

THE MAINTENANCE OF AN AUTHORITARIAN REGIME:

THE CASE OF MEXICO

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PREFACE

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

The student of contemporary Mexico confronts an array of baffling paradoxes. These paradoxes serve to both confuse and enlighten political analysts who attempt to penetrate and discern the substance of Mexican politics. There has been, for example, impressive economic growth in Mexico coupled with a sizable marginal population which has not enjoyed the benefits of this growth and in some instances, the material well-being of this marginal population has actually declined.¹ In Mexico, political participation decreases with competition, whereas in the West, political participation tends to increase with competitiveness.² Those groups of Mexican society which are most supportive of the regime are the same segments of Mexican society which are the most disadvantaged by the existing arrangement. Mexico is, in many respects, an authoritarian regime whose existence is dependent upon popular support. It is within this context that the Mexican political system must be viewed. Also within this context rests the future viability of the Mexican system.

As Kenneth Coleman suggests, much has been written about one-party systems, but little theory exists concerning regime maintenance through the identification of potential destabilizing problems.³ The purpose of this study is two-fold. First, the essential and distinctive features of the Mexican political system will be evaluated. The foundation upon which the Mexican one-party system rests will be analyzed in an effort to

assess its strengths along with its weaknesses. Secondly, this study will attempt to identify the major problem areas which are likely to threaten continued stability in Mexico. Hopefully, this study will provide insights into the dynamics of one-party authoritarian regimes and their ability to adapt to various problematic situations.

Mexico offers a fertile field of inquiry on several counts. First, Mexico's authoritarian regime is generally considered to be one of the more stable established one-party systems. Secondly, the regime will experience substantial strain due to enormous population growth and abject poverty resulting from gross income inequality and high unemployment. The hypothesis of this study is that the stability of the Mexican political system is connected to the effectiveness of the system's performance in responding to destabilizing elements within the system. Consequently, unless effective measures are adopted to satisfy popular demands, social conflict and political violence will increase which will threaten the continued stability of the regime. It is readily admitted that this type of study lacks the scientific or empirical preciseness which can be found in much of the social science literature. But it is also asserted that our lack of understanding of the vulnerability of some regimes to revolution or coup d'etat justifies a work of this nature. While the scope of this study must be limited to Mexico, the issue of regime maintenance is not.

Mexico is a nation well advanced in the process of modernization and also political development as measured by the level of institutionalization of political organizations and procedures. But as Samuel P. Huntington suggests, "As a concept [political development], it does not suggest that movement is likely to be in only one direction; institu-

tions, we know, decay and dissolve as well as grow and mature."⁴ Later in reference to the absence of literature on the process of decay in political institutions, Huntington notes:

As a result, models and concepts which are hopefully entitled "developing" or "modernizing" are often only partially relevant to the countries to which they are applied. More relevant in many cases would be models of corrupt or degenerating societies, highlighting the decay of political organizations and the increasing dominance of disruptive forces.⁵

Thus, within Huntington's theoretical framework, Mexico is offered as an example of a society experiencing political decay or degeneration. This assertion does not imply that the process is irreversible or that political collapse is inevitable. To be more precise, this study is seeking to delimit the range within which the Mexican regime is capable of response; and to ascertain whether the problems confronting contemporary Mexico are within the scope of remedial power.

The prediction of political events is precarious at best. Therefore, this study does not seek to forecast Mexico's future development. But instead, this study attempts to identify destabilizing forces presently undermining Mexico's political system. What the analyst cannot foresee is the critical point at which a potential destabilizer becomes an actual destabilizer. Nor can the analyst predict what event or person may emerge as the necessary catalyst. What is asserted, however, is that the next decade or two may well prove to be crucial ones in terms of the future of the Mexican polity. Harold Laski once observed that the values upon which political institutions are based are born of the ability to satisfy mass-demands, they wither away as that ability diminishes.⁶ Clearly, the increasing violence and alienation facing Mexico are the outgrowth of unsatisfied mass-demands.

Essentially, this study asserts that the increasing violence and alienation afflicting Mexico are warning signals that the system is experiencing a loss of legitimacy. Political legitimacy is paramount to the survival of any political order. A political system based solely upon coercion is neither stable nor likely to long endure. Legitimacy, as a concept, is a subjective evaluation by citizens of their political system. An individual's assessment of his political system--whether he considers it to be legitimate or illegitimate--is derived from a two-dimensional appraisal.⁷ That is, the sources of political legitimacy are two-fold. One source is instrumental and is concerned with effectiveness and performance. Loyalty to the political system is secured if the individual perceives the system as responsive to the mass-demands of the citizenry.

Secondly, loyalty to a political system is also created through a sentimental attachment. Sentimental attachment occurs when an individual holds an emotional commitment to the system. Cultural identity, nationalism, and a sense of community are channels through which a sentimental attachment to the system can be built. It is possible, however, that an individual's cultural or national identity may not be transferred into an attachment for political institutions. (For example, a Frenchman could value his identity of being French, but at the same time consider French political institutions as illegitimate.) This may well be the case in Mexico which illustrates the importance of the symbolism of the Mexican Revolution in building legitimacy for the system.

Sentimental and instrumental attachment to a political system are independent processes, but also they are not mutually exclusive phenomena.⁸ Therefore it is reasonable to conclude that a system which can-

not meet the needs of its people will ultimately experience a loss of sentimental attachment. Conversely, a system which suffers from a lack of sentimental attachment by its population loses some capacity to be effective. In short, the loss of political legitimacy consists of the interaction of these two processes.

Admittedly, detecting the loss of legitimacy of a political system poses an analytical problem. Basically, the problem centers on the selection of viable criteria for making such an assessment. Primarily, this study is concerned with the lack of effectiveness of the political system as an indicator of loss of legitimacy. S.M. Lipset has asserted that the legitimacy of a political system is closely associated with the manner in which the basic cleavages of society have been resolved.⁹ According to Lipset, three major issues have tended to divide society in Western nations: first, the role of the church in society; second, political participation by the masses; third, the distribution of income.¹⁰ Mexico's attempt to resolve these cleavages, especially the latter two, is far from successful and in fact this paper will argue that the cleavages in Mexican society are widening rather than narrowing.

Secondly, the decay of Mexican political institutions is affirmed by increasing alienation of the population vis-a-vis the political system. Alienation is manifested in two types of political behavior. First, alienation is evidenced by a withdrawal of support through decreasing political participation. For example, the last decade has witnessed a significant decline in voter turnout.¹¹ Thus active participation is replaced by non-participation. Secondly, alienation from the system is found in increased overt anti-system behavior. Political violence such as kidnapping, riots, and demonstrations serve to

challenge the physical maintenance of the regime by substituting confrontation for system allegiance.

The approach of the study is of a descriptive and analytical nature. Since this study also seeks an overall perspective, some of the parts which constitute the intellectual whole are unavoidably compromised. But one does well to remember Barry Commoner's "First Law of Ecology," the acknowledgement that "Everything is Connected to Everything Else." This maxim is as applicable to political systems as it is to ecosystems. While this study adopted a comprehensive approach, it nevertheless is not exhaustive. The dynamics of the Mexican system include many variables working simultaneously to undermine and reinforce the present regime which are not noted here.

Chapter II will outline the structure and features of the Mexican political system. Also included is a discussion of the Mexican Revolution of 1910 and its impact on the development of the current regime. The next two chapters focus on perhaps the most pressing problems which are currently confronting the Mexican regime. Chapter III will note the persistence of extreme income inequality despite rapid aggregate economic growth. Chapter IV details the Mexican population explosion and the strain it places on available resources. Additionally, the massive emigration of millions of Mexicans to the United States as a result of insufficient opportunities is discussed. Finally, Chapter V will attempt to reach a judgment concerning the structural responsiveness of the system in view of the nature of the problems besieging the Mexican regime.

ENDNOTES

¹Richard S. Weinert, "Introduction," in Jose Luis Reyna and Richard S. Weinert, ed., Authoritarianism in Mexico (Philadelphia: Institute for the Study of Human Issues, Inc., 1977), p. iv.

²Martin C. Needler, Politics and Society in Mexico (Albuquerque, N.M.: University of New Mexico Press, 1971), p. 18.

³Kenneth M. Coleman, Diffuse Support in Mexico: The Potential for Crisis, Sage Professional Papers in Comparative Politics, vol. 5, series no. 01-057 (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1976), p. 6.

⁴Samuel P. Huntington, "Political Development and Decay," World Politics, 17 (April 1965), 393.

⁵Ibid., p. 415.

⁶Harold J. Laski, Faith, Reason, and Civilization: An Essay in Historical Analysis (New York: The Viking Press, 1944).

⁷See, for example, Seymour M. Lipset, Political Man: The Social Bases of Politics (Garden City, N.Y.: Anchor Books, 1963), Chapter 3, and Herbert C. Kelman, "Patterns of Personal Involvement in the National System: A Social-Psychological Analysis of Political Legitimacy," in James N. Rosenau, ed., International Politics and Foreign Policy (New York: The Free Press, 1969), pp. 276-288. The following discussion of political legitimacy draws heavily from the works cited above.

⁸Kelman, op. cit., pp. 285-286.

⁹Lipset, op. cit., p. 71.

¹⁰Ibid.

¹¹Voter abstention in the non-presidential election years of 1973 and 1979 increased from 43 percent to over 50 percent.

