THE IMPACT OF URBANIZATION ON JAPANESE VOTER PREFERENCES: 1955-1967

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PREFACE

This study concerns the effect of urbanization on Japanese voter preferences during the period 1955-1967. Prefectural voting returns for the five House of Representatives elections, held during these years, were utilized in the analysis of urban and rural voter preferences. The primary objective was to determine whether differences exist between urban and rural voter preferences and, if so, to what extent changes in the urban/rural characteristics of prefectures would affect those preferences.

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Data for this study were made available through the Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research. The data were from the Data Confrontation Seminar on the Use of Ecological Data in Comparative Cross-National Research.

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CHAPTER I

DEFINITION OF PURPOSE AND PROBLEM

Introduction

Urbanization is one of the most important and dominant demographic currents of our time.[1] World urbanization has progressed dramatically. It is estimated that not more than 3 per cent of the world's population could have been considered urban in 1800. At the beginning of this century, only one nation, Great Britian, could be regarded as an urbanized society in the sense that more than one half of its residents resided in cities. By 1965, there were at least 30 such nations.[2] And in 1970, 39 per cent of the world's population was urban. Of this, 23.8 per cent resided in urban areas of 100,000 or more inhabitants.[3] The present degree of world urbanization is both very recent and totally unprecedented. The global level of urbanization continues to rise rapidly.[4]

As world urbanization progresses, it must have some profound social and political consequences. This study will attempt to explain the political implications of increased urbanization by studying Japanese voting patterns. The principle purpose of this examination is to determine what the effects of urbanization are, if any, on Japanese voter preference.

Japan presents an ideal situation for studying urbanization and voter preference because Japan has been one of the world's most rapidly

urbanizing nations. In the first really modern census taken in 1920, only 18.1 per cent of Japan's total population lived in cities. By 1930, this figure had increased to 24.1 per cent; by 1940, to 37.9 per cent; by 1960, to 63.6 per cent; and by 1975, to 75.9 per cent.[5] Japan continues to urbanize. It is projected that 99 million Japanese will live in urban areas by the year 2000. Further, it is projected that by the year 2000, two Japanese cities, Tokyo and Osaka, will be among the 10 largest cities in the world.[6] For these reasons, urbanization continues to be a major concern of the Japanese government.

The Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) is presently the governing party. The LDP, also known as the Jiyuminshuto, has for the past 25 years dominated the Japanese political scene. The party's continuous control of the government represents a unique success story among the world's democratic systems; no other major country has a matching record of political authority.[7] The opposition parties have not been able to pose a serious threat to the LDP's control.

However, over the past several years, the LDP has suffered a noticeable decline in its electoral strength in both houses of the Diet, the Japanese Parliament. In 1976, the LDP lost its majority in the House of Representatives, the lower house of the Diet. The party was able to recruit some independent winners and thereby retain its majority. In 1979, the LDP again lost its majority. It won 248 seats out of a possible 511. But again, the party was able to recruit enough independents to regain control.

With LDP's electoral decline, have come forecasts of impending disaster for the party. Prior to each national election, predictions of a new era in Japanese politics are made; an era of coalition politics.

Articles such as Matsushita Keiichi's "A New Liberalism in Prospect" and Margaret A. McKean's "Japan's Beleaguered Ruling Party" have predicted the downfall of the LDP and the emergence of a socialist coalition.[8] These predictions have, as yet, been premature because the LDP has managed to retain control. And in the unusual election of June 1980, the LDP made what has been termed a "remarkable comeback." The party won 286 of the 511 seats in the House of Representatives; a gain of 38 seats.

Because it is so difficult to predict future occurrences in Japanese politics, it would perhaps be helpful to look at the early years of the present major political parties to see if some insight into voter preference and electoral support may be gained. This study is concerned with the early years of the major political parties, 1955-1967.

The period 1955-1967 was a crucial one for Japanese political parties and Japanese politics. It was during these years that the Liberal Party and the Democratic Party merged to form the Liberal Democratic Party and the left and right wings of the Socialist Party merged, only to split into the Japanese Socialist Party and the Democratic Socialist Party in 1959. This period also saw the emergence of the Japanese Communist Party as a legitimate political force and the creation of the Komeito.

The question that arises is why was this particular period so vital in the development of Japanese political parties? This period was not only one of political party development but it was also one of increasing urbanization. Since these phenomenons occurred at much the same time, it has been theorized that the two are related in some manner.

In the study of Japanese politics and Japanese political parties, the following statements are frequently made concerning the relationship

of urbanization and voter preference: (a) "The Liberal Democratic Party is a rural-based party,"[9] (b) "The Liberal Democratic Party is disproportionately dependent on over-valued rural seats,"[10] and (c) "Urbanization results in an urban population that is more receptive to political innovation than the rural population."[11] The implication in these statements is that the urban and rural voters have differences in their voting preferences. And further, that rural voters should be attracted to conservative parties while urban voters should be attracted to progressive parties. The purpose of this study is to test the validity of these assumptions and to try to determine the relationship between urbanization and voter preference.

This chapter will review the existing literature on the impact of urbanization and voter participation and will describe the data and methods used to test the impact of urbanization, which will be examined in Chapter V. Chapter II describes the origin and development of the major Japanese political parties active during the period 1955-1967. It will also briefly describe the system of Japanese elections. Chapter III discusses the process of Japanese urbanization while Chapter IV describes the basic theories concerning urbanization and political participation.

Design of the Study

The purpose of this study is to evaluate the utility of urbanization as a predictor of voting preference. The method used in the investigation of this problem was to examine the perfectural voting returns for the five House of Representative elections held during the period 1955-1967. A prefecture is a regional devision which has its own government.

Japan has had a tradition of centralization in the government and although the United States occupiers tried to introduce local autonomy, the tradition continued.

Each prefecture will be defined in terms of its urban/rural characteristics. Then the results of the five elections will be assessed to determine what relationship exists between urbanization and voter preference in Japan.

The data for this study comes from the Data Confrontation Seminar on the Use of Ecological Data in Comparative Cross-National Research, 1969. The data was made available through the Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research. The data for Japan, 1949-1968, was supplied by Michitoshi Takabataki, Department of Political Science, Rikkyo University, Tokyo.

As a general framework for this study, it will be necessary only to define certain concepts. For the purposes of this study, "urbanization" will be defined as the process by which, through both migration and natural increase, increasing numbers or proportions of a society's inhabitants become residents of cities. James W. White's definition of a city will be used. He defines a "city" as "a relatively large, dense, and permanent settlement of a socially heterogeneous individuals, a relatively large proportion of whom are engaged in none agricultural occupations."[12]

Statement of Problem

To the extent that this study suggests explanations concerning the impact of urbanization on voter preference in Japan, the following assumptions are proposed for study:

In Japan, the place of residence seems to have an impact on voter preferences. There are differences between urban and rural voter preferences. Urban and rural voters have different political needs and demands and some of these are the result of urbanization. Urban voters have been concerned with issues such as air pollution, inadequate housing, and mass transit. These are not the issues that have been of primary interest to rural residents. Rural voters have been more concerned with agricultural supports and the improvement of the quality of rural life.

The responses of the major political parties to the needs of urban and rural voters vary. Obviously, voters will tend to be attracted to the party which is most willing and capable of meeting their demands. In Japan, the rural voters tend to be attracted to the conservative parties which have traditionally advocated policies which appeal to rural interests. Urban voters tend to be attracted to the more progressive parties which have been most responsive to their needs.

As the urban/rural characteristics of a prefecture change, it would be expected that there would be a corresponding shift in voter preference. Increasing levels of urbanization should result in additional support for the more progressive parties.[13]

Review of the Literature

Urbanization and its effect on political participation have been subjects of interest for researchers for a number of years. Much has been written on this subject, but the point must be made that there is little consensus on the possible impacts or effects of urbanization on political behavior. The following is meant only to provide a very general overview of the basic trends in the literature concerning

urbanization. The early studies or urbanization were primarily concerned with the sociological implication of the urban process. The early approaches were descriptive in nature. They described the characteristics of folk or traditional societies and the characteristics of urban society and then comparisons were made between the two.[14] The differences between the two types of societies were thought to be so profound that any migrant would suffer severe shock.[15]

Later studies began to investigate the political implications of urbanization. One of the pioneers in this type of society was Daniel Lerner. In his work of the late 1950's, he assigned a primary role to urbanization in the process of political participation. He hypothesized that urbanization led to literacy, which led to media consumption, which in turn was related to political participation. Other scholars subsequently analyzed these presumed causal relationships and though they came up with somewhat different patterns, they still attributed a major primary role to urbanization.[16]

As the behavioral approach in political science gained acceptance, the studies concerning the political implications of urbanization adopted this new approach. Statistical analyses of voting behavior and other forms of political participation were undertaken to gain some insight into the relationships of urbanization and political participation. A well known study, Nie, Powell, and Prewitt's "Social Structure and Political Participation," tested modernization theory with survey data on the political behavior of individuals from urban and rural areas in five countries. Their primary goal was to determine what factors influence political participation. Their findings will be discussed in Chapter IV.

Other studies have been particularly concerned with the impact of urbanization on migrants. Many of these studies have dealt with Latin American cities. Wayne A. Cornelius, Jr., in particular, has examined urbanization as an element of Latin American political instability. Other studies have dealt with specific nations and have examined voter turnouts and their relationships to urbanization. These studies will be discussed in more detail in Chapter IV.

Studies dealing specifically with the political implications of urbanization on voting behavior have generally been limited to a single community or other limited area or region. For example, in Political Implications of Cityward Migration: Japan as an Exploratory Test Case, James White analyzed the effects of urban migration in the community of Uji. The problems with such studies are obvious. The findings may not be applicable when they are generalized to the national level.

Studies concerning political participation in Japan have relied primarily on voting statistics and opinion surveys. Bradley Richardson and Robert E. Ward, among others, have utilized these sources of information to study political participation, political culture, and political socialization. Recent studies such as the one by Gary Allinson, Suburban Tokyo, have been concerned with political behavior in Japanese suburbs. Interest in this facet of Japanese politics is growing. While these studies are limited in their general scope, they do provide valuable information concerning urbanization and political participation.

FOOTNOTES

[1]James W. White, Political Implications of Cityward Migration: Japan as an Exploratory Test Case, Sage Professional Paper in Comparative Politics 01-001 (Beverly Hills, 1973), p. 6.

[2]United Nations, The Determinates and Consequences of Population Trends: New Summary of Findings on Interaction of Demographic, Economic and Social Factors, Vol. I (New York, 1973), p. 184.

[3]Kingsley Davis, World Urbanization 1950-1970 Volume II: Analysis of Trends, Relationships, and Developments (Berkeley, 1972), p. 9.

[4]Ibid.

[5]Robert E. Ward, Japan's Political System (2nd ed., Englewood Cliffs, 1978), p. 44.

[6]United Nations, The Population Debate: Dimensions and Perspectives, Papers of the World Population Conference Bucharest, 1974, Vol. I (New York, 1975), p. 200.

[7]Zbigniew Brzezinski, The Fragile Blossom: Crisis and Change in Japan (New York, 1972), p. 18.

[8]For other examples, see Roger W. Gale, "The 1976 Election and the LDP: Edge of a Precipice?" The Japan Interpreter (Spring 1977), pp. 433-447; and Hong N. Kim, "The Crisis of Japan's Liberal Democratic Party," Current History (April 1975), pp. 158-162.

[9]J. A. A. Stockwin, Japan: Divided Politics in a Growth Economy (New York, 1975), p. 101.

[10]Ibid.

[11]Ward, p. 44.

[12]White, p. 7.

[13]The terms progressive and conservative are not meant to imply any value judgments nor are these terms meant to be inflexible. Studies of Japanese politics commonly utilize these terms and their use in the study is for the sake of convenience.

[14]For a list of these characteristics see White, p. 57.

[15]White, p. 9.

[16]Samuel P. Huntington and Joan M. Nelson, No Easy Choice (Cambridge, 1976), p. 47).

CHAPTER II

JAPANESE POLITICAL PARTIES AND THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM

Introduction

The "Meiji Restoration" of 1868 marks the beginning of the era of modern Japanese political history. The ruling shogunate was replaced by a small group of oligarchs who exercised political power for the "restored" Meiji Emperor. Other leaders, who had been left out of the new government, demanded that a representative parliament be established. In addition, the dissidents asked for a constitution and for limited suffrage. In order to achieve their demands, political parties were organized.[1] The oligarchs in the government initially opposed the parties but the parties eventually proved too powerful to oppose.[2] A constitution, the gift of the Meiji Emperor, was promulgated in 1889. Modeled after the autocratic Prussian Constitution, it provided for a house of representatives with elected representatives.

Political parties continued to develop and they reached their ascendency after World War I. Although the Emperor was, under the 1889 Constitution, the ultimate authority, many of his powers were exercised through the Prime Minister. During the period from 1918 to 1932, the leaders of the two conservative parties, the Friends of Constitutional Government Association and the Constitutional Association, led nine of the 12 cabinets.[3]

In the 1930's, however, the political parties began to decline. There was no systematic organization of the parties. They were not mass-based parties; they were instead based on a rather complex system of loyalty to an individual leader. The average citizen would not identify himself with a party directly.[4] Political parties were not compatible with the cultural setting of the individual and they failed to respond to the public's needs and demands. And the endless mudslinging among the immature political parties and the frequent political scandals resulted in a national distrust of political parties.[5] As the people felt no real attachment to the parties, they were easily dismissed. The parties continued to exist and occasional elections were held but they were not powerful. Others exercised authority for the Emperor. The military, during this period, had steadily gained power and in 1940 the political parties were abolished and replaced by the Imperial Rule Assistance Association.[6]

During the decade after World War II, there existed at one time or another 17 conservative parties, each with a rather brief life span or with a frequent change in name or membership, merging with or splitting from others, and party switches by their members were frequent.[7] From the postwar elections held in 1946 until 1955, political power shifted among the various political parties. These parties were nothing more than cliques of new politicans clustered around a leader with access to funds, political experience, and with ambitions for leadership.[8] The personality of the leader was the most important factor in the development of these political parties.[9] Figures 1 and 2 illustrate the genealogy of the postwar reform and conservative parties.



Figure 1. Genealogy of Postwar Reform Parties



Figure 2. Genealogy of Postwar Conservative Parties

Major Political Parties: 1955-1967

Four of the five major parties in existence during the period 1955-1967, the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and the Japanese Socialist Party (JSP) and the Democratic Socialist Party (DSP), were derived from political parties which made new starts immediately after the end of World War II (see Figure 2). The Japanese Communist Party (JCP) resurfaced after 19 years in hiding and sprang into open activity.[10]

The Liberal Democratic Party

The Liberal Democratic Party was created in 1955, the result of the merger of two conservative parties. These conservative parties which emerged in 1945 were essentially resuscitations of the prewar political parties which had been dissolved in 1940 at the time of the establishment of the Imperial Rule Assistance Association.[11]

The conservative merger was prompted, first and foremost by the reunification of the JSP. The unified Socialists emerged as the biggest single party in the House of Representatives. In addition, the decline of the Liberal Party in 1953, Prime Minister Yoshida's inability to cope with intraparty strife, and the turmoil in the Diet in 1954 convinced the leaders of the business world of the need for political stability and effective leadership. The business community came to the conclusion that a conservative merger was necessary to meet the emerging Socialist threat to capitalism.[12] The conservative parties had been fighting among themselves and as a consequence were not concentrating on defeating the Socialists. Big business had supplied the conservatives with funds, most of which had gone to fight other conservatives. Big business wanted results for its contributions and pressured for a merger.

In November 1955, the LDP was formed. The organization of the LDP was outlined in the party regulations which were enacted by the party itself. There are no government laws prescribing political party organization.

In each prefecture, there is a LDP prefectural federation. Each federation has a chief secretary, general executive council, policy affairs research council, organization committee, and the various other party organs which correspond fairly closely to organs in the national headquarters.[13] National party headquarters are in Tokyo. In the organization of the LDP, the party presidency is the most important position because since 1955, the president of the LDP has also served as the government's chief executive, the prime minister. The LDP has been able to control this position as a result of their dominance of both houses of the Diet, which are responsible for electing the prime minister. Most importantly they have dominated the lower house.

The election of the party president is an intense struggle primarily because of the factionalism that exists within the party. Factions are a predominant feature of Japanese politics and they are very important in elections. Factions determine how an individual will vote in the party presidency election.[14] In return for their votes, the faction members receive campaign support in the elections, political funds, and assistance in securing posts in the party or in government.

The LDP is not a mass-based party; its formal membership is actually quite small. In 1966, for example, the LDP claimed a registered membership of approximately 1,700,000, but the figure of 350,000 was thought to be more accurate.[15] The party at the local level functions primarily through the koenkai (supporter organizations) of the individual

politicians. The koenkai are responsible for mobilizing support for the LDP. However, it must be understood that the koenkai is an organization that supports an individual candidate. Its organization belongs to that candidate and not to the party.

The LDP is a conservative party and its creed reflects this political orientation. The creed specifically notes the need for (1) establishment of national morals and reform of education, (2) reform of the political and bureaucratic apparatus, (3) attainment of economic independence, (4) active development of peaceful diplomacy, and (5) adequate preparation to preserve national independence.[16] The prime emphasis in practical administration has been on promoting economic independence and spurring rapid economic growth. In the context of Japanese tradition, the LDP pursues rather paternalistic policies toward the people and the nation.

The Japan Socialist Party

The JSP was organized in November 1945, when a number of proletarian groups merged to form a single party advocating socialism.[17] In 1947, in the general election the party gained a plurality of Diet seats and formed a coalition cabinet led by socialist Tetsu Katayama. But pressures from the left wing of the Socialist Party led to the downfall of the cabinet after eight months. In October 1951, the party split into left and right wing parties as a result of conflicting views over the San Francisco Peace Treaty and the Japan-United States Security Treaty. The left and right wing Socialist parties competed for seats until October 1955 when the reunification took place. The party again split in 1960; the differences between the two wings seemed to be

irreconcilable. The party's history has been filled with endless left-right confrontations over the direction the party should take.

The present JSP is the second largest political party. Formal party membership, however, has remained small, about 50,000. But the party does manage to garner more than 11,000,000 votes in the lower house elections. This support has come primarily through the support of Sohyo (the General Council of Trade Unions of Japan), the largest labor organization in Japan.[18] The support of the Sohyo has been critical for the JSP and because of this, critics have given the party the derisive label of the "Sohyo political department."[19] The party's excessive dependence on the Sohyo is one factor hindering its efforts to win a majority of the people to its side.[20]

The JSP is a progressive party, advocating a Socialist Party government as a transitional government only. A Socialist Party government is only a step in the progression to a truly socialist government. JSP party policy is anti-LDP and anti-monopoly. It further advocates class struggle at home and unarmed neutrality in foreign policy. Internally, the party continues to be plagued by factionalism that seems to stimulate some very tense internal conflicts.

