THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS FOR A CRITICAL REAPPRAISAL OF THE ROLE OF INSTRUCTIONAL MEDIA IN AMERICAN PUBLIC EDUCATION: A PSYCHOANALYTIC PERSPECTIVE

By

RICHARD KEITH PURSLEY

Bachelor of Arts

Oklahoma State University

Stillwater, Oklahoma

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Thesis Approved:

Randall Koetting
Thesis Adviser

Joyce S. Friske

Robert

Norman N. Durham
Dean of the Graduate College

PREFACE

This study represents an attempt to address some of the philosophical inadequacies that underlie the use of instructional media in American public schools. By using as a starting point the works of the writers in the curriculum field who have become known as the "reconceptualists," research will range quite far outside the traditional boundaries. From social, legal, and political issues, to the abstractions of the Frankfurt School and Freud's psychodynamics, a line of argumentation will be developed that reappraises the theoretical foundations of the field of instructional media.

It is possible that the indiscriminate use of instructional media as a teaching device may inadvertently interfere with the development of some students by its participation in conflict resolution at the site of the ego. When understood from a philosophical vantage point other than the current dominant one, it may be concluded that the use of instructional media in the classroom should be limited until more is known about the manner in which the individual learner experiences media.

I wish to express my sincere appreciation to all the people who have helped me in this work and during my stay at Oklahoma State University. In particular, I am indebted to

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

This paper represents an attempt to identify some of the foundations necessary for a critical reappraisal of the field of instructional media. For reasons detailed below, this investigation will proceed from a psychoanalytic perspective. Because the field is without a history of research of this type, it will be necessary to range outside the traditional boundaries defined by the history of instructional media and its roots in the behaviorist psychologies. Implications for instructional media will be drawn from sources in philosophy, sociology, psychology, and political science to create the argumentation for a reassessment of the role instructional media plays in instructional design in American public education.

Admittedly, there are a variety of design schemes that separately represent valid means for selecting and arranging information for instructional purposes.[1] Typically, "instructional media" is defined as a component of such schemes and used as a delivery system to facilitate reaching instructional objectives which have been stated behaviorally.[2] It will be asked here, however, whether the individual teacher who conceives of instructional media solely within

the parameters of goal-oriented teaching strategies may inadvertently overlook the fact that the manner in which a child experiences media in the classroom may directly or indirectly impact that child's development regardless of the content of the instruction. This is the central question of this paper.

In considering the use of media in an instructional setting there are three areas of concern:

1. that which is being influenced, i.e. the mental structure of a child and how that structure accommodates data;
2. the influencing stimuli, i.e. that which converges upon this structure;
3. the influencing process, i.e., the alterations that occur in the child's mind in response to these stimuli.[3]

The first concern traditionally has been the province of educational psychologists, while the second and third have been the object of instructional designers and psychotherapists, respectively. Typically, the third area has been ignored by those who use media in public schools.

The field of instructional media has developed in conjunction with the systems approach to instructional design, predominantly with regard to the structure and delivery of influencing stimuli based upon a conception of the learner that has been created by psychologists of the behaviorist-associationist schools of thought.[4] The result

has been the virtual omission of any serious consideration of the nature of the internal experience (in a psychoanalytic sense) of the individual who experiences communications delivered via a given medium. This paper represents an evolution of thought concerning this omission. Hopefully, it culminates in a contribution to the search for the theoretical underpinnings for a critical reappraisal of the field.

It is interesting to note at the start that even if it is established that the field of instructional media has ignored the third area of concern as described above, it still may not be readily evident that critique of the role media plays in instruction is warranted. The obvious potential for classroom applications of extraordinary technological advances seems to generate more enthusiasm than caution for their use.[5] Herbert Marcuse (1966) has stated that this phenomena characterizes our whole social system.

> Neither the mechanization and standardization of life, nor the mental impoverishment, nor the growing destructiveness of present-day progress provides sufficient ground for questioning the 'principle' which has governed the progress of Western civilization. The continual increase of productivity makes constantly more realistic the promise of an even better life for all (pp. 3-4).

Where, then, lies the impetus for critique? Chapter II will develop a line of reasoning that begins with an assessment of the positivist rationality which infuses instructional media as an academic discipline, and draw the conclusion that critique emanates from the apparent limita-

tions. An underlying theme for this paper, however, will be that critique actually begins in more fundamental ways that are not so easily articulated and discussed; that critique may begin in thoughtful reflection about the way we educate children and the feelings we have about those thoughts.

For Freud (1961), reflection concerning the technical and cultural development of people in civilization necessarily results in unsettling feelings, as he observed in the closing paragraph of Civilization and Its Discontents.

> Men have gained control over the forces of nature to such an extent that with their help they would have no difficulty in exterminating one another to the last man. They know this, and hence comes a large part of their current unrest, their unhappiness and their mood of anxiety (p.104).

Perhaps in a similar fashion (but on a less grand scale) the same anxiety emerges upon recognition of a growing technical sophistication of the delivery of instructional information and the evaluation of behaviorally stated goals. As we become more and more able to regulate the process of instruction we develop systems of information delivery that are adaptable to specific styles of learning rather than specific learners. If the technical design of education were perfected, would we exterminate the learner as individual? Presumably, a variety of factors function to prevent this from ever occurring, but a more realistic question emerges: to the extent that technical mastery of the process of education has been achieved, what has occurred within the individual learner? This is what a reappraisal of the

the individual learner? This is what a reappraisal of the field of instructional media seeks to discover.

The literature in the field typically treats this question tangentially. For instance, in a foreword written for a collection of essays concerning the translation of instructional media theory into practice, Walter K. Beggs, then dean of the Teachers College at the University of Nebraska, observes that "Modern man, in short, must learn to live in a milieu where change, tension, uncertainty, and frustration are endemic (Wiman and Meierhenry, 1969, p. v)." With the enlightened use of instructional media teachers may more effectively endow their students with the skills to cope with an oppressive world. What Beggs failed to do, however, was address the more immediate issue of how teachers help students accommodate the same change, tension, and frustration within their own learning environments.

It is understandable that this should be the case. If teachers risk reflective consideration of the implications of their technology in the classroom they risk personally experiencing anxiety of the sort that Freud described. It is certainly easier to ignore the issue because current praxis offers no satisfying resolution of these feelings. For example, consider the classroom teacher who is given instructional materials that are prepared by a commercial production company or a state agency. If the content of the materials meets curriculum objectives, and is accepted by governing agencies and the community, then the teacher may

be disinclined to analyze the content more carefully for its treatment of values, beliefs or actions. Thoughtful reflection can reveal small inconsistencies which may be argued as overstepping the public interest in education and encroaching upon an individual's private concerns. The border between public and private interests is not at all clear, and the teacher who approaches the issue risks the uneasy feelings of grappling with problems that seem to defy resolution.[6] The seduction of technically designed systems of instruction is that they obviate questions of philosophical import.

It is undeniable that instruction intrudes into personal areas of life, and it is perfectly legitimate, defensible, and desirable that American public education do so because of a vested public interest that children learn certain things and behave in certain ways. If, however, one experiences any concern for the means of such learnings, then the choice that confronts educators becomes whether to ignore the concern, or seek to deal with it. If the choice is for the latter, then the educator is faced with enormously complex questions such as the one posed at the beginning of this chapter regarding the implications for individual learners if instructional media is approached from outside its traditional theoretical structure.

This paper will not answer this question but it will attempt to identify a starting point for investigation. As mentioned, Chapter II will review the critique of positivist

rationality that underlies the use of instructional media, then follow one strand of philosophical thought to suggest Freud's theory of psychodynamics as a structure for an alternate theory base for the field. The unique nature of Freud's theories will be shown to split an investigation of the manner in which an individual experiences instructional media into two broad approaches: the individual may be defined and understood in terms of society, and in terms of self. Chapter III will review the broader social implications from a legal standpoint, and conclude that the evolution of Supreme Court decisions vis-à-vis American public education precludes definition of instuctional media by other than a positivist perspective, thus rendering psychoanalytic investigations moot. On the other hand, there is wide latitude available in the use of instructional media when it is understood as a component in interpersonal communication, as Chapter IV will demonstrate. An historical review of the general application of psychoanalysis to education reveals great confusion as to the meaning of Freud's work, but emergent common themes (such as the manner in which an individual resolves conflict) point the way for application to the use of media in the classroom. As a supplement to Chapter IV, a general review of Freud's theory of personality is presented in the Appendix. Chapter V will attempt to develop a synthesis of these diverse sources of influence to conclude that instructional media may indeed participate in personal development. Until these influences

are better understood, the immediate implications may be for restraint in media use for instructional purposes in American public schools.

ENDNOTES

[1]See B. F. Skinner, The Technology of Teaching (Englewood Cliffs, N. J., 1968); Bela Banathy, Instructional Systems (Belmont, Calif., 1968); James Hoetker, Systems, System Approaches, and the Teacher (The National Council of Teachers of English, 1972); Carlton W. H. Erickson and David H. Curl, Fundamentals of Teaching with Audiovisual Technology (2nd ed., New York, 1965).

[2]Some authors take a slightly different approach by viewing instructional media not as a component of instructional design but as a process in itself. See Phillip J. Sleeman, Ted C. Cobun, and D. M. Rockwell, Instructional Media and Technology: A Guide to Accountable Learning Systems (New York, 1979). The authors prefer the term "multimediation" as an active element of systematically planned instructional situations.

[3]Otto Fenichel, M. D., "The Means of Education," The Psychoanalytic Study of the Child, I (1945), p. 281.

[4]Banathy describes why this should be by tracing the evolution of the "systems concept" and "systems approach" from World War II with problem solving firmly grounded in the scientific method. He suggests the very semantics of the term "system" implies the integration of specific components to attain a predetermined purpose, thus reflecting the legacy of Thorndike, Pavlov, Guthrie, and the other mechanistically-oriented psychologists. See also Robert M. Gagne, "Learning and Communication," in Raymond V. Wiman and Wesley C. Meierhenry (ed.), Educational Media: Theory Into Practice, (Columbus, Ohio, 1969), in example of the application of behaviorist psychology to media utilization.

[5]See James W. Brown, Richard B. Lewis and Fred F. Harcleroad, AV Instruction: Technology, Media, and Methods (6th ed., New York, 1983),17. "It is fortunate that the potentialities of modern technology may be combined with educational planning to provide resources needed for this purpose. The desirable result of this effort should be a viable system involving purposes, processes, people, materials, machines, facilities, and environments leading to 'the best for each' - the cornerstone of a democratic society."

[6]Cf. Kenneth A. Strike, Educational Policy and the Just Society (Urbana, 1982), p. 87.

CHAPTER II

THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS: PHILOSOPHICAL ASPECTS

This chapter represents an attempt to discover the philosophical foundations necessary to begin a reassessment of the field of instructional media from a psychoanalytic perspective. It will begin with a brief summary of the critique of scientific rationality as it has been described by some educators. Following that, it will be suggested that the work of critical theorist Jurgen Habermas may be used to point to Freud's theory of psychodynamics as a possible structure for critique of the field. The sociological nature of Freud's work will be reviewed to better legitimate its application to the investigation begun here. Finally, a framework will be suggested as a starting point to guide investigation outside the confines of traditional research in instructional media.

Analysis of the issues surrounding the impact of technologically advanced instructional media on students is often ignored or given only cursory treatment at best within the literature. For instance, Heinich, Molenda, and Russell (1985, p. 28) note the argument that instructional technology tends to dehumanize students, then dismiss this fear

by concluding that dehumanization comes not from the technology itself but in the way teachers perceive their students. "In other words, it is not technology that tends to mechanize people but the uses to which people put technology." This may have a reassuring ring, but it says nothing about what constitutes appropriate uses or why inappropriate uses arise. In discussing the implications of a scientific system of education, Elliot Eisner (1979) expressed the opinion that dehumanization does stem from the technology itself.

> The technology we design to expand our freedom and flexibility becomes our constraint. The teacher who does not conceive of the educational process as a type of assembly line that processes the child in fields that are amenable to measurement has no alternative but to adapt to the demands placed on him or her by the school or school district, or to leave teaching, or to attempt to beat the system by providing the illusion of compliance (p. 2).

It appears the acceptance of this technology has become so widespread that it has almost become a part of our "common sense" regarding educational praxis. Michael Apple (1975) observes

> . . . the modes of discourse that curriculum workers and other schoolmen employ often seem to be manipulative and deterministic - in the dominance of a vulgar behaviorism, for instance, in much of our thinking about life in classrooms... The use of such modes of thought also mirrors the remarkable lack of self-reflectiveness among members of the curriculum field. That is, our 'habits of thought' are exactly that: habits that have become part of our taken- for-granted reality, a reality that has become so commonsensical that we have ceased even to question it (pp. 120 - 121).

As in the curriculum field, the prevailing notion within the field of instructional media is that inquiry naturally proceeds from a scientific perspective. The examination of the role of instructional media within the instructional design model from a perspective other than a scientific one is an issue that has been discounted by some researchers, if the treatment afforded the philosophical ramifications of the use of instructional media in teaching settings is any measure. For example, Jerrold E. Kemp (1985, p. 18) identifies his philosophical orientation toward his ten-element plan for instructional design by stating "I am designing a program of learning experiences for learners so that together we will be successful in accomplishing the stated goals and objectives." He continues by stating that "the resources used make substantial contribution to carrying out the activities and accomplishing the objectives they were selected to serve (p. 133)." Because Kemp identifies specific learning outcomes before the fact, he grounds his approach in a behaviorist model. To state goals and objectives without reference to how they are determined is not viewed as problematic. By virtue of the total omission of any consideration of alternative modes of inquiry, Kemp presumes a tacit acceptance by the reader that his design proceeds from a scientific rationality.

If analysis of the field of instructional media were possible from a perspective other than a technical one, it

is not immediately apparent from the literature. This is not to say that such analysis is not possible, but it is not easily initiated because to do so may require moving outside the field of education to seek the intellectual foundations necessary for meaningful critique of current praxis.[1] It is important to note at the outset that there are powerful forces that act to prevent such exploration.

For one, in order to discuss the philosophical or emotional impact of the technical nature of instructional media it is necessary to use language outside the scientific vocabulary. When this happens such comments may be regarded as speculative (that is, biased in and of themselves), and dismissed as irrelevant.[2]

Another difficulty is found in the illusion of objectivity inherent in scientific models. Essential to the scientific method is the opportunity for the unexpected discovery and unplanned exploration, and this implies a free learning atmosphere conducive to original thought. Within a behaviorist model, even those that propose to include elements of student experimentation, the experiences tend to be rigidly controlled so that genuine discovery is not easily accomplished. What is described as "scientific instructional design" is typically "technical instructional design." The elements of scientific rationality that would insure a school not resemble a factory are routinely left behind.[3]

A third difficulty lies in the allure of mechanistic

approaches which function to safeguard against teacher error in the everyday practice of teaching. Elliot Eisner points to Edward L. Thorndike as one of the individuals who first influenced learning theory in this regard. Eisner (1979, p. 6) quotes Thorndike to demonstrate Thorndike's belief that it is possible to "discover the laws of learning so that teachers could rely not on intuition, chance, artistry, or talent but rather on tested principles and procedures for managing the student's learning."[4] Thorndike's emphasis on control led to intricately designed instructional systems geared for specific settings. This approach became the dominating style of instructional design in education for years to come.