CHAPTER II

MEXICO'S POLITICAL SYSTEM

Requisite to understanding Mexico's present is to understand her past. Customarily, this requires an examination of the Mexican Revolution of 1910. The Mexican Revolution provided the Constitution of 1917 and also still provides the basis of legitimacy for the present regime. The Revolution was notable on several other counts as well. Lasting over ten years, the conflict was one of the most violent and costly revolutionary struggles ever. A full ten percent of the Mexican nation perished as a result of the Revolution.¹ Secondly, the Revolution destroyed the feudal structures that had prevented the development of Mexico into a modern state.

However, the conventional wisdom regarding the significance and effect of the Mexican Revolution is undergoing a reassessment.² The orthodox view of the events of 1910-1920 maintains that the Revolution was a social and political upheaval which destroyed the existing political institutions and in their wake a new political order was established. Challenging this view, Lorenzo Meyer contends that "the changes were less significant than the continuities. The Mexican Revolution did not destroy the authoritarian nature of Mexican political life, it modernized it."³ This re-evaluation of the Mexican Revolution is a somewhat expected occurrence, as it is consistent with a new interpretation of the Mexican political system. Prior to the middle 1960's, Mexico

was generally regarded as an example of an imperfect democratic system. It was imperfect because the goals of the Revolution were not yet fulfilled. This view of Mexico as in a transitional phase posited the expectation that future development would be in the direction of more democracy as the system matured. Generally, current opinion regarding Mexico denies that Mexico is an "imperfect version of anything" and instead alleges that it is essentially an example of an authoritarian regime.⁴ The negation of Mexico as a flawed democratic model implies that the expectation that Mexico is evolving into a Western style democracy is also unfounded. Of course, the revisionist interpretation of Mexico's political system does not preclude Mexico from adopting democratic norms, but it does suggest that democracy is not inevitable in Mexico nor is it as likely as it was once thought.

If there is a lack of consensus concerning the meaning of the Mexican Revolution, it does not extend to the pre-revolutionary period. This is an area where there is substantial agreement among scholars. In 1877 General Porfirio Díaz became President of Mexico via a coup d'etat. The advent of Díaz marked the beginning of a new era in Mexico's development. Díaz granted concessions to foreigners to attract capital to mine Mexico's natural resources, build railroads, and other public works. In fact, under Díaz, foreign holdings totaled more than Mexican holdings with United States citizens owning more property than all other foreigners combined.⁵ Concentration of wealth was extreme with 834 individuals owning one-fourth of Mexico's land.⁶

The philosophical basis for the Díaz regime was rooted in the positivism of Auguste Comte.⁷ Díaz surrounded himself with advisers known as "cientificos," who stressed the importance of political order and ma-

terial progress over individual freedom and equality.⁸ Therefore, in defense of Díaz, some regarded him not so much the dictator, but rather the statesman, using:

the only methods known to the economic and social sciences of his time, methods which are after all not too different from those used by developing countries today: that is, national planning and the importation of foreign capital and technical skills, while restraining popular drives to increase consumption.⁹

Additionally, General Díaz did not personally enrich himself through his position of power, although many of his subordinates did amass considerable fortunes from the public treasury.

In the long run, several features of the Díaz regime served to undermine its power base. First, as the regime evolved, it became more exclusionary. That is, wealth became more concentrated and entry into commercial activity was denied to an aspiring and expanding entrepreneur class. Thus, a rising Mexican middle class was prohibited from sharing in the fruits of the economic development. Since the benefits of economic development were reserved to foreign interests and a small inner-circle of Díaz's associates, discontent and resentment was wide spread among Mexico's emerging middle class. Secondly, the plight of the rural masses deteriorated thereby alienating this sector as well. To maintain order, Díaz established a particularly brutal rural police known as rurales. Furthermore, large land holding companies had dispossessed large numbers of peasants reducing them to peonage and a subsistence standard of living.

Toward the end of the dictatorship, General Díaz attempted to reassert control over the influence of foreign investors. But these efforts were too little too late. By the time Francisco I. Madero issued his call for revolution, Díaz had alienated the major segments of Mexi-

can society and the American business community operating in Mexico.

The Revolution did not produce any clearly defined ideology. In part, this is due to the heterogeneous nature of the revolutionaries. It is commonplace to identify the various factions according to the prominent generals of the Revolution. In the North, there were the armies of Venustiano Carranza, Alvaro Obregón, and Francisco "Pancho" Villa. To the South, the major army was that of Emiliano Zapata. While it was personal charisma rather than ideology which provided the adhesive to hold these armies together, Zapata did attempt to formulate an ideology in his Plan de Ayala.¹⁰ With the common goal of Díaz's removal serving as the motivation for each faction, it is important to note that the revolutionary movement was hopelessly divided on other goals. For example, in the South, the revolutionary movement was primarily a peasant movement concerned with the restoration of land to the peasants and their villages. In the North, the revolutionary movement was comprised of landowners and merchants alienated by Díaz's preferential treatment to foreigners and his exclusive club of associates. Therefore, it is not surprising that Díaz's downfall did not end the conflict in Mexico.

The process of reconciliation proved to be beyond the ability of Madero. Madero, although honest and sincere, could not restore order and unite the various factions under his leadership. Ultimately, fighting broke out in Mexico City between Madero's troops, led by General Victoriano Huerta, and Felix Díaz (Porfirio Díaz's nephew). The United States ambassador, who was openly hostile toward the Madero regime, intervened by negotiating a deal between Huerta and Felix Díaz. The plan called for Madero's removal and would place Huerta in the presidency and Felix Díaz would be the preferred presidential candidate in the next election.

As a result of this arrangement, Huerta seized power and executed Madero and his vice-president. To complicate the situation, newly inaugurated President Wilson refused to recognize the Huerta government. Wilson threw his support to the Constitutionalist forces under Carranza and Villa who controlled northern Mexico. Thus, Wilson allowed munitions to be sent to Carranza and Villa, hoping to promote civil war and the overthrow of Huerta.

Following an exchange of insults between Wilson and Huerta and an incident at the Mexican port of Tampico, President Wilson asked Congress for approval to occupy Veracruz to "secure respect for the U.S." More likely, Wilson was hoping to hasten Huerta's downfall by cutting off an arms shipment to Veracruz from Germany. The intervention by Wilson posed a serious dilemma for the President. All of the competing factions in Mexico opposed the American action and yet Wilson could not withdraw the American forces until Huerta was removed or United States prestige would be damaged. War between the United States and Mexico was averted with the mediation of the dispute by the foreign ministers of Argentina, Brazil, and Chile.

The resignation of Huerta in 1914, however, did not end the revolution. Venustiano Carranza, who succeeded Huerta, was opposed by his old rivals, Villa and Zapata. Eventually, Carranza was able to consolidate his power with the defeat of Villa and Zapata, only to be challenged later by Obregon. Subsequently, Obregón was proclaimed President in 1920. Abiding by the revolutionary motto of "effective suffrage and no reelection," Obregón turned over the presidency to president-elect Plutarco Elías Calles in 1924. Unfortunately, Obregón again sought the presidency in 1928. However, before he could take office, the president-

elect was assassinated by a religious fanatic who was allegedly in the employ of Calles. Under those circumstances, it was impossible for Calles to attempt to succeed himself, therefore, Emilio Portes Gil was chosen to be provisional president for fourteen months.

The stewardship of Emilio Portes Gil marked an important period of Mexico's political development. For it was during this period that Calles founded the political party which has ruled Mexico since its establishment in 1929.¹¹ Perhaps the greatest achievement in Mexico has been the institutionalization of the Mexican Revolution into a viable political system. The vehicle of the institutionalization process has been the ruling Institutional Revolutionary Party (Partido Revolucionario Institucional, or PRI).

In founding the PRI, Calles was attempting to transfer political power from personalities to institutions.¹² But in doing so, Calles was also attempting to rule Mexican politics by controlling the party apparatus. Nonetheless, the problem of succession of power was basically solved by establishing a political party which would provide stability and continuity. This was no small achievement, for as Samuel Huntington notes, the biggest threat to a one-party system is the problem of succession of power.¹³ By strictly adhering to the constitutional limitation of one term, Mexico has not experienced a problem of succession of power since President Lázaro Cárdenas asserted his independence of Calles and Calles was exiled to the United States.

Although the PRI has undergone significant reorganization through the years, it is the party which has ruled Mexico continuously since Calles. In short, the PRI is the channel through which political conflict is resolved and the vehicle for those aspiring to political power.

The strategy pursued by the PRI in seeking cohesion in the Mexican political system is a mixed policy of cooptation and repression.¹⁴ That is, if attempts to coopt political opposition fail, then these elements will be repressed. Thus, it is very difficult to attempt change by working outside the system and those who are coopted have a vested interest in preserving the status quo. Therefore, the ability of the regime to accommodate change is limited.

The organization of the PRI is on a tri-sectoral structure. The three groupings comprising the PRI are the labor, peasant, and popular sectors. (Originally, President Cárdenas also established a military sector, but it was disbanded by Cárdenas' successor.) This organizational structure was established during the administration of President Cárdenas in an attempt to expand the power and participation of the peasantry and labor.¹⁵ In effect, the reform minded Cárdenas was seeking to consolidate his power by increasing the influence of those groups which were the most supportive of his policies. Theoretically, this arrangement should ensure adequate representation for the peasantry and the working class. Cárdenas anticipated that the party's nominees for office would be drawn equally from the four sectors.¹⁶ Thus, after the various sectors had selected their candidates, the coalition would close ranks to support the party slate. However in reality, the popular sector and its extraparty associations dominate the PRI, limiting the ability of labor and peasants to affect policy decisions.

