THE END OF THE "CHRISTIAN CENTURY": AMERICAN PROTESTANT MISSIONARIES AND CHINESE NATIONALISM, 1919-1928

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PREFACE

This thesis is about American Protestant missionaries and their attempts to convert the Chinese to Christianity. American Protestants were not the first or only Christians to undertake this mission. Christianity appeared in China at least as early as the seventh century A.D. At that time, Nestorian churches in Syria and Persia sent missionaries to India and China. Some converted small numbers of Chinese to their faith and established churches there. Nestorianism enjoyed the favor of Chinese emperors during the Tang dynasty (618-907), especially the Tai Zong emperor (626-649). Although Nestorian missions ended in the tenth century, Roman Catholic missionaries who went to China in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries found some Chinese practicing Nestorianism. Both Nestorians and Catholics lived in China during the Yuan dynasty (1264-1368), but under the persecution of the early Ming (1368-1644) Christianity virtually disappeared.

Roman Catholic missions were more successful during the late sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. The contributions of the Italian Jesuit, Matteo Ricci, were largely responsible for this success. Working in China from 1583 until his death in 1610, Ricci established precedents in Catholic missionary work that continued into the twentieth

century.

Ricci and the Jesuits tried to accommodate themselves as much as possible to the culture of China, even adopting the traditional dress of Chinese scholars. They believed that concentrating their efforts on the educated elites was the best way to influence Chinese society. They used their technical and scientific knowledge as a way to gain the confidence of the Chinese scholars. Through these techniques, the Jesuits became influential at the Imperial Court, especially with the Kangxi emperor (1661-1722) of the Qing dynasty (1644-1911). During the seventeenth century, Franciscans and Dominicans from Spain and Jesuits from France joined the Italians in the China mission field.

In the eighteenth century, controversies over the adaptation of Catholicism to Chinese culture divided the missionaries and resulted in the suspension of Christian missions until the nineteenth century. This dissension centered on the "rites" and "terms" issues. The rites controversy concerned the traditional Chinese practice of honoring Confucius and family ancestors. Ricci and other Jesuits considered these ceremonies to be non-religious and did not forbid converts to practice them. Other Catholics, including Pope Clement XI and Franciscan and Dominican missionaries, decided that ancestor "worship" was a pagan rite and opposed the practice.

The terms controversy involved the question of what Chinese words should be adopted for "God." Several Chinese

terms had theistic connotations but none meant monotheism in the strict Judeo-Christian definition of the concept. The missionary community was divided on which Chinese terms they should use. The Franciscans and Dominicans also differed from the Jesuits by emphasizing the conversion of the illiterate masses instead of the educated elites of Chinese society. Because of these controversies, the Catholics lost the imperial favor they enjoyed. In 1742 Pope Benedict XIV sided with the Franciscans and Dominicans in the rites controversy. In response, the Qianlong emperor (1736-1796) issued an imperial edict declaring Christianity a seditious heterodoxy and the Catholics ended their missions until the nineteenth century.

In 1807 the London Missionary Society became the first Protestant organization to send missionaries to China. Protestant missionaries suffered the same imperial disfavor as the Catholics until the 1840s; they also dealt with many of the same problems. The rites and terms questions became divisive issues among the Protestants and had no easy solutions. Protestant missionaries struggled with the adaptation of their religion to Chinese culture throughout their campaign to save China. Compounding the missionaries' problems was the absence of monotheistic concepts in traditional Chinese philosophy. The eclectic mixing of ideas from Confucianism, Legalism, Daoism, and Buddhism was another obstacle to converting the Chinese. The ethnocentrism of both the Chinese and the missionaries created

problems that resisted resolution. Missionaries of all faiths in all eras confronted these formidable barriers.

American Protestants began their spiritual campaign to save China in 1830. Their efforts increased substantially after the Treaty of Tianjin between the United States and China in 1858. Although the campaign lasted more than a century and expended millions of dollars and thousands of lives, it was a failure. At no time during this period did more than one percent of the Chinese population espouse Christianity or practice a Christian lifestyle. The personal evangelistic style practiced by most missionaries for the first fifty years of the "Christian century" was especially ineffective in converting Chinese. After adopting the techniques of the social gospel, American missionaries were more successful in winning Chinese for Christ but the numbers remained small.

Liberal theology and the social gospel did, however, allow the missionaries to make progress in the secular areas of education and medical care. The goal of creating in China a reformed, modernized, Western democracy based on Christian ideals replaced the goal of making every Chinese a Christian. Despite this altered approach, the missionaries failed to effect these evolutionary changes in the Chinese polity. Civil wars, foreign wars, and anarchic domestic political conditions greatly hampered the missionaries' efforts. There was no consensus among the Chinese on their social and economic problems and this factionalism

made the missionaries' task more difficult. After Mao Zedong and the Communists established the Peoples' Republic of China in 1949, American Protestants evacuated the mainland leaving behind the dream of a Christian China.

The critical decade of the Christian century was 1919 to 1928. The rapid development of Chinese nationalism, the manifested goals of that nationalism, and the missionaries' reactions to those goals determined the future of Christianity in China. During this short period, the missionaries believed they had an opportunity to influence the outcome of China's struggle to become a modern state. Several issues of Chinese nationalism affected the missionary enterprise. Government control of mission schools, Chinese Christian control of churches, Chinese forms of worship, and the renegotiation of international treaties were problems that involved the vested interests of Protestant missions. There were no easy solutions to these problems. The missionaries' inability to successfully meet the challenge of these years of crisis is revealed in their responses to the issues of Chinese nationalism.

Although they were limited by their theology and the cultural burden their religion carried, American Protestants in China confronted alternatives and made choices that had consequences for themselves and their followers. Those choices influenced the Chinese decision to reject Christianity as a viable solution to the dilemma of modernization. The missionaries' conservative approach to

the issues alienated many Chinese Christians and was an important reason for their failure. The missionaries could only accept evolutionary change in themselves, their missions, and their followers. China was in the midst of a revolution.

I express my appreciation to Dr. Robert M. Spaulding who served as my major advisor and provided valuable guidance and helpful suggestions in the preparation of this manuscript. I am also thankful to the other members of my committee, Dr. Ronald A. Petrin and Dr. Paul Hiltpold, for their time and consideration. Thanks also to Dr. J. Paul Bischoff who spent some of his valuable time reading the thesis. Special thanks goes to the Interlibrary Loan Department of the OSU library for obtaining much of the material this work is based on. Most important of all, I would like to thank my wife, Dorothy, for her love and support during the ordeal that has been my education.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION: AMERICAN PROTESTANTS AND THE CHRISTIAN CENTURY, 1858-1953

Between 1858 and 1953, American Protestants sent thousands of men and spent millions of dollars in their attempt to create Christian churches in China. This "Christian century" began after the Treaties of Tianjin[1] insured the missionaries the right to proselytize and convert Chinese to their religion. The "toleration clauses" of these treaties established American Christian workers as a privileged elite in Chinese society.[2] Although the United States finally relinquished these privileges in 1943, it was the Communists who effectively ended these conditions after they gained control of the mainland in 1949.

After the Korean War and an intense anti-American movement began in 1950, even the most optimistic missionaries left China. Foreign Christian workers were harassed, accused of being spies, and imprisoned.[3] By 1953 only ten American missionaries remained and eight of them were in prison.[4] The attempt to Christianize China ended in failure. At no time during this period did the number of

Chinese Christians reach one percent of the total population.[5] As the missionaries fled the hostile Communist regime, their converts remained behind to negotiate a modicum of toleration for themselves and their Western religion.[6]

The Communist victory in 1949 marked the conclusion of two simultaneous, century-long struggles in East Asia. China's own struggle to break free from two thousand years of traditionalism and become a modern nation ended in totalitarianism. The campaign of American Protestants to Christianize China ended in bitter frustration and the "loss of China." The failure of the missionaries to change this conclusion in ways they desired is the legacy of the Christian century. The 1920s were the determining years in both struggles to change China. During this period, the missionaries believed their opportunity to influence the outcome of China's struggle to become a modern state was greatest. Yet they alienated many of their own followers and virtually neglected the rural Chinese, the eventual source of power in the new China. The missionaries' responses to the issues of Chinese nationalism during this critical decade determined their fate when political power and patriotism united against all Westerners after 1949.

Study of the Christian century enlightens aspects of cultural confrontation that have relevance for East-West relations. Two decades of alienation between China and the United States after 1950 indicate that the failure to

respond successfully to Chinese nationalism was more than a missionary problem. While American Christian workers were in China, they served as a line of communication between the East and West--their failure is their most important message.

Origins of the Protestant Campaign

The first American missionaries arrived in China in 1830. They worked under constraints the Qing government imposed upon all foreigners until 1842 when some of the restrictions were lifted by the treaty settlement that ended the First Anglo-Chinese War. The missionaries did not, however, make many converts until the Second Anglo-Chinese War forced the Empire to accommodate Westerners to a greater extent.

After the Treaties of Tianjin "opened" China in 1858, American Protestants undertook a century-long campaign to convert the "heathens" of the Middle Kingdom. The evolution of the missionary enterprise during the Christian century was related to political and social changes in both the United States and China. By the beginning of the twentieth century, the attitudes and techniques of the missionaries changed in accordance with the "social gospel." Missions were big business; the denominational boards established million-dollar institutions in China. These vested interests were threatened and then destroyed by the political forces that engulfed China after 1925.

The American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions (ABCFM) was the first American missionary society to send men to China. David Abeel and Elijah C. Bridgman arrived in Guangzhou (Canton) in 1830 where American and British merchants and other foreigners engaged in trade. Robert Morrison of the London Missionary Society preceded them as the first Protestant missionary to China in 1807. Bridgman, the first American missionary to learn Chinese, acquired a printing press in 1831 and began publishing the Chinese Repository in May 1832. This first missionary journal published in China set a precedent for Christians to report, comment, and editorialize on the events and conditions they confronted.[7]

American missionaries worked in the China field under very restricted conditions before 1858. The Chinese custom of interacting with foreigners according to the stipulations of the "tributary system" confined all Westerners to the single port of Guangzhou until after 1842.[8] Before this date, imperial edicts prohibited Christian missionaries from entering any part of China and also prohibited Chinese from becoming Christians. Missionaries violated Chinese law by going to Guangzhou and posing as clerks in the merchants' factories. They hired Chinese to distribute their printed tracts in the surrounding areas. They also ventured away from the factory district whenever they had an opportunity to elude the local Chinese officials.[9]

The treaties negotiated after the First Anglo-Chinese

War (1839-1842) opened four more Chinese cities to commerce and the residence of foreigners. Although Americans did not participate in the war, the United States negotiated a treaty with China similar to the Sino-British treaties of 1842 and 1843.[10] This treaty allowed the missionaries to build churches in the "treaty ports" but did not grant the right to convert Chinese. The French envoy obtained this right when he persuaded the Imperial Court to issue edicts rescinding the prohibition against Chinese accepting Christianity.[11] This war and the resulting treaties began the linkage between Western military power and the ability of Americans to proselytize in China. This relationship became a dilemma for succeeding generations of missionaries.

Between 1842 and 1858 foreign Christian workers resided in the five treaty ports opened after the First Anglo-Chinese War. They could travel away from these cities only a one-day's distance and had to return each night.[12] The missionaries resented these restrictions and looked forward to the time when they could work permanently in the interior.[13] The fact that few Chinese accepted the Gospel before the 1860s reinforced the belief that the inability of the missionaries to move freely in China diminished their effectiveness.[14]

In the 1850s, missionaries believed God was preparing China for redemption. This affected their view of contemporary events: God was causing the violence and chaos that engulfed China during this period. The Taiping Rebellion

(1850-1864) encouraged some Americans to believe the salvation of China was near.[15] By the time the missionaries realized the Taiping religion was at best a pseudo-Christianity and at worst a syncretic cult, renewed military aggression by Western nations had attracted their attention.[16]

The Second Anglo-Chinese War and the Treaties of Tianjin afforded foreign Christian workers the freedom they desired and established their elite position in China. The British began the war after the Arrow incident in 1856 and prosecuted it with their French allies for the sole purpose of obtaining commercial concessions from the Chinese. Although the United States claimed neutrality and did not participate in the hostilities, the American Minister, John B. Reed, accompanied the Anglo-French forces to Tianjin and negotiated a treaty. Samuel Wells Williams and W.A.P. Martin, two American missionaries, served as interpreters for Reed during the negotiations. They were instrumental in incorporating the "toleration clauses" into the American treaty with the defeated Chinese.[17]

The "unequal" Treaties of Tianjin solidified the relationship between Western military power and the missionaries' ability to proselytize in China. The settlement opened thirteen additional treaty ports, including several on the Chang Jiang (Yangtze River) in the interior. Foreigners, including missionaries, could now rent houses, establish businesses, and build houses and churches in

these cities. The toleration clauses allowed both foreigners and Chinese to "quietly profess and teach" Christianity without persecution.[18]

The American treaty was similar to those negotiated with Great Britain, Russia, and France. It was the French treaty, however, that acquired the greatest freedom for the missionaries. Father Delamarre, acting as interpreter for the French, inserted in the Chinese text of the treaty the stipulation that the missionaries could buy and lease property outside the treaty ports. Although the official French text held precedence over the Chinese text and did not include this, foreign Christian workers asserted that they now had the right to establish permanent missions in the interior. Western diplomats did not try to restrain the subsequent expansion of the missionaries outside the treaty ports. Confronted with the supremacy of Western military power, the Qing government had no recourse but to allow property transferral to the Christians.[19]

The American missionary effort expanded greatly after the Treaties of Tianjin created the "opened" conditions under the toleration clauses. Foreign Christian workers had no reservations about gunboats insuring their opportunities to save China.[20] They called for reinforcements, bought property for churches and schools, and were generally more successful in winning converts.[21] Some were tentative about the ability of Christians to supply the necessary manpower, and this was a problem during the

American Civil War.[22] But as American missionaries began their century-long attack on the "Gibraltar of Heathendom," they were confident they would reap "a great harvest at no distant day."[23]

The dramatic increase in missionary numbers after the Second Anglo-Chinese War indicates the efficacy of the toleration clauses in providing a favorable environment for evangelism. There were 81 Protestant missionaries representing 20 societies in China in 1858. This number increased to 1,096 in 1889; 39 percent were Americans.[24] Before 1842, only 56 Protestants had gone to China, and between 1842 and 1857 only 142 more undertook the crusade. At the end of the century, a total of 2,388 had gone, with the greatest increase coming between 1888 and 1897.[25]

Larger numbers of missionaries dedicated their lives to service in China after 1900. In 1905 the number of foreign Christian workers rose to 3,445, including 964 unmarried women.[26] The movement accelerated into World War I and beyond with 6,164 in 1918, 7,820 in 1924, peaking in 1926 at 8,325.[27] After an evacuation of the missionaries in 1927, they slowly returned to their former level and by 1930, 6,346 were working for 100 different societies. The number of Americans in 1930 was 3,052 which was 48 percent of the total.[28] This level of "occupation" remained constant until the second missionary evacuation after 1949.[29]

An increase in the number of Chinese Christians

corresponded to the growing missionary presence in China after 1858. Although missionaries had been active in the treaty ports for over a decade, they had only 350 followers in 1853. Eleven years after the Treaties of Tianjin there were 5,753. This number more than doubled in the next eight years reaching 13,035 in 1876.[30] The missionaries' efforts to win converts were successful throughout the rest of the nineteenth century. The 1889 count revealed 37,287 Chinese Christians. There were 85,000 converts in 1900, a 127 percent increase in eleven years.[31]

After the turn of the century, the rate of increase in the numbers of Chinese who joined the Christian churches steadily diminished. Between 1900 and 1906 there was a 106 percent increase which brought the reported number to 178,251. From then until 1920, the missionaries averaged about 10 percent a year in additional converts; the 1920 total was 366,524.[32] In 1930 Protestant missionaries claimed approximately 750,000 Chinese were in some way associated with their churches but only 400,000 were actual members. Considering the years that had passed since 1858 and the efforts of the missionaries, these numbers are not impressive.[33]

Missionary Institutions

During the Christian century, the development of Western institutions accompanied the expansion of the Protestant churches in China. More missionaries and converts

meant more mission schools, mission hospitals, and mission presses. Although the number of Christians remained small, these facilities enabled them to have a disproportional effect upon Chinese society.

Christian education was one of the most influential missionary activities. Popular education did not exist in traditional China. The Chinese gentry dominated the educational discipline which required self-effacing dedication to the Confucian canon. The primary goal of becoming a government official through the civil service examination system motivated men to engage in this process.[34] Because early Protestant missionaries failed to convert the educated elite, their efforts turned to the illiterate masses.[35] The first Americans to occupy the treaty ports established schools for both boys and girls. To save the uneducated "heathen," the missionaries first taught them to read the Bible.[36] From this beginning, a complete mission education system developed that was alien to the indigenous Confucian tradition.

The number of Chinese attending mission schools increased rapidly after the middle of the nineteenth century. In 1877, 5,917 Chinese of all ages were enrolled; in 1889 this increased to 16,836. In 1911, 102,533 Chinese students attended mission schools. This increased rapidly to 169,707 only four years later.[37] One reason for this tremendous expansion was the increased demand for a Western curriculum after the abolition of the Confucian civil

service examination system in 1905. At that time, the Qing government began its own system of popular education which tried to incorporate modern Western subjects. This reform movement forced the government to rely heavily on graduates from the mission schools for teachers with knowledge of modern subjects. Because the Christian schools already existed and taught these subjects, they benefitted from this development.[38]

In the twentieth century, foreign Christian workers gave special attention to college education. Many missionaries received a humanistic college education in the United States before going to China and wanted to reproduce this experience for their followers. Motivated by this desire, they gradually expanded the curriculum of some middle schools to incorporate college-level work. By 1890 there were four fully-developed Christian colleges with curricula that combined Western and Chinese subjects.[39]

American missionaries were especially dedicated to college education. With the expansion of their facilities from 1910 to 1924, higher Christian education in China virtually became their monopoly.[40] Although there were only 267 Chinese in Protestant colleges in 1910, this increased to 1,929 in 1920. This doubled in only four years when 3,901 students attended 17 schools. American missionary organizations operated 14 of the 17 Christian colleges.[41] Although Chinese nationalism greatly affected the mission schools during the rest of the Christian

century, the level of attendance remained relatively stable. By 1949 the missionaries had graduated over 50,000 Chinese from their colleges.[42]

In conjunction with the emerging institutions of Christian education, missionaries also expanded their publishing facilities. By 1897 there were eleven mission presses producing Bibles, tracts, hymnals, and religious books, as well as text books for the mission schools. The most important of these was the American Presbyterian Press in Shanghai.[43] Producing an adequate translation of the Bible was a primary goal for the Christians, and the American Bible Society made substantial contributions for revising earlier translations.[44] Some of these later translations adopted the Chinese vernacular and romanization of characters in an effort to communicate with the uneducated millions. Between 1890 and 1921 the number of Christian periodicals the mission presses circulated increased from forty to one hundred seven.[45]

The missionary enterprise became big business as a result of this expansion of Christian facilities. In 1917 the thirty largest American missionary societies raised $19 million for their work in all foreign countries. This increased to $30 million in 1920.[46] By 1930 the American investment in the China mission field reached 3,000 missionaries with a total annual budget of $7.7 million.[47] These large expenditures created a materialistic interest in China that became a burden for the foreign Christian

workers in the 1920s. Missionaries and their supporters hesitated to relinquish their control over these institutions and their million-dollar budgets when Chinese Christians demanded more involvement in their administration.

The Social Gospel

A changing missionary theology during the nineteenth century was responsible for the growing emphasis on Christian education, the use of published materials, and social reform programs. An evolution from a conservative, exclusive theology to a more liberal, inclusive Christianity or "social gospel," greatly affected the China missions of American Protestants.

The first Christian workers who went to China believed God condemned those "heathen" who died without the Gospel. Their mandate was to save individual Chinese through direct methods like street preaching and itineranting through the villages. Although the early missionaries built schools and hospitals, this was to attract more converts, not to benefit secular Chinese society.[4]

In the 1880s and 1890s, a religious revival in American Protestantism combined with progressive attitudes toward the social aspects of religion to produce the social gospel. Americans took pride in democratic institutions, public schools, social reforms, and modernization. They turned outward both secularly and religiously, believing

they should share their faith in progress with the rest of the world. Preventing the eternal punishment of the "lost" no longer was the sole motivation for foreign missions. The regeneration of the world and the elevation of human society became the ultimate goal of religion. Saving individuals was still a means to an end, but a new "Christian" society spread throughout the world was to be the manifestation of success.[49]

The effects of the social gospel were especially prominent in China missions during the first two decades of the twentieth century. The missionaries believed "regenerating" more individual Chinese would eventually "save" the nation. Their efforts changed from a direct evangelistic presentation of the Gospel to social reform, medical work, and education. By 1911 less than half of all missionaries were in evangelism. Many were administrators or educators in the Christian institutions required to implement the social gospel.[50]

These new ideas about conducting mission work had direct benefits for the Chinese. Foreign Christian workers started community movements against the social evils of gambling, opium use, alcohol, cigarettes, and prostitution.[51] They worked on famine and flood relief and organized athletics for the young.[52] Mission schools for girls elevated the status of Chinese women through education. They also required their students to unbind their bound feet.[53] Some missionaries helped find homes for abandoned

children and orphans.[54] As industry developed in China, missionaries became concerned about economic issues and tried to improve working conditions.[55] Through these types of activities, missionaries hoped to guide China into the modern world as a "Christian" nation.

The Student Volunteer Movement for Foreign Missions (SVM) and the Young Men's Christian Association (YMCA) were two important organizations involved in the social regeneration of China. American Protestants utilized both of these associations in their attempt to Christianize China after the turn of the century. Their development illustrates the dominant trends in China missions during this period.

Foreign Christian workers began to organize the first YMCAs in mission schools in the 1880s. By 1900 there were forty-seven associations in eight provinces and in 1901 one hundred seventy delegates attended a national convention in Shanghai. The desire to include Chinese in administration was a significant aspect of the YMCA. Three-fourths of the delegates at the 1901 conference were Chinese Christians. This trend continued into the 1920s when Chinese served as secretaries of local and national associations. The young men the YMCA carefully recruited from American college campuses were sensitive to the issues and conditions they confronted in China. As they expanded their activities from mission schools to Chinese government schools, the YMCAs became a highly visible division of the Christian

enterprise.[56]

The Student Volunteer Movement for Foreign Missions was the recruiting mechanism for the YMCA as well as other denominational missionary societies. Initiated with the fervor of revivalism, the SVM grew from 100 "Volunteers" in 1886 to an organization that had contributed 8,140 men and women to Protestant missions in 1919.[57] Dwight L. Moody, founder of the SVM, was largely responsible for creating the "crisis atmosphere" the movement thrived on.[58] "The Evangelization of the World in This Generation" became the SVM motto. Traveling secretaries visited college campuses throughout the United States persuading recruits to sign pledge cards declaring they would become missionaries.[59] Beginning in 1891, the SVM held quadrennial international conventions that attracted an attendance of almost 4,000 in 1909.[60]

The Volunteers were a highly educated elite who developed a new strategy of "republican" conversion. By converting young Chinese who were infatuated with the West, they hoped to develop Chinese Christian leadership capable of influencing the masses. This method also created a following the Westerners could interact with comfortably. Because they came from progressive American campuses, the men and women of the SVM influenced the trend towards identifying social regeneration as the goal for missions. Their revival-born enthusiasm contributed to missionary optimism that the churches could make beneficial changes in

China through Chinese Christian leadership.[41]

Missionary Attitudes

In the ranks of the SVM at the turn of the century were many of the missionaries who later contended with the problems of Chinese nationalism. Under the influence of the altered theology and goals that now directed missions, these men and women adopted different attitudes towards the people they were trying to save. Instead of lost "heathen," the Chinese were potential "democrats." This change in missionary attitudes was an important aspect of the Christian century.

The earliest Protestants in China displayed strong paternalistic attitudes that operated from racist convictions. The missionaries came from rural areas strong in pietism and attended colleges in New York or New England. These men believed they were the instruments of God.[42] When referring to the Chinese, they used the term "heathen," relegating their potential converts to a sub-human status. Ironically, the Chinese considered the Western intruders to be "American barbarians" or "foreign devils."[43] The early Christian effort was a "campaign" or "battle," and it required the "Society for the Diffusion of Cannon Balls" to overcome the "enemy."[44]

Although many of the blatant racist remarks disappeared from missionary rhetoric after 1900, paternalism remained an inherent part of Christianity in China. The

Chinese were a responsibility the Lord bestowed upon Americans to shepherd into His Kingdom and into the modern world. To effect this "flexible policy of paternalism," missionaries required their followers to give up ancestor worship and concubinage.[65] Western Christians also maintained a contemptuous attitude towards Chinese religions. The worship of "gods which are no gods" did not satisfy the Chinese soul the complete way the religion of Jesus could.[66]

The ability of American missionaries to relate better to their converts increased substantially by the 1920s despite the intransigence of paternalism. Many missionaries moderated their attitudes towards ancestor worship and other traditional Chinese ceremonies.[67] Westerners allowed Chinese Christians more participation in church administration. The number of ordained Chinese increased from 764 in 1915 to 1,305 in 1920, and to 2,196 in 1936.[68] Chinese began to assume the majority at national Christian conferences.[69] Some missionaries advocated giving their converts more freedom for self-development.[70]

These new attitudes were partially the result of pressure for more responsibility from the Chinese leadership the missionaries had successfully developed. As China entered the chaotic and decisive decade of the 1920s, the issues of church independence and the role of missionaries in the national life of China attracted more attention. Political events directly affecting the mission institu-

tions forced American Protestants to reexamine their Heavenly commission to "save" China. By 1928 many of them feared Christianity had missed its opportunity in China.[71] This perception proved true when the missionary enterprise came to a close in the early 1950s.

During the Christian century, missionaries benefitted from special privileges granted by the toleration clauses in the Treaties of Tianjin. A revival in American Protestantism in the 1880s and 1890s reinforced their attempts to Christianize China. Young Americans became determined to "Evangelize the World In This Generation." The social gospel and democratic ideals motivated missionaries to promote social reform and try to transform China into a "Christian" nation. National organizations like the YMCA and SVM channeled the American effort into institutions that required large administrative staffs and larger budgets. Despite the limited success that accompanied these developments, American missionaries remained highly optimistic into the 1920s when they confronted their greatest challenge.

CHAPTER I ENDNOTES

1. Before the recent official adoption of the pinyin system of romanization, Western writers romanized Chinese words and names in many different ways. This thesis retains older and often irregular romanizations in direct quotations from previous writers, but uses pinyin everywhere else.

2. The terms American (or foreign) Christian worker and missionary are interchangeable and refer to Protestant Christians. Missionaries from other Christian faiths such as Catholic or Russian Orthodox are excluded from the scope of this study. Chinese Christians, converts, or (missionary) followers refer to Chinese who accepted Protestantism.

3. Paul A. Varg, Missionaries, Chinese, and Diplomats: The American Protestant Missionary Movement in China, 1890-1952 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1958), pp. 304-306.

4. Richard C. Bush, Jr., Religion in Communist China (Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1970), p. 48.

5. Laymen's Foreign Missions Inquiry, Supplementary Series, Part Two, Volume V, China, Orville A. Petty, ed. (New York: Harper & Brothers Publishers, 1933), p. 5. The Laymen's Inquiry was a comprehensive survey of Protestant missions in China, India, Burma, and Japan conducted in 1931-1932. The survey was independent of missionary organizations. Lay men and women from seven of the largest Protestant denominations in the United States were the sponsors of the work: Northern Baptist, Congregational, Methodist Episcopal, Presbyterian Church U.S.A., Protestant Episcopal, Reformed Church in the United States, and United Presbyterian. See Laymen's Foreign Missions Inquiry, Rethinking Missions: A Laymen's Inquiry After One Hundred Years (New York: Harper & Brothers Publishers, 1932), pp. ix-x.

6. In May 1950 several Chinese Christian leaders met with Zhou Enlai to produce the famous "Christian Manifesto" that set the restricted conditions for the existence of Christianity under the Communists. Despite this document, Chinese Christians were something less than "people" in the new Peoples' Republic, Bush, Religion in Communist China,

pp. 41-42. Also see Varg, Missionaries, Chinese, and Diplomats, pp. 309-310.

7. For a brief sketch of the ABCFM see Kenneth S. Latourette, A History of Christian Missions in China (New York: Macmillan Company, 1929), p. 207, hereafter cited as Latourette, HCMC. David Abeel originally served the American Seaman's Friends Society but switched to the ABCFM after arriving in China, ibid., pp. 217-218. For Morrison and other early British efforts see ibid., pp. 211-216. The mission press existed primarily to assist in spreading the Gospel but also printed secular material initially dealing "almost exclusively with topics in world geography and history." See Suzanne W. Barnett, "Silent Evangelism: Presbyterians and the Mission Press in China," Journal of Presbyterian History 49 (Winter 1971): 293-294. The missionary publications also served as a method of communication between themselves and their supporters back home. See Frida Nilsen, "Midwest China Oral History and Archives Project," typed transcripts of tape-recorded interviews, Northwestern Luther Theological Seminary, St. Paul, Minnesota, p. 172; hereafter cited as "China Oral History Project." Nilsen was a missionary for the Norwegian Lutheran Church of America and was in China from 1918 to 1925.

8. An excellent description of the Tributary or Canton System is in John K. Fairbank, Trade and Diplomacy on the China Coast: The Opening of the Treaty Ports, 1842-1854, 2 vols. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1953), chap. 3.

9. This prohibition was a continuance of the exclusion of Christianity begun in the eighteenth century. See Tyler Dennett, Americans in Eastern Asia: A Critical Study of the Policy of the United States with Reference to China, Japan, and Korea in the Nineteenth Century (New York: Macmillan Company, 1922), pp. 559-561. In addition see A.L. Warnshuis, "Treaties and Missions in China," International Review of Missions 15 (January 1926): 21-22. For an example of the style of Christian tract the missionaries used see "Dialogue Between Two Friends," in The Chinese Repository 2 (October 1833): 283.

10. For details of this first Sino-American treaty see "Treaty Between the United States and China, 3 July 1844, Wangxia," in Paul Hibbert Clyde, United States Policy Towards China: Documents, 1839-1939 (New York: Russell and Russell, Inc., 1964), pp. 13-21. Although some Americans criticized the opium trade and the First Anglo-Chinese War, or Opium War, missionaries did not object to the forcible "opening" of China by Great Britain. In fact, "missionaries or former missionaries served as interpreters and secretaries in negotiating each of the three main treaties," Latourette, HCMC, pp. 231-232. Also see Dennett, Americans in

Eastern Asia, pp. 555-556. The four treaty ports opened by the negotiations after the First Anglo-Chinese War were Ningbo, Xiamen, Fuzhou, and Shanghi.

11. Ibid., pp. 559-560; Warnshuis, "Treaties and Missions," p. 22. The Dao Guang Emperor issued an edict on 28 December 1844 which only applied to Chinese joining Roman Catholic Churches. An edict on 22 December 1845 extended this freedom to include Chinese joining Protestant churches.

