POLITICAL PARTIES AND PROBLEMS OF NATIONAL INTEGRATION: A CASE STUDY OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF NIGERIA

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DEDICATION

This work is dedicated to my deceased grandmother, Mrs. Ebiavwo Ogbaudu, who, during her lifetime, was always committed to the integration of the extended family.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

> National integration in Nigeria has proved a delicate and continuing process that broadly has involved the interplay of institutional and sociological forces...It has witnessed the interaction of coercive (military), identitive (socio-psychological), and utilitarian (economic) factors...The present level of integration of this community and the success of future attempts to accelerate integration will depend on the judicious use of any or several of these factors... (Williams, 1968, p. 71)

The political entity called Nigeria is a polyethnic society with more than 250 linguistic groups. It is an artifical creation of the British resulting from the amalgamation of northern and southern protectorates in 1914.

Nigeria gained her political independence from Britain on October 1, 1960 and became a republic on October 1, 1963. But, from the 1940s to the 1980s, there have been a series of threats to secede from the federation by each of the major ethnic groups--the Hausa-Fulani, the Yoruba, and the Ibo. There have been two actual secession bids, although the first was a minor issue that was quickly overcome.

The first of the secession bids was in February 1966, when Isaac Boro, Sam Owanaro, and Nottingham Dick--some of the frustrated advocates of creating a rivers state out of the former Eastern Region dominated by Ibo-speaking people--"declared an illegal 'Delta People's Republic' and sought to defend it militarily" (Tamuno, 1970, p. 577). However, they were soon arrested by the Nigerian Army, tried and finally condemned

to death by the Federal Court for treason. They were later to be pardoned in 1967.

In May 1967, the people (the Ibo) of the Eastern Region of Nigeria under the leadership of the military governor of that region, Lieutenant Colonel Odumegwu Ojukwu, declared the formation of a new country, the "Republic of Biafra". The secession of the east led to a bloody civil war which lasted for about three years.

Besides the secession threats and bids, Nigeria has witnessed a number of military coups d'etat and counter coups, the lastest coup being that of December 31, 1983 which toppled the four years and three months old civilian administration of Alhaji Shehu Shagari.

The series of secession threats, the several military coups and counter coups, the "ill-fated gamble" and the declared illegal "Delta People's Republic", and the secession bids of the east and the subsequent civil war that Nigeria has witnessed since in the 1940s up to 1983, as Osei-Kwame (1980) rightly points out, clearly demonstrates the "lack of internal political integration in that country" (p. 1). Tamuno (1970), a Nigerian scholar and professor of history and a keen observer of the Nigerian political trends, also alluded to the problem of national unity in Nigeria when he stated, "historically, it was easier to establish the Nigerian state than to nourish the Nigerian nation...The latter eluded both British officials and Nigerians for several decades thereafter" (p. 564).

The question of national integration no doubt stands at the very core of the political problems in Nigeria. It stands out in the minds of serious and well-meaning Nigerians of all walks of life. It has been a problem in the past. It is still a problem and concern today and will continue to be a major concern in the years to come. Until this problem

is resolved, sectionalism, civil disturbances, threats of secession, and possibly another civil war may plague the country in the future.

Coleman and Roseberg (1964) point out that "the problems of integration are the major issues and obstacles in the task of nation building, which is itself the primary preoccupation of the leadership (and elites) of the new states" (p. 8). This is also true with Nigerian political leaders and elites. This concern was vividly reflected in the opening statement of the 1979 Federal Republic of Nigerian Constitution which states:

> We the people of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, having firmly and solemnly resolved; to live in unity and harmony as one indivisible and indissoluble sovereign nation... provide for a constitution for the purpose of consolidating the unity of our people (p. 9).

That fear of national disintegration is still a basic concern of most Nigerian leaders and intelligensia today can be seen in the increasing call on the federal government to emphasize those things that will integrate the people of Nigeria and to avoid those that tend to bring about disunity among the various groups.

Achebe (1985), for instance, points out that "Nigeria as a nation has not been founded up to now" (p. 34). Speaking to a writer with the same keeness of purpose and consummate intimacy of the problems of Nigeria as he often does in his literary works, he advised the current military leaders on the potentially "explosive" issue of "federal character" or "quota" system, not to be obsessed with quota to the exclusion of other considerations. He called on the federal military government to serve every community as fairly as possible. For him, the answer to the transformation in those areas which are educationally behind others does not lie in "halting those who are already ahead." He added that "if you (the federal military government) want a country

which will even survive into the 21st century you cannot do that" (p. 34).

Similarly, Ajayi (1985) also sees national integration as a serious problem in Nigeria. He argues that national integration is basic to the development of Nigeria. He, therefore urged the Federal Military Government to accord national integration a priority and to evolve a coherent policy and ideology towards the attainment of that goal.

The foregoing analysis indicates that after 25 years of political independence in which Nigeria has witnessed a series of secession threats, four military coups and one attempted coup (in which the Head of State, Major General Murtala Mohammed was assassinated), two secession bids, a thirty month bloody civil war, and 15 years of military rulership (1966-1979, 1983 to the present), Nigeria is still in search of national integration. As long as Nigeria continues to grapple with this problem of unity and nation-building, integration in Nigeria will continue to be a fertile ground of study by students, scholars, and researchers who would want to explain the Why of the problem so as to get insight into How it can best be resolved.

In the process of nation-building in the new states, the institutionalization of certain organizations has been identified as critical for the attainment of that goal. Political party has been singled out as one of such vital and indispensible institutions (Huntington, 1968; Coleman and Rosberg, 1964; Wallerstein, 1961; Burnham, 1967).

This study seeks to focus upon political parties and their role in the problems of national integration in Nigeria.

From the major works of some of the distinguished authors on political integration or nation-building in the developing countries (Haas, 1958; Deutsch, 1961, 1968; Geertz, 1963; Etzioni, 1964; Weiner,

1965; Calleo, 1967; Ake, 1967; Morrison, 1973; and Neuman, 1976), the problem of national integration in Nigeria is conceptionalized in this study as essentially one of getting the peoples of the various socio-cultural and discrete linguistic groups within the single territory called Nigeria, to identify more with and owe greater loyalty to the central government, show willingness to remain in the system, and not threaten or make bid to take the "exit" option, that is, to secede.

Analytical Framework

Political integration is a phenomenon that has received great attention by scholars of international politics and the emergent states. In spite of its wide usage, no generally agreed upon framework of analysis of national integration in the new states has emerged. The result of this state of affairs is that there are several propositions, theories, conceptual frameworks, and paradigms on national integration, almost as there are scholars on the subject. Several of these theories are discussed in detail in Chapter III.

This study applies one of these theoretical propositions--the political party brokerage theory--in investigating the problems of national integration in Nigeria. An analytical framework based on the proposition has been evolved for the purpose of the investigation. The scope of the framework will be a focus on certain dimensions of the Nigerian party system and the linkage of these dimensions to major crises in Nigeria and how these crises situations hinder national integration.

The framework of analysis consists of the following dimensions:

1. The identification of the major political parties in Nigeria up to 1966, and in the 1979 elections.

2. The scope, nature, and political bases of the major political parties as determined by:

a. The ethnic composition of the leadership group of each of the major parties.

b. The regional composition of the leadership group of the parties.

c. The communal bases of party support in situations of interparty competition, and

d. The electoral returns for each of the major parties in regional and federal elections from 1951-1965, and 1979.

3. The part played by political parties (by virtue of their scope) in major political crises in Nigeria from 1952 to 1965 and how these crises serve as impediments to national integration in Nigeria.

Several studies indicate that stability and national integration in a heterogeneous and complex political culture or society depends on and can be enhanced to the extent that groups; particularly political parties' membership reflects the diverse ethnic groups of the society (Truman, 1951; Coser, 1956; Lipset, 1963; and Lijphart, 1971). Such broad-based groups can act as a kind of balancing mechanism which can hinder deep cleavages along ethnic axis.

With regard to Africa, Coleman and Rosberg (1964) observed that political parties are "the most crucial political structures shaping the new African polities, and that the crises of national integration is the major hurdle in nation-building" (p. v). They theorized that "parties are destined, because of their central importance, to play a determinative role in the resolution of, or in the failure to solve, the problems of integration" (p. 8).

Similarly, Wallerstein (1961) stated that the integration of a country can be assured in the long run only if "majority of the citizens owe greater loyalty to the central government (than they do to their ethnic group or region) and begin to accept the state as the legitimate holder of force and authority, the rightful locus of legislation and social decision" (p. 88). Loyalty to the state can be measured by the sense of restraints its citizens feel in pursuing their demands or opposition to specific policies of the central government. According to Wallerstein, if the citizens "oppose the particular government in power but stop at a point short of destroying the state, (seceeding) or seriously weakening it, they can be said to be loyal" (p. 87).

A mechanism or mechanisms that are national in scope and orientation which can attract and hold the loyalty of the citizens and serve as intermediaries between the citizens and the state, and are able to turn the loyalty of the members to the service of the nation, are indispensible in the process of nation-building. Wallerstein identifies political parties as such mechanisms. He noted that "as one surveys the African scene today, one observes that where the party and the leaders are weak, so are the processes of national integration" (p. 95). Wallerstein made the case for the vital role that parties can play and does play in national integration when he added:

> Because the party, not the government, is the emanation of the people, that is, holds their loyalty and ties them to the state, the party integrates the nation and allows the integration to be accomplished by a method that maximizes the opportunity of every citizen to participate on a regular and meaningful basis in the decision-making process (p. 98).

He also noted that there is a correlation between the strength of party and the leader and the degree of national integration and stability.

Finally, Burnham (1967) also points to the integrative function that political parties play in democratic societies. He identified four broad functions which are performed by democratic parties as

1. Office-filling function or elite recruitment,
2. Political education or political socialization,
3. Policy-making function, and
4. Nation-building.

According to Burnham, the nation-building function, also referred to as integrative function, involves

> the regularized amalgamation and priority ordering of conflicting regional, ethnocultural, group, or class interests through the mechanisms of the political party. In modern politics, broad acceptance of the legitimacy of (and loyalty to) the political regime as a whole depends in large measure on the successful performance of the integrative function by the political parties (p. 278).

Burnham also asserts that a broad-based national political party is most likely to "accommodate an enormous variety of horizontal cleavages...such as the clash of sectional subcultures, clash between 'community' and 'society', and the clash of ethnocultural groups" (pp. 282-285).

To the extent that the above assertion is valid, it can also be argued that in a pluralistic society where the major political parties coincide with the dominant ethnic groups in the regions, the major cleavages are more likely to coincide and reinforce one another. Similarly, there is more likely to be a total devotion to the position of the group and region, and an intolerance of opposing groups. This is very true of Nigeria. As Diamond (1982) pointed out, it was the "progressive polarization of conflict between sectional parties that significantly contributed to the failure of the first Nigerian Republic" (p. 30).

One thing that is apparent from the above analysis is the seemingly diametrically opposite roles that political parties can play in developing countries. They can serve as instruments of political fragmentation and instability or as effective mechanisms for fostering stability and national integration in the emerging states.

Hypothesis

Nigeria is one of the new states in the continent of Africa with a number of political parties before and after it attained political independence. Since she achieved self-independence on October 1, 1960, Nigeria has witnessed a number of major political crises--coups d'etat and counter coups, threats of secession and secession bids, and a civil war which lasted for 30 months. These major crises situations are considered as indicators of problems of national integration in Nigeria. Nigeria, therefore, offers a fertile ground for the testing of the proposition by Coleman and Rosberg (1964) that "parties are destined, because of their central importance to play a determinative role in the resolution, or failure to solve the problems of integration" in the new states (p. v).

This study addresses itself to the role political parties as institutional structures have played in the process of integration in Nigeria. In the case of Nigeria, it can be hypothesized that, because the major political parties were not broad-based or national in scope (they were ethnoregionally based), they were most likely to constitute an impediment to political integration in Nigeria. This proposition will be examined in detail in Chapter IV.

The underlying assumption of the above proposition is that where parties are genuine and truly national in scope, its membership will

clearly exceed the boundaries of any particular ethnic group or region. This feature (national scope) will enable the parties to be more tolerant of opposing views, adequately represent and think in terms of the interests of the diverse groups within its membership and hence think more of national interest rather than the interest of a particular ethnic group or region. In such a situation, with time, members will come to develop a firm consensus among themselves that their several destinies would be best served by working together as Nigerians and owing loyalty to the state that supercedes that to traditional institutions and even loyalty to the party itself. Thus, by virtue of their national base, the parties will come to serve as vital and indispensible instruments for fostering national integration in Nigeria.

Significance of the Study

The search for the factors that militate against national integration cannot be an idle academic endeavor. Most scholars will agree that an understanding of how certain factors, such as political parties, hinder efforts at political integration can provide an insight, at least, as to ways that can be evolved to curtail, if not eliminate, these "de-integrators." The logic of this argument is that if the factor(s) analyzed actually constitute a disease in the body politics of the country, then correct diagnosis--which implies an understanding of the causes - can possibly lead to a cure.

Finally, the findings of this study will contribute to the body of theoretical knowledge in the area of national integration, particularly in the developing countries. It may also be of interest and importance to the intelligensia, practicing and non-practicing

politicians, as well as those within the country who are committed to the unity of that potentially great country, Nigeria.

Research Method

The basic research method for this study is documentary analysis. The sources of data, therefore, are purely secondary and occasionally primary. Generally, data will be drawn from relevant published works on Nigeria and in the general area of integration; official documents including interviews or statements by the Head of State and other government officials, legislations, government reports and white papers, decrees, journal articles, newspaper comments and features and editorials. Books constitute the other major souce of information.

Definition of Critical Terms

For the purpose of this study, the following concepts will be defined thus:

First Republic: refers to that period between the years 1963 and 1966; 1963 when Nigeria became constitutionally republic and 1966 when that republic came to an end in a military coup (Dudley, 1982).

Minority States: refers to those states which formerly constituted minority areas in the then three regions prior to 1964. In this study, minority states include: Bendel State in former Western Region; Rivers and Cross-Rivers States in former Eastern Region; and Benue, Plateau, Kwarra, Niger, Gongola, Benue, and Borno in former Northern Region.

Nationally Based Parties: have their membership clearly transcending the boundaries of any particular ethnic group or region. In other words, the parties' membership represents a broad cross-section

of the diverse ethnic groups of the country, thus reflecting the country's federal character.

National Integration: is the condition whereby the various socio-cultural and linguistic groups within the single territory called Nigeria come to identify more with and owe greater loyalty to the central government than to particularistic group, show willingness to remain in the system and not threaten or make bid to take the "exit" option, that is, to secede.

Parochial Political Parties: lack a national base in the sense that they draw most of their support from a constituency limited by tribe or region (Schwarz, 1965).

Public Institutions: refer to those organizations, or structures, through which the political affairs of government are conducted and managed (Dudley, 1982, p. 41).

Political Parties: are formal organizations which compete through the electoral process to control (either singly or in coalition with other similar organizations) the personnel and polices of government.

Second Republic: refers to the system of rule which was inaugurated October 1, 1979 and came to an end with the military coup of December 31, 1983.

In Chapter II of the study, we will discuss the various definitions, conditions, strategies, and theories of national integration. Chapter III opens with a discussion of the background to Nigeria, stressing the geography, precolonial history, colonialism, and postcolonial political developments. Chapter IV investigates the nature of the major Nigerian political parties, how the rivalry and conflicts between and among these parties have generated certain crises situations which in turn impede political integration in Nigeria. The fifth and concluding chapter

summarizes what has been discussed in the previous chapters. In addition, a case will be made that a two party system will be most appropriate for fostering national integration in Nigeria.

CHAPTER II

DEFINITIONS, CONDITIONS, THEORIES, AND STATEGIES OF NATIONAL INTEGRATION

Definitions of National Integration

The concept of "integration" has been widely used as an "heuristic device" for the study of the emerging states. The result is that there is a vast, and still expanding, professional literature on integration with particular reference to "third" world countries. Consequently, "integration" is now part of the vocabulary of every student and scholar of political development, modernization and change and political instability.

In spite of its popularity and wide usage, a generally accepted definition of national integration is yet to emerge. Often, scholars, students, researchers, authors and political leaders use the term differently; sometimes narrowly, other times broadly, and yet sometimes synonymously and interchangeably with political integration, national or political unification, nation-building, political stability or political development. Furthermore, the term has also been used relatively differently as a "process," as a "condition," and sometimes it is used in both meanings.

In order, therefore, to arrive at an operational definition of national integration that will be used in this study, the author will

examine first some of the different meanings of the concept in order to elicit the broad themes common to most of the definitions.

To integrate, according to Deutsch (1968) generally "means to make a whole out of parts--that is to turn previously separate units into components of a coherent system" (p. 158). He added that "an integrated system is cohesive to the extent that it can withstand stress and strain, support disequilibrium, and resist disruptions" (p. 160). In an earlier work, Deutsch (1961) had defined integration as

> the attainment of a sense of community, accompanied by formal or informal institutions or practices sufficiently strong and wide spread to assure peaceful change among members of a group with reasonable certainty over a long period of time (p. 98).

Such an integrated community, in Deutsch's terms, is a "security community."

Morrison (1972) defines integration as:

> a process by which members of a social system develop linkages and cohesion so that the boundaries of the system persist over-time and the boundaries of subsystems become less consequential in affecting behavior (p. 925).

Similarly, Binder (1964) views political integration as involving the creation of "a cultural-ideological consensus of a very high degree of comprehensiveness" (p. 630). Like Binder, Coleman and Rosberg (1964) defined integration as the "progressive reduction of cultural and regional tensions and discontinuities on the horizontal plane in the process of creating a homogeneous political community" (p. 9). Coleman and Rosberg also defined it as "the progressive bridging of the elite-mass gap" (Ibid).

The definitions of Deutsch, Morrison, Binder, and Coleman and Rosberg emphasize shared culture or gradual elimination of subordinate cultures in order to achieve a homogeneous political culture and

national integration. This perspective has been referred to as assimilationist definitions or models.

The assimilationist perspective has been greatly criticized by scholars of integration. For instance, Etzioni (1964) taking issue with Deutsch's contention that a common culture is a prerequisite for unification, argues that culturalism is not necessarily a prerequisite for integration. He advances two possible arguements to explain his point. First, he pointed out that many cultural characteristics may not be politically relevant because political culture is part of the general culture. He made the point that "sharing culture is not required for unification, nor does the lack of a shared culture prevent it; it simply has little effect on political unification" (p. 35).

The second argument Etzioni made was that shared culture may not be a "prerequisite for unification but a requirement that has to be fulfilled before the process can be advanced" (1964, p. 36).

For Haas (1958), political integration is

> ...the process whereby political actors in several distinct national settings are persuaded to shift their loyalities, expectations, and political activities toward a new center, whose institutions possess or demand jurisdiction over the existing national states" (p. 16).

He views the end result of the process of political integration to be a new political community defined as a "condition in which specific groups and individuals show more loyalty to their central political institutions than do any other political authority in a specific period of time and in definable geographical area" (pp. 13-14).

The Haas' definition is an example where political/national integration is sometimes defined both as a "process" and a "condition." The Hass' definition or version of integration extends the meaning considerably away from an exclusive focus on institutions to the people

involved. In other words, there is a dual development which is interconnected; "the modification of behavior which goes together with the building-up of new, supranational institutions" (p. 301).

Weiner (1965) has identified five specific usages of the concept of integration:

1. National Integration: is the process of bringing together culturally and socially discrete groups into a single territorial unit and the establishment of a national identity which overshadows subordinate parochial loyalities. This definition recognizes that national integration involves, in most cases, plural societies with distinct ethnic, religious, linguistic, and self-conscious cultural qualities, or other groups and strata. It also implies the subjective feelings that individuals in different groups or strata have toward the nation.

2. Territorial Integration: is the establishment of national central authority over subordinate political units or regions. This implies objective territorial control (pp. 44-45). Osei-Kwame (1980) refers to territorial integration as "horizontal integration" (p. 1).

3. Elite-Mass Integration: is the linking of government with the governed, assuming that there is a gap between them. This type of integration has been referred to as "vertical integration" (Osei-Kwame, 1980, p. 1).

4. Value Integration: is the minimum value consensus necessary to maintain a social order; the common myths, symbols, beliefs, and shared history of the people.

5. Integrative Behavior: is the capacity of people in a society to organize for some common purposes.

The Weiner's identification reveals the variety of meanings and usages of the concept of integration which are not always clearly defined.

Furthermore, Geertz (1963) defines national integration in contemporary new nations as:

> ...the aggregation of independently defined, specifically outlined, traditional primordial groups into larger, more diffuse units, whose implicit frame of reference is not the local scene but the 'nation' - in the sense of the whole society encompassed by the new civil state (p. 163).

Similarly, Calleo (1967) defines national integration as "the process by which member states give up making key public policies independently and instead make them jointly within a supranational cadre or pass them on to a new supranational administration" (p. 56). The central theme of Calleo's definition is the co-existence of this new supranational authority with pre-existing ones of the nation-state. This is more or less a focus on institutions.

Furthermore, Neuman (1976) points out that national integration is not a measure of social homogeneity, but of

> the ability of a political unit (a state for the purpose of this study) to conduct its important and necessary business without disaffecting large bodies of its constituents so that they are no longer willing to have their affairs regulated by or to participate in that political system (p. 20).

In other words, a state, whether homogeneous or not, is integrated so long as none of its constituents has taken or threaten to take the "exit" option. The Neuman Schema is more explicit because it clearly provides "an easily identifiable index or indicator of national integration and that is nonrecourse to the 'exit' option by members of the political system" (Olugbemi, 1978, p. 18). The Neuman's framework also makes it possible to distinguish between political instability and malintegration. Thus, a state may face internal political crises without being malintegrated. Moreover, he does not equate integration with cultural homogeneity, nor the absence of conflicts with integration.

Finally, Etzioni (1965) considers a community integrated if:

> (a) it has an effective control over the use of the means of violence,
> (b) it has a center of decision making capable of affecting significantly the (authoritative) allocations of resources and rewards throughout the community, and
> (c) it is the dominant focus of political identification for a large majority of politically aware citizens (p. 4).

Etzioni equates "political integration" with political community and political community, to him, is one that possess the three dimensions (a-c) above. He added that

> ...a community is established only when it has self-sufficient integrative mechanisms; that is, when the maintenance of its existence is provided for by its own processes and is not dependent upon those of external systems or member units (p. 9).

From the above analysis of the definitions of integration, three broad themes common to most of the definitions can be identified. These include:

1. The existence of an identifiable territory or political entity inhabited by the peoples to be integrated,

2. The existence of a central government within that political system, and

3. Loyalties of the peoples to the central government that should supercede loyalties to their parochial institutions.

In this study, the term national integration is used interchangeably in Weiner's first and second senses, and as used by Neuman and Etzioni. In this respect, national integration in the case of Nigeria can be seen as the condition whereby the various sociocultural and discrete linguistic groups within the single territorial unit (the Federal Republic of Nigeria)

1. Identify more and owe greater loyalty to the central government,

2. Participate in the Nigerian political system,

3. Show willingness to have the central government regulate their affairs, and

4. No longer threaten or make bid to take the "exit" option, that is, to secede.

This reseacher considers the Werner, Neuman, and Etzioni definitions as adequate for this study because he considers the assimilationist definitions of national integration as being unrealistic in the context of Nigeria specifically, and Africa in general. Smock and Bentsil-Enchil (1976), for example, have noted that given the tenacity of ethnic identities and the inevitable role they will continue to play in the political process of African countries, any attempt or effort at achieving homogenization will be unrealistic.

Nordlinger (1972) also critizes the assimilation definitions and approaches when he contends that it is fruitless and even dangerous for government leaders in plural societies (like Nigeria) to vigorously attempt to inculcate a national identity. To him, plural societies can only remain viable if their leaders emphasize conflict regulation and concession rather than mobilization. Osei-Kwame (1980), himself an African and a political scientist, made the point even clearer when he pointed out that in spite of the fact that

> most Africans today are learning new norms and behavior through formal education, intermingling with other ethnic groups...increasing physical mobility and intermarriage... they do not seem to be abandoning old indigenous norms and behavior (p. xxii).

This, to him, demonstrates that Africans are unlikely to give up everything of their past in favor of new mores. The dominant political process, he observes, going on in Africa is "not assimilation but an accommodation and interpenetration of new institutions, norms, and

behavior" (p. xxii). He believes, unlike the proponents of the assimilation models, in the possibility that "strong intragroup cohesion can co-exist alongside equally robust levels of cross-ethnic or state loyalty" in Africa (p. xviii). Finally, he made the interesting point that in the developed countries like the United States of America (like in most developing countries such as Nigeria), ethnic differences continue to be increasingly politicized, especially in elections. If in the United States there seems to be nothing necessarily incompatible between stressing one's Italian, Polish, Irish, or Jewish identity and one's American citizenship, he wonders why it has to take a different pattern in Africa.

Thus, the accommodation definitions/models of national integration are most appropriate to analyzing and explaining problems of political integration in Nigeria than the assimilationist models. The author regards the assimilation approach to integration as another form of colonization, this time, of major ethnic groups over smaller ethnic groups within a defined territorial unit. However, it is possible to note that

> states that have attempted to promote homogenization have also made some concessions to the intergroup accommodation model, and the states at the other end of the continuum have expressed some interest in promoting depluralization (Smock and Bentsil-Enchil, 1976, p. 23).

Finally, Mazrui (1972) also made a similar point when he asserted that national integration necessitates both some depluralization of society and the simultaneous establishment of mechanisms for intergroup conflict resolution. He noted that some concessions to the ethnically plural character of African states seems essential if their political systems are to remain viable and peaceful.

