SOCIOLOGY: THE DEVELOPMENT AND CONSEQUENCES

OF A SCIENCE OF SOCIETY

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CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION AND STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

The questions inevitably raised by any mind possessing the sociological imagination . . . is the capacity to shift from one perspective to another--from the political to the psychological; from examination of a single family to comparative assessment of the national budgets of the world; from the theological school to the military establishment; from considerations of an oil industry to studies of contemporary poetry. It is the capacity to range from the most impersonal and remote transformations to the most intimate features of the human self--and to see the relations between the two (Mills, 1972:7).

It is equally evident that at no time would the number of such individuals have been very large (Radin 1957:xxi).

Introduction

In the course of living all men establish a set of rudimentary assumptions. These assumptions and theories are expressed in the roughand-ready circumstances of everyday usage. Sometimes these words and actions are more pungent and articulate than more sophisticated expressions might be, but sometimes they are limited and insufficient. From these life expressions we know that all aspects of nature are intricately interconnected and interwoven with each other and that some events, in particular, seem always to cause others. However, our common sense understanding is often inadequate when we need to know *exactly* what these interconnections are and what events specifically cause others. Consequently, we are compelled to think more critically and analytically about

our ideas and about the nature of the facts we experience. We therefore, devise systematic methods so that our theories about cause-and-effect relationship can be tested. Certainly, not all individuals in a society perceive the need for their theories to be testable, but thought becomes more consciously critical and analytical as the human desire to know and understand is fulfilled.

Moreover, common sense is helpless when elements which have to be taken into account are very numerous: a housewife needs no statistics for making her plans, but without elaborate statistical calculations the planning of national economy will end in a calamity (Andreski 1969:39).

Almost from the outset of their career, homo sapiens have used distinctively human facilities not only to make substantial tools for use in the physical world, but also to imagine supernatural forces through which they could relate to it. Man, then, through the ages has been simultaneously trying to understand, and to utilize, natural processes and create imaginary beings in his own image that he hoped to coerce or cajole. He was building up science and superstition, as it were, side by side. For many centuries, to aid in this explanation of his surroundings, man developed animistic, anthromorphic and supernatural philosophies to supplement his common sense perceptions. Science as the most recent philosophy in this chain of inventions is also utilized for this These philosophies have more than an explanatory function. purpose. They also sustained man with illusions and provided him with courage, comfort, consolation, confidence, and a means for environmental control, all of which have a biological and social survival value.

The priori and most important means an individual has at his disposal for knowing his environment is perceptions of his everyday common sense experiences. Although these experiences may be adequate for his

immediate needs, they necessarily limit his total understanding. Often common sense concepts "are not consensually defined and most frequently they refer to what is sensed, not what is analyzed" (Denzin 1970:38). Therefore, development of specific philosophies was necessary as a means of predicting future events, as well as for setting-up of various social sanctions. As the size of groups and societies increased, specialization were necessary, organized by a division of labour to enable the totality of the social group to more efficiently secure its survival was inevitable. Accordingly, professionals were also necessary to act as social interpretors.

Their vision and knowledge, a mystery to other men, were supposed to give them the power to propitiate the gods and influence natural forces. Operating thus as mediators between the gods and men, the priests [as these persons came to be called] were therefore considered to stand above other men, closer to the gods (Sennett and Cobb 1973:226 italics added).

These men were also professionals whose social function it was to "interpret mysteries which affect the lives of those who do not understand", or for reasons of individual specialization have not the time to study the "evils" of the cosmos (Sennett and Cobb 1973:227).

In many cases these individuals possessed some charismatic qualities with the result that their position became revered. As professionals their knowledge was considered to have a universal quality that was needed in daily life, and their legitimacy was more than the average individuals felt adequate to dispute (see Sennett and Cobb 1973:239; Bledstein 1976:90). "Today it is generally sufficient that . . . [sociologists] bear the stamp of science to receive a sort of privileged credit, because we have faith in science" (Durkheim 1915:438). Further, "The Modern counterpart of the priest is the professional" (Sennett and Cobb 1973:226), whose power is such (in most Western countries at least)

that they have established what Burton Bledstein (1976) has entitled "The Culture of Professionalism". The esteem and prestige of these persons generally increases in direct proportion to their ability to "coerce or cajole" the populace "to 'trust' in the integrity of trained persons, to respect the moral authority of those whose claim to power lay in the sphere of the sacred and the charismatic" (Bledstein 1976:90; see also Andreski 1973:24,31). It appears, therefore, that possession of knowledge has a utilitarian function in certain respects that sets the knower apart from the remainder of humanity, and such an image revives notions of the Platonian statement that "The wise shall lead and rule, and the ignorant shall follow" (Popper 1971:120).

This brings me to the *first assumption* in this thesis, that the scientist, and with him the sociologist, occupies a position in society credited by a populace that is:

still possessed by the pre-Socratic magical attitude towards science, and towards the scientist, whom they consider as a somewhat glorified shaman, as wise, learned, initiated. They judge him by the amount of knowledge in his possession, instead of taking, with Socrates, his awareness of what he does not know as a measure of his scientific level as well as of his intellectual honesty (Popper 1971:129).

Like their counterparts (the priests, magicians, sorcers, and shamans,) scientists represent a social class in many ways distinct from the majority of the populace. Such separation was advocated by Plato and his contempories over a thousand years ago, and a similar attitude persists to this day. Historically, this class of intellectuals has been associated with the ruling elite, although largely free to engage in academic pursuits at will. In most cases their endeavours are oriented either directly or indirectly toward perpetuating middle-class values (Bledstein 1976; and Mills 1972:95-99). The emergence of sociology has

been the result of a few vested interests attempting to achieve a "science" of understanding and social control. The ideas heralding this event can be traced back to before the time of Christ. More recently however, the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries saw developments of thought and knowledge in the "sciences" themselves: in the theory of knowledge, in moral and political philosophy, and in the philosophy of history which were all such as to lead to, and emphasize the need for, the careful creation and elaboration of a specific science of society.

The widespread commerce which had gradually changed and then disrupted the order of Christendom was now developing into a new industrial capitalism in which science was becoming harnessed to agricultural and industrial technology and wherein secular nation states were the established and powerful unites of political authority. The "ancien regime" was doomed, and it was to be torn asunder during the revolutionary decades at the end of the eighteenth century. The French Revolution especially was the symptomatic bursting of these many ills of social change from which present Western culture festered.

With the disruption of traditional authorities, coupled with the disruption of religious beliefs, a few influential men came to believe that they themselves were responsible for the re-making of society. This was a conscious assumption of man's responsibility for the directing of his own destiny of a kind and a magnitude quite new in history. The second fact, attendant upon this, was that, needing responsibility to undertake the total reconstruction of their society, these men also felt the need for a body of knowledge about the nature of society as a totality of institutions to serve as a firm and reliable basis for their judgement and activities. That is, the natural structure of society needed to

be understood so that its functioning could be managed. A positive science of society was needed, by these political and entrepreneurial leaders. The positivistic theory of world history that resulted was "the historical self-projection of the west-European middle-class, in which the 'spirit of capitalism' had determined the ideals of knowledge and morality" (Scheler 1960:355).

It is worthwhile to press home this point and to point out that this is a factor which has remained at the heart of sociology from that day to this. This point has already been suggested, but Norman Birnbaum in his *On the Sociology of Current Social Research* carries the matter somewhat further. Birnbaum (1973:218) writes:

those methods of observation we today indetify as distinctively sociological developed in a considerable degree of isolation from the development of sociological thought itself. Moreover, these methods developed outside the universities, in response to the practical requirements of governments and voluntary associations for valid knowledge of immediate social circumstances. . . Their scientific form was given by the rise of statistical reasoning, their political content was determined by the imperatives which motivated governments and political groupings to examine at first hand the unprecedented conditions of a society which was undergoing urbanization and industrialization.

As a result of the transformation of human society from the relatively simple conditions of industrial agrarian communities to the vast complexity of the conditions of industrial and urban organization, a new body of knowledge was necessary if men were to exercise any effective control whatsoever over the social forces which these new conditions unleashed. "Generally, the collection of empirical social data . . . served reformist political purposes" (Birnbaum 1973:220). That is, it served "those seeking to exercise some control over the new industrial society" (Birnbaum 1973:218), or as Max Scheler (1960:355) suggests, the "modern industrial enterprise, [was] bent solely on the expansion of

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power". Congruent with this development "Empirical sociology, . . . entered the universities simultaneously with theoretical sociology, in response to the educated middle-classes' demand for orientation in a society become ever more bureaucratic and complex" (Birnbaum 1973:220). In America, a country designed to become the leading capitalist society, the "univesity came into existence to serve and promote professional authority in society" (Bledstein 1976:x).

These influential groups, or perhaps more specifically, these controlling groups, were becoming aware, not only of ideas, but of the visible and known implications of their economic and political activity and of the inter-linking of all the nations of the world into a global entity of human society. The merchants presented the financial motivation for this development as they sought to extend their trading relations and the links between political societies which these entailed. The universities through "the development of higher education . . . made possible a social faith in merit, competence, discipline, and control that were basic to accepted conceptions of achievement and success" (Bledstein 1976:x). The unity of mankind was therefore no longer an issue for ethical doubt or conviction, but was something which was clearly taking place. The new conception of the responsible self-direction of man was therefore, at once, a conception of a united world. A view that is still held by man today, and one that on the surface seems possible taking the view that

the middle-class person . . [is] the world's organizer: . . [who seeks] accurate information, act[s] with the 'coldest prudence,' and buil[ds] a more perfect institutional order than ha[s] ever been known, an order that permit[s] meritorious middle-class persons to realize their inner selves by means of publicly recognized status, power, and wealth (Bledstein 1976:27 italics added).

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Following in the footsteps of the socerer, the priest, and the magician, sociology appears to have developed as a discipline for maintaining social unity and supporting the status quo. Which essentially means in Platonian terms "When each class in the city minds its own business, the money-earning class as well as the auxiliaries and the guardians, then this will be justice" (see Popper 1971:90). Plato's classes include the workers, warriors, and rulers in that order. If this is the case, then some evidence would exist to suggest this contention. A further comment from Norman Birnbaum (1973:219) might be of assistance. He writes:

A political motivation for the pursuit of social inquiry need not always be salient in the consciousness of those engaged in inquiry. Indeed, those actively pursuing social inquiry may subjectively believe themselves to be responding to a disinterested curiosity, when in fact political factors in the envirronment may well have induced them to define their object of inquiry in one way rather than another (see Mills 1972:81).

Conceding the benefit of any doubt at this point, such a situation may be norm rather than the exception. But as Birnbaum (1973:224) further points out:

there has been an enormous increase in the employment of empirical research technique by sociologists either working directly for or on behalf of governmental agencies, industry, the mass media, the political parties, and a great variety of interest groups. These sponsors of sociological research are, clearly, not interested in knowledge or orientation in an abstract sense; they seek to manipulate, to control, the social environment. (see also Gouldner 1971b:439,445; Mills 1972:76-99).

In fact, rarely is any research performed in the United States today that is not conducted under the limitations and controls of some grantsman. With the result that:

It is unfortunate, . . . to find so many sociologists dissipating lifetimes of exhausting work while laboring under the illusion that their daily conduct is regulated solely by scientific curiosity. The spectacle of sociologists who energetically profess a humanistic outlook while contributing to

the oppressive institutions in our society is . . . [an] example of liberal irrationality (Schwendinger and Schwendinger (1978:xxvii-xxviii).

This is not to be taken to mean that all sociologists are technical sorcerers in any empirical sense as Jerome Ravetz (1973) points out. On the other hand, Ravetz (1973:21) tells us:

The 'technocratic' view of science is that of a basic factor of production, needing ever-increasing supplies of highlytrained 'scientific-manpower'. This view of science is a descendant, in a simplified and vulgarized form, of a tradition extending from Francis Bacon down through Karl Marx. Bacon gave the aphorism 'knowledge and power meet in one'; and Marxist historians have attempted to show that the major advances in science have come as a response [however indirect] to the particular needs of the production at the time.

It is also certain, that the discipline of sociology exists as a bureaucratized arm of the State controlled Department of Education, and individual sociologists have little control over how they apply their academic interests. Two points bear further explanation here. One is that "in many ways, Western sociology was and remains a response to a utilitarian culture". This means that since "utilitarianism . . . [is] also a central component of the everyday culture of middle-class society" (Gouldner 1971b:61), and being "Typically, middle-class . . . with professional pretensions", sociologists are morally obligated to "translate the moral cause of temperance into a scientific truth for successful living" (Bledstein 1976:91). The second point of relevance is suggested by Thomas Kuhn (1970:10-11) who says:

The study of paradigms, . . . is what mainly prepares the student for membership in the particular scientific community with which he will later practice. Because he there joins men who learned the bases of their field from the same concrete models, his subsequent practice will seldom evoke overt disagreement over fundamentals. Men whose research is based on paradigms are committed to the same rules and standards for scientific practice. That commitment and the apparent consensus it produces are prerequisites for . . . the genesis and continuation of a particular research tradition.

A brief look at some suggested perspectives pursued by sociologists might be helpful here to ascertain some understanding of what might be the intended or unintended consequences of their endeavours. Several attempts have been made to delineate the various perspective pursued by sociologists (Ritzer 1975). George Ritzer (1975:24) specifically suggests that there are three basic paradigms within sociology: (1) The Social Facts Paradigm; (2) The Social Definition Paradigm; and (3) The Social Behaviour Paradigm. Further, Ritzer (1975:24n-25n) contends that these can be defined as follows:

The social factist tends to be committed to professional goals. He is interested in the development of grand, abstract theory. If he is a researcher, he is interested in using sophisticated and elaborate statistics. The social factist fits Friedrichs' [1970] 'priestly' mode (italics added).

The social definitionist tends to reject grand theory and elaborate statistics. He is more orientated to the idea that he possesses peculiar skills. These skills are a result of his training and allow him to see things that would escape the layman. (This is Mills' 'sociological imagination' and Weber's Verstehen.) The social definitionist tends to be what Friedrichs called the 'prophet'. The social definitionist is particularly interested in debunking myths about society and changing various things that he regards as detrimental.

The social behaviorist tends to stand somewhere between the social factist and the social definitionist. He accepts the need to develop theory and use sophisticated methods and statistics. He also accepts a prophetic role within society. He tends to use his theories and methods to debunk myths, as well as lay the groundwork for improving society.

These three paradigms can be summarized as follows: The Social Factists are concerned with groups or tatalities; the Social Definitionists are concerned with interindividual-intergroup interactions; and, the Social Behaviourists are concerned with the individuals only (see also Ritzer 1975:197-198). Each of these paradigms are not unrelated as the above statement suggests, and, if they were, the concept of sociology as a discipline concerned with a holistic subject matter would be false.

Which means that:

Sociology is the scientific study of all forms of human association: their nature, functions, interconnections, and patterns of change, in various types of society. Beginning with reflection upon common-sense assumptions, and thereafter employing analytical, observational, classificatory, historicla and comparative methods, it seeks to establish testable knowledge, testable theories, about these associations (Fletcher 1971a:72).

Taken literally then, it could be said that since the formulation of the word "Sociology" by Auguste Comte in 1839, sociology has meant the study of all society. However, Emile Durkheim, the exemplar of a social factist perspective (Ritzer 1975:36) contends that "Sociology can . . . be defined as the science of institutions, of their genesis and of their functioning" (Durkheim 1962:1vi). Or to be more specific, the social factists contend that "social roles, institutional patterns, social processes, cultural pattern, culturally patterned emotions, social norms, group organization, social structure, devices for social control, etc." are the realm for sociology (Merton 1968:104; Blau 1960: 178). The theoretical orientation of these sociologists is structural functionalism. As grand theorists, they set forth "a realm of concepts from which are excluded many structural features of human society, features long and accurately recognized as fundamental to its understanding" (Mills 1972:35). As David Lockwood (1956) has noted, such a perspective delivers the sociologist from any concern with "power", with economic and political institutions insofar as they exist, they must exist naturally, and hence be maintained (see also Mills 1972:33-49; Gouldner 1971b:48-51).

With respect to the social definitionist, George Ritzer (1975:84) suggests that Max Weber is the exemplar of this paradigm which places its emphasis on social action. However, the ethnomethodologists and

symbolic interactionists as represented by the works of Harold Garfinkel (1967), Herbert Blumer (1962), and Erving Goffman (1959) might better fit this perspective. The emphasis here is as Blumer (1962:187) states: "Human society is to be seen as consisting of acting people, and the life of the society is to be seen as consisting of their actions". This perspective considers that how individuals organize themselves is the framework inside which social action takes place, and as such, the organization and changes in it is the concern for sociologists. That is, the products of the activity of acting individuals, gourps, and institutions, and not forces which leave such acting units out of account. In many respects "the systematic theory of the nature of man and of society all too readily becomes an elaborate and arid formulism in which the splitting of Concepts and their endless rearrangement becomes the central endeavor" (Mills 1972:23). The most important element in this perspective is the acting situation itself, or "Otherwise put, it seeks to give an organized account of the routine grounds for everyday action" (Andreski 1973:236). Thereby ignoring the fact that:

Both the correct statement of the problem and the range of possible solutions require us to consider the economic and political instituions of the society, and not merely the personal situation and character of a scatter of individuals (Mills 1972:9).

Finally, we have the social behaviour paradigm. The exemplar of this perspective is B. F. Skinner (Ritzer 1975:142). The subject matter of this paradigm is behaviour and contingencies of reinforcement. Concern is only with the individual, and such concepts as mind, social structure, or social institutions are ignored because they serve to distract us from a concern with behaviour (Ritzer 1975:195). One of the distinguishing characteristics of behavioural sociology is its clinically

applied aspect. Focus revolves around the behaviour of individuals as they interact with their environment so as to ascertain the types of contingencies and reinforcements that are produced in various settings, and which may be duplicated. When these factors are known, specific controls can be applied to condition the individual to accept whatever the behaviourist considers is best for him. This point is specifically set out in Skinner's (1971) book *Beyond Freedom and Dignity*. "Generally accepting the *status quo*, they tend to formulate problems out of the troubles and issues that administrators believe they face" (Mills 1972: 96).

In all these sociological perspectives the sociologist "tends to paint himself generously in hues of objectivity, humility and rationality" (Mahoney 1976:4). Such an image tends to support "the saintly prestige accorded him by the public", but few of his publications creditably justify his being "viewed as the passionless purveyor of truth" (Mahoney 1976:4-5, also 8-9, 92-124; and Andreski 1973). Methodologically, the social factist tends to use the abstract tools of structured interviews and/or questionnaires when he engages in social research. The social definitionist generally employs a limited participant observation technique. While, the social behaviourists have traditionally favoured clinical laboratory experiments, although in recent years they have been prone to reproduce and apply similar methods in the field (see Ritzer 1975:191-196). Rarely is there a combination of qualitative and quantitative methods used to explore the same subject matter, which tends to suggest that many sociologists are not concerned with a holistic approach to studies of social phenomena. There concern is more with supporting their method and acquiring "personal recognition" (Mahoney 1976:118-122;

Andreski 1973:30). Nevertheless, one gets the impression that each of these three paradigm perspectives tends to reinforce the others by means of a division of labour effect. Thereby, regardless of individual specialization sociology as a discipline still maintains a collective concern for the whole society in accordance with the parameters of traditional definitions.