12. Article XVII of the Wangxia Treaty allowed this, see Clyde, United States Policy, p. 17; Dennett, Americans in Eastern Asia, pp. 560-561. In addition see Henry Blodget to [Correspondence Secretary], July 1862, in ABCFM, Reports of the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions (Boston: T.R. Marvin, 1863), p. 126; hereafter cited as ABCFM, Annual Reports with year.

13. Dennett, Americans in Eastern Asia, pp. 563-564.

14. The Methodists began their mission to China in 1847 but had no converts until 1857 when they baptized their first Chinese. See Walter N. Lacy, A Hundred Years of China Methodism (New York: Abingdon-Cokesbury Press, 1948), p. 53.

15. ABCFM, Annual Report 1853, p. 8.

16. On the relation between Christianity and the Taiping see Eugene P. Boardman, "Christian Influence Upon the Ideology of the Taiping Rebellion," Far Eastern Quarterly 10 (February 1951): 115-124. John B. Littell discusses missionary involvement in the question of Western recognition of the Taiping government in "Missionaries and Politics: The Taiping Rebellion," Political Science Quarterly 43 (December 1928): 566-599. The definitive work on the Taiping is Michael Franz and Chang Chung-li, The Taiping Rebellion: History and Documents, 3 vols. (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1966). By 1862 even the optimistic American Board realized the Taiping were not "in any way directly favorable to the cause of true religion," ABCFM, Annual Report 1862, p. 152.

17. For a critical analysis of the Arrow Incident and Williams' and Martin's involvement in negotiating the treaty see Stuart Creighton Miller, "Ends and Means: Missionary Justification of Force in Nineteenth Century China," in John K. Fairbank, The Missionary Enterprise in China and America (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1974), pp. 257-262.

18. For the American treaty see "Treaty of the United States and China, 18 June 1858, Tianjin" in Clyde, United States Policy, pp. 47-57.

19. On the role of the French in acquiring toleration for Christianity see Paul A. Cohen, China and Christianity: The Missionary Movement and the Growth of Chinese Anti-Foreignism, 1860-1870 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1963), pp. 68-69. Miller states the editor of the San Francisco Call discovered Delamarre's deception in 1900 and accused American missionaries of being involved in the fraud, "Ends and Means," p. 263. There was some question that these concessions applied to Americans through the "most-favored-nation" clause, but this did not restrain the missionaries. See Dennett, Americans in Eastern Asia, p. 572. Also see chapter III, pp. 68-74 below.

20. Latourette discusses the missionaries' acceptance of the use of force in acquiring the toleration clauses in HCMC, p. 359. In addition see Clifton J. Phillips, Protestant America and the Pagan World: The First Half-Century of the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions, 1810-1860 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1969), pp. 199-203; Cohen, China and Christianity, p. 69.

21. Missionaries in Fuzhou believed the ability to lease land and houses helped them progress. See Ellsworth C. Carlson, The Foochow Missionaries (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1974), p. 76. American Board workers experienced a rapid rate of increase in converts immediately after the treaty. They reported 1,974 Chinese Christians in 1863 and 5,743 only five years later. S.C. Bartlett, Historical Sketch of the Missions of the American Board (Boston: American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions, 1876; reprint ed., New York: Arno Press, 1972), p. 17.

22. William Muirhead to Editor, 23 November 1858, North China Herald, 4 December 1858.

23. Henry Blodget to [Correspondence Secretary], July 1862, in ABCFM, Annual Report 1863, p. 127.

24. Records of the General Conference of the Protestant Missionaries of China Held at Shanghai, May 7-20, 1890 (Shanghai: American Presbyterian Mission Press, 1890), p. 732.

25. Latourette, HCMC, pp. 405-406. These numbers are approximations because there were many men and women whose dates of arrival are unknown.

26. Ibid., p. 606.

27. "Editorial," Chinese Recorder 49 (January 1918): 8; China Mission Year Book, 1924, p. 91. In addition see Varg, Missionaries, Chinese, and Diplomats, p. 249. M. Searle Bates found that although Americans were never a majority of missionaries, in 1917 they were 50 percent of the Protestant

total. See "The Theology of American Missionaries in China, 1900-1950," in Fairbank, Missionary Enterprise, p. 136.

28. Laymen's Inquiry, Supplementary Series, Part Two, Vol. V, p. 70, pp. 4-9. Chapter II describes in detail the evacuation of the missionaries in 1927, see pp. 47-50 below.

29. The ABCFM alone had sent a total of 4,800 workers to China by the early 1950s, Fred Field Goodsell, You Shall Be My Witness: An Interpretation of the History of the American Board, 1810-1960 (Boston: American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions, 1959), pp. 193-194.

30. Latourette, HCMC, p. 479.

31. Christian Occupation of China, Milton T. Stauffer, ed. (Shanghai: China Continuation Committee, 1922; reprint ed., San Francisco: Chinese Materials Center, Inc., 1979), p. 38. The use of the pejorative term "Occupation" in this study was unfortunate as anti-Christian Chinese utilized this in their pamphlets and circulars during the 1920s.

32. Ibid.

33. Laymen's Inquiry, Supplementary Series, Part Two, Vol, V, p. 68.

34. Excellent descriptions of the Chinese gentry and the Confucian examination system are available in Chang Chung-li, The Chinese Gentry: Studies on Their Role in Nineteenth-Century Chinese Society (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1955); Miyazaki Ichisada, China's Examination Hell: The Civil Service Examinations of Imperial China, Conrad Schirokauer, trans. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1976).

35. In this the Protestant missionaries did not follow Matteo Ricci and the Jesuits and failed to benefit from their example. See pp. iii-iv above.

36. In 1858 the ABCFM missionaries were conducting boarding schools for boys and girls in Shanghai and Fuzhou, ABCFM, Annual Report 1858, p. 99, p. 104; Latourette, HCMC, pp. 264-268.

37. Ibid., p. 623.

38. James W. Bashford, China and Methodism (Cincinnati: Jennings and Graham, 1906), pp. 99-100.

39. Latourette, HCMC, pp. 446-447; Liu Kwang-ching, "Early Christian Colleges in China," Journal of Asian Studies 20 (November 1960): 71-72. The schools were in

40. Latourette, HCMC, pp, 782-783.

41. Ibid.; Educational Review 16 (April 1924): 194; Laymen's Inquiry, Supplementary Series, Part Two, Vol. V, p. 369.

42. Francis P. Jones, The Church in Communist China: A Protestant Appraisal (New York: Friendship Press, 1962), p. 22.

43. Latourette, HCMC, p. 437.

44. Ibid., p. 266.

45. Occupation of China, p. 37.

46. Valentin H. Rabe, "Evangelical Logistics: Mission Support and Resources to 1920," in Fairbank, Missionary Enterprise, pp. 62-63, 88-89. Rabe concluded that "by World War I missions had become a unique form of big business."

47. Liu Kwang-ching, Americans and Chinese: A Historical Essay and Bibliography (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1963), p. 14.

48. Paul A. Varg, "Motives in Protestant Missions, 1890-1917," Church History 23 (1954): 71.

49. Varg, Missionaries, Chinese, and Diplomats, pp. 70-71.

50. Latourette, HCMC, p. 619; Occupation of China, p. 39. In addition see Laymen's Inquiry, Re-thinking Missions, p. 19.

51. Latourette, HCMC, pp. 657-661.

52. Janet Elaine Heininger, "The American Board in China: The Missionaries' Experiences and Attitudes, 1911-1952" (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Wisconsin, 1981), pp. 312-313.

53. Mildred Test Young, "China Oral History Project," p. 83. Young served in China from 1920 to 1925 for the Board of Missions of the Methodist Church.

54. Helen Hayes, "China Oral History Project," p. 24-26. Hayes worked for the Reformed Church in the United States and was in China from 1921 until 1935.

55. Latourette, HCMC, pp. 792-793; Julean Arnold, "China's Economic Problems and the Christian Missionary Effort," Chinese Recorder 50 (August 1919): 518-519.

56. Latourette, HCMC, pp. 584-587.

57. Clifton J. Phillips, "The Student Volunteer Movement and Its Role in China Missions, 1886-1920," in Fairbank, Missionary Enterprise, p. 105. Phillips found that 2,524 (31 percent) of the "sailed volunteers" went to China.

58. Varg, "Motives in Protestant Missions," pp. 69-70.

59. Ibid., pp. 92-98.

60. Students and the Present Missionary Crisis: Addresses Delivered Before the Sixth International Convention of the Student Volunteer Movement for Foreign Missions, Rochester, New York, December 29, 1909, to January 2, 1910 (New York: Student Volunteer Movement for Foreign Missions, 1910), p. 595.

61. Phillips, "Student Volunteer Movement," pp. 103-105.

62. Michael H. Hunt, The Making of a Special Relationship: The United States and China to 1914 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1983), p. 25.

63. Earl Swisher, China's Management of the American Barbarians: A Study of Sino-American Relations, 1841-1861, with Documents (New Haven: Yale University, Far Eastern Publications, 1953), p. xvi.

64. Frederick W. Williams, The Life and Letters of Samuel Wells Williams, LL.D.: Missionary, Diplomatist, Sinologue (New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1889; reprint ed., Wilmington, Delaware: Scholarly Resources, 1972), p. 257. In addition see Bartlett, Historical Sketch of the Missions, p. 8; Jessie Gregory Lutz, ed., Christian Missions in China: Evangelists of What? (Boston: D.C. Heath and Company, 1965), p. 11.

65. Edward Sovik, "China Oral History Project," p. 4; Roland Cross, ibid., p. 13-14. Sovik was a missionary for the Lutheran Church and worked in China from 1914 to 1948. Cross was a missionary for the ABCFM and served in that organization's North China Mission from 1917 to 1944. The Protestants' attitudes towards ancestor worship and other traditional Chinese practices continued the difficulties the Franciscans and Dominicans encountered in the seventeenth century. After 1900 a small minority of Protestant missionaries adopted a more accommodating position on these issues as Matteo Ricci and the Jesuits had done centuries earlier. This proved beneficial to those missionaries' attempts to make converts. See pp. iii-iv above.

66. John C. DeKorne, Chinese Altars to the Unknown God: An Account of the Religions of China and the Reactions to Them by Christian Missions (Grand Rapids, Michigan: Smitter Book Company, 1926). p. 79. Also see L. DeVargas, "The Religious Problem in the Chinese Renaissance," International Review of Missions 15 (January 1926): 8-11.

67. As early as 1904, John Leighton Stuart, who later became president of Yanjing University and United States Ambassador, believed "repudiation of ancestor-worship seemed to be a needlessly harsh aggravation of the difficulties for the Chinese convert," Fifty Years in China: The Memoirs of John Leighton Stuart, Missionary and Ambassador (New York: Random House, 1954), p.37.

68. Kenneth S. Latourette, A History of the Expansion of Christianity, Vol. VII, Advance Through Storm: A.D. 1914 and After, with Concluding Generalizations (New York: Harper & Brothers Publishers, 1945), p. 349.

69. Occupation of China, p. 34.

70. G.W. Sarvis, "Democracy and Mission Work in China," Chinese Recorder 49 (January 1918): 12.

71. Although Latourette, a China missionary, was guardedly optimistic about the future in 1928, he believed the period before World War I "was the time of greatest opportunity," HCMC, pp. 534-535.

CHAPTER II

ANTI-CHRISTIANITY AND CHINESE NATIONALISM

American missionaries considered their efforts in China to be in the best interests of their potential followers. Yet some Chinese forcefully resisted the attempts of foreign Christian workers to convert them. Anti-Christianity during the Christian century was an extension of traditional Chinese anti-foreignism. Because the only foreigners many Chinese confronted were missionaries, rejection of the West meant rejection of Christianity. In some instances, the struggle of the Chinese to rid themselves of the "foreign devils" resulted in violence. As the American Protestant campaign escalated during the nineteenth century, the prevalence of anti-Christianity also increased. The fanatical Boxer Movement of 1900 was the zenith of violent attacks against the missionaries and their followers.

The establishment of the Republic of China in 1912 produced a constitution that included religious freedom. Missionaries were optimistic about working under new conditions they considered to be progressive and favorable for their cause. Chinese warlordism and the global

conflict of World War I, however, quickly ended this peaceful period.

Building on the intellectual currents of the May Fourth Movement, anti-foreignism and anti-Christianity increased after 1919 in conjunction with Chinese nationalism. Between the May Thirtieth Incident in 1925 and the March Twenty-Fourth Incident in 1927, the anti-Christian movement became a manifestation of the Nationalist revolution and Chinese patriotism. The political and religious implications of this development presented American missionaries with their greatest challenge in China. In an environment of renewed hostility, they confronted issues that questioned their peculiar historical relationship with the Chinese.[1]

Anti-Christianity in the Nineteenth Century

Missionaries encountered instances of hostility and resistance from the beginning of the Christian century. At Fuzhou during the 1850s, the Chinese officials prevented American Board workers from moving inside the city. When the missionaries tried to visit various sections of the port, angry crowds subjected them to "stoning and violence."[2] In 1864 there were anti-Christian riots, and crowds attacked the Methodist and American Board missions. None of the foreign Christian workers suffered injury and Chinese officials made restitution for the property

damage.[3]

These incidents at Fuzhou were typical of anti-Christian disturbances during the 1860s and 1870s. The attacks were usually isolated and only infrequently extended outside a district or county. Most of these involved loss or damage to missionary property but rarely resulted in loss of life. Some of the riots occurred when Chinese students gathered for the government civil service examinations.[4]

Members of the educated elite and officials often fomented the anti-Christian movements. These men regarded the missionaries as rivals. The education of the missionaries, their privileged position under the toleration clauses, and their influence over Chinese converts threatened the hegemony of the Chinese gentry. Some missionaries increased this contention when they abused their extraterritorial status by interfering in local Chinese affairs.[5]

Chinese officials first learned Christianity was a potential threat through reading missionary publications. It was clear from what foreign Christians wrote that Christianity was an accretive and proselytizing religion. In books written or translated by the missionaries, the Chinese discovered that Christianity accompanied the political and economic expansion of Westerners.[6] The alienation of educated Chinese and the correlation of Christianity and Western expansion became major obstacles for the missionaries.

Opposition to Christianity among non-elite Chinese developed for several reasons. Many resented the missionaries' attack on indigenous Chinese religions and ancestor veneration. Foreign Christian workers relegated these to the "heathen" practice of idolatry. After anti-Christian riots, some missionaries obtained indemnities for the destruction of their property. The taxes to pay these came from the already impoverished peasants. Non-Christian Chinese resented the enhanced status missionary converts, or "rice Christians," enjoyed through the protection of their foreign benefactors.[7] Missionaries conspicuously failed to adopt any aspects of Chinese culture and remained an enclave of the West inside their compounds.[8] Using emotional propaganda, the gentry easily mobilized the traditional ethnocentrism of the masses against the strange foreigners in their midst.[9]

During the 1890s, anti-Christian riots became more widespread, especially in the Chang Jiang valley. Zhou Han, a Chinese official, began a systematic campaign against the missionaries in 1890-91. Zhou and his followers instigated riots among the commoners by spreading particulary lurid propaganda about the practices of Christians. From Changsha, Hunan, the movement escalated to include several provinces. Anti-Christian Chinese destroyed a large amount of mission property and killed one foreign Christian worker. Foreign gun boats intervened to rescue endangered missionaries. Western nations pressured

the Qing government to order the provincial authorities to suppress the riots. Similar disturbances continued throughout the 1890s and resulted in five missionary deaths.[10]

Protestants suffered the worst persecutions of the Christian century during the Boxer Movement in 1900. With the support of the Empress Dowager Cixi and reactionary officials of the Court, the Boxers blindly attacked all foreigners. In the general disturbances that affected three northern provinces, 188 foreign Protestants, including 53 children, lost their lives. The Boxers were responsible for the injury or death of a substantially greater number of Chinese Christians.[11]

Missionaries generally supported the suppression of the Boxers by foreign troops.[12] Two Americans, Reverend W.S. Ament and Reverend E.G. Tewksbury, actually led cavalry into the countryside looking for Boxers. When the soldiers looted and burned several villages, the incident became a major scandal publicized by newspapers in the United States.[13]

The military power that Western nations so easily exerted against the Boxers created a lasting impression upon the Chinese. The suppression of the Boxer Movement ended the blind anti-foreignism that characterized the nineteenth century. Many intellectuals, even within the imperial bureaucracy, realized China must change or disintegrate. In the interest of self-preservation, the

Chinese turned to the West to find those things it needed to enter the modern world.[14]

American Protestants believed the Boxer Movement was ultimately beneficial in their campaign to save China. The episode focused world attention on China and motivated more support for the Christians' efforts. They thought the repercussions made the Chinese see "that incantations and blind fury cannot solve the problems facing China."[15] One missionary, Arthur H. Smith, argued it was in the interest of the United States to assist in China's modernization. In 1906 he suggested that President Roosevelt use the Boxer indemnity to establish a scholarship fund for the support of Chinese studying in America.[16]

The Republican Revolution

The Republican revolution that began on 10 October 1911, further encouraged American missionaries to hope that China would soon be a "Christian" democracy. The revolution was relatively bloodless and only a short period of fighting occurred before the last Manchu emperor abdicated on 12 February 1912. In the chaos that accompanied the end of the Qing dynasty, at least two missionaries and six foreign children died. The majority of foreign Christian workers left the interior for the safety of the treaty ports. Americans chose to emphasize positive aspects of the revolution and did not dwell on the casualties.[17]

Some missionaries believed their activity influenced

the development of the revolution. The years of missionary work "had been spreading ideas which were revolutionary in character."[18] They maintained that their religion stressed democracy and individual freedom, and this caused their followers to support the new government. These men looked to Sun Yat-sen, the first provisional president of the Republic, as an example of Christian influence in the new China.[19]

American missionaries perceived the period between the establishment of the Republic and World War I as one of unprecedented opportunities in China. The Chinese National Assembly included "liberty of religion" in the Provisional Constitution proclaimed on 10 March 1912.[20] Chinese officials "often sought the advice of missionaries and Chinese pastors about methods of government."[21] When Sherwood Eddy, an evangelist for the YMCA, toured the country in 1914, the Salt Commissioner of Fujian and the Foreign Affairs Commissioner of Zhejiang were among his converts. The Cabinet asked Christians to set aside 27 April 1913 as a day of prayer for the new government. Large numbers of Chinese attended evangelistic services and church membership increased rapidly.[22]

This period with relatively little anti-Christianity in China did not last long. Internal and external political developments prevented the reforms necessary for effective modernization. Warlordism and civil wars followed the Republican revolution and institutionalized

political chaos for fifteen years. Japanese economic and political aggression further aggravated China's weakened condition. Many Chinese became disillusioned with some aspects of the West following World War I and the Paris Peace Conference. From these conditions, renewed hostility towards the missionaries and their religion emerged in the 1920s.

The May Fourth Movement

The May Fourth Movement was a phenomenon that greatly influenced many of the young Chinese who engaged in the anti-Christian campaigns after 1919. The term "May Fourth" refers to a series of student demonstrations that began on 4 May 1919 in Beijing. The May Fourth Movement, however, was much more than this one event. From 1917 to 1921, several complicated developments combined to produce a new generation of Chinese intellectuals.[23]

Chow Tse-tsung, an authority on May Fourth, believes it encompassed "the 'new thought tide,' the literary revolution, the student movement, the merchants' and workers strikes, and the boycott against Japan." The movement was not uniform and included many divergent ideas. But "patriotic sentiments, the spirit of Western learning and the desire to reevaluate tradition in the light of science and democracy in order to build a new China" inspired all the participants.[24]

The May Fourth intellectuals advocated abandoning China's traditional philosophy, ethics, natural science,

social theories, and institutions in favor of Western models. They adopted an anti-Confucian concept of man and society that emphasized the individual and his happiness. "Hard scientism" became the criterion of the iconoclasm of the new intelligentsia.[33] Many young Chinese became highly critical both of Chinese religions and of Christianity. At the invitation of the Young China Association, a Chinese student organization, Western philosophers including John Dewey and Bertrand Russell visited China. The lectures of these men further strengthened the skepticism and materialism of the students.[34]

The desire to enable China to resist the manipulations of stronger, more modern nations motivated many of the leaders of the May Fourth Movement. The Twenty-One Demands of the Japanese in 1915 and the failure of Chinese delegates to achieve their goals at the Paris Peace Conference in 1919 added to China's "national humiliation." These events intensified the feelings of patriotism and nationalism that were developing in the new intellectuals during this period. Ashamed and insulted by China's inability to exert its sovereignty against more powerful aggressors, the May Fourth generation passionately pursued their mission to create a new China.

The Twenty-One Demands were an attempt by Japan to gain inordinate economic and political privileges in China. The demands, delivered in the form of a diplomatic note on 9 May 1915, called for special recognition of Japan's

interests in Shandong, Nei Monggol (Inner Mongolia), and Dongbei (Manchuria). Japan was to engage in joint operation of China's iron and steel industries. Also, China was to employ Japanese advisors in its political, financial, military, and police administrations.[27] Under pressure of a Japanese ultimatum, President Yuan Shih-kai accepted most of the demands in a treaty on 25 May 1915. There was an immediate hostile reaction among Chinese students studying in Japan. Many returned to China to protest "Yuan's betrayal" and organized a boycott of Japanese goods.[28]

China's participation in the Paris Peace Conference following World War I increased the expectations of many Chinese that their nation would regain full sovereignty.[29] They believed much of the Wilsonian rhetoric about world democracy and hoped the conference would serve as a panacea for China's domestic and international problems.[30] The news on 3 May 1919 that the conference had rejected the proposals of China's delegation shocked the Chinese public.[31]

The failure at the Paris Peace Conference was the immediate cause of the student demonstrations on 4 May 1919. It also had the effect of uniting and intensifying many of the disparate themes of the broader May Fourth Movement. The new intellectuals, particularly students, became more organized in their efforts to change China. Using mass meetings, demonstrations, and the press, they attempted to influence public opinion. The student

movement gained wider support by establishing closer contacts with merchants, industrialists, and urban workers.

Anti-Christianity in the 1920s

The anti-Christian campaigns of the 1920s were an extension of the May Fourth Movement. Many of the leaders of the May Fourth Movement also became leaders of the movement against Christianity. They based their rejection of Christianity on premises that originated in the intellectual perturbation of May Fourth. The anti-Christians used organizations and publicity methods developed during the May Fourth Movement. During the 1920s, violent confrontations with foreigners galvanized their animosity against the West and intensified their campaigns against Christianity.

The first controversy concerning religion that was influenced by the May Fourth Movement occurred in September 1920. The Young China Association passed a resolution excluding anyone who had any religious beliefs. Some of the members maintained modern science relegated all religion to the realm of superstition. Although not directed specifically against Christianity, this decision led to a debate among the young intellectuals in the association which affected their views towards Christians.

Tian Han, a member of the association studying in Japan, believed study of the teachings of Jesus did not conflict with other intellectual pursuits. He also called

attention to the fact that freedom of religion was in the Chinese constitution. Others in the association asserted that a dichotomy existed between religion and science and religion served to emancipate man emotionally and subjectively. The Young China Association rescinded the resolution against religious beliefs in 1921. This debate emphasized the conflict between science and religion that was an integral part of the May Fourth Movement.[33]

The first anti-Christian campaign of the 1920s began in 1922 in opposition to the Beijing meeting of the World Student Christian Federation (WSCF). This international organization, established in 1895, attempted to unite Protestant college students throughout the world. John Mott of the YMCA was chairman of the WSCF and presided at the China conference. Delegates from twenty countries on five continents attended. Five hundred Chinese from eighteen provinces were also at the meeting held at Qinghua University on 4 April 1922.[34]

In March before the WSCF meeting, Chinese students in Shanghai founded the Anti-Christian Federation. A few days later, a similar organization, the Anti-Religion Federation, began in Beijing.[35] These organizations adopted a policy opposing all religions, but Christianity was their main target. The members of the federations asserted that Christianity prevented progress afforded by science because it was conservative and fatalistic. Their propaganda included the statement: "Christian religion impedes our

progress, stupifies [sic] our intelligence, fetters our nature, disgraces our personality, pollutes our brains, and suppresses our conscience."[35] On 9 April the Beijing federation sponsored a mass meeting at the National University to denounce the WSCF. The demonstration attracted over a thousand young Chinese.[36]

The Anti-Religion and Anti-Christian Federations did not succeed in disrupting the WSCF conference in Beijing. They did, however, quickly form branch organizations in other major cities. When WSCF delegates visited these centers, they decided not to hold public meetings because they feared the anti-Christians would disrupt the assemblies.[37]

The 1922 anti-Christian movement subsided with the departure of the WSCF delegates. Although there was relative calm until 1924-1925, the 1922 incidents facilitated later disturbances. The 1922 movement developed leaders who were familiar with the techniques of propaganda, demonstrations, and mass meetings. These students and other young intellectuals had formed an organizational structure that benefitted later anti-Christian campaigns.[38]

American diplomats and missionaries viewed the 1922 anti-Christian movement as a manifestation of "Bolshevistic" influence on young Chinese. The attack on Christianity was also an attack on capitalism and all foreigners in China.[39] It revealed that some educated Chinese now linked capitalism with Christianity and opposed both. Yet

the missionaries remained undaunted, believing the campaign proved the Chinese were no longer indifferent to Christianity. This increase in resistance marked a new beginning because "it helps frighten away the benefit seekers and clears the way for the truth seekers."[40]

The lull in the anti-Christian movement came to an end in 1924. In August the Chinese National Student Association held its sixth national congress. At this meeting, the delegates declared their organization should lead a campaign against imperialism by advocating restoration of "educational rights." This meant they would oppose Christian education and attempt to disrupt mission schools by organizing student strikes. By mid-1925, at least twenty incidents occurred in mission schools.[41]

The anti-Christians based their objections to mission schools on the belief that Christianity was a form of imperialism.[42] Christian schools "de-nationalized" their students. The anti-Christians claimed Christian education placed too much emphasis on religion by requiring attendance at Bible classes and religious exercises. They also objected to the reliance upon English, the lack of Chinese language and literature courses, and the low priority of science subjects in mission schools. The anti-Christians criticized the mission schools' failure to register with the national government.[43]

The Chinese Nationalistic Youth League, which evolved from the Young China Society, joined the National Student

Association in its attack on missionary education. This led to the formation of other organizations in most major cities. The Federated Association of Nationalistic Organizations coordinated much of the activity of these new societies. This highly-structured form of anti-Christianity was much different from the spontaneous attacks of the nineteenth century. The creation of these organizations "was a clear indication of the growing intolerance brought about by a pronounced upsurge of the nationalistic sentiment."[44]

The May Thirtieth Incident in 1925 greatly increased the success of these organizations in mobilizing popular opinion against Christian schools. Labor disputes in Japanese-owned cotton mills in Shanghai resulted in this violent confrontation between Chinese and foreigners. In December 1924, Chinese workers at the mills went on strike to protest low wages. These strikes were violent and in one the workers killed a Japanese employer. On 15 May 1925 there was a riot at one of the mills and Japanese police killed a Chinese worker and wounded several others.

On 30 May a group of college students and workers held a memorial service for the dead worker. Afterwards they demonstrated against the Japanese and other "imperialists" inside the Shanghai International Settlement. This led to the arrest of several of the demonstrators. Other students followed the British police who had made the arrests back to the police station. There a short altercation ensued

and the police ejected the students. By this time, a crowd had gathered outside the station and the police attempted to disperse it. When the crowd recoiled and moved towards the jail, the officer in charge shouted a warning in both English and Chinese. The crowd continued to advance and the officer ordered the policemen to fire, killing twelve Chinese and wounding seventeen.[45]

Although several commissions investigated the shooting during the following months, no real settlement occurred in the incident. The Shanghai Municipal Council, which governed the International Settlement and was composed of foreigners, supported entirely the actions of the police. An International Commission of Judges with a British, an American, and a Japanese member, generally supported the findings of the Municipal Council.[46]

There was foreign criticism of the incident. The report of E. Finley Johnson, the American judge on the International Commission, criticized the actions of both the Municipal Council and the British police.[47] The foreign diplomats in Beijing appointed their own investigating committee and its report was highly critical of the foreigners involved in the incident.[48]

Eventually, the British police commissioner of the International Settlement and the officer who ordered the shooting resigned. The Shanghai Municipal Council offered a seventy-five thousand dollar indemnity for the fatalities but the Chinese rejected this. These efforts at concili-

ation by the foreigners, however, came six months after the incident. Frank Rawlinson, editor of the Chinese Recorder, called attention to another problem with the attempts to settle the matter. He wrote: "For a judicial commission to be composed only of foreigners--virtually the defendants in the case--is almost a fiasco."[49]

The May Thirtieth Incident electrified and consolidated Chinese popular opinion. The Chinese believed the incident was the fault of the British and was only one event in a history of imperialistic aggression.[50] They did not hesitate to generalize this hostility to all foreigners in China. The fact that Stirling Fessenden, an American, was chairman of the Shanghai Municipal Council was enough to implicate the United States.[51] Yip Ka-che, in his study of anti-Christianity, maintains: "Never before in Chinese history had the Chinese people been so united in their drive against foreign encroachment."[52]

Demonstrations, strikes, boycotts, and violence in other cities immediately followed the Shanghai shootings. In June, disturbances occurred in Beijing, Jingjiang, Chongqing, Nanjing, Jiujiang, Hankou, and Guangzhou. The most violent of these accompanied a boycott of British goods and factories in Hongkong and Guangzhou. There, on 23 June, one Frenchman and fifty Chinese died in an exchange of gunfire between foreign troops and demonstrators. Four British soldiers were also wounded. The boycott continued into 1926 and was relatively effective

due to the support of the KMT.[53]

The increase in confrontations between Chinese and foreigners in 1925 revitalized anti-Christianity in China. The seventh congress of the National Student Association met in Shanghai on 7 July 1925. The delegates adopted a comprehensive resolution against Christianity. This "was one of the most significant documents of the anti-Christian movement."[54] The resolution asserted that Christianity was an instrument of imperialism. The congress instructed students to mobilize the rural masses during winter and summer vacations. It also scheduled an "anti-Christian week," 22-28 December, in which to hold demonstrations.[55]

Anti-Christianity in China became stronger during 1926-1927 in conjunction with the Northern Expedition of the Guangzhou-based Nationalist government. This civil war between rival northern and southern factions was one of many that occurred during this period. The Northern Expedition, however, succeeded in uniting China under one government for the first time in over a decade. Attacks on missionaries and missionary property were part of the general disturbances and anti-foreignism that accompanied this war.

After the May Thirtieth Incident, Chinese military and civil authorities began to ignore attacks on both foreign and Chinese Christians. This was a problem "particularly in areas controlled by the Kuomintang [KMT]."[56] Clemens Granskou, a missionary for the Norwegian Lutheran Church of

America, witnessed a KMT soldier harass a fellow missionary on a train to Hankou in 1925. The soldier stuck a revolver in the missionary's back and said, "How do you like this, you foreign devil?" The missionary escaped injury by maintaining his composure and asking stupid questions.[57]

Incidents like this became more common and more violent after the Northern Expedition began on 9 July 1926.[58] Both soldiers and party workers distributed anti-Christian propaganda in the areas that came under KMT control. Looting of foreign residences was common and "soldiers, workers, and peasants were in fact responsible for widespread commandeering and occupation of mission properties."[59] In some instances KMT troops occupied mission property and used it for their barracks.[60] These disturbances included student strikes against mission schools and persecution of Chinese Christians.

