THE PARADOX OF CHANGING UNITED STATES-NIGERIAN RELATIONS SINCE NIGERIAN INDEPENDENCE: A DECISION-MAKING EXPLANATION OF "LAG" IN UNITED STATES POLICY TOWARD NIGERIA

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1976

Submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate College
of the Oklahoma State University
in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the Degree of
MASTER OF ARTS
May, 1979

Thesis
1979
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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I wish to express my thanks to all who have assisted me in the completion of this study. I am deeply grateful for the encouragement and guidance which was given to me by Dr. James J. Lawler, chairperson of my thesis committee. I also appreciate the many constructive suggestions offered by the other committee members: Dr. Raymond Habiby and Dr. Franz von Sauer.

I also wish to acknowledge my parents who, through their support and encouragement, made my education possible.

I accept full responsibility for any limitations or errors in the thesis.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Since Nigeria became independent in 1960, her importance to the United States as a supplier of petroleum has rapidly increased and the two countries have become increasingly interdependent in terms of trade and investment.[1] Yet foreign relations between the two countries have shown no corresponding pattern of steady improvement. Indeed, during the decade from 1967 to 1976 relations between Nigeria and the United States seriously deteriorated.

In 1967, the United States antagonized the Federal Military Government of Nigeria by denying Nigeria's request to buy arms from United States manufacturers while antagonizing Biafra by withholding recognition.[2] Nigeria produced approximately 115.7 million barrels of oil in 1967 valued at $215.6 million.[3] Nigeria ranked sixteenth among world producers.[4] At the time of the Arab oil embargo of 1973-1974, Nigeria

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[1]See Scot R. Pearson and Sandra C. Pearson, "Oil Boom Reshapes Nigeria's Future," Africa Report, Vol. 16 (February, 1971), pp. 14-17; Jean Herskovits, "Nigeria: Africa's Emerging New Power," Saturday Review: World (February 9, 1974), pp. 14-17; "Wooing of Nigeria," United States News and World Report, Vol. 83 (December 5, 1977), pp. 67-70.

[2]Oye Ogunbadejo, "Nigeria and the Great Powers: The Impact of the Civil War on Nigerian Foreign Relations," African Affairs, Vol. 75 (January, 1976), p. 18.

[3]Pearson and Pearson, p. 15.

[4]World Oil, Houston: Petroleum Industry Research Foundation, Inc. (August 15, 1968), pp. 187-188.

had become the second largest supplier of crude oil to the United States--a position which Nigeria has retained ever since.[5] Nigeria was then, as it was in 1976, the sixth major world petroleum producing nation[6] and a member of Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (O.P.E.C.). Nigeria's total production exceeded 823 million barrels in 1974.[7] Nevertheless, the Nixon administration aroused unfavorable comments in the Nigerian press in October, 1973, by cancelling a scheduled meeting between President Nixon and General Gowon, the Head of State and Supreme Commander of Nigeria during the latter's visit to the United Nations.[8] Herskovits commented, "Fortunately Gowon is not easily piqued; otherwise, Nixon might be asking us to lower our thermostats even further."[9]

The United States - Nigerian relations reached their nadir in 1976. President Ford's letter to African leaders asking them to call for withdrawal of Cubans and Russians from Angola drew an angry response from the Nigerian head of government, General Murtala Muhammed, who accused the United States of "armtwisting".[10] Attacks by demonstrators upon the United States Embassy in Lagos--in January, 1976, and again after the assassination of General Muhammed, in February,

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[5]Herskovits, "Nigeria: Africa's Emerging New Power," p. 17.

[6]United Nations Monthly Bulletin of Statistics (New York: United Nations, July, 1977), p. 38.

[7]United States Bureau of Mines, Mineral Yearbook, Vol. III (1975), p. 683.

[8]African Diary, Vol. 13 (October 15-21, 1973), p. 6674.

[9]Herskovits, p. 17.

[10]"Nigeria," Africa Contemporary Record (New York: Africana Publishing Company, 1976), p. 799.

1976--reflected anti-American sentiment in Nigeria, as did the cancellation by the Nigerian government of Secretary of State Kissinger's scheduled visit to Nigeria in April, 1976.[11] These events occurred at a time when Nigerian petroleum comprised 14 percent of petroleum imports to the United States, second only to Saudi Arabia.[12] By 1974, Nigeria had overtaken and surpassed South Africa as the leading African trading partner of the United States.[13] Nigeria's crude has economic advantage: a sulfur content which is only 0.1 percent, compared with 0.2 percent and 1.7 percent for Libyan and Saudi Arabian oil, respectively;[14] and lower transportation costs than oil from the Arabian Peninsula. The availability of Nigerian oil 1973-1974 demonstrated its advantages as another source to Middle Eastern sources. Yet only during the Carter administration have relations between the countries shown any signs of marked improvement.[15]

The objective of this study is to identify major factors in policy-making which contributed to deteriorating relations between Nigeria and the United States during a period of increasing economic interdependence, and to improved relations during the Carter administration. A decision-making paradigm will be used to analyze the effects of non-

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[11] Ibid.

[12] Sandy Feustel, "Leadership in Africa," Africa Report (May-June, 1977), p. 48.

[13] Bruce Oudes, "The United States' Year in Africa," Africa Contemporary Record (New York: Africana Publishing Company, 1975), p. 87.

[14] Petroleum Press Service, Vol. 40, No. 10 (October, 1973), p. 365.

[15] Feustel, p. 48.

economic variables upon United States policy decisions concerning Nigeria. The thesis will be advanced that changes in the characteristics of the decision-makers, as well as changes in the domestic and international constraints upon the decision-making process, have facilitated a "re-definition of the situation" in United States' policy toward Africa; and that this in turn, has contributed to a policy toward Nigeria which is more congruent with economic relations of the two countries.

Rationale for a Decision-Making Approach

It is submitted that a decision-making approach offers advantages in the analysis of the erratic course of United States policy toward Nigeria. The "Realist" approaches of Morgenthau and others are useful in identifying discrepancies between foreign policy and national interest, but are of little help in explaining why those discrepancies exist.[16] Morgenthau diagnoses of such discrepancies in terms of deficiencies in the "quality of democracy", undue influence of public opinion upon foreign policy and/or excessive legalistic-moralistic attachments are not only vague, impressionistic and difficult to operationalize; but also beg the question why such deficiencies exists at any given time.[17] President Carter's foreign policy hardly seems less legalistic or moralistic than that of the Ford, Nixon and Johnson ad-

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[16]For expositions of realism, see Hans Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, 4th ed. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1969), pp. 3-14; Kenneth W. Thompson, Political Realism and the Crisis of World Politics: An American Approach to Foreign Policy (Princeton: University Press, 1960), pp. 23-25.

[17]Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, pp. 12-13.

ministrations, nor does he appear to be less influenced by public opinion than they. Yet United States policy toward Nigeria seems to have improved during his administration.

Determining the "national interest" in pursuing a particular policy is a complex task. Charles Binton Marshall observes that "there are many national interests, not just one."[18] Beard suggests that there is no common national interest beyond the special interest of competing groups in the national population.[19] The latter view of extreme pluralism is difficult to sustain. The structural-functionalists have shown that certain basic common tasks must be performed in any political system if that system is to survive and perform at a level acceptable to its members.[20] Nevertheless, the processes whereby the goals of systems are identified and the means of attaining them are related are performed by human beings. A fundamental assumption of a decision-making approach is that foreign policies are produced by the interaction of people in decision-making roles who are subjected to a variety of pressures, supports, and constraints from

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[18]Charles Binton Marshall, "The National Interest and Current World Problems," United States Department of State Bulletin, Vol. 26 (May 5, 1952), p. 699.

[19]Charles A. Beard, The Idea of National Interest (New York: MacMillan, 1934), p. 487.

[20]Gabriel Almond and G. B. Powell, Comparative Politics: A Developmental Approach (Boston: Little Brown Co., 1966); Marion Levy, Jr., "Functional Analysis," International Encyclopedia of Social Sciences, Vol. VI (New York: MacMillan Co. and the Free Press, 1968), p. 23.

both domestic and international environments.[21]

Elite-determinist models, including Maxist and neo-Maxist approaches, assume that official decision-makers were instruments of unofficial elites who wield real policy-making power.[22] The experience of United States-Nigeria relations suggests that the relationship between unofficial and official actions is more complex, and that United States policy toward Nigeria appears to have deviated on several occasions from the interest of capitalists and other groups which are prominent in prevailing theories of "the power elite." Whether or not official decision-making is truly independent of unofficial actions, actions of officials are necessary to convert the demands of elites into national policies. Therefore, the study of official decision-making provides a useful focus for tracing the effects of a variety of factors upon foreign policy.

The Paradigm

Unlike the approach of Snyder, et al. no attempt will be made in this study to take an extensive inventory of the multiplicity of

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[21]Richard Snyder, H. W. Bruck and Burtin Sapin, "Decision-Making as an Approach to the Study of International Politics," in Snyder, Bruck and Sapin, eds., Foreign Policy Decision-Making (Free Press, 1962); James Robinson and Richard Snyder, "Decision-Making in International Politics," in Herman Kelman, ed., International Behavior (Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1965), pp. 435-458; James Robinson and R. Roger Majak, "The Theory of Decision-Making," in James Charlesworth, ed., Contemporary Political Analysis (Free Press, 1967), pp. 175-188.

[22]Harry Magdoff, The Age of Imperialism (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1969); C. Wright Mills, The Power Elite (New York: Oxford University Press, 1956), pp. 269-297.

influences upon foreign policy decisions.[23] Consequently, the resulting analysis cannot purport to be a complete account of the dynamics of United States policy toward Nigeria. It is submitted, however, that the paradigm incorporates sufficient variables to be useful in illuminating major influences upon policy outputs.

A political decision is an outcome of a process in which choices are made for a polity by officials in that polity. Policy decisions refer to decisions which are intended to establish general principles to govern relatively broad ranges of conduct. A decision-making system is a network of independent governmental roles and processes by which official decisions are produced.

Five features of the decision-making system will receive particular attention in this study.

1. Decision-Makers. Who are the key persons who are involved in the decision-making system at a given time? How do they compare with each other in relative influence upon decision outcomes? How do they interact in the decision-making process?

It is expected that the identity and relative importance of various decision-making actors and roles will vary from one administration to another, and that a given decision will be influenced by: (a) institutional variables, including the interests, traditions, structure and legal constraints of the bureaucratic organization to

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[23] Snyder, Bruck and Sapin, "Decision-Making as an Approach to the Study of International Politics," pp. 67-74.

which each decision-maker belongs; and (b) idiosyncratic variables,[24] consisting of the personalities, backgrounds and outlooks of various decision makers.

2. Demands. A demand, as the term is used in this study, refers to any group-related interest which ordinarily claims attention from decision-makers, including the following:

a. The articulated demand or perceived interest of organized domestic groups,

b. Domestic "public opinion," or the perceived views of persons not representing organized interest groups,

c. The special articulated demands or perceived interests of overseas actors, especially allied governments and adversary governments,

d. International "public opinion", or the perceived general views or reactions of international society.

3. Functional Requisites. Any state must perform certain functions at some minimum level in order to survive and produce outcomes acceptable to the decision-makers constituencies. Three functions which Katz identifies are adopted as analytical focii in this study: (1) maintenance of domestic cohesion and the political base of support for the regime, (2) promotion of a favorable national economic "input-output ratio", and (3) maintenance of security from external

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[24]The concept is borrowed from James N. Rosenau, "Pre-theories and Theories of Foreign Policy," R. Barry Farrell, ed., Approaches to Comparative and International Politics (Evanston Northwestern University Press, 1966), p. 43.

enemies.[25] Although the sanity or public-spiritedness of some national leaders may occasionally be doubted, it is assumed that most of them will strive to achieve satisfactory levels of performance in each of these areas, if only to insure their continued incumbency. Perceptions of the functional requirements, their relative importance, and the best means of fulfilling them will be by both the idiosyncratic and institutional variables associated with decision-making positions.

4. Capabilities. Capabilities are resources which can be used by one actor to alter the behavior of others in direction(s) desired by the former actor. The following typology by Etzioni will be used in this study:[26] coercive capabilities, consisting of all means of inflicting punishment (military force, economic sanctions, breaking of diplomatic relations, etc.); utilatarian capabilities, consisting of all means of bestowing material rewards (economic assistance, trade, investment, etc.); and identitive capabilities, consisting of the more intangible means of persuasion (personal rapport and charisma, cultural ties, moral qualities, ideological appeals, prestige facility of communication, etc.).

5. Perceived Compatibility of Nigerian and United States' Policies. Of critical concern to the quality of relations between the United States and Nigeria is the extent to which policies or charac-

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[25]Daniel Katz, "Nationalism and Strategies of International Conflict Resolution," Herbert C. Kelman, Ed., International Behavior (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1965), pp. 358-59.

[26]Amitai Etzioni Political Unification: A Comparative Study of Leaders and Forces,(New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 1965), pp. 37-40.

teristics of the two countries are perceived by the decision-makers to be compatible. To the extent that those policies or characteristics are perceived to be compatible, it is expected that friendly relations between the two countries will develop or be enhanced. To the extent that the policies or characteristics are perceived to be incompatible, it is expected that either unfriendly relations or measures towards revision of the policies will occur, depending upon the extent to which decision-makers perceive friendly ties between the two countries to be important.

By applying the foregoing paradigm to the study of United States policy toward Nigeria from 1960 to 1978, it is expected that the paradox of deteriorating relations during a period of increasing economic interdependence can better be understood, and that the prospects for continued improvement in United States-Nigerian relations during the Carter administration can be assessed. Chapters Two through Five will correspond to periods marked by changes in relations between the two countries: 1960 to 1967, when Nigeria and the United States enjoyed friendly relations; 1967 to 1970, when relations began to deteriorate; 1970 to 1976, when the United States sought to adjust to Nigeria's strength as an oil producing country and a significant actor in international arenas; and 1976 to the present, when the policies of the Carter administration generated a new "Era of Good Feeling" between the governments. Chapter Six will draw some general conclusions about the relative importance of economic and non-economic factors in the foreign policy decision-making on the basis of the findings in preceding chapters.

A study which focuses primarily upon the decision-making process

of one country to explain the pattern of relations between two countries is admittedly one-sided. A more complete picture would emerge by applying the paradigm to Nigeria, as well. Unfortunately, the necessary sources of information about Nigeria are more difficult to obtain, and the magnitude of such a study would be beyond the scope of a Master's Thesis. It is hoped, however, that systematic study of the processes and effects of United States foreign policy decision-making toward Nigeria by means of the paradigm outlined above will add to an understanding of the reasons for an apparent discrepancy between national economic interest and foreign policy decisions.

CHAPTER II

THE 'ERA OF GOOD FEELING', 1960 TO 1967

The period from 1960 to 1967 was an era of friendly relations between Washington and Lagos, during which "Nigeria became the principal beneficiary of United States aid"[1] in Africa. Among the factors which Wallerstein cites to explain why Nigeria received "extra U. S. attention" are: greater receptivity on the part of Britain than France to "outside" involvement in the affairs of her former colonies; a tendency on the part of American balcks to identify more closely with Nigeria than with many other African countries; the availability of the English language as a medium of communication among elites of the two countries; and the fact that Nigeria, as Africa's most populous country, naturally attracted attention.[2] Kaplan adds that United States perceptions of Nigeria "as a potential bulwark of Western influence in a disorganized and unstable continent undoubtedly influenced the decision to provide substantial aid."[3] The perception of a Nigeria as a "bulwark of Western influence" can be explained by considering

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[1]George W. Shepherd, Jr., Nonaligned Black Africa (Lexington, Massachusetts: D. C. Heath and Company, 1960), p. 113.

[2]Immanuel Wallerstein, "Africa, the United States and the World Economy: The Historical Basis of American Policy," Frederick S. Arkhurst, ed., U. S. Policy Toward Africa (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1975), pp. 22-25.

[3]Jacob J. Kaplan, The Challenge of Foreign Aid (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1967), p. 97.

the characteristics of the two countries, their leaders, and their institutions during the period.

Decision-Makers: Institutions and Incumbents

The fact that the "era of good feeling" spanned the administrations of three presidents--Eisenhower, Kennedy and Johnson--provides an opportunity to assess the relative affects of personalities and roles upon United States' policy toward Nigeria. Although there were significant changes in the organization of decision-making during the period in question, changes in the occupants of policy decision-making roles were more frequent, and their immediate effects upon policy were more dramatic.

Institutional Developments

Although the Secretary of State is officially "top man in the hierarchy of advisers to the President on matters of foreign policy",[4] his actual influence has varied markedly depending upon his own personality and that of the President.[5] Accordingly the Secretary of State will be treated as a behavioral rather than an institutional variable. Within and outside the State Department, however, several agencies developed strong vested interests in African policy.

Perhaps the most conspicuous institutional development during the period was the emergence of Africa-oriented agencies within the foreign

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[4]Marian D. Irish and Elke Frank, U. S. Foreign Policy: Context, Conduct, Content (New York: Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich, Inc., 1975), p. 11.

[5]Ibid.

policy bureaucracy of the United States. Emerson remarks that Africa did not come "fully into its own"[6] until the Bureau of African Affairs was created within the State Department during the Eisenhower Administration. From its inception in 1958, the Bureau was the principal agency which reflected African viewpoints within the United States government. Since the majority of states within its jurisdiction were governed by Black Africans, the Bureau tended, even in the Eisenhower Administration, to be more critical of colonialism and apartheid in Africa than were other agencies of the government.[7]

The Bureau's personnel increased from 44 in 1960 to 97 in 1962.[8] As the newest and smallest of the regional bureaus, the African Affairs Bureau was still at a competitive disadvantage in disputes with rival agencies, especially the Bureau of European Affairs. Such disputes, however, mainly concerned relations with Portugal and South Africa, and the pace of decolonization in East Africa.[9] The Africa Bureau's supportive position toward Nigeria was compatible with that of the European Bureau because that policy did not offend Nigeria's former colonial metropole, the United Kingdom.

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[6]Rupert Emerson, Africa and United States Policy (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1967), p. 25.

[7]Marcel Van Essen, "The United States Department of State and Africa," Journal of Human Relations, Vol. 8 (Spring-Summer, 1960), pp. 847-48; Jim Hoagland, South Africa (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1972), p. 360.

[8]Vernon McKay, Africa in World Politics (New York: Harper and Row, 1963), p. 290.

[9]Hoagland, p. 360.

Nigeria was especially salient to the Bureau, not only because of the country's size and population, but because of the special informal ties which the Bureau of African Affairs maintained with the United States Embassy in Nigeria. Joseph Palmer II, the first United States Ambassador to Nigeria, had previously been Deputy Assistant Secretary of State responsible for African Affairs; and, as such, had helped to organize the office which became the Bureau of African Affairs.[10] In 1966, he succeeded G. Mennen Williams as head of the Bureau. Palmer maintained a close relationship with the Bureau during the interim.

By mid 1962, the State Department maintained 108 diplomatic and consular posts in Nigeria--second only to Ethiopia in numbers of foreign service and ICA officers deployed to a sub-Saharan African country.[11] While the magnitude of the United States reserve was commensuate with the size of Nigeria's population, the sizeable numbers of United States diplomatic and consular representatives helped to assure that Nigerian needs and concerns were communicated to Washington.

During the Kennedy Administration, two new agencies were created to implement United States overseas assistance programs: the Peace Corps, outside the State Department, and the Agency for International Development, a semi-independent agency within the State Department. By 1962, Nigeria had the largest number of Peace Corps Workers and AID

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[10] G. Mennen Williams, Africa for the Africans (Grand Rapids, Michigan: William B. Eerdman's Publishing Co., 1969), p. 164.

[11] Foreign Service List (Washington, D. C.: Government Printing Office, August, 1962), p. 5.

personnel of any African country; 759 and 190, respectively.[12] In contrast to the suspicion of the Peace Corps in some countries, Nigerian officials reported "that the Peace Corps had performed an invaluable service for their country and that they hoped a contingent would always work in Nigeria. The Agency for International Development (AID) was formed by a merger of two organizations which previously administered economic assistnace for the United States: the International Cooperation Administration (ICA) and the Development Loan Fund (DLF). The reorganization not only improved co-ordination of foreign aid programs, but created bureaucratic vested interests in their continuance in Nigeria.[13]

An older agency within the State Department which, after 1960, assigned increasing weight to Africa, was the Bureau of International Organization Affairs (BIOA). The BIOA prepare position papers for United Nations. In 1960, the Assistant Secretary who headed the BIOA observed that African countries would soon comprise the largest single block in the U. N., and that "there is great opportunity within the framework of the United Nations for co-operative efforts between ourselves and the African states to advance our mutual interests."[14]

Outside the State Department, the Central Intelligence Agency was undoubtedly influential in shaping United States' policy toward Nigeria,

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[12]F. Seth Singleton and John Shingler, Africa in Perspective (New York: Hayden Book Company, Inc., 1967), p. 296; McKay, Africa in World Politics, p. 366.