Partially accounting for the domination of the PRI by the popular sector is the organizational structure of the labor and peasant sectors. The labor sector is organized around the Mexican Workers Confederation (Confederación de Trabajadores de Mexico, or CTM). The CTM is a giant

government organized labor union. However, the leadership of the CTM is for the most part imposed from above rather than elected from below. Therefore, the role of the CTM leadership is not one of bargaining for benefits for labor, but the CTM works to assure labor support for the government.¹⁷ Thus, the CTM does not genuinely represent the interests of labor, but instead, its leadership tends to identify with the interests of the government and big business.

The second group, which is not adequately represented, is the peasantry. The peasantry is organized around a single organization, the National Peasant Confederation (Confederación Nacional Campesina, or CNC). The CNC, like the CTM, does not possess an effective voice within the PRI. Power in the CNC flows from the top down as top and middle level positions within the CNC are appointive.¹⁸ Also the general plight of the peasant in Mexico contributes to his lack of political clout. In short, the peasantry needs the government more than the government needs the support of the peasant to remain in power. Paradoxically, the peasant sector, which receives the fewest benefits from the government, is the sector which is traditionally the most supportive of the PRI. The preceding characterization of the labor and peasant sectors does not necessarily imply that these sectors are without political significance. But rather, the leadership of these sectors has been coopted into the system while the political power of the popular sector has appreciated.

The dominant position of the popular sector within the PRI is reflective of the interests in the economy it represents. That is, the popular sector is a catch-all category which basically identifies with the aspirations of the middle class and big business. The popular sector of the PRI is quite heterogeneous, representing groups such as doctors,

lawyers, teachers, merchants, large land owners, and various commercial interests. The popular sector differs from the labor and peasant sectors, however, in that the popular sector has been able to develop somewhat more independently of government control than the other sectors. The popular sector is organized around the National Confederation of Popular Organizations (Confederación Nacional de Organizaciones Populares, or CNOP). And as Johnson states,

Whereas in the cases of labor and the agrarian sectors there is a legally prescribed relationship and control between the national government and those sectorial organizations, the CNOP has been allowed to develop with relative independence since the group was founded in 1943.¹⁹

Therefore, this relative independence means that the CNOP is more likely to be the recipient of government benefits in securing CNOP allegiance to government policies than the other sectors.

There is considerable debate over the relative power of the private economic sector vis-a-vis the PRI.²⁰ One view maintains that the private economic sector, through the CNOP, controls the PRI and thus the Mexican state. According to this view, the PRI could not exercise independence of the economic elites even if it desired to do so. The other view argues that, yes, there has been an "alliance for profits"²¹ between the PRI and the economic elite. Nevertheless, the PRI still retains the option of asserting its independence if the political elite should decide that conditions warrant it. Regardless of viewpoint, the private economic sector exerts tremendous influence over the PRI. Also the fate of the proposed Echeverría reforms, which will be discussed later, seems to indicate that the economic elite may indeed be the dominant partner in this relationship.

The favored position of the popular sector within the PRI assumes

significance when one realizes that the PRI is the party-turned-government. A viable opposition party does not exist in Mexico. Although minor opposition parties exist on both the political left and right of the PRI, the party which most resembles an opposition party is the National Action Party (Partido Acción Nacional, or PAN). But, the efforts of PAN to become a genuine opposition party have been, thus far, stymied. PAN, whose support is basically drawn from clerically oriented, middle-class, urban dwellers, enjoyed relative success in the early 1970's. More recently, support for PAN has declined. In the 1976 presidential election, for example, PAN did not field an official candidate for president primarily as a result of intraparty conflict.

On the political left, the Mexican Communist Party (Partido Comunista Mexicano, or PCM) appears to be the major potential opposition party. PCM was granted legal recognition in 1978, therefore, it may be too early to assess the party's actual strength. PCM polled approximately five to ten percent of the vote in the 1979 Congressional elections which was comparable to PAN's share of the vote.²² Nonetheless, the existence of minor parties in the Mexican political system does not alter the one-party authoritarian character of Mexico's political structure. Perhaps more importantly, Mexico's one party rule cannot provide a "genuine sense of participation for the Mexican electorate."²³ This alienation of the electorate, due to the absence of meaningful participation, will surely increase as the PRI becomes more detached from the goals of the Mexican Revolution.

At the apex of the PRI and political power in Mexico is the President. As one scholar notes, "The President of Mexico is more powerful than his American counterpart, in terms of personal discretion in

decision-making.²⁴ Sources of power for the Mexican President are derived from his leadership position within the PRI and the Constitution of 1917, which grants the President a broad range of powers. Also contributing to presidential power is the role of the Mexican Congress in the political system, that is, the Congress tends to be subservient and functions primarily as a rubber-stamp to the President. The Mexican judiciary, while occasionally exercising independence, lacks the independence of its American counterpart and thus is limited in its ability to affect public policy.

The Mexican President also enjoys a special symbolic status because of the esteem bestowed upon the office by the Mexican populace. Perhaps due to the authoritarian and paternalistic Mexican culture, the Mexican President is viewed as the ultimate father figure who benevolently directs the fate of the Mexican people. Indeed, prior to President Díaz Ordaz, it was a tradition that the President and his immediate family were immune from public criticism. Despite the constitutional limitation of one six year term, the Mexican President is clearly in possession of great authority as the PRI is subordinate to the President a majority of the time.²⁵

The selection of the Mexican President is an interesting process where each President selects his successor. The party functionaries may participate in this process, but the final decision rests with the President. Thus, even with the no-reelection principle, the Mexican system practices a type of "continuismo" since each president will be a member of the PRI.²⁶ But this selection process is not intended to, nor does it actually, provide Mexico with presidents of uniform ideology. Instead Mexico has, within the PRI spectrum, chosen presidential candi-

dates of greatly divergent ideological hues. Martin C. Needler has identified a pendulum effect in the selection of Mexican presidents.²⁷ He asserts that Mexican presidents alternate between liberal and conservative orientations in a somewhat consistent and predictable fashion. Such a pendulum effect is the result of the inclusiveness of the PRI and its attempts to appease the extremes within the party.²⁸

While very powerful, the power of the Mexican President is nonetheless limited. The limits are not so much constitutional or statutory, but rather are more informal in nature. The proposed economic reforms of President Echeverría provide an apt illustration. The thrust of the Luis Echeverría reforms was a mild attempt to reduce the economic gap between the wealthy and poor. Echeverría proposed tighter restrictions on foreign investors, agriculture reforms, expanded public service, and higher taxes on corporations. In effect, Echeverría was attempting to achieve modest income redistribution at the expense of rapid aggregate economic growth. However, Mexican industrialists and financiers viewed the Echeverría reforms with alarm. As a result, domestic investment was withheld causing serious economic stagnation. Furthermore, allied with the conservative faction of the PRI, Mexico's economic elite was successful in preventing the implementation of Echeverría's reform policies by fomenting political unrest as a means to undercut Echeverría's authority.

The ability of the conservative economic elite to generate political and economic instability ultimately provided a challenge that Echeverría could not successfully meet. The end result is that when the economic elite in Mexico perceives its interests to be threatened, its political and economic power rivals the Mexican government. This is a fact of Mexican life that President López Portillo apparently understands. One

of the first goals of the López Portillo Administration was to reconcile with the business community and thus re-establish confidence in the Mexican economy. As a consequence, foreign and domestic investment has accelerated under López Portillo.

Since Mexico is subject to one-party rule (hence, winning candidates are determined prior to the election), the casual observer might inquire as to the utility and purpose of elections. The importance of elections should not be overlooked in Mexico or any one-party state. The function of elections in modern Mexico is one of providing legitimacy to the regime. In other words, the stability of the regime is dependent upon the PRI maintaining legitimacy. Electoral victory provides this cloak of legitimacy and it is for this reason that the PRI cannot tolerate real opposition. Since the PRI is the party-qua-government, the strength of Mexico's authoritarian regime depends upon the strength of the PRI. Therefore, the PRI must associate itself with the goals and aspirations of the Mexican Revolution. Accordingly, the PRI claims to be the only true heir to the Mexican Revolution. In doing so, political support for the Revolution is transferred to the PRI. Any dissociation of the PRI from the symbols of the Revolution will serve to undermine the PRI.

But the ability of the PRI to manipulate the symbols of the Revolution for political advantage is decreasing. For example, the passage of time puts distance between the leaders of the state and the ideals of the Revolution.²⁹ Another factor working to dissociate the PRI from the liberal-democratic themes of the Revolution is the rising political awareness resulting from urbanization and modernization. That is, the rural population has traditionally been the segment of the population which has been most susceptible to manipulation by the PRI. Therefore,

as Mexico experiences what Karl Deutsch has referred to as "social mobilization," the ability of the PRI to manipulate political imagery will become more problematic. Essentially, elections perform the same function today as during the dictatorship of Porfirio Díaz, the reaffirmation of support for the regime. However, the social-economic conditions of Mexico have undergone extensive change. Increases in literacy, urbanization, and modernization are transforming Mexico from a rural society to an urban one. Therefore, the transformation from a traditional society to a modern society will likely reduce the PRI's base of support.

Thus far, the PRI has been successful in coopting political opposition before it becomes a serious threat to the regime. The 1978 electoral reforms are reflective of this strategy. Under these reforms, the Chamber of Deputies was enlarged from 300 to 400. The additional 100 seats are allotted to the PRI's opposition according to proportional representation. However, the number of seats a party is eligible for under the proportional system is reduced if it wins over 90 seats in the 300 winner-take-all districts. These reforms give the appearance of liberalizing the political system while at the same time also ensuring that the PRI will retain a comfortable majority in the Chamber of Deputies. These reforms, however, could backfire if the opposition should increase its strength beyond a tolerable level.³⁰ If the regime becomes threatened by the increase in strength of opposition parties, it will have no alternative but to repress its opposition. As noted earlier, the PRI cannot tolerate meaningful opposition. But by coopting political opposition into the system, the PRI may be able to defuse the opposition before it poses a challenge.