When KMT troops arrived at the school for American missionary children at Pingdingshan, Henan, Clemens Granskou believed they were well-disciplined. But as more troops came, their anti-foreignism increased and they began taking food from the missionaries. Soon after this the missionaries left for the safety of the treaty ports.[61]

Walter Judd, a medical missionary for the American Board, worked at Shaowu, Fujian, during the Northern Expedition. Soldiers first occupied this city in December 1926. They took over the American Board hospital and asked Judd to treat their wounded. Judd volunteered his services

and there was little trouble. These troops soon left and another contingent arrived in January 1927. These soldiers accused Judd of being British and started to execute him. When the local magistrate arrived and assured the soldiers Judd was an American, they released him. He remained at Shaowu and treated KMT troops until 1930.[42]

In January 1927 an anti-Christian riot at Fuzhou resulted in the evacuation of the American missionaries working there. The Nationalists had controlled the city for several weeks without any incidents. During a period of fighting between the soldiers themselves, an anti-foreign riot began that lasted three days. A crowd composed of soldiers and civilians looted the residences of the American Board missionaries, the YMCA, the Methodist Church and hospital, and the Anglican hospital. On 19 January the American missionaries went to the Philippines aboard the U.S. destroyer, Pillsbury.[43]

The sporadic departure of missionaries from areas controlled by the Nationalists became a general evacuation after the March Twenty-Fourth Incident at Nanjing in 1927. This was "the most spectacular of the attacks on the missionaries" and resulted in the highest number of deaths of foreigners during the Northern Expedition.[44] This incident and the subsequent withdrawal of the missionaries had fateful consequences for Christianity in China.

On 23 March 1927 northern troops withdrew from Nanjing and during the night a Nationalist army entered the city.

In the morning of the twenty-fourth, groups of soldiers systematically looted the American, British, and Japanese consulates. The troops also attacked mission property and rioted at Nanjing University, a mission school. There, a KMT soldier shot and killed Dr. J.E. Williams, Vice-President of the university. A total of six foreigners died in the attacks and six were wounded, including the British consul.

A group of Americans and British fled the consulates and sought refuge at the compound of Standard Oil Company. When this came under attack in the afternoon, two American destroyers and a British cruiser on the Chang Jiang nearby bombarded the area around the compound. This action ended the attacks on foreigners and those at the Standard Oil property escaped to the river.

The next day other contingents of the Nationalist army entered the city and restored order. They released all foreigners, including a group held at Nanjing University. By the twenty-sixth virtually all foreigners had left Nanjing for Shanghai. The rioters had sacked all missionary residences and burned nine mission buildings. The reports of the number of Chinese killed in the barrage on the twenty-fourth varied from four to thousands.[45]

In the international controversy that followed the Nanjing Incident, the persons responsible for the killings other than Nationalist troops "seem not to have been judically [sic] established."[46] Some of the KMT command-

ers claimed outlaws and "ruffians" in Nationalist uniforms were responsible. Another commander, Yang Chieh, told the Japanese consul that Communists in Nanjing instigated the soldiers. This version, adamantly supported by the Japanese government, soon became the one most foreigners accepted. It is also the explanation later adopted by Chiang Kai-shek and the Right wing of the KMT.[67]

Seventeen American missionaries who were at Nanjing issued a written statement from Shanghai giving their version of the incident. They believed "those outrages were committed by armed Nationalist soldiers in uniform, who acted with the knowledge and approval of their superior officers." They also accepted the explanation that Communists in the Nationalist party were ultimately responsible. The missionaries maintained they would have all died if not for the action of the military vessels.[68]

The immediate effect of the March Twenty-Fourth Incident on American missions was the evacuation of the missionaries. Before the incident, American consular authorities made "secret suggestions" to some of the missionaries regarding their presence in combat zones. Following the violence at Nanjing, the diplomats strongly urged all missionaries to seek refuge in the major treaty ports. The American government also pressured the home mission boards to evacuate their workers to the treaty ports or to the Philippines and Japan.[69]

In the middle of 1927 missionary work in China came to

a halt. By April over 1,500 missionaries had left the interior for Shanghai and other protected ports. Less than 500 out of a total 6,600 missionaries remained outside the treaty ports in May. During this period, 3,000 missionaries left China; many did not return.[70] Frank Rawlinson tried to remain optimistic, but he "recognized that one era of Chris-tian effort in China is closed with somewhat of a shock."[71] Although new foreign Christian workers replaced many of the missionaries who did not return to China, the conditions they confronted were more formidable after 1927.

Nationalists, Communists, and Anti-Christianity

The relationship between the KMT, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), and the anti-Christian movement began in January 1924. The First National Congress of the KMT adopted a "Manifesto" that had "an intensely anti-imperialist character."[72] This document was the product of cooperation between Sun Yat-sen and a Russian advisor, Michael Borodin. Under the influence of Borodin, Sun had already agreed to allow Chinese Communist Party members to join the KMT and twenty delegates at the congress were Communists. After this the Nationalist movement became synonymous with "opposition to the political and economic privileges of foreigners in China."[73]

Between the First National Congress and the Second in January 1926, the KMT became more closely associated with

anti-Christianity. During 1925 both the KMT and the CCP supported anti-Christian parades and street lectures in Guangdong province. Nationalist troops occupied and destroyed missionary property on two occasions.[74] Douglas Jenkins, U.S. Consul-General at Guangzhou, reported he believed the KMT attempted to gain the support of students by mobilizing them against the mission schools.[75]

The Second National Congress officially endorsed the anti-Christian movement by adopting "a strong resolution charging schools, journals and churches run by missionaries as being 'the tongues and claws of imperialism.'" This policy became effective almost immediately when KMT forces gained control of Guangxi province in early 1926. Several anti-Christian riots and looting of missionary property occurred with the advance of the Nationalist troops.[76]

Many Nationalist leaders had ambivalent attitudes towards Christianity. Some were Christians and many were graduates of Christian schools. Although they recognized the political expediency of supporting anti-Christianity, they believed attacks on mission institutions damaged the reputation of the KMT abroad and with Chinese Christians.[77]

The actions of Chiang Kai-shek reflected this ambivalence. In January 1926, Chiang criticized American policy in China and denounced Christianity as being hypocritical.[78] As the Northern Expedition advanced and his troops attacked mission property and missionaries, Chiang became more conciliatory. As early as 20 July he issued a procla-

mation promising protection of all foreigners and their property.[79] On 19 November, Chiang stated he had no quarrel with Christianity and "the elimination of missions from China is not part of our program."[80]

After the March Twenty-Fourth Incident, Chiang and the Nationalists worked to establish a rapprochement with missionaries and Chinese Christians. This was actually an attempt to calm the hostility of foreign governments following the Northern Expedition. After Chiang's purge of the Communists from the ranks of the KMT in 1927, he claimed all anti-Christian activity had been Communist inspired. Chiang completed his reconciliation with Christianity with his baptism on 23 October 1930.[81]

The literature of American missionaries is filled with numerous accounts of violent incidents involving foreign Christians and Chinese during the period 1919-1928.[82] Remarkably, only twelve missionaries died because of violent acts, including six Americans. In the five years following 1929, fifteen more perished, a relative low number of fatalities considering the dangerous circumstances.[83] It was the particular nature of the hostility directed against the missionaries that distinguished this period.

The anti-Christian campaigns of the 1920s were different from the opposition the missionaries experienced earlier in the Christian century. The anti-Christians of this period were products of the May Fourth Movement. A

passionate belief in science and democracy motivated their rejection of all religions, including Christianity. Intense feelings of nationalism and patriotism dictated their goals of ridding China of warlords and foreign aggression. The leaders of this movement mobilized a much larger following than preceding anti-Christians. When anti-Christianity became a part of the KMT and CCP political program against imperialism and capitalism, the possibility for missionary success in China diminished greatly.

Historians have explained anti-Christianity in China during this period in different ways. Kenneth Latourette, a China missionary turned historian, believes a combination of factors was responsible. Among those he lists are nationalism, destructive criticism from the May Fourth Movement, Western agnosticism imported by returned students, and traditional Chinese rejection of theology, gods, spirits, and immortality.[84]

Chow Tse-tsung relegates the anti-Christian movement to the status of "later controversies" evolving from the May Fourth Movement.[85] Yamamoto Tatsuro and Yamamoto Sumiko maintain that ideas of nationalism, anti-imperialism, and anti-capitalism dominated the movement. They attribute the origin of the movement to the influence of Communism. After 1925, nationalism that was basically anti-foreign supported and developed the anti-Christian campaigns.[86]

Yip Ka-che and Jessie Gregory Lutz emphasize the role of both political parties in the spread of the movement. Lutz believes anti-Christianity lacked effective goals and political allies in the early 1920s. After 1924 the anti-Christians joined the wider campaign against imperialism by allying with the KMT and CCP. This "politicized" the anti-Christian tradition. The movement's leaders began to demand that mission schools "serve the orthodoxy of the new China and become the ideological bastions of Chinese sovereignty."[87]

Yip credits the Chinese Communist Party for first using the slogans of anti-imperialism and anti-militarism. After the alliance of the Communists and the Nationalists, "their joint efforts succeeded in hastening the process by which Chinese nationalism became identified with anti-imperialism." The propaganda of the KMT and CCP described Christianity as "cultural imperialism." Party workers accused mission schools of producing "unpatriotic" Chinese. The May Thirtieth Incident acted as a catalyst in intensifying the nationalism of the Chinese and the anti-Christian movement became part of the anti-imperialist struggle. "Many Chinese intellectuals now believed that Christian missionaries were agents of imperialist exploitation in China."[88]

CHAPTER II ENDNOTES

1. The May Fourth Movement, May Thirtieth Incident, and March Twenty-Fourth Incident are discussed below. The term "Nationalist" (as opposed to nationalism in a general sense) refers to the political party of Sun Yat-sen and is also designated as KMT. Nationalist also refers to the government established by this party in 1928.

2. ABCFM, Annual Report 1859, p. 117; Annual Report 1861, p. 108.

3. William Ellsworth Strong, The Story of the American Board: An Account of the First Hundred Years of the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions (Boston: The Pilgrim Press, 1910; reprint ed., New York: Arno Press and the New York Times, 1969), p.257.

4. Latourette, HCMC, pp. 468-469.

5. Cohen, China and Christianity, p. 270. In addition see John C. Ferguson, "The Toleration Clauses: A Practical Suggestion," Chinese Recorder 57 (June 1926): 416-418. "Extraterritorrial status" refers to the right of foreigners to reside in China and not be subject to Chinese law. See chapter III, pp. 68-74 below.

6. Suzanne W. Barnett, "Protestant Expansion and Chinese Views of the West," Modern Asian Studies 6.2 (1972): 146.

7. Both non-Christian Chinese and missionaries used the derogatory term "rice Christians" to refer to Chinese who joined the churches for material instead of spiritual gain. Although some Chinese did seek political or economic advantages by associating with the missionaries, this was not true of all Chinese Christians.

8. Sidney A. Forsythe believes the techniques and institutions of some missionaries "resulted in their effective segregation--psychological as well as physical--from the surrounding Chinese society." He concludes that "to accept and appreciate the Chinese, as they were, would have been a contradiction in terms" [emphasis in original]. See An American Missionary Community in China, 1895-1905 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971), pp. vii-viii. This type of missionary isolation continued into the twentieth century. Paul Hayes, a Methodist missionary in China from 1921 to 1935, admitted: "We were really more or less isolated from a lot of things that were going on in China." Hayes worked in a seven-acre compound in Wuhu and lived in a large house inside the wall that surrounded the mission property. He believed these were responsible for his separation from the majority of Chinese who lived in mud and straw huts. See "China Oral History Project," pp. 24, 34.

9. Cohen, China and Christianity, p. 270-271.

10. Latourette, HCMC, pp. 470-471; Varg, Missionaries, Chinese, and Diplomats, pp. 38-39.

11. For a general description of the Boxer Movement see Latourette, HCMC, pp. 502-508. Also see Varg, Missionaries, Chinese, and Diplomats, pp. 46-51. There is some disagreement on the number of casualties. The foreign Protestant numbers cited are from Latourette, HCMC, pp. 516-517. He believes the number of Chinese Protestants to be approximately 1,912. Varg lists 136 Protestant missionaries, 44 Catholics, and 53 missionary children killed. He cites the number of Chinese Christians killed as 30,000, but says this is too high, Missionaries, Chinese, and Diplomats, p. 47. Most of the violence occurred in the provinces of Shandong, Hebei (Chihli), and Shanxi.

12. Countries sending forces to China included: Japan, Great Britain, the United States, France, Russia, Austria, Germany, and Italy.

13. Miller, "Ends and Means," pp. 274-276; Latourette, HCMC, pp. 519-520.

14. Yip Ka-che believes the attitudes of some Chinese intellectuals, including Kang Yuwei, changed after China's defeat in the Sino-Japanese War. After 1895, they advocated complete reform as opposed to using Western technology to strengthen the Confucian system. See "The Anti-Christian

Movement in China, 1922-1927" (Ph.D. dissertation, Columbia University, 1970), p. 42-43. Latourette maintains the change occurred after the Boxer Movement, HCMC, pp. 528-529.

15. Occupation of China, p. 32.

16. Burton L. Goddard, The Encyclopedia of Modern Christian Missions (Camden, New Jersey: Thomas Nelson and Sons, 1967), p. 656. The total American indemnity was 32,939,055 Chinese taels, or approximately $24,000,000 (U.S.). The State Department later established the fund Smith advocated and it financed the American education of hundreds of "Boxer Indemnity Scholars" from China.

17. China Year Book, 1923, p. 903; Latourette, HCMC, pp. 608-609.

18. Ibid., pp. 609-610.

19. On Sun Yat-sen see Howard L. Boorman and Richard C. Howard, eds., Biographical Dictionary of Republican China, 5 vols. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1967), vol. 3, pp. 170-189. Sun's life exemplifies many Chinese intellectuals' ambivalence towards Christianity. He received a Western education at a Church of England boarding school in Hawaii. On many occasions, he made public remarks showing an admiration of Christians and certain aspects of Christianity. He urged Chinese Christians to participate in the revolution. After his death in 1925, a debate occurred in the KMT, Sun's political party, over the relationship of the party to Christianity. To reach a compromise, two funerals were held for Sun, one public and non-Christian, and one private and Christian. See Yip, "Anti-Christian Movement," pp. 201-203.

20. See the translation of Chapter II, Article 6.7 of "The Provisional Constitution of the Republic of China" in Harley Farnsworth MacNair, Modern Chinese History: Selected Readings (Shanghai: The Commercial Press, Limited, 1927), pp.729-734.

21. Latourette, HCMC, p. 611.

22. Ibid., pp. 610-614.

23. Historians also refer to the May Fourth Movement as the "New Thought Movement" or the "Chinese Renaissance." The work of Hu Shih gives the perspective of a Chinese intellectual on the Chinese Renaissance. Hu led the successful movement to replace the classical Chinese literary style with the more common vernacular. He received his graduate training at Columbia University and was a student of John Dewey. His career represents that group of the May Fourth intellectuals who rejected Christianity but did not adopt other more radical "isms" in its place. See Hu Shih, The Chinese Renaissance, 2nd ed. (New York: Paragon Book Reprint Corporation, 1963); "China and Christianity," Forum 78 (July 1927): 1-2. In addition see Jerome B. Grieder, Hu Shih and the Chinese Renaissance: Liberalism in the Chinese Revolution, 1917-1937 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1970).

24. Chow Tse-tsung, The May Fourth Movement: Intellectual Revolution in Modern China (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1960), p. 5.

25. Ibid., p.14; Yip, "Anti-Christian Movement," pp. 50-53.

26. China Mission Year Book, 1923, pp. 32-33. The lectures John Dewey gave while in China were published in Beijing and issued in fourteen editions at ten thousand copies each, Chinese Recorder 54 (August 1923): 453.

27. These are the most important and damaging demands. Others included the requirement that China purchase 50 percent of its munitions from Japan and the nonalienation of any coastal areas to a third power. For a translation of the texts of the communications between Japan and China see MacNair, Modern Chinese History, pp. 768-788.

28. For a sketch of the events surrounding the Twenty-One Demands and Chinese reaction see Chow, May Fourth Movement, pp. 20-25. May Ninth, the day the Japanese ambassador delivered the note with the twenty-one demands became known in later years as "National Humiliation Day." In the 1920s and 1930s, Chinese commemorated both May Ninth and May Fourth with demonstrations and public ceremonies.

29. Chinese Recorder, 50 (February 1919): 133-134.

30. Eugene P. Trani, "Wilson, China, and the Missionaries, 1913-1921," Journal of Presbyterian History 49 (Winter 1971): 348-350.

31. Chow, May Fourth Movement, pp. 84-94. Also see Dorothy Borg, American Policy and the Chinese Revolution, 1925-1928 (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1947), pp. 3-4.

32. Chow, May Fourth Movement, p. 322; Yip, "Anti-Christian Movement," pp. 78-81. It is interesting to note that Tian Han did not believe in the divinity of Jesus. Tian respected Jesus' moral and ethical teachings and believed in the principle of religious freedom.

33. Latourette, HCMC, pp. 695-696; Yip, "Anti-Christian Movement," p. 92.

34. Latourette, HCMC, pp. 695-696.

35. Peking Leader, 1 April 1922, newspaper clipping in A.M. Paddock, Vice-Counsel, Beijing, to Secretary [of State], Washington, D.C., 10 April 1922, U.S. Department of State, "Records Relating to the Internal Affairs of China, 1910-1929" (Washington, D.C.: U.S. National Archives, Microcopy 329), reel 123, 893.404/14; hereafter cited as USDS, "Records."

36. C.S. Chang, "The Anti-Religion Movement," Chinese Recorder 54 (August 1923): 460.

37. Latourette, HCMC, pp. 695-696.

38. The anti-Christians relied upon printed material to influence students and other intellectuals. In 1923 the Anti-Religion Federation in Beijing published the first of a planned series of books on great "Western Anti-Religionists." It presented short biographies of Western philosophers including: Bacon, Descartes, Voltaire, Diderot, Bentham, Leplace, Darwin, and Marx. See T.C. Chao, "Our Book Table," Chinese Recorder 54 (September 1923): 555-556. In addition see Yip, "Anti-Christian Movement," pp. 124-125.

39. Jacob Gould Schurman, Minister, Beijing, to Secretary of State, Washington, D.C., 6 April 1922, USDS, "Records," reel 123, 893.404/13; Inter-departmental corre-

spondence, F.P.L. [?], Division of Far Eastern Affairs to Secretary of State, 3 June 1922, ibid., 893.404/23. Also see Chang, "Anti-Religion Movement," p. 461.

40. Ibid., pp. 466-467.

41. Yip, "Anti-Christian Movement," pp. 157-159. Also see Edwin S. Cunningham, Consul-General, Shanghai, to Secretary of State, Washington, D.C., 14 January 1925, USDS, "Records," reel 123, 893.404/30; C.D. Meinhardt, Vice-Consul-in-Charge, Changsha, to J.G. Schurman, Minister, Beijing, 23 January 1925, ibid., 893.404/34.

42. Jacob Gould Schurman, Minister, Beijing, to Secretary of State, Washington, D.C., 2 January 1925, USDS, "Records," reel 123, 893.404/27, sheet 6.

43. Yip, "Anti-Christian Movement," p. 144.

44. Ibid., p. 152.

45. This description of the May Thirtieth Incident is from the relatively balanced account in Borg, American Policy, pp. 20-23. The diplomatic and consular officers of the United States in Shanghai generated a vast amount of letters, press clippings, translations of Chinese publications, and copies of propaganda posters during the subsequent months. For these see United States Department of State, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1925, vol. I, pp. 647-721; hereafter cited as USDS, Foreign Relations, with year.

46. [Editor], "Notes on Current Events," Chinese Recorder 57 (February 1926): 123.

47. China Year Book, 1926-27, pt. 2, pp. 946-951. Judge Johnson listed several long-standing causes of the trouble at Shanghai: extraterritoriality, expansion of the foreign concession by illegal means, and general hostility between foreigners and Chinese. He faulted the Municipal Council for not reconciling some of these differences and for attempting to enforce censorship on the Chinese. Johnson also criticized the officer who ordered the shooting. Some of the policemen involved testified that up until the moment they fired "they did not believe that the so-called rioters intended to do harm to persons or property."

48. Borg, American Policy, pp. 29-32.

49. Chinese Recorder, 57 (February 1926): 123.

50. P.W. Kuo, "The Present Situation in China and its Significance for Missionary Administration," International Review of Missions 15 (January 1926): 43-44.

51. Borg, American Policy, pp. 29-32. The American Consul-General at Guangzhou reported in late 1925 that the anti-Christian campaign was turning anti-American. The local Chinese press printed articles criticizing racism in the United States directed against blacks and Chinese. See Douglas Jenkins to Secretary of State, Washington, D.C., 8 December 1925, USDS, "Records," reel 123, 893.404/53.

52. "Anti-Christian Movement," p. 179. Also see C. Martin Wilbur, The Nationalist Revolution in China, 1923-1928 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), pp. 22-23.

53. Borg, American Policy, pp. 39-42.

54. Yip, "Anti-Christian Movement," pp. 187-188.

55. Ibid. In addition see J.C. Huston, Consul-in-Charge, Hankou, to Secretary of State, Washington, D.C., 10 November 1925, USDS, "Records," reel 123, 893.404/49. The Christmas week demonstrations began in Fuzhou with the explosion of a bomb at Fuzhou College of the American Board. The American Consul there wrote: "President Willard L. Beard, of the College, narrowly escaped injury. The new movement appears to be more radical than any previously reported." Ernest B. Price to J.V.A. MacMurray, Minister, Beijing, 28 December 1925, ibid., 893.404/56.

56. Latourette, HCMC, p. 819.

57. Clemens M. Granskou, "China Oral History Project," pp. 81-82. Granskou worked in China from 1921 to 1927.

58. For a good description of the Northern Expedition see Wilbur, Nationalist Revolution, pp. 56-99.

59. Yip, "Anti-Christian Movement," pp. 233-236.

60. Gladys Robina Quale, "The Mission Compound in Modern China: The Role of the United States Protestant Missions as an Asylum in the Civil and International Strife of China, 1900-1941" (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Michigan, 1957), p. 166. Edward Sovik reported Nationalist troops occupied the mission compound in Xinyang. "The buildings, including the church, hospital, and four residences, were severely damaged. This was the situation at all our stations." See "China Oral History Project," p. 26.

61. After Granskou left Pingdingshan, he went to Hankou. The missionaries evacuated this city on advice of the American consul in March 1927. They received transportation to Shanghai aboard an American gunboat. Granskou recalled, "As we moved south down the Yangtze River, the soldiers that were on the banks of the river would take pot shots at the boat." See "China Oral History Project," pp. 91-93.

62. Walter Judd, "China Oral History Project," pp. 40-42; Heininger, "American Board in China," p. 102. Judd worked in China from 1925 until 1939.

63. William Overholt, "China Oral History Project," p. 28; Chinese Recorder 58 (April 1927): 288-290; Heininger, "American Board in China," p. 101. Overholt was a Methodist missionary in China from 1924 to 1929.

64. Latourette, HCMC, p. 357.

65. This sketch of the March Twenty-Fourth or Nanjing Incident is from Wilbur, Nationalist Revolution, pp. 90-94; Borg, American Policy, pp. 290-295; Yip, "Anti-Christian Movement," p. 243; USDS, Foreign Relations, 1927, vol. II, pp. 146-163. Also see "Editorial: Some Aspects of the End of One Era of Christian Effort in China," Chinese Recorder 58 (April 1927): 227-234. The North China Herald reported that one Chinese counted only four people killed in the barrage from the foreign warships, 16 April 1927, p. 108.

66. Wilbur, Nationalist Revolution, p. 92.

67. Ibid. Chiang Kai-shek was the successor to Sun Yat-sen and commander of the Northern Expedition. His personal clique is referred to as the "Right wing " of the KMT. In April 1927 he began a purge of the Communists that successfully eliminated their influence in the Nationalist party.

68. China Year Book, 1928, pp. 725-726. John Leighton Stuart, a strong supporter of Chiang Kai-shek, also blamed the Communists. He believed they were trying to disrupt Chiang's relations with the West when they instigated the Nanjing Incident, Fifty Years, pp. 116-117.

69. C.L. Boynton, "The Evacuation and Return of the Missionaries," China Christian Year Book, 1928, pp. 155-159.

70. Ibid., pp. 156-158. Out of 170 missionary hospitals, 55 closed in 1927. Three of the thirteen Protestant colleges closed and six others lost all of their foreign staff, Latourette, HCMC, pp. 820-821.

71. "Editorial," Chinese Recorder 58 (April 1927): 229-230. For the decisions of individual missionaries on evacuation see Roland Cross, p. 31; Edward Sovik, pp. 15-16; Maud Russell, p. 37; William Overholt, pp. 35-36; Erwin Hertz, p. 30; "China Oral History Project." A few of the missionaries began to return to their stations in the interior in 1927 and more followed in 1928. Maud Russell served with the YMCA in China from 1917 until 1943. Erwin Hertz worked as an English teacher in Fenzhou, 1924-1927.

72. Borg, American Policy, pp. 16-17.

73. Wilbur, Nationalist Revolution, pp. 8-11, 68.

74. Ibid., p. 70.

75. Dispatch to Secretary of State, Washington, D.C., 29 January 1925, USDS, "Reports," reel 123, 893.404/32.

76. Wilbur, Nationalist Revolution, p. 70. The CCP Central Committee also adopted an anti-Christian resolution at its plenary session 12-18 July 1926 accusing the church of being the "vanguard of imperialism," ibid., p. 71. Yip believes the indoctrination of KMT cadets at Whampoa

military academy in Guangzhou "explains the fact that these military cadets turned out to be some of the most aggressive promoters and workers in the anti-Christian movement." He also found that several KMT party leaders were directly responsible for the revival of the Anti-Christian Federation. See "Anti-Christian Movement," pp. 135-137, 162-165.

77. Wilbur, Nationalist Revolution, p. 70.

78. Yip, "Anti-Christian Movement," p. 207. For a short biography of Chiang see Boorman and Howard, eds., Biographical Dictionary, vol. I, pp. 319-338.

79. Wilbur, Nationalist Revolution, pp. 71-72.

80. North China Herald, 12 February 1927, p. 230. Yip maintains that both the KMT and CCP were strong parties only on paper. Regionalism and factionalism plagued both organizations and this was partly responsible for "the confusion in the execution of the KMT's policy towards the anti-Christian movement." See "Anti-Christian Movement," p. 134.

81. Yip, "Anti-Christian Movement," pp. 250-253.

82. For examples see W.H. Oldfield, "In the Hands of Chinese Robbers," Chinese Recorder 53 (August 1922): 530-537; [Editor], "News for the Missionary," ibid., (February 1922): 137-138; "Editorial," ibid., (December 1922): 741-742; [Editor], "Gleanings from Correspondence and Exchanges," ibid., 54 (May 1923): 306; ibid., (September 1923): 563; [Editor], "In Remembrance," ibid., (October 1923): 613. In addition see Clemens M. Granskou, "China Oral History Project," p. 15.

83. Latourette, HCMC, pp. 366-367; Quale, "Mission Compound," p. 198.

84. HCMC, p. 694.

85. May Fourth Movement, pp. 320-327.

86. "The Anti-Christian Movement in China, 1922-1927," Far Eastern Quarterly 12 (February 1953): 140-146.

87. "Chinese Nationalism and the Anti-Christian Campaigns of the 1920s," Modern Asian Studies 10.3 (1976): 416.

88. "Anti-Christian Movement," pp. 260-261.

CHAPTER III

MISSIONARIES AND CHINESE NATIONALISM: THE ISSUES

The evacuation of the missionaries after the March Twenty-Fourth Incident in 1927 was not of long duration. Many began to return to their stations in the summer and fall of that year. Anti-Christian attacks diminished after Chiang Kai-shek consolidated his control over the KMT and established the Nationalist regime at Nanjing in 1928. Occasional demonstrations, school strikes, and violence continued to plague the missionaries' efforts. Yet the level of organization and intensity of anti-Christianity in China subsided until after World War II.

When American missionaries returned to their mission stations in 1927 and 1928, they confronted new conditions and old issues. In their absence, many of their converts left the churches; some joined the ranks of the anti-Christians. Chinese filled faculty vacancies at mission schools and church administrative positions. Chinese Christians no longer accepted missionary leadership as easily as in the past. Some missionaries doubted the Chinese still wanted or needed their ministry.

The critical decade of China missions was 1919 to

1928. Nationalism renewed and intensified Chinese objections to the continuance of the "unequal" treaties. The United States and other Western nations refused to relinquish the advantages these treaties afforded their citizens. Anti-Christians based many of their accusations against Christianity on its connection with the treaties. Chinese Christians and many missionaries joined the anti-Christians in questioning the maintenance of extraterritoriality under the treaties. Treaty revision was a difficult problem with no easy solutions.

Anti-Christians attacked mission educational institutions because they produced "denationalized" and "unpatriotic" students. They also criticized the failure of Christian schools to register with the Chinese government and become part of the educational system of China. The importance of this issue increased as both the northern warlord government at Beijing and the KMT began campaigns to "nationalize" missionary education.

Traditionally, the professed goal of the missionaries was the creation of Chinese churches that were self-governing, self-propagating, and self-supporting. During this decade, Chinese Christians and many missionaries questioned the progress made in producing an "indigenous" Christianity in China. A decisive problem for the missionaries was the lack of Chinese leaders, Chinese financial support, and Chinese forms of worship in the churches.

Many of these issues were not new. Foreign Christians

addressed them at various times during the Christian century. It was the intensity and divisiveness of the attacks that was now unique. During the 1920s, Chinese nationalism magnified the importance of these problems and demanded their solution. Because many of the missionaries' followers joined the opposition, it was impossible for foreign Christian workers to ignore the issues and continue the status quo. The missionaries' perceptions and responses to the issues reveal their relationship to Chinese nationalism. That relationship determined their ability to continue their campaign to save China and convert it to a "Christian" democracy.

Missionaries, Converts, and Treaties

International treaties between China and the United States were responsible for the peculiar status of American missionaries and their converts during the Christian century. The charge that missionaries were the "running dogs of imperialism" referred to their relationship with these treaties and the military power that enforced them.[1] Because the treaties protected Chinese Christians, they confronted the charge they were "unpatriotic" when they adopted the foreign religion.[2]

Many missionaries admitted that Christianity inherited a negative legacy because of its inclusion in the treaties. They realized their efforts were part of the total impact of the West upon China. Missionaries, like other Western-

ers, had displayed attitudes "of superiority and domination that are peculiarly resented."[3] Many Chinese mistakenly considered them to be representatives of their home governments.[4] Foreign Christian workers of the 1920s questioned the wisdom of their past involvement in treaty negotiations and the subsequent relationship between Christianity and Western military power that evolved during the Christian century.