These forces taken together function synergistically to form the appeal of technical models of instructional design. The allure of objective, technical plans wrapped in scientific verbage could account for the ready acceptance in 1949 of Ralph Tyler's Basic Principles of Curriculum and Instruction.[5] As one of the most influential works of its kind, it is a statement of what seems to be a clear, logical four-step guide to instructional planning. Tyler intended for this to be only a statement of guiding principles, but the work was mistakenly interpreted as a literal blueprint for designing educational experiences.[6] Why was Tyler's work taken in this way? Perhaps it is easier to follow a formula approach to the implementation of curriculum than to experience a re-examination of one's fundamental values before

beginning to design classroom activities.

In quoting Gunnar Myrdal, James MacDonald suggests that genuine objectivity in curriculum design results when the designer is able to escape three pervasive influences: the powerful heritage of earlier writings; the influences of the entire cultural, social, economic, and political milieu of the society where he lives, works, and earns his living and status; and the influence stemming from one's own personality.[7] Certainly this is not accomplished easily. Apple (1975) says

> . . . it may be essential that we - curriculists and other educators - devote a major portion of our efforts to developing a "critical science," one that will have an emancipatory interest and will persistently raise questions concerning the dominant demands in education and in other institutions for bringing all aspects of behavior under purposive-rational rubrics of technical control so that certainty will be enhanced. We must, then, look to other modes of analysis that will act as counterbalance to the perspectives usually employed in our work (p. 126).

The proposal that educators develop a critical theory of education suggests a review of the work of the critically oriented social theorists of the Frankfurt School who have written about the permeation of positivistic rationality throughout society to the virtual exclusion of all other forms of knowledge.[8] The existence of body of literature that can provide insight into the values underpinning the field of education is quite compelling, especially since the literature in education generally lacks the theoretical sophistication characteristic of literature of the Frankfurt

School.

One educator who is using the Frankfurt School to identify some of the preliminary steps in developing a critical theory for education is Henry Giroux. Giroux (1983, pp. 14-15) seeks to "develop modes of critique fashioned in a theoretical discourse that mediates the possibility for social action and emancipatory transformation." He is quick to point out that the task of developing a critical theory of education is imposing, if only because of the complex nature of the writings produced by those associated with the Frankfurt School. Moreover, this vast output does not represent unified thought; rather, it is a collection of ideas loosely bound together by agreement in general principles.[9] On the other hand, he observes that even from our current vantage point, we can glimpse the enormous effect a fully articulated expression of this thought relative to education might have.

> While it is impossible to elaborate in any detail on the implications of the work of the Frankfurt School for a theory of radical pedagogy, I can point briefly to some general considerations. I believe that it is clear that the thought of the Frankfurt School provides a major challenge and a stimulus to educational theorists who are critical of theories of education tied to functionalist paradigms based on assumptions drawn from a positivist rationality. For instance, against the positivist spirit that infuses existing educational theory and practice, whether it takes the form of the Tyler model or various systems approaches, the Frankfurt School offers an historical analysis and a penetrating philosophical framework that indict the wider culture of positivism, while at the same time providing insight into how the latter becomes incorporated within the ethos and practices of schools (p. 34).

If positivism is taken as an understanding that the meaning of knowledge is defined by scientific procedures, then the technology of education is acceptable only if the scientific interests that legitimate them are acceptable. When the interests of education are expressed within the context of scientific inquiry it becomes desirable to be able to control for quality and efficiency and to predict learning outcomes. If, however, the interests are defined outside this scientific rationality from a philosophical, or more specifically, an epistemologic perspective, then the instructional design model can be shown to have limitations.[10] It appears that in order to communicate effectively about learning theory it is first necessary to identify the underlying interests. MacDonald (1975) observes

> . . . we are often, for example, talking at different value levels and thus miss the whole point of each other's thinking. . . . Thus, people have either assumed that we all shared the same basic perspective, or that you simply could not communicate with certain other persons (p. 285).

In this regard, another representative of the Frankfurt School, German philosopher Jurgen Habermas, can provide a basis for the intellectual argumentation essential to seeking a common ground that can help unify the various learning paradigms.[11]

Habermas states that knowledge cannot be divorced from constitutive cognitive interests.[12] In so doing, he posits alternative but equally valid forms of knowledge, thus eliminating the objectivist illusion that currently domin-

ates learning theory. This understanding invalidates one of the primary legitimating factors of behavioristic approaches to learning which presumes that the acquisition of empirical data is the only valid means of research. Habermas (1971) identifies three forms, or processes, of inquiry.

> The specific viewpoints from which, with transcendental necessity, we apprehend reality ground three categories of possible knowledge: information that expands our power of technical control; interpretations that make possible the orientation of action within common traditions; and analyses that free consciousness from its dependence on hypostatized powers (p. 313).

The empirical-analytic sciences pose a context that creates rules evaluating statements regarding the creation of theories and the assessment of their accuracy. Examples of this would be the study of physics or chemistry, as well as the social sciences that have adopted a technical approach.

In contrast, the historical-hermeneutic sciences gain knowledge in a different way. Access to the facts is provided by the understanding of meaning, not empirical observation. "The verification of lawlike hypotheses in the empirical-analytic sciences has its counterpart here in the interpretation of texts (Habermas, p. 309)." This methodology, however, is ultimately circular because it eliminates from consideration the interpreter's pre-understanding and in this sense has its own objectivist tendencies.[13]

From this recognition that particular value sets guide the empirical-analytic and historical-hermeneutic sciences,

Habermas identifies a third method of inquiry that seeks to transcend the problems of objectivism.

> A critical social science...is concerned with going beyond this goal to determine when theoretical statements grasp invariant regularities of social action as such and when they express ideologically frozen relations of dependence that can in principle be transformed (Habermas, p. 310).

The roots for the only adequate psychology for critical theory, to date, can be found embodied in the work of Freud and his process of psychoanalysis.[14] The essence of this approach is established by the concept of self-reflection, (the releasing the subject from dependence on hypostatized powers). In this sense, this approach is "emancipatory" in nature.

The three categories of knowledge constitutive interests as defined by Habermas may be summarized as:

KNOWLEDGE CONSTITUTIVE INTEREST

Prediction and Control	Understanding	Emancipation

Figure 1. Knowledge Constitutive Interests

Apple sees compelling implications for educators in Habermas's work. To suggest that knowledge cannot be divorced from human interest leads us to question the dominant demands in education for bringing all aspects of behavior

under quantifiable, technical control. Rather than providing a vantage point of value-free inquiry, current research is probably guided by highly specific presumptions. Apple (1975) concludes by stating

> . . . the search for a process of schooling that is less economically, racially, and personally oppressive requires a concommitant effort to bring to the surface our basic rules and inerests so that they may be reconstructed. It may very well be the case that the constitutive elements of the strict sciences must be subsumed under those sciences with an emancipatory image (p. 128).

Embedded within Apple's statement, however, is an ambiguity. In stating that our basic rules and interests must be brought to the surface, it is not clear whether Apple means those rules and interests that have evolved within our phylogenesis (that is, at the level of society), or those that have been internalized by the individual and filtered through one's own unique psychological make-up (one's ontogenesis). It is a subtle distinction that is difficult to draw because of the continual interrelation between the two, but it is a distinction that is crucial to the premise of this paper. A review of the sociological nature of Freud's work clarifies this distinction.

Freud's sociological perspective differs from others in that it is inherently tied to the biological organism of human beings through the notion of instincts. The precondition for progress is the ability of society to check this biological nature in favor of goals defined outside the individual: civilization begins when the primary objective

of the individual is renounced.[15]

Freud labels the inhibition of uncontrolled urges as the shift from the "pleasure principle" to the "reality principle."[16] This is characterized by changes in an individual's value system from emphasis on immediate gratification to delayed gratification; from play to work; from receptiveness to productiveness. Thus, in exchange for the security of the group, one is willing to forsake the total absence of repression. These principles correspond to some extent with Freud's early distinction between the conscious and the unconsciousness. The pleasure principle and the reality principle represent two distinct mental processes existent simultaneously in the individual.

The interplay between these two processes is of extreme importance in Freudian theory. When the pleasure principle comes into conflict with the reality principle, the individual experiences first the painful fact that all desires cannot be gratified, followed by the understanding that the reality principle supercedes the pleasure principle. The individual learns to substitute immediate gratification for the guarantee of satisfaction at some later time. In this sense, the reality principle does not destroy the pleasure principle; rather, it safeguards it.[17]

> The adjustment of pleasure to the reality principle implies the subjugation and diversion of the destructive force of instinctual gratification, of its incompatibility with the established societal norms and relations, and, by that token, implies the transubstantiation of pleasure itself (Marcuse, 1966, p. 13).

Through the action of the reality principle, then, the animal drives of the individual are transformed into an organized ego. The function of reason emerges, and the individual strives for "what is useful." The scope of man's desires and the means for satisfying them is dramatically widened, but the identification of these ends and means are external to the subject. In seeking the protection of society from his own destructive tendencies, the individual exchanges freedom for constraints. For Freud, this is the great traumatic event in the development of man, in both the genus (phylogenesis) and the individual (ontogenesis).[18] Phylogenetically, this trauma occurred first when man left a state of unrestrained, self-centered motives to form the primal horde, a simple society dominated by a patriarch with exclusive sexual privileges. In an act of revolt triggered by sexual jealousy, the leader was murdered. Freud suggested that the memory of this primal revolt remained repressed in succeeding generations and that many forms of primitive rituals were re-enactments of the primal revolt. To prevent the actual recurrence of such revolts norms were institutionalized as controls. In this manner, the primal horde was slowly transformed into civilized society.

Civilized society manipulates individuals by frustrating the individual's instincts and offering other forms of satisfaction. The individual is taught the social taboos, and through the dominance of the reality principle, comes to despise his own instinctual urges and fear the

expression of such urges by others. By capitalizing on the fear, guilt, and anxiety felt by the subjects of a society, great power can be vested in a few leaders. Freud perceived a strong parallel between the individual and state, and the child and parent. Just as the child is continuously forced into submission to the will of the parent, so is the subject compelled to obey the law.

To continue this analogy, it is important to note that the child learns to regulate his own actions in accordance to the admonitions of the parent. In like manner, the repression of the individual by society has been supported by repression from within in the form of the superego. Marcuse (1966) observes that

> . . . the unfree individual introjects his masters and their commands into his own mental apparatus. The struggle against freedom reproduces itself in the psyche of man, as the self-repression of the repressed individual, and his masters and their institutions. It is this mental dynamic which Freud unfolds as the dynamic of civilization (p. 16).

To return to Apple's comment, it would appear that the rules and interests that make school oppressive operate in two ways: directly via the efforts of society to control the process of schooling; and indirectly via internalized repression learned and internalized by each person. Analysis of the process of schooling must include consideration of the nature of repression on two levels: the level of society and the level of the individual.

If artifical categories may be created for the purpose

of analysis, then Figure 1 may be expanded into the matrix of Figure 2, illustrating the dominant interests that stem from positivistic understandings of education regardless of the level of concern.

	KNOWLEDGE CONSTITUTIVE INTEREST		
LEVEL	Prediction and Control	Understanding	Emancipation
Philogenic	Dominant Interest	Subordinate Interest	Subordinate Interest
Ontogenic	Dominant Interest	Subordinate Interest	Subordinate Interest

Figure 2. Knowledge Constitutive Interests and Social Levels

Given this distinction between levels, a re-examination of Apple's contention that it may be necessary to subsume the constitutive elements of the strict sciences to those with an emancipatory image may be attempted from the vantage of the individual as well as those institutions external to the individual. To analyze the values that underpin education from a broader social perspective is to treat the issue politically; to analyze the question from a personal perspective is to treat the issue psychologically.

Chapter III of this paper will develop the argumenta-

tion that given the political nature of the institutions that form American education, the question of whether prevailing interests can be changed is a moot issue. The evolution of litigation through the American judicial process has created a system of power balance that automatically precludes any fundamental redesign of the process of public education to accommodate emancipatory interests. In Freudian terms, the social constraints upon the instincts have evolved to a position of pre-eminence vis-à-vis the tangible product of school media. Thus, while it may be possible to discuss in theoretical terms any new application or understanding of instructional media as it is currently employed within the Instructional Design Model, such investigation is largely meaningless in practical application.

Conversely, Apple's statement assumes profound proportions if considered exclusively from an individual perspective. If, as Habermas suggests, Fruedian theory can be used as a structured critical theory, then implications emerge that are both theoretical and practical. (See Figure 3)

KNOWLEDGE CONSTITUTIVE INTEREST

LEVEL	Prediction and Control	Understanding	Emancipation
Phylogenic	Dominant Interest May not be subsumed to other interest	Subordinate Interest Subsumed to dominant interest	Subordinate Interest Subsumed to dominant interest
Ontogenic	Dominant Interest May be subsumed to other interest	Subordinate Interest May be subsumed to other interest	Subordinate Interest May become dominant interest

Figure 3. Knowledge Constitutive Interests and Social Levels - Expanded

An authoritarian society, such as a feudal order, promotes submission through the promise of protection, where a democracy favors the ideals of independence, self-reliance and active mastery.[19] Modern America contains elements of both and indoctrinates students into the social order by the presentation of the potentially contradictory goals of submission (as patriotism) and self-sufficiency. The individual is caught in the perpetual struggle between the demands of self and society, and the personal resolution of this conflict (for purposes here, conflict resulting from the experience of instructional media) tends to be ignored at the level of society.

Such is not the case when instructional media is considered at the ontogenic level, for the individual may discover through psychotherapy the mechanism of social repression. In this way, knowledge that comes from psychoanalytic perspectives is emancipatory.

Two implications emerge for instructional media. For one, as suggested above, psychotherapy can provide a means of understanding the way repression occurs, and because all people share a certain biological commonality, generalizations about the functioning of this mechanism may be proposed. Second, and more importantly, the principles of psychoanalysis can provide a means of regulating the excesses of repression. For instance, the influence of external forces are experienced at the site of the ego. In an educational setting this includes the experience of the student-teacher relationship in which the teacher provides a model with which a child forms a strong attachment. The teacher who is distanced from the student by the intervention of instructional media certainly does not jeopardize a child in the sense of a mother distancing from her child, but the diminishing of that mutuality may hinder the child's development of identifications.[20] If a child's attention is skillfully focused upon, say, a rationally developed lesson presented on video tape, then the opportunity for seeking the appropriate models and examples for the proper sublimation of the energy of the instinctual urges is diminished, and the student is left with an unresolved conflict at the

site of the ego. If healthy maturation comes from appropriate resolution of this conflict, and it can be shown that the process of experiencing instructional media participates actively or passively in the process, then it is appropriate to seek to understand the impact of media in psychoanalytic terms, and to act in a manner that promotes the emancipatory interests of the individual learner.