[13]For the tendency of foreign affairs bureaucracies to perpetuate and multiply their functions, see John Kenneth Galbraith, "A Decade of Disasters," Progressive, Vol. 35 (February, 1971), pp. 33-38.

[14]Quoted in McKay, Africa in World Politics, p. 343.

although the agency's role must be inferred from circumstantial evidence. The CIA's involvement in deposing the late Premier Lumumba and in bringing Colonel Mobutu to power in Zaire has been discussed by other writers.[15] According to a former CIA station cheif, the CIA decision-makers in the early 1960's believed that Nigeria was "next on the list" of African countries to be targeted for Soviet subversion.[16] Accordingly, it is reasonable to assume that the CIA encouraged support of, or at least did not oppose, United States efforts to sustain the moderate, pro-western government of Prime Minister Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa in Nigeria.

More direct evidence is available concerning the positions of the Departments of Commerce. In August, 1959, a Trade Mission of the Department of Commerce reported that Nigeria offered "an investment climate unequalled in any underdeveloped area so far studied."[17]--an assessment which was reiterated in later publications by the department.[18]

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[15]See Andrew Tully, CIA: The Inside Story (New York: Morrow, 1962), pp. 219-229; Stephen R. Weissman, "Zaire: Fisticuffs for Mobutu," The Nation, Vol. 219 (November 30, 1974), pp. 558-559; Ian Colvin, The Rise and Fall of Moise Tshombe (London: Leslie Frewin, 1968), p. 417.

[16]Harry Risitzke, The CIA's Secret Operations (New York: Reader's Digest Press, 1977), p. 199.

[17]United States Department of Commerce, Africa Special Report (Washington, D. C.: Governemnt Printing Office, August, 1964), p. 12.

[18]See United States Department of Commerce, Survey of Current Business (Washington, D. C.: Government Printing Office, 1962); United States Department of Commerce, Trade Review, Economic Outlook for Twenty Countries in Africa (Washington, D. C.: Government Printing Office, 1962); United States Department of Commerce, "Basic Data on the Economy of Nigeria," Overseas Business Reports (Washington, D. C.: Government Printing Office, April, 1964), p. 16.

The Department of Defense, though not substantially involved directly in formulating policy toward Nigeria during the period, was instrumental in shaping the national security doctrines and priorities which affected United States' decisions concerning Nigeria. Although the Pentagon had established a Regional Directorate on Africa in 1957, the Department's relations with Nigeria were limited. A United States military officer was attached to the U. S. Embassy in Lagos. Yet the bulk of U. S. military personnel in sub-Saharan Africa were stationed at the military communications facility in Ethiopia, and the military missions in Liberia and Mali.[19] Nevertheless, a policy of bolstering stable, pro-western governments, like the one in Nigeria, during a period of intensified Soviet activity in the Congo, Guinea, and elsewhere in Africa, was consistent with prevailing military concepts of containment.

The first half-decade of Nigeria's independence coincided with the increasing influence of the White House Staff, especially the President's Assistent for National Security Affairs, upon foreign policy. The incumbents in that position during the period in question, manifested little interest in Africa. The National Security Council, which President Eisenhower's NSA Assistant fashioned into an elaborate decision-making mechanism,[20] was used as a major decision-making organ on African affairs at the outset of the Congo crisis in 1960.

The NSC brought together the President; the Vice President; the Secretaries of State, Treasury, and Defense; the Director of the Office

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[19]McKay, Africa in World Politics, p. 302.

[20]Townsend Hoopes, The Limits of Intervention (New York: David McKay Company, Inc., 1969), p. 4.

of Defense Mobilization; and any other officials whom the President invited to consider policy matters affecting national security. According to a Senate Investigating Committee Report, expressions of concern about the Congolese Premier, Lumumba, and a fateful meeting of the NSC led to the CIA's attempt to assassinate Lumumba.[21] The demise of Lumumba contributed to the division of Africa into rival blocs, the "moderate" side being led by Nigeria and supported by the United States.[22] In other respects, however, the role of the NSC in shaping United States' relations with Nigeria was minimal. The NSC atrophied under Presidents Kennedy and Johnson, who relied on smaller ad hoc groupings of key advisers.[23]

In the early 1960's Congress tended to defer to the executive branch of government in matters of foreign policy, especially on matters relating to Africa. In general, members of Congress had "only meager awareness of events and realities in Africa."[24] Within Congress, sustained interest in Africa was largely confined to the subcommittees on Africa, which were established within the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the House Foreign Affairs Committee in 1959. Occasionally, African policy came under the scrutiny of the Internal Security

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[21]Bruce Oudes, "The United States' Year in Africa: Postscript to the Nixon Years," Africa Contemporary Record, 1975-76 (New York: Africana Publishing Co., 1976), p. 119.

[22]Arnold Rivkin, The African Presence in World Affairs (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1963), p. 15; Claude S. Phillips, Jr., The Development of Nigerian Foreign Policy (Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern University Press, 1964), p. 90.

[23]Hoopes, pp. 4-5.

[24]Stanley Meisler, "The U. S. Congress and Africa," Africa Report, Vol. 9 (August, 1964), p. 6.

Committee and the Appropriations Committee, as certain members of those bodies perceived political advantages in public opinion concerning communist subversion and foreign aid, respectively.[25] The ability of Congress to obstruct Presidential initiatives on Africa depended largely upon the strength of presidential leadership, vagaries of public opinion polls, and the proximity of an issue in time to foster coming elections.

In sum, the institutional framework of decision-making provided broad constraints upon United States policy toward Nigeria. Nevertheless, policy outputs varied considerably, depending upon which individuals occupied the key positions within those institutions at any given time.

Idiosyncratic Variables

The record of United States relations with Nigeria supports the proposition that "presidential style has considerable impact--possibly more than that of the organization charts--on the patterns of interaction among the policy makers."[26] President Eisenhower, whose overseas experience had been primarily in Europe, "preferred to delegate"[27] responsibility in foreign policy matters. President Kennedy, on the other hand, considered foreign policy to be his forte, and he was determined to be his own Secretary of State.[28] The fact that Kennedy

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[25]Ibid.

[26]Irish and Frank, p. 11.

[27]Edmund Wright, "Foreign Policy Since Dulles," Political Quarterly, Vol. 33 (April, 1962), p. 117.

[28]Irish and Frank, p. 189.

had served as Chairman of the Senate Subcommittee on Africa before becoming Chief Executive gave him greater expertise on Africa than any United States President in history. "Kennedy, it could be said, understood the increasingly important role African nations would play in the world scene, and Africa, more than any other area, was to assume a new importance in his administration."[29]

Among the African countries, Kennedy gave priority to establishing good relations with Nigeria. He envisioned a "role for Nigeria in Africa similar to that which he hoped India would perform in Asia: a powerful democratic state friendly to the United States and the West in its region of the world."[30] It is not surprising, then, that while the Eisenhower Administration established relations with Nigeria and other emerging nations in Africa on a correct and friendly basis, support for Black Africa, in general, and for Nigeria in particular, reached unparallel heights during Kennedy's presidency. Between 1960 and 1963, total United States' economic assistance for Africa more than doubled, from $207 million to $427 million.[31] The $225 million in United States' grants and loans which were allocated for the Nigerian development plan in December, 1961, constituted "the largest single com-

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[29]Frank Freidel, America in the Twentieth Century, 2nd edition (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1965), p. 605.

[30]Ibrahim A. Gambori, "Nigeria and the World: A Growing Internal Stability, Wealth, and External Influence," Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 29 (Fall, 1975), p. 156.

[31]Agency for International Development, U. S. Foreign Assistance and Assistance from International Organizations, July 1, 1945 - June 30, 1961 (revised) (Washington, D. C.: Government Printing Office, 1962), p. ix; Agency for International Development, U. S. Overseas Loans and Grants, July 1, 1945 - June 30, 1971 (Washington, D. C.: Office of Statistics and Reports, May, 1972).

mitment the United States has made to an African state."[32]

President Lyndon Johnson announced in his January 14, 1965 message to Congress that Nigeria was the only African country to be included among the seven countries which received 64 percent of United States development aid because of their ability to use the aid effectively.[33] The Johnson Administration's support of Nigeria, however, cannot be attributed to any strong personal knowledge of Nigeria, Africa or foreign relations. As Kennedy's Vice President Johnson had made an official three day visit to Senegal, and he "carried on a fairly steady correspondence with President Senghor and other African leaders,"[34] especially those of Ethiopia, Kenya, Mali, Guinea, Tanzania and Liberia.[35] Nevertheless, Johnson admitted he was "much more familiar" with Latin America than with Africa.[36]

According to one official, Johnson tended "to view foreign affairs as a sort of 'black art', its substance alien to him and its Eastern establishment practitioners even more so."[37] The ability of the United States to maintain friendly relations with Nigeria during his first two

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[32]McKay, Africa in World Politics, p. 354; "U. S. Announces Intention to Aid Nigeria Development Program," United States Department of State Bulletin, vol. 46 (January 1, 1962), p. 25.

[33]Emerson, Africa and United States Policy, p. 39.

[34]Lyndon Baines Johnson, The Vantage Point: Perspectives of the Presidency, 1963-69 (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1971), pp. 351-52.

[35]Ibid., p. 353.

[36]Ibid., p. 352.

[37]I. M. Destler, Presidents, Bureaucrats and Foreign Policy: The Politics of Organizational Reform (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1972), p. 105.

years in office can be attributed to a penchant for preserving continuity with the Kennedy tradition by retaining in his administration key members of the Kennedy team.[38] Unlike Kennedy, however, Johnson lacked sufficient understanding of international relations to overrule major foreign policy and military advisers on important issues.[39] In 1966, the resignation of G. Mennen Williams, the most prominant State Department spokesman for Africa among the holdovers from the Kennedy Administration, left a team of principal foreign policy advisers to most of whom Africa was "the Dark Continent."

The identity of other leading individuals who shaped relations with Nigeria varied markedly from one administration to another. The years of good relations between Nigeria and the United States coincided with a period of relatively weak leadership from the Secretary of State--and concomitant aggressive leadership among his subordinates in the Bureau of African Affairs. Nigerian independence occurred during the post-Dulles years of the Eisenhower Administration. John Foster Dulles' successor, Christian Herter "did not make a particularly strong secretary"[40] and did not perpetuate "the one-man determination of foreign policy that distinguished Dulles."[41] The Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs began to express viewpoints which Dulles would probably never have cleared. At a time when such NATO allies as

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[38]Irish and Frank, p. 196.

[39]Hoopes, p. 8.

[40]John A. Garratay, The American Nation Since 1865 (New York: Harper and Row, 1966), p. 381.

[41]Freidel, p. 571.

Portugal and Belgium were resisting independence for their African territories, the Assistant Secretary for African Affairs, Joseph Satterthwaite, boldly announced, concerning the "readiness" of Africa for independence: "I believe that history has shown that this is an almost academic question. Peoples tend to make independence ready or not, according to a timetable of their own making."[42] In his address at Tulane University in January, 1959, Satterthwaite acknowledged the United States' commitment "to contribute to the stability and evolution of this giant continent, to be responsive to its needs and sympathetic to its aspirations."[43] A career foreign-service officer who had previously served as Ambassador to Burma, Director of the Neareastern and African Affairs Office, and Director General of the Foreign Service,[44] Satterthwaite was sensitive to the revolutionary currents in emerging nations.

Perhaps the most significant change in the post-Dulles foreign policy of the Eisenhower Administration was an abandonment of the theological rejection of neutralism"[45] which characterized Secretary of State Dulles' mentality. In his historic address to the United Nations on September 22, 1960, President Eisenhower called upon members of the United Nations "to respect the African peoples' right to choose their own way of life and to determine for themselves the course

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[42]Quoted in McKay, Africa in World Politics, p. 343.

[43]Quoted in Mark Van Essen, "The United States Department of State and Africa," Journal of Human Relations, Vol. 8 (Spring-Summer, 1960), p. 852.

[44]Who's Who in America, Vol. 31 (1960-66), p. 2418.

[45]Shepherd, p. 106.

they should choose to follow. . . ."[46] Governor Nelson Rockefeller, Special Ambassador to Nigeria's Independence Day celebrations, told Nigerian leaders that the United States did not "expect the newly independent nations like Nigeria to stand beside the United States as a kind of active and committed ally in all struggles and conflicts which are dividing the world."[47] These indications of a significant departure from the rigid anti-neutralism of the Dulles era gave Nigerian leaders the needed latitude to establish friendly ties with the United States without abandoning their policy of official non-alignment.

The position of the African Bureau was further strengthened by the appointments of the Kennedy Administration. Kennedy filled the position of Assistant Secretary of State before he appointed the Secretary of State. He appointed a strong political ally, G. Mennen Williams, to the former position, which Kennedy described as "second to none."[48] Kennedy "deliberately selected a relatively weak Secretary of State, Dean Rusk," in order to assure the President's own hegemony in foreign policy. Williams, former governor of Michigan and Vice Chairman of the Democratic National Committee, was "minimally knowledgeable about Africa."[49] Yet he was "a seasoned politician and administrator who was more than a match for the Assistant

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[46]"Eisenhower Calls for Peace Through U. N.," The New York Times (September 23, 1960), p. 5; Richard P. Stebbins, ed., Documents on American Foreign Relations, 1960 (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1961), p. 554.

[47]Quoted in "Nigerians to Achieve Their Independence," The New York Times (October 1, 1960), p. 5.

[48]Quoted in Destler, p. 266.

[49]Shepherd, p. 109.

Secretaries for Europe and other areas in the State Department."[50] Under Williams' leadership, the Bureau of African Affairs became more militant than ever in promoting Black African causes. When colonial officials complained about his controversial call for "Africa for the Africans" President Kennedy replied "I don't know who else it should be for."[51]

During Kennedy's first months in office, an unofficial "New Africa" group formed in the executive branch.[52] The group consisted of officials who shared "the conviction that in Africa nationalism was the wave of the future, and the United States must put itself in clearly and unmistakably on the 'side of history'."[53] Leadership from the group came from Williams; from his Deputy Assistant Secretary, J. Wayne Fredericks, and from the Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs, Harland Cleveland. Cleveland worked closely with Adlai Stevenson, the United States Ambassador to the United Nations, who also belonged to the group. As a former Presidential candidate of the Democratic Party, Stevenson commanded great prestige among the liberal wing of the party, and was influential in securing United States support for a General Assembly resolution condemning the African politice of a NATO ally, Portugal.[54] Also belonging

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[50]McKay, Africa in World Politics, p. 350.

[51]Theodore C. Sorensen, Kennedy (New York: Harper and Row, 1965), p. 539.

[52]Roger Hilsman, To Move a Nation (New York: Dell Publishing Company, 1967), p. 246.

[53]Ibid., p. 245.

[54]United Nations General Assembly Resolution 1603 (XV), April 20, 1961, in Emerson, p. 72.

to the group were Under Secretary of State George Ball; and Chester Bowles, whose credentials included previous service on the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, authorship of a best-selling book on Africa, and brief service as Under Secretary of State before becoming a political casualty of the Bay of Pigs invasion. The backing of the President and this distinguished group assured sympathetic attention to the needs of Black African countries.

The members of the "New Africa" group continued to serve the Johnson administration for awhile: Stevenson, until his death in July, 1965; Williams and Ball, until their retirements in 1966; and Fredericks, until he returned to the Ford Foundation in 1967. Bowles and Cleveland became increasingly peripheral to the group as a result of ambassadorial appointments--the former to India in 1963, the latter to NATO in 1965. Nevertheless, the persistence of a pro-Africa nucleus of advisers in the early years of the Johnson administration helped to sustain a positive orientation toward sub-Saharan Africa on the part of the United States government.

Demands

Outside the government, concern for Nigeria on the part of Americans was limited to a small number of groups and "publics"--principally scholars, missionaries, black Americans, and United States' business interests. Programs scholarships provided by the Ford, Rockefeller and Carnegie Foundations had helped to create a small but significant body of scholars with expertise on Africa. By 1962, three organizations of American "Africanists" on college faculties were expressing opinions on United States policy toward Nigeria: the African American Institute,

with offices in both Washington and Lagos; the American Society of African Culture, which opened a cultural Center in Lagos in 1960; and the American Committee on Africa, which served as a political pressure group to promote the interests of Black Africa.[55]

These intellectuals served as "opinion leaders,"[56] shaping the orientations of American elites at a time when the Congo crisis and the proliferation of new states on that continent were attracting attention. In testimony before the Subcommittee on Africa of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Professor David Apter, a distinguished young scholar who had benefitted from Ford Foundation grants, asserted that: "It is the business of the United States to back unity in Nigeria but never to dictate whose unity or what kind."[57]

Black Americans, preoccupied with their own unfulfilled struggle to achieve domestic civil rights, were not yet a major force in shaping United States' policy toward Nigeria. Meisler writing during the Johnson administration remarked:

> so far, the Negro's ethnic tie with Africa has f iled to have much effect on Congressional action or attitudes. Congressmen hear far more from American Jews about strengthening Israel, from Ukranian-Americans about erecting a statue to their na-

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[55] McKay, Africa in World Politics, p. 254.

[56] E. Katz and P. F. Lazarsfeld, Personal Influence (Glencoe, Ill: Free Press, 1955), p. 76; E. Katz, "The Two-Step Flow of Communication: An Up-to-Date Report on a Hypothesis," Public Opinion Quarterly, vol. 21 (1957), pp. 61-78; James Rosenau, Public Opinion and Foreign Policy (New York: Random House, 1961), p. 29.

[57] For the full text see David E. Apter, "Testimony U. S. Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on Africa, Hearings: Briefing on Africa, 86th Congress, 2nd Session (Washington, D. C.: Government Printing Office, 1961), pp. 134-139.

> tionalist poet Shevchenko, from Polish-Americans about freeing the old country from Communist domination.[58]

The American Society of African Culture, the principal group of American blacks with a specific orientation toward Africa, made Nigeria the site of its West African Culture Center. Yet its interests were cultural rather than political.

Christian missionaries in tropical Africa, numbering nearly 10,000 in 1962,[59] comprised "the largest group of American civilian residents in Africa."[60] Nigeria had attracted over 1,200 of them--the largest missionary population of any African country.[61] In 1956, the Africa Committee of the World Council of Churches' Division of Foreign Missions issued a policy document which declared: "The West has thrust itself upon Africa; we cannot remain indifferent to the consequences."[62]

Probably the most influential private interests to make demands concerning policy toward Nigeria were business corporations. Oil was discovered in Nigeria in 1957,[63] and by 1960, three United States oil companies--Gulf Oil, Overseas Petroleum, and Mobil Exploration--had

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[58]Meisler, p. 6.

[59]Emerson, pp. 49-50.

[60]McKay, Africa in World Politics, p. 250.

[61]Emerson, p. 49.

[62]"Activities of Private United States Organizations in Africa," United States Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on Africa, Hearings, 87th Congress, 1st session (Washington, D. C.: Government Printing Office, 1961), p. 135.

[63]William Hance, African Economic Development, revised edition (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1967), p. 259.

acquired concessions in the coastal areas of the Niger Delta. Nigeria began to export petroleum in 1962, and oil exports expanded rapidly under a petroleum code favorable to foreign investment. The oil lobby was the most powerful lobbying force on Capitol Hill,[64] and the "Big Seven" companies represented by the American Petroleum Institute, were keenly interested in Nigeria.

As Africa's largest market, with a population officially reported at 55.6 million in the 1964 census, Nigeria was generally attractive to United States firms engaged in international commerce and investment. Until 1960, United States' investment in Africa amounted to only two percent of total United States investment abroad, and half of the investment in Africa was in South Africa. By 1960, however, the percentage of United States' investment in Africa had doubled to 4 percent, two-thirds of which was in countries belonging to the Organization of African unity.[65] United States private investment in Nigeria grew from $24 million in 1960 to $79 million in 1964, of which some $31 million was in interests other than petroleum.[66] The more internationally-oriented business concerns communicated their foreign policy interests through a powerful pressure group, the Business Council.[67]

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[64]Erwin Knoll, "The Oil Lobby Is Not Depleted," The New York Times Magazine (March 8, 1970), pp. 26-27 and 103-9.

[65]Immanuel Wallerstein, "Africa, the United States, and the World Economy: The Historical Bases of American Policy," Frederick S. Arkhurst, ed., U. S. Policy Toward Africa (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1975), p. 20-21.

[66]Central Bank of Nigeria, Economic and Financial Review (June, 1965), p. 12.