The nineteenth-century treaties between China and the United States affected the missionaries in three major ways. The treaties allowed them legally to live in China and proselytize Chinese. Like all American citizens, the agreements granted missionaries the privileges of extraterritoriality. Under the treaties, the Chinese government agreed to protect Chinese converts from persecution.

As described above, missionaries began their campaign in China in defiance of Chinese law.[5] Before 1844 the Chinese government prohibited its subjects from accepting Christianity and missionaries from entering the country. Like Westerners engaged in the opium trade, missionaries chose to ignore the law.

The Treaty of Wangxia, the first agreement between the United States and China, only addressed the condition of missionaries as American citizens. Article XVII stipulated United States citizens could engage "in hiring sites from the inhabitants on which to construct houses and places of business, and also hospitals, churches and cemeteries."

The efforts of Dr. Peter Parker, an American missionary, were responsible for the inclusion of this article.[6]

In addition to the right to build churches, missionaries benefitted from the agreement in the treaty that granted extraterritoriality to American citizens.[7] This condition allowed Americans to reside in China but be exempt from Chinese law. They were subject only to United States law as enforced by American consuls. Although the word "extraterritoriality" did not appear in any treaties between the United States and China until 1903, it was commonly used to describe this condition of consular jurisdiction exempt from Chinese law.[8]

The right of foreigners to reside in China and ignore Chinese law became a point of great contention with the Chinese. The justification for this condition was the protection of American citizens from the "imposition of the severe and barbarous penalties" of an inadequate Chinese law system.[9] Over time, abuses developed in the administration of extraterritorial privileges. Foreigners, including Americans, used extraterritoriality to support "leased areas, concessions, settlements, navigation rights, their own military and naval protection, certain customs privileges, and other immunities."[10]

Among the abuses of extraterritoriality was the travel of American missionaries into the interior of China. An imperial edict of 1845 lifted the prohibition against Chinese accepting Protestantism. It also "definitely

prohibited missionaries from entering the interior of the country to propagate religion."[11] Missionaries ignored this and left the treaty ports to preach in the interior. Because the Treaty of Wangxia afforded the missionaries extraterritorial status, Chinese officials could not stop this. In a gesture of compliance, "British authorities made some efforts to restrain British and even American missionaries, but the French and American Governments did not."[12]

The treaties of 1858, 1880, and 1903 strengthened the position of American missionaries in China. The Treaty of Tianjin in 1858 was the first American treaty to include provisions just for missionaries. It reaffirmed extraterritoriality and provided toleration for missionaries and their converts. Yet it did not contain a specific article allowing travel into the interior.[13] It was the Chinese text of the French Treaty of Tianjin (1860) that first granted this right to French missionaries. The Chinese text of the French treaty also allowed the purchase of property and construction of houses and churches in the interior outside the treaty ports.[14]

American missionaries believed the articles in the Chinese text of the French treaty applied to them through the most-favored-nation clause in the American Treaty of Tianjin. United States diplomats were reluctant to agree with this and some actually denied that the French treaty applied to Americans. Charles Denby, American Minister in

Beijing, reported: "Our own missionaries have often cited this clause as being some sort of a basis for the right to go into the interior." He did not agree with this and "assumed, therefore, that the right to settle at will in the interior does not exist." Denby admitted, however, that the inclusion of extraterritoriality in the American treaties "practically" allowed the missionaries to do as they pleased in China.[15]

Frederick Low, who preceded Denby as United States Minister, also held that American missionaries had no right under the Treaties of Tianjin to go into the interior. In 1870 Low discovered the discrepancy between the French and Chinese texts of the 1860 treaty but decided not to publicize this or notify the Chinese government.[16] Low later wrote Secretary of State Fish that his "opinion is clear and decided that missionaries have no right to reside permanently away from the open ports."[17] Fish approved of Low's position and agreed that "the treaty [of Tianjin] does not guarantee to missionaries a right to establish themselves in inland places."[18]

Yet both Low and Fish believed that the long-term residence of some missionaries in the interior had established a precedent the United States should protect. If missionaries initially had the tacit approval of local Chinese officials for their presence in the community, the State Department would uphold their right to stay there. Consuls could not, however, insist that Chinese officials

accept missionaries in new locations where they were opposed.

The commercial treaty between the United States and China in 1880 restated the stipulation on extraterritoriality for American citizens.[19] It did not specifically address the missionary question. During this period, American missionaries traveled, bought property, and built churches and houses in the interior. These actions "were long a subject of debate and often a cause of friction."[20]

The treaty of 1903 legally established the right of the American missionaries to leave the treaty ports and operate in the interior. Article XIV included much of the wording of Article XXIX from the 1858 treaty. It added the right of missionary "societies" to rent and lease in perpetuity "buildings or lands in all parts of the Empire for missionary purposes." Article XIV prohibited missionaries from interfering with Chinese officials' jurisdiction over Chinese converts. It also stipulated that "native authorities" should not "make any distinction between converts and non-converts, but shall administer the laws without partiality."[21]

In this treaty, the United States made a token concession towards Chinese demands to end extraterritoriality. Article XIV stated the United States would assist China in reforming its judicial system. The United States would also "relinquish extra-territorial rights when satisfied that the state of the Chinese laws, the arrangements for

their administration, and other considerations warrant it in so doing."[22] During the next three decades, the Chinese based their attempts to renegotiate the treaties and abolish extraterritorial rights on this clause.

American missionaries were not passive recipients of the benefits of toleration clauses and extraterritoriality during the nineteenth century. Through the treaties, a relationship developed between American diplomats, American military power, and American missionaries. Because the Chinese government opposed their work, the ministry of foreign Christians depended upon the treaty privileges. This relationship was responsible for the Chinese belief that Christian missions were an extension of Western encroachment on China's sovereignty.

Missionaries acted as interpreters and secretaries for the diplomats and some ex-missionaries became United States officials. Peter Parker was American Commissioner to China from 1855 to 1857. He advocated the invasion of Taiwan to force China to open treaty negotiations with the Western nations. The Buchanan administration did not support this and quickly replaced Parker. This overt aggressiveness "was at the time far more characteristic of the missionaries than of merchants."[23]

Before 1900 the majority of missionaries did not hesitate to exercise their prerogatives under the treaties. When Chinese obstructed their activities, missionaries made complaints to their consuls and to Chinese officials. Some

"were disposed, too, to stretch some of their privileges to the limit and to claim the benefit of any doubt."[24] Nineteenth-century missionaries supported two wars in order to obtain their special position in China and were vigilant in maintaining their "treaty rights."[25]

Charles Denby, like many American diplomats in China, was ambivalent towards the missionaries. He denied some of the privileges claimed by the missionaries and believed they should receive the same treatment as other United States citizens. Yet he praised their work in "civilizing" China. Denby further admitted: "The diplomatic agent recognizes that the complete civilization of a people means the increase of trade and commerce with the rest of the world."[26] Regardless of motivation, most American diplomats upheld the rights of the missionaries under the treaties.

In the 1920s, actions by American officials and missionaries reinforced the Chinese belief that there was a close connection between the two. President Coolidge, the nation's premier diplomat, declared missions were America's number one interest in China.[27] American consuls in China scrutinized the anti-Christian campaigns and intervened to protect the treaty rights of foreign Christians.[28]

The status of Chinese converts further complicated the relationship of the missionaries and the treaties. Although the treaties only protected Chinese Christians from persecution, the desire of the missionaries to help

their followers gradually expanded this protection. The missionaries approached Chinese magistrates on behalf of their converts and generally used their influence to benefit Chinese Christians. This was an abuse of the missionaries' extraterritorial rights and had negative consequences.[29]

Some Chinese joined the churches only to obtain the protection of the missionaries. By claiming to be Christians, they were able to influence magistrates and other officials.[30] Missionaries in the 1920s were sensitive to the criticism that their predecessors and some Chinese abused the treaties this way. They realized that in practice the treaties separated "the Chinese Christians from the mass of their fellow countrymen." Furthermore, "the Chinese authorities unwisely but persistently made a sharp distinction in the terms used to describe Christians and other Chinese subjects."[31]

Another issue that evolved from the treaties and extraterritoriality was the use of the mission compound as an asylum. In a study of this phenomenon, Gladys Quale found that Chinese perceived mission compounds to be havens of safety during violent disturbances. Both Christians and non-Christians sought refuge inside the compounds during fighting between warlords or during bandit attacks. Fear of Western military power was the basis of the ability of missionaries to protect Chinese. This relationship strengthened the Chinese perception that foreign Christians were

part of Western imperialism.[32]

Anti-Christianity and the actions of the Nationalists ended the role of mission compounds as asylums. The occupation of mission property by KMT troops "displayed to Chinese all over the nation the disappearance in fact of the privileges retained in name by foreigners in China." After 1924, mission compounds served as refuges only in areas not controlled by the KMT. Quale believes the relationship between Western power and missions was a factor in Chinese resentment of foreigners. It also motivated their attempts at treaty revision during the 1920s.[33]

John Carter Vincent, a former American consular official, analyzed the effects of changing conditions in China on extraterritoriality. He believes the nineteenth-century system depended upon "a quiescent native society indifferent to 'isms' of a national or patriotic sort." Extraterritoriality worked because the Chinese government was too weak to assert popular leadership. It also relied upon the ability and willingness of the foreign governments to use force to support their "acquired rights." These conditions no longer existed in the 1920s and the diplomats' ability to enforce extraterritorial rights became more difficult.[34]

One of China's attempts to revise its treaties occurred at the Washington Conference in 1921-1922. At the invitation of President Harding, seven Western nations,

China, and Japan attended the meeting. The conference attempted to solve some of the problems in East Asia not resolved at the Paris Peace Conference in 1919.

The Nine-Power Treaty of 6 February 1922 incorporated some of the agreements worked out in the conference. Elihu Root, an American representative, consolidated a ten-point program proposed by the Chinese delegation into four general principles in the treaty. In signing the treaty, the powers agreed to: respect China's territorial integrity, not seek spheres of influence, respect its neutrality, and honor equal economic opportunity for all.[33]

These provisions did not address the specific grievances of the Chinese. They proposed that definite dates be set for the termination of tariff controls and the abolition of extraterritoriality. The foreign delegates avoided both of these questions by referring them to special commissions to be convened at a later date.[34]

Dorothy Borg, in her study of American policy during this period, believes the foreign governments did not want to modify their positions in China. They "were determined not to ruffle the status quo to an extent that would seriously disturb their own interests." The work of the American delegation to the conference produced the "Washington Formula." This policy continued the traditional position of the foreign nations. The treaty powers "would not relinquish their treaty rights until China had developed the capacity to govern herself according to Western

standards of efficiency."[37]

The controversy over tariff autonomy and extraterritoriality continued throughout the 1920s. As part of the "national humiliation," these issues were the focus of the anti-foreign and anti-Christian movement after 1925. The KMT effectively used these injustices to generate popular support for the party. When the Northern Expedition consolidated their control over China, the Nationalists claimed to be the legitimate central government. They renewed the efforts of China to regain its sovereignty through treaty revision.

Between 25 July and 27 December 1928, the Nationalist government negotiated eleven new treaties. All of these, including the Sino-American treaty of 25 July, recognized China's right to set its own tariffs. Belgium, Denmark, Italy, Portugal, and Spain further agreed to relinquish extraterritoriality by 1 January 1930.[38] Negotiations with the other nations on this question continued into 1929 without progress. On 6 July 1929, China unilaterally proclaimed "that as of December 31, 1929 all foreign jurisdictional rights in China would be terminated."[39]

This proclamation had no effect on the extraterritorial status of Americans or any other foreigners in China.[40] These nations ignored the demands of the Nationalists and the Chinese did not have the military capability to alter the situation. The United States did not surrender extraterritoriality until 1943 when China was an ally

in World War II. At that time, it was a concession with "little more than psychological value." In his monograph on the issue, Wesley Fishel concludes "the compelling consideration throughout the period of the decline of extraterritoriality was not international idealism, but national self-interest."[41]

In the 1920s American missionaries began to support the efforts of China to renegotiate its treaties with the United States. They particularly favored the abolition of extraterritoriality. They realized the actions of earlier missionaries in obtaining and developing the special position of Christianity in China created a negative legacy vulnerable to attack. A small minority of missionaries understood and sympathized with Chinese nationalism. This divided the missionary community as did many of the other issues of this fateful decade.[42]

"Recovery of Educational Rights"

The institution of Christian education was another target of Chinese nationalism. Anti-foreignism inspired attacks on mission schools because of their ownership. Anti-Christianity motivated opposition because of the religious content of the education. Both the northern warlord government in Beijing and the KMT attempted to gain control of Christian education in the 1920s. The issues involved in the "recovery of educational rights" produced a quandary for the missionaries in China.

Christian education was a conspicuous aspect of the missionaries' presence. In 1920, mission schools employed 10,000 Chinese, 50 percent of all those working for the missionaries. There were 200,000 Chinese children enrolled in 6,890 Christian schools at the middle school level and below. The missionaries also conducted 106 nursing schools with 1,380 students. Christian education was especially beneficial to women as 31 percent of the primary school students were girls.[43]

American missionaries made Christian education one of their major undertakings. American facilities had 50 percent of the lower primary students and 66 percent of the higher primary and middle school students who attended Christian schools. Americans were dedicated to higher education in China and supported it financially and by supplying teachers and administrators. In 1920 there were 14 Christian colleges with plants valued at $6 million (Mex.) and total annual expenditures of $1.2 million.[44]

These numbers increased substantially during the next ten years. In 1923 the annual expenditures of the mission colleges reached $4.5 million (Mex.) and the number of students increased to 4,700 in 1930.[45] Christian colleges had the capability to produce outstanding graduates who achieved recognition. In 1925, 12 percent of Chinese included in Who's Who in China attended mission schools. In 1931, 16 percent had a Christian education.[46]

The missionaries did not develop a national system of

education in China. The institutions and educators of the various Protestant denominations, however, cooperated on many issues and shared similar goals and beliefs. One avenue of cooperation was through the China Christian Educational Association (CCEA).

The CCEA originated at a national conference for Protestant missionaries at Shanghai in 1890.[47] First known as the Educational Association of China, its name changed to China Christian Educational Association in 1915. The CCEA held triennial conferences and published a quarterly journal, The Educational Review, to promote Christian education in China. It also produced textbooks for the mission schools and acted as a lobbying agency with the Chinese government.[48]

The China Educational Commission is an example of how missionaries cooperated through the CCEA. In 1915 the Advisory Council of the CCEA proposed that a commission of recognized professional educators evaluate Christian education in China. Because of World War I, the commission did not meet in China until September 1921. Sixteen missionary societies sponsored the group of seventeen American educators. Dr. E.D. Burton, President of Chicago University, was Chairman of the Commission.[49]

The commission published its findings in Christian Education in China in 1922. This report called for an expansion of missionary education in China. It defined the role of education in the total missionary effort as

bringing "individuals into personal relations with Jesus Christ, and the creation of a Christian social order." The commission stated that Christians must control mission education.[50]

The reaffirmation of Christian education in China by the Burton commission was a response to increasing Chinese criticisms. After 1922 the "recovery of educational rights" movement became an integral part of the anti-Christian and anti-foreign campaigns. The opponents of mission schools accused them of usurping the right of the Chinese government to control education in China. They also emphasized the foreign and religious content of the curriculum of Christian schools.[51]

Some Chinese claimed that graduates of Christian schools were "only suitable as recruits [converts], as compradors of the foreign trading houses, or, at most, as would-be drawing-room diplomatists." The graduates of the schools were uninterested in problems of China and sought personal success only.[52] Others pointed out that mission schools denationalized Chinese by promoting Western subjects over Chinese subjects. This charge accentuated the reliance of Christian educators on English and the neglect of Chinese language, literature, and history.[53] To remedy this situation, the critics of Christian education proposed that the Chinese government force all schools to register with the Ministry of Education. This would establish the amount of control necessary to incorporate

the mission schools into the national system of China.

Attempts to force mission schools to register with the Chinese government in the 1920s were not new. The treaty between the United States and China of 4 July 1868 gave Americans the right to establish schools in China. But the agreement restricted this to "those places where foreigners are by treaty permitted to reside." Mission schools built in the interior became a part of the treaty controversy described above.[54] The Chinese enacted regulations for registration of Christian primary schools as early as 1916. Yet few schools registered and the Ministry of Education was unable to force compliance.[55]

On 12 May 1917 and 16 November 1920, the Ministry of Education issued further proclamations on the registration of foreign colleges. These required that mission facilities meet government regulations on years of matriculation and designation of schools. They did not address the issue of curriculum content. The proclamations provided that upon registration, the Christian school graduates would enjoy the same privileges as graduates of government schools.[56]

The Ministry of Education issued an order on the registration of Christian middle schools on 9 April 1921 that set the agenda for the debate in the following years. This proclamation required the missionaries to add the word "private" to their schools' names. It also mandated that Chinese standards would apply to the curricula of all

middle schools and alterations would need approval. Moreover, the Ministry of Education ordered that "the content of the curriculum and the methods of teaching shall include nothing in the nature of the propagation of religion." The missionaries were also required to disregard religious affiliation in the treatment of students.[57]

Because of the weakness of China's warlord governments during this period, no mission schools felt compelled to register. The University of Nanjing "voluntarily" registered in 1920 under regulations that did not alter its curriculum.[58] During 1924, as the intensity of the anti-Christian movement increased, so did the pressure on mission schools to register.

At the annual meeting of the Chinese National Federation of Provincial Educational Associations in October 1924, the delegates adopted a comprehensive program aimed at controlling Christian education. The proposals included the stipulation that all foreign schools must register with the Ministry of Education. Both national and local governments should have control of all schools. Schools not qualified to register must close after a certain grace period. Celebrations and ceremonies should conform to government regulations. To the missionaries the most objectionable proposal was that foreigners must not use schools to propagate religion.[59]

In response to these recommendations and the increasing pressure of anti-Christianity, the Ministry of Educa-

tion issued another set of regulations on registration. The proclamation of 16 November 1925 replaced all other orders and applied to all levels of education. These regulations were similar to the proposals of the National Federation of Provincial Educational Association. To establish Chinese control over the mission schools, the regulations required that presidents or principals must be Chinese. Those schools that had boards of directors or managers must designate that a majority of these be Chinese. The educational purpose could not be the propagation of religion and required subjects could not include religion courses.[60]

While the Ministry of Education in Beijing attempted to gain control of Christian education for the northern government, the rival Nationalist government in Guangzhou took similar action. In November 1926, the KMT issued its regulations for private schools. These resembled the Beijing provisions but had more restrictions. Under these regulations, mission schools were considered the same as all other private schools. The Nationalists set specific dates for registration in Guangdong and Hunan provinces. All schools were to teach classes on the principles of Sun Yat-sen and every Monday morning conduct a memorial service in front of Sun's portrait or picture.[61]

The northern government was too weak to enforce any of its regulations concerning Christian education. Yet the Northern Expedition of the Nationalists proved they were

capable of controlling education in China. In 1927 foreign Christian workers became concerned about the possibility of losing their institutions.

In January the CCEA sent E.W. Wallace, a Christian educator, to meet with the Central Educational Commission of the Nationalist government. His task was to obtain a clear statement of the policy of the KMT towards Christian education. Representatives of the commission told Wallace that the KMT was only opposed to Christianity's connection to imperialism. When the Chinese eliminated imperialism, then the anti-Christian campaign would stop.[42]

The United States Department of State also tried to bolster the position of the missionaries. It maintained that mission schools were exempt from the authority of the KMT under the provisions of extraterritoriality. In November 1929, it reversed this position admitting it was within the rights of the Chinese government to require registration.[43]

The CCEA again approached the Central Education Commission in July 1927. It asked the ministry to define the term, "regain educational rights." At that time, the missionaries were especially concerned about KMT confiscation of school property. The commission denied that it was the intention of the Chinese government to arbitrarily take property. It maintained that the actions of individuals were responsible for the problems and issued a warning to those occupying mission property.[44]

Despite these efforts, there was much confusion in the ranks of the missionaries on government registration. Five Christian colleges closed for the fall semester in 1927. One-half of the middle schools in eastern China and all in central China closed that year.[65] Of seven theological seminaries, only three remained open.[66] As late as June 1929, only two colleges had registered, but the majority had made application. A majority of Christian middle schools had also applied.[67]

There were other important aspects of registration in addition to anti-Christianity and anti-foreignism. At the 1926 meeting of the CCEA, Christian educators admitted their graduates incurred disadvantages because their schools had not registered. Chinese from unregistered middle schools were not eligible for entrance to government colleges. They also could not apply for government scholarships for study abroad. Graduates of unregistered middle schools were "liable to political disfranchisement" because diplomas from those schools did not receive the government's stamp. The possession of a stamped middle school diploma was "the most general qualification for the franchise."[68]

Issues other than registration confronted the Christian educators during this period. Missionaries began to consider the problem of rural education, an area they had long neglected. One missionary believed his predecessors thought the country was not the place to send the best

educated Christian men and women. This was "something radically wrong in the policy and program of organized Christianity in China."[69] In 1924 there were only "thirty odd agricultural missionaries in China."[70]

Missionaries were extremely sensitive to the attempts of the Chinese to eliminate mandatory religious education from their schools. Religious education was a vital part of the mission school curriculum. The Burton commission defined the goal of religious education as giving "such instruction and training as shall inform the mind in respect to morals and religion, secure conversion, and develop character." The commission criticized the effectiveness of religious education in China and called for improvements in the "principles and methods" of instruction. The report also recommended the creation of an actual "Christian educational system" through greater cooperation.[71]

One reason for these criticisms was the failing ability of the mission schools to produce Chinese Christians. Particularly troubling was the low number of Chinese students willing to enter the ministry. In 1913, 87 percent of the graduates from the fourteen Christian colleges were Christians; 65 percent entered church service and 20 percent became ministers.[72]

By 1920 the number of Chinese interested in becoming ministers had dropped substantially. At that time, there were thirteen seminaries representing twenty-six missionary

societies. There were only ninety-six students studying at the college level in these institutions. The seminaries were producing an average of thirty-two Chinese ministers a year. This was less than 2 percent of total Chinese students in mission colleges.[73]

Anti-Christianity in the 1920s further eroded the ability of the missionaries to produce proteges. At Yanjing University, a leading American Christian institution, the Christians in the student body dropped from 88 percent to 63 percent between 1924 and 1926. By 1935 only 31 percent of the students were Christians. In the years 1917 to 1922, one-sixth of the university's graduates were from the school of religion. This dropped to one-twelfth in the years 1927 to 1931.[74]

Many Chinese Christians supported radical changes in Christian education; this added to the dilemma of the missionaries. Chinese Christians favored the registration of mission schools, regulations against compulsory religious education and ceremonies, and more involvement for themselves in administration.[75] They were especially critical of seminary education in China. Chinese Christians believed seminary graduates received poor training which emphasized the wrong subjects. Djang Fang, a Chinese Christian, argued "theological training cannot satisfy the needs of the people, whether urban or rural."[76]

The campaign against mission schools struck at the very.heart of the missionary enterprise. Missionaries

hoped to use education as an effective tool to transform China into a modern "Christian" nation. Many believed this goal was in jeopardy after Chinese nationalism attacked the institution of Christian education.[77]

Indigenous Christianity

Chinese Christians replaced foreigners as administrators of mission schools and church leaders during the missionary evacuation of 1927. The missionaries were unsure what their position would be when and if they returned to China. The evacuation accomplished what the missionaries had for years claimed as their goal. "Indigenous Christianity" was the term the missionaries used to describe the state of Protestantism they desired to create in China. For decades they had placed the accomplishment of this goal somewhere in a vaguely defined "future." Many were astounded when they realized "as the result of the evacuation of missionaries it actually took only about three weeks."[78]

Missionaries filled their correspondence, journals, and books with stories, articles, and polemics on indigenous Christianity. As early as 1861 the American Board espoused the policy that "it seems undesirable that missionaries should wholly occupy a heathen country." The churches in the mission field should develop their own self-reliance and enterprise.[79] When the Laymen's Inquiry conducted its investigation of missions in China in 1931,

it found that little "indigenization" had occurred.[80]

Indigenous Christianity meant churches in China would be self-supporting, self-propagating, and self-governing. Indigenous Christianity would ideally conform "as far as possible in doctrine, forms of worship, and organization, to Chinese rather than to Occidental traditions."[81] The Chinese delegation to the meeting of the International Missionary Council at Jerusalem in 1928 defined what the term meant to Chinese Christians. Indigenous Christianity would be "adapted to meet the religious needs of the Chinese people, most congenial to Chinese life and culture, and most effective in arousing in Chinese Christians a sense of responsibility."[82]

The goal of "indigenization" had important consequences for both missionaries and their converts. In indigenous churches, Chinese would assume the traditional role of most missionaries. The China delegation at Jerusalem stated: "In all the problems of the Church's faith and order, its government, finance and propagation, Chinese initiative should have entirely free course."[83]

This issue concerned much of the vested interests of the missionary enterprise that developed during the Christian century. Under the auspices of indigenous Christianity, Chinese would replace missionaries as the leaders of the churches. Financial support would be generated in China instead of in the West. Mission property worth millions of dollars would transfer to Chinese ownership.

And, ideally, a form of Protestantism recognized as "Chinese" would lead China into the modern world as a "Christian" nation.

Foreign Protestants in China traditionally said the development of replacements for themselves, or devolution, was essential to their mission. Between 1858 and 1900 no progress in this area occurred. Latourette apologizes for this failure by asserting that "the creation of a body of well-prepared, able men and women was, however, no easy task and not one to be accomplished in a few decades."[84] After the turn of the century, missionaries became more concerned about the lack of capable Chinese Christian leaders. Beginning with a national conference of Protestants in 1913, all large gatherings of missionaries addressed this issue.[85]

The small numbers of Chinese who became ministers justified this concern. In 1915 there were only 764 ordained Chinese in the churches. This number increased 70 percent to 1,305 in 1920, and Chinese then outnumbered ordained foreigners (1,268).[86] Yet the survey, Christian Occupation of China, conducted in 1921 found that foreigners still controlled two-thirds of the ecclesiastical leadership.[87] Milton Stauffer, editor of the survey, lamented that "it must, nevertheless, be admitted that the influence of the missionary is still strong, and in many cases dominate, notwithstanding that he is in the minority."[88] Stauffer repeated the traditional rhetoric that

devolution was the goal of the missionaries. To accomplish this, Chinese Christian leaders "must be trained, have increased self-determination and so guide more and more the policies of the Christian Church."[89] The "Survey Volume" set the agenda for the 1920s debate over Chinese leadership of the churches.

For Chinese Christians the issue of control was primary. In 1927 David Z.T. Yui assessed the missionaries' efforts and praised their beneficial organizations and institutions. He pointed out, however, that "the chief objection to them is the foreign control under which they have been operating."[90] The Laymen's Inquiry also found that in the problem of indigenous Christianity "the Chinese tend to regard control as crucial and all else as incidental."[91]

Between 1918 and 1927 Chinese Christians repeatedly suggested ways in which church leadership should devolve in the China missions. They maintained Chinese were ready, willing, and able to support the Christian work in their country.[92] When missionaries stated there was a lack of capable leaders, the Chinese replied this was partially caused by the foreigners. Some Chinese leaders left the churches because they found it difficult to work with the missionaries.[93] Missionaries desired passive "helpers" and the "mission system has not been successful in producing and retaining men of independent initiative and leadership."[94]

Financial independence was closely associated with the issue of Chinese control of the churches. For many missionaries, indigenous Christianity by definition included complete financial support by Chinese Christians. Some advocated that administrative autonomy be predicated upon financial independence.[95] Those who took this position emphasized past experiences that included the corrupt practices of some Chinese Christians and their poor record in giving.[96]

Western churches were very generous in financially supporting the missionary enterprise in China. After the adoption of the goals of the social gospel in the twentieth century, missionaries spent vast sums on schools and other institutions. These facilities were beyond the capability of Chinese Christians to pay for or maintain.[97] Some Chinese proposed that support from the West continue and they be given control of the funds.[98]

Another problem involving money was the transfer of mission property to Chinese ownership. C.Y. Cheng saw the "material equipment" of the missions as "a serious problem to the Chinese Church. It is neither easy to give up nor to keep up."[99] Other Chinese Christians maintained the property actually belonged to the "Christian movement in China." Its administration should be by boards of trustees with foreign and Chinese members.[100]

This issue was particularly troubling for foreign Christian workers. Some asserted that the Chinese did not

have the resources to maintain property and habitually neglected their own. Others worried about the ability of Chinese Christians to protect the churches from corrupt government practices such as illegal taxation. The most acceptable solution included gradual transfer using joint boards of trustees. These would guarantee the maintenance of the property and insure that it continued to function for the original purposes.[101]

The question of "Chinese" Protestantism was more difficult to define than leadership, financial support, or property transfer. Other than Chinese dominance in these areas, many missionaries were unsure what indigenous Christianity should entail. Some argued that Christianity would be indigenous when the Chinese "have absorbed the principles of Christianity, and interpreted them into Oriental terms of philosophy, organization and living."[102] Others believed building churches that conformed to Chinese architectural style was a step towards "indigenization." They questioned the wisdom of erecting "Mid-Victorian-Gothic" chapels in the midst of Chinese cities.[103]

Some foreign Christian workers believed inner values, not outward forms, were important indicators of progress in the adaptation of their religion. They observed the tendency of the Chinese "towards almost Quaker simplicity." This disaffection for "the Anglo-desire for control, [and] Western worship of efficiency and organization" caused them to question the need to transfer Western institutions and

ecclesiastical structures to China.[104]

Rawlinson maintained that the primary question for missionaries was "whether or not the movement for an indigenous church endangers Christian values." In fact, there was no agreement on what these values were. Yet "some express doubt as to whether or not the Chinese church is ethically or spiritually strong enough to guard these Christian values."[105] Some missionaries feared an indigenous church in China would be a syncretic cult. Rawlinson pointed out that Christianity was already "the product of syncretic readjustment."[106]

Chinese nationalism in the 1920s did not create the issues of indigenous Christianity but it did magnify their importance. The Laymen's Inquiry reported "the nationalistic movement had repercussions in the mind of the native church especially in regard to the matter of responsibility and control."[107] In 1919 Rawlinson observed a new "candidness" on the part of Chinese Christian leaders. He believed this indicated "an increasing determination to take a fuller part in the control of things affecting Chinese."[108] As the missionaries addressed these issues during this critical decade, the plight of indigenous Christianity in China became apparent.

Indigenous Christianity incorporated all of the problems of the missionary enterprise in China. Because indigenous meant independent, this was a threat to the vested interests of the missionaries. Chinese control of

foreigners, tariffs, churches, schools, and theology *in China* were issues of Chinese national sovereignty. The American men and women who confronted these issues believed their solution would determine the salvation of a quarter of the world's population.