ENDNOTES

[1]Cf. Trent Schroyer, The Critique of Domination (Boston, 1973), for his assessment of the need to move outside systems designed in accordance with a positivist rationality in order to develop a basis for critique. Schroyer argues against the logic of all kinds of purposive rational action which result in "a stoic acceptance of the social necessity of separating political decision from ethics, science from values, and social theory from the systematic analysis of utopian possibilities." (p. 12)

[2]See Michael Apple, "Scientific Interests and the Nature of Educational Institutions," in William Pinar (ed.), Curriculum Theorizing (Berkeley, 1975), p. 124. Cf. Kurt Hubner, Critique of Scientific Reason (Chicago, 1983), who approaches "technology" historically because its present-day form represents radical changes in its underlying intentions, in its self-conception, and in its particular aims and goals. It has developed a world of "intrinsic needs." "To rebel against rationality or progress today is for most people tantamount to protesting against the divine world order in times past (p. 214)."

[3]See Henry A. Giroux, Theory and Resistance in Education: A Pedagogy for the Opposition (South Hadley, Mass., 1983). Giroux argues that contemporary scientific rationality presents a view of knowledge without critical potential. Current praxis is reflected in Nietzsche's insight that: "It is not the victory of science that is the distinguishing mark of our nineteenth century, but the victory of the scientific method over science (pp. 14-15)."

[4]Elliot W. Eisner, The Educational Imagination: On the Design and Evaluation of School Programs (New York, 1979), p. 12. Thorndike's approach to research regarding the practice of teaching relied in part upon an acceptance of behaviorist psychology as if it were part of our "common sense." For example, see his discussion in Edward L. Thorndike, Psychology and the Science of Education: Selected Writings of Edward L. Thorndike (New York, 1962), pp. 62-63. "Anyone of good sense can farm fairly well without science, and anyone of good sense can teach fairly well without knowing and applying psychology. Still, as the farmer with the knowledge of and application of botany and chemistry to farming is, other things being equal, more

successful than the farmer without it, so the teacher, will, other things being equal, be more successful who can apply psychology, the science of human nature, to the problems of school."

[5]Ralph Tyler, Basic Principles of Curriculum and Instruction (Chicago, 1950). Tyler posed four questions as guides to curriculum planning:

1. What educational purposes should the school seek to attain?
2. What educational experiences can be provided that are likely to attain these purposes?
3. How can these educational experiences be effectively organized?
4. How can we determine whether these purposes are being attained?

[6]Eisner, p. 9. It is clear from Tyler's later writings, however, that he had some sense of his four questions being taken more literally than Eisner suggests. Cf. Ralph Tyler, "Distinctive Attributes of Education for the Professions," Annual Meeting - 1952, American Association of Schools of Social Work, (April, 1952), pp. 3-11. In this address, Tyler restates his four questions as "tasks" in curriculum development.

[7]James MacDonald, "Curriculum and Human Interests," in William Pinar (ed.), Curriculum Theorizing (Berkeley, 1975), p. 283. See Gunnar Myrdal, Objectivity in Social Research (New York, 1969), pp. 55-56. Myrdal states that the only way we can strive for objectivity in theoretical analysis is to "expose the valuations to full light, make them conscious, specific, and explicit, and permit them to determine the theoretical research."

[8]See Russell Keat, The Politics of Social Theory: Habermas, Freud, and the Critique of Positivism (Chicago, 1981), pp. 1-2. Keat defines a positivistic rationality as ". . . a belief in the possibility of a scientific investigation of social phenomena which shares its epistemological status with that of natural science, regarded as the paradigmatic example of human knowledge. Such a science aims at the discovery of universal laws, which enable us to predict and control physical and social processes. The truth or falsity of scientific theories depends exclusively upon their logical relationship to the empirical data provided through observation. No other criteria are relevant. In particular, scientific practice must be governed by the requirement of objectivity, of freedom from the distortions that result from the intrusion of moral or political values into science."

[9]Giroux, pp. 14-15.

[10]J. Randall Koetting, "Jurgen Habermas' Theory of Knowledge and Human Interests, and Educational Technology: A Theoretical Investigation" (unpub. paper, Oklahoma State University, 1983), p. 1.

[11]Note, however, that the work of Habermas does not yet represent a developed framework for routine investigation of culture. Cf. Robert Wuthrow et. al., Cultural Analysis (Boston, 1984), p. 237.

[12]Jurgen Habermas, Knowledge and Human Interests (Boston, 1971), p. 307.

[13]Ibid., p. 309.

[14]Theodor Adorno was one of the earliest writers to recognize the importance of psychoanalytic theory for sociological analysis and defended a strong orthodox interpretation of Freud's earlier works, even against Freud himself. See Gillian Rose, An Introduction to the Thought of Theodor W. Adorno (New York, 1978). Cf. Phil Slater, Origin and Significance of the Frankfurt School: A Marxist Perspective (London, 1977), p. 95.

[15]See Sigmund Freud, Civilization and its Discontents, tr. James Strachey (New York, 1961).

[16]Sigmund Freud, Beyond the Pleasure Principle (New York, 1961).

[17]Sigmund Freud, "Formulations Regarding the Two Principles in Mental Functioning (1911)," Collected Papers, 4 (London, 1948), p. 14: "Education can without further hesitation be described as an incitement to the conquest of the pleasure principle, and to its replacement by the reality principle; it offers its aid, that is, to that process of development which concerns the ego."

[18]Marcuse, p. 15.

[19]Fenichel, p. 291.

[20]See Lili E. Peller, "The School's Role in Promoting Sublimation," The Psychoanalytic Study of the Child, XIX (1956), pp. 437-449.

CHAPTER III

THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS: LEGAL ASPECTS

The technical interests that underlie the use of instructional media within American public education are necessarily dominant as guaranteed by the nature of the legal system of the United States when those interests are considered at the level of society. Investigation into the possibility of subsuming the interests of prediction and control to that of emancipation inevitably forces confrontation with the physical nature of "media" itself. Whether information is delivered via tape, film, or paper, it is something that may be taken into a court of law. Once specific rules are defined that govern the process of legal conflict, the definition of media is forced into objective terms. In this way, anything introduced into a public classroom that is liable to review in a court of law must be defensible in technical terms if it is to remain a part of the curriculum. If the use of instructional media is NOT liable to at least the technical justification that an instructional design model affords (that is, if it cannot be legitimated as serving objective ends) then it is liable to elimination on legal grounds. This chapter traces the evolution of the legal proceedings that have crystalized

educational praxis within the limitations of technical rationality, thus preventing opportunity for implementation of media use for emancipatory purposes that are sanctioned at the level of society.

It is important to note that if some use of instructional media can be shown to serve legitimate objective ends, then that media can be studied for its usefulness in personal (teacher to student) interaction to serve alternate knowledge-constitutive interests, as will be shown in Chapter IV.

Several of the educators mentioned in Chapters I and II, notably Apple, Giroux, and MacDonald, have been associated with the "reconceptualists," a term used to refer to a group of theorists who have posed quite probing questions regarding the nature of knowledge, the role schooling plays in the individual's acquisition of knowledge, and how students can better attain liberty, equity and social justice through that knowledge.[1] Their critique of orthodox research for its presumption of objectivity coupled with common sense thought aligns them with the phenomonological view of Husserl, the existentialism of Heidegger, and the neo-Marxism of Habermas, all of which form a general critique of instrumental reason.[2] Although there is wide disagreement within this group, it may be said that they represent a number of nonmainstream points of view and generally fall to the left of center within the political arena. The fundamental issue here, however, is the fact that their cri-

tique as it applies to schooling is political at all.

If concerns of schooling may be defined politically, can they be treated politically? The answer is "Yes," as even a cursory survey of America's legal history demonstrates with rich accounts of legislative and judicial proceedings concerning the operation of its public schools. In fact, during the last thirty-two years since Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U. S. 483 (1954), lawmakers have reconstituted the domain of educational policy. Decisions by local school boards (and in some cases by individual teachers) have come under court control. When educational praxis is defined in terms of a vested public interest in education, initiative concerning policy that was once vested in local school administration has shifted to state and federal entities, which in turn are mediated through the courts when conflicts arise.[3]

It is contended here that the use of the court system to resolve conflict in education has had the ultimate effect of rendering much of the reconceptualists' theory moot in regard to the American system of education.[4] Moreover, there is little chance that American education could be redesigned to reflect a value base with an overriding interest in "emancipation" (in this sense, an interest in insuring that power is retained by the individual) that the reconceptualists seek. We are firmly locked into a system that rests upon a predominant interest in technical "control" (in this sense, the investment of power in technically

defined authority, regulations, and procedures), and that control ultimately resides in authority in the form of the American legal system.

By virtue of the fact that this nation is based upon a constitution, all its institutions, education included, are automatically locked into some form of technical control. The concern is not whether some form of control operates in American education; rather, it is the degree of that control and the extent to which it excludes other interests. There may have been an opportunity during what Tyack calls the symbolic phase of American education, or the early years of the bureaucratic phase, to take advantage of the flexibility left to local authority to minimize the intrusion of the state into the affairs of education.[5] If we could have come to understand the state's interest in education as an interest based in hermaneutics or critique, the contemporary reliance on control might not have been needed; however, the concept of control was not seen as problematic from the start, and we have reached a time in our history that to implement the reconceptualists' theories in our current educational system would be the same as starting over.

In example of a current case related to instructional media, a group of parents in Mobile, Alabama, have launched an assault through the courts on the treatment of religion in textbooks used in Alabama public schools. The arguments in the trial of Smith v. Board of School Commissioners of Mobile County did not turn on the philosophical concerns[6]

but rather on the technical accuracy of a research report funded by the U. S. Department of Education through Secretary of Education William J. Bennett's discretionary funds.[7] How is it that fundamental educational issues of a philosophical nature can be treated in a mechanical fashion?

The reason for this can be found in the evolution of the involvement of the courts with education. Once it was established that disagreements concerning schooling could be resolved legally, the source of authority for educational decisions began to shift from the vagueness of local authority to legislative bodies expressing laws and guidelines in precise terminology that reflect what is constitutionally permissible. As a result, schools have become inextricably linked with the language of the judicial system. Moreover, the widespread reliance on litigation suggests that the prospect of legal remedy has seeped into the national consciousness. The broad issues of education have come to be viewed by professionals and non-professionals alike in terms of agreement or disagreement with the official authority. Past interests in informal concensus can now be expressed technically in the name of formalized due process proceedings and collective bargaining. By the same token, an interest in critique often translates into the technically described electoral process and lobbying procedures. Over the years, we have accepted as part of our common sense that the major concerns of education can, and should, be expressed and satisfied through appeal to official channels.

Since the turn of the century the cases decided by the courts have served to clarify the rights and obligations of all parties involved in education, while at the same time deepening the reliance on a technical control of what was once considered the domain of the autonomous teacher practicing the art of education. As recently as two decades ago, there was a possibility for accomodation of alternative value bases in the structure of education that could have institutionalized that autonomy. However, somewhere along the way, we reached and passed a "point of no return" that effectively sealed off any significant accommodation of any value orientation other than one of control. The following discussion illustrates this contention.

One of the earliest schooling issues to face the courts involved compulsory education in Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925). The Society of Sisters was an Oregon-based corporation that challenged the Compulsory Education Act (Ore.Gen Laws, ch. 1, p. 9 (1923)) adopted November 7, 1922, by the voters of Oregon. The thrust of this Act was to require any parent or guardian having charge of a child between the ages of eight and sixteen to send the child to public school until the child's completion of the eighth grade. The Society of Sisters operated a series of privately funded orphanages and schools, including schools that normally served students between the ages of eight and sixteen. The curriculum of the schools operated by the Society of Sisters was essentially the same as that offered

in the public schools. With the establishment of these schools in 1880, the Society of Sisters had acquired real property necessary to their maintenance and operation. Enforcement of the Act would destroy a significant portion of their business and diminish the value of their property.[8]

It is interesting that given the zeitgeist of the 1920's, the resolution of Pierce for the plaintiff turned not on religion or free speech but on potential loss of property. Clearly, the case involved broad implications, and there is a question as to whether the Court decided an issue that was improperly presented.[9] In a situation that involved moral and ethical issues, the Court chose to reach for a technical interest in the form of the destruction of a business for the languaging it needed to rely on the Constitution to rectify a wrong. The plaintiff's argument was a strong one in that it defined an issue within the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Pierce had little to do with the nature of the schools themselves and did not tamper with value sets that guide instruction, but it demonstrated the strength of the due process argument when the technical interest was couched in terms of something as concrete as money.

It is interesting to reflect upon the effectiveness of the plaintiff's arguments in Pierce, especially considering the fervor of anti-foreign sentiment at the time the case was decided. In contrast, note that however powerful the loss of income might be as a defense, it in no measure ap-

proximates the profound impact upon the nature of educational praxis when economics are used as a legal weapon. There are numerous cases involving money, contracts, and education in significant Court decisions, and one does not have to search too deeply in the literature to find examples. For this discussion, a trio of students' rights cases bring the "point of no return" into view.

In 1969, three students who attended public schools in Des Moines, Iowa, planned to wear black armbands to school beginning December 16 and continue throughout the holiday season to publicly oppose the war in Vietnam. The principals of the Des Moines schools learned of this plan and on December 14 adopted a new policy that students who wore armbands to school would be asked to remove them. Failure to do so would result in suspension. On December 16, the students wore the armbands and were suspended. Under sec. 1983 of Title 42 of the United States Code the students asked for an injunction restraining the school district from disciplining them, and also sought nominal damages.[10]

The Supreme Court decided Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District, 393 U.S. 503 (1969), in favor of the plaintiff agreeing that the administration was wrong in passing hasty regulations against the wearing of black armbands. It is clear in the majority opinion and Black's dissent that there were sharply divided views on the balance that was being created between the authority of teachers and the freedoms of students. Of fundamental

significance in the majority opinion is the reasoning that rules cannot be made to prevent the discussion of issues. In the eyes of the Court, the wearing of armbands was an element of free speech and the expression of free speech in this instance was not disruptive, and therefore school officials could not respond in a totalitarian manner. The case was presented and decided on First Amendment principles.

In Justice Black's dissent, it is argued that the provisions of the First and Fourteenth Amendment do not give total freedom of free expression to students. He believed that the armbands were disruptive and school officials were well within their rights to prohibit them. Black credited this case with the initiation of a new era in which the power to control pupils by school officials will be transferred to the Court by litigious students.

> Turned loose with lawsuits for damages and injunctions against their teachers as they are here, it is nothing but wishful thinking to imagine that young, immature students will not soon believe it is their right to control the schools rather than the right of the States that collect the taxes to hire the teachers for the benefit of the pupils.

It is important to note two things about Tinker: one, that students were recognized as citizens with defensible rights under the Constitution; and two, the legal issues, not the particulars of remedy, were central to the case. (In fact, the case was remanded to the lower courts for this.) Remedy itself assumed greater importance in cases

that followed.

For example, six years after Tinker, the Court heard Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975), another case involving the rights of students. Nine high school students attending the Columbus, Ohio, public school system were suspended from school for up to ten days. Such suspension was permitted by Ohio law, provided a student's parents were notified of the reason within twenty-four hours. If a student had been expelled, the decision could have been appealed to the Board of Education, but no similiar procedure was provided for student suspensions. The students filed action under Sec. 1983 Title 42 of the United States Code to declare the Ohio law unconsti- tutional and in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court decided in favor of the plaintiff.