Process of Political Integration

There are a number of conditions which do affect national integration. Etzioni (1965), in his book, Political Unification: A Comparative Study of Leaders and Forces, considers the question of the conditions under which the process of integration/unification is initiated from four viewpoints by raising the following questions:

1. What is the state of each societal unit that is to become a member of the union?

2. What is the nature of the aggregate of these units?

3. Are the environmental factors favorable for integration?

4. To what degree was there interdependence and integration before a specific process of national integration was initiated?

Deutsch (1966) suggests twelve factors, while Phillip and Toscano (1964) suggest ten factors that appear to exert an integrative influence upon people and political communities.

For the purpose of this study, the several conditions of integration that have been identified are subsummed under eight of the ten factors identified by Phillip and Toscano as follows:

1. Territorial and Geographical Proximity

According to Phillip and Toscano (1964), the closer people live together geographically, the more likely they are to develop integrative relationships among themselves. Similarly, the closer communities are to each other, the greater the likelihood of their political integration. They, however, pointed out that this hypothesis is usually indirect and must be mediated through other variables such as homogeneity, interaction or transactions, and mutual knowledge among the

groups. In other words, territorial contiguity of member units give them some definite advantages but does not guarantee an automatic success of the integrative effort. Geographical proximity and the absence of natural barriers such as seas and oceans or high mountain ranges between the protectorates of Nigeria helped to make the 1914 amalgamation possible.

2. Degree of Homogeneity

The hypothesis here holds that "the more that communities are similar, the more successful are attempts to build integrative relationship among them, and conversely, communities whose members are very different from one another will have a very hard time achieving or maintaining political integration" (Phillip and Toscano, 1964, p. 18). Thus, social and cultural homogeneity will contribute strongly to the feasibility of national integration. Where this advantage is absent as in Nigeria, characterized by heterogeneity, pluralistic ethnic groupings, and fragmented political culture, the achievement and maintenance of political integration may not be easy to come by.

3. Mutual Knowledge or Cognitive Proximity

Phillip and Toscano (1964) also point out that mutual knowledge or understanding among people and groups of people is essential to their functioning together effectively as a political community. They argue that unless people are aware of each other and know a good deal about one another, they are not likely to enter into social or political partnership, however much alike they may be in terms of elements of homogeneity. This condition is also appropriate to Nigeria. Although the various ethnic groups in Nigeria have been living close together

before the advent of colonialism, they have very little contact with one another and virtually no mutual understanding among themselves until they were forcefully brought together under one colonial experience. This is one of the reasons why the different ethnic groups do not trust one another. They are basically suspicious of one another to the extent that a totally functional integration of these diverse groups has become a major problem in the country.

4. Government Effectiveness

This refers to the capacity of the government to satisfy social expectations of the different groups. The proposition here is that "governmental effectiveness is necessary to retain the loyalties of the members of the community, and such loyalty is necessary to maintain internal integration in the community" (Phillip and Toscano, 1964, p. 43). They also point out that "government ineffectiveness, on the other hand, will engender pressures for new, different, or external forms of integration" (Ibid). This variable is particularly important in analyzing the degree of integration in societies where the governments are the chief employers of the salaried labor force and the principal controller and distributor of economic goods and social services.

The ability of such a government to satisfy the needs of the diverse groups will depend on its distributive capacity, which in turn, may depend on three categories of integrative powers--"coercive, utilitarian, and identitive" (Etzioni, 1965, p. 37). Coercive power refers to the use of force by the government to compel or impose its will or norms on the member units. This capacity stems from the government's monopoly over the instruments of coercion and its legitimate use. The use of force or the threat of force may sometimes be sufficient to

guarantee compliance in normal times. In Nigeria, the coercive capacity has been resorted to a couple of times, such as in the three year civil war, the TIV riots, and the western region crisis in the mid-1960s.

Utilitarian power of government results from its control of the economic possessions, technical and administrative capabilities, and its manipulation of these assets in a way that it can bring the subunits to comply with the norms it upholds for its members.

Finally, the "identitive" power involves the symbolic identification of the citizens with their government. These identitive potentials are usually "values or symbols built up by educational and religious institutions, national rituals, and other mechanisms" (Etzioni, 1965, p. 39).

5. Functional Interests

The hypothesis put forward here by Phillip and Toscano (1964) is that "integration is dependent on the extent to which the dominant functional interests are shared in each community and, thus, could be advanced by intercommunity agreement or association" (p. 29). It should be noted, however, that because people's devotion to particular interests may change with time and circumstances, converging functional interest "may not promise a firm and lasting basis for integration" (Ibid).

6. Communal Character or Social Motive

McClelland (1961) has identified three major sets of motivation that tend to differentiate societies. These are: 1. an affiliation motive, 2. an achievement motive, and 3. a power motive. Phillip and Toscano (1964) considers the affiliation motive as relevant to the issue of integration or cooperative behavior. Based on the McClelland's

typology, Phillip and Toscano hypothesized that "those societies characterized by a high proportion of affiliation motive, in contrast to achievement and power motives, would be both internally cohesive and strongly disposed to cooperate with other communities" hence national integration may be possible under such a condition (pp. 34-35).

7. Structural Frame

The argument here is that structures often result in certain ideological dispositions and that communities with a common or similar political structures have ideological affinities that make it possible for them to integrate more easily (Phillip and Toscano, 1964).

The several ethnic groups in Nigeria did have different governmental structures prior to colonialism. Consequently, each has its own ideological dispositions. The result is that today there is no clear-cut ideology in the country that can serve to unite or integrate the diverse linguistic and cultural groups.

8. Previous Integrative Experience

Finally, the studies of European integration by Haas (1968) suggests that integration may occur more easily if there have been previous integrative experiences. Tascano (1964) refers to similar experiences from the findings of his study of the Philadelphia suburban communities as "spill-over" effect. Furthermore, the pattern of political activity forced on a community by external forces such as colonialism, may generate the initial momentum for integration, but in most cases, such a common colonial experience may not be sufficient to sustain a firm integration among the different nationalities. Nigeria is an example

of this externally imposed amalgamation which has failed up to date to generate the much desired national integration.

Theories of National Integration

Just as the definition of integration varied, so do the proposed theories, strategies, and models for achieving political integration. Generally, most theories of national integration have been adopted from those theories of international political integration that have direct relevance for the analysis of the processes of national integration. It should be noted at this juncture, that most of the theoretical works on political integration have been developed within the field of international relations or relations among sovereign states.

The theories of national integration fall into two broad categories. The first is the pluralist version which involves the creation of cross-cutting affiliations among the different cultural groups within a society. Osei-Kwame (1980) refers to this approach as the "cultural accommodation model" (p. xix). The second approach is called the assimilationist version. Osei-Kwame refers to it as the "cultural displacement model" because this version assumes that "primordial and civil ties are mutually exclusive and that integration takes the form of zero-sum game culminating in the emergence of a homogeneous nation" (Zolberg, 1967, p. 451). That means that intragroup cohesion and loyalties should disappear and be replaced by loyalty to social classes or to the society called the state before integration can occur.

Whether pluralist or assimilationist, theories of political integration are important because they not only offer descriptions of various forms of integration and an explanation of the conditions which sustain them, but also provide an insight into the requisite

socioeconomic and political policies and structures for creating or meeting these conditions and achieving national integration.

The theories of national integration will be summarized under the following categories, which are fairly exhaustive.

1. Theory of Charismatic Leadership

Through an extensive review and analysis of the studies in integration, Ake (1969) grouped those approaches which emphasize charismatic leadership as an important factor in furthering political integration into a category called "charismatic legitimation." The theory concerns itself with how "the state comes to be the primary focus of the individual's loyalties, when, to begin with, these loyalties were formerly focused on parochial institutions such as the chieftancy or the tribal council" (Ake, 1967, p. 51). The theory suggests that one mechanism by which such a transfer of loyalties may be achieved is through the charismatic leader whose appeal to a broad spectrum of the different cultural and linguistic groups enable it to manipulate the diverse groups to transfering their political loyalties from parochial to central levels--or institutions.

According to Ake (1967), the underlying assumption of the theory is that the masses respect the charismatic leader in a way they do not respect the state. It is this love and respect for the magnetic personality of the leader that he seizes upon to buttress the state until it (the state) wins its own legitimacy. Apter (1963) recognizes the vital integrative role the charismatic leader can play and does play in the process of nation-building in the emerging states when he wrote:

> as charisma has worked...as a newly accepted source of legitimacy, it has provided for the public extension of legitimacy and support to new types of social structures

> in keeping with the objectives of nationalism (nation-building) meanwhile retaining subregional aspects of the traditional system and integrating these aspects in different relational and behavioral modes (p. 303).

Other proponents of charismatic leadership as an important transitional factor which can further political integration include Wallerstein (1961), Weber (1957), Runciman (1963), and Horowitz (1963).

The theory of charismatic legitimation has come under criticisms by scholars of political integration. First, the concept, charisma, has been criticized on several grounds. For instance, Friedrich (1961) points out that charisma does not provide an adequate type of leadership but only of power. He also noted that "power is differentiated according to its source, leadership according to its function" (p. 21). Leadership, he added, presupposes the existence of structured power, that is, institutionalized power "but, since charisma is the very antithesis of stuctuerd power, it is not clear what charismatic leadership means" (Ake, 1967, p. 56).

Emmet (1958) suggests that Weber "has conceptualized charisma too narrowly and assimilated it too hastily to a personal and irrational kind of authority" (p. 242). She suggests that charisma is more applicable to inspirational leadership than to the "hypnotic" leadership which Weber describes. Similarly, Blau (1963) has pointed out that Weber's theory "encompasses only the historical processes that lead from charismatic movements to increasing rationalization and does not include an analysis of the historical conditions that give rise to charismatic eruptions in the social structure" (p. 309). Popper (1959) also argued that to the extent that charisma implies integrated following, the theory of charismatic legitimation offers a purely deductive explanation of

political integration. Deductive "because its explicans does not contain statements that go beyond the explicandum" (p. 59).

Finally, because of the many thorny problems raised and the conceptual difficulties associated with the theory of charismatic legitimation, Ake (1967) has suggested two modifications in the theory. First, he urged that the concept of charisma should be dropped, for, while it is not essential to the theory, it is the major source of its weakness. Second, the personal authority for buttressing the state should not be sought from one charismatic leader but from a multiplicity of sources --traditional authorities and leaders of important secondary associations.

Ake's second point is particularly relevant to a complex society such as Nigeria because it takes into congnizance the fact that the multi-ethnic composition, the cultural heterogeneity, and the socio-political cleavages among the diverse groups in the new state can militate against the emergence of a leader with a nationwide personal appeal and authority.

2. The Political Party Brokerage Theory

This theory is closely related to that of charismatic legitimation. It is supported by Wallerstein (1961), Emerson (1966), Sklar (1967), LaPolombara and Weiner (1966), Stokes (1965, 1969), Coleman and Rosberg (1964), and Burnham (1967).

Wallerstein (1961) argues that national integration can only be presumed to have occurred when the citizen accepts the state as "the legitimate holder of force and authority, the locus of legislation and social decision" (p. 88). The legitimation of the state involves conscentious effort to get the citizen to regard it as a genuine

representative of his interests and, therefore, deserving his loyalty. In other words, it is to a large degree a matter of making him think of the state as "we" rather than "they" (Ibid, p. 91).

The principal instruments for legitimating the new state, for Wallerstein, are the dominant political party whose functions should include: communicating ideas between the government and the people; educating the citizenry and enlisting support for governmental policies; and strengthening social solidarity with its ideology. All these functions, according to Wallerstein, enables integration to be accomplished in a manner which maximizes mass participation. It is the party, then, that serves as "the structure by which the unifying influence of the charismatic leader assumes a stable and tangible mold" (Ake, 1967, p. 53).

Elaborating on the party brokage thesis, Osei-Kwame (1980) has identified two assumptions inherent in the theory. The first thesis is that in their attempt to broaden their support base in order to win elections, political parties, of necessity, formulate ideologies and policies which amalgamate both parochial and national interest groups. This, however, does not eliminate the necessity of parties appealing to their own ethnic groups. This is why countries with various ethnic groups, such as Nigeria, are very likely to benefit from the integrative role of political parties.

The second point Osei-Kwame made was that the political brokerage thesis assumes an environment in which multiparty democracy and free and fair elections are practiced. He argues that this approach "has no relevance in most African states today because the no-party military regimes, one-party regimes, and manipulated elections are so entrenched on the continent" (p. 34). Osei-Kwame's criticism not withstanding,

there is no doubt that political parties that are well-organized and institutionalized with memberships adequately representing a broad cross-section of the country do play a vital role in the integrative process in developing countries. One way they do this is by encouraging in the members a sense of loyalty and devotion and a feeling of security and confidence in the political system.

3. The Elite-Mass Gap Theory

This theory considers national integration as the systematic bridging of the socioeconomic and cultural "gap" between the modernizing or ruling political elites and the masses. Coleman and Rosberg (1964), Binder (1964), and Shils (1958) are some of the authors who have examined the elite-mass gap in systematic and comprehensive fashion.

Coleman and Rosberg (1964), for instance, defines political integration in terms of the elite-mass gap: "political integration... refers to the progressive bridging of the elite-mass gap on the vertical plane in the course of developing an integrated political process and a participant political culture" (p. 7). They see national integration as including "the reduction of cultural and regional tensions and discontinuities on the horizontal plane" (Ibid). Thus, their strategy involves, first, the bridging of what they call an "elite-mass gap" and, secondly, the forging of what they term "territorial integration."

According to Coleman and Rosberg (1964), the elite-mass gap is "generic to the Afro-Asian world... and it is the core of the issue of national integration in these states" (p. 686). Once this gap is bridged, the authors believe, the result will be "the development of an integrated political process and a participant political culture" (p. 9).

Shils (1958, 1960), like Coleman and Rosberg, sees national integration in the new states as dependent primarily on the closing of the elite-mass gap. In his 1958 article "The Concentration and Dispersion of Charisma: Their Bearing on Economic Policy in Underdeveloped Countries", Shils argued that it is mistaken to assume that the gap between the highly political outlook of the ruling elite and the pre-political outlook of the masses is caused by the detribalization of the former. He pointed out that the moderinization of the elite cannot be the relevant point because "in its political orientation, the educated elite displays a striking affinity with the traditional cultures from which it is supposed to be emancipated" (p. 2.).

In a later article published in 1960, Shils identifies parochialism as one of the factors causing the elite-mass gap. He observes that the importance of parochial loyalties in the political and administrative systems of the emergent states hinders the establishment of a tradition of bureaucratic impartiality. Parochialism causes mutual alientation of the masses and the rural elite. Parochialism itself, he noted, is intensified by the stratification system of the new state. The result of these features is the absence of a middle-class that will mediate between the powerful and wealthy on the one hand and the poor, underprivileged masses on the other hand. Consequently, there is a great polarization between the ruling elite and the masses in the new state. His prescription for bridging the gap is political democracy which guarantees the dispersion of initiative.

There is no doubt that the gap between the ruling class and the masses is an important obstacle to national integration in the new states. But, it is only one of the many cleavages that characterize the new states. Therefore, the panacea to malintegration in these states

does not lie only in bridging the elite-mass gap. This is why the theories of integration that focus on the bridging of the elite-mass gap are also limited in their usages.

While Coleman and Rosberg's analysis can be considered as being broader than that of Shils', their framework is also limited. For instance, they said little about how territorial integration is to be achieved other than the implied suggestion that the closing of the elite-mass gap will cause the primordial ties to be transcended. Secondly, the authors hardly at any point attempted to define what they meant by the "elite". Thirdly, Dudley (1976) points out that when Coleman and Rosberg talk of a "modernizing elite" and the "traditional mass," they are in fact assuming that both are relatively homogeneous groups. To talk of these groups as modernizing elite could be misleading. Dudley (1976), therefore, suggested that the term "elite" (and traditional mass) "need to be preceded by a more appropriate or suitable adjectival prefixes that describe the existence of congeries of elites: economics, political, traditional, bureaucratic, respect, and so on" (p. 32).

Ake (1967), in critizing the work of Shils, raised similar points made by Dudley with respect to the misleading usage of the term "elite." He states that, "it is unfortunate that emphasis on the elite-mass gap had tended to obscure the divisions and antagonisms on both sides of the gap" (p. 75). He added:

> 'Mass' and 'elite' are not necessarily homogeneous entities. For instance, those whom we lump together as the Nigerian masses may be Hausas, Ibos, Yorubas, (Ijaws, Urhobos, Itshekiris, Binis, Ishans), or TIV, Catholics, Protestants, Muslims, or Animists, peasants or urban laborers. Unless we breakdown 'elite' and 'mass' to their constituent elements we cannot fully appreciate the complexity of the problem of political integration (p. 75).

If we cannot assume that the "elite" constitute a homogeneous group in Africa, then, it can be argued that there is little left to be said of the prescriptions of Shils and Coleman and Rosberg. For as Huntington (1967) has observed,

> If the elite divides among itself, its factions appeal to the masses for support. This produces rapid mobilization of the masses into politics at the same time that it destroys whatever consensus previously existed among the politically active on the need for modernization (p. 427).

In other words, if the elite is divided and its factions are able to mobilize support among the masses, the mass itself is also not a homogeneous--or traditional--group (Dudley, 1976). This point is particularly relevant to Nigeria where there has been and continues to be elite-fragmentation or elite dissensus. Each of the leaders of various "factions" has always fallen back on their respective ethnic groups. The result is that the "masses" are in themselves mobilized along ethno-regional lines. This situation becomes worsened and threatens the unity of the country in times of political conflicts or crises. This increased mobilization of the masses is usually not accompanied by the institutionalization of processes and structures. The result is "political decay" and "malintegration."

Finally, Ake (1967) points out that the problem of political integration is not necessarily simplified by simply reducing it to one of increasing elite-consensus. He argues that "the amelioration of the malintegration of the new state demands not so much the bridging of the elite-mass gap as the progressive reduction of the tensions within the political elite" (p. 81). Thus, reducing tensions and increasing consensus within and among the political elites in a pluralistic and fragmented political culture such as Nigeria is a crucial factor in the process of building national integration. In short, the strategy that

there should be elite consensus and mass support for the elite provides a possible workable model to the question of national integration in Nigeria.

4. The Free Market Model

This approach to political integration has been attributed to Haas and Schmitter (1964). The authors have suggested that the primary requisite for political integration is that the political actors involved in the process behave rationally. Rational behavior they defined as that which seeks to maximize the pay-off's to individual participants. Although the Haas and Schmitter's theory was set in an international context (the integration of independent states), they saw themselves as putting forward a generalized theory of integration. To them, the theory can be more applicable to any specific level of analysis if different values are substituted for the variables in the theory. This implies that the theory can also be applied to a country like Nigeria which has more than 250 ethnic groups or communities.

The theory assumes that provided actors behave rationally, the collective welfare, like that of the individual, will be maximized because the gains and losses will cancel each other out leaving the collectivity better off. But, a number of difficulties are inherent in the Haas and Schmitter proposed framework.

It has been pointed out that there exists an inferential jump in the postulation that the pursuit of individual calculations, as defined, will automatically lead to the creation of an integrated community (Dudley, 1976). In fact, it can be shown, on game--theory grounds--using, for example, theorems deriving from the "prisoners dilemma"--that far from such a rational calculus leading to the "members" being

better off, both the members and collectivity would actually be worse off (Ruciman and Sen, 1965; Rapoport, 1969).

If an integrated community is to be taken as a goal, therefore, "the least desired strategy for achieving it would be the one proposed by Haas and Schmitter" (Dudley, 1976, p. 31). As Dudley (1973) rightly pointed out, from the experience of Nigeria, it can be demonsrated that it was the elite's pursuit of strategies like those suggested by Haas and Schmitter that all but led to the disintegration of the First Federal Republic of Nigeria (and also the demise of the Second Republic which came to an end on December 31, 1983 with the military overthrow of the four years and three months old administration of Alhagi Shehu Shagari).

5. The Structural-Functionalist Thesis

According to Osei-Kwame (1980), this group of theories essentially suggest that exposure to the forces of modernization such as wage employment, industrialization, commercialization, urban residence, migration, mass media, formal education, and increased political participation tends to reduce or eradicate traditional particularistic or ethnic tendencies, hence, they are capable of fostering political integration. Proponents of the structural-functional framework include Coleman (1955), Lerner (1958), Mitchell (1956), Almond and Verba (1963), Parsons (1964), Eisenstadt (1966), and Cohen (1974).

Inherent in and consistent with this thesis is the idea that very low levels of economic and social development have very low levels of political integration. With increasing modernization, therefore, comes the realization of the need for increased sociopolitical interdependence which is a prerequisite for political or national unity.

The applicability or suitability of the structural-functionalist thesis to a country such as Nigeria and many other African states have been called to question on empirical grounds. Unchedu (1970) and Bates (1973), for instance, have observed that, at least in the African context, modernization has demonstrated a rather strong tendency to coexist with or intensify traditionalistic tendencies such as tribalism. This observation invalidates the structural-functionalist proposition.

6. Social Communications-Transactional Theory

Deutsch (1957, 1964) developing his own previous work employing the theory of communication and control in the study of nationalism and social mobilization, later focused upon transactions and other forms of social communication in his analysis of the integration of political communities. The underlying hypothesis of this theory is that cohesiveness among individuals of a group and among communities can be measured by and promoted by the extent of mutual relationship or interaction among them. In other words, the greater the transactional exchanges between members of a group the greater the cohesiveness of the group.

Three types of major interactions are: communications which involves the interchange of messages (mail, telephone, radio, television, and so on); trade--the exchange of goods and services; and mobility--the movement of persons and the frequency of personal contacts (Jacob and Teune, 1964).

Deutsch suggests in his theory that an extensive pattern of communication between national or communal units will result in a closer community which he refers to as a "security community." He also argues that if the rate of communications between groups within a community increases, an increase in elite responsiveness will result; and if elite

responsiveness increases, then a security community will arise. Deutsch (1957) defines a security community as one that attains a sense of unity "accompanied by formal and informal institutions and practices, sufficiently strong and widespread to assure peaceful change among members" (pp. 5-7). Hence, if an integrated community is desired, ways had to be sought to increase the flow of transactional exchanges between and among its members and communities. Thus, unity in diversity becomes the core of this kind of pluralistic but coherent political culture.

The above conditions become essential elements in a society like Nigeria with a multiplicity of ethnic groups which have, to a large extent, been politicized along sectional or ethnoregional lines. But, there are a number of difficulties associated with the Deutsch model.

Deutsch talks of transactions independent of the perceptions and motivations of transacting actors. Although he added a number of postulates regarding such variables as trust, responsiveness, and complementarity, he left unexplained when and how trust and responsiveness among actors of a political community with fragmented political cultures are to occur (Dudley, 1976). This is why Haas (1971), in criticism of Detusch, states "it is as if theorists of the balance of power need only worry about the application of the principals of mechanics of international politics and need not worry about how foreign ministers perceive themselves in this supergame" (p. 23).

Huntington (1967) points out that increased communication can increase ethnic consciousness and this, in turn, can stimulate political disintegration, tearing apart the body politic. As he puts it:

> increased communication may generate demands for more 'modernity' than can be delivered (by the political system). It may also stimulate a reaction against modernity and activate traditional forces. Since the political arena is normally dominated by the more modern groups, it can bring

> into the arena new, anti-modern groups...it may also mobilize minority ethnic groups who had been indifferent to politics but who now acquire a self-consciousness and divide the political system along ethnic lines (thus stimulating political disintegration in the system's body politic)(p. 406).

Finally, Jacob and Teune (1964) points out that exchanges or transactions between people in various communities have costs attached to them. Costs of transactions, they noted, differentially benefit one community over another. Consequently, attempts to facilitate transactions and, thus political integration, would probably be resisted by communities whose income depends heavily on intercommunity transactions, or where one community fears that such transactions will lead to the other community perpertually dominating them economically, administratively, and politically. If costs of transactions are related to political integration, then, according to Jacob and Teune (1964), the greatest amount of national integration should occur between:

> communities where (1) distance and (2) political boundary factors are negligible, where (3) those who are affected by the changes in costs can participate in decisions relating to costs, and where (4) the benefits of the costs are rather evenly shared (p. 25.)

It should be noted that "the transactional influences, if indeed they do represent an integrative factor, may need to be conditioned by other variables; or other variables may need to be present for the transactions to have their integrative impact" (Ibid, p. 26).

7. The Cross-Pressure Theory

Groups of theories under this category argue that overlapping memberships reduce the salience of the inevitable differences within a society and thus produce a basically homogeneous political culture (Lijphart, 1971). For instance, Truman (1951) points out that the stability of a heterogeneous or complex society, to a large extent,

depends on "multiple memberships." Lipset (1973) made the point even clearer when he stated that "the chances for a stable democracy are enchanced to the extent that groups and individuals have a number of cross-cutting, politically relevant affiliations" (p. 37). Finally, Coser (1956) made the point more vividly when he argued that

> the multiple group affiliations of individuals make for a multiplicity of conflicts criss-crossing society. Such segmental participation, then, can result in a kind of balancing mechanism, preventing deep cleavages along one axis (pp. 78-79).

To the extent that the above is valid, it can also be argued that in a social structure where the major cleavages coincide and reinforce one another, there will more likely be a total and uncomplicated devotion to the position of the group and an intolerance of opposing groups. This is very true of Nigeria. As Diamond (1982) pointed out, it was "the progressive polarization of conflict between competing sectional parties that signficantly contibuted to the failure of the first Nigerian republic" (p. 30).

