the martial German Reich. France, on the other hand, was a powerful nation with a much admired army. By defeating her, Hitler took on the stature of a great conqueror, so much so that he was perceived by the American press as a threat to the United States.[35] An editorial in the New York Post vividly expressed the apprehension caused by the fall of France: "The American people definitely feel their security menaced. We are passing through a period of fear ... We fear Hitler ... because he is beating the Allies...."[36] The New York Times spelled it out: "The first line of our defenses is broken.... The misfortune which has overtaken Britain is our own in scarcely less measure."[37] Walter Lippmann and Dorothy Thompson called for a "total defense" effort of the United States and for an end to party strife. Both saw Hitler as bent on subjugating the world.[38]

A collection of American editorials on the war, What America Thinks, contains twenty-six pieces on the fall of France written between June 17 and July 3. Five of them regarded Hitler's victory over France as a threat to the security of the United States. Ten writers did not go that far but grasped the chance to advocate a massive American arms build-up in view of the French defeat.[39]

The French request for an armistice was registered by the vast majority of editors as unavoidable and a foregone conclusion. Out of the twenty-six editorials, fifteen discussed the defeat without expressing any opinion on the French fighting capacity, French morale, or the necessity of the Armistice itself. Ten editorials expressed admiration for French valor or were at least openly sympathetic to the plight of the vanquished country. In the eyes of these writers, a negotiated settlement was the best a defeated country could hope for. Thus, upon hearing of the German occupation of Paris on June 14, one editor wondered: "If Germany wins completely in France, will she grant terms, or will the war end in a blackout as it did in Poland?" Given the fact that none of Hitler's previous victims had been able to negotiate an armistice, the question was justified.[40] In most editorials the French defeat was characterized as total. France had but two alternatives left: either to fight to the complete destruction of the country or to sue for peace. Typical was the following comment: "The action of France in asking for an armistice

with Germany was the act of a brave people before overwhelming forces."[41]

However, as early as June 18, 1940, the editors of The New York Times displayed a markedly different attitude. They distinguished between the defeated nation and the new Pétain government. While praising "the heroic nation that gave away its strength in a vain effort to check dictatorship and aggression," they simultaneously blamed the Pétain government for deserting the British, who were now facing "unimaginable horrors." In agreement with Churchill, they argued that France should have continued the war from North Africa and should have assisted her ally with the French Navy and the remnants of the French air forces.[42]

This viewpoint was exceptional at the time, but the situation changed dramatically once the armistice conditions were published on June 26. Generally, the editors expressed shock and dismay over the harshness of the terms. The armistice of 1940 was considered much more punitive than the Treaty of Versailles on account of the occupation of two-thirds of the French territory. Significantly, the writers did not only describe the armistice terms as "shameful" and "humiliating," but as posing a threat to Great Britain. They argued that French soil would now become a base for the forthcoming German invasion of England, since the Germans were in possession of both the Channel and the Atlantic coasts. Moreover, the demand for the demobilization of the French fleet under German or Italian supervision signalled

to them Hitler's intention eventually to use the fleet against England.

Since only England remained in the battle as a bulwark against Hitler, the French armistice agreement was primarily evaluated by American editors in connection with its impact on Britain's security. The implications of the armistice conditions for France itself were at the moment of little interest to frightened American observers. On the contrary, in their eagerness to rally to Britain's side, some editors seemed to forget that France had not requested an armistice out of spite against the former ally, but because French forces had suffered a crushing defeat.[43]

Some of the editorials are therefore notable for their lack of realism. The editor of The New York Times, for instance, called the Pétain government a "puppet of Hitler's" because it had, as required in Article XIX of the armistice agreement, complied with the German demand to release and repatriate four hundred captured German aviators. He noted that these pilots would now return to Germany to fly raids over England. In his concern for Great Britain, he closed his eyes to the fact that no victor in any war would ever forgo the liberation of his own troops taken prisoner by the defeated enemy.[44]

Since the fate of Great Britain was uppermost in the editors' minds, only few among them took a closer look at those armistice terms which did not directly concern the war.[45] It is significant that not one among thirty

editorials written between June 24 and July 27, even mentioned the ominous second paragraph in Article XIX. This paragraph is today regarded by many historians as "the most shameful" of the armistice terms, since it mandated the extradition of German nationals living under French administration.

This meant that German refugees who had found asylum in France could no longer count on the protection of the French government. The groups most endangered by this provision were German anti-fascists and Communists. This problem was, however, immediately recognized by the staff of the New Republic and of the Aufbau, a German-language Jewish weekly, who drew attention to the foreseeable consequences of Article XIX.[46] Fearing for the fate of Jewish refugees, the Aufbau advocated their immediate departure to the United States to save their lives.[47] In reality, Jewish refugees in France were not yet endangered in 1940, contrary to the Aufbau's contention. As a matter of fact, the German Security Service (Sicherheitsdienst) was ordered on October 30, 1940, to take immediate measures to prevent the return of German and East European Jews to Germany. They were to be held in camps which would allow eventually a speedy evacuation to a location overseas.[48] Both papers attacked the French government bitterly for signing the armistice agreement. It is possible that they were unaware of the fact that the French government had initially rejected the paragraph involving the delivery of German nationals, but

the Germans had not yielded.[49]

Among those few writers who analyzed the French position and speculated on the future of France under German occupation was the news analyst of NBC, Hans V. Kaltenborn. While he considered the armistice agreement "a complete capitulation, without a single redeeming feature," he felt nonetheless that Hitler would not be able to "police France" unless he received substantial support from French fascists and sympathizers. Kaltenborn predicted as early as June 24, 1940, that the outcome of the war would determine the legitimacy of either Pétain or de Gaulle! Like other editors, Kaltenborn looked for a lesson to be learned from the French military fiasco and warned the United States government of the unpreparedness of American generals and admirals for such an "altogether different kind of war." The government would have to overcome the "extreme conservatism of its military and compel them to take up new methods, new ideas, and new weapons."

However, Kaltenborn agreed with Pétain that moral factors had contributed to the French defeat, noting that "no country can wax great in time of crisis, no country can meet a real challenge to its existence unless its people have the spirit of sacrifice." He regarded this revelation as "perhaps ... the most important lesson of all."[50] In a similar vein, Senator Styles Bridges entered an editorial into the Congressional Record which argued that "corrupt politics, corrupt newspapers, too much soft living, and too

much love of self and too little love of country brought about the downfall of France."[51]

No longer reticent in criticizing the French war effort, American papers informed their readers that "the morale of the French people in the period leading up to the war had been thoroughly bad."[52] On June 24, for instance, Time had only discussed the military defeat of France. In its July 1 edition, Time suggested that "France had not only been defeated in battle; her institutions had been discredited." The new Pétain government had been established through a coup involving the military, rightists and appeasers; its goal was "to wring mercy from the enemy." By July 22, Time attributed France's defeat to a "long, slow, disintegration of democratic and republican ideals."[53]

The sober examination of the French campaign by Mallory Browne of The Christian Science Monitor was unusual and refreshing, even though his love for Great Britain led him to astounding conclusions about British and French national characteristics. Writing from London, Browne attributed the fall of France primarily to the lack of great political leadership, the "inertia and shortsightedness" of French politicians, as well as to an overly defense-oriented strategy. Browne also blamed the French politicians for their failure to strengthen the French fortifications behind the frontiers of Luxembourg and Belgium and the High Command for placing second-rate troops in that area. He claimed that infantry soldiers and subordinate officers had felt

"let down" by the High Command and that widespread defeatism had set in soon after the Sedan breakthrough. Acknowledging the superior German armament and especially the Blitzkrieg strategy, with its massive use of tanks supported by fighter planes and bombers, Browne found the French unable to adjust swiftly to the new conditions imposed on them.

Browne's interpretation of the French government's decision to request an armistice is more a testimony to his love for the British than to his objectivity:

> The rigid logic of the French inclined their political and military leaders to reason that since the front was broken and the Army was disorganized, victory was impossible, and since the French could not win, logically France had to demand an armistice. In the same circumstances, the unreasoning British instinct would have inclined first to refuse to admit the possibility of defeat, and secondly, to conclude that the only thing to do was to fight on.[54]

Such harsh and detailed criticism heaped upon French democracy, morale, and military leadership must have been a shocking revelation to the interested American reader. Editorials on France written during the western campaign had not prepared them for such a scathing denunciation. Not that the French defeat was completely unexpected; the press had speculated rather cautiously about the fighting strength of the Allies after the disheartening failure of the Norwegian campaign, and some writers had considered the possibility of an Allied defeat as early as May 11.[55] Yet while the surrender of The Netherlands and Belgium and the emergency evacuation at Dunkirk gave cause for grave pessimism regarding the British and French capability to

resist Hitler, criticism of Britain and France had remained remarkably subdued. Out of sixty-two editorials in What America Thinks, which assessed the situation in France between May 10 and June 16, only fifteen expressed any criticism of the conduct of the war by the Allies, and of these, only six singled out France for their attack.[56]

This restraint was probably not accidental but the result of a self-imposed censorship or even pressure from the White House. Quincy Howe, an avowed isolationist, the former editor of Living Age, and in 1940 a news commentator on station WQXR in New York, charged in September, 1940, that pressure had been exerted on Washington writers during the western campaign. They had to adhere to the slogan of the hour--"national unity"--and "anyone who hinted that the French might lose or capitulate (even as late as June 10, the day the President delivered his Charlottesville 'stab in the back' speech) was branded a Fifth Columnist."[57]

Howe's remarks illustrate to what degree the American press had made the struggle against Hitler their own. Patriotism, a general revulsion against Hitler's aggressions, and worry over a breakdown of Allied morale as a result of criticism kept American editors from expressing their views freely. Since this attitude was discernible so early in the war, when the United States was still officially neutral and would remain so for one and a half more years, one could expect restrictions to increase significantly during the following months and years.

In view of the clear bias of the writers in favor of the Allies, one must ask why criticism of France, of her democratic institutions and her way of life, was suddenly unleashed after the armistice conditions had been published. The first reason was that France had left the war and was no longer a major factor to be considered in the continuing struggle. Secondly, a constraint on criticism was no longer serving the purpose of strengthening Allied morale; indeed it had become counter-productive. Hitler's stunningly easy victory over France would appear less awe-inspiring to the American public if it could be shown that he had toppled a hollow giant. Accusations that French morale had been "thoroughly bad" prior to the war, and statements to the effect that "France was not conquered, France collapsed," would imply that Hitler had not overpowered a healthy nation and a well-led army. Deprecatory remarks like "Pétain bowed meekly to the conqueror" signalled that France, even after defeat, could have stood up to Hitler and forced him to modify his terms. The American press thus imitated Premier Reynaud, whose violent denunciation of the Belgian king at the news of the Belgian surrender was probably also an effort to stem defeatism.[58]

The publication of the armistice conditions also inaugurated the transformation of Marshal Pétain's image in America from the "Victor of Verdun" to a stooge of Hitler or even a traitor to France. Pétain was probably the best known French military figure in the United States in the

period before World War II. He was revered as an old friend of General John Pershing, and he had visited the United States in October, 1931, for the 150th commemoration of Cornwallis's surrender to Washington at Yorktown. As the official representative of the French government, he had been much honored and had even received a Doctor honoris causa from the College of William and Mary at Williamsburg, Virginia. In several speeches during his visit he reminded his American hosts of the ancient link between the United States and France and affirmed the need for continuing close relations. On one occasion he referred to criticism leveled at France for its large military expenditures, which he defended as being purely defense-oriented. He also rejected doubts about France's peaceful intentions and repudiated charges of French imperialism.[59] Ironically, nine years later, France would be reeling under a devastating defeat, and again Americans would criticize the French governments of the thirties--this time for their lack of military preparedness and for having relied too much on a strategy of defense--and who but Marshal Pétain would be the main target of their criticism.

However, in April, 1940, Pétain's image was still untarnished, and Time magazine speculated about the possibility that the French President, Albert Lebrun, might recall Pétain from Spain to have him form a new cabinet. Time pointed out that "in every recent French crisis the old Warrior, strictly non-political, has been thought of as a

possible Savior." After his appointment to Reynaud's cabinet on May 19, Time referred to the old Marshal as "the shining symbol of French courage and resistance," who had repelled the Germans at Verdun and who had restored "the spirit of victory" in the French Army in 1917. Again, Time emphasized that "more than once in the past five troubled years the old man has been talked of as the man to rally a united France."[60]

Such praise became rare within a month after the armistice request, and a new Marshal Pétain, who had little in common with the man they had known, was introduced to American readers. One caricature showed him as a little old man squirming under Hitler's heel and proposing an armistice.[61] Both the Nation and the Aufbau alluded to sinister connections between Pétain and the extreme right-wing Cagoulards, a terrorist group bent on overthrowing the government. Even The Christian Science Monitor regarded Pétain as "tainted" on account of his "enthusiasm" for fascist General Franco of Spain.[62] Not only did Pétain's loyalty to the Republic become suspect, but also his soldier's reputation for courage and patriotism was attacked. Sometimes the attacks were ludicrous, revealing an astounding ignorance of France. The New Republic, for instance, counted Pétain among the "appeasers" and went on to explain that appeasers were "almost without exception conservative in politics and Catholic in religion." The writer was obviously unaware that 98 percent of all French

citizens were at least nominally Catholic.[63]

Not all political writers and analysts turned against Pétain, however. H. V. Kaltenborn continued to esteem him as an "honest soldier" and agreed with Pétain's analysis of the causes of the French defeat. The Catholic monthly magazine, America, praised Pétain to the hilt, using even a Biblical allusion: "greater love for France has no man than Marshal Pétain." America blamed the "traitors" of the Popular Front for the defeat, accusing them of having "suppressed every patriot who loved France more than he loved the Soviet." Now, Pétain, the symbol of "heroic France" had to shoulder the humiliating task of begging for peace. In a similar vein, the editor of the Aberdeen World of Washington state commented on Pétain's address to the French on June 20, wherein the Marshal tried to encourage his people but also blamed self-centeredness, too much love of pleasure, and the desire to avoid exertion for France's misfortune:

> Marshal Pétain could not have made his address a few years ago, for there would have been few to listen and none to heed. His would have been a voice crying in the wilderness.[64]

So, by the end of June, 1940, there was no longer a consensus among American editors and political writers on Pétain's image. In hindsight, the extreme viewpoints of 1940--"Pétain the Savior," and "Pétain the Traitor"--resemble uncannily those advocated by his supporters and by his enemies during his trial in July and August of 1945. It

seems that in June, 1940, praise and condemnation of the Marshal were basically ideological judgments, since Pétain had not yet taken any action to justify either. "Savior" and "Traitor": these terms were attached to him for representing a certain value system, not for imposing those values on others.

Conservatives, who largely shared Pétain 's values, tended to look with favor on the Marshal, while liberals feared that his conservative attitudes bespoke a fascist mentality. However, many American writers were not yet ready for an assessment of Pétain as a statesman. They continued to give him credit for his past achievements and refused to doubt his patriotism. They realized that he was confronted with incredibly difficult problems, and reserved their judgment for the time when it would be possible to evaluate his statesmanship from his record.

Obviously, the American press was intensely interested in the military developments and to a lesser degree in the political events in France during May and June of 1940. In spite of the war, news reached the United States through many channels. Newly returned American tourists, French refugees, and political exiles who had lost their haven in France contributed eyewitness accounts. However, the most important, regular, and dependable sources for the American press were the foreign correspondents. Some among them were accredited to the Allied, German, or Italian armies; others

were roving correspondents, sent by their newspapers to crisis areas. Still others worked for the Paris bureau of American papers or for one of the news agencies, such as the Associated Press, the United Press International, or the International News Service. These agencies as well as a number of the leading American newspapers like The New York Times, The New York Herald Tribune, The Christian Science Monitor, The Chicago Daily News, and The Chicago Tribune, kept permanent offices and staffs in France.[65] When the French government moved to Vichy on July 1, these papers, with the exception of The Christian Science Monitor, set up permanent staffs there.

Among the American correspondents who lived in France at various times during the war were many well-known journalists (Table I). Working in Vichy were G. H. Archambault, Percy J. Philip, and Lansing Warren of The New York Times, Edgar A. Mowrer, Peter Dewey, and Paul Ghali of The Chicago Daily News, John Elliott of The New York Herald Tribune, David Darrah of The Chicago Daily Tribune, and Taylor Henry (AP) and Ralph Heinzen (UP) of the news agencies. In Paris, Philip Whitcomb headed the Associated Press staff, while Glen Stadler was chief of the United Press bureau. Both Whitcomb and Stadler and thirteen AP and UP correspondents in occupied France were interned by the Germans when Germany declared war on the United States on December 11, 1941. After the Allied landing in North Africa on November 8, 1942, the Vichy government severed diplomatic

TABLE I

AMERICAN FOREIGN CORRESPONDENTS IN FRANCE

Employer	Correspondent	Departure from France	Age in 1940
AP	Taylor Henry	July 1, 1940	
	Roy Porter	Oct. 31, 1941	33
	Philip Whitcomb	Dec. 1941	49
The Chicago Daily News	Peter Dewey	Early summer 1940	24
	Paul Ghali	Jan. 1942	35
	Edgar A. Mowrer	June 1940	48
The Chicago Daily Tribune	David Darrah	1942	45
	Alex Small	Nov. 1940	45
The Christian Science Monitor	Mallory Browne	1938	
	William H. Chamberlin	Summer 1940	43
	Joseph Harsch	Dec. 1940 (stayed 2 weeks)	35
	Sisley Huddleston	June 1940 (stayed in Monaco during the war)	57
Life	Sherri Mangan	August 1940	
	Richard de Rochemont		37
The New York Herald Tribune	John Elliott	1942	
	Walter Kerr		
The New York Times	G. H. Archambault	Feb. 1942	63
	Percy J. Philip	Nov. 1940	54
	Lansing Warren	1942	
Sat. Evening Post	Demaree Bess		47
UP	Ralph Heinzen	Feb. 1942	
	Glen Stadler	Summer 1941	29
CBS	Eric Sevareid	June 1940	28
	William Shirer	June 1940	36
	Edmond Taylor	June 1940	32

relations with the United States, and German troops occupied the Free Zone three days later. By that time, all American correspondents had either left unoccupied France or were interned by the Germans. Both Paul Ghali and G. H. Archambault had already moved to Switzerland in the early spring of 1942 and continued their work from Berne. Only the former longtime correspondent for The Christian Science Monitor, Sisley Huddleston, stayed close by in Monaco throughout the war. From there he visited France periodically.

Some of the journalists had access to highly placed personalities. Ralph Heinzen, for example, was known as Pierre Laval's favorite correspondent, and Paul Ghali received special consideration from his friends in the French Foreign Office, since he was the nephew of the Egyptian ambassador to France and for a time had served as his secretary before joining the staff of The Chicago Daily News. Ghali, a Franco-Egyptian, and British-born Huddleston later became French citizens, while Archambault was a French native. It was common for the foreign bureaus of American newspapers to employ natives and other non-American correspondents who were intimately acquainted with the culture and mentality of the country, since they would not only provide information but interpretations of events from an insider's point of view.[66]

The years between 1940 and 1944 were among the most traumatic in French history, bringing suffering to the

nation and pitting Frenchman against Frenchman in opposing concepts of patriotism. Reporting and interpreting military and political events with a degree of detachment was difficult for even a seasoned journalist. Since the correspondents of the American newspapers reporting from France differed in cultural background and nationality, it is intriguing to examine how the correspondents' nationalities and affinities influenced their attitudes toward the war itself as well as toward the Armistice and its consequences for France.

The American-born correspondents most critical of the French war effort were Edgar A. Mowrer, William L. Shirer, Peter Dewey, and William H. Chamberlin. Mowrer, of The Chicago Daily News, who left Bordeaux for Lisbon on June 22, wrote several reports about the military and political situation in France after his arrival in Portugal. To him, the defeat of France and the possibility of Britain's collapse meant the destruction of civilization itself. He bitterly observed that "so far, Americans have not taken part in the battle for saving the heritage of the Occident," and he was shaken by "France's military defeat and moral collapse."

After the French government's request for armistice and peace conditions became known, he noted that "few foreigners believe the situation would permit further resistance, even if it were ordered." However, he was convinced of the

feasibility of continuing the war from the French colonies overseas and thought this was the wish of "the best of France." He called the government's decision to end the fight "a flight into submission," and accused the new leaders of "forcing the capitulation down the throat of France at the price of betraying Great Britain." Mowrer especially blamed them for keeping the public in the dark about international developments which would have encouraged a spirit of resistance among the people. To him, the new French leaders were quite capable of betraying Great Britain and eventually of turning against the United States in exchange for easy armistice conditions and eventual partnership with Germany. Mowrer also suspected that the Pétain government used the armistice as a means to escape "punishment" for "slackness" and "incompetence" during the western campaign, and even to avert a revolution by French workers, for "German machine guns would perhaps aid in shooting down French workmen who dared to revolt." Given the stridency of these accusations, Mowrer's description of Pétain sounds almost benevolent: "a noble figure totally conservative in trend, 84 years old, a personal friend of Spanish leader Generalissimo Francisco Franco, and completely swayed by Laval and [Foreign Minister] Baudoin [sic]."

Behind Mowrer's strident criticism of the French government and its armistice agreement was his conviction that Great Britain was not only defending its own interests

but had shouldered the defense of "world democracy" as well. A British defeat therefore meant grave danger for the United States, a primary concern of Mowrer. On the other hand, Mowrer was unperturbed by the idea that the Germans might take vengeance on France in case the government departed to North Africa to continue the war from overseas. Indeed, he mentioned such consequences airily, even callously, when he referred to the probable fate of a French "caretaker cabinet" in occupied France: "Judging by the correspondent's knowledge of Hitler and the Nazi methods, martyrdom would be a mild word for the fate of such a cabinet. But the French seem ripe for it."[67]

In a similar vein, William Shirer, who had spent the months of the Phony War in Berlin as a war correspondent and who entered France only on the heels of the German troops in June, 1940, criticized the French mercilessly. He saw the Fall of France as a "complete breakdown of French society--a collapse of the army, of government, of the morale of the people." On his journey through France, he had noticed only limited damage wrought upon the French countryside along the invasion route, and he concluded after talking to French and Belgian prisoners of war that "France did not fight."

In 1969, almost thirty years later, Shirer published his massive work, The Collapse of the Third Republic. While his judgment had somewhat mellowed, he could not refrain from pointing out that France had been saved by other

countries in both world wars. While admitting that France "had done more fighting than the others" in World War I, he felt that in 1940 the French soldiers "had lost the old determination to defend their soil to the bitter end." He tried to prove his point with examples of civilians who had kept army units from dynamiting bridges and of soldiers who had prevented their officers from continuing to fight. Twice, France's allies had rescued the nation, and Shirer warned that "over the centuries, a nation's decent survival depended upon itself."

As far as the armistice was concerned, Shirer was in complete agreement with de Gaulle that it had been dishonorable: "The country, the government [and the Marshal were] reduced to servitude," he declared. Even in 1969, Shirer remained convinced that continued resistance from North Africa had been feasible, basing his opinion on André Truchet's book L'Armistice de 1940 et L'Afrique du Nord, which rejected General Weygand's assessment of the situation.[68]

Peter Dewey, a newly appointed reporter for The Chicago Daily News, shared Shirer's view of low morale in the French Army during the Blitzkrieg. Unlike Shirer, Dewey had participated in the western campaign as an ambulance driver, and he wrote about his wartime experiences in As They Were, a book which was posthumously published in 1946. In the book, he complained bitterly about "the fleeing brass," as he described the chaos in June, 1940, when he gathered

wounded soldiers and refugees in the area around Paris. Retreating soldiers told him that only sergeants were left to command them, since "the officers [were] all gone." At Sézanne, the highest ranking officer he met was a lieutenant, while the streets of Orléans were "thick with majors and colonels." Upon arrival at Bordeaux, he found the roads "pullulated [sic] with golden kepi'd generals."

Still shaken by his first encounter with war, Dewey did not comment on the pros and cons of the request for an armistice. He only noted wearily in his diary, "though I feel the presence of the end, I hardly care." Indulging his nostalgia, he then lovingly described the Frenchman who represented to him "Old France," the country he loved, as "a Frenchman whose ability to cooperate was not perverted by misconceptions of individualism: the Grognard of Napoleon's legions, the Poilu of the last war, a man whose patriotism isn't rotted with political agnosticism, in short, a man fit to live in France."[69]

While Dewey criticized the officers for leaving their troops, William H. Chamberlin, who had been a foreign correspondent in the Soviet Union for twelve years and who worked in France during 1939 and 1940, blamed the mediocrity of French military and political leaders for neglecting to prepare the population psychologically for a total war which required "every ounce of national strength and energy." He observed that throughout the Phony War, life in France had

remained remarkably normal. The government refrained from imposing restrictions on food and other consumer goods, neglected to enforce the blackout of the cities, and through a strict censorship of the press prevented accurate reporting on German military strength. This failure to impress the reality of the state of war on the population allowed the French to relax after the initial shock of the Polish campaign.

In Chamberlin's view, France lacked a leader like Churchill, capable of arousing the nation to determination and passionate will to fight. Cradled in comfort and lulled into a feeling of false security by the long and uneventful months of the Phony War, the population was no longer prepared for a German invasion. Many had taken refuge in the formidable reputation of the French Army and the much vaunted sophistication of the Maginot Line in their refusal to come to grips with a harsh reality. The shock of the Blitzkrieg proved all the more devastating to the profoundly war-weary and unprepared people. Chamberlin's diagnosis was somber. He thought the rebuilding of France's strength would be an "ungrateful and complicated task, infinitely more difficult than after 1871."[70]

Mowrer, Shirer, Dewey, and Chamberlin castigated French leadership for its share in contributing to the defeat and revealed little sympathy for the defeated nation. Among this group of journalists, only Mowrer had been in France for several years and knew the French well. His experience

in Germany and Austria, where he had worked for a decade before coming to France in 1934, had made him aware of the ruthlessness of Nazism and of its threat to democratic countries. His severe judgment of the French may have stemmed from his frustration about their failure to realize the danger.

With the exception of Eric Sevareid, who had come to France only in 1938, the second group of correspondents, including Percy J. Philip, Edmond Taylor, and Sisley Huddleston, had spent long years in the country. Philip and Huddleston had worked in France since World War I, Taylor since 1933. They were less prone to write condescendingly and judgmentally. All of them tried to convey their insight into French attitudes and opinions to their readers, often revealing their empathy with the French.

In his dispatch on June 19, Philip, the head of the Paris bureau of The New York Times, analyzed the French response to the defeat. First, he registered a feeling of relief combined with "a dim hope" that the Germans would offer acceptable terms. Then, during the days of apprehensive waiting, a realization of the defeat in all its bitterness set in. At this time he began to sense a stiffening, a resistance within the population, and wrote: "in Munich they may be dividing the bear's skin but the bear is far from dead." He attributed the swift defeat to the "collapse in the organization of the country under the force

of the German hammer blows" and pointed out that France still had strong remaining assets: the fleet, much of the air force, and many divisions of troops. He hoped the French Empire would be engaged by the government to help "turn the tide of the war."[71]

Edmond Taylor, who became an associate of radio broadcaster Eric Sevareid in the spring of 1940, had long been interested in his French friends' opinions about the war. He wrote about his inquiries in the book The Strategy of Terror (1940); its final entries dated from the early days of May, just before the German invasion. His account is especially interesting since he wrote about the popular reaction in France to the then "Phony War." Taylor detected a new phenomenon, the "cold" war, as he called it, the rejection of war per se: "This was the first time in history that civilized nations had gone to battle unsustained by spiritual intoxicants, the first cold war."