Another aspect of the Mexican political system which merits atten-

tion is political alienation. Political alienation in Mexico is a multifaceted phenomenon which has no single root cause. One factor, of course, contributing to political alienation are the deficiencies of the electoral process. As von Sauer notes, it was dissatisfaction with both PAN and the PRI which led to 10 million voters remaining home in 1973.³¹ Perhaps, however, as long as this electoral alienation is not mobilized by the PRI's opposition, low levels of voter participation will be to the advantage of the PRI. On the basis of his survey of Mexico City, Kenneth Coleman concludes that efforts by the PRI to mobilize urban voters will prove to be counterproductive.³² This situation poses somewhat of a dilemma for the PRI. Historically, the PRI has depended upon the mass mobilization of the electorate for support. If the PRI's base of support is eroding, it may be that the PRI's support will depend, to a greater extent, upon political apathy. Certainly, from the PRI's perspective, this is an unhealthy and potentially dangerous turn of events.

A second factor related to political alienation in Mexico undoubtedly is the persistence of corruption. The negative impact of corruption on the political regime is impossible to measure. Nonetheless, it is reasonable to speculate on some of the probable consequences. Institutionalized corruption reinforces the belief of the Mexican that he cannot effectively contribute to political decisions and it also means that the actual exercise of power is more likely to be arbitrary than rational or equitable. It contributes to his fatalism and hopelessness. Those who possess power must be corrupt, or how else did they acquire power? Therefore, to be successful, one must be corrupt, even at the expense of exploiting one's fellow citizens. Perhaps in previous times corruption

performed a useful function in Mexico's political development, but today it is clearly dysfunctional.³³ Furthermore, "in Mexico the informal structures are likely to take priority over the legal ones."³⁴ The persistence of corruption will continue to impede the development of legitimacy for political institutions and the system as a whole. Without legitimacy, the regime will be susceptible to challenge during times of economic and political crisis.

A partial explanation of the authoritarian character of Mexico's political system may lie in the political culture of Mexico. Many writers have noted the authoritarian behavior of the Mexican. But Needler asserts that the authoritarianism of Mexico is different from the traditional authoritarian personality of Germany.³⁵ In Germany, authority may be used oppressively, but it is consistent rather than arbitrary. In Mexico, the psychological foundation for authoritarianism is vastly different. Mexican cultural traits include, for example: submissiveness, fatalism, cynicism, lack of hope or ability to change things, and also a lack of concern for the external material world. Possibly, the Mexican authoritarian personality, predisposed to deference and subservience, is a remnant of traditional peasant society.³⁶ Studies indicate that Mexicans born in rural areas significantly exhibit more authoritarian tendencies than those born in urban areas.³⁷ Another feature of the Mexican personality is the cult of male superiority, or machismo. Politically, machismo is manifested in the ability to dominate or impose one's will on others, exploitation, and a preoccupation with power. Thus, machismo would seem to be consistent with the authoritarian personality.³⁸

Thus in Mexico one observes an authoritarian political structure coupled with an authoritarian political culture. Whether one is the

result of the other is largely irrelevant, more importantly, culture and political institutions augment one another. In the words of Evelyn Stevens, Mexico has "a background of experimentation with liberal-constitutional forms superimposed on value systems more consistent with authoritarianism."³⁹ In Mexico, the liberal-constitutional forms appear to be more superficial than real.

The basic value of any political system is the maintenance of stability. Mexico's political system has preserved relative stability for 60 years. The success of the system has relied upon the ability of the ruling PRI to coopt opposition and repress dissent. Also central to the PRI's maintenance of power is the ability of PRI to sustain legitimacy. To this end, the PRI identifies with the social-justice themes of the Revolution and actively seeks reaffirmation of support through the electoral process. In the past, the success of the PRI at the polls has reflected the ability of the party to manipulate large segments of the population by advancing revolutionary rhetoric. In short, the PRI has successfully institutionalized the Revolution.

But Mexico's political institutions are beginning to exhibit signs of strain. Table I provides an indication of the increasing political violence of the late 1970's. Violence and alienation are the manifestations of this degenerative process. Urbanization and a rising urban proletariat will reduce the ability of the regime to manipulate political symbols for political support. In effect, the revolutionary party becomes a post-revolutionary party and, as such, it is more difficult to justify its existence on the basis of ideology. Consequently, the power of the party declines vis-a-vis other institutions, particularly the bureaucracy or the military. More important in the Mexican case, how-

ever, is the fact that the regime has become calcified. The system has stagnated which results in an inability to respond to new problems. The next two chapters will focus on the more serious problems confronting contemporary Mexico.

TABLE I
 MEXICAN AFFAIRS AS REPORTED IN THE NEW YORK TIMES, 1970-1979

Category	1970/71	1972/73	1974/75	1976/77	1978/79
Kidnap/Assassination	2	3	8	2	2
Strike	0	0	0	2	2
Demonstration	3	0	1	3	3
Guerrilla Activity	5	5	9	3	1
Demonstration Abroad	0	0	1	1	1
Corruption/Political Scandal	0	0	1	1	3
Riot	0	0	1	0	1
Bombing	0	1	3	3	0
Hijacking	0	1	1	0	0
Political Shootout	0	1	3	5	0
Local Revolt	0	0	1	0	0
Peasant Unrest/ Land Invasion	0	0	1	1	3
Repression	3	1	2	7	5
Total Anti-System Phenomena By Year	13	12	32	28	21

SOURCE: The New York Times Index, 1970-1979

ENDNOTES

¹Judith Adler Hellman, Mexico in Crisis (New York: Holmes and Meiers Publishers, Inc., 1978), p. 1.

²See, for example, Lorenzo Meyer, "Historical Roots of the Authoritarian State in Mexico," in Jose Luis Reyna and Richard C. Weinert, eds., Authoritarianism in Mexico (Philadelphia: Institute for the Study of Human Issues, 1977).

³Ibid., p. 4.

⁴Susan Kaufman Purcell, "The Future of the Mexican System," in Ibid., p. 173.

⁵Samuel Flagg Bemis, The Latin-American Policy of the United States (New York: W. W. Norton and Co., 1967), p. 170.

⁶Richard B. Mancke, Mexican Oil and Natural Gas: Political, Strategic, and Economic Implications (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1979), p. 27.

⁷L. Vincent Padgett, The Mexican Political System (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1966), pp. 18-20.

⁸Ibid., p. 19.

⁹Martin C. Needler, Politics and Society in Mexico (Albuquerque, N.M.: University of New Mexico Press, 1971), pp. 77-78.

¹⁰Hellman, op. cit., p. 5.

¹¹Originally, the party founded by Calles was known as the National Revolutionary Party or PNR. In the late 1930's the party was renamed the Mexican Revolutionary Party or PRM. And in the late 1940's the party was again renamed the Institutional Revolutionary Party or PRI.

¹²Needler, op. cit., pp. 3-4.

¹³Samuel P. Huntington, "Social and Institutional Dynamics of One-Party Systems," in Samuel P. Huntington and Clement H. Moore, eds., Authoritarian Politics in Modern Society (New York: Basic Books, Inc., Publishers, 1970), p. 30.

¹⁴Hellman, op. cit., Chapter 4.

¹⁵Ibid., p. 36.

¹⁶Ibid., p. 40.

¹⁷Ibid., p. 42.

¹⁸Ibid., p. 45.

¹⁹Kenneth F. Johnson, Mexican Democracy: A Critical View, rev. ed. (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1978), p. 81.

²⁰Purcell, op. cit., pp. 181-182.

²¹Ibid., p. 181.

²²Facts on File, July 20, 1979, p. 545.

²³Franz A. vonSauer, The Alienated "Loyal" Opposition (Albuquerque, N.M.: University of New Mexico Press, 1974), p. 137.

²⁴George W. Grayson, "Mexican Foreign Policy," Current History, 72 (March 1977), p. 97.

²⁵Padgett, op. cit., p. 50.

²⁶Ibid., p. 45.

²⁷Needler, op. cit., p. 47.

²⁸Ibid., p. 47.

²⁹Purcell, op. cit., p. 178.

³⁰Mancke, op. cit., p. 116.

³¹von Sauer, op. cit., p. 147.

³²Kenneth M. Coleman, Diffuse Support in Mexico: The Potential for Crisis, Sage Professional Papers in Comparative Politics, vol. 5, series no. 01-057 (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1976), p. 44.

³³It is not argued that all forms of corruption are dysfunctional in the Mexican system. But rather, some forms of corruption are essentially acceptable or "legitimate" while others are not. Thus offering a bribe to a policeman is such a widespread practice that it is difficult to categorize this action as corruption. This study is more concerned with other types of corruption which Mexican society generally does not condone, such as: electoral fraud and embezzlement of public funds. As a result, corruption of this type will prevent or diminish the development of support for the system.

³⁴Johnson, op. cit., p. 82.

³⁵Needler, op. cit., pp. 79-80.