CHAPTER III ENDNOTES

1. See the translation of an anti-Christian article in dispatch, Douglas Jenkins, Consul-General, Guangzhou, to J.V.A. MacMurray, Minister, Beijing, 23 December 1925, USDS, "Records," reel 123, 893.404/57.

2. C.Y. Cheng, a Chinese Christian, believed "it is perfectly clear that only harm will accrue from these treaties henceforth until they are changed." Cheng maintained Chinese Christians were not proud of the protection of the toleration clauses. See "Problems of the Chinese Church," in China Her Own Interpreter: Chapters by a Group of Nationals Interpreting the Christian Movement, Milton T. Stauffer, ed. (New York: Missionary Education Movement of the United States and Canada, 1927), p. 101.

3. H.T. Hodgkin, "The Church in China at the Crossroads," International Review of Missions 14 (October 1925): 548-549.

4. Edward Sovik, "China Oral History Project," p. 4.

5. See chapter I, pp. 4-5, above.

6. "Treaty Between the United States and China, 3 July 1844, Wangxia" in Clyde, United States Policy, p. 17; Dennett, Americans in Eastern Asia, pp. 559-560.

7. "Treaty Between the United States and China, 3 July 1844, Wangxia," Articles XXI, XXIV, and XXV in Clyde, United States Policy, pp. 13-21.

8. The word "extraterritoriality" is in Article XV, "United States and China, Treaty for the Extension of the Commercial Relations Between Them, 8 October 1903, Shanghai," ibid., p. 228. For a complete discussion of extraterritoriality see Westel W. Willoughby, Foreign Rights and Interests in China, 2 vols. (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press,

1927), vol. 2, chapter 22, "Extraterritoriality in China," pp. 545-601.

9. Charles Denby, Minister, Beijing, to Secretary of State Bayard, Washington, D.C., 9 October 1886, in Clyde, United States Policy, pp. 195-196.

10. Wesley R. Fishel, The End of Extraterritoriality in China (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1952), p. 216; Willoughby, Foreign Rights, pp. 600-601.

11. Warnshuis, "Treaties and Missions," p. 22; Dennett, Americans in Eastern Asia, p. 560.

12. Ibid., p. 561.

13. "Treaty of the United States and China, 18 June 1858, Tianjin," in Clyde, United States Policy, pp. 47-57. Articles XI, XXVII, and XXVIII granted extraterritoriality to American citizens, Article XXIX granted toleration of Christianity, and Article XXX provided for most-favored-nation status.

14. Dennett, Americans in Eastern Asia, pp. 572-573. The British Treaty of Tianjin allowed travel in the interior for British citizens holding special passports issued by their consuls. See Article IX, "Treaty of Peace, Friendship, and Commerce between Great Britain and China, 26 June 1858, Tianjin," in Lewis Hertslet, Treaties and Conventions, and Reciprocal Regulations at Present Subsisting Between Great Britain and Foreign Powers (London: Butterworths, 1864), p. 88. Also see chapter I, pp. 6-7 above.

15. Charles Denby, Minister, Beijing, to Secretary of State Bayard, Washington, D.C., 9 October 1886, in Clyde, United States Policy, pp. 194-195. In later correspondence with the State Department, Denby wrote that American missionaries claimed the provisions of both the British and French Treaties of Tianjin "by virtue of the favored nation clause" allowed them to buy land and settle anywhere in China. Denby pointed out that "the Department has approved on divers occasions of the statement that the treaties confer no legal right on Americans to secure property in the interior." He asked that Secretary of State Bayard give this specific issue consideration and that the Department formulate a policy statement. Bayard answered Denby: "The views expressed by you in relation to this subject meet with

the approval of the Department." Bayard continued: "It can not be contended that the treaties grant to citizens of the United States an unlimited right to buy or lease land in the interior of China" [emphasis mine]. Despite this, Bayard recognized that American missionaries had moved into the interior and acquired property. He instructed Denby to uphold the rights of American missionaries in cases where this had occurred with the acquiescence of local Chinese officials. See Charles Denby, Minister, Beijing, to Secretary of State Bayard, Washington, D.C., 20 December 1887, USDS, Foreign Relations, 1888, vol. I, pp. 238-239; T.F. Bayard, Secretary of State, Washington, D.C., to Charles Denby, Beijing, 7 March 1889, ibid., p. 266. In addition see Borg, American Policy, p. 70; Latourette, HCMC, pp. 525-526.

16. Frederick F. Low, Minister, Beijing, to Secretary of Stated Fish, Washington, D.C., 5 December 1870, in Clyde, United States Policy, p. 111.

17. Frederick F. Low, Minister, Beijing, to Secretary of State Fish, Washington, D.C., 23 October 1872, USDS, Foreign Relations, 1873, vol. I, p. 119.

18. Hamilton Fish, Secretary of State, Washington, D.C., to Frederick F. Low, Minister, Beijing, 31 December 1872, ibid., p. 137.

19. "The United States and China, Treaty on Commercial Intercourse and Judicial Procedure, 17 November 1880, Beijing," in Clyde, United States Policy, pp. 154-156. See Article XIV on extraterritoriality.

20. Warnshuis, "Treaties and Missions," p. 24.

21. "United States and China, Treaty for the Extension of the Commercial Relations Between Them, 8 October 1903, Shanghai," in Clyde, United States Policy, p. 228.

22. Ibid., p. 228. In addition see Borg, American Policy, p. 70; Latourette, HCMC, pp. 525-526.

23. Dennett, Americans in Eastern Asia, p. 563. Besides Parker, several American missionaries served the diplomatic corps in China in some capacity: E.J. Bridgman, Samuel Wells Williams, W.A.P. Martin, and John Leighton

Stuart. Stuart was American Ambassador to the Republic of China from 1946 to 1949.

24. Latourette, HCMC, pp. 472-473.

25. Anson Burlingame was United States Commissioner to China from 1861 to 1867. He represented a view of "conciliation and moderation within the Western diplomatic community." After his retirement in 1867, the Qing government appointed Burlingame to represent China in an attempt to renegotiate treaties with the United States, Great Britain, and France. American missionaries denounced Burlingame as a traitor. See Miller, "Ends and Means," pp. 265-266.

26. Charles Denby, Minister, Beijing, to Secretary of State Bayard, Washington, D.C., 9 October 1886, in Clyde, United States Policy, p. 197.

27. Shirley Stone Garrett, "Why They Stayed: American Church Politics and Chinese Nationalism in the Twenties," in Fairbank, Missionary Enterprise, p. 301.

28. A.S. Carrolton, Consul, Xiamen, to Secretary of State, Washington, D.C., 19 April 1922, USDS, "Records," reel 123, 893.404/15; Gordon L. Burke, Vice-Consul-in-Charge, Nanjing, to J.V.A. MacMurray, Minister, Beijing, 26 January 1926, ibid., 893.404/62.

29. Quale, "Mission Compound," pp. 36-37.

30. Latourette, HCMC, pp. 422-423; Fishel, End of Extraterritoriality, pp. 217-218. As Fishel points out, Chinese Christians were not the only ones who participated in this type of abuse. Many Chinese citizens illegally obtained foreign citizenship or ran businesses in China under foreign charters to escape Chinese laws and taxes.

31. Warnshuis, "Treaties and Missions," p. 34.

32. Quale, "Mission Compound," pp. 59-60.

33. Ibid., p. 174; Latourette, HCMC, p. 366; Frida Nilsen, "China Oral History Project," pp. 43-45. Nilsen served as a missionary educator in China for the Norwegian

Lutheran Church of America from 1918 to 1925.

34. The Extraterritorial System in China: Final Phase (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1970), pp. 3-4.

35. MacNair, Modern Chinese History, pp. 848-910. For the text of the treaty see "The Nine-Power Treaty on Principles and Policies Concerning China, 6 February 1922, Washington, D.C.," in Clyde, United States Policy, pp. 281-283. The Nine Powers signing the treaty were the United States, Belgium, the British Empire, China, France, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, and Portugal.

36. On the problems of the Special Commission on Extraterritoriality see ibid., pp. 284-291. On the work of the Special Commission on the Chinese Customs Tariff see Borg, American Policy, pp. 95-121, and for a full account of the Special Commission on Extraterritoriality see ibid., pp. 154-182. France delayed ratification of the Nine-Power Treaty until 1925 at which time China called for the convening of the Special Commissions. The Tariff Commission met in 1925 and the Commission on Extraterritoriality convened in 1926. Because China had no actual central government but was divided between warlords, the efforts of both of these commissions were not successful. Borg is very complimentary of Secretary of State Kellogg's attitude towards China during this period. See his "Statement Concerning United States Policy in China, 27 September, 1927, Washington, D.C.," in Clyde, United States Policy, pp. 288-291.

37. Borg, American Policy, pp. 9-11.

38. China Christian Year Book, 1929, pp. 31-33.

39. Ibid., p. 17; Fishel, End of Extraterritoriality, pp. 1-2.

40. Quale, "Mission Compound," pp. 163-164.

41. End of Extraterritoriality, pp. 1-2, 221, 233. The United States relinquished extraterritoriality in its treaty with the Republic of China, 11 January 1943. Russia gave up this right in a general agreement signed on 31 May 1924.

42. This is the subject of chapter IV.

43. Occupation of China, pp. 403-404. Also see chapter I, pp. 10-11, above. Figures cited here and following apply to the total Protestant educational effort unless otherwise indicated.

44. Ibid., p. 37. The Chinese educational system included the divisions of lower primary, higher primary, lower middle school, higher middle school, and post-middle school education.

45. Educational Review 15 (July 1923): 312; Laymen's Foreign Missions Inquiry, Supplementary Series, Part One, Volume II, China, Orville A. Petty, ed. (New York: Harper and Brothers Publishers, 1933), p. 133.

46. Jessie Gregory Lutz, China and the Christian Colleges, 1850-1950 (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1971), p. 500.

47. For the proceedings of this conference see Records of the General Conference, 1890.

48. F.L. Hawks Pott, "A brief Sketch of the History of the China Christian Educational Association," Educational Review 16 (July 1924): 300-303.

49. Ibid., 14 (April 1922): 117-118; Yip, "Anti-Christian Movement," p. 91.

50. Christian Education in China (New York: Committee of Reference and Council of the Foreign Mission Conference of North America, 1922), "Summary of General Principles," reprinted in Educational Review (April 1922): 120-136.

51. T.Z. Koo, "The Future of Christianity in China," in China Her Own Interpreter, p. 144.

52. T'ang Leang-li, China in Revolt: How a Civilization Became a Nation (London: Noel Douglas, 1927), p. 67.

53. "Editorial Notes," Educational Review 17 (January 1925): 1-6; Maud Russell, "China Oral History Project," p. 66; Tsai Yuan-pei, "The Development of Chinese Education," Asiatic Review 20 (July 1924): p. 507.

54. "The United States and China, Treaty of Trade, Consuls, and Emigration, 4 July 1868, Washington, D.C.," in Clyde, United States Policy, pp. 83-86; Article VII, p. 85.

55. Latourette, HCMC, p. 758.

56. Proclamations translated and reprinted in Educational Review 17 (October 1925): 405-407.

57. Ibid., pp. 404-405.

58. China Mission Year Book, 1924, p. 274.

59. Educational Review 17 (January 1925): 81-82; Laymen's Inquiry, Supplementary Series, Part Two, Vol. V, p. 364.

60. Educational Review 18 (January 1926): 99; Yip, "Anti-Christian Movement," pp. 222-223.

61. "Editorial Notes," Educational Review 19 (January 1927): 5-7; Yip, "Anti-Christian Movement," p. 247.

62. [Editor], "Christian Schools Under the Nationalist Government," Educational Review (April 1927): 150-159.

63. Vincent, Extraterritorial System in China, pp. 26-29.

64. H.C. Tsao, "The Nationalist Government and Education," Educational Review 19 (October 1927): 408-409.

65. [Editor], "The Present Situation: The Revolution and Christian Colleges," Chinese Recorder 58 (July 1927): 453-457; "Editorial Notes," Educational Review 19 (October 1927): 311.

66. China Christian Year Book, 1928, pp. 217-218.

67. Ibid., 1929, p. 272; Roland Cross, "China Oral History Project," p. 33.

68. Educational Review 18 (April 1926): 226.

69. G.W. Groff, "The Rural Church," Chinese Recorder 55 (December 1924): 777.

70. China Mission Year Book, 1925, p. 91.

71. "Editorial Notes," Educational Review 14 (April 1922): 128.

72. Latourette, HCMC, p. 635.

73. Occupation of China, p. 418.

74. Philip West, Yenching University and Sino-Western Relations, 1916-1952 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1976), pp. 233-234.

75. Koo, "Future of Christianity," p. 144.

76. "Theological Training in 1927," China Christian Year Book, 1928, p. 220.

77. For details of the missionaries' responses to the "recovery of educational rights" movement see chapter IV, pp. 128-140, below.

78. "Editorial," Chinese Recorder 58 (December 1927): 747. Frank Rawlinson advised returning missionaries to give "due regard to maintaining the delicate balance of this new and long-desired relationship of Chinese leadership and missionary cooperators." See "Editorial," ibid. (November 1927): 684. One missionary believed the uncertainty about the future did not come from the evacuation but "from the demand that the work immediately be made a distinctive Chinese enterprise." See the letter, Charles E. Patton,

n.p., to Editor, Shanghai, n.d., ibid. (April 1927): 287.

79. ABCFM, Annual Report 1861, p. 11.

80. Supplementary Series, Part Two, Vol. V, pp. 51-52.

81. Yip, "Anti-Christian Movement," p. 2. Also see Latourette, HCMC, p. 423.

82. Laymen's Inquiry, Supplementary Series, Part Two, Vol. V, pp. 32-33.

83. Ibid.

84. HCMC, pp. 425-426.

85. Ibid., pp. 673-674; "Editorial," Chinese Recorder 57 (January 1926): 1.

86. Latourette, HCMC, p. 801.

87. pp. 35-36.

88. Ibid., p. 380.

89. Ibid., p. 39.

90. "Cooperation from the West," in China Her Own Interpreter, p. 118.

91. Supplementary Series, Part Two, Vol. V, p. 86. For a description of how the missions in China were under the control of church boards in the United States see Garrett, "Why They Stayed," pp. 284-285.

92. For examples see Hsu Sheng Yen, "How to Extend the Chinese Christian Church," Chinese Recorder 49 (October 1918): 635-645; C.Y. Cheng, "The Chinese Church of Today," ibid. (November 1918): 709-715.

93. T.T. Lew, "The Training of the Future Leaders of the Chinese Church," ibid. 52 (March 1921): 161.

94. Koo, "Future of Christianity," p. 153.

95. "Editorial: The Indigenous Church," Chinese Recorder 55 (January 1924): 6-7; "Editorial," ibid. 56 (December 1925): 772.

96. Latourette, Expansion of Christianity, p. 350; Laymen's Inquiry, Supplementary Series, Part One, Vol. II, p. 87.

97. Koo, "Future of Christianity," p. 153; Paul G. Hayes, "China Oral History Project," pp. 13-14.

98. Yui, "Cooperation from the West," pp. 140-141.

99. "Problems of the Chinese Church," p. 108.

100. Yui, "Cooperation from the West," pp. 136-138.

101. E.W. Burt, "Equal Co-operation: The Present Goal," Chinese Recorder 57 (September 1926): 662; E.F. Willis, Xiaoshi, to Editor, Shanghai, n.d., ibid. (November 1926): 829-830; J. Taylor, Chengdu, to Editor, Shanghai, 22 November 1926, ibid. 58 (January 1927): 67; [Editor], "The Chinese Methodist Mind," ibid. 59 (February 1928): 124-125.

102. Jane Shaw Ward, "One Definition of Indigenous," ibid. 55 (September 1924): 574.

103. M.H. Throop, "An Indigenous Church," ibid. (January 1924): 57-58.

104. John Stuart Burgess, "Is the Church Really Becoming Indigenous?" ibid.: 39.

105. "Editorial: The Missionary Mind," ibid. 57 (August 1926): 535-536.

106. Frank Rawlinson, Naturalization of Christianity in China (Shanghai: Presbyterian Mission Press, 1927), pp. 175-176.

107. Supplementary Series, Part Two, Vol. V, p. 66.

108. "Editorial: The Chinese Viewpoint," Chinese Recorder 50 (September 1919): 582.

CHAPTER IV

MISSIONARIES AND CHINESE NATIONALISM: THE RESPONSES

The issues of Chinese nationalism that directly affected the missionaries in the 1920s were critical to the development of Christianity in China. In addressing the problems of treaty revision, educational autonomy, and devolution of church administration, the missionaries determined the future of Christianity in China. Christian theology, Western culture, and international politics influenced the decisions the missionaries made on these problems. Despite the limiting circumstances the missionaries dealt with, alternative solutions were available. The ways in which the missionaries chose to respond had consequences for themselves and their followers. Their responses to these issues reveal the missionaries' failure to successfully meet the challenge of Chinese nationalism.

Missionaries, as individuals, responded to the problems of Chinese nationalism in different ways. Yet, as members of religious organizations, they were not free to pursue independent solutions. Each denominational agency with workers in China made policy decisions on how to respond to the new conditions in the field. The adminis-

trators on the church boards that controlled the missions based their policies on information received from the missionaries. Through this process, the responses of the majority of the missionaries prevailed over any divergent minority opinions. During the critical decade of the 1920s, a conservative consensus emerged that resisted radical change and favored maintaining the missionary enterprise intact.

Chinese Christians reacted differently than their missionary leaders to the events of this period. On some issues, they contributed to the criticisms and demands for change the missionaries confronted. Chinese Christians considered how nationalism related to their "foreign" religion and how to respond to the various charges of the anti-Christians. Many decided that patriotism did not conflict with their religious beliefs. They became vocal supporters of change in Chinese Christianity as well as in other Chinese institutions. The responses of Chinese Christians to the issues of nationalism generally conflicted with those of foreign Christian workers.

May Fourth Nationalism

Christian involvement in politics affected many other issues of this period. The May Fourth Movement signified the increasing importance of politics in the 1920s. After the failure of the Chinese delegation at the Paris Peace Conference in 1919, Chinese Christians, like other Chinese,

became more conscious of international politics. Some Chinese Christians criticized missionaries for their failure to condemn Japanese aggression in China.[1] In a letter to the editor of the Chinese Recorder, Liu Pu-chi advocated participation of Christians in May Ninth memorial ceremonies. He believed "the Church has the duty of teaching personal and social justice, as well as international justice."[2]

In the early 1920s, many missionaries believed that Christians should not become involved in politics.[3] Although John Leighton Stuart disagreed with this view, he admitted he had to censor what he wrote in the China Mission Year Book. He thought the time was right for the missionary body to "reexamine its convictions as to the national and international bearings of its message."[4]

The YMCA's "Good Citizenship Week" was an example of the missionaries' ambivalent attitudes toward politics. This event in Guangzhou in 1924 was an attempt to redirect Chinese hostility on the anniversary of May Fourth and May Ninth. In reporting this, the editor of the Chinese Recorder reassured his readers that "care was taken that the movement should not meddle in party politics." Christians could participate "without getting anywhere near those vexing [political] questions which so quickly chill our spirits."[5]

There were exceptions among the missionaries on the issue of political involvement. Roland Cross translated

the speeches of President Wilson during World War I and distributed them to Chinese in Beijing. He believed in protesting any United States actions that conflicted with the best interests of the Chinese. The American Board warned Cross for participating in this activity telling him: "Don't identify democracy with Christianity."[6]

The concerns of the missionaries on political questions increased as the significance of the May Fourth Movement became apparent. Before the student demonstrations on 4 May 1919, missionaries called attention to the "nationalistic spirit" in China. Many missionaries began to emphasize the idea that Christianity could guide the forces of nationalism in the right direction.[7] The editors of the China Mission Year Book, 1919 believed the student movement had made it a memorable year. The new nationalism "if wisely directed may well usher in a new day in China."[8]

Between 1919 and 1925, missionaries saw a new opportunity as a result of May Fourth nationalism. China had rejected Christianity for a hundred years but now Chinese were "willing listeners and the Christian forces are mobilizing to take advantage of the great opportunity."[9] One Christian educator wanted to teach her students a flag salute, even if it was a "good translation of the American one."[10]

Frank Rawlinson, editor of the Chinese Recorder, advised missionaries on how to become involved in the May Fourth Movement. Churches should not participate but

Christians as individuals could address "the moral ideas of national righteousness." Missionaries must not engage in partisan politics and should discourage strikes and any type of violence. A missionary could "give the benefit of his judgment on the moral aspects of such movements." As leaders of the Christian community, missionaries should assist in the discussion of "national questions of moral significance among Christians."[11]

Some missionaries believed Christianity caused the May Fourth Movement. P.F. Price maintained that "the Christian movement has been the largest cause of the present intellectual awakening." Use of the vernacular language, modern educational methods, scientific inquiry, and freedom of speech and thought were the characteristics of the New Thought (May Fourth) Movement. Missionaries had traditionally stressed these aspects in their work.[12] Herman Bly agreed that missionaries helped to introduce science and technology into China and these were important parts of this movement. Other missionaries asserted that Christianity was responsible for the nationalism of young Chinese.[13]

Chinese Christians also viewed the activity of China's young intellectuals during this period as an opportunity for Christianity. They supported many of the goals of the May Fourth Movement including use of the vernacular, popular education, and increasing nationalism. Chinese Christians did not approve of the anti-Christian and anti-

religion trends in the movement. They hoped young Chinese would give Christianity a "chance to prove its worth." Chinese Christians admired the critical spirit of May Fourth and believed they could learn from this. Y.T. Wu advised fellow Christians to maintain an open mind towards new ideas and engage in introspective meditation. Adopting some of the new criticism, Wu wrote: "Half of the mistakes that missions and Churches have made may be said to be due to the lack of Chinese leadership."[14]

Wu's remark was an omen of future conflict. The majority of missionaries endorsed the May Fourth Movement only tentatively. In 1922 Rawlinson realized that the success of the new nationalism would mean changes in China missions. Eventually, Chinese churches would control Christian work in China. In this altered situation, missionaries would have to stop "expressing our Christianity in our nationalistic terms" and "respond to a call for service in terms of the national life of those who call."[15]

Although this was the expressed goal of the missionaries, Rawlinson was apprehensive about some aspects of the "new Christian movement." He wrote in 1923: Christianity in China "threatens to become hyper-nationalistic and is in danger of minimizing the international significance of Christian brotherhood."[16] Despite this doubt, Rawlinson remained a strong supporter of many of the intellectual trends of May Fourth. On the eve of renewed anti-Christian campaigns in 1924, he advised missionaries to "welcome the

taking up by strong [Chinese] Christians of national responsibility."[17]

The May Thirtieth Incident

Missionaries had varying opinions about the seriousness of the anti-Christian movement in late 1924 and early 1925. At that time, A.J. Bowen sent questionnaires to twenty-one missionary friends in order to survey the prevailing conditions. He reported that "the replies indicate the disturbed conditions have hindered in varying degrees the work of the missions."[18] In January 1925 the American Consul-General at Shanghai questioned both missionaries and businessmen about rumors of increasing anti-foreignism. Their answers indicated there had been no radical change in the attitudes of Chinese but there was some agitation in the Christian schools.[19]

Many missionaries were not overly concerned about anti-foreignism, anti-Christianity, and increasing nationalism before 30 May 1925. They remained optimistic about guiding the new "nationalistic spirit" in a Christian direction that would benefit both themselves and their followers. The tragedy at Shanghai and its aftermath quickly captured the missionaries' attention and altered the position of Christianity in China forever.

Christian leaders in Shanghai cabled John Mott in New York on 19 June 1925 advising him of the situation. These men emphasized the magnitude of Chinese anger over the

Shanghai shootings. The missionaries argued an American show of force would be disastrous and advised Mott to do all he could to prevent this. They agreed with the Chinese demands for an impartial investigation by an international board that included Chinese representatives. Mott subsequently forwarded their cable to President Coolidge.[80]

In July the Chinese Recorder reprinted several letters from groups of missionaries to Chinese Christians. The Missionary Associations in Shanghai, Tianjin, Shenyang (Mukden), Changsha, and the Shanghai YWCA expressed regret over the incident. All the foreign Christian workers supported an impartial investigation that would include both Chinese and foreign judges.[81]

The Shanghai association was concerned about transmitting accurate information to the home mission boards and welcomed all unbiased accounts of the tragedy. The Changsha missionaries believed "long-standing and deep-seated racial misunderstandings" were ultimately responsible for the shootings. The missionaries in Shenyang predicted the event would end extraterritoriality and advised all foreigners to prepare to surrender their privileges.[82]

The efforts of Chinese Christians to affect politics in China increased after the May Thirtieth Incident. Two days after the shootings, a mass meeting of Chinese Christians in Shanghai adopted "vigorous demands for redressing China's wrongs." The Christians published these in the

local press and sent copies to provincial and national government offices.[23]

Chinese Christians began to organize "Christian Unions" in Shanghai and other large cities. These cooperated with the general public in the various anti-imperialist and anti-capitalist movements. The unions issued manifestos, raised money for strike funds, and organized study sessions on the problems of Sino-foreign relations. They also distributed tracts and pamphlets in attempts to disseminate "correct" information on current events. The Christian Unions supported revision of the "unequal" treaties. Some members believed "that not a few missionaries by their reliance on military protection are compromising the position of the Chinese Church."[24]

When the May Thirtieth Incident remained unresolved, missionaries became more vocal in their support of the Chinese. Missionaries of the Methodist Episcopal Church, including Bishop L.J. Birney, sent a letter to the United States Secretary of State approving the calling of conferences on tariffs and extraterritoriality. The Methodists expressed confidence in the ability of the Chinese to solve the present problems. They pledged to support Chinese efforts "in so far as they do not lead us into interference with China's political affairs."[25]

One missionary showed his support by participating in a Chinese demonstration against foreigners. Clemens Granskou and his family were the only foreigners living in

Guangshan in the summer of 1925. When the Chinese asked him to march in their parade denouncing the Shanghai incident, he agreed. Granskou believed this indicated the Chinese held no personal animosity against him as an American. They were protesting the policies of Western nations that had existed since the Opium War. Because he also opposed these policies, Granskou did not consider his participation a betrayal of his citizenship. He hoped missionaries would try to understand the feelings of the Chinese and that "somehow the Chinese would appreciate that we were their friends rather than their enemies."[26]

By the end of 1925, many missionaries realized the May Thirtieth Incident was a critical juncture in the long struggle to create a Christian China. Under the title "What Do the Chinese Want?" Frank Rawlinson condensed all demands to one word: "autonomy." He believed the Chinese wanted autonomy in every aspect of their lives. To accomplish this would require changes in the international treaties. Educational autonomy and "administrative autonomy in church life" meant alterations in the missionary enterprise in China. Rawlinson thought "this urge for autonomy and liberty is the logical result of the Christian emphasis on the equality of value of individuals and races."[27]

Revision of the "Unequal" Treaties

Because the United States agreed in 1903 to consider

treaty renegotiation when China attained the proper internal conditions, missionaries occasionally discussed treaty revision. A few missionaries supported treaty revision before the May Thirtieth Incident. They debated how treaty revision would affect their work. As anti-foreignism and anti-Christianity increased in 1924 and 1925, foreign Christian workers gave more attention to this politically volatile question.[28]

In March 1925, American Board missionaries of the North China Mission began an effort to encourage the United States to revise the treaties. Out of a total of 134 missionaries in this association, 109 signed a statement addressed to their home board in Boston. They asked that the mission administrators do all in their power to persuade the State Department to pursue renegotiations. The American Board workers also asked the National Christian Council, a coordinating body for Chinese churches, to approach Western diplomats on the issue.[29]

The majority of missionaries in China joined the movement for treaty revision after the May Thirtieth Incident. From the middle of 1925 until the end of 1926, associations and groups of missionaries drafted proposals advocating new international agreements be made between China and foreign nations. Justifications for this reversal of the traditional missionary position on the "unequal" treaties varied.[30]

Foreign Christian workers were specifically concerned

with the protection of Christianity afforded by the toleration clauses. They also realized their privileges under extraterritoriality offended the Chinese. For the majority of missionaries, revision of the treaties meant ending all advantages for foreigners in China. Missionaries advocated new conditions in which Christian and commercial interests would depend entirely upon Chinese law for protection. This resulted in conflict between missionaries and businessmen over the abolition of extraterritoriality.[91]

A.L. Warnshuis, Secretary of the International Missionary Council, argued that missionaries should work for treaty revision because they had been instrumental in obtaining the original agreements. He urged missionaries "to use whatever knowledge and influence" they now possessed in an effort to renegotiate the treaties. Unlike the old agreements, the new treaties should "more truly express the Christian principles that ought to prevail in international relations." Some foreigners asserted that without extraterritoriality they would be subject to the corruption of Chinese officials, primarily the practice of "squeeze." Warnshuis believed this already occurred and would not increase with the loss of treaty privileges.[92]

Another reason for ending extraterritoriality was Chinese animosity towards gunboats and foreign concession areas. The Chinese associated missionaries with these encroachments on their nation's sovereignty. Because

missionaries lived near these signs of Western power, they were sometimes the targets of violence. Many foreign Christians believed it was safer living in the interior away from the protection of gunboats. They argued this proved extraterritoriality was no longer necessary.[33] One missionary realistically admitted: "A change is coming soon whether we want it or not. Why not yield to the inevitable gracefully?"[34]

The inclusion of religious freedom in China's constitutions was another reason missionaries supported abolition of the toleration clauses. The Provisional Republican Constitution of 10 March 1912 simply stated: "The People have liberty of religion."[35] The Permanent Constitution of 14 May 1917 allowed "citizens of the Republic of China [to] enjoy the liberty . . . within limits of law of choosing their religions."[36] Kenneth Latourette maintained these constitutions "were the basic law of the land [and] seemed to render invalid some of the arguments that once had been advanced for treaty protection."[37]

Missionaries who opposed alterations in the treaty protection of Christianity offered three main reasons. The toleration clauses protected Chinese Christians from persecution by other Chinese. Missionaries working in the interior would be unsafe without extraterritoriality. Because of the political chaos in China, treaty revision was premature. Ernest F.P. Scholes urged delaying negotiations for at least three years. With the rhetoric of

benevolent paternalism, Scholes concluded: "By reducing ourselves to their level we shall reduce ourselves to impotence."[38]

The efforts of the missionaries in China produced results in the United States. In late 1925 and early 1926, the administrators of the various foreign mission boards held meetings and adopted resolutions favoring treaty revision. The first of these was an unofficial meeting of eighty-five representatives from thirty-two mission organizations on 2-3 October in New York. This assembly urged all denominational mission boards and the United States government to take immediate action. The delegates proposed the United States revise its treaties with China to fulfill the principles of the Nine Power Treaty and the Washington Conference of 1922.[39]

Between October 1925 and January 1926, twenty-one denominational mission boards adopted similar resolutions. Among these were: American Baptist, Presbyterian Church, U.S.A., Methodist Episcopal, ABCFM, Free Methodist Church, Reformed Church in the U.S., Church of God, and Seventh Day Baptist. These actions became public when the Foreign Mission Conference of North America met 12-15 January 1925 at Atlantic City. The delegates to the conference endorsed treaty revision and reaffirmed their denominations' efforts to influence the State Department to open negotiations with China.[40]

Missionaries in China knowledgeable of the history of

the "unequal" treaties attempted to educate their colleagues during this period. Articles outlining the development of the missionaries' privileged status appeared in the Chinese Recorder and China Christian Year Book. Harley Farnsworth MacNair, missionary and professor of history, believed missionary training should include courses on ethics and international relations. This was necessary because "missionaries constitute one of the most powerful forces in inter-national relations of the present day."[41]

Publicizing the history of missionary involvement in treaty negotiations mobilized more support for treaty revision. Foreign Christian workers in the 1920s realized the participation of their predecessors in obtaining and expanding treaty rights was detrimental to their cause. They hoped to rectify these past mistakes by abolishing the toleration clauses. In calling for renegotiation of the Sino-American agreements, missionaries hoped to separate themselves from the cursed accusation of imperialism.