Taylor's friends were deeply troubled. They regarded war as a perennial scourge that bled Europe every twenty-five years. He divided them into two groups, the "defeatists" and the "bitter-enders," emphasizing that "the bitter-ender does not feel proud in anticipation of his victory, and the defeatist does not feel proud of his negotiated peace. Each chooses what he considers the lesser evil." One young physician in his circle argued for peace negotiations and American mediation "before two or three million men" were killed. Others foresaw "Europe in

shambles" and "frightful massacres" committed before an Allied victory could be achieved. Taylor concluded:

> The horror of war among the peoples of Europe was far deeper than any of their rulers had realized, men held peace to their hearts long after it was no more, like a female ape cradling her dead baby in her arms, until only a few strips of skin are left.[72]

Eric Sevareid, Edmond Taylor's colleague who drove with him from Paris to Bordeaux in June, looked for the causes underlying the French weariness with military victory and glory. In 1946, he reflected on the French mentality at the beginning of the war in his book, Not So Wild A Dream :

> Their last experience had taught them that there is no such thing as true victory for civilized men who have no desire to conquer others. Their tragedy was that they had reached a high point of human progress too soon, they were living before their times.[73]

Sisley Huddleston, longtime head of the Times bureau in Paris, and from 1919 until 1936, the European correspondent of The Christian Science Monitor, felt deeply for the French. He decided to become a French citizen during the war, as his testimony of love for the country where he had lived and worked for so long. His views were diametrically opposed to Shirer's belief in military prowess as the guarantor of a nation's decent survival. In his book, France: The Tragic Years, 1938-1947 (1952), he wrote: Military defeats and victories are ephemeral things. They solve nothing, and, until the world revolves to renounce the recourse to arms, there will be no solution to the

fundamental problems that affect mankind.[74]

Evidently, the American correspondents drew very different conclusions from their contact with the French. Taylor, Sevareid, and Huddleston detected a new mentality surfacing in France: a total rejection of war, a conviction that nothing justified the deaths of millions and the destruction of centuries of human achievements. "Anything was better than war." Mowrer, Shirer, Dewey, and Chamberlin, on the other hand, characterized French war-weariness not as a fundamental change in the people's attitude toward war per se, but as a symptom of weakness. In their opinion, the government had failed to arouse the nation's will to fight for survival; the population had become indulgent, self-centered, and fragmented, and therefore incapable of gathering its strength in a national crisis. In addition to that, they believed that treachery within the government and subversion by foreign elements had undermined morale. These correspondents recognized the revulsion against war among the French but they probably did not realize how deeply France had been marked by its experience in World War I.

Less than a generation before, the population had gone through the experience of seeing home and country devastated. France had lost twenty-eight percent of its male population between twenty and fifty, a million and a half French soldiers had been killed, and more than three and a half million had been wounded out of a total

population of forty million. More than 600,000 war widows and one million orphans were left without husbands and fathers. Large areas in northeastern France had been devastated during four years of trench warfare.[75] Rebuilding had taken years and had been very costly. Losing their homes was especially traumatic for the French, who build for generations to come and for whom the home is the symbol of the family's past, present, and future. To witness its destruction for the second time within one generation seemed unbearable especially, once there was no longer any hope for success. To many Frenchmen, it did not make sense to continue fighting for "honor's sake," when an armistice agreement appeared within reach. To continue fighting in North Africa seemed desirable to Mowrer, Shirer, and Philip, but was unimaginable for most Frenchmen, who longed for the end of a war that had been forced on them. The government's flight from Paris, the absence of official directives, and the lack of organized care and protection for the refugees on the roads conjured up the specter of chaos and panic. The government lost its credibility, and its projected move to North Africa was seen by many as a cowardly flight covered up by bold rhetoric. Several senators and deputies realized this when they tried to board the Massilia and were greeted by the crew with contempt and hatred.

Differing experiences with war deeply separated

Frenchmen and Americans. While the French associated death, mutilation, destruction, and broken families with war, relatively few Americans had suffered personal losses during World War I, and they associated glory, quick success, and an enormous gain in prestige with the American involvement in that war. The American losses had been light, with 125,000 soldiers killed. Destruction of civilian lives and property had never touched the United States, and due to its late entry into the war, the conflict had been mercifully short.

The reactions of American citizens to the fall of Paris demonstrated this clearly. Rather than provoking fear and repugnance, the news stimulated them to become more actively involved in the war, as was evident in newspaper headlines throughout the country. On June 16, The New York TImes reported the following headline from Boston: "New England for Aid to Allies at Once." From Chicago the headline read: "Midwest is Swinging From Isolation View"; and from San Francisco came the news that "The Demand For Support to the Allies Rises." Other cities and regions reported similar reactions.[76]

As in their views concerning the broad question of defeat, there was little consensus among the American correspondents as to Pétain's decision to negotiate the armistice. Some of them, including Edgar A. Mowrer and William Shirer, saw in him a defeatist who chose surrender over continued resistance from North Africa or Great

Britain. Others, like Eric Sevareid, despised Pétain for accepting the task of asking Hitler for terms, yet admitted that France was in no condition to fight on. A third group, with Sisley Huddleston, Edmond Taylor, and G. H. Archambault, regarded the armistice as inevitable, and admired the Marshal for shouldering the thankless burden of conceding defeat and trying to save as much as possible. Percy Philip and Paul Ghali, on the other hand, while acknowledging the need for an armistice in metropolitan France, vaguely hoped that the French colonies and the Fleet might still be used on the side of the Allies. Not one of the correspondents doubted the finality of the French defeat in the homeland.

It is interesting that even for those American-born reporters who had sympathy for the French and grieved with them over the defeat, France was finished, at least for the time being. In fact, many American journalists lost interest in France after the armistice became effective. Some correspondents returned to the United States; some, like Eric Sevareid and Edgar Mowrer, were magnetically drawn to London, now the heart of the resistance against Hitler's aggression. A few journalists, however, remained to accompany the French government to its provisional seat at Vichy, just twenty-five miles south of the demarcation line between "free" and Occupied France. Among them were Paul Ghali, G. H. Archambault, Lansing Warren, John Elliott,

David Darrah, and Ralph Heinzen. A handful of correspondents even braced themselves for life in the Occupied Zone: Philip Whitcomb worked in Paris as head of the Associated Press bureau, and Glen Stadler became director of the Paris bureau of the United Press. Alex Small and Roy Porter also worked in Paris. These journalists focused their interests on the political developments in France and the day-to-day problems ot life in a divided, oppressed, and partially occupied country.

G. H. Archambault's dispatches to The New York Times mirrored the transition from the chaos of defeat to the slow return of order during the first months after the armistice. They clearly distinguished him, the Frenchman, from his colleagues. He showed no interest in the continuation of the war and was eager to see France's return to normalcy. He sharply criticized the policies of the French governments during the inter-war years, blaming them for their lack of foresight, for their indulgence in "declamatory speeches" as a substitute for action, and for their party politics which covered up lack of statesmanship. Archambault set all his hopes on the new leadership he expected from Marshal Pétain, a "disinterested, dignified and truthful" leadership from a man who had "always kept aloof from politics."

The correspondent wrote that it was no secret that Pétain had been appointed President of the Council because his reputation might procure "less Drakonian conditions" for France. He defended the government's decision to stay in

France and agreed with Laval that "leaving the country is not the way to serve it." In the midst of chaos, he dreamed about a political and economic reconstruction of Europe, "even the world," and hoped that by the time of the peace conference, France would be in a position "to make her voice heard at the council table."

Archambault remained silent about Germany's role in this "reconstructed world" but stressed the importance of the United States' participation in such an endeavor, hinting that "the longer this [peace] conference is delayed the better the prospects will be." In view of the strict censorship at the time, one has to surmise the meaning of Archambault's somewhat cryptic words. Since the United States' opposition to Nazism was well known, and since Archambault emphasized the "great part" the United States had to play in the reconstruction of the world, one can conjecture that he hoped for an eventual American intervention in the war and a compromise peace in which the Americans would exert considerable influence.

Despite his hopes for a new French future, Archambault knew that the consequences of the defeat would only be felt in the days to come. He was worried because the bitter truth of the defeat had not yet "sunk in" among the French. For too many, "the defeat is not that of France but only of the regime," he wrote on June 20. They felt that it was up to the government to "get out of the mess."[77]

This survey of the foreign correspondents shows that they came to very personal, diverse conclusions about the significance of the fall of France and of the armistice. Their opinions range from Shirer's view that the defeat was the "total breakdown of French society," to Sevareid's feeling that the French had "reached a high point of human progress too soon." It is interesting that both Shirer and Sevareid attributed the fall of France to French mentality. They thought the conduct of the war as well as its issue said something about the state of French society and civilization. The defeat was not only a failure of the armed forces and of the government which had been responsible for national defense policies but also the failure of French society to stand up to the rigors of war.

A totally different mentality emerges from Archambault's description of Frenchmen who thought that "only the regime" had been defeated and that it was the regime's affair "to get out of the mess." In their eyes, only the government had been discredited by the military collapse. The German victory did not mean that German society was either healthier or less spiritually advanced, it just meant that the German government had been better at making war. The French regime had failed, as many Frenchmen had predicted it would after the Munich agreement of 1938, but it could be replaced. The French had survived a multitude of regimes and constitutions. While the republican form of government had become generally accepted

since it had almost accidentally become established in 1871, both monarchy and empire still evoked memories of French power and glory. A republican government in France did not have that quality of the "sacred" institution it had come to signify to Americans. As Cecilia Kenyon observed, after 1776, Americans "tended to associate all characteristics of good government with republicanism, and with republicanism only."[78]

Not surprisingly, the American editors and correspondents were to regard the fall of the Third Republic as the culmination of the French collapse. For many Frenchmen, however, the fall of the Third Republic was the deathknell of a despised regime and the rejection of corruption and deceit. For them, it was the first sign of hope that France would recover.

Journalism As the First Draft of History

Journalism has been defined as the first draft of history. It is intriguing to compare the opinions of journalists and historians on key events. Even more of interest is the question how well journalists in the past have been able to distinguish between significant trends and short-lived fads, and if they were able to recognize what historians later would call key events. One historian who believed that contemporary observers should play an essential role in the writing of history was Leopold von

Ranke, who wrote: "I see a time coming when new history will be built up from the reports of eyewitnesses and the most genuine immediate documents."[79]

Today it is possible to compare the assessment of the French defeat and armistice by American editors and foreign correspondents with their evaluation by American historians. Both journalists and historians agree that the French defeat in 1940 was an event of great magnitude with far-reaching consequences. Both groups also agree that the defeat was decisive and that a continuation of the war in metropolitan France would have been pointless.

With regard to the causes of the defeat, there is remarkably good agreement between journalists and historians. Particularly striking is the compatibility between Mallory Browne's analysis of June 24, 1940, and the historians' conclusions at the conference on "The Fall of France: Causes and Results," at Harvard forty years later. Browne's dispatch, written from London the day before the armistice became effective, could have been used as a summary of the historians' list of "causes for the defeat." He cited French political passions, the lack of great leadership, and an overly defense-oriented military policy which failed to incorporate new ideas in communications, strategy, and tactics. Human factors included widespread pacifism, lack of confidence in political and military leaders, and a guts-feeling that Germany would win a war against France.[80]

There is disagreement, however, on the question of low morale among the French troops. Several correspondents had commented on the "flight of the Brass." One historian, Henry Chabert, who searched for the "root cause of the disaster," came to the conclusion that "the collapse was really caused by the lack of fighting spirit of a few divisions located side by side at a key point in a crucial moment." Chaubert's thesis clashes with the now generally accepted theory of the "strategic surrender."[81] While historians Patrice Higonnet and Michael Mandelbaum acknowledged that certain divisions had panicked, they did not blame the rout of the French Army on low morale; rather they stressed that overall the French had fought well. Like Browne, in 1940, they attributed the swiftness of the German victory to the French army's lack of flexibility and inferior communication capabilities.[82]

Journalists had disagreed on the necessity of the armistice and on the feasibility of a continued struggle from the French Empire. The disagreement is just as sharp among historians, and Canadian historian John C. Cairns noted that "no question [had] been more sharply debated". He bluntly rejected those who perpetrated "the legend of the unnecessary surrender" and argued that the war was over for France at home. He was skeptical about the North African project. Cautioning historians against facile judgments in retrospect, he wrote: "No doubt, the armistice and the

Pétain regime spared the French little, but this no one, perhaps not even Hitler, could have known before the event."[83]

Most American historians examined the armistice from a pragmatic point of view. Prominent among them was William L. Langer, who published his classic study, Our Vichy Gamble, in 1947. He unequivocally endorsed Pétain's decision to conclude the armistice. Not only did the French government retain territory free from occupying forces, it also enjoyed a certain amount of independence. Besides, the armistice was popular, and the people "revered" Pétain as "the father who stood by his people in adversity."[84]

Only two American studies focused specifically on the armistice. Both date from 1958, when Brenton Hoyt Smith wrote his dissertation on "The Collapse of France in World War II, and the Armistice Convention of June 1940," and Paul Kecskemeti published his study, Strategic Surrender. Both of them considered the armistice as the best solution for France under the circumstances. Smith examined the question of honor as well as the conditions leading to the agreement to find out if the decision to negotiate was "right," and if it represented "effective diplomacy." Lastly, he wondered, "was there a wiser course to follow?"

The first question concerned France's commitment to Great Britain not to conclude separate armistice or peace agreements with Germany. Smith argued that precedents in European history showed that "obligation ends, where a

plausible chance of fulfillment ends." The author cited many examples of breaches of promise in modern European history, emphasizing that "no one can claim that the French were being whimsical, let alone treacherous, in their withdrawal from the war," since the French only decided to negotiate when the military situation had become hopeless.

Regarding the wisdom of the decision, Smith concluded: "It is hard to deny that in 1940 the Vichy [sic] analysis of affairs, though pessimistic, was frighteningly sound." He pointed especially to the German-Russian non-aggression pact, and to the close relations between Germany, Italy, and Spain. Great Britain was the only opponent left, and there was no indication that the United States would enter the war in the near future.

Regarding Pétain's decision not to carry on with the war from overseas, Smith stated that

> in the annals of coalition warfare in Europe, there is no instance where the government of a great power abandoned its territory after disastrous defeat and exiled itself to pursue a struggle from some other quarter.

He refused to compare the case of France with those of Poland, The Netherlands, or Norway, who had no chance of negotiating with Hitler. Smith added that De Gaulle's and Churchill's determination to continue the war were "glorious" and unique.[85]

While Smith analyzed the armistice in the context of the military situation in 1940, Paul Kecskemeti examined it

primarily as "a diplomatic and military agreement between two governments at war." He reminded his readers that in the past such agreements had been the norm, and only in World War II had "unconditional surrender" or even surrender of the enemy become "final objectives" of war and proclaimed as such.

Kecskemeti classified the Franco-German armistice of 1940 as "strategic surrender;" that is, a surrender "where winner and loser agree to dispense with a last round of fighting." Both sides had to be motivated by various considerations to renounce an all-out fight; among the factors to be considered were the foreseeable consequences for France and the war-weariness of a significant sector of the population.

Kecskemeti diagnosed the French as "defeatist," but noted that such an attitude was the consequence of "overwhelmingly strong military pressure." He left no doubt about the complete rout of the Allied forces. Normally, France could not have expected that Hitler would be ready to bargain under such circumstances. But because the Allies had retained their fleets and their colonial empires intact, they could choose between surrender and total war.

Kecskemeti called the French decision for strategic surrender a combination of "cold calculation" and "emotionalism:" France wanted to negotiate from the best bargaining position. Resentment toward the British for their half-hearted support during the western campaign made

the breaking up of the coalition easier. Domestic considerations favored a quick end to an unpopular war. Some politicians waited for the opportunity to effect changes in the political system, but many Frenchmen agreed with the decision because it seemed the only adequate solution. In Kecskemeti's opinion, Pétain had a popular mandate to end the war, but he did not have one to start a counterrevolution.[86]

Stephen Ryan, whose disseration on Pétain was published in 1969, under the title Pétain the Soldier, came to the conclusion that "the only thing Pétain could do was to try to pick up the pieces, to assume responsibility for the armistice and provide the leadership and authority which the crisis demanded."[87]

However, several authors challenged the idea that the armistice was necessary and beneficial. Philip Bankwitz, for instance, insisted in an interview with this writer that the transfer of military forces to North Africa would have been possible during the first week of June, 1940, and that a continued resistance based in the Empire would have been a viable option. Bankwitz regarded the armistice as a mistake--France would have been better off with a Gauleiter, since Hitler never intended to treat France as he had treated Poland. Bankwitz referred to Hitler's Mein Kampf, as proof of the Führer's special hatred toward the Slavs. In his opinion, traitors who wanted to overthrow the Third

Republic deliberately used the threat of "Polonization" as a scare to influence the parliamentarians.[88]

Bankwitz's point of view is supported by Robert Paxton in his book Vichy France (1972), in which he argued that France probably would not have suffered more had the French cabinet decided to go to North Africa, leaving a caretaker government in France. In 1981, Paxton pointed out to this writer that in 1940 the Germans could have ill spared the troops required to occupy all of France and maintain strict control. Total occupation would not have made much difference, since two-thirds of the country was already occupied. He saw no reason to assume that German demands and requisitions would have been more onerous in the absence of the Vichy regime. Paxton acknowledged that the living conditions in France from 1940 through 1942 were better than those in other occupied countries, but he argued that this was no longer true after 1942, implying that Vichy did not deserve any credit for it.[89]

A number of studies contradict Paxton on this point. British historian R. T. Thomas, for instance, wrote that the British government regarded the armistice as an exceptionally good deal for France. It openly resented the idea that on account of the armistice the French could "'browse on chocolates' and sit out the war with a minimum of discomforts." After concluding the secret Halifax-Chevalier agreement between Great Britain and France on December 6, 1940, Halifax wrote: "I have the uncomfortable

feeling that the French government is getting the best of two worlds." The agreement permitted the passage of French freighters from Africa to Vichy France without British interception.[90] According to Adrienne Hytier, two thousand ships carrying more than three million tons of freight delivered wheat, barley, oils, fruit, and vegetables to ports in the Unoccupied Zone from the fall of 1940 to the fall of 1942.[91] The importance of these food supplies for the French population is manifest in contemporary accounts of the drastic decline in rations after the transports were stopped in the aftermath of the Allied invasion of North Africa on November 8, 1942. Vichy must be given credit for the Halifax-Chevalier agreement, which would have been unthinkable without a free zone created by the armistice.[92]

Robert Paxton and Stanley Hoffmann differ from other historians mentioned above, because they are less pragmatic and emphasize ethical aspects of governmental policies. This is evident in Paxton's judgment of the fall of the Third Republic (see Chapter III), and in Hoffmann's condemnation of the armistice. Like de Gaulle, Hoffmann considers the armistice as the "poisoned well" to which every evil of the Vichy period can be traced. In an interview with this writer as well as at a conference on the fall of France, he acknowledged that the armistice "at least diluted" the harshness of the German occupation, and that it kept the number of French casualties in World War II much

lower than in World War I. However, in his opinion, the incidence of loss and the degree of suffering could only serve as a yardstick for the merits of the armistice to "people who believe in numbers." Because of the French government's commitment to the terms of the agreement, it necessarily became implicated in German actions and policies and therefore in their crimes. Had the government gone into exile, the blame for any abuses committed by the Germans would have fallen on the perpetrators alone. Hoffmann admitted that the French population, and specifically the Jews, might have suffered more as a consequence, but it would have been clear that the Germans were responsible, and the French government would have remained untainted.[93]

This argument is singularly abstract and divorced from reality and elevates the government above the people for whom it had been created. It echoes the French view of the state as being not only the representative of the general interest but as a superior entity in itself. Hoffmann's opinion in this matter is all the more puzzling as it contradicts his own guidelines for responsible behavior in international relations, as set forth in his book, Duties Beyond Borders (1981). He acknowledged there that neither pure Kantean ethics nor utilitarian principles alone can guide a statesman.

Hoffmann tends to be severe in his judgment of Pétain in all his writings. He condemned him, for instance, for having tried "to obtain France's survival by concessions

that mortgaged both French honor and French independence." Yet, Pétain could not have mortgaged the independence of France, since it had already been lost on the battlefields. Most importantly, the survival of a nation must be of higher priority than its honor or its independence, and no national leader has the right to risk it. Survival has pre-eminence over other values, since it allows future generations to redress the score, to redeem lost honor, and to reestablish a nation's sovereignty. The only alternative to survival is extinction, while values like honor and independence can be regained under more favorable circumstances. The case of Poland's resurrection after World War I is a striking example of independence rewon after 121 years.

Hoffmann's condemnation of Pétain raises the question of the national leader's primary responsibility toward his people in the event of a crushing defeat. Political scientist Peter Merkl responded in an interview that in his opinion,

> a leader's responsibility is to corporate survival; in other words, if whatever the leader does insures the survival of most of the people entrusted to him, then that is what he must do.

To the question, if there was a justification for a leader to try to save a country's "soul" even if that endangered the nation's survival, Merkl answered:

> This is a very tricky point of view, in part because a "soul" is something that doesn't have really any scientific status, so to speak, in political science. You could say that by destroying the self-respect of a people in the

> eyes of the vast majority of these people, thereby you might be destroying the nation.

Merkl added that Pétain could not be accused of having destroyed the self-respect of the French. "I would suspect that probably most Frenchmen wanted him to do exactly what he did, and did not at all feel that the soul was jeopardized."[94]

It is significant that the population of occupied European countries reacted with "bitter resentment" against their exile-governments. They felt the government's duty was to represent the nation and its interests before the invader, and to do its utmost to mitigate the consequences of the defeat. This grass-roots reaction was not confined to Europe. The American press reacted with considerable sarcasm to the exodus of European royalty in 1940, and American officials were long reluctant to take seriously French politicians who had left France for Great Britain or the United States. An OSS report of July 1, 1942, for instance, questioned their acceptance by the French public after the end of the war, since

> Persons who have remained in France will doubtless have, for psychological reasons, advantages over leaders of the Free French. It would not be surprising if someone like Herriot, Blum, or Mandel should become Premier...[95]

In the same vein, Sisley Huddleston attributed the universal popularity of Pétain partly to the fact that he had chosen to stay in France. He wrote,

> The same ordinary Frenchmen rallied to Pétain not only because Pétain was a venerable figure but

> chiefly because he had remained in the hope of protecting the French. After all, forty million Frenchmen could not go to England or to America or even to Africa...[96]

However, the armistice agreement achieved much more than giving the population a measure of comfort. It established a foundation for all relations between France and Germany until August 19, 1944, when Marshal Pétain was taken prisoner by the Germans and deported to Sigmaringen, Germany. Specifically, the extent of the rights and privileges of the German occupying forces were defined and circumscribed. In his dissertation, "Coercion and Resistance - Dependence and Compliance: The Germans, Vichy, and the French Economy" (1976), Simon Karter showed that the armistice gave the French government considerable power to refuse, to circumvent, or at least to dodge German demands which violated its terms. Through the Armistice Commission at Wiesbaden, procedures and lines of communication were established. For two years, the Germans adhered to the rules and rituals of negotiation. Even after the total occupation of France, habit and routine kept them from reverting to a more brutal and facile use of their power.[97]

Adversaries of the armistice have accused the Pétain government of near-sighted egotism, claiming that France not only wanted to avoid further bloodshed but also hoped to gain a favorite place among the German satellites, while other defeated countries could point out that their exile-governments continued the battle against Nazism and

preferred suffering to dishonor. Both Paxton and Hoffmann referred to The Netherlands in this context.

Again, recent studies have challenged this picture of heroic resistance. Adrian Manning's "The Position of the Dutch Government in London up to 1942" (1978), and Gerhard Hirschfeld's "Collaboration and Attentism in The Netherlands 1940-1941" (1981), show that continued resistance from abroad was not a foregone decision. Manning described the "painful discussions" among members of the Dutch government on the possibility of reaching a separate peace together with Belgium and France. They had become distrustful of the British government, especially after the destruction of the French fleet at Mers-el-Kébir on July 3, when England demonstrated its ruthlessness and uncompromising determination to pursue its national interest. Therefore the Dutch were "in a particularly defeatist mood in June and July."[98]

Gerhard Hirschfeld also noted a willingness in The Netherlands during the first months of occupation to accept the "political consequences" of the defeat and to come to a modus vivendi with the Germans. Hirschfeld explained that the conservative Dutch bourgeoisie "would have liked to combine with it a revision of the traditional Dutch state and social system."[99] Obviously, the Dutch government and the Dutch people drew conclusions from their defeat which closely resembled the French reaction. Through its action at Mers-el-Kébir, Great Britain had made it clear that one

could no longer speak of "allies," and more than ever, each nation involved acted in its own behalf.

It was not a singular phenomenon, as Jeffery Gunsburg found in his research for Divided and Conquered: The French Command and the Defeat of the West, 1940 (1979). He concluded that "all nations involved gave priorities to national concerns, not to the common war effort."[100] It seems that Richard Challener's statement in "The Third Republic and Its Generals" (1962), that "General Weygand and Marshal Pétain had an exclusively nationalist outlook" and "the nation and its interests formed the farthest horizon of their thinking," placed the two leaders squarely among their peers.[101]

Pétain has also been blamed for his belief that Hitler had won the war and that Great Britain would shortly give in. His "defeatism" is compared to de Gaulle's unwavering faith in the eventual victory of the Allies. It must be noted that neither of the two men foresaw the entry of Japan into the war or predicted Hitler's attack on the Soviet Union, events which were crucial factors in the duration and final outcome of the war. Just recently, John Lucacs has reminded his readers in an essay on Hitler, that it took the combined forces of both the United States and the Soviet Union to stem the powerful aggression of Fascism, and that neither of the two world powers by itself could have succeeded.[102] Clearly, the future was beyond Pétain's and

de Gaulle's imagination. Besides, they assessed it from very different positions. De Gaulle was an officer without political mandate, responsibility, or power at the time of the government's request for an armistice. Pétain, as President of the Council, was responsible for the survival of the French nation and the French state. He had to weigh the consequences of the German victory under the circumstances of capitulation and armistice. The model of the Treaty of Versailles did not augur well for the defeated. As one of the victors in 1918, Pétain had advocated a harsh treatment of Germany; in turn, he expected that Hitler would impose severe terms on France, including loss of territory and in all probability a long-term occupation of strategic areas. France had to reckon with German influence and pressure in all spheres, including foreign policy, the economy, and even education and culture. However, the government's exodus to North Africa would have removed all barriers to total German penetration. Pétain saw it as his duty to preserve French authority, French institutions, and French civilization; to accomplish this, an armistice was necessary.

It would be hard to deny the realism and sagacity of Pétain's assessment of the situation. The Polish precedent proved Hitler's ruthlessness toward a nation left without leaders. The exodus of a government, as well as unconditional surrender, leave a nation at the mercy of the victor. The example of Allied policies after World War II

demonstrates that all victors are capable of inhumane abuse of power, given the opportunity. One only has to think of the expulsion of 12.4 million Germans from their homeland. Worse yet, Germany lost its existence as a state and its national identity: it suffered the fate Pétain had been able to ward off by concluding an armistice.

Obviously, the American historians remain divided over the question of the necessity of the armistice, and they disagree on whether it was morally defensible and beneficial. However, the large majority agree that an armistice was the best deal France could hope for under the circumstances. Furthermore, the studies by Thomas, Hytier, and Karter contradict Paxton's contention that the armistice was not beneficial to the French. The research by Manning and Hirschfeld indicates also that a separate peace with Germany had been seriously considered by the Dutch government -- a fact which discredits Churchill's claim of August 20, 1940, that the Dutch had "valiantly and faithfully" persevered with "sword in hand." It also contradicts the notion that armistice or peace negotiations with Germany were generally regarded as immoral. Finally, Hoffmann's view of the armistice as morally wrong, since it inevitably involved the French government with crimes committed by the occupying forces, is not corroborated by post-World War II policies. Negotiating an armistice has not been regarded as dishonorable for a defeated nation, not

even in cases where a long-term occupation by the victor or a partition of the country ensued.

It is interesting that in the eyes of the American editors and correspondents, the fall of France was not symbolized by the armistice but by the fall of the Third Republic. For the first time, the American belief that a republican government was the only good -- and therefore strong and affluent -- government, had been successfully challenged by a totalitarian system. Hitler's achievements had been spectacular. Within six years, he had overcome the Great Depression, rebuilt Germany's armed forces, and galvanized a demoralized people into a united, dynamic nation. In the spirit of Calvinism, Americans had always associated success with inherent superiority. The French disaster was all the more upsetting as France had been regarded as the cradle of republican thought. Fear and doubt spread among American intellectuals, already shaken by a decade-long depression. Inevitably, they wondered if totalitarian systems were better suited to surmount times of crises. Could democracies survive the onslaught of Communism and Fascism without concessions to totalitarian methods and even principles?

Some Americans, like Anne Morrow Lindbergh, wondered if a new age was dawning, announcing itself in social upheaval, in revolutions and war, and if the democracies were just as blind in fighting against it as French aristocrats had been blind in trying to stem the French Revolution.[103]

Horrified, American commentators watched how quickly democracy in France gave way to an authoritarian system. Did the development in France foreshadow the future of democracies everywhere?

ENDNOTES

[1]Maxime Weygand, Rappelé au Service (Paris, 1950), p. 79. It is interesting that the American Military Review recognized the significance of the Polish campaign immediately. In December 1939, it published a day-to-day acount of the Blitzkrieg in Poland and came to the following conclusion: "This tremendous achievement bids fair to revolutionize many concepts of warfare. It showed, among other things, the efficiency of well-trained and well-led mechanized forces in a a war of movement, and it also proved that any army, no matter how loosely organized along World War I lines of 1914, is no match for the modern army of 1939." Lt. Col. E. M. Benitez, CAC, "The European War," Military Review, Vol. XIX, No. 75 (Dec. 1939), p. 36.