In his Republic Plato maintained that "we should begin our inquiry in the city, and continue it afterwards in the individual, always watching for points of similarity" (Popper 1971:79; Cornford 1977:55). This approach is still basically followed by the social factists, but since "society" today is larger and more complex than it was in Plato's day, individual sociologists are unable to effectively pursue such a holistic perspective. By necessity then, a division of labour is the only means by which the totality can be studied. Therefore, whilst the social factists satisfy themselves with structures and institutions, the social definitionists are mostly concerned with "expressions given off" (Goffman 1959:4), and the social behaviourists continue to concern themselves with "deviants" and those straying from adherence to the middle-class social norms for "successful living". With the result that, "Within this whole, the different individuals, and groups of individuals, with their natural inequalities, must render their specific and very unequal services" as defined by the social "guardians" (Popper 1971:81). Whilst "As practices, [these paradigms] . . . may be understood as insuring that we do not learn too much about man and society--the first by formal and cloudy obscurantism, the second [two] by formal and empty ingenuity" (Mills 1972:75 italics added). Therefore, since Thomas Kuhn formulated the term "paradigm" in 1960, the paradigm has increasingly

formed "the conceptual and methodological world of the scientist" (Mahoney 1976:19). "Moreover", as Michael Mahoney (1976:20) suggests, "the prevailing paradigm not only affects what the scientist may look for or see, but also *how* he sees it". Consequently, their concern with "keeping the faith" implies that their "primary goal is the 'legitimation' of the paradigm--that is, its confirmation, refinement, and expansion" only (Mahoney 1976:20).

It seems reasonable to suggest therefore, that techniques have dictated a view of humanity which eternalizes the present constraints to which men are subject. Empirical inquiries have been undertaken with political purposes which directly influence the use of empirical techniques. Thus, it can be readily seen that the conventional notion of the sociological recording of process in a fixed social reality is incompatible with methodologies of these types (Birnbaum 1973:226-231; Ritzer 1975:192-197). However, overall

the selectionist viewpoint provides a justification for the otherwise gratuitous functionalist assumption that every enduring institution must have a function--in the sense of Radcliffe-Brown's definition of 'making a contribution to the continued existence of the whole' (Andreski 1973:53).

This brings me to the second and third assumptions pertinent to this thesis. The second assumption is that generally sociologists engage themselves in pursuits that have the consequence, intended or unintended, of supporting the existing political and social norms and values of middle-class society. The third assumption is that generally sociologists are not concerned with describing, explaining, and understanding the total intricacy of social phenomena for the sake of knowledge alone. Their concern is more as Alvin Gouldner (1971:27) suggests:

[a] wish to become, and to be thought of as, scientists; they wish to make their work more rigorous, more mathematical, more

formal, and more powerfully instrumented. To them it is the scientific method of study intself, not the object studied or the way the object is conceived, that is the emotionally central if not the logically defining characteristic of sociology (see also Andreski 1973:24,31).

The importance of theory has already been suggested, but although these are of primary importance to the sociologist, and are compounded out of a number of orienting concepts, the view is generally held that the scientist cannot solve problems without them. In fact, as Thomas Kuhn (1970:187) suggests:

[this means that to] solve problems at all . . . he has [to have] first learned the theory and some rules for applying it. Scientific knowledge is [in this view] embedded in theory and rules; problems are supplied [therefore only] to gain facility in their application (italics added).

This view is totally wrong (Kuhn 1970:188), simply because if we resort to our common sense understanding for a moment, it becomes clear that beliefs, symbols, and assumptions that shape experience, guide perception and cognition, and discriminate between types of events, and specify the subjects of inquiry. In many instances once the subject of inquiry has been stated, the means for solving it as it were, is often found inherent within that subject (see Denzin 1970:35-38). In fact, without these orienting concepts there is little we can know and nothing we can study or reflect upon, and consequently, the concept of science could not exist. Our common sense views are theories in a sense, but they vary considerably from scientific theories in sofar as they tend to be less These theories essentially "consists of one or more proposiabsolute. tions--statements capable of being true or false--that state how things or events referred to by the orienting concepts are related to each other" (Honigmann 1976:3). Strickly speaking then, these theories refer only to

propositions that explain how events are brought about, how they predictably occur, or can be produced, and are often metaphysical in character.

Nevertheless, learning of the various theories and scientific methodologies remains a predominate occupation in most institutions of "higher" learning. One of the reasons for this relates to the fact that it is in the "academic establishments in which social theory today is made and taught" (Gouldner 1971b:402); and the other reason relates to a "growing instrumentalism, accelerated by the increasing role of the state" in academic affairs (Gouldner 1971b:444). Empirical problems in the social arena are often seen to be of minor concern, presenting a contradiction it would seem with the "traditional" goals of sociology. Alvin Gouldner (1971b:439) suggests that this situation "derives from its role as market researcher for the Welfare State", but is there really a contradiction? I shall return to this point shortly.

Sociological theories have been constructed about features of social life universally present in society and culture, present in only certain types of society and culture, and then only in accordance with what previous studies have stated about them. Scientific theories attempt to be always testable. Nevertheless, theories differ in comprehensiveness, and in the generality with which they grasp events, but at every level of comprehensiveness they tend to offer synchronic and diachronic explanations of social and cultural phenomena. In other words, the greater part of these contructs consist of three basic kinds of propositions. Firstly, such theories specify the conditions that predictably give rise to particular social phenomena (e.g. the family, division of labour, deviant behaviour), and trace their consequences or functions. Secondly, theory consists of general propositions tracing

unique changes that have taken place in societies through time (e.g. types of religious and nonreligious practices and symbols). Related to these theories and in some respects forming a fourth category of theory, are precedures followed in studying the social phenomena described. These consist of methodologies and metatheoretical propositions defending the importance of studying something, justifying why certain methods of investigation or view points are preferable to others, or explaining how information about social phenomena is acquired.

Basic to these theories is the belief that conceptual, empirical, ethical, and aesthetic knowledge are conceived to form a single unified system which materializes itself in society. This factor is important for the understanding of the aspirations of the early sociologists. As Don Martindale (1975:22) has written: "one source of the appeal of sociology, despite the many crudities in its early forms, was its aspiration for total knowledge at a time when this hope was fading". In the spirit of this acceptance Auguste Comte assigned to sociology the task of this acceptance of knowledge and bringing order to society. A similar pursuit was the concern of Plato and most other Greek philosophers long before Comte's time, and apparently this pursuit is what sociologists are still theoretically engaged in doing.

In most cases the early sociologists both before and after Comte were grand theorists and postulated a positivistic perspective of sociological endeavour. Setting the stage for this perspective Plato wrote in the *Laws* "Every artist . . . executes the part for the sake of the whole, and not the whole for the sake of the part". To facilitate him in his endeavour the sociologist was to bear in mind that "you are created for the sake of the whole, and not the whole for the sake of you" (Popper

1971:80-81). The important theme Plato says was not the "happiness of individuals nor that of any particular class in the state, but only the happiness of the whole" (Popper 1971:169). Sociologists therefore, were to deliberately confine themselves to discovering and stating regularities about the nature of social systems, the interconnections between their parts and the relations between whole societies. This concern was in fact the extent to which knowledge about the entire fabric of social interdependency was necessary. Methods to be used in this task were to include those used by the natural scientists. But at this point, the aims of sociology were to diverge from that of a holistic philosophy, for like the natural sciences, sociology was not to be concerned with individuals, but with classes, types and species of phenomena (the definitions referred to earlier by Durkheim, Merton and Blau are especially relevant here). Although their methodologies were to be the same, sociology differed from the natural sciences in that the historical method was necessary because human societies were different from other "facts" in nature in their being historical, cumulative, cultural sequences of feeling, thought and action. The classificatory and comparative method plus the historical method were thus to support each other.

"History therefore is not studied for its own sake but serves as the method of the social sciences. This is the historicist methodology" (Popper 1971:75). In the generation after Hegel's death, (1831) "the life of nature began to be thought of as a progressive life, and to that extent a life resembling the life of history inherent in the Greek concepts physis" (Collingwood 1976:128-9). So that, when Charles Darwin (1859) published The Origin of Species the idea of natural selection and progress was not new. With the result, as Collingwood (1976:129) points

Evolution could now be used as a generic term covering both historical progress and natural progress. The victory of evolution in scientific circles meant that the positivistic reduction of history to nature was qualified by a partial reduction of nature to history. . . leading to the assumption that natural evolution was automatically progressive, creative by its own law of better and better forms of life; and . . . through the assumption that historical progress depended on the same so-called law of nature and that the methods of natural science, in its new evolutionary form, were adequate to the study of historical processes.

Evolutionary theory, it is suggested, allowed for a comparative analysis useful for the devising of explanations about relationships between the parts of society as well as between societies. The like relationship between the parts of society as well as between societies. The like realtionship between the historical process and the natural process further suggested that society and its components were likewise natural phenomena and could therefore be treated as such scientifically.

Most of the old masters of sociology, if we may refer to them as such, were evolutionists, and methodologically accepted a structuralfunctional approach as the most relevant for disseminating the complexity of the socail milieu. Each also attemped to fulfil the sociological task on their own. In this respect, as we have seen, it is on this point that they differ from their modern counterparts, who attempt to achieve the same end by a division of labour whereby each only concerns himself with a specific paradigm of the total milieu. However, all have been confronted with the same obstacle which is the problem of selection of data.

Over-riding all purposes for these early sociologists was a desire to signify the importance of sociology as a science and to show not only how the discipline was useful for understanding society, but also how it

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was useful for *changing* it. Selection of data basically then, related to this objective. As a result, individual bias can be observed in the works produced as each emphasized different categories as the ideal type on which the framework of all society depended. For example, Karl Marx emphasized economy, class, and social revolution; Emile Durkheim emphasized the division of labour, religion, and education; Herbert Spencer emphasized structure, function and social evolution; Max Weber emphasized bureaucracy, religion and social action, as the basis for understanding society. But no matter how they attacked their data the results were basically consistent with the perceived aims of positivistic sociology (see Fletcher 1971b:761-813).

The other major problem confronting these men was how to justify their contentions. Phenomena that did not "fit" into their scheme was either ignored or relegated to a position of insignificance. The individual consistently filled this position, and this was justified by the contention that all people are born tabula rasa and their behaviour is ultimately the result of social learning in the context of the group by means of symbolic "conditioning". All products of this social interaction were considered to be the result of a "collective consciousness", and as such scientific analysis need only concern itself with examining social institutions and the relationships between them. These institutions were considered natural phenomena and were imputed with a life of their own and this being of creation was what controlled all else in society (Durkheim 1962:90; 1915:260,447).

In setting up their models of the idea society (and I make this distinction of the singular "society" because no sociologist has totally described a full society), these sociologists primarily concerned them-

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selves with reducing the total universe of social phenomena to managable proportions. Resorting to the perceived categories in common sense perception they assumed that the first logical categories were social categories; the first classes of things being groups of men from which these things were integrated. This was so because men were grouped and thought of themselves in the form of groups and in their ideas they grouped other things into regular categories. Out of these ideas and opinions grew the idea of a society "which" Emile Durkheim (1915:424) tells us, "once born, obey[s] laws all their own". Once individual ideas are expressed in language or written down they cease to be part of ourselves, and become instead part of a collectivity of ideas of knowledge that has a life of its own. Society, culture, religion and even science are born of these opinions (Durkheim 1915:418,438). Thus, the pivot of the first scheme of nature is not the individual per se, but society and culture. The quest for natural symbols becomes, by the force of this argument, the quest for natural systems of discerning phenomena. Therefore, categories such as economy, class, religion, education, the family, and so on are perceived as natural institutions developed in this collective bank of knowledge. Their use as a means for describing, and explaining social phenomena is therefore a "natural" prerogative for science and sociology.

Statement of the Problem

This brings me to the major purpose of this thesis. That is, to describe the process of theoretical reductionism engaged in by grand theorists. My interest is in showing how theorists like Karl Marx, Max Weber, Emile Durkheim, Talcott Parsons, and others like them develop their models of society. How they validate their contentions that the

individual need not be considered as an important unit of analysis. How they contend their reconstructions of the ideal society can be implemented and why it is that the realm of sociological pursuit is to be limited to the variables they suggest. The answer to this last question is simply, that the variables they offer are those that support their particular proposition and nothing more. Finally, my concern is to show what the intended and unintended consequences of these perspectives can be for a specific society.

It can be assumed that most of the old masters in sociology were grand theorists in the positivistic tradition, and as such were proponents of evolutionary theory and structural-functional methods of analysis. Further, it can also be assumed that these grand theorists still greatly influence modern day sociology even if this is not readily apparent or accepted in individual cases.

Mention was made earlier of the possibility that there existed a contradiction between the traditional goals of sociology and the methods pursued in the discipline today. I am inclined to believe that no contradiction exists, unless one confuses the goal of sociology as being similar to that of a holistic philosophy or a history based on a "mere ascertaining of facts for their own sake" (Collingwood 1976:127). A positivistic sociology has two major goals: one, ascertaining facts, and two, framing laws. The facts are immediately ascertained by sensuous perception, and the laws are framed through generalizing from these facts by induction. In practice this means that we are concerned with both a "historicist" perspective and a "social engineering perspective. As Karl Popper (1971:22) states:

a historicist . . . believes that intelligent political action is possible only if the future course of history is first

determined, the social engineer believes that a scientific basis of politics would . . . consist of the factual information necessary for the construction or alteration of social institutions, in accordance with our wishes and aims. Such a science would have to tell us what steps we must take is we wish, . . . to avoid depressions, or else to produce depressions; or if we wish to make the distribution of wealth more even, or less even.

Further, Popper (1971:24) says:

The engineer or the technologist approaches institutions rationally as means that serve certain ends, and . . . he judges them wholly according to thier appropriateness, efficiency, simplicity, etc. The historicist, on the other hand, would rather attempt to find out the origin and destiny of these institutions in order to access the 'true role' played by them in the development of history--evaluating them, for instance, as 'willed by God' . . . or as 'serving important historical trends', etc. [so as the laws for future action might become apparent]. (italics added).

Inherent in both these perspectives is a concern with controlling not only the data under review, but the social millieu from which the "facts" and "laws" originated. "It is clear that this attitude must lead to a rejection of the applicability of science or of reason to the problems of social life--and ultimately, to a doctrine of power, of domination and submission" (Popper 1971:5). The utopian historicist and social engineering perspectives are evident in the positivistic idealism of Plato, and similar conceptions can be found in the works of the grand theorists that followed in his footsteps (see Schwendinger and Schwendinger 1978:228-235,456,561). Plato was concerned with developing a utopian society based on a division of labour; a status quo in which the "function" of the philosopher-scientist was to organize it into existence and then to supervise its maintenance. The collective activities of present day sociologists are not in my view inconsistent with Plato's teachings.

The second chapter of this thesis will trace this positivistic theme using the idea of evolutionary theory, from its origin in the writings of Heraclitus and Plato, showing the various types of systems models commonly selected by sociologists, and finally outlining the reductional process inherent in the concept of the "survival of the fittest". This process shows how a total universe of phenomena can be reduced so that physical and psychological factors can be rejected as relevant variables for sicentific analysis in favour of purely cultural or ideational fac-Significant to this discussion is Karl Popper's (1975) treatment tors. of Darwin's thesis "survival of the fittest" in which Popper shows how the development of language and knowledge enabled the development of culture to reach a stage where culture could be imputed with a life of its own, and a power superior to its creators. The "essence-like" nature thus imparted to culture means that ideology becomes the total binding and controlling force of humanity. Much evidence exists today to suggest that ideation has achieved such power, and this can be traced to the efforts of academic productions. Some examples of this fact concludes chapter two.

The third and final chapter will be concerned with outlining Emile Durkheim's model of the ideal society and the realm of sociology. This chapter provides an example of grand utopian theorist in action, and qualifies the discussions of the preceding chapters. It is therefore, anticipated that taken as a whole, this thesis will illuminate the background, functions and realm of concern to which the discipline of sociology is directed. Hopefully, any misconceptions regarding the motives and endeavours of some individual sociologists may be dispelled. The resulting consequences of these actions, may be assessed at the discre-

tion of the individual reader. The views presented here may become more meaningful when compared to the reality of social conditions in contemporary American society.

CHAPTER TWO

THE IDEA OF EVOLUTION AS REFLECTED IN SOCIETY

Philosophic origins are not to be sought for in the cruder and conventionalized forms which religious beliefs assumed among the populace at large, but rather in the interpretations of the small intellectural class (Dewey 1957:xviii).

The Basis of an Evolutionary Perspective

Throughout the development of sociology emphasis has been placed on societal improvement and progress. Congruent with this idea of progress is a conception of evolution. As a scientific concept, evolution can only be traced back to the time of Heraclitus (c.544-484). Greek Society during Heraclitus' time was continually involved in wars of one form or another. Witnessing these events, Heraclitus developed the idea of change as his means of explanation. Observing that "everything is in flux and nothing is at rest" Heraclitus was concerned with bringing order to a situation appearing to lack a static edifice or a stable structure (Popper 1971:12). Becoming somewhat fascinated by change, Heraclitus concerned himself with its sources, properties, directions, and its relation to the principles of organic *physis*. Meaning more than simply *growth*, *physis* referred to the principle of generation or, more precisely, the generative power in the world, which was conceived in the manner of sexual generation.

Heraclitus was a member of Greek aristocracy, and during his time social life was determined by social and religious taboos where each

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individual had his assigned place within the whole of the social structure. In this schema every person was conceived as believing his place in the social structure was proper, "natural" and assigned to him by the cosmic forces which ruled the world. But, for some reason the ancient laws of the city were breaking down, and further research was needed to repair the breach. Working with the notion of change, Heraclitus was able to conceive that if the *physis* of a thing is how it grows and if everything in the universe, social and physical alike, has a *physis* of its own, then it becomes a simple matter to inquire as to what the *physis* is of each thing--that is to learn its original condition, its successive stages of development, the influences external to it, and its final form, or rather the form which may be said to be the ultimate "cause" of it all (see Nisbet 1977:21-23).

Investigating the "causes" of his crumbling universe, Heraclitus compared "the way things grow" to a "moral police". Thereby implying that if things do manage to deviate from what is the *physis* of each, retribution should be swift. The problem and the solution therefore was obvious, but Heraclitus' fight for order ended in vain. However, as we shall see shortly, Plato (c.427-347) found a solution in the development of a totally new society. Heraclitus' method of inquiry suggested that the practice for sicence was to observe, compare, and study waht is around us and in us. According to him,

that which encompasses the student will be enough for the student of how things grow; seeing it is reasonable and intelligent. From the notion of *physis* as 'moral police' as the judgement which steers all things through all . . . it is an easy step to the notion of *physis* as the ideal-type on which to build schemes of social reform and even revolution . . . (Nisbet 1977:24).

The concept of physis conceived as "growth" became embedded in Greek thought, and from it the Romans derived the term natura, which generally meant the physical world, including the physical aspects of man and society. Inherent in both these concepts is an element of the whole from which Heraclitus devised the concept of society "as the totality of all events, or changes, or facts" (Popper 1971:12). Thus, implying that if something was to be done about the conditions of the present then all things must be considered as a whole. Using Heraclitus' concepts later Greek philosophers suggested that society possessed an ordered nature (see Robinson 1968:78-31). From this concept of "growth" and regularity Aristotle (c.384-322) devised a theory of "natural stages" for establishing the origin of society. In his Metaphysics Aristotle wrote: the "generation of growing objects [is] the first constituent from which a growing object grows. . . [and this is] the source from which the motion first begins in each natural thing, and which belongs to that thing qua that thing" (Nisbet 1977:24 italics added). When understood this process means that "He who considers things in their first growth and origin, whether the state or anything else, will obtain the clearest view of them" (Nisbet 1977:24).

Applying this theory to practice and assuming that the state can be comprehended in terms of its full growth, it seemed imperative that attention be given to its origin in time. This means that in the origin of anything that grows (the state included) is to be found all the potentialities of the actual pattern of the growth process. Conceiving of the family as being a "species" incorporating various individual units united by a common bond Aristotle believed it constituted the origin of the state. From it arises "the most natural form of the village [which] appears to be that of a colony from the family, composed of children and grandchildren, who are said to be 'suckled with the same milk'" (see Nisbet 1977:25). Change from the family to the village is clearly cumulative. When several villages are brought together into a single community, the state comes into existence. Therefore, the state is emergent of the village in precisely the same way that the village is emergent of the family, and the family presumably of the individual. On this point Aristotle is emphatic.

If the earlier forms of society are natural, so is the state, for it is the end of them, and the completed nature is the end. For what each thing is when fully developed, we call its nature, whether we are speaking of a man, a horse, or a family (Nisbet 1977:25).