[67]Arnold M. Rose, The Power Structure: Political Process in American Society (New York: Oxford University Press, 1967), p. 34; David T.

Support for close economic ties with Africa was not without its opponents, however, especially where foreign aid was concerned. Within the ranks of business, spokesmen for the International Basic Economy Corporation, W. R. Grace and Company, Sears, Roebuck and Company, and the Chase Manhattan Bank expressed concern for the de-stabilizing effects of foreign aid to developing countries.[68] Public opinion polls indicated declining support for foreign economic assistance programs as Asians and Africans replaced Europeans as the major recipients of aid.[69] That United States' programs in Nigeria survived in an unfriendly climate of public and congressional opinion is an indication of her importance to powerful decision-makers and interest groups.

During its first two years, Kennedy's "New Frontier" generated sufficient momentum to raise United States' economic assistance to Africa to its highest level in history. After 1963, however, aid to most African countries was curtailed, pursuant to the committee, which President Kennedy formed to mollify the critics of foreign aid.[70] Significantly, however, the clay committee recognized certain exceptions in which "the United States must play a major role."[71] Nigeria was designated as one of them. By mid-1967, Nigeria had received $160 mil-

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Bazelon, "Big Business and the Democrats," Commentary, Vol. 39 (May, 1965), p. 42.

[68]Robert F. Smith, "Whatever Happened to Baby Alianza?" New Politics, Vol. 4 (Winter, 1965), p. 91 note 3.

[69]Alfred O. Hero, Jr., "Foreign Aid and the American Public," Public Policy, Vol. 14 (1965), p. 84.

[70]Sorensen, p. 351.

[71]Edward S. Mason, Foreign Aid and Foreign Policy (New York: Harper and Row, 1964), p. 56.

lion in bilateral grants and loans from AID which placed Nigeria second only to Zaire as the leading sub-saharan recepient of AID bilateral economic assistance.[72] The $44.2 million in grants and loans which AID committed to Nigeria in fiscal years 1966 and 1967 exceeded bilateral aid provided to any other African country, including previously favored North African recipients.[73]

The favored place of Nigeria was reaffirmed by the report which President Johnson requested from Edward Korry, the United States ambassador to Ethiopia. The Korry Report recommended, inter alia, that "the United States should concentrate its bilateral aid programs in those African countries whose size, population, resources, and performance afford the best opportunity for development."[74] Consequently, Nigeria did not experience the substantial curtailment of United States' economic assistance which most African countries encountered after fiscal year 1963.[75] Singleton and Shingle wrote in 1967:

> A recent favorite (as an aid recipient) has been Nigeria, the key nation of West Africa. With American help, Nigeria will hopefully become an example of development under a government that encourages private enterprise[76]

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[72]Anthony Astrachan, "AID Reslices the Pie," Africa Report, Vol. 12 (June, 1967), Table, pp. 13-14; U. S. AID, "United States Economic Aid to Africa," Africa Report, Vol. 9, Table, p. 10.

[73]Astrachan, Table, pp. 13-14.

[74]Ibid, p. 10.

[75]AID, U. S. Overseas Loans and Grants, July 1, 1945-June 30, 1971 (Washington, D. C.: Office of Statistics and Reports, May, 1972), pp. 9, 32, 64 and 82.

[76]Singleton and Shingler, pp. 293-294.

The fact that Nigeria's encouragement of private enterprise[77] had already won her influential friends in the United States' business community helps to explain her success in securing "American help."

Functional Requisites

In terms of functional requisites, Nigeria was important to the United States from the standpoint of national security, as well as economic benefits. By the late 1950's, developments in Africa indicated that the continent might become a major theater of the Cold War. When France pulled out of Guinea in 1958, "hundreds of Soviet block technicians and advisers (including Soviet Intelligence Agents) poured into"[78] that country, which was headed by a self-described Marxist, Sekou Toure. In November, 1958, Guinea and Ghana announced a merger in a political union "as a nucleus of West African States."[79] Although the Ghana-Guinea "union" was largely a fiction, it remained officially in existence.

In September, 1960, the arrival of Soviet military trucks, transport planes, and technicians to troubled Congo-Leopoldville,[80] at the request of that country's volatile Premier Lumumba, marked a turning point in United States' policy toward Africa. The CIA's complicity in

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[77]Peter R. Odell, Oil and World Power: Background to the Oil Crisis, 3rd ed, (Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1974), p. 90.

[78]Singleton and Shingler, p. 289.

[79]Joint Communique by the Presidents of Ghana and Guinea, quoted in Immanual Wallerstein, Africa: The Politics of Unity (New York: Vintage Books, 1967), p. 33.

[80]Colin Legum, Congo Disaster (Baltimore, Md.: Penguin Books, 1961), p. 141.

the overthrow of Lumumba's government is well-documented.[81] In September, 1960, when Ghana's President Nkrumah denounced Western actions in the Congo, Secretary Herter remarked that Nkrumah had "marked himself as very definitely leaning toward the Soviet bloc."[82] It was in this Cold War context that the United States responded to Nigeria, which became independent little more than a week after Nkrumah's speech. If the Eisenhower administration appeared to be more tolerant of non-alignment in 1960 than in 1955, United States decision-makers still distinguished sharply between officially "non-aligned" countries like Ghana and Guinea, which seemed to tilt toward Moscow, and countries like Nigeria which were more inclined toward the Western orbit.[83]

According to Hilsman, a speech by Khrushchev on January 6, 1961, was given great significance by President Kennedy, who "directed that all the members of his new administration read the speech and consider what it portended."[84] Khrushchev's speech, declaring that the Soviet Union would support "wars of national liberation. . . wholeheartedly and without reservation. . ."[85] reinforced fears of United States military strategists that the Soviet Union would seek to exploit the United States' overreliance on nuclear deterrence by supporting guerrilla

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[81]Tully, pp. 219-29; Weissman, pp. 558-59; Colvin, p. 147; Oudes, p. A-119.

[82]Quoted in McKay, p. 345.

[83]Shepherd, p. 106.

[84]Hilsman, p. 414.

[85]Two Communist Manifestoes (Washington, D. C.: Washington Center of Foreign Policy Research, 1961), pp. 51-52.

wars in developing countries.[86] Within a week after the speech was delivered, the "Casablanca" bloc of seven "revolutionary" states was formed which supported the soviet-backed faction in the Congo.[87]

Nigeria played a leading role in countering this grouping, by co-sponsoring (with Liberia and Togo) the Monrovia Conference of May, 1961. To a significant extent as a result of Minister Balewa's skillful diplomacy, the Monrovia group, consisting of twenty relatively moderate or conservative states, was formed.[88] This bloc was by far the largest, most diversified bloc of African countries in existence at the time. The charter of the Organization of African Unity (O.A.U.), was formed in 1963, marked the triumph of the Monrovia point of view. Rivkin remarks that the OAU Charter is "purely and simply, the repudiation of the inter-African code of behavior of the Casablanca block" and that "The Monrovia bloc. . . had its code of behavior ratified and adopted by the thirty-one states in attendance at the Addis Ababa Conference."[89] For a status quo power like the United States,[90] counter-

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[86]Hoopes, pp. 13-14, Maxwell D. Taylor, The Uncertain Trumpet (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1960), pp. 61-62; John W. Spanier, World Politics in an Age of Revolution (New York: Frederick A. Pareger), pp. 148-49.

[87]Immanuel Wallerstein, Africa: The Politics of Unity (New York: Vintage Books, 1967), pp. 47048.

[88]West Africa (August 26, 1961), p. 930; Africa Report, vol. 6 (June, 1961), p. 5; Claude S. Phillips, Jr., The Development of Nigerian Foreign Policy (Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern University Press, 1964, pp. 90-91.

[89]Arnold Rivkin, Nation-Building in Africa: Problems and Prospects (New Brunswick, New Jersey: Rutgers University Press, 1969), pp. 15-16.

[90]The term "status quo power" refers to the type of state described by Morgenthau as one "whose foreign policy tends toward keeping power and not toward changing the distribution of power in its favor. . ." Hans

action of revolutionary influences on the African continent was a major diplomatic victory in the African theater of the Cold War.

In January, 1964, almost at the outset of the Johnson Administration, fighting erupted again in central Africa. The National Liberation Committee (CNL) with offices in the People's Republic of the Congo and Burundi, sppnsored a guerrilla war against the government of Congo-Kinshasa. The support given to the CNL by Communist China, both in Brazzaville and in Burundi,[91] was viewed with alarm by United States decision-makers, who sought to bolster the regime of the controversial Moise Tshombe in Kinshasa.[92] The controversial Stanleyville airlift in November, 1964, when United States' planes transported Belgian paratroopers to rescue civilian hostages from the CNL rebels was widely condemned, even by such "moderate" African states as Ethiopia and Kenya, as improper outside intervention. Eighteen African states signed a resolution which was introduced in the Security Council of the United Nations to condemn the American-Belgian action. Nigeria,

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Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, 3rd edition (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1963), p. 39. Organski uses a similar category, "the powerful and satisfied", the United States, which favors "the status quo, since it has already used its power to establish a world order to its satisfaction." A. F. K. Organski, World Politics, second edition (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1968), p. 369.

[91]Tareq Y. Ismael, "The People's Republic of China and Africa," The Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol. 9 (December, 1971), pp. 516-17; Averell Harriman, "United States' Policy and the Congo," (Speech, August 18, 1964) in Catherine Hoskyns, ed., Case Studies in African Diplomacy, No. 1: The Organization of African Unity and the Congo Crisis 1964-65 (Dar es Salaam: Oxford University Press, 1969), pp. 12-13.

[92]In June, 1964, American pilots began flying missions for the government of Congo Kinshasa. The United States provided military advisers, motor transport, and C-130 transport planes to the Tshombe government. Hoskyns, ed., pp. xii-xiii; Harriman, p. 12.

however, demonstrated her friendship with the United States by defending the action.[93]

Besides providing diplomatic support and stability to a troubled continent, Nigeria was a promising economic partner for the United States. Nigeria was the world's leading producer of palm oil, peanuts, and columbite, which is used in making alloys for jet engines; and was a major producer of rubber, tin, and cocoa.[94] Petroleum production grew rapidly, from 0.9 million metric tons in 1960 to 6 million metric tons in 1964, and 21 million metric tons in 1966.[95]

It should be noted that Nigeria was not a mjor trading partner, nor a major source of strategic minerals for the United States in the 1960's. In 1968, Nigeria accounted for only 2.2 percent of total African mineral production by value, compared with 26.6 percent for South Africa, 28.4 percent for Libya, and 11.3 percent for Zambia.[96] In 1966, Nigeria provided little more than 0.2 percent of total imports of the United States, by value; and purchased only about 0.3 percent of total United States' exports.[97] Cocoa and rubber accounted for 83

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[93] Joune Afrique (December 13, 1964), in Hoskyns, ed., p. 45; Emerson, p. 2.

[94] British Information Service, Nigeria: The Making of a Nation (London: H. M. Stationery Office, 1960), pp. 8-9; Violaine I. Junod, assisted by Idrain N. Resnick, ed., The Handbook of Africa (New York: New York University Press, 1963), p. 264.

[95] Jonathan Baker, "Oil and African Development," Journal of Modern African Studies, vol. 15 (1977), p. 178 Table.

[96] William A. Hance, Africa's Minerals: Myths and Realities," Africa Report, vol. 16 (May, 1971), pp. 31-33.

[97] The Statesman's Yearbook, 1966-67, p. 620.

percent of the $35 million worth of commodities which the United States imported from Nigeria in 1964.[98]

Nevertheless, the potential for a much greater economic contribution in the future was evident. United States' private investments in Nigeria more than trebled between 1960 and 1964, with petroleum accounting for some sixty percent of the total in 1964.[99] In order to encourage and protect American private investors in Nigeria, the United States signed an Investment Guaranty Agreement, which permitted AID to underwrite investment projects undertaken by United States' business firms against "non-commercial risk of expropriation, currency inconvertibility, war and civil disturbances."[100] The rate of trade expansion between the two countries was impressive, and the balance of trade was in the United States' favor. United States exports to Nigeria, principally manufacturers, increased from $17.9 million in 1959 to $64 million in 1964, compared to $35 million of imports by the United States from Nigeria in the latter year.[101] For certain kinds of industrial equipment, such as boring machinery, crawler tractors, bulldozers, angledozers, and spare parts for machinery, the United States was Nigeria's leading supplier by 1962.[102] In sum, while it is difficult to

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[98]United States Department of Commerce, "Basic Data on the Economy of Nigeria," Overseas Business Reports (April, 1964), p. 16.

[99]Walter Schwarz, Nigeria (New York: Praeger, 1968), p. 289; United States Department of Commerce, Market Indicators for Africa (Washington, D. C.: Government Printing Office, 1962), p. 62.

[100]United States Department of Commerce, "Basic Data," p. 14.

[101]The Statesman's Yearbook, 1962-65, p. 620.

[102]United States Department of Commerce, "Basic Data," p. 16.

explain the quality of United States-Nigerian relations during 1960-66 in terms of economics alone, the economic potential of the country and the political pressures which it generated among various interest groups, no doubt reinforced the importance which Nigeria had acquired for United States' decision-makers for reasons of national security.

Domestic control within the United States was of little or no significance as an influence on United States' relations with Nigeria. During the 1960 presidential election campaign, Senator John Kennedy did accuse the Eisenhower administration of "disastrous error and neglect in Africa."[103] Policy toward Africa cannot be said to have been a major issue in the election. By the end of the Kennedy Administration, neither Black Americans nor white supremacists appeared to consider Africa a particularly salient issue.[104] Foreign aid was a serious issue affecting Africa, as support for foreign aid steadily declined, not only among members of the general public, but among liberal elite elements, as well.[105] Yet there was still a basic consensus in the country on primary goals and objectives of foreign policy, including a general acceptance of international involvement on the part of the United States.[106]

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[103]"Kennedy Maps End of 'Error' in Africa," The New York Times (October 9, 1960), p. 10.

[104]Meisler, p. 6.

[105]Hilsman, p. 394.

[106]Francis E. Rourke, "The Domestic Scene," in Robert E. Osgood, et al., America and the World (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1970), pp. 147-48.

Capabilities

The utilitarian capabilities of the United States increased markedly during the early 1960's, as three successive administrations were able to secure generous appropriations of economic aid for Nigeria despite congressional hostility toward foreign aid. During the last three years of the Eisenhower Administration, grants and loans to Africa under the Mutual Security Act increased more than fivefold, to $169.7 million,[107] and the United States pledged an additional $1 million to an expanded UNESCO. United States' aid to Nigeria doubled to $2 million between fiscal 1959 and 1960.[108] The World Bank, in which the United States held the largest share of votes, provided a $28 million loan for expansion of Nigeria's railway network and took under consideration a loan of $150 million for a hydroelectric project on the Niger River. Under Presidents Kennedy and Johnson, AID assistnace to Nigeria rose to unparalleled heights: $27.4 million in fiscal year 1963 and $46.0 million in fiscal year 1964.[109]

Aid from the United States accounted for little more than one-third of all Nigeria's economic assistance from the West,[110] and the United Kingdom remained the largest source of aid, trade and invest-

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[107] Emerson, p. 26.

[108] United States Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1962 (Washington, D. C.: Government Printing Office, 1962), p. 866.

[109] U. S. Agency for International Development, "U. S. Economic Aid to Africa," Africa Report, Vol. 9 (December, 1964), Table, p. 10.

[110] Emerson, p. 39.

ment.[111] Nevertheless, the United States offered Nigeria an opportunity to reduce her dependence on the former colonial power. The fact that Nigeria embarked on a $1.9 million six year development plan in 1962 increased her susceptibility to foreign utilitarian inducements,[112] while Congressional curtailment of United States aid to other African countries gave credibility to the prospect of a reduction of economic assistance if Nigeria displeased United States' decision-makers.

The identitive capabilities of the United States during 1960-66 were higher for Nigeria than for many other African countries. A common heritage of British institutions, language and culture provided an identitive bond between United States' and Nigerian leaders, while a remarkably peaceful transition to independence from the United Kingdom left little or no hostility to be transferred to Britain's most powerful ally. The identitive power of the United States on the eve of Nigeria's independence was reflected in the 1959 manifestoes of the three major Nigerian political parties. The Northern Peoples' Congress (NPC) declared that Nigeria "should aim at retaining and expanding her existing ties of friendship with the United States of America."[113] The National Convention of Nigerian Citizens, the NPC's partner in the governing coalition, stated: "Needless to emphasize our deep admiration of and affection for the United States, its ways of life, its championship of freedom and equality of man everywhere and no less important, its great-

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[111] Schwarz, pp. 287-89.

[112] Ibid., p. 297.

[113] Daily Times (September 18, 1959), p. 6.

ness."[114] The President of the opposition party, the Action Group, was initially even more outspoken in insisting that Nigeria "should not hesitate to make her attitude, towards the ideals for which the Western Democracies stand, clear beyond any shadow of a doubt."[115] Later the Action Group became more critical of close identification with the West.

The identitive capabilities of the United States, vis-a-vis Nigeria, increased during the Administration of President Kennedy, whom even such critics of the United States as Ghana's Nkrumah admired.[116] During the visit of Nigerian Prime Minister Balewa to the United States in 1961, he "was particularly impressed by the amount of time which the President devoted to him, as well as by the President's knowledge of Africa."[117] Assistant Secretary of State William's vigorous support of African causes, while offensive to some European officials, was warmly appreciated by Nigerians. Since Williams remained at his post until 1966, and President Johnson stressed the continuity of his policies with those of Kennedy, changes in the orientation of the Johnson Administration toward Nigeria were not apparent for some time.

It was Africa's good fortune that the United States chose to direct its formidable capabilities as a nuclear superpower toward other parts of the world. United States' nuclear superiority over the Soviet Union was demonstrated in the Cuban Missile crisis of 1962.[118] Counter-

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[114] Daily Times (October 9, 1959), p. 3.

[115] Daily Times (September 12, 1959), p. 2.

[116] Sorensen, p. 577.

[117] McKay, Africa in World Politics, p. 350.

[118] Robin Edmonds, Soviet Foreign Policy, 1962-1973; The Paradox of Super Power (London: Oxford University Press, 1975), p. 40.

insurgency capabilities were developed in the Army Special Forces, which grew five-fold during the Kennedy Administration.[119] In Africa, however, the United States preferred to work through the United Nations. A coalition was forged between the United States and the bulk of African states, including Nigeria, to support the United Nations Operations in the Congo, which the Soviet Union and France opposed.[120] Covert operations of the CIA contributed to the overthrow of Lumumba in Congo-Kinshasa, but there is no evidence of similar involvement by the CIA in other parts of Africa.[121] The fact that Africa was still the "Dark Continent," not only to a majority of Americans but to Soviet leaders, as well, may have helped it to avoid becoming a Cold War battleground comparable to Southeast Asia.

Characteristics of Nigeria

United States' decision-makers in the early 1960's perceived Nigeria to have the "brightest prospects of any nation on the continent for development of its (the United States') Western style of democracy."[122] Nigeria was moderate in leadership and seemingly stable politically, with a competitive party system, the trappings of Westminster democracy, and an official policy of "non-alignment" which, in practice,

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[119] Sorensen, p. 632.

[120] Ernest W. Lefever, Uncertain Mandate: Politics of the U. N. Congo Operation (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University, 1967), p. 77; King Gordon, The United Nations in the Congo: A Quest for Peace (New York: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1962), p. 104.

[121] Bruce Oudes, "The CIA and Africa," Africa Report, vol. 20 (July-August, 1974), p. 50.

[122] Waldemar A. Nielsen, The Great Powers and Africa (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1969), p. 322.

manifested decidedly pro-Western learnings.

Prime Minister Balewa stated: "We Nigerians are friends of the United States. There is no doubt about it. We want that friendship to become stronger."[123] During Nigeria's first week of independence, its government announced that it would send a battallion to support the United Nations forces in the Congo.[124] Although the United States was readily allowed to open an embassy in Lagos, opening of a Soviet embassy was postponed. Balewa claimed that the Soviet Premier had demanded "on opening an embassy forthwith."[125] The Nigerian Prime Minister declared: "We will not be bullied, and I told him (Khrushchev) that protocol must be followed and we would consider an application in the proper form."[126] Nigeria neither sought nor received economic aid from Communist countries during its first year of independence, while the officially non-aligned state received substantial aid from western countries.

Balewa's support came from the feudal Fulani aristocracy of northern Nigeria. Described by The New York Times as "the Quiet Nigerian," who shunned ideologies,[127] he was not the sort of person to whom Marxism or any other radical doctrine would have any appeal.

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[123]Quoted in The New York Times (October 3, 1960), p. 3.

[124]The New York Times (October 5, 1960), p. 20.