³⁶A discussion of the ethos of peasant society is found in Edward C. Banfield's study of a Southern Italian village. The Italian peasant would appear to be culturally similar to the Mexican peasant, with one notable exception. The Italian peasant is concerned with the material external world while the Mexican peasant is not. The influence of Indian culture in shaping the Mexican psychic probably accounts for this attribute of Mexican culture. The breakdown of peasant society and the assimilation of the peasant into the larger society is not without frustration for the peasant. The increase in expectations of the peasant outstrips his ability to satisfy his new wants. Interestingly, as Banfield notes, "As his opportunities for mobility improve, the peasant may become more hostile and aggressive as well as less miserable." The Moral Basis of a Backward Society (Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press, 1958), p. 168.

³⁷Ann L. Craig and Wayne A. Cornelius, "Political Culture in Mexico: Continuities and Revisionist Interpretations," in Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba, eds., The Civic Culture Revisited (Boston: Little, Brown, and Co., 1980), p. 350.

³⁸Ibid., p. 348.

³⁹Evelyn P. Stevens, "Protest Movements in an Authoritarian Regime," Comparative Politics, 7 (April 1975), 363.

CHAPTER III

ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND INCOME INEQUALITY

Since 1940, Mexico has experienced impressive aggregate economic growth. During this period, Mexico's Gross Domestic Product (GDP) has risen by an average of 6 percent per year. However, this dynamic, economic performance, has been achieved at high social costs. In Mexico, economic development is coupled with severe income inequality.

Mexico's drive toward modernization has placed emphasis upon capital-intensive rather than labor-intensive forms of production. According to Hellman, Mexico has pursued the "trickledown" theory of economic growth.¹ That is, to achieve rapid industrialization, Mexico has relied upon capital-intensive development to provide the high profits necessary to raise domestic savings and investment. In turn, these profits must be reinvested to maintain the rapid economic growth. A corollary to this strategy is that since profits are used to spur new investment, wages must be kept low. But eventually, the economic development will be beneficial to all segments of society, that is the benefits will "trickle down." As a consequence of this policy, employment has not kept pace with economic growth.

In a country with chronic unemployment, it is therefore prudent to examine in a little greater detail the emphasis placed upon capital-intensive development. Capital-intensive forms of production are one consequence of Mexico's drive toward industrialization through a policy of import substitution.² The policy of industrialization via import

substitution provides for the replacement of imports with domestically manufactured goods. In turn, this necessitates a protectionist economic structure for the domestic manufacturing sector. Thus, domestic industry is protected from external competition and provided an environment conducive to profitable investment. While import substitution is an effective means of promoting industrialization, it is not necessarily an efficient process.³ Protectionist policies allow the affected industries to produce inefficiently, thereby resulting in higher costs and thus prices. Another feature of the import substitution policy is the relative cheapening of the price of capital vis-a-vis labor.⁴ Therefore, Mexican businessmen are encouraged to adopt capital-intensive technologies rather than labor-intensive ones.

The policy of import substitution also has a negative effect upon income distribution. The impact is two-fold. First, protectionist policies, by encouraging capital-intensive forms of production, also promotes an oligopolistic or monopolistic domestic market which results in a further concentration of wealth. Secondly, by utilizing capital rather than labor, the demand for labor declines which tends to depress wages. Therefore, import substitution aggravates the problem of income inequality.

Another unattractive feature of the policy of import substitution is that it further increases Mexico's dependence on foreign capital, and thus the United States. Import substitution partially substituted the importation of goods with foreign investment and Mexico's trade deficit has been financed through external indebtedness. This situation has tended to increase the "external disequilibrium" in the Mexican economy.⁵ This means that the Mexican developmental model reinforces

the need for foreign capital in order to promote growth.

The Mexican policy on foreign investment is a unique contradiction between idealistic rhetoric and pragmatic realism. On the one hand, Mexico officially is sensitive to excessive foreign investment and foreign control over the economy. But Mexican policy makers also realize that economic development will require foreign capital. These seemingly contradictory goals are resolved through the policy of "mexicanization" of the economy. Judith Hellman has found the policy of "mexicanization" offers little real control over foreign investments.⁶ According to Hellman, this policy was intended to encourage foreign investment while subjecting that investment to certain restrictions. But there are many loopholes left open which allow the foreign enterprise to circumvent control. For example, under the "mexicanization" policy, majority stock must be held by Mexican nationals in certain sectors of the economy. In reality, a foreign firm can easily secure an exception by a variety of means, thus allowing great leeway in the implementation of the law. If a company cannot secure an exception or if an established firm is forced to sell stock, it still will not necessarily have to relinquish control. A wide-spread practice in Mexico is for a foreign firm simply to collaborate with a native in the symbolic use of his name as the majority stockholder. There are handsome profits for the Mexican businessman to make as a "name-lender" or (preslanombre). Thus, Hellman concludes that at times, Mexico has chosen to ignore violations of its "mexicanization" policy.

The impact of foreign investment in Mexico stems not only from the dollar amounts, but also from the concentration of investment in certain sectors of the economy. There are some scholars who maintain that for-

foreign enterprises (the United States accounts for 80 percent of all foreign investment in Mexico) possess an exaggerated amount of economic power due to their control of key sectors of the economy. According to Lorenzo Meyer, while foreign capital accounts for about 10 percent of the Mexican GDP, foreign capital is almost exclusively invested in the manufacturing sector.⁷ Kenneth Johnson maintains that this concentration in the manufacturing sector by foreign capital results in the ability of foreign capital to have great impact on the rest of the economy.⁸ Thus, the foreign firm tends to invest in the most dynamic sectors of the economy and exerts tremendous influence in those areas. Of the 400 largest corporations operating in Mexico, more than half are owned or heavily influenced by non-Mexicans.⁹ Another source of power and profit for the United States corporation in Mexico is the control by United States companies over the use of patents in Mexican industry. It is estimated that 80 percent of all patents used in Mexican industry are United States owned.¹⁰ From the Mexican perspective, American industry's control over patents prevents Mexican subsidiaries from developing trade abroad and discourages Mexican industry in general from making its own technological advances.

Another example of the power of foreign firms is the practice of requiring Mexican subsidiaries to purchase materials for manufacture from the parent company, often at inflated prices. One United Nations study found that some foreign owned companies charged their Mexican subsidiary in excess of 500 percent of the market price for these materials.¹¹ Mexicans also worry about capital flight from Mexico. Not only do foreign investors extract more capital from Mexico than they invest, but in times of economic crisis there is also the tendency for

Mexicans to send their money out of Mexico and deposit it in the United States.¹²

Further complicating Mexico's economic situation is Mexico's over dependence on one external market for trade. Seventy percent of all Mexican exports are destined to the United States, and 60 percent of Mexican imports are provided by the United States. As a result, the vitality of Mexico's economy is directly dependent upon the health of the United States economy. In addition to Mexico's dependence upon the United States economy, Mexico has experienced a balance of payments problem in recent years. The balance of payments deficit necessitated austere economic policies at home, heavy borrowing from foreign banks and a \$1.2 billion loan from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in 1976. These policies culminated in the devaluation of the peso in 1976. Also, Mexico's economy, which had been experiencing impressive growth, became quite sluggish with increased unemployment and a fall in the GDP (See Table II). Inflation has also plagued Mexico with the Consumer Price

TABLE II
MEXICAN GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT AND
PER CAPITA DOMESTIC PRODUCT

	1960	1963	1970	1975	1976	1977
Gross Domestic Product (Billion US\$)	11.1	14.6	30.9	71.6	70.7	65.3
Per Capita GDP (US\$)	307	363	609	1191	1135	1010

Source: United Nations, 1978 Statistical Yearbook

Index (CPI) rising an average of 20 percent per year between 1970 and 1979.¹³ Mexico's economic growth rate had improved in 1978, but inflation and unemployment still persisted. Also, Mexico's foreign debt had expanded to an estimated 30 billion dollars and Mexico's balance of payments deficit in 1979 had risen to 3 billion dollars.¹⁴

Mexico's drive toward industrialization, like any nation in the process of development, is dependent upon the reduction of the peasantry and the number of persons employed in the agricultural sector of the economy. In terms of the proportion of GDP the agricultural sector accounted for 8.5 percent in 1979.¹⁵ More problematic, however, is the fact that nearly 40 percent of the labor force is employed in agriculture. Consequently, the processes of modernization and urbanization have resulted in increasing the deprivation of the rural masses. The number of landless peasants is increasing while the average number of work days of rural laborers is decreasing.¹⁶ Also, notwithstanding sporadic land reform, the trend in Mexico is one of increasing the concentration of land ownership rather than a more equitable distribution. Accompanying this concentration of land is an expected concentration of income within the agricultural sector. In fact, the agricultural sector in Mexico has the most unequal distribution of income of all sectors of the economy.¹⁷ The prospects for the Mexican peasant do not appear to be very promising. First, it is unlikely that the government will effect serious land reform as the government views the large land holdings as more productive and the political influence of the large land owner militates against the break-up of these farms. Secondly, there is simply no new land left to distribute. For example, during the Díaz Ordaz administration (1964 to 1970), 91 percent of the land the peasants received was not arable.¹⁸

As noted earlier, Mexico's economic development has fostered extreme income inequality. In fact, concentration of wealth has increased in Mexico to the point where income inequality is as great today as in the pre-revolutionary Mexico of 1910.¹⁹ The egalitarian-social-justice theme of the Mexican Revolution has largely been abandoned for a policy of rapid economic growth. In other words, since Cárdenas, Mexico's economic growth has been coupled with a reconcentration of wealth. As David Felix notes, the material well-being of the poorest 40 percent has remained virtually unchanged since 1910, while the top 20 percent has been the recipient of the bulk of the material gains.²⁰ In comparison with 43 other less developed countries (LDC's), only 4 countries had an income distribution which was more skewed.²¹ Hence, few countries have a greater contrast between poverty and luxury than Mexico.