[2]Philippe Pétain, Actes et Ecrits, ed. Jacques Isorni (Paris, 1974), pp. 299-300. Pétain even mentioned the military importance of the railroad and highway system of the Saar area.

[3]B. H. Liddell Hart, History of the Second World War (New York, 1979), pp. 70, 78.

[4]Paul de Villelume, Journal d'une Défaite (Paris, 1976), p. 341. On May 19, 1940, Premier Paul Reynaud appointed General Maxime Weygand as Chief of Staff of National Defense. In this position Weygand replaced General Maurice Gamelin, who had been dismissed by Reynaud as Commander-in-Chief of the French Land Forces (this title was abolished).

[5]B. H. Liddell Hart,p. 85.

[6]Jean-Baptiste Duroselle, Histoire diplomatique de 1919 à nos jours (Paris, 1974), pp. 267-274.

[7]Dominique Leca, La Rupture de 1940 (Paris, 1978), p. 234.

[8]De Villelume, pp. 418, 434, 435. De Villelume mentioned that Hitler himself advised in his Mein Kampf that a defeated nation should under all circumstances preserve the freedom of a part of its territory where the spirit of the nation (la flamme) would be kept alive.

[9]Herbert W. Briggs, ed., "Haile Selassie versus Cable and Wireless," in The Law of Nations (New York, 1952), pp. 213-215.

[10]Paul Reuter, Droit International Public (Paris, 1976), pp. 174,153.

[11]De Villelume, p. 434.

[12]Gordon Wright, The Ordeal of Total War, 1939-1945 (New York, 1968), pp. 110, 113.

[13]René Albrecht-Carrié, Europe After 1815 (Totowa, 1972), p. 260.

[14]Auszug aus der Geschichte (Würzburg, 1976), pp. 1358-1360, 1384, 1462, 1468, 1490.

[15]Wright, pp. 111, 130, 145.

[16]Time, May 20, 1940, p. 24.

[17]Ibid., May 27, 1940, p. 30. The number given by van Kleffens was vastly exaggerated. From 1940-1945, only 12,000 Dutch soldiers were killed. See Auszug, p. 1421.

[18]The Long Beach Press-Telegram, Long Beach, California, June 4, 1940, in What America Thinks (Chicago, 1941), p. 1227. Hereafter referred to as WAT.

[19]Glen St. J. Barclay, "Diversion in the East: The Western Allies, Scandinavia, and Russia, November 1939-April 1940," The Historian, XLI (1979), p. 489.

[20]Briggs, pp. 222-227.

[21]Reuter, pp. 453-463.

[22]Henri Michel, "Le problème communiste et l'évolution de la guerre," In Comité d'Histoire de la Deuxième Guerre Mondiale, Francais et Britannigues dans la drôle de guerre (Paris, 1979), pp. 221-244.

[23]Léon Trotsky, Whither France? tr. J. G. Wright and H. R. Isaacs (New York, 1936), pp. 6, 10. Trotsky's ideas were published in 1934 and 1935 in La Vérité, but his authorship was kept secret. However, two years later the essays appeared under his name in the United States, and it can be assumed that by that time Trotsky was also known in France as the author. On the essays see Jean van Heijenvort, With Trotsky in Exile (Cambridge, 1978), pp. 74-75. Trotsky wrote the essays in Russian, and van Heijenvort translated them into French.

[24]Duroselle, p. 269.

[25]"Land and Air Forces of Nations of the World and Comparative Strength of Principal Navies - 1 March, 1939." Quarterly Review of Military Literature, Vol. XIX, No. 72 (March, 1939), pp. 34-35. It is revealing that Churchill refused to promise President Roosevelt that in the event of a British defeat the British fleet would neither be surrendered nor scuttled but sent to Canada or the United States. He made it clear that the fleet was a bargaining asset which a "Peace Government" might use to buy terms from the Germans. Eleanor Gates, End of the Affair (Berkeley, 1981), pp. 435-436.

[26]Charles de Gaulle, Mémoires de Guerre, 1940-1942 (Paris, 1954), pp. 81-84. Authors of the project were Jean Monnet, Chairman of the French Purchase Committee in London, Charles Corbin, the French Ambassador to London, and Sir Robert Vansittart, the permanent Secretary in the British Foreign Office.

[27]Robert Aron, Histoire de Vichy (Paris, 1954), pp. 44, 49, 61.

[28]The New York Times, June 26, 1940, p. 4.

[29]Aron, pp. 78-79. The armistice concluded with Italy did not contain any demands regarding Italian nationals living in France.

[30]De Gaulle, pp. 87-102.

[31]The Youngstown Vindicator, Youngstown, Ohio, September 3, 1939, WAT, p. 787.

[32]The Evening Bulletin, Providence, Rhode Island, September 29, 1939, ibid., pp. 825, 847.

[33]The Nation, March 16, 1940, p. 363.

[34]Easton Express, Easton, Pennsylvania, May 3, 1940, ibid., p. 1047. See also pp. 1053, 1055, 1057.

[35]Ibid., pp. 1325-1365.

[36]The New York Post, June 17, 1940, WAT, p. 1331.

[37]The New York Times, June 18, 1940, p. 22.

[38]The Daily Oklahoman, June 18, 1940, p. 10; June 19, 1940, p. 10; June 20, 1940, p. 10; June 24, 1940, p. 8.

[39]The Toledo Blade, Toledo, Ohio, June 24, 1940, WAT, p. 1353.

[40]The Cincinnati Times-Star, Cincinnati, Ohio, June 14, 1940, ibid., p. 1293.

[41]The Birmingham News, Birmingham, Alabama, June 17, 1940, ibid., p. 1325; St. Louis Post Dispatch, St. Louis, Missouri, June 17, 1940, ibid., p. 1335.

[42]The New York Times, June 18, 1940, p. 22.

[43]The News, Lynchburg, Virginia, June 24, 1940, WAT, pp. 1351-1352. The Toledo Blade, Toledo, Ohio, June 24, 1940, ibid., p. 1355.

[44]The New York Times, June 17, 1940, p. 4; June 21, 1940, p. 20; July 6, 1940, p. 14.

[45]The Dayton Herald, Dayton, Ohio, July 12, 1940, in WAT, p. 1371.

[46]The New Republic, July 1, 1940, p. 4.

[47]Aufbau, June 28, 1940, p. 3.

[48]Hanna Schramm and Barbara Vormeier, Menschen im Gurs (Worms, 1977), p. 371.

[49]Hermann Böhme, Entstehung und Grundlagen des Waffenstillstandes von 1940 (Stuttgart, 1966), pp. 404, 92. Böhme notes that a German expert opinion from 1958 declared the second paragraph of Article XIX as in accordance with International Law. According to Böhme, the German government never invoked the disputed second paragraph of Article XIX, and the French government was never asked to extradite a German political refugee. However, the SD (Sicherheitsdienst) bypassed legal procedures by arresting German emigres wanted by the German government.

[50]H. V. Kaltenborn, NBC Radio Broadcasts, June 20, 24, 1940. Kaltenborn Collection: The State Historical Society of Wisconsin, at Madison, Wisconsin, Radio Scripts, Reel 1: April 1 - October 10, 1940.

[51]Editorial, Carroll County Independent, Center Ossipee, New Hampshire, July 12, 1940, Congressional Record, 76th Congress, Third Session, Appendix, Vol. 86-Part 17, August 6, 1940 to September 27, 1940. (Washington, DC, 1941), p. 4838.

[52]Des Moines Tribune, Des Moines, Iowa, July 25, 1940, WAT, p. 1377.

[53]Time, June 24, 1940, pp. 20-21; July 1, 1940, p. 25; July 22, 1940, p. 23.

[54]The Christian Science Monitor, June 24, 1940, pp. 1, 6.

[55]Time, April 15, 1940, p. 33; May 27, 1940, p. 34; July 1, 1940, p. 24.

[56]WAT, pp. 1061-1325. Criticism leveled against France alone concerned the following topics: lack of preparation for war against Hitler; low morale on account of Popular Front radicalism; Maginot-Line mentality; neglect to step up production under the Blum government; incompetence of the French High Command; betrayal and defeatism.

[57]Quincy Howe, The News and How To Understand It (New York, 1940), pp. 74-75.

[58]The Dayton Herald, Dayton, Ohio, July 12, 1940; July 24, 1940, WAT, pp. 1371, 1375.

[59]Pétain received the Doctor honoris causa from William and Mary on October 18, 1931. His seven speeches during his visit in the United States are found in French in Pétain, Actes et Ecrits (Paris, 1974), pp. 264-281.

[60]Time, April 15, 1940, p. 33; May 27, 1940, p. 34; July 1, 1940, p. 24.

[61]The Daily Oregon Journal, Portland, Oregon, June 18, 1940, WAT, p. 1345.

[62]The Nation, June 29, 1940, p. 769; Aufbau, June 28, 1940, p. 2; The Christian Science Monitor, June 24, 1940, p. 1.

[63]The New Republic, July 1, 1940, p. 4; The Statesman's Yearbook 1940 (London, 1941), pp. 878, 880. French population in March 1936: 41,907,056; number of Protestants: 1 million.

[64]H. V. Kaltenborn, Radio Script, August 20, 1940; first interview of Pétain with American correspondents, Kaltenborn Collection; America, June 29, 1940, p. 310; The Aberdeen Daily World, Aberdeen, Washington, June 21, 1940, WAT, p. 1349.

[65]Robert W. Desmond, The Press and World Affairs (New York, 1937), p. 323; Joseph Barnes, "Press, Radio, Films," Public Opinion Quarterly, December 1940, p. 675; Edgar Dale, How to Read Newspapers (Chicago, 1941), p. 82.

[66]Letters to the author from Mrs. Bernadette Ghali, October 3 and 12, 1981. Mrs. Ghali donated her husband's papers after his death to the State Historical Society of Wisconsin at Madison. The Ghali Papers cover his work as a

foreign correspondent from 1940-1969. For biographies of Paul Ghali and of G. H. Archambault see Appendix. According to a letter from Mrs. Ghali, Paul Ghali had incurred Marshal Pétain's anger and was asked to leave. Philip Whitcomb, interview with the author, July 10, 1982; Sisley Huddleston, France: The Tragic Years, 1939-1947 (New York, 1952); William D. Leahy, I Was There (New York, 1950), p. 11.

[67]Edgar A. Mowrer, Undated dispatch [June, 1940], Ghali Papers, The State Historical Society of Wisconsin at Madison; Edgar Mowrer, Dispatch, "Leaders Dupe France--Cause of her Defeat," The Chicago Daily News, July 6, 1940, p. 3. Mowrer returned to the U. S. and co-authored with Col. William Donovan (the later OSS chief) a pamphlet, Fifth Column Lessons for America, which was published by the American Council on Public Affairs, Washington, DC, in 1940, and featured an introduction by Frank Knox, the Secretary of the Navy. The pamphlet was vicious, since the authors saw in all German immigrants the ready tools of Hitler. Mentioning "thousands of German servants, waiters, skilled workmen," they wrote, "many of them [are] naturalized but still essentially hyphenate, ready to annex the U. S. as a returning prodigal son." p. 15.

[68]William Shirer, Berlin Diary (New York, 1941), p. 434; and The Collapse of the Third Republic (New York, 1969), pp. 22, 29, 943, 876, 892, 898-899.

[69]Peter Dewey, As They Were (New York, 1946), pp. 192-193, 212, 213.

[70] William H. Chamberlin: "France in June: The Collapse," The Atlantic Monthly, 166 (September, 1940), pp. 298-304; and "France in the Shadows," Current History, September, 1940, pp. 22-24.

[71]Percy J. Philip, "Hitler's Term Awaited," The New York Times, June 19, 1940, p. 7.

[72]See the following works by Edmond Taylor: The Strategy of Terror (New York, 1940), pp. 150-151; "French Reasoning," in They Were There: The Story of World War II ed. Curt Riess (Garden City, 1945), pp. 172-174; and "Democracy Demoralized: The French Collapse," Public Opinion Quarterly, December, 1940, pp. 630-650.

[73]Eric Sevareid, Not So Wild A Dream (New York, 1946), pp. 124-125.

[74]Huddleston, pp. 39, 44, 48. See also Huddleston's Pétain, Patriot or Traitor? (London, 1951).

[75]Wolfgang Köllmann, Bevölkerung und Raum in Neuer und Neuester Zeit, Band 4 (Würzburg, 1965), pp. 270, 154, 148, 149, 268.

[76] "America's Role and the War Crisis--A Survey of National Sentiment," The New York Times, June 16, 1940, p. 7.

[77]G. H. Archambault, Dispatches, The New York Times, June 18, 1940, p. 15; June 19, 1940, p. 6; June 21, 1940, p. 15; June 22, 1940, p. 3; June 25, 1940, pp. 1, 4; June 28, 1940, p. 13; June 21, 1940, p. 15.

[78]Cecilia Kenyon, "Republicanism and Radicalism in the American Revolution: An Old-Fashioned Interpretation," in The Reinterpretation of the American Revolution, 1763-1789, ed. Jack Greene (New York, 1968), p. 305.

[79]Leopold von Ranke, quoted in Curt Reiss, ed., The Story of World War II and How It Came About (Garden City, 1945), p. XLII.

[80]Mallory Browne, "Why Did France Fail? Some Reasons Listed," The Christian Science Monitor, June 24, 1940, pp. 1, 6.

[81]Henry Chabert, "A Possible Historical Mistake: The Causes of the Allied Collapse in May 1940," Military Review, 44 (September, 1974), p. 89.

[82]The Center for European Studies, Harvard University, Monographs on Europe, Monograph 2. Fall of France: Causes (Cambridge, 1981), pp. 24, 33.

[83]John C. Cairns, "Some Recent Historians and the Strange Defeat of 1940," Journal of Modern History, 46 (March, 1974), p. 83.

[84]William Langer, Our Vichy Gamble (New York, 1947), pp. 64, 65.

[85]Brenton Hoyt Smith, "The Collapse of France in World War II, and the Armistice Convention of June 1940" (unpub. Ph.D. dissertation, The University of Michigan, 1958), pp. 522-541.

[86]Paul Kecskemeti, Strategic Surrender (Stanford, 1958), pp. 2-22, 31-70.

[87]Stephen Ryan, Pétain the Soldier (New York, 1969), p. 298.

[88]Philip Bankwitz, interviews with the author, March 14, 1981, and June 24, 1981.

[89]Robert O. Paxton, Vichy France (New York, 1972); and interview with the author, March 14, 1981.

[90]R. T. Thomas, Britain & Vichy, The Dilemma of Anglo-French Relations 1940-1942. (New York, 1979), pp. 56, 91.

[91]Adrienne Hytier, Two Years of French Foreign Policy (Geneva, 1958), p. 10. Hytier points out that only six ships were apprehended by the British during this period, while 40% of the tonnage on shipping lanes not covered by the agreement was seized.

[92]Elizabeth Foster, Journal: Nice, 1942-1944 (November 15, 1942-December 26, 1944). Manuscript Division, Houghton Library, Harvard University, MS AM 1612 * 59M276. While there was still sufficient food available in Nice on November 15, 1942, by Thanksgiving, Elizabeth Foster reported that the feast consisted of a little fish, carrots, and soup. On January 10, 1943, she stated, "Since the occupation we get less and less to eat." See also James J. Dougherty, The Politics of Wartime Aid: American Economic Assistance to France and French Northwest Africa, 1940-1946 (Westport, 1978), p. 12

[93]The Center for European Studies, Harvard University, Monographs on Europe, Monograph 2. Fall of France: Results (Cambridge, 1980), pp. 46, 47; Stanley Hoffmann, interview with the author, August 10, 1981. H. H. Gerth, and C. Wright Mills, eds., From Max Weber (New York, 1946), p. 120; Stanley Hoffmann, Duties Beyond Borders (Syracuse, 1981), p. 32.

[94]Peter Merkl, interview with the author, May 11, 1981.

[95]OSS Reports, Part IV, " Germany and its Occupied Territories During World War II," Microfilm copy, Harvard Univ., Cambridge, Massachusetts, Reel 7, part 6: "France," July 1, 1942.

[96]Huddleston, p. 44, 72.

[97]Simon M. Karter, "Coercion and Resistance--Dependence and Compliance: The Germans, Vichy, and the French Economy" (unpub. Ph.D. dissertation, The University of Wisconsin, 1976), passim.

[98]Adrian F. Manning, "The Position of the Dutch Government in London up to 1942," Journal of Contemporary History, 2 (January, 1978), pp. 117-136.

[99]Gerhard Hirschfeld, "Collaboration and Attentism in the Netherlands 1940-1941," Journal of Contemporary History, 3 (July, 1981), pp. 467-468.

[100]Jeffery A. Gunsburg, Divided and Conquered: The French High Command and the Defeat of the West, 1940 (Westport, 1979), p. 266.

[101]Richard Challener, "The Third Republic and the Generals," Total War and Cold War, ed. Harry L. Coles (Columbus, 1962), pp. 100, 103, 105.

[102]John Lucacs, "The Day They Yoked Hitler," The American Spectator, 16 (May, 1983), p. 13.

[103]Anne Morrow Lindbergh, The Wave of the Future (New York, 1940), passim.

CHAPTER III

THE FALL OF THE THIRD REPUBLIC

On June 25, 1940, France's armistice agreements with Italy and Germany became effective. Barely two weeks later, Pierre Laval, in the name of the French government, campaigned among the members of the French assemblies for their support in establishing an authoritarian regime under Marshal Pétain and initiating a constitutional reform. The plan, conceived by Laval and his fellow cabinet member Raphaël Alibert, had the approval of President Albert Lebrun and of Marshal Pétain, the Premier (Président du Conseil).

Since July 1, the government had resided at Vichy, and upon Laval's suggestion, press and radio called on all parliamentarians to meet there for a session of the National Assembly. Radio Paris broadcasted its agenda: to vote on a proposal authorizing Marshal Pétain to promulgate the new constitution which the circumstances required. Laval argued that the government must be capable of swift, decisive, and unencumbered actions to solve the countless problems caused by war and occupation. Continued Parliamentary control would hinder efficiency and block necessary but unpopular measures. Furthermore, since two-thirds of France was occupied by German troops, Franco-German contacts and

negotiations needed to be handled by a government with extensive authority.

Laval's efforts to have his proposal adopted were successful. On July 9, the National Assembly voted in two separate sessions that there was cause to revise the constitution. The Chamber of Deputies voted 398 to 3 for the proposition; the Senate's vote was even more decisive, 230 to 1. Herriot, President of the Chamber, strongly recommended revision, but insisted that republican principles were still as valid as ever. Jeanneney, the President of the Senate, made a plea for national reform and a return of moral values and authority. Neither Herriot nor Jeanneney gave any indication that the Republic would be overthrown by the planned revision of the constitution.

On the following day, the National Assembly unanimously accorded Marshal Pétain full authority to represent the nation and direct its reconstruction. However, twenty-seven representatives of both houses solemnly refused to vote on Laval's proposal which, in their opinion, would unavoidably lead to the disappearance of the republican regime. A group of war veterans also campaigned against it. But Laval's promise that the government would not tolerate the nazification of the country and his argument that the purpose of the constitutional revision was to obtain the least damaging peace possible succeeded in reassuring the overwhelming majority of the parliamentarians. In the afternoon, the National Assembly voted 569 to 80 (with 17

abstentions) in favor of the revision. The text read as follows:

> The National Assembly grants all powers to the government of the Republic under the authority and the signature of Marshal Pétain in order to promulgate through one or several acts a new constitution of the French State. This constitution must guarantee the rights of work, family, and country. It will be ratified by the nation, and applied by the assemblies which it will have created.

Marshal Pétain thus received not only the constituent but also the legislative and executive powers from the Assembly, except the right to declare war without prior consent from the National Assembly. He was the "absolute" master over a defeated, partitioned, and occupied nation.

On July 11, Pétain promulgated his first three constitutional acts. They abolished the Presidency of the Republic, outlined his powers as Head of State (Chef de l'État), and suspended the assemblies until he would call them into session. The following day, a fourth constitutional act regulated the succession to the Head of State and named Laval as Pétain's successor. The same day a law established the number of cabinet members at fifteen. Cabinet members were appointed by the Head of State and were responsible to him. The fifth Constitutional Act of July 30 decreed the creation of a Supreme Court of Justice. While the Third Republic had not been officially abolished, and the assemblies had formally adjourned, these constitutional acts had in fact replaced the parliamentary regime of France with an authoritarian government.[1]

The events of July 9-12 were the response to many years of criticism and frustration. The Third Republic had been under attack for decades because the parliamentary system was considered corrupt and inefficient, an impediment to modernization, and a system incapable of pulling the country out of a long economic crisis. While the constitution of the Third Republic had originally been designed with a strong executive, the legislative branch soon won control because the cabinet members were responsible to the Chamber of Deputies and depended on its approval. The result was political instability and a frequent change of cabinets. In the twenty-two years between 1918 and 1940, France had forty-four governments, with an average lifespan of less than six months. Innovative, comprehensive, and continuous policies in domestic and foreign affairs could not be developed. When the Great Depression hit France belatedly in 1932, the declining productivity, frequent bankruptcies, and growing unemployment which it entailed remained unresolved. In the meantime, across the border, Hitler's economic policies had led to full employment, and Germany's remilitarization raised the specter of another Franco-German war. By the mid-thirties, many Frenchmen believed that only a reform of the constitution could save France from economic decline and military defeat.

Among the numerous plans for reform proposed at that time, a special place belongs to Gustave Hervé and his scheme for an authoritarian republic, which received much

publicity during the 1930s. Like many patriotic Frenchmen, Hervé regarded the parliamentary republic as the root cause of French stagnation and decline. By 1935, he assessed the situation as genuinely dangerous for French security and proposed drastic steps in his famous pamphlet, C'est Pétain qu'il nous faut! (We Need Pétain!). The author blasted the government for its dependency upon powerful interest groups and the press, and he accused the parliament of neglecting the vital interests of the nation in its partisan quarrels. Worst of all, French foreign policy was linked to and dependent upon allies whose national interests were not compatible with those of France. Hervé proposed a drastic remedy: like the ancient Roman Republic in times of emergency, France should appoint a dictator for six months to steer the country onto a new course. The man he proposed for this task was Marshal Pétain. He would be called upon to promulgate a new constitution for an authoritarian republic on a corporate basis and to begin reforms which would be implemented by the new regime. Under a head of state with full legislative and executive powers, France would achieve the efficiency and dynamism of modern totalitarian countries. Christian ideals combined with social justice would protect the French from the twin dangers of Communism and Fascism. Technocrats would replace politicians to direct a streamlined, modern administration and economy. France would regain her great power status through an independent foreign policy.

In his opinion, Pétain had the necessary qualifications for a dictator who could claim the support of the nation. He was acceptable to the whole spectrum of political parties. As a non-practicing Catholic, he did not violate the sensibilities of the pious nor those of the anti-clericals. He also had a loyal following among war veterans, who revered him as a great and humane leader. One of the most important reasons for Hervé's belief in Pétain's success was his public image as a good republican. Hervé was convinced that Pétain could reform the government "without disruption or scandal, without civil war, and without damage for the republican form of government to which the whole nation still clings, in spite of its disgust with the parliamentary republic." Pétain's age was a further guarantee that as a dictator he would not be tempted to stage a coup d'état and that the authoritarian republic would be established after six months.

Unlikely as the idea of an emergency dictatorship may have been, the pamphlet was a success, and a revised edition was published in 1936. Hervé's proposition to draft Pétain won support from several newspapers, from the National Union of War Veterans, and from the Catholic right-wing movement Action Francaise.[2] But contrary to Hervé's hopes, the elections of 1936 brought the Popular Front to power. The failure of the Blum regime to overcome strikes, unemployment, low productivity, and the flight of capital caused a further polarization of the population. Communist

party membership grew from 30,000 in 1933 to 300,000 in 1937, and the rightist Parti Social Francais counted two million adherents.

Proposals for governmental reform continued. Hervé, who had acknowledged in 1935 that Pétain was perhaps not charismatic enough to inspire French youth, could take credit for having turned the spotlight on him. By 1938, Pétain's name had become a household word, associated with patriotism, leadership, and an almost magical power to save France. Articles in newspapers and journals proposed him for the presidency of the Republic, and at the age of eighty-three he was urged to become a candidate for the 1939 presidential elections.[3] Hervé's campaign had been immensely successful in projecting Pétain as the "Savior" to whom France could confidently turn in the hour of danger.

France's domestic problems were the topic of some extraordinarily incisive essays by American correspondents. Percy Philip, the head of the Paris bureau of The New York Times, and Mallory Browne of The Christian Science Monitor were acutely aware of the general dissatisfaction of Frenchmen with the performance of their government. Their articles and dispatches proved prophetic in their assessment of the troubled future of French democracy.

As early as March, 1938, the American journal Living Age published twin essays on "French Uncertainties," by Percy Philip and by the French deputy Gaston Bergery. Bergery described the French crisis as not merely economic

and financial but as political in nature. It had become a crisis of the authority of the state versus the power of interest groups. He explained that the same problem had arisen in Italy and in Germany after World War I, and the governments of both countries had failed to solve it with disastrous consequences. Bergery concluded that

> It was the growing number of strikes, the tolerance of illegality, the feeling that government was powerless against the coalition of political or economic interest that brought Fascism to Europe.[4]

In his contribution, Percy Philip attributed the notorious weakness of the French government to the parliamentary system, to the long-term effects of human and financial losses during World War I, and to the egotism of the French. He blamed the labor confederation for having tried to compete with the government for power, and also the financiers for pressuring the government by manipulating the currency. He was hopeful, however, that France eventually would achieve "that perfect balance between liberty and authority for which she is always searching."[5]

Only six months later, the picture had dramatically deteriorated. The Munich agreement had brutally awakened the French to the fact that France could not measure up to Hitler's power. Again, reform plans abounded, coming from all directions of the political spectrum. A remarkable essay on the French crisis was written on November 9, 1938, by Mallory Browne of The Christian Science Monitor, who was just about to leave France after a stay of seven years. He

gave it the ominous title: "Dictatorship or Democracy for France?" (For text of essay see Appendix B). According to Browne, many observers considered the Munich agreement a severe diplomatic defeat for France and a sign that the Third Republic was moribond. Sooner or later, a totalitarian regime would take its place. Browne made it clear that such was not only the thinking of the enemies of democracy, but also of sincere democrats. Frenchmen of all walks of life, ranging politically from the Left to the extreme Right, were worried about the future of the French Republic. They argued that France had to be reorganized before she could meet the challenge of Germany's sixty million people in close alliance with an equally totalitarian Italy.

Browne explained to his American readers that the term "totalitarian regime" was no longer implicitly linked to Communism or Fascism. To millions of Frenchmen, totalitarianism had come to mean

> that all the resources of a country--manpower, labor, capital, currency, trade, industrial equipment--are so organized and co-ordinated and controlled by the State as to be virtually in a condition of mobilization, and directed principally toward making the State more powerful militarily.

According to Browne, "Frenchmen of all classes" were convinced that all the resources of the French Empire had to be brought together under a strong, dynamic leadership. To be sure, there was total disagreement on the methods to be used to achieve this goal. Among the groups who advanced

programs of salvation were the Communists and the Royalists. A new group, the war veterans, wanted a "cabinet of experts" to govern France. They dreamed of playing a dominant role in a para-military government. While they encountered strong opposition from the left, they struck a resonant chord in many Frenchmen who had come to despise party politics. As Browne pointed out,

> The essential idea--that of a group of men who are specialists in their fields and who would govern France free from party considerations--receives widespread support throughout the country.

Even though Browne foresaw an inevitable crisis of the regime, he did not expect a dictatorship in the near future. The individualistic French would not give up democracy and liberty without a hard struggle, he believed.[6]

Browne's forebodings were echoed by Percy Philip, who by December, 1938, detected a profound malaise in France. He wrote that for the first time, even in the rural regions, people felt that the Republic was "used up" and talked about the need for a "firmer form of government." For the first time, too, "the mass of people" no longer believed that France would ever invade Germany, due to a lack of self-confidence and a solidly backed foreign policy. Philip put it in a nutshell: the French wanted "a leader and discipline." He did not think France would have to choose between Communism and Fascism, as Trotsky had predicted since 1934. Some type of "collectivist" regime would direct military and economic affairs, he guessed, but it would not interfere in the "spiritual and free intellectual life of

the people."[7]

These articles show that Hervé's ideas had caught the imagination of the French population, and they convey also how deeply impressed the French were with the success of the totalitarian systems across their borders. Italy and Germany had overcome the Great Depression and were engaging in imperialist ventures. They had become a menace for France, which was no match for their aggressiveness.