Within the facts of this case alone, the Court found evidence of direct violation of Lopez's due process rights in terms of property rights as it did in Board of Regents v. Roth.[11] More importantly, the Court went on to answer the question of "what process is due" if "due process" applies. In unmistakable terms, the Court created a suspension policy for the Columbus Public School System. Not only was it clearly established that students have rights under the Constitution, with Goss the Court was willing to provide the technical expertise in formulating the policies that delin- iate those rights.

Of interest is the dissenting opinion in the Goss case

written by Justice Powell who opposed the reliance on the judiciary and the adversary process as a way of resolving what he considered a routine problem of education by stating

> In mandating due process procedures the Court misapprehends the reality of the normal teacher-pupil relationship. . . No one can forsee the ultimate frontiers of the new 'thicket' the Court now enters. Today's ruling appears to sweep within the protected interest in education a multitude of discretionary decisions in the educational process. Teachers and other school authorities are required to make many decisions that may have serious consequences for the pupil. . . If as seems apparent, the Court will now require due process procedures whenever such routine school decisions are challenged, the impact upon public education will be serious indeed.

Lopez used 42 U.S.C. sec. 1983 to seek remedy according to the facts of a given case, and remedy was given in the form of the creation of school policy. Another case, Wood v. Strickland, 420 U. S. 308 (1975), decided in the same year as Goss, dramatically broadened the scope of 42 U.S.C. sec. 1983 in a way that forced school administrators to take student complaints far more seriously than they had in the past. Two students were suspended from Mena Public High School in Mena, Arkansas, for "spiking" punch served at a school party. At a later school board meeting which neither the students nor their parents attended, the two students were suspended for the remainder of the semester. The students and their parents, with counsel, attended the next board meeting, but the suspension was affirmed. The students sued the school board and won, arguing the suspension violated their rights of Due Process under the Fourteenth

Amendment and under Sec. 1983 of Title 42 U. S. Code 1983 because: it provided a means to remedy; the school board acted under the "color of the law;" and the "person" mentioned in 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 is the same as a local governing body. Wood established that as a citizen, a student is able to utilize 42 U.S.C. sec. 1983 to go beyond the case itself, as in Goss, in seeking a means to remedy a violation of constitutional rights. Acting under the color of state law, the school board members were found liable for real damages to the student injured. The essence of Wood is not the issue of denial of due process; rather it is that a student can collect damages. For the first time, students were able to "hit back" in a way that assaulted the private lives of those who direct education.

If a digression may be permitted , an analogy can be drawn between the implications of Wood and the monoliths of Stanley Kubrick's film, 2001: A Space Odyssey, in which it is learned that at some point in the Earth's forgotten past, this planet was visited by an intelligence from some space or dimension quite remote from this one. A series of black monoliths were placed in strategic locations to serve as sentinals to Man's progress. Of particular significance was the one hidden on the dark side of the Moon. Upon its discovery, a signal was emitted to inform its creators that Man had achieved a certain level of technological sophistication. Wood v. Strickland sounds a similar signal.

Once an avenue into the private lives of educators via

economics has been created, potential consequences must be assessed by administrators about the exercise of their power. Just as it would be impossible for Man to retreat from the nuclear age, it is equally impossible to return to the state of affairs in education that existed before Pierce. Wood brings into consciousness an awareness that potentially any individual act by educators is subject to scrutiny against technically defined rules. The "educator/artist" (that is, one who practices the art of education) must out of self-defense redefine the role to accommodate to a far greater extent than before the "educator/technician" aspect of the profession. Powell's dissent in Goss was correct in his recognition that the fact of rights for all disrupts the nature of the teacher-student relationship. Given another value base as Apple suggests would render such disputes meaningless; however, money lies at the heart of a capitalist society and without provisions to exempt an element of society, such as education, from its rules, then it was inevitable that the monolith be discovered, that education must be defined in terms of an overriding interest in control.

It was suggested at the beginning of this chapter that reconceptualist notions regarding the redesign of American education are inconsequential against a background of legal proceedings, but this is NOT to imply that such work is meaningless. To the contrary, the writings of Apple and others assume far greater importance once it is understood

that the issues of education must be viewed in terms of technical control and external authority. This can be illustrated by a reappraisal of Sipuel v. Board of Regents of the University of Oklahoma, 332 U.S. 631 (1948).

Just a decade before Sipuel, as the first step in its assault on Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896), the N.A.A.C.P. successfully supported a black law school applicant in Missouri ex. rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337 (1938) in which the court agreed that it was not enough for the state of Missouri to pay for Gaines's expenses to attend a law school with an open admission policy out of the state of Missouri. If the state of Missouri offered a law school to white students, then it must do the same for blacks according to the "separate-but-equal" principle.

With the establishment of the legal precedent of "separate-but-equal" for all forms of public education, the next step was the assault on the actual inequality of separate instruction. Ada Sipuel was denied admission to the law school at the University of Oklahoma because of race. When the Supreme Court ruled that she must be admitted because there was no "separate-but-equal" law school facility, the state of Oklahoma attempted to create a separate school. It became clear that the notion that this new school was equal to the University of Oklahoma law school was not defensible, and the legal action was dropped. During her first semester, Ms. Sipuel was segregated within the law school facilities, but other Court decisions successfully

removed those barriers, too.[12]

In her own words, Ms. Sipuel presents a stirring defense of the American legal system.[13] It can be said that brilliant, incisive legal minds turned to the particulars of her situation in order to render a fair judgment, and that the resolution of this suit affected her in a profoundly personal way. However, it must be noted at the same time that Ms. Sipuel did not formally initiate this case; in fact, it was not even her idea. Ada Sipuel was approached by others who recognized the inequities in education and were proceeding in a deliberate fashion within the legal system to seek change. By working in the name of what some humanist educators have called the "concrete individual," (in the form of Ms. Sipuel) the N.A.A.C.P. sought to serve the "abstract individual" (any wrongfully disadvantaged black student).

In this sense, the N.A.A.C.P.'s course of action paralleled the logic of the defense in Pierce: in order to seek remedy to a broad issue, be it antiforeign or racial prejudice, it was necessary to first find a means of restating the real issue in concrete terms. In Pierce, the concrete issue became the destruction of a source of income. In Sipuel, the concrete issue was the denial of (equal) access to a source of income, with the difficult part being the redefinition of what were once considered the intangibles of education, and presenting them as something just as "concrete" as the loss of a business. Once the Court agreed

that the logic of "separate but equal" was flawed then remedy was possible.

The process of seeking remedy for an injustice involves two things: the recognition of the unjust situation, and a restating of that situation in terms that can be linked to constitutional principles. Ironically, what appears to be simplistic (the recognition of an injustice) may in fact be extraordinarily difficult. It is doubtful that Ada Sipuel on her own could have taken her case to the Supreme Court, expenses aside, simply because the schools and the wider culture with its ever-increasing reliance on technical control did not facilitate the sharpening of an individual's critical skills beyond more than a vague awareness of a social ill that ought to be corrected. For Ada Sipuel, it took the insightful guidance of people like Thurgood Marshall to properly argue the case in specific terms to demonstrate how she, and therefore her peers, were being injured by a system of segregation.

Ada Sipuel was victimized on two fronts: from the social institutions in which she lived, and the extent to which she had accepted these institutions into her own psychological make-up. In a Freudian interpretation, and in partial agreement with the Bowles and Gintis recognition of educational development as an outcome of class conflict, the individual is vulnerable to repression from social institutions that act externally upon the individual and become part of the individual's personal understanding of right and

wrong.[14] An historical avenue to correct repression in society has been to redefine the system. Given the peculiar evolution of our system of education, that redefinition is no longer possible, but it may not be necessary if the individual who recognizes a wrong can articulate a complaint in language that permits access to technically defined remedy. Therein lies the value of the reconceptualists.

The reconceptualists may be read as theorists addressing both the abstract and concrete individual. They speak of "resistances" and suggest alternative means by which education can proceed through other value bases. Instead of attempting to create emancipatory systems of education, rather, educators can seek to create emancipated individuals who can then define the issues and seek correction within a system defined in technical terms. It is not necessary that all people become lawyers, but it is important that the skills of critique be developed as a safeguard against the manipulation of self by external forces. It is essential that individuals cultivate the ability to examine their own situations critically and articulate their own needs.

The distinction between the concrete individual and the abstract individual is important to the study of education by a case approach. Each suit is filed in behalf of an individual, or group of individuals, seeking to correct a very real affront to their personal and/or professional lives. By virtue of <u>stare decisis</u>, other cases are decided in similar manner or not developed at all. For instance, once Ada

Sipuel was admitted to the University of Oklahoma School of Law, it was obvious that similar cases would be decided in a similar manner and the litigation of this issue stopped. In this way, the abstract individual is served. It is possible for the Court to reverse itself, but the process is the same: the particulars concerning the individual work to define limits and capabilities for the broader society.

The distinction is important in another sense, too. The individual teacher may do what the abstract teacher may not. The self-defense posture that created the "teacher/technician" mentioned earlier must not be allowed to comprise one's definition of one's role as an educator. If teachers as a group are subject to legal assaults that may have a direct effect on their personal lives, then they too will choose to influence the technical definitions of their roles to create some safeguards. It is left to the individual teacher to critically examine his or her own situation and exercise resistances to a technologic mind set as he or she sees fit. Even if at the broader social level it is agreed that the battle for an approach to education other than one of a technologic mentality is lost, the autonomous individual may redefine the battle line at the site of one's own person and proceed accordingly.

There is a futility in discussing educational theory in a social system that can no longer tolerate alternatives to the technical interests that direct the operation of public education. A case study approach illuminates past patterns

of discrimination and the avenues of rectification in terms of the system itself. If the reconceptualists are used to clarify the understanding of personal action, or to identify issues to be translated into the language of technical control, then their work is quite useful, especially in an effort to understand the impact of instructional media on individual development. If, however, their commentary is introduced after a situation has been crystalized within the operating framework of legal procedure, then perhaps a certain indifference becomes the only rational response possible.

ENDNOTES

[1]See William H. Schubert, Curriculum: Perspective, Paradigm, and Possiblity (New York, 1986), pp. 314-315.

[2]See Trent Schroyer, The Critique of Domination (Boston, 1973), p. 28.

[3]Mark G. Yudof et al., Kirp & Yudof's Educational Policy and The Law (Berkeley, 1982), p. xxiii.

[4]This is not to say that the work of Apple and others is unimportant. It will be shown that the work of the reconceptualists is of tremendous significance when taken at the level of personal development.

[5]See David Tyack, "Ways of Seeing: An Essay on the History of Compulsory Schooling," Harvard Education Review, 46 (1976), pp. 355-388.

[6]See Kirsten Goldberg, "Vitz Report On Textbooks Is Attacked" in Education Week (October 29, 1986), p. 6. Goldberg observes that it is ironic that both sides in this issue agree that the textbooks generally lack religious content. There is disagreement as to how the topic should be treated (education about religion as opposed to religious indoctrination) but the arguments in the case centered on the more objective issue of numbers of religious references in the books in question.

[7]Interestingly, even though Secretary Bennett agreed with the central point of the study (that the attempt to avoid controversy has caused textbooks to be bland) completed by New York University psychology professor Paul C. Vitz, the Department did not formally adopt the study because of [technical] questions regarding the methodology.

[8]Of some interest is the fact that the Act passed by a narrow margin, largely as a result of the efforts of a coalition of anti-Catholic interests including the Ku Klux Klan, and the efforts of public school teachers.

[9]The court was faced with a situation that could have been decided in terms of whether the state or the family controlled the question of compulsory education. The Court chose a middle-ground that became known as the "Pierce Compromise" in which it was decided the State could compel

education, but parents could decide where the education was to occur.

[10]42 U.S.C. SEC. 1983 provides: "Every person who, under color of any statute or ordinance, regulation custom, or usage, of any state or territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other persons within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the person injured in an action of law, suit in equity or other proper proceedings for redress."

[11]In Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972), Roth was fired from his teaching position at Wisconsin State University - Oshkosh, and the majority opinion held for the University because Roth failed to establish a contractual claim to a property interest in the form of his employment. Lopez was more successful and in part won his case because he was able to make the "property interest" claim, which for him was the access to a public education.

[12]The N.A.A.C.P. quickly followed Sipuel with two more cases concerning professional school admissions. In Sweat v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950), the Court recognized that intangibles in law school such as prestige, faculty reputation, and experience of the administration, must be considered part of the equality determination. See Kirp, p. 421. In McLarin v. Oklahoma State Regents, 339 U.S. 637 (1950), the reasoning in Sweat was applied to professional schools other than law schools. The Court agreed that in-house segregation was a genuine handicap in the pursuit of a graduate education.

[13]As evidenced in a video taped lecture on the campus of Oklahoma State University in 1984.

[14]See Bowles and Gintis, "The Problem with Human Capital Theory - A Marxist Critique," American Economic Review, 65 (1965), pp. 74-78.

CHAPTER IV

THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS: PSYCHOANALYTIC ASPECTS

If the application of instructional media in a specific instructional setting may be legitimated in terms of technical interests that satisfy social concerns, then consideration may turn to the nature of interpersonal communication and the relevance of Freud's work. As a supplement to this chapter, a general review of Freud's theory of psychodynamics is presented in the Appendix.

An investigation of Freud's work vis-à-vis instructional media is not an easy task. A cursory review of the literature reveals an extraordinary wealth of publications relevant to psychoanalytic theory. The Index of Psychoanalytical Writings lists over 100,000 such books and articles in more than thirty languages.[1] Few, however, have focused exclusively upon the implications of Freud's work for education.

This paper will take the position that Freud's psychoanalytic theory does not imply a theory of instructional design on its own; rather, it serves a more useful function as a supplement to the theory that originates in educational research and other fields. Freud said he believed psycho-

analysis was a legitimate source of influence for educational practice, but left the discovery of the nature of that influence to other researchers. Despite several masterful attempts, however, this task is one that has remained unfulfilled.

One reason for this can be attributed to the recurring shifts in the popularity of Freud's ideas. As current theory in education changes, so then does the assessment of his impact on the field at a given time. This has been especially true given the anti-Freudian tendency of recent years.[2] For example, in the fourth edition of Theories of Learning, Hilgard and Bower (1975, p. 347) included a chapter entitled "Freud's Psychodynamics" which begins with the statement, "Sigmund Freud so influenced psychological thinking that a summary of theoretical viewpoints, even in the psychology of learning, is incomplete without reference to him." It is interesting that just six years later in the fifth edition of their text they omit any reference to Freud at all, except for a note in the preface explaining the deletion "because a survey of teachers using the text indicated that those chapters were not being used in the typical course in learning theory (Bower and Hilgard, 1981, p. vi)."

Another reason can be found not in Freud's psychology, but in his sociology, which at times has assumed broad political overtones that obscured and confused the implications of his theory for education.[3] Freudian theory lies outside the positivist logic involved in systems that call

for accountability in quantifiable terms, such as the American legal treatment of issues in schooling reviewed in Chapter III. While it may be concluded that Freud's ideas may be less useful than some contemporary theories for classroom practice, it would be an error to view his work solely in terms of the dynamics of individual personality. Freud's importance for education, the thrust of this chapter, lies in the unique biological basis that he applies to his sociological understanding of Man.