To accomplish this, missionaries attempted to distance themselves from their cultural and political heritage. In addressing this problem, Methodist Episcopal workers admitted that "no nation nor civilization perfectly exemplifies Christ's teachings." Missionaries were "not in China as the propagandists of any particular type of civilization."[42] W.J. Mortimore lamented some Chinese charged Christianity "with being the agent of that selfish

capitalism." He believed any benefits of the toleration clauses "have been more than nullified by the evil effects of this foreign political relationship."[43] Clemens Granskou recalled: "We began to see that the protection was a liability rather than an asset . . . extraterritoriality was really a thorn in the flesh of the Chinese."[44]

Chinese Christians hoped their support of treaty revision would ameliorate their relations with the anti-Christians. The National Christian Council surveyed Chinese Christian leaders on treaty revision in 1926. On the question of church involvement in politics, 171 out of 275 answers favored participation and 190 favored abolition of the toleration clauses. The reasons for abolition included: their incompatibility with Christian teachings, the guarantee of religious freedom in the constitution, and "it would help in dealing with the anti-Christian movement."[45]

The editor of the Chinese Recorder questioned Chinese Christians on "the place of the missionary in promoting international understanding and relationships?" They replied missionaries should influence their home governments to deal justly with the government of China. Missionaries needed to "use their influence to have the 'toleration clauses' abolished." They should also "interpret China to their own countries" better than "diplomats, tourists, and merchants do."[46]

The intensity of Chinese nationalism and anti-

foreignism after the May Thirtieth Incident revealed the precarious situation of the missionaries. Criticisms by Chinese Christians increased their difficulties. Chinese Christians in Qufu found "it impossible to convince non-Christians that the missionaries do not believe in the doctrine of physical force." They challenged foreign Christian workers to issue a statement separating themselves from the policies of Western governments.[47]

The majority of missionaries continued to support treaty revision after the failure of the Commission on Extraterritoriality in 1926 and the success of the Northern Expedition of the KMT in 1927.[48] The foreign Christian workers KMT soldiers attacked in Nanjing on 24 March 1927 were an exception. They were thankful extraterritoriality was still in place and gunboats were nearby to rescue them.[49]

When missionaries returned to their stations after the 1927 evacuation, they explored ways to separate themselves from treaty protection. George W. Hollister suggested no missionary return who wanted military protection or who did not favor abolition of extraterritoriality.[50] R.B. Whitaker believed Chinese Christians "take the attitude that for missionaries to continue to rely upon foreign military protection is to reduce very greatly their effectiveness in Christian work."[51] Some missionaries tried to voluntarily surrender their extraterritorial status and protection of the toleration clauses. The State

Department advised that the only way to accomplish this was to relinquish American citizenship. Missionaries were not willing to do this. The "unequal" treaties remained a problem with no obvious solution for the missionaries.[52]

Historians believe a majority of American missionaries favored treaty revision in the 1920s. Latourette maintains missionaries were divided on the issue before the May Thirtieth Incident. After that most mission boards and societies adopted specific resolutions calling for renegotiation. A majority advocated abolition of the toleration clauses and some addressed the questions of extraterritoriality and tariff control. Yet, there was "a fairly large minority of missionaries [who] believed that the time had not yet come for the removal of extraterritoriality."[53]

Yip Ka-che and Dorothy Borg agree that a majority of missionaries supported treaty revision. Yip concludes this did not help their cause, however, because the prevalent view in China was that missions were connected with imperialism.[54] Borg believes the mission boards in the United States took the lead in developing support for renegotiation. Action by missionaries in China was slow in coming and not unanimous. Although they never conducted an accurate survey, missionary leaders in China thought a majority of their number advocated treaty revision.[55]

Paul Varg maintains the missionaries' strongest support for renegotiation occurred before the Northern Expedition and the March Twenty-Fourth Incident. Following

this they continued to espouse treaty revision, but missionaries no longer "had the same faith as Chinese in the virtue of Chinese nationalism." Varg believes after 1927 devolution was the major concern of the missionaries in China.[56]

Control of Christian Education

The attempts of the Chinese governments to gain control of Christian schools in the 1920s were a serious threat to the missionary enterprise. Foreign Christians believed their educational efforts were of primary importance in changing Chinese society. Missionaries hoped their Christian-educated followers could become leaders in China's government as well as in the Chinese churches. The anti-Christians' success in making control of mission schools an issue of Chinese nationalism jeopardized this goal. After the KMT unification of the country, the missionaries confronted the problem of surrendering their institutions' autonomy or ending Christian education in China.

As part of the Western presence in China, mission schools had to defend against the charge of imperialism. The editor of the Educational Review warned missionary educators in April 1925 not to rely "upon 'treaty rights' for the maintenance of the Christian schools." This would encourage the belief that the schools were agents of imperialism and "that would be fatal." After two troubled

years, the editor admitted, Christian education "in too many cases, is in a strategically false and vulnerable position." It was easy for Chinese "who desire its destruction to make it appear to be one of the enemies of national salvation."[57]

One of the goals of the movement against mission schools was the elimination of compulsory religion courses from the curriculum. Christian teachers attributed this to the influence of secularization of education in the West and Japan. They believed "French and Japanese trained Chinese educators and certain visiting educators and writers from America and England have helped to deepen this conviction."[58] This resulted in attacks from the "front and rear." Chinese intellectuals criticized Christian education because of their traditional rationalistic tendencies. When Chinese teachers accepted Western secularization, this reinforced their criticisms. Missionaries lamented that "Chinese rationalistic tendencies plus western secularization make a formidable combination."[59]

Missionaries realized there were problems in their educational institutions in the early 1920s. F.L. Hawks Pott, President of the CCEA, was concerned about the effects of the New Thought Movement on Christian schools in 1922. Pott believed the critical outlook of China's young intellectuals required Christian education to revise its traditional dogmatism. He advised teachers to adopt the "use of the inductive method in teaching all subjects of

the curriculum." Teaching should include class discussions and an "open forum." Pott warned missionaries that "it will be sad if the Christian educators prove more conservative than these advocates of the new literary movement."[60]

Other missionary criticisms of Christian schools included the weakness of religious education, the use of poorly trained teachers, lack of organization, and the "foreignness" of the institutions. In denigrating religion courses, William L. Sanders charged there was "poor teaching of the Bible, lack of a well-defined aim, and a dead formalism." He admitted "our Bible teachers teach like parrots."[61]

The Christian Educational Commission in 1922 found that nearly all mission schools were "conducted by teachers and principals without special professional training for their tasks." It recommended Christian educators develop a better organized system and pay adequate salaries to attract better teachers. The commissioners were "surprised by the foreign complexion of the work." They suggested the missionaries give more responsibility to the Chinese and include Chinese language and literature in the curriculum.[62]

The use of English was a chronic and pervasive problem in missionary education. Christian colleges relied on English for instruction beginning in the first year. In order to develop the required proficiency, middle schools had to devote a substantial amount of teaching time to

English. This resulted in an unbalanced curriculum at the middle-school level and Christian colleges that excluded the majority of Chinese students.[63] John Leighton Stuart noticed that disorganization in Christian education compounded this problem. Students from Christian middle schools often failed to pass the college entrance examinations. Other important problems were the failure of Christian schools to produce Christian men and women and the failure of the best students to go into the ministry.[64]

Chinese Christians also faulted the mission schools. T.Z. Koo accused both churches and schools of remaining aloof from Chinese society. He observed that "some Christian institutions even pride themselves on the fact that they have nothing to do with government schools." Koo counted only five Christian student groups in the one thousand ninety-six Chinese middle schools in 1924. He suggested the missionaries put more effort into a student Christian movement.[65] Chinese Christians criticized missionary educators for their inability to understand the patriotic movement. They also found Christian teachers' ignorance of Chinese history, literature, and language particularly offensive.[66]

The missionaries' followers particularly disliked compulsory religion classes and religious exercises in the schools. Roland Cross, who conducted classes for Chinese ministers, discovered they thought "students should not be compelled to attend worship." To attract the students,

"every effort should be put forth to make the services interesting."[67] King Chu argued that "the compulsory system does not suit Chinese sentiment." Most Chinese considered religion to be a matter of personal choice. Compulsory religious education "may go on smoothly with the uneducated Chinese" but this only produced "rice Christians."[68]

The campaign against mission schools intensified after the May Thirtieth Incident at Shanghai in 1925. Student strikes, demonstrations, or other forms of disruption affected at least eighty-eight schools between June 1925 and May 1926. These attacks intimidated Chinese Christians and they became "unwilling to express their faith publicly." Membership in the YMCA dropped and thousands of students left the Christian schools.[69]

As the fervor of nationalism and anti-foreignism increased, registration with the Chinese government became the consuming problem for the Christian educators. In an attempt to avoid further conflict, the General Board of the CCEA approved the principle of registration in April 1925. The board recommended mission schools register with local or central government authorities as soon as possible. However, the CCEA suggested the schools not register if that action would affect the "special function of the Christian schools."[70]

The missionaries were most concerned with government regulations on curriculum and purpose of the schools. The

Ministry of Education proclamation of 16 November 1925, Article 5, disallowed the propagation of religion as the aim of any registered school. Article 6 prohibited religion courses or religious exercises in the required curriculum. The editor of the Educational Review believed mission schools could avoid the regulation on propagation of religion. He claimed the aim of Christian education was the development of the student's character. Yet the ban on compulsory religion in the schools was a difficulty that "must be frankly faced."[71]

Throughout 1926 Christian educators debated the implications of registering with the Ministry of Education. This issue was the sole topic of discussion at the annual conference of the CCEA held at Shanghai on 3-8 May 1926. The majority of delegates agreed in principle with registration but there was dissension over the specific requirements of the regulations. Many believed Article 5 technically excluded Christian education. Other delegates feared that support from the home churches would be lost if the Christian colleges surrendered "their distinctive religious character."[72]

Chinese Christians at the conference cautioned their foreign colleagues not to reject registration too quickly. They urged the missionaries to prove "that these institutions exist to serve Chinese youth by their acceptance of a relation to the national educational authorities through registration." The delegates did not reach a consensus on

the issue and passed no resolutions on registration.[73]

The majority of Chinese Christians favored registration. Chinese who worked at or attended mission schools were targets of anti-Christianity and anti-foreignism. The anti-Christians accused them of being part of Western imperialism. Chinese Christians hoped that when the mission schools registered with the Ministry of Education the anti-Christians would end their attacks. They also believed it was within the rights of the Chinese government to control educational institutions inside China.[74]

Some missionaries adamantly supported compulsory religion in the Christian schools. They opposed registration under regulations that prohibited this. These teachers maintained that education without required classes in religion and mandatory chapel attendance was not Christian education. If Chinese wanted to avoid religion they should attend other schools. One foreign Christian worker asserted that compulsory functions in the mission schools taught Chinese students discipline and they particularly needed that lesson.[75] Many of the Christian educators who favored religious requirements decided they would close their schools rather than submit to the Chinese government's regulations.[76]

Christian teachers who believed required religion was unnecessary in mission schools argued that compulsion hindered rather than helped Christianity. All education worked better when students made their own decisions.

These educators proposed alternative plans which included allowing students to attend "ethics" classes and substituting their own "life policy" for religious training. They refuted the assertion that Chinese students could choose to attend other schools. One missionary believed Chinese students' "only escape from a life of drudgery is the education afforded by the Christian institution, and he is glad to accept its advantages on any terms."[77]

Missionaries unopposed to registration accepted the change to voluntary religious functions. They did not believe this compromised the Christian nature of their educational institutions. These educators maintained that living a Christian life and setting a good example was the most effective way to influence Chinese students. Many hoped by registering the schools they could work for reforms and exert a greater influence on the national educational system. When the alternative was closing the schools, these missionaries chose registration.[78]

Registering with the northern government in Beijing or the KMT in Guangzhou also meant Chinese would assume the administrative positions of missionaries. In support of this, the editor of the Educational Review argued in 1925 that the problems of Christian education were actually Chinese problems. The issue of Chinese control of mission schools "has suddenly come to its crisis." Because missionaries were foreigners, they must let Chinese Christians fight for religious and educational freedom.[79]

Although Christian educators frequently said they had no objections to the transfer of authority, they did little to implement this before 1927.[80] John Mott met with mission leaders in an emergency conference in January 1926 at Shanghai. He suggested all Christian educators study carefully the issue of voluntary religion in the schools. The missionaries at the conference resolved: "The process of devolution of authority should be pushed forward as rapidly as possible and more rapidly than has hitherto been contemplated."[81]

The success of the KMT Northern Expedition in 1927 stimulated a wave of candid responses in the missionary literature. E.H. Cressy observed that the missionaries had talked for decades about giving more responsibility to the Chinese. Yet "they have been waiting until they were good and ready before doing so." Now "the present revolution has snatched the work out of their hands."[82] Rawlinson, in the Chinese Recorder, evaluated the problem of "the inadequacy of Chinese Christian leadership in the field of religious education." He attributed this to "the fact that the missionaries have kept this type of work too much in their own hands."[83] In surprise, the editor of the Educational Review exclaimed: "Chinese leadership has arrived. Suddenly. The time is unpropitious. No opportunity has been available for careful preparation."[84]

The majority of Christian educators did not seriously consider registration until 1927.[85] At that time, the

missionaries perceived the military and political power of the KMT would eventually necessitate their compliance. The missionary evacuation accomplished the transfer of authority to the Chinese that the foreign Christians had previously promised. Although some schools closed, most remained in operation with Chinese serving on the faculties and boards of trustees. The editor of the China Christian Year Book reported in 1929 that there were few problems under the new conditions. He expressed concern, however, about one development in the Chinese-controlled schools. The Chinese hired the best teachers based on their scholastic qualifications. This resulted in a majority of the faculty of Christian schools being non-Christians.[86]

In 1928 Herman C.E. Liu became President of Shanghai College. He admitted that Christian education had "broken down somewhat," but this was just a "passing phase in the evolution of Christianity in China." People had criticized mission schools because of their poor quality, ritualism, and "self-centeredness." Liu acknowledged these problems yet believed Christian education was capable of finding solutions. Because Chinese were assuming responsibilities previously held by missionaries, Liu was optimistic about the future of Christian schools.[87]

The secondary literature on Christian education in China is critical of some aspects of the missionaries' efforts. Latourette believes Chinese Christian graduates did not function well in local churches. Their superior

education was not a preparation for the realities of Chinese life in the 1920s. The emphasis on the use of English and Western subjects and the neglect of Chinese subjects reinforced the differences between Christian and non-Christian Chinese.[88]

Latourette maintains that foreign and Chinese Christians agreed on the principle of registration. Missionaries did not strongly oppose the transfer of authority to Chinese administrators. They also recognized the need for a more practical curriculum including courses on Chinese literature and history. The divisive issue was compulsory religion courses and religious exercises. Chinese Christians favored making these a voluntary part of Christian education and many resented this mandatory aspect of the schools.[89]

Alice Gregg believes Chinese Christians desired changes in the mission schools long before the May Thirtieth Incident. From 1909 until 1927, "missionaries were under pressure from Chinese Christians who were asking a share in the determining of educational content and policy."[90] Yamamoto Tatsuro and Yamamoto Sumiko emphasize the effects of the May Thirtieth Incident on students in Christian schools. After that event, the students joined the anti-imperialism and educational rights recovery movement. The Yamamotos conclude: "In the last phases of the anti-Christian movement, when it was dominated by nationalism, one finds Christians participating in it."[91]

In her authoritative monograph on the subject, Jessie Gregory Lutz agrees with the Yamamotos. She finds the charge that Christian students were unpatriotic or "denationalized" applicable only to the early 1920s. Many Christian graduates joined the nationalistic movement and the issue divided the Christian college campuses. Lutz criticizes Christian education for not addressing the desires of the Chinese earlier. She writes: "When nationalism began to demand greater emphasis on Chinese culture and greater use of Chinese, the Christian colleges' response was slow." Lutz concludes mission schools did not develop the leaders to change China into a liberal Christian democratic nation.[72]

Edward Rhoads posits a dichotomy between the responses to Chinese nationalism of missionary educators and evangelists. In his study of Lingnan University after the shootings in Guangzhou on 23 June 1925, Rhoads examines the reactions of the president and vice president of the university. Alexander Baxter, the vice president, was an evangelist who believed the primary role of Christian schools was to create Christians. Baxter did not understand the anti-Christian movement and was alienated from the students. He "also misjudged the pervasiveness and the strength of the nationalistic appeal."[73]

James McClure Henry, president of the university, although an ordained Presbyterian, concentrated his efforts on education. Henry "was not hostile to nationalism; on

the contrary, he accepted its development as inevitable, and perhaps even welcomed it as a hopeful sign of China's resurgence." Rhoads believes the contrast between Baxter and Henry was typical of broader conflict in the missionary community. Conservative evangelists and liberal missionary educators reacted in opposite ways to Chinese nationalism. He concludes that "the victory of the missionary educator and the liberal was hastened by the success of the Nationalist Revolution." Ironically, this "in turn paved the way for the immediate nationalization of the Christian colleges and ultimately for their secularization."[94]

Indigenous Chinese Protestantism

The missionaries who returned to their stations in 1927 and 1928 confronted a new situation. The Nationalist government at Nanjing had established a military and political hegemony over most of China. Both Chinese and foreigners realized Western nations would now be extremely reluctant to use military power to enforce extraterritoriality. The KMT Central Education Commission was trying to "nationalize" Christian schools by forcing them to register under its regulations. Chinese Christians had replaced missionaries in the administration of schools and churches. Some missionaries wondered if the Chinese would welcome their return. They also speculated about the possibilities of continuing in their previous positions of leadership.

The majority of missionaries believed there was still

a need for them in China. When many of the home mission boards hesitated to return their forces to full strength, one missionary advocated the number of workers be increased. He pointed out that "after more than one hundred years of Protestant missionary work, we can only claim one worshiper in four hundred."[95] Another foreign Christian allayed the fears of his colleagues by appealing to divine authority. God determined who went to China, not mission boards or Chinese churches.[96]

As foreigners returned to the interior, they reported that Chinese Christians had managed to survive the absence of the missionaries. F.H. Hawkins found "the Chinese Church, on the whole, carried on Christian work with much heroism and success." The fact that in some areas there was "a tendency for politics to take too prominent a place in Church life and teaching" disturbed Hawkins. Yet he believed that "never was there a greater opportunity before the Church to win China for Christ."[97]

Chinese Christian leaders reassured the missionaries they still wanted them in China. Li Fu Hsiang, however, saw the missionary role as having changed. Hsiang told foreign Christians their new duties would include visiting and inspiring churches, contributing to religious education, and social service. Hsiang did not include holding administrative offices among the new missionary functions.[98]

Djang Fang credited the evacuation with being "one of

the causes of the starting of new movements in the Chinese Church." Chinese Christian leaders had gained a new initiative and some missionaries had adapted to this. Fang observed that others "can hardly be blamed if, in view of their previous training, social heritage, individual personality and administrative necessities," they do not accept the changed conditions."[77]

Fang's attitude towards missionaries who disliked their displacement by Chinese was magnanimous. For decades foreign Christians professed a policy of developing Chinese leaders for the churches in China. This was a primary goal in establishing indigenous Christianity. Independent churches with dynamic Chinese Christian leaders were to be the method of salvation for the nation. When Chinese assumed positions of authority during the evacuation in 1927, this fulfilled many aspects of the policy of devolution.

The missionary literature of the 1920s frequently referred to the urgent need to develop competent Chinese leadership. John Stuart Burgess, secretary for the Beijing YMCA, outlined a "Program for the Present Crisis in China" in 1920. Burgess included social reconstruction through Christian study of political and social conditions in China. Christians should offer a plan for moral and social reform including "disinterested" public service. Burgess believed the most important task was training Chinese Christian leaders. They should be theologically sound and

willing to work for the "social reconstruction of the nation."[100]

Frida Nilsen, a missionary for the Norwegian Lutheran Church of America, recognized that "the Chinese were still in the learning stage and they accepted missionary leadership as perfectly natural" during this period. Nilsen added: "But we were training the Chinese for leadership in the church."[101] According to A.L. Warnshuis, Chinese leadership meant Chinese ministers. More Chinese ministers would help refute the typical Chinese view that Christianity was a foreign religion. Warnshuis suggested missionaries surrender the authority to appoint church workers to the Chinese churches.[102]

In 1922 Frank Rawlinson maintained the Chinese churches still needed the guidance of missionaries. He observed that the "Church is relatively weak, still incoherent and not yet fully conscious of its responsibilities."[103] After anti-Christianity, anti-foreignism, and nationalism increased in 1925, Rawlinson divided missionary opinion on devolution into two groups. Many missionaries said only that they would give more authority to Chinese Christians sometime in the future under certain unspecified conditions. Others, including Rawlinson, predicted: "When Chinese Christian leadership is ready it will take the helm."[104]

Some missionaries contended that the issue of devolution was a Chinese problem. They argued that Chinese

Christians were reluctant to accept responsibility. William Overholt said the majority of missionaries favored devolution but before 1927 the Chinese did not cooperate with them. Overholt believed the evacuation forced Chinese to assume positions of leadership against their wishes.[105]

Other foreign Christians opposed the idea of turning administrative authority over to their followers. Amy Foster disliked much of what she read in the Chinese Recorder. In a letter to the editor, she wrote: "That youths of any race should be taught to aspire to leadership is to my mind a dangerous doctrine." Because they are trained or are well qualified does not mean Chinese "are to lead the foreigners." Foster advised Chinese Christians to be content to be followers. Rowland Hogben agreed with Foster and added it was not the duty of missionaries to train Chinese to be secular or religious leaders.[106]

Resistance to devolution by some missionaries continued throughout the 1920s. Rawlinson admitted in 1925 that missionaries "will doubtless be pained and perplexed" that they "may have to 'take a back seat' in the councils and work of the Chinese Church."[107] In 1927 T.Z. Koo maintained that a small group of missionaries were doubtful the churches could survive without their guidance and therefore "have kept a restraining hand on the growing consciousness of the indigenous church."[108] George R. Grose assessed "The Present Missionary Morale" in 1927 by questioning a "score" of men in seven different denominations. He found

that "the mission as a foreign organization had been too slow in becoming an integral part of the Chinese Christian Church." Grose concluded: "It is not easy for a benevolent paternalism to pass into a true fraternalism."[109]

Yet many missionaries favored devolution and worked to develop independent churches with capable Chinese leaders. Frank Rawlinson believed the period following World War I was the time to implement this policy. In 1919 he wrote: "Here is an opening for the play of Chinese initiative. We look for the Chinese leadership to step forward."[110] Isaac Mason rejected the idea that most missionaries opposed independent Chinese churches. He admitted, however, that many missionaries in the past had "behaved badly on this question."[111]

Erwin Hertz worked as an English teacher in Fenzhou from 1924 to 1927. He thought indigenous Christianity "seemed to be the spirit of the mission station." This meant "that we were to turn over to the Chinese much of the work and as soon as possible."[112] In 1925 H.T. Hodgkin advocated countering the anti-Christian movement by giving more power to Chinese leadership. Hodgkin warned that "at our peril will the missionary organizations hold to the rudder when they should hand it over to those well qualified to take it."[113]

After the conference with John Mott in 1926 at Shanghai, missionary leaders advised their colleagues to adopt new attitudes. To accommodate the demands of Chinese

Christians, missionaries should be willing to accept functions the Chinese churches assigned to them. They should agree to serve under Chinese control. Missionaries should also "minimize official status and emphasize personal service."[114]

Missionary organizations achieved various degrees of devolution during the 1920s. Maud Russell served with the YWCA from 1917 to 1943. She related that American volunteers were completely under the control of the YWCA's National Board in China. Although a foreigner served as General Secretary until 1926, a majority of the board members were Chinese. The Y's recruiters in the United States told Russell before she went to China that "all of the decisions about you will be made by the Chinese National Board." She believed this "was on a right basis right from the beginning."[115]

The missionaries of the ABCFM North China Mission were leaders in advocating the development of Chinese Christian leadership. In June 1914, they voted to establish the North China Council. This council involved missionaries and Chinese as partners in the administration of affiliated Congregational churches in that area. The council called this affiliation of churches the North China Gong Li Hui. Roland Cross, who served as American secretary for the Gong Li Hui, recognized "many leaders in other missions viewed with skepticism, even apprehension, this new plan" of including Chinese in administration.[116]

Cross reported several instances of devolution in the China Mission Year Book, 1925. These included Chinese serving on the boards of control for the YMCA and YWCA since 1914 and the establishment of the North China Gong Li Hui. The Methodist Episcopal Church in 1920 made joint appointments of missionaries and Chinese to the district superintendent position. In 1922 the Presbyterian Church, North, adopted a policy of creating joint Chinese-American associations to administer missionary work. When members of the Beijing Missionary Association voted on the issue of missionaries becoming members of local Chinese churches in November 1923, 90 percent approved.[117]

In researching the issue of devolution, Cross studied the minutes of Beijing missionary society meetings from 1905 to 1925. He found that there had been a "frequent sensing" of the need to give more responsibility to the Chinese. Yet, "very often there has not been a willingness to pay the price of thoroughgoing change." Cross argued that even with the changes already made, "control, in many cases, is still kept in the hands of the missionary." He believed foreign Christians accomplished this by controlling the salaries of the Chinese serving on joint committees. Another technique was the use of "specials" or "specifics." These gifts of money from the United States designated only for their use gave missionaries additional "power of the purse."[118]

The issues of money and property complicated the

policy of devolution. Because mission boards in the United States raised the funds that supported Christianity in China, the officers of those organizations controlled the budgets of the missionaries. Christian schools and Chinese churches depended upon financial aid from the West for their very existence. They received this money through the missionaries. It was much easier for the missionaries to approve giving Chinese Christians more leadership than to relinquish control of the budget.

As the missionaries discussed devolution of administration in the 1920s, they also debated the question of financial control. Some missionaries adamantly opposed giving the Chinese responsibility for money or property. One foreign Christian believed this was the largest problem in the "indigenization" of Christianity. He observed that "God made the Occidental to be a Christian. But it takes God and the Occidental to make an Oriental Christian."[117] James Maxon Yard, General Secretary of the Executive Board of Methodist Missions, admitted: "There is sometimes difficulty in the relationship with the home boards in the matter of property and funds."[120]

In discussing "How to Devolve the Work of the Church," Donald Fay separated missionary opinion on this problem into three categories. A few wanted to turn all aspects of the work over to the Chinese immediately. The majority adhered to the traditional stance of promising transfer sometime in an undefined future. They thought "that

Christian work should be handed over to the Chinese as soon as the Chinese are ready for it." The third group was conservative and opposed devolution. Fay proposed that church property transfer as each Chinese congregation became able to meet one-third of its budget. He predicted the question of church property "will be a great problem for any of us to handle."[121]

Most mission societies included financial responsibility as part of their plans for devolution after 1925. The Northern Baptist Mission in East China transferred an entire mission, including evangelical work, middle school, and hospital to the Chinese. The results of this were not satisfactory and gave "abundant evidence that this mission has not yet solved its problem."[122]

In 1927 several missions joined the Northern Baptists in giving more control to Chinese Christians. The Council of the American Baptist Foreign Mission Society voted approval of the principle of property transfer but took no other action. The Council of the North China Gong Li Hui put both foreign financial aid and personnel under Chinese administration. The ABCFM, the home board of this mission, leased its property to the Chinese and planned to make a permanent transfer. The Methodist Episcopal mission gave control of church property to a Chinese financial committee and took preliminary steps towards a title change. The missions of the Presbyterian Church, North, Presbyterian Church, South, and Methodist Episcopal Church, South were

initiating plans for devolution that included some dispensation of property. These actions by missionary leaders in China had the approval of the mission boards in the United States.[123]

There were difficult problems related to the issue of financial devolution. The majority of Chinese Christians were very poor and incapable of financing the schools and churches the missionaries had established. Chinese churches could not support their own ministers. If property transferred to Chinese Christians, they could not afford to pay taxes and other fees.[124]

Frank Rawlinson suggested a "new emphasis in economic cooperation" as a solution for some of these problems. In 1928 he advocated giving Chinese Christians total administrative responsibility while maintaining "dual support." Many churches engaged in "economic self-help" but could not accomplish "economic self-reliance." Rawlinson predicted "this latter will not be possible for many churches and institutions for a long time" and the West should continue its financial aid.[125] One missionary expressed an opposite opinion: The Chinese "are in the dangerous position of being able to fix their own salaries and emoluments. This is an impossible situation in any land."[126]

Because the concept of indigenous Christianity included independent theology as well as independent churches, missionaries expected undefined alterations to occur in the religion of Chinese Christians. Chinese

Christian leaders also believed in and advocated the development of a unique Chinese Protestantism as part of the "indigenization" of Christianity. There was division in missionary opinion on what forms Chinese Protestantism would assume.