Only one and a half years later, France had been defeated and had inaugurated a new regime. In the meantime, the demands for a thorough change in the leadership of the country had not ceased, but became even stronger. Hervé's remedies seemed particularly well suited to French needs after the Armistice. First, advocates of an authoritarian regime argued that Hitler would welcome the rejection of the parliamentary system as a sign that France would "mend her ways." Secondly, a strong executive was needed to restore order to France and to communicate effectively with the Germans. Third, a system where parties were excluded from government would free the country from one of the main causes of strife and governmental paralysis during the Third Republic. Such a republic would not be vulnerable to either Communist or Fascist takeovers, since both ideologies expressed themselves through parties. In addition, corporatism had apparently worked in Italy and might be the economic system of the future. Avoiding the excesses of both communism and capitalism, it could make possible the

dream of a society in which a harmonious cooperation between employers and employees would be insured by the arbitration of the state.

Pétain had never commented publicly on Hervé's campaign in his behalf nor on the other writers who had so many times called on him to lead the nation. Pétain had never advocated a constitutional reform. Yet the plan proposed by Laval on July 10, 1940, was strikingly similar to the six months' emergency dictatorship envisioned by Hervé, including the idea that a new constitution should be written and submitted to the people in a referendum. A number of the features of Hervé's "authoritarian republic on a corporate basis" were literally adopted by Pétain, including the title of the Chief of State, the Supreme Court, decentralization through the establishment of regions, and the designation of the successor by the Chief of State himself. Even the multiple vote for fathers of minor children was contemplated by Pétain and publicly discussed by Vichy government officials.

The American foreign correspondents could hardly have been unaware of these links between Hervé's plans and the government's proposal of July 10, 1940. This may well account for the fact that not one of the correspondents described the new regime as Fascist; no American correspondent compared Pétain with Hitler or Mussolini or saw him as their imitator. The most negative reaction to the new regime came from the Associated Press dispatch which

called Laval a "canny rightist and long-time apostle of friendship with dictators," but even this report used the term "authoritarian France" in describing the new government's character. The reports by G. H. Archambault and Paul Ghali approved strongly of the new regime, and Lansing Warren stressed that its purpose was to keep France under French control.[8]

With regard to Pétain's public standing, several reports indicated that his leadership was more secure after the British attack on French naval units at Oran, Algiers, on July 3, in which 1297 French sailors died. No action by the Germans could have wounded French feelings as deeply as this unprovoked and, in every Frenchman's mind, unjustified act by an erstwhile ally. In bitterness and anger they rallied around the French government, and Alex Small of The Chicago Tribune reported that "a wave of indignation" had "swept away practically all opposition to the government of Premier Pétain and silenced Frenchmen who believed Britain would lead France to victory."[9]

As far as governmental reforms were concerned, the expectations of many Frenchmen were tempered with skepticism and a realistic appraisal of the immense difficulties the government had to overcome. An anonymous correspondent reported on July 11 from Bordeaux that real, lasting reform could only be expected from new men with a new mentality. Otherwise, "the same old gang of politicians would pull the old, graft-worn ropes." David Darrah of The Chicago Tribune

wrote that many Frenchmen hoped for the restoration of the balance between the legislative and the executive branches. He expected much more drastic changes, however, such as assemblies which would only be called into session at Pétain's request and whose membership would not be chosen along party lines.[10]

Paul Ghali of The Chicago Daily News dryly announced the forthcoming demise of the French parliament. He was not fond of the representatives and thought it was their patriotic duty to commit "harakiri"--implying that "harakiri" was an honorable way of admitting and atoning for failure. He was sure that an overwhelming majority of the National Assembly would vote for Laval's proposal. Parliamentarians like Étienne Flandin, who had tried to rally opposition to Laval, had been "immediately dissuaded from doing so." In Ghali's opinion, France was in dire need of strong leadership. Already, the Germans had begun to interfere in the Occupied Zone, dismissing and replacing a prefect in Britanny and threatening to reopen factories under German administration if the owners did not come back. Ghali was convinced the French government under Pétain could be relied upon to defend its administrative rights in both zones.

On the same day, July 8, Ghali was granted a special interview with Foreign Minister Paul Baudouin, who outlined the composition of the new government for him and who wanted to assure the American public that France would continue as

a democratic state. Under the new constitution, the Prime Minister would be the Head of State with broader powers in response to the need for solving the "dramatic problems" France had to face. Baudouin emphatically rejected the idea that France would abolish parliament and live under a dictatorship:

> Never will Marshal Pétain or any other member of government be a dictator. France will keep its parliament a true and effective one, elected by universal suffrage. French families will have a larger share in the elections. The number of children will be the number of the father's votes.

Baudouin also denied a statement by Duff Cooper, the British Minister of Information, that the French government was not free from German interference: "We shall either be free or in jail, but Marshal Pétain's government will never stand for foreign influence." The Foreign Minister concluded the interview by telling Ghali: "France wants to keep America's friendship."[11]

Lansing Warren of The New York Times described in his report of July 11 what he considered the aim of the new regime: to keep the French administration free from foreign influence. "Its purpose . . . is to preserve the French nation." He clearly wanted to convey to his readers that France was not going to be a puppet of Hitler.[12] G. H. Archambault wrote along the same lines, anxious to explain to the American people that France had chosen the best solution under the circumstances. He saw only three alternatives: a "peaceful and deliberate" reconstruction of

the nation under Pétain; a civil war; or a German-imposed regime. He reminded his readers that France had once before chosen a strong leader after a defeat--Adolphe Thiers following the Franco-Prussian War--who guided the nation until a new constitution was written. Thiers had not betrayed the people's trust. Archambault endorsed Pétain's leadership wholeheartedly and stressed that a wide spectrum of politicians supported the "new order," including Xavier Vallat of the extreme Right and Charles Spinasse of the extreme Left.[13]

It is obvious that the foreign correspondents made a concerted effort to explain to Americans that France had not turned Fascist and would remain a democracy, even though Marshal Pétain had received dictatorial powers. They wanted to convince their readers that the French public trusted the Pétain regime to defend French interests against German encroachments. Finally, they argued that the grave situation in which France found herself required a stronger leadership than that provided in a parliamentary republic.

Headlines and editorials in American newspapers in July, 1940, show that the correspondents' efforts remained largely ineffective, however. The headlines spelled it out in big, bold letters: France had become Fascist. Not one among the correspondents had used the hated word, but this did not keep their editors from branding the Vichy regime as Hitler's disciple and puppet. The Christian Science Monitor announced, "Swastika over Pétain. Totalitarian France is

Born." The New York Times carried the headline, "France to be a Fascist State", on July 9. The New York Herald Tribune and The Chicago Daily News emphasized, too, that France had adopted Fascism. Editorials reiterated the same idea but with more subtlety and not so uniformly strident a tone. The New York Times editorial, for instance, was much more circumspect than the headline suggested. Acknowledging that the Third Republic was "dead," it pointed out that the parliamentary system had degenerated before the French defeat. The writer thought it unwise to attribute much significance to the proceedings in France, since decisions could only be provisional as long as the war continued and France remained under German domination and occupation.[14] Time magazine also assessed the situation soberly, acknowledging the need for "some kind of new order" but also admitting the narrow limits of action under the circumstances. The fact that neither Time magazine nor Newsweek devoted a cover picture to the fall of the Republic denotes that they did not regard the event as one of first-rate importance.[15]

Two newspapers, however, totally rejected the suggestion that the Vichy government could have a policy of its own. An editorial in The New York Herald Tribune declared categorically that "no Frenchman is free", and asserted that "neither Marshal Pétain nor any other French leader can possibly be any more than a Nazi puppet." The editor disregarded any news from France which did not fit

his preconceptions as the product of Nazi censorship. The foreign editor of The Chicago Daily News, Carroll Binder, took the same position.

A very interesting and revealing conflict of opinion developed between Binder and his paper's correspondent in Vichy, Paul Ghali. An editorial on July 10 at once characterized the new regime as Fascist. Three days later, two assessments of the Pétain government, by Ghali and Binder respectively, were published on the same page. They contradicted each other totally. Ghali described the Vichy regime as "a new form of government" which could be "authoritarian or parliamentarian depending on circumstances." He admitted that the executive of the new regime was a very strong one but pointed out that the government was authoritarian only out of necessity to deal with the crisis. Ghali concluded:

> Pétain's government has promised to safeguard French liberties, and the French people remain deeply liberal and democratic. In France, more than in any other country, a text is one thing and the spirit in which it is applied is another.

Carroll Binder saw the situation in a very different light: "Pierre Laval and his anti-democratic associates have officially killed democracy and liberalism in its traditional home, France." In his view, the outlook was gloomy. Even though the reactionaries' goal was to ingratiate themselves with the Germans, they would not be successful. Germany was draining the country of its wealth, and French enterprises were working for the Germans'

benefit, while the Pétain regime was "wreaking vengeance" on former French leaders. "It is a sorry fate for a once great nation," he concluded.[16]

During the following weeks, Ghali continued to portray the Vichy regime in a rather favorable light. He was annoyed that the foreign press had only been informed about the new regime after it had been established, but he was impressed with the quality of the men Pétain had chosen. Ghali observed that

> the new cabinet is surely the strongest France has had for the last ten years . . . The French Marshal and his advisers have put aside all party questions and have appointed the right man in the right place. Maybe for the first time in French constitutional history only personal qualifications seem to have counted in the choice of new ministers.[17]

In Ghali's opinion, this was the government France needed; the country could no longer indulge in partisan squabbles and parliamentary intrigues. Only one thing counted: France's salvation. The fact that the German press gave the new regime a "tepid" welcome, considering it too "French," was one more proof that the regime was the right one. The German invader had obviously counted on a more "servile" attitude from the French leaders. In spite of these positive signs, Ghali entertained no illusions about the difficulties France would face in the days ahead. "Marshal Pétain has decided for a policy of negotiations with Germany in order to preserve French independence. The near future might tell whether he has been right or not."

Binder and Ghali remained at loggerheads during the

following months. On August 17, for instance, Binder rebuked Ghali in a telegram, calling the dispatches "good but too long," and telling Ghali he should omit "personal expressions of approval or disapproval, and stress explanations of what was actually transpiring." His objections to the length of the reports is surprising, since American newspapers at the time were still complaining about the dearth of news from France.[18] The number of American correspondents had dwindled since the fall of France, and those who remained were restricted by the lack of transmission facilities.

By July, 1940, only four American newspapers maintained correspondents in France who wrote under their own byline, though both AP and UP kept staffs in Paris and Vichy. Alex Small of The Chicago Tribune was the only one stationed in Paris, while his colleague, David Darrah, and the two New York Times correspondents, G. H. Archambault and Lansing Warren, as well as John Elliott of the The New York Herald Tribune and Paul Ghali wrote from Vichy. Occasionally, American news magazines would send a reporter on temporary assignment. In August, 1940, Frank Norris and George Streck went to Vichy for Life magazine, and Joseph Harsch from The Christian Science Monitor visited France in December. Sherry Mangan and Demaree Bess, as well as Janet Flanner and Kaye Boyle, also authored articles for a number of magazines. News on political developments came, however, mainly from the newspaper correspondents in France and from

Associated Press and United Press reporters in Switzerland and in England. Those from London especially were written from a distinctly anti-Vichy bias.

The Chicago Daily News, a paper owned by Frank Knox, the newly appointed Secretary of the Navy, normally permitted its correspondents to voice their own political views forcefully. It seems, however, that editorial policy did not permit enthusiasm for the Vichy regime. Comparisons between Paul Ghali's typescripts and their published versions reveal deletions of information which had already passed the French censor. These deletions are significant, since they usually concerned Ghali's assessment of the Vichy regime, his approving remarks about Marshal Pétain, or his appeals to American readers for sympathy and understanding for the difficult situation in which the French government found itself. Sometimes, when Ghali seemed to express Vichy's point of view, editing substantially weakened his argument. For instance, he wrote shortly after the armistice: "In her whole history France has perhaps never found herself in such a dramatic position." The edited version read: "Apologists for the French reaction explain that France in all its history has perhaps never found itself in such a dramatic position as today."[19]

Paul Ghali's dispatches were generally much more personal and more emotionally involved than those of his colleague, Lansing Warren. This is understandable, since Ghali's mother was French, Ghali himself had studied in

France, and he had strong personal ties to the country. The difference between the style of Ghali and Warren is very evident in their reports of Marshal Pétain's first press conference to seventeen foreign correspondents representing newspapers from the United States and Latin America.

Unknown to the reporters, the conference had been suggested by President Roosevelt to Pierre Laval's son-in-law, Count René de Chambrun, at the White House on August 1. The President had promised to see to it that the Free Zone would receive "regular food shipments, particularly condensed milk, for the duration of the hostilities," in return for a "pro-American statement" by Marshal Pétain endorsing United States rearmament and the democratic ideal. On August 20, Chambrun arranged the interview and introduced the correspondents to the Marshal. They received from him a written statement whose central theme linked France and the United States on the basis of common values. Lansing Warren wrote to The New York Times that Pétain told the assembled reporters, France

> will remain firmly attached to the ideal that she professes in common with the great American democracies, an ideal founded on respect for the human individual, on the cult of family, community and country, on love of justice and humanity.

Warren commented that the Marshal was reasoning with "remarkable lucidity," and he mentioned also that he spoke with "greatest calm and clearness" and held himself erect in spite of his 84 years. The press conference gave Pétain a chance to speak directly to Americans about the

constitutional reform and its consequences for France, and he left no doubt that it was up to the French voters whether or not France would remain a republic under the new constitution. While authoritarian states had certain advantages in competing with pluralist democracies, he maintained that in the presence of patriotism and discipline, national unity could be achieved in a democracy.

The correspondents also inquired about the limitations which the German occupation of two-thirds of France imposed on the administration's liberty of action. Pétain noted that his government was "bound absolutely" by the armistice agreement, adding, "The Germans hold the rope and twist it whenever they consider the accord is not being carried out." He insisted, however, that in the Unoccupied Zone he was in complete control of the administration, and no pressure was exerted on him in internal affairs.[20]

While Lansing Warren gave a precise and straightforward report of the news conference, Paul Ghali's dispatch to The Chicago Daily News was more personal, and he seemed intent on presenting the Marshal as a man in full control, completely at ease with critical, aggressive journalists, and physically and mentally in full vigor. His editor's deletions, however, considerably weakened the force of Ghali's argument. For example, in the following transcript of Ghali's dispatch of August 19, the deletions have been underscored to show how these omissions alter the tone of the report:

'This country refuses to die. I know that it will survive.' The man who speaks of [the] future of [his] beloved country as if centuries were before him is eighty-four years old - Marshal Pétain who received the American press [in] Vichy this afternoon. He is [a] vivid image [of] what patriotism can make. He is much younger now than ten years ago because he [has] got a real job.

In [his] yellow panelled living-room full [of] flowers he looks straight at you with his light blue eyes, and the dream of a new France seems to take shape in his words. France will return [to her] former traditions. She will cultivate the virtues of strong countries and honor [the] truths [of] Christianity without which a country cannot live. 'I can assure you she will never give up this ideal which is also [an] American ideal[:] respect for [the] human being, love [of] family, love [of] justice [and] humanity.'

The future comes before [the] past for Marshal Pétain. He explains why France [was] beaten: she [was] materially [and] morally unprepared [for] war. Under [the] name [of] democracy France [was] simply corrupted. 'Don't be mistaken,' says [the] old Marshal with quick wit, 'to be strong a democracy must be united and face peril with all its strength. Patriotism [is] needed. Look at Switzerland for instance. Is Switzerland weaker because [of] democracy?' How will you teach patriotism [and] self-force [sic] to [the] old generations [of] this country? was [the] question put forward [by] your correspondent. '[The] old ones will have to learn it through discipline,' was [his] quick answer. 'Youth of course will learn it easily.'

Other questions [are] put forward and [the] Marshal answers with [the] same good grace. Will France remain [a] republic? 'How can I know? There is something called popular vote.'

The Marshall took [his] guests to [the] dining-room for [a] friendly chat. He [had] just received [a] letter from General Pershing. 'The friendship between us,' says the Marshal, 'will last up to my last day. I know that if General Pershing was in better health, he would be here today beside me,' concludes Pétain. The old Marshal does not seem to know what a defeat is. This is why he is today the image of France, of future France.[21]

Clearly, the positive image which Ghali sought to convey was not congenial to the editorial policy of The Chicago Daily

News.

Both Warren and Ghali portrayed Pétain as a man who had nothing in common with the pessimistic, defeatist leader depicted by his adversaries. Indeed, Pétain seemed excessively optimistic to Ghali, whose personal assessment of the French situation in a second dispatch on the same day was quite somber. In his opinion, the Vichy government would have preferred a bad peace to the present uncertainty and its detrimental effect on public opinion, but an early peace seemed now unlikely, and reform efforts would have to remain tentative as long as the German peace conditions remained unknown. Ghali was also concerned about the relentless criticism of the French leaders by the German press, and he suspected that it was a prelude to German intervention in French domestic affairs. He felt that the case was stacked against the French government, and he closed his second report on the day of the news conference with a plea: "French leaders with their hands full with internal and external problems, deserve comprehension." The French censor let the remark pass--not so the foreign editor of The Chicago Daily News. Ghali's request for a sympathetic attitude toward the new men in France was deleted.[22]

Since only Ghali's typescripts are available at this time, it is not known whether the other newspapers imposed a censorship on their correspondents' dispatches. But it is nevertheless evident that editors and correspondents

evaluated the political situation in France very differently. One would assume that editors had at their disposal a very wide range of sources: visiting French officials who tried to explain their government's actions; refugees from France; diplomats and U.S. government personnel; in addition to international newspapers and correspondents' dispatches from Switzerland and England. These could have made for a richly varied picture. Yet editorials have a tendency to exaggerate and simplify. Editors forgot that no government ever enjoys being another power's puppet and that every government tries to preserve and increase its own authority. After a defeat, it will make every effort to undermine the power of the victor. That editors described the Vichy leaders as willing puppets of Hitler reveals a lack of understanding of the relationship between the oppressor and the oppressed.

One might argue that the editors unconsciously revealed their lack of faith in the strength of French patriotism and democratic ideals when they assumed that the people could be turned into Fascists and mindless slaves overnight. A more plausible explanation for such editorials is that they tried to hide a lack of comprehension or a genuine indifference toward France by exaggerated profusions of sympathy or inordinate criticism.

The correspondents, on the other hand, lived among the French and shared their daily problems in coping with lack of food, shortages of goods, disrupted communication and

transportation, and crowded living conditions. They knew from firsthand experience the difficulties which had to be overcome by the government. While the editors writing from a life of ease and abundance in the United States "mourned" the loss of democratic freedoms in France, correspondents hoped for a government that would be capable and efficient enough to pull the country out of the misery which had been caused by the war. In the face of hunger, lack of shelter, unemployment, and worry about family members in prisoner-of-war camps, ideological debates lost their relevance.

The Fall of the Third Republic and the American Historians

The fall of the Third Republic has fascinated American political scientists and historians ever since the French National Assembly--always notorious for its inefficiency--managed in two days to delegate legislative and executive powers to Marshal Pétain and to charge the head of the new government with the revision of the constitution. The first studies were published as early as 1940 and 1941, in answer to questions regarding the motives for the action and the legality of the proceedings, as well as the characteristics of the new regime and its popular base.

William H. Chamberlin, foreign correspondent and historian, published his assessment of the demise of "the slack, easy-going, middle-of-the-road, slightly left-of center Republic" in his article "France in the Shadows," of

September 1940. He refrained from attributing the fall of the old regime to defeat or German pressure alone and regarded it as inevitable. Chamberlin argued that

> Something quite different, something harder, more authoritarian, would almost certainly have been put in place, even if the French people were free agents, able to consult only their own inclinations. In view of the chaotic French situation and the difficult times ahead, an authoritarian system would be more efficient than the slow, easy-going methods of democracy.

However, he did not underestimate the fundamental factor of the German occupation and thought that the French had to adopt a government along the Fascist pattern. In his opinion, the new regime followed not the German or Italian model but rather the examples of Dollfuss of Austria and Salazar of Portugal. Pétain, whom Chamberlin characterized as a representative of French Catholic conservatism, followed their example in creating an authoritarian state incorporating "Catholic social principles." Since Chamberlin left France shortly after the change of regime, his impression of the French population's attitude toward the new system could only be a cursory one. He had detected neither enthusiasm nor brooding hostility or resistance against it.[23]

Among the scholars interested in the fall of the Republic, Karl Loewenstein examined the legality of the National Assembly's decision for a complete revision in his study "The Demise of the French Constitution of 1875" (1940). Loewenstein called the fall of the Third Republic a

Fascist revolution from above, referring to the absence of a Fascist mass party in France as well as to the absence of a charismatic leader. He saw in Pétain only a "French Hindenburg," "mummified in the prestige of Verdun." He came to the conclusion that the establishment of the new regime had followed prescribed procedures completely. This adherence to legality was exceptional, since "not a single one of the nine constitutions since 1789 [had] been abrogated or replaced according to law." But this did not mean that the French had been in favor of the demise of the Third Republic, since in Loewenstein's opinion,

> never in the years since World War I has a nation as a whole voluntarily submitted to authoritarian government; the step was always the work of an activist minority assuming power against the will of the people.

Answering charges raised in Great Britain and the United States denying the legitimacy of the new government, Loewenstein pointed out that the actions by the assemblies on July 9 proved "irrefutably that the Pétain cabinet was considered by Parliament as the legally constituted government of France and not as only a gouvernement de fait." He also affirmed the authority of the French National Assembly to vote for a total revision of the Constitution. In conclusion, he wrote, "It must be admitted that the National Assembly had jurisdiction to transform France from a democracy into a fascist state." It is interesting that he noted that "juridically, totalitarian government is not incompatible with what is called the

republican form of government." He saw no clear break between the Third Republic and Vichy and considered the plebiscite which was to ratify the new French constitution as "the essential link between the old order and the new regime of France."

A grave problem, in his opinion, was the lack of a Bill of Rights in the Constitution of 1875, since there were "no legal obstacles . . . to the enactment of arbitrary, unequal, discriminatory, and unjust laws" by the new regime. Some of the consequences could already be observed in the laws prohibiting secret societies and the deprivation of citizenship of persons considered undesirable by the government. Loewenstein attributed these infractions to the "common fascist pattern of arbitrariness disguised as raison d'Etat." There was still a chance, however, that the regime would stop short of violating the basic liberties which France had upheld since the French Revolution.[24]

Was the Pétain regime Fascist? J. G. Heinberg, author of "French Government under Pétain," in Government in Wartime Europe (1941), accepted Loewenstein's view that the abolition of the Third Republic had been legal. It was, in his opinion, too early to decide whether the Pétain regime was just a "swing to the political right, combined with a more extreme form of parliamentary abdication" than France had experienced during the past six years, or whether it was a revolutionary type of government. He doubted the latter, since as he put it, "Octogenarian Frenchmen do not begin

anew." Pétain's power, even though it encompassed constituent, legislative, and executive powers, was fundamentally limited by the fact of the German conquest and occupation and by the continuing lack of a peace treaty. Though he was far from being a powerful dictator, Pétain had a certain independence in domestic affairs, as his dismissal of Laval on December 13, 1940, proved, and the government also seemed to resist German demands "by means of delays and half-hearted execution of Hitler's directions."

Heinberg was puzzled by Pétain's political stand, which he characterized as "carrying water on the Right and the Left shoulder." Also, Pétain's aversion to parties did not fit the pattern of contemporary dictatorships. While pre-war criticism had pointed in the direction of a stronger executive, the "complete absorption of constituent and legislative powers by that executive" was novel. France did not have a revolutionary mass party or a new ideology, and nobody suspected Pétain of having monarchist leanings. The suspension of parliament deprived Frenchmen of the traditional way of exerting control over the government and using their manhood suffrage.

In spite of the governmental changes, Heinberg was not ready to call Vichy a counter-revolution because it lacked a doctrine and did not employ Fascist methods. The social theory behind the recent changes was French, not foreign, in his opinion, and he was comforted by the fact that Marshal Pétain appointed the well-known Law Professor Joseph

Barthélémy as Minister of Justice. It was very unlikely that Barthélémy would tamper with the Code pénal (criminal law) or with criminal procedure.[25]

Would the Third Republic have fallen had there been no defeat? This question intrigued historians in 1940 as well as their colleagues in 1980. R. K. Gooch, in "The French Counter-Revolution of 1940" (1940), thought this would be "impossible to prove and exceedingly difficult to believe." The shortcomings of the Third Republic had, in his opinion, been more a matter for improvement than for an overthrow of the regime. The demise of the government had been legal, but those who were responsible for it were men who had never accepted the French Revolution. They were not republicans at heart; they wanted to establish an undemocratic government modelled after Germany and Italy.

These three authors were lenient in their assessment of the Third Republic, and did not address the question whether a parliamentary republic could stand up to an aggressive totalitarian state, as many American writers did. Loewenstein and Heinberg were intrigued by the fact that the Vichy regime did not fit the normal pattern of contemporary dictatorships, but they were obviously unaware of Hervé's ideas which had found such a striking realization in Pétain's leadership and in the composition of the French government. While both Loewenstein and Heinberg regarded the demise of the Third Republic as a revolution from above, they were cautious in speculating about the eventual

character of the new regime.[26]

In the years after the war, American historians studied various aspects of the fall of the Third Republic: Pétain's rise to power; Laval's role in the proceedings of July 9 and 10, 1940, the motives of the delegates in according full powers to Pétain, and the links between the military defeat and the abolition of the Republic. The causes of the general discontent with the parliamentary republic were studied, as well as the popular desire for a stronger government and a less fragmented polity, especially in view of the spread of the totalitarian regimes. They did not successfully address the questions raised by the apparent rush of the French to commence reforms under the very eyes of the Germans or the reasons for the unprecedented support which Pétain enjoyed in 1940 among the population and the politicians.

The legality of the proceedings at the National Assembly on July 9 and 10, 1940, was not challenged, but historian Jacques Szaluta examined in his dissertation, "Marshal Pétain Between the Two Wars" (1969), the question as to whether Pétain's rise to power had been the result of a plot to overthrow the Third Republic. He came to the conclusion that Pétain "did not actively participate in any illegal action" and that his character would not have allowed him to seize power illegally.[27] Pétain's lawful ascendancy was much less problematic than Laval's part in the abolition of the parliamentary regime. Philip Bankwitz

wrote in his dissertation, "Weygand: A Biographical Study" (1952), of Laval's "assault" on the republic and of his "singular triumph" in orchestrating the political suicide of the parliamentarians.[28] Sister Evangeline Steinmann, in her study, "The Vichy State and French National Unity" (1950), also placed the responsibility for the vote of July 10 on Laval, but she blamed the parliamentarians as well for their compliance.[29] Gordon Wright also commented that "almost every parliamentarian was ready to entrust France to Pétain at least for the immediate future, and many were prepared to see a permanent shift to authoritarian government."[30] This picture did not change in the later years, as historians, without belittling Laval's crucial role, emphasized the almost universal support Pétain received for his proposals in the National Assembly.