The confusion regarding the true nature and meaning of Freud's ideas has compounded the difficulties associated with research in psychoanalytic theory. Donald K. Adams (1954) commented that it is

> . . . quite apparent to anyone who reads the literature on psychotherapy that the level of discourse is low and that the different schools of psychotherapy have different systems of propositions. These systematic differences make intercommunication with regard to single propositions extremely difficult and in so far as science involves good intercommunication demonstrates the low level of scientific understanding in the domain (p. 114)

Communication regarding a single proposition can be facilitated according to the structure developed in Chapter II. First, it is necessary to state whether one is talking at the level of society, the individual, or both (that is, if the nature of argument requires a blurring of the distinction as in Marcuse's work). Second, attempts to apply principles of psychotherapy to educational praxis are made easier by reviewing such efforts for the underlying inter-

ests as Habermas stated. In this way, it is possible to discover works that have a presumed interest in control, in intrepretation, or in emancipation. This makes the overwhelming task of researching the literature much more manageable, and it will be shown that part of the reason for the lack of acceptance of Freudian thought in instructional design has been this confusion among theorists as to the thrust of each other's ideas.

Chapter III reviewed the issue of application of Freudian thought to instructional media at the level of society with a constitutive interest in emancipation. This chapter will now turn to the level of the individual. Because there is no history of psychoanalytic critique of instructional media, the foundations for such investigation will be taken from the emergent themes in a general review of the history of application of psychoanalysis to education.

The application of psychoanalysis to education may be viewed in three broad phases from its beginning in the period prior to World War I to the present, as suggested by Rudolf Ekstein and Rocco L. Motto in a paper presented to the American Psychoanalytic Association entitled, "Psychoanalysis and Education - Past and Future" which is summarized below.[4]

A first phase occurred in Europe that lasted until the beginning of the Second World War; a second phase in America and England started after the Second World War; and a third

(and current) phase that began in the early 1960's.

The first phase itself may be divided into two parts. It should be noted that psychoanalysis was not well received initially so that there were relatively few attempts at application to education prior to the First World War. Immediately after the war, however, there was a desire for an abandonment of old approaches to education, so that a number of experimental applications of psychoanalysis to education were tried. There was a spirit of liberation that characterized much of the work as a reaction to what had been regarded as the suppression of instinct in the Victorian society. At the same time, investigators such as Siegfried Bernfeld recognized the limits of education because of unconscious forces in the child as well as the reaction to these forces by society.

With growing acceptance of the psychoanalytic movement came the first organized expression of an effort to relate psychoanalysis to education with the Zeitschift fur psychoanalytische Padagogik in October, 1926. The lead article viewed psychoanalysis as a new means of education to be applied by teachers. This lack of differentiation between psychoanalysis and education has posed profound theoretical and practical dilemmas since that time.

The main source of interest in the application of psychoanalysis came from teachers who became the first child analysts, such as Anna Freud. By the late 1930's, the psychoanalytically oriented educator shifted from emphasis

upon the liberation of the instincts to creation of the optimum environment for the avoidance of pathological trauma as well as the extremes of indulgence or strictness. In 1936, techniques of psychoanalysis for educators were described by Editha Sterba who recommended that teachers use interpretation to deal with a situational crisis in order to help a child cope with an educational task.[5] This approach focused upon specific observable disturbances as distinguished from routine educational situations where the educator functions as a teacher rather than as a therapist. In this way, Sterba expressed the view that the classroom teacher functions in two distinct roles, as psychoanalyst and instructor.

The earliest attempts to apply Freud's psychoanalytic theory to the more routine educational situations of instruction yielded widely differing conclusions in three significant works that were published during the latter portion of the first phase.[6] Between 1925 and 1930, three books on psychoanalytic education were published: August Aichhorn's Wayward Youth; Anna Freud's Psychoanalysis for Teachers and Parents; and Siegfried Bernfeld's Sisyphus or the Limits of Education. Each is significantly different from the others. Taken collectively, they represent the diversity of interpretations possible when attempting to interpret Freud's work for practice. These will be reviewed, followed by the suggestion that the apparent contradictions among them, at least in part, stem from the differing inter-

ests the researchers brought to their work, and the social level of their concern.

Aichhorn's (1925) work is the text of a series of lectures to which he added some additional material and published as an orientation to the use of psychoanalysis with delinquent youth. He makes it clear from the beginning that his concern is for the control of the process of education.

> Psychoanalysis enables the worker to recognize dissocial manifestations as the result of an interplay of psychic forces, to discover the unconscious motives of such behaviour, and to find means of leading the disso- cial back to social conformity (p. 3).

Aichhorn also admits that the book is nothing more than an orientation to Freud's ideas coupled with some conjecture on its application to a specialized group. His intent, he claimed, was to "arouse thoughtful consideration . . . and to stimulate independent effort (ibid.)."

Aichhorn's understanding of Freud led him to conclude that deviant behavior is a result of some unresolved psychic conflict. In a general sense, he perceived his patients as individuals whose overt behavior represented the ongoing effects of this conflict. Treatment, then, must begin at the point of the conflict and take the form of "re-education." For instance, Aichhorn believed delinquent behavior could be the result of either an excess of love or an excess of severity.[7] Through transference, the teacher could try to create an environment that presents a balance between love and the established limits for overt behavior, thus

creating the external environment necessary for the resolution of the conflict.

This process is similiar to that of individual psychotherapy, but it is the ends that distinguish an educator from the therapist. The therapist seeks through transference to give the patient the means to work on emotional problems.[8] The transference helps to create a temporary change as an avenue to later adjustments. In education, Aichhorn viewed transference as an end in itself. The transference achieved in the learning setting is an achievement in itself, representing a change in personality to permit proper adjustment to society.[9]

The ultimate weakness of Aichhorn's book lies in the vagueness of his observations. He was clearly enthusiastic about Freud's work because it provided a framework for what he claimed the "good teacher" knows intuitively, but the reader is never really made aware of what this intuition is, or how the less gifted teacher can acquire it.[10] For instance, Aichhorn (ibid. p. 149) noted that "from the very beginning we felt intuitively that above all we must see that the boys and girls from fourteen to eighteen had a good time." Such comments tend to diminish the credibility of his thought.

It is interesting to note that Freud himself wrote an introduction to Aichhorn's book in which he made two points. One was that an educator, especially one lacking the intuitive talents that Aichhorn possessed, should be trained

in psychoanalysis to better understand the dynamics of conflict experienced by the child. The other was a caution that education must not be confused with psychotherapy. He said that the appropriate role of psychoanalysis was to supplement the practice of education instead of substitute for it. His concern for the role of psychotherapy in application to education was that it ". . . guide the child on his way to maturity, to encourage him, and to protect him from taking the wrong path (ibid., pp. v-vi)." This represents a different interest than Aichhorn's, and is more closely aligned with that of his daughter, Anna.

Anna Freud's early ideas about education and psychotherapy are offered in a collection of four lectures she presented to German day-school workers in 1929 and represent a strikingly different view of Sigmund Freud's work when compared to Aichhorn's text. Rather than assess means and methods for altering behavior, she developed an introduction to psychotherapy that focused more on the explanation of behavior.

For instance, in her last lecture entitled "The Relation Between Psychoanalysis and Pedagogy," she suggested three principles of psychoanalytic theory which can be of use to the educator.[11] Review of these principles, or "characteristic viewpoints" as she called them, illustrate the hermeneutic nature of her work.

The first was concerned with the three distinct stages of life through which the individual progresses leading to

adulthood. She stated that behavior can be understood only against the background of the child's given stage of life.

> In each period there is a different emotional reaction of the child to those around him, and a different stage of instinctual development, each of which is normal and characteristic. A special attribute of the child, or his method of reaction, cannot therefore be judged without reference to the specific period of his life (Anna Freud, p. 93).

The second had to do with the inner growth of the child's personality. Instead of viewing the child as a homogenous being, he can be seen as representing a three-part nature made of the id, ego, and superego. Inconsistencies in behavior, then, may be traced to whatever part of the individual predominates at a given moment. This also points to the importance of the educator's becoming familiar with the students' backgrounds.

The third principle is concerned with the conflict between the three divisions of the personality (a point that will assume far greater proportions later in phase two of the appliciation of Freudian thought to education). Regardless of the overt behavior of the child, it is important for educators to realize that the child is experiencing an ongoing inner struggle among these parts. How these ongoing conflicts are resolved depends upon the relative strength of each part of the personality to the others. This last point is much the same conclusion that Aichhorn drew, but with different implications. For Anna Freud, the usefulness in recognizing the nature of internal conflict could be found

not in its potential as a means for correcting behavior, but for understanding what the teacher observed.

Anna Freud admits that knowing this does little in providing practical guidance for the educator, but she does note that one conclusion may be that education should be limited whenever possible. The educator who presumes to interfere in the child's own method of conflict resolution (that is, insisting on replacing a "naughty" behavior with a "good" one) may be making permanent adjustments in the child's way of coping. Given the educator's ignorance of the child's inner life, she suggests that perhaps the educator is better in some instances to let the child develop on his own rather than conform to some external source of authority. This is not to suggest that education adopt a "hands off" policy. To the contrary, she admonishes the educator to seek the "via media," or the middle road, between instinctual-gratification and instinctual-restriction.[12]

It is apparent that Anna Freud approached her assessment of the role of psychoanalysis in education with caution and viewed it as a field in its infancy, immediately useful as a tool of explanation. Moreover, she explicitly admitted that psychoanalysis as a field of study was far from expressing a description of an analytical pedagogy. What is most interesting about her work, though, is that out of her hermaneutic position she anticipated each of Habermas's categories and identified three possible uses of psychoanalysis

for education. The first was that it is well qualified to offer a criticism of existing educational methods. Second, it offers an extension of the teacher's knowledge about the complicated relations between the child and educator. Finally, as a method of treatment, it offers a means of repair of injuries which are inflicted upon children during the process of education. Thus, critique, interpretation, and control are each seen as potential uses for psychoanalytic theory in education.[13]

Perhaps of greater interest, though, is that nearly fifty years later, in a preface to a new translation of the third text of interest here, Siegfried Bernfeld's, Sisyphus or The Limits of Education, Anna Freud (1973) reveals a continued predominant interest in hermaneutics. She states that new learnings, on which better education might be based

> . . . brings us closer to realizing the possibilities and impossibilities of changing the instinctual nature of the child and of assessing the benefits as well as the possible damage done to it by educational interference (Anna Freud, p. viii).

She concluded her foreword to Bernfeld's book with another insightful observation that advances in education

> . . . will be all the more beneficial if we approach them and make use of them in the same spirit of criticism and skepticism which pervades the present book and gives it its especial value (ibid.).

Bernfeld (1973) demonstrates his interest in critique in an attack on the existing theories of his time.

> The subject of its investigation is the product of its own foreshortened vision. It mistakes the psychic surface of the child for the whole child. Simply because the school separates learning from life and reduces vital beings to mere learners who are either bright or dull, the theory of instruction fancies that its findings about school learning represent true insights into learning generally and even into the life of the child. It assumes that the young mind is neatly organized into distinct faculties for reading, writing, arithmetic, manual arts, and religion; it then proceeds to investigate each and proclaims such rules as it is able to establish as psychological laws. It is blind to the integrity of the child's life, to his drives, desires, and ideals, and knows nothing of the pleasure or the hatred he feels for formal learning. I am not saying that it is useless to observe children under the tangled conditions of the school. Such experiments may prove instructive, though they would certainly be remote from life. One must know, however, what one is doing. But the methodologists of instruction, here as elsewhere, do not know. And that may the Lord forgive them, for I cannot (pp. 17-18).

Bernfeld read Freud with a concern for exposing the subjective nature of prevailing standards and conventions. He saw education in his day as a mixture of capitalistic interests and parental anxieties passed from one generation to the next as a social tradition that was never questioned. He argued that education was at all times conservative because it prepares the individual to become like other members of the society, thus maintaining the status quo. It was the duty of educators, he argued, to recognize the inherent inequities in the educational system and to eliminate them if possible. Bernfeld also observed that educators are themselves products of their society and ultimately unable to rid themselves of all the limitations

which society puts on them. In this sense, the limits of education are not only in a given political system, but in the psychology of the child, the adult, and finally in the teacher.

In this way, Bernfeld incorporated the sociological nature of Freud's work into his assessment that education was limited ultimately by forces over which it could exert no absolute control: the unconscious forces in the child, and the reaction of society to those forces. Bernfeld endorsed the scientific investigation of childhood development as an attempt to break with the prevailing approach that ignored these limits and presumed without any theoretical basis or formalized statement that the role of education was to make the child a "good" child above all else. He argued that psychoanalysis offered a starting point and a frame within which to work, beginning with the psychoanalysis of the teacher himself. In this way, the educator would be able to

> . . . scientifically understand the working of mind and body without being swayed like weathervanes by political, and other, ideologies and the prejudices of society. Or rather, one should say that educators should at least be aware of their own frailities and the societal influences under which they work and be able not to be entirely swayed by them (Bauxbaum, 1969, p. 30).

If the books mentioned briefly above are a representative sample of the thought of those psychoanalytic educators contemporary with Freud, it may be concluded that despite distinct differences in tone and conclusions, there was at

least one theme that emerged as common among them, that of the role of conflict as impetus for educational intervention.[14] For instance, while Aichorn cautioned from the start that his observations were rooted in his own (unspecified) intuition, he was firm in his assertion that education must proceed from the observable evidence of the conflict his students experienced as individuals. Anna Freud was more explicit in her explanation of the development of the individual in her assessment, but concluded as Aichhorn did that the child should be seen as one who enters the educational setting a product of quite profound experiences and unresolved conflicts. She stressed that knowledge of these conflicts helps the teacher to know when to discipline and when to reward, and ultimately, how to teach although in her opinion an articulated pedagogy was never achieved. Bernfeld proceeded from a more sociological point of view by observing that the individual is in conflict not only with himself and his parents, but with society as well, but he agreed with Anna Freud and Aichorn that the teacher should undergo psychoanalysis personally. He addressed the specific concern of what implications psychoanalysis might have for learning theory by concluding that the issue was best left to future researchers who would have the benefit of a more mature science of child development.

Though there were the beginnings of application of psychoanalytic understanding to the routine classroom situation by child analysts in Vienna in the 1930's, the

European analytic organizations began to crumble by the end of the decade. These were replaced by new organizations in the United States and Europe which were influenced by the political upheavals in Europe and the Second World War to the extent that educational institutions were viewed in light of the existing social order and emancipatory interests. Against these more clearly defined interests occurred a rereading of some earlier phase one works that had not achieved the initial attention that Aichhorn, Anna Freud, or Bernfeld had.

For instance, new significance was given to the 1931 publication of The Early Years of Life, by Alice Balint, in which it was observed that there are no absolutes in pedagogy or mental hygiene, and that society, regardless of its nature, produces its underpinnings in educational measures. Conversely, educational reforms necessarily led to changes in civilization even if such change were not intentional, thus making the science of education revolutionary.[15]

Balint's work in some respects anticipated the relationship between psychoanalysis and education as it emerged during the second phase with far less emphasis on technique than on study and research. With the appearance of The Psychoanalytic Study of the Child, there can be seen a clear shift away from a preoccupation with psychoanalysis as clinical practice to a more theoretical investigation for general themes of social interest. The 1950 publication of Erik H. Erikson's classic Childhood and Society is an excel-

lent example of such scholarship.