Some missionaries believed the social aspects of Christianity were important in developing an indigenous Chinese religion. Rawlinson asserted that "Christian idealism" and "Chinese idealism" were similar. He suggested that missionaries recognize that Chinese think in terms of the salvation of society, not personal salvation. He advocated foreign Christians and Chinese Christians working together to create a society worthy of salvation.[127] Roland Cross believed the social gospel was attractive to the Chinese because it "was not too much other-worldly but was activist in this world."[128]

Paul Hayes urged missionaries to instruct Chinese ministers and church members to identify themselves with the major interests of their communities. He attributed some of the criticism of Christianity to the fact that "too often the church is a thing apart, a foreign guild." The most important need was "a thoroughly tested form of public ritual for the reverence of ancestors, thus identifying the church with the better values in the prevalent worship of ancestors."[129]

Chinese Christian leaders wanted to develop a religion in China that would be "Chinese," but had no specific goals

other than separation from the West. An all-Chinese committee addressed this issue when it met in conjunction with a national Christian convention in 1922. The members resolved that the "Chinese Church should not be alien to the racial inheritance and spiritual experience of our people." They especially opposed "slavish imitation" and advocated the establishment of churches that take "cognizance of the spiritual inheritance of the Chinese race." The committee asked missionaries to give "unfettered freedom to the Chinese Christians in these experiments."[130]

Other Chinese objected to the development of denominationalism in China. Over 130 Protestant denominations had missionaries in China at this time.[131] For the traditionally eclectic Chinese, this was confusing. C.Y. Cheng criticized this aspect of Christianity, writing: "China has shown little interest in these imported divisions."[132] David Z.T. Yui advised missionaries that the Chinese wanted a united Christianity and needed the help of Western Christians in an ecumenical movement.[133]

Missionaries observed that they created churches in China that were more "foreign" than indigenous. Often the result was neither Chinese nor Western. One missionary described the singing of hymns at Sunday worship as "a doggerel which can scarcely be called Chinese of any style."[134] Paul Hayes admitted that the Methodists "didn't do anything in the matter of ritual, except the translation of the rituals we already had." Their "churches stood up

like sore thumbs" because they were Western style.[135]

There was opposition to changing Christianity to meet the demands of Chinese Christians. J.G.G. Bompas maintained that "what China needs to-day is to be westernized." Christianity, with its Western connotations, would assist in this. There was no need to alter Christianity because "much that is distinctively Chinese is going to be lost." Bompas explained "the real danger is that we try to establish an eastern type of Christianity."[136]

John DeKorne, a missionary, taught at Calvin College and Theological Seminary after he served in China in the early 1920s. He cautioned the aspiring ministers that "China has changed every religion that has come to her." DeKorne believed it was acceptable to allow the Chinese to develop a "de-Westernized" version of Christianity unless "it would humanize or Sinicize pure Christianity." This would be "something against which we must testify."[137] Edwin Marx agreed the Chinese had a right to create their own Christianity just as Greeks, Catholics, Protestants, Anglicans, or Baptists had. Yet he pleaded: "After relieving Jesus of his Western regalia, spare Him the ordeal of being tricked out in mandarin garments."[138]

The secondary literature on the issues of devolution is generally critical of the missionaries' efforts. Latourette, a China missionary, is more appreciative of the problems involved and his colleagues' attempts to overcome them. He maintains the majority of missionaries believed

administration would eventually transfer to the Chinese. Yet "numbers of them were not quite as insistent as the 'natives' that the transfer be made quickly." In the 1920s, "especially after 1925, events moved more rapidly than some of the missionaries were prepared to approve."[139]

Latourette credits "the nationalistic temper of the Chinese" with accelerating devolution. When the missionaries relinquished their control, they did not confront major problems in finding replacements. The largest obstacle was creating an ordained ministry, "for nothing in the Chinese background quite corresponded to the Christian pastor." Latourette believes "the rapid transfer of authority to the Chinese gave to some of the missionaries a feeling of insecurity." He notes that as late as 1935 missionaries still held many administrative positions. "To those who cherished the vision of what should be, progress towards the goal at times seemed discouragingly slow."[140]

Paul Varg finds that missionaries exerted their influence in different ways after giving "official" authority to the Chinese. Missionaries "educated" the Chinese on making the right decisions by sitting on joint committees or serving as advisors. Because they had years of administrative experience and an intense interest in the work, missionaries often held an advantage over the Chinese in any partnership arrangement. Varg believes the Chinese concentrated on the issue of foreign control and deferred to the missionaries on other issues.[141]

Janet Heininger, in her study of American Board missionaries, maintains they failed to achieve the goal of self-supporting Chinese churches. The low economic status of the missionaries' converts was the principal reason for this. The American Board's North China Mission led most missionary societies in transferring church administration to Chinese. The missionaries, however, used "their position as 'holders of the money-bag'" to exert a greater influence than they were entitled to in the new organizational structure.[142]

Stephen Neill is more critical of the missionaries than the other authors. He argues that there was a tendency for missionaries to maintain their positions of authority for too long. This occurred because "the belief in the innate superiority of the white man" created an inertia that required decades to escape.[143]

Three missionaries who participated in the China Oral History Project in the 1970s also criticized the progress of devolution in the 1920s. Clemens Granskou recalled the Lutheran mission emphasized the training of Chinese Christian leaders, "but we were slow in turning over leadership, a little bit slow." Granskou explained that one of the reasons was paternalism. "We were too slow in recognizing the Chinese needed to take over and found their own church. We were too reluctant to accept that." He regretted that the Chinese equated Christianity with Western culture. Preventing this was difficult because

"the new curriculum, the hymns, the liturgy, and even the architecture all reflected western customs." This was unfortunate because "our major job then was to Christianize, not westernize, Chinese civilization."[144]

Paul Hayes believed the missionaries expected Chinese Christians "to develop more rapidly than was possible in matters of self-support, self-government, self-promotion." The failure of the missionaries to consider the Chinese point of view contributed to this. "All we did, not intentionally but because we didn't seem to know any other way of doing it, was too foreign for easy acceptance on the part of our Chinese people."[145]

The lesson Herman Bly learned from his China experience "was that we should appreciate more the indigenous culture and way of life of the Chinese." Bly argued that "Christianity should have been divorced from the cultural background of the nations from which it had come." Although the missionaries went to save the Chinese, they "didn't go there to make Americans out of them or to make them appreciate American culture." Bly concluded: "Missionaries now know and believe that some things could have been done in a more indigenous way."[146]

CHAPTER IV ENDNOTES

1. Y.C. Ling, n.p., to Editor, Shanghai, n.d., Chinese Recorder 50 (November 1919): 777. Ling criticized an earlier article in the Recorder by Kenneth Latourette in which Latourette failed to take a stand against Japan. Ling argued that China was right and Japan was wrong and wondered why "should a missionary refrain from working publicly for the right?" See Latourette, "Relations of Japanese and Chinese Christians," ibid., (August 1919): 501-507.

2. Liu Pu-chi, Fuzhou, to Editor, Shanghai, 9 May 1924, Chinese Recorder 55 (June 1924): 408. For May Ninth see chapter II, pp. 37-38, above.

3. Frida Nilsen, "China Oral History Project," p. 219.

4. China Mission Year Book, 1919, p. 71.

5. 55 (June 1924): 346-347.

6. "China Oral History Project," p. 33, 2.

7. In March of 1918, Harold Balme wrote that China's "nationalistic spirit is the greatest force for good or ill which is operative today." He urged missionaries to guide it towards "a true Christian internationalism." See "Missions and the War: Are We Losing Our Perspective?" Chinese Recorder 49 (March 1918): 153-154.

8. See p. iii. E.C. Lobenstine and A.L. Warnshuis were editors for this volume.

9. C.G. Sparham, "Churches and Missions: The Outlook," China Mission Year Book, 1919, p. 59. Also see John Leighton Stuart, Fifty Years in China, pp. 104-105; Erwin Hertz, "China Oral History Project," p. 19.

10. Alice Margaret Huggins, Dongxin, to Editor, Shanghai, 10 May 1920, Chinese Recorder 51 (June 1920): 435.

11. Chinese Recorder 50 (July 1919): 433-437; ibid. 52 (June 1921): 372-373.

12. "The Present Intellectual Awakening and Its Bearing upon the Christian Church," ibid.: 411-412.

13. "China Oral History Project," pp. 96-97. Bly was a missionary for the Evangelical Lutheran Church and served in China from 1926 to 1950. E.R.M. Brecker in "China's Place in the Church Universal" wrote that Christianity "is a spiritualization of the most fanatical patriotism the world has ever known," Chinese Recorder 54 (July): 392. Also see DeVargas, "Religious Problem in the Chinese Renaissance," p. 7.

14. "Our Message," Chinese Recorder 54 (August 1923): 485-489. In addition see T.T. Lew, "China's Renaissance--the Christian Opportunity," ibid. 52 (May 1921): 301-323; H.C. Hu, "The New Thought Movement," ibid. 54 (August 1923): 447-455. In 1924 Rawlinson used quotations from five Chinese Christians to reinforce his optimistic views on the increase in nationalism and opportunities for Christianity. They, like he, believed one benefit was the "realization of the thinking class of religion as a force tremendously needed by China in the present juncture." See ibid. 55 (April 1924): 212-213.

15. Ibid. 53 (October 1922): 619.

16. Ibid. 54 (August 1923): 441-442.

17. Ibid. 55 (April 1924): 211.

18. "The Effect of the Present Situation of Public Affairs in China Upon the Work of Missions, 1924," China Mission Year Book, 1925, p. 61.

19. USDS, Foreign Relations, 1925, vol. I, p. 722.

20. Copy of cable in letter, John R. Mott, General Secretary, National Council of the YMCA, to President of the United States [Coolidge], 22 June 1925, USDS, "Records," reel 43, 893.00/6302. The cable was over the signatures of David Z.T. Yui and Fletcher S. Brockman who claimed to represent others. Mott highly recommended the senders to the President so he would "attach the more weight to their opinion."

21. 56 (July 1925): 470-472.

22. Ibid.

23. China Christian Year Book, 1926, pp. 111-112.

24. Ibid. Also see [Editor], "For Pondering and Prayer," Chinese Recorder 56 (July 1925): 480; Yip, "Anti-Christian Movement," pp. 183-184.

25. Letter, "To Our Chinese Fellow-Workers" translated and reprinted in Chinese Recorder 56 (November 1925): 759-760. Also see Paul G. Hayes, "China Oral History Project," p. 25. Hayes was a correspondence secretary for the Methodist Episcopal mission in China. Dorothy Borg believes "many" missionaries hesitated to express opinions on the incident but the majority of those who did sided with the Chinese. American Policy, pp. 25-26. For the conferences on extraterritoriality and tariffs see chapter III, pp. 77-80, above.

26. "China Oral History Project," pp. 74-77.

27. Chinese Recorder 56 (November 1925): 699-700. In addition see Eugene E. Barnett, "Cooperative Christian Activities in China in 1925," China Christian Year Book, 1926, p. 113; Yip, "Anti-Christian Movement," p. 185.

28. In January 1924, Rawlinson believed missionaries were concerned about extraterritoriality only because Chinese Christians benefitted from it. Some missionaries thought these "political connections unnecessarily make the missionary an embarrassment to the Chinese Church." Rawlinson divided the opinions of Chinese Christians into two groups: those who believed the treaties were necessary for their protection; and those who thought the treaties provided no protection and Chinese churches should bear

their own burdens. "Editorial," Chinese Recorder 55 (January 1924): 3-4. Also see John Hind, n.p., to Editor, Shanghai, n.d., ibid.: 53-54.

29. Roland Cross, "China Oral History Project," p. 29. Also see China Christian Year Book, 1926, pp. 510-534. Clemens Granskou had doubts about some aspects of United States policy during this period. He remarked: "It seemed appalling to us that in our international policy, we were more concerned about expediency than about the long-range effect of our relationship with the country." See "China Oral History Project," p. 55.

30. The 1926 volume of the China Christian Year Book listed twenty missionary or church groups that had publicly announced their support of treaty revision. Also listed were eight groups that had decided to remain neutral on the issue, pp. 510-534. Also see [Editor], "Christian Actions in RE Extrality and 'Toleration Clauses,'" Chinese Recorder 57 (February 1926): 143-145; F.W.S. Neill, "The New Era," ibid. (May 1926): 317.

31. Rawlinson, a strong advocate of treaty revision, advised missionaries that "steps should be taken to confer with diplomatic and commercial leaders before making any declaration" on the tariffs or extraterritoriality. See the editorial in Chinese Recorder 56 (November 1925): 697-704. Also see China Christian Year Book, 1926, p. 33. In 1926 Barton W. Currie, editor of Ladies' Home Journal, commissioned Charles A. Selden to make an impartial investigation of conditions in China. Selden reported that most missionaries agreed with the Chinese demands for treaty revision. Businessmen did not hold this view. Many believed their ability to make money depended upon "all the special geographical, political and economic concessions which China has been forced to yield." Are Missions a Failure? A Correspondent's Survey of Foreign Missions (New York: F.H. Revell Co., 1927), p. 179. In June 1925, a controversy carried by the press developed between Senator William E. Borah and the American Chamber of Commerce in Hankou. Borah announced he favored immediate abolition of extraterritoriality and believed the American public stood behind this. The Chamber of Commerce cabled the State Department asking that Borah be silenced, claiming he was inciting the Chinese with his remarks. Borah responded by accusing the American businessmen in Hankou of being "part of the imperialistic combine which would oppress and exploit the Chinese people." Borg, American Policy, pp. 26-27.

32. "Christian Missions and Treaties with China," Chinese Recorder 56 (November 1925): 706-707; "Treaties and Missions," pp. 31-32. Also see the editorial by Rawlinson in Chinese Recorder 56 (October 1925): 627-630.

33. China Christian Year Book, 1926, p. 31; Archibald G. Adams, "Extraterritoriality and the Missionary in an Interior City," Chinese Recorder 57 (January 1926): 48-55. In addition see Missionaries of the American Church Mission, Guling, to Reverend Thomas F. Gailor, President of National Council, New York, 22 August 1925, ibid. 56 (December 1925): 811-812; D.T. Huntington, n.p., to Editor, Shanghai, 15 July 1926, ibid. 57 (September 1926): 670-671.

34. W.H. Lingle, Changsha, to Editor, Shanghai, n.d., ibid. (November 1926): 828.

35. "Chapter II, People, Article 6.7," of Provisional Republican Constitution proclaimed by National Assembly, 10 March 1912, text translated in MacNair, Modern Chinese History, pp. 729-734.

36. China Year Book, 1924-25, p. 623.

37. The constitution of 1 May 1914 also contained a clause on freedom of religion, HCMC, p. 691.

38. "Changing China's Status Amongst the Nations and the Missionary's Status in China: A Plea for Delay," Chinese Recorder 57 (May 1926): 328. Also see China Mission Year Book, 1925, p. 254; D.E. Hoste, "The Christian Attitude Towards Present International Agreements," Chinese Recorder 55 (April 1924): 245-251; John A. Aspberg, Shanzhou, to Editor, Shanghai, 28 May 1926, ibid. 57 (July 1926): 525-526; John Bell, Sanyuan, to Editor, Shanghai, 27 May 1926, ibid. (August 1926): 601-602. Aspberg and Bell responded to and agreed with the article by Scholes.

39. [Editor], "Important Actions on the China Situation," Chinese Recorder 56 (December 1925): 834-835. Also see Borg, American Policy, pp. 78-79. For the Nine Power Treaty and Washington Conference see chapter III, pp. 77-80, above.

40. China Christian Year Book, 1926, 496-504; Borg, American Policy, p. 80.

41. "Missionary Ethics," Chinese Recorder 57 (March 1926): 161-163. For a sample of the articles see China Christian Year Book, 1926, pp. 1-70. This includes articles by Harley Farnsworth MacNair, Harold Balme, J.J. Heeren, L.T. Chen, and E.C. Lobenstine.

42. "To Our Chinese Fellow-Workers," Chinese Recorder 56 (November 1925): 760.

43. "How Treaty Privileges Affect Christian Work," ibid. 57 (October 1926): 752.

44. "China Oral History Project," p. 36.

45. Bulletin of the National Christian Council 20 (September 1926): 11-12, transmitted in A.L. Warnshuis, Secretary of International Missionary Council, New York, to Nelson T. Johnson, Division of Far Eastern Affairs, Department of State, Washington, D.C., 3 November 1926, USDS, "Records," reel 123, 893.404/67.

46. [Editor], "The Chinese Christian Answers the Missionaries' Questions," Chinese Recorder 58 (January 1927): 23-27.

47. Ibid. 57 (January 1926): 74-75.

48. China Christian Year Book, 1928, pp. 2-3; "Editorial," Chinese Recorder 59 (June 1928): 335.

49. China Year Book, 1928, p. 728. Reverend William R. Johnson agreed with the Nanjing missionaries on the need for military protection. He opposed any attempts at "renunciation of the right to such protection on the part of the missionaries as they return to their posts." See "Shall Missionaries Renounce Their Citizenship?" Chinese Recorder 59 (June 1928): 368.

50. "Some Principles That Should Govern the Coming of Missionaries to China," ibid. (January 1928): 9-12.

51. "Shall Missionaries Renounce Their Calling?" ibid. (June 1928): 370. Also see ibid. (August 1928): 519-521.

52. [Editor], "On the Field," Chinese Recorder 59 (January 1928): 60-61; "Editorial," ibid. (February 1928): 71-72; [Editor], "The Changing Situation," ibid. (March 1928): 193. The International Missionary Council, meeting at Jerusalem in 1928, urged all missionary societies not to ask for military protection by their governments for missionaries or property. D.W. Lyon, "Modern Christians at Jerusalem," ibid. (June 1928): 376-377.

53. HCMC, p. 811.

54. "Anti-Christian Movement," p. 185.

55. American Policy, pp. 90-94.

56. "The Missionary Response to the Nationalist Revolution," in Fairbank, Missionary Enterprise, pp. 311-316.

57. Educational Review 17 (April 1925): 105; ibid. 19 (January 1927): 3.

58. Ibid.: 101.

59. Chinese Recorder 58 (February 1927): 116-118.

60. "The New Thought and the New Literary Movements in Relation to Christian Education," Educational Review 14 (July 1922): 242-245.

61. Sanders was a Christian educator. See China Mission Year Book, 1924, p. 279.

62. Howard S. Galt, "The Message of the Educational Commission's Report to the Missions and Churches," Educational Review 15 (April 1923): 103-106. In addition see F.L Hawks Pott, "Some Principles Contained in the Report of the China Educational Commission," ibid. (July 1923): 218.

63. E.W. Wallace found that 78 percent of the students in Christian colleges in 1924 were from Christian middle schools. In addition to the problem of English, non-Christian students could not pass the college compulsory religion classes that required four to twelve years of

prior Bible education. See "Correlation of Higher and Secondary Education," Educational Review 16 (April 1924): 133-136.

64. "Some Administrative Problems," ibid. 15 (October 1923): 333-337.

65. "Religious Life in the Colleges and the National Student Christian Movement," ibid. 16 (April 1924): 170.

66. China Mission Year Book, 1924, p. 345. Also see Chinese Recorder 51 (July 1920): 466.

67. "The Chinese Mind and Christian Worship," ibid. 59 (December 1928): 771.

68. "Compulsory Religious Instruction--A Chinese View," Educational Review 18 (April 1926): 295-296.

69. Samuel D. Ling, "The Other May Fourth Movement: The Chinese 'Christian Renaissance,' 1919-1937" (Ph.D. dissertation, Temple University, 1981), p. 57.

70. Educational Review 17 (July 1925): 259-260.

71. Ibid. 18 (January 1926): 3-5.

72. Ibid. (July 1926): 226-231.

73. Ibid.

74. Y.L. Lee, "Registration of Christian Schools in Canton," Educational Review 19 (April 1927): 113-116, 105. In addition see the survey of the National Christian Council conducted in 1926. Of 275 Chinese Christian leaders, 214 favored registration of "Christian bodies," including schools, with the Chinese government. On the regulations of the Ministry of Education in Beijing, 113 Chinese favored all 6 articles; 101 believed Articles 5 and 6 should be revised; 42 did not favor complying with the regulations. See Bulletin of the National Christian Council 20 (September 1926): 13, in USDS, "Records," reel 123, 893.404/67.

75. Ivan D. Ross, "Compulsory or Voluntary Worship and Instruction," Educational Review 15 (October 1923): 349-350. Also see James B. Webster, "The Place of Religious Education in Mission Schools," Chinese Recorder 51 (April 1920): 241-244.

76. Sten Bugge, "Required Attendance at School Chapel and Religious Instruction Classes in Middle School," Educational Review 18 (April 1926): 298-304. Also see E.J.M. Dickson, Luding, to Editor, Shanghai, 22 July 1926, Chinese Recorder 57 (September 1926): 672-673.

77. Melsom S. Tuttle, "Compulsory Chapel and the Project Method," Educational Review 14 (January 1922): 78-81. In addition see B. Burgoyne Chapman, "Compulsory or Voluntary Worship and Instruction?" ibid. 15 (July 1923): 239-241. On the success of voluntary chapel attendance see Chinese Recorder 57 (October 1926): 748-751.

78. Alfred D.Heininger, "Voluntary Attendance At Worship: The Result of an Experiment," Educational Review 18 (October 1926): 499-502; F.C. Wilcox, "Shall Christian Schools Register?" ibid. 19 (July 1927): 216.

79. Educational Review 17 (April 1925): 104-105.

80. Ibid. (July 1925): 203-204. Also see Colena M. Anderson, "China Oral History Project," p. 26. Anderson was a missionary for the Northern Baptist Foreign Mission Society and served in China from 1918 to 1932. In 1926 her husband, Elam, resigned from the University of Shanghai, a Christian college, and taught at the Shanghai American School for foreign children. He did this to allow a Chinese Christian teacher to replace him on the faculty of the University of Shanghai. Elam Anderson "was a forerunner in that respect and he stood a great deal of criticism from his peers and friends. They accused him of deserting the mission cause."

81. Educational Review 18 (April 1926): 309-311.

82. Ibid. 19 (July 1927): 213.

83. 58 (December 1927): 747.

84. 19 (October 1927): 314.

85. Mission societies and home boards took some action on registration in 1926, but only the trustees of Yanjing University approved an application to the Ministry of Education on 13 April. Educational Review 18 (October 1926): 562-563. According to the January 1927 issue of the Educational Review several schools had adopted a policy of voluntary religion and registered. These included: Yanjing University, Shandong Christian University, University of Nanjing, Suzhou University, Lingnan University, Central China University, Yale-in-China, and West China Union University. But these schools applied to the Ministry of Education in Beijing and their registrations became void when the KMT captured that city in 1928. The China Christian Year Book, 1929 reported only two colleges had registered with the KMT by July 1929, p. 272.

86. p. 270.

87. "Christian Education in China," Chinese Recorder 59 (December 1928): 763-764.

88. HCMC, pp. 757-758. On the problem of using English as the medium of instruction in Christian colleges see Liu, "Early Christian Colleges," pp. 74-75.

89. HCMC, pp. 814-815. Also see Expansion of Christianity, p. 358.

90. China and Educational Autonomy: The Changing Role of the Protestant Educational Missionary in China, 1807-1937 (Syracuse, New York: Syracuse University Press, 1946), p. 198.

91. Yamamotos, "Anti-Christian Movement," p. 143.

92. China and the Christian Colleges, pp. 492-514.

93. "Lingnan's Response to Chinese Nationalism: The Shakee Incident, 1925," in Liu Kwang-ching, ed., American Missionaries in China: Papers from Harvard Seminars

(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1966), pp. 187-189.

94. Ibid., pp. 195-196, 206.

95. "Beta," n.p., to Editor, Shanghai, n.d., Chinese Recorder 59 (February 1928): 121.

96. C. Bolwig, n.p., to Editor, Shanghai, n.d., ibid. (June 1928): 390-391.

97. "As a Visitor Sees Christianity in China," Chinese Recorder 59 (May 1928): 274-275. Also see Selden, Are Missions a Failure?, p. 177.

98. "On the Field," Chinese Recorder 59 (February 1928): 129. In addition see [Editor], "The Chinese Christian Answers the Missionaries' Question," ibid. 58 (January 1927): 25.

99. "New Christian Movements in China," ibid. 59 (September 1928): 549.

100. Ibid. 51 (September 1920): 606-607.

101. "China Oral History Project," pp. 216-217.

102. "The Christian Ministry in China," Chinese Recorder 52 (October 1921): 678-679.

103. Ibid. 53 (January 1922): 3-4.

104. Ibid. 57 (January 1926): 5-6.

105. "China Oral History Project," p. 32.

106. Amy Foster, Guling, to Editor, Shanghai, 18 March 1921, Chinese Recorder 52 (April 1921): 282; Rowland Hogben, Hongdong, to Editor, Shanghai, n.d., ibid. (September 1921): 643-646.

107. Chinese Recorder 56 (July 1925): 417.

108. "Future of Christianity," p. 147.

109. Chinese Recorder 58 (January 1927): 12-14.

110. Ibid. 50 (January 1919): 5.

111. "What Chinese Are Thinking About Christianity: The Independent Church," ibid. 51 (October 1920): 704-705.

112. "China Oral History Project," p. 26.

113. "Church in China," p. 555. Also see J.W. Nipps, "The Place of the Missionary in the Changing Situation in China To-day," Chinese Recorder 55 (August 1924): 505-508. Nipps believed the majority of missionaries recognized the need to give more responsibility to the Chinese. But many were making two mistakes: "we refuse to turn over leadership until we are forced to, and turn it over in such a way that makes it almost impossible for them [Chinese] to succeed."

114. Logan H. Roots, "The Changing Function of the Missionary," China Christian Year Book, 1926, p. 164.

115. "China Oral History Project," pp. 6-7.

116. "China Oral History Project," pp. 8-10.

117. "Mission Devolution in North China: The Question of Organization," pp. 103-105.

118. Ibid., p. 105. Also see Roland M. Cross, "The Problem of Mission-Church Relationships in Peking," Chinese Recorder 56 (February 1925): 106-110.

119. "A. Wayfarer," "The Church in China Begins to be Chinese," ibid. 55 (June 1924): 387.

120. "Recent Changes in Mission Organization," China Mission Year Book, 1924, p. 251.

121. Chinese Recorder 57 (September 1926): 658-660.

122. Ibid., 97-100.

123. Lewis F. Havermale, "New Era Difficulties in Educational Administration," Educational Review 19 (October 1927): 322-324. Also see Herman Bly, "China Oral History Project," p. 16; Roland Cross, ibid., pp. 7-8. Of the American Board's North China Mission, Cross said, "we felt free to take the Chinese into our confidence in dealing with money matters." The survey of Chinese Christian leaders the National Christian Council conducted in 1926 included a question on transferring mission property to Chinese control. Of the 275 respondents, 157 favored transfer to the "custodianship of the Chinese Church." An additional 24 favored transfer to Chinese Christians. Bulletin of the National Christian Council 20 (September 1926): 13, in USDS, "Records," reel 123, 893.404/67.

124. Paul G. Hayes, "China Oral History Project," pp. 13-17. Hayes stated: "Our later experience proved that we were building institutions beyond their ability to maintain." In addition see Havermale, "New Era Difficulties," p. 326. In 1926 A.J. Bowen surveyed the economic status of Chinese in four east-central provinces. He reported the average family income per year to be $210 (Mex.). The average expenses were $184, excluding funerals and weddings. These ranged from a low of $100 for weddings to a high of $500 for funerals. "Economic Status of Christian Schools and Economic Strength of Chinese," China Christian Year Book, 1926, pp. 253-259. There were exceptions to this poverty, especially in southern China. In 1924 Chinese Christians in Guangzhou gave financial support to boys' and girls' middle schools, special scholarships for seminary students, and raised $20,000 (Mex.) to endow a college fund. They also contributed to the construction of new church buildings. China Mission Year Book, 1924, pp. 117-118.

125. Chinese Recorder 59 (August 1928): 471.

126. China Christian Year Book, 1929, pp. 194-195. J.G.G. Bompas believed the best way to handle financial devolution was to stop all aid from the West. See "Chinese and Western Christianity," Chinese Recorder 57 (August 1926): 564.

127. Rawlinson, Naturalization of Christianity, p. 182.

128. "China Oral History Project," p. 6.

129. "On the Present Situation," Chinese Recorder 57 (May 1926): 368-369, (emphasis in the original).

130. Report of Committee III at the National Christian Convention, "The Message of the Church," Chinese Recorder 53 (June 1922): 370. Also see K.S. Liu, "What the Chinese Are Thinking About Christianity: The Anti-Religion Movement, Christianity, and Religion," ibid. (December 1922): 751-752.

131. Occupation of China, p. 345.

132. "Problems of the Chinese Church," p. 106.

133. "Cooperation from the West," p. 136.

134. A. Sydenstricker, n.p., to Editor, Shanghai, n.d., Chinese Recorder 55 (February 1924): 131.

135. "China Oral History Project," p. 17.

136. "Chinese and Western Christianity," Chinese Recorder 57 (August 1926): 562-563.

137. Chinese Altars to the Unknown God, pp. 75-76.

138. "Progress and Problems of the Christian Movement Since the Revolution," China Mission Year Book, 1924, pp. 97-98. In addition see S.C. [?], n.p., to Editor, Shanghai, n.d., Chinese Recorder 58 (September 1927): 595-596. S.C. criticized "the new school of young Chinese Christian leaders" for reducing Christianity to "a superior system of ethics and little else."

139. HCMC, p. 802.

140. Expansion of Christianity, pp. 348-349.

141. Missionaries, Chinese, and Diplomats, p. 208.

142. "American Board in China," p. 159.

143. Colonialism and Christian Missions (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1966), p. 417.

144. "China Oral History Project," pp. 12, 101, 88.

145. Ibid., p. 39.

146. Ibid., pp. 97-98.

CHAPTER V

CONCLUSION: MISSIONARIES AND CHINESE NATIONALISM DURING THE CRITICAL DECADE, 1919-1928

As the third decade of the twentieth century began, American missionaries believed their efforts to save China would finally achieve the results they desired. China was "awake" after centuries of dynastic inertia. New intellectual trends combined with a spirit of nationalism to produce a feeling of optimism and progress. Missionaries perceived this as their opportunity to effect substantial changes in the social and religious life of the nation. China was on the verge of entering the modern world and, with God's help, it would become a "Christian" democracy.

Conversely, the decade ended with the evacuation of thousands of missionaries from the interior, many leaving China forever. Anti-foreignism, anti-Christianity, and "radical" nationalism altered the position of the missionaries in China. Chinese Christians engaged in the movements against the West and demanded that the missionaries fulfill their commitments to devolution. This development compounded the problems the missionaries confronted in this crucial period. The responses of foreign Christians to the

issues of Chinese nationalism that affected their missions determined their fate. The failure of the missionaries to respond appropriately to the demands of their followers led to the loss of any opportunity for Christianity this period presented.

The Critical Decade: Missionaries and "Radical" Chinese Nationalism

Missionaries predicted the years following World War I would be a turning point in their campaign to save China. The editor of the China Mission Year Book told his readers in 1919 that "the next five to ten years are to be supremely critical years for the Church in China, as well as years of unbounded opportunity." This statement was representative of the general sentiment of most foreign Christians.[1] The increase in nationalism, intellectual change, and political and social awareness of Chinese youth would give Christianity its greatest occasion to effect the unsaved masses of China. Milton Stauffer, editor of the Christian Occupation of China, hoped the development of indigenous Christianity would relieve the churches of the "incubus of being regarded as a 'foreign religion.'"[2]

The anti-Christian campaigns and attacks on missionary institutions after 1924 reinforced the belief that this was the decisive period for Christianity in China. The "unbounded opportunity," however, was now obscure. Missionaries believed the movement against Christian education

was a crucial threat to their endeavor.[3] In 1927 they confronted falling income from the home churches, reductions in staff, inadequate salaries, contention with other foreigners, and increasing criticism from their converts. The unification of the nation and the evacuation of the missionaries produced "a missionary revolution." D. Willard Lyon announced: "It is plainly obvious that the missionary cannot return to a position similar to the one he has previously occupied."[4]

Chinese Christians also believed the 1920s were a fateful juncture in the history of Christianity in their nation. David Z.T. Yui speculated that the anti-Christian and anti-foreign "phases of our present revolutionary movement" might end the missionary enterprise. The hostility of some Chinese "seemed to indicate the dire possibility that all Christian work of the past century in China may be uprooted and that there may be no future for it at all."[5] In 1928 Frank Rawlinson admitted that "a roll-call of church members in China would in many places show a decrease." The Chinese church "has also lost decidedly in evangelistic aggressiveness owing to its disturbed state of mind." Rawlinson concluded that 1927 was a "baptism of fire."[6]

The "disturbed state of mind" in the Chinese churches was the result of the missionary evacuation. This satisfied the demands of Chinese Christians for more administrative independence. Afterwards Chinese Christians and

missionaries confronted the issues of their new relationship. Missionaries wanted to return to their former positions of prestige and leadership. Chinese Christians would not relinquish the fulfillment of their nationalistic aspirations. Rawlinson's "baptism of fire" was actually a political conflict within the Christian community. Missionaries had tried to avoid this and failed.