In short, Mexico has experienced economic growth without development.²² That is, Mexico's rise in per capita GDP becomes meaningless when other economic goals (employment, income redistribution, and independence from foreign markets and capital) are sacrificed in the process. This is precisely the condition of Mexico's economic growth. High increases in per capita output are coupled with rising unemployment, reconcentration of wealth, and increasing dependence on the United States. Further undermining the economic condition of the poor is a high rate of inflation, since the economic costs of inflation are not distributed equally. The Mexican wage earner has experienced a decline in purchasing power during the 1970's as pay increases have not kept pace with inflation.²³

Ironically, recent research of the Mexican economic model suggests that the effects of income redistribution on economic growth through the

alteration of capital and import needs would be slight.²⁴ In other words, conventional theory maintains that the redistribution of income leads to a fall in the rate of savings and thus a decline in economic growth due to a lack of capital formation. However, it may well be that the decline in savings effects will be at least partially offset by other effects resulting from redistribution.²⁵ If high aggregate growth is not dependent upon income inequality, then this certainly would bolster the egalitarian argument for income redistribution.

Fundamentally, the unequal distribution of income stems from an unequal distribution of political power in the Mexican polity. The urban working class and the rural peasant have no effective political organizations through which they can place demands upon the government in pursuit of their economic interests. The political parties, trade unions, and peasant organizations are unable to function as pressure groups in the manner which is associated with Western liberal democracies. Rather than place legitimate demands on the government, these groups are manipulated and controlled by the government. Therefore, political and economic decisions benefit those segments of society which are organized and thus possess political and economic power.

It is important to note that while material benefits have not trickled down to the majority of Mexicans, some social benefits have. Income inequality is the same today as in 1910, but literacy, life expectancy, and urbanization have increased. Certainly, this has also increased the expectations of the average Mexican. He is also probably more aware of his relative deprivation and therefore potentially more susceptible to social and political mobilization. Poverty breeds alienation. In light of the "rising expectations" of the Mexican worker

and peasant and the concomitant inability of the present regime to fulfill these expectations, the economic system is one source of instability in Mexico's future.

ENDNOTES

¹Judith Adler Hellman, Mexico in Crisis (New York: Holmes and Meiers Publishers, Inc., 1978), p. 57.

²René Villerreal, "The Policy of Import-Substitution Industrialization, 1929-1975," in Jose Luis Reyna and Richard S. Weinert, eds., Authoritarianism in Mexico (Philadelphia: Institute for the Study of Human Issues, Inc., 1977), p. 76.

³Ibid., pp. 74-75.

⁴Ibid., p. 76.

⁵Ibid., p. 81.

⁶Hellman, op. cit., pp. 60-62.

⁷Lorenzo Meyer, "Historical Roots of the Authoritarian State in Mexico," in Authoritarianism in Mexico, op. cit., p. 17.

⁸Kenneth F. Johnson, Mexican Democracy: A Critical View, rev. ed. (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1978), p. 117.

⁹Carlos A. Astiz, "Mexico's Foreign Policy: Disguised Dependency," Current History, 66 (May 1974), 221.

¹⁰Johnson, op. cit., p. 117.

¹¹Ibid., p. 115.

¹²"An Interview with Lopez Portillo," Time, July 23, 1979, p. 51.

¹³Banco Nacional de Mexico, Review of the Economic Situation in Mexico, 55 (December 1979), p. 437.

¹⁴Ibid., pp. 440-441.

¹⁵Ibid., p. 420.

¹⁶Roger D. Hansen, The Politics of Mexican Development (Baltimore: The John Hopkins Press, 1971), p. 81.

¹⁷Ibid., p. 78.

¹⁸Jose Luis Reyna, "Redefining the Authoritarian Regime," in Authoritarianism in Mexico, op. cit., p. 164.

¹⁹David Felix, "Income Inequality in Mexico," Current History, 72 (March 1977), 112.

²⁰Ibid., p. 111

²¹Ibid., p. 111.

²²Villerreal, op. cit., p. 67.

²³Banco Nacional de Mexico, op. cit., p. 420.

²⁴John R. Stewart, Jr., "Potential Effects of Income Redistribution on Economic Growth: An Expanded Estimating Procedure Applied to Mexico," Economic Development and Cultural Change, 26 (April 1979), 485.

²⁵Ibid., p. 468. For example, Gunnar Myrdal has argued that income redistribution will increase labor productivity and thereby offset the decline in savings effect.

CHAPTER IV

POPULATION PRESSURES AND EMIGRATION

Despite reports that the rate of population growth may have declined in recent years,¹ a population explosion is perhaps the most serious problem confronting Mexico (see Tables III and IV). When President López Portillo's term expires in 1982, Mexico will have a population of 75--78 million of which one-third will reside in Mexico City. Mexico's rate of population growth is double that of China and one percent higher than that of India. Even if Mexico's birth rate should decline in the near future, her population will double in twenty years. These predictions become more ominous when viewed in light of the extreme poverty in Mexico. In 1976, the National Institute of Nutrition reported that 5 out of 6 Mexicans were undernourished and that 85 percent of the goods in Mexico was consumed by 18 percent of the population.² Mexico's agricultural sector has been unable to increase production to meet the increased demand for foodstuffs. In the decade of 1970-1979, per capita harvested area declined by 20 percent in Mexico.³ As a result, it has become increasingly necessary for Mexico to import food. Since land under cultivation is only expanding at a rate of 1 percent a year, the importation of large quantities of food should continue, if not increase, in the future.⁴

Food is the most basic need that Mexico's expanding population will require. But there are additional areas which will also be affected.

TABLE III
MEXICO'S POPULATION

	1955	1960	1965	1970	1975	1979
Millions	30.7	36.2	42.6	50.1	58.7	65.7

Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract of the United States: 1979. (100th edition) Washington, D.C., 1979.

TABLE IV
MEXICAN BIRTH AND DEATH RATES

	1955-59	1960-64	1965-69	1970-74
Birth Rate (per thousand)	44.9	44.4	43.2	44.1
Death Rate (per thousand)	12.2	11.0	9.5	7.2
Annual rate of natural increase* (per cent)	3.27	3.34	3.37	3.69

*Does not reflect population changes due to immigration or emigration

Source: Ansley J. Coale, "Population Growth and Economic Development: The Case of Mexico," Foreign Affairs, 56 (January 1978).

More schools, hospitals, housing and jobs must be provided, therefore, population growth cannot be evaluated in isolation from an overall perspective of Mexican development. It is not the absolute size of Mexico's population which is significant, but rather, it is the ability of Mexico's political and economic system to absorb it. For instance, Mexico's economic system currently generates 300,000 new jobs a year. However, over 1 million Mexicans are entering the work force each year.⁵ Although figures vary, a reasonable estimate would be that 40-50 percent of Mexico's population is either unemployed or underemployed. The inability of Mexico's economic system to provide adequate employment explains why 10 percent of Mexico's population lives and works in the United States.

The relationship between economic development and population growth is not entirely conclusive. Professor Ansley Coale has identified two traditional views of population growth and economic development.⁶ One view holds that rapid population growth will simply serve to negate gains made by economic development. Economic growth, then, enables developing countries to support larger populations while the standard of living remains constant or even deteriorates. Thus, in Malthusian fashion, population growth constitutes a trap for developing countries and efforts at economic development are likely to be ineffectual. The counterposition, according to Coale, is one of placing emphasis on economic growth, the world can support larger populations. Also, as society becomes industrialized, birth rates will decline thereby reducing both poverty and population growth. Since Mexico is experiencing rapid economic development with no reduction in population growth, Coale surmises that the solution lies in strong population control measures.

Lawrence C. Stedman asserts that redistributing wealth is the key to reducing birth rates.⁷ Stedman maintains that poverty and hunger are not necessarily caused by not enough food and too many people. As an example, Stedman cited the United States where 10 to 12 million people are estimated to be either starving or sick because they cannot afford to eat. This is, of course, in spite of the fact that the United States has an adequate food supply. Thus Stedman says, "To eliminate hunger, it is not enough simply to produce great amounts of food and to lower fertility rates; one must also change the way goods and purchasing power are distributed."⁸ In short, Stedman's argument is that the more egalitarian the distribution of wealth, the lower the birth rate. Secondly, income redistribution and land reform also help to feed people by allowing the people to produce food on their own land rather than working the land for a large land owner at subsistence wages. To the extent that Stedman's argument is correct, it has great applicability in the case of Mexico. As noted in Chapter III, few countries have a more unequal distribution of income than Mexico.

There are, however, cultural, religious, and economic obstacles which will impede any attempts at population control in Mexico. Rooted in the Mexican cultural tradition is the notion of machismo. That is, one's manliness is determined by his sexual virility. Therefore, the more children a man has, the more macho he feels. Secondly, since Mexico is predominantly Catholic, the papal encyclical against birth control may have a negative effect on curbing population growth. However, the impact of the church on population control may be less than expected because of the historic antagonism between Church and State in Mexico, the secularization of education, and the decline in general

of the influence of the Church. Nevertheless, one might expect the Church to have considerable influence over those who are deeply religious, especially in the rural areas. In addition to the Catholic Church, both PAN and PCM are opposed to birth control. The opposition of PAN to birth control reflects its support of the Church while PCM has adopted the Marxist view that birth control is a:

Yankee, Protestant, capitalistic plot to hold down the number of Latin American (and Third World brown-skinned) people, so that the world economic and political power will not shift from the Northern to the Southern hemisphere, from the rich to the poor nations.⁹

There is little reason to suspect that either PAN or PCM opposition to birth control has any significant impact upon Mexico's masses.¹⁰ Finally, the third obstacle to effective birth control is economic in nature. It is simply the fact that, in many developing nations, children are an economic asset rather than an economic burden. Even though the family may exist in extreme poverty, the children contribute more to the family by way of income or chores that they perform than they cost to feed, house, and clothe. While this perhaps does not apply to all of Mexico, it does apply to at least some of Mexico's poor families.