The Democratic Socialist Party

The DSP came into existence in January 1960, the product of a split between the left and right wing factions of the JSP. The right wing faction members left the JSP, charging that the left wing factions dominated the party. The catalyst for the split was the 1960 revision of the Japan-United States Security Treaty.

The DSP defines itself as a "political association of those people who believe in the principles of democratic socialism" that will "confront capitalism and totalitarianism whether of the right or of the left."[21] The party's platform is basically "anti-LDP and anti-communist."[22] The DSP is irreconcilably opposed to communism and refuses to consider any plans for a coalition government that includes the JCP.

The DSP is a small party and draws its base of support from the Domei (The Japanese Confederation of Labor), the second largest labor organization in Japan. The Domei group includes largely private industrial unions. Its policies are much more conservative than the Sohyo's.

The Japanese Communist Party

The JCP was founded in July 1922, as an illegal political party which came under the directives of the Third International. During its early years, the JCP operated clandestinely. Violent revolution and the dictatorship of the proletariat characterized its basic party line. In its early years, the JCP was beset with difficulties. The Japanese government took repressive measures against the party and as a result, the JCP collapsed.

After World War II, the JCP continued to pursue its line of violent revolution, until 1955, when it switched to a policy of peaceful revolution. In 1961, at the Eighth Party Congress, the JCP adopted its present party platform. The platform calls for the establishment of a "democratic coalition" government by creating a unified progressive front.[23] The proposed "democratic coalition government" will

(1) liquidate the Japan-United States Security Treaty, (2) switch from an economic policy tailored to big capital, and (3) establish democracy.[24]

The JCP is a small party and does not receive any consolidated labor union support comparable to that afforded its rivals by the Sohyo and the Domei.[25] The JCP does receive strong support in particular unions, especially those on the left wing of the Sohyo group such as Nikkyoso (The Japan Teachers' Union).[26] The real secret of the JCP's is its organization. Unlike the LDP, the JSP, or the DSP, the JCP is a mass-based party. The JCP operates on a variety of fronts, often through mass organizations in which its members play leading or, at least, prominent roles. One of the less known and most successful of these has been the Democratic Youth Organization, the Minseido.[27] The party is also known for its influence in citizens' movements.

The Komeito

The Komeito, also known as the Clean Government Party, was organized in November 1964. The Komeito was Japan's first religious political party and it was formed with the backing of the Soka Gakkai, a lay organization affiliated with the Nichiren Shoshu sect of Buddhism.

The Komeito is a middle-of-the-road reformist party. The party platform upholds the ideals of humanistic socialism, an independent peaceful diplomacy, adherence to the Constitution, and reinforcement of parliamentary democracy. The party since 1970 has advocated a separation of politics and religion.[28] However, the base of support for the party continues to be the members of the Soka Gakkai. The party has a membership of approximately 400,000, and of these, about 90 per cent are members of the Soka Gakkai. The Komeito has tended to appeal to groups that

feel alienated by the other parties, such as women and people who are making the transition from a rural to urban setting.

Japan's Electoral System

Japan's general electoral system is based on the Public Offices Election Law of 1950. It laid down the provisions for elections of members of the Diet and prefectural and local candidates. Candidates for office must be 25 years old. To become a candidate for either house of the Diet, a person simply notifies the chairman of the local election board and files a deposit of 100,000 yen.[29] The money is returned if the candidate polls one-fifth of the valid votes cast, divided by the number of seats to be filled from the district.[30] Qualifications for voting were revised in 1945 to provide for female suffrage and to lower the voting age from 25 to 20 years.

The electoral districts were created by dividing the 46 prefectures in such a way that the districts did not cross prefectural lines. During the period 1955-1967, there were 117 electoral districts for the lower house of the Diet. Shortly before the 1967 election, the number increased to 123. These are medium-sized election districts which were established in 1947. Each district has three, four, or five seats, but each elector has only one vote. There is one exception, the electoral district of the Amami Islands has only one representative. The system is basically a multimember, single-vote system.[31] What makes the Japanese system unique is the combination of multimember districts and a single nontransferrable vote. This combination produces a de facto proportional representation result without being a formal proportional representation election system.[32]

In this system, the candiates receiving the highest numbers of votes wins. For example, in the Shizuoka Prefecture third district, which is entitled to four seats in the House of Representatives, the four candidates receiving the highest number of votes win the four seats.[33] In this type of system, minority parties which receive only a small proportion of the votes cast may win one or more seats.

There are some problems with such an electoral system. A major problem is that members of the same party often compete for votes in the same district. Candidates for the House of Representatives often run as members of their individual factions rather than as party candidates. This may lead to intense, bitter struggles among candidates of the same party. These struggles are often more hostile and competitive than those with the members of the opposition parties. However, this is a major problem only for the candidates of the LDP.

Because the electoral system provides for multimember districts, the political parties must decide how many candidates to run in each district. It is necessary for each party to put up the optimum number of candidates in each district because if a party runs too many candidates the votes may be too divided and the party may only win a few or it may win none at all. If it runs too few candidates, then valuable votes are wasted; votes that could be used to increase the party's strength in the Diet. A further complication develops if one of the candidates is too popular. Since the voter only has one vote, if too many cast their vote for one candidate it may take votes away from another fellow party candidate.[34]

Japan's electoral system forces the majority party to calculate its chances optimistically and constantly tempts it to run too many

candidates, thus splitting its strength, while at the same time the system encourages the weaker parties to concentrate their smaller support more effectively behind one or two candidates.[35]

While anyone who qualifies may become a candidate for office, realistically only those who have the endorsement of a party have a good chance to be elected. Independents usually have little chance. Those candidates who do run as independents are normally those members of political parties who did not receive their parties' endorsement. An endorsement is important because first of all, it means that the candidate is taken seriously in Tokyo, a factor that the politician believes carries great weight with the electorate. Secondly, the candiate will receive money from the party and can use the services of the party's regional organizations, such as they are. Thirdly, the candidate can call upon the support of other Dietmen to tour and speak in the district on his behalf.[36]

Aside from the strategic party problems of deciding how many candidates to run and the resulting intraparty strife, there are two other difficulties inherent in the Japanese electoral system. First, the Public Offices Election Law does not contain a workable reapportionment provision. The 1947 electoral system has remained basically intact. There have been a few changes. The Anami Island was returned in 1953 and a new electoral district was created with one seat. In 1964, five new electoral districts with 19 legislative seats were created. These changes were an attempt to correct inequalities in the electoral system. The Japanese system has failed to keep up with large shifts in population within Japan, with the result that one common criticism has been made concerning the system. That criticism is that the system is biased

because the rural districts are over-represented. The general ratio of representation is 1 to 200,040 but the difference may vary by 70,000.[37] In the second district of Tochigi, Fujio Masayuki won a seat in the 1967 general elections with 34,901 votes. In the seventh district of Tokyo, however, Nakamura Koichi lost with 96,620 votes.

The reason for the imbalance in the system is that immediately after World War II, the Japanese soldiers returned to their homes in the rural areas. The rural system was established during this period and reflects an abnormally large rural population.[38] Although the electoral system is to be adjusted every five years on the basis of the national census, this has been difficult to do. The result has instead been chronic malapportionment. It is easy to add seats to the Diet but not to reapportion the existing seats. This means the continued expansion of the lower house which is considered by many to be too large now.

Various proposals to change the present "medium-sized" electoral districts have been presented. The LDP has advocated a "small-district" system, which some believe would work to the party's benefit because it might reduce factional strife for nominations and elections. The "small-district" system has been rejected not only by the opposition parties but also by the antimainstream factions within the LDP. The Socialists have advocated the large districts with proportional representation. This type of system would probably benefit all opposition parties. However, as long as the LDP retains its majority it is not likely that there will be a drastic change in the electoral system. The LDP benefits from the over-representation of the rural districts because a major source of the party's support, it is thought, comes from the rural or semi-rural areas. Historically, the LDP has enjoyed

overwhelming control in these over-represented rural areas. This condition will be discussed further in Chapters V and VI. The Asahi Shimbun, a Japanese newspaper, in its analysis of lower house malapportionment, concluded that a fair reapportionment would add 67 seats to the urban constituencies and subtract an equal number from the rural areas.[39]

Another difficulty inherent in the electoral system is that the system does not exactly reflect the popular vote. Minority parties do not get all the legislative seats to which the popular vote entitles them. The LDP and the JSP win more seats than their percentages of popular vote allows them to receive. The other parties receive fewer votes than their popular vote entitles them (see Table I). The reason for this disparity is that the Japanese electoral system with its multi-member districts with a single nontrasferrable vote places a high premium on effective campaign strategy. The secret of success lies in achieving an optimal relationship between the number of candidates a party runs in a given election district and the number of votes that it controls in that area, given a fairly equitable distribution of those votes among the party's total number of candidates.[40] This situation combined with the over-representation of the rural districts accounts for most of the disparity.

The percentage difference between seats received and the popular vote has never been great enough to frustrate the people's choice of the ruling party in past elections. Generally, the present system seems to reflect the will of the people.[41]

TABLE I

PERCENTAGE OF VOTES AND SEATS FOR THE MAJOR JAPANESE POLITICAL PARTIES: 1955-1967

Election	LDP	JSP	DSP	JCP	Komeito
1955					
% of votes received	63.2	29.2		2.0	
% of seats received	63.6	33.4		0.4	
1958					
% of votes received	57.8	32.9		2.6	
% of seats received	61.5	35.5		0.6	
1960					
% of votes received	57.5	27.5		2.9	
% of seats received	63.3	31.0		0.6	
1963					
% of votes received	54.7	29.0	7.4	4.0	
% of seats received	60.6	30.8	4.9	1.0	
1967					
% of votes received	48.8	27.9	7.4	4.8	5.4
% of seats received	57.0	28.8	6.2	1.0	5.1

Source: Robert E. Ward, Japan's Political System (2nd ed., Englewood Cliffs, 1978), pp. 123-124.

FOOTNOTES

[1]Nathaniel B. Thayer, How the Conservatives Rule Japan (Princeton, 1969), p. 3.

[2]Ibid.

[3]Ibid.

[4]Robert E. Ward, Japan's Political System (1st ed., Englewood Cliffs, 1967), p. 74.

[5]Yvichi Sato, "Political Parties," The Diet, Elections, and Political Parties (Foreign Press Center Japan, No. 13 [Tokyo, 1979]), p. 30.

[6]Theodore McNelly, Politics and Government in Japan (Boston, 1972), p. 15.

[7]Taketsugu Tsurutani, Political Change in Japan (New York, 1977), p. 70.

[8]Thayer, p. 9.

[9]Ibid.

[10]Koichi Kishimoto, Politics in Modern Japan (Tokyo, 1977), p. 91.

[11]McNelly, p. 85.

[12]Ibid., p. 89.

[13]Ibid.

[14]It should be noted that in 1978 there was a change in the LDP rules concerning the election of the party president. The new system incorporates a preliminary election in which all dues-paying LDP members vote and a final election in which only the LDP Diet members choose between the two top candidates. For more details see "The Birth of the Ohira Administration," The Japan Echo, VI (1959).

[15]Ward, p. 64.

[16]Sato, p. 40. To Western scholars, the fact that a supposedly "conservative" party should advocate such seemingly Western "liberal" views, is contradictory. It must be noted, however, that Western norms and political thought are not necessarily applicable. In terms of Japanese political norms, the LDP is truly a "conservative" political party.

[17]Sato, p. 40.

[18]The Sohyo is composed primarily of workers employed in the public sector.

[19]Sato, p. 41.

[20]Ibid.

[21]Koichi, p. 117.

[22]Ibid.

[23]Sato, p. 43.

[24]Ibid.

[25]Robert E. Ward, Japan's Political System (2nd ed., Englewood Cliffs, 1978), p. 104.

[26]Ibid.

[27]Ibid., p. 105.

[28]The policy of separation of church and state, adopted in 1970, was the result of a scandal in which the Komeito attempted to suppress a book critical of the Soka Gakkai. Public outrage at this violation of freedom of expression forced the party to adopt its current policy.

[29]However, a candidate must have his party's endorsement in order to make use of the party resources and party identification.

[30]Ronald Hrebernar, "Politics of Electoral Reform in Japan," Asian Survey, 17 (October 1977), p. 985.

[31]McNelly, p. 131.

[32]For an excellent account of the difficulties encountered by a potential candidate for the House of Representatives, see Gerald L. Curtis, Election Campaigning Japanese Style (New York, 1971).

[33]Ward, 1st ed., p. 54.

[34]Ibid.

[35]Ibid.

[36]Thayer, p. 120.

[37]Ibid., p. 114.

[38]The percentage of the total Japanese population living in urban areas increased steadily during the period 1920-1940. It increased from 12.2 per cent in 1920 to 29.4 per cent in 1940. In 1950, the percentage of total population increased to 25.7 per cent. This drop in the total urban population after WWII is attributed to the return to the countryside of the soldiers. In 1955, the percentage of the population living in urban areas began to increase, returning to the prewar pattern. For more information see Thomas O. Wilkinson, The Urbanization of Japanese Labor, 1868-1955 (Amherst, 1965), particularly p. 80.

[39]Hrebenar, p. 985.

[40]Ward, 2nd ed., p. 126.

[41]Thayer, p. 115.

CHAPTER III

URBANIZATION IN JAPAN

Introduction

Before it is possible to determine how urbanization has affected political participation and voter preference during the period 1955-1967, it is necessary to discuss the urbanization of Japan. Japan just a little more than a century ago was an isolated feudal nation. Today, Japan is a modern, wealthy, world power. Japan's achievements have attracted the attention of scholars who hope that Japan's rapid modernization may provide a model for other developing nations.

Modernization, an important concept in the study of comparative politics, is a complex process whereby "traditional" societies take on the characteristics of "modernity." The transformation affects a whole range of factors--economic, social, political, and cultural.[1] According to Robert E. Ward, a modern society is characterized by low birth, and morbidity rates and by high ratios, degrees, or levels of (1) inanimate to animate sources of energy; (2) tool technology, mechanization, and industrialization; (3) specialization and professionalization of labor; (4) gross and per capita national production of goods and services; (5) urbanization; (6) differentiation, achievement orientation, and mobility in social organization; and (7) literacy, mass education, and mass media circulation.[2]

In Japan's case, two characteristics of the modernization process are difficult to separate. They are economic growth and urbanization. Urbanization and economic growth occurred simultaneously. For this reason, some mention of Japan's economic growth must be made.

No country has achieved more spectacular economic progress since the 1950's as Japan.[3] Japan's economic progress prior to World War II had been steady but it was not until after the war that rapid economic growth occurred. It seemed remarkable that after a crushing defeat in 1945, Japan could come back and create one of the largest economies in the world. At the time of the surrender in 1945, the nation was faced with repairing the enormous damages caused by the war. Roughly 25 per cent of the national wealth had been destroyed or lost; some 40 per cent of the built-up area of the 66 major cities subjected to air attacks had been leveled to the ground; almost 20 per cent of the nation's residential housing and almost 25 per cent of all its buildings had been obliterated; 30 per cent of its industrial capacity, 80 per cent of its shipping and 47 per cent of its thermal power-generating capacity had been destroyed; and 46 per cent of its prewar territory had been lost, some of it only temporarily, however.[4]

But as with West Germany, Japan's defeat was a prelude to a great surge of economic growth. Japan's economic growth has been termed a "miracle." Although theories concerning the reasons for Japan's "miracle" are varied, it is generally accepted that several factors seem to have played an important part. According to J. A. A. Stockwin, these factors include a high rate of productive investment by industry, a high level of personal savings, low wages, a favorable atmosphere for expansion of exports, an educated and skilled population, a large pool of

labor, moderate taxation and defense spending, and government policies which have encouraged economic growth.[5]

Between 1951 and 1973, the Japanese economy grew at an average annual rate of 10 per cent in real terms, which represented a seven and one-half fold increase in the size of real GNP.[6] Since the mid-1960's, it has ranked third in the world in total GNP, behind the United States and the Soviet Union. The GNP has risen from a postwar low of $3.6 billion (in US dollars) in 1947, to upwards of $488 billion in 1975. During the same period, the GNP on a per capita basis rose from $34 dollars to $4,432.[7]

Japanese Urbanization

In 1872, the population of Japan was 34,806,000, of which 75 to 80 per cent were engaged in agriculture. Many of the farmers did not own the land they farmed; they were tenants. At the beginning of the Meiji Restoration, 65 per cent of the nation income was derived from agriculture.[8] In this agrarian society, rice was the primary crop produced.

In the 1890's, agriculture's share of the GNP declined to 48.5 per cent. But until the end of the nineteenth century, the majority of the workers were engaged in agriculture. In the period from 1894 (the beginning of the Sino-Japanese War) to 1917 (the end of World War II), Japan underwent an industrial revolution accomplished by enlarging her world markets and her range of available resources.[9] This industrialization was accomplished at the expense of the average Japanese farmer.

Modernization of rural society was seriously delayed by the lack of government measures designed to modernize, and by the limitations of natural resources and traditional social patterns.[10] Agricultural

production did increase but many farmers were unable to withstand the burdens of taxes and the prices of farm equipment and fertilizers. As a result, they simply gave up and left the farms for the cities. This migration provided industry with a large supply of cheap labor. Much of this cheap labor force was composed of women and sons who had no prospects of inheriting land.

Industrialization had a tremendous effect on the structure of Japanese society. In this process, rural communities were drawn out of self-sustaining, closed economies into commercial production to support larger communities centered in the cities. Urban society, in turn, fed back into the rural communities the improved techniques that helped expand the productive capacities of the rural lands.[11] With new technology, agriculture became capable of supporting increasing numbers of people with fewer workers. This created a surplus of labor in the rural districts which in turn supplied new labor to the growing commercial and industrial centers in the cities.

During this period, in terms of occupation, agriculture and forestry decreased in population percentages while industry and commerce both experienced gains in population percentages. This increase was not totally due to the influx of farmers into the cities. There was an overall increase in the total population due to an increased standard of living. But the major reason for the increase in population in the larger cities was the migration of the rural residents.[12]

The urban population increases were not uniform, as there were limitations on the industrial and commercial potential of the different cities, depending on geographical access to natural resources and markets. That the concentration of industries and commercial organs

in the cities did account for the movement of large numbers of the agricultural population into the cities is undeniable.[13] The cities had new jobs to attract the rural populations. Many of the jobs were in areas other than industry, such as domestic service, manual labor, and trade. Cities which served a variety of functions expanded more rapidly and to a greater extent than those which did not. Some examples were Tokyo, the capital and center of finance, and Yokohama, which also was a key foreign trade center.