The reactions of Chinese Christians and missionaries to the issues of nationalism diverged after the May Thirtieth Incident in 1925. Chinese Christians felt obligated to defend Chinese nationalism. P.W. Kuo, in explaining the "Present Situation" in 1926, maintained that Chinese nationalism was not entirely destructive, anti-foreign, or "bolshevistic." The movement was patriotic and worked for social, economic, and political reforms.[7] P.C. Hsu argued in the 1929 China Christian Year Book that a nationalist could be a good Christian. It was foreign control of Christianity in China that caused conflict.[8]

Such arguments served to defend Chinese Christians against the attacks of anti-Christians who questioned their patriotism. They also were meant to allay the fears of missionaries who looked with disapproval on the increasing participation of Chinese Christians in the nationalist movement. Dissension intensified when Chinese Christians began to criticize the missionaries.

Chinese Christians questioned missionary opposition to their political involvement. Many believed they had a

"responsibility to discharge in promoting right ideals in political as in other realms of life."[9] It was in the best interests of the churches to influence politics. Gideon Chen, a secretary for the National Christian Council, wrote: "The Church will be doomed if it fails to turn out trustworthy personalities in political careers."[10]

Missionaries were aware of their followers' desires to help shape China's political destiny. H.T. Hodgkin recognized that Chinese Christians believed "the Church is the one body that can speak out on great political matters, and that she will betray her trust if she keeps silence."[11] Yet other missionaries chose to maintain a more traditional attitude towards the Chinese. One missionary commented from Guangzhou that "Chinese Christians, like other Chinese citizens, do not greatly care what party is in power so long as their ordinary routine is undisturbed."[12] Many missionaries believed politics and Christianity did not mix. One missionary advised Rawlinson to leave politics out of the Chinese Recorder "and let the politicians air their views in a periodical of their own."[13]

In spite of this advice, Rawlinson attempted to explain the attitudes of Chinese Christians on politics. He wrote that "full often are we told that Christians should leave politics alone." Chinese Christians, however, were sensitive to political issues because of the Confucian tradition. China's great thinkers historically tried to apply ethics to political life. Following this example,

now "an increasing number of [Chinese] Christians desire to make Christ's principles live in their political relations."[14]

Contrary to Rawlinson's explanation, it was the missionaries who set the example for political involvement. The majority of missionaries were involved in the politics of treaty revision after the May Thirtieth Incident. They professed their support for devolution which was inherently a political issue. Yet missionaries traditionally commanded their followers to abstain from "partisan politics." When politics threatened to disrupt the normal missionary-convert relationship, the concerns of the missionaries increased.

After 1925 Chinese Christians emphasized their desires to establish independent churches. Writing in 1926, T.C. Bau observed that although Protestantism had "more than one hundred years of history there has as yet existed no real Chinese Church." Christian songs, forms of worship, and even the church buildings were foreign. Bau maintained "in polity and worship Christianity has been a foreign religion, and the Church a foreign institution." He announced that Chinese churches were forming a national movement for independence in response to the May Fourth Movement, anti-Christianity, and "the overwhelming nationalistic spirit."[15]

Hsu Pao Ch'ien, a secretary for the YMCA, made similar remarks as early as 1920. Hsu believed the Renaissance or

May Fourth Movement "had caused the Christians in China to pause and think." He urged Christians to direct the critical spirit of this movement and lead it in reconstructing Chinese society. Hsu then offered his own criticisms of Chinese Christianity including the missionaries, Chinese ministers, lay leaders, and Chinese church members.[16]

Hsu and other Chinese Christians criticized missionaries for "a certain amount of autocracy." Missionaries failed to train and incorporate Chinese Christians into church administration. Hsu emphasized this issue stating: "With the new awakening on the part of Chinese Christians for self-government and independence, the mission policy in China is confronted with a very delicate problem."[17]

Chinese Christians realized missionaries opposed some aspects of their increasing desire for independence. They believed that many missionaries "view the rise of the Chinese to positions of leadership as the result of a spirit of nationalism and anti-foreignism as a sign of insubordination and usurpation."[18] David Z.T. Yui noticed that after the demands of both non-Christian and Christian Chinese increased in 1925 "many missionaries and mission administrators showed great anxiety." Following the events of 1926 and 1927, missionaries were "still anxious lest the institutions, organizations, [and] property may be occupied, confiscated or destroyed." Yui claimed Chinese Christians were "enthusiastic, patriotic, and determined"

to obtain the goal of indigenous Christianity.[19]

In October 1927, Rawlinson divided missionary attitudes towards the "Nationalistic Revolution" into three groups. Some saw "little of value or promise in it." Others regretted the violence and destruction but were optimistic about the outcome. A third group supported the revolution initially but had changed their minds and now opposed it.[20] In listing the "Effects of 1927 on the Work of Missionaries," L.H. Roots concluded that "personnel, property, institutions and morale have suffered, in many cases most pitifully."[21]

The editor of the 1929 edition of the China Christian Year Book admitted that Christianity "viewed as a whole had lost somewhat of its former momentum." He recognized "the Revolution has brought Christianity into a whirlpool, mentally, economically and spiritually."[22] In the same edition, missionaries filed reports from different areas of China on the "Effects of Five Years Upon the Chinese Church." Edwin Marx reported from east-central China that the issues had remained the same with some progress in "indigenization." But the capability of both missionaries and Chinese to do evangelical work was only 50 percent that of five years earlier.[23]

J.S. Kunkle characterized the period as a "time of defense, not of advance" in south China. There were no new programs, new church buildings, or new members to report. George D. Wilder stated that "Gospel preaching in street

chapels has failed to win a hearing for decades" in north China. Both missionaries and Chinese had given up on this type of evangelism.[24]

Reverend Djang Fang of Nanjing Theological Seminary viewed the period after the 1927 KMT unification as a trial period for Christianity. He realistically thought the KMT's new toleration of religion was only "an expedient in international relations." To obtain religious freedom, Fang urged "Christians at large to fight for it." Christianity "must submit to an examination to determine whether it has a survival value or not." Because of "the progress of science and desire for comfort, it is necessary to determine whether the human being is or is not in need of any such thing as religion."[25]

C.Y. Cheng also believed Christianity confronted a new situation in China because of nationalism. He perceived a "spirit of criticism" in Chinese youth and noticed "even amongst Christian Chinese there is a general desire to reexamine the fundamentals of the Christian faith." Cheng advised missionaries and Christian leaders to "take note of the signs of the time and to make the adjustments necessary to meet the present challenge."[26]

In retrospect, E.H. Cressy observed that "it was axiomatic that the National Movement should put great emphasis upon things Chinese." He concluded that "it was a natural corollary that it should in certain respects be anti-foreign."[27] Many missionaries never reached the

understanding of Chinese nationalism that Cressy's words revealed. In 1954 John Leighton Stuart, an avowed anti-Communist, predicted an early end to Mao Zedong's regime. The Chinese, Stuart affirmed, are "a people who are fundamentally democratic in their social behavior and their political aspirations." They could not remain Communists for long.[88]

Between 1919 and 1928, there was a change in the responses of American missionaries to Chinese nationalism. Foreign Christian workers approved of Chinese nationalism as long as it was not a threat to their institutions. They supported and tried to direct "May Fourth nationalism" in the reconstruction of Chinese society. Chinese nationalism became more "radical" after the May Thirtieth Incident and many issues of the movement directly affected the vested interests of the missionaries. Although they advocated revision of the "unequal" treaties, missionaries could not appease all the demands of radical Chinese nationalism. To do this would mean the end of the missionary enterprise in China. Because both Christian and non-Christian Chinese decided the restoration of their nation's sovereignty was the vital task for their generation, they refused to tolerate foreign domination of any type, including that of Christian missionaries.

The missionaries avoided a complete break with their followers by renewing their traditional commitments to devolution. Yet many missionaries resented their displace-

ment by Chinese Christians during the 1927 evacuation. They, in fact, did not believe in or support the professed goal of devolution. The creation of self-governing, self-supporting, and self-propagating Chinese churches remained unaccomplished. Missionaries withdrew their active support of the nationalist movement and tried to maintain as much of the status quo as possible. They were successful in preserving much of the missionary enterprise in China with few alterations for another twenty-five years.

The conservative response of American missionaries to radical Chinese nationalism was unfortunate. The missionaries could only accommodate evolutionary change; China was in the midst of a revolution. Young Chinese intellectuals concluded that Christianity would not be instrumental in making the radical transformation they desired in Chinese society. The missionaries' failure to willingly surrender control of Christian institutions in China perpetuated the perception that Christianity was an aspect of Western "imperialism." This alienated many of their followers. In a period when patriotism became synonymous with anti-foreignism, the political identification of religious beliefs intensified. This extinguished any opportunity for Christianity in China. The majority of Chinese concluded that to be Christian was to be something other than Chinese.

Rural Reconstruction

Historians often refer to the years between the establishment of the KMT government in 1928 and the Japanese attack in 1937 as the "Nanjing decade."[28] Chiang Kai-shek and the Nationalist party strengthened their control over China and initiated changes in the social and economic life of the country during this period. Chiang sponsored the "New Life Movement" in 1934 as an attempt to revive traditional Chinese values and implement health and sanitary reforms. He sought the assistance of missionaries in this effort and reassured Western nations, especially the United States, that the Chinese needed and welcomed their assistance. Despite this rapprochement, the plight of Christianity in China did not improve.

Chiang wanted to incorporate American missionaries and Chinese Christians into the New Life Movement in order to bolster his regime. The KMT accomplished this by convincing some missionaries to join the "model" rural reconstruction projects that were a part of the New Life Movement. The New Life Movement achieved little success in rural or urban China. Many Chinese intellectuals quickly became discouraged with the conservative KMT government. Chiang hoped to counter this with the support of the Christian community. He also wanted to influence students in Christian colleges and he needed the vital connection with the United States the missionaries provided.[29] Ironically, this reversal of KMT policy towards the missionaries did

not benefit the position of Christianity in China. Because Christianity became identified with Chiang's regime, the missionaries received the same rejection as the KMT and the New Life Movement in the 1930s.

Some missionaries remained skeptical of Chiang and the KMT in the Nanjing decade. Clemens Granskou believed "he was more interested in his power than in his reform of the country." Granskou faulted Chiang for not implementing land reform. Land tenure was a critical problem in rural China where millions of peasants suffered through years of famine, high taxes, and usuary. Granskou concluded: Chiang "was getting most of his support from the landowners, therefore, he was slow to really reinforce the agrarian revolution which I thought was a necessity."[91]

The neglect of rural China was also a missionary problem. Missionaries in the twentieth century tended to concentrate their efforts in cities and large towns. Most of the one million villages of China remained beyond the scope of mission work during the 1920s. Missionaries were involved in flood and famine relief but did not develop the extensive programs necessary to correct many rural problems. When foreign Christian workers became involved in rural reconstruction through the New Life Movement, their attempts were minimal and came too late to influence the direction of Christianity.

Missionaries were not unaware of the problems of the rural Chinese. Between 1919 and 1928 they frequently

called attention to this area of neglected opportunity and made proposals to implement rural reconstruction programs. The regional delegates of the China Christian Educational Association addressed the issue in 1919. They petitioned the Executive Committee of that organization to formulate an "all China" plan to introduce agricultural education in mission schools. It was not until 1923 that the CCEA established an agricultural committee to develop agricultural education.[32] In 1924 the National Christian Council recognized that "the creation of an indigenous church is clearly dependent in large measure upon the development of the rural church."[33] The Advisory Council of the CCEA recommended in the same year that middle schools serving rural areas "should introduce agriculture in order to give their students a sympathetic rural outlook for their future work."[34]

The findings of the 1922 survey, Christian Occupation of China, reinforced the admonitions to exert more effort in rural reconstruction. The statistics in the survey revealed the extent of the missionaries' neglect of rural China. Only 106 of China's 1,704 xian (counties) remained "unclaimed" by any Protestant missionary organization. Yet 45 percent of all "claimed" area was beyond eleven miles from any evangelistic center.[35] The survey found that 66 percent of all missionaries and 34 percent of Chinese Christian workers lived in cities with a population of 50,000 or greater. This concentration occurred between

1905 and 1915, the same time the number of missionaries substantially increased. Milton Stauffer, editor of the survey, surmised: "It is therefore evident that new workers from the West went largely into the old stations."[36]

There was a correlation between concentration of missionary effort and success in winning converts. Guangdong, Shandong, and Fujian had the highest number of missionary "residential centers." This was where the highest numbers of Chinese Christians lived. Seven coastal provinces (including these three) contained 65 percent of the missionaries, 65 percent of the Chinese evangelists, and 65 percent of the Chinese medical staff. The Christian educational effort also was concentrated in the seven coastal provinces with 63 percent of lower primary students and 77 percent of middle school students located there. The survey counted 71 percent of Chinese Christians in these seven provinces.[37] Missionaries had confined their work to less than half of China's provinces.

The Laymen's Foreign Mission Inquiry conducted a similar survey of China missions in 1930-1931. Despite the growing awareness among missionaries that they had neglected rural China, little had changed since 1922. The Laymen's survey found 60 percent of the missionaries working in the coastal provinces. Another 25 percent were concentrated in the central provinces of the lower Chang Jiang valley. In north China there was only one Christian for every three hundred families or fifteen hundred people.

These converts were widely scattered as 80 percent of the villages had four or fewer Christians and 58 percent of the villages had only one or two. The Inquiry concluded that "the starting of work where little or none at all exists obviously constitutes a special problem of evangelization."[38]

Some missionaries and Chinese Christians criticized this failure to meet the needs of the rural masses. Tai Ping Heng faulted the missionaries in 1921 for concentrating their efforts in urban areas and large institutions.[39] In 1924 K.T. Chung realized that all Christian work was in "strategic centers" and "any country work done is generally undertaken by persons not needed in the cities." Chung suggested that mission money and evangelists be redistributed to benefit the villages.[40] The editor of the Educational Review admitted in 1926 that "heretofore the efforts of those who work for the progress of the country have been almost entirely confined to the cities and towns."[41]

The secondary literature agrees that the missionaries generally neglected rural China. Kenneth Latourette believes that before the 1922 survey, missionaries directed little attention to the problems of the rural areas. After the survey, "only a beginning had been made, however, before the disorders of 1925, 1926, and 1927 supervened."[42]

James Thomson studied the involvement of missionaries in the New Life Movement during the Nanjing decade. He

maintains that missionary efforts at rural reconstruction failed because many Chinese identified them with the KMT government. The rural policies of the KMT did not solve the critical problems of land tenure, land tax, or credit for farmers. The New Life Movement failed to win the support of most Chinese intellectuals because it adopted neo-Confucianism as an ideological base. The alienation of both farmers and intellectuals was fatal for the KMT. Thomson concludes that the missionaries' association with the New Life Movement was futile because "the NLM played no part whatsoever in the thinking of China's youth."[43]

Paul Varg criticizes the missionaries for not presenting viable solutions to the problems of rural Chinese. He believes "Christianity made itself irrelevant by failing to include the community, and, in turn, the community never embraced the esoteric Christian enterprise." The missionaries did not overcome the problem of making the institution of the church feasible in rural China or making Christianity an integral part of Chinese life. Varg reports a statistical survey in 1936 found "the rural church had made little significant progress toward the stated objective of becoming a driving force and shaping influence in the reconstruction of rural China."[44]

William Brown, although complimentary of the attempts the missionaries made at rural reconstruction, finds several faults with the programs. Work in agricultural education failed because of poor personnel policies.

Workers were not properly trained and were usually stationed in isolated areas where failure led to poor morale. Chinese Christians who attended colleges and seminaries wanted lucrative jobs in the cities and would not serve in rural areas. The theological seminaries did not develop training programs in rural work and paid little attention to rural problems.[43]

A major problem was the poverty of the peasants. Survey's conducted in 1930 and 1936 found that to support a minister, rural churches would need an average membership of 200 to 400 Chinese. The actual size of the churches ranged from forty-five to eighty-three. Another problem was the continued emphasis on evangelization in rural China. Brown believes practical social service work should have replaced this as the main effort of rural missions in the 1930s.[44]

In her study of American Board missionaries, Janet Heininger is more favorable towards the missionaries' attempts at rural reconstruction. She uses the example of two American Board missionaries, Hugh and Mabel Hubbard, who worked in rural reconstruction in the 1930s. At Fan village, in Hubei province, the Hubbards implemented an experimental program for making Christianity indigenous to rural China. The Hubbards' work was service-oriented and did not include proselytizing. Complete cooperation was sought from the Chinese on all questions. The Hubbards lived like the villagers and concentrated their efforts on

education, disease prevention, and improving farming techniques.[47]

Heininger maintains that "rural reconstruction had the potential for revolutionizing the mission movement." To be successful, missionaries would have had to implement it on a much larger scale. This did not occur because missionaries viewed the work at Fan village as only experimental. World War II and the Japanese invasion also disrupted the rural reconstruction projects. In addition, Heininger concludes, the majority of American Board missionaries did not want to revolutionize their work and create indigenous Christianity. This would have ended the missions.[48]

The Missionary Enterprise

Historians offer differing interpretations of the missionary enterprise in China. Many are critical of the missionaries' efforts to "save" China; others are more positive in their evaluations. The majority of scholars stress the significance of Christianity in China in the development of all aspects of Sino-American relations.

Hu Shih was a contemporary of the missionaries in the 1920s and provides a Chinese intellectual's interpretation of the missionaries' problems. Hu credits Christianity for influencing much needed social reforms in China. Missionaries also helped the Chinese recognize the need to modernize their country. The opposition to Christianity combined rationalism from traditional Chinese philosophy

with new scientific knowledge from the West "to become a truly formidable safeguard." Having rejected Christianity himself, Hu believes the whole world will one day recognize "that Young China was not far wrong in offering some opposition to a religion which fought religious wars and persecuted science."[48]

Kenneth Latourette presents an interpretation of this period from the Christian point of view. He believes Christianity affected Chinese society by contributing to the "dissolution of the older culture." This would have occurred without the influence of Christianity but the work of the missionaries increased the beneficial aspects of the "dissolution." The missionary enterprise had defects yet it tried to bring the best of the Occident to China.[49]

Latourette places the origins of the problems of the 1920s in the characteristics of mission expansion during the preceding decades. Between 1900 and World War I, Protestant missionaries greatly expanded the Christian institutions in China. The church buildings, schools, hospitals, and missionary residences were far larger than Chinese Christians could ever hope to support. Latourette believes this expansion was flawed because it postponed self-support. It also developed a Western bureaucracy that Chinese were uncomfortable with and it distracted both missionaries and Chinese from the primary function of evangelism. Latourette explains that with these weaknesses "Christianity might suffer severely and even disappear

before a strong wave of nationalism."[91]

On the issues of devolution and indigenous Christianity, Latourette is more critical. He believes the inflexibility of some missionaries "is a serious and unnecessary handicap for it insists upon more of a dislocation of the older culture than is essential." The inability of missionaries to give up Western forms "burdens Christianity with an enormous amount of baggage that is Graeco-Roman, Russian, British, German, or American."[92] On the results of devolution, Latourette admits that "with all the progress towards an independent Chinese Church, the goal was still far from being reached." Despite these faults, Latourette concludes that Christianity, in 1928, "had a better chance of surviving and making a permanent impression than at any time during its presence in China."[93]

John Fairbank argues that missionaries contributed to the revolutionary process in modern China. As the Qing dynasty ended, many Chinese rejected Confucian traditionalism for other ideologies. Interaction between foreigners and the majority of Chinese at that time was primarily through missionaries and their followers. Christian educational institutions and missionary publications influenced young Chinese intellectuals. Through them Christianity contributed to China's nationalism. Although some Chinese Christians and missionaries attempted a spiritual regeneration of Chinese society, the issues of

the 1920s revealed the limitations of this approach.

Because Christianity was nonpolitical and nonrevolutionary, most Chinese intellectuals rejected it in favor of more militant ideals. Missionaries continued their traditional activities while Chinese nationalism became more radical. In the 1930s and 1940s, Chinese viewed missionaries as defenders of KMT conservatism. They were "no longer apostles of China's transformation but more often worried bystanders."[54] Fairbank concludes that Chinese nationalism achieved fulfillment by "rejecting the Christian West in favor of that minor nineteenth-century western Christian heresy, Marxism-Leninism."[55]

The writings of Paul Varg represent a critical and thorough analysis of the missionary enterprise in China. Varg believes Americans became more concerned about China's future as a nation when the missionary goal became the regeneration of Chinese society. This concern combined with expanding American nationalism in the late nineteenth century resulted in the belief that the United States could influence the changes occurring there. China could enter the modern world as a "Christian" democracy and ally of the United States or it could be something else and an enemy. Through this process, China missions became an aspect of United States national interests.[56]

Missionaries did not realize until 1924 the danger of their historical reliance on treaty privileges. Varg criticizes this delayed recognition citing the demands of

the Chinese delegates at the Paris Peace Conference in 1919 and the Washington Conference in 1922 as signals of increasing Chinese nationalism. He believes the missionaries' "myopic concern with the daily routine of their mission stations, and their theological bent" were responsible for this failure.[57] Although the missionaries and their home boards supported treaty revision, they did not significantly influence United States policy during this period.[58]

Missionaries and diplomats in China responded to Chinese nationalism similarly. Both showed sympathy and understanding for the Chinese point of view. Yet they deplored the violence and extreme anti-foreignism that characterized the movement. Varg maintains the "response of both missionaries and American government officials represented something deeper." They experienced "a common inability to share the Chinese view that the extreme price paid to achieve Chinese nationalist goals was not too great."[59]

Varg finds no consensus among the missionaries on Chiang Kai-shek and the KMT during the Nanjing decade. Many were pessimistic about the ability of the KMT to solve China's problems. Most missionaries supported Chiang as the lesser of two evils. Some, however, correctly assessed the weaknesses of the KMT. They perceived "its determination to preserve one-party rule, its failure to implement many of the social aspects of its program, and its suscep-

tibility to corruption."[60]

The missionaries were responsible for several failures in their campaign to save China. They portrayed the worst of Chinese life to the home churches in order to generate continuing support. This developed American feelings of paternalism and altruism towards the Chinese. These attitudes confused the issues of Sino-American relations during the Christian century. Americans believed that their philanthropic activities in China, including schools and hospitals, were the basis for permanent friendly relations between the two countries. When these became the targets of Chinese nationalism, Americans felt betrayed.[61]

Varg believes the missionaries met no generally recognized needs in China. They ignored the problem of Chinese poverty. This became a primary target of reform for the Chinese. But "American moral idealism prevented missionaries from recognizing Chinese needs of economic rehabilitation and equal status among nations."[62]

In the 1920s, the Chinese passionately searched for solutions to their economic and sovereignty problems. The majority of missionaries "side-stepped political and economic issues and sought to convince the Chinese that their problems were spiritual." At the close of the Christian century, American nationalism and Chinese nationalism overcame the best aspects of Christian idealism and Confucian humanism. Christianity failed because it was not an economic and political doctrine--Marxism was.[63]

A balanced interpretation includes an appreciation of the sacrifices and ideals of the missionaries. Many American men and women gave the most productive years of their lives for a cause they fervently believed was good. Better educated Chinese children, better health care, and better treatment of Chinese women are among their many accomplishments. As is the case in all human endeavors, misconceptions and missed opportunities plagued the missionary enterprise. Many Christian workers were short-sighted and made foolish mistakes. Yet many of the problems they confronted were beyond their power to remedy. Above all else, the missionaries were representatives of their nation, their culture, and their religion. The history of their interaction with the Chinese in an often hostile environment clarifies much that is unique in the American character.

CHAPTER V ENDNOTES

1. China Mission Year Book, 1919, pp. iii-iv. Also see "Editorial," Chinese Recorder 52 (January 1921): 7.

2. Occupation of China, pp. 3, 39.

3. China Mission Year Book, 1925, p. vi.

4. "Should the Missionary be Discouraged?" Chinese Recorder 58 (May 1927): 313. In addition see Kenneth S. Latourette, "Boards and Missionaries: Suggestions Toward and Understanding," ibid. (January 1927): 18-20; George R. Grose, "The Present Missionary Morale," ibid.: 14-15. A non-missionary American believed by 1928 that "the heyday of Christian missionary endeavor in China is seemingly past never to come again." J.V.A. MacMurray, Minister, Beijing, to Secretary of State, Washington, D.C., 3 March 1928, Department of State Archives, quoted in Varg, Missionaries, Chinese, and Diplomats, p. 201.

5. "Cooperation from the West," pp. 115-116.

6. "Editorial," Chinese Recorder 59 (January 1928): 5.

7. pp. 50-51.

8. "Nationalism and Religion," p. 142.

9. David Z.T. Yui, "Cooperation from the West," p. 135. In addition see William Hung, "Consecration and Politics," Chinese Recorder 59 (April 1928): 210-217.

10. "How Can the Church Help the Government," ibid. (December 1928): 763.

11. "Church in China," pp. 550-552.

12. China Christian Year Book, 1925, p. 63.

13. Lucy Soothill, n.p., to Editor, Shanghai, n.d., Chinese Recorder 59 (April 1928): 258.

14. Ibid. 58 (August 1927): 479-480.

15. "Changes in the Chinese Church," China Christian Year Book, 1926, pp. 132-137.

16. "The Christian Renaissance," Chinese Recorder 51 (July 1920): 459-463. In addition see Wu Lien Teh, "A Chinese View of the Missionaries," ibid. (January 1920): 9-12; Chengting T. Wang, "Making Christianity Indigenous in China," ibid. 52 (May 1921): 323-329; Chao Yun-wen, "A Chinese View of What Should be the General Aim of Christian Work in Changsha," ibid.: 335-341.

17. Chinese Recorder 51 (July 1920): 464.

18. China Mission Year Book, 1923, p. 88.

19. "Cooperation from the West," pp. 119, 125. Also see [Editor], "The Present Situation," Chinese Recorder 58 (April 1927): 291-294. This reports the actions of the Shanghai and Hangzhou Chinese Christian Associations which issued manifestos to the missionaries. They declared that missionaries should give more responsibility to Chinese Christians and persuade their home governments to abolish the "unequal" treaties.

20. "Editorial," Chinese Recorder 58 (October 1927): 618.

21. China Christian Year Book, 1928, pp. 113-115.

22. Ibid., 1929, p. 10.

23. Ibid., pp. 160-162.

24. Ibid., pp. 165, 188.

25. "New Christian Movement in China," Chinese Recorder 59 (September 1928): 547-554.

26. "Problems of the Chinese Church," p. 100.

27. China Christian Year Book, 1929, p. 268.

28. Fifty Years in China, pp. 4-5.

29. The KMT designated Nanjing ("southern capital") as the national capital and renamed Beijing ("northern capital") as Beiping ("northern peace").

30. James C. Thomson, Jr., While China Faced West: American Reformers in Nationalist China, 1928-1937 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1969), pp. 227-228. Chiang also desired the support of missionaries because the majority were anti-Communist. Thomson believes that although the missionary response to the New Life Movement was pluralistic, cooperation did occur through Christian organizations such as the YMCA. He states: "Many missionaries were above all astonished and pleased to be courted by the Chinese Nationalist government."

31. "China Oral History Project," pp. 70, 118-119. After Chiang's baptism in 1930, Helen Hayes realized "he was going to be a Methodist and we were not proud of him as such." She thought his beliefs and actions were neither Christian nor Methodist, ibid., p. 71.

32. China Mission Year Book, 1919, p. 158. Also see Educational Review 15 (July 1923): 266. This action of the CCEA occurred because the China Educational Commission's report of 1922 criticized the missionaries' neglect of rural work. The only major effort in agricultural education at the college level was the College of Agriculture and Forestry at Nanjing University. Established in 1914 with 29 students, the college had 163 students in 1930. See William A. Brown, "The Protestant Rural Movement in China," 1920-1937," in Liu, American Missionaries in China, p. 229.

33. China Mission Year Book, 1924, pp. 155-156. The NCC also noted that 66 percent of missionaries were in cities with a population of 50,000 or greater. In addition see Brown, "Protestant Rural Movement," pp. 221-226. Brown describes the effort of the NCC between 1922 and 1934 as "paper plans."

34. Educational Review 16 (July 1924): 315-316. These courses were to include practical knowledge like gardening, technical agriculture, and village improvement. The editor of the 1925 China Mission Year Book advised that Christian leaders in rural China must have some "knowledge of methods and agencies that can be used to bring about rural improvement." They should also have a "belief in the rural people and a conviction that great progress in their economic, social and religious life is possible," p. 92.

35. Occupation of China, p. 748.

36. Ibid., p. 34.

37. Ibid.

38. Supplementary Series, Part Two, Vol. V, China, pp. 9-10.

39. "The Christian Church and Rural Reconstruction," Chinese Recorder 52 (October 1921): 696-697.

40. "The Rural Church and Its Relation to Religious, Educational, Medical, and Social Work," China Mission Year Book, 1924, pp. 127-130.

41. 18 (April 1926): 148.

42. HCMC, pp. 793-794.

43. While China Faced West, pp. 198-202, 222-227, 231-233. In addition see Mary C. Wright, "From Revolution to Restoration: the Transformation of Kuomintang Ideology," Far Eastern Quarterly 14 (August 1955): 515-532. Wright believes the KMT failed in the Nanjing decade because it changed from a revolutionary party to a reactionary, uncompromising defender of traditional Confucian morality.

Chiang, in fact, tried to lead a "neo-Restoration" based on the nineteenth century principles of Zeng Guofan.

44. Missionaries, Chinese, and Diplomats, pp. 226-239.

45. "Protestant Rural Movement," pp. 232-233.

46. Ibid., pp. 234-235, 230-231.

47. "American Board in China," p. 196.

48. Ibid., pp. 311, 317-320.

49. "China and Christianity," pp. 1-2. In addition see The Chinese Renaissance, p. 78.

50. Expansion of Christianity, pp. 376-377.

51. HCMC, pp. 617-618.

52. Ibid., p. 43.

53. Ibid., pp. 810, 822.

54. Missionary Enterprise, pp. 10-15, 3.

55. "China Missions in History: Some Introductory Remarks," Journal of Presbyterian History 49 (Winter 1971): 285.

56. "Motives in Protestant Missions," pp. 79-80.

57. Missionaries, Chinese, and Diplomats, p. 194.

58. Ibid., p. 334.

59. Ibid.

60. Ibid., pp. 320-325.

61. Ibid., p. 122.

62. Ibid.

63. Ibid. pp. 320-322, viii-ix.

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