The immediate and underlying causes for the abolition of the parliamentary regime were examined by a number of historians. According to some historians, among them Stanley Hoffmann, it had become a French tradition that a major military defeat be followed by the overthrow of the unsuccessful government. Brenton Smith showed that in the twentieth century this procedure had spread worldwide.[31] For many historians, however, the establishment of the Vichy regime was not an inevitable consequence of the French defeat. Among them was Paul Farmer, who wrote the first thorough American study of the Vichy regime, Vichy Political Dilemma (1950). He argued that there was no German pressure

on France to change her system of government. After all, the armistice agreement had already been concluded, and the Germans had not stipulated any political alterations. Farmer acknowledged that under the circumstances of defeat and occupation, an authoritarian regime was advisable for sheer efficiency and flexibility. But he noted that after the outbreak of the war the cabinet had become the decision-making body, and parliament had regularly been side-stepped. There was no need to establish a new regime.[32]

Several authors contended, however, that the defeat brought to the fore an immense hostility toward the Third Republic. Gordon Wright expressed it best:

> The shock of the defeat produced an intense desire for vigorous leadership and an equally intense revulsion against the men and the system that had failed to avert the debacle.[33]

Even William Shirer, who described Laval as the great conspirator in his The Collapse of the Third Republic (1969), argued that many delegates voted full powers to Pétain because they thought the population held them responsible for the defeat. They considered it their patriotic duty to make room for a new and hopefully more successful crew.[34] Robert Paxton also saw the defeat as the crucial element, because it not only confirmed criticism which had been brought against the parliamentary regime for years, but it also robbed France of her great power status. In his opinion, the consequence was a "massive repudiation" of the regime and at the same time a general willingness to explore alternative models of government--even the

totalitarian ones which had just proven their superiority in aggression and conquest.[35] So unanimous and profound was the hostility against the Third Republic that even de Gaulle was unable to prevent the rejection of the Constitution of 1875 after World War II, as Stanley Hoffmann remarked at the Harvard Conference on the Fall of France in 1980. He also reminded his colleagues that there was a tendency to get on the bandwagon of success. Among others, Laval was convinced that totalitarian states were an aspect of the wave of the future.[36]

Most striking is the unanimity among historians about the unprecedented popularity of Pétain among politicians and with the public. Gordon Wright pointed out that not a single party voted as a bloc against him. Peter Novick wrote in 1968 that "No French political leader in modern times--with the possible exception of General de Gaulle at the moment of Liberation--ever enjoyed such wide confidence and support."[37] Paxton acknowledged that Pétain was not only entrusted with the executive and legislative powers but also had a broad mandate to promulgate a new constitution.[38]

All historians agreed that Pétain's cabinet represented a wide spectrum of political opinions. Nevertheless, Paxton detected a trend favoring technicians, bureaucrats, and conservatives over "the more political, and the more parliamentary and the more left elements of the old regime." He also called attention to the fact that France was the only one among Hitler's victims which changed its system of

government and even began domestic reforms under the German occupation. He attributed the sudden desire for "national revival," for "unity," and for social justice to the government's fear of social disorder as a consequence of the defeat and its attempt to prevent that possibility through reforms. Both Paxton and Hoffmann linked the desire for change to the defeat and did not think that the criticism levelled against the Third Republic before the war was crucial to its fate. As Hoffmann remarked, "I don't think too many people were looking for alternatives."[39]

Contemporaries and Historians Compared

Editors, correspondents, and historians commenting on the fall of the Third Republic wrote from different perspectives, with different suppositions, and with different goals in mind. Editors generally wrote about France from the point of view of American interests and how events in France influenced or affected these interests. During the summer of 1940, Hitler was considered a threat not only to England but also to the United States, since he seemed intent on dominating the world. Assuming that he would succeed in conquering Great Britain, many feared that German power over Europe would be undisputed. The United States would than have to contend with a formidable land-and-sea power. Moreover, the threat was not only a military one: Hitler's Germany was feared also for its aggressive ideology, as contemporary reports of subversion and fifth

column activities prove. The fall of the Third Republic was therefore not perceived as a change of regime to improve the efficiency of the government and to reform it for the sake of France, but rather as an orientation toward Fascism which alienated France's allies.

Editorials tended to exaggerate the consequences of the vote on July 10, and assumed that the new regime would be Fascist. They also overestimated the extent of the German occupation and refused to believe that Unoccupied France had any degree of independence or that the French were indeed able to pursue domestic reform programs of their own. The frequent editorial charge that Vichy was a Fascist regime has not been sustained by the American historians. They have confirmed Chamberlin's view that Pétain was a conservative Catholic nationalist.

The correspondents, on the other hand, were remarkably accurate in assessing the significance of events and developments in their host country. They had the advantage of access to the major political figures of the day and were able to tap the insight of experts as well as the attitudes at the grass roots. There is consequently a high degree of agreement between the views of correspondents and historians in several areas. Both groups agreed that the Vichy regime was not Fascist, and neither the historians nor the journalists doubted the legality of the proceedings which gave Pétain full powers and a mandate to write a new constitution. Both groups also agreed that Pétain had the

full support of the French people.

There is, however, an interesting discrepancy between historians and correspondents regarding the repudiation of the Third Republic. The historians concentrated on the military defeat as the root cause of the demise of the parliamentary regime and as the major reason for the reforms undertaken under Vichy. The correspondents, on the other hand, regarded the defeat as a consequence of the failure of the Third Republic to reform the government in time to withstand German aggression successfully. For instance, Mallory Browne's dispatch of November, 1938, already enumerated the reform proposals which Paxton considers a result of the impact of the defeat. Both Philip and Browne wrote that the French strongly desired a more professional, bureaucratic, and less political administration. The call for national unity, for a stronger government--if need be, even a dictatorship--was described as widespread by both journalists.

None among the historians mentioned Hervé's influence on the Vichy regime. Jacques Szaluta wrote about his campaign for Pétain in 1935, but he seemed unaware of the fact that several Vichy institutions were identical to those proposed in Hervé's blueprint for a new constitution.[40] The correspondents, on the other hand, seemed familiar with Hervé's ideas, even though they did not mention his name. It is significant that they were not surprised by the change of regime; neither were they astonished that an eighty-four-

year-old Marshal was drafted as head of state with dictatorial powers in the most critical period France had ever experienced. In fact, they expected the parliamentarians to commit "harakiri" several days before the decisive vote.

Farmer and Paxton argued that the demise of the Third Republic had been unnecessary. The government could have ruled by decree during the remainder of the war. Both historians seemed baffled by the eagerness with which the French parliament voted itself into oblivion. The correspondents' dispatches, however, point out that the Third Republic was much more profoundly discredited before the defeat than the historians assumed. Browne's and Philip's articles in 1938, as well as the dispatches by Archambault and Ghali in 1940, emphasize the general contempt for the parliamentary system and the frustration felt by millions of Frenchmen who watched France decline without being able to prevent the disaster. Only a deep revulsion against the Republic before the defeat can explain the "unique" urge to commence reforms even under the restrictions of German occupation.

Only the frustration with a weak and dependent France can explain the astounding popularity of Pétain in 1940. Since 1934, his name had been associated with those who wanted to restore France as a great power, and he had become the symbol of a France that had held Verdun against all odds and finally won victory in 1918. The reform plans of the

1930s had been specifically designed to restore the power and status of France. The defeat of 1940 had not destroyed these plans but had rather made their realization more imperative. For American historians, as for the editors in 1940, the fall of the Third Republic was the culmination of the French decline. The correspondents' dispatches show that a majority of Frenchmen perceived the fall of the Third Republic as the first step toward the renewal of France.

The Trial of the Third Republic at Riom

Many Frenchmen were not content merely to see the Third Republic abolished but clamored for the punishment of its leaders as well. On July 9, Deputy Tixier-Vignancourt suggested before the National Assembly that an investigation of the "political, administrative, and military responsibilities for the defeat" be held and that those responsible be punished, but his request was rejected for technical reasons.[41] Nonetheless, the call had been heard, and it seems that in the summer of 1940 many people indeed wanted to see those leaders punished whose policies had proven so disastrous for France. Among those clamoring for a trial were the Communists, who protested against their treatment by the Daladier government. In September, 1939, Daladier had dissolved the Communist Party and later he excluded its delegates from parliament. Hundreds of Communists had been arrested and were still imprisoned in July, 1940.[42]

Other Frenchmen objected to a trial of their former leaders or thought the idea was premature under the circumstances. Nevertheless, on July 30, 1940, Marshal Pétain created a Supreme Court to try crimes against the security of the state, and one day later the new court initiated the investigation of Edouard Daladier, General Maurice Gamelin, Léon Blum, Paul Reynaud, and several ministers. All of the accused were arrested during the fall of 1940 and underwent pre-trial interrogations. The court collected 100,000 pages of documentation and testimony from 900 witnesses. Therefore, the proceedings went slowly and, under German pressure,[43] Pétain appointed a Council for Political Justice in September, 1941, to assess the case against the defendants. Two weeks later, the Council found imprisonment at a military prison for an indefinite period justified for Daladier, Blum, Gamelin, Reynaud, and Georges Mandel, while the others were interned at a country estate.[44] The Supreme Court finally finished its preparations, and the court opened its public sessions on February 19, 1942, at Riom. The indictment charged Daladier, Blum, Gamelin, and three other high officials with the responsibility for the nation's lack of preparedness for war.[45]

The trial was plagued by controversy. Opponents of the indictment declared that the Third Republic had not been formally abolished and that impeachments should have followed the rules laid down in the Constitution of 1875.

They considered the Supreme Court unconstitutional and its actions invalid. Moreover, they rejected Pétain's decree from January 27, 1941, which gave him the power to charge, prosecute, and punish any wrongdoings of government officials retroactively within the past ten years, as violating French legal tradition. Other major objections to the trial involved the arbitrariness in selecting the defendants, and the time frame of the accusation, which made the Popular Front government solely responsible for insufficient preparation and excluded any discussion of the actual conduct of the war. As was to be expected, the Supreme Court rejected these arguments.

Each of the defendants was provided with defense counsel, but Gamelin decided to remain silent, arguing that he had already been condemned by the Council of Political Justice in complete contempt of his right to defend himself. Moreover, he did not want to involve the Army in his case. The other defendants, however, put up a spirited fight to exonerate themselves, and did not hesitate to accuse the military leadership, including Marshal Pétain, of incompetence. They asserted that the government had provided all the funds requested by the military and that the French armed forces were roughly equal in armament and equipment to the German army. In their opinion, it was an overly defense-oriented mentality and an outdated military doctrine which caused the French defeat. They also charged French armament manufacturers and industrial workers with

sabotage of the government's efforts to step up defense measures by pursuing selfish interests on the one hand, and by undermining the nation's morale with propaganda about Allied imperialism on the other. Finally, Blum declared in the presence of two hundred reporters from all over the world: "The public conscience of the world knows without any need for a supreme court where the responsibility for the war lies." The accused had turned prosecutors, indicting the government for its defamation of democracy and condemning the conquerors for their policy of aggression.[46]

"Riom" became an international sensation for the most contradictory reasons. First, it was unheard of that the accused at a political trial could freely speak out and even accuse the Head of State who brought them to trial. Secondly, the government's indictment against the leaders of the Third Republic revealed its fierce determination to defend its independence. Under the very eyes of the conqueror, Vichy dared to prosecute them for having lost the war. The point was not lost on Hitler, who berated the trial in a speech in the Reichstag on March 15.[47] The Germans had hoped that the accused would be tried for having declared war against Germany, and that the war guilt of the Third Republic would thus be established. The trial, however, convinced Hitler irrevocably of the profound hostility of the Pétain government toward Germany, as one of his advisers pointed out.[48]

To the great surprise of the German press, the judicial

proceedings were not halted after Hitler's angry speech.[49] However, a combination of domestic and German pressure forced Pétain to suspend the trial one month later. The defendants remained in French custody until they were deported to Buchenwald in November, 1942. With the exception of Georges Mandel, who had been returned to France and was subsequently assassinated by the Milice, the former leaders remained in Germany until the end of the war, when they were finally freed after five years in French and German prisons.[50]

From its very beginning, Americans were very interested in the trial, not the least because one of the accused, Pierre Cot, former Minister of Air, lived in the United States and used the American press as a forum for both his defense and his accusations against Vichy. The major news magazines and journals of opinion followed the hearings at Vichy closely. Not surprisingly, the American reaction to the political trial against the leaders of French democracy, was one of contempt. Time wrote of the "shameful job" of the newly created Supreme Court, and NBC news analyst H. V. Kaltenborn declared that

> The so-called treason trials have created an unfavorable impression everywhere. They have reduced the prestige of the Pétain government and emphasized its efforts to curry favor with the Nazi regime . . . The Nazis will develop increased contempt for a government that attempts to besmirch its own political leaders because they made mistakes.[52]

When the court finally convened on February 19, 1942,

the American journalists and editors found to their surprise that the French government was obviously interested in permitting the international community to have a front seat at the hearings. The main audience consisted of journalists from all over the world; among the two hundred reporters were about twenty German correspondents. The situation was somewhat awkward, because Germans and Americans sat side by side, even though the two nations were at war. The American correspondents in Occupied France had been arrested and interned when Germany declared war on the United States after Pearl Harbor. But since the Unoccupied Zone was considered as "sovereign, neutral France", American journalists were still free to work there. While the French government had promised that the dispatches of the foreign correspondents would not be censored, the French reporters received "guidelines" for their reports to Vichy papers. This selective censorship did not work very well: the German journalists were free to write for papers in the Occupied Zone without being subjected to censorship, and the public in Vichy France was then able to read in the press from Paris what had been stricken by the censor at home.[53]

For three American journalists, the trial at Riom signalled the end of their career in France. Ralph Heinzen, the head of the United Press bureau in Vichy, and Paul Ghali found that their credentials had been revoked and that they would not be allowed to cover the trial.[54] It is possible that the French authorities had discovered that Heinzen

wrote a weekly letter for the American Intelligence Agency, C.O.I. (Coordinator of Information).[55] His colleague, Ghali, fell into disgrace because he had written an article in which he blamed General Corap for the French disaster on the Meuse in May, 1940, an accusation which the Vichy government considered an insult. Even though G. H. Archambault received permission to attend the trial, he left France for Switzerland before it was suspended. Both Ghali and Archambault reported from Berne for the duration of the war.[56]

The trial turned out to be highly interesting on several accounts. Paul Ghali had been correct in 1940, when he rejected the assumption that the French government wanted to placate the Germans. In his opinion, the real purpose of the trial was "to research and punish the use of a degenerate regime by those in power."[57] As the hearings progressed it became more and more obvious that German wishes or considerations really played no part. In the first place, the judges allowed the accused full freedom of speech, and Archambault was able to write: "there is unanimity--even among the accused, as this correspondent can testify--on the sincerity and impartiality of the court."[58] This surprising information delighted American editors, who had expected a "show trial", with forced confessions and self-incrimination. The author of "Topics of the Times" wrote: "Riom offers the extraordinary spectacle of a state trial in which the people are allowed to plead 'not

guilty.'"[59] One week later, The New York Times affirmed again that "even in Nazi-dominated France a sense of justice" survived.[60] The Christian Science Monitor also praised the judges--"they turned out to be Frenchmen."

In their delight over the freedom of speech accorded the defendants, the newspapers forgot that the accused naturally spoke in their own interest and that their goal was not to establish "the truth," but to exonerate themselves. Thus, The Christian Science Monitor uncritically accepted Blum's and Daladier's accusations against Pétain and the military and stated that the defendants showed that "the Pétainists, military traditionalists, and fascist-minded arms manufacturers were very largely to blame for disunity and military defeat."[61] Time, which at first denounced the trial as a "disgrace" and found that it was "without gallantry, showing only misery, and recrimination and bitter remembrance," sounded very different in its next issue. Only secret sessions could prevent the hearing from turning into a "trial by proxy of Pétain and Vichy," it now declared.[62] Only the editorial "Topics of the Times" dared to voice a cautious critique of Daladier's charge that the High Command had been incompetent. The writer quietly reminded his readers that only the German success had definitely proven the feasibility of the Blitzkrieg strategy, and of separate mechanized divisions. Earlier experiences at Guadalajara during the Spanish Civil War had sustained the French High

Command's position.[63]

While editorials expressed immense gratification that the accusations against the republican government, symbolized by Daladier and Blum, had backfired and embarrassed Vichy, a grudging respect for Pétain occasionally came to the fore. Within days after the trial had been suspended and Laval had been appointed Premier under German pressure, unusually friendly remarks about Pétain appeared in The Chicago Daily News. Carroll Binder himself described Pétain as "the aged victor of Verdun" and as a "decent and patriotic Frenchman."[64] Time, which had just enjoyed Daladier's and Blum's attacks against him, praised his "creaking stubbornness" in defending the French fleet and the Empire.[65] Anne O'Hare McCormick of The New York Times wrote that it was time to acknowledge Pétain's "magnificent job of stalling." She added:

> Reports from France agree that even those who disagree with his ideas and believe he has made a tragic mistake in 1940 feel instinctively that he has been holding out against the enemy.[66]

The reasons for this unexpected surge of respect were Pétain's decision to allow the defendants to speak freely, even to his detriment, and Pétain's quiet resistance to German pressure during the trial at Riom. The fact that he did not bow to Hitler's demand to charge the accused with war guilt impressed even the American government. The term "war guilt" evoked memories of World War I and the Treaty of Versailles, where the Germans were forced to shoulder the burden of guilt--and therefore of financial reparations--

alone. An admission of war guilt by the defendants at Riom could have had immense consequences for future peace negotiations, and not even Hitler's wrath could compel Vichy to commit such an irreparable blunder. As an OSS report of April 22, 1942 explained, Pétain's resistance to strong German pressure "eased Franco-American relations:"

> It was felt that the course of the trial showed that Pétain's government was more than a mere puppet regime and that Germany was not succeeding in forcing a policy of collaboration on France.

The report concluded that the trial had the opposite effect on Franco-German relations, since the French stubbornness irritated the Germans and taught them that France still regarded herself as a great power. The very fact that the leaders of the Third Republic were punished for losing the war against Germany was proof of undiminished French pride. The German government considered this "a complete misunderstanding of France's present position and of her place in the 'New Order.'" The OSS report inferred that the Franco-German crisis, culminating in Laval's return to the government as Premier, had been hastened by the events at Riom.[67] Leo Gershoy, who wrote two articles in Current History in April and May, 1942, on Riom and Laval's return, realized perhaps best that Pétain's politics unerringly tended to protect French interests and that American or German concerns only entered into his considerations as either positive or detrimental influences on his goals.[68]

In contrast to the intense American interest in the trial in 1942, "Riom" has not provoked American historical studies. This is regrettable, since the trial had repercussions on France's foreign relations with the United States and with Germany. Moreover, the trial reveals two important aspects of Pétain's politics: his jealous watch over French rights and his constant defense of French interests.

"Riom" has been mentioned among others by Paul Farmer, Adrienne Hytier, and Joel Colton, but has been omitted in Paxton's classic study, Vichy France. Joel Colton dedicated two chapters of his biography of Léon Blum to the trial. The author's main concerns were the irregularities of the political trial, such as the creation of the Supreme Court, the establishment of a Council of Political Justice, and the arbitrariness in choosing defendants, topics of accusation, and the time-frame of the inquiry. He also showed that the judges tried to accomplish the impossible--to conduct an unjust trial fairly.[69] Paul Farmer and Adrienne Hytier mentioned the trial in a cursory fashion in their works. To Paul Farmer it was a "farce," but like Colton, he was unaware of the fact that the hearings were subjected to censorship only in Vichy France.[70] Adrienne Hytier described the trial as a blunder of the Pétain government, covering it with "ridicule" and "discrediting the government even more."[71] She did not connect the thaw in Franco-American relations in April, 1942, to the trial, as

suggested by the OSS report.

A comparison between the reaction by foreign correspondents to the announcement of the trial in 1940 and their reports of its eventual suspension shows the immense difference between the Pétain regime of July, 1940, and what it had become by 1942. Paul Ghali's dispatches in the summer of 1940 mirrored the attitude of a very self-confident government, out to clean up the debris left behind by an incompetent regime. The emphasis was on punishment for wrongdoing and satisfaction of "the people's" desire for revenge on those who were responsible for leading France into the war and bringing disaster to the nation. In spite of many misgivings about the wisdom of a political trial, the government confidently opted for an "open" trial with hundreds of witnesses. Two years later, the people of Vichy France were not permitted to read uncensored reports about the proceedings. One of Pétain's reasons for suspending the trial was the fear that public opinion would succumb to the "exaggerations of the defense," and French unity would be threatened. This was a far cry from two years earlier, when the government was sure of the people's trust. Worse yet, the defendants of 1940 had become the prosecutors of 1942. They dared take pride in their achievements in view of their successors' shortcomings.

The trial at Riom hurt Pétain's image in 1940 because it was seen as an ignoble act by a much respected leader. In 1942, the trial had become an anachronism, and the Vichy

government had become vulnerable through failures of its own. Only Pétain's courage in permitting the accused politicians to attack him in return, and his stubborn defense of French independence and French interests mitigated the contempt aroused by the trial against the Third Republic.

ENDNOTES

[1]Robert Aron, Histoire de Vichy (Paris, 1954), pp. 96-155, 220-222.

[2]Gustave Hervé, C'est Pétain qu'il nous faut! (Paris, 1935). On July 22, 1940, Walter Kerr reported to The New York Herald Tribune that Gustave Hervé's La Victoire had been suppressed by the Germans after he warned his readers of an unjustified press campaign against the British. Kerr described Hervé as "anti-democratic at heart and pro-German by inclination." See also A. W. Palmer, The Penguin Dictionary of Modern History (Aylesbury, 1978), pp. 325-326.

[3]Richard Griffiths, Pétain (New York, 1972), pp. 181, 200-201.

[4]Gaston Bergery, "French Uncertainties: Liberty or Authority?" Living Age, No. 354, March, 1938, pp. 26-28.

[5]Percy Philip, "French Uncertainties: The Question of Efficiency," ibid., pp. 28-30.

[6]Mallory Browne, "Dictatorship or Democracy for France? Diary of an Outsider," The Christian Science Monitor, Nov. 9, 1938, p. 20.

[7]Philip, France, pp. 76-80.

[8]Associated Press dispatch, The Chicago Tribune, July 13, 1940, p. 7. United Press reports from July 8 and 9 came from Grenoble and were inaccurate in their reporting of events at Vichy. The July 8 report quoted mainly the French newspaper Le Petit Dauphinois which predicted a new constitution with "certain elements borrowed from the Portuguese dictator Antonio Salazar and from the Constitution of the United States." The July 9 dispatch reported that the resolution placed full powers to establish a totalitarian state in Marshal Pétain's hands, and that the National Assembly would ratify the resolution "without debate."

[9]Jean-Baptiste Duroselle, L'Abîme 1939-1945 (Paris, 1982), p. 231. Alex Small, Dispatch, The Chicago Tribune, July 9, 1940, p. 5.

[10]David Darrah, Dispatch, ibid., July 8, 1940, p. 11.

[11]Ghali, Undated dispatch [July 8, 1940], "in order to decide," Ghali Papers.

[12]Lansing Warren, Dispatch, The New York Times, July 12, 1940, p. 3.

[13]G. H. Archambault, Dispatches, ibid., July 6, 1940, p. 3; July 12, 1940, p. 3.

[14]The Christian Science Monitor, July 12, 1940, July 20, 1940, p. 2; The New York Times, July 9, 1940, p. 20. The New York Herald Tribune, July 7, 1940, Sect. II, p. 8; The Chicago Daily News, July 9, 1940, p. 1.

[15]Time, July 8, 1940, p. 25; July 22, 1940, p. 23.

[16]Carroll Binder, The Chicago Daily News, July 13, 1940, p. 2. Binder later gained a high reputation in journalism. In 1949 he was appointed to the UN Subcommittee on Freedom of Information and of the Press, and in 1951 he was chosen a member of the UN committee which drafted an internationally binding "Convention of Freedom of Information." See Current Biography Yearbook (New York, 1951), pp. 39-41.

[17]Ghali, Undated dispatch [July 12, 1940, or shortly after], "french new Government," Ghali Papers.

[18]Telegram, Carroll Binder to Paul Ghali, Chicago, August 17, 1940, ibid.

[19]Ghali, Dispatch, July 19, 1940, "quote whatever," ibid., Published in The Chicago Daily News, July 19, 1940, p. 3.

[20]Frank Norris, managing editor of Time magazine and a specialist on foreign affairs, and photographer George Streck accompanied René de Chambrun to Vichy. Their report, "Vichy," was published in Life, Sept. 23, 1940, pp. 71-80. René de Chambrun, "Notes and Remembrances." Lansing Warren, Dispatch, The New York Times, August 21, 1940, p. 6.

[21]Ghali, Dispatch, August 19, 1940, "this country refuses to die," Ghali Papers.

[22]Ghali, Dispatch, August 19, 1940, "while only important problems," ibid.

[23]William H. Chamberlin, "France in the Shadows," Current History and Forum, Sept., 1940, pp. 21-24.

[24]Karl Loewenstein, "The Demise of the French Constitution of 1875," The American Political Science Review, XXXIV, 5 (1940), pp. 867-895.

[25]J. G. Heinberg, "French Government under Pétain", in Governments in Wartime Europe, eds. Harold Zink and Taylor Cole (New York, 1941), pp. 171-187.

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[30]Gordon Wright, France in Modern Times: 1760 to the Present (Chicago, 1960), pp. 510-511.

[31]Smith, p. 479.

[32]Paul Farmer, Vichy Political Dilemma (New York, 1955), pp. 127-145.

[33]Wright, p. 511.

[34]Shirer, p. 945.

[35]The Center for European Studies, Fall of France: Results, pp. 1-5.

[36]Ibid., pp. 5, 6.

[37]Wright, p. 512; Peter Novick, The Resistance Versus Vichy (New York, 1968), p. 6.

[38]Paxton, pp. 32, 33.

[39]The Center for European Studies, Fall of France: Results, pp. 1-8.

[40]Jacques Szaluta, Pétain For and Against (New York, 1973), p. 24.

[41]Jean Montigny, Toute la Vérité (Clermont-Ferrand, 1940), p. 66.

[42]Joel Colton, Léon Blum (New York, 1966), p. 338-339. See also Hanna Schramm and Barbara Vormeier, Menschen im Gurs (Worms, 1977), p. 254.

[43]Colton, pp. 399, 400, 404.

[44]Pétain, pp. 560, 599-601.

[45]Colton, p. 400.

[46]G. H. Archambault, Dispatch, The New York Times, February 20, 1942, pp. 1, 5; Lansing Warren, Dispatches, The New York Times, March 11, 1942, p. 8; March 12, 1942, p. 13; Leo Gershoy, "Vichy on Trial," Current History, 2 (1942), pp. 119-120.

[47]The Christian Science Monitor, April 15, 1942, p. 6.

[48]Friedrich Grimm, Frankreichberichte (Bodman, 1972), p. 169.

[49]The Christian Science Monitor, April 15, 1942, p. 6.

[50]Colton, pp. 436-444.

[51]Time, August 12, 1940, p. 25.

[52]H. V. Kaltenborn, NBC Radio Broadcast, October 3, 1940, Radio Scripts, Reel 1: April 1-October 10, 1940.

[53]G. H. Archambault, Dispatch, The New York Times, February 22, 1942, p. 13.

[54]Lansing Warren, Dispatch, ibid., February 19, 1942, p. 7; G. H. Archambault, Dispatch, ibid., February 20, 1942, pp. 1, 5.

[55]OSS Reports, Part IV, Reel 7, part 4: "French 'War Guilt' Trial at Riom," April 22, 1942.

[56]Letter from Mrs. Bernadette Ghali to the author, December 7, 1981. The following correspondents received accreditation: Herbert King (UP), Taylor Henry (AP), N. N. Dubrunfaut (JNS), Lansing Warren (N.Y.T.), G. H. Archambault (N.Y.T.), John Elliott (N.Y. Herald Tribune), and Paul Achinard (NBC). Source: The New York Times, Feb. 19, 1942, p. 7.

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[59]"Topics of the Times," ibid., March 22, 1942, part IV, p. 8.

[60]Ibid., April 1, 1942, p. 20.

[61]"Frenchmen Make Poor Slaves," The Christian Science Monitor, April 3, 1942, p. 18.

[62]Time, March 2, 1942, p. 28; March 9, 1942, p. 52. See also Newsweek, March 2, 16, 30, 1942; April 13, 1942; The Nation, March 7, 14, 1942; The New Republic, March 23, 1942; The Commonweal, March 13, 1942; April 3, 1942; Scholastic, March 2, 1942; and Collier's, March 28, 1942.

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[64]Carroll Binder, Editorial, The Chicago Daily News, April 18, 1942, p. 2.

[65]Time, April 27, 1942, p. 26.

[66]The New York Times, April 15, 1942, p. 20.

[67]OSS Reports, Part IV, "Germany," Reel 7, part 4: "Riom," April 22, 1942.

[68]Leo Gershoy, "Vichy on Trial," Current History, 2 (1942), pp. 118-122; "Laval's New Bid for Power," ibid., pp. 205-209.

[69]Colton, pp. 385-427.

[70]Farmer, pp. 280-281.

[71]Hytier, pp. 329-330.

CHAPTER IV

THE NATIONAL REVOLUTION

> The impact of war in itself provides men with a tremendous power for the reshaping of their institutions. Without regard to political belief, war unleashes forces for social change; it burns away weak and ineffective forms of social behavior; it destroys many firmly established routines; it forces change that might otherwise take decades -- Pendleton Herring.[1]

Normally, French domestic programs were of little interest to Americans, since life styles and social conditions in the United States were altogether different from those in France. The National Revolution of Marshal Pétain, however, aroused considerable American curiosity. It also offered political observers an opportunity to study a great nation's reactions to defeat, foreign occupation, and oppression. To some analysts it served as a case study of a nation's effort to repair the failure of its institutions, policies, and methods by political, administrative, social, and economic reform.