In 1898, there were eight cities with populations of more than 100,000. By 1920, there were six cities with populations over 500,000 and 10 cities with a population of more than 100,000.[14] In 1950, there were four cities with populations of over 1,000,000 and two were cities with a population over 500,000. There were also 58 cities with populations of over 100,000. The city of Tokyo in 1950, had a population of 6,277,000. In 1960, there were six cities with populations over 1,000,000 and three cities with populations over 500,000. There were also 107 cities with populations over 100,000. The city of Tokyo, in 1960, had a population of 9,684,000.[15]

Between 1868, the Meiji Restoration, and 1965, the population of Japan tripled. The population grew from approximately 34,000,000 in 1872 to 97,000,000 in 1964, making Japan seventh in the world in terms of population.[16] This population was unevenly distributed among the prefecture with 45 per cent of the population living in three metropolitan areas comprising nine prefectures around Tokyo, Osaka, and Nagoya.

In the period 1868 to 1945, the urban population increase was due primarily to the rise of industry, while the growth of the urban

population from 1945 to 1947 was due primarily to the rise of the tertiary, or service sector (education, administration, information services, commerce, and entertainment), at the expense of the other sectors.[17] The rural migration to the cities has continued, especially among the young.

In 1965, 68 per cent of the population lived in urban areas. Of these, 48 per cent resided within the Tokaido Megalopolis. The Tokaido Megalopolis is a coalescence of Japan's three largest metropolitan areas (Tokyo, Osaka, and Nagano) which contain only 19 per cent of the land area in Japan. When the first modern census was taken in 1920, only 18.1 per cent of the population was urban.

The number of urban households declined from 6,000,000 in 1955 to 5,400,000 in 1967. Among these 5,400,000 farm households, 4,300,000 of them were part-time farm households with some members employed in industry. During this period, approximately 53 per cent of the gross income of farm families was derived from nonagricultural activities (see Table II).[18] In 1963, according to the national income by industry, primary industries accounted for 13 per cent, secondary industry for 39 per cent, and tertiary industry for 48 per cent.[19]

The urban areas have been attractive to rural residents for a number of reasons. The urban areas offer greater job opportunities and a higher standard of living and many rural Japanese leave the farms in order to take advantage of such opportunities. The variety of consumer goods and services that are available further advance the appeal of the cities.[20]

The government, in order to combat increased migrations, has made it a policy to improve the standard of living in rural areas. Agriculture has been the most heavily protected of the industries. Domestic price

supports for farm products have been the highest in the world.[21] In 1961, a new agricultural act which called for the restructuring of Japanese farming was proposed. Provisions in the act included enlarging farms, adjusting output, increasing labor productivity, and most importantly raising farm incomes. Farm incomes have been raised but the other provisions have been overlooked. All of these policies have been designed to arrest the rural to urban migration.

TABLE II

FARM HOUSEHOLDS

Year	Total	Full Time	Full-Time
1950	6,176,000	3,086,000	3,090,000
1955	6,043,000	2,106,000	3,937,000
1960	6,057,000	2,078,000	3,979,000
1963	5,856,000	1,405,000	4,451,000
1964	5,806,000	1,242,000	4,564,000
1965	5,665,000	1,219,000	4,446,000
1967	5,419,000	1,151,000	4,268,000

Source: Statistical Handbook of Japan 1970 (Tokyo, 1970).

Rapid migration, of the type that Japan has experienced, is often accompanied by serious social problems and conflicts.[22] Japan, while it has experienced as high a rate of urbanization after World War II as any country, has been fortunate to avoid many of these serious problems. For example, Japan is a racially and ethnically homogenous country; it

has had no substantial influx of foreigners with different languages, customs, and educations. Equally important, the high quality of Japanese education outside the cities has meant that migrants have been able to cope with city life and compete for city jobs. Above all, the rapid postwar economic growth and great employment potential of the cities have meant that no significant pool of unemployed and desperate people have grown up in the cities.[23] However, Japan has not escaped other urban problems such as over-crowding. The major cities are saturated with people.[24]

Among the most prominent of the social problems plaguing Japan are urban congestion, air and water pollution, inadequate housing, low levels of social security, sparse recreation and leisure facilities, weak protection against unsafe consumer products, threats to health maintenance, and inappropriate educational opportunities.[25] In the rush to industrialize, urban planning was pushed aside and private exploitation of the land for production purposes was given precedence. The result has been that even the Japanese government has said that Japan is the most polluted nation in the world.[26]

FOOTNOTES

[1]Robert E. Ward, "Modernization and Democracy in Japan," Comparative Politics: Notes and Readings, eds., Roy C. Macridis and Bernard E. Brown (3rd ed., Homewood, 1968), p. 574.

[2]Ibid.

[3]J. A. A. Stockwin, Japan: Divided Politics in a Growth Economy (New York, 1975), p. 1.

[4]Robert E. Ward, Japan's Political System (2nd ed., Englewood Cliffs, 1978), p. 19.

[5]Stockwin, pp. 1-3.

[6]Hugh Patrick and Henry Rosovosky, "Japan's Economic Performance: An Overview," Asia's New Giant: How the Japanese Economy Works, eds., Hugh Patrick and Henry Rosovosky (Washington, 1976), p. 3.

[7]Ward, Japan's Political System, 2nd ed., p. 31.

[8]Takeo Yazaki, Social Change and the City in Japan (Japan, 1978), p. 373.

[9]Ibid., p. 377.

[10]Ibid., p. 392.

[11]Ibid., p. 418.

[12]Ibid., p. 420.

[13]Ibid., p. 390.

[14]Ibid., p. 420.

[15]Kingsley Davis, World Urbanization 1950-1970 Volume I: Basic Data for Cities, Countries, and Regions (Berkeley, 1969), p. 191.

[16]Statistical Handbook of Japan 1965 (Tokyo, 1965), p. 19.

[17]Theodore McNelly, Politics and Government in Japan (Boston, 1972), p. 47.

[18]Statistical Handbook of Japan 1970 (Tokyo, 1970), p. 29.

[19]Statistical Handbook of Japan 1965, p. 95.

[20]For further information concerning the total populations in each of the 46 prefectures during the period 1955-1967, refer to Appendix A, Table XVIII.

[21]Edward F. Denison and William K. Chung, "Economic Growth and Its Sources," Asia's New Giant: How the Japanese Economy Works, eds., Hugh Patrick and Henry Rosovosky (Washington, 1976), p. 773.

[22]Edwin S. Mills and Katsutoshi Ohta, "Urbanization and Urban Problems," Asia's New Giant: How the Japanese Economy Works, eds., Hugh Patrick and Henry Rosovosky (Washington, 1976), p. 678.

[23]Ibid.

[24]Refer to Appendix B, Table XVIX, for prefectural population densities.

[25]Solomon B. Levine, "Japan's Economy: End of the Miracle?" Current History (April 1975), p. 150.

[26]Ibid., p. 151.

CHAPTER IV

THEORIES OF POLITICAL PARTICIPATION

Introduction

For the purposes of this study, "political participation" is defined as "activity by private citizens designed to influence governmental decision making."[1] Political participation takes many forms but because of the limitations of this study only the facet of voting behavior will be examined. Voting, as an expression of political choice, is of particular importance and interest because it is through elections that the composition of a democratic government is determined.

In this study, the question that must be considered is what impact does urbanization have on political participation? Much has been written about the effects of urbanization on mass political behavior. Unfortunately, there is little consensus on this subject. According to various theories, urbanization creates masses of displaced persons who are not adequately employed or housed and who are responsive to radicalizing movements. However, according to other theories, urbanization is not a radicalizing or mobilizing process.[2] The only point of agreement among social scientists is that urbanization is a politically relevant variable.

Research has shown that urban residence can alternately be a positive or negative correlate of political involvement and participation, or in some cases it may have no impact at all.[3] Some of the

contradictions found in this type of research are possibly due to differences in levels of analysis and to cultural differences between individual countries.

In the late 1950's, Daniel Lerner theorized that urbanization led to increased literacy which indirectly was related to political participation.[4] The theory that urbanization led to increased political participation was generally accepted. Others, including Karl Deutsch, stressed the importance of urbanization. According to Deutsch

> urbanization . . . creates among citizens new ties to the national scene, increases the amount of political communication, and leads to greater awareness of social and political needs. In short, urbanization is one of the processes of modernization which shifts the political orientation of citizens from parochial to national and participant.[5]

However, later studies by other researchers came up with conflicting results. Dahl, in 1967, found that the smaller the unit, the greater the opportunity for citizens to participate in the decisions of the government.[6] In other words, urbanization does not necessarily lead to increased participation, in fact it may have the opposite effect. Other studies have also shown that in some areas rural residents turn out to vote more frequently than urban voters. For example, Herbert Tingsten found that in prewar Switzerland rural voter turnout was higher than urban voter turnout. In local elections in France, it has been shown that rural areas produce a higher voter turnout than other sections of the country.[7] Japan has also traditionally been associated with higher rural turnouts.[8]

Other studies have found that urban voting is more common than rural voting. In some studies, urban residence has been associated with higher levels of participation such as in the United States. In Sweden and Norway, similar patterns have been observed.[9]

In other studies, researchers have found no relationship between urbanization and political participation. Nie, Powell, and Prewitt, in their reanalysis of the Almond and Verba data for five countries (the United States, the United Kingdom, Italy, Mexico, and Germany), found that "place of residence is no predictor of political activity."[10] In further studies, it was shown that urbanization had little independent effect on political participation when the latter is measured by a scale including both national and local acts of political participation.[11]

At the individual level, as opposed to the societal level, there are also diverging theories on how urbanization affects political participation. There are three common theories concerning the political effects of rural to urban migration. The first theory posits that the migrant, once in the city, becomes frustrated, bored, and alienated. According to this theory, urbanization breeds economic frustration. The migrant becomes intensely dissatisfied with the political system when he realizes that the government could alleviate his problems and does not.[12] When the migrant is not integrated into society, he becomes available for mobilization by radical parties or organizations.[13]

The second theory is also known as the "supportive migrant" theory. According to this theory, the migrant does not feel deprived, rather the new urbanite is inclined to support the system.[14] The new migrant has some foreknowledge of the city and does not have unreal expectations of life there. Cityward migration, therefore, does not seem to lead to severe socioeconomic frustration, alienation, or radicalization.

The third theory of the impact of rural to urban migration takes the second theory one step further. Initially, migrants are satisfied with their urban life which may be an improvement over the old rural

life, but the longer they reside in the cities the greater their expectations. If these expectations are not met, the migrants become dissatisfied and susceptible to radicalization.

Problems exist with each of these theories. But, according to James W. White, given the data presently available, the third theory appears most accurately to represent the process of urbanization.[15]

It can be seen from the preceeding paragraphs that there are numerous discrepancies in the theories concerning urbanization and political participation at both the individual and societal levels. Some of the differences can be attributed to differences in levels of analysis. Several of the studies have analyzed political participation in individual countries, while others have analyzed it in several countries as part of the modernization process. The type of data utilized may also account for some of the variation encountered in these theories. National aggregate voting returns and public opinion surveys are two common sources of information used in such research. If the underlying differences in the implications of urban and rural residence in different places could be clarified, it could pave the way to identifying basic cross-national uniformities in the roots of political performance.[16]

Theories of Japanese Political Participation

The political implications of urbanization have been of particular interest in studies of Japanese politics. Much of the research has been concerned with individual Japanese communities. James W. White's study of Uji and Robert E. Ward's study of Okayama and Osaka are examples of this type of study.[17] The other major category of research has utilized

aggregate national data. Bradley Richardson and Jun'ichi Kyogoku and Nobutaka Ike have undertaken such studies. While these studies have each been based on different levels of analysis, there were some general points of agreement. The results of these studies can be summarized as follows:

1. The voting rate is uniformly higher in rural areas at all levels of elections.

2. At all levels--local, prefectural, and national--the dimensions of conservative political strength are greater in the countryside than in the city.

3. Progressive political allegiances in general are notably weaker at all levels in the countryside than in the city.

4. Communist Party affiliation is far stronger in the city than in the countryside, and is insignificant in the villages at the local and prefectural level.[18]

There are problems with the results of those studies. One problem is that some of these studies were limited to a specific community. This fact makes generalization of the results to the national level hazardous. Another difficulty is that some of these studies were limited to a specific year. Some of the studies have attempted to study voting behavior over a period of several years but these studies have either been concerned with the immediate postwar years in Japan, 1947-1958, or with the most recent elections. There has been a gap in the research concerning urbanization and voting behavior during the period 1955-1967. This study, it is hoped, may provide some information about voter preference during this period.

FOOTNOTES

[1]Samuel P. Huntington and Joan M. Nelson, No Easy Choice (Cambridge, 1974), p. 4.

[2]For a more complete discussion of this theory see Wayne A. Cornelius, "Urbanization as an Agent in Latin American Political Instability: The Case of Mexico," American Political Science Review, 63 (September 1969), pp. 833-855.

[3]Bradley Richardson, "Urbanization and Political Participation: The Case of Japan," American Political Science Review, 67 (June 1973), p. 433.

[4]Daniel Lerner, The Passing of Traditional Society: Modernizing the Middle East (Glencoe, 1958), p. 60.

[5]Karl Deutsch, "Social Mobilization and Political Development," American Political Science Review 55 (September 1961), p. 494.

[6]N. H. Nie, G. B. Powell, Jr., and K. Prewitt, "Social Structure and Political Participation: Development Relations, Part I," American Political Science Review, 63 (June 1969), p. 366.

[7]See Mark Kesselman, "French Local Politics: A Statistical Examination of Grass Roots Consensus," American Political Science Review, 60 (December 1966), pp. 963-973; and also Sidney Tarrow, "The Urban-Rural Cleavage in Political Involvement: The Case of France," American Political Science Review, 65 (June 1971), pp. 341-357.

[8]Jun'ichi Kyogoku and Nobutaki Ike, "Urban-Rural Differences in Voting Behavior in Post War Japan," Economic Development and Cultural Change, 9 (October 1960), p. 170.

[9]Herbert L. Tingsten, Political Behavior: Studies in Election Statistics (Totowa, 1963), p. 214.

[10]Nie, Powell, and Prewitt, p. 366.

[11]Ibid., p. 368.

[12]James W. White, Political Implication of Cityward Migration: Japan as an Exploratory Test Case, Sage Professional Paper in Comparative Politics 01-001 (Beverly Hills, 1973), p. 12.

[13]Ibid.

[14]Ibid., p. 13.

[15]Ibid., p. 15.

[16]Richardson, p. 435.

[17]For further details see James W. White's Political Implications of Cityward Migration: Japan as an Exploratory Test Case, Sage Professional Paper in Comparative Politics 01-001 (Beverly Hills, 1973); and Robert E. Ward's "Urban-Rural Differences and the Process of Political Modernization in Japan: A Case Study," Economic Development and Cultural Change, 9 (October 1960), pp. 1-164.

[18]Robert E. Ward, "Urban-Rural Differences and the Process of Political Modernization in Japan: A Case Study," Economic Development and Cultural Change, 9 (October 1960), pp. 163-164.

CHAPTER V

URBANIZATION AND JAPANESE VOTING PREFERENCE: 1955-1967

Introduction

In order to assess the impact of urbanization on Japanese voter preferences, the results of five elections for the House of Representatives during the period 1955-1967 were examined. As mentioned previously, this data is part of the Data Confrontation Seminar on the Use of Ecological Data in Cross-National Research, 1969, and was supplied by Michitoshi Takabataki. This data also contains ecological information taken from the Japanese national censuses. For the purposes of this study, only the data from the 1955, 1960, and 1965 censuses were used.

A study of urbanization and how it affects voting preferences presents several difficulties. A fundamental problem is one of definition. What exactly does "urbanization" refer to? What constitutes an "urban" area?

In this study, "urbanization" is defined as the process by which, through both migration and natural increases, increasing numbers or proportions of a society's inhabitants become residents of cities.[1] However, to define "urban" is more difficult. Unfortunately there is no widely accepted definition of "urban." The United Nations, in preparing its statistics on rural and urban populations in a given state, uses that individual state's criteria of what constitutes a rural area and an

urban area. The criteria used to distinguish between rural and urban areas varies.[2] Traditionally, rural residence has been associated with agricultural employment. More typically, the distinction between "rural" and "urban" localities rests on a quantitative criterion of number of inhabitants. In many countries, the cutting point between "rural" and "urban" localities may lie between 2,000 and 5,000 inhabitants, though there are many exceptions.[3]

In Japan, the government uses administrative categories rather than the size of the population to designate urban and rural areas.[4] The administrative categories include a metropolitan prefecture, cities (shi), towns (machi), and villages (mura). The categories are somewhat misleading because the term "city" often refers to an area which is primarily rural in nature. The definitions are further confused by official reports which use the label "large cities" to refer to Tokyo and other metropolitan centers. In addition, in the statistics reported to the United Nations concerning the number of urban residents, the Japanese government defined "urban areas" as "densely inhabited districts."[5]

Efforts to clarify these terms have been made. Professor J. A. A. Stockwin adapted Okina Yasuhara's system and divided Japan's electoral districts into four categories: metropolitan, urban, semi-rural, and rural.[6] "Metropolitan" refers to constituencies in the urban category which have either no rural population or only a negligible proportion. "Urban" refers to constituencies in which, at the time of the past four general elections, more than 50 per cent of the electors have lived in cities. "Semi-rural" refers to constituencies in which, over the period of the last four general elections, the percentage of electors living

in cities has increased from less than 50 per cent to more than 50 per cent. "Rural" refers to constituencies in which, during the time of the past four general elections, less than 50 per cent of the electors have lived in cities.[7] This definition is vague and rather difficult to use. It is not a satisfactory definition, at least for the purposes of this study; nor are the definitions used by the United Nations or by the Japanese government.