Erikson described his text as a psychoanalytic book on the relation of the ego to society in which he investigates a variety of cultural settings and the meaning of childhood within them.[16] He observes that in all cultures children are prepared for an entrance into adult life by some sort of schooling, whether that be in classroom, field, or jungle.[17] The child receives, in Erikson's words, some "systematic instruction" in which the "fundamentals of technology" are developed, whether it be hand tools and weapons, or the more sophisticated developments of literate cultures.[18] Throughout this stage of development is a potential for ego damage in the sense of inadequacy and inferiority for the child who feels unable to cope with these new social demands. This potential is exacerbated in the more complex cultures with a high degree of role specialization. School life becomes quite distinct from the parents, and to the extent that a child experiences a blurring of his understanding of his proper role he experiences anxiety for his own survival.

> We are also aware of the fact that the inhumanity of colossal machine organization endangers these very gains of what is so specifically American. Responsible Americans know the danger emanating from a 'total war' machine and from its facsimile in peacetime. But it is not superorganization alone which today makes cultural values relative. The rapid spread of communication and the increasing knowledge of cultural relativity endanger people who are in a marginal position, people who are traumatically exposed to a numerical increase or the closer proximity or the greater power of others-than-themselves. Among such people the drive for tolerance has its point of diminishing returns: it causes anxiety (Erikson, 1985, p. 17).

Two questions emerge here that have significant implications for the field of instructional media if Erikson's observations are taken to be correct. For one, the potential for harm to children as a result of the process of public education may be greater for those children in technically advanced cultures. Child training in other cultures (such as the two American Indian tribes he profiles) which is characterized by a rich personal contact between teacher and student appears to diminish the potential for anxiety in adult life. One question, then, asks if the use of instructional media contributes to this potential. Upon reflection, a second question comes from the first: If it is accapted that the experience of instructional media can be shown as a contributor to this anxiety, can anything be done about it?

A logical starting point in investigation of these questions is evident from one of the predominant themes of phase one research in its assessment of conflict. As suggested earlier, it appears that the early psychoanalytic educators understood the experience of conflict at the site of the ego as an avenue into the individual for purposes of public education. If the nature of conflict were understood, then it may be the case that specific implications for the use of instructional media may be revealed.

In this sense, it is unfortunate that phase two took its pronounced theoretical turn away from the earlier interest in specific classroom practice of Aichhorn for it may

have led to clearer assessments of a child's internal experience of the process of education. On the other hand, there was a vein of theoretical research in phase two that drew its observations from special cases of deviant children in an attempt to better understand how individuals experience the broader forces of society. Of particular interest here is the work of Gerald Pearson's 1954 publication of Psychoanalysis and the Education of the Child.

In attempting to derive specific implications for instructional media from Pearson's work vis-à-vis the Freudian concept of conflict, it is useful to recall that Freud was trained as a reductionist and a positivist.[19] His early work as a scientist and his fascination with the German advances in physics in the study of energy transfer influenced his construction of an energy-flow model of mental energy. His desire for mechanistic explanations of mental functioning was tempered by his recognition of the need to accommodate the more elusive influence of human purpose, intention and conflict. The result was the formulation of a theory that was useful for its metaphoric representations of the processes that Freud believed would be given positivistic explanations in the future. It is logical, then, to turn to a construct to explore the specific role of conflict in learning.

Because the ego is the regulator between the internal and the external world, it is the site of all learning. It is also the site for the mediation of all conflict. Freud

argued that it is the tendency of an individual to reduce conflict; the intensity of this tendency is a measure of the individual's motivation. The extent that the ego is conflict free is a measure of the individual's learning capacity. Pearson identifies four steps in learning from the psychoanalytic point of view:

1. The projection of instinctual libidinal impulses onto the subject matter to be learned. (This gives the subject matter interest and the learner is aroused to make the subject matter part of himself. It is important to note that the major concern is the opportunity to release instinctual energy. The efforts on the part of a teacher to present the subject matter in a desirable way assumes secondary importance.)
2. The agreement of the ego with the projected libidinal impulses (otherwise it would act to block discharge).
3. The introjection of the matter to be learned along with the projected instinctual impulses (thus becoming part of the psychic reality of the individual).
4. Secondary differentiation of the projected instinctual impulses from the matter that has been learned (so that it becomes an acquisition and is differentiated from the impulses themselves which may have components which are frightening to the ego).

Conflict becomes significant for learning in the role it plays as a facilitator or (more commonly) as a direct or indirect inhibitor. Generally, the source of the conflict can be traced to one of four sources: the id; the superego; a disorder in the ego in the form of a malfunction; or to a source external to the individual. The analysis of conflict in learning is complicated by the fact that it can arise from any source, in any combination, and in any intensity of effect within the limits of the individual. Moreover, it can occur at any point of the learning process as outlined above.

Pearson admits that the delicate balance of forces involved in the learning process makes it difficult to design technical methods of investigation. For this reason he explored the role of conflict through the clinical examination of learning disorders. His work suggests three broad categories of analysis of the impact of Freudian conflict on learning:

1. Physiological attributes resulting in conflicts that affect learning;
2. Psychological conflicts that affect the learning process indirectly;
3. Psychological conflicts that participate in the learning process.

The learning process begins with the functioning of the central nervous system; therefore the ability to learn has a structural basis. This structural endowment, a result of

genetic and environmental factors, is a specialized part of the ego called the nonconflictual ego. Unlike the other parts of the ego, the nonconflictual ego is not formed as a result of conflict; however, the physiological attributes of the individual can function through the nonconflictual ego to act in conjunction with other sources of conflict to indirectly affect the learning process. Typically, conflict involving the nonconflictual ego affects learning prior to the initiation of the four-step process as outlined above.

An example of the role of conflict resulting from physiological sources might be the individual who is born with a diminished intellectual endowment (expressed through the nonconflictual ego) because of disease or injury, or as a result of genetic factors. The slow development of the child creates prolonged periods of infantile anxieties and a decreased ability to identify with the parents (which could also affect the quality of love exhibited by the parents). This child comes into learning situations with a weakened ego. The conflict between the superego or external demands and the ego disorder is experienced as frustration by virtue of a diminished ability to cope.

Other physiological conditions can result in nonconflictual ego disorders. Chronic illness, physical defects (especially impaired vision or hearing), or impairment of motor functions can all contribute to ego disorders in a manner similar to those discussed above. Physical fatigue, notably exertion that leads to decreased oxygen flow, can

lessen the functioning of the ego in conflict situations. Note, too, that anxiety can result in physical responses that can lead to fatigue. Ongoing tension can weaken the body through constant muscle contractions so as to lessen the capacity of the nonconflictual ego to contribute to the resolution of conflict situations.

It is interesting that the demands placed on the ego can lead to a conflict that interferes with learning if the subject is endowed with superior intellectual capacity. For instance, in a classroom situation this individual may require only a few minutes to complete a learning task designed to occupy a much longer time period. With the task completed, and nothing else to occupy his time, the individual may resort to daydreaming and discover that this activity is more pleasurable than the one encountered in the real world. If this occurs on repeated occasions, the individual ultimately falls behind and later experiences the learning task without the requisite skills to complete it successfully. As in the example above, the conflict is between demands and weakened capacity in the ego. If the conflict is resolved by escaping into more intense daydreaming then the conflict becomes a hindrance to future learning.

The functioning of conflict in learning is less obvious when we turn to its purely psychological sources. The second category involves those conflicts that affect the capacity to learn because of conscious conflicts in the ego.

These conflicts do not take part directly in the learning process, but act indirectly by influencing the subject's attention relative to a specific learning task.

One example of this can be seen in the operant conditioning of a subject. If an individual is punished for a particular response to a learning task, a conflict arises at the first or second step of the learning process. The ego blocks the cathexis with an anti-cathexis, thus creating a conflict with the superego or an external force, and learning is disrupted.

In operant conditioning, it can be argued that conflict can facilitate learning in some instances. For instance, a rewarded response in an ongoing learning situation can be vested with libidinal energy despite opposite urgings from the superego. The creation of a conflict (an "anti-" anti-cathexis) in response to the superego's anti-cathexis can favor the id and permit the smooth progression of the four steps in the learning process.

A second example of conflict functioning indirectly in the learning process would concern the subject's involvement with another subject. For instance, if a classroom teacher is viewed with hate, anger, or fear, (perhaps as a result of a real experience, displaced feelings, transference, projection, or through a failure to make an appropriate identification) a conflict is created by the ego blocking the investment of libidinal energy.

The first two examples have identified explicit ex-

ternal sources that force attention to themselves, thereby creating a conflict affecting learning. The deflection of attention may also originate in the subject who actively chooses to focus on some other concern or object. This is often experienced as anxiety. For instance, a child at school who, for whatever reason, fears for the mother's safety will focus attention on the resolution of this perceived threat to the child's personal security, to the exclusion of any learning task. Similarly, an individual experiencing shame, guilt, embarrassment, or any other threat to personal safety will tend to work on that problem. Instinctual desires, especially sexual urges in adolescents, come into direct conflict with superego and external demands from parents and teachers. At best, total attention cannot be given to a learning task without the employment of some defense mechanism (such as a reaction formation) because as Freud observed the instincts ultimately have the top priority.[20]

Pearson observes that educators typically assume that all forms of conflict in the learning process are included in the two broad categories discussed above. He describes a third category, however, in which the neurotic conflict is actually a part of the learning process. This can occur at the third step, the fourth step, or following the fourth step of the model.

Perhaps the most common occurrence of conflict as a part of the learning process occurs after the fourth step as

an inhibition of the use of learning. The ego may refuse to act or respond to its recent learning because of a projected outcome resulting from the integration of the learning with the neurotic conflict. Pearson identifies three main reasons:

1. In order not to undertake a fresh effort of repression which would mean a further conflict with the id.
2. In order not to become involved in conflicts with the superego.
3. Because it is so impoverished with respect to the energy available to it that it is driven to restrict its expenditure in many places at the same time.

The capacity for the reception of information can be increased or decreased depending upon the instinctual conflicts present in the individual. This is closely tied to the individual's "curiosity," or the exploration of pleasurable experiences in infancy. If this curiosity is severely punished or enthusiastically encouraged during infancy, the normal discharge of libidinal energy can be affected in later life. A learning activity that is involved with the function of sense organs, or in a secondary manner in thought, which relates in some way to an earlier punished activity may result in the unconscious inhibition of those sense organs and secondary thoughts throughout the learning experience. If, on the other hand, a learning activity

activates a memory trace of pleasurable activity, then additional concentration may be focused on that event and other concerns blocked.

Finally, conflict can exert its influence on the learning process at point four through a disturbance in the assimilation and categorization of learning. In a mild form, this may account for the differences among individuals in the practice time required to master a task. If information is taken into the ego in the presence of an unresolved conflict, then the efficiency of the sorting process is hampered. The flexiblity in approaching the problem from new angles is weakened and apparently more time-on-task is required.

This type of conflict can also represent one of the most serious types of learning difficulties because of the complexity of forces that can contribute to the conflict. Pearson offers one hypothesis that some new information arrives in the ego at essentially the same strength as an ongoing unresolved conflict in the forefront of the consciousness. The overwhelming influx of information results in a resolution of the conflict by regression to a point at which the secondary process of the ego no longer predominates. The primary process originates in the id, and represents no ability to catalogue, associate, or process logically. Cases such as this represent severe neuroses.

The ultimate weakness of psychoanalytic descriptions is that in an academic world that developed with such strong

biases for scientific methodology, Pearson's ideas have little substance of a technical nature. It must be remembered, however, that the intent here is to begin an exploration of alternative ways of viewing the role of instructional media and that such exploration may appear tentative. Specific conclusions regarding Pearson's work will be presented in Chapter V.

It might be noted, too, that despite Ekstein and Motto's prediction of the development of a third phase of application of psychoanalysis to education, it has failed to materialize. Certainly much more has been published regarding this topic, such as Seymour Fox's Freud and Education in 1975, but it is the position here that little new insight into the application of Freudian theory to educational praxis has been offered. There has been a resurgence of interest in Europe and especially in France for a rereading of Freud from a sociological perspective initiated by Jacques Lacan and continued by Louis Althusser and Roland Barthes. A central point of agreement among them is for the critical significance of Freud's work and out of this may emerge new directions for educational research, but as yet such directions have not been expressed.

At this point, then, discussion will turn to some conclusions regarding the implications of a psychoanalytic perspective for instructional media. Emphasis will be given to Pearson's ideas as they apply to practice in this field.

ENDNOTES

[1]David Ashley and David Michael Orenstein, Sociological Theory (Boston, 1985), p. 286.

[2]See Ernest R. Hilgard and Gordon H. Bower, Theories of Learning (4th ed., Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1975), pp. 372-373.

[3]See Robert Bocock, Freud and Modern Society (New York, 1978), pp. 176-177.

[4]See Manuel Furer, M.D., "Psychic Development and the Prevention of Mental Illness," The Journal of American Psychoanalytic Association, 10, 3 (July, 1962), p. 613.

[5]See Editha Sterba, "Interpretation and Education," The Psychoanalytic Study of the Child, 1 (1945). pp. 309-317.

[6]Edith Bauxbaum, "Three Great Psychoanalytic Educators," From Learning for Love to Love of Learning (New York, 1969), p. 28.

[7]Ibid., p. 200.

[8]See Sigmund Freud, The Origin and Development of Psychoanalysis (Chicago, 1965), pp. 62-63, for his description of transference.

[9]August Aichhorn, Wayward Youth (New York, 1925), pp. 235-236.

[10]Ibid., p. 9.

[11]Anna Freud, Psychoanalysis for Teachers and Parents (Boston, 1960), pp. 92-114.

[12]Ibid., p. 105.

[13]Ibid., p. 106.

[14]Certainly other themes can be seen as common, but the following discussion will explain why the concept of conflict is of particular interest. Cf. Arthur Asa Berger, Media Analysis Techniques (Beverly Hills, 1986), pp. 68-88, for an assessment of some other psychoanalytic themes

relevant to instructional media.

[15]Furer, p. 614.

[16]Erik H. Erikskon, Childhood and Society (35th ed., New York, 1985), p. 17.

[17]Ibid., p. 258.

[18]Ibid., p. 259.

[19]See Sigmund Freud, An Autobiographical Study, tr. James Strachey (New York, 1952).

[20]See Sigmund Freud, Totem and Taboo, tr. A. A. Brill (New York, 1946).

CHAPTER V

CONCLUSIONS

The essence of psychoanalysis stems from theories which developed in the interaction between patient and therapist according to what Freud first called the "talking cure."[1] This evolved into the highly specialized technique of psychoanalysis, but it remains at heart a two-way communication process for learning that functions in much the same way as public education does. It is by interaction with significant other individuals that we gain many of the insights necessary for coping with the demands and stresses of life. In a school setting, the student solves the problems encountered in the classroom through interactions which often involve the teacher or peers, as Erickson and others have observed. Ernest Jones (1923, p. 665) offered a simple definition of education in psychoanalytic terms by saying that a ". . . child can, of course, educate himself, but by education is usually meant the influencing of a child by another person for certain specific purposes."