Thus, Aristotle concludes, "the state is by nature clearly prior to the family and to the individual, since the whole is of necessity prior to the part . . . [because] the individual, when isolated, is not self-sufficing; and therefore he is like a part in relation to the whole" (Nisbet 1977:26 italics added).

Traditonal Greek Society was identified as a system of diverse elements (meaning people), fitting together so harmoniously that the system was admirable to behold. Such an organization was obviously to be desired, and the "flux" and unrest observed by Heraclitus must somehow be controlled and eliminated. Society was now seen as breaking-up into a community of disunited individual units, and since the "natural pattern of growth", grows, obviously in a necessary way, it is only necessary that any living thing *must* grow in the very way prescribed by its own nature. It is "necessary" that infancy precede puberty, that puberty precede adulthood, and so on. Therefore it is equally "necessary," as Aristotle claimed, that monarchy precede oligarchy,

that oligarchy precede a republican form of government, that democracy produce dictatorship in the name of the people (see Nisbet 1977:78). Similarly, it is only natural and "necessary" for the diverse elements to be brought into harmony and maintained in orderly relationships with one another. The key to such a condition was to be found in education.

Protagoras (c.485-410) suggested education endows children with the values they are supposed to possess when they become adult members of society (see Robinson 1968:243-4). This idea was also accepted by Plato who considered that society arises not from material conditions alone but from conditions associated with individual values and conduct. In this view society is the result of the social conditioning process operating upon the tabula rasa organism, so that when school is finished the moral and social laws of a priori society begin to play their inescapable educational role for sound citizenship (see Cornford 1977:27-65, also Berger and Luchmann 1966). Also in this view political systems and the moral qualities of individuals grow out of the nature of society, and are inculcated (sometimes far more consciously) through factors we recognize as cultural. (Later we shall see how Emile Durkheim adopted a similar view of education. Chapter 3). Imputed to society is a moral task which Aristotle suggests is "to take care of virtue [and this] is the business of a state which truly deserves this name" (see Popper 1971:112 italics added). To translate this view into the language of political demands we find a wish to make the state (which is essentially society as distinct from God) an object of worship (see Nisbet 1977:81-2, and Popper 1971:111-3). In practice Aristotle implies that the officers of the state, namely the educating and ruling fraternity

should be concerned with the morality of the citizens, and that they should use their power not so much for the protection of citizen's freedom as for the control of their moral life. In other words, it is the demand that the realm of legality, i.e. of state-enforced norms, that should be increased at the expense of the realm of morality proper . . . (Popper 1971:113).

Such an effort is only "natural", because as Plato says in the *Laws* "Every artist . . . executes the part for the sake of the whole, and not the whole for the sake of the part". This is "necessary" because "you are created for the sake of the whole, and not the whole for the sake of you" (see Popper 1971:80-1).

This briefly was the climate of thought existing when Plato set about devising a solution to the problems of Greek society illuninated by the efforts of Heraclitus. In the Republic, written about a century after Protagoras, Plato not only interprets society as an instrumental organization for meeting human needs and insuring survival (see Cornford 1977:56-64), but he also sets out his utopian concept for social reconstruction. This was essentially a reconstruction of the ancient tribal forms of social organization based on a caste-like class structure (see Popper 1971:45,89-90). Many needs exist, and many individuals possessing varying skills are required to fill them. We all require partners and helpers. When these partners and helpers are assembled within one community, we have a state. The state is invented out of necessity, that is, out of the "natural" needs of mankind to provide himself with food, clothing and housing. The personal subsystem suggested by this enumeration includes a husbandman, builder, weaver, shoemaker, and many other miscellaneous menials. In this system Plato restricted himself to a belief that social diversity could be best controlled by ordering it into specialists based on a division of labour

in technological and commercial activities. Maintenance of social order could be achieved by consensus of acceptance of this system (see Gouldner 1972a:42-5). Such a consensus is based on a belief in "justice" and "equality". In the *Gorgias* Plato "speaks of the view that 'justice is equality' as one held by the great mass of the people, and as one which agrees not only with 'convention', but with 'nature itself'" (Popper 1971:91).

Implied in this system is a belief that each man ought to do only those things he does best. Implicit here also, is the belief that if one only does what one likes best one will not be competitive in other areas of the market place and social conflict would be non-existent. Additionally, Plato recognized that society also needed toolmakers, carpenters, smiths, shepards, importers, exporters, merchants, and so forth just for basic subsistence. But to establish a truly civilized State, one must also include actors, dancers, dressmakers, servants, tutors, and a military. The latter was necessary for protecting one's own land from neighbours who might wish to invade it.

Thereby, Plato sketches the components for a well-functioning State and provides us with a blueprint describing how to assemble these components to form an ideal Republic. Change was considered evil and in Plato's view "change can be arrested if the state is made an exact copy of its original, i.e. of the Form or Idea of the city" (Popper 1971:86). Therefore, since only things "natural" are *Good and Just* we find in the *Republic*:

The law is designed to bring about the welfare of the state as a whole, fitting the citizens into one unit, by means of both persuasion and force. It makes them all share in whatever benefit each of them can contribute to the community. And it is actually the law which creates for the state men

of the right frame of mind; not for the purpose of letting them loose, so that everybody can go his own way, but in order to utilize them all for welding the city together. (Popper 1971:80; see also Cornford 1977:52-3, 233).

Heraclitus set out the importance of understanding the diversity of the elements in society, and a similar view is implied in Plato's system of a new utopia. Such knowledge Plato clearly shows is "necessary" for the implementation of a just and proper community. Believing that social change occurs as the result of human action, Plato considered that disunity was brought about by ambition that originates in the yount (see Cornford 1977:273; Popper 1971:40-1). Hence the importance of a well organized education for correcting this occurance. The ideal or "best state is a kinship of the wisest and most godlike of men. This ideal city-state is so near perfection that it is hard to understand how it can change" (Popper 1971:29). But as Plato was attempting to show, this ideal state could only be set up and maintained by the elimination of competition, and providing it was "governed by a young tyrant . . . who has the good fortune to be the contemporary of a great legislator, what more could a god do for a city which he wants to make happy?" (Popper 1971:44). Here Popper (1971:44) suggests Plato "When speaking of the great lawgiver and the young tyrant must have been thinking of himself".

"The philosophies of Parmenides, Democritus, Plato, and Aristotle can all be appropriately described as attempts to solve the problems of that changing world which Heraclitus had discovered" (Popper 1971:12). Further as Popper (1971:35) has claimed:

Plato was one of the first social scientists and undoubtedly by far the most influential. In the sense in which the term 'sociology' was understood by Comte, Mill, and Spencer, he was a sociologist; that is to say, he had successfully

applied his idealist method to an analysis of the social life of man, and of the laws of its development as well as the laws and conditions of its stability.

Karl Popper by no means exhausts the number of sociologists influenced by Plato and the Greek philosophers. As a result it is reasonable to claim that sociologists by their theories and models of the ideal society, are attempting to implement changes in the *present* social conditions of a better life style. Implicit in these models of the ideal society is the inherent importance of the sociologist as guardian of the needs and desires of the masses of humanity. The reasons for which are related to their position in society as I outlined in the Introduction. Further,

We have an insistence that all that has actually happened, in the sense of all events and persons in time, has necessarily happened; that, not merely the development of forms and types, but the history of events, acts, and motives has been necessary (Nisbet 1977:79).

Plato aimed at setting out "a system of historical periods, governed by a law of evolution; in other words, he aimed at a historicist theory of society" (Popper 1971:40).

The Theorist Selects a Perspective

Plato commenced his model of society with a set of categories which he considered were the basic elements from which the ideal State could be constructed and understood. Further, he imputed to society the status of "the Great Being" and this attitude was similarly held by Comte (Appelbaum 1970:22) and Durkheim (Durkheim 1974:35-97). Plato's categories were the division of labour and technology. By necessity then, Plato engaged in an exercise of reduction, a process of selection in accordance with his personal ideals and beliefs of his social environment. All men do this, but our concern here is that persons after the mode of Plato deliberately intend to use their ideals for the control of others. This is a very different purpose from that utilized by most individuals in their everyday action of living. Most constructions of the ideal society, then, are based on the perception that ideals are the real essences binding the social milieu, or else, it can be said that material factors are the real binding forces. Therefore, if we concern ourselves with "established" poles and "emergent" poles as a base from which to construct our social models.

This means that an established situation is one in which all conditions are specifiable and predictable in the action-relevant environments; and all action-relevant states of the system are specifiable and predictable. In this situation available research technology of records is considered adequate to provide statements about the probable consequences of alternative actions or events. In contrast, an emergent situation is one in which some of these conditions do not prevail (see Boguslaw 1961:2;2-19). For example, a multiplication table is an established situation as is a table of random numbers (see Popper 1973:22). A controlled laboratory experiment is devoted to the study of established situations. Most of the work done by unskilled or semiskilled labour porbably deals with established situations. A sample attitude survey of a population with previously determined characteristics is an established situation analysis. Established situations are thus situations specifically imposed at a given time. On the other hand, building a house involves dealing with an emergent situation, as does creating the multiplication table of the random number table before such things existed (see Popper 1973:22). Constructing a social,

political, or military system to promote world peace and prosperity within an environment of such complexity in which available analytic techniques cannot provide reasonable probability statements, requires emergent situation design. Emergent situations are therefore, situations for which little or nothing is known prior to investigating them. The studies undertaken by Plato and his contemporaries were emergent situation analyses.

It is important to note here that some systems are required to deal with established situations, while others are required to deal with emergent situations. However, other systems may be required to deal with both established and emergent situations. There are different system designers and implicity, if not explicity, differences in their answers which imply gross differences in methodology and technique. According to Robert Boguslaw (1965:9-23) there are four major approaches to system design used by both the classical and the new utopians: the Formalist Approach, the Heuristic Approach, the Operating Unit Approach and the Ad Hoc Approach.

Before describing these four approaches to system design, the record suggests that sociologists generally tend to place themselves in either the category of "historicist" or that of the "social engineer or technologist". As we have seen the historicist is inclined to look upon social institutions mainly form the point of view of their history; their origin, their development, and their present and future significance in an endeavour to arrive at some established end. The social engineer or technologist on the other hand, will be concerned with whether "if such and such are our aims, is this institution well designed and organized to serve them?" (Popper 1971:23). Thus his concern

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will be the social effects of any measure which might be taken in accordance with a predetermined end. Both approaches therefore are concerned with *ends*, (see Popper 1971:22-4,157; and Nisbet 1977:190-1). Methodologically, both approaches have a common starting point and a common end. The principles generally adopted are:

if applied to the realm of political activity, demand that we must determine our ultimate political aim, or the Ideal State before taking any practical action. Only when this ultimate aim is determined, in rough outline at least, only when we are in possession of something like a blueprint of the society at which we aim, only then can we begin to consider the best wyas and means for its realization, and to draw up a plan for practical action (Popper 1971:157).

Therefore, the sociologist can if "he wishes to employ only scientifically developed concepts, that is, concepts constructed according to the method instituted by himself;" ensure that his aims are appropriately established (Durkheim 1962:31-32).

The Formalist Approach is characterized by the implicit or explicit use of models. These models can be of two types: replica and symbolic. The replica models provide a pictorial representation in a material sense, and resemble the real thing, e.g. biological organisms or mechanical objects. The use of these models allows for the expansion of the concept *physis*. "For as things come into being, so must they go out of being. Progress and degeneration are the two sides of the same cycle of genesis and decay" (Nisbet 1977:61). Such models therefore, enable the sociologist to impute "good" and "evil" to certain phenomena, and similarly to establish *what* social actions require doctoring (Durkheim's Suicide is an example of this). Stages of growth can be illustrated more easily and judgements made as to what appears to be "best" for humanity. The symbolic models, on the other hand, are intangible and use abstract ideational symbols as representatives for

specific objects. Such models do not resemble the real thing in any way, e.g. mathematical (graphic or statistical) models. Economists and demographers commonly use these symbolic models to illustrate and explain changing trends. Both models are basically concerned with emergent phenomena.

The Heuristic Approach uses specific principles or guidelines and is not bound by preconceptions about the situations the system will encounter. Fundamentally, this consists of setting forth general principles and insisting that the ideal society must operate in consonance with these principles. In reference to Joseph Proudhon's What is Property - An Inquiry into the Principle of Right and of Government, Robert Boguslaw (1965:15-6) states: "Proudhon did not prepare any blueprints for an ideal society". Nevertheless, its principles provide action guides for use in the face of completely unanticipated situations and in situations for which no formal model is available. "The techniques are designed to facilitate higher order problem solving by computers in such areas as symbolic logic and chess"-like maneuvers (Boguslaw 1965:13). Such an approach can be applied to both established and emergent phenomena, but tends to be applied to emergent situations using established data.

The Operating Unit Approach begins neither with models of the system nor selected principles, but with people or machines carefully selected or tooled to possess certain performance characteristics. The system, or organization, or utopia that ultimately unfolds will incorporate solutions that these units provide. Man may be inflexible, machines may be flexible or vice versa, but "under some conditions, it may be highly desirable to limit the range of operating unit flexibility

to insure reliability and predictability of system performance. Under other conditions the reverse may be true" (Boguslaw 1965:17). The fictional utopia of B. F. Skinner's *Walden Two* provides an illustration of this system. Reliability in performance is achieved through conditioning or deliberately altering the "natural" phenomena to behave in a "reasonable" and acceptable fashion. Such an approach deals with an established situation using established data.

The Ad Hoc Approach is a classificatory system and involves no commitment to models, principles, or operating units; but consists of more or less arbitrary classes constructed for the sake of summarizing data. No attempt is made to fit classes to data in order to summarize the relationships between variables. The classes are independent of one another. This is essentially a method of organizing observations so that more sophisticated theory development can follow. This approach proceeds with a view of present or established reality as being the only constant in the equation. The design process characteristically begins with a review of an existing system, and its subsequent course is, at every state, a function of the then existing situation. The conceptual state of this approach is by far the least developed and usually derives from empirical phenomena.

It is frequently adopted when a future system is more or less clearly perceived by the system designer and the problem is one of implementation. Under these circumstances the ad hoc approach is used as a means of moving from the current state of affairs to the desired system state (Boguslaw 1965:21).

The salient feature of this situation is the existence of a problem for which not solution currently exists. The system is based on the concept of Darwinian evolution and the situational problem is resolved in any viable manner that ensures survival. The remaining configuration is logically assessed as being the most successful adaptation to the environment. Concern here, is with established situations for purposes of prediction. To arrive at this situation it becomes necessary that

To understand the system we must obtain data through time. We must, in point of fact, engage in what might be termed a historical or genetic investigation. We must understand what they are at the present in terms of how they arrived at the present (Boguslaw 1965:149).

My description of these model approaches is necessarily brief, but, I feel, sufficient to reveal the possibilities available for the researcher and theorist. The various methods available to the historicist and the social engineer or technologist are such taht any one whole approach may be followed or a combination of all possible approaches may be selected. I stated in the previous chapter that most grand theorists from the Greeks to the present day pursued an evolutionary and functional approach in building their utopias. Therefore, if we accept the fact, as does Kingsley Davis (1959), that academic sociology and functionalism are not dissimilar (see also Gouldner 1971b:373-411), then we might reasonably suggest that we are dealing with a combination of the Formalist and Ad Hoc Approaches. Emile Durkheim's work exemplifies this dual approach. As we shall see in the next chapter, Durkheim's approach was concerned with the search for optimal solutions to problems involved in the operation of a system, namely society as a whole. By constructing an organic model of the established system using an emergent situation perspective he was able to impute from his model an intended result. "Validating" his results by use of a comparative method Durkheim was doing

hardly more than a shoring-up of the idea of progressive development generally, and more particularly, of the belief that the recent history of the West could be taken as evidence of

the direction in which mankind as a *whole* move and, flowing from this, *should* move (Nisbet 1977:190-1)

What is Evolution?

Basically, evolution is another term for change. But at the same time, evolution is more than that; it is also a process (growth) and an idea. In so far as the idea of evolution has come to be conceived of by social evolutionists it refers to:

The naturalness of change to each social institution or system, as well as to the whole of society; the directional for trendlike character of change; the emanation of change from forces internal; the genetic continuity of change; the necessity of natural change upon uniform, persisting forces throughout time (Nisbet 1977:187-8).

But in so far as the concept was conceived of by Charles Darwin (1858) and his contemporary Alfred Russel Wallace (1838) it referred to a biological life process. The former view is built upon precisely that conception of organic growth derived from the Greek word *physis* and the Roman word *natura*. This conception according to Robert Nisbet (1977: 164) means that: "Such growth is *not* the model of Darwinian natural selection or of post-Darwinian theory in biology. Such growth *is* the model of the theory of social evolution---and it remains so even today in the social sciences".

During his travels around the world, especially in the "Beagle" (1832=1836) Darwin observed that varying types of plants and animals encountering limited food supply must compete. Those most successful and best adapted to their environment therefore, left more off-spring for the next generation. Darwin could not explain the diversity of the species from which change came; he could only observe it. This process Darwin labelled "natural selection". Not until he had read An Essay on the Principle of Population by Thomas Malthus (1798) was Darwin able to offer an explanation. Malthus suggested that the reporductive potential of mankind was far in excess of the natural resources available to nourish an expanding population. Malthus further suggested that in practice the size of populations is limited by such lethal factors as disease, famine, and war, and that such factors alone appeared to check what would otherwise be an expanding population.

Darwin realized then that the individuals that in fact survived must for that reason be in some way better equipped to live in their environment than those which did not survive. Thus it followed that in a natural interbreeding population any variation would most likely be preserved that increased the organism's ability to leave fertile offspring, while the variations that decreased that ability would most likely be eliminated. Therefore, only a proportion of individuals in a population survive long enough to reach maturity and in turn bear offspring. The environment itself determines the fate of each and, in destroying a proportion, selects the remainder. Through its effect upon each individual the environment controls to a decisive extent the direction and rate of evolution, and for that reason it may be considered to be one creative factor in the process of evolutionary change. Important in this regard is the fact that evolution implies a change over time, historically, or from generation to generation as a naturally evolving condition.

Although natural selection acts on individuals, it is the population of the species that evolves (Simpson 1958:14), since the genetic plan of an individual is unalterable and remains constant throughout its life. It is not my purpose here to explain this process through

the complications of genetics but just to mention its importance in the operation of biological evolution (see Dobzhansky 1962; Campbell 1974). Importantly, the reader at this point, is to note the change of emphasis; from the individual to the collectivity. I shall deal with this important feature of the evolutionary process shortly. The theory presented by Darwin and Wallace can be stated as four propositions and three deductions. Both these propositions (P) and deductions (D) have been defined by Bernard Campbell (1974:8) as follows:

P.I. Organisms produce a far greater number of reproductive cells, and, indeed, young individuals, than ever give rise to mature individuals.

P.2. The number of individuals in populations and species remains more or less constant over long periods of time.

D.I. Therefore there must be a high rate of mortality both among reproductive cells and among immature individuals.

P.3. The individuals in a population are not all identical but show variation in all characters, and the individuals that survive by reason of their particular sets of characters will become the parents of the next generation.

D.2. Therefore the characters of those surviving organisms sill in some way have made them better adapted to survive in the conditions of their environment.

P.4. Offspring resember parents closely but not exactly.

D.3. Therefore subsequent generations will maintain and improve on the degree of adaptation realized, by gradual changes in every generation.

The evolving species Homo developed a socio-cultural system of adaptation to his natural surroundings, and this process is as important to an understanding of humanity as is biological evolution. Darwin's thesis was based on his observation of the adaptation of plants and animals other than man. Therefore, in attempting to understand humanity, socio-cultural evolution may present a more fruitful area for concentration. But like the biological process, socio-cultural evolution is a

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process of gradual change and development that is based on individual experiences. The two forms of evolution are not different facets of a single phenomenon, but are separate and distinct processes. At the same time, there are important links between the two modes of evolution. An examination of human evolution shows us that biological evolution produced the species, Homo sapiens (Modern Man), that now creates and uses symbol systems to build cultures, and in this sense socio-cultural systems, and their evolution as well, are productions of biological evolution.