Two days after he received full powers from the French National Assembly, and again on October 10, 1940, Marshal Pétain outlined the main goals and methods of the reform program which he called the "National Revolution." The most important political changes had already taken place: France had replaced a weak executive and an unmanageable parliament

with a head of state endowed with dictatorial powers. In time, appointed mayors replaced elected officials in the larger towns and cities, and Départements were combined into Régions under the authority of regional prefects. The goal was to decentralize authority, diminish the dependence of the provinces on Paris, encourage cultural diversity, and stimulate the citizens to active participation in local and regional affairs.

Knowing that no mere political or administrative reform would diminish tension caused by social injustice, Pétain opted for a corporate system where employers and workers would cooperate, where differences would be resolved through negotiation and, if necessary, arbitration by the state. His Labor Charter, published in October, 1941, provided for the first time a subsistence wage, the right as well as the duty to work, and social security. It, however, denied the worker the right to found a free union and the right to strike. Similarly, the employer lost his right to a lockout. He too was forced to cooperate with the employees to the benefit of all, including the enterprise.[2]

France had suffered a severe population loss in World War I and had not fully recovered when the Second World War began. To increase the low birthrate and to promote the well-being of French families, a Family Code had been established in 1939. Pétain enacted major legislation to improve its provisions. The government provided grants for young couples and gave financial aid to pregnant mothers.

Families with children received allowances, and those with a single provider were granted a special stipend to allow mothers to care for the children instead of having to work outside the home.

In keeping with Pétain's view that rights incur obligations, families were expected to assume increased responsibility for the welfare of their members. Divorce was permitted only after three years of marriage. Abortions were prohibited, and child abandonment was severely punished. Partly because so many families were left without a father at home, the wife's legal rights were enlarged. The term "head of the family" was no longer confined to the husband, but defined a function which could be filled by a woman as well. Married women could now also enter a profession of their choice.[3]

But the reconstruction of France involved more than social justice and adequate living conditions. Only a high degree of unity and determination could hold the nation together and restore its will to survive. The country needed a unifying faith, and French youth had to be educated for citizenship and prepared physically and mentally for a technological era. Consequently, the French educational system was reformed. Besides courses in civics, classes in manual skills, home economics, and physical education were offered for the first time. Classes in Christian moral principles completed the program. While the Church did not intrude into the public schools except for a few months, its

role was strengthened through state aid to Catholic education.[4]

Pétain shared with many conservatives an aversion to individualism. He considered it sterile and parasitic. He was an implacable enemy of Communism and international capitalism, in his eyes the manifestations of rootless, faceless individualism. He saw Jews as the exponents of these religions without God and insisted on excluding them from education and from positions as judges. In October, 1940, the Pétain Government published its first statute on Jews. A second followed in June, 1941, and the legislation was completed by a decree on the Aryanization of Jewish property. By June, 1941, Jews in France had been excluded from education, the media, commerce, finances, and the professions. Only old established Jewish families, former soldiers who had fought for France, and those who had achieved distinction were exempted from these disabilities.[5] Beside the Jews, other groups in the population were stigmatized as unreliable. Almost three million foreign-born, among them half a million recently naturalized citizens, were no longer permitted to work for the civil service. Only Frenchmen whose fathers had been born in France were considered trustworthy.[6] Another decree proscribed Freemasonry because of its leftist tradition and its political clout.[7]

In January, 1941, a National Council was established to act as a liaison between the government and the citizens and

to elaborate the new constitution. Its 188 members were influential men in politics, economics, and culture and were charged with advising Pétain. He was very conscious of the fact that the new constitution could only fulfill its purpose if it was accepted by the French people. Regarding the parliamentary republic as obsolete and incapable of reforming itself, he asked the Council for advice in creating a form of government which, though no longer based on the majority principle, would still be acceptable to the nation. As a military man, Pétain correlated power with responsibility. The hierarchical system worked in the military, but how could one translate this principle to a modern country? How was the political "weight" of a citizen to be defined? What would be the scale of merit? Would a man's political role be determined by his position in the family, the community, and his profession? Unlike a dictator, Pétain left these questions for the councillors to ponder and to provide solutions.[8]

However, by July, 1941, to the frustration of many supporters of Vichy, the new constitution was not ready, and French citizens were still without representation. In the meantime, a fratricidal war in Syria had opposed de Gaulle's Free French troops against Vichy's army. In June, 1941, Germany and Russia had gone to war, and the French Communists who had lain low as long as Moscow and Berlin were on friendly terms began their guerrilla war against the German occupying forces and intensified their propaganda

against the Vichy regime. The population, frustrated by economic misery, the division of the country, and the oppressive German occupation, and realizing that peace was farther in the future than ever, was increasingly open to anti-government propaganda. The French could choose between Gaullist dissent, Communist opposition, and ultra-collaborationist attacks against Vichy in Paris. The Communists were the most dangerous opposition for the regime, since terrorism against the German occupation army resulted not only in cruel reprisals but sparked new opposition as well as resentment against a government unable to protect innocent lives from both terrorist attacks and German revenge.

Clearly the French government was confronted with unsolvable problems. The original idea that France could begin her reconstruction while a peace treaty was being prepared had vanished. The future portended more severe economic problems, terrorism, and in its suite civil war. It was in this climate of impending disaster that Pétain spoke on August 12, 1941, to the French people: "For the last several weeks I have felt an ill wind rising in many regions of France."[9] His speech closed the period of the National Revolution and inaugurated a time of repression and terror. Only three years later, after France had once again become a battlefield in the summer of 1944, was she again mistress of her own destiny.

American Journalists and the National Revolution

In spite of the difficulties the foreign correspondents encountered after the Armistice, the transmission of news soon resumed its normal flow, and an immense number of dispatches reached the United States. Editorial interest, however, was very sporadic. For instance, from June 17, 1940, until the end of the year, only seventeen editorials in The New York Times dealt with France. Not even the first statute on the Jews aroused the interest of the editors. Of these editorials, none concerned the National Revolution.[10] The correspondents themselves seemed much more interested in political and diplomatic developments than in Pétain's efforts to revitalize France. One of the rare topics which really excited them was the legislation against the abuse of alcohol. It is amusing to read how these representatives of a profession so well known for its affinity with bars praised the salubrious effects of the new law.[11]

Generally, correspondents were in favor of reforms which would put an end to corruption, inefficiency and irresponsibility in government. G. H. Archambault and Paul Ghali had expected and hoped for reforms even prior to the fall of the Third Republic. It is difficult to know what the American-born journalists thought of the National Revolution, since they only wrote about certain aspects of it and did not make generalized statements. Three correspondents wrote at least about their impressions of the

first six months of Pétain's regime.

These first assessments of Pétain's new regime were written by Joseph Harsch, the brilliant Berlin correspondent of The Christian Science Monitor, John Elliott of The New York Herald Tribune, and G. H. Archambault of The New York Times. Harsch spent two weeks in Unoccupied France and wrote four incisive articles about the experience. What he found there surprised him: Vichy was not a German "puppet government," and it was not Fascist. According to Harsch, Pétain let Laval deal with foreign policy as long as he did not jeopardize French honor. The Marshal himself concentrated on "trying to make France function." Pétain's ideas on government and order were typical of any old soldier unfamiliar with the workings of a democratic government. The anti-democratic trend of the Vichy regime lacked unity, purpose, and popular support, in Harsch's opinion, and was merely an expression of a general revulsion against the "corruption and machine politics" of the past. Referring probably to the Chantiers de la Jeunesse, Harsch described the youth movement as similar to the CCC and the WPA in the United States, which were also established to provide work relief and to keep unemployed youths off the streets. Harsch attributed censorship and the anti-Jewish legislation, on the other hand, to German pressures.

The Berlin correspondent was astonished that public opinion had not awakened to a full realization of the defeat and its consequences. Since Harsch was used to the German

public's acceptance of a strict rationing system, he was shocked by the public disregard for similar measures in France. Living conditions in France varied immensely, and he found the French "living off stored-up resources of the past heedlessly or desperately, or sometimes even gaily." At the same time, real misery existed in the cities overcrowded with refugees and among the one million unemployed. Harsch's report suggests that it was much easier to abolish the outward trappings of the Third Republic than to destroy its spirit. Pétain's pleas to the population to unite in common purpose and sacrifice had not been heard by the wives and mistresses of officials and diplomats, who astonished Harsch with their luxurious attire; nor had they been heard by the haberdasher who had only a dozen pairs of socks left to sell but nevertheless went all out to sell the correspondent several pairs. Coming from austere Berlin, Harsch called Vichy a "tinseled bit of unreality." He thought the hungry, angry masses would one day shred it all to bits and scatter "its dreams of kings and corporative states and obedient workers, and army style civil service to the winds." As to public opinion on the new regime, he wrote that the populace watched Vichy "with a disassociated eye, conforming, when it chooses, to Vichy edicts, but ignoring with equal freedom when it is so inclined." Among the government officials, the only one to inspire trust was Pétain, and the people's faith in him was "compounded of affection, pity, and

confidence in his integrity."[12]

About a month later, John Elliott reported on the state of France. He painted a somber picture. Half a year had passed since the Armistice. One and one-half million Frenchmen were still prisoners of war in Germany. The National Assembly and the general councils of the Départements remained suspended; a number of mayors and town councils had been dismissed for "persistent hostility" toward the regime; and one could not be sure what the French people thought about the new government and its program. "The 'vox populi' has had little chance of making itself heard," he added. One thing was certain -- the Marshal was personally popular.[13]

The circumstances surrounding G. H. Archambault's essay, "Frenchman of the Hour," on January 19, 1941, are interesting. Pétain had already been severely criticized in the United States for his authoritarianism and for his statute on the Jews. But President Roosevelt had decided to send his friend, Admiral Leahy, as ambassador to Vichy, to counteract German pressures on Pétain. Before this goal, "minor considerations" such as discrimination against the Jews fell by the wayside.

Archambault dwelt mainly on Pétain's personal qualities, and he portrayed him as a natural leader and a soldier. In an account of his career, he underscored Pétain's leadership qualities: independence of thought and decisiveness coupled with careful examination of a given

problem. He sternly told liberals who were hostile toward Pétain because of his authoritarianism that "the fact stands that today he personifies faith and hope throughout the unoccupied zone, and the occupied zone also is rallying to him." Nevertheless, he was not optimistic about Pétain's chances of success, because of the German occupation and also because the Vichy leadership had not yet proven trustworthy.[14]

This skepticism regarding the chances for success of Pétain's reform program was shared by all the correspondents. Ghali's dispatches especially reveal the staggering impediments against it. Among those who actively worked against Pétain's efforts to keep all Frenchmen united were Germans, French collaborationists, Gaullists and other dissidents, and, by the summer of 1941, a growing segment of the population which had expected peace and normal living conditions to return within a few months after the armistice. Ghali's reports show a long decline from the hope and confidence in the new regime to its beleaguered position by 1942. The correspondent belonged to those who had been glad to see the politicians go in 1940 and who supported political and administrative reforms as necessary for France's survival. He regarded the slogan "Family, Work, Country," not so much as a substitute for "Liberty, Equality, and Fraternity" but rather as a program for the hard and somber times ahead.

Ghali deplored Pétain's failure to explain to the

population how difficult the government's task was. Especially in the Occupied Zone, the public needed to hear that the French government had shown firmness and was doing its best to resist German demands. "French national pride [is] undoubtedly very shaken these days," he wrote, "and the country needs all [that] can enhance national prestige."[15] In July, 1941, Pétain made a trip to Savoy where he outlined the Labor Charter and talked about his plan to decentralize France and to resurrect the ancient Régions. Ghali thought the popular Marshal would find it "relatively easy" to convince the public in the Unoccupied Zone that the new measures would be "for the good of France." However, things were different in the Occupied Zone, where Pétain's efforts "were terribly handicapped" and often derided as reactionary. To Ghali, the Marshal's enthusiastic reception in Savoy proved again that he was "the best propagandist for his regime." Ruefully, he repeated what he had written a year before: "Such trips [are] badly needed in the occupied zone."

Ghali obviously wanted to inform the American public that the two parts of France had become alienated from each other, and the government at Vichy was too remote from daily life in the Occupied Zone to command the authority and allegiance it relied upon in the Free Zone. Pétain had been concerned about the unity of France on the morrow of the defeat. Since then the artificial division of the nation had further aggravated the problem. Ghali wrote that France

was becoming restless. One year after the fall of the Third Republic, France still did not have a new constitution. Well-informed sources indicated that the projected parliament would consist of two houses, but their members would not be elected by the voters at large. One house would consist of two hundred members; half of them would be appointed by the Head of State, the other half by corporations and provincial councils. The three hundred members of the other house would be elected by "families, trades, and the Legion of Veterans." Ghali noted that objections to this scheme had been raised in the Paris paper Nouveaux Temps with the argument that only the people could delegate power and that this delegation was "hardly clear" in the projected constitution.[16]

Writing for an American audience, the correspondents concentrated primarily on the French government's dealings with Germany, on its defense of the Empire, and on the shaky Franco-American relations. They reported important domestic legislation but often without commenting on its significance or portent. Consequently, their dispatches rarely elicited editorial analysis. However, some of the new laws aroused an unusual interest in the United States, among them the decree interdicting secret societies and the creation of industrial committees to control all aspects of industry without consultation with labor. The announcement in July, 1941, that the new constitution would be the foundation of an authoritarian, hierarchical, and social state aroused the

editors' contempt. The two statutes on the Jews of October, 1940, and June, 1941, as well as the persecution of the Jews throughout the period of German occupation gave rise to sharp criticism of Pétain's government.

The interdiction of the Masonic order on August 13, 1940, was one of the first suppressive measures reported by Ghali, who explained that French rightists had achieved one of their most cherished objectives in crushing Freemasonry. He mentioned that French Masonry had always been influential in politics and had been accused "of being mixed in practically all financial scandals." It was widely believed that half of all the Freemasons were government officials and politicians. French Masonry, traditionally leftist, was accused of having been responsible for the close links between Socialists and Communists in 1936. According to Ghali, the government wanted to get rid of them now because they were Socialists. He thought if they had remained a purely philanthropic organization like the British and American lodges, they would not be in such difficulties.[17]

Ghali's opinion about the Masons was not to his foreign editor's liking. His dispatch was censored before publication, and the reference to the non-political British and American lodges was omitted. In addition, Carroll Binder published his own opinion about French Masonry two days later in an editorial, in which he wrote, "The reactionaries continued this week to reshape France after their heart's desire. They dissolved the Masonic lodges

which played such a large role in the liberal politics of pre-1940 France."[18] That the lodges were not quite so harmless was revealed in Time magazine's report which acknowledged that Masonry for years had been dominating the government behind the scenes.[19] In France on Berlin Time (1941), Thomas Kernan accused French Freemasonry of controlling high political positions and of protecting corrupt politicians.[20]

Vichy's labor policy was among the measures which aroused American criticism from the start. In August, 1940, the government permitted employers to violate the forty-hour work week and industrial committees began to direct industry without consulting labor. Ghali excused these actions on the grounds that defeated France could no longer afford the regulations which had been adopted when the country was "rich and happy." He called the projected cooperation between employers and employees on a corporate basis a "revolutionary step" toward social justice without bowing to Communist extremism.[21] To the editor of The Chicago Daily News, however, corporatism meant nothing less than the end of organized labor: "they are just tossing out that corpse in the alley." Corporative labor was "slave labor," in his opinion. "It means go where you're sent, do what you're told, take what we give you, and carry your hat in your hand."[22]

As might be expected, Pétain's announcement of the new constitution, which would establish an "authoritarian,

hierarchical, social state" was greeted with open derision by American editors. The New York Herald Tribune editorial was entitled "Back to the Middle Ages," and The Christian Science Monitor called Pétain "an agent of reaction." The Monitor concluded that Pétain "simply [did] not believe in the democratic way of life" and that the state he envisioned fitted far better into Hitler's Europe than in a Europe of free nations. The Christian Century was just as categorical in its rejection: "What it boils down to is the denial of the right of the people to set up a government to protect their common interests, and the substitution of government by a clique. That is where the French Revolution went out."[23]

There is a striking contrast between the lack of interest shown by the liberal press in Vichy's social reforms and their passionate discussion in Christian magazines like America, The Commonweal, and The Christian Century. Many of Vichy's concerns evidently struck a responsive chord among American Christians. In August, 1940, The Christian Century commented on Pétain's call for a moral renewal: "There is more than regimentation for a fascist society in all this. Behind it lies the recognition, born of catastrophe, that moral laxity produces a sort of softness which is as suicidal for nations as for men."[24]

In September, 1940, the Catholic monthly America published John La Farge's enthusiastic comments. He related

that French Catholic Action had worked for the same goals:

> Its aim was to realize on a lasting thoroughly popular foundation that regenerated structure of authority, family, labor and agriculture which the Pétain Government is now heroically trying to erect in desperate haste amid desperate circumstances.[25]

Harvard professor Louis Mercier also recognized the long-cherished ideals of French Christians in Pétain's "social justice," which he defined as "social realism." Mercier argued that

> For class war, social realism would substitute class cooperation, and for individual selfishness, self-consecration for the common good, warmed by feelings of patriotism and of Christian universal brotherhood.[26]

Mercier saw the ideals of the National Revolution as the antithesis of Nazism. His enthusiastic article, "The New French Regime," published in March, 1941, in The Commonweal, provoked a heated but civilized debate over the following months.

Yves Simon, of Notre Dame University, wrote a sharp rebuttal, which derided the idea that the Germans would tolerate "the antithesis of Nazism" under their very eyes. He defined Pétain's regime as "a transitional regime, intended to make possible a thorough domination of the international Nazis over the French people."[27] In his counterattack, Mercier referred to the endorsement given to Pétain by the Catholic Episcopate and Pastor Boegner, the president of the Protestant Federation of the Reformed Churches, as a proof that his program was compatible with

Christian values. In turn, he enumerated Pétain's implacable adversaries: "all the anti-Christian groups so ceaselessly active under the French Republic in dechristianizing France, all the communists, and all those for whom profit is the only fatherland would no doubt gladly sweep Pétain from power."[28]

A letter from France in response to Mercier's article supported Simon's opinion that under German occupation real reform was impossible.[29] However, a few months later, Helen Iswolsky, daughter of the former Russian ambassador to France, wrote an essay, "Rebuilding in France," which echoed Mercier's views. She had been in close contact with French social workers during the previous year and had come to respect their work highly. Whatever Vichy's shortcomings were, it was clear that the government was "zealously devoting itself to social work." And, she added, "it is for the present that which is most important to the French." She left no doubt that the National Revolution was "a vital necessity," and that everybody agreed on that. In the domestic sphere, the Pétain government had a much wider range of freedom than in foreign politics, because the Germans did not interfere in such matters in the Free Zone. Unlike many Americans, she found it completely appropriate to start reforms before the war was over or the country liberated, since

> the old framework, which resisted all previous attempts to reform, has been broken up by war and defeat. There actually exists a sort of *tabula rasa*, on which the new state can be built.[30]

She stressed that "what is best and most durable in the new order in France is based on the Catholic social movement." Iswolsky did not avoid the question posed by Americans like Simon, who asked whether the reformers were not in truth collaborating with Nazism, since they worked with the shackled Vichy regime. She denied the allegation, citing one of the reformers who described his job as strengthening French youth physically and morally to withstand the influence of Nazism. While Iswolsky was basically in favor of the National Revolution, she criticized some of Pétain's measures and rejected his "reactionary Catholic order" as well as the labor policies which suppressed free unions and tended toward state corporatism.

In spite of the Church's initial support of Pétain's ideals and goals, problems soon arose between many French Catholics and their government. Herbert Morris traced their gradual disenchantment with the Vichy regime for the readers of The Commonweal. Among other grievances, Catholic workers did not support Pétain's anti-Semitic legislation. They joined the French unions to protest against discrimination based on race or creed for the first time in November, 1940, and reiterated this opposition on the occasions of May Day in 1941 an 1942. They also opposed the dissolution of the free labor unions and the establishment of state-imposed mixed corporate unions. Catholic youth, treated with benevolence by the government, objected to the intrusion of the Department for Youth Affairs into the training of

leaders by its organizations. While the "conformist mass" was still looking to Pétain for guidance, Morris insisted that critical Catholics were concerned about Vichy's increasing collaboration with the Germans and ashamed of the government's involvement in the rounding up and deportation of Jews.[31] The increasingly authoritarian and anti-Semitic character of the Vichy regime also alienated American Catholic and Protestant magazines which had been intuitively sympathetic to many of the ideals of the National Revolution.

The anti-Semitic aspects of Pétain's National Revolution aroused more attention, concern, and comment in American newspapers than any other French domestic issue during the Vichy period. The first statute on the Jews, which excluded them from high public office, teaching, and the media, was issued in October, 1940, and came as a shock to most Americans. Time magazine expressed this sense of disbelief and shame in the following editorial comment:

> Last week for the first time came words so un-French, so very German in accent that the outside world found it hard to believe that they came from the mouth of an old fighter for France, Henri Philippe Pétain.[32]

They should not have been surprised. As early as August 28, Paul Ghali reported that the law against slandering racial or religious groups had been revoked. He expected the rise of "anti-Jewish feelings", even though the French people were not anti-Semitic and had no strong racial prejudices. While the law did not mention Jews

specifically, polemicists would undoubtedly use the opportunity to start a campaign against them because "they were richer, and had more political influence." Part of the reason was the massive unemployment, and, as Ghali remarked coldly, "getting rid of Jews [in] offices [and in the] professions would mean more jobs available." He added that personal attacks on individuals were still prohibited, and an "authoritative source" in the Ministry of Justice had assured him that the government would censure such a hate campaign severely.[33]

On October 18, after the promulgation of the first statute on the Jews, Ghali wrote:

> Once again [the] wandering Jew has to pick up his pack [and] start again [his] eternal wanderings. France once [the] most liberal country in [the] world for them decided this morning [to] treat them as second rate citizens.

He noted that France had practically been the "only country left for Jewish activities." He continued to insist that the country as a whole was not hostile toward the Jews. It was just that the bourgeoisie presently in power "always had [a] touch [of] anti-Semitism ever since the Dreyfus case." Moreover, he argued, the Vichy regime had decreed the law against the Jews because it desired to "place itself [in a] better position [to] cooperate fully with [the] Germans." In the long run, Ghali believed, the decree would damage the country. It would not alter the attitude of French peasants and workers, and the Jews would merely "transfer [their] money activities in more hospitable soil" at a time when

France needed the help of all her citizens.[34]

Not all correspondents agreed with Ghali that anti-Semitism was confined to the ruling circles of the regime or simply adopted as a ploy to mollify the Germans. Both Alex Small and William H. Chamberlin reported "growing anti-Semitism" among the population at large. It was alleged that many Nazi agents had slipped into the country under the cloak of Jewish refugees and then undermined the French war effort. Others blamed the Jewish refugees for plunging France into a hopeless war against Germany. They had, it was said, described the German armed forces as weak, underequipped, and demoralized and thus easy to defeat. Often the charges were contradictory; some Frenchmen branded the Jews as war-mongers; others linked them to Communism and accused them of defeatism in 1939.[35]

Thomas Kernan, who had worked in Paris for the well known fashion magazine Vogue, advanced more specific reasons to explain the persistent resentment against the Jews. He blamed it partly on the unwillingness of Jewish refugees to fight for France during the war. In order to avoid obligatory military service, many alien Jews had lived in France for years without applying for citizenship, Kernan averred. When the war broke out, male enemy aliens, including Jewish refugees from Germany, were interned in camps. These internees, however, were offered freedom if they agreed to serve in the French colonial army. According to Kernan, only a few hundred men out of twenty thousand

internees preferred military service to internment. This, he said, was "a mystery and an outrage to the French," who felt that while the refugees had accepted French hospitality, they had "failed to requite it in France's hour of peril." Kernan, like Ghali, insisted that the French people were not anti-Semitic and that their hostility was reserved for foreign Jews; particularly they distrusted German Jewish refugees "because they never seemed to forget that they were Germans."[36]

Throughout the war, the American press coverage of the fate of Jews in France remained extensive. The anti-Semitic ordinances in the Occupied Zone, news of arrests, the rounding up of physicians in Paris, and the expulsion of Jews from the city of Vichy were all reported in detail. In 1941 alone, The New York Times printed ninety-four articles on the subject, or an average of about two per week.[37] However, the small number of editorials on the persecution of the Jews, and the silence of the American government on the problem of discrimination and violation of human rights betrayed the dilemma in which Americans were caught. Because white America discriminated against black Americans far worse than Hitler or any other European government discriminated against the Jews, the Americans could not express their outrage. Only the deportation of Jews to the East exceeded acceptable limits and permitted government officials to speak out against such criminal inhumanity.[38] In the meantime, private American efforts by Jewish

agencies, the Quakers, the American Red Cross, and other charities quietly improved the lot of many Jews and other refugees in France, helped thousands to emigrate, and made life in refugee and internment camps more bearable.[39] American foreign correspondents played their part in these endeavors. In March, 1941, nineteen foreign correspondents, photographers, and newsreel cameramen received permission to visit the refugee camps in France, where thirty thousand aliens were detained. Lansing Warren of The New York Times reported in three lengthy dispatches about the five-day tour which brought the journalists to five camps: Récébédou and Noé for the elderly; Le Vernet for political detainees and "dangerous characters;" Rivesaltes for minors and their families; and Argelès-sur-Mer for Spanish militiamen. Warren stated at the very beginning of his report that the correspondents were "distressed" by many of their experiences, but that they could not criticize France. The nation had "in an unexampled act of humanity" accepted hundreds of thousands of refugees. The Vichy government had been flooded with other requests for help from refugees from Belgium and the Occupied Zone and from French families expelled from Alsace and Lorraine. The lack of transportation equipment and the destruction of traffic facilities hampered efforts to improve the refugees' living conditions. Besides, Warren pointed out,

> One and a half million of France's finest men are war prisoners in other parts of Europe under conditions that can hardly be as favorable for most of them as for the majority of foreigners

guarded here.[40]

Warren explained that the correspondents had requested permission to visit the refugee camps several months before. Government officials told him that their insistence had kept the refugees' problems on the agenda, and improvements had been made largely as a consequence of their inquiries. Warren described the conditions in the camps as varied -- from dirty, crowded Argelès to clean but crowded Rivesaltes and the decent quarters at Récébédou and Noé. Food rations were inadequate at all the camps. The camp commanders told the journalists that they gladly released their charges if they had a job or a visa which allowed them to leave France, a statement which was disputed by some internees. As squalid as conditions were at Argelès, however, the inmates staged demonstrations on the day of the journalists' visit against their extradition to Spain, where Franco's harsh vengeance awaited them.[41]

Warren was overwhelmed and wrote of:

> the immensity of the international problem that these exiled internees will raise . . . The problem is to put these people or their descendants at least in a situation where they can again become members of something other than an outcast community.