8. The Equitable or Balanced Development Approach

This approach, widely held by politicians of third world countries, claims that the problem of integration in the new states can be resolved by providing equal development for all ethnic regions. This thesis is widely held by most African leaders, politicians, and intellectuals, is best expressed by Busia (1967), a Ghanian sociologist and former Prime Minister of Ghana, when he stated that:

> if the regions of a state (within a country) are more evenly developed, and the people are able to share adequately in the government of their own areas, tribalism will cease to be a divisive force (and a threat to national unity)(p. 121).

Osei-Kwame (1980) has warned that while this approach may be tempting and probably justifiable on the basis of local knowledge, "the problems involved in the logistics and financing of 'equal development of all ethnic regions' means that the resolution of integration problem through equal development is unrealizeable in the immediate future" (p. 33).

9. Consociational Democratic Theory

Among the foremost proponents of this theory are Apter (1961), Lehmbruch (1967), Bluhn (1970), Idem (1971, 1975), and Lijphart (1968, 1969, 1971, 1975, 1977, 1979). Apter (1961) coined and used the term "consociational democracy" in the context of African political systems. He sees it as a type of democracy that works in a political system that is willing "to accomodate a variety of groups of divergent ideas in order to achieve a goal of unity." He describes it as "essentially a system of compromise and accommodation" (pp. 24-25, 474-475, and 477-478). He added that, if suitably divised and genuinely implemented, consociational democracy can render conflict into effective government by distributing power among relevant political groups.

Lijphart has developed the most systematic and comprehensive theory of consociational democracy. Like Apter, Lijphart's (1969) concept of consociational democracy calls for the formulation of nondivisive and accommodative solutions to most political issues facing plural societies, while recognizing the necessity of transcending cleavage lines on some critical occasions. Lijphart's approach is what Esman (1973) refers to as "balanced pluralism." Alternative terms are "proportionalism" used by Lehnbruch (1967) in a study of Austria and Switzerland, and "contractarianism," used by Bluhn (1970) in his study of Austria.

Lijphart (March, 1971) asserts that political stabiilty in culturally fragmented systems depends "not so much on any particular institutional arrangement as on the overarching cooperation at the elite level" to counteract the centrifugal tendencies of cultural fragmentation. It is this pattern of mass culture and elite behavior that Lijphart attached the term "consociationalism."

In his 1977 book Democracy in Plural Societies, Lijphart identified four major characteristics or principles of consociational democracy. They are:

1. Government by a grand coalition of the political leaders of all significant segments of the plural society,

2. The mutual veto or "concurrent majority" rule,

3. Proportionality as the principal standard of political representation, civil service appointments, and allocation of public funds, and

4. A high degree of autonomy for each segment to run its own internal affairs (segmental autonomy).

Lijphart (1977) also attempted to identify those social structures and political cultures which are conducive to the development of consociational politics. These favorable conditions include:

1. A multiple balance of power among the subcultures,

2. A moderate multiparty system,

3. Distinct lines of cleavage between the subcultures or segments,

4. Small or moderate size,

5. Overarching loyalties which serve to provide cohesion for the society as a whole and thus moderate the intensities of all cleavages simultaneously, and

6. Prior existence of a tradition of elite accommodation.

Kemeny and others (1966), elaborating on the grand coalition or elite consensus which Lijphart used as the central theme of this theory, pointed out that elite consensus is possible when authoritative allocations are made by maximal coalitions. To Kemeny and his coauthors:

> A coalition is maximal when it includes all possible winning coalition in the society, and there is no winning coalition that is not a member of the maximal coalition....If S is the set of all possible winning coalitions, then the maximal coalition M is that coalition such that S is included in M (pp. 79-80).

For maximal coalition to remain as such, Kemeny et al. point out that allocative decisions must be made in a way that no one member is left worse off. This, they believe, would be the case, when, as a minimum condition, allocations in a political system are made in direct proportion to the relative size of the different coalitions.

Like the other theories of political integration, the approach provided us by Lijphart has its own limitations. Lijphart (1971) himself pointed to the major disadvantages of consociationalism when he stated that "the price to be paid for a system of participation by all 'elites', mutual veto, autonomy, and proportionality is inevitably a certain amount of inefficiency, slowness, and lack of decisiveness" (p. 14). He also accepted that consociationalism is an expensive type of government since subcultural autonomy will require the multiplication of the number of governmental and administrative units and other institutions and separate facilities. Furthermore, mutual veto has the disadvantage of may be used in blocking or delaying the adoption of socially, politically, and economically desirable policies.

However, in spite of the disadvantages inherent in the consociational democratic approach to national integration, it has alot of merit and appeal and possible applicability to achieving political integration

in Nigeria and other African states if it can honestly be implemented. This is because the theory accepts the existence, in developing places such as found in Africa, the relative weakness of popular national sentiments. On the basis of this reality, it stipulates that it is necessary and sufficient that there be processes within the society capable of effecting elite accommodation and that elite accommodation be reflected in mass support through proportional representation and in the authoritative allocations of values.

Furthermore, consociationalism has been supported by the factor analytic findings of Morrison and Stevenson (1972). These findings were that:

> (1) Turmoil, elite, and communal instability are related types of violence in political systems; (2) turmoil is a localized response to the failure to achieve a signficant redistribution of rewards in political systems which have experienced elite or communal instability; and (3) communal instability in Africa is a response on the part of the communal groupings in national populations (i.e., our 'pluralistic security community') to elite stability which either fails to bring about a reapportionment of ethnic representation in government or which effects a too radical reapprotionment (p. 366).

Finally, the consociational model can be considered as being compatible with a variety of structural sociopolitical forms--the single-party state, the multiparty system, and with the no-party state. It is also compatible with the situation found in traditional societies, and even with a military regime where parties have been banned, with preferably some form of proportional representation (Dudley, 1976). The consociational approach, however, is not compatible with the bi-party system where the two parties stand in counter-position and where governing takes on the characteristic of a zero-sum game" (Dudley, 1976, p. 34).

Besides the theories we have examined above, Ake (1967) also has identified the work of a number of classical sociologists which, though do not offer us an articulated theory of social and political integration, no doubt provides us with insights into the processes and problems of national integration. These classical social theorists include:

1. Karl Marx - whose works constitute a philosophy of history and from whom we learn how the economic structure of society determines its solidarity.

2. Max Weber - His writings constitute a theory of social evolution. His description of bureaucratic and traditionalistic organizations "represent in effect different types of integration and his analysis of the consequences of these forms of integration illuminate the phenomenon of political integration" (Ake, 1967, p. 39). Weber's analysis also indicates that the regularizing of expectations is an important prerequisite of integration.

3. Henry Maine - developed a status and contract schema. He points out that the movement of progressive societies have been uniform in one basic respect: the tendency for contract to replace status as the basis of association.

4. Ferdinand Toennies - like Maine, argued that there was a universal movement from social order based on consensus of wills and nourished by mores and religion to a social order based on convention and agreement. Toennies (1940) refers to all associations in which natural will predominants as "Gemeinschaft," and all those which are formed and "fundamentally conditioned by rational will, Gesellschaft" (p. 19). Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft are ideal types and they signify "the model qualities of essence and the tendencies of being bound together" (Ibid, pp. 17-18).

5. Herbert Spencer - also developed a theory of social evolution. He distinguished between two types of societies, each of which is characterized by a different principle of integration. The first type is the "military" society where the principle of integration is "compulsory cooperation." The second is the "industrial" society where the principle of integration is voluntary cooperation.

6. Emile Durkheim - distinguishes two types of social solidarity: mechanical and organic. Mechanical solidarity is a feature of lower societies where the social behavior of members are determined by a "common conscience," which is "the totality of beliefs and sentiments common to the average citizen" (Durkheim, 1937, p. 79). In organic solidarity, the focus of interests shifts from the collective conscience to the individual. Durkheim argues that organic solidarity is morally superior and more lasting than mechanical solidarity. Lower societies, he believes, break down easily because they lack resistive force and totality of mutually complementary parts. Thus, Durkheim reminds us, as Ake points out, that "if a society is to be integrated and have resistive force, its component parts must be functionally complementary" (p. 49).

From the above analysis of the various definitions, conditions, and theories of political integration, a number of problems that tend to hinder national integration can be identified. These factors include: multiethnicity and cultural heterogeneity or fragmented political cultures; fears of domination; lack of interaction or transactions between and among the different subunits of a political community; and elite-fragmentation or elite instability. Other problems of integration are: uneven patterns of development; poor leadership and lack of truely national heroes; elite-mass gap; lack of previous

integrative experience and lack of institutionalized or broad-based organizations such as political parties. All these factors and the absence of generally agreed upon approach to achieving national integration indicate that political integration is a very complex phenomenon.

CHAPTER III

BACKGROUND TO NIGERIA

Introduction

A full understanding of the problems of national integration and the analysis developed in this research requires some awareness, comprehension, and insight into the political history of Nigeria. This political history can be given a broad tripartite categorization: precolonialism, colonialism, and postcolonialism. Many readers who are unfamiliar with this background history will find it intriguing and equally interesting and helpful. Others who are familiar with this background may still find it useful to have it recalled as frequent reference will be noted to the salient events that are highlighted in course of analyzing the problems of national integration in the next chapter.

Geography

The Federal Republic of Nigeria is in West Africa--one of the regions in the continent of Africa. It occupies a total land area of about 356,669 square miles (924,000 square kilometers). It lies within the tropics between latitudes 4° and 14° north of the Equator and longitudes 3° and 15° east of the Greenwich Meridian. It is bounded in the west by the Republic of Benin (formerly Dahomey), on the east by the Republic of Cameroun, on the north by the Republic of Niger, and in the south it is washed by the Atlantic Ocean (see Map 1).



Map 1. Nigeria and Her Neighbors

The most conspicuous physical feature of Nigeria is the Niger River whose "Y" shape became the boundries by which Nigeria was divided into three political-administrative sectors--the Northern Region, Western Region, and Eastern Region--up till May 1967 when more states were created out of the three regions.

Ranging from south to north, four vegetational features are distinguishable. Along the coastline to the south is a dense belt of swamp and mangrove forests varying from 10 to 60 miles in width. This area is sparsely populated. To the north of the swamp lies the deciduous or tropical rainforest, from 50 to 100 miles wide. Here are found evergreen trees such as mahoganies and other valuable woods for furniture. Oil-palm bush is also found in this zone. This belt, in turn, yields

further north to a 300-mile-wide belt of open woodland and grass savannah. North of this zone, is a bare, sandy scrub which shades off until the southern Sahara is reached.

The different layers of swamp, trees, and desert correspond to the different layers of climates. Thus, the climate accentuates the north-south contrast. Generally, all Nigeria is hot but the south is very wet half of the year with very high humidity all the time. Rainfall in the south ranges from 100-140 inches a year. In contrast, the north has an average annual rainfall which ranges from 20-40 inches with very low humidity. The north has the typical characteristics of hot dry days and cool or cold nights as you approach places in the extreme north such as Sokoto and Maiduguri (see Map 2). It should be noted that the



Map 2. Vegetative and Rainfall Zones in Nigeria.

geographical differences between the north and the south help to explain the varying impacts of Islam, Christianity, Arabic, and western education upon them.

The estimated population of Nigeria is 80 million, making it the most populous country in Africa. This population is multiethnic with nearly as many as 250 cultural linguistic groups, each with its own language, culture, traditions, customs, and so on. Thus, Nigeria can be considered as a conglomeration of nations or a "nation of nationalities." It is because of these numerous distinct linguistic groups that made Greenberg (1955) to refer to Nigeria as a principal "linguistic crossroads" of Africa.

The three largest ethnic groups in Nigeria are the Hausa-Fulani, who are the dominant group in the north, the Ibo who are the principal group to the east, and the Yoruba who constitute the dominant ethnic group in the west. Other principal ethnic groups include the Kanuri, TIV, Edo, Ijaw, Efik, and Ibibios (see Map 3 and Table I).

The two main religions in the country are Islam and Christianity. Islam has an overwhelming importance and influence in the north, while Christianity predominates in the south. Within the Christian south, the west is mainly Protestants and partly Moslems, while the east is mostly influenced by Catholicism.

PreColonial History

Introduction

> A common history can help hold a nation together, but the most significant general comment that can be made about precolonial history in Nigeria is that it is not Nigerian history but rather the history of different tribes, or, occasionally, groupings of tribes.
>
> Schwarz, 1965



Map 3. Main Tribal Groups in Nigeria

Source: Walter Schwarz. Nigeria. London: Praeger Publishers, 1969, p. ix.

TABLE I

SIZE OF THE FIFTEEN MAJOR ETHNIC GROUPS
IN NIGERIA

Nigeria: Total Population 55,670,555		
Major Ethnic Groups	Size	Percent of Total Population
Hausa	11,652,745	20.9
Yoruba	11,320,509	20.3
Ibo	9,246,388	16.6
Fulani	4,784,366	8.6
Kanuri	2,259,091	4.1
Ibibio	2,006,489	3.6
Tiv	1,393,649	2.5
Ijaw	1,088,885	2.0
Edo	954,970	1.7
Annang	675,004	1.2
Nupe	656,296	1.2
Urhobo	639,251	1.2
Igala	581,551	1.0
Idoma	485,562	0.9
Igbirra	425,783	0.8
Total	48,170,546	86.6

Source: Population Census of Nigeria 1963, Vol. III, Federal Office Statistics. Lagos, pp. 10-11.

The opening statement points to the fact that prior to colonization and the eventual artificial creation of the territorial political unit called Nigeria, there had existed a number of people inhabiting the area but with very limited links and important historical relationships. We do know, however, that the area which came to be called Nigeria had witnessed the rise and fall of a number of important empires and kingdoms prior to colonialism.

In the northern part of Nigeria, which belongs to an area geographically and historically known as the Western Sudan, there had emerged

at different times: the Kanem-Bornu or Kanuri empires, the Hausa States, and the Usman Dan Fodio Jihad of 1804-1814. In the western region was a number of Yoruba kingdoms and states, the most notable being the Oyo Empire and the powerful Benin Kingdom. In the eastern region was a number of semi-autonomous Ibo states. The Niger Delta region also witnessed a number of small states. Each of these states and empires had their own traditional political culture.

For the purpose of having a cross-cut perspective of the different political cultures, the peoples of Nigeria will be treated by region. Within each region only the governmental customs, culture, and political culture of the dominant groups or kingdoms/empires will be discussed fairly in detail. Some of the other principal ethnic groups within the regions will, however, in certain cases, be mentioned and briefly discussed (see Maps 3 and 4).

The Peoples of Northern Nigeria

The Hausa-Fulani are today the dominant group in northern Nigeria and their system of government was basically theocratic. The other principal group is the Kanuri (see Map 4).

The Hausa people trace their origin back to one Bayajidda, a prince of Baghdad, who got married to a queen of Daura. Their descendents founded the seven "true" Hausa states called the Hausa Bakwai prior to colonalism. These states were Biram, Daura, Katsina, Kano, Zaria, Rano, and Gobir. Bayajidda's seven illegal sons also founded seven states in the northern region and were called the Banza Bakwai--the "Bastard" States. These included: Zamfara, Kebbi, Gwari, Yauri, Nupe, Yoruba, and Kwararafa. By the 15th century, these cities had developed



Map 4. Historical Empires that Arose in the 16th Century in the Area Which Came to be Known as Nigeria in 1914.

Source: Adapted and simplified from Michael Crowder. A Short History of Nigeria. New York: Praeger Publishers, 1966, Map 2, p. 38.

into strong kingdoms. It was during this time that the Islamic religion began to penetrate Hausaland (Thatcher, 1974).

By the late 15th century, the Fulanis, who had established themselves in Kano and began paying tributes to the Hausa leaders, soon absorbed the Hausa culture. They, however, eventually succeeded in converting some Hausa chiefs to the Islamic religion. Sooner, the Fulanis, under their local head, Usman Dan-Fodio, under the pretext of reviving the Islamic religious fervor and purifying the Islamic religion among the Hausa, declared a Jihad. He and his followers succeeded in overthrowing the Hausa chiefs. In their places Fulani leaders were installed as local emirs. Ilorin, a Yoruba state, fell to the troops of Alimi, a Sokoto Fulani, in 1817.

The new leaders and emirs were appointed by and owed their allegiance to Fodio and later to his son, Bello, who became the undisputable Sultan of Sokoto. Bello became the political and religious leader of all Islamic Fulani-Hausa Emirates. The Jihad resulted in the creation of the largest empire in northern Nigeria and in reversal of the relationship among the Hausas and Fulanis.

The Fulani empire had its own distinguishing form of political organization. It was composed of 13 emirates in which the emir of each emirate personified both religious and political authority. The emirs were chosen from the royal families and the titled chiefs as well as the traditionl offices of the states were hierarchically organized. According to Sklar and Whitaker (1966), emirate rule was despotic in form because

> The personal security of the commoner depended wholly on the uncertain benevolence of his overlords...The concentration of 'de jure' power and authority in the hands of the emir tended to inhibit any opposition to him, even from those within the ranks of the ruling status (p. 7).

Thus, the Hausa-Fulani Empire was a theocratic dynasty, for the emir claimed unquestioned religious sanctions derived through divine delegation. Here then is "a fusion of the sacred and the secular without constitutionality" (Olorunsola, 1972, p. 7).

The Kanuri people who are found to the east and west of Lake Chad constitute the third largest group in northern Nigeria (see Map 5 and Table II). They built a number of empires known as the Kanem-Bornu Empires before the British colonization of northern Nigeria in 1902-1904. The Kanuri-speaking people had been converted to Islam at the end of the 11th century, before the Hausa. According to Schwarz (1965), "their ties as part of the Kanem-Bornu Empire were with Egypt and north-east coast of Africa, rather than, as the Hausa, with the kingdoms of



Map 5. Principal Ethnic Groups in Northern Region.

Source: James S. Coleman. Nigeria: Background to Nationalism. Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1960. p. 19.

TABLE II

ETHNIC DISTRIBUTION OF NORTHERN REGION'S POPULATION, 1963

Hausa	11,550,975
Fulani	4,767,269
Kanuri	2,258,112
Tiv	1,374,440
Yoruba	1,144,034
Nupe	648,060
Igala	570,276
Idoma	473,944
Gwari	378,144
Igbirra	364,869
Ibo	357,915
Mumuye	294,202
Alago	249,438
Higgi	176,962
Bura	171,861
Chamba	162,326
Shau Arabashuwa	155,514
Kaje	151,992
Jari	146,976
Kambari	145,608
Eggon	143,007
Kobchi	141,194
Angas	137,717
Karekare	128,786
Birom	118,685
Yergan	116,204
Others	3,430,840
Total	29,749,350

the Western Sudan and Morocco" (p. 15). The Kanem-Bornu Empire reached its height in the 16th century under Mai (King) Idris Alooma, during which time the empire even had some control over some of the Hausa city states.

The Kanuri developed a stable and efficient system of government. Islam provided unity and an efficient method of government. At the head

of the central government was the Mai, an hereditary monarch chosen from the Shehu's family. Theoretically, his power was supreme, but in practice he had to take into consideration the advise of his council of twelve nobles--who were responsible for the north, east, south, and west of the empire. Women of the royal family--the Magira (the Mai's mother), the Magara (the Mai's senior sister), and the Gumsu (the Mai's first wife)--had considerable influence and often exercised great power, especially when there was a weak Mai (Thatcher, 1974). While the great office-holders stayed in the capital under the eyes of the Mai, the day-to-day running of the local governments of the empire was delegated to officials called Chimagina. Their responsibilities included maintaining law and order and were expected to remit regularly to the King parts of the revenues they had collected from the Mai's subjects.

The Nupe people is the fourth and smallest of the predominantly Moslem groups in the Northern Region. They are partially localized in the Niger River Valley. Before the Fulani Jihad, a Nuper Kingdom had existed since the 15th century. However, the kingdom was conquered during the Fulani Jihad and was divided among several Fulani states (Coleman, 1960).

The fifth major ethnic group in the former Northern Region of Nigeria is the TIV--who are highly concentrated in south of the Benue River. The TIV are a distinct tribal group who resisted both the Fulani Jihad and the impact of Islam. They never had a central government but have a strong feeling of individuality because of "the conspicuous uniformity of their language and physique, their common customs, and their belief in a common origin" (Coleman, 1960, p. 23). The TIV people were never conquered by the Fulani and were one of the last groups to be pacified by the British in northern Nigeria. The lack of traditional

political institutions made Sklar (1961) refer to the TIVs as an "egalitarian if not anarchistic polity" (p. 10).

The Peoples of Western Nigeria

The Yoruba people are the largest cultural group inhabiting the land south and west of the lower Niger (see Table III and Map 6). They were not, at any time, either in political or commercial contact with the Kanuri who lived to the northeast, or with the Hausa-Fulani to the north, or at least, not until the early 19th century.

TABLE III

ETHNIC DISTRIBUTION OF THE POPULATION OF WESTERN REGION, 1963

Yoruba	9,667,612
Ibo	208,563
Urhobo	101,903
Hausa	63,210
Edo	59,764
Igbirra	45,979
Ijaw	34,718
Fulani	15,439
Isoko	11,844
Tiv	9,754
Efik	7,933
Ibibio	5,500
Nupe	5,347
Itsekiri	3,593
Idoma	2,608
Igala	1,643
Others	3,461
Total	10,248,871

Source: Population Census of Nigeria 1963, Vol. III, Federal Office of Statistics. Lagos, p. 20-21.



Map 6. Principal Ethnic Groups in Western Region.

Source: James S. Coleman. Nigeria: Background to Nationalism. Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1960. p. 19.

The origins of the Yoruba people is shrouded in myth and mystery. However, it is believed that by about 900 A.D. or 1000 A.D., they had already settled in their present abode. Their early history, based on oral tradition, centers on Oduduwa who is believed to have come down from heaven at Ile-Ife and there created earth. Today, Ife remains the spiritual and cultural center of the Yoruba.

The area occupied by the Yoruba witnessed the rise of many Yoruba kingdoms in the 18th century. According to Coleman (1960), during most of the 18th century, the Yoruba people were united into one large kingdom ruled by Old Oyo. But, by 1780, they had been split into four states--Oyo, Egba, Ketu, and Jebu--because of internal conflicts, and by 1850, as a result of the Fulani conquest of Ilorin (a Yoruba state), four new states emerged. These new states were "Ibadan, Ilesha, Ife, and the Ekiti Parapo" (p. 25). This additional fragmentation was a consequence of the devastating internal wars which came to be known as the 19th Century Yoruba Intercine Wars.

Despite the large amount of internal discord and dissonance in the precolonial times, there is a comparatively strong Yoruba consciousness which has persisted because of the strong belief in a common origin.

The Yoruba developed large-scale traditional political arrangements that were urban oriented before the British intrusion. Of all the different systems, the Old Oyo Kingdom which managed to unite all the Yoruba--except the important Ijebu subtribe--during most of the 19th century is the much studied example of a typical Yoruba kingdom.

The Old Oyo Kingdom, like most other Yoruba kingdoms, developed a system of government with a complicated arrangement of checks and balances to prevent any one branch of the government acquiring excessive powers. At the head of the central government was the Alafin, who was

always from one of the royal families. Unlike the Fulani Emir, the powers of the Alafin was not absolute. Other institutions checked his authority.

There was the Council of Ministers known as the Oyo Mesi. This council served as the kingmaker and the supreme council of state. They have the power of life and death over an Alafin that was becoming too despotic. The Alafin and this council actually ruled over the kingdom.

Next to the Council of Ministers was the Ogboni Cult, a secret religious society whose responsibility it was to approve all decisions of the Oyo Mesi and to mediate between the Alafin and the Oyo Mesi when there was a conflict.

Finally, there was the Esos--the warlords who were appointed by the Oyo Mesi and who were responsible for the raising of troops to defend and expand the frontiers of the empire. The head of the Esos and the military was the Are-Ona-Ka-Kanfo, the field marshal. Much of the administrative work of the empire was carried out by palace chiefs (Thatcher, 1974). The system of government of the Yoruba states has been referred to as a constitutional monarchy. As Olorunsola (1972) rightly pointed out, "the (Yoruba) Obas were limited, hence, they could not afford to be despotic without recrimination" (p. 11).

Another empire which emerged in the west was the Benin Empire founded by the Ebos. It was situated in the southwest of the Yoruba empire in the coastal region. Its center was the city of Benin. By as early as 1400, it was already a powerful state. The Edo people of Benin created a highly developed system of centralized government which survived almost unchallenged until the conquest of Benin by the British in 1897 (Thatcher, 1974).

The Benin Empire adopted a monarchial system of government, at the head of which was the Oba who was considered supreme in all things and was held as a semi-god by his subjects. Like the Alafin of Oyo, he has a council called the Uzama. But, unlike the Alafin, the Oba did not have his power limited by his council which was merely an advisory council. The Uzama could not create or destroy an Oba. The Obaship and the chieftancies in the Benin Empire are inherited by primogeniture. Thus, chiefs tended to serve less as a representatives of their lineages as among the Yoruba and more as privy counselors of the Oba.

The Ijaw people on whom virtually no ethnographic work has been completed, constitute another major ethnic group. They occupy the Niger Delta of western and eastern Nigeria. The tribe is considered as one of the oldest in this area of West Africa. The language possesses little affinity with any other in Nigeria. Their traditional political arrangement is not as structured as those of the Hausa-Fulani, Kanuri, Yoruba, and Edo.