To summarize this process; both the genetic alphabet and symbol systems provide a population with the means of acquiring, sotring, transmitting, and using information; and, both are mechanisms through which change occurs in a population. A symbol system, therefore, is the functional equipment of the gnetic alphabet.

These two evolutions operate in comparable ways and produce comparable results. Significantly, evolution involves the interaction of populations and their environments. Environments, as the term has been used so far, refers to the physical environment, which in the case of man must also include social factors. The understanding of the change factor brought about by the evolutionary process, may be facilitated by a comparison of contemporary human societies with their appearance only a few generations ago. However, if we turn from this present age of social and cultural diversity to that era hundreds of thousands of years ago when every human society was a small band of nomadic hunters and gatherers with relatively little distinguishing differences between them; or for that matter, from the societies of other anthropoids, the effect of evolution can be more readily grasped. Therefore, it is easy

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to conceive of human society as evolving through a series of stages of development, with one stage producing the next, as adaptational information banks correspondingly increase in volume. Present human society could quite easily be considered as the pinnacle of such a development.

What is Evolutionary Theory?

The reader has probably already assumed that inherent in the evolutionary process is a concept of direction seemingly suggestive of linear progression; from lower to higher, or from primitive to modern. This is like saying those who evolve and survive are good, and those who did not were bad and so they died. In any event, this concept appears to be the view taken by many evolutionary theorists, especially those grand theorists of the classical mold. In adducing empirical evidence in support of these theories, evolutionists often speak of evolution as being inherent in culture taken as a whole. Their approach is what Julian Steward (1953:315, 1955:4,14) has called "universal evolution". If the sequence of stages is meant to apply to the totality of culture, then its empirical support must be found in this unit, and it can be applicable to this unit only. That is, stages such as "Primitive", "Chieftan", "Feudal", and "Modern" are considered to stem from certain conditions present in a preceding state (see Childe 1946:17). Such a progression does however, indicate and a priori construct, which becomes attractive chiefly because it puts our own culture at the top of the growth pyramid. Our own culture in this sequence bears a connotation of being the "best" adapter.

In other contexts however, we find evolutionists referring not to the totality of human culture, but to the development of particular

cultures. When the sequence is meant to be applicable to all cultures, we may call the theories "unilinear evolution" or to use Steward's term "universal evolution". Such schemes, if they are to be valid for particular cultural histories, must be derived from a comparison of the historical developments of a sizeable sample of the world's cultures. On the other hand, if an evolutionary scheme refers to a limited class of cultures, or the one cultural area over time, then the data need only refer to a convincing sample of the class in question. In such cases we may apply Julian Steward's (1955) term "multilinear evolution".

The "less progressive" or "less industrialized" societies of our generation are as much a part of the totality of human culture as is Euro-American culture (any introductory Anthropology text documents this fact). Each society has changed, each in its own way over the years. Certain changes which have occurred in the prehistory and history of mankind as a whole can be considered as steps made toward the present condition of each and every culture on earth. This must be granted when one concedes that all "stages" extending from the beginning of man's history to the present state of each society. For, given the entire life-history of the whole of mankind, it seems likely that each culture can have its own criteria for progress or change, and its own evolution, and can place itself at the pinnacle of the cultures on earth if it so wishes. Evolutionists studying these various cultures could, if they are interested in cycles, select facets of culture which would give them cyclical narratives. But if their interests are in "progress"; then a simple-to-complex development is the outcome; with appropriate definitions of "simple" and "complex". The sequence thus need only pass from that which is most unlike their own culture, though those aspects

that are similar to it, to the apex, whatever that might be. The purpose of the evolutionist is salient in this scheme of things, and omnipresent in evolutionary theory is the view that the present condition of any society is the most complex in a chronological sequence of adaptations. But why one of these many cultures is selected as being more advanced than the others will be explained later.

Earlier it was noted that "The thing that is actually evolving is a population" (Simpson 1958:14), and it is in this light that evolutionary theory should be understood. As Gerhard Lenski (1977:557) states: "Evolutionary theory is designed to provide answers to questions about fundamental trends in history; it was never intended to provide explanations of the actions of all the individuals who, collectively, create the trend". Although evolutionary theory is a grand theory, it must be acknowledged as having "Specific" and "General" features, as Marshall Sahlins (1970) makes perfectly clear.

On the one side, it creates diversity through adaptive modification: new forms differentiate from old. On the other side, evolution generates progress: higher forms arise from, and surpress, lower. The first of these directions is Specific Evolution, and the second, General Evolution (Sahlins 1970:12-13).

The distinction drawn here is that "any given change in a form of life or culture can be viewed either in the perspective of adaptation *or* from the point of view of overall progress . . . the context is very important" (Sahlins 1970:13). To state this more simply,

General cultural evolution, . . . is passage from less to greater energy transformation, lower to higher levels of integration, and less to greater all-round adaptability. Specific evolution is the phylogenetic, ramifying, historic passage of culture along its many lines, the adaptive modification of particular cultures (Sahlins 1970:38).

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In this view, evolution in its specific (phylogenetic) aspect is multilinear; and evolution in its general or universal aspect is unilinear (see White 1970:viii-ix).

Multilinear evolution according to Richard Applebaum (1970:57) "is more of a methodology than a coherent set of propositions, and, in fact, its principal task appears to be a taxonomy rather than explanation". Thus it is concerned with accumlating data on individual cultures and the changes taking place in their histories as its specific area of emphasis. "Human evolution then, is not merely a matter of biology, but of the interaction of man's physical and cultural characteristics, each influencing the other" (Steward 1964:139). Unilinear evolution on the other hand, is more a theoretical construct concerned with explaining trends in world history, based on facts gathered by a multilinear evolutionist. Both, then, adhere to a similar theme, and differ only in methodological emphasis (Applebaum 1970:58-9).

Earlier it was stated that evolution was, among other things, an idea. Of necessity then, as ideas, evolutionary sequences are abstractions from established reality in which a perceived element of progress exists. In his *The Positive Philosophy*, Auguste Comte (1821-50) carefully explained that these "abstractions" were history divorced from all particularity of the events, actions, personages, places, and periods which was the very substance of the historian's concern. Therefore, by "abstract history" Comte meant precisely a method for the study of human evolution, progress, or development (see Nisbet 1977:165). Nevertheless, evolution also means change, and change according to Robert Nisbet (1972:1) "is a succession of differences in time in a persisting identity". The three equally vital elements of that definition are:

"differences", "in time", and "persisting identity". Further, if the idea of evolution as it is implied in a multilinear approach is a methodology and not a theory as Richard Appelbaum suggests, in the sense of being a "theoretical generalization", the idea must be more apparent in a unilinear approach to evolution. To repeat again, the idea of progress as Marshal Sahlins (1970:35-37) points out, is the passage from less to greater energy transformation; the passage from lower to higher levels of integration; and greater adaptability. Therefore, we find implied here, as was the case with Darwin's "natural selection", a concern with establishing the most adaptive condition as an ideal for which all cultures or species may strive. It is no coincidence then, that Sahlins (1970:37) should state: "So modern national culture tends to spread around the globe". "Modern national culture" of course being the present Euro-American culture. Auguste Comte opted for such a situation, and similar positions are implied in all utopian models of society. Not only are modern sociology and functionalism seen as one, but the idea of evolution becomes an invaluable tool for establishing a base for which such ideal models of society can be constructed (see Collingwood 1976:128-9).

Evolution of the Idea of Culture

Before Darwin it was customary to view organisms as divinely created and therefore perfect solutions to the problems of life on this planet. Associated with this perfect creation the Greek's devised the idea of growth (physis), which evolved cyclically via a series of natural stages from generation to generation. The organism man evolved this way and in a like manner so assumably did society. During the

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nineteenth century awareness of the numerous mistakes in this life process became a matter of academic concern because this process was not a carefully planned and meticulously performed attempt to realized an aim that had been thought out in advance by some ecclesiastical being. The life process was in fact, seen as often unreasonable, wasteful, and it produced an immense variety of forms that left to nature the selection for elimination of the unadapted. Some of the remaining forms were surprisingly efficient as if they had been planned with a definite aim in mind, but there was no consistency and the operation of natural selection was not eliminating all the maladjusted. The question posed by this situation was, if the life on our planet was divinely created should not all species be perfect? Obviously they were not, because everywhere one could observe maladjustment and dysfunctioning members of all species existing along side more perfect examples. During this time the human condition was chaotic in Europe just as it had been in Greece during the time of Heraclitus and Plato and their contemporaries. Concerned with this situation in much the same way that the Greeks had been, many statesmen and academics considered that a programme of reconstruction was needed if the ills were to be eliminated. Nature therefore needed some assistance.

The importance of Darwin's thesis on "natural selection" and the survival of the fittest to this academic climate was obviously substantial as Collingwood (1976:128-9) points out. The idea showed that the mechanism of natural selection can, in principle, stimulate the actions of the Creator, and His purpose and design, and accordingly stimulate rational human action directed towards righteous purpose or aim. Thus, Darwin's theory showed that it was possible to reduce teleology to

causation by explaining, in purely physical terms, the existence of a natural design and purpose in the world. In this principle, any particular teleological explanation may be reduced to, or further explained by, a causal explanation.

Although it is true that the mass of the physical object cannot be reduced, and that laws about mass cannot be reduced to geometrical laws, nevertheless, mass is autonomous with respect to geometrical properties. We should not, on that account, separate the mass of an object from its shape and transport it into a separate category. But then is this always true? Admittedly, a physical object would then not be in a category of actually existing material things, but an abstraction, and with the collaboration of various abstract categories symbolically constructed, we might thereby arrive at something that can aspire to be acceptable as "the very standard of reality".

It is true however, that we can always abstract from the particular properties of a physical system and concentrate, say, on its energy, just as an economist "abstracts" from the height, weight, intelligence, and sex appeal of people and considers their economical behaviour only. In a similar manner a sociologist can view the whole of society and concentrate on its energy and "abstract" from perceived social, technological, philosophic, and sentimental factors, and consider "technology is the basis of all other sectors of culture" (White 1959:27). This does not mean that the economist's, physicist's or sociologist's abstractions can be regarded in anyway as aspects or properties of these bodies. Quite the contrary, it is essential to remember that they are such aspects, that they do belong to the physical world or the whole enterprise ceases to make sense. Important in this scheme is the classification of humans as physical objects in that their economic products, or the calculation of energy spectra, can be emphasized as the elements necessary only for analyzing cultural and social change. Therefore, there is no reason why the argument so presented should stop short of logic, because abstractions, far from being excluded from the physical world, must always be referred back to the physical situation from which they arose, or for that matter from which they were designed if we accepted a "natural design", and of which they form an essential part. In relativity energy has mass and the same may be true of concepts.

We noted in the last chapter that society or culture was the realm to which sociology applies itself. We noted there also, that sociology in its quest for explanation of natural symbols, laws and regularities existing in a society or culture would, once found and established, offer a natural system for discerning social phenomena. All social phenomena is the product of a set of interacting individuals who over time build-up a bank of knowledge from which further accumulations of knowledge are derived and likewise stored. This search for systems of explanation by necessity means that the theorist naturally reduces the total universe of social phenomena to manageable proportions. His final selections are then usually presented as having a priori common sense validity. The theorist essentially "consists in the establishment of a social and moral order sui generis" (Durkheim 1960:61). How a theorist in the mold of Durkheim reduces the total social universe to a select number of categories and imputes to them an existence sui generis, is the concern of this section.

Karl Popper (1975) in *Of Clouds and Clocks* attempted to restate the theory of evolution presented by Charles Darwin and show how it related

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to ideational construction. Some of the ideas adduced in this paper by Popper are pertinent to the explanation of how the social environment can be controlled simply by the creation of a static edifice. Such an edifice eluded the Greeks, and the importance of the idea of evolution and the sociologist in the present pursuit of this end will be addressed.

Popper (1975:242-4) outlines twelve theses of Darwin's evolutionary perspective which are as follows:

(1) All organisms are constantly, day and night, engaged in problem-solving; and so are all those evolutionary sequences of organisms--the phyla which begin with the most primitive forms and of which the now living organisms are the latest members.

(2) These problems are problems in an objective sense; they can be, hypothetically, reconstructed by hindsight, as it were. (I will say more about this later.) Objective problems in this sense need not have their conscious counterpart; and where they have their conscious counterpart, the conscious problem need not coincide with the objective problem.

(3) Problem-solving always proceeds by the method of trial and error: new reactions, new forms, new organs, new modes of behaviour, new hypotheses, are tentatively put forward and controlled by error-elimination.

(4) Error-elimination may proceed either by the complete elimination of unsuccessful forms (the killing-off of unsuccessful forms by natural selection) or by the (tentative) evolution of controls which modify or suppress unsuccessful organs, or forms of behaviour, or hypotheses.

(5) The single organism telescopes into one body, as it were, the controls developed during the evolution of its phylum-just as it partly recapitulates, in its ontogenetic development, it phylogenetic evolution.


(6) The single organism is a kind of spearhead of the evolutionary sequence of organisms to which it belongs (its phylum): it is itself a tentative solution, probing into new environmental niches, choosing an environment and modifying it. It is thus related to its phylum almost exactly as the actions (behaviour) of the individual organism, and its behaviour, are both trials, which may be eliminated by errorelimination. (7) Using 'P for problem, 'TS' for tentative solutions, 'EE' for error-elimination, we can describe the fundamental evolutionary sequence of events as follows:

$$P \rightarrow TS \rightarrow EE \rightarrow P$$

But this sequence is not a cycle: the second problem is, in general, different from the first: it is the result of the new situation which has arisen, in part, because of the tentative solutions which have been tried out, and the error-elimination which controls them. In order to indicate this, the above schema should be rewritten:

$$P_1 \rightarrow TS \rightarrow EE \rightarrow P_2$$

(8) But even in this form an important element is still missing: the multiplicity of the tentative solutions, the multiplicity of the trials. Thus our final schema becomes something like this:



Background Knowledge

(9) In this form, our schema can be compared with that of Neo-Darwinism. According to Neo-Darwinism there is in the main one problem: the problem of survival. There is, as in our system, a multiplicity of tentative solutions--the variations or mutations. But there is only one way of error-elimination--the killing of the organism. And (partly for this reason) the fact that P_1 and P_2 will differ essentially is overlooked, or else its fundamental importance is not sufficiently clearly realized.

(10) In our system, not all problems are survival problems: there are many very specific problems and sub-problems (even though the earliest problems may have been sheer survival problems). For example an early problem P_1 may be reprocution. Its solution may lead to a new problem, P_2 : the problem of getting rid of, or spreading, the offspring-the children which threaten to suffocate not only the parent organism but each other.

It is perhaps of interest to note that the problem of avoiding suffociation by one's offspring may be one of those problems which was solved by the evolution of multicellular organisms: instead of getting rid of one's offspring, one establishes a common economy, with various new methods of living together. (11) The theory here proposed distinguishes between P_1 and P_2 , and it shows that the problems (or the problem situations) which the organism is trying to deal with are often new, and arise themselves as products of the evolution. The theory thereby gives implicitly a rational account of what has usually been called by the somewhat dubious names of 'creative evolution' or 'emergent evolution'.

(12) Our schema allows for the development of error-eliminating controls (warning organs like the eye; feedback mechanisms); that is, controls which can eliminate errors without killing the organism; and it makes it possible, ultimately, for our hypotheses to die in our stead.

The theory of evolution described here consists of a certain view of evolution as being a growing hierarchical system of "plastic" controls, and a view of organisms as incorporating: or as in the case of culture, evolving exosomatically. Emphasis is placed on the fact that "mutations" may be interpreted as more or less accidental trial-anderror action, and "natural selection" is one way of controlling these actions by error-elimination. Some attempt will be made here to explain these theses in more detail.

As Karl Popper (1975:245) points out; "Each organism can be regarded as a hierarchical system of plastic controls--as a system of clouds controlled by clouds". The controlled subsystems make trial-anderror movements which are partly suppressed and partly restricted by the controlling system. An example of this can be seen in the relations between the lower and higher members of the animal kingdom. The lower ones continue to exist and to play their part in the biotic community, but they are constrained and controlled by the higher ones in the food chain. More specifically, the physical force of gravity acts as a plastic control over our abilities to stand erect. In a similar manner, the atmosphere controls climatic and vegetational conditions around the world.

These examples illustrate the thesis first stated by Popper where each organism is considered to be continually engaged in problem-solving by trial-and-error actions. The chance-like nature of these actions being such, that if they are unsuccessful they are eliminated. The problem is one of survival. Such a proposition ignores the fact that even though the trails appear randomly assigned there must be at least an "after-effect", for the organism is constantly learning from its mistakes, and establishes controls which suppress or eliminate, or at least reduce the frequency of certain possible trials. Successful learning processes increase the probability of the survival of mutations which "stimulate" the solutions so reached, and tend to make the solution hereditary, by incorporating it into the spatial structure or form of the new organisms. The process of adaptation is always conditioned by the environment even in the case of human beings; but in their case, exosomatic growth changes the physical environment of the organism, and socializes it. Success then is an organismic achievement, and the type of social environment created is the result of human acgion.

In these theses Popper proposes a theory of evolution that entails a Darwinian epstemology and explains knowledge as an ever-changing "exosomatic" product of the organism, as a kind of secretion that is constantly modified and augmented by trial and error procedures that protects the organism from being modified itself. Knowledge is a product of man, which can be changed by man, but is still objective and even autonomous; that is, it cannot be reduced to either physical or mental processes. It is objective because it obeys laws of its own that are independent of the intentions of its creators. Having been produced by man it no longer obeys all his wishes. Knowledge is

autonomous because these laws are neither physical laws, nor mental laws, nor reducible to physical and/or mental laws. Thus, in Popper's schema the phenomenon of knowledge shows that the physical world in an open world and that some of its inhabitants are affected by physical as well as by non-physical or mental influences.

To facilitate better understanding of the importance of knowledge to Popper's evolutionary process, his concepts of "physical", "mental", and "non-physical" worlds need to be explained. These three different types of entities are presented as: the world of physical objects, or World 1; the world of mental processes, or World 2; and the products of the human mind, or World 3 (Popper 1975:74,106-7). "By 'World 1' I mean what is usually called the world of physics, of rocks, and trees and physical fields of forces" (Popper 1973:20). To be more specific, Popper (1975:37) states:

there are many sorts of real things . . . foodstuffs . . . or more resistent objects . . . like stones, and trees, and humans. But there are many sorts of reality which are quite different, such as our subjective decoding of our experiences of foodstuffs, stones, and trees, and human bodies. . . Examples of other sorts in this many-sorted universe are: a toothache, a word, a language, a highway code, a novel, a governmental decision; a valid or invalid proof; perhaps forces, fields of forces . . . structures; and regularities.

We might also add, ghosts, numbers, spirits, gods, God and the Devil; because they "are either minds endowed with immortal bodies or else pure minds, in contrast to ourselves" (Popper 1975:153).

With regard to Worlds 2 and 3 Popper (1973:20) says:

By 'World 2' I mean the psychological world, the world of feelings, of fear and of hope, of dispositions to act, and of all kinds of subjective experiences. . . By 'World 3' I mean the world of the products of the human mind. Although I include works of art in World 3 and also ethical values and social institutions (and, thus, one might say, societies), I shall confine myself largely to the world of scientific problems and to theories, including mistaken theories. All concrete physical bodies belong to World 1 and absrract things belong to World 3 phenomena. Popper's system of clouds referred to earlier, being abstract forces, are therefore contained in World 3.

The ordering of these three worlds shows a historical progression. Popper (1973:21) therefore assumes:

that the physical world existed before the world of animal feelings; and [he] suggests that World 3 only beings with the evolution of specifically human language. . . I will take the world of *linguistically formulated human knowledge* as being most characteristic of World 3. . . I will also assume that World 3 has a history.