Official policies directed toward birth control are very recent and modest. It was not until 1973 that the Mexican government launched a program of family planning. Even if successful, the impact of these efforts certainly will not be felt for some years to come. The approach of the Mexican government has been one of a purely technical nature. That is, the Mexican government is promoting birth control through the establishment of family planning clinics which provide information and free contraceptive devices. The government has not, however, launched any programs to reform political and social impediments to birth con-

trol (e.g., land reform or income redistribution). Therefore, for those who feel the solution to population growth is social and political, as well as technical,¹¹ the Mexican approach is clearly insufficient. Another flaw of Mexico's family planning clinics is their limited accessibility. Alisky estimates that only 26 percent of Mexico's females live close enough to the clinics to regularly use the birth control service.¹²

Coupled with a fast growing population, Mexico is also experiencing a relative decline in her peasant population. Mexico's rural population (residents in areas with a population of 2,500 or less) has decreased from 58 percent (1970) to 40 percent (1979).¹³ Precipitating this shift has been a migration from the rural areas to urban areas in search of employment. Employment opportunities in the cities, while for the most part scarce, are higher paying and more abundant. Modernization of agriculture and large land holdings have resulted in forcing the Mexican peasant from the land to the cities.

It should be noted that there are glaring disparities between urban and rural Mexico. Per capita income in metropolitan areas is 4 times greater than that of rural areas.¹⁴ According to Pablo Gonzalez Casanova, Mexico is a dual society consisting of two groups, one marginal and the other participant.¹⁵ This marginal population has not been integrated into Mexican society. It is less well-fed, less educated, less prosperous, and predominately rural. Indeed, Gonzalez Casanova asserts that the marginal population in Mexico is the victim of internal colonialism.¹⁶ While this marginal population is declining proportionally, it is increasing in absolute numbers. This situation tends to cloud the issue of Mexico's rural poverty, especially since the gap between

the haves and have-nots is widening.

At the bottom of Mexico's marginal population is the Indian. Mexico's Indian population poses a complex and perplexing social and political problem for Mexico. As a societal outcast, the Indian becomes vulnerable to exploitation and discrimination. Gonzalez Casanova provides an insight to the Indian's condition:

In general terms, whites and mestizos (both citizens and authorities) consider their Indian fellow citizens as inferior, and treat them with a roughness comparable to that of the Spanish conquerors. The way in which the authorities view the Indian, how they make him suffer, amuse themselves at his expense, feel more intelligent than he, humiliate him, make him feel uneasy, attack him, treat him with excessive familiarity, these are all forms linked to the violence of domination and to colonial exploitation.¹⁷

In sum, Mexico is struggling with intractable population problems. The present population control measures are more cosmetic than real, as fundamental structural reforms do not appear to be forthcoming. The economic system is unable to keep pace with the demands for employment, housing, food, schools, and all the various goods and services, both private and public, which Mexico's population growth creates. Exacerbating the problem is the existence of a marginal population which is unassimilated, culturally traditional, and primarily rural. It is against this background that Mexico's solution to population pressures assumes substance. Central to managing Mexico's population problem is the emigration of millions of her citizens to the United States in search of employment.

The United States Census Bureau recently reported that, at any one time, no more than 3 million Mexicans are in the United States illegally.¹⁸ This figure seems somewhat conservative as most informed estimates place the number of Mexicans residing illegally in the United

States in the six to eight million range. Regardless of the source of one's estimate, the significance of the Mexican migration northward is not lost.

For Mexico, emigration of her workers to the United States provides an escape valve releasing pressures placed on the system. Mexico views less restrictive United States immigration policies as a means of relieving pressures from her domestic problems of poverty, unemployment, and population growth. In fact, many writers have argued that the phenomenon of Mexican migration northward is a modern restatement of the "Safety Value Theory" of the 19th Century. According to this theory, the immigration to the United States of Irish, German, Eastern European, and Mediterranean workers relieved population pressures abroad while providing a cheap labor supply for America's industrial development. Also of importance is the fact that dollar remittances from Mexican workers in the United States help to alleviate Mexico's balance of payments deficit. For these reasons, the problem of illegal aliens in the United States can be viewed as a direct extension of domestic Mexican politics and the inability of the political regime to deal with domestic problems.¹⁹ Therefore, curbing the influx of illegal aliens into the United States will mean that the focus of correctional action must be directed at present conditions in Mexico, not the United States.²⁰ In other words, unilateral actions taken by the United States, such as prosecuting employers of illegal aliens, attempting to close the border, requiring national identity cards, will be ineffectual and very likely counterproductive. Unless the conditions of poverty and unemployment, which cause this migration, are addressed, any restrictive American policy will only contribute further to Mexican social unrest and instability.

For the United States, the presence of millions of Mexican laborers constitutes a de facto "guest worker" arrangement not unlike that of Britain, Germany, or France.²¹ Bluntly stated, the United States needs the Mexican to fill the unattractive, dirty, and low paying jobs which Americans (including most minority Americans) are reluctant to take. Since the illegal alien is usually willing to work for less than his American counterpart and is also difficult to unionize, American employers find Mexican labor attractive. In a very real sense, then, both nations need each other.

A recent study prepared by the Library of Congress concluded that past experience demonstrated an adverse effect upon wages and working conditions of domestic workers by allowing aliens in.²² Furthermore, the study noted that in spite of a shortage of unskilled labor in the United States, action on a large scale guest worker program for the United States should be postponed.²³ Notwithstanding the Library of Congress report, some sort of renewed Bracero program appears to be the only plausible solution to the immigration problem. Mexico's rapid population growth will continue for the foreseeable future. This also implies that pressure for northward migration will be a long-term phenomenon rather than a short-term one. Mexico's massive unemployment problem lures millions of its jobless northward seeking work in the United States. Even though the plight of the Mexican worker in the United States is often very harsh, the United States nevertheless represents an improvement over the conditions which exist in Mexico.

Therefore, the United States policy regarding illegal immigration is of primary importance to the continued stability of Mexico. It would seem that the immigration problem tends to be minor for the United States,

but vital for Mexico. Any attempt by the United States government to halt the flow of Mexicans across the border will cause serious repercussions in Mexico. Generally, the most vocal opposition to the illegal alien is organized labor. Organized labor often claims that the illegal alien contributes to unemployment in the United States by securing employment which otherwise would be filled by United States workers. However, if economic conditions worsen in the United States in the 1980's, then one can expect pressures for more restrictive immigration policies to increase.

In 1977, the United States Immigration and Naturalization Service reported that nearly 1 million surreptitious entries into the United States were detected and thwarted, with nearly all of these occurring on the United States-Mexican border.²⁴ However, for every unsuccessful attempted entry, it is believed that quite a few more are successful. Additionally, nearly 1 million illegal Mexicans residing in the United States were discovered and deported in 1977.²⁵

The mother of a Mexican who regularly journeys to California to work summed up the Mexican attitude about working illegally in the United States. When quizzed about the possibility of the entire family moving to California, she replied, "We would all go if we could ... Who knows, maybe everyone in Mexico would go ... All of us. There is nothing for us in Mexico."²⁶

ENDNOTES

¹Robert Reinhold, "Mexico's Birth Rate Seems Off Sharply," New York Times (November 5, 1979), p. 14.

²As reported in Marvin Alisky, "Mexico's Population Pressures," Current History, 72 (March 1977), 131.

³Banco Nacional de Mexico, Review of the Economic Situation in Mexico, 55 (December 1979), 428.

⁴Ibid., p. 425.

⁵Gene Lyons, "Inside the Volcano," Harpers, 254 (June 1977), 42.

⁶Ansley J. Coale, "Population Growth and Economic Development: The Case of Mexico," Foreign Affairs, 56 (January 1978), 415.

⁷Lawrence C. Stedman, "Third World Development: A Rebuttal," Foreign Affairs, 57 (Winter 1978/79), 407-408.

⁸Ibid., p. 407.

⁹Marvin Alisky, "Mexico versus Malthus: National Trends," Current History, 66 (May 1974), 202.

¹⁰Ibid., p. 202.

¹¹Stedman, op. cit., p. 410.

¹²Alisky, 1977, p. 132.

¹³Banco Nacional de Mexico, op. cit., p. 422.

¹⁴David Felix, "Income Inequality in Mexico," Current History, 72 (March 1977), 113.

¹⁵Pablo Gonzalez Casanova, Democracy in Mexico (New York: Oxford University Press, 1970), p. 71-103.

¹⁶Ibid., p. 71.

¹⁷Ibid., p. 102.

¹⁸Facts on File, February 29, 1980, p. 147.

¹⁹Kenneth F. Johnson, Mexican Democracy: A Critical View, rev. ed. (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1979), p. 198.

²⁰Richard R. Fagen, "The Realities of United States-Mexican Relations," Foreign Affairs, 55 (July 1977), p. 389.

²¹James Flanigan, "North of the Border--Who Needs Whom?," Forbes, 15 (April 1977), p. 37.

²²Facts on File, February 29, 1980, p. 147.