The People of Eastern Nigeria

The Ibos are the dominant tribe in eastern Nigeria (see Map 7 and Table IV). The Ibo people have no large-scale centralized political institutions. Their traditional political system was based on the principle of village democracy. This is why they have been referred to as a segmentary society. Coleman (1960) attributed the highly decentralized political structure of the Ibo people to three major factors:

1. The wide spread dense forest that covers a large part of the eastern region,

2. The absence of invasions or mass migrations which would have induced or compelled them to form large states administered by a

centralized authoritative leadership, and

3. The cultural emphasis upon individual achievement affecting rank status.



Map. 7. Principal Ethnic Groups in Eastern Nigeria.

Source: James S. Coleman. Nigeria: Background to Nationalism. Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1960. p. 29.

Among the Ibo and Ibibio, there were two main institutions of government in each village; the Council of Elders and the village assembly. The Council of Elders was usually composed of the heads of each extended family. In the village assembly all had the right to speak and decisions had to be unanimous. The system of justice was equally democratic and age-set organizations were used to undertake public works (Thatcher, 1974).

TABLE IV

ETHNIC DISTRIBUTION OF EASTERN REGION'S POPULATION

Ibo	7,967,969
Ibibio	1,986,493
Ijaw	786,369
Annang	670,287
Ekoi	342,839
Ogoni	201,747
Efik	132,559
Andoni	83,559
Yalla	53,566
Ukelle	26,106
Eleme	23,441
Ejaghan	17,012
Hausa	15,948
Yoruba	15,272
Isoko	11,601
Igala	8,924
Tiv	8,556
Idoma	8,445
Urhobo	8,268
Edo	6,684
Others	5,865
Total	12,381,510

Source: Population Census 1963, Vol. III.

Stevenson (1968) has pointed out that "leadership and political office among the Ibo...in the precolonial period have been much more largely based on achievement and wealth as opposed to lineage ascription" (p. 200). This emphasis on achievement as a basis of wielding power and authority made Olorunsola (1972) to state that "the Ibo value system heavily rewarded aggressiveness" (p. 11). Thus, an analysis of the traditional political culture of the Ibos, the largest ethnic group in eastern Nigeria, reveals neither a constitutional monarchy nor a

theocracy as was found to characterize the Yorubas and Hausa-Fulanis, respectively. For the Ibos, the value system was one of equalitarianism, individualism, and achievement.

It should be noted that while the social structure of the Ibo and Ibibio are regarded as similar, they do not otherwise possess cultural or linguistic identities (Greenberg, 1955). Other peoples of the eastern region are the Efik, Ijaw, to mention but two. It is important to note that each of the regions discussed above consists of one major ethnic group and several minority ethnic groups (see Map 8).

The foregoing sketch of the political history of Nigeria prior to colonialism, particularly of the major ethnic groups and their traditional political arrangements makes it apparent that Nigeria is an ethnically fragmented country. The ethnic groups are broadly distributed throughout the country. No significant relationships appear to have spanned the entire territory at any time during the period under discussion. Indeed, the few relations that develop tended to be limited to geographically adjacent neighbors. Even those relations were characterized at best by a mixture of antagonism and small-scale trade. It is little wonder then, that Nigeria after twenty-five years of independence is still finding ways by which it can integrate these heterogeneous ethnic groups into a nation-state.

It is this diversity of ethnic groups which characterize Nigeria that led Awolowo (1947) to state:

> Nigeria is not a nation. It is a mere geographical expression. There are no 'Nigerians' in the same sense as there are 'English', 'Welsh', or 'French'. The word 'Nigerian' is merely a distinctive appellation to distinguish those who live within the boundaries of Nigeria from those who do not (pp. 47-48).



KEY

•—•—	Nigerian Boundary
– – – –	Regional Boundaries
YORUBA	Dominant Ethnic Group of Western Region
MW	Minority Ethnic Groups of Western Nigeria
IBO	Dominant Ethnic Group of Eastern Region
ME	Minority Ethnic Groups of Eastern Nigeria
⋰⋰⋰	Minority Areas of Northern Region
Y Y Y	Yoruba Minority Area of Northern Region
N N N	Nupe Minority Area of Northern Region
T T T	Tiv Minority Area of Northern Region
HAUSA FULANI KANURI	Hausa-Fulani and Kanuri Dominant Ethnic Groups of Northern Region

Map 8. Ethnic Majority and Minority Areas of Regions.

From Colonialism to Independence

Introduction

Europeans in the persons of Portuguese had visited the Coast of Guinea by the 15th century. For instance, Coleman (1960) reports that "Portuguese traders and missionaries briefly visited Benin City in the 1480s, and from the latter part of the 15th century until the beginning of the 19th century they exercised an appreciable influence in the Itsekiri Kingdom of Warri" in the Niger Delta (p. 40).

From the 1500s on, most of the leading European nations participated in the lucrative slave trade, and trading posts of one sort or another sprang up along the West African coast. By 1712 the British had secured a virtual monopoly over slave trading on the west coast. However, the British declared slave trade illegal in 1807 and slave trade was finally ended in the 1840s. European traders were, as a result of the abolition, compelled to turn to legitimate trade in other commodities such as palm oil and ivory. By 1826, twelve British merchant ships were reported to have been in the Bonny River in the Eastern Region of Nigeria (Coleman, 1960).

Although British contact with the coast of Nigeria dates back several centuries, British colonization did not formally commence until the annexation of Lagos in 1861, the year that Lagos was ceded to the Crown. And it was not until the beginning of this century (1914) that Nigeria, as a geographical entity, was established by administrative fiat.

From 1861 Annexation of Lagos Up To Amalgamation in 1914

The British colonization process of the territory which later became known as Nigeria took two principal forms:

1. Acquiring jurisdiction through unequal treaties with local rulers (especially in the south), and

2. Outright military conquest of the northern Moslem emirates, using the West African Frontier Force in 1902-1904.

During the same period of the annexation of Lagos, British missionary activities expanded rapidly, especially in Yorubaland, notably Abeokuta, while British trading activities were concentrated in the Niger Delta area and along the Niger River.

In 1879, Sir George Goldier united all the rival companies into the United Africa Company (U.A.C.). The Berlin Conference of 1885 acknowledged British claims to the Niger Basin. In 1886, the United Africa Company acquired a royal charter from the British government which gave it the power "to administer, make treaties, levy customs, and trade in all territories in the basin of the Niger and its affluents" (Perham, 1937, p. 3). The company became known as the Royal Niger Company.

In 1897, the Benin Empire was brutally conquered and incorporated into the Niger Coast Protectorate, thus extending British influence in the middle Niger area. In 1900, the company lost its charter as the British government assumed direct control of the Royal Niger Company. In the same year, the Niger Coast Protectorate became the Protectorate of Southern Nigeria (Coleman, 1960).

The Royal Niger Company, after the conquest of the Benin Empire, had prepared the way for the British advance against the Sokoto Empire

by signing treaties with the Sultan of Sokoto and the Emir of Gwandu and by conquering Nupe and Ilorin in 1817 (Thatcher, 1974). The British government completed the conquest of the Sokoto Empire after which it established the Protectorate of Northern Nigeria with Sir Frederick Lugard as High Commissioner. Lugard, through a mixture of force and persuasion, was able to bring the whole empire under British control between 1901 and 1904.

Faced with limited resources of men and money, and since the vast area already possessed a highly developed and efficient system of administration headed by emirs, Lugard decided to introduce the indirect rule system. Because of the existence of strong, respected traditional rulers, indirect rule worked in the north and enabled the British government to rule the area cheaply and peacefully.

In 1906, the Southern Protectorate was amalgamated with Lagos under the title of the Colony and Protectorate of Southern Nigeria. Finally, in 1914, goaded by economic factors, Lord Lugard amalgamated the two protectorates (Northern and Southern) to form the Colony and Protectorate of Nigeria. This amalgamation gave birth to the country which came to be called Nigeria with Lugard as its first Governor General.

Political and Constitutional Developments from Amalgation (1914) - Independence (1960)

Two years after the amalgamation, a legislative council dominated by whites was established by Lord Lugard. This council was regarded, more or less, as a debating society.

From 1914 to 1919, Lugard also attempted to extend the indirect rule system to the south, but it was a partial success in the west and a total failure in the east where Lugard, finding no traditional chiefs,

created "warrant" chiefs who were very unpopular among the Ibo. Indirect rule was eventually abandoned in the east and replaced by a more democratic system modelled after the British local government. The abandonment was due to the Aba Women's Riot of 1929 which followed an attempt by the created warrant chiefs to impose direct taxation on the people.

The Legislative Council of the Colony, established by Lugard, was very unpopular among the people of the colony because of its extremely limited powers. In order to obtain the advise of responsible members of the community, it became necessary to devise some other means. The result was the abolition of the small council for the colony by order in council in 1922 and in its place was substituted the Clifford's Constitution (Burns, 1964).

The 1922 Clifford's Constitution provided for and established a larger legislative council for the whole country. The council consisted of 26 official members, the Governor as Chairman, 16 unofficial members, and four members elected to represent the municipal areas of Lagos and Calabar. It was during this time that Nigeria witnessed the emergence of its first political party, the Nigerian National Democratic Party (NNDP), founded by Herbert Macaulay.

It is important to note, however, that the legislative council legislated only for the colony and the southern provinces and had no power to legislate or impose taxation in the northern provinces (Burns, 1963). It is also vital to note that during this time,

1. The north had its affairs put under the control of the governor,

2. The council was a mere debating society and a mere appendage to the all powerful governor, and

3. No money could be expended in the northern provinces from the public treasury without the approval of the council.

The national agitation which continued with the formation of the NNDP throughout the 1920s took a significant turn in the 1930s with the formation of the Nigerian Youth Movement (NYM) and the entry of Nnamdi Nzikiwe with his two newspapers into the political arena in 1937. In 1939, because of the vigorous criticism of the British administration, Governor Bourdillon split the country into three regions--North, West, and East--and suggested that the North must be reunited with the South as soon as practicable.

In 1943, Governor Bourdillon was succeeded by Sir Richards. In 1945, there was a country-wide strike organized by the nationalists. The crisis impressed on Richards the urgency for a new constitution to replace the 24 year old Clifford Constitution. Hence, in January 1947 Sir Arthur Richards unilaterally formulated a constitution for the country.

The objective of the constitution was to promote the unity of Nigeria and to provide adequately within that unity for the diverse elements which make the country and to secure greater participation by Nigerians in the decision of their own affairs. To this effect, the consititution provided for a central legislative body to legislate for the entire country, including the northern provinces. Northerners were to be members of the legislative council for the first time. Thus, the idea which Governor Bourdillon expressed in 1939 was translated into action in 1947. For the first time, too, persons (known as "unofficials") other than colonial administrators were to be in a majority in the only national legislative body (Schwartz, 1965).

The new central legislature consisted of 16 official members and 28 unofficial members, three of whom were to be elected from Lagos and

one from Calabar. The constitution also provided for regional houses for the three regions. In addition, a House of Chiefs was established in the north. Thus, the Richards Constitution established for the first time a federal system of government for Nigeria consisting of three regions. It also gave birth to a new political party--the National Council of Nigeria and the Cameroons (NCNC) with Herbert Macaulay as its first president.

In spite of the remarkable progress that the Richards Consitution made, it was bitterly criticized for the lack of any consultation of the people and its arbitrary imposition by the colonial government. Secondly, the legislative body provided for by the constitution was a mere national debating forum. Thirdly, the very nature of the electoral system (that is, nominees of native authorities and chiefs) insured that the various assemblies were unrepresentative of the educated youths.

Moreover, the Richards Constitution made no alteration in the executive branch of the central government; no Nigerians were added to the Governor's Executive Council which held actual powers. Because of these limitations, the nationalists intensified their activities on the colonial administration. For instance, an NCNC team led by Herbert Macaulay and Azikiwe set out on a national tour in 1946 to educate the people to reject the Richards Constitution. They even carried their case to the Secretary of State for the colonies in London.

In 1948, Sir Arthur Richards was replaced by Governor MacPherson who decided to replace the Richards Constitution which was intended to work for nine years, with his own. Obviously, hoping to avoid the problems caused by the failure of Richards to consult Nigerian leaders in 1945 to 1947, MacPherson spent two years in a series of local, provincial, and regional conferences devoted to an exhaustive discussion as

to the form the new constitution should take. The new constitution was presented to the nation in 1951.

The constitution provided for

1. A central house of legislature to be known as the House of Representatives,

2. Two houses--the Houses of Assembly and Chiefs--in both the West and North; and a single house--the House of Assembly--for the East, and

3. An executive council headed by the governor consisting of ministers selected from the regional houses. They were ministers without ministries.

In spite of the long period of consultation, the MacPherson Constitution was vehemently opposed and denounced by the nationalists for certain weaknesses, which included:

1. The absence of the Prime Minister inspite of the provision for an executive council,

2. The ministers at the center were without portfolios, and

3. The ministers were representatives of regional houses--thus their outlook were regional rather than national.

Party hostilities between the northern NPC and southern parties (the NCNC and AG) over the 1953 self-independence motion in the House of Representatives by Chief Enahovo of the AG led to the eventual breakdown of the MacPherson Constitution. MacPherson was recalled to London by the British government in 1953 and was succeeded by Lytelton who had proposed to put into practice all decisions of the conferences that had been held both in London and Lagos to settle the political parties.

The result was the Lytelton Consitution of 1954, which went a little further to satisfy the aspirations of the nationalists. It increased the membership of the central house. Secondly, apart from retaining

the existing houses in the regions, it also established a House of Chiefs in the east. Thirdly, the police and the judiciary were regionalized. Fourthly, it set up an electoral commission to conduct elections in the country. Finally, it alloted ministries to the ministers. Once again, the Lytelton Constitution still left out the post of the Prime Minister. It was not long before the 1954 constitution was found to be unworkable and a series of constitutional conferences were held, both in Nigeria and in London. The May and June 1957 constitutional conferences, held in London and attended by representatives of all political parties in Nigeria, resulted in further constitutional advances for Nigeria (Burns, 1964).

On August 8, 1957, the Eastern and Western regions became self-governing. In 1958, a conference was held in London where it was decided that Nigeria should become independent on October 1, 1960. In the same conference, it was further agreed that the Northern region should become self-governing in 1959, and the post of the Prime Minister was established.

On March 15, 1959, the Northern Region became self-governing and in December there were federal elections to an enlarged House of Representatives and members of a new Senate were appointed. On October 1, 1960, Nigeria became an independent federation consisting of Northern, Western, and Eastern Nigeria (Burns, 1964).

Principal Political Parties at Independence

At the time of independence in 1960, there were three principal political parties corresponding to the three dominant ethnic groups and their different regions. The parties were:

1. The National Council of Nigeria and the Cameroons (NCNC),

2. The Action Group (AG), and

3. The Northern People's Congress (NPC).

The NCNC was an Ibo dominated party and it controlled the Eastern House of Assembly. The AG was the Yoruba answer to the mainly Ibo NCNC and founded by Obafemi Awolowo in 1951 from the Egbe-Omo-Odu-Duwa (formed in 1948), a Yoruba cultural organization. The AG also had a large majority in the Western Region House of Assembly. The NPC was formed from a number of cultural groups in 1951. It is mainly Hausa-Fulani party and it had an overwhelming majority in the Northern Region House of Assembly.

The results of the election held in December 1959 into the Federal House of Representatives were: NPC 142, NCNC 89, AG 72, and Independents 9.

According to Burns (1964), following this elections, because no single party won the majority of seats to enable it form the government "a coalition government was formed of the NPC and the NCNC, with the Action Group as the opposition. It was this government which was in power when Nigeria attained independence" (p. 260). Alhji Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa became the first Prime Minister of the coalition government, while Nnamdi Azikwe, who was the President of the NCNC--the junior partner of the coalition, became the President of the Senate. Azikwe later succeeded Sir James Robertson as the Governor-General of Nigeria on October 16, 1961 (Burns, 1964).

The NPC-NCNC coalition was a strange one. It was referred to as a "marriage of convenience" or as a "marriage of incompatibles." To Schwartz (1965), the coalition brought together the most conservative (the NPC) and one of the then most radical parties (the NCNC) at the federal level. The coalition cannot be said to have been founded

primarily upon a program for the promotion of national unity as both parties had almost diametrically opposed ideologies and political goals. Most people of Nigeria had expected the AG and the NCNC, which had the educated elites with similar values and very similar political goals, to combine against the NPC. At this juncture, two questions might be in order. First, why was it that the NCNC and the AG were unsuccessful at forming a coalition against the NPC? Secondly, what factors brought the NPC and the NCNC together?

The above questions are particularly worth addressing because immediately the results of the 1959 election were formally announced and it was evidenced that no party won a majority to form the federal government, Chief Awolowo was reported to have declared his party's desire to form a coalition government with NCNC. The leadership of such a coalition would have been conceded to Azikiwe, the leader of the NCNC. Awolowo strongly expressed the view that he would rather have a nationalist like Azikiwe lead the country than Balewa, who in 1947, had declared that "Nigerian unity is only a British intention for the country" and that "if the British quitted Nigeria now at this stage the Northern people could continue their interrupted conquest (1814 Jihad) to the sea."[1] Awolowo also alluded to Balewa's response to Azikiwa's motion of 1948 which called for a united Nigerian outlook. Balewa's response to the motion was that many Nigerians

> deceive themselves by thinking Nigeria is one. This is wrong. I am sorry. This presence of unity is artificial and it ends outside this chamber...The southern tribes who are now pouring into the North in ever increasing

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[1]Legislative Council Debates, March 20 to April 2, 1947. Lagos: Government Printer, 1947, p. 212.

> numbers...do not mix with the northern people in social matters and we in the North look upon them as invaders.[1]

However, Awolowo's plans did not materialize. While the refusal of the NCNC to accept Awolowo's proposals has been attributed to the fact that he was suspected of duplicity (Nwankwo and Ifejika, 1969), the truth of the matter was that the answer to the first question above can be best explained by the early rivalry between the Yorubas and the Ibos. In other words, the answer lies in the intensity of the interpersonal, interregional, interethnic, and interparty competition between the Ibos and the Yorubas for federal services and political leadership of the country. This rivalry is traceable to the 1940s.

The people of Western Nigeria, especially the Yoruba's, were the first to embrace western religion and education because of their proximity to the coast. The advantages of this early contact with Europeans were enormous as the Yorubas acquired western education and consequently were to hold an overwhelming majority of higher positions in the Nigerian Civil Service and in business firms. Similarly, until the emergence of the NCNC in the 1940s, the Yorubas had a near monopoly over modern political activities in Nigeria (Coleman, 1960).

However, western influence later spread to the Eastern Region of Nigeria as churches, schools, and other institutions of learning were being built. The Ibos, the dominant ethnic group in the East, absorbed western education so rapidly that by the early 1930s, the disparity between the West (the Yorubas) and the East (the Ibos) had virtually disappeared. According to Schwarz (1965), by the late 1930s, "there were more Ibos than Yorubas at most of the important Nigerian schools"

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[1]Legislative Council Debates, March 4, 1948, p. 227.

(p. 67). With the rapid acquisition of western education, the Ibos moved very fast as tough competitors for jobs which the Yorubas had held almost exclusively for the past three decades through their earlier access to education. The Yorubas, according to Coleman (1960), expressed fear of what they called Ibo domination--actually the Ibo challenge. The Yoruba intellectuals responded to the Ibo challenge with tribal nationalism. First, with the formation of the cultural association, Egbe-Omo-Oduduwa and, second, by the emergence of the AG as a political party under the leadership of Obafemi Awolowo as the champion of Yoruba nationalism. The AG became the first great rival of Azikiwa for national political power.

The Yoruba fear of possible Ibo domination was expressed as early as 1940 by Chief Awolowo when he stated, "it seemed clear to me that (Azikiwe) policy was to corrode the self respect of the Yoruba people as a group; to build up the Ibo as a master race."[1] In 1948, Sir Adeyemo Alakiya, the President of the Egbe-Omo-Oduduwa, echoed the same fear expressed by Awolowo when he stated at the inauguration of the association at Ile-Ife, "The Big Tomorrow...(for the Yoruba) is the future of our children....How they will hold their own against other tribes of Nigeria. How the Yorubas will not be relegated to the background in the future."[2]

By late 1948, the tension between the Yorubas and Ibos in Lagos had reached a breaking point as the conflict nearly led to violence. According to Schwarz (1965), at this time, both groups prepared by pur-

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[1]Quoted in Nigeria: The Seeds of Disaster, by John Hatch. Chicago: Henry Regnery Company, 1970. p. 242.

[2]Quoted by Coleman, 1960, p. 346.

chasing all avaliable machetes. It need be pointed out that the fear of the nonIbos in Lagos, especially the Yorubas, can be justified by certain arrogant and tribalistic utterances of Nnamdi Azikiwe. For instance, in his presidental address at the first Ibo State Union (a quasi-political wing of the NCNC) Conference in 1949, Azikiwe made the following statement:

> It would appear that the God of Africa has specially created the Ibo nation to lead the children of Africa from the bondage of the ages...The martial prowess of the Ibo nation at all stages of human history has enabled them not only to conquer others but also to adapt themselves to the role of preserver...The Ibo nation cannot shirk its responsibilities from its manifest destiny.[1]

Thus the Ibos came into conflict with the Yorubas in two ways: 1) the spread of Ibos all over Nigeria (following their rapid acquisition of western education) including Yoruba cities which challenged the job opportunities and other economic interests of the Yorubas, and 2) the Ibo challenge of the established political interests of the Yorubas (Schwarz, 1965). It was the rivalry and the intensity of the competition between the Yorubas and the Ibos which led to ethnic hostility and distrust between the groups which made it very difficult for the NCNC (the party of the Ibos) to combine together with the AG (the party of the Yorubas) to form a coalition government at the central level.

To the second question (what brought the NPC and the NCNC together) can be explained in terms of a "national consequence of the animosity that both the NPC and the NCNC felt toward the AG because of its efforts to create new states or regions and stir up minority fears in their home regions" (Schwarz, 1965, pp. 112-113). Finally, it has been argued that

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[1]Nnamdi Azikiwe, West African Pilot, July 6, 1949, quoted in Coleman (1960), p. 347.

Azikiwe agreed to enter into a coalition with the NPC to form the central government because if the NCNC and the AG had arrayed themselves in a coalition against the NPC, the latter would have seceeded. Thus, Nigeria would have ceased to exist as a country.

The NPC-NCNC coalition was a shaky one throughout its duration. It was finally split apart in 1965 following rivalry and attempts by by each of the coalition partners to politically outmaneuver the other so as to win control of the federal government. But, the last straw that broke the camel's back was the controversy over the census figures of 1962-1964. The NCNC vehemently opposed the figures of the 1962 elections and of the 1963-1964 recount. It was here the party came at direct confrontation with the NPC--the senior partner of the coalition. We wish to point out that the Ibos (the NPP) were also in a coalition partnership with the NPN (an Hausa-Fulani party) in the Second Republic. As in the First Republic, the coalition was a complete failure.

Political Trends in Nigeria From Independence to the Present

The independence Nigeria won from the British on October 1, 1960 was one surrounded by many unresolved malintegrative forces. These included:

1. The fears of the people from the minority areas under the domination of the majority ethnic groups,

2. The federal system composed of three regions, in which, one region, the North, was bigger and, therefore, commanded more seats in the Federal House, than the other regions combined, and

3. The tribalistic outlook of the politicians as well as their political parties.

Act one of the drama was the 1962 crisis of the Western Region House of Assembly. In this year, the internal party upheaval between Awolowo, the leader of the AG who resigned his premiership in the West to become the opposition leader at the center, and his deputy and successor, Chief Akintola, reached a climax. The Executive Committee of the Action Group called upon Chief Akintola to resign as Premier of the West after "finding him guilty of maladministration, antiparty activities, and indiscipline" (Schwarz, 1965, p. 135). Chief Akintola refused to resign and the Governor revoked his appointment as Premier and appointed in his stead Alhaji D. S. Adegbenro.

On May 25, 1962, the supporters of Akintola disrupted the Regional House that was convened in order to approve the appointment of Alhaji Adegbenro. According to Schwarz (1965), as soon as the House was convened, three words, "Mr. Speaker, Sir..." had hardly been spoken when,

> Suddenly an Akintola supporter jumped on his bench and leapt through the room, shouting 'fire, smoke, fire... fire on the mountain'. Fighting immediately broke out, punches were traded, and chairs, thrown; the speaker was nearly decapitated with the symbolic mace and order was not restored until the police entered and cleared the room with tear gas (p. 37).

The Awolowo faction wanted to reconvene the House so as to complete the formalities of replacing Chief Akintola. Accordingly, they requested police protection from the Prime Minister Tafawa Balewa, but the latter refused. The second meeting convened was also disrupted by Akintola's supporters and had to be dispersed just like the first incident.

Following the breakdown of the Action Group controlled government in the Western Region because of the crisis within the party, the Prime Minister declared a state of emergency on the region on May 29, 1962.

The affairs of the region were, for six months, placed under the management of an administrator, Dr. A. M. A. Majekodumi.

Later in 1962, Chief Obafemi Awolowo (the opposition party leader at the center), with whom members of his factions of the AG (and that of Akintola) had been put under restrictions, were rounded up and charged with conspiracy to commit treasonable felony. Akintola was released from restriction, left the AG, and formed a new party (the United People's Party--UPP) at the end of the year when the emergency ended. Akintola was later restored to office by the Federal Government as Premier of Western Region without election (Schwarz, 1965).