No nation by itself would be able to solve the problem, he observed, and France was under the circumstances the candidate least likely to succeed.[42] The visit to the camps was not in vain, however. The American correspondents' effort and persistence proved beneficial for the internees. In April, 1941, the French government appointed André Jean-

Faure to the newly created position of inspecteur general of internment camps and centers.[43]

In June, 1941, the much more restrictive second statute on the Jews practically excluded Jews in France from most occupations besides those of craftsmen or workers. One year later, the Germans began to round up foreign Jews for deportation to the East. At that time, numerous clergymen and bishops protested against the inhumane treatment of the foreign Jews. The papal nuncio, Msgr. Valerio Valeri, warned Pétain and Laval that their salvation was jeopardized by such inhumanity. According to a correspondent's dispatch, Pétain was grieved by the deportations but saw himself helpless to prevent them. Laval, on the other hand, told the nuncio to "mind his own business." The writer repeated what contemporaries so often said: "No impartial observer in France doubts that it is the Germans who demanded the arrest and handing over of Jews and that the French are only acting as their instruments." The persecution of the Jews had long ceased to be a part of the National Revolution and had assumed a life of its own, directed by Germany.[44]

Among Jewish immigrants in the United States, the discriminatory legislation in France naturally caused anguish and fear. The pages of their German-language Aufbau were filled with news from France, eyewitness reports from refugees who had reached the United States, and appeals to the readers to help Jews interned in French camps. The

pages of the Aufbau mirrored the relentless tightening of the net around the Jews in France, from the discriminatory Jewish statutes to the Aryanization of Jewish businesses, and finally to their deportation to Eastern Europe. The Aufbau, which alleged in July, 1940, that Pétain had been a right-wing plotter before the war, castigated him on many occasions for his part in the persecution of Jews in France.[45] In November, 1940, a poem accused the "pious general" of besmirching and perverting the message of "La Marseillaise." In October, 1942, a French Catholic in London demanded in an open letter (reprinted in the Aufbau) that Pétain protest publicly against the crimes committed against the Jews, even at the risk of losing his freedom and his life. Otherwise, the writer warned, history might regard him as another Herod. The Aufbau also published the letter by Archbishop Saliège of Toulouse, in which he condemned the treatment of the Jews as inhumane and un-Christian.[46]

Liberal journals, like The Nation, and Christian magazines joined the protests of the Aufbau and condemned Vichy's policies regarding the foreign Jews sharply, as The Christian Century's reaction to the news of the deportation of the Jews in July, 1942, proved. The editors wrote:

> Even those who have been inclined to reserve judgment on the Vichy government because of the difficulties which confront it must feel revolted by such a betrayal of elemental human decencies. It is to be hoped that the aged Marshal Pétain will sense this, and even at this last moment intervene to save these otherwise doomed

victims.[47]

Like their French brethren, American Christians watched how the ideals of the National Revolution were perverted. Indications of an ominous change had already been observed by Morris in the summer of 1941, when two Catholic journals had been suspended by the Pétain government. Morris charged that Pétain had changed "his fatherly admonitions into threats and commands." This new tone had been noticeable for several months, clearly a sign that the crisis was severe.[48] Morris referred to Pétain's speech on August 12, 1941, in which the Marshal acknowledged that the National Revolution had not become a reality. He attributed its failure to inexperience and ineptitude and to the opposition of all those who still adhered to the Third Republic, such as the political parties, government officials who had profited from the system, Freemasons, and, by implication, Communists. Pétain complained that the government was no longer backed by popular consent. In fact, it had become unable to govern. The crisis was so severe that a mere reshuffling of ministers would not suffice. France was condemned to change her methods or face civil war. To prevent this, Pétain increased Prime Minister Darlan's power and imposed what amounted to martial law: political parties were suspended, high officials of Masonry were no longer permitted to exercise any public functions; and parliamentarians would no longer receive their salaries. Pétain also planned to break the power of the trusts and to

punish those who profited from their positions of access to foodstuffs and other resources. In his long speech he avoided citing those by name who were largely responsible for the "troubled minds" of many Frenchmen, the Communists.

Since the German invasion of the Soviet Union, the French Communists had begun their underground war against the German troops in France and had intensified their propaganda campaign against the Vichy regime.[49] On August 20, Ghali acknowledged that the "unsigned alliance between Communism, Gaullism, and all the disgruntled who miss [the] Third Republic is becoming [the] chief preoccupation [of] Marshal Pétain's government." Ghali reported on two riots in Paris and a surge of sabotage acts, adding: "Up to now combined German [and] French police efforts seem [to] have been unable [to] dam [the] rising tide." The Communists were not only fighting against the Germans but opposing Vichy's economic collaboration with Germany. The traditional antagonism of French workers toward their employers was now fueled by the employers' image as collaborationists. While both Communists and Gaullists were less influential in the Unoccupied Zone, Ghali pointed out that even there the government had no easier task with all those who missed the Third Republic and wanted to see "the return of [the] free [and] easy life [of] that period."[50]

Another correspondent, Richard de Rochemont, also noted that the National Revolution had failed. He considered its concept as inappropriate for a modern industrialized nation

and concluded,

> It is moral, exemplary, Spartan and Christian. Even left-wing Liberals are obliged to admit that it might be a good trick if one could do it. But it can't be done. The French know it can't be done. So do the Germans. So today does Pétain, and in his recent speech he has admitted its failure.[51]

Yet Thomas Kernan saw the National Revolution in a much more positive light. After his return to the United States he wrote:

> Except for the measures against the Jews, the social measures of the Vichy Government to date have most probably been good for France, whatever the reason for their adoption. A reform is a reform, even if the devil makes it. Reforms are extremely slow in a democracy, because there are few which do not encroach upon some vested interest, and each of Vichy's measures would have taken years instead of months to put into effect in normal times.[52]

The Scholars' View

Given the intense interest of many Americans in the fate of the Jews in France, and given the lack of interest in French social legislation, it is no wonder that the anti-Semitic legislation has become in the American mind the one issue besides collaboration that is associated with "Vichy." For a broader view of Pétain's National Revolution, American readers had to turn to the pages of the more specialized and scholarly journals of the time, in which articles on the political, administrative, and social changes appeared. The Monthly Labor Review explained French labor legislation in a strictly factual manner.[53] The American Political Science Review published a survey of "Recent Governmental Reforms in

France," by H. J. Heneman, which appeared as early as February, 1941.[54]

More informative was Paul Vaucher's "The National Revolution in France," in the Political Science Quarterly of March, 1942. It offered an excellent summary and analysis of all aspects of the legislation of the Vichy government. Vaucher had remained in France until the spring of 1941, and was therefore able to observe some of the results firsthand. His aim was to call attention first to changes that he considered "likely to last," because they were appropriate to French circumstances. He was most negative in his evaluation of the political changes and concluded that Pétain's principles led to a permanent dictatorship. In regard to administrative changes, he thought that local government in rural districts would benefit from the reforms which provided for salaried mayors and trained clerks and retained democratically elective municipal councils. He did not believe that the abolition of elected mayors and municipal courts in larger towns would be tolerated by the population in the long run, even though the reason for the change had been the frequency of corruption and the domination by political machines.

Vaucher saw much promise in the economic changes that had occurred. He regarded the restoration of the ancient regions as beneficial, since they provided more resources and allowed a more efficient use of industry. The author also praised the government for quick action to repair war

damages and for a "huge plan of public works." Price-fixing by the government, the distribution of resources to industry, and the allocation of industrial products by a central office enabled Vichy "to succeed in keeping the French industry alive" while at the same time reducing unemployment by two-thirds within a year. Vichy kept all the social reforms of the Popular Front and even increased benefits, but, as Vaucher pointed out, many industrial workers were employed only part-time, and the improvements only helped to lessen the gap between income and cost of living. Vaucher, who expected a strong trend toward socialism after the war and extensive nationalization of industry, believed that Vichy's industrial policy would facilitate the transition. He gave much space to Pétain's agricultural policy, which was designed to increase agricultural production through modernization and halt the depopulation of rural areas by easy credits and financial inducements to help young families stay on the farm. These reforms were overdue, since earlier attempts under the Third Republic had been frustrated by political inertia.

Vaucher's assessment of the National Revolution was positive in many aspects. At no point did he suggest that the efforts of the government were inappropriate or that the reforms were impossible to accomplish under the circumstances. Indeed, he emphasized that many of the reforms might provide a lasting foundation for a future government.[55]

Historian Shepard B. Clough wrote about French corporatism in "The House that Pétain Built," in March, 1944, in The Political Science Quarterly. Corporatism had old roots in France, the author pointed out, and he considered the Vichy regime as "an important landmark in the history of corporatism in Europe." After explaining the provisions of the Labor Charter, he described it as a tool in the hands of the "dictator" to exercise his power and to enforce discipline. While the directed economy served and saved France during the emergency caused by war, occupation, and blockade, ultimately it helped Germany to "milk the country." While labor had acquiesced for the time being, it could not be expected to renounce free unions for long. Clough did not believe that corporatism as practiced by Vichy would survive. However, he did not exclude the possibility that it would later be revived in some form, since a study by ranking French economists had shown a French trend toward corporatism for the period 1911-1936.[56]

Shepard B. Clough's interest in the National Revolution was not widely shared by American historians during the war. Current History, the forum for historians C. E. Black, Leo Gershoy, E. J. Knapton, Sidney B. Fay, and Bernadotte Schmitt, published more than thirty articles on France from 1940 through 1945 -- none of them exclusively on the National Revolution. Several of the essays touched on one or the other pieces of legislation, be it the Labor Charter or the educational reform, but always in a cursory manner.[57]

Leo Gershoy once commented with scorn on "Pétain's toy," "the glorious reconstruction of France which few Frenchmen want, most misunderstand and all are skeptical about."[58] These historians focused on military, political, and diplomatic developments and on the state of the French economy. They showed little interest in the anti-Semitic legislation and in the persecution of the Jews in France, which they evidently considered as peripheral affairs. They obviously had no suspicion whatsoever that the deportations to the Eastern front could mean anything other than "forced labor."

Among the legislative acts within the framework of the National Revolution, the application and the improvement of the Family Code were not recognized in America for their significance at the time. Yet this may well have been the most important and enduring reform by the Vichy government, and its decrees were so progressive that even forty years later they sound like Utopia to American women. One of the rare detailed contemporary American accounts of the Family legislation is contained in an OSS report entitled, "Psychological Warfare Significance of Recent Shifts in the French Social Structure." The report, written in January, 1944, acknowledged that the legal status of married women had been improved to enable them to function as head of the family. Most importantly, the government took the financial burden off families willing to have children and enabled them to provide an environment which was favorable to the

childrens' development. The report also recognized the government's efforts to assure the health and well-being of the children through prenatal medical care, strict laws protecting children from abuse and neglect, and provisions for obligatory medical examination of all school children. The OSS report noted, however, that many of the projects, though decreed, were not yet realized.[59]

This OSS report is of particular importance also with regard to the other aspects of the National Revolution because it reveals some of the obstacles Pétain had to face. His adversaries were not only Germans, or the Collaborators in Paris, or the Resistance, but also Allied propaganda which purposely undermined his efforts and blatantly lied to the French population to achieve its ends. A few examples may suffice. The report recommended that since the farmers of France were much better off than other groups, psychological warfare, i.e., U.S. propaganda, should concentrate upon stirring discontent among them. They should be told that an early Allied victory would provide them with seeds, fertilizers, equipment, fuel, etc. Workers, on the other hand, should be promised a fair share in the national income, and they should be told that the Vichy trade union reform was "purely artificial." Propaganda should persuade small industrialists that they were the victims of Vichy, and that industrial concentration was "ruthless." It should emphasize that "the little man" was a victim of Vichy's deflationary policy, and that banks

were the big profiteers. Government employees, collaborators, and black marketeers should also be depicted as profiteers.[60] By mixing truth and lies, the Allies could increase the frustration and discontent of practically all social groups and turn them against the French government. In this way, radio brought Allied fifth column activities right into French homes.

The Contemporaries and the National Revolution

The contemporary assessment of the National Revolution by correspondents, editors, the Office of Strategic Services, and scholars offers a kaleidoscope of views. Correspondents saw the reforms in the context of a nation beset by a multitude of problems. They agreed on the necessity of reforms but were skeptical about Pétain's chances of success. They perceived too many obstacles, including the division of the country and the influence of the German occupation in the Occupied Zone (Ghali), unproven leadership in Vichy (Archambault), the lack of a forum for public opinion (Elliott), and the pervasive spirit of the Third Republic (Harsch). Editors, on the other hand, tended to be very sensitive to the authoritarian aspects of the Vichy regime and watchful for signs of undemocratic acts by the French government, but were disinterested in Vichy's social reforms.

Christian magazines, both Catholic and Protestant, as

well as the OSS were very interested in social reforms and Vichy's efforts to rally the population to effect a national renewal. American Christians recognized that the French government addressed burning social issues from a deliberately chosen Christian point of view. This was all the more remarkable as both Communism and Fascism had tried to achieve social justice by rejecting or ignoring Christian principles. The OSS, on the other hand, studied Vichy reforms to assess the state of French society for purposes of psychological warfare.

None among the contemporaries objected on principle to reform, even structural reform. In fact, Helen Iswolsky mentioned that the war had broken down barriers to reform which no previous effort had been able to remove. The attention paid by the correspondents to the plight of the Jews was not reflected in newspaper editorials but rather in journals of opinion and in the Aufbau. The latter focused on the Jewish question but was not interested in the other aspects of the National Revolution. Political scientists were the group most open to and most interested in the French reforms, while historians showed astonishingly little interest in the National Revolution. They focused almost exclusively on French politics and foreign relations and on the state of the French economy. Neither political scientists nor historians treated the discrimination against the Jews as a central issue or showed much interest in the problem of the foreign Jews in France.

The American Historians and the National Revolution

The first American historian to write extensively on the National Revolution was Paul Farmer in his Vichy Political Dilemma (1955). The main drawback of the National Revolution was, in his opinion, the fact that it was "from start to finish the work of intellectuals," an interesting point which has not been made so clearly since. None of the other groups, from farmers and workers to businessmen were ever committed to it. Vichy's most striking failure was the regime's inability to establish a stable cabinet, and Farmer called the civil service the real government of the period. By contrast, he considered the application and improvement of the Family Code a real achievement. Most of the other reforms were failures. The establishment of the statutes on the Jews was motivated by two contradictory considerations: first, some officials wanted to prove to the Germans that France was ready to participate in the New Order; secondly, for others, the legislation was a forestalling action, to prevent the Germans from encroaching on French authority.[61]

The National Revolution has been more extensively treated by Robert Paxton, whose basic attitude toward his subject was stated early in his Vichy France, published in 1972:

> In their excitement, Frenchmen committed the most elementary imprudence. In their impatience to avenge old wrongs and transform the conditions that had led to defeat, they made major structural changes during an enemy occupation.[62]

Paxton's whole view of the National Revolution is colored by this premise. In 1980, during the Conference on The Fall of France: Causes and Results, he talked of the "fundamental reconstruction" decided upon in 1940, and declared, "the idea of waiting until liberation when the reconstruction of society could be accomplished calmly was hardly mentioned."[63] Paxton regarded the failings of the Third Republic as minor ones, not serious enough to merit a revolution. Yet the eagerness of Frenchmen to reform their country proved that they regarded the failures of the Third Republic as so looming and profound that not even the devastation by the Germans could divert their attention from their goal. The conditions for a reconstruction were therefore present. To postpone it until a hypothetical day of peace and quiet would have seemed to them like postponing an emergency operation until the life-threatening situation was over.

Paxton himself described the incredible political immobility under the Third Republic, citing as an example the fact that twenty-four bills for an old age pension law had been rejected down to 1936, the last passing the Chamber in March of that year but failing in the Senate. Yet he belittled Vichy's pension law by calling it "unfinished business of the 1930s." Paxton's aversion toward the Vichy regime led at times to unfair assessments of the Vichy reforms. For example, he attributed the abolition of the French teacher-training colleges by the Vichy regime to its

desire to root out the "evil seminaries of democracy."[64] In fact, as W. D. Halls' study, The Youth of Vichy France (1981), has shown, the teachers' colleges were not only virulently anti-religious but discriminated against students who were perceived as being religious. Given the fact that about 98% of all Frenchmen were nominal Catholics and that one-fourth of all school children attended Catholic schools to which their parents paid tuition, it is safe to assume that a substantial section of the population objected to the anti-religious spirit of the teachers' education and approved of the change.[65]

Similarly, Paxton's conclusion that "Vichy preferred women barefoot and pregnant in the kitchen,"[66] does an injustice to the provisions of the Family Code. The special stipend which was paid to families with one breadwinner was designed to permit mothers to take care of the children without depriving the family of the additional funds her outside work would have provided. The image of the working mother may be appealing to American women of the last decade, but not to French mothers during World War II, a time when washing machines, refrigerators, and central heating were extremely rare, and cars still made news in the neighborhood. Hours had to be spent standing in line at a number of stores to buy the family's rations each day, and toiling over the washboard. For a family it meant hardship, and for the mother a crushing burden if she had to work outside the home.

Paxton also dismissed the enormous efforts of social workers, priests, and educators too glibly when he wrote that "much of Vichy's promotion of a better moral order was a whited sepulchre."[67] Leadership schools like Uriage worked with genuine devotion to build character, promote physical fitness, and inspire young people for community service. John Hellman observed in his study, Emmanuel Mounier and the New Catholic Left 1930-1950 (1981), that "among the over four thousand alumni of the Uriage 'school of elites' are many of the present ambassadors, generals, presidents in the private and public sector, bishops, and union leaders of France."[68] Gordon Wright, in his The Rural Revolution in France (1964), also noted that the National Revolution stimulated the development of rural leaders and a lasting sense of unity among the French peasants.[69]

Paxton's evaluation of the administrative and economic reforms, and the establishment of the Peasant Corporation under the Peasant Charter, was more positive. He acknowledged that, primarily due to the imperative need to keep the French going, professionalism, concentration, and efficiency were fostered, and France was steered toward modernization.[70] The trend continued after the war -- a fact which contradicts Paxton's own premise that the Vichy government should not have embarked on structural reforms.

Paxton's severest indictment against Pétain's National Revolution concerned its anti-Semitic legislation, the treatment of foreign Jews, and the French collaboration in

their deportation, which began in July, 1942. He called it "the blackest mark on the whole Vichy experience." Contrary to most of the correspondents and political scientists of the 1940s, he affirmed that the first statute on the Jews had not been the result of German pressure on the French government.[71] His condemnation of Vichy was even more severe in Vichy and the Jews (1981).[72] A recent work by John F. Morley throws some of the blame for Vichy's treatment of the Jews on the Vatican, which assured Pétain in September, 1941, that it had no objections against the statutes on the Jews. Morley concluded that "a strong protest by the papal emissary in France might have dissuaded [Pétain] from accepting or passing the anti-Semitic measures."[73]

An important study on Vichy economic reforms was included by Richard F. Kuisel in his work, Capitalism and the State in Modern France, published in 1981. Unlike Paxton, Kuisel did not condemn the inception of reforms during the armistice period. The economic reformers were convinced that France had to secure her place in Hitler's Europe; their goal was to strengthen France's position by invigorating her economy. Among the Vichy innovations which not only left a lasting mark but endured after the Liberation was the Ministry of Industrial Production and the National Service of Statistics. The Labor Charter, on the other hand, was a failure. Vichy planners were not satisfied with emergency measures and developed a ten-year

plan in 1942 and a two-year plan in 1944 with far-reaching goals, as Kuisel pointed out. While Pétain did not support either plan, they were utilized by de Gaulle's government after the Liberation.[74] Kuisel's study, as well as Gordon Wright's work on the rural revolution, proved that structural reforms during the occupation were possible and that a number of them proved durable and beneficial long after the demise of the Vichy regime.

Unfortunately, two recent studies, one on youth camps in southern France, the other on an attempt at corporatism, turned out to be case studies of failures. Roger Austin's article, "The Chantiers de la Jeunesse in Languedoc, 1940-44" (1983), showed that the leaders of the youth camps in Languedoc "were singularly unsuccessful in promoting Pétain's National Revolution," except during a few months in 1941.[75] According to Joseph Jones' study, "Vichy France and Postwar Economic Modernization: The Case of the Shopkeepers," the attempt to introduce corporatism into the retail trade proved also unsuccessful. During the war the shopkeepers did very well without it, and after the war it was rejected by merchants .pa jealous of their independence even at the cost of efficiency.[76]

Contemporaries and Historians Compared

Both wartime correspondents and Robert Paxton agreed that the National Revolution irrevocably waned in the summer of 1941, and the contemporaries and the historian gave the

same reason: the Communist resistance. Ghali added the general impatience of the population with wartime deprivations as a further cause for the increasing opposition which the Marshal faced. Both contemporaries and American historians showed remarkably little interest in Pétain's social reforms. This may well be the effect of the American disdain for socialist programs. Otherwise, it would be difficult to understand how a revolutionary measure like the special stipend for families with one breadwinner could have escaped a historian's interest. This is also true for the right to work philosophy of the Labor Charter, which gave unemployment compensation a different meaning. From now on, the worker had a right to life and sustenance, combined with the duty to work according to his capability.

The most striking difference between the contemporaries' and Robert Paxton's view on the National Revolution concerns their attitude toward change. For Paxton, the appropriate time to reform the Third Republic should have been during a period of normalcy; for the contemporaries, the opportunity for change came in the wake of a great upheaval, when customary procedures were suspended for a moment.

There is also a disparity in the way correspondents and historians looked at the Jewish question. Warren, for instance, primarily described the almost insoluble problem of caring for thousands of exiles when he saw the refugee camps. For the historians, the question has become almost

exclusively a moral one: who was guilty of neglect? Why did the government do nothing to prevent the deportations to the East? Marrus and Paxton dealt exclusively with the Jewish refugees, but thousands of workers were also deported in spite of government protests. Perhaps the power of the Pétain government to intervene successfully has been overestimated by historians. Vichy has become the primary target of accusations of Jewish persecution even though only about 75,000 Jews were deported from France, out of a total population of 350,000, while the deportees from The Netherlands alone numbered 105,000, or 75 percent of the Jewish population. Historian Patrice Higonnet went so far as to say: "The anti-Semitism of Vichy is now becoming the moral touchstone around which the whole regime is going to be considered." This is indeed an enormous change in attitude, since neither contemporary political scientists nor historians saw the Jewish question as a central issue. At the time, discrimination against minorities was common and accepted in Europe and the United States. The deportations were sharply condemned as inhuman, but they were not equated with genocide, since the Endlösung was kept secret. To condemn a government on an issue whose consequences were unforeseeable at the time is not history but polemics.

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CHAPTER V

CONCLUSION

This dissertation focuses exclusively on the American evaluation of the armistice, the fall of the Third Republic, the trial at Riom, and the National Revolution. There is a natural unity to these topics which show Pétain's efforts to preserve the state and to limit the power of the German victor by negotiating terms with him. The Marshal tried to establish an authoritarian government with the goals of providing strong leadership for an unprecedented time of crisis and of excluding influences which had weakened national leadership. He wanted to design a program of reforms to boost the country's morale, eliminate class conflict, modernize its economy, and encourage population growth.

Pétain's decision to ask Germany for armistice and peace conditions earned him the epithet "defeatist" among American editors. And yet, he was the person who deserved it least. Since 1934, he had warned of the German danger and proposed ways to meet it. He had castigated the prevailing pacifism and tried to shake the French out of their war-weariness because they could not afford it: France was in mortal danger of being overrun by an aggressive, strongly motivated adversary. In World War I,

Pétain had become known for his intensive study or enemy combat methods, which enabled him to achieve for the French Army the most significant progress in tactics during World War I. As a general, Pétain had studied his enemy in order to emulate his strengths and avoid his weaknesses. It was natural for him to do the same as a statesman. Historians have ridiculed him for his desire to become Minister of Education. Nothing reveals more their misunderstanding of Pétain. In 1934, he had called attention to the totalitarian nations, which considered the education of their young among their top priorities, and had called their programs "the greatest attempts at nationalist education in history." The main aspect of this education was the link between school and army which made a superb preparation for war possible. In view of the demands total war would impose on the population, Pétain insisted that France also needed a defense program which involved school and army and provided a high degree of preparedness for war. In his opinion, even countries whose military policy was purely defensive must focus on physical fitness, patriotism, and the passionate will to fight for survival.

However, Pétain's admonitions were unheeded. By 1939, the nation had not yet recovered its vigor, and the Marshal thought the Declaration of War of September 3, 1939, was a mistake, because France was neither militarily nor mentally prepared. By June 16 of the following year he was convinced that an armistice was necessary, not only to stop a hopeless

battle but also to preserve the state and to permit the French government to limit as much as possible German encroachment in all areas of life.

Such French concerns were far from the minds of American editors. They reacted to the French defeat with shock and bewilderment. The fall of France left Great Britain as the last bastion of democracy in Europe, and most Americans were convinced that it too would fall within a few weeks. Many editors saw the security of the United States itself threatened.

The fate of France was of little concern at such a moment. When the armistice conditions were made public, editors turned against the French in much the same manner as Premier Reynaud had turned his fury upon King Leopold of Belgium after his capitulation. To explain the devastating defeat without having to acknowledge Hitler's phenomenal success, they put the blame on French decadence and lack of fighting spirit. Editors reiterated Churchill's charge that the French government could and should have continued the war from her overseas Empire, a policy which would have left metropolitan France without a government, and under complete German control.

Marshal Pétain also came under fire when he requested an armistice. American Jews especially condemned him for accepting the clause requiring France to deliver up German nationals upon Hitler's demand. They did not consider that in a totally occupied France, all Jews and political

refugees would have been completely at Hitler's mercy, and without recourse to French authorities.

While Pétain had become a defeatist and even a traitor in the eyes of many liberals, conservatives and many Catholics admired him and regarded him as a martyr who took upon himself the unpalatable task of admitting defeat in the place of those who were responsible for the disaster. "Traitor" and "Savior": these images were established from the start and did not change during the next four years, an indication that liberals and conservatives in the United States were as profoundly divided in their views as their counterparts in France.

The reactions of the foreign correspondents for American papers were much more complex and closely linked to their experiences in France. Correspondents who had lived in France for many years tended to be very sympathetic to Pétain and his decision to request an armistice. Some had detected a new spirit among Frenchmen, a deep conviction that war never solved problems but created new and more difficult ones. Others blamed French war-weariness on the experience of World War I, from which the nation had not yet recovered. A third group castigated French leadership for its failure to motivate the population into fighting an all-out war. Military leaders were not spared, either. Decisive French military weaknesses, as pointed out by the correspondents, were lack of flexibility, outdated logistics, and inferior strategy.

An interesting difference in mentality separated the American-born correspondents from those of French background. While Americans tried to relate the defeat to French mentality and to characteristics of French society, many Frenchmen blamed the regime alone for the disaster and expected it to "get out of the mess," as in ancient times when kings lost battles and the citizens' primary duty was to remain calm. As a consequence, the American-born correspondents regarded France as "finished," and William Shirer wrote of a "complete collapse of French society."

Significantly, none among the correspondents imagined that the French government would inevitably become involved in crimes committed by the German occupying forces, as has been suggested by Stanley Hoffmann. Rather, as Sisley Huddleston pointed out, the government was expected to protect the French people from German atrocities. So pervasive was this attitude that an OSS report from 1942 argued that those political leaders who had gone into exile would be rejected by the French once the war was over. Obviously, growing Allied strength and cruel German reprisals for acts of resistance changed such assumptions: the Gaullists acquired status, and the French government did become involved in the persecution of the Resistance.

As far as the French defeat is concerned, there is very close agreement between the correspondents and the historians with regard to its military causes. As to the possibility of continuing the war from the colonies, the

historians have not reached a consensus, but skepticism prevails.

There is a striking difference regarding the Fall of the Third Republic between the foreign correspondents and their editors at home. For American editors, the fall of the Third Republic was an awesome event, and in this point they are in complete agreement with the historians. In interviews, top specialists in the field, such as Philip Bankwitz, Stanley Hoffmann, H. Stuart Hughes, and Robert Paxton, invariably condemned Pétain for his abolition of the Republic. None among them considered its weaknesses so fatal as to justify its demise. This is one issue upon which American historians clearly react as Americans, as men who consider a republican government the only good government. Foreign correspondents, especially those French-born, reacted completely differently. Paul Ghali, for instance, took the death of the regime with total equanimity. After all, France had survived fifteen constitutions in 150 years, and the spirit of the French Revolution had proven irrepressible. The correspondent's main concern was to establish a government which would defend French interests vis-à-vis the Germans. Under the circumstances, parliamentary debates, oratory, and party squabbles seemed frivolous. G. H. Archambault also felt that while the regime was "finished", France would recuperate with a new leadership. Logically, he was not interested in seeing the government leave France to fight on

in the colonies but wanted a new regime to take over, save what was possible, and guide the country through the dark times ahead.

While editors in the United States regarded the new regime as Fascist, or at least dangerously close to Fascism, political scientists examined Pétain's authoritarian government and discovered a hybrid structure with elements borrowed from democratic, Fascist, and socialist regimes. As J. G. Heinberg complained, Pétain "carried water on both his Right and his Left shoulder." One of the regime's most interesting features was its total lack of a party system, a truly bold and revolutionary way of trying to avoid factionalism and an ingenious method of preventing a takeover by Communists and Fascists alike. Interestingly, the political scientists acknowledged that the new regime had been established according to the most stringent legalities.

Unfortunately, no American study has as yet done justice to the trial at Riom, which caused such ambivalent reactions. While condemning Pétain for accusing the leaders of the Third Republic for losing the war, American editors respected him for insisting on the great power status of France irrespective of the defeat of 1940.

Pétain's most original action was probably the reform program of the National Revolution, which implemented his proposals of the 1930s. If, as had been generally expected, the war had been over within a year of the armistice,

Pétain's plan might well have been successful. The original enthusiasm that inspired many Frenchmen in the summer of 1940 to create a regime that would be more French, more social, and more competitive in Europe, wore thin with time and endless frustration. Within a year Ghali was citing not only Communist resistance as an obstacle to the reconstruction, but the people's longing for the easygoing, "good old days" of the Third Republic as well. No other regime would have been able under the circumstances to overcome this longing for the past, and for the National Revolution it was deadly. Pétain himself knew well what was happening, as his speech of August 12, 1941, showed. He knew that an Axis success as well as an early peace were becoming more unlikely, and hunger, misery, and frustration would increase in months to come. His greatest worry was civil war in France, and in despair he tried to impose his programs on a reluctant and disillusioned population.