Further Popper (1973:22) contends that:

a thought, once it is formulated in language, becomes an *object* outside ourselves, . . . and with it emerges the human World 3, the world of objective standards and the contents of our objective thought processes.

Human knowledge which includes plans, problems, theories, and solutions of problems as Popper (1975:230) contends are "something quite abstract". Abstract entities such as numbers, concepts, etc. cannot have a causal influence upon physical processes, yet human knowledge has transformed the physical world. There must, therefore, exist processes that mediate between World 3 and World 1 phenomena. These processes can be neither abstract, nor material. But they must be capable of acting on World 1 and being acted upon by World 3. Now we know that "we must normally grasp, or understand a World 3 theory before we can use it to act upon World 1" (Popper 1973:21), so that, grasping, thinking, understanding seem to be the mediating processes we are looking for. It follows also, that they cannot be material processes, but must form an autonomous domain between World 1 and World 3, and this domain is naturally World 2. It is the discovery of human knowledge that makes us realize that the physical world is an open system

in the sense that it can be changed by non-physical influences, and that mental processes are among such influences and consequently form World 2 phenomena (Popper 1973:26). In a biological sense then, evolution is clearly not a conscious process, but in a cultural sense evolution does become conscious. To extrapolate the concept of "survival of the fittest" to mean the ideal type: the desirable product of achievement, problem solving in the biological evolutionary model and the cultural model are based on the difference between rational and irrational actions. For example, using this argument we might accept that the amoeba's actions are not rational, while we may assume that human actions are. The observable difference that tends to support this contention is the existence or non-existence of exosomatic extensions, and it is in this light that the human species is set apart from other species.

Nevertheless, all organisms, even amoebas, face "objective problems" which "need not have their conscious counterpart; and where they have their conscious counterpart, the conscious problem need not coincide with the objective problem" (Popper 1975:242). For problems of this kind are created by the physical surroundings of the organism; however, they can also arise from the transformations which the organism effects in these surroundings and which have often unintended side effects, so that, the transformations "may create a new need, or a new set of aims" (Popper 1975:117). Therefore, either can act back upon the organism, or at least they have the potentiality of so acting and "this potentiality or disposition may exist without ever being . . . realized" (Popper 1975:116). "A wasp's nest [or a cultural artifact] is a wasp's nest [or a cultural artifact] even after it has been deserted" (Popper 1975:

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115 italics added), and apart from being a certain physical structure it also offers advantages, or resistances to properly equipped organisms, and it offers these advantages and these resistances even if there are no organisms around to profit from them, or to be disturbed by them. Thus, the interactions between an animal and its surroundings give rise to a whole "universe of possibilities and potentialities . . . [to] a world which is [both] more abstract than the world of physical bodies", and to a large extent also autonomous (Popper 1975:116 italics added). In the case of man, we have physical products such as books, libraries, etc., and these physical products are used in various ways (Popper 1975: 115). Importantly, the "power", or the disposition, or the potentiality of these physical objects is that they can be understood, or misunderstood, interpreted, or misinterpreted even if there is no one around who does the understanding and the interpreting. The fact that archeologists are able to interpret fossil remains of ancient civilizations provides a good example of this situation.

The important point emphasized here is that it is the *powers* of the objects and not the objects themselves that form "a new universe" of autonomous entities. The distinction here is between value and being, or to use Max Scheler's terminology, "in the realm of essences" beyond the physical world of man's experience (Staude 1967:21-211). The power inherent in the content of books and libraries, for example, is such that these objects possess the power to make organisms act in a certain way and this "*power*" resembles "a system of clouds controlled by clouds" and thereby makes World 1 and World 3 coincide. This is so, because

Man, as a composite of spirit and matter, of mind and instinctual drives, [can] . . . infuse spirit into the world of matter by shaping it according to his ideals. In itself, the world of

essences, the ideal realm, remain[s] pure potentiality. That is, in itself, it remained impotent . . . [until] actualized by man (Stuade 1967:211 italics added).

Birds sit on stones, fences, trees, and man reads the will of the gods in tea leaves, in the stars, and so on. These objects produce abstractions which have the power of reality and should be considered for the part they play in the evolutionary process.

The world of an organism is a natural world, and it acts blindly. On the other hand, the world of a theory is a social world, and is built up by humans who have to decide what to keep and what to eliminate. Thus, we ask ourselves, is the decision to be made completely arbitrary, or is it supposed to proceed according to explicit rules and, if the latter, which rules shall we choose? These are the questions which arise once we start relying on methods of elimination instead of looking for methods of justification. Natural selection thus becomes a non-random process in the cultural realm of man, and often his aims and decisions are not motivated by reasons of survival alone.

Returning to Popper's first three theses where we are concerned with the difference between rational and irrational actions, we find that with the ability to think and act accordingly, human actions proceed as a series of trial-and-errors as he tests mental constructs or hypotheses of conceived phenomena until he arrives at an expected condition. These mental constructs are formulated in words, and often expressed in writing. By doing so man is able to look for flaws in any one of his hypotheses, by criticizing it, and testing it, and eventually with the help of other humans he will be able to consciously select one as the most desirable. As Popper (1968:Chapter 10) asserts, we choose

what we consider the "best" of a set of competing hypotheses in this way and hopefully arrive "nearest to the truth".

Humans have the ability to abstract from the conditions of their physical surrounding regularities and subjective meanings that when examined objectively allow them to make decisions on which to act. Such an ability is not available to the amoeba or most other animal species, and so it happens, more often than not, that natural selection eliminates a mistaken hypothesis or expectation by eliminating those organisms which hold to it. Therefore, the organism either adapts or dies because it cannot change its physical surroundings. But because of man's ability to change his physical environment by the use of exosomatic extensions, he is able to exist knowing "our hypotheses die in our stead: ... a case of exosomatic evolution" (Popper 1975:248).

The next series of Popper's theses: four to eight, are concerned with the development of control mechanisms. We find that emphasis is an error-elimination, and to succeed in this endeavour some form of control mechanism is necessary. Because individuals are not born alike and have different subjective thought processes (which belong to World 2), consequently they "can have either similar or entirely different" conceptions of the same thing. These different beliefs can, in the context of World 3, be essentially "kicked by the logical structure of World 3, which shows that their alleged theorem contradicts the objectively true statement" of fact (Popper 1973:22). The "true statement" is true because the person making it believes it to be "nearest to the truth" in an absolute sense. To arrive at a consensus of opinion the differing individuals must be "kicked" by the "laws of 'the fact', not by other people", and in this way, the World 3 objects "influence our thought processes

decisively" (Popper 1973:22). To avoid conflict between individuals each must be made to understand the "*laws*" naturally existing in World 3.

To expand this point a little more we can say that norms and customs are "laws" that exist in World 3 and these "laws" define for us proper ways of behaving. These norms and customs, because of their a priori tradition are conceived as "real" and do in "many different ways" influence the way in which we solve our problems. Therefore, our success at solving problems will depend

at least partly upon the existence or non-existence, in World 3, of a solution to the problem, and partly upon whether or not [we] are led by [our] thought process to objectively true thought contents" (Popper 1973:23 italics added).

In this way World 3 objects can have a strong causal influence upon World 2 processes, and like a "system of clouds controlling clouds" we are made to conform to a particular norm or custom. Obviously if we do not, or are unable to, then we will be "*eliminated*", from society. Only the fit *must* survive.

Man created the human language and with it discovered knowledge which in World 3 becomes realistic and is thus able to order and control our physical and mental actions. Inherent in language is a series of contents varying between descriptive function and the value of truth. As Popper (1973:23) further suggests;

with its argumentative function and the value of the validity of arguments, . . [and] with it man has created the objective World 3, . . . and with this, he has produced a new world of civilization, of learning, of non-genetic growth: of growth which is not transmitted by the genetic code; of growth which depends not on natural selection but on a selection that is based upon rational criticism.

The theories about our surroundings in World 1 are therefore produced by us, and the consequences of our thinking create new problems deeming further consideration for solving. "All of us contribute to its growth,

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but almost all our individual contributions are vanishingly small" (Popper 1975:161). This point should be borne in mind, because it suggests the limited importance of single individual and heightens the importance of the collectivity in the development of World 3. Because as Popper (1973:23) further contends, our theories about World 1 are:

not merely our constructs, for their truth or falsity depends largely upon their relation to World 1, a relation which, in all important cases, we cannot alter. It depends both upon the inner structure of World 3 and upon World 1, the latter of which, . . . is the very standard reality.

Although World 1 "is the very standard reality", World 3 also possesses "real" factors, and we know that there is an interaction between the two worlds via World 2 which suggests that who-so-ever controls World 3 can also control World 1, and possibly World 2 as well. Further, we know that the human species is not a species of equal individuals and each is subject to the "reality" of World 3 which continually defines how we should act and think. World 3 is "the World of the products of the human mind" (Popper 1975:106-7, 1973:20), which includes all of culture, and we know that culture, "this mass of extra-somatic tools, institutions and philosophies, has a life and laws of its own" (White 1949: 358, 1959:28). Therefore, we now find that biological evolution can be scientifically reduced to the single individual, and this process is significant for the survival of man, but culture (World 3), although it is a product of individuals, can only be analyzed as a result of its manifestation in the collectivity, and thus, the individual loses control over his destiny.

Continuing with Popper's final theses we move from "the evolution of new means for problem solving, by new kinds of trials, . . . new methods for *controlling* the trials. . . . [to examining] new standards of

selection" (Popper 1975:240 italics added). Of importance to Popper's theses is the belief that "The higher levels of language have evolved under the pressure of a need for the better control of . . . things" (Popper 1975:240). Quite specifically we now understand that World 3 products have the power of influencing us, and as Popper (1975:240) contends, "their power . . . is part and parcel of these contents and meanings; for part of the function of contents and meanings is to control". We can now also, better understand Popper's use of "clouds" to explain World 3 phenomena, because we know that "For the control of ourselves and of our actions by our theories and purposes is a plastic control" (Popper 1975:240). In an open society we are not forced to submit ourselves to the control of our theories because we still have the right to freely reject them, but this freedom becomes extremely difficult to enact once our theories gain social acceptance and become part of our established norms and customs. In a closed society however, we must accept our theories because we do not have the freedom to criticize them and hence control is complete.

It is now relevant to refer back to the point made earlier that the world of the organism is a natural world, and it acts blindly, while remembering that evolution is a trial-and-error process. In such a process adaptation takes place almost entirely at the World 1 level. But with the development of language and the discovery of knowledge, Worlds 2 and 3 are introduced into the evolutionary process, and slowly the trial-and-error process of survival is reduced, so that, today man no longer needs to be fearful of most World 1 attributes. We have developed many extensions of our biological selves which in many ways allow us to comfortably reside in safety from the rigors confronting the amoeba, for

example. But, we might ask ourselves where is the evolutionary process we have set in motion leading us? What then is the direction suggested by Popper's description of the evolutionary process? Is the influence of our World 3 phenomena totally excluding *all* individuals from the process of decision making, or only some?

Ideology and Control Develop

Inherent in all species is a condition of instinctive action that allows each to interact together with a certain degree of harmony. In fact,

Sublimation of instinct is an especially conspicuous feature of cultural evolution; it is this that makes it possible for the higher mental operations, scientific, artistic, idealogical activities to play such an important part in civilized life (Freud 1961:44).

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aspects of human culture . . . have one feature in common. They unite one human being to the other, . . . against being left alone . . [and] ultimately, *civilization is a series* of institutions evolved for the sake of security (Roheim 1971:109).

To facilitate this condition we find animal and human parents correcting their erring off-spring by the use of physical and psychological actions which emerge either from the "innate structure (the programme) of the organism" (Popper 1975:72) or from the results of a learning procedure built-up in thier World 3 theories (culture). Therefore, education is a natural condition with an *a priori* tradition. Such an existence means that our World 3 contains a natural institution for promoting acceptance of the proper norms and customs in society.

We begin our life-long process in World 2 by learning assumptions about our surroundings from our personal experiences and perceptions while learning language. For language provides us with the categories that constitute the domains to which these assumptions and beliefs refer. As we learn the categories and the domains that they demarcate, we also acquire a set of rules (norms, values, attitudes, sanctions) of how to behave properly. As "almost all our subject knowledge (World 2 knowledge) depends upon World 3, that is to say on (at least virtually) linguistically formulated theories" (Popper 1975:74), existing independently of our own conceptions we learn to accept these ideologically binding formulations. Culture and society thus emerged as ambiguous consumptions, as being man's own creations but also having lives and histories of their own (see Durkheim 1915:424). "Once this view is accepted" Alvin Gouldner (1971b:53) asserts, "society and culture can be conceived of as autonomous things: things that are independent and exist for themselves". Society and culture are then amenable to being viewed like any other "natural" phenomena in World 1, and, as having laws of their own that operate quite apart from the intentions and plans of men (see Gouldner 1971b:53; Popper 1975:74).

In this context it becomes obvious that our common sense perceptions of our surroundings and our intuitive understanding of them, is "not absolutely reliable" (Popper 1975:72). Therefore, it becomes also obvious that we need a highly articulate mechanism for interpreting World 3 phenomena, because our subjective facilities are insufficient for the task. We necessarily need science.

With the third world phenomena being accepted as being "natural" phenomena, like any physical object, it becomes only a matter of a logi cal consequence that the disciplines that studied them could be viewed as natural sciences. When Emile Durkheim (1962:1vi) claimed that "Sociology

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can . . . be defined as the science of institutions, of their genesis and of their functioning", he was defining an autonomous body of phenomena similar to what Karl Popper defines in his World 3 category. Consequently, it became a simple matter for the early interpreters of sociology to borrow methods from the "natural sciences" such as physics and biology. To emphasize the point, we find that a biological or natural science approach to the study of World 3 phenomena commences with:

the first category consist[ing] of problems concerned with the acts of production; . . The second category of problems is concerned with the structures themselves. . . Very important also is the feedback relation from the properties of the structure to the behaviour of the animals . . . their biological functions (Popper 1975:112-113).

It is these same properties in the social universe that sociology is concerned with as it attempts to define the natural laws that enable the whole to operate. Therefore, by selecting this phenomena as its realm "sociology emerged as a natural science" (Gouldner 1971b:53). In support of this perspective its proponents claimed simply that, if it worked for physics and biology, it should also work for sociology (see Lundberg 1955, 1956).

As the complexity of the cultural knowledge bank increases the task for the social sciences becomes more pertinent and necessary. As Karl Popper (1975:107) points out:

The thesis of an objective third world [means that] all these entities are, essentially, symbolic or linguistic expressions of subjective mental states, . . . these entities are means of *communication--* . . . symbolic or linguistic means to evoke in others similar mental states or behavioural dispositions to act (italics added).

Importantly then, since these "symbols . . . are", as C. Wright Mills (1972:38) contends:

separated from the actual persons or strata that exercise the authority. The 'ideas', not the strata or the persons using the ideas, are then thought to rule. . . The symbols are thus seen as 'self-determining'.

These ideas therefore become the binding force uniting the individuals in society according to some socially determined theme. Further, the "ideology of autonomy involves partial acquiescence," as Alvin Gouldner (1971b:59) suggests, and the message offered is that we should "accept the system, [and] work within it" (italics added). Basically then, it is because we desire to initiate these "mental states of behavioural dispositions to act" that we readily accept in our subjective knowledge that to be certain of our understanding of the messages, a perspective as objective as science claims to be, is what we require for guidance. Further, while all concepts propose lines of action toward social objects, scientific concepts consensually defined within the community of scientists assume that sociologists possess a quality of accuracy that common sense concepts seldom posses (Denzin 1973:38).

In reference to the importance of science as a medium for social guidance and control, a comment is needed in respect to the relationship between science as espoused by the academic adherents and the ideology of culture. It was suggested in the last chapter that today at least much of our third world phenomena is the product of academic minds, and this seems to be true the more widely these theories become disseminated (see Andreski 1973:33-4). Evidence to this effect can be readily seen by examining the effect American universities have had in rendering a specific universal scientific standard credible to the public (Bledstein 1976: 326; also Schwendinger and Schwendinger 1978:519-521). In fact Burton Bledstein (1976:326) points out that:

To the middle-class American . . . science implied more than method and procedure. . . . science established a rational and orderly process of development beneath the fragmented experiences of American life.

The institutions of higher learning are producers of marketable items according to the dictates of the requirements needed to manage and operate a modern technology and capitalist state. By necessity "they produce highly skilled workers and technical knowledge which are useful primarily for maintaining the social, political, and economic institutions of our society" (Schwendinger and Schwendinger 1978: 520). Organization as a result is primarily based on standards that eventually lower the emphasis on acquisition and dissemination of knowledge for aesthetic Such an emphasis means that individual "rewards are not given reasons. for sociology . . . and this means, in effect, that sociology remains a non-cumulative science" (Denzin 1970:32). As stated in the previous chapter, sociology is a product of the developments originating in the political state, and, above all, in the market economy of the last century. It means then, that by resembling the philosopher-kingdom of Plato's dreams "An inclusive instituion, university contained and structured the culture of ideas in American life" (Bledstein 1976:327). Therefore, in summary, it seems reasonable to reflect upon the beginning of this chapter to the comments on the Greeks. Thus, we find that in many respects the elusive control of World 3 phenomena has been attained, and if the "natural pattern of growth" has credance, perhaps the next necessary development will "produce dictatorship in the name of the people".

Plato took the view that the social nature of man has its origin in the imperfection of the human individual, therefore he

teaches that the human individual cannot be self-sufficient owing to the limitations inherent in human nature. . . The state therefore must be placed higher than the individual since only the state can be self-sufficient ('autark'), perfect, and able to make good the necessary imperfection of the individual (Popper 1971:76; also Nisbet 1977:26).

Since this is a "natural" condition supported by a positivistic science which maintains that there are not other norms but the laws which have actually been set up by nature, it is only "natural" for a sociologist to believe that "it is a gross misunderstanding to believe that the individual can judge the norms of society; rather, it is society which provides the code by which the individual must be judged" (Popper 1971:71). Adherence to this view implies that the sociologist is "qualified" to understand and make predictions about these laws. A contention that easily allows for "the pursuit of control as a goal [and] takes the sociologist out of the scientific enterprise and into politics" (Denzin 1970:32). In the next chapter an attempt will be made to outline an example of this practice as execplified in the works of Emile Durkheim.

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CHAPTER THREE

DURKHEIM THE MASTER BUILDER

He will restore us to our original nature, and heal us, and make us happy and blessed (Popper 1971:169).

Introduction

Man's world is manifest, and his attitudes are manifold. What is manifold is often frightening because it is not neat and simple. To be comfortable and acquire security we engage ourselves in a process of reducing the possibilities open to us. Inherent in this process is a desire to control. The wealth of possibilities breeds dread with the result that the "wise" tend to offer two ways for understanding and ordering the complexity of the universe. But almost invariably only one is good. No matter what the truth of the ordering is, belief tends to lie in that which gratifies some personal wish. Most human belief systems tend to hold that ideas are real, or alternatively, material is real. In the following analysis of Emile Durheim's work we find the integration of both ideas and material to such an extent that finally ideas seem to triumph. The manifold world of our existence is thereby reduced to a single absolutism.

Durkheim's theory is best understood in relation to his intentions and underlying assumptions. His *primary objective* was to establish sociology as a legitimate science on a footing equal to that enjoyed by such recognized disciplines as physics and biology. More importantly,

he was attempting to scoop out a niche for sociology between the realms of philosophy and psychology. His second objective, and in some ways equally important, was to set up a model for the reconstruction of society. The legitimation of sociology as a science capable for this task was the underlying assumption of his work. Durkheim's contention was that in order to validate its claim to legitimacy, any scientific discipline must identify its own distinctive territory or reality for study. Science itself was considered the study of reality, and all reality was assumed to be a system of forces that could only be measured by their effects. The greater the effects, the more powerful the forces must be and the greater their reality. For Durkheim (1962:90), social institutions were social facts, and as all social facts are forces, these are real to the extent that specific effects can be uniquely attributed to them. That is, the forces in question have their own and not a derived, subordinate, or borrowed power, and this is so because "although purely ideal . . . they determine the conduct of men with the same degree of necessity as physical forces" (Durkheim 1915:260). "Sociology can then be defined as the science of institutions, of their genesis and of their functioning" (Durkheim 1962:1vi). These are the major perspectives underlying Durkheim's themes which he set out to show conclusively.