This is not to imply that broader sociological understandings are of no value. In fact, just the opposite is true, because it is the sociological character of Freud's work that led to the examination of the interests that

direct the design of most instructional media, as discussed in Chapter III. Clearly, we may debate instructional media in terms of emancipation at the level of society (in terms of our phylogenesis) but the unique combination of our American legal system coupled with the fact that media may be defined as a physical object (as opposed to a process or technique) liable to examination and debate outside the school setting has rendered much of this argumentation moot. The legal checks upon school activity prevent definition of the highly visible instructional media product in terms other than those that serve a dominant positivist interest.

The content of instructional media is therefore rooted in the analytic-empirical sciences. It is the delivery of the information contained within this technically designed media that assumes significance for emancipatory interests. Delivery occurs in the more personalized and flexible setting of the classroom and may be used in ways that serve each of the categories of interest as defined by Habermas.[2] For this reason alone, a critical investigation of the function of the use of instructional media must occur at the site of an individual student who is understood in terms of both psychological and social development.

The concern here is for what happens when the fundamental nature of education as an on-going process of interaction between two people is interrupted however briefly by the use of instructional media. If it is possible that anxieties are created for students by virtue of the exper-

ience of a one-way communication as Pearson's work implies, (that is, if students are inadvertently being denied an avenue of problem-solving because of a technical means of instruction) then it is valid to explore that experience to see if any change in our approach to pedagogy is warranted.

It is unfortunate that such concerns are not often addressed. One popular understanding of the purpose of public education is found within the framework of the functional paradigm of education.[3] For most citizens, school represents a process for selecting and promoting people according to their talents, and for socializing all people into the culture. It would be ironic if, in our zeal for academic excellence, we have inadvertently manipulated the advances of technology into uses that insure specific cognitive growth in some areas of a person's life at the expense of heightened anxieties. While it is not the intent of this paper to suggest that this is the case, it is a conclusion that further investigation is warranted concerning whether the uninformed use of instructional media for teaching purposes may create restrictions on personal development.

To some extent, the literature within the field of instructional media has demonstrated attempts to understand the student's personal experience of media. It is generally accepted that the initial state of the learner at the beginning of any learning situation is important.[4] It appears, however, that no psychologically valid prescriptive instructional methods for instructional media have been formulated

outside a mechanistic assessment. There has been a failure to analyze meaningfully the impact of instructional media communications on the internal psychological processing operations of individual learners, and a cursory review of the literature suggests that this is not an area of intensive research at this time.[5] If this is true of the currently popular cognitive psychology then it might be assumed that (owing to its present disfavor) proportionally less research about Freudian conflict and its relationship to instructional media is in progress.[6]

It must be remembered that Freud's work does not imply a unified theory of learning; rather, as he observed, it may be used as a supplement to other theory more closely associated with pedagogy. Freud was a positivist who reluctantly turned away from the prevailing mechanistic models of his time to construct his own theory of personality.[7] He never disavowed his conviction that ultimately the actual process of human functioning could be described in physical terms, but he left that task to others in the field of education.[8]

Of importance for the investigation begun here is the idea that an individual is born with certain capablities and instincts, but it is out of conflict that the personality takes shape. The formation of the ego, followed by the superego, plus an extensive array of defenses develop relatively slowly as the individual prepares to encounter the external world on his own terms. By the age of five, the individual has experienced profound conflicts. Ironi-

cally, some of the most significant events in the individual's life are experienced as conflicts so terrifying that their memories are repressed deep within the subconscious. While the memories of those earliest times may be lost, the influences of the conflicts surrounding them continue to influence the individual throughout his life.[9]

If indeed the individual developed out of a process of conflict, and that process is never completely resolved, then the teacher must take into account before anything else that the ego is never truly conflict-free.[10] Virtually all learning objectives attained by the student in the contemporary classroom will be colored by the extent and nature of some conflict(s) at any given moment by that individual. It would be convenient if conflict functioned as an electrical switch, either "on" or "off;" either of extreme intensity to completely stop learning, or totally resolved to permit uninhibited understanding. Unfortunately, such is not the case, and the teacher must design instruction to cope with the unknowable nature of the learner's inner life.

Freud and his followers suggested that a first step in this effort must be with the teacher as an individual. If the classroom is serving as a forum in which the instructor is attempting subconsciously to work out personal unresolved conflicts, that person may inadvertently be adding to the conflict experienced by the student. How these conflicts are resolved is certainly a matter of individual consideration but by whatever means the instructor must be able to

diminish the effect of personal conflicts in the classroom in order for efficient instruction to occur.[11]

Following self-analysis, the teacher can turn to other areas for review in search of ways in which teaching might create conflict or inhibit conflict resolution. This does not necessarily involve the individual psychoanalysis of each student. Given a theoretical understanding of the conflict each human experiences in his progress toward stabilization, certain generalizations may be made about the existing instructional setting, the materials used in instruction, and the nature of the relationships the student experiences in this setting.

It is recognized that any observations offered are tentative, and serve best as starting points for future research. There are many issues that can be raised and many avenues for research suggested; but in following the theme of conflict investigation that emerged from the phase one writers coupled with the logic developed by Pearson, broad categories for investigation may be identified in three questions:

1. Does instructional media participate in physiological conflicts that affect learning?
2. Does instructional media participate in psychological conflicts that affect the learning process indirectly?
3. Does instructional media participate in psychological conflicts that affect the learning process

directly?

These categories are not necessarily discrete, and some overlap is unavoidable. Each question will be examined briefly with suggestions for possible areas of research.

A rereading of the existing literature within the field of instructional media provides an excellent starting source of information with respect to category number one. In effect, this category addresses the physical aspects of media experience ranging from simple concerns of elements of comfort, to the mechanism of stimulus variation within a multimedia presentation. Even though such findings tend not to be expressed in psychoanalytic terms, some research conclusions are psychoanalytically valid.

For instance, the physical design of the classroom must be conducive to conflict resolution in that it must project permissiveness, openness, and acceptance; that is, to whatever extent is practically possible, it must not be an environment that offers potentially more sources of conflict. This openness must be balanced with constraints, however, because it must be remembered that the development of the ego in the first place was in reaction to the id. The individual should not have reason to believe that he's in a place where he might "run wild." How such a classroom might actually be created is the topic of future research.

If positivistic research has articulated sophisticated means for compelling and holding student interest for some instructional objective, the question then focuses on

whether the experience of instructional media is beneficial to the individual in terms of time taken away from the developmental concerns of conflict resolution. Does it make any difference if attention is deflected from such a task? Is the student better served by gaining some relief from the constant involvement with the conflict? Is conflict resolved in an entirely different manner so the physical demands of participation in instructional media offer no genuine barrier to development?

Louise L. Tyler believes that the concept of Freudian conflict has strong implications for the selection of instructional materials and how those materials are used.[12] Tyler argues that conflict resolution comes through active involvement in the resolution process by the individual, and that no matter how cleverly designed, media tends to promote passivity by virtue of the physical isolation (as in automated study carrels) or physical restraint (when watching films or video tapes). If the natural state of the individual is toward conflict resolution, then it is necessary for the teacher to provide tools for the task in the form of interpersonal relationships as opposed to prepackaged curriculum media. The immediate conclusion is that as consumers of instructional media, students may gain more information but not be aided appreciably in their efforts toward stabilization. Perhaps this is especially important for immature students whose progress toward maturity could be meliorated with maximized one-on-one instruction.

Research for category two may be more difficult to accomplish. Internal experiences of conflict are unique to the individual, but generalizations may be drawn from case studies and sociological investigations that are useful for the field of instructional media. For instance, David W. Johnson at the University of Minnesota has published extensively concerning the social process of education. Johnson does not address the concept of conflict resolution directly, but his ideas discussed from this point of view are illuminating. He states that the primary focus of educational research should be on the social organization of the classroom because most learning is mediated by interpersonal action.[13] The efficiency of instruction is enhanced if a good working relationship is established between the student and teacher via transference. In this way, conflict experienced in another setting may be weakened in its effect if the teacher is open to its resolution; otherwise, the conflict is experienced internally only and its ultimate impact cannot be assessed.

Johnson's work points the way for research into the impact of instructional media as an indirect participant in conflict with his reference to transference. Recall that it is the intent of this paper to suggest that exploration of the role of instructional media in conflict is necessary. This does not, however, represent an attempt to address the way in which this conflict might be resolved, for such comments lie far outside the scope and sophistication of the

work here. An overwhelming variety of provocative questions can be posed by mention of any of the defense mechanisms Freud identified. For example, with respect to transference: Can an instructor introduce a particular production to effect transference? Can instructional media be used to facilitate transference at all? Would this be desirable? If not, is the teacher justified in using media as an indirect block to conflict resolution if resolution means the personal involvement of an instructor whose stated role is to implement the basic curriculum only?[14]

Seymour Fox's 1975 publication of Freud and Education offers an interesting variation on this exploration of defense mechanisms with his description of the teacher as "polyvalent."[15] In the classroom the teacher represents collectively a significant adult, society, society as seen by the child, and the source of knowledge. As a representative of society, for instance, the teacher is in a unique position to permit safe experimentation in dealing with society. By a similar process, the teacher can be cast in a fifth persona as parent who represents a potential for the student to experiment with the resolution of parental conflicts. In this way the intuitive teacher can permit experimentation in the resolution of the conflicts in a variety of ways depending upon the student's perception of the teacher at a given moment. Certainly such education would depend upon the student's ability to shift from one perception to another. Perhaps the effective use of instructional

media could facilitate this process, if such were deemed desirable.

Just as investigation in category two appears to be more difficult than category one, the final category regarding the direct participation of instructional media in conflict seems to be proportionately more difficult to investigate because of less clearly defined "mechanisms." One clinical attempt to investigate the role of conflict in learning was reported in John Butler's essay concerning "repressive versus vigilant" individuals. His work offers some statistical evidence in an indirect way.[16]

In summary, two subjects were selected to take part in tests in associative learning. One of the subjects was interviewed before the test to identify a list of words particular to that individual that related in some way to conflict unique to that person. These words were then embedded in a larger list which was presented to both subjects. The first subject, the "repressive" individual, scored significantly poorer than did the second subject, the "vigilant" individual. The implication is that information that relates to unresolved conflict tends to be processed in a less efficient manner than conflict-free material. Of particular interest is the fact that after a brief counseling session in which the repressive individual was aided in resolving the conflict, his performance score more closely approximated that of the vigilant subject.

Although far removed from pedagogy, Paulina F. Kern-

berg's investigations regarding mother-child mirroring as a component in the development of self-recognition may stimulate a line of research. Freud speculated that among the first conflicts in life were those involving the self as defined against the family members, especially the mother. Kernberg argues that the infant needs the "mirroring" of self in the face of the mother in order to foster an identity independent of mother. In severe cases, therapy with young children who have failed to develop self-recognition may be helped by employing a mirror as a tool to aid the psychotherapeutic process. More important to this discussion is the implication that the child with a distorted self-concept may seek a reflection of self in individuals encountered other than the mother.

> It is as if the self comes to know itself by projecting itself onto others and then retrieving this image. Not only does one see an affective image of oneself in the other's face, but one also receives a reflection of more abstract character or personality attributes through this process of projection and introjection (Kernberg, 1984, p. 109).

Kernberg notes that infants at five months of age can recognize themselves in video taped playbacks (though with less interest than with their mirror images). This indicates that it is possible for this mirroring to occur via recorded media, and this raises interesting prospects for instruction. If images of self are received however imperfectly from others, and if this is possible in a recorded format, to what extent is an individual's self-concept in-

fluenced by experiencing, say, broadcast television? Can the appropriate selection of instructional media aid in clarifying self-images among students, that is, can it participate directly in the conflict experienced as a result of an imperfect self-concept?

It must be noted in conclusion that these implications are not offered in a cavalier sense nor are they meant to imply that the teacher should attempt an active investigation into conflict. To the contrary, perhaps the significance of this paper for instructional media lies in the realization that new understandings are necessary for the use of media in the classroom. The nature of media may in some manner thrust itself into intensely personal areas of conflict occurring in personalities that are not yet stabilized. Perhaps that intrusion can profoundly affect a child, but to presume to actively choose to interfere in the individual process of conflict resolution requires answers to psychological, educational, and ethical questions that have yet to be posed. Certain preliminary implications drawn from research in social education suggest that through thoughtful design and planning the teacher can help to mitigate the painful effects of the conflict by understanding some of the dynamics of the process and decrease inadvertent contributions to it. Until more research is completed, it appears that restraint in the use of media in favor of personal interaction whenever possible is the prudent course of action.

ENDNOTES

[1]Freud's early experiments in hypnosis as treatment for hysteria led to a conclusion that some symptoms were related to unconscious feelings that could be rediscovered. The classic study involved Anna O., a patient of Joseph Breuer. Freud published one of his first accounts of the "talking cure" jointly with Breur in 1892. See Sigmund Freud, An Autobiographical Study, tr. James Strachey (New York, 1963), pp. 32-36. Cf. Sigmund Freud, The Origin and Development of Psychoanalysis (Chicago, 1965), pp. 1-17.

[2]By this it is meant that, say, a film may be used as a component of an instructional design scheme; presented as a source for interpretation in a hermeneutic sense; or used as a trigger for dialogue. Cf. Paulo Freire, Pedagogy of the Oppressed (New York, 1962).

[3]See Christopher J. Hurn, The Limits and Possibilities of Schooling: An Introduction to the Sociology of Education (Boston, 1978), pp. 30-31, for a critical examination of the functional, or traditional, paradigm of education in the United States, as compared to the "radical" paradigm.

[4]Robert M. Gagne, "Developments in Learning Psychology," Educational Technology (June, 1982) pp. 11-15.

[5]See Linda Wheeler, "Successful Instructional Methods," Educational Communication and Technology, 29,4 (Winter, 1981), pp. 203-217.

[6]See Robert Glaser, "Components of Psychology of Instruction: Towards a Science of Design," Review of Education, 46, 1 (1976), pp. 1-24.

[7]See James Strachey, tr., "Sigmund Freud: A Sketch of His Life and Ideas," On the History of the Psycho-Analytic Movement by Sigmund Freud (New York, 1966), pp. vii-x.

[8]Cf. Sigmund Freud, Beyond the Pleasure Principle (New York, 1961), 54: "Biology is truly a land of unlimited possibilities. We may expect it to give us the most surprising information and we cannot guess what answers it will return in a few dozen years to the questions we have put to it. They may be of a kind which will blow away the whole of our artificial structure of hypotheses."

[9]An excellent summary of Freud's theories at the time of his death (his "final system") can be found in Calvin S. Hall, A Primer of Freudian Psychology (New York, 1954).

[10]Ibid. This is in reference to the period that a student is in public school. The time required for a person to develop through Freud's various periods to a stabilized personality requires approximately twenty years.

[11]See Clemens A. Loew, Three Psychotherapies (New York, 1975).

[12]See Louise L. Tyler, "Curriculum Development from a Psychotheraputic Perspective," Four Psychologies Applied to Education, ed. Thomas B. Roberts (New York, 1975), pp. 55-61.

[13]See David W. Johnson, "Social Psychology," Psychology and Education: The State of the Union, ed. Frank H. Farley and Neal J. Gordon (Berkeley, 1981), pp. 265-287.