It is no wonder that the National Revolution did not attract much attention in the American daily press. Even forty years later, American newspapers have little interest in purely domestic legislation of foreign countries. It is rather surprising that the correspondents wrote about such details as corporatism in the dairy industry or an old age pension law. The topics which did attract the editors' attention are revealing, however: the statutes against the Jews, the suspension of the Masonic order, labor-management relations, and the future constitution of France. Americans

were plagued by discrimination and labor disputes themselves and found therefore a common interest in these areas. The French government's efforts to increase the population by encouraging large families had no appeal to American readers, however, since they could not identify with the problem. In spite of the women's liberation movement, this neglect has not been remedied in recent years, and American specialists on Vichy made no effort to examine the French family legislation closely. On the other hand, several American historians wrote in detail about Vicny's economic policies. The anti-Semitic legislation has also been extensively studied and has drawn so much critical attention that it now tends to color the whole regime. A reading of the reports of correspondents and contemporary observers can restore a reasonable balance.

The most striking result of the investigation was the realization that some of the foreign correspondents were excellent historians of their own time and wrote a first draft of history which ranks their insight and comprehension on a par with scholars writing several decades later.

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APPENDIX A

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCHES OF FOREIGN CORRESPONDENTS

ARCHAMBAULT, GASTON HANET (1877-1951)

G. H. Archambault was born at Ay, Marne, on February 25, 1877. Educated in England, he was already writing for British financial papers before the turn of the century. He married an English girl and wrote for the first English-language paper in Paris, the Messenger. In 1905, he began his 18-year career as editor of the Paris Herald. It was interrupted by World War I, when Archambault fought with the French Army at Verdun, was wounded, and received the Legion of Honor and the Croix de Guerre. Later in the war, he became a liaison officer for the American Expeditionary Forces. After the war, he established the Paris Times, and, following its demise, he worked for the New York Sun. He joined the Paris bureau of The New York Times in 1933. He covered World War II from Paris and Vichy until February, 1942, when he left France and moved to Berne, Switzerland. Archambault returned to Paris in October, 1944. One year later, after a three months' stint in London, he began his last assignment for The New York Times in Pretoria, South Africa, where he worked until his death on May 21, 1951. The funeral service was held in St. George's Cathedral, Capetown, South Africa, on May 23, 1951. His son, Michael of Southern Rhodesia, survived.

Source: The New York Times, Obituary, May 22, 1951, p. 31; ibid., May 24, 1951, p. 35.

BESS, DEMAREE (1893-1962)

Demaree Bess was born on July 28, 1893, in Kansas City, Missouri, the son of a Presbyterian minister. In 1916, he received a bachelor's degree from the University of Iowa and subsequently taught English at Assiut College in Egypt. He then joined the British forces in Palestine and worked with the American Red Cross in Palestine and Syria. After World War I, Bess joined The Minneapolis Tribune and also worked for The Los Angeles Times before he went to the Far East as correspondent for The New York Post and The Philadelphia Public Ledger. For one year, Bess was news editor of The Japanese Advertiser, an English-language newspaper in Tokyo. Then, from 1928-1931, he and his wife Dorothy travelled all over China for the United Press. Bess worked as bureau manager for the United Press in Peiping until 1931, when he became Far Eastern Chief and correspondent for The Christian Science Monitor, a position he held until 1938, when he joined The Saturday Evening Post. He covered World War II from the major capitals and battle fronts. At the time of his death, on June 2, 1962, Bess was working on the memoirs of former Undersecretary of State Robert Murphy. In 1950, Bess had testified on behalf of Professor Owen Lattimore who had been accused by Senator Joseph McCarthy of being a "Communist sympathizer" and a "malignant influence on th shaping of American policy toward Soviet Communism."

Source: Obituary, The New York Times, June 3, 1962, p. 88.

DARRAH, DAVID (1894-1976)

David Darrah was born on May 27, 1894, in Loydsville, Ohio, and was eduated at the University of Akron. He began his career as a reporter in 1912 with the Akron Beacon Journal. In October, 1917, he enlisted in the United States Army and after his discharge joined the Paris bureau of The Chicago Tribune. Seven years later he moved to London but in 1927 he accepted a position as Chief of the Rome bureau. His incisive articles about Mussolini angered the Italian leader, and in 1935 Darrah was expelled from Italy. The Tribune sent him again to Paris, this time as head of the bureau. After the fall of France he remained in Vichy and was interned by the Germans in the fall of 1942. Released in 1944, he continued his work as a war correspondent, and after the liberation of France resumed his position in Paris. He retired in 1946 but returned to work in 1955 as head of the Madrid bureau where he stayed until his final retirement in January, 1968. Darrah died on March 29, 1976, in Biarritz.

Source: Obituary, The Chicago Tribune, March 30, 1976, p. 14; Biography in Ohio Authors and Their Books (Cleveland, 1962), p. 154.

DE ROCHEMONT, RICHARD (1903-)

Richard de Rochemont was born on December 13, 1903, in Chelsea, Massachusetts. In 1938 he graduated cum laude from Harvard. During his studies he worked for the Boston Daily Advertiser. In 1930, de Rochemont became involved in working on newsreels, and a year later he was appointed editor of the French edition of the Fox-Movietone newsreels. In 1934, he became the European Manager of the March of Times newsreels. Among the features he supervised were "Croix de Feu," "League of Nations," "Revolt in France," and "The Maginot Line." After the French defeat he left France and returned to the United States. However, he visited France in 1941 for several months to study the conditions in the Unoccupied Zone. Back in the United States, he became National President of France Forever, de Gaulle's organization in the U.S. He returned to France after the liberation and continued his career as producer of the March of Time features.

Source: Current Biography 1945 (New York, 1946), pp. 147-149.

DEWEY, PETER (1916-1945)

Peter Dewey was born in Chicago on October 8, 1916, the son of a prominant banker and politician. He was educated in Switzerland, at St. Paul's school in Concord, New Jersey, and at Yale, where he graduated in 1939. With his parents he spent the summer of 1939 on the family's estate in Normandy, and in the fall of 1939 he began his job as a correspondent for The Chicago Daily News. During the western campaign he joined the Polish National Army in France as an ambulance driver. He returned to the United States after the fall of France and enrolled at the University of Virginia Law School. For one year he worked for Nelson Rockefeller's Office of the Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs. In 1942, he entered the United States Army, served in Arica and Arabia, and was later transferred to the Office of Strategic Services (OSS). As commanding officer of the Mission Etoile, he parachuted into France on August 10, 1944, prior to the southern invasion. Upon his return to the United States, he worked for the State Department, and was then sent to French Indo-China for the OSS as "Senior American Authority." He was killed in Saigon on September 26, 1945. Peter Dewey's widow published his book, As They Were, in 1946. It is an account of his experiences in France from the summer of 1939 to July, 1940.

Source: Peter Dewey, As They Were (New York, 1946), jacket.

GHALI, PAUL (1905-1970)

Paul Ghali was born on June 24, 1905, in Avignon, France. His father was Ghali Bey, an Egyptian appellate judge, his mother was Jeanne de Baroncelli-Javon, the descendent of an exiled Florentine family which had come to Avignon in the thirteenth century. Ghali received degrees from the University of Alexandria, from the Sorbonne, the Paris School of Political Science, and Oxford. Before turning to journalism, Ghali was a professor of international law at Cairo and a member of the Egyptian diplomatic service in Paris. He later became a French citizen. In 1939, he joined the Paris bureau of The Chicago Daily News, and became its chief in July, 1940. On January 8, 1942, Ghali filed his last dispatch from Vichy France before he left for Switzerland. In 1943, Ghali freed the daughter of Benito Mussolini from a Swiss asylum, and she allowed him to copy the diary of her husband, Count Galeazzo Ciano on microfilm. Ghali managed to send the microfilm in a perfume bottle to The Chicago Daily News. The publication of the diary created a sensation and was of high propaganda value for the Allies. Upon his return to France, Ghali, together with four other American correspondents, received the first Legion of Honor award to the foreign press after the liberation of France. In 1961, he married Bernadette Beaune. He died on June 3, 1970, in Paris.

Sources: The Chicago Daily News, June 4, 1970. Obituary, The New York Times, June 4, 1970, p. 39.

HARSCH, JOSEPH (1905-)

Joseph Harsch joined The Christian Science Monitor in 1929. In 1939, he became the Assistant Director of the Committee on Political Refugees in London. He worked in Berlin as correspondent for The Christian Science Monitor from 1940 to 1942 and as a news broadcaster and analyst for CBS from 1943 to 1949. From 1952 to 1967, Harsch was Senior European Correspondent and then Washington Diplomatic Correspondent for NBC. From 1967 to 1971, he worked for ABC as Washington News Commentator. In 1971, he became Chief Editorial Writer for The Christian Science Monitor. He continues to write a daily column on international affairs for that paper. His publications include, Pattern of Conquest (1941) and The Curtain Isn't Iron (1950). Joseph Harsch's papers are at the State Historical Society of Wisconsin at Madison.

Source: Blue Book 1975 (New York, 1975), p. 643.

HUDDLESTON, SISLEY (1883-1952)

Sisley Huddleston was British-born but left his native country before World War I to work in France as a foreign correspondent. In 1914, he was editor of The Continental Daily Mail, but he wrote for journals in many countries, including Canada and Australia. During the Versailles Peace Conference he became a correspondent for The Christian Science Monitor, a position he held for nearly twenty years. He was President of the Anglo-American Correspondents' Association for the year 1923. Huddleston was very disappointed with the peace settlements after World War I. After 1936 he no longer wrote on a regular basis from France. After the fall of France he move to Monaco, where he owned an apartment. Throughout the war he returned regularly to France. Huddleston was a passionate defender of Marshal Pétain. In 1943, he had a lengthy interview with the Marshal; the same year he became a French citizen. After the liberation of the Riviera, Huddleston was arrested as a Collaborator by members of the Resistance. However, in April, 1951, the highest French Court ordered the French government to pay him an indemnity "for the grave and unfair mistake committed against him."

Source: The New York Times, July 18, 1952, p. 19; ibid., Nov. 4, 1952, p. 28.

MOWRER, EDGAR ANSEL (1892-1977)

Mowrer was born in Bloomington, Illinois, on March 8, 1892, the son of a businessman. He studied at the University of Chicago and in Paris, and graduated with a B. A. degree from the University of Michigan in 1913. He returned to Paris and joined the staff of The Chicago Daily News as a reporter covering the war in Flanders. In 1915, he was transferred to the bureau of the Daily News in Rome. In 1923, he was sent to Berlin and remained there for a decade. His book, Germany Puts the Clock Back (1932), in which he predicted the downfall of the Weimar Republic, was banned in Germany. Mowrer was President of the Foreign Press Association in Germany, and, in spite of German pressure, only agreed to resign from this position when a Jewish correspondent, who had been arrested, was released. In 1934, Mowrer replaced his brother, Paul, as head of the Paris office of The Chicago Daily News. Later, he visited Spain, the Soviet Union, and China. After the fall of France, he was assigned to the Washington bureau of The Chicago Daily News and, together with William J. Donovan, authored a series of articles on fifth-column activities in Europe. From 1941 to 1943, he worked in the Office of War Information. After the war, Mowrer wrote books on American foreign policy, edited Western World, and wrote a column for the McClure newspaper syndicate. He died on March 2, 1977, in Madeira, Portugal.

Source: Current Biography Yearbook 1962 (New York, 1962), pp. 310-312; Obituary, The New York Times, March 4, 1977, part IV, p. 12.

PHILIP, PERCY J. (1886-1956)

Percy Philip was born on July 12, 1886, in Scotland, the son of a Presbyterian minister. Because of his weak heart he could not finish his medical studies and began writing nature sketches for the London press. During World War I he became a reporter for The London Daily News. After the war he stayed in France as a Paris correspondent for several English newspapers. In 1920, he became an assistant to the chief of the Paris bureau of The New York Times, Edwin L. James. In 1932, he succeeded James as head of the bureau, a position he held until the fall of France in 1940. He remained for a few months in Vichy France, moving to Ottawa, Canada, in the late fall of 1940 as the Canadian correspondent of The New York Times. During his stay in Canada he also did radio broadcasts for the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation network.

Source: Obituary, The New York Times, Nov. 10, 1956, p. 19.

PORTER, ROY (1907-1947)

Roy Porter was born in Chicago and educated at the University of Iowa, where he studied journalism. He got his first job in 1927 with The Los Angeles Herald. From May, 1937 to September, 1941, he covered Paris as a reporter for the Associated Press. Porter then worked as a commentator for NBC in Europe and in the China-Burmese war theater. After the war he returned to Paris but then came back to the United States and worked in New York City for an advertising agency. In 1942, Porter published a book on his experiences in Occupied France under the title Uncensored France.

Source: Obituary, The New York Times, December 27, 1947, p. 14.

SEVAREID, ARNOLD ERIC (1912-)

Eric Sevareid is a native of North Dakota, where he was born on November 26, 1912. In 1935, he received an A. B. degree from the University of Minnesota and continued his studies in Paris in 1937. He started his career in journalism as a copy boy, became a reporter for the Minneapolis Star, and was appointed editor of the Paris edition of The New York Herald Tribune in 1938. Advancing quickly, he became a night editor for the United Press in Paris in 1939 and the European correspondent for CBS in August, 1939. After the French defeat, Sevareid left France to broadcast news from all over the world. He wrote a book of reminiscences, Not So Wild a Dream, which was published in 1946 and republished in 1976.

Source: Who's Who in America 1980-1981 (Chicago, 1980), p. 2381.

SHIRER, WILLIAM L. (1904-)

William Shirer was born in Chicago on February 23, 1904. In 1925, he received an A. B. degree from Coe College. From 1925 to 1926, he was the Paris editor of The Chicago Tribune and its foreign correspondent from 1926 to 1933. He worked for the Universal News Service from 1935 to 1937, when he accepted the position of Continental representative for CBS. During World War II, he was a war correspondent, and after the war he was a commentator for CBS and the Mutual Network. As war correspondent, Shirer entered France with the German Army in 1940. He described his experience in Berlin Diary (1941), the first in a series of famous books, among them The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich (1961) and the Collapse of the Third Republic (1969).

Source: Who's Who in America, 1980-1981 (Chicago, 1980), p. 3018.

SMALL, ALEX (1895-1965)

Alex Small was a native of Hartford, Connecticut. In 1916, he graduated cum laude from Harvard. He served in the United States Army during World War I. After the war he taught English for two years at the University of Wisconsin. Small then began three years of graduate studies in France and Germany. He joined The Chicago Tribune in Paris in 1925, and reported on the Spanish Civil War from 1936 until he was expelled from Spain and threatened with execution. Small was in Warsaw when Hitler invaded Poland in September, 1939, and reported on the retreat of the Polish forces. He returned to Paris, stayed until the fall of 1940, and then worked in Berlin until he was interned by the Germans in December, 1941. After his release he reported from North Africa and India. After World War II, Small covered the Middle East and Europe for a number of years. He died on May 18, 1965, in St. Charles, Missouri.

Source: Obituary, The New York Times, May 19, 1965, p. 47.

WHITCOMB, PHILIP WRIGHT (1891-)

Philip W. Whitcomb was born on Nov. 24, 1891, in Topeka, Kansas. Both his parents were lawyers. He received his B. A. degree from Washburn University in 1910, and as a Rhodes Scholar he earned a B. A. from Oxford University in 1914. In 1952, he added an M. A. from Oxford and a Ph. D. from the University of Kansa in 1981. From 1914 to 1942, Whitcomb was a European correspondent for The New York Tribune, Harper's Weekly, and The Boston Evening Transcript. He was a war correspondent for the Associated Press in France druing 1941 and 1942, and European correspondent for The Baltimore Sun, from 1942 to 1947. Later, he spent many years as a special correspondent for The Christian Science Monitor. After World War II, former President Herbert Hoover chose Whitcomb to edit and translate France During the German Occupation, 1940-1944 (3 vols.). For many years Whitcomb was editor of Euromarket News, Commerce in France, and Commerce in Germany.

Source: Contemporary Authors, Vol. 73-76 (Detroit, 1978), p. 639; Kansas City Times, June 10, 1981, p. 81.

APPENDIX B

"DICTATORSHIP OR DEMOCRACY FOR FRANCE?"

"Dictatorship or Democracy for France?"

Diary of an Onlooker

By Mallory Browne

The Christian Science Monitor, Nov. 9, 1938, p. 20. PARIS

France is facing a period of serious political change. Just how long the period of transition will last, and how grave the changes will be, no one can say. But it is certain that French democracy has reached a crucial point, a testing time great with significance not only for France but for the world.

There are plenty of political prophets, both French and foreign, who predict positively that a dictatorship in France is now only a question of a few months, perhaps even of a few weeks. The diplomatic defeat implied in the Munich accords, these observers say, marked the final collapse of the republican regime and prepared the way for the advent, in one form or another, of a totalitarian regime.

Do not think that it is only the enemies of democracy who say these things.

Many Frenchmen who are ardent and sincere democrats, who are genuine supporters of the doctrine of parliamentary government, who belong to political parties of various shades: Left, Right and Center, today express serious apprehensions as to the outlook for the French Republican regime.

There is a very general feeling, cutting right across

ordinary party lines, that France -- faced as she is with a totalitarian Germany now numbering nearly 80,000,000 people against her own 40,000,000, and a totalitarian Italy more or less closely allied to the Reich -- must be reorganized on a more efficient basis before she can possibly meet the challenge of these militaristic neighbors.

For the term "totalitarian" has come to have a specific sense: it means essentially that all the resources of a country -- man power, labor, capital, currency, trade, industrial equipment -- are so organized and co-ordinated and controlled by the State as to be virtually in a condition of mobilization, and directed principally toward making the State more powerful militarily.

* * *

The conviction is steadily growing among Frenchmen of all classes that, unless France is to resign herself to a policy of repeated abdications before the superior force of Germany and Italy, some means will have to be found of uniting and disciplining under a vigorous, active authority all the resources of the French Empire -- that "Greater France" which has a population of over 100,000,000 people.

I do not think I am exaggerating in saying that on so much, there is a remarkable measure of agreement among French men and French women of all classes and all walks of life. But there the agreement ceases.

How this is to be accomplished, and by whom, and in

what form -- these are questions upon which there is almost complete discord.

To take the extremes first, the Communists are unshakably convinced that capitalism is the sole cause of France's troubles, and that only a dictatorship of the proletariat will establish what they call "a free, strong and happy France."

The Royalists -- and they cannot be entirely ignored, for though not numerous they are active and persistent -- have just proclaimed through the son of the pretender, the Comte de Paris, who risked imprisonment to fly to France and launch a manifesto, that only the return of the Monarchy can bring about the restoration of French greatness.

* * *

There is of course nothing new about these two theories, except perhaps the fact that at both ends of the scale they are being urged with renewed energy. What is new is the effort of the French war veterans to oblige the politicians to take a back seat for a time and turn over the management and government of France to a non-party "Cabinet of Experts," a strong, semi-military Government dominated by the war veterans themselves. This movement has met with considerable resistance, especially in political circles of the Left. But its essential idea -- that of a group of men who are specialists in their field and who would govern France free from party considerations -- receives widespread support throughout the country.

There are two other currents which should be recorded. One is what might be termed "bourgeois opinion" -- meaning chiefly the moneyed and propertied classes -- which genuinely fears and even expects a "red" revolutionary movement directed against capitalism and capitalists. The other is what might be called "democratic leftist opinion," which is equally fearful that these "bourgeois" through their control of the press and their influence on the Government through the banks, would lend themselves to a "Fascist" coup backed by Germany and Italy, and based on the alleged necessity of saving France from Communism.

Two facts -- the precarious condition of France's finances and the imminent prospect of a burdensome super-rearmament program -- lend peculiar significance to the political unrest. I do not share the alarmist apprehensions of some observers, who foresee a French dictatorship in the near future. The Frenchman remains an individualist and a lover of liberty and democracy. He can be counted upon not to abandon these blessings without a hard struggle. But it is nevertheless true that this struggle has now begun in France. What its eventual outcome will be, only time will tell.

APPENDIX C

TEXT OF THE FRANCO-GERMAN ARMISTICE AGREEMENT

THE TEXT OF THE FRANCO-GERMAN ARMISTICE AGREEMENT

Effective June 25, 1940

(Source: The New York Times, June 26, 1940, p. 4)

Article I

The French Government directs a cessation of fighting against the German Reich in France as well as in French possessions, colonies, protectorate territories, mandates as well as on the seas. It (the French Government) directs the immediate laying down of arms of French units already encircled by German troops.

Article II

To safeguard the interests of the German Reich, French State territory north and west of the line drawn on the attached map will be occupied by German troops.

As far as the parts to be occupied still are not in control of German troops, this occupation will be carried out immediately after the conclusion of this treaty.

Article III

In the occupied parts of France the German Reich exercises all rights of an occupying power. The French Government obliges itself to support with every means the regulations resulting from the exercise of these rights and to carry them out with the aid of French administration.

All French authorities and officials of the occupied territory, therefore, are to be promptly informed by the French Government to comply with the regulations of the German military commanders and to cooperate with them in a correct manner.

It is the intention of the German Government to limit the occupation of the west coast after ending hostilities with England to the extent absolutely necessary.

The French Government is permitted to select the seat of its government in unoccupied territory, or, if it wishes, to move to Paris. In this case, the German Government guarantees the French Government and its central authorities every necessary alleviation so that they will be in a position to conduct the administration of unoccupied territory from Paris.

Article IV

French armed forces on land, on the sea and in the air are to be demobilized and disarmed in a period still to be set. Excepted are only those units which are necessary for maintenance of domestic order. Germany and Italy will fix their strength. The French armed forces in the territory to be occupied by Germany are to be hastily withdrawn into territory not to be occupied and be discharged. These troops, before marching out, shall lay down their weapons and equipment at the places where they are stationed at the

time this treaty becomes effective. They are responsible for orderly delivery to German troops.

Article V

As a guarantee for the observance of the armistice, the surrender, undamaged, of all those guns, tanks, tank defense weapons, warplanes, anit-aircraft artillery, infantry weapons, means of conveyance and munitions can be demanded from the units of the French armed forces which are standing in battle against Germany and which at the time this agreement goes into force are in territory not to be occupied by Germany.

The German armistice commission will decide the extent of delivery.

Article VI

Weapons, munitions, and war apparatus of every kind remaining in the unoccupied portion of France are to be stored and, or, secured under German and, or, Italian control--so far as not released for the arming allowed to French units

The German High Command reserves the right to direct all those measures which are necessary to exclude unauthorized use of this material. Building of new war apparatus in unoccupied territory is to be stopped immediately.

Article VII

In occupied territory, all the land and coastal fortifications, with weapons, munitions and apparatus and plants of every kind are to be surrendered undamaged. Plans of these fortifications as well as plans of those already conquered by German troops are to be handed over.

Exact plans regarding prepared blastings, land mines, obstructions, time fuses, barriers for fighting, etc., shall be given to the German High Command. These hindrances are to be removed by French forces upon German demand.

Article VIII

The French war fleet is to collect in ports to be designated more particularly and under German, and, or, Italian control to demobilize and lay up--with the exception of those units released to the French Government for protection of French interests in its colonial empire.

The peacetime stations of ships should control the designation of ports.

The German Government solemnly declares to the French Government that it does not intend to use the French war fleet which is in harbors under German control for its purposes in war, with the exception of units necessary for the purposes of guarding the coast and sweeping mines.

It further solemnly and expressly declares that it does not intend to bring up any demands respecting the French War

Fleet at the conclusion of a peace.

All warships outside France are to be recalled to France with the exception of that portion of the French War Fleet which shall be designated to represent French interests in the colonial empire.

Article IX

The French High Command must give the German High Command the exact location of all mines which France has set out, as well as information on other harbor and coastal obstructions and defense facilities. In so far as the German High Command may require, French forces must clear away the mines.

Article X

The French Government is obligated to forbid any portion of its remaining armed forces to undertake hostilities against Germany in any manner.

The French Government also will prevent members of its armed forces from leaving the country and prevent armaments of any sort, including ships, planes, etc., being taken to England or any other place abroad.

The French Government will forbid French citizens to fight against Germany in the service of States with which the German Reich is still at war. French citizens who violate this provision are to be treated by German troops as insurgents.

Article XI

French commercial vessels of all sorts, including coastal and harbor vessels which are now in French hands, may not leave port until further notice. Resumption of commercial voyages will require approval of the German and Italian Governments.

French commercial vessels will be recalled by the French Government or, if return is impossible, the French Government will instruct them to enter neutral harbors.

All confiscated German commercial vessels are, on demand, to be returned to (to Germany) undamaged.

Article XII

Flight by any airplane over French territory shall be prohibited. Every plane making a flight without German approval will be regarded as an enemy by the German Air Force and treated accordingly.

In unoccupied territory, air fields and ground facilities of the air force shall be under German and Italian control.

Demand may be made that such air fields be rendered unusable. The French Government is required to take charge of all foreign airplanes in the unoccupied region to prevent flights. They are to be turned over to the German armed forces.

Article XIII

The French Government obligates itself to turn over to German troops in the occupied region all facilities and properties of the French armed forces in undamaged condition.

It (the French Government) also will see to it that harbors, industrial facilities and docks are preserved in their present condition and damaged in no way.

The same stipulations apply to transportation routes and equipment, especially railways, roads and canals, and to the whole communications network and equipment, waterways and coastal transportation services.

Additionally, the French Government is required on demand of the German High Command to perform all necessary restoration labor on these facilities.

The French Government will see to it that in the occupied region necessary technical personnel and rolling stock of the railways and other transportation equipment, to a degree normal in peacetime, be retained in service.

Article XIV

There is an immediate prohibition of transmission for all wireless stations on French soil. Resumption of wireless connections from the unoccupied portion of France requires a special regulation.

Article XV

The French Government obligates itself to convey transit freight traffic between the German Reich and Italy through unoccupied territory to the extent demanded by the German Government.

Article XVI

The French Government, in agreement with the responsible German officials, will carry out the return of population into occupied territory.

Article XVII

The French Government obligates itself to prevent transference of economic valuables and provisions from the territory to be occupied by German troops into unoccupied territory or abroad.

These valuables and provisions in occupied territory are to be disposed of only in agreement with the German Government. In that connection, the German Government will consider the necessities of life of the population in unoccupied territory.

Article XVIII

The French Government will bear the costs of maintenance of German occupation troops on French soil.

Article XIX

All German war and civil prisoners in French custody, including those under arrest and convicted who were seized and sentenced because of acts in favor of the German Reich, shall be surrendered immediately to German troops.

The French Government is obliged to surrender upon demand all Germans named by the German Government in France as well as in French possessions, colonies, protectorate territories and mandates.

The French Government binds itself to prevent removal of German war and civil prisoners from France into French possessions or into foreign countries. Regarding prisoners already taken outside of France, as well as sick and wounded German prisoners who cannot be transported, exact lists with the places of residence are to be produced. The German High Command assumes care of sick and wounded German war prisoners.

Article XX

French troops in German prison camps will remain prisoners of war until conclusion of a peace.

Article XXI

The French Government assumes responsibility for the security of all objects and valuables whose undamaged surrender or holding in readiness for German disposal is

demanded in this agreement or whose removal outside the country is forbidden. The French Government is bound to compensate for all destruction, damage or removal contrary to agreement.

Article XXII

The Armistice Commission, acting in accordance with the direction of the German High Command, will regulate and supervise the carrying out of the armistice agreement. It is the task of the Armistice Commission further to insure the necessary conformity of this agreement with the Italian-French armistice.

The French Government will send a delegation to the seat of the German Armistice Commission to represent the French wishes and to receive regulations from the German Armistice Commission for executing [the agreement].

Article XXIII

This armistice agreement becomes effective as soon as the French Government also has reached an agreement with the Italian Government regarding cessation of hostilities.

Hostilities will be stopped six hours after the moment at which the Italian Government has notified the German Government of conclusion of its agreement. The German Government will notify the French Government of this time by wireless.

Article XXIV

This agreement is valid until conclusion of a peace treaty. The German Government may terminate this agreement at any time with immediate effect if the French Government fails to fulfill the obligations it assumes under the agreement.

This armistice agreement, signed in the Forest of Compiègne, June 22, 1940, at 6:50 P.M., German Summer time.

HUNTZIGER,
KEITEL.

Appendix

The line mentioned in Article II of the armistice agreement begins in the east on the French-Swiss border at Geneva and runs thence nearly over the villages of Dole, Paray, Le Monial and Bourges to approximately twenty kilometers (about twelve miles) east of Tours. From there it goes at a distance of twenty kilometers east of the Tours-Angoulème-Liborune railway line and extends through Mont de Marsan and Orthez to the Spanish border.

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