Because of the nature of the data to be examined and the problems of definition illustrated in the preceeding paragraphs, an alternative definition was decided upon. A further and more precise insight into the urban-rural characteristics of the Japanese people may be gained from an analysis of their occupational characteristics.[8] A classification system based on the percentage of the labor force engaged in primary industries (farming, fishing, and forestry) would more accurately represent the urban-rural characteristics of the prefectures. The system that will be used consists of five categories: Class I = less than 10 per cent of the population involved in the primary sector, Class II = 10-19 per cent of the population involved in the primary sector, Class III = 20-29 per cent of the population involved in the primary sector, Class IV = 30-39 per cent of the population involved in the primary sector, and Class V = more than 40 per cent of the population involved in the primary sector.[9]

This system has been used by Japanese official sources in the analysis of two general elections.[10] A variation of this system has been used by Irene B. Taeuber, Jun'ichi Kyogoku and Nobutaka Ike.[11]

Prefectural Urbanization Levels

The first step in the analysis of Japanese urbanization was to determine the level of urbanization for each of the 46 prefectures. The ecological information provided in the data set allowed the researcher to determine the level of urbanization for each prefecture, during the period 1955-1967, using the classification system based on the percentage of the population employed in the primary sector. The results are given in Table III.

Looking at Table III, it can be seen that in 1955, 38 of the 46 prefectures had more than 40 per cent of their labor forces employed in the primary sector. These are classified as Class V prefectures. In 1955, there was one Class IV prefecture, the prefecture of Shizuoka with 38 per cent of its population employed in the primary sector. Four prefectures had 20-29 per cent of their labor forces employed in the primary sector. Only one prefecture, Kanagawa, could be classified as a Class IV prefecture. There were two prefectures, Tokyo and Osaka, that could be classified as Class I prefectures with less than 10 per cent of their labor forces employed in the primary sector.

In the years between 1955-1960, the number of Class V prefectures declined from 38 in 1955 to 29 in 1960. Ten prefectures had 30-39 per cent of their labor force employed in the primary sector and were classified as Class IV prefectures. Two prefectures, Hyogo and Fukuoka, were Class III prefectures with 20-29 per cent of their labor forces employed in the primary sector. Kanagawa, Aichi, and Kyoto each had between 10-19 per cent of their labor forces employed in the primary sector and were classified as Class II prefectures. Two Class I

TABLE III

LEVELS OF PREFECTURAL URBANIZATION

Name of Prefecture	1955 % of Population in Primary Sector	1955 Degree of Urbanization	1960 % of Population in Primary Sector	1960 Degree of Urbanization	1965 % of Population in Primary Sector	1965 Degree of Urbanization
1. Hokkaido	43	Class V	36	Class IV	26	Class III
2. Aomori	62	Class V	52	Class V	47	Class V
3. Iwate	63	Class V	57	Class V	49	Class V
4. Miyagi	54	Class V	46	Class V	38	Class IV
5. Akita	61	Class V	55	Class V	48	Class V
6. Yamagata	58	Class V	52	Class V	45	Class V
7. Fukushima	57	Class V	51	Class V	44	Class V
8. Ibaragi	64	Class V	56	Class V	46	Class V
9. Tochigi	53	Class V	46	Class V	36	Class IV
10. Gumma	51	Class V	43	Class V	34	Class IV
11. Saitama	46	Class V	35	Class IV	22	Class III
12. Chiba	56	Class V	47	Class V	33	Class IV
13. Tokyo	4	Class I	2	Class I	2	Class I
14. Kanagawa	16	Class II	10	Class II	6	Class I
15. Niigata	56	Class V	48	Class V	43	Class V
16. Toyama	46	Class V	39	Class IV	31	Class IV
17. Ishikama	45	Class V	37	Class IV	29	Class III
18. Fukui	47	Class V	40	Class V	31	Class IV
19. Yamanashi	51	Class V	44	Class V	37	Class IV
20. Nagano	57	Class V	48	Class V	39	Class IV
21. Gifu	44	Class V	34	Class IV	26	Class III
22. Shizuoka	38	Class IV	30	Class IV	23	Class III
23. Aichi	26	Class III	19	Class II	14	Class II
24. Mie	48	Class V	42	Class V	33	Class IV
25. Shiga	51	Class V	44	Class IV	35	Class IV

TABLE III (Continued)

Name of Prefecture	1955 % of Population in Primary Sector	1955 Degree of Urbanization	1960 % of Population in Primary Sector	1960 Degree of Urbanization	1965 % of Population in Primary Sector	1965 Degree of Urbanization
26. Kyoto	23	Class III	18	Class II	12	Class II
27. Osaka	8	Class I	4	Class I	3	Class I
28. Hyogo	28	Class III	20	Class III	14	Class II
29. Nara	42	Class V	31	Class IV	25	Class III
30. Wakayama	41	Class V	35	Class IV	27	Class III
31. Tottori	57	Class V	49	Class V	40	Class V
32. Shimane	60	Class V	53	Class V	45	Class V
33. Okayama	51	Class V	43	Class V	35	Class IV
34. Hiroshima	41	Class V	33	Class IV	24	Class III
35. Yamaguchi	42	Class V	35	Class IV	28	Class III
36. Tokushima	54	Class V	47	Class V	39	Class IV
37. Kagawa	49	Class V	42	Class V	34	Class IV
38. Ehime	50	Class V	42	Class V	36	Class IV
39. Kochi	59	Class V	51	Class V	41	Class V
40. Fukouka	27	Class III	21	Class III	17	Class II
41. Saga	50	Class V	44	Class V	39	Class IV
42. Nagasaki	48	Class V	41	Class V	35	Class IV
43. Kumamoto	56	Class V	51	Class V	44	Class V
44. Oita	56	Class V	50	Class V	42	Class V
45. Miyazaki	59	Class V	53	Class V	44	Class V
46. Kagoshima	68	Class V	60	Class V	51	Class V

prefectures, Tokyo and Osaka, each had less than 5 per cent of their labor forces employed in the primary sector.

In 1965, there were 13 prefectures in the Class V category, 16 prefectures in the Class IV category, and 9 in the Class III category. Four prefectures (Aichi, Kyoto, Hyogo, and Fukuoka) were Class II prefectures, with 10-19 per cent of their labor forces employed in the primary sector. Three prefectures (Tokyo, Osaka, and Kanagawa) were considered to be Class I prefectures, with less than 10 per cent of their labor forces employed in the primary sector.

In the 10 year period between 1955 and 1965 censuses, several changes in the urban-rural characteristics of the 46 prefectures can be seen. First, there has been a steady, definite decline in the percentages of the labor force employed in the primary sector in all of the 46 prefectures, except in the prefecture of Tokyo. In the years 1960-1965, Tokyo experienced no change in the percentage of persons employed in the primary sector. During this period, only approximately 2 per cent of Tokyo's labor force was employed in the primary sector. Looking at Table III, it can be seen that the range of decline was from -2 per cent to -24 per cent. The average rate of decline was 10.26 per cent. However, even though every prefecture experienced a decline in the primary sector, many prefectures remained predominantly rural or semi-rural in nature. The prefectures with a high degree of urbanization tend to be clustered along what has been referred to previously as the Tokaido megapolis which is comprised of the nine prefectures around Tokyo, Osaka, and Nagoya.

Urban-Rural Voter Preference

In order to assess the impact of urbanization on voter preference, it was first necessary to determine whether there is a difference between urban (Class I and II) and rural (Class IV and V) voter behavior. Voter preference was determined by calculating the percentage of the total vote that each group received.[12] It should be noted that, because of the nature of the data, voter preference for each individual party is not given. Rather, the political parties were grouped into the following categories by Michitoshi Takabataki: conservative, socialist, communist, Buddhist sector, miscellaneous, and independent. The "conservative" category includes only the LDP, while the "socialist" category includes both the JSP and the DSP. The "communist" category refers to the JCP and the "Buddhist sector" refers to the Komeito.

The results of the five elections held during the period 1955-1967 for the House of Representatives are given in Tables IV through XVII. Detailed information about the changes in levels of urbanization in the individual prefectures is given in Appendix C.

Table IV shows the voters' preference in Class V prefecture for the year 1955. Looking at the table, it can be seen that in these predominantly rural areas the Conservatives have enjoyed overwhelming support. In that election year, the support of the Conservatives did not fall below 54 per cent. The range of support was wide--54 per cent to 82 per cent. In 1955, support for the Conservatives averaged 70 per cent.

Table V shows the voters' preferences in Class I, II, III, and IV prefectures. These classes were combined because of their small numbers. Looking at the table, it can be seen that in the one Class IV prefecture

TABLE IV

CLASS V PREFECTURES: VOTER PREFERENCE FOR 1955 HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTION

Name of Prefecture	% of Conservative Vote	% of Socialist Vote	% of Communist Vote	% of Komei Vote*	% of Miscellaneous Vote	% of Independent Vote
1. Hokkaido	54	42	3.0	-	0.4	0.3
2. Aomori	80	17	2.0	-		
3. Iwate	70	28	0.5	-	0.6	
4. Miyagi	59	34	0.3	-	5.0	0.6
5. Akita	66	31	2.0	-		
6. Yamagata	73	24		-	2.0	1.0
7. Fukushima	66	33		-	0.2	0.1
8. Ibaragi	70	28	0.3	-		0.3
9. Tochigi	68	30	0.7	-		0.3
10. Gumma	68	31	0.4	-		0.2
11. Saitama	64	33	0.5	-		0.9
12. Chiba	76	23		-		
13. Niigata	58	39	2.0	-		
14. Toyama	76	24		-		
15. Ishikawa	79	20	0.3	-		
16. Fukui	70	29		-		1.0
17. Yamanashi	58	40		-		2.0
18. Nagano	58	37	4.0	-	0.5	
19. Gifu	73	25		-	1.0	
20. Mie	77	22		-		
21. Shiga	64	35		-		
22. Nara	72	24	2.0	-		0.3
23. Wakayama	72	27		-		
24. Tottori	58	37	4.0	-		

TABLE IV (Continued)

Name of Prefecture	% of Conservative Vote	% of Socialist Vote	% of Communist Vote	% of Komei Vote*	% of Miscellaneous Vote	% of Independent Vote
25. Shimane	69	27	3.0	-		
26. Okayama	66	32	2.0	-		
27. Hiroshima	74	25	0.4	-		
28. Yamaguchi	65	33		-		1.0
29. Tokushima	79	20		-		
30. Kagawa	60	23	5.0	-		
31. Ehime	75	23	0.9	-		
32. Kochi	75	23		-		0.4
33. Saga	73	26		-		
34. Nagasaki	70	28	0.5	-		0.1
35. Kumamoto	76	23		-		
36. Oita	77	22		-		0.8
37. Miyazaki	74	24	0.3	-		
38. Kagoshima	82	16	1.0	-		

Note: The percentage totals may not equal 100 per cent due to missing data and to rounding.

*The Komei, or the Komeito Party, was not in existence during the 1955 election.

TABLE V

CLASS I, II, III, AND IV PREFECTURES: VOTER PREFERENCE FOR 1955 HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTION

Name of Prefecture	% of Conservative Vote	% of Socialist Vote	% of Communist Vote	% of Komei Vote*	% of Miscellaneous Vote	% of Independent Vote
Class I						
1. Tokyo	56	37	5.0	-	0.9	0.5
2. Osaka	55	35	8.0	-		0.4
Class II						
1. Kanagawa	53	40	4.0	-		0.1
Class III						
1. Aichi	69	27	3.0	-	0.02	0.5
2. Kyoto	57	35	6.0	-	0.8	0.4
3. Hyogo	61	36	1.0	-		0.3
4. Fukuoka	52	44	2.0	-		0.5
Class IV						
1. Shizuoka	75	22	2.0	-		0.8

Note: The percentage totals may not equal 100 per cent due to missing data and rounding.

*The Komei, or the Komeito Party, was not in existence during the 1958 election.

the Conservatives enjoyed overwhelming support--75 per cent. In Class III prefectures, the Conservatives also were the voters' choice. The range of Conservative support was 57 to 69 per cent. The average rate of support was 62 per cent. In the Class II prefecture, the Conservatives were also the favorite and received 53 per cent of the total votes cast. In the Class I prefectures, the Conservatives received 56 and 55 per cent of the total votes cast.

Table VI shows the voters' preferences in Class V prefectures for the year 1958. Looking at the table, it can be seen that in these predominantly rural areas the Conservatives enjoyed overwhelming support. In that election year, the support for the Conservatives did not fall below 50 per cent. Range of support for the Conservatives was between 50 and 83 per cent. In 1958, support for the Conservatives in all 38 Class V prefectures averaged 68 per cent.

Table VII shows the voters' preferences in Class I, II, III, and IV prefectures. These classes were combined in Table VII because of their small numbers. Looking at the table, it can be seen that in the one Class IV prefecture the Conservatives dominated, polling 72 per cent of the total vote. In Class III prefectures, the Conservatives also succeeded in winning a majority of the total votes cast. The range of support varied between 53 and 61 per cent. The average rate of support was 58 per cent. In the Class II prefecture of Kanagawa, the Conservatives received 55 per cent of the total vote. In the Class I prefectures of Tokyo and Osaka, the Conservatives received 53 and 50 per cent of the vote respectively.

Table VIII shows the voters' preferences in Class V prefectures for the year 1960. Looking at this table, it can be seen that in these

TABLE VI

CLASS V PREFECTURES: VOTER PREFERENCE FOR 1958
HOUSE OF RESPRESENTATIVES ELECTION

Name of Prefecture	% of Conservative Vote	% of Socialist Vote	% of Communist Vote	% of Komei Vote*	% of Miscellaneous Vote	% of Independent Vote
1. Hokkaido	50	47	2.0	-	0.4	0.2
2. Aomori	74	24	2.0	-		
3. Iwate	63	34	1.0	-		
4. Miyagi	64	31	1.0	-	3.0	
5. Akita	60	37	2.0	-		
6. Yamagata	76	22	1.0	-		0.1
7. Fukushima	61	37	1.0	-		0.2
8. Ibaragi	68	29	1.0	-		0.4
9. Tochigi	67	31	1.0	-		0.3
10. Gumma	68	29	1.0	-		0.4
11. Saitama	65	32	2.0	-	0.5	
12. Chiba	72	25	2.0	-		0.3
13. Niigata	61	36	2.0	-		0.4
14. Toyama	74	24	2.0	-		
15. Ishikawa	75	22	2.0	-		
16. Fukui	72	27	0.8	-		
17. Yamanashi	64	33	1.0	-	0.4	
18. Nagano	55	39	4.0	-	0.1	0.4
19. Gifu	65	33	2.0	-		
20. Mie	72	26	0.8	-	0.1	
21. Shiga	58	39	2.0	-		1.0
22. Nara	71	27	1.0	-		
23. Wakayama	71	25	2.0	-		0.5
24. Tottori	64	32	2.0	-		1.0

TABLE VI (Continued)

Name of Prefecture	% of Conservative Vote	% of Socialist Vote	% of Communist Vote	% of Komei Vote *	% of Miscellaneous Vote	% of Independent Vote
25. Shimane	66	30	3.0	-		
26. Okayama	64	33	2.0	-	0.1	
27. Hiroshima	68	30	1.0	-		
28. Yamaguchi	66	31	2.0	-		
29. Tokushima	69	29	1.0	-		
30. Kagawa	73	26	0.4	-		
31. Ehime	75	27	0.6	-		
32. Kochi	67	31	1.0	-		
33. Saga	71	3	2.0	-		
34. Nagasaki	73	25	1.0	-		0.05
35. Kumamoto	78	21	0.9	-		
36. Oita	83	30	1.0	-		
37. Miyazaki	72	27	0.6	-		
38. Kagoshima	76	22	1.0	-		0.5

Note: The percentage totals may not equal 100 per cent due to missing data and to rounding.

*The Komei, or the Komeito Party, was not in existence during the 1958 election.

TABLE VII

CLASS I, II, III, AND IV PREFECTURES: VOTER PREFERENCE FOR 1958 HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTION

Name of Prefecture	% of Conservative Vote	% of Socialist Vote	% of Communist Vote	% of Komei Vote*	% of Miscellaneous Vote	% of Independent Vote
Class I						
1. Tokyo	52	44	5.0	-	0.9	0.6
2. Osaka	50	49	10.0	-		0.08
Class II						
1. Kanagawa	55	40	4.0	-		0.3
Class III						
1. Aichi	60	37	2.0	-	0.06	0.1
2. Kyoto	53	40	6.0	-		0.9
3. Hyogo	61	36	2.0	-		0.08
4. Fukuoka	56	41	2.0	-		
Class IV						
1. Shizuoka	72	25	3.0	-		0.04

Note: The percentage totals may not equal 100 per cent due to missing data and to rounding.

*The Komei, or the Komeito Party, was not in existence during the 1958 election.

TABLE VIII

CLASS V PREFECTURES: VOTER PREFERENCE FOR 1960
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTION

Name of Prefecture	% of Conservative Vote	% of Socialist Vote	% of Communist Vote	% of Komei Vote*	% of Miscellaneous Vote	% of Independent Vote
1. Aomori	72	26	2.0	-	0.2	
2. Iwate	62	35	2.0	-		0.2
3. Miyagi	59	35	1.0	-	3.0	
4. Akita	57	39	2.0	-		
5. Yamagata	71	27	1.0	-		
6. Fukushima	61	36	2.0	-		0.04
7. Ibaragi	66	31	2.0	-		
8. Tochigi	67	32	0.8	-		0.09
9. Gumma	64	33	2.0	-		0.3
10. Chiba	71	27	1.0	-	0.08	0.06
11. Niigata	54	42	2.0	-		0.1
12. Fukui	66	33	1.0	-		
13. Yamanashi	63	35	1.0	-	0.4	
14. Nagano	54	40	5.0	-		0.7
15. Mie	68	29	1.0	-	0.3	
16. Shiga	60	37	2.0	-		0.7
17. Tottori	63	34	2.0	-	0.08	
18. Shimane	69	28	2.0	-	0.6	0.2
19. Okayama	60	36	2.0	-		
20. Tokushima	73	32	1.0	-	0.04	0.04
21. Kagawa	72	26	1.0	-		
22. Ehime	63	34	1.0	-		
23. Kochi	63	34	2.0	-		
24. Saga	73	34	2.0	-		

TABLE VIII (Continued)

Name of Prefecture	% of Conservative Vote	% of Socialist Vote	% of Communist Vote	% of Komei Vote*	% of Miscellaneous Vote	% of Independent Vote
25. Nagasaki	66	32	2.0	-		
26. Kumamoto	72	25	1.0	-		0.07
27. Oita	62	35	1.0	-		
28. Miyazaki	62	35	1.0	-		
29. Kagoshima	71	25	1.0	-		0.7

Note: The percentage totals may not equal 100 per cent due to missing data and to rounding.

*The Komei, or the Komeito Party, was not in existence during the 1960 election.

predominately rural areas the Conservatives again enjoyed overwhelming support. In that election year, support for the Conservatives did not fall below 54 per cent. The range of support for the Conservatives was between 54 and 73 per cent. In 1960, support for the Conservatives in all 29 Class V prefectures averaged 65 per cent.