[125]The New York Times (November 3, 1960), p. 13.

[126]Ibid.

[127]The New York Times (October 7, 1960), p. 16.

Among Nigeria's many attractions to the United States was its liberal investment code. The petroleum code of the Balewa government limited the government's share of oil profits to 35 percent, "little more than half that taken by the major exporting nations. . ."[128] The government provided foreign investors with such incentives as accelerated depreciation allowances, relief from import duties, and a low income tax.

Few Western observers realized the seriousness of political unrest in the country surrounding the treason trial of the major Action Group leader, chief Awalowo, in 1962-63; the bitter controversy over the 1963 census results which determined representation in the national parliament; nor the riots in 1960 and 1964 by members of the Tiv ethnic group which demanded greater autonomy from the Fulani-dominated government of the Northern Region. The significance of these events, which contained seeds of the 1966 coups and the civil war, were masked by the facade of Westminster-style democracy.

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[128]Odell, p. 90.

CHAPTER III

DETERIORATING RELATIONS, 1967 TO 1970

The first major strains in relations between Nigeria and the United States occurred during the Nigerian Civil War from 1967 to 1970. Under both the Johnson and Nixon Administrations, United States' policy was essentially the same: to remain uninvolved in the war, while officially opposing secession and refusing to recognize the rebel government of Biafra, on the one hand, and providing "humanitarian aid" to starving Biafrans, on the other.[1] Washington, thereby, managed to antagonize both sides in the conflict.

The Federal Military Government (F.M.G.) expressed resentment at the United States Government's denial of export permits for arms purchases from commercial manufacturers in the United States.[2] Spokesmen for the F.M.G. charged that the embargo was imposed "in full knowledge of the fact that Biafra was receiving a relatively unrestricted flow of

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[1]For the official position of the United States toward the Nigerian Civil War, see "Department Statement," United States Department of State Bulletin (September 11, 1967), p. 320; President Lyndon B. Johnson, "Additional U. S. Contribution Authorized for Nigerian Relief," United States Department of State Bulletin (November 25, 1968), pp. 543-44; Undersecretary of State Nicholas Katzenbach, "The Tragedy of Nigeria," United States Department of State Bulletin (December, 1968), p. 653; "Department Reviews U. S. Efforts to Aid Victims of the Nigerian Civil War," Department of State Bulletin (August 4, 1969), pp. 94-97.

[2]"Position of the United States Clarified," Africa Report, Vol. 12, (October, 1967), p. 55.

arms from unauthorized arms dealers, some of whom were American."[3] The United States' position was regarded in Lagos as one of "thinly disguised support" for Biafra, motivated by a desire to secure "cheap oil supplies."[4] When Biafrans used American made planes in its bombing raids, the F.M.G. issued an official protest to the United States Embassy in Lagos.[5] Secretary of State Rusk's declaration that the United States would not become more actively involved because Nigeria was "a British responsibility"[6] was taken by the F.M.G. as an insulting insinuation of a neo-colonial relationship between Lagos and London.

The F.M.G. also protested the "humanitarian" contacts between the United States and Biafra, which:

> had distinct political implications. First of all, it involved direct dealings with the Biafran authorities, which considerably strengthened the status of Biafra in striving for recognition. Secondly, the establishment of contact with (the Biafran) regime led to an increase in pressure by the Biafran lobby in the United States for some kind of diplomatic relations.[7]

Deutsch observes that "failure to respond to a group, a community, or individuals in situations which are crucial and highly salient to

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[3]W. B. Ofuatey-Kodje, "Conflicting Political Interests of Africa and the United States," Frederick S. Arkhurst, ed., United States Policy Toward Africa (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1975), p. 210.

[4]The New York Times (August 24, 1967), p. 15; Richard P. Stebbins, The United States in World Affairs, 1967 (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1968), p. 246.

[5]Suzanne Cronje, The World and Nigeria (London: Sidgwick and Johnson, 1972), p. 229.

[6]"Position of the United States Clarified," p. 55.

[7]Zdenak Cervenka, The Nigerian War, 1967-70 (Frankfurt am Main: Bernard Graefe Verlag fur Wehrwesen, 1971), p. 126.

them would be one of the strongest ways of destroying a community."[8] A variety of factors inhibited the ability of the United States to respond effectively to a situation which Nigerian leaders considered to be "crucial and highly salient" damaged the bonds of community which had been developing between the two countries since 1960.

Decision-Makers

In contrast to the basic consensus among United States decision-makers on foreign policy during 1960, there was a marked dissension among them on policies and priorities toward Nigeria and other countries during 1967-70. Intensification of the War in Indochina, among other changes, profoundly altered the character of foreign policy decision-making in the United States.

Institutional Variables

Significant differences in values and outlook among major governmental units emerged by 1967. Within the executive branch, the most significant division affecting relations with Nigeria was that between the Bureau of African Affairs and the United States Embassy in Nigeria, on the one hand, and the other major agencies of foreign policy decision-making, on the other. As the war in Vietnam increasingly absorbed the attention of the President, his major staff advisers at the White House, the CIA, the Pentagon, the Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs and the top leadership of the State Department, however, the influence of the

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[8]Karl W. Deutsch, "Communication Theory and Political Integration," Philip E. Jacob and James V. Toscano, eds., The Integration of Political Communities (New York: J. B. Lippincott Co., 1964), p. 70.

Bureau of African Affairs diminished. Mid-1966, when the United States began bombing Hanoi and Haiphong oil depots and the demilitarized zone, and the United States "assumed the brunt of the offensive fighting"[9] in Vietnam, marked a major threshold in the shift of the United States' policy priorities.[10]

The Bureau of African Affairs like most of the African states which formed its "constituency," opposed secession out of fear that "a successful secession of Biafra from Nigeria could trigger a disastrous wave of civil wars throughout much of Africa."[11] The Bureau of African Affairs advocated Federal Military Government.[12] Other State Department officials, however, including the Secretary of State, advised the President to adopt a neutral, non-involved position--a decision which was undoubtedly "influenced by the deep United States involvement in Vietnam."[13]

More fundamental institutional changes were the increased assertiveness of Congressional liberals on foreign policy matters, and the increasing friction between the Administration and important elements

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[9]Hoopes, pp. 16-24; Destler, p. 117.

[10]George McTurnan Kahin and John W. Lewis, The United State and Vietnam, revised edition (New York: Dell Publishing Company, 1969), p. 183.

[11]Nielsen, p. 323; Cronje, p. 229; The Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the OAU, Fourth Ordinary Session in 1967, resolved to reiterate "their condemnation of secession in any Member States. . ." Resolution ANG/Res. 51 (iv).

[12]Cronje, p. 229.

[13]El Khawas, p. 414.

of the Senate leadership over foreign policy. After President Johnson failed to heed the letter of January, 1966, by twenty-nine Senators, calling for a bombing pause in Vietnam, relations between the Administration and Senate liberals became strained. In an article in May, 1966 Chairman Fullbright of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee castigated the Johnson Administration for a "Fatal Arrogance of Power."[14] Congressional liberals were by May, 1967, when the Nigerian Civil War erupted, changing the administration with taking insufficient initiatives in the United Nations to resolve the Nigerian conflict, and for inadequate relief assistance for Biafrans.[15] The self-styled "humanitarian" spokesmen in Congress manifested greater sympathy for the plight of Biafra than was evident from either faction in the State Department.

Idiosyncratic Variables

By 1967, continuity between the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations, in terms of key personnel concerned with policies toward Nigeria, had terminated. The "New Africa Group," which was the nucleus of pro-African sentiment among the ex-Kennedy advisers,[16] gradually disintegrated with the death of Stevenson in 1965, the resignation of Williams and Fredericks in 1966, and the isolation of Bowles as Ambassador to

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[14]J. William Fulbright, "The Fatal Arrogance of Power," New York Times Magazine (May 15, 1966), p. 29.

[15]Colin Legum, "The United States and Africa," Colin Legum and John Drysdale, ed., Africa Contemporary Record, 1968-1969 (London: Africa Research, Ltd., 1969), p. 36.

[16]Hilsman, pp. 245-46.

India. Legum remarks that preoccupation with Indochina, inter-alia, "made it easier for Dean Rusk--never an enthusiast for the forward looking policies initiated in the Kennedy era--to pursue his lukewarm policies to Africa without much difficulty after the departure of Kennedy men like G. Mennen Williams and, especially J. Wayne Fredericks."[17]

The principal Kennedy holdovers in the upper echelons of power in 1967 were Secretary of Defense McNamara and Walter Rostow. The former was "a rational activist, with a very thin grounding in foreign affairs. . . ."[18] the latter, an economist whose elaborate theories of development contributed to his virtual fixation on Vietnam as the critical battleground of the Cold War.[19] Neither of these most influential of Johnson's advisers showed much interest in Africa,[20] nor did Clark Clifford, the Washington lawyer, who succeeded McNamara in 1968.

When President Nixon came to the White House in 1969, he was expected to adopt a policy more favorable to Biafra, because of statements which he had made during the election campaign. He had charged that:

> Until now efforts to relieve the Biafran people have been thwarted by the desire of the central government of Nigeria to pursue total and unconditional victory, and by the fear of the Ibo people that surrender means wholesale atrocities and genocide.[21]

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[17] Legum, p. 32.

[18] Hoopes, p. 18.

[19] Ibid., pp. 20-21.

[20] Ibid., p. 21; Irish and Frank, p. 237.

[21] Quoted in Cronje, p. 226.

However, in office, he was dissuaded from more active relief measures for Biafra by, inter-alia, "the apparent anti-Biafran stance of Dr. Kissinger in the White House."[22]

During the first term of the Nixon Administration, Dr. Kissinger, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, exerted "more effective influence upon foreign-policy decisions than either Secretary of State Rogers or the Secretary of Defense, Melvin Laird."[23] In his book, The Necessity of Choice, Kissinger identified Nigeria as the African country deserving top priority. "The best method of having a major impact on many countries," he explained,

> will be to make a going concern of one country. India in Asia, Brazil in Latin America, Nigeria in Africa could become magnets and examples for their regions if we acted with the boldness and on the comparative scale of the Marshall Plan.[24]

Unlike the leading decision-makers of the Johnson Administration, Kissinger shared the "One-Nigeria" sympathies of the Bureau of African Affairs in the State Department and the United States Embassy in Lagos.

Personnel changes in the Bureau of African Affairs and the United States Embassy in Nigeria, likewise, contributed to fragmentation in United States policy toward the country. Joseph Palmer II, who succeeded Williams as Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs,

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[22]Oye Ogunbadejo, "Nigeria and the Great Powers," p. 19.

[23]Irish and Frank, p. 11.

[24]Henry A. Kissinger, The Necessity for Choice (New York: Anchor Books, 1962), p. 336.

had been the United States Ambassador to Nigeria for six years. Consequently, he assigned higher priority to the Nigerian crisis. His personal sympathies were strongly pro-federal and anti-Biafran. In June, 1967, he said that the only solution favored by the Bureau was one which maintained the unity of Nigeria, and in July, 1968 told the Supreme Commander of the F.M.G. that "it was the wish of the United States Government that Nigeria's Federal Republic of States remain a unified indivisible country."[25]

Elbert Matthews, Palmer's successor in Lagos, inherited Palmer's policies and staff, and with Palmer in the State Department as his immediate superior, the new Ambassador had no incentive to seek a fresh approach. Indeed, he soon began issuing statements "more openly in support of Nigeria than Washington's stance of neutrality would have dictated."[26] The contrast between the pro-F.M.G. statements of Assistant Secretary Palmer and Ambassador Mathews, on the one hand, and the "frigid disinterest"[27] of Secretary of State Rusk, on the other, gave the impression of a foreign policy which was inconsistent or insincere.

Additional confusion concerning the United States' position was created by the self-styled "humanitarian" voices in the U. S. Senate--especially Senators Edward Kennedy, Charles Goodall and Eugene McCarthy. Kennedy charged that the Johnson administration had "done

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[25]Cronje, p. 229.

[26]Ibid.

[27]Legum, p. 32.

little or nothing to feed the starving or end the war."[28] In January, 1969, Goodall organized a large-scale relief donations program in conjunction with a "Biafran Christian ship."[29] McCarthy went further in advocating that the United States "accept Biafra's right to separate national independence."[30]

On the other hand, the F.M.G. also had its supporters in Congress, notably the black Senator, Edward V. Brooke, who denounced the Head of the Biafran Government. "Once before in modern history," Brooke told the Senate African Affairs Subcommittee in 1968, "a national leader chose to rule or die, and to take his people with him."[31]

Confronted with these differences of opinion, President Nixon appointed an official fact-finding mission led by Representative Charles C. Diggs, a black member of the Subcommittee on Africa of the House Foreign Affairs Committee. After touring Nigeria and Biafra in February, 1969, the Mission upheld the positions of the Johnson and Nixon Administrations.[32]

The dissension among the different decision makers was resolved, by both the Johnson and the Nixon Administrations, by adopting a position of ambivalent neutrality.

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[28]Ibid., p. 36; Senator Edward Kennedy, "Time for Action on Biafra: A Moral Imperative," Reader's Digest, Vol. 44 (May, 1969), pp. 75-76.

[29]Charles E. Goodall, "Biafra and American Conscience," Saturday Review, Vol. 52 (April 12, 1969), p. 26.

[30]A.H.M. Kirk-Greene, Crisis and Conflict in Nigeria (London: Oxford University Press, 1971), p. 403.

[31]Quoted in Cervenka, p. 123.

[32]Report of the Special Fact-Finding Mission to Nigeria, Charles A. Diggs, Chairman, February 7-20, 1969 (Washington, D. C.: Government Printing Office, 1969), p. 1.

Demands

The involvement of actors outside the government in shaping United States' policy toward the Nigerian conflict was considerable, although the extent of their influence is difficult to measure. United States' policy was "vigorously opposed by a pro-Biafran lobby that extends across the spectrum of American political opinion."[33] The most active elements of the lobby were Biafran students, who made up the largest contingent of some 1,400 Nigerians studying in the United States; and missionaries, whose humanitarian concerns may have been reinforced by the fact that Biafra contained the largest Christian population in Nigeria.[34]

The fact that the Biafran leadership was "strongly pro-Western and imbrued with the values of the private enterprise system"[35] appealed to conservatives in the United States; and the fact that Portugal and South Africa, were actively aiding the Biafran cause,[36] also

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[33]Richard L. Sklar, "The United States and the Biafran War," Africa Report, Vol. 14 (November, 1969), p. 22.

[34]A majority of the population of the Eastern Region was Christian, primarily Catholic, while only 3.5 percent of the politically dominant Northern Region was Christian. While General Gowon, the supreme commander of the F.M.G., was a Christian and some 40 percent of the population in the Western Region was Protestant, the prominence of northerners in the new government and in the mobs who had slaughtered tens of thousands of Easterners before the Civil War gave religious overtones to the conflict.

[35]"Nigeria," Legum and Drysdale, ed., p. 563.

[36]Ibid.

helped to marshall support for Biafra among American sympathizers of those countries. The public relations firm of Selvage and Lee served as lobbying instrument for Portuguese interests, while South African viewpoints were presented in the United States by the firm of Collier, Shannon, Rill and Edwards.[37]

Undoubtedly most of the Biafra sympathizers in the United States were motivated by genuinely humanitarian concerns. The plight of the Biafrans

> was revealed in all its horror by the medium of television, which had already proved so effective in arousing a deep feeling about the war in Vietnam. Close-up pictures of starving women seen in the living-rooms of millions of homes in western Europe and North America, roused a deep emotional response.[38]

Thousands of New Yorkers, including Mayor John Lindsay and Archbishop Cooke, participated in the drive to fill a supply ship known as the "Biafran Christian Ship."[39]

There were also influential groups which exerted influence on behalf of the F.M.G. United States businessmen in Lagos persuaded in-coming ambassador Truehart of the advantages of "keeping Nigeria the largest single market for business enterprise"[40] in Africa. Gulf Oil, which had its major operations in territory controlled by the

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[37]Meisler, p. 6; Barbara Rogers, "Sunny South Africa: A Worldwide Propaganda Machine," Africa Report, Vol. 22 (September-October, 1977), pp. 6-7.

[38]Margery Perham, "Nigeria's Civil War," Legum and Drysdale, eds., Africa Contemporary Record (London: Africa Research Ltd., 1969), pp. 1-12.

[39]Charles E. Goodall, p. 26.

[40]Cronje, p. 249.

F.M.G., lobbied for more active support of the central government.[41]

The United States was also dissuaded from supporting Biafra by the fact that a major ally, the United Kingdom, was supporting the F.M.G. and supplying it with arms.[42] The NATO allies were, thus, divided over the Nigerian conflict--Britain supporting the F.M.G., France and Portugal supporting Biafra. With major allies and domestic interest groups expressing such division on the issue, it was politically difficult for the United States government to take a decisive stand.

Functional Requisites

From the standpoint of United States' national security, the Nigerian conflict was complicated by the fact that the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom were supporting the same side. Consequently, the United States, "with far less at stake, preoccupied with Vietnam and its own internal problems and confident that Britain would hold the Western line against Communist infiltration, declared a formal arms embargo against both sides."[43]

From an economic standpoint, more was at stake, but the national interest of the United States was difficult to determine. On the one hand, approximately three-fifths of Nigeria's oil was located in Bia-

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[41]Cronje, p. 39; Claire Sterling, "Can Nigeria Catch Up With Its Reputation," Reporter (May 19, 1966), p. 39.

[42]Charles R. Nixon, "Nigeria and Biafra," Steven L. Spiegel and Kenneth N. Waltz, ed., Conflict in World Politics (Cambridge, Mass.: Winthrop Publishers, Inc., 1971), p. 295-296; "Position of the United States Clarified," p. 55.

[43]John De St. Jorre, The Brothers War (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, Co., 1972), p. 181.

fra,[44] and Nigerian crude had become more valuable since the closure of the Suez Canal in mid-1967. On the other hand, the success of Biafran secession would have meant the disintegration of tropical Africa's largest market, and a potential precedent for further fragmentation elsewhere in Africa. Between the outbreak of the civil war in May, 1967 and April, 1969, United States' private investment in F.M.G. controlled Nigeria roughly doubled, from about $200 million to about $400 million.[45] Petroleum production declined from 580,000 to 55,000 barrels per day during the first year of the war, but by mid 1969 it had surpassed pre-war levels. By the end of 1969, the F.M.G. recaptured virtually all of the oilfields, which were producing 1 million barrels of oil a day.[46] United States' companies accounted for 17 percent of federal Nigeria's $381 million worth of oil exports in 1969--second only to the British share of 22 percent.[47]

From the standpoint of domestic stability, the Nigerian Civil War coincided with a period of intense unrest inside the United States. Vietnam and Cambodia, not Nigeria, were the major foreign policy issues, even for American blacks. Public opinion polls during the period indicate a strong antipathy among blacks to the Vietnam War, which was viewed as "another example of blacks being given the dirty

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[44]Frederick Forsyth, The Biafra Story (Baltimore: Penguinn Books, 1969), p. 107.

[45]Cronje, p. 246.

[46]Sayre P. Schatz, "A Look at the Balance Sheet," Africa Report, Vol. 15 (January, 1970), p. 19.

[47]Pearson and Pearson, p. 14.

and dangerous jobs to do by the white majority. . . ."[48] On college campuses, Biafra was eclipsed by Indochina as a target for protest. The principal manifestations of public concern about the situation in Nigeria came from middle class liberals on the east coast.[49]

Capabilities

The coercive capabilities of the United States were heavily committed to Vietnam when the Nigerian Civil War erupted. By December, 1966, United States troop levels in Vietnam had reached 362,000,[50] and the United States was dropping a larger weekly tonnage of bombs on North Vietnam than the total "amount dropped on Germany at the peak of World War II.[51] An active military presence in Nigeria, or even the risk of extensive involvement in the Nigerian conflict by supplying munitions to one or another of the belligerents, would have been difficult or impossible, both politically and militarily. Stebbins notes that, having recently been condemned by many African states for the Stanleyville airlift, the United States was inclined to be cautious about any military response to the Nigerian war.[52]

Any identitive assets which the United States may have given Nigeria were quickly depleted by the unresponsive behavior and state-

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[48]Milton J. Rosenberg, Sidney Verba, and Philip E. Converse, Vietnam and the Silent Majority (New York: Harper and Row, 1970, p. 75.

[49]Goodall, p. 26.

[50]Committee of Asian Scholars, The IndoChina Story (New York: Bantam Books, 1970), p. 322.

[51]The New York Times (August 21, 1966), p. 14.