Awolowo and his leading party members were tried for the felony charges and were found guilty of the offense and sentenced to jail for periods ranging from 15 to 20 years. Schwarz (1968) points out that "the trial was the central political event of the Balewa regime and Awolowo's conviction marked the end of effective constitutional opposition" (p. 128).

The act in 1962 closed with a controversial national census which was rejected outright by the NCNC and the AG. This rejection led to a fresh count in 1963 which put the population of Nigeria at 55.6 million; made up of 29.9 million from the North, 12.3 million from the East, 10.2 million from the West, 2.6 million from the MidWest (formerly a part of the Western Region), and 0.6 million from Lagos. These numbers were also rejected by the NCNC and AG parties on grounds that they were inflated but the Prime Minister, himself a northerner, quickly announced the figures as the officially accepted population for the country before opposition to them became intensified.

On October 1, 1963, the country became a republic and Nnamdi Azikiwe became the first Nigerian President--a mere constitutional president.

In the same year, amidst bitter oppositions from the AG (the coaltion government, in order to destroy Awolowo politically) the Mid-West was created from the West as the fourth region, while the East and bigger North were left intact. Chief Dennis Osadebey became the administrator until January, 1964, when he was elected as the Premier of the Mid-Western Region.

In 1964, another act was opened with the general workers strike, the census controversy--"a bitter tribal arguement which wrecked the alliance of the Northern (NPC) and Eastern (NCNC) parties" (Schwarz, 1968), and the federal general elections in which a new line-up, with both the popular parties of the South (the AG and NCNC) now ranged against the Northern establishment. There was the TIV riots in the middle belt whereby the military had to be called in to quell the spreading revolt.

Before the 1964 elections, the major political parties had regrouped themselves into two. The NCNC and the AG formed themselves into the United Progressive Grand Alliance (UPGA), while the NPC and the newly formed Nigerian National Democratic Party (NNDP) formed an alliance known as the Nigerian National Alliance (NNA). It should be noted that the new NNDP was formed in March 1964 in the name of Yoruba and Western Region interests. According to Schwarz (1965), "it brought together in the Western House of Assembly Akintola's United People's Party and 14 NCNC members of the Assembly who resigned from the NCNC" (p. 142).

Then came the elections. The results were rejected by the UPGA for alleged irregularities. The crisis that followed almost broke the

Federation apart, but an uneasy compromise reached by the two parties saved the Republic.

There then opened the final act, the last straw that was to break the camel's back. This was the 1965 Western Region election, "the final, desperate attempt of the Southern alliance to win power by constitutional means" (Schwarz, 1968, p. 128). But, the elections were "super" rigged by the NNA which then formed the government. Its failure, and amidst the bitterness of a rigged election, the UPGA, under Alhaji Dauda Adegbenro, formed an alternative government in the same Western Region. This unusual event was followed by wide spread chaos in the West; burning of houses and looting, during which many hundreds of people lost their lives. The chaos continued for months and was spreading to Lagos, the capital. It was apparent that law and order had completely broken down in the West. In the face of this more serious threat compared to the 1962 disorder in the Western Region Assembly, the Prime Minister refused to declare a state of emergency in the West because his political party alliance was in power in that region.

It was during this very explosive situation in the country, particularly the spreading chaos in the West, that led directly to the coup d'etat of January 5, 1966. This coup claimed the lives of prominent Nigerian politicians and top military officers. Among those killed were: the Prime Minister, Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa; the Premiers of both the North (the Saudana of Sokoto) and the West (Chief S. L. Akintola); the Federal Minister of Finance, Chief Okotie-Eboh; Bridagier Maimalari and Ademulegun; Lieutenant Colonels Pam, Largema, and Arthur Unegbu; and so on.

The coup planners and executioners were mainly Ibo-speaking from the Eastern Region and all but one of those killed in the coup were

nonIbo-speaking. This tended to confirm the sectionalist image of the coup. On the whole, 27 people were known to have been killed in the coup (Dudley, 1982, p. 80).

Major General Aguiyi Ironsi, the man who foiled the coup, became the head of the new military government. Ironsi, himself, was an Ibo. As soon as he assumed power, Ironsi, on May 24, promulgated Decree No. 34 making the country a unitary system in spite of strong opposition from Northerners who had expressed fears that the coup was organized to get rid of northern political leaders so that the Ibos could dominate the country.

The reaction in the North to Decree No. 34 was swift and violent. By May 28, killings of Ibos which started in Kano had spread throughout northern Nigeria. Hundreds of Ibo people were killed by thugs in the Sabon gari--the "strangers quarter"--of the major cities in the north where the Ibos lived (Schwarz, 1968). At this point, Ironsi was showing signs of loosing control. In a desperate attempt to do something, Ironsi started a tour of the regions amidst expectations of a counter coup. He was never to return.

On July 29, 1966, Northern military officers organized and executed a counter coup. Major General Aguiyi Ironsi, then touring parts of the Western Region, and his host, Lieutenant Colonel Adekunle Fajuyi, the military governor of the West, and many Ibo army officers were killed in this second coup.

On August 1, 1966, Lieutenant-Colonel Yakubu Gowon--a Northerner and then the Chief of Staff (army)--assumed the control of the country and as the Supreme Commmander of the Nigerian Armed Forces. He promised to restore peace and harmony to the country. But the killing of Ibo people continued in the North up till September 1966. One of the first

actions of Gowon on assuming office was the abrogation of the controversial Decree No. 34 establishing a unitary system. He then reverted to the federal system of government. He also released political prisoners, including Chief Obafemi Awolowo (on August 4) who then was serving a ten year jail term. Gowon later on set up a steering committee to recommend to him the type of constitutional government that would be most suitable for the country. The committee could not achieve any progress owing to the withdrawal of the eastern region delegation from the conference on the grounds that they were not safe in the country. The search for peace and harmony continued with the January 4, 1967 meeting of all Nigerian leaders at Aburi, Ghana, but peace was still eluded the country.

On May 27, 1967, Major General Gowon broke the country into 12 states and later appointed military governors for 11 of the 12 states. Mr. Ukpabi Aska, a civilian, was appointed administrator for the East Central state, the 12th state. The decree divided the North into six separate states, something "southern politicans had been trying for decades to do--and what the Sardauna had so fiercely resisted. It ended an administration that had been unified since the Holy War of Usman Dan Fodio in 1817" (Schwarz, 1968, p. 233).

On May 30, 1967, the former Eastern Region, formerly seceeded declaring itself an independent country under the name the "Republic of Biafra" with Lieutenant Colonel Emeka Ojukwu as the "Head of State".

In order to thwart the Ibo efforts at disintegrating the country, Gowon, in his capacity as commander-in-chief of the Nigerian Armed Forces, on July 6, 1967 ordered the Nigerian Forces to enter the Eastern Region. This marked the beginning of what came to be known as the Nigerian Civil War, a war which lasted for thirty months.

On January 9, 1970, the rebel leader, Emeke Ojukwu, in a dramatic move, fled the country, leaving his dream republic (the "Republic of Biafra") under the control of his second in command--Lieutenant Colonel Phillip Effiong. The civil war ended on January 12, 1970, when Colonel Effiong handed over the so-called Biafra to General Yakubu Gowon with the following statement:

> I, Major-General Phillip Effiong, officer administrating the (ill-fated) government of the Republic of Biafra now wish to make the following declaration:
>
> (a) That we affirm we are loyal Nigerian citizens and accept the authority of the federal military government of Nigeria.
>
> (b) That we accept the existing administration and political structure of the federation of Nigeria.
>
> (c) That any future constitutional arrangement will be worked out by representatives of the people of Nigeria
>
> (d) That the Republic of Biafra hereby ceases to exist. (Dudley, 1976, pp. 81-82).

The above "statements of surrender" formally brought the Republic of Biafra to an unceremonious end.

Gowon received the declaration and replied with the greatest magnonimity, that in the war, there are "no victors no vanquished." He immediately initiated the policies of rehabilitating and reconciling the people, as well as reconstructing the damaged roads, bridges, installations, and institutions in the country.

Later, in 1970, Gowon announced a "nine-point program" of transition to handing over power to a civilian government in 1976. But, on October 1, 1976, he announced to the astonishment of the country that it would be "unrealistic" for the military to hand over power in 1976 as earlier promised. He did not promise an alternative date for possible handover of government to a civilian administration (Dudley, 1982).

On the 29th of July, 1975, after about nine years of rule, General Gowon, himself, was overthrown in a "palace coup." He was succeeded

by Brigadier Murtala Muhammed, himself a northerner. Murtala promised to return the country to a civilian rule. To achieve this objective, he soon set up a constitution drafting committee. He also created more states, changing the 12 state structure to 19 states in the federation. Of the 19 states, 10 are in the former Northern Region (see Map 9).

On February 15, 1976, Brigadier Murtala Muhammed was assassinated in an abortive coup led by Colonel Dimka. Muhammed was succeeded by his second in command, Lieutenant General Olesegun Obasanjo (a Yoruba) who became "the fourth military person to take over the Head of State and Commander-in-Chief in ten years after the coup which had first brought the military to power" (Dudley, 1982, pp. 83-84).

The Obasanjo administration basically followed the policy outlines laid down during the Muhammed era. At the end of September 1978, the decree which imposed a state of emergency in May 1967 was abrogated. This permitted the formation of political parties to contest the forthcoming elections. Five parties: the National Party of Nigeria (NPN); Unity Party of Nigeria (UPN); Nigerian People's Party (NPP); Great Nigerian People's Party (GNPP); and People's Redemption Party (PRP), were approved to contest the elections. In July/August 1979 elections were held into the newly created office of the Executive President; the state governors, and the National Assembly and State Assemblies.

On October 1, 1979, General Obasanjo formally handed over power to the newly elected Executive President, Alhaji Shehu Shagari, and thus began what came to be referred to as the Second Federal Republic of Nigeria, after 13 years of military rule.

However, on December 31, 1983, because of rigged elections (of August/September 1983) and killings during the elections, the worsening

Map 9. Nigeria as a Federation of Nineteen States.

Source: Federal Nigeria, Vol. 4, No. 1 (July-August-September, 1978), p. 16..

economic situation, corruption and ineptitude of the Shagari administration, and increasing unemployment and the potential atmosphere of political instability, the military staged another comeback. This brought to an end not only the Shagari's administration which was three months into its second term (after the first term of four years), but also the Second Republic of Nigeria. Major General Mohammadu Buhari (a Northerner) became the head of the new Federal Military Government with effect from January 1, 1984.

CHAPTER IV

THE MAJOR NIGERIAN POLITICAL PARTIES AND THE PROBLEMS OF NATIONAL INTEGRATION

Introduction

> Political parties are regarded as institutions characteristic of modern demmocracy; they are also considered to be indispensible for its success and survival...They serve as instruments (of integration) to integrate interests, to provide leadership, and to facilitate a periodic choice of alternatives by the common man.
>
> Coleman 1955, p. 225

> On several counts the task of African parties in promoting national integration in particular is both more difficult and more necessary than it would be in any other part of the world. Achieving independence with a lower stable level of national integration within the existing political units..., all African countries south of the Sahara are in grave need of forces which can actively promote their unity. In a number of these countries political parties have played a central and invaluable role in speeding and consolidating the process of integration... In some instances parties have impeded rather than advanced integration, notably where their guiding star was tribalism or regionalism rather than nationalism...
>
> Emerson 1966, p. 267

The thesis of this study is that the major political parties in Nigeria during the first Republic were not broad-based national parties. In fact, they were ethnoregionally based. This particularistic nature of the parties made them to impede the process of national integration in Nigeria. In investigating this proposition, the discussion in this

chapter is structured in terms of the specific dimensions outlined in the analytical framework developed in Chapter I.

Identifying The Major Political Parties In Nigeria Up To 1966, And In The 1979 Elections

The real decisive factor--the precipitant--in the formation of political parties in Nigeria has been attributed to increased nationalist movements in the country, particularly, immediately after World War II. As Hodgkin (1954) succinctly stated:

> In Nigeria, as elsewhere in emergent Africa under British or French rule, nationalist pressures quickened the pace of constitutional advance which in turn stimulated the development of political parties (p. 13).

At the time of the first military coup that brought the First Republic of Nigeria to an end on January 15, 1966, 81 political parties were in existence (Peil, 1976). In May 1966, all 81 political parties were dissolved by the military government. Table V presents some of these political parties, their leaders and their main areas of operation. Of the 81 parties in the First Republic, three were often been considered as the major political parties by virtue of their leadership size, the size of their membership, and control over one of the three, and later four, regions in the country.

The three major parties in the First Republic of Nigeria were:

1. The National Council of Nigeria and the Cameroons which later became known, as from 1961, as the National Council of Nigerian Citizens (NCNC).
2. The Northern People's Congress (NPC), and
3. The Action Group (AG).

TABLE V

MAJOR POLITICAL PARTIES OF THE
FIRST REPUBLIC OF NIGERIA

Initials	Name	Leader	Main Area of Operation
*AG	Action Group	Chief Obafemi Awolowo	west
BYM	Bornu Youth Movement	M. Abba Gana	northwest
DP	Dynamic Party	Dr. Chike Obi	east
MDF	Mid-West Democratic Front	Apostle John Edokpolor	midwest
MGA	Mobolaje Grand Alliance	Alhaji Adelabu	west
*NCNC	National Council of Nigerian Citizens	Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe	east
NDC	Niger Delta Congress	Harold Biriye	southwest
NEPU	Northern Elements Progressive Union	Alhaji Aminu Kano	north
NNDP	Nigerian National Democratic Party	Chief Samuel L. Akintola	west
NNA	Nigerian National Alliance	(NPC-NNDP coalition)	north/west
*NPC	Northern People's Congress	Sir Ahmadu Bello	north
NPF	Northern Progressive Front	(NEPU-UMBC coalition)	north
---	Otu Edo	Chief Omo-Osagie	midwest
SWAFP	Socialist Workers and Farmers Party	Dr. Tunji Otegbeye	south
UMBC	United Middle Belt Congress	Joseph Tarka	middle belt (southern part of Northern Nigeria)
UPGA	United Progressive Grand Alliance	(AG-NCNC coalition)	south

*Three major Parties

Source: Margaret Peil, Nigerian Politics, p. 100.

In the Second Republic--October 1, 1979 to December 31, 1983--the five parties that qualified for registration and which contested the elections held in July/August 1978 can be considered as major political parties. Out of about 150 political associations that were formed at

the end of 1978 in which 50 applied for registration as political parties, only 5 met the electoral decree provision of January 1978 that a political association must have headquarters in 13 of the 19 states to be registered as a political party by the Federal Electoral Commission (FEDECO).

The five parties that were registered and which contested the July/August 1979 elections were:

1. The National Party of Nigeria (NPN),
2. The Unity Party of Nigeria (UPN),
3. The Nigerian People's Party (NPP),
4. The Great Nigeria People's Party (GNPP), and
5. The People's Redemption Party (PRP).

The Scope, Nature, and Political Bases of the Major Political Parties In the First Republic

In determining whether or not the major political parties in Nigeria were broad-based or national in scope, certain indicators will have to be examined. These variables are:

a. The ethnic composition of the leadership of each of the major parties,

b. The regional composition of the leadership group of each of the parties,

c. The communal bases of political support of each of the major parties in situations of interparty competition, and

d. The electoral returns for each of the major parties in regional and federal elections from 1951 to 1965 and in the 1979 elections.

If the ethnic and regional composition of the political parties are a representation of a broad cross-section of the plural society of Nigeria, if the communal bases of the parties' support and electoral returns show a crossethnic or regional lining, then the political parties can be regarded as broad based and national in scope. In such a situation the political parties should be able to play a vital integrative function in Nigeria.

On the other hand, if the variables examined point to the contrary--particularistic tendencies--such as ethnoregional composition of the parties' leadership, ethnic and regional support of a particular party in cases of interparty competition and elections, then the political parties cannot be considered as national in scope. Under such conditions, the parties are most likely to constitute an obstacle to efforts at national integration in Nigeria.

Before examining the above variables to determine the scope, nature, and political basis of the major political parties in Nigeria, it should be recalled that the Richards Constitution of 1946 divided Nigeria into three "unequal" regions. These were the North, East, and Western Regions. Each region was dominated by a particular ethnic group. The Hausa-Fulani in the North, the Yorubas in the West, and the Ibos in the East. Each of these regions were also comprised of several minority groups.

The Richards Constitution marked and set in motion regional politics in Nigerian political life. The growth of political parties naturally followed regional/ethnic divisions. One of the major parties dominated each region and the party, in turn, was dominated by the predominant linguistic group in that region. It was the Action Group (AG) and the Yorubas in the Western Region, the National Council of Nigerian Citizens

(NCNC) and the Ibos in the Eastern Region, and the Northern People's Congress (NPC) and the Hausa-Fulanis to the Northern Region. This prevailing situation can be summed up thus:

Northern Region = NPC = Hausa-Fulani
Western Region = AG = Yorubas
Eastern Region = NCNC = Ibos

The origin of the major political parties was discussed in the closing section of Chapter III and will not be discussed here.

It should be remembered that the minorities in these regions responded to their dominance by the major ethnic group and their political parties by forming their own ethnic parties and demanded that states be created for them. This led to the emergence of 81 political parties in January 1966 when the military seized power and dissolved all political parties in the country.

In examining, comparatively, the ethnic and regional distribution of the political leadership of the major political parties in 1960, Tables VI and VII reveal that the top leadership groups of all parties reflect their ethnic and regional foundations. The NPC, in accordance with its motto "One North One People," was made up only of northern tribes and the largest single group in the party leadership is the Fulani-Hausa who also constitute the dominant ethnic group in northern Nigeria.

Similarily, the AG, in spite of its incursion into minority areas in the Eastern and Northern Regions, had as its ethnic and regional core of leadership, essentially the Yorubas of western Nigeria. This ethnic group constituted 68.2% of the party leadership.

Furthermore, the NCNC party leadership was dominated by the Ibos of the Eastern Region. The Ibos are the major ethnic group in eastern Nigeria.

TABLE VI

ETHNIC DISTRIBUTION OF MAJOR PARTY LEADERS,
NIGERIA (IN PERCENTAGES)

Party	IBO	Other Eastern Groups	Yoruba	Other Western Groups	Northern Groups	Cameroonians, Non-Nigerians and Unknown	N
NCNC	49.3	9.9	26.7	5.6	2.8	5.6	71
AG	4.5	15.2	68.2	7.6	3.0	1.5	66

Party	Fulani	Habe (Hausa)	Nupe	Kanuri	Yoruba	Other Northern Groups	Unknown	N
NPC	32.4	18.9	9.4	6.8	6.8	16.2	9.4	74
*NEPU	14.0	67.1	4.6	3.1	0.0	7.1	3.2	64

*The radical wing of the NPC broke away in 1950 to form the Northern Element Progressive Union (NEPU) under the leadership of Amino Kano.

Source: James S. Coleman and Carl G. Rosberg. Political Parties and National Integration in Tropical Africa. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1964. p. 12.

TABLE VII

REGIONAL DISTRIBUTION OF THE MEMBERS OF THE CENTRAL EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE OF THE MAJOR PARTIES, 1959

Parties	Regions					N
	Northern	Eastern	Western	Lagos	Cameroons	
NCNC	5	37	22	5	2	71
AG	15	14	31	6	--	66
NPC	74	--	--	--	--	74

Source: Richard L. Sklar. Nigerian Political Parties: Power in an Emergent Afican Nation. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963. pp. 323, 483-484.

Table VIII lists selected examples of the communal bases of the parties in situations of interparty competition. The table indicates that all parties were supported mostly by the major ethnic groups in the region where they had their bases. Each of the major parties then woos the cultural minorities within its domain and the minority groups in the other regions--the domain of the other rival parties. We see from the table, for example, that the AG was supported by most sections of the Yoruba speaking people, while in the Eastern and Northern Regions, it was supported, not by the dominant ethnic groups in those areas--the Ibos and Hausa-Fulanis, respectively, but by the people from the minority areas of those regions.

Besides, Table IX which presents the results of Nigerian elections 1951-1965 indicates that except for the federal election in the Western Region in 1954 where the NCNC won 23 seats, 5 seats more than the AG in the former's own region and party base, all other election returns

TABLE VIII

SELECTED COMMUNAL BASES OF PARTY SUPPORT IN SITUATIONS OF INTERPARTY COMPETITION

Party	Eastern Region	Western Region and Lagos	Northern Region
Action Group	Mostly people from minority sections - the Ibibio, Efik, and Aro people.	Most sections of the Yoruba-speaking people, and the Itsekeri and Okpe-Urhobo people of the delta area.	Mostly people from the minority areas: Bernu, TIV Chamba, Birom, Jarawa, and Sayawa, Igbolo, and Igbomina Yoruba people.
NCNC-NEPU Alliance	All sections of the Ibo-speaking people, and the Annang and Qua people in Ikot Ekpene and Calabo divisions, respectively.	Edo, Ibo, and Urhobo (settlers of Warri) people of the mid-west. Yoruba people from Illa, Ilesha and Modakeke (ward of Ife) districts Itausa and Ibo settlers in Lagos and Ibadan.	Mostly minority peoples - Ngizim and Karekare, Kilba, Gwari, and the Tijaniyya peoples.
Northern People' Congress	Ijaw people of Brass division.	Ibadan Yoruba, and a minority of the Yoruba Muslims.	Peoples of the Hausa-Fulani state system and the Bornu Emirate. Igala and Idoma people of Igala and Idoma divisions, respectively.

Source: James S. Coleman and Carl G. Rosberg. Political Parties and National Integration in Tropical Africa, 1964. p. 645.

TABLE IX

THE RESULTS OF NIGERIAN ELECTIONS,
1951-1965 AND 1979

Election	Party	Percent of Total Vote[a]	Seats
1951			
Eastern Regional Election	NCNC	--	65
	United National Party	--	4
Western Regional Election	Action Group	--	45
	NCNC	--	30-45[b]
Northern Regional Election	NPC	--	64[c]
1953			
Eastern Regional Election	NCNC	--	72
	National Independence Party	--	9
	United National Party	--	3
1954			
Federal Election, Eastern Region	NCNC	--	32
	Action Group	--	3
Federal Election, Western Region	NCNC	--	23
	Action Group	--	18
Federal Election, Northern Region	NPC	--	79
	Minority parties allied with NPC	--	6
	Action Group	--	1
Federal Election, Lagos	NCNC	--	1
	Action Group	--	1

TABLE IX (Continued)

Election	Party	Percent of Total Vote[a]	Seats
1956			
Western Regional Election	Action Group	48.30	48
	NCNC	45.30	32
Northern Regional Election	NPC	--	100
	Action Group	--	4
1957			
Eastern Regional Election	NCNC	63.26	64
	Action Group	10.75	13
1959			
Federal Election, Eastern Region	NCNC-NEPU Alliance	64.60	58
	Action Group	23.10	14
Federal Election, Western Region	Action Group	49.50	33
	NCNC-NEPU Alliance	40.20	21
	NPC	1.70	0
Federal Election, Northern Region	NPC	61.20	134
	Action Group	17.20	25
	NCNC-NEPU Alliance	16.10	8
Federal Election, Lagos	NCNC-NEPU Alliance	55.90	2
	Action Group	43.80	1
	NPC	0.20	0
Federal Election, Total	NPC	28.20	134
	NCNC-NEPU Alliance	36.10	89
	Action Group	27.60	73
	Others	8.10	16

TABLE IX (Continued)

Election	Party	Percent of Total Vote[a]	Seats
1960			
Western Regional Election	Action Group	53.60	79
	NCNC-NEPU Alliance	36.20	33
1961			
Northern Regional Election	NPC	69.20	160
	Action Group	14.60	9
	NCNC-NEPU Alliance	14.20	1
Eastern Regional Election	NCNC	58.00	106
	Action Group	14.40	15
	Dynamic Party	4.40	5
	Independents	22.20	20
1964-1965			
Federal Election, Eastern Region	NNA	--	0
	UPGA	--	68
	Independents	--	2
Federal Election, Western Region	NNA	--	36
	UPGA	--	20
	Independents	--	1
Federal Election, Northern Region	NNA	--	162
	UPGA	--	4
	Independents	--	1
Federal Election, Midwestern Region	NNA	--	0
	UPGA	--	13
	Independents	--	0

TABLE IX (Continued)

Election	Party	Percent of Total Vote[a]	Seats
1964-1965, cont.			
Federal Election, Lagos	NNA	--	0
	UPGA	--	3
	Independents	--	1
Federal Election, Total	NNA	--	198
	UPGA	--	108
	Independents	--	5 (one seat still to be contested)

*The table has been adopted from the works of Sklar (1963, pp. 35-37), Coleman and Rosberg (1964, pp. 652-654), and Sklar and Whitaker (1966, pp. 53-56).

[a]Blanks indicate that data are not available.

were on ethnoregional bases. Consequently, we see the NPC consistently winning all or an overwhelming majority federal seats in the north and controlling the northern government and the state House of Assembly, while hardly winning a seat in the Eastern or Western regions. Similarly, the AG won a majority of the federal seats in the Western Region within this period, except for the 1954 federal elections. However, it controlled the state government and the state House of Assembly. The few seats it ever won in the other two regions of the federation were from the minority areas of those regions.

Finally, the NCNC won an overwhelming majority of the seats during all federal elections in the Eastern Region and controlled the state government and the state House of Assembly during this period under discussion. Besides the federal elections of 1954 when it won the majority of seats in the west over the AG, the few seats it ever won in both federal elections and regional elections in the Western and Northern Regions were from the minority areas.