Table IX shows the voters' preferences in Class IV prefectures. Looking at the table, it can be seen that with two exceptions, the Conservatives enjoyed a high level of electoral support. In the prefecture of Hokkaido, the Socialists were very strong in 1960. The Conservatives received 50 per cent of the vote, only 3 per cent more than the Socialists. The other exception was the prefecture of Ishikawa, where the Conservatives polled only 41 per cent of the vote. The Conservatives polled more votes than the other parties, but for some reason there was a high percentage of invalid votes. The reason for this situation is not indicated in the data. The range of support for the Conservatives was between 41 and 70 per cent. The average rate of support for the Conservatives was approximately 63 per cent. The average rate of support for the Socialists was approximately 30 per cent.

Table X shows the voters' preferences in Class I, II, and III prefectures. These classes were combined because of their small numbers. Looking at the table, it is evident that the Conservatives did not do as well in the 1960 election in the Class I prefectures. In the Class I prefecture of Tokyo, the Conservatives polled fewer votes than did the Socialists. It was admittedly a small margin of victory, approximately 1 per cent. In the other Class I prefecture, Osaka, the Conservatives out-polled the Socialists by only 2 per cent. In the Class II prefectures of Kanagawa and Kyoto, the Conservative victories were

TABLE IX

CLASS IV PREFECTURES: VOTER PREFERENCE FOR 1960
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTION

Name of Prefecture	% of Conservative Vote	% of Socialist Vote	% of Communist Vote	% of Komei Vote*	% of Miscellaneous Vote	% of Independent Vote
1. Hokkaido	50	47	2.0	-	0.2	
2. Saitama	63	34	2.0	-		
3. Toyama	73	25	1.0	-		
4. Ishikama	41	19	3.0	-		
5. Gifu	65	33	2.0	-		
6. Shizuoka	68	29	2.0	-		0.3
7. Nara	67	31	1.0	-		
8. Wakayama	70	22	4.0	-		
9. Hiroshima	68	30	2.0	-		0.4
10. Yamaguchi	64	34	1.0	-	0.6	1.0

Note: The percentage totals may not equal 100 per cent due to missing data and to rounding.

*The Komei, or the Komeito Party, was not in existence during the 1960 election.

TABLE X

CLASS I, II, AND III PREFECTURES: VOTER PREFERENCE FOR 1960 HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTION

Name of Prefecture	% of Conservative Vote	% of Socialist Vote	% of Communist Vote	% of Komei Vote*	% of Miscellaneous Vote	% of Independent Vote
Class I						
1. Tokyo	46	47	5.0	-	0.4	0.4
2. Osaka	45	43	11.0	-	0.03	0.3
Class II						
1. Kanagawa	53	41	5.0	-		0.08
2. Aichi	60	37	2.0	-	0.05	0.3
3. Kyoto	46	43	9.0	-		0.7
Class III						
1. Hyogo	57	40	2.0	-	0.08	0.06
2. Fukuoka	50	44	5.0	-		

Note: The percentage totals may not equal 100 per cent due to missing data or to rounding.

*The Komei, or the Komeito Party, was not in existence during the 1960 election.

narrower. In Kyoto, the Conservatives won by only 3 per cent. But in the Class II prefecture of Aichi, the Conservatives dominated the election. In the Class III prefectures, the Conservatives also defeated the Socialists. In Fukuoka, however, the margin of victory was only 6 per cent.

Table XI shows the voters' preferences in Class V prefectures during the 1963 election. Looking at the table, it can be seen that the Conservatives were again very strong in these predominantly rural areas. Support for the Conservatives did not fall below 55 per cent in this election. The range of support for the Conservatives was between 55 and 79 per cent. In 1963, support for the Conservatives in all 29 Class V prefectures averaged 66 per cent.

Table XII shows the voters' preferences in Class IV prefectures during the 1963 election. With two exceptions, the Conservatives received over 60 per cent of the vote. Even in the prefectures where the Conservatives did not poll over 60 per cent of the vote, the Conservatives were still strong enough to poll over 50 per cent of the vote. The range of support for the Conservatives was between 51 and 71 per cent. The average rate of support during the 1963 election was approximately 64 per cent. The average rate of support for the Socialists during the 1963 election was approximately 32 per cent. Support for the Socialists was highest in the prefectures of Hokkaido and Yamaguchi where they polled 45 and 43 per cent of the vote respectively. The range of support for the Socialists was between 21 and 45 per cent.

Table XIII shows the voters' preferences in Class I, II, and III prefectures. These classes were combined because of their small numbers. Looking at the table, it is evident that the Conservatives did not do

TABLE XI

CLASS V PREFECTURES: VOTER PREFERENCE FOR 1963 HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTION

Name of Prefecture	% of Conservative Vote	% of Socialist Vote	% of Communist Vote	% of Komei Vote*	% of Miscellaneous Vote	% of Independent Vote
1. Aomori	67	29	3.0	-		
2. Iwate	62	35	2.0	-		
3. Miyagi	55	40	2.0	-	3.0	
4. Akita	55	41	3.0	-		
5. Yamagata	70	27	1.0	-		0.2
6. Fukushima	64	34	2.0	-		
7. Ibaragi	72	25	2.0	-		
8. Tochigi	68	30	0.9	-		
9. Gumma	67	30	2.0	-		
10. Chiba	69	28	2.0	-	0.02	0.07
11. Niigata	61	35	2.0	-		
12. Fukui	72	27	1.0	-		
13. Yamanahi	66	32	1.0	-	0.3	
14. Nagano	55	35	8.0	-		0.8
15. Mie	77	21	2.0	-	0.07	0.2
16. Shiga	57	39	3.0	-		
17. Tottori	60	37	2.0	-		
18. Shimane	65	31	3.0	-		
19. Okayama	61	36	2.0	-		
20. Tokushima	79	19	1.0	-		
21. Kagawa	71	27	1.0	-		0.04
22. Ehime	64	33	2.0	-		0.08
23. Kochi	60	29	9.0	-		
24. Saga	65	34	1.0	-		

TABLE XI (Continued)

Name of Prefecture	% of Conservative Vote	% of Socialist Vote	% of Communist Vote	% of Komei Vote*	% of Miscellaneous Vote	% of Independent Vote
25. Nagasaki	60	37	2.0	-		
26. Kumamoto	75	23	1.0	-		
27. Oita	70	28	2.0	-		
28. Miyazaki	62	35	2.0	-		
29. Kagoshima	73	24	1.0	-		0.5

Note: The percentage totals may not equal 100 per cent due to missing data and to rounding.

*The Komei, or the Komeito Party, was not in existence during the 1963 election.

TABLE XII

CLASS IV PREFECTURES: VOTER PREFERENCE FOR 1963 HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTION

Name of Prefecture	% of Conservative Vote	% of Socialist Vote	% of Communist Vote	% of Komei Vote*	% of Miscellaneous Vote	% of Independent Vote
1. Hokkaido	51	45	2.0	-		0.2
2. Saitama	62	34	3.0	-		0.2
3. Toyama	69	27	3.0	-		0.4
4. Ishikama	69	21	10.0	-		
5. Gifu	69	28	2.0	-		
6. Shizuoka	65	32	2.0	-		0.1
7. Nara	63	34	1.0	-		0.7
8. Wakayama	69	26	4.0	-		0.7
9. Hiroshima	71	26	2.0	-		
10. Yamaguchi	54	43	2.0	-		

Note: The percentage totals may not equal 100 per cent due to missing data and to rounding.

*The Komei, or the Komeito Party, was not in existence during the 1963 election.

TABLE XIII

CLASS I, II, AND III PREFECTURES: VOTER PREFERENCE FOR 1963 HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTION

Name of Prefecture	% of Conservative Vote	% of Socialist Vote	% of Communist Vote	% of Komei Vote*	% of Miscellaneous Vote	% of Independent Vote
Class I						
1. Tokyo	45	46	7.0	-	0.3	0.5
2. Osaka	39	46	13.0	-	0.2	0.4
Class II						
1. Kanagawa	47	47	5.0	-	0.01	
2. Aichi	55	40	4.0	-		0.2
3. Kyoto	40	44	13.0	-	0.3	
Class III						
1. Hyogo	51	44	4.0	-		0.7
2. Fukuoka	51	41	6.0	-		0.2

Note: The percentage totals may not equal 100 per cent, due to missing data and to rounding.

*The Komei, or the Komeito Party, was not in existence during the 1963 election.

well in the 1963 election. In both Class I prefectures, Tokyo and Osaka, the Conservatives did not receive a majority of the votes. The Socialists outpolled the Conservatives in both Class I prefectures. The average rate of support for the Conservatives in Class I prefectures in the 1963 election was 42 per cent. The average rate of support for the Socialists in Class I prefectures was 46 per cent. In the Class II prefectures, the Conservatives outpolled the Socialists in only one prefecture, Aichi. In the prefecture of Kyoto, the Socialists outpolled the Conservatives by 4 per cent. In the Class II prefecture of Kanagawa, the Socialists and the Conservatives each received 46 per cent of the vote. In the Class III prefectures, the Conservatives did outpoll the Socialists. The average rate of support for the Conservatives was 51 per cent while the average rate of support for the Socialists was approximately 43 per cent.

Table XIV shows the voters' preferences in Class V prefectures during the 1967 election. In the 14 Class V prefectures, the Conservatives were quite strong. In this election, support for the Conservatives did not fall below 52 per cent. The range of support for the Conservatives was between 52 and 74 per cent. In 1967, support for the Conservatives averaged 63 per cent. Support for the Socialists in this selection averaged 32 per cent. The range of support for the Socialists was between 22 and 43 per cent.

Table XV shows the voters' preferences in Class IV prefectures during the 1967 election. Looking at this table, it is clear that the Conservatives enjoyed a clear majority of support with one exception. In the prefecture of Nagano, the Conservatives polled 47 per cent of the vote, while the Socialists polled 44 per cent of the vote. The

TABLE XIV

CLASS V PREFECTURES: VOTER PREFERENCE FOR 1967 HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTION

Name of Prefecture	% of Conservative Vote	% of Socialist Vote	% of Communist Vote	% of Komei Vote	% of Miscellaneous Vote	% of Independent Vote
1. Aomori	70	25	3.0			
2. Iwate	60	36	2.0			
3. Akita	52	43	3.0			
4. Yamagata	64	34	2.0			
5. Fukushima	60	37	2.0			
6. Ibaragi	70	27	2.0			
7. Niigata	62	34	3.0			
8. Tottori	57	40	2.0			
9. Shimane	67	30	2.0			
10. Kochi	57	27	9.0	13.0		
11. Kumamoto	67	30	1.0			
12. Oita	67	30	2.0			0.2
13. Miyazaki	59	37	3.0			
14. Kagoshima	74	22	1.0			0.7

Note: The percentage totals may not equal 100 per cent, due to missing data and to rounding.

TABLE XV

CLASS IV PREFECTURES: VOTER PREFERENCE FOR 1967 HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTION

Name of Prefecture	% of Conservative Vote	% of Socialist Vote	% of Communist Vote	% of Komei Vote	% of Miscellaneous Vote	% of Independent Vote
1. Miyagi	60	35	2.0		1.0	
2. Tochigi	64	34	1.0			
3. Gumma	64	32	4.0			
4. Chiba	59	30	3.0	8.0		0.1
5. Toyama	72	25	2.0			
6. Fukui	60	37	2.0			
7. Yamanashi	58	39	1.0		0.4	0.2
8. Nagano	47	44	8.0			
9. Mie	68	28	2.0		0.2	
10. Shiga	51	44	4.0			0.3
11. Okayama	58	31	3.0	7.0		
12. Tokushima	61	24	2.0	12.0		
13. Kagawa	73	24	2.0			
14. Ehime	71	26	3.0			
15. Saga	69	29	1.0			
16. Nagasaki	62	34	2.0			0.1

Note: The percentage totals may not equal 100 per cent, due to missing data and to rounding.

range of support for the Conservatives was between 47 and 73 per cent. The average rate of support for the Conservatives in this election was approximately 62 per cent.

Table XVI shows the voters' preferences in Class III prefectures during the 1967 election. In the nine Class III prefectures, the Conservatives dominated the election with one exception. In the prefecture of Hokkaido, the Conservatives and the Socialists each received 47 per cent of the vote. The range of support for the Conservatives in Class III prefectures was between 47 and 68 per cent of the vote. The average rate of support for the Conservatives was 59 per cent. The range of support for the Socialists in these prefectures was between 24 and 47 per cent. The average rate of support for the Socialists was 33 per cent.

Table XVII shows the voters' preferences in Class I and II prefectures. These classes were combined because of their small numbers. Looking at the table, it is evident that the Conservatives no longer dominated the Class I prefectures in 1967. In each of the three Class I prefectures, the Socialists outpolled the Conservatives. The range of support for the Conservatives was between 30 and 37 per cent, while the range of support for the Socialists was between 38 and 42 per cent. The average rate of support for the Conservatives was 35 per cent, but the average rate of support for the Socialists was 40 per cent. In three of the four Class II prefectures, the Conservatives outpolled the Socialists, although by narrowing margins. In the prefecture of Kyoto, the Conservatives and the Socialists each received 39 per cent of the vote. The Communists received 44 per cent of the vote in that election. The range of support for the Conservatives in 1967 was between 39 and 50

TABLE XVI

CLASS III PREFECTURES: VOTER PREFERENCE FOR 1967 HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTION

Name of Prefecture	% of Conservative Vote	% of Socialist Vote	% of Communist Vote	% of Komei Vote	% of Miscellaneous Vote	% of Independent Vote
1. Hokkaido	47	47	4.0	3.0		0.5
2. Saitama	57	30	5.0	7.0		0.04
3. Ishikawa	66	26	5.0			0.3
4. Gifu	61	31	2.0	5.0		0.3
5. Shizuoka	62	30	2.0	4.0		
6. Nara	51	43	2.0			0.2
7. Yakayama	60	34	4.0			
8. Hiroshima	68	24	3.0	4.0		
9. Yamaguchi	61	35	2.0			0.1

Note: The percentage totals may not equal 100 per cent, due to missing data and to rounding.

TABLE XVII

CLASS I AND II PREFECTURES: VOTER PREFERENCE FOR 1967 HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTION

Name of Prefecture	% of Conservative Vote	% of Socialist Vote	% of Communist Vote	% of Komei Vote	% of Miscellaneous Vote	% of Independent Vote
Class I						
1. Tokyo	37	38	10.0	13.0	0.1	0.3
2. Kanagawa	37	42	5.0	13.0	1.0	4.0
3. Osaka	30	40	10.0	25.0		0.5
Class II						
1. Aichi	50	39	6.0	0.4	0.03	0.08
2. Kyoto	39	39	14.0	6.0		
3. Hyogo	44	41	5.0	10.0		0.7
4. Fukuoka	45	39	7.0	8.0		0.2

Note: The percentage totals may not equal 100 per cent, due to missing data and to rounding.

per cent. The average rate of support was 45 per cent. The range of support for the Socialists in 1967 was between 39 and 41 per cent. The average rate of support was 40 per cent. The average rate of support for the Communists was 8 per cent.

Conclusions: Class V Prefectures

The Conservatives, overall, enjoyed strong support in the 14 predominantly rural prefectures. While support for the Conservatives declined, they never received less than 50 per cent of the total votes cast in Class V prefectures. However, the overall trend was a decline in support for the Conservatives. The average rate of electoral support for the Conservatives in Class V prefectures was approximately 57 per cent. The Socialists were not able to pose a serious threat to the Conservatives. They enjoyed a steady support of approximately 30 per cent. In the Class V prefectures, the Communists have never polled a substantial share of the votes cast. Support for the Communists averaged about 2 per cent.

The returns for the Komeito do not allow any conclusions to be drawn. The 1967 election was the first in which the Komeito ran candidates for the House of Representatives. Returns for the Komeito are missing for most Class V prefectures. The most likely explanation is that the Komeito did not run candidates in Class V prefectures.

No miscellaneous candidates or parties received a substantial share of the vote in any prefecture.

Independents never polled more than 1 per cent of the vote in the Class V prefectures. The reason for this result is that most individuals

who run as independents are, in reality, members of a major political party who did not receive their parties' official endorsement.

Conclusions: Class IV Prefectures

The Conservatives, overall, enjoyed strong support in the semi-rural prefectures. While their support declined or fluctuated in some Class IV prefectures, the Conservatives' average rate of support was 66 percent. When the prefectures changed from Class V to Class IV, 10 of the 16 experienced a decline in Conservative support. This decline in support averaged 7 per cent. In the other six prefectures, the Conservatives experienced an increase in support averaging about 4 per cent.

The Socialists were not able to pose a serious threat to the Conservatives. In Class IV prefectures, the Socialists enjoyed an average rate of support of approximately 27 per cent. When the prefectures changed from Class V to Class IV, there was no clear indication of a trend of either increasing or decreasing support. Socialists in seven of the prefectures experienced a decline in support averaging about 4 per cent. In nine of the prefectures, the Socialists experienced an increase in support averaging approximately 5 per cent.

In the Class IV prefectures, the Communists have never polled a substantial share of the votes cast in any election during the period 1955-1967. The average rate of electoral support was less than 2 per cent. When the prefectures changed classes, the Communists in nine of these prefectures experienced an increase in support of approximately 1 per cent. In one of the prefectures, the Communists experienced a decline in support of 1 per cent.

The Komeito first ran candidates for the House of Representatives in 1967. They ran candidates in three of the Class IV prefectures. The party received approximately 9 per cent of the votes cast in these prefectures.

No miscellaneous candidates or parties received a substantial share of the vote in any prefecture except that of Miyagi. In Miyagi, miscellaneous candidates and parties were unusually successful. Without adequate documentation, it is impossible to explain this anomaly.

Independents never polled more than 2 per cent of the vote in Class IV prefectures. The reason for this result is that most individuals who ran as independents are, in reality, members of major political parties who did not receive their parties' official endorsement.

Conclusions: Class III Prefectures

The Conservatives dominated the Class III prefectures. While support for the Conservatives, in these traditional prefectures, fluctuated or declined, it averaged 64 per cent. When the prefectures changed to Class IV, Conservatives in five of the nine prefectures experienced a decline, averaging 9 per cent. When the prefectures changed to Class III, Conservatives in eight of the nine prefectures experienced a decline in support of approximately 6 per cent. Only one prefecture showed an increase in Conservative support when the prefecture changed classes.