All Durkheim's work is based on the assumption that:

when it is recognized [by the sociologist] that above the individual there is society, and that this is not a nominal being created by reason, but a system of active forces, a new manner of explaining men becomes possible (Durkheim 1915:447 italics added).

When considering the definition of "social facts", Durkheim (1962:35) wrote:

In order to be objective, the definition must obviously deal with phenomena not as ideas but in terms of their inherent properties [treat them as material]. . . . Now, at they very betinning of research, when the facts have not yet been analysed, the only ascertainable characteristics are those external enough to be immediately perceived (italics added).

Therefore,

since objects are perceived . . . Science, to be objective . . . ought to borrow the materials for its initial definitions directly from perceptual data. . . . Science, then has to create new concepts; . . . and return to sense perception (Durkheim 1962:43-4).

Bearing in mind that "To-day it is generally sufficient that they bear the stamp of science to receive a sort of priviledged credit, because we have faith in science" (Durkheim 1915:438). Within the empirical science of sociology, this reality is the object of analysis, but it is taken as given without the need for inquiries about its foundations. This inquiry is seen as a philosophical task and was engaged in by Durkheim simply as a means of validating the realm of sociology.

A central theme in Durkheim's work is that the network of social institutions in any society rested essentially upon a core of moral sanctions; that morality, far from being one aspect of society, through the association with religion interpenetrated the whole. This was Durkheim's fundamental fact and throughout his work he spoke of society as a moral reality, and whether writing of religion, of the division of labour, of domestic institutions, or even of social currents of crime or suicide and the conditions of group membership with which they seemed always to be correlated, he conceived the associational emergence of a collective "constraint" upon conduct (as an institutionalized "regulation") as an element of "collective conscience". Durkheim did not only think that as an outcome of human association a "collective "consciousness" was created (see Durkheim 1915:423-4,438,208), but also that such contraint, was obligatoriness. This emergence of a collective conscience in relation to specific areas of associational behaviour (marriage, the family, property, occupations, laws, political constitutions, education, religion, etc.) was, in fact, the process of institutionalization. The more individuals adhered to this moral institutionalization the greater the social solidarity, and the happier the individuals would be.

Morality, Durkheim argues, is social; it reflects the nature of the group (or society) in which it obtains. "The qualification 'moral' has never been given to an act which has individual interests . . . as its object" (Durkheim 1974:37). Indeed, the worth of the individual is itself a social construct.

[A human's] . . . sacredness . . . has been added to him by society. Society has consecrated the individual and made him pre-eminently worthy of respect . . . The individual submits to society and this submission is the condition of his liberation. (Durkheim 1974:72 italics added).

Moral behaviour, in Durkheim's view, is behaviour in harmony with "the *true* nature (or norms and rules) of society". Which means that fundamentally, morality reposes upon the value of success or utility of the immortal and unlimited entity called "society". Here, in collectivity, is the source of all authority and of that discipline, exercised through the coercive customs and habits of the community, for which Durkheim inculcates respect. Science and religion are important to this contention, because by equating science with the power of religion , Durkheim (1915:429-30,438) sees it as being a controlling force of social phenomena. The importance of this analogy needs to be understood as we proceed.

Durkheim is also concerned with social reconstruction, and this concern results from the belief that present industrial society "leave[s]

too large a place for unjust inequalities. . . . we desire another which would be more practicable" (Durkheim 1915:427). As we shall see Durkheim does not claim to have the complete answer to this problem, but through the use of a common education system "A day will come when our societies will know again those hours of creative effervescence, in the course of which new ideas arise and new formulae are found which serve for a while as a guide to humanity" (Durkheim 1915:427-8). The purpose throughout the following pages is to outline Durkheim's model of society and to show the place he assigns the sociologist within it.

Setting up the Categories

"Categories", Durkheim (1915:13) argues, "are applicable to all that is real, and since they are not attached to any particular object they are independent of every particular subject". A given object is rather an intersection of categories; units for reference to elements or aspects or states of totally different objects. The relationship between the two is relational and kaleidoscopic. Facts, therefore, or sensations, are not the origin of categories, but rather categories are what give facts or sensations this or that status or "category". In this sense categories can be assumed to exist anywhere Durkheim decides to deposit them and in whatever order he chooses. In fact, in *The Rules of the Sociological Method* Durkheim agreeing with the views of Descartes and Bacon indicates that "he wishes to employ only scientifically developed concepts, that is concepts constructed according to the method instituted by himself; all those having some other origin . . . must be rejected" (Durkheim 1962:31-2).

Durkheim commences with "Society" which he states "is a reality sui generis; [and] it has its own peculiar characteristics, which are not found elsewhere and which are not met with again in the same form in all the rest of the universe" (Durkheim 1915:16; also 1960:26 italics added). Society in a sense is a system, and like an organism, tends to establish and maintain and equilibrium, even though this may be a moving equili-Important in Durkheim's (1915:418) schema is that "the sensabrium. tions sui generis out of which religious experience is made, is society". Religion in fact, is Durkheim's most important category, and accordingly, "religion" is presented as the basis for change or growth in society. The principal social facts Durkheim chooses to use are: "religion, morality, laws, economics and aesthetics" (Durkheim 1974:96). All these categories are interrelated and even economics which, when exemplified in the division of labour "consists in the establishment of a social and moral order sui generis" (Durkheim 1960:61). Through it individuals are linked to one another, and their actions and behaviours are determined by the aesthetics of religious dictations of morality and laws. In reciprocal reinforcements, religious beliefs sanctify norms of conduct and supply their ultimate justification. Religious rites elicit and act out attitudes expressing, and thus strengthening, the awe and respect in which such norms are held. Thus religion provides, through its sanctification and renewal of basic norms, a strategic basis for social control in the face of deviant tendencies and the expression of impulses dangerous to the stability of society.

In setting up his model of society Durkheim primarily concerned himself with reducing the total universe to managable proportions. Resorting to the perceived categories in common sense perception he assumed

that the first logical categories were social categories; the first classes of things were classes of men into which these things were inte-This was so because men were grouped and thought of themselves grated. in the form of groups and in their ideas they grouped other things into regularities. Out of these ideas and opinions grew the idea of a society "which, once born, obey[s] laws all their own" (Durkheim 1915:424). Once individual ideas are expressed in language or written down they cease to be part of ourselves, but as they are exposed to objective criticism of others, the collectivity of ideas form a bank of knowledge that has a life of its own. Society, culture, religion and even science are born of these opinions (Durkheim 1915:418,438). Thus, the center of the first scheme for natural symbols becomes by the force of this argument the quest for natural systems of symbolizing. Traditionally Durkheim considered

Religion sets itself to translate these realities into an intelligible language which does not differ in nature from that employed by science; the attempt is made by both to connect things with each other, to establish internal relations between them, to classify them and to systematize them. . . . both pursue the same end; scientific thought is only a more perfect form of religious thought (Durkheim 1915:429).

Thus, Durkheim establishes the importance of religion as an agent for the socialization and explanation of society from which science can naturally emerge and follow.

For Durkheim religious representations were collective representations and that which makes religion binding in man's life is not religion as idea, but religion as membership, as communal participation. The authority of religion is, basically, the authority of society, but it is given an intensity that no other aspect of social life reveals. Such intensity emerges from man's ageless division of the world into the

sacred and the profane. Religion is society, but it is a focus of those aspects of society which are endowed with sacredness. Hence, the almost infinite influence of religion on culture and personality, and even on the establishment of the authority of reason "is the very authority of society, transferring itself to a certain manner of thought which is the indispensable condition of all common action" (Durkheim 1915:17).

In the Division of Labour Durkheim attacks the problem of origins in a way that leads directly to his later systematic treatment of this problem in The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life. He says:

There are in each of us . . . two consciences: one which is common to our group in its entirety which, consequently, is not ourself, but society living and acting within us; the other, on the contrary, represents that in us which is personal and distinct, that which makes us an individual. . . . There are, here, two contrary forces, one contripetal, the other centrifugal, which cannot flourish at the same time. We cannot, at one and the same time, develop ourselves in two opposite senses. If we have a lively desire to think and act for ourselves, we cannot be strongly inclined to think and act as others do. If our ideal is to present a singular and personal appearance, we do not want to resemble everybody else. (Durkheim 1960:129-130).

The conflict between these "two consciences", both of which are aboriginal is to a very large extent what motivates the whole process of social development. In religion we find two opposed categories: the sacred and the profane, and similarly: in each of us the same division occurs with the self. By understanding how these divisions operate means that we are in a better position to control one and allow the full expression of the other. Knowing this factor allows for a fuller understanding of Durkheim's method and purpose also. The concept of the sacred, like the concept of authority, is one of the constitutive elements of Durkheim's analysis of social behaviour. Durkheim restored religion to a

central role in the study of man, and attributed to it indispensable symbolic and integrative properties in social and intellectual systems.

Durkheim therefore, is concerned with the opposition between society and the unsocialized individual. The socialized individual is acceptable as that which is sacred to society, while the unsocialized individual isolates himself from the "collectiveness" in society and is therefore profane. Essentially, religion is a society's classification of some things as sacred and others as profane. Sacred things are, by nature, superior in dignity and power to profane things, and this is particularly true in their relation to man himself. Man looks up to them, emulating himself in one degree or another, so that his relation to the sacred is sometimes one of awe, love, or even of measureless dread, but sometimes one of ease and pleasure. Man, however, is always in a state of expressed inferiority before his gods, and as society has in Durkheim's terms a god-like property, it is only natural that we should hold it in reverence (see Durkheim 1973:48-53, 1974:73-5, 1915:431).

Therefore, the idea of the sacred and, with it, the communal, becomes the basis of Durkheim's interpretation of the character of religion (Durkheim 1958:171), and he applies the perspective of the sacred and the profane to specific institutions in societies in order to show the historical and psychological source of their authority. Importantly, Durkheim rejects the view that religion is defined by beliefs in gods or transcendent spirits and he does not believe its origins can be made synonomous with those of magic. Religious beliefs, Durkheim (1915:44) maintains, "are always common to a determined group, which makes [a] progession of adhering to them and of practicing the rites connected with them" (italics added). These believers as we shall see later are the

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socialized individuals who hold to the values and norms of the "collective". It should be pointed out here that by imputing to society the reverence of God, Durkheim is doing so simply because "it is quite certain that anything man has ever handled, felt, come in contact with or lived *can* become a hierophany" (Eliade 1974:11). More importantly, since, as Durkheim points out, society is the origin of all things social, and "because religion is human it must for that very reason be something social, something linguistic, something economic" (Eliade 1974: xiii). Therefore, religion becomes the "essences" of society and not just of a supernatural being called God. We shall return to this point later.

As so far indicated Durkheim saw it necessary to discard the individual from his analysis. By "disregarding the individual as such, his motives and his ideas" we can then "seek directly the states of the various social environments (religious confessions, family, political society, occupational groups, etc.), in terms of which the variations [between them] occur" (Durkheim 1952:151 italics added). Further, in *The Rules of the Sociological Method* we find that "when the individual has been eliminated, society alone remains. We must, then, seek the explanation of social life in the nature of society itself" (Durkheim 1962:102). But, Durkheim is concerned with justifying a set of data that was to be the realm of the new discipline sociology, and rejection of the individual from social phenomenon was not to be as simple as the statements quoted above suggest. Durkheim commences with a definition of man that is acceptable to our common sense reasoning, and then expands his spliting operation to validate society in the common sense realty of the

individual from where it arose. Thus, he concerns himself with analysing the duality of the self.

At a common sense level of abstraction man is both "body" and "soul" and intersection and integration of two different realms of being. We acknowledge this distinction because "sense" is "common" and the more that it is universal, the truer it is. For example Durkheim repeatedly appeals to that which is "common" to "sense" in order to establish the validity of his definitions. In defining "man" in his essay on The Dualism of Human Nature Durkheim (1973:150) says, "In every age, man has been intensely aware of this duality. He has in fact everywhere conceived of himself as being formed of two radically heterogeneous beings: the body and the soul". Durkheim thus defines "body" and "soul" as a binary opposition universal to human thought and experience, that is, as that which is the most "common" to "sense". In a like manner he argues his case that "society" is an irreducible constraining power, and he does so by appealing to the "common sense" experience of "eternality". In The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life Durkheim (1915:237) notes that given ends and interests contrary to those of the individual, society "requires that, forgetful of our own interest, we make ourselves its servitors, and it submits us to every sort of inconvenience, privation and sacrifice, without which social life would be impossible". Consequently, individuals find themselves subjected to "rules of conduct and of thought which we have neither made nor desired, and which are sometimes even contrary to our fundamental inclinations and instincts" (see also Durkheim 1915:298).

This conception of an individual--social opposition underlies all Durkheim's basic categories of explanation of society (see Durkheim 1952:

319, 1960:130). In The Division of Labour Durkheim makes a universal association between "body" and "soul" and organic and mechanical solidarity. Man is both "body" and "soul" by definition, so if his being is respectively associated with societies bound together by organic and mechanical solidarity, then when he becomes one or the other, namely all body or all soul, then man is no longer man but a social fact. Meanwhile, societies constituted of souls, that is, those based on mechanical solidarity, are united, moral and happy, and those constituted of bodies, that is, based on organic solidarity, are abnormal, immoral and individaulistic. Similarly, the individual who exists in the condition of "body", or individualistic in nature, is disruptive to a united society, whilst an individual existing in the condition of all "soul", is completely socialized and united with the collectivity of society. Obviously one of these conditions has the connotation of being better than the other. Durkheim gives an example of this in his Suicide, where we find that suicide is merely a behavioural completion or parallel to rational connections in a meaningful, and far more real universe. Therefore, not only does Durkheim appeal to common sense to validate his definition, but his definitions are themselves common sense ones. Social reality or social facts are the most universal elements of human experience, the "conscience collective".

Conceiving of the individual and the social as opposed forces, Durkheim feels that the greater the internalization of the social component the greater the control it exercises over the individual and the less his freedom of choice. Perhaps the most vivid illustration of this is to be found in his account of the mechanical solidarity in *The Division of Labour*. Other examples such as altruistic suicide in *Suicide*,

and primitive religion in The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life are given where personality is composed almost wholly of the internalized social factor, and "the collective conscience chains us to our group and shackles the liberty of our movements" (Durkheim 1960:304). In modern society (Organic solidarity) personality is a less completely internalized component, social control is weaker, and the individual is freer from the restrictions found in primitive society (Mechanical solidarity). As social products these needs can be restrained only by the moral power of the group; to the extent that this restraint is lacking, a means-needs dysjunction arises and creates the unhappiness that brings man to suicide Thus Durkheim holds that the more the individual is subject to or crime. the sacred and moral control of the group, the more scaled down are his personal needs, the more needs and means exist in a state of equilibrium, the happier man is and the less likely he is to commit suicide or crime; hence regulation, suicide and crime vary inversely. As man is freed from social restraint he experiences an unfulfilled need to find meaning in life by his own activities, or a means-needs disequilibrium resulting from the insatiable nature of his own needs, passions, and desires. Completely divorced from society, he is subject to the profane and the "blind and amoral forces of nature" (Durkheim 1974:55). Either way, the individual does not exist in the realm of freedom, but in Durkheim's society he can be at least happy.

In summary, man lives in a society as both a "body" and a "soul". The "body" is the physical and psychological being or part of the self that maintains the individuality in modern industrial society. The "soul" is the conditioned other of the self that unites the individual with the "conscience collective" where he is controlled and acts in

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accordance with the norms and values of his society. The ideal society for Durkheim is primitive society, the mechanical solidarity. There are obvious problems with Durkheim's construction here, but generally the duality of the self is accepted in our common sense reasoning because man is a social being and society is something external to ourselves and it does seem to exercise an influence over our everyday activities. A life of change in the midst of a social revolution, appeared to Durkheim unnatural, and only a stable whole, the permanent collective, has natural reality, not the passing individuals.

Setting the Stage: The Division of Labour

Durkheim like most grand theorists of his time, focused his concern on the vast, complex, highly specialized, and rapidly changing processes brought about by industrialization. The social changes Durkheim observed in Europe, and especially in France at this time had disrupted and made completely outmoded the old social orders of traditional societies, without seemingly assuming a satisfactory order of its own. The French Revolution had occurred a hundred years before, but still by the end of the nineteenth century mankind to many statesmen and intellectuals appeared to be adrift; dragging along, so to speak, behind a social milieu which individuals could not control. Durkheim, like most of his predecessors, set for himself the task of bringing order to this milieu. Importantly, Durkheim was greatly impressed by aspects of the French Revolution and this was to have a significant influence on his writings. For him the French Revolution

was in large part a great movement of national consolidation, ... for all moral and political particularism. Never did we have a more vivid feeling for the supremacy of collective interests; and of the sovereignty of the law, dominating in its

majesty the multitude of individuals. These sentiments are expressed by the theorists as well as the statesmen of the period (Durkheim 1973:259).

Durkheim's central aim as already stated was to provide an understanding of society on the basis of which a new "social solidarity" could be achieved which was appropriate to the new complexity of economic and social actions. He was deeply concerned about the unrest, the unstability, the insecurity, the lack of firm beliefs, the lack of a settled morality, the "anomie" or general "normlessness" which attended the lack of fit between many institutions in this modern situation; and he wished to resolve these problems.

Determined to dispense with ethics, Durkheim argued, that social facts were to be considered "normal", "healthy", and "good", if they were found on the average in societies of the same type and at the same phase of evolution, and "pathological", "morbid", and "bad", if they were abnormal in this sense. The role of the statesment was not to strive for political reform in the light of ethical ideals, but to seek to keep society in a condition of "normal health". We have seen, too, that according to Durkheim "social facts" existed in their own "natural" right, adjusted themselves to each other naturally in accordance with the conditions within which society as a whole was placed, and consequently it was an error and futile to seek to understand and explain these processes of social facts in terms of individual purpose (see Durkheim 1962:80-124).

In The Division of Labour Durkheim argued that, during the evolution of society a very simple division of labour concomitant with a social solidarity resting chiefly upon a strong traditional authority of "repressive law" gave way to a much more highly differentiated division of labour

in which the social solidarity was a concomitant of the division of labour *itself*; that is, restitutive law, which was the real basis of the moral bond in society. Let us note that strickly speaking, this was a two fold *typology*: a construction of a "mechanical" type and an "organic" type of which specific changes could be interpreted; but Durkheim did give much comparative illustration of these kinds of labour divisions among his various kinds of "social species". Also we must remember that, any conception of "normal" division of labour in a society was, according to Durkheim, that which was found on the average in that social species and at that particular phase of evolution. "Social solidarity" and its appropriate division of labour at a particular level of social evolution was therefore "normal", "healthy", and "good".

At the end of Durkheim's study we find a shift in definition. We find that if in many societies, different kinds of division of labour are concomitant with different kinds of social solidarity, all good and well. But, we find, in comparing all societies at the phase of evolution of industrial capitalism, that the division of labour exhibits an extraordinary degree of specialization which is concomitant with a highly mobile, flexible change among many institutions which leaves them disconnected and ill-fitting, and both the institutions and the individuals among insecure, restless, anxious, pulled by hectic motives of material gain, status emulation, and the like. Durkheim's conclusion then should be that *this* is the "normal" condition of the division of labour, and that social instability and not social solidarity is found "on the average" in societies of this type and at this phase of evolution. As the "normal" condition of this "social fact" in this type of society, it should be held that "instability" is the "healthy" condition of this

society, "good" and "desirable"; and the statesmen's task should be to keep it in this condition of "normal" health.