One conclusion that is evident from the foregoing analysis of the data presented in Tables V through IX is that the major political parties in Nigeria in the First Republic were ethnoregionally based. Thus, they cannot be considered as nationally based political parties. We found that the NCNC has its base in the Eastern Region and was dominated by the major ethnic group of that region, the Ibos. The AG has its base in the west and was dominated by the Yorubas, and the NPC which is a Northern Region party was exclusively Hausa-Fulani dominated. This cultural particularism that characterized the major political parties made them not only to espouse panregionalism but also to completely identify and equate their interests with the survival of their respective regions as a political entity.

As Okoli (1980) rightly observed, under the above condition:

> the distinction between regional government and the party in power; between the party in power and the dominant ethnic groups within the various regions became blurred. This close identification of the region with the party, on the one hand, and the party with the dominant ethnic group within the region, on the other hand, tended to make the party in power intolerant of opposition within the region and at the same time incapable of responding effectively to cross-pressures from other regional parties... The lack of responsiveness has, in turn, severely stunted the growth of communication between the regions and reinforced sectionalism (p. 115).

According to Lipset (1966, p. 77), "The greater the amount of sectionalism, the greater the danger for a political system." So it was with Nigeria in the First Republic as we shall elucidate later in this chapter. The inability of the political parties to transcend their ethnoregional bases, and their failure to reflect national perspective and interests in their debates of issues with national consequences, adversely affected their ability to serve as instruments of national integration.

The above discussion of the scope, nature, and political bases of the major parties in Nigeria up to 1966 can be clearly summed up in the statement by Mazrui and Tidy (1984). They stated that,

> The political history of Nigeria from 1945 to 1960 was less a struggle for independence than a struggle for supremacy within a federal state between the three most populous ethnic communities: the Hausa-Fulani of the North, the Yoruba of the West, and the Ibo of the East (p. 92).

They added,

> Each of these three communities expressed its political subnationalism (regional nationalism as distinct from nation-wide nationalism) in a regionally based political party. The Hausa-Fulani overwhelmingly supported the Northern People's Congress (NPC), led by the Sardauna of Sokoto, Sir Ahmadu Bello, and his Lieutenant Abubakar Tafawa Balewa...The Yoruba rallied behind the Action Group (AG) led by Chief Obfemi Awolowo. The Ibo rallied to the

National Council of Nigeria and Cameroons (NCNC) led by Nnamdi Azikiwe (p. 92).

The emergence of three regionally based political parties and the development of ethnic subnationalist politics in Nigeria constituted an obstacle to the evolution of a strong one-Nigerian national consciousness, identity, and political integration. Rather, it paved the way to a series of conflicts which resulted in major crises and disunity among the various cultural groups in the country.

The military regime which handed government over to a democratically elected civilian government on October 1, 1979 recognized the danger and the distability and disintegrative role played by the particularistic nature of the major political parties in the First Republic. It was in light of this realization that the military government proposed and incorporated certain criteria (to be met by all associations before they can be registered as political parties) in the Electoral Decree No. 73 of 1977. These criteria were meant to make all political parties reflect the "federal character" of Nigeria.

Some of the relevant criteria here are the provision that for an association to qualify for registration as a party by the Federal Electoral Commission (FEDECO), it required, among other things, to:

1. Register the names and addresses of its national officers with the Commission,

2. Make its membership open to every Nigerian irrespective of his place of origin, religion, ethnic group, or sex (the former Northern People's Congress had in its constitution prohibited Southerners by making the membership of the party open only to people of Northern Nigerian descent),

3. Register a copy of the association's "constitution" with the principal officer of FEDECO,

4. Ensure that the name, emblem, or motto has no ethnic or religious connotation, and

5. Have the headquarters of the association located in the federal capital, Lagos.

6. The decree also required that the rules and constitution of a party provide for the periodic election "on a democratic basis" of the principal officers or members of the executive or governing body of the party, and

7. The officers or members of the executive committee should reflect the "federal character of the society" (Dudley, 1982, pp. 182-183).

The five parties that were registered and which contested the 1979 state and federal elections met the above criteria, hence they can be considered as not only major parties but also parties that have membership from a broad cross-section of the Nigerian society.

In spite of the electorial provisions, the party system (the five recognized political parties) under the Second Republic were more or less a reincarnation of the ethnoregionally based political parties of the First Republic. A political correspondence with the West Africa magazine based in London examined the new political parties and put it concisely when he pointed out:

> Broadly, the present parties correspond in terms of membership and support to the pre-1966 ones. The NPN is the Northern People's Congress (NPC) by name; the NPP is the former NCNC; while the UPN is the Action Group (AG) reborn.

> The PRP is NEPU, while the GNPP groups together something of all the other (old parties).[1]

This parallel in the social bases and leaderships of the new parties with those of the old was even more vividly stressed and illustrated by Ojigbo (1980). He stated that

> 1. The National Party of Nigeria (NPN) is a reconstruction of the old NPC--its base is in the north, and its guiding force remains the Fulani aristocracy.
> 2. The Unity Party of Nigeria (UPN) is the Action Group reborn based again in the Yoruba west, and led again by Chief Obafemi Awolowo.
> 3. The Nigerian People's Party (NPP) reproduces the old NCNC, the party of the Ibos and of Nnamdi Azikiwe.
> 4. The People's Redemption Party (PRP) is the reincarnation of the radical Hausa party, NEPU, and once again is dominated by Mallam Aminu Kano.
> 5. Even the Great Nigerian People's Party (GNPP), led by Waziri Ibrahim, is strongest in his home state, Borno, and so may be compared to the Borno Youth Movement (pp. 223-225).

Phillips (1980) also alluded to and lamented the nature of the new parties in spite of FEDECO's attempts to prohibit ethnic and local parties. As he bluntly puts it:

> Many rightly argued that Nigeria was now back to square one: despite all efforts at newness, at recombinations, at stringent standards, at controls, there had emerged from the process the same politicians who had figured prominently in and survived the First Republic. The feeling was widespread that 13 years had changed nothing but the ages of the participants (p. 15).

Ejindu (1979) also observed another nature of the 1979 political parties. He pointed out that instead of open, high debates on national unity and progress, freedom, the economy and welfare of the country, the "Nigerian debates during the 1978/1979 campaign were concerned with the benefits of one (major) ethnic group against those of another" (p. 1303). Ejindu went on to quote another commentator that the new parties

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[1]West Africa, July 2, 1979, p. 1149.

"had degenerated into virtually replacing the banned tribal ones of the 1960s, the difference being that the new tactics are more subtle and more sophisticated" (p. 1303).

Some writers like Diamond (1980) have argued that despite the striking continuity in party social base and leadership, the five new parties that conducted the 1979 elections were nevertheless not sectional. Often the same writers have pointed out that the National Party of Nigeria was the most widely based and has the broadest ethnic character. Officially, "its 34 national officers hail from 17 of the 19 states, while its rivals, the 24 UPN national officers and 29 NPP officers are each drawn from 13 states" (Diamond, 1980; p. 633).

Diamond and others are correct when they argue that the five parties in 1979 were national in their leadership and membership composition. But, this author contests Diamond's assertion that the parties were not sectional. The fact is that while all the parties seem to have a broad base among the different ethnic groups, their roots and support were still mainly on dominant ethnic-"regional" basis. The politics of Nigeria in 1979, in fact, like politics of the 1950s and 1960s, was still a "politics of the major ethnic groups." An examination of the vote returns of the 1979 elections may help clarify this issue.

Table X presents the parties' percentage share of the votes in the 1979 presidential election. The table shows that the UPN had an overwhelming support (over 80% of the votes) in four states--Lagos, Ogun, Ondo, and Oyo. It should be pointed out that all these four states are Yoruba speaking states. The UPN also won 53.23% of the votes in Bendel State, formerly a minority area in the Western Region, 39.9% in Kwara where a significant portion of the electorate are Yoruba speaking people, and 21.68% in Gongola, formerly a minority area in northern Nigeria.

TABLE X

PERCENTAGE VOTE (PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION)

State	GNPP	UPN	NPN	PRP	NPP	Total Votes Cast
Anambra	1.68	0.75	13.49	1.20	82.88	1,209,038
Bauchi	15.44	3.00	62.48	14.34	4.74	998,683
Bendel	1.23	53.23	36.19	0.74	8.61	669,511
Benue	7.98	2.57	76.39	1.35	11.71	538,879
Borno	54.05	3.36	34.71	6.52	1.35	710,951
Cross River	15.14	11.76	64.41	1.02	7.66	661,103
Gongola	34.09	21.68	35.53	4.34	4.36	639,138
Imo	3.00	0.64	8.80	0.89	86.67	1,153,355
Kaduna	13.81	6.68	43.13	31.66	4.72	1,382,712
Kano	1.54	1.25	18.58	77.71	0.92	1,200,338
Kwara	5.71	39.49	53.62	0.67	0.52	354,605
Lagos	0.48	82.30	7.18	0.47	9.57	828,414
Niger	16.16	3.61	75.42	3.72	1.09	391,641
Ogun	0.53	92.61	6.23	0.31	0.32	744,668
Ondo	0.26	94.51	4.19	0.18	0.86	1,369,846
Oyo	0.57	85.78	12.75	0.34	0.55	1,396,547
Plateau	6.96	5.40	33.39	4.07	50.18	537,405
Rivers	2.18	10.34	72.66	0.47	14.35	687,951
Sokoto	27.16	3.39	65.21	3.32	0.92	1,358,798
Percentage vote recorded	10.08	29.28	33.58	10.29	16.77	16,833,583

Source: Billy Dudley. An Introduction to Nigerian Government and Politics. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1982. p. 208.

In the other 12 states of the federation. The percent vote for Chief Awolowo and his party, the UPN, ranged from as low as 0.75 in Anambra to 15.14 in Cross-River.

The NPP received an overwhelming support (over 82%) in Imo and Anambra States which are Ibo-speaking states and identified ethnically with the party's leader, Nnamdi Azikiwe. The party also received 50% of the votes in Plateau State, formerly a minority section in northern Nigeria. Besides these three states, the NPP did not receive as much as 15% of the votes in the other sixteen states of the federation.

Of the five presidential candidates who contested the 1979 presidential elections, three were from northern Nigeria which now comprises ten of the nineteen states of the Federation of Nigeria.

The NPN polled over 65% of the votes in Sokoto, the home state of the party's presidential candidate, Alhaji Shehu Shagari. Sokoto is dominated by the Hausa-Fulanis who also identified with Shehu Shagari. The NPN also polled more than 50% of the votes in Bauchi (62.48%), Benue (79.39%), Kwara (53.62%), Niger (75.42%) all are minority areas in the former Northern Region. The NPN also polled more than 60% in Cross-River (64.41%) and Rivers (72.66%) minority areas formally in eastern Nigeria.

The GNPP succeeded in polling over 50% (54.05%) of the votes in only one state, Borno, an essentially Kanuri state and the home state of the party presidential leader, Alhaji Ibrahim Waziri.

Finally, the PRP polled over 70% (77.71%) in Kano, an Hausa-Fulani state and the home state of the party leader and presidential candidate, Mallam Aminu Kano. The percentage of the votes polled by the party in the other states ranged from 0.18% to 31.66%.

From the above analysis, four features are identifiable:

1. The new parties in 1979, like those of pre-1966, were ethno-regionally based, although they appear to be national in their origin and leadership composition.

2. Each of the parties won overwhelmingly in the party leader's or presidential candidate's home state.

3. Majority of the parties (the UPN, NPN, and NPP) polled overwhelming votes in one or more of the "minority" states.

4. Finally, the voting (as the data on the presidential election returns show) has been on ethnic and regional bases.

Political Parties and Conflicts and Crises in Nigeria

In 1960, shortly after independence, Cole (1960) reflected on the political development in Nigeria in the last fifteen years. His conclusion was that

> The trend...had been towards separation rather than unity; that there has been no real emergence of symbols which would attract loyalities or even the attention of the illiterate and impoverished masses...nor is there any social setting in which a national consciousness can be grounded; that political parties...fail to accept the common interests on which ties of unity can rest; and without the existence of such ties of unity, a central government in a Nigerian federal system must either remain weak or disappear entirely (p. 4).

Nigeria has not disappeared but weak it has been and may continue to be as a political entity because of the absence of common interests on which ties of unity can be based. Nigerian political parties which could have been instrumental in creating a basis of national consciousness had not only failed to do so but rather has weakened loyalty to a common central government and intensified loyalties to the regions.

In order to clarify how the major Nigerian parties have led to the weakening of citizens' loyalties to a common central government while strengthening loyalties to the regions, we will subject actual crisis to a thorough analysis. In such an examination, we will determine the role the major political parties played in generating the crises and how the crises in turn led to a dislike for a single political entity called Nigeria while intensifying the need for autonomous government for the regions.

The crises that have been selected for detail analysis are:

1. The 1953 motion for independence in 1956,
2. The census conflict from 1933 to 1964, and
3. The 1964-1965 election crises.

The Self-Government Crises at the Center in 1953

At the Action Group's annual convention in December 1952, the party adopted a policy of political independence for Nigeria in 1956 (Sklar, 1963).

In March 1953, the House of Representatives (comprising of 50% Northern representatives, 25% Western representatives, and 25% Eastern Region representatives) met for its annual budget session. During this session, on March 31, 1953, Chief Anthony Enahoro, an AG member of the House moved a motion requesting the House to "accept as a primary political objective the attainment of self-government for Nigeria in 1956" (Schwarz, 1965; p. 77). This motion plunged Nigeria into crisis and nearly led to the sucession of the Northern Region.

The Northern representatives, fearing Southern domination if self-government were granted too early, were implacably opposed to the motion. To them, an acceptance of the motion at a time when the North

was far behind the South politically would be an "acceptance of the invitation to commit suicide." Consequently, Mallam Ahmadu Bello, the Sardauna of Sokoto, speaking for the North and his party, the NPC, offered an amendment replacing the specific date of 1956 with the phrase "as soon as practicable" (Sklar, 1963; p. 127).

The AG and some members of the NCNC refused to accept this vague amendment. When it became clear that the NPC was going to use its numerical strength to "veto" the motion or postpone debate on the motion for self-independence, the AG and NCNC members walked out of the House of Representatives (Sklar and Whitaker, 1966). The Northern representatives were later booed and jeered at by Lagos crowds for their stand over the independence motion. They were also called names such as "puppets" and "stooges" of the British colonialists. The Northern representatives returned home feeling humiliated. They were much upset by the events that occurred in Lagos.

The Northern delegates had hardly returned home when the AG decided to go to the north to campaign in order to convince the people of the north to desert their leaders and join in the demand for self-government in 1956. But, the NPC political leaders were prepared to do battle with The AG members who were going to campaign in the North. This point was made more explicit by Mallam Inuwa Wada, a member of the NPC and the Information officer for the Kano Native Authority. He stated,

> Having abused us (the Northerners) in the South, these very Southerners have decided to come over to the North to abuse us, but we have determined to retaliate...We have therefore orgnized about 1,000 men ready in the city to meet force with force; those men will parade Kano tomorrow, singing and

> shouting that the delegates are not wanted in Kano and that no lecture or meeting will be delivered by them.[1]

Upon the arrival of the AG campaign under the leadership of S.L. Akintola in Kano in May, rioting broke out. The four days of rioting resulted in 241 wounded and 26 deaths (Coleman, 1958).

After the riots, the NPC government drew up and passed an "eight point program" which was jointly endorsed by the joint meeting of the Northern House of Assembly and the Northern House of Chiefs. According to Coleman (1958), if this program had been implemented, it "would have meant virtual secession of the Northern Region from Nigeria" (pp. 399-400).

As a result of the crisis provoked by the 1953 motion for self-government in 1956, the Colonial Secretary called a conference of Nigerian political party leaders to meet in London in July, 1953. Another conference was also held in Lagos in 1954. The result of these constitutional conferences was the 1954 Lyttleton Constitution which established, for the first time, a genuinely federal system of government in Nigeria. Even after the constitutional conferences, the north was still bent on taking further steps to reducing the dominance of the southerners in certain sectors of both the public and business circles.

In January 1954, the northern leaders, as represented by the NPC government, proclaimed their policy of Northernization. This policy, according to Cole (1962) was interpreted by the Public Service Commission of the Northern Region as follows:

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[1]Report of Kano Disturbance, 16th-19th May, 1953 (Lagos, 1953), Appendix B, p. 46.

> If a qualified Northerner is available, he is given priority in recruitment; if no Northerner is available, an expatriate may be recruited (before) or a (non-Nigerian who is a) non-Northerner on contract terms (p. 108).

Professor Kalu Ezera, a Nigerian academician and parliametarian expressed the indignation that was widespread in the south with regard to the Northernization policy when he stated,

> I would rather not be a citizen of a country where I am regarded as a second class citizen. We know it to be a fact that in some parts of this federation citizens of this country are not regarded as citizens but, rather as expatrirates; Pakistanis, Ceylonese, and other nationalities are given preferential treatment. I am not saying that the Northerninzation policy, giving preference to Northerners, is a bad thing as such, but where Northeners are not available other Nigerians should be given preference to expatriates, if we are sincere about our advocacy of Nigerian unity... If all these are not acceptable, then I would suggest that we agree to disagree and break up the federation.[1]

The policy of Northernization was so vigorously pursued in early 1958 that by August 1958, the primier of the north, Sardauna of Sokoto, was able to report to the Northern House of Assembly that "a total of 2,148 southerners had been dismissed from the Northern Public Service since January 1954 and that only 24 southerners remained in the senior echelon of the permanent establishment."[2] By 1959, of the 221 members of the Northern Regional Administrative Class, "161 were expatriate officers, 59 were Northern Nigerians, and one was a non-northern Nigerian" (Younger, 1960; p. 5). This statistics reveal the extent and alacrity with which the northernization policy was pursued in the attempt to exclude southern Nigerians from the northern bureaucracy.

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[1]Nigerian House of Representative Debates, March 1954, p. 97.
[2]Daily Service, August 5, 1958

This policy, thus, entailed the periodic dismissals of non-northern Nigerians from their jobs in the north. Today, this policy still continues in the northern states of Nigeria but in a more subtle, sophisticated, and disguised fashion. However, it needs to be pointed out that in Nigeria, the preponderant majority of Nigerian members of every state bureaucracy consists of persons who are indigenous to the particular state.

In addition to the 1954 Northernization Policy, in 1958, the government of northern Nigeria controlled by the NPC (whose representatives were booed in Lagos in March 1953 and who engineered the May 1953 Kano political riots) haven been pressured by northern businessmen who had greatly supported the party financially for more business contracts, adopted regional laws and local regulations that discriminated against non-northern Nigerians. In that year, 1958, the government instructed

> All Provincial Tenders Boards to prepare new registrars of local contractors, excluding contractors of non-northern origin (southern Nigerians) from all but a few specialized tasks which are not at present within the scope of contractors of northern origin.[1]

Contractors who were of southern Nigerian origin were hurt by this discriminatory instruction emanating from the Northern Region government. Some of the contractors had to leave for their region of origin. This policy by the Northern Government is an illustration of the "bread and butter" politics in Nigeria. It shows the relationship between party membership and guarantee of government jobs and contracts once that party is in control of a regional or federal government.

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[1] Notice by the Ministry of Finance,, Northern Region, "Provincial Tenders Boards", Nigerian Citizen, November 8, 1958.

As we can visualize from the above analysis, the crises and other events that followed the conflict over the 1953 motion for political sovereignty in 1956 did not urgur well for a country in search of nationhood since it was amalgamated in 1914. The humiliation of the Northern representatives in Lagos in 1953 and the consequent threat of secession by the north as indicated in their "eight point program" could not but direct the loyalties and unite the northern peoples behind their regional government, at the expense of national unity.

Similarily, the death of southerners in the Kano political disturbance and the northernization policies implemented by the Northern government and their impact on southerners could not but create rancor in the minds of the peoples of southern Nigeria. The peoples affected, particularly those of the dominant ethnic groups, became more tied to the dominant party and its leaders with base in their region as the only group capable of protecting their interests. To those parties, their leaders, and the regional governments they owed much allegiance. The state of affairs across the country is best demonstrated by the concerns expressed by the Ibos should something bad happen to their son and political hero and leader of the Ibo dominated NCNC, Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe, "If a hen were killed, the chicken would be exposed to danger."[1]

In such a situation where, both in the North and Southern Regions, ethnic and regional loyalties of the people come to supercede that to the state, we have a problem of national integration.

The Northernization Policy and other discriminatory regulations implemented in the north had the effects of balkanizing political allegiance and effectively excluding all southerners from effective

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[1]West African Pilot, August 30, 1948.

participation in northern politics. As Okoli (1980, p. 25) observed, these policies also "had the baneful and highly disruptive effects of regionalizing citizenship rights, (loyalties), obligations, and duties. It made southern Nigerians aliens in their own country..." and thus hindered the process of political integration.

Census Conflicts From 1933-1964

If there is any single issue that can be identified in Nigeria that has become so complicated, politicized, sensitively explosive and has continuously generated conflict each time it crops up, that thing is census enumeration. This state of affairs can be attributed to the fact that the authoritative allocation of most valued goods in the country is largely dependent on the recorded population of each region/state. When the people came to realize that parliamentary and state or local representation, distribution of social amenities to states, local governments, and towns are based on census figures, they became over-zealous about the importance of census in Nigeria.

According to Aluko (1965),

> The more literate people became, the more over-zealous the value of a census and the more they were prepared to do anything, not only to enumerate all their people, but also, if possible, to engage in double or triple (even quadruple) counts. The political leaders also became even more enthusiastic than others about the census returns, because they regarded them as instruments of political power (p. 377).

This attitude of the politicians made census enumeration to be seen as a political contest between the regions before and during the First Republic.

Although estimates and enumerations have been carried out in different parts of Nigeria before the 1950s, census figures did not become so politicized, controversial, and contested by southern Nigerian

politicians until when in 1954, the 1950-1953 census figures "came to be used as an arguement for giving northern Nigeria 50% representation in the federal legislature" (Aluko, 1965; p. 376). In 1953, of the recorded total of 30.42 million, 16.84 million were in northern Nigeria (see Table XI for population estimates for each region from 1901 to 1963).

In 1917, three years after the southern and northern protectorates had been amalgamated to form one country called Nigeria, the British passed a census ordinance requiring decennial census. Pursuant to this ordinance, the first systematic census was conducted throughout the country in 1921. The census returns put the population of Nigeria as 18,631,442, but later revision rounded it out to 18.72 million (Aluko, 1965).

The next decennial census was held in 1931[1]. The enumeration in the north was considered relatively satisfactory. The population of the north was given as 11,435,000. But, in the southern provinces, the elaborate arrangements made for the census were disrupted by the Women's Riots and disturbances of 1929-1930 in Aba, Owerri, Onitsha, and Calabar (Aluko, 1965).

Okoli (1980) has identified two major causes of the 1929 Aba Women's Riots. These include 1) the counting of human beings was a serious breach of the Ibo custom, and 2) the rumor that the census was the first step in a European attempt to tax women and increase the taxes on men. As a result, the people of the southern provinces did not cooperate with

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[1]For complete history and inaccuracies of Nigerian census figures, see S.A. Aluko, "How Many Nigerians? Analysis of Nigeria's Census Problems, 1901-1963". The Journal of Modern African Studies. 3(1965):371-392.

TABLE XI

GROWTH OF POPULATION IN NIGERIA, 1901-1963

Census	Northern Nigeria			Eastern Nigeria			Western Nigeria			Midwestern Nigeria			Lagos			Nigeria		
	M.	%	%	M.	%	%	M.	%	%	M.	%	%	M.	%	%	M.	%	%
1901[1]																		
Population	7.16			2.22			1.58						0.042			11.00		
Percentage of Total		65.0			20.3			14.3						0.4			100	
1911[2]																		
Population	8.12			4.50			2.15			1.21			0.074			16.03		
Percentage of Total		51.2			27.4			13.8			7.2			0.4			100	
Annual Rate of Growth			1.3			7.4			---			---			5.8			3.9
1921[3]																		
Population	10.56			5.11			2.17			0.78			0.100			18.72		
Percentage of Total		57.0			26.5			11.6			4.4			0.5			100	
Annual Rate of Growth			2.7			1.3			0.1			4.3			3.0			1.6
1931[4]																		
Population	11.44			4.55			2.95			0.99			0.126			20.06		
Percentage of Total		57.0			22.7			14.7			4.9			0.7			100	
Annual Rate of Growth			0.8			-1.2			3.1			2.3			2.3			0.9

TABLE XI (Continued)

Census	Northern Nigeria			Eastern Nigeria			Western Nigeria			Midwestern Nigeria			Lagos			Nigeria		
	M.	%	%	M.	%	%	M.	%	%	M.	%	%	M.	%	%	M.	%	%
1950-1953[5]																		
Population	16.84			7.22			4.60			1.49			0.272			30.42		
Percentage of Total		55.1			24.0			15.0			5.0			0.9			100	
Annual Rate of Growth			1.9			2.2			2.1			2.0			3.8			1.9
1963[6]																		
Population	29.78			12.39			10.28			2.53			0.675			55.66		
Percentage of Total		53.4			22.3			18.4			4.6			1.3			100	
Annual Rate of Growth			5.1			5.3			7.5			5.0			9.5			5.7

[1]Calculated from Annual Report of Northern Nigeria, 1901-1911 and Annual Report and Blue Book of Southern Nigeria, 1904 and 1901-1909. Figures for Western Nigeria in 1901 include the area which is now Midwestern Nigeria.