[52]Richard D. Stebbins, The United States in World Affairs, 1967 (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1968), p. 246.

ments of the United States, especially Secretary Rusk's insulting statement that Nigeria was a British responsibility.[53] A speech by Undersecretary of State Katzenbach in 1968 did not endear the United States to either side in the Nigerian war by accusing both sides of subordinating the lives of innocent persons to political and tactical advantage.[54]

In terms of utilitarian assets, the United States provided more economic assistance to Nigeria than to any other African country during 1967-70. Bilateral aid from the United States to Nigeria rose from $21.3 million in fiscal year 1968 to $32.6 million in fiscal year 1971,[55] and Nigeria received one in five of the 10,500 United States technical experts who were sent to Africa in 1968--the largest share of any African country.[56] For a country in the midst of a war, however, the estimated $10.7 million worth of military aid which the Soviet Union gave Nigeria in 1969 alone[57] was undoubtedly more valued by the F.M.G. than the purely economic assistance which the United States provided.

Moreover, the F.M.G. resented the relief which the United States provided to Biafran civilians because of potential recognition and

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[53]"Position of the United States," p. 55.

[54]Legum, p. 33.

[55]United States Agency for International Development, in The New York Time Almanac 1970 (New York: The New York Times, 1969), p. 703 and in The Official Associated Press Almanac (New York: Almanac Publishing Company, Inc., 1973), p. 594.

[56]Pol Guyomarch, "Africa and the U. S. A.," Africa '71 (New York: Africana Publishing Co., 1970), p. 62.

[57]Dominique Duault, "Africa and the U.S.S.R.," Africa '71 (New York: Africana Publishing Co., 1970), p. 91.

propaganda value to the Biafran government from such contacts.[58] By July 1, 1969, the United States Government had given $60 million in relief aid for Biafra, and private United States citizens had given more than $10 million additional assistance.[59] President Johnson explained that "While we have no intention of interfering in Nigerian affairs, we do not believe innocent persons should be made victims of political maneuvering."[60] In sum, the capabilities of the United States were not only limited, relative to the magnitude of Nigeria's needs, but were expended in ways which the F.M.G. perceived as unresponsive or detrimental to its needs.

Perceived Characteristics of Nigeria

The Nigerian war, and the events during the previous year which precipitated it, caused great disappointment in Washington, and a fundamental reassessment of the country on the part of United States' decision-makers. A country which had been hailed as a "showcase" of stability and democracy in Africa had experienced, between January, 1966 and the end of May, 1967, Nigeria had experienced the assassinations of two heads of government, two bloody coups d'etat, and the massacre of several thousand Eastern Nigerians in genocidal pogroms in Northern Nigeria.

The United States had shown no compunctions about backing military

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[58]Audrey Smock, "The Politics of Relief," Africa Report, Vol. 15 (January, 1970), p. 25.

[59]Ibid., p. 24.

[60]President Johnson, "Additional U. S. Contribution Authorized for Nigerian Relief," p. 544.

governments of dubious stability which had come to power through assassination in Southeast Asia--even when accompanied by genocidal massacres, as was true in Indonesia. Yet in Southeast Asia, the military governments which the United States sponsored came to power in countries which were considered vulnerable to Communist or pro-Communist penetration. In the case of Indonesia, the programs were directed against suspected Communist sympathizers. In Nigeria, leaders who were overthrown and murdered in both coups were friendly to the United States; and the Ibo victims of the Massacres were perceived by Americans as "a highly talented, industrious, westernized, and above all Christian people."[61] Moreover, the Federal Military Government, headed by mild-mannered, Sandhurst-trained "Jack" Gowon, seemed in little danger of going Communist."[62]

The potential of Nigeria as an oil rich nation containing "an ocean of oil, the purest in the world,"[63] as well as Black Africa's largest market, was sufficiently appreciated by United States private economic interests in Nigeria, especially Gulf Oil Corporation and Mobil Oil Corporation, to induce them to lobby actively against more extensive aid to Biafra.[64] Yet it is apparent that economic logic was outweighed by other factors shaping United States' responses to Africa, in general, which were governed:

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[61] Ofuatey-Kodje, p. 210.

[62] Ogunbadejo, p. 18.

[63] Forsyth, p. 107.

[64] Smock, p. 26.

> partly by preoccupation with Vietnam and Asia; partly by the loss of idealistic interest in the new African states, because they were not behaving like Jeffersonian model democracies; partly by diminished belief in Africa's capacity to mobilize effective, independent power in the foreseeable future, and, partly, by a lessening of anxiety about Russia.[65]

Cold War reflexes and racial stereotypes about the "Dark Continent" precluded a more decisive response to the Nigerian problem.

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[65] Legum, p. 32.

CHAPTER IV

UNFRIENDLY RELATIONS, 1970 TO 1976

During the half-decade following the end of the Nigerian Civil War in January, 1970, relations between the United States and Nigeria deteriorated to their lowest point in history. In January, 1970, Dr. Kissinger submitted his National Decision Memorandum to President Nixon. The memorandum endorsed the second of four options presented in National Security Staff Memorandum--Option Two, calling for the United States to increase contacts with the white-ruled governments of southern Africa. Pursuant to this recommendation, the African policy of the Nixon and Ford Administrations emphasized improving relations with the white-ruled countries of southern Africa, on the assumption that: "the whites are here to stay and the only way that constructive change can come about is through them."[1] This orientation by the United States contributed to increasing insensitivity to the interests of Nigeria, which had adopted a new role of activism in foreign relations and militant opposition to continued white rule in Africa.[2]

The tone of communications between the two countries reveals

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[1] See Bruce Oudes, "Southern African Policy Watershed," Africa Report, Vol. 19 (November-December, 1974), p. 50: Text of Option 2 of NSSM 39.

[2] Jean Herskovits, "Nigeria: Africa's New Power," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 3 (January, 1975), p. 321; Herskovits, "Nigeria: Africa's Emerging New Power," p. 16-17.

that an unusual degree of hostility had been reached by 1976. President Ford's letter to African leaders, suggesting that they support a Cuban withdrawal from Angola in order to obtain a withdrawal of South African forces from Angola, was published by the Nigerian government, along with an angry reply from the Nigerian Supreme Commander, General Murtala Muhammed, that:

> Nigeria rejects completely this fatuous attempt by the Ford Administration to insult the intelligence of African nations and scorn the dignity of the black man. It totally repudiates the fake logic that equates the presence of the Cuban and Soviet advisers in Angola with that of South African regular troops, their fellow soldiers of fortune and motley mercenaries.[3]

At an Organization of African Unity meeting in Addis Ababa, General Muhammed denounced the western powers for refusing to take any action against South Africa's presence in Angola, and he again criticized President Ford's letter. The reply issued by the United States Department of State expressed regret that the Nigerian Government had chosen to publish a personal communication from the President of the United States, and accused Nigeria of making "unjustified accusations against the United States and of gratuitously impugning American policy in Angola."[4]

The continuation of hostilities led to the anti-American demonstrations in Laogs, Kaduna, and Ibadan. On January 11, 1976, some two thousand Nigerians attacked the United States Embassy. Some of the demonstrators "broke into the grounds of the Embassy, plastered

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[3]"Lagos Rebuked by Washington for Impugning Angola Policy," The New York Times (January 9, 1976), p. 2.

[4]Ibid.

slogans on the windows, and threw sticks and stones at the building."[5] After the attempted coup d'etat in which General Mohammed was assassinated, demonstrators once again attacked the U. S. Embassy, claiming American complicity in the plot and shouting "C.I.A. must go!"[6] Nigeria refused to receive Secretary of State Kissinger during his tour of Africa in April, 1976, because of "inconvenient timing."[7]

In attempting to explain how relations between two once friendly countries could have reached such depths of ill-feeling, a variety of interacting factors deserve consideration.

Decision-Makers

The Nixon and Ford Administrations saw the consummation of two trends which had begun during the previous period: the increasing centralization of the machinery of the executive branch for making foreign policy decisions and the increasing assertiveness of Congress in foreign policy decisions.

Institutions

Within the Executive Branch, the influence of the President's National Security Affairs Assistant and his "tightly controlled" staff increased at the expense of the State Department and the Foreign Ser-

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[5]"Nigerians Attack American Embassy Over Angolan Issue," The New York Times (January 12,11976), p. 5.

[6]"Nigeria," Africa Contemporary Record, 1975-76 (New York: Africana Publishing Co., 1976), p. B-799.

[7]Ibid.

vice.[8] In August, 1973, when Kissinger became Secretary of State, while retaining his position as National Security Affairs Assistant, the State Department bureaucracy relegated to an inferior position vis-a-vis the National Security Staff. Kissinger

> continued to spend his mornings at his White House office, and even when he spent time at the State Department he remained communication with his NSC deputy, Brigadier General Brent Snowcroft. Top specialists in the State Department were rarely let in on his major policy decisions.[9]

Consequently, the influence of the regional bureaus of the State Department diminished. Under a Secretary of State whose energies were absorbed in "shuttle diplomacy" with Hanoi, Saigon, Peking, Moscow, and the capitals of the Middle East, the influence of the Bureau of African Affairs declined even more than the others. President Nixon's delay, after his inauguration, in appointing a new Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs was taken by some observers as an indication of the low priority which the President attached to Africa.[10]

The repeal of the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution in 1970 signalled greater assertiveness on the part of Congress on foreign policy matters. Congress became bolder as the Watergate hearings weakened the authority of the President. In November, 1973, the War Powers Act imposed a limit of 90 days on the President's authority to dispatch combat troops without specific Congressional approval, and gave Congress the power to stop the movement of troops without a presidential veto.

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[9] Ibid., p. 229.

[10] Colin Legum, "America's Year in Africa," Africa Contemporary Record, 1969-70 (Exeter: Africa Research Ltd., 1970), p. 41.

From the standpoint of relations between the United States and Nigeria, the greater prominence of Congress in foreign policy produced mixed results. Congressional action did limit a course of United States' actions in Angola which jeopardized relations with Nigeria. Congress voted overwhelmingly, by a margin of 323 to 99, to reject President Ford's appeal for aid to the FNLA/UNITA forces in their struggle against the MPLA, which Nigeria recognized as the rightful governing party in Angola. On the other hand, Congress also effectively opposed the Nixon and Ford Administrations two areas on which administration policy coincided with Nigerian policy: sanctions against Rhodesia and foreign aid.

Dr. Kissinger and Secretary of State Rogers, in support of international legal obligations under the United Nations Charter and the wishes of an ally, the United Kingdom, voiced their opposition to Congressional efforts to remove certain sanctions against trade with the regime of Ian Smith in Rhodesia. Yet the 1971 amendment to the Military Procurement Act authorizing the purchase of Rhodesian chrome was passed by Congress through the initiatives of Senator Byrd of Virginia, Union Carbide and the Foote Mining Company.[11] Driven by "a fierce desire to place restraints on the presidential foreign policy making powers,"[12] the Senate rejected the administration's entire foreign aid bill in 1971, and forced the Nixon Administration into compromises which, inter alia, provided the smallest amount of overseas

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[11]Aaron Segal, "The United States' Year in Africa," Africa Contemporary Record, 1971-1972 (New York: Africana Publishing Corporation, 1972), p. A 134.

[12]Ibid., p. 133.

decade. As a result economic assistance to Nigeria declined by nearly one-quarter, or $7.7 million, between fiscal year 1971 and fiscal year 1972,[13] at a time when Nigeria's remarkable economic growth was still insufficient to meet her ambitious plans for development of transportation and industry.

A noteworthy development in Congress during the period was the consolidation of an effective black voting group, with an interest in Africa, in the House of Representatives: the Congressional Black Caucus, (CBC). The CBC formed in 1971, and by 1975 it was one of the best-financed of the nine unofficial caucusing groups in the House, with one of the largest staffs.[14] President Ford acknowledged the importance of the CBC when he met with it three days after his inauguration. Oudes credits CBC pressure with Ford's reversal of his previous support of the Byrd Amendment.[15] Nevertheless, the influence of the CBC was offset by opposing blocs which were heavily influenced by lobbyists for friendlier relations with southern Africa. In 1975, the House of Representatives defeated by a vote of 209 to 187 a bill endorsed by President Ford and Secretary of State Kissinger to repeal the Byrd Amendment.

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[13]United States Agency for International Development, in The Official Associated Press Almanac 1973, p. 594 and The Official Associated Press Almanac 1974, p. 707.

[14]See Marguerite Ross Barnett, "The Congressional Black Caucus," Proceedings of the Academy of Political Science, Vol. 32, No. 1 (1975), pp. 34-50.

[15]Bruce Oudes, "New Agenda for Africa Policy," Africa Report, Vol. 19 (September-October, 1974), p. 54.

Idiosyncratic Variables

The most important personality variable during the period is that of Henry Kissinger. Not since the era of Secretary of State Dulles was foreign policy-making so heavily dominated by the personality of a single individual. Hughes claims that the United States had made so great an "overinvestment in one exceptional man--Henry Kissinger" that "In the process, our national priorities have perforce become his preferences. Our national interests have become his interests."[16] Even if Hughes may exaggerate the influence of individuals on United States' policy, it seems accurate to say that, not since the era of Secretary of State Dulles was foreign policy making in the United States so dominated by a single official. Inasmuch as Kissinger had favored the Federal Military Government which eventually won the war, the subsequent deterioration of relations with Nigeria while Kissinger remained the leading architect of United States' policy requires an explanation.

Three characteristics of Kissinger's thought help to explain his problems in dealing with Nigeria: his "neo-classical" view of world politics; his lack of experience with sub-Saharan Africa; and his preference for personal management of foreign policy.

In his perceptive biography, Mazlish ascribes to Kissinger the "Europeanization" of American foreign policy, one of the "key elements" of which "has been a ponderously conceptualized and updated version of the balance-of-power doctrines of the nineteenth century, especially

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[16]Thomas L. Hughes, "Foreign Policy: Men or Measure?" Atlantic Monthly, vol. 234 (October, 1975), p. 53.

those of the Congress of Vienna that Kissinger had studied so intently."[17] This perspective led Kissinger to regard the major world powers as the principal actors in international politics, and to be concerned with lesser powers primarily when their instability seemed to invite intervention by the great powers. Thus, Kissinger was interested in Nigeria when its civil war made it a potential object of such intervention. When the war ended, and the Federal Military Government seemed secure again, his interest turned elsewhere. Hoagland remarks that Kissinger's "global view of real politik had little place for Africa."[18]

Kissinger dealt with Africa in three of the 370 pages of his book, The Necessity of Choice,[19] but he had little familiarity with the continent. He had visited South Africa as a lecturer before taking public office, but he did not include tropical Africa in his busy itinerary of world travel until 1976. Kissinger's understanding of the developing countries was far more limited than his knowledge of the traditional world powers.[20]

Kissinger's personalistic leadership and distruct of the State Department bureaucracy recall the style of Dulles. Oudes complained that "while he has no interest in or desire to consider African questions he is not willing to delegate authority to others to make policy

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[17]Bruce Mazlish, Kissinger: The European Mind in American Policy (New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1974), p. vii.

[18]Hoagland, p. 365.

[19]Kissinger, pp. 348-49 and p. 336.

[20]Mazlish, p. 234.

decisions."[21] When he became Secretary of State, this attitude led to friction with the Bureau of African Affairs.

David Newsom, who succeeded Palmer as Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs in late 1969, was a competent career diplomat who seemed content to follow dutifully the directives of his superiors. Newsom's previous African assignments had been north of the Sahara, as Director of the Office of Northern African Affairs and Ambassador to Libya. He had previous experience with Africa. Initially sharing "the orthodox critical view of South Africa of most of the State Department's African bureau at the beginning of his term,"[22] Newsom later became a vocal defender of the Nixon Administration's increasingly friendly relations with the white-ruled regimes of Africa, for which he was commended by Radio South Africa.[23]

Donald Easum, who succeeded Newsom in 1974, was less compliant. Easum's three tours od duty in West Africa gave him an affinity for the black-ruled countries of that region. He was initially successful in persuading Kissinger to meet with the Nigerian National Day celebration. Yet Easum's support in United Nations for Guinea Bissau, which was governed by former anti-Portuguese guerrillas, led to open friction between the Assistant Secretary and Easum, whom Kissinger dubbed "Mr.

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[21]Bruce Oudes, "The U. S. Year in Africa," Africa Contemporary Record, 1974-75, p. 88.

[22]Ken Owens, Johannesburg Star (January 5, 1974), discussed in George M. Houser, "U. S. Policy and Southern Africa," Frederick S. Arkhurst, ed., U. S. Policy Toward Africa (New York: Praeger, 1975), p. 89.

[23]Hoagland, p. 367.

Guinea-Bissau."[24] When Easum suggested, on a trip to Tanzania, that the United States might consider voting against South Africa's continued membership in the United States, he was summarily dismissed from the Bureau, and "banished" to the post of Ambassador to Nigeria.[25]

Nathaniel Davis, whom Kissinger sponsored as Easum's replacement in the Bureau of African Affairs in 1975, had been United States Ambassador to Chile at the time of Allende's overthrow, and his appointment was criticized by the Organization of African Unity's Council of Ministers. Kissinger's caustic reply attacked "this unprecedented and harmful act of the Council."[26] Nevertheless, in the face of a continuing barrage of criticism from African leaders and African sympathizers in the United States, Davis resigned after serving only a few months as Assistant Secretary. Edward Mulcahy served as Acting Assistant Secretary until 1976, when the position of Assistant Secretary for African Affairs was filled by William Schaufle, the former Inspector General of the Foreign Service.

The controversies surrounding Easum and Davis left an imprint on the decision-making process. Mulcahy spoke of "our beleaguered Africa Bureau."[27] Kissinger continued to refer to the Bureau's personnel as

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[24]Bruce Oudes, "The Sacking of the Secretary," Africa Report, Vol. 20 (January-February, 1975), p. 17.

[25]Ibid.

[26]Quoted in Bruce Oudes, "Kissinger Confronts Africa," Africa Report (March-April, 1975), p. 46.

[27]Bruce Oudes, "The United States' Year in Africa: Postscript to the Nixon Years," Africa Contemporary Record, 1975-76, p. A 118.

"cry babies."[28] In this atmosphere of unprecedented tension between the Bureau of African Affairs and the Secretary of State, it was difficult to make sound decisions concerning Nigeria and other African countries.

Demands

The policy of favoring relations with the white-ruled countries of Africa at the expense of friendly relations with Black Africa followed intense lobbying activities by the white regimes and private United States business corporations which had a stake in the continuation of those regimes. Arkhurst observed in 1975 that the black regimes of Africa, unaccustomed to the workings of the political system in the United States, had neglected "to develop appropriate and judicious links with the sources of power in the American legislature,"[29] and that the South African government alone was outspending tropical Africa in public relation efforts in the United States.

The two principal lobbying organs of South Africa in the United States were the South Africa Foundation, which distributes propaganda favorable to South Africa's cause to legislators and opinion leaders in the United States; and the firm of Collier, Shannon and Edwards, which uses a more direct interpersonal "network of contacts on Capitol Hill,

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[28] Ibid.

[29] Frederick S. Arkhurst, "Introduction," Frederick S. Arkhurst, ed., U. S. Policy Toward Africa (New York: Praeger Publishers, Inc., 1975), p. 7.

the administration, and key business as well as other circles"[30] to promote policy change toward South Africa. DeKieffer had friendly contacts with General Snowcroft, Kissinger's top aide on the National Security Staff. Rogers claims that a meeting between the South Africa Foundation's president, Sir Francis Guingand, and both Kissinger and President Nixon in 1969, was primarily responsible for the adoption of Option Two of N.S.S.M. 39.[31]

The white governments of Africa found other champions among private individuals and companies in the United States. Two respected statesmen of the early Cold War era, former Secretary of State Acheson and George Kennan, stressed the geopolitical necessity of maintaining anti-Communist powers on the Cape of Good Hope.[32] The African American Affairs Association "worked closely with other organizations supporting the Rhodesians, fostering American oil interests in Portuguese territories, and assisting the South African lobby in putting together influential programs such as the South African Leadership Program."[33]

Also active were a number of large business corporations. Over 300 United States firms were doing business in South Africa by 1971, and United States investment was "diversified and spread among many companies, a number of which are major contributors to campaign funds of

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[30]Barbara Rogers, "South Africa's Fifth Column in the United States," Africa Report, Vol. 22 (November-December, 1977), p. 15.

[31]Ibid., p. 14.

[32]Mohamed A. El-Khawas, "Kissinger on Africa: Benign Neglect?" A Current Bibliography on African Affairs, Vol. 7 (Winter, 1974), p. 5; Colin Legum, "America's Year in Africa," Africa Contemporary Record, 1969-70, pp. 42-43.