We might ask then, is that what Durkheim thought? He certainly recognized that this was the "normal" condition of societies characterized by industrial capitalism because he wrote, "there the state of crisis and anomy is constant and, so to speak, normal" (Durkheim 1952:256). However, Durkheim did not accept that this condition of health was good and desirable for modern society, because "anomy is the contradiction of all morality" (Durkheim 1960:431n). Indeed, he was anguished about this "normal social fact" which he had discovered in his comparative study of modern industrial societies. Furthermore, Durkheim was not only disturbed about this social fact as a thing in its own right, but also for the consequences of its "individual manifestations" (Durkheim 1952:256).

Now we notice Durkheim changes his argument, and instead of adhering to the concept of the "normal", his argument shifts to the fact that since the division of labour had produced social solidarity in all the societies studied so far, that this should be taken as its "normal function". A pathological phenomenon exists "when it is not within the average, whether it be above or below it" (Durkehim 1960:432). This, it can be seen, appears as a complete inconsistency, for it is specifying as abnormal in one type of society a social fact which is found to be normal in that type of society, simply on the assertion that its nature in all other types of society establishes its *normal function*. "The same method must be followed in ethics", Durkheim (1960:43) tells us, "because we need only determine the normal intensity of the social reaction which follows the violation of the rule".

In pursuing this point further we note, that to assert that it is the normal function established in societies which have emerged so far which is healthy, good, desirable; and that any new normal social fact in new social conditions must be considered abnormal, pathological, and to be avoided in terms of this assertion; and that the object of the statesmen should be to avoid the new "pathological" condition and preserve this earlier "normal", "healthy" function; is to construct a vast intellectual, ethical, ideological, and political apparatus of conser-This is in fact exactly what Durkheim was doing. I shall return vatism. to this point later. But it should be noted here that such a construction was imputed by Durkheim (1960:246-7) with a condition of morality, Durkheim's "morality" was in effect that a synthetic society allowed men simply to be what they were anyway, namely body and soul, and this is advocated, not arbitrarily, but according to the ultimate principles of reason itself. Reason is not determined by sensory experience because reason is necessary and universal (Durkheim 1915:14). On the other hand, sensory experience is not determined by reason because the latter is socially relativistic. Finally, society is not reason, nor is society sensations, that is, it is not dissolvable into the materiality of this Therefore, what Durkheim is doing here relates to the fact that world.

Rational thinking is thinking according to the laws which are imposed upon all reasonable beings; acting morally is conducting one's self according to those maxims which can be extended without contradiction to all wills. In other words, science and moral imply that the individual is capable of raising himself above his own peculiar point of view and of living an impersonal life [as a fully social person] (Durkheim 1915:445 italics added).

"Though normally the division of labour produces social solidarity" Durkheim 1960:353) wrote:

it sometimes happens that it has different, and even contrary results. It is important to find out what makes it deviate from its *natural* course, [because] the study of these devious forms will permit us to determine the conditions of existence of the normal state better.

This "better" understanding will as Durkheim (1960:375) contends, enable us "to change the established order and to set up a new one". However, the use of the word "natural" here is interesting especially since Durkheim spoke of a social fact being *denatured* if the function which it appeared to have in certain societies become transformed in later and more complex changes (Durkheim 1960:372), but his is a very odd notion if social facts and their functions are differently normal in different "social species". The word "natural" seems arbitrary here, and is simply being used to lend strength to particular social facts as the argument requires. Elsewhere, Durkheim used similar terms which carried a moral connotation. Thus, he not only spoke of the "denaturing" of social facts, but also the "debasement" of human nature.

It was also part and parcel of Durkheim's account of the evolution of the division of labour that the strength of the early kind of "collective conscience" in connection with strong traditional authority became enfeebled, as a more complex and rational moral consensus came with greater differentiation in society. This too therefore was "normal". This concept can therefore be used to explain the supposed "abnormality" of the "normality" of "anomie" that he also mentions (Durkheim 1960:364-5).

In short, Durkheim explained the "abnormality" of the actual "normality" of the relations between the complex division of labour and social instability by simply asserting that in modern industrial capitalist societies the course towards a new social solidarity was not yet completed. The "conditions of equilibrium" had not yet been established. The many conflicting interests in society had "not yet had the time to be equilibrated". This was going to eventually happen: "Social facts" as "things" in social systems *did* establish new equilibrium situations; and this despite the finding that all the *facts* demonstrated that anomie was normal in these societies. Nevertheless, the "highest perfection can be determined only in the function of the normal state" (Durkheim 1960:434).

Importantly here, Durkheim never really considers that his "social facts" would move towards a successful equilibrium on their own account. For, we find in the preface to the second edition of *The Division of Labour* not only that the "normal" condition of the division of labour in these societies is unhealthy, but also that society has an aim, "which is to suppress, or at least to moderate, war among men, subordinating the law of the strongest to a higher law: (Durkheim 1960:3). Here also we find that society is not only surprisingly "teleological", but also surprisingly ethical, for it turns out that it has *duties* as well as *aims*.

Durkheim in presenting society as a system likened it to an organism, and in his system of "things" the "organic" type of division of labour, it was the industrial "corporation" that was the basis of the moral consensus and solidarity of social life (Durkheim 1960:5). Since it was now obvious that society had failed, it became necessary for men to act purposefully to reconstitute industrial corporations in order to resuscitate the moral life and the social solidarity of society. In fact, Durkheim (1960:29) laid down proposals for this task for the guidance of statesmen. Also, such a program should not be piece-meal

for "Justice" Durkheim (1960:406) wrote, "*must prevail*" throughout the entire network of contractual relationships. Such action was needed, with the rise of great industry and the large-scale contractual relations of commerce; "not because of the economic services it can render, but because of the moral influence it can have" (Durkheim 1960:10,23).

It is curious here to note that Durkheim could only regard as a "moral" action, one which *would* contribute to social solidarity. He wrote, "It is, indeed, impossible to regard some practices as moral which would be subversive of the societies observing them, for it is a fundamental duty everywhere to assume the existence of the fatherland" (Durkheim 1960:423). Therefore, given the urgent need for the reconstruction of the industrial corporation: "How . . . important it is," Durkheim (1960:423-4,387) said, "to put ourselves at once to work establishing the moral forces which alone can determine its realization!"

It is also important to remember here that Durkheim considered himself a scientist and considered that as such he was aptly situated to design social reconstruction programs, and in fact it was his moral obligation to do so, because "The clearer our notion of reality, the more apt we are to behave as we should. It is science that teaches us what is. Therefore, from science, and from science alone, must we demand the ideas that guide action, moral action as well as any other" (Durkheim 1973:274).

Reasons for Social Reconstruction: Crime and Law

Durkheim used the example of crime and the law (and Custom) to empasize the importance of the sociologist to society because these were the best indicators of the network of established institutions. "Since law reproduces the principal forms of social solidarity, we have only to

classify the different types of law to find the different types of social solidarity which correspond to it" (Durkheim 1960:68).

In the modern industrial state current thinking was evidently based on the idea that a presumably normal person who violates the existing social code threatens, more so than an insane person, the viability of that code. This being so, social reaction, Durkheim contended, was not one which was concerned with the welfare of the person who broke the code, but with the welfare of the code itself. To the extent the violator is considered normal yet subjected to punishment he or she must be seen as a sacrifice for the welfare of many. This Durkheim suggested was a characteristic of all societies. As a result, concern was not only with making criminals "pay" when they were punished, but that concern was with making them an embodiment of suffering which balances the affront to the moral order. "When we desire the repression of crime, it is not we that we desire to avenge personally, but to avenge something sacred which we feel more or less confusedly outside and above us" (Durkheim 1960:100). The power of the moral order comes from the fact that it is a collectively held set of beliefs. Therefore, Durkheim considered it is the sociologist, who from his disengaged vantage point, who could feel a sense of horror when he read of the excessive nature of "repressive" sanctions being prescribed. Thus, it was the sociologist who could then work towards the introduction of the more equable "restitutive" form of punishment because, as Durkheim advocates, the sociologists as scientists are the keepers of society.

Let us examine "social facts" a moment. Durkheim (1962:13) wrote:

A social fact is every way of acting, fixed or not, capable of exercising on the individual an external constraint; or again, every way of acting which is general throughout a given society,

while at the same time existing in its own right independent of its individual manifestations.

Certain social ways of acting and thinking and these social facts could be quite dissociated from the form, or nature, in which they were embodied in the minds of individuals. But as Durkheim (1962:7, 1973:277) further points out,

It is the collective aspects of the beliefs, tendencies and practices of a group that characterizes truly social phenomena. As for the forms that the collective states assume when refracted in the individual, these are things of another sort.

What Durkheim has done here is state firstly, that "social facts" were now lifted to the position of an existence independent of all the socio-psychological aspects of individuals as they had been affected by the process of association, and secondly, the study and explanation of them was to take place without reference to these socio-psychological aspects of individuals. The "social facts" existed in some realm of reality in their own right, and they were to be explained solely in terms of each other and the sick processes of interdependence as existed among them.

There is no doubt then, that when Durkheim spoke of society as a system of independent social facts which were things possessing functional relations with each other, changing, differentiating, integrating in relation to the total environmental conditions of the whole; and in accordance with an equilibrium--disequilibrium process of adaptation, he really meant precisely that. He most certainly did have in mind a new substantive kind of reality; a super-organic *being* or a qualitatively distinct kind of associational facts in conditions of inter-dependency. The constraint of social facts, Durkheim (1962:125) wrote is that: recourse to artifice is unnecessary to get the individual to submit to them of his entire free will; it is sufficient to make him become aware of his state of natural dependence and inferiority . . . Since the superiority of society to him is not simply physical but intellectual and moral,

Further Durkheim (1915:444) writes:

Society is not at all the illogical or a-logical, incoherent and fantastic being which it has too often been considered. Quite on the contrary, the collective consciousness is the highest form of the consciousnesses. Being placed outside of and above individual and local contingencies, it sees things only in their permanent and essential aspects.

Society is both source and object of morality (Durkheim 1973:86, 1974:59), and moral regulations express "needs that society alone can feel" (Durkheim 1960:5). Therefore, "to act morally is to act in terms of the collective interest" (Durkheim 1973:59). Given the individual and society as opposed forces, the greater the morality, the less the control exercised by the individual over his own behaviour. It is when he is freed from social control that he acts in an immoral or, at best, amoral fashion. Thus anomie and crime is the contradiction of all morality and strong social control its source. In short, Durkheim does not link morality with freedom of choice; indeed, freedom from social control is basically subversive of morality.

Furthermore, man has a basic "need to be contrained, bounded [and] restricted" by society (Durkheim 1973:113). Therefore, only through society can the individual realize his own potential as a human being (Durkheim 1974:55). Society far surpasses the individual and represents the ultimate of his moral behaviour (Durkheim 1974:44-5, 1973:86). This, coupled with the inherently good and superior nature of society makes it desirable for the individual (Durkheim 1974:54-6, also 1973:243, 1962: liv). When the individual understands the basically beneficial and necessary nature of the social commands embodied in moral rules he is lead to voluntary compliance, which therefore remains compatible with the autonomy and self-determination of the individual (Durkheim 1973:116-120).

As set out in Moral Education Durkheim (1973:17-126) considers this to be the individuals "duty" to society (also Durkheim 1974:35-62). The impact of society is in no way intolerable, and individuals do not experience its weight any more than they feel the weight of the atmosphere on their shoulders. They live in a physical environment with its attendant restraints successfully, and society is not different in this regard. Therefore, having been raised by the collectivity, the individual "will naturally desire what it desires and accept without difficulty the state of subjection to which he finds himself reduced" (Durkheim 1958:61, also 1962:6). To reject this state the individual automatically subjects himself to the "sanctions of society". The sources of these "sanctions" and the reasons why they exist are because "acts universally disapproved of by members of each society" are "collective sentiments" and these "are common to the average mass of individuals of the same society" (Durkheim 1960:81); so to break them brings the individual into conflict with the sentiments of the society thus calling forth strong feelings of disapproval.

That should be enough to show how Durkheim posits an individualistic debt and subservance to society. Durkheim (1915:446-7) conceived of *society* as a fund of creative forces with

a distinctive level of associational processes, and the creativity of society as a new level in nature of socio-psychological interaction and creation, can be accepted without at all accepting the reification of a social organism, completely independent of "individual manifestations".

In summary, "Society", Durkheim (1973:277) wrote, "is a complex of ideas and sentiments, of ways of seeing and of feeling, a certain intellectual

and moral framework distinctive of the entire group. Society is above all a consciousness of the whole". Therefore, "social facts" do exist, and as Durkheim insisted, they can be seen to possess at least a number of characteristics. Namely, (a) they are external to the individuals in society; they are material entities; (b) they are constraining upon individuals, in that individuals, find them objectively existent, and are compelled to come to terms with them; (c) they are diffused, and in the most established cases general throughout the society, and (d) they have a nature going beyond their individual manifestations.

To understand Durkheim's analogy of "health" and "illness" we must note the importance of the religious distinction between the sacred and the profane in his methodology. We will speak more on this feature shortly. On the other hand, Durkheim (1960:34) assumed the existence of conditions of health and illness in societies and then sought objective criteria for them. While he was investing the regularities of occurrence of facts in society with the additional connotations of the word "health" and social irregularities with those of the world "illness", Durkheim followed this analogy by stating that "crime . . . is a factor in public health, an integral part of all healthy societies" (Durkheim 1962:67). Similarly, he carried the analogy completely into his conception of the role of the statesmen or legislator. Political leaders should not seek to change society in accordance with ethical ideals. Although this may be discouraging for men to feel that their "ideals" in society are not going to be attained or realized, Durkheim contended that political activity

is no longer a matter of pursuing desperately an objective that retreats as one advances, but of working with steady perseverance to maintain the normal state . . . [and further] his

role is that of the physician: he prevents the outbreak of illness by good hygiene, and he seeks to cure them when they have appeared (Durkheim 1962:75 italics added).

This peculiar condition, nevertheless, is very important in Durkheim's scheme of "things" as we shall see, but firstly let us examine an example of what is posited here. If the normal crime rate of murders in societies of the same type are, say 500 murders a year, and the actual number in a specific society is only 400, then this society is unhealthy; it is suffering some morbid, pathological condition; so then, the statesmen must bring conditions back to the normal level of hygiene at which there will be 500 murders. Other examples can be given such as the normal rates of unemployment, and the like. On the other hand, as we saw earlier, the "normal" condition of "anomie" in industrial societies must be combated because the division of labour in these societies is not performing the function which it "normally" fulfills in other types of society. As was mentioned earlier Durkheim was concerned with social reconstruction, and so we need to understand that for him the maintenance of uniform or "normal" crime rates was closely related to his purpose. Durkheim was an admirer of the great crises in social history such as "Christendom", the "Reformation and Renaissance", and the "revolutionary epoch and the Socialistic Upheavals" (see Durkheim 1974:92) in so far as they led to "moments of collective ferment [in which] are born the great ideals upon which civilizations rest" (italics added). At such times "The periods of creation or renewal occur when men for various reasons are led into a closer relationship with each other" (Durkheim 1974:91). Therefore, before social reconstruction could commence, a condition of "collective consciousness" had to be reached in all societies. Crime was an individual act and thus unhealthy and "bad" and the continued crime

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rate, Durkheim hoped, would help raise the "consciousness" of the masses towards change (Durkheim 1915:443).

As we have seen, Durkheim was concerned with, society and this point should be continually borne in mind. With this objective he saw fit to discard all elements of human purposiveness as constituting grounds of "causality" in social affairs. His grounds for doing so, I might, clarify, were related to the metaphysical *entity* of society as he conceived it (see Durkheim 1962:103-4). That is, Durkheim (1973:227) wrote:

Society is not the work of the individuals that compose it at a given stage of history, nor is it a given place. It is a complex of ideas and sentiments, of ways of seeing and of feeling, a certain intellectual and moral framework distinctive of the entire group. Society is above all a consciousness of the whole.

Additionally, Durkheim (1915:418) wrote:

For that which makes a man is the totality of the intellectual property which constitutes civilization, and civilization is the work of society. . . . society cannot make its influence felt unless it is in action, and it is not in action unless the individuals who compose it are assembled together and act in common.

By insisting upon the uncovering of social facts, Durkheim was actually asserting that society was a *natural entity*, a *system of social facts at their own level*, and an explanation of any of these facts and their relationships was a *deterministic* explanation in terms of causeand-effect connections between a certain species of "things". So that, what Durkheim meant by "things" we shall define again:

Things include all objects of knowledge that cannot be conceived by purely mental activity, those that require for their conception data from outside the mind, from observations and experiments, those which are built up from the more external and immediately accessible characteristics to the less visible and more profound (Durkheim 1962:xliii).

On the basis of this conception Durkheim fully and deliberately excluded all "purpose" in "individual consciousness" and all "uses" which individuals could comprehend as "purposes" from being possible sources of "explanation". He replaced these *purposes and uses* completely by "efficient causes" among the inter-connections of social facts themselves, and the "functions" in terms of their fulfilment of *societal* needs. Importantly, these "social facts" could only be understood by the sociologist who was not a member of society. These metaphysical "things" were *real* to them even if they weren't to anyone else (Durkehim 1962:35,43-4).

For Durkheim there were two elements in any social milieu: material and immaterial conditions and artifacts. For example, codes of law, works of literature, as well as natural resources, buildings, tools, weapons, and so on, on the one hand; and the human milieu, the people of the group in their collective conditions, on the other. Clearly Durkheim argued, only the latter can be the source of the creative energy that leads to institutionalization and the development of society. Durkheim considered himself a sociologist, and also that his task was to seek some characteristics of this human-social milieu which he asserted, without reduction to psychological and biological factors, could be shown to be responsible for the *causation* and the development of social facts. There were, he claimed, *two* such characteristics: firstly, the sheer *number* of units in the group (population in the society), and secondly, the degree of *dynamic density* of all these units in their interaction in the group as a whole.

To begin here, Durkheim held to the view that sociology was concerned with a specific order of "things". That is, to *describe* what the things of its subject-matter were, to observe and record their qualities; and secondly to *classify* them in accordance with the observable varieties among them; thirdly to investigate the *causes* of their nature and their

varieties by "methodical inductions"; and then fourthly, to compare all these results in order to arrive at a statement of general "laws": statements of *constant concomitance* which existed among them.

Mechanical and Organic Solidarity

In order to analyse this transformation of the division of labour and the nature of social solidarity Durkheim constructed his two "types". Then having, as he thought, established that the function of the division of labour was to unite the specialization of tasks in society in an overall social solidarity; and having insisted that this was essentially a basic moral order pervading society; Durkheim then sought the external characteristics whereby the nature of the morality existing among the people might be measured. To put this another way, he looked for some observable index of the nature and intensity of the collective moral sentiments which operated in society. This "visible symbol", he argued, was the law in society, and, going a little farther than this, it was the sanctions manifested in the law which were a clear index of the intensity with which certain moral precepts were held in "sentiments" of the community. He then argued that two "great classes" of sanctions could be distinguished among judicial rules, namely, "repressive" and "restitutive" sanctions: the first characterizing penal law, the second characterizing other elements of the law, such as civil, commercial, procedural, administrative and constituional law (see Durkheim 1960:425-7). His two "types" of social solidarity were constructed on this basis.

In relatively simple societies possessing a relatively simple division of labour, with simple techniques traditionally regulated and repeated from generation to generation, with only a moderate "dynamic density" among the population, with a wide-spread familiarity of awareness and a sense of "likeness" or similarity among its members, and with predominately, a body of regularitory law which was "repressive", there was what Durkheim called a "Mechanical Solidarity". People, though performing special tasks, did so within a simple framework of rules, traditions, and expectations and were not too much dependent on each other. The values and rules of society could be upheld by a simple "repressive" law which visited the indignation of society upon the offender punishing him, seeking an "explation" of his guilt in so doing, and, above all, reinforcing the traditional morality of the people as a whole. Such a society could become quite large, even embracing the earlier civilizations and the City States of antiquity, and the "ancien regime" of Christendom. The crucial element to which Durkheim pointed was that, in all such societies the "industrial corporation", or occupational group, was not only an economic enterprise nor only a narrow contractual relationship of an economic nature. It was in the fullest sense a social group providing many social and communal supports, functions, festivities, serving also as a basis of moral and even of religious life. The "industrial" or economic life of the people still found a fully ordered place within the intimate context of the wider fabric of values and other social institutions. There was a clear, supported, and continually reinforced consensus of traditional values and practices linking man's economic life meaningfully and richly with the entirety of society.