[2]Calculated from the Census of 1911 (London, 1913), and Handbook of Southern Nigeria (Lagos, 1912), pp. 338 and 348. In 1911 the population figures for Southern Nigeria were given for the Western, Central, and Eastern Provinces. Parts of the present Eastern and Northern Regions were included in the Central Provinces (now the Midwest), so the figures have been adjusted accordingly.

[3]Census of Nigeria, 1921 (London, 1923) and Nigeria Handbook, 1925 (London, 1926).

[4]Census of Nigeria, 1931 (London, 1933), vols. I, II, III, and IV.

[5]Census of Nigeria, 1952-53 (Lagos, 1956 edn.).

[6]Preliminary figures only.

Source: S.A. Aluko. "How Many Nigerians?" An Analysis of Nigeria's Census Problems, 1901-1963". The Journal of Modern African Studies. 3(1965), p. 374.

the census officers. The eastern section of the southern provinces was to pay heavily for this affront on the British colonial power.

Compounding the above problems was the fact that in the western section of the southern province, intensive enumeration also did not take place except in the colony of Lagos, Ibadan and Owo divisions, and Egbaland of western Nigeria. The census figures for other areas of western Nigeria were based, for no justifiable reasons, on tax returns and records.[1]

From the above analysis it is apparent that the 1931 census must have been defective in its population estimates for the different sections of the country. Even the government statistician pointed to this fact when he commented that "there was good reason to suppose the census figures to be slightly defective in the northern provinces and much in defect in the southern provinces" (Aluko, 1965, p. 375).

The extent to which the 1931 census must have grossly underestimated the population of the southern provinces has been widely illustrated by Okoli (1980) when he wrote:

> While the 1921 population for the eastern section of the southern provinces was estimated at 5,440,000, that of the 1931 was estimated at 4,691,000. This represents a loss of 749,000. The low estimate which was made of the population of the southeastern region had a serious effect on the total population of southern Nigeria. In 1921, it was 8,371,000 as against 9,998,000 for the north. In 1931 it stood at 8,493,000 as against 11,435,000 for the north (p. 50).

According to Aluko (1965) there is enough evidence to believe that the population figures for southern Nigeria between 1900 and 1931 were largely inaccurate and may have been consistently underestimated.

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[1]Census of Nigeria, 1931, Vol. I, pp. 6 and 60 and Vol. III, pp. 1-2.

Similarly, Okoli (1980) has pointed out that there were allegations that "the British had consistently undercounted the southern population" (p. 51). He added,

> All along the southern politicians had felt the population of the south was greater than that of the north but the British had manipulated the figures in favor of the north (p. 57).

The reason why the British would want to inflate the population figures of the north has been given by Aluko (1965). It was "to ensure that political power in the country remained with conservative northern politicians, who were regarded as more favorably disposed towards them --the British interest" (p. 376).

The decennial census was not held in 1941 because of the second world war. The next census was that of 1950-1953. However, between 1941 and 1953 an updated version of the 1931 census figures was used and in 1950, the official estimate of the population for the different regions of Nigeria was: North--13,514,000; West (excluding Lagos)--3,977,999; and East was estimated at 5,243,000. This figure indicated that the Northern Region population was almost twice that of the Eastern and Western Regions combined (Okoli, 1980, p. 50).

The protested 1950-1953 census enumeration was conducted at different times throughout the federation. Again, like previous elections, the results attracted a lot of controversy. The conduct of the enumeration was problematic, particularly in the Southern Region, as it was in 1931. According to Aluko (1965),

> There was still a lot of suspicion about the motives for the census, as many Nigerians were reluctant to have their wives and children counted. Many regarded the census as a plot to enable the tax-gatherers to collect heavier taxes because in some parts of Nigeria, in the past, the more wives and children a man had, the more wealthy he was deemed to be and the heavier the tax he paid! Others, more superstitious, believed that the census brought ill-luck, famine, (death),

> or other misfortune. Yet others regarded it as a means of spying on their property and mode of life, or of providing names for military service (p. 376).

In the 1950-1953 census there was clear evidence of undercounting in certain parts of the country. This was revealed by the Western Region Free Primary Education in 1955. According to Aluko (1965), based on the 1952-1953 Census of Western Nigeria, it was projected that 170,000 children would attain the ages of six and seven in 1955 and be enrolled for the Free Primary Education which was introduced in that January. Preparations were made accordingly. However, "when actual registration was completed in December 1954, it was discovered that there were 392,000 such children. This represents 230% more than the estimated number deduced from the 1950-1953 census. Such a gross understatement considerably embarrassed the government" (Aluko, 1965, p. 378).

At this juncture it should be pointed out that by late 1952 the people of the south had come to realize the important role of census figures in the distribution of valued social goods in the country. As Aluko (1963) pointed out, "parliamentary and local council representation, government amenities, and the relative importance attached to towns, districts, provinces, or regions were largely dependent on the census figures of each" (pp. 376-377). The result is that the unwillingness to allow census taking because of superstitions began to gradually fade away. It is in the light of this newly aroused enthusiasm (for census) that the 1962 enumeration, just two years after independence, was conducted. Thus, according to Pius (1971), "the real battle between the north and the south was postponed until the 1962 census" (p. 133). Once census enumeration was politicized it became very difficult to depoliticize.

In 1962, every Nigerian knew the implications of a low census count for his or her area or region. The country-wide census for that year was conducted simultaneously. The exercise lasted for 17 days between May 5 and May 21, 1962, but unfortunately, the census figures were not released after six months. This long delay led to rumors and speculations about the likelihood of political interference and inflation of the census figures in some provinces. There were charges and countercharges between the northern and southern political leaders (particularly between the federal coalition partners, the NPC, and the NCNC), who accused each other of trying to inflate the figures in order to have control of the central legislature. As Aluko observed, the flood of attacks that were being unleashed by the Eastern Nigerian NCNC politicians against the NPC looked "as if the census controversy would split the nation asunder" (p. 383). The chief protagonists over this census issue were thus, the Eastern Region and the Northern Region.

Six months after the census count, that is as late as November 1962, it was alleged that census counts (which were supposed to end on May 21, 1962) were still going on in many parts of Northern Nigeria.[1] This allegation became substantiated when an official of the NPC replied to the above charges on November 27, 1962,

> That 20,000 Ibos living in the Gboko Divisions of Northern Nigeria had been recounted because during the census they had travelled home to Eastern Nigeria to be counted, so as to swell the population there to the disadvantage of Northern Nigeria. This was a clear admission of the double counting of 20,000 people in one division alone. Similar practices were alleged in many parts of the country (Aluko, 1965, p. 382).

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[1] Eastern House of Assembly Debates (Enugu), November 16, 1962.

Mackintosh (1966) also noted the case of one junior official from the north "who allowed himself to be counted six times" (pp. 551-552). As Okoli (1980) rightly pointed out, to this junior northern officer, "it was a show of loyalty to the region in its competition against other regions" (p. 63).

The controversy over the 1962 census led to a great deterioration in North-South relations, particularly between the NCNC and the NPC which formed the coalition government at the center. The 1962 census figure were never published officially. In the end, in February 1963, ten months after the original count, the Prime Minister (NPC) nullified the 1962 census results and a costly recount of the population was made later that year.

With this atmosphere of North-South bitterness, distrust, and antagonism, elaborate safe-guards were made to ensure a fair and reliable census in 1963. According to Aluko, "the period of enumeration was shortened from 17 to 14 days--November 5-8, 1963, so as to reduce the chances of multiple counting" (p. 384).

On February 24, 1964, the federal government released preliminary statistics of the enumeration to be 55.4 million, distributed thus: Northern Nigeria, 29.7 million; Eastern Nigeria, 12.3 million; Western Nigeria, 29.7 million; Midwestern Nigeria, 2.5 million; and the Federal Territory of Lagos, 675,000 (Carter, 1966).

Like the 1962 census, these figures evoked a great deal of inter-party and interregional conflicts and controversy. The NCNC-controlled governments of the Eastern and Midwestern Regions immediately rejected the figures declaring that the North's were inflated to enable that region and the NPC preserve its numerical supremacy in the House of

Representatives and to dominate Nigeria.[1] The Northern region and Akintola's Western regional governments accepted them.

Shortly before the November 5-8, 1963 elections, Mr. R.B.K. Okafor (NCNC), Parliamentary Secretary to the Federal Minister of Justice, had warned that all the three southern regions (West, Midwest, and East) would secede and form a new country if the November 5-8, 1963 census recount collapsed as a result of "intrigue" by northerners.[2]

In May 1964, the National Economic Council finally accepted the figures. The eastern government challenged the federal government's acceptance of the figures in the Federal Supreme Court, but lost on the technical grounds that the court had no authority to entertain the suit (Aluko, 1965).

According to Schwarz (1965), in using the accepted figures for delimiting constituencies for the 1964 federal election, the North was allotted 167 parliamentary seats out of 312 (a reduction of 7); the East got 70 (a loss of 3); the West received 57 (a gain of 10, this is the reason why the Akintola government in the West accepted the 1963 census figures); the Midwest 14 (a reduction of 1); and Lagos 4 (a gain of 1). Although the North lost 7 seats with the new figures, it still held 27 seats more than the East, West, Midwest, and Lagos combined. It seemed the North was assured a substantial overall majority in the upcoming 1964 federal general election.

The foregoing analysis indicates that the 1962 and 1963 censuses developed into North-South overtones. But, that the 1963 recount and

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[1]West Africa, March 7, 1964, p. 271.
[2]West Africa, November 2, 1963, p. 1231.

the crisis that followed the federal government acceptance of the disputed figures in 1964 developed pronounced Ibo-Hausa overtones, despite the fact that both dominant tribes constituted the coalition partners at the federal level.

The aftermath of the 1963-1964 census controversy on the national integration in Nigeria can be identififed in the work of Okoli (1980). Because of the conflict over the census between the NCNC and the NPC, some members in the Northern House of Assembly demanded punitive action against the Ibos for their challenge of the northern census figures. According to Okoli, by the following day, "more than 2,000 Ibos in Kano alone had been expelled from their market stalls. There was spontaneous, seemingly uncoordinated evictions of Ibos from Gusau, Funtua, and Katisna. Rumors spread that this was only the beginning of the complete elimination of Ibos from the north" (p. 65).

Furthermore, some Ibos who owned businesses were forced out of them and specifically asked by the Northern regional government to surrender their businesses. Most Ibos in the regional public service--most of whom were on contracts--were dismissed without delay. Thus, the census controversy brought conflict between the East and the North one step closer to the eventual confrontation which came with the military coup d'etat of 1966 and the civil war that followed in 1967.

As Okoli (1980) rightly pointed out with regard to the crises over the census figures, "once the forces of hate and recrimination are let loose, it is hard to call the enraged to sanity and calm" (p. 65). The census crisis had brought into prominence regional power and loyalty while the center was completely immobilized. The interregional, interethnic and interparty rivalry and struggles over census figures had not only prevented Nigerians from knowing how many they were, but also

hindered any effort at the political integration of the diverse cultural groups in the country.

The Election Crisis of 1964-1965

The preceeding section revealed that the contoversy over the 1962 census and the conflicts over the recount in 1963 severely strained the five-year-old federal coalition between the NPC and the NCNC, and that the coalition was going to be discarded. We noted that the NCNC (the junior partner in the federal coalition and identified with the Ibos in the East) were furious over the census figures and did not hide its bitterness. Because of this, the NPC leaders (the senior partner of the federal coalition and identified with the Hausa-Fulani in the North) accused their southern partners (the NCNC) of fickleness and unreliability.

According to Schwarz (1968), at the end of July 1964, about five months after the controversial census figures had been officially accepted by the NPC federal government, the Sardauna of Sokoto, the party leader of the NPC, stated categorically that,

> Even if my party fails to get the required majority in the next federal elections, it will definitely not enter into any agreement or coalition with the NCNC... The Ibos have never been true friends of the North and never will be (p. 164).

Thus, by August 1964, the tension that had been building up between the federal coalition partners because of the controversies over the results of the decennial census had reached a breaking point.

Having discarded the NCNC and the Ibos, the NPC sought an alliance with the Yorubas of the West. This it found in the anti-Awolowo faction of the Yoruba AG. This was the Akintola's faction which the NPC federal government had helped to impose on the people of the West six months

after it declared a state emergency in that region in 1962. Accordingly, in August 1964, the NPC and Akintola's NNDP formed the Nigerian National Alliance (NNA) to fight the upcoming 1964 federal elections. The NNA immediately attracted small opposition parties in the Eastern Region--the Niger Delta Congress (NDC), the Dynamic Party (DP) led by Chike Obi, an Ibo, and the Mid-West Democratic Front (MDF).

On the other side, the two major parties in the South--the NCNC and the AG--joined together to form the United Progressive Grand Alliance (UPGA). This coalition was joined by the Northern opposition parties, the Northern Progressive Front (NPF) formed as a result of the merger of Joseph Tarka's United Middle Belt Congress (UMBC) and Aminu Kano's Northern Elements Progressive Union (NEPU). With the formation of UPGA, there then emerged two nationwide alliances (parties) competing to gain control of power at the federal level through the electoral process in December 1964.

According to Carter (1966), before the election, UPGA leaders calculated that it would have to win some 20-30 seats out of the 167 in the Northern Region to win an overall majority of the 312 parliamentary seats at stake. It was also optimistic that it could win virtually all the 87 seats in Midwest, Lagos, and East, and all but half a dozen of the Western seats since there was apparently no support for the Akintola regime. The alliance's optimism was based on the 1959 performance of the AG, the NCNC, and their northern allies--in which they won over 30% of the northern votes cast and 33 northern seats. In that same election, it was the parties that now constitute the UPGA which won all the seats in Lagos, West, and in the Eastern Region.

The campaign that preceeded the December 1964 federal election was a bitter one. As the elections approached, the NPC government of the

North increasingly frustrated UPGA candidates in the North so that many of them could not file their nomination papers (Ademoyaga, 1980; Carter, 1966; Schwarz, 1968; Okoh, 1980). The hopes of the UPGA dimmed with the increasingly frequent complaints of harrassment, including mass arrest and malicious persecution of its members in the North (Carter, 1966).

As a result of the numerous complaints by the opposition, the members of the electoral commission flew to Kano. According to Okoli (1980)

> There, they found that the opposition candidates were virtually prevented from submitting their nomination papers or even entering their constituencies to campaign. All of the 24 opposition candidates in Sokoto province, 12 of the 14 opposition candidates in Katsina, and 1 candidate from the province of Biu sought refuge in the opposition headquarters in Kano because it was unsafe for them to enter their constituencies, much less to campaign there. Those who dared to file their papers were sent to prison. According to Aminu Kano, the President of the opposition Nigerian People's Front (NPF), as of November 20, 1964, the number of opposition candidates jailed was 26. Even J.S. Tarka, the General President of the United Middle-Belt Congress (UMBC), one of the parties that formed the NPF coalition, had been arrested and jailed (p. 103).

Furthermore, it was found that Mr. G.M. Abengowe, an Ibo and one of the lawyers appointed by the UPGA to protect the interests of the coalition, was charged with unlawful assembly[1] by an Alkali Court[2], tried, and sentenced to nine months imprisonment with hard labor.

The optimism of UPGA had been shattered. The whole crisis atmosphere surrounding the elections deepened, when, ten days before the election it was announced that 68 NPC candidates had been declared "elected" unopposed. In the East, 15 NCNC candidates were returned unopposed and in the West, two NNDP members were returned unopposed

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[1] The West African Pilot, October 21, 1964.

[2] The Aalkoli courts is a special arm of the Northern Native Authority System. The law which operates within it is the Koranic law, and the accused is not allowed any representation.

(Schwarz, 1968; Carter, 1966). The UPGA leadership rejected the "unopposed" returns in the North and demanded an immediate postponement of the election for six months pending the clarification of the disputed "unopposed" returns. The Prime Minister, Tafawa Balewa, refused and insisted that the elections must be held as scheduled on December 20, 1964. A meeting between the President and the Prime Minister on December 27 yielded no positive results.

Consequently, on December 24, 1964, the UPGA, led by Dr. Okpara the Premier of the Eastern Region, called for a mass boycott of the election by its supporters. Dr. Okpara, in a press conference, argued that the election had become "a colossal farce--a daylight fraud" (Schwarz , 1968, p. 1969).

The UPGA boycott was completely effective in the Eastern Region, where the NCNC government used its powers to ensure that no election was held. In the Western Region the boycott was partly successful, but very detrimental to UPGA, particularly the AG. According to Schwarz (1965), in the West there was a low turnout voting in all constituencies and the practical effect of the boycott was to increase the number of seats won by the NNDP (36 of 57) and reduce those won by the Action Group (15) and NCNC (3). In the Midwestern Region, leaders of the NCNC were not in agreement and so the party leader, Dennis Osadebey, decided not to have his followers boycott the election. The voting turnout was light but the NCNC won for its party all 14 seats. In the North, the NPC solidified its position winning 162 of the 167 seats. In the end, the NPC and its ally, the NNDP, had a clear majority--a comfortable figure of 198 seats out of the 312 parliamentary seats at stake.

Although the election results lacked credit and while the UPGA leaders rejected them, the NPC and its allies of the NNA, which

single-handedly carried out the elections, generally accepted them (Ademoyega, 1981). Again, like the controversy over the 1962 and 1963 census, the election results reflected a major confrontation between the NPC (the Northern Region) and the NCNC (the Eastern Region). The dispute between the UPGA and the NNA over the acceptability of the election results led to a national political stalemate. Four days after the elections, President Azikiwe (himself an Ibo and NCNC) failed to call upon the Prime Minister to form a government based upon the results of the election.

According to Sklar and Whitaker (1966), for six days after the election, the peace and unity of the nation appeared to hang in the balance, waiting to explode, while intensive negotiations were conducted involving the President, the Prime Minister, leaders of the regional governments, and other influential persons. At last, a "six point plan was accepted by both the President and the Prime Minister as the only way to save the constitution, avoid deadlock, and prevent bloodshed and disintegration" (Okoli, 1980, p. 121). Among the six points was the agreement that the President should ask the Prime Minister to form "a broad-based national government," and that election would be conducted in those constituencies which had been successfully boycotted.

In March 1964 elections were held in the previously boycotted constituencies in the East and Lagos. The UPGA won the Lagos seats and all but 2 of the 45 Eastern seats, giving the final 1964-1965 federal election result of NNA--197 seats; UPGA--108 seats; and Independents--7 (Mackintosh, 1966, pp. 602-603). Pursuant to the Prime Minister's promise to make his government broadly based after the elections (in March 1965) he enlarged his ministrial appointments to 54, doubling the number in the previous government. The NPC took 22 of the ministries,

15 of those with cabinet rank. The NCNC and NNDP were assigned, respectively, 16 and 14 ministries. The Action Group was not represented in the cabinet. Therefore, the government could not be considered a broad-based national government. Here again, we find the NCNC, under the leadership of Azikiwe, like in the 1959 election entering into coalition with the NPC at the federal level and once more leaving the AG in the rain. That interpersonal conflict between Azikiwe and Awolowo, the interparty, interregional, and interethnic conflict and distrust between the Ibos and Yorubas we noted in the late 1940s was still vivid in the minds of the political leaders. Schwarz (1965) himself, has noted that during the 1964 election crisis, the NCNC which was the senior partner in the UPGA coalition showed that it was willing to "sacrifice the UPGA coalition for the interests of the NCNC, the East, and the Ibo people" (p. 147). However, this coalition at the federal level was not to last long as the army took over power in January 15, 1966.

It should be noted that the new government emerged as a result of concessions and compromises over certain issues. The basic problem of the nation had not been solved, but swept under the carpet. The political parties were still identified with the major ethnic groups in the regions. The loyalty of the people was to their party or region rather than to the central government. The North-South showdown still loomed on and had only once again been postponed.

The Western Region Election Crisis, November 1965

The year 1965 climaxed with the deteriorating political situation in Nigeria. According to Schwartz (1968), not long after the conflicts of the 1964 federal elections and the consequent formation of a "broad-based" federal goverment, another "election fever, with its complaints

and counter-complaints, its threats and counter threats, its thugs and counter-thugs was not long in returning to Nigeria" (p. 1978). This was the October 1965 elections for the Western House of Assembly.

In Chapter III we noted the intraparty conflict and the split within the Action Group between Chief Obafemi Awolowo, the party leader, and Akintola, the Vice-President of the party and the Premier of the AG controlled Western Region government. The basic causes of the split within the AG were threefold:

1. The struggle for power between chief Akintola and Chief Awolowo,

2. The differences between the two over the party's program of "democratic socialism" and nationalization. Chief Akintola was against nationalization of basic industries, and

3. The differences between Akintola's and Awolowo's wings of the party over support for minority movements in the North and East and the need to strike a deal to join with the coalition in a national government. Akintola's wing desired to cease support of the minority movement in other regions, abandonment of all campaigning out of the Western Region, and join in a federal coalition government. This was contrary to Awolowo's stand on these issues.

This internal rivalry for control of the party leadership had important consequences for the Yorubas. The Yorubas also became split and we began to wittness a process of clan or ethnic rivalries between the Yorubas in spite of their homogeneity. For instance, there was rivalry between the Ijebus and the Ogbomoshos. Awolowo was an Ijebu and Akintola was an Ogbomosho. In spite of the many army changes and long Nigerian civil war, no changes had occurred in the pattern of clan or ethnic rivalry among the Yorubas. This rivalry among clans in the Yoruba land was again particularly noticeable in the August/September

campaigns and elections into state and federal assemblies, state gubernatorial, and presidential elections in 1983.

The result of this conflict within the AG was that Akintola's faction broke away to form the NNDP. Because of his stand on regionalization, Akintola easily found support with the NPC, the senior partner in the federal coalition government. It was in light of this support that, following the uproar in the Western Region State House of Assembly and the consequent declaration of the state of emergency in that region, the NPC finally aided and abetted the Akintola faction of the AG, imposing Akintola as premier on the people of the West in 1962. This is why the tensely awaited October 1965 election was significant. The Akintola party, the NNDP, that was in power in the West was, thus, yet to win a fully contested election. The October election, therefore, was to test and decide once and for all whether the people of the Western Region endorsed all that the Prime Minister, Sir Abubakar Tafawa Belawa, had done for them since 1962 and whether they accepted the rulership of Akintola.

The opposition parties--AG and NCNC--campaigned under the banner of their alliance--the UPGA. They considered the October 1965 election as an opportunity to eliminate their rival--the NNA which includes the NNDP--from serious contention in southern Nigeria (Sklar and Whitaker, 1966). The UPGA called the campaign "operation do or die." The party took precautionary measures to try to thwart techniques that the NNDP, in collaboration with its ally the NPC, might take to rig the election. For example, Schwarz (1968) reported that the UPGA knowing that the Akintola government would declare a number of the seats elected "unopposed," took the precaution of publishing in advance the names of its candidates for all 94 constituencies as soon as the Western House

of Assembly was dissolved. Once again, the election was misconducted as the Akintola government publicly interfered with the election process and the results of the election.

First, at the end of the nominations, with 94 seats at stake, it was announced that 16 government (NNDP) candidates, including Premier Akintola himself, were duly "returned unopposed." The opposition, UPGA, protested vehemently that its candidates had been fraudently excluded. Secondly, on election day, large numbers of ballot papers mysteriously disappeared from police custody only to find their way into government party boxes. Police also found thousands of ballot papers in the illegal possession of electoral officials who were appointed by the regional government. Thirdly, after the polling, at the counting stations, local police were used to keep the opposition's polling agents and candidates away from the count. Finally, in a number of cases, AG candidates who had been declared elected by the returning officer and even given certificates to that effect were not recognized by the government. Instead, their defeated opponents were declared elected through governmental news media (Ademoyega, 1981; Schwarz, 1968; Sklar and Whitaker, 1966). The official result was: NNDP--71, AG--15, and NCNC--2.

The UPGA leaders refused to accept the results of the openly rigged elections by the NNDP. However, the NNDP went ahead to form the government. Alternatively, the UPGA, under Alhaji Dauda Adegbenro, gave a press conference (the evening of the same day Akintola formed his government) in which he declared he had formed his own government. This was an unusual event. The following day, according to Schwarz (1968), Adebgenro and some of his "cabinet" were arrested and charged with unlawfully forming "an interim executive council." The Chief Justice of the region, Mr. Justice Morgan, refused to grant them bail until they

agreed to a retraction of the published formation of a substitute government.

A jumble of confusion followed the election crisis in the west. By November 1965, many violent and rebellious acts, arson, and political murders began to sweep across the region. The people had risen in arms to fight the unpopular Akintola government. What actually took place following the elections can be best summarized in the words of Ademoyega (1981), himself a Yoruba from the West and the only survivor of the trio who planned and executed the first Nigerian coup d'etat of January 15, 1966. He wrote:

> the people of Western Region did not appeal to the deaf gods typified by the law courts. They simply recalled the days of their ancestors when unpopular rulers were removed by the concerted efforts of the people...By November 15, 1965, the people had started to fight the unacceptable Akintola government. They sang war songs and fought on the streets. They invented the 'WETIE' (meaning 'soak him up'), a practice in which a political opponent and his house or property were sprayed with petrol and set ablaze...By December 1965, there had been a total breakdown of law and order in Western Nigeria. The lawlessness had gone beyond the control of the mobile (antiriot) police and the Akintola government was generally seen tottering to its collapse (p. 22).

Estimates made later suggest that over 2,000 people were killed in the region between August 1965 and January 1966 as a result of political disturbances during the period after the Western Region election.