The Socialists, in Class III prefectures, were stronger than in Class IV and V prefectures. In two of the prefectures, support for the Socialists declined when the prefectures changed to Class IV. The average rate of decline was 3 per cent. Three prefectures experienced no change in support when they changed to Class IV. Three of the

prefectures experienced an increase in Socialist support when they changed classes. When the prefectures changed to Class III, Socialists in four of the prefectures experienced a decline in support averaging approximately 4 per cent. In five of the prefectures, the Socialists experienced an increase in support averaging approximately 5 per cent.

In Class III prefectures, the Communists were never able to poll a substantial share of the votes cast. The average rate of electoral support was approximately 2.5 per cent. Of the eight prefectures that went from Class V to IV to III, three of them experienced a decline when the prefecture went to Class IV. The average rate of decline was 2 per cent. Three of these prefectures experienced no change in Communist support. One prefecture experienced an increase of 1 per cent.

The Komeito ran candidates in five of the nine prefectures. The average rate of support was approximately 5 per cent.

Miscellaneous candidates and parties have not been a significant force in Class III prefectures. The average rate of support for the miscellaneous candidates and parties was approximately 0.5 per cent.

Independents never polled more than 1 per cent of the vote in Class III prefectures. The reason for this is that most individuals who run as Independents are, in reality, members of a major political party who did not receive their parties' official endorsement.

Conclusions: Class II Prefectures

In Class II prefectures, the Conservatives experienced an overall decline in support. Support in the Class II prefectures was not as strong as in Class III, IV, and V prefectures. The average rate of support was approximately 53 per cent. However, support did fall as

low as 39 per cent in the prefecture of Kyoto. When the prefectures changed to Class II, three of the prefectures experienced a decline of approximately 7 per cent. One prefecture experienced no change in support.

The Socialists in Class II prefectures were strong. Support in Class II prefectures has been as high as 44 per cent. Support for the Socialists in Class II prefectures averaged 40 per cent. When the prefectures shifted to Class II, two of the prefectures experienced a decline in Socialist support of approximately 3 per cent. One prefecture experienced no change in support.

The Communists were more successful in Class II prefectures than In Class III, IV, or V prefectures. Support for the Communists was as high as 14 per cent. When the prefectures changed classes, three of the four prefectures experienced an increase in support for the Communists. The average rate of increase was approximately 2 per cent. One prefecture experienced no change in support.

The Komeito ran candidates in all four Class II prefectures. The average rate of support for the Komeito was approximately 7 per cent.

No miscellaneous candidates or parties recieved a substantial share of the votes in any Class II prefecture. The average rate of support was less than 1 per cent.

Independents never polled more than 1 per cent of the vote in Class II prefectures.

Conclusions: Class I Prefectures

In the Class I prefectures, the Conservatives have not been the dominant force. Initially, the Conservatives were successful, but after

the 1960 election the Socialists effectively challenged their control. Support in these metropolitan prefectures was as low as 30 per cent. When Kanagawa became a Class I prefecture, support for the Conservatives declined 5 per cent. The average rate of support for the Conservatives in Class II prefectures was approximately 47 per cent.

The Socialists were a major force in Class I prefectural politics. The average rate of support for the Socialists was 40 per cent. When the prefecture of Kanagawa changed to a Class I prefecture, support for the Socialists dropped 5 per cent.

The Communists were strongest in the Class I prefectures. The average rate of support for the Communists was approximately 7 per cent. This rate of support was higher than that in any other class.

The Komeito ran candidates in each of the three Class I prefectures. The Komeito polled a substantial share of the votes cast in each Class I prefecture. Support for the Komeito ranged from 25 to 13 per cent and it averaged 17 per cent.

No miscellaneous candidates or parties received a substantial share of the votes in any Class I prefecture.

Independents were not a strong force in Class I prefectural politics. With one exception, Independents never received more than 1 per cent of the votes cast in any House of Representatives election.

1955-1967 Results and Trends

While the literature concerning Japanese political behavior has stated and assumes that there is a difference between urban and rural voting preference, that difference is not as distinctive as one might have expected. In the 1955 and 1968 House of Representatives elections,

both urban and rural voters preferred the Conservatives. In the 1960 election, the voters in Class II, III, IV, and V prefectures expressed a similar preference for the Conservatives. But, in the Class I prefectures, voter preference was different.

In the 1963 election, the Conservatives dominated the Class III, IV, and V prefectures while voters in the Class I and II prefectures expressed preferences for other parties. In the 1967 election, in the Class II, III, IV, and V prefectures, voters expressed similar preferences while those in Class I prefectures tended to support another party. In the 1967 election, the Komeito ran candidates for the time in the elections for the House of Representatives. Their showing was quite remarkable, but the lack of data makes it impossible to evaluate the party's impact.

There were differences in urban and rural voting preferences, but they did not occur to the extent that was anticipated. It was only in the 1963 and 1967 elections that, in the metropolitan prefectures (Class I), a distinct difference in voter preference became evident. The data does seem to support a hypothesis that distinguishes between metropolitan voters' preferences and rural and semi-rural voters' preferences. The data does not, at this time, allow any definite distinctions to be made between urban and traditional voters' preferences and metropolitan, rural, or semi-rural voters' preferences.

Since voters will tend to be attracted to the party which is most willing and capable of meeting their demands, it was thought that Japanese rural and urban voters would tend to support the conservative parties which have traditionally advocated politics which appeal to rural interests. Urban voters, it was thought, would tend to support

the more progressive parties which have been more responsive to their needs. It was expected that voters in predominantly urban prefectures (Class I and II) would have indicated a preference for progressive parties such as the Socialists or the Communists.

According to the results of this study, it is true that in Class I prefectures voters preferred the Socialists in the 1963 and 1967 elections. In 1960, Class I prefecture supported the Socialists, while the others supported the Conservatives. The Communists were also stronger in the Class I prefectures than in the rural prefectures.

Voters in Class IV and V prefectures, as expected, indicated a preference for the Conservatives. In each election held for the House of Representatives during the period 1955-1967, the Conservatives were the overwhelming favorites in the Class IV and V prefectures. The Socialists and the Communists, on the whole, were not strong in these rural and semi-rural prefectures.

As the urban/rural characteristics of a prefecture changed, it was expected that there would be a corresponding shift in voter preference. Increasing levels of urbanization should result in additional support for the more progressive parties. It is important to observe the changes that occurred in the prefectures that shifted classes. The prefectural changes that are of particular importance are the changes from Class IV to III and Class III to II. These are distinct changes in prefectural levels of urbanization and a noticeable change in voter preference should be evident. This assumption is not borne out by the data. When the prefectures shifted from Class IV to III, the Conservatives continued to dominate the elections. Several prefectures experienced a decline in Conservative support, which would be expected.

The Socialists, in a majority of the prefectures that changed to Class III, experienced an increase in support. However, even in those prefectures, the Conservatives continued to be very strong.

When the prefectures changed to Class II, a majority of these prefectures experienced a decline in support for the Conservatives. In one half of the Class II prefectures, the Socialists also experienced a decline in support. There is no clear evidence to show that a change in the urban/rural characteristics of a prefecture would result in a shift in voter preference. It would be expected that as the prefectures shifted classes, the Socialists would have received increasing support. That did occur in a few prefectures, but it did not occur to the extent expected and there was no definite, perceivable trend. The data does not seem to support the assumption.

FOOTNOTES

[1]James W. White, Political Implications of Cityward Migration: Japan as an Exploratory Test Case, Sage Professional Paper in Comparative Politics 01-001 (Beverly Hills, 1973), p. 9.

[2]United Nations, The Determinants and Consequences of Population Trends: New Summary of Findings on Interaction of Demographic, Economic, Social Factors, Vol. 1 (New York, 1973), p. 184.

[3]Ibid.

[4]Bradley M. Richardson, "Urbanization and Political Participation: The Case of Japan," American Political Science Review, 67 (June 1973), p. 436.

[5]Robert E. Ward, Japan's Political System (2nd ed., Englewood Cliffs, 1978), p. 44.

[6]J. A. A. Stockwin, Japan: Divided Politics in a Growth Economy (New York, 1975), p. 95.

[7]Ibid.

[8]Ward, Japan's Political System, 2nd ed., p. 46.

[9]Ibid., p. 92.

[10]Ibid.

[11]For further information see Irene B. Taeuber, "Urbanization and Political Change in the Development of Modern Japan," Economic Development and Cultural Change, 9 (October 1960), pp. 1-28; and Jun'ishi Kyogatu and Nobutaka Ike, "Urban-Rural Differences in Voting Behavior in Postwar Japan," Economic Development and Cultural Change, 9 (October 1960), pp. 167-185.

[12]In calculating the percentage of total votes received by each party, it was necessary in some cases to round the figures. The data was reported in both rounded and actual figures. In order to maintain consistency, all figures were rounded.

CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSIONS

The primary purpose of this study was to assess the impact of urbanization on Japanese voter preferences. In the following paragraphs, some of the findings reported in the previous chapters are reviewed and an attempt will be made to identify any patterns of preference.

The political preferences of urban and rural residents, during the period 1955-1967, were examined to determine whether differences in voter preference existed. An examination of the data indicates that during this period there were differences between urban and rural voter preferences. However, as seen in Chapter V, there is no conclusive pattern of preference.

During this period, urban and rural voters tended to express similar preferences for the Conservatives. It was initially expected that the rural and semi-rural voters would prefer the Conservatives because the party has had a history of advocating policies specifically aimed at the rural interests.[1] This expectation was proven to be correct in the results given in Chapter V. In the five House of Representative elections considered, the Conservatives in the rural and semi-rural prefectures were the overwhelming favorites.

Further, it was expected that the urban and metropolitan voters would have expressed preferences for the more progressive parties. This was true for some of the prefectures. In the metropolitan prefectures,

for example, the voters preferred the Socialists in the 1963 and 1967 elections. However, a majority of the voters in the urban and transitional prefectures preferred the Conservatives. It should be noted that the Communists were stronger in the metropolitan prefectures than in the rural prefectures.

As the urban/rural characteristics of a prefecture changed, it was thought that there would be a corresponding change in voter preference. Preference was expected to shift from the Conservatives, the LDP, to the more progressive parties such as the JSP, DSP, or the JCP. As the data in Chapter V indicates, there was no overall distinguishable shift in voter preference. In some prefectures, this shift did occur but not to the extent expected.

It is interesting to note that other studies have shown that there are significant differences between urban and rural residents' political behavior.[2] For example, rural voters tend to be more interested in politics and have a stronger sense of political effectiveness. However, these differences may not affect actual voting preferences.

An understanding of the Japanese political culture may help to explain or clarify this situation. "Individualism," a belief which stresses the importance and superiority of the individual, is an integral part of Western political thought. In Japan, "individualism" has never been fully adopted. "Individualism" has had negative connotations in Japan.[3] It is associated with such traits as nihilism, selfish egotism, and antisocial behavior. Most Japanese prefer to be a member of a group and act within that group even though group membership usually implies some suppression of individual desires and wishes in favor of group norms and goals.[4] In Japan, most citizens feel more comfortable acting

in consensus with a group--either their family, peers, or co-workers. Therefore, when the actual votes are cast, a citizen (whether a rural or urban resident) may feel an obligation to vote inaccordance with his perceived group's wishes. So that even an urban voter who was less interested in politics and felt less politically effective than his rural counterpart, could (through his group memberships) express similar party preferences.

Opinion polls have shown that while many citizens are critical of the conservative LDP government and may feel that another political party or coalition of parties would provide more effective leadership, they still want the LDP to remain in control of the government.[5] The pressures of group memberships may help explain this feeling of ambiguity toward the political parties and the political system. It may also help explain the persistence of conservative strength and provide some insight into a situation where urban/rural differences in political behavior diminish the actual act of voting occurs.

Of course, this study has not dealt with any aspect of political behavior other than that of voting. For that reason, speculation is necessarily limited. There are, however, some possible explanations for the results encountered.

One reason for the weakness of the progressive parties during 1955-1967 was, obviously enough, the strength of the Conservatives. Although there were five major political parties active during these years, the Japanese political system was commonly referred to as a "one and a half party system."[6] The LDP was in control of the apparatus of government and was able to use its position to help it dominate Japanese politics. The LDP could provide tangible services and a strong sense

of identity with an active, effective party. The progressive parties were portrayed by the LDP, the press, and by scholars as reactionary and ineffectual. This may have affected voters' perceptions of progressive parties as a viable, effective alternative to the LDP.

Another possible explanation for the failure of the progressive parties to attract votes is that groups that the JSP and the JCP rely on for support, especially the union members, have found that the LDP has adequately represented their interests. Rising affluence has promoted political moderation among workers. Studies of workers in Japan's auto industry, for example, have shown that they moderated their political allegiances significantly in step with their growing affluence.[7] As Gary D. Allinson pointed out, a fundamental problem confronting Japan's progressive parties was: "How could a party premised on inequity survive when the policies of an established regime were reducing inequity for the party's key constituents?"[8]

A further explanation is that the members of the various parties overlap in terms of political preferences.[9] In other words, each of the political parties contains members which hold views closer to those of another political party. In a study carried out in Tokyo in 1964, the conclusion was that among LDP supporters, some 30 per cent had progressive views, while 28 per cent of those who supported progressive parties were conservative in their ideas.[8] In terms of conservative and progressive party membership, there is an overlap of membership. The individuals who fall in this category may cross over and vote for the other party's candidates.

Political socialization may also help explain why place of residence is not an accurate predictor of political party preference as was

theorized in Chapter I. Most voters, during the years 1955-1967, were products of a prewar Japanese society. Educated in the prewar school system, aligned with conservative politicians, and accustomed to the relatively consensual politics of the 1920's and 1960's, they were very likely to support conservatives.[10] It was not until the 1960's that the postwar changes in Japan's educational system affected politics. The educational system produced new attitudes in the future voters who tended to support the Socialists. It was in the 1960, 1963, and 1967 elections that the potential strength of the Socialists became evident in the metropolitan areas.

Although the results of this study showed no definite pattern of preference, the importance of urbanization as an independent variable should not be dismissed without further study. As pointed out previously, other researchers have found that urbanization does significantly affect other aspects of political behavior such as voter turnout, level of interest in politics, and feelings of political efficacy. Voter preference, too, may be found to be significantly affected by urbanization. It may be that place of residence and preference for a particular political party may not be a direct relationship. Place of residence, as an independent variable, may not be able to account for differences in voter preferences. It is likely that an individual's party preferences are the result of an interaction of a number of variables such as education, occupation, and social class. Further research could serve to explain some of the results found in this study.

This study was quite limited in its scope. The analysis was concerned only with the years 1955-1967 and only with prefectural voting returns. And, because of the nature of the data, this study could only

be concerned with aggregate Japanese voting preferences. The data does not allow for conclusions to be drawn concerning individual Japanese voter preferences. The conclusions formed may not be valid for individual voter preferences, or for voter preference at the local level.

Future studies concerning Japanese voter preference may help clarify the role of urbanization in voting behavior. The importance of urbanization should not be dismissed. It is a complex process but the increasing levels of urbanization in Japan make it necessary for researchers to understand what impact such a phenomenon has on the political system.

FOOTNOTES

[1]See Chapter III, p. 36. For further information see Edward F. Denison and William K. Chung, "Economic Growth and Its Sources," Asia's New Giant: How the Japanese Economy Works, eds., Hugh Patrick and Henry Rosovosky (Washington, 1976).

[2]See Bradley M. Richardson, "Political Attitudes and Voting Behavior in Contemporary Japan: Rural and Urban Differences" (unpub. Ph.D. dissertation, University of California, Berkeley, 1966). Also, see Robert E. Ward, Japan's Political System (2nd ed., Englewood Cliffs, 1978).

[3]Nobutaka Ike, Japanese Politics: Patron-Client Democracy (New York, 1972), p. 10.

[4]Ibid.

[5]See T. J. Pemple's, "The Dilemma of Parliamentary Opposition in Japan," Polity (Fall 1975), pp. 63-79, for a discussion of the problems facing opposition parties.

[6]Ibid, p. 63.

[7]Gary D. Allinson, Suburban Tokyo (Berkeley, 1979), p. 226.

[8]Ibid., p. 227.

[9]Ike, p. 97.

[10]Allinson, p. 144.