[33]George W. Shepherd, "Comment," United States Policy Toward Africa (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1975), p. 46.

both parties."[34] Particularly active in supporting the chrome imports from Rhodesia were Union Carbide and the Foote Mining Company of Pennsylvania.[35] In 1973, private United States' investment totalled $1 billion in South Africa and some $265 million in other white-ruled territories.[36] Although United States' investment in independent Black Africa was approximately double that in white-ruled Southern Africa, and United States' investment in Nigeria alone was nearing the $1 billion mark, it was not clear that friendlier relations with the white-ruled countries, if carefully pursued, would jeopardize investment in the black-ruled countries.

Of critical importance was the position of Gulf Oil Corporation. Gulf had been a steadfast ally of the Nigerian Federal Military Government during the Nigerian Civil War because of the company's substantial investments in federally-controlled territory. However, Gulf had an even larger stake in the Cabinda enclave of Angola, which was under Portuguese control until November, 1975. By mid-1973, Gulf had invested over $150 million in Cabinda, thereby providing most of United States investment in the Portuguese territories.[37] Cabinda represented approximately ten percent of Gulf's total world production. While Portugal controlled Angola, Gulf continued United States support of Portuguese

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[34]Hoagland, pp. 359-60.

[35]W. A. E. Skurnik, "Recent United States Policy in Africa," Current History, Vol. 64 (March, 1973), p. 100.

[36]David D. Newsom, "Department Reports to Congress on Aspects of United States Policy Toward Southern Africa," U. S. Department of State Bulletin, Vol. 68 (May 7, 1973), p. 579.

[37]Ibid., p. 580.

policy in Africa. By 1974, revenues from Gulf's production in Angola were paying for approximately three quarters of the Portuguese budget for military operations there.[38] "Gulf became a public apologist for Portugal, saying that it was doing 'good things' in Angola."[39]

During the 1970's, organized opposition to the governments in Africa also became significant, principally among liberal church groups, American blacks, and the Americans for Democratic Action. The National Council of Churches warned that several of its affiliated denominations were considering withdrawal of some $4 billion worth of securities which they held in companies doing business in white-ruled Southern Africa. The American Negro Leadership Conference, likewise brought together a group of black Americans to protest the United States' policies toward the white regimes. In 1972, Americans for Democratic Action attempted to organize a boycott against Gulf Oil Corporation because of its support of Portuguese Angola.[40] The resources of these groups, however, were no match for those of their adversaries especially given the sympathetic orientation of the Nixon and Ford Administrations toward the white regimes.

Functional Requisites

United States security interests in 1970-76 reflected geopolitical

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[38]Louise Stack and Don Morton, Torment to Triumph in Southern Africa (New York: Friendship Press, 1976), p. 118.

[39]Ibid.

[40]Leslie Rubin and Brian Weinstein, Introduction to African Politics (New York: Praeger, 1974), p. 142.

concerns about British withdrawal from the Indian Ocean after 1968, and a Soviet naval buildup in the area thereafter. Since approximately half of the world's seaborne petroleum is in transit on the Ocean routes around Africa at any time, the military and economic implications of these developments were considered serious. Interest in the Indian Ocean increased during the 1973 war in the Middle East, after which Secretary of Defense Schlesinger announced that the United States presence in the Ocean was expected to be "more frequent and more regular than in the past."[41]

Concern about the Indian Ocean increased as a result of two coups d'etat in 1974: the coup in Ethiopia which brought an unstable Marxist junta to power on the Horn; and the coup in Portugal, which brought about the collapse of the Portuguese empire in Mozambique and Angola, thereby opening northern South Africa and Namibia, and eastern Rhodesia, to intensified guerrilla infiltration. The increased vulnerability of South Africa was of concern to geopoliticians, who described it as a "southern Gibralter" and the "gatekeeper" to the Atlantic and Indian Oceans.[42]

Pursuant to the philosophy of Option Two of NSSM 39 and the growing concern about the security of the Cape, the United States began gradually to relax restrictions upon indirect military assistance to Africa's white governments. Within a month after Kissinger's endorsement of Option Two, the Nixon Administration authorized the sale of

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[41]Quoted in David B. Johnson, "Indian Ocean: Troubled Waters for the U. S. Navy," Africa Report, Vol. 20 (January-February, 1975), p. 8.

[42]Armed Forces Journal International, quoted in "Why the West Needs South Africa," Africa Report, Vol. 20 (January-February, 1975), p. 20.

C-130 transport planes to a South African company, which used them for military transport. Subsequently, the United States shipped large amounts of weapons-grade enriched uranium to South Africa, and provided the Portuguese government with nearly $500,000,000 of economic assistance in 1971 as "rent" for continued use of military bases in the Azores.[43]

The power struggle between rival guerrilla factions in Angola after Portugal withdrew from the territory led to support of one of the belligerents by the United States, at the expense of friendly relations with Nigeria, which supported the opposing side

Soviet support for the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) and covert CIA support for the rival National Front for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA) began during the Kennedy Administration. State Department dissidents in the Bureau of African Affairs charged that Kissinger "upped the ante" in January, 1975, by endorsing a CIA plan to provide $300,000 in covert aid to the FNLA.[44] Two months later, the Soviet Union shipped large quantities of arms to the MPLA. The increase in Soviet aid induced South Africa to send troops into Angola, allegedly to protect the Cunene Dam. This, in turn, prompted Cuba to dispatch 10,000 troops to support the MPLA.

The intervention of South Africa in Angola led Nigeria, which had previously been neutral in the conflict, to recognize the MPLA, on November 25, 1975, as the legitimate government of Angola. A statement

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[43]Skurnik, p. 98.

[44]Seymour Hersh, "Who Upped the Ante in Angola?", The Washington Star (December 19, 1975), p. 9.

by the Federal Military Government explained:

> There is now abundant evidence of racist South Africa's troops in the conflict. The faction fighting against the MPLA are backed not only by South Africa, but by other interests which are clearly against Angolan independence and freedom in Africa. For this reason, Nigeria has to take the stand to recognize MPLA as the legitimate government of Angola.[45]

On the other hand, the increase in Soviet and Cuban support for the MPLA prompted Kissinger to go before Congress, on January 29, 1976, to argue that an MPLA victory would "have repercussions throughout Africa" which would be favorable to the Soviet Union.[46] President Ford sent a letter to Congress warning that:

> The United States cannot accept as a principle of international conduct that Cuban troops and Soviet arms can be used for a wanton intervention in local conflicts in areas thousands of miles from Cuba and the Soviet Union, and where neither can claim an historic national interest. If we do so, we will send a message of irresolution not only to the leaders of African nations, but to U. S. allies and friends throughout the world.[47]

Although a majority of Congress rejected the President's arguments, his remarks illustrate the radical differences between the Ford Administration's assessment of international realities in Africa and that of the Nigerian decision-makers.

The economic functional requisites of the United States would seem to have warranted greater concern for Nigeria's goodwill than

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[45]Quoted in "Nigeria and Angola," Africa, No. 53 (January, 1976), p. 11.

[46]Quoted in Colin Legum, "Foreign Intervention in Angola," Africa Contemporary Record, 1975-76, p. A 20.

[47]"President Ford Reiterates U. S. Objectives in Angola," U. S. Department of State Bulletin, Vol. 74 (February 16, 1976), p. 181.

United States policymakers displayed. By 1970, Nigeria was producing over one million barrels of oil a day, more than twice the production before the Civil War. The value of Nigerian crude had risen to $381 million.[48] By 1974, Nigeria was producing 2.3 million varrels of oil per day.[49] In 1974, Nigeria overtook Venezuela to become the second largest source of imported crude oil for the United States, and overtook South Africa to become the leading African trading partner of the United States.[50] Nigerian oil was valued not only for its low sulphur content, but also as an alternative to Middle Eastern sources, which proved unreliable during the Arab oil embargo of 1973-74. In 1971, Nigeria became the eleventh member of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries, the producers cartel which controlled the global price of oil.

Nevertheless, some aspects of economic relations with Nigeria were viewed by the United States as undesirable. The Nigerian petroleum law of November, 1969; the establishment of the Nigerian National Oil Corporation (N.N.O.C.) in 1971; and the participation agreement of 1971 with Phillips Petroleum company, which gave the N.N.O.C. one-third of the equity in Phillips' Nigerian operations, marked the beginning of greater government participation in the petroleum industry. In 1974, the F.M.G. increased its share to 55 percent and concluded participation agreements with the remaining producers, including Gulf, Mobil, and

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[48]Pearson and Pearson, p. 14.

[49]Ibid.

[50]Bruce Oudes, "The United States' Year in Africa," Africa Contemporary Record, 1974-75, pp. A 87.

Texaco/Chevron.[51] Assistant Secretary of State Schaufele attributed the decline of United States investment in Nigeria by $220 million during 1974 to "the transfer of equity in U. S. petroleum firms to the Nigerian Government."[52]

From the standpoint of domestic politics, Shepherd notes the rise, during the early 1970's, of an "African constituency to a position of influence in American society and policy that it has not previously possessed,"[53] as a result of its increasing political sophistication. As a product of the Black Power and African consciousness movements of the 1960's, the influence of middle class blacks "in interpreting Africa academically and publicly has grown rapidly and representatives of their point of view have begun to penetrate the highest echelons of American government, religion, business and finance."[54] Yet this "constituency" was not the constituency of the Nixon Administration, whose policies toward South Africa paralleled "Southern strategy" at home. Oudes believes that President Ford was more responsive to the Black constituency, and that his reversal of long-standing support for the Byrd Amendment was based upon a discovery that "in terms of unit cost it is easier to give in to pressure from Black America on a question involving far off Africa than it is to move on a domestic

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[51] Jonathan Baker, "Oil and African Development," The Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol. 15 (1977), p. 188.

[52] William E. Schaufele, "United States Economic Relations with Africa," U. S. Department of State Bulletin, Vol. 74 (March 8, 1976), p. 296.

[53] George W. Shepherd, "Comment", Frederick S. Arkhurst, ed., U. S. Policy Toward Africa (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1975), p. 52.

[54] Ibid., p. 53.

issue."[55] On the specific issue of the Angola situation, however, the "constituency" had no clear position, and it is doubtful that African policy was sufficiently salient to enough voters to make a significant difference in national elections.

More significant politically was the emergence of a larger body of citizens who were increasingly skeptical of overseas military involvements in developing countries, as a result of the bitter experience of the war in Indo-China.

> The focus of interest for these groups is the hard-pressed consumer and taxpayer who suspects the multinational corporations, yawns over the oddly anti-communist shibboleths, prefers a less costly based at home, and hopes the United Nations can fulfill the original ideals of the Charter of Human Rights.[56]

Congressional awareness of this constituency helps to explain the negative reaction of Congress to the urgent pleas for greater United States involvement in Angola to counter Soviet and Cuban involvement.

Capabilities

The capabilities of the United States for influencing Nigeria were probably lower than at any time in Nigeria's history as a sovereign state. United States coercive resources during the period of the Nigerian Civil War, continued until January 28, 1973. Although the number of infantrymen in Vietnam declined from a peak of 549,oOO in 1969 until the withdrawal of the final battalion in August, 1972, the participa-

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[55]Oudes, "New Agenda for Africa Policy," p. 54.

[56]Shepherd, "Comment," p. 53.

tion of some 32,000 infantry in the Cambodian expedition of April-July, 1970, and the resumption of concerted bombing of North Vietnam in 1972 placed a heavy, burden upon United States' military capabilities.

After the War, the psychological and legal constraints upon overseas commitments remained. The War Powers Act of 1973, which imposed a time limit of ninety days upon the President's authority to deploy United States troops without express Congressional consents, was only a manifestation of a pervasive national mood of "non-interventionism" in international relations which set severe limits upon the ability of the Executive to use coercion in international politics.[57] During 1973-74, Presidential power resources were further drained by the Watergate scandal, which reduced the percentage of the United States public who approved of "the way Nixon is handling his job as President."[58]

Inasmuch as the United States was probably more dependent upon Nigeria than vice versa after the Arab oil embargo of 1973-74, the Nixon and Ford Administrations had little or no economic leverage to exert upon the government in Lagos.

Washington still had some resources at its disposal, especially technology and food, which could be converted into either utilitarian or coercive power. In 1971, the Federal Military Government established

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[57]Walter Laqueur, "The West in Retreat," Commentary, Vol. 60 (August, 1975), p. 51; Bruce Russett, "America's Retreat from World Power," Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 90 (Spring, 1975), p. 18.

[58]Gallup Poll, January, 1974, in Irish and Frank, pp. 104-105.

a Petroleum Training Institute, in an attempt to produce the trained indigenous manpower necessary for true control of its economy with enrollments of 240 for each two year program, however, Nigeria was still dependent upon imported technology for oil development.[59] During 1973, Nigeria imported over $307 million worth of grain as a result of a devastating drought and the de-emphasis of domestic food production in the national development plan. The Third National Plan, begun in 1975, concedes that the country's food supply "in general is inadequate in terms of both quantity and quality."[60] In December, 1974, the World Bank, of which the United States is the most influential member, agreed to provide $107.5 million for five projects in agricultural and livestock development in Nigeria, and provided another $20 million loan to rehabilitate the cocoa industry.[61] United States' grain supplies accounted for nearly half of the total world supply.[62]

Not until 1975 did the United States' government move "slowly, even awkwardly to wield food power in the diplomatic area" by placing "quid pro quo conditions" upon delivery of commercial grain exports.[63] The deliberate use of United States agripower as an instrument of foreign policy was used primarily in bargaining with the Soviet Union. Domestic and world opinion, as well as the political influence of

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[59]Jonathan Baker, "Oil and African Development," p. 188.

[60]The Third National Plan, quoted in "Nigeria," Africa Comtemporary Record 1975-76, p. 803.

[61]"Nigeria," Africa Contemporary Record 1974-75, p. B 751.

[62]"U. S. Food Power: Ultimate Weapon in World Politics?" Business Week (December 15, 1975), p. 54.

[63]Ibid.

several million farmers, would severely limit the use of food as a weapon against such hungry nations as Nigeria.

Watergate, as well as the Indo-China War, exacted a heavy toll upon the prestige and other identitive resources of the United States. During the Watergate crisis, the limited responsive capabilities of the United States President resulted in treatment of the Nigerian Supreme Commander which was perceived in Nigeria as an insult.[64] The United States' Government had scheduled a meeting between President Nixon and General Gowon on October 5, 1973, but in September the appointment was cancelled. It was later disclosed that Nixon, "preoccupied with the firing of Watergate Special Prosecutor Cox and the resignation of the Attorney General, wanted to make the first weekend in October a long one at Key Biscayne."[65] In sum, during a period which, according to Russett, was characterized by "The Americans' Retreat from World Power,"[66] the United States Executive was substantially deprived of effective means of influencing or responding to a major oil-producing nation.

Characteristics of Nigeria

The United States' "retreat" from international involvement coincided with the emergence of Nigeria as one of the most powerful and

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[64]Herskovits, "Nigeria: Africa's Emerging New Power," p. 17; "Wooing of Nigeria: A Courtship Pays Off," U. S. News and World Report, Vol. 83 (December, 1977), p. 70.

[65]Bruce Oudes, "The United States' Year in Africa," Africa Contemporary Record, 1973-74, pp. 51-52.

[66]Russett, p. 1.

active states in African international politics. As a result of its civil war, Nigeria acquired one of the largest armies on the African continent--a force of 250,000--which the Federal Military Government continued to maintain. In terms of Gross National Product, which Organski considers to be the best single indicator of a country's power potential,[67] Nigeria's G.N.P. of approximately $4.8 billion was surpassed, in sub-Saharan Africa, only by that of South Africa.[68]

Nigeria was not only developing the capabilities for influence, but also was evolving "a more activist and militant foreign policy than it did under any of the previous civilian governments of the first or second Republics."[69] Herskovits attributed the F.M.G.'s $3 million interest-free loan to neighboring Dahomey, and construction of road links to Niger, to a policy of undermining "the most obvious of Africa's neo-colonialisms--that of France."[70] Of particular importance, from the standpoint of relations between the United States and Nigeria, was the fact that after 1970 Nigeria "emerged as a militant champion of African liberation movements."[71] At a Summit Meeting of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) in 1971, General Gowon proposed that Africa "liberate at least one colonial territory within the next three years"

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[67]A. F. K. Organski, World Politics, 2nd edition (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1968), p. 208.

[68]Leslie Rubin and Brian Weinstein, Introduction to African Politics: A Continental Approach (New York: Praeger, 1974), Table, p. 299.

[69]"Nigeria," Africa Contemporary Record, 1973-74, p. B 738.

[70]Herskovits, "Nigeria: Africa's Emerging New Power," p. 16.

[71]"Nigeria," Africa Contemporary Record, 1971-72, p. B 657.

and called for "direct confrontation" with South Africa.[72] At the OAU's Foreign Ministers' meeting in the same year; the Nigerian representative successfully led a group of 28 members in successfully opposing the proposal backed by 11 members that the OAU begin a "dialogue" with South Africa. The Nigerian Minister for External Affairs promised that his country would "oppose to the last drop of its blood any suggestion that the OAU as an organization which speaks on behalf of all independent Africa should enter into a dialogue with South Africa."[73] These new manifestations of militancy on the part of Nigeria toward the white governments of sub-Saharan Africa occurred during the same year the United States was beginning to pursue friendlier policies toward those governments, pursuant to the rationale of Option Two, NSSM-39.

Nigeria recognized the independence of Guinea-Bissau in September, 1973, when Portugal still claimed sovereignty over that territory. In contrast, the United States delayed recognition until 1976, and was the only country to veto the admission of Guinea-Bissau to the World Health Organization in 1974. Even Portugal abstained.

It was the clash between Nigerian and United States policies toward Angola which produced the greatest strain in relations between Lagos and Washington. In 1975, the F.M.G. not only recognized the MPLA as the legitimate government of Angola, but also provided $20 million in aid to that party and promised to send Nigerian troops to support the MPLA, if the latter requested them. Thus, the efforts of

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[72]Quoted in Ibid., p. B 658.

[73]Quoted in Colin Legum, "Dialogue: The Great Debate," Africa Contemporary Record, 1971-72, p. A 77.

the Ford Administration to aid the opposing FNLA/UNITA coalition aroused animosity in Lagos.

Differing policies toward southern Africa were not the only sources of discord between the United States and Nigeria. Following the Nigerian Civil War, the F.M.G. embarked upon a course of economic nationalism which resulted in 55 percent government share in the equity of all oil companies in 1974. In 1975, Nigeria joined the "hawks" of O.P.E.C. in demanding a 20 percent increase in the price of petroleum.

Whether or not the reaction of Nigeria to South African intervention in Angola, or to President Ford's letter of January, 1976, would have been the same had General Gowon remained in office is a matter of speculation. The coup d'etat which overthrew Gowon in July, 1975, brought to power more a Supreme Commander who showed a greater willingness than Gowon to take drastic measures against corruption and inefficiency in domestic policy.[74] It is clear that this "iron surgeon"[75] was no less determined than the Gowon government to combat white rule in sub-Saharan Africa, and to assert national control over Nigeria's economic resources.

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[74] Africa Report, Vol. 21 (January-February, 1976), p. 23.

[75] The label "iron surgeon" is borrowed from Edward Feit, "The Rule of the Iron Surgeons: Military Government in Spain and Ghana," Comparative Politics, Vol. 1 (July, 1969), pp. 485-86.

CHAPTER V

RESTORATION OF FRIENDLY RELATIONS: APRIL, 1976 TO SEPTEMBER, 1978

The exchange of visits by Nigeria's Supreme Commander, Lt. General Obasanjo, to the United States in October, 1977, and by President Carter to Nigeria in March, 1978, were manifestations of the dramatic improvement which had taken place in relations between their countries. A new cooperative relationship between the two countries "proved instrumental in the mediation of the border conflict between Zaire and Angola. . ."[1] According to Feustel:

> U. S. diplomatic initiatives backed Nigerian mediation of the conflict. . . . During the talks a U. S. preference for the Zaire problem 'to be handled by the Africans themselves' emerged amid indications that the Nigerian government would use its good offices with the Neto government in Angola to mediate the conflict.[2]

Ironically, the new partnership was made possible, partly, by actions taken by Secretary Kissinger on the trip in April, 1976, during which he was spurned by the Nigerian government.

Kissinger's speech at Lusaka, Zamiba, on April 27, 1976, expressed unequivocally the United States' commitment to "unrelenting opposition"

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[1] Feustel, p. 49.

[2] Ibid.

to the white government of Rhodesia "until a negotiated settlement is achieved;" to independence for Namibia under a definite timetable, with United Nations' supervised elections in which all groups of Namibia could participate in deciding "the political and constitutional structure of their country;" and to "self-determination, majority rule, equal right and human dignity for all the peoples of Africa."[3] One of his promises was given substance five months later, when Kissinger secured an agreement from Rhodesian Prime Minister Ian Smith to transfer power to the black majority in his country within two years. The Carter administration continued and extended these positions, thereby making clear that the United States was now on the side of the more militant African nationalists against the white governments of sub-Saharan Africa.