²³Ibid., p. 147.

²⁴U.S. Department of Justice, Annual Report: Immigration and Naturalization Service (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1977), p. 14.

²⁵Ibid., p. 14.

²⁶Lyons, op. cit., p. 52.

CHAPTER V

CONCLUSION

This study advanced the hypothesis that Mexico is an example of a political system in the process of declining legitimacy. It was further argued that a crisis of regime maintenance is in process because of the inability of the system to successfully deal with a growing number of fundamental problems. Additionally, it is believed that there is a causal association between these two processes. That is, the decadence of political institutions in Mexico results from a loss of legitimacy of the political system. This loss of legitimacy stems from the declining ability of the system to satisfy mass demands.

The weakening of Mexican political institutions is not intrinsic to the authoritarian one-party political structure; it is due to extrinsic factors. For example, political institutions in Mexico, specifically the PRI, lack sufficient autonomy or independence from the small wealthy elite. Consequently, the PRI cannot articulate and formulate public policies directed at the common interest because private interests dominate public ones. The subordination of public goals to private ones allows a small privileged class to impede the adoption of policies directed at promoting the public well-being. Mexican policy makers should consider the adoption of tax codes and other policies which would encourage labor-intensive production technologies rather than capital-intensive ones. Mexican industrialists and financiers find it more

profitable to build factories on the North American model rather than apply more appropriate production forms—viz., labor-intensive industries—to existing conditions, and they possess the economic and political power to impose such a policy.

The problem is not that a very small number of individuals control the political decision making apparatus, because this is the case in most countries whether developed or developing. The problem basically results from an absence of foresight by those in power. Income inequality will exist in any capitalist economy, but the severity of income inequality in Mexico is destabilizing in that it leads to social and political unrest.

Another factor which is fostering decadence of the Mexican system is the narrowness of scope of the political institutions. Structurally, the PRI is a broad based party organized around the major segments of Mexican society. In reality, the peasants and labor have little input into the system. While in theory the party is inclusive, in fact, the party tends to be quite exclusionary. Julius Nyerere has warned that "No party which limits its membership to a clique can ever free itself from fear of overthrow by those it has excluded."¹ The PRI derives legitimacy insofar as it promotes the goals of the Revolution. By enunciating hollow revolutionary rhetoric, the legitimacy of the PRI as a political institution is transformed into alienation for the system. The strength of the Mexican system depends upon the strength of the PRI.

Corruption also promotes political decay. This is not to say that corruption is always dysfunctional. In many circumstances, political corruption can have a positive influence on economic development or the process of nation building. There is also a cultural bias which leads

to the identification of some practices as corrupt which may be actually culturally acceptable to the particular society in question. That is, one must be careful that the political norms or behavioral standards used in defining corruption are applicable to the society under investigation. Nepotism as a means to relieve unemployment or bribery to supplement the low wages of bureaucrats may perform a useful function in the Mexican system. But corruption in Mexico is extensive, encompassing all aspects of society. The persistence of corruption in Mexico must be considered a weakness of the regime since it presents an obstacle in securing support for political institutions and organizations. The widespread malfeasance of party officials and bureaucrats benefits the interests of a few at the expense of the majority of Mexicans.

Any analysis of political instability must be tempered by several considerations. First, in Mexico (and Latin America generally), political processes and institutions do not always function according to the legally prescribed norms. The Mexican Congress and Mexican labor unions do not perform the same function in the Mexican system as their American counterparts in the United States. Thus, these institutions and processes may give the appearance of being unstable or chaotic when, in reality, they are not. Secondly, all political systems are compelled to guide or manage pressures for change. While the forces of change often are destabilizing, the successful adaptation to new situations or coping with problems is a sign of system strength. In view of these considerations:

A stable political system may be defined as one which can manage change within its structures. In a stable system, the pattern of interactions is not subject to large or radical change, and the political actors can depend upon certain procedures and relationships, which adjust to the changing requirements of the society. Stability results, on the one hand, from the views that the population have of their politi-

cal system and, on the other hand, from the strength of the system itself. In a stable political system, the members of the system consider it to be both legitimate and effective and the system, in turn, must have the power and ability to meet the demands and needs of the society as well as the flexibility to adjust to changing circumstances. An unstable system is the converse of the stable system.²

By this definition, Mexico past would qualify as a stable system. Change was managed through the existing structures either by cooptation or repression. Also, the system enjoyed legitimacy due to the popular support given to the system by most sectors of Mexican society.

This study concludes that support for the Mexican regime is eroding. Various factors in the Mexican system are causing increased alienation and thus undermining the ability of the government to respond to the demands and needs of society. Certain reforms, if adopted, could prevent a further deterioration. For example, the PRI might re-implement reforms such as advocated by Carlos Madraza. Madraza, a former PRI president, attempted to introduce meaningful competition into the candidate selection process through the establishment of intra-party primaries. Such a policy would revitalize the PRI by curbing the abuses of power by PRI officials and make them more responsive. Today, there are few internal or external checks placed on party members in positions of power.

The one-party system seems to be best suited to Mexico's needs. Competition between parties in Mexico would prove to be counterproductive as it would increase the polarization of Mexican society when Mexico needs a dynamic and vital party to confront her social, economic, and political problems.

As asserted earlier, the Mexican political system is experiencing a process of degeneration. Decay can be expected to continue because of

the severity of the destabilizing elements in Mexican society. Mexico's economic development policies have not solved, but in fact have worsened, the economic condition of a vast segment of the Mexican nation. The top five percent of the Mexican population received forty percent of the national income whereas the poorest twenty percent receives only four percent of the national income.³ Since the political power of the economic elite is extensive, changes to redress this inequality are not likely to be forthcoming. With the "rising expectations" of the Mexican frustrated, the result will be more alienation and disenchantment with the existing system.

Additionally, the rapid population growth places increased strain on already scarce resources. Schools cannot be built and teachers cannot be trained fast enough to provide education for the increasing number of school aged children. The needs of Mexican society are expanding faster than the ability of the system to satisfy those needs. As a result, the standard of living for most Mexicans will decline rather than improve. In other words, suffering will increase, not decrease. The mass exodus from Mexico to the United States validates this assessment.

If the contention that the problems confronting contemporary Mexico are beyond the scope of the remedial power of the system is correct, this poses a serious threat to the continued maintenance of the system. Therefore, it is appropriate to speculate on some possible alternative directions of change. First, notwithstanding the increased alienation of the masses, which makes this segment of the population more susceptible to political mobilization, a Castro-style revolution in Mexico appears doubtful. The organization of this sector into a force of poli-

tical opposition would be extremely difficult in view of the power and resources of the upper and middle sectors. Secondly, the United States could not tolerate a hostile regime as it would threaten extensive American holdings in Mexico. Consequently, it would be in the national interest of the United States to assist in the suppression of a movement of this type.

A more plausible scenario would be one of increased oppression in Mexico. Faced with the inability of satisfying mass-demands, Mexico will find it increasingly necessary to repress dissent to keep the system intact. This strategy might prove successful so long as the demands of the middle class can be placated. In other words, the alienation of the middle class is a much greater threat to the system than the alienation of the working class and peasants.

A third possibility is the intervention by the military. By Latin American standards, the political power of the Mexican military is generally considered to be weak. However, in times of economic or political crisis, the upper and middle classes might turn to the military as a means to maintain order. Or if the military perceives the civilian government as too feeble to maintain stability, the military might intervene on its own initiative. The key to Mexico's future would seem to lie in the plight of the middle class and the role of Mexican military assumes within the system.

The consequences of the decay of the Mexican system is impossible to forecast. In the absence of structured reforms, the present regime seems incapable of solving the problems currently besetting Mexico. This is likely to result in a crisis of regime maintenance for the present system. The prospects for Mexico are not bright. Therefore, it

will be instructive for others to observe the manner in which Mexico chooses to ignore or solve her problems of poverty, unemployment, income inequality, and population growth. Various scholars have noted the capacity of the Mexican to endure hardship and suffering. But Kenneth Johnson surmises that:

The Mexican political system is a throne atop a pyramid which has lost most of its basic popular support. Withdrawal of consent is one basic weapon of the poor. Insurgency is another. Power without legitimacy, that is contemporary Mexico. Poverty and repression have thresholds of criticality. When the people can endure no more, political collapse can be expected.⁴

ENDNOTES

¹Julius Nyerere as quoted in Kenneth F. Johnson, Mexican Democracy: A Critical View, rev. ed. (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1978), p. 242.

²Ernest A. Duff, and John F. McCamant, "Measuring Social and Political Requirements for System Stability in Latin America," in John D. Martz, eds., The Dynamics of Change in Latin American Politics (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1971), p. 232.

³Johnson, op. cit., p. 236.

⁴Ibid., pp. 17-18.

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APPENDIX

MEXICAN PRESIDENTS, 1876-1982

Porfirio Díaz	1876-1911
Francisco I. Madero	1911-1913
Victoriano Huerta	1913-1914
Venustiano Carranza	1914-1920
Alvaro Obregón	1920-1924
Plutarco Elías Calles	1924-1928
Emilio Portes Gil	1928-1929
Pascual Ortiz Rubio	1929-1932
Abelardo Rodríguez	1932-1934
Lázaro Cárdenas	1934-1940
Manuel Ávila Camacho	1940-1946
Miquel Alemán	1946-1952
Adolfo Ruiz Cortines	1952-1958
Adolfo López Mateos	1958-1964
Gustavo Díaz Ordaz	1964-1970
Luis Echeverría Alvarez	1970-1976
José López Portillo	1976-1982

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