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APPENDIXES

APPENDIX A

TOTAL PREFECTURAL POPULATIONS: 1955-1967

TABLE XVIII

TOTAL PREFECTURAL POPULATIONS: 1955-1967

Name of Prefecture	Total Population 1955	Total Population 1960	Total Population 1965	Overall Population Change
1. Hokkaido	4,773,087	5,039,206	5,171,800	Increase
2. Aomori	1,382,523	1,426,606	1,416,518	Increase
3. Iwate	1,427,097	1,448,517	1,411,118	Decrease
4. Miyagi	1,727,065	1,743,195	1,753,126	Increase
5. Akita	1,348,871	1,335,580	1,279,835	Decrease
6. Yamagata	1,353,649	1,320,664	1,263,103	Decrease
7. Fukushima	2,095,237	2,051,137	1,983,754	Decrease
8. Ibaragi	2,064,037	2,047,024	2,056,154	Decrease
9. Tochigi	1,547,580	1,513,624	1,521,656	Decrease
10. Gumma	1,613,549	1,578,476	1,605,584	Decrease
11. Saitama	2,262,623	2,430,871	3,014,983	Increase
12. Chiba	2,205,060	2,306,010	2,701,770	Increase
13. Tokyo	8,037,084	9,683,802	10,869,244	Increase
14. Kanagawa	2,919,497	3,443,176	4,430,743	Increase
15. Niigata	2,473,492	2,442,037	2,398,931	Decrease
16. Toyama	1,021,121	1,032,614	1,025,463	Increase
17. Ishikawa	996,187	973,418	980,499	Increase
18. Fukui	754,055	752,696	750,557	Decrease
19. Yamanashi	807,044	782,062	763,194	Decrease
20. Nagano	2,021,292	1,981,433	1,958,007	Decrease
21. Gifu	1,583,605	1,638,399	1,700,365	Increase
22. Shizuoka	2,650,435	2,756,271	2,912,521	Increase
23. Aichi	3,769,209	4,206,313	4,798,653	Increase
24. Mie	1,485,582	1,485,054	1,514,467	Increase
25. Shiga	853,734	842,695	853,385	Decrease
26. Kyoto	1,935,161	1,993,403	2,102,808	Increase
27. Osaka	4,618,308	5,504,746	6,657,189	Increase
28. Hyogo	3,620,947	3,906,487	4,309,944	Increase
29. Nara	776,861	781,058	825,965	Increase
30. Wakayama	1,006,819	1,002,191	1,026,975	Increase
31. Tottori	641,259	599,135	579,853	Decrease
32. Shimane	929,066	888,886	821,620	Decrease
33. Okayama	1,689,800	1,670,454	1,645,135	Decrease
34. Hiroshima	2,149,044	2,184,043	2,281,146	Increase
35. Yamaguchi	1,609,839	1,602,207	1,543,573	Decrease
36. Tokushima	878,109	847,274	815,115	Decrease
37. Kagawa	943,823	918,867	900,845	Decrease
38. Ehime	1,540,628	1,500,687	1,446,384	Decrease
39. Kochi	882,683	854,595	812,714	Decrease
40. Fukuoka	3,859,764	4,006,679	3,964,611	Decrease
41. Saga	973,749	942,874	871,885	Decrease
42. Nagasaki	1,747,596	1,760,421	1,641,245	Decrease
43. Kumamoto	1,895,663	1,856,192	1,770,736	Decrease

TABLE XVIII (Continued)

Name of Prefecture	Total Population 1955	Total Population 1960	Total Population 1965	Overall Population Change
44. Oita	1,277,199	1,239,655	1,187,480	Decrease
45. Miyazaki	1,139,384	1,134,590	1,080,692	Decrease
46. Kagoshima	2,044,112	1,963,104	1,853,541	Decrease

APPENDIX B

PREFECTURAL POPULATION DENSITIES

TABLE XIX

PREFECTURAL POPULATION DENSITIES

Name of Prefecture	Population/km^2 1955	Population/km^2 1960	Population/km^2* 1965
1. Hokkaido	60.8	64.2	66.0
2. Aomori	143.8	148.4	147.0
3. Iwate	93.4	94.8	92.0
4. Miyagi	237.0	239.3	241.0
5. Akita	116.2	115.0	110.0
6. Yamagata	145.2	141.6	135.0
7. Fukushima	152.1	148.9	144.0
8. Ibaragi	338.9	336.2	338.0
9. Toshigi	240.4	235.8	237.0
10. Gumma	254.8	248.6	253.0
11. Saitama	595.0	639.7	793.0
12. Chiba	438.0	489.0	535.0
13. Tokyo	3,972.8	4,777.7	5,357.0
14. Kanagawa	1,236.4	1,458.1	1,886.0
15. Niigata	196.7	194.2	191.0
16. Toyama	240.1	242.9	241.0
17. Ishikawa	230.4	232.1	234.0
18. Fukui	176.8	179.8	179.0
19. Yamanashi	180.8	175.2	171.0
20. Nagano	148.4	145.9	144.0
21. Gifu	151.1	155.7	160.0
22. Shizuoka	341.2	354.8	375.0
23. Aichi	745.3	831.7	948.0
24. Mie	257.7	257.6	263.0
25. Shiga	212.6	209.8	212.0
26. Kyoto	417.6	432.2	456.0
27. Osaka	2,551.7	3,005.6	3,618.0
28. Hyogo	434.7	469.0	517.0
29. Nara	210.4	211.5	224.0
30. Wakayama	213.5	212.6	218.0
31. Tottori	176.1	171.8	166.0
32. Shimane	140.2	134.2	124.0
33. Okayama	239.4	236.6	233.0
34. Hiroshima	254.9	259.0	270.0
35. Yamaguchi	265.1	263.8	254.0
36. Tokushima	212.0	204.5	197.0
37. Kagawa	507.6	494.2	484.0
38. Ehime	272.6	265.6	256.0
39. Kochi	124.2	120.3	114.0
40. Fukuoka	787.6	817.6	807.0
41. Saga	405.1	392.3	362.0
42. Nagasaki	427.7	430.8	401.0
43. Kumamoto	257.2	251.8	240.0

TABLE XIX (Continued)

Name of Prefecture	Population/km^2 1955	Population/km^2 1960	Population/km^2* 1965
44. Oita	202.3	196.4	188.0
45. Miyazaki	147.3	146.7	140.0
46. Kagoshima	223.6	214.8	203.0

*1965 census figures have been rounded.

APPENDIX C

INDIVIDUAL PREFECTURAL TRENDS

The following paragraphs provide information concerning individual prefectural voting trends for the years 1955-1967. The prefectures are grouped according to their level of urbanization in 1967. The purpose of the following is to allow the reader to look at the voting preferences within the individual prefectures with greater ease.

Class V Prefectures

These are prefectures that have remained Class V prefectures during the period 1955-1967. Included is a discussion of the changes that occurred in support for each party during the period.

Aomori

In the prefecture of Aomori, there was an overall decline in support for the Conservatives. However, in each election year support for the Conservatives has not been below 67 per cent.

During this period, the Socialists experienced small gains in support. Support for the Socialists has ranged from 17 to 29 per cent.

The Communists have not been a strong force in Aomori during 1955-1967. Support for the Communists was not above 3 per cent.

In 1967, the percentage of electoral support for the Komeito was not given. The reason for this is probably that the Komeito did not run a candidate in Aomori. This was the first House of Representatives election that they competed in and their resources were limited so the party carefully selected prefectures in which they would have the best chance of winning.

Iwate

In the prefecture of Iwate, there was a steady decline in support for the Conservatives. But, in each election during the period 1955-1967 support for the Conservatives was 60 per cent or above.

During this period, there was a steady increase in support for the Socialists. Support for the Socialists ranged between 17 and 36 per cent.

Support for the Communists in Iwate was not strong during this period. Support for the Communists was never above 2 per cent.

The Komeito probably did not run a candidate in the prefecture of Iwate in 1967.

In 1955, miscellaneous candidates and parties received 0.6 per cent of the votes cast.

Akita

In the prefecture of Akita, there was a steady decline in support for the Conservatives. However, support for the Conservatives during the period 1955-1967 did not fall below 50 per cent.

There was, during this period, increasing support for the Socialists. Support for the party reached its peak in 1967 when the Socialists polled 43 per cent of the vote.

The Communists enjoyed steady, low support during this period. Support for the Communists was never greater than 3 per cent.

In 1967, the percentage of electoral support for the Komeito was not given. This is probably because the Komeito did not run a candidate in Akita.

Yamagata

In the prefecture of Yamagata, during the period 1955-1967, there was an overall decline in support for the Conservatives. There was one exception, in 1958 the Conservatives experienced a gain of 3 per cent.

The Socialists experienced a steady increase in support during this period. There was one exception; in 1958 the Socialists suffered a decline of 2 per cent. Support for the Socialists was as high as 34 per cent in 1967.

Support for the Communists in this prefecture was consistently low. Electoral support was never greater than 2 per cent.

The Komeito probably did not run a candidate in Yamagata in the 1967 election.

Miscellaneous candidates and parties were never strong in Yamagata. But in 1955, miscellaneous candidates and parties polled 2 per cent of the vote.

Independents also were not strong in Yamagata. Support for Independents was never greater than 1 per cent.

Fukushima

In the prefecture of Fukushima, during the period 1955-1967, there was fluctuating support for the Conservatives. However, support for the Conservatives did not fall below 60 per cent.

There was also fluctuating support for the Socialists during this period. Support for the Socialists ranged between 33 and 37 per cent.

Support for the Communists in the prefecture of Fukushima was low but steady. Support was never greater than 5 per cent.

The Komeito probably did not run a candidate in Fukushima in the 1967 election.

Miscellaneous candidates and parties were never strong in Fukushima. In 1955, miscellaneous candidates and parties polled 0.2 per cent of the vote.

Ibaragi

In the prefecture of Ibaragi, during the period 1955-1967, there was fluctuating support for the Conservatives. However, the Conservatives have always polled more than 66 per cent of the vote during this period.

There was also fluctuating support for the Socialists during this period. There was an overall increase in support for the Socialists. Support for the Socialists varied between 28 and 34 per cent.

Support for the Communists was consistently low. It has never been greater than 1 per cent.

The Komeito probably did not run a candidate in Ibaragi in the 1967 election.

Independent candidates were never strong in Ibaragi. Independents, during 1955-1967, never polled more than 0.5 per cent.

Niigata

In the prefecture of Niigata, during the period 1955-1967, there was fluctuating support for the Conservatives. But, the Conservatives never received less than 54 per cent of the vote during this period.

There was also fluctuating support for the Socialists during this period. There was, however, a small overall decline in support for the Socialists.

The Communists have enjoyed low steady support in the prefecture of Niigata. Support was never greater than 3 per cent.

The Komeito probably did not run a candidate in Niigata in the 1967 election.

Independents have never been strong in Niigata. They have never polled more than 0.5 per cent of the vote.

Tottori

In the prefecture of Tottori, during the period 1955-1967, there was uneven support for the Conservatives. There was a steady decline in support for the Conservatives after the 1958 election. But, electoral support never dropped below 57 per cent.

During this period, there was a drop in the electoral support for the Socialists after 1955. After the 1958 election, there were small gains in support. The range of support for the Socialists was between 32 and 40 per cent.

The Communists enjoyed low steady support in the prefecture of Tottori. Support for the Communists was never greater than 4 per cent.

The Komeito probably did not run a candidate in Tottori in the 1967 election.

Miscellaneous candidates and parties were never strong in Tottori during this period. In 1960, miscellaneous parties and candidates received less than 0.5 per cent of the vote.

Independents also were not strong in Tottori. During this period, Independents polled less than 0.5 per cent of the vote.

Shimane

In the prefecture of Shimane during 1955-1967, there was fluctuating support for the Conservatives. Support fluctuated between 65 and 69 per cent. However, support never fell below 65 per cent.

The Socialists also experienced fluctuating support. Support fluctuated between 27 and 31 per cent. The Socialists never received more than 31 per cent of the votes cast in any one election.

Support for the Communists was low but steady. Support for the Communists was never greater than 3 per cent.

The Komeito probably did not run a candidate in Shimane in the 1967 election.

Miscellaneous candidates and parties were never strong in Shimane during this period. In 1960, miscellaneous parties and candidates received 0.6 per cent of the vote.

Independents also were not strong in Shimane. Independent candidates never polled more than 0.6 per cent of the votes cast.

Kochi

In the prefecture of Kochi, during the period 1955-1967, there was a steady decline in support for the Conservatives. However, this support never fell below 57 per cent.

During this period, Socialist support was uneven. Socialists experienced a gain in support until the 1960 election. After the 1960 election, support declined.

In the prefecture of Kochi, the Communists experienced increasing support. Support jumped 7 per cent between the 1960 and the 1963 election.

The Komeito ran a candidate in Kochi during the 1967 election. The Komeito received 13 per cent of the votes cast.

Independents were never strong in Kochi. Independents never polled more than 0.5 per cent.

Kumamoto

In the prefecture of Kumamoto, during the period 1955-1967, there was fluctuating support for the Conservatives. Support for the Conservatives ranged between 67 and 78 per cent. Support never fell below 67 percent.

The Socialists also experienced fluctuating support during this period. Support fluctuated between 21 and 30 per cent.

Support for the Communists has been low but steady. The Communists have never polled more than 1 per cent of the vote.

The Komeito probably did not run a candidate in Kumamoto in the 1967 election.

Independents were never strong in this prefecture. Independents polled less than 0.1 per cent of the vote in 1960.

Oita

In the prefecture of Oita, during the period 1955-1967, there was fluctuating support for the Conservatives. However, during this period, the Conservatives never polled less than 62 per cent.

The Socialists also experienced fluctuating support during this period. The range of support for the Socialists was between 22 and 35 per cent.

Support for the Communists has been low but steady. The Communists never polled more than 2 per cent of the vote during 1955-1967.

The Komeito probably did not run a candidate in Oita during the 1967 election.

Independents were never strong in Oita. They polled less than 1 per cent of the vote in 1958.

Miyazaki

In the prefecture of Miyazaki, during the period 1955-1967, there was an overall decrease in support for the Conservatives. However, the Conservatives never received less than 59 per cent of the vote during this period.

During this period, there was overall increasing support for the Socialists. Support for the Socialists was as high as 37 per cent in 1967.

Support for the Communists was low during this period. But, there were very small increases in support although the Communists never polled more than 3 per cent of the vote.

The Komeito probably did not run a candidate in Miyazaki during the 1967 election.

Kagoshima

In the prefecture of Kagoshima, during the period 1955-1967, there was an overall decrease in support for the Conservatives. However, the Conservatives never received less than 71 per cent of the vote during that period.

The Socialists experienced small increases in support until 1960. After 1960, the Socialists experienced small decreases in support.

The Communists have never been strong in Kagoshima. They never received more than 1 per cent of the vote in any election.

Class IV Prefectures

These are prefectures that have become Class IV prefectures at some point during the period 1955-1967. Included is a discussion of the changes that occurred in support for each party during the period.

Miyagi

After the 1965 census, Miyagi changed to a Class IV prefecture. In the prefecture of Miyagi, there was steady support for the Conservative party. Support fluctuated between 55 and 60 per cent. When the prefecture changed classes, support for the Conservatives increased 5 per cent. Support for the Conservatives never fell below 55 per cent.

During this period, support for the Socialists fluctuated. Support varied between 31 and 40 per cent. When the prefecture changed classes, support for the Socialists declined 5 per cent.

Support for the Communists was very low during this period. The Communists never received more than 2 per cent of the votes in any election.

The Komeito probably did not run a candidate in Miyagi during the 1967 election.

Miscellaneous candidates and parties were unusually strong in Miyagi. Support for miscellaneous candidates and parties ranged between 1 and 5 per cent.

Independents were never strong in Miyagi. They polled less than 1 per cent of the vote during this period.

Tochigi

After the 1965 census, Tochigi changed to a Class IV prefecture. In the prefecture of Tochigi, the Conservatives have enjoyed steady support. When the prefecture changed classes support did drop 4 per cent. But, the Conservatives have not received less than 64 per cent of the vote in any election during this period.

The Socialist party enjoyed fluctuating support during the period. Support ranged from 30 to 34 per cent. When the prefecture went to Class IV, support increased 4 per cent.

Support for the Communists was very low in Tochigi during this period. The Communists never received more than 1 per cent of the vote in any election.

The Komeito probably did not run a candidate in the 1967 election.

Gumma

After the 1965 census, Gumma changed to a Class IV prefecture. In the prefecture of Gumma, there was somewhat uneven support for the Conservatives. Support has never fallen below 64 per cent, however. When the prefecture changed classes, support dropped 3 per cent.

During this period, support for the Socialists was uneven. Support ranged between 29 and 33 per cent. When the prefecture changed classes, support increased 2 per cent.

In this period, there was low but steady support for the Communists. Support increased during this period from 0.4 to 4 per cent. When Gumma

changed classes, support increased 2 per cent.

The Komeito probably did not run a candidate in Gumma in 1967.

Independents were never strong in Gumma. They never received more than 0.5 per cent of the vote.

Chiba

After the 1965 census, Chiba changed to a Class IV prefecture. In the prefecture of Chiba, the Conservatives experienced a steady decline in support. However, support for the Conservatives never fell below 59 per cent. When the prefecture changed to Class IV, support dropped 10 per cent.

During this period, there was steady increasing support for the Socialists. When the prefecture changed classes, support increased 2 per cent.

Support for the Communists during this period was less than 3 per cent. When the prefecture changed classes, support increased by 1 per cent.

The Komeito ran a candidate in Chiba during the 1967 election. The Komeito received 8 per cent of the vote in that election.

Miscellaneous candidates and parties were never strong in Chiba. The support was negligible; less than 0.1 per cent.

Independents also have never been strong in Chiba. They never received more than 0.5 per cent of the vote.

Toyama

After the 1965 census, Toyama changed to a Class IV prefecture. In the prefecture of Toyama, the Conservatives experienced an overall

decline in support. When the prefecture went to Class IV, support declined 1 per cent. However, support during this period was no lower than 69 per cent.

During this period, there was steady support for the Socialists with slight increases. When the prefecture changed classes, support increased 1 per cent.

Support for the Communists in this period was less than 3 per cent. When the prefecture changed classes, support decreased 1 per cent.

The Komeito probably did not run a candidate in Toyama during the 1967 election.

Independents have never been strong in Toyama. In the 1963 election, Independents received 0.4 per cent of the votes cast.

Fukui

After the 1965 census, Fukui changed to a Class IV prefecture. In the prefecture of Fukui, support for the Conservatives was uneven. Support dropped 12 per cent when the prefecture when to Class IV. However, support for the Conservatives never dropped below 60 per cent.

During this period, there was fluctuating support for the Socialists. Support ranged from 27 to 37 per cent. When Fukui changed classes, support for the Socialists increased 10 per cent.

Support for the Communists was very low and uneven. Support was never greater than 1 per cent of the votes cast in any election during this period.

The Komeito probably did not run a candidate in Fukui during the 1967 election.

Independents have never been strong in Fukui. In 1955, Independents only received less than 1 per cent of the vote.

Yamanashi

After the 1965 census, Yamanashi changed to a Class IV prefecture. In the prefecture of Yamanashi, the Conservatives experienced fluctuating support. When the prefecture changed classes, support for the Conservatives dropped 8 per cent.

During this period, support for the Socialists fluctuated. The range of support was between 32 and 40 per cent. When the prefecture changed classes, support increased 7 per cent.

Support for the Communists was very low during this period. The Communists never received more than 1 per cent of the votes cast in any election.

The Komeito probably did not run a candidate in Yamanashi during the 1967 election.

Support for Independents has been uneven and low. In 1955, Independents received 2 per cent of the vote. In 1967, Independents received 0.2 per cent of the vote.

Nagano

After the 1965 census, Nagano changed to a Class IV prefecture. In the prefecture of Nagano, support for the Conservatives underwent an overall decline. When the prefecture changed classes, support dropped 8 per cent. Support for the Conservatives fell as low as 47 per cent.

Socialist support in Nagano was uneven. When the prefecture changed classes, support increased 9 per cent. In 1967, there was

only 3 per cent of the vote separating the Socialists and the Conservatives.

Communist support in this prefecture was rather high. Support ranged from 4 to 8 per cent. When the prefecture changed classes, there was no change in support for the Communists.

The Komeito probably did not run a candidate in Nagano in the 1967 election.

Miscellaneous candidates and parties were never strong in Nagano. In 1955, miscellaneous candidates received 0.5 per cent of the vote. And in 1958, they received only 0.1 per cent of the vote.

Independents also have never been strong in Nagano. They have never received more than 1 per cent of the votes cast in any election during 1955-1967.

Mie

After the 1960 census, Mie changed to a Class IV prefecture. In the prefecture of Mie, support for the Conservatives was uneven, but they did experience an overall decline. When the prefecture changed classes, support declined 4 per cent. However, during this period, support for the Conservatives did not fall below 68 per cent.