These fundamental transformations in United States' policy toward Africa followed several major changes in decision-making variables which might explain the re-orientation of the United States government toward Africa and Nigeria.

Decision-Makers

The willingness of Congress to deny the President's urgent requests for military aid to FNLA/UNITA while the Soviet Union and Cuba provided the MPLA with sufficient assistance for victory was a sobering experience for the Ford Administration. By March, the MPLA and supporting Cuban forces had triumphed, although guerrilla resistance continued in parts of Angola. The United States executive confronted the dual chal-

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[3]Quoted in "Kissinger Speech Heralds New Era in U. S.-Africa Relations," Africa Report, Vol. 21 (May-June, 1976), p. 21; see also Franklin H. Williams, "Towards an African Policy," Africa Report, Vol. 21 (July-August, 1976), p. 2.

lenges of regaining political initiatives not only with the Soviet Union, but also with the United States Congress.

Institutions

Few important changes occurred in the structure or operation of foreign policy decision-making institutions affecting Nigeria during 1976. One significant change was a new effort at bipartisan involvement in United States-African relations--a development which Kornegay attributes to the politics of a presidential election year.[4] Kissinger was careful to include a liberal Democrat, Senator Abraham Ribicoff, in his entourage visiting Africa. Ribicoff's support proved to be useful in countering critics of Kissinger's Lusaka proposals. If the United States did not support Kissinger's African initiatives, the Senator said, "a shambles of the American position in the Third World, including Africa, would result."[5]

Profound changes in the decision-making structure occurred after the inauguration of President Carter in January, 1977. The highly centralized pattern of the Kissinger era was replaced by a more flexible, collegial pattern, in which lines of responsibility are often difficult to discern. Indeed, State Department spokesmen stress that "no one person or bureau is making policy," and that "policy is made by consensus."[6] According to Deutsch, "(t)he President himself and a

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[4]Francis A. Kornegay, Jr., "Africa and Presidential Politics," Africa Report, Vol. 21 (July-August, 1976), p. 7.

[5]Quoted in Ibid.

[6]Richard Deutsch, "Carter's African Record," Africa Report, Vol. 23 (March-April, 1978), p. 47.

collection of close personal appointees currently make African policy decisions."[7] Besides the President, the persons include: the Secretary of State, the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, the Director of the Office of Policy Planning in the State Department and his aids, the Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, the United States Ambassador to the United Nations and aide, and the Vice President.

The most conspicuous figure in United States' relations with Nigeria and other African countries is the Ambassador to the United Nations, Andrew Young. Young's prominent role in negotiating a partnership with Nigeria to mediate the Zaire crisis, and in negotiating with British Foreign Secretary David Owen on "Anglo-American" Plan for a settlement between the Rhodesian government and black guerrillas, has involved him more deeply in African affairs than any previous incumbent of his office. A leading role has also been given to the Vice President in conducting important negotiations involving Africa. In May, 1977 Vice President Mondale was given the responsibility for meeting with South African Prime Minister John Vorster in Vienna on the subject of majority rule in South Africa.[8]

Another significant development has been revitalization of the Office of Policy Planning in the State Department--which had been moribund since the Truman Administration. Headed by Mr. Anthony Lake, and including two top African specialists, Marianne Spiegel and Haskell Ward, the Policy Planning Office vied with the Africa Bureau as the

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[7]Ibid., p. 47.

[8]Quoted in "U. S. Warns South Africa to End Discrimination--or Else," Africa Report, vol. 22 (July-August, 1977), p. 31.

most responsive to Black African viewpoints.[9] The Policy Planning Office is responsible for providing long-term policy options for the Secretary of State, and often prepares the Secretary's speeches. In the Carter Administration, the State Department and the National Security Affairs Staff were, once again, headed by separate, often rival figures: Secretary of State Vance and Zbigniew Brzezinski, respectively.

In the House of Representatives, Ad Hoc Monitoring Group on South Africa, a group of 30 House liverals, was organized in September, 1977, to back legislation to exert economic pressure on South Africa. The group is independent of, but generally supportive of, the still active Congressional Black Caucus.

Although these diverse centers of decision-making influence were not always in agreement, they shared a basic consensus supportive of the aspirations of Black Africans which had been lacking in the United States since the dissolution of Kennedy's "New Africa" group.

Idiosyncratic Variables

It is unlikely that the personality and attitudes of Henry Kissinger underwent a basic alteration during his last few months in office. His Lusaka Declaration is consistent with ideas of statecraft and personality patterns which are revealed in his writings and in his actions as Secretary of State. Flexibility of political alignment, unencumbered by ideological or moralistic attachments, was the essence of the classical statecraft of Metternich and Castlereagh. A good statesman,

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[9]Deutsch, p. 47.

Kissinger argued, must adapt to changes in the international environment.[10] Mazlish observes that "a constant theme in Kissinger's life and career" was "his ability to change and develop."[11] Consequently, it is not surprising that Kissinger, who had advised friendlier relations with the white governments of Africa when it appeared that "The whites are her to stay and the only way that constructive change can come about is through them,"[12] would recommend a different policy when events in Angola and Mozambique cast doubt upon that assumption.

Much credit, for the change in United States' policy must also be given to William E. Schaufele, Jr., who became Assistant Secretary for African Affairs in December, 1975. Schaufele had extensive experience in tropical Africa, as former Ambassador to Upper Volta, Department Desk Officer for the Congo, Deputy Director of the Office of Central African Affairs. According to Schaufele:

> U. S. policies in southern Africa are essentially founded on political interests, a significant ingredient of which is concern for human rights. . . . We cannot remain a spectator in the decolonization of Rhodesia and Namibia and the system of apartheid in South Africa.[13]

Nevertheless Schaufele's approach was compatible with Kissinger's style

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[10] Kissinger, p. 1.

[11] Mazlish, p. 284.

[12] "Text of Option 2 of NSSM 39," in Bruce Oudes, "The United States' Year in Africa," Africa Contemporary Record, 1974-75, p. A 99.

[13] William E. Schaufele, Jr., "U. S. Relations in Southern Africa," The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 432 (July, 1977), p. 111.

of statecraft in emphasizing that "Our diplomacy toward South Africa must. . . be carried out with a good deal of finesse and skill," and in advocating "a nuanced policy" toward that country."[14]

Schaufele continued to head the Africa Bureau until July, 1977, when he was replaced by Richard Moose. Schaufele became associated with the "gradualist" faction which eventually became a minority viewpoint among the makers of United States policy toward Africa in the Carter Administration. Yet Schaufele provided an element of continuity between Kissinger's policies of the Lusaka Declaration, on the one hand, and the views of the uncompromising African liberationists of the Carter Administration, on the other. The appointment of Moose, former Staff Director of the Foreign Assistance Subcommittee of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee signified not only the Carter administrations's awareness of Africa's economic problems, but also recognition of the need for closer ties between the Africa Bureau and Congress.

The uncompromising "liberationist" position was advanced by Andrew Young, Assistant Secretary Lake, and Vice President Mondale.[15] Feustel considers Young's visit to the Festival of Arts and Culture in Nigeria in 1977 to be a milestone in the political relations between the two countries.

> Visiting with the Nigerian head of state, General Olusegun Obasanjo and the foreign minister, Brigadier Joseph Garba, Ambassador Young discussed the whole gamut of the diplomatic and economic spectrum, especially southern Africa. Since

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[14] Ibid., p. 116.

[15] Daniel Fine, "Rhodesia: A Gingerly Diplomacy," The Nation, Vol. 225 (September 10, 1977), p. 199; "U. S. Warns South Africa," p. 31.

> then Young has continued his talks with the Nigerians on southern Africa--a recognition of the importance of Nigeria's leadership in African politics.[16]

Upon his return to the United States from Nigeria, Young declared that "Nigeria is the key to Africa."[17]

Young's extensive tours of Africa, and his outspoken, controversial statements in support of African liberation, are reminiscent of the style of G. Mennen Williams in Kennedy's Africa Bureau. Like Williams, Young had no previous diplomatic experience, but a strong domestic political constituency and close personal ties to the President. President Carter has acknowledged that "when Andrew Young speaks for our country, he speaks with my full authority and my complete support."[18] Young's status as a Black Civil rights leader has also probably been an asset in establishing rapport with the leaders of Black Africa. Nigeria's Commissioner for External Affairs, Brigadier Garba, has called Young "a great Africanist who represents a new and emerging black conscience coming out of America."[19]

Anthony Lake, the Director of the Office of Policy Planning, earned the reputation as a dissident member of the National Security Council Staff during the Nixon administration, and had been under electronic surveillance by his superiors. Before his appointment by President Carter he wrote "The Tar Baby Option," criticising the official policy, contained in Option Two of NSSM 39, of supporting white

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[16]Feustel, pp. 48-49.

[17]Quoted in Africa Diary (February 4, 1977), p. 8322.

[18]Presidential Documents (Friday, June 7, 1977), p. 867.

[19]"Nigeria: High Diplomacy," Africa (November, 1977), p. 20.

minority governments in Africa. Although Young is a more conspicuous figure, Lake has been credited with greater decision-making influence.[20]

Vice President Mondale has also been more active and outspoken than his counterparts in previous administrations on matters involving Africa. At a news conference in Vienna, where he was meeting with Prime Minister Vorster, Mondale warned: "We hope that the South African Prime Minister will not rely on any illusions that the United States will in the end intervene to save South Africa from the policies it is pursuing. Failure to make progress will lead to a tragedy of human history."[21] On the subject of the quasi-independent tribal homelands inside South Africa, Mondale said: "We cannot accept, let alone defend, governments that reject the basic principles of human rights, economic opportunity, and the political participation of all of their people, regardless of race."[22]

Secretary of State Vance has taken a far less domineering attitude to the State Department than Kissinger. Unlike Kissinger, he had not developed an elaborate theory of international politics, but had served as a "diplomatic troubleshooter" for President Johnson.[23] As former Deputy Secretary of Defense, however, Vance had experience as a top adviser to both Secretary of Defense McNamara and President Johnson, and he has been credited with an influential role in persuading Presi-

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[20]Fine, p. 199.

[21]Quoted in "Mondale vs. Vorster: Tough Talk," Time, Vol. 109 (May 30, 1977), p. 34.

[22]Ibid.

[23]Hoopes, p. 214.

dent Johnson to reconsider the wisdom of continued escallation in Vietnam.[24] Vance has shown greater sensitivity than Kissinger to the domestic political and economic dimensions of foreign policy.[25] Lacking expertise on Africa, he has relied heavily upon the Africa Bureau and the Office of Policy Planning in developing policies toward that continent.

On July 1, 1977, Vance delivered, before the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, his major policy speech on Africa. He said, inter alia, that:

> The most effective policies toward Africa are affirmative policies. They should not be reactive to what other powers do, nor to crises as they arise. . . .A negative, reactive policy that seeks only to oppose Soviet or Cuban involvement in Africa would be dangerous and futile. Our best course is to help resolve the problems which create opportunities for external intervention.[26]

Vance referred specifically to Nigeria in announcing that the United States' approach would be "to build positive relations with the Africans primarily through support for their political independence and economic development through the strengthening of social ties."[27] He said: "Our new and positive relations with Nigeria encourages us in this course."[28]

A somewhat different view of Africa has been expressed by Vance's principal rival in the Carter Administration, National Security Adviser

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[24]Ibid., p. 217.

[25]Ibid., pp. 215-216; Mazlish, pp. 169 and 258.

[26]Cyrus Vance, "U. S. Policy Toward Africa: To Assist Human Needs and Rights," Vital Speeches (August 15, 1977), pp. 642-643.

[27]Ibid., p. 645.

[28]Ibid.

Brzezinski. Brzezinski attaches far more importance to the Third World than did Kissinger.[29] Brzezinski considers Nigeria to be "a most important" African country.[30] While accompanying President Carter to Nigeria, Brzezinski stated that a "profound change" has occurred in America's attitude toward Africa."[31] Unlike other Carter Administration officials, however, especially Lake and Young, Brzezinski continues to stress Cold War rivalry, and the need to contain Soviet advances in Africa, either by direct action or through proxies such as Morocco, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, or Iran.[32]

The final arbiter among these advisers is President Carter, himself. Lacking previous foreign policy expertise, and new to the circles of power in Washington, Carter must rely more heavily upon the advice of others than did Kennedy. He appears to rely more heavily upon the advice of Young, Vance and Lake on African matters than upon that of other advisers.[33]

While welcoming Nigeria's Supreme Commander, General Obasanjo, to the United States, Carter remarked that: "Nigeria is the most important country economically in Africa."[34] During Carter's own visit to Nigeria

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[29]Donald Baker, "Kissinger--Carter: U. S. Perspective on Southern Africa, Developments," African Institute Bulletin No. 68 (1977), p. 200.

[30]"Nigeria and the United States," West Africa (October 10, 1977), p. 2062.

[31]"Carter's Nigeria Visit," Christian Science Monitor (April 3, 1978), p. 9.

[32]"Africa on the Front Burner," The Economist, No. 266 (February 25, 1978), p. 26.

[33]Fine, p. 119.

[34]"Obasanjo in Washington," West Africa (October 17, 1977), p. 2138.

in March, 1978, the President observed that:

> . . .it is no coincidence that I come to Nigeria to talk about bilateral relationships and the problems of Africa. And it is no coincidence that our nation has now turned in an unprecedented way toward Africa. . . .And this departure from past aloofness is not just a personal commitment of my own but I represent the deep feelings and the deep interest of all the people of my country.[35]

Carter also expressed pride that he was the first President to make an official visit to Nigeria.[36] This, in itself, is an indication of the new saliency which Nigeria now commands in the highest echelons of official decision-making in the United States.

Demands

The fact that an abrupt change in the Ford Administration's policies toward Africa occurred during a presidential election year and "in a Bicentennial year of heightened and defensively expressed American nationalism,"[37] is probably not coincidental. Kornegay suggests that one significant effect of Kissinger's African excursion may have been to pre-empt a challenge from the Democrate Party "to return Washington to the spirit of the early 60's,[38] the Kennedy era of foreign policy toward Africa. Soon after Congress defeated the Ford-Kissinger efforts to aid the FNLA/UNITA forces, Representative Udall, a liberal Democrat

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[35]"Lagos, Nigeria: Remarks of the President at the Welcoming Ceremony, April 1, 1978," Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents (April 10, 1978), p. 646.

[36]Ibid.

[37]Kornegay, p. 7.

[38]Ibid.

candidate issued a statement criticising previous Ford Administration policies in southern Africa.[39] Senator Frank Church's Campaign Committee issued a policy statement pointing out that the Senator had long advocated "that the U. S. should support nationalist movements in Africa which were trying to gain independence from European colonial powers."[40] Governor Carter declared: "The Angola situation is a result of (a) policy vacuum. The United States should move immediately toward using leverage on South Africa to encourage the independence of Namibia and the beginning of majority rule in Rhodesia."[41] At the April, 1976 Caucus of Black Democrats, Senators Church and Jackson, Representative Udall, and Governor Carter all "indicated that they would rely far more Black American input in the shaping of U. S. policy towards Africa than has been the case in the past."[42]

Another significant development which is likely to have influenced the change in Ford Administration policies is the change in orientation toward Africa on the part of the business community in the United States. The most dramatic change was the decision of Gulf Oil Corporation to support the Marxist MPLA in Angola when the United States government, through the CIA, was supporting the rival FNLA/UNITA forces. In autumn, 1975, Gulf paid $116 million in oil royalties to the MPLA

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[39]"Congressman Morris K. Udall African Policies," Africa Report, Vol. 21 (July-August, 1976), p. 11.

[40]"Senator Frank Church's African Policy," Africa Report, Vol. 21 (July-August, 1976), p. 13.

[41]"Jimmy Carter on Africa," Africa Report, Vol. 21, (May-June, 1976), pp. 19-20.

[42]Kornegay, p. 8.

which had not yet established its position as the effective government of Angola.[43] Gulf's payments to the MPLA were considerably greater than the $32 million which the CIA covertly provided to FNLA/UNITA.[44] Gulf complied with a directive from the State Department to place in escrow an additional $125 million until the outcome of the war, but in March, 1976, Gulf received permission to deliver the royalties to the MPLA. Gulf resumed production in Angola in April, 1976--the month in which Secretary Kissinger issued his Lusaka Declaration.

Williams notes that by mid-1976, the center of economic gravity of United States' commercial and investment interests below the Sahara had decisively "shifted in favor of the black developing states as opposed to South Africa."[45] Private United States investment in the black-ruled African countries totallled over $2.2 billion, more than half of which was in Nigeria.[46] United States' private investment in South Africa amounted to $1.5 billion, but the rate of investment there declined sharply because of political uncertainties.[47] Ironically, investment confidence was greater in Nigeria than in politically volatile South Africa. United States' oil companies accounted for approximately four-fifths of United States' private investment in Nigeria and

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[43] The New York Times (February 1, 1976), p. 1.

[44] The New York Times (September 25, 1975), p. 1.

[45] Williams, "Towards an African Policy," p. 6.

[46] Ibid.; "The Wooing of Nigeria: A Courtship Pays Off," U. S. News and World Report, Vol. 83 (December 5, 1977), pp. 68-69.

[47] "South Africa: Wary Investing Policy--Until Reform," Business Week (February, 1977), p. 67.

one-third of Nigerian oil production by late 1977.[48]

The election of President Carter gave new power to the "African constituency" in the United States,[49] since the blacks, liberals, and clergymen who made up that "constituency" were an important part of Carter's electoral constituency. President Carter is aware that not only about 94 per cent of black votes were cast for him in the national election,[50] but also that the support of urban blacks was critical in securing the nomination of the Democratic Party. Early in 1976, shareholder resolutions were filed by a coalition of Protestant and Roman Catholic church groups against six large United States corporations and five major United States banks to curtail activities in South Africa.[51] These developments provided political support for the new course on which the United States government embarked in Africa in the spring of 1976.

Functional Requisites

In every dimension of the United States' functional requirements, Nigeria was more important to the United States by 1976 than in any previous period. By the end of 1977, United States' oil imports from Nigeria had risen to 18 per cent.[52] On the other hand, between 1975

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[48]"The Wooing of Nigeria," p. 69.

[49]See p. 82; Shepherd, "Comment", pp. 45-46.

[50]"A New Candidate Wins with an Old Coalition," Congressional Quarterly Almanac, Vol. 32, p. 820.

[51]"Africa in the U. S.," Africa Report, Vol. 21 (January-February, 1976), p. 24; "Africa in the U. S.," Africa Report, Vol. 22 (March-April, 1977), p. 27.

[52]"The Wooing of Nigeria," p. 67.

and 1977 United States doubled its exports to Nigeria--making Nigeria "Africa's main importer of United States equipment and services, in excess of $700 million annually."[53]

In the area of national security, Nigeria became valuable as a partner to the United States, which had become hesitant to intervene directly when crisis erupted in Africa. When Katangan rebels based in Angola launched an invasion of Zaire's Shaba province in 1977, the United States called upon Nigeria to exercise increasing influence to settle the conflict. Nigeria was able to be of service because its early support of the MPLA gave it access to the government in Luanda, while its determined opposition to secession of Biafra gave it a bond of identity with Zaire. Feustel reports that:

> A week of quiet diplomatic activity preceded the initiative and involved talks between Ambassador Young and visiting Nigerian Foreign Minister Joseph Garba, in New York, and State Department discussions in Washington involving Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs William Schaufele, Jr., Garba, and Donald Easum, U. S. Ambassador to Nigeria.[54]

The United States manifested new restraint in allowing other countries--Nigeria in diplomatic arenas, France and Morocco in military theaters--to take the lead in bringing the invasion to an end. According to one analyst, current United States policy toward Nigeria

> is based on the premise that Nigeria is listened to in African councils. The United States can exert its influence obliquely without running the risk of direct involvement,

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[53] The Washington Post (September 13, 1977), p. 16.

[54] Feustel, p. 49.

> if it forms a close working relationship with Nigeria's military rulers.[55]

Even from the standpoint of promoting domestic cohesion in the United States, closer relations with a powerful Black country assumed new importance as a result of increasing awareness of Africa on the part of the American public. In a major speech explaining United States policy toward Africa, Secretary of State Vance observed that:

> Beyond these political and economic ties that bind our futures, there are the social and cultural links from which we have benefitted generally. Our society and culture are enriched by the heritage so many Americans find in Africa. We experience this enrichment every day--in our literature, our art, our music, and our social values.[56]

The public reaction in the United States to the televized adaptation of Alex Haley's novel, Roots, helped to sensitize large numbers of Americans, both back and white, to Africa and to racial injustice, at a time when events in southern Africa were making newspaper headlines.[57]

Capabilities

General Obasanjo drew attention to the growing utilitarian capabilities of the United States when he remarked that "The United States without doubt possesses the largest stock and variety of technology

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[55] The New York Times (October 12, 1977), p. 8.