In spite of the total breakdown of law and order in the Western Region, the Prime Minister of the Federation, Sir Abubakar Tafawa Belawa, refused to invoke his emergency powers and declare a state of emergency. His critics pointed out that in 1962, "when disorders were restricted to a scuffle in the House of Assembly, he had declared a state of emergency. Why not again, now that law and order had effectively broken down throughout the region?" (Schwarz, 1968, p. 189). The Prime Minister's only response was that he had simply "no power" to impose

a solution on the West." He even stated that the situation in the West was normal and that everything was effectively under control. While the violence was spreading to Lagos, the Prime Minister was deceiving the world. He was receiving, in January 1966, delegates at Lagos airport to the Commonwealth Conference.

However, it was clear to most Nigerians that the Belawa government was more interested in preserving Akintola and his party, the NNDP (ally to the NPC), as the premier and party of the region. He did not forsee the general calamity that was going to befall his whole regime by his inaction. It was a situation in which Blondel's (1969) prediction was to come true. He had rightly stated that "unless some arrangement exists by which governments can be created and ended in a peaceful fashion, the overthrow of these governments will be attempted" (p. 336).

In Nigeria, these arrangements for the peaceful transfer of power have been seriously handicapped and weakened by the political parties. Consequently, they became effectively unworkable. The result was that, following the explosive situations in western Nigeria on January 15, 1966, the army overthrew the Nigerian government bringing to an end the First Republic of Nigeria.

CHAPTER V

SUMMARY, FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS

> No one can dispute that the role of political parties in national integration is, and presumably will remain, very great in emergent states.
>
> Emerson, 1966, p. 300

Chapter IV examined the nature and scope of the major political parties in Nigeria before and during the First Republic and the nature of the major parties during the Second Republic. The chapter also analyzed the role of the major political parties in the problems of national integration in Nigeria by examining and concentrating on three major political events or crises before the demise of the First Nigerian Republic. In short, the chapter was devoted to testing the basic premise of this research. That proposition was that the lack of broad-based national parties in Nigeria made the major political parties into hinderances of political integration in the country.

The present chapter will present a summary of the study, the findings of the study, conclusions based on the findings, and a number of recommendations as to what particular party system should be adopted in Nigeria in order to avoid the deplorable conditions that have been associated with previous party systems.

Summary

We noted that Nigeria is a new country. It was created out of a number of entities by Britain as a colonial power in October 1, 1960. Today, over 80 million people are distributed throughout the country. Prior to the creation of more states in 1967, the peoples of Nigeria were distributed throughout three regions (later four regions with the creation of the Midwest from the West in 1964). Each region was dominated by one of the three major ethnic groups, the Hausa-Fulani in the North, the Yorubas in the West, and the Ibos in the East. In addition, there are a number of many smaller tribes in each of the regions.

Nigeria is a heterogeneous state. This heterogeneity and cultural fragmentation is evidenced by the over 250 different cultural and linguistic groups found within the country. This extraordinary diversity no doubt poses a lot of real problems in questions of national integration. As Bascom (1956) rightly recognized "it would be a mistake for Nigeria's political leaders to underestimate the stength of these cultural and linguistic loyalties" in the process of nation-building (p. 368).

We also noted that for about a decade, from 1954 to 1962, government in Nigeria rested upon a tripartite balance of power--the NPC to the north, the AG to the west, and the NCNC to the east. The torpedo of the AG rule in the Western Region by the coalition federal government of the NPC and NCNC was to mark the beginning of greater crises that were to come and which were, in turn, to affect the stability of the First Republic of Nigeria. The last straw that broke the camel's back was the Western Region Election Crises of 1965 which led to the first military coup d'etat of January 15, 1966. Since that first coup, Nigeria

has witnessed several other coups and counter-coups, threats of secession, and a civil war which lasted for thirty months.

Although the military returned power to a democratically elected civilian government on October 1, 1979, as a result of ineptitude and mass corruption of the political leaders coupled with the economic woes that were beginning to plague the country and the mass rigging and violence that characterized the August/September 1983 elections, the military again staged a comeback on December 31, 1983. This military coup brought to an end the Second Republic of Nigeria. At the time of this study, the military has not yet laid out a program for a return to civilian rule. Consequently, we do not know what date in the future a civilian government will be succeeding the present military administration in Nigeria.

Findings

In analyzing the data relating to the several dimensions associated with the thesis of this study, the following major findings are presented below:

1. There were three major political parties at the time of demise of the First Republic, and five major parties during the Second Republic. Thus, Nigeria's party system during these periods can be best described as multiparty systems.

2. Prior to 1964 when the Midwest Region was created from the Western Region, in all the regions, the major political parties relied for mass support upon the communal participation of the dominant ethnic group in the areas of traditional base. Consequently, we find that in Eastern Nigeria, the NCNC benefitted from the tendencies of the Ibos to identify the party with their collective interests. In the West the

Yorubas identified with the AG and, in the north, the NPC benefitted from the support it enjoyed of the Hausa-Fulanis.

3. Each of the major parties formed the ruling government from 1952 up to 1965 in their respective regions of habitation, except after 1962 when, with the declaration of the state of emergency in the West, the Akintola faction of the AG assumed the rulership of the Western government until the coup of January 15, 1966.

4. The major parties were engaged in unmitigated conflicts over national issues such as the 1953 motion for independence in 1956, census figures from 1953 up to 1964, and the federal election results of 1963 and 1964. The controversies surrounding each of these issues resulting principally from the interparty conflicts threatened the political stability of the country.

5. The prevailing political crises resulting from the controversies surrounding the three major events discussed (the 1953 motion for independence, census enumerations, and federal election results) weakened the spirit of the citizens' loyalty to one central government while strengthening subnationalism, loyalty to the ethnic group, the party, the region, and its institutions.

Conclusions

Based upon the findings, the following conclusions are drawn.

1. That the major political parties in Nigeria before and during the First Republic were parochial in outlook and character. They were ethnoregionally based, drawing most of their support mainly from a constituency limited principally by tribe and region.

2. Nigeria operated a multiparty system in both the First and Second Republics.

3. The major political parties had a negative net impact on national integration in Nigeria. By their actions and ultimate claims, they not only fostered tribal and regional loyalty and identity among their supporters to the detriment of loyalty to the federal government, but also constituted a unique threat to the existence of the state and impeded the processes of national integration. In other words, the political parties in Nigeria operated with antinational loyalties.

Thus, the findings of this study support the basic premise of this research, and that is, the lack of broad-base national parties in Nigeria made the major parties to constitute obstacles to national integration in Nigeria.

In light of Nigeria's condition of ethnoregional divisions, can anything be done to promote national integration and restore an effective democratic system?

While the correspondence of party divisions and ethnoregional divisions does not indicate that the former necessarily caused the latter, this study presented some evidence that multiparty divisions reinforced ethnic consciousness. An effective constitution for a "Third Republic" in Nigeria might, therefore, incorporate measures to reduce or inhibit this correspondence between regional and ethnic divisions and party base and alignment.

To some extent this was attempted in the constitution of the Second Republic by requiring parties to show a measure of interregional support in order to be recognized in state and national elections and by prohibiting symbols and slogans having an ethnic appeal. These provisions, while moving in the proper direction, proved to be inadequate to counteract the pre-existing patterns of alignment and centrifugal forces. It

is submitted that more drastic measures may be in order to encourage development of a two-party system in Nigeria.

The measures envisioned here would include:

a. Extensions of the Second Republic electoral restrictions to include more stringent requirements of an interregional showing as a precondition for recognition of a party in national or state elections,

b. Retention of the Second Republic's prohibitions against ethnic or regional appeals in party politics, and

c. Legal restrictions, patterned after the model of Senegal, but instead of allowing one of three parties to represent each of three designated set of ideological positions as in Senegal, there should be, in the case of Nigeria, two parties allowing only one to represent each of two designated sets of ideological positions.

This plan is advanced with the recognition that it will not be a panacea for Nigeria's problems with political integration and that the assumptions upon which it rests are open to challenge.

A number of objections might be raised with regard to the plan. First, it may be argued that even if it can be shown that two-party systems are more integrative than one-party or multiparty systems (and even here there are exceptions), it is difficult to demonstrate that a two-party system can be effectively imposed or adopted deliberately. Known two-party systems developed naturally, in response to historical, cultural, social, electoral, and other factors.

Furthermore, it can be argued that an effective two-party system is a reflection of integration rather than a means for achieving integration. Two-party systems work in countries like the United States and the United Kingdom because of a high degree of the existing political and socioeconomic consensus.

Similarly, some might argue that Nigeria did have one brief and unfortunate experience with a two-party system in 1964; the United Progressive Grand Alliance (UPGA) versus the National Nigerian Alliance (NNA). This two, however, cannot be considered as a two-party system. They were parties of "parties." In other words, each alliance was a coalition of a number of parties arranged simply for the explicit purpose of contesting the 1964 federal election and the 1965 regional elections in the Western Region. The alliances were not formed in the interest of Nigerian unity. The NNA was brought together by a belief in regionalization, while the UPGA was formed largely because of southern antipathy toward the north. Furthermore, each coalition was identified with the region which provided the leadership. As Okoli (1980) pointed out, the NNA was identified with the NPC which had its base in the Northern Region. The UPGA was identified with the NCNC which had its base in the East. It is little surprising then when, in spite of the two-party alliances, Chinwuba (1980) stated that "Nigerian politics in 1965 were more regionalized and ethnic based than in 1960..." (p. 99).

Nevertheless, there are reasons to believe that a two-party system has advantages from the standpoint of national integration, and that an electoral system can be designed to promote the development of such a system along lines which discourage ethnoregional polarization. The literature on political parties, as we shall discuss shortly, indicates that a two-party system may have a number of advantages.

Recommendation

We have been able to establish from the analysis of available data for this study that the particularistic nature of the major parties in Nigeria made them to constitute an impediment to political integration

in Nigeria. At this juncture the question might be asked, how can we organize parties in Nigeria so that they can become more broad-based national parties (or broadly inclusive combinations of the different ethnic and interest groups), so that the parties can best pursue their integrative functions? In other words, what type of party system can best help achieve the much desired broad-base national parties? What party system can best lead to a stable and effective integrative government in Nigeria? We suggest the two-party system as the most desirable and most capable of resolving the questions raised above. Before making case for the two-party system, we will examine critically the merits and demerits of the other types of party systems as instruments of national integration. In other words, we will analyze the net balance of the integrative and malintegrative consequences of particular party systems as a whole.

In spite of the fact that political parties do function as brokers or intermediaries between the people and the government and as potential mechanisms for integrating diverse groups within a state, they are not found in all political systems. Some governments are under military rule and some others are under royal regimes. In most of these cases, there exists no political parties.

In countries where political parties exist as institutions, they vary both in type, ideology, and in numbers. However, party systems are most commonly classified by political scientists according to the number of political parties that compete effectively for the control of government and regularly secure substantial portions of popular votes in elections. Based upon this criterion, a tripartite categorization of party systems has emerged. These are the one-party, the two-party, and the multiparty (three ore more) systems.

In some countries, only a single-party is allowed. All parties are prohibited except the single official state party. This is most commonly found in Communist totalitarian states. The Soviet Union is the oldest and perhaps the best example of this category of one-party states. This party system cannot be considered compatible with democratic government.

The second category includes one-party states in the developing countries, particularly in Asia and Africa (such as Iraq, Tanzania, Kenya, Guinea, and Ivory Coast) which are not totalitarian. In such cases, the official party is not ideological and tends to be less extreme. Most one-party state leaders in Africa, such as Nyerere of Tanzania, Sekou Toure of Guinea, and Houphouet-Boigny of Ivory Coast, believe that only a single party with the participation of the mass of the people can discourage ethnicism and build a spirit of national unity among diverse ethnic groups.

While the one-party system can provide for political stability as in Tanzania, it is not a guarantee that it can necessarily foster national integration as in Ivory Coast, for example. Under Houphouet-Boigny, political stability has been maintained mainly by operating a ruthless one-party police state. The result has been regional discontents and a trend towards multipartyism (Mazrui and Tidy, 1984).

Thus, there are some serious shortcomings of one-party systems as an integrating force. One danger of the single national party is that its democratic forms can actually conceal authoritarian government. As Hitcher and Harbold (1980) rightly observed,

> The absence of an opposition (in a one-party system) confronts the dominant leaders with neither rival nor checks; all too easily they suffer the delusions of indispensability and omniscience and drift into unqualified dictatorship (p. 180).

Furthermore, in one-party systems the government and the party tend to become indistinguishable. That is, the party becomes "governmentalized." According to Weiner and LaPalombara (1966), where the party and government are indistinguishable, "there tends to be no buffer between the formulation of public policy and its application. The mediating influence of the party is lost and in the process, the party loses much of its ability to interpret government to the people and people to power holders" (p. 415). They added, in such a case,

> Loyalty to the nation is equated with loyalty to the party and disaffection from the party may mean disaffection both from the national state and from the political process itself. The difficulties of achieving any kind of integration beyond the tribal territory is enormously complicated by such a pattern (p. 415).

Finally, the disadvantages and the malintegrative consequences of the one-party system can be best illustrated and summarized in the statement by Grodzins (1966). He argues that

> Rather than existing to put alternatives before the citizen, the single party attempts to repress all competition. Rather than being separate from and less than the government itself, where only the single party exists, state and party tend to become merged, one with the other, so that distinguishing their functions becomes difficult. Rather than relying on persuation, the single party ultimately depends upon threats of violence and violence itself. Fear replaces persuation for dissident groups. In such a situation integration becomes unattainable (p. 327).

From the foregoing analysis, it is apparent that the malintegrative consequences of the one-party system can outweigh the integrative functions it can perform, particularly in a federal, heterogeneous society with deep cleavages between cultural groups such as found in Nigeria. Similarly, we want to point out that many one-party systems arise out of a social milieu with severe and prolonged internal war such as after a revolution as witnessed in the People's Republic of China, the Soviet Union, the Demmocratic Republic of Vietnam, and Mexico (now a one-party

dominant state). The absence of such a social milieu as described above in contemporary Nigeria helps to militate against any attempt to impose a one-party system in the country.

Where there are three or more major political parties contesting effectively to win control of governmental power, the country is considered to have a multiparty system. Nigeria operated a multiparty system during her First and Second Republics. The great appeal of the multiparty system is its reflection of all shades of political views in a society. To some, this is the essence of democracy. But, multipartyism has serious limitations as an instrument of national integration, particularly in a society characterized by plurality of ethnic and linguistic groups, diverse social values, and differences in history, religion, and political culture.

First, governments in multiparty systems are often composed of coalitions of parties, thus making it difficult to distinguish the government and the opposition. In such cases, as Ebenstein (1980) noted, there is no clear alternative party to which the voters may turn if they become displeased with those in power. Similarly, where governments are formed by coalition of several parties, they are often weakened by the withdrawal of certain members of the coalition. In other cases, such a friction often leads to a dissolution of the cabinet. This situation creates political instability and insecurity among the diverse groups in the country. In developing countries, such as Nigeria, such an environment is an occasion for the major ethnic groups to rally their support behind a party whose base lay in their region. This is because a member of the ethnic group is most likely to protect the interests of the group. The result is increased subnationalism rather than loyalty to a common central government.

Furthermore, the multitude of partisan views which arise from a multiparty system, in most cases, may well overcomplicate public opinion on important national political questions. Besides, some parties may organize only in certain sections of the country; some parties may not even offer national programs, including performing integrative functions.

The dispersal of partisan support and organization in a multiparty system may have several other negative consequences with regard to national integration. For instance, Ferguson and McHenry (1967) pointed out that

> The disadvantages of having many parties is great... The multiparty system produces instability, confuses the electorate with a multitude of alternatives, represents local groups and factions, and diffuses responsibility for action and inaction. It would make continued functioning of the electoral system (and integration of diverse ethnic and socioeconomic groups) virtually impossible (p. 218).

Moreover, there is the genuine fear that any multiplication of parties would in fact be a multiplication of separatist tribal groups. This has been one of the grounds, according to Emerson (1966), on which the advocates of the one-party system and bipartism could defend their positions. As Weiner and LaPalombara (1966) observed, frequently in heterogeneous societies operating multiparty systems the political parties are often associated with the various fragmented cultures. In such a case, the parties have no intention of facilitating integration but aim instead at reinforcing loyalties to the subcultures with which they are identified.

Finally, Sartori (1966) points out that the multiparty system is the most insecure and less viable solution to national integration in heterogeneous society. He also points out that not only that the multiparty system cannot profit from the stimulation of a responsible opposition, but also that it is often paralyzed by cabinet instability

and by the presence of antisystem parties which replace competitive politics with irresponsible outbidding. Under these conditions, according to Sartori, the multiparty system

> is more an agent of disintegration than an instrument of aggregation and integration, and the outcome is sheer immobility, malintegration, or disorderly change, that is, an ideologically motivated, unrealistic sequence of abrupt changes that are likely to be unsuccessful (p. 175).

This lack of stability and continuity of government in multiparty states, as noted by Sartori, is examplified in what has happened in France and Italy. According to Ebenstein and others (1980), France, under the Third and Fourth Republics, and in Italy, electoral support has been so fragmented and unstable that governments have found it difficult to handle critical social, political, and economic problems without being voted out of office. The authors point out that in France, for example, "from 1951 to 1956, under the Fourth Republic, cabinets lasted an average of only seven months, and in Italy from 1945 to 1979 there were 39 cabinets" (p. 182). However, some multiparty countries such as the Netherlands, Switzerland, and the Scandinavian countries have had relatively stable governments for many decades.

A developing pluralistic society in search of national integration cannot afford to experience abrupt political changes and instability, nor can it afford increased polarization of the great number of cleavages that already exist in the society. This is why the multiparty system has failed repeatedly in Nigeria as a mechanism for fostering political stability and national integration. It is a party system that should not be experimented with anymore in Nigeria.

We have analyzed the one-party and multiparty systems and found them to be grossly inadequate and unworkable as instruments of integration, effective, and stable government in a pluralistic society such

as Nigeria. This brings us to an examination of the biparty system.

A two-party system, according to Thomas and Stoerker (1980), is a form of democratic politics in which power is exercised almost exclusively by two major parties, each of which has a realistic chance of winning control of the government, although one or more parties may also nominate candidates.

Like the other party systems, bipartyism has its own limitations. Unlike multiparty system, for example, it may not reflect accurately differing political views in the country. Secondly, the two-party system has been criticized for limiting voters to candidates of two parties. These choices, it has been argued, are relatively meaningless if both parties have similar programs. Furthermore, the two-party system has been accused of encouraging policy ambiguity or less coherent policies because "ambiguity" may be a "safe" strategy (Ebenstein and others, 1980).

In spite of the above limitations, the two-party system has numerous advantages and integrative power. First, it is interesting to note that none of the limitations or criticisms considers bipartyism as an instrument of malintegration or as a mechanism in which its malintegrative properties outweighs its integrative potentials. Secondly, some of the criticisms of the two-party system have not been argued in a balanced fashion. For instance, while it is true that in a two-party system voters are limited to candidates of two parties and that voters may not be getting a real choice, particularly where both parties have similar programs, it can also be equally argued that in such a case what has happened is that "the parties have succeeded in performing one of their main crucial functions: compromising different and conflicting points of view before the election" (Olson and Meyer, 1975, p. 127). This

success contributes to stability of the political system, an indispensible requirement in the process of nation-building.

Furthermore, in a two-party system majorities in the legislature are produced automatically by elections. This eliminates any need for constructing coalitions of parties to constitute a legislative majority, coalitions that often prove to be shaky and threatening to the stability of a government. Similarly, political activity is less fragmented and complicated. Since a two-party system frames many political questions in terms of either/or, according to Thomas and Stoerker (1980), choices for the voter are made less complex.

Another integrative feature of a two-party system is that both parties tend to be moderate--moderating political conflict and rejecting attitudes of extremism. According to Ebenstein and others (1975), because "the parties adopt moderate policies, they unify rather than divide the people. In such a situation, the parties help to integrate the country" as seen in the United States (p. 180). Morlan (1979) made a similar point when he argued that not only do the parties in a biparty system sufficiently define issues for voters, but when necessary "they can temporarily blur certain issues that are too sharply divisive for the society to bear" (p. 123). Such issues, he noted, cannot safely be ignored or neglected, but given time they can usually be worked out, whereas an immediate confrontation as might occur in multi-party systems might be totally destructive. The parties, he added, can "then serve as brokers for the compromise necessary for solution and for promoting political unity and national integration" (p. 123).

The biparty system also has the effect of offering the voter a clear-cut choice between alternative governments, something which is difficult in a multiparty state. Moreover, according to Wasserman and

others (1980), bipartyism prevents a country from being polarized or severely divided by keeping factions with unconventional or radical views from winning much power.

To Thomas and Stoerker (1980), the two-party system is an important institution because it normally affords a high degree of stability. According to Monsona (1973), the chief significance of the two-party system lies in its encouragement of broadly based national parties. As Emerson (1966) rightly observed, only nation-based competitive political parties can be counted upon to undertake the positive promotion of a sense of national identity and the fostering of the processes of nation-building and national integration. This advantage of the two-party system makes it the more appealing to the Nigerian situation. For the absence of broad-based national parties made the party system in Nigeria to constitute an impediment to political integration in the country.

Chambers (1966), after an extensive analysis of the American experience with the two-party system, suggests, as a general hypothesis, that a democratic two-party system can produce a net balance of integrative impacts on political development. In his 1966 work, Parties and Nation Building in America, he concluded that a two-party system has the capacity and advantage of

> turning group conflict from unlimited pluralistic into manageable dualistic channels before it reached the decision-making centers of government. As compared with the tensions of deadlock that are often associated with indigeneous pluralism or multi-partyism, party dualism reduced malintegrative strain (p. 103).

One other appealing feature of the two-party system is its fit of Duverger's natural law of politics. Sartori (1966) points out that Duverger has, through his detailed study of political parties, suggested

a sort of natural law of politics, for according to him:

> Dualism is "natural," and while one does not always find a two-party system one almost always finds, all over the world, 'a dualism of tendencies'--left-right; conservative-liberal; majority-opposition; movement-status quo; and so on (p. 137).

Finally, after an exhaustive study of three multiparty systems--simple pluralism, moderate pluralism, and extreme pluralism--Sartori (1966) came to the conclusions that

> the simple two-party pluralism is the most secure working solution to problems of integration in a pluralistic society...It obliges the parties to perform integrative functions; while discouraging the growth of a highly ideologized policy orientation and the polarization of the party system. Under these conditions a realistic and pragmatic process of orderly change, that is, a gradual change which does not throw off balance the equilibrium of a political system is very likely to be successful (p. 175).

From the above analysis of the three types of party systems, we find that the potential and the net impact of the integrative consequences of the biparty system far surpasses not only its malintegrative tendencies, if any, but also greatly outweighs any integrative merits that may be associated with either the one-party system or the multiparty system. The tremendous integrative features of the two-party system is the reason why we recommend that Nigeria adopt the two-party system in its Third Republic. Common membership in two parties throughout the 19 states in Nigeria will assist in drawing together the most heterogeneous population of the country. The names of the two major parties, with time, will thus serve as symbols that will help to unify the millions of peoples from the different ethnic groups.

We recommend that a two-party system should be included in the Third Nigerian Federal Republican Constitution as the nation's party system. Rather than be like the 1977 Electoral Decree No. 73 (which was restated

in the 1979 federal constitution) requirements for the two-party system should be quite different. The two parties to be registered must have offices in all the states of the federation and the executive body of the party must be drawn from all of the states of the Federal Republic of Nigeria. This requirement will make the parties broad based national parties, thus avoiding the parochial, ethnoregional based parties that characterized the previous two Republics which fostered subnationalism or ethnicism at the expense of loyalty to a central government.

The idea for the deliberate adoption of a particular party system or restricting parties to designated ideologies seems strange. However, it is not original with this author. In an effort to reinvigorate the decaying single party system in Senegal, President Senghor, in 1977, revived multiparty constitutionalism in Senegal through deliberate planning. Senghor's plan provided for three parliamentary parties. To achieve this goal, he legalized two new parties. Of the three parties provided for "one is to advocate liberal democratic policies, another to support social democratic or slightly left-of-center policies, and a third to put forward extreme left-wing Marxist-Socialist policies" (Mazrui and Tidy, 1984, p. 291). In addition to the planned three party system, President Senghor also introduced a new electoral law providing for a system of proportional representation in the national assembly.

It is the opinion of this researcher that a two-party system will help to promote stability and effective government in Nigeria and these qualities will, in turn, help foster national integration. With two broad-based national parties, the diverse ethnic, socioeconomic, formal, and informal groups in the country will become less polarized. All these will help to ameliorate the disintegrative polarization of existing cleavages, a feature that had been associated with the previous

multiparty systems. With harmony and unity among the diverse groups and political stability, the likelihood of the military seizing power might be greatly reduced as polarization within the military must have also been greatly reduced with the biparty system.

However, bipartyism will not automatically be a panacea to the problems of integration in Nigeria. The effectiveness and workability of such two-party system as an instrument of national integration will depend very much upon the willingness of Nigerians, the political leaders, in particular, to engage in fair play in politics and make the party system work. At this juncture, the advise of Weiner and LaPalombara (1966) is important to Nigeria's political leaders. They must search out other

> a) institutional arrangements that will encourage dialogue among the diverse ethnic groups, b) unblock communication channels, c) keep political and governmental leaders on their toes, d) be more accountable and facilitate the articulation and aggregation of conflicting interests and in these ways create a sense of political unity out of ethnic diversity (p. 418).

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