Support for the Socialists was also uneven during this period. When the prefecture changed classes, support increased 3 per cent.

Communist support in Mie was very low. The Communists never received more than 2 per cent of the vote in any election during this period.

The Komeito probably did not run a candidate in Mie during the 1967 election.

Miscellaneous candidates and parties consistently received votes in the election held during this period. But, they have never received more than 0.5 per cent of the vote.

Independents have never been strong in Mie. In the 1963 election, the Independents received only 0.2 per cent of the votes cast.

Shiga

After the 1960 census, Shiga became a Class IV prefecture. In the prefecture of Shiga, support for the Conservatives declined. When the prefecture went to Class IV, support increased 2 per cent. Support for the Conservatives during this period was never below 51 per cent.

Support for the Socialists increased during the period 1955-1967. There was one exception; when the prefecture changed classes support declined 2 per cent. In 1967, there was only a 7 per cent difference between Conservative support and Socialist support.

Communist support in Shiga has been steady and low. There have been, however, slight increases in support for the Communists during this period.

The Komeito probably did not run a candidate in Shiga during the 1967 election.

Independents have never been strong in Shiga. They have never received more than 1 per cent of the vote in any election during this period.

Okayama

After the 1965 census, Okayama changed to a Class IV prefecture. In the prefecture of Okayama, support for the Conservatives steadily

declined during this period. When the prefecture changed to Class IV, support for the Conservatives dropped 3 per cent. Even though support for the Conservatives declined during this period, support never dropped below 58 per cent.

Support for the Socialists during this period was uneven. When the prefecture changed classes, support dropped 5 per cent.

Communist support in Okayama has been steady but low. Support for the Communists has never been greater than 2 per cent.

The Komeito ran candidates in the 1967 election. In that election, the Komeito received 7 per cent of the votes cast.

Miscellaneous candidates and parties were never strong in Okayama. In 1958, they received only 0.1 per cent of the vote.

Tokushima

After the 1965 census, Tokushima became a Class IV prefecture. In Tokushima, support for the Conservatives fluctuated. When the prefecture changed classes, support for the Conservatives dropped 18 per cent. However, during this period, support for the Conservatives never fell below 61 per cent.

The Socialists also experienced fluctuating support. When the prefecture changed classes, support for the Socialists increased 5 per cent.

The Communists enjoyed very low but steady support in Tokushima. The Communists never received more than 2 per cent of the vote during this period.

The Komeito received 12 per cent of the vote in the 1967 election.

Independents were never strong in Tokushima. In the years that Independents ran they never received more than 0.5 per cent of the vote.

Miscellaneous candidates and parties have been very weak in Tokushima. In 1960, they polled only 0.04 per cent of the vote.

Kagawa

After the 1965 census, Kagawa became a Class IV prefecture. In Kagawa, support for the Conservatives fluctuated. When the prefecture changed classes, support increased 2 per cent. Support for the Conservatives during the period 1955-1967 never fell below 60 per cent.

Support for the Socialists was stable during this period, although there were slight variations. When the prefecture changed classes, Socialist support declined 3 per cent.

Communist party support fluctuated during this period. Support ranged from a high of 5 per cent to a low of 0.5 per cent.

The Komeito probably did not run a candidate in Kagawa during the 1967 election.

Independents were never strong in Kagawa. In the years that Independents ran, they never received more than 0.5 per cent of the vote.

Ehime

After the 1965 census, Ehime became a Class IV prefecture. In Ehime, the Conservatives experienced fluctuating support during this period. When the prefecture changed classes, support for the Conservatives increased 7 per cent. Support for the Conservatives never fell below 63 per cent.

The Socialists' support during the 1955-1967 period was uneven. When the prefecture changed classes, support decreased 7 per cent.

The Communists enjoyed low support during 1955-1967. There were small increases, but support was never greater than 3 per cent.

The Komeito probably did not run a candidate in Ehime during the 1967 election.

Independents were never strong in Ehime. In 1963, the Independents received only 0.08 per cent of the vote.

Saga

After the 1965 census, Saga became a Class IV prefecture. In Saga, support for the Conservatives was uneven. When the prefecture changed classes, support for the Conservatives increased 4 per cent. And, support for the Conservatives during this period was never below 65 per cent.

Support for the Socialists, during 1955-1967, was uneven. When the prefecture changed classes, support for the Socialists dropped 5 per cent.

Support for the Communists was steady but low. During this period, support for the Communists was never greater than 2 per cent.

The Komeito probably did not run a candidate in Saga during the 1967 election.

Nagasaki

After the 1965 census, Nagasaki became a Class IV prefecture. In Nagasaki, the Conservatives' support fluctuated during the period 1955-1967. When the prefecture changed classes, support for the Conservatives

increased 2 per cent. Support for the Conservatives never fell below 60 per cent.

Socialist support was uneven during this period. When the prefecture changed classes, support decreased 3 per cent.

Support for the Communists was steady but low. During this period, support for the Communists was never greater than 2 per cent.

The Komeito probably did not run a candidate in Nagasaki in the 1967 election.

Independents were never strong in Nagasaki. Support for the Independents was never greater than 0.5 per cent.

Class III Prefectures

These are prefectures that have become Class III prefectures at some point during the period 1955-1967. Included is a discussion of the changes that occurred in support for each party during the period.

Hokkaido

After the 1965 census, Hokkaido became a Class III prefecture. In Hokkaido, support for the Conservatives declined during 1955-1967. There was no change in support when the prefecture changed from Class V to Class IV. But there was a 4 per cent decrease when the prefecture changed to Class III. During this period, support for the Conservatives fell as low as 47 per cent.

Socialist support slightly increased during this period. When the prefecture shifted from Class V to IV, there was no change in support. But when the prefecture changed to Class III, support increased 2 per cent.

Support for the Communists was low and uneven. When the prefecture changed from Class V to IV, there was no change in support. But when the prefecture changed to Class III, support increased 2 per cent.

The Komeito received 3 per cent of the votes cast in the 1967 election.

Miscellaneous candidates and parties were never strong in Hokkaido. They never polled more than 0.5 per cent of the votes in the years that they ran.

Independents were also never strong in Hokkaido. In the years that they ran, the Independents never received more than 0.6 per cent of the vote.

Saitama

After the 1965 census, Saitama became a Class III prefecture. In Saitama, support for the Conservatives declined during 1955-1967. When the prefecture changed from Class V to IV, support for the Conservatives declined 2 per cent. And when the prefecture changed to Class III, support for the Conservatives again dropped but by 5 per cent. During this period, however, support for the Conservatives never fell below 57 per cent.

Socialist support slightly increased during this period. When the prefecture changed from Class V to IV, support for the Socialists increased by 2 per cent. But when the prefecture changed to Class III, support also declined by 4 per cent.

Support for the Communists was low during this period, but there were small increases. Support increased during this period from 0.5 per cent to 5 per cent. There was no change in support when the prefecture

changed from Class V to Class IV. When the prefecture changed to Class III, support increased by 2 per cent.

The Komeito received 7 per cent of the votes cast in the 1967 election.

Miscellaneous candidates and parties were never strong in Saitama. In 1958, they polled only 0.5 per cent of the vote.

Independents were also never strong in Saitama. In the years that they ran, the Independents never received more than 1 per cent of the vote.

Ishikawa

After the 1965 census, Ishikawa became a Class III prefecture. In Ishikawa, support for the Conservatives declined during 1955-1967. When the prefecture changed from Class V to IV, support for the Conservatives dropped from 75 to 41 per cent. However, for some unknown reason in this election in 1960, there was an abnormally large number of invalid votes. When the prefecture changed to Class III, support for the Conservatives dropped 2 per cent. During this period, even with the abnormal return in 1960, support for the Conservatives did not fall below 41 per cent.

Socialist support, during this period, was uneven. Support for the Socialists dropped 3 per cent when the prefecture changed to Class IV. Support increased 5 per cent when Ishikawa went to Class III.

Support for the Communists was uneven during this period, it ranged from 0.3 to 10 per cent. There was a 1 per cent increase in support when the prefecture shifted from Class V to IV. And when the prefecture changed to Class III, support declined 5 per cent.

The Komeito probably did not run a candidate in Ishikawa during the 1967 election.

Independents were never strong in Ishikawa. In 1967, they polled only 0.3 per cent of the vote.

Gifu

After the 1965 census, Gifu became a Class III prefecture. In Gifu, support for the Conservatives declined during 1955-1967. There was no change in support when the prefecture changed from Class V to IV. But support dropped 8 per cent when the prefecture shifted to Class III. During this period, support for the Conservatives never dropped below 61 per cent.

Socialist support, during this period, was uneven. There was no change in Socialist support when the prefecture shifted from Class V to IV. Support did increase 3 per cent when Gifu changed to Class III.

Support for the Communists was steady but low during this period. The Communists never polled more than 2 per cent of the vote in Gifu. There was no change in support when the prefecture changed classes.

The Komeito received 5 per cent of the vote in the 1967 election.

Independents were never strong in Gifu. In 1967, they polled only 0.3 per cent of the vote.

Shizuoka

After the 1965 census, Shizuoka became a Class III prefecture. In Shizuoka, support for the Conservatives declined steadily. Support declined 3 per cent when the prefecture changed from Class IV to III.

Conservatives, during 1955-1967, received at least 62 per cent of the vote.

Support for the Socialists increased overall during this period. There was a slight decline in support of 2 per cent, when Shizuoka changed from a Class IV to Class III prefecture.

Support for the Communists was steady but low. The Communists never polled more than 2 per cent of the vote in Shizuoka. There was no change in support when the prefecture changed classes.

The Komeito received 4 per cent of the votes cast in the 1967 election.

Independents were never strong in Shizuoka. In the years that they ran, the Independents never received more than 1 per cent of the vote.

Nara

After the 1965 census, Nara changed to a Class III prefecture. In Nara, support for the Conservatives declined steadily during 1955-1967. When the prefecture changed from Class V to IV, support declined 4 per cent. Support declined 12 per cent when Nara shifted to a Class III prefecture. Conservatives, during this period, received at least 51 per cent of the vote.

Support for the Socialists increased steadily during this period. When prefecture changed from Class V to IV, support increased 4 per cent. It increased 9 per cent when the prefecture changed to Class III.

Communist support was steady but low. Communists never polled more than 2 per cent of the vote in Nara.

The Komeito probably did not run a candidate in Nara in the 1967 election.

Independents were never strong in Nara. In the elections held during 1955-1967, Independents never received more than 1 per cent of the votes cast.

Wakayama

After the 1965 census, Wakayama changed to a Class III prefecture. In Wakayama, support for the Conservatives steadily declined during 1955-1967. When the prefecture changed from Class V to IV, support declined 1 per cent. And support declined 9 per cent when the prefecture changed to Class III. Conservatives received at least 60 per cent of the vote during this period.

Support for the Socialists, during this period, fluctuated. When the prefecture changed from Class V to Class IV, support declined 3 per cent. But when Wakayama shifted to a Class III prefecture, support increased 8 per cent.

Communist support was steady but low. The Communists never polled more than 4 per cent of the vote in Wakayama. When the prefecture changed from Class V to IV, support increased 2 per cent. There was no change in support when the prefecture changed to Class III.

The Komeito probably did not run a candidate in Wakayama during the 1967 election.

Independents were never strong in Wakayama. In the years that they ran, the Independents received less than 1 per cent of the vote.

Hiroshima

After the 1965 census, Hiroshima changed to a Class III prefecture. In Hiroshima, support for the Conservatives fluctuated. There was no

change in support when the prefecture shifted from Class V to Class IV. There was a decrease in support of 3 per cent when Hiroshima changed to a Class III prefecture. Conservatives, during 1955-1967, received at least 68 per cent of the vote.

Support for the Socialists was also uneven. There was no change in support when the prefecture shifted from Class V to Class IV. Support declined 2 per cent when Hiroshima became a Class III prefecture.

Communist support was low but there were slight increases. During this period, support for the Communists increased from 0.4 to 3 per cent. Support increased 1 per cent when the prefecture shifted to Class IV. And support also increased 1 per cent when Hiroshima changed to Class III.

The Komeito received 4 per cent of the votes cast in the 1967 election.

Independents were never strong in Hiroshima. In 1960, the Independents received only 0.4 per cent of the vote.

Yamaguchi

After the 1965 census, Yamaguchi became a Class III prefecture. In Yamaguchi, support for the Conservatives was uneven. Support decreased 2 per cent when the prefecture changed to Class IV. But support increased 7 per cent when the prefecture shifted to Class III. Support for the Conservatives, during 1955-1967, never fell below 54 per cent.

Support for the Socialists was uneven in Yamaguchi. There was an increase of 3 per cent when the prefecture changed to Class IV. But support declined 8 per cent when Yamaguchi changed to Class III.

The Communists enjoyed low but steady support in Yamaguchi. The Communists never received more than 2 per cent of the votes cast in any election held during 1955-1967.

The Komeito probably did not run a candidate in Yamaguchi in the 1967 election.

Class II Prefectures

These are prefectures that have become Class II prefectures at some point during the period 1955-1967. Included is a discussion of the changes that occurred in support for each party during the period.

Aichi

After the 1960 census, Aichi became a Class II prefecture. In Aichi, support for the Conservatives declined during the period 1955-1967. There was no change in support when the prefecture shifted to Class II. Support for the Conservatives never fell below 50 per cent during this period.

Socialist support in Aichi was uneven. There was no change in support when the prefecture changed classes.

Support for the Communists was steady but low. And there were small increases in support. There was no change in support for the Communists when the prefecture shifted to Class II.

The Komeito received 4 per cent of the vote in Aichi during the 1967 election.

Miscellaneous candidates and parties were never strong in Aichi. They did, however, consistently run in each election held in Aichi during

this period. But they never received more than 0.1 per cent of the vote.

Independents also have not been strong in Aichi. They never received more than 1 per cent of the vote during 1955-1967.

Kyoto

After the 1960 census, Kyoto became a Class II prefecture. In Kyoto, support for the Conservatives steadily declined. When the prefecture changed to a Class II prefecture, support dropped 7 per cent. During 1955-1967, support for the Conservatives fell as low as 39 per cent.

The Socialists were very strong in Kyoto. When the prefecture changed to Class II, support increased 3 per cent. In 1963, the Socialists outpolled the Conservatives and in 1967, the Socialists tied the Conservatives.

Communist support in Kyoto was rather high. The range of support was between 6 and 14 per cent. When the prefecture changed classes, support increased 3 per cent.

The Komeito received 6 per cent of the vote in Kyoto during the 1967 election.

Miscellaneous candidates and parties were never strong in Kyoto. In the years that they ran, they never received more than 1 per cent of the vote.

Independents also were never strong in Kyoto. During the period 1955-1967, Independents never polled more than 1 per cent of the votes cast.

Hyogo

After the 1965 census, Hyogo changed to a Class II prefecture. In Hyogo, support for the Conservatives declined steadily during 1955-1967. When the prefecture changed to Class II, support declined 7 per cent. Support fell as low as 44 per cent in 1967.

Support for the Socialists was strong and steady. When Hyogo changed to a Class II prefecture, support dropped 2 per cent.

Communist support was low but there were slight increases. Support in Hyogo for the Communists ranged from 1 to 5 per cent during this period.

The Komeito received 10 per cent of the votes cast in Hyogo during the 1967 election.

Miscellaneous candidates and parties were never strong in Hyogo. In 1960, they received only 0.08 per cent of the vote.

Independents also were never strong in Hyogo. During this period, Independents did not receive more than 1 per cent of the vote.

Fukuoka

After the 1965 census, Fukuoka became a Class II prefecture. In Fukuoka, there was uneven support for the Conservatives. When the prefecture changed classes, support dropped 6 per cent. Support for the Conservatives fell as low as 45 per cent during the period 1955-1967.

Support for the Socialists was strong in Fukuoka. When the prefecture changed classes, support did drop 2 per cent.

Communist support during this period was low, but there were small increases. Support in Fukuoka for the Communists ranged from 2 to 7

per cent during this period.

The Komeito received 8 per cent of the votes cast in Fukuoka during the 1967 election.

Independents were never strong in Fukuoka. They never received more than 1 per cent of the votes cast in the elections held during this period.

Class I Prefectures

These are prefectures that have become Class I prefectures at some point during the period 1955-1967. Included is a discussion of the changes that occurred in support for each party during the period.

Tokyo

Tokyo, during the period 1955-1967, remained in a Class I prefecture. In Tokyo, the Conservatives were not as strong as they had been in other prefectures. Support for the Conservatives fell as low as 37 per cent. Conservative support declined steadily and they were outpolled by the Socialists in several elections.

The Socialists were a major force in Tokyo politics during the period 1955-1967. Support was uneven, however.

There was appreciable, steady support for the Communists during this period. Support in Tokyo, for the Communists, ranged from 5 to 10 per cent.

The Komeito received 13 per cent of the votes cast in Tokyo during the 1967 election.

Miscellaneous candidates and parties were never strong in Tokyo. They never received more than 1 per cent of the vote.

Independents also have never been strong in Tokyo. They never received more than 1 per cent of the vote during 1955-1967.

Kanagawa

After the 1965 census, Kanagawa became a Class I prefecture. In Kanagawa, Conservative support declined overall. Support for the Conservatives fell as low as 37 per cent. When the prefecture changed classes, support for the Conservatives dropped 10 per cent.

Socialist support during the period, 1955-1967, was uneven. But the Socialists were a strong force in Kanagawa politics. When the prefecture changed classes, support declined 5 per cent.

Support for the Communists was steady in Kanagawa, about 6 per cent. There was no change in support when the prefecture changed to Class I.

The Komeito received 13 per cent of the votes cast in Kanagawa during the 1967 election.

Miscellaneous candidates and parties were never strong in Kanagawa. During this period, they never received more than 1 per cent of the vote.

Independents also were never strong in Kanagawa with one exception. In 1967, Independents received 4 per cent of the vote.

Osaka

Osaka, during the period 1955-1967, remained a Class I prefecture. In Osaka, the Conservative support declined steadily. Support declined as low as 30 per cent.

Support for the Socialists was uneven, but they were a major force in Osaka politics. The range of support was between 30 and 43 per cent.

Communist support was uneven during this period. But support was quite high. Range of support for the Communists was between 8 and 13 per cent.

The Komeito received 25 per cent of the vote in Osaka during the 1967 election.

Miscellaneous candidates and parties were never strong in Osaka. In 1960, they only received 0.08 per cent of the vote.

Independents also were never strong in Osaka. Support for Independents was never greater than 1 per cent.

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