[56] Vance, "U. S. Policy Toward Africa," p. 624.

[57] Ali A. Mazrui, "Roots: The End of America's Amnesia?" Africa Report, Vol. 22 (May-June, 1977), p. 6.

necessary to the successful mechanization of production and the resultant abundance of material goods."[58] Obasanjo's first budget speech, in March, 1976, reported that, despite Nigeria's oil boom, the country was encountering severe economic problems: an unexpected decline in oil production, a substantial balance of payments deficit, an overall decline of economic growth to 2.8 percent, and a serious decline in domestic food production. He ordered a revision of Nigeria's Third National Plan (1975-78) to eliminate prestige projects and to give greater priority to housing, health, and agricultural development. On April 1, he launched "Operation Feed the Nation," to encourage greater agricultural productivity.[59] A year later, he proclaimed 1977-78 to be "the year of agriculture and industry."[60]

These new emphases increased Nigeria's dependence upon United States' technology. In September, 1977, the F.M.G. sent 489 students to vocational training schools and junior colleges in the United States, under a program administered by the U. S. AID, and planned to send 10,000 per year after 1979 under the same program. Although large numbers of students from other countries are studying in the United States, only the Nigerians are in the AID administered program. Most of the Nigerian students are enrolled in programs of agricultural technology, health care, and construction--pursuant to the revised goals of the

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[58]"Lt. Gen. Obasanjo of Nigeria Visits the U. S.," Department of State Bulletin, Vol. 77 (Washington D. C., November 14, 1977), p. 694.

[59]Levi A. Nwachuku, "Nigeria's Uncertain Future," Current History, Vol. 71 (November, 1976), p. 167.

[60]Quoted in Africa Diary (April 30-May 6, 1977), p. 8456.

National Plan.[61]

Even more impressive than these utilitarian relationships have been the restoration and extension of identitive bonds between Nigeria and the United States. President Carter was basically accurate when he said: "Years ago we had nothing but animosity between us now we have nothing but friendship."[62] Since April, 1976, United States' policy objectives have moved closer to those of Nigeria in seeking a just order in southern Africa and a modus vivendi with the newly liberated Portuguese territories. The race and rhetoric of Andrew Young have given credibility to the change.[63] When Nigeria sponsored a World Conference for Action Against Apartheid, held in Lagos on August, 1977, the United States' participated actively, with Andrew Young as its official representative. Young acknowledged that "Nigeria, in a unique way, is responsible for the new sensitivity in the West."[64] Conversely, the new sensitivity of the United States toward the aspirations of Nigeria and other countries of tropical Africa has helped to restore the prestige of the United States in Africa. The fact that Nigeria will return to civilian government in 1979 under a constitution based upon

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[61] "Education to Politics--U. S. Lends a Hand in Nigeria," U. S. News and World Report, Vol. 83 (December 5, 1977), p. 70.

[62] Quoted in Thomas A. Johnson, "Nigeria and the United States," Africa (December, 1977), p. 22.

[63] "Nigerian's U. S. Visit Tied to Carter Shift," The New York Times (Wednesday, October 12, 1977), p. 8; Africa Recorder (March 12-25, 1977), p. 4484; Feustel, p. 48.

[64] "Development Concerning Apartheid," Statement by Andrew Young, United States Representative to the United Nations, Department of State Bulletin (October 3, 1977), p. 446.

United States' model, rather than the British or the Soviet models,[65] is one indicator of the identitive power which the United States still holds for Africa's most populous country.

A new United States' strategy of using coercive assets contributed to more effective relations with Nigeria and other African countries. Instead of regarding every crisis in Africa in terms of East-West confrontation, and to assume the lonely role of policeman in Africa, the United States is learning to allow other countries, such as France, Belgium, Morocco, and Saudi Arabia to take the primary initiative containing subversion--a strategy which proved effective in overcoming two incursions in Zaire.[66]

Perceived Characteristics of Nigeria

The trend toward better relations between Nigeria and the United States followed a few months after Lt. General Obasanjo became head of the Nigerian government in February, 1976. The change in leadership helped to eliminate past personal animosities. Trained at the British Royal Engineers School and the Royal College of Defense Studies in England, Obasanjo served as Federal Commissioner for Works and Housing in the Gowon administration, and as Chief of Staff, Supreme Headquarters, in the administration of Murtala Muhammed. Obasanjo was per-

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[65]"The Draft Constitution has been described as 'American style' with a strong executive president, a senate, a house of representatives, federal and state legislatures. It allows for a plurality of political parties." John Howe and Richard Synge, "Political Issues," Africa Guide, 1978 (Saffron Walden, Essex, England: Africa Guide Company, 1977), p. 243.

[66]Daniel Southerland, "U. S. Foreign Policy Muddled?" Christian Science Monitor (December 19,11977), p. 3

ceived by foreign observers as "a quiet, competent individual. . .,"[67] somewhat less conciliatory than Gowon but less austere than Muhammed.

As "a dominant member of the post-Gowon reformist crew,"[68] Obasanjo continued his predecessor's programs to combat corruption and inefficiency in government, with striking success. His decisions to revise the Third National Plan, and to reduce government spending to combat inflation brought impressive results in 1976-77: a reduction of the rate of inflation by 15 percent, an increase in the economic growth rate to 10 percent (from 2.8 percent during the previous year), and a tripling of the rate of agricultural production.[69] This record helped to inspire the confidence of the United States in the new government.

Spokesmen for the United States also indicated their satisfaction with Nigeria's political stability, despite the abortive coup of February, 1976, and with its skill in exercising power. William Schaufele, then Assistant Secretary of State for Africa, observed early in 1976 that "the United States was pleased that Nigeria is recovering from an attempted coup in a fashion which demonstrates the viability of Nigerian institutions."[70] In August, 1977, Andrew Young remarked that: "The fact that Nigeria is exercising its power in a statesmanlike, wise and

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[67]Tunde Adeniran, "Olusegun Obasanjo: Head of the Nigerian Federal Military Government," Africa Report, Vol. 21 (May-June, 1976), p. 37.

[68]Ibid., p. 38.

[69]Africa Diary (April 30-May 6, 1977), p. 8456.

[70]William E. Schaufele, "United States Economic Relations with Africa," Address, United States Department of State Bulletin (March 8, 1976), p. 298.

restrained fashion adds to its credibility and effect."[71]

The evident progress of the F.M.G. in honoring its pledge to return the country to democratic civilian rule by October, 1979 has also enhanced its attractiveness to United States' decision-makers. According to Adeniran,

> General Obasanjo is a steadfast advocate of a return to civilian rule. His personal conviction that the military should be back in the barracks, the fate of Gowon who did not keep his promise, coupled with the tenacious and popular feeling for civilian rule in the nearest future, point to Obasanjo keeping to the unconditional date set by his predecessor.[72]

The successful election of a Constituent Assembly in August, 1977 proceeded smoothly, without incident; and six new commissioners, all civilians, have been appointed, as equivalents of cabinet ministers. Welcoming the appointment of civilian ministers, the New Nigerian commented: "It has always been our view that one of the ways of preparing the ground for a smooth return to civilian rule is to appoint civilian commissioners at the federal level, while the military and the police are gradually phased out of the cabinet."[73]

Graubard remarks that Secretary of State Kissinger thought of power as "a complex compound, consisting, of course, of military capability and economic resources, but depending ultimately on one other

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[71]Andrew Young, "Development Concerning Apartheid," Statement, United States Department of State Bulletin (October 3, 1977), p. 446.

[72]Andeniran, p. 39.

[73]Quoted in Howe and Synge, p. 247.

crucial element--the quality of political leadership."[74] By April, 1976, it appeared that Nigeria had added that crucial element to her economic and military endowments to make her a power to be reckoned with on the African continent. To the increasingly civil rights-conscious Carter Administration, the Nigerian government was also showing signs of progress in acquiring the institutions which Western observers regard as indicators of constitutionalism and democracy.

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[74] Stephen R. Graubard, Kissinger: Portrait of a Mind (New York: Norton, 1973), p. 12.

CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSIONS

On the basis of the foregoing analysis, it is possible to draw some tentative conclusions about United States foreign policy decision making, which might serve as hypotheses in future studies of the United States' relations with African countries. It is also possible to evaluate the analytical utility of the paradigm which was used in this study.

Institutions: Structure and Consensus

The periods of friendly relations between the United States and Nigeria have largely coincided with structural pluralism and ideological consensus among decision-making units. During the post-Dulles "era of good feeling" from 1960 to 1967, the Bureau of African Affairs acquired substantial influence in making policy toward Africa. The Bureau developed an institutional identity with its principal clientele, the Black-ruled countries of Africa. Other decision-making agencies, including the Central Intelligence Agency, the Department of Commerce, the National Security Affairs Staff, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and the House Foreign Affairs Committee, while differing on some matters, shared a common set of beliefs and values which might be called the "Liberal Cold War" ethos. Although they rejected the anti-neutralism of Dulles, the "Cold War Liberals" accepted United States' responsibility to compete with the Soviet Union for the friendship of

"non-aligned" developing countries. United States-Nigerian relations were friendliest when an informal, inter-agency group, the so-called "New Africa Group," was most influential in decision-making circles.

The disintegration of the "New Africa Group" roughly coincided with the deterioration of relations between the United States and Nigeria. The war in Vietnam shattered the consensus which had held the key decision-making institutions, especially the executive branch and Congress, together. Consequently, the United States adopted a noncommital policy toward Nigeria during the Civil War, while the diverging positions of the African Bureau, the Secretary of State, and the "Biafra Lobby" in Congress alienated both belligerants in the war.

The renewed prominence of the Secretary of State among the principal decision-makers of the Johnson Administration further reduced the relative influence and autonomy of the Bureau of African Affairs. The trend toward centralization of foreign-policy decision-making reached its apex when the positions of National Security Affairs Adviser and Secretary of State were united under Kissinger.

Centralization of decision-making power reduced the influence of the Africa-oriented agencies, especially the Bureau of African Affairs. Unless the principal decision-maker happens to have a personal interest in Africa, which, given traditional United States' interests, seems unlikely, the risk of a foreign policy which is unresponsive to Black African countries is increased. The open animosity between Kissinger and his African Bureau is a case in point. Concentration of decision-making responsibility did facilitate the abrupt shift in African policy which was manifested in Kissinger's 1976 Lusaka Declaration. Nevertheless, the delay in the United States' response to negative feedback

concerning its policies toward Africa illustrates the dangers of such concentration of decision-making influence. The return to a more polycentric pattern of decision-making by the Carter Administration enabled those officials who are most interested in Africa--notably the Ambassador to the United Nations, the Director of Policy Planning in the State Department, and the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs--to exert major influence over foreign policy toward Africa.

Idiosyncratic Variables

Idiosyncratic characteristics of the decision-makers appear to have influenced United States-Nigerian relations at virtually every critical juncture. The personality of the President has been crucial in determining which other decision-making roles have been decisive. President Eisenhower's choice of Herter as Dulles' successor in the State Department, and Herter's inclination to delegate initiative to the regional Bureaus, rather than appropriate it to himself, gave the Bureau of African Affairs a leading role in shaping initial United States relations with Nigeria, at the time of the latter country's independence. Friendly relations between the two countries reached their apex when the President himself, John F. Kennedy, had a special expertise and interest in the Continent, as former Chairman of the Senate Subcommittee on Africa, was President, and relied heavily upon the "New Africa" Group in making key decisions affecting Nigeria. President Johnson's penchant for continuity especially in foreign policy, resulted in the retention of many members of Kennedy's advisers on African Affairs, G. Mennen Williams, for a few years after

Kennedy's death. The departure of Williams from the African Bureau deprived Africa of one of its most influential champtions, and coincided with the beginning of a decline in United States-Nigerian friendship.

It appears that the domestic political ties of the top advisers on Africa, and their enthusiasm for the continent, have been more important than their diplomatic or area-related expertise. "Soapy" Williams and Andrew Young horrified professional diplomats, but were more effective at winning the simultaneous trust of Nigerian leaders and the President of the United States than such professional diplomats as Satterthwaite, Newsom, Schaufele, Palmer, and Davis. The latter two won the respect of Africans at the expense of that of their own superiors.

Troubled relations between the United States and Nigeria have occurred under Secretaries of State who espoused elaborate theories of world power which minimized the importance of Black Africa or regarded it as primarily a battleground in the Cold War. Secretary of State Dulles' rejection of the legitimacy of non-alignment and acceptance of Portugal, imperial Belgium, and South Africa as friends because of their anti-Communism exemplified such a pattern before the period with which this study is concerned. Secretary of State Rusk regarded Nigeria as being essentially within the British sphere of influence, while Indo-China was the primary responsibility of the United States. Kissinger's "neo-classical" view of Africa tended to regard Nigeria and other African countries as arenas of power politics among the major world powers, rather than as important independent actors. Although the theoretical elegance of Kissinger's writings

has yet to be rivalled by that of the major architects of the Carter Administration's policies toward Africa, Kissinger's successors seem to have greater respect for Nigeria and other African countries as worthy of consideration as international actors, themselves.

Demands

Without negating the possibility of covert activities by a power elite in the decision-making process, the available evidence supports the proposition that a variety of interest groups were influential in shaping United States' relations with Nigeria. The pattern which emerges is one of plural elitism, in which some elites appear to wield more influence than others. The petroleum companies, especially Gulf Oil Corporation, have been active, but not always successful, in lobbying for changes in United States' policy toward Nigeria and other African countries. During the Nigerian Civil War, Gulf and Mobil lobbied for a more active pro-federal policy than the United States' government did, in fact, pursue. After the Civil War, heavy involvement by Gulf in Angola induced that company to support pro-Portuguese colonial policies which contributed to the strains in relations between the United States and Nigeria. Nevertheless, the pragmatism of the corporation induced it to switch its support to the MPLA in 1975, when the Nixon Administration was supporting the opposition to that Marxist party. The notion that international oil interests control United States policy is contradicted by the behavior of Gulf, and by the fact that the bulk of United States' petroleum investment in tropical Africa was in Nigeria, where official United States policies opposing the "liberation" of southern Africa before 1976 were extremely unpopular.

The orientation of United States overseas business interests toward Africa was, by no means, monolithic. Although the major automobile companies had heavy investment in the white-ruled countries of southern Africa, and companies such as Union Carbide, lobbied heavily for trade with Rhodesia, the oil companies, which accounted for half of all United States investment in Africa, had their extractive operations exclusively in countries belonging to the Organization of African Unity--especially after the independence of Angola.

The split in international business interests has enabled non-economic interest groups to play a decisive role in the policy-making process toward Nigeria. Christian missionaries, heavily concentrated in Nigeria, formed a loose pro-African political coalition with Black Americans, to whem Nigeria has a special significicance as an ancestral homeland and the leading economic and military power of tropical Africa.

Functional Requisites

Since 1960, national security interests have been at least as important as economics in shaping United States' policy toward Nigeria. During the early 1960's, the support of Nigeria's civilian government was crucial in countening the influence of the revolutionary "Casablanca" bloc on the continent and in supporting United States efforts to stabilize Congo-Kimshasa. With Nigerian help, the United States was so successful in containing Soviet influence that other regions, especially Indochina, eclipsed Africa as objects of United States' concern. The result was a lack of responsiveness to Nigerian concerns and sensi-

bilities.

The destabilization of Africa by events following the Portuguese and Ethiopian coups revived United States' interest in Africa, but the United States had to adjust to a new power structure on the African Continent. The American reflex of containment clashed with the interests of a Nigeria more powerful and militant than before. By abandoning an initial effort to be policeman for Africa and accepting Nigeria as a more equal partner, the United States was, once again, able to form a successful partnership with Nigeria which served mutual national security interests managing conflict between Zaire and Angola.

The relationship between Africa and domestic politics in the United States remains minimal, but the potential for Africa to become a major domestic issue is more apparent now than in the 1960's. Blacks comprise over 11 percent of the population of the United States, and a significant number of white liberals might reasonably be expected to share Black antipathy toward the white-dominated regimes of southern Africa. Consequently United States' involvement in supplying military aid to South Africa or Rhodesia has the potential of producing divisions in the United States which would be at least as profound as those during the Vietnam War. The good services of African partners like Nigeria in assisting in the challenging diplomacy ahead will be more important to the domestic harmony of the United States than in the past.

Capabilities

The findings of the present study support the view of Deutsch that responsive capabilities are among the most critical in affecting

the quality of relations among states.[1] Responsive capabilities are a complex compound consisting of both emotional and material characteristics. At times when the United States material assets which were vastly superior to those of Nigeria, emotional variables impeded full utilization of these assets in responding to Nigeria's needs. The force of tradition relegating tropical Africa to an inferior position vis-a-vis Europe, Asia and Latin America as a sphere of United States' concern; the retreat from foreign aid responsibilities in regions which have not replicated the "economic miracle" of the Marshall Plan in Europe; the massive commitment of military and economic resources to the Vietnam theater, and the reluctance for subsequent foreign involvments elsewhere which resulted from that ill-fated venture; and preoccupation with domestic crises, such as Watergate, have all limited United States' responsiveness to Nigeria's needs in past administrations.

Yet the utilitarian interdependence between the two countries created by Nigeria's petroleum resources and the United States' petroleum technology provides the material basis for mutual responsiveness based on reciprocal economic benefits. Moreover, a significant change in the identitive capabilities of the United States, personified in Andrew Young and given substance in the United States' "hard line" on Rhodesian settlement, has given credibility to the Carter Administration's assurances that Nigeria and the United States are once again on the same side in international politics. In the present study, classi-

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[1]Karl W. Deutsch, "Communication Theory and Political Integration," Philip E. Jacob and James V. Toscano, eds., The Integration of Political Communities (New York: J. B. Lippincott Co., 1964), p. 70.

fication of power resources into the tripartite categories of coercive, utilitarian and identitive categories has facilitated analysis of the interplay of qualitatively different resources in support of foreign policy decisions. The effectiveness of the Kennedy and Carter Administrations in dealings with Nigeria underscores the importance of the least tangible of the three categories: identitive resources.

Perceived Characteristics of Nigeria

Changes in the characteristics of Nigeria, as perceived by United States' officials have, likewise, influenced the decision-outputs of the United States. Political stability, a pro-western political orientation, economic policies favorable to overseas political investors, influence in international arenas, and democratic political institutions appear to be the perceived characteristics which have been most salient to decision-makers in the United States. The civilian regime which governed Nigeria from 1960 to 1966 was perceived by United States officials to have relatively high levels of achievement in all five areas, despite the considerable gap between image and reality where the first and last of the characteristics is concerned. The deflation of Nigeria's reputation for stability and democracy as a result of the military coups d'etat and the civil war in 1967, combined with disenchantment over the Federal Military Government's efforts to "Nigerianize" the economy, coincided with the deterioration of relations between Washington and Lagos. General Murtala Muhammed's support of the MPLA in Angola was interpreted by Dr. Kissinger as "pro-Soviet," even though Gulf Oil Company's support of the MPLA was given a different interpretation. Consequently, it is not surprising that relations between the

United States and Nigeria were at their lowest ebb during the administration of General Muhammed, whose nationalist economic and foreign policies were misconstrued by Washington as pro-Socialist.

Improved relations between the two capitals followed changes in both realities and perceptions of Nigeria by Washington's decision-makers. Successful steps toward restoration of civilian government in Nigeria; the country's growing economic and military power, coupled with its activism in international politics; the stabilization of domestic affairs by the reforms of the late General Muhammed; and Nigeria's willingness to co-operate with the United States in alleviating tensions between Zaire and Angola, are realities. The Carter Administration's interpretation of Nigerian economic and foreign policies as manifestations of nationalism rather than pro-Soviet socialism reflect significant perceptual changes since the Nixon and Ford Administrations.

The Decision-Making Paradigm: Strengths and Limitations

The decision-making paradigm which was used in this study has both strengths and limitations as an analytical tool. By forcing attention to the interaction of a multiplicity of variables, the paradigm helped to identify several plausible explanations, or partial explanations of changes in United States-Nigerian relations. The foregoing analysis thereby suggests alternatives to simple mono-causal explanations of international politics, such as the economic determinism of the Marxists or the power determinism of the Realists.

A limitation of the paradigm is that it provides little guidance

to the assignment of relative weights to the variables, nor does it establish "causal" connections among them. It is submitted that the weighting of variables and causal modeling are premature, given the current state of research in international relations. It is hoped that further use of the paradigm in case studies and comparative research will provide the basis for more penetrating theories of international relations.

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