[14]Cf. Lili E. Peller, "The School's Role in Promoting Sublimation," The Psychoanalytic Study of the Child, 11 (1956), pp. 437-449. Cf. Velimir Svoren, M.D., Conflict and its Solution (New York, 1971).

[15]Seymour Fox, Freud and Education (Springfield, 1975), pp. 163-166.

[16]John Butler, "Prospects and Perspectives in Psychotheraputic Theory and Research," Learning Theory, Personality Theory, and Clinical Research, ed. Donald K. Adams (New York, 1954), p. 126.

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APPENDIX

FREUD'S THEORY OF PERSONALITY: A DEVELOPMENTAL VIEW

Freud's theory of individual personality was linked systematically with the biological organism of human beings via the notion of instincts.[1] For this reason, the following treatment will proceed from a developmental point of view. Beginning with the infant as an individual possessing no guiding structures or mechanisms for dealing with the world other than its reflexes and instincts, the discussion will highlight some of the events leading to the development of two additional systems that, in combination with the instincts, form the basis for the emergence of the stabilized personality. It will be suggested that this twenty-year process is characterized by constant change and tension as the individual progresses through four stages of life: infancy, early chldhood, latency (the period of time between the ages of five and twelve when the child's sexual and aggressive impluses are in a subdued state) and adolescence.[2] Finally, a brief review will be offered of some of the defense mechanisms employed at the site of the ego to control the instincts.

At birth, the infant is equipped to interact with the

external world through a reflex apparatus that aids in the discharge of some of the energy, or "tension," resulting from a stimulus to a sense organ. For instance, a bright light can create tension which is dispelled by a reflex that triggers the closing of the eyelid. If all tensions could be discharged by some reflex, there would be no need for psychological development, but such is not the case. The hungry infant cannot discharge the stomach contractions automatically and the contractions lead to crying instead. In this case, the tension is discharged only by external assistance.

Eventually, the parents begin to establish a schedule of feeding and initiate the first attempts at training and discipline. As the infant experiences alternating periods of frustration and satisfaction, the "id" is formed. The sole function of the id is to provide for the immediate discharge of quantities of excitation (energy or tension) that are created in the organism by internal or external stimulation.[3] Stated more simply, it is that part of the personality made up of unconscious impulses and instincts that were born with the child.

Freud postulated two great groups of instincts: those that are in the service of life (Eros); and those that are in the service of death (Thanatos). The form of energy which is created by the life instinct is called libido. It is mental energy that is directed toward the realization of some life-preserving impulse. This term is often used in

specific reference to sexual energy, per Freud's example in earlier writings, but it is used here in the broader sense as the energy of all life instincts.

All energy for performing the work of the personality comes from the instincts, and it is important to note that an instinct has as a final aim the removal of a need, such as the elimination of hunger, and the ultimate restoration of a state of peace. Freud believed this dynamic concept to be an important end. In his terminology, the investment of an urging force emanating from the id onto an external object is the "cathexis."

The id discharges tension in two ways: through impulsive motor activity and the formation of memory images, or "primary process." If the id recalls an image of an object (a food item for instance) and temporarily reduces a tension (hunger) by concentrating on the image, then this is an example of the primary process. This process is obviously inefficient; the personality needs additional structures in order to survive.

As the infant matures there begins to develop a second system of the personality which Freud called the "ego." In contrast to the id which is governed by the pleasure principle, the ego is dominated by the reality principle. Its function is to mediate the transactions between the person and the world at large. It is what enables the child to begin to distinguish between the things that are harmful (not appropriate for cathexis) and which are safe. Some-

times, when the person wants to do something, and the ego prevents it, the individual experiences internal frustration. The checking force operating in opposition to the cathexis is the anti-cathexis and represents a primary source of conflict.

One of the most variable features of an instinct is the shifting from one object that is not appropriate for cathexis to another. The process of rechanneling psychological energy is called displacement and is a common means of conflict resolution. For instance, one of the earliest pleasurable activities that the child experiences is associated with taking food and sucking. As the parents regulate the feeding schedule, the child learns to suck his own finger to reproduce the sensation of sucking at his mother's breast; and later appears to interpret the world by using his mouth. Freud suggested that the development of personality proceeds in large part by a series of energy displacements or object substitutions. The aim of the urging force remains the same, only the object changes.[4]

The pleasure of sucking is followed by the discovery of other enjoyable activities. As the parents attempt to regulate the child's wetting and dirtying of diapers, the child's attention is directed to the anus and he becomes aware of new pleasures associated with self-regulation of his bowel movements.[5] As toilet training proceeds, the child discovers his genitals and the pleasures possible through self-stimulation. Freud argues that such activities

are important for the individual's sexual maturation, and the resulting conflict with the parents plays a role in the formation of the third system of the personality, the superego.

Given the long period of dependence on the parents, the child experiences repeated conflicts with them. In time, the child learns to adopt the exacting set of rules and standards they hold. This identification with the parents results in the formation of the superego out of the ego. It is like the ego in that it stems from the individual's perception of the world, but is different in that it is not based on the reality principle; rather, it reflects an idealized impression of the all-powerful parents.

The superego can be thought of as the moral component of the personality and is, in a very real sense, an extension of the child's parents, vested with the same power. The parents exert control over the development of the superego with a combination of rewards and punishments expressed physically and psychologically. Physically, rewards and punishments are expressed by giving or removing food, toys, swats, caresses, and the like. Psychologically, rewards and punishments are expressed through the giving or removing of love, protection or acceptance. The superego exerts its control over the ego in essentially the same way through its two main subsystems: the ego-ideal, which corresponds to what the parents believe is morally good; and the conscience, which corresponds to what the parents believe is

morally bad. The superego functions in effect by permitting the industrious individual a vacation (physical reward) and a sense of pride (psychological reward) while the lazy individual may get a stomach ache (physical punishment) and feel guility (psychological punishment).

It is interesting to note that rewards or punishments are not based solely on expressed acts. The ego may be rewarded or punished for a mere thought. Thus, conflict can occur in the absence of any overt stimulation. The subtle interplay of actions on the ego by the superego may happen at a level of thought that is not obvious to the individual. This could account for feelings of guilt or elation that an individual may experience which seem inappropriate to a given situation.[6] Freud suggests the fascinating implication that very little that the individual experiences is by accident; rather, it is a result of the manipulations of the superego that lead the individual to apparently fortuitous situations or runs of bad luck.[7] In the final analysis it appears that rewards and punishments, whatever their sources may be, are conditions that reduce or increase inner tension.[8]

Like the ego, the superego possesses both cathexes and anti-cathexes and influences the object selections of the ego. In some cases, the compromises made by the ego because of influences in the external environment coupled with the superego can result in a displacement that represents a higher cultural goal. This is called "sublimation." In a

broad sense, sublimation represents the ability to transform basic instinctual urges into needs that can be filled symbolically.[9]

It may be noted here that a more precise investigation of the earliest stages of personality development is hampered by what Freud called "infantile amnesia."[10] The ability to remember the earliest events of life varies somewhat from individual to individual, but generally speaking, humans have no clear memory of their earliest impressions. These first years are characterized by a profound helplessness and dependency which ultimately determines the individual's destiny. Freud suggests that certain events occur during this time which are highly traumatic, and the act of forgetting may be an act of defense. Anna Freud suggested the following scenario.

The child at a very early age develops strong ties to his mother, and it is logical to assume that the child becomes interested in maintaining this state of affairs.[11] The bond transcends the child's feelings of hunger or fright; a love develops that is independent of the instincts of self-preservation. The child would probably be content if the mother did nothing but tend to his needs and love him.

By the end of the first year, however, the child has become aware of the fact that the world includes others who intrude upon the exclusivity of his relationship with his mother. The other family members, typically the father and

siblings, appear to be just as important as he thinks himself. The resulting jealousy leads to an undifferentiated wish, presumably violent, to eliminate the rivals for the mother's attention.

As time passes, the child's anger begins to assume two distinct forms. The first comes from the realization that the mother loves the siblings and that the child is encouraged to dismiss the feelings of anger and love the siblings as well. Anna Freud suggested that this is the source of conflict between siblings, and that the stronger the earliest ties are between mother and child, the stronger is the likelihood of conflict between siblings in later years.[12]

The other form of anger is directed toward the father. Not only is this person a rival for the mother's attention, he clearly has won the competition as evidenced by his ability to take the mother away and even to sleep with her. The desire to eliminate the father and possess the mother Freud labeled as the Oedipus complex. In all other respects, however, the child admires and loves the father which leads to an extraordinary problem: the child loves and admires a person he hates and wishes dead. Freud proposed that this early conflict results in agony at the strength of his evil wishes, fear of his father's revenge and the loss of love, the destruction of all ease and peace in his relations with his mother, his bad conscience, and his mortal dread of death.[13]

The individual experiences this agony as anxiety, one of the central features of psychoanalytic theory. For Freud, anxiety is synonymous with fear, but he used the term "anxiety" to distinguish it from the lay understanding of fear as something that results from a threat external to the individual.[14] Freud identified three categories of anxiety. The first he called reality anxiety and stems from a genuine danger to the individual from the external world, such as a physical assault. The second is neurotic anxiety and comes from an instinctual object-choice (cathexis) of the id. This is exemplified by the person who experiences almost uncontrollable urges which could lead to harm if pursued. Finally, Freud identified moral anxiety. This is experienced as deep guilt or shame in the ego created by the conscience in the superego. In essence, the ego experiences anxiety as a fear of the external world, the id, and the superego. These anxieties are also primary sources of conflict.[15]

With the development of the personality comes the appearance of mechanisms for dealing with the anxiety. Five of the more important ones are reviewed below.

If a cathexis of the id, ego or superego is blocked by an anti-cathexis, the resulting anxiety can be avoided by the prevention of the conflict from being expressed in the consciousness. This Freud labeled as "repression" and he identified two categories. The first is "primal repression" which refers to innate object choices that have never been

conscious but are common to all persons.[16] The second is "repression proper" (or simply "repression") and is concerned with those conflicts specific to the individual. The concept of repression is of central importance for this paper for it is the process by which infantile amnesia occurs. Note that even though a memory is repressed, it retains its ability to create conflict.

"Projection" occurs when an individual experiencing anxiety caused by the id or superego attributes it to an external source. A person angry with himself may project the anger onto another person by claiming, "He hates me." An explanation for this may be that external problems are perceived as less complex or potentially frightening than internal conflicts, and may be easier to solve. This could also explain why individuals seem to seek external explanations for their behavior rather than experience the anxiety of introspection.[17]

When an instinct creates anxiety directly on the ego or indirectly by way of the superego, a defense may take the form of a "reaction formation" which is the outward expression of an opposite feeling. A person who hates another but cannot express that hate may choose to demonstrate love instead. In this case, "love" is distinguished from "love resulting from a reaction formation" by the latter's rigidity and excessive profession.

As suggested earlier, there are four broad stages of human development. If for some reason, movement from one

stage to another, or development within a given stage, is perceived as a change that can produce considerable anxiety, the individual may simply refuse to take the next step. This is labeled as "fixation," and is at work in the individual who refuses to separate from his mother. It is usually not so much a result of strong ties of love as it is a fear of moving on without the mother's protection. In this sense, fixation is a defense mechanism.

Just as a person may refuse to move on, the experience of anxiety may cause an individual to move back to an earlier stage of development. This is called "regression," and can be seen in the actions of a newlywed who rushes back to his parents at the first sign of difficulty. It may be thought of as a reverting of the libido to a form of expression that belonged to an earlier stage of life.[18]

Thus, what appears on the surface as a protracted period of helplessness during the time of infancy and early childhood is a period of helplessness only in the sense of the individual's limited ability to direct specific responses to the external world. Internally, he experiences an astonishing variety of complex emotions and impressions largely represented as frustrations and conflicts that result in the formation of the personality and its sophisticated defenses.

One final thought is in order. It is interesting to note that the development of the superego at approximately age five corresponds roughly with the onset of the second

stage of development that Freud called "latency." This period is marked by a pronounced drop in libidinal energy (presumably a function of maturation) that lasts approximately seven years until the beginning of adolescence. The latency period is characterized by its subdued state during which the child's sexual and aggressive impulses are replaced by what appears to be a child who "finally learned how to be good." Perhaps it is more than mere coincidence that this is typically the point that marks the beginning of public education.

ENDNOTES

[1]Robert Bocock, Freud and Modern Society (New York, 1978), p. 176.

[2]The specific conceptualization that follows was suggested by Anna Freud, Psychoanalysis for Teachers and Parents (Boston, 1935); and, Calvin S. Hall, A Primer of Freudian Psychology (New York, 1954)

[3]Anna Freud, p. 22.

[4]Ibid., p. 79.

[5]Sigmund Freud, Character and Culture (New York, 1963), pp. 27-33. This is an interesting essay in which Freud suggests that there is a relationship between anal retention and one's choice of occupation.

[6]In Freud's early work, he used the term "unconscious" to refer to that part of the personality that he later called the "id."

[7]Hall, p. 33.

[8]Ibid., p. 32.

[9]David Ashley and David Michael Orenstein, Sociological Theory (Boston, 1985), p. 292.

[10]It is wrong to assume that an adult cannot remember his infancy because of the passage of years because even a five-year old child cannot recall that time, either.

[11]Note that Freud didn't really discuss situations involving a child without a mother, or even the development of women very much at all. A parallel to the Oedipus conplex was developed later that postulated an analagous phase called the Electra complex.

[12]Anna Freud, pp. 37-39.

[13]Ibid., p. 34.

[14]Hall, 63.

[15]Ibid., p. 62.

[16]See Sigmund Freud, Totem and Taboo, tr. A. A. Brill (New York, 1946).

[17]An interesting variation on this would involve the student who cheats on an exam and justifies his actions by claiming that "everybody does it."

[18]Ashley and Orenstein, p. 292.

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VITA

Richard Keith Pursley

Candidate for the Degree of

Master of Science

Thesis: THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS FOR A CRITICAL REAPPRAISAL OF THE ROLE OF INSTRUCTIONAL MEDIA IN AMERICAN PUBLIC EDUCATION: A PSYCHOANALYTIC PERSPECTIVE

Major Field: Curriculum and Instruction

Biographical:

Personal Data: Born in Omaha, Nebraska, November 26, 1950, the son of Keith W. and Sylvia L. Pursley. Married to Rebecca L. Gum on December 24, 1984.

Education: Graduated from Northwest Classen High School, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, in May, 1969; received Bachelor of Arts degree in Political Science from Oklahoma State University in December, 1972; completed requirements for the Master of Science degree at Oklahoma State University in July, 1987.

Professional Experience: Classroom Teacher, Edmond Public Schools, Edmond, Oklahoma, April, 1976, to May, 1980; Consultant, Oklahoma State Department of Education, June, 1981, to August, 1982; Artist-in-Residence, State Arts Council of Oklahoma, August, 1980, to May, 1981, and September, 1982, to May, 1985; Teaching Assistant, Department of Curriculum and Instruction, Oklahoma State University, January, 1986, to May, 1987; Director of Video Production, Education Department; National Rural Water Association, Duncan, Oklahoma, May, 1987, to present.