The second "type" distinguished by Durkheim was the very large and complex society of the nation based upon modern industrial capitalism which was characterized by curious, but clearly related, paradoxes.

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First of all, a greatly increased population brought with it a greatly intensified dynamic density among its members and consequently a greatly increased moral intensity of reciprocal demands, contracts, needs, obligations, and duties. Secondly, this brought with it curiously conflicting tendencies indeed paradoxical socio-psychological conditions. The extreme specialization bound men together in bonds of close dependence upon each other which were objectively quite inescapable. Men could not now manage at all to sustain their mode of life alone; to make their own motor cars, shoes, suits of clothes, or economic organization, as labour in large societies is complex and reciprocal (see Durkheim 1973:132). They were objectively constrained by these general external "social facts" which were, themselves, rooted in inescapable "collective conditions". At the same time, individuals were subjectively denuded of many dimensions not only of social and moral, but also of economic life. They were themselves simply units of labour, factors of production. Work itself was not a creative activity embodying personal skill in creating a whole object for clearly seen use; it was a specialized, automatic "bit" of a process of production. Even the work relations of men were not longer of a full social nature, but narrowed down to the where economic compulsion of wage-earning. The complex, contractual structure of economic enterprise was orientated entirely to contractual interest so that no over-all unity of belief or morality, or social or personal discipline, unified this complexity. There was, in fact, a condition of "anomie", of "normlessness" in which men compulsorily constrained by the objective pressures of specialization, were subjectively adrift; unrelated to each other in any satisfying way, and possessing no framework for meaningful life, either as a citizen or as a person. This complexity was both

marked, and, if anything, furthered, by the growing predominance of "restitutive law" whose rationale was simply to make restitution for injuries done to ensure "the return of things as they were". This reinforced little more than the propriety of the contract itself. This second "type" was that which Durkheim called "Organic Solidarity" indicating the intricate nature of interdependence within it.

One of the crucial points here is to be found in the movement from the "Mechanical" to the "Organic" type of solidarity, the division of labour itself becoming the principal ground of social solidarity. His argument was that social change had proceeded so rapidly that there had not been time for a thorough "adjustment" of social institutions to take place. His ultimate proposal was that such an "adjustment" should be assisted by political policy by deliberately bringing about an appropriate "reconstruction" of the "industrial corporation".

Durkheim argued, for example, that "provincialism" was dead (Durkheim 1960:28), and that nothing which did not recognize the largeness of scale and the centralization of society could now be effective. Similarly no "political" solution, whether "regional" or "central" could put these matters right, as they were beyond the range of ordinary political policies. What was required was a thorough re-organization from top to bottom of industry itself. Especially required was the actual recreation, the resuscitation, of the entire "industrial corporation" itself, for as Durkheim argued, this had come to be split into senseless and expedient "specialisms". Attention thus should be given to the social, the moral, and the communal aspects of the provisions for life of its members and not to economic matters alone. Of prime importance in Durkheim's scheme is that of making a virtue out of *specialization* (see Durkheim 1960:30, 1915:443). According to Durkheim, the days were gone when men could think of a full, rounded education and life encompassing all the ingredients of "Mechanical Solidarity". To avoid all collisions their emphasis should now be upon performing one task with satisfactory skill in contributing to the complex division of labour as a whole (see Durkheim 1952:390). In such an orientation would lie a satisfactory "ethic", and, perhaps, a satisfactory personal and social ideology for life within these new industrial conditions. "The categorical imperative of the moral conscience" then as Durkehim notes, "is assuming the following form: make yourself fulfil a determinate function" (Durkheim 1960:43).

It is important to see that in his proposals for the reconstruction of the "industrial corporation" Durkheim saw this as a kind of "filling in" of the gap between individual and State with elements of socio-economic organization which would effectively focus men's allegiance and multifaceted social life and effort, by the provisions of an actual set of social conditions which would themselves engender new moral sentiments and new judicial rules. Durkheim (1960:28) wrote:

The nation can be maintained only if, between the State and the individual, there is intercalated a whole series of secondary groups near enough to the individuals to attract them strongly in their sphere of action and drag them, in this way, into the general torrent of social life. Occupational groups are suited to fill this role, and that is their destiny (see also Durkheim 1952:380-1).

Further,

Social life can be divided, while retaining its unity, only if each of these divisions represents a function . . . But first the corporation must be organized. It must be more than an assemblage of individuals . . . It can fulfil its destined role only if, in place of being a creature of convention, it becomes a definite institution, a collective personality, with its customs and traditions, its rights and duties, its unity (Durkheim 1952:391). Thereby Durkheim portrays the complex, specialized society which would provide the basis for the richest fulfilment and freedom of the individual. Indeed, what he was proposing was a return to the conditions of his "Mechanical Solidarity", which was "accordingly, a real discussion which makes us believe that personality was so much more complete when the division of labour had penetrated less" (Durkheim 1960:404).

Durkheim's entire emphasis in his study of the changing nature of social facts, as traditional societies yielded to modern industrial capitalist societies, was essentially a study of morals. Moral sentiments and moral sanctions pervaded the whole structure of institutions in society; morality lay at the heart of institutionalization. Durkheim's "occupational groups" were such a condition of institutionalization that produced such solidarity within the society. "Morality", Durkheim (1960: 399) tells us, "in all its forms, is never met with except in society". Therefore, we could conclude that Durkheim's new "corporation" meets all of these conditions:

Everything which is a source of solidarity is moral, everything which forces him to regulate his conduct through something other than the striving of his ego is moral, and morality is as solid as these ties are numerous and strong (Durkheim 1960:398).

Durkheim's essential point is that to be a free discriminating individual person is only possible within such a condition of society. In his "mechanical" society, the individual's obligation is to "resemble his companions"; that is, to conform to others. Similarly, it is only in the highly specialized society where the individual is "autonomous" to any degree (Durkheim 1960:403-4), and in accordance with Durkheim's conditions of "normal", that such a situation would be considered *abnormal*, *pathological*, and "bad". Of significance here is Durkheim's (1973:257) contention that "We can only dedicate ourselves to society if we see in it a moral power more elevated than ourselves". The motive power of society, so to speak, is thus considered to lie in the power of "religion", for here is deposited the harnessed energy necessary for controlling all other social facts. The magnitude of this motive power is always finite because, "A society can neither create itself nor re-create itself without at the same time creating an ideal . . . the collective ideal which religion expresses" (Durkheim 1915:422-3; see also 237-8).

In modern society the *being of power* that is society is often opposed by the personal purposes and desires of individuals because "collective representations also contain subjective elements, and these must be progressively rooted out, if we are to approach reality more closely" (Durkheim 1915:444). The reality Durkheim seeks is the *new* society, which

is possible only when the individuals and things which compose it are divided into certain groups, that is to say, classified, . . . it is necessary that each particular group have a determined portion of space assigned to it: . . . which everybody conceives in the same fashion. . . the co-operation of many persons with the same end in view is possible only when they are in agreement as to the relation which exists between this end and the means of attaining it. (Durkheim 1915:443-4).

To this point we have dealt with the mechanics of Durkheim's justification of the problem inherent in modern industrial society. The next section examines how Durkheim intended to bring about changes.

Reconstruction through Education

Basic to Durkheim's aspirations for achieving the reconstruction of society is the importance of education. To commence with, Durkheim (1973: 260) tells us, "we assign to the individual an end that transcends him, . . . provide some objective for the need for devotion and sacrifice that lies at the root of all moral life". Then, once we have provided these goals, education must be used to convey "a sense of the real complexity of things" to the individuals, and "This, sense must finally become organic to him--natural, as it were--and constitute a category in his mind" (Durkehim 1973:260-1). By these means education "can lead him on the road to understanding that society is not simply the sum of individuals who compose it" (Durkheim 1973:262, also 1915:422). Once this is understood, "he can no more separate himself from it than from himself. It is the collective consciousness that we must instill in the child", and as Durkheim (1973:276-7) contends, "It is the business of the school to organize it methodically".

For education to have any success in conveying its message to the child it had to be organized in a specific way according to Durkheim. Durkheim realized that if "the child has obeyed a given person many times, he is quite naturally brought to borrow from this same person certain attributes associated with the influence exerted over him by the latter" (Durkheim 1973:142). During Durkheim's time this meant being subjected to the influences of the one or maybe two or three teachers for all subjects a child was taught in school. But, Durkheim (1973:142) contended: "Such an education would, by force of circumstance, easily lead to subservience. The child could not fail to reproduce passively the single model placed before him". Therefore, to avoid this "kind of servitude", and insure "that education does not make of the child a carbon copy of the teacher's shortcomings," Durkheim (1973:143) wrote, we must rotate "the teachers in order that they may complement one another," and also to ensure "that the various influences prevent any one from becoming too exclusively preponderant."

The "aim of the school is to prepare for life . . . [and] it would fail in its task if it made the child develop habits that the conditions of life would someday contradict" (Durkheim 1973:205 italics added). Thus, important to Durkheim's scheme was the fact that, in order to commit oneself to "collective ends, we must have above all a feeling and affection for the collectivity". Thus, before one makes a commitment, "he must be fond of life in a group setting" (Durkheim 1973:238). Therefore, if we hold that "Associations can only spring up . . . when the feeling for association awakens", it is possible and reasonable to expect that "it cannot awaken except within already existing associations" (Durkheim 1973:239). This was Durkheim's concern, and as "existing associations" could be "bad" he contended that:

The only way of getting out of this circle is to get hold of the child when he leaves his family and enters school. It is at that moment that we can instill in him the inclination for collective life. For the school is a society, a natural group . . . [and] if the child, at this decisive time, is carried along in the current of social life, the chances are strong that he will remain oriented in this way throughout his life. [Thus], if he develops the habit of expressing his interests and activities in various groups, he will keep the habit in his post-school life; and then the action of the lawmaker will really be fruitful for it will emerge from soil that education will have prepared (Durkheim 1973:239 italics added).

Durkheim then, would have accomplished his goal of a "new corporation". The "laws" of the legislator and statesmen would consequently he enacted to maintain this condition in the "child".

These ideals are simply the ideas in terms of which society sees itself and exist at a culminating point in its development. Ideals are not abstractions, cold intellectual concepts lacking efficient power. They are essentially *dynamic* for behind them are the powerful forces of the collective" (Durkheim 1974:93).

Therefore, we may conclude that "the only thing necessary for a society to be coherent is that its members have their eyes fixed on the same goals". and that they, "concur in the same faith" (Durkheim 1973b:48). "The believer bows before his God, because it is from God that he believes that he holds his being, particularly his mental being, his soul". Becuase as Durkheim (1974:73) argues, "We have the same reasons for experiencing this feeling before the collective".

So what we want or perhaps need if we are going to correct social ills, is "to love and respect that which is *ideally perfect*", for as Durkheim (1974:75) tells us, "God Himself could not be the object of such a feeling, since the world derives from Him and the world is full of imperfection and ugliness". Essentially what we are looking for is something even more perfect than God. Christianity was rejected by Durkheim (1973b:53) as "A religion which tolerates sacrilege", and as such, "abdicates all dominion over man's minds (Consciences)". As Durkheim 1973b: 52-3) tells us, with the advent of christianity "The very center of moral life was thus transported from the external to the internal, and the individual was thus elevated to the sovereign judge of his own conduct, accountable only to himself and to his God". But, "Finally, in consumating the definitive separation of the spiritual and the temporal, in abandoning the world to the disputes of men, Christ delivered it at once to science and to free inquiry." This "explains", according to Durkheim (1973b:52-3), "the rapid progress made by the scientific spirit from the day when Christian societies were established". Thus, with the aid and guidance of science as Durkheim (1973b:51) suggests:

we make our way, little by little, toward a state, nearly achieved as of now, where the members of a single social group will have nothing in common among themselves except their humanity, except the constitutive attributes of the human person (personne humaine) in general.

The "religion of yesterday could not be the religion of tomorrow"

(Durkheim 1973b:51). Because as Durkheim (1915:431) says:

From now on, faith no longer exercises the same hegemony as formerly over the system of ideas that we may continue to call religion. A rival power rises up before it which, being born of it, ever after submit it to its criticism and control. And everything makes us foresee that this control will constantly become more extended and efficient, while no limit can be assigned to its future influence.

The essence of religion is the community of believers, the indispensible feeling of collective oneness in worship and faith (see Durkheim 1915:44). It is the consistent part of Durkheim's conception of religion that a deity expresses in a person from the power of the society, a power clearly felt, though not so consciously defined. For Durkheim God is society "apotheosized", and therefore, society is the real God. This identity is adumbrated in the totem animal, a sacred object; and more clearly shown in the person deity, Jahveh, or Zeus. The tribal god is, like the totem animal, which is often confusedly conceived of as a member of the group; another evidence of the close relationship between group and deity. That is, that which is considered sacred in a society is given its awesome qualities by virtue of its capacity to represent values, sentiments, power, or beliefs which were shared in common; the sacred object comes out of and is supported by the total society. The profane object, on the other hand, is not supported in this manner. It may have a considerable utility, but it gains its value primarily from the extent to which it is useful to some individual, as it has little or no public relevance, such as the criminal for example dealt with earlier.

The sacred object represents or symbolizes some force which is capable of inducing submissions, awe, a sense of personal impotence, humility, and powerlessness to the individual. In Durkheim's terms science can occupy this same position, especially when the force that is capable

of achieving this position, in relation to the individual is society. The position is achieved when society validates the sacred object, so that the sacred object becomes a symbolic representation of the social force. Other examples can be given, but the important factor to remember in understanding this example, is that Durkheim considered religion could not be conceived of in rational terms. This was because, from his point of view, religious rites appear to be "only an external translation contingent and material, of these internal states which alone pass as having any intrinsic values" (Durkheim 1915:416). The essence of religion, according to Durkheim (1915:416, and 1973b:51), is not what it says about things, external or internal, but what it does toward making action possible, and life endurable. "Our wills alone can make it a living reality" Durkheim (1974:89) tells us, because "Society cannot make its influences felt unless it is in action, and it is not in action unless the individuals who compose it are assembled together and act in common". So that, as Durkheim (1915:418) further argues, "It is by common action that it takes consciousness of itself and realizes its position; it is before all else an active co-operation".

By rejecting christianity Durkheim considered he was belying the importance of "individualism" and its manifestations of social *instability*, *abnormal*, and *pathological* conditions of the industrial capitalist state, and through the use of science returning "society" to a "Mechanical" type solidarity. As an example of his new *model* of "society" Durkheim contended that "Religious minorities are an interesting example of the tempering of character, of the training of life that a strongly cohesive group communicates to its members " (Durkheim 1973:239-240). As Durkheim perceived it, these minorities offered a good example of the rejection of the "individual" self. That is, the "body" in favour of the "soul".

For, he says:

With the religious minority, there is a backlog of solidarity, of mutual aid and comfort; there is something unifying, which sustains the faithful against the difficulties of life. . . There is pleasure in saying 'we', rather than 'I', because anyone in a position to say 'we' feels behind him a support, a force on which he can count. . . The pleasure grows in proportion as we can say 'we' with more assurance and conviction. [Therefore] To experience the pleasure of saying 'we', it is important not to enjoy syaing 'I' too much (Durkheim 1974:240 italics added).

Thus, for Durkheim (1960:279), the "Collective life is not born from individual life, but it is, on the contrary, the second which is born of the first".

Therefore, Durkheim was hoping for a decline of egoism and the flowering of a "cult of man" as a source of solidarity in the modern world. This cult Durkheim (1973b:49) claimed, "has as its primary dogma the authority of reason and as its primary rite the doctrine of free inquiry". The "man" which is its object is not the concrete personality but a social reality, a shared, idealized conception of the individual which is "sacred in the ritual sense of the word". Therefore, there is no contradiction in speaking of "a religion in which man is at once the worshiper and the god" (Durkheim 1973b:46).

Precisely as he makes religion into a manifestation of society and its crucial phases, Durkheim makes society, in turn, depend upon a nonrational, super-individual state of mind that can only be called religious. Between religion and society there is a functional interplay. We see how the "organic" division of labour brought into being an entire system of rights and duties, binding the individuals together in a "corporation" of "solidarity". The condition of "anomie" as Durkheim perceived it required the reconstruction of the "industrial corporation" as he argued it, to bring about an adequate "fit" between the several levels and elements of society. It is important to note that Durkheim was not intertaining the thought of dispensing with a class society. Indeed, he believed that the people should be taught "how to respect natural superiority without ever losing . . . [one's] self-respect". Importantly, Durkheim (1973b:33) stated, "This is what the future citizens of our democracy must be". What he wanted, was for individuals to appreciate their niches in society as they were organized by the "division of labour", and for them these niches would be "just" and the "ultimate" extent of individual requirement. Such positions were not only "natural" but also morally correct, and from these the individual attained an existence of reverence or essense-like properties.

The duties of the scientist then, are to understand these "spatial" and "temporal" relations, and keep the national leaders and politicians informed accordingly, so that they could "maintain" the status-quo. This duty was also "natural" and "moral" for "Moral discipline not only buttresses moral life", but *is* moral life (Durkheim 1973:46); and of course, "Legal authority . . . is still a rule whose morality is not contested" and exists to aid in the maintenance of society (Durkehim 1960:427).

Conclusion

Concluding this review, it can be said that Durkheim's two major aims were the development of a model of society, and the refining of his sociological method. Of significance in this regard is Durkheim's contention that the scientist "must throw off, once and for all, the yoke of those empiric categories which from long-continued habit have become tyrannical" (Durkheim 1962:32). Simply because, to "start from the concept

of man . . . it is impossible to reach a truly objective conclusion" (Durkheim 1960:421); and, "It is evidently impossible ever to find the law dominating so vast and varied a world, if one begins by observing it in its entirety" (Durkheim 1960:420). Instead, Durkheim (1960:421) tells us:

First of all this concept of man, serving as the basis of these deductions, cannot be the product of a scientific elaboration, methodically conducted; for science is not able to give us that information precisely.

The alternative appears to be precisely that once the parameters of society are constructed according to an ordered and controlled division of labour, science will be adequate for investigating the regularities so defined. In Durkheim's schema then, the realm of sociology is most definitely *not* that of an holistic discipline.

Sociology therefore, was to be a selective discipline. The important implication of this situation can be closely related to Durkheim's attitude toward the role of the political state. Durkheim felt that the basic function of the state was its social control function, and since all things social are necessarily the preoccupation of the members of society, Durkheim essentially advocated the general subserviance of the individual to the authority of that body. Durkheim (1960:219-222) justified the expansion of the state by suggesting that, as the small family businesses were eliminated by the development of industrial capitalism, "the number of different enterprises grew less". Consequently, "public distress" resulted, and since "distress of some general scope cannot be produced without affecting the higher centers", such as the political state and its "subsidiary organs", these are increasingly "forced to intervene out of self-preservation" and "moral obligation" to ameliorate this dysfunctional situation.

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Since a stable government cannot operate without an efficient and consciously acceptable ideology, science has a necessary function in promoting this condition. In fact, Durkheim stressed functional obligations and political dependency, "because we fill some domestic or social function", and as a result such was our social role in society. Further, Durkheim (1960:227) says:

we are involved in a complex of obligations from which we have no right to free ourselves. There is above all, an organ upon which we are tending to depend more and more; this is the state. The points at which we are in contrast with it, multiply as do the occasions when it is entrusted with the duty of reminding us of the sentiment of common solidarity.

Obviously then, this schema derives its impetus from the works of the Greek philosophers since a close similarity exists between Durkheim's model of the ideal society and that outlined by Plato. In the last chapter some mention was made of the present day effects and influences of works such as Durkheim's and together with the discussion in the first chapter it seems pointless covering these points again. But most decidedly, Durkheim's positivism is still very much in vogue.

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